Defining the Family: Law, Technology, and Reproduction in An Uneasy Age 9780814744239

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Defining th e Family

Janet L . Dolgi n

DEFINING THE FAMIL Y LAW, T E C H N O L O G Y , AND R E P R O D U C T I O N IN A N UNEAS Y AG E

New York University Pres s New York and London

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S New York and London Copyright © 199 7 by New York University All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dat a Dolgin, Janet L., 1947Defining th e family : law , technology, and reproduction i n an uneasy age / Janet L. Dolgin. p. cm . Includes bibliographical reference s and index. Contents: The transformation o f the family—Family law in transition—Status and contract in surrogate motherhood—Unwe d fathers and surrogate mothers—Social implication s of biological transformations—The "intent " of reproduction—Suffer th e children. ISBN 0-8147-1859-0 (alk. paper) 1. Huma n reproductive technology—Law and legislation—Unite d States. 2 . Huma n reproduction—Law and legislation—United States . 3. Domesti c relations—Unite d States . 4 . Family—Unite d States. 5. Huma n reproductive technology—Social aspects—Unite d States. I. Title . KF3830.D65 199 7 346.7301*7—dc40 96-3561 [547.30617] CI

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New York University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and their binding materials are chosen for strength and durability. Manufactured i n the United States of America 10

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To Aaron and our children, Ahuva, Shoshana, and Nava

CONTENTS

Preface i x Acknowledgments xii i Introduction 1 ONE

The Transformatio n o f the Famil y 1 4 TWO

Family La w i n Transition 3 2 THREE

Status an d Contrac t i n Surrogat e Motherhoo d 6 3 FOUR

Unwed Father s an d Surrogat e Mother s 9 4 FIVE

Social Implication s o f Biological Transformation s 13 4 six The "Intent " o f Reproduction 17 6 SEVEN

Suffer th e Childre n 21 3 Conclusion 24 5 Notes 25 5 Bibliography 27 3 Index 28 3

PREFACE

This boo k examine s a subjec t centra l t o almos t al l o f m y academi c career. Tha t subjec t i s the anatom y o f culture : th e investigatio n o f th e basic assumptions tha t underli e cultur e i n general, and tha t provide th e foundation upo n which , i n particular cultures , institutions, and pattern s of thought and feeling, are based. The stud y o f la w ha s bee n centra l t o thi s investigation . Th e lega l system o f any cultur e reflects , an d i s reflected in , th e culture' s broade r system o f meaning s an d beliefs , an d thu s th e law , properly understood , provides an invaluabl e aid to understanding social order. As a student of anthropology, a s well a s of the American lega l system , I have asked, fo r two decades, and continu e t o ask, the sam e set of basic questions: upon what cultura l assumption s d o lawmaker s an d judge s rel y a s the y enac t and interpre t law? How closely do these assumptions reflec t th e explanations and justification s th e la w provides a s disputes ar e adjudicate d an d rules established? When, and why , does an essentiall y conservative legal system change ? And ho w accurately doe s law, as it shifts an d adjust s i n response t o changin g socia l conundrums , reflec t an d direc t th e large r culture? I search fo r answer s to such question s i n orde r to locate an d analyz e the basi c assumption s abou t peopl e an d th e worl d tha t constitut e th e cultural bedrock of society. From tim e t o time i n th e lif e o f societies, central assumption s abou t life an d though t ar e challenge d openly , an d becom e th e subjec t o f debate an d ideologica l controversy . Tha t i s happenin g i n th e Unite d States now , as assumptions abou t th e scop e an d meanin g o f family an d of familial relationship s are challenged, defended , modified , o r rejected . Long-standing assumptions about what families are , and about the differ ences betwee n familia l an d othe r sort s o f relationships , ar e bein g chal lenged vociferousl y an d widely . As a result, societ y faces dramati c shift s in th e contour s an d significanc e o f what ha s for centurie s bee n amon g its central institutions—the family . ix

Preface

This process , although no t initiate d b y the adven t an d developmen t o f reproductive technolog y (includin g i n vitro fertilization, th e cryopreserva tion o f embryoni c an d gameti c material , an d posthumou s conception) , has been accelerate d b y those technologie s an d b y the relate d phenome non o f surrogate motherhood . Ne w forms o f assisted reproduction , whic h appear wit h startlin g rapidity , challeng e no t onl y the socia l dimension s o f family, bu t th e biologica l substrat e i n term s o f whic h familia l relation ships have lon g been understoo d withi n Wester n culture . Detailed stud y o f th e law' s response s t o th e dispute s an d dilemma s occasioned b y the us e o f assisted reproductio n i n th e creatio n o f familia l relationships enable s th e traine d observe r t o anatomiz e no t onl y particu lar law , bu t a seismi c shif t i n America n culture . A t stak e i n th e debat e surrounding assiste d reproductio n ar e man y o f th e centra l conundrum s of th e period , includin g thos e associate d wit h apparen t choice s abou t community an d autonomy , abou t traditio n an d modernity , and , mos t concretely, abou t th e dimension s an d meanin g o f actua l relationship s between parent s an d thei r children . I n thi s debate , advocac y i s every where evident . I t i s absent, b y design, fro m th e presen t book , whos e ai m is no t t o suppor t a position , bu t instea d t o analyz e th e debate , th e assumptions—often remarkabl y similar—tha t undergir d competin g views, and th e implication s o f those assumption s fo r th e emergin g mean ing of family withi n contemporar y America n society . As I though t abou t an d wrot e thi s book , I wa s aide d b y a numbe r o f people. I am indebte d t o all o f them . Many o f th e concept s centra l t o th e boo k develope d unde r th e tute lage o f Professor Davi d M . Schneider , wit h who m I studied a s a postdoctoral studen t i n anthropolog y a t th e Universit y o f Chicag o i n th e mid 1970s. Professo r Schneider' s semina l insight s int o America n kinshi p during th e middl e decade s o f th e twentiet h centur y hav e helpe d m e t o assess transformations i n th e American famil y i n recen t decades . Various section s o f the boo k wer e rea d i n draf t b y Professors Rober t A. Baruch Bush , Robi n Charlow , Eri c Freedman , Joh n DeWit t Gregory , Wendy Rogovin , an d Caro l Donovan , Esq . Professor Charle s A . Wood, Th e Danie l Webste r Professo r o f Histor y at Dartmout h College , share d wit h m e hi s remarkabl e knowledg e o f medieval histor y and o f the feuda l family . Mr. Danie l May , Esq. , Assistan t Directo r o f th e Hofstr a Universit y Law Library , provide d scholarl y an d bibliographi c assistance . Ms . Men a x

Preface

Sieber, Document s Libraria n a t th e Library , researche d variou s govern ment documents . Professor Stuar t Rabinowitz , Dea n o f th e Hofstr a La w School , gener ously encouraged my research an d writing . Mr. Nik o Pfund , edito r i n chie f o f the Ne w York Universit y Press , was unfailingly insightfu l an d supportive .

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An earlier version of parts of chapters 1 and 2 appeared i n the Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 82, number 4, pp. 1519-1571 . An earlier version o f chapter 3 appeared i n the Buffalo Law Review, vol . 38, number 2, pp. 515-550. An earlier version o f chapter 4 appeared i n the UCL A Law Review, vol . 40, number 3 , pp. 637-694. An earlier version o f chapter 5 appeared i n the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, vol. 7, number 1, pp. 37-86. An earlier version of chapter 6 appeared i n the Connecticut Law Review, vol. 26, number 4, pp. 1261-1314. Earlier versions of chapter 7 appeared i n the Arizona State Law Journal, vol. 28 , numbe r 2, pp . 473-542 , an d i n th e Children's Legal Rights Journal, vol. 16, number 1, pp. 1-10.

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Introduction

Cultures depen d fo r stabilit y upo n axioms : self-eviden t truth s upo n which institution s pron e t o gai n civi c allegianc e ma y wit h confidenc e be built . Whe n suc h axiom s ar e transforme d int o suppositions , a rar e occurrence, culture s becom e unstable . Among th e axiom s centra l t o Western cultur e ha s been th e convictio n that th e famil y i s roote d i n th e ver y natur e o f things . Definition s o f "family" an d o f "nature" vary. I n th e Wester n world , however , consensu s has existe d tha t famil y wa s a s natura l a s th e turnin g o f th e sun , a s immutable, subjec t a s strictly t o intrinsi c law , a s indispensabl e t o th e conduct o f life. Upon tha t consensu s th e stabilit y o f muc h o f Wester n societ y wa s founded. Whe n i t ha s faltered—whe n th e structur e o f th e famil y an d it s essential meaning—ha s bee n calle d int o question , societ y has been face d with unrest . Throughout mos t o f Wester n history , th e meanin g o f famil y wa s as sumed. Durin g th e pas t tw o centuries , however , a s th e consequenc e primarily o f majo r economi c transformation s i n th e West , th e bedroc k axioms b y whic h famil y wa s define d hav e bee n transforme d int o mer e suppositions. Durin g th e pas t severa l decades , thi s transformatio n ha s accelerated i n a revolutionary fashion . As a result , th e scop e an d meanin g o f famil y ar e no w subjec t t o intense, self-conscious debate , not onl y i n publi c media , art , law, politics, science, bu t als o amon g ordinar y people . Mor e tha n th e socia l parame ters and fat e o f family ar e at stake i n thi s debate, for i t encompasses man y of th e centra l socia l concern s o f th e period . A t issu e a s wel l ar e differ ences ove r th e comparativ e valu e o f modernit y an d tradition , freedo m and constraint , individualis m an d community . This debat e ha s bee n furthere d an d complicate d b y th e adven t an d development withi n th e pas t fe w decade s o f assiste d reproduction , in cluding th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s an d surrogat e motherhood . Since 1978 , with th e birt h o f the first chil d conceive d i n vitro , reproduc -

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Introduction tive technology ha s develope d a t an astonishin g pace , altering th e mean s and meanin g o f huma n reproduction , an d inevitably , th e meanin g an d scope o f family. As novel option s fo r reproductio n accumulat e an d multi ply, they ente r th e debat e abou t family . Almos t everyon e ha s an opinion , and almos t everyone' s opinio n stem s from and , i n turn , connect s bac k to, sometime s revising , mor e familia r understanding s o f famil y an d o f relationships withi n families . In less than tw o decades, it has become possibl e completely to separate reproduction fro m sexuality , to distribute th e tasks of biological maternit y among differen t women , an d t o manipulat e th e spatia l an d tempora l dimensions o f reproduction . Moreover , a n entir e industry—brokers , agents, lawyers, psychologists, an d doctors—ha s develope d aroun d surro gacy arrangements . Today, a s a resul t o f reproductiv e technology , conceptio n nee d no t involve sexua l intercours e an d nee d no t begi n i n a woman' s body . Afte r conception, th e embry o ma y be divide d int o two , four, o r mor e identica l embryos; it may be tested fo r genetic diseas e and discarde d i f defective; i t may be froze n an d store d fo r months , or even years , and the n thawe d fo r implantation an d gestation . Th e woma n wh o provide s th e eg g nee d no t be th e woma n wh o gestate s th e embryo . Tw o differen t wome n ca n giv e birth t o "identica l twins, " or on e woma n ma y giv e birt h t o "twins " years apart; babies may be born years after th e deaths of their genetic "parents" ; men withou t activ e sperm ca n becom e geneti c fathers ; an d soo n egg s fo r the production o f human childre n ma y be retrieve d fro m aborte d fetuses . These possibilitie s ar e unsettling , eve n astonishing , t o a societ y tha t has long understoo d huma n reproductio n a s the inevitabl e consequenc e of natural an d thu s unchanging , biologica l proces s and that , further, ha s understood famil y relationship s throug h referenc e t o the fixed certaintie s of biologica l reproduction . Withi n suc h a world , th e appearanc e an d expansion o f reproductive technolog y ha s don e muc h mor e tha n presen t infertile peopl e wit h a se t o f ne w option s fo r havin g children . Thi s technology, whic h seem s almos t dail y t o presen t ne w possibilitie s fo r creating, an d thu s fo r defining , families , simultaneousl y disrupt s familia r assumptions abou t th e biologica l correlate s o f human reproduction . Previously, societ y coul d rel y o n a se t o f unquestione d assumption s about biological reproductio n t o assess the changin g parameters o f famil y life. Tha t measurin g poin t ha s no w begu n t o shif t positio n a s rapidl y a s have th e socia l contour s o f famil y life . So , fo r example , th e speculatio n

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Introduction about th e meanin g o f motherhood commo n i n twentieth-centur y societ y can n o longe r presum e th e certaint y o f biologica l truth . Unti l recently , the inexorabilit y o f biologica l maternit y anchore d consideration s o f th e transforming characte r o f motherhood a s a social, cultural, psychological , and economi c matter . Now , society' s understandin g o f biologica l mater nity is itself being challenged b y phenomena suc h a s in vitro fertilization , embryo transfe r (whic h permit s on e woma n t o gestat e a fetu s forme d from anothe r woman' s fertilize d ovum ) cryopreservatio n (whic h permit s fertilized egg s t o b e froze n fo r years , eve n decades , befor e implantatio n and gestation) , an d th e fertilizatio n o f egg s fro m aborte d fetuses fo r gestation i n th e bodie s o f wome n wh o d o no t themselve s produc e ov a that ca n b e fertilized . A s a result , identificatio n o f the biologica l mothe r is n o longe r obvious . Th e socia l an d biologica l dimension s o f maternit y being questione d simultaneously , i t i s n o longe r possibl e t o judg e ques tions about th e socia l dimension s o f motherhood agains t the unchangin g parameters o f biologica l maternity . Th e complicate d shift s i n meanin g that resul t ar e deepl y disruptiv e t o social expectation s abou t th e relation s that do, or should, pertai n amon g famil y members . Reproductive technolog y i s unsettling t o society i n othe r way s as well. In a society accustomed t o individualism, a t least in the marketplace , an d practically obsesse d wit h consume r choice , i t was perhaps inevitabl e tha t the possibilit y o f separatin g gamete s an d embryo s fro m th e bodie s tha t produce the m woul d lea d t o th e sal e an d purchas e o f gameti c an d embryonic material , an d tha t th e possibilitie s o f separatin g conceptio n from sexua l intercours e an d o f dividing biologica l maternit y int o geneti c and gestationa l component s woul d lea d t o surrogac y contract s an d pai d surrogate mothers . But , still, such options , expressly presented a s creativ e of famil y life , hav e seriousl y disquiete d a societ y conditione d fo r almos t two centurie s t o understan d th e famil y a s a domai n o f lif e separat e an d protected fro m th e worl d o f work . T o allo w th e parent-chil d relatio n t o be create d throug h monetar y exchang e ha s seeme d antithetica l an d deeply threatenin g t o th e notio n o f family , develope d durin g th e earl y years o f th e Industria l Revolution , a s a domai n o f lif e characterize d b y love and endurin g commitment . The socia l an d economi c choice s characteristi c o f surrogat e mother hood, gamet e purchase , an d embiy o transfe r d o no t provid e th e onl y instances i n contemporar y societ y o f familia l relationship s create d an d effected throug h form s onc e understoo d a s appropriat e t o th e market -

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Introduction place bu t no t t o th e home . Fo r severa l decade s befor e th e adven t o f reproductive technology , th e creatio n an d operatio n o f famil y relation s were increasingl y recognize d a s open t o th e fre e choice s o f autonomou s individuals. Societ y reacted wit h intens e ambivalence t o that recognition , at onc e fearin g an d enjoyin g th e proliferatio n o f choice . Th e develop ment o f assiste d reproductio n intensifie d tha t ambivalence , no t simpl y because assiste d reproductio n compel s societ y t o redefin e th e famil y bu t because i t accelerate s a redefinitio n tha t wa s proceedin g a t a rat e th e society already foun d har d t o accommodate . Certainly, before th e appearanc e o f "test-tub e babies " an d surrogat e mothers, familie s wer e becomin g increasingl y individualisti c an d th e parameters o f family lif e wer e increasingl y see n a s open t o choic e rathe r than dictate d b y th e natur e o f unchangin g biologica l an d socia l truths . Indeed, fo r a t leas t 15 0 years befor e th e adven t o f th e ne w reproductiv e technologies, th e famil y i n th e Unite d State s ha d bee n evolvin g consis tently, thoug h no t alway s obviously , towar d greate r individuality , tran siency, and choice . The impac t of reproductive technolog y o n contempo rary America n societ y must , o f course , b e understoo d i n tha t large r context. In short , althoug h reproductiv e technolog y ha s revolutionize d tradi tional understanding s o f th e family , th e adven t o f reproductiv e technol ogy did no t initiat e th e process of change. The ne w technological option s for huma n reproductio n di d no t becom e widel y availabl e unti l afte r th e family (an d famil y law ) ha d accepte d a wid e se t o f changes , includin g no-fault divorce , nonmarita l cohabitation , an d prenuptia l agreement s i n contemplation o f divorce , tha t challeng e traditiona l understanding s o f proper famil y relationships . Perhap s th e appearanc e o f assisted reproduc tion awaited , becaus e it s us e depende d on , broade r socia l change s tha t had prepare d th e wa y for ne w understanding s o f family, relative , parent , and child . Specifi c question s abou t the causa l link s between th e develop ment o f assisted reproductio n an d th e developmen t o f a vision o f famil y that coul d encompas s th e consequence s o f assisted reproductio n mus t b e referred t o historian s o f science. Whatever th e causa l links , the availabil ity an d us e o f assiste d reproductio n ha s intensifie d a se t o f question s about th e dimension s o f famil y lif e tha t wer e alread y bein g activel y debated withi n th e societ y i n th e severa l decade s befor e babie s coul d b e conceived i n vitr o an d befor e froze n gameti c an d embryoni c matte r could b e purchase d t o create huma n life . 4

Introduction Reproductive technolog y an d surrogac y ar e doin g mor e tha n acceler ating th e rat e o f chang e i n th e contemporar y family . I n addition , thes e phenomena provid e new , rathe r startling , context s withi n whic h societ y must dea l wit h an d conside r th e transformatio n o f th e America n family . The question s raise d b y reproductiv e technolog y an d surrogacy , an d th e answers bein g suggeste d i n response , hav e becom e par t o f th e wide r debate abou t family . Socia l response s t o reproductiv e technolog y an d surrogacy almos t immediatel y als o becam e response s i n th e large r socia l debate abou t th e shap e an d fat e o f th e America n family . Conclusion s about reproductio n ar e used , sometime s self-consciously , sometime s les s so, t o control , o r simpl y t o understand , th e fat e o f th e famil y mor e generally. Since th e mid-nineteent h century , America n societ y ha s bee n openl y concerned wit h th e preservatio n an d transformatio n o f th e family . Th e beginnings o f thi s self-consciousnes s abou t famil y coincide d wit h th e development o f th e nineteenth-centur y marke t an d th e consequen t un derstanding o f th e famil y a s a refug e fro m th e pressure s o f th e worl d o f the marketplace . Befor e tha t time , societ y di d no t see th e worl d o f hom e and famil y i n expres s contras t t o the worl d o f work. Moreover , hom e an d work were no t a s likely, i n fact , t o have bee n separat e i n earlie r centurie s as they were afte r th e Industria l Revolutio n began . As vas t technologica l an d economi c change s transforme d lif e i n th e nineteenth century , a ne w ideolog y o f famil y emerged. 1 Thi s ne w ideol ogy whic h develope d wit h th e Industria l Revolutio n include d a ne w awareness o f family a s a centra l socia l unit . Th e self-consciousnes s abou t family tha t evolve d durin g th e nineteent h centur y suggeste d tha t familie s can b e altered—tha t the y hav e histories—an d that , i n consequence , th e family face d increasin g jeopard y a s broa d change s i n th e res t o f lif e would com e eventuall y to invade, and the n t o alter, life withi n th e family . Especially amon g urban , middle-clas s Americans , th e fea r tha t familie s would b e undermine d b y larger socia l force s wa s understoo d i n counter point t o a ne w conceptualizatio n o f famil y lif e durin g th e nineteent h century a s affectionate, selfless , an d childcentered. 2 During th e cours e o f th e followin g century , thi s understandin g o f family wa s endorsed an d consistentl y refashioned . Lookin g back nostalgi cally towar d a pas t tha t neve r wa s an d forwar d towar d a futur e tha t seemed increasingl y uncertain , th e nineteent h centur y understandin g o f family wa s carried int o the nex t century an d institutionalize d mos t firmly , 15

Introduction but briefly , durin g th e year s immediatel y followin g Worl d Wa r I I i n th e middle decade s o f the twentiet h century . By th e latte r par t o f th e twentiet h century , th e famil y mor e openl y reflected, an d famil y la w mor e full y endorsed , aspect s o f the nineteenth century famil y tha t were feare d rathe r tha n celebrated—especiall y auton omous individualit y an d expandin g choice . However , th e ideolog y o f family tha t develope d a t th e star t o f th e nineteent h centur y continued , and stil l continues , to infor m reaction s to , and choice s about , famil y life . During thi s lon g period , fro m th e beginnin g o f th e nineteent h centur y into th e secon d hal f o f th e twentieth , socia l understanding s o f famil y became increasingl y self-consciou s a s wel l a s increasingl y doctrinal . So cial image s of decent famil y lif e continue d t o be modele d on , and actua l families wer e condemne d fo r departin g from , a notio n o f famil y an d home tha t contraste d almos t completel y wit h th e worl d o f th e market place. Reproductive technolog y an d surrogac y emerge d an d develope d al most instantaneousl y a t th e en d o f thi s period , jus t a s societ y bega n t o acknowledge an d openl y accep t change s tha t departe d from traditiona l understandings o f family . Th e option s introduce d b y thi s technology options abou t ho w an d whe n t o creat e children , abou t whic h gamet e should b e used t o create them, about which woma n shoul d gestat e them , and abou t th e contour s o f the relationshi p tha t shoul d connec t a child' s progenitors t o eac h othe r an d t o th e child—dramaticall y complicat e society's ongoin g debat e abou t family . Assiste d reproductio n question s the mora l limit s o f individualism—a s wome n sig n contract s t o produc e and surrende r childre n fo r money . An d assiste d reproductio n als o sug gests th e creativ e potentia l o f th e choic e t o emplo y technolog y i n th e service o f family—as infertil e couple s becom e parent s with th e participa tion o f third-party doctors, gestators, and gamet e donors . To a societ y alread y overburdene d wit h choic e (an d wit h th e illusio n of choice) , reproductiv e technolog y ha s brough t mor e choices , no t jus t reproductive choice s bu t ideologica l choice s a s well . Peopl e ca n desig n their ow n reproductiv e live s i n way s very recentl y unimaginable , limite d however b y cos t an d th e succes s rate s o f reproductiv e technology , stil l poor. The fac t tha t such choic e exist s has become almos t as unsettling a s the actualizatio n o f particula r choices . Moreover , th e apparen t choice s often disguis e othe r choices , an d a s a resul t th e implication s o f eac h set o f choice s ar e blurred . Fo r example , choice s presente d b y assiste d

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Introduction reproduction ca n b e define d a s conformin g t o traditiona l model s o f family, a s whe n technolog y i s use d t o creat e childre n (an d therefor e families) fo r desperate, infertile couples . The choices presented by reproductive technology ca n als o be defined a s destroying traditional familie s and everythin g those familie s represent , a s when th e technolog y i s seen to turn women and children int o commodities and parents into business partners. Assisted reproductio n ha s provide d a ne w contex t withi n whic h t o consider the moral and social parameters of family. Bu t it is a context so confusing tha t i t i s less likely t o provid e direc t answer s tha n t o expan d the term s of , an d excit e interes t in , th e society' s large r debat e abou t family. I n larg e part , socia l response s fro m th e societ y t o assiste d repro ductive technology assimilate the uses and consequence s of the technology to familiar things . Bu t there i s wide disagreemen t abou t ho w to d o that an d eve n wide r disagreemen t abou t concret e conclusion s t o b e drawn from the analogies. So, for instance, extracorporeal gameti c material can be, and has been, equated with a child, a human organ, a special sort of human organ , or a commodity. As a result, conclusions about the proper fat e o f gameti c materia l becom e conclusion s abou t babies , hu man organs , special sort s o f huma n organs , an d commodities . Th e op tions fo r definin g gamete s an d embryo s multiply , bu t a share d socia l frame o f reference seem s simultaneously to vanish. Society has reached almost no consistent, generally accepted decisions about ho w t o understan d o r regulat e assiste d reproduction . Televisio n personalities, philosophers, and theologian s disagre e among themselves, and stat e legislatures hav e not responde d uniforml y o r comprehensivel y to the conundrums presented b y reproductive technology and surrogacy. When th e Nationa l Conferenc e o f Commissioner s o n Unifor m Stat e Laws devise d a mode l statut e fo r recommendatio n t o stat e legislature s anxious to regulate the status of children produced from assiste d conception, the y provide d tw o alternatives . On e alternativ e mandate s tha t al l surrogacy arrangements be void. The other permits surrogacy and identi fies th e parents of any resulting child a s the couple who entered int o an agreement t o produc e tha t chil d rathe r tha n th e surrogat e wit h who m the "intendin g parents " entere d int o th e agreement. 3 Som e state s hav e enacted statute s regulatin g variou s aspect s o f reproductiv e technolog y and surrogacy, but the response has been neither widespread nor comprehensive.

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Introduction Courts, unlik e legislatures , canno t dela y o r limi t response s t o repro ductive technolog y an d surrogac y unti l a socia l consensu s emerge s o r until th e absenc e o f regulation become s disastrou s fo r th e society . Partie s to specific , unresolve d dispute s occasione d b y assisted reproductio n see k judicial resolution , an d th e judiciar y mus t respond . Som e o f the assiste d reproduction case s considere d b y court s aros e a s par t o f large r divorc e actions. Other s presente d variou s sort s o f disagreements , includin g dis putes among surrogate mother s an d intendin g parent s ove r the parentag e and custod y o f childre n the y agree d t o produc e together , dispute s be tween a woman anxiou s t o us e he r dea d lover' s froze n sper m t o produc e a chil d an d th e dea d man' s children , o r dispute s betwee n gamet e donor s and th e fertilit y clinic s storin g their gametes . Courts hav e listene d t o thes e people' s claims , analyze d th e implica tions o f thei r choices , an d determine d right s an d obligation s o f famil y members an d contrac t partner s t o gamete s an d t o babies . Take n a s a set o f responses , judicia l decision s i n thes e case s ar e characterize d b y bewilderment an d inconsistency . Tha t i s indicated , eve n befor e particu lar decision s ar e examined , b y th e frequenc y wit h whic h tria l courts ' rulings i n such case s are overturned o n appea l o r are affirmed bu t o n th e basis o f an analysi s entirel y a t odd s wit h tha t o f the cour t tha t first hear d and decide d th e case . In general , la w provide s a powerfu l commentar y o n th e lif e i t regu lates. Tha t commentar y i s provide d differentl y b y legislature s an d b y courts. Legislativ e regulation , especiall y i n th e Unite d States , signal s social agreemen t fa r mor e ofte n tha n d o cour t opinions . Legislatio n suggests th e resolutio n o f debate . Judicia l response , especiall y t o issue s not ye t subjec t t o widesprea d an d consisten t legislativ e regulation , ma y suggest only the term s o f debate. Certainly , thi s i s the cas e with regar d t o reproductive technolog y an d surrogacy . Becaus e court s ar e compelle d t o make specifi c decision s i n orde r t o resolv e actua l disputes , the y mus t make decision s quickly , withou t th e benefi t o f prolonge d consideration . Thus th e text s of judicial decision s reflec t wit h comparativ e transparenc y the confusion s an d uncertaintie s bein g engendere d b y surrogac y an d b y the ne w reproductive technologies , as well as society's inability to provid e any broad, consisten t response . Historically, th e law' s respons e t o artificia l insemination , a for m o f reproductive contro l tha t doe s no t requir e sophisticate d technolog y an d that ha s bee n availabl e fo r applicatio n t o human reproductio n fo r ove r a 8

Introduction century, provide s a n illuminatin g illustratio n o f th e proces s throug h which th e la w assimilates, and the n come s consistentl y t o regulate, unset tling changes i n th e possibilitie s fo r huma n reproduction . I n th e first half of th e twentiet h century , dispute s occasione d b y artificia l insemination , especially whe n th e procedur e wa s accomplishe d usin g th e sper m o f a donor rathe r tha n th e sper m o f the husban d o f the woma n t o b e insemi nated, involve d question s abou t th e paternit y o f th e dono r an d o f th e mother's husband . Courts , almos t alway s relyin g o n on e o r anothe r familiar understandin g o f family matters , responded variousl y and usuall y with intensity . Som e equate d artificia l inseminatio n wit h adultery 4 an d defined th e chil d a s illegitimate. 5 Other s define d th e relatio n betwee n the mother' s husban d an d th e chil d produce d fro m artificia l insemina tion a s on e o f semi-adoptio n o r potentia l adoption. 6 Other s refuse d t o entertain a divorcin g mother' s clai m tha t he r childre n wer e conceive d through artificia l inseminatio n becaus e tha t clai m suggeste d th e childre n should b e define d a s bastards. 7 N o legislatio n specificall y guide d court s in thes e case s unti l th e mid-1960s . A t abou t tha t time , famil y la w wa s becoming generall y responsiv e t o change s i n th e famil y tha t suggeste d a new plac e fo r individualis m an d choic e withi n families . In 196 4 Georgi a enacte d th e first statut e directl y responsiv e t o th e questions raise d b y artificial insemination . Th e statut e declare d childre n born throug h artificia l inseminatio n usin g dono r sper m t o b e th e legiti mate childre n o f their mother' s husbands. 8 Within a short period o f time, a majorit y o f th e state s promulgate d statute s tha t regulate d artificia l insemination an d tha t provide d fo r th e legitimac y o f th e resultin g chil dren. B y the 1970 s social consensu s ha d emerged . With regar d t o bot h th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s an d t o surro gacy arrangements , whic h bot h appeare d ove r a centur y afte r artificia l insemination wa s first use d i n huma n reproduction , a simila r consensu s has no t ye t appeare d i n th e societ y o r i n th e law . However , th e judicia l decisions tha t hav e bee n occasione d b y reproductiv e technolog y an d b y surrogacy, an d whic h see m t o agre e abou t littl e beyon d th e importanc e of the questions asked, provide a remarkably fruitful contex t within whic h to deciphe r an d understan d society' s developin g respons e t o assiste d reproduction, an d b y implication t o broader change s i n th e family . Deci sions i n thes e case s provide invaluabl e text s for th e socia l analyst . I n part , this follow s inevitabl y fro m th e fac t tha t judge s liv e withi n th e cultur e they hel p order . Bu t eve n more , judicia l decisions , i n tellin g litigant' s

l9l

Introduction tales, aim specificall y a t resolvin g disagreement s i n a for m approve d an d institutionalized b y th e society . Whe n societ y ha s no t provided , o r ha s not yet provided , a generall y appropriat e respons e t o a se t o f dispute s being litigated , that , too , i s reflecte d i n courts ' decisions . Suc h judicia l decisions indicat e society' s yearning s an d fears , it s hesitations an d confu sions, and it s assumptions an d expectations . Cases abou t surrogac y an d reproductiv e technolog y reveal , fo r in stance, that courts apparently a t utter odd s over the resolutio n o f disputes involving assiste d reproductio n ma y predicat e thei r conflictin g decision s on a shared visio n o f family. I n fact , th e great majority o f courts that hav e entertained suc h case s hav e justifie d thei r decision s b y linkin g thos e decisions t o an ideolog y of family tha t values traditio n an d tha t is , at best , cautious abou t th e benefit s o f granting family member s expande d choic e and o f defining famil y member s a s autonomous individuals . Thus, th e judiciary , face d wit h case s occasione d b y assisted reproduc tion, ha s i n larg e par t mounte d a defens e o f tradition . However , th e defenders ar e often apparentl y unawar e tha t they are mountin g a defens e at all , an d whe n aware , ar e unclea r abou t precisel y wha t the y ar e de fending, an d eve n abou t why they are mountin g th e defens e a t all. So, fo r instance , eve n court s tha t hav e validate d surrogac y contracts , and hav e thereb y apparentl y side d wit h choic e an d individualism , hav e done s o in the nam e o f the pluperfect, traditiona l famil y created , or likely to b e created , a s a resul t o f th e contrac t i n question . I n this , court s have accepte d surrogac y contract s an d recognize d intendin g parents , no t because traditio n shoul d withdra w i n th e fac e o f modernity bu t because , for thes e courts , the correlate s o f contract seeme d t o ensure th e preserva tion o f tradition , a t leas t withi n specifi c families . I n thes e cases , a s i n the large r society , th e term s o f th e debat e abou t famil y ar e murky . I n consequence, centra l concept s com e t o see m substitutabl e fo r thei r ap parent antagonists . The confusion s underlyin g judicia l decisions i n such case s reflect, an d also encourage , simila r confusion s i n th e large r society . Litigate d case s occasioned b y assisted reproductio n ofte n becom e news . As such, judicia l stories ar e retol d b y journalists , newscasters , an d eve n writer s o f fiction, and ar e then, i n turn , rea d b y judges, lawyers, and futur e litigants . For the societ y as a whole, the confusion s engendere d b y reproductiv e technology cente r aroun d a general , socia l ambivalenc e regardin g th e expansion o f individua l choic e i n th e creatio n an d operatio n o f families . 10

Introduction The societ y imagine s itsel f to thrive o n th e expansio n o f choice i n almos t all domain s o f lif e an d act s ou t tha t belie f dail y i n selectin g amon g a n apparently unendin g variet y o f consume r choices . Yet, at th e sam e time , the societ y continue s t o limi t choice , o r a t leas t t o mas k it s interes t i n expanding choice , withi n th e domai n o f famil y life . Tha t th e explosio n of consume r societ y i n th e Unite d State s ha s bre d a deep , thoug h curi ously illusive, faith i n choice-as-salvation i s not surprising, nor i s it surprising tha t fait h ha s com e openl y t o groun d vision s o f family lif e a s well a s life i n th e marketplace . More surprisin g perhap s i s th e tenacit y o f th e resistanc e an d o f th e strength wit h whic h societ y continues t o value mor e traditiona l vision s of family i n whic h relative s ar e connecte d throug h tie s that limi t individua l choice, and i n whic h familie s ar e expecte d t o endure a s committed unit s of socia l interactio n becaus e tha t i s wha t familie s are. Whethe r societ y will continu e t o valu e suc h families , an d whethe r "old-fashioned " fami lies wil l survive , an d i f so , i n wha t form , i s fo r th e futur e t o determine . But response s b y th e societ y an d th e la w t o th e conundrum s create d b y reproductive technolog y ma y provide a glimpse o f that future . This book , i n lookin g towar d tha t future , begin s b y examinin g th e past. Change s i n th e famil y an d i n image s o f th e famil y i n th e pas t tw o centuries, and mor e particularly i n the past few decades, are examined, a s are the shifting response s o f the lega l syste m t o those changes . Chapters 1 and 2 describ e th e emergenc e i n th e earl y nineteent h centur y o f a n ideology o f famil y whic h develope d i n respons e t o th e pressure s o f th e Industrial Revolutio n an d whic h glorifie d th e hom e a s a n escap e from the tension s o f th e marketplace . Thi s ideolog y o f family , whic h toda y remains importan t thoug h no t unopposed , i s referre d t o i n thi s boo k a s "traditional." Althoug h regnan t fo r almos t tw o centuries , thi s traditiona l ideology of family wa s never a s pervasively actualized a s people believ e i t to have been. 9 Throughout th e nineteent h century , fo r example , divorce , although difficult , wa s far from unknown . I n the first half of the twentiet h century, a significantl y lowe r percentag e o f childre n live d wit h a t leas t one paren t tha n di d s o i n th e las t decade s o f the century. 10 And, i n 1835, Alexis d e Tocquevill e describe d America n childre n t o b e largel y free o f paternal authorit y eve n befor e th e teenag e years. 11 Ironically, th e traditiona l ideolog y o f famil y cam e closes t t o bein g reflected i n socia l fact , an d wa s most extensively articulated, i n th e 1950s , just befor e tha t ideolog y starte d t o crumble . I n th e 1960 s an d 1970 s

Iu I

Introduction people bega n fo r th e first tim e openl y t o question , an d thereb y t o chal lenge, the traditiona l vie w of family. Tha t challeng e i s reflected clearl y i n the law—i n legislature s whic h provide d fo r no-faul t divorce , i n court s which recognize d prenuptia l agreement s an d cohabitatio n contracts , an d in th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t whic h clearl y describe d th e famil y in th e mid-1970 s a s a collectio n o f independent , autonomou s individ uals.12 Chapters 3 , 4 , an d 5 discus s surrogat e motherhoo d an d th e ne w reproductive technologie s a s thes e development s ar e reflecting , an d be coming par t o f th e ongoing , an d increasingl y intense , debat e withi n th e society about the permissible scop e and meanin g o f familial relationships . Chapter 3 describe s a singular , traditiona l visio n o f famil y tha t la y behind, an d ultimatel y unified , a se t o f apparentl y conflictin g response s to on e case involvin g a failed surrogac y agreemen t durin g th e lat e 1980s . Chapter 4 considers a set of cases decided b y the Unite d State s Suprem e Court involvin g th e right s o f unwe d father s t o exercis e thei r paternity . Assumptions abou t father s an d mother s underlyin g thos e case s ar e the n compared wit h othe r assumption s abou t mothers , i n particular , underly ing cases occasioned b y surrogacy and b y reproductive technology . Chap ter 5 looks directl y a t th e changin g "facts " o f huma n reproductio n an d considers developin g socia l an d lega l response s t o thes e ne w facts . Thi s chapter the n examine s th e remarkabl e disruptio n create d b y the simulta neous transformatio n o f the socia l an d biologica l correlate s o f family . The las t tw o chapter s ( 6 an d 7 ) conside r i n detai l tw o quit e differen t legal response s t o th e problem s raise d b y assiste d reproduction . On e response (relianc e o n th e notio n o f intent) , considere d i n chapte r 6 , clearly reflect s th e law s o f the marketplac e an d thu s suggest s tha t famil y law, which fo r almos t tw o centurie s ha s define d an d regulate d th e famil y as a domai n apar t an d differen t fro m th e worl d o f work , i s becomin g increasingly simila r to the laws that regulat e contracts , torts, and property . The secon d response , considere d i n chapte r 7 —reliance o n th e bes t interests of the child—ha s bee n widel y institutionalized withi n famil y la w for almos t a century . Eac h respons e show s court s strugglin g t o mediat e contradictions betwee n th e correlate s o f traditio n an d th e correlate s o f modernity i n th e constructio n o f families—struggling, mor e specifically , to preserve th e illusio n o f tradition bu t t o accept th e correlate s o f moder nity. Neithe r resolve s th e dilemma s presente d b y assiste d reproduction . 12

Introduction Each, however , reveal s th e concern s an d confusion s tha t assiste d repro duction i s engendering . In sum , thi s boo k examine s th e respons e o f th e la w a s surrogac y an d the ne w reproductiv e technologie s threate n o r challeng e (dependin g o n perspective) traditiona l famil y value s an d structures . As the la w responds , it reconsider s a se t o f fundamenta l assumption s abou t th e famil y tha t for ove r a centur y wer e accepted , internalized , an d onl y infrequentl y challenged openly . The choice s th e la w i s no w makin g flow fro m a se t o f assumption s about th e famil y tha t favor s holism , fixed relationships , an d endurin g connection a s wel l a s fro m a se t o f assumption s tha t favor s autonomy , negotiated bargains , an d fungibl e choice . Thi s boo k focuse s o n th e development of , an d connection s among , thes e assumption s abou t fam ily, recognizing that , i n practice , th e incident s o f tradition an d o f moder nity have lon g since becom e substitutabl e fo r eac h other . In examinin g th e choice s tha t th e la w i s making abou t ho w th e famil y is, and shoul d be , defined , thi s boo k make s it s own assumption : tha t th e law, in respondin g t o the dilemma s create d b y assisted reproduction , wil l be onl y as fair, just , and equitabl e a s its underlying assumption s allow .

*3

ONE

The Transformatio n of the Famil y

Contemporary change s i n th e famil y hav e becom e a subject o f intens e moral an d sociologica l concer n i n th e Unite d State s i n th e pas t several decades. The value of alterations in the form an d meanin g of family lif e is bein g debate d widely , a s ar e th e apparen t consequence s o f thos e changes for social and political life generally. Both surrogat e motherhoo d an d th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s challenge traditional understandings of family and have thus entered th e debate abou t famil y wit h grea t force . However , neithe r developmen t engendered tha t debate . Thus, understandin g socia l response s t o surrogacy an d reproductiv e technolog y (tha t is , t o assiste d reproductio n i n general) an d th e rol e tha t assiste d reproductio n no w play s i n shapin g contemporary vision s o f th e famil y i n th e Unite d State s depend s o n understanding th e large r debat e abou t famil y an d it s history befor e th e advent of surrogate motherhood an d of the new reproductive technolog ies. Therefore, thi s chapter and th e nex t describe the social and histori c context withi n whic h th e contemporar y debat e abou t th e family—an d thus abou t assiste d reproduction—ha s developed . Thi s chapte r outline s the social and intellectual history of the family; the next chapter considers a basi c se t o f change s i n th e ideolog y o f famil y a s thos e change s ar e reflected i n changing responses of the law to the family. Since th e 1960 s alternative vision s o f family hav e begu n t o compet e openly with the "traditional" ideology of family, developed a t the start of the Industria l Revolution . Increasingly , societ y recognizes , an d a t leas t partially accepts, a variety of family forms. More specifically, however , at the sam e time , societ y bega n t o categoriz e familie s a s comparativel y traditional or comparatively modern. H

The Transformation of the Family Modern families, understood as less dependent on biogenetic relation s than traditiona l families , ar e further described , especiall y b y their proponents, a s ideall y egalitarian . Withi n thes e families , famil y member s ar e described as individuals who choose to join together as relatives. Although these families-through-choic e ar e sometime s presente d a s an alternativ e to traditional families , they can be, and often are , also described i n terms that see m a s old-fashione d a s any . Moreover , som e familie s tha t migh t appear t o b e families-through-choic e woul d appreciat e an d appropriat e the description . Man y suc h familie s ar e describe d i n Kat h Weston' s ethnographic stud y o f lesbia n an d ga y kinship . Other s woul d rejec t th e term or understand i t as applicable, but largely irrelevant . The tw o notions o f traditional (o r old-fashioned) familie s an d moder n families sugges t a developmenta l process . Suc h a proces s ha s occurre d and continue s t o occur . However , th e tw o notion s o f traditiona l an d modern familie s ar e also presented a s ideological antagonist s in a contest for the future o f the family. As such, the two notions represent contrasting options an d ar e actuall y use d i n way s tha t variousl y ignore , subvert , elaborate, or reconstruct the history of families. The Englis h anthropologis t Marily n Strather n make s a simila r poin t in commenting o n another anthropologist's analysi s of surrogate mother hood. Tha t othe r anthropologist , Robi n Fox , argue d i n hi s boo k Reproduction and Succession that surrogac y play s havo c wit h "biologica l real ity" and therefore mus t be condemned. 1 Strather n responded: Fox situates his battle in a culture that values kinship as some ancient or traditional form that has given away before modernity. But there are times when the same cultur e would also like to entertain both, and technology makes both possible . I n truth, the ne w reproductiv e technologie s enabl e moderns to choose between "traditional" and "modern" forms of relating, or to choose to facilitate bot h at the same time for that matter ("artificia l assistance" to produce a baby genetically, biologically and psychologically "us", in the words of one father).2 When traditio n an d modernit y ar e posed a s ideological antagonist s i n the characterizatio n o f famil y matters , tw o contrastin g vision s o f famil y emerge. Th e first sees familie s a s ideall y hierarchical , holistic , an d im mune from, or at least unlikely to welcome, the manipulations o f choice. It is presented as reflecting a long, moral history in which famil y relation s were alway s predicate d o n natura l an d supernatura l truths , an d wer e 151

The Transformation of the Family therefore good. Th e secon d visio n see s familie s a s ideall y egalitarian . I n such familie s relationship s ar e understoo d a s grounded i n th e exercis e o f autonomy. Thes e familie s ar e portraye d b y their proponent s a s heraldin g an ag e tha t tolerantl y provide s fo r practicall y unlimite d choic e i n th e creation an d ongoin g actualization o f human connection . These description s o f tw o contrastin g sort s o f familie s ar e stark , to o stark t o describ e th e actua l proces s throug h whic h peopl e o f al l persua sions ar e discussin g an d constructin g families . However , th e description s do presen t contrastin g possibilitie s fo r imaginin g families . An d thes e possibilities undergir d th e complicate d debat e abou t famil y tha t en grosses much o f contemporary society . This debat e ha s a history, and th e man y actua l familie s aroun d whic h the debat e twirl s have histories as well. Those historie s are connected bu t are certainl y no t identical , an d mus t therefor e b e disentangled . Fo r th e social analyst , neither th e ideologica l debat e no r th e parameter s o f famil y life ca n b e understand apar t from th e larger social and intellectua l histor y of family. Although thi s book does no t presume t o present tha t history , it s outlines ca n b e suggested . That outlin e wil l focu s aroun d tw o period s —medieval time s an d th e period sinc e th e star t o f the Industria l Revolution . Eac h o f these period s is especiall y significan t fo r understandin g th e developmen t o f th e con temporary famil y toda y and th e developmen t o f the contemporar y debat e about th e family . An ideology of relationship tha t prize hierarchy an d holis m i s far mor e characteristic o f the medieval , tha n o f the modern , world . Tha t ideolog y indicates th e sourc e o f th e hierarchical , holisti c fram e withi n whic h families an d image s o f familie s wer e structure d fo r man y centurie s afte r the demis e o f the feuda l worl d itself . The for m o f feuda l relations , understoo d throug h a n ideolog y tha t valued hierarch y rathe r tha n equality , an d holis m rathe r tha n individual ism, has in the succeedin g centurie s bee n mor e full y preserve d an d mor e accurately reflecte d i n famil y relation s tha n elsewher e i n th e developin g societies o f th e West . Bu t beyon d that , withi n th e pas t on e hundre d years especially , th e medieva l worl d ha s provide d a mode l agains t whic h contemporary relations , bot h insid e an d outsid e families , hav e bee n expressly assessed . I n thi s regard , th e feuda l mode l ha s bee n interprete d variously an d serve d mor e tha n on e ideologica l end . I t has been take n t o represent a n intoleran t an d hierarchica l pas t bes t forgotten . Bu t i t ha s 16

The Transformation of the Family also bee n take n t o represen t a univers e o f lovin g interconnectio n tha t should b e preserve d wher e possibl e an d resurrecte d wher e not . Thus, th e medieval world , a s viewe d b y th e nineteent h an d twentiet h centurie s in establishin g thei r ow n understanding s o f family , ma y appea r mor e committed t o hierarchy an d holis m tha n was , in fact , th e case . Moreover , the medieva l famil y itself , thoug h embedde d i n a worl d tha t generall y prized hierarch y an d holism , lef t significan t roo m fo r individua l choice s and thu s fo r structura l variety. 3 The secon d perio d o f particula r importanc e fo r understandin g th e current debat e abou t th e family , tha t fro m th e star t o f th e Industria l Revolution t o the present, shows an unsteady , though apparent , transitio n away fro m th e feuda l model , towar d individualis m an d choic e a s th e defining characteristic s o f familia l connections , eve n thoug h th e mos t pervasive ideolog y o f famil y durin g mos t o f th e sam e perio d seeme d t o reject individualis m an d choice . During mos t o f thi s period , th e famil y wa s describe d a s a uniqu e domain o f interactio n tha t contraste d wit h interaction s i n th e market place. Tha t notio n o f separatio n wa s reflecte d i n a lega l syste m tha t regulated th e famil y throug h a distinc t se t o f rules . Thes e rule s con trasted—as "home " contrasted wit h "work"—wit h th e rule s that regulate d interactions i n th e marketplace . Until th e pas t fe w decades , societ y an d th e la w understoo d th e famil y as a univers e distinc t fro m almos t ever y othe r aren a o f socia l life—a s a realm o f private interaction s grounde d i n natura l an d supernatura l truths . On thos e truth s wer e predicate d th e hierarchica l structur e o f th e famil y unit a s well a s th e endurin g inevitabilit y o f famil y relationships . Durin g this period , th e famil y wa s almos t uniqu e withi n th e societ y a s a hierar chical socia l uni t grounde d i n a notion o f natural truth . However, other , olde r societies , bot h withi n th e Wes t an d elsewhere , did function, fa r mor e broadly, with hierarch y an d holis m a s their govern ing principles . Withi n th e West , th e feuda l perio d provide s th e bes t example o f a society tha t value d hierarch y an d holis m an d anchore d th e social whol e i n a sens e o f inexorabl e (supernatural ) truth . I n tha t worl d hierarchy an d holis m a s ideologica l principle s wer e no t relegate d t o th e domain o f hom e an d family , bu t rathe r broadl y define d relation s withi n the society . Th e medieva l world , a s a whole , suggeste d t o late r centurie s a mode l fo r understandin g th e famil y in contrast t o the mode l o f interac tion i n th e marketplace . 1171

The Transformation of the Family The present debate about family challenges an ideology of family that developed durin g th e nineteent h centur y an d tha t wa s furthe r embel lished durin g th e twentiet h century . However , th e intellectua l root s of that ideology took hold centuries earlier, during feudal times , when most social relation s wer e define d i n term s that , i n th e nineteent h century , came to distinguish the family from th e world of the marketplace. I. Hierarch y and Holism : Feudal Model s an d Feuda l Roots Louis Dumont and Steven A. Barnett,4 both anthropologists and students of Indian culture, compare the ideology of medieval Europe with that of traditional cast e India . Thei r analyse s provid e insight s abou t th e differ ences betwee n a worl d suc h a s th e nineteenth - an d twentieth-centur y United States that has come increasingly to value equality (as an ideological matter) and a world such a s feudal Europ e o r caste India tha t prizes hierarchy a t leas t i n significan t part . I n medieva l Europ e an d i n cast e India peopl e though t thei r worl d was , an d shoul d be , hierarchica l fa r more generall y tha n i n late r centuries . I n th e West , i n comparison , inequalities (suc h a s that represente d b y patriarchy o r those represente d by racism) conflict wit h a more general egalitarian ideolog y and are thus constantly bein g explaine d awa y (often th e respons e t o racism) o r justi fied as appropriat e within , thoug h onl y within , a particula r domai n o f interaction (th e family). In fact, choice and equality often compete d with hierarchy an d holis m i n definin g th e medieva l world . Bu t tha t world , because i t did value hierarchy and holism , provided late r centuries with a usefu l mode l o f socia l relation s no t premise d o n th e valuatio n o f equality and individualism . This difference betwee n an ideology of hierarchy in medieval Europ e and i n the modern world with regar d to definitions o f the family, funda mentally distinguishe s th e two . However , a close r loo k a t th e medieva l world an d it s notion s o f hierarch y an d holism—no t s o muc h withi n the family , a s withi n th e societ y mor e generally—allow s u s bette r t o comprehend th e developmen t o f thos e notion s i n applicatio n t o th e family within the transformed worl d of the modern West. The medieval world was organized around two interconnected hierar chies, tha t o f th e laity , culminatin g i n feuda l kings , an d tha t o f th e Catholic church. 5 Hierarch y an d a principl e o f inequalit y wer e centra l for each . Th e Churc h an d th e nobility , th e latte r includin g titula r an d i is

The Transformation of the Family generally wea k king s quit e unlik e thos e wh o emerge d late r i n Europea n history, wer e antagonist s an d compatriots . Th e bisho p an d th e nobl e each viewe d th e othe r a s a potentia l usurpe r o f hi s ow n rightfu l power . Yet the tw o group s share d a vision o f realit y tha t ultimatel y unite d the m in oppositio n t o th e shift s tha t shoo k feuda l Europ e a t th e en d o f th e medieval period . Each grou p relie d on , an d wa s organize d into , a hierarchica l syste m grounded i n sacred o r natural fact . The medieva l historia n George s Dub y refers t o th e "principl e o f necessary inequality " tha t organize d th e feuda l world, an d argue s tha t th e understandin g an d structur e o f tha t worl d developed ou t of the conjunction o f two kinds of dissimilarity, that institute d b y the ordo— there wer e th e priest s an d th e others—conjoine d wit h tha t institute d b y natura—there were noble s and serfs . The sourc e o f disorder wa s not that nature changed , bu t tha t th e orde r wa s breached . Thi s occurred , fo r instance, whe n "rustics " were include d i n th e deliberation s o f the peac e assemblies (o r whe n a ma n no t bor n int o th e nobilit y accede d t o th e episcopal dignity), when nobles were required to pray, or oratores to fight. 6 Those wh o labored , calle d variousl y peasant s o r serfs , wer e supporte d and exploite d b y th e noble s an d th e clergy . Thei r exploitation , however , was no t understoo d a s unnecessarily exploitative . Rather , oppressio n wa s hereditary. Adalbero , bisho p o f Lao n an d membe r o f a tenth-centur y noble famil y describe d peasant s a s thos e wh o wer e fit t o serve . "[T]hei r blood wa s no t th e bloo d o f kings , an d becaus e the y wer e no t ordained , [they] were compelle d t o alienate thei r strength i n the service of others." 7 Within th e medieva l worl d hierarch y wa s a fact—indeed th e preeminen t fact—of life , bot h everyda y an d sacred . Th e fac t o f hierarchy wa s consid ered a s inevitable a s the fac t o f social lif e itself . Again, hierarch y i n th e medieva l worl d mus t b e distinguishe d fro m inequality i n contemporar y society . Th e first reflecte d society' s under standing o f wha t shoul d be ; th e secon d contravene s a n ideolog y o f equality. So , fo r instance , American s ma y describ e a grou p define d i n terms o f rac e o r gende r a s inferio r an d the n procee d t o disclai m th e implication o f tha t inferiority' s inevitability . I n contrast , i n medieva l Europe hierarch y di d no t nee d t o b e excused . Inequalitie s wer e take n t o reflect a n inexorabl e realit y an d therefor e di d no t requir e justification . Moreover, th e medieva l worl d understoo d hierarch y a s a structur e 1191

The Transformation of the Family with reciprocit y an d mutualit y a t it s center . Medieva l hierarchy , i n bot h its religious an d secula r forms , constitute d a structured unity. Th e whol e was define d b y a notio n o f "mutua l interchange." 8 Whe n Charlemagn e ordered tha t "ever y man shal l kee p t o his ow n life' s purpos e an d hi s ow n profession, unanimously" h e capture d th e fac t o f hierarch y an d th e reciprocity embedde d i n it. 9 I n th e worl d o f medieva l hierarchy , thos e a t each en d o f the socia l order wer e understood t o exist only in dependenc e on eac h other . There wa s little roo m fo r autonomou s individuality . Christian metaphor s spawne d an d nourishe d th e mutualit y o f medi eval hierarchy. George s Dub y explained : To mak e disciplin e bearable , an d inequalit y tolerable , i t wa s prudent t o accredit th e notio n tha t i n Christia n society—muc h a s betwee n parent s and children , ol d an d young , or as in an y community, i n monaster y an d palace alike , i n village s a s among soldiers—heart s wer e boun d b y ties of affection.10 In metaphor s characterizin g the unit y and reciprocit y o f social and eccle siastical hierarch y i n the medieva l world , reference s t o the corpora l unit y of Chris t wer e transforme d int o reference s t o th e domesti c uni t an d relations within it . To the exten t tha t th e medieva l famil y operate d a s a hierarchical unit , defined b y respect an d deference , tha t famil y reflecte d th e large r society . In this , the famil y wa s an extensio n o f the res t o f feudal lif e an d wa s no t defined, a s modern familie s hav e been , i n contras t wit h muc h o f the res t of ongoing social life . The famil y metapho r ca n b e applie d t o th e large r feuda l societ y because th e societ y a s a whole wa s seen a s a hierarchical unit , eac h par t of whic h wa s understoo d i n ligh t o f th e large r whole . I n th e medieva l world, th e structure d relation s tha t define d a socia l whol e provide d th e unit o f ideological value . In th e feuda l world , th e hierarchica l an d holisti c characte r o f socia l life preclude d th e sor t o f extrem e individualit y an d individua l privac y later attache d t o th e individua l i n th e Wes t a s a fac t an d then , expressly , as a right . Th e comparativ e absenc e o f individua l privac y furthe r distin guishes medieva l familie s fro m thos e o f today . Ideologica l constraint s on th e developmen t o f individua l privac y wer e parallele d b y physica l constraints tha t made personal , physical privacy , as it is understood today , a virtual impossibilit y within th e medieva l household . Certainl y form s o f |2 0|

The Transformation of the Family privacy existe d i n th e feuda l period , bu t tha t privac y wa s significantl y different fro m th e individua l privac y tha t develope d late r i n Europ e an d the Unite d States . Eve n famil y privacy , s o importan t i n socia l an d lega l approaches t o famil y matter s fro m th e nineteent h centur y on , wa s no t framed a s distinct fro m othe r form s o f privacy i n th e feuda l world . Privacy, lik e almos t al l othe r socia l aspect s o f the medieva l world , wa s defined an d regulate d b y th e realit y o f a hierarchica l universe . Within any uni t o f tha t hierarch y (e.g. , a feuda l manor , a domus, o r a famil y residence), relation s wer e "private " i n th e sens e tha t the y wer e not , o r were onl y minimally, regulate d b y outside powers . Indeed, on e o f the ke y developments i n th e secon d par t o f the feuda l perio d wa s the "privatiza tion o f power. " Thi s so-calle d "feuda l revolution " involve d a dramati c evisceration o f public la w and power . I t did not , however, involv e the sor t of autonomous individualit y tha t provide d th e ideologica l contex t fo r th e development o f privac y (including , i n particular , th e developmen t o f private property ) tha t occurre d i n th e West i n th e nineteent h century . The perso n i n feuda l Europ e wa s neve r private , a s presentl y under stood. Th e perso n wa s always , an d o f necessity , define d a s part of som e larger unit . Obviously , individua l peopl e existe d a s physicall y distinc t agents o f action , bu t eac h perso n wa s define d a s separat e onl y i n th e context o f some larger , hierarchicall y organize d group . Medieval societ y value d th e group , no t th e individual . Individua l privacy was an ideologica l impossibilit y i n a world tha t di d no t recogniz e individuals a s th e ultimatel y valuabl e uni t o f socia l life . Accordingly , privacy attache d t o group s an d no t t o individua l persons . Withi n th e society's hierarchicall y structure d subgroup s (e.g. , domestic groups , how ever widel y defined) , bond s o f connection , grounde d i n heredity , linke d people together . Th e resultin g whol e wa s organize d hierarchically . Th e word prive in courtl y Frenc h referre d t o "th e peopl e an d thing s include d within th e famil y circl e . . . over which th e maste r o f the hous e exercise d his power." 11 Thu s privac y i n feuda l Europe , lik e privac y i n th e moder n world, coul d impl y intimac y wit h thos e insid e an d distanc e fro m thos e outside. However , th e locu s fo r understandin g intimac y an d distanc e alike was not the person, but som e hierarchicall y organized , larger , socia l whole. The emergenc e o f moder n understanding s o f th e perso n i n th e Wes t depended o n the transformation an d demis e of feudal society . The notio n of personal privacy , defined a s an attribut e an d righ t of individuals could , 21

The Transformation of the Family and did , develo p onl y afte r th e almos t tota l declin e o f feuda l forms . Privacy i n th e moder n sens e depend s o n definin g th e individua l perso n apart fro m large r socia l forms . Th e firm institutionalizatio n o f the sor t of individualism tha t provide d fo r an d encourage d individua l privac y cam e with th e Industria l Revolutio n an d th e Frenc h Enlightenment . Eac h depended o n an d promote d th e replacemen t o f th e notio n o f privileg e with th e notio n o f equality, an d o f holism wit h individualism . Obviously, the declin e o f privilege an d th e developmen t o f individual ism an d o f the notio n o f individual equalit y di d no t signa l th e actua l en d of social inequality . However , a s R . H . Tawney , amon g others , ha s mad e clear, th e for m an d meanin g o f th e inequalitie s tha t survive d differe d significantly fro m th e for m an d meanin g o f feudal inequality . The erosio n o f feudalism an d th e appearance o f modern individualis m involved th e declin e o f th e feuda l world' s religiou s an d secula r hierar chies. I n feuda l Europ e thos e form s directe d al l aspect s o f life, includin g the relation s amon g peopl e an d th e relation s betwee n peopl e an d God . The person' s relatio n t o Go d wa s inevitabl y mediate d b y a n elaborat e Church hierarchy ; similarly, before th e development o f the moder n state , the person' s relatio n t o secula r powe r wa s mediate d b y th e complicate d secular hierarch y compose d o f nobles an d knights , serfs an d kings . In th e system o f belie f tha t undergirde d feuda l society , unmediate d acces s t o the king or to God coul d hardl y be imagined . This description, o f course, is a t th e leve l o f ideology . I n fact , ever y societ y seem s t o witnes s an d support variou s exception s t o preferre d an d institutionalize d forms . Bu t as a matter o f belief an d value , the feuda l worl d di d no t acknowledg e th e possibility o f individual peopl e enjoyin g direc t acces s to king o r God . The emergenc e o f unmediated acces s t o rulin g power s —in th e socio political worl d wit h th e establishmen t o f nationalism an d i n th e religiou s world wit h th e establishmen t o f Protestantism—provide d a contex t within whic h lat e eighteenth - an d nineteenth-centur y individualism , along wit h th e individual' s righ t t o privac y an d t o privat e property , coul d develop. Perhaps nowher e ar e th e socia l implications , i f no t th e concret e his tory, o f feudalism's declin e mor e forcefull y suggeste d tha n i n Saint ]oan, George Bernar d Shaw' s pla y abou t Joa n o f Arc . Th e Ear l o f Warwick , Shaw's principa l representativ e o f feudalism' s declinin g nobility , ex plained wh y it was imperative tha t Joan's voice be stilled. H e sai d o f Joan: "It i s the protes t o f th e individua l sou l agains t th e interferenc e o f pries t

I22 I

The Transformation of the Family or peer betwee n th e privat e ma n an d hi s God . I should cal l i t Protestant ism i f I had t o find a name fo r it." 12 Sha w elaborate d o n th e them e i n hi s long preface t o the play : [Joan's] prayer s wer e wonderfu l conversation s wit h he r thre e saints . He r piety seeme d superhuma n t o th e formall y dutifu l peopl e whos e religio n was onl y a tas k t o them . Bu t whe n th e Churc h wa s no t offerin g he r favorite luxuries , bu t callin g o n he r t o accep t it s interpretatio n o f God' s will, and to sacrifice he r own, she flatly refused, an d made it clear that her notion o f a Catholic Churc h wa s one i n whic h th e Pop e was Pope Joan. How could the Church tolerat e that, when i t had jus t destroyed Hus , and had watched th e career of Wycliffe wit h a growing anger that would have brought him, too, to the stake, had h e not died a natural deat h before th e wrath fel l o n hi m i n hi s grave? Neithe r Hu s no r Wycliff e wa s as bluntly defiant a s Joan : bot h wer e reformer s o f th e Churc h lik e Luther ; whils t Joan, like Mrs. Eddy, was quite prepared to supersede St . Peter as the rock on whic h th e Churc h wa s built , an d lik e Mahomet , wa s alway s read y with a privat e revelatio n fro m Go d t o settl e ever y questio n an d fit every occasion. In Shaw' s presentation , Joa n foreshadowe d Protestantis m on e hundre d years befor e Marti n Luthe r b y effectin g a religiou s stanc e tha t afforde d the individua l direc t acces s t o God , thereb y precludin g nee d fo r th e mediation o f th e clerica l hierarchy . Joan' s relatio n t o Go d wa s i n tha t sense individualistic , an d fo r tha t reason , coul d becom e widesprea d onl y centuries later . The hierarchica l an d holisti c bond s o f relationshi p tha t anchore d medieval hierarch y an d imbue d i t with meanin g an d powe r hav e largel y disappeared fro m th e moder n world . The y hav e bee n replace d b y othe r forms o f connectio n i n th e contemporar y West . Ther e i s n o ideologica l constraint preventin g direc t connectio n betwee n th e individua l an d sources o f ultimate power . Tha t is , nothing a t th e leve l o f belief o r valu e now preclude s th e individua l fro m approachin g form s o f ultimate powe r (whether o r no t thos e ar e stil l define d a s "God " an d "king" ) withou t mediators. Obviously , ther e ma y b e a hos t o f practical reason s tha t mak e it impossible o r unlikel y tha t an y individua l coul d obtai n direc t acces s t o the source s o f political o r religious power . Yet, it is not unimaginable tha t mediation b e eliminated. 13 The obviou s demis e o f th e feuda l worl d notwithstanding , pocket s o f social interactio n tha t migh t hav e seeme d vaguel y familia r t o th e medi I2 3 I

The Transformation of the Family eval perso n hav e survive d int o th e presen t century . Th e famil y wa s primary amon g thes e pocket s o f socia l lif e tha t remaine d hierarchica l and tha t wa s understoo d a s a socia l whol e rathe r tha n a s a collectio n o f autonomous individual s lon g afte r equalit y replace d hierarch y a s th e dominant ideolog y o f the time . II. Th e Preservatio n an d Transformatio n o f Feuda l Form s in th e Moder n Famil y Connection i s no longer inevitabl y embedde d i n community . Rather , th e ideology of autonomous individualit y define s peopl e as free t o select thei r own partners , desig n thei r ow n communities , an d ac t ou t thei r ow n dramas. Th e mos t obviou s aren a fo r thi s individualisti c focu s ha s bee n the worl d o f work, th e worl d o f the marketplace . There , th e connection s between peopl e ar e neithe r endurin g no r deepl y rooted . The y ar e no t expected t o be . The complet e perso n i s by definition th e perso n entitle d to negotiat e an d ente r contracts . A s contract s begi n an d end , s o d o th e connections the y effect . A n essentia l aspec t o f contractua l link s i s tha t they ar e no t understoo d a s necessaril y endurin g no r solidary . Suc h con nections d o no t generally , an d ar e no t expecte d to , evolv e int o tie s tha t last beyon d th e perio d tha t th e partie s bargaine d for . Wit h thes e ne w forms o f interactio n come s a ne w for m o f privac y a s well . Thi s i s th e privacy o f th e individua l apar t fro m an y group s t o whic h h e o r sh e ma y belong. Until recently , i n th e moder n worl d th e famil y almos t alon e seeme d to stan d apar t fro m th e encompassin g ideolog y o f th e marke t wit h it s stress o n autonomou s individuality . N o longe r deepl y embedde d i n a larger worl d tha t prized hierarch y an d determine d wort h a s an inevitabl e correlate o f social position , th e famil y emerge d int o the moder n worl d a s a lonel y reminde r o f a ver y differen t socia l order . A s such , th e famil y became a symbol, as well perhap s a s a historic repository , for a world tha t contrasts wit h th e marketplace . I n thi s sense , beginnin g wit h th e star t o f the Industria l Revolution , th e famil y i n th e moder n worl d distinctivel y began t o represen t a n olde r univers e i n whic h socia l relation s wer e hierarchical an d holisti c an d whic h reflecte d equalit y an d individualit y only fleetingly an d onl y incidentally . The characte r o f th e famil y bega n t o appea r noticeabl y uniqu e i n society b y th e lat e eighteent h an d earl y nineteent h centurie s becaus e a t

IHI

The Transformation of the Family that tim e othe r socia l institution s ha d almos t completel y she d thei r medieval roots . Indeed , th e family—practicall y alon e amon g Wester n institutions, an d despit e significan t transformation s durin g th e cours e o f the past several hundred years—preserve d wel l int o the twentiet h centur y significant aspect s o f the holistic , hierarchical structur e o f social relation ships tha t characterize d mos t o f feuda l life . B y this time , th e ideologica l distinction betwee n hom e an d wor k encourage d th e elaboratio n o f a n ideology o f family tha t sharpl y differentiate d th e famil y (an d th e worl d o f women an d children ) fro m th e worl d o f work (an d o f men) . Obviously , however, th e famil y o f th e Industria l Revolutio n an d th e subsequen t century, precisel y becaus e i t was increasingl y distinguishe d fro m th e res t of social life, differed dramaticall y from th e feudal famil y which reflected , and forme d a n integra l par t of , th e large r socia l world . In contras t with th e famil y tha t develope d a t the star t o f the Industria l Revolution, familie s o f th e colonia l perio d i n th e Unite d State s wer e distinctly premodern . Durin g th e seventeent h an d muc h o f th e nex t century, familie s wer e joine d i n tie s o f mutuality wit h th e large r colonia l community. N o ideologica l contrasts , an d n o distinc t socia l patterns , ye t separated familie s fro m th e large r world . Familie s durin g thi s perio d resembled thos e o f th e followin g centurie s i n bein g compose d basicall y of marrie d couple s an d thei r children . However , mor e tha n i n th e nex t century, familie s i n th e colonia l perio d ofte n include d boarders , trad e apprentices, an d servants . Moreover , n o separatio n stoo d betwee n thes e nuclear familie s an d th e worl d o f work . Eac h participate d in , an d wa s clearly part of , th e other . As John Demo s describe s th e colonia l famil y "i t was no t simpl y tha t th e famil y an d th e communit y ra n togethe r a t s o many points; the on e was, in the words of the preacher, ' a lively represen tation' o f th e other . Thei r structure , thei r guidin g values , thei r inne r purposes, were essentiall y the same." 14 By th e ver y en d o f th e eighteent h century , th e shif t towar d famil y structures no w describe d a s moder n bega n t o develop . A t thi s time , a sense o f impendin g doom—on e stil l fel t an d activel y discussed—bega n to develo p wit h regar d t o famil y matters . T o a significan t exten t durin g this period , th e societ y maintaine d a vie w o f famil y resemblin g tha t o f the medieva l worl d with regar d t o social lif e generally . Within th e family , for instance , the locu s of value remained , a t least until quit e recently , th e family uni t as a whole —not any particular person . However , eve n durin g the nineteent h an d earl y twentiet h centurie s rea l change s obviousl y 1251

The Transformation of the Family began t o emerge, change s tha t ultimatel y transforme d th e famil y an d th e understanding o f family awa y from th e medieva l model . Although th e traditiona l ideolog y o f famil y wa s rarel y conteste d ex pressly unti l recen t decades , th e sociologica l contour s o f famil y tha t ar e so often associate d wit h unprecedente d development s durin g th e las t half of th e twentiet h centur y bega n t o appea r clearl y a centur y earlier . I n the nineteent h century , paterna l authorit y weakened , marriag e becam e increasingly a matte r o f individua l choice , an d th e family , n o longe r unaided i n providin g fo r th e educationa l an d welfar e need s o f it s mem bers, wa s mor e ofte n expecte d t o "provid e romance , sexua l fulfillment , companionship, an d emotiona l satisfaction." 15 Moreover , th e divorc e rate ros e noticeabl y i n th e nineteent h century . Mint z an d Kellog g repor t that i n Sa n Francisc o i n th e first par t o f th e twentiet h century , one quarter o f al l marriage s ende d i n divorce . An d divorc e a t tha t tim e wa s not unknow n elsewhere . Twent y percen t o f marriage s i n Lo s Angeles , and 1 4 percen t o f thos e i n Chicag o terminate d i n divorce. 16 A t th e same time , birthrate s decreased , especiall y withi n middle-clas s families . Moreover, wome n bega n t o work for wage s i n large r numbers. 17 Ironically, durin g th e nineteent h century , a s relation s amon g famil y members, especiall y adul t famil y members , bega n increasingl y t o resem ble relation s outsid e th e family , eve n relation s withi n th e m a r k e t relations buil t o n fre e choic e rathe r tha n o n inexorabl e bond s o f connection—an imag e o f the famil y tha t depende d on , and embodie d a contras t between famil y an d wor k wa s elaborate d an d wa s rarel y contradicte d b y alternative ideologica l visions . Thi s traditiona l ideolog y o f family , founded o n difference s betwee n relationship s a t hom e an d relationship s at work , wa s mos t full y develope d an d wa s widely , almos t universally , embraced i n th e Unite d State s i n th e middl e year s o f th e twentiet h century, just before th e developing threat to the traditional famil y becam e obvious. Thus, i n respondin g initiall y t o th e astonishin g change s i n cultur e and famil y tha t coincide d wit h th e ful l developmen t o f th e Industria l Revolution, th e societ y constructe d a visio n o f old-fashioned , decen t families tha t playe d o n an d romanticized , bu t di d no t reall y accuratel y reflect, familie s a s the y ha d existe d befor e th e earl y nineteent h century . Ironically, nineteenth-century , romanticize d image s o f loving , commit ted, eternall y enduring , an d deepl y affectionat e familie s wer e embrace d 26

The Transformation of the Family most intensel y an d pervasivel y i n th e middl e year s o f th e twentiet h century. In th e 1950 s especially , th e societ y widel y endorse d th e ideolog y o f family develope d durin g th e nineteent h century . Althoug h no t al l fami lies followe d th e rules , thos e rule s wer e clearl y define d an d vigilantl y defended i n th e middl e year s of the twentiet h century . The famil y o f that period, a s describe d b y th e anthropologis t Davi d M . Schneider , consti tuted a unit o f life, characterize d b y "enduring, diffus e solidarity." 18 In a n ethnograph y o f America n kinship , first publishe d i n 1968 , Schneider explained : The se t of features whic h distinguishe s hom e an d wor k i s one expressio n of th e genera l paradig m fo r ho w kinshi p relation s shoul d b e conducte d and to what end. These features form a closely interconnected cluster . The contrast between love and money in American culture summarizes this cluste r o f distinctiv e features . Mone y i s material , i t i s power , i t i s impersonal an d unqualifie d b y consideration s o f sentimen t o r morality . Relations o f work , centerin g o n money , ar e a temporary , transitor y sort . They are contingent, depending entirely on the specific goal—money . . . . [T]he opposition between money and love is not simply that money is material an d lov e i s not. Mone y i s material, bu t lov e i s spiritual. Th e spiritual qualit y o f lov e i s closel y linke d wit h th e fac t tha t i n lov e i t i s personal consideration s whic h ar e th e crucia l ones . Persona l considera tions are a question of who it is, not of how well they perform thei r task or how efficien t the y are . Lov e i s a relationshi p betwee n persons . Moralit y and sentimen t i n tur n ar e th e essenc e o f the spiritua l qualit y o f love, for they transcend smal l and pett y considerations of private gain or advantage or mere gratification. 19 In analyzin g th e famil y o f th e mid-twentiet h century , Schneide r de scribed th e symbo l o f lov e t o bridg e tw o culturall y distinc t domains . H e characterized thes e tw o domain s t o involve , respectively , relationship s based o n share d "substance " (e.g. , blood , genes ) an d relation s define d through a particula r "cod e fo r conduct " (th e conduc t o f kin towar d an d among eac h other) . Thu s Schneide r describe d th e famil y o f th e perio d to involv e a biologica l dimensio n an d a socia l dimension . Muc h o f th e contemporary debat e abou t family revolve s around consideratio n o f these two dimension s o f familia l relationships . I n th e 1960s , however , thes e terms were mor e ofte n assume d tha n activel y debated . 2

7

The Transformation of the Family Schneider described Americans as envisioning the family of the period as a special, almost sacred domain, distinct spatially, and i n almost every other way, from work (the world of money and of the "office"). Schneide r portrayed th e famil y a s a domai n i n whic h relationship s wer e ordered , enduring, an d inexorable . I n contrast , a t work, people coul d a t least i n theory negotiat e th e term s o f thei r ow n realitie s an d relationships . A bargain was intended to last only as long as the parties planned. Not so at home. Relationships endured , an d th e terms of those relationships were not freel y negotiable . Mother s wer e understoo d a s mothers , father s a s fathers, and children as children because nature harmonized with history to make them so. As home stood to love, so work stood to money. Thus, well int o the twentiet h century , the ideolog y of family, despit e significant transformation s i n th e demograph y o f family lif e durin g th e course of the preceding several centuries, valued both holism and hierarchy, traits that characterized social relations throughout the feudal world . Moreover famil y relations , ideall y characterize d b y relation s o f af fection and intimacy, were understood as cemented by the fact of biological inevitability . Similarly , the obligation s owed , and right s accorded, to people within familie s wer e understood a s predicated upo n th e substantial (biological) link s among those people. These links were consistently understood to make families families. This understanding of families was held widel y i n th e Unite d State s unti l th e lat e 1960s . Then, wit h aston ishing speed , larg e segment s o f th e societ y recognize d an d accepte d alterative vision s o f family , whic h conflicte d i n importan t regard s wit h the traditional ideolog y of family. III. Familie s o f the Presen t Within onl y a decade o r two after Schneide r s o forcefully describe d th e shape of the American family at mid-century, people in almost every walk of life becam e increasingl y self-consciou s abou t the meanin g of familia l relationships an d abou t alternative s fo r creatin g an d livin g i n families . The comparativel y homogenous ideolog y of family describe d b y Schneider fo r th e societ y a s a whol e jus t afte r mid-centur y seeme d suddenl y challenged by alternative understandings. As a result, old-fashioned fami lies have increasingly become subject to criticism and even contempt by some within th e society . Fo r others, they represen t a hallowed pas t tha t should be preserved at almost any cost. 28

The Transformation of the Family The demographic s o f famil y lif e change d mor e rapidl y an d mor e dramatically i n the last half of the twentiet h centur y tha n i n the previous century an d a half . Elain e Tyle r Ma y define d i96 0 a s a "demographi c watershed" i n th e characte r o f the America n family. 20 B y the 1970s , 50 percent o f America n marriage s terminate d i n divorce ; 2 5 percen t o f households consiste d o f one individual ; an d onl y 3 3 percent o f familie s contained tw o parents an d thei r mino r children . B y the mid-1980 s les s than 1 5 percent o f American familie s containe d a working father , a stayat-home mother , and their children . Further , whil e 1 2 percent of mothers of preschool childre n worke d i n 1950 , by 1980 45 percent worked , and by the lat e 1980 s mor e tha n 6 6 percent o f three- and four-year-old childre n were i n day care or nursery school . Betwee n th e early 1960s and the early 1990s th e percentag e o f childre n bor n t o unmarrie d parent s increase d 500 percent, fro m 5 percent of all births to 25 percent. Reactions t o thes e change s diffe r fro m thos e o f previou s decade s i n that now significant segment s of the society accept, or at least justify, suc h changes. Certainly , man y peopl e withi n th e society se e such change s i n the famil y a s signalin g a disastrou s breakdow n i n th e socia l order , wit h the "disintegratio n o f th e family " a t th e cente r o f tha t phenomenon. 21 However, other s focu s o n differen t aspect s o f th e transformin g family , especially th e increase d choice s ope n t o peopl e creatin g an d livin g i n families, an d se e change a s mor e valuabl e tha n disruptive . Onl y withi n the las t thre e o r fou r decade s ha s the transformatio n o f the famil y awa y from th e traditiona l idea l bee n widel y applaude d a s well a s disparaged . Alternative understanding s o f family—understandings tha t value equalit y and autonom y a t least a s much a s permanence—vie publicl y wit h mor e traditional understandings . The resultin g debat e ha s engaged wid e segment s o f the society . Self consciousness abou t th e famil y ha s grow n throughou t th e society ; th e consequent proliferatio n o f widel y divergent , ofte n contradictory , re sponses i s occurring wit h muc h strengt h o f feeling. Thi s debate , whic h followed almos t inevitabl y a s the gap between image s o f family an d the reality o f actua l familie s becam e almos t impossibl e t o ignore , ha s itsel f become a n importan t facto r i n the developing transformatio n o f familie s and familia l relationships . Still, to some extent , th e traditional ideolog y o f family, tha t seeme d t o reign almos t entirel y unoppose d durin g the middle year s of the twentiet h century, and that today is clearly challenged b y alternative visions, contin2

9

The Transformation of the Family ues t o infor m lega l an d socia l choices . However , t o a remarkabl e extent , the famil y ha s been an d i s being redefine d i n term s muc h close r t o thos e that onl y thre e o r fou r decade s ag o wer e associate d almos t exclusivel y with th e marketplace . A s a result , vision s o f old-fashione d familie s no w compete wit h vision s o f families-through-choice . However, the presentatio n o f these visions as contrasting options belie s the realit y o f contemporary famil y life . Actually, familie s viewe d a s traditional an d other s viewe d a s "modern " reflec t an d resembl e eac h othe r more ofte n tha n not , eve n a s they are contrasted wit h eac h other . Neithe r seems clearly to be displacing or replacing the other . Or, mor e accurately , in a worl d i n whic h societ y interpret s th e "politic s o f family " t o defin e what i s generally valuable, traditional familie s becom e mor e "traditional " and moder n familie s mor e "modern, " eac h b y expres s compariso n wit h the other . Eac h depend s on , an d develop s i n respons e to , th e other . A s the Englis h anthropologis t Marily n Strather n ha s observed , ther e ar e times whe n ou r societ y want s t o entertai n traditio n an d modernit y a t once. Sh e writes: [F]or contemporar y Euro-America n culture , w e coul d sa y tha t ther e i s both mor e statu s an d mor e contrac t aroun d —more appea l t o geneti c essentialism an d mor e opennes s t o optiv e kinship . And i f there seem s to be "more," it is because Euro-Americans imagine they are able to do more things wit h thei r ideas , implemen t the m i n mor e situations . W e ca n point t o on e sourc e o f enablement , "technology" . . .. I n truth , th e ne w reproductive technologies enable moderns to choose between "traditional" and "modern" forms of relating, or to choose to facilitate bot h at the same time for that matter. 22 The nineteent h centur y value d traditio n bu t constructe d "traditional " families t o sui t th e need s an d desire s o f th e tim e rathe r tha n t o reflec t accurately wha t ha d been . Th e twentiet h centur y preserved , an d broad ened tha t approac h t o famil y bu t complexifie d i t wit h intensifie d self consciousness, wit h ope n approva l an d elaboratio n o f familie s define d through autonomou s individuality , an d wit h th e acceptance , howeve r ambivalent, o f a technologica l approac h t o huma n reproductio n tha t challenges completel y th e assumption , s o crucial t o th e nineteent h cen tury, tha t natura l processe s o f biologica l connectio n undergir d famil y relationships. For these reasons , the dilemma s an d dispute s occasione d b y reproduc -

ho

The Transformation of the Family tive technolog y an d surrogac y provid e a remarkabl y fruitfu l aren a withi n which t o examine socia l response s t o the changin g family . Assiste d repro duction involve s incredible , ne w form s o f choic e fo r peopl e bot h withi n and outsid e o f traditiona l famil y structures . I t question s th e biologica l underpinnings o f traditiona l conception s o f family; moreover , i t encour ages people t o create families i n context s that depend upo n th e assistanc e of thir d partie s (includin g doctors , lawyers , brokers , surrogates , an d ga mete donors ) an d tha t usuall y involv e mone y exchange . A s a result , assisted reproduction , muc h a s th e familie s i t promise s (o r threatens ) t o create, ca n be , an d is , acclaimed fo r enablin g th e creatio n o f enduring , affectionate families ; equall y i t can be , and is , condemned fo r manipulat ing th e dimension s o f huma n reproductio n an d thereb y contributin g t o the breakdow n o f traditional famil y life .

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TWO

Family La w i n Transitio n

The socia l an d ideologica l change s examine d i n th e las t chapte r ar e reflected i n th e response s o f th e la w t o famil y matters . I n th e final decades o f the twentiet h century , famil y la w change d dramatically . Afte r more tha n a century o f opposition t o increase d choic e an d individualis m within th e family , legislator s i n ever y state quickl y amende d ol d law s an d promulgated ne w one s i n th e las t fou r decade s o f the twentiet h century . These ne w rule s clearl y acknowledg e an d reflec t th e demographi c an d ideological change s tha t ha d bee n alterin g th e scop e an d meanin g o f the family fo r man y decades . Reproductive technolog y an d surrogac y severel y test the law' s limits as courts an d legislator s slowl y abandon , o r a t leas t reconstruct , th e famil y law syste m fashione d durin g th e pas t centur y an d a half. Face d wit h th e startling consequence s o f surrogacy an d th e ne w reproductiv e technolog ies, legislators hav e bee n slo w in responding , an d courts , uncertain abou t how t o reac t bu t compelle d t o d o s o anyway , hav e a s a grou p behave d with confusio n an d ambivalence . For th e mos t part , th e law' s developin g recognitio n o f individualis m and choic e i n th e creatio n an d operatio n o f families ha s limite d itsel f t o relationships betwee n adult s (especiall y spouse s an d cohabitants ) withi n families. Wit h regar d t o th e parent-chil d connection , th e la w ha s bee n much slowe r t o accep t change . Bu t dispute s occasione d b y reproductiv e technology ofte n involv e question s abou t parentag e an d custod y an d ar e therefore provin g especiall y difficul t fo r court s t o resolv e wit h certaint y and consistency . For thi s reason , thi s chapte r consider s change s i n famil y la w durin g the las t decade s o f th e twentiet h centur y tha t acknowledg e choic e an d that extend the opportunity to negotiate the terms of familial relationship s but wit h regar d primaril y t o relationship s involvin g adults . Subsequen t

IV I

Family Law in Transition chapters explor e th e law' s fa r mor e hesitan t an d ambivalen t respons e t o the consequence s o f assisted reproductio n (whic h affect s th e parent-chil d relationship directly) . This chapte r firs t outline s a widesprea d se t o f shift s i n th e concret e responses o f the la w i n th e Unite d State s a s a whol e durin g th e pas t fe w decades t o relationship s amon g adult s withi n families . Thes e shift s al l indicate increasin g acceptanc e b y the la w of the ideologica l shif t towar d individualism withi n families . Th e forc e an d implication s o f that accep tance ar e the n considere d throug h compariso n o f tw o decision s o f th e United State s Suprem e Court— Griswold v . Connecticut, decide d i n 196 5 and Eisenstadt v . Baird, decide d i n 1972 . Eac h invalidate d o n constitu tional grounds a state statute that limited th e availability of contraception . Each strengthene d lega l argument s fo r protectin g procreationa l auton omy. An d thu s eac h hold s implication s fo r case s involvin g th e ne w reproductive technologie s an d surrogacy . However, a significan t ideologica l differenc e separate s Griswold fro m Eisenstadt i n tha t th e first reflect s traditiona l understanding s o f famil y and home . The secon d doe s not. This contrast between th e two otherwis e quite simila r case s indicate s th e law' s developin g acceptanc e o f a visio n of family , especiall y wit h regar d t o relation s amon g adults , tha t value s choice an d individualism . I. Th e Transformin g Respons e o f th e La w t o Famil y Matter s During th e nineteent h century , a n interes t i n stemmin g socia l change s in traditiona l pattern s o f domesti c lif e provide d on e encouragemen t t o the growt h o f family la w as a discrete are a o f American civi l law. Even so , the respons e o f the la w i n th e Unite d State s t o changin g famil y pattern s has no t bee n withou t deviation s an d regiona l differences . However , dur ing th e nineteent h centur y th e appearanc e withi n th e famil y o f similari ties t o form s o f interactio n i n th e marketplac e threatene d a societ y tha t more an d mor e define d th e famil y throug h contrast s wit h th e worl d o f work, and th e explici t separation o f family la w from al l forms o f commer cial la w provide d on e defens e agains t th e possibilit y tha t th e for m o f relationships i n th e marketplac e coul d b e importe d int o th e hom e an d could begi n t o affect relationship s there . Thus, on e importan t respons e o f the la w to changes i n famil y pattern s during th e nineteent h centur y involve d th e impositio n o f hars h ne w 133

Family Law in Transition definitions an d prohibitions . Fo r instance , acknowledgin g an d re sponding t o a ris e i n th e rat e o f divorc e b y th e lat e nineteent h century , state legislature s widel y reduce d th e ground s an d toughene d th e proce dures b y whic h peopl e coul d divorce . A t th e sam e tim e an d fo r simila r reasons, state s widel y restricte d th e availabilit y o f contraceptio n an d forbade abortio n a t an y poin t durin g a pregnancy . Abortio n ha d bee n made a statutor y crim e i n th e Unite d State s abou t fifty years earlier , bu t the earl y anti-abortio n statute s generall y preserve d th e common-la w rul e that ha d n o quarre l wit h terminatio n o f a pregnancy befor e "quickening " (the mother' s first recognition o f fetal movement). 1 In 1873 , m e U.S . Congres s passe d th e Comstoc k La w (name d afte r New York' s "purit y campaigner, " Anthon y Comstock) . Thi s la w severel y punished th e transmissio n o r importatio n o f materia l providin g informa tion about contraception o r abortion. 2 Thus, for many decades lawmaker s refused t o endors e th e ne w realitie s emergin g i n socia l an d domesti c lif e in the Unite d States . However, the hars h statute s promulgated durin g th e nineteenth centur y wer e somewha t les s rigidl y applie d i n practic e be cause courts , though generall y followin g legislativ e direction , wer e reluc tant i n particula r case s t o enforc e th e stringen t ne w laws . Ultimately , such legislativ e restriction s an d prohibition s faile d t o contai n th e pro cesses o f change . Despit e th e promulgatio n o f law s tha t prohibite d con traception an d abortion , famil y siz e continue d t o decline ; actua l hus bands an d wive s note d th e new , stif f law s tha t expressl y prohibite d contraception an d abortion , bu t spoke i n oppositio n throug h "silen t practice." 3 Faced wit h a growing gap between lega l rule s and life , the la w eventu ally relented , an d especiall y b y th e secon d hal f o f th e twentiet h centur y began t o tolerate , an d ofte n activel y t o endorse , change s i n th e famil y that reflecte d individualis m an d tha t valued choic e ove r tradition. B y this time, mor e tha n hal f o f American marriage s ende d i n divorce , an d onl y about one-thir d o f familie s consiste d o f tw o parent s an d thei r mino r children. With astonishin g rapidity , beginnin g i n th e lat e 1960 s th e legislativ e bulwark, erecte d i n th e previou s centur y t o thwart change s i n th e famil y and represente d especiall y by prohibitions agains t divorce, contraception , and abortion , collapsed . Withi n a decad e famil y la w reverse d cours e almost completely . B y the lat e 1970 s family law , at leas t a s regard s adult s and th e relatio n betwee n adult s withi n families , provide d fo r broadene d 1341

Family Law in Transition understandings o f familia l relationships . Moreover , famil y la w began , i f hesitantly an d onl y partially , t o amalgamat e wit h contract , tort , an d property law . The proces s occurre d rapidly , though no t without lingerin g ambivalence. With regar d t o childre n an d th e parent-chil d relationshi p i n particu lar, th e la w ha s bee n slowe r t o sanctio n shift s awa y fro m tradition . Tha t process i s occurrin g a s wel l bu t i s mor e obviousl y riddle d wit h dee p ambivalence, an d consequentl y wit h contradiction . Thi s proces s ca n b e seen perhap s most clearly in the response s of the la w to disputes involvin g reproductive technolog y becaus e ther e th e parent-chil d bon d i s bein g created i n transparentl y ne w ways , sociall y an d biologically . I f thi s rela tionship ca n b e created in contractua l term s and o n commercia l grounds , perhaps i t can , an d will , becom e indistinguishabl e fro m commercia l relationships i n it s actualization a s well as in it s creation. The consequen t fear tha t babies, and th e women wh o produce them , will be commodifie d is onl y th e mos t frequentl y voice d lamen t abou t th e developmen t o f assisted reproductio n t o surrogac y an d th e ne w reproductiv e techno logies. At present , th e la w remain s reluctan t t o allo w th e parent-chil d bon d to b e create d i n term s o f th e marketplace . Bu t wit h regar d t o adults , family law , beginning i n the lat e 1960s , expressly approved th e creatio n — and t o some, though a lesser, extent , the operatio n —of families governe d by the predicate s o f contract (individualis m an d choice) . The shif t i n famil y la w toward th e acceptanc e o f nontraditional form s of interaction appeare d dramaticall y i n the so-called "divorc e revolution. " In the late 1960 s state legislators began t o permit divorc e upo n agreemen t of the parties : no-faul t divorce . Californi a wa s th e first stat e t o recogniz e no-fault divorce . I n les s tha n a decade , almos t ever y stat e provide d fo r some sor t o f divorc e tha t a t leas t lessene d th e nee d fo r accusation s o f fault betwee n th e parties. 4 Previously , divorc e wa s neve r availabl e simpl y because th e partie s chose t o separate, but onl y i n case s in which th e stat e deemed th e action s o f one part y t o th e marriag e s o aberrant a s to rende r the relationshi p nonexistent . Unde r law s tha t permitte d divorc e onl y upon accusation s o f fault, ground s include d act s such a s adultery, willfu l desertion, an d absenc e lon g enoug h t o lea d t o a presumptio n o f death. 5 Along wit h th e shif t fro m faul t t o no-faul t divorc e cam e a se t o f proce dural change s makin g i t fa r easie r fo r couple s t o divorce . A fe w state s even bega n t o provid e fo r summar y dissolutio n proceeding s tha t ca n b e 35

Family Law in Transition used i n case s involvin g n o mino r childre n an d tha t requir e n o divorc e hearing a t all. So, within a decade th e law transferred a great part of the responsibilit y for regulatin g marriag e an d divorc e from th e state to the partie s involved . In consequence , no-faul t divorce , a s Mar y An n Glendo n notes , i s als o "no-responsibility" divorce—a t leas t n o responsibilitie s enforce d b y lega l sanction.6 A s wit h busines s partners , spouse s ca n desig n th e term s o f their relationships 7 beginning s an d endings , an d th e la w will enforc e th e agreements the y reach . Legal acknowledgemen t tha t th e spousa l relationshi p i s n o longe r uniquely define d b y an encompassin g an d fixed se t o f right s an d obliga tions i s furthe r indicate d b y th e increasin g willingnes s o f court s an d legislatures t o recogniz e cohabitatio n agreement s betwee n partie s neve r formally married . Thes e agreement s sugges t that couples who choos e no t to marry ma y enjo y th e benefit s o f cohabitation an d ma y determine, an d ask the law to ensure, the financial an d othe r consequence s o f a potentia l separation, muc h a s busines s partner s ma y determin e th e consequence s of thei r firm's dissolution . Marvin v . Marvin, decide d i n Californi a i n 1976, wa s th e first cas e t o recogniz e an d agre e t o enforc e cohabitatio n contracts i n contemplation o f the cohabitation's termination . Othe r state s followed th e Marvin exampl e an d thereb y gav e unmarrie d cohabitant s some o f the protection tha t the la w had alread y provided t o couples upo n the terminatio n o f marital relationships . A further exampl e o f the proces s o f defining an d treatin g th e famil y a s a collectio n o f separat e individual s rathe r tha n a s a uni t o f socia l valu e beyond th e individual s involved , appear s i n antenuptia l agreement s i n contemplation o f divorce . Dismisse d b y court s everywher e onl y a fe w decades ag o a s violative o f stat e publi c policy , suc h agreement s ar e no w widely recognize d an d enforced . Moreover , severa l o f the court s tha t first recognized antenuptia l agreement s i n contemplatio n o f divorce justifie d their decision s wit h referenc e t o shift s i n th e characte r o f the famil y an d increases i n th e frequenc y o f divorce. I n Posner v. Posner, for example , a Florida cour t i n 197 0 took judicia l notic e o f th e increas e i n th e rati o o f divorce t o marriag e withi n th e society . I n thes e cases , court s enforcin g premarital agreement s largel y relie d o n principle s o f standar d contrac t law. As one revie w of changes i n famil y la w published i n 198 8 explained , states generall y enforc e antenuptia l agreement s i f they ar e "(1 ) free from fraud an d overreaching , (2 ) reflec t a ful l an d fai r disclosur e b y an d 36

Family Law in Transition between th e partie s o f thei r respectiv e assets , and i n som e states , (3 ) no t unconscionable a s to property division o r spousal support." 7 This accoun t could refe r t o almost an y unexceptiona l contrac t case . The la w has furthe r begu n t o consider contract s betwee n couple s tha t define th e characte r an d term s o f ongoin g relationship s a s wel l a s th e terms o f th e creatio n o r terminatio n o f relationships . Th e Unifor m Pre marital Agreemen t Ac t allow s couple s t o establis h certai n aspect s o f a n ongoing marriag e i n a n antenuptia l agreement. 8 Thi s possibilit y provide s expressly for th e contractualizatio n o f the term s o f marriage a s a continu ing relationshi p an d represent s a chang e a t leas t a s unsettlin g t o tradi tional understanding s o f family a s that permitting premarita l negotiation s providing fo r th e term s o f a marriage' s dissolution . Lega l recognitio n o f bargained negotiation s betwee n partie s t o a marriag e ove r th e term s o f their relationshi p completel y contradict s a long-standin g assumption , deeply embedde d i n nineteenth-centur y liberalism , tha t famil y relation ships, unlik e almos t al l othe r relationships , wer e no t t o b e regulate d b y consent bu t by the natura l subordinatio n o f one kin d o f person (wives ) t o another (husbands). 9 A furthe r upheava l i n assumption s abou t th e natur e o f familie s i s indicated b y a decisio n o f th e Hawai i Suprem e Cour t i n 199 3 whic h provided tha t unde r th e state' s constitutio n eve n th e definitio n o f mar riage, traditionall y understoo d a s a bon d betwee n on e ma n an d on e woman, mus t b e ope n t o revision s base d o n choice . I n Baehr v . Lewin, Hawaii's highes t cour t agree d wit h a grou p o f si x litigant s protestin g th e state's prohibitio n agains t same-se x marriage , tha t th e definitio n o f mar riage ca n n o longe r b e limite d b y traditiona l understanding s o f th e marital relationship . The cour t hel d th e state' s marriage statut e presump tively unconstitutiona l i n restrictin g marriag e t o opposite-se x partie s be cause th e statut e violate d th e equa l protectio n claus e o f the state' s consti tution. I n earlie r cases , decide d i n othe r states , court s ha d alway s concluded tha t marriag e by definition include s a man an d a woman . Thus, mor e an d mor e th e America n lega l syste m ha s com e t o vie w adult famil y member s a s i t view s busines s associates—a s autonomou s individuals free t o negotiate th e term s o f their relationship s an d th e term s of their relationships ' demise . With regar d t o childre n an d t o the parent child tie , th e lega l syste m ha s bee n les s read y t o sanctio n th e amalgam ation o f family la w with th e law s o f the market . Bu t eve n her e chang e i s occurring. 37

Family Law in Transition The pressur e t o redefin e th e essenc e o f the parent-chil d connectio n i s nowhere stronge r tha n i n case s involvin g reproductiv e technology . Bu t other example s exis t a s well . Case s o f relativel y youn g childre n at tempting t o initiat e th e terminatio n o f thei r relationship s wit h thei r parents illustrat e dramaticall y th e scop e of potential shift s i n the meanin g of th e parent-chil d ti e an d i n th e statu s o f children . I n In re Kingsley, a ten-year-old bo y i n Florid a hire d a lawye r (actuall y hi s foste r father ) t o help hi m terminat e hi s biologica l mother' s parenta l right s an d t o effec t his adoptio n b y th e famil y tha t ha d bee n housin g hi m a s a foste r child . The tria l cour t decision , althoug h overturne d o n appeal , i s significan t because i n th e decisio n th e lega l syste m recognize d th e chil d an d hi s relation t o hi s parent s i n term s o f contract , rathe r tha n biologica l status . Despite th e wa y tha t th e medi a frame d th e case , i t di d no t actuall y involve th e creatio n o f a "divorce " actio n betwee n parent s an d thei r children. Rather , th e importanc e o f th e cas e la y i n th e standin g give n the youn g boy , Gregor y Kingsley , t o argu e tha t hi s biologica l mother' s parental right s should b e terminated becaus e sh e was unfit t o be a parent. In on e sense , th e cas e ca n b e describe d a s nothin g mor e tha n a mino r transformation o f a fa r mor e familia r abus e o r neglec t action . However , the tria l court' s decisio n fo r th e boy , which provide d fo r th e terminatio n of the biologica l mother' s right s an d fo r th e child' s adoptio n b y his foste r parents, wa s significan t becaus e i t suggeste d tha t i n th e futur e childre n could initiat e terminatio n an d adoptio n actions. 10 Th e tria l court' s deci sion reste d o n it s recognition o f the chil d a s an autonomou s acto r abl e t o engage a n attorne y an d t o initiat e th e lega l proces s tha t would determin e his own parentage . An olde r exampl e o f choice , rathe r tha n biology , determinin g th e parent-child bon d i s tha t o f adoption . Lega l approache s t o adoptio n during mos t o f thi s centur y wer e designe d t o reflec t th e mode l o f th e nuclear famil y compose d o f marrie d parent s an d thei r biologica l chil dren. 11 Presen t change s i n adoptio n law , an d eve n more , proposal s t o reform adoptio n la w i n way s tha t woul d differentiat e adoptiv e familie s from biologica l families , sugges t widespread confusio n abou t th e essenc e of the bon d betwee n parent s an d thei r childre n i n general . For th e commo n law , th e significanc e o f biolog y i n th e definitio n o f family preclude d th e recognitio n o f adoptiv e families . B y th e lat e nine teenth century , statutor y la w provided fo r adoptiv e familie s i n th e Unite d States an d Grea t Britain , an d onl y i n th e twentiet h centur y wer e suc h 381

Family Law in Transition families afforde d rea l protectio n b y th e law . T o som e extent , th e lega l recognition o f adoptiv e familie s represente d a n earl y acknowledgmen t that th e lov e an d intimac y tha t ar e suppose d t o characteriz e th e parent child relationshi p nee d no t b e anchore d i n biology . Fo r decades , how ever, the la w continued t o insis t that adoption b e structure d "i n imitatio n of biology." 12 Now, ope n adoption s i n whic h biologica l an d adoptiv e parent s joi n together i n parentin g a chil d hav e becom e increasingl y acceptable. 13 The mov e towar d unsealin g adoptio n record s represent s a simila r trend . However, bot h ope n adoption s an d th e so-calle d "searc h movement, " which advocate s unsealin g adoptio n records , ca n be , an d ar e being , rea d to support contradictor y conclusion s abou t th e essenc e o f the famil y an d therefore sugges t tha t societ y an d th e la w ar e no t consistentl y embracin g negotiations an d choic e i n famil y matters . Thes e recen t change s i n approaches t o adoptio n ar e variousl y interprete d t o sugges t tha t n o on e model nee d dictat e ho w famil y member s ar e relate d t o on e anothe r an d to sugges t tha t relation s founde d i n biologica l connection s are more rea l than othe r relations . Generally , controversie s abou t ho w th e la w shoul d define an d regulat e adoptio n dramaticall y illustrat e th e society' s ambiva lence an d confusio n abou t changin g understanding s o f children i n fami lies and o f the parent-chil d bond . Thus, i t appear s tha t fo r th e la w eve n th e onc e inviolat e cor e o f th e family unit , th e parent-chil d connection , ha s becom e subjec t t o th e pressures o f individualis m i n way s tha t woul d hav e bee n unimaginabl e three o r fou r decade s ago . The proces s o f chang e i n th e parent-chil d ti e is occurring mor e slowl y an d amids t muc h stronge r emotion , confusion , and oppositio n tha n th e paralle l proces s regardin g relation s amon g adults. Bu t eve n here , a t th e cor e o f th e famil y unit , a t leas t a s that uni t has bee n understoo d fo r th e pas t centur y an d a half , a ne w vision , o r rather a variet y o f ne w visions , o f famil y ar e bein g recognize d an d actualized. Thi s proces s i s occurring, bu t amids t considerabl e confusio n and uncertainty . II. Fro m Famil y Autonom y t o Autonomou s Individuality : From Griswold t o Eisenstadt The acceptanc e b y th e la w o f th e ideologica l underpinning s fo r thes e shifts i n famil y la w (th e acceptanc e o f choice, consent , an d autonomou s I 39 I

Family Law in Transition individuality i n th e constructio n o f famil y matters ) emerge d clearly — although thi s wa s littl e note d a t th e tim e —in a Unite d State s Suprem e Court decisio n i n 1972 . In Eisenstadt v . Baird th e Cour t hel d unconstitu tional a Massachusett s statut e tha t prohibite d th e distributio n o f contra ception t o unmarried adults . In Eisenstadt, th e Cour t declare d unhesitat ingly, almos t a s i f i t wer e merel y reiteratin g a familiar , unchallenge d assumption, tha t familie s ca n onl y b e comprehended , an d therefor e regulated, throug h protectio n o f th e autonomou s individualit y o f eac h family member . The ful l significanc e o f Eisenstadt i s framed throug h compariso n wit h another case , Griswold v . Connecticut, decide d onl y seve n year s earlie r and generall y presente d a s th e immediat e precurso r o f Eisenstadt an d a number o f othe r cases , includin g Roe v . Wade, i n whic h th e Cour t granted wome n a limite d constitutiona l righ t t o abortion . A s a grou p these case s create d a constitutiona l righ t t o various sort s of procreationa l autonomy. In fact , Griswold, thoug h innovativ e fro m th e perspectiv e o f constitu tional jurisprudence , reflect s a rathe r traditiona l vie w o f famil y relation ships. Eisenstadt doe s not . Th e differenc e i s especially revealin g sinc e i t was precisel y i n th e year s betwee n th e tw o case s tha t stat e legislature s began widel y t o revis e famil y la w statute s an d court s bega n t o overtur n long-standing precedent s i n orde r t o acknowledg e an d provid e fo r indi vidual choic e i n famil y matters . Comparison o f Griswold and Eisenstadt dramaticall y reveal s th e char acter an d dee p significanc e o f th e shif t occurrin g i n famil y la w a t th e time. Th e implication s o f Eisenstadt fo r changin g understanding s o f th e family ca n bes t b e appreciate d b y first considerin g Griswold an d th e limits o f tha t decisions' s rhetoric , an d the n examinin g Eisenstadt, an d finally, the distinction s betwee n th e two. The appellant s i n Griswold wer e Estell e T . Griswold , th e executiv e director o f th e Planne d Parenthoo d Leagu e o f Connecticu t an d C . Le e Buxton, a doctor an d professo r a t Yale Medical Schoo l wh o had serve d a s a medica l directo r a t th e Ne w Have n cente r o f Planne d Parenthoo d o f Connecticut. Bot h wer e foun d guilt y of having been accessorie s t o violations o f a Connecticu t birt h contro l la w tha t forbad e the m from givin g "information, instruction , an d medica l advice " t o marrie d peopl e i n order to help them avoi d conception. 14 The statut e i n questio n provided : "Any perso n wh o use s an y drug , medicina l articl e o r instrumen t fo r th e 40 I

Family Law in Transition

purpose o f preventing conceptio n shal l b e fine d no t les s than fifty dollars or imprisone d no t les s than sixt y days no r mor e tha n on e yea r o r be bot h fined an d imprisoned." 15 In Griswold th e Cour t justifie d it s decisio n t o declar e Connecticut' s birth contro l statut e unconstitutiona l b y referenc e t o a certai n vie w o f the family . Th e tex t o f th e Court' s decisio n clearl y limit s th e holdin g t o cases involvin g marrie d couples . Th e Cour t i n Griswold declare d tha t the stat e canno t invad e th e "zon e o f privacy" tha t surround s th e marita l relationship. Griswold wa s controversia l whe n i t wa s decided . However , virtuall y none o f th e disagreement s tha t surrounde d Griswold focuse d on , o r were engendere d by , th e Court' s invocatio n o f marriag e a s a "sacred, " "intimate," an d "enduring " state. 16 Rather , Griswold wa s controversia l largely for relyin g on a "substantive du e process " approach t o the Consti tution. Th e righ t t o "privacy " tha t th e decisio n protecte d wa s no t foun d in th e clea r languag e o f th e Constitutio n bu t wa s discerne d i n variou s "penumbras" surrounding severa l constitutiona l provisions . The jurispru dential altercation s tha t followe d th e decisio n relate d primaril y t o th e absence o f an y specifi c constitutiona l referent s fo r th e righ t define d in , and protecte d by , Griswold. In contrast , virtuall y n o controvers y surrounde d th e Court' s under standing of marriage a s a sacred, endurin g state . As a cultural, social, an d political matter , tha t clai m wa s almos t incontrovertibl e i n th e Unite d States i n 1965 . Withi n les s tha n a decad e afte r Griswold, however , th e law challenged an d quickl y revised statutes protecting the traditional vie w of marriag e reflecte d i n Justic e Douglas' s majorit y opinio n i n Griswold. The clea r languag e o f Griswold suggest s tha t th e Cour t extende d privacy right s t o marrie d couple s becaus e famil y relationships , unlik e other relationship s i n whic h individual s ma y engage , shoul d partak e of sacre d privilege . Tha t positio n i s explici t i n th e Court' s emotiona l conclusion, whic h make s stirrin g referenc e t o the famil y uni t a s explana tion an d justificatio n fo r th e decision . The Cour t wrote : We dea l wit h a righ t o f privac y olde r tha n th e Bil l o f Rights—olde r tha n our politica l parties , olde r tha n ou r schoo l system . Marriag e i s a comin g together fo r bette r o r fo r worse , hopefull y enduring , an d intimat e t o th e degree o f being sacred . I t i s an associatio n tha t promote s a way o f life, no t causes; a harmon y i n living , no t politica l faiths ; a bilatera l loyalty , no t 41

Family Law in Transition commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.17 Thus, without question, the express language o f Griswold provides consti tutional protectio n t o relation s betwee n spouse s within families , an d an y extension o f tha t protectio n t o peopl e outsid e familie s relie s o n a mod e of reasonin g no t eve n implie d b y th e tex t o f Griswold. Moreover , Griswold suggest s protectio n i s afforde d t o th e marita l couple , a s such , an d not t o the individual s wh o compose th e marita l union . The languag e o f th e opinio n reflecte d accuratel y th e large r society' s view o f families, a view long echoe d i n th e law . The Constitutio n make s no referenc e t o an y privac y right s tha t protec t relationship s betwee n married couple s o r amon g famil y member s mor e generally . However , a long traditio n o f famil y cas e la w extol s th e "autonomous " famil y uni t and presume s t o protec t i t fro m stat e intervention , excep t i n th e mos t compelling circumstances. 18 Thus , i n fact—thoug h no t fro m th e per spective o f constitutiona l theory—th e Court' s decisio n i n Griswold ac knowledges an d reiterate s a long-standing, widel y accepted , common-la w view that i n mos t case s relation s betwee n famil y member s shoul d no t b e subjected t o stat e regulatio n o r perusal . Th e controversie s surroundin g Griswold canno t b e explaine d a s a respons e t o th e notio n o f "famil y autonomy," per se. Those controversie s focuse d expressl y on th e constitu tional grounding , bu t no t upo n th e wisdo m o r historica l accuracy , o f th e Griswold Court' s claim s abou t th e characte r o f th e family . Thos e wh o criticized Griswold di d no t questio n th e visio n o f th e famil y inheren t in th e opinion' s constitutionalizatio n o f famil y autonomy . Rathe r the y questioned th e Court' s attemp t t o groun d a righ t t o "privacy"—whethe r familial o r individual—o n constitutiona l "penumbras " instea d o f o n th e explicit languag e o f the Constitution . The interpretativ e debat e encourage d b y Griswold was complicated b y other confusion s i n th e Court' s opinion . Whe n Griswold wa s decide d i n the mid-1960s , som e commentator s rea d th e opinio n t o protec t th e pri vate sexua l behavio r o f individua l adults , rathe r tha n t o protec t behavio r of an y kind , includin g sexua l behavior , within familie s alone. 19 But , i f that readin g reflecte d th e Court' s inten t an d desire , i t certainl y contra dicted th e Court' s words . Th e opinio n clearl y refer s t o marital privacy , and th e languag e o f th e tex t make s i t abundantl y clea r tha t th e Cour t 42 I

Family Law in Transition was concerned abou t safeguardin g th e family , a s a sacred unit , fro m stat e intrusion. That commentator s immediatel y reache d alternativ e reading s t o an y implied b y th e tex t wa s largel y testimon y t o th e rhetorica l strengt h o f individual right s i n contemporar y understanding s o f constitutional right s and no t t o anythin g implie d i n Griswold itself . America n la w ha s stead fastly concerne d itsel f wit h relation s between , o r th e right s an d obliga tions of , autonomou s individuals , an d i n genera l canno t o r wil l no t seriously addres s grou p need s o r responsibilitie s excep t b y focusin g o n the need s o r responsibilities o f the individual s tha t compos e suc h groups . Family la w ha s bee n a remarkabl e exceptio n i n thi s regar d an d on e tha t points dramaticall y t o th e powe r o f establishe d famil y value s i n th e American tradition . Famil y la w wa s lon g rooted , an d t o som e exten t continues t o be rooted , i n a social order tha t understoo d an d provide d fo r group interaction s an d identit y apar t fro m th e individual s composin g such groups . It wa s n o acciden t tha t famil y matter s wer e onl y infrequentl y th e subject o f constitutiona l litigatio n befor e th e mid-1960s . I n practice , constitutional law , at leas t sinc e th e nineteent h century , resemble d mos t of la w i n th e Unite d State s i n recognizin g th e invocatio n o f individual rights only . I n general , fo r abou t a centur y an d a hal f befor e Griswold, the America n lega l syste m focuse d o n th e individual , no t th e group , a s the uni t with regar d t o which rule s were devised an d effected . Famil y law was a n exception . Famil y matters , handle d b y a separat e an d distinc t body o f la w an d hear d i n stat e court s unde r stat e law , wer e largel y regulated wit h referenc e t o the family , no t the autonomou s individual , as the smalles t uni t o f social relevanc e an d value . That famil y la w s o lon g remaine d a n exceptio n t o th e individualisti c focus o f th e society' s lega l syste m reflect s th e strengt h o f th e distinctio n for American s sinc e a t leas t th e earl y nineteent h centur y betwee n hom e and work , betwee n th e famil y an d virtuall y al l othe r associations . Thus , in sum , th e Griswold opinion , thoug h ope n t o hones t debat e fo r it s invocation o f right s no t expressl y state d i n th e Constitution , reflecte d a mainstream vie w o f th e America n famil y an d it s specia l plac e i n th e culture. However, sinc e man y o f th e commentator s focu s o n individua l right s in interpretin g Griswold y an explanatio n o f that focu s i s in order . Severa l 431

Family Law in Transition can b e found . I t i s possibl e tha t th e Cour t clothe d it s messag e i n tradi tional rhetori c i n a n attemp t t o preclude, o r at least dull , th e controvers y that woul d likel y hav e develope d i n 196 5 i n respons e t o a decisio n that , at least by implication, protecte d th e individual' s righ t to sexual freedom . The ver y issues at stake i n Griswold, the availabilit y o f contraception an d the rol e of Planned Parenthoo d i n fosterin g th e us e of contraception, ha d long provoked angr y debate abou t the changin g more s of the period . Th e Court, i n anticipatio n o f controversy , ma y hav e consciousl y selecte d family metaphor s t o describ e th e privac y righ t delineate d i n Griswold i n order t o softe n th e implication s o f a mor e libertaria n position , on e tha t implied "th e constitutionalizatio n o f some contemporar y versio n o f John Stuart Mill' s principl e o f liberty." 20 Thi s explanatio n o f th e disparit y between th e tex t of Griswold and it s immediate interpretatio n an d us e b y the large r societ y suggest s tha t th e languag e o f the majorit y opinio n ma y have bee n artfull y chose n i n orde r t o mask th e underlyin g agenda . More likely , a somewha t differen t explanatio n i s i n order ; th e justice s who wrot e Griswold ma y themselve s hav e bee n ambivalen t o r confuse d about th e implication s o f th e case . Griswold cam e t o th e Cour t a t a moment o f startling transition i n th e lif e o f the American family , an d jus t before America n la w reacted widel y and approvingl y to changes i n famil y life. Whe n Griswold wa s decided , however , neithe r th e scop e no r th e intensity of that transition ha d yet emerged concretely . Thus, it is possible that th e Court' s invocatio n o f traditional famil y value s an d it s disruptio n of thos e value s i n th e nam e o f th e individual' s righ t t o privac y an d freedom reflecte d a real , thoug h no t necessaril y completel y obvious , conflict fo r th e justice s wh o decide d Griswold jus t a s a perio d o f aston ishing alteration i n famil y lif e an d famil y la w was beginning . Comparing a n earlie r draf t o f Griswold t o tha t finally rendere d b y th e Court, show s tha t th e Cour t wa s originall y uncertai n abou t groundin g the Griswold holdin g i n a righ t t o privacy , buttresse d b y domesti c meta phors. 21 I n a draf t opinio n o f th e Court , Justic e Dougla s founde d th e Griswold holdin g o n a Firs t Amendmen t righ t o f spouse s t o associat e freely. Suc h a righ t woul d hav e stemme d fro m eac h spouse' s freedo m t o associate wit h th e other , a subspecie s o f individua l rights , rathe r tha n from th e collectiv e privac y of the famil y unit . Concurring opinion s i n Griswold, writte n b y Justice s Goldberg , Har lan, an d White, 22 similarl y invoke d domesti c metaphor s t o describ e an d legitimate th e righ t t o privac y an d similarl y suggeste d tha t tha t righ t i44i

Family Law in Transition belonged t o individual s withi n familie s rathe r tha n t o familie s a s such . Justice Goldber g declare d "tha t th e right s t o marita l privac y an d t o it s specific guarantee s demonstrat e tha t th e right s t o marita l privac y an d t o marry an d rais e a famil y ar e o f simila r orde r an d magnitud e a s th e fundamental right s specifically protecte d [b y the Constitution]." 23 Justice Harlan urge d protectin g th e "privac y o f th e home " so that individual s could contro l informatio n abou t intimat e matters. 24 At home, individual s deserved t o be "le t alone" by government. 25 Finally , Justice White woul d have base d th e decisio n o n respec t fo r th e "marriag e relationship, " bu t he di d no t explai n why. 26 All o f these justice s preserve d traditiona l understanding s o f the family . That notwithstanding , i t might b e argue d tha t today , when constitutiona l rights are clearly interprete d a s individual rights , the constitutionalizatio n of privacy i n th e famil y contex t mus t assum e th e individualizatio n o f th e once holisti c family . Suc h a n argumen t suggest s furthe r tha t i n a worl d of traditiona l familie s regulate d b y a traditiona l famil y la w system , ther e was n o nee d t o constitutionaliz e famil y privac y becaus e famil y la w as sumed, an d therefor e protected , privac y withi n families . T o th e exten t that tha t i s so, Griswold foreshadowe d late r case s includin g Eisenstadt i n heralding th e individualizatio n o f th e family , an d thereb y th e erosio n o f the famil y a s a unit mediatin g betwee n th e individua l an d th e state . However tha t ma y be , th e explici t them e i n Griswold assume d a holistic famil y unit , no t a collectio n o f autonomou s individuals . I n thi s regard, Eisenstadt v . Baird carrie d a different message . Eisenstadt present s exactly th e positio n tha t commentator s attribute d t o Griswold. Decide d seven year s afte r Griswold, Eisenstadt declare s unconstitutiona l a Massa chusetts statut e tha t prohibite d th e distributio n o f contraceptio n t o un married adults . At issu e i n th e cas e wa s a stat e statut e tha t provide d a maximu m fiveyear priso n ter m fo r "whoeve r . . . give s awa y . . . an y drug , medicine , instrument o r articl e whateve r fo r th e preventio n o f conception. " Th e statute mad e exception s fo r "[a ] registere d physician " prescribin g "fo r any marrie d perso n drug s o r article s intende d fo r th e preventio n o f pregnancy o r conception. " William Bair d wa s convicte d a t tria l i n Massachusett s fo r exhibitin g contraceptive device s durin g a speec h t o student s a t Bosto n Universit y and fo r givin g a package o f Emko vagina l foa m t o one woma n a t the en d of hi s lecture . Th e Massachusett s Suprem e Cour t sustaine d th e convic I 45 I

Family Law in Transition tion fo r givin g contraceptiv e foa m t o a n unmarrie d woman . Th e Unite d States Suprem e Cour t reversed , basin g it s decisio n o n th e equa l protec tion o f unmarried, a s compared wit h married , people . The Court' s decisio n i n Eisenstadt discard s th e essentia l distinctio n i n Griswold between hom e an d wor k and firml y attache s the righ t of privacy to the individua l person . Indeed , Eisenstadt expressl y and firmly disavow s any view of families a s more, or other, tha n th e individual s wh o compos e them. Th e Eisenstadt Cour t explained : It i s true tha t i n Griswold th e righ t o f privacy i n questio n inhere d i n th e marital relationship . Yet the marita l coupl e i s not a n independen t entit y with a min d an d hear t o f it s own , bu t a n associatio n o f tw o individual s each wit h a separat e intellectua l an d emotiona l makeup . I f th e righ t o f privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, marrie d o r single, to be free from unwarrante d governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affectin g a perso n a s th e decisio n whethe r t o bea r o r bege t a child.27 That explanatio n wa s essential t o the Court' s equa l protectio n analysi s in Eisenstadt. Griswold, decide d seve n year s before , ha d mad e i t uncon stitutional fo r state s t o preven t marrie d couple s fro m usin g birt h control . The conclusio n i n Eisenstadt, tha t a simila r rul e mus t appl y wit h regar d to unmarrie d persons , wa s premise d o n th e conclusio n tha t a state' s different treatmen t o f marrie d an d unmarrie d person s i n a birt h contro l statute lacke d a rational basis , and coul d therefor e no t b e tolerated . Massachusetts ha d delineate d variou s goal s th e statut e served . Tha t the statute was justified a s a deterrent against fornication mad e littl e sense to the Court , sinc e th e statut e mad e contraceptive s generall y availabl e t o prevent th e sprea d o f disease an d t o married person s fo r us e i n marita l o r extramarital relations . Th e Cour t furthe r describe d i t a s "plainl y unrea sonable" fo r th e stat e t o punis h fornication , a misdemeano r unde r stat e law, wit h pregnanc y an d th e birt h o f a n unwante d child . Moreover , th e Court conclude d tha t th e statute , originall y promulgate d a s part o f a se t of statutes dealin g with "Crime s Against Chastity, Morality , Decenc y an d Good Order, " coul d no t b e justifie d a s a healt h measure . Amon g othe r things, i f protectin g healt h demande d tha t contraceptive s b e prescribe d by doctors , tha t nee d pertaine d t o marrie d an d unmarrie d persons . I n addition, no t al l contraceptive s pose d a dange r t o health . Therefore , th e statute, if justified a s a health measure , would hav e bee n overbroad .

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Family Law in Transition Finally, the Cour t i n Eisenstadt state d tha t i f preventing contraceptio n per se formed th e state' s purpose, then tha t purpose mus t apply equally t o married an d unmarrie d people . The Cour t conclude d "tha t b y providin g dissimilar treatmen t fo r marrie d an d unmarrie d person s wh o are similarl y situated, [th e Massachusett s statute s i n question ] violat e th e Equa l Pro tection Clause." 28 But , i n a worl d i n whic h th e bond s tha t connec t family member s ar e viewe d a s inherentl y unlik e th e connection s tha t link autonomou s individuals , th e dissimila r treatmen t a t issu e i n Eisenstadt woul d b e no t onl y rationa l i t woul d b e inevitable . A s lon g a s th e family continue d unambiguousl y t o enjo y th e sacre d prerogative s it s history implies , i t mad e perfec t sens e fo r th e la w t o trea t legall y marrie d couples differentl y fro m othe r peopl e i n othe r sort s of groupings. I n suc h a world , neithe r th e relationshi p betwee n spouse s no r relationship s within familie s coul d generall y b e describe d a s an "association, " o f "individuals eac h wit h a separate intellectua l an d emotiona l makeup." 29 Thus th e expres s clai m i n Eisenstadt i s far mor e startlin g an d fa r les s traditional tha n tha t i n Griswold. Th e Eisenstadt Court' s referenc e t o a married coupl e a s a n "associatio n o f tw o individuals " an d it s languag e affirming th e righ t o f th e '"individual" t o privac y see m familia r i n a world largel y define d through , an d deepl y dependen t on , notion s o f th e autonomous individual . I n fact , i t i s revolutionar y whe n applie d t o th e family. Lon g afte r th e las t vestige s o f th e feuda l orde r wer e replace d i n the marketplac e b y notion s o f fre e contrac t an d autonomou s individual ity, Western societ y continue d t o defin e spouses—and , eve n mor e partic ularly, parent s an d thei r children—a s unit s o f relationshi p wit h a realit y apart from, an d encompassing , tha t o f th e individual s involved . Th e Court's straightforward , unapologeti c descriptio n i n Eisenstadt o f th e "marital couple " a s nothin g othe r tha n tw o people , associate d together , signals a fundamenta l alteratio n i n th e society' s vie w o f th e sor t o f relationships traditionall y associate d wit h families . Because i n late r case s decide d afte r th e 1970 s th e Suprem e Cour t moved bac k fro m it s positio n i n Eisenstadt y Eisenstadt's ultimat e rol e i n the evolutio n o f family o r "privacy " law , remain s unclear . Whateve r tha t role, th e opinio n constitute s a n importan t statemen t fro m th e Suprem e Court abou t th e changin g characte r o f the American family . Commenta tors hav e describe d Eisenstadt a s a n extensio n t o nontraditiona l familie s of th e protectio n th e Constitutio n grant s th e famil y (a s explicate d i n Griswold). Thu s a 199 1 famil y la w caseboo k discusse s Eisenstadt i n a 1471

Family Law in Transition section called , "Constitutiona l Protectio n o f Nontraditiona l Families, " and explains : We begin [ou r discussio n o f the topic ] wit h Griswold v. Connecticut, the modern sourc e o f th e constitutiona l righ t o f intimat e association . Eisenstadt v. Baird follows becaus e i t is the first case to vindicate, i f obliquely, the constitutional claims of the unmarried, and is therefore the foundatio n case in any argument urging protection of nontraditional families. 30 The notio n o f a "nontraditiona l family " ha s indee d bee n widel y institu tionalized i n the years following Eisenstadt An d i t is a notion tha t reflect s the licens e grante d i n Eisenstadt t o define , an d thu s t o form , familie s a s units involvin g n o mor e tha n th e separat e individual s recruite d t o pla y familial roles . Th e family—understoo d a s a whole , an d grounde d i n natural (e.g. , "blood " o r "genes" ) o r supernatura l truth s suggestin g eac h member's clea r role s an d obligations—i s thu s replace d b y a grou p o f people, ultimatel y unfettere d b y ties tha t connec t the m inexorably . Thi s is the associatio n t o which th e Cour t i n Eisenstadt referred . The characte r o f that association, a s compared wit h th e sor t of association protecte d i n Griswold, an d th e far-reachin g implication s o f th e transformation i n th e understandin g an d plac e o f the famil y i n America n society tha t Eisenstadt signals , becom e eve n cleare r whe n th e cas e i s compared wit h a muc h earlier , thoug h equall y controversial , cas e tha t had nothin g directl y to do with famil y matters . That case , Lochner v . New York, decide d b y th e Suprem e Cour t i n 1905 , considere d a Ne w Yor k statutory prohibitio n agains t bakerie s hirin g employee s t o wor k mor e than sixt y hours i n a wee k o r mor e tha n te n hour s i n a day . The Court , describing th e statut e a s an interferenc e wit h "th e libert y o f person" an d "the righ t of free contract," 31 hel d i t unconstitutional a s a violation o f the Fourteenth Amendment . The opinion , no w almos t a centur y old , portray s clearl y an d unapolo getically th e ideolog y o f contract a s that ideolog y wa s constructed durin g the developmen t o f th e Industria l Revolution . Lochner thu s provide s a useful compariso n fo r th e late r "privacy " cases , in whic h th e Cour t use d a simila r interpretiv e approac h i n th e contex t no t o f economic s o r busi ness, bu t o f relationship s betwee n peopl e withi n families . Justic e Peck ham, writin g fo r th e Cour t i n Lochner, understoo d wha t wa s a t stake . The statute , h e explained , wa s no t concerne d wit h th e prohibitio n o f I 48 I

Family Law in Transition involuntary labor . Rather , it s openin g words—"n o employe e shal l b e required o r permitte d t o work. . ," 32—revealed th e statute' s purpose . I n Justice Peckham' s view , the statut e wa s "equivalent t o a n enactmen t tha t 'no employe e shal l contrac t o r agre e t o work / mor e tha n te n hour s per day." 33 A s such , th e statut e interfere d wit h th e employer' s an d th e employee's equa l right s t o negotiat e th e term s o f thei r workin g relation ship, and thereby , violated th e Constitution' s guarante e tha t al l individu als b e a t "liberty " t o negotiat e th e term s throug h whic h the y "purchase " others' labor o r "sell" their own. 34 The notio n tha t th e libert y o f contract belong s a t least as much t o th e employee a s to th e employe r emerge s a s a basi c assumptio n i n Lochner. In term s perfectl y reflectin g nineteenth-centur y liberalism' s vie w o f indi vidual liberty , th e Cour t referre d t o th e baker y owne r an d th e baker y employee a s "person s wh o ar e sui juris" an d focuse d o n th e imbalanc e in power , no t betwee n employe r an d employee , bu t betwee n th e stat e and th e baker y employees affecte d b y the statute . Thus th e Cour t frame d Lochner a s a dispute betwee n th e stat e an d th e individua l baker y worker . The Cour t explained : [I]t becomes o f great importanc e t o determine whic h shal l prevail,—th e right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose, or the right of the state to prevent the individua l fro m laboring , or from enterin g into any contract to labor, beyond a certain time prescribed by the state.35 The Cour t argue d tha t th e healt h o f baker y worker s o r o f brea d eater s could no t hav e bee n th e rea l motivatio n behin d th e statu e a t issue . Bakeries, th e Cour t reported , d o no t pos e particula r danger s t o health , and ther e i s n o "connectio n betwee n th e numbe r o f hour s a bake r ma y work i n th e baker y an d th e healthfu l qualit y o f th e brea d mad e b y th e workman." 36 Thus, according to the Court , th e argumen t tha t section n o of th e state' s labo r la w serve d th e healt h interest s o f th e employee s o r o f the publi c wa s mere pretext . The state' s motive lay elsewhere. The Cour t wrote: It seems to us that the real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between th e maste r and hi s employees (al l being men, sui juris) in a private business , no t dangerou s i n an y degree t o morals, or i n any real and substantial degree to the health of the employees. 37 I 49 I

Family Law in Transition The state' s aim , a s th e Cour t viewe d it , wa s simpl y an d conclusivel y t o intervene i n th e marke t s o as to deprive worke r an d employe r alik e o f the right to negotiate th e term s o f their ow n interactions . The Court' s concern s abou t state regulatio n presume d tha t the worke r and th e employe r entere d th e negotiatio n proces s a s equals . Twice , th e Court referre d t o the tw o as being equa l befor e th e law . "The maste r an d his employees, " declare d th e Court , "al l bein g men , sui juris" 38 shoul d not b e subjecte d t o stat e interventio n i n thei r privat e affairs . Th e Cour t affirmed th e equalit y o f th e tw o b y notin g tha t th e "on e ha s a s muc h right t o purchas e a s th e othe r t o sel l labor." 39 Th e Cour t wen t further , arguing that New York's labor law impugned th e equality and intelligenc e of bakers , wh o surel y coul d negotiat e thei r ow n workin g condition s without governmenta l interference . Th e Cour t wrote : There i s no contention tha t bakers as a class are not equal i n intelligenc e and capacit y t o me n i n othe r trade s o r manua l occupations , o r that the y are no t abl e t o asser t thei r right s an d car e fo r themselve s withou t th e protecting ar m o f the state , interferin g wit h thei r independenc e o f judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the state.40 Justice Holmes' s dissen t emphasize d th e economi c underpinning s o f th e Court's holding . T o wha t exten t th e Cour t believe d i n th e accurac y o f the factua l assumption s beneat h it s economi c theor y i s less clear . Bu t i t is clear , a s Justic e Holme s declare d i n hi s dissent , tha t th e Cour t wa s motivated b y it s preference fo r a substantiv e outcom e contrar y t o tha t o f New York' s labo r law . Th e Court' s preference , i n Justic e Holmes' s view , though arguabl y reasonabl e a s a vie w o f economi c affairs , faile d t o provide adequate ground s for a decision invalidatin g the statute as uncon stitutional. Justice Holme s explained : It i s settled b y various decision s o f this cour t tha t stat e constitution s an d state law s may regulat e lif e i n man y way s which w e a s legislators migh t think as injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally with this , interfer e wit h th e libert y t o contract . . . . Som e o f thes e law s embody convictions o r prejudices whic h judge s are likely to share. Some may not . Bu t a Constitutio n i s no t intende d t o embod y a particula r economic theory , whether o f paternalism an d th e organi c relatio n o f the citizen to the state or of laissez faire.41 Justice Holmes' s criticism s o f th e Court' s decisio n i n Lochner ar e echoed b y th e critic s o f Griswold an d Eisenstadt wh o sugges t tha t th e 1501

Family Law in Transition decisions i n thos e case s wer e no t roote d i n th e Constitutio n an d were , therefore, th e illegitimat e product s o f reading substantive guarantee s int o the Constitution . Jus t a s th e Constitutio n fail s t o protec t th e unfettere d right to enter contracts that New York, and other states, perceived as threats to public health and welfare, so too the Constitution fails to assert a general right t o privacy , o r mor e specifi c rights , regardin g sexua l freedom , mar riage, or abortion, protected i n privacy cases following Griswold. 42 In thi s regard , th e officiall y repudiate d Lochner era, 43 an d it s us e o f substantive du e proces s argument s i n constitutiona l interpretation , wa s revived i n anothe r context , a t leas t a s a methodologica l matter , wit h th e Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe lin e o f cases. The late r case s use substantive du e process t o protec t no t economi c interests , bu t interest s relate d t o th e family o r to decisions tha t implicat e famil y matters . Curiously, however , thos e wh o deplor e substantiv e du e proces s argu ments i n th e economi c contex t ofte n accep t the m i n th e noneconomi c context o f cases suc h a s Griswold, Eisenstadt, an d Roe. Indeed , i n decid ing Griswold, Justic e Dougla s expressl y an d decisivel y disassociate d th e Court fro m Lochner an d th e mode l fo r protectin g libert y interest s offere d there. Th e Lochner Court , declare d Justic e Dougla s disapprovingly , served a s a "super-legislatur e t o determin e . . . laws that touc h economi c problems, busines s affairs , o r social conditions." 44 I n distancin g th e Griswold Cour t fro m th e Lochner precedent , Justic e Dougla s simpl y distin guished th e tw o statute s becaus e on e wa s concerne d wit h economics , business, o r socia l condition s whil e th e othe r "operate[d ] directl y o n a n intimate relatio n o f husband an d wife." 45 Th e assumption s o n whic h th e Court predicate d tha t distinction betwee n th e economi c an d th e intimat e or familia l wer e no t mad e clear . However , the y can , an d should , b e delineated. The Griswold Cour t suggest s that, whe n determinin g th e constitution ality o f a stat e statute , i t i s the content o f th e legislatio n unde r consider ation tha t determine s th e legitimac y o r illegitimac y o f a constitutiona l approach tha t relie s o n contemporar y perception s o f values . Mor e spe cifically, th e Court' s disclaime r suggest s tha t governmenta l interferenc e with freedo m o f contrac t doe s no t compar e i n seriousnes s wit h govern mental interferenc e i n the "intimate relatio n betwee n husban d an d wife. " Thus, th e Cour t i n Griswold suggest s tha t th e prio r sor t o f stat e interfer ence canno t justif y th e invocatio n o f contemporar y value s t o interpre t the Constitution , bu t tha t th e latte r can .

I5 !I

Family Law in Transition Embedded i n tha t difference—th e differenc e betwee n th e contractua l connections o f th e marketplace , an d th e intimat e connection s o f hom e and hearth—ar e th e crucia l term s tha t structure d America n thinkin g about th e famil y b y distinguishin g th e worl d o f home from th e worl d o f work. The Court' s decisio n i n Griswold, whether consciousl y o r not, use d the ideologica l differenc e betwee n hom e an d wor k to justif y resurrectin g a Lochner approac h t o constitutional interpretation . Griswold was written to suggest that a threat to the society' s core values, described a s the value s of the marita l ti e and th e domesti c nest , compelle d th e Court' s response . The Griswold Cour t wrot e i n a wa y tha t appeare d t o reflec t an d eve n replicate th e wide r society' s vision o f the famil y a s a univers e o f love an d enduring obligatio n almos t entirely set off from th e fungibl e negotiation s that defined th e market , and attempte d thereb y t o justif y th e sam e sor t of noninterpretivist readin g o f th e Constitutio n tha t allowe d a n earlie r Court t o decid e Lochner a s i t did . Th e Cour t i n Griswold appeare d t o suggest tha t fo r thi s hallowe d purpose , an d fo r thi s purpos e alone , th e Constitution's protectio n wa s meant t o be extende d an d it s text stretched . Such wa s Justice Douglas' s apparen t readin g for th e Court . A seemingly simila r readin g wa s suggested b y Justice Harlan' s concur rence. Justic e Harla n describe d th e violatio n o f th e Constitutio n a s "a n intolerable an d unjustifiabl e invasio n o f privac y i n th e conduc t o f th e most intimat e concern s o f an individual' s persona l life." 46 H e foun d th e right o f privac y t o b e containe d i n th e du e proces s claus e o f th e Four teenth Amendment' s guarante e o f liberty. Justice Harla n wrote : The bes t tha t ca n b e sai d i s tha t throug h th e cours e o f thi s Court' s decisions [du e process ] ha s represente d th e balanc e whic h ou r Nation , built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content t o this Constitutional concep t ha s of necessity bee n a rational process, it certainly has not been on e where judge s have felt free to roam where unguide d speculatio n migh t tak e them . Th e balanc e o f whic h I speak i s the balanc e struc k b y this country, having regard t o what history teaches are the traditions from which i t developed a s well as the traditions from whic h it broke.47 Justice Harlan' s opinion—althoug h no t unlik e Justic e Douglas' s i n justifying a noninterpretivis t approac h b y referenc e t o th e centralit y o f the value s i n nee d o f constitutiona l protection—indicate s a seriou s flaw 1521

Family Law in Transition in the majority' s justificatio n fo r the righ t of privacy attached t o familia l units. Justic e Harla n describe d th e libert y interest s protecte d b y th e Fourteenth Amendmen t a s attachin g t o th e individual . H e expressl y referred t o "the liberty of the individual." 48 In this regard he was entirely correct as a matter of constitutional jurisprudence . From at least the early nineteenth century , th e individua l ha s bee n th e locu s o f th e interest s protected b y the Constitution. Traditionally, the interest s of the family — long preserved i n ou r societ y as one o f the fe w unit s with value beyon d that o f the individual s involved—wer e regulate d an d protected , i f at all, by state statutor y la w and no t b y the Constitution . Onl y i n th e las t few decades, sinc e Griswold, hav e court s com e rathe r routinel y t o conside r the constitutional implication s of family disputes. Griswold appeared to justify it s form of constitutional interpretatio n by invoking th e inviolabilit y o f th e famil y a s a whole , separat e fro m th e person an d th e stat e alike , an d thu s justl y protecte d fro m legislativ e attempts to regulate its most intimate affairs. However , precisely that view of th e family—th e famil y a s a whole, th e famil y a s a uni t beyond , bu t encompassing, it s members—had previousl y playe d a significant par t i n placing th e famil y beyon d th e Constitution' s reach . An d tha t fac t emerged definitivel y i n Eisenstadt, the cas e i n whic h th e implication s that commentators read into Griswold, as well perhaps as the implications of the Griswold subtext, became clear. Underlying it s simple an d seemingl y inconsequentia l (becaus e obvi ous) distinctio n betwee n "home " an d "work, " Griswold's apparently straightforward attemp t t o distinguis h itsel f from Lochner, obscured a larger process—the process through which the society's understanding of the family was beginning to shift an d new understandings of family were beginning to exist alongside more familiar understandings . In the society at large, the family referred to in Griswold—a sacred universe, understood as set apart from th e world of money and of work—was being joined and transformed b y the family implied by Eisenstadt—a discrete collection of individuals, associating together as a matter of choice. Some remarkabl e implication s o f tha t proces s ar e presen t i n Eisenstadt, which provides at the level of constitutional adjudication on e of the first express acknowledgment s o f th e se t o f change s regardin g famil y matters that were occurring widely in the society. That acknowledgmen t signals a clear transformation i n the traditional ideology of family as well. In the seven years between Griswold and Eisenstadt, a momentous set of I 53 I

Family Law in Transition changes tha t ha d bee n developin g i n th e structur e an d scop e o f th e American famil y fo r man y decade s bega n t o gai n widesprea d acknowl edgment an d acceptanc e fro m th e law . Thoug h societ y remained , an d still remains , confuse d an d ambivalent , th e strengt h o f th e change s i s indicated i n th e law' s willingness t o define an d regulat e th e family—o r a t least its adult members—a s a collection o f discrete individual s connecte d by a se t o f temporar y choice s an d unaffecte d b y th e eterna l dictate s o f God o r blood. I n consequence , the ideologica l distinctio n betwee n hom e and wor k become s murky , an d a s tha t happens , famil y relation s appea r less an d les s differen t fro m relation s i n th e marketplace , an d further , seem increasingl y amenabl e t o regulatio n b y rule s resemblin g thos e formulated fo r th e regulatio n o f market interactions . Ironically, i n thi s regard , Griswold, bu t no t Eisenstadt, ca n ultimatel y be harmonize d wit h Lochner. Bot h Griswold an d Lochner (thoug h th e second onl y implicitly ) presum e a worl d i n whic h hom e an d wor k ar e separate. Eisenstadt, i n contrast , discard s tha t distinction . Thi s readin g depends o f course o n Griswold's express language . The opinion' s subtext , as well a s an earlie r draft 49 prepare d b y Justice Douglas , but neve r used , suggest tha t th e Cour t ma y hav e bee n fa r mor e comfortabl e wit h a vie w of the family a s a collection o f autonomous individual s tha n th e languag e of the opinio n actuall y states . Whatever th e agend a o r unresolve d confu sions underlyin g Griswold, the rhetori c an d metaphor s tha t were use d b y the Cour t sugges t th e unprecedente d characte r o f th e Eisenstadt deci sion, whic h clearl y define s th e individua l a s th e uni t t o whic h valu e attaches, even withi n families . Over thre e decade s afte r Griswold, i t seems clea r tha t familie s (a t leas t with regar d t o adult s withi n them ) ar e increasingl y understoo d t o b e composed o f individual s and , that , fo r a larg e segmen t o f th e societ y much o f th e time , familie s a s unit s o f mora l valu e ar e n o mor e an d n o less significan t tha n thei r separate , individua l members . A s the famil y i s increasingly define d throug h th e term s o f th e market , i t i s les s ofte n automatically understoo d a s a locus o f sacred value , apart from , o r rathe r encompassing, individua l famil y members . T o th e exten t tha t familie s deserve protectio n fro m th e law , that protectio n increasingl y attache s t o individual famil y member s an d no t t o th e famil y uni t a s a n undivided , and indivisibl e whole . That o f course wa s the messag e o f Eisenstadt Purportedly, Eisenstadt gre w ou t o f Griswold. Bu t tha t i s so onl y i n a limited sens e and onl y if Griswold's express language i s ignored. Certainl y I 54 I

Family Law in Transition each decisio n recognize d a privac y righ t t o th e us e o f contraceptives . However, i n thei r respectiv e characterization s o f family, th e tw o decision s are fa r mor e differen t tha n similar . I n fact , i n man y regard s Eisenstadt resembles no t Griswold, but Lochner. Th e justificatio n tha t buttressed th e Griswold decision—tha t th e family, surely , ha d t o b e fre e fro m stat e intrusion —is presen t onl y a s allusio n i n Eisenstadt. Th e Eisenstadt Court's equa l protectio n analysi s presume s tha t th e protectio n afforde d by Griswold applie s t o individua l famil y member s an d no t t o th e famil y or marital uni t pe r se. Eisenstadt an d Lochner alik e sough t t o protec t th e individua l fro m state interference . I n bot h case s i t was the individua l a s the ultimat e uni t of social value , th e individua l a s a socia l whole , joine d t o other s onl y b y choice an d neve r absolutely , whos e interest s th e Cour t protected . Th e Lochner Cour t accuse d th e Ne w Yor k maximu m hour s statut e o f "lim iting th e hour s i n whic h grow n an d intelligen t me n ma y labo r t o ear n their living " an d therefor e conclude d tha t th e la w wa s a "mer e meddle some interference[ ] wit h th e right s o f th e individual." 50 Th e Eisenstadt Court too k a simila r vie w wit h regar d t o adult s makin g sexua l an d reproductive choices . Tha t Cour t sai d tha t th e Massachusett s birt h con trol statut e a t issu e curtaile d "th e righ t o f th e individual, marrie d o r single, t o b e fre e fro m unwarrante d governmenta l intrusio n int o matter s so fundamentall y affectin g a perso n a s th e decisio n whethe r t o bea r o r beget a child." 51 Differences continu e t o separat e th e worl d a t issu e i n Lochner (o f employer-employee relations ) fro m th e worl d a t issu e i n Eisenstadt (o f relations betwee n unmarrie d lovers) . These difference s are , however, les s absolute tha n thos e tha t onc e unambiguousl y separate d hom e fro m wor k in America n ideology ; th e earlie r differences depende d centrall y o n a n understanding o f home an d famil y tha t preclude d autonomou s individu ality. Wha t i s remarkabl e abou t th e similarit y betwee n Lochner an d Eisenstadt i s tha t Lochner s idealize d portrai t o f th e nineteenth-centur y market—populated b y individual s equall y fre e t o mak e thei r separat e choices an d t o desig n thei r uniqu e connections—wa s transferre d wit h virtually n o notice , an d therefor e wit h littl e recognitio n o f th e conse quences, t o Eisenstadt 's mid-twentieth-centur y portrai t o f couple s —married o r unmarried—describe d a s "a n associatio n o f tw o individual s eac h with a separat e intellectua l an d emotiona l makeup" 52 who , a s such , deserve constitutiona l protection . I n bot h Lochner an d Eisenstadt, partie s I 55

Family Law in Transition involved i n a relationship (whethe r commercial , as in Lochner, o r familia l as in Eisenstadt) ar e considere d t o possess equal bargainin g power . Despite th e similaritie s betwee n Lochner an d Eisenstadt, however , th e two opinion s canno t b e rea d t o sa y th e sam e thing . I n fact , Lochner portrays on e pol e o f a world, whose othe r pole , as defined i n nineteenth and earl y t o mid-twentieth-centur y America n ideology , i s th e family , whose member s i n relatin g togethe r wer e understoo d t o contras t almos t totally wit h th e unrestraine d individual s o f th e fre e market . Thi s i s th e family a s portrayed , a t leas t o n th e fac e o f th e text , i n Griswold, bu t i t i s not the famil y envisione d b y Eisenstadt. Certainly th e justice s wh o wrot e Lochner woul d hav e bee n a s unset tled b y Eisenstadt a s thos e wh o wrot e Eisenstadt wer e unsettle d b y Lochner. Th e explanatio n o f eac h group' s rea l o r presume d disquie t with th e othe r i s th e same . Betwee n Lochner an d Eisenstadt, a s mor e dramatically, becaus e mor e suddenly , betwee n Griswold an d Eisenstadt, established truth s abou t th e difference s betwee n hom e an d work , a s well as truth s abou t th e peopl e wh o populate d thos e tw o worlds , ha d bee n torn asunder . Fo r the justice s who wrote Lochner—and probabl y fo r mos t people wh o approve d o f th e decision—th e worl d o f work an d th e worl d of home were understood t o be inevitably separate. The family , describe d by Davi d Schneide r i n hi s stud y o f American kinshi p a t mid-century , a s a univers e o f "enduring, diffus e solidarity " defined throug h tie s of natura l substance ("blood") , contrast s i n almos t ever y regard wit h th e individual ism o f the marketplace , i n whic h "ever y ma n is , in principle , a n embodi ment o f humanity a t large, and [where ] a s such h e i s equal t o every othe r man, and free." 53 Both Lochner an d Eisenstadt presum e th e autonomou s individua l an d protect that individual's freedo m fro m unjustifie d restraint . I n the contex t of relevanc e i n Lochner (th e worl d o f work) , tha t presumptio n is , an d since th e lat e eighteent h centur y ha s been , familia r an d therefor e ex pected. A t th e tim e an d i n th e contex t o f relevanc e i n Eisenstadt (th e world o f home) , th e presumptio n o f autonomou s individualit y wa s no t generally expecte d an d i s still no t always expected o r entirel y acceptable . For over a century, Americans ha d assume d tha t the autonomous individ ual existe d i n th e market , bu t no t i n th e home . Eisenstadt i s significan t for envisionin g th e autonomou s individua l a t th e cente r o f the domesti c unit. I n thi s regard , th e opinio n suggest s forcefully—becaus e i t seem s

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Family Law in Transition almost t o assume—tha t a fundamenta l chang e ha d occurre d i n th e society's understandin g o f th e family . Fo r centuries , th e famil y ha d pro vided on e o f th e ver y fe w context s i n America n lif e withi n whic h th e putatively equal , unfettere d individua l o f th e marketplac e wa s not pre sumed. Eisenstadt represente d a ne w vie w an d acknowledge d a ne w reality. In Eisenstadt, th e famil y wa s clearly and unmistakenl y recognize d a s a collection o f individuals . And eve n thoug h Eisenstadt's expres s languag e protected onl y th e righ t t o mak e a certai n kin d o f procreative, o r sexual , decision, ther e i s n o expres s languag e i n th e decisio n tha t limit s th e protection delineate d onl y t o peopl e engage d i n thos e activities , an d i n addition, th e vie w o f th e famil y suggeste d i n Eisenstadt reappeare d i n a set o f late r cases , includin g Roe v . Wade. I n protectin g families , o r activities associate d wit h families , Eisenstadt protecte d th e righ t o f th e individual, alone , t o decid e ho w t o desig n hi s o r he r life . I n thi s regard , Eisenstadt doe s no t reflec t Lochner. I t extend s it . However , th e extensio n contends wit h th e ideologica l underpinning s o f th e worl d i n whic h Lochner wa s decided , a worl d i n whic h hom e an d wor k wer e viewe d a s fundamentally separate . I n thi s regard , Eisenstadt ca n b e distinguishe d from Lochner an d Griswold alike . O f th e thre e opinions , onl y Eisenstadt declares tha t th e difference s betwee n th e marketplac e an d th e hom e have becom e essentiall y incidental . The ver y justificatio n offere d b y th e Cour t fo r it s approac h i n Griswold— that th e famil y a s a worl d apar t fro m th e res t o f everyda y lif e deserves specia l protection—wa s declare d illusor y b y Eisenstadt Eisenstadt, despit e citin g Griswold a s it s centra l precedent , differe d fro m Griswold i n declarin g tha t th e famil y i s merely a collection o f individuals, n o different fro m individual s wh o joi n i n other form s o f association an d that , therefore, individual s i n familie s ar e deservin g o f n o greate r an d o f n o lesser protection tha n individual s i n marke t associations . III. Privacy , Liberty , an d Procreationa l Autonom y The righ t to privacy, formulated i n Griswold and reaffirme d i n Eisenstadt, was extended , an d the n limited , i n futur e constitutiona l case s an d ha s been applauded , examined , reinterpreted , an d condemne d b y judges an d commentators. Almos t nobod y ha s considere d th e issue s an d remaine d I 57 I

Family Law in Transition entirely neutral , an d eve n peopl e approvin g th e apparen t consequence s of creatin g a constitutiona l righ t t o privac y hav e questione d th e Court' s jurisprudence i n thes e cases . Griswold and Eisenstadt, an d the privacy cases that followed, includin g Roe v. Wade, i n whic h th e cour t base d a limited righ t t o abortio n o n th e right t o privacy , a s wel l a s case s decide d abou t a decad e late r suc h a s Bowers v . Hardwick, whic h restricte d th e righ t t o privacy , revea l th e legal concern s an d mora l puzzle s tha t constitut e th e law' s contemporar y response t o case s occasione d b y reproductiv e technology . Eisenstadt, especially ha d th e implication s o f tha t cas e bee n furthere d rathe r tha n circumscribed i n late r cases , migh t b e rea d t o provid e a clea r constitu tional righ t to ente r surrogac y arrangements , t o donat e o r to buy an d sel l gestational service s o r gameti c material , an d t o reproduc e usin g th e gametes o f deceased spouse s o r lovers . John A . Robertso n i n Children of Choice recommend s suc h a n approac h t o reproductiv e technology , on e based o n a right to "procreative liberty. " "There is, " proclaims Robertson , "no better alternative tha n leavin g procreative decision s to the individual s whose procreativ e desire s ar e mos t directl y involved." 54 Robertson' s ap proach flows fro m Eisenstadt mor e directl y tha n fro m Griswold. H e suggests an individual , no t a communal, righ t when h e discusse s "procre ative liberty. " I n fact , a s Robertso n recognizes , th e ultimat e implication s of privacy jurisprudenc e fo r law s restricting th e righ t t o us e reproductiv e technology o r t o ente r int o surrogac y arrangement s remai n uncertain . However, t o the exten t that th e earl y privacy case s do protect th e righ t t o have childre n throug h surrogacy , throug h th e us e o f donated gametes , o r with th e assistanc e o f othe r reproductiv e technologies , tha t protectio n stems fro m th e understandin g o f privac y articulate d i n Eisenstadt, an d not from tha t i n Griswold. The sor t o f privac y protecte d i n Griswold— the privac y o f th e family , as a whole , fro m thos e outsid e th e family—reflected , an d thereb y con firmed, long-standin g image s o f th e famil y a s a domai n protecte d fro m the large r worl d o f wor k an d money . Th e righ t t o privac y protecte d i n Eisenstadt attache d t o th e individua l an d no t th e group , an d i n tha t important regard , was thereby of a different orde r than th e righ t protecte d in Griswold. Fa r mor e tha n th e familia l privac y protecte d i n Griswold, the righ t protected i n Eisenstadt (th e righ t o f the individual t o reproduc e or not ) support s th e sor t o f procreationa l libert y tha t Robertso n recom mends, especially because assiste d reproductio n ha s come increasingl y t o

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Family Law in Transition require th e participatio n o f thir d parties , includin g sper m donors , eg g donors, an d wome n willin g t o gestat e babie s fo r others . Onl y unusuall y are such thir d partie s defined , eve n b y participants, as "family members. " A mor e explici t consideratio n o f th e difference s betwee n privac y a s defined i n Griswold an d privac y a s define d i n Eisenstadt i s i n order . Some commentator s an d judge s hav e suggeste d tha t "liberty " might hav e been a bette r ter m tha n privac y t o describ e th e righ t protecte d i n bot h cases. Tha t suggestio n provide s a goo d startin g poin t fro m whic h t o explore th e difference s betwee n th e notion s o f privac y involve d i n th e two cases . Justic e Dougla s studiousl y avoide d an y mentio n o f th e ter m "liberty" i n Griswold. Hi s choice o f the ter m privac y t o describe th e righ t protected wa s probabl y motivate d b y a n interes t i n avoidin g th e sor t of direc t referenc e t o Lochner whic h us e o f th e ter m "liberty " woul d undoubtedly hav e suggested . However , th e ter m "privacy " does describ e the righ t extende d i n Griswold, an d fro m a socia l an d historical , thoug h not perhap s fro m a constitutional , perspective , th e ter m "privacy " wa s a better choic e tha n libert y would hav e bee n fo r describin g tha t right . Privacy an d libert y d o no t sugges t precisel y th e sam e thing . Thoug h the tw o term s ar e closel y connecte d i n meaning , th e ton e o f each differ s from tha t o f th e other . I n commo n language , privac y mor e ofte n con notes "intimate " an d "personal " tha n doe s liberty . Th e famil y ha d lon g been th e centra l aren a fo r privat e relation s i n Wester n society . "Privat e life shoul d b e live d behin d walls, " wrot e Littr e i n hi s mid-nineteenth century Dictionnaire. "N o one, " he continued , "i s allowed t o pee r int o a private hom e o r t o revea l wha t goe s o n inside." 55 I n contrast , a t leas t since th e Frenc h Revolution , th e individua l —not larger unit s such a s the family—has bee n understoo d a s th e agen t o f "liberty. " Thus , Griswold protected th e righ t t o privac y fo r famil y relationships , withi n families . That righ t reflecte d a pervasiv e perceptio n o f famil y lif e durin g th e century an d a hal f befor e Griswold a s privat e fro m thos e outsid e th e family unit . Famil y privac y doe s not , however , depen d on , o r guarantee , the privac y o f family members , eac h fro m th e others . Griswold's subtext , a s wel l a s Justic e Douglas' s earlie r draf t whic h predicated th e decisio n o n a Firs t Amendment righ t o f spouses t o associ ate freely , sugges t th e Cour t ma y a t som e leve l hav e understoo d th e privacy righ t a s attaching t o individual s rathe r tha n t o families a s holisti c units o f socia l interaction . I t woul d strai n credulit y t o argu e tha t funda mental understanding s o f personhood an d famil y coul d hav e change d a s I 59 I

Family Law in Transition completely i n seve n year s a s th e differences betwee n Griswold's expres s language an d Eisenstadt suggest . However , i n 1965 , the Cour t stil l voice d its concern wit h protectin g privac y i n languag e recallin g traditiona l fami lies as wholes. In 1973 , the Cour t di d not . The establishmen t o f individua l privacy , suggeste d perhap s i n Griswold's subtext , bu t elaborate d expressl y i n Eisenstadt an d late r privac y cases, depended on , and reflected , th e transformation o f the predominan t ideology o f family. I n thi s transformation, th e family , onc e understoo d t o involve inexorabl e an d endurin g connections , cam e t o b e understoo d t o entail relationship s far mor e similar to those expected i n the marketplace . Privacy wa s value d fo r centuries , bu t th e notio n o f privac y a s attache d exclusively o r a t leas t mos t fittingly t o th e autonomou s individua l i s a recent innovatio n i n th e histor y o f ideas . I t i s eve n mor e recen t wit h regard t o peopl e i n families . Th e positio n tha t famil y member s ar e private, o r a t leas t hav e th e right t o b e private , on e fro m another , i s fundamentally differen t fro m th e notio n tha t famil y privac y shoul d b e protected fro m th e large r societ y and th e state . That differenc e i s illuminated b y comparin g th e traditiona l notio n i n family la w o f "famil y autonomy " wit h th e sor t o f autonom y righ t pro tected i n Eisenstadt. Court s ofte n justified , an d t o som e exten t continu e to justify, decision s to avoid stat e interventio n i n family matter s unde r th e rubric o f family autonomy . A s traditionally understood , th e righ t o f fami lies t o enjo y autonom y protecte d familie s a s socia l unit s fro m stat e intervention aime d a t assistin g o r controllin g individuals within ongoing families. Th e stat e has regulated th e creatio n o f families and , t o whateve r extent i t wa s willin g t o d o so , th e terminatio n o f familie s fo r centuries . The stat e define d marriage , determine d custody , an d mad e cohabitatio n criminal. But , th e doctrin e o f famil y autonom y proclaime d tha t withi n operational families—an d onl y there—th e famil y a s a whol e could , an d should, desig n an d creat e th e specifi c contour s o f everyday life . Unstated i n mos t application s o f thi s doctrine—becaus e thoroughl y assumed—was a certain understandin g o f families. Rarel y challenged , a t least befor e th e latte r par t o f the twentiet h century , familie s i n thi s vie w were understoo d a s hierarchica l unit s i n whic h me n an d adults , i n th e very nature o f the case , controlled wome n an d children . So , for example , in a well-know n Nebrask a cas e decide d i n 1953 , a stat e cour t refuse d t o agree wit h Lydi a McGuir e tha t he r husband , Charle s McGuire , despit e 60 I

Family Law in Transition his ampl e financial resources , shoul d furnis h th e couple' s hom e wit h indoor bathroo m facilities , a new furnace, an d decen t furniture . Invokin g the doctrin e o f famil y autonomy , th e cour t reasone d tha t thes e matter s were privat e t o eac h famil y whic h shoul d no t hav e t o suffe r stat e intru sion becaus e a particula r husban d wa s less generous tha n h e migh t hav e been. "[T]h e livin g standards o f a family," th e Nebrask a cour t wrote, "ar e a matte r o f concer n t o th e household , an d no t fo r th e court s t o deter mine." 56 I n th e court' s view , th e McGuir e famil y followe d th e socia l expectation tha t husbands , no t wives , make majo r financial decision s fo r the family . Thus , thi s famil y (o r rathe r thi s famil y understoo d inevitabl y with Mr . McGuir e a s dominant) coul d no t b e disrupte d b y state interfer ence t o protect th e wife' s interes t i n decen t support . Family autonom y (th e privac y o f th e famil y a s a structure d whole ) i s more likel y to preclude tha n t o provide th e sor t of protection t o individu als involve d i n famil y matter s tha t woul d see m t o b e assure d b y Eisenstadt However , once the righ t to privacy attaches to the individual , rathe r than t o th e whole , option s fo r creatin g an d fo r livin g everyda y lif e i n units definabl e a s "families " multipl y exponentially . Fo r thi s reason , Eisenstadt, thoug h no t Griswold, suggest s broad constitutiona l protectio n for individual s t o form intimat e relationship s tha t ma y o r ma y no t resem ble traditional understanding s o f family, includin g relationship s produce d from, o r necessary fo r th e us e of , reproductiv e technology . Had th e implication s o f Eisenstadt bee n extende d an d elaborated , rather tha n reinterprete d an d limite d i n Suprem e Cour t case s tha t fol lowed it , som e o f th e mos t troublin g question s presente d t o famil y law , including question s raise d b y reproductiv e technology , woul d find readier, thoug h no t necessaril y better , answer s tha n i s the case . That tha t has no t happene d seem s no t surprising , perhap s eve n inevitable , i n light o f th e wide-scal e ambivalenc e i n th e societ y tha t accompanie s th e transformation o f th e famil y towar d th e sor t o f assembl y envisione d i n Eisenstadt Tha t suc h a shift coul d occu r withou t vacillatio n an d disarra y is not easil y imaginable . In fact , a littl e mor e tha n a decad e afte r Eisenstadt, th e Suprem e Court expressl y limite d th e righ t t o privac y define d there . I n Bowers v. Hardwick, decide d i n 1986 , th e Cour t refuse d t o exten d th e protectio n based o n privac y to sodomy betwee n consentin g adults . In othe r cases , as well, th e Cour t limite d th e implication s o f Eisenstadt Fo r instance , i n

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Family Law in Transition Webster v . Missouri Reproduction Services, decide d i n 1989 , th e Cour t sharply restricte d a woman's righ t to abortion guarantee d b y Roe v. Wade, a righ t that Roe located withi n th e righ t to privacy . These case s wer e decide d b y a differen t assortmen t o f judge s fro m those wh o decide d th e earlie r cases , judge s wit h differen t response s and concerns . However , fro m th e perspectiv e o f th e socia l analyst , th e confusions an d ambivalenc e tha t followe d Eisenstadt an d it s immediat e progeny represen t th e complicated , bu t no t surprising , response s o f a society adjustin g t o profoun d change s i n a centra l socia l institutio n an d to equall y consequentia l change s i n th e concept s o f personhoo d an d o f persons i n relatio n t o each other . For simila r reasons , societ y i s ambivalen t an d confuse d abou t th e increasingly impressiv e solution s offere d b y reproductiv e technolog y t o infertility. Thi s ambivalenc e an d confusio n ar e precisel y reflecte d i n th e law whic h seek s bot h t o protec t an d t o discourag e suc h technology . Legislative response s ar e neithe r comprehensiv e no r timely . Courts , i n responding t o particula r case s tha t deman d resolution , see k t o preserv e the correlate s o f individualit y an d expandin g choice , whil e als o workin g to protect families—an d especiall y th e parent-chil d bond—fro m th e con sequences o f unlimited, ofte n unregulated , choice .

I 62 I

THREE

Status an d Contrac t in Surrogat e Motherhoo d

The societ y an d th e la w remai n deepl y ambivalen t an d confuse d abou t the transformatio n o f the famil y fro m a holistic unit , protecte d b y the la w as such , t o th e famil y a s a collectivit y o f people , protecte d b y th e la w individually. Socia l an d lega l response s t o reproductiv e technolog y an d surrogate motherhoo d reflec t tha t ambivalenc e an d confusion . This chapte r consider s thos e response s i n th e contex t o f surrogacy . Even th e labels—surrogate , surrogacy , surrogat e motherhood—ca n b e viewed ambivalently , sinc e fro m a certai n perspectiv e th e surrogat e mother i s the rea l mother . I n fact , surrogac y i s no t reall y a n instanc e o f reproductive technolog y althoug h i t i s almos t alway s considere d an d discussed a s i f it were. Surrogacy—a t leas t wha t ha s come , quit e remark ably, to be calle d "traditional " surrogacy—require s n o sophisticate d tech nology. Nothin g beyon d a turke y baste r i s necessar y t o perfor m th e artificial (o r assisted ) inseminatio n o f a so-calle d surrogat e mothe r wit h the sper m o f a n "intended " father . Th e procedur e nee d no t involv e medical assistance , though fo r lega l an d othe r reason s i t often does . I. "Traditional " Surrogac y Traditional surrogac y pose s n o challeng e beyon d tha t pose d b y artificia l insemination t o familia r notion s o f biologica l maternity , thoug h i t doe s upset expectation s abou t th e connectio n betwee n biologica l an d socia l maternity. I n contrast , gestationa l surrogac y involve s th e separatio n o f biological maternit y int o a geneti c an d a gestationa l aspect , wit h eac h aspect allotte d t o differen t women . Gestationa l surrogac y doe s thereb y unsettle expectation s abou t huma n reproductio n an d present s differen t

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Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood conundrums fro m thos e presente d b y traditiona l surrogacy . Gestationa l surrogacy i s considered i n late r chapters . Traditional surrogac y has some ancient precedents includin g th e bibli cal stor y o f th e birt h o f Ishmae l t o Haga r afte r Sar a pleade d wit h he r husband Abraha m t o becom e th e fathe r o f a chil d wit h Sara' s servan t Hagar. "Com e t o my slave, " Sar a tol d Abraham , "an d hopefull y I wil l have son s through her." l Biologically , th e biblica l precedent s diffe r fro m current practic e onl y i n tha t i n th e biblica l case s conceptio n followe d sexual intercours e rathe r tha n artificia l insemination . A s a socia l matter , however, surrogac y wa s mor e acceptabl e t o th e worl d i n whic h Sara , Abraham, Hagar , an d Ishmae l live d than i t is in th e contemporar y world . But tha t fac t notwithstanding , th e consequence s o f Hagar' s "surrogat e motherhood" wer e quit e calamitou s fo r everyon e involved . As resurrected i n th e moder n world , surrogac y i s classe d a s a for m o f reproductive technolog y fo r social , rathe r tha n technologica l o r biologi cal, reasons. Although no w surrogacy arrangements ca n tak e many forms , they al l involv e th e participatio n o f a woma n wh o agree s t o gestat e an d give birt h t o a chil d who m sh e furthe r agree s t o surrende r t o othe r parents. These parent s ar e variousl y calle d "contracting, " "intending, " o r "social" parents. In th e mos t typica l surrogac y case , th e fathe r wh o contract s wit h th e potential surrogat e i s also th e sper m dono r an d is , therefore, th e biologi cal fathe r o f th e child . Jus t a s th e nam e "surrogate " suggest s tha t th e biological mothe r i s no t a rea l mother , s o th e term s contracting , in tending, an d socia l parent s sugges t tha t thes e peopl e ar e no t rea l (i n th e sense perhap s o f complete) parent s either . Sometimes , th e father , wh o i s usually a biological parent , i s referred t o simply as "the father, " whil e hi s wife i s called a contracting, intending , o r socia l parent . However , insofa r as biologica l father s i n ou r cultur e hav e traditionall y becom e father s b y marriage t o thei r children' s mothers , father s i n surrogac y arrangement s may not be considere d socia l father s unti l an d unles s their wive s becom e mothers. Surrogacy i s sometimes considere d b y infertil e couple s who , fo r vari ous reason s suc h a s advanced age , may find i t difficult t o adopt . Marrie d couples engagin g a surrogat e mothe r usually , thoug h no t necessarily , include a wife unabl e t o conceive o r gestate a baby, and desir e a child t o whom a t least one of them (th e husband) wil l have a genetic connection . Variations o n thi s pattern exist . For instance , i f the husban d i s infertile o r

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Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood has a famil y histor y o f geneti c disease , th e sper m o f a third-part y dono r can b e use d i n th e insemination . I n suc h a case neithe r intendin g paren t will b e connecte d throug h genetic s t o th e resultin g child . I n addition , the intendin g parent s ma y no t b e marrie d t o one another ; th e biologica l and intendin g fathe r ma y b e unmarrie d an d ma y desir e t o becom e a single parent , o r a n unmarrie d woma n ma y ente r int o a contrac t wit h a surrogate wh o wil l the n b e inseminate d wit h th e sper m o f a third-part y donor. When surrogac y involve s a contract—and i t may not , especiall y whe n the partie s ar e relative s o r clos e friends—th e practic e ha s bee n fo r th e intending father , bu t no t th e intendin g mother , t o sig n th e agreement . This practic e i s aime d a t mitigatin g th e suggestio n tha t a chil d i s bein g purchased an d sold . I n ever y state , i t i s illega l t o pa y fo r a child . I f th e surrogate i s married , he r husban d generall y enter s int o th e contractua l arrangement wit h th e surrogat e an d th e intendin g father . Th e husban d of th e surrogat e mus t expressl y refus e t o consen t t o th e inseminatio n o f his wife ; otherwise , unde r existin g law , i n mos t jurisdiction s h e wil l b e the child' s legal father . Commercial surrogac y generall y involve s payment s o f betwee n $10,000 an d $15,00 0 t o th e surrogate . Tha t pric e ha s hardl y budge d i n the pas t decade . I n addition , eve n large r sum s ma y b e pai d t o brokers , including commercia l surrogat e mothe r programs . Helen a Ragone , wh o did anthropologica l researc h wit h surrogate s an d intendin g parents , re ported i n 199 4 tha t ther e wer e eigh t suc h program s operatin g i n th e United State s an d tha t mos t couple s wer e payin g fee s betwee n $28,00 0 and $45,000 , including payment s t o the surrogate . Surrogacy, a s a mean s fo r infertil e couple s t o have children , appeare d in th e 1980s , a fe w year s afte r a n Englishwoma n gav e birt h t o th e first child conceive d i n vitro . Thus, i n exactl y th e sam e period , beginnin g i n the earl y 1980s , society was faced wit h a variety o f new form s fo r creatin g families, an d court s were soo n bein g asked t o resolve dispute s occasione d by surrogat e motherhoo d an d other s occasione d b y th e us e o f th e ne w reproductive technologies . Although surrogac y does not confoun d expec tations abou t biologica l reproductio n a s profoundl y a s i n vitr o fertiliza tion, embry o transfer , o r th e cryopreservatio n o f gamete s an d embryos , surrogacy an d th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s alik e challeng e tradi tional understanding s abou t th e family . Th e simultaneou s appearanc e o f "modern" surrogacy and th e ne w reproductive technologie s wa s probably

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Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood not coincidental . B y th e lat e 1970s , a s th e law' s increasingl y libera l response durin g th e previou s decad e an d a hal f t o othe r change s i n th e family suggests , th e societ y wa s prepare d t o entertain , howeve r ambiva lently, familie s tha t conflicte d wit h traditiona l expectations . Surrogac y and th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s depen d o n th e recognitio n o f choice an d variet y i n th e creation , an d perhap s i n th e operation , o f families. Eac h therefor e ca n find acceptanc e onl y i n a world , suc h a s that assume d i n Eisenstadt, tha t views families a s collectivities o f individ uals wh o join—an d dissociate—throug h choice. I n suc h a world, bu t no t in on e tha t imagine s familie s a s holisti c socia l unit s produce d an d de fined throug h inexorabl e biologica l processes , couple s ca n contrac t t o produce childre n an d familie s ca n include , o r ignore , socia l parents , genetic parents , an d gestationa l parents . Th e competin g social , moral , and lega l claims to which surrogac y and th e ne w reproductive technolog ies hav e give n ris e al l deriv e a t botto m fro m continuin g uncertaint y about th e valu e o f th e cultura l shif t represented—thoug h obviousl y no t generated—by th e transitio n fro m Griswold to Eisenstadt However, traditiona l surrogac y differ s fro m th e ne w reproductiv e tech nologies i n no t seriousl y disruptin g familia r assumption s abou t huma n reproduction. Therefore , surrogac y provide s a comparativel y straightfor ward contex t withi n whic h t o begi n th e analysi s o f socia l response s t o assisted reproduction , includin g surrogac y an d th e ne w reproductiv e technologies. Thes e technologie s presen t a mor e complicate d challeng e to traditional image s o f family lif e tha n doe s surrogacy. Surrogac y manip ulates, an d therefor e challenges , th e socia l dimension s o f family , bu t unlike th e ne w reproductive technologies , surrogacy raise s few metaphys ical question s abou t the parameter s o f biological maternit y o r paternity . Surrogacy doe s depend o n th e us e of artificial insemination . Bu t today use o f tha t procedur e raise s fe w metaphysica l o r ontologica l question s about biologica l parentage . Th e societ y an d th e la w wer e onc e deepl y troubled b y the implication s o f artificial insemination , especiall y i n case s involving th e us e o f sper m fro m third-part y donor s rathe r tha n fro m th e husband o f th e mother . However , America n la w accepte d an d widel y regulated artificia l inseminatio n ove r a decad e befor e th e appearanc e o f surrogacy i n th e earl y 1980s . With that , earlie r concern s abou t adulter y and bastard y resultin g fro m artificia l inseminatio n hav e bee n replace d with th e determinatio n tha t a t leas t i n th e cas e o f marrie d couple s the consentin g husban d o f a woma n wh o conceive s throug h artificia l 66

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood insemination usin g dono r sperm , an d no t th e sper m donor , i s the fathe r of any resultin g children . Surrogacy i s problematic fo r society and th e law today, but not becaus e it involve s artificia l insemination . Rathe r surrogac y question s traditiona l understandings o f mothe r an d commodifie s an d commercialize s th e creation o f the parent-chil d bond . Wit h surrogacy , th e biologica l mothe r (the surrogate ) agree s t o participat e i n th e ac t o f reproduction bu t no t i n the proces s o f socializatio n tha t follows . Tha t ha s trouble d a societ y which a s a whol e continue s t o understan d biologica l mothers , fa r mor e than biologica l fathers , a s inexorabl y conditione d b y th e processe s o f biological reproductio n t o becom e socia l parents . I n addition , becaus e surrogacy s o ofte n involve s contractua l agreement s an d financial ex change, i t suggest s th e erosio n o f traditiona l understanding s o f famil y which hav e fo r s o lon g define d th e worl d o f famil y i n contras t t o th e world o f work. Thus, althoug h surrogac y doe s no t seriousl y disrup t famil iar expectations abou t th e biologica l correlate s o f kinship, i t does sugges t images o f women an d o f families tha t contras t wit h traditiona l image s i n important regards . In th e traditiona l ideolog y o f family , wome n ar e distinguishe d fro m men—and mother s fro m fathers—o n th e basi s o f biologica l correlates . Fathers represen t culture , wherea s mother s represen t nature . Father s stand fo r contract—fo r th e righ t t o negotiat e reality , includin g relation ships; mother s stan d fo r status—fo r th e inevitabilit y o f relationship s an d their structure . But , i n th e contex t o f surrogac y arrangements , mother s can b e oppose d t o other kinds o f mother s a s wel l a s t o fathers . I n thi s opposition, certai n mother s represen t cultur e o r contract ; wherea s other s represent statu s or nature. This oppositio n i s more complicate d tha n tha t between father s an d mothers . Surrogat e mother s represen t contrac t an d culture i n that they enter written agreement s tha t provide fo r the creatio n of new forms o f relationship an d fo r th e terminatio n o f maternal ties . Bu t they represen t natur e i n tha t the y ar e "natura l mothers" ; thei r clai m t o the chil d i s base d i n biology , mor e tha n i n law . Intendin g mother s may als o represen t contrac t an d culture . The y becom e mother s throug h agreement, rathe r tha n throug h pregnancy . Bu t intendin g mother s ma y be associate d wit h traditio n i n tha t the y typicall y hop e t o replicat e tradi tional famil y forms , t o creat e familie s indistinguishable , excep t i n origin , from old-fashione d America n families . Although surrogac y disrupt s familia r expectation s about , an d under -

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Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood standings of , families , i t als o promise s t o creat e more traditional , old fashioned families . I t suggest s th e commodificatio n o f wome n an d o f their children an d th e absolute collaps e o f loving, enduring families. But , it suggest s a s well, th e creatio n o f loving , endurin g familie s that , wer e i t not for surrogacy , could neve r be . These differences , an d thei r implications , ca n b e sharpl y focuse d through referenc e t o an ideologica l shif t describe d i n th e lat e nineteent h century b y th e Englis h socia l theorist , Si r Henr y Maine . "[T]h e societ y of ou r day, " wrot e Main e i n 1861 , "is mainl y distinguishe d from tha t o f preceding generation s b y th e largenes s o f th e spher e whic h i s occupie d in i t b y Contract/' 2 I n contras t t o a univers e s o largel y occupie d b y contract, Main e pose s a mor e ancien t world , largel y define d throug h relations o f status, relation s whic h "fixe d a man' s socia l positio n irrevers ibly at his birth." 3 In a univers e base d i n status , right s an d dutie s ar e se t a t birth ; more over, i n suc h a universe , right s an d dutie s ar e viewe d a s inexorabl e because the y atten d relationship s understoo d a s natural . Thus , th e rela tionships betwee n a maste r an d a serf , o r betwee n a pater familias an d his children , ar e establishe d a t birth , follo w familia r forms , an d deter mine th e right s an d dutie s betwee n th e tw o parties . I n a world base d o n status, law s ar e no t formulate d abstractl y fo r applicatio n t o putativel y equal individuals . Rather , the y follo w th e perceive d natura l orde r o f things, reflectin g th e inevitabilit y o f statu s an d relationship . I n suc h a world, peopl e ar e wh o the y ar e becaus e the y wer e bor n t o b e tha t way , and th e pretex t of abstract equalit y i s absent. In contrast , i n a worl d base d o n contract , a s Main e describe s it , th e basic uni t o f social realit y i s understood a s the individual , equa l t o othe r individuals an d fre e t o define hi s or her ow n lif e apar t from th e accident s of birth . Suc h a n individua l i s define d legall y b y th e abilit y t o contrac t with other , equall y situate d individuals . Main e wrote : The movemen t o f th e progressiv e societie s ha s bee n unifor m i n on e respect. Throug h al l it s cours e i t ha s bee n distinguishe d b y th e gradua l dissolution o f family dependenc y an d th e growt h o f individual obligatio n in it s place . Th e individua l i s steadily substitute d fo r th e Family , a s th e unit o f which civi l laws take account. .. . Nor i s it difficult t o see what is the ti e betwee n ma n an d ma n whic h replace s b y degrees thos e form s o f reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin i n the Family . It is contract. Starting , a s fro m on e terminu s o f history , fro m a conditio n o f I 68 I

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem t o have steadily moved towar d a phase of social orde r in which all these relations arise from fre e agreemen t of individuals.4 In theory , i n suc h a worl d individual s wh o ar e putativel y equa l an d unconstrained b y a priori characterizations reac h thei r ow n bargains , ac t out their ow n dramas , and defin e thei r ow n lives . In thi s social world , th e individual i s thought o f a s "th e proprieto r o f hi s ow n person, " fre e fro m dependence o n th e wil l o f other people. 5 The theor y o f complet e equalit y wa s belie d i n Maine' s worl d an d i s belied i n ou r ow n b y the realit y o f equality onl y for some—fo r thos e wh o are defined a t any moment a s full huma n beings . Various groups , includ ing women , blacks , an d childre n hav e bee n denie d tha t recognition . Maine di d acknowledg e tha t i n certai n circumstances , wome n migh t be define d a s complet e people , putativel y equa l t o othe r autonomou s individuals. Thus, he wrote that the statu s of the Female , under Tutelage , "if th e tutelag e b e understoo d o f person s othe r tha n he r husband , ha s also cease d t o exist ; fro m he r comin g o f ag e t o he r marriag e al l th e relations sh e ma y form ar e relation s o f contract." 6 But , fo r th e mos t part , Maine define d wome n a s inherentl y incomplet e a s peopl e i n a worl d o f contract. Fo r most women o f Maine's period , of course, the time betwee n coming o f ag e an d marriage , durin g whic h tim e female s coul d for m relations o f contract , wa s quit e short . Fo r th e mos t part , wome n contin ued t o be define d throug h relation s o f status, despite declaration s suc h a s Maine's whic h suggeste d tha t a s a n ontological , i f no t a social , matte r women could b e th e sor t o f people capabl e o f enterin g int o contracts . A similar recognitio n o f women' s incompletenes s i n a worl d o f contrac t underlay th e 187 2 U.S . Suprem e Cour t decisio n i n Bradwell v . Illinois. There, the Cour t refuse d t o grant Myra Bradwel l th e righ t to practice la w because a s a married woma n sh e coul d no t form contractua l relation s o n her own . In th e languag e o f contemporar y sociology , th e univers e o f statu s i s one i n which people' s conditio n i s largely ascribed; whereas, the univers e of contrac t i s on e i n whic h people' s conditio n i s largel y achieved . A s Maine wrote : All the forms of Status taken notic e of in the Law of Persons were derived from, an d t o som e exten t ar e stil l colore d by , th e power s an d privilege s anciently residin g i n th e Family . I f then w e emplo y Statu s . . . t o signif y 1691

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood these persona l condition s only , an d avoi d applyin g th e ter m t o suc h conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the movemen t o f the progressiv e societie s has hitherto bee n a movement from Status to Contract 7 Although intende d a s a historica l an d anthropologica l presentation , Maine's descriptio n o f th e difference s betwee n statu s an d contrac t i s accurate les s as a historical accoun t tha n a s a description o f the ideolog y of family tha t develope d durin g hi s ow n centur y an d tha t wa s elaborate d during th e nex t 15 0 years . Certainly , Maine' s accoun t reflect s som e aspects o f th e transformatio n tha t occurre d with , an d after , feudalism' s demise. However , i n th e feuda l world , th e locu s o f valu e fo r th e statu s relations tha t Main e describes—wa s th e socia l orde r a s a whole , no t individuals an d no t families . Th e contras t betwee n statu s an d contrac t i n terms o f whic h Main e propose d an d delineate d differences betwee n hi s own worl d an d tha t o f earlie r period s describe s i n fac t a nineteenth century solutio n t o th e broa d disruptio n i n socia l pattern s brough t abou t by the Industria l Revolution . The separatio n o f family fro m work , and th e romanticization o f family a s a domain o f love and endurin g commitment , preserved fo r th e nineteent h centur y th e illusion , an d t o some exten t th e reality a s well , o f stabilit y an d traditio n despit e th e vas t change s repre sented b y the developin g marketplace . The status/contrac t contras t provide s a n especiall y powerfu l fram e within whic h t o examin e contemporar y response s t o surrogac y sinc e those enterin g int o surrogacy arrangement s willfull y premis e th e creatio n of familial relations , and eve n mor e o f the parent-chil d bond , o n contrac tual negotiation s an d financial exchange . Thi s remain s troublin g t o a society stil l concerne d t o preserv e a t leas t th e illusio n tha t th e famil y i s a real m apar t fro m th e worl d o f work , define d throug h autonomou s individuality, contract , an d choice. 8 Certainly, i n th e contemporar y worl d lega l relation s define d i n term s of contrac t predominat e ove r thos e define d i n term s o f status . Yet , rela tions base d o n statu s ar e foun d alongsid e thos e base d o n contrac t an d often conflic t wit h th e genera l presumptio n i n ou r societ y tha t lega l rights an d dutie s d o no t depen d o n "accident s o f birth. " Famil y la w ha s been th e mos t significan t exceptio n t o th e law' s genera l tendenc y t o define an d regulat e relationship s i n contractua l terms . I n famil y life , th e law ha s proclaimed , quit e firmly an d consistentl y a t leas t unti l th e las t 70

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood few decades , tha t relation s o f statu s rathe r tha n o f contrac t ar e supposed to predominant . Th e visio n o f famil y o n whic h th e la w ha s predicated , and t o som e exten t continue s t o predicate , it s stanc e towar d famil y matters reflect s th e nineteenth-century' s romanticizatio n o f famil y rela tionships a s lovin g because inexorable . Th e parent-chil d relationshi p became th e bes t illustratio n o f a relationshi p i n whic h socia l fact s wer e grounded i n biologica l facts . I n thi s view , th e biologica l foundatio n o f the parent-chil d relationshi p constitute s an d direct s actua l relationship s between parent s an d thei r children . So , for instance , i n thi s vision o f th e parent-child tie , i n whic h childre n ar e suppose d t o lov e thei r parents , and parent s thei r children , parent s ar e suppose d t o provid e a hom e fo r their childre n an d car e fo r the m becaus e love , no t money , i s involved . This vision o f family reflect s Davi d Schneider' s descriptio n o f the cultur e of family a t about th e middl e o f the twentiet h century . That surrogac y ha s receive d an y publi c acceptanc e stand s a s a testa ment t o the exten t that th e univers e o f contract ha s entere d int o th e law' s understanding o f famil y relations . I n larg e part , surrogac y ha s continue d to prov e troublin g t o th e societ y because , eve n mor e tha n relationship s between adult s withi n families , th e parent-chil d relationshi p ha s bee n understood conservativel y a s a status-base d relationshi p characterize d by th e loyalt y an d commitmen t o f kinship . Th e shif t awa y fro m thi s understanding, a s illustrated i n surrogac y case s and i n case s involvin g th e new reproductiv e technologie s a s well , ha s bee n startlin g an d discon certing. The resultin g controvers y ha s been intricat e an d heated . This controvers y abou t surrogac y ha s bee n publi c an d ha s frequentl y been presente d an d debate d i n th e pres s an d o n television . Suc h publi c presentations sometime s sugges t that families ca n b e categorize d int o two sorts, on e reflectin g th e parameter s o f statu s an d th e other , th e parame ters o f contract , a s i f som e familie s hav e retaine d traditiona l form s o f interaction an d other s hav e evolve d wit h th e moder n world . I n fact , however, a s a sociological , i f no t necessaril y a s a n ideological , matter , most familie s reflec t bot h images . Moreover , man y familie s tha t migh t appear a s moder n families-through-choic e see themselve s a s happil y re flecting traditiona l form s o f familia l relationships . Assessment s b y court s and other s o f familie s create d throug h surrogac y arrangement s ofte n illustrate a tendenc y t o defin e suc h familie s a s eithe r completel y a t odds wit h th e worl d o f traditiona l familie s o r a s almos t paradigmaticall y illustrative o f that world . 1711

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood In addition , th e effor t t o categorize, an d thu s mak e sens e of , surrogac y is widel y informe d b y a basi c conservatis m i n th e society' s an d th e law's response s t o famil y matters . Tha t conservatis m i s unavoidabl y an d profoundly challenge d b y surrogat e motherhood . Th e arrangemen t di rectly threaten s th e biologica l predicate s o f th e romanticize d notio n o f family develope d durin g th e previou s centur y an d a half. Th e particula r threat tha t surrogac y pose s t o tha t ideolog y o f famil y ca n b e observe d i n detail b y substitutin g fo r "status " an d "contract " tw o correlativ e terms , respectively "gift " an d "commodity, " both understoo d t o refer t o children . Just as the predominan t ideolog y o f family ha s assume d tha t th e famil y i s supposed t o b e create d fro m (an d for ) love , not money , childre n ma y b e understood a s "gift s o f nature. " The y ar e valuabl e bu t ar e no t t o hav e a monetary valu e pu t o n them . Ever y stat e prohibit s th e sal e o f children . Adoption law s specificall y prohibi t paymen t t o a biologica l mothe r fo r her agreemen t t o allo w adoptio n o f her chil d beyon d thos e necessar y t o cover medica l an d othe r cost s incurre d a s a result o f the pregnancy . The societ y firmly opposes the self-consciou s commodificatio n o f children. Childre n canno t b e bough t o r sold. Their parentag e can , however , be transferre d fro m biologica l parent s t o other s an d i n making , o r ac cepting, such transfers , parent s sometimes imagin e th e exchang e throug h the metapho r o f gift-giving. " A gift," write s Lewi s Hyde , "is a thing we d o not ge t b y ou r ow n efforts . W e canno t bu y it ; w e canno t acquir e i t through a n ac t o f will. I t i s bestowed upo n us." 9 A gift create s a bond . I t cannot b e compare d with , or fairly exchange d for , othe r things. In Hyde' s words, a gift ha s "worth" ; i t i s prized, bu t w e "can' t pu t a price o n it. " I n contrast, a commodit y ha s a "value. " I t ca n b e compare d with , an d exchanged for , othe r things , including money. 10 As Hyde recognized , th e distinction betwee n wort h an d valu e tha t h e draw s correlates wit h Marx' s distinction i n Das Kapital betwee n use-valu e an d exchange-value . Contracts ar e written i n order to arrange for the exchang e o f commod ities. In fact , legally , a contract t o give a gift i s unenforceable fo r th e lac k of consideratio n (qui d pr o quo) . Withi n th e ideolog y o f contract , con tracts ar e entere d int o an d commoditie s ar e exchange d betwee n puta tively equa l individual s wh o nee d not , an d ideall y d o not , hav e othe r ties t o eac h other . B y contrast , gift s ar e exchange d betwee n peopl e i n relationships. Lik e relationship s base d i n status , and unlik e tie s base d i n contract, gifts d o not demand tha t the giver and th e receive r be putativel y equal. Hyd e writes: 1721

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood We might bes t picture th e differenc e betwee n gift s an d commoditie s . . . by imagining two territories separated by a boundary. A gift, when it moves across the boundary, either stop s being a gift o r else abolishes the bound ary. A commodity ca n cros s th e lin e withou t an y chang e i n it s nature ; moreover, it s exchang e wil l ofte n establis h a boundar y wher e non e pre viously existed (as for example in the sale of a necessity to a good friend). 11 The hom e an d famil y stil l represen t a domai n o f lif e i n whic h statu s distinctions—distinctions derive d through birt h suc h a s age and gender — are transparentl y important . Member s o f a famil y exchang e gifts . The y do no t typicall y ente r int o contract s wit h eac h other . I f the y do , the y begin t o trea t familia l relationship s a s i f they wer e marke t relationships . Hyde tell s th e stor y o f a gir l wh o agree d t o donat e a kidne y t o he r il l mother onl y i f the mothe r promise d a fu r coa t i n return . Th e daughter' s consequent agreemen t t o donat e he r kidne y wa s no t a gif t bu t a n ex change o f one commodit y ( a kidney) fo r anothe r ( a coat). "As soon a s the daughter shifte d th e categor y o f th e exchang e an d trie d t o barter, " ex plains Hyde , "al l he r authorit y draine d away . Whe n eithe r th e dono r o r the recipien t begin s t o treat a gift i n term s o f obligation, i t ceases t o be a gift."12 Th e marketplac e represent s a domain o f life base d o n contractua l understandings. I n th e marke t peopl e exchang e commodities . Commod ity exchang e doe s no t reinforc e relations . I t i s a n economi c exchang e without emotional , spiritual , o r aestheti c correlations . Commodit y ex change i s a n exchang e betwee n fre e agents . Gif t exchang e ha s th e capacity to cement an d t o commit peopl e t o each other . Surrogacy arrangement s ca n b e ordere d s o tha t th e bab y i s define d primarily a s a commodity, o r primarily a s a gift. I n eithe r case , the result s are problematic. The crucia l variable s affectin g th e definitio n o f the bab y in this regard are whether mone y i s exchanged betwee n th e parties, and i f so, how and whe n an d whethe r th e partie s bind themselve s contractually . Surrogacy arrangement s involvin g contract s an d th e exchang e o f mone y become lega l busines s deals , obviousl y openin g th e wa y for th e develop ment o f adversarial , lega l relationships . Suc h relationship s canno t b e harmonized wit h th e ide a tha t lif e i s a gif t whic h ca n b e bestowe d bu t not sold , o r wit h th e sens e o f famil y a s a n aren a o f loyalty an d commit ment, rathe r tha n o f legal controvers y an d commercia l interaction . If, however , th e chil d i n a surrogac y arrangemen t i s defined a s a gift , the limit s o f wha t constitute s a n appropriat e presen t ar e superseded . Children ar e "gift s o f nature " bu t ar e no t considere d appropriat e object s I 73

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood to b e exchange d betwee n peopl e a s presents . Althoug h gift s diffe r fro m commodities i n establishin g an d reinforcin g bonds , the y ar e lik e com modities i n bein g property . Again , Hyde' s orga n transplan t exampl e i s a good one . Whe n orga n transplantatio n develope d ther e wer e n o legall y cognizable right s t o bod y parts . No w th e Unifor m Anatomica l Gif t Act , enacted i n ever y state , give s a n adul t th e righ t t o bequeat h organ s a t death. I n th e cas e o f mino r children , th e righ t t o bequeat h bod y part s falls t o the parents . For th e society , commercia l surrogac y i s questionabl e becaus e i t de fines a bab y a s a commodity , u p fo r sal e a t th e prevailin g marke t price . Such deal s ca n als o b e interprete d a s definin g th e surrogat e a s a com modity. Mar y Gordo n refer s t o a fea r o f "som e feminists " tha t surrogac y will lea d t o "large-scal e bab y farm s wher e poo r wome n ar e turne d int o breeders fo r th e ric h wh o canno t o r choos e no t t o bea r thei r ow n children." 13 Surrogac y arrangement s involvin g n o exchang e o f mone y are les s problematic . Althoug h suc h arrangement s als o defin e a bab y a s property, th e bab y exchange d a s a gif t ha s a uniqu e worth ; wherea s th e baby exchange d fo r mone y i s fungible , substitutabl e fo r other , equall y valuable things . The differenc e i s not onl y ideological . Th e relationship s betwee n th e parties, includin g th e baby , ar e likel y t o develo p differentl y i n th e tw o cases. Wher e th e bab y i s exchange d i n th e "spiri t o f a gift " (a s betwee n friends o r siblings), the transfe r i s more likel y to reinforc e existin g bonds . Where th e bab y i s exchange d fo r money , pursuan t t o a contract , th e parties ar e likel y t o remai n fre e o f on e another . Jus t a s peopl e ar e expected t o ente r contract s a s equal , fre e agents , s o they ar e expecte d t o complete the m an d g o on t o other things . And a s Hyd e notes , while gift s bind, contract s separate . Whil e gift s transfor m relationships , contract s leave the m untouched , an d whil e gift s bespea k attachment , contract s bespeak freedom . Thus Helen a Ragone , i n he r ethnographi c stud y o f surrogacy , foun d many surrogate s experience d disappointmen t afte r th e birt h o f the chil d because they , thoug h receivin g payment , understoo d thei r rol e a s gift giver mor e tha n a s contrac t partner . A s a result , th e surrogate s who m Ragone studie d ofte n expecte d th e relationshi p wit h th e coupl e t o con tinue, bu t th e couple , understandin g th e relationshi p i n contractua l terms, expected i t to terminate whe n eac h sid e ha d receive d th e contrac tual benefit s o f th e arrangement . Ragon e quote s on e pai d surrogate : " I I 74 I

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood felt the y [th e intendin g parents ] ha d bee n my friends , bu t afte r the y go t what the y wanted, the y weren't." 14 The surrogate' s disappointmen t stemme d fro m difference s betwee n her visio n o f surrogacy an d tha t o f the coupl e fo r who m sh e bor e a baby. Ragone report s tha t man y pai d surrogate s clai m no t t o b e primaril y motivated b y th e financial aspect s o f surrogacy . Sh e conclude s tha t surrogates a s a grou p se e surrogac y a s a callin g o r vocatio n rathe r tha n simply as work for money . Sh e describe s man y surrogates , when the y first heard abou t institutionalize d surrogac y (ofte n throug h advertisement s seeking surrogate s o r from televisio n programs ) t o hav e bee n "astonishe d to lear n tha t surrogac y wa s no t merel y a privatel y hel d fantas y abou t helping infertil e couple s bu t a n actua l arrangemen t i n whic h the y coul d have a part." 15 Fo r th e intendin g couple s who m Ragon e interviewed , however, surrogac y wa s a mean s t o a n end , understoo d muc h mor e clearly as a business deal , though on e tha t would resul t i n th e satisfactio n of their deepes t desires . With respec t t o surrogat e motherhoo d i n particula r an d socia l institu tions i n general , suc h contrastin g vision s o f relationshi p a s thos e sug gested b y differences betwee n surrogates ' an d couples ' understanding s o f their connection s wit h eac h other—th e apparen t choic e betwee n statu s and contrac t o r between gif t an d commodity—represen t essentiall y differ ent conception s o f one reality . Yet each vision—an d usuall y suc h vision s are neithe r distinc t no r perfectl y self-consciou s —can b e defended , o r opposed, i n languag e tha t ofte n echoes , and almos t alway s resonates wit h some trut h for , th e other . Th e visio n define d i n term s o f statu s relation ships promise s th e advantage s o f secur e familia l loyaltie s an d commit ments; however , tha t visio n threatens , an d ofte n preclude s egalitaria n relationships. I n a univers e i n whic h commitment s an d loyaltie s ar e understood t o b e th e consequence s o f biological inevitabilities , i t i s eas y to justif y th e unequa l treatmen t o f certai n group s (e.g. , women ) b y reference t o natura l o r biologica l difference s amon g groups . A vision o f family define d largel y i n term s o f contrac t relationship s understoo d i n contract terms , promise s equality , choice , an d th e freedo m t o enjo y tha t choice. However , thi s visio n threaten s familie s wit h a los s o f relationa l anchors an d wit h th e potentia l commodificatio n o f famil y members , with, for instance , the possibility of purchasing o r selling babies. Together these tw o visions , usuall y intertwine d an d constantl y referrin g bac k an d forth t o eac h other , constitut e a contemporar y ideolog y o f family . Fro m I 75 I

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood within thi s ideology are generated th e meanings, as well as the confusion s and disagreement s abou t th e meanings , of family an d o f familial relation ships at present . Surrogacy, especiall y commercia l surrogacy , force s almos t al l th e con fusions an d disagreement s t o th e for e becaus e i t depend s o n contract s and bargaine d negotiation s an d ye t aim s t o creat e loving , usuall y "tradi tional," families. Th e respons e o f the la w to commercia l an d contractua l surrogacy arrangement s reflect s thes e disagreement s an d confusions . American la w concern s itsel f directl y wit h surrogac y arrangement s onl y when contract , a s define d b y Maine , i s integra l t o th e arrangement s made b y th e partie s involved . Whe n contrac t doe s no t exist , th e la w i s generally silent . The la w regulates instance s o f noncontractual surrogacy , but not as a special case. Existing laws that regulate adoption an d artificia l insemination provid e a noncontroversia l vehicl e fo r effectin g non commercial surrogac y arrangement s an d d o no t commen t o n surrogac y per se. With th e introductio n o f significant commercia l an d contractua l obli gations, the luxur y o f relying on existin g statutory schemes , schemes tha t regulate adoptio n an d artificia l inseminatio n i n particular , disappears . Prebirth agreement s whic h oblig e th e surrogat e mother , i n retur n fo r some financial consideration , t o revok e he r parenta l right s immediatel y upon th e birt h o f the bab y inescapabl y entai l a wide rang e o f profoundl y unsettling question s an d dilemmas . With these , peopl e an d societ y mus t deal. And so , in consequence , mus t the law . Not surprisingly , th e la w i s ambivalent . A s we shal l no w see , bot h i n rulings tha t establis h th e contex t o f th e Baby M . cas e an d i n tha t cas e itself, as adjudicated bot h a t trial an d o n appeal , two contradictory effort s have bee n made : t o protec t th e family , a s define d b y status , fro m th e incursions o f surrogacy ; an d t o empowe r surrogacy , a s define d b y con tract, to effect suc h incursions . Thus, fo r th e mos t par t existin g la w doe s no t adequatel y regulat e contractual surrogac y arrangements . Wit h regar d t o thes e arrangements , the law, like the societ y it reflects, ha s not yet decided conclusivel y who m to protect, ho w completely, an d when . It s ambivalence i s reflected i n th e tentative, slo w respons e o f legislature s an d i n th e uncertain , conflictin g responses o f courts. Legislatures regulatin g traditiona l surrogac y hav e followe d a fe w ver y different models. 16 One prohibit s contractua l surrogac y absolutely , some -

i ?6 1

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood times eve n makin g participatio n i n surrogac y arrangement s a crimina l offense. I n Michigan , fo r instance , participatio n i n a surrogac y contrac t is defined a s a misdemeanor . Arrangin g o r mediatin g suc h a contract i s a felony, punishabl e b y a fine o f u p t o $50,00 0 and/o r a priso n ter m o f u p to five years. In Ne w York, surrogacy agreement s ar e void an d unenforce able; participant s ar e subjec t t o civi l penaltie s an d broker s an d othe r mediators receivin g paymen t ar e subjec t t o a civi l penalt y fo r a first offense an d t o criminal penaltie s fo r subsequen t offenses . A secon d mode l permit s som e form s o f contractua l surrogacy , bu t without providin g a comprehensiv e regulator y scheme . A numbe r o f states, includin g Alabama , Nevada , an d Wes t Virginia, exemp t surrogac y from rule s tha t prohibi t payment s i n th e contex t o f a n adoption . Kansa s has mad e rule s prohibitin g advertisin g t o effec t a n adoptio n inapplicabl e to surrogacy. Arkansas, one o f the first states to permit surrogacy, regulate s surrogacy o n th e mode l frequentl y foun d i n statute s regulatin g artificia l insemination. Althoug h Arkansa s generall y define s th e birt h mothe r a s the natura l an d lega l mother , i n case s o f surrogac y "th e woma n wh o intended t o b e th e mother " i s deeme d th e lega l an d natura l mother . The provisio n wa s adde d t o tha t par t o f th e state' s statut e definin g th e consequences fo r a child's parentag e o f artificial insemination . A thir d model , foun d i n onl y a coupl e o f states , permit s contractua l surrogacy an d regulate s i t comprehensively . Ne w Hampshire , fo r in stance, has established a broad regulator y schem e tha t permits and moni tors surrogac y arrangements . I n Ne w Hampshire , al l partie s t o a surro gacy agreemen t mus t b e evaluate d medicall y an d psychologically , an d agreements mus t be authorized judiciall y before th e parties may go ahead with th e arrangement . Thus, th e legislativ e respons e t o surrogac y reflect s th e ambivalenc e o f the society . Mos t stat e legislature s hav e faile d t o respon d a t all , an d o f those tha t hav e responded , th e result s ar e extraordinaril y varie d an d generally fai l t o establis h a broa d regulator y syste m fo r handlin g surro gacy. Moreover, beyon d th e statute s tha t hav e bee n promulgated , an d thos e that hav e bee n abandone d o r neve r drafted , constitutiona l jurisprudenc e offers littl e guidanc e t o statute-makers . Bot h th e righ t t o procreat e an d the righ t t o rais e childre n ar e encompasse d b y the mor e broadl y define d constitutional righ t t o privacy , discusse d i n chapte r 2 . Ye t thes e tw o privacy right s hold conflictin g implication s fo r surrogacy . 1771

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood Even i f th e righ t t o procreat e include s noncoita l reproduction , th e presence o f a n essentia l thir d part y (th e surrogate ) i n surrogac y arrange ments ma y defea t a privac y claim . Th e mor e surrogac y participant s resemble contrac t parties , th e les s easil y ca n relationship s amon g the m be define d a s familial . I n mos t contractua l surrogac y arrangements , th e intending parent s d o no t expec t th e surrogat e t o becom e a membe r o f the famil y the y wan t t o form , whateve r th e surrogate' s ow n hope s abou t this ma y be . Postbirt h contact s betwee n th e surrogat e an d th e intendin g parties or the baby are usually minimal o r nonexistent. Thus, the relation ships betwee n intendin g parent s an d surrogate s ar e no t understoo d a s familial o r "family-like, " an d woul d not , therefore , b e protecte d b y th e right t o privacy , a t leas t insofa r a s tha t righ t protect s individual s in families. Beyond th e righ t t o procreate, a parent ha s a right t o "th e companion ship, care, custody and managemen t o f his or her children." 17 Thi s right , in contras t t o th e righ t t o procreate , however , depends , fo r it s effect , o n extant definition s o f parent , mother , an d father . Onl y t o th e exten t tha t parents i n the contex t of traditional surrogac y cases are defined a s biological parent s (therefor e includin g th e geneti c fathe r an d th e surrogate) , could th e righ t t o rais e one' s childre n limi t th e righ t o f a state t o enforc e surrogacy agreement s agains t a surrogate' s wishes . O n th e othe r hand , even i f parent s ar e s o defined , th e righ t t o rais e one' s childre n doe s not, alone , prefe r surrogate s ove r geneti c father s o r geneti c father s ove r surrogates. Finally, conflictin g o r inconclusiv e answer s tha t follo w fro m analysi s of th e righ t t o procreat e an d th e righ t t o rais e one' s childre n ar e magni fied b y th e fragilit y o f th e privac y righ t itself . Case s followin g Griswold and Eisenstadt mak e i t clear tha t protections suc h a s the one s afforde d i n those case s wil l follo w unreservedl y onl y t o protec t traditiona l famil y structures. Thi s becam e transparen t i n Michael H . v . Gerald D. , a 198 9 Supreme Cour t cas e involving the constitutionalit y o f a California statut e that presume d a chil d t o b e th e natura l chil d o f th e mother' s husband . Rejecting th e claime d "liberty " interests o f the biologica l father , Michae l H. ( a ma n no t marrie d t o his biological child' s mother) , the Court , i n a n opinion authore d b y Justic e Scalia , declare d tha t suc h asserte d libert y interests must , i n orde r t o receiv e protection , "b e roote d i n histor y an d tradition."18 Michael' s wa s not . "Ou r traditions, " wrot e th e Court , "have protecte d th e marita l famil y . . . against th e sor t o f clai m Michae l 1781

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood asserts."19 With regar d t o innovativ e famil y structures , i n mos t case s th e Court i s decidedly ambivalen t abou t extendin g constitutiona l protection . In general , a broad constitutiona l righ t t o privacy (o r liberty) i n famil y matters encourage s th e developmen t o f nontraditiona l relationship s an d arrangements. Tha t wa s precisely th e concer n o f those wh o oppose d th e privacy decision s i n th e 1960 s an d 1970s . Thus , i n decidin g whethe r t o limit th e righ t t o privac y (o r liberty), an d i f so, how, lawmaker s ar e face d with tw o interrelate d questions . First , shoul d individual s b e fre e t o effec t changes tha t ma y entai l th e transformatio n o f the famil y i n th e directio n of increase d autonom y fo r it s individua l members ? Second , shoul d indi viduals b e fre e t o choos e ne w right s an d duties , o r ne w form s o f interac tion, withi n th e univers e o f family ? Tha t is , shoul d the y b e encourage d in celebratin g th e proliferatio n o f choices abou t ho w t o create , an d eve n about ho w t o liv e in , families ? Sinc e th e acknowledgmen t tha t th e for m and scop e o f familia l relationship s ar e mutabl e is th e acknowledgmen t that suc h relationship s ar e no t inexorabl y base d i n nature , th e tw o ques tions are related . Thus, a decision t o permit th e unregulate d alteratio n o f familial relationship s recognize s th e famil y a s a domain define d i n term s closer t o those o f the marke t tha n t o those o f the traditiona l family . In additio n t o constitutiona l consideration s relatin g t o famil y matters , surrogacy arrangement s ar e als o arguabl y protecte d b y a broa d righ t t o enter contract s and a n expectatio n tha t states will enforce thos e contracts . In th e absenc e o f relevan t legislatio n o r countervailin g publi c polic y concerns—and bot h ma y o f course, an d i n som e place s alread y do , exis t with regar d t o surrogacy— a potentia l surrogat e an d intendin g parent s have th e righ t t o ente r a contrac t i n whic h th e surrogat e agree s t o bear a child an d foreg o th e companionship , care , and custod y of that child. Th e Supreme Cour t ha s hel d tha t constitutiona l right s ca n b e waive d i n a numbe r o f cases. 20 Th e waive r o f a constitutiona l righ t require s a demonstration "tha t ther e wa s a n 'intentiona l relinquishmen t o r aban donment' " o f th e right. 21 I f thi s ca n b e shown , peopl e hav e a righ t t o enter int o a surrogac y agreement , an d al l els e bein g equal , tha t agreement shoul d b e enforceable . Yet, th e righ t t o ente r contract s doe s no t ensur e th e legalit y o f surro gacy contracts, and i n fact , o f course, thos e contract s hav e bee n declare d illegal o r unenforceabl e i n a numbe r o f states. Mos t o f the requirement s for a valid contrac t ar e found i n surrogac y contracts , but i t can b e argue d that suc h contract s ar e inevitabl y baby-sellin g agreement s an d thu s I 79 I

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood should b e void as violative or public policy . Alternatively, it can be argue d that suc h contract s shoul d b e neithe r voi d no r enforceable—tha t th e state shoul d no t interven e betwee n partie s t o a surrogac y contrac t bu t should als o no t enforc e suc h contract s agains t unwillin g biologica l mothers. The confusin g an d indeterminat e result s suggeste d b y examinin g th e implications o f right s analyse s fo r surrogacy , lik e th e law' s mor e genera l ambivalence abou t surrogacy , reflec t society' s uncertaint y abou t th e pres ent for m an d likely , o r hope d for , fat e o f th e family . Identificatio n o f relevant lega l right s doe s no t resolv e th e surrogac y issu e becaus e lega l analysis of those rights contains th e same tension generate d b y the choic e between a t leas t tw o visions o f family—one resemblin g Maine' s worl d o f status an d on e resemblin g Maine' s worl d o f contract—tha t effect s surro gacy. I n short , th e conflict s tha t surroun d an d constitut e th e surrogac y debate ar e simpl y replicate d a t anothe r leve l i n th e attemp t t o resolv e questions abou t surrogac y throug h rationa l selectio n o f establishe d lega l principles. II. Baby M : Whe n I s a Famil y a Family ? All o f th e ambivalenc e thu s fa r discussed—th e inabilit y o r essentia l unwillingness o f contemporar y America n society , an d therefor e o f it s legal system , eve n a decad e afte r Baby M. , t o decid e whethe r th e famil y belongs—and shoul d belong—t o th e univers e o f status, or to its apparen t ideological antagonist , th e univers e o f contract—an d al l o f the tensions , confusions, an d perplexitie s inevitabl y engendere d b y tha t ambivalence , are reflecte d clearl y i n th e cas e o f Baby M . which , therefore , merit s detailed analysis . The case involve d th e mos t difficul t an d unpleasan t consequenc e o f a surrogacy arrangement : a custod y battl e betwee n th e intendin g parent s and the surrogate mother. The case , the first involving a surrogate seekin g to retai n materna l right s t o th e bab y an d a biologica l fathe r seekin g t o enforce a surrogacy contrac t i n court , wa s brought b y William Stern , th e biological father . Ster n ha d entere d int o a contrac t wit h a surrogate , Mary Beth Whitehead, an d he r husband, Richar d Whitehead. Mar y Bet h Whitehead agree d tha t sh e woul d b e artificiall y inseminate d wit h Stern' s sperm, gestat e th e resultin g fetus , an d a t th e baby' s birt h terminat e al l I 80 I

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood parental right s i n favo r o f Ster n an d hi s wife , Elizabeth . Elizabet h Ster n did no t ente r int o th e contrac t i n orde r t o avoi d violatin g stat e rule s tha t forbid purchasin g a baby. After th e birt h o f the child , Whitehead, unwill ing to surrender th e baby , fled t o Florid a wit h he r husban d an d thei r tw o children Rya n an d Tuesday , respectivel y abou t age s thirtee n an d eleve n at the tim e o f the trial . Severa l month s later , th e baby , named Meliss a b y William an d Elizabet h Ster n an d name d Sar a b y Mary Bet h Whitehead , was forcibly returne d t o the Stern s a s a result o f a court order . The opinio n o f Judge Sorkow , before who m th e cas e was heard i n th e New Jerse y Superio r Court , proceede d fro m th e assumptio n tha t th e preservation o f the univers e of status, as defined b y Maine, was and ough t to be , th e overriding , thoug h no t th e exclusive , concer n o f th e law . Almost exactl y th e sam e assumptio n underla y bot h th e opinio n o f th e New Jersey Suprem e Cour t (whic h hear d th e cas e on appeal ) an d a brief presented t o tha t cour t b y th e Sterns . An assumptio n mor e conservativ e than an y othe r i n th e cas e underla y th e brie f presente d b y Mar y Bet h Whitehead. Thus , thoug h th e position s o f th e intereste d partie s an d o f the court s differed radically , the consensu s a s regards ideolog y was almos t total. Th e superio r cour t hel d i n almos t al l respect s fo r th e Sterns . Th e court expressl y declare d voi d onl y on e provisio n i n th e contrac t tha t ha d been entere d int o amon g th e parties . Tha t claus e gav e Willia m Ster n control ove r an y abortio n decision . Th e tria l cour t uphel d th e surrogac y contract, frame d th e cas e a s involvin g primaril y th e bes t interest s o f th e baby—calling al l th e othe r issue s "commentary"—decide d tha t thos e interests require d terminatin g th e surrogate' s parenta l rights , granted ful l custody t o Willia m Stern , an d ordere d th e adoptio n o f th e bab y b y Elizabeth Stern . By contrast, th e Ne w Jerse y Suprem e Cour t invalidate d th e surrogac y contract, outlawe d th e paymen t o f mone y t o th e surrogate , an d voide d both th e terminatio n o f Mar y Bet h Whitehead' s parenta l right s an d th e adoption o f th e bab y b y Elizabet h Stern . Judicia l position s mor e thor oughly at odds cannot b e imagined . Th e difference s betwee n Whitehea d and th e Stern s wer e absolute . Yet , astonishingl y perhap s t o th e casua l observer, everyon e involve d argue d fro m essentiall y th e sam e ideologica l assumption: tha t whateve r th e legitimat e demand s o f th e marketplace , they shoul d retir e befor e th e sacre d prerogative s o f institution s an d im pulses hallowe d b y fixed, eternal nature . 1811

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood In almos t al l respects , th e Ne w Jerse y Superio r Cour t hel d fo r Stern , upholding th e surrogac y contrac t an d decidin g tha t th e bes t interest s o f the bab y required terminatin g th e surrogate' s parenta l right s and grantin g full custod y to the contractin g father . The centralit y o f status to the superio r cour t opinio n ma y no t see m a t once obvious , sinc e Judg e Sorko w focuse d intently , an d a t som e length , upon th e surrogac y contrac t itself . In fact, however , th e contrac t was only an elemen t o f Judg e Sorkow' s "commentary, " an d eve n a s suc h wa s forced t o serv e th e onl y concer n h e describe d a s ultimatel y o f impor tance: th e bes t interest s o f the baby . Wit h respec t t o tha t concer n Judg e Sorkow's commitmen t wa s almos t unreservedl y traditional . I t wa s a con cern fo r status . The judgment s tha t li e a t th e hear t o f Judg e Sorkow' s opinio n ar e very old-fashioned : tha t familie s shoul d b e traditionall y middle-class , consisting o f tw o parent s an d thei r childre n livin g i n a conventiona l fashion, an d tha t suc h familie s shoul d b e protecte d fro m unstabl e "out siders." In defens e o f these judgment s Judg e Sorko w was prepared t o rul e very creatively indeed : b y in effec t assertin g tha t Bab y M. ha d n o mothe r and therefor e n o family . One' s vie w o f whether o r no t a "family " existe d for thi s chil d befor e th e cour t create d on e depend s o n one' s vie w o f th e family i n th e Unite d States . I f th e notio n i s limite d t o familia r an d mainstream variants , then , a s Judg e Sorko w suggested , Bab y M . ha d n o "real family " befor e th e court' s decisio n create d one . Apparentl y be lieving so , th e tria l cour t foun d itsel f oblige d t o identif y a mother , an d thereby creat e a famil y (t o it s liking) , fo r Bab y M . I t di d s o by invoking , for th e ac t of creation, th e presumption s o f contract . That socia l pola r opposite s confronte d hi m wa s self-eviden t t o Judg e Sorkow. H e depicte d Willia m an d Elizabet h Ster n a s a perfec t middle class, professiona l couple , wit h a "stron g an d mutuall y supportiv e rela tionship," "cooperativ e parenting " skills , an d th e abilit y t o "initiat e an d encourage intellectua l curiosit y and learnin g for the child." 22 I n contrast , Mary Bet h an d Richar d Whitehea d wer e portraye d a s financially an d emotionally unstable . Mar y Bet h wa s characterize d a s a manipulativ e wife an d mother , unabl e o r unwilling to "recognize an d repor t th e truth " and essentiall y unreliable. 23 A s evidenc e o f thi s las t assertio n th e cour t referred t o Mar y Bet h Whitehead' s breac h o f th e surrogac y contract . Judge Sorko w decide d tha t a woma n wh o balke d a t fulfillin g a contrac t to terminat e materna l right s t o he r newbor n baby , o r wh o defie d a cour t I 82 I

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood order b y "runnin g awa y wit h th e infant, " coul d no t b e a n impressiv e mother i n general , o r i n particular , a good mothe r t o Bab y M . That bein g th e case , Judg e Sorko w propose d t o find a goo d mother , part o f a good famil y fo r Bab y M. H e di d s o by the remarkabl e expedien t of asserting tha t i n effect , a t birt h Bab y M . ha d lacke d no t onl y a family , but als o a mother . "Whe n Meliss a wa s bor n o n Marc h 27 , 1986, " Judge Sorkow wrote: there wer e no , attendan t t o th e circumstanc e o f he r birt h [sic] family gatherings, famil y celebration s o r famil y worshi p service s tha t usuall y accompany such a happy family event. . .. I n reality, the fact of family was undefined i f non-existent [sic]. Th e mother and father ar e known but they are no t family . Th e interpositio n o f their spouse s wil l no t serv e t o creat e family without further cour t intervention. 24 The contex t o f thes e conclusion s wa s th e court' s consideratio n o f Mar y Beth Whitehead' s parents ' applicatio n fo r visitatio n rights . I n rejectin g the applicatio n o f Mr . an d Mrs . Messe r fo r grandparenta l visitatio n rights, th e cour t reaffirme d it s understandin g tha t Bab y M . wa s no t par t of thei r family . Th e court' s depictio n her e i s obviousl y biased . Whethe r or no t a famil y existe d befor e Judg e Sorko w wrot e hi s opinio n depend s on one' s understandin g o f family. I n thi s regard , th e cour t ha d a numbe r of choices. It could, fo r instance , have approache d th e cas e sociologicall y and asked : Wha t is goin g o n here ? Wha t definition s o f famil y ar e sug gested b y thi s case ? And , o f these , whic h make s mos t sens e legally , culturally, o r psychologically? Or , th e cour t coul d hav e assume d a defini tion o f family . I t di d th e latter . I t assume d tha t a famil y i s compose d o f two parent s an d thei r children , an d faile d t o conside r th e possibilit y tha t practices suc h a s surrogate motherhoo d ma y represen t o r encourag e ne w kinds o f families . Judg e Sorko w di d no t writ e tha t h e wa s creatin g a proper famil y fro m a n imprope r family . H e wrot e tha t th e "fac t o f famil y was . . . non-existent" befor e th e cour t reache d it s decisions. In orde r t o creat e a famil y fro m th e character s involve d i n th e case , Judge Sorko w slotted th e partie s into his own mode l o f an idea l America n family. Fo r that t o be don e i n thi s case , one o f the biologica l parent s ha d to b e obliterated . Further , th e spous e o f th e othe r biologica l paren t ha d to b e name d as a parent. Thus , Bab y M.' s famil y wa s define d s o a s t o include he r biologica l fathe r an d hi s wife Elizabet h Stern , wh o wa s abl e to adop t th e bab y immediatel y afte r th e court' s terminatio n o f 1831

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood Whitehead's parenta l rights . The court' s adoptio n orde r excuse d Eliza beth Stern from complianc e with state law mandating procedures prerequisite to a successful adoption . The cour t symbolize d it s decisio n t o gran t ful l custod y t o Willia m Stern and its creation of a family for Baby M. by shifting, at just the point in it s decision tha t i t declared th e Sterns ' parentage, from "Bab y M." to "Melissa" i n reference s t o th e child . Meliss a wa s the nam e give n Bab y M. by the Sterns ; Whitehead ha d name d he r Sara . N o longer merel y a key character i n a complicated lega l drama , th e chil d wa s now named. In it s view, th e cour t ha d erase d he r afamilia l pas t an d allowe d he r t o become a real baby, identifie d a s par t o f a family , wit h a nam e an d two parents. With this , the cour t attempte d t o obliterat e histor y an d it s complications. That done to its satisfaction, th e court was able in good conscience to deprive Mar y Bet h Whitehea d no t onl y o f custody bu t als o o f parenta l rights. On the face of the opinion, the termination o f Whitehead's maternal right s was simply the resul t of the court' s best-interest determinatio n and it s readin g o f th e contract . Mar y Bet h Whitehead , declare d th e court, "agree d t o terminate [he r parental rights] . This Cour t gives effec t to her agreement." 25 Suc h conclusion s di d no t reflect lega l conclusion s so much a s the court's sense of "good" families, i n general, and it s sense in thi s cas e o f the bes t famil y tha t coul d b e create d fro m th e partie s i n the Bab y M. drama. Thus, the cour t conclude d tha t Whitehead's right s could b e terminate d because , a s sh e ha d neve r reall y bee n th e baby' s mother, they had never existed. The tria l court' s conclusion s abou t parentag e i n this case entailed a s well a clas s elemen t tha t wa s largel y masked , bu t tha t wa s relevan t nonetheless, in the court' s best-interest analysis . In that analysis, considered i n muc h mor e detai l i n chapte r 7 , th e cour t relie d o n a se t o f criteria propose d b y psychologis t Le e Sal k tha t wil l usuall y encourag e judicial preferenc e fo r th e mor e middle-clas s parent , especiall y i n case s such as that of Baby M. in which one potential parent or custodian seems not t o b e middle-clas s wit h regar d eithe r t o incom e o r t o presentation of-self whil e anothe r is . Amon g othe r things , Salk' s determinant s fo r establishing Baby M.'s best-interests asked whether the child was "wanted and planne d for. " Salk' s criteri a furthe r aske d th e cour t t o loo k a t th e "stability" of the home; "familial attitude s toward education"; the "capac1841

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood ity o f th e adult s . . . t o mak e rationa l judgements, " t o "instil l positiv e attitudes" about healt h an d nutrition , t o explain th e circumstance s o f th e child's birt h t o her , an d t o assist her i n becomin g " a productiv e membe r of society." 26 Relyin g o n thes e criteri a alone , almos t an y cour t woul d almost b e compelle d t o selec t th e Sterns—h e a scientist wit h a Ph.D . i n bio-chemistry, an d sh e a pediatricia n wit h a Ph.D . i n huma n genetic s and a n M.D.—ove r th e Whiteheads . Th e cour t mad e muc h o f th e Whiteheads financial an d emotiona l instabilit y a s compare d t o th e Sterns. Mar y Beth , wh o droppe d ou t o f hig h schoo l a t ag e fifteen, ha d been o n public assistanc e during a period o f separation fro m he r husban d in th e lat e 1970s . Richard, wh o worke d a s a drive r fo r a wast e collectio n company a t the tim e o f trial, had ha d seve n job s i n th e previou s thirtee n years. Togethe r th e coupl e ha d move d twelv e time s i n on e eight-yea r period. Moreover , durin g th e perio d o f the marriag e Richar d ha d ha d a constant proble m wit h alcohol . Perhap s th e mos t illuminatin g aspec t o f the court' s understandin g o f th e Whiteheads ' comparativ e fitness a s par ents was it s apparent conclusio n tha t Mar y Bet h wa s not, an d wa s essen tially no t fi t t o be , th e mothe r o f Willia m Stern' s child , bu t tha t sh e was a perfectl y adequat e mothe r fo r he r tw o childre n wit h Richar d Whitehead. Further, t o demonstrat e tha t thi s wa s s o Judg e Sorko w invoke d th e universe o f contract, bu t to serve his interests rathe r tha n it s own. Relyin g upon th e contrac t i n th e case , h e enforce d a n agreemen t which , i n a larger context , represent s significan t alternatio n i n familia r notion s o f th e family. Implicitly , o f course, Judg e Sorko w recognize d thi s contradictio n by defining hi s contract analysi s a s "commentary," no t law. 27 In addition , the contradictio n betwee n Judg e Sorkow' s view of family an d hi s enforce ment o f th e surrogac y contrac t wa s mediate d b y a n associatio n o f th e contract wit h Whitehea d rathe r tha n wit h th e Sterns . Thi s associatio n served t o bolster th e court' s conclusio n tha t Whitehead wa s not a mother to th e bab y i n thi s case . I n contrast , th e cour t portraye d th e Stern s a s a n ideal couple, who exhibited al l the virtues associated wit h a "good" famil y defined i n traditional, status terms. Whitehead wa s characterized a s being outside family . I n relatio n t o Richar d Whitehea d an d he r tw o childre n with him , Mar y Bet h wa s seen a s a wif e an d mother , eve n a fit wife an d mother. Certainly , th e cour t neve r suggeste d tha t Whitehead wa s unfit t o be a mothe r t o Rya n an d Tuesday , he r tw o childre n wit h Richar d

1851

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood Whitehead. Bu t i n relatio n t o Bab y M., Whitehead wa s seen a s someon e who had signe d a contract, a n individua l wh o had undertake n a persona l service commitmen t pursuan t t o a n agreement , an d the n breache d th e agreement. Sh e wa s portraye d no t a s a mothe r t o Bab y M. , bu t a s th e person wh o ha d promise d t o provide th e Stern s wit h th e mean s t o creat e their family . Therefor e sh e wa s ordered—legitimately , i n th e opinio n o f the court—t o hono r he r par t o f a busines s agreemen t betwee n autono mous, self-interested principals . Whether o r no t Judg e Sorko w understoo d th e problem s inheren t i n his appea l t o contrac t i s no t certain . Hi s overridin g commitment , how ever, i s beyon d doubt . Th e la w o f parentag e an d custody , a s h e demar cates it , bespeaks a universe define d unmistakabl y i n term s o f status. The Ne w Jerse y Suprem e Cour t di d precisel y th e sam e thing , an d although i n a unanimou s opinio n i t reverse d almos t al l o f the la w mad e by Judg e Sorkow , i t di d s o i n th e nam e o f mora l standard s mor e o r les s identical t o his own . As has bee n noted , th e stat e suprem e cour t invalidate d th e surrogac y contract o n th e ground s tha t i t conflicte d wit h stat e la w an d publi c policy. Further , th e cour t outlawe d th e paymen t o f money t o a surrogate. The cour t describe d suc h paymen t t o hav e bee n mad e i n orde r t o affec t the adoptio n o f th e chil d b y Elizabet h Ster n an d proceede d t o voi d both th e terminatio n o f Mar y Bet h Whitehead' s parenta l right s an d th e adoption o f the bab y by Elizabeth Stern . In particular , th e suprem e cour t declare d tha t th e promis e o f mone y from Willia m Ster n t o Mary Bet h Whitehead constitute d paymen t fo r a n adoption, no t fo r Whitehead' s services , an d therefor e contravene d Ne w Jersey la w prohibitin g th e transfe r o f mone y i n connectio n wit h th e placement o f a chil d fo r adoption . A basic argumen t agains t th e legalit y of commercia l surrogac y contract s i n genera l ha s bee n tha t the y violat e state law s proscribin g adoption s i n exchang e fo r payment . Th e Ne w Jersey Suprem e Cour t stresse d thi s an d describe d suc h paymen t o f money to a surrogate a s "illegal, perhaps criminal, and potentiall y degrad ing t o women." 28 Th e tria l court , wit h regar d t o thi s issue , had reasone d that th e legislatur e coul d no t hav e intende d adoptio n statute s t o gover n surrogacy because surrogac y was unknown whe n th e state's adoption law s were promulgate d an d therefor e hel d tha t law s governing adoptio n wer e irrelevant t o surrogacy. 29 I 86 |

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood The suprem e cour t furthe r declare d th e contrac t invali d becaus e i t provided fo r th e terminatio n o f Whitehead's parenta l right s without satis fying relevan t statutory criteria. Termination o f parental right s in th e stat e could b e effecte d onl y pursuan t t o a voluntary surrende r o f a child t o a n agency approve d b y th e stat e o r t o th e Divisio n o f Yout h an d Famil y Services alon g wit h a documen t acknowledgin g terminatio n o r pursuan t to a showin g o f parenta l abandonmen t o r unfitness. 30 Neithe r ha d oc curred i n thi s case . Additionally, th e suprem e cour t decide d tha t th e absenc e o f a revoca tion righ t fo r Mar y Bet h Whitehea d contravene d Ne w Jerse y law . I n short, th e cour t ruled , th e centra l provision s o f th e contrac t wer e "de signed t o circumven t [state ] statutes , an d thu s th e entir e contrac t wa s unenforceable." 31 Th e cour t furthe r declare d tha t th e surrogac y contrac t between th e Whitehead s an d Willia m Ster n conflicte d wit h Ne w Jerse y public polic y sinc e stat e polic y preferre d tha t childre n b e raise d b y thei r "natural" parents, that the right s of a "natural father " b e equa l to , and no t greater than , thos e o f a "natura l mother, " an d tha t a "natura l mother " contemplating surrende r o f parental right s be evaluate d an d counseled. 32 For the Ne w Jersey Supreme Court , th e child' s parents were, and wer e to remain , he r tw o biologica l parents , Willia m Ster n an d Mar y Bet h Whitehead. Th e opinio n allowe d n o legal relationshi p betwee n th e chil d and eithe r Elizabet h Ster n o r Richard Whitehead . Although he r husban d was given custod y o f the child , Elizabet h Ster n wa s given n o lega l right s to Bab y M. , an d shoul d he r husban d di e o r shoul d sh e an d Willia m Stern divorc e a t an y poin t durin g th e child' s minority , i t woul d b e difficult fo r he r t o insis t upo n a continuin g relationshi p wit h th e child . The cas e wa s remanded t o the tria l cour t fo r consideratio n o f Mary Bet h Whitehead's righ t t o visi t he r daughter . O n remand , th e tria l cour t granted Whitehea d th e immediat e righ t t o visi t wit h th e chil d on e da y each wee k betwee n 10:3 0 a.m . an d 4:3 0 p.m . Beginnin g th e followin g fall, Whitehea d wa s to b e give n a n additiona l da y ever y othe r wee k wit h the chil d an d b y th e followin g spring , th e chil d wa s t o sta y wit h he r fo r two day s an d overnigh t ever y othe r week . I n addition , visitatio n durin g specified holiday s wa s ordered . Th e cour t expresse d th e hop e tha t th e parties woul d no t nee d t o rel y o n th e specifi c visitatio n right s outline d but woul d b e abl e t o wor k ou t a mutuall y agreeabl e visitatio n schedul e that woul d b e suitabl e t o bot h sides . Tha t di d no t happen. 33 Furthe r 187

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood consideration o f th e implication s o f th e final resolutio n o f thi s cas e — especially wit h regar d t o th e courts ' views o f children an d childhood—i s found i n chapte r 7 . Thus, i n sum , th e stat e suprem e cour t rule d tha t babie s coul d no t b e bought o r sold , an d tha t contract s coul d no t eliminat e motherhoo d — obvious truths , bu t onl y i n a univers e i n whic h absolut e value , utterl y unrelated eithe r t o commerc e o r t o autonomou s self-fulfillment , ca n b e assigned bot h t o babies , an d t o a clearl y define d setting—th e traditiona l family—presumed t o giv e bot h babie s an d thei r parent s th e bes t chanc e to flourish. Th e suprem e cour t ruled , i n short , precisel y a s Judge Sorko w had ruled : almost unreservedl y i n favo r o f the univers e o f status. In bot h opinions , onl y on e concession—thoug h a significan t one , productive o f significant tension—wa s granted t o the univers e of contract. It was granted perhap s unwittingl y b y Judge Sorkow . When relyin g upo n the expedien t o f the contract , h e i n effec t empowere d th e substitutio n o f law fo r natur e i n definin g th e relationshi p betwee n paren t an d child . I n this regard , th e suprem e cour t wa s fa r mor e self-awar e an d explicit , inviting th e legislatur e t o alte r surrogac y la w i n an y constitutiona l man ner i t chose: We have found tha t our present laws do not permit the surrogacy contract used i n thi s case . Nowhere , however , d o w e find an y lega l prohibitio n against surrogacy when the surrogate mother volunteers, without any payment, to act as a surrogate and i s given the right to change he r mind and to assert her parental rights. Moreover, the Legislature remains free to deal with thi s mos t sensitiv e issu e a s i t see s fit , subjec t onl y t o constitutiona l constraints.34 By thus invokin g th e potentia l rol e o f the legislatur e i n regulatin g surro gacy, the cour t acknowledged , a s Judge Sorko w ha d don e fa r les s overtly , that famil y form s an d relationship s ar e mutable . Th e cour t cautione d against th e dange r o f suc h transformation s bu t di d no t recogniz e a n essential discontinuit y betwee n famil y form s an d natura l processes . I n short, each opinion , though onl y grudgingly and onl y in part, opened th e way fo r th e transitio n o f famil y relationship s fro m relationship s define d in traditiona l term s t o relationship s define d (becaus e created ) a s th e result of bargained negotiation s betwee n autonomou s individuals . The parties , i n thei r brief s t o th e courts , reflecte d th e courts ' prefer ence fo r traditiona l families . Mar y Bet h Whitehead' s position , however , I 88 I

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood was fa r mor e conservativ e tha n th e Stern s an d tha n eithe r court . Sh e argued emphaticall y an d withou t ambiguit y o f an y kin d tha t he r claim s should b e judge d exclusively agains t th e imperative s o f traditiona l fami lies, define d i n term s o f th e worl d o f status , almos t precisel y a s Main e characterized tha t world. 35 Whitehead grounde d th e mother-chil d relationshi p definitivel y i n th e inevitabilities o f nature , describin g he r pregnanc y no t a s a quid pro quo entitling he r t o a baby , bu t a s a n inexorabl e proces s endowe d wit h natural, inalienabl e value. 36 He r brie f t o the Ne w Jerse y Suprem e Cour t focused upo n th e biologica l basi s o f th e mother-chil d tie , an d declare d that surrogac y represent s a doome d effor t t o alte r natura l event s an d processes. Mor e particularly , Whitehea d characterize d th e mother-chil d relationship a s quintessential ^ natural , contrastin g i t i n thi s regar d t o the relationshi p betwee n father s an d children . Sh e declare d tha t "[t]h e emphasis o n relationshi p foun d i n women wil l tend t o enhance bonding , while th e emphasi s o n separatio n an d independenc e i n me n wil l tend t o minimize th e importanc e o f bonding." 37 Whitehead' s brie f found s th e tie betwee n mother s an d thei r childre n o n "hormona l balance " durin g and followin g pregnancy , an d assert s tha t "th e learnin g responsibl e fo r the initia l formatio n o f th e materna l bon d appear s t o b e heavil y depen dent upo n th e hormona l condition s normall y presen t fo r a shor t tim e after birth." 38 Moreover , Whitehead , invoke d a cros s cultural similarit y in materna l behavio r a s well a s a similarit y betwee n huma n an d anima l parental behavio r i n suppor t o f her position . In short , Mar y Bet h Whitehead' s positio n befor e th e cour t provide s an excellen t illustratio n o f th e argumen t tha t surrogac y i s evi l because unnatural, an d shoul d b e prohibite d i n ligh t o f it s effects o n th e natura l operation o f familial relationships . I n arguin g tha t she was entitled t o th e child no t becaus e sh e ha d suffere d hardship s bu t becaus e he r clai m wa s natural, sh e asserte d tha t familia l relationship s ar e base d i n natur e an d cannot b e altered o r effected b y the wil l o f the partie s to a contract. The y are, i n effect , immun e fro m contractua l manipulations . He r positio n represents i n it s purest for m statu s a s defined b y Maine an d reflect s mos t clearly th e romanticize d imag e o f famil y constructe d durin g th e lat e nineteenth century , when , no t b y coincidence, Main e di d hi s work . In apparen t contrast , th e Sterns ' brie f argue s tha t traditiona l familie s can an d shoul d b e effecte d b y the wil l o f the partie s t o a contract. 39 Bu t here, a s i n Judg e Sorkow' s opinion , appearanc e ca n deceive ; lik e Judg e

18 9 1

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood Sorkow th e Stern s invoke d th e univers e o f their ideologica l antagonis t i n their interest , rather than i n its own. Upholding the contract , they argued , would serv e to strengthen traditiona l values . Like Whitehead , th e Stern s wer e concerne d wit h effectin g status based relationships , and neithe r denie d th e importanc e o f natural proces s nor suggeste d tha t traditiona l familie s shoul d b e reexamine d an d refash ioned i n moder n times . Rather , the y asserte d tha t good , old-fashione d American familie s ca n b e create d i n a variet y o f way s an d nee d no t b e grounded i n natura l processes : Through surrogat e parenthood, traditional famil y values are strengthened . In seeking to create a traditional family structure i n the only way available to the commissioning couple , surrogate motherhood insure s that the couple who has invested bot h considerabl e tim e and mone y i n the surrogacy process wil l b e dearl y dedicate d t o th e child . A surrogat e motherhoo d arrangement actuall y increase s th e overal l numbe r o f family unit s within society.40 "Surrogate parentin g agreements, " th e Sterns ' brie f continued , "als o facilitate th e exercis e o f procreative libert y fo r women . A women wh o i s unable t o hav e a chil d ca n no w becom e a paren t regardles s o f medica l limitations."41 Th e Sterns ' argumen t her e ma y see m opaqu e i n tha t surrogate parentin g agreement s d o no t exten d wha t th e brie f call s "pro creative liberty " to women lik e Elizabet h Stern . I n vitr o fertilization ma y do that . Gamet e transfe r fro m on e woma n t o anothe r ma y d o that . Bu t surrogacy doe s not. Elizabet h Ster n hope d t o adopt Bab y M. That optio n was available lon g before surrogacy . By definin g surrogac y a s a cas e o f expande d "procreativ e liberty " th e Sterns' argumen t connect s traditiona l surrogac y t o th e ne w reproductiv e technologies an d thereb y blur s th e biologica l realit y that Whitehead, no t Stern, i s th e baby' s mothe r accordin g t o traditiona l understanding s o f "mother." Tha t is , despit e th e implication s o f th e brief , Elizabet h Ster n was neither biologicall y no r geneticall y relate d t o Bab y M . Th e brie f di d not reall y inten d t o declar e tha t Elizabet h Ster n wa s Baby M.' s "natural " mother; rather , i t intended t o suggest that Elizabet h wa s the baby' s "real " mother an d that , t o b e such , sh e nee d no t demonstrat e a geneti c o r biological lin k t o the child . Th e Sterns ' arguments impl y tha t "blood " o r genetic relationshi p i s not essentia l t o the creatio n an d developmen t o f a simple, old-fashione d America n family . I n thi s regard , th e Stern s relie d 1901

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood on tha t aspec t o f America n cultur e whic h stresse d "code-for-conduct " (culture) a s opposed t o "blood " (nature) , t o us e th e term s Davi d Schnei der proposed , a s the crucia l elemen t o f kinship relations . Today, far mor e than i n th e 1960 s whe n Schneide r wrote , th e societ y an d th e la w recog nize kinshi p connection s predicate d o n pattern s differen t fro m thos e represented b y th e traditional , nuclea r family , tie d togethe r b y bond s o f "blood." Th e Stern s argue d i n effec t tha t traditiona l familie s ca n b e formed an d ca n thrive , eve n i f no t create d i n traditiona l ways . Thei r arguments sugges t tha t bond s o f kinshi p traditionall y predicate d o n bio logical connection s ca n b e predicate d o n lov e an d choice , a s i n th e cas e of adoption. Suc h bonds , th e Stern s declare d i n thei r brief , ca n b e quit e as strong and permanen t a s any familial bonds . In presentin g th e cas e tha t surrogac y harmonize d wit h traditiona l family values , th e Stern s expressl y addresse d th e counterargumen t tha t surrogacy fo r mone y i s immoral. 42 The y responde d tha t th e famil y wa s already affected b y and define d throug h commercia l interaction s withou t ill effects . The y referre d t o fee s pai d t o sper m an d ovu m donors , t o "commercialized socia l parentin g i n th e for m o f da y car e facilities , bab y sitting, wet nurse s an d nannies " and t o fosterparenting "subsidize d b y th e state." The Stern s example s wer e poorl y chosen . Eve n th e bes t day-car e facilities, baby-sitters , an d nannie s d o no t becom e ki n t o th e children , o r to th e parent s o f th e children , t o who m car e i s given. Th e inten t o f th e Sterns' argument s is , however , clear . The y aime d t o demonstrat e tha t a proper family , eve n a traditional family , ca n b e create d throug h relation s based o n notion s o f bloo d (an d status ) or through relation s founde d o n choice an d confirme d b y law. In th e Sterns ' view, the mod e throug h whic h suc h a family cam e int o existence wa s relativel y unimportant . Tha t traditiona l familie s shoul d b e encouraged t o exis t an d t o thriv e wa s crucial—t o them , t o Mar y Bet h Whitehead, t o Judge Sorkow , and t o the Ne w Jersey Suprem e Court , an d to eac h o f thes e participant s i n th e lega l dram a fo r essentiall y th e sam e ideological reason . I n th e unmistakabl e positio n o f each , th e famil y i n general, an d motherhoo d i n particular , ar e absolutel y valuabl e an d mus t therefore b e safeguarded , eve n a t th e cos t o f tensio n resultin g fro m th e counterclaims o f a legitimat e an d strengthenin g modernity . Thu s th e courts tha t issue d th e Baby M. opinion s an d th e partie s themselve s al l stressed th e overridin g nee d t o safeguar d th e famil y a s an aren a i n whic h relationships ar e base d o n status—whic h the y al l understoo d t o mea n 1911

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood enduring bond s o f lovin g commitment . However , the y disagree d abou t how that should, an d could , b e done . The tria l cour t an d th e Stern s argue d tha t surrogac y (includin g surro gate contracts ) ca n preserv e relationship s base d o n statu s becaus e suc h relationship ca n ste m fro m biolog y o r fro m law . Th e Stern s eve n sug gested tha t la w can creat e biolog y when the y argue d tha t surrogac y offer s "procreative liberty " t o (otherwise ) infertil e women . Th e tria l cour t wa s more confuse d abou t th e significanc e o f the surrogac y contract , viewin g it, i n th e end , a s a n expedien t fo r guardin g statu s relationship s in this case. Similarl y concerne d t o protec t th e famil y fro m th e incursion s o f contract i n Maine' s sense , th e stat e suprem e cour t chos e t o preserv e status in general b y invalidatin g th e contrac t i n thi s case . I n contras t t o both court s an d t o th e Sterns , Mar y Bet h Whitehea d describe d th e mother-child relationshi p a s essentiall y unavailabl e excep t throug h a biological ti e an d vilifie d surrogac y contract s fo r defyin g natura l pro cesses. Eac h positio n represent s a n instanc e o f society' s ambivalenc e about th e perceive d mov e fro m relationship s base d o n statu s (o n tie s tha t represent endurin g commitmen t an d structure d bonds ) t o relationship s based o n contrac t (o n tie s establishe d throug h th e exercis e o f autono mous choice) . In Baby M . th e mod e o f a family' s creatio n wa s a t issue . Th e Stern s and Judg e Sorko w agree d tha t traditiona l familie s ca n b e created o n th e basis o f bargaine d negotiation s an d contractua l agreement . Th e stat e supreme cour t an d Mar y Bet h Whitehea d disagreed . However , neithe r judge no r an y o f the partie s suggeste d tha t th e parameter s o f th e parent child relationshi p shoul d becom e generall y negotiable . O n th e latte r point everyon e favore d tradition . Whethe r th e contractualizatio n o f th e creation o f the parent-chil d bon d wil l resul t ultimatel y i n th e contractu alization o f the incident s o f that relationship a s well remains unclear . Bu t answers t o tha t question—answer s tha t ar e fa r mor e ofte n assume d tha n articulated an d studied—accoun t fo r muc h o f the disagreement i n societ y and i n la w about th e consequence s o f permitting, o r of legally enforcing , surrogacy arrangements . In general , th e law' s ambivalenc e abou t th e mov e fro m traditio n t o modernity i n th e creation—an d perhap s finally i n th e livin g out—o f th e parent-child relationshi p i s especiall y heartfel t becaus e th e relationshi p at stak e ha s constitute d on e o f th e last , importan t preserve s o f statu s relationships i n moder n society . 92 I

Status and Contract in Surrogate Motherhood Thus, th e challeng e facin g famil y la w today , on e poignantl y repre sented b y Baby M , i s t o nothin g les s tha n a traditional , an d extraordi narily influential , conceptio n o f the family , i n particular , t o a traditiona l conception o f father s an d mothers . Confronte d wit h thi s pressure , th e American judiciary , i n Baby M. an d widel y i n othe r cases , has responde d with steadfas t resistance , insistin g tha t th e traditiona l conceptio n b e maintained. But , ironically , a s Baby M . suggests , i n th e effor t t o preserv e that conception , court s have , withou t knowin g it , empowere d th e effor t to alter an d redefin e it .

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FOUR

Unwed Father s and Surrogat e Mother s

The iron y i n Baby M . i s evident i n othe r case s as well. In thes e cases , the American judiciary , confronte d wit h a basic challeng e t o understanding s of family assume d a t least since th e nineteent h centur y t o reflect inexora ble truth , ha s responde d wit h essentiall y conservativ e oppositio n t o th e challenge o f modernity . An d yet it s respons e ha s aide d an d abette d th e challenge. Thus, unwittingly, the judiciar y has undermined it s own caus e and advance d th e caus e o f its avowed antagonists . Many court s i n case s involving potential redefinition s o f maternity an d paternity fai l t o see th e need s tha t motivat e th e decision s the y reach , o r the exten t t o whic h thei r decision s endange r thei r ow n avowe d ends . Thus, som e courts , suc h a s th e tw o court s tha t issue d decision s i n Baby M. , wor k t o protec t traditiona l conception s o f th e family , but , i n attempting t o d o so , appropriat e th e languag e o f change . A t th e sam e time, other courts approve new forms o f family, but i n doing that, disguis e the result s with traditiona l garb . The ne t resul t i s the instructiv e phenom enon o f a judiciar y operatin g a t cross-purpose s t o itself , unawar e tha t it s ideological conservatis m i s fostering th e evolutionar y chang e i t opposes . This phenomeno n ca n b e see n i n Baby M . bu t become s eve n cleare r when Baby M. (an d othe r case s focusin g o n th e meanin g o f "mother" ) are compare d wit h case s raisin g question s abou t th e limit s an d implica tions o f paternity. The law' s response t o parties involve d i n surrogat e mothe r agreement s as wel l a s it s respons e t o father s neve r marrie d t o th e mother s o f thei r biological childre n reveal s som e basi c change s occurrin g i n th e under standing o f famil y tha t ha s bee n predominan t fo r almos t tw o centuries , 94

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers but als o illustrate s court s workin g t o preserv e traditiona l understanding s of family . Cases involvin g unwe d father s an d case s involvin g surrogat e mother s provide a n illuminatin g contrast , eac h wit h th e other . Bot h sort s of case s defy som e aspec t o f traditiona l understanding s o f family . Th e unwe d father case s involv e me n anxiou s t o be father s t o their biologica l childre n but no t anxious , o r no t able , t o marr y th e mother s o f thos e children . Cases suc h a s Baby M. , i n contrast , def y traditio n b y involvin g thir d parties i n th e reproductiv e proces s and , a t leas t sometime s (a s i n Baby M.), b y defining th e creatio n o f the parent-chil d relationshi p i n contrac tual terms . Gestationa l surrogac y case s similarl y involv e thir d partie s an d contractual relationship s i n th e proces s o f huma n reproductio n and , beyond this , upse t familia r assumption s abou t th e biologica l fact s o f reproduction. Th e disruptio n pose d b y tha t thir d aspec t o f gestationa l surrogacy i s examined i n greate r detai l i n th e nex t chapter . Here , under standings o f "mother " i n th e contex t o f gestationa l surrogac y ar e exam ined fo r th e compariso n presente d wit h understanding s o f "mother " i n cases involvin g unwe d fathers . Comparison o f cases involvin g unwe d father s an d surrogat e mother s i s illuminating i n a numbe r o f specifi c regards . Eac h se t o f case s involve s too many, rathe r tha n to o few , parents . Tha t phenomena , foun d a s wel l in man y case s occasione d b y th e ne w reproductiv e technologies , con trasts wit h case s hear d earlie r i n th e twentiet h centur y an d i n th e nine teenth century , whe n court s resolvin g question s abou t parentag e o r cus tody rarel y face d a plethor a o f read y an d willin g parents . I n addition , these case s a s a whol e illustrat e differences i n th e wa y father s ar e under stood a s parent s whe n the y ar e compare d wit h mother s an d whe n the y are compare d wit h othe r fathers , an d difference s i n th e wa y mother s ar e understood whe n the y ar e compare d wit h father s an d whe n the y ar e compared wit h othe r mothers . Finally , bot h sort s o f case s reflect , an d participate i n th e erosio n of , traditiona l conception s o f famil y tha t de pended o n maintainin g a firm separatio n betwee n hom e an d work . Judicial decision s i n case s involving unwe d father s an d i n case s involv ing surrogat e mother s recognize , bu t ofte n oppose , shift s i n society' s understanding o f family (o r "mothers" and "fathers " an d thei r relation s t o each othe r and t o "children"). As in Baby M. , th e decision s i n these case s more generall y represen t a n attemp t t o preserve , despit e th e frequen t 95 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers legitimation o f change , a traditiona l domai n o f family . Th e decision s represent a n attemp t t o kee p th e famil y separat e fro m an d unaffecte d b y the world o f money and work , unaffected tha t i s by the market , includin g its often unremittin g view of people a s unconnected autonomou s individ uals. I n th e effor t t o preserv e traditiona l familie s whil e assimilatin g pat terns and possibilitie s tha t seem t o constitute genuin e change , court s rel y on and articulate , but also begin t o alter, fundamental assumption s abou t what makes families "families " and abou t what makes mothers "mothers, " fathers "fathers, " an d childre n "children. " Th e resul t i s curious . T o safe guard treasure d form s i n th e fac e o f changin g value s an d structures , courts have considered, an d the n sometime s shifte d o r defined anew , th e key symbol s throug h whic h familie s ar e discusse d an d understood . But , in consequence , th e ver y effor t t o preserv e traditiona l familie s an d tradi tional conception s o f famil y represent s an d ha s bee n providin g ne w grounds for justifyin g th e change s feared . Specifically thi s chapte r analyze s a numbe r o f assumption s abou t fatherhood—and b y contrast , abou t motherhood—mad e b y th e Unite d States Suprem e Cour t i n a se t o f case s i n whic h unwe d father s hav e sought paterna l rights ; the n th e chapte r consider s assumption s abou t motherhood underlyin g judicia l decision s i n case s involvin g surrogac y contracts. Th e case s revea l th e transformatio n o f th e famil y a s th e forc e of traditio n i s increasingl y molde d b y th e pressure s o f modernit y t o recognize th e famil y a s a collectivit y o f equal , autonomou s individuals , connected b y choice an d b y negotiated design . I. Wha t Make s a Fathe r a "Father" ? Not unti l 197 2 di d th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t recogniz e th e constitutional right s o f unwe d father s i n thei r relationship s wit h thei r children. Sinc e tha t tim e th e Cour t ha s decide d fou r additiona l case s which furthe r delineat e th e scop e o f unwe d fathers ' paterna l rights . Commentators heralded , an d continu e t o herald, th e unwe d fathe r case s as exemplifying a ne w recognitio n o f the right s of fathers a s compared t o those o f mothers. 1 Certainly, these case s did effect concret e change s i n state laws regulating th e authorit y o f unwe d father s t o sustai n relationship s wit h thei r biological children . However , th e assumption s behin d th e Suprem e Court's unwe d fathe r decision s an d th e theoretica l groun d o n whic h 1961

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers those case s rest , harmoniz e wit h a vie w o f th e fathe r constructe d ove r a century an d a half earlier, during the earl y years of the Industria l Revolu tion. I n thi s view fathers—because male—ar e define d primaril y throug h their relatio n t o th e marke t economy . Th e organi c bonds , see n t o relat e fathers t o thei r familie s i n a n earlie r time , ha d lon g bee n sundered . B y the earl y nineteent h century , fathers , a s famil y members , wer e largel y defined b y choice, no t nature . I n th e secon d hal f o f th e nineteent h an d first half o f the twentiet h century , paternit y wa s mediate d b y the biologi cal father' s lin k t o hi s children' s mother . Mor e recently , paternit y ha s additionally bee n recognize d o n th e basi s o f the father' s behavior towar d his biologica l children . Tha t recognition , however , wa s conditione d b y an understandin g tha t th e requisit e relatio n betwee n a fathe r an d hi s biological chil d mus t includ e th e child' s mother . Bot h th e vie w tha t conditions paterna l right s o n a marriag e (o r othe r simila r relationship ) between a biologica l fathe r an d hi s children' s mothe r an d a vie w tha t conditions paterna l right s o n a biologica l father' s behavio r towar d hi s children assum e a father' s relationshi p t o hi s childre n i s a cultural cre ation, and thu s a choice, 2 no t th e automati c correlat e o f a biological tie . In 199 1 John Hil l delineate d thre e dimension s o f relevanc e t o th e la w in identifyin g paternity . These includ e "th e man' s biologica l relationshi p with th e child , hi s lega l o r socia l relationshi p wit h th e child' s mother , and th e extent of his social and psychologica l commitmen t t o the child." 3 However, these factors d o not, as Hill's analysis might suggest, carry equa l weight fo r th e societ y o r fo r it s lega l system . Rather , the y ar e weighte d differently dependin g o n context , and o n th e essentia l understandin g tha t fathers, unlik e mothers , ar e no t socially limite d b y thei r biologica l rela tion t o thei r children . Father s ar e fre e eithe r t o invok e biologica l father hood o r to ignor e it . The debat e abou t paternity, however, does not focus aroun d biologica l questions. Instead , thi s debat e concern s th e othe r tw o dimension s tha t Hill delineate d b y which societ y an d la w identif y fathers . Althoug h eac h of thes e tw o dimension s predicate s paternit y o n cultur e an d choic e an d variously assumes , downplays , o r ignore s a man' s biologica l relatio n t o his child , th e implication s o f th e tw o dimension s diffe r considerably , each fro m th e other . Th e debat e abou t paternit y ha s largel y becom e a debate between th e decision t o predicate paternit y on a man's connectio n to th e mothe r o f hi s chil d an d th e decisio n t o predicat e paternit y o n a man's relationshi p wit h hi s children . 1971

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers The positio n tha t presumes a father become s a father onl y through th e mediation o f his child's mothe r presume s a n olde r century' s definitio n o f family tha n th e positio n tha t presume s a ma n ca n becom e a fathe r b y establishing a socia l relationshi p wit h hi s child . Wit h th e first position , there i s fa r les s roo m fo r th e autonomou s individual , fo r th e father , fre e to creat e an d eve n recreat e relationship s a s h e chooses . Rather , histori cally, thi s firs t positio n presumed , an d t o som e exten t continue s t o pre sume, tha t eac h familia l relationshi p ca n onl y b e understoo d withi n th e context o f th e large r familia l whole . So , fo r example , th e relationshi p between a fathe r an d hi s chil d wa s inevitabl y understoo d i n th e contex t of th e relationshi p betwee n th e fathe r an d th e child' s mother . I n thi s view, me n becom e father s b y marryin g wome n wh o wil l b e th e mother s of their children . In contrast , the view that allows putative fathers t o effect thei r paternit y through th e developmen t o f a relationship wit h their children , apart fro m those children' s mothers , erode s traditiona l forms . Fro m thi s view , a putative fathe r ca n choose t o b e a fathe r withou t regar d fo r a large r network o f familial relationships . H e can , that is, effect a connection wit h his chil d entirel y outsid e th e contex t o f a large r family , muc h a s on e might choos e t o establis h a relationshi p wit h a frien d o r eve n a busines s associate. Thu s thi s secon d position , whic h presume s lega l paternit y t o follow fro m th e developmen t o f a relationshi p betwee n a fathe r an d hi s biological child , largel y rejects olde r pattern s tha t embedde d ever y famil ial relationshi p i n a n encompassin g networ k o f familia l connection s and tha t viewe d eac h relationshi p a s entailin g a se t o f clea r right s an d obligations. Confusion abou t thes e difference s an d abou t wha t exactl y does , an d should, mak e father s fathers , i s apparen t i n th e se t o f Suprem e Cour t cases decide d betwee n 197 2 and 1989, 4 tha t conside r th e paterna l right s of unwed father s a s a constitutional matter . The implication s o f the case s seem ambiguou s exactl y becaus e th e Cour t shifte d betwee n th e positio n that fathers becom e father s becaus e the y establish relationship s wit h thei r children, an d th e positio n tha t father s becom e father s becaus e the y ar e connected t o th e mother s o f thei r children , withou t acknowledgin g tha t it was doing so. All five o f th e recen t case s concerne d wit h th e lega l paternit y o f unwed father s sa y quite clearly , though eac h wit h mor e o r less force, tha t the paternity of biological father s wh o have developed socia l relationship s 198

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers with thei r childre n i s guaranteed constitutiona l protection . Yet , underly ing al l fiv e case s an d explici t i n th e mos t recen t Suprem e Cour t cas e (Michael H.) involvin g th e right s o f a n unwe d biologica l father , i s th e suggestion tha t lega l paternit y depend s o n th e father' s developin g a relationship, no t wit h hi s children , bu t wit h thei r mother . Th e expres s language o f severa l o f th e case s doe s sugges t tha t lega l paternit y ca n be premise d o n a n unwe d biologica l father' s establishin g a paterna l relationship wit h hi s children . I n fact , th e majorit y o f commentator s o n the unwe d fathe r case s have stresse d thi s trend an d hav e rea d th e case s to predicate lega l paternit y o n th e presenc e o r absenc e o f a socia l relation ship betwee n a putativ e fathe r an d hi s child. 5 However , th e cases , a s a set, make sens e onl y i f the apparentl y sufficien t requiremen t fo r effectin g legal paternity—tha t a fathe r effec t a socia l relationshi p wit h hi s biologi cal chil d —is rea d a s a cod e fo r th e requiremen t tha t h e effec t suc h a relationship within the context of family. An d that contex t i s mos t easil y identified i n case s i n whic h th e fathe r ha s establishe d a marriag e o r marriage-like relationship , with th e child' s mother . Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, an d Lehr: The Choic e t o B e a Fathe r Stanley v . Illinois, th e first Suprem e Cour t cas e t o exten d constitutiona l protection t o unwe d fathers , involve d Pete r Stanley , wh o ha d live d inter mittently wit h hi s thre e childre n an d thei r mother , Joa n Stanley , fo r eighteen years . Pete r an d Joa n neve r married . Whe n Joa n died , Illinoi s law presumed unwe d father s wer e unfi t an d therefore , require d th e stat e to tak e th e childre n a s wards . Th e Cour t describe d Pete r Stanle y a s a member o f a family unit , includin g himself , Joan, an d th e thre e childre n and determine d tha t th e statute , b y failin g t o provid e Stanle y a hearin g on hi s fitness a s a parent, deprive d hi m o f due proces s an d equa l protec tion. Justic e Whit e wrot e fo r th e Court : "Th e privat e interes t here , tha t of a ma n i n th e childre n h e ha s sire d an d raised , undeniabl y warrant s deference and , absen t a powerful countervailin g interest , protection." 6 The Court' s decisio n i n Stanley strongl y suggest s tha t th e right s ex tended t o Stanle y depende d o n hi s positio n a s a biologica l and a socia l father t o hi s children . Bu t i t was no t entirel y clea r afte r Stanley whethe r biological paternit y outsid e th e contex t o f marriag e (o r a n establishe d family unit ) o r outsid e th e contex t o f a n establishe d socia l relationshi p I 99 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers between th e biologica l fathe r an d hi s childre n woul d b e enoug h t o constitute lega l fatherhood . Nor wa s i t clear fro m Stanley ho w heavil y th e Court' s decisio n reste d on Peter's having had a relationship with Joan that resembled a traditional marriage. I t was no t clear , tha t is , how futur e court s woul d interpre t th e significance o f th e finding tha t th e Stanley s wer e a "family. " A footnot e in th e opinio n create d particula r confusio n abou t th e implication s o f biological paternit y alone . That footnot e read : We note in passing that the incremental cos t of offering unwe d fathers a n opportunity fo r individualize d hearing s o n fitnes s appear s to be minimal . If unwed fathers , i n th e main , d o no t car e abou t th e dispositio n o f their children, they will not appear to demand hearings . If they do care, under the scheme here held invalid, Illinois would admittedly at some later time have t o afford the m a properly focused hearin g i n a custody o r adoptio n proceeding. Extending opportunit y fo r hearin g t o unwe d father s wh o desir e an d claim competenc e t o car e fo r thei r childre n create s n o constitutiona l o r procedural obstacl e t o foreclosin g thos e unwe d father s wh o ar e no t s o inclined. Th e Illinoi s la w governing procedur e i n juvenil e case s . . . pro vides for personal service, notice by certified mail , or for notice by publication when personal or certified mai l service cannot be had or when notic e is directed t o unknown respondent s unde r th e styl e of "All whom i t may Concern." Unwed fathers wh o do not promptly respond canno t complai n if their childre n ar e declare d ward s o f the State . Those wh o d o respon d retain the burden of proving their fatherhood. 7 The footnot e create d confusio n becaus e th e Cour t faile d t o explai n whether th e protectio n afforde d Stanle y wa s t o b e mad e availabl e t o al l unwed father s o r only to those, such a s Stanley, who ha d playe d a part i n the socializatio n o f thei r childre n o r wh o ha d live d wit h thos e childre n and th e mothe r o f those childre n a s a family. 8 Chief Justic e Burger , dissentin g i n Stanley , wa s more explici t than th e majority abou t th e socia l an d lega l consequence s o f biologica l father hood. Chie f Justice Burge r disavowed th e significance o f biological pater nity a s compare d wit h biologica l maternity , first, becaus e biologica l fa thers ar e harde r t o identif y tha n biologica l mothers , and , second , an d more importantly , becaus e th e biologica l lin k betwee n mothe r an d chil d is understood a s having social significance. Chie f Justic e Burge r wrote : 100

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers [T]he biologica l rol e o f th e mothe r i n carryin g an d nursin g a n infan t creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds resulting from th e male' s ofte n casua l encounter . Thi s vie w i s reinforce d b y th e observable fac t tha t mos t unwe d mother s exhibi t a concer n fo r thei r offspring eithe r permanentl y o r a t leas t unti l the y ar e safel y place d fo r adoption, whil e unwe d father s rarel y burde n eithe r th e mothe r o r th e child wit h thei r attention s o r loyalties . Centurie s o f huma n experienc e buttress thi s vie w o f th e realitie s o f huma n condition s an d sugges t tha t unwed mother s o f illegitimat e childre n ar e generall y mor e dependabl e protectors of their children than are unwed fathers. 9 In short , fo r mothers , biology ordain s an d constitute s a maternal "role" 10 and thu s carrie s socia l significance ; fo r father s i t i s simpl y a fac t o f "nature," no t necessaril y connecte d i n an y wa y t o socia l consequences . Fathers ar e lef t free t o choose . Although offere d i n dissent , Chie f Justic e Burger's commentar y o n th e comparativ e significanc e o f biologica l ma ternity an d biologica l paternit y support s an d reflect s basi c assumption s behind th e majorit y opinion . I n bot h opinions , though mor e expressl y i n Chief Justice Burger's , maternity i s defined throug h biolog y and paternit y is defined a s a matter o f choice. Chief Justic e Burge r did , however , provid e a different versio n o f Stan ley's own conduc t a s a father tha n di d the majority . Chie f Justice Burger' s rendition o f the fact s asserte d tha t Stanle y wa s not, i n fact , a good father , and h e suggeste d tha t that fac t supporte d th e genera l positio n tha t fo r men, thoug h no t fo r women , biologica l parenthoo d shoul d no t b e rea d to impl y th e likel y developmen t o f a parent-chil d relationship . A s Chie f Justice Burge r tol d th e story , Pete r Stanle y wa s no t th e attentiv e fathe r the majorit y opinio n suggested . Rather , afte r th e deat h o f th e children' s mother, Stanle y transferre d car e o f th e childre n t o anothe r couple . H e made n o effort s t o b e recognize d a s th e fathe r unti l th e stat e becam e aware tha t n o adul t ha d an y lega l obligatio n fo r th e suppor t o f th e children. A t tha t tim e Stanle y mad e himsel f know n bu t only , accordin g to Chie f Justic e Burger , becaus e h e feare d losin g welfare payment s i f others were name d guardian s o f the children . Obviously, Chie f Justic e Burge r recounte d thes e fact s i n orde r t o buttress hi s clai m tha t unwe d father s rarel y provid e adequat e car e fo r their childre n and , mor e particularly , t o implicat e this fathe r a s on e o f that purported multitude . The additiona l fact s presente d b y Chief Justic e I 10 1 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers

Burger abou t Pete r Stanle y d o no t provid e logica l ground s fo r ques tioning th e majority' s opinio n sinc e th e majorit y onl y require d tha t th e state prove , rathe r tha n presume , Stanley' s unfitnes s befor e deprivin g him o f th e children . Similarly , th e additiona l fact s d o not , o f course , gainsay th e positio n tha t biologica l paternit y i s n o less , o r a t leas t no t much less , determinative o f parental affection s tha n biologica l maternity , and thos e fact s pos e n o theoretica l objectio n t o th e Court' s decisio n tha t the stat e canno t presum e me n lik e Pete r Stanle y unfi t fathers . However, i n th e aren a o f discours e i n whic h natur e an d nurtur e ar e separated an d compare d a s determinant s o f huma n behavior , scienc e offers ver y few assurances. Conclusions abou t th e contribution s o f natur e and nurtur e t o human behavio r are more faddish tha n certain . Therefore , the tellin g of a particular stor y can b e a crucial determinan t o f the weigh t given eac h componen t o f the nature/nurtur e controversy. 11 Moreover , b y presenting fact s tha t minimize d th e significanc e o f Peter Stanley' s actua l relationship wit h hi s children, Chie f Justice Burger' s account strengthen s the significanc e o f Stanley' s long-ter m relationshi p wit h hi s children' s mother an d o f th e fac t o f "family " i n th e Stanley case , a s factor s crucia l to the Court' s holding . Again, in Quilloin v . Walcott, decide d si x years after Stanley, th e Cour t assumed —now mor e explicitl y eve n tha n i n Stanley— that biologica l paternity, unlik e biologica l maternity , offer s n o assurance s abou t th e probable actualizatio n o f parenta l behavior . I n Quilloin th e Cour t con sidered a Georgi a statut e tha t gav e al l unwe d mothers , bu t onl y certai n unwed fathers , th e righ t t o vet o th e adoption s o f thei r children . Unde r the Georgi a statut e a t issu e i n th e case , unwed father s coul d acquir e th e right t o vet o th e adoptio n o f a chil d i f the y "legitimized " th e chil d b y marrying the mothe r an d acknowledgin g paternity , or by having the chil d declared legitimat e throug h a cour t order. 12 Leo n Quilloin , a n unwe d father, desire d t o veto th e adoptio n o f his chil d b y the child' s stepfather , Randall Walcott . Th e mother , Ardel l William s Walcott , ha d marrie d Randall Walcot t i n 1967 , almos t thre e year s afte r th e birt h o f he r chil d with Leo n Quilloin . Quilloi n an d Ardel l Walcott ha d neve r establishe d a home togethe r wit h th e child , who ha d bee n i n th e custod y o f its mothe r since birth . Quilloi n ha d offere d irregula r suppor t t o th e chil d an d ha d visited wit h th e chil d o n "man y occasions " befor e th e mother , assertin g the child' s best interests , had ende d Quilloin' s contact s wit h th e child. 13 I 10 2 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers The Cour t i n Quilloin, retreatin g fro m th e mor e expansiv e implica tions o f Stanley, explicitl y refuse d constitutiona l protectio n t o unwe d fathers o n th e basis of biological paternit y alone ; under Quilloin constitu tional protectio n i s onl y extende d t o certai n unwe d fathers . Th e Cour t was no t ver y clear , however , abou t who thos e unwe d father s are . Th e opinion (especiall y whe n rea d i n concer t wit h Caban v . Mohammed, decided th e nex t year), has ofte n bee n interprete d a s defining th e father s who are protecte d a s thos e wh o act lik e fathers , wh o "shoulder[ ] . . . significant responsibilit y wit h respec t t o th e dail y supervision , education , protection, o r care of their child." 14 However , tha t readin g o f the opinio n offers onl y a partial renditio n o f what th e opinio n actuall y says. The Cour t wa s a t leas t equall y concerne d wit h th e absenc e o f a "family unit " includin g Quilloin , hi s child , an d tha t child' s mothe r a s i t was wit h th e absenc e o f a socia l relationshi p betwee n Quilloi n an d hi s child, pe r se . "[T]h e resul t o f a n adoptio n [b y th e child' s step-father ] i n this case, " wrot e th e Court , "i s t o giv e ful l recognitio n t o a famil y uni t already i n existence , a resul t desire d b y al l concerned , excep t appel lant." 15 Th e Court' s languag e abou t father s wh o shoulde r "significan t responsibility" regardin g th e socializatio n o f thei r childre n seeme d t o distinguish Quilloi n fro m separate d o r divorce d father s wh o ha d onc e had a relationshi p wit h thei r children' s mother s i n th e contex t o f havin g been joine d i n a "famil y unit " wit h tha t mothe r an d thei r children . Thi s language als o serve d t o stres s th e absenc e o f a relationshi p betwee n Quilloin an d th e child . "[E]ve n a fathe r whos e marriag e ha s broke n apart," wrote the Court , "wil l have borne ful l responsibilit y fo r the rearin g of his children durin g th e perio d o f the marriage." 16 That statemen t ma y be tru e a s an assumptio n allowe d t o law , but, a s the Cour t clearl y knew , does no t necessaril y describ e th e behavio r o f any particular father . Thus , the opinio n suggests , eve n i n th e mids t o f a statemen t abou t th e impor tance o f unwe d fathers ' paterna l behavio r tha t tha t behavio r itsel f i s conditioned b y the father' s relationshi p wit h th e children' s mother . The Cour t wa s certainl y concerned , a s commentator s hav e stressed , that Quilloin ha d n o substantial parenta l relationshi p wit h hi s child. But , of a t leas t equa l concer n wa s th e absenc e o f a "famil y unit " involvin g Quilloin, an d th e presenc e o f a "famil y unit " includin g Ardel l Walcott , Randall Walcott , an d th e child . Th e Cour t declare d tha t "[w]hateve r might b e require d i n othe r situations , w e canno t sa y tha t th e Stat e wa s 103

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers required i n thi s situatio n t o find anythin g mor e tha n tha t th e adoption , and denia l o f legitimatio n [o f th e chil d b y Quilloin] , wer e i n th e 'bes t interests o f the child / " 1 7 Thus, unde r th e holdin g i n Quilloin, biolog y alon e i s o f minima l importance i n securin g lega l recognitio n fo r th e paterna l relationshi p o f unwed father s t o thei r biologica l children . Behaviora l tie s betwee n suc h fathers an d thei r childre n ar e significant , bu t no t conclusive . Th e Cour t did no t eve n tr y t o delineat e how much socia l responsibilit y a n unwe d father ha d t o accep t fo r hi s chil d i n orde r t o b e guarantee d parenta l rights. O f greates t importanc e i n determinin g a biologica l father' s right s to a lega l relationshi p wit h hi s chil d appear s t o b e th e father' s inclusio n in a "famil y unit " wit h th e childre n an d thei r mother . Althoug h th e "family unit " recognize d i n Quilloin wa s marital , th e Cour t di d no t express a n explici t preferenc e fo r marita l a s compare d t o nonmarita l family units . Onc e again , a s wa s tru e unde r th e commo n law , Quilloin implies tha t fo r mos t father s a t least , paterna l right s ar e mediate d b y th e father's relatio n t o hi s child' s mother , althoug h Quilloin, unlik e th e common law , does no t sugges t tha t tha t relationshi p mus t b e effecte d i n the contex t o f a marriage. I n sum , the Quilloin Cour t considere d eac h o f the three factors tha t might provide an unwe d fathe r ground s for claimin g parental rights : a biologica l ti e t o th e child ; a socia l connectio n t o th e child; an d creatio n o f a "famil y unit " wit h th e chil d an d hi s o r he r mother. O f these three factors , the first alone was given little significance ; the secon d an d thir d wer e recognize d a s important , bu t onl y th e thir d factor emerge d a s determinative . Quilloin suggests , withou t eve r statin g explicitly, tha t the relationshi p whic h make s a n unwe d fathe r mos t like a married father— a relationshi p founde d o n th e establishmen t an d main tenance o f a household wit h th e mothe r an d child—woul d carr y greates t weight i n determinin g unwe d fathers ' paterna l rights . Thus, betwee n Stanley an d Quilloin th e Cour t seeme d t o mov e fro m an equivoca l willingnes s t o recogniz e paternit y o n th e basi s o f a biologi cal father's commitmen t t o his child towar d a mor e certai n reluctanc e t o recognize paternit y unles s th e biologica l fathe r mad e a commitment t o a "family unit " tha t included , a t least a t som e point , th e children' s mothe r as wel l a s th e ma n an d hi s children . I n eithe r case , paternit y i s distin guished fro m maternit y a s a matte r o f choice , an d biolog y i s no t pre sumed t o determin e a father' s relationshi p t o hi s children . Th e Quilloin Court di d no t conside r th e disparat e treatmen t o f unmarrie d father s an d I 104

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers unmarried mothers. 18 However , th e Cour t di d separat e ou t th e mother child relationshi p a s th e cor e aroun d whic h "famil y units " form . B y implication, th e Cour t understoo d female , bu t no t male , biolog y t o encompass, an d therefor e t o guarantee, a parent-child relationship . In Caban v . Mohammed, decide d on e yea r afte r Quilloin, a n unwe d father, wh o wa s anxiou s t o preserv e hi s parenta l rights , presente d a n equal protectio n argumen t base d o n disparat e treatmen t accorde d unwe d fathers an d unwe d mothers . Whe n th e cas e wa s heard , Caba n wa s married t o anothe r woman . Thi s fact—makin g Caba n par t o f a "fam ily"—may hav e playe d som e unstate d rol e i n th e Court' s vie w of Caban . The cas e involve d th e constitutionalit y o f a Ne w York statute whic h gav e unwed mothers , bu t no t unwe d fathers , th e righ t t o withhold consen t fo r the adoptio n o f children. 19 Th e parent s i n Caban neve r marrie d bu t established an d maintaine d a househol d togethe r fo r five years . Durin g that tim e Mari a Mohamme d gav e birt h t o tw o children . Whe n th e children wer e tw o and four , Mari a lef t Abdiel Caba n an d shortl y thereaf ter marrie d Kazi m Mohammed . Tw o years after th e marriage , Mari a an d Kazim filed a petitio n t o hav e Kazi m adop t th e tw o children . A Ne w York surrogate grante d th e adoption . Eventually, th e Unite d State s Suprem e Court , reversin g th e decision s below, hel d Ne w York' s statut e unconstitutiona l unde r a n intermediat e standard o f review . Th e Cour t foun d tha t th e statutor y distinctio n "be tween unmarrie d mother s an d unmarrie d fathers , a s illustrate d b y thi s case, doe s no t bea r a substantial relatio n t o th e State' s interes t i n provid ing adoptive home s fo r it s illegitimate children." 20 The Cour t rejecte d a s justificatio n fo r th e statutor y distinctio n th e Mohammeds' argumen t tha t " a natura l mother , absen t specia l circum stances, bear s a close r relationshi p wit h he r chil d . . . tha n a fathe r does." 21 Th e Cour t admitte d th e statistica l validit y o f thi s clai m bu t expressed concer n tha t som e unwe d father s ma y pla y a n importan t rol e in th e live s o f thei r childre n an d decide d tha t th e right s o f suc h father s deserve protection . "Th e presen t case, " wrot e th e Court , "demonstrate s that a n unwe d fathe r ma y hav e a relationshi p wit h hi s childre n full y comparable t o that of the mother. " 22 Caban suggest s tha t a biologica l father' s paterna l behavio r wil l deter mine th e degre e o f protectio n th e Constitutio n provide s i n safeguardin g his relationshi p wit h hi s biologica l child . However , th e languag e o f th e opinion focuse s o n Caban' s havin g "live d togethe r a s a natural family " 105

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers with Mari a Mohamme d an d thei r childre n rathe r tha n o n th e characte r of the relationshi p tha t Caba n affecte d wit h hi s children. 23 I t was, argued the Court , as a member of a natural family y tha t Caba n care d fo r an d supported hi s children . Onc e again , i n Caban th e Cour t i n larg e par t predicated th e unwe d father' s relatio n t o hi s childre n an d hi s claim s t o legal paternit y o n hi s relatio n t o hi s children' s mother—o n th e creatio n of a "natura l family"—a s muc h a s o n hi s relationshi p wit h hi s children , per se. Commentators analyzin g Caban 2* hav e note d th e Court' s acknowl edgment tha t an unwe d fathe r ma y have a "relationship wit h hi s childre n fully comparabl e t o tha t o f th e mother," 25 bu t hav e frequentl y faile d t o recognize th e exten t t o which th e Caban Court , i n fact , premise d recog nition o f the father-child relationshi p o n th e unwe d father' s havin g set u p a "natura l family " wit h th e childre n an d thei r mother . Technically, th e ter m "natura l family " wa s used i n Caban t o refe r t o a social uni t o f unmarried biologica l parent s an d thei r children . However , the ter m carrie d additiona l implications . Th e ter m "family " refers , o f course, t o a comparabl e uni t involvin g tw o married adults . "Natura l family" i s th e marke d term. 26 Th e traditional , idea l famil y ca n b e de scribed withou t us e o f th e adjectiv e "natural. " Tha t adjectiv e i s use d t o delineate a special , margina l famil y group . I n thi s regard , therefore , Caban differe d fro m th e traditiona l positio n tha t to achieve lega l recogni tion a famil y mus t includ e tw o adult s married t o eac h other . Bu t th e decision di d no t eliminat e altogethe r th e presenc e o f "family " a s a basi c precondition fo r th e protectio n o f a biological father' s lega l paternity . For th e Court , th e socia l constellatio n i n Caban coul d b e describe d as a famil y no t only , no t eve n primarily , becaus e ther e wer e biologica l ties betwee n Caba n an d hi s children , bu t becaus e th e adult s ha d cohab ited o n th e mode l o f a marrie d couple , togethe r wit h thei r children . Thus, th e importan t "natural " relationshi p givin g Caba n lega l right s t o his childre n wa s no t hi s biologica l lin k t o th e children , no r eve n hi s unmediated socia l ti e t o them , bu t hi s continuin g lin k t o thei r mothe r after thei r births . That lin k mad e Caba n par t o f a "natural " famil y an d gave hi m legal rights to hi s biological children . Caba n wa s able t o effec t the righ t t o clai m paternit y b y declarin g hi s connectio n t o hi s children' s mother, th e paren t whos e biologica l ti e t o he r childre n s o muc h mor e irrefutably constitute d a parenta l tie . Thus , agai n i n Caban, th e choic e that give s a n unwe d fathe r paterna l right s i s th e choic e t o relat e t o hi s 106 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers children's mothe r a s muc h a s th e choic e t o relat e t o th e children , themselves. Justice Stewart' s dissentin g opinio n share d a se t o f assumption s wit h the Court' s majorit y abou t th e comparativ e significanc e o f femal e an d male biolog y an d delineate d mor e expressl y tha n th e majorit y th e impli cations o f th e assume d difference s betwee n biologica l maternit y an d biological paternity . This dissen t i s important becaus e i t reintroduces th e underlying assumption s abou t biolog y tha t allowe d th e majorit y an d th e dissent alik e s o facilely t o distinguish mother s fro m fathers . Justice Stewar t wrote : "Parenta l right s d o no t sprin g full-blow n fro m the biologica l connectio n betwee n paren t an d child . The y requir e rela tionships mor e enduring . Th e mothe r carrie s an d bear s th e child , an d i n this sense , he r parenta l relationshi p i s clear." 27 Justic e Stewar t posite d the mother' s relationshi p wit h he r chil d t o begi n wit h th e gestatio n an d delivery o f th e child . Thus , "th e biologica l connectio n betwee n paren t and child " tha t i n Justic e Stewart' s vie w doe s no t giv e ris e automaticall y to parenta l right s mus t b e a geneti c connection , th e onl y biologica l connection availabl e t o a father. O n thi s reading , female biolog y encom passes maternity , bu t no t becaus e th e mothe r provide s th e eg g fro m which he r chil d develops . The gestational , no t th e genetic , rol e make s a biological mothe r a "mother " i n a cas e suc h a s Caban. 2S I n contrast , biological paternity , understoo d t o involv e onl y a geneti c ti e carrie s n o certain implication s fo r th e socia l relationshi p betwee n a ma n an d hi s biological child . "Th e validit y o f th e father' s parenta l claim s mus t b e gauged b y other measures, " wrote Justic e Stewart. 29 Traditionally , contin ued Justic e Stewart , tha t measur e ha s bee n legitimatio n o f th e paterna l relationship throug h th e father' s marriag e t o th e mother . S o far , Justic e Stewart's positio n resemble s tha t o f the majority . Th e difference , an d th e determinative differenc e fo r Abdie l Caban , i s tha t th e majorit y wa s will ing t o rea d th e creatio n o f a "natura l family " a s comparabl e t o th e creation o f a marita l famil y fo r purpose s o f establishin g paterna l rights . That difference , althoug h determinativ e fo r Caban , i s in a mor e analyti c context a mino r difference , holdin g fe w implication s fo r th e essentia l character o f paternity. Like Justic e Stewart' s dissen t i n Caban, Justic e Stevens' s dissen t stressed th e relevanc e o f biologica l maternit y t o th e establishmen t o f a mother-child ti e an d wa s o f particula r significanc e i n foreshadowin g Justice Stevens' s majorit y decisio n i n th e nex t unwe d fathe r cas e t o reac h I 10 7 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers the Supreme Court. Referring to the biological ties between mothe r and child that develop and grow during pregnancy and birth, Justice Stevens's Caban dissen t invoke d a "symbioti c relationship " betwee n mothe r an d child tha t provide d a "physica l an d psychologica l bond " betwee n th e two, "no t presen t betwee n th e infan t an d th e fathe r o r an y othe r per son."30 Thus , fo r Justic e Steven s th e "natural " root s o f maternit y an d paternity differ , an d mother s diffe r accordingl y fro m fathers . Bu t i t was not unti l Lehr v . Robertson, that Justic e Steven s explaine d i n detai l his view o f the difference s betwee n biologica l maternit y an d biologica l paternity. In Lehr, Justice Stevens , fo r th e Court , denie d th e petitio n o f th e putative father , Jonatha n Lehr , t o prevent th e adoptio n o f his daughter , Jessica, b y th e husban d o f th e child' s mother . Leh r argue d tha t Ne w York's failure t o provid e hi m notic e o f the adoptio n proceedin g denie d him du e process and tha t the different treatmen t o f unwed mother s and unwed fathers i n the statute denied him equal protection. Addressing the du e proces s claim , Justic e Steven s concede d tha t th e "intangible fibers that connect parent and child " deserve "constitutiona l protection i n appropriate cases." 31 Lehr's case was not seen to be such a case, however, becaus e " a mer e biologica l relationship" 32 canno t alon e establish lega l paternity . The majorit y proceede d t o quote Justic e Stew art's dissent in Caban: "Parental right s do not spring full-blown from the biological connectio n betwee n paren t an d child . The y requir e relation ships more enduring." 33 Justice Stevens declared: The significanc e o f the biologica l connectio n i s that i t offers th e natura l father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. I f he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility fo r th e child' s future , h e ma y enjo y th e blessing s o f the parent-child relationshi p and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. 34

Biology, i n short , give s me n options . A n unwe d biologica l fathe r ma y establish hi s relationshi p wit h hi s biological chil d an d wit h tha t child' s mother through appropriate behavior and become a legal father. Alternatively, h e ma y trea t th e biologica l relationshi p a s irrelevan t an d no t become a father at all. Mothers, we d o r unwed , d o no t hav e th e sam e choices. 35 Th e Su preme Court implie d tha t fo r mother s parenta l right s do spring fro m a 11081

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers biological, thoug h no t fro m a genetic , connectio n betwee n paren t an d child. 36 Th e gestationa l bon d condition s (an d i n mos t case s compels ) biological mother s t o be socia l mothers . Biolog y gives men th e chance t o become fathers . However , i t inexorabl y make s wome n mothers—a t leas t when the y are being compare d t o fathers . In respondin g t o Lehr' s equa l protectio n argument , th e Cour t di d no t openly rel y on, or even expressl y refer to , its own assumption tha t biologi cal paternit y an d biologica l maternit y ar e differen t enoug h t o situat e unwed mother s differentl y fro m unwe d father s fo r purpose s o f constitu tional analysis . Rather , th e Cour t decide d tha t Lehr' s equa l protectio n claim faile d becaus e he ha d no t "establishe d a substantia l relationshi p with hi s daughter" whil e th e child' s mothe r ha d suc h a relationshi p wit h the children. 37 O n thi s basis, the Cour t distinguishe d Lehr fro m Caban. Thus, th e Cour t i n Lehr implie d tha t ha d Leh r onl y bee n a mor e committed father , ha d h e "com e forwar d t o participat e i n th e rearin g of hi s child," 38 hi s paterna l right s woul d hav e receive d constitutiona l protection. Thi s explanatio n i s unconvincing , however , i n ligh t o f th e facts reveale d i n Justic e White' s dissentin g opinio n whic h indicate d tha t the child' s mothe r ha d hidde n bab y Jessica fro m Leh r wh o "neve r cease d his effort s t o locate " th e mothe r an d th e child. 39 Whe n h e di d locat e them, th e mothe r threatene d Leh r wit h arres t i f he attempte d t o se e th e child. The fact s presented i n Justice White's dissent indicate that the decisio n in Lehr rest s les s o n Lehr' s specifi c failur e t o effec t a paterna l rol e tha n on tw o broader , implici t assumption s tha t th e Cour t made . First , th e Court assume d tha t biologica l paternity , unlik e biologica l maternity , carries n o imperative s fo r father s —implying, o f course, tha t Lehr' s equa l protection argumen t mus t fai l because me n an d wome n ar e not similarl y situated wit h regar d t o their status as parents. Second, the Cour t assume d that th e recognitio n o f paternit y depend s i n mos t case s o n a connectio n (either "lawful " o r "natural" ) betwee n th e fathe r an d th e child' s mother . Neither assumptio n wa s express. Tacit, fundamental assumption s of the sort found i n Lehr ca n direct the course o f constitutiona l decision-makin g and , becaus e tacit , ca n b e masked by other, more express justifications. So , for example, the assumption tha t me n an d wome n diffe r a s parents o n th e basi s o f innat e gende r differences provide s at least implicit justificatio n fo r differentia l treatmen t of the two groups. Often tha t treatment will be justified o n othe r grounds . 109

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers

But, i n suc h cases , carefu l examinatio n wil l generall y revea l tha t th e ex press grounds o n whic h suc h decision s ar e premise d prov e inadequat e t o explain the decisions, or are even patently self-contradictory . Thus, whe n th e fact s i n Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, an d Lehr ar e examined, th e Court' s decision s i n Stanley an d Caban ar e not adequatel y distinguished fro m Quilloin an d Lehr o n th e groun d tha t th e first tw o fathers effecte d relation s wit h thei r childre n an d th e secon d tw o di d not . The Lehr Cour t di d no t expressl y refe r t o Lehr' s failur e t o establis h a household wit h th e mothe r an d th e child , bu t tha t fact , mor e tha n Lehr's not having "come forward," 40 distinguishe d Lehr' s situation, i n th e Court's view , fro m tha t o f th e father s i n Stanley an d Caban an d mad e him mor e lik e th e fathe r i n Quilloin. Fo r th e Court , th e determinativ e difference betwee n th e tw o set s o f case s wa s tha t th e father s i n Stanley and Caban effecte d relation s that adequatel y resemble d familie s wit h th e children's mother s an d th e father s i n Quilloin an d Lehr di d not . Th e Court neve r focuse d clearl y o n th e importanc e thi s differenc e playe d i n its unwe d fathe r decisions . Th e Cour t simpl y assumed , quit e implicitly , that throug h th e mediatio n o f th e mothe r i n th e contex t o f a "family, " biological father s becam e socia l father s and tha t i n th e absenc e o f suc h mediation, the y di d not . The assumptio n i n thes e case s tha t biolog y doe s no t compe l socia l paternity, a s i t compel s socia l maternity , undergird s th e deman d tha t fathers see k othe r path s fo r securin g lega l right s t o thei r biologica l chil dren. B y formin g "families " wit h th e mother s o f thei r children , father s share i n th e natura l bond s tha t connec t mother s an d children . A man' s ties to his biological chil d ar e thereby socialized . Another se t o f case s regardin g paternity , however , doe s see m t o posi t legal paternit y o n th e sol e groun d o f biologica l paternit y an d therefor e calls fo r furthe r explanation . Thes e ar e case s i n whic h unwe d biologica l fathers hav e bee n hel d responsibl e fo r supportin g thei r biologica l off spring despit e th e absenc e o f an y socia l relationshi p betwee n th e fathe r and hi s biologica l chil d a s wel l a s th e absenc e o f a continuin g relation ship betwee n th e fathe r an d th e mothe r o f tha t child. 41 Althoug h suc h cases d o mak e declaration s o f lega l paternit y o n th e basi s o f biologica l paternity alone , the y ar e essentiall y decision s tha t th e biologica l fathe r bears a certai n contractual , financial obligatio n —not tha t h e i s o r nee d be a socia l fathe r ( a "real " father) . N o relationshi p with the child i s assumed t o flow fro m th e man' s biologica l paternit y i n thes e suppor t InoI

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers cases. Hi s responsibilit y fo r th e child' s suppor t i s i n essence , eve n i f no t literally, a matte r betwee n th e ma n (a s autonomous , individua l —not a s family member ) an d th e state . The unwe d fathe r case s decide d b y th e Suprem e Cour t di d no t in volve childre n deprive d o f financial support . Thus , i n thes e cases , th e Court tacitl y assumed , an d relie d o n th e assumption , tha t fo r me n biology doe s no t compe l socia l paternity . Fatherhood , unlik e mother hood, i s understood t o b e constructe d socially. 42 Throug h th e mediatio n of woman ("mother") , th e fathe r choose s t o proclaim (an d thu s t o claim ) his "natural " relationshi p t o hi s biologica l child , gainin g th e status , an d therefore th e constitutiona l protection , tha t fo r wome n i s viewed t o ste m directly fro m th e biologica l connectio n an d tha t ha s no t generall y bee n viewed a s a matter o f choice. Michael H. : Th e Limit s o f Choic e This readin g o f Lehr an d th e othe r thre e unwe d fathe r case s tha t pre ceded Lehr become s eve n mor e compellin g i n ligh t o f th e Court' s 198 9 decision i n Michael H . v . Gerald D. 4 3 Michael H. teste d th e principl e apparently enunciate d i n Lehr— that a n unwe d biologica l fathe r create s a libert y interes t i n hi s relationshi p t o his chil d i f he "demonstrate s a ful l commitment t o th e responsibilitie s o f fatherhood" 44 —and foun d tha t principle's limit easily reached i n a case in which th e father demonstrate d a commitmen t t o hi s biologica l child , bu t di d no t establis h a marita l o r marriage-like familia l relationshi p wit h tha t child' s mother . The biologica l fathe r i n Michael H. di d no t establis h a familia l rela tionship wit h th e child' s mothe r becaus e h e legall y coul d not . Th e mother wa s marrie d t o anothe r man . H e di d develo p a relationship wit h his child' s mother , but , i n th e Court' s view , that relationshi p wa s neithe r marital no r th e kin d o f nonmarita l relationshi p tha t resemble s tha t be tween spouses . Th e Cour t describe d a famil y (calle d a "unitar y family" ) to includ e th e marita l famil y an d a "household o f unmarried parent s an d their children. " "Perhaps, " wrot e Justic e Scalia , "th e concep t ca n b e expanded eve n beyon d this , but i t will bea r n o resemblanc e t o tradition ally respecte d relationships—an d wil l thu s ceas e t o hav e an y constitu tional significanc e —if i t i s stretched s o fa r a s to includ e th e relationshi p established betwee n a married woman , he r love r an d thei r child." 45 Justice Scalia' s pluralit y opinio n i n Michael H . seem s inconsisten t

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Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers with th e implication s o f th e Stanley lin e o f case s i f those case s ar e rea d to sa y tha t a biologica l father' s relationshi p wit h hi s chil d wil l deserv e constitutional protectio n i f he effect s a social relationshi p wit h tha t child . In particular , Michael H . seem s inconsisten t wit h th e broa d implication s of Quilloin an d Lehr tha t a putativ e fathe r a t leas t deserve s th e righ t t o develop a social relationshi p wit h hi s biologica l chil d adequat e t o ensur e constitutional protectio n fo r tha t relationship . If , however , Quilloin an d Lehr ar e rea d t o posi t a putativ e father' s relationshi p t o hi s biologica l child t o res t heavily on , an d t o be mediate d by , his relationshi p wit h tha t child's mother, the n Michael H. an d th e earlier cases can b e harmonized . Michael H . differe d fro m th e earlie r case s involving the paterna l right s of unwe d father s becaus e i n Michael H . th e child' s mothe r wa s marrie d to anothe r man . Michael H . als o differe d fro m th e earlie r unwe d fathe r cases i n tha t Michae l wa s mor e directl y oppose d i n hi s claim s t o hi s daughter Victoria' s paternit y b y anothe r fathe r tha n b y a mother . I t ma y be tha t a man' s biologica l ti e t o a chil d carrie s eve n les s weigh t whe n that ti e i s compared t o th e ti e o f another man tha n whe n i t i s compare d to th e ti e o f a woman . A readin g o f Michael H . an d th e othe r unwe d father case s doe s no t provid e enoug h evidenc e fo r a clea r conclusio n o n this point . Carole, th e mother , wa s marrie d t o Geral d whe n sh e conceive d an d bore a daughter , Victoria . Durin g th e perio d o f Victoria' s conception , Carole ha d a relationshi p wit h Michael . Geral d wa s liste d a s Victoria' s father o n th e birt h certificate , bu t bloo d test s late r showe d a 98.07 % probability tha t Michae l wa s th e child' s biologica l father . Michae l an d Carole live d together fo r eleve n month s durin g the child' s infancy . Even tually, Carole , wit h th e child , lef t Michae l i n Californi a an d resettle d with Geral d i n Ne w York . Betwee n thos e tw o periods , Carol e move d back an d fort h betwee n Geral d an d Michae l numerou s times . I n addi tion, sh e move d i n wit h a thir d man , Scott , fo r te n month s i n 1982-83 . During Victoria' s first three an d a half years , Carole an d Victori a move d a doze n time s amon g differen t "family " constellation s (consistin g vari ously o f Victoria , Carole , an d Gerald ; Victori a an d Carole ; Victoria , Carole, Michael an d Carole' s mother ; and Victoria, Carole , and Scott). 46 Michael, however , appeare d t o have effecte d th e kin d o f commitmen t to Victoria referre d t o i n Lehr a s the basi s for a n unwe d father' s righ t to a relationship wit h hi s biologica l child . Withi n eightee n month s o f Victo-

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Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers ria's birt h h e filed a petitio n fo r a declaratio n o f paternity ; h e provide d financial suppor t t o th e child ; an d h e establishe d a parenta l relationshi p with Victoria. The chil d calle d hi m "Daddy. " In 198 4 Michael , an d Victori a throug h a guardia n a d litem , sough t visitation right s fo r Michael . However , Sectio n 62 1 o f th e Californi a Evidence Cod e provide d tha t "th e issu e o f a wif e cohabitin g wit h he r husband, wh o i s not impoten t o r sterile, is conclusively presume d t o be a child o f th e marriage." 47 Fo r a putativ e fathe r th e presumptio n wa s irrebuttable. Th e Californi a Superio r Cour t grante d Gerald' s motio n fo r summary judgmen t o n th e basi s o f affidavit s submitte d b y Carol e an d Gerald tha t indicate d tha t th e tw o ha d live d togethe r durin g th e perio d surrounding Victoria' s conceptio n an d birt h an d tha t Geral d wa s neithe r impotent no r sterile . Th e stat e cour t o f appeal s affirmed , notin g tha t despite Michael' s interes t i n maintainin g a relationshi p wit h Victoria , "the state' s interes t i n preservin g th e integrit y o f th e matrimonia l famil y is s o significan t tha t i t outweigh s mos t othe r interests." 48 Michae l an d Victoria the n appeale d directl y t o the Unite d State s Suprem e Court. 49 The Court , i n a five-to-four opinion , affirme d th e Californi a court' s summary judgmen t fo r Gerald . Justic e Scalia , wh o authore d th e Court' s plurality opinion , decide d tha t Michae l di d no t hav e a constitutionall y protected libert y interes t i n hi s relationshi p wit h Victori a an d conclude d that th e righ t o f putativ e father s t o develo p a relationshi p wit h thei r biological childre n di d no t includ e th e righ t t o rebu t th e marita l pre sumption containe d i n Sectio n 621 . Justice Scali a analyze d Michael' s due proces s clai m a s a substantive , no t a procedural , claim . Th e Cour t read sectio n 62 1 as a substantiv e rul e o f law , phrase d a s a presumption . The pluralit y asserted : "Californi a declare s i t t o be , excep t i n limite d circumstances, irrelevant fo r paternit y purpose s whethe r a chil d con ceived during , an d bor n into , a n existin g marriag e wa s begotte n b y someone othe r tha n th e husban d an d ha d a prio r relationshi p wit h him." 50 The pluralit y rejected Michael' s relianc e o n Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr a s wel l a s hi s readin g o f thos e cases . I n th e plurality' s view , those case s di d no t establis h a libert y interes t o n th e basi s o f "biologica l fatherhood plu s an establishe d parenta l relationship—factor s tha t exis t in the presen t cas e a s well." 51 Rather , a s th e pluralit y viewe d them , th e unwed fathe r case s reste d "upo n th e histori c respect—indeed , sanctit y 11131

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would no t b e to o stron g a term—traditionall y accorde d t o th e relation ships that develop within th e unitar y family." 52 Commentators , a s well as Justice Brennan' s dissen t i n Michael H. , too k umbrag e wit h Justic e Scalia's interpretatio n o f th e earlie r unwe d fathe r cases. 53 And , indeed , the expres s languag e i n thos e case s conflict s wit h th e Court' s revie w i n Michael H. , a s Justic e Brenna n pointe d out . However , Justic e Scalia' s interpretation o f the earlie r case s merel y articulate s th e implici t messag e that run s beneath , an d explains , the opinion s i n those cases . The wa y the fathers i n thos e earlie r case s wer e treate d depended , a s Justic e Scali a noted, o n thei r rol e i n a "unitar y family " ( a famil y includin g th e chil d and hi s o r he r mother) . Th e explici t languag e o f th e earlie r case s faile d to explai n th e assumptio n behin d th e law . A s Justic e Whit e recalle d i n Michael H. , th e Cour t had sai d i n Lehr tha t a n unwe d fathe r receive s due proces s protectio n whe n h e "demonstrate s a full commitmen t t o th e responsibilities o f parenthoo d b y 'com[ing ] forwar d t o participat e i n th e rearing o f his child/ " 5 4 However , the explanatio n offered , an d quote d b y Justice Brennan , i s a second-leve l explanation . Th e basi c explanation — the on e tha t explain s whe n th e Court , i n fact , identifie d a fathe r i n th e unwed fathe r case s as effecting th e requisit e commitment—depende d o n the father' s relatio n t o th e mothe r or , a s Justic e Scali a pu t it , o n th e father's relationship s withi n a "unitary family." 55 Thus, th e pluralit y i n Michael H. distinguishe d th e earlie r case s b y interpreting thos e case s t o protec t th e right s o f a father withi n a "unitar y family." I n th e plurality' s view , Michae l an d Victori a di d no t belon g t o such a famil y unit , an d thu s Michael' s particula r relatio n t o Victori a became irrelevant . Justic e Scalia' s opinio n declare d a biologica l father' s constitutional righ t t o a relationshi p wit h hi s chil d t o res t firmly o n hi s involvement i n a family unit . The pluralit y rejected th e possibility, almos t without exploration , tha t a n unwe d fathe r an d hi s biologica l chil d coul d form a family uni t i n th e absenc e o f an appropriat e relationshi p betwee n the unwe d fathe r an d th e child' s mother ; th e opinio n refuse d t o includ e within "traditional, " an d thu s protected , famil y unit s th e "relationshi p established betwee n a married woman , he r love r and thei r child. " A crucial aspec t o f th e Michael H. decisio n wa s th e Court' s delimita tion o f wha t relationship s wil l b e considere d th e buildin g block s o f a "unitary family " (als o calle d "traditiona l families" ) an d wil l thu s deserv e constitutional protection . Th e pluralit y wrote :

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Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers The family unit accorded traditional respec t in our society, which we have referred t o a s th e "unitar y family, " i s typified , o f course , b y th e marita l family, bu t als o include s th e househol d o f unmarrie d parent s an d thei r children. Perhap s th e concep t ca n b e expande d beyon d this , bu t i t will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships. 56 Justice Brenna n referre d t o th e plurality' s depictio n o f a "unitar y family " as a "pinche d conception " an d sai d i t wa s "jarrin g i n ligh t o f ou r man y cases preventin g th e State s fro m denyin g importan t interest s o r statuse s to thos e whos e situation s d o no t fit th e government' s narro w vie w o f th e family" 57 In any event, on th e basis of its understanding o f "family," the pluralit y denied protectio n t o Michael' s relationshi p wit h Victoria , howeve r dea r that relationship . Th e stat e wa s no t require d t o conside r th e intensit y o r duration o f tha t relationshi p i n thi s case , on e i n whic h th e biologica l mother's marriag e t o anothe r ma n definitivel y preclude d th e biologica l father fro m establishin g th e sor t o f relationshi p with the mother tha t would provid e constitutiona l protectio n fo r hi s relationshi p wit h hi s biological daughter. 58 The implication s o f the assumption s behin d thi s decisio n ar e o f grea t moment fo r understandin g th e law' s vie w o f paternity . Th e opinio n asserted tha t father s i n certai n families , bu t no t others , deserv e constitu tional protection . Th e implication s o f Justic e Scalia' s opinio n ar e espe cially suggestiv e becaus e h e state d explicitl y tha t father s becom e father s by forming prope r "traditional " families, that the decision tha t a particula r father i s part of such a family i s unrelated t o notions o f "biological" truth , and finally, tha t a man' s biologica l relatio n t o a chil d (a s i n th e cas e o f an "adulterou s natura l father, " a s th e Cour t labelle d Michae l H. ) ma y actually imperi l th e man' s relianc e o n constitutiona l protectio n i n as serting legal paternity . The implication s o f Justice Scalia' s opinion i n Michael H. ar e dramati cally illustrate d b y the tw o distinct , eve n opposing , meaning s tha t under lie his us e o f the ter m "nature " (o r "natural" ) i n th e opinion . Invocation s of nature ar e ofte n suggestive . The divergen t meaning s o f "nature" repre sent a genera l parado x i n Wester n culture. 59 O n th e on e hand , tha t which i s natural i s good, moral , an d inevitable . Nature , a s i n th e phras e "mother nature, " direct s an d protect s a n inexorabl e realit y wit h whic h people to y onl y a t thei r peril . O n th e othe r hand , natur e i s inferio r t o n

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Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers culture. Natur e represent s brut e emotio n an d untrammele d instinc t which mus t b e channele d an d containe d fo r peopl e t o liv e togethe r i n society. The first use of "nature" is found i n Justice Scalia' s claim that "Califor nia law , like nature itself, makes n o provisio n fo r dua l fatherhood." 60 I n referring t o "natur e itself " Justice Scali a asserte d tha t natur e dictate s tha t children hav e on e father , no t two , an d tha t Michael , b y claimin g t o b e Victoria's father , defie d tha t natural , an d thus , prope r pattern . I n fact , o f course, Michael' s clai m wa s tha t he wa s Victoria' s natura l father . H e argued tha t a s a resul t o f that truth , hi s paternit y deserve d socia l an d legal recognition . Moreover , th e ver y statute tha t Justic e Scalia' s opinio n fervently uphel d define d a child's fathe r t o be th e husban d o f that child' s mother's even i n case s i n whic h th e mother' s husban d wa s no t th e biological (genetic ) father . Thus , i n effect , Justic e Scalia , a t leas t b y implication, argue d tha t a child' s stepfathe r i s a mor e "natural " fathe r than th e child' s genitor . Later, Justic e Scali a invoke d "nature's " role , agai n suggestively , whe n he referre d t o Michael a s the "adulterou s natura l father." 61 Now , the very "naturalness" o f Michael's fatherhoo d seem s t o justif y th e state' s decisio n to ignor e hi s biological paternity . Here , the descriptio n "natural " justifie s the deprivation , rathe r tha n th e extension , o f right s becaus e th e ter m now implie s disorde r an d contrast s wit h socia l control , morality , an d justice. Th e opinio n almos t suggest s tha t Michael' s claim , base d o n biological paternity , withere d befor e th e nee d t o punish hi m fo r interfer ing wit h wha t shoul d hav e bee n anothe r man' s paternity , fo r hi s rol e a s "an adulterous , natura l father. " Justic e Scali a wrot e further : We hav e foun d nothin g i n th e olde r sources , no r i n th e olde r cases , addressing specificall y th e powe r o f th e natura l fathe r t o asser t parenta l rights ove r a chil d bor n int o a woman' s existin g marriag e wit h anothe r man. .. . [T]he evidenc e shows that even i n moder n times—when , a s we have noted, the rigid protection o f the marital family has in other respects been relaxed—th e abilit y o f a perso n i n Michael' s positio n t o clai m paternity has not been generally acknowledged. 62 In thi s sens e o f th e ter m "natural, " peopl e ar e cultured . Animal s ar e natural. Fo r fathers, fo r who m parenthoo d appear s t o be, at least i n larg e part, a matte r o f choice, th e "natural " facts ge t n o lega l recognitio n unti l garbed wit h socia l form .

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Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers In short , Justic e Scali a applaude d th e preservatio n o f "natural " pat terns, as evidenced b y "California law. " Yet he sustaine d th e law's obliteration o f Michael' s paternity , th e paternit y o f th e ma n h e calle d Victoria' s "natural father " an d justifie d tha t ac t because th e father' s paternit y wa s merely "natural. " And herei n lie s the mora l o f the tale . A "natural" father's paternit y ca n be ignore d precisel y becaus e father s (men ) ar e no t encompasse d b y thei r biological selves . O n th e whol e father s represen t cultur e an d history , a s opposed t o wome n (an d mothers) , wh o stan d fo r nature . Fo r men , th e predominant aspec t o f parenthoo d must , therefore , ste m from , an d b e predicated upon , culture , no t nature . Thus, onl y when th e tw o meaning s of "natural" come together , i s the "natura l father " th e father . Thi s occurs , of course, when th e biologica l fathe r effect s hi s fatherhood i n th e contex t of a moral an d prope r (read , "natural, " i n it s other sense ) family . The centra l differenc e betwee n Michael H . an d th e earlie r unwe d father case s i s not, a s commentator s hav e suggested, 63 tha t i n th e earlie r cases biologica l father s achieve d th e righ t t o lega l paternit y b y effectin g social relationship s wit h thei r childre n whil e Michael H . require d some thing more . Rather , Michael H. an d th e earlie r case s alik e extende d constitutional protectio n t o a biological father' s lega l paternit y i f the ma n established a "family, " a home , wit h th e chil d an d tha t child' s mother . This assertio n i s based o n a readin g o f the fou r case s a s a whole . Withi n any on e opinio n i n an y on e o f the cases , i t is possible t o find suppor t fo r popular interpretation s o f th e cases . Fo r instance , Justic e White , dis senting i n Lehr v . Robertson an d joine d b y Justice s Blackmu n an d Mar shall, wa s mor e read y t o protec t Lehr' s paternit y o n th e basi s o f a n independent relationshi p betwee n Leh r an d hi s biologica l chil d tha t di d not includ e th e child' s mother . O f course , i n Lehr i t wa s possibl e t o assume, o n th e basi s o f the give n facts , tha t Leh r would have establishe d a relationshi p wit h hi s chil d an d eve n perhap s wit h tha t child' s mother , had th e mothe r bee n willing . However , i t i s importan t t o recogniz e tha t Justice White expressl y predicated hi s readiness to protect Lehr's paternit y on th e fac t o f a biologica l relationshi p betwee n Leh r an d th e child . Justice Whit e wrote : "Th e 'biologica l connection ' i s itsel f a relationshi p that create s a protecte d interest . Thu s th e 'nature ' o f th e interes t i s the parent-chil d relationship ; ho w wel l develope d tha t relationshi p ha s become goe s to its 'weight,' no t it s 'nature.' " 6 4 The positio n tha t biologica l paternit y deserve s protectio n i n case s i n

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which th e fathe r establishe s a hom e wit h th e chil d an d tha t child' s mother wa s explici t i n Michael H . an d wa s implici t i n th e earlie r cases . The differenc e betwee n Michael H. an d th e othe r case s lie s elsewhere . The differenc e stem s fro m th e narrownes s wit h whic h th e concep t "family" wa s define d i n Michael H . a s compared wit h th e earlie r unwe d father cases . If , a s Justice Brenna n pleade d i n hi s dissen t i n Michael H. , Michael, Carole , an d Victori a compose d a family , then Michae l wa s a socia l father , whos e fatherhoo d deserve d protection . If , however , a s Justice Scali a argued , th e famil y i s to be define d mor e narrowly , in , as h e framed it , "traditional " terms , the n Michae l wa s no t par t o f a famil y involving himself, hi s child , an d th e child' s mother . Fo r that reason , an d for n o other , Michae l faile d t o adequatel y effec t hi s socia l fatherhood . By definition, tha t option—th e optio n o f forming a "unitar y family " wit h his biologica l chil d an d tha t child' s mother—wa s no t availabl e t o Michael H . In fact, the fathers whos e paternal right s received constitutiona l protec tion i n th e first fou r unwe d fathe r case s di d fit int o Justic e Scalia' s definition i n Michael H. o f a "unitar y family. " However , Michael H. , unlike th e earlie r cases , mad e i t abundantly clea r tha t th e limit s o f wha t could constitut e a "family " fro m a constitutiona l perspectiv e woul d b e strictly defined an d uncompromisingl y applied . In sum , th e unwe d fathe r cases , fro m Stanley throug h Michael H. , delineate thre e factor s tha t mak e a n unwe d ma n a father . Thes e ar e th e man's biologica l relatio n t o the child ; hi s social relatio n t o the child ; an d his relatio n t o th e child' s mother . Stanley throug h Lehr see m t o suggest , and hav e certainl y bee n rea d t o say, that a man ca n effec t a legal relatio n to hi s biologica l chil d b y establishin g a relationshi p wit h tha t child . However, th e fact s o f thos e case s beli e th e clai m tha t tha t i s a ful l interpretation. Michael H. , whic h ha s bee n rea d t o conflic t wit h th e earlier decisions , i n fac t suggest s a n elaboratio n o f th e messag e implici t in Stanley throug h Lehr, take n a s a group . I n thi s regard , Michael H. clarifies th e earlie r cases . A biological fathe r doe s protec t hi s paternity b y developing a social relationshi p wit h hi s child, but thi s step demands th e creation o f a family, a step itsel f depending upo n a n appropriat e relation ship between th e ma n an d hi s child's mother. 65 The ambiguit y o f th e Court' s respons e t o th e unwe d fathe r case s i s predicated o n rea l ambivalence . Th e case s acknowledge d an d approve d | 11 8

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers a chang e tha t carrie s importan t implication s fo r th e scop e an d for m of th e famil y an d the n quickl y (thoug h quietly ) retreated . Th e Cour t proclaimed tha t unwe d father s ma y becom e lega l father s b y establishin g relationships wit h thei r biologica l childre n an d the n hedge d tha t procla mation, thoug h neithe r directl y no r certainly , b y tacitl y restrictin g th e context i n which a father coul d demonstrat e th e existenc e o f the requisit e relationship wit h hi s biologica l childre n t o on e includin g th e children' s mother—to on e define d traditionall y a s "family." Me n ar e stil l viewe d a s less restricted i n thei r commitmen t t o parenthood b y biological processe s than women , an d fo r men , a s fo r women , famil y relationship s ar e pre sumed t o b e significantl y differen t fro m marke t relationships . A ma n may, indee d must , choose his paternit y i n orde r t o guarante e it s legality , but h e mus t embe d tha t choic e i n certai n (familial ) form s an d processes . The relationshi p betwee n a fathe r an d a chil d canno t b e effecte d lik e any relationshi p betwee n tw o autonomou s individuals , fre e t o com e an d go a s the y agree . A ma n become s a fathe r b y relatin g t o hi s chil d in the context of family. Tha t contex t i s prototypically 66 create d b y th e development o f a spousa l o r spouse-lik e relationshi p betwee n a fathe r and hi s child' s mother . Thus, i n th e end , th e fathe r is required t o effec t hi s relationshi p wit h his biologica l childre n throug h act s i n th e worl d i n orde r t o protec t hi s paternal relationshi p unde r th e law . However , no t an y act s wil l do . Th e acts tha t mak e a biologica l fathe r a social , an d thu s a legal , fathe r ar e familial acts , acts that socialize th e "natural " facts b y inserting themselve s in, an d thu s definin g themselve s through , a certai n orderin g o f th e relationship betwee n th e fathe r an d hi s child' s mother . I n tha t way , th e preservation o f traditional famil y form s i s supported . II. Wha t Make s a Mothe r a "Mother" ? At leas t sinc e th e nineteent h century , claim s t o maternity , unlik e claim s to paternity , hav e bee n recognize d a s predicate d o n biology . Tha t belie f supported th e "cul t o f motherhood " a s i t develope d durin g th e nine teenth centur y an d a s i t was elaborate d furthe r i n th e middl e decade s o f the nex t century . I n th e word s o f th e Englis h anthropologis t Marily n Strathern: "Betwee n mothe r an d father , th e mothe r i s recognized ; th e father, b y contrast , i s constructed. " Strather n mean s tha t i n traditiona l I "9I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers European-American thinkin g a mother's identit y i s understood a s a natu ral fac t whil e a father's identity , itsel f a produc t o f his relationshi p t o th e mother, i s understood a s a social fact. 67 In part , thi s differenc e i n understanding s o f maternit y an d paternit y can b e attribute d t o th e comparativ e certaint y wit h whic h biologica l maternity, unlik e biologica l paternity , coul d b e presumed . However , tha t is an aspect , mor e tha n a n explanation , o f presumed difference s betwee n maternity an d paternity . Th e inexorabilit y o f th e connectio n tha t linke d mothers t o their childre n gav e women fewe r choice s tha n men . Mothers , unlike fathers , wer e understood , i n th e nature o f thei r maternity , a s bonded t o their childre n an d thei r homes . In thi s sense , recognitio n o f th e biologica l ti e betwee n a woma n an d her chil d a s the essenc e o f maternit y furthere d th e preservatio n o f tradi tional famil y forms . Father s chos e fatherhood . Wome n were mothers , a fact presume d t o hav e bee n a t onc e demonstrate d an d effecte d b y th e simultaneity o f biological an d socia l motherhood . Thi s notio n o f mother s and motherhoo d ha s bee n absolutel y essentia l t o society' s understandin g of family fo r almos t tw o centuries . Now, society faces a number o f challenges t o deeply embedded under standings o f "mother." Centra l amon g thes e challenge s i s the generaliza tion o f a n ideolog y o f autonomou s individualit y int o th e home , a n ideology which grant s ne w option s t o women, increasingl y understoo d a t least sometimes an d a t least i n theor y a s equal t o men. Th e contractuali zation o f maternit y represente d b y surrogac y arrangement s provide s a n especially stark , an d therefor e especiall y troubling , instanc e o f th e ero sion o f romanti c image s o f woma n an d mothe r first constructe d a t th e start o f the Industria l Revolution . Tha t wome n ma y negotiat e th e condi tions o f thei r biologica l maternit y befor e becomin g pregnant , an d tha t they ma y furthe r choose to undertak e biologica l maternit y withou t desir ing o r presumin g tha t socia l maternit y wil l follow , completel y disrupt s traditional understanding s o f motherhood . I n particular , th e possibilit y that wome n ca n negotiat e th e socia l consequence s o f biologica l mater nity and tha t social motherhoo d ca n follo w fro m bargaine d arrangement s and financial exchange s a s wel l a s fro m th e inevitabilit y o f biologica l reproduction suggest s a ne w kin d o f mother . However , i n respondin g to case s occasione d b y surrogacy , courts , eve n whil e recognizin g th e contractualization o f motherhood , hav e largel y trie d t o preserv e tradi tional understanding s o f mothe r an d o f family . Tha t become s increas 120 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers ingly difficult , an d so , i n case s suc h a s Baby M. , a s wel l a s i n case s o f gestational surrogacy , involvin g th e separatio n o f gestational an d geneti c maternity, courts , ofte n implicitl y an d sometime s unwittingly , ar e rede fining th e meanin g o f mother . This proces s o f reconstructin g motherhoo d ha s bee n accelerate d b y the adven t o f reproductiv e technolog y which , mor e an d more , enable s people t o contro l th e processe s o f huma n reproduction . However , th e challenge no w presente d t o traditiona l understanding s o f motherhoo d cannot b e attribute d completely , o r eve n primarily , t o technologica l advances. Tha t become s clea r i n ligh t o f th e majo r disruptio n tha t traditional surrogac y present s t o establishe d understanding s o f mother hood an d o f family . Certainly , a s th e discussio n i n chapte r 5 indicates , the possibilit y o f separating biologica l maternit y int o discret e aspect s tha t can b e distribute d amon g differen t women , a s well a s other alteration s i n the proces s o f huma n reproductio n becomin g possibl e throug h technol ogy assistance, compe l societ y an d th e la w t o reconside r th e meanin g o f motherhood. However , th e change s ar e broade r an d mor e fundamenta l than thos e occasione d b y th e us e o f ne w technologies . Th e reexamina tion o f motherhoo d i n case s suc h a s Baby M . an d i n other s involvin g gestational surrogacy , i s bein g directe d by , an d against , a n emergin g understanding o f family that supersedes that forged durin g the nineteent h century an d elaborate d i n subsequen t years . In thes e cases , mothers ar e bein g compare d wit h othe r kind s o f moth ers, an d the y ar e bein g compare d wit h fathers . Thus , th e case s occa sioned b y surrogacy arrangements, comment , thoug h generall y obliquely , on th e understandin g o f fatherhoo d suggeste d b y th e case s abou t th e paternal right s o f unwed fathers . From th e unwe d fathe r cases , on e woul d expec t tha t a biologica l mother wh o entered , an d the n regrette d entering , int o a surrogac y agreement woul d brin g mor e powerfu l argument s t o a n adversaria l pro ceeding a t whic h th e baby' s parentag e wa s i n disput e tha n woul d th e contracting an d geneti c father . Thi s woul d see m t o b e th e cas e fo r bot h surrogates suc h a s Mar y Bet h Whitehea d an d fo r surrogate s lackin g a genetic connectio n wit h th e child . Moreover , on e woul d conclude , a t least o n th e basi s o f Justic e Stewart' s dissentin g languag e i n Caban, quoted favorabl y i n Justic e Steven' s majorit y opinio n i n Lehr, 6S that , everything els e bein g equal , gestationa l mother s woul d b e preferre d t o genetic mothers . Discountin g th e importanc e o f biological paternit y pe r 11211

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers se, Justice Stewar t recognize d th e gestationa l lin k betwee n a woman an d a chil d t o constitut e th e foundatio n fo r a n "enduring " relationshi p (fo r a mothering relationship) . "Th e mother, " wrot e Justic e Stewart , "carrie s and bear s the child , and i n this sense her parental relationshi p i s clear." 69 Thus, th e unwe d fathe r opinion s asser t clearl y tha t genetic s (biologica l paternity) play s a limited rol e i n makin g a ma n a father ; the y suggest , b y implication, tha t genetic s play s a similarl y limite d rol e i n makin g a woman a mother. Bu t these case s say that for wome n ther e i s a biologica l basis fo r th e constructio n o f motherhood—th e relationshi p forme d be tween a woman an d th e bab y she gestate s an d bears . Thus, th e unwe d fathe r case s woul d see m t o suppor t th e claim s o f a surrogate seeking recognition o f her maternity i n opposition t o the biolog ical father , a s wel l a s th e claim s o f a gestationa l surrogate , seekin g recognition o f her maternit y i n oppositio n t o the claim s o f the biologica l father and/o r th e geneti c mother . Yet , th e surrogac y case s d o no t reflec t this pattern . Rather , court s i n bot h traditiona l an d gestationa l surrogac y cases have bee n read y t o negat e absolutely , o r t o minimiz e seriously , th e significance o f the biologica l base s o f a surrogate's claim s t o lega l mater nity. Baby M. , alon g with a gestational surrogac y cas e decided i n Califor nia i n th e earl y 1990s, Johnson v. Calvert, illustrat e th e law' s response. In Baby M. , a s describe d i n chapte r 3 , bot h Ne w Jerse y court s tha t heard th e cas e initiall y recognize d Willia m Ster n a s the baby' s father an d Mary Bet h Whitehea d a s he r mother . Eve n th e tria l court , whic h con cluded b y terminating Whitehead' s materna l rights , appeared a t the star t to presum e tha t o n biologica l ground s th e claim s o f Whitehea d an d o f Stern argue d fo r eac h one' s parentag e o f Bab y M . Th e cour t bega n b y stating: Justice, our desired objective , to the child and the mother, to the child and the father, cannot b e obtaine d fo r bot h parents . Th e cour t wil l see k t o achieve justic e fo r th e child . Thi s court' s fac t finding and applicatio n o f relevant law must mitigate against the heartfelt desire s of one or the other of the natural parents.70 Accordingly, th e cour t examine d th e child' s bes t interests . However , i n that examination , th e cour t returne d agai n an d agai n t o th e "natural " bases o f Whitehead's maternit y wit h th e apparent , thoug h unstated , pur pose o f reducing it s significance . Although th e cour t coul d not , an d di d not , find tha t Whitehea d wa s ,22 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers an unfi t mother , i t di d questio n he r fitness t o b e a mothe r to this child. In a clever , thoug h possibl y uncalculated , move , th e tria l cour t predi cated it s concern s abou t Whitehead' s fitness t o b e a mothe r t o Bab y M . on th e ver y motherliness o f her maternity . Th e cour t wrote : Mrs. Whitehead ha s been foun d to o enmeshed wit h thi s infant chil d an d unable t o separat e he r ow n need s fro m thos e o f th e child . Sh e tend s t o smother the child with her presence even to the exclusion of access by her other two children. Sh e does not have the ability to subordinate hersel f to the need s o f this child . Th e cour t i s satisfied tha t . . . Mrs. Whitehead i s manipulative, impulsive and exploitive [sic]. 71 The cour t als o wrote : "[Whitehead ] exhibit s a n emotiona l overinvest ment. I t wa s argue d b y defendant' s counse l tha t Mrs . Whitehea d ha d loved he r childre n to o much . Thi s i s no t necessaril y a strength . To o much lov e ca n smothe r a child' s independence . Eve n a n infan t need s her ow n space." 72 Whitehead, a s the cour t viewe d her , ha d becom e to o muc h a mother . To the extent that her claim t o legal motherhoo d reste d o n the invocatio n of he r "natural " maternity , th e cour t viewe d tha t maternity , i n he r case , to have ru n amok . Sh e smothere d th e chil d an d faile d t o separate hersel f reasonably fro m it . Sh e ha d com e t o lov e th e chil d to o much . He r natural motherin g instincts , perhaps du e t o her effor t t o reclaim th e chil d she ha d earlie r chose n t o giv e t o others , develope d uncontrolled . He r exaggerated maternit y ha d becom e a parody o f motherhood. A s depicte d by th e court , Whitehead , selfis h fro m th e start , ha d obstructe d he r ow n maternity b y agreein g t o bargai n i t away . Whitehea d ha d presume d t o choose wha t n o "real " mothe r woul d dar e select . Sh e chos e t o abdicat e maternity. Th e cour t wrote : "Mrs . Whitehea d wa s anxiou s t o contract . . . . She kne w jus t wha t sh e wa s bargainin g for . Thi s cour t finds tha t sh e has change d he r mind , renege d o n he r promis e an d no w seek s t o avoi d her obligations." 73 Whe n late r sh e "change d he r mind, " sh e wa s unabl e to resum e a norma l motherin g role . He r materna l instinct s ha d becom e exaggerated an d deformed . In thi s way , th e socia l forc e o f Whitehead' s biologica l maternit y an d in particular , o f he r gestationa l role , wa s dispelled . Neve r denyin g th e importance o f gestatio n a s a symbo l an d a s a guaranto r o f socia l mater nity, th e cour t define d Whitehea d a s an exception . Mor e specifically , b y entering int o a contractual arrangemen t aime d a t determining he r child' s 11231

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers parentage, Whitehea d wa s understoo d a s a n antagonis t o f tradition , an d in particula r o f traditiona l conception s o f famil y whic h depen d o n th e separation o f home an d work—o f lov e and money . Against Whitehead' s uncontrolled , strangulatin g motherhood , th e court balance d Stern' s prope r home , prope r job , and prope r wife . I n thi s context, th e cour t stresse d th e importanc e o f Stern' s biologica l role . Unlike Whitehead , Ster n behave d a s a fathe r should , an d thereb y strengthened th e social impac t o f his biological paternity . Here , a component o f biologica l paternit y no t stresse d i n th e unwe d fathe r case s emerges. That componen t consist s of the ownershi p right s of a biologica l father t o hi s chil d i n case s i n whic h th e fathe r is deeme d par t o f a traditional family . Th e court , concludin g tha t Ster n ha d no t pai d Whitehead for the baby, justifie d tha t conclusio n b y assertin g tha t i n such case s "the father doe s not purchase th e child . I t is his own biologica l genetically relate d child . He cannot purchase what is already his" 74 The geneti c lin k mad e th e bab y Mr . Stern's . I t di d no t automaticall y make hi m a socia l father . Ha d Ster n bee n onl y a biological , an d no t a social, father , th e ownershi p componen t o f Stern' s paternit y coul d hav e created obligations , bu t no t rights . Bu t Stern' s socia l fatherhoo d wa s confirmed fo r th e cour t b y hi s relationshi p wit h Elizabet h Ster n an d b y their join t appearance , i n th e court' s view , a s a n old-fashione d coupl e anxious to be parents . Fo r the tria l court , th e tw o factors—Stern's geneti c connection t o th e chil d an d th e characte r o f hi s familia l role—togethe r made th e decisio n irresistible : William Ster n an d hi s wife wer e t o be th e child's onl y parents . Elizabet h Stern , wh o becam e a mothe r through he r husband, wa s t o replac e th e mothe r whos e socia l maternit y ha d bee n thwarted eve n befor e he r biologica l maternit y commenced . Stern, lik e Whitehead , ha d entere d int o a contrac t tha t involve d th e purchase o f his biological child , but unlike Whitehead h e did not thereb y hinder hi s ow n parenthood . Withi n traditiona l understanding s o f family , mothers, representin g nature , home , an d family , canno t negotiat e th e terms o f their maternit y throug h th e us e o f marke t forms . Father s appar ently can . Thus, a s th e tria l cour t arrange d th e pieces , th e assumption s behin d Baby M. harmonize d i n larg e par t wit h thos e behin d th e unwe d fathe r cases. Stern' s biologica l paternit y assume d importance—eve n impor tance superio r t o that o f the biologica l mother— because h e ha d effecte d a prope r relationshi p wit h th e woma n wh o woul d b e th e baby' s mother . I 12 4 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers That woman' s maternit y coul d substitut e fo r th e maternit y o f the biologi cal mothe r whos e untoward , exaggerate d maternit y deserve d onl y eviscer ation. As a result, th e Ster n famil y woul d surviv e a s an instanc e o f what a family ough t t o be . Th e onl y stumblin g block , Whitehead' s biologica l maternity, wa s bypasse d b y recognizin g tha t sh e hersel f dissolve d tha t maternity throug h he r initia l choic e t o ente r int o a contract . B y tha t choice, th e surrogac y contract , unlik e othe r sort s o f contracts , became , in effect , unbreachable . B y enterin g int o th e contract , Whitehea d s o completely oppose d nature' s desig n tha t sh e destroye d th e usua l socia l consequences o f biological maternity . An obviou s contradictio n endures , however , betwee n th e court' s treat ment o f William , an d b y implicatio n o f Elizabeth , Ster n a s contrac t partners an d it s treatmen t o f Whitehead . Th e tria l court' s decisio n rest s on it s recognitio n tha t familie s ca n b e successfull y create d throug h mar ket interactions . Thus , th e decisio n thoug h ostensibl y sidin g full y wit h tradition, disrupt s traditio n thoroughly . The stat e supreme court' s decision, which restore d Whitehead's mater nity but lef t custod y wit h Willia m Stern , contain s assumption s simila r t o those of the trial court with regar d t o the effects o n Whitehead's maternit y of he r havin g entere d int o th e surrogac y contract . Rathe r tha n viewin g the "natural " parent s a s analogou s t o thos e i n th e unwe d fathe r cases — in whic h event , Whitehead' s clai m t o maternit y migh t hav e predomi nated ove r Stern' s clai m t o paternity—th e cour t viewe d th e tw o a s i t would a divorcing coupl e battlin g fo r th e custod y o f their child . For th e Ne w Jerse y Suprem e Cour t a s (mor e strongly ) fo r th e tria l court, Whitehead's "natural " ties to her chil d wer e marre d an d weakene d by her willingness , a s the court s sa w it, to redefin e the m a s commodities . By entering int o a contrac t fo r "th e sal e o f a child , or , a t th e ver y least , the sal e o f [her ] righ t t o he r child, " sh e forfeite d th e protectio n normall y afforded a biological mother . Sh e agreed t o interrupt he r "natural " mater nity, an d tha t interruptio n persuade d th e stat e suprem e cour t t o depriv e Whitehead o f her child' s custody . This decisio n wa s less radical tha n tha t of the tria l court , largel y becaus e th e suprem e cour t refuse d t o recogniz e the surrogac y contrac t entere d int o amon g th e partie s an d thereb y deter mined custody , bu t no t parentage . Eve n so , the suprem e cour t rea d th e "facts" t o downgrad e th e significanc e o f Whitehead' s biologica l mater nity. Each Ne w Jerse y cour t bega n it s inquir y wit h th e assumptio n tha t I "5 |

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers

Whitehead wa s th e baby' s mother . Eac h deprive d he r o f he r maternity , in ful l o r i n part . I n doin g that , neithe r cour t renounce d th e mode l presented i n th e unwe d fathe r case s whereb y motherhood , thoug h no t fatherhood, i s a n aspec t an d a continuatio n o f biologica l processes . In stead, eac h cour t define d Whitehea d a s a n exception . B y presumin g t o define he r chil d i n th e term s o f th e market , rathe r tha n o f th e family , Whitehead obstructe d he r ow n maternity . I n th e eye s o f th e tria l cour t that act was total. Whitehead's maternit y was eradicated absolutel y b y her willingness to define he r chil d a s a commodity and b y her later, hysterica l attempt t o compensat e fo r th e origina l agreement . I n th e eye s o f th e state suprem e court , Whitehead' s maternity , thoug h intact , ha d bee n deformed b y th e consequence s o f he r agreemen t t o sel l he r child . Nei ther opinio n denie d th e presumptio n underlyin g th e unwe d fathe r cases , that biologica l maternity , especiall y i n it s gestationa l aspect , symbolize s and constitute s motherhood . Rather , bot h courts , thoug h i n somewha t different ways , characterize d Whitehea d a s a n exampl e o f natur e gon e askew. Thus eac h opinio n defende d traditio n an d a t th e sam e tim e eac h opinion rewarde d a n attachmen t t o modernit y tha t permitte d th e Stern s to enter int o a contract fo r a child . Johnson v. Calvert, a case simila r t o Baby M . excep t tha t th e surrogat e had n o geneti c lin k t o th e child , brough t a ne w consideratio n int o play and require d a n elaboration , an d ultimatel y a transformation , o f th e assumptions underlyin g traditiona l understanding s o f mother . Now , fo r the first tim e i n a litigate d case , ther e wer e tw o wome n whos e claim s t o motherhood coul d b e grounde d o n biologica l link s to the child . In thi s cas e al l thre e partie s predicate d thei r parenthoo d o n a biologi cal connectio n t o on e baby . Crispin a an d Mar k Calvert , marrie d fo r several years , wanted t o have a baby. Although a hysterectomy ha d mad e it impossible fo r Crispina t o gestate a fetus, the surger y had no t interfere d with he r body' s productio n o f ova . Ann a Johnson , a vocationa l nurs e a t the hospita l wher e Crispin a worke d a s a registere d nurse , volunteered t o serve as a gestational surrogat e fo r th e Calverts . At the time , Johnson wa s the singl e paren t o f a youn g daughter. 75 Th e Calvert s an d Johnso n agreed tha t Anna Johnso n woul d gestat e an d bea r a baby produce d fro m Crispina Calvert' s ovum and fertilize d i n vitro with Mar k Calvert's sperm . Johnson agree d tha t at the baby' s birth sh e would relinquis h "al l parenta l rights" t o Mar k an d Crispina . I n return , th e Calvert s agree d t o pa y 11261

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers Johnson $10,00 0 i n a serie s o f installment s an d t o pa y fo r a $100,00 0 lif e insurance polic y o n Johnson' s life . In Januar y 1990 , an embry o produce d fro m th e Calverts ' gamete s wa s implanted i n Johnson's uterus . Johnson's pregnanc y wa s soon confirmed . In July , durin g th e sevent h mont h o f her pregnancy , Johnso n sough t th e balance o f th e payment s du e he r fro m th e Calverts , eve n thoug h unde r the contract , th e payment s wer e no t all due. I n fact , th e las t payment wa s not du e unti l si x weeks after th e birt h o f the child . Johnso n threatene d t o keep th e bab y i f th e mone y wa s no t forthcoming . I n response , th e Calverts sued , seekin g a declaration o f their parenta l rights . The lega l decision s i n thi s case , fa r mor e dramaticall y tha n thos e i n Baby M. , revea l a basic disruptio n i n understanding s o f familial relation ships, an d o f motherhood , i n particular , a s th e societ y attempt s t o mak e sense o f new form s o f biological reproductio n mad e possibl e b y technol ogy. Thre e Californi a court s reache d decision s i n Johnson. Al l hel d for th e Calverts , bu t th e thre e decision s represen t remarkabl y differen t responses to , and interpretation s of , gestationa l surrogacy . The tria l court , characterizing Ann a Johnso n a s a "gestationa l carrier, " bu t a "geneti c hereditary stranger " to the child , identifie d th e "famil y unit " by referenc e to the "shared genes " among the baby, Crispina, and Mark . The appellat e court affirmed , relyin g o n stat e statute s tha t regulate d th e law' s recogni tion o f th e parent-chil d relationship . Thus , th e appellat e cour t recog nized Crispin a Calver t a s th e baby' s natura l mothe r becaus e bloo d test s identified geneti c similaritie s betwee n he r an d th e bab y bu t no t betwee n the bab y an d Johnson . However , unlik e th e tria l court , th e appellat e court explicitl y acknowledge d th e existenc e o f other rationa l scheme s fo r identifying a baby's mothe r i n suc h cases . Finally, the stat e suprem e cour t expressl y recognize d th e disruptio n t o familiar biologica l assumption s abou t huma n reproductio n an d huma n kinship presente d b y gestationa l surrogacy . Tha t disruptio n no t onl y made i t impossible t o continue relyin g on suc h truth s i n determinin g th e parentage o f childre n bor n t o gestationa l surrogate s bu t mad e statutor y schemes, promulgate d i n ligh t o f suc h assumptions , largel y irrelevan t t o the resolutio n o f suc h cases . I n consequence , th e suprem e cour t side stepped aroun d familia r biologica l truth s an d establishe d statutor y defi nitions i n determinin g th e parentag e o f Christopher , th e bab y involve d in th e case . Th e suprem e cour t constructio n o f th e case , unlik e th e I 12 7 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers decisions o f th e tw o lowe r court s i n Johnson, acknowledge s tha t th e old rule s d o no t appl y an d embodie s a new—thoug h almos t certainl y transitory—approach t o th e understandin g o f parentage . Tha t decision , and it s implications, are analyze d i n chapte r 6 along with othe r decision s in othe r case s occasioned b y the ne w reproductiv e technologies . The tria l court , face d wit h a set o f reproductiv e fact s tha t woul d hav e been almos t unimaginabl e onl y a fe w year s earlier , prove d unwillin g t o abandon a traditiona l approac h t o th e creatio n o f famil y relationships . That court , i n tryin g t o mode l it s response o n familia r understanding s o f mother—understandings i n whic h maternit y i s th e inevitabl e conse quence o f biologica l facts—altere d familia r understandings , thoug h no t as obviously and certainl y no t as self-consciously a s did the stat e suprem e court. In Johnson an y cour t presumin g t o rel y o n biologica l fact s i n settlin g Christopher's parentag e wa s practicall y compelle d t o compar e th e sig nificance o f th e geneti c an d gestationa l aspect s o f biologica l maternity . The tria l court made this comparison an d concluded , i n marke d contras t to th e messag e abou t th e importanc e o f gestation underlyin g th e unwe d father cases , that gestation was of little moment i n determining maternity . Judge Parslow , presidin g i n th e tria l court , pai d hee d t o th e par t Ann a played i n th e creatio n o f th e child , bu t clearl y an d unhesitatingl y de scribed he r rol e i n social , environmental—bu t no t biological—terms . The cour t compare d he r t o a foste r paren t wh o surrender s he r parenta l role as soon as the child's "real " parent i s able t o resume a parenting role . For th e tria l court , genetic s emerge d a s th e primar y facto r linkin g a biological paren t t o his or her child . Judge Parslow, who gave his opinio n orally, declared : Who w e ar e an d wha t w e ar e an d identit y problem s particularl y wit h young childre n an d teenager s ar e extremel y important . W e kno w tha t there i s a combination o f genetic factors. We know more and mor e about traits now, how you walk , talk an d everythin g else, all sort s of things tha t develop out of your genes, how long you're going to live, all things being equal, whe n you r immun e syste m i s going t o brea k down , wha t disease s you ma y b e susceptibl e to . The y hav e uppe d th e intelligenc e rati o o f genetics to 70 percent now. 76 Accordingly, th e tria l cour t identifie d th e Calvert s a s Christopher' s par ents on the basis of their genetic connectio n t o the child . "Yo u have," the 128 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers judge concluded , "Mar k Calvert , Crispin a Calver t an d thei r chil d the y call Christopher ; thre e peopl e i n a family unit." 77 Thus, th e cour t unequivocall y define d kinshi p throug h relationship s based o n a natura l substanc e (genes) . Th e family , a s a lega l entity , wa s delineated a s a uni t anchore d i n share d substance . Th e claim s o f th e woman wh o carrie d an d bor e th e baby , characterize d b y Justice Stewar t in Caban a s th e part y whos e "parenta l relationshi p i s clear, " wer e n o longer paramount . Th e grea t importanc e pai d th e gestationa l rol e i n th e earlier case s i s replaced i n Johnson b y a clea r statemen t tha t familie s ar e a matte r o f share d substance , a matte r o f genes . Th e tria l cour t judg e recognized thi s apparent shif t an d offere d a n explanation . H e said : "On e of th e reason s w e ha d a presumptio n tha t th e perso n fro m who m th e child emerge d wa s th e mothe r i s i t mad e tha t sid e o f th e transactio n clear a t birth . Paternit y wa s alway s a matte r o f opinion , bu t yo u coul d always establis h wh o delivere d th e child." 78 Thi s explanatio n suggest s that gestating an d bearin g a child wer e neve r importan t pe r se. However, that questions the significance give n to gestation a s evidenc e not jus t of who the mothe r wa s but o f what th e mothe r wa s in th e unwe d father cases . Fo r instance , i n Justic e Stewart' s descriptio n i n Caban, quoted b y th e Court' s majorit y i n Lehr v . Robertson, 79 carryin g an d bearing a chil d constitute d a parenta l relationship . Unti l reproductiv e technology mad e othe r option s available , gestatio n wa s no t jus t th e easiest wa y o f identifyin g th e mother , bu t wa s viewe d a s a n inevitabl e correlate o f bein g a geneti c mother . Th e gestationa l rol e bot h signaled , and followe d from , th e substantia l (genetic ) lin k betwee n a mothe r an d her child . In orde r fo r Judg e Parslo w t o premis e th e legitimac y o f Crispin a Calvert's claim s t o motherhoo d o n he r "natural " maternity , h e ha d t o rend Anna' s gestationa l rol e asunde r fro m th e biologica l link s tha t mak e a mothe r a "mother." H e accomplishe d thi s in tw o ways. First, he locate d the gestationa l rol e i n a social, rather than a natural, domain. H e define d gestation a s a socia l role , aki n t o tha t o f a temporar y caretake r o r foste r parent. Then , an d mor e forcefully , h e redefine d gestatio n a s a matte r almost entirel y unrelate d t o familia l affairs . H e characterize d Anna' s gestation o f th e bab y a s primaril y a busines s dea l an d thereb y separate d it decisivel y fro m an y clai m tha t gestatio n signal s o r symbolize s "real " maternity. Anna, conclude d Judg e Parslow , was to be pai d $10,00 0 unde r the contrac t fo r he r "pai n an d suffering. " " I haven' t carrie d a chil d I 12 9 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers myself," declare d th e judge , "bu t fro m wha t I'v e seen , it' s a toug h pro gram. An d I thin k altruis m aside , ther e i s nothin g wron g wit h gettin g paid fo r nin e month s o f what I understand t o be a lot o f misery and a lo t of bad days." 80 Thus, Anna's gestational rol e was essentially a contractual , and no t a biological, matte r an d could , a s a result, b e define d t o exclud e maternity. In contrast , th e Calverts ' geneti c connectio n t o th e chil d ha d t o b e defined t o constitut e parenthoo d and t o harmoniz e wit h th e notio n tha t the gestatio n o f th e bab y wa s a busines s deal . Accordingly , th e judg e characterized th e Calverts ' geneti c contributio n i n multidimensiona l terms, a s a lin k tha t constitute d parenthoo d an d a s evidenc e o f th e privileges o f ownership . Th e Calverts , sai d th e court , wer e "desperat e and longin g for thei r own genetic product 7781 The court , unlik e th e Ne w Jerse y court s i n Baby M. , di d no t bas e it s decision o n a n expres s consideratio n o f th e babv' s bes t interests . Rather , the tria l cour t i n Johnson presumed t o identif y th e child' s rea l parent s o n the basi s o f biologica l facts . However , a s i n Baby M. , th e cour t foun d parental right s t o li e i n th e coupl e tha t mor e full y reflecte d a traditional , middle-class family . Anna , wh o wa s part-black , part-Nativ e American , and part-Irish , ha d fro m tim e t o tim e bee n a welfar e recipient. 82 Mar k Calvert wa s whit e an d Crispina , a Filipina . Durin g th e trial , Crispina' s heritage, unlike tha t o f Anna, was rarely mentioned b y the media . Nicol e Healy ha s suggeste d tha t i t was almos t a s i f Crispina, marrie d t o a whit e man, becam e white , an d thu s ethnicall y unmarke d i n contras t wit h Anna. 83 Whateve r th e precis e effec t o f rac e i n thi s case—an d i t wa s widely debate d a t th e tim e o f trial—th e judg e portraye d th e biologica l "facts" t o accord wit h an d suppor t a declaration o f legal parentag e i n th e married, middle-clas s coupl e rathe r tha n i n th e single , black , poore r woman wh o gestated th e baby . The stat e appellate court , relying on Californi a statute s to affirm Judg e Parslow's opinion , als o stresse d th e significanc e o f a geneti c ti e a s th e basis o f a clai m t o parenthood . Th e cour t describe d genetic s a s " a powerful facto r i n huma n relationships . Th e fac t tha t anothe r perso n is , literally, develope d fro m a par t o f onesel f ca n furnish th e basi s fo r a profound psychologica l bond . Heredit y can provid e a basis of connectio n between tw o individual s fo r th e duratio n o f their lives. " 84 However, Justic e Sills , writin g fo r th e appellat e court , suggested , obliquely an d almos t i n passing , tha t othe r "rational " bases fo r claim s t o 130 I

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers maternity o r paternit y migh t exist . I n th e end , th e appellat e court , i n declaring Crispin a Calver t th e "natural " mother , relie d o n statutor y la w that allowe d a ma n o r woma n t o b e presume d a "natural " paren t o n th e basis of blood test s which identifie d geneti c similaritie s betwee n th e ma n or woma n an d th e child . Th e court , expressl y describin g th e rul e a s "rational an d no t arbitrary," allowed b y implication fo r th e possibilit y tha t other equall y rationa l scheme s migh t exist . In fact , th e viabilit y o f such alternativ e scheme s wa s suggested b y th e Uniform Parentag e Ac t itself , th e ke y statut e o n whic h th e appellat e court relie d i n th e case . The ac t provide d tha t "betwee n a chil d an d th e natural mothe r [th e parent an d chil d relationship ] ma y be establishe d b y proof o f her havin g given birt h t o th e child. " Th e cour t dismissed Anna' s reliance o n thi s section a s a basis for he r claim s t o "natural" maternit y b y asserting tha t th e statut e onl y gav e a woma n otherwis e identifie d a s a "natural mother " th e righ t t o refe r t o th e birt h proces s a s proo f o f maternity. Tha t readin g i s not, o f course, inevitable . Th e legislativ e bod y that promulgate d th e statutor y provisio n a t issu e simpl y assume d tha t th e genetic an d gestationa l mothe r wer e one ; i t i s therefor e no t possibl e t o presume anythin g abou t th e legislativ e definitio n o f "natura l mother " i n this cas e fro m a readin g o f the statut e a t hand . I n fact , legislativ e bodies , both i n th e Unite d State s (wher e ther e i s still relativel y littl e legislation ) and abroad , hav e tende d t o defin e motherhoo d a s flowing mor e directl y from th e gestational , tha n th e genetic , aspects o f biological maternity. 85 Johnson, unlik e Baby M. , an d unlik e th e unwe d fathe r cases , forced a selection betwee n tw o wome n whos e claim s t o motherhoo d coul d bot h be premise d o n biologica l facts . I n Johnson, i t was possible t o demarcat e genetics a s the predominatin g biologica l fac t withou t equatin g biologica l maternity an d biologica l paternity . Non e o f th e opinion s i n th e cas e spoke abou t th e comparativ e significanc e o f sperm an d ovu m donor s visa-vis eac h other . Th e cas e require d a choic e betwee n mothers , o r mor e accurately betwee n on e mothe r an d anothe r mothe r plu s he r husband , the father , an d di d no t cal l fo r selectin g betwee n claim s t o maternit y an d claims t o paternity . Fo r thi s reason , i t seeme d possibl e t o minimiz e th e significance o f gestatio n i n effectin g maternity , t o defin e gestatio n a s social an d contractual , bu t no t biological , an d t o avoi d threatenin g th e presumption tha t me n stan d i n relatio n t o cultur e a s wome n stan d i n relation t o nature . However, thes e conclusion s wer e onl y fragile y grounded . A s the stat e 11311

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers supreme cour t i n Johnson recognized , neithe r th e biologica l fram e o n which th e tria l cour t relie d no r th e statutor y fram e o n whic h th e appel late cour t relied , provide d rea l guidanc e i n resolvin g th e question s th e case presented . I n fact , bot h commo n assumption s abou t biologica l par entage an d th e Californi a parentag e statute—itsel f base d o n th e sam e essential assumption s abou t biologica l reproduction—coul d hav e bee n used t o justif y judicia l recognitio n o f Anna Johnso n o r o f Crispin a Cal vert a s th e child' s mother . Further , assumption s abou t th e connection s between biolog y an d kinshi p an d th e statutor y schem e tha t reflecte d those assumption s could hav e justifie d a decisio n t o recogniz e bot h women—or neithe r woman—a s mothe r t o the child . The stat e suprem e cour t opinio n i n Johnson (presente d an d discusse d in th e nex t tw o chapters ) recognize d expressl y th e profoun d disruptio n presented b y th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s t o familia r assumption s about biologica l reproductio n an d accordingl y t o assumption s abou t th e connection betwee n biologica l reproductio n an d relation s o f kinship. As a result , tha t cour t rejecte d bot h biolog y an d stat e la w a s guidepost s fo r resolving the dispute . The disruptio n t o established expectation s an d understanding s cause d by the developmen t o f the ne w reproductiv e technologie s seriousl y com plicates th e society' s ongoing , an d related , effort s t o mak e sens e o f th e transformation o f the famil y awa y from th e mode l develope d durin g th e nineteenth century— a transformatio n tha t wa s occurrin g obviousl y fo r several decade s befor e th e adven t o f the ne w reproductiv e technologies . In tha t transformatio n th e family , onc e understan d a s the domai n o f lif e in whic h enduring , hierarchicall y organize d relationship s wer e mor e important tha n th e individual s composin g them , ha s com e increasingl y to be understoo d a s a collectivity of autonomous individuals , more o r less free t o choos e how , fo r ho w long , an d i n wha t way s to associat e togethe r as family members . In decidin g th e unwe d fathe r case s an d traditiona l surrogac y case s such a s Baby M. , court s can preserv e and hav e preserved th e illusio n tha t change t o th e family , althoug h undeniabl y occurring , ca n b e assimilate d into traditiona l pattern s an d ca n thereb y b e contained . Thus , i n th e unwed fathe r cases , certai n father s wer e give n apparentl y ne w right s t o their biologica l childre n bu t onl y i n case s i n whic h thos e father s estab lished relation s wit h th e mother s o f thei r childre n that , eve n thoug h nonmarital, resembled old-fashione d spousa l relationships . And, similarl y ^2

Unwed Fathers and Surrogate Mothers in Baby M., th e tria l court , i n particular , wa s able t o recognize a surrogacy contrac t bu t onl y becaus e th e famil y produce d b y tha t contrac t reflected th e court' s ow n imag e o f a n old-fashione d nuclea r famil y in cluding a mother, a father, an d thei r mutua l child . These case s did no t involve, an d di d no t challenge , long-standin g assumption s abou t th e social implications of biological reproduction . The effor t t o accept change , while apparentl y assimilatin g i t to tradition, continue d i n Johnson bu t wit h les s success—a s th e stat e suprem e court, o n appeal , explained . I n Johnson and other , simila r cases , th e threat to traditional understandings of family is especially intense because the socia l an d biologica l correlate s o f familia l relationship s ar e bein g challenged simultaneously . Wit h gestationa l surrogacy—a s wel l a s a number o f other reproductiv e possibilitie s suc h a s embryo cryopreserva tion—the effor t t o preserv e th e illusio n tha t nothin g essentia l ha s changed collapses . Too much ha s changed to o obviously. Moreover, the possibilities presente d b y th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s challeng e central assumptions about the connections between biological reproduc tion and kinship. The change can genuinely be labeled revolutionary . The remainde r o f this book examines the efforts o f society and la w to preserve orde r i n th e fac e o f th e breathtakin g acceleratio n i n rate s o f change t o famil y lif e (alread y undergoin g majo r transformation ) an d to understanding s o f th e famil y introduce d b y th e ne w reproductiv e technologies.

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FIVE

Social Implication s of Biological Transformation s

Disruptions t o traditiona l understanding s o f famil y presente d b y surro gacy cases such a s Baby M . an d b y cases questionin g th e state' s respons e to unwe d father s ar e magnifie d man y time s i n case s occasione d b y th e new reproductiv e technologies . Judicia l response s t o Johnson v . Calvert, reviewed i n th e previou s chapter , sugges t the enormit y o f the disruption . Now, th e societ y an d th e la w mus t determin e no t onl y wh o i s th e mother, th e father , o r th e baby , bu t wha t i s a "mother, " a "father, " o r a "baby." Th e simultaneou s challeng e t o th e socia l fact s o f famil y an d t o the biologica l fact s o f famil y preclude s certaint y o f almos t an y sort . I t becomes increasingl y difficul t t o argu e convincingl y tha t biolog y i s fate . Consequently, th e actua l fate s tha t awai t children , o r families , produce d through assiste d reproductio n becom e potentiall y mor e variabl e an d uncertain. By threatenin g centra l assumption s abou t th e biologica l correlate s o f family—assumptions tha t unti l recentl y wer e rarel y examine d a t al l — the ne w reproductiv e technologie s endange r th e ideologica l framework within whic h famil y ha s lon g bee n understood . I n consequence , repro ductive technolog y an d th e familie s i t produces heral d a mor e complet e transformation o f th e America n famil y tha n tha t whic h ha s alread y oc curred. Thi s chapte r examine s th e complicate d interactio n betwee n changing fact s abou t huma n reproductio n an d th e socia l transformatio n of the family . I. Th e Biologica l "Facts " Only withi n th e pas t tw o decade s ha s i t becom e possibl e fo r human s t o orchestrate th e processe s o f huma n reproductio n i n a wid e variet y o f I 13 4

Social Implications of Biological Transformations ways. Previously , whateve r peopl e migh t hav e imagine d th e "miracl e o f birth" to imply , they viewed th e proces s o f reproduction a s the essentiall y unchanging produc t o f natura l o r supernatura l forces . Eve n i n recen t centuries, Wester n society , reflectin g th e view s o f Wester n scienc e an d the perceive d limit s o f scientifi c technology , understoo d huma n repro duction a s a continuou s proces s beginnin g wit h sexua l intercours e be tween a ma n an d a woman , includin g th e fertilizatio n o f a n eg g (pro vided b y the woman' s body ) b y sperm (provide d b y the man' s body) , th e subsequent developmen t o f th e embry o withi n th e woman' s body , an d then th e birt h o f a bab y fro m th e bod y o f th e woma n i n who m concep tion occurred . Unti l th e las t fe w decades , onl y artificia l inseminatio n provided a mean s fo r human s t o alte r thi s process , an d tha t procedure , although subjec t t o hars h criticism s i n th e first hal f o f th e twentiet h century, appeare d t o b e a n isolate d an d no t particularl y disruptin g possi bility. Then , withi n les s tha n tw o decades , i n vitr o fertilizatio n (IVF) , cryopreserved embryos , an d th e transfe r o f embryo s betwee n wome n became routin e medica l procedures . I n 1993 , less than twent y years afte r the birt h o f the first baby conceive d i n vitro , over 30,00 0 IV F procedure s were performe d i n th e Unite d States. 1 IVF, originall y know n a s "extracorporea l mammalia n fertilization, " was th e first, an d i s stil l probabl y th e mos t well-known , o f th e ne w reproductive technologies . The procedure , whic h separate s reproductio n from sexuality , involve s fertilizatio n outsid e a woman's body . IV F usuall y begins wit h a woman' s undergoin g a serie s o f hormona l treatment s t o stimulate th e productio n o f multipl e ov a withi n a particula r monthl y cycle. Then , matur e ov a ar e retrieve d fro m th e woman' s ovarie s wit h minor surger y throug h th e abdome n o r th e cervix. Thes e ov a ar e place d in a cultur e dis h wher e the y ar e combine d wit h sperm . Fertilization , i f successful, occur s here . In 198 1 tw o Englishmen , Rober t Edward s an d Patric k Steptoe , first' announced tha t huma n embryo s coul d b e successfull y froze n an d stored.2 Thu s ov a no t implante d followin g retrieva l an d fertilizatio n ca n be store d rathe r tha n discarded. 3 Thes e fertilize d ov a (variousl y calle d zygotes, preembryos, o r embryos ) ca n b e preserve d i n cryoprotectant s fo r years an d can , later , b e thawe d fo r implantatio n i n th e bod y o f th e woman i n who m th e ov a wa s produce d o r i n th e bod y o f som e othe r woman. I n th e Unite d State s the first live birth followin g implantatio n o f a thawe d embry o occurre d i n 1985. 4 Also i n th e earl y 1980s , a pregnanc y 11351

Social Implications of Biological Transformations was first produce d usin g donate d ova . Thus , gestationa l surrogac y be came a possibility . Embryo transfer , use d i n gestationa l surrogacy , an d th e cryopreserva tion o f huma n embryoni c an d gameti c matte r clearl y disrup t tempora l and spatia l expectation s abou t th e processe s o f huma n reproduction . I n addition t o thes e possibilitie s others , whic h see m similarl y t o disrup t expectations abou t reproduction , hav e alread y bee n use d t o produc e a pregnancy o r see m likel y t o b e use d t o produc e a pregnanc y i n human s within th e nex t fe w years . I t i s alread y possibl e t o obtai n viabl e sper m from recentl y dea d men . I n theory, eggs could b e similarly remove d fro m the bod y of dead women . Egg s removed fro m livestoc k immediatel y afte r slaughter hav e bee n fertilize d an d hav e bee n use d t o produc e successfu l pregnancies. As a resul t o f posthumous inseminatio n o r th e posthumou s fertilization o f eggs , childre n ca n b e conceive d afte r th e death s o f bot h genetic parents . Th e possibilit y o f retrievin g an d maturin g ov a fro m aborted fetuse s an d the n usin g thos e ov a i n donatio n program s coul d soon becom e a technological reality . That woul d lea d t o the gestatio n o f children whos e "mothers " had neve r bee n born . These possibilitie s occasione d b y assiste d reproductio n presen t suc h novel scenario s as children wit h multipl e biologica l mother s (o r arguabl y with n o "real " biologica l mother) , a s see n i n Johnson v . Calvert, o r embryos store d i n tes t tubes fo r extende d period s s o that a woman woul d be able , fo r example , t o gestat e he r ow n mother' s o r grandmother' s sibling (he r ow n "aunt, " "uncle, " "great-aunt, " o r "great-uncle") . Fo r instance, a woman , cal l he r Sue , coul d becom e th e mothe r o f he r ow n sibling if the gamete donor s (Sue' s parents) ha d a n embry o cryopreserve d and then , year s later , tha t embry o wa s thawe d an d implante d i n Sue' s uterus. Su e coul d the n gestat e an d giv e birt h t o th e resultin g baby . Ha d the embry o i n questio n develope d i n vivo , without th e interruptio n tha t cryopreservation allows , the embry o woul d hav e bee n bor n a generatio n earlier a s its mother Sue' s "sister" or "brother. " Similarly , a woman coul d become mothe r t o her aunt or uncle i n a case in which th e cryopreserve d embryo wa s donate d b y he r grandparent s rathe r tha n b y he r parents . Obviously th e us e o f th e word s "sister, " "brother, " an d "aunt, " a s well a s "mother," coul d b e vigorously debated . The challeng e t o definition s o f famil y i s far-reachin g an d socia l re sponses ar e stil l spars e an d generall y inadequate . Tha t notwithstanding , the ne w reproductiv e technologie s hav e develope d i n concer t wit h ex i 3 61

Social Implications of Biological Transformations isting scientifi c paradigm s tha t explai n huma n reproduction . Th e devel opment o f reproductive technolog y ha s no t depende d upo n th e develop ment o f a ne w visio n o f huma n reproduction . Reproductiv e technolog y multiplies th e way s throug h whic h huma n reproductio n ca n occu r bu t has no t widel y challenge d existin g scientifi c paradigm s tha t explai n th e biological fact s o f human reproduction . I n fact , reproductiv e technolog y uses existin g paradigm s an d eve n serve s t o demonstrat e thei r accurac y and powe r b y multiplying th e possibilitie s fo r controllin g th e processe s o f reproduction. Th e technolog y i s not revolutionar y becaus e i t challenge s a contemporar y scientifi c vision . Rather , i t i s revolutionar y becaus e i t actualizes tha t vision throug h th e contro l an d manipulatio n o f biologica l processes previously understood a s "natural" and a s impervious to huma n manipulation. In short , reproductiv e technolog y ha s no t unsettle d a familia r an d important scientifi c theory , and , therefore , change s occasione d b y repro ductive technolog y d o no t challeng e th e theorie s tha t explai n ho w repro duction occurs . Rather , thes e change s disrup t th e ver y notio n tha t th e science o f huma n reproductio n reflect s a natural , unyieldin g process , and questio n th e fundamenta l assumptio n tha t huma n reproductio n i s the resul t o f natura l processe s whic h inevitabl y defin e socia l relation ships. Alread y thi s technolog y challenge s traditiona l understanding s o f mother, father , an d child . Other, fa r mor e dramati c possibilitie s see m decades , rathe r tha n cen turies, away. Once babie s can b e manufacture d i n laboratories, a possibility that ha s no t (yet ) bee n realize d bu t tha t i s no longe r imaginabl e onl y as scienc e fiction, the n th e biologica l correlate s o f huma n reproductio n will n o longer—o r a t leas t wil l n o longe r easil y an d automatically — ground securel y th e value s an d belief s tha t American s hav e traditionall y attached t o family. Th e los s of the biologica l ancho r ha s not yet, and ma y never, completel y negat e thos e value s an d beliefs , bu t i t does remove th e certainty wit h whic h traditiona l value s an d belief s abou t famil y wer e assumed an d invoked . As a result , dispute s occasione d b y the ne w reproductiv e technologie s provide remarkabl y fruitfu l context s for furtherin g th e mor e fundamenta l debate abou t th e for m an d futur e o f th e famil y itself . Sinc e famil y disputes resultin g fro m gestationa l surrogac y o r cryopreserve d embryo s occur i n a contex t i n whic h bot h th e socia l an d biologica l aspect s o f family ar e questioned , traditiona l understanding s o f th e socia l orde r ca n 11371

Social Implications of Biological Transformations be invoke d t o justify , t o condemn , o r t o mas k th e significanc e o f th e transformations. However , a s option s fo r definin g an d regulatin g th e family multiply , expectation s abou t th e famil y an d abou t th e contour s o f familial relationship s ar e less and les s widely agreed upo n an d actualized . The biologica l facts , especiall y a s the y becom e increasingl y subjec t t o change, ca n b e invoke d an d analyze d t o justif y decision s about th e scop e and desig n o f the socia l orde r o r t o condem n change s tha t see m t o def y the dictate s o f what coul d onc e b e take n unequivocall y a s natura l truth . Litigants an d courts , lik e th e societ y o f whic h the y for m a part , ca n n o longer continu e t o assum e tha t th e biologica l fact s o f huma n reproduc tion groun d th e famil y an d familia l relationship s i n a n unyieldin g reality . Increasingly, th e traditiona l anchors—th e biologica l an d socia l correlate s of family—are bein g simultaneously dislocated . And s o the terms throug h which suc h dispute s ar e aire d an d resolve d ar e bein g constructed . Th e terms chosen , an d th e meaning s attache d t o those terms , broadly sugges t emerging understanding s o f family an d o f personhood . The ne w reproductiv e technologie s ar e bein g take n t o signa l th e en d of orde r o r alternativel y th e achievemen t o f unprecedente d possibilitie s of choic e an d happiness . Fo r some , reproductiv e technolog y an d th e social arrangement s tha t ma y accompan y it , violat e th e natura l order , and thu s augur socia l chaos . The anthropologis t Robi n Fox , for instance , argues a s a matter o f scientific fac t tha t a woman bond s wit h a child tha t she carrie s i n he r body . H e therefor e conclude s tha t "i f w e tr y t o forc e bonded mother s t o give up thei r childre n i n th e nam e o f contract... w e will fail—or a t least deserve t o fail." 5 Fo r others, reproductive technolog y simply afford s mor e jo y by providing mor e routes , and thu s mor e oppor tunities, t o creat e familie s an d familia l relationships . Thos e familie s ca n be imagine d o n th e mode l o f traditiona l familie s o r o n other , les s tradi tional models . On e Britis h journalist , arguin g tha t reproductiv e technol ogy doe s no t alte r th e characte r o f families , proclaimed : "Thi s i s wha t science i s for, the extensio n o f human happines s through choice." 6 Thus, reproductive technolog y ca n b e viewe d a s disturbing th e socia l incident s of family a s it alters the biological dimension s throug h whic h familie s ar e created o r i t ca n b e viewe d a s leavin g th e socia l incident s o f famil y essentially untouched . Other , intermediat e position s ar e possibl e an d ar e being voiced . In th e fac e o f th e myria d confusion s an d uncertaintie s pose d b y reproductive technology , disputin g parties in cases involving this technol 1138

Social Implications of Biological Transformations ogy rel y wit h remarkabl e consistenc y o n biologica l fact s t o presen t thei r arguments i n court . Sinc e th e mora l an d existentia l implication s o f th e facts o f huma n reproduction , bu t no t th e fact s pe r se , ar e usuall y i n dispute, opposin g litigant s rel y o n essentiall y th e sam e biologica l facts . Those fact s ar e the n presente d t o th e court , b y th e disputin g litigant s taken a s a group, as conclusive evidenc e o f contradictory socia l truths . Consequently, th e biologica l fact s di m i n significance . Fo r example, if the biologica l fact s ca n demonstrat e equall y tha t a genetic mothe r an d a gestational mothe r ar e "real " mother s (o r tha t neithe r i s fully a mother) , then a dispute suc h a s that i n Johnson betwee n competin g mother s mus t ultimately b e resolve d withou t appea l t o biology. I n th e end , definin g th e family a s a socia l realit y tha t follow s clearl y an d inevitabl y fro m th e biological fact s o f famil y become s increasingl y difficult . Tha t i s o f tre mendous significanc e t o a societ y tha t ha s assume d fo r hundre d o f years that kinship follow s fro m biologica l relationships . II. Wha t I s a Biologica l Mother ? Many o f th e interpretiv e conundrum s t o whic h gestationa l surrogac y gives rise emerged i n th e contex t o f Johnsonan d McDonald v . McDonald (a 1994 New York case), taken together . Whil e Johnson involve d a coupl e each o f who m provide d a gamet e t o b e joine d an d the n gestate d i n another woman' s uterus , McDonald involve d a wif e wh o gestate d a n embryo forme d fro m th e fertilizatio n o f a donate d ovu m wit h he r hus band's sperm . Johnson v . Calvert As describe d i n chapte r 4 , th e tw o lowe r court s tha t rendere d decision s in Johnson relie d respectivel y o n biolog y an d o n statutor y la w to giv e th e baby Christophe r t o Mar k an d Crispin a Calvert , th e geneti c parents , rather tha n t o Ann a Johnson , th e gestationa l parent . Th e Californi a Supreme Cour t affirme d tha t holdin g bu t o n ver y different grounds . Th e state suprem e court , concludin g tha t neithe r biolog y no r th e state' s statutory definitio n o f mothe r provide d adequat e criteri a fo r selectin g between Crispin a an d Anna , relie d o n neither . Moreover , th e cour t refused t o accept th e ple a o f amicus curia e tha t bot h wome n b e denomi nated "mother. " I n reachin g it s holdin g i n Johnson, th e stat e suprem e *39 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations court (affirmin g th e holding s o f th e lowe r court s whic h name d th e Calverts a s th e child' s onl y parents ) relie d o n th e notio n o f parenta l intent. That notion , as well as its implications an d potentia l usefulnes s i n cases such a s Johnson, i s examined i n chapte r 6 . Even thoug h th e highes t Californi a cour t largel y ignore d th e biologi cal correlate s o f Crispina's an d Anna's respectiv e claim s t o maternity, th e litigants di d not . Th e Calvert s an d Johnso n base d thei r appeal s t o th e court o n alternativ e interpretation s o f th e reproductiv e proces s tha t le d to the birt h o f baby Christopher . In premisin g he r parenthoo d o n biologica l truth , Ann a Johnson , fo r instance, argue d tha t natur e inevitabl y create s a bond betwee n a woma n and a bab y tha t sh e gestate s an d bears , an d tha t th e preservatio n an d development o f tha t bon d establishe s th e mother-chil d connection . Sh e further argue d tha t th e lin k betwee n a woman an d th e bab y sh e gestate s is mor e significan t fro m a biologica l perspectiv e "tha n [that ] o f th e genetic donors." 7 Th e Calvert s stresse d thei r biologica l lin k t o th e chil d as conclusive o f their parentag e an d o f Anna's essentiall y incidenta l rol e in th e creatio n o f thei r child . The y argue d tha t th e embryo , produce d from thei r gametes and fertilize d i n vitro, was "already defined [as ] a ne w human individual" 8 befor e i t wa s implante d i n Johnson' s uterus . Thus , in th e Calverts ' presentation , Johnso n coul d no t premis e he r maternit y on biolog y since , a s a biologica l matter , th e embryo—an d thu s th e complete being that was their child—existed befor e uterin e implantation . The brief s a s a whol e demonstrat e th e remarkabl e flexibility wit h which societ y and th e la w can invok e an d interpre t biologica l definition s of reproduction. Onc e assume d t o present th e essenc e o f natural parent age, genes ca n b e define d variousl y an d may , amon g othe r things , repre sent an almost incidental donatio n t o the woman wh o maintains a "bloo d relationship" wit h a bab y sh e ha s gestate d an d t o whic h sh e ha s give n birth. 9 Similarly , gestatio n take s o n ne w meaning s a s judicia l response s to Johnson suggest . Gestatio n wa s lon g understood , an d wa s describe d specifically b y the U.S . Suprem e Cour t i n th e case s involvin g th e pater nal right s o f unwe d fathers , a s th e symbo l an d essentia l instanc e o f biological maternity—a s th e inviolabl e biologica l fac t tha t distinguishe d maternity fro m paternit y and tha t mad e biologica l maternit y synonymou s with socia l an d lega l maternity . No w gestatio n ca n b e interpreted , a s i t was b y th e tria l cour t i n Johnson, a s creativ e o f a socia l an d incidental ,

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Social Implications of Biological Transformations rather tha n a biologica l an d thu s permanent , connectio n betwee n a woman an d th e bab y she gestate s an d bears . Thus, Judg e Parslo w coul d describe Anna's role as "analogous to that of a foster parent/' 10 The facts of Johnson challenge—and affirm— a wid e array of meanings that society presently attache s t o th e term s tha t define huma n reproduc tion—terms suc h a s fertilization , embryo , fetus , bloo d relationship , an d gene. Despite growing indications as the case moved through the California court s tha t biological truth s would prov e conclusiv e fo r neithe r side , each sid e continue d vehementl y t o argu e tha t it s biologica l connectio n to the child shoul d be determinative . Each prospectiv e mothe r argued tha t her connection t o the chil d was more substantial tha n the connectio n o f the "othe r mother" in the sens e that her connectio n wa s mor e real . Crispin a Calver t an d Anna Johnso n each trie d t o distinguis h th e real , endurin g relationshi p (he r own ) fro m the mor e ephemera l one . Eac h define d he r relationshi p t o th e chil d i n terms o f a n inexorabl e biologica l connection . Eac h woma n argue d tha t her ow n biologica l connectio n wa s mor e significant , eithe r qualitativel y (e.g., mor e natural ) or quantitatively (e.g. , involvin g a greater investmen t of pain , time , o r energy) . Yet , fo r bot h sides , th e shado w o f th e other s biological connectio n t o bab y Christopher , howeve r fleeting, mad e i t impossible t o rel y upo n traditiona l assumption s abou t th e substantia l connection tha t links mothers to their children. The powe r o f th e clai m tha t biological mother s coul d onc e mak e i n asserting thei r maternit y depende d o n th e exclusivit y o f th e claim . I n cases occasione d b y reproductiv e technology , assertion s o f biologica l maternity n o longe r necessaril y determin e socia l maternity . Onc e th e traditional assumption s abou t maternity—an d "blood " relation s mor e generally—are challenge d b y nove l reproductiv e possibilities , th e entir e scheme withi n which thos e relations once mad e sense collapses. In th e wak e o f tha t collapse , th e ol d term s continu e t o see m im portant—even momentaril y conclusive . I n fact, th e fram e withi n whic h their conclusivenes s wa s onc e assure d ha s eroded . Consequently , th e parties in Johnson, an d in other similar cases, continue t o argue back and forth, eac h assertin g he r special clai m t o maternit y i n ligh t of traditional understandings o f motherhood . Bu t a s th e argument s proceed , eac h side's claims ar e confused with , and ultimatel y becom e substitutabl e for , those o f th e other . Thus , th e claim s o f bot h side s flounder and , i n thei r Hi

Social Implications of Biological Transformations attempt t o undermin e eac h other , ultimatel y undermin e themselves . Moreover, th e respec t onc e accorde d biologica l trut h a s a n arbite r i n defining familia l relationship s necessaril y diminishes . In Johnson, th e difference s between , an d comparativ e significanc e of , genetic an d gestationa l contribution s t o the productio n o f a chil d defin e the term s o f th e debate . I n othe r cases , th e term s o f th e debat e ar e differently defined . I n case s occasione d b y reproductiv e technology , th e debate abou t th e significanc e an d implication s o f particula r biologica l facts become s a debate abou t somethin g eve n larger . Ironically , Johnson, and othe r case s lik e it , questio n th e fundamenta l relevanc e o f biologica l facts t o th e definitio n o f famil y relationships . Consequently , suc h case s almost inevitabl y ente r th e contemporar y debat e abou t th e changin g meaning an d implication s o f "family" i n American society . Thus i t becomes importan t t o examine i n detai l th e shiftin g meaning s of th e symbol s o f maternit y i n Johnson. Severa l sort s o f contentions , more o r less expressly articulated b y the parties , constituted th e principa l themes presented t o the court s i n Johnson. Among these were conflictin g contentions abou t th e meaning s o f mothe r an d parent , th e particula r meaning o f the ter m "bloo d mother, " an d conflictin g contention s abou t the rol e tha t choic e ca n o r shoul d play fo r th e societ y an d th e la w i n determining parentage . The partie s considere d eac h o f these contention s through referenc e t o th e comparativ e significanc e o f geneti c an d gesta tional contribution s t o the creatio n an d developmen t o f a baby. Significantly, non e o f th e partie s i n Johnson argue d tha t familial , including maternal , relationship s shoul d b e determine d withou t refer ence t o biological connection . I n fact , eithe r sid e could hav e argued tha t culture, no t nature , shoul d determin e parentage . Johnson , fo r instance , might have emphasized tha t based o n he r socia l an d psychologica l bond s with th e baby , forge d i n fac t durin g th e lon g month s o f gestation , she , and sh e alone , ha d alread y psychologicall y becom e a parent—th e onl y "parent" figure i n th e newbor n child' s life . Th e Calverts , i n turn , migh t have presente d (a s th e Californi a Suprem e Cour t did ) th e surrogac y contract an d th e parties ' preconception plan s a s conclusive o f the child' s parentage. Althoug h th e Calvert s obviousl y argue d fo r th e legalit y an d enforceability o f the surrogac y contrac t entere d int o betwee n themselve s and Ann a Johnson , eve n tha t argumen t wa s embedded i n th e discussio n of the parties ' comparative biologica l claims. 11 Instead, eac h sid e premise d it s clai m t o parenthoo d o n th e uniqu e 142 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations significance o f its biological connectio n t o the baby . The Calvert s argue d that a person i s the consequenc e o f his or her parents ' combined gameti c material, an d that , accordingly , a t th e fertilizatio n stag e o f development , the identit y o f a ne w huma n individua l ha s alread y bee n defined. 12 Th e Calverts defined Ann a Johnson's rol e as essentially indistinguishabl e fro m that o f th e laborator y i n whic h th e eg g wa s fertilize d an d develope d before implantatio n i n Johnson's uterus : From th e momen t tha t sper m successfull y penetrate s th e ovu m an d im pregnation i s achieved a new generation o f human exists . It is within th e care an d custod y o f medica l expert s tha t i n th e laborator y provid e th e environment i n which th e embry o grows and mature s until i t is ready for implantation int o the uterus. These laboratories and expert s sustained th e embryo during a time when i t could no t survive in utero , at a time when Anna Johnson could not provide the environment and care needed. Likewise, Crispina Calver t coul d no t provid e the uteru s wit h whic h t o care fo r th e embryo , Ann a Johnso n could . Sh e wa s entruste d wit h th e embryo's car e unti l i t develope d an d mature d an d Crispin a an d Mar k Calvert were able to provide the proper environment and care. It cannot rationally be said that there is a distinction between paying for the car e of the ovu m by the doctor s and clini c an d payin g for th e care of the ovum by the gestational mother. 13 Thus, th e Calvert s suggeste d tha t whil e Ann a Johnson' s rol e ma y hav e been biological , i t was not th e rol e o f a biological mother . Johnson, i n response , too k issu e wit h th e Calverts ' (an d th e tria l court's) understandin g o f biologica l reproduction . "Ther e i s n o founda tion i n science, " sh e declare d i n presentin g he r cas e t o th e appellat e court, "t o defin e Biolog y . . . t o contribut e t o th e conclusio n [sic] that a n actual birt h mothe r i s not a natural Biologica l parent." 14 Johnso n define d her psychologica l relationshi p t o th e chil d a s a natura l consequenc e o f her havin g gestate d an d give n birt h t o th e baby . Sh e furthe r argue d tha t because he r biologica l maternit y (unlik e tha t o f Crispin a Calvert ) en tailed a relationship t o the baby , he r gestationa l role , unlike th e Calvert' s genetic role , reliabl y predicte d tha t sh e woul d no t jus t b e a mothe r bu t that she would b e a good mother— a bette r mother—t o th e baby . In presentin g he r cas e t o th e appellat e court , Johnso n quote d exten sively in her brief from th e testimony of Dr. Michelle Harrison , a psychiatrist who ha d serve d a s an exper t fo r Johnso n a t trial . "The bab y i n Ann a Johnson's womb, " Dr . Harriso n asserted , "i s no t th e sam e bab y tha t I H3

Social Implications of Biological Transformations would hav e bee n i n th e wom b o f Mrs . Calvert . Therei n lie s th e tota l misconception." Tha t misconception , Dr . Harriso n explained , wa s tha t "a bab y i s mad e fro m DNA." 15 Harriso n agree d withou t qualificatio n when aske d a t trial whether i t could b e said that "the biologica l contribu tion o f th e birt h mothe r t o th e creatio n o f th e bab y i s greate r tha n th e biological contributio n o f th e commissionin g parent s wh o donat e eg g and sperm." 16 Harrison furthe r characterize d Johnson' s gestationa l bon d t o th e bab y as the bon d o f "love": 17 In m y interview wit h Ms . Johnson, sh e talke d tearfull y abou t th e experi ence of nursing the baby . .. o f her belief that he recognize s her by odor, and when she has him h e roots to nurse since she has continued t o nurse even during the visitations. She believes that he feels safe and falls asleep easily in her arms.18 When Harriso n wa s late r aske d t o explai n th e assertio n tha t th e bab y recognized Johnso n "b y odor," she responded : There ar e actuall y som e scientifi c studie s demonstratin g newborn' s [sic] familiarity wit h the odor of the mothe r whey [sic] the y have been nursed . And Anna i n thi s case . .. describe d ho w i t felt t o her whe n h e bega n t o root. In other words, when she would pick him u p after man y days of not seeing him and he would begin to root for her breast. 19 Finally, Johnson' s lawye r asked Harriso n wha t "make[s ] a woma n a mother." Sh e answered : What make s he r a mothe r i s he r emotiona l an d physica l wor k i n th e nurturing of the fetus, and the way in which . . . her body builds the baby. Her body brings it oxygen, her body takes away waste, her body protects it .. . from bacteri a [and ] from externa l assault. 20 Harrison furthe r declare d tha t th e mother' s bod y "treat s [th e embryo ] a s though i t were th e sam e tissu e a s the tissu e o f her hand s o r he r hear t o r anything else . And a s that process goes on, she also incorporates th e bab y into her psychologica l development." 21 Harrison's testimon y answere d th e Calvert' s clai m t o genetic exclusiv ity an d allowe d Johnso n t o argu e tha t he r biologica l connectio n t o th e baby, unlike tha t o f the Calverts , encompassed, an d thu s guaranteed, th e fact an d th e succes s o f he r psychologica l an d socia l maternity . Johnso n H4 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations proclaimed tha t sh e wa s th e baby' s socia l mothe r because sh e wa s th e gestational mother . I n short , she argued tha t her socia l relationshi p t o th e child wa s an inevitabl e resul t o f a natural proces s and therefore , superio r to any relationshi p th e Calvert s migh t effec t wit h th e child . As eac h woma n relie d o n biologica l fact s t o prov e hersel f th e onl y natural mother , bot h partie s engage d i n severa l subsidiar y controversies . Anna Johnso n an d Crispin a Calver t eac h presente d hersel f t o th e cour t as th e baby' s bloo d mother . Traditionally , th e ter m "bloo d mother " ha s been synonymou s wit h "rea l mother" ; fo r centurie s "blood " ha s bee n understood, a t leas t metaphorically , a s th e essentia l substantia l connec tion betwee n a mothe r an d he r child . I n th e post-Mendelia n era , at leas t until recently , th e term s "bloo d mother " an d "geneti c mother " hav e generally bee n understoo d a s synonyms . Now , wit h th e availabilit y o f gestational surrogacy , i t ha s becom e possibl e t o argu e tha t a child' s genetic mothe r an d bloo d mothe r ar e tw o differen t people . Th e geneti c mother, according to this argument, i s the ovum donor ; the blood mothe r is the woma n wh o gestate s th e fetus , sharin g he r bloo d wit h tha t o f th e fetus durin g th e perio d o f fetal development . Unti l th e earl y 1980 s how ever, i t was assumed tha t the rea l relationshi p betwee n a woman an d he r child result s no t fro m a litera l contributio n o f materna l bloo d t o a fetu s but fro m a woman's geneti c contributio n t o the embryo . In a curiou s twist , th e adven t o f gestationa l surrogacy , alon g wit h other technologica l possibilitie s suc h a s DN A bloo d testing , onc e agai n encourages peopl e t o understan d bloo d literall y a s a substanc e share d between a woman an d bab y and a s an indicato r o f fetal-maternal identity . Thus eac h woma n wa s able to present herself as the baby' s blood mother . Presumably, i n characterizin g hersel f a s the bloo d mother , eac h woma n intended t o dra w o n th e powe r traditionall y associate d wit h th e meta phoric attributio n "bloo d mother. " Eac h woma n use d th e languag e o f scientific an d lega l discourse , no t th e languag e o f poeti c metaphor , t o show concretel y tha t he r maternit y coul d conclusivel y an d uniquel y b e premised o n similaritie s betwee n he r bloo d an d tha t o f the child . The Calvert s invoke d several provision s i n Californi a la w that togethe r allowed a child' s geneti c mothe r t o be declare d th e child' s lega l mother . The provision s i n questions , repeale d i n 1992 , the yea r afte r th e birt h o f Christopher, wer e foun d i n th e Unifor m Parentag e Act , enacte d i n California i n 197 5 as part o f the Californi a Civi l Code . Focusin g o n th e lH5 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations blood testin g whic h ca n b e use d t o establis h geneti c relationships , th e Calverts hypothesized : Assuming this, or for that matter, any child wer e confused wit h a number of other childre n i n th e hospita l nursery . Assuming further tha t n o othe r identifying dat a i s available. Could the n Anna Johnso n prov e he r mater nity? Indeed, only Crispina Calver t could, by blood tests, prove her maternal connection to the child. 22 The Calvert s also urged tha t the la w recognize th e continue d importanc e of preservin g "huma n bloo d lines. " Th e "socia l value " o f huma n bloo d lines, the y declared , "i s incalculable , fo r i t i s throug h ou r progen y tha t we perpetuate culture , traditions and history." 23 The Calvert s specificall y denie d tha t ther e wa s a "bloo d relationship " between Johnso n an d th e baby. 24 Presumably , th e Calvert s intende d th e term "bloo d relationship " t o serv e a s a synonym fo r geneti c relationship . Anna Johnson , i n turn , presente d hersel f a s the child' s bloo d mother . I n doing so , she relie d o n he r gestationa l connectio n t o th e baby , referrin g to th e "mixin g o f bloo d betwee n mothe r an d baby " tha t occur s throug h the placent a an d a t birth. 25 Dr . Davi d Chamberlain , wh o testifie d fo r Johnson a t trial , describe d Johnso n an d th e bab y a s "intimatel y attache d and biochemicall y related. " I n th e languag e o f medica l science , h e described tha t attachment concretely : There i s a flooding of catecholamines. The mother' s blood strea m carrie s adrenal hormone s throug h th e placent a t o th e baby' s blood . Virtuall y everything tha t th e mothe r ha s goin g o n i n he r bod y an d bloo d strea m goes directly through t o the baby. This i s absolutely main strea m medica l thinking.26 Finally, i n characterizin g hersel f a s the baby' s bloo d mother , Johnso n argued tha t sh e to o coul d clai m parenthoo d o n th e basi s o f bloo d tests . In respons e t o th e Calverts ' clai m tha t the y alon e coul d demonstrat e parentage o n th e basi s of blood tests , Johnson maintained : Respondents [th e Calverts ] clai m tha t i t woul d b e impossibl e fo r Ann a Johnson t o prove he r maternit y i f the hospita l nurser y ha d mixe d u p th e babies in the hospital. Not only was this issue never litigated o r proved at trial, but the premise, once again is a total falsehood . Dr. Klaus, Dr. Call, Dr. Chamberlain an d Dr . Harrison al l agreed tha t the baby was born wit h Anna Johnson's antibodie s an d hormones. 27 TestI H6

Social Implications of Biological Transformations ing th e antibodie s an d hormone s coul d therefor e prov e maternit y an d clearly identify the baby. 28 Thus, bot h th e Calvert s an d Ann a Johnso n use d exper t testimon y pres enting th e biologica l fact s o f maternit y t o persuad e th e court s tha t Ann a or Crispina, respectively , should b e exclusively identified a s Christopher' s blood mother—an d therefor e a s his real mother . In th e end , th e parties ' claim s abou t th e identit y o f th e baby' s bloo d mother prov e inconclusive , a s d o thei r claim s abou t th e comparativ e significance o f Anna's gestational, and Crispina' s genetic , contribution t o the baby' s development . Indeed , th e parties ' contention s almos t neutral ize eac h other , s o that th e identificatio n o f a single "real " mother o n th e basis o f th e biologica l fact s an d argument s presente d become s largel y a matter o f social choice . The obviou s challeng e suc h controversie s pos e t o th e biologica l fact s themselves—and, mor e importantly , t o th e relevanc e o f biologica l fact s altogether i n definin g th e famil y an d characterizin g familia l relation ships—encourages ne w interpretation s o f huma n reproductio n an d it s social implications . Two further example s from th e Johnson case illustrat e this point . The first involve s Johnson' s suggestio n tha t Crispin a Calvert , mor e like a fathe r tha n a mother , coul d no t premis e he r parenthoo d o n a biological connectio n t o th e child . Th e second , i n direc t contrast , in volves the suggestion , mad e expressl y by amicus curiae , tha t Christophe r was the chil d o f two mothers . Anna Johnson , respondin g t o the Calverts ' presentation o f the biologi cal facts , reinterprete d th e socia l implication s o f thos e fact s s o a s t o define th e Calverts, or at least Crispina Calvert , a s biologically—and thu s socially—abnormal. Anna acknowledge d Crispina' s geneti c contribution , but redefine d tha t contributio n t o b e somethin g othe r tha n tha t o f a mother. Dr. Harrison , testifyin g a s an exper t for Johnso n a t trial, declared : [I]t's really I think mor e like Anna i s the mother an d th e Calvert s are the other half, the other interest. Like as I say, again, much mor e like a father, and again , that' s not— I mean , ou r languag e i s gende r relate d s o i t ha s implications whic h I don' t mea n i n thi s sense , bu t the y ar e th e geneti c part of the child. 29 I 14 7 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations Accordingly, Johnso n argued : "Bot h appellee s stoo d i n th e shoe s o f a n expectant father , a s eac h provide d geneti c materia l whic h impregnate d Appellant."30 The argumen t illustrate s th e remarkabl e flexibility wit h whic h th e symbols o f huma n reproductio n ar e bein g interprete d an d th e far-reach ing social consequences o f such interpretations . B y elaborating th e impli cations o f a traditiona l associatio n betwee n gestatio n an d maternit y an d between a semina l (genetic ) donatio n an d paternity , Johnso n define d a genetic mothe r as more like a father tha n a mother. Johnson thu s asserte d that sh e shoul d b e recognize d a s th e baby' s rea l mother—th e paren t fo r whom biolog y bot h encompasse s an d assure s a n ongoin g socia l connec tion wit h th e child—an d tha t th e Calvert s togethe r b e recognize d a s the baby' s "father. " Thu s Johnson' s interpretatio n o f th e biologica l fact s associates Johnso n an d he r claim s t o maternit y wit h familiar , old-fash ioned understanding s o f motherhood , an d i n contras t define s Crispina' s role a s incidenta l (sinc e th e chil d clearl y ha s a fathe r already ) o r a s perverse, wit h th e lurkin g suggestio n tha t a woma n s o distorte d shoul d not b e recognize d a s th e mothe r o f a chil d wh o ha s a norma l mothe r already on hand . Even more , th e ver y sam e biologica l fact s o n whic h Johnso n relied , were use d b y othe r partie s t o sugges t tha t Christophe r ha d no t on e mother (Johnson ) an d tw o father s (th e Calverts ) bu t tw o mother s (Ann a Johnson an d Crispin a Calvert ) an d on e fathe r (Mar k Calvert) . Th e American Civi l Libertie s Union , writin g a s a n amicu s curiae , declare d that Ann a an d Crispin a shoul d eac h b e recognize d a s mother. 31 Th e courts, anxious t o preserve a mor e traditiona l vie w of family, rejecte d th e notion. Certainly, th e court s coul d hav e identifie d thre e biologica l parents , including tw o biologica l mothers . Ha d the y bee n determine d t o defin e the biological , rathe r tha n th e contractua l o r social, parents a s the baby' s legal parents , then , a conclusio n tha t bot h Ann a an d Crispin a wer e biological mother s would hav e been quit e plausible—even perhap s inevi table. Whil e non e o f th e court s accepte d thi s conclusion , eac h court' s reasoning allowed fo r suc h a possibility . The stat e suprem e cour t directl y addresse d th e possibilit y o f tw o biological mothers , declarin g tha t bot h wome n "hav e adduce d evidenc e of a mothe r an d chil d relationshi p a s contemplate d b y [Californi a law] . Yet fo r th e chil d Californi a la w recognize s onl y on e natura l mother , IH8

Social Implications of Biological Transformations despite advance s i n reproductiv e technolog y renderin g a differen t out come biologicall y possible." 32 Th e assertio n i s reminiscent o f one foun d in Justic e Scalia' s pluralit y opinio n i n Michael H . There , denyin g pater nal right s to an unwe d biologica l fathe r give n th e mother' s marriag e wit h another man , th e Cour t declare d tha t "Californi a law , lik e natur e itself , makes n o provisio n fo r dua l fatherhood." 33 Th e fact s i n Michael H. support th e invocatio n o f natur e a s arbite r o f socia l truth . Thos e i n Johnson do not . Even th e Calverts , wh o ha d argue d consistentl y fo r thei r exclusiv e biological parentage , responde d t o th e ACLU' s recommendation s b y asserting tha t a judicia l finding o f tw o mother s (o r thre e parents ) woul d ill serv e th e child' s bes t interests. 34 Tha t contentio n averts , bu t doe s no t gainsay, Anna Johnson' s clai m t o biological maternity . In fact , th e unanimit y wit h whic h th e court s rejecte d th e possibilit y o f a three-parent famil y i s partly explained b y the threa t that such a possibility poses t o traditiona l understanding s o f family, apar t fro m any account ing or interpretatio n o f the biologica l facts . I n divorcin g families, steppar ents ma y b e understoo d clearl y a s socia l parents , relate d t o th e childre n through marriag e t o on e o f th e biologica l parents . Th e increasin g inci dence o f divorc e an d stepparen t familie s i n th e las t severa l decade s ha s itself threatene d th e traditiona l family ; bu t tha t threa t i s understoo d a s one o f social chang e rathe r tha n o f changes i n th e ver y natur e o f things , and therei n differ s fro m th e threa t t o traditiona l notion s o f th e famil y posed b y gestationa l surrogac y cases . Th e latte r threa t a t onc e directl y challenges traditiona l assumption s abou t th e biologica l correlate s o f par entage an d traditiona l assumption s abou t th e parameter s o f family . The socia l contour s o f famil y hav e bee n consistentl y define d throug h reference t o the biologica l correlate s o f familial relationships . As a result , shifts i n th e meanin g o r us e o f th e biologica l fact s o f famil y mor e seriously threate n traditiona l understanding s o f th e famil y tha n d o shift s in wha t appea r t o b e socia l patterns . Socia l pattern s ca n b e altered , an d later rejected ; bu t biologica l facts , Wester n societ y ha s lon g held , reflec t the ver y natur e o f thing s an d thu s pos e seemingl y secur e limit s t o th e definition o f family . Gestational surrogac y simultaneousl y suggest s bot h a ne w for m o f family an d a ne w understandin g o f th e biologica l fact s throug h whic h shifts i n socia l pattern s migh t b e understoo d an d assimilated . A s a resul t of thi s simultaneou s shif t i n society' s understandin g o f th e socia l an d H9 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations biological fact s o f family, th e possibilities for new forms o f family multipl y accordingly. In th e worl d o f gestationa l surrogacy— a worl d i n whic h partie s ca n press their claim s by arguing tha t a child ha s two fathers an d on e mothe r or, wit h apparentl y equa l sanity , tha t th e sam e chil d ha s tw o biologica l mothers an d on e father , th e traditiona l anchors , tha t mad e famil y rela tionships inexorable , hav e vanished . Variou s interpretation s o f family , and o f th e connection s betwee n th e biologica l an d socia l component s of family , ma y continu e t o alig n themselve s wit h tradition . However , understandings o f famil y ca n n o longe r b e grounde d i n absolut e an d inexorable truth . McDonald v . McDonald McDonald, a divorc e actio n filed i n Ne w Yor k i n 1990 , resemble s Johnson, i n tha t i t too involve d a disput e ove r th e parentag e o f children bor n to a gestationa l mother . I n McDonald, however , th e woma n wh o in tended fro m th e star t t o b e th e socia l mothe r provide d th e gestational , but no t th e genetic , component o f biological maternity . The cas e furthe r differs fro m Johnson in that the disput e i n McDonald wa s between a ma n (a father ) an d a woma n ( a mother ) rathe r tha n betwee n tw o wome n (o r rather, on e woma n an d anothe r woma n togethe r wit h he r husband) . The McDonalds , h e a podiatrist , sh e a n M.D. , marrie d i n 1988 . Unsuccessful a t conceiving a child, th e coupl e sough t medica l assistanc e from a n infertilit y clinic . Eventually , embryo s wer e create d throug h th e use o f donor eggs , fertilized b y Robert McDonald' s sperm . Th e embryo s were implante d i n Olg a McDonald' s uterus , an d i n Februar y 199 1 twin girls were born . Before th e birt h o f th e children , Rober t filed fo r divorce . H e sough t sole custod y o f bot h children . A s describe d b y a Ne w Yor k appellat e court,35 Rober t argue d tha t he , a s th e "onl y geneti c an d natura l paren t available,"36 brough t th e superio r clai m t o parentage . Accordingly , h e contended tha t Olga , a s a gestational , bu t no t a genetic , parent , shoul d play n o custodia l rol e a s lon g a s a geneti c paren t wa s availabl e t o d o so . The appellat e divisio n disagree d an d affirme d th e tria l court' s gran t o f custody t o Olga . From a biologica l perspective , th e fact s i n McDonald ar e a mirro r image o f those i n Johnson. The tw o cases differ i n tha t i n McDonald, th e I 15°

Social Implications of Biological Transformations "intending" mothe r wa s th e gestational , bu t no t th e genetic , mother . I n contrast, Crispin a Calver t wa s Christopher' s genetic , bu t no t hi s gesta tional, mother. Almost reflexively, court s and others , including the media , have characterize d th e rol e o f the gestationa l mothe r entirel y differentl y in th e tw o sort s o f cases . Ann a Johnso n i s calle d a gestationa l surrogat e and th e cas e i s referre d t o a s a gestationa l surrogac y case . I n contrast , Olga McDonal d i s described a s a gestational mothe r o r as a mothe r wh o used dono r egg s to conceiv e he r child . I n eithe r case , she i s described a s a mother , an d McDonald i s characterize d a s a n "ovu m donor " case . The Californi a Suprem e Cour t i n Johnson justifie d thos e difference s b y concluding that , i n suc h cases , th e intentiona l mothe r i s th e natura l (and thu s legal ) mother . Som e commentator s hav e posite d tha t clas s differences tha t ofte n exis t betwee n intentiona l mother s an d gestationa l surrogates hav e affecte d th e assumption s tha t societ y and th e la w bring t o such cases . O n th e othe r hand , clas s difference s d o no t generall y distin guish intentional/gestationa l mother s fro m ovu m donors . Man y anony mously donate d ov a ar e provide d b y wome n wh o ar e themselve s under going infertilit y treatments . I n fact , suc h wome n ar e sometime s encouraged t o donat e ov a i n exchang e fo r reduce d IV F fees . A s a grou p such wome n ar e a t leas t moderatel y well-off . Moreover , th e ver y issu e o f class differences betwee n gestational/intentiona l mother s an d ovu m do nors i s usuall y maske d fo r th e partie s becaus e th e identit y o f ovu m donors, unlike tha t of gestational surrogates , i s usually no t reveale d t o th e intending parents . Similarly , ovu m donor s generall y wil l no t kno w th e identity o f the intendin g parents . In fact , th e appellat e cour t i n McDonald, lik e th e stat e suprem e cour t in Johnson, foun d th e intendin g mothe r t o b e th e "natural " mother . McDonald i s significant i n thi s regar d becaus e th e conclusio n tha t Olg a McDonald wa s th e twins ' "natural " mothe r wa s no t compelle d b y statu tory law. I n contrast , th e conclusio n o f the Californi a Suprem e Cour t i n Johnson, tha t th e intentiona l mothe r wa s th e "natural " mother , arguabl y followed fro m part s o f California' s statutor y provision s tha t regulate d th e identification o f a child's "natural " mother . Relying expressl y o n th e decisio n o f the Californi a Suprem e Cour t i n Johnson, the McDonald cour t determine d Olg a t o be th e natura l mothe r because sh e wa s the intentiona l mother . McDonald relie d o n a footnot e in Johnson i n whic h th e cour t elaborate d th e implication s o f its decisio n that i n case s o f spli t biologica l maternity , th e woma n whos e "acted-o n 1511

Social Implications of Biological Transformations intention" caused th e chil d t o b e conceive d an d bor n should b e name d the child' s "natural, " an d thu s only , mother . Th e Johnson cour t ex plained: "Thus , unde r ou r analysis , i n a tru e 'eg g donation ' situation , where a woman gestate s an d give s birth t o a child forme d from th e eg g of another woman wit h the inten t to raise the child a s her own, the birth mother i s th e natura l mothe r unde r Californi a law." 37 Relyin g o n tha t characterization, th e McDonald cour t concluded: In the cas e at bar, we have a true "eg g donation" situation, an d we find the reasonin g o f th e Suprem e Cour t o f Californi a o n thi s issu e t o b e persuasive. Accordingly , th e Suprem e Court , Queen s County , correctl y held tha t in the instan t "donation" case, the wife, wh o i s the gestational mother, i s the natural mothe r of the children, and is, under the circumstances, entitled to temporary custody of the children with visitation to the husband.38 In McDonald, a s i n Johnson, the partie s supporte d thei r claim s t o parenthood throug h reference s t o the biologica l facts . And a s in Johnson the partie s interprete d thos e fact s t o suppor t contradictor y conclusion s about the parentage of the twin daughters born to Olga. Robert, i n claimin g parentag e an d askin g fo r sol e custod y o f th e children, relie d largel y o n hi s geneti c connectio n t o th e babie s an d th e absence o f a comparabl e connectio n betwee n Olg a an d th e twins . H e described himsel f a s "th e sol e geneti c paren t amon g th e parties " an d Olga as a "genetic stranger" to his children. 39 In large part, his arguments parallel argument s asserte d b y th e Calverts . However , unlik e th e Cal verts, who presente d themselve s a s a traditional, marrie d couple , Rober t asked for custody as a divorcing man and single parent . Olga's argument s t o th e cour t contras t with thos e o f Rober t and wit h the argument s presente d b y al l th e partie s i n Johnson i n tha t Olg a focused o n the social correlates of her maternity. Certainly, she describe d her biological contributio n t o the babies ' creation, bu t for the mos t part she presented tha t contribution a s evidence o f her motherliness ( a social matter) rathe r tha n a s evidenc e o f a n inexorabl e clai m t o "natural " maternity. For a number of reasons, Olga, unlike Anna Johnson, was able to stres s th e materna l behavio r sh e ha d exhibited , an d continue d t o exhibit, toward the children. In contrast, Anna Johnson's ability to present herself a s a goo d mothe r wa s curtaile d b y th e ver y fac t o f he r havin g entered int o th e agreemen t t o gestate , an d the n t o forego , materna l i is * i

Social Implications of Biological Transformations claims t o a baby . Moreover , Olga , althoug h i n th e mids t o f divorc e proceedings, was married t o the fathe r o f the babie s sh e ha d gestate d an d borne an d thu s ha d th e advantag e o f havin g starte d he r relationshi p t o the babies i n a traditional mother-father-childre n triad . In addition , Olga , unlike Anna , ha d retaine d custod y afte r th e children' s birth s an d ha d continued t o serv e a s thei r custodia l parent . Finally , Olga' s claim s t o maternity, unlik e thos e o f Anna, oppose d th e claim s o f a fathe r an d no t those o f another mother . Fo r all thes e reasons , Olga wa s able to construc t her cas e b y relyin g o n a se t o f arguments tha t ha d no t bee n availabl e t o Anna Johnson . Olga explicitl y distinguishe d Johnson fro m he r ow n case . Sh e submit ted he r brie f prio r t o th e Californi a Suprem e Court' s rulin g i n Johnson, which, t o Olga' s benefit , relie d o n materna l inten t t o establis h "natural " maternity. Refutin g th e relevanc e o f th e lowe r cour t ruling s i n Johnson, Olga declare d tha t sh e coul d no t b e describe d a s a "surrogate." 40 Sh e further asserted : In th e instan t case , ther e i s n o contes t betwee n th e eg g dono r an d th e respondent [Olga ] for custody, and therefore i t is still a one (1) mother/one (1) father scenario . There i s no need for this Court to be concerned abou t the psychologica l impac t i t might have on a child t o be brought u p with two (2) mothers. Conversely, i t i s the appellan t wh o woul d lik e t o deprive th e childre n [of] the only mother that they have ever known. It is respectfully submitte d that suc h deprivatio n woul d i n fac t hav e a devastatin g effec t upo n th e children. This Court i s not bound b y the Calvert rulin g and ma y find that ther e is much mor e significanc e t o the individua l wh o actuall y give s the chil dren life. In the analysis of the instant case, it is important to note that the child wa s born durin g a lega l marriag e an d therefor e i s presumed t o b e the legitimate issue of both parents.41 Certainly, Olg a referre d t o he r gestationa l rol e a s a significan t aspec t of he r maternity . However , i n describin g tha t role , sh e stresse d th e pai n and sufferin g tha t th e embry o implantatio n an d th e subsequen t preg nancy ha d brough t her , rathe r tha n th e physiologica l processe s o f mater nal bondin g o n whic h Ann a Johnso n ha d focused . Olg a portraye d th e history o f he r pregnanc y i n detail . I n doin g so , sh e focuse d o n he r own endurance , an d asserte d tha t Rober t ha d continuall y attempte d t o undermine th e pregnancy' s success . Fo r instance , Olg a claime d sh e 1531

Social Implications of Biological Transformations responded t o a n earl y perio d o f spottin g i n th e pregnanc y wit h devasta tion an d grief . I n contrast , sh e proclaime d tha t Rober t ha d expresse d delight tha t " 'the experimen t ha d failed / " 4 2 Sh e furthe r describe d Rob ert a s having though t o f the developin g fetuse s a s " 'freaks, monster s an d anomalies' " 4 3 and t o have urged terminatio n o f the pregnancy. Olg a sai d that late r stage s o f th e pregnanc y brough t he r continuin g anxiet y an d illness. Eac h diagnosti c sonogram , sh e reported , "wa s a veritabl e night mare" fo r her. 44 Later , bese t wit h seriou s symptom s cause d b y the ongo ing pregnancy , Olg a chos e t o continu e th e pregnanc y rathe r tha n ris k a seriously premature birth : The responden t decide d t o sacrific e he r ow n lif e an d tr y t o endur e th e complicated pregnanc y a little longe r s o that th e childre n coul d b e bor n healthy and normal . The toxemi a go t so much wors e that the responden t experienced swellin g all over her body, had extensive nose bleeds and was totally unable to walk, and required a wheelchair to get around. 45 At the birt h Olga , treate d wit h loca l rathe r tha n general , anesthesia , wa s "aware of every incision, cut, contraction an d th e incredibl e pain , yet was only concerned abou t th e welfar e o f the children . Ou t o f that nea r deat h experience cam e tw o very healthy an d beautifu l girls." 46 Olga's biologica l maternity , a s she describe d it , involve d almos t unre lenting emotiona l an d physica l agony , fro m conceptio n throug h birth . For Olga , he r constan t sacrific e an d courag e durin g tha t perio d indicat e the qualit y o f her maternity . Thus , sh e claime d tha t he r experience s an d reactions durin g pregnancy , especiall y whe n compare d wit h Robert' s disdain, proved he r th e bette r parent . Alongside thi s characterizatio n o f he r pregnanc y an d maternity , Olg a presented anothe r typ e o f argumen t abou t th e biolog y o f reproduction . She suggeste d tha t th e ne w option s fo r huma n reproductio n mad e avail able b y technological advance s suc h a s i n vitr o fertilization cal l fo r a far reaching reevaluatio n o f th e socia l implication s o f biologica l maternit y and paternity . "Thi s cour t mus t recognize, " Olg a declared , "tha t suc h onerous terms , lik e 'geneti c stranger / [sic] hav e n o plac e i n a worl d which ha s embrace d ne w reproductiv e technolog y a s a necessar y mean s to assis t individual s i n thei r desire s t o procreate." 47 Th e argumen t rest s on the presumption tha t reproductive technolog y i s good. Olga supporte d that presumption b y arguing that reproductive technolog y provides a new set of solutions to an ol d an d troublin g problem—th e proble m o f infertil 11541

Social Implications of Biological Transformations ity. Usin g hersel f a s a n example , Olg a asserte d tha t she , "[ljik e man y individuals . . . s o desperatel y desire d t o eithe r bea r a chil d o r hav e on e borne fo r her , tha t sh e turne d t o th e advance s o f medica l technolog y t o assist her i n tha t importan t goal." 48 Thus, Olg a argue d tha t reproductiv e technolog y shoul d rightl y b e viewed a s a mean s fo r relievin g huma n suffering—sufferin g create d i n the absence o f family—and that , in consequence, the requisite ^interpre tation o f huma n reproductio n coul d b e justifie d b y referenc e t o th e significance o f family . Analyzin g th e sor t o f strateg y Olg a too k (thoug h writing abou t a differen t context) , th e Englis h anthropologis t Marily n Strathern, explains : "Argument s i n favou r o f embracin g th e ne w repro ductive technologie s ca n poin t t o the m a s technique s tha t wil l alleviat e suffering an d provid e remedie s fo r disability , an d thu s enabl e th e famil y to take it s proper an d traditiona l form." 49 Fo r Olga , a societal decisio n t o adopt reproductiv e technolog y preserve s traditiona l familie s b y helpin g to creat e them . Th e likelihoo d tha t thi s decisio n ma y challeng e society' s most fundamenta l assumption s abou t th e biologica l correlate s o f famil y is presented a s essentiall y inconsequential . Thus , Olg a suggest s tha t par entage shoul d no t b e exclusivel y premise d o n a geneti c connectio n between paren t an d child . In plac e o f tha t familia r assumption , sh e offer s a vie w o f famil y epitomized b y he r ow n sacrificia l rol e a s th e gestato r o f he r twi n daugh ters. Olg a ple d tha t th e socia l implication s o f biological reproductio n b e reexamined assertin g tha t th e essenc e o f th e traditiona l family—whic h she identifie d a s love—b e preserved . Thus , Olg a describe d gestatio n a s one stag e i n th e "nourishmen t an d care " tha t a goo d mothe r give s he r children. 50 Genetic s doe s no t produc e tha t concern . I n a remarkabl e twist o n traditiona l definition s o f family , Olg a characterize d Robert' s concern wit h hi s geneti c connectio n t o th e twin s a s evidenc e tha t h e would b e a bad father : It was not until th e appellant learned o f his paternity did [sic] h e begin to illustrate a desir e t o b e a paren t t o th e twins . I n effect , hi s lov e fo r th e children was conditioned upo n his genetic link to the children. Now he is asking thi s Court t o awar d hi s [sic] custody base d upo n hi s genetic s alone.51 For Olga , th e invocatio n o f family—eve n o f traditiona l familie s —in this ne w context , a contex t tha t expand s th e univers e o f traditiona l fami 1155

Social Implications of Biological Transformations lies, requires a shift i n ol d assumptions . Those ol d assumption s grounde d traditional view s o f famil y i n th e inevitabilit y o f natura l truth . Withou t such assumptions , th e notio n o f enduring , committe d relationship s tha t traditionally describe s an d constitute s th e famil y lack s a sustaining force . Thus, i n McDonald, a s i n Johnson, partie s associat e thei r opposin g cases wit h tradition . Rober t McDonal d relie d o n hi s exclusiv e geneti c connection t o th e childre n an d suggeste d that , i n comparison , Olg a wa s a "stranger " seekin g custod y o f hi s children. 52 H e ignore d Olga' s gesta tional rol e i n orde r t o asser t tha t h e an d hi s childre n coul d constitut e a traditional family , on e i n whic h th e parent-chil d bon d wa s grounde d i n natural truth . Olga als o premise d he r clai m t o maternit y o n tradition . Sh e define d herself i n term s o f traditional portrait s o f a good mother—self-sacrificing , loving, unendingl y committe d t o he r children . Sh e connecte d tha t self portrait to her biological (gestational ) role , but she also proposed tha t th e advent o f reproductiv e technolog y necessitate d ne w understanding s o f parent an d child . I n effect , sh e suggeste d tha t th e socia l an d biologica l dimensions o f parenthoo d b e disassociate d s o tha t th e socia l dimensio n might b e preserve d i n it s mos t traditiona l form . I n thi s vision , fo r in stance, "goo d mothers, " eve n i f infertile , migh t b e enable d t o creat e families an d t o raise children wh o would benefit , a s children alway s have benefited, fro m thei r mothers ' loving care. III. W h a t I s a n Embryo?—O r I s I t a n Embryo ? Disputes involvin g th e dispositio n o f froze n embryo s resembl e thos e involving childre n produce d a s a resul t o f gestational surrogac y arrange ments o r ovu m donation , i n tha t th e invocatio n o f biologica l fact s fur thers a large r debat e abou t th e natur e an d futur e o f family . Her e too , arguments apparentl y abou t th e biologica l fact s o f huma n reproductio n serve as a pretext for voicin g and resolvin g controversie s abou t th e mean ing an d limit s o f personhood . And , her e too , th e disruptio n t o long standing assumptions about the scope and contour s of family i s profound . A New Tim e an d Spac e fo r Huma n Reproduction : In Vitr o Fertilizatio n an d Cryopreserve d Embryo s In 1978 , Louis e Brown , th e first bab y conceive d i n vitro , wa s bor n i n England. Si x years later i n Australia, another chil d conceive d i n vitro was 11561

Social Implications of Biological Transformations born. I n th e Australia n case , however , th e embryo , fertilize d outsid e th e body, wa s cryopreserve d an d onl y late r thawe d an d implante d i n th e uterus o f th e woma n fro m whos e bod y th e ovu m ha d bee n extracted . Thus, withi n a n extraordinaril y shor t perio d o f time , bot h th e spatia l and tempora l dimension s o f huma n reproductio n becam e subjec t t o technological manipulation . Fo r th e first tim e i n history , huma n repro duction coul d begi n outsid e a woman's bod y and coul d b e suspende d fo r long period s o f time afte r conceptio n an d befor e furthe r developmen t o f the embryo . Thus , i n vitr o fertilization , an d th e cryopreservatio n o f early embryos , mak e i t impossibl e t o continu e assumin g tha t huma n reproduction i s spatiall y contiguou s an d temporall y continuous . Th e consequent disruptio n t o traditional view s of the famil y ca n b e acute . The adven t o f i n vitr o fertilizatio n an d cryopreservatio n necessitate s that th e la w settl e controversie s abou t th e right s to , an d th e right s of , frozen embryos . Several types of disputes hav e arisen i n the wak e of these new reproductiv e technologies . On e lin e o f case s ha s involve d dispute s between gamet e donor s an d th e infertilit y clinic s tha t helpe d t o create , and the n store , thei r embryos . I n York v . Jones, Steve n Yor k an d Ris a Adler-York wen t t o cour t t o forc e th e Howar d an d Georgeann a Jone s Institute fo r Reproductiv e Medicin e i n Norfolk , Virginia , t o transfer thei r frozen embry o t o a fertilit y clini c i n Lo s Angeles. Th e coupl e ha d bee n treated fo r infertilit y a t th e institute . Durin g th e cours e o f the treatment , they had on e embry o cryopreserve d fo r possibl e late r implantation . How ever, befor e tha t implantatio n wa s attempted , th e coupl e move d t o Lo s Angeles. Th e Jone s Institut e refuse d t o transfe r th e embryo . A federa l district cour t i n Virginia , relyin g o n th e term s o f th e Cryopreservatio n Agreement betwee n th e coupl e an d th e institute , conclude d tha t th e agreement ha d create d a bailor-baile e relationshi p betwee n th e coupl e and th e clinic . Th e cour t foun d tha t th e Jone s Institut e ha d "full y recognize [d] plaintiffs ' propert y right s i n th e pre-zygot e an d . . . limite d [its own ] right s a s baile e t o exercis e dominio n an d contro l ove r th e pre zygote."53 In additio n t o dispute s suc h a s tha t i n York, there hav e bee n dispute s between tw o gamet e donor s who , havin g ha d embryo s froze n fo r futur e implantation, late r decide d no t t o become parent s togethe r a s a resul t o f their deterioratin g relationship . Davis v . Davis represent s th e latte r sort of case. Unlike gestationa l surrogac y cases , froze n embry o case s hav e a rela 11571

Social Implications of Biological Transformations tively long, impassioned, an d self-consciou s histor y because o f the contro versy abou t th e legalit y of , an d limit s upon , abortion . Th e abortio n debate ha s been marke d b y unending an d generall y inconclusiv e appeal s to the biologica l correlate s o f embryonic development . Those appeal s wer e give n lega l significanc e b y th e framework withi n which th e Suprem e Cour t analyze d th e abortio n issu e i n Roe v . Wade. In Roe, th e state s o f Texa s an d Georgia , whos e abortio n statute s wer e under constitutiona l attack , argue d tha t the protectio n o f fetal lif e consti tuted a "compelling stat e interest " tha t justifie d infringin g o n th e privac y interests o f pregnant wome n wantin g to terminate thei r pregnancies . Th e Supreme Court , i n response , expressl y refuse d t o "resolv e th e difficul t question o f when lif e begins," 54 but agree d tha t th e privac y interest s o f a pregnant woma n ar e no t absolute . Th e Cour t conclude d tha t th e state' s "interest i n protectin g th e potentialit y o f huma n life " counterbalance s the right s o f a woman seekin g a n abortio n a t th e poin t o f "viability." Th e Court place d th e poin t o f viabilit y a t abou t twent y eigh t weeks , notin g that i n som e case s viabilit y coul d occu r a s earl y a s twent y fou r weeks. 55 Since Roe, the poin t o f fetal viabilit y has been locate d a few weeks earlie r than wa s the cas e a t the tim e o f the decision . I n 1982 , dissenting i n Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Justic e O'Conno r asserte d tha t the trimeste r framewor k o n th e basi s o f whic h th e Cour t decide d Roe was bein g calle d int o questio n a s a resul t o f advance s i n medica l tech nology.56 At th e tim e o f Roe, th e cour t explaine d it s conclusion s abou t "th e point o f viability": With respec t t o the State' s importan t an d legitimat e interes t i n potentia l life, th e "compelling " poin t i s at viability. This i s because th e fetu s the n presumably ha s th e capabilit y o f meaningfu l lif e outsid e th e mother' s womb. State regulation protectiv e of fetal lif e afte r viabilit y thus has both logical and biological justifications. 57 Thus, i n th e la w regulatin g abortio n afte r Roe, conclusion s abou t th e point a t whic h lif e begin s wer e displace d b y mor e concrete , thoug h changing, conclusion s abou t th e poin t o f fetal viability . Roe promise d t o displace theologica l debate , at least within th e univers e o f legal discourse , with empirica l observation . Roe thu s appeared , a t leas t momentarily , t o justify it s trimeste r approac h t o th e regulatio n o f abortion . However , after Roe, th e biologica l "facts " o f embryoni c developmen t remaine d a s 1581

Social Implications of Biological Transformations significant a s eve r t o th e law' s regulatio n o f abortion. Withi n th e society , Roe ha s intensified , rathe r tha n stilled , th e controvers y abou t whe n lif e begins. Since Roe, a woman' s righ t t o abortio n befor e viabilit y ha s bee n premised o n he r privac y righ t t o contro l he r body . At both th e beginnin g and th e en d o f pregnancy , tha t schem e i s threatene d b y technologica l advances whic h permi t feta l developmen t outsid e a woman' s body . Roe y common sense , an d mos t o f Wester n theolog y an d philosoph y stat e clearly that , onc e born , a bab y (eve n i f stil l exhibitin g wha t woul d previously have been feta l development ) i s a person an d therefor e canno t be killed. However , n o comparabl e agreemen t exist s about th e existentia l or mora l statu s o f the embry o durin g th e earlies t stage s o f development . This disagreemen t i s problemati c because , throug h i n vitr o fertilization , embryos ca n b e conceive d outsid e a woman' s bod y an d ca n develo p there fo r a t least severa l days . Of course , those embryo s ar e no t viable (a s the ter m wa s use d i n Roe) becaus e the y canno t develo p int o babie s unless implante d i n a woman' s uteru s fo r gestatio n beyon d th e first few day s o f development . However , embryo s produce d throug h i n vitr o fertilization ca n surviv e outsid e th e bod y and , i f frozen, ma y be availabl e years afte r thei r creatio n fo r implantatio n an d gestatio n i n a woman' s uterus. Thus the y ma y lead eventuall y t o the birt h o f a child . This possibilit y ha s require d th e lega l syste m onc e agai n t o conside r when lif e begins . Thousand s o f embryo s ar e no w bein g store d a t fertilit y clinics i n th e Unite d States . Som e wil l b e implante d i n th e woma n fro m whose ovarie s th e ov a wer e extracted ; som e wil l b e implante d i n othe r women, som e o f whom wil l no t expec t t o becom e mother s t o the babie s they gestat e ("gestationa l surrogates" ) an d other s o f whom wil l expec t t o become mother s ("intentiona l mothers") ; some wil l b e use d fo r research ; and other s will eventuall y b e discarded . If, however , a s some argue, 58 earl y embryo s ar e huma n life , th e entir e enterprise and , i n particular , an y decisio n t o discar d a froze n embryo , becomes problematic . A s a resul t o f thi s controversy , i n a numbe r o f recent case s involvin g the fat e o f frozen embryos , courts have bee n asked to decid e th e statu s an d fat e o f cryopreserve d embryos . Th e first publi cized cas e o f thi s sor t occurre d i n Australia . Heralde d i n th e medi a an d elsewhere a s th e tal e o f "froze n embry o orphans, " th e cas e involve d a wealthy Californi a couple , Mari o an d Els a Rios , who went t o Australia t o receive IVF treatments. Severa l embryo s resulte d fro m th e treatment ; tw o 11591

Social Implications of Biological Transformations were frozen fo r late r use . The Riose s were then kille d i n a plane crash . The case led to questions about the fate of the frozen embryos and their potential right to inherit an intestate share of the Rioses' large estate.59 Other cases , suc h a s Davis and Kass v. Kass, decided i n Ne w York several year s afte r Davis, arose a s divorc e proceeding s betwee n partie s who ha d earlier , whil e mor e happil y married , undertake n infertilit y treatments together. Davis v. Davis: Wer e the Embryo s Children, Property , or Something i n Between ? Mary Sue and Junio r Lewi s Davis married i n 1980 . In the earl y years of the marriage , Mar y Su e suffere d a serie s o f ectopi c pregnancie s tha t resulted i n th e los s o f he r fallopia n tubes . Then , i n 1985 , the coupl e entered a n i n vitr o fertilizatio n progra m a t a Knoxvill e fertilit y clinic . Mary Su e trie d th e i n vitr o procedur e withou t succes s severa l time s during the next few years. In 1988, on the advice of their infertility doctor, the coupl e decide d t o cryopreserve embryo s for futur e us e should Mar y Sue no t becom e pregnan t durin g th e nex t cycl e i n whic h ov a wer e extracted. I n Decembe r 1988 , nine ov a were retrieved . Tw o were fertil ized an d implanted , bu t di d no t resul t i n a pregnancy . Seve n wer e cryopreserved an d store d i n th e Knoxvill e clinic . Two month s later , i n February 1989, the Davises' marriage failed . The coupl e agree d abou t al l th e term s o f thei r divorc e excep t th e disposition o f the seven frozen embryos . At first, Mary Sue hoped t o use the embryos to become pregnant herself. She later remarried (becomin g Mary Su e Stowe ) an d requeste d tha t th e embryo s b e donate d t o a n infertile couple . Junior Davi s opposed bot h uses , proposing instea d tha t the embryo s b e store d indefinitely . A t th e time , indefinit e storag e wa s understood a s "tantamoun t t o destruction " sinc e i t wa s believe d tha t frozen embryos would likely not be viable after a couple of years.60 Later, Junior asked that the embryos be discarded. In th e cours e o f litigation , thre e Tennesse e court s hear d th e case . Each base d it s opinion o n a view of the embryos ' existentia l conditio n radically differen t fro m tha t o f the othe r tw o courts. To Judge Young of the tria l court , th e embryo s wer e children . "Th e Cour t finds and con cludes," h e asserted , "tha t th e seve n cryopreserve d embryo s ar e hu man."61 Fo r Judg e Young , tha t conclusio n delineate d wha t h e the n 160 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations described a s th e essentia l questio n i n th e case : "Wha t the n i s th e lega l status t o be accorde d a human bein g existin g a s an embryo , in vitro, i n a divorce cas e i n th e stat e o f Tennessee?" 62 H e answered , expressl y as serting the court' s parens patria e power : [I]t i s to th e manifes t bes t interes t o f the children , in vitro, that the y b e made availabl e fo r implantatio n t o assure their opportunit y fo r liv e birth; implantation i s their sol e and onl y hope fo r survival . The Cour t respect fully finds an d conclude s tha t i t furthe r serve s th e bes t interes t o f thes e children fo r Mrs . Davi s t o b e permitte d th e opportunit y t o brin g thes e children to term through implantation. 63 The cour t furthe r veste d "temporar y custod y o f th e parties ' seve n cryo genically preserve d huma n embryos " with Mar y Sue . The Cour t o f Appeals o f Tennesse e reversed . I n th e appellat e court' s decision, th e tria l court' s focu s o n th e mora l an d existentia l statu s o f th e embryos disappears , an d wa s replace d b y a focus o n outcome . "Th e sol e issue o n appeal, " declare d th e appellat e court , "i s essentiall y wh o i s entitled t o control seven o f Mary Sue' s ova fertilized b y Junior's sperm." 64 The cour t conclude d i n effec t that , whateve r th e statu s o f th e fertilize d ova, the y woul d b e afforde d a statu s somewher e betwee n propert y an d body organs available for transplant . Citin g th e Unifor m Anatomica l Gif t Act, a s passe d i n Tennessee , th e cour t conclude d tha t Mar y Su e an d Junior share d "a n interest " i n th e cryopreserve d embryo s and , accord ingly, vested "join t control" in both o f them.65 The decision s went furthe r toward definin g th e embryos ' status than towar d determinin g thei r practi cal fate . The stat e suprem e cour t affirme d th e holdin g o f th e appellat e court , but separated itsel f from an y implication i n th e lower court's opinio n tha t the parties ' interes t i n th e embryo s wa s "i n th e natur e o f a propert y interest."66 Th e cour t explained : [Pjreembryos ar e not, strictly speaking, either "persons " or "property," but occupy a n interi m categor y tha t entitle s the m t o specia l respec t becaus e of thei r potentia l fo r huma n life . I t follow s tha t an y interes t tha t Mar y Sue Davi s and Junio r Davi s have i n th e preembryo s i n thi s cas e i s not a true propert y interest . However , the y d o hav e a n interes t i n th e natur e of ownership, to the exten t that they have decision-making authority concerning dispositio n o f the preembryos , withi n th e scop e o f polic y se t by law.67 161

Social Implications of Biological Transformations In it s conclusion s an d holding , however , th e stat e suprem e cour t evaded th e questio n o f how to respect cryopreserve d embryo s an d turne d instead t o the interest s and right s of the gamet e donors . The cour t finally decided that , give n th e lac k o f eithe r a curren t o r prio r agreemen t between th e partie s abou t th e embryos , i t became necessar y t o weigh th e "relative interest s o f the partie s i n usin g o r no t usin g th e preembryos." 68 The cour t wrote : Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that th e othe r part y ha s a reasonable possibilit y o f achievin g parenthoo d by means othe r tha n th e us e o f the preembryo s i n question . I f no othe r reasonable alternative s exist , the n th e argumen t i n favo r o f usin g th e preembryos t o achiev e pregnanc y shoul d b e considered . However , i f the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely to donate them to another couple , the objectin g part y obviously has the greate r interes t and should prevail. 69 In th e aftermat h o f tha t conclusion , th e embryo s wer e transmitte d t o Junior Davi s b y th e Knoxvill e infertilit y clini c wher e the y ha d bee n stored fo r ove r fou r years . I n Jun e 1993 , Davi s announce d tha t h e ha d had th e embryo s destroyed. 70 Each o f the thre e stat e court s that rendere d opinion s i n Davis, a s well as th e partie s an d amic i curia e wh o presente d argument s t o th e courts , reviewed th e biologica l fact s o f embryoni c creatio n an d developmen t i n order t o justif y th e decisio n reache d o r desired . Thus , whil e th e partie s (along with amic i curiae ) disagree d abou t th e description , th e definition , and th e "personhood " o f the embryos , the y use d th e sam e medica l fact s surrounding i n vitro fertilization t o support thei r respectiv e claims . This cas e differe d fro m Johnson v. Calvert i n tha t th e opposin g partie s in Davis ha d eac h donate d a gamete t o produce th e embryo s i n question . Thus neithe r part y coul d us e th e biologica l fact s a s the y ar e no w gener ally understood t o demonstrate a greater o r more "natural " relation t o th e embryos. Othe r understanding s d o exist , bu t wer e no t stresse d b y th e parties i n Davis. I n fact , fo r instance , folkcultur e ofte n ignore s th e scien tific understandin g o f gameti c donation—whic h characterize s th e mal e and femal e gamete s a s similar apar t fro m th e X and Y chromosomes—i n order t o view th e donatio n o f the mal e a s superior t o tha t o f the female . Helena Ragon e note s the us e of this folk-theory amon g surrogate mother s who hop e t o minimiz e thei r ow n biologica l connectio n t o the child. 71 I n 162 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations fact, Dr . Jerome Lejeune , a Frenc h geneticis t wh o testifie d fo r Mar y Su e Davis at trial, did asser t that i n hi s view, the gamet e provide d b y the mal e is not geneticall y comparabl e t o tha t provide d b y th e female . H e argue d that certai n sort s o f geneti c informatio n ar e carrie d b y sper m an d othe r sorts o f informatio n ar e carrie d b y ova. 72 Mar y Su e di d no t stres s thi s understanding i n he r ow n argument s befor e th e courts . Th e partie s i n Davis did , however , invok e biologica l fact s t o defin e th e mora l an d existential statu s o f th e embryos , an d thu s hopefull y th e controversy , s o that th e fat e o f th e embryo s woul d b e decide d a s each , respectively , desired. The brief s an d th e argument s presente d t o the court s i n Davis sugges t three broa d view s o f th e embryos ' status . Eac h o f th e thre e view s wa s adopted b y on e o f th e thre e court s tha t rendere d decision s i n th e case . The tria l cour t viewed th e embryo s a s children an d therefor e understoo d the cas e a s a custod y battl e betwee n tw o parents . Th e intermediat e appellate cour t viewe d th e embryo s a s animat e commodities , muc h a s other court s hav e viewe d geneticall y engineere d matter. 73 Th e cour t therefore frame d th e cas e t o resembl e a property disput e betwee n divorc ing spouses. Finally, the stat e suprem e cour t sough t a middle course , on e that avoide d expressl y viewin g th e embryo s a s eithe r peopl e o r property . The cour t determine d tha t th e embryos , althoug h no t persons , wer e entitled t o "specia l respec t becaus e o f thei r potentia l fo r huma n life. " This vie w allowe d th e cour t t o distinguis h it s treatmen t o f th e embryo s from th e treatmen t i t woul d affor d inanimat e commoditie s i n anothe r case, while als o allowin g th e cour t t o bypass th e interest s o f the embryo s (which woul d b e determinativ e i f they were "children") . In fact , th e Tennesse e Suprem e Court , afte r emphasizin g th e respec t owed th e embryos , turne d t o a worl d o f contractua l negotiations , an d a world concerne d wit h th e preservatio n o f people' s (i n thi s case , th e gamete donors' ) constitutiona l right s i n th e contex t o f intimat e familia l relationships. Th e cour t encourage d th e us e o f prefertilizatio n contract s between gamet e donor s intereste d i n togethe r becomin g th e parent s o f a child, an d suggeste d tha t th e term s o f suc h contract s b e conclusiv e i n future disputes . I f suc h a contractua l agreemen t di d no t exist , th e cour t suggested focusing , a s it did i n Davis itself , on th e interest s o f the gamet e donors. Thus , i n th e end , th e stat e suprem e cour t i n Davis di d no t exactly trea t th e embryo s a s havin g a statu s intermediat e betwee n tha t of peopl e an d tha t o f property . Rather , th e cour t hel d tha t treatmen t o f 116 3 1

Social Implications of Biological Transformations disputes ove r embryo s shoul d var y dependin g upo n th e existenc e o f agreement. Wher e a n agreemen t exists , th e cour t wil l trea t th e disput e more lik e on e involvin g property . O n th e othe r hand , whe n ther e i s n o agreement betwee n th e gamet e donors , th e cour t wil l trea t th e disput e more lik e on e involvin g famil y members . Thus , a s will b e considere d i n detail i n chapte r 7 , althoug h th e cour t premise d it s conclusion s o n th e "special respect " owe d embryo s "becaus e o f thei r potentia l fo r huma n life," th e decisio n i n fac t reflecte d concer n fo r th e gamet e donor s in stead.74 Mor e specifically , th e decisio n di d no t respec t th e embryos , except to the exten t tha t th e embryos ' interest s were encompasse d b y th e interests o f the donors . Moreover, th e donor s wer e respecte d onl y insofa r as th e court —unable t o rel y o n a contractual , o r other , agreemen t be tween them—focuse d o n thei r procreationa l autonom y a s protecte d b y the Constitution . In fact , non e o f th e thre e courts ' respectiv e conclusion s abou t th e existential statu s o f the embryo s necessitate d th e holdin g tha t eac h cour t reached abou t th e fat e o f th e embryos . Thei r conclusion s abou t th e embryos' statu s did , however , establis h th e term s o f th e debate . Fo r instance, a conclusion tha t th e embryo s are , or resemble , childre n estab lishes tha t th e cas e shoul d b e handle d a s a custod y dispute . Within tha t dispute, the cour t coul d theoreticall y hav e decide d tha t th e bes t interest s of th e embryoni c childre n la y wit h perpetua l storage , wit h donatio n t o an infertil e couple , o r wit h som e othe r us e o r disposition . Similarly , a conclusion tha t th e embryo s are , o r resemble , propert y establishe s tha t the cas e shoul d b e handle d b y referenc e t o th e parties ' comparativ e claims t o "control " th e propert y a t stake . Tha t perspectiv e doe s not , however, clearl y dictat e th e prope r us e o r dispositio n o f th e Davis em bryos. While th e rhetori c i n Davis doe s not necessitate a particular outcome , it serve s a ver y importan t rol e i n structurin g th e curren t debat e abou t family. Clearly , Davis wa s about fa r mor e tha n th e fat e o f seven embryos . Encompassing th e controvers y abou t th e fat e o f the seve n Davis embryo s is a much broade r debat e abou t the meanin g an d parameters , indee d th e very nature, of the family , an d o f the person s who compos e families . Th e case provide d a concret e foru m i n whic h th e large r debat e coul d b e conducted. In carryin g o n tha t large r debate , th e partie s consistentl y invoke d th e biological fact s o f embryoni c development . A s i n Johnson, eac h sid e 1164

Social Implications of Biological Transformations claimed tha t the weight of scientific trut h demonstrate d th e uniqu e valu e of it s perspectiv e an d it s propose d us e fo r th e dispute d embryos . And, a s in Johnson, th e invocatio n o f biological fact s prove d generall y inconclu sive. N o conclusion s abou t th e statu s o f th e embryo s coul d fairl y b e derived fro m th e tota l testimon y o f th e medica l experts . Ye t eac h cour t relied o n som e o f that testimon y t o justif y it s view o f the embryo s an d it s conclusions abou t thei r fate . Of th e thre e court s tha t hear d th e case , th e tria l cour t mos t emphati cally embrace d biologica l fact s t o suppor t it s conclusion s abou t th e embryos' existentia l an d mora l status . Tha t cour t relie d heavil y o n th e interpretations o f Dr. Jerome Lejeune, th e Frenc h geneticis t who testifie d for Mar y Su e Davi s a t trial . Dr . Lejeun e wa s know n i n th e scientifi c world fo r hi s discover y o f th e chromosom e responsibl e fo r Down' s syn drome. H e ha d bee n appointe d i n 197 4 by th e Pop e a s a membe r o f th e Pontifical Academ y o f Sciences and ha d worke d activel y to have abortio n declared illegal. 75 Dr . Lejeun e premise d hi s argument s fo r Mar y Su e o n the positio n tha t i n vitr o fertilizatio n doe s no t diffe r fundamentall y fro m fertilization withi n a woman's body . After describin g th e proces s o f fertil ization withi n a woman's body , Dr . Lejeun e asserted : It is not at all the inseminator who makes fertilization, h e just puts on the right medium , a ripe ovum , active sperm , and i t i s the sper m wh o mak e the fertilization. Ma n would be unable to make a fertilization. I t has to be done directly by the cells. And it' s because they were normally floating in the fluid that this extracorporeal technique is at all possible. Now, the reproduction proces s is a very impressive phenomenon i n the sense that what is reproduced i s never the matter, but it is information. 76 In thi s statement , Dr . Lejeun e attempte d t o suppor t tw o arguments . First, h e wante d t o establis h tha t embryo s produce d throug h i n vitr o fertilization ar e n o differen t fro m embryo s produce d throug h sexua l intercourse. Second , h e se t th e scientifi c stag e fo r concludin g tha t th e embryos, cryopreserve d a t th e four-to-eigh t cel l stage , represen t uniqu e human beings , jus t a s they woul d ha d the y bee n conceive d an d allowe d to develo p i n a woman' s body . Dr . Lejeun e argue d that , becaus e eac h embryo contain s al l th e informatio n necessar y t o produc e a uniqu e human bein g eve n befor e th e eight-cel l stage , eac h i s a huma n being . "[S]cience," he asserte d "ha s a very simple conceptio n o f man; as soon a s he ha s bee n conceived , a ma n i s a man." 77 Whe n Charle s Clifford , i6 5

Social Implications of Biological Transformations Junior Davis's attorney, asked whether a zygote deserves "the same respec t as an adul t huma n being," 78 Dr . Lejeun e responded : I'm no t telling you that because Pm not in [the ] position o f knowing that. I'm tellin g you, he is a human being , and then i t is a Justice who will tell whether thi s human bein g has the sam e right s as the others . . . . But as a geneticist you ask me whether this human bein g is a human, and I would tell yo u tha t becaus e h e i s a bein g an d bein g human , h e i s a huma n being.79 After discussin g th e implication s o f cryopreservin g cells , Dr . Lejeun e suggested tha t alternative s t o i n vitr o fertilization , an d th e cryopreserva tion o f any resultin g embryos , were o n th e horizon . H e furthe r suggeste d that thes e alternative s offere d biologicall y an d sociall y superio r result s t o those produce d throug h th e presen t methods . "[L]ove, " h e declared , "i s the contrar y [sic] of chilly. Lov e i s warmth. . . . [T]he bes t w e ca n d o fo r early huma n being s i s t o hav e the m i n thei r norma l shelter , no t i n th e fridge."80 Dr. Lejeun e wa s on e o f five expert s wh o testifie d a t trial . H e alon e testified that , a s a scientific matter , huma n lif e begin s a t conception ; yet , the tria l cour t relie d o n Dr . Lejeune' s testimon y fo r jus t that conclusion , which i t proclaime d i n a lis t o f twelve "finding s o f fact an d conclusion s of law resultin g i n judgment." 81 Reviewin g Dr . Lejeune' s scientifi c testi mony, an d comparin g i t wit h tha t o f othe r exper t witnesses, 82 th e cour t concluded tha t nothin g i n th e testimon y o f th e othe r expert s effectivel y disputed Dr . Lejeune' s assertio n tha t th e cell s o f a n earl y embry o ar e differentiated. I n describin g th e earl y embryo' s cell s a s "differentiated, " Dr. Lejeune hope d t o show that the earl y embryo i s unique, autonomous , and human—thus , "a n earl y human being. " Whatever th e validity of Dr. Lejeune' s controversia l conclusion s abou t the biolog y o f earl y embryos , the y hardl y compe l th e conclusio n tha t four-cell embryo s ar e huma n beings . However , Dr . Lejeune' s testimony , and th e court' s characterizatio n o f tha t testimony , dramaticall y illustrat e how th e fact s o f natur e ar e use d t o justif y socia l an d mora l conclusions . The cour t justifie d it s holdin g b y referrin g t o Dr . Lejeune' s explanatio n of th e biologica l fact s o f embryoni c development , eve n thoug h i t ac knowledged tha t Dr . Lejeune' s conclusion s abou t th e differentiatio n o f cells i n earl y embryo s wer e "highl y technical , incapabl e o f observatio n 11661

Social Implications of Biological Transformations by th e Cour t an d require[d ] th e Cour t t o eithe r accep t o r rejec t th e scientist's conclusion." 83 At leas t tw o broadl y dissimila r strategie s ca n b e employe d i n re sponding t o Dr . Lejeune' s testimon y an d t o th e tria l court' s conclusion s based o n tha t testimony . First , a n alternativ e descriptio n and/o r interpre tation o f the biologica l fact s migh t b e presente d t o disput e th e details , o r the implications , o f Dr. Lejeune' s testimony . Second , th e biologica l fact s might b e bypassed , an d th e term s o f discourse shifte d t o anothe r domai n entirely. Junior Davi s and th e tw o higher courts , each o f which disagree d with th e tria l court' s analysis , employe d eac h o f thes e strategie s a t on e time o r another . Junior Davi s offere d a n alternativ e descriptio n o f th e seve n cryopre served embryos . "As just two or eight cel l tin y lumps o f complex protein, " he argued , "th e embryo s hav e n o rea l valu e t o eithe r party. " 84 Moreover , he offere d competin g theorie s fo r interpretin g th e socia l significanc e o f embryonic development . Junio r differentiate d a fetu s fro m a n embryo , and stresse d tha t th e earl y embry o lack s a nervou s system . Quotin g th e work o f John Robertson , on e o f Junior's expert s a t trial, Junior declared : Even i f on e take s a ver y cautiou s positio n o n whe n a nervou s syste m begins, the earliest possible time of arguable relevance i s the formation o f the primitiv e streak , th e precurso r t o th e nervou s system . Ye t thi s first structure o f th e embry o prope r doe s no t develo p unti l implantatio n ha s occurred, some ten to fourteen day s after fertilization. 85 In a similar vein, the state court of appeals, with almos t no elaboration , simply replace d th e tria l court' s interpretatio n o f th e relevan t biologica l facts wit h it s own: There are significant scientific distinction s between fertilized ov a that have not been implante d an d a n embry o i n the mother' s womb. The fertilize d ova at issu e are betwee n 4 and 8 cells. Genetically eac h cel l i s identical. . . . I t i s importan t t o remembe r whe n thes e ov a wer e fertilize d throug h mechanical manipulation , thei r developmen t wa s limite d t o th e 8 cel l stage.86 The Tennesse e Suprem e Cour t expressl y dismisse d Dr . Lejeune' s sci entific testimony . Whil e acknowledgin g Lejeun e a s "a n internationall y recognized geneticist, " th e cour t note d tha t hi s "backgroun d fail s t o 1167

Social Implications of Biological Transformations reflect an y degre e o f expertise i n obstetric s o r gynecolog y (specificall y i n the field o f infertility ) o r i n medica l ethics. " Moreover , "hi s testimon y revealed a profoun d confusio n betwee n scienc e an d religion." 87 Th e court describe d i n som e detai l th e testimonie s o f Dr. Ra y King and othe r experts, al l o f whic h controverte d Dr . Lejeune' s testimon y abou t th e stages through whic h a fertilized ovu m proceed s durin g gestation . At th e heart o f this alternativ e depictio n o f embryonic developmen t i s the "bio logic differenc e betwee n a preembry o an d a n embryo." 88 Dr . King' s testimony, a s summarize d b y th e court , characterize d th e preembryoni c stage a s continuin g unti l cellula r differentiatio n begins , abou t fourtee n days after fertilization . Whateve r th e scientifi c meri t o f the distinction , i t can b e use d t o arbitrat e socia l an d mora l disagreements . Finally , th e court conclude d it s description o f the embryo' s development wit h it s own disclaimer abou t th e relevanc e o f th e distinctio n i t ha d jus t describe d between th e preembry o an d th e embryo . "Admittedly , thi s distinction, " the cour t acknowledged , "i s not dispositiv e i n th e cas e before us." 89 The biologica l fact s ca n b e debate d an d revised . A s tha t debat e pro ceeds, th e implication s tha t th e biologica l fact s hol d fo r th e socia l con tours o f famil y ar e reconstructed . Almos t always , i n case s suc h a s Davis there ar e alternativ e response s t o a disconcertin g characterizatio n o f th e biological fact s fo r on e part y a s presente d b y anothe r party , o r b y a court. Fo r instance , whe n face d wit h a n unsettlin g presentatio n o f th e biological facts , i t i s possibl e t o shif t th e leve l o f discours e s o tha t th e biological fact s become backgroun d t o a discussion abou t social, cultural, psychological, o r theologica l matters . Junio r Davi s di d precisel y this . I n arguing hi s cas e t o th e courts , h e largel y bypasse d th e biologica l fact s o f embryonic development , i n orde r t o presen t hi s cas e i n social , rathe r than biological , terms . No t surprisingly , i n almos t al l o f hi s argument s before th e courts , Junior Davi s focuse d upo n family , an d highlighte d hi s desire t o preserve a traditional vie w of familial relationships . Junior referre d t o hi s geneti c connectio n t o th e embryo s i n orde r t o support his constitutional righ t not to become a father. I n this manner, h e defined th e controvers y a s essentially unrelate d t o the fact s o f embryoni c development. Fo r instance , i n concludin g hi s brie f t o th e Tennesse e Supreme Court , h e expressl y state d tha t th e disput e wa s no t abou t em bryos but abou t "whethe r o r no t th e partie s wil l become parents." 90 Thi s shift i n focu s mad e relevan t a variet y o f socia l an d lega l argument s an d 168

Social Implications of Biological Transformations analogies tha t woul d hav e bee n irrelevan t ha d th e cas e bee n abou t th e existential statu s o f the embryos , demonstrable onl y throug h referenc e t o the biologica l fact s o f embryoni c development . If , a s Junior argued , th e central questio n i n th e cas e involve d th e definitio n an d regulatio n o f family, the n Junio r di d not need t o focus exclusivel y on disputin g the tria l court's understandin g o f th e biologica l fact s o f embryoni c development . Instead, h e coul d turn—a s h e did—t o a variety of laws and lega l interpre tations abou t th e famil y tha t di d no t requir e an y consideratio n o f th e facts o f embryoni c development , o r an y furthe r consideratio n o f th e biological underpinning s traditionall y though t t o limi t an d defin e famil y relations. H e could , fo r example , rel y o n th e numerou s constitutiona l decisions rendere d i n th e las t thre e decade s tha t defin e a righ t t o famil y privacy o r autonomy . Thos e case s includ e Griswold v . Connecticut an d Eisenstadt v . Baird, discusse d i n chapte r 2 , a s wel l a s Roe v . Wade. A s a group thes e cases , an d other s lik e them , protec t th e righ t o f individual s to establish familial , an d othe r intimate , relationship s withou t stat e inter ference. Junior' s definitio n o f th e cas e similarl y allowe d hi m t o invok e various statutor y rule s an d regulation s whos e implication s fo r th e socia l and mora l dimension s o f family relationship s favore d hi s case. If, afte r all , th e essentia l issu e i n Davis wa s no t whethe r th e embryo s were human , bu t th e constitutiona l an d statutor y right s o f th e gamet e donors (th e potentia l parents) , the n evidenc e abou t th e specific s o f em bryonic developmen t wa s peripheral. Accordingly, Junior argued : Tennessee specifically recognizes the high importanc e of family or genetic relationships i n conferrin g rights an d benefit s an d allocatin g burden s among citizens . I n man y area s o f th e law , th e mer e fac t o f biologica l kinship alone is sufficient t o confer a right or impose a duty. In such areas the Stat e acknowledge s th e mos t ancien t an d fundamenta l right s an d duties springin g fro m huma n kinshi p an d wil l no t intrude , eve n i f more modern concepts of fairness or equity might dictate otherwise. 91 At this point , Junio r wa s able t o invok e a serie s o f statutes regulatin g th e relations betwee n famil y members , suc h a s thos e controllin g intestat e inheritance, thos e imposin g a n obligatio n o n a biologica l paren t t o sup port hi s o r he r child , an d thos e regulatin g th e donatio n o f a de ceased person' s bod y organ s b y famil y members. 92 I n relyin g o n thes e statutory rules , Junio r suggeste d first, tha t whateve r th e existentia l statu s 1169

Social Implications of Biological Transformations of the embryos , h e coul d b e oblige d t o support an y chil d produce d fro m them, and second , that such a development shoul d no t occur without hi s consent. For example , Junio r analogize d rule s regulatin g th e donatio n o f bod y organs t o th e regulatio n o f the fat e o f the Davis embryo . Unde r Tennes see law , th e organ s o f a decease d person , absen t a statemen t lef t b y th e deceased, ma y b e donate d i f th e deceased' s nex t o f ki n agree . I f mor e than on e perso n i s next of kin t o the deceden t (e.g. , children o r siblings), agreement mus t b e unanimou s amon g al l member s o f th e grou p befor e donation ca n occur . Junio r suggeste d tha t similarl y i n th e cas e o f froze n embryos, a decisio n t o donat e (thoug h apparentl y no t t o discard ) th e embryos, should onl y be affected upo n agreemen t of both gamete donors . Junior explained : "Eac h party' s interes t i n th e dispositio n o f the embryo s springs fro m th e sam e ancien t wellsprin g o f kinshi p involve d i n th e policy o f orga n donatio n se t ou t above . N o dispositio n shoul d b e mad e of their embryo s unles s they both agree." 93 Somewhat mor e implicitly , Junio r use d th e orga n donatio n statut e t o invoke the importanc e o f family an d to connect himself, and hi s position, to family . Tennesse e rule s regulatin g orga n donatio n b y a dea d person , he asserted , illustrate d "th e hig h degre e o f respec t an d deferenc e du e human kinship." 94 I n thi s way , Junior transforme d th e debat e fro m on e about th e humanit y o f th e embryo s int o on e abou t th e parameter s o f family. A s a result, h e wa s able t o associate hi s positio n wit h th e "ancien t wellspring o f kinship." 95 Ironically , Junior' s invocatio n o f family , an d o f the "ancien t wellsprin g o f kinship," aimed t o protec t hi s righ t t o remai n free o f family . H e allude d t o famil y an d traditio n i n orde r t o safeguar d his righ t t o autonomou s choice . Junior' s allusio n reflecte d th e pervasiv e transformation o f th e America n famil y fro m a holisti c uni t structure d i n hierarchical term s t o a collectivit y o f separat e individuals , unconnecte d until an d unles s the y choos e connections . The Tennesse e Suprem e Court , afte r considerin g an d evaluatin g th e extensive testimon y abou t biologica l facts , an d th e consequen t statu s o f the embryos , similarl y shifte d th e leve l o f discourse . First , th e cour t switched fro m th e biologica l t o the lega l dimension s o f the case , in orde r to dra w conclusion s abou t th e statu s o f th e embryos . Later , th e cour t turned awa y entirel y fro m th e questio n o f th e embryos ' statu s o r rights , and considere d instea d th e competin g constitutiona l right s o f th e tw o gamete donors . I 17°

Social Implications of Biological Transformations After considerin g th e "scientifi c testimony " presente d t o the tria l cour t about th e fact s o f embryoni c developmen t an d concludin g tha t tha t testimony faile d t o compe l an y particula r judicia l response , th e cour t turned t o a n examinatio n o f th e state' s treatmen t o f fetuse s i n th e womb. 96 Reviewin g th e Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t decisio n i n Roe v. Wade whic h assert s that fetuses ar e no t "persons " under th e law , the cour t concluded tha t th e embryo s i n Davis shoul d certainl y no t b e treate d a s legal persons . The cour t stil l ha d t o decide, however , wha t t o do with th e Davis' embryos . Th e lega l conclusio n tha t embryo s ar e no t person s offered almos t n o mor e assistanc e tha n ha d th e parties ' an d experts ' interpretations o f the biologica l facts . In orde r t o reac h an d justif y a concret e decision , th e cour t shifte d th e focus o f it s analysi s eve n furthe r fro m th e existentia l statu s o f th e em bryos. After decidin g tha t th e embryo s wer e neithe r person s (o n th e basi s of som e combinatio n o f th e biologica l fact s an d th e law ) no r propert y (on th e apparen t basi s o f th e court' s ow n sens e o f things—includin g perhaps th e ver y fac t tha t th e embryos ' biolog y coul d be , an d ha d been , extensively considered) , th e cour t focuse d o n th e right s o f th e gamet e donors rathe r tha n o n th e right s o f (o r "respect " owed ) th e embryos . I n this regard , th e cour t relie d o n Junio r Davis' s vie w tha t th e cas e wa s no t about th e embryo s o r wher e t o stor e th e embryos , bu t wa s rathe r abou t "whether th e partie s will becom e parents." 97 After reviewin g federa l an d stat e assurance s o f a "righ t t o privacy, " th e court declared : Obviously, th e drafter s o f th e Tennesse e Constitutio n o f 179 6 could no t have anticipated the need to construe the liberty clauses of that document in term s of the choice s flowing from in vitro fertilizatio n procedures . But there ca n b e little doubt tha t they foresaw th e nee d t o protect individual s from unwarrante d governmen t intrusio n int o matter s suc h a s th e on e before us , involving intimate questions of personal and family concern. 98 The cour t the n addresse d tw o equa l right s derivin g fro m th e "righ t t o procreational autonomy " tha t i t define d a s bein g a t stak e i n Davis— the "right t o procreate " an d th e "righ t t o avoi d procreation" 99 —and under took t o weigh "th e relativ e interests " of Junior an d Mar y Su e i n regar d t o the embryos. 100 Thus, th e cour t al l bu t abandone d it s concer n wit h th e existentia l status o f the embryos . The court' s holdin g effectivel y disregarde d it s ow n 171

Social Implications of Biological Transformations determination tha t th e existentia l statu s o f th e embryo s demande d the y be given "special respect " because o f their potential fo r life 101 an d instea d favored th e statu s an d right s o f the gamet e donors . B y asserting tha t th e case was essentially about the contour s o f family—even i f a disintegratin g family—the cour t apparentl y satisfie d it s conditio n tha t th e la w respec t the embryos , an d therefor e fel t fre e t o focu s o n th e interest s o f th e gamete donors . I n effect , th e decisio n presume s tha t th e gamet e donor s as family , o r potentia l family , t o th e embryo s woul d demonstrat e th e requisite respec t fo r th e embryo s i n an y decisio n abou t th e embryos ' us e or disposition . Essentially, th e cour t wa s abl e t o rel y o n th e possibilit y inheren t i n Western view s o f th e famil y o f separatin g biologica l fro m socia l fact . A s Marilyn Strather n ha s asserted : Arguments in favour o f embracing the new reproductive technologies can point to them as techniques that will alleviate suffering an d provide remedies fo r disability , an d thu s enabl e th e famil y t o tak e it s prope r an d traditional form. The domains of biological and social fact are not, in this view, to b e confused . Medica l interventio n i s strictly interventio n i n th e biological process . And whil e i t ma y alte r th e dispositio n o f kin, tha t is , alter expectation s abou t wh o becomes related , th e traditiona l famil y a s a social unit is not necessarily challenged. 102 The possibilit y o f separatin g th e biologica l an d socia l fact s o f famil y allows partie s an d court s t o premis e thei r argument s o n th e significanc e of preservin g traditiona l familie s eve n i n case s i n whic h th e biologica l facts ar e unknown , ambiguous—a s i n Davis— or i n apparen t conflic t with th e view , pervasiv e i n Wester n cultures , tha t specifi c biologica l relationships ancho r famil y relationships . The stat e suprem e cour t i n Davis, unlik e th e tria l court , wa s unabl e or unwilling t o ground it s decision o n th e certaint y o f inexorable natura l fact. Instea d th e cour t shifte d th e leve l o f discourse , an d focuse d o n a domain o f socia l interaction , tha t o f th e family . Tha t domai n ha s lon g held a special , eve n sacred , plac e i n Wester n culture , an d ha s bee n understood throug h referenc e t o biological facts that have more generall y been assume d tha n delineate d an d described . Thus , again , th e respec t the cour t declare d tha t th e la w owe d th e embryo s o n th e basi s o f thei r existential statu s wa s satisfie d b y actualizin g th e respec t owe d th e tw o people wh o migh t hav e become th e embryos ' parents . 117*1

Social Implications of Biological Transformations In fact , th e court' s opinio n allowe d for , an d eve n encouraged , explici t contractual regulatio n o f cryopreserve d embryo s i n futur e cases . I n th e absence o f an y agreement s betwee n th e Davises , th e cour t ultimatel y effected a disposition tha t relied , mor e tha n anything , on it s own sens e of the har m Junio r woul d suffe r b y havin g childre n produce d fro m th e embryos, as compared t o the relativ e benefi t t o Mar y Su e i f the embryo s were t o survive to become children . In th e end , th e cour t wa s abl e t o "respect " an d t o avoi d considerin g fully th e biologica l realit y o f embryoni c developmen t an d o f four-cel l cryopreserved embryos . I t wa s abl e t o connec t th e extensiv e testimon y provided b y expert s a t tria l t o it s characterizatio n o f th e embryo s a s deserving o f "respect." Th e cour t accomplishe d thi s withou t considerin g the concret e implication s o f "respecting " embryos , an d withou t directl y actualizing th e presumptio n o f respec t a t all . Moreover , th e cour t wa s able t o preserv e traditiona l view s o f famil y b y premisin g it s decisio n o n the parties ' familia l status , while simultaneousl y defyin g traditio n almos t entirely b y suggestin g tha t contract , rathe r tha n family , la w coul d bes t deal wit h cryopreserve d embryos . Thus, th e opinio n o f th e suprem e cour t ca n b e rea d bot h t o connec t biological trut h t o th e socia l order , an d t o disassociat e th e tw o almos t completely. Further , th e opinio n ca n b e rea d t o herald , o r a t leas t t o encourage, a radically new view of intimate (family ) relationship s an d ye t to focu s chiefl y o n safeguardin g old-fashione d right s an d responsibilitie s connected t o th e family . I t can b e rea d i n thes e various , often contradic tory, ways in larg e par t becaus e th e cour t appeare d t o ground it s decisio n in a reasone d assessmen t o f what Justic e Daughtrey , writin g fo r th e stat e supreme cour t i n Davis, calle d th e "scientifi c testimony " (th e biologica l facts), whil e acknowledgin g quit e forthrightl y tha t thos e fact s faile d t o direct th e cour t t o a clea r holdin g i n th e case . I n a sense , th e biologica l facts offere d solac e where the y failed t o offer guidance . They allowe d th e court t o invok e traditio n an d th e sacre d orde r o f old-fashione d families , while a t th e sam e tim e permittin g th e cour t t o sugges t that , t o resolv e disputes suc h a s thos e i n Davis, contrac t la w migh t b e bette r tha n fam ily law. In short , th e Davis case , take n a s a whole , show s th e continuin g interest o f th e la w an d th e societ y i n predicatin g famil y relationship s o n biological truths , a s wel l a s th e genera l disruptio n an d som e o f th e specific option s availabl e whe n thos e truth s ar e difficul t t o deciphe r o r *73 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations do no t provid e clea r directio n fo r resolvin g controversie s occasione d b y reproductive technology . Eve n i f the assume d connection s betwee n fam ily relationships an d biologica l fact s ca n b e ren t asunde r b y reproductiv e technology, o r already hav e been , t o whatever degree , i t remains possibl e to invoke traditio n a s if it has remained intact . IV. Transformin g Assumption s The varie d response s o f courts t o case s occasione d b y reproductiv e tech nology sugges t the dept h an d significanc e o f the socia l an d lega l transfor mation o f the famil y no w occurring . Take n a s a whole, th e lega l system , much lik e th e large r society , i s reacting wit h uncertaint y an d confusion . In Johnson, for instance , each o f the thre e court s that considere d th e cas e relied o n widel y discrepant understanding s o f maternity an d o f the origi n of th e parent-chil d bon d i n determinin g th e parentag e o f bab y Christo pher. Similarly , eac h o f th e thre e Tennesse e court s tha t rendere d deci sions i n Davis depende d o n thre e completel y differen t understanding s o f the mora l an d existentia l statu s o f frozen embryos . Reproductive technolog y develope d withi n a world alread y witnessin g widespread change s i n th e meanin g o f family . A t present , however , th e new reproductiv e technologie s confron t a legal syste m stil l committe d i n significant par t t o old-fashione d conception s o f famil y wit h familie s tha t often canno t b e assimilate d int o thos e conceptions . I n case s occasione d by reproduction technology , biologica l truth s ma y b e invoke d t o identif y a child' s "real " parents , bu t opposin g partie s ofte n presen t th e sam e biological fact s t o demonstrate contrar y conclusions . In consequence , th e implications fo r societ y o f the biologica l fact s o f reproductio n canno t b e taken fo r granted . Tha t preclude s th e law' s defining an d regulatin g fami lies i n a familiar , consisten t fashion . A s the assumption s tha t previousl y undergirded th e law' s approac h t o familie s ar e challenged , th e la w i s compelled t o inven t ne w approaches . Sometimes, th e recognitio n tha t biologica l fact s n o longe r securel y anchor th e society' s understanding o f family an d famil y relation s present s a ne w challeng e t o th e biologica l fact s themselves . Sometimes , th e bio logical fact s ma y b e elide d b y a n appea l t o traditio n tha t focuse s o n th e social fact s o f family . An d sometime s a ne w vie w o f famil y clearl y emerges, a view tha t value s autonom y mor e tha n connection , an d there *74 I

Social Implications of Biological Transformations fore suggest s tha t famil y relationship s ar e grounde d i n individua l choice —open t o chang e an d t o negotiatio n —rather tha n i n share d as sumptions abou t th e essenc e o f familia l connection s —connections ou r society onc e understoo d a s grounde d predominantl y an d securel y i n unalterable, an d thu s eternal , truths .

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The "Intent " o f Reproductio n

Disputes occasione d b y reproductiv e technolog y forc e court s t o recon sider—and thu s often t o reinvent—assumptions tha t undergird notion s of mother, father , child , an d family . I n case s suc h a s ]ohnson y McDonald, and Davis, th e la w is confronted wit h possibilitie s that challeng e virtuall y every presumptio n th e societ y ha s hel d abou t th e essenc e o f familia l bonds. Moreover , th e la w i s bein g asked t o respon d t o th e disruption s presented b y reproductiv e technology , jus t a s traditiona l assumption s about th e socia l dimension s o f famil y an d th e characte r o f ki n relation s are bein g questione d an d erode d mor e generally . Fo r th e mos t par t th e task ha s fallen t o the judiciary . Court s ar e respondin g b y settling particu lar disputes. But they are doing much mor e than that . They are beginnin g to erec t a se t o f frames , withi n whic h t o thin k abou t an d develo p th e family o f th e future . The y are , i n short , bein g asked t o develo p a ne w social—even a ne w moral—visio n o f familie s an d familia l relationship s so that the y ca n determin e th e appropriat e respons e t o th e socia l an d moral dilemma s create d b y the ne w reproductiv e technologies . Courts hav e begu n thi s tas k ofte n unaide d b y statutor y law , becaus e rules promulgate d t o guid e court s face d wit h dispute s involvin g custod y and parentag e determination s stil l generall y reflec t traditiona l assump tions abou t th e biologica l parameter s o f th e parent-chil d relationshi p and abou t th e meaning s attache d t o huma n reproduction . Mos t stat e legislatures have not yet promulgated rule s aimed directl y at handling disputes engendered b y surrogacy and the new reproductive technologies . In fact , courts , i n considerin g an d resolvin g concret e dispute s involv ing reproductiv e technology , ar e providin g a potentia l laboratory , whos e results legislator s ma y revie w when , a s mus t eventuall y occur , state s respond t o th e conundrum s presente d b y th e ne w reproductiv e techno logies and surrogac y with comprehensiv e statutor y rules . i 7 61

The "Intent" of Reproduction So, for instance , courts decidin g case s such a s Johnson and McDonald (in eac h o f whic h tw o wome n claime d t o b e th e biologica l mothe r o f one child ) wer e poorl y assiste d b y existin g la w sinc e stat e statute s ad dressing matter s o f custod y an d parentag e wer e largel y promulgate d during a perio d i n whic h onl y scienc e fiction envisione d a separatio n o f biological maternit y int o geneti c an d gestationa l aspect s wit h differen t women carryin g ou t eac h role . Some court s facin g suc h case s bypas s existin g statutor y rule s an d formulate ne w approache s aime d expressl y a t resolvin g thes e unprece dented dilemmas . Others , however , adap t establishe d statutor y ap proaches t o situations no t imagine d b y the legislator s who formulated th e exiting rules . Thus, no t surprisingly , court s ar e bot h designin g ne w rule s and stretchin g existin g rule s i n resolvin g dispute s occasione d b y the ne w reproductive technologies . Bot h sort s o f response s ar e alterin g th e con tours an d meanin g o f family . The first sor t of response i s represented b y the decisio n o f the Califor nia Suprem e Cour t i n Johnson. There th e cour t relie d o n parenta l inten t to distinguis h betwee n tw o wome n claimin g t o b e a child' s biologica l mother. Th e court , obviousl y strugglin g t o mediat e amon g conflict s presented b y various image s o f family, ultimatel y side d wit h on e vision o f family. Th e secon d sor t o f respons e i s illustrated b y Baby M . There , th e New Jerse y tria l cour t an d th e stat e suprem e court , despit e ver y differen t decisions, eac h relie d o n th e familia r best-interes t standar d t o determin e the child' s parentage and/o r custody . Judicial relianc e o n th e best-interes t standard, whic h ask s court s t o determin e a child' s bes t interest s i n de termining tha t child' s custod y o r parentage , inevitabl y presume s som e understanding o f family. Fo r that reason, reliance o n th e standard i s more likely to reflec t tha n t o resolv e contradiction s tha t develo p a s families ar e defined a t once throug h th e term s o f the marketplac e an d throug h thos e of th e traditiona l famil y (includin g th e inevitabilitie s associate d wit h blood an d geneti c connection) . Neither sor t o f approach—neithe r tha t whic h bypasse s establishe d rules fo r resolvin g dispute s involvin g custod y an d parentag e no r tha t which attempt s t o adap t establishe d rule s t o ne w contexts—ha s a s ye t proved adequat e t o th e genera l tas k o f definin g an d regulatin g familia l bonds produce d throug h reproductiv e technology . Thi s chapte r an d th e next examin e instance s o f eac h approach , respectively . Thi s chapte r focuses o n th e implication s an d consequence s o f relyin g o n parenta l I 17 7 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction intent t o resolv e dispute s abou t parentage . Th e nex t chapter , i n turn , examines the implication s an d consequence s o f adapting the best-interes t standard t o resolv e parentag e o r custod y dispute s i n case s occasione d b y reproductive technolog y an d surrogacy . Eac h approac h depend s on , an d intensifies, existin g confusion s abou t th e meanin g an d limit s o f th e family. I. Th e Generalizatio n an d Redefinitio n o f Choic e Courts decidin g a numbe r o f case s involvin g reproductiv e technolog y have fastene d upo n th e concep t o f intent an d charge d i t with th e tas k o f resolving disputes about parentage an d custod y as well as, more generally , of mediatin g betwee n th e demand s o f traditio n an d thos e o f modernity . Reliance o n th e deceptivel y simpl e concep t o f inten t inevitabl y involve s the vastly , perhap s endlessly , complicate d stud y o f motivation . Th e charge o f the court s t o themselve s ha s bee n tha t th e stud y o f motivatio n will, somehow o r other , enabl e divers e an d contradictor y understanding s of family t o be reconciled . The result s hav e no t bee n impressive . Inten t i s very difficul t t o deter mine. I t ha s bee n aske d b y th e court s i n particula r case s t o shuttl e between divers e conception s o f famil y i n a dizzyin g an d almos t rando m fashion. Becaus e o f its nature, the concep t o f intent canno t i n goo d fait h act a s mediato r an d ha s fulfille d it s tas k onl y sometime s an d tentatively , if a t all . Thu s court s invokin g inten t t o mediat e betwee n ver y differen t understandings o f family suc h a s bargained interactio n an d love , profan e business an d sacre d connection , hav e rendere d decision s whic h hav e uniformly resiste d an y absolut e identificatio n wit h eithe r understanding . In consequence , a significan t confusio n ha s bee n compounde d b y th e introduction o f a concept designe d t o resolv e th e initia l confusion . Intent i s th e practica l realit y tha t underlie s th e abstrac t concep t o f choice. Inten t precede s choic e an d i s "played back " to the perso n choos ing "i n th e consume r idio m o f choice! 71 Choic e i s essential t o th e worl d of th e marketplace . Th e presumptio n o f unfettere d choic e define s tha t world an d th e actor s wh o operat e i n it . Th e consume r society , consis tently, an d almos t everywhere , stresse s th e appea l o f unendin g choice . Represented b y television an d th e advertising industry , this society assures people tha t a bette r everyda y lif e depend s onl y o n th e appropriatio n o f choices no t yet tried . So , for instance , i f one bran d o f shampoo, laundr y 1178

The "Intent" of Reproduction detergent, o r breakfas t cerea l fail s t o mak e lif e better , a ne w an d bette r brand surel y will soo n appear. 2 Reproductive technology , i f appropriated an d understoo d throug h th e idiom o f th e market , assert s tha t choice s abou t parentag e an d familia l relationships ar e fully comparabl e t o other choice s of the market . Yet, the market's presumptio n o f choice—tha t everythin g ha s bee n chose n an d that everythin g coul d hav e bee n chose n differently—increasingl y i s found i n connectio n wit h th e famil y no t onl y i n case s occasione d b y reproductive technolog y bu t muc h mor e generally . Th e ver y fac t o f infertility, fo r example , a fac t tha t ma y resul t i n th e us e an d purchas e o f reproductive technologies , i s describe d a s unfortunat e precisel y becaus e it limit s o r preclude s choice. 3 Thu s reproductiv e technolog y help s t o create a certai n kin d o f choice—th e choic e t o hav e childre n an d t o create "families. " Generally speaking , reproductiv e technology , simpl y b y unfolding , invites huma n being s t o becom e increasingl y autonomous , an d t o ente r into a rang e o f contract s tha t ma y prov e unlimited . I t thu s invites , an d values, choice . I n this , reproductiv e technolog y inevitabl y challenge s a traditional conceptio n o f famil y whic h i n man y respect s regard s choic e as essentiall y destructive . Thi s i s understandable , sinc e a worl d define d by unchanging truth s roote d i n traditio n an d immutabl e la w tends, o f its nature, t o prefe r a validate d statu s qu o t o unteste d change . Thu s choic e justifies th e developmen t an d us e o f reproductiv e technolog y an d simul taneously threaten s traditiona l understanding s o f family . That bein g th e case , i t i s obviousl y impruden t t o establis h choic e a s the mediatin g principl e betwee n familie s o r aspect s o f familie s under stood a s traditiona l an d familie s o r aspect s o f familie s understoo d a s modern. Nonetheless , i t ha s bee n s o establishe d b y court s anxiou s t o reconcile contradictor y understanding s o f family, uncertai n abou t ho w t o proceed, an d naivel y hopefu l that , someho w o r other , a societ y increas ingly intrigue d b y th e contractua l choice s offere d b y reproductiv e tech nology will , o f it s ow n volitio n (b y choice ) tur n awa y fro m them , an d back towar d traditiona l definition s o f family . This hop e —essentially, th e quixoti c expectatio n tha t choic e wil l de construct itself—underlie s muc h o f the heightene d confusio n an d ambiv alence eviden t i n a number o f cases occasione d b y the ne w reproductiv e technologies, i n which court s have relie d o n th e notio n o f intent i n orde r to resolve conflictin g ideologica l claims . I 179

The "Intent" of Reproduction While inten t precede s choice , choic e enable s intent . Moreover , th e "real" meaning o f a particular choic e ca n b e discovere d throug h analysi s of the motivatin g intent . Thu s inten t explain s choice . Clearly , therefore , a legal syste m prepared t o deal wit h th e challenge s posed b y reproductiv e technology throug h th e analysi s o f inten t ha s implicitl y concede d th e inevitability o f choic e i n allowin g peopl e significan t freedo m t o defin e the scop e an d meanin g o f family. Th e failur e o f such a system t o realiz e that i t has concede d th e inevitabilit y o f choic e merel y assure s tha t th e system wil l adjudicat e th e conflictin g demand s o f traditio n an d moder nity in a confused, self-contradictor y fashion . And thi s i t has done, and continue s t o do. Courts relyin g o n inten t t o resolv e dispute s engendere d b y reproduc tive technology, hav e faile d t o delineate th e parameter s an d implication s of intent . Severa l la w revie w articles , suggestin g tha t inten t shoul d be come th e centra l too l throug h whic h t o settl e dispute s involvin g repro ductive technology , hav e delineate d th e contour s o f th e concept. 4 I n each case , inten t ha s bee n equate d almos t completel y wit h th e sor t o f choice understoo d a s paradigmatic o f contractual negotiations . Thus, th e articles urg e tha t court s recogniz e an d enforc e contractua l agreement s concerning th e creatio n o f childre n an d families . Court s hav e generall y not bee n willin g t o d o that . Althoug h the y hav e relie d o n intent , court s have faile d t o addres s th e obviou s question s raise d b y tha t reliance . Th e decisions tha t exis t hav e al l faile d t o explai n ho w a party' s rea l inten t i s discerned, eve n thoug h people' s intention s ar e ofte n obviousl y multidi mensional, complicated , an d confused . Th e decision s hav e failed , a s well, t o explai n wh y an y on e inten t i s preferred ove r anothe r i n case s i n which a party' s inten t changes . I f inten t wer e understoo d t o b e synony mous wit h contract , a s ha s bee n suggested, 5 th e question s raise d b y courts' relianc e o n inten t coul d b e resolve d throug h th e principle s o f contract. Bu t that ha s no t generall y bee n th e case . Courts hav e explicitl y distinguished a party' s inten t fro m th e sam e party' s contractua l agreements. I n effectin g a party' s intent , som e court s hav e referre d to , and eve n relie d directl y on , a contract a s evidence o f intent. Bu t i n suc h cases, th e court s hav e insiste d tha t th e nee d t o effec t a party' s intent , rather tha n th e obligatio n t o enforce a contractual agreement , ha s neces sitated thei r holdings . Thus , th e court s hav e denie d tha t the y ar e simpl y applying rule s of the marketplac e t o the regulatio n o f family life . The concep t o f inten t ha s bee n attractiv e t o court s i n thes e cases , 180 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction precisely becaus e relianc e o n inten t ha s seeme d t o allo w court s t o me diate betwee n image s o f th e marketplac e an d thos e o f th e traditiona l home. A s wil l becom e clea r fro m a revie w o f th e cases , court s hav e used th e concep t o f inten t s o that , quit e remarkably , i t suggest s th e rational negotiation s o f th e marke t an d a t th e sam e tim e resemble s "blood" (o r genes ) a s th e groun d o n whic h familia l connection s ar e rendered real . Thus, th e concep t o f inten t suggest s a worl d o f contract , offerin g unlimited fre e choice , bu t courts , relyin g o n th e concep t i n case s occa sioned b y reproductiv e technology , hav e constructe d th e concep t t o invoke image s o f traditiona l famil y relationship s a s wel l a s thos e o f contract. Fo r instance , court s hav e relie d o n inten t s o as to effect certai n kinds o f choices , choice s tha t reflec t th e parameter s associate d wit h traditional famil y life . Other courts , hearing cases calling for a determina tion o f parentag e o r fo r th e righ t t o contro l gameti c material , hav e limited th e choice s tha t ca n b e effecte d throug h judicia l relianc e o n intent by suggesting that use of the concep t b e restricte d t o the resolutio n of case s involvin g som e biologica l connectio n betwee n th e partie s an d the dispute d gamet e o r child . As a result , th e freedo m t o choos e implie d by judicia l relianc e o n inten t ma y becom e th e freedo m o f onl y certai n parties (thos e wit h a biologica l connectio n t o th e gamet e o r child ) t o choose, o r i t ma y becom e th e freedo m t o selec t onl y certai n choice s (those tha t suppor t traditiona l famil y values) . Judicial relianc e o n inten t a s the essentia l determinan t o f parentage i n these case s ha s not , an d probabl y canno t successfull y mediate , an d thereby comfortabl y combine , traditiona l an d moder n conception s o f family. I n fact , thi s relianc e ha s engendere d a se t o f confusion s an d inconsistencies whic h see m inevitabl e if , a s ha s bee n th e case , th e la w fails t o specif y ho w relevan t intention s ar e t o b e identifie d i n an y case . Indicatively, court s relyin g o n th e notio n o f inten t hav e generall y use d the ter m i n th e singula r ( a usag e followe d i n thi s chapte r fo r th e mos t part) a s i f t o sugges t tha t eac h disputan t ca n b e clearl y identifie d wit h one, predominant, motivatin g intent . Th e presumptio n tha t a person wil l likely hav e acte d o n th e basi s o f on e inten t an d tha t tha t inten t ca n b e identified b y other s assume s to o muc h abou t th e complicate d working s of th e huma n mind . Huma n intention s ar e almos t invariabl y comple x and mos t judges , lik e mos t people , ar e unabl e t o delineat e an d deciphe r the multidimensiona l motivation s tha t engende r huma n action . 11811

The "Intent" of Reproduction Courts coul d defin e inten t a s a matter o f law to be identifiabl e onl y by reference t o a contract o r other, simila r documentation . On e commenta tor ha s suggested, fo r instance , tha t i n case s involvin g artificia l insemina tion "th e parties ' preconceptio n intent " shoul d "gover n paternity " an d that la w maker s shoul d conside r "requirin g tha t som e documentatio n o f that inten t b e filed wit h th e state." 6 In general , however , court s handlin g disputes occasione d b y reproductiv e technolog y hav e no t directe d tha t intent b e specifie d throug h referenc e t o preconceptio n documentatio n (such a s a contract ) fo r a simple , thoug h unfortunat e reason : tha t th e courts, i n thei r confusion , find inten t attractiv e precisel y becaus e i t ca n be constructe d t o serv e th e apparen t interest s o f tradition an d o f moder nity (o f status an d o f contract). A party's inten t ma y indicat e th e term s o f a contrac t int o whic h tha t part y ha s entered ; or , equally , i t may b e take n to refe r t o an undeclare d sens e o f self in connectio n t o other s (includin g familial others) . Not surprisingly, therefore, i n the process of constructin g intent t o serv e various , ofte n contradictor y ends , th e meanin g o f th e concept shifts . If the la w were clearl y t o defin e inten t i n suc h case s t o reflec t princi ples o f contract , th e concep t woul d los e it s usefulnes s i n mediatin g conflicting understanding s o f family . I n fact , eac h cour t tha t ha s relie d on th e concep t o f inten t i n confrontin g th e challenge s o f reproductiv e technology ha s constructe d th e meanin g o f th e notio n inten t indepen dently. I n eac h case , th e meanin g constructe d suggest s a paralle l recon struction o f th e relation s understoo d t o differentiat e an d connec t hom e and work, including related image s of tradition an d modernity . Moreover , construction o f th e notio n o f inten t i n thes e case s reflects , an d the n affects, th e difference s an d similaritie s betwee n th e perso n a s an autono mous individua l an d th e perso n a s a n essentia l par t o f a n endurin g constellation o f familial relationships . The relevan t case s illustrat e th e pressure s o n th e judiciary , an d o n th e legal syste m mor e generally , to decide wha t constitutes a family an d wha t the implication s o f that decisio n ar e fo r competin g claim s t o gametes , embryos, o r children . Moreover , thos e case s illustrat e th e dee p confu sions an d inconsistencie s i n th e law' s respons e a t presen t t o th e possibili ties that reproductiv e technolog y occasions .

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The "Intent" of Reproduction II. Th e Judicia l Response : Inten t a s a n Optio n In Davis v. Davis, th e Tennesse e divorc e cas e i n whic h Junio r an d Mar y Sue Davi s fough t fo r contro l o f thei r seve n froze n embryos , th e conflic t between a vision o f the embryo s a s children an d a vision o f the embryo s as propert y wa s bot h transparen t an d acute . A s a result , th e cas e frame s dramatically th e attractio n tha t a procedure promisin g t o permit contrac t and choic e bu t t o preserv e traditio n hold s fo r courts . Th e stat e suprem e court forge d a n approac h whic h apparentl y promise s t o d o jus t that—t o preserve traditio n an d t o recogniz e modernity . I n fact , th e promis e i s illusory. The cour t bowed to traditional understanding s o f family b y demandin g that "special respect " be paid t o the embryos , defined a s valuable becaus e of thei r "potentia l t o becom e . . . children/' 7 However , i n reachin g a specific holding , th e cour t bypasse d th e interest s o f th e embryo s an d focused o n thos e o f th e progenitors . Th e cour t explaine d tha t ideall y such dispute s shoul d b e resolve d b y effectin g "th e preference s o f th e progenitors,"8 bu t that , i f the progenitor s disagreed , court s shoul d loo k t o any "prio r agreemen t concernin g disposition " o f the embryos . The cour t further explaine d tha t i n case s such a s Davis i n whic h th e partie s di d no t agree, an d ha d neve r expressl y agreed , abou t alternativ e disposition s o f the embryos , "the relativ e interest s of the parties i n usin g or not usin g th e preembryos mus t b e weighed. " In theory , thi s thir d approac h followe d fro m th e righ t t o privac y protected b y th e federa l an d stat e constitutions . However , th e righ t t o privacy offer s n o guidanc e i n selectin g amon g disputants ' conflictin g rights t o procreationa l privacy . Th e constitutiona l fram e withi n whic h the cour t balance d th e parties ' preference s pose d th e righ t t o procreat e against th e righ t t o avoi d procreation . Th e cour t describe d thes e a s "rights o f equal significance." 9 Tha t fram e di d no t compe l an y particula r decision. An d so , the stat e suprem e cour t considere d suc h factor s a s th e "emotional stres s an d physica l discomfort " tha t IV F cause s women , th e "joys of parenthood," the "anguish o f a lifetime o f unwanted parenthood, " the "emotiona l burden " o f knowin g tha t IV F ha d bee n undertake n fo r naught, an d th e burde n o f "wondering " abou t one' s "parenta l status." 10 Thus, th e cour t examined , characterized , an d compare d th e parties ' preferences an d th e emotiona l underpinning s o f thos e preferences . Pre 11831

The "Intent" of Reproduction suming t o balanc e th e parties ' constitutiona l interests , th e cour t i n fac t examined thei r preferences , an d the n effecte d on e party' s preference . The court' s asserte d respec t fo r th e embryos , o n th e on e hand , an d it s attention t o th e wishe s an d interest s o f th e parties , o n th e othe r hand , appear t o recognize , and thu s t o provide for , alternativ e vision s o f family . In fact , however , th e languag e o f th e decisio n reflects , bu t th e holdin g fails completel y t o reconcil e o r eve n acknowledge , th e contradiction s presented b y th e case . B y invokin g th e embryo s an d definin g the m a s i t did, th e Davis cour t appeare d t o acknowledge an d favo r traditiona l fami lies, define d i n contras t wit h th e dictate s o f th e marketplace . Bu t i n recognizing a s definitiv e th e preference s an d contractua l agreement s entered int o b y th e progenitors , th e cour t define d th e Davise s a s associ ates i n th e busines s o f human reproduction . Eve n th e approac h actuall y followed, whereb y th e cour t presume d t o balanc e th e Davis' s respectiv e constitutional interests , reflect s a vie w o f famil y member s a s essentiall y unconnected, autonomou s individuals . Th e Unite d State s Suprem e Court clearl y delineate d tha t vie w i n Eisenstadt (i n proscribin g a statu tory prohibitio n agains t th e distributio n o f birt h contro l t o unmarrie d individuals) a s well a s in latte r privac y cases . However, i t is a view almos t completely a t odd s wit h traditiona l understanding s o f th e famil y a s a connected, endurin g whole . In Davis th e contradiction s betwee n alternativ e vision s o f famil y a s well a s the court' s failur e t o mediate thos e contradiction s ar e transparent . That i s so because th e Davis cour t faile d eve n t o attempt t o reconcil e it s conclusions abou t th e embryos ' ontologica l statu s wit h it s focu s o n th e progenitors' preference s an d interest s i n actuall y resolvin g dispute s suc h as that i n Davis. The sam e se t o f contradiction s appear s i n a numbe r o f othe r case s i n which courts , asked to settle disputes occasioned b y reproductive technol ogy, define d parentag e throug h referenc e t o parenta l intent . I n thes e cases, however , th e contraction s betwee n traditiona l an d moder n under standings o f family ar e fa r les s transparent tha n i n Davis, largel y becaus e the court s attempte d t o construc t th e concep t o f inten t itsel f t o reflec t both th e parameter s o f th e marketplac e an d thos e o f th e traditiona l home.

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The "Intent" of Reproduction Maternal Inten t In bot h Johnson v . Calvert an d McDonald v . McDonald, court s relie d expressly on th e notio n o f intent t o establish th e parentag e o f a baby with two biological mother s (on e genetic, one gestational). Each cas e involve d IVF an d th e gestatio n o f the resultin g embry o i n th e uteru s o f a wome n unconnected geneticall y t o tha t embryo . I n Johnson th e gestationa l mother (calle d th e surrogate ) wa s pai d t o gestat e a n embry o produce d from th e gamete s o f Crispin a an d Mar k Calvert , th e intendin g parents . In McDonald, i n contrast , th e gestationa l mothe r wa s th e intending , though no t genetic , mother . Bot h th e Californi a Suprem e Cour t i n Johnson and th e New York appellate cour t i n McDonald, expressl y follow ing the mode l erecte d i n Johnson, identifie d th e intendin g mothe r a s th e baby's "natural" and lega l mother . As see n from th e discussio n o f Johnson i n th e previou s chapter , th e California Suprem e Cour t i n that case looked t o the notio n o f intent onl y after concludin g tha t neithe r o f th e traditiona l method s fo r establishin g parentage i n California—throug h referenc e t o biolog y o r t o existin g statutory rules—coul d b e applie d satisfactoril y t o th e case . Thus , th e court sough t a n alternativ e metho d fo r establishin g maternity . However , in relyin g o n th e notio n o f inten t t o establis h Crispin a Calvert' s mater nity, th e cour t reconstructe d th e meanin g o f th e term . Thi s chapte r i s concerned primaril y with th e implication s o f that sort of reconstruction . As reconstructe d i n Johnson, th e ter m "intent " denote s alternative , even contradictory , view s of person, parent , an d family . I n thi s sense , th e decision i n Johnson resemble s tha t i n Davis. However , th e Davis cour t delineated tw o essentially unconnecte d approache s t o the case , and then , without explanation , relie d o n onl y on e o f them . I n contrast , th e stat e supreme cour t i n Johnson relie d o n th e singl e concep t o f inten t t o recognize favorabl y th e creatio n o f familie s throug h choic e an d t o ac knowledge th e valu e o f traditional families . As use d b y th e cour t i n Johnson, th e concep t o f inten t represent s a contractual, and a traditional , vie w o f family . Th e decisio n certainl y acknowledges tha t through agreement , familia l connection s ca n b e imag ined, produced , an d then , wit h th e law' s assistance , enforce d an d solidi fied. Also , however, th e ter m i s used a s a symbo l o f familial connection , as a ne w alternativ e t o term s suc h a s bloo d an d genes , whic h constitut e the connectio n betwee n generations . I n thi s sense , th e ter m "intent " 11851

The "Intent" of Reproduction suggests the essenc e o f familial loyalt y and lov e associated wit h traditiona l understandings o f family . Again an d again , th e cour t i n Johnson elaborate d upo n th e notio n o f intent b y invokin g simultaneousl y th e assumption s centra l t o th e worl d of the marketplac e an d thos e centra l t o th e worl d o f traditiona l families . The assumption s o f th e marketplac e see m obviousl y associate d wit h th e concept o f intent . Inten t suggest s wil l an d reason ; i t depend s o n choic e and negotiation , an d i t provide s fo r changin g perspective s an d shiftin g interactions. I n almos t complet e contrast , biology , a s a ground o n whic h familial relation s have long been rendere d sensible , makes those relation s inevitable an d thei r terminatio n unlikely . The suprem e cour t i n Johnson recognize d expressl y tha t it s relianc e on th e notio n o f inten t implie s a contractua l vie w o f family . Th e cour t explicitly approved, althoug h i t did no t directl y enforce , th e contrac t int o which th e partie s ha d entere d an d o n whic h th e cour t relie d i n discern ing th e parties ' intentions . Suc h contracts , explaine d th e court , ar e no t inconsistent wit h publi c policy . But, the notio n o f intent was fashioned by , and wa s useful to , the cour t in Johnson because tha t cour t did not abando n a view of family base d o n a traditional conceptio n o f inexorable connectio n an d replac e i t with on e based firmly an d exclusivel y o n autonomou s individuality—traditionall y perceived a s appropriate t o the marketplac e bu t no t t o the home . Rather , the court relied o n the notio n o f intent, and define d tha t notion variously , if confusedly , a s associate d wit h bot h traditiona l famil y bond s an d wit h contract an d autonomou s individuality . Thus, th e cour t asserte d unhesitatingl y tha t it s relianc e o n inten t wa s not merel y a pretex t fo r identifyin g th e geneti c parent s a s th e lega l parents an d declare d accordingl y tha t parenta l inten t i s determinativ e not onl y o f legal maternity , bu t o f "natural " maternity . Althoug h th e eg g donor emerge s a s th e natura l mothe r i n Johnson, i n othe r cases , th e gestator, i f als o th e intendin g mother , woul d b e th e natura l mother . Exactly tha t identificatio n wa s mad e i n McDonald. There , th e cour t identified th e gestationa l mother , Olg a McDonald , a s th e children' s natural mothe r becaus e Olga , no t th e eg g donor , ha d intende d t o be come thei r socia l mother . Thes e decision s expressl y separate th e designa tion "natura l mother " fro m biologica l considerations ; tha t notwithstand ing, th e designatio n "natura l mother " i n case s suc h a s Johnson an d | 18 6

The "Intent" of Reproduction McDonald perform s th e sam e service—tha t o f identifying a child's "real " mother—usually performe d throug h referenc e t o biology . Neither th e cour t i n Johnson no r tha t i n McDonald use d th e ter m "natural mother " a s a synony m fo r "bette r mother. " Th e Johnson cour t was explicit . I t sough t t o identif y th e real mother . Tha t become s clea r from th e court' s respons e t o th e dissent . Justic e Kennard' s dissen t sug gested tha t th e cas e shoul d b e decide d b y identificatio n o f the paren t o r parents wh o would bes t serve the child' s interests : This "best interests" standard serves to assure that in the judicial resolutio n of disputes affectin g a child's well-being , protection o f the mino r chil d i s the foremost consideration. Consequently, I would apply "the best interests of the child " standar d t o determin e wh o ca n bes t assum e th e socia l an d legal responsibilitie s o f motherhoo d fo r a chil d bor n o f a gestationa l surrogacy arrangement. *] The majorit y describe d th e dissent' s positio n a s "confusing] concept s o f parentage an d custody. " "Logically," the cour t continued , "th e determina tion o f parentage mus t precede , an d shoul d no t b e dictate d by , eventua l custody decisions." 12 Th e cour t explaine d tha t decision s abou t parent age—about wh o th e parent s are — must b e mad e befor e decision s abou t custody. That i s so, however, only in a world i n which inexorable , incontestabl e truths (suc h a s those traditionall y represente d b y claim s base d o n blood , or genetic connections ) dictat e th e fact s o f family. Th e dissen t presume d that i t could establis h parentag e a s well a s custody through a best-interes t determination. Tha t presumptio n suggest s tha t parent s ca n b e linke d t o their childre n withou t relianc e o n inexorabl e truth s abou t th e everlastin g essence o f th e parent-chil d connectio n an d tha t th e identificatio n o f parentage i s a socia l choice . Th e majority , however , i n shar p contrast , self-consciously an d unequivocall y sough t th e rea l an d natura l mother , not the bes t mother . Apart fro m th e replacemen t o f blood o r gene s wit h intent , th e court' s understanding o f the connectio n o n whic h i t predicated th e existenc e o f family i s remarkabl y traditional . Fo r instance , followin g a mode l o f old fashioned, traditiona l families , th e cour t depicte d relation s i n th e famil y and a t hom e ideall y t o b e relation s o f endurin g an d solidar y commit ment, exactl y the typ e o f relations tha t hav e lon g bee n take n t o mak e th e 11871

The "Intent" of Reproduction family differen t fro m th e worl d o f work—a worl d i n whic h relation s ar e transient an d oriente d towar d specifi c goals . I n larg e part , therefore , th e court responde d t o th e challeng e tha t th e fact s i n Johnson presente d t o traditional view s o f famil y b y preservin g a traditiona l vie w but , withi n that, substitutin g ne w assumption s (fo r example , inten t i s productiv e o f familial connections ) fo r ol d assumption s (fo r example , bloo d connec tions produc e familia l relations) . I n thi s sense , th e cour t replace d bloo d and gene s wit h inten t a s th e inexorabl e foundatio n o f familia l commit ment. T o thi s extent , therefore , inten t become s a substitut e fo r bloo d a s the basi c connectio n betwee n parent s an d thei r "natural " children . Thus, th e cour t use d th e notio n o f inten t a s a justificatio n for , an d a s an elaboratio n of , it s central determination—"tha t Crispin a i s the child' s natural mother." 13 Thi s us e o f th e notio n o f inten t ma y initiall y appea r effective, an d thu s perhap s eve n determinative , becaus e i t seems t o brin g the correlate s o f traditiona l famil y lif e int o harmon y wit h th e correlate s of the marketplace , wit h eac h pointin g t o Crispin a Calver t a s the baby' s mother. However, tha t harmon y ca n b e easil y shattered . I n fact , th e court' s approach t o determinin g parentag e i n suc h case s i s self-contradictor y and inherentl y unstable . Th e cour t presente d th e parties ' intention s a s revealing the baby's real and onl y mother; but at the sam e time, the cour t itself connecte d th e parties ' intention s t o th e contractua l agreemen t among them . Mor e particularly , th e cour t embedde d a contractua l un derstanding o f famil y i n th e rhetori c o f famil y a s a real m o f status , a hierarchical real m define d throug h love , loyalty , an d endurin g commit ment. Complication s an d contradiction s ar e evident . Fo r instance , th e court recognize d th e strengt h o f biological connection s i n orde r t o tran scend th e implication s tha t suc h connection s carry . Thus , th e cour t explained tha t i n wha t i t calle d a "tru e 'eg g donation ' situation, " a situation i n whic h th e gestational , rathe r tha n th e genetic , mothe r wa s the intendin g mother , the n th e "birt h mother " woul d b e "th e natura l mother." 14 McDonald represente d exactl y tha t case , and there , th e Ne w York court , relyin g o n Johnson fo r a model , denominate d th e gestationa l and intending , bu t no t genetic, mother, th e "natura l mother. " The court s i n Johnson an d McDonald unhesitatingl y claime d t o hav e identified a real an d natura l mother . I n on e cas e that mothe r wa s genetically relate d t o he r chil d bu t di d no t gestat e no r giv e birt h t o th e child ; in th e othe r sh e gestate d an d gav e birt h t o he r chil d bu t wa s no t linke d | 18 8

The "Intent" of Reproduction to tha t chil d throug h genetics . Th e courts ' conclusion s i n eac h cas e depended o n reconstructin g th e concep t o f intent . I f inten t i s ultimatel y allied wit h th e worl d o f contract , wit h th e worl d o f th e marketplace , then, a s th e dissen t assumed , court s ma y selec t th e bes t paren t i n suc h cases, but the y canno t identif y an d distinguis h th e rea l parent . If , o n th e other hand , parentag e flows inevitabl y fro m th e fact s o f natur e o r fro m the fact s o f family , then , a t leas t i n theory , court s ca n identif y th e real paren t (a s wel l perhap s a s th e bes t parent ) i n suc h case s onl y b y reconstructing th e concep t o f inten t s o tha t intentions , o r a t leas t inten tions that hav e bee n articulate d an d announced , becom e nonnegotiable . Such intention s mus t b e separate d fro m th e worl d o f th e marketplac e and allie d wit h th e sor t o f inexorabl e truth s lon g though t t o underli e familial connections . Clearly, Johnson, an d McDonald i n it s wake , ar e self-contradictory . The contradiction s underlyin g thes e case s reflec t a se t o f contradiction s found pervasivel y withi n present-da y famil y lif e an d famil y law . They ar e thus wort h explorin g further . Tha t exploratio n ca n continu e b y examin ing i n greate r detai l th e response s o f Justic e Kennard , wh o dissente d i n Johnson, t o th e argument s throug h whic h th e majorit y elaborate d upo n the notio n o f inten t a s th e centra l determinan t o f parentag e an d th e court's response s t o Justice Kennard' s dissent . Justice Kennar d asserte d tha t th e cour t i n Johnson looke d t o "tort , property [and ] contrac t law " an d shoul d instea d hav e relie d o n "famil y law, as the governin g paradig m an d sourc e o f a rul e o f decision." 15 Tha t observation i s no t inaccurate . However , o n deepe r examination , th e majority di d no t simpl y rel y o n th e law s o f th e market ; rather , i t appro priated thos e law s an d refashione d the m t o reflec t th e correlate s o f a n ideology o f status a s well a s o f contract . Fo r instance , th e cour t justifie d its relianc e o n inten t b y claimin g tha t "th e chil d woul d no t hav e bee n born bu t fo r th e effort s o f th e intende d parents." 16 Certainly , "but-for " arguments, familia r t o th e la w o f torts , hav e no t generall y bee n invoke d in th e resolutio n o f dispute s concernin g parentage . However , th e cour t framed it s discussion t o suggest that Crispina Calvert' s causative intentio n effected a fundamenta l an d endurin g connectio n betwee n he r an d th e baby—a connectio n a s stron g an d certai n a s an y predicate d o n th e biological correlate s o f maternity . S o understood , inten t become s con nective, joinin g peopl e mor e strongl y an d mor e securel y tha n an y con tract can . i8 9 1

The "Intent" of Reproduction The cour t explained : [T]he menta l concep t o f the chil d i s a controllin g facto r o f it s creation , and th e originator s o f tha t concep t meri t ful l credi t a s conceivers . Th e mental concep t mus t be recognize d a s independently valuable ; i t creates expectations i n the initiating parents of a child, and i t creates expectations in society for adequate performance o n the part of the initiator s as parents of the child. 17 The dissent , describin g thi s languag e a s reminiscen t o f th e law s tha t protect intellectua l property , wrote, [I]t may be argued, just as a song or invention i s protected a s the property of th e "originato r o f th e concept, " s o to o a chil d shoul d b e regarde d a s belonging to the originator of the concept of the child, the genetic mother. The proble m wit h thi s argument , o f course , i s tha t childre n ar e no t property. Unlike songs or inventions, rights in children canno t be sold for consideration, o r mad e freel y availabl e t o th e genera l public . Ou r mos t fundamental notion s o f personhoo d tel l u s i t i s inappropriat e t o trea t children as property.18 The cour t di d not , however , simpl y equat e childre n wit h song s an d inventions. Rather , th e cour t interprete d Crispina' s inten t t o constitute her maternit y an d therefore , t o provid e evidenc e o f he r abilit y t o paren t well. I n th e court' s view , Crispina' s intent , simila r t o anothe r mother' s blood o r genes , connecte d Crispin a t o th e chil d an d mad e tha t chil d hers. The Johnson cour t furthe r justifie d it s relianc e o n inten t b y declarin g that " Intentions tha t ar e voluntaril y chosen , deliberate , expres s an d bargained-for ough t presumptivel y t o determin e lega l parenthood / " 1 9 The dissen t responded : The unsuitabilit y o f applying the notion that , because contrac t intention s are "voluntaril y chosen , deliberate , expres s an d bargained-for, " thei r per formance ough t t o be compelle d b y the court s i s even mor e clea r whe n the concept of specific performanc e i s used to determine the course of the life o f a child . Jus t a s childre n ar e no t th e intellectua l propert y o f thei r parents, neither ar e they the personal propert y of anyone, and thei r delivery cannot be ordered as a contract remedy on the same terms that a court would, for example, order a breaching party to deliver a truckload o f nuts and bolts.20 190

The "Intent" of Reproduction

Again, however , th e cour t di d no t simpl y appropriat e rule s promul gated fo r resolvin g dispute s i n th e marketplac e an d appl y thos e rule s t o determine a child's parentage. Instead , the cour t reconstructe d th e mean ing o f the rules , an d thu s th e rule s themselves , s o that, i n th e contex t o f decisions abou t parentage , thos e rule s assum e connectio n a s wel l a s autonomy, an d unalterabl e trut h a s well a s negotiated, changin g arrange ments. Th e cour t di d no t enforc e th e parties ' "bargaine d for " intention s as it would enforc e an y contract . I t effect thos e intention s a s the embodi ment o f a set of truths abou t familia l relationship s compelle d th e conclu sion tha t Crispin a wa s th e baby' s "natural " mother . Th e cour t enforce d the contractua l arrangemen t entere d int o b y the partie s onl y incidentall y in actualizin g th e inten t tha t the contrac t revealed . In declarin g Crispin a th e "natural " mothe r becaus e sh e ha d intended to b e th e mother , th e cour t presume d he r th e bette r mothe r a s wel l because th e cour t understoo d materna l inten t t o indicate , eve n mor e completely tha n th e biologica l component s o f motherhoo d i n othe r cases, tha t th e intendin g mothe r woul d b e th e bette r mother . Th e cour t explained tha t "th e interest s o f children , particularl y a t th e star t o f thei r lives, ar e '[un]likel y t o ru n contrar y t o thos e o f adult s wh o choos e t o bring the m int o being / " 2 1 In response , the dissen t argue d tha t th e court' s approach woul d alway s prefer th e geneti c mothe r i n case s suc h a s Johnson an d tha t i n certai n cases, tha t preferenc e woul d no t serv e th e bes t interest s o f th e chil d o r children involved . I n fact , th e cour t ha d expressl y asserte d tha t th e gestational mother , i f the intendin g mother , shoul d b e denominate d th e natural mothe r unde r stat e law . However , o n it s reading o f the majority' s decision (perhap s referrin g onl y t o tha t subse t o f case s i n whic h th e gestational mothe r di d no t initiall y inten d t o become th e socia l mother) , the dissen t explained : It requires littl e imaginatio n t o foresee case s i n whic h th e geneti c mother s are, fo r example , unstabl e o r substanc e abusers , o r i n whic h th e geneti c mothers' lif e circumstance s chang e dramaticall y durin g th e gestationa l mothers' pregnancies , whil e th e gestationa l mothers , thoug h o f a les s advantaged socioeconomi c class , ar e stable , mature , capabl e an d willin g to provid e a lovin g famil y environmen t i n whic h th e chil d wil l flourish. Under thos e circumstances , th e majority' s rigi d relianc e o n th e inten t o f the geneti c mothe r wil l no t serv e the bes t interest s o f the child. 22 I 19 1

The "Intent" of Reproduction Yet, courts generall y prefe r a biological paren t t o anyon e els e i n dispute s involving a child' s parentag e o r custody , withou t assumin g tha t tha t parent wil l necessaril y b e th e wises t o r mos t impressiv e paren t o r custo dian amon g thos e seekin g th e role . A biological paren t ma y b e declare d unfit, thereb y obviatin g th e strengt h o f th e biologica l connectio n i n disputes ove r parentag e o r custody . That , however , i s understoo d a s th e extreme an d unusua l case . Generally, court s stres s the importanc e o f th e biological connectio n pe r se and presum e tha t preference fo r a biologica l parent i n case s involvin g dispute s ove r parentag e wil l bes t serv e a child' s interests eve n i f other contender s fo r th e rol e o f parent see m psychologi cally, sociologically , o r economicall y superio r t o th e biologica l parent . The positio n o f the majorit y i n Johnson tha t a n intendin g paren t shoul d be preferre d t o anyone els e i s analogous. In fact , th e presumptio n i n Johnson that a n intendin g paren t wil l b e a good paren t i s arguably stronge r tha n th e comparabl e presumptio n abou t biological parent s i n othe r cases . Th e clai m presumin g tha t biologica l parents ar e bette r parent s relie s o n th e correlate s o f an ideolog y o f statu s only—on th e notion , fo r instance , that that which i s "natural" i s good, o r at leas t bette r tha n alternatives . Th e comparabl e clai m fo r a n intendin g parent relie s o n th e correlate s o f statu s alon g wit h thos e o f contract . I n addition t o being the "natural " mother, th e intendin g mothe r i s a rationa l parent. Sh e chos e t o b e a paren t an d actualize d tha t choic e a s a n autonomous acto r negotiatin g a n agreemen t t o produce he r child . Thus , Crispina, i n th e court' s view , becam e Christopher' s mothe r eve n befor e the child' s birt h a s a matte r o f natur e (signifie d b y he r gamet e donatio n along wit h he r intent ) an d a s a matte r o f cultur e (signifie d b y he r contractual agreemen t tha t demonstrate d he r intent) . Th e cour t di d no t expressly separat e Crispina' s maternit y int o a natura l an d a cultura l aspect. Rather , th e cour t describe d eac h aspec t s o tha t i t strengthene d the realit y and legitimac y o f the other . Thus, th e cour t attempted , perhap s no t self-consciously , bu t quit e obviously, t o combin e th e correlate s o f a n ideolog y tha t prize s autono mous individualit y an d bargaine d negotiation s wit h th e correlate s o f an ideolog y tha t prize s enduring , inexorabl e connectio n amon g famil y members. Ultimately , however , th e contradiction s inheren t i n tha t effor t prove i t unworkable . Th e stat e suprem e cour t i n Johnson neve r directl y addressed thos e contradiction s no r th e implication s tha t flow from them . For instance , th e Johnson cour t neve r addressed , an d appear s no t t o I *92

The "Intent" of Reproduction have recognized , th e difficul t bu t inevitabl e problem s presente d b y shift ing o r confuse d intent . Yet , i f the la w i s to predicate parentag e o n inten t in case s involving disputes occasione d b y reproductive technology , court s that rel y o n inten t t o determin e parentag e mus t b e abl e t o identif y th e parties' rea l intentions . I n fact , however , people' s intention s ar e rarel y unidimensional o r everlasting , an d i t i s rarel y possibl e t o identif y a person's one , true intent . The cour t i n Johnson di d no t conside r th e difficultie s pose d b y chang ing inten t an d uncertai n intent . Perhaps , th e cour t avoide d tha t tas k because consideratio n o f thes e difficultie s woul d likel y hav e entaile d a n analysis more clearly embedded i n the world of the marketplac e tha n tha t which th e cour t produced . Instea d o f delineatin g expressl y a procedur e available t o futur e court s involve d i n identifyin g a party' s inten t i n suc h cases, th e Johnson cour t imagine d implicitl y a n almos t primordia l mo ment durin g whic h th e parties ' intention s wer e rendere d unalterabl e a t least fo r purpose s o f judicia l analyse s an d conclusions . B y locatin g tha t moment a t th e baby' s creation , th e cour t presume d a momen t o f clear , eternal intentio n an d thereb y avoide d th e realit y of changing intent : But for [th e Calverts'] acted-on intention , the child would no t exist. Anna agreed t o facilitate th e procreation o f Mark's and Crispina' s child . . .. [I] t is saf e t o sa y tha t Ann a woul d no t hav e bee n give n th e opportunit y t o gestate o r delive r th e chil d ha d she , prior t o implantatio n o f the zygote , manifested he r ow n inten t t o b e th e child' s mother . N o reaso n appear s why Anna' s late r chang e o f hear t shoul d vitiat e th e determinatio n tha t Crispina i s the child's natural mother. 23 The cour t thereb y posite d a n initial , inviolabl e inten t tha t woul d deter mine al l futur e interaction s an d connections . Change s o f hear t ma y occur an d b e unfortunat e fo r th e parties , bu t the y canno t challeng e th e force o f the origina l inten t o r th e law' s readines s t o ensur e th e actualiza tion o f tha t intent . Th e cour t justifie d it s preferenc e fo r tha t initial , almost mystical , inten t throug h referenc e t o the contractua l arrangemen t among th e parties , but th e cour t di d no t enforc e tha t contract . Courts o r legislature s coul d decid e t o enforc e suc h contracts . Tha t i s not wha t th e Johnson cour t did , however . Ha d th e cour t simpl y enforce d the contrac t int o whic h th e partie s ha d entered , th e cour t woul d hav e avoided th e nee d t o presum e intent . Bu t th e cour t would , a s well , hav e definitively define d th e famil y i n marke t terms , a s a collectio n o f free , 11931

The "Intent" of Reproduction essentially unconnected , uncommitte d individuals . Ha d th e cas e bee n decided o n th e basi s o f ordinar y contrac t principles , i t woul d no t hav e been necessary , o r eve n possible , t o infe r Crispina' s "natural, " an d thu s exclusive, maternit y fro m th e agreement . I n fact , th e cour t neithe r en forced no r dismisse d th e gestationa l surrogac y contract . I t acknowledge d that contract , an d the n use d i t t o safeguar d a worl d understoo d throug h the pris m o f relations founde d o n statu s rathe r tha n contract . As a result , maternit y a s define d i n Johnson i s fragile . Th e court' s efforts t o groun d it s identificatio n o f the mothe r i n natura l fac t notwith standing, th e identificatio n an d definitio n o f mothe r d o becom e matter s of negotiabl e choic e onc e th e definitio n o f mothe r i s separate d fro m connections (suc h a s thos e base d i n bloo d o r genes ) understoo d b y th e larger societ y a s inevitable . Th e notio n o f inten t canno t reflec t an d preserve autonomou s individualit y an d a t th e sam e tim e substitut e con vincingly fo r bloo d o r genes a s the endurin g essenc e o f familial lov e an d loyalty. Judicial relianc e o n inten t i n suc h case s will prov e impractica l o r will b e expressl y transforme d int o a mor e straightforwar d relianc e o n ordinary contrac t principles . A Dea d Sper m Donor' s Inten t For a fe w decade s befor e Johnson, court s face d wit h conundrum s pose d by th e us e o f AI D (artificia l —or alternativ e —insemination, donor ) in voked consent—thoug h no t intent—i n identifyin g a child' s father . I n none o f those decisions , however , wa s a consentin g fathe r thereb y desig nated a "natural" father . Donor Sper m an d th e "Consenting " Fathe r Long before th e appearanc e o f the ne w reproductiv e technologies , court s faced dispute s occasione d b y th e us e o f artificia l inseminatio n (some times no w referre d t o a s alternative insemination) . I n th e first half o f th e twentieth century , thi s for m o f reproductiv e assistanc e wa s problemati c for th e societ y an d th e law . Mos t controversia l wer e case s o f artificia l insemination tha t involve d us e o f sper m fro m a ma n othe r tha n th e husband o f th e woma n bein g inseminated . Thi s for m o f insemination , referred t o a s AI D ha s generall y bee n use d b y wome n whos e husband s were sterile , ha d lo w sper m counts , o r wer e deeme d likel y t o produc e 194

The "Intent" of Reproduction children wit h genetic diseases , or by women choosin g to become mother s without th e activ e involvemen t o f a mal e partner . Artificia l inseminatio n cases involving use of sperm fro m th e mother' s husban d (AIH ) hav e bee n much les s controversial . Slowly, during th e cours e o f the twentiet h century , th e la w recognize d the mother' s husban d a s th e fathe r o f childre n produce d throug h us e o f donor sper m i n case s i n whic h th e mother' s husban d consente d t o th e insemination. I n severa l AI D cases , court s determine d a mother' s hus band t o b e he r child' s lega l father , o r a t leas t t o b e responsibl e fo r chil d support, despit e th e absenc e o f a biological connectio n betwee n th e ma n and th e child . I n thos e cases , th e husband' s paternit y wa s premise d o n his consent t o the artificia l inseminatio n o f his wife wit h dono r sperm . For instance , i n People v . Sorensen, th e Californi a Suprem e Cour t decided i n 196 8 that a man wh o ha d agree d t o the artificia l inseminatio n of his wife wit h dono r sper m remaine d responsibl e fo r th e chil d thereb y produced afte r hi s divorc e fro m th e child' s mother . Sorensen involve d a criminal prosecutio n fo r failur e t o support th e child . Sorense n argue d h e had n o dut y o f support . Th e cour t disagree d wit h hi m an d asserte d tha t Sorensen, havin g "consented ] t o th e productio n o f a child," an d havin g thereby mad e i t "saf e t o assum e tha t withou t [his ] activ e participatio n and consen t th e chil d woul d no t hav e bee n procreated, " becam e th e child's fathe r an d a s a resul t becam e responsibl e fo r supportin g th e child. 24 Th e cour t i n Sorensen expressl y and carefull y differentiate d suc h a fathe r fro m a "natural" father : The determinativ e facto r i s whethe r th e lega l relationshi p o f fathe r an d child exists . A child conceive d throug h heterologou s artificia l insemina tion [inseminatio n usin g donor sperm] does not have a "natural father," as that term s [sic] i s commonly used . . . . Since ther e i s no "natural father, " we can only look for a lawful father. 25 In Sorensen, a consentin g fathe r wa s a clea r alternativ e to , rathe r tha n a variant of , a natura l parent . "I n California, " th e cour t concluded , "legiti macy i s a lega l statu s tha t ma y exis t despit e th e fac t tha t th e husban d i s not the natura l fathe r o f the child." 26 Other court s similarl y predicate d paternit y o n th e consen t o f th e mother's husban d i n case s involvin g AID . I n In re Adoption of Anonymous, a Ne w Yor k cour t allowe d a fathe r wh o ha d consente d t o th e conception an d pregnanc y fro m dono r artificia l inseminatio n o f his wif e 195 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction to veto the adoption of the child by the mother's new husband. In Gursky v. Gursky\ a father wa s held responsibl e for support of a child conceive d by his wife through AID. In that case, a New York court held th e fathe r responsible, despit e th e annulmen t o f th e marriag e o n ground s tha t i t was unconsummated, because he had consented to the insemination . Thus, courts have been considering issues engendered by cases involving artificial inseminatio n fo r many decades. For that reason, these cases invite contras t wit h mor e recen t one s involvin g th e us e o f th e ne w reproductive technologies . The earlies t case s and commentarie s involv ing the us e of donor insemination , decided befor e mid-century , focuse d on danger s and advantage s o f artificial inseminatio n usin g donor sper m for the character o f the family and , more particularly, for the stability of marriage. In Orford v. Orford, on e o f the earlies t legal case s involving AID, the Ontario Suprem e Cour t declare d i n 192 1 by wa y o f dict a that , unde r Ontario divorc e law, a married woma n allegedl y artificially inseminate d with sper m fro m a donor , withou t th e knowledg e o f her husband , wa s guilty o f adultery. Th e cour t define d adulter y t o includ e th e voluntar y surrender b y th e guilt y perso n o f th e reproductiv e power s t o someon e other than th e spouse . Thus, the cour t clearly understood marriag e as a status relationship, not as a negotiated association between two essentially separate people. The cour t declared: "[I]n th e case of the woman [adul tery] involves the possibility of introducing into the family of the husband a fals e strai n o f blood. Any act o n th e par t o f the wif e whic h doe s tha t would, therefore , b e adulterous." 27 Th e Orford court presume d tha t family relations , includin g th e relation s betwee n spouse s wer e (o r a t least should be ) anchore d decisivel y an d exclusivel y i n a natural order . Anything perceived to deviate from that order deserved condemnation . Only by the middle of the twentieth centur y did courts in the Unite d States begi n t o recogniz e th e legitimac y o f childre n produce d from donor inseminatio n i n case s suc h a s Sorensen in whic h th e mother' s husband ha d give n his consent. At about the same time, states began to provide by statute for the recognition of families created through artificia l insemination usin g dono r sperm . I n 1964 , th e first statut e regulatin g artificial inseminatio n wa s promulgate d i n Georgia, 28 an d a t presen t about three-fifth s o f th e state s hav e statute s tha t permi t an d regulat e artificial insemination . With th e first cases approving artificial inseminatio n an d legitimizin g 11961

The "Intent" of Reproduction the childre n involved , th e husband' s consen t becam e pivotal . However , that consen t wa s no t equate d o r confuse d wit h intent . Thus , a husban d who consente d t o th e dono r inseminatio n o f hi s wif e coul d no t den y paternity by arguing that he ha d neve r i n fact intende d t o effect th e term s of hi s apparen t consent. 29 Neithe r coul d a wif e den y th e paternit y o f her divorcin g husban d t o childre n bor n durin g th e marriag e b y dono r insemination i f the husban d consente d t o the procedure. 30 To a significan t extent , th e developin g rule s governin g th e us e an d implications o f artificia l inseminatio n hav e continue d t o reflec t old fashioned famil y values . Court s an d legislature s hav e worke d t o ensur e that artificial inseminatio n woul d occu r within a social context associate d with traditiona l families ; th e la w accomplishe d thi s b y allowin g paterna l consent t o b e substitute d fo r biologica l paternit y i n determinin g th e implications o f artificial inseminatio n usin g dono r sperm . Tha t substitu tion reflecte d th e traditiona l notio n tha t a mother' s husban d wa s th e father o f he r children . Relevant , contemporar y statute s routinel y trea t a mother's husban d wh o consent s t o dono r inseminatio n a s the y trea t a "natural" father, bu t d o no t labe l hi m a s such. Mor e specifically , statute s regulating artificia l inseminatio n trea t a consentin g mother' s husban d a s the child' s father , givin g hi m th e right s an d holdin g hi m t o th e respon sibilities of any father, withou t requirin g that he adop t the chil d involved . The husband' s consent—no t hi s intent—i s centra l t o th e existin g rules . The ai m ha s been t o ensure tha t the husband' s right s and responsibilitie s would b e preserved wit h regar d t o any child resultin g from dono r insemi nation o f hi s wife , an d concomitantl y tha t familie s produce d throug h donor inseminatio n woul d resembl e traditiona l familie s a s closel y a s possible. The la w ha s bee n slowe r t o provid e expressl y fo r th e right s o f wome n seeking nonmarita l motherhoo d b y choice. I n the mid-1980s , Carol Don ovan reviewe d thi s are a o f th e la w an d foun d a continuin g absenc e o f protection fo r unmarrie d wome n anxiou s t o establis h familie s withou t legal fathers. 31 Sinc e then, a number o f cases have involved sperm donor s claiming paternit y o f childre n bor n t o unmarrie d mothers . Largely , i n these cases courts have relied o n existin g statutes to determine th e respec tive rights of the parties. For instance, i n Jhordan C. v . Mary K , th e cour t found th e sper m dono r t o b e th e fathe r o f th e chil d becaus e a statut e provided tha t th e "dono r o f seme n provided to a licensed physician fo r use i n artificia l inseminatio n o f a woma n othe r tha n th e donor' s wif e i s I 19 7 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction treated i n la w a s i f h e wer e no t th e natura l fathe r o f a chil d thereb y conceived/' 32 I n th e case , however, th e inseminatio n ha d occurre d with out physician involvement . Can Dea d Me n Hav e Children ? The respons e th e la w has develope d ove r th e las t few decade s i n regulat ing artificia l inseminatio n i s today bein g teste d anew . With th e availabil ity by the 1950 s of cryopreservation t o store sperm indefinitel y i n a froze n state, ne w possibilitie s hav e begu n t o emerge . On e suc h possibility , th e use o f a man' s sper m afte r hi s death , challenge s th e law' s assumption s about the meanin g o f paternity and canno t be regulate d throug h relianc e on existin g rule s sinc e th e la w has no t yet responde d t o th e possibilit y o f posthumous insemination , conception , an d birth . Legislator s hav e no t yet defined th e familia l relatio n betwee n a dead sper m dono r an d a chil d conceived throug h us e o f hi s sperm . I n general , th e la w i n th e Unite d States doe s no t yet regulat e contro l ove r froze n sper m o r clarif y suc h matters as the inheritanc e right s of children conceive d afte r th e death s of their geneti c parents . Therefore, court s ar e confuse d i n case s occasione d b y posthumou s insemination. I n suc h cases , th e meanin g o f fathe r mus t b e reexamine d and clarified , jus t as the meanin g o f mother demand s reexaminatio n an d clarification i n case s occasione d b y gestationa l surrogacy . Posthumou s use o f sper m stretche s existin g statutor y scheme s fo r regulatin g famil y relationships beyon d thei r limits . I n particular , i t become s difficul t t o sustain th e broa d approac h t o artificial insemination , widel y institutional ized i n th e 1960s , a s a n exceptio n tha t ca n b e comfortabl y harmonize d with traditiona l view s of family . Torn betwee n th e security of old understandings o f family an d th e pul l of novel understanding s engendere d a t least i n par t by the ne w reproduc tive technologies, court s ar e attemptin g t o bypass, or sometimes t o incor porate, both , an d t o construc t ne w categorie s throug h whic h t o thin k about, an d govern , th e creatio n o f families. And , a s with case s involvin g gestational surrogacy , court s face d wit h dispute s abou t th e contro l o f a dead man' s sperm hav e declared th e inten t of the parties to be determina tive. Two cases , one decide d i n Franc e i n 198 4 (Parpalaix c. CECOS) an d 1198

The "Intent" of Reproduction the othe r i n Californi a i n th e 1990 s (Hecht v . Superior Court), hav e presented court s wit h jus t suc h a dispute . I n Franc e a t th e time , n o laws directl y addresse d th e question s presented . I n severa l regard s th e California cour t wa s abl e to , an d did , refe r t o existin g stat e statutor y provisions, bu t th e centra l questio n i n Hecht coul d no t b e answere d b y the state' s existin g law. Thus, bot h court s chos e no t t o infe r a response t o the dispute s befor e the m fro m related , existin g rules . Eac h cour t fash ioned it s own responses to the dilemma s presented b y posthumous insem ination. In Hecht v . Superior Court th e Californi a court s wer e aske d t o deter mine th e fat e o f William Kane' s froze n sperm . Kan e was already dead. I n October 1991 , Kane deposite d fifteen vial s o f hi s sper m wit h Californi a Cryobank, Inc. , a Lo s Angele s sper m bank , an d signe d a n agreemen t authorizing th e ban k t o release hi s sperm t o Debora h Hecht , th e woma n with who m h e ha d live d fo r five years. Specifically, Kan e signe d a "Specime n Storag e Agreement " whic h provided tha t i n th e even t o f hi s death , th e sper m ban k shoul d "[con tinue t o stor e [th e specimens ] upo n reques t o f the executo r o f th e estat e [or] [r]eleas e th e specimen s t o the executo r o f the estate." 33 I n fact , a fe w weeks befor e Kan e deposite d sper m wit h Californi a Cryobank , h e exe cuted a will that named Hech t a s executor o f his estate an d tha t provide d that "an y specimen s o f my sper m store d wit h an y sper m ban k o r simila r facility fo r storage" be bequeathed t o Hecht. Hech t was not in fact servin g as executo r o f Kane' s estat e whe n th e Californi a appellat e cour t hear d the case , an d th e recor d befor e tha t cour t wa s apparentl y unclea r a s t o whether referenc e t o Kane' s executo r wa s a referenc e t o Hech t o r t o anyone servin g i n th e rol e o f executor. 34 I n anothe r provisio n o f th e agreement int o whic h Kan e entere d wit h th e sper m ban k (labele d "Au thorization t o Release Specimens" ) Kan e authorize d th e ban k t o "releas e my seme n specimen s t o Debora h Elle n Hecht . I a m als o authorizin g specimens t o be release d t o recipient's physicia n Dr . Kathry n Mover." 35 Then, a t th e en d o f th e mont h (Octobe r 1991) , Kan e committe d suicide. Afte r hi s death , Hech t aske d tha t th e sper m b e release d t o her . Kane's tw o adul t childre n fro m a forme r marriage , Katharin e Kan e an d William Everet t Kane , Jr. , conteste d Kane' s wil l an d asked tha t Kane' s sperm b e destroyed . Kane' s childre n invoke d traditiona l famil y value s i n urging th e cour t t o order destructio n o f their father' s sperm . 199

The "Intent" of Reproduction Kane's will , execute d o n Septembe r 27 , 1991 , a mont h befor e hi s suicide, explicitly provided: " I bequeath al l right , title , and interes t tha t I may hav e i n an y specimen s o f m y sper m store d wit h an y sper m ban k o r similar facilit y fo r storag e t o Debora h Elle n Hecht." 36 Kane' s childre n asserted tha t eve n wer e hi s wil l declare d valid , publi c polic y argue d against both th e artificia l inseminatio n o f Hecht a s an unmarrie d woma n and th e us e o f a dea d man' s sperm . I n th e vie w o f Kane' s children , destruction o f the sper m woul d "hel p guar d th e famil y unit " b y preclud ing th e creatio n o f an untraditiona l famil y (on e compose d o f Hecht , th e child, an d th e memor y o f Kane ) an d would , equally , protec t a n existin g family uni t (thei r own ) fro m invasio n b y a posthumou s siblin g an d th e "emotional, psychologica l an d financial stress " tha t suc h a child' s birt h would create . The y describe d thei r father' s interes t i n producin g a post humous chil d a s "egotisti c an d irresponsible" ; suc h a descriptio n ma y harmonize wit h socia l view s of expected, an d eve n permissible , actio n i n the marketplace , bu t i s strongl y a t odd s wit h almos t an y accoun t o f a good father. Thu s Kane' s children suggeste d tha t i n their father's decisio n to suppl y an d freez e sper m fo r posthumou s reproduction , Kan e showe d virtually n o rea l fatherl y interes t i n th e potentia l welfar e o f th e childre n who might resul t from th e posthumou s us e of his sperm . The tria l cour t agree d wit h Kane' s childre n an d ordere d th e sper m destroyed. Whe n aske d b y Hecht' s counse l t o explai n th e lega l base s o f this order, the tria l cour t judg e replied : It reall y doe s no t matte r doe s it ? I f I a m right , I a m righ t an d i f I a m wrong, I am wrong. As you know, I am persuaded by the arguments in the moving papers . This i s something tha t i s going to have t o be decide d b y the appellate courts. Let's get a decision.37 The Californi a Cour t o f Appeal vacate d th e orde r o f th e tria l cour t an d remanded th e cas e fo r determination s a s t o th e validit y o f th e will , th e validity o f th e sper m ban k contract , an d th e enforceabilit y o f settlemen t agreements regardin g probate o f Kane's estate that had bee n entere d int o by Hecht an d Kane' s two children . The appellat e cour t di d determin e tha t Kan e ha d a n "ownership " interest i n hi s sperm sufficien t t o permit inclusio n o f those sper m withi n Kane's probat e estate . Curiously , th e cour t conclude d tha t th e characte r of Kane' s ownershi p interes t i n hi s sper m mad e thos e sper m par t o f hi s probate estat e (assumin g a vali d will) , bu t preclude d th e sperm' s bein g I 20 0 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction the object o f a gift (eithe r inter vivos or causa mortis). The court' s opinio n left th e distinctio n unexplained : We conclude that at the time of his death, decedent had an interest, in the nature o f ownership, to the exten t tha t h e ha d decision-makin g authorit y as to the us e o f his sperm fo r reproduction . Suc h interes t i s sufficient t o constitute "property " withi n th e meanin g o f [stat e law] . Accordingly, th e probate court had jurisdiction with respect to the vials of sperm. In concluding that the sperm is properly part of decedent's estate, we do not address the issue of the validity or enforceability o f any contract or will purporting to express decedent's intent with respect to the stored sperm. In view o f th e natur e o f sperm a s reproductiv e materia l whic h i s a uniqu e type o f "property, " w e also declin e petitioner' s invitatio n t o appl y t o thi s case the genera l la w relating t o gifts o f personal propert y o r the statutor y provisions for gifts in view of impending death. 38 The cour t conclude d tha t decedent' s interes t i n hi s sper m "fall s withi n the broa d definitio n o f propert y [provide d fo r i n th e Californi a Probat e Code], a s 'anythin g tha t ma y b e th e subjec t o f ownershi p an d include s both rea l an d persona l propert y an d an y interes t therein / " The court' s decisio n tha t cryopreserve d sper m i s amon g th e types o f property tha t ca n b e bequeathe d a t deat h di d no t ensur e tha t Hech t would inheri t those sperm. That assuranc e depended , amon g othe r possibilities, on th e validit y o f Kane's will . I n fact , Kane' s childre n questione d the validit y o f thei r father' s will , claimin g tha t Kan e wa s "o f unsoun d mind, subjec t t o the undu e influenc e of . . . . Hech t and/o r sufferin g from insane delusions" when h e designe d an d execute d th e will. 39 That claim , if supported b y the facts , woul d erod e Hecht' s righ t t o receiv e th e sper m under th e wil l an d woul d preclud e he r referrin g t o th e wil l a s evidenc e of Kane's inten t regardin g dispositio n o f the sper m tha t h e ha d deposite d with Californi a Cryobank , Inc . Thus, i n theory , a finding tha t Kan e wa s i n fac t competen t whe n h e executed th e will , an d i n particula r tha t h e ha d no t bee n undul y influ enced b y Hecht, woul d allo w probat e o f the wil l an d transmissio n o f th e sperm t o Hecht. I n addition, such a finding woul d establis h Kane' s inten t that hi s sper m b e use d posthumousl y t o inseminat e Hecht , thereb y providing alternativ e ground s (no t dependen t o n th e ultimat e fat e o f th e will) fo r grantin g Kane' s sper m t o Hecht . Th e cour t explaine d tha t th e will "evidence s th e decedent' s inten t tha t Hecht , shoul d sh e s o desire , is t o receiv e hi s sper m store d i n th e sper m ban k t o bea r hi s chil d 12011

The "Intent" of Reproduction posthumously."40 Wer e Kan e incompetent , subjec t t o undu e influence , or th e victi m o f frau d whe n h e execute d hi s will , the n tha t wil l woul d not provide evidenc e o f his intent . In fact , o n remand , th e tria l cour t mad e n o finding abou t Kane' s competence a s a testator . Rather , th e cour t relie d o n a settlemen t agreement int o which th e parties had entere d i n Decembe r 1991 . Eventually, unde r th e settlemen t agreement , th e tria l cour t entere d a n orde r i n March 199 5 directing the administrato r o f Kane's estat e to distribute thre e vials o f sper m t o Hecht . Kane' s childre n appealed , bu t i n Augus t 1995 , the cour t o f appeal rule d tha t th e tria l cour t orde r ha d t o b e carrie d ou t immediately becaus e i t wa s issue d o n th e groun d tha t Hecht , the n pas t forty year s o f age , wa s "a t imminen t ris k o f los s i f sh e ha d t o wai t ou t the appellat e proces s befor e attemptin g t o b e impregnate d wit h Kane' s "41

sperm. In it s initial decision , however, the appeals court assumed, fo r purpose s of its decision, tha t Kan e ha d intende d tha t hi s sperm b e use d t o insemi nate Hecht . The cour t explained : [W]e ar e no t adjudicatin g th e validit y o r invalidit y o f th e wil l o r an y contract o r settlemen t agreemen t a t issu e i n thi s case ; w e als o d o no t purport t o adjudicat e an y claim s o f decedent' s competenc e o r Hecht' s undue influence . Fo r the purpose o f addressing this rationale fo r th e trial court's order, we assume, arguendo , particular intentio n o n the part of the decedent. The cour t proceede d t o conside r th e publi c polic y concern s raise d b y Kane's children . I n doin g that , th e cour t frame d it s recognitio n tha t families ca n be create d an d regulate d i n contrac t terms, with a n extende d discussion o f families understoo d a s units o f status. Katharine an d Willia m Everett , Jr., argued tha t single women, suc h a s Hecht, shoul d no t b e encourage d t o hav e childre n an d creat e families . They furthe r describe d th e posthumou s us e o f their father' s sper m a s "i n truth, th e creatio n o f orphane d childre n b y artificia l mean s wit h stat e authorization." 42 Th e cour t rejecte d bot h polic y concern s raise d b y th e Kane children , bu t di d s o withou t strongl y denyin g o r acceptin g th e children's clai m fo r status—th e clai m tha t th e la w shoul d encourag e traditional marriag e an d traditiona l families . Instead o f focusin g o n familie s i n general , th e cour t focuse d o n this family. So , i n denyin g tha t publi c polic y woul d limi t th e us e o f artificia l 202 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction insemination t o marrie d women , th e cour t conclude d tha t th e disput e over Kane' s sper m carrie d n o far-reachin g implication s fo r th e "institu tions o f famil y an d marriage " sinc e th e cas e involve d "n o existin g mar riage relationshi p involvin g deceden t a t th e tim e o f hi s deat h an d obvi ously there ca n b e non e afte r hi s death." 43 In addressin g th e children' s argumen t tha t publi c polic y preclude d the us e o f a dead man' s sper m t o produce a posthumous child , th e cour t turned t o th e on e directl y relevan t preceden t o f whic h i t wa s aware — Parpalaix c . CECOS , decide d i n 198 4 b y a Frenc h tria l cour t i n th e suburbs o f Paris. When th e Californi a Cour t o f Appeal first decided Hecht i n 1993 , only a fe w case s involvin g th e posthumou s us e o f sper m ha d bee n decide d anywhere. Al l bu t Parpalaix differe d fro m Hecht i n importan t regards . Among these othe r case s was that of a French widow , Claire Gallon , wh o desired t o becom e pregnan t throug h th e us e o f he r dea d husband' s sperm, froze n i n a state-ru n sper m bank . Th e sper m ban k i n whic h Michel Gallo n ha d deposite d seme n i n 198 5 refused . Th e cas e differe d from Hecht an d Parpalaix becaus e Miche l ha d signe d a claus e i n a n agreement wit h th e sper m ban k stipulatin g tha t th e sper m shoul d onl y be release d i n hi s presence . I n 1991 , a cour t i n Toulous e rejecte d Clair e Gallon's request. 44 A somewhat differen t issu e regardin g th e postmorte m use o f sperm wa s brought t o court i n Virginia an d Californi a b y prisoner s condemned t o deat h wh o requeste d tha t thei r sper m b e store d fo r possi ble postmorte m reproduction. 45 Th e court s decide d tha t suc h me n hav e no righ t t o reproduce. 46 Since Parpalaix and Hecht wer e decided, a number o f cases have bee n reported i n th e pres s involvin g widow s wh o preserve d th e sper m o f thei r recently dea d husbands . Severa l use d tha t sper m i n th e effor t t o hav e a child. Nanc y Hart , a Louisian a widow , becam e pregnan t severa l month s after he r husband' s deat h wit h sper m tha t h e ha d ha d preserved . Afte r the birt h o f a daughter, Judit h Christine , i n June 1991 , Hart filed a lawsuit in orde r t o obtai n Socia l Securit y survivor' s benefit s fo r th e child. 47 I n December 1995 , a Socia l Securit y appeal s counci l denie d th e chil d th e right t o receive payments . Nanc y Har t plan s t o appeal th e cas e i n federa l court. 48 However, whe n Hecht wa s first hear d b y th e Californi a Cour t o f Appeal i n 1993 , Parpalaix provide d th e onl y relevan t lega l model . Th e California cour t relie d heavil y on Parpalaix in describing th e significanc e I 20 3 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction of a decedent's inten t for determining the posthumous us e of his sperm. On the basis of the Parpalaix precedent, the Hecht court constructed th e concept o f inten t s o a s t o reincorporat e an d invok e traditiona l famil y values, the values of a world i n which famil y relation s were understoo d as embedded i n inexorable truth. Parpalaix involved the request of Corinne Richar d Parpalaix , a young widow, for he r dead husband' s sperm. In that request she was supported by he r husband' s parents . I n 1981 , Alain Parpalaix , il l wit h testicula r cancer, wa s tol d tha t chemotherapy , th e onl y hop e fo r a cure , migh t render hi m sterile . Alain an d Corinn e wer e no t ye t married , bu t the y were living together. Alain deposited nine vials of sperm with the Centre d'Etude e t d e Conservatio n d u Sperm e (CECOS) , a government-ru n sperm ban k locate d outsid e o f Paris . Alai n lef t n o direction s wit h th e sperm bank abou t the future us e of his sperm. In Decembe r 198 3 Alain died, two days after marryin g Corinne. CECOS refused Corinne' s request for Alain's sperm. After the French Ministry of Health declined t o rule swiftly on Corinne's request, she and Alain's parent s wen t t o court. 49 Ther e the y argue d tha t a s Alain's heir s they succeede d t o Alain' s contractua l right s a s a sper m deposito r wit h CECOS to receive his sperm upon request. The court found Frenc h civil law governing contracts of deposit inapplicable and proceeded instea d to consider Alain' s intent . I n fact , fo r th e Parpalaix cour t Alain' s inten t constituted the only important question in the case.50 In language quoted and relied on by the California cour t in Hecht, the Parpalaix cour t describe d Alain's intent i n terms that almos t completel y separated that intent from lega l agreements and the world of contractual negotiations. The cour t define d "[s]per m [as ] the see d o f life; i t is connected t o th e fundamenta l libert y o f a perso n t o conceiv e o r no t t o conceive."51 The cour t explaine d tha t as such, sperm canno t be subjec t to civil rules governing contracts of deposit but must be governed by "the intent o f the ma n fro m who m i t emanates. " The cour t conclude d tha t for tha t reaso n Alain' s inten t regardin g th e us e o f his sperm constitute d the sole issue presented. 52 In considerin g Alain's intent , th e cour t clearl y separate d th e analysi s of that intent from a world associated wit h marke t relations and embed ded i t firml y i n a worl d o f familia l relation s understoo d i n traditiona l terms. Fo r th e Parpalaix court , Alain' s inten t regardin g hi s sper m wa s central t o his sense of self and, therefore, th e fat e o f those sper m coul d 204 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction not b e cavalierl y regulate d b y th e rule s o f contract . However , th e cour t did no t hesitat e t o asses s an d delineat e Alain' s inten t abou t th e posthu mous us e o f hi s sper m despit e th e fac t tha t Alai n ha d apparentl y neve r made tha t inten t clearly known. Indeed , th e cour t required Alain's widow to prov e Alain' s inten t wa s "unequivocable" 53 —a proo f tha t migh t no t seem achievabl e i n th e absenc e o f an y clea r statemen t lef t b y th e dea d man. Bu t th e cour t easil y foun d th e necessar y inten t o n Alain' s par t b y reference t o Alain's familial connection s (o f enduring lov e and loyalty ) t o those anxiou s tha t Alain' s sper m b e mad e availabl e t o Corinne . Th e court explaine d that , the testimon y o f Pierr e an d Daniell e Richard , th e parent s o f Corinn e Parpalaix, the attitude of Alain Parpalaix, who in the middle of his illness, and wit h th e agreemen t o f [Corinne ] desire d t o preserve hi s opportunit y to procreate, an attitude impressivel y confirmed tw o days before hi s death by a religious and civil marriage, the value of the position i n this proceeding o f Alain Parpalaix' s parents , wh o woul d hav e bee n abl e t o kno w th e deepest intention s o f their son , provid e a set o f testimony an d presump tions tha t establish , withou t equivocation , th e expres s inten t o f Corinn e Parpalaix's husban d t o mak e hi s wif e th e mothe r o f a commo n child , either during his life or after hi s death. For the Parpalaix court, Alain's inten t abou t th e fat e o f his sperm wa s no t demonstrated b y a contract , bu t b y Alain' s lovin g relation s a s son , hus band, an d potentia l father . Pau l Lombard , Corinn e Parpalaix' s attorney , told th e cour t tha t i t coul d "decid e t o consecrat e a ne w lega l preceden t where a deceased ma n woul d hav e th e righ t to implan t lif e i n a woman' s womb, an d prov e tha t lov e i s mor e powerfu l tha n death." 54 Th e state ment suggest s th e continuin g significanc e o f Alain Parpalaix' s autonom y but, a t the sam e time , defines Alai n throug h hi s enduring connection s o f familial lov e to his spouse an d potentia l child . The inten t tha t th e cour t identifie d wit h Alain' s "dee p desire " wa s assumed, no t demonstrated , t o exis t i n ligh t o f Alain' s familia l connec tions. Th e cour t satisfie d th e searc h fo r Alain' s contractua l inten t b y substituting th e desire s o f Alain's survivor s for hi s intent . Thus , th e cour t identified Alai n (a s family ) wit h hi s wido w an d parents , presume d t o delineate their dee p desires , an d agree d t o effec t thos e desire s a s i f the y were (an d assume d the m t o be) Alain's "deep desire. " Thus, i n relyin g o n Alain's inten t an d orderin g releas e o f hi s cryopreserve d sper m t o Co I 205 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction rinne's doctor , th e cour t presume d th e dictate s o f traditional understand ings of family a t least as much a s it presumed th e dictate s o f the worl d o f the market . In Novembe r 1984 , Corinne wa s inseminated wit h Alain' s sperm . Sh e did no t becom e pregnant . O f th e nin e vial s o f sper m tha t Alai n ha d deposited wit h CECOS , seve n wer e use d i n th e inseminatio n an d tw o were use d i n tests. 55 The Californi a cour t in Hecht relie d heavil y on Parpalaix in answerin g the argument s o f Kane' s children' s tha t publi c polic y forbi d th e posthu mous inseminatio n o f Hech t wit h thei r father' s sperm . I n doin g so , th e court suggeste d tha t Kane' s intent , a s Parpalaix's, was to be understoo d a s a "dee p desire" 56 to create familia l bonds , at least as much a s it was to b e understood a s the motiv e fo r contractua l negotiations . Both courts— Parpalaix explicitl y and Hecht b y implication—depicte d intent a s a n emotiona l an d mora l matte r mor e tha n a s a matte r o f contractual motivation . Eac h cour t bega n b y considerin g th e decedent' s choice i n term s resemblin g thos e typicall y use d i n interpretation s o f disputed an d ambiguou s contracts . Bu t eac h cour t switche d it s ideologi cal bearing s an d sought , instead , t o identif y th e decedent' s (familial ) desires, thereb y presumin g t o creat e fo r th e deceden t th e emotiona l future an d famil y constellatio n h e woul d hav e establishe d fo r himsel f had h e live d lon g enoug h t o do that . The choic e tha t prove s conclusiv e fo r th e court s i n thes e case s (reli ance o n th e notio n o f intent ) i s an overdetermine d choice— a choic e o f the marke t an d a choic e o f th e home . Freu d use d th e ter m "overdeter mined" t o refe r t o a drea m symbo l tha t actuall y appeare d i n a drea m because i t carrie d a heavy loa d (a n overload , fro m th e perspectiv e o f th e unconscious) o f meanings . Freu d describe d a n overdetermine d dream symbol a s referrin g t o man y dream-thoughts. 57 Analogously , relianc e o n the notio n o f inten t seeme d compellin g fo r th e court s i n thes e case s because, a s constructed , th e notio n o f inten t provide s a t th e sam e tim e for th e preservatio n o f traditio n an d fo r th e acceptanc e o f modernity . I t might appear therefor e tha t nothin g i s lost and a great deal i s gained. For eac h court , thoug h mor e clearl y fo r th e cour t i n Hecht, th e decision t o recogniz e th e dea d man' s inten t include d recognitio n o f tha t man's autonomou s individuality , includin g hi s abilit y t o desig n hi s ow n future contractually , a s well a s recognition o f his connecte d statu s withi n the contex t o f familia l relationships . Fo r th e courts , th e dea d men' s 12061

The "Intent" of Reproduction choice durin g lif e t o procreat e posthumousl y ha d t o b e effecte d becaus e the rule s o f the marke t deman d tha t freel y bargaine d choice s b e effecte d by th e law ; and , contrastingly , because , a s a mora l matter , th e choic e t o reproduce posthumousl y actualize d eac h man' s lovin g commitmen t an d enduring connection s t o family , an d thu s preserve d eac h man' s "dee p desire." As model s fo r futur e cases , Parpalaix an d Hecht offe r littl e rea l guid ance. Bot h court s justifie d thei r conclusion s a s compelle d b y th e dea d sperm donor' s intent . Bu t neithe r cour t seriousl y considere d ho w t o determine th e relevan t intent . Th e tw o court s eithe r rejecte d expressly , or avoided implicitly , exclusiv e relianc e o n principle s o f contract law . As a resul t neithe r cour t provide d fo r a sper m donor' s changin g o r conflict ing intentions , o r fo r a sper m dono r wit h n o consciou s intention s abou t the posthumou s us e o f hi s sperm . I n th e effor t t o preserv e traditiona l models o f family bu t als o to incorporat e form s o f interaction traditionall y identified wit h th e marketplace , no t th e hom e —in th e effor t bot h t o respect traditiona l familie s an d t o safeguar d th e right s o f th e individua l to desig n an d effec t uniqu e families—th e court s i n thes e case s faile d t o address th e confusion s underlyin g th e disputes , confusion s abou t th e meaning an d futur e o f parents, children, an d families . III. "Intent " Become s Contrac t Cases suc h a s Davis, Johnson, Hecht, an d Parpalaix demonstrat e th e allure tha t th e dictate s o f th e marketplac e hol d fo r th e la w i n resolvin g complicated dispute s about the meanin g and scop e o f family an d familia l relationships. These case s demonstrate a s well th e continuin g gri p on th e society an d th e la w of an ideolog y o f family constructe d durin g th e earl y years o f th e Industria l Revolutio n an d elaborate d durin g th e cours e o f the subsequent decades . Within tha t view, families ar e distinguished fro m the world o f work as enduring, stable , and deepl y loyal . Moreover, withi n the ideolog y of family develope d durin g the pas t two centuries, the socia l facts o f family—th e way s i n whic h familie s are loya l an d enduring , fo r instance—are understoo d a s deepl y embedde d i n a se t o f biologica l truths tha t generat e an d defin e th e essentia l connection s betwee n kin . Changes i n famil y lif e durin g th e pas t fe w decades , includin g thos e occasioned b y th e ne w reproductiv e technologies , challeng e tha t ideol ogy. However , case s suc h a s Davis, Johnson, Hecht, an d Parpalaix sho w I 20 7 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction the ambivalenc e o f th e la w abou t expressl y reconstructin g th e famil y s o that th e distinction s betwee n hom e an d wor k evaporate . Th e law , muc h like th e large r society , i s redefinin g th e parameter s o f famil y bu t i s simultaneously attempting , thoug h ofte n no t self-consciously , t o mas k the proces s o f redefinitio n b y connectin g th e ne w meaning s t o ol d understandings o f family . Thus, th e la w recognize s th e consequence s o f marketplac e negotia tions i n th e constructio n o f familie s an d familia l relationships , bu t at tempts to modulate th e consequences o f unlimited choic e i n the creatio n and definitio n o f families . Tha t ai m ha s led , amon g othe r things , t o judicial relianc e o n inten t i n case s suc h a s Johnson tha t as k court s t o determine parentag e an d i n case s suc h a s Davis, Hecht, an d Parpalaix that ask courts t o determine th e statu s an d fat e o f gametic material . I n al l these cases , court s hav e reconstructe d th e meanin g o f inten t s o tha t th e term appear s t o mediat e betwee n th e worl d o f the traditiona l famil y an d the worl d o f the marketplace . O n th e on e hand , th e inten t t o becom e a parent i s take n t o determin e parentag e becaus e court s i n thes e case s defined thi s inten t t o ste m from , an d thu s t o indicate , th e deepes t sens e of self , th e sel f tha t desire s an d thereb y constitutes , motherhoo d o r fatherhood. O n th e othe r hand , th e concep t o f inten t i n thes e case s suggests rational negotiatio n an d shiftin g bargains . The concep t o f intent , the apparen t mediato r betwee n traditio n an d modernity , itsel f become s another aspec t o f the contemporar y debat e abou t family . In that debate, intent , however elaboratel y redefined , remain s the firm associate o f contrac t an d choice . Allowin g th e famil y t o b e define d through choice—an d throug h intention—ma y b e th e transitio n t o fami lies defined throug h contract . An essentia l aspec t o f the traditiona l ideol ogy o f famil y i s th e inexorabilit y o f famil y relationships . Understoo d as grounde d i n bloo d o r genes , famil y relationship s simpl y mirro r th e inevitability o f natura l processes . That doe s no t gainsa y tha t actua l fami lies hav e appeare d i n a broa d assortmen t o f form s an d tha t actua l rela tionships withi n familie s hav e varie d widel y from famil y t o family durin g the cours e o f th e pas t tw o centuries . Yet , thes e variation s hav e bee n understood withi n a n encompassin g ideolog y tha t define d th e famil y i n contrast with th e marketplace . To some extent, judicial relianc e o n inten t to determin e parentag e i n recen t case s represent s a continuatio n o f thi s process. However , i n case s suc h a s Davis an d Johnson th e famil y i s no t 208 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction distinguished fro m th e marketplace . Rather , inten t (ofte n evidence d b y reference t o actua l contracts ) a s th e groun d o n whic h familia l relation s are constructed , substitute s fo r bloo d an d gene s i n constitutin g th e par ent-child relationship . I n thi s construction , choic e an d bargain , essentia l incidents o f contractua l interaction , becom e centra l t o th e definitio n o f family. Some implication s o f thi s proces s o f chang e emerg e fro m th e histor y of contrac t la w itsel f whic h contain s a simila r transition . Tw o hundre d years ago , the la w refuse d t o recogniz e idiosyncrati c bargains . The fledgling la w o f contracts , seekin g t o preserv e th e las t vestige s o f statu s i n th e marketplace, enforce d onl y those contract s tha t reflecte d th e tradition s o f the ol d order . Th e la w ofte n supporte d onl y commercia l exchang e tha t reflected traditiona l understanding s o f th e prope r relation s amon g peo ple. Eve n a s lat e a s th e eighteent h century , law s regulatin g contractua l agreements—though no t yet acknowledged a s a separate domain o f law— largely concerned th e transfe r o f title and th e actualizatio n o f "customar y obligations."58 Onl y wit h th e star t o f th e Industria l Revolutio n di d th e law o f contract s recogniz e agreement s tha t faile d t o reflec t expecte d customs an d tradition . Analyzin g th e histor y o f contrac t law , Ja y M . Feinman an d Pete r Gabe l describ e thi s transition : Eighteenth-century contract law would be barely recognizable to the modern lawyer . Th e cor e o f eighteenth-centur y contrac t la w wa s no t th e enforcement o f private agreement s bu t th e implementatio n o f customary practices and traditional norms. . .. In part, contracts was that portion of the law of property concerning the transfer o f title to specific thing s from on e person to another—the proces s by whic h "m y horse " becam e "you r horse. " . .. Contrac t la w als o con cerned customar y obligation s betwee n peopl e relate d t o status , occupa tion, o r social responsibilities . Fo r example, a patient wa s "contractually" obligated b y custo m t o pa y fo r a physician' s service s whethe r o r no t h e actually had promise d t o pay prior to the renderin g o f the services. In all types o f contract s cases , th e substantiv e fairnes s o f th e agreemen t o r relation was subject to scrutiny by a lay jury applying community standards of justice. If a physician sue d for hi s fee or a seller of goods for her price, the jur y coul d decid e tha t eve n a n amoun t agree d t o b y the partie s was excessive and inequitable, and so award a smaller sum instead. Thus, eighteenth-centur y contrac t la w di d no t encourag e commercia l I 20 9 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction exchange. Th e traditiona l imag e o f th e worl d presente d b y contrac t la w regarded the enforcement o f market transactions as often illegitimate , so a seller coul d neve r b e guarantee d th e pric e h e o r sh e ha d bargaine d for , and liability might be imposed in the absence of agreement when required by popular notions of fairness.59 With th e burgeonin g o f capitalis m a t th e en d o f th e eighteent h an d early part of the nineteent h centuries , courts increasingl y referre d to , and enforced, th e wil l o f th e partie s t o a contract . I n addition , a t thi s tim e law-makers began t o define contrac t la w itself as an instrumen t fo r realiz ing th e wil l o f free , putativel y equal , individuals . B y th e middl e o f th e nineteenth century , the understandin g tha t courts were obliged t o respec t and enforc e bargain s amon g negotiatin g partie s stoo d a t th e cente r o f contract law , replacin g a vie w o f contract s a s a documentatio n o f a relationship (suc h a s tha t betwee n a buye r an d selle r o f property ) tha t reflected, an d tha t therefor e wa s willin g t o sea l i n th e particula r case , some aspec t o f the endurin g orde r o f things. Feinman an d Gabe l sugges t tha t th e ideologica l underpinning s o f contract la w shifte d ye t agai n b y th e middl e o f th e twentiet h centur y i n response t o ne w socia l an d economi c change s i n th e large r society . Twentieth-century la w imposed constraint s o n th e uncontrolle d commer cialism o f th e previou s century. 60 Thus , court s limite d th e contractua l freedom tha t define d th e nineteenth-centur y marke t b y exploring , fo r example, th e fairnes s o f a bargai n an d refusin g t o enforc e bargain s tha t seemed seriousl y unfai r (e.g. , unconscionable) . The ideolog y o f famil y tha t develope d durin g th e nineteent h centur y depended upon , an d encouraged , nineteenth-centur y commercialis m b y defining th e famil y a s a necessar y refug e fro m tension s o f th e market . Home an d wor k were understoo d a s different, eve n a s opposites, bu t no t as antagonists . Eac h depende d o n th e other . Societ y elaborate d th e ideological distinctio n betwee n famil y an d marke t throug h th e 1950s . After that , th e distinctio n bega n t o blu r eve n a s a n ideologica l matter . Thus, beginnin g i n th e middl e o f the twentiet h century , withi n a perio d of thre e o r fou r decades , societ y redefine d th e marke t i n term s close r t o those that earlier define d th e hom e an d th e family . And th e family , a fe w decades late r bu t durin g approximatel y th e sam e period , wa s redefine d in terms closer to those that earlier defined th e world o f work and money . Changing understanding s o f th e marke t ar e indicate d an d illustrate d b y the histor y o f contract la w durin g th e las t severa l decades . Case s suc h a s 210 I

The "Intent" of Reproduction Davis, Johnson, Hecht, an d Parpalaix indicat e an d illustrat e changin g understandings o f th e family , eve n a s th e change s ar e maske d b y th e continuing invocatio n o f nineteenth-century image s o f family life . The temptatio n o f relyin g o n a reconstructe d conceptio n o f inten t i n such case s i s clear. Th e consequence s ma y b e les s clear . Bu t amon g th e obvious consequence s i s th e recognitio n o f contrac t a s a n appropriat e mode fo r creatin g famil y relationships , includin g thos e betwee n parent s and children . Th e court s i n thes e case s dimme d th e impor t o f tha t recognition b y definin g inten t t o reflec t traditiona l image s o f famil y a s strongly a s image s o f contractua l negotiatio n an d mone y exchange . Bu t the notio n tha t th e tw o image s ca n b e harmoniousl y combine d i s clearly illusory. Less clea r i s th e kin d o f famil y imag e tha t wil l replac e tha t forge d during the first century following th e Industria l Revolution . The la w may come full y t o recogniz e an d applau d th e creation , an d perhap s th e operation, o f famil y relation s o n th e basi s o f principle s o f contract . Contract principle s could , fo r instance , determin e th e law' s respons e t o changed intentions . One commentator , suggestin g tha t th e la w shoul d recogniz e th e con tractual orderin g o f th e parent-chil d relationship , especiall y i n case s occasioned b y reproductiv e technology , woul d rel y expressl y o n princi ples o f contract la w to interpre t agreement s abou t parentage . Sh e argues , for instance , tha t th e la w ca n provid e fo r changin g intention s abou t parentage a s it can provid e fo r changin g intention s abou t othe r matters : Enforcement o f promise s occur s precisel y becaus e peopl e chang e thei r minds abou t performin g obligation s the y have assumed. Indeed , a subset of contract doctrin e govern s whe n change d circumstance s shoul d excus e nonperformance. Presumably , even under existing doctrine, some changes of mind i n the contex t of reproductive agreement s migh t lead t o excused performance. Fo r instance , i f a surrogat e mother' s tw o existin g childre n died i n a fire durin g her surrogate pregnancy, a court might relieve her of the obligatio n t o perform th e surrogac y agreement. . .. B y contrast, i f the surrogate simpl y mispredicte d ho w attache d sh e woul d fee l t o thi s baby , the clai m o f excus e woul d b e har d t o sustai n unde r existin g contrac t doctrine.61 Such a n unambivalen t appropriatio n o f contrac t principle s i n establish ing parentag e i s internally consistent . Th e approac h openl y relinquishe s I 21 1 |

The "Intent" of Reproduction the preservation of traditional conceptions of family in that this approach rejects definitivel y th e notio n tha t familie s ar e defined throug h inexora ble truth s a s nonnegotiable , hierarchicall y organize d unit s o f endurin g relationships. Peopl e creatin g families throug h relianc e o n principle s of contract ma y still choose t o establish an d sustai n familie s tha t resembl e those portraye d i n th e traditiona l ideolog y o f family. Bu t suc h families , because understood a s products o f culture, o f self-conscious negotiatio n and choice , an d no t a s product s o f nature , wil l b e understoo d a s con stantly open to challenge and replacement by alternative choices. Thus, judicial relianc e o n inten t i n cases occasioned b y reproductive technology appear s t o represen t a transitional response . The attemp t t o mediate between, and thus preserve, images of traditional family life and images o f families created , an d perhap s operated , throug h contrac t an d choice wil l almost certainl y prov e self-defeating . Unde r pressure , courts have invoke d th e concep t o f inten t t o resolv e specifi c dispute s an d t o fashion a respons e t o th e large r confusion s presente d b y th e adven t of reproductiv e technology . Bu t th e concept , invoke d t o amalgamat e traditional and contemporar y understandings of family, is inimical to the traditional ideolog y of family. The basic impulse of the concept of intent is, however , barel y notice d a t all . B y it s nature , th e concep t o f intent entails that o f choice an d thu s poses an essentia l ideologica l contras t to traditional understandings of family. Thus th e ideologica l oppositio n arises , no t onl y fro m without , bu t from within . It seems likely to remain attractive to the law. If so, the law's reliance o n inten t i n case s occasioned b y reproductive technology , an d in others in which courts are asked to determine parentage, may become express reliance on principles of contract.

I 21 2 |

SEVEN

Suffer th e Childre n

Judicial relianc e o n inten t i n case s occasione d b y reproductiv e technol ogy represent s a n innovative , thoug h ultimatel y unstable , approac h t o defining parentag e an d t o understandin g th e parent-chil d relationship . That approach ha s sometimes seemed attractiv e insofa r a s it has appeare d to recogniz e th e creatio n o f th e parent-chil d relationshi p i n contractua l terms withou t expressl y renouncin g a traditiona l ideolog y o f famil y tha t for almos t tw o centurie s ha s eschewe d th e amalgamatio n o f contractua l and familia l relationships . Ultimately, th e law' s reliance o n inten t t o defin e parentag e o r custod y is a temporar y measur e tha t fail s t o provid e stabl e guidanc e t o a societ y faced wit h phenomen a suc h a s froze n embryos , gestationa l surrogac y and posthumou s insemination . Thi s i s so becaus e inten t i s linked essen tially t o a worl d o f autonomou s individualit y an d choice , no t t o a worl d of fixed relations predicate d o n biologica l truth . As a result , th e decisio n to rel y o n inten t i s a decisio n t o rel y full y o n contractua l agreement s i n resolving suc h cases . At present , societ y i s no t willin g t o d o that . More over, inten t canno t accomplis h th e tas k assigne d i t becaus e intention s shift an d ar e alway s complex . Onl y i f the meanin g o f inten t i s restricte d to tha t inten t mad e obviou s i n a contrac t doe s i t becom e possibl e t o specify a party's inten t wit h certaint y an d t o effect tha t intent . So, othe r court s hav e trie d othe r approache s t o th e resolutio n o f disputes engendere d b y reproductiv e technolog y an d surrogacy . Som e courts, rather tha n fashionin g ne w approache s t o the problem s presente d by these cases , have attempted t o mold familia r approache s t o resolve th e new dilemmas . A fe w courts , especiall y i n traditiona l surrogac y cases , have relie d almos t exclusivel y on th e best-interes t standar d t o identify th e parents o r custodian s o f a child . Thi s approach , unlik e judicia l relianc e on intent , make s us e o f a principl e tha t ha s bee n institutionalize d fo r 12131

Suffer the Children almost a century fo r us e i n the resolutio n o f family la w disputes involvin g children's parentag e o r custody . As a result , relianc e o n th e best-interes t standard i n case s occasione d b y surrogac y o r ne w reproductiv e technol ogy ofte n appear s t o integrat e thos e case s wit h other , fa r mor e familia r disputes abou t famil y matter s an d thereb y suggest s tha t thes e case s ar e not a s unsettlin g t o traditiona l understanding s o f famil y a s the y usuall y appear t o be. However, thi s approac h i s not provin g mor e satisfactor y tha n relianc e on th e notio n o f intent . Yet , th e reason s fo r eac h approach' s failur e ar e quite different . Relianc e o n th e best-interes t principl e prove s inadequat e to resolv e case s occasione d b y reproductiv e technolog y an d surrogac y because applicatio n o f the best-interes t principl e depend s o n a t leas t th e illusion (i f not the reality ) o f shared assumption s withi n societ y about th e contours an d meanin g o f familial relationships . Th e question s presente d by cases involving children (o r gametes) produce d throug h th e us e of the new reproductiv e technologie s ar e to o large , to o disturbing , an d to o unprecedented fo r tha t illusio n t o b e easil y sustained . I n thes e cases , courts, compelled t o reconstruct th e meaning s of maternity and paternity , are unabl e t o assum e that , howeve r a specifi c disput e i s resolved, famil y is still ultimately family , an d tha t nothing very important i s changing. In fact , th e exten t o f the disruptio n tha t th e ne w reproductiv e techno logies present to traditional view s of family i s indicated b y the very failur e of th e best-interes t standar d generall y t o resolv e dispute s engendere d b y use o f thi s technology . Fo r ove r a century , th e notio n tha t a child' s custody (an d sometime s eve n a child' s parentage ) ca n b e determine d b y examining th e child' s bes t interest s ha s serve d famil y la w faithfully . Cer tainly, th e principl e ha s alway s provide d littl e concret e guidanc e t o courts face d wit h dispute s involvin g children . Decision s abou t children' s custody an d parentag e hav e alway s depende d o n th e wisdom , insight , and worldvie w o f th e presidin g judge . Unti l recently , however , th e ver y indeterminacy o f th e best-interes t standar d ha s prove d useful . A s socia l values hav e shifte d ove r time , th e la w ha s bee n abl e t o depen d consis tently on on e standar d fo r resolvin g a large set of cases involving childre n in families. Now , however, especiall y i n case s occasioned b y reproductiv e technology, almos t ever y assumptio n tha t undergirde d th e traditiona l ideology o f famil y i s bein g challenge d a t once . I n consequence , th e disruption thes e case s pose to traditional understanding s o f family canno t be accommodate d b y a principl e tha t demand s a t leas t som e broa d 214 I

Suffer the Children agreement withi n societ y abou t th e characte r o f familia l connections . That is , applications o f th e principl e depen d o n courts ' actualizin g a variety o f social assumption s abou t th e familie s an d familia l relationship s that the y regulate . A s lon g a s thos e assumption s ar e a t leas t broadl y generalized throughou t th e society , th e best-interes t principl e ca n serv e to cement an d justif y particula r custod y determinations . This is , however, often n o longe r true . An d i t i s certainl y no t tru e i n case s occasione d b y the ne w reproductiv e technologies . Courts d o see m abl e an d willin g t o rel y o n th e best-interes t principl e more ofte n i n traditiona l surrogac y case s tha n i n case s involvin g repro ductive technology , probabl y becaus e traditiona l surrogacy , althoug h threatening t o a traditiona l ideolog y o f family , doe s no t als o threate n t o disrupt the biologica l correlate s o f human reproduction . So , for instance , in Baby M. , th e mos t well-know n lega l cas e involvin g a traditiona l surrogacy arrangement , th e Ne w Jerse y trial cour t determine d th e child' s parentage b y assessin g he r bes t interests . An d th e stat e suprem e court , while reversin g th e tria l cour t decisio n i n almos t ever y othe r regard , praised th e lowe r court' s analysi s of the child' s situatio n an d welfare . In case s occasioned b y the ne w reproductiv e technologie s court s hav e only rarel y relie d o n th e best-interes t principle . However , eve n i n thes e cases, courts hav e almos t alway s invoke d childre n an d thei r interest s an d have justifie d th e decision s reache d wit h assurance s tha t thos e decision s serve th e interest s o f th e childre n involved . So , fo r example , i n Johnson v. Calvert, th e Californi a Suprem e Cour t relie d o n parenta l inten t t o identify th e Calvert s a s bab y Christopher' s parents , bu t asserte d tha t i n such case s th e interest s o f children ar e ver y likely t o b e serve d b y courts ' recognizing thei r intendin g parent s a s their lega l parent s and custodians. 1 The continue d invocatio n o f children's bes t interests i n suc h case s proves as significant fo r understandin g th e law' s changing respons e t o the famil y as doe s th e genera l failur e o f th e best-interes t principl e satisfactoril y t o resolve disputes occasione d b y assisted reproduction . For man y decade s th e best-interes t standar d ha s enjoye d a mora l superiority i n famil y law , eve n thoug h th e principl e ha s ofte n serve d actual childre n rathe r poorly . Fo r almos t tw o centuries , societ y ha s equated childre n an d famil y an d ha s describe d th e developmen t o f happy, protecte d childre n a s th e ultimat e purpos e o f th e traditiona l family. A lasting nostalgia fo r traditiona l familie s durin g th e cours e o f the pas t 12151

Suffer the Children two centuries ha s consistently bee n expresse d b y the la w through refer ence t o childre n an d thei r interests . Thes e reference s hav e provide d evidence, bot h rea l an d symbolic , that image s associate d wit h old-fash ioned, decent families are still valued and that, in turn, such families are valued as well. Nostalgia fo r old-fashione d famil y lif e i s no t new . As the famil y ha s obviously change d durin g th e cours e o f th e pas t tw o centuries , eac h generation has shown some reverence for the lost family of the generation before. Unti l recently , however , th e confusion s an d uncertaintie s pro duced by changes in the form and meaning of family could be accommodated within the broad ideolog y of family that developed with the Industrial Revolution. That i s no longer the case . As a result, the best-interes t principle seems more and more obviously inadequate as the law's primary response t o custod y an d parentag e disputes . I n case s occasione d b y assisted reproduction, that inadequacy is especially transparent. It is clear from cases in which the best-interest principle is obviously no more than an incidental rhetorical device as well as from cases in which courts have relied o n th e best-interes t principl e t o determin e a child' s custod y o r parentage bu t hav e obviousl y faile d t o focu s adequatel y o n th e bes t interests o f th e chil d involve d i n ligh t o f th e changin g parameter s o f family. Even more , a similar invocatio n o f children an d thei r welfare , an d a similar failure of these invocations to resolve social confusions, character ize the ongoin g social debate about family that encompasses, and tha t is often reflecte d in , th e law' s contemporar y debat e abou t family . I n gen eral, a panopl y o f contradictor y voice s i s respondin g t o reproductiv e technology through a set of similar, and similarly nostalgic, references t o the central role that children mus t play in any acceptable understandin g of hom e an d family . A s th e debat e abou t familie s produce d throug h assisted reproductio n unfolds , socia l conclusion s abou t th e valu e reproductive technolog y ma y hol d fo r actua l familie s an d actua l childre n become increasingly murky. More generall y still , examination o f legal case s as well a s of broader social response s t o surrogac y an d th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s suggest that , despit e th e continue d invocatio n o f childre n an d thei r interests, societ y i s rapidly revisin g a n understandin g o f childhoo d an d children tha t ha s been centra l t o the ideolog y o f family fo r a t least two centuries. Thus, relianc e o n th e best-interes t standar d i n surrogac y an d | 21 6

Suffer the Children reproductive technolog y cases , an d invocation s o f childre n an d thei r welfare b y the law and b y society in the larger social debate abou t assiste d reproduction, see m stil l t o reflec t traditiona l response s t o famil y matters . But mor e an d mor e often , contradiction s displac e eve n th e illusio n o f consensus. I. Contradictor y Socia l Impulses : Th e Best-Interes t Standar d During the past century, the best-interes t principle ha s been institutional ized everywher e i n the Unite d State s either throug h stat e statutory provisions o r throug h judicia l preceden t a s the applicabl e rul e fo r establishin g a child' s custod y i n case s o f parenta l divorc e o r separatio n an d fo r establishing custody , an d sometime s parentage , i n case s involvin g paren tal deat h o r the terminatio n o f parental rights . The widesprea d institutionalizatio n o f the standar d reflect s th e appar ent concer n o f th e societ y an d o f th e la w durin g th e pas t tw o centurie s with th e welfare o f children . Image s o f childre n an d o f th e valu e o f childhood continu e t o pla y a n essentia l rol e i n th e law' s treatmen t an d definition o f families. Th e concer n wit h childre n di d no t alway s exist , a t least no t a s a centra l componen t i n understanding s o f family . Recen t developments i n th e law' s respons e t o childre n ca n b e evaluate d onl y i n light o f a longe r histor y i n whic h children' s interest s becam e importan t to the law . Images o f childre n an d childhoo d becam e practicall y sacre d withi n the ideolog y o f famil y durin g th e nineteent h century . Sinc e tha t time , nostalgic image s o f childre n hav e shape d an d justifie d th e law' s under standing an d regulatio n o f family matters . By the middl e o f the twentiet h century, suc h image s ha d becom e indispensabl e t o th e ideolog y o f th e family i n th e Unite d States . A dee p nostalgi a fo r a worl d portraye d a s having protecte d children—th e worl d o f th e traditiona l family—contin ues t o b e reflecte d eve n i n th e decision s o f court s supporting , o r eve n more, self-consciousl y advocating , th e developmen t o f non-traditiona l family structures . Before th e Industria l Revolutio n th e welfare an d interest s o f childre n were no t relevan t t o determination s o f custod y an d parentage . Whe n called upo n t o determin e a child' s custod y o r parentage , Englis h com mon la w virtuall y ignore d th e child' s welfare . Althoug h peculia r an d outrageous t o contemporary ears , this was not a self-conscious attemp t t o 217

Suffer the Children subvert th e interest s o f children . Inquirie s int o children' s interest s wer e not mad e an d the n discounted . Suc h inquirie s wer e no t mad e becaus e almost n o on e expecte d the m t o hav e bee n made . Focu s o n children' s interests i n dispute s abou t custod y o r parentag e make s sens e onl y t o a world tha t frame s childhoo d a s a separat e stag e (beyon d infancy ) an d that values children an d childhood . Suc h a world di d no t com e full y int o existence unti l th e lat e eighteenth , o r earl y nineteenth , century . I n th e colonial perio d childre n wer e generall y no t eve n mentione d i n divorc e petitions, an d whe n the y were , i t wa s no t primaril y t o invok e thei r interests bu t t o indicat e tha t th e marriag e o f thei r parent s wa s long standing. Traditionally, the common law , reflecting Roma n la w before it , viewed children a s belongin g t o thei r father s wh o ha d a moral , bu t no t a legal , obligation t o support the children . A father, i n thi s view, had "th e perfec t legal r i g h t . . . t o the possessio n an d controu l o f his child." 2 Thu s fathers , but not mothers, almost invariably gained custody , even i n cases in whic h the child' s welfar e woul d obviousl y b e ill-serve d b y paterna l custody . I n Rex v . DeManneville, ofte n note d t o sho w th e tenacit y o f tha t rule , a n English cour t gav e custod y o f a nursin g bab y t o it s father i n spit e o f th e uncontested clai m b y the mothe r tha t he r separatio n fro m th e fathe r wa s caused b y his extrem e cruelty . By th e mid-nineteent h century , change s i n th e law' s treatmen t an d understanding o f childre n appeare d i n Englis h statutor y law . A t tha t time, mother s wer e give n a statutor y righ t t o see k custod y o f youn g children. 3 I n the United State s at the same time, courts began to questio n rigid adherenc e t o a rul e tha t virtuall y alway s grante d custod y t o fathers . Although fathers ' right s to custody usuall y remained paramoun t i n Amer ican court s durin g th e nineteent h century , suc h right s wer e increasingl y predicated o n a father's obligations , both mora l an d legal , to support an d educate hi s children . Although man y Unite d State s courts preferred father s i n custod y case s as lat e a s th e earl y twentiet h century , thing s wer e changing . Preferenc e for father s wa s n o longe r automatic . Specifically , i t bega n t o b e limite d through referenc e t o th e welfar e o f th e childre n involved . B y this time , courts wer e willin g t o gran t custod y t o mother s i n case s i n whic h father s were prove n unfit . An d eve n a s earl y a s th e mid-nineteent h century , some court s i n th e U.S . embraced th e welfar e o f the chil d a s the crucia l principle i n determinin g a child' s custody . I n 1840 , a Ne w Yor k court , 218

Suffer the Children granting custod y t o a divorcin g mothe r wit h a two-year-ol d child , state d clearly tha t "[t]h e interes t o f th e infan t i s deeme d paramoun t t o th e claims o f bot h parents." 4 Th e cour t explaine d tha t th e interes t o f th e child la y wit h maternal , rathe r tha n paternal , custod y becaus e "th e la w of nature " attache d mothers , mor e strongl y tha n fathers , t o thei r youn g children. Thus , th e court , thoug h justifyin g it s decisio n b y referenc e t o natural truth , inevitabl y suggeste d tha t tha t truth wa s itself fungible, o r a t least debatable . Afte r all , othe r court s ha d lon g assume d tha t custod y belonged t o fathers a s a matter o f natural o r supernatural truth . By the en d o f the nineteent h century , th e old rule s for resolvin g famil y disputes, includin g thos e relevan t t o th e determinatio n o f custod y i n cases o f parental divorc e o r separation , wer e clearl y bein g challenge d b y new understanding s o f family. Ne w rule s developed . Increasingly , court s facing custod y dispute s appeare d t o ignor e th e interest s an d right s o f parents an d focuse d instea d o n th e welfar e o f th e childre n involved . This approach , ultimatel y institutionalize d a s th e best-interes t principle , provided grea t flexibility t o a lega l syste m uncertai n abou t wha t kind s o f families an d wha t sort s o f parent s th e socia l orde r endorse d o r woul d soon endorse . The expres s focu s o f th e best-interes t principl e o n th e welfare o f children seeme d t o provid e a mora l fram e withi n whic h t o determin e custody. However , th e changin g se t o f presumption s throug h whic h th e standard ha s bee n applie d t o actua l childre n suggest s tha t th e standar d was neve r rigidl y anchore d i n a n unchangin g conceptio n o f family. Th e reach o f th e best-interes t standard , initiall y linke d with , an d use d t o support, a ne w reverenc e fo r motherhoo d i n th e nineteent h century , soon widene d t o suppor t othe r interest s an d othe r understanding s o f family. Th e principl e coul d successfull y b e applie d to , an d coul d mak e sense of , an y se t of presumptions abou t famil y tha t conforme d broadl y t o the ideolog y o f famil y develope d i n th e nineteent h centur y an d no w described throug h reference s t o "traditional " families . Indeed , th e stan dard itsel f neve r demande d th e sor t o f shifting , eve n opposing , conclu sions abou t th e welfar e o f childre n whos e parent s divorc e tha t actua l applications o f the standar d hav e supporte d ove r th e years . Moreover, application s o f th e best-interes t standar d hav e reflecte d a deep irony . I n theory , th e standar d demand s tha t som e visio n o f childre n and thei r interest s li e a t th e hear t o f ever y custod y decision . I n fact , however, courts , no t alway s full y consciou s o f th e implication s o f thei r

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Suffer the Children own procedures , have frequentl y substitute d th e interest s o f contendin g adults for those of the children. Judicial attention to the conduct of adults seeking custod y i s almos t alway s essentia l t o th e proces s o f evaluatin g options for a child. However, conclusions about the moral, psychological, or social trait s of adults seekin g custody ca n easil y become conclusion s about custody rather than information tha t courts use to discern a child's best interests. The bes t interests of a child ca n be subverted b y a judge who simply fails t o understan d th e complicate d personalitie s an d relationship s in volved i n a custod y case , a s wel l a s b y a judg e wh o doe s no t focu s carefully o n th e detail s o f a particula r cas e bu t instea d assume s tha t middle-class, comparativel y mainstrea m custodian s wil l bette r serv e a child's interests than poorer or more socially marginal custodians. So, for instance, i n 199 5 th e Virgini a Suprem e Cour t i n Bottoms v. Bottoms granted custod y o f a youn g bo y t o th e grandmothe r rathe r tha n th e mother, essentiall y o n th e ground s tha t th e child' s bes t interest s woul d not be served by residence with his lesbian mother . Despite it s shortcomings, however , th e best-interes t standar d ha s no t only survived bu t ha s been invaluabl e t o the evolutio n o f family la w in the past century. The standar d ha s provided th e illusio n of sane stability in a society undergoing rapi d change . More important , judicia l relianc e on th e standar d ha s successfull y suggeste d i n cas e afte r cas e tha t th e families constructe d throug h referenc e t o th e bes t interest s o f childre n are more moral and more decent than alternatives because moral, decent families an d th e best-interes t standar d ar e alike presumed t o place chil dren a t th e center . Thus , th e best-interes t standard , a s muc h a s an y principle i n famil y la w today, stands fo r tradition . Bu t i t has also served the interest s o f those who , self-consciously o r not , favo r change s i n th e family and in family law. In a society for which childre n an d the parent-child bon d hav e come to b e understoo d a s th e survivin g vestig e an d lastin g representatio n o f old-fashioned families , th e best-interes t principl e affirm s th e continuin g significance o f traditiona l familie s withi n th e socia l order . A t the sam e time, the standar d ha s masked, an d thu s provide d a certain comfor t to , departures from know n an d expecte d patterns . Th e standard' s surviva l cannot b e attribute d t o th e protectio n o f actua l children . Rather , th e best-interest standard has supported society's continuing nostalgia for the way families were thought once to have been. I 22 0 I

Suffer the Children II. Judicia l Relianc e o n Best-Interes t Standar d i n Surrogacy an d Ne w Reproductiv e Technolog y Cases : Contradictory Message s abou t Childre n A simila r nostalgia , an d a relate d attemp t b y th e la w t o accommodat e changes i n th e presen t throug h compariso n wit h constructe d image s o f a valued past , mark s socia l an d lega l response s t o surrogac y an d ne w reproductive technology . However , th e challeng e no w presente d b y as sisted reproductio n i s of a ne w order . Effort s t o assimilat e thes e changes , like thos e o f earlie r decades , t o familia r image s o f famil y life , continu e but ar e marke d b y increasing contradictio n an d confusion . Society doe s no t ye t presum e t o full y understan d th e implication s o f surrogacy an d th e ne w reproductiv e technologies , eve n a s these phenom ena ar e generatin g ferven t mora l debate . I n tha t debate , societ y an d th e law continue, but less insistently and les s conclusively, to measure chang e against its consequences fo r children. I n public presentations , both oppo nents an d proponent s o f surrogac y an d ne w reproductiv e technolog y evaluate th e us e o f assiste d reproductio n agains t image s o f traditiona l families an d image s o f childre n withi n suc h families . Advocate s an d adversaries o f surrogac y an d o f ne w reproductiv e technolog y sugges t i n concert tha t childre n an d th e parent-chil d bon d represen t th e lastin g sacred cor e o f famil y lif e and , accordingly , prais e o r condem n th e ne w technologies an d surrogac y throug h referenc e t o th e apparen t result s fo r children. Underlying thes e varie d claim s li e othe r interest s whic h serv e adult s more tha n childre n an d whic h suppor t th e correlate s o f autonomou s individuality mor e tha n thos e o f social connection . Bu t now , i n contras t to th e interpla y i n earlie r decade s betwee n th e law' s invocatio n o f chil dren an d it s focu s o n adul t interests , th e contradiction s an d confusion s cannot b e a s easil y maske d an d thu s ignored . Th e semblanc e o f a n ordered rul e tha t characterize d th e law' s respons e t o dispute s involvin g custody an d parentag e i n earlie r decade s ha s yielde d t o mor e obviou s uncertainty an d bewilderment . Contradictions betwee n image s o f traditiona l familie s an d th e realit y of creatin g familie s throug h reproductiv e technolog y ar e becomin g harder to contain. Court s invok e children an d thei r best interests i n case s occasioned b y reproductiv e technology , bu t mor e an d mor e ofte n thes e invocations fai l t o mediat e th e difference s betwee n image s o f traditiona l 221

Suffer the Children family lif e an d actua l familie s create d throug h commercia l negotiation s and technologica l intervention . Image s o f childhood an d th e interest s o f children, thoug h stil l ofte n invoked , ar e i n fac t becomin g les s centra l t o the regulatio n o f family matters . Illustrative Case s Three cases , eac h o f whic h ha s alread y bee n presented , a s wel l a s on e other, illustrat e variou s level s o f attentio n t o childre n an d thei r interest s in case s o f assiste d reproduction . Davis v . Davis, involvin g th e Davises ' divorce an d thei r resultin g disput e abou t th e fat e o f thei r seve n froze n embryos, elaborates , t o th e poin t o f derailin g altogether , th e concer n o f the la w with childre n (o r potential children ) an d thei r interests . I n Davis the familia r judicia l tendenc y i n case s abou t custod y o r parentag e t o disguise the satisfaction o f one set of interests (those of adults) by invoking another se t o f interest s (thos e o f children) , become s almos t a parody . Both o f th e decision s o f th e Ne w Jerse y court s i n Baby M. , a cas e presenting social more than biologica l confusions , involve d extensiv e an d express relianc e o n th e best-interes t standard . Th e cas e illustrate s th e us e of the best-interes t principle , whether self-consciousl y o r not, to effect th e illusion tha t traditiona l familie s ca n b e safeguarde d despit e th e enormit y of change . I n addition , th e cas e indicate s th e complexitie s tha t actuall y face court s seekin g t o discer n th e bes t interest s o f a chil d produce d a s a result o f surrogac y an d othe r form s o f assiste d reproduction . I n suc h cases, s o man y expectation s abou t th e scop e an d meanin g o f famil y are challenge d a t onc e tha t i t become s almos t impossibl y difficul t t o accommodate th e changes . I n suc h cases , th e best-interes t principl e seems hardl y abl e t o preserv e th e illusio n o f order . Moschetta v . Moschetta, a traditiona l surrogac y case , complicate d b y a divorc e be tween th e intendin g parents , reveal s eve n mor e starkl y than Baby M . th e confusions create d b y use o f the best-interes t principl e i n case s involvin g assisted reproduction . Finally , i n Johnson v . Calvert, th e Californi a cas e involving gestationa l surrogacy , th e stat e suprem e cour t invoked , bu t otherwise ignored , th e bes t interests of the chil d an d decide d th e cas e o n grounds tha t referre d onl y incidentall y t o th e child' s interests . However , the dissen t i n tha t cas e present s on e o f th e fe w instance s i n whic h a judge recommende d establishin g parentag e i n a cas e occasione d b y reproductive technolog y o n th e basi s of a best-interest determination . 222 |

Suffer the Children Davis di d no t involv e childre n a t all. Yet, the cas e vividly suggests ho w the la w ca n rel y o n th e best-interes t standard , an d other , relate d princi ples, t o effec t agenda s tha t hav e n o rea l concer n fo r childre n o r thei r welfare. I n particular , th e cas e reveal s th e powe r o f invokin g th e mora l status of children (o r in Davis, itself , of embryos) t o establish a n apparen t connection wit h decenc y an d tradition . The Tennesse e tria l court i n Davis expressl y defined th e cryopreserve d embryos, abou t whic h Mar y Su e an d Junio r Davi s wer e arguing , a s children an d expressl y considere d th e bes t interest s o f thos e embryo s i n deciding to allow Mary Sue to gestate them an d giv e birth t o the resultin g child o r children . However , neithe r o f th e tw o highe r Tennesse e court s that rendere d decision s i n th e cas e viewed th e embryo s a s children . The suprem e court , relyin g o n ethica l standard s promulgate d b y th e American Fertilit y Society , define d th e embryo s (calle d preembryos ) a s neither person s no r property bu t as entitled t o "special respec t becaus e o f their potentia l fo r huma n life." 5 I n s o definin g th e embryos , th e cour t situated it s own ideologica l sympathie s betwee n th e tria l court' s concer n with th e embryo s a s childre n an d th e intermediat e appellat e court' s treatment o f th e embryo s a s property , o r somethin g quit e lik e property . Such conclusion s abou t th e ontologica l statu s o f froze n embryo s d o no t automatically determin e thei r fat e i n case s suc h a s Davis. A conclusion , for instance , suc h a s tha t o f the Davis tria l court , tha t th e embryo s wer e ontologically n o differen t fro m childre n migh t lea d t o a numbe r o f different decision s abou t thei r actua l fate . Presumably , however , a court' s approach t o questions abou t th e embryos ' actual fat e woul d b e consisten t with tha t court' s conclusion s abou t th e embryos ' ontological status . Yet, i n a remarkabl e an d ironi c twist , th e stat e suprem e cour t define d the embryo s a s deservin g "specia l respect " an d the n ordere d tha t th e embryos b e discarded . I n makin g thi s determination , th e cour t offere d no commen t o n th e transparen t contradictio n betwee n it s descriptio n o f the embryos ' ontological statu s an d it s actual holdin g i n th e case . Finall y ordering that the embryo s b e given t o Junior's lawyer who would presum ably discard them , th e cour t apparentl y ignore d it s own insistenc e o n th e respect tha t mus t be afforde d t o cryopreserved embryos . The cour t announce d tha t th e embryo s wer e owe d "specia l respect " but neve r explaine d o r examine d th e implication s o f tha t conclusion , and i n explainin g it s actua l holding , th e cour t di d no t focu s o n th e embryos a t all . Instead , th e cour t conclude d tha t th e comparativ e 22

3

Suffer the Children strength o f th e right s claime d respectivel y b y Mar y Su e an d b y Junio r would prov e determinate . Moreover , th e cour t expressl y approve d th e use of contracts and contrac t principle s i n future case s involving cryopre served embryos . Justice Daughtre y explaine d tha t th e Davises ' respectiv e interests would b e determinative onl y because th e parties could no t agre e and ha d neve r entere d int o a n agreemen t abou t th e fat e o f their unuse d embryos. In sum , th e Davis cour t invoke d th e embryos , an d define d the m a s worthy o f specia l respect , analogou s t o th e wa y tha t othe r court s face d with dispute s involvin g custod y o r parentag e invok e childre n an d thei r best interests . Bu t immediatel y th e Davis cour t reache d a decisio n tha t overlooked th e embryos , thei r status , an d th e respec t du e the m becaus e of tha t status . Instead , simila r t o othe r court s handlin g routin e custod y cases, th e Davis cour t focuse d onl y o n th e interest s o f th e disputin g adults. If questione d abou t th e apparen t contradictio n betwee n it s holdin g and it s discussion o f the embryos ' status, the cour t migh t hav e note d tha t it invoke d th e progenitors ' constitutiona l rights , no t thei r propert y inter ests, and thu s neve r treate d th e embryo s a s property an d neve r confuse d the correlate s o f hom e wit h thos e o f th e marketplace . However , tha t explanation woul d b e unconvincing . First , th e cour t asserte d that , al though i t di d focu s o n th e parties ' constitutiona l rights , i t woul d hav e preferred t o focu s o n thei r interest s a s defined throug h contrac t la w an d that i t woul d certainl y hav e don e s o ha d th e partie s entere d int o a relevant contractua l agreement . Second , th e constitutiona l right s t o which th e court looked, right s concerning people' s intimat e relationship s such a s th e righ t t o autonom y i n matter s relatin g t o procreation , affor d protection t o th e individual i n intimat e matters , no t t o th e famil y a s such. Thus , th e court' s focu s o n Junior' s an d Mar y Sue' s respectiv e constitutional right s doe s no t demonstrat e tha t th e cour t respecte d th e embryos, a s it s analysi s o f thos e embryos ' statu s suggest s i t shoul d have . In explaining its actual holding, the court made no place for the embryos , and mad e n o effor t t o take account o f the respec t apparently owe d them . The contradictor y position s o f th e Davis cour t wit h regar d t o th e frozen embryos—it s invocatio n o f thei r specia l statu s an d the n it s tota l disregard fo r the m i n it s holding—i s mor e transparen t tha n simila r con tradictions i n othe r case s involvin g custody dispute s ove r actual children . The court , b y detailin g it s concer n fo r th e embryo s an d b y concludin g 224

Suffer the Children they shoul d b e give n specia l respect , aligne d itsel f wit h a traditiona l ideology o f family . Th e court' s concer n fo r th e embryos , howeve r real , was als o a pretext . A s pretext , th e court' s concer n wit h th e embryo s played n o part in th e holding . Th e cour t could disregar d the embryo s so easily and openly i n reachin g it s holding, because , i n fact, there were n o actual childre n t o protect . Bu t th e mor e importan t poin t i s tha t th e court's expres s concer n fo r th e embryos ' specia l statu s serve d onl y t o temper the implication s o f the actual holdin g in Davis. I n effect, conclu sions i n Davis abou t the embryos ' status and the respec t owed the m du e to that status became a rhetorical devic e that served to preserve a connection between th e decision an d a traditional view of family. The ontologica l an d mora l confusion s presente d b y gametic an d em bryonic cryopreservatio n ar e completel y novel . Thus , i t i s not surprisin g that th e discrepancie s betwee n agend a an d resul t i n Davis ar e stark . Because th e contradiction s underlyin g Davis ar e s o evident , th e cas e provides a n illuminatin g mode l throug h whic h t o conside r th e mor e opaque, bu t essentiall y similar , contradiction s underlyin g mor e routin e cases involvin g th e resolutio n o f custod y an d parentag e questions . I n those cases , the apparen t concern o f the la w with the welfare o f children is ofte n belie d b y th e treatmen t afforde d t o actua l children . I n thes e cases, however , th e contradictio n i s generall y disguise d b y a n expres s judicial effor t t o determin e an d effec t th e children' s bes t interests . No t even th e pretens e o f suc h a n effor t existe d i n Davis wit h regar d t o ensuring proper "respect" for the frozen embryos . In contrast, in a number of disputes occasioned by surrogacy contracts, courts hav e actuall y relie d o n th e best-interes t principl e t o resolv e cus tody an d parentag e issues . Suc h case s diffe r fro m Davis an d othe r case s that unsettl e expectation s abou t th e proces s o f huma n reproduction . Surrogacy disturbs social, but not biological, understanding s o f maternity and paternity. The creation of the parent-child relationship in contractual terms i s provin g troublin g t o society , bu t traditiona l surrogacy , whic h relies only o n artificia l inseminatio n an d no t o n mor e complicated , technological form s o f assiste d reproduction , doe s no t challeng e tradi tional notion s about biological reproduction . I n fact, in Baby M . non e o f the partie s questione d Mar y Bet h Whitehead' s biologica l maternit y no r William Stern' s biological paternity . The tria l cour t judge , apparentl y validatin g th e contrac t int o whic h the partie s ha d entered , describe d th e "primar y issue " in th e cas e a s the I 225

Suffer the Children best interest s o f Bab y M. 6 I n accordanc e wit h it s best-interes t analysis , the tria l cour t grante d parentag e an d custod y t o th e biologica l father , William Stern , and hi s wife, Elizabet h Stern . The court' s reliance o n th e child's bes t interest s t o determin e parentage , no t jus t custody , wa s un usual bu t no t unprecedented . Th e stat e suprem e court , reversin g tha t aspect o f th e lowe r court' s decision , applaude d th e lowe r court' s best interest analysi s an d relie d o n i t i n grantin g custod y t o Willia m Stern . That relianc e an d it s consequence s i n thi s cas e revea l th e complexitie s and confusion s tha t resul t fro m th e applicatio n o f existin g famil y la w principles, suc h a s th e best-interes t principle , t o case s tha t disrup t socia l expectations abou t th e creatio n an d incident s o f familial relationship s b y combining famil y lov e with marke t negotiations . In recognizin g Mar y Bet h Whitehea d a s Bab y M.' s mothe r an d Wil liam Ster n a s he r father , an d i n givin g eac h th e righ t t o continue d association wit h th e chil d (thoug h Willia m Ster n alon e wa s give n cus tody), th e stat e suprem e cour t decisio n create d a famil y unlik e familie s reconstructed followin g divorc e o r following th e separatio n o f unmarrie d parents. The surrogac y agreemen t entere d int o b y Whitehead an d Ster n aimed t o creat e a chil d produce d fro m Whitehead' s ovu m an d Stern' s sperm. Yet the tw o ha d neve r live d togethe r o r ha d sexua l relation s wit h each other ; the y neve r expecte d t o shar e a lif e together , an d ha d no t intended, an d neve r desired , t o shar e th e parenta l role . Ha d th e interest s of the chil d bee n thoughtfull y considere d i n thi s case , thes e fact s woul d have bee n a t th e cente r o f the judicia l inquiry . I n fact , thi s aspec t o f th e child's interest s was not considere d a t all. The best-interes t analysi s o f th e tria l cour t di d no t conside r thes e matters becaus e tha t cour t ha d name d th e Stern s a s th e baby' s parent s and terminate d Whitehead' s parenta l rights . Th e cour t thu s ha d n o reason t o conside r th e effect s o n th e chil d o f havin g Whitehea d fo r a mother an d Ster n fo r a father an d o f living at least some o f the tim e wit h each o f them . I n relyin g o n th e lowe r court' s best-interes t analysis , th e supreme cour t faile d t o conside r th e change d contex t tha t resulte d fro m its havin g reverse d mos t o f th e tria l court' s holding . Th e highe r cour t ignored th e rea l choice s tha t followe d fro m it s invalidatio n o f the surro gacy contract . Instea d th e cour t define d th e issu e i n th e cas e a s a simpl e choice betwee n "lif e . . . fo r Bab y M . . . . wit h primar y custod y i n th e Whiteheads o r one wit h primar y custod y i n th e Sterns." 7 The cour t the n concluded tha t o n th e basi s o f th e tria l court' s best-interes t analysis , 226

Suffer the Children custody shoul d remai n wit h Willia m Stern . Finally , th e suprem e cour t remanded th e cas e t o th e lowe r cour t fo r a determinatio n abou t th e extent o f Whitehead' s visitation . I n remandin g th e case , th e cour t de clared tha t th e fac t o f Whitehead' s visitatio n wa s "no t ope n t o th e tria l court o n . . . remand." 8 The suprem e court' s decisio n faile d completel y t o conside r th e possi bility tha t it s basic determination—tha t Ster n b e name d th e child' s lega l father an d Whitehea d he r mother—migh t no t serv e th e interest s o f th e child. Th e cour t understoo d stat e statutor y la w a s givin g i t littl e alterna tive i n thi s regard . However , th e cour t di d no t relat e tha t limitatio n t o it s best-interest analysi s and , mor e importantly , di d no t instruc t th e tria l court o n reman d t o conside r th e particula r an d uniqu e aspect s o f th e dispute i n determinin g th e detail s o f Whitehead's visitation . The cour t remarked , thoug h almos t incidentally , tha t th e cas e wa s unlike mos t custod y dispute s followin g divorce , an d resemble d othe r cases "i n whic h th e non-custodia l spous e ha s ha d practicall y n o relation ship with th e child." 9 B y implication, th e child' s bes t interest s would no t likely b e serve d b y assumin g th e fact s o f a typica l custod y dispute . Bu t that i s just what th e suprem e cour t i n effec t did , an d s o the cour t ha d t o justify it s approach. I n doin g that, th e cour t referre d t o Whitehead's earl y custody o f Bab y M . durin g th e four-mont h perio d i n whic h sh e live d with th e chil d i n Florid a afte r havin g escape d wit h th e bab y fro m th e Sterns and fro m stat e law. In addition , th e cour t dismissed a s inconsequential th e implication s o f the dispute' s uniqu e histor y b y assertin g th e right s o f th e biologica l mother rathe r tha n th e interest s o f the child . Th e cour t explained : [Mrs. Whitehead ] i s no t onl y th e natura l mother , bu t als o th e lega l mother, an d i s no t t o b e penalize d on e iot a becaus e o f th e surrogac y contract. Mrs . Whitehead, a s the mothe r (indeed , a s a mothe r wh o nur tured her child for its firstfour months—unquestionably a relevant consideration), i s entitle d t o hav e he r ow n interes t i n visitatio n considered . Visitation cannot be determined without considering the parents' interests along with those of the child. 10 At this crucial poin t i n it s analysis of the case , the cour t substituted th e interests o f th e mothe r fo r thos e o f th e child , an d therefore , despit e it s apparent focu s o n th e child' s bes t interests , mad e i t impossibl e t o deci pher th e actua l interest s o f tha t child . Tha t tas k woul d hav e require d 12271

Suffer the Children analysis o f th e consequence s fo r th e chil d o f movin g betwee n tw o sig nificantly differen t homes , between thre e parent s and two mother s origi nally joine d togethe r a s contrac t partners , an d betwee n parent s whos e intense animosit y towar d eac h othe r was expressly a consequence o f the child's negotiate d birth . Thos e determinativ e fact s ar e uniqu e t o Baby M., an d shoul d clearl y hav e bee n centra l t o th e law' s consideratio n o f the child's interests. On remand , th e tria l cour t was directed t o decid e th e terms , bu t no t the fact , o f Whitehead' s visitation . I n response , tha t cour t provide d fo r "unsupervised, uninterrupted , liberal visitation" between Whitehead an d the child. 11 Som e o f the complication s tha t follow, eve n i n theory , fro m the suprem e court' s best-interest determinatio n wer e vividly suggested i n a 199 4 stor y i n Redbook tha t feature d Bab y M . an d he r family . Th e story, subtitled , "A n Exclusiv e Intervie w wit h America' s Mos t Famou s Surrogate Mothe r about the Daughte r Sh e Fough t so Hard to Keep, But Couldn't," included small , familia r picture s o f Baby M. , th e Sterns , and Mary Beth Whitehead take n at the time of trial and other, larger pictures showing seven-year-ol d Bab y M. , no w know n a s "Sassy " Stern , a t th e beach, i n th e park , an d a t her materna l grandparenta l hom e i n Florid a with he r mothe r (no w know n publicl y a s Mar y Bet h Whitehea d an d privately as Mary Gould). The stor y also featured Mar y Beth's immediat e family, includin g he r two children wit h Richar d Whitehead from who m she wa s divorced , tw o younge r childre n bor n befor e an d durin g Mar y Beth's second marriage , and her second husband , Richard Gould . The stor y di d no t includ e picture s o f th e chil d wit h th e Sterns , wh o were no t interviewe d b y the magazine an d apparentl y playe d n o par t in the preparatio n o f th e story . However , th e contrast , especiall y i n Mar y Beth's view , betwee n lif e i n he r hom e an d lif e i n tha t o f th e Stern s provides th e centra l them e o f th e story . Whitehea d compare d he r ow n health wit h wha t "he r spies " i n th e Stern' s Ne w Jerse y communit y de scribed a s Bets y Stern' s worsenin g physica l stat e a s a resul t o f multipl e sclerosis. Whitehead complaine d about the child's following the "frumpy, old" model set by Betsy Stern and angrily contrasted the eating, conversation, and recreational pattern s in the two homes, finding the Ster n hom e seriously wanting. Parts of th e stor y present problem s familia r t o unfriendl y divorces . I n Baby M.'s case, he r mother's antagonism i s directed a t a second mother , I 22 8 I

Suffer the Children more tha n a t a father, bu t tha t ma y happe n afte r a divorce, following th e remarriage o f one parent. Fa r more consequentially, th e child her e know s clearly, an d apparentl y hear s frequently , a t leas t fro m Whitehead , tha t her negotiate d birt h brough t an d continue s t o brin g grea t sadnes s t o he r parents. Even th e fact tha t a popular magazine , displayed i n supermarket s and othe r store s throughou t th e country , feature d th e chil d i n a stor y increases th e likelihoo d o f th e child' s exposur e t o th e pai n he r birt h brought others . Whitehead' s mother , Eilee n Messer , tol d th e Redbook reporter, ou t o f Whitehead's hearing : "Thi s whol e busines s ha s destroye d our family , an d it' s changed he r [Mar y Beth]. " Equally discordan t consequence s migh t wel l hav e followe d ha d th e supreme cour t affirme d th e lowe r court' s rulin g an d sanctione d th e termination o f Whitehead's maternity , o r ha d th e cour t grante d materna l rights an d custod y t o Whitehead . Tha t notwithstanding , th e suprem e court wa s remis s i n no t requirin g tha t th e child' s bes t interest s b e exam ined ane w i n ligh t o f it s own holdin g whic h restore d Whitehead' s mater nity an d rescinde d th e adoptio n o f th e chil d b y Elizabet h Stern . Th e decision faile d t o acknowledg e tha t a child' s bes t interest s ar e actualize d or no t i n concret e setting s an d i n particula r relationship s an d tha t th e setting established b y a commercial surrogac y arrangement i s quite differ ent fro m mos t family setting s that court s consider . The best-interes t analysi s i n thi s cas e ultimatel y serve d interest s be yond thos e o f th e child . Fo r eac h court , relianc e o n th e best-interes t principle serve d t o endors e a particula r visio n o f family . Tha t vision , similar fo r bot h courts , wa s predicate d o n th e centralit y o f childre n an d of th e parent-chil d bond . Eac h decisio n reflecte d a traditiona l ideolog y of family ; eac h cour t sough t t o preserv e a famil y tha t woul d reflec t tha t ideology. However , th e fact s o f th e cas e mad e tha t resul t difficul t t o design wit h certainty . Tha t i s indicate d b y th e exten t t o whic h th e best interest principl e i n Baby M . becam e a term i n a n ongoin g debat e abou t family quit e a s much a s a tool for resolvin g the particula r dispute . I n this, the consequence s o f judicial relianc e o n th e best-interest principle i n thi s case ar e simila r t o th e consequence s o f judicia l relianc e o n th e concep t of intent i n othe r case s occasioned b y reproductive technology . Three year s afte r Baby M. , a Californi a tria l court , aske d t o resolv e a traditional surrogac y disput e i n tha t state , applie d th e best-interes t tes t and grante d join t custod y t o th e intendin g biologica l fathe r an d th e I 22 9 I

Suffer the Children surrogate mothe r (referre d t o as the "unintended " mothe r b y the Califor nia appellat e court). 12 That case began i n 1989 when Rober t and Cynthi a Moschetta , anxiou s to hav e a chil d bu t unabl e t o d o so , entere d int o a surrogac y contrac t with Elvir a Jordan . Cynthia , almos t fifty year s ol d whe n th e partie s entered int o th e surrogac y contract , ha d ha d a tuba l ligatio n befor e sh e married Rober t i n 1981 . Th e surrogac y contrac t provide d tha t Rober t Moschetta woul d pa y $10,00 0 t o Jorda n i n " 'recognition' o f Robert' s 'obligations t o suppor t [the ] chil d an d hi s righ t t o provid e [ Jordan] wit h living expenses / " B Elvir a becam e pregnan t throug h artificia l insemina tion b y th e en d o f tha t year . However , befor e th e birt h o f th e child , a daughter bor n i n Ma y 1990 , th e Moschettas ' marriag e ha d begu n obvi ously t o fal l apart . Jorda n learne d o f difficultie s i n Rober t an d Cynthia' s marriage fro m Cynthi a whil e Elvir a wa s i n labor . A s a result , sh e hesi tated t o surrende r th e chil d bu t finally allowe d th e Moschetta s t o tak e the bab y hom e fro m th e hospita l o n conditio n tha t sh e b e permitte d t o visit with th e chil d durin g th e first year . Further , sh e refuse d t o agre e t o a terminatio n o f her ow n parenta l right s for a t least one year . About si x month s afte r th e birt h o f th e baby , name d Marissa , th e Moschettas' separated . Rober t departe d fro m th e marita l hom e wit h th e child. Afte r this , Cynthia , Robert , an d Elvir a al l commence d action s i n court. Thes e action s wer e consolidated , an d i n th e sprin g o f 1990 , Judge Nancy Weibe n Stoc k declare d Rober t t o b e Marissa' s fathe r an d Elvira , her mother . Sh e furthe r ordere d tha t th e tw o parent s woul d shar e physi cal an d lega l custod y o f baby Marissa . Judge Stock' s custody determinatio n i s not unusua l fo r expressl y deny ing the importanc e t o the court' s decisio n o f class and ethni c differences among potentia l custodians . However , th e decisio n i s unusua l amon g custody case s generally, an d amon g surrogac y case s more particularly , i n reaching a conclusio n tha t canno t i n fac t b e easil y attribute d t o suc h factors. Judge Stoc k explained : Robert. . . was Caucasian, a middle income professional an d a new father. Elvira was an Hispanic middle-aged single mother with one pre-teen child at home. Elvira had a low income, was at one time on welfare and worked as a resident manager of her apartment complex. . . . The attorneys for Cynthia, Elvira and Marissa all urged the court not to base it s custod y decisio n o n thes e socio-economi c factors . Th e Cour t shared their hesitation. 14 230 I

Suffer the Children However, th e factor s upo n whic h th e cour t di d rel y i n determinin g tha t the child' s bes t interes t la y i n a joint-custod y arrangemen t wer e poorl y delineated. I n decidin g tha t Elvir a an d Rober t shoul d shar e physica l an d legal custod y o f the baby , the cour t contravened th e recommendation s o f both court-appointe d experts , a clinica l psychologis t an d a marriage , family, an d chil d counselor . Th e expert s ha d opine d that , Elvira Jordan had "difficulty i n setting structure and limits as her children grow." Her tw o older childre n ha d droppe d ou t o f school an d he r eldes t had "problem s relate d t o drugs. " He r "attitudes , competitiveness , lac k of self-awareness, an d possessiveness " limite d th e typ e o f custod y pla n tha t could be developed. 15 Judge Stoc k explaine d tha t i n thi s cas e sh e ordere d join t custody becaus e she wa s no t satisfie d tha t Rober t woul d mak e a fit sol e custodian . Sh e compared Robert' s "lack of sensitivity to the need s of the chil d a s separate and apar t fro m hi s own " wit h Elvira' s constan t readines s t o giv e (he r "unrefuted intent " wa s t o "giv e th e gif t o f lif e t o a n infertil e couple"). 16 Judge Stoc k furthe r base d he r joint-custod y orde r o n he r conclusio n tha t "frequent an d continuin g contac t wit h bot h biologica l parent s wa s i n Marissa's bes t interests." 17 Sh e buttresse d thi s decisio n wit h referenc e t o the legislative directio n tha t where possibl e parent s " 'share the right s an d responsibilities o f chil d rearing/" 1 8 Th e cour t rejecte d Robert' s argu ment tha t th e standar d wa s not intende d t o b e applie d t o situation s suc h as tha t involve d i n Moschetta: "[Wjhethe r th e chil d i s th e produc t o f a marital unio n o r not , th e cour t i s no t foreclose d fro m applyin g publi c policy consideration s applicabl e t o the child' s bes t interests." 19 The Californi a Cour t o f Appeal affirme d th e lowe r court' s decisio n a s to parentage , despit e th e stat e suprem e court' s decisio n i n Johnson, decided afte r th e tria l cour t opinio n i n Moschetta. Th e Moschetta court , refusing t o extend Johnsons intent-analysi s t o a case involvin g traditional , rather tha n gestational , surrogacy , distinguishe d Johnson, describe d a s having involve d a biologica l "tie " betwee n tw o "mothers, " fro m Moschetta (i n whic h Elvir a wa s th e onl y biologica l mother) , an d con cluded tha t i n a disput e occasione d b y traditional surrogacy , th e biologi cal mothe r o f th e chil d i s th e lega l mothe r a s well . However , th e cour t remanded th e cas e fo r a reconsideratio n o f th e custod y issu e o n th e ground tha t th e tria l cour t ha d "penalized " Rober t fo r havin g insiste d a t trial tha t Jorda n wa s no t th e child' s mothe r an d fo r havin g aggressivel y I 2 3*

Suffer the Children litigated th e controversy . Th e cour t asserted : "Th e statemen t o f decisio n [by th e tria l court ] treat s Rober t Moschett a a s a recalcitran t divorce d parent who obstructs the legitimate visitation right s of a former spouse." 20 In fact , Rober t wa s a divorcin g spous e thoug h h e wa s divorcin g Cyn thia, no t Elvira . Tha t divorc e wa s centra l t o th e histor y tha t le d t o Moschetta an d t o th e tria l cour t opinio n i n th e case . Elvira' s initia l reluctance t o surrende r th e chil d afte r he r birt h stemme d fro m Elvira' s apprehension abou t th e child' s bein g raise d b y a singl e father . Similarly , the tria l cour t judg e explaine d he r join t custod y decisio n wit h referenc e to he r concern s abou t Robert' s abilit y t o serv e adequatel y a s sol e custo dian. In another , mor e startlin g regard , th e Moschetta divorc e informe d th e trial court's approach t o the case. Although th e court certainly recognize d that Rober t wa s divorcin g Cynthi a an d wa s t o shar e custod y o f Mariss a with Elvira , th e cour t conflate d th e tw o wome n a t a crucia l poin t i n it s decision. Fo r th e firs t seve n month s o f Marissa' s life , th e bab y ha d live d together wit h Cynthi a an d Robert . I n considerin g Robert' s conclusion s about the consequences fo r the chil d o f his departure wit h th e chil d fro m the marita l hom e an d fro m Cynthia , th e cour t asserte d tha t Rober t showed "gros s misconception s abou t maternal/infan t bonding." 21 Later , considering a possibl e rol e fo r Cynthi a i n th e child' s life , th e cour t declared: At trial Robert clung to the position that Cynthia had no rights and should be terminated fro m Mariss a as quickly as possible. All three child custod y experts disagree d wit h thi s approach . Elvira , o n th e othe r han d full y endorsed a rol e fo r Cynthi a tha t woul d resembl e tha t o f a belove d aun t or Godmother . Althoug h a t tria l Elvir a wa s facin g a n evaluatio n repor t recommending ver y limite d acces s an d right s wit h Marissa , Elvir a wa s consistent i n he r offe r t o share with Cynthi a whateve r visitation tim e she had with the minor. 22 Thus, i n determinin g Marissa' s bes t interests , th e tria l cour t implicitl y assumed th e parameter s o f a routin e divorc e cas e rathe r tha n thos e o f a surrogacy disput e complicate d b y a divorc e betwee n th e intendin g par ents. The court , i n effect, replace d th e dimensions o f the actual cas e with those o f a n easier , les s disturbin g case . B y s o redefinin g th e case , a s a n unexceptional custod y actio n i n th e contex t o f a divorce , th e court , without particularl y considerin g th e matter , was able t o rely on a familia r

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Suffer the Children family la w rule, and o n th e basis of its best-interest determination , gran t joint custody of Marissa to Elvira Jordan and Robert Moschetta. Unfortu nately, however , thi s best-interes t determinatio n assume d a famil y tha t did no t exis t and i n importan t regard s ignore d th e famil y tha t di d exist . The uncertaintie s tha t define d th e actua l cas e wer e disguise d an d re placed wit h a revise d understandin g o f th e underlyin g context . Th e appellate cour t wa s quit e correc t i n concludin g tha t th e tria l court' s "statement o f decision " treate d Rober t Moschett a a s " a recalcitran t di vorced paren t who obstructs th e visitation right s of a former spouse. " In fact, that seems to be how the trial court actually envisioned the case. The appellat e cour t affirmed th e finding that Elvira an d Rober t were the child' s parents bu t remande d th e cas e for a reevaluation o f the tria l court's decision t o grant Elvira an d Rober t join t custody of the child . As a result , i n 1995 , five years afte r th e child' s birth , a stat e tria l cour t reviewed th e cas e an d Judg e Stock' s origina l joint-custod y decision . At that time, a court-appointed psychiatrist testified tha t the original decision "split . . . th e chil d i n half , Solomon-like, " whic h le d t o symptom s o f depression an d anxiet y i n th e child , no w five years old. 23 Accordingly , Judge John C. Woolley, who presided a t the proceedings, reversed Judge Stock's earlier decision and granted sole custody to Robert. This decision, as did th e earlie r one , "brush[ed ] asid e th e issue s o f surrogacy." 24 Th e court simpl y explaine d tha t th e chil d ha d suffere d unde r th e earlie r custody orde r an d tha t therefor e "th e child' s health , safet y an d welfar e dictate placement with the father." 25 Thus, th e tria l court s i n bot h Baby M. an d Moschetta (and t o som e extent th e stat e suprem e cour t i n Baby M.) relie d o n th e best-interes t principle t o resolve surrogacy disputes , and i n doin g that, reconstructe d the dimension s o f the tw o disputes. Each cour t molde d th e dimension s of the cas e before i t to conform wit h assumptions underlyin g traditiona l family la w principles . I n doin g that , eac h cour t disregarde d significan t aspects of the actual cas e before th e court and replace d tha t case with a different an d mor e traditional case . In effect, eac h cour t determined th e best interest s o f the chil d fo r whos e fat e i t was responsibl e almos t a s if the surrogac y arrangement s tha t le d t o th e tw o children' s respectiv e conceptions and births had never existed. With dispute s occasione d b y gestationa l surrogacy , i t i s harde r fo r courts t o rel y o n traditiona l famil y la w principle s an d harde r t o effec t even the illusion that those cases can be encompassed by existing family 12331

Suffer the Children law rules , formulate d t o handl e fa r mor e traditiona l sort s o f cases . Thu s in Johnson v . Calvert, decide d tw o year s afte r th e tria l cour t originall y decided Moschetta, th e sam e state' s suprem e cour t relie d o n th e notio n of intent t o determine th e baby' s parents an d thereb y resolv e the dispute . In fact , non e o f th e thre e Californi a court s tha t issue d decision s i n Johnson relie d o n th e best-interes t principle . Althoug h tw o o f th e thre e courts referre d t o th e welfar e o f th e chil d an d declare d tha t it s holdin g served hi s advantage , neithe r premise d it s decision o n hi s interests . Onl y the dissen t i n th e stat e suprem e cour t suggeste d tha t th e baby' s interest s should b e determinative . The tria l court , whic h hel d fo r th e geneti c parent s o n th e groun d tha t the parent-chil d bon d i s a t bas e a geneti c bond , mad e n o independen t findings abou t the welfar e o f the actua l chil d involve d i n th e cas e but di d refer severa l time s t o th e bes t interest s o f childre n i n general . Fo r in stance, the cour t rejecte d th e suggestio n tha t it find three natura l parents , asserting tha t suc h a finding woul d no t serv e th e child' s interests . Late r the judg e describe d hi s decisio n a s "definitel y pr o child." 26 Ironically , however, i n explainin g tha t conclusio n th e judg e referre d t o the interest s of the Calvert s rathe r tha n t o thos e o f the child . Th e cour t declare d tha t the chil d "shoul d b e raise d exclusivel y b y the Calvert s a s natural parents . They shouldn' t hav e to spend th e nex t 1 8 years waiting for th e othe r sho e to drop." 27 The appellat e court , anxiou s t o avoi d consideration s o f publi c polic y in reachin g it s decision, relie d o n on e statutor y provisio n (whic h define d a mothe r a s a woma n identifiabl e throug h blood-geneti c markers ) an d ignored anothe r provisio n i n Californi a la w (whic h define d a mothe r a s the woma n wh o gav e birt h t o a child) . Th e appellat e court , seemingl y anxious t o avoi d independen t consideratio n o f th e socia l an d mora l implications o f gestationa l surrogacy , ha d n o nee d t o justif y it s holdin g through invocation s o f children an d thei r welfar e sinc e i t presented tha t holding a s compelle d b y statutor y law . Th e court , certainl y awar e that , whatever it s holding, a n appea l woul d likel y follo w i n th e stat e suprem e court, refraine d almos t completely fro m justifyin g it s own decision . How ever, that decision frame s dramaticall y the inapplicabilit y o f most existin g family la w statute s t o case s occasione d b y th e ne w reproductiv e techno logies. The decision s o f th e Californi a Suprem e Court—particularl y o f Justice Panell i fo r th e majorit y an d o f Justic e Kennar d i n dissent—eac h 2

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Suffer the Children grounded parentag e o n cultural , rathe r tha n natural , parameters. 28 Bot h the determinan t selecte d b y th e majorit y (parenta l intent ) an d tha t se lected b y the dissen t (th e bes t interest s o f the child ) requir e analysi s an d choice befor e parentag e ca n b e established ; neithe r anchor s parentag e i n even th e illusio n o f inexorable truth . Despite thi s importan t similarity , th e tw o approache s diffe r signifi cantly. Th e majorit y attempte d t o preserv e a traditiona l mode l o f famil y that presume s parentag e t o flow inevitably fro m th e fact s o f the case , bu t substituted inten t (an d th e worl d o f contract implie d therein ) fo r biolog y as the centra l operatin g principl e throug h whic h claim s t o parentage ca n be settled . Th e dissent , i n contrast , relie d o n th e centra l famil y la w principle fo r resolvin g custod y dispute s (th e bes t interest s o f th e child) , but applie d tha t principl e s o a s t o construc t a ne w mode l o f parentage . In thi s model , a child's interest s d o no t follo w from , bu t rathe r establish , "natural" parentage . Justic e Kennar d note d tha t he r procedur e fo r de termining th e child' s parentag e wa s not unprecedented . Tha t i s so. How ever, he r procedur e doe s challeng e society' s genera l understandin g o f natural parentage . The majorit y criticize d th e dissen t fo r relying , i n effect , o n th e best interest standar d potentiall y t o upset , rathe r tha n t o affirm , th e basi c order o f things , a n orde r tha t inexorabl y provide s "natural " parent s fo r each chil d apar t from consideration s o f those parents ' abilities t o serve i n the parenta l role . Th e claim , a s th e dissen t recognized , i s peculiar , given th e majority' s ow n recommendatio n tha t parentag e b e establishe d through relianc e o n a standard (parenta l intent ) fa r les s often connecte d to the regulatio n o f family matter s tha n i s the best-interes t principle . As described i n th e previou s chapter , th e majorit y blurre d th e poten tial contradiction s betwee n it s ow n relianc e o n inten t an d it s apparen t preference fo r traditiona l understanding s o f family b y reconstructin g th e notion o f inten t t o confor m with , an d t o suggest , thos e mor e traditiona l understandings. However , th e contradiction s underlyin g th e majority' s position canno t b e s o easil y mediated . An d th e controvers y betwee n th e dissent an d th e majorit y abou t th e bes t approac h t o suc h case s illustrate s starkly th e inabilit y o f the society , includin g it s courts o f law, to interpre t sensibly an d uniformly , an d t o adjus t easil y to , contemporar y change s i n the creatio n an d operatio n o f the family . Justice Panelli' s majorit y opinio n an d Justic e Kennard' s dissen t eac h depart from traditiona l understanding s o f family an d parentage . However , 12351

Suffer the Children the tw o opinion s take n togethe r focu s attentio n o n a long-standing , central assumptio n abou t parentag e tha t ha s bee n essentia l i n applica tions of the best-interest principle throughout the twentieth century . This assumption, tha t parent s almos t alway s serv e thei r children' s interests , that they "naturally care for their children an d love them," is reflected i n the majorit y decision , bu t i n a ne w form , an d i s questione d i n Justic e Kennard's dissent. The assumptio n wa s made startlingly clear more than a decade befor e Johnson, i n Parham v. J.R. In that case, the Unite d State s Supreme Cour t validated a Georgia statute that provided for the commitment o f children to menta l institution s upo n applicatio n o f a paren t o r guardia n an d authorization b y the superintenden t o f the hospital . Th e Cour t justifie d its holding through referenc e t o "natural bonds" that guide parents to act in their children's best interests: The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a chil d lack s i n maturity , experience , an d capacit y fo r judgmen t required for making life's difficult decisions . Mor e important, historically it has been recognize d tha t natural bonds of affection lea d parents to act in the best interests of their children.29 This assumption—tha t parent s naturall y ac t t o serv e thei r children' s interests—routinely inform s courts ' applyin g th e best-interes t principle . Although th e assumptio n obviousl y doe s no t assis t court s t o selec t be tween tw o fit parents , i t ha s usuall y serve d th e interest s o f parent s i n disputes with potential nonparenta l custodians . The assumptio n tha t parent s serv e thei r children' s interest s because they are parents is reflected i n Johnson i n the majority's express claim that parents, her e identifie d throug h inten t rathe r tha n throug h biologica l connections, wil l serv e thei r childre n wel l becaus e th e interest s o f chil dren wil l no t likely "ru n contrary to those o f adults who choos e t o bring them int o being." 30 So , after establishin g th e Calverts ' parentage o n th e basis o f thei r parenta l intent , th e stat e suprem e cour t wa s abl e t o con clude tha t Crispin a an d Mar k woul d b e "good " parents. Contrastingly , the cour t concluded tha t Johnson's initia l denia l o f parental inten t "conceded th e best interests of the chil d [were ] not with her." 31 The majorit y thereby presume d tha t it s decisio n serve d th e child' s interest s a s tha t decision reconstructe d parentag e throug h relianc e o n th e notio n o f in tent. I n contrast , th e dissen t reverse d traditiona l assumption s abou t th e 12361

Suffer the Children connection betwee n parentag e an d bes t interests , an d propose d tha t parentage shoul d flow from, an d thereb y ensure , a child's interests . In fact , neithe r th e majorit y no r th e dissen t i n Johnson pai d rea l hee d to th e actua l interest s o f th e chil d involved . Th e majorit y preclude d th e need t o examin e th e child' s interest s b y presumin g expressl y that , i n th e nature o f the case , intendin g parent s wil l serv e thei r children' s interests . The dissent , proposing that the child' s bes t interest s determin e it s parent age, lef t futur e court s withou t a clu e abou t ho w t o asses s th e conse quences o f gestational surrogac y i n orde r reall y to accomplish th e tas k of deciphering a child's bes t interest s i n a case such a s Johnson. Both the majority an d the dissent in Johnson unsettle traditional under standings o f famil y b y expressl y substitutin g choic e fo r inexorabl e trut h as the determinant o f parentage. Each justifie d tha t substitution b y invoking o r relyin g expressl y o n th e interest s o f th e child . Neither , however , entertained concretel y th e interest s o f the actua l chil d involved . The Case s Compare d The response s o f th e court s tha t hear d Baby M. an d Moschetta mos t closely resembl e thos e o f courts handlin g routin e custod y disputes . Thi s is no t accidental . Compare d wit h Davis an d Johnson y Baby M. an d Moschetta presen t only minimal disruptio n t o cultural expectation s abou t the biologica l processe s underlyin g huma n reproduction . Artificia l in semination, use d i n Baby M. an d Moschetta, ha s bee n know n fo r centu ries, an d ha s bee n use d i n huma n reproductio n fo r wel l ove r on e hun dred years . Th e procedure , i n requirin g th e extra-corpora l transfe r o f sperm, disrupt s th e continuit y o f the reproductiv e process , but n o longe r seriously challenge s cultura l assumption s abou t th e meaning s o f mater nity, paternity , o r th e parent-chil d bond . A s a result , Baby M. an d Moschetta coul d b e treate d muc h a s court s trea t othe r les s noteworth y disputes abou t childre n betwee n adult s contendin g fo r custod y o r par entage. Baby M. an d Moschetta did , however , threate n social expectation s about th e form s throug h whic h familie s shoul d b e established . Mos t o f the contradiction s an d confusion s presente d b y th e opinion s i n thes e cases resul t fro m a broa d socia l reluctanc e t o defin e th e parent-chil d bond i n contractua l terms . Eac h o f the court s tha t hear d thes e case s wa s able t o rely on th e bes t interest s o f the childre n t o resolve th e dispute s i n 2

37 I

Suffer the Children a manne r tha t seems, at least at first glance, to differ onl y minimally fro m many othe r decision s involvin g custodial issues . In fact , eac h court' s best interest analysis , largely becaus e eac h wa s effected as if thes e case s wer e no different fro m a thousand othe r custody cases, failed ultimatel y to take account o f eac h child' s bes t interest s withi n th e socia l context s tha t le d to the creatio n of , an d tha t would continu e t o define, eac h child' s life . Both Davis an d Johnson, i n contras t wit h Baby M. an d Moschetta, challenge th e socia l an d biologica l correlate s o f familial relationships . I n each case , court s invoke d childre n (o r embryos ) an d justifie d th e deci sions reache d wit h assurance s tha t th e childre n o r potentia l childre n would b e wel l served . Neithe r cas e wa s resolve d throug h applicatio n o f the best-interes t principl e an d althoug h th e stat e suprem e court' s dissen t did rel y o n th e best-interes t principle , i t di d s o with th e unusua l thoug h not unprecedente d ai m o f establishing parentage , no t custody . In Davis th e Tennesse e suprem e cour t determine d tha t embryos , though no t people , ar e owe d a "specia l respect " a s potential people , an d thereby establishe d th e mora l fram e withi n whic h th e disput e shoul d b e resolved. Then , withou t apparen t recognitio n o f th e ga p betwee n tha t frame an d th e resolutio n actuall y reached , th e cour t examined , an d selected among , th e interest s o f th e adult s whos e donate d gamete s ha d produced th e embryo s i n question . Similarly , th e Californi a suprem e court i n Johnson bypasse d familia r lega l responses . Th e cour t instea d fashioned a nove l respons e (relianc e o n parenta l intent ) whic h side d with th e worl d o f contrac t an d autonomou s individualit y an d the n de scribed tha t respons e t o benefi t th e childre n whos e fat e i t woul d deter mine. In al l thes e cases , court s invoke d childre n an d thei r interest s i n orde r to justif y a wide variet y of ends no t directl y relate d t o those children . Fo r instance, childre n (o r embryos ) wer e invoke d (b y the tria l cour t i n Baby M.) t o mitigat e tha t court' s obviou s discomfor t a t havin g validate d th e contractualization o f th e parent-chil d bond ; (b y the stat e suprem e cour t in Davis) t o proclai m th e potentia l humanit y of , an d consequen t respec t owed to , embryonic material ; (b y the stat e suprem e cour t i n Johnson) t o mediate th e contradiction s betwee n a world founde d i n term s of contrac t (intent, a s generall y understood ) an d a worl d founde d i n term s o f statu s ("intent" a s reinterpreted b y the court) .

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Suffer the Children III. Vision s o f Children : Responses t o Biotechnologica l Childre n The sam e sor t of contradiction tha t underlie s th e law' s responses t o case s occasioned b y assiste d reproductio n i s found i n broade r socia l response s to surrogac y an d th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s a s wel l a s t o th e "biotechnological" childre n thereb y produced. 32 Socia l an d mora l con clusions bein g voice d bot h i n oppositio n to , an d i n favo r of , assiste d reproduction ar e bein g justifie d b y reference s t o childre n an d thei r interests. Those opposin g reproductiv e technology , fo r instance , focu s o n chil dren an d sugges t tha t childre n conceive d throug h th e assistanc e o f suc h technology wil l suffe r seriou s psychological , an d eve n physical, 33 harm s as a result o f their technologica l beginnings . Those harm s ar e connecte d to a larger mora l order . Opponent s o f reproductive technolog y an d surro gacy focu s o n problem s i n self-identit y tha t suc h childre n ma y face. 34 The charg e i s tha t reproductiv e technolog y threaten s t o substitut e fo r familial connections , and thereb y preclude s th e benefit s o f those connec tions fo r th e resultin g children . Again , a focu s o n childre n further s an d disguises othe r interests . Reproductiv e technolog y threaten s th e tradi tional order , no t jus t wit h regar d t o th e parent-chil d bon d bu t wit h regard t o almost ever y aspect o f family life . Thus, acceptin g reproductiv e technology ma y seem t o suggest accepting divorce , abortion, an d th e sor t of familie s withi n whic h suc h choice s mak e sense . Image s o f childre n are stil l powerfull y evocativ e o f traditiona l families . T o th e exten t tha t reproductive technolog y i s presente d a s harmin g children , i t ca n b e forcefully condemne d i n the nam e o f a past portrayed a s having protecte d children an d a s having preserved thei r interests . The Catholi c church , fo r instance , ha s explaine d it s oppositio n t o reproductive technolog y b y referrin g t o th e "right " o f a chil d t o b e conceived onl y i n traditiona l way s b y a marrie d couple. 35 Othe r oppo nents o f reproductiv e technolog y refe r t o identit y confusion s likel y t o plague babie s produce d fro m donate d gamete s a s well a s to th e negativ e consequences tha t surrogat e motherhoo d ma y hav e fo r childre n whos e social mother s canno t develo p a committe d relationshi p t o the fetu s a s a result o f the biologica l processe s o f gestation. 36 These storie s sugges t that , jus t a s reproductiv e technolog y disrupt s society's understandin g o f family life , s o i t disrupts th e abilit y o f childre n 12391

Suffer the Children produced throug h reproductiv e technolog y t o form secur e persona l iden tities. Suc h childre n ar e portraye d a s rootles s an d unhappy—jus t a s th e society ha s bee n uproote d by , and shoul d b e unhapp y about , th e contin ued developmen t an d us e o f reproductiv e technolog y i n particula r and , in general , b y broader change s i n th e famil y awa y from traditiona l forms . One stor y abou t childre n produce d throug h th e us e o f anonymousl y donated seme n severa l decade s ag o describe s a group o f angry, confuse d adults. The autho r acknowledged tha t "donor-inseminated children " wh o do "take u p the hunt" for thei r genetic father s ma y be especially unhapp y and thu s no t representativ e o r ma y b e th e product s o f neglectfu l home s and thereb y als o no t representative . Despit e tha t disclaimer , sh e pro ceeded t o describe , a s i f completely typica l o f people conceive d throug h artificial insemination , adult s obsesse d wit h th e nee d t o discove r thei r genetic fathers . On e suc h woman , a fort y five-year-old lega l assistan t i n California, brok e of f relation s wit h he r mother' s husban d (he r lega l father) afte r sh e learne d followin g th e deat h o f he r mothe r tha t he r mother's husban d wa s not her genetic parent . Sh e explaine d he r decisio n to dro p hi s las t name : " 'I couldn' t spen d th e res t o f m y lif e writin g m y name a s it was. It felt lik e a lie ever y time/ " 3 7 Opponents o f reproductiv e technology 38 als o voic e fear s o f broade r social consequences . A s a grou p the y fea r especiall y th e acceptanc e o f choice, limite d onl y b y technology' s ow n limits , i n th e constructio n o f family bonds . Tha t fea r relate s a s directl y t o adults , an d th e definitio n of marriage , a t i t relate s t o childre n an d th e constructio n o f th e parent child bond . Th e Catholi c church , i n on e statemen t o n th e mora l statu s of assisted reproduction , declare d expressly : [M]arriage possesses specific good s and values in it s union an d i n procreation whic h canno t b e likene d t o thos e existin g i n lowe r form s o f life . Such value s and meaning s ar e of the persona l orde r and determin e fro m the mora l poin t o f view the meanin g and limit s of artificial intervention s on procreation and on the origin of human life. 39 Other contemporar y theologian s hav e similarl y condemne d reproductiv e technology a s morall y objectionabl e because , i n th e word s o f one , th e technology "insist[s ] on free choic e abou t huma n relations." 40 Much lik e thos e opposin g assiste d reproduction , thos e favorin g it s development d o s o with reference s t o children . The y refer , fo r instance , to th e capacit y o f assiste d reproductio n t o enabl e th e creatio n o f happ y I 24 0 I

Suffer the Children families for couples who might otherwise remain childless. The childre n born to , o r for , suc h couple s ar e describe d a s especiall y care d fo r an d loved.41 Proponents of reproductive technology focus on concrete images of normal, even privileged, children, whose happy childhoods are attributed t o thei r unusua l beginnings . Th e parent s o f suc h childre n ar e described a s better, mor e carin g parent s becaus e the y yearne d fo r chil dren wh o wer e onl y produce d afte r grea t expenditure s o f time, money , and emotiona l energy . Fo r instance , on e newspape r articl e conclude d that "[pjarent s o f tes t tub e babie s ar e bette r mother s an d father s tha n those o f normall y conceive d children." 42 Proponent s o f reproductiv e technology describ e tha t technolog y a s extendin g an d magnifyin g bot h the sanctity of childhood an d th e joy s that children bring . The technol ogy provides more—not just more children, as in the multiple births that so frequentl y resul t wit h fertilit y treatment , bu t happier , securer , eve n smarter children. 43 Thi s focu s o n children , however , hardl y disguise s other interest s a t stak e i n th e developmen t an d us e o f reproductiv e technology, includin g th e interest s o f couple s unabl e t o hav e childre n without assistance, the interests of a medical fertility industry with annual profits of billions of dollars, and the interests of an entire society obsessed with the availability of unending choice. Fertility clinics depend on images of thriving children to support their work. The firs t o f a series o f articles i n th e New York Times in 199 6 on "The Fertilit y Market," 44 focused o n the large financial stakes and inevitable competitio n fo r mone y an d powe r withi n fertilit y clinics . Th e article feature d a clini c a t Ne w York Hospital-Cornel l Medica l Center , where doctors earn salaries of up to one million dollars a year, and which provides th e large r hospita l wit h tw o millio n dollar s i n annua l surplu s income. The article detailed th e intense antagonism amon g doctors and scientists in the clinic, described to have the highest pregnancy and birth rate i n th e country . A dozen scientist s lef t th e clini c las t year fo r othe r professional home s a s a resul t o f interna l antagonisms . Yet , abov e th e article, o n pag e on e o f th e newspaper—i n apparen t contras t wit h th e story's description o f the clinic' s aggressiv e bi d fo r patients—sit s a large picture o f the clini c director , Dr . Zev Rosenwaks, posed cross-legge d o n the floor, holdin g thre e babies , tw o o f the m apparentl y neonates , an d surrounded b y four others . Dr . Rosenwak s smiles broadly. The childre n nibble crackers, stare at each other, or sleep quietly. In recen t years , man y clinic s hav e attempte d t o gai n publicity , ap 12411

Suffer the Children proval, an d thu s presumabl y increase d busines s an d fundin g fo r thei r efforts b y hosting "reunions " for childre n produce d throug h reproductiv e technology an d fo r thos e children' s gratefu l parents . Often , thes e re unions, hel d i n park s an d othe r publi c places , have welcome d th e press . The storie s tha t result 45 contras t miraculou s conception s an d birth s wit h normal, everyda y childhoo d behaviors . On e suc h story , typica l o f th e genre, reporte d o n a "reunion " organize d b y a fertility clini c an d hel d a t a loca l park . Th e reunio n brough t togethe r tw o hundre d childre n con ceived throug h th e clinic' s assistance , alon g wit h thos e children' s par ents. 46 The reunion-picni c wa s described a s a celebration o f the "medica l advancement that , i n the word s of many, had miraculousl y change d thei r lives." The stor y reported: "Whil e th e childre n playe d ball , blew bubble s and hugge d th e life-siz e Disne y character s wh o parade d throug h th e park, man y o f their parent s swappe d wa r storie s with on e another , jus t as they ha d durin g simila r picnic s tha t hav e bee n hel d eac h o f th e pas t three years." Particular childre n hav e als o bee n use d t o portra y th e valu e o f repro ductive technology. 47 Th e fifteenth an d sixteent h birthday s o f Louis e Brown forme d th e focu s o f a n arra y o f new s storie s abou t reproductiv e technology. Louise , th e first perso n conceive d i n vitro , wa s bor n i n Oldham, England , o n Jul y 25 , 1978. Louise mad e th e celebratio n o f he r fifteenth birthda y a contex t fo r supportin g th e growt h an d developmen t of infertilit y treatment . Sh e agree d t o hav e th e da y celebrate d publicl y and tw o month s earl y i n orde r t o hav e i t coincid e wit h Britain' s first National Fertilit y Week . Th e storie s abou t Louise' s birt h an d develop ment reflec t th e theme s o f the reunio n stories . One suc h stor y began: "A miracle o f technology brough t Louis e Brow n int o this world, but that was 15 years ag o an d no w she' s jus t anothe r teenager." 48 Anothe r bega n wit h a descriptio n o f Louise: "I n he r jeans , floppy rugb y shir t an d overprice d running shoes , Louis e Brow n look s lik e a typica l teenager . He r parent s complain tha t she likes 'loud musi c an d stupi d clothes ' and muc h prefer s the compan y o f friends t o 'us old codgers. ' " 4 9 "But," the stor y continued , "if life i n th e Brow n househol d i n Bristol , England , i s rather routine , th e world's memor y o f Louise i s anything but. " In eac h o f thes e generall y favorabl e stories , thos e abou t th e fertilit y clinic reunion s an d thos e abou t Louis e Brown , th e miracle , a s reported , is supposed t o b e a s muc h th e typica l (an d thu s remarkable ) childhood s of children produce d throug h th e us e o f reproductive technolog y a s i t is 242

Suffer the Children the technolog y itself . Eac h o f thes e storie s proclaim s tha t reproductiv e technology i s impressive because i t allows for th e creatio n o f typical, an d therefore treasured , babie s fo r thei r lovin g parents , an d tha t i t doe s s o even mor e certainl y tha n traditiona l form s o f human reproduction . Lou ise i s describe d a s bein g exactl y wha t a teen-ag e gir l shoul d b e because her technological origin s ensured a propitious—and thu s normal —childhood. Other storie s o f the sam e sor t focus les s intently o n childre n an d mor e on th e need s an d frustrations , an d o n th e successe s o r failures, o f parent s and potentia l parents . Thes e storie s detai l th e anguish—an d usuall y (i n the stories ) th e reward s —of infertil e adults , especiall y women , wh o ar e treated fo r infertility. 50 On e suc h story 51 reporte d th e pai n o f grea t sadness a n infertil e thirt y five-year-old woma n fel t o n occasion s suc h a s Mother's Day , and upo n seein g women wit h bab y carriages. After month s of treatment , describe d i n detail , th e woma n an d he r husban d ha d a child (bor n afte r i n vitr o fertilization , cryopreservatio n o f th e resultin g embryos, an d finally thawin g an d implantatio n o f th e embryos) . Th e story concludes wit h th e woman' s proclaimin g tha t "th e goo d Lor d kne w He put u s through suc h hel l t o have he r [th e baby]. H e figured He' d giv e us the perfec t baby. " IV. Conclusio n That advocate s an d opponent s o f reproductiv e technolog y bot h justif y their assertion s throug h reference s t o childre n an d childhoo d add s fue l to th e suggestio n tha t thos e reference s ar e a pretex t that , a t least , i n par t serves othe r ends . Reproductiv e technolog y i s testin g th e meanin g an d parameters o f th e family , an d th e debat e occasione d b y us e o f tha t technology i s abou t muc h mor e tha n th e consequence s o f tha t technol ogy fo r actua l children . Th e developin g debat e abou t assiste d reproduc tion broaden s dramatically , ye t continues , a n olde r debat e abou t th e moral an d socia l implication s o f the individualizatio n an d privatization 52 of famil y relationships— a debat e tha t bega n t o develo p clearl y i n th e mid-nineteenth century . Now , a s then , image s o f childre n provid e a powerful foca l poin t aroun d whic h th e shiftin g scop e o f famil y lif e ca n be understood . Now, however, even a s the rhetori c abou t the consequence s o f assisted reproduction fo r childre n intensifies , bot h fro m adherent s an d fro m 243 I

Suffer the Children opponents, society and the law as a whole cannot rely securely on images of children an d on references t o children's interest s in resolving disputes about family. Fo r a long time, certain truth s about children, about thei r importance an d endurin g value , stood seemingl y unaffected , a t the ey e of th e debat e abou t family . Thes e ol d truth s provide d a harbo r withi n which th e large r debat e coul d b e anchored . Message s abou t wha t th e family i s ar e stil l communicated , i f les s securel y an d les s coherently , through reference s t o children. However , the interests of actual childre n are almos t visibly being encompasse d an d subsume d b y the ideologica l debate. Nostalgic image s of families o f yore, symbolized b y children-infamilies, hav e served polemi c interest s fo r thos e who favor th e preserva tion o f tradition . Almos t equall y the y hav e serve d thos e wh o endors e individualization an d contractualizatio n i n th e formatio n an d operatio n of famil y life , bu t wh o tempe r th e harshes t implicatio n o f that choic e with assurances about the continuing appreciation of children and childhood.

I 24 4 I

Conclusion

In the contemporary debate about the American family, political agendas and deeply felt, ofte n passionate , responses are everywhere evident . This is understandably so , since the debate encapsulates man y of the cultura l conflicts an d social conundrum s centra l t o our time, and demands tha t basic choice s b e made: between equalit y an d inequality , betwee n com munity an d autonomy , an d betwee n freedo m an d constraint . I n suc h demands, no t onl y ideologica l intensities , bu t call s fo r prophec y an d prescription, are immanent. For th e mos t par t thi s boo k refrain s fro m respondin g eithe r t o the intensities or to the calls. Basically a work of cultural anthropology , i t is, by design, descriptive in nature. Because the law, as an institution, ofte n reflects, clearl y an d accurately , th e contour s an d evolutio n o f socia l thought, th e book deduce s fro m actua l la w the state o f mind, historica l and current , o f American cultur e a s i t has , for severa l centuries , con fronted, an d continues to confront, a n issue of moment. On the question of the value of that state of mind the book is, by design, silent, as it is on the questio n o f what ma y issue fro m it—o n th e confiden t assumptio n that th e socia l scientis t contribute s t o productiv e debat e b y definin g issues, and by placing them i n historical and intellectual context , so that they ma y b e clearl y seen , an d i n consequenc e clearl y an d honestl y discussed. The imperativ e o f understanding th e shifts i n the conception o f the American family—for a long time gradual, but more recently seismic —is increasingly self-evident . Tha t conceptio n reflects , i n basi c ways , th e culture's vie w o f it s essentia l self . Thus , t o analyz e th e shift s i n th e conception i s to grasp, in some significant par t at least, the rumination of America upon itself. For th e reason s stated , th e analysi s ma y be productivel y conducte d through a study of American family law, and in particular through a study of the response of that law during the past few decades to surrogacy, and to revolutionary developments in reproductive technology.

Us I

Conclusion This boo k ha s presente d suc h a study , offerin g ideologica l suppor t t o no sid e i n th e debat e occasione d b y th e law' s response , bu t t o eac h sid e impartially elucidatio n a s an ai d t o debate . Central t o th e stud y i s it s detaile d focu s upo n assiste d reproduction , which bot h reflect s an d accelerate s recen t change s i n th e scop e an d meaning o f th e America n family . Tha t childre n ar e conceive d pursuan t to contractua l arrangement s involvin g th e exchang e o f money ; tha t con ception nee d no t begi n wit h sexua l intercourse , an d nee d no t occu r within th e bod y o f a woman; tha t th e geneti c makeu p o f a chil d (an d o f its clone d twi n o r triplet ) ca n b e selecte d fro m a panopl y o f geneti c options—these factor s pos e a profound threa t to the ideolog y o f family a s it develope d i n th e earl y year s o f th e Industria l Revolutio n an d wa s elaborated an d glorifie d i n th e succeedin g tw o centuries . Within tha t ideolog y familie s ar e understoo d a s holistic , hierarchical , social units , tha t endur e i n th e fac e of , an d a s a defens e against , th e tensions an d contingencie s o f everyday life . Moreover , th e enduranc e o f familial relationship s i s a mora l precep t o f fundamental significanc e an d is understood t o ste m from, an d t o reflect , almos t inevitably , th e natura l truths tha t undergir d socia l connection s amon g kin . Withi n traditiona l families, childre n lov e thei r parents , an d parent s thei r children , no t because the y chos e on e another , bu t becaus e th e biologica l bond s tha t connect the m ensur e endurin g love . That thi s ideolog y o f famil y wa s neve r perfectl y o r eve n closel y re flected i n most actual relationship s was largely irrelevant to the continue d predominance o f the ideology . In fact, to the extent that society perceive d and reacte d t o th e ga p betwee n ideolog y an d reality , i t bemoane d th e reality an d imagine d way s t o compe l rea l familie s t o confor m mor e closely t o preferre d forms . Unti l recen t decades , th e ga p betwee n ideol ogy an d realit y wa s fa r mor e ofte n use d t o criticiz e th e realit y tha n self consciously t o reevaluate th e ideology . The traditiona l ideolog y o f famil y ha s bee n consistentl y comple mented b y a dee p nostalgi a fo r familie s o f yore . Thos e families , alway s placed a fe w decade s befor e th e present , an d alway s imagine d t o hav e been precisel y what families ar e supposed t o be, convinced societ y durin g successive decade s o f it s uniqu e responsibilit y fo r th e destructio n o f traditional famil y life . Ironically , th e familie s s o imagine d neve r existed . But the abilit y to imagine the m provide d a constant reminde r durin g th e 12461

Conclusion course o f the las t two centuries tha t familie s coul d b e precisel y what the y were supposed t o be, but were not . The nostalgi a tha t accompanie d th e developmen t o f th e ideolog y o f family durin g th e nineteent h centur y relie d o n image s associate d wit h a much mor e ancien t worl d i n whic h relation s define d throug h th e inexo rable connection s o f land an d bloo d organize d muc h o f the socia l world . In tha t preindustria l world , autonomou s individualit y wa s fa r mor e lim ited an d unrestricte d choic e fa r mor e suspec t tha n the y becam e i n th e following centuries . I n fact , th e developmen t o f th e nineteenth-centur y market depende d on , an d value d withou t reservation , th e freedo m o f autonomous individual s t o choos e thei r ow n bargain s an d desig n thei r own connections . I t provide d th e socia l contras t agains t which , fro m th e early nineteent h century , image s o f th e famil y wer e constructe d an d prized. The famil y tha t mid-twentieth-centur y American s treasure d coul d b e characterized i n almos t ever y regar d b y referenc e t o it s difference s fro m the worl d o f th e marketplace . An d so , Davi d Schneide r i n hi s mid century ethnograph y o f American kinshi p conclude d tha t the "distinctiv e features o f kinship i n American culture " ca n b e "understoo d i n term s o f the contras t between lov e and mone y whic h stan d fo r hom e an d work." l Throughout th e nineteent h centur y an d th e first half o f the twentieth , the ideolog y o f famil y responde d wit h impressivel y stead y oppositio n t o demographic change s tha t persistentl y widene d th e ga p betwee n th e ideology o f famil y an d th e reality . Durin g thi s period , th e authorit y o f fathers diminished , divorc e rate s rose , birt h rate s fell , an d b y th e lat e nineteenth centur y wome n bega n t o wor k fo r wage s i n increasin g num bers. These shift s di d no t g o unnoticed , bu t practicall y everyon e agreed , specific practice s an d ne w pattern s notwithstanding , tha t ideally , th e family contrasted , an d shoul d alway s contrast , wit h th e office , tha t affair s at hom e wer e matter s o f love , no t money , an d tha t th e connectio n between ki n wa s deeply , almos t irretrievably , embedde d i n th e ver y nature o f things. Only i n th e secon d hal f o f th e twentiet h centur y wer e th e demo graphic change s i n th e for m o f famil y tha t develope d durin g th e cours e of th e previou s centur y an d a hal f approve d b y significan t group s o f people. Wit h th e clea r emergenc e o f competin g ideologie s o f famil y b y the 1960s , U.S . societ y a s a whol e becam e obviousl y perplexe d an d 247 I

Conclusion unsure abou t th e prope r rang e an d shap e o f familia l relationships . Th e change towar d wide r acknowledgmen t an d acceptanc e o f famil y form s that differed fro m those considered proper within the traditional ideolog y of family became startlingl y clear in the response s o f family la w throughout th e Unite d State s a t tha t time . No t onl y di d lawmaker s recognize , and provid e for , eas y divorce , nonmarita l cohabitation , an d prenuptia l contractual agreements , but , eve n more , court s expressl y redefine d th e holistic, hierarchica l family , value d i n earl y decades , a s a collectio n o f autonomous individuals , connected onl y insofar , an d only for so long, as the individual s involve d chos e t o b e connected . Tha t redefinitio n wa s explicit, thoug h littl e note d a t th e time , i n th e 197 2 decisio n o f th e United State s Suprem e Cour t i n Eisenstadt v . Baird. I n that case, whic h invalidated a Massachusett s statut e tha t mad e illega l th e distributio n o f contraception t o unmarrie d people , th e Cour t presume d tha t famil y members (o r a t leas t adul t famil y members ) wer e essentiall y indistin guishable fro m th e individual s wh o negotiat e bargain s i n th e market place. I n that view, the type of bargains family member s reach , as well as the worl d o f interrelation s the y choos e t o effec t throug h thos e bargains , may diffe r fro m mos t bargain s negotiate d i n th e market . However , th e mode throug h whic h thos e interrelation s ar e create d differ s onl y insig nificantly fro m th e mod e throug h whic h contractua l relation s i n th e world of work are created. Thus, b y the secon d hal f of the twentiet h century , th e la w accommo dated change s i n th e for m o f familial relationship s b y recognizing thos e changes and, more important , by acknowledging a new understanding of family tha t undergirde d changin g mode s o f creatin g an d livin g i n fami lies. Bu t eve n th e la w wa s no t unanimou s i n thi s ne w acceptanc e an d redefinition o f family . An d i n th e societ y mor e broadly , th e voice s o f dissent were strong. In the last decades of the twentieth centur y the traditional understand ing o f family ha s bee n unde r siege , thoug h i t is still widel y perceive d a s the best , i f no t th e only proper , understandin g o f family . A s a variety o f new option s fo r livin g i n an d understandin g familie s ha s bee n gainin g increasing recognitio n withi n society , th e debat e abou t th e America n family has grown in prominence an d intensity . In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the responses of the law and of society more generall y t o th e changin g famil y wer e challenge d dramaticall y b y 1248

Conclusion the adven t o f th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s an d th e appearanc e o f surrogacy arrangements . Whethe r thes e phenomena , especiall y thos e that depended o n developments i n science, appeared coincidentally wit h broad change s i n th e family , o r appeare d onl y afte r societ y wa s ready , however fitfully, to accept them, i s a question for historians of science. In considering the implication s and consequence s o f creating familie s through contract s an d financial exchange , an d o f redesignin g huma n reproduction s o tha t peopl e ca n choos e how , when , an d wher e t o con ceive thei r children , an d wh o thos e childre n wil l resembl e onc e born , society i s continuing it s ongoin g debat e abou t th e parameter s o f accept able family life. Assisted reproduction presents a challenge o f overwhelming proportion s t o traditiona l understanding s o f family . Wherea s th e traditional ideolog y of family depended o n th e separation of , an d distinction between , relation s a t home an d relation s a t work, assisted reproduc tion amalgamate s th e tw o world s o n a multitud e o f levels . Almos t ever y aspect o f huma n reproductio n can , an d is , being designe d throug h bar gained negotiations . Relation s onc e describe d a s "accident s o f nature " now resul t from self-consciou s choice . Reproductiv e technolog y an d surrogacy do not simpl y resembl e marke t relations. There i s now a large market i n infertilit y treatment . Consumer s compar e fertilit y clinic s fo r price an d succes s rates . Billion s o f dollar s a yea r ar e exchanged . Con tracts are signed; agreements are breached; damages are assessed. Social response s t o surrogac y an d th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s reflect, bu t als o exacerbate , th e society' s large r debat e abou t family . Assisted reproductio n provide s a ne w contex t fo r tha t debate . Bu t fa r more important , assiste d reproductio n alter s th e terms , an d intensifie s the tone , o f the debate , b y presenting a n entirel y ne w leve l o f challeng e to traditional understanding s o f family. For th e mos t part , societ y an d th e law , i n acceptin g an d approvin g new form s o f familia l connectio n i n th e decade s followin g mid-century , refrained from interfering expressly with traditional understanding s of the parent-child tie . I t wa s especiall y th e connectio n betwee n mother s an d their children tha t became th e central , apparently lasting, representatio n of enduring, loving family bonds and that, as such, continues to be widely valued. Although tha t bond may be threatened i n fact in particular cases, by redefinition s o f marriage , divorce , an d cohabitation , non e o f thos e changes directl y implicate s th e parent-child bond . Assisted reproduction , I 249

Conclusion in contrast , proclaim s tha t th e creatio n o f th e connectio n betwee n par ents an d thei r childre n ca n b e manipulated . Althoug h Wester n societ y understood th e socia l an d biologica l dimension s o f family a s separable i n theory befor e th e adven t o f th e ne w reproductiv e technologies , i t wa s assumed unti l tha t phenomeno n appeare d tha t a se t o f biologica l truth s undergirded, an d directed , the social dimensions o f familial relationships . The possibilitie s o f separatin g maternit y int o aspect s suc h a s freezin g gametic materia l fo r decade s befor e i t i s used t o conceiv e a child , creat ing embryo s afte r th e death s o f th e embryos ' progenitors , producin g babies fro m aborte d fetuses , an d othe r possibilitie s simila r t o these , seri ously unsettl e socia l expectation s abou t huma n reproduction , an d a s a result unsettl e assumption s abou t th e socia l consequence s o f biologica l reproduction. In sum , surrogac y an d th e ne w reproductiv e technologie s distur b traditional understanding s o f famil y i n tw o different , bu t equall y basic , regards. First , thes e phenomen a challeng e th e long-standin g notio n tha t the parent-chil d ti e shoul d b e founde d i n love , no t i n money . I n ever y state o f the Unite d States , adoption law s prohibit th e exchang e o f mone y for a baby . Yet , commercia l surrogac y arrangement s an d th e growin g market i n infertilit y treatmen t involv e th e exchang e o f mone y fo r ga metes, embryos , an d babies , pursuan t t o a variet y o f contractua l agreements. Second , th e ne w reproductive technologies , includin g gesta tional surrogac y (bu t les s s o traditiona l surrogacy) , muddl e assumption s about th e socia l correlate s o f biological reproduction . Specifically , thes e phenomena distur b basi c assumption s tha t undergirde d publi c under standings o f th e parent-chil d relationship . Certainly , peopl e ca n choos e to creat e familie s throug h reproductiv e technolog y o r surrogac y that , once formed , resembl e traditiona l familie s i n tha t thei r member s under stand on e anothe r a s deepl y an d lastingl y bonde d together . Bu t becaus e they ar e founde d i n choice , rathe r tha n create d a s a n inevitabl e conse quence o f natura l processes , suc h familie s ca n alway s b e replace d b y others, attributable t o other an d differen t choices . Assisted reproductio n ha s transforme d a n evolutionar y chang e i n th e family int o a revolutionar y change . Th e cultur e barel y accommodate s the challeng e tha t assiste d reproductio n add s t o olde r uncertaintie s an d confusions abou t th e meanin g an d fat e o f th e family . Whe n chang e occurs slowly , ove r centuries , cultur e ha s th e capacit y t o adjus t itsel f t o 250

Conclusion the change , o r t o forc e th e chang e t o confor m t o existin g cultura l patterns. Th e pac e o f th e ne w challeng e presente d almos t dail y b y assisted reproductio n i s antithetical t o culture' s abilit y t o respon d consis tently o r sagely. This challenge , an d society' s halting , muddle d response , ar e reflecte d in th e law . Stat e legislature s hav e hesitate d t o respon d t o th e complex , volatile question s raise d b y assiste d reproduction . Thi s i s no t surprisin g since legislator s ar e ofte n loat h t o trea d o n uncertai n groun d an d t o decide hotl y debate d questions . Courts , however , d o no t hav e th e optio n of remaining silent . Particula r dispute s involvin g actua l litigant s with rea l problems deman d resolution . Thus , court s hav e becom e th e primar y arena i n whic h th e societ y i s forgin g an d considerin g it s respons e t o assisted reproduction . More ofte n tha n no t conservative , th e judiciar y ha s striven , fo r th e most part , t o preserv e traditiona l conception s o f th e famil y i n case s occasioned b y surrogacy and b y the ne w reproductive technologies , whil e rendering decision s tha t threate n traditiona l understanding s o f family . Thus, i n facin g suc h disputes , court s suppor t an d protec t definition s o f family tha t acknowledg e choic e an d individuality , bu t ofte n d o s o i n language tha t support s an d protect s traditiona l conception s o f famil y i n which relation s ar e understoo d t o b e anchore d i n fixed, unchangin g truths. Courts ar e thu s developin g a se t o f response s tha t ai m t o preserv e traditional understanding s o f family—understanding s o f famil y base d i n the separatio n o f home an d work—an d t o expand definition s o f family s o as t o provide d fo r freedo m an d choic e —concepts tha t hav e bee n associ ated wit h th e marketplace , no t th e home , durin g th e pas t centur y an d a half. Thus, th e essentia l tas k o f th e courts , althoug h i t woul d see m ofte n undertaken wit h les s than ful l consciousness , ha s become tha t o f mediat ing between th e ideologica l correlate s o f modernity (choice , autonomou s individuality, an d equality ) an d thos e o f tradition (connectio n founde d i n inexorable truth , holism , an d hierarchy) . I n performin g tha t task , court s have employe d a variety of legal strategies . Some , such a s reliance o n th e concept o f parenta l inten t i n determinin g parentage , ar e unfamilia r t o family la w as i t ha s existe d unti l th e present . Others , suc h a s applicatio n of th e best-interes t principle , ar e mainstay s o f th e existin g famil y la w 2511

Conclusion system. Bot h sort s of approaches fai l t o achieve thei r desire d ends . More over, both , fashione d t o resolv e som e aspec t o f the bafflin g debat e abou t the meanin g an d scop e o f the family , complicat e tha t debate . So, fo r instance , court s hav e redefine d th e concep t o f inten t s o tha t parental inten t signal s th e choic e t o becom e a parent , bu t als o become s substitutable fo r bloo d o r gene s a s th e essentia l bon d tha t assure s tha t parents (o r at least "normal" parents) will love and car e for their children . Courts ar e askin g th e concep t o f inten t t o mov e betwee n conflictin g understandings o f family . By relyin g o n th e concep t o f intent , court s hav e avoide d clearl y identifying wit h an y particula r understandin g o f famil y t o th e exclusio n of others . A s a result , th e confusion s tha t th e concep t o f inten t wa s introduced t o resolv e hav e intensified . Rathe r tha n resolvin g th e debate , the apparen t solutio n ha s becom e a ter m i n tha t ongoin g debate . Simi larly, relianc e o n th e best-interes t principl e i n case s occasione d b y as sisted reproductio n ha s widene d th e debat e abou t family , a s court s hav e presumed, bu t clearly failed t o comprehend, th e best interests of children conceived, fo r example , pursuant t o commercial agreements , or from th e egg of one woma n bu t gestate d b y another. Relianc e o n th e best-interes t standard i n suc h case s ha s bee n mor e successfu l a t revealin g th e enor mity of the question s bein g asked tha n a t resolving those questions . Not only the specifi c strategie s on whic h court s have relied fo r settlin g disputes involving assisted reproductio n lea d t o ambiguity an d confusion . The argument s presente d t o th e court s b y th e partie s i n thes e cases , ar e also, an d perhap s inevitably , cloude d b y self-contradiction . So , fo r in stance, Willia m an d Elizabet h Ster n an d th e tria l cour t judg e wh o i n effect decide d t o enforc e th e surrogac y contrac t int o whic h the y ha d entered, justifie d honorin g tha t contrac t because i t promise d t o creat e a traditional, enduring , committe d old-fashione d family . Similarly , Junio r Davis, i n arguin g tha t h e shoul d b e allowe d t o determin e th e fat e o f th e seven froze n embryo s produce d fro m hi s an d hi s ex-wife' s gametes , invoked th e "ancien t wellspring s o f kinship " i n orde r t o safeguar d hi s own righ t to autonomous choice . How thes e contradiction s wil l eventuall y b e resolve d i s uncertain . Perhaps, social consensu s wil l emerg e (a s it did whe n artificia l insemina tion appeared) , an d a relativel y unifor m statutor y respons e fro m stat e lawmakers wil l preclud e th e nee d fo r court s t o reente r th e debat e eac h time th e us e o f assiste d reproductio n lead s t o a disput e amon g th e I 252

Conclusion participants. I f so , th e characte r o f th e guidanc e tha t legislature s wil l provide ma y endors e th e definitio n o f familia l relationship s i n marke t terms and agre e t o enforce surrogac y contract s an d t o permit th e transfer , and perhap s als o th e purchas e an d sale , o f gameti c an d embryoni c material. Eve n i f tha t happens , th e legislativ e decisio n t o permi t th e creation o f familie s an d o f th e parent-chil d bon d throug h th e us e o f contracts an d mone y exchang e ma y o r ma y no t indicat e th e shap e and ton e o f th e resultin g families . Alternatively , however , legislatures , following th e mode l o f nineteenth-centur y lawmaker s respondin g t o th e apparent threa t pose d b y changes i n th e famil y a t that time , ma y reac t t o prohibit, i n th e hop e o f suppressing, th e developmen t an d us e o f assisted reproduction. The nostalgi a tha t has consistently accompanied socia l understanding s of the famil y sinc e a t least the earl y nineteent h centur y indicate s a stron g longing fo r a worl d (i n som e par t imagined ) tha t n o longe r exists . But , whether societ y ca n eve r "g o back " remain s unclear . Certainly , a clear , though unstable , self-contradictor y an d openl y criticized , tren d exist s toward increasin g recognitio n o f autonomous individualit y an d choic e i n the creatio n (an d termination ) o f familial relationships . Onl y histor y wil l tell whethe r th e futur e tha t tren d suggest s for th e famil y i s realized . Whatever happens , th e dispute s currentl y occasione d b y surrogac y and b y th e ne w reproductiv e technologies , an d thos e certai n t o appear , reflect a larger , continuin g debat e i n particula r betwee n traditiona l an d modern conception s o f th e famil y an d i n genera l betwee n radicall y different, an d ofte n perhap s irreconcilable , conception s o f society . Fo r obvious reasons , this debate mus t be closel y and ver y carefully watched .

1*53 I

NOTES

Notes t o th e Introductio n 1. A s use d i n thi s book , th e ter m "ideology " ma y include , bu t doe s no t primarily refe r to , a set of political beliefs . Rather , th e ter m refer s t o the pervasiv e forms i n term s o f whic h peopl e understan d wha t i t mean s t o b e human . Thi s definition i s simila r t o tha t o f th e Frenc h anthropologis t an d Indologist , Loui s Dumont, wh o wrote : Our definitio n o f ideolog y thu s rest s o n a distinctio n tha t i s no t a distinc tion o f matter bu t on e o f point o f view. We do no t tak e a s ideological wha t is left ou t whe n everythin g true , rationa l o r scientifi c ha s been preempted . We tak e everythin g tha t i s sociall y thought , believed , acte d upon , o n th e assumption tha t i t i s a livin g whole , th e interrelatednes s an d interdepen dence o f whose part s woul d b e blocke d ou t b y the a priori introductio n o f our curren t dichotomies . (Dumon t 1977 , 22) 2. Insightfu l analyse s o f th e developmen t o f ne w image s o f family—and ne w forms o f family—durin g th e nineteent h centur y ar e foun d i n Demo s (1986) ; Ehrenreich an d Englis h (1978 , ch . 1) ; Mint z (1983) ; an d Mint z an d Kellog g (1988, ch. 3) . 3. Unifor m Statu s o f Childre n o f Assiste d Conceptio n Ac t (1988) , promul gated b y th e Nationa l Conferenc e o f Commissioner s o n Unifor m Stat e Law s and foun d a t 9B U.L.A.152 (Supp. 1994). 4. See , e.g., Orfor d v . Orford, 4 9 Ont. L.R . 1 5 (1921). 5. See, e.g., Doornbo s v . Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 230 8 (Super . Ct . Coo k City. , 111., Dec. 13 , 1954), appea l dismisse d o n procedura l grounds , 1 2 111. App.2d 473 , 1249 N.E.2d 84 4 (1956). 6. See , e.g. , Strna d v . Strnad , 19 0 Misc. 786 , 7 8 N.Y.S.2 d 39 0 (N.Y . Sup . Ct . 1948). 7. Se e e.g. , Peopl e e x rel. Abajian v . Dennet 18 4 N.Y.S.2d 17 8 (1958). 8. Ga. Cod e Ann . tit . 7 4 Sec. 101. 1 (1964). 9. Stephani e Coont z (1992 ) provide s a detaile d analysi s o f th e myt h o f tradi tional famil y life . 10. Coontz (1992) , 15. 11. De Tocquevill e ([1835 ] 1945); (reprinted i n Bremne r (1970 ) vol. I, 347-50) . 12. Se e Eisenstad t v . Bair d (1972) ; see also discussio n o f Eisenstadt i n chap ter 2.

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Notes to Chapter 1 Notes t o Chapte r 1 1. Fox (1993), 123. 2. Strathern (1993) , 22 (citation omitted ) (draf t o n file wit h author) . 3. Mar c Bloc h describe s medieva l familie s t o hav e ha d a "dua l character. " Maternal relation s (e.g. , th e mother' s brother ) wer e almos t a s importan t a s paternal relations . Children' s names , fo r instance , cam e variousl y fro m th e maternal o r paternal side . Bloch (1970) , 137. 4. Barnet t (1976) ; Barnet t an d Silverma n (1979) ; Dumon t (1967) , especiall y Appendix (1977) . 5. For direction i n th e descriptio n o f the feuda l orde r I am gratefu l t o Charle s T. Wood, The Danie l Webste r Professo r o f History at Dartmouth College , and t o the work s o f Philipp e Arie s an d George s Duby , eds . (1988) ; Mar c Bloc h (1968 , 1970); Georges Dub y (1978,1980) ; and Davi d Herlih y (1985) . 6. Duby (1980) , 59. 7. Quoted i n ibid . 8. Ibid., 71. 9. Capitularia Regu m Francoru m (A . Boretins and V. Krause, eds. [1883-97]) , cited i n ibid. , 36 3 n.9. 10. Duby (1980) , 70. 11. Duby (1978) , at 6. 12. Shaw, St. Joan, Sc. 4. 13. Today , thi s i s les s tru e o f Catholicis m tha n o f othe r socia l institutions , and t o tha t degre e Catholicis m present s a contemporar y counterpoin t t o th e transformation o f lif e i n th e Wes t awa y fro m feuda l form s o f hierarch y an d holism. Increasingly , however , feuda l form s see m les s and les s certain eve n here . 14. Demos (1986) , 28. 15. Mintz an d Kellog g (1988) , 19, 20,108. 16. Ibid., 108. 17. For m y understandin g o f the developmen t o f the famil y i n th e year s afte r the lat e eighteent h centur y I a m especiall y gratefu l t o th e followin g works : Coontz (1992) ; Demos (1986) ; Grossberg (1985) ; Mintz (1983) ; Mintz an d Kellog g (1988); and Shanle y (1994) . 18. Schneider (1980) , 50. 19. Ibid., 48-49. 20. May (1991) , 583-87. 21. Seib (1993). 22. Strathern (1993) , 22. Notes t o Chapte r 2 1. Chester (1992) , 160. 2. Ibid., 66-70 .

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Notes to Chapter 2 3. Mint z and Kellogg (1988) , 170. 4. I n th e mid-1990 s a numbe r o f stat e legislature s bega n t o conside r bill s aimed a t limitin g th e developmen t o f no-faul t divorce . A Michiga n bill , fo r instance, propose d tha t no-faul t divorc e b e unavailabl e i n bot h case s involvin g children an d case s i n whic h on e part y preferre d no t t o divorc e (Rhod e 1996) . Such restriction s o n no-faul t divorc e sugges t th e continuin g concer n o f a t leas t some group s withi n th e Unite d State s abou t th e obviou s transformatio n o f th e family and of family law since the middl e o f the twentieth century . 5. Friedman (1985) , 204-7. 6. Glendon (1987) , 104-5. 7. Free d and Walker (1988), 560. 8. Unifor m Premarita l Agreemen t Act , Sec . 3 and cmt. , 9 B U.L.A . 371 , 37374 (1987)9. The consequences of this assumption i n the Victorian world are considered by Mar y Lyndo n Shanle y i n Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England (1989) . 10. Th e tria l cour t decisio n i n Kingsley wa s partiall y reverse d o n appeal . A Florida cour t o f appea l hel d tha t Gregory , becaus e stil l a child , di d no t hav e legal capacit y t o commenc e th e terminatio n proceeding . Th e erro r was hel d t o have bee n harmless , however , becaus e fou r othe r partie s wit h capacit y filed petitions on the boy's behalf requesting termination o f Gregory Kingsley's biological mother s parenta l rights . Kingsley v. Kingsley at 790. 11. Bartholet (1993) , 55—61,170-72. 12. Ibid. , 170. 13. Se e generally Caplan (1990) . 14. Griswold , 38 1 U.S. at 480. 15. Conn . Gen . Stat . Sec . 53-3 2 (1958) (quoted in Griswold, 38 1 U.S. a t 480). 16. Griswold , 38 1 U.S. at 486. 17. Ibid . 18. The law' s claim t o protect family autonomy has not, of course, meant that, in fact , th e la w ha s refraine d fro m definin g an d regulatin g famil y life . France s Olsen make s thi s poin t clearl y whe n sh e argue s tha t bot h stat e interventio n i n the family and the state's refusal t o intervene accordin g to the principle o f family autonomy are ideological, no t analytic concepts . Olse n (1993) , 281. 19. See , e.g. , Allen , 7 2 B.U.L. Rev. 683 , 687 ; Coleman , 2 4 Ind. L. Rev. 399> 4°420. Grey , 43 Law and Contemp. Probs. 83, 84. 21. Schwart z (1985) , 227-39 . A n earlie r draf t o f Griswold i s printe d i n Schwartz's book . Tha t draf t make s clea r th e Court' s uncertaint y abou t th e constitutional theor y on which t o base the holdin g i n the case. 22. O f the seven justice s who joine d or concurred i n the Griswold holding , n o more tha n thre e agree d upo n th e natur e o f th e constitutiona l suppor t fo r tha t holding.

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Notes to Chapter 2 23. Griswold, 38 1 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg , J., concurring) . 24. Po e v . Ullman , 36 7 U.S . a t 54 8 (1961 ) (Harlan , J. , dissenting) . I n hi s concurrence i n Griswold, Justic e Harla n referre d to , and relie d on , hi s dissen t i n Poe v. Ullman. 25. Griswold, 38 1 U.S. at 550-51 . 26. Ibid., a t 50 2 (White, J., concurring) . 27. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 28. Ibid., at 454-55. 29. Ibid., a t 453. 30. Ellman e t al., (1991), 849. 31. Lochner, 19 8 U.S. at 65. 32. Ibid., a t 46. 33. Ibid., a t 52. 34. Ibid., a t 53. 35. Ibid., at 54. 36. Ibid., a t 62. 37. Ibid., at 64. 38. Ibid., at 53 , 64. 39. Ibid., a t 56. 40. Ibid. , a t 57. 41. Ibid. , a t 75. 42. Fo r exampl e i n Carey v . Population Servs. Int'l, th e Cour t invalidate d a state law that restricte d advertisin g and distributio n o f contraceptives becaus e th e law infringe d upo n "protecte d individua l choices. " Zablocki v . Redhail declare d that marriag e i s a fundamental right . I n Roe v . Wade, th e Cour t foun d a limite d right to abortion . 43. I n 193 7 th e Cour t decide d West Coast Hotel Co. v . Parrish. The cas e i s generally acknowledge d t o have ende d th e Lochner era . 44. Griswold, 38 1 U.S. at 482. 45. Ibid . 46. Po e v . Ullman , 36 7 U.S . a t 53 9 (Harlan , J. , dissenting ) (referre d to , an d relied on , i n Justice Harlan' s concurrenc e i n Griswold, 38 1 U.S. at 500) . 47. Poe , 36 7 U.S . a t 54 2 (relie d o n i n Justic e Harlan' s concurrenc e i n Griswold). 48. Poe , 36 7 U.S . a t 54 2 (relie d o n i n Justic e Harlan' s concurrenc e i n Griswold). 49. A n earlier , unuse d draf t fo r Griswold prepare d b y Justic e Dougla s prem ised th e holdin g o n a Firs t Amendmen t righ t o f spouse s t o associat e freely . Schwartz (1985) , 227-39. 50. Lochner, 19 8 U.S. at 61. 51. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. 52. Ibid. 53. Dumont (1977) , 4. 1258

Notes to Chapter 3 54. Robertson (1994a) , 235. 55. Perrot (1990), 341, citing Littre, Dictionnaire (1863-1872). 56. 59 N.W.2d at 342. Notes t o Chapter 3 1. Genesis 16:2. 2. Maine ([1861] 1917), 179. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 99. 5. MacPherson (1962) , 3. 6. Maine ([1861] 1917), 99. 7. Ibid., 100 (emphasis in original). 8. My use of Maine's description o f the contrasts between a world defined i n status terms and a world defined i n contractual terms differs i n tone from earlier uses I have made of the contrast. I am grateful t o Burton Agata, Jana B. Singer, and Marilyn Strathern for showing me how careful on e must be in using Maine's distinction. Th e distinctio n betwee n familie s define d i n term s o f statu s an d families defined i n terms of contract is most important to the history of ideas. As a description of a continuous historical process, the distinction i s less useful and , if relied on, should be used only with great caution. 9. Hyde (1979), xi. 10. Ibid., 56-60. 11. Ibid., 61. 12. Ibid., 70. 13. Gordon (1987) , 25. 14. Ragone (1994), 80. 15. Ibid., 55. 16. Statutes regulating at least one aspect of surrogacy arrangements include: Ala. Code $ 26-10-3 4 (1996); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. $ 25-218. A (1995); Ark. Code Ann. $ 9-10-201 (Michi e Supp . 1995) ; Ind. Cod e Ann . $ $ 31-8-1-5 , 38-8-2- 1 (Burns Supp . 1996); Iowa Code Ann. $ 710.11 (West Supp . 1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann J j 199-590; La. Rev . Stat. Ann. J 9217 3 (Supp. 1996) ; Mich. Comp . Laws Ann. $ $ 722.853 , 722.855(5), 722.85 9 (1996) ; Nev. Rev . Stat . $ 126.045 (Michi e 1995); N.H. Rev . Stat. Ann. $ $ 168-6:16-25 ( SuPP- *99 6); N.Y. Dom. Rel . Law j}J} 121-24 (McKinney Supp . 1996) ; N.D. Cent. Cod e J j 134-18-05 (1991) ; Utah Code Ann . $ 76-7-204 (1996) ; Va. Cod e Ann . $ $ 20-15 6 t o 20-16 5 (Michi e 1996); Wash. Rev. Code $ 26.26.210 (1995); W. Va. Code $ 48-4-16 (1996) ; Wis. Stat. $ 69.1 4 (1994). 17. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 651. 18. Michael H., at 124. 19. Ibid., at 124 (footnote omitted). 20. See , e.g. , Brad y v . U.S. , at 74 8 (waive r o f constitutiona l righ t mus t b e I 25 9 I

Notes to Chapter 4 voluntary t o b e effectiv e i n crimina l cases ) an d Pierc e v . Somerse t Railway , a t 648 (act or omission t o act can be grounds fo r waiving constitutiona l right) . 21. Brookhart v . Janis, at 4 (quoting Johnson v . Zerbst, a t 464). 22. Matter o f Baby M, 52 5 A.2d at 1170. 23. Ibid . 24. Ibid., at 1172. 25. Ibid . 26. Ibid., a t 1151-52. 27. Ibid., at 1172. 28. Ibid., 53 7 A.2d at 1234. 29. Ibid., 52 5 A.2d at 1157-58. 30. Ibid., 53 7 A.2d at 1242. 31. Ibid., at 1246. 32. Ibid., at 1246-47. 33. Ibid., 225 N.J. Super. 267 , 542 A.2d 52 (1988). 34. Ibid. M. , 537 A.2d at 1264. 35. Brie f o n Behal f o f Mar y Bet h an d Richar d Whitehea d a t 34-5 5 (herein after Whitehea d Brief) . 36. Whitehead Brief , at 34-55. 37. Ibid, a t 37. 38. Ibid., at 38-39. 39. Brief on Behalf o f Respondent a t 99-106 (hereinafte r Ster n Brief) . 40. Ster n Brief , at 80. 41. Ibid . 42. Ibid, a t 82.

Notes t o Chapte r 4 1. Of the Suprem e Court' s unwe d fathe r decisions , one (Michael H. v . Gerald D.) ha s generally bee n treate d a s representing a break wit h th e position asserte d and suggeste d i n th e othe r unwe d fathe r decisions , al l o f whic h wer e decide d before Michael H. Michael H. , unlik e th e othe r unwe d fathe r cases , ha s no t been analyze d a s a harbinger o f a new social orde r regardin g paterna l right s and relationships. 2. See Czapansky (1991) , 1420, in which Czapansk y describe s choice s involve d in a father's parenta l role . 3. Hill (1991) , 381 (footnotes omitted) . 4. Stanle y v . Illinois (1972) ; Quilloin v . Walcott (1978) ; Caban v . Mohamme d (1979); Lehr v . Robertson (1983) ; Michael H . v. Gerald D . (1989). 5. See, e.g., Zinman (1992) , 980. 6. Stanley , 405 U.S. at 651. 7. Ibid., at 657 n.9.

I 26 0 I

Notes to Chapter 4 8. See, Batty (1990) , 1181; DeMarco (1985) , 301-3. 9. Stanley , 405 U.S. at 665-66 (Burger , J., dissenting) . 10. I t i s no t entirel y clea r fro m Justic e Burger' s languag e whethe r h e predi cated these conclusion s on a natural, and thu s presumably inexorable , propensit y of females t o bon d strongl y wit h thei r childre n an d a natura l absenc e o f suc h a propensity i n males , o r whethe r Justic e Burge r woul d hav e allowe d tha t th e condition h e describe d i s cultural, an d thu s presumabl y mor e easil y mutable . 11. See Hubbar d (1990) , 114-17 especially, for a good discussio n o f some o f the complexities involve d i n sortin g ou t th e consequence s o f natur e an d nurtur e fo r people. 12. Ga. Cod e Sec . 74-10 1 (1975); Ga. Cod e Sec . 74-10 3 (1975) . Quilloin, 43 4 U.S. at 249. 13. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251. 14. Ibid., a t 256. 15. Ibid., at 255. 16. Ibid., a t 256. 17. Ibid., at 255. 18. Ibid. , a t 25 3 n.14 . Fo r procedura l reasons , th e Cour t refuse d t o conside r Quilloin's equa l protectio n clai m base d o n hi s gender . 19. Th e versio n o f Sectio n 11 1 of th e Ne w Yor k Domesti c Relation s La w i n effect a t th e tim e provide d tha t " 'consent t o adoptio n shal l b e require d a s follows: 1 . O f th e adoptiv e child . . . . ; 2 . o f th e parent s o r survivin g parent , whether adul t o r infant , o f a chil d bor n i n wedlock ; 3 . Of th e mother , whethe r adult o r infant , o f a chil d bor n ou t o f wedlock ; 4 . O f an y perso n o r authorize d agency havin g lawfu l custod y o f the adoptiv e child. ' " N.Y. Dom . Rel . La w § 111 (quoted a t Caban 44 1 U.S., at 38 5 n.4). 20. Ibid., at 391. 21. Ibid., a t 38 8 (quoting Transcript o f Oral Argument a t 41). 22. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389. 23. Ibid . 24. See, e.g., Eveleig h (1989) , 1062; Perry (1984) , 1511; Wintjen (1990) , 1075. 25. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389. 26. Barthes (1967) , 76. The distinctio n betwee n marke d an d unmarke d terms , recognized i n linguistics , ha s prove d usefu l i n th e stud y o f other socia l phenom ena. I n thi s derivativ e use , marke d term s refe r t o peopl e an d group s o f peopl e who ar e i n som e sens e considere d peripheral . Thus , usin g th e exampl e o f gender, "male " is the unmarke d term , an d "female " i s the marke d term . Marke d categories (e.g. , women ) wil l frequentl y b e identifie d a s such . Thus , a femal e politician o r a femal e docto r wil l mor e ofte n b e referre d t o throug h us e o f th e gender designatio n tha n wil l a male politicia n o r a male doctor . Mal e politician s or mal e doctor s wil l simpl y b e referre d t o a s politician s o r doctors . Unles s otherwise informed , th e cultur e stil l assumes politician s an d doctor s ar e male . 27. Caban, 441 U.S. at 39 7 (Stewart, J., dissenting) . 261 I

Notes to Chapter 4 28. Thi s appear s t o b e th e cas e i n whic h maternit y i s invoke d pe r se an d i n which maternit y i s compare d wit h paternity . I n othe r case s (whic h wil l b e considered later in this chapter), cases in which one kind of maternity is opposed to othe r kind s o f maternity , th e comparativ e significanc e o f genetic s an d gesta tion ma y be reversed. 29. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 30. Ibid. , a t 40 5 n.1 0 (Stevens , J. , dissenting) . Justic e Steven s asserte d tha t sociological an d anthropologica l researc h indicate d th e presenc e an d impor tance o f the bond to which h e referred . 31. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256. 32. Ibid., at 259-60. 33. Ibid., at 260 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 [Stewart , J., dissenting]). 34. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. 35. I n thi s sense , th e unwe d fathe r case s furthe r limi t mother' s choices . See , e.g., Czapansk y (1991) , 1416 , 1456-6 3 (describin g mother s a s "draftee " parent s and fathers as "volunteer" parents). 36. Justic e Stewar t seeme d t o restric t hi s us e o f th e ter m "biologica l ties " to ties with a genetic base. Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting). However, the mother' s "mor e enduring " connectio n wit h th e chil d i n th e for m o f he r having gestated and born the child, to which Justice Stewart referred as establishing her parenthood, i s clearly biological, thoug h no t genetic. 37. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267. 38. Ibid, (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392). 39. Ibid., at 269 (Whit e J., dissenting). 40. Ibid. , at 267 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392). 41. Se e Gome z v . Perez (1973) . (Texa s violated th e equa l protectio n claus e by not allowin g childre n o f unmarrie d parent s th e righ t t o paterna l support , al though childre n of married parents were given this right.) 42. Se e Strather n (1992) , 148-49. 43. Th e holdin g i n Michael H . wa s base d o n a pluralit y opinio n writte n b y Justice Scalia , joine d by a concurrence writte n by Justice Stevens . 44. Lehr , 463 U.S. at 261. 45. Michael H. , 491 U.S. at 124 n.3. 46. Joint Appendix at 44, Michael H.. 47. California Evidenc e Cod e Sec . 621 (quoted at 491 U.S. at 115). The statut e allowed rebutta l o f it s presumptio n withi n tw o year s o f th e child' s birt h b y th e husband or , i f th e biologica l fathe r filed a n affidavi t o f paternity , b y th e wife . The biologica l fathe r wa s give n n o righ t t o rebu t th e section' s presumption . Michael H. , 491 U.S. at 115. 48. Michae l H. , 236 Cal. Rptr . 810, 818 (Ct. App. [1987]). 49. Th e Californi a Suprem e Cour t denie d certiorari . Tha t judgmen t i s re ported at 23 California Officia l Reports , Minutes o f the Suprem e Cour t 9 (1987); Brief for Appellant Victoria D . a t 1, Michael H . v. Gerald D. , 491 U.S. 11 0 (1989) 12621

Notes to Chapter 4 (No. 87-746) . Thus , Michae l an d Victori a wer e abl e t o appea l directl y t o th e United State s Supreme Court . Michae l H. , 485 U.S. 903 (1988). 50. Michael H. , 491 U.S. at 119. 51. Ibid. , a t 123 . Justic e Brenna n pointe d ou t i n dissen t tha t i n Quilloin, Cabariy and Lehr "the putative father' s demands woul d hav e disrupted a 'unitary family' as the plurality defines it. " 491 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 52. Michael H. , 491 U.S. a t 123. 53. See, e.g., Hinna n (1990) , 623; Ibid., at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 54. Michae l H. , 49 1 U.S . a t 16 0 (Whit e }. , concurring ) (quotin g Lehr , 46 3 U.S. at 261 [quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 n.7]). 55. Michael H. , 491 U.S. at 123. 56. Ibid., n.3. 57. Ibid., (Brennan, J., dissenting). 58. Followin g th e Court' s decisio n i n Michael H. , th e Californi a legislatur e amended th e statut e a t issue i n the case . The amendmen t allowe d a "presume d father" to rebut the presumptio n o f the mother' s husband's paternit y i f a motion is brought within tw o years of the child' s birth. 16 Fam. L . Rep. 1520 (1990). Th e sections' definitio n o f "presume d father " woul d hav e covere d th e biologica l father in Michael H. 59. See , e.g. , Barnet t an d Silverma n (1979) , 46 ; Schneide r (1980) , 107-10 , 114-17.

60. Michae l H. , 491 U.S. at 118 (emphasis i n original). 61. See e.g. , Ibid. , at 130 n.6, n.7 . 62. Ibid. , at 124. 63. See , e.g. , Note , Michael H. v . Gerald D. : The Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers and A Proposal for Reform 1990 , 1201 ; Note, Tradition and the Liberty Interest: Circumscribing the Rights of the Natural Father 1990, 314. 64. 463 U.S. at 272 (White, J., dissenting) (footnot e omitted) . 65. I n 1990 , i n In re Raquel Marie X , Ne w York' s highes t cour t declare d unconstitutional a statute tha t gav e onl y certai n unwe d father s th e righ t t o vet o the adoptions of their children. The cour t referred expressly to the statutes' focus on th e relationshi p betwee n th e tw o parent s a s a basi s fo r paterna l right s an d declared tha t focu s inappropriat e a s a measur e o f a father's commitmen t t o hi s children. The cas e thus affirms th e direct importance o f the father-child relation ship to protecting legal paternity . However , th e fact s i n Raquel Marie involve d a father who did establish a relationship with his child's mother. Indeed , the fathe r in the cas e marrie d hi s child's mother , bu t only afte r th e chil d ha d been place d for adoption pursuant to the mother's consent. I n In re Baby Girl S. , consolidate d and decide d b y the Ne w Yor k Cour t o f Appeals wit h Raquel Marie, th e father , upon learning of his lover's pregnancy, responded , "I love you and want to marry you." 53 5 N.Y.S. 2 d at 678. The tw o di d no t marr y because th e mothe r refused . Thus, both fathers involved i n Raquel Marie demonstrate d a fitting commitment, not just to their children, but to the mothers of those children a s well. 263

Notes to Chapter 5 66. Obviously , som e unwe d father s ca n no w obtai n constitutiona l protectio n for thei r relatio n t o thei r childre n despit e th e absenc e o f an appropriat e relatio n between th e fathe r an d th e child' s mother . Suc h case s include , fo r instance , a case i n whic h th e children' s mothe r i s deceased . Ther e are , tha t is , othe r way s for th e fathe r t o establish th e requisit e "family " uni t tha n b y establishing a hom e with th e children' s mother , bu t the y are no t thought o f as prototypical. 67. Strather n (1992) , 148-49. 68. Lehr , 46 3 U.S . a t 26 0 (quotin g Caban , 44 1 U.S . a t 39 7 [Stewart , J. , dissenting]). 69. Caban, 441 U.S. at 39 7 (Stewart, J., dissenting) . 70. Baby M., 52 5 A.2d a t 1132 (emphasis added) . 71. Ibid., a t 1170. 72. Ibid., at 1168. 73. Ibid. , a t 1160. 74. Ibid., a t 1157 (emphasis added) . 75. Rothenberg (1990) , 345. 76. Johnson, No . X-633190, slip op. at 18. 77. Ibid., sli p op. at 10. 78. Ibid. , slip op. at 18. 79. Lehr , 46 3 U.S . a t 26 0 (quotin g Caban , 44 1 U.S . a t 39 7 [Stewart , J. , dissenting]). 80. Johnson, No . X-633190, slip op. at 21. 81. Ibid, (emphasi s i n original) . 82. Healy (1991) , 95. 83. Ibid. 9 7 n.39. 84. Johnson v . Calvert, sub nom. Ann a J . v. Mark C , 28 6 Cal. Rptr . a t 380-81 . 85. Rothenberg (1990) , 346.

Notes t o Chapte r 5 1. Collins (1995) . 2. Clifton an d Schneide r (1992) , 463 n.2. 3. Th e first pregnanc y i n a huma n resultin g fro m th e implantatio n o f a n embryo tha t ha d bee n froze n an d the n thawe d occurre d i n 1983 . That pregnanc y did no t resul t i n a birth , bu t othe r pregnancie s an d birth s (begu n wit h embryo s that ha d bee n frozen ) soo n followed . Trounso n an d Moh r (1983) , 707-9. 4. Marr s e t al. (1986) , 1503. 5. Fox (1993), 122,123-24. 6. Jenkins (1994) . 7. Petitioner's Openin g Brie f at 8, Johnson v . Calvert. 8. Respondents' Brie f at 23, Johnson v . Calvert (sub nom. Ann a J . v. Mark C ) . 9. Appellant's Repl y Brie f at 8, ibid . I 26 4

Notes to Chapter 5 10. Johnson v . Calvert, No . X-633190, slip op. at 5. 11. Respondents' Brie f a t 22-26, Johnson v . Calvert (sub nom. Ann a J . v. Mar k

C).

12. Respondents' Brie f at 23, ibid . 13. Respondents' Brie f at 26, ibid. 14. Appellant's Openin g Brie f at 27, ibid. 15. Petitioner's Openin g Brie f at 8 , Johnson v . Calvert, 85 1 P.2d 776. 16. Appellant's Openin g Brie f a t 5-xi i (quotin g transcrip t o f testimony offere d at trial, R.T. vol. Ill 579) , Johnson v . Calvert (sub nom. Ann a J . v. Mark C ) . 17. Appellant' s Openin g Brie f a t 5-i i (quotin g fro m transcrip t o f testimon y offered a t trial, R.T. vol. Ill 483), ibid . 18. Appellant's Openin g Brie f a t 5-i v (quotin g transcrip t o f testimon y offere d at trial, R.T. vol. Ill 491), ibid. 19. Appellant's Openin g Brie f at 5-v , ibid . 20. Appellant's Openin g Brie f a t 5—v i (quoting transcrip t o f testimony offere d at trial, R.T. Vol. Ill 496), ibid . 21. Appellant's Openin g Brie f a t 5—v i (quoting transcrip t o f testimon y offere d at trial, R.T. vol. Ill 497), ibid . 22. Respondents' Brie f at 45, ibid. 23. Respondents' Brie f at 49, ibid . 24. Respondents ' Brie f a t 51 , ibid . I n respons e t o Johnson' s clai m tha t he r partial India n heritag e mad e th e India n Chil d Welfar e Ac t applicabl e t o th e case, th e Calvert s asserte d tha t th e bab y "ha s n o bloo d relationshi p t o Ann a Johnson," Ibid . Tha t ac t require s notificatio n t o th e relevan t trib e shoul d a n Indian chil d b e mad e availabl e fo r adoption . 2 5 U.S.C. Sec . 1903-1919. 25. Appellant' s Repl y Brie f a t 8 , Johnso n v . Calver t (sub nom. Ann a C . v . Mark C ) . 26. Appellant' s Repl y Brie f a t 6- 7 (quotin g transcrip t o f testimon y offere d a t trial, R.T . Vol. Ill 621) , ibid. 27. Drs. Klaus, Chamberlain, an d Harriso n testifie d a t trial as experts for Ann a Johnson; Dr . Cal l testifie d a s an exper t fo r Crispin a an d Mar k Calvert . 28. Appellant' s Repl y Brie f a t 8 (citation s t o transcrip t omitted) , Johnso n v . Calvert (sub nom. Ann a J . v. Mark C ) . 29. Appellant's Openin g Brie f a t 5—x i (quoting transcrip t o f testimon y offere d at trial, R.T. Vol. Ill 565) , ibid. 30. Appellant's Openin g Brie f a t 46, Johnson v . Calver t (sub nom. Ann a J . v. Mark C ) . 31. Johnson v . Calvert, 1 9 Cal. Rptr.2 d a t 499 n.8. 32. Johnson v . Calvert, 85 1 P.2d a t 781. 33. Michael H. , 491 U.S. at 118. 34. Respondents ' Answe r t o Amicus Curia e Brie f b y ACLU a t 16 , Johnson v . Calvert (sub nom. Ann a J . v. Mark C ) . 35. Robert J. McDonald provide d a very different stor y of the case , both i n hi s 2651

Notes to Chapter 5 briefs and supporting papers and during two telephone interview s (July 7 and 8, 1994). According t o Robert , th e cas e involve d massiv e frau d o n th e par t o f his wife Olg a an d th e infertilit y clinic . McDonal d asserte d tha t h e ha d bee n tol d originally tha t th e babie s wer e produce d fro m dono r sper m an d tha t hi s ow n sperm were probably inadequat e to fertilize a n egg. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant , Robert J. McDonal d at 8-9, McDonald v . McDonald. Moreover, Robert asserted that Olga ha d initiall y informe d hi m tha t he r pregnancy ha d resulte d from the fertilization o f her own eggs. In fact, the pregnancy resulted from the fertilization of donor eggs . Ibid, at 6. At least until lat e 1994 , Robert continued hi s efforts t o discover the identity of the ov a donor, whose eggs, once fertilized wit h his sperm, resulted i n th e conceptio n o f the twi n girl s involved i n the case . The appellat e division denie d Robert' s reques t tha t th e medica l record s pertainin g t o th e i n vitro fertilizatio n an d implantatio n b e mad e availabl e t o him . Th e cour t de clared: "Clearly , resolutio n o f th e custod y issu e i n th e instan t cas e doe s no t require revelatio n o f the wife's medica l record s concerning her in-vitr o fertiliza tion. . .. Sinc e an y informatio n regardin g th e eg g donor i s no t relevan t t o th e issue of custody i n thi s case, that branc h o f the husband' s motio n wa s properly denied." McDonald v . McDonald , 608 N.Y.S.zd at 481 . 36. Brie f fo r Plaintiff-Appellan t Rober t J . McDonal d a t 3 , McDonal d v . McDonald. I am gratefu l t o Dr . Rober t McDonal d fo r providin g m e wit h th e briefs in this case. 37. Johnso n v . Calvert , 851 P.2 d at 762 n.10. 38. McDonald , 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480 (citation and footnote omitted). 39. Brie f for Plaintiff-Appellant , Rober t J. McDonald a t 18-19, McDonald v. McDonald. At the center of Robert's arguments to the court was the "fraudulen t conduct" allegedly committed b y Olga and the fertility clinic , in which sh e was treated an d whic h performe d th e IV F that le d t o the conceptio n o f the babies. Ibid, a t 27; Letter fro m Rober t J. McDonal d t o Offic e o f Professional Medica l Conduct, N.Y.S. Dept. of Health (Jul y 25,1991). 40. Brie f for Defendant-Respondent , Olg a B. McDonald a t 24, McDonald v. McDonald. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid, at 7.

43. Ibid, at 8. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, Ibid, Ibid,

at 10. at 11. at 12 (citation omitted). at 16. at 17.

49. Strather n (1995) , at 6. 50. Brie f for Defendant-Respondent , Olg a B. McDonald a t 21-22, McDonald v. McDonald. 51. Ibid , at 21 .

12661

Notes to Chapter 5 52. Brie f fo r Plaintiff-Appellant , Rober t J . McDonal d a t 18-19 , McDonal d v . McDonald. 53. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. at 427. 54. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. 55. Roe , 41 0 U.S . a t 16 0 an d n.5 9 (relyin g o n L . Hellma n an d J . Pritchar d W 1 * P - 493)56. Akron , 46 2 U.S . a t 45 8 (O'Connor , J. , dissenting) . I n Akron, th e Cour t declared secon d trimeste r hospitalizatio n requirement s fo r abortio n unconstitu tional. 57. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 58. Probably , th e mos t well-know n an d forcefu l institutiona l advocat e o f th e position tha t a human bein g exist s a t conception i s th e Catholi c churc h whic h holds that: [T]he frui t o f huma n generatio n from th e first momen t o f it s existence , that i s t o say , fro m th e momen t th e zygot e ha s formed , demand s th e unconditional respec t that is morally due to the human bein g i n his bodily and spiritua l totality . The huma n bein g i s to be respecte d an d treate d a s a person from th e momen t o f conceptio n an d therefor e from tha t sam e moment hi s right s a s a perso n mus t b e recognized , amon g whic h i n th e first place i s th e inviolabl e righ t o f ever y innocen t huma n bein g t o life. ("Sacred Congregatio n fo r th e Doctrin e o f Faith, " Instruction o n Respec t for Human Lif e i n Its Origin and on the Dignit y of Procreation, in Donum Vitae 1990 , app. at 211) 59. Smit h (1985-86) . 60. Davis , 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *36. 61. Ibid., at *i3. 62. Ibid. , at *3i. 63. Ibid. , at *37« 64. Davis , (1990) Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *i (emphasi s added). 65. Ibid. , at *8-9. 66. Davis , 842 S.W.2d a t 596. 67. Ibid. , at 597. 68. Ibid. , at 604. 69. Ibid . 70. Curride n (1993) , A2. 71. Ragone* (1994), 125. 72. Transcript of Proceedings, Davis , at 41. 73. I n Diamond v . Chakrabarty, fo r instance , th e U.S . Suprem e Cour t con cluded that living things can be patented under federal paten t law. 74. Davis , 842 S.W.2d a t 597. 75. Professor Jerome Lejeune (obituary) , The Times (London), April 7,1994 . 76. Transcript of Proceedings, Davis , at 23.

1*7 I

Notes to Chapter 6 77. Ibid., a t 48. 78. Ibid. , a t 78 . Th e ter m "zygote " generall y refer s t o th e fertilize d ovu m immediately afte r fertilizatio n occurs . 79. Ibid. , at 79. 80. Ibid., a t 51. 81. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS, at *io . 82. The othe r expert s wh o testifie d a t trial included : Prof . John A . Robertson , Baker an d Bott s Professo r o f La w a t the Universit y o f Texas a t Austin, Texas; Dr . Irving Ra y King , directo r o f th e Fertilit y Cente r o f Eas t Tennesse e i n Knoxville ; Dr. Charle s A . Shivers , hea d o f th e Departmen t o f Zoolog y a t th e Universit y o f Tennessee i n Knoxville ; an d Debora h Coope r McCarter , RN , primar y patien t coordinator a t Dr . King' s IV F Clinic . Th e cour t summarize d th e testimon y o f these, an d othe r witnesse s i n Appendi x B to it s opinion . Davis , 198 9 Tenn. App . LEXIS 642 , at *75-84 . 83. Ibid. , a t "24-25. 84. Brie f fo r Appelle e a t 18 , Davis , 84 2 S.W.2 d 588 . I a m gratefu l t o Mr . Charles M . Clifford , Esq . (lawye r fo r Junio r Davis ) fo r providin g m e wit h th e briefs i n thi s case. 85. Ibid , a t 7, Davis, 842 S.W.2d 58 8 (citing John A . Robertson [1986] , 974). 86. Davis , (1990) Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 , at * 2 (footnote omitted) . 87. Davis, 842 S.W.2d, at 593. 88. Ibid. , a t 594. 89. Ibid . 90. Brie f for Appellee a t 18, Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588. 91. Ibid. , a t 9. 92. Ibid., a t 9-11. 93. Ibid. , 11. 94. Ibid. , at 10. 95. Ibid. , a t 11. 96. Davis , 842 S.W.2d at 593-94 . 97. Ibid. , a t 598. 98. Ibid. , a t 600. 99. Ibid. , a t 601. 100. Ibid., a t 603-4. 101. Ibid., 596-97 . 102. Strathern (1995 ) 3 1 (footnote omitted) . Notes t o Chapte r 6 1. Strathern (1990) , 10 (emphasis i n original) . 2. Barnett an d Silverma n (1979) , 69. 3. Strather n (1990) , 8. 4. See , e.g., Trespalacios (1992) .

12681

Notes to Chapter 6 5. Shultz (1990) . 6. Andrews (1986) , 20. 7. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 8. Ibid., at 604. 9. Ibid. , a t 601. 10. Ibid., a t 601, 604. 11. Johnson v . Calvert, 85 1 P.2d at 799 (Kennard , J. , dissenting) . 12. Ibid., at 782, n.10. 13. Ibid., at 782. 14. Ibid., n.10. 15. Johnson v . Calvert, 87 2 P.2d at 799 (Kennar d J. , dissenting) . 16. Johnso n v . Calvert , 85 1 P.2 d a t 78 2 (quotin g Hil l [1991] , 441) (emphasi s omitted). 17. Ibid., at 783 (quoting Stump f [1968] , 196) (emphasi s omitted) . 18. Ibid., a t 796 (Kennard , J. , dissenting) . 19. Ibid., a t 783 (quoting Shult z [1990] , 323) (footnote omitted) . 20. Ibid., at 796-97 (Kennard , J. , dissenting) . 21. Ibid., a t 783 (quoting Shult z [1990] , 397). 22. Ibid., at 799 (Kennard , J. , dissenting) . 23. Ibid., a t 782. 24. People v . Sorensen, 437 P.2d a t 499. 25. Ibid., at 498. 26. Ibid., at 501. 27. Orford, 4 9 Ont. L.R . a t 23. 28. Se e Harris , Comment 1981 , 924 (citing Ga. Cod e Ann . J 101. 1 [1964]). 29. See , e.g., In re Baby Doe ; Byers v. Byers. 30. See, e.g., Peopl e v . Dennett . 31. Donovan (1982-83) , 194, 216-22. 32. Jhordan, 22 4 Cal. Rptr . a t 531. 33. Hecht, 2 0 Cal. Rptr . 2d at 276. 34. Ibid., n.i . 35. Ibid. , a t 276 (quotin g agreemen t betwee n Kan e an d Californi a Cryobank , Inc.). 36. Ibid., at 276. 37. Ibid., at 279, n.3. 38. Ibid., at 281. 39. Answer o f Real Partie s i n Interes t Willia m Everet t Kane , Jr., Katharin e E . Kane an d Rober t L . Greene , Administrato r CT A o f th e Estat e o f Willia m E . Kane t o Petitio n fo r Wri t o f Mandate/Prohibitio n i n th e Firs t Instanc e and/o r Other Extraordinar y Relie f at 9, Hecht, 2 0 Cal. Rptr.2 d 27 5 (1993). 40. Hecht , 2 0 Cal. Rptr.2 d a t 283-84. 41. Hecht , 4 4 Cal. Rptr.2 d 578 , 1995 Cal. App . 842 , 1995 Cal. App . Lexi s 842, at*6.

I 26 9 I

Notes to Chapter 7 42. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr.id at 288. 43. Ibid., at 287. 44. Reuters Library Report, "French Cour t Reject s AIDS Widow s Insemination Plea" (1991). 45. Robertson (1994b). 46. See Goodwin v. Turner (1990). 47. See , Ric k Bragg , "Cheatin g Death , an d Testin g a Reproductiv e Law, " (*994)-

48. "High-Tech Mom Vows to Fight for Federal Benefits," (1995) 49. Dionne (1984). 50. Parpalaix, at 561-62. 51. Ibid., at 561. 52. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d at 288 (describing conclusions of Parpalaix court). 53. Parpalaix, at 562. 54. "Court Awards Young Widow Sperm of Late Husband," (1984). 55. "Woman Fails to Conceive from Dead Husband's Sperm" (1985). 56. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d at 288-89. 57. Freud ([1900] 1950), 343-43 . 58. Feinman and Gabel (1990), 375. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid., at 379-81. 61. Shultz (1990), 349. Notes to Chapte r 7 1. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d at 783. 2. In the Matter of Kottman, 2 Hill at 364. 3. Infants Custody Act, 1873, 36 and 37 Vict. c. 12 . 4. Mercein v. The People, 25 Wend, at 102. 5. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597. 6. Mattter of Baby M., 525 A.2d at 1143. 7. Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1257. 8. Ibid., 537 A.2d at 1263. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Matter of Baby M., 542 A.2d at 55. 12. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d at 894. 13. Ibid., at 895. 14. Moschetta, D324349 at 17. 15. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d at 901. 16. Moschetta, D 324349 at 14. 17. Ibid., at 13. I 27 0 I

Notes to Chapter 7 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Moschetta , 3 0 Cal. Rptr.2 d at 902. 21. Moschetta, D32434 9 at 15. 22. Ibid., at 16. 23. Boucher (1995). 24. Ellingwood (1995) . 25. Ibid , (quotin g Orang e Count y Superio r Cour t Judg e Joh n C . Woolley' s oral opinion o f November 17,1995) . 26. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-633190 at 14. 27. Ibid. 28. Justic e Arabian wrot e another , concurring , opinio n i n th e case . H e wrot e to voice his disagreement with the court's conclusion tha t surrogacy contracts are " 'not inconsistent with public policy / " Johnson, 851 P.2d at 788. 29. Parham , at 602. 30. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 783 (quoting Shult z [1990 ] at 397). 31. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782, n.10. 32. I am gratefu l t o Professo r Larr y I . Palme r o f Cornel l La w Schoo l fo r th e term "biotechnologica l children. " Professo r Palme r wa s no t th e first to us e th e term. However , hi s us e i s especiall y instructiv e becaus e i t clearl y suggest s bot h the descriptive and ironi c appeal o f the term. Se e Palme r (1994). 33. Se e e.g. , Hom e (1994) ; Winslow (1994) . 34. Se e e.g. , "Mora l Torpor Spawn s Designe r Babies " (1994); "Donum Vitae " (1990), Appendix. 35. "Donum Vitae" (1990), Appendix, at 216. 36. Se e e.g. , "Mora l Torpor Spawns Designer Babies " (1994). 37. Orenstein (1995) . 38. Thi s discussio n doe s no t refe r t o feminis t opponent s o f reproductiv e technology. Feminis t oppositio n t o reproductiv e technolog y focuse s a s much o n physical an d psychologica l harm s tha t befall wome n a s a result o f being treate d for infertility a s on the harms that befall th e resultin g children . 39. "Donum Vitae" (1990), Appendix, at 208. 40. See , e.g., Cahil l (1990) . 41. See , e.g., Baura c (1992) ; Williams (1992) ; Laboy (1993); Lawson (1993). 42. Mihil l (1994) . 43. Pallo t (1993). 44. Gabrie l (1996) . 45. Se e e.g. , Hopkin s (1995) ; Clancy and Tropiano (1994). 46. Steinber g (1993). 47. See , e.g. , Pearc e (1994) ; Ratcliff e (1994) ; Lawso n (1993) ; Midgle y (1993) ; Wells (1993). 48. Wells (1993). I 27 1 I

Notes to the Conclusion 49. Lawso n (1993) . 50. Se e e.g. , Rochel l (1995) ; Shave r (1995) ; Lan e an d Szab o (1992) ; Dote n (1991)51. Loose (1993) . 52. See Singe r (1992) .

Notes t o the Conclusio n 1. Schneider (1977) , 66.

272 I

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I 2 73

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281

INDEX

Abortion, 34 , 40,158-59, 239 ; and surrogacy contracts, 81 Abraham (Biblical) , 6 4 ACLU, 149 Adoption, 38-39 , 64, 72, 76, 250, 26m. 19; and artificial insemination , 9,196 ; an d "search-movement," 39 ; and surrogacy , 77, 81 , 86-87; a n d unwe d fathers , 102, 103,105,108, 263n . 65 Adoption of Anonymous, 19 5 Adultery: and artificial insemination , 196; and unwed fathers , 116 Alternative insemination . See Artificial in semination Antenuptial agreements . See Prenuptia l agreements Artificial insemination , 8-9 , 66 , 67, 76, 77, 135,182,194-207, 237 , 240, 252; and con sent, 194-97 . See also Sper m donor s Autonomous individualism . See Individu alism Autonomy: procreative, 40, 57-62,17 0 Baby M. , 76-93 , 94,120-26,129,130,131, 134,177, 215, 222, 224-29, 237-38, 252 Baehr v. Lewin, 3 7 Baird, William, 45-4 6 Barnett, Steve n A., 18 Best-interest standard, 214-38 "Best-interests": of child, 82 , 84-85,122-23, 177,187, 213-44, 251 Bible: story of birth of Ishmael, 6 4 Biology: i n definition o f family, 30-31 , 38, 63, 66, 67, 72, 91,127-30,134-75, ^ 8 , 191-92, 215, 235, 237-38; and maternity , 107-9,119—33.137—56,191, 262n. 26; and paternity, 97,100-119,120-2 1 "Biotechnological" children, 239

1283

Birth control. See Contraceptio n "Blood mother," 145 Bottoms v . Bottoms, 21 9 Bowers v. Hardwick, 6 1 Bradwell v . Illinois, 6 9 Brown, Louise, 156 , 242-43 Caban v . Mohammed, 105-8,110,119,121 , 129

Carey v . Population Servs. Int'l, 258n. 42 Caste, 18 Catholic church , 18 , 239, 240, 256n. 13, 267n. 5 8 Charlemagne, 2 0 Children: commodification of , 72 ; and law, 35, 37-39,214-38; names of, 256n . 3 ; and understandings of, 47, 72-74,190,219, 239-44; a nd unwe d fathers, 96-119. See also Adoption; "Best-interests"; Custody; Families; Gestational surrogacy ; Surrogacy Choice: concep t of , 178-82 . See also Marketplace Class: in assisted reproductio n cases , 8285,126,130, 230 Clifford, Charles , 165 Cohabitation contracts , 12 , 36 Commercial surrogacy , 65, 75-77, 79-80 , 86, 90-91,126,129 , 229 ; and crimina l law, 77; and fees, 65 . See also Contracts; Gestational surrogacy ; Surrogac y "Comstock Law, " 34 Constitution: and due process, 52 , 99,108; and equa l protection , 47, 99,105,109 , 262n. 41; and families, 39-62,163 , 224; and First Amendment, 44; and liberty interest, 113; an d noninterpretivst readings , 52; and paternity , 98-119,168; and righ t

Index Constitution (Continued) to privacy, 39-62,158-59 , 171,183 ; and rights o f gamete donors , 170-71,183 , 214; and right s o f individual, 43-45; and sub stantive du e process , 51-52 ; and surro gacy, 77-80; and waive r o f rights, 2606in. 2 0 Consumer choice , 3 , 178 Contraception, 34 , 40-55, 248, 258^ 42 Contracts: an d artificia l insemination , 182 , 199, 200; in Baby M. , 80-82 , 84-87, 90, 123-26,133, 226, 227; and cryopreserva tion, 157 ; in Davis v . Davis, 163 ; history of, 209-10 ; ideology of , 24 , 35, 47-52, 64-77, 80 , 88, 89-92,179-80,189-93, 202, 209-10, 235, 238, 246, 259n. 8 ; in Johnson v. Calvert, 127,129,142,193-94 ; in McDonald v . McDonald, 152 ; in Moschetta v . Moschetta, 230 ; and posthu mous reproduction , 199 , 203, 204-5. See also Commercial surrogac y Cryopreservation: o f embryos, 3,133,135 , 136,157,159-74, 201 > 21 3> 2 43- See als o Davis v. Davis; Embryo s Culture: i n America, 245 ; assumptions of , ix; ideology of , 6 7 Custody: an d ov a donation , 152 , 156; and surrogacy, 80-92 , 95,125, 187, 231-33; and unwe d fathers , 96-119 . See also "Best-interests" Das Kapital, 7 2 Davis v . Davis, 160-73 , l l^y 183—85 , 207-8 , 211, 222-25, 237—38, 25 2 Divorce, 35 , 37, 257m 4 ; and artificia l in semination, 195 , 196; and assiste d repro duction 8,149,150,160-61 , 228-33, 239» rates o f 26, 29, 34. See also Custod y "Divorce Revolution, " 3 5 DNA: testing of , 145,14 6 Donovan, Carol , 197 Douglas, William, 41 , 44, 51 , 54, 59 Duby, Georges , 19 , 20 Dumont, Louis , 18 , 255m 1 Edwards, Robert , 135 Egg donation. See Ov a donatio n

Eisenstadt v . Baird, 33 , 39-62,169,184, 248; and surrogacy , 66 , 78 Embryos: as "children," 163 , 183-84; development of , 165-68 ; freezing of , 156-74 , 264n. 3 ; as persons, 171 ; as property, 163, 171,183, 84; respect owe d to , 172-73 , 183, 223-24, 238, 267n. 58 ; status of , 163-65 , 169-71,174, 223-24; storage of , 159 ; transfer of , 3 , 135,136,150. See also Cryopres ervation; Davis v . Davis; Gestationa l sur rogacy Equality: social , 16 , 69. See also Constitu tion, an d equa l protectio n Families, 1-10 ; an d assumption s about , 13, 27-28,127,133, 134,138,142 , 147,149 , 156, 164, 171, 176-82, 184, 203; autonomy of , 42 , 61, 98, 257m 18 ; of feudal pe riod, 16-17 ; history of , 5 , 15, 16-31, 132, 256n. 3 ; ideology of , 4-5,11,14-18 , 26 30, 36-37 , 47, 52-54 , 67-77, 83 , 94, 120, 178-82, 207-8, 210-12, 213, 215-17, 225, 237-38, 240, 243-44, 245—53; a nd love , 26, 27, 39, 70, 72, 76, 91-92,124, 205, 246, 247; nontraditional form s of , 47-48 , 200

Family law : and choice , 4, 6,13, 32 , 93; contradictions in , 10 , 70, 71,189, 207-12, 217-38; and individualism , 32 , 39, 45-57, 66; i n transition , 4, 6-7, 32-62 , 70-71 , 96, 127-28,134,176,191 , 207-12, 214, 21520, 235, 245. See also Constitution; Legis lation Fathers. See Paternit y Feinman, Ja y M., 20 9 Fertility clinics : as business, 241-42 Fetal viability , 158 Fetus, 3,144 ; compare d t o embryo, 167; and viability , 158-5 9 Feudal: relations , 16-24 , 256nn. 3,1 3 "Feudal Revolution, " 21 Foster parent , 141 Fox, Robin, 15,13 8 Fraud: an d fertilit y treatments , 265~66nn . 35>39 Freud, Sigmund , 20 6 284

Index Gabel, Peter , 20 9 Gallon, Claire , 203 Gamete donation , 157,162,192 . See also Artificial insemination ; Ov a donatio n Gay kinship: and "families-through choice," 15 Gender: understanding s of , 1 9 Gestational surrogacy , 63-64 , 95,126-33, 136,139-50,156,159,185-94, 21 3- $ ee also Commercial surrogacy ; Johnson v. Calvert; Ov a donation ; Surrogac y Gifts: ideolog y of , 72-7 4 Grandparental visitation : an d surrogacy , 8 3 Griswold v . Connecticut, 33 , 39-62,169, 257nn. 21 , 22, 258^ 49 ; and surrogacy ,

66,78

Gursky v. Gursky, 19 6 Harrison, Michelle , 143,14 4 Hart, Nancy , 20 3 Hecht v . Superior Court, 199-204 ; 206-8, 211

Hierarchy: socia l an d familial , 16-25 , 45, 246, 251

Hill, John, 97

Holism: social an d familial , 16-24 , 66, 246, 251

Home: ideolog y of , 25 , 46, 53 , 247 Hyde, Lewis , 72-7 4 Ideology: definitio n of , 25 5 n. 1 . See also Families, ideolog y o f India, 18 Indian heritage , 265^ 2 4 Individualism, 3 , 21-22, 24, 32, 36, 47-57, 66, 69 , 96, 98,120,132,175,179,193-94 , 210, 213 , 221, 238 , 247 , 25 1

Industrial Revolution : an d family , 3 , 14, 17, 24, 25, 26, 97, 207, 209, 211, 21 7 Infertility, 64 , 154,156,157,160,16 2 Inheritance: o f sperm, 199-20 3 Intent: concep t of , 178-212 , 213, 236, 238, 252 In vitr o fertilization , 3 , 4,126,135,140, 151, 154, 156-57,159,162,183, 243 IVF. See I n vitr o fertilizatio n

Jhordan C. v . Mary K., 197-9 8 Johnson, Anna, 126-30,13 2 Johnson v . Calvert, 122,126-33 , *34> l5&, 162,176,177,185, 211, 265n. 24; and bio logical "facts, " 136,139-50,185-94 , 2 °7~ 8, 215, 222, 234-38 Kellogg, Susan , 2 6 King, Irvin g Ray , 168, 268n. 8 2 Kingsley, In re, 38, 257^ 1 0 Labor: notion s of , 48-5 2 Legislation, 8 , 34 , 40,176; and abortion , 158; and adoption , 250 , 26m. 19 ; and arti ficial insemination , 196-97 , 252; and as sisted reproduction , 250 , 252-53; and "best-interests," 216; and chil d support , 169; and commitmen t t o menta l hospi tal, 236; and divorce , 35-36 , 257^ 4 ; and embryos, 169 ; and gestationa l surrogacy , 130,131,132,145,148-49; an d intestat e succession, 169 ; and orga n donation , 169-70; and posthumou s reproduction , 201; and surrogacy , 76-77 , 88 , 251, 259^ 16; and unwe d fathers , 96,102 , 105,113, 262-63^ 49 , 263n. 5 8 Lehr v. Robertson, 108-10,111,112,117,118 , 129 Lejeune, Jerome , 163,165-6 8 Lesbians: and custody , 220 ; and "families through-choice," 15 Liberalism: o f nineteenth century , 4 9 Liberty, 44, 48, 57-6 2 Linguistics: and marke d terms , 261 Lochner v . New York, 48-57, 5 9 Maine, Henry , 68-70 , 80 , 81, 89, 259^ 8 Marketplace: ideolog y of , 24 , 30, 46-54, 81, 96, 126 , 178-83,185, 204, 207-10, 224, 247, 249. See also Work Marriage, 4, 29, 36-37, 41, 240; and same sex, 37 ; traditional vie w of , 41 . See also Divorce Marvin v. Marvin, 3 6 Marx, Karl , 72 Maternity, 119-33 ; biological dimension s

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Index Maternity (Continued) of, 3,139-56 ; and custody, 218-20. See also Biolog y Matter of Baby M. Se e Baby M . May, Elaine Tyler, 29 McCarter, Debora h Cooper, 268n. 82 McDonald, Robert , 265~66nn. 35 , 39 McDonald v . McDonald, 139 ; and biologi cal "facts, " 150-56,176,177,185-89, 265 66nn. 35 , 39 McGuire v . McGuire, 6 1 Michael H . v . Gerald D. , 78-96,111-18 , 149, 26on. 1 Mill, John Stuart , 44 Mintz, Steven, 26 Moschetta v . Moschetta, 222 , 231-33, 23738 Motherhood: cult of, 119 Mothers. See Biology; Gestatonal surro gacy; Maternity; "Natural" mother; Surrogacy; Women "Natural" family, 105-7,116-1 7 "Natural" father, 116-18,194,195,19 8 "Natural" mother, 152,187,188,191-9 2 "Natural" parentage, 235, 236 Nature: ideology of, 67,115-17,125 ; and maternal bond , 140-47 , 26m. 10 ; and nurture, 102 "No-fault" divorce, 12 , 35-36 Orford v. Orford, 196 Organ transplantation, 74-7 5 Ova donation, 131,150-51,156,188 ; and fees, 91,151,152. See also Gestational sur rogacy Overdetermination: o f symbols, 206 Parental rights : termination of , 80-81 , 8 7 Parent figure, 142 Parents: intending, 10 , 63, 64, 65, 75, 80, 151-52,159,177,185-94, 215 , 235, 236, 238, 251, 252. See also Intent, concept o f Parham v. /. R. , 23 6 Parpalaix c. CECOS, 198 , 203-8, 211 Paternity: and artificial insemination , 194 -

207; of unwed fathers , 94-119,121,12324,131,140, 262n. 35 , 263nn. 51 , 58, 65, 264n. 66. See also Biolog y People v. Sorensen, 195,19 6 Personhood, 21. See also Individualis m Planned Parenthood , 4 4 Posner v. Posner, 36 Posthumous reproduction , 136,198-207 , 213

Preembryo. See Embry o Prenuptial agreements , 12 Prisoners: and posthumous reproduction , 203

Privacy: in feudal world , 20; of individual , 20, 21-22; and righ t to, 41-62,158-59, 183; and surrogacy, 77-7 9 "Procreative liberty, " 90. See also Autonomy, procreativ e Protestantism, 22-2 3 Quilloin v . Walcott, 102-5,110,11 9 Race: and surrogacy, 130 , 230; understandings of, 1 9 Ragone, Helena , 65 , 74,16 2 Raquel Marie X , In re, 263^ 65 Reproductive technology : challeng e pre sented by , 3-4,14, 245-53. $ ee a ^so Arti " ficial insemination ; Cryopreservation; Embryos; In vitro fertilization; Gesta tional surrogacy ; Posthumous reproduc tion; Surrogacy Reunions: and reproductiv e technolog y clinics, 242 Rex v. DeManneville, 21 8 Rios, Mario and Elsa , 159-6 0 Robertson, John A., 58,167 , 268n. 82 Roe v. Wade, 40, 58,158-59,16 9 Roman law : and custody, 218 Rosenwaks, Zev, 241 Salk, Lee, 8 4 Sara (Biblical), 6 4 Schneider, Davi d M. , 27, 28, 71, 91, 247 Shaw, George Bernard , 223; and Saint Joan, 22-23

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Index Shivers, Charles A., 26811. 82 Social Security : survivor's benefits an d posthumous reproduction , 203 Sodomy: between consenting adults, 61 Sorensen. See People v. Sorensen Sperm donors, 131; and fees, 91; and surrogacy, 64-65, 67. See also Artificial insem ination; Posthumous reproductio n Stanley v . Illinois, 99-102,110,118,11 9 Strathern, Marilyn, 15,119,17 2 Status: ideology of , 64-77 , 80-82 , 88, 8 9 92,188-89,192, 202 , 259n. 8 Steptoe, Patrick, 134 Surrogacy, 6 , 9, 63-93, 94-95; and con tracts, 10, 63-77,120. Se e als o Baby M.; Commercial surrogacy ; Gestational sur rogacy; Johnson v . Calvert; Moschetta v . Moschetta Tawney, R . H. , 22 Uniform Anatomica l Gif t Act, 161 Uniform Parentag e Act, 131,14 5

Uniform Premarita l Agreement Act, 37 Uniform Stat e Laws , 7 "Unitary" family, 114-15,11 8 Visitation: and surrogacy, 87 , 228 Webster v. Missouri Reproduction Services, 62 Weston, Kath , 15 Wills. See Inheritanc e Women: commodification of , 67 ; and harms from reproductive technology , 27m. 38 ; as mothers, 119-33 ; social statu s of, 69 , 75. See also Maternity; "Natural" mother Work: ideology of , 70,124 . See also Market place York v. Jones, 15 7 Zygote. See Embryo s

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