Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia: Building State and Citizenship 9781351124645, 9780815357360

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Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia

This book investigates demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) in Colombia during the twentieth and twenty-­first centuries. The six large peace processes and amnesties that took place in Colombia over this period were nation-­led, providing an interesting case study for the wider DDR literature, which has historically focused on Africa and Asia. The continuous process of creating and demobilising illegal armed groups has been pivotal in building the Colombian state. Although the peace settlements and amnesties have brought renewed cycles of violence, they have also been key to the negotiation of democracy and citizenship rights for both ex-­combatants and wider sectors of the population. Here the author analyses the role of DDR programmes in building state and citizenship. Comparing DDR during Alvaro Uribe’s presidency and the peace process with the FARC guerrilla under the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, the book draws on extensive fieldwork conducted with local authorities, officers on the ground and ex-­combatants themselves. It details the process of creating and implementing DDR policy and explores the difficulties, challenges and security dilemmas ex-­combatants may face in integrating within a post-­conflict society in social, economic and political dimensions. Bringing us right up to date with the implementation of the FARC’s peace process and the challenges ahead in the reintegration of ex-­combatants under a new president, this book will be of interest to scholars and researchers of politics and development in Colombia, and to those with an interest in peace-­building, state-­building and DDR in other countries and conflicts. Francy Carranza-Franco is an associated researcher at the Observatory of Land Restitution and Property Rights, Colombia and has a PhD in Development Studies from SOAS, University of London, UK.

Routledge Studies in Latin Amer­ican Development

The series features innovative and original research on Latin Amer­ican development from scholars both within and outside of Latin America. It particularly promotes comparative and interdisciplinary research targeted at a global readership. In terms of theory and method, rather than basing itself on any one orthodoxy, the series draws broadly on the tool kit of the social sciences in general, emphasising comparison, the analysis of the structure and processes, and the application of qualitative and quantitative methods. Market Liberalizations and Emigration from Latin America Jon Jonakin Money from the Government in Latin America Conditional Cash Transfer Programs and Rural Lives Edited by Maria Elisa Balen and Martin Fotta Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia Building State and Citizenship Francy Carranza-­Franco

Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia Building State and Citizenship

Francy Carranza-­Franco

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Francy Carranza-­Franco The right of Francy Carranza-­Franco to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data Names: Carranza-Franco, Francy, author. Title: Demobilisation and reintegration in Colombia : building state and citizenship / Francy Carranza-Franco. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: Routledge studies in Latin American development | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018049139 (print) | LCCN 2018061770 (ebook) | ISBN 9781351124645 (eBook) | ISBN 9780815357360 (hbk) | ISBN 9781351124645 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Peace-building–Colombia. | Social integration– Colombia. | Disarmament–Colombia. | Insurgency–Colombia. | Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. | Colombia–Politics and government–1974– Classification: LCC JZ5584.C7 (ebook) | LCC JZ5584.C7 C37 2019 (print) | DDC 320.9861–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018049139 ISBN: 978-0-8153-5736-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-12464-5 (ebk) Typeset in Goudy by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

To my parents for their love, support, help and patience with the making of this book and all projects I undertake

Contents



List of tables Acknowledgements List of acronyms and names



Introduction

viii ix x 1

1 Continuous demobilisations: state-­building without peace

21

2 DDR design: security or development

56

3 Social reintegration and DDR organisations: DDR programmes and ex-combatants’ NGOs

93

4 Economic reintegration

121

5 Political reintegration

146



Conclusion

164



Index

170

Tables

1.1 Comparison of peace settlements and petitions by rebel groups 1902–1994 2.1 Individual demobilisations 2002–2010 per group 3.1 Reinsertion and reintegration programmes in Colombia 4.1 Evolution of short-­term economic aid including collective and individual demobilisations under Uribe and the FARC-­Santos agreement

26 71 96 128

Acknowledgements

Conversations with my friend Helena about the Colombian conflict were of utmost importance in giving shape to many of the ideas that I develop in this research. I am also grateful to Pilar for sharing her knowledge and her kindness, to Michael for his friendship and support and to Anna who contributed enormously to my PhD research project. James Hogg helped in making sense of my thoughts and my writing. My colleagues from the PhD in Development at SOAS were always supportive and provided plenty of insightful comments. I received orientation from Professor Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Professor Marta Herrera. Likewise, two reading groups contributed enormously to the writing process, and I’m very grateful to the members of the group Pen-­Umbra and to Juana Dávila, Juana Afanador, Simón Uribe and Maria Elisa Balen for taking the time to read and comment on several chapters of my PhD thesis. To all of them, my deepest feelings of gratitude. The group Rodeemos el Dialogo helped me to maintain contact with the peace process and obtain very valuable information in the conversations, breakfasts and other activities that were organised around the FARC–Santos peace process. Also, my participation in Ojo a la Paz gave me both the opportunity to research and the agency to build our much-­needed peace. These groups and the commitment to peace of its members became a crucial reference for civic mobilisation in the most difficult moments of the peace process and taught me to maintain hope and endure in this project. My PhD studies and the fieldwork in 2012 were sponsored by the Colombian Government Institution for Science, COLCIENCIAS, Francisco José de Caldas Scholarship. Part of the fieldwork carried out in 2018 was only possible as a result of the support of the Observatorio de Tierras, and the mentoring by professor Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín. Eline Hietbrink generously carried out some of the fieldwork at the TATR in Montañita, Caquetá in 2018. Ildefonso Heano and Myriam Criado also provided me with valuable information, support and their friendship. I am also grateful to the staff of the Colombian Agency for Reintegration, Peace and Reconciliation Programme and the PAPDRB for sharing their experiences with me and supporting my research. I also want to thank all the anonymous ex-­combatants who participated in this study for their time and enthusiasm in revealing their own personal histories, as well as the experts who patiently gave me interviews and valuable information.

Acronyms and names

Acronym

English

Spanish

ACDEGAM

Peasant Association of Cattlemen and Farmers of Magdalena Medio. Self-­Defence Groups of Magdalena Medio Colombian Agency for Reintegration

Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio Alta Consejería para la Reintegración (2006–2011) Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (2011–2017) Autodefensa Obrera Autodefensas del Casanare; Autodefensas del Meta y el Vichada Alianza Nacional Popular Agencia para la Reincoporación y la Normalización (2017 onwards) Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia Bloque Cacique Nutibara Centro de Formación para la Paz y la Reconciliación

ACMM ACR

ADO Alianza Oriente ANAPO ARN AUC BCN CEPAR CNN CNR CODA CONVIVIR CRP CRS

Worker’s Self-­Defense Self-­Defence Groups of Casanare and Self-­Defence Groups of Meta and Vichada National Popular Alliance Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization Colombian United Self-­ Defenses Cacique Nutibara Bloc Institute for Education of Demobilised Population in Medellin National Council for Nomalisation National Council for Reincorporation Operative Committee for Laying Down Arms Cooperatives of Private Security Corporate Responsibility Programme Socialist Renovation Current

Consejo Nacional de Normalización Consejo Nacional de la Reincorporación Comité Operativo para la Dejación de Armas Cooperativas de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada Programa de Responsabilidad Corporativa Corriente de Renovación Socialista

Acronyms and names   xi Acronym CSIVI

English

Spanish

Commission for the monitoring, Comisión de Seguimiento, impulse and verification of Impulso y Verificación a la the implementation of the Implementación del acuerdo final agreement Final CWU Community Work Unit Unidad de Trabajo con la Comunidad DAS National Secret Service Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad DEA Drug Enforcement Administration DDR Demobilisation, Disarmament Desmovilización, Desarme y and Reintegration Reintegración Departamento Nacional de DNP National Department of Planning Planeación ECOMUN Cooperative of FARC ex-­ Cooperativa de excombatientes combatants “Social “Economías Sociales del Economies of the Commons” Común” ELN National Liberation Army Ejército de Liberación Nacional EPL Popular Liberation Army Ejército Popular de Liberación ERU Economic Reintegration Unit Unidad de Reintegración Económica FARC Colombian Revolutionay Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Armed Forces de Colombia Fast-­track Special Legislative Procedure Procedimiento Especial for Peace Legislativo para la Paz FUCEPAZ Colombian Foundation of Fundación Colombiana de Ex Ex-combatants and Peace Combatientes y Promotores de Promoters Paz Humanicemos-­DH Civil organisation for demining, Organización civil de desminado formed by former FARC humanitario conformada por members las FARC ICBF Institute of Family Welfare Instituto de Bienestar Familiar ICC International Criminal Court Corte Penal Internacional IDDRS International Demobilisation, Estándares Internacionales de Disarmament and Desmovilización, Desarme y Reintegration Standards Reinserción Institute for Colonization and Instituto de Colonización e Migration Inmigración INVIAS National Institute for Road Instituto Nacional de Vias Construction. IOM International Organization for Organización Internacional para Migration las Migraciones JAC Communal Action Boards Juntas de Acción Comunal JAL Local Action Boads Juntas de Acción Local JEP Special Jurisdiction of Peace Jurisdicción Especial de Paz M-­19 April 19 Movement Movimiento 19 de Abril MAPAZ Model for the Provision of Modelo de Atención Psicosocial para la Paz Psycho-­social Services MAPP-­OEA Mission to Support the Peace Misión de Apoyo al Proceso de Process – Organization of Paz – Organización de Estados Amer­ican States Amer­icanos

xii   Acronyms and names Acronym

English

MAQL

Armed Movement Quintín Lame Medellín Popular Militias Liberal Rebel Movement

MIR-­COAR MRL National Front NCN NPR NSR OACP PAHD PAPDRB Peace and Reconciliation PRSE PRVC PRT MCR Return to Legality SAC SENA SRC TATR TZN UP

Spanish

Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame Milicias Populares de Medellín Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal National Front Frente Nacional National Council for Consejo Nacional de Normalization Normalización National Plan for Rehabilitation Plan Nacional de Rehabilitación National System of Sistema Nacional de Reincorporation Reincorporación Peace Commissioner Office Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz Programme for Humanitarian Programa de Asistencia Assistance to the Humanitaria al Desmovilizado Demobilised Programa de Atención al Proceso Bogota’s Reintegration Programme de Desmovilización y Reinserción en Bogotá Medellin’s Reintegration Paz y Reconciliación Programme National Policy of Social and Política Nacional de Economic Reintegration Reincorporación Social y Política Programme of Reincorporation Programa de Reincorporación a la into Civil Life 2003–2006 Vida Civil Revolutionary Worker’s Party Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Municipal Councils for Consejos Municipales de Reincorporation Reincorporación Medellin’s Reintegration Model Retorno a la Legalidad Colombian Agricultural Society Sociedad de Agricultores de Colombia National Institute for Job Skills Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje Training Socialist Renovation Current  Corriente de Renovación Socialista Territorial Areas for Training Espacios Territoriales de and Reincorporation Capacitación y Reincorporación Transitory Zones of Zonas Veredales Transitoras de Normalisation Normalización Patriotic Union Party Union Patriótica

Introduction

The implementation of post-­war Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programmes have become an important part of a wider set of policies on peace-­building and models for state reconstruction pursued by multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or the World Bank (Muggah, Berdal, and Torjesen, 2009; Ottaway, 2002). The International Standards on DDR (IDDRS) by the UN has stated that the DDR programmes’ focus on ex-­combatants is “necessary and justified in order to build confidence and security in war-­torn societies” (UNDP, 2006, 4.30, p. 6) by preventing the transformation of combatants into self-­equipped soldiers or mercenary groups. The aim of these programmes is twofold: the disbandment of armed groups that jeopardise the state’s monopoly of force and the management of ex-­combatants that are the product of these demobilisations: The UN sees DDR as an early step in a series of peace-­building processes. DDR focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with armed forces and groups; lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-­ abiding citizens; and builds national capacity for long-­term peace, security and development. (UNDP, 2006, 2.10 p. 5) However, criticism has been raised on the “liberal peace” approach that defines an apolitical and technical emphasis by multilateral organisations in the design and implementation of DDR programmes and the creation of reintegration institutions (Duclos, 2012; Giustozzi, 2012; McMullin, 2013; Özerdem, 2009). Conversely, DDR are highly politicised processes: on the one hand, the capacity to mobilise or demobilise large numbers of troops lies at the core of a warlord’s bargaining power at the negotiating table; on the other, DDR policies and institutions are defined in the interplay between subnational, national and international political agendas. Certainly, the demobilisation of troops and the reintegration of ex-­ combatants back into society constitute an important part of the historical process that has shaped modern civilisation and hence state-­building (Ottaway,

2   Introduction 2002). Fritz and Menocal (2007) have posited that “the political settlement sits at the heart of the state-­building process”. While research has shown that demobilisation contributed to the creation of the modern welfare systems in the Unites States and Europe (Campbell, 2003; Pereira, 2003). Thus Giustozzi (2012) has made a call for “bringing the State back in”, inviting academics to analyse the impact of DDR on post-­conflict societies in areas such as its contribution to the administrative capacity, the consolidation of political settlements, the shaping of state architectures, the legitimacy of peace processes and the role of veterans. On the other side of the coin, when conflicts come to an end, breaking the military structure of the warring factions and the decision to reallocate the soldiers into new military structures or to simply disbanding the group and sending them home, constitute an important part of the new security and political arrangements in post-­conflict societies. As Tilly has pointed out: In royal service, soldiers and sailors were often expected to provide for themselves by preying on the civilian population: commandeering, raping, looting, taking prizes. When demobilised, they commonly continued the same practices, but without the same royal protection; demobilised ships became pirate vessels, demobilised troops bandits. It also worked the other way: A king’s best source of armed supporter was sometimes the world of outlaws. Robin Hood’s conversion to royal archer may be a myth, but the myth records a practice. (Tilly, 1985, p. 173) Furthermore, questions on what to do with the surplus of soldiers left after the conflict, on the adverse effects of their military-­like behaviours, as well as doubts and fears on their capabilities or willingness to go back to civilian life, can be traced back to the Napoleonic wars, the World Wars or the Vietnam War (Kriger, 2003, p. 21; Söderström, 2011, p. 16). Accordingly, there is much scepticism – in folk and expert knowledge alike – about any real willingness or capacity among the demobilised to abandon their life in the armed groups. Stemming from assumptions rooted in neoclassical economic theories, fighters are often deemed to be “irrational” in their actions and inevitably “greedy” in their motivations, which subsequently drive them towards violence in the form of criminality or their recruitment into criminal groups. This underlines a wider tendency to analyse social conflict from the perspective of methodological individualism that attributes social and political problems to individual behaviours, attitudes or personalities while the social arrangements and interactions that cause and reproduce wars and violence are neglected (Cramer, 2006, p.  125; Martín-Baró, 1983, p. 24, 1990). Although the UN has itself recognised this interplay between society and individuals – “Individual demobilisation mirrors the wider demobilisation of a society emerging from conflict, and is an important symbolic phase in the ­consolidation of peace” (UNDP, 2006, 4.20 p.  2) – this emphasis on the

Introduction   3 e­ x-­combatants should be understood not wholly on the individual’s behaviours, personality traits or skills, but on wider political and social conditions. Elias has argued that the monopolisation and centralisation of the physical force that underpins the creation of modern states trickles down to “changes in the human conduct and sentiment”, in the form of self-­perception and socially acceptable or unacceptable patterns of conduct. This transition from social constraint to self-­constraint in human behaviour is what Elias calls “the civilizing process” (Elias, 1982a, 1982b). Thus, the “monopoly of force” should be understood not as an attribute of the state but as a relational practice (Somers, 1993; Somers and Gibson, 1994). Ultimately, the DDR – and reintegration in particular – is a process of negotiating citizenship, not limited to the ex-­combatants but looking outwards at whole marginalised communities: Thus it [reintegration] is a matter of encouraging new loyalties to state institutions and in that way cementing the legitimacy of the newly (re)born state. Putting in place a dynamic of “civilianisation” which can be understood as a definitive return to civilian life combined with a change of identity that leads the ex-­combatant to abandon the military reference and prefer a civil identity, is generally considered an essential step in the normalization of political life. (Duclos, 2012, p. 3) Tilly (2003, p.  60) has pointed out that a relational definition of democracy highlights the interaction between citizens and their governments and brings with it questions around the bargaining process that establishes mutual rights and obligations. He defines citizenship as: A continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of (1) the person’s membership in an exclusive category, the native-­ born plus the naturalised and (2) the agent’s relation to the state rather than any other authority the agent may enjoy. (Tilly, 1996, p. 8) While for Turner: Citizenship may be defined as that set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups. (Turner, 2000, p. 2) Thus, it is important to clarify the difference between DDR processes and programmes (Torjesen, 2013). The former is an overarching term referring to a series of events and actions that start with the disbanding of armed troops in the

4   Introduction aftermath of conflict. The latter is an organised and intended set of policies, institutions and practices for the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, aiming to prevent and control security problems that may arise from the reduction of troops in post-­conflict settings (Colletta, Kostner and Wiederhofer, 1996; UNDP, 2006, 1.10 p.  1). As such, a DDR process could or could not include a programme, and certainly the ex-­combatants can go through their own demobilisation and reintegration process regardless of their participation in a programme. Torjesen (2013) has proposed that the research activities on DDR should focus more on the ex-­combatants’ experience, rather than on the analysis of international interventions and agendas. In the same line, this research explores the difficulties, challenges and security dilemmas combatants may face in integrating within a post-­conflict society and switching to a citizen identity. Therefore, emphasis is made on the reintegration phase of two different DDR processes in Colombia: the DDR of paramilitary groups and individual guerrilla members during Álvaro Uribe’s presidency (2003–2010) and what has been called an “early reincorpoaration” of FARC troops, a result of the peace process between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and president Juan Manuel Santos (2010–2018). Scholars have warned that the reintegration phase is often neglected and underfinanced during DDR programme design (Specker, 2008) and when it is considered at all, there is a tendency to over-­emphasise the economic elements, while the social and political receive less attention (Muggah et al., 2009, p.  279). This is due to the belief that economic incentives are the principal drivers for recruitment into armed groups and that ambition lies at the root of political conflict. Furthermore, these three dimensions tend to be considered in isolation rather than as deeply entangled parts of the whole (Özerdem, 2012, pp.  53, 66). Hence, scholars and policy-­makers have often forgotten that the economic, the social and the political form part of a complex, interwoven reality and that their separation is only workable for purely analytical purposes. The contrasts between Uribe’s DDR and FARC-­Santos DDR then, will shed new light on understanding the DDR as a process of building state and citizenship in the articulation between three dimensions: social (favouring both the break of factional ties and the creation of other social links); economic (creating skills and opportunities for livelihoods outside of the criminal or war economy); and political (through the creation of political parties and the individual’s transformation into law-­abiding citizens). In addition, other elements need to be factored in, such as the terms of the peace agreement, the creation and development of transitional justice systems, the lack of willingness or capability by the government to fulfil promises or implement the peace process, and most importantly, the security dilemma. For doing so, this study also questions the tendency of categorising the ex-­combatants as an automatic security risk due to an alleged tendency to return to their groups or by joining criminality. Foregrounding the risk the demobilised may pose in post-­conflict settings neglects both their potential to contribute to development and reconstruction

Introduction   5 in post-­conflict settings and the threats they face after giving up their weapons and controlled territories. My main argument is that the reintegration of ex-­ combatants is entangled with the building of democratic institutions, the extension of citizenship rights to both the ex-­combatants and the communities they come from, and the demand of transparency and accountability from governing elites.

Ex-­combatants as security risk McMullin (2012, p. 18) has argued that the policies on DDR tend to overstate the scale and scope of the threat posed by ex-­combatants to the state or to the local community by describing the ex-­combatants as the main source of security threats post-­conflict, ignoring other sources of insecurity such as the legal security forces, political elites or the wealthier classes. Reintegration from this perspective aims to achieve a negative peace, brushing aside any sense of political or social struggle to overcome inequality or poverty. Therefore, the potential for the ex-­combatants themselves becoming agents of reconciliation and reconstruction has been greatly reduced. Nübler (1997) and Özerdem (2009, p. 47) have proposed an alternative approach by which the ex-­combatants are treated as human resources, with an enormous potential to contribute to development as members of the workforce or in generating economic activities. Guáqueta (2007) has also shown that emphasising economic factors in the analysis of armed conflict has “portrayed fighters as greedy individuals who do not have a legitimate political cause and, therefore, can or should not be politically reintegrated”. Similarly, Gomes Porto, Alden and Parsons (2007, p.  27) claim that theories on DDR characterise the combatants as mere “potential spoiler[s] resorting to violence, criminal activity and predatory behaviour”. Vries and Wiegink (2011, p. 38) also note that combatants are imagined as tickingtime bombs and that it is too easily assumed that unsuccessfully reintegrated combatants will automatically pose a threat to peace. Finally, Özerdem (2009) signals the stereotyping of ex-­combatants as security risks on two levels: at the micro level, it is assumed that lack of employment, together with the military skills acquired in the armed groups, increases the propensity of ex-­combatants to get involved in criminality. At the macro level, these same unhappy former fighters are thought to harbour the potential to destabilise the state and the government by creating civil unrest and reigniting the conflict. Such discourse only served to reinforce the stigmatisation of ex-­soldiers as a source of violence: propagating a sense that ex-­combatants will slide back into violence as a natural recourse or as a direct result of their unsatisfied claims. The following excerpts from policy documents would appear to confirm this perceived labelling of ex-­combatants as usual suspects: The return of ex-­combatants can also worsen the real or perceived vulnerability of local populations. Ex-­combatants may be seen as a ‘lost generation’, having been deprived of education, employment and training during the

6   Introduction conflict period. Often they are left traumatised by war and can only understand the world from a military perspective. Their lack of civilian skills or assets, combined with their habit of relying on violence to get what they want, may result in their becoming involved in predatory behaviour against communities, such as banditry and theft; or they may turn once more to organised armed violence in a group. (UNDP, 2006, 4.20 p. 3, emphasis mine) There are several reasons that underlie the MDRP strategy of providing direct support for the demobilisation and reintegration of ex-­soldiers and guerrillas. First, failed reintegration of ex-­combatants could jeopardise the peace-­ building process. Indeed, long-­term costs for the entire society could be considerable if ex-­combatants are not able to establish new livelihoods and reintegrate in communities. Their inability to do so could contribute to new violent political opposition or lead to an increase in banditry and insecurity that could inhibit recovery and development efforts. (MDRP, 2004, p. 1, emphasis mine) Conversely, research has shown that many ex-­combatants are unwilling to go back to war out of a sense of fatigue and scepticism over the efficacy of violence (Fifthen and Richards, 2005, p. 135; Pugel, 2009, p. 88; Thruelsen, 2006, p. 15). In their seminal study, Colletta et al. (1996, p.  63) found no increase in criminality in the aftermath of DDR processes in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda and that crimes attributed to ex-­combatants were “infrequent” and “negligible”. In all three countries the ex-­combatants entered the poorest echelons of society and received incomes far lower than the national average, yet it was noted that “most ex-­combatants are disciplined” and “only some 10 per cent are considered undisciplined, troublemakers, drug-­abusers or thieves” (ibid., 1996, p. 55). Likewise, Pugel’s (2009, p. 88) study in Liberia concluded that those ex-­combatants from the poorest, least-­educated and most-­agricultural backgrounds were successful in reintegrating, despite being more economically disadvantaged than other former combatants. Certainly, the possibility remains of the ex-­combatants remobilising into armed groups or criminality, but rather than purely economic factors, there are other elements that should be taken into consideration. These include the re-­ marginalisation of ex-­combatants, especially in the political arena; the presence of mid-­level spoilers who assemble new armed factions; and the creation of coalitions between the former and the latter (Themnér, 2011, p.  7). Furthermore, the relapse into violence may involve different people (McMullin, 2012, p. 11), or the decrease in security is not necessarily caused by the ex-­combatants themselves, but by other factors, such as the weakening of the controls that the illegal armed groups have on petty crime (Massé, 2011). More importantly, by reducing the ex-­combatants to the singular status of security threat in post-­conflict settings the power arrangements and institutional designs that perpetuate conflict are neglected. For instance, renewed emphasis

Introduction   7 on the security risk posed by the ex-­combatants may also justify certain political manoeuvres. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998, p. 21) have argued that “the invocation of security has been the key to legitimising the use of force, but more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilise, or to take special powers, to handle existential threats”. Foucault and Arendt, too, warn of the priority given to national security to justify the restriction of citizenship rights, which certain power elites manipulate in order to maintain their privileges and avoid their own accountability (in Rojas, 2009, p. 230). DDR programmes may also tend to avoid tackling the more structural issues of land reform, inequality and access to political participation (McMullin, 2012, p.  242). DDR literature continues to overlook the ways in which a successful reintegration of ex-­combatants may depend more on the social, political and economic conditions they are placed back into, rather than on their personality traits, interest or willingness. Thus, the question of “reintegration into what?” gains crucial importance (Jennings, 2007, p. 214; Vries and Wiegink, 2011, p. 44). McMullin has also noted that the literature on DDR does not bestow on the ex-­combatants the title of veterans: while former fighters in developed countries are reified as heroes and freedom-­fighters, having a crucial role in the defence or construction of the nation-­state, combatants from the so-­called “new wars” are portrayed as angry, irrational and violent, with a natural tendency towards banditry and mercenarism (McMullin, 2013, p. 22). In addition, despite their vastly differing meanings and origins, in DDR literature the words citizen and civilian are often used synonymously. However, “civilian” is a classification that refers specifically to non-­military people, while “citizen” defines a person’s political agency in relation to the state. The category of “civilian” is established by outsiders and ignores the fact that a person may become a combatant or a civilian at different places or times (Cramer, 2006, p. 77; Mitton, 2012, p. 105). On the one hand, of course, a citizen can also be a soldier. Moreover, being a citizen implies some degree of willingness to participate in the defence of the political body: the Athenian polis, the Roman Empire, the medieval city or many modern nations base their security on the military draft of citizens. On the other hand, a civilian is not necessarily a citizen: as in cases where individuals or indeed communities lack citizenship within a given state. Arguably, by excluding the ex-­combatants from the category of veterans, but including them in that of civilians, the DDR literature overlooks the political conditions needed for their reintegration, namely, the creation of democratic institutions that are both accessible and relatable. Therefore, rather than imposing the responsibility for reintegration on the ex-­combatants or the communities, changes in the overarching political order mirror changes in the behaviour and identity of the combatants, as well as in their willingness to embrace the rule of law. Otherwise, in the absence or failure of democratic institutions, both ex-­combatants and communities are left with little option but to establish social, political and economic relationships with any group that has forcibly claimed control over the place they live in. Citizens cannot be created in a political vacuum. Multilateral organisations or foreign

8   Introduction governments may play a role in breaking apart the military factions and in transforming fighters into civilians, but their transition into law-­abiding citizens ultimately depends on their ability to forge structurally sound relationships with the state and its national and local authorities.

DDR in Colombia The Colombian case presents very atypical features compared to those cases on which the international community bases its DDR literature and experience: first, Colombia has a tradition of successful peace processes and demobilisations that did not bring the conflict to an end: during the twentieth century four large peace processes and more than a dozen different demobilisations and ex-­ combatant reintegration took place (Villamizar, 1998; Villarraga, 2006). Each time, the country relapsed into conflict due the systematic killing of unarmed rebel leaders and troops that have embraced democracy, as well as personal attacks and violence against civil groups and leftist or liberal political parties. Second, a variety of illegal armed groups (rebel liberal forces and guerrillas, scattered paramilitary groups and guerrillas from different spectrums of the Marxist ideology) have participated in the conflict, with a very different DDR approach for each. Third, all these DDRs have been nation-­led; the Colombian government orchestrated the design, administration, fundraising and implementation of the entire demobilisation policy. Finally, the Colombian democracy is an “anomaly”: a system of long-­term democratic institutions while maintaining high levels of repression (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2013). Thus, as a direct consequence of the different peace procces democracy was stregtened and basic individual rights were extended, but at the same time violence increased. This book starts by making an historical account of the peace processes in the country during the twentieth century and then it focuses on comparing two very different demobilisation and reintegration processes that took place in the twenty-­first century: Uribe’s DDR and the FARC-­Santos DDR. Uribe’s DDR was one of the pillars of his national security programme, the Policy of Defence and Democratic Security,1 which included two different yet complementary strategies: the government opted for negotiating and establishing a peace settlement with paramilitary groups, while at the same time increasing its military offensive against the FARC guerrillas. In practice, the DDR was developed in two stages that coincided with Uribe’s two presidential terms: the negotiation, demobilisation and disarmament phases (2002–2006) and the reintegration phase (2006–2010). Negotiation with paramilitary leaders began two months after Uribe assumed the presidency in 2002, and the government representative for the entire process was the psychiatrist Luis Carlos Restrepo. Due to the fragmentation of the paramilitary leadership, four different negotiating tables were created, resulting in the collective demobilisation of 31,671 soldiers organised across 37 structures by 2006 (OACP, 2006, p. 8). In 2008 there were also some collective demobilisations of small guerrilla structures comprising 264 members, including the FARC group Cacica Gaitana (alleged FARC

Introduction   9 d­ issidents), other FARC militias and imprisoned members, and a small dissident guerrilla force named the Guevarist Revolutionary Army2 (ODDR, 2008). In a parallel process, an increasing number of deserters from the guerrillas surrendered to the authorities as a result of sustained military operations and programmes that encouraged defection from rebel groups (Pinto, Vergara, and De La Huerta, 2002). Based on a set of laws and legal procedures launched in the early 1990s,3 deserter guerrilla members were entitled to judicial benefits and reinsertion treatment, through which they could attain the status of demobilised population (Villarraga, 2006, p.  31). This type of demobilisation has been called individual, as there was no negotiation between the armed factions, and this was indeed a process that targeted scattered individuals who deserted from two guerrilla or paramilitary forces still operating in the country. During Uribe’s government there were 23,001 of these individual demobilisations, of which 81.6 per cent were former members of the ELN or the FARC and 16.3 per cent were ex-­paramilitaries (Ministry of Defence, 2003). Also significant, there were two different legal frameworks for the demobilisation: Law 782 of 2002 for the rank-and-file paramilitaries and guerrilla deserters; while the paramilitary leaders were processed by Law 975 2005 of Justice and Peace, that would provide amnesty or lenient treatment on gross human rights violations and crimes punishable under international criminal law. Although in 2003 Uribe launched an initiative to attract external aid and cooperation (ACCI, 2005, p. 27; Acción Social, 2006), by 2005 the national budget had financed most of the demobilisation expenditure (Schönrock, 2005, p.  8). The government of the United States provided some resources through USAID in the form of the Plan Colombia cooperation policy (US, 2008, p. 54), but the international community proved to be highly reluctant to fund the DDR process: both the European Union (EU) and some US Congress members raised concerns over the negotiations between the government and the paramilitary leaders, including the clandestine involvement of drug-­ traffickers, the lack of advance planning for the reintegration phase, and the government’s proposal of universal amnesty to crimes punishable by the International Criminal Court and crimes related to drug-­trafficking (CIDH, 2004, 2006; Guáqueta, 2007, p.  26; United Nations, 2003, 2004). For the reintegration phase, though, the government was more successful in attracting external funding from the governments of Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain. In 2004, at the request of the Colombian government, the Organisation of Amer­ican States (OAS) took an observational role by creating the Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP). However, the international community was again reticent to provide funding for MAPP’s operations: to the point that the Colombian government had to “donate” US$1 million to get the mission off the ground.4 Even then, the OAS remained very critical of Uribe’s DDR, as evidenced in the reports presented by the Inter-­Amer­ican Commission of Human Rights (CIDH, 2004) and by MAPP itself (MAPP/OEA, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). In a more operational and technical role, the International

10   Introduction Organisation for Migration (IOM) administered USAID resources and implemented an information system called SAME,5 a database on the personal situation and individual progress of each of the demobilised within the reintegration programme. As mentioned above, throughout the conflict the Colombian state maintained a crucial capacity to build institutions. Thus, during the DDR process, there was a variety of offices and programmes that were already in place to manage the demobilised population: during the first phase, the collective negotiation and demobilisation of paramilitaries were carried out by the Peace Commissioner Office, while the individual demobilisations were the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. The Ministry of the Interior and Justice was initially designated to carry out the reinsertion policies through the Programme of Reincorporation to the Civil Life (PRVC),6 but for reasons explained in the second chapter, this office was replaced in 2006 by the Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR), who reported directly to the President. In 2008 – five years after the first demobilisations – the National Policy of Social and Economic Reintegration (PRSE)7 was finally enacted and other minor offices or civil servants were delegated to specific DDR duties within 14 ministries and public offices (Rodriguez, 2006, p.  111). At the subnational level two independent programmes were created by the Mayor Offices of the largest and most important cities of the country: “Peace and Reconciliation” in Medellín and the “Programme of Services to the Process of Demobilisation and Reintegration” (PAPDRB) in Bogotá. However, in practice, all low-­ranking paramilitaries that demobilised from 2003 onwards entered into a judicial limbo: they were not considered criminals, but there were legal impediments that prevented the ACR programme from establishing the requirements or a deadline to consider the ex-­combatants as fully reintegrated members of society. From 2006 to 2011, the demobilised could be considered “inactive” with regard to the ACR programme, meaning that they were registered but there was no further information on their whereabouts. Following the election of President Juan Manuel Santos in 2010, the ACR underwent an internal reorganisation and the Congress enacted law 1424 of 2011 – replacing law 782 of 2002 – which changed, for the third time, the legal status of the demobilised. Law 1424 established at last a procedural closure to the reintegration process, stating that the enrolment and satisfactory approval of the ACR programme was a compulsory requirement to finish the judicial process and graduate the demobilised as citizens. Uribe had appointed Santos as his Ministry of Defence and backed his successful presidential candidature in 2010. However, once elected, Santos broke up with Uribe’s discourse, policies and political style, in particular in regard to the treatment of the armed conflict and the FARC.8 Secret exploratory dialogues with the FARC started very early during Santos’ administration but in October 2012 he unveiled the process to the public and announced the start of formal negotiations in Olso, to continue in La Habana. During five years the peace talks revolved around six points: first, the agrarian issue and the appalling

Introduction   11 living conditions of the peasantry in rural areas, which also includes questions over land property and rural development. Second, the issues of political participation, not restricted to FARC members but open to an array of grassroots organisations and leaders from marginalised communities that have traditionally been targeted and killed for voicing their grievances. The third point in the agenda had three sections: the bilateral ceasing of hostilities and subsequent disarmament; the reincorporation to FARC members into civil life; and the guarantees of security, with particular reference to the fight against those criminal and paramilitary organisations responsible for attacks on human rights activists, political movements or social organisations. The fourth point looked at the drug-­trafficking problem and the need to seek out alternatives to the prohibition policies that have thus far proved highly ineffective. The fifth explored how to recompense or mete out some form of justice to the victims from all sides of the conflict. Finally, the sixth point stated the mechanisms for implementing and monitoring the agreements.9 This time, the international support was strong: Norway and Cuba acted as guarantors of the process while Venezuela and Chile also played a part as companions during the negotiations. Barak Obama appointed Bernard Aronson as the US special delegate to the peace process and the United Nations had a main role throughout the process: the UN Security Council voted unanimously to support the negotiating table and played a role in the verification of the ceasefire, while the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia Todd Howland became a key reference for the entire negotiating process and his office collaborated with other institutions in the organisation of public forums for discussion of, and building proposals on, the specific points in the negotiating agenda.10 Once the final peace agreement was signed, the UN formed part of the monitoring team, along with the Colombian army and the FARC, in the process of cantonment and disarmament. The Norwegian government has also played a main role in the process of demining, while the US offered 450 million dollars per year in aid for the post-­conflict, and the European Union also announced loans of 4,456 million US dollars to be invested in rural development.11 On 26 September 2016 the FARC and the government signed the final agreement in Cartagena. However, as part of the sixth point of the negotiating agenda, it was established that the peace settlement was to be endorsed by Colombians in a plebiscite to take place on Sunday 2 October and, unexpectedly, the “No” campaign won by a very tiny margin of 0.4 per cent. This forced the government to include some of the demands made by Uribe and his coalition of right-­wing politicians. A New Final Agreement was then signed on 12 November and approved by Congress on 1 December, including the amnesty for FARC combatants. This was the beginning of two processes: on the one hand, the demobilisation of FARC troops; on the other, the “fast track”, i.e. debates in Congress for the approval of the legislation needed for the implementation of the new agreement. The peace process began its implementation in December 2016, when the FARC troops started their last military march, out of the forest and towards the

12   Introduction cantonment areas: 26 Transitory Zones of Normalization (TZN) were created, designed as temporary shelters to last for six months for the disarming and registration of 7000 ex-­combatants.12 In total, 11,049 FARC members demobilized:13 this included men (77%) and women (23%), the troops in the field (55%), the militias in the urban areas (29%) and the imprisioned structures (16%). The vast majority of the troops were of rural (66%) or urban-­rural (15%) background. Although most of them said they were able to read and write (90%), in reality the majority had never been to school or had only attended primary education (60%). After the successful process of disarmament, it became apparent that many of the ex-­combatants would not return to their areas of origin or disperse, as the government thought would happen, as the majority of them had no place to live (77%). Thus, some of the Transitory Zones became permanent, under the name of Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation (TATR), yet after two years only 3,700 ex-­combatants remain there (according to ARN data, December 2018). The FARC has rejected the very idea of DDR on three main arguments:14 first, that ACR was created by Uribe’s government to instrumentalise the demobilisation and reintegration as a form of counterinsurgency strategy to attack the guerrillas and to favour his paramilitary allies. Second, that their understanding of giving up their weapons was neither to surrender nor to dismantle their organisational structure but to transform it into a new social, economic and political structure that would allow them to continue their struggle by peaceful and legal means. Third, that theirs is a collective reincorporation process, different from the mere collective demobilisation of the paramilitary and contrary to the DDR approach of providing the ex-­combatants with individual incentives or pursuing individual reintegration. Therefore, they refer to their remobilisation rather than demobilisation and prefer to use the term reincorporation over reintegration, which was the term used by the guerrillas that demobilised in the 1990s.15 In consequence, although the ACR director took part at the negotiating table from the beginning, the FARC did not accept it as the institution in charge of their reincorporation process. Instead, The FARC-­Santos Peace Settlement created the Commission for the Following, Impulse and Verification of the Final Agreement (CSIVI),16 formed by three representatives of the government and three of the FARC, in charge of the implementation of the agreement. For the reintegration phase, the National Council for Reincorporation (CNR) and Territorial Councils for Reincorporation in the regions were created, all of them formed of two representatives of the FARC and two of the government.17 However, after having won the plebiscite, the demands of the “No” campaign were included: to strengthen the individual process of those FARC members who did not want to continue in the group nor to duplicate institutionality, meaning that the experience and structure of the ACR had to be taken into account. Nonetheless, the FARC would not accept the ACR approach; thus the government accepted to change it into a new institution named the Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN),18 although with no major alteration of its previous structure.19 The

Introduction   13 ARN then, took part at the CNR in the creation of a new public policy on reincorporation in 2018 (CONPES 3931, 2018). This book is published more than two years after the peace process began its implementation. As a new Congress and a new president, Iván Duque, have just started their four-year terms, it is their responsibility to implement the FARC-­ Santos DDR, a task that proves challenging, as both the Congress and Duque’s governing coalition are led by fierce attackers of the peace process: Duque was a senator of the Democratic Centre, one of the main leaders of the “No” campaign20 and was hand-­picked by Uribe as the party’s candidate. As such, Duque’s government has blocked the implementation of the FARC peace process and has also dropped the peace process with the ELN.

Methodology and book outline As said above, this research compares two different process and historical moments in the country: DDR of paramilitary and individual guerrilla members during Alvaro Uribe’s presidency (from now on Uribe’s DDR), and the negotiation and the beginning of the implementation of the peace agreement between the FARC and President Santos (from now on FARC-­Santos DDR). In both DDRs, I focused in the experiences of rank-­and-file and adult ex-­combatants that were not accused of gross human rights violations, meaning that they were facing trials under transitional Law 782 or the JEP. For Uribe’s DDR, the ex-­combatants interviewed participated in the ACR programme, meaning that they demobilised under Law 782. I conducted fieldwork in Colombia for my PhD thesis over nine months (October 2011 and July 2012), and gathered verbal data from: (a) 141 ex-­combatants who participated in 29 focus groups and 27 interviews; (b) six leaders of grass-­roots organisations; (c) interviews with 46 contractors working for the ACR, 12 for Peace and Reconciliation and four for the PAPDRB, as well as four contractors from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM); and (d) seven experts with previous research and/or practice in the Colombian DDR. At the time, the ACR authorised interviews with contractors at its central office in Bogotá, as well as the interviews and focus groups with reintegration officers and ex-­combatants at regional offices in seven capital cities: Cúcuta, Bucaramanga, Monteria, Sincelejo, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Yopal. For the fieldwork in Bogotá and Medellín I contacted the municipal offices of the PAPDRB in Bogotá and Peace and Reconciliation in Medellin, and both institutions authorised and facilitated the interviews with their own reintegration officers and the ex-­combatants working with them. This fieldwork coincided with the beginnings of the implementation of Law 1424, meaning that all ex-­combatants were summoned to appear before government offices either to activate their status as participants in the ACR reintegration programme or as eligible candidates for processing under Law 975 of 2005. Legally at least, there was no possibility of self-­reintegration, and the ex-­ combatants did not join the army due to strong political opposition. Thus, the

14   Introduction ex-­combatants were classified into three groups: first, the rank-­and-file ex-­ paramilitaries and ex-­guerrillas, for whom the ACR reintegration programme was compulsory; second, the paramilitary leaders and mid-­ranking combatants, who were sent to prison under Law 975; and finally, those who did not present themselves and were therefore declared outlaws, with warrants issued for their arrest.21 For the FARC-­Santos DDR, I followed the development of the peace process throughout the four-­year phase of public negotiations. Additionally, I conducted fieldwork at different moments of the disarming of the FARC and its transit into legal life: (a) conferences, meetings and other events organised by the FARC: the FARC’s 10th Conference at Llanos del Yarí (17 to 23 August 2016), their Conference in Bogotá (28 to 31 August 2017), the balances of the first and second year after the beginning of the demobilisation and disarmament (1 December 2017 and 26 November 2018), the graduation of ECOMUN leaders (4 July, 2017) and other public events with the participation of FARC representatives; (b) visits to two TATRs: Icononzo (2 February 2017 and 22 April 2018) and Mesetas, Meta (17 to 20 January 2018); (c) interviews with 25 former guerrilla members: 12 at the 10th Conference, four at the Mesetas TATR; seven at the Montañita TATR in August 2018 (conducted by Eline Hietbrink); and with three FARC mid-­ranking commanders in Bogotá; (d) interviews with one ARN assessor and one CNR assessor. In addition, abundant primary and secondary data was found in reports published in print and online: both governments published the memoires of the processes,22 and the network of institutions that took part in both DDR processes produced several official reports, including those from the Peace Commissioner Office, the Ministries of the Interior and Defence, the ACR and the ARN. In addition, speeches and press statements have been made available to the general public: from President Uribe and his Peace Commissioner (Restrepo, 2005, 2006); and for the FARC-­Santos DDR, information was available from the negotiating-­table webpage,23 government sources24 and the FARC communication office and webpage.25 The Mayoral Offices of Bogotá and Medellín published several reports on their own activities, which included the proceedings of public forums that took place in each city. Open letters and public statements from the paramilitary groups during the negotiation and demobilisation phases were widely available, having been included in several official reports or published in literature or in the press. The paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño, in particular, was very vocal in his defence of the paramilitary cause; I have made extensive use of his letters and his authorised biography.26 To a lesser extent, other paramilitary leaders wrote public letters or gave interviews to the press: here I refer to those by Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente Castaño and Iván Roberto Duque aka Ernesto Baéz. On the other hand, the FARC has always been very open to communicating with the public; even when they were a clandestine force, they had created a webpage, and as part of their transition into legal life, they developed their own news channel, available on their webpage and facebook.27

Introduction   15 There are also compilations of documents from the different peace processes, most remarkably (a) the work of Villarraga in publishing nine volumes of documents from the guerrilla peace processes in the 1990s to Uribe’s DDR, a series entitled Biblioteca de la Paz; and (b) the studies by Villamizar (1998, 2018) on guerrilla groups and peace processes. Also, some organisations took on the task of making for balance in the peace processes, most remarkably Fundación Ideas para la Paz, Viva la Ciudadanía and the Kroc Institute. Other secondary sources include data gathered from multilateral organisations (United Nations, OAS, MAPP-­OEA, IOM) and think-­tanks (Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, Fundación Ideas Para la Paz, International Crisis Group). I have also made extensive use of press reports from a variety of printed media: the two most important daily journals in the country (El Tiempo and El Espectador), the influential weekly political journal (Semana) and other established websites that collect and post both reports and news on the conflict and the DDR process (Verdad Abierta, La Silla Vacía). I also consulted the legislative archives for records of debates in Congress to approve the laws regarding both DDRs as well as other related legislation (decrees and resolutions). For the FARC-­Santos process I also followed the “fast-­track” procedure for the approval of legislation, including attending in person to the debates and discussions in the Congress. All of this collated information was crucial to reconstructing how the DDR process was contested and defended, as well as tracking how it originated, evolved and changed over time. The book is organised as follows: the first chapter makes a brief historical account of the peace processes and amnesties that occurred in Colombia in the twentieth century, focusing on the petitions made by the ex-­combatants and the situations of the demobilised. The second chapter depicts and compares the negotiation and demobilisation of Uribe’s DDR and FARC-­Santos DDR, analysing the different approaches to security and development and thus the decisions on who would be targeted with the reintegration aid: the ex-­combatants or the communities. Then, the other three chapters focus on the reintegration processes and the ex-­combatants: the third zooms in on the social reintegration and the role of DDR institutions in creating social tissue and links between the former combatants and the communities; while the fourth expands on the economic reintegration of, and the difficulties faced by, ex-­combatants in participating in the formal economy; finally, the fifth chapter analyses the political reintegration at two levels: the consolidation of a collective political proposal by the former armed groups and the individual access to and interpretation of the mechanism of citizenship.

Notes   1 Hereafter referred to as the Policy of Democratic Security. For his second mandate Uribe continued with this policy under the name of the “Policy of Consolidation of the Democratic Security”.   2 Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (ERG).   3 Law 104/1993, Decree 1384/1994 (Pinto et al., 2002, p. 1; Villarraga, 2006, p. 31).

16   Introduction   4 El Tiempo, 22 June 2004.   5 Acronym in Spanish: Sistema de Alerta Monitoreo y Evaluación. SAME was implemented from 2003 to 2009, when the ACR developed its own software Sistema de Información para la Reintegración (SIR).   6 Acronym in Spanish: Programa de Reincorporación a la Vida Civil. Previously Dirección Nacional para la Reinserción. For an account of the different institutions involved in reintegration and their transformations see Pinto et al., 2002 and Turriago and Bustamante, 2003.   7 Acronym in Spanish: Política Nacional de Reintegración Social y Económica para personas y grupos armados ilegales. Conpes 3554 enacted on 1 December 2008.   8 See timeline of the FARC-­Santos peace process by the High Commissioner for Peace www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Paginas/home.aspx; and the press El Tiempo www.eltiempo.com/datos/linea-­del-tiempo-­de-los-­dialogos-de-­paz-56584.   9 Negotiating Agenda, October 2012. 10 On the Rural Agrarian Reform on 17 and 19 December 2012; on political participation; on the victims July and August 2014. 11 El País. Así fue el Respaldo International al Proceso de Paz en Colombia, 26 September 2016 www.elpais.com.co/proceso-­de-paz/asi-­fue-el-­respaldo-internacional-­al-en-­ colombia.html. 12 The process of moving towards the cantonment areas was designed to last 180 days, it started on 1 December, the disarmament phase started on 27 May and finished in September. https://news.un.org/es/story/2017/09/1386501. 13 The census included 10,000 ex-­combatants. Caracterización comunidad FARC-­EP. Censo socioeconómico UN-­CNR, 6 July 2017. 14 Interview with FARC Commander representative to the CNR, 25 January 2018. 15 To avoid confusion, I will use the term demobilisation regardless of FARC’s rejection of it. I adopt the UN definition of reinsertion as “the initial assistance offered to the ex-­combatants immediately after their demobilisation and is regarded as a transitional period prior to the longer process of reintegrating as civilians”, while reintegration is “the process by which ex-­combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income”. I use reintegration when referring to Uribe’s DDR process, while reincorporation when talking about the guerrilla demobilisation processes in the 1990s and FARC-­Santos DDR. 16 Acronym in Spanish: Comisión para el seguimiento, impulso y verificación de la implementación, Decree 1995, 7 December 2016. https://csivi.co/. 17 Agreement signed in Cartagena; point 3.2.2.3; Decree 2027, 7 December 2016. The two representatives by the government are one by the OACP and one by the ARN. 18 Decree-­Law 897, 29 May 2017. 19 Interview with ARN Assessor. 20 He, and other representatives, filed a legal action to block the Legislation Act No 1 of 2012, which created a legal framework for the peace negotiations. Also see, for instance, Duque speech as Senator on 1 December 2015. www.youtube.com/watch? v=YtJjkRaMAOg; or his ad for the NO campaign www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Tlay XeEhxM. 21 Law 1424/2011, Article 6; Resolution 0163/2011, Article 2 (paragraph 2). 22 Uribe’s DDR Proceso de Paz con las Autodefensas, Memoria Documental (2008) and FARC-­Santos DDR Biblioteca del Proceso de Paz con las FARC (2018). 23 See all documents at www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/mesadeconversaciones/ index.html. 24 See timeline of the FARC-­Santos peace process by the High Commissioner for Peace www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Paginas/home.aspx; and the press El Tiempo www.eltiempo.com/datos/linea-­del-tiempo-­de-los-­dialogos-de-­paz-56584. 25 www.farc-­ep.co/.

Introduction   17 26 Published in Observatorio para la Paz (2002), his biography was written by the journalist Aranguren (2002). 27 NC News.

References ACCI (2005). Estrategia de Cooperación Internacional. Alta Consejería para la Acción Social. Agencia Colombiana de Cooperación Internacional. Presidencia de la República de Colombia. www.accionsocial.gov.co/documentos/estcoop.PDF. Acción Social. (2006, 18 August). Informe de Gestión 2006–2002. Acción Social. Dirección de Cooperación Internacional. www.accionsocial.gov.co/snci/contenido/contenido. aspx?catID=438&conID=1214. Aranguren, M. (2002). Mi Confesión. Carlos Castaño Revela sus Secretos. Bogotá: Oveja Negra. Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Campbell, A. (2003). Where do all the soldiers go? Veterans and the politics of demobilization. In: D. Davis and A. Pereira (eds.), Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation (pp. 96–117). New York: Cambridge University Press. CIDH (2004, 13 December). Informe sobre el Proceso de desmovilización en Colombia. Inter Amer­ican Commission of Human Rights. Available at www.cidh.org/pdf%20 files/COLOMBIA%20COMPILACION.pdf. CIDH (2006). Informe Colombia. Inter Amer­ican Commission of Human Rights. Available at www.cidh.org/countryrep/colombia04sp/informe4.htm. Colletta, N., Kostner, M. and Wiederhofer, I. (1996). The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-­Saharan Africa. World Bank Publications. CONPES 3931 (2018, 22 June). Política Nacional Para la Reincorporación Social y Económica de Exintegrantes de las FARC-­EP. Gobierno de Colombia. Cramer, C. (2006). Civil War Is Not A Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence In Developing Countries. London: Hurst. Duclos, N. (ed.) (2012). Introduction. In: War Veterans in Postwar Situations: Chechnya, Serbia, Turkey, Peru, and Cote d’Ivoire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Elias, N. (1982a). Power and Civility. New York: Pantheon Books. Elias, N. (1982b). The Civilizing Process: State Formation and Civilization. Oxford: Blackwell. Fifthen, C., and Richards, P. (2005). Making war, crafting peace: militia solidarities and demobilization in Sierra Leone. In: P. Richards (ed.) No Peace, No War: An Anthology of Armed Conflicts (pp. 117–136). Oxford: James Currey. Fritz, V., and Menocal, A. R. (2007). Understanding state-­building from a political economy perspective. Overseas Development Institute, 21. Giustozzi, A. (2012). Post-­conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-­building Back In. London: Routledge. Gomes Porto, J., Alden, C. and Parsons, I. (2007). From Soldiers to Citizens: Demilitarization of Conflict and Society. Aldershot: Ashgate. Guáqueta, A. (2007). The way back in: Reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now. In: M. Berdal and D. H. Ucko (eds.), Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition (pp. 11–46). London: Routledge. Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2013). El Orangután con Sacoleva. Bogotá: IEPRI, Debate. Jennings, K. (2007). The struggle to satisfy: DDR through the eyes of ex-­combatants in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, 14(2), 204–218.

18   Introduction Kriger, M. (2003). Guerrilla Veterans inPpost-­war Zimbabwe. Cambridge: CUP. MAPP/OEA (2006, 30 August). Seventh Quarterly Report. www.mapp-­oea.net/index. php?option=com_content&id=51&Itemid=82. MAPP/OEA (2007a, 14 February). Eighth Quarterly Report. www.mapp-­oea.net/index. php?option=com_content&id=51&Itemid=82. MAPP/OEA (2007b, 31 October). Tenth Quarterly Report. www.mapp-­oea.net/index. php?option=com_content&id=51&Itemid=82. Martín-Baró, I. (1983). Acción e Ideología. Psicología Social desde Centroamérica. El Salvador: UCA Editores. Massé, F. (2011). Cuarto Informe. Presencia de desmovilizados e inseguridad en las ciudades. Casos De estudio: Villavicencio, Montería y Bogotá. Centro Internacional de Toledo para la Paz – Observatorio sobre DDR y Ley de Justicia Paz. McMullin, J. (2012). Integration or separation? The stigmatisation of ex-­combatants after war. Review of International Studies, 39(2), 385–414. McMullin, J. (2013). Ex-­Combatants and the Post-­Conflict State. New York: Palgrave ­Macmillan. MDRP (2004, January). Targeting MDRP assistance: Ex-­combatants and other war-­ affected populations. Multi-­country demobilization and reintegration program. Position paper. World Bank Publications. www.mdrp.org/index.htm. Ministry of Defence. (2003). Política de defensa y seguridad democrática. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Colombian Government. Mitton, K. (2012). Irrational actors and the process of brutalisation: Understanding atrocity in the Sierra Leonean Conflict (1991–2002). Civil Wars, 14(1), 104–122. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.654691. Muggah, R., Berdal, M. and Torjesen, S. (2009). Enter an evidence-­based security promotion agenda. In R. Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-­Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge. Nübler, I. (1997). Human resources development and utilization in demobilization and  reintegration programs. BICC Paper No 7. Bonn International Center for ­Conversion. OACP (2006, November). Proceso de paz con las autodefensas. Informe Ejecutivo. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Available at www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co. Observatorio para la Paz (2002). Las verdaderas intenciones de los paramilitares. Bogotá: Intermedio editores. ODDR (2008). Desarme y desmovilización del Ejercito Revolucionario Guevarista (ERG). Monitoreo de caso. Informe especial. Observatorio de procesos de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración. Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Available at www.observatorioddr.unal.edu.co. Ottaway, M. (2002). Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states. Development and Change, 33(5), 1001–1023. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.t01-1-00258. Özerdem, A. (2009). Post-­war Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. London: I. B. Tauris. Özerdem, A. (2012). A re-­conceptualisation of ex-­combatant reintegration: ‘social reintegration’ approach. Conflict, Security & Development, 12(1), 51–73. https://doi.org /10.1080/14678802.2012.667661. Pereira, A. (2003). Where do all the soldiers go? Veterans and the politics of demobilization. In: D. Davis and A. Pereira (eds.), Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation (pp. 96–117). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Introduction   19 Pinto, M., Vergara, A., and De La Huerta, Y. (2002). Diagnóstico del programa de reinserción en Colombia: mecanismos para incentivar la desmovilización voluntaria individual. Departamiento De Planeación Nacional. Archivos De Economía. Doc. 11. Banco De La República. Available at Www.Dnp.Gov.Co/Portals/0/Archivos/ Documentos/DEE/Archivos_Economia/211.PDF. Pugel, J. (2009). Measuring reintegration in Liberia. In: R. Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-­ Conflict Reconstruction. Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war. London: Routledge. Restrepo, L. (2005). Justicia y Paz. De la Negociación a la Gracia. Medellín: Instituto Tecnológico Metropolitano. Restrepo, L. (2006). Hablar con ilegales: un abordaje desde la salud mental. In: G. Sánchez (ed.), Un Caminio Hacia la Paz. Paz y Salud Mental en Colombia (pp. 311–327). Bogotá: Academia Nacional de Medicina. Rodriguez, D. (2006). Darle la mano a un reinsertado es ser protagonista de la paz. In: G. Sánchez (ed.), Un Caminio Hacia la Paz. Paz y Salud Mental en Colombia (pp. 111–120). Bogotá: Academia Nacional de Medicina. Rojas, C. (2009). Securing the state and developing social insecurities: the securitisation of citizenship in contemporary Colombia. Third World Quarterly, 30(1), 227–245. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802622631. Schönrock, P. (2005). Reinserción de ex-­combatientes y cooperación internacional en Colombia. Perspectivas Internacionales, 2. Söderström, J. (2011). Politics of Affection: Ex-­Combatants, Political Engagement and Reintegration Programs in Liberia. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. http://uu. diva-­portal.org/smash/get/diva2:451598/PREVIEW01.jpg. Somers, M. (1993). Citizenship and the place of the public sphere: Law, community, and political culture in the transition to democracy. Amer­ican Sociological Review, 58(5), 587–620. Somers, M., and Gibson, G. (1994). Reclaiming the epistemological other: Narrative and the social constitution of identity. In: C. Calhoun (ed.), Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell. Specker, L. (2008). The R-­phase of DDR processes: An overview of key lessons learned and practical experiences. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Themnér, A. (2011). Violence in Post-­Conflict Societies: Remarginalization, Remobilizers and Relationships. London: Routledge. www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781136708275. Thruelsen, P. (2006). From soldier to civilian: Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration in Afghanistan. DIIS Report 2006, 2007. Danish Institute for International Studies. Tilly, C. (1985). War making and state making as organized crime. In: P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back (pp.  170–187). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (1996). Citizenship, Identity and Social History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2003). Armed forces, regimes and contention in Europe since 1650. In: D. Davis and A. Pereira (eds.), Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation (pp. 37–81). New York: Cambridge University Press. Torjesen, S. (2013). Towards a theory of ex-­combatant reintegration. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(2), 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.cx. Turner, B. (2000). Contemporary problems in the theory of citizenship. In: Citizenship and Social Theory (pp. 1–18). London: Sage. Turriago, G. and Bustamante, J. M. (2003). Estudio de los procesos de reinserción en Colombia 1991–1998. Bogotá: FIP and Alfaomega

20   Introduction UNDP (2006). Integrated demobilization, disarmament and reintegration standards. United Nations. http://unddr.org/. United Nations (2003, 24 February). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Colombia. United Nations. United Nations (2004, 17 February). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Colombia. United Nations. US (2008). Plan Colombia: Drug reduction goals were not fully met, but security has improved; US Agencies need more detailed plans for reducing assistance. Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. Report to US Senate. Villamizar, D. (1998). Un adios a la guerra memoría histórica de los procesos de paz en Colombia. Bogotá: Planeta. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ca t01040a&AN=pujbc.521665&site=eds-­live. Villamizar, D. (2018). Las guerrillas en Colombia una historia desde los orígenes hasta los confines. Bogotá: Debate. Villarraga, A. (2006). La Reinsercion en Colombia. Bogotá: Fundación Cultura Democrática, Asociación de Constructores de Paz. Vries, H. de, and Wiegink, N. (2011). Breaking up and going home? Contesting two assumptions in the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. International Peacekeeping, 18(1), 38–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.527506.

1 Continuous demobilisations State-­building without peace

Giustozzi (2012) identifies four main schools of thought on DDR: first, what he calls the neo-­liberal school, which emphasises the reintegration of ex-­combatants in economic activities, mainly in the private sector, as well as the establishing of democratic institutions and market liberalisation of the economy. Although this school is the dominant approach implemented by the UN and the World Bank, it has been criticised, as these expectations may be unrealistic in war-­torn societies that lack an economic system able to absorb the former fighters into the workforce. Second, the developmental school, which focuses instead on structural changes in power and economic relationships. It assumes that addressing the root causes of conflict is a precondition for the reintegration of ex-­ combatants. Depending on the author, this approach may or not be understood as compatible with neoliberal policies and market liberalisation. Third, the school of politics first emphasises the political will and international commitment to implement policies that provide both economic and personal security to the former fighters. Finally, there is the security first school that claims that power-sharing arrangements will create stability and democratisation through the inclusion of members belonging to opposite factions in the creation and reform of security forces, a process that has been called Security Sector Reform. However, Giustozzi argues that all these schools of thought have in common the neglect of the relationship between DDR and state-­building. Furthermore, he points out that the creation of DDR programmes does not necessarily contribute to state-­building, in particular when these institutions are part of short-­ term international interventions that dismantle the entire programme when the task or the funding ends (Giustozzi, 2012). Alternatively, this relationship emerges as more relevant when analysing the impact of DDR in the process of state formation: e.g. in the creation of modern welfare to benefits veterans of regular armies (Campbell, 2003), or in the extension and creation of citizenship rights (Pereira, 2003). Moreover, Baas (2012) and McMullin (2013, p.  7) have claimed that the debates on DDR tend to focus on the practice of multilateral organisms in the design and implementation of DDR programmes, which are not always related to the needs perceived by the governments or warring factions involved in the negotiation of the peace processes. Thus, it has been argued that international-­led

22   Continuous demobilisations DDR programmes prioritise the security concerns and economic agendas of the countries that dominate the international political order, while ignoring the social and political reality of the local governments and communities (Cramer, 2006, p. 258; Kriger, 2003, p. 20; Muggah, 2010, p. 2; Ottaway, 2002). In the same line, Ottaway (2002) posits that the intervention of international actors in war-­torn societies contradict the historical process of statebuilding. That is, while the international community expects quick transitions from collapsed societies to Weberian state models, in reality the internal processes of building institutions is slow and marred by violence. Wesley (2008) has also said that the concept of state-­building has been narrowly defined by the international community, limiting its meaning to activities related to international interventions in two areas of technical collaboration in the building of state institutions – mainly in regard to the creation of bureaucracy – or by assuming, temporarily, state functions for what has been called “failed states”. Thus, it is expected that in the long term, this replacement of state functions will somehow lead to an efficient and sustainable state apparatus that resembles western states in an idealised manner: security and the rule of law; transparent and efficient bureaucratic institutions; the provision of basic services to the population nationwide; democratic processes and norms; and a market-­led economy. Moreover, Berdal and Zaum (2012) have shown several problems in the understanding of state-­building by the international literature in war-­torn societies: (a) the policy-­making literature assumes the weakness of the state as the primary source of conflict, ignoring the various ways and processes through which the state is formed; (b) informal structures of governance and war economies that originated during the conflict are resilient and adaptable, thus interventions by outsiders – i.e. limited in time and resources – face important difficulties in transforming them to more western-­like forms of governance; (c)  political economy analyses are important to understanding the continuation of violence in post-­war situations; as well as (d) the continuities and breaking points in the relationship between state-­building and conflict; and (e) that the role of outsiders in post-­conflict situations is varied, and certainly international community interventions may have perverse and unintended effects. Call (2008) has defined state-­building as “actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation to society (which may or may not contribute to peace-­building)”. He also points out that although there are different approaches of what “state” means, there is some consensus on the basic Weberian definition of the monopoly of force and legitimacy through the building of institutions for policy-­making and management in basic areas of state functioning such as security forces, taxes, justice, financing, agriculture, trade, etc. Yet he argues that the relationship between state-­building and peace-­building is not necessarily straightforward, as tensions may arise in several areas, including the gaps between the terms negotiated in the agreement and the actual state capacity

Continuous demobilisations   23 and legitimacy to implement it in a sustainability manner; between short-­term and long-­term goals; between international and national interests; and between the motivations of the elites that negotiated the deal and the needs of the general population. Thus, although the classic definitions of the state by Weber, which focused on the monopoly of force, legitimacy and centralised power and by Tilly, which focused on the centralised and autonomous control of the population, imply the creation of functional links with the people in a defined territory, the forms of doing so varies across time and societies (Di John, 2008; Fritz and Menocal, 2007). Furthermore, [D]emocratisation and state-­building often push in opposite directions […]. State-­building calls for considerable concentration of power, authority, autonomy and competence in state political and bureaucratic institutions. Democratisation, on the other hand, has an inherent tendency to disperse power and slow down decision-­making processes through the creation of multiple veto players and checks and balances. (Fritz and Menocal, 2007) More to the point, Mann (2004) has also recognised that the development of Latin-­Amer­ican states has followed a different historical path than the process of state formation in Europe or the United States, this due to a lesser pressure over power elites by external military threat, thus creating fewer incentives to develop strong armies and fiscal systems. In addition, Latin-­Amer­ican countries are characterised by the continuation of sharp ethnic differences instead of the homogenisation of the population that has underpinned the idea of “nation” in western countries and by integration into the international and globalised economy rather than the need for developing an internal one. All such elements have generated higher levels of inequality and lower accountability when compared to Europe and the US. Thus, he posits that the challenge for Latin-­ America – and Colombia in particular – is the strengthening of democracy by reducing class inequality and incorporating the very heterogenic population as citizens within the state. In the same line, the Colombian researcher Fernán González (2016) has shown that, while the process of state formation in Europe was underpinned by the development of inter-­state wars, in Latin America, the internal wars played a major role in the process of state formation, but that did not guarantee the strengthening of central powers or control nor democratisation. Specifically, in cases such as the Colombian, the continuous creation of illegal armed groups had played a main role in negotiation and articulation between the regions and the central state. Thus, the continuous violence must be understood as an open-­ ended negotiation of economic and political relationships in which the different regions and their populations articulate in a subordinated manner to the national economy. In other words, the cost of monopolisation in the use of force and in the administration of justice in the country is high; thus the central state

24   Continuous demobilisations d­ elegates its functions to regional powers, which in turn results in a constant (and violent) negotiation with the regions and the development of mechanisms for indirect rule (González, 2016). Fritz and Menocal (2007) have posited that “the political settlement sits at the heart of the state-­building process”, as it creates links between the state and society and provides legitimacy to the rulers; yet these settlements are constantly renegotiated over time. This chapter then, makes a brief historical account of the process of mobilising and demobilising armies and groups in Colombia by analysing the peace settlements and the petitions made by the rebels for their demobilization and disarmament. In the first section I describe the settlement products of two civil wars between the Liberal and Conservative Parties (the Thousand Days War and La Violencia); in the second, I study the petitions made by the liberal and communists guerrillas for their demobilisation in 1953 and 1957; and in the third I study the peace settlements between the government and the guerrillas in the 1990s (M-­19, EPL, CRS, MAQL, PRT and the MIR-­COAR). This analysis shows that most of these peace processes achieved the successful dismantling and disarmament of rebel groups, yet the unfulfillment of the petitions and agreements on judicial benefits, security, political participation, development, state reforms and considerations for the victims played a role in the continuation of violence (see Table 1.1). Furthermore, the petitions of the armed groups made evident the weaknesses – or unwillingness – of the state in providing security, democracy and development, urging the building of state institutions and the extension of citizenship to wider parts of the population. This, despite the systematic killing of rebel leaders who had given up their arms and of other civilian leaders not necessarily linked with the rebels but voicing similar grievances.

The civil wars between the Liberal and Conservative Parties The modern Colombian state is the product of continuous cycles of mobilisation and demobilisation of armed groups. After its independency from Spanish rule in 1810, and throughout the nineteenth century, nine different civil wars took place in the country, apart from two wars against Ecuador and over 50 smaller conflicts between the regions or between them and the central government (Villamizar, 1998). These wars were to define the shape of the state on structural issues such as the model of governance (centralism or federalism), the relationship between the regions and the central state, the creation of two political parties (liberal and conservative) and the balance of power between them (González, 2016; Tirado, 1990). In consequence, Colombian history is also full of amnesties and pardons,1 as a way of solving the dridlock produced when the government could not obtain a decisive victory over the rebels (González, 2016). Certainly, more than 63 pardons and 25 general amnesties benefited different rebel groups between 1820 and 2001 (Aguilera, 2001). In 1885, the Conservative Party in power was successful in imposing the centralist model, eliminating the federal states and making them administrative

Continuous demobilisations   25 units named departaments, over which the President would have direct control through the establishment of bureaucracy at all levels (Tirado, 1990). The Liberal Party reacted by declaring a new war against the government to defend the federalist model, but they were defeated a year later. Thus, in 1886, a new constitution was drafted by the conservatives, establishing an authoritarian and centralist government, and in 1887 the Catholic church restored its lost political and economic power (González, 2016). All this resulted in the violent repression of grievances flagged up by the Liberal Party, such as freedom of expression, a free press, and the suppression of both fiscal monopolies and the centralised management of public finances by the National Bank. Additionally, in 1892, the representation of the Liberal Party in the Congress was reduced to one person and was completely eliminated by 1896 (Medina and Sánchez, 2003; Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001). Not surprisingly then, all these tensions ignited a new civil war between both parties that started in October 1899 and took the name of the Thousand Days War, and the country entered the twentieth century in the midst of one of the bloodiest conflicts in Colombian history, which extended throughout the entire territory. Despite the military superiority of the national army, the conservative government lost important battles.2 The conservative president San Clemente was deposed and replaced by Manuel Marroquín, who declared total war on the liberal guerrillas, officially naming them mere criminals instead of politically motivated groups, which allowed the expropriation of their property.3 The liberal forces had resisted the offensive but were divided into three different factions (from the provinces of Cauca-­Magdalena-Bolívar, Santander and Panamá) and after one big defeat at battle of Palonegro they fragmented even further into guerrilla-­type groups spread all over the country (Bergquist, 2001; Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001). In March 1902, the commander of the liberal group of Cauca was defeated by the conservative forces and decided to sign a peace agreement at the Neerlandia farm (in the department of Magdalena), and in June President Marroquín offered the rebels general pardon, considering the appalling conditions of the rebels, that they have been reduced to small and scattered groups, while the big and brave government army hunts them and defeats them everywhere, thus creating the proper conditions for the effective implementation of the good will measures taken by the government […] to speed the end of the war by pacific means.4 In fact, the other two liberal commanders were in control of their respective regions, yet they knew that without the support of Cauca troops they had no chance of military success; they thus accepted to sign two other peace settlements, on the USS Wisconsin (stationed in Panamá) and in the town of Chinácota (in the department of Santander). The liberals accepted giving up their weapons but not surrendering them to the conservative army (Neerlandia Treaty, point 3). They also committed to embrace the Constitution of 1886 and

Table 1.1  Comparison of peace settlements and petitions by rebel groups 1902–1994

The Thousand Days War 1899–1902

Conflict

Date

Factions

Settlement/offer of amnesty

Judicial benefits and security

Political petitions/ agreements

Reincorporation

24 October 1902

Conservative Government and Liberal Guerrillas lead by Gen. Rafael Uribe Uribe in Cauca

Neerlandia

Electoral district reforms to allow equal participation of the Liberal Party in municipal and department councils and the congress

21 November 1902

Conservative Government and Liberal guerrillas lead by Gen. Benjamín Herrera in Panamá

Wisconsin

•  Legal permits for freedom of movement (security guarantees) •  Amnesty to the combatants and pardon of prison sentences •  Legal permits for freedom of movement (security guarantees) •  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences

To include the liberal combatants in the Registry of Veterans, which entitles them to: •  Priority to obtain jobs in the government •  Scholarships (for them or their sons) •  100 hectares of land •  In the event of becoming a coloniser the Ministry of Agriculture would provide an alimony of one peso per day for ten months, and 300 pesos for building a house, farm animals, help in medicines, seeds and tools (Law 65, 1937)

21 November 1902

Conservative Government and Liberal guerrillas lead by Ricardo Jaramillo and Ricardo Tirado in Santander

Chinácota

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences •  To halt any form of repression •  The government would give back all private property confiscated during the war

•  Electoral district reform •  1989 Reforms •  The Liberal Party makes the commitment to respect the constitution and pursue reforms or amendments only by pacific means.

Transparent elections to congress and the discussion on the issues of the Panamá Canal, 1989 constitutional reforms, and reforms to the monetary system

Development petitions/ agreements

State reforms

Considerations for the victims

Liberal guerrillas of the Oriental Plains (Guadalupe Salcedo, Fonseca Brothers)

Rojas Pinilla Amnesty (demands before rendition)

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences •  Guarantees for the return of those displaced by the war to their places of origin •  Electoral district to elect at least one representative and one senator to the congress to represent the Oriental Plains

•  To officially •  To solve the recognise the rebels economic deficit of the rebels and the debts they owe to civilians

Liberal guerrillas of South Tolima (Loaiza Family, aka Mariachi, Arboleda, Santander and aka Peligro)

Rojas Pinilla Amnesty (demands after rendition)

•  Security guarantees for the ex-combatants and their families, and citizens in general

Liberal guerrillas of eastern and southwest Antioquia (Juan Franco)

Rojas Pinilla Amnesty (conditioned dismantling of the group without rendition)

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences •  Guarantees for the return of those displaced by the war to their land •  To halt any attack by the army •  The guerrillas are committed to respect the rule of law but the government should stop the state of siege (Estado de sitio)

•  Loans to prepare lands again for agriculture and the building of houses •  Help from the office of Rehabilitation and Aid in medicine, clothes

La Violencia 1949–1953

1953

La Violencia 1949–1953

1953

•  Building of roads in •  Reforms to the the Oriental Plains army by firing •  Provision of “bad” soldiers and medical care and reintegrating those medicines soldiers who were •  Free press fired due to their party affiliation •  To solve the situation of servicemen who joined the rebels and those who were imprisoned •  The government should control criminals and cow thieves •  Dismantling of counterrevolutionary troops and military bases •  Building of schools •  Control of and roads to criminality by the transport the government, with agricultural the help of the products to the guerrillas towns

•  To compensate Oriental Plains dwellers who are in poverty due the war •  To give back lands and properties that were bought at low cost due to the war •  Guarantees to bury the dead without repression

•  Credits and help for seeds and tools for those who want to colonise •  Land distribution and help for poor peasantry

continued

Table 1.1  Continued

La Violencia 1949–1953

Conflict

Date

Factions

Settlement/offer of amnesty

Judicial benefits and security

Liberal guerrillas of Santander (Rafael Rangel)

Rojas Pinilla Amnesty (conditions imposed by the army to accept rendition)

Communist guerrillas (South Tolima, north Huila, Sumapaz, Tequendama)

Rojas Pinilla Amnesty (demobilisation without rendition)

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences •  Security guarantees for the ex-combatants •  Amnesty to the combatants and pardon of prison sentences •  Legal permits for freedom of movement for the rebels and civilians (security guarantees) •  Economic aid for the return of those displaced by the war •  Withdrawal of government forces of the area •  Elimination and disarmament of conservative army forces (laureanistas) •  the government should stop the state of siege (Estado de sitio)

Political petitions/ agreements

Reincorporation

Development petitions/ agreements

State reforms

Considerations for the victims

•  Free market for the peasanty of Tolima •  Provision of tools and seeds for the peasantry •  Land distribution for cultivators •  Relief of taxes on roads and of the peasantry’s debts to the banks •  Building of roads and schools in rural areas •  Lowering the budget for war by 60%, to be invested in health and education •  Raising the wages of peasants and workers •  Control of prices of basic-living items •  Free press

•  A new constitutional assembly •  Free elections •  Revision of the treaty with the USA to recover military autonomy •  A policy of peace with the border countries •  Legal procedures against the perpetrators of violence and the thieves of the public money

•  Reconstruction of peasant homes and reparation of damages produced by the dictatorship

Conservative vs. Liberal

Benirdom, Stiges and San Carlos plebiscitum

1957 and 1958

Liberal guerrillas (Sumapaz)

Petitions to the Military Junta and to Alberto Lleras Camargo

La Violencia 1949–1953

24 July 1956

•  Amnesty for the guerrillas and pardons so they can go back to cultivating land without the threat of imprisonment or political retaliation •  To eliminate military controls, the need for movement permits, curfews and the militarisation of Sumapaz. •  Change of government personnel in the area

•  Respect for the constitution •  Separation of powers •  Power sharing •  Parity division of political posts (Ministry, Congress, etc.) •  Parity division of regulation bodies’ post (Supreme Court and Administrative Courts) •  Decisions by consensus (vote of 2/3) •  New elections to congress

•  Women’s rights •  Creation of civil •  Free press service system and •  Social and •  Public servants are economic not allowed to development to the participate in areas affected by politics violence •  Regulations of the •  Modernisation of wages of civil the state servants •  10% of the national budget to be invested in education

•  Compensation (credits and aid) for the damaged caused by the bombing, so guerrillas can go back to agriculture and build houses •  Devolution of land and livestock, property of members of the guerrillas

•  Aid and compensation for peasantry affected by violence and expelled from their properties •  Education plan, including the provision of books and furniture •  Roads and transport planning for agricultural products •  Monetary policies to halt the rise in the cost of living •  Technification of agriculture and fair salaries for workers

continued

Table 1.1  Continued Date

Factions

Settlement/offer of amnesty

Judicial benefits and security

Political petitions/ agreements

Reincorporation

Development petitions/ agreements

State reforms

9 March 1989

M-19 (national)

Final Agreement between the government and the M-19

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences

•  Demobilization and reinsertion plan by the National Council for Normalisation (NCN)

•  National Fund for Peace for the benefit of the community in the areas of operation of the guerrilla (workers’ rights, natural resources, production and market for agricultural products, food security, housing, health)

•  Reform of Justice •  A commission to study the problem of drugs

25 January 1991

PRT (national)

Agreement between the government and the PRT

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences

•  Institutional reforms •  New Constitutional Assembly •  Electoral district for the M-19 (which was replaced by participation in the Constitutional Assembly) •  Electoral district to allow participation of minorities in Congress •  To modernise procedures for elections (ballot card and privacy for voting) •  Legalisation of political parties •  Participation in the Constitutional Assembly (one speaker) •  Proposal for an indigenous police

Leftist guerrillas 1966–onwards

Conflict

Reinsertion Plan by •  National Plan for the NCN: Normalization •  Creation of NGO •  Investment plans Corpadec for communities •  Monthly alimony (with their of 75,000 pesos for participation in the six months design) •  Provision of health •  Education (primary and high school) •  Vocational training •  Government help in one of the following options: business projects, an undergrad education or employment

•  Actions by the government to halt paramilitary, sicario and private justice groups

Considerations for the victims

•  Creation of an office of human rights on the Atlantic Coast •  Creation of an office to make complaints in Sucre •  30 million pesos for the support of families of the victims •  One delegate in the commission to overcome the violence •  TV programme on the topic of forced disappearances

Leftist guerrillas 1966–onwards

15 February 1991

EPL (national)

•  Amnesty to the combatants and pardon of prison sentences

27 May 1991

MAQL (Cauca)

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences

•  Legalisation of political parties •  Participation in the Constitutional Assembly (two delegates)

Reinsertion Plan (NCN): •  Creation of NGO Progresar •  Monthly alimony of 150.000 pesos for six months •  Health provision •  Education (primary and high school) •  Vocational training •  Credits for business projects, undergraduate education •  Help for employment •  Participation in the Reinsertion Plan Constitutional (NCN) Assembly •  Creation of NGO (speakers) Sol y Tierra •  Monthly alimony of 150,000 pesos for six months •  Education (alphabetisation, primary and high school) •  Vocational training •  Credits for business projects •  Seven million pesos and an office for the NGO

•  Development plans for 2,000 million pesos •  Creation of municipal councils for peace to allow the participation of communities

•  Development plans for 600 million pesos •  Dental health programme

Implementation of the International Law of Human Rights by the government

•  A commission to overcome violence (development in areas affected by the violence) •  Aid to the victims

•  A commission to overcome violence (development in areas affected by violence)

continued

Table 1.1  Continued

Leftist guerrillas 1966–onwards

Conflict

Date

Factions

9 April 1994

26 May 1994

Settlement/offer of amnesty

Judicial benefits and security

Political petitions/ agreements

CRS (Sucre, Urabá)

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences

•  Two members to the Chamber of Representatives •  To foster laws on participation and citizen negotiation •  To activate the fund for citizen participation •  Pedagogy about the constitution and participation •  To strengthen the Institute for the Development of Democracy (Luis Carlos Galán)

MIR-COAR (Medellín)

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences •  Creation of community police •  Creation of security cooperative Coosercom (vigilante groups)

Reincorporation

Reinsertion Plan (NCN): •  Creation of an NGO Corporación Arco Iris •  50 million pesos for the housing fund of the NGO •  Education (alphabetisation, primary and high school) •  Psychological help •  Vocational training •  Credits for business projects •  A forum in Urabá to explain the reincorporation process •  Electoral districts Reinsertion Plan to include their (NCN): political party in •  Creation of an the Medellín NGO Fundación Council para la •  Participation in the Convivencia council boards Ciudadana •  Participation in •  Health provision meeting for •  Education planning and social (alphabetisation, investment of the primary and high neighborhoods of school) operation •  Psychological help •  Vocational training •  Credits for business projects (3.5 million per combatants) •  250 million pesos for the NGO

Development petitions/ agreements •  To foster citizen proposals •  Development plans in the areas affected by the conflict (plans for social investment) •  Land distribution in Ovejas, Sucre

•  Social investment in Medellín for poor neighborhoods •  Infrastructure (roads public services, education, health, leisure and sports) •  Housing programmes for 200 million pesos •  Mechanism for participation and discussion of community problems •  Vocational training for the youth •  Programmes for reconciliation and pacific coexistence

State reforms

Considerations for the victims •  A forum to study the situation of human rights in the country

20 June 1994

FFG

•  Amnesty for the combatants and pardon of prison sentences

•  Electoral districts in the areas of operation of the FFG

•  Creation of an NGO Colombia Viva •  40 million pesos for the reinsertion process and business projects •  Hiring ex-combatants to promote the peace process

Sources: Peace settlements full text or fragments in (Diaz & Villamizar, 1999; Londoño, 2003; Medina & Sánchez, 2003; Sánchez, 1984; Sánchez & Aguilera, 2001; Villamizar, 1998; Villanueva, 2014).

34   Continuous demobilisations the rule of law, as well as to use legal procedures to pursue changes to the Constitution (Chinácota Treaty, point 11). In exchange, the conservative government were to give general pardon to political prisoners, amnesty to the rebels and guarantees of personal security to both (Wisconsin Treaty, points 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, Chinácota Treaty, points 4 to 9). More significantly, the peace settlement gave political rights to the Liberal Party: (a) the electoral districts in Congress (circunscripciones electorales) would include candidates from all parties;5 (b) representatives of the Liberal Party could participate in electoral institutions as candidates, and in overseeing the process, including the counting of ballots; and (c) the liberals could aim for future and equal participation in the municipal and department councils and the Congress (Neerlandia Treaty, point 14 and Chinácota Treaty point 5). Additionally, new elections for Congress would be called; once installed the Congress would address issues of national interest such as the ­separation of the Department of Panamá and reforms to the monetary system (Wisconsin Treaty, point 7). Finally, the judiciary obtained the monopoly in its function of processing criminality (Wisconsin Treaty, point 5). In his analysis of this peace process, Bergquist (2001, p. 391) coined an illustrative aphorism – “[T]he liberals, by losing the war, won the peace” –, meaning that despite their military defeat, they obtained political participation and were able to make important structural changes in the long term, including two amendments to the constitution in 1905 and 1910. Nonetheless, this peace settlement also reinforced the control of the Conservative Party over the government – they remained in power until 1930 – and of the Catholic Church over society – imposing education and moral systems, as well as attacking any source of liberal or modern ideas, including the free press or science groups. Also significant, this process drew the modern borders of Colombia by avoiding the separatism of some regions that had defended the federalist scheme (Cauca, Antioquia and Santander); by dismissing any proposal of joining again in a federation with neighbouring countries; and by the loss of Panamá, which became an independent country in 1903 following a political manoeuver by the United States (Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001). It is also worthy of note that although these peace agreements brought political stability to the country, the situation of the soldiers was largely neglected. The social sectors participated in different ways in the war: either being forcibly recruited and instrumentalised by the political elites (in particular, indigenous groups), voluntarily choosing sides looking for social mobility and citizenship rights through the drafting in to one of the factions (Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001); or the peasantry would simply join the side chosen by their patrons and landowners, which would give them some access to the political arena (Sánchez, 1984; Sánchez and Meertens, 1985). However, the peace settlements included only a lame statement on the reestablishment of the soldiers’ “rights and obligations” (Wisconsin Treaty, point 6). Furthermore, it took five years for imprisoned soldiers and rebels to obtain general pardon for their political crimes, as long as they could demonstrate their former military link to the liberal or conservative armies.6 To make it worse, the

Continuous demobilisations   35 veteran status of the rebels was only recognised more than 30 years later, when the government, this time in the hands of the Liberal Party, enacted two laws7 to reinstate and provide military ranking to the liberal troops that had fought in the wars, and thus were entitled to benefits such as: support to pursue basic education (Art 5, Law 65/1937), 100 hectares of land or extra-­benefits for their participation in the colonisation programme8 (Paragraph Art. 6, Law 65/1937); and a lump sum equivalent to one year of salary depending on their military ranking (Law 7/1938). In 1930, the hegemonic power of the conservatives came to an end when the candidate for the Liberal Party, Enrique Olaya Herrera, won the presidential elections. This shift in the balance of power reignited some of the old political skirmishes, but the expansion of the violence was halted by an unexpected international threat: the invasion in 1932 by Peruvian troops of the border city of Leticia in the Amazonian forest. This attack on sovereignty prompted nationalist feelings and collaboration between both political parties (Medina and Sánchez, 2003). After recovering the invaded territory in 1934 and signing a peace settlement with Perú, the political tensions were contained and the Liberal Party remained in power for three more presidential terms. Also significant is that the Liberal Party was the driving force behind the process of industrialisation that brought about economic growth and modernisation in the country during the first three decades of the twentieth century. However, this process created a progressive problem of class differentiation that became a breeding ground for the development of workers’ movements in the 1920s and the creation of the Communist Party in 1930 (González, 2016; Sánchez and Meertens, 1985). Throughout this period, the Liberal Party adopted contradictory approaches, including simultaneously voicing grievances from the working class and engaging in alliances with the conservative elites in power. This resulted in divisions within the Liberal Party that deepened when they finally attained the presidency. In addition, the development policies implemented by the liberals for the industrialisation and modernisation of the agriculture sector (Revolución en Marcha), created huge expectations amongst the working class and the rural peasantry that were not fulfilled in the long term and instead resulted in the exponential grow of urban and rural poverty (Sánchez and Meertens, 1985); while the conservatives attacked these policies by saying that were just a vehicle for communist infiltration into the country (Karl, 2018). In this context, the liberal candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitán emerged as the representative of the popular classes and against the elitist and traditional liberal sectors; such division allowed the Conservative Party to win back the presidency in 1946. Nonetheless, Gaitán defeated Gabriel Turbay – a member of the liberal elite – in an internal election in 1947, becoming general director of the Liberal Party and the official candidate for the next presidential elections to take place in 1950. Being such a powerful figure, Gaitán’s assassination on 9 April 1948 triggered a new civil war and ruthless confrontations between highly fragmented liberal and conservative factions. This period adopted the illustrative name of La Violencia.

36   Continuous demobilisations The commission for the study of La Violencia concluded that even before 1948, the conservatives instrumentalised the use of violence to gain back electoral control over many towns (Guzmán, Fals-­Borda, and Umaña, 1964). In the midst of the confrontation, the Conservative Party once more installed a one-­ party system through the imposition of two presidents: first Mariano Ospina Pérez and then Laureano Gómez, in 1950, who unleashed strong repression against liberal and communists groups, or any civilian population that was not conservative (Karl, 2018; Sánchez and Meertens, 1985). This context was the origin of guerrilla-­type groups that were organised as forms of resistance and self­defence to counter the brutal attacks by government forces that included the army and the police, as well as paramilitary groups known as chulativas, pájaros or aplanchadores, depending on their area of operation. These guerrillas were scattered groups, with liberal ideology, that operated in the Oriental Plains (departments of Caquetá, Meta, Casanare, Arauca, Guainía Vichada, Vaupés), south of the department of Tolima, west and south-­east of the department of Antioquia and the department of Santander; while some communist-­ideology guerrillas were formed in south-­Tolima and the Sumapaz area (Sánchez and Meertens, 1985; Villamizar, 2018). In 1952, the Oriental Plain guerrillas and representatives of the conservative government had signed a deal to create the Pacifying Command (Comando de Pacificación); its function was to halt the violence and to provide guarantees for the exercise of citizenship rights by liberal sympathisers.9 However, this agreement never came to be implemented, as the period of La Violencia did not end in victory or a peace settlement: by 1953 both parties were worn out and fragmented and the party leaders in Bogotá had lost control over the armed groups in the regions. Additionally, and despite its widespread use of violence, President Gómez had lost his grip over the government, as he was ill and had appointed his minister of war as a replacement. Thus, a military junta led by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla took power in a coup d’état underpinned by sections of the Conservative Party and supported by some of the most powerful members of the Liberal Party (Medina and Sánchez, 2003; Villamizar, 2018). The liberal guerrillas in the Oriental Plains had also developed a strategy to unify and to organize military action, as well as beginning the implementation of programmes for social development (Villamizar, 2018). However, this strategy never came to fruition, as Rojas offered a cessation of hostilities and amnesty to all guerrillas, also starting a process of rebuilding and developing the regions affected by the violence (Special Commission for Rehabilitation); this involved the building of infrastructure (roads, airports, jails, housing, bridges, etc), which had only partial success, as explained below. After a brief period of peace, Rojas increased the repression of civil movements and the press and became involved in scandals of corruption and reckless management of public finances, all of which undermined the support from the conservative and liberal leaders that had put him in power (Villamizar, 2018). In 1956 the liberal leader and former president Alfonso López Pumarejo, ­proposed an agreement to the Conservative Party that resulted in two peace

Continuous demobilisations   37 s­ ettlements: the Benirdom Agreement was signed in 1957 and created an alliance that was able to jointly organise a massive national strike that forced Rojas out of power and out of the country, but the power remained in the hands of a military junta (Karl, 2018; Medina and Sánchez, 2003). Then, a year later, the Stiges Pact defined the details of a power-­sharing agreement named the National Front. The National Front had two main aims: to dismantle the dynamics of polarisation that had underpinned the violence between the two parties; and to impede the continuation of the military junta and Rojas’ power. Also of significance was that the agreements were signed on the understanding by both parties of the need to modernise and transform state institutions, as well as the urgency for economic development in rural areas and the agriculture sector to improve the living conditions of the peasantry (Dávila, 2002; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2007; Hartlyn, 1993; Hirschman, 1963). Therefore, both parties agreed to renounce electoral competition and embrace a system designed on the basis of the equilibrium of power: on the one hand, the bureaucracy was divided in half at all levels, including Congress, ministers, the judiciary and the political jobs in the regions; on the other, the presidency was to be filled by liberal and conservative candidates alternatively for four presidential periods – 16 years (Bagley, 1979; Dávila, 2002; Hartlyn, 1993). Additionally, it was agreed that all decisions taken in public office must be by consensus rather than a simple majority, meaning that, for instance, laws could only be approved with no less than two thirds of the votes in Congress (Bagley, 1979, p. 141; Dávila, 2002; Villamil, 2015). Then, both parties called for a plebiscite to endorse the decisions written into both agreements and other structural changes: women would obtain the same political rights as men (Art 1); Congress and ministries’ positions would be divided in half (Art 2 and 4), as well as the positions in the Supreme Court of Justice and the State Advisory Board (Art 12); any decision in public office had to obtain two thirds of the vote (Art 3); the creation of a civil service system whereby public employees were appointed on the basis of meritocracy and were prohibited from participating in politics (Art 5, 6 and 7); the regulation of the salaries of Congress members and public officers (Art 9); and 10 per cent of national income being destined for education (Art 11). This peace settlement certainly brought stability and ended more than 100 years of confrontation between the Liberal and Conservative Parties, but it made it difficult to pursue structural changes, as one party (or a faction of it) could easily block any policy by imposing restrictions on the president, the Congress or in public offices (Bagley, 1979; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2007). For instance, the dynamics of the National Front halted the agrarian reform (Carranza-Franco, Gómez, Ospina and Parada, forthcoming), and restricted participation in politics at any level to the two parties alone (Dávila, 2002; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2007). In sum, the peace processes between the Liberal and Conservative Parties gave shape to the modern Colombian state: including the definition of the borders; a centralised model of governance rather than a federal one; created the basis for depolicised and meritocratic bureaucracy; and brought in other

38   Continuous demobilisations changes such as political rights for women and the public financing of education. It is also worthy of note that in both cases the peace settlements simply neglected the situation of ex-­combatants, as there was no, or negligible, interest in providing them with support for reintegration or benefits to alleviate their situations after the war. Yet the continuation of the conflict cannot be attributed merely to them as individuals.

The origin of the guerrillas Rojas offered an amnesty to the guerillas, but as a form of rendition rather than a negotiating process. In a letter to the commander, Guadalupe Salcedo, two rebel commanders recall a meeting with representatives of the military and the government to negotiate their demobilisation: at first, the rebels were able to present their grievances, which revolved around the lack of worker’s rights. However, their counterparts quickly lost their patience and began shouting that the rebels were already defeated and thus had no option other than unconditional surrender, threatening the commanders with death or imprisonment and promising the ultimate annihilation of the entire rebel group.10 As a matter of fact, the guerrillas were in no position to negotiate; therefore, between June and October of 1953, some 19 commanders and 6,500 troops gave up their weapons11 (Barbosa, 2003; Medina and Sánchez, 2003; Villamizar, 2018). Sánchez (1984) has proposed five different ways in which the guerillas responded to the amnesty proposals: unconditional renditions (liberal guerrillas of south Tolima, led by the Borja brothers and Rangel); groups that presented demands after rendition (liberal guerrillas of south and north Tolima, led by commanders Santander, Arboleda, Mariachi, Peligro and the Loaiza Family); groups that presented their demands before rendition (Oriental Plains ­guerrillas); those that proposed the dismantling of the group but without surrendering to the army (Antioquia guerrillas); and those that made proposals of demobilisation just to gain some time for the military strengthening and ­reorganising of troops (communist guerrillas of south Tolima, north Huila, Sumapaz and Tequendama). The clear, common demand from all these groups was amnesty, pardon for prisoners and security guarantees from the government. Basic requirements for reinsertion or reintegration of ex-­combatants depended on the willingness of each commander to negotiate benefits for his troops. For instance, Commander Eduardo Fonseca negotiated his own amnesty and personal benefits with the army, abandoning his own troops. Other commanders asked for benefits for their combatants: economic help and security guarantees for those who wanted to return from exile (south Tolima guerrillas); economic relief from taxes and debts that were acquired during the war (liberal south Tolima guerrillas); credits to build houses that had been destroyed and to prepare abandoned lands for cultivation; and a visit from the Office of Rehabilitation and Aid, in the expectation that it would provide medicine and clothes to the rebels and their families (Oriental Plains and communist guerrillas).

Continuous demobilisations   39 The guerrilla commanders also flagged up grievances about the lack of economic development in the areas affected by the violence, asking for: the building of infrastructure and the provision of basic education and health systems (Oriental Plains, liberal and communists guerrillas); support for agriculture, including credits for colonisation, and provision of land and seeds (Antioquia guerrillas); free-­market conditions to sell agricultural products; the provision of land for poor peasants; the construction of infrastructure and roads; higher wages for the working class; lower living costs; the lowering of the taxes for war; and more investments in roads and schools (communist guerrillas). This, in addition to some political demands: press freedom, democracy and no repression of unions (Oriental Plains and communist guerillas); a new constitution and elections (communist guerrillas); a new electoral district to represent the Oriental Plains in the Congress and new public offices in the area for the administration of justice; as well as the provision of identity documents for citizens (Oriental Plains guerrillas) (Medina and Sánchez, 2003; Sánchez, 1985). These demands were also included in Rojas’ rehabilitation plan for post-­ conflict development that would be implemented by two offices: on the one hand, the Office for Rehabilitation and Aid,12 whose functions were: (a) to provide credits for the building of houses and to help in the preparation of abandoned land for cultivation; (b) to provide sanitation, welfare, housing and goods to the areas affected by violence; (c) to carry out an inventory of abandoned land, goods and business that had been destroyed and people who had been dispossessed by the war; (d) to establish procedures for the return of people who had been forcibly displaced and for those who wanted to reclaim dispossessed land; (e) and to provide medical health to those injured in the war. On the other, the Institute for Colonization and Migration, that replaced a similar structure created in 1948;13 its function was to pursue economic and financial projects in the rural areas by fostering the colonisation of empty lands (baldíos) and the expansion of the agrarian frontier. However, both institutions were underfunded and did not provide the promised aid to ex-­combatants or the victims of the violence, nor development to the regions affected by the violence (Villamizar, 2018). In fact, the ex-­combatants only received paltry benefits: Two minutes after I gave up my weapon, the most cruel humiliation: I received a paper bag with a pound of beans, a shirt, and a pair of trousers […] a straw hat, peasant shoes, a box of matches, a pound of sugar, [a box of] toothpicks. All a joke. (Alape, quoted in Barbosa, 2003) In terms of the demobilisation and disarmament of armed groups, Rojas’ amnesty was a success, as it resulted in massive surrender and the giving up of weapons by the liberal guerrillas. However, overall, these process have been considered a failure for reasons outside the control of the individual combatants: first, the rehabilitation plan was never implemented; second, the security guarantees, amnesties and pardons were not always fulfilled and some guerrillas were

40   Continuous demobilisations killed after the amnesty by the army, the police or other government sympathisers (e.g. the ex-­combatants from the Borja brothers group) or were arrested by the army, arguing that they had not surrendered but had been caught in action (e.g. Commander Eduardo Franco); third, Rojas progressively unleashed violence and repression against social movements, student and peasant organisations, communists groups and the areas where the rebel communist guerrillas had not surrendered (Barbosa, 2003; Londoño, 2003, 2011; Medina and Sánchez, 2003; Sánchez, 1984). In 1955 Rojas sent a military attack to the area of Sumapaz – on the border between south Tolima and Cundinamarca –, which included the bombarding of several towns considered guerrilla strongholds (most famously Villarrica) and the deployment of paramilitary groups and death squads that did not distinguish between civilians, social leaders or the rebels (Sánchez, 1984). After months of enduring this military offensive, thousands of peasants were forced to flee, including the communist guerrillas and their families (Villamizar, 2018). Far from pacifying the area, as Rojas had thought, these bombings and the subsequent forced displacements (known as Columnas en Marcha) led to the creation of towns far from the reach of the government (in other areas of Tolima or deeper in the forest of Meta, Caquetá and Huila) becoming breeding grounds for the communist guerrillas and which later on were accused of being “independent republics”, as explained below.  After Rojas fell in 1957, the military junta remained in power for a few months and offered another amnesty to the guerrillas still in operation, and when the liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo was appointed as the first president of the National Front in 1958, he proposed yet another amnesty, with two aims: to give legitimacy to the groups – mainly liberals but also some conservatives – that fought against Rojas and the transformation of communist guerrillas into agrarian movements (Sánchez, 1984). Juan de la Cruz Varela, a prominent social liberal leader of the agrarian movement in Sumapaz, had negotiated the amnesty with Rojas, but due to the repression and an assassination attempt, he remobilised the liberal guerrillas in the area. Then, in 1957, he again negotiated demobilisation, this time with the military junta, which stopped the military operations and promised to start the rehabilitation plan in the area, although the actual amnesty was only granted a year later by Lleras (Londoño, 2003). Varela’s petitions revolved around security guarantees to the peasantry in Sumapaz: that the guerrillas could go back to cultivating the land without the threat of imprisonment or political retaliation; as well as the elimination of military controls, the need for movement permits, curfews and the militarisation of the area; and the replacement of government personnel working there. In regard to the combatants, he asked for compensation (in credits and aid) for the recovery of damages caused by the bombings, so the guerillas could go back to agriculture and rebuild their houses; and for the government to devolve land and livestock. In addition, he presented Alberto Lleras with other petitions in regard to development: aid and compensation of the peasantry affected by the violence and expelled from their properties; an education plan, including the

Continuous demobilisations   41 provision of schools, books and furniture; roads and transport for agriculture products; monetary policies to halt the rising cost of living; the technification of agriculture and fair salaries for workers (in Londoño, 2003). There was a short period of peace after the fall of Roja’s disctatorship and the recovery to democracy (Karl, 2018). However, the National Front restricted participation in politics at any level to the two parties alone, excluding all other citizens, and the repression and violence of the army against the agrarian movement, students and other social organisations continued. Furthermore, attacks on the most important rebel leaders took place after Rojas: Commander Guadalupe Salcedo was shot dead in June 1957, a month after Rojas left power and the country; and other rebel commanders were murdered in 1960 (Sánchez, 1984). Similarly, Juan de la Cruz Varela was the victim of an assassination attempt in 1960, when he was already working in public office as representative of the Liberal Rebel Movement (MRL) – a dissident of the Liberal Party, but entirely legal (Londoño, 2003). In fact, Lleras Camargo was in the process of negotiating an amnesty with the communist guerrillas, but everything came to an end in January 1960 when one of the main representatives of the guerrillas and a member of the Communist Party, Jacobo Prías Alape, aka Charronegro, was killed by troops of another guerrilla leader (aka Mariachi) linked to conservative forces of the army and the police14 (Sánchez, 1984; Villamizar, 2018). Prías was replaced by Pedro Antonio Marín, aka Manuel Marulanda Vélez or “Tirofijo”, who became FARC commander for more than 40 years until his death in 2008. Marulanda was a communist guerrilla commander who had reintegrated successfully, and supported the peace proposed by the Liberal party, but due to factors such as the killing of Prias Alape, the fragmentation of the government’s authority and the low capacity of the government of controlling rustle, he decided to rearm (Karl, 2018). In 1951, the liberal guerillas were split into two groups: the “cleans”, who were still loyal to the Liberal National Dean, and the “dirty”, who no longer followed the orders of the Liberal Party; and there was a third group named the “commons” or communist guerrillas (González and Marulanda, 1990). In any case, the “cleans” were prone to violence towards all three goups of the population (Karl, 2018). Tirofijo himself argued that the coalition between liberal and communist guerrillas did not work for several reasons: on the one hand, disappointment with the Liberal National Dean that, from Bogotá, took wrong military and political decisions that resulted in the victory of the conservatives in several battles; on the other, the liberal guerrillas, in particular the Loaiza brothers, did not agree with the military discipline and the political organization of the communists, and Gerardo Loaiza did not accept sharing the leadership with the communists as part of the Joint Directorate. Thus, while the Loaizas and the “cleans” demobilised in 1953, the communist guerrillas focused on strengthening their political bases between 1954 and 1957 (Marulanda, 2015). The groups that did not demobilise were declared “bandits” by the government and most of them were finally defeated by the army in 1965 (Sánchez,

42   Continuous demobilisations 1984; Sánchez and Meertens, 1985). However, the government’s inability in establishing a monopoly of force in the areas where the communist guerrillas operated, was interpreted by the Conservatives as part of a communist plan to obtain control of the country by the creation of “independent republics”. It could be said that this discourse was just rethoric to increase a fear of communism that was not, in reality, so strong. Thus, all these accusations were instrumentalised to instigate fear and force the Liberal government to launch military attacks on those areas. In 1962 the government ordered a military attack on the area of Marquetalia and, in 1964, decided to launch a military attack named Soberany Operation, with the support of the United States as part of its campaign against communism. However, the communist guerrillas had been able to put together an armed structure that grew and gathered strength by organising the abundant and impoverished peasant population. Thus, despite the army’s military superiority, they were able to survive and respond, also developing a military structure and strategy that was consolidated two years later when the guerrillas took the name of FARC (Ferro and Uribe, 2002; Marulanda, n.d; Villamizar, 2018). Also significant was the triumph of the Cuban Revolution and the expansion of the communist movements in Latin-­America, prompting the creation of other communist movements and guerrillas in Colombia. First, in 1964, the Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN) was formed by a group of students and young activists who had travelled to Cuba to receive training in guerrilla warfare. The next year, the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) emerged from Maoist dissidents of the Communist Party and in 1965 was transformed into a guerrilla group. In any case, the role of ex-­combatants in the relapse into violence needs to be nuanced, as, of all the guerrillas that demobilised, only a small group of ­communist rebels remained armed and operating, while all the other liberal guerrillas and conservative armed groups were killed or vanished; this, despite the lack of a reintegration strategy and the ineffective development projects that affected rebels from all sides equally. González (2016) has pointed out that along with a system of political exclusion and unresolved agrarian underdevelopment, other factors need to be taken into account when explaining the continuation of armed groups, such as the success of the Cuban revolution and its effect on Latin América, and the stubbornness of the Colombian elites in not addressing structural problems. Similartly, Gutiérrez Sanín (2013) has pointed out three factors for the continuation of violence: undefined property rights, privatization of security, and central powers that were permeated by – and created alliances with – violent groups.

Peace with the guerrillas in the 1990s In 1970, Rojas Pinilla had returned to the country and was presidential candidate for a new political party he had created in alliance with some conservative politicians, the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO). It was the last term of the National Front and the turn of the conservative candidate, Misael

Continuous demobilisations   43 Pastrana. The elections took place on 19 April and, after a partial counting of votes, the registry office sent several reports saying that Rojas Pinilla was leading the voting by a narrow margin (5%).15 Then, the official radio broadcast was interrupted and the next morning the registry office said that the final count of votes gave the presidency to Misael Pastrana. Rojas accepted the result, but the feelings among urban youth of having been defrauded and politically blocked triggered the creation of another guerrilla: April 19 Movement (M-­19). This was the only one of an entirely urban nature and formed by middle-­class students who were not necessarily sympathisers of communist ideology. Then other small guerrillas, with less military power, emerged: in 1974 the Worker’s Self-­ Defences (ADO); in 1982, the Revolutionary Worker’s Party (PRT), from other dissidents from the Communist Party; in 1983, the indigenous guerrilla Armed Movement Quintín Lame (MAQL); and in 1990, the Socialist Renovation Current (CRS) from dissidents of the ELN. Finally, in 1989, a self-­defence group was created in Medellín to protect citizens from increasing drug and gang criminality, and later on was transformed into a vigilante-­type group named the Independent Revolutionary Movement Armed Commands (MIR-­COAR) ­(Villamizar, 2018). Pastrana and the liberal president who followed, Turbay Ayala, adopted a military approach against the guerrillas and implemented repressive policies against social movements and the political opposition. In 1982, a conservative president, Belisario Betancur, took power, although he put forward some very liberal ideas; he understood that the guerrilla struggle was the product of widespread social inequality, poverty and the restriction of political participation to the two governing parties. On the one hand, he fostered political reforms for the opening-­up of democracy, and for the decentralisation and modernisation of  the state. These reforms included the popular elections of mayors and governors,16 instead of them being appointed by the President as had been established by the National Front (Gutiérrez Sanín, Pinto, Arenas, Guzmán, and Gutiérrez, 2009, p.  8). On the other, Betancur gave a new treatment to the armed conflict, prioritising peaceful negotiations over military actions (Medina and Sánchez, 2003). Betancur offered a general amnesty to the guerrillas and started negotiations with the FARC, the M-­19 and the EPL (Law 35 of 1982). In 1984 the FARC and the government signed an agreement at La Uribe (in the department of Meta)17 and the guerrillas agreed to a unilateral cessation of hostilities and of any military action: kidnapping, extortion and other terrorist acts (La Uribe Agreement, points 1 and 3). It was also stated that the rebels would begin a one-­year process to reorganise its structure in three dimensions – social, political and economic; while the government promised to guarantee security and stability in the areas affected by the violence (La Uribe Agreement, point 6). The government would then implement a new rehabilitation plan to attend to the victims of violence and the general population living in the areas affected by the conflict including: (a) pursuing policies for the modernisation of the political system (political reform, guarantees for the exercise of political opposition, popular election of mayors, political control, to enhance the system

44   Continuous demobilisations of justice and public administration, etc); (b) the implementation of agrarian reform, and the provision of services to the peasantry, in order to improve the quality of life in the rural areas and agricultural production; (c) the strengthening of social movements (Communal Action Boards,18 peasant and indigenous organisations, cooperatives, trade unions and worker’s movements); (d) improving health, education, housing and employment systems; (e) guarantees for the exercise of citizenship; and (f ) the promotion of forms of reconciliation19 based on the slogan of “forget and forgive” (Medina and Sánchez, 2003). On 23 August 1984, a demobilization agreement was signed with ADO,20 and a cease of fire with the M-­19 and the EPL.21 The guerrillas agreed to a cessation of hostilities and to stop military operations, while the government promised: (a) to delegate the office of the Attorney General to investigate the cases of forced disappearances and the phenomenon of the emerging paramilitary groups; (b) to hear and process the denunciations of human rights violations; (c) to guarantee civil and social rights, including freedom of expression and the right of assembly, organisation and mobilisation; (d) to pursue the opening-­up and modernisation of politics and the strengthening of democracy; (e) to organise a “Big National Dialogue”, a mechanism for public discussion regarding issues such as the agrarian problem, worker’s rights, urban development, justice, education, universities, health, public services and economic development. A year later, the Peace Commissioner and two dissidents from the ELN units signed yet another demobilization agreement22 to start the reintegration process. However, apart from the demobilization of ADO and the two ELN dissidents, these agreements did not hold. The FARC announced the creation of its political party: the Patriotic Union (UP), a year after La Uribe Agreement. Dudley (2004) has argued that the creation of the UP was part of the FARC’s expansion plan: the FARC was trying to mix military and political mechanisms in order to increase their impact in the political arena. Dudley also clarifies that many members of the UP were not aware of the guerrillas’ duplicitous intentions and later publicly condemned the FARC’s violence. Thus, alongside their armed opposition to traditional politicians, subnational elites and the army, the guerrillas created ambiguity by simultaneously engaging in both: expanding militarily whilst also trying to consolidate a viable, legal political proposition. This, he claims, blurred the distinction between armed guerrillas and civic movements (Dudley, 2004). However, it is also clear that this ambiguity was exploited by illegal political groups and traditional parties to impede political opening-­up: for instance, a day before the first election of mayors in 1988, 42 people were killed in the Urabá area; the victims included banana workers, union members and even students of a school committee (Romero, 2003, p.  197). The paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño later on explained in his memoires that, as it was difficult to attack the FARC, killing UP members became a means to counter the guerrillas (Aranguren, 2002, p. 73). By 1987 there were already 1,598 fatal victims who had been members of, or sympathisers of, the UP (Romero quoted in Villamizar, 2018). To a lesser extent, the guerrillas were also competing with each other: for instance, the EPL demobilised in 1990 and was transformed into the political

Continuous demobilisations   45 group “Esperanza, Paz y Libertad”.23 However, this legal political party retained certain links with armed militias. When the UP and Esperanza, Paz y Libertad campaigned politically for electoral support in Uraba, the FARC and the EPL militias also engaged in fatal attacks against members and supporters from each of the legal political parties (Romero, 2003, p. 164). Also, importantly, the other guerrillas expanded and increased their military offensive and, in 1985, the M-­19 conducted an operation to besiege the Palace of Justice, the most important institution of the judicial system in the country, located in downtown Bogotá, directly in front of the Congress and a few meters from the presidential palace. The army responded by attacking the building, leaving no room for negotiation,24 which resulted in the destruction of the entire Palace of Justice and hundreds of civilians were killed or disappeared. After this, Betancur could not maintain his peaceful approach to the armed conflict in the country; while the FARC went back to its military activity and, along with the ELN, started a process of military expansion, becoming stronger in both numbers of troops and military tactics (Ferro and Uribe, 2002; González, 2016). Despite the failure of Betancur’s peace process, the next president, the liberal Virgilio Barco, signed a peace settlement with the M-­19 in March 1990, which successfully demobilised its troops. Then a new president, César Gaviria, also signed peace settlements to demobilise other guerrilla groups: the PRT in January, EPL in February, and the MAQL in May 1991, and a small guerrilla, Ernesto Rojas Command, in March 1992. Then two years later, in 1994, another three groups gave up their weapons: the CRS, a small dissident group of the EPL named Frente Francisco Garnica, and the MIR-­COAR in Medellín. These demobilisations transformed the political landscape again by prompting the creation of democratic institutions that increased and facilitated state access, control and accountability at the national and subnational levels. The changes included the call by a constitutional assembly to draft a new constitution, and the creation of the Fiscal Office, the Constitutional Court, the Inspector General Office and the Office for the Defence of the People.25 In the peace agreement, the political petitions of M-­19 included: the strengthening of the democratic institutions by creating mechanisms of participation for both the general population and the demobilised guerrillas; the creation of one special electoral district for the guerrillas (Circunscripción Especial de Paz) and one for the participation of minority groups in the Congress (Circunscripción Nacional y Territorial); pursuing electoral reforms; to modernise the procedures for voting (including a ballot card and privacy at the time of voting). The EPL lead the initiative of the new Constitutional Assembly, in which the M-­19, EPL, PRT and MAQL participated as legal political parties and gave birth to a new Constitution in 1991. In addition, the settlement signed with the CRS states its participation in the Chamber of Representatives for two periods; and mechanisms for citizenship participation in government decisions (Acción Popular). Finally, the MIR-­COAR peace settlement also demanded special electoral zones in order to participate as a political group in the Council of Medellín and in the Communal Action Boards.

46   Continuous demobilisations For the reintegration of ex-­combatants as such, the peace agreements stated that the demobilised would obtain: basic education, vocational training and credits to pursue graduate courses; a monthly alimony for six months; healthand psychological care; money to start their own business (2 to 3.2 million Colombian pesos); support for job-­seeking; security guarantees; and a demand by the CRS for land. The government also created the National Council for Normalization (NCN), as a type of DDR structure that would provide benefits to the ex-­ combatants and help them in their process of reintegrating into the civilian life. However, the guerrillas also created their own NGOs to support the reincorporation of their own members: Progresar Foundation (EPL), Sol y Tierra Foundation (MAQL), Arcoiris Foundation (CRS), Foundation for the Citizenship Life in the North-­West Neighbourhoods of Medellín (MIR-­COAR) and Foundation Colombia Viva (Francisco Garnica Front). These NGOs also served to canalise the money given to the ex-­combatants into common projects for their economic reintegration and became crucial to the process of social reintegration and community development, as will be explained in the third chapter. In regard to development, the M-­19 petitions were: the creation of a fund for peace (Fondo Nacional para la Paz) to pursue social projects in the areas of operation of the former guerrillas; the renovation of policies regarding participative planning, natural resources, agricultural production, labour rights and wages; the creation of markets for the products produced by peasants; policies for food security, housing and health systems. The EPL and the PRT demanded the creation of regional plans for the development of communities, with a participatory approach; while the EPL asked for the creation of peace councils as mechanisms of participation and communal decisions. The MAQL asked for the participation of the community in development plans in areas affected by conflict in the department of Cauca and for the implementation of oral health care. The CRS pressed for regional development, community participation and social investment in the department of Sucre. Finally, the MIR-­COAR also asked for social investment in the Medellín neighbourhoods affected by the violence; the building of infrastructure (roads); the provision of basic services (schools, health and sports facilities); and security systems such as community police and vigilante cooperatives, which were named Coosercom. In regard to human rights, the demands were: reforms to the justice system; research on the problem of drug trafficking (M-­19); research on, and the implementation of, programmes to overcome the root causes of violence; aid to the victims of violence; the implementation of the International Humanitarian Law in the country (EPL); forums to analyse the human rights situation in the country (CRS and MAQL, PRT); forums to explain the peace process in Urabá (CRS); to create an office of human rights on the Atlantic coast; to establish offices for attending to citizenship complaints on human rights violations in Sucre; regular reports on government action against death squads and other paramilitary groups; and the proposal of an indigenous police (PRT).

Continuous demobilisations   47 It could be said that these peace settlements were far more complex compared to the petitions made by the guerrillas in the 1950s, but they also revolved around similar topics: social and economic development, political participation, human rights, basic conditions for democracy and citizenship. As before, the individual benefits for the ex-­combatants were linked to the building of a basic state structure that could provide wider communities with economic and social development and security. Furthermore, the lump sums for economic reintegration and business projects were requested as credits, not as donations; this would change in later DDRs. These demobilisations were once again successful, as the guerrillas gave up their weapons, but the political violence continued, this was because the democratic reforms prompted by the peace settlements impacted enormously on the power of the traditional parties and elites in the regions (Romero, 2003, p. 40). Although political reform and decentralisation aimed to strengthen democracy and local autonomy, it had the unintended effect of the creation of illegal paramilitary groups to counter both the guerrilla threat and the opening-­up of democracy. Romero (2003) has shown that the confluence of three different factors contributed to the creation and multiplication of paramilitary groups. First, there was burgeoning military competition among the different armed groups that were operating in the country at the time: the FARC, the ELN and a small EPL dissident group that did not demobilise. Second, the policies for democratic decentralisation and reforms nationwide led to a polarisation of the political landscape. Third, and as a consequence of the other two factors, came the fragmentation of the state, between military forces and civil authorities and between central government and regional power elites. Also, significantly, drug-­ trafficking began to expand in the country and provided sizeable economic resources to finance the military power of both guerrillas and paramilitaries, as well as prompting the creation of private armies to fulfil the security needs inherent in criminality (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón, 2005; Romero, 2003). The expansion of the guerrillas, the FARC in particular, greatly impacted the area of Magdalena Medio, as the FARC overwhelmed the business communities, and the wealthy living in rural areas, with extortion, kidnapping and selective killings (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón, 2005, p. 10). In 1982, in Medellin, a meeting was held among some 250 people who considered themselves victims of the guerrillas, including cattle ranchers, industrial farmers and businessmen. This meeting instigated the creation of ACDEGAM in 1984 (Aranguren, 2002, p. 76), which oversaw both military and civic duties, focused on an anti-­subversive campaign, by joining with two other forces: the sicario organisation formed by drug-­traffickers26 and sympathising members of the Colombian Army (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón, 2005, p. 11). During the 1990s, the Castaño brothers tried to organise the various groups into a proto-federation named the United Colombia Self-Defences or AUC. The paramilitaries succeeded in creating a heterogeneous coalition that catalysed the security needs of many impacted groups: the regional elites, politicians and many sections of the military, along with the drug-­traffickers, found a common cause in

48   Continuous demobilisations the counterinsurgency discourse that collapsed the guerrilla threat and the state modernisation together into the same enemy (Romero, 2003, pp. 41, 227). Paradoxically, some ex-­guerrilla members also entered into an alliance with paramilitary groups, for a variety of reasons: for instance, due to the security threat posed by the FARC, some EPL members who had not demobilised turned to criminality and joined the paramilitaries in their campaign of territorial expansion; others aimed to gain military leverage against the political expediency of the UP and the military insurgency of FARC (Aguirre, 2010, p. 16; Romero, 2003, p. 178; Villarraga, 2006, p. 153). More significantly, the paramilitaries were also willing to receive deserters and unhappy members from guerrilla groups: the paramilitary leader Carlos Castaño said that his troops included hundreds of ex-­ military personnel and ex-­guerrillas from groups such as the EPL, FARC and ELN (Aranguren, 2002, p. 7). Furthermore, some ex-­guerrillas climbed up their respective paramilitary hierarchies, for instance: Antonio Lopez (aka Job, ex EPL) became spokesman of the AUC and Luis Eduardo Cifuentes (aka El Aguila, ex FARC) led the Bloque Cundinamarca (Gutiérrez Sanín and Jaramillo, 2004, p. 27).26 Although the ex-­guerrillas did not necessarily constitute a large proportion of the paramilitary groups, they contributed massively to subsequent political discourse and to the implemention of social and community programmes in areas under paramilitary control (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón, 2005, p.  27; Romero, 2003, p. 164). The inclusion of political and social aims in their discourse enabled the paramilitaries to gain wider social support and to create a political identity independent from their constituent parts: members of the army, of the agrarian elites or drug-­traffickers (Romero, 2003, p. 246) As a result, the paramilitaries became a main element in the renewal of, and increase in, the violence in the country: although the new parties formed by ex-­ guerrillas were highly successful against their traditional liberal and conservative counterparts in winning democratic elections, few of their elected candidates were able to exercise their mandate or even be inaugurated into their offices. Many politicians – mainly, but not exclusively, those from new leftist parties – fell victim to selective killings by the guerrillas who had not demobilised, or by the paramilitaries, the drug-­traffickers and the national army (Ávila, 2010, p. 102; Romero, 2003, p. 91). By the mid 1990s the political parties formed by ex-­rebels, but also those created by civic movements, were wiped out through the systematic murder of their politicians, members and sympathisers. The selective assassination of members of civic movements and political parties formed by former rebels has been widely documented (Villarraga, 2006; GMH, 2013; Gómez-Suárez, 2014). Most famously, Jaime Pardo (UP) was killed in 1987, and three candidates for the presidential elections in 1990 were assassinated: Luis Carlos Galán (Liberal), and Carlos Pizarro (M-­19) and Bernardo Jaramillo (UP). The death toll in the country was triple the average of other Latin Amer­ican countries and had quadrupled since 1980 (Romero, 2003, p. 27). In 2005 the political influence of the paramilitary groups within government was uncovered in what has been called the “para-­politics” scandal: abundant

Continuous demobilisations   49 evidence revealed that many politicians, public servants and influential figures had engaged in unlawful alliances with these groups and other drug-­traffickers. Far from being marginal, these alliances were present within many democratic institutions – including Congress, the National Secret Service (DAS27) and offices inside the judiciary system – and hence greatly influenced the approval of laws and the provision of services from a variety of public institutions (López, 2010; López and Sevillano, 2007; Acemoglu et al., 2009, p. 2).28

Conclusion: state-­building in the midst of the political genocide As Villarraga has argued,29 the amnesties and giving up of weapons are part of the dynamics of war rather than an ending of it. The intensity of guerrilla warfare demands levels of commitment as well as physical and mental conditioning that are difficult to maintain over long periods of time; subsequently guerrillas typically move through a more or less constant cycle of recruitment and desertion (Cárdenas, 2005, p. 13; Pinto et al., 2002, p. 1). Equally, the rebel groups may demobilise because they have reached a point of exhaustion, the realisation by the commanders of the impossibility of winning the war or for fear that it will increase beyond their control. However, the Colombian state has been unable to completely defeat the rebels and has faced enormous difficulties in obtaining a monopoly of force and in guaranteeing security to the demobilised or to citizens. This chapter has shown that the relapse into war does not depend completely on the successful, or massive, demobilization of ex-­combatants. There are other elements that contribute to the continuation of violence: first and foremost, repression and violence from government itself; second, the failure of government in pursuing development programmes or in implementing effective democracy and citizenship rights; third, the reaction of local powers to modernisation, political opening-­up and changes in the balance of power; and, finally, the introduction of illegal economies, which, in the case of Colombia, was drug-­ trafficking. It is the political leaders who can take the decision to reignite or halt violence, regardless of the situation of the ex-­combatants. This is not to say that the low-­ranking ex-­combatants have no agency in their reintegration, but certainly, once the leaders have taken the decision to dismantle the armed group or not to continue with military action, there is little room for an individual to continue the political fight by violent means. In both civil wars between the Liberal and the Conservative Parties, the benefits, or even the concern, for the former combatants of both sides was little or non-­existent: after the Thousand Days War the soldiers from both factions were dismissed; those who belonged to the National Army – the conservatives – continued receiving a salary, while those who were part of the rebel troops – the liberals – had to wait 35 years to be recognised and receive some benefits for their participation in the war. Nevertheless, peace was maintained through a

50   Continuous demobilisations variety of circumstances – including an international war – until 1948. Then after La Violencia, reintegration programmes were neglected, as the political parties focused instead on solving their own disputes and created an alliance to overthrow a third force that had unexpectedly removed them from power: the dicatatorship of Rojas. It could be said that an analysis of the reintegration of the low-­ranking combatants should also take into account two elements: one the one hand, the willingness or capacity of commanders to ask for benefits for their troops. The old, liberal and communist guerrillas were too weak to continue the fight and were forced to surrender; thus the leaders either abandoned their troops or had no leverage to ask for a good deal. In consequence, the benefits for the troops were reduced to an amnesty and, if lucky, a paper bag with some basic items: clothes, food and a box of matches. Conversely, in the peace process with the guerrillas in the 1990s, the commanders were able and keen to negotiate benefits for their troops that were also linked to the continuation of their political project through the creation of political parties and NGOs. On the other hand, it is clear that the reintegration of ex-­combatants is deeply related to improvement of the social and economic conditions of society in general. The disappointment at unfulfilled demands seems to have less to do with individual benefits for combatants than with the rehabilitation and development plans that never came to fruition. It is symptomatic that after more than 100 years, the grievances flagged up by many different rebel groups (the Liberal Party, the liberal guerrillas, and the communists guerrillas) remain the same: the provision of basic services for the general population (education, health, road infrastructure); the basics of democracy (participation in power-­structures and freedom of the press, expression, assembly and mobilisation); access to economic development, including the basic conditions of capitalist development (freedom of commerce, a market system for peasant production and commerce, and policies on land and agriculture); and electoral districts for representation in Congress of armed groups and other citizens (circunscripciones). Furthermore, all these petitions were also the core part of the negotiation and peace settlement between the FARC and Santos’ government, as will be explained in the next chapter. In sum, the reintegration of ex-­combatants cannot be isolated from the peace settlement that resulted in their demobilization. In the Colombian case, the continuation of grievances by different groups makes evident that the poor and marginalised communities that were left behind became the breeding ground for recruitment into illegal groups. Also, remarkably, the rebels have had a main role in the process of state-­building. The agreements between the liberals and the conservatives and between the government and the guerrillas (liberal or communist) have shaped the Colombian state, through constant negotiation about the mechanisms and institutions that allow participation from all sides of the political spectrum, as well as developing accountability, democracy and citizenship rights. Recalling Bergquist’s statement: the rebels may lose the war, yet they obtain political gains in the long term.

Continuous demobilisations   51

Notes   1 An amnesty forgives the crime, while pardon forgives the pending sentence to those on the run or already in prison.   2 Most remarkably, the battle of Peralonso battle gave the liberals control over Bucaramanga.   3 14 January 1901; Diario Oficial No. 11401 in (Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001).   4 Decree No 933, 12 June 1902; Diario Oficial No. 11696 (Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001).   5 In Colombia each of the national circunscriptions defines the access to the Senate; while the territorial one provides at least two places in the Chamber of Representatives, or more, depending on the number of votes.   6 Law 27 of 1907, Diario Oficial Año XLII. No. 12964. 4 June 1907 and General Pardon to Political and Common Crimes in The Last Civil Wars Law 4 of 1908, Diario Oficial No. 13362, 14 August 1908 (Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001).   7 Law 65 of 1937, 13 October; Law 7 of 1938, 25 February (Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001).   8 The Ministry of Agriculture would provide a daily allowance of one peso per family member for ten months, money to build a house, some farm animals, a lump sum for cutting down the forest and preparing the land for agriculture and some help in medicines, seeds and tools.   9 Proceedings of the conference between the rebel leaders of the Oriental Plains and Mr José Gnecco Mozo. (Medina and Sánchez, 2003), El Tiempo, 19 April 1952. 10 Letter to Guadalupe Salcedo from E. Franco Isaza and R. Sandoval M, 15 August 1953. 11 From Antioquia, Boyacá, the Oriental Plains, Santander and North Santander, the Magdalena river, Tolima, Huila, Alto Sinú, Sumapaz and two liberal guerrillas from south Tolima by commander Isauro Yosa (el Mayor Lister) and commander Alfonso Castañeda (Capitán Richard). 12 Decreé 1725 of 1953, 2 July; and decreé 2266 of 1953, 22 September. 13 Institute of Taken Land, Colonisation and Defence of the Forrest. Intituto de Parcelaciones, Colonizaciones y Defensa Forestal. 14 Aka Mariachi was a former liberal guerrilla leader, but at the time he had changed sides and was linked to conservative paramilitary groups. 15 The following numbers from the radio station Todelar: at midnight Rojas had 1,235,679 votes and Pastrana 1,121,958 (Villamizar, 2018). 16 Acto Legislativo 01, 9 January 1986. www.registraduria.gov.co/Se-­cumplen-25-anos-­ de-la-­primera.html. 17 Agreement by the Peace Commision and the FARC, 28 March 1984. 18 JAC (Junta de Acción Comunal) and JAL (Junta de Acción Local) are committees that are elected by each community in the rural areas or groups of neighbors in the cities. 19 Fraternidad democratica. 20 Agreement between the Peace Commision and Autodefensa Obrera (ADO). 21 Agreement for the Ceasefire and National Dialogue. 22 Agreement between the Peace Commision and the ELN units Simón Bolívar and Antonio Nariño, December 1985. 23 The name of the guerrilla was Ejercito Popular de Liberación (Popular Freedom Army). Following their demobilisation, they kept the same acronym in Spanish but with the altered meaning: Hope, Peace and Liberty. 24 On 27 February 1980, the M-­19 also carried out the siege of the Embassy of the Dominican Republic, kidnapping 16 high-­level ambassadors and high-­level diplomats that were attending the embassy. The government was forced to negotiate and the siege lasted until 25 April, when the diplomats were released safely and the guerrillas took a plane to Cuba.

52   Continuous demobilisations 25 Semana, 8 July 2008. 26 See also Contravia: 24; El Espectador 8 September 2014. 27 Acromyn in Spanish. Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad. 28 See Semana, 11 September 2005, Votaciones atípicas en las elecciones de congreso del 2002. 29 Interview Villarraga, 4 July 2012.

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Continuous demobilisations   53 Dávila, A. (2002). El Frente Nacional: una transición democrática reformista y conservadora. In: Democracia pactada: El Frente Nacional y el proceso constituyente de 1991 en Colombia. Lima: Institut français d’études andines. Di John, J. (2008). Conceptualising the causes and consequences of failed states: A critical literature review. Crisis States Research Centre, LSE, London. Dudley, S. (2004). Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla Politics in Colombia. London: Routledge. Ferro, J. G., and Uribe, G. (2002). El orden de la guerra las FARC-­EP entre la organización y la política. Bogotá: Universidad Javeriana. Fritz, V., and Menocal, A. R. (2007). Understanding state-­building from a political economy perspective. Overseas Development Institute, 21. Giustozzi, A. (2012). Post-­conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-­building Back In. London: Routledge. GMH (2013). Basta Ya!. Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y Dignidad. Grupo de Memoria Histórica. Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional. Gómez-Suárez, A. (2014). Genocide, geopolitics and transnational networks: Con-­textualising the destruction of the Unión Patriótica in Colombia. London: Routledge. González, F. (2016). Poder y Violencia en Colombia. Bogotá: Cinep. González, J. J., and Marulanda, E. (1990). Historias de Frontera. Colonización y guerras en el Sumapaz. Bogotá: Cinep. Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2007). ¿Lo que el viento se llevó? los partidos políticos y la democracia colombiana (1958–2002). Bogotá: Editorial Norma. Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2013). El Orangután con Sacoleva. Bogotá: IEPRI, Debate. Gutiérrez Sanín, F., and Barón, M. (2005). Re-­stating the State: paramilitary territorial control and political order in Colombia (1978–2004). Working Paper No. 66. Crisis States Research Centre (LSE). www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/ crisisStates/. Gutiérrez Sanín, F., and Jaramillo, A. (2004). Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security – the case of Medellín, Colombia. Environment and Urbanization, 16(2), 17–30. Gutiérrez Sanín, F., Pinto, M., Arenas, J., Guzmán, T., and Gutiérrez, M. (2009). Politics and security in three Colombian cities. Working paper 44. Crisis States Research Centre, LSE. Available at www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/. Guzmán, G., Fals-­Borda, O. and Umaña, E. (1964). La Violencia en Colombia: estudio de un proceso social. Bogotá: Tercer Mundo. Hartlyn, J. (1993). La política del régimen de coalición: la experiencia del Frente Nacional en Colombia. Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes. Hirschman, A. (1963). Journeys Toward Progress. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund. Karl, R. (2018). La Paz Olvidada. Bogotá: Lerner. Kriger, M. (2003). Guerrilla Veterans in Post-­war Zimbabwe. Cambridge: CUP. La Uribe Agreement. Acuerdo entre la comisión de paz y las FARC. Signed 28 March 1984. In M. Medina and E. Sánchez (eds.), Tiempos de Paz. Acuerdos en Colombia 1902–1994 (pp. 311–314). Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2003. Londoño, R. (2011). Juan de la Cruz Varela: sociedad y política en la región de Sumapaz (1902–1984). Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Londoño, R. (2003). De la autodefensa armada a la resistencia cívica en la región de Sumapaz. In: Tiempos de Paz. Acuerdos en Colombia 1902–1994 (pp.  119–135). Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá.

54   Continuous demobilisations López, C. (2010). La refundación de la patria, de la teoría a la evidencia. In: C. López (ed.), Y refundaron la Patria. De cómo mafiosos y politicos reconfiguraron el Estado Colombiano (pp. 29–79). Bogotá: Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, Randon House Mondadori. López, C. and Sevillano, O. (2007). Balance Politico de la Parapolítica. Revista Arcanos, 11(14), 62–87.  Mann, M. (2004). La crisis del estado nación en América Latina. Desarrollo Económico, 44(174), 179–198. Marulanda, M. (2015). Resistencia de un Pueblo en Armas. (Vol. Tomo I). Colombia: Ocean Sur. Marulanda, M. (n.d.). Cuadernos de Campaña. El Abejón Mono. McMullin, J. (2013). Ex-­Combatants and the Post-­Conflict State. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Medina, M., and Sánchez, E. (2003). Tiempos de Paz. Acuerdos en Colombia 1902–1994. Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. Muggah, R. (2010). Innovations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy and research. Reflections on the last decade. NUPI Working Paper 774. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Available at https://core.ac.uk/download/ pdf/52114333.pdf. Neerlandia Treaty, signed on 24 October 1902. In M. Medina and E. Sánchez, E. (eds.), Tiempos de Paz. Acuerdos en Colombia 1902–1994 (pp. 57–60). Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2003. Ottaway, M. (2002). Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states. Development and Change, 33(5), 1001–1023. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.t01-1-00258. Pereira, A. (2003). Where do all the soldiers go? Veterans and the politics of demobilization. In: D. Davis and A. Pereira (eds.), Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation (pp. 96–117). New York: Cambridge University Press. Pinto, M., Vergara, A., and De La Huerta, Y. (2002). Diagnóstico del programa de reinserción en Colombia: Mecanismos para incentivar la desmovilización voluntaria individual. Departamiento De Planeación Nacional. Archivos De Economía. Doc. 11. Banco De La República. www.Dnp.Gov.Co/Portals/0/Archivos/Documentos/DEE/ Archivos_Economia/211.PDF. Romero, M. (2003). Paramilitares y autodefensas. 1982–2003. Bogotá: Planeta. Sánchez, G. (1984). Raíces históricas de la amnistía o las etapas de guerra en Colombia. En Ensayos de historia social y política del siglo XX/Gonzalo Sánchez G. Bogotá: El Áncora Editores. Sánchez, G., and Aguilera, M. (eds.) (2001). Introduction. In: Memoria de Un País en Guerra. Los Mil Días 1899–1902 (pp. 19–29). Bogotá: Planeta. Sánchez, G., and Meertens, D. (1985). Bandoleros, Gamonales y Campesinos. El Caso de la Violencia en Colombia. Bogotá: El Áncora Editores. Tirado, Á. (1990). Colombia: Siglo y medio de bipartidismo. In: J.  O. Melo (ed.), Colombia Hoy. Perspectivas hacia el siglo XXI (pp.  104–177). Bogotá: Tercer Mundo. Villamil, C. (2015). La Reforma Agraria del Frente Nacional. De la concentración parcelaria de Jamundí al Pacto de Chicoral. Bogotá: Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Villamizar, D. (1998). Un adios a la guerra memoría histórica de los procesos de paz en Colombia. Bogotá: Planeta. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ca t01040a&AN=pujbc.521665&site=eds-­live.

Continuous demobilisations   55 Wesley, M. (2008). The state of the art on the art of state building. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 14(3), 369–385. https://doi. org/10.5555/ggov.2008.14.3.369. Wisconsin Treaty, signed on 21 November 1902. In M. Medina and E. Sánchez (eds.), Tiempos de Paz. Acuerdos en Colombia 1902-1994 (pp. 61–64). Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2003.

2 DDR design Security or development

The main debates in the design of DDR programmes revolve around the relationship between security and development. Although DDR alone cannot solve the conflict or prevent the violence, it is a contributing factor for establishing a secure environment and subsequent social recovery and development: “[t]he objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-­ conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin” (UNDP, 2006). Similarly, the World Bank claims that “DDR programs and SSR [Security Sector Reform] share the objective of contributing to a countrywide […] process toward peace and stability and to creating better conditions for development” (MDRP, 2003). However, Jennings (2008, p. 13) has argued that, in reality, this smooth continuity between security and development does not take place as their goals “[…] may neither coincide nor be mutually realisable”. Scholars and policy-­makers have debated whether DDR interventions should be security-­oriented (traditional or minimalist) or development-­oriented (second-­generation or maximalist); as well as the correct balance between targeting ex-­combatants with reinsertion aid (combatant-­based) or extending that aid to recipient communities and victims (community-­based) (Muggah, 2010, p.  14). On the one hand, minimalist approaches address the management of immediate security risks in post-­conflict settings. Hence, emphasis is made on preventing and controlling the risk ex-­combatants may pose in terms of their return to arms or their involvement in criminality. On the other, maximalist approaches imply long-­term and more ambitious goals for reconstruction and development, comprising activities to stimulate the economic and social recovery of war-­torn societies as a whole (Muggah, 2010, p. 2; Torjesen, 2009, pp. 412–416). Minimalist approaches have been criticised because they have proved insufficient – even counterproductive – in preventing the resumption of conflict or the continuation of violence in other forms. It has been argued that DDR programmes tend to be designed as short-­term technocratic interventions: restricted to achieving immediate security goals and insufficiently linked to other critical areas such as reconstruction, security-­sector and judicial reform, peace-­building or development (Jennings, 2008, p.  11; Muggah, 2010, p.  2; PDS, 2009; Thruelsen, 2006). For instance, Berdal (1996, p. 23) has argued that failures in

DDR design   57 implementing, planning and funding DDR programmes only served to exacerbate the political tensions in Angola and Somalia. Thus, practitioners and policy-­makers on international peace-­keeping missions started to question the effectiveness and ethics of restricting their activities to providing short-­term and security-­oriented aid (Berdal, 1996, p.  23; Muggah and Baaré, 2009, p. 227). Although originally, multilateral operations for “peace-­keeping” were deployed with a mandate for maintaining a minimum of security in post-­conflict situations by imposing a military presence and reducing the number of armed groups that threaten the monopoly of force, the emphasis has shifted to broader developmental aims in “peace-­building” and “state-­building” missions (Kriger, 2003, p.  3; Muggah, 2010, p.  1; Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen, 2009, p.  270; Rufer, 2005, p.  27). This prioritising of development, in turn, mirrors changes in the international community’s own precepts and discourses, which have progressively moved towards stressing positive peace as opposed to negative peace (Özerdem, 2009, p. 45) and focusing on human security rather than military security (PDS, 2009, p.  13). The subsequent turn towards a maximalist approach has highlighted the need for long-­ term and multi-­institutional actions to address human security, going beyond mere military security, and producing overarching reforms in the security, political and economic realms (Gomes Porto, Alden and Parsons, 2007, p.  32; Ottaway, 2002; PDS, 2009, p. 13; SIDDR, 2005, p. 10). However, making the decision between addressing security-­oriented versus development-­oriented goals may be contingent on the political environment, the nature of the peace settlement, the expectations of the warring factions, and the political arrangements that were negotiated throughout the DDR process. Therefore, while the international community requests (and expects) security from war-­torn states as a precondition to development – sovereignty and monopoly of force, as much as human security – national governments may have other priorities, namely, their military goals and the consolidation of territorial control. In addition, while the demobilisation and disarmament phases are, for the most part, framed as a military problem, the reintegration phase is generally taken on by civilian institutions (Berdal, 1996, p. 48; MDRP, 2010, p. 50; Rufer, 2005, pp. 28, 31; Specker, 2008, p. 3). In practice, then, the different phases of DDR can become disconnected as the institutions and organisations involved do not necessarily form a unified body or pursue a coherent policy. Also significant is the fact that the debate between minimalist and maximalist approaches is linked to the question of targeting. Sending aid directly to the ex-­combatants and their families is deemed to be a means of preventing their involvement in criminal or war-­related activities. However, it has been argued that this constitutes a divisive strategy, creating resentment in the communities and perceptions of reward and impunity towards perpetrators (Muggah, 2010, p.  8; Özerdem, 2009, p. 54; PDS, 2009, p. 13). Additionally, choosing certain people over others may unintentionally strengthen the position of the commanders by legitimising the armed groups and reifying the perpetrators of violence (Schulhofer-­Wohl and Sambanis, 2010, p.  25; Torjesen, 2009, p.  415).

58   DDR design McMullin (2012, p.  29) has pointed out that ex-­combatants are portrayed by the international community, and in the DDR literature, as a threat, and, at the same time, as the subject of resentment from the community; both narratives thus present former fighters as a group wholly separate from the community and bestow on them sole responsibility for the conflict. Moreover, targeting the demobilised population with differential treatment may have the contrary effect of inhibiting or delaying reintegration by artificially creating differences between the ex-­combatants and the community that do not stand up in reality (Gomes Porto et al., 2007, p. 3). In areas where going to war is seen as a social norm, reintegration programmes may stigmatise those who would otherwise be “ordinary boys”, no more marginalised, no less educated or no less poor than their compatriots in their own communities of origin (Boas and Hatloy, 2008, p. 52). Likewise, Özerdem (2012, p. 60) argues that the engagement of existing community structures in the reintegration process has a positive impact on the development of civil society and on the ex-­combatants’ participation in the structures of local governance. Thus, integrated approaches to DDR may factor in the situation of all the affected groups (Gomes Porto et al., 2007, p. 29; Karamé, 2009, p. 506; Muggah et al., 2009, p. 197; Pugel, 2009, p. 90). More to the point, the benefits provided as part of reinsertion and reintegration – far from remaining politically neutral – could be co-­opted and exploited by local political elites as instruments to consolidate their own rule (McMullin, 2013, p. 36). The decision to include or exclude certain groups from the status of demobilised, and the subsequent economic and judicial benefits, must therefore also be understood within the (often slippery and/or tainted) context of negotiation of the peace settlement and the political and security needs of the warring factions. Also significant is the fact that the criteria that define who attains demobilised status and its corresponding benefits are typically subject to significant challenges throughout the implementation of DDR programmes. Certainly, it is difficult to estimate the total number and characteristics of combatants beforehand, which prevents appropriate planning and funding of reintegration aid. Commanders may lack any accurate inventory of troop numbers, or may inflate them on purpose; limited or lax criteria may permit the registration of civilians; and surveys or assessments of demobilised populations are often inadequate (Özerdem, 2009, p.  178). On the one hand, relaxed criteria may encourage civilians to seek out those benefits on offer to the combatants, or they may buy or obtain weapons of their own in order to be included in the programmes. On the other, restricted criteria may unwillingly deny demobilised status to those combatants located at the very bottom of the military hierarchy – women and children in particular – who have little chance of demonstrating their affiliation to the group and hold limited access to weapons (Jennings, 2007, p. 209, 2008, p.  20; McMullin, 2013, p.  240; Özerdem, 2009, p.  178; Söderström, 2011, p.  337). Giustozzi (2012, p.  9) has also argued that “focusing on the state-­ building and state formation aspects in the post-­conflict settlement is probably

DDR design   59 more productive than wasting energy and resources in the pursuit of the chimera of full disarmament”. Crucially in terms of this research, the DDR literature often overlooks how the criteria to provide reintegration benefits are contingent with the rationale behind the negotiations by the leaders of the warring factions. Kriger (2003, pp. 21–22) has argued that the decision on “who” to demobilise and “how” plays a major role in strengthening or weakening the position of the ruling party or coalition, and is thus intrinsically linked to the aims that political actors expect to obtain from a peace settlement. Furthermore, during the DDR process, military commanders acquire the power to decide who is included or excluded from demobilised status and so obtains the economic and judicial benefits; this in turn may simply reinforce the vertical and patron–client relationship between the leader and his troops, as well as between armed factions and the civilian population (Munive and Jakobsen, 2012, p. 369; Özerdem, 2009, p. 19). This chapter analyses the relationship between the security/development approach to DDR, focusing on the politics behind the demobilisation and the decision as to who to target with reintegration benefits. The first section describes Uribe’s DDR, showing that the focus on ex-­combatants responded to two different yet complementary strategies within the framework of the Policy of Defence and Democratic Security: on the one hand, the negotiation and collective demobilisation of paramilitary groups, in which the criteria for obtaining demobilised status were relaxed to include drug-­lords seeking judicial advantages; on the other hand, the individual demobilisations of former guerrilla members originated as a counterinsurgency strategy to weaken the rebels by encouraging desertion as a source of intelligence-­gathering. The second section turns to the FARC-­Santos peace negotiation, showing that discussion focused on the wider development of communities (rural reform, political participation, the solution to the drugs problem and the treatment of the victims of the armed conflict), yet the judicial situation, in particular in regard to drug trafficking, defines the DDR design. In both processes, the criteria as to who would participate in the reintegration programme was defined by the political negotiations between the faction leaders; thus the ACR or the ANR play no part in this decision.

Uribe’s DDR process In 1998, the candidate for the conservatives, Andrés Pastrana, won the presidential elections due to the expectations he had created with regard to the peace talks with the FARC. He accepted FARC’s demand of the complete demilitarisation of an area of 42,000 km2 in the departments of Meta and Caquetá, a traditional FARC stronghold, in order to carry out peace dialogues close to the town of San Vicente de El Caguán. However, after four years of intense negotiations, it became clear that the FARC understood the demilitarisation zone as an opportunity to strengthen their troops and military power. They continued carrying out bold military actions such as the kidnapping and murder of former Minister of Culture, Consuelo Araujo Noguera. The straw that

60   DDR design broke the camel’s back was the kidnapping of an entire plane to capture its most notorious passenger Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem in 2002, a few months before new presidential elections. Thus, Pastrana decided to put an end to the peace talks and ordered the army to take back military control of the area. As a new battle between the army and the FARC unfolded, Ingrid Betancourt who was carrying out activities for her independent campaign to the presidency, was left behind and the FARC kidnapped her along with her collaborator Clara Rojas.1 In such a context of the catastrophic failure of the peace process, the liberal candidate Álvaro Uribe Vélez won the presidency by promising Colombians the taking back control of security and the ultimate military defeat of the FARC. The Policy of Defence and Democratic Security was Uribe’s national security programme:2 its main aims were to recover the monopoly of force into the hands of the state by attacking criminality and the outlawed armed groups operating in the country. It was also assumed that establishing nationwide security would lead to opportunities for development: Economic development and employment depend on a security environment that allows investment, commerce and the spending of municipal resources to benefit the communities, all of which are subject of permanent predation by the armed groups.3 However, although provision was made for actions addressing the protection of citizens, social and economic development, as well as the efficiency and transparency of institutions, the security goals were prioritised through a counterinsurgency offensive underpinned by two military strategies: the Plan Colombia4 and the Plan Patriota. The Plan Colombia was a counterterrorism programme of US military aid merging the war against drugs and the attacks on guerrilla groups under the same strategy. Its budget of US$6.13 billion allocated US$4.859 billion to military aid, US$1.031 billion to promote social and economic justice and US$238 million to promote the rule of law (US, 2008, p. 15). According to its initial design, the European Union was to finance the development component by funding these latter two as part of promoting justice and the rule of law, but ultimately withdrew its offer of aid, partly due to concerns over human rights violations and the para-­political scandal (Gutiérrez Sanín and Rincón, 2008). As a result, the Plan Colombia was devoted almost entirely to its security goals, abandoning its development aims to a large extent (Gutiérrez Sanín and Rincón, 2008; Hylton, 2010; Oehme, 2010; US, 2008). The Plan Patriota, meanwhile, was the national military strategy to attack FARC-­controlled areas near Bogotá and in the southern departments of Caquetá, ­Guaviare and Meta (US, 2008).5 Some analysts agree that this privileging of the military goals was entirely justified, given the threat to the state posed by the illegal armed groups; yet this also comes with a warning that the emphasis on security should quickly evolve into institutional reforms and social development programmes that consolidate

DDR design   61 the security gains in the long term (Marks, 2006; Mason, 2003). Elsewhere, the case has been made for a more nuanced analysis of the outcomes of the policy in three main areas. First, both the Plan Colombia and the Plan Patriota aimed to improve the efficiency of the armed forces by increasing troop numbers as well as the overall level of professionalisation. To do so, the Plan Colombia injected significant economic resources into the military, and the state increased the internal budget allocated to them6 (Rojas, 2009; US, 2008). This sudden boost in economic resources, however, took the form of a system of incentives that led to heightened levels of corruption inside the military, including the widespread practice of murdering civilians and disguising them as guerrillas to present as military results (Cárdenas and Villa, 2012).7 Second, President Uribe himself has been accused of attempts to concentrate power and bypass other authorities, and of the systematic use of illegal espionage and sabotage to achieve political advantage, including reforms to the constitution to allow his own re-­election8 (Rojas, 2009). Finally, under the façade of development projects – such as agribusiness or ecotourism, many of them financed by the World Bank or USAID – the reality has been legalisation of land grabbing, forced displacement and mass murder by the paramilitary forces and drug-­traffickers (Ballvé, 2012; Ojeda, 2012). Between 2002 and 2009, for instance, more than 2.4 million people were forcibly displaced – the third highest rate in the world – with the majority of them expelled from their land by paramilitary forces (CCJ, 2008; Howe, Sánchez, and Contreras, 2010; Romero, 2003). Similarly, the country ranked first in the world in the killing of union leaders, which in turn has resulted in the continuation of poor working conditions and low wages (Maher and Thomson, 2011). Therefore, as Jennings (2008, p. 13) has warned, this emphasis on security did not necessarily translate into development in the form of services and welfare for the wider communities. Furthermore, Rojas (2009) has argued that during Uribe’s presidency, the emphasis on national security found its counterpart in the creation of insecurities at the micro-­level: allowing paramilitary control to continue unabated while weakening the democratic mechanisms and impeding the implementation of citizenship rights in those areas. Paradoxically, then, the improvement in overall security was accompanied by weaknesses in bringing governability, especially in the rural areas (Delgado, 2015; US, 2008). More to the point, Uribe’s DDR was one of the pillars underpinning the Policy of Democratic Security. The negotiations raised questions about the over-­friendly, or even complicit, relationship between Uribe and the paramilitary leaders.9 Up to the present, the discussions and agreements reached have been kept secret and never disclosed to the public; thus the collective demobilisations were widely perceived to be a scheme to provide amnesty to paramilitary leaders for gross human rights violations and to save drug-­barons from extradition to the US, as explained below.

62   DDR design Collective demobilisations Despite their military expansion in the late 1990s, the paramilitary groups tended towards fragmentation. Carlos Castaño resigned from the AUC leadership twice, in May 200110 and in July 2002. In public statements he argued that this was due to the increasing tension between the politically motivated paramilitaries and the drug-­traffickers. In personal communications to the press,11 Carlos Castaño condemned drug-­trafficking as “the cancer” causing the “feudalisation of the self-­defences” as well as “the force that is sinking the paramilitary cause” and kept the AUC divided. However, as mentioned earlier, the paramilitaries, from their origins, had had strong links with criminality and with drug-­ trafficking in particular (Gutiérrez Sanín and Barón, 2005, p.  5; Pardo, 2007, p. 20; Romero, 2003, p. 244). In 2001, at the end of Pastrana’s administration, the AUC was included on the lists of terrorist organisations by the US12 and in 2002 by the European Union.13 As result, the AUC was forced to explore two different options: on the one hand, to enter into negotiations with any candidate with the likelihood of winning the presidential elections in 2002, looking further to demobilise and legalise the situation of the paramilitary groups.14 In the past, indeed, Carlos Castaño had advocated the negotiated solution: in 1998 he released a statement15 proposing a possible negotiating agenda, but this was doomed to failure, as the elected President Pastrana preferred to pursue negotiations with the FARC instead, choosing to exclude the paramilitaries. On the other hand, the other option was complete surrender to the US government.16 Castaño advocated strongly for the paramilitaries to renounce drug-­trafficking, either by replacing its enormous rents with other legal and illegal but less dangerous businesses, or by relying on the taxing and control of coca crops, which meant smaller but less violent profits – and therefore more tolerated by society. Two subsequent events would leave the negotiation solution as being more attractive than total surrender: the election in May 2002 of Alvaro Uribe as president, whose security agenda was compatible with the paramilitary cause due to its focus on counterinsurgency. Second, in September the US demanded the extradition of Carlos Castaño and Salvatore Mancuso,17 on charges of drug-­ trafficking. Castaño had already resigned for the first time from the AUC, but three days after the extradition request, he joined the other AUC commanders in the release of two statements:18 they alleged unity and expressed their commitment to achieving a negotiated solution to the armed conflict; they also reaffirmed that their intention was not to attack the government, but rather to transfer the control of the territory into the hands of the state; finally, they invited the paramilitary groups to cease fire and bring an end both to their internecine clashes and the violence perpetrated against civilians, other than that justified by counterinsurgency against the guerrillas. In further communications, Castaño19 urged the government and the AUC to make a clear distinction between paramilitaries and drug-­lords and also stated his willingness to surrender to the US.

DDR design   63 The threat of extradition was the primary factor in the paramilitaries’ decision to demobilise, but it was not the only threat looming at the international level: during the Pastrana administration, the country signed the Rome Statute to join the International Criminal Court20 (ICC). Two days before Alvaro Uribe took the oath as president, the text was secretly ratified, but made use of Article 124 in the treaty to include the seven-­year delay of its implementation. As a result, enforcement of the statute would not apply to war crimes committed on Colombian soil prior to 2009.21 The existing legal framework for establishing peace negotiations allowed the president to enter into dialogue with those illegal armed groups that had previously been recognised as politically motivated22 (OACP/ACR, 2010). As the efforts to remould the paramilitaries into this category proved unsuccessful, the law was eventually modified. The new Law 782 gave equal political status to both guerrillas and paramilitaries under the name of “outlaw armed groups” (Art. 8), allowing the president to grant amnesty from political crimes to groups that had negotiated peace with the government, or to individuals who decided to demobilise (Art. 50). In practice, this authorised the president to sign resolutions23 to legalise the demobilisation of any group, regardless of its political status (OACP/ACR, 2010; Pardo, 2007). However, this law only covered the rank-­and-file fighters, as they were considered guilty of crimes related to rebellion activities but not involved in gross human rights violations, crimes against humanity, or drug-­trafficking. Thus, the demobilisation of paramilitary fighters took place within two different legal frameworks (OACP/ACR, 2010). On the one hand, the rank-­ and-file paramilitaries and guerrilla deserters were treated under the same scheme: law 782 of transitional justice, which covered political crimes as part of the armed conflict, such as belonging to or collaborating with rebel groups or the use of illegal weapons and military fatigues. On the other hand, the paramilitary leaders were in need of a separate law of transitional justice that would provide amnesty or lenient treatment on gross human rights violations and crimes punishable under the international criminal law. This first bill, and other subsequent bills on transitional justice, sparked a political battle in Congress that lasted for two years until it was finally enacted under the name of Law 975 of Justice and Peace, a process that will be explained below. However, both laws, 782 and 975, were subject to substantial amendments throughout the DDR process, with subsequent changes to the legal and political status of the paramilitaries who demobilised collectively, and further impact on those guerrilla members who demobilised individually. The negotiations started in October 2002, but one of the main problems during the negotiations was the prospect of maintaining unity and control of the paramilitary troops under the AUC, but also under commander Carlos Castaño’s political leadership, as opposed to the military leadership of Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente Castaño and aka Ernesto Baez. The alliance between paramilitaries was extremely volatile: their origins and interests proved difficult to harmonise and their respective links with criminality and drug-­trafficking

64   DDR design invariably pushed them into internecine conflict. This became apparent during the negotiations, with the peace commissioner entering into talks with three different clusters: the AUC, the Bloque Central Bolivar and the East Alliance,24 while the Peasant Self-­Defences of Magdalena Medio (ACMM)25 accepted to negotiate with the government but refused to join the other three (OACP, 2006). Nonetheless, the demobilisations started in June 2003: 69 child and young soldiers were progressively handed over by the paramilitary groups to the Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF ) (OACP, 2006). In July, both sides signed the Ralito26 Agreement “to finish the exploration phase and start the negotiating one” (point 4). As a result, the paramilitaries committed to gradual demobilisation of all their structures to be completed within 18 months (point 2), to declare a ceasefire (point 6), and to distance themselves from activities related to drug-­trafficking (point 7). The government then introduced the Alternative Penalty Bill27 to Congress, which aimed to provide a legal framework of transitional justice for the treatment of people who had committed grave human rights violations and crimes against humanity during the armed conflict. On the one hand, it was argued that although the paramilitaries lacked political identity or the intention to govern, they constituted a de facto political, social and economic authority, in the absence of the state. On the other, detractors claimed their participation in gross human rights violations and their involvement in drug-­ trafficking made them unsuitable for political status (Guáqueta, 2007). The debates also addressed the implications of considering the crimes committed by the paramilitary groups as political,28 meaning their legal treatment could include amnesty and pardon, their participation in politics, the possibility of requesting political asylum in foreign countries, as well as the guarantee of no extradition.29 Outside Colombia, the international community attacked the Alternative Penalty Bill: the UN argued that it would provide amnesty and impunity for crimes committed by drug-­traffickers who were using the paramilitary cause as a political smokescreen (United Nations, 2003, 2004). Similarly, reports from Human Rights Watch accused the demobilisation process of being a strategy to avoid extradition to the US under charges of drug-­trafficking (HRW, 2005a, 2005b). Uribe’s government countered by arguing that, in practice, all the illegal armed groups had some degree of involvement in the drugs trade; thus excluding crimes related to drug-­trafficking from the possibility of judicial favour would prove problematic (Pardo, 2007). Moreover, Peace Commissioner Restrepo himself recalled the guerrilla demobilisations of the 1990s, recommending the actions of paramilitary groups be considered as rebellion, and therefore treated as a political crime.30 He also endorsed the advantages of providing the paramilitaries with lenient jail sentences31 and compared the request of making them confess their crimes to authoritarian systems of torture and inquisition.32 It was in the midst of such surrounding controversy that the demobilisations of adult combatants began. Remarkably, then, the paramilitary

DDR design   65 demobilisations started not after but during the negotiations. The decision as to who to demobilise and how was inevitably embedded in the bargaining process over the political status of the paramilitaries. The Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN) was an urban group that operated in Medellín and became the first paramilitary front to demobilise under the Ralito Agreement in November 2003. The Bloc was primarily made up of gangs and petty criminals led by Don Berna, head of the drug-­trafficking organisation known as the Envigado Office. Don Berna had made an alliance with the AUC in 2001 to gain military control over Medellín slums. In October 2002, the National Army launched the military operation Orion to occupy and control Comuna 13, the most violent neighbourhood in the city. It has been argued that Orion received some support from the Cacique Nutibara Bloc and the operation mainly targeted guerrilla militias and other paramilitary groups that were not willing to join the negotiations with the government, such as Don Berna’s competitor, the Metro Bloc (Arias and Guáqueta, 2008; Gutiérrez Sanín and Jaramillo, 2004; Romero, 2007). A few days after Orion, Don Berna declared a ceasefire and expressed his willingness to demobilise the Cacique Nutibara Bloc. By the time the demobilisation took place, his troops numbered around 4,000 members and controlled three quarters of Medellín’s poorest neighbourhoods (ICG, 2004, p. 12). In spite of this strength, it only demobilised 868 of its members along with two leaders: Giovanni Marin and Fabio Orlando Acevedo (aka Don Fabio). Don Berna himself did not demobilise but stayed at the negotiating table. Crucially for this research, the Cacique Nutibara demobilisation had no prior cantonment and there was no strategy for their reinsertion or reintegration; however, two weeks later La Ceja Agreement was signed, placing responsibility for the reinsertion of these troops33 on Medellín’s mayoralty. In December 2003, a second group, under the name of Peasant Self-­Defence of Ortega,34 demobilised 168 members. This was a small and indigenous group created in 2000 following the massacre of 13 members of the community at the hands of FARC. Its members only used machetes and hand-­crafted weapons (OACP, 2006). Arguably, this was the only group of a purely defensive nature that demobilised during this time: none of their leaders was present at the negotiations; none of them has been accused of drug-­trafficking; and there have been no reported incidents of them relapsing into violence. In March 2004 the government finally succeeded in creating a unified negotiating table,35 but this was placed in jeopardy by the increasing fragmentation within the paramilitaries, as the AUC political leaders started to be killed by those commanders more involved in drug-­trafficking (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2004; Romero, 2007). Carlos Castaño himself fell victim to the internecine conflict and two other commanders who had distanced themselves from drug-­trafficking were also neutralised: the commander of the defeated Metro Bloc, Carlos Fernandez aka Doble Cero, was murdered36 (ICG, 2004); while Martín Llanos, commander of the Casanare Peasant Self-­Defences, was forced to cede territorial control to the Centauros Bloc – an AUC franchise bought by drug-­lord Miguel Arroyave37 – before fleeing to Venezuela.38

66   DDR design As criticism of the negotiations between the government and the paramilitaries continued, a new agreement was signed outlining the creation of a zone for the concentration of troops in Ralito, Department of Cordoba.39 On 15 June 2004 the government was forced to withdraw the Alternative Penalty Bill as reaching an approval in Congress proved difficult and the legal deadline for legal expiration was close. On the same day Uribe signed two resolutions formalising the negotiations that had started unofficially almost a year earlier.40 In practice, this had two main outcomes: the government suspended the arrest warrants of the paramilitary leaders and, in exchange, they gathered some of their troops in the designated concentration zones. The debates in Congress continued over not one, but nine other bills that were introduced by different political forces (ICG, 2005; Palou and Llorente, 2009; Pardo, 2007). Palou, (2006) has argued that following the withdrawal of the Alternative Penalty Bill, the government decided to change its strategy by trying to achieve political consensus before introducing a replacement bill. Hence, at the end of July 2004, three key paramilitary leaders – Salvatore Mancuso, aka Ernesto Baez and Ramon Isaza41 – made a surprising visit to an informal session of Congress, giving speeches that received standing ovations by a third of Congress members in attendance42 (Pardo, 2007). The speeches had only been made possible because two Congress members summoned the paramilitary leaders to speak,43 and the visit was ratified by the peace commissioner, who issued freedom-­of-movement permits. Furthermore, the mayor of Monteria and the governor of Cordoba accompanied them on the trip to Bogotá; the National Army and the police provided transport and logistics and this extraordinary session was broadcast on national TV (Pardo, 2007).44 In the end, however, the whole event drew enormous criticism from a wide variety of groups, nationally and internationally. The US ambassador to Colombia, along with members of the US Congress, expressed their disapproval (Palou, 2006; Pardo, 2007). Similarly, the leaders’ visit to Congress created fractures within the government, as some Congress members, including some who were part of Uribe’s coalition, rose up against it.45 Only a few months later, in November 2004, 27 members of Congress visited the negotiations in Ralito and proposed a constitutional reform to forbid extradition in the case of peace processes (Pardo, 2007).46 This proposal never came to fruition. Just as the overarching process was entering into crisis, the demobilisations started again: the paramilitaries announced the demobilisation of three different structures between November and December 2004.47 However, before their inception, the Supreme Court of Justice authorised the extradition of one paramilitary leader held in the encampment area: Juan Carlos Sierra aka El Tuso. The president was reluctant to effect the extradition (Palou, 2006), until the political journal Semana leaked a secret recording between paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso and Peace Commissioner Restrepo, which revealed that the extradition was one of the main points discussed at the negotiating table.48 Two days later, Uribe authorised the extradition of El Tuso to the US, and in October the paramilitaries issued a statement entitled “An act of faith in the

DDR design   67 peace”, announcing a new wave of demobilisations due to start in November, in order “to gain back confidence in the process”.49 Subsequently, at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 200550 eight military structures demobilised, including Mancuso and 2,362 of his troops. The peace commissioner would claim that “[it] is a gesture of good will that the Self-­Defenses had declared a ceasing of hostilities and the demobilisation of [4,820] of its members”, before the approval of the transitional law (Restrepo, 2005, p. 39). The negotiations continued, but in April 2005 politician Orlando Benitez51 was assassinated along with his sister and driver, very close to Ralito. Don Berna, still present at the negotiating table, was himself accused of the murders and an arrest warrant was issued in his name. It was alleged that he had ordered the attack because Benitez was carrying out a political campaign in the area without paramilitary authorisation. Don Berna fled, only to surrender three days later after a man-­hunt by the army and intermediation by the peace commissioner.52 Despite the incident, he was granted demobilised status and was thus allowed to continue in his role as a member of the negotiation team (Pardo, 2007). Only a few weeks later, in June 2005, Don Berna demobilised as the leader of the Heroes de Tolová Bloc. On 25 July 2005 the transitional law was finally approved by Congress, entitled Law 975 of Justice and Peace. In total, 11 paramilitary structures, containing 5,903 fighters, had demobilised in the interim, making up 18.63 per cent of the total paramilitary demobilisation. Therefore, the demobilisations were instrumental in negotiating the political status of the paramilitary leaders and in their efforts to gain public trust and to pressurise Congress into approving a legal framework that would mitigate the extradition and the international justice threats (Guáqueta, 2007; ICG, 2004; Pardo, 2007). The government understood the same thing, as, in response to the unfulfilled deadline that was initially established for the demobilisations, the peace commissioner declared: […] We are worried that the Self-­Defenses have postponed the demobilisations before and have used that as a strategy for the negotiation. This cannot become an excuse to revisit topics that have already been covered at the negotiating table, or topics that are in the hands of the government, such as the Law of Justice and Peace or the prisons they will go to pay for their alternative jail terms.53 In sum, Law 782 authorised the President to demobilise rank-­and-file troops and rebel leaders, there was thus a need for the paramilitaries to find political backing for their cause (outside of support from the President) in order to make structural reforms to the legal system. These reforms would lead to the form of transitional justice needed for their crimes to be treated as politically motivated. Following the approval of Law 975, 26 paramilitary structures comprising 26,366 soldiers demobilised between August 2005 and April 2006. However, Law 975 was subjected to several claims of unconstitutionality and a number of amendments were made by the constitutional court: its final version states that

68   DDR design crimes against humanity (e.g. kidnapping, genocide and terrorism) and crimes not related to the nature of the armed conflict (e.g. rape, fraud and drug-­ trafficking) are to be excluded from legal favour54 (Ministry of the Interior, 2006). Confession of crimes became compulsory and the paramilitary leaders were required to declare their crimes in front of the fiscal office.55 The paramilitary commander Vicente Castaño issued the following complaint about later changes made to Law 975: I totally trust in Uribe, but one swallow does not make a summer […]. Even if we achieve our aims, the international community or a new president may overthrow everything […]. That is why the law of Justice and Peace is full of hidden issues not in our favour but against us, in order to put us in the deepest dungeons of torture by the Amer­icans and the International Criminal Court.56 It was later discovered that the BCN demobilisation was partially contrived. Don Berna disguised homeless people and inhabitants of the slums as soldiers in order to perform theatrical disarmament ceremonies in front of the world’s media.57 Thus, the numbers were inflated by civilians, while most of the real combatants remained active in illegality. In practice, therefore, the BCN was transformed into the Bloque Heroes de Granada, who were to hold power for some time in Medellín, but was finally demobilised permanently two years later (López, 2010, regional cases). Furthermore, there was a group, allegedly of FARC dissidents, that also demobilised named Cacica Gaitana Front, that was later discovered to be fake. For this, criminal charges were filed against Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo; in 2012 he was summoned to testify by the Colombian authorities but fled the country,58 and attempts to call him to trial have so far been unsuccessful. Thus, the decision as to who would obtain demobilised status was defined through the interplay of these three elements: the negotiation between government and paramilitary leaders; the demobilisation of paramilitary rank-­and-file troops; and the debates in Congress to approve the transitional law 975 to provide judicial benefits to the paramilitary leaders. The paramilitary leaders decided on the demobilisation of certain specific groups and provided the relevant list of ex-­combatants, purely according to their own needs and in the broader absence of a DDR strategy. These groups were clearly not core military or political structures: at first, child soldiers, and then fake or negligible combatants. Other paramilitary leaders, starting with Salvatore Mancuso and Don Berna, only demobilised with their troops when they could no longer avoid jail: their status as “demobilised” protected them from imprisonment and extradition, at least temporarily. However, in 2008, Uribe decided to extradite 12 of those leaders, arguing that they were not truly committed to the DDR and had continued in drug-­trafficking. Looking further ahead, the actions of the justice system changed the course of the DDR process, and the conditions that the paramilitary leaders had

DDR design   69 ­ egotiated with the government for their demobilisation were overturned: on n the one hand, the paramilitary leaders who demobilised were not able to escape from jail or extradition; on the other, the low-­ranking demobilised fell into a judicial limbo and their legal situation remained unsolved for nine years. Crucially, then, the political negotiations revolved around the legal benefits for the demobilised paramilitary leaders, while any negotiation on the future reintegration or the legal, economic or social situation of former rank-­and-file combatants were neglected. Furthermore, the reintegration of low-­ranking fighters was impeded by their unresolved legal situation and the lack of a strategy either on the part of government or of the paramilitary leaders. As I have explained elsewhere (Carranza-­Franco, 2014), the creation of the ACR in 2006 was prompted by the crisis around reintegration and it was not until 2011 that President Santos enacted Law 1448, which established the procedures solving the legal situation of the ex-­combatants. Individual demobilisations In 2002, a report by the National Department of Planning (DNP)59 showed that desertions of guerrilla members had increased from 150 to 1,200 fighters between 1998 and 2002. The report also suggested that the government could benefit from this phenomenon of desertion in order to reduce the numbers of the rebel groups and to gather intelligence against them, with the additional benefit that reintegrating guerrilla fighters was cheaper than fighting them head­on (Pinto, Vergara and De La Huerta, 2002). The Policy of Democratic Security, therefore, depicted the individual demobilisations as a strategy to increase the military pressure on the guerrillas within the counterinsurgency frame (ACR, 2009; OACP/ACR, 2010; Pretelt, 2006). Accordingly, in 2003, the Ministry of Defence launched a campaign to encourage the guerrillas to desert by offering demobilisation benefits (OACP/ACR, 2010). In the same vein, imprisoned guerrilla members, or those caught up in combat with the army, were offered the benefits of demobilisation and reintegration, in exchange for the jail sentences they faced. The institution responsible for the individual demobilisations was the Programme for Humanitarian Assistance to the Demobilised (PAHD),60 administered by the Ministry of Defence. The PAHD had four main objectives: to foster the demobilisation of guerrilla members, especially from mid-­ranking soldiers and urban militias; to promote a positive image of the demobilisations among the national and international community; to provide humanitarian services to the demobilised; and to prevent recruitment within illegal armed groups (OACP/ ACR, 2010).61 Equally, the director of the reinsertion programme stated that the offer of demobilisation to guerrilla members aimed to slow down the expansion and strengthening of illegal armed groups, by providing alternatives to the use of military force or criminal prosecution to process the ex-­combatants (Ángel, 2005). Among the guerrillas, desertion is considered betrayal and invariably punished by death. However, many fighters prefer to risk their lives and abandon

70   DDR design the group rather than bear the intensity of the combat, the precarious living conditions and the proximity to death involved in guerrilla warfare. Building on this, the Ministry of Defence focused its attention on those that dared to escape and managed to survive. Deserters from the guerrillas could simply present themselves in front of any civil or military authority and request demobilised status. The combatants would then be transferred to a military compound where he or she would remain for a maximum of two weeks for adults and 36 hours for minors. Following this period, they would proceed to one of a set of shelters administered by the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defence, mainly located in Bogotá. The ex-­combatants could also include their families in the programme: their partners, children or parents (ACR, 2011; OACP/ACR, 2010). During Uribe’s administration, there were circa 23,000 reported individual demobilisations.62 Between August 2002 and October 2008, 17,450 people were granted demobilised status, an average of eight per day (CONPES 3554, 2008, p. 12). Ex-­guerrillas, both from FARC and ELN, constituted 67 per cent of the individual demobilisations, compared to 13.41 per cent of ex-­members of paramilitary groups (Table 2.1). The policy of individual demobilisations can be considered a turning point in the treatment of guerrilla deserters. On the one hand, the Policy of Democratic Security offered them demobilised status, which entitled them to some form of protection from the death threat posed by their former comrades, as well as opportunities for employment and education. On the other, within their own ranks, the police and the army promoted the idea that the protection and good treatment of the demobilised facilitated the process of gathering information useful to military operations, which would be translated into positive results against the guerrillas (CCJ, 2008, p. 30). As a US report on the Plan Colombia stated: [The Colombian] government, through its counternarcotics strategy, military and police actions, and other efforts (such as its demobilisation and deserter programmes) has degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and weakened their operational capabilities […]. [T]he number of FARC combatants and its capabilities have been dramatically reduced by continuous assaults on its top leadership, the capture or killing of FARC members in conflictive zones, and a large number of desertions. (US, 2008, pp. 22, 25, emphasis mine) Also, it is significant that the contrast in bureaucratic procedure between the collective and the individual demobilisations shows that both responded to different strategies and institutions within the frame of the Policy of Democratic Security. The collective demobilisations of paramilitary groups were handled by civilian institutions: the Office of the Peace Commissioner was responsible for the negotiation and demobilisation; the Ministry of Interior (PRVC office) for providing reinsertion assistance; and the MAPP-­OEA for monitoring the

Table 2.1  Individual demobilisations 2002–2010 per group GROUP

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

200763

2008

2009

2010

%

FARC % ELN % Para % Others % Total

529 72.47 139 19.04 0 0 62 8.49 730

1,376 54.22 405 15.96 692 27.27 65 2.56 2,538

1,300 43.74 333 11.20 1,269 42.70 70 2.36 2,972

1,135 44.27 301 11.74 1,096 42.75 32 1.25 2,564

1,558 63.33 359 14.59 470 19.11 73 2.97 2,460

2,480 77.69 423 13.25 155 4.86 134 4.20 3,192

3,027 87.46 403 11.64 0 0 31 0.90 3,461

2,128 80.67 492 18.65 0 0 18 0.68 2,638

2,009 82.13 359 14.68 65 2.66 13 0.53 2,446

15,542 67.6 3,214 14.0 3,747 16.3 498 2.2 23,001

Source: Ministry of Defence, statistics. 2015. Percentages mine.

72   DDR design process, while an inter-­institutional group was in charge of collecting and destroying the surrendered weapons. The individual demobilisations, conversely, were the responsibility of the military institutions, in particular the Ministry of Defence, and the bureaucratic procedures to obtain status as demobilised required former guerrillas to collaborate in intelligence-­gathering against their group (OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 102). It was only after the demobilisation process had been exhausted that ex-­combatants from both individual and collective processes were transferred to the PRVC office. Each deserter would receive a certificate from the Operative Committee to Laying Down Arms (CODA), which was part of the PAHD and formed by representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Office of the Peace Commissioner. CODA was responsible for verifying and certifying that the candidates were real guerrilla members: thus, during their time in the military compounds or in the shelters, the former fighters were subjected to a series of interviews to establish their status and activities inside the rebel group and the Ministry of Defence was allowed to offer millions of pesos in monetary rewards64 to the demobilised for information and for their participation in military operations (Arias and Guáqueta, 2008; Ministry of the Interior, 2006). Physical or psychological abuse in these interviews has not been reported, although some ex-­combatants have complained of being under pressure from their interviewers, while others understood that the CODA certificate depended on their participation in military operations (Cárdenas, 2005; Procuraduría, 2006). Rosenau, Espach, Ortiz and Herrera (2014) found more than 15,000 of these interviews conducted with ex-­FARC members, containing personal information regarding the reasons behind their recruitment into, and their desertion from, the guerrillas, as well as intelligence information about the group’s activities. Furthermore, the army publicly stated that the demobilisation policy had resulted in: 1. Affecting the enemy: reducing its number of combatants, demoralising them and obtaining vital intelligence (logistics, mobility, strategy and military targets). The PAHD has provided: 1.1 intelligence to plan military operations fundamental for the success of the Policy of Democratic Security […] and many other operations where the demobilised have been the only source of information. 1.2 the demobilisation has been fundamental in halting the military offensive by the guerrillas because it implies: sending less troops to the operations, in an effort to minimise the risk of desertion; the need to move more often due to the information provided by the demobilised; more time invested in recruiting […]65 However, the use of the demobilised population for military purposes has been heavily criticised: first, the informants were at risk of being killed during their participation in military operations or as a result of retaliation by the guerrillas. Second, the monetary rewards became a source of corruption within the military; reports emerged of payments that were delayed or never made, as well

DDR design   73 as cases of unlawful killing of ex-­combatants by the military in order to claim their monetary rewards for collaboration (Cárdenas, 2005; Procuraduría, 2006; UNDP, 2003; Villamizar, 2005). A report from the Defensoría del Pueblo and Unicef also flagged up evidence that intelligence-­gathering interviews were carried out with child soldiers, and that some of them even received offers to participate in military operations, both practices being illegal under Colombian child law (Defensoría, 2005). Finally, these offers of money were implemented in the absence of a reintegration policy and followed the confrontation dynamics that privileged greed over other forms of personal development (Arias and Guáqueta, 2008; Cárdenas, 2005; Villarraga, 2013).66 In some cases also, those who participated in this scheme were recruited by paramilitary groups.67 Certainly, the policy of individual demobilisation addressed the phenomenon of an increasing number of deserters, but also promoted it for specific military ends. Ultimately, as the security aims were prioritised, any notions of pursuing further reintegration of ex-­guerrilla combatants or development for the wider communities affected by the conflict were largely abandoned, while the combatants themselves were targeted on the basis of their military worth as collaborators and providers of counterinsurgency intelligence.

The FARC-­Santos DDR Juan Manuel Santos was one of Uribe’s main allies during his presidency: they were both fellow members of the Liberal Party and when Uribe decided to break with the liberals for not supporting his re-­election campaign,68 they both co-­ founded the “Party of National Unity” (the U Party from now on). Once in place in the presidency, Uribe appointed Santos as Minister of Defence, from 2006 to 2009, and backed his presidential candidature in 2010. As a matter of fact, Uribe had made unsuccessful attempts to start negotiations with the FARC. From 2004 to 2007 Uribe made contact with the guerrilla commander Pablo Catumbo through the entrepreneur Henry Acosta, to negotiate the release of 12 deputies kidnapped by the FARC in Cali in 2002;69 in exchange the FARC asked for the release of some of its imprisoned members. However, these negotiations did not come to fruition, as in 2007 the deputies were killed – in, it seems, an incident of accidental crossfire between two different guerrilla fronts (Acosta, 2016, p. 63). Acosta has said that, during this time, there were some windows of opportunity to start peace dialogues, but Uribe simply offered the FARC secretariat the chance to give up their weapons and troops in exchange for exile, while the FARC insisted on conversations about the overarching economic model and development projects for the rural areas (Acosta, 2016, pp. 70–71). Before the end of his mandate in 2010, Uribe sent an offer to the FARC to pursue peace dialogues, which the guerrilla declined, due to the proximity of presidential elections in August.70 Once in the presidency, Santos asked Acosta to continue with these contacts, but Santos’ new treatment of the FARC as a political actor and recognition of the existence of an armed conflict instead of a

74   DDR design mere terrorist threat, was disapproved of by Uribe and became one the main points of breakdown between the new president and his predecessor.71 Nevertheless, secret talks were held for over a year, with the support of the Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, and the governments of Cuba and Norway acting as guarantors. Santos had declined any request by the FARC for a demilitarised zone (Acosta, 2016) and insisted on pursuing peace negotiations in the midst of open confrontation. Thus, as the Colombian army continued its defensive and offensive activity, in November 2011 it killed one of the most important FARC leaders, Alfonso Cano, with the subsequent impact of a halt in any contact between the government and the guerrilla. Hugo Chavez then played a main role in mediating between both sides, and helped to unlock the conversation, which continued, this time, with Rodrigo Londoño, aka Timochenko, who was appointed as FARC’s main commander after Cano’s death.72 This first phase of secret but formal negotiations was held during most of 2012 (23 February to 26 August). Then, on 4 September 2012 Santos made an announcement marking the start of a new phase of public peace talks, to be inaugurated on 19 October in Olso and to continue at La Habana. The original negotiating team was led by Humberto de La Calle, a liberal politician known for his political experience in the preceding peace process with the guerrillas in the 1990s and in the writing of the new constitution in 1991. The team was also formed of Sergio Jaramillo, leading the Office of the Peace Commissioner; Alejandro Eder and Frank Pearl, representing the ACR, at different times; General Jorge Mora, former army commander-­in-chief and renowned for his counterinsurgency activity; and General Oscar Narajo, an iconic figure in the police force, having beennamed the World’s Best Policeman in 2010 for his role in the war against drugs. The rebels’ team was formed of five main political and military figures: Iván Marquez, Marcos Calarcá, Andres París, Rodrigo Granda and the symbolically appointed Simon Trinidad, imprisoned in a US jail for the kidnapping of three US contractors. A month after the negotiations started, the FARC decided to order a unilateral cessation of hostilities. However, Santos always emphasised that the peace negotiations were to be held in the midst of the conflict; thus, not surprisingly, this produced some incidents that jeopardised the talks: two soldiers were kidnapped by the FARC in municipalities of Valle del Cauca but were released three weeks later (27 July 2013); a FARC commander aka Jacobo Arango was killed in a military operation (31 January 2013); three guerrillas were killed in a military operation (3 February 2014); Army General Alzate was kidnapped by FARC troops under strange circumstances, as he did not inform his colleagues of his whereabouts – he was released two weeks later (17 November 2014); the soldier Carlos Becerra was kidnapped by FARC troops but released a week later; the FARC killed 11 soldiers in Cauca (15 April 2015); 26 guerrillas were killed in a retaliation attack by the army (21 May 2015); and the FARC kidnapped Lieutenant Cristian Moscoso, who was released two weeks later (19 July 2015). Yet, the confrontation in many areas diminished or stopped completely and the cessation of hostilities was maintained overall and homicides and kidnappings diminished to record low levels.73

DDR design   75 In 2013, Uribe broke with his own U Party and created a new one, named the Democratic Centre. His political agenda was based on the opposition to Santos’ government and, in particular, to the peace process. The Democratic Centre was very successful from the beginning: by March 2014, in its first elections ever, it won 39 seats in the Congress (19 in the Chamber of Representatives and 20 in the Senate) and Uribe himself was elected as a senator. Then, for the presidential elections in May the same year, the Democratic Centre backed the right-­wing candidate Oscar Iván Zuluaga, who actually won the first round in the presidential elections against Santos.74 However, as none of the candidates obtained more than 50 per cent of the votes, a second round took place. The result was overturned and Santos was re-­elected as president.75 Despite strong political opposition from the Democratic Centre, negotiations continued. After four years and 39 conversation cycles, the FARC and the government agreed a mutual cessation of hostilities in January 2016 and by August they announced a Final Agreement that was signed in a public ceremony in Cartagena on 26 September. However, as part of the sixth point of the negotiating agenda in regard to implementation, it was established that the peace settlement was to be endorsed by Colombians in a plebiscite to take place on Sunday 2 October. Following the same idea as with the National Front, the voters would decide whether they approved the signed settlement, meaning that the president would be obliged to, or impeded from, presenting bills to the Congress for laws and constitutional reforms emanating from the Final Agreement.76 There were two challenges for the promoters of the plebiscite: first, to reach the minimum threshold required for making constitutional amendments (it was lowered from the 50 to 13 per cent or c.4.5 million voters), which proved difficult in a country of traditionally high abstention levels; and second, to obtain a majority of votes for the “Yes” option. To make it worse, by law the Government was not allowed to campaign for the “Yes” option; it could only put out information on the content of the agreement in neutral terms and it had to provide equal conditions for civil society groups that supported each option. Thus, civil society became a crucial element through the active support of the “Yes” campaign, while the “No” campaign was led by an alliance of the Democratic Centre and other conservative and right-­wing politicians such as former president Pastrana. Every single poll on the matter had predicted a rather easy win for “Yes” by some two-­thirds of the vote, yet there was no certainty as to whether the number of voters would reach the threshold. Surprisingly, the voting was massive but “No” won by a very tiny margin (0.4%).77 In his speech that day, Santos recognised the result, yet he reaffirmed that his duty as president was to guarantee stability and peace, thus the government negotiating team were to travel to La Habana to talk with its FARC counterparts and find options for maintaining the cessation of hostilities;78 he would also organise meetings with the “No” campaign leaders to hear their objections to the Final Agreement. Then, two days later, on Wednesday 5 October, the entire process took a new turn: on the one hand, the general manager of the “No” campaign, Juan

76   DDR design Carlos Vélez, declared in a press interview that it had been the “cheapest and most effective campaign ever”.79 He explained that following the advice of a marketing company, their strategy had been to create feelings of outrage rather than providing people with truthful information on the peace agreement, thus their slogans had actually been based on misinformation and lying to the public. Vélez also mentioned that the campaign had cost $1,300 million pesos, double the amount they had officially declared. Uribe immediately reacted, disavowing Velez, who had to recant his words and give in to the Democratic Centre the very next day.80 As a matter of fact, later on the State Advisory Council (Consejo de Estado), responding to the demands of two citizens and based on Velez’ interview and other evidence, declared that there was generalised and intentional deception by the “No” campaign; thus the plebiscite had no legal basis and President Santos was not impeded from pursuing a new agreement.81 On the other hand, fearing a new relapse into war and a new increase in violence, citizens spontaneously organised peaceful demonstrations to support the peace agreement. Thousands of people gathered, filling the main squares nationally, and internationally, for three weeks, also installing peace camps that became a point of reference, and performing theatre and demonstrating other forms of support. Then, at the end of the week, on 7 October, Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Price “[F]or his resolute efforts to bring the country’s more than 50-year-­long civil war to an end […]”.82 All these events gave Santos both moral support and political manoeuvering to start negotiations with representatives of the “No” campaign. It became evident that the Democratic Centre was not prepared for a victory in the plebiscite and that the coalition of the right did not necessarily work together because there was not a unified position in the face of the Final Agreement. Furthermore, the pressure was now on Uribe as, although Santos had invited him and other opposition representatives several times to participate at the negotiating table in La Habana,83 they had refused. Thus, along with the discredit from Velez’ declarations, Uribe was accused of delaying the peace and asking impossible, or too many changes, to the Final Agreement. Twenty days later, five different counterproposals were presented (by the Democratic Centre, former president Pastrana, former ministry of Defense Marta Lucía Ramirez, former attorney general Alejandro Ordoñez, plus one other from the Association of FARC Victims) and after a month of conversations, the government gathered 60 proposals from the “No” campaign to be presented to the FARC negotiating team, which ended up accepting all but two: their non-­participation in politics and the implementation of stricter sentences.84 Thus, some amendments were made, but the core structure of the original document was maintained and a New Final Agreement signed in Bogotá, at the Colon Theatre on 23 November 2016. As the plebiscite had failed to endorse the peace settlement, to make it legally viable the New Final Agreement was presented to the Congress. Despite opposition from the Democratic Centre, the Congress approved the Special Legislative Procedure for Peace85 or “fast-­track”, which was a mechanism to speed up the legislation by reducing, by half, the time (from 12 to six months)

DDR design   77 and the number of debates (from eight to four) needed to approve the Constitutional reforms and ordinary laws required for the implementation of the new agreement in the Senate and in the Chamber of Representatives. This strategy was crucial for the sustainability of the entire process as there was only one year left of Santos’ administration, meaning that the election of a new president would jeopardise all the progress made. The New Final Agreement was then approved by a large majority86 of the Congress on 1 December 2016, and the amnesty was finally extended to the FARC members. Despite this good start, during 2017 the legislation to implement the New Final Agreement went through a slow and painful process that brought important changes to the agreement. On the one hand, Santos progressively lost popular support and his coalition crumbled due to political splits and individual or party interests. In particular, some members of the Liberal Party and the whole Cambio Radical Party, an important portion of Santos’ coalition and a crucial force in the Congress, decided to block or reject important laws or to impose modifications in others. On the other hand, the Democratic Centre was able to slow down, modify or block altogether some of the legislation.87 As Fernando Londoño, one of its main representatives, publicly stated at its convention on 6 May 2017, “[…] [t]he first challenge of the Democratic Centre is to make into little pieces that damned agreement with the FARC”.88 Thus, their strategy was to sabotage the “fast-­track” in all forms: apart from the traditional lobby and political manoeuvering, its members would leave the room right before the voting, trying to impede the required quorum, or would overuse their right to make modifications by proposing hundreds of them to one bill. Then, in 2018, Uribe reaffirmed his  strong electoral power by choosing the Democratic Centre presidential ­candidate, Iván Duque, who finally won against the candidate of the left. Collective FARC’s demobilisation The peace commissioner Sergio Jaramillo has argued that one of the “strategic moves”89 that allowed the advance in the conversations with the FARC was the creation of a narrative of “the end to the conflict” that would give direction to the negotiations and clarified three main points from the beginning: first, the introduction into the negotiating agenda of a point on disarmament, which the FARC had, until then, rejected several times; second, the understanding that the process would go beyond disarmament towards the definitive end of the different cycles of violence in the history of the country by addressing points one, three and four of the agenda, which I explain below; and third, the negotiation had to recognise, and include, the victims of the conflict, guaranteeing their rights but also developing mechanisms for reconciliation and pacific coexistence, which was the fifth point on the agenda. For four years, the negotiations revolved around the issues of development and political participation90: the first point on the agenda was the Integral Rural Reform, which was debated for six months (November 2012–May 2013) and

78   DDR design included issues on: land access and use by poor peasants; formalisation of property; the regulation of agrarian frontiers and protected areas; social and economic development of rural areas; rural infrastructure; poverty eradication; the stimulus of agricultural production; and the creation of cooperatives and enterprises based on solidarity work in the rural areas or “solidarity economies”. The second point, on political participation (between July and December 2013), revolved around the rights to, and guarantees of, the exercise of political opposition and citizenship participation, not restricted to FARC guerrillas but benefiting all Colombians. The fourth point was the solution to the drugs problem (between December 2013 and May 2014), seeking alternatives to the war on drugs, such as programmes for substitution of illegal crops, which should include the participation of communities in its design, implementation and evaluation; programmes for the protection and recovery of the environment affected by coca and poppy cultivation; programmes to prevent drug consumption; and policies to address the production and commercialisation of drugs. It took a year and a half to discuss the fifth point (June 2015 to December 2015) because it included the participation of civil society in a variety of forms, such as public forums held in several cities in the country and visits by victim groups to La Habana. The debates on this point then revolved around mechanisms for the creation of a truth commision, guarantees of no repetition, reparation to the victims of the conflict, and a transitional system to provide justice for the crimes committed during the conflict. This point also included the creation of special electoral districts (circunscripciones) so that victim representatives could be elected to the Congress. Point three, on the end of the conflict, was the last to be discussed (January– June 2016), and the one that gave closure to the entire process because it revolved around the creation of mechanisms for the definitive cessation of hostilities in two main forms. On the one hand, the provisions to the FARC ex-­ combatants: amnesties and pardon to imprisoned combatants; disarmament and reincorporation; and personal security. Jaramillo has posited that it was important to give guarantees for the FARC disarmament beyond the arrangements for an international and UN presence, this in regard to: its transit to the political participation; the personal security and protection to FARC members; judicial security, so the agreements could not be changed by a new government; and the socioeconomic reintegration of the ex-­combatants.91 On the other, with regard to the state: reaffirming the monopoly on the use of force and on taxation by the state and throughout the territory, including the government’s responsibility in fighting criminal bands and the paramilitary phenomenon, the fight against any form of illegal economy and the strengthening of the administration of justice.92 Santos had to emphasise that this was neither a power-­sharing agreement nor an acceptance of FARC power, as the opposition claimed; instead the armed forces and the state institutions would remain in charge.93 Furthermore, the sub-­commission94 created for the discussion and planning of point 3, included 13 active military personnel who, along with their

DDR design   79 counterparts from the FARC and other representatives from civilian institutions, developed the protocols for the FARC disarmament. For the government, the reincorporation of the FARC was “framed in logic of territorial integration and the efficient and transformative presence of the State nation-­wide” and: […] would focus not only on recognizing the measures and components that seek to guarantee the success of the reincorporation [of ex-­combatants, but] it should also promote the participation of the dwellers in the territories through the different projects and initiatives linked to the reincorporation.95 Whereas the FARC has posited that: For us the reincorporation is an integral matter, as was stated in the agreement. It is not only the reincorporation of 14,200 ex-­combatants, but the reincorporation of territories into development, into wealth, into the nation. It is the reincorporation into the State of the territories that were always there but for things other than to satisfy the provision of rights and security. Thus we understand the reincorporation as holistic.96 On 10 February 2016, the FARC announced its decision to stop recruiting minors. This was an important step forward, as the FARC had developed a robust system of recruitment to overcome the constant killing and desertion of its troops during the conflict, in which the conscription of minors from the large and marginalised population of peasant youth played a main role (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2004). As a matter of fact, the FARC’s internal statutes established that the group would only recruit men or women older than 15, although the participation of younger soldiers has been widely documented (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2007). Then, on 15 May, the FARC and the government reached an agreement to demobilise FARC members under the age of 18 to start their process of reincorporation.97 By 31 December 2017 the FARC handed over 132 minors to the Red Cross International Committee and the ICBF. However, the United Nations later declared that they were expecting more children and urged the FARC to let them out of their military structure.98 The FARC was also clear in saying that they would not give up their weapons or make their way out of the forest without guarantees of an amnesty. Law 1820 was finally enacted by the Congress on 30 December 2016, providing amnesty for the political crimes and other related ordinary crimes that had been committed during the armed conflict. This law covered both the FARC guerrillas and members of the state, meaning that soldiers who were accused of crimes in the context of the armed conflict and military personnel involved in the unlawful and unjustified killing of civilians, including those cases in which the civilians were presented as military results or “false positives”, would also obtain legal benefits. Thus, as some 7,000 soldiers from the FARC structures

80   DDR design marched out of the forests, 1,536 FARC99 prisoners and 1,703 army soldiers,100 were released from jail. However, the amnesties and pardons to both militaries and guerrillas are conditional on presentation in front of the Especial Jurisdiction of Peace (JEP),101 which was the transitional justice system agreed between the FARC and the government. The JEP is responsible for judging the crimes committed during the conflict and decides if the accused is only guilty of rebellion and related crimes (mainly low-­ranking, such as belonging to an armed group, unauthorised use of weapons and military fatigues), or should respond to grave crimes against humanity and those contemplated by international humanitarian law (genocide, kidnappings, torture, sex crimes, forced displacement, etc). The former would obtain unconditional amnesty; while the latter would be sentenced to lenient and symbolic forms of punishment. The JEP trials may include FARC ex-­combatants, state members and other people who did not belong to any of the armed factions but that may have participated in the conflict, e.g. by financing or collaborating with illegal armed groups. It is worthy of note that the “No” campaign had different proposals with regard to the JEP: the Democratic Centre requested the elimination of the JEP and that these legal processes be carried out by the creation of special structures within the system for ordinary crimes. They also accepted the amnesty for the low-­ranking troops but proposed that guerrillas guilty of grave crimes should obtain 5- to 8-year jail sentences depending on the confession of their crimes, or more than 15 years if they had not publicly acknowledged these acts; this was very similar to the sentences contemplated by Law 975.102 Former senator Ramirez agreed, but included the possibility of serving the sentences at agricultural farms. Pastrana accepted the JEP but asked to limit its operation to only two years and be more articulated – or less independent depending on the interpretation – with the system of ordinary justice; with regard to the sentences, he also agreed on alternative ones that would not involve jail, such as forms of parole and restriction-­of-movement areas. Finally, Ordoñez accepted the amnesty to low-­ranking combatants, but proposed a stricter response to the confession of crimes.103 The final new agreement maintained the JEP, but created mechanisms for collaboration and articulation with the system of ordinary justice. With regard to the combatants, these proposals did not affect the situation of the low-­ranking, but included the possibility of parole-­type sentences and restricted the free movement of FARC commanders.104 Peace Commissioner Jaramillo has also posited that the narrative of “the end of the conflict” unleashed the potential of the peace process to discuss the structural problems that had underpinned the conflict for so long. In particular, it was an opportunity to “put flesh on the bones” of the constitution of 1991, with the intention of finally transforming the poorer and more vulnerable territories. He argued that, although the critics of the peace process claimed that those reforms were the responsibility of any government and there was no need to discuss them with the FARC, in reality many territories were excluded from the benefits of the economic system and “only a peace process can push the institutionalisation and

DDR design   81 democratisation of the territories strongly enough”.105 Jaramillo also thinks about the difficulties of carrying out a peace process within the rules of democracy, as although he considers democracy the best way of governing, the down side is that the peace process becomes subject to political competition and opposition by the parties and politicians that aim to obtain political gain.106 In sum, Santos-­FARC DDR is designed to be development-­oriented, deeply linked to the social and economic development of those areas in the country that have been left behind; thus the reintegration of ex-­combatants is also community-­based. As will be explained in the next chapter, the benefits for the former guerrillas are linked to the communities in two main forms: the development programmes that benefit communities in the territories in general and the business projects for the ex-­combatants that are meant to be implemented with the participation of wider sectors of the population. In this fashion, the FARC proposed a social and economic structure in the form of a nationwide system of economy based on cooperatives and solidarity work named Social Economies of the Commons (ECOMUN), which the former combatants could join and where they could, by the creation of a common fund, invest money in business projects.107 FARC’s aim is to develop a cooperative-­ type productive system that could benefit both the ex-­combatants and communities in the territories.108 In the New Final Agreement it was stated that the government would provide legal and technical advice for its creation and functioning;109 the CNR has the responsibility of checking viability and authorising the transfer of money to each business project proposed by ECOMUN;110 and the ARN administers the money and helps in the access to the banking system by the ex-­combatants.111 Drug-­trafficking and extradition Also, importantly, the involvement in drug-­trafficking and the possibility of extradition were very controversial discussion points. Although the United Nations had eliminated the FARC from the list of terrorist groups, the US still has extradition requests for some commanders. This extradition is not necessarily for drug-­related crimes but is also in regard to terrorism and the kidnapping of three US contractors.112 In the end, the FARC and the government agreed that drug-­trafficking would also be processed by the JEP, with regard to its connection to the political conflict, and that there will not be extradition on any grounds. The FARC made a committment to abandon any activity related to the chain of commerce and production of illegal drugs and other economies. Yet the “No” campaign asked for drug-­trafficking not to be included in the crimes covered by the amnesty and to force FARC members to give all the information they had on routes, markets and other activities of the drug economy. Although these proposals were not included, the New Final Agreement is clearer in terms of the request for information from the FARC and it states that drug-­trafficking for personal economic gain could not be considered a crime connected with the conflict, thus will be processed by the ordinary law.113

82   DDR design However, in April 2018, the FARC commander aka Jesus Santrich was caught in a joint investigation between the police and the DEA, accused of involvement in the trafficking of ten tons of cocaine, for which the US has requested his extradition. As this crime was committed after the signing of the agreement, it is not covered by the amnesty or the JEP. Marlon Marin, nephew of commander Iván Marquez, was also arrested in the same operation and he was extradited to the US, becoming a protected witness in the case. All this has exacerbated FARC members’ fears of extradition as a political retaliation by those who oppose the peace process. Furthermore, in December the Congress approved a proposal by the Democratic Center that may give powers to president Duque in reactivating the arrest warrants to FARC members. However, Congresswoman Goebertus has denounced this proposal, saying it was never properly discussed by the Congress as was concealed in the wording of the Law of Public Order. In any case the Fiscal Office or the DEA have not been very efficient in providing the evidence in the case, thus the future of Santrich and the impact of this case in the entire process are not yet known.

Conclusion This chapter has shown two very different approaches to DDR: on the one hand, Uribe’s DDR process was security-­oriented and combatant-based. It was assumed that establishing nationwide security would lead to opportunities for development. However, rather than the immediate concerns over the security threat posed by former combatants, or the effectiveness of their reintegration aid, the negotiations revolved principally around who among them could obtain the judicial benefits from the new transitional legislation, in particular drug-­traffickers who understood the DDR process as an opportunity to resolve their pending extradition orders. On the contrary, the FARC-­Santos DDR has been negotiated as development-­ oriented and community-­based; this as the government and the FARC agreed that the solution to the country’s security problems could not be solved by the mere dismantling of the guerrilla, but rather by addressing and tackling profound problems of inequality, rural backwardness and the poverty that affects wider communities in the countryside. Thus, it was expected that the development would provide a basis for the creation of security. The comparison between both DDRs make evident the differences that were created during the negotiations in regard to the treatment of the leaders and the troops, which in the Colombian case were defined along the lines of those who were or were not involved in grave crimes and those included in international humanitarian law, or in relation to drug-­trafficking. Not even those who wished to contradict the peace processes rejected the amnesty for low-­ranking ex-­ combatants, but they did ask for restrictions on their leadership. The criteria for the target population was defined with regard to the political bargaining during the negotiations, in which the judicial benefits gain more importance than the economic ones and where the reintegration programmes play no part in the decision as to who should receive benefits provided to ex-­combatants.

DDR design   83 These DDRs are also linked to different understandings of demobilisation. First, the demobilisation of troops may be instrumental in obtaining advantages in the negotiation process. The paramilitary leaders decided on the demobilisation of certain specific groups that were not core military or political structures: some minors, and then two other groups that held little military power or sway. Second, the demobilisation of guerrilla members was used as part of a counterinsurgency campaign; thus the combatants themselves were targeted on the basis of their military worth as collaborators and providers of counterinsurgency intelligence. In both cases the prioritising of security meant that development aims were largely overlooked and the process of state-­building was rather limited. Third, the demobilisations are the result of a long and slow process of negotiation in which the armed factions address other overarching problems with regard to wider social and economic development, citizenship and democracy. In this context, the creation of institutions (on the points of integral rural reform and a solution to the drug problem) and the extension of democracy and citizenship rights (the point on political participation) underpin the entire DDR, beyond mere disarmament in exchange for individual benefits to the ex-­combatants.

Notes    1 Betancourt has declared that she did ask the presidential office to take her out in a military plane as there was no way out by land.    2 From now on Policy of Democratic Security. For his second mandate Uribe continued with this policy under the name of “Policy of Consolidation of the Democratic Security”.    3 Policy of Democratic Security, 2003, p. 22§31.    4 The Plan Colombia was an initiative that began during Pastrana’s administration, but was carried out mostly under Uribe’s mandate.    5 Semana 5 February 2006.    6 Uribe also created a new tax for security purposes. Decree 1838/2002.    7 Three thousand cases have been documented. Critics of this policy come from both outside and inside the military. In recent declarations, the ex-­colonel Juan Carlos Rodriguez, who was sentenced to 40 years in jail for his collaboration with paramilitary groups, said that the Colombian army had become a “mercenary army”. Recordings of the open audience in the Peace and Justice trial to the 285 members of the Central Bolivar Bloc, 22 September 2015.    8 As part of the controls of power imposed after the civil war, any president was only allowed one term of office (four years). Uribe succeeded in modifying the law, allowing himself a second term.    9 When Uribe was governor of the department of Antioquia he strongly supported a form of legal paramilitary groups, the CONVIVIR, cooperatives of private security.   10 Castaño Letter to the public ¨Las AUC de Hoy”, in Coorporación Observatorio para la Paz (2002), Annex 21: 324–326. It seems he resigned in May but the public announcement was made in July (Romero, 2007, p. 113).   11 Ibid. La amarga obligación de la autodefensa; Public letter. “Y quien volverá a creer en nosotros?”. 21 July 2002. Annex 20: 322; “Letter to Anne Patterson”. Annex 30: 365–366. 24/09/2002. In Corporación Observatorio para la Paz (2002).   12 Designation of the AUC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Secretary Colin L. Powel, Washington, DC 10 September 2010. Corporacion Observatorio para la Paz (2002). Annex 23: 342.

84   DDR design   13 European Union decision on updating the list of terrorist organisations. 3 May 2002. In Villarraga (2013, p. 151).   14 Open letter from the AUC to the presidential candidates. In Villarraga, 2013, p. 173.   15 Carlos Castaño Letter, 13 April 1998. In Corporación Observatorio para la Paz (2002).   16 Public statement on “Cumbre de Cartago”, where Castaño says that around 50 drug­dealers attended. 25 March 2002. Annex 25, 347–352; Castaño public letter. The truth of the ACR in front of the international community and the US. Annex 23: 343–346. In Corporación Observatorio para la Paz (2002).   17 On 1 September 2002.   18 4 September 2002. Letter to the Public Opinon. In Corporación Observatorio para la Paz. Las Verdaderas Intenciones de los Paramilitares. Bogotá: Intermedio editores, Annex 26: 347–352. Letter to the peace commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo, Monseñor Pedro Rubiano, Ann Paterson and Kofi Annan. In Corporación Observatorio para la Paz. Las Verdaderas Intenciones de los Paramilitares. Bogotá: Intermedio editores, Annex 28: 358–361   19 Ibid. La amarga obligación de la autodefensa.   20 Colombia signed the statute on 10 December 1998; its enforcement was expected to begin on 1 July 2002, and it was ratified on 5 August 2002 and unveiled by the media on 1 September. www.icc-­cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/latin%20 Amer­ican%20and%20caribbean%20states/Pages/colombia.aspx.   21 El Tiempo 31 July 2002; 1 September 2002. This temporary immunity included war crimes committed by US nationals, as part of an agreement between both countries (El Tiempo 28 August 2002).   22 The legal framework has been modified depending on the political circumstances of peace dialogues: Law 104/1993, Law 418/1997, Law 548/1999 and Law 782/2002.   23 It is important here to differentiate between laws, resolution and decrees. For the purpose of this study, it is sufficient to say for now that the laws are approved by the Congress, while the last two can be enacted by the president, ministries or public institutions, with no consultation from other democratic bodies.   24 The East Alliance (Alianza Oriente) included the Peasant Self-­Defence of Casanare and the Meta and Vichada Self-­Defence Groups.   25 Acronym in Spanish: Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio.   26 Ralito is a small town located in the department of Cordoba, in a zone of paramilitary control.   27 Bill to modify the Constitution No. 85. Introduced to Congress on 21 August 2003. In Gaceta del Congreso 436 (27 August, 2003). www.imprenta.gov.co/gacetap/ gaceta.nivel_3.   28 Classified as sedition and rebellion.   29 Speech on the second appeal to Articles 61 and 64. Bill No. 211/2005 in the Senate and No. 293/2005 in the House of Representatives. Gaceta Del Congreso 331/2005.   30 Press release, “Political Crime Definition”, 13 March 2005, pp.  29–32; “Self-­ Defence’s criminal classifying”, 13 March 2005, pp. 33–40 (Restrepo, 2005).   31 Press release, “Reflection on jail sentences”. 10 March 2005, pp. 65–68; “Diminishing of jail sentences”, 13 March 2005, pp. 69–72 (Restrepo, 2005).   32 Press release, “Speech in front of the First Commissions from Senate and Chamber of Representatives”, 5 April 2005, pp. 177–193 (Restrepo, 2005).   33 La Ceja Agreement, a peace agreement between the National Government and the Bloque Cacique Nutibara. Signed in La Ceja, Antioquia on 10 December 2003. Available at www.verdadabierta.com/.   34 Autodefensas Campesinas de Ortega.   35 Public Letter titled “Unity for Peace” in Villarraga (ed.) (2013). El Gobierno de Uribe frente al conflict armado y la paz, acuerdo con las AUC, p.  223, 31 March 2004 Biblioteca de la Paz. Bogotá: Fundación Cultura Democrática.

DDR design   85   36 Carlos Castaño disappeared in April 2004, most likely to be murdered by his former associates (Semana 23 August 2006;l CCJ, 2008, p. 40). He had publicly stated his sympathy for Carlos Fernandez and aka Martin Llanos in “The Self-­Defence’s Sour Duty”.   37 Arroyave was later murdered on 19 September 2004 by his own associates.   38 Sentence given to José Barnery Veloza García §211, pp. 78–79. Bananero, Calima and Centauros Bloc Trial, No. 2006/80585. Available at www.fiscalia.gov.co/jyp/ direccion-­de-fiscalia-­nacional-especializada-­de-justicia-­transicional/ley_justicia_y_paz/.   39 Fatima Agreement, 13 May 2004. More of these concentration zones were then created by presidential decree under the title of Temporary Zones of Location (OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 85).   40 Resolution 091 and 092/2004.   41 Iván Roberto Duque aka Ernesto Baez; Ramon Isaza aka El Viejo.   42 At the time, Congress was made up of 268 members, of whom 60 were present at the meeting. Only Senators Gustavo Petro and Rafael Pardo, as well as the representative Gina Parody, abstained from applauding the paramilitary leaders.   43 Rocio Arias and Eleonora Pineda.   44 Semana 1 August 2004; El Tiempo 29 July 2004.   45 Semana 1 August 2004; El Tiempo 29 July 2004.   46 El Tiempo 12 November 2004.   47 The Oriental Plains Self-­Defence (led by Miguel Arroyave, Pablo Mejia and Guillermo Torres), the North Bloc (led by Salvatore Mancuso, aka Jorge 40, Diego Vecino, Ramón Mojana, Camilo Catatumbo) and the Bloque Bananero (led by Ever Velosa García aka Hernán Hernandez). Public letter, 12 August 2004, Annex 11, p. 133 (OACP, 2006).   48 This is the only known evidence of the dynamics and topics addressed in the negotiations. Semana 24 September 2004.   49 Public Letter “An act of faith on the peace”, 7 October 2004, Annex 12, p.  134 (OACP, 2006).   50 Commander Ever Veloza demobilised the Bananero and Calima Blocs; Mancuso demobilised the Catatumbo and Cordoba Blocs; and other smaller groups were included: South Magdalena Self-­Defence group, as well as three military structures: Cundinamarca, South-­West Antioquia and Mojana Blocs. The demobilisation of the Self-­Defence of the Oriental Plains never took place, as its leader, Miguel Arroyave, was murdered by his own associates when he left the encampment area. The North Bloc demobilised later in 2006.   51 Orlando Benitez, from the Liberal Party.   52 El Tiempo 27 May 2005.   53 In an interview with Semana. “The Peace Commissioner Uncovered”, 12 February 2006.   54 Sentences from the Constitutional Court C-­531 on 12 July 2006; C-­127 22 February 2006. Sentence C-­370/2006 18 May, 2006 that modifies paragraph 71, among others (CONPES 3554, p. 5; OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 86).   55 Currently, there are thousands of declarations used by the judicial system to judge the paramilitary leaders, but also to open new investigations against those people who were involved acts of violence, including the financing of violence or military support in the case of army personnel.   56 Vicente Castaño, interview in Semana. “Vicente Castaño Uncovered”, 7 October 2006.   57 Semana 24 September 2004.   58 BBC 9 February 2012.   59 Acronym in Spanish: Departamento Nacional de Planeación.   60 Acronym in Spanish: Programa de Atención Humanitaria al Desmovilizado. Resolution 0722/2001.   61 Army webpage.

86   DDR design   62 Ministry of Defence, 2013. Statistics of Individual Demobilisations per year (2002–2012). PAHD. Available at www.defensa.gob.gov.co [Accessed on 12 June 2013]. Data on the individual demobilisations tends to factor in the number of ex-­ combatants plus their families. This is misleading, as it is frequently interpreted as the total figure for deserters from guerrilla groups. The ACR does provide services for the family, but not to the same extent as for the ex-­combatants.   63 After the last collective demobilisation, in 2006, the government only recognised individual demobilisations, which explains the increase in the numbers in 2007 and 2008.   64 Decree 2767, 31 August 2004; Decree 128/2003 and 395/2007. The reward amount could range from US$750 to US$35,000.   65 Webpage Colombian Army, accessed 7 June, 2015. Available at www.ejercito.mil. co/wap//index.php?idcategoria=274415.   66 See also the debates in Foro Distrital (2005) and Foro Bogotá (2006).   67 See for instance the documentary Ciro y Yo.   68 The opposition to Uribe by the Liberals was not new. See, for instance, The Liberal opposition, 19 June 2005, El Tiempo, and Uribe will not be the Liberal Party candidate: Vives, 15 August 2004, El Tiempo.   69 Acosta, 2016, p. 60.   70 Ibid. p. 62.   71 Ibid. p. 38.   72 El Espectador 22 July 2018.   73 See CERAC. Monitor mensual de desescalamiento del conflicto armado interno en Colombia www.cerac.org.co/es/infograf%C3%ADa/monitoreo-­cerac.html   74 Zuluaga (Democratic Centre), 29.25%; Santos (the U Party), 25.69%; Marta Lucía Ramírez (Conservative), 15,52%; Clara López (Polo Democrático) 15,23%; Enrique Peñalosa (Green Party), 8.28%.   75 Santos, 50.9%; Zuluaga, 45.04%.   76 Law 1806, 24 August 2016, that regulated the plebiscitum.   77 No 50.23%, Yes 49.76%.   78 Santos’ speech, 2 October 2016 www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVjcUJN3iW0.   79 La República, interview 5 October 2016. The interview was published in the printed version, but the audios were leaked and are posted online: www.youtube.com/ watch?v=9Jwuk-fGbrs.   80 El Espectador 6 October 2016.   81 Later on, this process was also annulled as the New Agreeement was approved by the Congress, thus the opposition to the plebiscite was void.   82 www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2016/press.html.   83 See for instance: Expectativa por respuesta de Uribe a Santos, Semana, 20 October 2014 www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/santos-­invita-uribe-­hablar-de-­paz/406579-3; Santos Invita a Uribe a reunirse y trabajar juntos por la Paz de Colombia, El Nuevo Herald, 12 July 2016 www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-­latina/ colombia-­es/article89189822.html.   84 Jaramillo, 2018, p. 56.   85 Acto legislativo No 02, 7 August 2016, modified later by the constitutional court in the sentence.   86 Seventy-­five votes in favour in the Senate and 130 in the Chamber of Representatives. No votes against, although the opposition tend not to abstain rather than voting against. www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-­de-paz/congreso-­aprueba-acuerdos-­conlas-­farc-a-­favor-del-­gobierno-45950.   87 Viva la Ciudadanía reports.   88 See Londoño’s speech Minute 30’ www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPQCt7who4I&feat ure=youtu.be.   89 He recalls Schelling’s theory. Jaramillo, op. cit., 7 p. 43.

DDR design   87   90 General Agreement to End of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace. Signed by representatives of the Government and the FARC. 26 August 2012; La Habana, Cuba.   91 Jaramillo, op. cit., pp. 54–55.   92 Ibid. p. 53.   93 Government vision of point 3, the end of the conflict. Tomo 6, pp. 47–48.   94 Technical Subcommission on the End of the Conflict, which functioned from August 2014 to June 2016.   95 Ibid. p. 52.   96 Interview FARC representative to CNR, 25 January 2018.   97 FARC public communicate. La paz: el mejor futuro para las nuevas generaciones Pacto para liberar a los menores de quince años en las filas de las FARC‑EP, fin del reclutamiento de menores de dieciocho años y realidad precaria de la infancia colombiana. Ibid, p. 321.   98 “FARC no ha entregado todos los niños reclutados”: ONU. El País, 20 March 2018.   99 The FARC has calculated more than 4,000 members in jail. 100 Guerrilleros y Militares Desesperados por Salir de la Cárcel Ya. http://pacifista.co/ guerrilleros-­y-militares-­desesperados-por-­salir-de-­la-carcel-­ya/ (accessed 10 July 2017). 101 On the point for the victims, in the negotiations the creation of an Integral System for the Truth, Justice, Reparation and No Repetition was agreed. This system includes the creation of a truth commission, a unit for the search of people who disappeared during the conflict, measures for reparation of the victims and the JEP. 102 Centro Democrático Proposal. 103 Las cinco propuestas de los del ‘No’ en el plebiscito. 15 October 2016, El Tiempo. 104 Goebertus, J. Una reflexión para quienes votaron NO en el Plebiscito. 17 November 2016, El Tiempo. www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-­de-paz/cuales-­fueron-los-­ cambios-del-­nuevo-acuerdo-­de-paz-­31308. 105 Jaramillo, op.cit, Tomo 1, pp. 44–45. 106 Jaramillo, op. cit, p. 57. 107 New Final Agreement 3.2.2.6. 108 FARC’s representative Jairo Quintero, ECOMUN presentation, 4 July 2017, Bogotá. 109 New Final Agreement 3.2.2.1; Decree 899/2017, Articles 5 and 6. 110 Decree 899/2017, Article 13. 111 Ibid., articles 20 and 21. 112 Commander aka Ricardo Palmera, was extradited for crimes of terrorism and kidnapping. He was sentenced to 60 years for the kidnapping, but the decision of the jury on terrorism charges was divided. Washington Post, 10 July 2007, FARC Leader Convicted in Taking of 3 U.S. Hostages. 113 Goebertus, op. cit.

References Acosta, H. (2016). El hombre clave el secreto mejor guardado del proceso de paz de Colombia. Madrid: Aguilar. ACR (2009). The Cartagena Contribution to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Procceedings of the International congress on DDR. June 4–7 Cartagena. Cartagena: ACR. ACR (2011). Reintegración avances y retos. Informe de Gestión 2011. www.reintegra cion.gov.co. Ángel, J. (2005). Política de reincorporación nacional avances y desafíos 2002–2006. In: Forum Proceedings: Desmovilización, Un Camino Hacia la Paz (19.a-­20 May, 2005.a ed., pp. 197–220). Bogotá: CUN, Hogares de Paso La Maloka, Alcaldía de Bogota.

88   DDR design Arias, G., and Guáqueta, A. (2008). Transitional DDR in Colombia: Useful or Counterproductive? Bogotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz. Ballvé, T. (2012). Everyday state formation: Territory, decentralization, and the narco landgrab in Colombia. Environment and Planning. Society and Space, 30(4), 603–622. Berdal, M. (1996). Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boas, M., and Hatloy, A. (2008). ‘Getting in, getting out’: militia membership and prospects for reintegration in postwar Liberia. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 46(1), 33–55. Cárdenas, E., and Villa, E. (2012). La política de seguridad democrática y las ejecuciones extrajudiciales. Ensayos sobre Política Económica, (31), 64–72. Cárdenas, J. (2005). Los Parias de la Guerra. Bogotá: Aurora. Carranza-­Franco, F. (2014). A sub-­national approach to state-­building and security: the role of municipal institutions in Colombia’s DDR process. Conflict, Security & Development, 14(3), 245–274. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.923149. CCJ. (2008) Colombia: El espejismo de la justicia y la paz. Comisión Colombiana de Juristas. www.coljuristas.org/documentos/libros_e_informes/el_espejismo.html. CONPES 3554 (2008, 1 December). Política nacional de reintegración social y económica para personas y grupos armados ilegales. Gobierno de Colombia. Available at www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES.aspx. Defensoría. (2005, 31 December). Informe de seguimiento a la desmovilización colectiva y proceso de reincorporación de miembros de las autodefensas unidas de Colombia. November 2003–April 2005. Defensoría del Pueblo. www.defensoria.gov.co. Delgado, J. (2015). Counterinsurgency and the limits of state-­building: An analysis of Colombia’s policy of territorial consolidation, 2006–2012. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 26(3), 408–428. Foro Bogotá (2006). Forum Proceedings: Reinserción, Reconciliación y Ciudades Bogotá: Fundacion Konrad Adenauer, Alcaldías Mayores de Bogotá y Medellín, Revista Semana, Fundación Ideas para la Paz and PNUD.  Foro Distrital (2005). Forum Proceedings. Desmovilización, un camino hacia la paz. 19– 20 May 2005. Bogotá: CUN, Hogares de Paso la Maloka, Alcaldia de Bogota. Giustozzi, A. (2012). Post-­conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-­building Back In. London: Routledge. Gomes Porto, J., Alden, C. and Parsons, I. (2007). From Soldiers to Citizens: Demilitarization of Conflict and Society. Aldershot: Ashgate. Guáqueta, A. (2007). The way back in: reintegrating illegal armed groups on colombia then and now. In: M. Berdal (ed.), Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, Violence and Transition (pp. 11–46). London: Routledge. Gutiérrez Sanín, F., and Rincón, G. (2008). Rediscovering Europe? The aid dilemmas during and after the Plan Colombia: Analysis: Conflict, security & development: Vol. 8, No. 1. Conflict, Security & Development. www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/ 14678800801977112. Gutiérrez Sanín, F., and Barón, M. (2005). Re-­stating the State: paramilitary territorial control and political order in Colombia (1978–2004). Working Paper No. 66. Crisis States Research Centre (LSE). www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/. Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2004). Recruitment in a civil war: a preliminary discussion of the Colombian case. Paper for the seminar: Patterns of violence in civil wars. Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2007) Organising minors: the case of Colombia. Ford Institute for Human Security. www.files.ethz.ch/isn/45787/2007_Organizing_minors.pdf.

DDR design   89 Gutiérrez Sanín, F., and Jaramillo, A. (2004). Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security – the case of Medellín, Colombia. Environment and Urbanization, 16(2), 17–30. Howe, K., Sánchez, F., and Contreras, C. (2010). El camino hacia la paz o palos de ciego? Impacto del Programa de Desmovilización Paramilitar en la violencia homicida en Colombia. Documentos CEDE, UniAndes. HRW (2005a). Smoke and mirrors: Colombia’s demobilization of paramilitary groups. Human Rights Watch, August 2005 Vol. 17, No. 3 (B). HRW (2005b, January). COLOMBIA: Letting paramilitaries off the hook. Human Rights Watch. Hylton, F. (2010). Introduction: A better way?. In: Plan Colombia: The measure of success. Brown Journal World Affairs, 17(1), 99–115. ICG (2004, 5 August). Demobilising the paramilitaries in Colombia: An achievable goal? Latin America Report No. 8. International Crisis Group. www.crisisgroup.org. ICG (2005, 16 June). Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects. Latin America Report No. 14. International Crisis Group. Available at www.crisisgroup. org. Jaramillo, S. (2018). La posibilidad de la paz. Biblioteca del Proceso de Paz con las FARC – EP, Vol. I (p. 56). Bogotá: Colombian Government. Jennings, K. (2007). The struggle to satisfy: DDR through the eyes of ex-­combatants in Liberia. International Peacekeeping, 14(2), 204–218. Jennings, K. (2008). Seeing DDR From below: challenges and dilemmas raised by the experiences of ex-­combatants in Liberia. Fafo Report. Karamé, K. (2009). Reintegration and the relevance of social relations: the case of Lebanon. Conflict, Security and Development, 9(4), 495–514. Kriger, M. (2003). Guerrilla Veterans in Post-­war Zimbabwe. Cambridge: CUP. López, C. (2010). La refundación de la patria, de la teoría a la evidencia. In: C. López, (ed.), Y refundaron la Patria. De cómo mafiosos y politicos reconfiguraron el Estado Colombiano (pp. 29–79). Bogotá: Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, Random House Mondadori. Maher, D., and Thomson, A. (2011). The terror that underpins the ‘peace’: the political economy of Colombia’s paramilitary demobilisation process. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(1), 95–113. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2011.553391. Marks, T. (2006). Colombian military support for ‘democratic security’. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 12(2), 197–200. Mason, A. (2003). Colombia’s democratic security agenda: Public order in the security tripod. Security Dialogue, 34(4), 391–409. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010603344002. McMullin, J. (2012). Integration or separation? The stigmatisation of ex-­combatants after war. Review of International Studies, 39(2), 385–414. McMullin, J. (2013). Ex-­Combatants and the Post-­Conflict State. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. MDRP (2003, October). Linkages between disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-­combatants and security sector reform. Multi-­country demobilization and reintegration program. Position paper. World Bank Publications. Available at www. mdrp.org/index.htm. MDRP (2010). MDRP Final Report. Overview of program achievements. Multi-­Country demobilization and reintegration program. The World Bank. July 2010. Available at www.mdrp.org/index.htm [accessed on 3 February 2011]. Ministry of the Interior. (2006). La política de reincorporación a la vida civil 2003–2006. Ministry of the Interior and Justice.

90   DDR design Muggah, R. (2010). Innovations in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration policy and research: Reflections on the last decade. NUPI Working Paper 774. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Available at https://core.ac.uk/download/ pdf/52114333.pdf. Muggah, R., and Baaré, A. (2009). Negotiating reintegration in Uganda: Dealing with combatants during the peace process. In: R. Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-­ Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge. Muggah, R., Berdal, M. and Torjesen, S. (2009). Enter an evidence-­based security promotion agenda. In: R. Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-­Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge. Munive, J., and Jakobsen, S. F. (2012). Revisiting DDR in Liberia: exploring the power, agency and interests of local and international actors in the ‘making’ and ‘unmaking’ of combatants. Conflict, Security & Development, 12(4), 359–385. https://doi.org/10.10 80/14678802.2012.724792. OACP (2006). Proceso de paz con las autodefensas. Informe ejecutivo. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. www.altocomisio nadoparalapaz.gov.co. OACP/ACR (2010). Desarme, desmovilización y reintegración – DDR en Colombia. lecciones aprendidas y resultados del proceso 2002–2010. Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Oehme, C. G. (2010). Plan Colombia: Reassessing the strategic framework. Democracy and Security, 6(3), 221–236. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2010.521055. Ojeda, D. (2012). Green pretexts: Ecotourism, neoliberal conservation and land grabbing in Tayrona National Natural Park, Colombia. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 357–375. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2012.658777. Ottaway, M. (2002). Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states. Development and Change, 33(5), 1001–1023. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.t01-1-00258. Özerdem, A. (2009). Post-­war Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. London: I. B. Tauris. Özerdem, A. (2012). A re-­conceptualisation of ex-­combatant reintegration: ‘social reintegration’ approach. Conflict, Security & Development, 12(1), 51–73. https://doi.org /10.1080/14678802.2012.667661. Palou, J. (2006). Trámite de la ley de justicia y paz. Fundación Social. Palou, J., and Llorente, M. (2009). Reintegracion y seguridad ciudadana en Medellín: Un balance del programa de paz y reconciliación (2004–2008). Fundación Ideas para La Paz. Pardo, R. (2007). Fin del Paramilitarismo. Es Posible su Desmonte? Bogotá: Ediciones B. PDS. (2009). Security promotion in fragile states: Can local meet national? Exploring the connections between community security and disarmarment, demobilization and reintegration. Peace Security and Development Network. Pinto, M., Vergara, A., and De La Huerta, Y. (2002). Diagnóstico del programa de reinserción En Colombia: mecanismos para incentivar la desmovilización voluntaria individual. Departamiento De Planeación Nacional. Archivos De Economía. Doc. 11. Banco De La República. www.Dnp.Gov.Co/Portals/0/Archivos/Documentos/DEE/ Archivos_Economia/211.PDF. Pretelt, D. (2006). Speech. In: Forum Proceedings: Reinserción, Reconciliación y Ciudades. Bogotá: Fundacion Konrad Adenauer, Alcaldías Mayores de Bogotá y Medellín, Revista Semana, Fundación Ideas para la Paz and PNUD.

DDR design   91 Procuraduría (2006). Proyecto: Control preventivo y seguimiento a políticas públicas en materia de desmovilización y reinserción. Tomo II. Procuraduria General de la Nación. Pugel, J. (2009). Measuring reintegration in Liberia. In: R. Muggah (ed.), Security and Post-­Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge. Restrepo, L. (2005). Justicia y Paz. De la Negociación a la Gracia. Medellín: Instituto Tecnológico Metropolitano. Rojas, C. (2009). Securing the state and developing social insecurities: the securitisation of citizenship in contemporary Colombia. Third World Quarterly, 30(1), 227–245. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590802622631. Romero, M. (2003). Paramilitares y autodefensas. 1982–2003. Bogotá: Planeta. Romero, M. (2007). Parapolitica. La Ruta de la Expansión Paramilitar y los Acuerdos Políticos. Bogotá: Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, CEREC. Rosenau, W., Espach, R., Ortiz, R. D., and Herrera, N. (2014). Why they join, why they fight, and why they leave: Learning from Colombia’s database of demobilized militants. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(2), 277–285. https://doi.org/10.1080/0954655 3.2012.700658. Rufer, R. (2005). Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR): Conceptual approaches, specific settings, practical experiences. Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF ), 116. Schulhofer-­Wohl, J., and Sambanis, N. (2010). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs: An assessment (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 1906329). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Available at https://papers.ssrn. com/abstract=1906329. SIDDR. (2005). Stockholm initiative on disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration. Sweeden Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Söderström, J. (2011). Politics of Affection: Ex-­Combatants, Political Engagement and Reintegration Programs in Liberia. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Specker, L (2008). The R-­phase of DDR processes: An overview of key lessons learned and practical experiences. Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Thruelsen, P. (2006). From soldier to civilian: Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration in Afghanistan. DIIS Report 2006, 2007. Danish Institute for International Studies. Torjesen, S. (2009). New avenues for research in the study of DDR. Conflict, Security & Development, 9(4), 411–423. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678800903345754. UNDP. (2003). Deshacer los ejércitos: La desvinculación de combatientes. El conflicto, callejón con salida. United Nations. www.pnud.org.co/img_upload/9056f18133669868 e1cc381983d50faa/capitulo_10.pdf. UNDP. (2006). Integrated demobilization, disarmament and reintegration standards. United Nations. Available at http://unddr.org/. United Nations. (2003). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human rights situation in Colombia. United Nations. United Nations. (2004). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human rights situation in Colombia. United Nations. US (2008). Plan Colombia: Drug reduction goals were not fully met, but security has improved; US agencies need more detailed plans for reducing assistance. Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. Report to US Senate.

92   DDR design Villamizar, D. (2005). Introduction. In: Forum Proceedings: Desmovilización, Un Camino Hacia La Paz. 19–20 May 2005 (pp.  17–26). Bogotá: CUN, Hogares de Paso La Maloka, Alcaldía de Bogota. Villarraga, A. (ed.) (2013). El Gobierno de Uribe frente al conflict armado y la paz, acuerdo con las AUC. Biblioteca de la Paz. Bogotá: Fundación Cultura Democrática.

3 Social reintegration and DDR organisations DDR programmes and ex-­combatants’ NGOs

The UN makes its own assumption that by breaking the social networks created by the military life – between combatants as peers as well as with their leaders – there will be a transfer of loyalties from the warlords to the democratic system and the rule of law (UNDP, 2006, 6.10:9). Subsequently, the demobilisation and reintegration of troops is portrayed as a means of reducing the risk of relapse into conflict, based on the belief that fragmenting the armed structures hinders any return to armed contestation (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009, p.  49). Munive and Jakobsen (2012, p. 369) have also warned of the risks of reproducing patron–client structures that characterise the relationships between commanders and their troops in wartime if these structures are not first broken down. Similarly, it has been argued that the lack or failure of reintegration programmes may leave ex-­combatants prone to manipulation by their commanders as they try to maintain influence and authority (PDS, 2009, p. 39). Studies in Sierra Leone have concluded that breaking up the hierarchies of command and merely sending ex-­combatants back to their communities of origin is not sufficient to achieving successful reintegration (Vries and Wiegink, 2011, p.  38); while Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) found that dismantling social ties with the armed group does not necessarily improve the likelihood of finding employment or of acceptance by communities. On the contrary, supporting networks that originated within the military structures may, in fact, have helped the reintegration of ex-­combatants into civil life (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007, pp. 532–534; Vries and Wiegink, 2011, p. 47). For instance, Giustozzi (2008) has argued that breaking the social links among ex-­combatants did not prevent their absorption by systems of patronage in Afghanistan. Rather, their economic situations were directly dependent on their capacity to take part in these social networks. Similarly, in Northern Ireland, IRA combatants released from jail received support not from the government but from NGOs created by former fellow fighters (McEvoy and Shirlow, 2009, p. 34; Rolston, 2007, p. 271). Therefore, the temporary maintenance of existing military structures may facilitate, and allow time for, the transition between military and civil life (SIDDR, 2005, p. 25). These forms of social fabric among ex-­combatants take on particular relevance in cases where the reintegration phase has been poorly conceived or not included in the original

94   Social reintegration DDR programme design, as well in those cases where the community of origin has been destroyed or where returning to it is not a desirable option. Moreover, the role of communities in replacing the military milieu of the demobilised and in providing support for their reintegration in the form of community-­based approaches has been stressed. Thus, the debates around who to target with reintegration aid tend to place responsibility for reintegration with either the ex-­combatants or the communities, while the role of the state in creating a social fabric and democratic relationships with the ex-­combatants and the communities they come from is often neglected. In sum, the literature on DDR has prioritised the dismantling of military links, without foreseeing how to replace the layers of social and political organisation that are also destroyed. This chapter shows how DDR programmes may play a major role in the fostering of new social and political interactions to replace those relationships that were created between combatants during the war, but also to address those social tensions between the communities and the state that ignited the war in the first place. The UN recommends the creation of national institutions for the adequate functioning of DDR programmes at three main levels: the development policy and strategy level (that takes the form of a DDR commission); the planning and technical level, including the coordination of activities among different entities; and the implementation and operational level, responsible for executing activities in the field and in regional offices (UNDP, 2006, 3.30). Thus, the UN aims to establish national institutional capacity through the implementation of partnerships within civil society, the creation of employment in local communities and authorities and the recognition of the role of community leaders and civil society in the founding and functioning of DDR institutions (UNDP, 2006, 2.10 p. 123). In the same vein, the World Bank’s programme in the Great Lakes Region trusted the implementation of DDR programmes – and the aid that came with it – to the newly formed national governments (MDRP, 2010, p.  45). The UN and the World Bank understand that national ownership is essential for the success and sustainability of DDR programmes. Thus, there has been subsequent emphasis on capacity and state-­building activities such as the supply of technical assistance, training and funding to national and subnational authorities and civil-­society groups (MDRP, 2010, pp.  11, 62; UNDP, 2006, 2.10 pp. 12, 3.30, 3). However, it has been argued that DDR programmes impose one-­size models made to fit an overarching international agenda, and as a result, the agency of both communities and ex-­combatants is often neglected and their participation is reduced to passive recipients of aid (Özerdem, 2009; PDS, 2009). McMullin (2013, p.  28) has also noted that the dominant blueprint of the internationa standards on DDR, although couched in terms of empowerment and partnership, only reinforce the dominance of the international agenda, as it leaves little room for the input or participation of communities or civil society. Moreover Ottaway, (2002, p.  261) posits that those international initiatives in state-­ building and development are inevitably engaged in a task that is, in its very

Social reintegration   95 essence, oxymoronic: building democratic institutions and fostering social and economic reforms for people who may themselves be unwilling to embrace such policies. More significantly, the demobilisation and disarmament phases tend to be led by top-­down policies, imposed by international bodies or national governments that are prioritised over smaller political communities in which the reintegration phase takes place. For instance, there is a tendency for multilateral organisms to use local NGOs or grass-­roots organisations as mere subcontractors to implement the international guidelines, which in reality may inhibit the potential for these groups to contest these policies or to mediate between local communities and DDR practitioners (PDS, 2009, p.  71). By way of counterpoint, community-­based approaches may choose to focus more on keeping ownership within the recipient communities rather than on larger state-­building strategies, which may result in conflicting goals and activities and subsequent tensions between the local and the national (ibid., p. 41). This chapter analyses the interplay between two types of organisations that take part in the social reintegration of ex-­combatants and the different reintegration and reincorporation programmes developed by the government and the ex-­combatant’s organisations and NGOs. In the first section I focus on the first reincorporation1 programmes that were developed in Colombia (see Table 3.1) and the NGOs created by ex-­combatants for the demobilisation of guerrilla groups in the 1990s: the ACR programme as part of Uribe’s DDR; and the ARN reincorporation programme for the Santos-­FARC DDR. The second section analyses the role of DDR programmes and ex-­combatants’ organisations in social reintegration. Finally, the last section shows the difficulties the ex-­ combatants may have in their social reintegration, both collectively and individually.

Reintegration programmes Reintegration programmes in the 1990s The peace process with the guerrillas in the 1990s prompted the creation of the policy of National Reconciliation, Normalisation and Rehabilitation with two main programmes: the National Plan for Rehabilitation (NPR) for the development of the regions affected by the conflict, and the Presidential Programme for Reinsertion2 (Presidencia, 1989). The peace settlement with the M-­19 stated two post-­conflict structures: on the one hand, the National Council for Normalisation3 (NCN) that was represented in the regions by the municipal councils; on the other, the peace fund,4 with the function of implementing rehabilitation programmes in the areas where the former guerrillas used to operate. Moreover, the peace settlements between the new president, Cesar Gaviria, and the other guerrillas, apart from the possibility of the creation of political parties, foresaw the creation of ex-­combatants’ organisations and NGOs in order

Table 3.1  Reinsertion and reintegration programmes in Colombia Year

Programme

Institution

President/mayor

1982–1998

Presidential Programme for Reinsertion

Presidency

1991–1994 1994–1999 1999–2003 2003–2006 1994–2003 2003 2005–2015

National Office for Reinsertion Special Secretary for the Reinsertion General Directorate for the Reinsertion Programme of Reincorporation to the Civil Life (PRVC) Reincorporation into Civilian life Peace and Reconciliation Complementary Services to the Demobilised Population (PAPDRB)

Presidency Red de Solidaridad Social Ministry of the Interior Ministry of the Interior Mayoral Office of Medellín

2007–2012 2012–2016 2017

High Commission for Reintegration (ACR) Colombian Agency for Reintegration Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation

Presidency

Virgilio Barco César Gaviria César Gaviria Ernesto Samper Andrés Pastrana Álvaro Uribe Vélez Luis Pérez Sergio Fajardo Luis Eduardo Garzón Samuel Moreno Gustavo Petro Álvaro Uribe Vélez Juan Manuel Santos Juan Manuel Santos

Mayoral Office of Bogotá

Presidency

Social reintegration   97 to provide support after the dismantling of the rebel’s military and social structures: Fundación Progresar (EPL), Corpadec (PRT), Fundación para la Convivencia Ciudadana de las Comunas Nororientales de Medellín (MIR-­COAR), Corporación Arco Iris (CRS), Fundación Colombia Viva (Frente Francisco Garnica) and Fundación Sol y Tierra (MAQL). Thus, while the government relied on its own NPR offices, the former ex-­combatants developed political participation and citizenship activity through their own NGOs, in particular at the Municipal Councils for Normalisation (Diaz and Villamizar, 1999; Turriago and Bustamante, 2003; Villamizar, 1998). The reincorporation itself was developed in three phases (Turriago and Bustamante, 2003): the first focused on the provision of individual benefits (amnesty, business projects and lumps sums, personal security and IDs) but there were some difficulties with regard to the judicial and personal security of the ex-­ combatants. On the one hand, the amnesties were delayed, as the NCN had the task of seeking out each ex-­combatant’s legal file and processing it within the framework of transitional justice. In particular, it was difficult to resolve the pending arrest warrants for the M-­19 commanders for the violent siege of the Palace of Justice. Although the initial problems in providing amnesty to M-­19 commanders had been solved and they were finally able to participate in the constitutional assembly and in the drafting of the new constitution, the M-­19 presidential candidate, Carlos Pizarro, was assassinated, putting even more pressure on the government to protect each M-­19 commander and their offices (Turriago and Bustamante, 2003). On the other hand, the economic reintegration scheme entered into crisis: the Reinsertion Commission had the function of providing the ex-­combatants with the benefits offered by the government: an alimony of six months, help in finding employment, education, vocational training and support for the creation of business, including credits and technical assistance. However, Gaviria’s government struggled to find and manage resources, as other state institutions were reluctant to provide or administer the money for the ex-­combatants; as a result, there was a six-­month delay in the provision of credits. To make it worse, there were problems of coordination between the National and Municipal Councils for Normalisation; thus some municipalities were reluctant to accept the demobilised and their projects. (Turriago and Bustamante, 2003). As a consequence of all the aforementioned problems, by 1991, of the 3,287 demobilised, only 1,462 had obtained the credits promised; likewise, only eight business projects – with the participation of 147 ex-­combatants – were allotted land. By 1992, from the $3,000 million available for these projects only half had been used (Turriago and Bustamante, 2003). The second phase started in 1993 when the aforementioned crisis forced President Gaviria to reorganise the entire reincorporation programme. The government and the demobilised thus agreed a New Pact for the Consolidation of the Peace Process, that shifted the approach from the demobilised being treated as mere recipients of aid to them becoming active participants in the implementation of the peace settlements and in the reconciliation process. Changes were

98   Social reintegration made in three main areas: first, the individual benefits were reorganised and refinanced; second, the ex-­combatants began educational activities on topics around the new constitution, citizenship participation and human rights; third, the NPR and the Programme for Reinsertion were merged and the implementation was decentralised through closer work with the 17 NPR regional offices and with the participation of the demobilised NGOs in the design and implementation of reinsertion activities. Gaviria’s government also fostered the creation of decentralised structures within the governor’s offices (peace and reinsertion funds, reinsertion plans and reinsertion committees) in order to articulate the national policy to the development (i.e. rehabilitation) programmes designed locally by each governor. This phase finished with the demobilisation of other small guerrilla groups towards the end of Gaviria’s mandante in 1994: the Socialist Renovation Current (SRC), the Medellín Popular Militias (MIR-­ COAR) and the EPL dissident, Francisco Garnica Front. Besides, individual guerrilla members kept deserting and they obtained demobilised status; thus the offices for reincorporation were maintained, although in a much more discrete manner, first inside the NPR and then by another institution that replaced it named the Red de Solidaridad Social.5 The third phase started in 1995, with the creation of the Project on Education for Peace and Democracy. Apart from the obvious peace pedagogy, its aims were to consolidate the implementation of the peace agreements in the regions affected by the conflict or where the demobilised had settled down; this, by articulating the benefits to the demobilised and those received by the communities. This project was later dismantled and in 1999 the Ministry of the Interior created an office to facilitate the process of desertion and demobilisation of guerrilla members,6 with the function of coordinating the institutional offer of health, education, working skills and employment opportunities (Villarraga, 2006, p. 31). Corporation Democracy and the paramilitary leaders For the reinsertion phase, Uribe’s strategy was to employ the same programmes, methods and infrastructure that had been in place since the 1990s; thus he gave new life to the programme of the Ministry of the Interior and created the Programme for the Reincorporation for the Civil Life (PRVC) in 2003 (OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 133; Villarraga, 2006, p. 31). Between 1990 and 1994 the total number of ex-­combatants was 4,715 who demobilised collectively as part of peace settlements, while between 1998 and 2001 the programme provided services to 2,505 ex-­combatants who had deserted from the active guerrillas (Pinto, Vergara, and De La Huerta, 2002). Under Uribe’s government, however, the PRVC was appointed to provide reintegration services to both collective and individual demobilisations alike. In less than two years, the number of users skyrocketed: between December 2003 and August 2005, the PRVC was in charge of 16,596 ex-­soldiers: 8,796 from collective demobilisations and 7,800 from individual demobilisations (Ángel, 2005,

Social reintegration   99 p. 197). The PRVC was no longer able to cope with this new level of demand – more than five times higher than before –, simply because its budget and resources did not increase at the same rate. Such lack of resources and forward capacity was evident in the estimated ratio of around 1,500 to 2,000 ex-­ combatants to one social worker.7 In this context, the mayor’s offices of Bogotá and Medellín played a main role in the design and implementation of the national policy of DDR as each city developed programmes to provide services to the ex-­combatant products of Uribe’s DDR (Carranza-­Franco, 2014). However, contrary to those of the national government, the activities of these municipal programmes were not a constitutional responsibility; instead they functioned as a type of social programme for the marginalised population, providing complementary assistance to the demobilised by supplementing the services offered from the central institutions. Medellín’s mayor had a primary role to play, as between 2003 and 2006 nine different paramilitary groups demobilised in Antioquia, two of them in Medellín itself: the Cacique Nutibara Bloc and Héroes de Granada Bloc. By 2006, 10,844 ex-­paramilitaries were living in the department of Antioquia and 4,130 in its capital, Medellín, constituting 34 and 13 per cent respectively of all the collective paramilitary demobilisations (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007, p. 15). Medellín already had a reintegration programme designed for the demobilisation of the MIR-­COAR and that was then transformed into a new programme named Peace and Reconciliation, which in practice took over the reintegration of ex-­paramilitaries, while the PRVC provided services to the individual demobilised (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007, p. 9; Salazar, 2007, p. 8). Specifically, as part of the Ralito Agreement, the paramilitary leaders created the NGO Corporation Democracy, whose main function was to support the reinsertion and reintegration of troops from the two groups that had demobilised in Medellín – the Cacique Nutibara Bloc in 2003 and Héroes de Granada two years later: The government recognises the NGO ‘Corporation Democracy’ as the organisation that represents the demobilised from the Cacique Nutibara Bloc. [The government and BCN] will work in tandem to support, implement and monitor the process of reincorporation. The national government, the Medellín Mayoralty and Corporation Democracy will design any programme needed for the support, development and monitoring of the reinsertion phase.8 Corporation Democracy thus assumed the function of providing support and orientating the ex-­combatants during the different stages of the process, as well as informing them of the benefits and services they were entitled to receive, including the creation of business plans. It also maintained some semblance of order among the demobilised, and encouraged their participation in the activities offered by Peace and Reconciliation. Additionally, Corporation Democracy coordinated another 15 or so small NGOs with similar functions (ODDR, 2009,

100   Social reintegration p.  19). As part of the DDR policy, some of these NGOs were rewarded with contracts from the national and municipal authorities for projects based around ex-­combatant reinsertion activities, as well as others for the benefit of the communities. This scheme also granted preferential treatment to those larger construction companies that voluntarily included job quotas for ex-­combatants associated with these NGOs in their contracts with public institutions (Arias and Guáqueta, 2008, p. 17).9 However, Corporation Democracy was also accused of being a façade for the continuation of the social order created by the paramilitaries in Medellín: particularly as it was headed by drug-­trafficker Don Berna, who, by this time, was still part of the team negotiating with the government. Allegedly, Corporation Democracy was involved in criminal networks: the social controls imposed by the drug-­trafficking organisation, the Envigado Office, were often perpetuated through the participation of ex-­combatants in vigilante groups; this was also true of their political control over local structures of governance in neighbourhoods and small rural communities: the Juntas de Acción Local (JAL) and Juntas de Acción Comunal (JAC) (ICG, 2004, p. 14; Personería Municipal de Medellín, 2005, p.  18).10 Additionally, some of the demobilised from the Cacique Nutibara Bloc were found to have stolen money and resources from those construction firms that offered them employment.11 Reports also emerged of local convenience-­store owners falling victim to extortion, forced into buying products from certain ex-­combatants’ Business Plans.12 Later on, Corporation Democracy fell apart due the extradition of the paramilitary leaders in 2008 and its own internal criminal dynamics: in 2009 four of its leaders were killed in internecine struggles for power while other leaders were arrested for their involvement in criminal activities after the demobilisation.13 Peace and Reconciliation had in fact encouraged the organisation of small units of political participation among ex-­combatants (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007). However, these efforts were halted to prevent the continuation of the social and political structures that underpinned the strength of the drug-­ traffickers in Medellín through Democracy Corporation. Certainly, the creation of organisations by the demobilised may also have a dark side in the creation of NGOs and civil organisations as a strategy for the continuation of the warlords’ power. The Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR) Meanwhile, in May 2005, the mayor’s office of Bogotá launched the Programme of Complementary Services to the Process of Demobilisation and Reintegration in Bogotá (PAPDRB),14 which provided an arena for contesting and redefining Uribe’s entire reintegration strategy and urged the creation of the High Counsellor for Reintegration, which was later transformed into the Colombian Agency for Reintegration15 in 2011 (Carranza-­Franco, 2014). When the ACR was created in 2007, it had three main objectives: first, to develop a more sustainable and long-­term strategy for the reintegration of

Social reintegration   101 e­ x-­combatants; second, to include the communities in the process; and third, to achieve better and longer-­term coordination between the national and subnational authorities16 (OACP/ACR, 2010, p.  11). In order to do so, the ACR extended the reintegration services to those areas where the ex-­ combatants were living; thus a network of 29 regional offices was established, and with it a team of professionals in the areas of psychosocial, economic and community reintegration and legal advice (OACP/ACR, 2010, pp. 325–328). Peace and Reconciliation in Medellín had created a reintegration strategy named Return to Legality, which was adopted as the ARC reintegration model nationwide.17 Return to Legality was a model for psychosocial intervention based on the assumption that restoring or creating a healthy and resilient social fabric would bolster the ex-­combatants’ mental health and reintegration.18 It aimed to “provide services in psychology as well as family and community counselling, create and strengthen trust, promote the development of the community and establish a process of reparation and reconciliation” (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007, p. 13). This would operate at three different levels: (a) the individual, providing support in health, education, recreational activities and prevention of recidivism; (b) the family, including counselling services in partner relationships, family therapy and domestic violence; and (c) the community, fostering social organisation and participation (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2006, p. 128). In 2008, the ACR developed a new psychosocial model named MAPAZ,19 which maintained some continuity with Return to Legality but also had a distinctive approach of its own: placing further emphasis on the measurable individual and social competencies acquired by the demobilised. On the one hand, MAPAZ assumed that the treatment of aggressive or criminal behaviour should take into account the characteristics of the social context in which the demobilised lived (ACR, 2011a, p.  4). As such, it aimed to facilitate the interaction between the demobilised and their new environment: family, community, working place and education institutions (ACR, 2011a, p.  21; CONPES 3554, 2008, p. 27). On the other, MAPAZ intended to develop four specific personal competencies: assertiveness; non-­violent conflict resolution; responsibility and capacity in planning;and achievement of goals (ACR, 2011a, p.  16; OACP, 2010, p.  4; OACP/ACR, 2010, p.  177). Thus, the demobilised were each assigned a personal tutor to lead them through the process of psychosocial reintegration, as well as to monitor their other activities in education, vocational training and family relations. The majority of psychosocial services took the form of workshops, but tutors would also make visits to the homes of the demobilised as well as other family and social activities (ACR, 2011a, p. 42). The ACR programme, then, had a defining role to play in establishing a reintegration strategy that was coherent and compulsory for the demobilised nationwide and which related to the combatants in terms of their attachment to their social environment. Furthermore, the implementation of the ACR programme also prompted the development of an overarching reintegration

102   Social reintegration bureaucracy in the regions with the hiring and training of personnel to deliver services at its 29 regional centres. These regional teams had the additional function of coordinating policies with the municipal authorities. This meant lobbying mayors, governors and other authorities to include the demobilised as a special population within their policies and budgets, in order to facilitate their access to subnational institutions and local services, as well as engaging directly with the recipient communities. This articulation of local agents was crucial to the both reconciliation and the reintegration as a whole (CONPES 3554, 2008, p. 10; OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 273). As a result, by 2010, 17 departments and 132 municipalities had factored in the demobilised population as part of their local government programmes (OACP, 2010, p. 4). Also, importantly, the creation of the reintegration institutions helped in the definition of which services could be subcontracted and which would be delivered directly by national government. For instance, the psychosocial services and the reintegration officers depended on central government, while education and health services relied on the municipalities. Other services for economic and community reintegration were monitored by the ACR, albeit by outsourcing them to third-­party companies.20 In 2008, a National Policy of Social and Economic Reintegration (PRSE)21 was enacted, with two main areas of action: the ex-­combatants and the communities. The ACR thus became responsible for: (a) unifying criteria within the regional reintegration programmes; (b) coordinating with the subnational authorities in the national implementation of the PRSE; (c) evaluating and monitoring the demobilised living in the regions; and (d) strengthening the channels of communication between subnational and national institutions through the regional offices (CONPES 3554, 2008, p. 61). The Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN) As mentioned in the introduction, the FARC rejected the ACR reintegration approach; instead, the peace settlement between the guerrilla and government agreed on a strategy of reincorporation and the ARC was transformed into the ARN. Arguably, FARC’s expectations mirror the peace processes in the 1990s, in regard to the creation of ex-­combatants’ organisations22 and the transformation of the guerrillas into political parties. Thus, they have rejected any action or policy with regard to the reincorporation that is not consulted about with them or in which they have no agency,23 and they fear that the scheme of individual benefits may fracture their collective project.24 Thus, on its current design, the ARN has two lines of action:25 on the one hand, it continues with the original reintegration programme; providing services to the ex-­combatants who demobilised during Uribe’s DDR, as well as accepting people from new individual demobilisations. For these combatants, the ARN has made adjustments to its previous reintegration strategy, but continues organising the services around the psychosocial work. The reintegration process

Social reintegration   103 should last a maximum of six and a half years, starting with the design of a personalised working plan between the psychologist (now named reintegrators) and each ex-­combatant around eight dimensions: education, health, personal relationships, citizenship, livelihood, security, housing and family.26 The provision of payments depends on attending education and vocational courses and psychologist appointments.27 On the other hand, the ACR added a new line of work for the reincorporation of FARC ex-­combatants, which has been designed in conjunction with the guerrilla at the CNR and that has also resulted in a new public policy on ­reincorporation (CONPES 3931, 2018). This policy will be implemented for eight years with the FARC former members and their families; and emphasises the idea of the “collective” defined as a shared identity that makes the individuals come together and build a sense of belonging, allowing strategies of ­collective work towards a common wealth around four aims: In the first place, it will guarantee the continuation of the entire process in the short term, with the aim of a future design for, and implementation of, a National System for Reincorporation (NSR). This means that the ARN now has the responsibility to find and organise the institutional resources, as well as the funding and technical capacity, so that the FARC team for the CNR can continue their work at the National and Municipal Councils for Reincorporation. Then, in 2019, the ARN and the CNR will define the design of the NSR and its implementation through the coordination and management of the different institutions involved in the process. In the second place, it will develop a strategy of Social Reintegration with Territorial Approach that articulates the different business projects that should benefit both the former FARC members and the communities. This strategy also seeks to tackle the discrimination against former combatants, as well as strengthening grass-­roots initiatives for peace building and reconciliation, including: peace pedagogy, the creation of social tissue, the creation of solidarity economies with the participation of FARC ex-­combatants and communities, the implementation of the development policies included in the New Final Agreement, and the strengthening of women’s citizenship participation. Additionally, this social reintegration implies the design and implementation of a policy for the “Coexistence, Reconciliation, Tolerance and No Stigmatisation” established in the New Final Agreement (point 3.4.7.4.4) as well as the Integral Programme for the Security and Protection of communities and social organisations in the territory (point 3.4.8). The third goal is to remove the obstacles to access to mechanisms and resources for the economic reincorporation of the ex-­combatants and their families. In doing so, the government must carry out a survey to gather information on: the ex-­combatants’ skills and preferences on economic activities; and the existing policies for the economic development of rural areas, bearing in mind its possible articulation with the reincorporation process. This also means the strengthening of associations and organisations of former FARC members – ECOMUN in particular – and the development of business projects.

104   Social reintegration Finally, this policy seeks to improve the access and protection of the ex-­ combatants’ basic rights. Hence, both the ARN and the CNR should design a programme to provide psychosocial support, health care, education, housing, legal advice and citizenship rights for FARC ex-­combatants and their families; also placing special emphasis on strategies for family re-­unification.

The role of DDR programmes and the ex-­combatants’ NGOs This account of the reintegration programmes makes evident two types of organisations that take part in the social reintegration of ex-­combatants: on the one hand, those NGOs created by the former combatants; and on the other, the DDR programmes, in particular their capacity to develop a bureaucracy committed to the creation of social tissue and links between the ex-­combants and the communities. The NGOs fulfil the function of organising the former combatants around a common project, other than a political party. Thus, they may take part in the implementation of the peace settlements, in activities of development and the strengthening of citizenship and democracy, and at the same time favour the creation of links between the ex-­combatants and the communities. In the same line, these NGOs – and other forms of grass-­roots movements – are also key in fostering citizenship participation in formal structures of decision-­making, in particular at the local level. However, there is the risk of instrumentalising these organisations for the continuation of warlords’ power and social control over communities. Thus, a national policy of reincorporation may also state these NGOs’ roles, functions and limits; as well as including regulations and guidelines on their interaction with both the DDR programmes and the communities. In regard to the DDR programmes, their role in social reintegration can be analysed at different levels. On the one hand, at the municipal level, Peace and Reconciliation first addressed community needs by fostering reconciliation and providing services to both ex-­combatants and victims of violence through actions of collective reparation; also, channelling financial resources and business projects to the recipient communities was seen as a way of preventing the relapse of violence (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007, p.  14; Salazar, 2007, p. 8). Thus, Peace and Reconciliation developed four strategies: (a) to implement projects for social benefit, as well as cultural and artistic activities to promote integration; (b) to prevent recruitment into illegal armed groups, and the promotion of non-­violent conflict resolution; (c) to articulate the institutions involved in the reintegration process and raise awareness on the matter among public ­servants, also bringing in other actors, including politicians and academia; and (d) to create programmes for the prevention and control of the causes of violence (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007). Likewise, the PAPDRB developed projects to facilitate reconciliation and inclusion, cultivating awareness of ex-­combatant reintegration and encouraging the pacific coexistence between them and the communities28 (Villamizar, 2005, p.  18). This included installing a library in a marginalised area, some recreational and

Social reintegration   105 artistic activities, and talks from the demobilised in public schools (PAPDRB, 2010). On the other hand, at the national level, the ACR found that the equal distribution of benefits between the demobilised and the community contributed to the reconciliation process (OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 350). The Community Work Unit (CWU) coordinated three types of projects (citizenship formation, citizen initiatives and symbolic actions) and two strategies (preventing illegal recruitment and prioritising the communities) (OACP/ACR, 2010, p.  213).29 These activities sought to strengthen the social fabric and to promote reconciliation through training and workshops with the participation of the demobilised, their families and the wider community on topics such as peaceful coexistence and leadership, citizenship and legality, peaceful problem-­solving and human rights (OACP, 2010, p. 6). Furthermore, in 2008, the CWU launched a national policy of community reintegration financed by the European Union, whose purpose was to “create and strengthen the relationship between the social actors by starting public affair debates that allow the restoration of trust, coexistence and reconciliation among the members of the community and at the same time create legitimacy for the state” (CONPES 3607, 2009, p. 3). This policy also broached the prospect of producing active and autonomous citizens and of conflict resolution by peaceful means. Between 2007 and 2009 there were 68 community interventions in 57 municipalities (OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 217), including activities such as improving public spaces such as parks and schools.30 However, a report from the MAPP concluded that these community-­based reintegration projects and activities suffered from low levels of participation among the demobilised, due to factors such as project location and the time and money required to travel there, stigmatisation, security problems, or general lack of interest on the part of the demobilised (MAPP/OEA, 2010). As one former fighter said: I don’t want to take part in the activities of the ACR, because we, the demobilised, are always singled out. So, as soon as a demobilised does something, makes a mistake or does something [bad], the people say “all the demobilised are the same”. So I try not to let the people know, because then my clients would leave. Or the neighbour would say “that person is demobilised” and then you are marked out […]31 Therefore, there are limitations on these isolated community interventions to facilitate long-­term relationships between ex-­combatants and the communities. In other words, community workshops do not seem to have yielded significant positive or long-­lasting results, especially if the precarious security and employment situation of the demobilised remains unresolved and they need, or prefer, to conceal their past as fighters in armed groups. Alternatively, reconciliation and the creation of community links would be achieved by addressing services to the demobilised not as individuals but as part of a family and of a community, or in the development of broader development projects.

106   Social reintegration Also, importantly, the DDR officers may also play a main role on both personal and professional bases. In both Uribe’s and FARC-­Santos DDR, the reintegration officers contributed enormously to helping the demobilised address the problems they faced in interacting with their social environment and adapting to their new lives. Also, significantly, the reintegration officers are key in the strict control of ex-­combatants’ compulsory participation and advancement in the activities of the reintegration or reincorporation process. On the one hand, for Uribe’s process, by 2008, the ACR had a staff of around 700 people; 70.8 per cent worked in the regions and 79.9 per cent directly provided services to the demobilised as reintegration officers (ACR, 2008, 2011b). The psychosocial tutors constituted roughly one quarter of the reintegration officers and were tasked with providing support in establishing and strengthening socio-­affective links through personalised and direct attention to the individual (ACR, 2009). As a result, they became the most important link between the demobilised and the ACR, and represented a crucial point of reference in the ex-­combatants’ everyday lives. In the fieldwork done for this research, the demobilised said the tutors had helped them in the following ways: changing their previous mentality and/or modifying their aggressive behaviour; improving their sociability skills with both family and immediate community; orientating them in their new life as citizens, or telling them how to comport themselves on a day-­to-day basis. Yes, they have helped me. When I was there [in the group] I was very aggressive. And now I have changed, it is not like before. I had another face there, here the face it is different. I mean that I changed a lot, thanks to the psychologists who are always attentive to us.32 For me [the psychologists] are a good thing. Because, again, had there been no psychosocial workshops we would be worse, crazy. Because that’s where we can find out about all [the services] from the government. Even how to ask for membership to the health service; had the psychological workshops not existed, I would not know how to get [those services]. When you get closer to the psychologist, you ask for family counselling, and although they won’t give you an appointment [for personal counselling] they try to give you some advice on the problems that you may have at home.33 Remarkably, the reintegration officers also perform control and surveillance functions: according to the new regulations introduced by Law 1424, in order to receive their monthly allowance participants needed to achieve a 90 per cent attendance rate for the compulsory activities, or a minimum of four sessions per month for the workshops and educational courses.34 Both the tutors and the ACR at the time keep detailed records for each ex-­combatant, including their personal, family and employment status. Failing to attend the compulsory workshops or courses has severe consequences, whether they be expulsion from the programme; loss of benefits; or the subsequent opening of criminal legal proceedings:

Social reintegration   107 This is not easy. Maybe our life at this moment is harder than the life of the other citizens because they are not being monitored. Whether we like it or not, we are being monitored. I said to the tutor, if we say “I want to withdraw”, [the answer is] “no, you must carry on or else you go to jail”. They tell you that in different terms, but that is the reality. “Even if I didn’t kill or participate in …?”; “no, you have to [attend], because this is a process”. Unfortunately life is like that.35 On the other hand, for the FARC-­Santos DDR, the ARN has also been crucial in penetrating institutions in the TATR and in the creation of functional links with the former guerrillas.36 Initially, the FARC blocked the entry of government delegates to the Transitory Zones of Normalisation, apart from the Office of the Peace Commissioner, that was in charge of logistics and the demobilisation and disarmament phases. By 2018, the ARN had designated 270 reintegrators to work in the Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation (TATR), and increased its regional offices to 34 across the country. From August 2017 the ARN began a process of “early reincorporation”, which includes work with the demobilised in providing them with access to the health-­care system, education and vocational courses, cultural and sport activities, as well as work with communities and reconciliation activities.37 Currently, one representative from the Office of the Peace Commissioner and four or five from the ARN are appointed to each TATR. This has allowed the creation of working links with the demobilised, as the ARN psychologists provide support for the issues of daily life. Additionally, the ARN leadership has provided assistance for the functioning of two NGOs: Fundación Colombiana de Ex Combatientes y Promotores de Paz (FUCEPAZ),38 an initiative of former imprisoned commanders; and Humanicemos DH, for carrying out demining across the country. However, in the fieldwork with former guerrilla members, it was found that the perception of the ARN officers varies: while some ex-­combatants reported a good working and personal relationship between FARC members and ARN officers,39 others may still perceive the government reintegration programme as the continuation of Uribe’s counterinsurgency strategy, which ultimately aims to break their collective project: [The ARN] interest is that we develop individual business projects, that as citizens we carry on with our individual life, [but] losing the role in the political life, in the life as an organization.40 They want to push us more towards the individual project than the collective one.41 Certainly, the FARC ex-­combatants are free to move from the collective programme of reincorporation agreed with the guerrilla, to the individual program of reintegration. Currently the former FARC members have freedom of movement and can live in any place they prefer, whether inside the TATR or not, as

108   Social reintegration long as they keep fulfilling the requirements established by the JEP. According to reports from a former ANR officer, up to now, some 6,000 former FARC members have decided to abandon the guerrilla project and pursue individual reintegration.42 This does not mean that the ARN or the government have an intended strategy of breaking up the FARC’s post-­conflict social structure, but that it is a natural result of the end of the war, as will be shown in the next section. In addition, with time the guerrilla movement has lost its structure and cohesion, due, in part, to the time the commanders spent negotiating in La Habana and, now, living in Bogotá; this makes it more difficult for them to maintain leadership over the troops and has created fractures between the national and the regional leaders and between them and their former troops.43

Breaking away, building social ties Research has shown that the vast majority of recruitment in the illegal armed groups in Colombian was made on voluntary bases as the result of being offered opportunities for social mobility, an escape from oppressive social conditions and, in some cases, money or a regular salary (Arjona and Kalyvas, 2012, p. 115; Ferro and Uribe, 2002, p. 88; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008, pp. 13, 23). However, once in the group, the new recruits have to face the reality of war and military life; for instance, the economic promises that were very frequent in the paramilitary groups are likely to be a deception: When I started working for the paramilitaries, I joined because I had financial problems. I thought that it would solve my issues, to improve my quality of life. I thought that, but when I was there I realised that it was all lies, a deceit.44 Thus, both guerrillas and paramilitaries had to develop strategies to prevent mass desertion through the combination of the use of force – by killing any person who attempted to leave the group – and the offer of other incentives to replace those that attracted the recruits in the first place, such as prestige, education and possibilities for personal development and social mobility (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008, p. 29; Medina, 2008, p. 27). For Uribe’s DDR, maintaining hierarchy and order within the troops during the cantonment and demobilisation phases was crucial to preventing mass disorganised disbandment after the demobilisaton ceremonies of the paramilitary groups. However, the ex-­combatants do not necessarily expect any sense of continuity from the paramilitary, but rather may see the demobilisation as an opportunity to break away from it. For the guerrilla deserters, the discontent was so strong that they decided to risk their lives and break with the armed group. Similarly, for the FARC-­Santos DDR, the organisation and the commanders had played a main role in guiding the ex-­combatants through marching out of the forest and the creation of canntonement areas and the TATR. However, the

Social reintegration   109 number of FARC members that do not want to continue with the group and have chosen individual reintegration has increased by 60 per cent.45 In the fieldwork for this research, the former paramilitary and guerrilla deserters under Uribe’s DDR explained their personal reasons maintaining their reintegration process: first and foremost, there is the family. The reintegration officers also agreed that the raising of a new family or the recovering of an existing one acted as a solid buffer against any return to illegal activities; it also served to strengthen the ex-­combatants’ resolve and their commitment to the reintegration programme as a whole.46 I saw the opportunity to leave and reintegrate into normal life. It was the only opportunity I had, and I took it straight away. Otherwise it would not have been possible, because once you are inside you die there, you never leave. If you leave they’ll look for you at your house, they’ll visit you several times and if you don’t go back they’ll kill you, so you don’t speak here or there.47 I wanted to leave. I was able to send money to my parents, my children, 1.2 million pesos, but I was tired. I prayed to God to give me the opportunity to leave.48 Furthermore, in the absence of a reintegration programme (or problems in access to it), the combatants are most likely to rely on their family and community networks (Karamé, 2009, p. 506). These bases of support, in turn, may have a significant positive impact on their economic reintegration. For instance, ex-­combatant businesses overseen by the Medellín mayoralty tend to be more successful when there is a level of support provided by the family network (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2007, p. 29).49 One should, however, be wary of idealising these relationships: on the dark side, both families and communities can also become a compelling reason for enrolment in the armed groups. The family may itself be collaborating with one of the warring factions or, in areas affected by the conflict, young people may decide to sign up as an alternative to their oppressive social and family conditions, such as poverty or domestic violence. Additionally, when there is some form of payment, in particular for the paramilitary groups, family relations may become strained when the ex-­combatants return home unemployed after their demobilisation.50 Therefore, although family plays an integral role in the development of citizen identity and acts as a strong incentive not to return to crime (Özerdem, 2012, p.  55), its networks are also caught up in, and influenced by, those same social and political conditions in which the activities of war are embedded. The second most prevalent reason revolves around the ex-­combatants’ negative memories of the war and of life in the illegal armed groups. A significant majority remembered their experience in the armed groups as wholly negative or in which nothing was learned: these included experiences of an oppressive military order, harsh living conditions and arduous physical activities. In stark

110   Social reintegration contrast, their new life in civil society symbolises freedom to do what they please, but, more importantly, to stay among family and friends I’m not proud of it, I’m embarrassed. I quit, I demobilised, I came here to be far away from it, not to remember. I don’t want my kids to be pointed at: “He’s the son of [an ex-­combatant], he will be the same”. That is what I want to avoid. I got nothing from it.51 The ones who go back are doing so because they don’t want to study, they do not want to progress. Because being there brings you nothing. You will pay with your life, you’ll find nothing else. I’m better off staying here, even if I have no money, rather than being so restricted. I am happy here, nobody will bother me, nobody will tell me what to do. Now I only have to obey my mum and God.52 Tiredness from the war or disenchantment with the group also served as primary motivations for desertion among the ex-­guerrillas. The FARC and the ELN operate within the most isolated areas of the country, so the rebels must endure the most challenging geographical conditions, along with the constant threat of attacks from the army and the paramilitary groups. Some ex-­combatants also voiced that they had problems with their commander or fellow rebels, which in some cases may result in punishment or even in a death sentence. For guerrilla women, too, being forced to have an abortion is a common cause for desertion: the group enforces a strict policy for regulating the love-­life of its members, whereby the creation of permanent couples must be authorised by the commanders and the use of contraception is compulsory.53 In the case of unwanted pregnancy, both the man and woman involved will receive sanctions and the woman will be forced to have an abortion.54 The third most common response was of fear for their own security upon returning to the illegal groups, in two forms: on the one hand, the risk that criminal activity may bring upon them or their families, or, on the other, imprisonment and legal ramifications for those who commit crimes post-­ demobilisation. It is also worth pointing out here that the Colombian judicial system does not distinguish between felony and misdemeanors. Hence, any form of legal problem could bring still harsher consequences, making the demobilised lose any judicial favour and be processed by the criminal system rather than by the transitional law.55 Fourth, it may also be the case that former combatants want to break with the group and they no longer identify with its ideology.56 In fifth place, the ex-­ combatants also posited that unemployment may be a strong cause of recidivism; however, they clarify that enrolling purely for money is not really worthwhile, as will be explained in the next chapter. Other reasons were flagged up for return to armed groups or involvement in criminality: that there are people who simply like the lifestyle offered by war and crime, who do not want to make the effort required to embrace a new way of life; the unfulfilled promises of the government; the fear of imprisonment due to the legal requirements for

Social reintegration   111 the amnesty; or security issues, as some people may be looking for protection against revenge brought about by “unfinished business” in the criminal world, in the case of the ex-­guerrilla defectors because they have collaborated with the army, or for the former FARC due to fear of not obtaining amnesty and of extradition.57 It can be concluded, then, that, first and foremost, participating in war is something that most people are not willing to do twice. Furthermore, having experienced the risks of war, the economic offers that initially proved highly attractive simply lose their value as incentives. The demobilised are keenly aware that going back to armed groups or joining criminal bands will most likely result in imprisonment or death for themselves or their families. Second, the emotional links provided by raising or restarting a family are of immense value, and provide an important incentive to enter in, and remain dedicated, to the reintegration process. Finally, and as a consequence of the first two, demobilisation itself is perceived as a once-­in-a-­lifetime opportunity to break free of the shackles of the armed group. However, the former combatants face important challenges to reintegration or reincorporation into society. The ex-­combatants may hide their past from the immediate community when they move to a new place to live after breaking from the group.58 On the one hand, the ex-­combatants face security problems that have been attributed to the action of criminal groups created after demobilisation, but it is difficult to establish whether the demobilised were victimised for their refusal to join these criminal bands or because they had taken an active role in them. Moreover, in cases when the conflict continues, there remain entire rural areas and even neighbourhoods in the cities in which armed groups still operate,59 meaning that the ex-­combatants’ security and that of their family are inextricability linked to their capacity to hide their past: In my case, nobody knows that I am demobilised. Nobody knows and I am not interested in them knowing because it is a “hot” neighbourhood. There are still many active [members of the guerrilla].60 Had I said that I am demobilised I would be dead already.61 On the other hand, widespread discrimination is also frequent, even after the successful reintegration of many ex-­combatants into civilian life during the peace processes of the 1990s. For instance, the mayor of Bogotá said that the demobilised were still stigmatised by citizens and even by public servants (Garzón, 2006, pp. 18–19). As one former combatant said: [A]nyway, the damage done to society was very great and society does not understand that we want to compensate for that. Society has been very harsh to us. Here we had a problem with the press. At the beginning they stigmatised us a lot and this influenced society not accepting us as we had expected.62

112   Social reintegration For the Santos-­FARC DDR the situation is very similar. For instance, the acceptance by communities may depend on the impact of the Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation (TATR): some communities were negatively affected by the contamination of their water sources, while others benefited from new developments such as the construction of roads and other infrastructure.63 However, there is also widespread rejection of the FARC: as part of their transformation into a political party, the FARC leader, Rodrigo Londoño, had planned political rallies in different areas of the cities of Cali and Armenia, in February 2018, ahead of Congress elections. Although the New Agreement had already established ten Congress seats for the FARC, they decided to start political activity and perhaps obtain more seats. After a few public appearances, they had to abandon their campaign, due to several violent incidents and personal attacks, including situations close to mob lynching and people throwing stones, tomatos and eggs at them.64 As will be explained in the next chapter, this rejection and discrimination strongly affects the possibilities of ex-­combatants with regard to economic reintegration. However, it is important to differentiate between specific sections of the community in order to understand exactly where the rejection is most prevalent. For instance, ex-­combatants may encounter rejection when looking for a job, but then they may also find acceptance from their immediate community.65 As the majority of ex-­combatants belong to the poorest and most marginalised sections of society, in many cases victims and perpetrators belong to the same community. Also, the Colombian conflict does not follow ethnic lines; hence it is common to find members of the same family or the same community fighting for opposing armed groups.66 Furthermore, victims’ associations may act in contrasting ways when it comes to social reintegration: some may reject and isolate the demobilised,67 but it does appear as though there is a stronger tendency to understand the reintegration of ex-­combatants as a process that contributes to the general peace.68 Therefore, rejection comes not necessarily from the immediate communities, nor from the victims, but from other sections of society that do not interact with them on an everyday basis: A: In my case, where I live, I worked there when I was in the group and everybody knew who I was. People there show their appreciation. Everybody knows that I am demobilised and that I worked with the group and I haven’t had any problem. B: Because you are in the same area. You are in the same area where everybody knows you, so it is not so strange. However, if you live in a big city and say “I am demobilised”, everybody would look at you and [rejects you].69 Q: Have you told people [in the community] that you are demobilised? R: No, I never told them. But I told some co-­workers, because they were from the area [I used to live in]; they were forcibly displaced. Then you

Social reintegration   113 d­ iscover people from the same area you come from and [you trust them] … these are people who are escaping from the same situation.70 In sum, there are two main problems faced by ex-­combatants with regard to their social reintegration: security and discrimination. As a result, they prefer to hide their pasts as ex-­combatants. Therefore, DDR programmes play a main role in supporting the demobilised who decide not to continue with the social or political structures of the group – including the NGOs – after giving up the weapons, but also by supporting wider families or communities in which the demobilised live. In this, the DDR personnel, in particular in the form of a national bureaucracy, take special importance, as they become the first and main contact with the civilian authorities. In his research in Sudan, Baas (2012, p.  201) questions the efficacy of the international DDR bureaucracy in achieving the reintegration of ex-­combatants and preventing the relapse of war. He argues that, in reality, the actions of local agents are essential to resolving the everyday social and political issues on the ground. Certainly, in Colombia, Nussio identified three key components that favoured the creation of a social contract with the state: fulfilled promises by government; positive interactions with state officers and institutions; and the existence of sanctions for those who relapse into violence or criminality (Nussio, 2012, pp.  175–177). Conversely, unfulfilled promises, a negative experience with officers, and a lack of an active state presence tend to weaken their trust in state institutions. Weber has proposed that bureaucracy is created whenever the state needs to impose the rule of law over a larger territory, and that the legal administration of a state becomes more complex, impersonal and rational in a democratic political system and capitalist economic system (Weber, 1920, p. 956). This allows for the disruption of hierarchies based on patrimonial privilege and bestowals of political favour, and a movement towards a system that instead bases its authority on people appointed according to their expert qualifications and applies rules that go beyond any sense of personal volition (ibid., 1920, p.  958). Certainly, the ACR and the ARN programme in Colombia developed precisely this form of local bureaucracy, which operated primarily through the regional offices, with oversight from their headquarters in Bogotá. The ACR and ARN officers, then, are key in both prescribing and controlling behaviours that are more suitable and desirable for their new life: [For] the people who at some point have had problems with drug abuse, some of them are alone and that does not help the process. Because they need to feel stimulated, motivated by their families, so that [they feel that] the family does not abandon them in the process. So sometimes we have to take over that role and say “don’t worry, I will be here, I will help you, you won’t be alone”, because it is our responsibility that the ex-­combatant progresses in the process. This goes beyond our duty, but looking at it from the point of view of our responsibility, we want that person to progress and to

114   Social reintegration benefit from the programme, meaning that they can be stable and keep the balance […].71 Furthermore, the contradictions and ambiguities inherent in national policies – caused by a shifting legal framework and an unpredictable political landscape – are frequently resolved or mitigated in the officer’s everyday work with the demobilised. For instance, during Uribe’s DDR, the reintegrators had the responsibility of communicating changes in legislation to the ex-­combatants, and explaining the implications for each individual; this went far beyond a one-­ way communication but also implied orientation and emotional stability and cognitive equilibrium in the face of a highly contested and unsettled legal context. Last, but not least, the reintegration bureaucrats can also be the lynchpin in creating functional links between the demobilised, the state and communities, which has enormous potential in the carrying-­out of development policies that go beyond the individual benefits to ex-­combatants.

Conclusion This chapter has addressed the process of destruction and creation of social links for the demoblised. For the literature on DDR, breaking down the embedded military ties and hierarchies constitutes the quintessential stage in the DDR process. Yet, for the demobilised, it could be the social fabric into which they are returned that proves more important. In this process, two organisations play a main role: on the one hand, the ex-­combatants’ NGOs and on the other the DDR programmes. Both organisations may go beyond the mere breaking up of the military structure, to contribute in the creation of social tissue and links between the ex-­combatants and the communities, and between them and the state. For the demobilisation of guerrilla groups that took place during the 1990s, the reincorporation programmes and the ex-­combatants NGOs interacted with each other in the implementation of broader development policies. This process helped the former combatants to regain agency through their work in reconciliation activities and with the communities. Then, the reintegration programmes developed strategies for acceptance of the demobilised within communities, but also developed projects that would benefit the community as a whole and give them more access to the services provided by the state. However, during Uribe’s DDR, the NGO formed by the paramilitary leaders was instead instrumentalised for the continuation of the hierarchy and the power of drug-­traffickers. After that, the ACR consolidated a reintegration strategy and included the needs of the communities; however, it was in the absence of ex-­combatants’ organisations. Currently, the ARN is working in tandem with NGOs formed by FARC former combatants seeking to strengthen their social and economic projects that benefit the people living at the TATRs as well as in the nearby communities. All the aforementioned reintegration programmes have addressed the former combatants as part of their social environments, rather than as isolated individuals.

Social reintegration   115 The creation of social links has been flagged up as an integral part of the reintegration experience and constitutes a primary motivation for their perseverance outside of other illegal or criminal activities. Family clearly represents the most important social relationship for the demobilized, as a source of mental and emotional stability. However, it is also important to bear in mind that families are not immune to the implications of the wider social and political context, to the extent that they could also be a causal factor for involvement in the armed groups or in criminality. Other reasons that maintain the ex-­combatants on the track of their reintegration process are: the negative memories of the war and of life in the illegal armed groups; tiredness from the war or disenchantment with the group; fear for their own security upon returning to the illegal groups; the risk of criminal activity for them and their families, or imprisonment and legal ramifications for those who have committed crimes post-­demobilisation; and because they no longer identify with the group’s ideology.72 Moreover, rejection of the demobilised is a very common feature in social reintegration. Paradoxically, this rejection does not necessarily come from the direct victims of violence or the immediate communities, but from other sections of society. As a result, the ex-­combatants tend to hide their past and their demobilised status to avoid problems in obtaining employment or danger to their personal security. In particular, the DDR bureaucracy takes on special importance, as it becomes the first and main contact with civilian authorities. Rather than assuming a merely technocratic role, it actively serves to establish a functional relationship with the demobilised, as well as the creation of social tissue and channels of communication at various levels: between the national and subnational authorities, and between the central offices and their regional counterparts. Also, importantly, the creation of the reintegration institutions also define which services can be subcontracted and those that will be delivered directly by national government.

Notes   1 Reincorporation or reinsertion are used indistinctively for the guerrilla collective demobilisations in the 1990s and after Santos-­FARC DDR, while the term reintegration refers to Uribe’s DDR.   2 Created on 29 April 1991. Before that, presidents had the widespread practice of creating peace commissions. Turbay Ayala: Peace Commission, decree 2761 (from 8 October 1981 to May 1982). Belisario Betancourt: Peace Commission Advisor to the National Government, decree 2711 (from 19 September); High Commissions for Peace, decree 240, 1983; High Commission for Peace in Magdalena Medio, decree 2560, 1983; National Commission for Verification, president statements on 29 May 1984 and 27 September 1984; National Commission for Negotiation and Dialogue, presidential statements (17 July 1984 and 22 July 1984); Peace, Dialogue and Verification Commission, decree 3030, 18 October 1985.   3 Decree 314, 1 February 1990.   4 Law 35, 1982.

116   Social reintegration   5 Procesos de Reincorporación en Colombia, documento de referencia.   6 Dirección General para la Reinserción, Decree 2546, 1999.   7 Interview Villamizar; Reintegration Officers No. 73, 128, 141, 143; MAPP-­10, 2007: 6.   8 La Ceja Agreement, between the Cacique Nutibara Block and the government 2003.   9 See also Verdad Abierta 10 February 2010. 10 JAC and JAL are committees that are elected by each community in the rural areas or groups of neighbours in the cities. 11 Verdad Abierta, 10 February 2010; 23 March 2011. 12 Reintegration Officer No. 53. 13 Severo Antonio López (aka Job), John Jairo Hidalgo, Ruby Liliana Suaza Arango and Ubaldo Ayala were murdered and the Fiscal Office arrested Giovanni Marín and Fabio Orlando Acevedo (aka Don Fabio), who had led the demobilisation of the BCN, accusing them of heading up the Los Paisas criminal band (Semana 24 June 2009). John William Lopez Echavarria – the only ex-­combatant to be democratically elected to one of the JALs – was arrested and sentenced to 22 years in prison because he continued in criminality (Verdad Abierta 19 November 2009). 14 Acronym in Spanish: currently Programa de Atencion al Proceso de Demobilizacion y Reinserción en Bogotá. 15 Both use the same acromyn. 16 Interview Officer No. 17; Interview Cárdenas. 17 ACR, Un modelo de atención psicosocial basado en el desarrollo humano, 3. OACP/ ACR, Desarme, Desmovilización y Reintegración – DDR en Colombia, 161. 18 Reintegration Officer No. 48. 19 Acronym in Spanish: Modelo de Atención Psicosocial para la Paz. 20 Reintegration Officers No. 20, 31, 49–51. 21 Acronym in Spanish: Política Nacional de Reintegración Social y Económica para personas y grupos armados ilegales (Conpes 3554), 1 December 2008. 22 Interview witg ARN former assessor, 2 August 2018. 23 Interview with CNR FARC assessor. 24 Interview with ARN former assessor, 2 August 2018. 25 www.reincorporacion.gov.co/en/reintegration/Pages/what.aspx. 26 Resolution No. 753, 2013; www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-­reintegracion/Paginas/ ruta.aspx. 27 ACR Resolution No. 76/20 January 2006. 28 Coordinated Plan to Attend the Receiving Communities; Peace and Development in the Capital (PAPDRB, 2010, pp. 56–60). 29 Reintegration Officer No. 20. 30 Reintegration Officer No. 20. 31 Interview ex-­combatant No. 21. 32 Interview ex-­combatant No. 24. 33 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 8. 34 Resolution 163/2011 Art. 18; Reintegration Officer No. 47. 35 Interview ex-­combatant No. 16. 36 Interview with ARN former assessor, 2 August 2018. 37 Interview with ARN former assessor, 2 August 2018; www.reintegración.gov.co. 38 Colombian Foundation of Ex-­combatants and Peace Promoters. 39 Interview No. 10 Mesetas. 40 Interview No. 8 Mesetas. 41 Interview No. 11 Mesetas. 42 Interview with ARN former assessor, 2 August 2018. 43 Interview with ARN former assessor, 2 August 2018 and interview with CNR FARC assesor. 44 Interview ex-­combatant No. 22.

Social reintegration   117 45 Interview ARN former assessor, August 2, 2018. 46 Reintegration Officers No. 73, 109, 128, 143. Interview with ARN former assessor, August 2, 2018. 47 Interview ex-­combatant No. 15. 48 Interview ex-­combatant No. 1. 49 Reintegration Officers No. 31, 49–51. 50 Reintegration Officers No. 58 and 93. 51 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 9. 52 Interview ex-­combatant No. 17. 53 The FARC Disciplinary Code regulates the behaviour of its members. It states rules for the creation of couples and bans unauthorised couples and pregnancy. 54 Interview ex-­combatants No. 2 and 21; focus group ex-­combatants No. 2 and 4. 55 For instance, failing to provide economic support for their children or problems of domestic violence are considered crimes. If they are found to be involved in this form of legal processes, they must forfeit their demobilised status. 56 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 22. 57 UNP confirma que Romaña Renunció a su esquema de seguridad. www.elespectador. com/noticias/politica/unp-confirma-que-romana-renuncio-su-esquema-de-seguridadarticulo-809590; El Espectador, 31 August 2018. 58 This was also a frequent topic when talking to the reintegration officers. Reintegration Officers No. 20, 13, 50, 93, 117, 119, 120, 143. 59 Group interview teachers CEPAR; Focus group ex-­combatants No. 5 and 31. 60 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 3. 61 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 5. 62 Interview ex-­combatant No. 18. 63 Interview with ARN former Assesor, 2 August 2018. 64 EFE. 8 February 2016 www.efe.com/efe/america/politica/con-­huevos-piedras-­y-tomates-­ agreden-a-­timochenko-en-­suroeste-de-­colombia/20000035-3517399. 65 Interview Negrete. 66 Reintegration Officer No. 143; see also Arando el pasado para sembrar paz. 67 Reintegration Officer No. 90. 68 Reintegration Officers No. 23, 30, 66, 73, 143, 158, 159; Aguirre, 2010, p. 62. 69 Focus Group ex-­combatants No. 29. 70 Interview ex-­combatant No. 2. 71 Reintegration Officer No. 12. 72 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 22.

References ACR (2008). Informe al congreso, From June 2007 to May 2008, 23–30. Alta Consejería Para La Reintegración Social Y Económica De Personas Y Grupos Alzados En Armas. http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/dapre/Documents/Informe-­Congreso/Informe_congreso_ 2008.pdf. ACR (2009). The Cartagena contribution to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Procceedings of the International Congress on DDR. June 4–7 Cartagena. Cartagena: ACR. ACR (2011a). MAPAZ. Un modelo de atención psicosocial basado en el desarrollo humano: Manual de estrategia psicosocial para la reintegración de desmovilizados de grupos armados ilegales. Internal Documment. ACR (2011b). Reintegración avances y retos. Informe de Gestión 2011. www.reintegracion.gov.co. Aguirre, G. (2010). Trayectorias del paramilitarismo tras los acuerdos de paz. Medellín: Conciudadanía.

118   Social reintegration Alcaldía de Medellín (2006). Programa paz y reconciliación. Propuesta para una política nacional de reinserción. In: A. Hincapié (ed.), Conflicto Armado, Medellín-Colombia: comprensiones y acciones. Medellín: UPB. Alcaldía de Medellín (2007). Sistematización del programa paz y reconciliación. Modelo de intervención regreso a la legalidad. Peace and Reconciliation. Ángel, J. (2005). Política de reincorporación nacional avances y desafíos 2002–2006. In: Forum Proceedings: Desmovilización, Un Camino Hacia la Paz (19.a-­20 May, 2005.a ed., pp. 197–220). Bogotá: CUN, Hogares de Paso La Maloka, Alcaldía de Bogota. Arias, G., and Guáqueta, A. (2008). Transitional DDR in Colombia: Useful or Counterproductive? Bogotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz. Arjona, A. M., and Kalyvas, S. N. (2012). Recruitment into armed groups in Colombia: A survey of demobilized fighters. In: Y. Guichaoua (Ed.), Understanding Collective Political Violence (pp. 143–171). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/ 9780230348318_8. Baas, S. (2012). From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Carranza-­Franco, F. (2014). A sub-­national approach to state-­building and security: the role of municipal institutions in Colombia’s DDR process. Conflict, Security & Development, 14(3), 245–274. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2014.923149. CONPES 3554 (2008, diciembre 1). Política nacional de reintegración social y económica para personas y grupos armados ilegales. Gobierno de Colombia. Available at www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES.aspx. CONPES 3607 (2009). Importancia estrategica programa apoyo a comunidades receptoras de población desmovilizada en Colombia desarrollado con la cooperación financiera no reembolsable de la Comunidad Europea. Bogotá, 14 September 2009. Gobierno de Colombia. Available at www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES.aspx. CONPES 3931 (2018, 22 June). Política nacional para la reincorporación social y económica de exintegrantes de las FARC-­EP. Gobierno de Colombia. Diaz, A., and Villamizar, D. (eds.) (1999). Acuerdos de paz/Red de Solidaridad Social. Programa para la Reinserción. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ca t01040a&AN=pujbc.529030&site=eds-­live. Ferro, J. G., and Uribe, G. (2002). El orden de la guerra las FARC-­EP entre la organización y la política. Bogotá: Universidad Javeriana. Garzón, L. (2006). Speech. In: Foro Bogotá (Forum proceedings). Reinserción, Reconciliación y Ciudades. Bogotá: Fundacion Konrad Adenauer, Alcaldías Mayores de Bogotá y Medellín, Revista Semana, Fundación Ideas para la Paz and PNUD. Giustozzi, A. (2008). Bureaucratic façade and political realities of disarmament and demobilisation in Afghanistan. Conflict, Security and Development, 8(2), 169–192. Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2008). Telling the difference: Guerrillas and paramilitaries in the Colombian war. Politics & Society, 36(1), 3–34. Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Demobilization and reintegration. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(4), 531–567. Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J. M. (2009). Demobilization and reintegration in Sierra Leone. In: R. Muggah (ed.), Security and post-­conflict reconstruction: Dealing with fighters in the aftermath of war (pp. 47–69). London: Routledge. ICG (2004, 5 August). Demobilising the paramilitaries in Colombia: an achievable goal? Latin America Report No. 8. International Crisis Group. www.crisisgroup.org. Karamé, K. (2009). Reintegration and the relevance of social relations: the case of Lebanon. Conflict, Security and Development, 9(4), 495–514.

Social reintegration   119 MAPP/OEA (2010, 26 April). Fourteenth Quarterly Report. www.mapp-­oea.net/index. php?option=com_content&id=51&Itemid=82. McEvoy, K., and Shirlow, P. (2009). Re-­imagining DDR Ex-­combatants, leadership and moral agency in conflict transformation. Theoretical Criminology, 13(1), 31–59. McMullin, J. (2013). Ex-­Combatants and the Post-­Conflict State. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. MDRP (2010, June). Multi-­country demobilization and reintegration program: End of program evaluation. Final Report Scanteam. World Bank Publications. www.mdrp.org/ index.htm. Medina, C. (2008). No Porque Seas Paraco o Guerrillero Tienes que Ser un Animal. Procesos de Socialización en FARC-­EP, ELN y Grupos Paramilitares. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes, CESO. Munive, J., and Jakobsen, S. F. (2012). Revisiting DDR in Liberia: exploring the power, agency and interests of local and international actors in the ‘making’ and ‘unmaking’ of combatants. Conflict, Security & Development, 12(4), 359–385. https://doi.org/10.10 80/14678802.2012.724792. Nussio, E. (2012). La vida después de la desmovilización: Percepciones, emociones y estrategias de exparamilitares en Colombia. Bogotá: Uniandes. OACP (2010). Oficina Alto Comisionado para la Paz y la Reintegración. Balance de Gobierno 2002–2010. Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. Available at www. reintegracion.gov.co/Es/ACR/Documents/doc_rendicion/separata.pdf. OACP/ACR (2010, 14 July). Desarme, desmovilización y reintegración – DDR en Colombia. Lecciones aprendidas y resultados del proceso 2002–2010. Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. ODDR (2009). Las formas organizativas y asociativas de desmovilizados (FOAD) en Colombia. Observatorio de procesos de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración. Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Available at www.observatorioddr.unal.edu.co. Ottaway, M. (2002). Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states. Development and Change, 33(5), 1001–1023. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.t01-1-00258. Özerdem, A. (2009). Post-­war Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. London: I. B. Tauris. Özerdem, A. (2012). A re-­conceptualisation of ex-­combatant reintegration: ‘social reintegration’ approach. Conflict, Security & Development, 12(1), 51–73. https://doi.org /10.1080/14678802.2012.667661. PAPDRB (2010). Programa de Atención al Proceso de Desmovilización y Reintegración en Bogotá. Modelo Diferenciado, Polifónico y Pedagógico. Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá. PDS (2009). Security promotion in fragile states: Can local meet national? Exploring the connections between community security and disarmarment, demobilization and reintegration. Peace Security and Development Network. Personería Municipal de Medellín. (2005). Informe annual de la situación de derechos humanos 2005. Alcaldía de Medellín. Pinto, M., Vergara, A., and De La Huerta, Y. (2002). Diagnóstico del programa de ­reinserción en colombia: Mecanismos para incentivar la desmovilización voluntaria individual. Departamiento De Planeación Nacional. Archivos De Economía. Doc. 11. Banco De La República. Available at Www.Dnp.Gov.Co/Portals/0/Archivos/­ Documentos/DEE/Archivos_Economia/211.PDF. Presidencia. (1989). La Política de Reconciliación, Normalización y Rehabilitación. Historia de un proceso (Vol.  1). Bogotá: Consejeria Presidencial para la Reconciliación, Normalización y Rehabilitación. Presidencia de la República.

120   Social reintegration Rolston, B. (2007). Demobilization and reintegration of ex-­combatants: the Irish case in international perspective. Social & Legal Studies, 16(2), 259–280. https://doi. org/10.1177/0964663907076534. Salazar, S. (2007). La Construcción de lo Imposible. El Nacimiento del Proceso de Reconciliación in Medellín. Medellín: Alcaldía de Medellín. SIDDR (2005). Stockholm initiative on disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration. Sweeden Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turriago, G., and Bustamante, J. (2003). Estudio de los procesos de reinserción en Colombia 1991–1998. Bogotá: Libros de Cambio. Ideas para la Paz, Alfaomega. UNDP (2006). Integrated demobilization, disarmament and reintegration standards. United Nations. http://unddr.org/. Villamizar, Darío. (1998). Un adios a la guerra memoría histórica de los procesos de paz en Colombia. Bogotá: Planeta. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ca t01040a&AN=pujbc.521665&site=eds-­live. Villamizar, D. (2005). Introduction. In: Forum Proceedings. Desmovilización, Un Camino Hacia La Paz. 19–20 May 2005. (pp.  17–26). Bogotá: CUN, Hogares de Paso La Maloka, Alcaldía de Bogota. Villarraga, A. (2006). La Reinsercion en Colombia. Bogotá: Fundación Cultura Democrática, Asociación de Constructores de Paz. Vries, H. de, and Wiegink, N. (2011). Breaking up and going home? Contesting two assumptions in the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. International Peacekeeping, 18(1), 38–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2011.527506. Weber, M. (1920). General Economic History. Mineola, NY: Dover. www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/forumForEuropeanPhilosophy.

4 Economic reintegration

Academic studies and policy-­making literature around war and political conflict tend to emphasise economic forms of analysis, and to overstate greediness, poverty or unemployment as the causes of violence (McMullin, 2012, 2013; Muggah, Berdal and Torjesen, 2009; Specker, 2008). Accordingly, the literature on DDR assumes that ex-­combatants are likely to return to arms or to slide into criminality as a means of earning a living following their demobilisation. Therefore, providing aid, money or income opportunities is thought to alleviate security problems created by the former combatants during the post-­conflict. Such assumptions are illustrated in the following excerpt from the UN: At the end of a conflict there is often an abrupt release into the labour market of thousands of ex-­combatants who compete with ordinary civilians for extremely scarce jobs and livelihood opportunities. In such circumstances, ex-­combatants might attempt to use violence to make a living, becoming involved in banditry, theft and other forms of illegal and harmful activity. Providing support for the reintegration of ex-­combatants is therefore vital to help develop alternatives to violence-­based livelihoods. This support can have an immediate positive effect on security and contribute to the improvement of overall economic conditions. Economic reintegration will be successful only if the reintegration support provides or encourages viable forms of economic activity and is socially productive. All interventions must be sustainable to ensure that ex-­combatants do not turn to violence to earn a living. (UNDP, 2006, 4.30 p. 27 emphasis mine) The World Bank has also claimed that failed reintegration may result in a general context of insecurity: as ex-­combatants may resort to “rent-­seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun” (Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, 1996, p.  18). Likewise, using several examples of looting and profiteering by armed groups in illegal economies in Africa, Berdal has argued that weapons always have economic and security value for those who possess them: “with limited employment opportunities and few marketable skills among soldiers, this in itself is a disincentive to lay down arms” (Berdal, 1996, p. 17). Spear (2006, p.  168) also states that providing legitimate economic opportunities to the

122   Economic reintegration e­ x-­combatants is essential “to wean away from the war economy those who saw it as the only means to survive”; while Specker upholds the following two factors as crucial to a successful reintegration: the trust of the ex-­combatants in the process and the presence of economic alternatives (Specker, 2008). This assumption was also summarised by the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration: What is virtually guaranteed is that unless ex-­combatants have a real opportunity to acquire functional skills or resume or recreate sustainable livelihoods, they will not return to normal civilian life. (SIDDR, 2005, p. 24, emphasis mine) Certainly, former fighters can face significant disadvantages in finding civilian employment. First the ex-­combatants often lack the education and working skills required to perform jobs outside of military action. Second, there is widespread rejection of ex-­combatants in places of work as potential employers fear and discriminate against them on the basis of their military background. Third, poor macro-­economic conditions and the low socio-­economic capacity of society to provide jobs for the general population constitute a very common setting in post-­ conflict societies (BICC, 2003, p.  31; Gomes Porto, Alden and Parsons, 2007, p.  115; Muggah et al., 2009, p.  197). To address these issues, DDR programmes develop economic reintegration activities that tend to take the form of schemes of temporary monetary assistance, vocational training, and support for the creation of employment opportunities and micro-­businesses. In consequence, the debates around the economic dimension of reintegration typically focus on strategies to integrate the ex-­combatants and their dependants in the jobs market: including the provision of cash handouts; the need for the creation of employment programmes; or support for business start-­ups or other forms of self-­employment (UNDP, 2006, 4.20 p. 14; UNDPKO, 2010, p. 22). However, this emphasis on economic reintegration stems from the liberal and neoclassical doctrines1 that understand war as “development in reverse” (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, p. 2) and have highlighted the primacy of economic factors as causes of political violence. Baas has argued that the recurrent emphasis on greed as explanation for violence has two different ontologies: while Collier and Hoeffler (2004) state the universality and priority of economic motivations across time and cultures, Kaldor (2006) accepts that the causes of conflict may change, but assumes that all civil conflicts that started at the dawn of the twentieth century have replaced their political motivations with criminal aims driven by mere economic profit (Baas, 2012, p.  16). Gutiérrez Sanín has similarly indicated two major pitfalls in these theories: on the one hand, it is assumed that all wars are alike, that all armed groups are similarly greedy and that all rebels are utility-­maximisers by nature; on the other, political conflicts are understood as ultimately criminal endeavours: “[a]s Collier and associates did, to study rebellion as a form of criminality, that can be explained as a confluence of rent seeking actions by the leadership and the existence of a labour

Economic reintegration   123 market for armed action” (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008, p. 5). These assumptions, in turn, have been mirrored by two main assumptions in DDR programmes: on the one hand, economic recovery and the creation of employment opportunities are the central challenges in post-­conflict societies; on the other, addressing the personal economic situation of ex-­combatants is put forward as a preventive measure to avoid recurring security problems. Additionally, there is a romanticised view of the pre-­war conditions and the belief that the combatants broke some sort of golden or halcyon order, ignoring the social and political causes that ignited the conflict in the first place, such as poverty, inequality or totalitarian rule. Such assumptions are evidenced in the following statement by the World Bank: [DDR contributes to the] restoration of civil society and peaceful return to productive civilian life of hitherto destabilizing forces. (Colletta et al., 1996, p. 72, emphasis mine) On the contrary, research has shown how these theories overstate the economic motivations: greediness, unemployment or poverty have proved insufficient in explaining the origin and continuation of civil strife or the recruitment into armed groups (Baas, 2012, p. 204; Cramer, 2006, pp. 124–135; McMullin, 2012, p.  13). Furthermore, in Colombia, the decision to join the guerrillas is more likely to worsen the economic prospects of the combatants than to improve their opportunities of obtaining income through salary or looting (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2003, 2008). In Liberia, research has also challenged the salience of economic reintegration: Boas and Hatloy (2008) found that unemployment and idleness have been overemphasised as reasons to join an armed group. Rather, it was the combatants’ concerns for their own safety and that of their families that initially led young people into war: Thus, our data suggest that the effects of “idleness” and “unemployment” are overstated with regard to people joining armed groups, and thereby also the effect on societal security of combating “idleness” and “unemployment” through the [DDR] programme. Thus, the question that begs to be asked in the Liberian case is, if idleness does not seem to have been behind the first decision to pick up the gun, then why should post-­conflict policy-­makers assume that idleness would be behind security problems after the war? (Boas and Hatloy, 2008, p. 49) Moreover, the debate remains open as to how to effectively assess a successful economic reintegration: while some practitioners and scholars argue that DDR should aim to equalise the economic conditions of the ex-­combatants with that of the rest of the population, others say that doing so only serves to position them in the same marginalised conditions that ignited war in the first place (Alden, 2002, p. 342; Gomes Porto et al., 2007, p. 49; McMullin, 2013, p. 19; MDRP, 2010, p. 2; Rufer, 2005, p. 76). Ultimately, it is precisely in the creation

124   Economic reintegration of employment for ex-­combatants and economic recovery for the communities involved that DDR programmes have hitherto shown little success. Even in countries where DDR programmes adopted maximalist approaches and were heralded as successful by the international community, unemployment among ex-­combatants remained high amid widespread poverty and inequality, as witnessed in Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Kosovo (Alden, 2002, p.  6; BICC, 2003, p.  31; McMullin, 2013; Mitton, 2012; Özerdem, 2009). Even worse, in Ethiopia the income of ex-­combatants was found to be lower than pre-­war levels (Muggah et al., 2009, p. 197). Gomes Porto et al., (2007, p. 140) have pointed to the international community’s apparent overlooking of the fact that DDR programmes may only achieve “reintegration into poverty”. Certainly, the capacity of the ex-­combatants to provide a livelihood for themselves and their families could be taken as a key indicator of a successful reintegration into civil life as well as of a general economic recovery. However, the assumption that there is such continuity between political violence and criminality is a flawed one, even more so when considering how economic motivations fall short by way of explanation. The real weight of economic incentives in the decision to leave an armed group and remain attached to the reintegration process requires a more nuanced assessment. This chapter analyses four strategies to fulfill the short- and long-­term income-­generation needs of the demobilised. The first section describes the provision of basic education, the short-­term aid (provision of cash handouts and monthly allowances), the strategies for long-­term economic income (vocational training, education, support for employment or creating businesses) and the appeal to the private sector. The second section explains that despite enormous institutional efforts, the economic outlook of ex-­combatants is of low-­income and informal work; while the third section challenges the common assumptions found in the DDR literature by showing that recidivism is not necessarily the preferred option among the ex-­combatants, nor because of poor results in their economic reintegration.

Short- and long-­term economic reintegration strategies Basic education The UN has suggested that education and training are the two quintessential strategies for achieving a successful long-­term economic reintegration (UNDP, 2006, 4.30 p. 27): Many ex-­combatants have missed opportunities for basic and further education, and as a result are disadvantaged in the competition for jobs and opportunities. Provision of adult literacy classes, adult education, and technical and vocational training is important both to improve the skill sets of adult and young ex-­combatants and provide opportunities for reorientation and demilitarisation.

Economic reintegration   125 However, Söderstrom has argued that more research is needed to understand the real need of education and training: she found that their relation to economic reintegration appears rather weak, whereas their impact in other areas, such as personal development and political reintegration, could be more evident (Söderström, 2011, p. 53). Similarly, a report on Bosnia-­Herzegovina concluded that rather than lack of training, the ethnic divisions and authoritarian patterns of behaviour acquired during military life caused psychological and behavioural shortcomings that inevitably had a negative impact on the economic reintegration of former combatants (BICC, 2003, p.  34). One study in South Africa found that the ex-­combatants were no less qualified than other civilians to compete in the labour market. There had indeed been high unemployment among the demobilised, but other factors were seen to have prevented their reintegration: It could be that their psychological state and interpersonal skills make it difficult for them to find and maintain jobs; that employers are reluctant to take on or keep ex-­combatants; or a combination of both. (Bandeira, 2008, p. 19) For Uribe’s DDR it was concluded that most of the low-­ranking demobilised from both paramilitary and guerrilla groups belonged to a demographic that had very limited access to land and economic capital, and thus suffer from significant shortcomings in education (ACR, 2009, p.  61). At the time of their demobilisation, 60 per cent of the ex-­paramilitaries and 71 per cent of the ex-­guerrillas had only primary-­school education, or none whatsoever (CONPES 3554, 2008, p.  16).2 Furthermore there was a 70 per cent rate of functional illiteracy among the demobilised (ACR, 2009, p.  68; UNDP, 2005). Similarly, surveys of ex-­combatants living in Medellín and Bogotá showed that 85 per cent of them never finished high school (Cárdenas, 2005, p. 30; Villegas, 2006, p. 30); while for the FARC-­Santos DDR, the census of FARC troops reported that 11 per cent of them had no education, 57 per cent had some primary school education and 21 per cent went to high school, 8 per cent had taken vocational courses and 3 per cent went to graduate school.3 Later surveys focusing only on their educational skills4 made evident that their performance in alphabetisation and education exams was even lower than the levels reported previously. For Uribe’s DDR, there were three different strategies to tackle this issue: the Medellín mayoralty created an institute for adult education (CEPAR)5 to provide literacy, primary and high-­school education and other courses not only for ex-­combatants but to four different social programme groups: victims of violence; youth at risk of crime or prostitution; the homeless; and young former prisoners (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b, p. 69);6 while the programme by Bogota’s mayoralty (PAPDRB) rather encouraged the use of pre-­existing adult education and literacy programmes created for the entire Bogotá population located at schools or other education institutions. This encouraged the demobilised to

126   Economic reintegration take up the offer of social care as any other citizen would.7 Finally, when the ACR was created, one of its main tasks was unifying the policies of collective and individual reintegration that had hitherto been divided and spread across different institutions; thus the ACR designated one education liaison officer to each of its offices, with the function of coordinating provision of adult education to the ex-­combatants at schools or educational institutions located in their towns and cities (OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 163). With regard to the FARC-­Santos DDR, the provision of basic education (primary and secondary school and vocational training) was included in the schemes for economic and social reintegration. The Ministry of Education and the Norwegian Refugee Council signed an agreement to develop a programme named Plowing Education (Arando la Educación) to provide basic education to 4,500 ex-­combatants and 4,000 people from the community living near the TART.8 By February 2018, it had benefited 3,500 people at 19 TATRs.9 Additionally, Distrital University, a public university based in Bogotá, had designed and implemented a type of flexible educational model to train the ex-­ combatants to present themselves for state exams and obtain their high-­school diplomas.10 Moreover, the New Final Agreement also posited the possibility of homologation of knowledge, meaning that the skills learned during the war could also be formalised. However, the provision of training and education does not necessarily translate into long-­term employment. Certainly, the precarious social and educational background of the ex-­combatants meant they were far from ideal candidates for formal employment, but there were also political problems that impeded their economic reintegration, such as their unresolved legal status, the bureaucratic delays in starting the economic strategies or the problems with regard to land, as explained in the next sections. Short-­term: cash hand-­outs and monthly allowances Short-­term reinsertion assistance to the ex-­combatants often takes the form of lump sums and monthly allowances, for a maximum of one year. However, the United Nations has expressed doubts over how the money is spent: “past experience has documented misuse of cash hand-­outs, which is spent on alcohol or weapons rather than essential items”, but also, they recognise that the money can be used to buy essential items and provide economic stability and a sense of dignity for the ex-­combatants and their families. However, the UN does not provide clear guidance on this matter, and simply advises the DDR practitioners and policy-­makers to examine the context before taking a decision (UNDP, 2006, 4.20 p. 14, 8.9.1). For Uribe’s DDR, the agreement reached between the peace commissioner and the paramilitary leaders in 2003 stated that each ex-­combatant would receive a monthly payment of US$240 over the course of 18 months. Similarly, the policy for individual demobilisations stated that each ex-­combatant would receive a monthly allowance of $265 plus $90 per family member, up to a

Economic reintegration   127 maximum of around $450 (Pretelt, 2006). These amounts exceeded the minimum wage in the country11 and functioned as a monthly salary solely on the basis of being offered to those with the status of ex-­combatant. It was not until 2005, two years after the first demobilisations, that compulsory enrolment in basic education and vocational training was introduced as a requirement for obtaining economic support from the government12 (CONPES 3554, 2008, p. 5). However, this system of payments merely encouraged the demobilised to attend as many courses as they could: as there was no control over which courses they were taking, some simply attended courses at random or repeated the same course several times purely to obtain the resulting economic aid.13 In one interview, one tutor pointed out that, rather than lack of, or insufficient education, the real problem of the demobilised was that of disparate education.14 In other words, despite receiving many certificates of completion, the ex-­combatants never really acquired the skills needed to find employment or to generate long-­ term income.15 With the creation of the ACR in 2006, these economic stimuli were unified for collective and individual demobilisations, and the allowance was reduced to a maximum of US$140.16 In addition, it was concluded that the ACR had to resolve the evident lack of planning for the ex-­combatants’ future economic and life projects (CONPES 3554, 2008, p. 22). Hence, it was established that each of the demobilised had to figure out a personal life-­project during counselling sessions with their tutor and, accordingly, to choose their options for education and vocational training, as well as their preferred aid for seeking employment or starting a business. In the opinion of one officer interviewed, these adjustments to the policy prompted a change in attitude towards reintegration, as the ex-­ combatants focused more on personal development rather than purely on monetary reward.17 Also, as the economic support was now based on merit and achievements, it helped to develop responsibility, discipline and a sense of personal progress.18 These schemes will continue for those who want to follow their reintegration process individually (i.e. FARC guerrillas who chose the individual option or other guerrillas who demobilise), although in these cases the monthly payments were reduced to only four months.19 For the FARC-­Santos DDR, the New Final Agreement stated that FARC ex-­combatants would receive a lump sum of two million pesos (US$700), plus monthly payments of 90 per cent of the minimum national wage until August 2019. After that, those who choose to study will be granted allowances depending on further education.20 However, this monthly payment was not linked to presentation to the ARN or their enrolment in reintegration courses or activities;21 instead, the FARC proposed that ECOMUN will have the function of providing advice and structure to the courses the ex-­combatants would take. In the visits to, and interviews in, the TATR, some ex-­combatants explained that they had invested the two million pesos or their monthly payments in specific cooperative projects22 that are part of ECOMUN (see Table 4.1) It could be said, then, that the effectiveness of monetary incentives depends not on the amount of money itself, but on how they are linked to a strategy of

Table 4.1  Evolution of short-term economic aid including collective and individual demobilisations under Uribe and the FARC-Santos agreement Year

2003–2005

2005–2007

2007–2010

SHORT TERM ECONOMIC BENEFITS

COLLECTIVE US$240/month INDIVIDUAL US$265 plus $90 per family member/month

COLLECTIVE UNIFIED US$240/month US$140 INDIVIDUAL US$265 plus $90 per family member/month

REQUIREMENTS

Demobilised status

Basic education and vocational training

RESULT

Little long-term investment Disparate education

•  Design of a life-project •  Basic education and vocational training

Personal development

2016 INDIVIDUAL US$130–240 FARC US$239 plus a lump sum of US$700 after leaving the cantonment areas (TZN) •  Additional allowance depending on further education •  Not be working •  He/she may chose to join ECOMUN Some ex-FARC have invested their money in ECOMUN cooperatives

Economic reintegration   129 reintegration or reincorporation defined either by the government or by the guerrilla. On the one hand, for Uribe’s DDR, the ACR strategy brought in a process of counselling for each of the demobilised to properly plan out their future, while also giving them the opportunity to gain knowledge and evaluate their options through education and vocational training. On the other, in the FARC-­Santos DDR, ECOMUN adopted these functions by taking charge of the short and vocational courses taken by the ex-­combatants as part of the long-­ term and common economic project. The role of the ANR is to work in tandem with them in the administration of resources. Furthermore, the initial approach of Uribe’s DDR to the reinsertion of ex-­ combatants focused on providing economic incentives with no further control or requirements from the government, which may have facilitated – or even promoted – reckless practices (e.g. the scams by the paramilitary leaders or the attendance of courses with no aim by the rank-­and-file combatants). Fortunately, these problems were eventually overcome by the contestation of Uribe’s DDR policy and the action of reintegration institutions such as the ACR, Peace and Reconciliation and the PAPDRB: basic education and vocational training were linked to compulsory counselling on economic and life-­projects, as well as new requirements for obtaining the money and further expert support. At the FARC-­Santos DDR, it was negotiated that ECOMUN would be the organisation to advise ex-­combatants with regard to the investment of their money and the taking of the courses; such thinking was based on a collective project to underpin ECOMUN itself. However, those former FARC who want to carry on with their individual projects may do so, but at the moment there are no regulations or requirements for them. The singular provision of economic aid proves insufficient – and can be counter-­productive – to reintegration, particularly in the absence of policies or programmes (by the government or by the former armed group) that define goals and limits for the demobilised, and which engender a genuine sense of personal development based on achievement and progress. Nevertheless, it remains essential to address the ex-­combatants’ basic need to gain a livelihood for themselves and their families. Yet, while these initial payments may initially attract the demobilised into certain activities in the reintegration programme, the economic incentives should also lay the foundations for their progressive economic independence over time, as will be seen in the following section. Long-­term: vocational training, employment seeking and business start-­ups Immediately after the demobilisation and during the reinsertion phase, it is important to keep the demobilised occupied with short-­term training courses and job creation.23 However, this needs to be supported by policies and strategies that address the transition into long-­term employment and more stable forms of income:

130   Economic reintegration These initial, often short-­term employment opportunities serve several functions. They provide demobilised fighters with sufficient income through the transitional phase, and provide evidence that they can survive within the civilian economy. (ACR, 2009, p. 63) Training should generally be regarded as a tool for reintegration and not as reintegration itself. It should be practical, and should be designed mainly to respond to the requirements of the informal sector, which is where most microenterprises will start up. (UNDP, 2006, 4.30 p. 27) For Uribe’s DDR, the reintegration programmes developed three main strategies to provide training and work experience to the demobilised: vocational training, short-­term employability schemes and income-­generation support. Originally, these strategies were developed by Peace and Reconciliation in Medellín, to provide training and work experience to the demobilised. These different strategies were maintained by the ACR, albeit in adjusted forms (OACP, 2010, p.  4; OACP/ACR, 2010, p.  197). In Bogotá, the PAPDRB provided further support for business plans and employment seeking24 (PAPDRB, 2010, p.  62, 2011, p. 30). First, the demobilised were enrolled to a massive extent in a variety of short vocational courses provided by the National Institute for Work Training (SENA).25 This offer of vocational training was maintained throughout the entire reintegration process and consisted of courses offered by SENA or by ACR contractors,26 although there was no funding for pursuing university degrees. Second, the short-­term employability scheme was originally put in place by the mayor of Medellín’s office to hire ex-­combatants on three- to six-­ month contracts to perform a variety of unskilled roles within public programmes27 (CONPES 3554, 2008, p. 48; OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 194; Rodriguez, 2006, p.  116). The scheme aimed to introduce the demobilised to the norms and schedules that make up everyday working life. As such, the ex-­combatants received vocational and psychosocial training and were paid a small salary for working up to 80 hours (CONPES 3554, 2008, p.  48; OACP, 2010, p.  4; OACP/ACR, 2010, p.  201). Their activities included assisting the transit police28 or participating in community projects such as the building and maintenance of parks, schools and other public areas. Additionally, the demobilised were given the opportunity to get some work experience through internships as part of SENA vocational courses, or in private companies (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b, p. 17). The third strategy thus targeted more long-­term income generation through two main activities: employment-­seeking and business plans. Employment-­ seeking had three main aims: to broaden the working opportunities for the demobilised in both the private sector and self-­employment; to facilitate the  process of entering into the jobs market; and to reduce the cases of job

Economic reintegration   131 desertion. The business plans, in turn, provided the ex-­combatants with seed capital: a lump sum for buying machinery and raw products with which to start their own businesses (CONPES 3554, 2008, p. 50; OACP, 2010, p. 4). Uribe’s DDR policy offered guerrilla deserters a seed capital of US$4,000, but for the paramilitaries it was negotiated with the leaders that each combatant was entitled to US$1,000. When questioning the reintegration officers about the reasons for this difference, their response was simply that there was no clarity, and that the only reason they could think of was to compensate for the greater risk involved in deserting from the guerrillas.29 For the FARC-­Santos DDR, the New Final Agreement posited two main strategies of long-­term reintegration: on the one hand, vocational training was offered by SENA, although restricted to areas such as gastronomy and baking, agronomy sciences and as peace advisors,30 plus other courses in agroecology that were provided by a company named Panaca.31 Additionally, the government of Cuba offered 1,000 scholarships to study on the island; half of them would benefit FARC ex-­combatants, while the Colombian government could decide who would benefit from the other half.32 On the other hand, it was also agreed that the government will give each FARC ex-­combatant eight million pesos to start their own business (point 3.2.2.7). The money can be invested in two ways: either collectively in one of the cooperatives forming ECOMUN or in individual projects in the form of a down-­payment for housing or for a business start-­up. For the creation of ECOMUN, FARC former combatants received training in the subject of economy based on solidarity work, which was taught jointly by the SENA and the Special Unit for Solidarity Organisations in the Ministry of Work. The 36 ex-­combatants that benefited from the course did so with the commitment that they would pass on this knowledge to their fellow ex-­combatants living in the TATRs, in order to strengthen ECOMUN by the creation of businesses based on solidarity work. The private sector The ACR developed various strategies to attract support from the private sector as part of its training and employment schemes. These included lobbying companies to release job opportunities, learning contracts or internships for the ex-­ combatants or their families, providing tax breaks if a company hired ex-­combatants, and appealing to the Corporate Responsibility Programmes (CRP) of larger companies (ACR, 2008; OACP, 2010, p. 5; OACP/ACR, 2010, p.  204). For instance, the ACR partnered Time Bank in a project that used volunteers to provide training for marginalised demographics, including the demobilised.33 Peace and Reconciliation and the PAPDRB created further strategies, such as convincing companies to buy products from the business plans, or offering recruitment services to mid- and small-­size companies that lacked selection schemes of their own.34 Aside from improving their basic employability, these strategies aimed to introduce the ex-­combatants to competing in the

132   Economic reintegration labour market in the same way as any other citizen would (Santander and Villamizar, 2006, p. 35). However, in general the private sector tends to be reluctant to employ demobilised people, which has an even higher impact in smaller municipalities that have a low capacity for job creation (Aguirre, 2010; Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011a, p. 8; OACP/ACR, 2010, pp. 203, 354). While many companies did play an important role in providing vocational training and supporting the creation and maintenance of business plans, when it comes to employment there are still very few companies willing to hire ex-­combatants. One example is the Grupo Exito, which runs a programme of corporate responsibility called “Workplace Inclusion for the Vulnerable Population”, offering training and permanent jobs to forcibly displaced groups, the physically disabled, single mothers, the demobilised and victims of violence (Zuluaga, 2010, p.  150). However, by 2009 this programme had only employed 236 ex-­combatants, and in 2011 this figure was a mere 86 (ACR, 2011, p.  10; OACP, 2010, p.  10). Similarly, the Microsoft Group created the “Mi Llave” initiative to build 11 technology centres in cities heavily affected by the conflict and to provide training to around 3,000 vulnerable people. Although it is claimed that 12 per cent of these trainees went on to find jobs (Silva, 2010, p.  154), it is unclear exactly how many of them were demobilised. The ACR also tried to foster employment schemes in the regions, which gave direct employment to 53 ex-­combatants (OACP, 2010, p. 5). More successfully, the ACR worked in partnership with the National Institute for Road Construction (INVIAS) to include a compulsory quota of 10 per cent of jobs for the demobilised in their building contracts. Through this scheme the ACR achieved the direct employment of 822 ex-­combatants by 2011 (ACR, 2011, p. 10). By 2017, the ARN had a list of some 650 companies that collaborated with the programme and employed between 1,500 and 2,00035 ex-­ combatants, a rate of 2 or 3 per company. Considering the enormous institutional effort aimed at employment-­seeking, these results appear rather paltry. Previously, in 2005, the director of the PRVC had expressed concern about the low level of response from the private sector in hiring the demobilised population (Ángel, 2006, p. 12). More recently, in 2013, the director of the ACR issued a public appeal entreating companies to halt the rejection of ex-­combatants from the workplace and asking companies not to discriminate against ex-­combatants in their job-­selection processes.36 As one former combatant explained: There is a lot of discrimination. If you go to a company to ask for a job, they won’t give you one because you are demobilised. We had a lot of problems with that. Very few accept us to work as demobilised. And if you start working, they fire you as soon as they realise.37 Furthermore, ACR officials are themselves conscious that the term “demobilised” carries with it negative associations, particularly as a label linked to criminality; there has hence been an institutional effort to phase out its usage

Economic reintegration   133 and replace it with “participant”38 to avoid the label that links them with criminality. In 2017, the ARN director also mentioned that in more than 8,000 jobs the employers did not know that they where hiring the ex-­combatants.39 Understandably, extortion and kidnapping are still a reality throughout the entire country, so the ex-­combatants are seen as a very real threat in this regard. Also, a report by the ACR concluded that the strategies for employment-­ seeking were less successful in places where the private sector had only a small footprint and/or had been heavily affected by the conflict (ACR, 2011, p.  9; OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 297). However, apart from the more typical problems of educational shortcomings and fear of the demobilised, it is clear that other factors contributed to the sector’s negative attitude. One study on the perceptions of the private sector towards the demobilised presented three key findings. First, private companies felt rather overwhelmed by uncoordinated requests and proposals from various sections of the government, which in turn provoked a sense of confusion and overlap among the different reintegration institutions. Second, the ex-­combatants had to compete with other vulnerable sections of society for jobs and resources within the companies’ corporate responsibility programmes. Companies thus tended to prioritise those people they considered to be victims over those they saw as perpetrators. Finally, incentives such as tax breaks are limited depending on the size of the companies involved: mid-­sized companies are more likely to react positively, while larger companies can be rather indifferent, as such a stimulus only represents a small return compared to their global income (Giha, 2010). Unsurprisingly, then, rejection and redundancy based only on one’s status as demobilised is a frequent occurrence.40 Hiring people who have a criminal record may understandably be a risk that many are not willing to take, but discrimination, lack of understanding of the reintegration process, and plain apathy or impassivity on the part of the private sector also greatly impacted on the economic opportunities available to the demobilised. Also, importantly, companies may believe that the business projects of ex-­combatants might mean that the ex-­combatants become their competitors; thus, for instance FARC’s representatives had to clarify that ECOMUN was not aiming to compete with other enterprises or organisations, but to work with them in order to pursue further social and economic development for all.41

Reintegration into poverty? The real economic outlook of the demobilised After their demobilisation, low-­ranking ex-­combatants tend to be unemployed or work in informal, low-­income jobs. As a result, they remain entrenched in the poorest demographics in the country: by 2006, official figures showed that only 443 of the demobilised had formal jobs, while 1,820 were working in informal activities (Ángel, 2006, p.  12). Similarly, Bogotá’s mayor found that the majority of ex-­combatants living in the city lived in the poorest and most marginalised neighborhoods (PAPDRB, 2011; Santander and Villamizar, 2006,

134   Economic reintegration p. 16) and by 2007, in Medellín, the ex-­combatants performed occupations such as taxi drivers, mechanics, builders and bus-­driver’s helpers, or in agriculture (Aguirre, 2010; Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b, p. 9). This situation did not change with the creation of the ACR: in 2011, it was calculated that 55 per cent of the ex-­combatants were working in informal jobs, 12 per cent had obtained formal employment and 31 per cent were unemployed (ACR, 2011, p. 12).42 In the fieldwork for this research with ex-­combatants that demobilised under Uribe’s DDR, when asking about the problems they have faced during their reintegration, unemployment was the most common response. It was also found that only a few of them had obtained formal jobs (within a company, as freelance technicians, in their own business); instead, the majority were working in informal jobs that required little education or training, thus were low-­income, such as driving moto-­taxis, working in construction or as street vendors. Likewise, by 2018, 70 per cent of ex-­combatants that took part in the ARN individual programme were performing informal jobs,43 while the FARC ECOMUN is focusing on activities that are mainly linked to the rural sector (such as different agricultural projects, small shops or bars in the countryside, or wild-­life tourism),44 which tend also to be informal and low-­income. As discussed in the previous chapter, rejection – and redundancy – based solely on their status as demobilised is a frequent occurrence. Thus, many of them may conceal their demobilised status from their bosses or their colleagues: I had the experience of being in a company where I was sacked because I asked for a permit [to leave early] because I had to go to the ACR workshop. So I arrived late because they didn’t let me go earlier. Then, in order to catch up I had to speak again with the boss and he said: “Man, it was the same yesterday and again today”. So I asked the psychologist to talk to him and after that [the boss] told me: “Here’s your [severance] payment, goodbye”.45 Equally, the demobilised may lack knowledge of, or experience in, accessing formal employment within the legal economy. Their shortcomings in education and social capital had a negative effect on their capacity to present the references or to certify the formal training required to compete in a normal job-­ selection process (Acosta, Gabrysch and Góngora, 2007, p. 66; CONPES 3554, 2008, p.  22). Besides, their unresolved legal status due to the delay in the amnesties or in the legal processes of Justice and Peace or JEP, also result in a lack of identification and other legal documents – yet another impediment for them in finding long-­term jobs outside of the provision of state aid. This situation also impacts on other aspects of the ex-­combatants’ lives, including their inability to rent a place of their own due to a lack of references and other requisite documentation (Foro Bogotá, 2006, p. 182).46 Remarkably, problems such as illiteracy or lack of education were mentioned only a few times in the interviews. This could mean that they were performing jobs where no more than basic or no literacy was required (ACR, 2009, p. 68;

Economic reintegration   135 UNDP, 2005). Arguably, then, those ex-­combatants who are forced into informal employment may not perceive their shortcomings in education as an immediate problem in their reintegration. Rather, they have developed a means of generating income within social conditions that they share with the large percentage of the Colombian population that lives in poor conditions (about 27% per cent of the population by 2017). Also, significantly, the creation of independent business is difficult to pitch and maintain: in 2006, the director of the PRVC calculated that there were around 474 business plans (Ángel, 2006, p.  12); however, by 2012 no more than a dozen of these were still in place.47 One study concluded that by 2007 135 out of 157 business associations no longer existed (ODDR, 2009, p. 16). Similarly, in 2015, ACR data showed that despite the fact that more than 90 per cent of the economic benefits had been invested in individual business, only 27.11 per cent of the businesses were still functioning.48 However, by 2017, the ARN reported that the rate of survival of business projects had improved to 65 per cent.49 For the FARC, the process has been slow, as the creation of small business and cooperatives has not received the expected support from the government: more than two years after the FARC came out of the forest and began to concentrate on the cantonment areas, it is not yet clear whether or when the government will provide the eight million pesos to each combatant. Although the “early reincorporation” has already started and the reincorporation route has been agreed (CONPES 3931, 2018), the vocational training and all the other requirements to obtain money have not been delivered by the government. In practice, all this means is that to start an individual business now, the combatants rely on their own money, either from the lump-­sum or the monthly payments that will end by August 2019. Although international cooperation has contributed to a few projects,50 the New Final Agreement states that the government cannot delegate this responsibility for international community funding (point 3.2.2.8). By September 2018, the FARC complained at the lack of real implementation of the business plans, which in turn affects the sustainability of ECOMUN.51 More worryingly, Duque’s government insists there is no budget to implement the peace process.52 Also, significantly, there is the issue of land. To solve the problem of the provision of land to pursue business projects, FARC and government representatives drafted a decree to modify the already existing Decree 1071 of 2015 that regulates land distribution. The proposal was to create a special programme to provide land for reincorporation purposes; thus the National Land Agency could obtain land expropriated to criminals (mainly drug-­traffickers) and give it to any form of association formed by FARC ex-­combatants.53 This proposal also included a list of requirements of the potential beneficiaries, such as: not having enough land to cultivate; not owning land at all or property apart from their houses; not having previously been beneficiaries of other land programmes; not possessing more than 200 million pesos; being summoned to make a declaration before the Transitional Justice System; and not being an illegal occupant of land.

136   Economic reintegration However, the draft of this decree triggered criticism from several sectors, including associations of victims of forced displacement that are in the process of claiming land, and the Colombian Agricultural Association (SAC), a powerful agricultural guild, which, although it had supported the peace process (SAC, 2013), has traditionally opposed agrarian reform (SAC, 1968; Carranza-­ Franco, Gómez, Ospina and Parada, forthcoming). As a result, the government decided to enact a decree that was not negotiated with FARC representatives and that merely added a lame paragraph to an already existing article of Decree 1071, stating, in one line, that the “National Land Agency could directly adjudicate land to associations or cooperatives”,54 neither mentioning FARC or ex-­combatants nor giving them any special status. This puts ex-­combatants at the end of the very long line of people claiming land in the country (poor peasants, victims of forced displacement, ethnic communities, etc). Therefore, in reality, in the short to medium term no former FARC member or ECOMUN will obtain land for the implementation of business projects. In this context, the FARC members have opted either for buying land collectively or for collaborating with the community through systems of sharecropping or in the cultivation of community land.55 It is also worth noting that the business projects are located inside or nearby the TATR, those areas chosen by the FARC for security reasons rather than for economic development, meaning that are difficult to access and far from large cities or main roads. In sum, the difficulties in the developing independent businesses can be attributed to three main factors: first, these tend to be microbusiness, which have a natural and general failure rate of more than 70 per cent.56 Likewise, developing business skills takes time and inevitably involves a process of trial and error; and ultimately not everyone is best suited to entrepreneurial commerce.57 Second, these forms of association need to be transitioned into, as they are forms of authority that do not reproduce the vertical hierarchy of armed groups. The projects may also fail due to reckless management58 or simply because coordinating so many people is complicated. Third, there is a strong preference among the demobilised for pursuing agricultural enterprises, given that many of them come from peasant backgrounds.59 Additionally, government representatives and the leaders of armed groups may believe that these activities produce large increases in employment in the short term.60 However, it is precisely these agricultural activities that face complex structural problems, such as the concentration of land in the countryside and long-­term investments with low-­profit returns or the continuation of those social and economic structures that underpin poverty and exploitation in rural areas, mainly land concentration.61 This, in turn, tends to reproduce the social conditions that force people into the cultivation of coca and, thereby, their subsequent involvement in drug-­trafficking or other illegal economies.62 In fact, the FARC has committed to restore stolen or dispossessed land to the government: they have reported 240,000 hectares in 722 plots of land.63 These land plots are supposed to become part of the land fund to reparate the victims of violence, as stated in the New Final Agreement. However, there are already difficulties, such as the lack of documentation or multiple claims over land,

Economic reintegration   137 including claims by drug-­traffickers or by people who illegally took public land, even though they qualify as victims, as they were, indeed, victims of blackmail and forced displacement by the guerrillas. In any case, these lands are becoming part of legal processes that merely mirror other, overarching problems around rural property that are still far from being solved.

Recidivism: the real value of economic incentives By 2010, recidivism in the demobilised population of Uribe’s DDR was estimated at around 15 per cent: out of a total of 54,806 ex-­combatants, 11.8 per cent had been captured and 4.3 per cent killed in actions linked to criminality (CNRR, 2010, p.  156; FIP, 2010, p.  3; Procuraduría, 2011, p.  12; US, 2008, p. 56).64 Other studies have shown that 17 per cent of the captured members of criminal bands were former paramilitaries, amounting to around 2 per cent of the total number of those collectively demobilised (Arias and Guáqueta, 2008, p. 5). In 2014, research concluded that 76 per cent of the ex-­paramilitaries had not fallen into criminality, and only 10 per cent of those demobilised who reported having received offers of this type felt inclined to accept them (FIP, 2014, p. 6); while by 2016 the rate of recidivism was calculated at between 20 and 24 per cent (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018).65 With regard to the FARC-­Santos DDR, by 2018 the FARC dissidents that have relapsed into violence were formed of 2,400 guerrillas, which constitutes some 20 per cent of the total troops demobilised.66 This includes both troops that separated from the FARC secretariat before the signing of the agreement (as they rejected any negotiation with the government)67 and those who demobilised but have left the TATR to join the FARC dissidents or illegal armed groups. As mentioned above, the ex-­combatants posited that unemployment may be a strong cause of recidivism; however, other reasons keep them out of illegal activities, such as family, negative memories of the war and of life in the illegal armed groups, security reasons, and disenchantment with the group ideology. During the fieldwork, some ex-­combatants talked about offers they had received from the armed groups. According to them, the salary for leading a small racketeering gang could reach as much as one to three million pesos [US$300 to 1,000] per month.68 However, they clarify that for them, enrolling purely for money is not really worthwhile and they are not keen to accept these offers: A: I want the Colombian government to take into account what we are doing because now things are difficult with the armed groups. Here in Medellín, there are all these opportunities [for recidivism]. All the time they are telling you: “We’ll give you money to join us”. B: A million, 1.2 million pesos per month. A: And they [the government] do not realise that. We are here and we want to keep going. They do not realise that. On the contrary, they want to screw us. That’s wrong from the government.

138   Economic reintegration B: It is because we have a goal now, a place to go. But if [the criminal bands] talk to someone that is in trouble, like one of our mates, and they convince him, he will go back. And many have returned because of that.69 A: I don’t regret deserting from the group, never. The government has not fulfilled its promises, and I know it never will but I have no regrets. I am here and I have a son. […] I will never go back to an armed group, and I have received offers [of joining criminality]. But I am out of that now, I only want to work, to make a living for me and my family.70 The reintegration officers were also conscious that neither the ACR nor the government is capable of competing with the economic incentives offered by illegal armed groups. Yet they also understand that these incentives have lost their value to the demobilised, and that there are other elements that play a more crucial role, be it their families or the sense of freedom from military life.71 Kaplan and Nussio’s (2018) statistical study on the recidivism of combatants from Uribe’s DDR found that former paramilitaries are more likely to relapse than the guerrillas; while women, people from both sexes with family commitments and those who are more controlled by the ARN, are less prone to recidivism. On the contrary, those who had strong personal motives for joining in the first place, who had spent more time in the groups and who live in areas where criminal bands operate, are more likely to relapse. Also, unemployment has a significant effect on the recidivism of former paramilitary members, but not of ex-­guerrillas, and motives of greed (involvement in crimes such as extortion or drug-­trafficking) or living near coca crops, does not increase recidivism. Although the money that comes with criminality is far higher than the incentives offered by the government and the minimum wage salaries ex-­ combatants are likely to receive in civilian jobs, many do not behave as greedy or utility-­maximising individuals, the economic incentives to return to armed groups appearing to have lost their attraction.

Conclusion This chapter has analysed the strategies for economic reintegration. On the one hand, the real value of the economic aid provided to former fighters does not reside in its amount or frequency, but on how these stimuli are used as a tool for facilitating and encouraging active participation in reintegration or reincorporation activities. More than a mere provider of economic rewards, the reintegration programmes play a critical role in defining goals and limits for the former combatants, as well as establishing a plan for personal development in their transition into civilian life. However, and despite substantial institutional effort, the social background of the demobilised represents a critical barrier to access to jobs and a stable income. As a result, the ex-­combatants remain tied to conditions of poverty and marginality: their educational and social background, along with their rejection by the private sector, pushes them further into

Economic reintegration   139 informal jobs, unemployment and deeper poverty. In spite of this, they share the same economic conditions with almost one-­third of the country’s population. On the other hand, bearing in mind the gigantic economic profits produced by criminality and drug-­trafficking, the Colombian government is simply unable to compete with the financial incentives on offer to those who take part in illegal activities. Nevertheless, for the demobilised, war and life within the armed group is remembered as an intense and highly negative experience, and one that is simply not worth the money. Ultimately, although there is the possibility of receiving millionaire-­making offers from the criminal world to create or lead new illegal armed groups, there remains a strong tendency to reject these proposals out of awareness of its consequences: imprisonment or death. Reintegration, therefore, goes beyond the like-­for-like replacement of economic stimulus obtained in war-­related activities with legal alternatives in civilian life. Without doubt, gaining employment or a stable income is an important indicator of the success or failure of the reintegration process.72 But the experience of the Colombian reintegration institutions has shown that this economic dimension is not the starting point but the final element in the reintegration process (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2006, p. 129). No different from any other type of educative curve, the productive life is the result of a socialisation process that creates mutually reinforcing relationships between individuals and their social milieu. Thus, this chapter has reassessed the emphasis placed on achieving a successful economic reintegration to prevent recidivism among ex-­combatants. Certainly, the economic dimension has an important role to play in the dynamics of war and political conflict; it is not, however, sufficient to explain the success or failure of the process of reintegration or reincorporation into society.

Notes   1 Especially those by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Kaldor (2006).   2 ACR statistics 2015. Chart 6. Educational level. When starting in the reintegration programme, 28.38 per cent of the ex-­combatants participating had finished high school. September 2015. www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-­reintegracion/Paginas/cifras. aspx.   3 Censo Socioecómico (UN-­CNR, 2017).   4 Carried out by the Ministry of Education, the Norwegian Refugee Council and Fucepaz.   5 Acronym in Spanish: Centro de Formación para la Paz y la Reconciliación.   6 Reintegration Officer No. 38.   7 Interview Villamizar.   8 Ministry of Education 4 August 2017; Presidency, 30 September 2017.   9 UNAD. 22 February 2018 https://noticias.unad.edu.co/index.php/unad-­noticias/ todas/2-unad-­noticias/2042-arando-­la-educacion-­la-iniciativa-­de-la-­unad-para-­ensenarla-­paz. 10 Universidad Distrital, 2017. 11 The minimum salary approx: 2003 (US$166), 2004 (US$180), 2005 (US$190), 2006 (US$200), 2016 (US$239), 2017 (US$256), 2018 (US$271).

140   Economic reintegration 12 Resolution 513/2005. 13 Reintegration Officer No. 27, 49–51, 143, 159. 14 Reintegration Officer No. 120. 15 Cartagena, 2009:69; Acosta et al., 2007, p, 65; Reintegration Officer 18–19; Interview Negrete. 16 Decree 395/2007. 17 Interview officer. 18 Reintegration Officers No. 47, 73, 75–77, 109, 128. 19 ACR Resolution No 76, 2016. 20 Peace Agreement 3.2.2.7, Articles 7 and 8, Decree 899, 2017 art 8. 21 Interview with ARN former Assessor, 2 August 2018. 22 Interview Mesetas, Interviews Montañita, Interview FARC CNR Assessor, 10 July 2018. 23 Reintegration Officer No. 128. 24 Programme to Strengthen the Business Projects of the Ex-­combatants and their Families. Reintegration Officer No. 31. 25 SENA is a public institution that provides short- and medium-­length courses in a wide range of working skills. 26 This service was mainly founded by USAID and the IOM. 27 This included the Institute for Management Sports and Recreation (INDER), Institute for Management of Recreational Parks (METROPARQUES), the municipal TV channel (TELEMEDELLIN) and the local Secretary of State. 28 The scheme was called Salvavías. 29 Reintegration Officers No. 31, 49–51, 109, 129, 131–132, 157. 30 ECOMUN presentation, 4 July 2017. 31 Vicepresidencia, 8 March 2018. 32 El Espectador 15 March 2017; CNN 17 March 2017. 33 The Time Bank was a private initiative run by the foundation “Colombia Presente” and supported by the chambers of commerce. In Medellín, the demobilised have access to the Opportunity Bank and the Zone Centres for Company Development (CEDEZO), which provides them with credit and technical support in both business and employability (OACP, 2010, p. 4; CONPES 3554, p. 50; Reintegration Officer No. 148). 34 After establishing the job vacancies for each particular company, the reintegration officers select candidates from a pool of CVs mainly made up of the demobilised and their families. The company then receives a shortlist of candidates for interviewing. If one of the demobilised is eventually hired, the officers provide further support to both employer and employee in terms of monitoring the demobilised and mediating in case of problems. (Reintegration Officers No. 31, 49–51; PAPDRB, 2010, p.  63, 2011, p. 30; Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011b, p. 45). 35 Interview with ARN former assessor, 2 August 2018; Más de 650 empresas del país ya emplean a ex-­combatientes www.portafolio.co/economia/empresas-­que-emplean-­aex-­combatientes-en-­colombia-503322. 36 El Tiempo, 9 December 2013. 37 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 24. 38 The term “participant” also aims to distinguish between the ex-­combatants who have “active” status in the process and the paramilitaries who demobilised but never entered into the reintegration programme (OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 325). 39 Más de 650 empresas del país ya emplean a ex-­combatientes www.portafolio.co/ economia/empresas-­que-emplean-­a-ex-­combatientes-en-­colombia-503322. 40 Reintegration Officers No. 75–77; 143, 146. 41 Jairo Quintero, FARC’s representative ECOMUN presentation, 4 July 2017. 42 More recent data show small changes in this trend. The work in formal employment has increased to 17% and 26%. ACR statistics 2015. Chart 8. Occupation among the

Economic reintegration   141 demobilised. September 2015. www.reintegracion.gov.co/es/la-­reintegracion/Paginas/ cifras.aspx. 43 Interview ARN former assesor. 44 Interview Vistahermosa, Interview Montañita. 45 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 13. 46 Interview former commander, women, 28 March 2018. 47 Reintegration Officers No. 49–51, 53. 48 Other forms of investment were to buy houses or in education. ACR statistics 2015. Chart 9 shows the areas of investment of the economic stimuli and in Chart 10 the current situation of the Business Plans. September 2015. www.reintegracion.gov.co/ es/la-­reintegracion/Paginas/cifras.aspx. 49 Más de 650 empresas del país ya emplean a ex-­combatientes www.portafolio.co/ economia/empresas-­que-emplean-­a-ex-­combatientes-en-­colombia-503322. 50 PNUD has developed two projects and some by Norway and Sweden. 51 Declaración política pacto unificado por al Paz y la Nueva Colombia, FARC, 1 September 2018. 52 El Espectador, 14 September 2018. No Hay Recursos para Implementar el Acuerdo de Paz. Interview with Emilio Archila.  53 For an analysis and draft of the decree https://verdadabierta.com/se-­embolata-la-­ adjudicacion-de-­tierras-para-­la-farc/. 54 Decree 756/2018. 55 Interview with CNR Assessor. 56 Pax Christy (2006) Un Nuevo Comienzo. Un Final Abierto. Report, November 2006.  57 Interview Reintegration Officers No. 18–19, 31, 49–51, 108, 131–132; Interview ARN former assesor. 58 This happened in particular in the paramilitary groups Reintegration Officers No. 31, 53, 128, 157, 144; Interview ex-­combatant No. 104; Pax Christy, 2006: 49. 59 Reintegration Officers No. 18–19, Interviews Montañita, Mesetas, Visits to Icononzo. 60 Reintegration Officer No. 53. 61 Land concentration remains a difficult problem to solve in Colombia. By 2009, land GINI in the country was 0.863 (IGAC, 2009). 62 Aguirre, 2010, p. 114; Reintegration Officers No. 49–51,128141, 115, 129; Interview Negrete. 63 Los primeros 25 predios de las FARC para reparar a las víctimas. El Espectador, 30 September 2018 https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/pais/los-­primeros-25-predios­de-las-­farc-para-­reparar-las-­victimas. 64 Policía, 2010. 65 Semana, 23, July 2016. Por qué tantos ex-­combatientes han recaído en el crimen?: Enzo Nussio www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/posconflicto-­enzo-nussio-­habla-de-­excombatientes-­que-reinciden/482977. 66 Dónde están, cuántos son y qué tan peligrosos son los disidentes. Semana, 5 May 2018. www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/disidencias-­de-las-­farc-tienen-­1300-miembros-­portodo-­el-pais/566081. 67 Gentil Duarte, Front 1; Iván Mordisco. 68 Interview grass-­roots No. 6, Focus group ex-­combatants No. 31. 69 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 3. 70 Focus group ex-­combatants No. 3. 71 Reintegration Officer No. 109; 154. 72 Reintegration Officer No. 31, 154.

142   Economic reintegration

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Economic reintegration   145 UNDP (2006). Integrated demobilization, disarmament and reintegration standards. United Nations. http://unddr.org/. UNDPKO (2010). DDR in peace operations. A retrospective. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions. DDR Section. US (2008). Plan Colombia: Drug reduction goals were not fully met, but security has improved; US agencies need more detailed plans for reducing assistance. Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate. Report to US Senate. Villegas, G. (2006). Generación de ingresos para los reinsertados: Medellín. In: Debates de Coyuntural Social (pp. 26–39). Bogotá: Fedesarrollo, Fundación Corona. Zuluaga, L. (2010). Grupo Exito and its care of the vulnerable population in Colombia. In: M. Prandi and J. Lozano (eds.), CRS in Conflict and Post-­Conflict Environments: From Risk Management to Value Creation. (pp.  149–152). Ecola de Cultura de Pau, Institute for Social Innovation ESADE.

5 Political reintegration

The UN has claimed that the DDR process should create a social contract based on participation and democratic principles (UNDP, 2006, 2.10 p.  6). Other authors have also argued that demobilising and disarming the combatants should be understood in terms of them entering into a social contract with the state and the government (Duclos, 2012; Kilroy, 2011; Knight and Özerdem, 2004; McMullin, 2013; Özerdem, 2009). This notion of DDR as social contract goes beyond the implementation of free elections or mere voting rights: it implies a broader notion of governance, specifically the extent to which the new economic and social order is perceived to be fairer and more acceptable when compared to its pre-­war equivalent (Duclos, 2012; Gomes Porto, Alden and Parsons, 2007; Kilroy, 2011). Rousseau’s theory of social contract refers to a mutually binding relationship between equals with two key implications: the delegation of the creation and enforcement of the law, and the emergence of a common identity that relies on self-­control. Citizens do not renounce their rights of freedom and social order but instead choose to delegate the use of force to an authority in order to protect and preserve those rights. In turn, this implies the creation of a political subjectivity that accepts and supports that authority as legitimate, prompting subsequent changes in individual behaviours (Magnette, 2005; Rousseau, 1923). Such political subjectivity takes the form of citizen identity, defined in relation to both everyday practices and functional links with regard to state institutions. Although international peace-­building missions and other military interventions justify their actions in terms of building democratic institutions and establishing free elections, the political dimension has been largely ignored by DDR programmes (Duclos, 2012; Gomes Porto et al., 2007; Guáqueta, 2007; Söderström, 2011). In fact, in policy-­making documents by the UN (the IDDRS) and the World Bank, political reintegration is barely mentioned, thus there is a lack of guidelines on specific actions. However, Söderström (2011) has claimed that research around political reintegration has focused on three main areas: the general political consequences of DDR programmes; the transformation of armed groups into political parties; and the individual level of political engagement. Her research is devoted to the last of these, and specifically how ex-­ combatants relate to politics through the development of mechanisms for

Political reintegration   147 improving access to and interpretation of the democratic process (ibid., p. 20). Similarly, Mitton (2012) has argued that the success of political reintegration should be assessed beyond the group’s ability to become a political party or to share power. Instead, other elements should be taken into account, such as the participation of the demobilised in civil society groups or public discussions, as well as their interaction with political institutions. Moreover, Schulhofer-­Wohl and Sambanis (2010) have claimed that DDR programmes can influence political participation at three different levels: the legitimisation of the post-­war political order at the macro-­level; the transformation of armed groups into political organisations at the meso-­level; and creation of resources and skills development for individual ex-­combatants and civilians at the micro-­level. Political reintegration also embraces civic responsibilities and other political aspects such as: how justice is meted out for crimes committed during the war; how to establish a new system of law and order; and how ex-­combatants can access those decision-­making mechanisms available to other citizens (Özerdem, 2012). Moreover, although reforms in governance are not necessarily prioritised by DDR programmes or peace-­building strategies, a successful political reintegration can only be achieved once the political system has been reformed further towards democracy (PDS, 2009). The political reintegration of individuals is thus inevitably linked to wider issues of security and state-­ building: Some of the measures that support the political reintegration of ex-­ combatants include reforming security forces, developing and strengthening political institutions, government capacities and civil society, as well as enhancing human rights and introducing reconciliation mechanisms. (Gleichmann, Douglas, Odenwald, Steenken and Wilkinson, 2004, p. 64) This chapter analyses the difficulties for the ex-­combatants in the creation and implementation of a political proposal that keeps them as a group after demobilisation. In the first section I show the political influence of the paramilitary leaders before their demobilisation and their unsuccessful attempt to develop a political proposal. In the second, I depict the transit of the FARC from a guerrilla group to a political party. Finally, the third section explains two different ways DDR programmes may address the political reintegration understood as citizenship-­building, either by supporting the creation of democratic institutions and practices, or at the individual level by the creation of links with the state.

The (failed) political project of the paramilitary leaders The political influence of the paramilitary leaders before their demobilisation has been widely documented by research on what has been called the “para-­ politics”. López and Sevillano (2008) reported eight different alliances established between paramilitary leaders and politicians or public servants in the early 2000s; most famously the Ralito Pact1 sealed the alliance between the

148   Political reintegration AUC commanders and, among others, the Governors of Cordoba and Sucre, 11 Congress members, three mayors and several other public officials. Two other pacts, Chivolo and Pivijay,2 were signed in meetings that included 13 mayoral candidates and 395 candidates to other public offices in the department of Magdalena, while other pacts fixed the winners in the elections of governors, mayors, local representatives and congressional members in the areas of the ­Oriental Plains, Uraba, Magdalena Medio, the Coffee Belt and Caldas (López and Sevillano, 2008). Additionally, another judicial investigation found enough evidence to bring criminal charges against 23 politicians, including one senator and three mayors, for their pacts with the paramilitary leader aka El Aleman in the area of Marizco, Cordoba.3 This positioning in the political arena at the local level trickled down to create an enormous influence on the voting patterns in the congressional and presidential elections between 2002 and 2006. On the one hand, the paramilitaries engaged in alliances with traditional parties – the Liberal Party in particular – but they also decided to create their own new political parties,4 which entered the electoral competition for the first time and were, suddenly, very successful (López, 2010). On the other hand, the political strategy of the paramilitary groups included terrorising the population and coercing constituents to vote for a specific candidate or creating lone candidates by killing or threatening their rivals.5 Besides, other more traditional forms of cheating were used: such as pre-­marked ballots or absentee voting (Acemoglu, Robinson and Santos, 2009, p. 21). Additionally, for the elections in 2002, the electronic database of the National Registry Office was infiltrated (López and Sevillano, 2008) and in 2006 various methods of rigging the vote-­count were used to achieve more seats with the same number of votes (López, 2010). All these alliances between illegal groups and politicians thus created “atypical voting patterns”,6 i.e. candidates whose number of votes increased by more than 1,000 per cent compared to their results in previous elections, inaugural candidates elected with more than 70 per cent of the vote and candidates who had an unexpected fall in votes in some areas, but achieved more than 70 per cent in others, meaning that they were brokering deals to divide the electoral districts. It has been calculated that 34 per cent of Congress members that were elected between 2002 and 2006 were involved in these illegal alliances (López, 2010). Furthermore, a statistical study7 concluded that following the Ralito Pact, “paramilitary groups actively tried and succeeded in influencing vote in national elections”, a strong association was found between the areas controlled by paramilitary groups and a greater concentration of votes favouring Alvaro Uribe in the presidential elections (Acemoglu et al., 2009, p. 20). For every ten members of Congress accused of para-­politics, eight were part of Uribe’s political coalition (López, 2010). In other words, 70 per cent of the politicians involved in the criminal investigations of para-­politics were part of Uribe’s coalition (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010). López and Sevillano (2008) have argued that by gaining political power in the regions, the paramilitaries aimed to influence national institutions, allowing

Political reintegration   149 them to act with impunity thereafter, and to gain access to legal and illegal business opportunities and the possibility of laundering the ill-­gotten gains. Acemoglu et al. concluded that this was a symbiotic relationship: “paramilitaries deliver votes to politicians with preferences relatively close to theirs, while politicians they helped elect implicitly or explicitly support laws that they prefer”. As a consequence, a significant portion of the democratic institutions fell under the control of the paramilitaries and members of Congress in Uribe’s coalition tended to enact policies of direct benefit to the paramilitaries: “[w]hile in non-­ paramilitary areas policies are targeted at citizens, in paramilitary-­controlled areas they are targeted at paramilitaries” (Acemoglu et al., 2009, p. 2). Further research by Ungar and Cardona has explained the mechanics behind this congressional influence: the large number of members involved in para-­ politics gave them powerful leverage for political manoeuvres such as outlining procedures to approve or block bills or appointing presidents and vice-­presidents of the commissions that give the final vote on specific bills. Subsequently, these presidents enacted further nefarious practices, such as not allowing the opposition to present their objections in debates, not providing accurate information about the bills themselves or fixing voting proportions. Also, importantly, their actions were concentrated in areas where there were huge ramifications at the national level: including constitutional reforms, the electoral system, budget and revenues, social security and reforms to the justice system and offices of control. However, Ungar and Cardona show that members of Congress investigated for para-­politics did not necessarily vote as a group. They found that at times the members acted in favour of the paramilitaries whereas at others they were acting out of their own economic interests when approving or rejecting the bills. In any case, rather than being a strong political collective, the para-­ politicians remained staunchly individual – acting out of separate interests and from a variety of political perspectives – whose central point of articulation was Uribe’s agenda (Ungar and Cardona, 2010). However, the transformation of the paramilitary leaders into politicians proved less successful than their alliances. Carlos Castaño had originally formed the National Movement of Demobilised Self-­Defences (NMDS) in 2002, in an attempt to create a political organisation that could engage in direct negotiations with US representatives, and to separate the AUC’s political project from the influence of the drug-­traffickers.8 The expectation of the paramilitary leaders was to directly transpose their military power into the political arena post-­ demobilisation. For instance, commander Mancuso declared: I am already there [in the political arena]. My current activities will inevitably take me to an election post as soon as the law allows it.9 After the demobilisations had taken place, a few paramilitary leaders10 stood as candidates in electoral posts for the 2006 and 2007 elections,11 but they never reached office and their political proposal never came to fruition for a variety of reasons: on the one hand, they lost the backing provided by President Uribe. In

150   Political reintegration August 2006, one week after he was inaugurated for his second presidential term, the president announced that the paramilitary leaders would be imprisoned due their continuation of criminal activities after demobilisation. The legal imposition used was not an arrest warrant but a voluntary confinement, yet most of the leaders complied voluntarily and were jailed in a former recreational centre in La Ceja, Antioquia. In November that year they were then transferred to a high-­security prison in Itagui, Antioquia.12 The leaders reacted by inciting protest riots in areas under their control, in Medellín in particular (Pardo, 2007), but they remained in prison. Consequently, they tried to revive the NMDS in 2007: the paramilitary leader and former director of Corporation Democracy, Severo Antonio López, became its first director and ex-­Congress member Rocío Arias was named as its civil representative (ODDR, 2009). López, however, was assasinated months later as part of internecine clashes13 and Arias was later heavily implicated in the para-­politics scandal and the criminal enquiries that followed. On the other hand, the Colombian legal system was reacting against the apparent impunity of the paramilitary demobilisations. On 18 May 2006, the Supreme Court of Justice enacted the first of several amendments to Law 975, stating that crimes against humanity (e.g. kidnapping, genocide and terrorism) and crimes not related to the nature of the armed conflict (e.g. rape, fraud and drug-­trafficking) were excluded from legal favour.14 In 2007, Decree 128 was modified to establish that “the benefits cannot be given to [those demobilised] who have been charged with or sentenced to crimes governed by the Constitution, the law, or international treaties signed by Colombia”.15 The constitutional court likewise ruled that electoral activity on the part of the demobilised was not permitted until they had completed their reintegration process16 (ICG, 2006). In addition, other institutions such as the Office for the Defence of the People and the Inspector General formally opened legal investigations against those ex-­combatants still involved in criminal activities. Ultimately, under the new regulations of Law 975 the ex-­paramilitary leaders were forced to confess their crimes and to reveal information that unravelled the web of para-­politics. By 2008, having remained in prison for around two years, the paramilitary leaders had already lost much of their power. Uribe then decided to extradite 12 of those leaders held in Itagui;17 it was argued that they were not truly committed to the DDR and had continued drug-­trafficking activities. This brief account of the attempt at political reintegration by the demobilised paramilitary commanders highlights the difficulties that the paramilitaries faced in consolidating a political proposition. First, the systematic killing of their own political leaders rebounded on them, producing yet more fragmentation within the paramilitaries and making it harder for drug-­traffickers to disguise their illegal activities behind a political façade. Second, it was difficult for them to transform their militaristic discourse into a political one; although Carlos Castaño had made several attempts to articulate an ideology and political agenda,18 they failed in consolidating a political identity or proposal beyond their counterinsurgency aims or their individual interest in extradition, thus

Political reintegration   151 impeding any formal transition into a political party.19 Finally, the judicial system, and in particular the High Courts of Justice, impeded the direct participation of paramilitary leaders and drug-­traffickers in the political arena, and further undermined their influence in politics through criminal investigations of para-­politics. Already beset by this combination of factors, the extraditions ordered by Uribe finally destroyed any remaining potential for political organisation.

Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común – FARC party The New Final Agreement states that the government will provide a special and temporal scheme for the creation of the FARC political party and its participation in the democratic system. This includes the provision of funds and the alleviation of some requirements that are compulsory to other political parties to obtain a place in the Congress. As part of this scheme, the FARC was granted five seats in the senate and five seats in the Chamber of Representatives for two electoral periods (2018 and 2022). Also, a FARC representative can participate in the National Electoral Council, although he/she has no vote in the decisions of this entity (point 3.2.1.2) Rather surprisingly, the representatives of the “No” campaign did not oppose this point in their proposals after the plebiscite, although they tried to impose some restrictions: the Democratic Centre asked that those ten seats in the Congress could not to be filled by people found guilty of human rights violations, which in practice might impede the participation of the main FARC commanders, but not of other members. Marta Lucía Ramírez proposed the need to clarify that the funding provided to the FARC party had to be the same as the other parties, that their political activities could not receive finance from illegal resources and that those responsible for gross human rights violations could not be candidates for the Congress or the presidency. The only direct opposition came from Ordoñez, who said that the political participation of FARC members could only happen after they had served jail sentences and had made reparation to their victims. None of these proposals impeded the real participation of the FARC as a political party in the Congress, while the individual situation of specific commanders in regard to human rights violations now depends on the JEP and other judicial institutions, as was stated from the beginning in the peace settlement. Thus, less than a year after the signing of the New Final Agreement, the FARC guerrilla group was transformed into a political party, maintaining the same acronym but it now meaning “The Alternative Revolutionary Force of the Commons”.20 This reference to the commons harks back to its historical origins as the “commons”, the communists that rejected Rojas’ amnesty in 1953, as explained in Chapter 1. Currently, the term also refers to their approach in pursuing a nationwide political project that includes the “common” people. For their political project, the FARC has assumed Clausewitz’ aphorism that politics is the continuation of war through other means:

152   Political reintegration We don’t have weapons any longer, but our [political] party has always existed. We have always followed the guidelines by the party and now it is legal, before it was clandestine, so I think that we have changed now only the weapons, as the comrade Timochenko said, our only weapon now is the words […] our ideology is the same, we haven’t change anything only because we don’t have weapons or uniforms.21 As a party we want to consolidate and to continue, always with the idea of taking power through politics, no using war and violence any longer, but with the party in the political arena.22 The FARC has been successful in transforming its military structure into a democratic one. The political party has so far held two congresses in Bogotá23 and, in line with procedures from communist ideology, has adopted a complex system of internal elections to decide its representatives. As explained in Chapter 3, for the elections in 2018, the FARC party launched a campaign in order to obtain more Congress seats, apart from the ten established in the New Final Agreement. The list of 23 candidates included 12 former guerrillas and 11 civilian sympatisers, one of them the first transgender candidate in the history of the country.24 However, the polls showed 85 per cent of negative perception of the FARC party before the elections,25 and they only obtained 52,531 votes, less that 0.5 per cent of the national total, thus not enough to obtain extra seats in Congress. Certainly, the FARC party had faced numerous problems in pursuing its campaign: on the one hand, the money provided by the government for the campaign was only delivered four days before the elections, with additional problems in administering the money due the open legal investigations against the FARC leadership – most of them are included in the Clinton list – that make basic banking procedures difficult.26 On the other hand, Timoleón Jiménez, the FARC candidate for the presidency had some health issues that prevented him from continuing his campaign. More importantly, the rejection and protests against them quickly escalated into death threats and selective personal attacks on party representatives in the regions. In January 2018, two FARC members who were carrying out activities for the campaign in Antioquia were killed;27 one of their political offices was attacked in Quibó, Chocó;28 and in Bogotá another of their members was attacked by men who threatened to kill more FARC members.29 During 2017, 24 former FARC were killed,30 and by September 2018, the FARC denounced the assassination of another 50.31 Despite this, eight FARC members are currently participating in the Congress.32 Jesús Santrich has not been able to take his seat in Congress because he is currently facing an open investigation for drug-­trafficking after the demobilisation; while Iván Marquez, along with other commanders, has gone into hiding because of the lack of guarantees for their judicial situation, even though they are still taking part in the reincorporation process (El Espectador, 2018).  Certainly, the transformation of an illegal army into a legal political entity is by no means straightforward. For example, the M-­19 ran a successful campaign

Political reintegration   153 for the elections to the New Constitutional Assembly in 1990 and won 29 seats, in second place after the Liberal Party. However, for the next elections they had almost disappeared as a political force, in part due to problems of internal organisation (Camacho, 2016). Similarly, Gutiérrez Sanín and Jaramillo (2004, p. 24) have argued that the leftist militias that demobilised in Medellín in 1994 failed to recast their military power into electoral support: their internal military organisation and dynamics contrasted sharply with those that are needed to stand as a political party and to take part in elections. In sum, the FARC party has many challenges: first, it already faces a low level of popularity among voters; second, the legal situation of its members remains unsolved, and in particular their leaders are still facing trial on the JEP transitional system, and there is extradition request from the US, which also risks being used against them politically; and third, the FARC members still face security risks, especially those who participate in politics and are more visible. Also importantly, the links between the former combatants and their leaders may fade away, In this context, the ARN may contribute to the political reintegration at the individual level, based on the experience of the former ACR, as explained in the next section.

Building citizenship Söderström (2011) has claimed that DDR programmes can shape the ex-­ combatants’ relationship with politics through the enabling of access and interpretive mechanisms that define their practice in a democratic system. Access mechanisms refer to the provision of material and cognitive resources that expand access to political participation, while interpretive mechanisms are structures of meaning, norms and values that are internalised by individuals. Thus, the creation of resources and the point of contact with public institutions is beneficial to the emergence of a social contract between the ex-­combatants and the state (Mitton, 2012; Schulhofer-­Wohl and Sambanis, 2010). The transformation of combatants into citizens then may be implemented by the ARN in two forms: on the one hand, the integration of the agreement on political participation (point 2 of the New Final Agreement) into its mission and practice; on the other, the individual development of citizenship through the strengthening of access and the resignification of the democratic mechanisms already in place, which changes the position of the ex-­combatants in relation to their political community and the state. Building of democratic institutions The Colombian state has sustained its democratic institutions over many years, but its lack of a monopoly of force has left a broad array of marginalised groups without the means to access them. The Human Development Report in 2011, for example, found that the rural population in Colombia suffers a “deficit of citizenship”: finding itself in a generalised situation of poverty, and faced with a lack of labour rights and access to land ownership, as well as very limited possibilities for

154   Political reintegration political participation (UNDP, 2011). Using Tilly’s (1996) and Turner’s (2000) definitions on citizenship, this deficit then impedes the establishment of mutual rights and obligations in practices that link them to the state, instead of any other illegal authority that takes control of the rural areas. The second point of the New Final Agreement is titled “Political participation: democratic opening to build peace”; accordingly, it addresses the widening and strengthening of democracy as a direct product of the demobilisations and the end of the use of violence as a means of political action. This can only be reached by the provision of guarantees for access to political participation by broader sectors of the Colombian population, facilitating the creation of new political parties and political movements that present opposition and alternatives to the existing groups of power-­holders. These guarantees also imply a better distribution of public resources – in particular those given by the government to political parties and movements; the strengthening of the exercising of political opposition; and more transparency in the electoral process in two ways: the control of the electoral process and the electoral authorities; and the protection of social leaders, in particular in the regions where threats and selective attacks on them are still very frequent. The agreement on political participation also requires the modernisation and updating of the electoral system; the protection of plurality in political expressions, in particular social protest; the focus on rural communities that have been traditionally marginalised, abandoned and isolated from the political system; the provision of more and better opportunities for women; and the fostering of citizen participation in the design and planning of development projects and public policy that directly affect them. In order to do so, there are three mechanisms contemplated in the New Final Agreement. First the provision of rights and guarantees for the exercise of the political opposition, which implies opportunities for political plurality; the creation of a statute for political opposition, with the participation of two particular civic organisations, Marcha Patriótica and Congreso de los Pueblos; the creation of an integral system of security for the exercising of politics, to include risk prevention and protection for those who operate in political opposition; and the prevention and protection of social leaders and grass-­roots movements. Second, the establishment and strengthening of democratic mechanisms for citizen participation: the fostering of a pluralist offer to social movements and organisations, guaranteeing their mobilisation and pacific protest and their access to public mass media, as well as the fostering of reconciliation, pacific coexistence, tolerance and non-­stigmatisation. This point also included the development of a policy of democratic and participative planning, i.e. widening citizenship participation in the design of development plans, as well as in the monitoring of their implementation and evaluation. The third mechanism is the promotion of means for participation through access and equality in political competition; fostering transparency in the electoral process; pursuing reforms to the regime and electoral organisation; and the promotion of a culture of democracy and participation.

Political reintegration   155 Also, significantly, the New Final Agreement posited the creation of 16 new electoral districts (Circunscripciones Transitorias Especiales de Paz) as a way to promote political representation in the congress of the areas affected by the conflict. These electoral districts would also allow the election of candidates to the Chamber of Representatives for two periods (2018 and 2022), to represent the 167 municipalities most affected by violence and conflict, from a list of social organisations, citizen movements, indigenous areas or areas with inhabitants of African descent. However, during the fast-­track process the bills on these electoral districts were strongly attacked by the Democratic Centre, the conservatives and even parties that were part of Santos’ coalition, such as Cambio Radical; thus it was not possible to obtain congressional approval.33 It could be said that the reforms impacted on the personal and group interests of these parties, even more than did the demobilising of FARC troops or the participation of its commanders in the Congress. Although some of these reforms have been introduced again to the new Congress elected in 2018, they were rejected again, leaving them with no real possibility of being approved. A recent report by the Kroc Institute (Kroc, 2018) on the state of implementation of the peace agreement shows that the point on political participation is one of the least advanced of all (67% of non-­initiated implementation). On the one hand, there have been some advances in the approval of legislation with regard to the statute of political opposition, security and protection for the exercise of politics, the commission for the protection of social leaders, the commission for citizen participation and guarantees for social protest, the National Council for Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence and some recommendations to the electoral commission. On the other, there have been delays in the development of other regulations needed for the actual implementation in these laws with regard to the law for citizenship participation, guarantees for social protest, the electoral political reform, the electoral districts; as well as a difficult security situation in some areas where the FARC used to operate,34 which trickles down to killing and threats against social leaders and FARC ex-­combatants. However, all these mechanisms provide a wide array of areas and activities that could be included by the ARN in its mission and practice with regard to the development and strengthening of citizenship that benefit both the ex-­ combatants and the communities. Individual development of citizenship The reintegration programmes in Colombia already have broad experience in the development of citizenship at the individual level. For instance, the PRVC designed a training course called Module Zero to provide citizenship education35 and assist the demobilised in understanding and complying with both general bureaucratic procedures and basic rules for coexistence (OACP/ACR, 2010). Module Zero informed the ex-­combatants about the services available to them, while also introducing them to topics such as democratic participation, everyday life in the city and peaceful conflict resolution (ACR, 2011; CONPES 3554,

156   Political reintegration 2008; OACP/ACR, 2010). Similarly, the PAPDRB incorporated activities to welcome the ex-­combatants as new citizens, including a sightseeing tour around Bogotá and a symbolic oath of commitment to the city.36 By the same token, the ACR assumed the task of providing courses to inform and train ex-­combatants in the mechanisms of citizen participation, accountability and control37 and to encourage the exercising of active citizenship (ACR, 2011; CONPES 3607, 2009; OACP/ACR, 2010). The syllabus of the psychological workshops therefore featured knowledge of and practice in citizenship rights and duties38: They know that here the benefits are the same for everybody. And if someone thinks that we are not providing a good service, that we are failing them, who feels that the State is not … [I tell them]: “Guys, even if I am sacked, it does not matter, make use of the mechanisms of participation that we have studied in class.” […] Because it would be wrong, if a person demobilises, […] that now you are a Colombian citizen and I deny your citizen rights. [I tell them]: “Those are the rights that you acquired or recovered after the demobilisation: use them, apply them”. And in fact some of them have filed complaints.39 Thus, the ACR reintegration programme facilitated access to democratic mechanisms in two ways: on the one hand, improving their literacy and education skills has eased the ex-­combatant’s transition into recognising, understanding and using the appropiate mechanisms for participation and accountability. On the other, compulsory courses and training in citizenship encouraged the demobilised to know their rights as well as their duties, while at the same time providing those material and cognitive resources needed to properly participate in democracy. Some of the reintegration officers interviewed for Uribe’s DDR highlighted the change they witnessed in the behaviour of the demobilised. At the beginning of the process, for example, resorting to verbal aggression and threats was a common occurrence among the ex-­combatants. Yet these behaviours were progressively replaced by the alternatives that were emphasised by the tutors in the workshops.40 Moreover, the tutors recognised the ability of the demobilised to use legally established mechanisms to present complaints as a positive indicator of their advancement in the reintegration process41: There has been a lot of progress. Before, a participant used to come here, kicking, shouting, and threatening to break the computer because: “I haven’t been served”. Now the participant says: “I will call customer services and file a complaint”. Or they write down a complaint in the office. For me that’s nice, because it has been worth it. At this stage of the process, to have participants who I’ve found out have called and made a complaint against me, that’s nice. […] They know that it’s through communication, through other institutions […]. Nowadays, they threaten you to go to the

Political reintegration   157 Ombudsman. But it is nice when they say “I am going to the Ombudsman” rather than “I’m gonna break your a … and I will shoot you three times”.42 I used to be aggressive, very aggressive and I solved everything [by] shouting. But now … I had a tutor last year who helped me with calming down. Now I am transformed completely […] I used to tell her my problems, that I used to blow up really quickly and then I wanted to kill someone. I looked for her advice and she told me: “when you have those problems, count from 1 to 10”. And I do so. I can’t recognise myself.43 Similarly, in Medellín, Peace and Reconciliation also approached behavioural education in the CEPAR. Aside from providing adult education, the teachers also played a vital role in creating environments that re-­signified the reintegration process and subsequently led to the acceptance of basic coexistence rules and new authority figures. The CEPAR also instigated the role of coexistence officer, whose responsibility was to deal with any coexistence problems by enacting and enforcing a new system of protocols (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011): Saying that the people inside the armed groups had no rules is inaccurate. The people who belonged to the armed groups had rules and hierarchies. The role of the CEPAR is to introduce respect and communication into the relationships and regulations of a group, renouncing the use of the force. (Alcaldía de Medellín, 2011) As described in Chapter 3, during the demobilisation and reinsertion phases, maintaining a sense of vertical hierarchy was crucial to avoiding a disorganised demobilisation or mass desertions. Similarly, as witnessed in the case of Corporation Democracy, the control exercised by the paramilitary leaders was key to maintaining discipline among the ex-­combatants, and to forcing them to attend workshops in the early stages of the DDR process. However, the leaders progressively relinquished these powers of leadership, and their control over their former troops faded away.44 Nonetheless, in the beginning, the reintegration officers had little choice but to work within, rather than against, these entrenched hierarchies in order to transform them: It was like that in the small towns. When I arrived there was nobody [in the classroom]. Then the commander phoned them: “Miss […] is here, you all have to come here”. Then I had to work with the commander and tell him: “I am the psychosocial worker here, so I am the one that has to call them. I am the person that draws the boundaries … although you can help by bringing them to the workshops”. One had to use them as leaders, at the beginning it had to be like that, but different from [the leadership] they were used to. That leadership had to be understood from another point of view.45

158   Political reintegration When asking the reintegration officers about the methods they employed in their attempts to break down the existing hierarchies, they claimed that they were strict in respect of basic rules and the egalitarian treatment of all ex-­ combatants, regardless of their previous armed group or ranking46: Q: How have you achieved the change of hierarchies? R: It is [achieved] through interacting with them and by understanding the other person as equal […]. For instance, in the workshops they have to interact with anybody, with whoever they have to, as in everyday life. And we work with that: before they used to respect because there was a commander, [from whom] they received orders. Now they need to respect because there is a norm. It is not only one person but the voices of many that are telling you that things should not be like that.47 What you have to do is to unify those behaviours. Here at CEPAR nobody is paramilitary, guerrilla or victim. Here all are students and there is a manual for coexistence. You have to follow it […] the rule is for one and for all. So here we try to homogenise discipline: no one will impose things on their group […]. It really helps, to homogenise. In the end the teachers know that there are some particularities within the population, but that cannot constitute a benchmark to give to the class or to deal with the group or to talk to them.48 To give a further example, initially the CEPAR in Medellín had to schedule separate days for providing educational services to each group – guerrillas, paramilitary, victims of violence and vulnerable groups – in an effort to avoid conflicts. Then, at a later date, the groups were mixed together, forcing the ex-­combatants from different groups to coexist and interact with other civilians. As a result of this approach, social links emerged spontaneously between them.49 It is equally worth remembering that the taskforce of the PAPDBR also mixed together ex-­combatants, from guerrillas and paramilitaries alike, as part of their daily activities. Thus, the ex-­combatants themselves view progress through the process, as a product of personal effort or commitment, rather than it being associated with privileges for a specific group: We are all equal, all of us have the right to study. There are people who have finished primary school, then high school, and then obtained their degree as technicians. They completed three processes. Some others haven’t finished primary or high school. […] Those that made progress are people who took advantage of the process, the Business Plan, all that. Since the beginning we have been committed to this, we have studied. More importantly, [we don’t] to get in troubles again, we walk the line.50 Therefore, if breaking the military hierarchies is one of the main aims of a DDR process, there is also much potential for DDR programmes to introduce the combatants to new democratic structures. This, by opening up access and interpretive mechanisms to the demobilised population, extending the rights

Political reintegration   159 of citizenship to those that have lost, or have never had, a positive political relationship with the Colombian state. The equality of citizen rights inherently defines the role of a person with regard to the wider political order. Arguably, during war, being able to differentiate between friends and foes, loyalists and traitors, is a matter of life and death; likewise, maintaining a military hierarchy is essential to the survival of the group and of each of its members. However, once war comes to an end and the armies are dismantled, this polarisation loses its critical function and the differences between armed groups, or between military hierarchies, become blurred. Thus, the institutional effort to minimise the differences among ex-­combatants, and between them and other citizens, resulted in the forging of social links on two important levels. On one level, it reified their relationship with the Colombian state as the provider of services and opportunities otherwise inaccessible in their condition as peasants or as combatants. On the other, their nascent equality is born out of the creation of a social fabric that binds them together with other people, with whom they might share the status of equal citizens. Therefore, a reintegration programme can establish or resurrect links between national institutions and ex-­combatants, achieved through the systematic training of the demobilised in the use of public services and participatory mechanisms that were unknown or inaccessible to them while serving within the military structure. Additionally, the programme may introduce the demobilised to new social and political roles resulting in the development of new social and political behaviours in which the use of violence is no longer accepted or tolerated.

Conclusion This chapter has evaluated the different pathways for political reintegration. The transformation of the paramilitary groups into political parties failed for a variety of reasons: first, their incapacity to consolidate a political proposition; second, the continuation of criminal activities and the internecine power struggles that followed; third, high levels of rejection at the national and international level; and, finally, the action of the judicial system in blocking their promised amnesty, and the subsequent extradition of their leaders. Hence, despite the infiltration of paramilitary leaders into the political system and its democratic institutions, their attempts to become politicians were doomed to fail in the long term. The FARC is just beginning their activity in politics; however, they are already facing numerous problems, including a low level of popularity among the voters; the legal situation of its members remains unsolved, in particular the former commanders are still facing trials on the JEP transitional system, and their extradition request by the US. Besides, there are security threats and personal attacks on its members, especially those who are more visible. In this context, the state institutions, in particular the ANR, may also contribute to the development of citizenship through the enabling of access and interpretive democratic mechanisms (Söderström, 2011). This, in two ways: on

160   Political reintegration the one hand, in the contribution to the integration into its mission and practice of the political participation point established by the New Final Agreement; on the other, in strengthening the access and resignification of the democratic mechanisms already in place. The literature on DDR has understood the political reintegration of former combatants in the light of a social contract, which implies the creation of institutions that reinforce the rule of law, and of moral codes and a common identity. If the ultimate objective of the DDR is to transform combatants into citizens, the inculcation of a political subjectivity needs no longer to be ignored. The existence, or building, of democratic institutions, with which the ex-­ combatants can interact, and their equality of rights with their fellow citizens, are of the utmost importance in socialising the demoblised into the democratic system. This process of integration also coincides with the development of behaviours more suitable to democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, rather than placing the responsibility of reintegration wholly on the shoulders of the ex-­combatants or their recipient communities, the ARN and the other reintegration institutions may integrate mechanisms for the development, on the part of ex-­combatants, of a political identity as citizens.

Notes   1 Ralito Pact, signed on 23 July 2001. This differs from the Ralito Agreement that was signed two years later.   2 Chivolo Pact, signed on 28 September 2000. Pivijay Pact, made in November 2001.   3 As they were dealing with rather unreliable partners, some of the paramilitaries made politicians sign deals that were later leaked to the public. El Espectador, 27 December 2012; Meridiano 1 July 2013.   4 In calculating the probability of a political party being involved in para-­politics, Lopez found that the traditional Liberal and Conservative Parties had a 22% risk, while other parties such as Coalición Uribista had 50%, Movimiento Colombia Viva 200%, Colombia Democratica 133%, Covergencia Ciudadana 71%, Alas 60%, Cambio Radical 53% and Pin 89% (this latter was calculated only for 2010).   5 Semana, 11 September 2005.   6 In Spanish the term is “votaciones atípicas”, first coined by Semana, 11 September 2005.   7 This study analyses data from 1991 to 2006.   8 Semana, 29 July 2002.   9 Interview in Semana, 18 April 2005. 10 Jairo Angarita and Giovanni Marín. Marín participated in the political campaign of congresswoman Rocio Arias. 11 Semana 12 February 2006. 12 Semana 1 December 2006. 13 Semana 28 July 2008. 14 Sentences from the Constitutional Court C-­531 12 July 2006; C-­127 22/02/2006. Sentence C-­370/2006 18/05/2006 that modifies the paragraph 71 among others. CONPES 3554, p. 5; OACP/ACR, 2010, p. 86. 15 Decree 395/2007. 16 Sentence C-­1153/05. 17 Between 2002 and 2010, 1,221 people were extradited, 93 per cent of them to the US (CEJ, 2011).

Political reintegration   161 18 Letter from Carlos Castaño to the Red Cross International Committee, the Commission of National Reconciliation and Cambio 16 Journal. In Observatorio para la Paz (2002). Annex 22: 326–341. 19 Carlos Alonso Lucio, in the proceedings of the Forum Paramilitarism and Politics. 21 September 2005: 43. www.pnud.org.co/img_upload/9056f18133669868e1cc381983d5 0faa/foro_paramilitarismo_y_pol%C3%ADtica.pdf. 20 FARC’s first congress, 26 August to 1 September 2017. 21 Interview 9. Montañita. 22 Interview 8. Montañita. 23 Public letter, second congress, 31 August to 1 and 2 September 2017. 24 Comunicado: Anuncio de candidaturas 2018. www.farc-­ep.co/comunicado/comunicado-­ anuncio-de-­candidaturas-farc.html; El Espectador. La Farc amplía su lista de candidatos al Congreso y va por lista cerrada, 9 December, 2017. https://colombia2020.elespectador. com/politica/la-­farc-amplia-­su-lista-­de-candidatos-­al-congreso-­y-va-­por-lista-­cerrada. 25 Semana. Cómo les fue a las FARc en las urnas? 11 March 2018. 26 www.elespectador.com/elecciones-­2018/noticias/politica/el-­viacrucis-electoral-­de-la-­ farc-articulo-­743842. 27 www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-­de-paz/ataques-­a-miembros-­del-partido-­politicofarc-­en-campana-­politica-174414. 28 Ataque a sede de campaña política del partido Farc en Chocó, 24 January 2018. www.farc-­ep.co/comunicado/ataque-­a-sede-­de-campana-­politica-del-­partido-farc-­enchoco.html. 29 www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-­de-paz/ataques-­a-miembros-­del-partido-­politicofarc-­en-campana-­politica-174414. 30 FIP report July 2018. 31 Public letter, second congress, 31 August to 1 and 2 September 2017. 32 Jorge Torres Victoria (Pablo Catatumbo), Judith Simanca (Victoria Sandino), Julian Gallo Cubillos (Carlos Antonio Lozada) and Criselda Lobo Silva (Sandra Ramírez) in the Senate; Omar de Jesús Restrepo (Olmedo Ruíz), Luis Alberto Albán Urbano (Marcoleón Calarcá o Marcos Calarcá), Reinaldo Cala (Jairo Quintero) and Sergio Marín in the Chamber of Representatives. 33 Viva la Ciudadanía Report, 21 August 2018. 34 Chocó, Cauca, Nariño, Guaviare, Putumayo, Córdoba, Valle del Cauca, Antioquia (Bajo Cauca and Urabá) and Norte de Santander. 35 Resolution 513/2005, Articles 15–16. 36 Interview Villamizar, 15 May 2012. 37 These include the Ombudsman’s Office, the General Inspector’s Office and other control institutions that have been created over the last 30 years. 38 Reintegration Officers 20, 27, 47, 90, 94, 95, 97, 120, 116, 117, 141, 143, 146, 149, 157. 39 Reintegration Officers No. 75–77. 40 ‘Tutelas’ and ‘Derechos de petición’, in particular, are mechanisms available to any citizen, consisting of filing requests or complaints against public institutions. Reintegration Officers No. 75–77, 95, 128, 129, 143, 147, 159. 41 Reintegration Officer No. 75–77, 117, 154. 42 Reintegration Officer No. 117. 43 Interview demobilised No. 13. 44 Reintegration Officer No. 66. 45 Reintegration Officer No. 146. 46 Reintegration Officers No. 47, 49–51, 54, 66, 73, 75–77, 94, 106, 116, 120, 146. 47 Reintegration Officer No. 94. 48 Reintegration Officer No. 54. 49 Group Interview teachers CEPAR. 50 Interview ex-­combatant No. 21.

162   Political reintegration

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Political reintegration   163 Kroc (2018). State of implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement. Report Two. 1 December 1 2016 to 31 May 2018. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame. López, C. (2010). La refundación de la patria, de la teoría a la evidencia. In: C. López (ed.), Y refundaron la Patria. De cómo mafiosos y politicos reconfiguraron el Estado Colombiano (pp. 29–79). Bogotá: Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, Random House Mondadori. López, C., and Sevillano, O. (2008). Balance politico de la parapolítica. Revista Arcanos, 14, 67–87. Magnette, P. (2005). Citizenship: The History of an Idea. Colchester: ECPR Press. McMullin, J. (2013). Ex-­Combatants and the Post-­Conflict State. New York: Palgrave ­Macmillan. Mitton, K. (2012). Irrational actors and the process of brutalisation: Understanding atrocity in the Sierra Leonean conflict (1991–2002). Civil Wars, 14(1), 104–122. https:// doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2012.654691. OACP/ACR (2010, 14 July). Desarme, desmovilización y reintegración – DDR en Colombia. Lecciones aprendidas y resultados del proceso 2002–2010. Alto Comisionado para la Paz, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz. ODDR (2009). Las formas organizativas y asociativas de desmovilizados (FOAD) en Colombia. Observatorio de procesos de desarme, desmovilización y reintegración. Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Available at www.observatorioddr.unal.edu.co. Özerdem, A. (2009). Post-­war Recovery: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. London: I. B. Tauris. Özerdem, A. (2012). A re-­conceptualisation of ex-­combatant reintegration: ‘social reintegration’ approach. Conflict, Security & Development, 12(1), 51–73. https://doi.org /10.1080/14678802.2012.667661. Pardo, R. (2007). Fin del Paramilitarismo: Es Posible su Desmonte? Bogotá: Ediciones B. PDS (2009). Security promotion in fragile states: Can local meet national? Exploring the connections between community security and disarmarment, demobilization and reintegration. Peace Security and Development Network. Rousseau, J. (1923). The Social Contract and Discourses. London: J. M. Dent and Sons. Schulhofer-­Wohl, J., and Sambanis, N. (2010). Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs: An assessment (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 1906329). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1906329. Söderström, J. (2011). Politics of Affection: Ex-­Combatants, Political Engagement and Reintegration Programs in Liberia. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. http://uu. diva-­portal.org/smash/get/diva2:451598/PREVIEW01.jpg. Tilly, C. (1996). Citizenship, Identity and Social History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Turner, B. (2000). Contemporary problems in the theory of citizenship. In: Citizenship and Social Theory (pp. 1–18). London: Sage. UNDP (2006). Integrated demobilization, disarmament and reintegration standards. United Nations. http://unddr.org/. UNDP (2011). Human development report. Colombia 2011. Colombia rural. Razones para la esperanza. United Nations. hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-­Profiles/ COL.pdf. Ungar, E., and Cardona, J. (2010). Hubo una bancada parapolítica? In: C. López (ed.), Y Refundaron la Patria: De Cómo Mafiosos y Politicos Reconfiguraron el Estado Colombiano. Bogotá: Corporación Nuevo Arcoiris, Random House Mondadori.

Conclusion

The literature and practice on DDR tend to be understood as a technocratic task by multilateral organisations. However, this research has shown that DDR design and implementation are political in nature: on the one hand, in the negotiation of peace settlements the capacity to mobilise or demobilise large numbers of troops lies at the heart of the warlord’s bargaining power; on the other, the interplay between multiple subnational, national and international political agendas defines the terms of the agreements and may impose changes and restrictions in its implementation. The continuous process of creating and demobilising armed groups has been a pivotal part in the building of the Colombian state: although the peace settlements and amnesties have brought renewed cycles of violence, they have also been key in the negotiation of citizenship rights for both the ex-­combatants and wider sectors of the population. Thus, this research has made an effort to understand the ex-­combatants not as a security risk nor assuming a tendency to return to their groups or to criminality, but in their potential to contribute to development and reconstruction in post-­conflict settings. In order to do so, it has explored the difficulties, challenges and security dilemmas combatants may face in integrating into a post-­conflict society. The first chapter made a brief historical account of four large peace processes and amnesties that took place in the twentieth century, focusing on the peace settlements and the petitions made by the rebels for their demobilisation and disarmament: first, the peace settlements of the civil wars between the Liberal and the Conservative Parties (the Thousand Days War and La Violencia), that defined the shape of the modern Colombian state and resulted in political stability but also limited political participation to only two political parties; second, the origins of the guerrilla groups and the two amnesties that achieved the demobilisation of the liberal guerrillas but also strengthened the communist ones; third, the peace processes in the 1990s that were successful in demobilising seven leftist guerrilla groups and achieved political openness, although these changes in the balance of power at the local level contributed to the creation of paramilitary groups. The rebels have had a main role in modernisation and the process of state-­ building. Yet, each time, the relapse into war did not depend on the successful or massive demobilisation and reintegration of ex-­combatants; rather, there

Conclusion   165 were other elements that contributed to the continuation of the conflict, such as: repression and violence from the government itself; the failure of the government to pursue development programmes, as well as to extend democracy and citizenship rights to the general population; the reaction of local powers to changes in the balance of power; and the introduction of illegal economies, i.e. drug-­trafficking. As Villarraga has argued, the amnesties and giving up of weapons can be part of the dynamics of war rather than an end to it. The rebel groups may demobilise because they have reached a point of exhaustion; or because of the realisation by the commanders of the impossibility of winning the war or of the fear that it will increases beyond their control. Thus, it is the political leaders that may take the decision to reignite or to halt the violence, despite the ex-combatant’s personal preferences. With regard to the demobilised, their reintegration should take into account two elements: on the one hand, the situation of the ex-­combatants depends on the ability or willingness of the commanders to negotiate benefits for their troops. On the other, the individual benefits for the rank-­and-file troops seem to have less impact on the relapse into conflict than the improvement of the general social and economic conditions, in particular in the rural areas. In Colombia, the rehabilitation and development plans that were promised by the government for the development of conflict-­affected areas never came to fruition. As a result, structural problems remain to this day: lack of provision of basic services for the rural population (education, health, road infrastructure); restrictions on democracy (participation in powers structures and freedom of assembly and mobilisation of civil movements); unequal access to economic development, in particular on land distribution and in the agricultural sector; and lack of representation in congress and other decision-­making structures for vulnerable populations. The second chapter compared Uribe’s DDR and the FARC-­Santos DDR in their different emphases on security or development, which in turn defined who to target with reintegration benefits. The DDR literature needs to further take into account that reintegration benefits are linked to the rationale behind the negotiations of the leaders of the warring factions, in two ways: the power to decide who is included or excluded from demobilised status and the salience of judicial benefits over economic ones. It is also worth noting that the peace talks and settlements, inevitably, create differences with regard to the treatment of the leaders and the troops, which, in the Colombian case, were defined along the lines of those who can be accused (guilty or not) of grave crimes and crimes against international humanitarian law, as well as those involved in drug-­ trafficking. Remarkably, DDR programmes play no part in the definition of the targeted population; thus their design is the result of bargaining during the peace settlement. Uribe’s DDR was part of his Policy of Defence and Democratic Security, with two main strategies: the negotiation and collective demobilisation of paramilitary groups and the individual demobilisation of guerrilla deserters. For the

166   Conclusion former, the negotiations revolved around the political status of the paramilitary leaders, hence the criteria for obtaining demobilised status were relaxed to include drug-­lords seeking judicial advantages. For the latter, the individual demobilisations were designed as a counterinsurgency strategy in order to encourage desertion and intelligence-­gathering against the guerrillas. In both cases, the demobilisation of troops was instrumentalised by the leaders while reintegration of rank-­and-file fighters and development for the wider communities were neglected. By the way of contrast, the FARC-­Santos peace negotiation revolved around democracy and development (rural reform, political participation, the solution to the drugs problem and the treatment of the victims of the armed conflict). Thus, the benefits for former guerrillas are linked to the communities in two main ways: on the one hand, in the development programmes that benefit the territories affected by violence and abandoned by the estate; on the other, in the business projects for the ex-­combatants that are designed to be implemented with the participation of the community. Thus, the FARC has started the creation of a cooperative of communal businesses based on solidarity work known as Social Economies of the Commons (ECOMUN), which the former combatants could join and in which they could invest money for business projects, to benefit both the ex-­combatants and the communities. The third chapter analyses the social reintegration of the ex-­combatants, and concludes that DDR programmes may play a major role in the fostering of new social and political interactions to replace those social and political relations that are destroyed along with the dismantling of the military structure. This, on two levels: on the one hand, to contribute in the creation of social tissue between the ex-­combatants and the communities; on the other, in the creation of links between the ex-­combatants and the communities and the state. Additionally, it was found that two types of organisations may take part in the social reintegration of ex-­combatants: the programmes developed by the government, and the ex-­combatant’s organisations and NGOs. For the demobilisation of guerrilla groups in the 1990s the reincorporation programmes were part of broader development policies, while the ex-­combatants NGOs were an active part in the implementation of these policies, in particular through their work with communities in reconciliation activities and pedagogy about political openness and the extension of democracy. However, during Uribe’s DDR, the NGO formed by the paramilitary leaders was instead instrumentalised for the continuation of the hierarchy and power of drug-­traffickers. In regard to the programmes developed by the government, the social reintegration was pursued through strategies for the acceptance of the demobilised within the communities. The ACR took into account the needs of communities, either by also providing them with services or by offering workshops and activities tailored to reconciliation. Currently, the ARN is working in tandem with FARC representatives in the development of social and economic projects that aim to benefit not only former combatants but also nearby communities. However, it could also be concluded that workshops and other forms

Conclusion   167 of isolated activities tend not to be effective, while activities where the ex-­ combatants and the communities work together for mutual benefit, seem more helpful. Nevertheless, more than expecting a continuation of their social links with the armed group, many ex-­combatants may prefer their individual reintegration into the society. They may refrain from continuing with the collective project because of their negative memories and exhaustion as a result of the war and military order, or as a result of dissent from the group’s ideology and dynamics. For them, the creation of social relations plays a main role in the reintegration experience: first and foremost, the creation, or restoration, of family links provides mental and emotional stability. Second, the reintegration institutions can address the former combatants as part of their social environment, rather than as isolated individuals. On the one hand, the reintegration bureaucracy may go beyond the technocratic role to help the demobilised in the creation of social tissue and in facilitating channels of communication at various levels: between the ex-­combatants and the authorities, as well as among authorities (national and subnational or central and regional offices). On the other, the reintegration institutions can address the rejection of the demobilised, in particular with regard to the negative impact of the difficulty in obtaining employment. It is important to understand that this rejection does not necessarily come from the direct victims of violence or the immediate communities, but from other sectors of society that have not necessarily had direct contact with them. Chapter 4 focused on the economic reintegration of the demobilised and four strategies for economic reintegration. First, the provision of basic education, as the majority of the demobilised present with profound educational shortcomings. However, this strategy does not necessarily result in long-­term or formal employment, as the ex-­combatants lack knowledge of, or experience in, accessing formal employment within the legal economy and their lack of social capital has a negative effect on their capacity to present references or to certify the formal training required to compete in a normal job-­selection process. Second, it was concluded that the effectiveness of short-­term aid for reinsertion immediately after the demobilisation (cash handouts and monthly allowances) does not reside in its amount or frequency, but on how these stimuli are used as a tool for facilitating and encouraging active participation in reintegration or reincorporation activities. Thus, the DDR programmes may contribute to the development of strategies and counselling for the establishment of personal plans for the economic future of each demobilised ex-­combatant. Conversely, the singular provision of economic aid proves insufficient and even counter-­productive to reintegration in the absence of policies or programmes that define goals and limits for the demobilised. Third, the short-­term aid may lay the foundations for the ex-­combatant’s progressive economic independence in the long term. Three main strategies were identified to provide training and work experience to the demobilised: vocational training, employability schemes and business projects. With regard to employability, there are frequent problems in relation to the rejection and

168   Conclusion redundancy of the demobilised; while the success of business projects is rather limited: independent business are difficult to pitch and maintain even for people who are not demobilised and the projects may also fail due to reckless management or problems among those associated with them. More importantly, there is a strong preference among the demobilised for pursuing agricultural enterprises, due to the peasant background of many of them. However, these businesses have to face the problems inherent in the land issue, which has never been solved in Colombia: high levels of land concentration, lack of development in the rural areas, lack of an agrarian policy that helps the peasantry, and long-­ term investments with low profit return. In particular for the FARC, the initiatives for obtaining land for the productive projects have been blocked and President Duque has shown unwillingness to provide money for the business projects. Finally, with regard to the private sector, it was shown that the reintegration institutions have made considerable efforts to open the possibility of obtaining formal jobs within established companies through a variety of strategies such as the inclusion of the demobilised within corporate responsibility programmes. However, the results are rather paltry, this due to several reasons: uncoordinated requests and proposals from various sections of the government; the preference of companies to help other vulnerable sections of society, such as the victims; fear or rejection of the demobilised; and fear of competition by the new companies formed by the demobilised. All these factors have a negative impact on the economic outlook of ex-­ combatants, who tend to be unemployed or work in low-­income and informal jobs. In addition, their unresolved legal status – due to the delay in amnesties or in the legal processes of transitional justice, or the lack of identification and other legal documents, and bureaucratic delays in starting economic strategies – becomes yet another impediment for them in finding long-­term jobs beyond the provision of state aid. However, this situation does not necessarily lead them to recidivism. Although the economic incentives that criminality offers are much higher than the aid offered by the government or the income ex-­combatants are likely to obtain in their civilian jobs, for many of the demobilised the economic stimulus have lost its value in the face of the negative experiences they had during the war and the family links they have forged since leaving the armed group. The fifth chapter analysed the difficulties of ex-­combatants in the creation and maintenance of a political party. During Uribe’s DDR the paramilitary commanders tried to maintain their political influence and power through the transition into legal forces. However, they failed, for a variety of reasons, including their incapacity to consolidate a political proposition beyond their military structure; the continuation of criminal activities and the internecine power struggles in which the main political leaders were killed; high levels of rejection at the national and international level; and the blocking of the unconditional amnesty by judicial powers, which in turn led to the extradition of the commanders involved in drug-­trafficking.

Conclusion   169 With regard to the FARC, its transition from being a guerrilla group to becoming a political party has also faced difficulties: a low level of popularity among the voters, security threats and personal attacks on its members, the unresolved legal situations of its commanders who face trial in the JEP transitional system; and the US extradition request, which can also be used by the political opposition to attack the peace settlement as a whole. In any case, the transformation of an illegal army into a legal political entity is by no means straightforward and, at least in the Colombian case, the political parties’ aim of the demobilisation of armed groups tended to be doomed to failure, with the exception of isolated former commanders who continued with political activity. Therefore, DDR programmes may address political reintegration through strategies for citizenship-­building, either by supporting the creation of democratic institutions and practices, or at the individual level: on the one hand, DDR programmes may develop strategies for training the demobilised in the use of public services and participatory mechanisms that were unknown or inaccessible to them during their time involved in the conflict; on the other, the programme may introduce the demobilised to new social and political roles resulting in the development of new social and political behaviours in which the use of violence is no longer accepted or tolerated.

Index

ACDEGAM 47 Acosta, Henry 73 Alternative Penalty Bill 64 Arias, Rocío 150 Armed Movement Quintín Lame (MAQL) 43, 45–46 Aronson, Bernard 11 Benirdom Agreement 36 Benitez, Orlando 67 Betancur, Belisario 43, 45 Betancourt, Ingrid 60 bureaucracy 102, 106, 113–114; see also reintegration Cacica Gaitana Front 9, 68 Cacique Nutibara Bloc 65, 68, 98–100 Caguán, San Vicente de El 59–60 Carlarcá, Marcos 74 Castaño, Carlos 44, 48, 62, 149; dead 65 Castaño, Vicente 63, 68 cease of hostilities 74, 78 Chile, government 11 Chinácota Treaty 25, 34 Circunscripción: Circunscripción Especial de Paz 45; Circunscripción Nacional y Territorial 45; Circunscripciones Transitorias de Paz 78, 155; Thousand Days War 34 citizenship 3, 7, 147, 153–159 Colombian Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN) 12, 81, 95, 102, 107–108, 113, 114, 127, 135 Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR) 10, 12, 100–102, 104, 106–107, 113, 114, 125, 127, 131–135, 156 Colombian Army 11 Columnas en Marcha 40 Comando de Pacificación 36

Commission for the Following, Impulse and Verification of the Final Agreement 12 Communal Action Boards 44, 45 Communist Party 35, 39–40 Conservative Party 24, 34–37 Corporation Democracy 98–100, 150, 157 criminality 4, 6 Cuba government 11, 74, 131 De La Calle, Humberto 74 demobilisation 82–83: collective 8, 62–69, 98; children 64, 79; individual 8, 69–73, 98 Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR): combatant-based 56, 82; community-based 56, 81, 82; development-oriented 56–59, 81, 82; institutions 94; International Standards 1, 56, 95; maximalist approach 56–57; minimalist approach 56–57; process 3; programmes 1, 4, 94; security-oriented DDR 56–59, 82 Democratic Centre Party 75, 77, 80, 151, 155 democratic institutions 3, 5, 7–8 Don Berna 65, 67, 100; see also Cacique Nutibara Bloc drugs problem 78, 81 Duque, Iván 77 ECOMUN, Social Economies of the Commons 81, 103, 127–129, 131, 133–136 Eder, Alejandro 74 education 124–127, 139; vocational training 130 Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 9, 13, 42, 47, 109

Index   171 Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) 42, 45, 47 Ernesto Rojas Command 45 extradition 61–62, 66, 68, 81, 82, 111, 150 false positives 79 FARC 4, 11, 59, 74, 102, 109, 136; Party 151–153; victims 76, 136 FARC-Santos DDR 4, 47, 73–82, 102–104, 107–108, 109, 111, 125, 127–129, 133–136, 137 fast track 11, 76–77 Final Agreement, Cartagena 75 Frente Francisco Garnica 45, 98 Frente Nacional 36, 40–41 Fundación Colombiana de Ex Combatientes y Promotores de Paz (FUCEPAZ) 107 Gaitán, Jorge Eliecer 35 Gaviria, César 95–98 Gómez, Laureano 36 Granda, Rodrigo 74 guerrillas 8, 38–42, 42–48; communist 38–42; liberal 41; see also FARC Guevarist Revolutionary Army 9 Humanicemos DIH 107 inde­pendent republics 40, 42 Independent Revolutionary Movement Armed Commands (MIR-COAR) 43, 45–46, 98, 99 inequality 7, 158–159 Institute for Colonization and Migration 38 Integral Rural Reform 77 international cooperation 9, 22, 60, 94–95, 105, 124, 126 International Criminal Court 9, 63, 68 Jaramillo, Sergio 74, 77, 78, 80–81; see also Peace Commissioner Office JEP 80, 108, 134 La Ceja Agreement 65 La Habana, dialogues 10, 74, 78, 108; negotiation agenda 11 La Uribe Agreement 43 La Violencia 35–36 land allocation 135–136 land reform 7; see also land allocation Law 1424 of 2011 9, 10, 106 Law 782 of 2002 9, 10, 63, 67

Law 975 of 2005 9, 63, 67, 80, 150 Liberal Party 25, 34–37; MRL 41, 73 liberal peace, criticism 1, 2, 121 Lleras Camargo, Alberto 40, 41 Londoño, Rodrigo 74, 111 López Pumarejo, Alfonso 36 López, Severo Antonio, aka Job 150 M-19 43, 45–46, 97 Mancuso, Salvatore 62, 66, 149 MAPAZ 101 Marquetalia 42 Marquez, Iván 74, 82 Ministry of Defence 10, 69, 72; Humanitarian Assistance to the Demobilised (PAHD) 69 Ministry of the Interior and Justice 70, 72, 98 Mora, Army General Jorge 74 Naranjo, Police General Oscar 74 National Council for Nor­malisation (NCN) 46, 95, 97 National Council for Reincorporation 12, 97–98, 103 National Movement of Demobilised SelfDefences 149–150 National Plan for Rehabilitation (NPR) 95, 98 National Policy of Social and Economic Reintegration (PRSE) 10, 102 Neerlandia Treaty 25, 34 New Final Agreement 11, 76, 103, 126, 127, 131, 136, 151, 153, 153–155, 160 New Pact for the Consolidation of the Peace Process 97 NGOs, demobilised and ex-combatants 46, 95, 97–98, 102–104 Norway government 11, 74; Oslo 10 Operative Committee to Laying Down Arms (CODA) 72 Ordoñez, Alejandro 76, 80, 151 paramilitary: groups 8, 36, 48, 62, 147; negotiation 8, 10, 64, 82–83 para-politics 48, 147–151 París, Andrés 74 Pastrana, Andrés 59, 75, 76, 80 Pastrana, Misael 43 Patriotic Union 44, 48 Peace and Reconciliation 10, 99–100, 101, 104, 130, 131, 157–158 Peace Commissioner Office 8, 64, 66, 68, 70

172   Index peace settlement 4 peace-building 1, 22; missions 57 Pearl, Frank 74 Peasant Self-Defence of Ortega 65 Plan Colombia 60–61, 70 Plan Patriota 60–61 plebiscite 75–76 Policy of Defence and Democratic Security 8, 60–61, 70, 72 political participation 7, 78, 153–155 Presidential Programme for Reinsertion 95, 98 private sector 131–133 Programme of Reincorporation to the Civil Life (PRVC) 10, 72, 98, 131, 155 Programme of Services to the Process of Demobilisation and Reintegration in Bogotá (PAPDRB) 10, 100, 104, 125, 130, 131, 156–158 Project on Educa­tion for Peace and Democracy 98 Ralito Agreement 65–66, 99 Ralito Pact 147 Ramírez, Marta Lucía 76, 80, 151 recidivism 137–138 rehabilitation: Rojas 36; Office of Rehabilitation and Aid 38, 39 reincorporation 12, 79, 95, 97, 102–103; early 107 reintegration: economic 97, 121–139; in the 1990s 95–98, 114; failed 6, 93, 147–150; social 93–120, 139; political 147–163; Rojas 38; Thousand Days War 34 remobilisation 12 Return to Legality 101 Revolución en Marcha 35 Revolutionary Worker’s Party (PRT) 43, 45–47 Rojas Pinilla, Gustavo 36, 38–40, 42–43 Santos, Juan Manuel 4, 10, 72, 75–76, 78

Santrich, Jesús 82 security: dilemma 4; national 7; risk 4, 5–8, 121–123, 146 self-defence: liberal 36; communist 38; see also paramilitary Soberany Operation 42 social contract 146, 160 Socialist Renovation Current (CRS) 43, 45–46, 98 state-building 1, 2, 21–24, 50, 59, 94, 146; Latin America 23; missions 57 Stiges Pact 37 Supreme Court of Justice 37, 66, 150 Territorial Areas for Training and Reincorporation (TATR) 12, 107, 108, 111, 114, 126, 127, 137 Thousand Days War 25, 34–35, 49 Tirofijo 41 transitional justice 4, 78 Transitory Zones of Normalization 12, 107 United Colombia Self-Defences (AUC) 47, 62, 65, 147 United Nations 1, 79, 93, 94, 121, 126, 146; High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia 11 Uribe, Álvaro 4, 9, 61, 70, 73, 148–149 Uribe’s DDR 4, 9, 62–73, 82, 98–102, 109, 114, 125–129, 131–135, 137 Varela, Juan de la Cruz 40, 41 Venezuela 11, 74; government veteran 7, 35 victims 78 Villarrica 40 Wisconsin Treaty 25, 34 Worker’s Self-Defences (ADO) 43, 44, 45 World Bank 1, 56, 94, 121, 123, 148 Zuluaga, Oscar Iván 75