Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America 9780300129830

Citation preview

Defining Nations

TA M A R H E R Z O G

Defining Nations IMMIGRANTS AND CITIZENS I N E A R LY M O D E R N S P A I N AND SPANISH AMERICA

Yale University Press New Haven & London

Published with assistance from the Program for Cultural Cooperation between Spain’s Ministry of Education and Culture and United States Universities. Copyright ∫ 2003 by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Set in Sabon type by Keystone Typesetting, Inc. Printed in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Herzog, Tamar. Defining nations: Immigrants and citizens in early modern Spain and Spanish America / Tamar Herzog. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-300-09253-9 1. Citizenship—Spain—Castile—History—18th century. 2. Citizenship— Spain—Colonies—History—18th century. 3. Spain—Colonies—America— History—18th century. I. Title. JN8399.C26 H47 2003 323.6%09171%24609033—dc21 2002011548 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Acknowledgments vii 1.

Introduction 1

2.

Vecindad: Citizenship in Local Communities 17

3.

Vecindad: From Castile to Spanish America 43

4.

Naturaleza: The Community of the Kingdom 64

5.

Naturaleza: From Castile to Spanish America 94

6.

The Other: Conversos, Gypsies, Foreign Catholics, and Foreign Vassals 119

7.

The Crisis of an Empire 141

8.

Was Spain Exceptional? 164

9.

Conclusions and Afterthoughts 201 Abbreviations 209 Notes 211 Glossary 271 Bibliography 275 Index 323

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank David Nirenberg, Juan Pro Ruíz, Tom Cummins, Mireille Peytavin, Piero Ventura, John Brewer, Cornell Fleischer, Julius Kirshner, Steve Pincus, Claudio Lomnitz, Jan Goldstein, Richard Kagan, Jeremy Adelman, Jim Amelang, and Antonio Manuel Hespanha, each of whom discussed aspects of this manuscript with me and gave me wise suggestions. S. N. Eisenstadt, Luis Roniger, and Mario Sznajder asked good questions. The anonymous readers of the press carefully read the manuscript and advised me what to change and how. I also thank Jorge and Anahi Myers, José Carlos Chiaramonte, Marta Valencia, Orense Carlos Cansanello, Guillermo Banzato, Luciano Andrenacci, and the staff at the Archivo General de la Nación, most particularly Liliana Crespi, Gabriel Taruselli, and Fabián Alonso, who made my stay in Argentina possible, interesting, and agreeable; José Frank Ragas Rojas, who assisted me in the Archivo General de la Nación in Lima, and Carole Leal Curiel, who helped in Caracas; José Manuel Pérez Prendes, Magdalena Rodríguez Gil, and Clara Alvarez Alonso, who did the same in Madrid; María Inés Carzolio, Orense Carlos Cansanello, Marcela Ternavasio, and María Elena Martínez, who allowed me to read and cite their unpublished papers; Federica Morelli, Gabriela Gómez Cárcamo, and David Nirenberg, who called my attention to different sources and citations; María Gómez Garrido, Susan Allan, and Eliza Childs, who edited parts of the manuscript;

viii

Acknowledgments

Byron Hamann, who prepared the index; Laura Lobera Argüelles, who offered me her house and plotted a visit to Minorca; and Yuval Erlich, for being there. Born in Lima, this book first took shape as a research project at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. It matured at the University of Chicago and saw completion at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Its different parts were discussed in the meetings of the Society of Spanish and Portuguese Historical Studies, the American Historical Association, the Forum on European Expansion and Global Exchange, and the Association of European Latin American Historians, and in the seminars of Juan Carlos I of Spain Center at New York University, Johns Hopkins University, the International House of the University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, the Center for Early Modern History of the University of Minnesota–Twin Cities Campus, the University of Kansas at Lawrence, the University of Toulouse–Le Mirail, the Autonomous University of Madrid, the Max Weber College in Erfurt, Germany, and the Truman Research Institute of the Hebrew University, Israel. I would like to thank the faculty, students, and staff of these institutions for their support and encouragement. I would also like to thank the Yad Hanadiv Foundation and the Social Sciences division of the University of Chicago for supplying the funds necessary to conduct the archival research. This book is dedicated to the memory of Francisco Tomás y Valiente and Luis Castro Leiva, professors and friends, and to that of Jorge Díaz Giménez, whose love for Spain and the Hispanic world accompanies me despite his absence.

1

Introduction

The construction of a community of natives of the kingdoms of Spain, one that in the early nineteenth century would be defined as the ‘‘Spanish community,’’ is at the center of this book. I argue that this community emerged as a result of the establishment of a distinction between immigrants who were willing to integrate themselves into the community and take on both the rights and duties of membership, and those who were not. In the Middle Ages, this distinction applied only to immigrants. In the early modern period, however, it became instrumental in defining the status of people already living in the community. The distinction between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ immigrants was first elaborated in Castilian localities, where it found expression in the term vecino, designating people who were entitled to certain rights as long as they complied with certain duties. It was then applied to the kingdom of Castile as a whole. In the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, this distinction served to define the natives (naturales) of the kingdom, and by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it also defined a Spanish community, including natives of all Spanish kingdoms first in Spanish America and then in Spain itself. This distinction explained how Spaniards and Spanish citizens were defined in the first Spanish constitution (1812) and how European Spaniards were distinguished in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from Spanish Americans by a Creole discourse that affirmed the uniqueness of those inhabiting the New World. The

1

2

Introduction

distinction between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ immigrants was also applied to people of different ethnicities, races, religions, or vassalage. It justified the rejection of converso Jews, the persecution of the Gypsies, the exclusion of individuals of African descent, and on the contrary, the welcoming to Spain of foreign vassals and foreign Catholics. Distinguishing good from bad immigrants involved defining good and bad and determining who had the authority to decide these issues. It was in this realm, of believing or not the good intentions of migrants and making their integration easier or harder, that most debates took place. In order to illuminate these questions, I trace the evolution of vecindad and naturaleza as categories of belonging in early modern Castile, Spain, and Spanish America mainly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I identify the relation between these categories, the theories explaining them, and the communities created as a result of these distinctions. I argue that the classification of people as good or bad was a byproduct of the need to decide who could enjoy rights and who could be forced to comply with duties. This was the crucial issue. The decision constituted people as bearers of rights at the same time it defined them as members of a community. In a period that predates the elaboration of formal definitions of nationals and citizens (categories that generally arise at the end of the eighteenth century or the nineteenth century), belonging to these communities and enjoying these rights constituted the main mechanism by which citizens and Spaniards were distinguished from foreigners. These claims differ from those supported by most contemporary scholarship. Historians who studied early modern communities in the past consistently engaged in debates that were largely modeled according to present-day perceptions. Anderson, Hobsbawm, and Greenfeld affirmed the legal and politically constructed or even imagined character of nations; Armstrong, Anthony Smith, and Hastings argued instead that nations were naturally created as a result of linguistic or ethnic commonalties.∞ For the first, nations were a modern phenomenon, a byproduct of the emergence of modern states and modern means of communication; for the second, they existed in the Middle Ages and they preceded and were independent of the state. The conceptual difference between ‘‘constructed communities’’ and ‘‘natural communities’’ was also helpful to other historians who instituted a distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Godechot, Brading, and Viroli classified patriotism as a natural identity, emerging among people who knew one another and who lived within the boundaries of small communities.≤ They identified nationalism, on the contrary, with a larger social and geographical unit where collective identities were indeed willfully invented. Whereas patriotism was a product of the past, nationalism was a modern invention. The first was based on ‘‘community’’ (gemeinschaft), the second on ‘‘association’’ (gesellschaft).≥

Introduction

3

Since most people living in early modern Europe felt attached to a local community, an abstract ‘‘national’’ identity could emerge only when this local attachment disappeared, indeed, once the modern state came into being. In spite of recent criticism by such scholars as Peter Sahlins and José María Portillo Valdés, this analysis still presents both nation and state formation as antagonistic processes.∂ They confronted an expansionist and artificial state with ‘‘natural’’ and older peripheral bodies who resisted the penetration of the state. After their defeat, older and natural communities were replaced by a sense of belonging to a wider, unified, artificial, national society. The literature on the development of early modern categories of belonging largely supports this narrative linking state and nation and affirming that both were contemporaneous and both emerged as a result of confrontation between state organs and local communities. Historians of Europe affirm that during the early modern period the distinction between being of one country or the other depended on subjection to a sovereign power.∑ Although horizontal ties, integration, and acceptance were important in determining the way individuals were actually treated, all treatment that differed from formal legal categories based on subjection was interpreted as a simple proof for the dissociation between law and its application and between legal and social categories.∏ Whereas the community of subjects was constructed through vertical ties, horizontal ties defined a citizenship regime in local communities.π This regime had no direct bearing on the construction of either state or nation. Local citizenship existed only in a few privileged municipalities and included only a minority of men.∫ By the eighteenth century, local status was indicated by largely honorary titles that were often associated with duties (to be avoided) rather than with rights (to be obtained). In some cases, such as Spain, local citizenship was a widespread status, yet it bore no relationship to the classification of people as Spaniards or foreigners.Ω In short, in early modern Europe two community levels coincided: the local community and the community of subjects. According to most research, each of these communities operated on a different level and had its own implications as well as criteria. Because the local experience was either irrelevant or unfit for the construction of states and nations, modern citizenship could be viewed (and reconstructed) only through the lens of antiquity.∞≠ For precisely the same reason, even historians who did look at the relation between local communities and central authorities could pursue their research with little attention to the ways participation in local communities defined membership in the larger units that eventually became states or nations. And, although the state was often perceived as a city (republic), this did not imply that actual practices in local communities were applied to the realm of the state.∞≤ I believe that the insistence on distinct community levels and the focus on

4

Introduction

subjection result from the way historians have reconstructed the past. Most research has centered either on local communities or on national structures, either on law and doctrine or on social practices. The assumption was that early modern communities were fundamentally similar to our own. Historians studied communities with the aim of affirming that they were national or not, artificial or not, state generated or not. This method reduced communities to legal definitions, which depended on a dichotomy between a law of birth (that ascribed individuals to a community by virtue of birth in a given territory) and descent (that classified individuals in accordance to their genealogy).∞≥ People participating in the debates about the natural or constructed nature of nations viewed communities as ensembles whose membership could be reconstructed and defined conclusively. They gathered that the identification of people as insiders or outsiders was stable rather than contingent, and they assumed the transhistorical nature of identity politics. They also supposed that answering the question of who was a member of the community and who was not was important to contemporaries a priori and irrespective of conjuncture and circumstances, and that individuals and local and state authorities invested time and energy in the identification of people and in establishing their rights.∞∂ If we consider that early modern communities were profoundly different from our own, then answering the questions currently asked by historians, and engaging in the above-mentioned debates, is both impossible and unnecessary. Instead of asking when the current structures emerged, we need to ask what kinds of communities existed in the past, how people belonging to them perceived their participation in them, and how they argued in favor of excluding or including others. This task is especially important given the nature of the primary sources at our disposal. Most historians considered letters of citizenship and naturalization as the only method by which individuals could obtain classification as insiders or outsiders. Yet, unlike today, early modern categories of belonging were not embodied in legal definitions or in acts of authority. Instead they were generated by the ability to use rights or to be forced to comply with duties. The question was never who was a Spaniard, who was a Frenchman, or who was a citizen of a local community. At stake was always the question of who could enjoy a specific right or be obliged to perform a certain duty. Under such a system, the use of rights of citizens and natives implied the claim that one was a citizen or a native, and the silence of those allowing it (both the authorities and other individuals) implied consent. This meant that most people acted as citizens and as natives and were allowed to do so without their status ever being questioned or affirmed.∞∑ Indeed, by enacting the role of citizen or native they created a public image that they were citizens or natives, and this image in turn allowed them to become citizens or

Introduction

5

natives. The ability to act as citizens or natives and thus become citizens or natives without any formal declarations explains why citizen lists in European cities were short in comparison to the actual number of people who identified or acted as citizens.∞∏ It also explains how the majority of natives were in fact natives without formal declarations or the elaboration of lists. Indeed, under such a system, the issuing of formal declarations of citizenship or nativeness, such as those embodied in letters of citizenship and letters of naturalization, was the exception and not the rule. Formal declarations were issued only in a small minority of cases, in which a conflict either occurred or was imminent, or in which the authorities wished to grant status to people whose circumstances did not allow them to make a legitimate claim to membership. In these cases, the authorities used the letters as both instruments and proofs of their sovereignty. The letters enabled the municipal authorities or the king to disregard normal procedures and to intervene by constituting as citizens or natives people who were not, or by aiding others whose status was questioned. It should therefore not surprise us that, as historians have affirmed, most letters of naturalization were granted to wealthy people who were interested in obtaining a certain right. Far from being the only foreigners acting, or wishing to act, as natives, as other scholars have assumed, wealthy people simply tended to encounter opposition where other people did not.∞π They therefore invested the effort and resources needed to secure an official recognition that other foreigners found unnecessary. And, since the question of who was worthy of which treatment could be pursued in certain moments and abandoned in others, and since it could become meaningful under certain circumstances, or be completely irrelevant in others, the status of certain people could be consensual at one moment and questioned at others. This is why people who had lived in a community for twenty, thirty, or even forty years without their status being an issue suddenly had to prove they were citizens or natives. Since the documents at our disposal describe the exceptions, not the rule, in each case we must ask ourselves why status was questioned and what agents and interests were involved. Yet, first and foremost, we must ask what happened in other cases, indeed, in most cases, where consensus reigned. Moving beyond existing documentation will, as a rule, enable us to avoid overemphasizing the importance of formal procedures and state structures and to discover the power of implicit social categorizations and ongoing social negotiations in the creation and definition of early modern communities. This move will demonstrate that, rather than a status leading to entitlement to rights, as would be the case with citizenship and even nationhood today, belonging to a local community or the community of the kingdom in the early modern period was a process.∞∫ As Margaret Sommers has noted, this process was contingent upon

6

Introduction

and constituted by networks of relationships and political idioms. It generated citizenship rather than administered it.∞Ω If we wish to comprehend early modern communities, we must analyze local actions and everyday interactions that classified people, allowing some to enjoy the benefits of the community while excluding others. We need to abandon the quest for ‘‘identity’’ and examine instead processes of ‘‘identification,’’ that is, the processes through which people claimed to be or were identified as members of the community.≤≠ This will enable us to look at the history of state and nation formation in Europe by linking immigration policies to the construction of communities and by arguing that the exercise of rights, rather than legal enactments or official declarations, defined the boundaries of early modern communities. In this book I look at these questions by analyzing the case of Spain and Spanish America and trace the evolution of two categories of rights: vecindad (which denoted the rights of citizens) and naturaleza (which captured the relationship people had with the community of the kingdom). Vecindad was a term that originated in Castile in the eleventh and twelfth centuries during the reconquest and resettlement period. It initially designated the privileges and duties of individuals who were willing to abandon their communities of origin and come to settle in lands recovered from the Muslims and now under Christian control. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the vecindad status lost its immediate relation to immigration on one hand, and to a factual situation of residence on the other. Instead, it came to imply a wide range of fiscal, economic, political, social, and symbolic benefits in return for the fulfillment of certain duties. These rights and duties varied from one community to the next and changed over time. In most communities vecinos could use the communal property, especially communal pastureland. In small communities, they participated in managing local affairs through their membership in the local council (concejo). In large communities, only individuals who purchased their office, or responded to special criteria of ‘‘honor’’ or seniority, participated in the local council. Vecinos, however, could still influence local politics by electing their representatives to the council, by being elected to certain offices, or by participating in public meetings (concejo abierto). In some cases, vecinos also enjoyed special commercial privileges, such as lower tariffs or the right to introduce certain products into the local markets. Among the duties of vecinos was the obligation to submit to the local authorities. Vecinos had to pay their fair share of the taxes levied on the community as a whole (most taxes) and contribute to other public expenses, such as hiring a professional surgeon or subsidizing public works. They were expected to join the local militia and reside in the community.

Introduction

7

Beyond its practical implications, vecindad denoted a social and cultural distinction. It identified people as both members of the community and ‘‘civilized.’’ Membership was important in itself, and people who were denied vecindad complained about their inability to exercise certain rights, but they mainly expressed their resentment in social terms. As far as they were concerned, being a vecino meant acceptance and not being one meant rejection. Men and women could lead a civil life only when integrated into a community. Those who were not integrated were the ultimate outsiders, the true barbarians. Through making use of their rights and fulfilling their obligations, vecinos thus indicated that they were socially and politically members of the local community. This condition was granted to people residing in both royal and seigniorial jurisdictions, and in urban and rural communities alike. It was applied to individuals of all three estates and, in the sixteenth century it was generally granted to all Castilian heads of households.≤∞ By the eighteenth century, vecindad was presented as their ‘‘natural right.’’ Most historians of Spain have argued that vecindad was a status that depended on compliance with certain legal requirements.≤≤ According to these scholars, vecindad was generated by formal declarations issued by competent authorities. Yet other historians noted that vecindad was an important institution, which lacked clear criteria, was extremely flexible, and was linked to reputation.≤≥ As I argue in this book, both groups of historians looked at the picture from a restricted point of view. In spite of their ostensible similarity to modern definitions of citizenship, early modern legal enactments did not enumerate requirements for vecindad.≤∂ Instead, contemporaries viewed these enactments as examples of a more general rule, which the legislation did not enumerate. Since the general rule was more important than the examples, these legal enactments could be disregarded in specific cases in which they conflicted with the general rule without it constituting a legal violation or a corrupt practice. By the early modern period, and certainly in the eighteenth century, all communities in Castile shared this general rule. Inspired by Roman law as applied and interpreted under Castilian conditions, this rule held that vecindad was constituted on its own, at the moment when people acted as if they felt attached to the community. Complying with military duties within the community, for example, affirmed peoples’ inclusion in the community and bestowed on them vecindad.≤∑ The same was true of rights. Exercising the rights of vecindad, for example, taking one’s goats to the common pasture, was both a claim and a confirmation of membership. There was no need for official declarations, and, indeed, vecindad was generated largely by what could be described as reputation. The gap between one group of historians studying laws and institutions, and another studying social practices, is thus closed.

8

Introduction

Similar affirmations can be made with regard to the implementation of Castilian vecindad in Spanish America. Historians of Spanish America have affirmed that either late medieval Castilian practices continued to operate in the Americas or that, in the Americas, vecindad lost its original meaning becoming a simple honorary title. This misunderstanding arose from the concentration on legal enactments and formal procedures, on one hand, and the consideration of social practices alone, on the other. As I argue in this book, by the mid-seventeenth century, Spanish American practices took a different path than the Castilian ones. Yet this path introduced in Spanish America policies that were more natural and more in tune with the Castilian theory than was the practice in Castile itself. It ‘‘essentialized’’ the idea of vecindad by allowing Spanish Americans to exclude all non-Spaniards from citizenship and by expanding citizenship inside the Spanish community. At the same time, citizenship, which originally applied only in the Spanish community, gradually found its way to the Amerindian one, eventually creating a citizenship regime common to both Spanish and Indian communities. The second category of rights that operated in early modern Spain and Spanish America was naturaleza. Naturaleza (translated here as ‘‘nativeness’’) was a status that appeared in Castile in the late medieval period and was immediately distinguished from vassalage and subjection. By the fifteenth century, it defined a particular community of people who enjoyed exclusivity in office holding and in the use of ecclesiastical benefices in the kingdom. In the sixteenth century, legislation granted natives the exclusive right to legally immigrate and to trade in Spanish America. These rights initially defined a Castilian community of natives, which was distinguishable from the other communities of natives existing in the other kingdoms of Spain. Yet, over the years, a community of ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’ also made its appearance. In 1596, natives of all Spanish kingdoms were officially allowed to cross the Atlantic and engage in the transatlantic trade. In 1716, they were permitted to hold offices and benefices everywhere in Spain. The definition of this community of ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’ largely followed the Castilian model. The importance of this model was clear in Spanish America, which, as a Castilian territory, was subjected to Castilian law, institutions, customs, and practices. Yet it was also clear in Spain, where the rights of natives of all kingdoms were made equal in the beginning of the eighteenth century precisely because Castilian public law was applied also in the Crown of Aragon. In return for their privileges, natives had to be loyal to king and community. They had to obey the local and royal laws that protected them in some ways, yet limited their liberty in others. These limitations became apparent in the eighteenth century, when many native merchants complained that their for-

Introduction

9

eign competitors received better treatment in Spain.≤∏ They enjoyed the protection of their national laws and consuls and could produce, buy, or sell goods without being members of a guild. Most important, they did not have to pay royal or local taxes. As happened in the case of vecindad, most historians have assumed that nativeness had a clear legal definition.≤π They reproduced the few legal enactments that mentioned nativeness, without taking into account the fact that they all referred to specific situations and specific rights or duties. They disregarded all contemporary mention of rules absent in the legislation and refused to take seriously a discourse emphasizing the importance of love among community members. They also considered all failures to observe the requirements enumerated in the laws as cases of corrupt and illegal practices.≤∫ Although historians argued that nativeness was a condition denoting integration in a political community, one that in contemporary terms would embody the idea of ‘‘nationality,’’ they maintained that it operated separately in each Spanish kingdom.≤Ω Historically, there were natives of Castile, natives of Aragon, natives of Catalonia, but never ‘‘natives of Spain.’’ During the early modern period, they concluded, ‘‘Spain’’ was meaningful only as a religious creed and as a community of descent. When the evidence is studied it becomes apparent that the few cases presented by historians are more the exception than the rule. It becomes clear that contemporaries considered legal enactments and formal declarations as examples. Rather than a fragmentary regime suggested by the various legislative pieces, or a regime totally dependent on the king as letters of naturalization indicated, nativeness had a logic of its own. This logic determined that people who were integrated in the community and were willing to comply with its duties were indeed natives, independent of their place of birth or descent and independent of formal declarations. Despite their different genealogy and origin, and despite representing different interests and apparently different community levels, in the early modern period vecindad and naturaleza came to be associated with one another. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, vecindad, which originally defined only local immigration policies, influenced nativeness, which designated a relation to the kingdom. During this period vecindad was instituted as a mechanism of naturalization, allowing foreigners to become natives and inducing the classification of natives who lost their vecindad as foreigners. It was through their relation to a local community that people took their places in the kingdom, and it was the lack of such a connection that made them foreigners. Although religion was important, and Catholicism was indeed a precondition for achieving recognition as citizen or native, religion was not

10

Introduction

sufficient on its own. Vassalage, on the contrary, was the result of, and not a condition for naturalization. Spain, therefore, was not defined solely by reference to religion, vassalage, or even descent as historians have argued in the past. Rather than constituting a ‘‘nation,’’ naturaleza constituted a community that defined who could enjoy the rights of Spaniards. This definition depended on implied categorizations and norms, and it varied according to the interests of individual agents or groups and the specific circumstances of time and place. Reconstructing the boundaries of the community by examining who was allowed to use which rights enables us to step aside from most affirmations concerning the nature of both state and nation in early modern Spain and Spanish America.≥≠ In Spain, these affirmations confront a first group of historians who argue that during the early modern period ‘‘Spain’’ was only a geographical idea or a political project, and a second group who believes that ‘‘Spain’’ had always existed. According to the first, until the eighteenth century, and possibly even later, the only bond among the different Spanish kingdoms and communities, which were politically, culturally, legally, and linguistically differentiated, was a common allegiance to the monarch and the Catholic church.≥∞ According to the second, inherent and natural ties connected Spaniards to one another from as early as the fifth century.≥≤ In twentieth-century Spain, these visions led to debates between regional nationalists, who affirmed the existence of separate nations in each of the Iberian kingdoms, and Spanish nationalists, who denied it.≥≥ It allowed claiming that local communities and the state were antagonists, and that only when local allegiances were suppressed could a national identity come into being.≥∂ The importance of integration as a mechanism by which people could become worthy of rights and communities could be defined also led to a well-known controversy between Américo Castro and Claudio Sánchez Albornoz. The former attested that Spaniards forged themselves historically by mixing with other cultures and races, and the latter insisted that a ‘‘Spain’’ existed since the early Middle Ages and that it had constantly fought against all external influences, including but not limited to the presence of Jewish and Moorish populations.≥∑ In the Spanish American case, claims were made for the existence of a ‘‘national’’ discourse during the colonial period, or on the contrary, for the construction of nations only after independence. It was generally assumed that people were classified according to their place of birth and not according to their activities or wishes.≥∏ If vecindad and naturaleza operated on a daily level in social settings where the ability of individuals to use rights could be consensual or not, affirmed or denied by a multiplicity of agents, some of whom were ‘‘official,’’ and some not, how can one speak of an ‘‘invented’’ or a ‘‘natural’’ community? How can local

Introduction

11

communities and the state or nation be antagonistic to one another in a situation where the kingdom was always perceived from the local point of view and people integrated in a the local community were by definition Spaniards? How can one maintain a distinction between patriotism and nationalism? Indeed, in early modern Spain there was no need to ‘‘imagine’’—as Benedict Anderson has led us to believe—being familiar or similar to other members, because all members belonged to the same local community and only by extension held rights in the kingdom. Close scrutiny reveals that membership in local communities defined the relationship linking individuals to the kingdom and that a ‘‘law of domicile’’ was as important, if not more important, than the law of birth (ius soli) and descent (ius sanguinis).≥π Conflicts regarding the classification of individuals as good or bad, members or nonmembers, were frequent. They could be tied to economic interests and competition for resources. This clearly happened in Spanish America, where, as I will argue in this book, merchants classified economic rivals as foreigners to prevent them from immigrating and trading in the New World (chapter 5). Competition for resources was also evident in Castilian local communities, whose members often sought to exclude as many people as possible from using the common pasture, or where special campaigns were carried out against people deemed too rich or too powerful (chapter 2). Personal animosity or rivalry also motivated conflicts. The nature and extent of competition could change over time. These changes could be justified by changing economic conditions or by shifting alliances. They could be induced by the improved social or political status of a rival. Although conflicts concerning individual status were always tied to the specific circumstances of place, time, case, and parties, they also expressed some more general concerns. In seventeenth- and especially in eighteenthcentury Spain, for example, conflicts regarding nativeness forced the kings to confront their subjects in a constitutional debate (chapter 4). The kings argued that naturalization was a royal prerogative and that, as sovereigns, they could naturalize whomever they pleased whenever they pleased. They portrayed the community of natives as an agglomeration of people directly subjected to royal authority and claimed the right to introduce into it their foreign vassals and servants. The communities and organs representing the kingdom argued otherwise; natives were distinguished from foreigners by virtue of natural laws that the king could not modify. These laws indicated that integration and compliance with duties tied people to one another and made them members of the same (local) community and, by extension, the community of the kingdom. In their view, the king’s vertical notion of community disappeared; instead, the community was portrayed as one based mainly on horizontal ties.

12

Introduction

Although debates concerning individual status could occur in cases of the native born whose families had ‘‘always’’ resided in a particular jurisdiction, they were probably more acute, and more frequent, when they involved newcomers who could not point to a history of integration or of love and loyalty to the community. Attitudes towards migration could change over time, according to local conditions as well as the particular characteristics of each migrant. In Spain, the freedom of all people to choose their place of residence was continuously affirmed at the same time it was questioned. When it was useful to their interests, for example, to restrict commercial competition, some Spaniards claimed that a permanent difference should be instituted between ‘‘natives’’ and ‘‘naturalized,’’ and between those born in the community to citizen and native parents and those who were not (chapter 5). On other occasions, the same people insisted that all foreigners permanently residing in Spain were true natives (chapter 4). Social attitudes towards migrants were just as ambiguous. Many foreigners lived in Spanish territories.≥∫ They were concentrated in port cities, where they easily came to represent as much as 10 percent of the population.≥Ω Some foreigners integrated into the Spanish community by hispanizing their names, actively participating in communal life, obtaining citizenship, or marrying a Spaniard. Others maintained a separate or semiseparate existence by constituting national associations, merchant organizations, and confraternities; marrying inside their group; living in compact neighborhoods; employing servants from their countries of origin; and sending their children to be educated abroad. Conflicts between natives and foreigners were frequent, and so were complaints that foreigners accumulated too much economic power, which they used to benefit their homeland rather than Spain or Spanish America.∂≠ Hostility towards foreigners was also expressed by calling into question their faith and their loyalty and by mocking their customs.∂∞ Another source of conflict regarding individual status was the conviction that individuals also formed parts of groups, and as members of groups they were granted special treatment. This treatment was based on the conviction that group membership was telling; that people who belonged to certain groups or categories tended to act in certain ways that were different from other people. It was often stated that people who worked for a salary, for example, surgeons, barbers, or shepherds, resided in communities only as long as they had work there. Their residence was never truly voluntary, and as such communities considered it as less meaningful than that of others who actively chose to live in the jurisdiction (chapter 2). The same kind of reasoning led to the stereotipization of all Gypsies as nomadic and ‘‘badly behaved,’’ even though it was clear to contemporaries that ‘‘good’’ citizen Gypsies also existed (chapter 6). It was under these circumstances that, in 1812, people of

Introduction

13

African descent were declared foreigners: they belonged to a group whose progenitors—slaves—were said to have never expressed their intentions to become natives (chapter 7). Indeed, discussions on good and bad immigrants not only fixed the internal membership criteria, it also allowed the community to portray people of different ethnicities, races, or cultures as foreigners or semiforeigners, therefore justifying their rejection. A theory centered on integration, and apparently allowing all good-willed people to become members of the community, could thus lead to exclusion, and a practice theoretically classifying people according to their individual behavior could classify them according to their perceived membership in a group, such as the Gypsies or the Africans. Because status verification and registration occurred only in exceptional cases, we must use the information they provide to deduce what was so obvious and so unquestionable that it was never openly discussed. The importance of this task is demonstrated in chapter 2, where I contrast formal citizenship procedures with their ‘‘hidden’’ meaning. The importance of the unspoken is also made clear in chapter 6, where I examine the role of religion in the formation of communities. It is also present in other chapters, where I study what early modern Spaniards and Spanish Americans meant when they affirmed their vecindad or nativeness, or when they classified their colleagues. The need to deduce the rule from the exceptions requires engagement in comparative research. The size, social structure, and economic orientation of each of the enclaves I study (Seville, Madrid, municipalities included in the jurisdiction of the court of Valladolid, Caracas, Lima, and Buenos Aires) were different. Also different was the identity of people engaged in debates on vecindad and naturaleza, the dynamic between them, and the interests they represented. This diversity allowed me to ask questions that a microhistory, for example, would not. Diversity facilitates the construction of the rule because it permits the location of subjects, considerations, and themes that were only hinted at in some places yet openly discussed in others; that were consensual in one locality yet conflictual in another. Looking at similar questions in very different local settings also allows us to appreciate similarities and to ascertain that if these similarities existed in such different contexts, they could not be accidental. By comparing the practice of vecindad and naturaleza in different centers, I was able to gain a better understanding of my sources, which I was forced to rethink constantly. For example, it was only after I read discussions about nativeness in Spanish America that I recognized the operation of nativeness by integration (prescription) in Castile and Spain. Put simply, Spanish American discussants openly mentioned naturalization by integration when they asserted that their practices were different. I then returned

14

Introduction

to the documents I had studied in Spain and realized how important and how pervasive naturalization by integration was. I ‘‘suddenly’’ discovered it in the legislation and in court cases. I ‘‘suddenly’’ understood that debates in the Spanish parliament (cortes) dealt only with one type of naturalization (by royal letter), but not another (by integration). Without comparative cases, such insight would not have been possible. Comparison was also the motivation behind looking at the Iberian world on both sides of the Atlantic. Rather than wanting to explain New World orders, I perceived Spain and Spanish America as a single space, and I attempted to understand developments in both by constantly looking at one side and the other. Although I learned that Castilian practices changed in the New World, I often discovered that these changes illuminated what was happening in Spain as much as they told about the conditions in Spanish America. Another way to reconstruct the rule by using the exceptions was to consult a wide array of sources—legislation, legal and political literature, administrative records, administrative correspondence, and political debates, especially those taking place in the parliament (cortes) and among cities with voting rights in parliament. I studied some 3,500 cases in which the classification of people as citizens or natives became necessary, including formal petitions for citizenship or nativeness and instances where the status of individuals was called into question when they sought to do something that was restricted to citizens or natives. These sources proceed from municipal records and from the archives of merchant guilds and other economic bodies, such as the juntas of agriculture and commerce. They are included in the documentation generated by the Council of the Indies, the Council of Castile, and the Council of State, the House of Trade (Casa de Contratación), and the local American authorities. I also considered a wide array of other materials, such as lists of citizens, taxpayers, and militiamen and letters of citizenship and naturalization. Throughout this book, I translate vecindad as ‘‘citizenship.’’ In doing so I follow the path already taken by other historians.∂≤ This translation does not imply that vecindad was identical to present-day citizenship. Within the scope of Old Regime societies, however, vecindad was certainly similar to other contemporary institutions that described the relationship between individuals and local communities, such as citizenship in Italian city-states.∂≥ Translating vecindad as citizenship is also authorized by the fact that the Spanish term currently indicating citizens (ciudadano) was completely absent in early modern legal and administrative records.∂∂ In contemporary political literature, this term was either used as a synonym for ‘‘subject,’’ or it was modeled according to classical authors. In the first case, it designated a relationship with the monarch, one that in legal, administrative, and social settings corre-

Introduction

15

sponded to the term vasallo (vassal).∂∑ In the second case, it designated the perfect citizen who lived in a city and who had certain moral and behavioral traits that were considered essential for the well running of a perfect republic.∂∏ On both accounts, ciudadano fails to describe citizenship as practiced in early modern Castile; vecindad, on the contrary, does so perfectly. In this book I write about Castile, Spain, and Spanish America. By ‘‘Castile’’ I mean the crown of Castile. I use this term mainly to study the local communities included in the jurisdiction of this crown or to examine the evolution of nativeness (naturaleza) before the early eighteenth century. ‘‘Spain’’ designates the collectivity of the Spanish kingdoms as defined in Spanish America in the late sixteenth century (‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’) and as created in the Iberian peninsula in the beginning of the eighteenth century. By ‘‘Spanish America’’ I refer mainly to the Spanish territories in the Southern Hemisphere. Wishing to circumscribe the object of my inquiry, I decline to explore the specific ways by which the Spanish community interacted with the Indian one. This interaction, I believe, is well covered in contemporary research, as well as in different studies centered on the formation of purity of blood (limpieza de sangre) and mestizos categories in Spanish America. Instead, I center my attention on the processes by which Spaniards distinguished themselves from one another and from other Europeans, and the ways they justified giving membership privileges to certain people. For lack of space and because of the highly casuistic nature of the privileges attached to citizenship and nativeness, I decline to analyze their material ramification in each individual case. Instead, I study debates about the ability to enjoy privileges not in order to evaluate these privileges, but in order to examine processes of identification. For the same reason, I use no quantitative analysis, nor do I necessarily mention the specific results obtained in each case. My goal is not to determine how frequently this or that opinion was pronounced or who was successful in his claims. Instead, I look at the ways communities were described in social processes of inclusion and exclusion. Although centered on early modern Spain and Spanish America, this book calls into question our understanding of other early modern communities. There are many indications in the literature on Italy, France, and England that status was just as ambiguous and contingent in these countries as well; that on most occasions status was neither requested nor acknowledged but was instead a byproduct of the enjoyment of rights; that a direct relation existed between membership in a local community and in the kingdom. It was also clearly the case that in all three countries formal rules were modified by social practices. The rules themselves were highly complex, and they included both local and royal laws as well as a great diversity of other norms, such as

16

Introduction

‘‘natural law,’’ ‘‘common law,’’ or ‘‘Roman law,’’ which seriously modified the nature and extent of rights, and thus of status. Indeed, a preliminary review of the existing literature on Italy, England, and France (chapter 8) suggested that Spain was exceptional. A closer reading indicates that it was not. The need to redefine the object of study, the questions asked, and the methodology used is thus as pertinent to other cases as it is to Spain and Spanish America. Further research needs to be done if we wish to fully understand the way early modern European communities were formed over time. This understanding will clarify the relation between local communities, citizenship, state, and nation. Observing the intersection between state and nation and between social practices and legal enactments in this way, we can provide an alternative vision of European history, one that explores the (neglected) connection between horizontal and vertical social ties and that looks at the construction of communities from both below and above.

2

Vecindad: Citizenship in Local Communities

Castilian citizenship originated in the Middle Ages. During this period, the northern provinces of Castile gradually expanded southward, conquering territories previously under Muslim domination.∞ This effort, though cast as a ‘‘reconquest’’ in an attempt to stress continuity between the pre- and postconquest periods and to claim legitimacy, was clearly the beginning of a new age, in which Christian control was extended throughout Spain and in which new forms of government and territorial management gradually emerged. From the eleventh century onward, people moved to the lands reclaimed from the Muslims and formed new communities or transformed existing ones. Often spontaneous in nature and dependent on individual or collective agency and on the activities of the church and the military orders, this movement was also encouraged by the Castilian crown. Royal decrees recognized most new or transformed communities as corporate entities, and they allocated specific rights to those who were willing to come and settle in them. Granted equally to all permanent settlers by virtue of their settlement, these rights were extended to people irrespective of their religion, their vassalage, and their status as villains or nobles, ecclesiastics or not.≤ By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the kingdom of Castile consisted of a great diversity of communities, each with its own legal regime and its own set of privileges, which were extended to all permanent settlers.≥ The disparity of

17

18

Vecindad: Local Communities

legal standards between one community and the other was substantial, and a variety of local laws existed, each replicating the conditions under which the specific community was created. With the consolidation of royal authority and the introduction of ius commune (revived Roman law) in the kingdom, mostly from the late fourteenth century onward, many communities began defining the ways citizenship could be achieved and the conditions for its achievement.∂ In most cases, they presented citizenship as a legal tie that could have external manifestations, such as residence, but contrary to the reconquest period, it no longer depended on them. Instead, citizenship was formulated as a contract in which the newcomer agreed to certain obligations (mainly to reside in the community and to pay taxes) in return for receiving certain benefits (usually access to communal lands and office holding).∑ By the sixteenth century, this citizenship regime extended to all Castilian communities. Whether under royal or seigniorial jurisdiction, whether rural or urban, the people of all three estates were divided between citizens (vecino) and noncitizens (residentes or forasteros).∏ Citizens enjoyed a wide array of privileges and were obliged to comply with many duties from which noncitizens were excluded. Principal among their rights was the privilege of using communal property and, in most communities, of voting and being elected to office. Principal among their duties was the obligation to reside in the community, pay taxes and other public expenses, and serve in the local militia. Local citizenship in Castile is well documented for the medieval period, and dozens of studies describe the ways it was obtained or lost, as well as the rights and duties attached to it.π Covering the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, these studies tend to focus on a specific community and argue that citizenship was highly localized in scope and differed dramatically from one place to another. Each community defined citizenship differently, through its local laws and constitutions ( fueros), and attributed citizens with different sets of rights and obligations. Although studies of medieval citizenship are numerous, hardly any research had been done on early modern Castilian citizenship.∫ This is surprising given that many scholars refer to Castilians as vecinos and habitually affirm the importance of local communities to the governing of Spain, on one hand, and to the generation of collective identities, on the other.Ω In general, it is assumed either that medieval practices, which were highly fragmented and locally based, continued into the early modern period or that during the early modern period citizenship became a flexible regime, with no particular or clear guidelines. The idea that early modern Castilian citizenship continued to be a highly fragmented and locally based practice is due to the fact that Castilian local laws and constitutions ( fueros) enumerate the conditions required to exercise

Vecindad: Local Communities

19

the rights attached to citizenship, yet these conditions differ for each community, time, and the type of privilege or duty involved.∞≠ The ordinances of Avila (1487), for example, determine that in order to use the communal pasture, one had to be a citizen, and that citizens are defined as individuals who live in the community continuously or the largest part of the year, own a house, and pay taxes.∞∞ According to the ordinances of Jaén (1573), citizens are individuals who reside in the city with their family or who establish domicile in the jurisdiction. Citizens who wish to use the communal pasture have to request formal admission into the community by petitioning the local council to recognize them as citizens and by promising to reside in Jaén for the next ten years.∞≤ In Archidona (1598), ‘‘no one would be considered a citizen . . . without first being received by the council, guaranteeing his compliance with citizenship’s duties, and buying a house and a vineyard within a year of his reception to the community.’’ Citizens of Archidona must also bring their families to the jurisdiction and live there for at least ‘‘four continuous years.’’∞≥ If local laws and constitutions indicate the highly fragmented nature of citizenship, laws pertaining to the kingdom as a whole—such as the Siete Partidas, Fuero Viejo, Fuero Real, the Recopilación, and the Novísima Recopilación—hardly make any mention of citizenship, let alone define it. Although they affirm the liberty of all vassals to change their place of residence and become citizens of new communities, these laws fail to explain the mechanism allowing this change. They simply state that ‘‘any person who lives and resides in any city, town or village of our kingdoms . . . that wishes to live in another . . . can do so and become a citizen of a new community,’’ and they stress that prohibiting such a movement would be ‘‘against justice and reason and against their liberty, which is notorious to all.’’∞∂ This lack of explanation and the specificities of local legislation has led some historians to the conclusion that during the early modern period no Castilianwide citizenship existed. This conclusion was further encouraged by the lack of reference to citizenship in the legal literature. This literature describes some of the rights and privileges of citizens, yet it fails to define who the citizens are and how citizenship can be obtained.∞∑ Castilian political literature is also silent on issues of citizenship. Alonso de Castrillo, Diego de Guerra, and Sebastián de Covarrubias address the ciudadano rather than the vecino. They describe only the urban citizen, who symbolizes both virtue and order, and use him to portray the ‘‘perfect republic’’ rather than the existing one.∞∏ Juan de Mariana and Martín González de Cellorigo see the kingdom as a community of people subject to a king and so portray the ciudadano as a vassal rather than as a citizen.∞π In both cases, early modern political literature fails to illuminate citizenship (vecindad) as practiced in Castilian local communities.

20

Vecindad: Local Communities

In spite of these misleading indications, common rules regarding citizenship did exist in early modern Castile, and they were observed in local communities throughout the kingdom in surprisingly similar ways. These rules can be reconstructed only by examining concrete cases in which citizenship was applied to individuals. I located some 1,500 such cases, in which either individuals requested recognition as citizens or their citizenship status was discussed in conjunction with their wish to enjoy benefits or their obligation to comply with certain duties. Because these cases include a discussion among individuals who share the same values and a common knowledge of citizenship that we lack, the only way to understand their meaning is by conducting comparative research. The cases I have studied, dating from the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, come from Seville, Madrid, and a series of communities in Northern Spain that were subjected to the jurisdiction of the royal court (chancillería) of Valladolid.∞∫ Because of their origin in different local circumstances and traditions, information missing in some cases is often made explicit in others. Also, different aspects of the same problem emerge because of the difference in individual and collective conditions, needs, and expectations. There are two ways to look at citizenship. First, there is a formal story to tell about how people requested recognition as citizens from local councils. This story identifies the procedures and conditions for obtaining a declaration of citizenship. It ties the practice of citizenship to local circumstances and explains how this practice changed as immigration policies were modified over time. This is, indeed, the story told by most historians. But the cases I reviewed also suggest the existence of a second story, a story that emerges from beneath the formalities and the often dry and repetitive legal discourse. It explains what citizenship practices and the changes in them meant, why certain prerequisites for citizenship were adopted, and what happened when they were absent. Rather than focusing on legal requirements and formal procedures, this second story focuses on the theories that informed them, on the relation between social and legal classifications, and on the community that was constructed as a result. Using records from late seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury Seville I will make a case for this second story, one that interrogates the meaning of citizenship and describes the various ways individuals could obtain rights in local communities.

Citizenship in Seville According to documents stored in Seville’s municipal archives, people who wanted to become citizens of the city had to petition the local council. In the seventeenth century and until the 1710s, those born in the city presented

Vecindad: Local Communities

21

their baptismal record and an affidavit stating that they intended to remain in the jurisdiction. Newcomers had to prove, also by affidavit, that they had resided in the city for at least ten years as heads of households. During this period, it was explicitly asserted that the affidavit was sufficient: candidates did not have to present any other form of proof, and witnesses were heard only in cases of doubt. A standing committee (caballeros diputados de vecindades) studied the petitions and advised the city council on how to proceed. In some cases, third parties—for example, the guild to which the candidate belonged or would join if admitted—also expressed their views regarding the candidate’s acceptability to the community.∞Ω After 1710, gradual changes were introduced in this regime.≤≠ Codified in 1743, these changes required that all candidates present proof of their residence in the city and their condition as heads of households. Possible proofs included the testimony of a parish priest or the submission of original receipts for rental fees. After these documents were collected, the candidates presented witnesses. These witnesses, usually friends and neighbors, would testify that the petitioner had expressed in words and acts his desire to remain in Seville permanently. Parallel procedures were instituted for newcomers married to local women. These newcomers had to present marriage certificates and orally identify their place of residence, and they had to promise to remain permanently in the community.≤∞ In these cases, and those of other newcomers, once the files were completed the representative of municipal interests ( procurador) advised the council how to proceed. If and when citizenship was granted, newcomers took an oath that they would maintain residence in the city, backing it by a security deposit called fianza de guardar vecindad.≤≤ Also according to the 1743 ruling, those born in Seville could continue to request citizenship in the old way, by submitting only a petition and an affidavit. Native-born petitioners were not required to take an oath or to secure financially their continued residence in the community.≤≥ Further modifications in the citizenship acquisition procedures occurred in the 1770s. During this period authorities in Seville expressed their concern regarding the presence in the city of a great number of wealthy inhabitants, many of them foreign merchants who, despite their prolonged residence, had never requested citizenship. Their lack of commitment to the community had important consequences. As noncitizens, they paid no local taxes. In a system where taxes were levied on the community as a whole but were distributed among and paid only by those recognized as citizens, individuals classified as citizens had to carry an unfair tax burden. Citizenship, the municipal authorities now claimed, was both a privilege and a duty.≤∂ An interested party could request it, but the authorities could also impose it on people who did not wish to claim it.

22

Vecindad: Local Communities

Seville’s authorities then proceeded to identify those they considered citizens, and they required them to act as citizens by demanding that they pay taxes. In less than a century, Seville’s attitude towards immigrants changed dramatically. On one hand, immigrants who were once trusted on the basis of an affidavit that included only their own declaration now had to supply additional proofs of both their residence in the city as heads of households and their intention to remain in the jurisdiction permanently. On the other hand, by the 1770s the authorities also demanded that wealthy inhabitants commit themselves to the community by becoming citizens and paying taxes. These changes could be explained by local circumstances. In the early sixteenth century, Seville was designated as the main port of communication and trade between Spain and Spanish America.≤∑ Following this designation, it experienced enormous growth sustained mainly by immigration. Although many immigrants were transients on their way to the New World and never established a permanent relationship with the local community, others remained in Seville, establishing residence and becoming citizens. In the next century, prosperity declined. General trends of depopulation and economic readjustments experienced elsewhere in Castile in the seventeenth century played a role in this, but local circumstance contributed as well: Seville suffered a series of epidemics and drought, and by mid-seventeenth century, maritime routes had shifted to Cádiz. This shift, which was gradual, was formally acknowledged in the 1710s when the House of Trade (the main institution charged with controlling communication and trade with the Indies) and the local merchant guild were transferred from Seville to Cádiz. Seville bitterly fought this decision until its final defeat in the 1740s. Chronicles dating from this period describe a depopulated city suffering a severe economic crisis. Urban structures were inadequate, and insufficient housing led rental prices to rise. According to contemporaries, with the city in decay, most of its immigrants were extremely poor and rarely ‘‘useful’’ to the community. This perception—of the city being invaded by the poor and unworthy—was especially powerful between 1729 and 1733 when Philip V and his court temporarily resided in Seville. The court attracted many new immigrants and although its presence generated employment, it also augmented public expenses and exasperated the desire for order. Perceptions of crisis and insufficient social control intensified in the 1770s when the Spanish monopoly system collapsed altogether, and free trade between Spain and its American colonies was gradually introduced. After the 1770s Seville, once a world city, was reduced to a provincial capital. In spite of the gradual nature of these changes, and the frequent turns and tides, two clear crisis periods emerge: the first decades of the eighteenth century

Vecindad: Local Communities

23

and the 1770s. Because these were also the periods during which citizenship practices were modified, it is possible to argue that a link existed between socioeconomic circumstances, immigration policies, and municipal regulation of citizenship. As long as Seville served as the main port of communication with Spanish America, the local authorities allowed immigrants to become citizens simply by petitioning and by personally ensuring that they had resided in the city for more than ten years. As Seville’s special privileges faded, and the fight to preserve them failed (1710s–1740s), the authorities adopted a more restricted vision of citizenship. The easy integration of newcomers was no longer encouraged, and the authorities created obstacles to citizenship by demanding that candidates present more proofs (such as witnesses and written receipts for rent paid) and by requiring a longer administrative process. By the 1770s, with the complete breakdown of the monopoly system and as the city plunged into economic crisis, the main objective of the authorities was to ease economic pressure by extending citizenship to all permanent, wealthy residents. This analysis leaves many questions unanswered. For example, we don’t know why until the early eighteenth century ten-year residence could transform inhabitants into citizens. Nor do we know why after 1743 candidates for citizenship had to prove that they wished to remain in the community permanently or how the municipality could force some inhabitants into citizenship in the 1770s against their will. This forcing of citizenship was justified by Seville’s authorities on the grounds that ‘‘Castilian law’’ clearly indicated who should be considered a citizen. Persons who met the prerequisites for citizenship could be considered citizens whether they requested this status or not. Yet the Castilian law mentioned by Seville’s authorities is nowhere to be found. It is not enumerated in Castilian legal codes, nor is it included in Castilian legal and political literature. The search for this ‘‘missing’’ law becomes especially important once we establish that on many occasions Seville’s authorities accepted as citizens people who did not comply with the normal requirements for citizenship. For example, in 1735 Seville’s council granted citizenship to Antonio Joseph de Saavedra, whose grandparents, once citizens of Seville, had left the city, and who resided elsewhere.≤∏ Was this decision a simple proof of illegal and corrupt practices, a gap between law and its implementation? Antonio Joseph testified that his family originated from Seville and that its individual members continued to act as citizens of Seville. The members of the city council gave credit to his allegations. They noted that Antonio Joseph’s parents and grandparents paid some local taxes and they agreed that their continuing engagement with the community demonstrated that despite their absence from the city they did not renounce their citizenship. What were they talking about?

24

Vecindad: Local Communities

Castilian Citizenship: The Common Ground Seville’s citizenship practices point to rules not included in municipal or royal legislation and not mentioned in legal or political literature. At first, many of these rules appear to arise from ius commune theories about the extension and meaning of medieval citizenship in Italy.≤π In the fourteenth century, jurist Bartolus of Sassoferrato emphasized the voluntary nature of human associations.≤∫ He adopted the Aristotelian view according to which communities did not naturally exist but that their members who united to live together under the same law collectively created them. He concluded that the wish to live together under the same law, expressed in a contract or a pact, was the sole criterion for identifying people as citizens or noncitizens. Regardless of their place of birth and origin, people willing to join this contract or pact could be transformed into citizens. Their willingness to join the pact could be implicitly established by the fact that they acted as citizens. Although acting as a citizen could have many different expressions, Bartolus specifically mentioned that moving the greater part of one’s economic resources from one community to the other, for example, could indicate that a person had made a decision to join the pact and become a citizen. In the next generation, Baldus of Perugia added to this theory by stating that native citizens had a natural inclination, a habitus, in favor of their community of origin.≤Ω Yet newcomers could also acquire this habitus once they lived in the city for a sufficient period with the intention of integrating into it. In such a case, these individuals would acquire a ‘‘second nature’’ that would link them to their new community. Thereafter, ius commune jurists portrayed citizenship as a process of civic conversion. It consisted of ‘‘an official recording of a change of heart’’ and, once it was completed, newcomers had to be granted equality with natives.≥≠ The reception of ius commune began in Castile in the thirteenth century.≥∞ From that moment and until the late eighteenth century, it was the only law taught alongside canon law in law faculties in Spain, where royal and municipal law were completely absent.≥≤ Jurists, as well as royal and local officials who were often trained in law, used the ius commune in their daily activities, creatively combining it with local understanding, customs, and legal traditions. Ius commune also influenced the codification of local laws, which adopted many of its terms, ideas, and institutions. It encouraged the enactment of Castilian legal codes, such as the Siete Partidas and the various Recopilaciones.≥≥ Within a legal structure fragmented by kingdoms and local communities, ius commune was virtually the only law common to all Castilians and probably all Spaniards.≥∂

Vecindad: Local Communities

25

The mixing of ius commune with local understanding, practices, and needs produced an unwritten yet frequently invoked Castilian common law. This law, which did not depend on legislation, nor was reproduced in it, was nevertheless cited by litigants in defense of their citizenship rights and by communities in their efforts to forcibly enroll citizens as well as in their refusal to accept ‘‘undeserving’’ applicants. Jurists were aware of the fact that this law originated in ius commune.≥∑ Yet for most people citing it, this law depended on natural law, rather than on man-made legal arrangements. It was common to all humanity, it had been practiced since antiquity, and it was based on the way God created this world (see chapter 8).

Castilian Citizenship: The First Premise In reconstructing this Castilian common citizenship law from particular allegations and petitions argued in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century, it becomes clear that those wishing to become citizens and those fighting against it considered this law to include two basic premises. The first and most important was the understanding that citizenship was a natural right, which people could exercise freely: ‘‘According to the freedom that according to natural law we have, each one of us can renounce the citizenship that he has and live and become a citizen in another place according to his choosing.’’≥∏ The sole requirement for people who wanted to join a community was simply that they express their desire to do so. During this period it was repeatedly asserted, at times with great lamentation, that freedom of immigration prevented community members from refusing to admit newcomers who expressed their wish to join them: ‘‘In order to accept us as citizens, no other circumstances are needed except for an expression of will.’’≥π Petitioners used these arguments to force municipalities to accept them, and they insisted that communities were not authorized ‘‘to refuse to grant citizenship, being that the passage from one citizenship to the other was a free act according to royal laws.’’≥∫ Furthermore, ‘‘the law allows everyone to become a citizen where he pleases’’ and ‘‘every person who wanted to change his citizenship from one place to another . . . could do so freely.’’≥Ω WOMEN AND MINORS

The most important factor limiting the freedom to chose where to live and become a citizen was that citizenship was available only to the head of a household. Typically, heads of households were adult males. They were distinguished from other adult males by their being responsible for an independent

26

Vecindad: Local Communities

political unit, the (extended) family. This usually implied that they resided in an independent residence—whether as proprietors or as renters,—and that, preferably, they were married and had children.∂≠ Women and minors (under age twenty-five) were not eligible for citizenship. In the case of women, it was generally understood that, as members of a household, they obtained some of the benefits of citizenship by way of dependence. They first enjoyed the rights attached to the citizenship status of their fathers and, upon marriage, they attained some of the privileges attached to the citizenship status of their husbands. This state changed only when women became independent heads of households. In these cases, women gained a full legal capacity and, among other things, could express a legally binding intention, such as the intention to acquire citizenship.∂∞ This reality was evident in the documents I consulted: only women who were widows or solitary spinsters petitioned for citizenship.∂≤ The case of minors (persons under twenty-five) was much more complex. Unlike women, minors had no legal capacity at all and, as a result, their ability to declare their intention to become citizens was legally impaired. Because they were under the protection of legal guardians, it was questionable whether minors could express an independent intention to become citizens. Nevertheless, the ability of minors to acquire citizenship was an extremely important issue in cases where they owned cows, sheep, and the like and wished to use the communal pasture. When the minors lived in the same community as their guardians, and it was in this community that they owned property, the question of their ability to use communal pastures was seldom raised because they could exercise the privileges of citizenship (use of pastures) as members of a citizen’s household. But when the guardian was not a citizen of the community where the minor owned property, a decision was needed regarding the minor’s ability to acquire an independent citizenship. Certain municipalities allowed minors to obtain (or retain) citizenship despite the foreignness of their guardians and even despite their physical absence from the jurisdiction, yet other communities refused to do so.∂≥ FOREIGNERS, NONVASSALS, AND NON-CHRISTIANS

Castilian citizenship law did not restrict foreigners to the kingdom, nonvassals of the king, or non-Christians from obtaining local citizenship. During the medieval period, the possibility of granting citizenship to these people was openly admitted, and their presence, especially during the reconquest and resettlement stage, was even encouraged.∂∂ The openness of Castilian communities with regard to Catholic foreigners and nonvassals continued during the early modern period. There are multiple examples of individuals from both of

Vecindad: Local Communities

27

these categories being accepted as citizens, and on many occasions it was openly attested that questions of foreignness and the ‘‘right to be in Spain’’ were irrelevant to the admission of people as citizens. It was on this ground that Bartolomé French, native of Ireland, was accepted as a citizen of Seville in 1743, and Diego Roberto Tolosa, native of France, became a citizen of Málaga in 1748.∂∑ Indeed, foreigners to the kingdom ‘‘could become citizens in any of the villages of these your domains without the councils being able to impede it in any way, or speak against it, as it is expressly ordered in your royal orders on the matter.’’∂∏ Although the admission of nonvassals and foreigners continued, in a long and complicated process, which I cannot cover here, stretching from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, Castile gradually became a territory in which only orthodox Catholics could live. First came the expulsion of the Jews in 1492, then the growing encroachment on the rights of Muslims to practice their faith, eventually leading to the expulsion of all descendants of Moors in the beginning of the seventeenth century. Added was the growing persecution of Christian ‘‘heretics,’’ Protestants included. Since non-Christians and nonCatholics could not live on Castilian soil, they clearly could not become citizens of Castilian communities (see chapter 6). ESTATE AND GENEALOGY

Despite longstanding freedom of migration, which admitted all Catholics of all estates and conditions to citizenship as long as they were heads of household and as long as they expressed their desire to become citizens, estate and genealogy could become important in exceptional cases. These cases included citizenship in behetrías cerradas, that is, in a special type of communities, which were granted the privilege of excluding people of certain estates and social condition from citizenship.∂π Las Ormazas (jurisdiction of Burgos) was one such community. In 1745, it refused to admit Pedro Ruíz to citizenship because he was a noble (hidalgo), while the community was a behetría cerrada of simple folk ( pecheros).∂∫ Pedro’s offer to pay taxes was insufficient. It was unclear if his children would feel bound to his offer and would agree to pay taxes, and, at any rate, the exclusion of nobles from the community was not only linked to tax payment, from which they were exempted, but was also motivated by other concerns, such as their participation in the local militia. Fenar (jurisdiction of León) was another behetría cerrada. In 1773, its authorities argued that Santiago Morán, who had resided in the settlement for more than eighteen years and was married to a native, could not use the communal pasture nor participate in the council meetings because the

28

Vecindad: Local Communities

community excluded all people who were not ‘‘of the noble estate of hidalgo, with letters and orders to prove it.’’∂Ω Santiago could be acknowledged as citizen only if he proved ‘‘his quality as a nobleman.’’ Genealogy could also intervene in other cases. In 1758, the council of Trespaderne (jurisdiction of Burgos) refused to grant citizenship to Santiago García because of his family’s employment in ‘‘mechanical or vile occupation.’’∑≠ All other members of the community were ‘‘pure of blood,’’ and none of them was ever employed in such low offices. Admitting a person who did not respond to these characteristics would endanger the collective well-being by destroying the reputation of the community and introducing divisions among its citizens. Thereafter, citizens would no longer be equal to one another and would no longer be able to ‘‘drink from the same cup.’’ The council of Trespaderne also stressed that whereas people of different characteristics, status, and estates could easily coexist in a big community, in a small settlement like their own, such a practice would be disastrous.

Castilian Citizenship: The Second Premise The first premise of Castilian local citizenship thus asserted that Catholic heads of households living in Castile, independent of their condition as natives or vassals and in most cases independent of their estate and genealogy, could become citizens by expressing a desire to tie themselves permanently to a specific local community. It further stated that once this desire was expressed, communities could not refuse to admit these people as citizens. A second premise followed, according to which all such heads of households had to be integrated in one community or the other. This view was expressed by the council of Getafe (jurisdiction of Madrid) when it argued against the petition of three citizens to terminate their relationship with the community. This petition had to be denied, the authorities said, because the three had not obtained a new citizenship in another community. No one can be without a ‘‘known citizenship’’ (vecindad conocida) because this lack of citizenship meant a complete personal liberty, which could not be permitted.∑∞ Heads of households could change their residence and citizenship, yet no one was allowed to live on his own. People with neither fixed domicile nor local loyalty were dangerous because they ‘‘neither served the republic, nor married, nor paid taxes.’’∑≤ Belonging to two communities at the same time was also considered abnormal. Blás Alvarez could not be a citizen of Pardavé (jurisdiction of León) in 1787 because he was already accepted as citizen of another village.∑≥ This solution was both legally and morally justified. No one could feel loyal to two communities at the same time and ‘‘common decency’’ required that a

Vecindad: Local Communities

29

single person not enjoy citizenship rights in two communities, nor be required to comply with citizenship obligations twice. The notion that people could be citizens of only one community at the time also justified the 1798 exclusion of Manuel Rojo Martín y Néstor from the town meeting of Arensena de Abajo (jurisdiction of La Rioja).∑∂ Manuel was a citizen of Villarejo and as a ‘‘true’’ and complete citizen of that other village, he could not also be a citizen of Arensena.

Obtaining Citizenship People seeking recognition as citizens had to petition the local council and to supply the necessary proofs. Such was the case in Seville, but this practice was also followed in many other contemporary communities in Castile in which the council—or the entire citizen body in cases of small communities—could grant or refuse to grant citizenship to newcomers.∑∑ But if communities were forced to accept people who requested status as citizens, what was the meaning of formal citizenship acquisition procedures? In spite of the formal proceedings, it is clear that in Castile the role of local councils and communities in the classification of citizens was limited. For example, when the status of individuals was discussed as a by-product of their wish to enjoy certain rights or their duty to obey certain obligations, it was often apparent that the citizenship status of individuals who had no previous official recognition could be acknowledged. On these occasions, formal admission into the community was not at stake. In spite of the absence of a formal declaration, these individuals were considered citizens and therefore worthy of treatment as citizens, their citizenship coming into being even before the community and its organs intervened. The local judge told Agustín Vázquez, who had resided with his family in Pozo Antiguo (jurisdiction of Zamora) for nine years that, in his condition as noncitizen, he could no longer use the communal pasture.∑∏ In response, Agustín obtained from the provincial judge (corregidor) a ruling that he had always been a citizen although he had never obtained formal recognition. The authorities of Villarramiel (jurisdiction of Palencia) told Melchor Pardo in 1791 that he could not receive a land plot because his citizenship was unclear.∑π He appealed the decision to the royal court (chancillería) and presented proofs that he was a ‘‘true and legitimate citizen.’’ These proofs included his residence in an open house, and his willingness to remain in the community and contribute to its finances. Melchor specifically stated that to be recognized as a citizen, there was no need for a formal reception. Indeed, the community and its authorities did not confer citizenship as much as recognize its existence. Although the authorities of

30

Vecindad: Local Communities

Villarramiel agreed that this might be the case in some communities, they insisted that in their community only those formally acknowledged as citizens could enjoy the rights of citizenship. Melchor, the authorities explained, knew about this custom. The fact that he had not requested to be formally admitted as citizen until the present demonstrated that he did not want to become a citizen. The appellate court (chancillería) disagreed and declared Melchor a citizen from the day he first became worthy of this status. The practice of a posteriori recognition demonstrated that other mechanisms for acquiring citizenship existed parallel to the formal procedures. These mechanisms constituted citizenship without the intervention of the authorities. They allowed citizenship to come into being by persons enacting the role of citizens, thereby proving themselves worthy of citizenship. This automatic conversion of people from foreigners to citizens was the natural result of a theory that determined that people became citizens by virtue of their intention, and their intention alone. Although this intention had to be verified and embraced by the receiving community, in both theory and practice, the activity of the community and its organs was limited to this verification. Many petitioners explicitly stated this fact. They insisted that local councils did not constitute them as citizens but only recognized that they were already citizens. Indeed, citizenship acquisition procedures only declared what was established beforehand. As Agustín Cordovilla Sánchez, who defended his right to use the communal pasture, put it: ‘‘Even without the solemnity of an expressed reception to the community, effectuated by the council, he should be considered strictly as a citizen, because of his continuous residence and the settled house that he owned.’’∑∫ This understanding of citizenship did not stop many Castilian communities from maintaining formal procedures for citizenship acquisition. These communities, for example, Cordobilla (jurisdiction of Salamanca), Villarramiel (Palencia), Ojacastro (La Rioja), Jaén, and Archidona, stated that, unless their authorities issued formal declarations, no one should be allowed to enjoy the rights of citizenship.∑Ω But even in these cases communal recognition was a political rather than a legal necessity. Formal reception allowed the community to identify its citizen body, and it served to limit the discussion about the correct classification of individuals. The idea that citizenship was a status that was recognized, rather than created, by local authorities allows us to understand how these authorities were able to force people into citizenship. In the 1770s, the council of Seville argued that the people it targeted, indeed, forced to act as citizens by paying taxes, were citizens whether they had requested citizenship or not. Their citizenship came into being by way of prescription and by the fact that they acted

Vecindad: Local Communities

31

as citizens. Since they were citizens, they were required to comply with citizenship duties. Hence, despite municipal insistence on maintaining formal procedures for citizenship acquisition, even in Seville citizenship could be constituted on its own without municipal intervention. It could be created by a public perception that certain individuals behaved as citizens. Individuals who were perceived as citizens of Seville had to clarify their wish to dissociate with the community if they wanted to remain outsiders. Only such an open and explicit clarification would counter the general rule according to which he who acted as a citizen, or was reputed to be a citizen, was indeed a citizen. The discussion in Seville in the 1770s pointed directly to this question: ‘‘He who lives in a settled house in these kingdoms must be considered citizen . . . he has against him the presumption and it must be his duty to establish, by some facts or cases, that he had been here with no intention to remain.’’ Silence would imply consent.∏≠

Loss of Status The duality between a formal regime of citizenship by declaration and an implied reception into the community by enacting the role of citizen was paralleled by the ability to lose—formally or implicitly—the status of citizen. In some communities, such as Madrid, formal procedures existed allowing citizens to terminate their relationship with the community by petitioning their desavecindamiento (literally, the undoing of citizenship).∏∞ Unless such petitions were made, people continued to be citizens, independent of their activities and wishes. Yet, in most communities, people could lose their status as citizens if they transferred their residence to another jurisdiction where they acted as citizens, or if they failed to comply with citizenship duties. No petition or formal declaration was required in these case, and people who considered themselves citizens could thus find out one day that they were no longer citizens. The authorities of San Miguel de la Ribera (jurisdiction of Zamora) did not allow Baltazar Delgado to use the communal pasture in 1769 because his citizenship had expired once he refused to comply with citizens’ obligations, the last straw being his unwillingness to serve as a local judge (alcalde ordinario) the previous year.∏≤ From the moment Baltazar failed to act as a citizen, the authorities said, he demonstrated that he no longer felt a member of the community and thus he was no longer a citizen. Manuel Rojo Martín y Néstor was told in 1789 that the authorities of Arensena de Abajo (jurisdiction of La Rioja) no longer considered him a citizen.∏≥ To publicly demonstrate that he was still a citizen, Manuel attended the council meeting, in which only citizens were allowed to participate. Alas, the other members refused to admit

32

Vecindad: Local Communities

him. In his distress, he petitioned the royal court (chancillería) to issue a formal declaration of his citizenship. To his displeasure, the court sided with Arensena, ruling that although he had been a citizen once, twenty-one years earlier he had moved to Villarejo, where he now resided with his wife and family. Under these circumstances and because he had not paid taxes or other public expenses for many years or participated regularly in the council meetings his citizenship in Arensena had automatically expired.

Verifying Intentions Intention to become a citizen was thus sufficient to constitute citizenship, and its absence was a cause to terminate the relationship between an individual and a community. But who verified the existence of this intention and when did verification take place? As mentioned earlier, the local authorities verified citizenship when they exercised their power to declare formally that certain individuals were citizens. Verification, however, could also be implicit in the activities of these authorities. Their willingness to accept taxes paid by certain individuals was considered an implicit recognition of citizenship.∏∂ Those allowed to act as citizens—for example, those who were employed in local offices or used the communal pasture—were also tacitly admitted as citizens.∏∑ In some cases, the identification between the exercise of rights and the subsequent acquisition of citizenship was such that people confused one with the other. In 1776, Vicente de Saura asked the authorities of Valladolid whether his nomination as a rural judge (alcalde de la hermandad) implied that he was accepted as a citizen or whether he was still required to request formal admission to the community.∏∏ Status verification was not limited to the local authorities. Other members of the community could also exercise it by implicitly recognizing people as citizens when they tolerated their behavior as citizens. Once allowed to act as citizens, people were reputed as citizens and were instituted as citizens.∏π These processes involved in acting as a citizen were social rather than legal or political. They silently operated in day-to-day interactions. People could lead their goats to the communal pasture, participate in local assemblies, and pay taxes without asking for recognition as citizens or having to prove that they were citizens. Their acceptance into the community and their transformation into citizens were implicit. In the absence of conflict or fear of conflict, there was no reason for things to happen differently. Formal decisions were required only in exceptional cases when conflicts occurred. Conflicts could be generated by the municipal wish to control immigration. The authorities of Uruñuela (jurisdiction of La Rioja) refused to recog-

Vecindad: Local Communities

33

nize Jorge García as a citizen in 1748 because the community was ‘‘so small and limited, that it was insufficient even to contain the existing citizens, their cattle and fields.’’∏∫ In 1770, Arisgotas (jurisdiction of Toledo) explained that Pedro de los Infantes could not become a citizen because communal resources could not support an additional member.∏Ω Occasionally, councils paired restricted local resources with the conviction that a specific newcomer would contribute nothing to the community. This was the case in 1782 when Valverde de la Sierra (jurisdiction of León) refused to recognize Joseph Corvillos as a citizen. Joseph was a poor man who had no interest in remaining in the jurisdiction where he owned nothing. His presence in the community was ‘‘burdensome to the common in this sterile land, that suffered annually from heavy snows because of its narrowness and its high elevation, and in which during the four months of the winter we often cannot leave our own houses.’’π≠ The matching of local circumstances with the specific characteristics of certain candidates also happened in contrary cases: communities sometimes feared that newcomers would monopolize the use of communal property or that their citizenship would limit municipal liberty. Such fears motivated attempts to exclude Agustín Vázquez from his community of residence in 1784, judging that he was too wealthy and would use too much pastureland.π∞ Jorge García was rejected for the same reason in 1748: he was much too affluent and had too many properties and animals.π≤ Conflicts concerning the citizenship of individuals could also be motivated by other considerations. In 1684, the authorities of Villamayor de Campos (jurisdiction of Zamora) refused to admit Pedro de Luaces Seijas to citizenship on the grounds that his character was questionable and that he did not get along with his neighbors.π≥ His occupation as a barber did not help his petition; the community had already contracted the services of another barber, and it was too small to employ both. In 1753, Estepar (jurisdiction of Burgos) refused to admit José Quintanillas to citizenship, explaining that he was a litigious person who acted proudly and pretended to dominate his fellow men.π∂ The local council narrated how, during the time he resided in the community, he maltreated and often insulted the other members whom he considered ‘‘simple folk.’’ Similar allegations were also made in 1784 against Agustín Vázquez and his wife, who were accused of having bad tempers and a family that was far too large to support within the confines of a small settlement.π∑ Some cases give us a clear indication of the importance of personal animosities in the generation of conflicts regarding the citizenship of individuals. In 1678, Marcelo de Zancada explained that he failed to obtain recognition as a citizen because of a debt two councilmen owed to his current employee. According to Jerónimo Francos, Aguilar de Campos (jurisdiction of Valladolid) imposed new conditions on his citizenship in 1735 because of the

34

Vecindad: Local Communities

animosity of the local judge. In 1782, Agustín Sánchez pointed to Nicolás Sánchez as the person responsible for his exclusion from the community of Cordobilla (jurisdiction of Salamanca). Nicolás, who hated Sánchez and his family, made sure that the local authorities would not permit him to use the communal pasture. He did so by arguing that Sánchez was not a citizen despite the fact that his citizenship had previously been an accepted fact.π∏ There are many other examples of the way personal animosities led to questioning the status of individuals whose citizenship was already acknowledged. Whether the animosity was new, or whether rotation in local office holding suddenly allowed old-time competitors (or friends) to have a say in local affairs, it was clear that a person’s citizenship could be contested at certain periods, consensual in others.ππ Froyan Rodríguez, who lived in Fuente del Fresno (jurisdiction of Madrid) for more than twenty years, was told one day that he no longer belonged to the community. Like other people involved in these kinds of confrontations, he argued that this request was new and unexpected. He had been recognized as a member before and was unsure what had happened.π∫ The questioning of status was considered a social, as well as a legal, affair. In 1760, Zacarías de la Torre was ordered to leave the room where the annual communal office-holding election was held.πΩ His protests, that he was a citizen with voting rights, were silenced, as were the allegations of his supporters. The damage done to his honor was irreparable. In order to defend his reputation and prestige, he was forced to file a complaint against Alonso Crespo, the councilman who initiated his expulsion from the meeting. Honor and reputation were also central to Manuel Rojo Martín y Néstor, who in 1798 was expelled from the meeting of the council of Arensena de Abajo (jurisdiction of La Rioja).∫≠ The scene was so powerful, and so public, he later said, that after it took place his wife refused to set foot in the village. The exchange between Germán Salcedo—marquis of Fuertehijar, caballero of the military order of Carlos III, and a judge of the appellate court (chancillería) of Valladolid—and the community of Buitrago de Lozoya (jurisdiction of Madrid) was extremely revealing of such tensions.∫∞ Germán was granted citizenship in the community in 1788 under the condition that he reside in the settlement and pay taxes. The following year, the council refused to continue to recognize him as a citizen. According to Germán, he was rejected because several local cattle-raisers viewed him as a competitor and wanted him expelled from the community. Admitting that Germán was using ‘‘too much’’ pastureland for their liking, the authorities of Buitrago explained their refusal differently: by virtue of his noble estate Germán was exempt from tax payment, and because of his services to the crown, he resided first in

Vecindad: Local Communities

35

Valladolid and then in Madrid. His initial promises to pay taxes and reside in the community remained unfulfilled, although in both cases his refusal to comply could be legally justified. Yet the most powerful allegation against Germán was that his original acceptance as a citizen was made under duress. He arrived in the jurisdiction one morning on an unannounced visit. He came to the council meeting and, aided by the local judge (alcalde mayor) who was his ally, influenced the members into recognizing his citizenship. There was no room for discussion or time to organize opposition. The whole question surprised the community, and the process itself was heavily influenced by the ‘‘quality’’ of the petitioner, his ‘‘circumstances,’’ and the ‘‘respect’’ the local council owed him as a nobleman, a jurist, and a member of the court. From the perspective of the local council, the whole affair was ‘‘violent.’’ The physical presence of the petitioner literally left the members with no choice but to accede. The appellate court, where Germán served as a judge, agreed with him. It accepted Germán’s position that he had always been a citizen of the community and that he had meant to be one. It also implicitly adhered to his understanding that the refusal to recognize him as a citizen was not genuine but only represented the economic interests of a few powerful citizens.

The Importance of Citizenship Although in many communities citizenship was an important issue, which could lead on occasions to severe and even violent confrontations, citizenship was not meaningful enough in all cases and under all circumstances to justify an effort to obtain it. Madrid represents an extreme example of this reality. The fastest growing town in early modern Spain, it doubled in size between 1563 and the end of the sixteenth century, and tripled by 1630.∫≤ It had 120,000 inhabitants in 1700, 150,000 in 1760, and 200,000 in 1800. This enormous growth was sustained mainly by immigration. In its function as a court and seat of the Spanish central administration, Madrid attracted large numbers of nobles, bureaucrats, candidates for jobs, and a great variety of service providers. It is estimated that in the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, about a half to two-thirds of its inhabitants had been born outside the city, these numbers being especially high between 1560 and 1625, and between 1750 and 1800.∫≥ Contemporaries referred to this reality by pointing out that ‘‘only Madrid was court’’ (solo Madrid es corte), that it was a ‘‘city of foreigners,’’ and that it was the ‘‘common patria’’ of all Spaniards.∫∂ The functioning of Madrid as a capital city obscured the existence of a local community, with local needs and local jurisdiction. People coming to the city were too obsessed with the court, too dependent on the king, too powerful, or

36

Vecindad: Local Communities

simply too disrespectful of the local community. This had a direct effect on the formation of the local citizenry. Many longtime residents never requested formal citizenship, nor claimed to have obtained it by way of performance. Luis Manuel de Quiñones arrived in Madrid as a child in 1662.∫∑ Having studied there and then married a native-born wife, he was employed first as a solicitor ( procurador) in the royal councils and then as a public notary. After some fifty years of residence in the court, he requested the town council to declare that he had been a citizen of Madrid for at least thirty years. The reason for his request was openly confessed: he now wished to obtain a seat in the parliament (cortes), a seat available only to people with at least six years of formal citizenship in the community. According to the municipal authorities, his lack of interest in being recognized as a citizen earlier on represented a lack of commitment to the town, which was an attitude shared by many people residing in Madrid. This attitude was also denounced in the 1720s and again in the 1790s, when the members of the local council complained that the habit of requesting citizenship was fading away. Frequently practiced in the ‘‘old days,’’ it was no longer commonly exercised. The authorities reasoned that most newcomers did not request admission into Madrid’s community either because they did not recognize the utility of citizenship or because of the ‘‘confusion of the court.’’∫∏

Proving an Intention One question remains unanswered. People could become citizens by virtue of their decision and without the need for a formal declaration. But how was this decision communicated to the local community? How could communities, their councils, and citizens know that a decision to become a citizen had been made? As mentioned earlier, according to the ius commune, newcomers could make their intentions known through their behavior. People demonstrated by their actions their wish to become citizens. This implied that communities were forced to interpret the meaning of certain activities in order to determine a person’s state of mind. Ius commune jurists argued that a ten-year residence or marriage to a local woman could serve as adequate proofs of the newcomers’ intentions, and these views were adopted in Castilian communities as demonstrated by the case of Seville.∫π Following the conviction that citizenship depended on intentions rather than external acts, however, Castilian individuals, corporations, communities, and authorities constantly battled with how to identify the behavior that would lead to citizenship in a particular case given the circumstances of each candidate and community.

Vecindad: Local Communities

37

Take for example the most common claim—that intention could be proved by a prolonged residence. Individuals who lived in a community for a long period could be thought of as people who tied their future to that community and, by implication, as people that wanted to become citizens. This was the opinion of ius commune jurists, who argued that a ten-year residence was the best proof for the newcomer’s intentions, and this rule was frequently adopted in Castilian local legislation, that included a requirement that candidates reside in the community for several years before they could acquire citizenship. However, residence, which during the resettlement period was a necessary condition and the raison d’être of granting privilege to people, was now presented as a legal presumption. During the early modern period, it could be used to discover the newcomer’s intentions, but its use was neither necessary nor sufficient to prove those intentions. People who did not reside in the community but who could prove their attachment to it in other ways could be considered citizens. For example, Tomás del Corrral successfully argued that he was a citizen of Soto (jurisdiction of Cantabria) despite not residing in the community because he had ‘‘a house, with family and servants capable of complying with all municipal demands and tax payment. . . . No one can be forced to live and reside personally in a place, because this would be against natural liberty, and is prohibited by law.’’∫∫ In question was not behavior, but its meaning: ‘‘As intention is an internal act, only known by God . . . it can only be manifested or discovered by observing external acts, which in this case demonstrate that my client had a continuous wish to remain in the village.’’∫Ω The interpretation communities gave to residence usually depended on local circumstances and on local perceptions concerning the character and intentions of the people seeking recognition as citizens or noncitizens. On occasions, individual activity was interpreted according to the classification of petitioners as members of certain groups. People born in the community were entitled to the presumption that they wanted to be citizens. It was generally agreed that natives implicitly expressed their desire to be citizens by virtue of their continued residence in the jurisdiction. In most cases, this was sufficient to demonstrate that they were citizens; the native born were not generally required to perform any formal act, or to reside in the community for a specific length of time. Indeed, only exceptional communities forced native-born persons to request admission to the community by proving their intentions.Ω≠ Royal servants enjoyed a similar presumption. By definition and unless otherwise proved, their absence from the community did not indicate their desire to sever ties with it. In their case, absence was considered involuntary, since royal service was a duty they could not refuse. It was often unclear, however, whether all members of the court and all officials could claim this

38

Vecindad: Local Communities

exception and whether it could cover tax farmers or professionals working as lawyers in royal courts. Again, the willingness to apply a strict or flexible interpretation depended on the place, time, and candidates. On occasion, a distinction was made between those who served the king for their ‘‘own convenience and utility’’ and those who were motivated by the ‘‘obligation towards his royal person.’’Ω∞ According to this distinction, only the members of the second group were truly forced to abandon their communities, and only they could enjoy the presumption that allowed them to continue to be citizens of communities where they no longer lived. But this distinction was sufficiently broad to allow for different interpretations. In practice, most Spanish magnates residing in the court were able to enjoy the protection of this exception and maintain citizenship in their original communities where they owned a family estate. This enabled them to enjoy the rights of citizens, particularly the highly valued usage of communal pasture. Some communities, such as Seville, gladly embraced the residence exception in these cases, as members of its council considered the citizenship of magnates a privilege and a cause for local pride.Ω≤ Others, for example Buitrago, whose case was mentioned above, resisted such practices and demanded that jurists who were members of the court must reside in the municipality or lose their citizenship. The application of a particular understanding to people belonging to certain groups was also evident in the case of surgeons, pharmacists, shepherds, and clerics who resided in the community because they were hired to perform certain tasks. Because their residence was an involuntary byproduct of their employment, communities argued that in their case residence alone was insufficient to prove their intentions.Ω≥ This residence was linked to ‘‘temporary motives which were changeable and accidental . . . under no concept can these motives be considered legitimate so that through them it could be understood that they acquired right to citizenship . . . because being that the main prerequisite [for citizenship] is the wish to remain, it is notorious that the mere causality excludes it, and on the contrary, one assumes it does not exist, nor continues to exist in someone who had had no other destiny that service which indifferently is searched for and obtained where it is found and with the same ease and indifference it is abandoned.’’Ω∂ Added to these considerations was the fact that many such employments granted tax exemptions to their practitioners. Since tax payment was a conventional means of enacting citizenship, it was unclear whether under these circumstances receiving a tax exemption proved that the person did not want to establish permanent ties with the community. In spite of the individual features of these debates and their dependence on the place, time, and parties, several common traits emerge. For example, most

Vecindad: Local Communities

39

communities insisted that maintaining property in the community or even a house with servants or other representatives was insufficient because it did not indicate the wishes of the owner or his personal loyalty to the community.Ω∑ Another common theme was the length of residence. In most cases, communities argued that meaningful residence had to be ‘‘continuous,’’ ‘‘with no substantial absence,’’ and ‘‘during the larger part of the year.’’Ω∏ Temporary leaves, such as visits to relatives and to properties located outside the community, were allowed. Citizens could also be temporarily employed in another community if warranted by economic and personal circumstances. Passing needs, such as the wish to acquire a university degree or engaging in litigation away from the community, could also justify an absence as long as return was guaranteed upon completion of the task.Ωπ Similar conclusions linking external behavior to internal intentions were reached with regard to possession of property, exchanging marriage vows with a local woman, and payment of taxes. All of these factors, which were often enumerated in local laws and which were traditionally interpreted by historians as requirements for citizenship, were not prerequisites. Instead, they were instruments that allowed communities to inquire into the intentions of newcomers. House owning and tax payment, petitioners said, ‘‘manifested the intention of wanting to come, reside, and settle a domicile, habitation, and residence in the place,’’ and this intention was sufficient to acquire citizenship even in the absence of other indicators.Ω∫ Indeed, searching for factors such as residence, marriage, property holding, and tax payment, local councils affirmed that these factors were not decisive for citizenship acquisition. They operated only as indicators of the intention to remain in the community and of the decision to become a citizen. Thus, local communities had to look beyond facts and interpret them. Although many communities never experienced the kind of conflict that required close examination, others used their interpretive powers to accept and reject people. It was in these cases of conflict, or potential conflict, that communities debated the type of residence, the length of marriage, or the amount of property that would be sufficient to prove intentions. Sufficiency depended on the candidate, the circumstances of the case, the community, and the time and place. Because of these considerations, individuals lacking the prerequisites mentioned in laws were accepted as citizens because they were considered to have given sufficient proof of their intention. And in some cases, other individuals who did comply with the prerequisites were considered nevertheless undeserving of citizenship. The cases of Melchor Pardo and Rufino Vivanco tied many of these questions together. Melchor Pardo arrived to Villarramiel de Campos (jurisdiction of

40

Vecindad: Local Communities

Palencia) in 1761 when he was hired to serve as the local pharmacist (boticario).ΩΩ Excluded from land partition by virtue of his foreignness, in 1791 he requested formal recognition that he was a citizen. According to his version, he was a citizen because he had acted as a citizen. He had resided in the community with his family for more than thirty years and had the intention to remain permanently, which is why he joined several local confraternities. The laws required neither formal declaration nor special reception, and his behavior was sufficient to transform him into a citizen. The authorities of Villarramiel disagreed. They argued that he resided in the community as a professional by virtue of a contract and that, since his immigration was not voluntary, it could not transform him into a citizen. Rather than a citizen, he was a simple resident. This was why the community was willing to pay for his relocation, and why it allowed him to enjoy a tax exemption. Since the day he arrived, Melchor had done nothing to change this situation, and there was no reason to consider him differently. Local customs instructed that newcomers request their formal admission as citizens. Melchor was familiar with this custom, and if he did not request his citizenship earlier, it was because he did not want to be considered a citizen. The royal court (chancillería), which first ruled in favor of the Villarramiel, later changed its verdict and declared Melchor a citizen. An exact opposite stand was adopted by Santibañez de Zarsaguda (jurisdiction of Burgos) in 1790. Rufino Vivanco, a noble (hidalgo) and a pharmacist, established his residence and commercial headquarters in this settlement in 1787.∞≠≠ Three years later, he was notified that he could either become a taxpaying citizen or leave the jurisdiction. Rufino responded by arguing that he wished to remain in Santibañez and to continue to enjoy the status of both hidalgo and noncitizen. As a ‘‘public servant’’ (servidor del público), his residence in the community could never constitute citizenship; as a nobleman, he had no obligation to pay taxes. His position rejected, he was literally thrown out of the village together with his family and merchandise. While Rufino claimed that the campaign against him was motivated by personal rivalries— his father was the local tax farmer and his business competed with another— the council of Santibañez argued that such was not the case. Explaining that their community, a behetría cerrada, possessed special privileges that prohibited noblemen from becoming citizens, and that permanent residence necessarily implied citizenship, it required Rufino to either renounce his rights as a noble and became a citizen or to leave the community. Using arguments similar to the ones voiced by Seville’s council in the 1770s, the local authorities insisted that citizenship was not only a privilege but also a duty that could be imposed on people who lived in the community. They further argued that local practices prescribed that all people of competent age and situation should become cit-

Vecindad: Local Communities

41

izens; there was no reason to create an exception in Rufino’s case. In fact, except for Rufino, all other residents—both natives and newcomers—obeyed this rule, and all of them were accepted as citizens. The practice of becoming citizens was so well rooted in the community that the authorities expected Rufino to conform to it, and they attempted to persuade him extrajudicially. It was only after their peaceful attempts failed that they removed him physically from the community. The authorities also explained that although they tolerated Rufino’s presence in the jurisdiction for more than three years, they were no longer willing to do so. At stake were not only compliance with local laws and customs, but also the need to adhere to justice: people who enjoyed citizenship’s benefits must also be subjected to its corresponding obligations. The employment of presumptions linking behavior to intentions also explains why the authorities of Seville could recognize Antonio Joseph de Saavedra as a citizen in 1735. This recognition was not illegal, nor did it indicate a distance between law and its application. It was based on the idea that residence was a presumption and that, as with all other presumptions, it could be replaced by other factors that indicated the existence of the intention to be a citizen. In Antonio Joseph’s case, intention could be deduced from the close relationship between the candidate’s family and the community, as well as through the payment of taxes. Yet the use of presumptions also sheds light on the changes introduced in Seville’s citizenship policies. These changes did not modify the conditions for citizenship. Instead, they effected only the method by which petitioners’ intention to become citizens could be proved. Before 1743, petitioners were required to prove their intention by submitting an affidavit, attesting that they had resided in Seville for more than ten years and intended to remain in the city permanently. After 1743, petitioners had to supply the council with the testimony of the local priest, affirming their residence in Seville, and with rental receipts. Petitioners were also required to present witnesses who could testify that in speech and action they behaved like citizens.

Conclusions The first legal definition of local citizenship in Spain dates from the early 1800s. Included in legal dictionaries, which were elaborated in order to facilitate the work of jurists and administrators, this definition specifies vecino as: ‘‘a person who is domiciled in a place with intention to remain there. According to the law, this intention can be presumed and reputed as proved by the passing of ten years, although it can also be proved by other facts that manifest it without the need for the passage of ten years, for example, if one sells his

42

Vecindad: Local Communities

possessions in one place and buys others in the place to where he transfers his residence, or if one is received as a vecino by the local community, promising to remain there ten years and paying taxes.’’∞≠∞ The product of an early nineteenth-century obsession with legal categories, this definition nevertheless summarizes with precision eighteenth-century views of Castilian citizenship. First, it stresses that citizenship is based on individual intention rather than on formal declarations. People are citizens by virtue of their activities, and they lose their condition as citizens if they fail to enact the citizen role. Status is thus socially negotiated and socially recognized. Second, this definition specifies that intention could be proved by legal presumptions that link behavior to a state of mind. Such factors as residence, marriage, and the possession of property, whether detailed in the laws or not, are meaningful only as reflections of an internal decision to become a citizen. This combination of factors created in Castile citizens by performance, that is, people whose citizenship depended on their behavior and reputation and not on formal declarations. Yet, the obligation to demonstrate an internal decision by performing certain external acts guaranteed that only people who were able to convince the community of their goodwill ‘‘good’’ immigrants would be recognized as citizens. This ability, in turn, depended on the concerned parties, but also on local circumstances and perceptions. Different requirements were elaborated, demanding people in different periods to provide a diverse range of proofs. On occasion, citizenship was portrayed as a privilege. At other times it was presented as an obligation. The story of local citizenship in Castile thus reveals the existence of common perceptions, often leading to individual local arrangements. Rather than a fragmentary and highly localized regime, as portrayed in the legislation and as assumed by most historians, citizenship was based on doctrine and practices common to all Castilians. Examining citizenship petitions in a single community and tying them to local circumstances and immigration policies thus potentially impoverishes our understanding of what citizenship meant. It ignores the existence of citizens who were not formally admitted by local communities, and it does not explain how and why did people become worthy of rights in the local sphere.

3

Vecindad: From Castile to Spanish America

Soon after their arrival in the New World, and even before the territory was under their actual control, Spanish conquistadors proclaimed royal jurisdiction over the land and founded new settlements.∞ Standing in open territory and in the presence of notaries when these were available, expedition commanders announced that, under the authority received from the king, viceroy, or governor, they were founding a settlement. They then set the territorial jurisdiction of the community, nominating the local authorities and dividing the land by plots, assigning sites for the main square ( plaza mayor), local council hall, and jail. Asking those present if they wished to become citizens (vecinos), commanders announced that they could do so by presenting themselves to the authorities in the following days. Through this ceremony, new communities came into being—with territory, authorities, urban plan, and citizens—before the first cornerstone was ever laid. Similar procedures were carried out where Indian enclaves were already in existence. In all of them— for example, Mexico City, Quito, and Cuzco—the community was reinvented as a Spanish enclave, as though the previous settlement had ceased to exist. By 1571, there were some two hundred Spanish settlements in the American continents and adjacent islands, and by 1580 the colonial settlement network, which survived to the nineteenth century, was firmly in place. At first, the Spanish American urban experience appeared to be a repetition

43

44

Vecindad: Spanish America

of the Castilian experience during the Middle Ages.≤ Settlement was perceived as a process by which communities, rather than individual houses, were founded, and this process of founding could ignore such facts as the presences of existing communities that were populated and governed by other traditions. The role of communities was also similar, as in both cases their foundation confirmed Spanish control over not only territory but also its non-Spanish inhabitants. As was the case for participants of the reconquest and resettlement of Spain, citizenship (vecindad) could be obtained by the mere fact of being part of the group that founded the community. All that was required of the conquistador—now made citizen—was to be present at the foundational act or to come to the community in subsequent days.≥ Once this first phase was completed, most Spanish American communities developed procedures that enabled newcomers to petition for citizenship. Newcomers had either to allege their wish to establish permanent ties with the community or to supply proofs for the existence of such a wish.∂ During this period, most requests were tied to the desire to obtain land grants, which were available only to citizens. Another motivation for requesting citizenship was the wish to be employed in municipal offices. Petitions for citizenship in Spanish American communities were very common during the sixteenth century, but they gradually disappeared from municipal records by the second, third, or fourth decade of the seventeenth century. Although people continued to refer to themselves as vecinos in notarial acts, in legal declarations, and in their social interactions, the archives tell us nothing about how they achieved or maintained this status. As a result, like their colleagues studying early modern Spain, historians of Spanish America simply ignored the issue of citizenship.∑ They assumed either that late medieval Castilian practices continued to operate in the Americas or that, in the Americas, vecindad was an honorary title and no longer attached to notions of citizenship and belonging. Nevertheless, until the end of the colonial period, Spanish American citizenship remained a tie among people forming part of the same community. It was a status that implied both privileges and duties, and people who acted as and were reputed to be citizens could obtain citizenship. Yet in contrast with Castile, in Spanish America citizenship was converted fully from a legal category into a classification based on social reputation. Instead of maintaining both formal and implicit citizenship, as was the case in the Old World, in the New World implicit citizenship prevailed. New forms of exclusion that were particular to Spanish America also emerged. Most important among them was the tendency to exclude Indians and persons of mixed blood or African descent from citizenship. Another was the introduction of restrictions on the

Vecindad: Spanish America

45

citizenship of non-Spanish Europeans. This combination of factors tended to identify Spanishness with citizenship. Under Spanish American conditions, citizenship became a regime more restricted than the Castilian one in some ways; more open in others. By excluding non-Spaniards, this regime brought about greater opportunity for Spaniards, who could gain recognition as citizens in the New World with greater ease than in Castile. While citizens were being created in the república de españoles, a república de indios was also conjured up in Spanish America. Theoretically, it allowed the governance of Indian settlements to continue according to indigenous traditions as long as they were not contradictory to Christian morality. But the Indian republic, too, was penetrated by Castilian ideas regarding citizenship and foreignness. Although this influence was limited, it contributed to a growing tendency to classify those living in Indian communities according to residence and the performance of the citizen’s role rather than by descent. This tendency pointed to the eventual homogenization of both republics and the appearance of ‘‘citizen’’ as a category of person who could choose his place of residence and become, through action and reputation, a member of a new community. The first indication that Spanish American communities would take a different path was present in the foundational period (mid-sixteenth to early seventeenth century), which is where my study begins. In order to account for local differences, my analysis will follow the developments in three very distinct enclaves: Caracas, Buenos Aires, and Lima. I located some six hundred cases proceeding from these enclaves.∏ They demonstrate the existence of different types of tensions leading to different developments, yet as a group these cases indicate some of the possible consequences of the implementation of Castiliantype citizenship in Spanish America.

Caracas The transformation of citizenship from first a legal category into a classification based on social reputation and then as a status not available to nonSpaniards, is best exemplified by the case of Caracas, which serves here as the first model for how Castilian citizenship was modified in the Americas. Caracas was founded in 1567 as a military garrison.π Until the 1580s, its permanent population was very small, and in 1578, only 14 of the 136 people who participated in its founding still lived in the community. Protected by a mountain range yet close to the sea, Caracas soon became a trading post for agricultural products coming from the hinterland. From the 1580s to the first decade of the seventeenth century, and coinciding with the pacification of the

46

Vecindad: Spanish America

territory, wheat, tobacco, and cattle hides provided its inhabitants with profitable export. In the following decades, the local economy gradually shifted to the exportation of cacao to Mexico. This export trade, which sustained the growth of the city for two hundred years, transformed Caracas into a major slave labor economy. At the end of the sixteenth century there were some 90 citizens; by 1633 this number had virtually doubled in size. Formal petitions for citizenship in Caracas were fairly frequent until the 1620s. In accordance with the Castilian tradition, these petitions were presented to the city council, whose members decided whether the person should, or should not, be recognized as vecino. Petitions expressed the Castilian belief in freedom of immigration and included a declaration by the newcomer of his intention to reside in the jurisdiction and to establish his home there.∫ It was often clear in municipal records that many petitioners had just arrived in the city and that their citizenship requests were a first step towards integration in the local community. Their promise to tie themselves to Caracas was deemed sufficient to secure their recognition as citizens and to enable them to enjoy citizens’ rights. During this period, most people requesting admission into the community petitioned to receive land (solar), and in most cases, the authorities, recognizing them as citizens, granted them land, thus enabling them to establish themselves in the city both legally and materially.Ω Also during this period, people who left Caracas continued to be considered citizens as long as they delegated the exercise of their obligations to another person. Caracas was also willing to admit absentee members: in 1597, Nofre Carrasques, representing Fernán de Zárate, requested that his client be recognized as a citizen.∞≠ His petition was granted even though there were many indications of Fernán’s absence and his representative made no promise that Fernán would ever come to the city. Attempts to force compliance with citizenship obligations, especially the obligation to reside in the jurisdiction, were also sidetracked, as affluent members continued to disobey municipal orders and responded instead with the casual payment of penalties.∞∞ This became a frequent practice beginning in the 1610s; by the 1650s, the council exempted certain people from citizenship duties—residence included—because they were willing to routinely pay the authorities certain sums.∞≤ At this early stage of its history, it was clear that Caracas gave less weight to actual residence and integration into the community than did its Castilian counterparts. Also noteworthy was the lack of a clear definition of what was municipal, what was provincial, and what was Spanish. People residing in the province could claim that they were integrated into the local community, and services to the crown were also considered to constitute ties between the individual and the city.∞≥ Perhaps because the jurisdiction of Caracas stretched for dozens of miles with no other Spanish settlement nearby, and because the city

Vecindad: Spanish America

47

represented all that was Spanish, as opposed to what was Indian or simply foreign, the distinction between what was local, provincial, and Spanish was weak from the start.∞∂ The demise of formal citizenship procedures in Caracas began at the end of the sixteenth century. By that time, people requesting the allocation of different resources described their attachment to the community in qualitative terms rather than by simply asserting that they were citizens. For example, Tomás de Aponte, who requested a land grant in 1597, explained that he had come to the city with his wife, sons, and family, and that he intended to live and to remain in the jurisdiction.∞∑ Francisco Carbajar declared that he had been living in Caracas for more than seventeen years, that he had occupied a house with his wife and children, and that he had always complied with all citizenship obligations.∞∏ Although some people continued to request formal admission to the community by petitioning for citizenship, and others mentioned their citizenship when petitioning for rights, both practices were diminishing. By the 1640s, the traditional association between citizenship and land grants was also fading away. During the second half of the century, people petitioning for land no longer mentioned their citizenship, and those petitioning for citizenship no longer necessarily requested land.∞π At this time, land grants had ended, and a new regime allocated land by virtue of monetary payments. As access to land was increasingly independent of citizenship, the recording of citizenship petitions virtually ceased. By the middle of the seventeenth century, formal citizenship criteria were thus giving way to implicit categorizations. Although individuals continued to argue that they were citizens and thus worthy of rights, they no longer needed to obtain a formal declaration of citizenship. Citizenship was now implicitly recognized when rights were allocated. Instead of maintaining a regime in which citizenship was formally acknowledged by the local authorities, the ability to use rights usually reserved to citizens now rested on personal reputation and on the idea that people who acted as citizens were in fact citizens. Reputation determined whether the person was indeed integrated in the community and whether the other members considered him worthy of the rights of a citizen. In 1650, for example, Francisco López stated that ‘‘it was well reputed and established’’ (es notorio y consta) that he had been a citizen of Caracas for more than thirty years. In 1652, Juan Rodríguez argued that his citizenship could not be doubted, since both in the city and its province ‘‘he must be taken as such’’ (debe ser habido por tal ) because of his many services to the crown.∞∫ Despite its novelty, citizenship by reputation had Castilian roots. As mentioned in chapter 2, Castilian citizenship could be acquired without the intervention of the authorities. It came into being once a newcomer behaved as a

48

Vecindad: Spanish America

citizen and this behavior was interpreted and validated by the other members of the community or by communal organs. Yet while Castilian communities fought against these practices and, in the name of good government attempted to constitute a monopoly over the classification of people as citizens and noncitizens, the authorities of Caracas did nothing of the sort. I could not find even one attempt to support the continuation of formal procedures for citizenship and to ensure municipal control over the classification of people as citizens. The disappearance of formal citizenship in Caracas in the 1620s and 1630s could be explained by local developments, such as the gradual disassociation between land grants and citizenship and the passage from free allocation of land to a monetary payment. Perhaps this disappearance was tied to Caracas’s coming of age. In the early 1600s Caracas was already a self-sustaining city, with a stable population, a fairly flourishing economy, and stable institutions. Under these circumstances, it no longer required an aggressive immigration policy, and as an established community, it could close ranks by linking citizenship (and rights) to reputation rather than to abstract legal categories. The shift from a formally recognized citizenship to a socially reputed one allowed for the introduction of new factors of exclusion, most important among them the ineligibility of Indians and people of mixed blood (mestizos and mulattos) to obtain citizenship. Castilian citizenship practices found that origin and genealogy were irrelevant to citizenship acquisition, and they lacked mechanism for examining the candidate’s ethnicity. In theory, therefore, Indians, mestizos, and mulattos should have been eligible for citizenship in Spanish American communities despite the aspiration to constitute two separate republics, one ‘‘Spanish’’ and the other ‘‘Indian.’’∞Ω Officially, the república de indios was established to protect Indians from Spanish influences as long as they needed such a protection, and it was mainly embodied in the prohibition of Spaniards in Indian communities. This establishment did not explicitly prohibit the integration of Indians into Spanish communities, and, indeed, soon after its installation, Indians began immigrating to Spanish settlements, where they established a permanent residence.≤≠ This fact was evident in early Caracas, when Indians and mestizos were at times granted citizenship and admitted into the purportedly Spanish community.≤∞ Nevertheless, following the transformation of citizenship from a formal category to a socially reputed status, the presence of Indians, mestizos, and mulattos was virtually eliminated. It was also during this period that Indians, mestizos, and mulattos were treated as ‘‘miserable’’ and in need of help, rather than as integrated members of the community. They now received land not because they were citizens but because of their poverty, their weakness, and in the case of Indians, because of recent royal decrees favoring the native population.≤≤

Vecindad: Spanish America

49

Buenos Aires A second example of how Castilian practices were modified in the New World can be found in Buenos Aires.≤≥ Initially a military outpost at the mouth of the River Plate, Buenos Aires had become a bustling port city by the early seventeenth century. Whereas the economy of Caracas was based on agricultural products, in Buenos Aires the main export was mainly metals from Potosí in exchange for slaves and other European products, most of which reached the city through illegal contraband networks. Buenos Aires’ initial years were just as humble. Founded in 1580 by 60 citizens, it was abandoned by many of them in subsequent years, and its population did not stabilize until the beginning of the seventeenth century.≤∂ During the first half of that century, the city had some three hundred citizens as well as a huge military regiment. This military presence was justified not only by the need to protect the river, but also by the closeness of Brazil. Because of its location, Buenos Aires became an important enclave against Portuguese expansion, yet it also flourished as a point where Portuguese and Spanish trade networks converged. One important result of this collaboration and competition was the presence of many Portuguese merchants in the city. This presence internally divided Buenos Aires, with most commerce in the hands of the Portuguese and most agriculture in the hands of Spaniards. The uneasy relationship between the two communities led to several campaigns against the presence of the Portuguese in the city. Early in its history, Buenos Aires faced a growing threat to its control of the countryside as a consequence of the expansion across the Andes of the Arauncanian people of southern Chile. According to municipal records, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, Buenos Aires defined itself as a frontier settlement simultaneously antagonistic to and cooperating with the Portuguese and the Indians. Because war was a permanent preoccupation, those wishing to become citizens of Buenos Aires were required to have a horse and arms, and to guarantee that when they were absent another person would fulfill their military obligations.≤∑ The menace of a foreign presence, and the struggle against the Portuguese both inside and outside Buenos Aires, produced an acute consciousness of the Spanish character of the city. This awareness was expressed in two different ways. On one hand, the distinction between what was local and what was Spanish was unclear. For example, it was generally argued that ‘‘services to the crown’’ were also services to the local community. Those engaged in expanding Spanish control, in discovering gold mines, and in paying money to the royal treasury could claim that these activities qualified them as citizens by demonstrating their attachment to the local community.≤∏ On the other hand,

50

Vecindad: Spanish America

and this was even more surprising, the authorities of Buenos Aires insisted that under normal circumstances only ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’ could be accepted as citizens.≤π This demand was a clear departure from the Castilian precedent; Castilian communities easily and frequently admitted foreigners as citizens (chapter 2). In Buenos Aires, on the contrary, only exceptional foreigners who were very ‘‘useful’’ to the community and highly immersed in its society could be granted citizenship.≤∫ Some leniency was demonstrated towards Portuguese residents during the union of the crowns of Portugal and Castile (1580–1640), yet this leniency evaporated in the following years.≤Ω People requesting citizenship in Buenos Aires had to prove that they were ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain,’’ and the inclusion of candidates’ birthplace in citizenship petitions became the usual practice in the city by 1618.≥≠ When the actual place of birth was unknown, the petition at least formally stated that the person’s arrival to the Americas was legal, and that, as a result, he was necessarily a ‘‘native of the kingdoms of Spain.’’ In contrast to the situation in Caracas, land distribution was seldom mentioned in Buenos Aires, and it was only in the 1610s that newcomers’ duties were formally extended from having arms to also possessing a house. During this period both requirements were integrated into a formal oath that all candidates for citizenship had to take.≥∞ Nevertheless, as late as 1619 and 1620, Buenos Aires still admitted absentee citizens.≥≤ By the late 1620s, the number of citizenship petitions was dropping, and in the next few decades, citizenship petitions practically disappeared from municipal records. In spite of differences in the particular development of these two cities and in their understanding of citizenship, formal petitions for citizenship in Buenos Aires disappeared from the records around the same time they declined in Caracas. Once again, local circumstances may explain this development. Like Caracas, Buenos Aires came of age in the beginning of the seventeenth century as its population stabilized and it began to flourish economically as a port. Yet contrary to Caracas, in the case of Buenos Aires we lack indications on how the growing dissociation between citizenship and rights brought about the demise of formal citizenship. We also lack a clear vision of what the results of this demise were.

Lima Whereas certain similarities existed between Caracas and Buenos Aires, developments in Lima, my third model for how Castilian practices changed in the New World, were very different. Established in 1535 in a fertile valley near the sea and populated by many Indians, Lima, until the late 1540s, suffered

Vecindad: Spanish America

51

the consequences of Spanish conquistadors fighting for both political control and material resources.≥≥ The coming of peace—with the government of viceroy Conde de Nieve (1556)—and of important administrative reforms— especially with the government of viceroy Toledo (1569)—marked Lima’s true beginning. The power of conquistadors and encomenderos diminished, and the city was transformed into the capital of an enormous territory that covered practically the entire South American continent. In 1572, with the suppression of the last major Indian revolt, Lima’s future was secured. Its economy, which initially flourished thanks to Indian and slave labor, became tied to its role as a capital city. Lima housed a vice-regal court and attracted many professionals, students, litigants, and candidates for jobs who immigrated on a temporary or permanent basis. Lima also flourished as one of the few enclaves legally permitted to engage in the transatlantic trade. Through its port (Callao), it exported metals mostly coming from Potosí in exchange for European goods that were then distributed for profit throughout the continent. Early citizenship practices in Lima were very similar to those in Caracas. In the 1540s and 1550s, most petitions for citizenship included requests for land (solar), and all of them contained an implicit or explicit promise to settle in the jurisdiction.≥∂ There were also cases where citizenship was requested on its own, although I found none where land was granted without the previous acquisition of citizenship. Other similarities with Caracas, Buenos Aires, and even Castile also existed. For example, physical residence maintained its status as the best proof of citizenship, and in 1570, the authorities expressed their view that a person who resided in the city where he had his home and where he acted as a municipal judge could not possibly be a citizen of another community.≥∑ Also like Caracas and Buenos Aires formal citizenship petitions disappeared by the early seventeenth century. Despite these similarities, Lima’s case was very different. This difference was tied to the presence of a viceroy and the importance of encomienda.≥∏ From the 1560s onward, this combination of factors produced an extraordinary situation: the viceroy rather than the local community determined who was a citizen of Lima. This could happen because encomenderos were legally obliged to reside next to their Indians and because the viceroy controlled the grant of encomiendas.≥π It meant that each time the viceroy granted encomienda in the jurisdiction of Lima, he also implicitly ordered that the encomendero would reside in Lima. This order was interpreted as a grant of citizenship. Indeed, although some encomenderos invoked the regular tests for citizenship, most of them simply reproduced the vice-regal order that allocated them the encomienda and claimed that this order also gave them a right to be acknowledged as vecinos. In 1596, Juan de la Cueva attested that

52

Vecindad: Spanish America

the viceroy granted him the encomienda previously belonging to Lorenzo de Figueroa Estupiñan and that, since Lorenzo was a citizen of Lima, so was he. In his appearance before the local council, Alonso de Aliaga presented a viceregal decree that literally ordered the council to receive him as citizen because he was an encomendero.≥∫ The role of the viceroy in defining Lima’s community was just as immediate when he ordered (as he often did) that certain encomenderos would comply with the residence requirement in Lima even though ‘‘their’’ Indians belonged to another jurisdiction.≥Ω The viceroy could also decide, usually upon the request of the interested party, that an encomienda originally belonging to the jurisdiction of a neighboring town would thereafter be considered under the jurisdiction of Lima. This happened, for example, in 1562, when Alvaro de Torres requested to transfer ‘‘his’’ Indians from the jurisdiction of Guanuco to that of Lima. He explained that it was more logical to submit the Indians to Lima, which was nearer and more accessible to where they lived. This transfer would also enabled the Indians to earn their living with greater ease. After ‘‘his’’ Indians were assigned to Lima, Alvaro became a citizen of that city.∂≠ The accumulative effect of these practices was that the viceroy could and often did grant citizenship in Lima’s community. Candidates openly argued as much when they told the local authorities that the viceroy had already granted them citizenship and that all they now desired was to obtain a formal confirmation of this fact.∂∞ Vice-regal intervention, and the close association between encomienda and citizenship, created in Lima a new category of citizenship called vecindad de indios. This citizenship designated people whose status depended on their encomienda. It distinguished them from other citizens, and thereafter two different classes of citizens existed in Lima: the vecino-encomendero (also called the vecino feudatario) and the simple vecino (also called ‘‘caballero without Indians,’’ caballero situado, caballero avecindado, caballero no vecino, and ciudadano).∂≤ While encomendero citizens were accepted into the community by virtue of their encomienda and because of vice-regal grants, all other citizens were still recognized by the local council according to the traditional tests.∂≥

Early Citizenship in Spanish America: Recapitulation These three models for early Spanish American citizenship demonstrate that the principal traits of Castilian citizenship were maintained in the New World (residence, an intent to remain permanently), despite undergoing important modifications. In sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Caracas,

Vecindad: Spanish America

53

Buenos Aires, and Lima, citizenship could be acquired by petitioning the town council, and success depended on the establishment of, or the promise to establish, ties with the community. Newcomers had to express their desire to become citizens, which could be proved by residence, the establishment of a house, or compliance with citizens’ duties. The distinction introduced in Lima between vecinos-encomenderos and simple vecinos was new, as was the illdefined frontier between the local community and the community of the kingdom, which were often used synonymously. This led in Caracas to the exclusion of Indians, mestizos, and mulattos, and in Buenos Aires to the demand that citizens be natives of the kingdoms of Spain. The abandonment of formal procedures for citizenship acquisition and the total dependence on reputation also marked a change from Castilian practices. The way Caracas, Buenos Aires, and Lima developed helps explain this trajectory. Caracas gradually became a slave labor economy, leading to heightened ethnic awareness. Because of the presence of many non-Spanish Europeans, especially the Portuguese, Buenos Aires experienced ongoing social tension. Lima suffered vice-regal intervention in municipal affairs, and many encomenderos were among its oldest and most important citizens. Yet notwithstanding these explanations, similar processes were happening elsewhere. Although we lack precise information, we do know that the division of citizens into encomenderos and non-encomenderos was not particular to Lima but was practiced in other Peruvian cities, such as Popayán, Jujuy, Cuzco, and Arequipa.∂∂ This division was also mentioned in the main compilation of Spanish American colonial legislation (Recopilación de Indias), which reproduced a 1554 decree stating that both ‘‘normal citizens’’ and vecinos encomenderos could be elected to municipal offices.∂∑ Historians have affirmed that Indians, mestizos, and mulattos could become citizens of Spanish American communities in the sixteenth century, but that this was no longer true in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They assumed that throughout Spanish America, in order to be a citizen, one had to be Spanish.∂∏ The abandonment of formal citizenship procedures in the beginning of the seventeenth century was also a general trend. By the 1620s, formal citizenship petitions disappeared from the town records of Mexico City.∂π In seventeenth-century Popayán (present-day Colombia), citizenship was a highly informal status and did not depend on the inclusion of a resident’s name in official registries. It was constituted socially and granted automatically to people who integrated into the community.∂∫ In eighteenth-century Quito and Cuenca (present-day Ecuador), citizenship was instituted by ‘‘public knowledge,’’ which required no proof.∂Ω These findings indicate that the exclusion of non-Spaniards from

54

Vecindad: Spanish America

citizenship, as well as the continuation of formal citizenship procedures in Castile and their abandonment in Spanish enclaves in America, cannot be explained only by observing the local circumstances in each community.∑≠ The exclusion from citizenship of Indians, mestizos, and mulattos as well as non-Spanish Europeans was likely tied to, as well as motivated by, a growing identification between ‘‘Spanishness’’ and citizenship. This growing identification led to the rejection of non-Spanish people. Non-Spanish Europeans could be rejected as citizens because their presence in Spanish America was legally prohibited (see chapters 4 and 5). Although Castilian citizenship practices clearly stated that the foreignness of people was irrelevant to their status as citizens or noncitizens, this statement was made under the assumption that the presence of foreigners was allowed and even welcomed, as was the case in Castile. Once their presence was prohibited and considered highly dangerous, as was the case in Spanish America, it became reasonable to exclude nonSpanish Europeans from the local community. Because foreigners who resided in local communities could obtain status as natives, Spanish Americans who wanted to protect the Spanish monopoly in the Americas had to make sure that no foreigner was allowed to settle permanently on the continent. It is therefore not surprising that the exclusion of non-Spanish Europeans, which probably also existed elsewhere, was most evident in Buenos Aires, where there were many such foreigners and where their presence motivated repeating confrontations. Whereas the rejection of non-Spanish Europeans from citizenship could be tied to the illegality of their presence in Spanish America, the exclusion of Indians, mestizos, and mulattos had no clear legal reason. Both the Castilian citizenship regime and Castilian law prohibited this exclusion, and its practice was indeed limited as long as Spanish American communities applied formal categories. When formal categories were abandoned at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the rejection of Indians and the mixed-blood became more frequent and more apparent. Seemingly, a regime based on reputation rather than legal categories was more likely to follow the general sense that, regardless of legal definitions, those who are not Spanish are external to the local community. Again, it is not surprising that this exclusion was most evident in Caracas, which became dependent on slave labor. Yet it probably existed in other places as well. If the rejection of non-Spanish Europeans, Indians, the mixed-blood, and mulattos could be explained by some sort of essentialization that, for different reasons, tended to equate the local community with the larger Spanish community, the abandonment of formal procedures, also common to many Spanish American settlements, must be reasoned by other factors. One way to

Vecindad: Spanish America

55

discern how this common development came about is to compare the practical implications of citizenship in Castile and Spanish America, on one hand, and the frequency of conflicts (or potential conflicts) regarding citizenship, on the other. As I indicated in the introduction and in chapter 2, citizenship was an important issue in Castile because it allowed people to enjoy a wide array of privileges and obligated them to comply with many duties. Despite this fact, citizenship was registered and debated in Castile only in cases of conflict or potential conflict. In all other cases, it operated silently, and people were classified and allowed to exercise rights and duties without their status being explicitly discussed. Was this the case in Spanish America? There are many indications that by the beginning of the seventeenth century Spanish American communities no longer maintained a discriminatory regime that clearly distinguished between the rights of citizens and noncitizens. There are hundreds of cases where noncitizens in Spanish American communities enjoyed rights that in Castile would have been reserved for citizens. In many Spanish American communities communal property was open to both citizens and noncitizens, and noncitizens could be employed in municipal offices.∑∞ In some jurisdictions, taxation and military duty were imposed equally on both citizens and noncitizens.∑≤ Indeed, once land grants ceased, Spanish American practices no longer substantially discriminated against noncitizens. Emptied of most of its pragmatic implications, by the mid-seventeenth century, Spanish American citizenship embodied only the social and cultural recognition that one was a permanent member of the community. Once this was the case, the struggle to define who was a citizen lost much of its importance; it probably became less frequent, less urgent, less conflictual, and thus less often recorded. The relation between the demand for rights, on one hand, and formal acknowledgement of citizenship, on the other, can be exemplified by reviewing the few occasions when citizenship did matter in Spanish America. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when obtaining citizenship enabled individuals to enjoy a particular regime of rights and duties, discussions on citizenship reappeared. In these situations, citizenship was argued according to the Castilian tradition that linked behavior to intention: people who acted as citizens were in fact citizens. The opposite was also true. Those no longer acting as citizens were considered to have expressed implicitly a desire to severe ties with the community. Yet, in the late seventeenth and eighteenth century, two important factors, which were present in early Caracas and Buenos Aires, became especially apparent. These factors were (1) the growing identification between domicile and citizenship and (2) the close association between citizenship and nativeness. One example for late seventeenth-century and eighteenth-century Spanish

56

Vecindad: Spanish America

American citizenship discussions is the debate provoked by the application of Spanish American legislation prohibiting certain officeholders and their children from marrying local spouses.∑≥ This prohibition, which initially excluded only spouses who were born locally as marriage partners, was extended in the late seventeenth century to cover all people having domicile in the jurisdiction. Thereafter, to determine whether unions were to be allowed or prohibited, the authorities had to examine whether the spouse was native born or had a domicile in the jurisdiction. In investigating these cases, they solicited the opinion of interested parties and local witnesses. Although motivated by different considerations, interested parties, witnesses, and eventually the authorities did agree on a few basic elements.∑∂ First and foremost, when asked about domicile, they answered about citizenship (vecindad), thus demonstrating that from their point of view the two terms were interchangeable.∑∑ The identification of domicile with vecindad was made explicit, for example, by Juan Pez de Aller who interpreted the prohibition as including spouses who were ‘‘citizens (vecino) and had domicile (domiciliado) in the jurisdiction.’’ Second, they made no suggestion that citizenship was a formal category obtained by virtue of a formal administrative procedure. On the contrary, according to them, citizenship was a status dependent on reputation and ‘‘common knowledge’’ (voz común). They assumed that all permanent residents of Spanish origin were citizens, and they expressed their belief that residence had to be accompanied by the intention to be tied permanently to the community. A residence that was joined by the hope to return to the community of birth, for example, was considered temporary and did not constitute citizenship.∑∏ Spaniards who were in Spanish America on a temporary basis were therefore noncitizens; Spaniards, who tied their future to the community, where they wanted to remain permanently, were citizens (see chapter 7). The linking of citizenship with domicile and permanence was also supported in the writing of contemporary Spanish American scholars. In the seventeenth century, Juan Solórzano Pereira ascertained that the marriage prohibition should not be applied to natives who no longer had a domicile in the jurisdiction.∑π He asserted that people had abandoned their domicile if they left the jurisdiction, taking their families and properties with them and having the intention ‘‘to reside and remain’’ permanently in another community. He also mentioned that the passing of ten years was a sufficient proof of an intention to abandon one’s community. In short, speaking about domicile, Solórzano reproduced with fidelity the Castilian desavecindamiento, the undoing of citizenship (chapter 2). The identification of domicile with citizenship also occurred elsewhere. For example, in early eighteenth-century Quito, a debate took place: could certain

Vecindad: Spanish America

57

people residing in Otavalo participate in ceremonies taking place in Quito as if they were citizens of Quito? It was then explained that these people originated from Quito and never meant to abandon their citizenship in the capital when they founded Otavalo. Applying ‘‘the natural law which aided them, as free vassals of his royal person,’’ these people were eligible to ‘‘voluntarily . . . swear domicile’’ in Quito.∑∫ In this case, domicile was equaled to citizenship and distinguished from residence. Obtaining it depended on the interested party’s wishes, which were guaranteed by freedom of immigration and by natural rights. Similar conclusions were also reached in late colonial Buenos Aires, where the distinction between noncitizens and citizens was interpreted as identical to the distinction between transients and permanent residents.∑Ω This interpretation allowed all permanent residents who complied with obligations to be considered citizens and to acquire the rights and obligations of citizens. The identification between citizenship and domicile was paralleled by a tendency to identify citizenship with nativeness. This tendency was already suggested in the colonial legislation that initially prohibited ministers and their children from marrying persons born in the jurisdiction that they governed and later prohibited them from marrying citizens. It was also present in the application processes. Witnesses evaluating the spouse often considered that individuals who were well integrated in the local community and who were citizens of it were also by extension natives, or were worthy of treatment as natives, even when they had been born elsewhere. The idea that integration implied both nativeness and citizenship and that one could lead to the other was also reproduced in Quito in the 1740s. Witnesses in the investigation against president José Araujo y Río attested that Sancho de Segura should be considered a native of Lima.∏≠ Although they were aware that he was born in Quito, they explained that he immigrated to Lima at a young age ‘‘where he remained for a long time and co-naturalized in that city, having more relationship and closeness with its citizens (vecinos) than with those of Quito.’’∏∞ Exchanging ‘‘nativeness’’ with both ‘‘citizenship’’ and ‘‘domicile,’’ the witnesses also requested that certain offices not be granted to foreigners but be reserved for natives or individuals domiciled in the jurisdiction.∏≤ The relation between citizenship and nativeness was also invoked in late eighteenth-century Buenos Aires. People appointed to local offices requested exemption because they were citizens of another community. Yet to prove their citizenship, they mainly referred to their nativeness (see below). Obtaining rights was one reason to discuss citizenship. Another was the presence of conflicts or the fear of conflicts. In 1652, the Caracas city council refused to recognize Juan Rodríguez Agrán as the new constable (alguacil

58

Vecindad: Spanish America

mayor).∏≥ Alleging that he was a noncitizen, the municipal authorities, who had another candidate in mind, insisted that municipal offices must be reserved to citizens or natives of the jurisdiction. Just as important was their complaint that Juan was of low social standing. He was a servant (criado) with neither independent financial resources nor a sufficiently good reputation (estimación). Invoking his condition as a foreigner, the authorities mostly disqualified Juan on the basis of other factors that, according to them, demonstrated that he was unworthy of the office. They also used against him an argument—foreignness—that they had been willing to ignore in other cases by admitting other noncitizens to office. Conflict or fear of conflict was also the reason why in the mid-eighteenth century, the town council of Buenos Aires declared Francisco Pérez de Saravia and the people who supported him noncitizens. Francisco had just been elected the local commercial deputy of Lima’s merchant guild. The town council, which spoke for the local merchants, opposed his appointment because it suspected that he would be subservient to the guild and insufficiently loyal to local interests.∏∂ According to the council, in spite of the fact that the guild’s ordinances stipulated that both electorate and elected must be citizens, many foreigners ( forasteros) voted in the elections, and, indeed, the elected official (Francisco) was himself a noncitizen. Francisco and his supporters rejected these claims: although they were unmarried and owned no house or real estate in the jurisdiction, they were nevertheless citizens because citizenship depended on only one factor: the transfer of money and property to the jurisdiction by a person ‘‘who came to reside in the city with the intention of living there perpetually.’’∏∑ Although their rivals shared this understanding, they reached the opposite conclusion. According to them, both Francisco and his supporters were transients rather than citizens because they came to Buenos Aires only to sell goods ‘‘without the intention of residing perpetually’’ in the city: they meant to leave as soon as their business dealings were done.∏∏ The viceroy, following the advice of the appellate court (audiencia) of Lima, ruled in favor of the town council and annulled the elections. Again, the formal conflict involved identifying citizens. Yet beneath this conflict was a real struggle to control local offices and to guarantee that only the ‘‘right’’ people would be elected to them. Holding municipal offices also motivated conflicts regarding citizenship. A coveted privilege during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, municipal office holding had lost much of its attraction by the eighteenth century. Employment in nonremunerated offices carrying heavy responsibility and a great deal of work no longer interested community members. This was especially true in regions with no Indians (and thus, no tax collection duties) and in cases

Vecindad: Spanish America

59

where candidates were merchants and needed to look after their business affairs.∏π Elected to office, these people claimed that they were too poor, too busy, or simply unworthy of the honor bestowed on them. This wish to avoid office holding became an epidemic in late eighteenth-century Buenos Aires.∏∫ Alleging different circumstances and needs, on occasion, those elected to office also argued that they were noncitizens and that, as a result, they could not be obliged to comply with citizenship duties. Jacinto de la Fuente argued that he was a citizen of Arrecife and not Pergamino, which was where he was elected to office.∏Ω His citizenship in Arrecife was based on the fact that he was a native of the jurisdiction, where he had established his domicile together with his wife and children. The authorities disagreed. Jacinto resided in Pergamino the greater part of the year, and his business operation was located in that community. As a result, he should ‘‘be reputed and held’’ (reputado y tenido) as a citizen of Pergamino. Other people were more successful in making the same claims. Joseph Fortunato Ruíz de Arellano requested that his nomination in Buenos Aires as a local judge (alcalde ordinario) be revoked because he was, in fact, a citizen of Asunción (Paraguay).π≠ His citizenship in Asunción, he said, was tied to the fact that he was a native of that jurisdiction: there he had property and had recently married an Asunción native by way of proxy. He also served as a judge in Asunción in 1760 and had always wished to return to that city. According to his claims, his case was radically different from those other petitioners who refused office but had resided in Buenos Aires continuously for many years. Unlike him, these people were citizens, and they could be forced into office.π∞ The authorities agreed with him.

Citizenship in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Recapitulation There is sufficient ground to believe that the abandonment of formal procedures for citizenship declaration in Spanish American enclaves was tied to the absence of a discriminatory regime that distinguished between the rights of citizens and noncitizens. This absence made the meaning of citizenship less crucial, and it generated fewer conflicts regarding the correct classification of each individual. But debates concerning citizenship did reappear when discrimination was reintroduced and when conflicts were possible or ongoing. Yet we still do not know why Spanish American communities stopped discriminating against noncitizens while Castilian communities continued to do so. Although the archives contain no answer to this question, one possible explanation is that once citizenship could be identified with such diverse notions as domicile, nativeness, and Spanishness, and once foreigners, Indians,

60

Vecindad: Spanish America

and the mixed-blood were rejected, the need to discriminate against people who were Spanish disappeared. Indeed, once citizenship was identified with Spanishness, all Spaniards could be admitted as citizens, or, at least they could enjoy a common regime of rights and privileges. At the same time, discrimination was maintained, even enforced, with regards to ‘‘true’’ outsiders: the Indians, mestizos, mulattos, and, to a certain degree, non-Spanish Europeans. One could say that in their joint opposition to foreign and seemingly hostile elements, in Spanish America all Spaniards were citizens of a single community and all non-Spaniards were classified as aliens. As a result, in this hectic and constantly changing world, there was an overpowering sense of familiarity. People acted as if they knew who the others were, and individuals moved across dozens, hundreds, and thousands of miles behaving as if they were in a familiar territory.π≤ In addition to the growing identification between Spanishness and citizenship, the abandonment of a discriminatory regime could also be explained by the structural and legal differences between Castile and Spanish America. In Castile, citizenship was defined at the same time in which the kingdom itself was created. The coincidence guaranteed a regime that was initially very localized and that admitted great differences between one community and the other. Processes of homogenization within the kingdom gradually closed the distance between the practices of different communities, yet until the end of the Old Regime, some differences, especially with regard to formal requirements and procedures, remained in place. It was also clearly the case that in Castile municipal entities were contemporaneous to the kingdom. Their residents forged an identity of their own at the same time in which they were gradually inserted into the kingdom. The contrary was true with regard to Spanish America. The settlement of the New World happened after the kingdom of Castile had consolidated. While the kingdom was a fact, the local community was a project. In the Americas, new communities were formed, and they initially had no local historical traditions, nor a clear local identity, nor a law of their own.π≥ Indeed, Spanish American enactments—whether local or common to the entire territory—lacked instructions concerning citizenship.π∂ This lack could be supplemented because Spanish American law determined that Castilian law would be adopted in cases of legal lacuna. There was, however, no single or simple set of Castilian laws that Spanish Americans could adopt. As noted earlier and in chapter 2, a common Castilian citizenship regime existed, but it depended on doctrine and practices. Castilian local legislation, on the contrary, included different rules with regard to the acquisition of formal citizenship. At certain places and times, the king instructed Spanish American communities to adopt

Vecindad: Spanish America

61

a specific Castilian community, for example, Seville, as a model. Yet other models also existed and were used in Spanish America. Confusion over the variety of local Castilian traditions that could potentially guide Spanish Americans was matched by personal convictions about the meaning of citizenship in Castile. Spaniards arriving in Spanish America originated in different communities, both Castilian and Aragonese. They each brought their own understanding of citizenship, which they wished to continue practicing as they had in Spain. This combination of factors encouraged the creation in Spanish America of a citizenship regime that was weak on formalities and laws but strong on convictions. This regime abandoned the peculiarities typical to Castilian local communities and adopted instead what was common to the entire kingdom (and probably Spain): the idea that beyond formalities people could become citizens by enacting the role of citizen.

The República de Indios There are many indications that by the mid-seventeenth century and especially during the eighteenth century, Castilian notions of citizenship were also being introduced to the Indian republic. The literature on migrant ( forastero) Indians in Spanish America hints at such developments.π∑ Indians were originally classified as members of Indian communities by virtue of birth and descent. This classification was used to determine duties, especially paying taxes (tributo) and contributing with labor (repartimiento). Although migration among communities within and outside the Indian republic was permitted, only under exceptional circumstances were Indian migrants allowed to abandon their rights and duties in their community of birth and acquire new ones in a community of their choosing. By the seventeenth century, attitudes towards community affiliation gradually changed. Willingness developed to allow Indians to change the community to which they were legally bound. Like the Spanish, Indians came to be associated with the communities where they paid taxes, used communal land, or worked in certain offices. It was generally agreed that they acquired a set of rights and obligations by virtue of their behavior. Once these migrants had established themselves in the new community, they were no longer considered members of their original community. As immigration intensified, the original distinction between Indians who were members of the community (originarios) and Indians who were not ( forasteros), was replaced by another, which distinguished between temporary and permanent migrants. Temporary migrants were the ‘‘true’’ forasteros. They were external to the community and had no right to use communal land and no duty to pay taxes. The transient

62

Vecindad: Spanish America

nature of their association with the community led to their stigmatization as people with no fixed residence; they were often viewed as fugitives or vagrants. Permanent migrants included individuals who, despite their origin as forasteros, were considered members of the community. They could use the communal land and were obliged to pay taxes. Indeed, both the Spanish and the Indian authorities protested when permanent forasteros did not act as community members. They insisted, for example, that these forasteros were ‘‘naturalized’’ in the community, and that by virtue of their residence, marriage to local spouses, or ownership of property, they must be treated as ‘‘natives.’’ Although the term vecindad was mentioned in none of these cases, the similarities between these developments and Castilian citizenship practices are nevertheless striking. In fact, it seems that over time in their attempt to control migration among Indians, both the Spanish and Indian authorities implemented notions more related to the Castilian tradition of citizenship than to birth. Eventually, Indian local communities were viewed as associations based on the compliance with duties, which in turn generated the right to enjoy benefits. Both Indian and Spanish authorities insisted that permanence created ties between newcomers and the community, ties that became as important and as meaningful as birth and descent. Thereafter, the distinction between transitory and permanent members of the community, a distinction that was crucial to Castilian understandings of communal structures and belonging, was also introduced into the Indian world.

Conclusions The relation between Castilian and Spanish American practices was highly complex. A superficial study would indicate that Spanish American citizenship differed dramatically from the Castilian example. In early modern Castile, citizenship was a category both formal and explicit and with widereaching social, economic, honorary, cultural, and institutional implications. In Spanish America, citizenship became a status based on reputation, which implied no clear discriminatory regime and that had mostly a social—rather than legal—significance. A thorough investigation nevertheless demonstrates that the distance between the Castilian and the Spanish American experience was in some respects more apparent than real and in others, more real than apparent. On one hand, despite the disappearance of formal procedures, Spanish American citizenship still included the basic Castilian premise that people could become citizens by virtue of deciding to do so, and that this decision could best be proved by behavior as citizen, mainly through residence. Spanish American citizenship thus remained a measure of the person’s integration in

Vecindad: Spanish America

63

the community. This integration depended on the wishes of each candidate, as well as on the willingness of the other members to admit him. The abandonment of formal procedures in itself was not foreign to the Castilian tradition. On the contrary, it gave full credit to the idea, already present in Castile, that municipal intervention was not truly necessary to constitute citizenship, and that citizenship was automatically attained once the newcomer began acting as a citizen. In some odd way, Spanish American practices revealed the essence of the Castilian view more clearly than practices in Castile themselves: instead of municipal authorities’ validating through formal tests the power of people to convert themselves by virtue of their decision, Spanish American practices simply recognized the power of citizenship by reputation. On the other hand, conserving a regime that in many ways was similar to its Castilian precedent, Spanish American practices introduced innovations of great importance. These were the gradual identification between citizenship and domicile, and between citizenship, nativeness, and Spanishness. This identification permitted the ‘‘essentialization’’ or even the ‘‘nationalization’’ of citizenship. A great variety of local practices were unified in a common regime, and this regime rejected all non-Spanish elements.

4

Naturaleza: The Community of the Kingdom

Spain emerged from the Middle Ages as a highly complex and fragmented political entity. It included two crowns (Castile and Aragon); various kingdoms, provinces, and principates; and thousands of local communities.∞ The kingdoms included in the crown of Aragon, whose units—Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Majorca—each maintained their autonomous legal and political structures, had their own governing and representative institutions and their own laws. Some of the kingdoms and principates included in the crown of Castile, for example, León, Asturias, and Galicia, were integrated into a single system and were subjected to the same institutions and laws. Others, such as Navarre and the Basque provinces, conserved many of their separate structures.≤ People living in the different Spanish kingdoms were legally classified in different ways. They belonged to separate groups, each enjoying a particular regime of rights and duties as defined by the legal system of their kingdom or crown. Most important among these rights was the monopoly on office holding (reserva de oficio), which restricted the use of public office and ecclesiastical benefices to natives (naturales) of the jurisdiction. According to this monopoly, only natives of Castile could hold offices in Castile, only natives of Catalonia could hold offices in Catalonia, and so on.≥ Since implementing this monopoly required that foreigners (extranjeros) be distinguished from

64

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

65

natives, a theory of nativeness (naturaleza) was developed in each of the Iberian kingdoms. A common Spanish nativeness, which included all natives of all Spanish kingdoms, originated in Spanish America sometime at the end of the sixteenth century and was the result of a new monopoly that allowed only ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’ (naturales de los reinos de España) to emigrate to and to trade in the New World.∂ This monopoly forced the authorities on both sides of the Atlantic to determine whether people who wanted to immigrate and to trade were indeed natives of Spain. Because Spanish America was formally a Castilian territory, the answer to this question depended on Castilian legal arrangements. Although a community of ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’ was defined with regard to the colonial enterprise by the late sixteenth century, in the Iberian peninsula several communities of natives continued to coexist. The construction of a common community of Spanish natives did not come about until the early eighteenth century (1706–16) with the subjection of the Aragonese kingdoms to Castilian ‘‘public law.’’ This subjection was justified by Aragonese support for the vanquished Habsburg pretender during the Spanish War of Succession. Among the legal reforms that followed this war, several explicitly stated that natives of the Aragonese kingdoms would be equally eligible to offices and benefices all over Spain and that, by the same token, offices in the crown of Aragon would be open to Castilians.∑ Although Navarre and the Basque provinces preserved their individual legal regimes, because of special privileges granted to them in the sixteenth century, their natives were considered Castilians and, like all other Castilians, they could now hold offices anywhere in Spain.∏ The story about how discussions of the right to immigrate and to trade in the New World, and to hold public offices and ecclesiastical benefices in both Spain and Spanish America, defined the Spanish community, is largely untold. Spanish scholarship on nationalism and protonationalism centers on state structures and administrative developments and assumes that the construction of the Spanish community was a natural outcome of both.π Because ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘nation’’ were one of the same thing, subjects and nationals were synonymous. The king decided who was Spanish by accepting certain people as his vassals and by granting letters of naturalization to others.∫ Although in each particular Spanish kingdom ‘‘nativeness’’ expressed an early modern sentiment of ‘‘nation,’’ in Spain as a whole no such sentiment existed either because there was no community of Spanish natives or because this community, which included both local and foreign vassals, failed to generate distinctions between Spaniards and non-Spaniards.Ω

66

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

Despite these misleading indications, a community of Spanish natives did exist from the late sixteenth century, and its definition did not depend on the king alone. This community was instituted by reference to the ability to exercise certain rights and was defined as a result of a struggle to distinguish insiders (worthy of rights) from outsiders. This struggle depended on the efforts of individuals to obtain rights and the response of others—individuals, corporations, or authorities—who wished to assist or prevent them from achieving their goal. It was a struggle motivated by the wish to control the allocation of such resources as offices and commercial privileges. Yet, discussions about nativeness and foreignness also involved constitutional debates and demonstrated how local communities, merchants, and individuals responded to pressures from above, and how they clashed with the king over the right to define the community. On occasion, discussions about nativeness also expressed a genuine need to identify the moment and mechanism by which foreigners were transformed into natives or confirmed as outsiders. In early modern Spain nativeness and foreignness were never self-evident criteria, and they never obeyed clear legal prescriptions. Rather than being simply a matter of birth—as the term ‘‘native’’ might indicate and as most historians have assumed—in Spain and Spanish America nativeness became a social and legal construct.∞≠ This construct was subjected to negotiations and pacts, and it suffered revisions as it was applied and interpreted by different people acting under different circumstances and for different ends. First defined in thirteenth-century Castile, over time and especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Castilian and then Spanish nativeness became associated with local citizenship. People were natives, or became natives, once they established, with the intent to remain permanently, residence in a community located on Spanish territory, or once they gave other proofs of their wish to tie themselves to such a community. By the same token, individuals who left the community lost their status as natives independent of their place of birth or their descent. Indeed, like citizenship, nativeness operated on the margins of formal declarations: it existed as an implicit category. People obtained it, or lost it, because of the way they behaved rather than because of birth or royal recognition. Yet, while certain people were allowed to act as natives without their status being questioned, others encountered opposition within the community and had their rights contested. This opposition could force individuals who gave no indications of foreignness—for example, those born in Spain or Spanish America to Spanish parents and who had always lived in the community—to defend their status as natives. These tensions within the community were further complicated by the existence of formal procedures that allowed the king to naturalize foreigners.

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

67

These procedures—royal naturalization letters—constituted an authority parallel to the system of implicit categorizations. Their use provoked constant confrontations between the king and the kingdom. The king wished to gratify his clients by naturalizing them, and he insisted that the Spanish community consisted of vassals directly tied to him. It was up to him as a sovereign monarch to decide who would be accepted as vassal, and acceptance as vassal meant immediate naturalization. The representatives of the kingdom, on the contrary, believed that people were naturalized through establishing ties with the community, by acting in a way that made them members. Although nativeness was mentioned in thirteenth-century legal texts, discussions about the meaning of Castilian nativeness began only in fourteenthand fifteenth-century Castile. These discussions were tied to determining eligibility for public office and ecclesiastical benefices. By the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these discussions were applied to the colonies and were used in both Spain and Spanish America to define a community of Spanish natives for the purpose of immigration and trade in the New World. By the early eighteenth century and with the application of Castilian law in Aragon, the same discussions helped determine the extension of a Spanish community also in Spain. As happened in the local sphere, these issues were not apparent in the legislation. Although all peninsular kingdoms had laws explaining nativeness in reference to a particular right, the requirements enumerated by these laws seem arbitrary and they changed from one case to the other.∞∞ The importance of legal requirements was not clear; they were often ignored by individuals and authorities, whom historians have accused of disregarding the law and introducing corrupt practices.∞≤ In spite of its frequent use in administrative, judicial, and mercantile records, the term ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’ was never legally defined. Following the Recopilación de Indias that clarified that among those native of Spain were natives of Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, Minorca, Navarre, and the three Basque provinces, it was generally assumed by historians that Spanish nativeness had no definition of its own and that to be Spanish one had to be native of Castile, Aragon, or Catalonia, and so forth.∞≥ Yet, as in the case of local communities, these conclusions change once we examine individual cases where the application of the category ‘‘native of Spain’’ was required either because individuals requested to be recognized as such, or because others wished to bar them from privileges. These cases demonstrate the construction of Spanishness as a category independent of membership in an individual Spanish kingdom. I examined some 1,700 such cases, mainly concerned with the ability to immigrate and to trade in the New World

68

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

and the right to hold offices and benefices in Castile and other parts of Spain. For the sake of convenience, I have separated developments in Castile and Spain from developments in Spanish America. Despite this material separation, the two debates, which are explored below and in chapter 5, should be viewed as complementary.

The Monopoly on Office Holding (the Reserva de Oficio) The construction of a community of Spanish natives began in thirteencentury Castile. The Siete Partidas defined nativeness (naturaleza) as: ‘‘one of the greatest obligations people can have with one another. If nature ties them by lineage, nativeness converts them into a single unit through the long practice of loyal love.’’ Responsible for the creation of human associations, nativeness included the ‘‘obligation which men are under to others to love and cherish them for some just reason.’’ It consisted of a natural inclination: ‘‘The following distinction exists between it [nativeness] and nature, namely, nature is a force which causes everything to remain in the condition directed by the bond of God; nativeness is something which resembles nature and assists everything derived from it to exist and be preserved.’’∞∂ The Siete Partidas enumerates ten ways to achieve nativeness. The first and best is nativeness obtained by birth in the territory to a family that descended from the jurisdiction.∞∑ Other ways include vassalage, nurture (crianza), knighthood, marriage, inheritance, rescue from captivity, death or dishonor, emancipation, conversion to Christianity, or ten years’ residence. Even at this early stage, nativeness was clearly distinguished from vassalage. Nativeness was a natural condition, automatically acquired once the circumstances for its constitution were present. Vassalage, on the contrary, was a contract that came into being mainly through subjection and service.∞∏ Each of these conditions implied a different set of rights and obligations, and each could be achieved and abandoned in a different way. I will return to this issue in chapter 6. Although rooted in medieval times, the practice of identifying people as natives and distinguishing them from foreigners became important in Castile only in the following centuries. Two reasons contributed to this growing importance. (1) During the late Middle Ages, and especially after the unification of the crowns of Castile and Aragon, the Spanish monarchy became a ‘‘composite’’ monarchy, embracing different territories with different legal regimes. Under these circumstances, the definition of natives and their distinction from foreigners, especially foreign vassals of the Spanish king, became essential as inhabitants of the different kingdoms wished to limit the power that foreign vassals could acquire through their relationship with the monarch. (2) The

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

69

fifteenth and sixteenth centuries constituted a period of bureaucratic expansion. The number and importance of available public offices and ecclesiastical benefices grew substantially. This growth was accompanied by the patrimonialization of public offices and ecclesiastical benefices, which came to be viewed as the private property of communities, particular families, or specific individuals. Communities, families, and individuals competed for the allocation of these resources, and they offered the monarch substantial amounts of money in order to obtain control of their assignment. During this period, public offices and ecclesiastical benefices were also perceived as rewards, which the king could distribution among his allies and loyal servants. They, his allies, expected to receive these rewards, and he, the king, wished to distribute them. As a result of both these processes, by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the representatives of the kingdom in parliament (cortes) argued that only natives should be allowed to exercise offices and benefices that were very profitable or that included jurisdiction over people and territory.∞π In response to these petitions, as early as 1377 and repeatedly over the next two centuries, Castilian monarchs first promised to revoke all grants of ecclesiastical benefices to foreigners and then expanded that exclusion to most public offices, retail mercantile activities, and all seigniorial jurisdictions. The exclusion of foreigners also found expression in local laws and in the ordinances of specific institutions or offices, which clarified that they must be ‘‘reserved for natives.’’∞∫ It thus became necessary in Castile to distinguish natives from foreigners. This distinction had no simple definition in the existing legislation. Instead, there were several overlapping definitions, each seemingly indicating the importance of different criteria. The first definition, included in the Siete Partidas and specifying that birth, vassalage, nurture, knighthood, marriage, inheritance, rescue, emancipation, conversion, or a ten years’ residence constituted nativeness, was a main point of reference.∞Ω Yet in 1565, a second definition was added, clarifying who was a native of Castile for the sake of receiving ecclesiastical benefices. According to this second definition, natives were persons born in the kingdoms to a native father, and others who had established their domicile in the jurisdiction and lived there for ten years. Nativeness could be extended to sons of natives born abroad if their parents were absent from the kingdom because of royal service, with royal permission, or if their absence was temporary.≤≠ Although this definition, which was included in the Recopilación de Castilla, was not meant to change the existing legal situation, it was clear that the criteria and prerequisites it enumerated were different from the ones included in the Partidas. Vassalage, conversion, nurture, knighthood, marriage, inheritance, rescue, and emancipation disappeared, and in their place emphasis was placed on birth and descent, on one hand, and a

70

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

prolonged residence, on the other. Other definitions also followed. In order to obtain their naturalization in Castile, foreigners had to petition the Council of Castile and demonstrate that they had lived in the kingdom for ten years, had owned a house, and were married to a native.≤∞ Marriage and the owning of a house were thus added to the criteria listed to distinguish foreigners and natives. In 1620, ‘‘sons of foreigners born in Spain’’ were declared ‘‘natives of Spain,’’ apparently for all purposes and especially with reference to the ability to immigrate and to trade in the New World.≤≤ At this point, it seems that birth in the territory is sufficient to obtain nativeness, and descent is no longer an issue. In 1623, foreigners who resided in Castile for ten years, owned property, and were married to a Spanish wife for at least six years were equal to natives in many respects.≤≥ This apparent legal discrepancy was echoed in early modern literature. Alonso de Acevedo, Hugo de Celso, Juan de Hevia Bolaños, José de Veitia Linaje, Gregorio López de Tovar, Rafael Antunes y Acevedo, and Juan Sala also pointed to a variety of situations allowing people to acquire nativeness.≤∂ Nevertheless, they identified two situations as principal: birth and a prolonged residence in the kingdoms, which some of them titled ‘‘domicile’’ (domicilio) and others ‘‘citizenship’’ (vecindad or avecindamiento). Hugo de Celso, for example, specifically mentioned that despite the variety of ways to acquire nativeness, ‘‘birth, nurture (crianza), or long residence are the principal ways.’’≤∑ Gregorio López de Tovar stressed the fact that a ten years’ residence could transform foreigners born outside the kingdom into natives.≤∏ Yet residence, domicile, and citizenship were three different realities. Residence referred to the material presence of a person in a given territory. Domicile included the idea that this presence was voluntary, and that it incorporated the intention to remain in that place permanently.≤π Citizenship could be similar to domicile, or it could include other proofs for the newcomer’s insertion in the community such as marriage, owning property, and the payment of taxes. The only common thread in these situations was the idea that people who met the enumerated criteria loved the community and were loyal to it. In the case of individuals born in Spain to Spanish parents, it was automatically assumed that they loved the community and felt loyal to it. This assumption was based on the belief that natural law dictated that people loved the land of their birth. This belief appeared in the Siete Partidas, and it was repeatedly stated by authors, such as José María Alvarez, who cited the Partidas’s definition of nativeness, or Gerónimo de Uztariz, who attested in 1742: ‘‘I know children in this city born of parents that were both foreigners and educated under their eyes, that are in their heart and manners more Spaniards than foreigners, I may add in language, for they chose rather to speak the dialect of

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

71

this kingdom and are averse to their fathers’, though they hear nothing else at home but his native language. This does not surprise me, when I consider what effect the place of birth usually has, the great influence of the first acquaintance and society we contract in the world.’’≤∫ The native born could be trusted, but foreigners could not. They were rejected because they ‘‘were not obliged to the community, neither with faith, nor with love.’’≤Ω Because foreigners did not love the community they were ‘‘dangerous.’’ Foreigners did not identify with local interests, and they hoped to benefit from their association with Castile while planning to later return to their community of origin: ‘‘These foreigners who have dignities and benefices in our kingdoms want to be in their lands more than in a foreign land. They will take out the money [they earn] from our kingdoms, leaving them with great damage and poverty and enriching foreign kingdoms, even enemy kingdoms. . . . When prelates and other beneficiaries are natives, they help us . . . in the war against the Moors and the defense of the royal crown of our kingdoms. All of this is not true when the prelates and beneficiaries are not our natives.’’≥≠ People who loved the community could thus be considered natives. People who did not love the community were classified as foreigners. Yet, as Baltasar Alamos de Barrientos, Gerónimo de Uztariz, and Pedro Fernández Navarrete pointed out, foreigners who fixed their domicile in Castile, where they owned a house or were married to a native, no longer posed a threat.≥∞ Although they may ‘‘not afford us the affection and reliance of native and loyal subjects,’’ they were still worthy of nativeness.≥≤ The presumption was that their lengthy or close association with the community created a ‘‘sufficient sense of loyalty.’’≥≥ As trustworthy people, they could be granted the rights of natives. Implied in these observations was the idea that certain foreigners went through some sort of conversion that allowed them to abandon their condition as outsiders. This conversion transpired without the intervention of the authorities. It was a by-product of the association between a person and a community, an association that could be established in a variety of ways. It could depend on residence, but it could also be generated by other factors, such as birth in the jurisdiction, marriage to a native, or owning property. It could be demonstrated by the fact that the foreigner severed all ties to his community of origin because he no longer hoped to return there. What was important was not the specific way this association came about, but the guarantee it supplied for the person’s good intentions. In the words of a seventeenth-century observer: ‘‘Almost all the foreigners who live in this city [Seville?] are very naturalized in it, some of them for the many years in which they had lived here, others also for having been born in it, others because they

72

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

were married in many cases with natives, or their daughters married natives, reasons for which they have established deep roots that made them love and desire the best for these kingdoms.≥∂’’ Indeed, certain foreigners could be considered natives ‘‘because most of them lived in Cádiz for 20, 30, 40, and 50 years, and they are married with natives, and they have their estate and family there, without having any dependency on Portugal.’’≥∑ These foreigners, although not formally declared natives, were ‘‘connaturalized,’’ their residence being ‘‘in substance the same as if they were declared natives.’’ Their conversion to natives was both legal and social. Indeed, it even affected their nature. For example, according to some authors, Frenchmen who were sufficiently integrated in Spain acted in a way that combined ‘‘Spanish grave-character’’ with ‘‘French Lightness.’’≥∏ Because of this understanding that permanent resident foreigners, many of whom were citizens of local communities, no longer posed threat to the Castilian and Spanish communities, legal enactments became less important than the intentions that they sought to reproduce. The conditions stipulated by the laws governing nativeness and naturalization were interpreted as legal presumptions. Similar to their role in the local sphere, these presumptions aimed to help the authorities distinguish between true outsiders and integrated foreigners who had attained nativeness. The presumptions did not prescribe the only way foreigners could be transformed into natives. Indeed, individuals could be declared natives even when they did not fulfill the conditions stipulated in the laws if other indications proved that they had tied themselves to the community. For example, in 1769, Ignacio Barra obtained recognition that he was a native on the grounds that he was ‘‘well rooted’’ in Spain and would probably never leave the country.≥π In the same year, Antonio Rafael Mengs was able to demonstrate his love of Spain by establishing a school of arts in Madrid and training many disciples.≥∫ Despite being married to an Irish compatriot and thus lacking one of the requirements for naturalization, Roberto White was granted naturalization because he had purchased a house and obtained citizenship in Cádiz, and the authorities believed that he wanted to establish a permanent domicile in Spain.≥Ω People who lacked the legal requirements could obtain their naturalization, as often as others were denied the status of natives despite fulfilling these requirements if their loyalty was questioned. Juan Jerónimo Burgué, a Frenchman, resided in the Iberian peninsula for many years and was occupied in different commercial undertakings first in Cádiz and then in San Sebastián.∂≠ According to the local authorities, despite this permanence and his status as a local citizen, it remained unclear whether he was truly tied to Spain. He had no

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

73

Spanish partners, employed only Frenchmen in his household, and he ran a business initially set up by his brother, who was married to a French woman and who had recently returned to France with his Spanish-born children. It was also unclear whether the properties Juan Jerónimo was managing were his own. ‘‘Because of the lack of effective proofs that he wished to remain, and the indications that he might not,’’ his petition for naturalization was denied.∂∞ Although Bernardo Micheu had resided in Spain for more than seventeen years, in 1762 his residence was considered temporary, leading the authorities to refuse his naturalization.∂≤ It appears that, contrary to what we may have believed in the past, grants of nativeness that did not conform to the conditions stipulated in the laws were not necessarily unlawful. Nor was the refusal to grant nativeness to individuals who complied with all the legal requirements necessarily an illegal act. Instead, these decisions followed legal and political practices that were broader than the written law, practices that most historians have ignored.∂≥ In the words of the representative of royal interests in the Council of the Indies: There could be a case, in which all the circumstances [enumerated in the laws] would be present, yet by law it would be impossible to declare the person native. . . . This would be the case of foreigners who had resided in the kingdom for a sufficient time, yet who must be considered transients because they lack the wish to remain or to establish domicile. . . . This is the way we must understand the Partida law, which establishes that a ten-year residence is sufficient to obtain nativeness. This law must be interpreted in the following way: the ten-year residence operates a presumption that the petitioner wishes to remain in the country permanently. If there is a contrary presumption, or contrary proofs, the ten-year residence is insufficient to grant nativeness.

Indeed, ‘‘if one is to pay attention to the wording of the Partida it is clear that a ten-year residence does not convert foreigners into natives. What converts foreigners into natives is the wish to remain.’’∂∂ The idea that foreigners could become natives based on proof that they felt loyal to the community established a close association between nativeness and citizenship. Foreigners who obtained citizenship could easily demonstrate their nativeness and, indeed, citizenship acquisition was a common proof of integration in the community of natives. Faustino Borgnis Desbordes came to Puerto Santa María in the early 1760s.∂∑ Fifteen years later he requested recognition as native of Spain. This was owed to him because he was a citizen and because he came to the country ‘‘with the intention to establish domicile.’’ This intention, Faustino argued, could be proved by the fact that he had married

74

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

a native-born spouse, had children, and had established his business there. Through this activity, he had become ‘‘connaturalized’’ (connaturalizado) and ‘‘rooted’’ (arraigado) in Spain. Given the importance of integration, and the understanding that integration always happens on a local level and within the boundaries of a specific community, local authorities became involved in processes of naturalization. They were asked to render judgment regarding the status of foreigners residing in their district, and their affirmation that these foreigners acted as Spaniards and were attached to the local community was essential to the recognition that these foreigners were already natives, or merited naturalization.∂∏ Persons who lost their citizenship risked becoming nonnatives. This was the opinion of Gregorio López de Tovar and Juan de Hevia Bolaños, according to whom ‘‘if a native of the kingdom, or anyone reputed as native, leaves the kingdom and resides in a foreign kingdom, where he establishes domicile, if he later pretends to be a native, he is no longer considered native.’’∂π Benito Gerónimo Feijóo agreed with them, pointing out: ‘‘Spain is the object of love of all Spaniards. This rule applies when migration to another country does not convert Spaniards into members of another society, in which case they must love that other society more than the country where they were born. This obligation [to love] the republic does not depend on birth in the district, but on being a component of its society. Therefore, people who legitimately emigrate from their country of birth and fix their domicile in another dominion owe the same obligation to the new republic as to the one they had to the republic where they were born, and they must regard this new republic as their patria.’’∂∫ Natives who severed their ties with the local community, who established a permanent residence outside Castile or Spain, or who married a foreigner while residing abroad could lose their status as natives. These people and especially their sons could not hold public offices or emigrate to Spanish America.∂Ω If they wished to remain natives despite their detachment from the community, they had to prove that their cases were exceptional. Joseph Larrugia was born in Baza (jurisdiction of Granada) to parents who were natives of the kingdom of Castile.∑≠ At a young age, he was sent to Malta, where he was educated in the seminary of the Order of San Juan to which he now belonged. In 1786, Joseph requested the royal council to declare him a ‘‘true Spaniard’’ (verdadero español ), eligible to receive an ecclesiastical benefice. Joseph explained that the other members of the order suspected he was a foreigner, and they therefore refused to grant him the privileges that were rightfully his. Despite his absence from Spain, he declared, he never renounced his condition as native. In another case, Octavio Ximénes Aldeano presented to the royal council letters from two Spanish overseas officials who considered him ‘‘of the

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

75

Spanish nation, despite having been born in Sicily.’’∑∞ He insisted on his wish to ‘‘return to the primitive privileges of his great-grandfather’’ and requested a declaration that he was a native. He attempted to demonstrate that his family —whose genealogy he presented—had always been employed in royal service. As a result, despite their physical absence from the kingdom, its members never intended to severe their relationships with the community.∑≤ They enjoyed the exception, reproduced in the Recopilación de Castilla, according to which ‘‘if the parents . . . were outside these kingdoms in our service, or according to our order, or as transients and without establishing domicile outside these kingdoms, their sons born abroad would be considered natives of these lands.’’∑≥ Although Octavio’s request was denied, other candidates were more fortunate. The father of Ignacio Aguirre had emigrated to Rome, where he obtained an ecclesiastical office and married a Roman woman. These factors apparently indicated that he had decided to establish domicile in that city and that his membership in the Spanish community had expired. Nevertheless, his son asserted that such was not the case. Before the ten years required to establish domicile had passed, Ignacio’s father was nominated as a secretary of the Spanish postman in Rome. ‘‘In this way, he conserved the nativeness of Spain, which he could retain as a royal servant.’’ Because his father, abroad on royal service, was Spanish, so was he. Furthermore, Ignacio himself was employed in the same office and his attachment to the Spanish community was demonstrated by his membership in the Spanish confraternity of Rome, with which he ‘‘credited the same possession [of nativeness] and proved his wish and intention to retain and conserve it.’’∑∂ Upon his request, Ignacio was declared native. Being eligible to rights and obligations in the kingdom was, therefore, independent of formal declarations and of formal circumstances, such as birth and descent. People were natives or foreigners by virtue of their internal decision to be a permanent member of the community. This decision was assumed in the case of natives who continued to live in the jurisdiction. After all, natives naturally loved their place of birth. Yet an internal decision could also be deduced by observing the behavior of foreigners who resided in Spain or natives of Spain who left it. The idea that integrated foreigners underwent a conversion that truly effected their nature was clear in their designation as ‘‘natives’’ rather than ‘‘naturalized.’’ Their nativeness, it was said, was constituted by the ‘‘passage of time’’ (mediante el tiempo) or simply by ‘‘prescription’’ (naturaleza por vía de prescripción). People living in seventeenth-century Castile and eighteenth-century Spain requested formal declaration that they were natives when they feared conflict

76

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

or were experiencing one. Among them were natives who were suspected of foreignness. In 1624, Guillermo Bequer explained that although according to the law he was native, he did not dare to act as native because of the ‘‘continuous hustle he suffered, as well as his designation as a foreigner.’’∑∑ Joseph Larrugia asked to be declared ‘‘truly Spaniard’’ (verdadero español ) in order to prove to his colleagues of the Order of San Juan that he was worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice.∑∏ Other people who requested to be formally declared natives were foreigners who, having been naturalized in Spain by way of prescription, found it necessary to obtain also a formal declaration. Juan Olavide, born in France, arrived to Spain as a child in 1746.∑π He completed a university degree in Alcalá and became a candidate (opositor) for a fellowship. Those competing with him raised the issue of his foreignness, which would make him ineligible. Although the university rejected these claims, ‘‘these precedents did not diminish his fear that he would be unable to receive ecclesiastical benefice in these kingdoms unless he proceeded to request a formal declaration that he was native. Nor is he assured by the fact that his brother Miguel de Olavide, who lives in Lima, was allowed to trade in the Indies.’’ He had spent so much money in his academic degree that it would be highly prejudicial to him if he had to abandon the Spanish kingdoms. Furthermore, abandoning these kingdoms would be ‘‘impractical, since he was so connaturalized in them and would have difficulty in any language other than Spanish.’’∑∫ Juan’s request was granted on the grounds that he virtually grew up in Spain. Antonio María Benchi wished to obtain a formal naturalization ‘‘so that no one will ever consider him a foreigner.’’∑Ω Faustino Borgnis explained that he was already connaturalized in Spain, and now all he required was a formal declaration of this fact.∏≠

Royal Naturalization Policies In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries royal naturalization policies became a major issue in relations between the monarch, the parliament (cortes), and local communities.∏∞ Royal naturalization policies were considered by the parliament and communities an unwelcome intervention in these natural processes of communal construction. These policies enabled the king to naturalize whomever and whenever he saw fit. They allowed the monarch to contravene the monopoly on office holding by naturalizing undeserving foreigners subsequent to their appointment to office and solely to render them eligible for that office. Using this method, the crown was able to grant offices and benefices to many of its foreign clients, thus depriving the natives of their right to exclusivity. In the fifteenth and sixteenth century, the king transformed

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

77

royal councilors, ambassadors, and bankers into natives.∏≤ In the eighteenth century, he continued to do the same and allowed royal servants, including various nobles, military men, members of the royal household, and royal confessors, to enjoy the privileges of natives.∏≥ In order for natives to preserve their monopoly on office holding, it became essential to restrict the power of the king to naturalize foreigners. Although this struggle to restrict the power of the king to naturalize foreigners began with the inception of the monopoly in the late Middle Ages, it become a central issue in tax negotiations between the king and the kingdom only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.∏∂ In return for their consent to pay extraordinary contributions (servicio de millones), the representatives of the kingdom in parliament repeatedly demanded a royal pledge to respect the monopoly on office holding and a royal promise to never again naturalize foreigners.∏∑ The king agreed to these demands, but royal ministers devised new methods by which to continue the old practice.∏∏ Arguing that each case involved unique people and unique services to the crown, royal secretaries requested that the parliament make exceptions to the general rule and agree to the naturalization of specific foreigners as early as 1632.∏π This strategy was used in the seventeenth century, and it continued through the eighteenth.∏∫ Because the parliament rarely met during the eighteenth century, royal secretaries wrote to the cities with a vote in parliament and requested their consent individually.∏Ω This practice, which originated in Castile, was applied everywhere in Spain after the kingdoms of Aragon were placed under obedience to Castilian law in the beginning of the eighteenth century (1707–16).π≠ Seeking individual permission was formally acknowledged as a routine method in 1715 and was reproduced in the first compilation of Spanish law, the Novísima Recopilación.π∞ As happened in parliament during the seventeenth century, when asked to give their approval for the naturalization of foreigners in the eighteenth century, individual communities occasionally protested.π≤ Although their protest was expressed mainly in the language of obedience, it nevertheless stated that the king abused his authority by granting naturalization to unworthy people. He exercised his powers freely to gratify his servants and their clients for services rendered and to build a loyal clientele and a subservient administration. This freedom had neither legal nor political justification. Foreigners could not be transformed into natives simply because the king wished it. Instead, the transformation of foreigners into natives was a matter of natural and not civil law, and the king could not modify its requirements and procedures. The king was also bound by the tax agreement he made with the kingdom. This agreement benefited third parties, so even if the contracting

78

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

parties (the king and kingdom) were willing to modify the agreement, the king requesting permission to naturalize foreigners and the kingdom acceding, they could not do so. As a ‘‘third party,’’ any individual living in the kingdom could make a claim against such a modification and compel the king and kingdom to enforce the original agreement.π≥ The Recopilación de Castilla recognized this right, setting the rule that ‘‘we [the kings] order and give faculty to all and each one of our subjects and natives that they may oppose and resist on these issues [naturalization], because this opposition concerns the privileges and honors and it guards the preeminence of the king and patria.’’π∂ Although the kingdom and the cities with a vote in parliament argued against royal naturalization policies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they did not once invoke the need to change the definition of nativeness and foreignness. Implicitly, they accepted the idea that foreigners could be transformed into natives through their activities, which proved their loyalty. What they rejected was the notion that foreigners who were not integrated in the community could be given the rights of natives solely because the king wished it so. This willingness to accept foreigners naturalized by integration and to reject those naturalized by the king can also be seen in the fact that when the king naturalized integrated foreigners there was little or no challenge at all. For example, in 1783, there was general agreement that Antonio Krasa merited his letter of naturalization as he had resided in the court since 1772, preaching and hearing confession in some six different languages as well as teaching music.π∑ The same thing was true of Angel Saviana, who served as a chaplain first in Naples, then in Barcelona. He was well known in the jurisdiction and was famous for the number of Protestant ‘‘heretics’’ he converted to the Catholic faith.π∏ By the same token, conflict was especially intense when candidates for royal naturalization clearly lacked an attachment to Spain, either because their residence in the jurisdiction was deemed temporary or because they resided elsewhere.ππ The conflict between the king and the kingdom regarding naturalization policies encouraged royal officials to develop a clearer distinction between naturalization by integration (prescription) and naturalization by royal grant. This distinction became a standing feature of eighteenth-century political debates and was now advocated by both the kingdom and the king. The cities with votes in parliament used it to distinguish between foreigners who were worthy of naturalization (by integration) and those who were not (by royal letter). Royal officials used it to establish when the kingdom could oppose a candidate’s naturalization. Approval of the kingdom to depart from the terms of the tax agreement, royal official argued, was required only in cases where

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

79

candidates for naturalization were ‘‘true’’ foreigners rather than integrated ones. Only in these cases did the king convert complete aliens into natives, and only in these cases did he potentially contravene his promise not to do so. In all other cases involving integrated foreigners, the opinion of the kingdom was irrelevant because integrated foreigners were already natives: ‘‘Bernardo Begues enjoys the privileges of native of these kingdoms because he had permanent residence and domicile in them for many years . . . and is married with children and is rooted in the principate of Asturias. . . . The naturalization letter which he requests is no other than a declaration of nativeness. This declaration is almost due in justice to a person who, like Bernardo Begues, already participates in the privileges of natives of this kingdom. In order to grant it [the declaration], it is unnecessary to obtain the agreement of the cities with vote in parliament.’’π∫ Because letters granted to integrated foreigners constituted nothing new, they should be issued free of charge: ‘‘It will be very just and convenient to the state that foreigners requesting the concession of this and similar grants will not be asked to pay for them in cases in which they are already citizens in Spain. This will encourage other people who request the same grace to establish their domicile in these kingdoms.’’πΩ One way royal officials attempted to reduce the kingdom’s opposition to the grant of naturalization by the king was by restricting the legal consequences of these grants. Beginning in the late seventeenth century, instead of granting nonintegrated foreigners ‘‘true’’ and total naturalization, most royal letters of naturalization specified the reason they were issued and restricted their effect to this reason alone. Foreigners who received these types of naturalization were not considered ‘‘natives’’ of the kingdoms. Instead, they were made equal to natives only in order to enjoy a specific right or privilege, office, or salary. In all other respects and for all other ends, they remained aliens. At the end of this process, an analytical distinction was established between four different types of letters of naturalization.∫≠ The first naturalization was ‘‘absolute,’’ and it allowed foreigners to enjoy the rights of natives without any limitation. The second naturalization only habilitated them to obtain secular offices. The third only permitted their access to a specific ecclesiastical benefice, and the fourth granted access to a specific secular office. This solution clearly contravened the monopoly on office holding. If offices and salaries were reserved to natives, then the only way to justify their allocation to foreigners was by claiming that certain people who were once foreigners were no longer truly aliens. Integrated into the community, these people could be granted privileges and be expected to comply with duties. Naturalizing individuals to make them eligible for office and limiting the consequences of the grant to this office alone did exactly the contrary. It affirmed

80

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

that people who continued to be complete aliens could nevertheless be employed in offices and enjoy benefices reserved for natives. Indeed, the awareness that these types of naturalization were a legal fiction is signaled by the fact that by the second half of the eighteenth century most of them were called dispensas. These legal instruments exempted people from certain legal requirements, thus permitting them to do something that they otherwise could not do. Dispensas included, for example, orders to treat minors as though they were of age so they could manage their own affairs and decrees that transformed illegitimate children into legitimate heirs.∫∞ Beyond the specific circumstances of each foreigner and each case, the debate between the king and the kingdom concerning royal naturalization policies involved a political struggle over questions of sovereignty and parliamentary control. The king and his ministers insisted that naturalization was a royal affair; it depended on royal grace and could be practiced by the monarchs as they pleased and to reward whom they saw fit. Royal naturalization letters were a useful instrument in affirming royal sovereignty precisely because they dictated against the common or general law: ‘‘The sovereigns are legislators and according to the circumstances of the subjects and their own pleasure they can . . . make exceptions and allow certain foreigners to hold ecclesiastical offices . . . otherwise, there will be a total subordination or subjection of the sovereignty, which is absurd and very bad, and for the same reason there was an infinite number of similar examples in all of the Christian kingdoms.’’∫≤ The community of the kingdom disagreed. Individual municipalities, the parliament, and at times even royal ministers maintained that the naturalization of foreigners was not a royal affair. It affected the entire community, and it depended on natural law and on Castilian legal traditions. If the king wanted the kingdom’s collaboration, for example, in tax payment, he would have to respect these laws and traditions. Yet the question had implications beyond the sovereignty of the king versus the power of local communities and legal traditions. Implied in the debate was a disagreement about the nature of the community. The model advocated by the king (that foreigners who sought naturalization needed to establish ties—usually service or patronage ties—with the monarch) constructed the Castilian and Spanish community as a community of vassals in which each individual was tied to the monarch and the monarch alone. The model advocated by the kingdom, on the contrary, allowed foreigners to become natives only when they tied themselves to the other members, thereby integrating themselves in a local community. According to this view, the community of the kingdom was an association between local communities that were themselves built from the ties among integrated individuals.∫≥

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

81

The degree to which legal traditions could circumscribe the power of the king to define the community was reaffirmed in other ways as well. In 1707– 16 the Aragonese kingdoms were subjected to obedience to Castilian law. One of the most important measures included in this reform was the unification of many communities of natives (natives of Castile, natives of Aragon, and so on) into a single community that was defined according to Castilian law. Castilian traditions determined who was a native of the kingdoms of Spain, and Castilian practices, such as requesting the permission of the kingdom to naturalize exceptional foreigners, were implemented in non-Castilian kingdoms, where foreigners were now identified as natives according to the Castilian doctrine. Yet, despite royal wishes, in the years following its enactment, the formation of this united community ran into problems. Ecclesiastical benefices, for example, were regulated by both local and papal legislation. In Catalonia, the monopoly of natives was embodied in local legislation, which recognized the principle of reciprocity. Foreigners, it stipulated, were excluded from benefices only as long as their countries of origin followed the same policy with regard to Catalans. Under these circumstances, the creation of a single community of Spanish natives posed no particular challenge. Such a community could be established either by changing the Catalan laws (which depended on local legislation) or by stipulating that—now that Catalans could hold benefices anywhere in Spain—other Spaniards should be able to do the same in Catalonia. The situation in Aragon was similar and posed no problems. In Valencia, however, the exclusion of nonnatives from ecclesiastical benefices won papal approval. Because the exclusion was embodied in papal legislation, neither the king nor the local authorities could modify it. Nevertheless, Valencia’s legal arrangements recognized the principle of reciprocity. Consequently, although the law itself could not be modified, its practical effect could, by making sure that natives of Valencia would be allowed to hold offices throughout Spain.∫∂ In Majorca the restrictions were based on papal bulls, which did not include the principle of reciprocity. This meant that there was no mechanism allowing the king or the local authorities to intervene in the status quo and end the monopoly of natives. In spite of the application of Castilian law on the island and the royal wish to end the coexistence of various communities of natives in Spain, natives of Majorca would remain the only ones allowed to hold ecclesiastical benefices in the jurisdiction. Because of reciprocity—recognized elsewhere in Spain—they would also be barred from exercising similar privileges in the other Iberian kingdoms.∫∑ Candidates for offices who suffered the consequences of this arrangement lamented this conclusion. Natives of Majorca were isolated geographically by the sea that separated them from the Spanish mainland.∫∏ Tied to an island,

82

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

which they rarely left, Majorcans falsely believed that other Spaniards were different from themselves. They were convinced that if they ever left their homes monstrous things would happen to them. Majorcans were like a ‘‘cadaver’’: instead of allowing a natural circulation in their community and encouraging mutual correspondence and participation with other Spaniards, they were left on their own, without the stimulation of exchange. The isolation of Majorca was also distasteful to royal officials. The representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) in the Council of Castile believed that the good of the state required that all differences between Majorca and the rest of Spain ‘‘immediately cease to exist.’’∫π Linguistic differences—Majorca being a Catalanspeaking region—were insufficient to justify excluding Castilians from ecclesiastical benefices. On the contrary, linguistic differences justified forcing a Castilian presence on Majorca as this presence would guarantee that the lingua franca of Spain would finally be used in that region. These difficulties could be resolved only by moving away from the monopoly on office and focusing instead on the community for whom offices were reserved. In Catalonia, the eighteenth-century royal decrees were interpreted as a measure of collective naturalization that converted all non-Catalan Spaniards into Catalans.∫∫ It was as ‘‘Catalans’’ rather than as ‘‘Spaniards’’ that these people could now obtain benefices reserved to natives. In Aragon, a different interpretation was used. The turn-of-the-century decrees did not abolish the monopoly on office holding, but rather changed the definition of the community enjoying its protection.∫Ω Whereas the previous community included only natives of Aragon, the current community was composed of all natives of all Spanish kingdoms. In 1772, similar arguments were made with regard to Majorca.Ω≠ Although one could not modify the monopoly on office holding as practiced in the island, one could claim that the community protected by it had changed. According to Castilian law, now in force in Majorca, there was only a single community of natives in Spain. As a result, offices in Majorca should indeed be reserved to natives, but nativeness should now embrace all Spaniards of all kingdoms.

Foreign Merchants and the Obligation to Become Native By the mid-eighteenth century, the discussion about who was eligible to hold office in Castile and Spain was paralleled by a growing protest against integrated foreigners who refused to assume Spanish nativeness. This protest was especially directed at foreign merchants who often resided on Spanish soil for many years but nevertheless refused to consider themselves natives, or who alternatively adopted nativeness or foreignness according to their convenience

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

83

and needs: ‘‘Although it is true that many of these merchants are Irish in origin, although they enjoy all privileges as if they were of this country, they are angry when one considers them Spanish.’’Ω∞ These foreigners, it was now claimed by intellectuals, local communities, and merchant associations throughout Spain, enjoyed the best of all worlds. As outsiders, they were exempt from tax payment and from subjection to the local authorities and to most restrictions on trade.Ω≤ As permanent residents, they were treated as natives and enjoyed all that Spain had to offer. In the words of the junta of commerce and agriculture of Valencia: [They] participate (though they do not want to admit it) in the same benefits as the natives in the interior of this kingdom, and even if they do not achieve other benefits than that of coming to the kingdom with a humble and low beginning, working their way up in prejudice of your vassals, who if it were not for them would have done the same and taken this work, it would seem that this would be sufficient in order to have them happily embrace the fundamental laws of this kingdom and obey blindly your soft and sovereign precepts. On the contrary, Señor. They resist them with all their forces and they do not omit any measure, even the most irregular, in order not to obey them.

Resentment was accompanied by the demand that those benefiting from privileges be induced to comply with duties: ‘‘May the clear and happy day come, Señor, in which the old and flourishing commerce of our Spain be reborn; may foreigners come to Spain, merchants, artisans, and the hard-working, and they will subject themselves to our laws and to the obligations of the state and enjoy with us the benefits.’’ Indeed, ‘‘reason and good political maxims state . . . that he who participates in the benefits of the republic, must also participate in the obligations.’’Ω≥ Foreigners should be allowed to come to Spain and ‘‘should be admitted as other members are to the pastureland and other communal properties.’’ They should be able to hold public offices and participate in the local militia.Ω∂ Yet in return, they must obey Spanish law, declare their allegiance to the Spanish monarch, and pay taxes. The opinion that Spanish practices favored foreigners at the expense of natives encouraged the crystallization of a distinction between extranjeros transeuntes (transient foreigners) and extranjeros avecindados y arraigados (integrated citizen foreigners). This distinction, formally elaborated in 1716 by the junta de extranjeros (a dependency of the Council of State) in order to define its jurisdiction, was now used to identify people who despite their foreign origin were natives.Ω∑ It established the rule that transient foreigners would enjoy the fuero de extranjería and would be treated as aliens, while integrated citizen foreigners would be compared to natives in both privileges

84

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

and obligations and would be considered ‘‘vassals of this crown and subjects to the status and laws of Spaniards.’’Ω∏ Among integrated citizen foreigners— now considered natives—were people who received naturalization letters or who were born in Spain. Also included were foreigners who had converted to Catholicism in Spain (which was equal to a spiritual rebirth in Spain), had established a domicile there, had received citizenship (vecindad) in a Spanish local community, had married a Spaniard, had bought property, had worked as an independent artisan or retail merchant or were employed in honorary posts (all of which were theoretically reserved for natives of the kingdom), had acted as vecinos using municipal property, had resided in Spain for more than ten years with an open house, or had, according to common or royal law, obtained nativeness or citizenship (vecindad) in Spain.Ωπ These people shared a common behavior indicating that they wished to establish permanent ties with the Spanish community. In some cases, this behavior included a formal admission—for example, the acquisition of naturalization or citizenship letters. In others, it was implicit in the candidates’ behavior. Candidates who acted as a citizens of local communities by using the communal pasture, for example, or as natives of the kingdom by holding offices reserved to natives, could be declared natives because they acted as citizens or as natives. The 1716 instruction followed the rules of the traditional Castilian presumption regime. It explained the circumstances under which foreigners would be recognized as natives, circumstances it adopted first for administrative purposes (to define the jurisdiction of the junta de extranjeros in 1716) and then throughout Spain (in order to distinguis natives from foreigners in the second half of the eighteenth century). This system replicated the duality of formal declarations, on one hand, and implicit categorizations, on the other. Formal declarations included letters of naturalization and letters of citizenship. Implicit categorizations were based on the activities of each candidate that theoretically demonstrated his decision to become a member. Citizenship in a local community was formally instituted as a mechanism of conversion that allowed foreigners to become natives. Indeed, independent of their origin and descent, people who were citizens of local communities, through either formal or implicit means, were now by extension clearly natives. The 1716 ruling thus formally acknowledged the existing relationship between vecindad and naturaleza. In the second half of the eighteenth century, and coinciding with the abovementioned complaints about foreign residents who refused to comply with the duties of Spaniards, the 1716 instruction became a powerful tool. Instead of waiting for foreigners to affirm their integration in the community either by requesting their naturalization or by simply exercising the rights of natives,

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

85

beginning in the 1750s the authorities, using the criteria established in 1716, proceeded to classify aliens on their own initiative. Motivated by the wish to facilitate knowledge of who was who, and who was worthy of which treatment, they ordered local authorities to elaborate lists of both transient and domiciled citizen foreigners.Ω∫ The central authorities hoped that, after the lists were complied, it would be possible to ensure that each person received the treatment he deserved. True foreigners (transient aliens) would be excluded from the rights of natives, and natives (integrated citizen foreigners) would be forced to comply with the duties that corresponded to them.ΩΩ The idea that transient aliens could be distinguished systematically from integrated foreigners was easy to conceive but hard to apply. The complexity of the question came to light when the local authorities attempted to elaborate the desired lists.∞≠≠ The foreign community in Spain refused to cooperate with this effort and denounced the measure as tyrannical. Many foreigners of long standing wished to conserve their status as aliens and refused to be treated as ‘‘vassals of Spain.’’∞≠∞ Juan Bautista Valerino, a municipal judge (alcalde de barrio) in Seville, claimed he had no domicile in the city. Antonio de Arbone, who was a member of a local dynasty of foreign merchants and served as the French consul, also pretended to reside in the jurisdiction only temporarily. In Orán, Juan Pedro Prats, who was married to a Spaniard, had fathered five children, and had a retail shop and a house, declared his wish to remain vassal of the French king and to be considered a transient foreigner. Others who had only recently arrived to Spain claimed that they were integrated and thus natives.∞≠≤ A third group of foreigners moved between one position and the other. Miguel Charles and Pedro Constayns claimed they were citizens when they petitioned their admission to the local guild, yet they insisted they were transients when they were asked to pay taxes.∞≠≥ In Valencia, French merchants who were members of the local guild suddenly requested to be classified as transients.∞≠∂ Perplexed, the local authorities wrote to the central administration in Madrid.∞≠∑ Were they obliged to examine the circumstances of each case and decide whether the foreigner was truly integrated or not? Should the presumptions enumerated in the decree constitute proof against foreigners, or could they be contradicted? Was the inclusion in a list evidence for future reference, or were foreigners allowed to change their minds, alternately requesting different legal statuses? In question was not only the correct classification of foreigners, but also the adequate definition of jurisdictional spheres. According to the laws, transient foreigners were under the authority of military commanders, and integrated foreigners (now considered natives) were subject to the ordinary local authorities. Disagreement about the classification of people

86

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

as transient or integrated could thus provoke jurisdictional conflicts; the local authorities could contest the intervention of military commanders in matters they considered their own and vice versa.∞≠∏ Jurisdictional conflicts could also take place regarding the inheritance of foreigners, which was subjected to the local authorities if they were integrated, and to alien consuls or military commanders if they were not.∞≠π Madrid at first insisted on the official criteria, which it judged sufficiently clear. It was only when the lists arriving at the court were classified as insufficient or incorrect that the royal authorities recognized the need to adopt a different solution. Instead of relying on legal presumptions to discover the true intentions of foreigners, in 1764 they began to allow foreigners to state their mind orally.∞≠∫ Foreigners were at liberty to choose whether they wanted to be considered transients or integrated, yet this freedom could be exercised only once. They would be bound by their choice; the only modification they were permitted was the passage from a transient to an integrated alien status.∞≠Ω Why introduce oral declarations? The deliberations leading to the decision and those following it testify to the growing frustration of both officials and candidates with a presumption regime that was highly ambivalent and that provoked continuous debates. The representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) in the Council of State openly debated this question in 1766.∞∞≠ The main difficulty in classifying foreigners correctly was the need to interpret their intentions by observing their external behavior. A ten-year residence could operate as a ‘‘tacit or open expression of will’’ to permanently remain in the community. Nevertheless, a residence could be motivated by other considerations. As a result, it was often unclear how a meaningful residence could be distinguished from a nonmeaningful one. The same thing was true of marriage. Marriage could serve as an indicator of the foreigner’s intentions, but it was insufficient on its own. Neither was birth in the jurisdiction sufficient because it was necessary to wait until the person grew up in order to ascertain whether he truly felt loyal to the Spanish community or whether he would leave it as soon as he could. It was just as risky to claim that employment in offices and professions reserved to natives demonstrated individuals’ attachment to the community, since employment could be based solely on their personal convenience. Instead of adhering to a complex and hybrid regime based on endless discussions about what could or could not be proved by certain external facts, it was now time for an efficient and conclusive test. Foreigners would be asked to declare their intent, and once this declaration was made, they would not be allowed to change their status. This solution would produce clarity, and the authorities would have lists permanently defining people as either transient (and thus foreigners) or integrated (and thus natives). Retrospectively, it was

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

87

explained that ‘‘the aim of the legislation is that the census will clarify the doubts with respects to the Frenchmen [the largest foreign community in Spain] living in Spain, whether they are transitory or naturalized, leaving it to their own decision on that occasion to chose the concept according to which they would like to be treated, so that after this election they could be treated with the corresponding distinction according to the class they elected and the laws of these kingdoms in both the favorable and the unfavorable.’’∞∞∞ The wish for clarity was such that it justified suspending the power of ordinary laws (the presumption regime) and allowing foreigners to choose freely the category to which they would belong. As a result of the new arrangement, recently arrived foreigners could be recognized as integrated if they formally requested it, while, in some cases at least, established aliens could maintain their foreignness. Not all Spaniards welcomed this reality. After reviewing the case of a Frenchman who declared himself a transient foreigner, the local judge (teniente) of Seville expressed his bewilderment and requested the Council of State to reexamine its policies. It could not have been the royal intention, he wrote, to allow foreigners to classify themselves as they chose. It was the authorities’ duty to decide who was a native of Spain and who was not, and in their decision, the authorities had to follow the traditional presumption regime. Although this regime gave some value to the foreigner’s verbal expressions, verbal expressions were never sufficient on their own. Oral claims had to be verified by external facts. Any other solution was inconceivable. It was utterly unthinkable that foreigners could determine who should be considered a native of Spain and therefore vassal of the Spanish king. Such a matter was for Spaniards to decide. Furthermore, the lists were originally created because of the wish to no longer permit foreigners to freely choose their status. The lists aimed at identifying foreigners who, by virtue of their behavior, were indeed natives, forcing them to act as natives, thus ensuring the rights of both community and king. Adopting a regime based only on oral declarations guaranteed the contrary. In short, it was a ‘‘great novelty,’’ and ‘‘exorbitant alteration that must always be avoided.’’∞∞≤ Similar arguments were invoked by Valencia’s Junta de Comercio y Agricultura in 1773, yet most other people were willing to allow foreigners to classify themselves.∞∞≥ Among other things, they hoped that this autoclassification would allow ‘‘useful’’ foreigners to integrate into the Spanish community. It was in Spanish interests, the royal councils argued, to define nativeness in the widest possible way, as this would open the community to beneficial newcomers. The more people classified as integrated foreigners and thus native, the better the situation in Spain would be.∞∞∂ Indeed, by the 1770s the

88

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

willingness to permit and even to encourage the arrival and integration of foreigners in Spain was such that royal ministers portrayed the Spanish community as a melting pot, made of different elements that gradually converged into one. Spain’s origins, they said, could be traced back to the end of Roman domination and the subsequent conquest of the Iberian peninsula by the Goths (beginning of the fifth century). Land was then distributed among victors (the Goths) and the vanquished (the Spaniards, then named ‘‘Romans’’), and eventually the two merged into one ‘‘warlike and powerful’’ community. Together, they fought against the Muslims. Many foreign soldiers participated in these campaigns, and ‘‘many people from all over Christianity came to Spain and were welcomed into it.’’ The integration of foreigners into Spain was not new. Foreigners were always welcome in Spain, and, in fact, many Spaniards were of foreign origin.∞∞∑ Despite good intentions, the classification of foreigners continued to be as uncertain as it had been before, and foreigners were still able to change their status according to their needs and desires.∞∞∏ New instructions were elaborated in 1791, probably motivated by the desire to control the movement of French immigrants and to avoid the spread of revolutionary ideas.∞∞π These instructions ordered foreigners who wanted to be recognized as Spaniards to attest formally their wish and subsequently to swear obedience to the Catholic Church and the Spanish sovereign, as well as to Spanish law.∞∞∫ Officially renouncing their status as aliens ( fuero de extranjería), these foreigners would agree to terminate ‘‘their relations, union, and dependency on the country in which they were born, promising not to use its protection, nor its ambassadors, ministers, or consuls.’’∞∞Ω After the ceremony ended, they would be ‘‘understood and reputed to belong to the class of Spanish vassals, separated from their original status and community.’’∞≤≠ Foreigners who, on the contrary, wished to be classified as transients would require special licenses if they wanted to remain in Spain, and their professional activities would be severely restricted. As outsiders, they would not be allowed to practice the liberal arts or mechanical offices, and they would be unable to engage in artisanal or retail mercantile activities. They would also be required to take a special oath, in which they would promise to submit themselves to the sovereign and to obey the laws of Spain as long as they remained on Spanish soil.∞≤∞ By that end of this process, either foreigners acquiesced and became Spaniards, or they lost their right to remain in Spain. Although these measures could be explained, as they often were in the past, by the war situation, it is clear that they were in tune with similar developments in Castilian local communities.∞≤≤ Contemporary Castilian local communities insisted that people should either commit themselves fully to the community or leave. What was

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

89

intolerable was the presence of people who enjoyed the benefits of residing in the community but who refused to act as true members of it, that is, accept its obligations. The late eighteenth-century passage from legal presumption to oral declaration changed the balance of power between local communities, the kingdom, and the king. Under the presumption regime, communities played an important role in the acceptance of foreigners into the kingdom. The presumptions tied citizenship to nativeness and determined that people who were formally accepted as citizens, or who acted as citizens, were also by extension natives. Foreigners could become part of the community of the kingdom through an integration that could be achieved only by establishing ties with a concrete local community. Under a regime based on oral declarations, admission of foreigners by local communities was no longer required, and foreigners could be classified as integrated by declaring their intentions to remain in Spain before they actually established themselves in the community. At the same time, integrated aliens—who were true members of local communities—were allowed to remain foreigners. The fact that by the end of the eighteenth century nativeness could no longer depend on citizenship or local integration was specifically stipulated in a 1791 decree ordering local communities to accept as citizens all foreigners who had already obtained recognition as natives.∞≤≥ Such foreigners-made-into-natives now enjoyed the freedom of all Spaniards to immigrate and settle where they wished. Rather than making integration a precondition for their acceptance as natives, their status as natives now allowed these foreigners to claim integration in local communities. Indeed, instead of citizenship giving persons the right to nativeness, nativeness now gave foreigners the right to citizenship. In short, under the new regime, the inclusion of foreigners in both the local and the Spanish community came to depend only on their wishes, on one hand, and on the king—who gave them the power to do so—on the other. Once again, the royal administration justified these developments by presenting naturalization as a royal prerogative. The king, royal officials argued, could change the rules governing nativeness and naturalization because the conversion of foreigners into natives was a regalía, a faculty that depended only on the monarch: ‘‘Because of his pure moderation and justice, the king wanted to grant it [the right to declare intentions]. The laws of Spain identify foreigners who should be reputed as natives, and the king could have ordered that foreigners will subject themselves to all payments and obligations as such . . . which would have been part of is sovereignty,’’ but he did not. Instead, he allowed foreigners to choose the treatment that they would receive.∞≤∂ The discussions between the king and kingdom regarding the monopoly on

90

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

office holding and the identification of foreigners in the eighteenth century thus involved identifying but also inventing the rules allowing foreigners to become natives. According to royal officials, these rules were a royal creation and depended on the royal will. According to the merchants and representatives of local communities, they were determined by a natural law: only people who loved the community and were integrated into it could enjoy the rights of members. Rather than a community of vassals, the Spanish community was a conglomerate of many local communities, each with the power to convert foreigners into natives by integrating them and admitting them to citizenship. Despite claims of royal sovereignty, some ministers expressed their fear that the king was not truly at liberty to decide on the conversion of foreigners into natives. This conversion, the junta de extranjeros stated, was not just an internal matter as it could affect the king’s international obligations.∞≤∑ Among these obligations, for example, were the ‘‘family pacts’’ celebrated in the eighteenth century between the French and Spanish monarchs. These pacts guaranteed that natives of France would be treated as natives in Spain and vice versa.∞≤∏ Spanish legislation stipulating that those acting as natives were in fact natives could thus be interpreted as a breach of the family pacts, as it automatically converted all those enjoying the privileges contained in these pacts into Spaniards, a conversion certainly not envisioned or desired by the French kings. These concerns were well founded. Foreign representatives in Spain protested against the new policies and claimed that Spain could not unilaterally change the way it treated foreign nationals.∞≤π Especially vocal in this respect was the French ambassador, who represented the largest foreign community in Spain. The French ambassador stated that the Spanish view—which converted all integrated foreigners into ‘‘vassals and nationals’’ —was completely unacceptable.∞≤∫ Nativeness and domicile were two different regimes, and each activated a different set of rights and obligations. Although certain types of residence could indeed prove the person’s intention to abandon the country of his birth, such cases were limited and were not well represented in contemporary Spanish legislation. According to the ambassador, it was essential that Spaniards respect the ‘‘laws of the nations, as well as the ancient Spanish laws’’ with regards to both nativeness and naturalization. The Spanish authorities rejected these claims. They insisted that the definition of the Spanish community was an internal Spanish affair and that foreign powers could not intervene. Each sovereign was free to establish and enforce the laws of his own territory. It was in the kingdom’s interest to clarify who was a member of the community and who was not, and this verification was a duty of sovereignty. According to the Spanish understanding, integrated foreigners were already

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

91

disconnected from their community of birth by virtue of their integration in Spain. Because they were no longer aliens, foreign monarchs had no say in their status and foreign delegates in Spain could not defend their interests.∞≤Ω

Conclusions The construction of a community of natives first in Castile and then in Spain was a long historical process that depended on different interests and actors. This process involved a concern for office holding and the use of ecclesiastical benefices, and it caused a confrontation between Spanish and foreign merchants. The same process also created conflicts between the king and the kingdom over issues of sovereignty and the right to classify people as natives or foreigners. The construction of a community of natives required determining whether nativeness and naturalization depended on natural law or civil law, and it brought into light two different understandings of the community: one perceived the kingdom as a community of the king’s vassals; the other saw the community as made up of individuals tied to one another and to specific local communities. By the eighteenth century, discussions on nativeness in Castile were extended to the rest of Spain. This extension was not void of difficulties, precisely because the king’s power to change the existing situation was limited. By that period, confrontation over the identification of people worthy of offices and benefices was paralleled by the wish to protect local merchants against ‘‘unloyal’’ foreign competition, and the desire to force all those permanently residing in Spain to act as natives. It was also during this period that pressure from merchant and local communities alike led the authorities to search for a more straightforward regime that would eliminate ambiguities and would classify people once and for all. Their success at obtaining such a regime was limited. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the distinction between foreigners and natives was still highly debatable, and in practice foreigners could act as natives on some occasions and as foreigners in others. Initially representing a complex relationship between people, their lord, and the land, by the early modern period nativeness mainly depended on the establishment of a relationship between individuals living on the same space. As José María Alvarez put it in 1818, nativeness represented the ‘‘natural inclination that people who are born or live in the same place and under the same government feel to one another. This consideration has so much power, that it perfectly imitates nature: as one can admit adopted children to the group of relatives, one can also accept foreigners who legitimately established domicile in the community.’’∞≥≠ Because both birth and residence allowed people to

92

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

acquire nativeness, citizenship and nativeness were closely associated. This association was timidly present in the thirteenth century, at least according to eighteenth-century readings.∞≥∞ It became clearer in the following centuries and was present in the striking similarities between the conditions required to obtain both statuses and in the conviction that people who were citizens were also capable of obtaining recognition as natives. By 1716, the distinction between transient and integrated foreigners stated that the acquisition of citizenship was the same as the acquisition of nativeness. Thereafter, foreigners who acquired citizenship (whether formally, through the acceptance of a letter of citizenship, or implicitly through acting as citizens) were recognized automatically as natives. It was also during this period that both the representatives of the kingdom and royal officials clearly distinguished between integration, which naturally converted people from one status to the other, and formal procedures (letters of naturalization), which conferred status solely at the will of the king. Eventually, the wish to create a clear regime that would classify people once and for all led to important shifts. The presumption regime was abandoned, and in its place foreigners were allowed to attest their intentions orally. This change practically suspended the relation between nativeness and integration, on one hand, and local communities and the community of the kingdom, on the other. Thereafter people could be transformed into natives without obtaining integration or citizenship. Nevertheless, the relation between citizenship and nativeness was not completely abandoned. This relation was present in the writing of Pedro Fernández Navarrete who in 1972, speaking about the naturalization of foreigners, described this process as one in which forasteros become citizens.∞≥≤ It was also present in 1805, when it was inscribed in the first Spanish law code. The Novísima Recopilación de las leyes de España published that year stated that the 1716 decree (which spoke about ‘‘natives’’) fixed the circumstances that foreigners must have in order to be considered ‘‘citizens’’ (vecinos) of these kingdoms.’’∞≥≥ Replacing ‘‘nativeness’’ with ‘‘citizenship’’ without changing any of the conditions required in order to obtain this status, the 1805 law also stated that both ‘‘nativeness’’ and ‘‘citizenship’’ were mechanisms of conversion, and that both enabled foreigners to acquire what was now called ‘‘vecindad in the kingdoms.’’ From a 1805 perspective, it becomes clear that late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century developments in Castile and elsewhere in Spain eventually led to the creation of a citizenship regime for the Spanish world. Whether conceived as vecindad or naturaleza, this regime emerged without destroying local definitions. Striking a balance between a larger community (the community of the kingdoms) and many individual local communities, it constructed citizenship as a natural membership dependent on inte-

Naturaleza: Community of the Kingdom

93

gration and not on birthright. The community it portrayed was organic rather than artificial. Royal interventions were always presented as extraordinary. The king intervened in order to change the existing rules. Yet, his right to do so, and to act on the margin of communal traditions, was continuously questioned. Contemporaries presented society as a natural mechanism that could run perfectly on its own. According to them, people could be converted from natives into foreigners and vice versa without official intervention. A ‘‘discourse of love’’ was central to this argument. People naturally loved the community where they were born, and foreigners could naturally come to love the community where they resided for a lengthy period and where they had established roots. The king and the state were external to these processes. They were called to intervene only when problems emerged, and when conflict could not be resolved within the community. In these instances they were requested to declare officially that certain integrated foreigners were already natives, either to enable them to enjoy rights or to force them to comply with duties. Indeed, it was only when society’s self-regulating and natural processes broke down that royal action became legitimate. In all other cases, the king and his administration were expected to do nothing, and their claim that they could and must act— for example, by naturalizing foreigners—was completely rejected.

5

Naturaleza: From Castile to Spanish America

Soon after the Spanish arrival in the New World, the Spanish king began regulating the relationship between the Old World and this overseas domain. In a series of laws dating from the early sixteenth century, the crown instituted a legal monopoly: only natives of the kingdoms of Spain could immigrate, settle, and trade in Spanish America.∞ Also, only certain certified Castilian ports— mainly Seville—could maintain contacts with similarly certified American ports, and only Spanish ships, manned by Spaniards, could travel between them.≤ In the following decades, the presence—despite these prohibitions—of foreigners in Spanish America set about an endless chain of royal decrees demanding that local authorities locate these illegal immigrants and expel them from the continent.≥ As a result of these measures, whenever people wanted to immigrate or trade in the New World, and whenever they were included in lists of foreigners to be expelled, a conflict arose that could be resolved only through their formal classification as natives or foreigners. The way discussions on the right to immigrate and trade in the New World contributed to the formation of a Spanish community is to a large degree a story untold. Many historians have assumed that for purposes of trade and immigration, nativeness was a straightforward category whose interpretation varied because of illegal practices or ‘‘human’’ understandings that permitted ‘‘a

94

Naturaleza: Spanish America

95

working compromise between justice and decency.’’∂ Other scholars presented the struggle to define who could engage in the colonial enterprise as a nationalistic struggle, never realizing that nativeness itself was being constructed in the process.∑ Most campaigns to expel foreigners from Spanish America were of interest to historians as a source of data to enumerate, classify, and study that continent’s foreign population. Earlier investigations thus made no effort to analyze why certain people were classified as native while others were not.∏ Yet, as in Castile and Spain, the category of ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain’’ as implemented in Spanish America and by the colonial institutions residing in Spain was a highly complex social and legal construct. Especially striking in Spanish America was the importance of commercial interests and the agency of merchants and merchant associations in the classification of people. Because of this agency, naturalization by integration (prescription), which was so common in Castile, disappeared. In Spanish America, foreigners who wished to be treated as natives in order to immigrate and to trade in Spanish America had to obtain a formal naturalization letter. The legislation that sanctioned this disappearance, however, failed to eradicate naturalization by integration. Even after its enactment, integration still served as a measure against which foreigners were judged. In addition, a new regime was instituted (composición) in Spanish America, one that allowed integrated foreigners to remain in the continent despite the illegality of their presence. Another important difference between the Castilian and Spanish American views of nativeness was the never-ending struggle in Spanish America to distinguish between natives and naturalized foreigners and to restrict the privileges of the latter mainly by attesting that they were not completely trustworthy. This struggle, which was especially important in the eighteenth century, had two different expressions. First, it led to the conclusion that, although a single community of ‘‘true’’ natives existed in Spain and Spanish America, foreigners naturalized in Spain remained aliens in Spanish America. Likewise, naturalization in the New World could not make one native of Spain. Second, it allowed the claim that foreigners who were naturalized in Spanish America would never be equal to ‘‘true’’ natives. Once again, none of these developments were clearly expressed in the laws. Perhaps for this reason, historians who examined the laws regarding foreign presence in Spanish America generally failed to appreciate the complexity of these questions or to understand the meaning of legal changes introduced over the years. They were, in fact, completely unfamiliar with debates about nativeness in Spain, the importance of legal doctrines, and the evolution of social and legal practices in the classification of people as natives and foreigners.

96

Naturaleza: Spanish America

Natives of Spain in Spanish America The stage upon which Spanish American deliberations on nativeness and foreignness took place was radically different from the Castilian one. In Castile, these deliberations initially centered on the development and continuation of the monopoly on office holding. The king was brought into conflict with the parliament, the cities with a vote in parliament, and individual communities, all of which disagreed on how to assess the suitability of candidates for office and on the procedures for transforming foreigners into natives. These entities debated how to distinguish Castilians from other natives of the kingdoms of Spain, as well from other foreigners. By the eighteenth century, this peninsular debate was further complicated by the claim of Spanish merchants and local communities against the presence of non-Spanish foreigners who, while enjoying the rights of natives, refused to comply with the corresponding duties. These developments led to the demand that people either fully commit themselves to Spain or be expelled. In Spanish America, on the contrary, issues of nativeness usually centered on foreigners who wished to participate in the transatlantic trade. Conflict with natives of Spain, whose economic and commercial undertakings were protected by the Spanish monopoly, was unavoidable. Most active among these natives were the members of the merchant guild (consulado) established in Seville in 1543.π The merchant guild was a corporation of all merchants legally trading in the city. Meant to serve primarily as a court for commercial litigation, the guild also defended certain practices and lobbied for legislation to protect and favor its members. Another important agent in the Spanish American discussion was the House of Trade (casa de contratación), also located in Seville.∫ This royal court, charged with controlling and directing all communication and trade with the Indies, granted licenses-of-passage to the Americas after investigating the identity of applicants and ascertaining that they were natives.Ω Both institutions were founded in the sixteenth century, and the House of Trade was in the beginning the more dominant. In time, however, the merchant guild became the more active partner. It eventually monopolized the organization and financing of fleets and the licensing of ships, people, and merchandise.∞≠ By the early seventeenth century, it frequently intervened in discussions about the nativeness of individuals, and by 1633, when the crown recognized the guild as an interested party in all decisions concerning the ‘‘nativeness of people in order to trade in the Indies,’’ this intervention became official.∞∞ As an interested party, the guild was notified of all naturalization requests and was asked to give its opinion on the nativeness or foreignness of

Naturaleza: Spanish America

97

candidates for immigration. Its role was so preeminent that crown officials voiced their disappointment when the guild failed to express its view. This rarely happened. In most cases, the merchants responded eagerly to their newly acquired function and, on their own initiative, even produced lists of foreigners to be expelled from Spanish America. Whenever a person’s classification was debated, individual merchants or the guild acting for them, personified in the courts, wrote allegations, presented petitions, and did everything possible to ensure that nativeness was acknowledged in people who met with their approval. Most parties to the discussion on ‘‘nativeness in order to immigrate and trade in Spanish America’’ were thus merchants, and commercial interests were foremost on their minds. These interests could be local and have as their goal the classification of business competitors as foreigners. Such a decision would ensure the competitor’s expulsion from the Americas or disqualify him from participating in transatlantic trade. These interests also might include wider economic concerns, such as the wish to protect the internal market or to ensure the accumulation of precious metals.∞≤

Mercantile Agency and the Identification of Natives The effect that mercantile agency had on the Spanish American debate on nativeness and foreignness first became apparent at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Until then, the Castilian understanding of nativeness was implemented in the Americas, and those who qualified as natives in Castile were considered ‘‘natives of the kingdom of Spain’’ for the purpose of engaging in the colonial enterprise. This was the explicit instruction of the crown. The Spanish king specified, for example in 1561, 1562, and 1566, that foreigners (1) who were citizens of local Spanish communities, or (2) who had acted as citizens of local communities, had lived in the kingdoms for ten years with house and property, and were married to natives, or (3) those who had come to Spanish America illegally but had then lived there for at least ten years and were accompanied by their wives must be considered natives (ser habidos) and must be allowed to reside and trade in Spanish America.∞≥ Accordingly, in the 1580s, several foreigners obtained recognition that, as citizens (vecinos) of Seville, they were also, by extension, natives of Spain and eligible to emigrate to and trade in the New World. For example, in 1581, Francisco de Spínola was allowed to immigrate to Spanish America because he had resided in Seville for more than twenty years. This residence he said, and the authorities agreed with him, accrued him the right to both vecindad and naturaleza. A similar venue was followed by Rui Fernándes Pereyra, who first obtained a carta de vecindad in

98

Naturaleza: Spanish America

Seville and then proceeded to request recognition as native.∞∂ But as the sixteenth century drew to a close, and as the commercial power of foreign (naturalized) transatlantic merchants became evident, this understanding of nativeness gradually came under attack. Under the continuing pressure of Seville’s merchant guild, new regulations were enacted, eventually creating important differences between Castilian and Spanish American practices. Although the first indications of this separation in practices were present at the end of the sixteenth century, it was only in the early seventeenth century that Seville’s guild was able to achieve important gains.∞∑ As happened in Castile during the same period, these gains were tied to negotiations concerning the collection and payment of taxes. In 1591, the guild agreed to collect the avería, the tax that financed the military escort for the annual fleets from Seville to Spanish America.∞∏ This agreement implied that the guild promised to hand over to the royal treasury a certain sum. Theoretically the guild was charged with collecting this money, but it would have to pay the sum whether the collection was successful or not. As was customary under tax farming, the guild received important concessions in return for its willingness to collaborate with the crown. It obtained jurisdiction over bankruptcy litigation, as well as a decree that instructed royal authorities to stop granting foreigners licenses of passage to Spanish America. The guild reasoned that if foreigners were not allowed to cross the Atlantic, they would not be able to obtain naturalization by integration there. This would put an end to naturalization by prescription in Spanish America, as people could no longer acquire rights by exercising them. It would guarantee the immediate cessation of the intervention of naturalized aliens in the transatlantic trade because foreigners would no longer be allowed to attain the status of natives.∞π When the guild refused to take on the collection of avería in 1598, the crown was forced to contract with a group of individual merchants, a solution that turned out to be impractical and unfortunate. In 1608, when the guild was once again willing to administer the same tax, the crown was ready to make considerable concessions.∞∫ These concessions, enacted in 1608 and later reproduced in the main compilation of Spanish American law (Recopilación de Indias), were tied to the definition of nativeness and foreignness in order to immigrate and trade in Spanish America.∞Ω At the guild’s request, the king explicitly revoked the sixteenth-century decrees that allowed foreigners naturalized by integration to immigrate and trade in the New World. The king then determined that foreigners who wished to be considered natives in order to immigrate and trade in the Americas would be required to seek a formal recognition of their status as natives. The Council of the Indies, which received

Naturaleza: Spanish America

99

information from the municipality where the foreigners lived, would grant this recognition by issuing a letter of naturalization. Before such a document could be issued, the council had to examine whether the foreigner resided in Spanish territories for at least twenty years (instead of the ten years required in Castile), and whether he was married and had a sufficient amount of property. These modifications meant that from 1608 onward the path for implicit and automatic naturalization—so common in Castile—was no longer available to those claiming nativeness in order to immigrate or trade in Spanish America. In their case, it was no longer sufficient to prove their citizenship in a local community, or to assert in any other way that they were integrated in the kingdom and thus natives. What was required, instead, was a formal letter of naturalization. The adoption of more stringent requirements, the merchants claimed, was essential to the verification of the ‘‘true intentions’’ of foreigner merchants. It was common practice among merchants to live in foreign countries for a prolonged period, to marry local women, and to purchase properties. As a result, residence, marriage, and property, which in cases involving nonmerchants were sufficient to ascertain their intentions, were for merchants almost useless.≤≠ Furthermore, in the case of merchants, the common assumption was that their residence depended on their trade; once this trade was completed, they would leave the jurisdiction.≤∞ Rather than allowing the presumptions of residence, marriage, and property to work on their own, it was essential in the case of foreign merchants to institute formal procedures to verify whether what appeared to be integration was indeed integration. Because so many foreigners wanted to participate in the Spanish American trade, and because this participation was considered prejudicial to Spanish interests, it was crucial to maintain formal procedures to verify the status of individuals in the Spanish American case. These procedures were designed to guarantee that only foreigners worthy of nativeness would indeed be allowed to trade in the colonies. The merchant guild insisted on the strict application of these new rules, and its organs and individuals constantly stressed the differences between Castilian and New World practices. They repeated that in the Americas there was no need to distinguish transient from integrated foreigners because, in the Americas, foreigners were either legal because they were formally naturalized, or not. ‘‘How different is the law of residence in the Indies, than in the kingdoms of Spain! In the kingdoms of Spain a ten-year residence, marriage, and the owning of property allow to consider the foreigner a native, nativeness being introduced by way of prescription when the requisites for it are met. But in the Indies, marriage, property, and a ten- or even a twenty-year residence do

100

Naturaleza: Spanish America

not produce nativeness. They only produce merits, which allow the king in his supreme council to grant naturalization by issuing a letter of naturalization, which is the only way it is possible to acquire nativeness.’’≤≤ The delegation of responsibility on this issue to the Council of the Indies was typical. The royal administration was divided by councils, each having a jurisdiction over certain matters or territories. It was thus natural that only the Council of the Indies could issue letters concerning the New World, and that letters granted by other councils—for example, the Council of Castile—could have no effect in Spanish America. Therefore, foreigners who wanted to be considered natives in Spanish America had to address the Council of the Indies. Their recognition as natives of Spain by, say, the Council of Castile was insufficient to guarantee immigration and trade rights in the New World. Although enjoying the status of natives in Spain, in the New World these people were considered foreigners. Despite mercantile efforts, the eradication of Castilian naturalization by integration was only partially successful. There are several indications that the viceroy of New Spain and the metropolitan authorities exchanged letters on this issue from 1670 to 1693.≤≥ The viceroy argued that naturalization by prescription was still available to foreigners who wished to reside in Spanish America; the 1608 decision should be applied only to foreigners who wished to engage in the transatlantic trade. He saw this not only as the correct legal interpretation of the 1608 decision, but also as a just solution according to the ‘‘law of nations,’’ which admitted integrated foreigners into communities. On this occasion the Council of the Indies disagreed, but in 1680 its members voted in favor of recognizing integrated foreigners as natives.≤∂ Responding to a royal decree that criticized the council for allowing too many foreigners to naturalize in Spanish America, the council explained that the presence of foreigners in Spanish America was indeed prohibited, but despite all efforts many foreigners were able to cross the Atlantic and settle there. ‘‘Well rooted’’ in the continent, they married local women, raised sons, and owned property. According to the council, these factors indicated that they ‘‘no longer had love for their motherland, and that they established perpetuity and domicile in these provinces, so that much of the fear and many of the disadvantages usually associated with their temporary settlement, ceased to exist.’’≤∑ In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the same opinion was held by Spanish American communities that distinguished between foreigners who were integrated and trustworthy and those who were not. On different occasions the councils of Santiago de los Caballeros (Santo Domingo), Cartagena de Indias (Nueva Granada), and Guayaquil (Quito) indeed asked the authorities to allow their foreign citizens to remain on the continent despite the

Naturaleza: Spanish America

101

illegality of their presence.≤∏ In 1763, the local governor (corregidor) of Riobamba (Quito) acted in a similar way. He asked the president of the local royal court (audiencia) to tolerate the presence of Ignacio Verenux, a Catholic Irishman, in the jurisdiction. Ignacio had been allowed to reside in Riobamba ‘‘because he is a Catholic Irishman, because his manners and behavior did not justify a contrary solution . . . and not ignoring the privileges that individuals of his nation who are Catholics, enjoy in the dominions of our sovereign in Europe [where they are recognized as natives].’’≤π Ignacio himself explained that ‘‘once I found myself distant from the danger from which I fled, and found security and tranquility in my Christian faith, enjoying this benefit for over ten years, in which I live among Spaniards and in their lands, I now pretend and promise to swear domicile and citizenship in the place which will be most convenient to me, among those included in the province of Quito. . . . I therefore request that I be admitted to the corporation ( gremio) of the Spanish nation and would be allowed to become citizen . . . without any further opposition or obstacles under the pretext that I am a foreigner, because I should not be called foreigner.’’ Ignacio was allowed to remain in Quito because he was a miner, and the local royal court considered this residence ‘‘useful.’’ Other nonnaturalized foreigners also argued that by virtue of their integration in the community they were no longer truly foreigners. In 1775, Nicolás Campe, who had been living in Spain and in Spanish America for more than ten years, was married to a Spaniard, had established a house, and had children and property claimed that his behavior and activities naturalized him automatically, independent of any decision taken by the authorities.≤∫ Other ‘‘foreigners’’ in similar circumstances also asserted that a long residence in Spanish territories and services to the crown earned them both vecindad and naturaleza.≤Ω Naturalization by integration was also advocated by the merchants when they considered it beneficial to their collective interests or when they wanted to protect a particular colleague. In 1677, the merchant guild of Seville offered the crown a donation in return for not investigating the foreignness or nativeness of Francisco Marqués de Granada who was a member of the corporation. In 1688, the guild did the same for a group of foreign merchants residing in Seville and Cádiz.≥≠ The merchants also agreed that it was logical to distinguish between integrated and transient foreigners and they consented that foreigners who had lived in the territory for twenty years with property, house, and family were indeed of a different quality than transient aliens. This quality, which was based on the aliens’ behavior, ensured their trustworthiness even when they lacked formal naturalization.≥∞ The idea that integrated foreigners were no longer dangerous influenced the

102

Naturaleza: Spanish America

way the authorities implemented the new (post-1608) naturalization regime. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Council of the Indies— which was now the only body responsible for formalizing a person’s status— continued to implement Castilian understanding regarding nativeness and foreignness. Judging the worthiness of candidates, the council searched for indications that they were integrated into the local society. The council remained faithful to the idea that foreigners who were tied to local communities (vecinos) were also tied by extension to the community of the kingdom (naturales). It also held, as did Castilian officials, courts, and litigants, that the requirements specified in naturalization laws (twenty years’ residence, marriage, and owning a certain amount of property) were only legal presumptions. As was the case with all legal presumptions, it was legitimate to ignore them if they weighed too heavily on specific candidates or, on the contrary, rested too lightly on others. As a result of such considerations, in 1743, for example, the Council of the Indies recommended the naturalization of Antonio Butler despite the fact that he was a bachelor. The council stated that the legal condition of marriage could be ignored because it was a mere presumption and because ‘‘given his age . . . and other external acts . . . he manifested his constant wish to remain in Spain.’’≥≤ Antonio was a Catholic, the owner of a large estate, and had been living in Cádiz for more than thirty years without ever leaving the jurisdiction. He was not a ‘‘simple’’ bachelor hoping one day to marry, nor was he married in another country. Instead, he chose to remain on his own willfully. This choice did not demonstrate that he did not wish to remain in Spain, and it should thus not bar him from naturalizing. The council issued a similar recommendation in the case of Pablo Capitanache. Pablo was not married, nor had he sufficient property. Yet he ‘‘credited his wish to remain in these realms, a wish previously expressed by living in a house for over 33 years and by his reception as a citizen (vecino) of Cádiz in 1739. Extrajudicial information assures us that the candidate is not a transient foreigner but a domiciled one, and there are sufficient reasons to believe that he will not return to his place of origin.’’≥≥ In yet another case, Pedro Lazaleta was granted naturalization in 1768 despite lacking sufficient property because he had lived in Spain since 1735, had married a native in 1742 with whom he had children, kept a house, and acted in all respects as a native, clearly demonstrating his wish (ánimo) to become a member of the community.≥∂ The persistence of integration as an indication of the ability and the right of foreigners to naturalize in Spanish America meant that candidates for naturalization in the New World engaged in arguments very similar to those invoked by foreigners in Castile. In both places it was useful to fulfill the legal prerequisites for naturalization, but simply meeting these requirements was neither

Naturaleza: Spanish America

103

necessary nor sufficient to achieve one’s deserved status. What was required instead was to prove one’s wish to become a Spaniard and to demonstrate one’s commitment to the local community. Following this logic, Luis Vacaya asserted in 1697 that he was already ‘‘conaturalized’’ in the community. He had rendered many services to the crown, more than most other natives did. He thus demonstrated in his behavior his wish to remain in the kingdoms, which was the only important fact for deciding his case.≥∑ Other candidates for Spanish American naturalization demonstrated that they severed their ties with their community of origin, and they argued that they were integrated in Spain. In the words of Valerio Martino, native of Naples and merchant in Cádiz: ‘‘Since the first moment, I resisted participating in the national meetings of the Neapolitans and contributing to their association, without allowing my name be included in their lists, and having always behaved as a true Spaniard in commercial dealings, negotiations, and other activities.’’≥∏ As in Spain, Spanish American naturalization was only a formal recognition of a situation that had been generated earlier on its own. Rather than converting foreigners into natives, naturalization verified that certain foreigners were already integrated and were thus worthy of treatment as natives. This verification required interpreting the meaning of an external behavior. Again, as in Spain, this interpretation could be consensual or it could provoke debate. The House of Trade and the merchant guild often disagreed about how certain facts should be interpreted and evaluated.≥π In these cases, although formally what mattered was the interpretation of the intentions of foreigners, the results also depended on the balance of power between these two institutions, as well as the role played by the Council of the Indies, royal secretaries, and the king. On occasion, the king insisted that the decision was his to make. He demanded a complete and detailed file on each candidate, and he asserted his independence by stating that he could reject the recommendation of the merchants, the House of Trade, and royal ministers.≥∫ The merchant guild and the House of Trade argued the contrary. Contesting the power of the Council of the Indies and even the king, they attested that only they knew who was worthy of which treatment. Foreigners requesting naturalization in order to trade in the Indies were usually well known either in Cádiz or in Seville. The House of Trade and the guild were thus best placed to examine their petitions and attest to the true nature of their intentions. Their value as eyewitnesses was enhanced by their capacity as expert witnesses who knew merchants and understood them best. Indeed, in most cases, the recommendation of the guild or the House of Trade was crucial to the success or failure of a petition. Favorable recommendation by the House of Trade and the guild usually assured naturalization, and disapproval barred it.

104

Naturaleza: Spanish America

Conflicts between the king and the merchant guild were not limited to arguments over who could best understand foreign merchants. At times the guild pressured the monarch to cancel all letters of naturalization issued to foreigners they considered unworthy. In the mid-seventeenth century, the guild claimed that of 126 foreigners naturalized by letters, only 13 met the legal criteria and only 21 others ‘‘almost did.’’≥Ω The guild was particularly militant in cases of naturalization issued for services rendered to the monarch or purchased by some means. In 1622, for example, Jorge de Paz de Silvera, a Portuguese merchant, included the receipt of an American naturalization letter as one of his conditions for lending the crown 1,000 escudos for the ‘‘needs of the war in Flanders.’’ Not only did Jorge not meet the legal requirement for naturalization, but when he renounced his intention of using this grant, he requested that it be extended to Domingo de Herrera, a partner of his.∂≠ The guild insisted, as did Castilian local communities, that the king could not admit foreigners to the community at will. It argued that, according to natural and royal laws, only integrated foreigners were worthy of treatment as natives. Royal officials, echoing their response in Castile, were divided about how to proceed. Some ministers felt that the grant of letters to total foreigners was so pernicious that the matter was serious enough to justify revoking all letters given in the past. Other ministers sympathized with the protest yet recommended against revoking the letters. They determined that letters of naturalization were a contract between the king and the foreigners and that, as for all other royal obligations, they could not be withdrawn unless justified by a compelling ‘‘public interest.’’ This second group of ministers recommended that the letters remain in force because revoking them would cause social upheaval. However, the king should avoid granting similar letters in the future.∂∞ Needless to say, the king continued to issue naturalization letters to nonintegrated foreigners, and merchant opposition only served to limit the effects of some of these grants.∂≤ As in peninsular Spain where four different types of naturalization existed, in Spanish America naturalization letters often distinguished between foreigners allowed only to settle in the continent, and those allowed to trade.∂≥ Because the effect of these letters was restricted to the privileges enumerated in them, Gaspar Escalona y Agüero concluded that foreigners allowed to reside or trade in Spanish America were not eligible for public offices or ecclesiastical benefices in Spanish America or in Spain.∂∂ Eventually, Spanish American naturalization letters were classified as dispensas, that is, as special letters including dispensation from certain legal requirements. They were enumerated among gracias al sacar, which were royal grants allowing people to do things that were otherwise prohibited.∂∑

Naturaleza: Spanish America

105

Recipients were charged different prices, according to whether they had all the required attributes, some of them, or none at all. In Spanish America as in Spain, the communities and merchants opposed royal policies and insisted on natural ways for foreigners to become natives. Whereas the king wished to assert his sovereignty and to push his right to naturalize foreigners, the communities and merchants argued in favor of upholding the traditional regime of integration. Once again, two different models for the Spanish community were at stake. The first, advocated by the king, perceived the community as a collection of vassals. The second, advocated by the communities and the merchants, presented Spain as an association of people tied to one another.

‘‘True’’ Natives and Naturalized Foreigners Despite continuities, diverging practices did form different communities of natives on either side of the Atlantic. As a result of the early seventeenthcentury modifications (1608), in Spanish America it became essential to verify in each case whether the person who wanted to immigrate or trade was native by birth or by integration. Those native by birth, now called ‘‘natives and originals,’’ continued to be considered natives in both Spain and Spanish America, and their rights and duties were identical in both jurisdictions. But those who were native by integration—whether through a letter of naturalization, through citizenship in Spanish municipal communities, or in some other way—had a different status on either side of the ocean. Considered ‘‘true’’ natives in peninsular Spain, they were nevertheless treated as foreigners in Spanish America. As foreigners in Spanish America, they were barred from immigrating and trading unless they were able to gain formal naturalization by the Council of the Indies. The representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) in the court (audiencia) of Lima summarized this rule in 1762: ‘‘Those born in kingdoms and provinces not subjected to royal dominion and jurisdiction, even though naturalized in Spain because they fulfill the conditions embodied in the laws of Castile or in other particular privilege allowing them to reside and live in Spain, as far as their ability to undertake commercial activity in the Indies, they are still considered foreigners.’’∂∏ The evolution of different procedures for constituting nativeness in Spain and Spanish America and the institution of a new distinction between natives by birth and by integration—that is, between natives and the naturalized— provoked new instances of political and legal debate. Given the complexity of the Castilian regime and the Castilian conviction that naturalized foreigners were natives rather than ‘‘naturalized,’’ it was often unclear whether certain

106

Naturaleza: Spanish America

individuals were natives by birth or by integration. In both Spain and Spanish America, people who wished to immigrate and trade in the Indies demanded to be recognized as ‘‘natives and originals’’ of the kingdoms. Their demands were in turn opposed by the monopolist merchants, who classified them instead as ‘‘foreigners who were naturalized in Castile’’ but who consequently remained aliens in Spanish America. One example of such a discussion can be found in the status of people born in Lower Navarre (Navarra la Baja), which had belonged, theoretically at least, to the Catholic kings since 1512.∂π Under French domination since 1607, it was formally ceded to the French crown in 1659. In 1669, the Spanish king declared that natives of Lower Navarre were also ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain.’’∂∫ During the eighteenth century, however, the status of natives of Lower Navarre in Spanish America was highly contentious. In question was the correct interpretation of the royal decree that declared them ‘‘natives.’’ Was this decree an act of collective naturalization, thus transforming all natives of Lower Navarre into ‘‘naturalized foreigners,’’ or was it a declaratory act that formally recognized their previously existing status as ‘‘natives and originals’’ of Spain? While natives of Lower Navarre claimed that the second interpretation was correct, the monopolist merchants and the courts asserted that the contrary was true. They managed to have their way: despite their nativeness in Castile, natives of Lower Navarre were prohibited from immigrating and trading in Spanish America. Similar doubts were also raised about ‘‘sons of foreigners born in the kingdoms of Spain’’ (also called genizaros). Declared ‘‘truly originals and natives’’ (verdaderamente originales y naturales) in 1620, they found their status contested in the following century.∂Ω According to Seville’s merchant guild, the sons of foreigners were actually naturalized foreigners. As a result, they needed a special Spanish American naturalization if they wished to participate in transatlantic trade. The sons of foreigners fought back, contending that they were ‘‘true natives’’ of Spain and thus natives in both Spain and Spanish America.∑≠ This debate, which originated in the early seventeenth century, became especially violent at the beginning of the eighteenth century.∑∞ It confronted the merchant guild with a group of sons of foreigners resident in Cádiz, Seville, Puerto Santa María, Málaga, and San Lúcar, towns that were the main ports of the Spain–Spanish America trade network. Motivated by the petition of some twenty of its members, in 1719 Seville’s merchant guild complained to the king about what it considered an illegal practice by the House of Trade. According to the information it supplied, in order to issue licenses to immigrate and trade in the Americas, the House of Trade only required candidates to present copies of the baptismal record that verified their birth in Spain. It

Naturaleza: Spanish America

107

thus failed to distinguish correctly between natives and foreigners.∑≤ Especially painful was its disregard for the distinction between those with Spanish parents and those with foreign parents. This distinction was essential. In spite of the wording of the 1620 decree that declared apparently without limitation that all sons of foreigners born in Spain were natives, this was not the case. Birth in the kingdom did not produce nativeness. Instead, nativeness required a combination of local birth and a native or naturalized parent. Sons of transient foreigners, even if born in Spain, could never be considered natives by virtue of their birthplace alone; yet those born in Spain to integrated parents were in fact Spaniards. The reason for implementing this distinction was clear: transient parents were true foreigners who, despite their presence in the kingdoms, were still attached to their community of birth, as were their sons. Integrated foreigners were foreigners who had abandoned their previous allegiance to an alien community. Their sons, if born in Spain, merited treatment as ‘‘true’’ natives. Echoing similar discussions in Spain, the merchant guild argued that what was at stake was never the length of residence in the kingdoms. A ‘‘thousand years of residence,’’ for example, could easily be insufficient to produce nativeness because ‘‘neither the period of residence, nor birth grants nativeness. Nativeness is only conferred by the wish to remain.’’∑≥ What was required was some indication that the parents of the Spanish-born child had decided to sever ties with their community of origin and remain in Spain permanently. This was the ruling of ‘‘common law’’ and Spanish law, and this was common practice throughout Europe, where sons of foreigners were not treated as natives unless born to domiciled parents. Like their colleagues in Spain, the transatlantic merchants also criticized the presumption regime. Residence and property were not always good indicators of a foreigner’s intentions as both could be motivated by personal convenience and could be easily undone. The merchants argued that, because of the employment of presumptions, many undeserving foreigners obtained their naturalization by simply making sure they fulfilled certain requirements. In this way, they fooled the community into believing that they had decided to remain in Spain, which was a decision they had never made. Many foreigners who seemed integrated in Spain were not truly loyal to the community: all they wanted was a license to immigrate and to trade in Spanish America. Among this number were the sons of foreigners born in the kingdom. The Council of the Indies agreed with this interpretation. It clarified that only sons of domiciled foreigners born in the kingdom were natives by birth. Unlike the sons of transient foreigners, they could be allowed to immigrate and trade in Spanish America without obtaining an independent Spanish American naturalization letter. Upon request, the council further specified that the establishment of the parental domicile could occur after the children were born.

108

Naturaleza: Spanish America

In the following years, the practical implications of this decision came to light. Sons of foreigners who wanted to be treated as ‘‘true’’ natives in order to immigrate and trade in Spanish America, had to prove that their parents were integrated foreigners and thus natives. Carrying the burden of proof, they were forced to petition, from 1725 onward, the Council of the Indies to recognize them as true natives before they could obtain the necessary licenses of passage from the House of Trade.∑∂ This obligation was extremely burdensome. It involved a large investment in time, energy, and resources. Proofs had to be collected in the petitioner’s place of birth and residence. The documents were sent to the House of Trade, which then solicited the expert opinion of the merchant guild. Ultimately, the petition and its evidence were transferred to Madrid, where the case was decided.∑∑ When evidence was sufficient, the Council of the Indies declared the petitioner ‘‘native and original of these kingdoms and allowed to engage in the Spanish American trade.’’ Once again, determining the domicile and thus nativeness of parents was a complicated affair. The father of Juan Joseph Behic resided in Spain for some forty years, was married to a native, had children, and ‘‘had always acted as a Spaniard.’’∑∏ However, he remained associated with other natives of France with whom he had commercial dealings. In 1758, in the presence of a public notary, he formally declared that this continuing association with his former compatriots was not personal in nature but was only for business. According to him, it did not reflect on his loyalty to Spain. Was he a true Spaniard who wanted to live and die in the kingdom? Was his son a ‘‘true’’ native? The struggle to bar the sons of foreigners from the Spanish American trade continued after the ruling of the Council of the Indies. In 1762, Lima’s merchant guild insisted that only sons of a Spanish mother and a foreign father could be considered true natives. On the contrary, those whose parents were both foreigners or whose mother was alien were either aliens or naturalized foreigners.∑π The Peruvian authorities took a different view, certifying the right of all ‘‘sons of domiciled foreigners’’ to trade in Spanish America. Similar discussions also took place in Spain, where attempts to exclude the sons of foreigners from the transatlantic trade took on new forms. In the decades following the initial discussion, Seville’s merchant guild refused to admit the sons of foreigners as members, thus practically disabling them from participating in the transatlantic trade.∑∫ Royal officials, who reproached this practice, declared, once again, that genizaros should be treated like all other native Spaniards. The struggle against the sons of foreigners, which began by questioning their (true) nativeness and their right to emigrate and trade in the New World, soon shifted to questioning the privileges they should be allowed to enjoy.

Naturaleza: Spanish America

109

Having failed to prevent their participation in immigration and trade in the New World, the merchant guild attempted to institute a distinction between ‘‘old Spaniards’’ (españoles antiguos), and all other natives, such as the sons of foreigners. It argued that an acquired naturalization could never have the same legal and social implications as ‘‘the native and properly original nativeness.’’∑Ω The guild pointed out that the Siete Partidas established this much when it declared in the thirteenth century that the most perfect nativeness was the one obtained at birth. Deserving of special treatment much like that granted to a first-born child, ‘‘old Spaniards’’ should be preferred over more recent natives. This was a sensible conclusion because Spaniards who descended from Spanish families were in the habit of obeying the king for hundreds of years and were therefore more trustworthy than the sons of foreigners. The representative of royal interests in the Council of the Indies agreed with the merchants: If one reflects on this matter, there is no doubt that a difference exists between original natives and sons of foreigners. Original natives have always been in royal domains, both they and their ascendants served the king, without having any foreign connections. As a result, their love is more radical and more perfect. The sons of foreigners cannot refrain from having affection to their origin, affection that the law considers even more important than the affection they have to their place of birth. They have their ascendants and relatives in foreign domains, to whom they look with love, which is induced by blood. Because of this affection, any ordered republic adopts this policy [that distinguishes them from natives]. These natives [naturalized foreigners] have a relationship with foreign potencies because of family ties and friendship, and they could communicate to them the state of the kingdom, its disposition, progress, and resolutions, which must be prohibited because it is so prejudicial to the common good.∏≠

The sons of foreigners rejected these claims. They stressed their commitment to Spain and their worthiness. This commitment depended on ‘‘their birth, establishment, and other circumstances that ensured their permanence, having never known another sovereign, or paid another sovereign taxes, having never known another patria, domicile, citizenship, or settlement. They have the prerequisites of birth, establishment, and others, without ever experiencing that any of them had revoked or returned to the dominions from where his forefathers came.’’∏∞ The Council of the Indies agreed. It stated that the allegations of the guild and the representative of royal interests were absurd, and it determined that privileges could not be granted on the basis of antiquity in Spain. ‘‘No one can prove that he is a descendent of the companions of Tuval, who because of the confusion of the languages [Tower of Babel] came to live in

110

Naturaleza: Spanish America

Spain, Spain having been so flooded with innumerable nations that even the most genealogical person cannot boast an origin previous to the Goths, who came to Spain after many other nations dominated it. . . . Until now, no one had imagined or thought to form a genealogical tree that would declare his degree of antiquity in Spain only to obtain license to trade in the Indies.’’∏≤ Official insistence that sons of foreigners were true natives and merited treatment as such continued through the following decades. In 1774, responding to a naturalization petition presented by Juan Andrés de Prasca, the Council of the Indies declared that Juan Andrés was already a ‘‘true native.’’∏≥ His nativeness did not depend on formal declarations but arose from the fact that he was born in Spain, that his father and two uncles had resided in Spain since 1720, and that both he and his father had already obtained Castilian naturalization. In doing so, he and his other relatives demonstrated their unwavering and permanent wish to remain in the kingdoms, a wish that was sufficient to transform Juan Andrés into a true native. Litigants and the authorities often lamented the distinction between different types of natives (‘‘natives’’ and ‘‘naturalized’’ or ‘‘true natives’’ and other ‘‘natives’’) and the construction of two different communities in the New and the Old Worlds. Most of them, however, pointed out that despite some differences, nativeness still had the same core meaning in both Spain and Spanish America. In both places the authorities wished to examine the ‘‘true intentions’’ of newcomers, and in both places nativeness was granted to people who were loyal to the community and who wanted to establish permanent ties with its members. From this perspective, the differences between Spain and Spanish America were similar to the variations between the practices of different municipal communities. Although all municipalities in Castile shared similar notions regarding citizenship (vecindad), each one of them invoked it according to local needs and understandings, thus bringing about different consequences. Like some municipalities, the Spanish peninsular community facilitated the entry of new members by granting them the status of natives with relative ease in order to encourage needed immigration. Like other municipalities, the Spanish American community made procedural requirements for those wishing to become natives extremely rigorous in order to exercise control over admissions.∏∂

The Regulation of Illegal Presence Although integrated foreigners could not be naturalized automatically in Spanish America, their residence and commercial activities were nevertheless tolerated. This toleration found expression in the institution of a regime of

Naturaleza: Spanish America

111

special grants called composición. Composición was granted through a license issued by the local authorities to illegal aliens residing in their district. Rather than consisting of a permit to remain and work in the jurisdiction, it instructed all subordinate authorities to refrain from taking action against a foreigner despite his illegal situation, thereby inhibiting the normal course of justice.∏∑ Composiciones were irregular grants that could be revoked at the discretion of the authorities. Their bearers were limited both geographically and temporally. Because the particular privilege they enjoyed stemmed from a specific local authority, they could not exercise it outside the jurisdiction of the granting body, and the privilege could expire once the grantor left office. Foreigners who wished to migrate from one American region to another needed to reapply for a composición each time they moved, and the permits might not protect them if the authorities launched a campaign to expel foreigners.∏∏ Composiciones involved the payment of different fees and constituted an important source of revenue for the local Spanish American authorities. Yet most important for our discussion is the fact that they bridged Castilian with Spanish American practices. In order to receive them, foreigners were required to have resided in the jurisdiction for a prolonged period, to own or rent a house, to be married to a native, and so on. This meant that composiciones were granted to foreigners who, according to the Castilian tradition, would have been considered natives by integration. They allowed these foreigners to remain in the community despite the Spanish American legislation prohibiting it. The similarity between Castilian nativeness by integration and Spanish American composiciones was openly acknowledged. Juan de Sosa Brito, a native by integration in Spain and living in Popayán (present-day Colombia) at the time of his application, was admitted to a composición on the basis of his integration.∏π The same happened to Juan Martín Puyrredas, who was denied naturalization in 1774 but was nevertheless granted composición the following year, given his long residence and marriage in Spanish America.∏∫

Campaigns to Expel Foreigners from Spanish America Mercantile engagement in discussions on nativeness and foreignness was not restricted to Spain. Guilds operated in both the New and the Old Worlds and were extremely influential in Spanish America as well, where they promoted and conducted campaigns to expel illegal foreigners. The activities of Lima’s merchant guild in the 1750s and 1760s are most illuminating in this respect, although evidence suggests that its case was not exceptional and that similar activities were carried out by merchants in Cartagena, Havana, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and Cuzco.∏Ω Lima’s guild petitioned the crown in 1759

112

Naturaleza: Spanish America

and 1760 to launch campaigns against the presence of foreign merchants in Peru.π≠ It insisted that better control be exercised in Spain before ships left port, and it requested authorization to investigate and prosecute merchants suspected of foreignness. In 1761, it was charged with verifying the nativeness of people arriving in the port of Buenos Aires, and during the 1760s it collaborated with the viceroy and supplied him with lists of individuals to be expelled from the realm.π∞ Lima’s merchants also inspected ships arriving at Callao (Lima’s port) to determine if any illegal foreigners were on board.π≤ The role played by Lima’s guild in the identification and prosecution of foreigners was clear to the people it pursued. Many of them argued that economic competition or merchant animosity was the only reason for their placement on expulsion rolls. They were included in the lists because someone, somewhere, objected to their presence for reasons having nothing to do with nativeness and foreignness. Whether truly foreigners or not, the people targeted in these campaigns expected to be left untouched, and, indeed, this was usually the case unless a specific merchant, or the merchant community, considered them ‘‘dangerous’’ or simply wanted to eliminate them as a source of competition. In 1762, Pedro Vidarte blamed his misfortune on the guild: ‘‘What kind of harm did I do to the merchant guild, or the commerce of this city and kingdom, if, since I came from Spain, I spent most of my time helping the most important [local] merchants?’’π≥ Pedro de la Ripa stated in 1723 that his inclusion in the lists served the interests of particular individuals. There was no other reason why he, a native Spaniard, would be included in the list. His commercial rivals, who wanted to see him ruined, promoted the false accusation that he was a foreigner.π∂ Nicolás Campe, whose status as a native or foreigner was indeed unclear, suffered a similar experience in 1775 when he attempted to collect a debt from Santiago Espantoso (literally Terrifying Santiago).π∑ Santiago, refusing to repay Nicolás, classified him as a foreigner. This classification seriously compromised Nicolás’s ability to continue his commercial activities in the jurisdiction, and it definitely allowed Santiago to avoid repaying the debt. In many other cases commercial and personal rivalries—and not foreignness—were the true reasons for inclusion on the lists. In 1754, 134 merchants residing in Panama requested the expulsion of a certain Juan Cranisbrot, whom they considered ‘‘very prejudicial to the local trade.’’π∏ In 1761, their colleagues in Lima acted in a similar vein when they protested against the presence of Juan Valois, whom they ‘‘accused’’ of amassing a considerable fortune estimated at more than one million pesos.ππ In the same year, Lima’s merchant guild also admitted that the merchant community of Trujillo (Peru) initiated the prosecution of Juan Flores because it wanted him to leave.π∫ In

Naturaleza: Spanish America

113

1790, a financial conflict between the Conde de Casa Jijón and his French employee in Otavalo (present-day Ecuador) was also transformed into an administrative procedure against the rebellious worker now classified as a foreigner.πΩ On occasion, expulsion decrees were issued against people who had lived in the jurisdiction for ten, twenty, and even thirty years without being challenged.∫≠ And because the activities of merchants were so predominant in these procedures, nonmerchant foreigners had a better chance of avoiding these inquiries. Since the same was true of aliens who were willing to promise not to engage in commercial activities, expulsion proceedings frequently depended on the question of whether certain people were artisans or merchants. The expulsion of Arturo Alejandro Gordón in 1761 hinged on whether he was a merchant (to be expelled) or a surgeon (to remain as a professional in Spanish America). Felix Conforto was classified as a merchant of silver and gold, but he was allowed to stay in Lima after agreeing that he would cease ‘‘commerce in metals.’’∫∞ When individuals included in expulsion rolls contested their classification as foreigners, a judge of the royal court (audiencia) heard their case. On many such occasions, it became clear that proofs of foreignness were extremely frail. They might consist, for example, of the testimony of a single witness received in a secret hearing. The witness was not required to explain how he came to believe that the accused was an alien. People were classified according to their surnames, appearance, behavior, dress, or speech, and witnesses openly admitted that their testimony was based on ‘‘public opinion’’ or simple rumors. Some employed ‘‘commonsense’’ presumptions, such as the belief that employees of a well-known French Huguenot family must themselves be foreigners.∫≤ Yet distinguishing natives from foreigners was not a simple affair. Don Ventura Mariño Barriero y Figueroa, who was ‘‘of Galician origin and a Spanish hidalgo,’’ was labeled in 1762 as a foreigner because of the ‘‘foreignness’’ of his surname. When he was ordered to leave Peru, he protested to the local courts: ‘‘I was born in the city of Cangas in the kingdom of Galicia subject to the Catholic kings of Spain to parents notoriously qualified and known . . . both natives of this city.’’ He further claimed that the allegations that he was a foreigner were ‘‘an injury to him and his parents . . . since it suspected their nature and nobility, which was among the best in the kingdom.’’∫≥ Bernardo García, a native of Valencia, suffered the same fate because of his ‘‘foreign’’ pronunciation of Spanish.∫∂ Bartolomé Guillén, born in San Clemente, was classified as a foreigner: ‘‘One does not need, in order to know that he is French, other proofs than his signature, which he drew on the petition . . . because it uses a style so foreign, as is his speech, so that in his speech and in his written-letter he has two conclusive witnesses of his foreignness.’’∫∑ In 1764,

114

Naturaleza: Spanish America

Francisco Carte y Linze was included on expulsion rolls because his ‘‘foreignness is notorious, in the first place . . . because even though he speaks Castilian, he does not speak it fluently . . . and this lack of vocabulary is typical of those who have acquired the language in an older age.’’∫∏ All these people were later recognized as natives. In discussing their cases, the courts, royal officials, and litigants were forced to admit that cultural and linguistic tests were not necessarily helpful in distinguishing natives from foreigners. There was in fact no single way of being a ‘‘native of the kingdoms of Spain’’ because the Spanish kingdoms each possessed their own culture and language.∫π Catalans were often mistaken as French, and the fate of those born in Valencia and the Basque provinces was similar. In fact, even the identity of some Castilians—for example, natives of Galicia—could be questioned because they did not conform to expected habits, linguistic capacities, or other external traits. The presentation of a genealogical tree was not a guarantee against persecution. Ventura Mariño Barriero y Figueroa, whose case is mentioned above, went through long judicial proceedings in 1756 to prove his hidalguía (nobility). For that end, he supplied ample proof of his genealogy and place of birth. The results of these proceedings were communicated to the local merchant guild, but only five years later, in 1761, and on a basis of a single witness, he was classified as a foreigner.∫∫ Certainty about a person’s nativeness was very hard to establish, and people suspected of foreignness, third parties, and the authorities all suffered the consequences. Foreigners could be treated as natives because no one suspected they were aliens, and true natives could be wrongly accused of foreignness.∫Ω In some cases, public opinion classified the same people as both native and foreign. In 1795 Buenos Aires, different people who wished to bar José Manuel Rebelo from the office of local judge (alcalde ordinario) classified him as a foreigner. On that occasion the local authorities explained that José Manuel was elected to office because no one suspected that he was a foreigner. The fact that other foreigners had exercised this office was irrelevant, since they were able to do so only because they were considered natives. Indeed, on many occasions the authorities confessed their permanent confusion: ‘‘Finding out truth in this matter is very difficult, as in the Indies very few or none of those wishing to remain there confess that they are French, English, Dutch, or of another nation, instead, they say that they are Castilian, Andalusians, Navarres, or from Vizcaya, and they are careful to change their names, in case their patria is ever examined.’’Ω≠ But how could one prove one’s nativeness in an early modern world? Most litigants ended up doing what their detractors did. They enlisted their public

Naturaleza: Spanish America

115

reputation as their aid, and they swore that their condition as natives was a fact that could not be doubted. Ordered to leave Spanish America because of his alienness, in 1763 Bernardo García protested that despite the contrary information ‘‘he was a Spaniard and a native of the city of Valencia.’’Ω∞ To back this claim, he presented to the judge commissioned to review his case in Lima a copy of his license-of-passage to the Americas, which attested that he was a ‘‘native of the kingdoms of Spain.’’ The merchant guild of Lima, acting as an interested party in the proceedings, rejected this proof. It explained that licenses-of-passage were not a conclusive proof of nativeness because they were automatically given to all those allowed to sail to Spanish America.Ω≤ From a formal point of view, the license was not Bernardo’s; it was issued to the master with whom Bernardo arrived in the New World. Many foreigners falsified their names and genealogies in order to receive these licenses, and Bernardo could well be one of them. The merchant guild explained that in the hearings it held to produce lists of foreigners, one witness declared that García was not Bernardo’s true surname, and many others attested that by ‘‘public fame’’ he was a foreigner. The guild insisted that the burden of proof was now on Bernardo, who needed to demonstrate that despite all these indications he was nevertheless a Spaniard. Bernardo presented seven witnesses before the judge. Some declared that it was ‘‘public and notorious’’ that he was a native of Valencia, as were his parents. Categorizing their information as facts that needed no proof and could not be legally contradicted ( público y notorio), they protested that it was utterly unthinkable to conclude otherwise.Ω≥ Other witnesses met him and his parents in Valencia or saw him associate with other natives of this Spanish kingdom. One attested that he spoke perfect Valenciano, and another reported that his kinsman, who recommended Bernardo, told him that he was a native of Valencia. The merchant guild remained unsatisfied. It classified these proofs as ‘‘very weak’’ because none of the witnesses present in Lima could actually attest to Bernardo’s identity, birthplace, and genealogy. Bernardo had no documents, such as a baptismal record, to support his claim, and whatever was affirmed by way of ‘‘public knowledge’’ could be contradicted by the same knowledge that attested that he was a foreigner. Nevertheless, the judge declared Bernardo a Spaniard and allowed him to remain in Spanish America. Similar discussions took place in other Spanish American enclaves. In 1749 in Buenos Aires, Fernando Arentavegaray attempted to refute allegations that he was French. He presented three witnesses who attested that they had met him in Cádiz and that they had always held him (lo han tenido y tienen) to be a native of either Navarre or Vizcaya. The witnesses also stated that they had no doubt that he was a Spaniard (español ), which is why the House of Trade

116

Naturaleza: Spanish America

allowed him to sail to Spanish America in the first place. In order to avoid further complications, the representative of the local merchant community opted to consider Fernando a native and to allow him to stay in the city.Ω∂ The nature of the hearing granted to those included on expulsion roll was unclear. According to the merchant guild, these hearings were administrative and not judicial. They were granted by way of ‘‘grace,’’ and the authorities were not legally required to hold them. This implied that individuals wishing to contest their classification had no right to due process: they had no right to be heard, to see the proofs against them, or to claim legal exceptions.Ω∑ Most litigants, realizing the fragility of their situation, limited their arguments to proving their nativeness or asking for mercy. Only a few litigants were willing to confront the guild on these issues. In 1723, Bernardo Coghen y Montefrío refused to defend himself against merchant allegations that he was a foreigner because, according to him, the merchant guild was not a party to the discussion. Even if it were, the guild—rather than he—carried the burden of proof. Pedro Juan de Ripa adopted a similar line of defense. As he had already proved his nativeness in the House of Trade, he argued that the merchant guild had neither the authority nor the cause to force him to prove his status again.Ω∏ In 1764, Francisco Carte y Linze also complained against the practice of placing the burden of proof on those accused of foreignness: ‘‘This process attempts to distinguish foreigners from natives, which cannot be done without proof and the case cannot be decided according to the opinion of the guild only because the court had committed errors in the list and included in them many that are not foreigners.’’Ωπ Accordingly, the information supplied by the merchant guild should be treated as an accusation the guild had to prove rather than one requiring the so-called foreigner to demonstrate his nativeness.

Conclusions Spanish American practices were both similar to and different from Castilian traditions. On both sides of the Atlantic, integration, which was verified by presumptions, was the main criterion for the conversion of foreigners into natives. Also similar was the confrontation between the king and the community, with the role of the community represented in Spanish America mainly by merchants and the merchant association. This confrontation involved the questions of whether the community was natural or artificial, and whether its constitution depended on the king or on organic processes of integration and convergence. Last but not least, in Spanish America as in Spain, late eighteenth-century discussants expressed a growing frustration with the presumption regime, which allowed foreigners either to obtain a

Naturaleza: Spanish America

117

status that they did not deserve (in Spanish America), or to act alternatively as foreigners and natives (in Spain). As a result of these perceptions, demands were made on both sides of the ocean for the adoption of a clearer system that would depend on formal declarations. In Spain, this led to the adoption of a regime that first codified the different ways people could become natives, and then allowed foreigners to choose their own status. In Spanish America, the same demand produced a contrary result. It first justified the suppression of naturalization by prescription and the adoption of a regime of naturalization by formal declaration. It then required that authorities deciding on the naturalization of foreigners go beyond the verification of facts to interpret their true meaning. If similarities were important, so were differences. Whereas in Castile the evolution of nativeness and foreignness was tied mainly to office holding and to debates concerning the sovereignty of the king and the structure of the community, in Spanish America this process was closely related to mercantile interests and mercantile agency. These interests and agency were responsible for the legal modifications introduced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yet, although in 1608 naturalization by integration (prescription) was banned, local communities, the authorities, and even the merchants themselves continued to tolerate the presence of integrated foreigners. At times, these foreigners were allowed to remain in the jurisdiction because they were willing to pay fees (composición). Yet on most occasions, foreigners were simply left alone. Foreigners were most likely to be persecuted when they were wealthy merchants or when their engagement in the Spanish American trade seemed unfavorable to the ambitions of individual merchants or the guilds. In these cases, the distinction between natives and foreigners suddenly became meaningful. The distinction between true natives and other natives also became very important because it allowed the merchants to claim that those naturalized in Castile were not necessarily naturalized in Spanish America and it lay basis to the claim that ‘‘old’’ natives should always be preferred to ‘‘new’’ (naturalized) natives. Merchants and mercantile agency were thus crucial in the identification and expulsion of foreigners. People were classified as foreigners even when they were true natives and their inclusion in the list depended more on their wealth and the state of their affairs than it did on their alienness. Indeed, in Spanish America more than in Spain, the link between conflict or potential conflict on one hand, and status verification on the other, was extremely clear: there was a direct relationship between those fighting to exclude foreigners and those benefiting from this exclusion. Under these circumstances, the monopolist merchants came up with new ideas on how to exclude people; those singled out for exclusion responded by defending their

118

Naturaleza: Spanish America

rights. This conversation, often taking place between neighbors and competitors, lasted for two hundred years. It repeatedly utilized a discourse of the natural love of patria, and it frequently questioned the ability of natives to trust foreigners. It was in this nexus between natural love (obtained at birth and reinforced by descent) and elected love (arising from the decision to integrate in a new community), between natural inclination (birth) and choice (immigration), that Spanish American debates were carried out. In Spanish America more than in Spain, the right of people to choose their community was reaffirmed at the same time it was repeatedly questioned.

6

The Other: Conversos, Gypsies, Foreign Catholics, and Foreign Vassals

My hypothesis as developed in the preceding chapters suggests that the community of Spanish natives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a highly complex social and legal construction, based not on cultural or linguistic traits nor principally dependent on birth. Instead, it was founded on the assumption that people who wanted to live together and who were willing to commit themselves permanently to the community had the right to consider themselves members, both as citizens (vecinos) and as natives (naturales). This organic community depended on natural processes of integration and was limited in only two respects. First, in order to be integrated, candidates had to be Catholics. Second, candidates were judged not solely by their individual behavior, but also by their inclusion in certain social groups. There were two reasons why Catholicism was a condition for membership. From a practical point of view, under normal circumstances and with very few exceptions, from the late fifteenth and certainly in the sixteenth century, only Catholics could live permanently on Spanish soil. This meant that only Catholics could achieve the integration needed to become citizens or natives. From a more substantial point of view, the community was perceived, first and foremost, as an association of people who wanted to live together, and membership in it implied the willingness to submit to a common regime. This regime was based on an agreement on a few basic principles that could be achieved

119

120

The Other

with foreign and nonvassal Catholics, but that was practically impossible to achieve in the cases of ‘‘heretic’’ Christians (Protestants) and non-Christians. As I will argue in this chapter, the restriction of membership in local communities and in the community of the kingdom to Catholics alone did not mean that the Spanish community was defined only by reference to religion as historians have maintained.∞ Although Catholicism defined many of the laws governing the behavior of Spaniards, and although it embodied in certain ways the constitution of the Spanish community and state, Catholicism does not explain the appearance of both community and state.≤ The cases of foreign Catholics and converso Jews living in Majorca (Chuetas), which I review in this chapter, demonstrate that Catholicism was indeed essential to the acceptance of individuals into the community. It was, however, insufficient. The second factor that limited natural processes of integration was the idea that individuals existed as part of groups. Individuals were trusted because they behaved in certain ways that were acknowledged by the authorities or by community members. Belief in a person’s intentions and trusting in their loyalty could depend on individual circumstances, yet, on occasion, belief and trust depended on group affiliation. The belief that natives were naturally disposed to favor the community of their birth is an example of this practice (chapter 2). Another example is the treatment accorded merchants or contracted professionals whose residence could not sufficiently prove their intention to integrate into the community (chapters 2 and 5). Although the importance of membership in a group was admitted in these cases, in other cases authorities and litigants treated individuals as components of groups yet denied they were doing so. Such was the case of settled Gypsies and converso Jews living in eighteenth-century Majorca (Chuetas) who were rejected as citizens and natives by invoking their individual behavior when, in fact, their behavior was not considered individually but instead was constructed by reference to their membership in a group whose constituents, ‘‘it was well known,’’ behaved in certain ways. The Gypsies, born and raised in Spain, were classified as foreigners or semiforeigners because by definition they were not integrated in local communities. Gypsies who were citizens of local communities found it hard, not to say impossible, to demonstrate that they were Spaniards. The same was true of Majorcan converso Jews. Because they were Chueta, individuals belonging to this group were stigmatized as heretics and were accused of maintaining practices that rejected all association with the local community. Through the Gypsies and the Chuetas we can also examine the degree to which integration in a local community was essential to the classification of people as Spaniards and foreigners. The importance of integration is further

The Other

121

demonstrated by examining cases involving the status of foreign vassals of the Spanish king, which clarify the difference between a community of vassals and a community of natives, two terms that in the historiography traditionally were associated with one another. Together, the cases I review in this chapter (foreign Catholics, foreign vassals, converso Jews, and Gypsies) reaffirm the conclusion that the community of Spanish natives was defined by reference to religion, on one hand, and integration, on the other. They also show that vassalage was a consequence, rather than a cause, of both. Lastly, they demonstrate how a discourse focused on integration was used to exclude people, especially on the basis of their being drawn from marginal groups.

Religion Early modern Spaniards envisioned themselves first and foremost as Christians.≥ This vision found expression in the adoption of Catholicism as a political theme by kings who called themselves ‘‘Catholic,’’ a label carried by all Spanish kings beginning with Ferdinand and Isabel in the fifteenth century.∂ The Spanish crown instituted the protection of the ‘‘true faith’’ as a social ideal—as expressed by the reconquest and the military orders—and fought to preserve and augment the Catholic world.∑ The importance of Catholicism to the construction of Spain justified the persecution of religious minorities and the rejection of heretics. For early modern Spaniards, Catholicism was a culture and an identity: ‘‘Religion is the tie of human society, and it sanctions and sanctifies the alliances, the contracts, and even the society itself.’’∏ Religion supplied Spaniards with a moral code, a prescription for behavior, and a key to understanding the world. These codes, behaviors, and understandings were shared with Catholics outside Spain and thus allowed Spaniards to feel connected to a wider community. Spaniards frequently asserted that apparent cultural, linguistic, and behavioral differences between themselves and foreign Catholics were inconsequential. What mattered was not what separated Catholics from one another, but what united them.π Church institutions encouraged the creation of this pan-Christian community and supplied a common patria (the ‘‘city of God’’), a common structure (the church), and a common bureaucracy (clergy and orders). The fact that the community of Spanish natives was by definition a Catholic community was rarely discussed. It was so obvious to contemporaries and so consensual in nature that there was no need to spell it out. Protestants could not reside in Spain or Spanish America unless special privileges allowed it, and in these cases they were tolerated rather than integrated.∫ No matter how long they resided in the community, they were external and their presence was

122

The Other

deemed temporary. The integration of non-Christians was impossible. It was generally assumed that, after the expulsion of Jews at the end of the fifteenth century and of the Moors in the beginning of the seventeenth century, only Christians could live on Spanish soil. This understanding was so socially embedded that the Catholicism of natives was mentioned only as an axiom. Seville’s merchant guild employed the qualification of Catholicism in the 1720s to argue that not all sons of all foreigners were natives (chapter 5).Ω The most obvious and necessary disqualification for nativeness was to be the son of a heretic, Jew, or Muslim, who, even if born in Spain, could never be considered Spanish. This argument was used to demonstrate that important exceptions must be made to the rule allowing all sons of all foreigners to attain the status of natives. Although eighteenth-century discussants recognized the important commonalties they shared with foreign Catholics, they nevertheless asserted that there was a fundamental difference between a community of faith and a political community. Alien Catholics, they argued, were the quintessential foreigners in Spain and Spanish America. Although they were the only people who could become members of municipal communities and, by extension, natives, their inclusion was not automatic. Instead it depended on the usual tests, as described in chapters 2 through 5. Assimilation between natives and Catholics was reserved to special cases. The Siete Partidas determined that conversion was one of the methods by which foreigners could obtain their naturalization.∞≠ This idea, that nonCatholic foreigners could become Catholics and natives at the same time and by virtue of a single act, was also included in the 1716 decree that distinguished transients from integrated foreigners (chapter 4). In both instances, it was reasoned that conversion could produce nativeness because it was a form of birth. Indeed, conversion designated a spiritual rebirth that was more important than the biological birth.∞∞ Despite these affirmations, in most cases, rather than constituting people as natives, conversion simply removed a significant legal impediment for naturalization. It allowed people who already resided on Spanish territory and who were practically—although not theoretically—integrated into the community to be recognized as both citizens and natives. This idea that conversion was not an independent mechanism of naturalization, but was instead a final factor in the complete integration of individuals already present in the community was clear in the documents I consulted. These documents meticulously recorded the circumstances in which new converts lived. Rather than simply stating their conversion, they analyzed their insertion in the community. For example, in 1782, the royal council declared that Samuel Manning was a native of Spain because he had resided in Bar-

The Other

123

celona for thirty-three years and because he had converted to Catholicism in 1765, married a Spaniard, and was the father of several children.∞≤ In 1803, a foreign convert residing in Santa Fe (present-day Argentina) received a similar treatment. In reviewing his case, the local authorities specified that this foreigner was educated in a convent and than converted to Catholicism. He was hard working and truly acted as a Catholic, attending mass daily.∞≥ They openly suggested that his conversion to Catholicism was motivated by his wish to live among Spaniards, a life that was impossible without embracing the faith: ‘‘he reconciled with the church in order to live among us . . . and if he will return to his [original] land, he will be rejected.’’ From the authorities’ point of view, conversion constituted a legal presumption. It proved that the foreigner wished to integrate into the community, and it guaranteed his intention to remain permanently because, given his conversion, he could no longer return to his native land. Indeed, even in cases of conversion and despite the wording of the laws, candidates were still assessed across the range of the usual tests of integration. Catholicism and the opportunity to achieve nativeness were also closely associated in cases of persecuted Catholics, who were invited to Spain, and promised the status and treatment of natives, by the royal authorities. In 1701, 1703, and 1734 such orders were issued for the reception of Catholics from England, Ireland, and the Netherlands. These Catholics could be granted naturalization as soon as they arrived in Spain.∞∂ Privileged over all other foreigners, whose naturalization was conditioned by integration, they merely had to present a copy of their baptismal record to be recognized as natives. The preferential treatment they received was attributed to their suffering religious persecution. This suffering was mentioned in legal and administrative records, but it was also invoked by the immigrants themselves. Requesting permission to remain in Spain and to achieve recognition as Spaniards, these individuals testified that they immigrated to Spanish territories in order to practice their religion freely. Martín de Liñane was a clergymen who had preached in Ireland when, ‘‘experiencing persecution by heretics,’’ he returned to Spain.∞∑ In 1763, Ignacio Vereux claimed that he had decided to live in Spain ‘‘once he found himself distanced from the danger from which he escaped and had obtained the safeness and tranquility in his Christian profession, enjoying these privileges for the ten years in which he had lived among Spaniards and in their lands.’’ He also specified in a second petition that ‘‘in addition, religion and natural law should favor a person who is a Catholic, but especially one who since he was young has been struggling to avoid contamination by the different heretic sects to which he was exposed in a kingdom and nation which are Protestants.’’∞∏

124

The Other

Some petitioners suggested that their Catholic faith made them immediate members of the Spanish community because the Spanish community was first and foremost a community of faith.∞π Accordingly, the laws that declared them ‘‘natives of Spain’’ simply recognized their previously existing condition as natives by virtue of Catholicism. As a result, they were ‘‘true and original’’ natives, rather than naturalized foreigners, which meant that they should be able to immigrate and trade in Spanish America (chapter 5) and not be required to choose status as transient or integrated citizen foreigners (chapter 4). The Spanish authorities, courts, and merchant guilds rejected these claims. They asserted that persecuted Catholics were naturalized in Spain because Spain in Europe wished to guarantee that Catholics could freely practice their religion; however, this naturalization did not make them ascribed members of the community.∞∫ Persecuted Catholics who wanted to immigrate and trade in Spanish America needed a Spanish America naturalization letter and, if they wished to continue their residence in Spain, they had to choose whether they wanted to be treated as integrated or transient foreigners.∞Ω Although Catholicism alone was not sufficient to turn foreigners into natives, not adhering to this faith could bar people (who otherwise would be considered natives) from integrating into the community. One example is the status of converso Jews living in Majorca. In the 1770s members of this group, also called Chuetas or de la calle (of the street) addressed the royal council in Madrid and requested an end to their isolation and discrimination.≤≠ According to their plea, they were excluded from most offices and occupations, honors, and privileges enjoyed by all loyal vassals and native Spaniards. This discrimination was motivated by their classification as ‘‘Chuetas,’’ a classification that alluded to their Jewish origin. The Chuetas insisted that they had been loyal vassals of the king and good Christians since 1435, the year their forefathers converted to Catholicism. As had other conversos before them, they argued that postconversion discrimination must cease. Humanity in its entirety descended from either Jews or Gentiles, and many Spaniards were of Jewish origin, making it unclear why the Chueta should be treated differently.≤∞ Spain had to encourage conversion, and there was no better encouragement than the promise of equality. The Chuetas also asked the king to recognize that they were faithful to the patria, useful to the state, good citizens, and exemplary in their conduct. In short, as natives of the land and vassals of the king, they were true members of the community and merited equal treatment. Asked to give their opinion on this petition, the authorities of Majorca expressed their opposition and concern. Although the local royal court (audiencia) could not justify the discrimination of the Chueta on legal grounds, it nevertheless explained that anti-Jewish legislation dating from the preconversion period (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) could be applied in this case if

The Other

125

Jewishness were interpreted as a category defining descent and not religious belief.≤≤ Discrimination was also legally permitted by the rules of individual guilds, which used limpieza de sangre categories to exclude those of Jewish descendant from membership. These rules were a practical necessity. Experience demonstrated that mixing Chuetas with ‘‘pure-blooded’’ Christians in a single professional association was disruptive. Those of pure blood resented the presence of the Chuetas, and the Chuetas formed alliances among themselves that dominated the work of these associations. Other practices, such as their exclusion from office holding and confraternity membership, and the unwillingness of Spanish Catholics to intermarry with them, were based on the general opinion that many Chuetas still secretly practiced Judaism. This opinion was confirmed when on several occasions individual Chuetas were condemned by the local inquisition as crypto-Jews ( judaizantes). The royal court also argued that the Chuetas’ disbelief was hereditary, and that it was acquired through descent. Thus, the Chuetas were substantially different from other converts and could never become true members of the community. The court also held that, even if the Chuetas were right and the discrimination was unjust and illegal, its practice must nevertheless continue. The redemption of some 300 Chueta families was not important enough to justify offending the perceptions and sensibilities of the 30,000 families living in Majorca. The court also resented the allegation that most Spaniards descended from Jews and called it ‘‘an audacious folly.’’≤≥ The city council of Majorca and the representatives of the kingdom soon followed suit. They stated that they could not trust the Chueta, either religiously or socially. Jewishness, they argued, was a genetic, not a religious, trait. The only way to guarantee the good behavior and usefulness of the Chueta was by exercising control over them. The Chuetas were not loyal because they loved the king and the state, but because they feared retribution or because their relation to the community was useful to them in some way or the other.≤∂ Their character and nature were unalterable. Despite efforts to change them, and despite their apparent conversion, the Chuetas persisted in their offensive ways, accustomed to lying and permitted by their religion of descent to break their oath. It would be humiliating to all other vassals, even the most miserable among them, if the Chueta were granted equality. Such a grant would add nothing to the state because there were already sufficient numbers of people who loved the state and were willing to serve it. Last but not least, discrimination against conversos was practiced everywhere in Spain, but only the Chuetas, because of their particular audacity and disloyalty, dared to challenge it. The representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) in the Council of Castile, Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes, was appalled when he received the facts of this

126

The Other

case.≤∑ Declaring that both legislation and legal and political theory favored the petition of the Chuetas, he also explained that all states must strive to unify their inhabitants and mould them into a single body. In this case, nothing stood in the way of unification except the aversion of the inhabitants of Majorca for the Chuetas. This aversion was bad for the state and completely unjust; it must be immediately reversed. Suspecting that his recommendation would be bitterly resented, Rodríguez Campomanes suggested a second round of consultations with the authorities of Majorca. In response to his invitation, the authorities sent different pleas to Madrid in the following months. The ecclesiastical chapter and the university requested that the monarch place the well-being of the local community above that of the Chuetas. They insisted that the Chuetas were not true Christians and that they could not be trusted. They also personally attacked the six deputies appointed by the Chuetas to represent them in Madrid, claiming they were all crypto-Jews. The pleas for continued discrimination fell on deaf ears. In 1775, Rodríguez Campomanes clarified once again that the discrimination of the Chuetas was illegal and unjust.≤∏ Descent was irrelevant to the classification of royal subjects as ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’: guilt could not be inherited, and individuals could not be stigmatized by their family genealogy. The discrimination of the Chuetas severely obstructed the social, economic, and political progress of Majorca and had to be remedied for the island’s sake. The Council of Castile agreed with this analysis. In 1778, it condemned the discrimination of the Chuetas as ‘‘contradictory to reason, to evangelical and political law and to the well-being of the state and the city of Palma.’’≤π It reprimanded the local authorities for having adhered to their practice for such a long time and for having supported the popular misjudgment instead of correcting it. Only two ministers voted against this decision. They did not deny its legal foundation, but they expressed concern about its political consequences. Treating the Chuetas as ‘‘original Christians’’ (cristianos originarios) could ‘‘light a violent fire and a nonextinguishable hate.’’≤∫ This hate, which was legally unjustifiable, was nevertheless socially understandable. The Chuetas promoted it by continuing their heretic practices and by mocking Christianity and Christian dogma, and also by their exclusionary social practices. They separated themselves from the rest of society and acted as an independent corporate body. Their transformation into truly good and useful citizens and into true natives could be achieved only by breaking their internal solidarity and by forcibly integrating them into mainstream society. The two ministers suggested that the Chuetas should be resettled all over Spain, allowing a maximum of two families per community. They further stated that, once the Chuetas fully integrated into local communities, their bad name would automatically die out and ‘‘their problem’’ would be solved.

The Other

127

An inverse plan was elaborated by the representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) in the royal court (audiencia ) of Majorca. Admitting that the Chuetas were often loyal and beneficial subjects of the crown, the representative suggested transferring them in bulk to Minorca, an island recently freed of English occupation and practically uninhabited.≤Ω Adopting a ‘‘separate but equal’’ solution, he expressed his opinion that in Minorca the Chuetas could finally be given equality without it causing a major social upheaval. Passing over these suggestions, the king agreed with the majority opinion. Granting that the Chueta were indeed natives, he first ordered that they were free to reside where they wanted (1782). He then allowed them to join the navy and to be employed in different occupations, as well as in different public offices (1785 and 1788). In order to diminish local opposition, the king instructed the authorities to act gradually and to employ moderate means. The parties to the debate never denied that the Chuetas were born in Spain nor that they continued to reside in Spain, where they wished to remain permanently. But while the royal authorities in Madrid agreed that birth and permanent residence justified treating people as natives, the protesters from Majorca rejected these claims. According to them, the participation of the Chuetas in the community of natives was not complete because their Catholicism was not sincere and because socially they were not truly integrated. In order to demonstrate the insufficient Catholic faith of the Chuetas, the authorities of Majorca invoked considerations regarding genetic determinism and inquisitorial records. They claimed that, according to the first, there was something inherent in the group that did not allow its individual members to convert to Catholicism. Although the nature of this ‘‘thing’’ was unclear in the allegations, clarification was not truly required. The claim that Jews were ‘‘abnormal’’ converts whose conversion was never complete dated from the Middle Ages. It formed part of a traditional discourse about converso integration in Spain that consistently questioned whether true conversion was possible at all.≥≠ This discourse portrayed Jewishness not only as a faith, but also as a cultural trait and a genealogical classification. It consequently determined that Jews continued to be Jews even after they chose (or were forced) to become Catholics. Genealogy thus conditioned the Chuetas to heresy; heresy being a trait people could inherit.≥∞ Yet Chuetas disbelief, the authorities in Majorca claimed, was not only dependent on their genealogy: the conviction of several Chuetas as crypto-Jews by the Inquisition offered hard proof of these deterministic traits. The Chuetas were not only disposed to heresy by descent, but they were also practicing heretics. Whereas the different authorities in Majorca espoused the traditional discourse on conversion and heresy, and used it to argue that the Chuetas were unworthy of the privileges of natives, the royal authorities in Madrid refused

128

The Other

to follow this path. Adopting a different approach, they admitted that some Chuetas might indeed have failed to be good Christians, but they concluded that the attitudes of the few should not incriminate the whole. Christian attitudes were a question of fact that should be examined in each individual case, and neither descent nor past conviction was a sufficient indication that all Chuetas were invariably heretic. Even the two ministers who voted against the majority opinion refused to surrender to genealogical determinism. Like their colleagues in Madrid, they believed that, rather than condemned forever, the Chuetas were ‘‘correctable.’’ Otherwise, there was no point in ensuring their dispersal across Spain, no hope that, through integration, their ‘‘problem’’ would be solved. Possessing a defective faith was therefore the first argument against the inclusion of the Chuetas in a community of natives, which theoretically included only orthodox Catholics. Yet, besides their faith, the Chuetas were also rejected because of their internal solidarity ties and their subsequent isolation from the rest of society. According to the allegations of the local authorities, despite being born in the city and continuing to reside there, the Chuetas were not truly integrated. Instead, they constituted a distinct group. They threatened society not as individuals, but as members of a foreign entity. Whenever admitted into guilds and associations, their ‘‘union, wealth, and industry’’ soon dominated these organizations to the exclusion of other members. The Chuetas were responsible for their own isolation. Society discriminated against them only to protect itself, and only in reaction to the Chuetas’ exclusionary practices. This was the reason why the two dissenting ministers proposed to ‘‘solve’’ the Chueta ‘‘problem’’ by forcing their integration into Spanish society by dividing the group and sending them individually to different local communities. This perception of the Chuetas as outsiders and foreigners was also accompanied by resentment. Constituting a separate group, it was feared that, if granted the rights of natives, they would dominate society. They were simply too successful, too rich, and too powerful.

Integration The importance of integration and the indication that its absence made people foreigners despite the fact that were born, raised, and resided in Spanish territories is especially clear in the case of the Gypsies. Anti-Gypsy legislation was common in Castile during most of the early modern period. As early as 1499 and again in 1539, 1586, 1619, and 1633, Gypsies were ordered to abandon their nomadic way of life and establish a permanent domicile.≥≤ From the late seventeenth century onward, Gypsies were also ordered to pre-

The Other

129

sent themselves periodically to the local authorities to register their names and places of residence, as well as to give information about their families, occupations, and properties.≥≥ A general expulsion of the Gypsies was decreed in 1695, and only Gypsies permanently residing in municipalities of at least 200 vecinos and occupied in farming activities were exempt. Local authorities were charged with overseeing the implementation of these measures, and they were ordered by the royal administration to conduct regular inspections of Gypsy places of residence and to collect information about their activities. Gypsies were not allowed to reside in separate neighborhoods, to use special clothing, or to speak any language other than Spanish. Any Gypsy caught in a group of three or more would be sentenced to death unless he denounced his fellow kinsmen and their activities. Similar orders were issued in 1717, 1726, 1738, 1745, 1746, 1749, 1783, and 1784 and were applied throughout Spain.≥∂ A list of places permitted for Gypsy residence was elaborated in 1738 and extended in 1746. A ratio was set according to which a single Gypsy family could be accommodated for each one hundred (non-Gypsy) citizens (vecinos).≥∑ Gypsies were also barred from immigrating to Spanish America.≥∏ Repeated orders demanded their immediate expulsion from that continent, alleging that their presence was detrimental both to the effort to convert the Indians and to the general well-being.≥π Their potential harassment of the Indians and their possible collaboration with foreign nations against Spanish interests were considered especially dangerous.≥∫ There were other concerns as well, such as the Gypsy’s alleged vagrancy and criminal way of life. Why were Gypsies treated this way? According to the decrees, the aim was to ensure that the Gypsies changed their way of life. They were to abandon their ‘‘vagrancy,’’ as well as all traits that distinguished them from other members of society, such as clothing and language. Instead of allowing them to maintain their isolation—which was viewed as self-inflicted—these orders would force them to integrate into local communities and to sever the ties that connected them to one another. If they refused to do so, they would automatically lose the right to remain in Spain. Gypsies who insisted on maintaining a separate existence would be incarcerated, expelled, or even sentenced to death. Who were the Gypsies? According to the seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury anti-Gypsy legislation, there was no Gypsy nation, only the Gypsy people.≥Ω If there had ever been a Gypsy nation, either it did not reach the Iberian peninsula, or its members were no longer there.∂≠ Instead, in Castile and in other parts of Spain, it was believed that Gypsiness was taken on voluntarily by people who sought out a bad life (mal vivir). These people were

130

The Other

ordinary citizens. Born on the peninsula as vassals of the king, they nevertheless chose to behave in an antisocial and illegal manner.∂∞ The Gypsy community was thus a ‘‘normal’’ political community. Like other contemporary political communities, its members had no natural, ascribed, or ethnic characteristics that compelled them to come together: ‘‘Those who are called and who identify themselves as Gypsies are not Gypsies by origin or nature, nor do they proceed from any infected root.’’∂≤ Instead, membership in the Gypsy community depended on choice and on individual adhesion. Paradoxically, anti-Gypsy legislation also appealed to fairness. It ascertained that it was unfair that the Gypsies, who were an undistinguishable segment of society, were allowed to adopt an antisocial behavior while other members were required to remain obedient. It determined that because Gypsies were natives, decency required that they should behave as natives and, among other things, should pay taxes.∂≥ Constructing Gypsiness in this manner undermined society’s role in stigmatizing the members of the group.∂∂ Gypsiness, the laws stated, was a selfappropriated denomination. The identification, isolation, and discrimination of the Gypsies were the sole responsibility of the members themselves. If and when individual Gypsies stopped behaving as they did (a thing the decrees wished to obtain), their Gypsiness would automatically disappear and they would be integrated as full members of the community. Despite its internal coherence, this definition of Gypsiness clashed with reality. Eighteenth-century administrative correspondence and judicial records continuously admitted this fact by making abundant reference to ‘‘good Gypsies,’’ who were citizens of local communities. Were these people really Gypsies? Should the restrictive measures be applied against them? What could ‘‘good Gypsies’’ do if they wished to avoid prosecution?∂∑ As the eighteenth century drew to a close, two answers emerged. On one hand, people classified as Gypsies could attempt to prove that, despite their initial classification, they were ordinary natives. On the other, ‘‘good Gypsies’’ could claim that because of their behavior and despite their Gypsiness, they were exempt from the antiGypsy measures. The reclassification of individuals initially identified as Gypsies was practiced, for example, in 1745, when several families from Jerez de la Frontera claimed that by virtue of their citizenship (vecindad) and nativeness they were ordinary Spaniards (españoles).∂∏ Their petition was backed by the local council who declared that—on the basis of their occupation as agricultural laborers, their usefulness to the local society, their adherence to the general code of dress, their use of Spanish, and their dissociation from other Gypsies—they should be classified as castellanos viejos (old Castilians) rather than as Gyp-

The Other

131

sies. Thus, people who acted as ‘‘normal’’ Spaniards and who showed no signs of ‘‘antisocial behavior’’ were indeed Spaniards, or old Castilians, rather than Gypsies. Similar affirmations were made in other cases. The Moreno family, for example, had obtained recognition in 1709 that its members were castellanos viejos, given that they descended from a mixed union of old and new Castilians, had a permanent domicile, were hard working, and paid taxes.∂π Nevertheless, under similar circumstances, less fortunate individuals failed to obtain the desired declaration. In the 1790s, Baltazar Vargas and his family attempted to establish a domicile in Madrid. When the city council refused to admit them on the basis of their Gypsiness, they addressed the royal council and requested a declaration that they were Castilians (castellanos) rather than Gypsy ( gitanos).∂∫ As all other Castilians, they were free to choose their place of residence and citizenship (vecindad), and Madrid could not refuse to admit them. According to their petition they were Castilian rather than Gypsies because they were born to parents with domicile and citizenship in Orihuela (kingdom of Valencia). They were agricultural laborers, born and raised in that village, where their family had resided for many generations. They were educated to be ‘‘good people’’ and were instructed in the ‘‘mysteries of the Catholic faith.’’ They later moved to the city of Valencia, where they continued in the same vein, working the land and being ‘‘useful members of society.’’∂Ω Always tied to a specific local community, they had no bad reputation, and no one ever considered them Gypsies. In short, since they did not behave as Gypsies, they should not be considered Gypsies. Their petition was denied. Similar decisions were reached in other cases where ‘‘well-behaved Gypsies’’ were classified as Gypsies despite their exemplary lives. In many such cases, the only concession made towards these people was to allow them, as ‘‘good Gypsies,’’ to remain in the jurisdiction despite the prohibitions invoked by the anti-Gypsy measures. Francisco Vargas was a ‘‘quiet man’’ who had lived in Villafranca for more than thirty years and was one of two blacksmiths working in the jurisdiction; he was allowed to stay in the settlement. Motivated by similar considerations, Veléz requested the intervention of the royal administration with regard to some seventeen Gypsy families whose members were born and raised in the community. Motril and Cádiz expressed identical concerns and also sought to enable certain ‘‘good Gypsies’’ to remain in their territory.∑≠ In all these cases, admitting that petitioners were indeed hardworking and law-abiding members of society, both the royal administration and the local authorities continued to consider them Gypsies. The royal administration was especially inflexible, declaring that communities who wanted to keep ‘‘good Gypsies’’ in their jurisdiction would be made responsible for their

132

The Other

behavior. Since it was their personal recommendation that allowed these Gypsies to remain in the territory, they would be accountable for any mischief that might result. Overwhelmed with the flood of petitions, the royal council set a general rule: Gypsies who had resided in a community for more than ten years could remain if the local authorities considered their presence beneficial.∑∞ Why require a ten-year residence? Why allow Gypsies who had a permanent domicile to remain in the jurisdiction? In spite of the official discourse that censured Gypsies for their behavior, customs, and linguistic habits, the most essential point of contention between Gypsies and non-Gypsies was domicileestablishment.∑≤ Gypsies were considered ‘‘dangerous’’ and external to the Spanish commonwealth because of their lack of permanent ties with local communities. Eighteenth-century discussions stressed this point. They stipulate that all people must be tied to an identifiable community, asserting that no one can live on his or her own (chapter 2). They argued that local citizenship was a condition for membership in the Castilian community and the kingdoms of Spain and that local citizenship implied, by extension, nativeness (chapters 4 and 5). The conclusion that people who were not tied to local communities —such as Gypsies—were necessarily foreign to the community of Spanish natives was thus immediate. The adoption of a ten-year residency rule demonstrated this point. According to Castilian and eventually Spanish law, a tenyear residence was the period required of foreigners before they could be considered citizens and natives. Thus, as with all foreigners, Gypsies could be considered natives and be allowed the rights of natives only after they had resided in the community for a sufficient period. The Gypsies themselves understood the direct relation between the absence of domicile and foreignness. In their petitions to acquire the status of castellanos viejos many of them argued that citizenship and nativeness were the same thing. They requested recognition as castellanos, even when they had been born and had resided in other Iberian kingdoms. They also petitioned to receive ‘‘local citizenship letters’’ (cartas de vecindad), assuming that once they were recognized as citizens they would automatically be accepted as natives. Local citizenship, they argued, was necessary in order to be included in the ‘‘constitutions, exemptions, and privileges of the natives of these kingdoms.’’∑≥ Indeed, obtaining citizenship was the only method by which they could guarantee their reception as natives rather than foreigners. People classified as Gypsies also identified Gypsiness with foreignness: ‘‘the name that they were given as Gypsies was untrue, because in reality they were not Gypsies since they were not foreigners.’’ They argued that they were ‘‘originals of the kingdoms and not of the Gypsy nation.’’∑∂ These petitioners stressed that people were either vecinos and naturales or they were Gypsies: those belonging to the

The Other

133

first category could not belong to the second and vice versa.∑∑ Foreign observers also held these perceptions, which were shared by the legislation, the royal and local administrations, and the Gypsies themselves. For example, in 1749 the French consul in Cádiz argued that Spanish Gypsies could be considered ( peuvent être regardés) natives, but he asserted that they were usually not included in this category as long as they remained vagabonds and practiced their ‘‘bad habits.’’∑∏ The idea that Gypsies were both ordinary (although badly behaved) natives and foreigners persisted throughout the eighteenth century. This duality explained why ‘‘well-behaved’’ Gypsies were nevertheless considered Gypsies, and why Gypsy residence—like all other foreign residence—was ‘‘tolerated’’ rather than permitted.∑π During this period, and consistent with the treatment of other foreigners, Gypsies were identified by way of reputation. Commonsense standards—such as, ‘‘if he associates with Gypsies then he must be a Gypsy’’—were very influential. Confusion and cases of mistaken identity also occurred. This confusion and the uncertainties that naturally arose from the dependence on reputation led the local judges of Buenos Aires to conclude in the late eighteenth century that it was impossible to determine with certainty who was a Gypsy and who was not.∑∫ Nevertheless, and as happened in the cases of other foreigners, many people believed that Gypsies could be easily distinguished from other Spaniards. In 1757, the local judge of Vera expressed such a belief. He received information that several men with torn and dirty clothes and dark complexions were seen in the jurisdiction.∑Ω Assuming that this description could fit only a Gypsy, he then proceeded to look for them (and indeed found them) in the house of a local Gypsy. Last but not least, like other foreigners, persons assumed to be Gypsies carried the burden of proof if they wanted to establish that they were either ‘‘good Gypsies’’ or not Gypsies at all. Obtaining recognition as a non-Gypsy did not guarantee the same result on another occasion. Suspicious individuals, even those who held certificates attesting that they were castellanos viejos, were required to prove their status each time an anti-Gypsy campaign was initiated.∏≠

Vassalage Medieval legal thought in Castile distinguished between vassalage and nativeness.∏∞ Vassalage was a personal tie created by virtue of mutual consent. It was based on a pact between the king and his vassals, and this pact could not be unilaterally revoked. Nativeness, on the contrary, was a political tie that subjected a person to a jurisdiction. This subjection could be created at birth without the consent of the interested party, or it could be acquired later in a

134

The Other

variety of ways. Although nativeness, like vassalage, carried a series of mutual obligations, it could, unlike vassalage, be abandoned unilaterally by a native leaving the jurisdiction or by the king relinquishing his sovereignty over it. In medieval Castile, vassalage was considered an alternative, not an obligation, of all natives. The same was true with regard to nativeness. Vassals could become natives if they wished—vassalage being one of the methods by which nativeness could be acquired—but they were not obliged to do so.∏≤ People living in medieval Castile could therefore be both natives and vassals, or nonnative vassals, or natives who were not vassals, or neither natives nor vassals.∏≥ The distinction yet potential interrelation between vassalage and nativeness persisted during the early modern period. Although vassalage was no longer mentioned as a method for naturalization, as was the case in the Siete Partidas, early modern conditions allowed the kings to transform their vassals into natives by granting them letters of naturalization.∏∂ In 1740, Carlos Satores was naturalized because he was born in Milan ‘‘while the city was under my [the king’s] legitimate domination, his father being . . . one of my most loyal vassals and a native of the city. . . . When the said state was conquered by the arms of Germany [1707] he refused to recognize another sovereign except me, he left his homeland and, abandoning it, he came to Spain, where he established a house in Cádiz and brought his family along with him.’’∏∑ Francisco Belcredi obtained the same privilege in 1708 because ‘‘as a loyal vassal of his majesty, he was exiled from that city [Milan] by the prince Eugenio . . . sacrificing his person, possessions, and properties because of the anger of the enemy.’’∏∏ Pedro de la Mesta won the same favor: ‘‘With the ardor of a faithful vassal, since early age he served your royal person with all the fidelity necessary in military troops in the kingdoms of Spain, in the campaigns of the years 6, 7, and 8 [1706–8, during the Spanish War of Succession], in the siege of Barcelona, Lérida, Cartagena de Levante, and in other military actions that were needed during these campaigns, risking his blood and life in order to defend your rights and your banners.’’∏π The idea that vassals who served the king, especially in time of war were worthy of naturalization was prominent in many eighteenth-century petitions for naturalization. Some of these petitions argued not only that vassalage justified a grant of naturalization, but that it should earn the requestor the status of native. According to this view, all vassals were, by extension, natives of all territories ruled by the king. Nicolás Campe, a native of Sicily, argued as much in 1775 when he attested that he was a ‘‘native of the kingdoms of Spain’’ because the Spanish king—no longer in possession of this island— enumerated among his titles that of king of Sicily.∏∫ Similarly, individuals born

The Other

135

in Malta also asserted that their island was ‘‘reputed to be an aggregated part of the crown of Aragon,’’ and as a result they were ‘‘natives of Spain.’’∏Ω Luis Melloni, born in Sardinia, suggested that having been a royal vassal, he was not truly a foreigner. Instead, by virtue of a ‘‘certain type of justice and old memories’’ and because he spoke Spanish, he should be assimilated as a Spaniard.π≠ Natives of the Lowlands also participated in this debate. In the 1720s they asserted that, as vassals who continuously served the king, they were ‘‘true natives’’ of Spain ( propiamente naturales españoles) rather than naturalized foreigners. This meant that they did not need to naturalize if they wished to immigrate and trade in Spanish America (chapter 5): For various centuries they had been vassals of this crown and always won the first esteem among all subjects for the special appreciation that earlier kings had for their country. History books would tell the merits that they had in halting the violence of their princes, but on this occasion they must mention the many services that they rendered to the crown in their country and the only slightly inferior [services] that they had done since in Castile. Their zeal and service were demonstrated clearly in the happy reign of your majesty, with the contributions that they had given, as well as in their decision to abandon their patria and their interests [and come to Spain]. So peaceful and profound were their relationships with Spaniards, that they were never called foreigners in this land, and the Spaniards always lived in Flanders as natives.π∞

Although the king and his foreign vassals insisted that an immediate relationship existed between vassalage and nativeness, the local communities, the parliament, the merchants, and some royal administrators disagreed. According to them, aliens could not be transformed into natives by royal decree, and nativeness could not be established solely through ties with the king.π≤ Asserting, time and again, that a community of allegiance consisting of all those subject to the Spanish king and even foreigners subject to his rule did exist, they nevertheless insisted that this community was not identical to the community of Spanish natives. The Spanish monarchy included many kingdoms and was composed of different communities, each with their own constitutions, laws, and natives. Membership in one kingdom did not automatically produce membership in another. This was the situation as long as the various kingdoms and holdings were under royal domain, and it was certainly true after a holding was lost. As a result, natives of Sicily were deemed foreigners in Spain even when their island was still under royal control, and they clearly remained aliens after its secession. The fact that the monarch continued to ceremoniously invoke among his titles that of king of Sicily was irrelevant to the question.π≥ The only thing that mattered were the terms under which each kingdom joined the monarchy.π∂ Kingdoms that were made an accessory

136

The Other

(accesoriamente) part of the Spanish monarchy lost their independent political and legal structures, and their natives automatically became members of the community of natives of Spain. Kingdoms that joined the union aquae principaliter, maintaining their separate structures, also maintained their separate body of natives, a body external and foreign to the Spanish community of natives. This was not only the legal reality, it was also a just solution. Since natives were people who agreed to live together, only those governed by the same legal regime should be part of the same community of natives. Although not all vassals of the king were natives of Spain, it was clear that by the early modern period all natives of Spain had to be royal vassals. This fact was so obvious and so consensual that, as with the notion that all Spaniards were Catholics, it was never openly discussed. During this period, and independent of the reason for which it was obtained, naturalization was always presented as an instance in which a foreigner became a vassal. Whether vassalage was sufficient to attain nativeness—as the king argued—or whether integration in the community was also required—as the local communities, the parliament, and the merchants maintained—when people became natives, they also established a relationship with the king. Letters of naturalization clearly stipulated it, as they attested that in response to certain justifiable causes the king was willing to admit foreigners as vassals and to treat them as natives. Naturalization by integration indirectly implied this relationship, as those naturalized by integration also became, in consequence, royal vassals. The idea that people living in Spain were tied to both the community and the king clearly emerged in the late eighteenth century, when several decrees stipulated that integrated foreigners had to take an oath of allegiance to the monarch on one hand, and to pledge obedience to the laws and traditions of Spain on the other (chapter 4). Foreigners taking this oath were often confused about the relationships they established as a result. They frequently used the terms ‘‘native’’ and ‘‘vassal’’ as synonyms. They declared themselves ‘‘Spaniards’’ (español ) or expressed their desire to be ‘‘included in the class of Spanish nationals’’ (clase de tal nacional español ).π∑ They asserted that they wished to be recognized as ‘‘vassals of the crown,’’ and they petitioned for inclusion with those who were ‘‘domiciled and vassals’’ or with ‘‘citizens of the city and natives of these kingdoms.’’π∏ Some of them expressed a desire to enter ‘‘under Spanish protection and flag’’ (bajo la protección y bandera de España).ππ Their confusion was at times paired with that of contemporary Spaniards who attempted to classify them. Whereby most people attested that integrated foreigners were indeed natives, some argued that they were nonnative vassals. They claimed that the community into which these foreigners integrated was not the ‘‘Spanish community,’’ but the ‘‘community of vassals.’’ According to

The Other

137

this version, by fixing their domicile in Spain foreigners subjected themselves to the king, but they did not necessarily tie themselves to the Spanish community.π∫ The royal administration and courts rejected these claims. They insisted on the nativeness of integrated foreigners and explained that by becoming natives, these foreigners also took on the responsibilities of vassalage. The distinction between vassals and natives, which provoked confrontations between the king, local communities, and merchants, was especially contentious in cases involving natives who lived in territories that were no longer in the royal domain. Although it was clear that natives who willfully abandoned the kingdom became foreigners, it was uncertain whether living under foreign occupation and being subjected to a foreign monarch justified the exclusion of people from the community of Spanish natives. Such a debate occurred over the status of Lower Navarres who, during the eighteenth century, defended their status as natives against the opposition of the monopolist merchants, who classified them as foreigners naturalized in Spain who remained aliens in Spanish America. Lower Navarres were natives of a territory that had theoretically been under Castilian domination since 1512 (see chapter 5). Its seizure by France in 1607 was officially recognized by Spain in 1659. Ten years later the Spanish king declared Lower Navarres ‘‘natives of Castile.’’ Nevertheless, the status of Lower Navarres continued to be debated in the following years. In question was the correct interpretation of the decree that declared them natives: was it an act of collective naturalization or did it simply acknowledge that they had always been natives? Favoring the second interpretation, which would allow them to immigrate and to trade in the New World, Lower Navarres based their argument on their vassalage. They asserted that the Catholic kings never renounced their rights in Lower Navarre, where they continued to perform ‘‘positive acts of domination,’’ such as tax collection. Because the monarchs were ‘‘owners of their dominions and the best authors of the boundaries of their crown,’’ it was up to them to decide whether to acknowledge Lower Navarres as vassals and natives. Furthermore, individuals whose families had belonged to the community for more than two hundred years could not suddenly be stripped of their rights and classified as foreigners only because of a foreign conquest that they were powerless to halt.πΩ Natives of Rossellon, a Catalan region partially under French dominion since 1659, voiced similar claims. As late as 1782 some of them argued that they ‘‘are virtually taken to be equal to the natives of Spain, or included under the dominion of this crown.’’∫≠ Nevertheless, the courts, royal officials, and the merchant guilds continued in their refusal to equate vassalage with nativeness. They agreed that these people might still be royal vassals—if they maintained

138

The Other

their allegiance to the king and if he continued to act as their sovereign—yet they insisted that once territories changed hands, so did the membership status of their inhabitants. In short, Lower Navarres and natives of Rossellon were vassals of the king, but they were no longer natives of Spain. There was at least one case where these assertions were rebuffed and where the distinction between vassals and natives was somewhat blurred. Analyzing in the 1770s the status of natives of Minorca (ceded to Britain in 1713), the representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) in the Council of Castile was willing to consider them ‘‘original Spaniards’’ precisely because they were still vassals of the king.∫∞ Expressing the view that they remained loyal to the king—having refused to recognize the foreign monarch as their own or to pay him taxes—he determined that, by virtue of vassalage, they were also natives. This willingness to admit natives of Minorca as natives of Spain was partially explained by religious considerations. England was a Protestant power. As a result, if natives of Minorca were not recognized as Spaniards, they would have no community where they could freely practice their creed. This reasoning was sufficient to admit them to the Spanish community. After all, Spain allowed complete foreigners seeking freedom from religious persecution to integrate into the community; it should certainly do the same with vassals who were now under the domination of a non-Catholic power. Implied in these observations was the assumption that natives of Minorca had to choose one of two options. Either they remained in their island and accepted foreign domination, foreign vassalage, and membership in a foreign community, or they left their island and established themselves in Spain. Only in the second case would they be recognized as original natives and their insertion in the community be guaranteed. The relation between vassalage and nativeness was examined again in the late eighteenth century when the status of individuals originating in Colonia de Sacramento (present-day Uruguay) was discussed. Colonia had been established at the end of the seventeenth century as a Portuguese outpost in an area where both Iberian crowns claimed jurisdiction.∫≤ Strategically located and serving as an important enclave for contraband trade, Spaniards saw the city as a potential threat to their political and mercantile domination of Upper Peru. Conquered by Spanish forces but returned to Portugal on several occasions, Colonia was finally ceded to Spain in 1777. What was to become of the Portuguese living there at the time of its secession? The terms of surrender stipulated that residents of Colonia willing to swear allegiance to the Spanish banner and king could remain in the settlement or immigrate to Buenos Aires. Were they then transformed into vassals of the king or into members of the Spanish community of natives?

The Other

139

This question became important in later years when these people attempted to hold offices reserved to natives, or when they sought the right to reside and to trade in Spanish America. Natives of Colonia could be considered natives of Spain by virtue of conquest if their homeland was inserted into Spain and subjected to the same rights and obligations as other Spanish territories. They could be considered natives by integration and or by reputation if in the years following the annexation they acted as natives and were accepted as natives. But at the same time, they could be considered foreigners if the normal Spanish American laws were applied. These stipulated that in Spanish America people could be naturalized only by receiving a formal naturalization letter. In this case, natives of Colonia would be vassals of the king but not natives of Spain. Although the authorities invoked the distinction between vassalage and nativeness and examined the ways these people could be transformed into natives, the natives of Colonia adopted a different approach.∫≥ They explained that their association with Spain was voluntary. Territorial conquest, they claimed, only implied domain over land. It allowed those living on the land to chose whether to remain in their old society or to become members of the new one: ‘‘No one is forced to subject himself to more than what he had consented, and a citizen who agreed in a free and independent state to live in a society, can, if this society changes its nature and submits to a foreign dominion, abandon it . . . since submission to a foreign dominion ends the social ties and the obligation that one has with society. In one word, one remains wholly and naturally free to chose and submit to the empire and domination that he wishes.’’ Just as natives of Spain who remained in territories ceded to Portugal implicitly accepted their new condition as Portuguese and freely chose to sever ties with their community of origin, so did the Portuguese who, of their own will, stayed in territories ceded to Spain. Indeed, nativeness depended on choice. It consisted of the willingness to love the community, and people could choose whether to love one community or another. The theoretical debate persisted while practical solutions prevailed. The natives of Colonia easily obtained letters of naturalization in both Spain and Spanish America and were rarely asked to fulfill any requirement aside from submitting a petition.∫∂

Conclusions Religion or vassalage alone were insufficient to transform foreigners into natives. Although by the early modern period both became fundamental characteristics of all Spaniards, in was nevertheless clear that they were not identical to nativeness. What made people natives was their integration in the community. This community had a common faith and a common monarch. Yet

140

The Other

nativeness was based on social integration, which people achieved by establishing a domicile and taking part in the life of a specific local community. Religion and vassalage also differed from one another because Catholicism was a condition for nativeness, while vassalage was the result of nativeness. The establishment of Catholicism and integration as conditions for nativeness justified questioning the status of people who were suspected of lacking an authentic Catholic faith or who did not appear to tie themselves genuinely, and permanently, to a local community. Individuals who fell under these suspicions could be rejected as foreigners. The use of a civic discourse that examined the citizenship and nativeness of individuals for the purpose of excluding both the Chuetas and the Gypsies demonstrated that a process focused on integration and elaborated in order to construct communities could conversely be used to achieve social enclosure. Discussions concerning the Chuetas and the Gypsies also proved that, despite emphasis on intentions, which were particular to each individual, people were classified by reference to their membership in groups. This classification reasoned that persons who belonged to certain groups had unalterable ways of being. Familiarity with these ways of being allowed the rest of society to ‘‘understand’’ the activities of the suspect group in a certain way and to attribute to them a certain meaning. Because of these preconceptions, individual Chuetas and Gypsies, however ‘‘good’’ or wise, could hardly prove that their intentions were different.

7

The Crisis of an Empire

In 1808, the Iberian peninsula was invaded by French troops. The Spanish king was forced to abdicate in favor of Napoleon, who instituted his brother Joseph as the new monarch of Spain. Many Spaniards refused to recognize Joseph as their king and maintained allegiance to Fernando, the captive monarch. Adopting early modern contractualist theories to nineteenthcentury conditions, they claimed that in Fernando’s absence sovereignty returned to the ‘‘people’’ and was now to be exercised by local assemblies ( juntas), established throughout Spain and Spanish America.∞ After a short period of anarchy, during which each junta acted on its own, claimed sovereignty, and refused to cooperate with the other juntas, in late 1808 the juntas were joined in a single institution, the Junta Central. This was an incomplete solution to the crisis of government: it was unclear whether the central junta spoke for the kingdoms of Spain or whether it was only an assembly of juntas with no sovereign power of its own. Also problematic was the fact that Spanish American juntas were not represented in the central junta, which led some of the New World juntas to claim that they were equally sovereign and need not obey the instructions of the central junta. Conservatives and royalists in both Spain and Spanish America, who attested that the only body that could replace an absent king was a regency, also criticized the central junta. In 1820, as French troops stormed south, meeting little military resistance, and

141

142

The Crisis of an Empire

as independent measures were taken in some Spanish American capitals to establish local sovereignty vis-à-vis the central junta, the central junta dissolved itself, leading to the establishment of a temporary regency and the calling of a general meeting of the Spanish people. This meeting took on a parliamentary form (cortes) and included delegates from both Spain and Spanish America. It was held on the Isle of León near Cádiz between 1810 and 1812. One of the first missions of the 1810–12 cortes was to enact a new constitution for Spain. This constitution, the members of the central junta hoped, would enable the state to reinstate ‘‘order’’ and would regain the true character of Spain that had been lost because ‘‘our parents were incapable of conserving the precious depository of liberty that their ascendants had left them.’’ The junta intended to use the invasion, the legitimacy crisis and the resulting power vacuum to consolidate the state, unify the laws of the different kingdoms, and return to the golden age that had allegedly preceded the war and royal absolutism: ‘‘My parents have left me slavery and misery, and I will leave my descendants liberty and glory.’’ These goals could not be achieved without a constitution: ‘‘because one cannot build well on sand, and without fundamental and constitutional laws, which would defend the good that has already been done and will prohibit the bad which some attempt to do.’’≤ After two years of discussions, the Constitution of Cádiz was enacted (1812). It reflected a fragile balance between the retention of existing laws and legal innovation, between traditional and enlightened thought.≥ In the background was the French example, which most Spaniards viewed as a model to avoid. France was the invading enemy that had attempted to force on Spaniards foreign ways of living and foreign laws. Yet the French model was also rejected because even the most enlightened and liberal sectors in Spain viewed with horror the elimination of the monarchy and especially the attack against the church. The establishment a central junta, a regency, the meeting of the parliament, and the enactment of a constitution failed to restore peace to the monarchy. In both Spain and Spanish America, discussions between liberals and conservatives continued, and many individuals refused to accept a constitution they felt betrayed both king and religion. In some Spanish American capitals—for example, Caracas—local juntas were established as a response to the institution of the regency, and in 1811, independence from Spain and the Spanish king were formally declared. In spite of these dramatic developments within the Hispanic world, the fate of the Spanish monarchy was once again determined by outside forces. The defeat of Napoleon in Europe allowed Fernando to reoccupy the Spanish throne in 1814. He immediately nullified the Constitution of Cádiz and rein-

The Crisis of an Empire

143

stated Old Regime structures in both Spain and Spanish America. Some Spaniards resented these measures, and eventually Fernando was forced to reinstate the Constitution of Cádiz in 1821. The return to Old Regime structures also brought about a break with the liberal, autonomy-seeking Spanish American juntas, which in the late 1810s adopted republican forms of government and declared their independence.∂ The king reacted by sending troops to Spanish America and mobilizing the local militias. The war, which is often portrayed as a civil war between Spanish Americans, ended in 1826, leaving Spain stripped of its colonies, with the exception of Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. Some areas experienced widespread popular uprisings, and different regions struggled to affirm their sovereignty or even supremacy. Territorial fragmentation followed, leading to the creation of new states by way of pacts between cities and regions. The literature that analyzes these events usually portrays them as instances of national affirmation that also marked the transition from Old Regime to new liberal forms of government. In the Spanish American case, the French invasion of peninsular Spain in the early nineteenth century and subsequent developments in Europe initiated wars for national independence, fought against European Spaniards who were seen as foreign invaders and illegitimate rulers. This view of the European Spaniards was the natural result of the emergence of a distinct Spanish American identity, an identity reaffirmed during the struggle for independence.∑ Often called ‘‘Creolism,’’ it emerged in many fields, such as culture, language, and religion. Yet it was essentially social and political in orientation. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Creolism was a vehicle through which Spanish Americans expressed their desire for a greater local autonomy and equality with other Spaniards. In the seventeenth and particularly in the eighteenth century, it allowed Spanish Americans to affirm their distinction from European Spaniards. By the early nineteenth century, Creolism led Spanish Americans to seek their independence. Presented as a national or protonational identity, Creolism was used by the nascent Spanish American states to consolidate their collective identities.∏ There were several reasons for interpreting Creolism as a national sentiment in spite of its spread throughout diverse regions of Spanish America. According to the literature, Creolism was an identity automatically given (or taken— this is seldom clarified) by people born in the New World.π Initially it coexisted with a Spanish identity, and indeed Creoles stressed that nothing distinguished them from other Spaniards. But by the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Spanishness and Creolism became antagonistic notions, and European and American Spaniards were placed in opposition to one another.∫ Initially a local and urban identity, by the early nineteenth century Creolism

144

The Crisis of an Empire

spread to cover larger territories, which eventually coincided in many cases with the nascent Spanish American states.Ω While in Spanish America national affirmation was developing in opposition to European Spaniards, a war of independence was taking place (1808– 14) in Spain as well, but against a foreign invader. According to the literature, this war marked the beginning of ‘‘contemporary Spain,’’ and it signaled the first steps towards the construction of a liberal, national, and centralized state.∞≠ One of the most important legal modifications introduced during this period was the redefinition of the citizen (vecino) as a ‘‘national.’’ Urban identity, which defined membership in the local community, thus became a guideline defining both Spaniards and Spanish citizens. And, because this process lacked historical references and because debates on modern citizenship had to rely on Old Regime traditions, the transition to new models was only partially successful. Among other things, the Cádiz legislators failed to theorize a national citizen as an abstract individual participating in an abstract nation. Instead, they continued to perceive the national citizen in terms of real persons with ties to actual communities. For most historians, the continuing use of the term vecino in debates about ciudadanos (which was the term used in the Constitution of Cádiz), and of the term natural in debates about Spaniards, thus signals difficulty in breaking with the past.∞∞ The intention of early nineteenth-century Spaniards was to create a modern nation with nationals and citizens, but result fell short of the goals. In the following pages, I address these issues by looking at the way both the Spanish and Spanish American communities defined their boundaries in this period of upheaval. I show how old forms of inclusion and exclusion survived the crisis, not because of a failure to eradicate traditional structures, but because of a deliberate wish for continuity. I also question the ‘‘national’’ character of these early nineteenth-century events and demonstrate that a discourse traditionally interpreted as ‘‘national’’ was not truly new, nor was it intended to construct a new type of community. In Spanish America, a Creole discourse gained importance in the late eighteenth century and during the years of imperial crisis. This discourse, however, was not ‘‘nationalist.’’ It strove to demonstrate that Spanish America was an independent kingdom within the structures of the Spanish monarchy; that is, it was an independent kingdom within the kingdoms of Spain. As such, its people were eligible to enjoy a monopoly on office holding, and they could not be subjected to other Spanish kingdoms. The independence Creoles sought was from Castile, not from Spain. This independence, which had no legal precedent, was argued by reference to natural law. It adopted the distinction between permanent residents and transient foreigners in order to explain how people who legally belonged to the same

The Crisis of an Empire

145

community (European and American Spaniards) could nevertheless be distinguished from one another. The adoption of new structures by virtue of natural law allowed Creoles to present their community as a political community, which, as with all other (Spanish) political communities, was not based on birthright but depended on mutual ties of love and integration. Yet precisely because it was dependent on natural law, the external boundaries of this new community were ill defined and had to be reconstructed in the early nineteenth century and beyond. While this was happening in Spanish America, in Spain, the Constitution of Cádiz adopted a definition of Spanishness and Spanish citizenship that was based on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century discussions regarding vecindad and naturaleza. Rather than defining the nation in cultural, linguistic, or ethnic terms, the constitution described Spaniards as people permanently residing on Spanish territories in both the Old World and the New. It included or excluded people from this community by reference to the traditional distinction between permanent members and transient foreigners. This distinction allowed the inclusion of Indians—who were truly native to the region—and the exclusion of Africans—who were brought there against their will—from Spanish citizenship. Clearly, even in the early nineteenth century, inclusion and exclusion were still carried out without mentioning commonalities other than ‘‘love’’ and commitment to the community. Furthermore, if the constitution represented a break with the past, it did not necessarily indicate the coming of a new era. More than anything else, the constitution marked an effort to codify a long-standing tradition and to transform a complex system of classification and status attribution into a clear, unequivocal regime based on legislation and formal declarations. This effort, however, had begun earlier (chapters 4 and 5).

The Spanish American Scene: Making European Spaniards Foreigners The antagonism between European and American Spaniards can be traced back to the sixteenth century, when sons of conquistadors claimed economic, honorary, and administrative rewards for the services their families had provided to the crown during the conquest period.∞≤ Claiming that they were beneméritos, literally that they had ‘‘good merits,’’ these people specifically requested preferential treatment over the new immigrants who had only recently arrived from Spain. During the next two centuries, the antagonism generated by competition between old and new immigrants became a permanent feature of Spanish American life. It was noteworthy in the religious

146

The Crisis of an Empire

orders, where old immigrants (American Spaniards) and new immigrants (European Spaniards) competed for office, and it eventually extended to a struggle regarding the allocation of ecclesiastical benefices and municipal offices.∞≥ European Spaniards asserted that Creoles were unworthy for office because they were born into a different climate, which caused physical and moral degeneration, because many of them were mestizos or at least had some Indian influence, and because their loyalty to Spain was incomplete. Creoles responded to these allegations by affirming their Spanishness and thus their eligibility for office.∞∂ This discussion began in the seventeenth century and became especially important in the eighteenth century after the Bourbon kings deliberately limited the role of Creoles in the management of local affairs.∞∑ Yet what Creoles mainly resented was a series of seventeenth-century decisions that prohibited Spanish Americans from holding offices in their native jurisdiction. These laws clearly favored European Spaniards, who were not only allowed to hold offices in Spain but enjoyed the same right in the New World. Indeed, rather than instituting a monopoly on office holding that favored natives, as was the case in Spain, in Spanish America the laws favored a monopoly by foreigners. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, Creole eligibility for office was argued by stressing the Spanishness and loyalty of Creoles: they were ordinary Spaniards who merited the rights enjoyed by all other natives and vassals.∞∏ People should not be discriminated against because of the territory or kingdom where they were born, and immigration to the New World could never extinguish the original blood privileges (originarios privilegios de sangre) of Spanish Americans. Despite their birth and residence in the New World, Creoles still belonged to the kingdom of Castile, with which they formed a single body politic (cuerpo político) and whose privileges they had the right to enjoy.∞π Because Creoles were qualified and faithful vassals, and because they were Castilians, they were worthy of equal treatment. As was true for all other Castilians, they could be employed in local offices. This Creole stand accurately reflected their rights in the current legal situation. By law, the Spanish American domains were an extension of Castilian territory and, by law, natives of Spanish America, even if their families originated in a non-Castilian kingdom, were Castilians.∞∫ Castilian law and Castilian institutions operated in Spanish America, and, theoretically at least, there was no legal instrument that distinguished Spanish Americans from other Castilians.∞Ω Under these circumstances, demand for equality with other Castilians was both comprehensible and justified. Yet, by the mid-seventeenth century, and particularly in the eighteenth century, Creole demands for eligibility for offices in Spanish America were accompanied by the call to institute

The Crisis of an Empire

147

in their favor a monopoly on office holding.≤≠ Because a monopoly on office holding was always tied to nativeness, it was essential to claim that Creoles were natives of the jurisdiction, whereas all other Spaniards were not. Writing in 1667, Pedro de Bolívar y de la Redonda forcefully argued that European Spaniards loved Spain rather than Spanish America. Unlike nativeborn Spanish Americans, or persons who were raised, or studied, or lived in Spanish America, or who had acquired citizenship (vecindad) in it, Spaniards born in Europe could not be interested in its welfare. They considered Spanish America a foreign land, and they maintained their loyalty to their original community, where their families continued to reside and to which they longed to return. Although European and American Spaniards were formally natives of the same kingdom and vassals of the same king, in Spanish America European Spaniards were ‘‘newcomers’’ (advenedizos) and ‘‘outsiders’’ (estraños). Even in the best of circumstances they could only be viewed as adopted, not natural, children of the land.≤∞ Some sixty years later, Juan Antonio de Ahumada added to this argument by clearly stating that European Spaniards were transients in Spanish America.≤≤ They were different from Spaniards who were born, had been educated, had studied, and had fixed their domicile in Spanish America because, unlike these people, European Spaniards were not citizens (ciudadanos). They lacked citizenship because they had no domicile in the jurisdiction, and as simple transients ( peregrinos), they only merited treatment as guests. The city of Caracas made similar allegations in 1796. Its authorities distinguished between noncitizen (no vecinos) European Spaniards, on one hand, and natives and citizens of the city, on the other.≤≥ Explaining that European officials who were noncitizens knew very little about their community, the local council insisted that their condition as transients meant they cared little for its welfare. As people who considered Caracas a place of passage ( posada), they only wanted to acquire sufficient property to return to their native land. Because they had no need to remain in the jurisdiction of Caracas, they did not care if the country was destroyed. Natives and Spanish citizens (vecinos españoles), on the contrary, linked their future to Caracas. As people who were married in the jurisdiction and who possessed property there, they attempted to live in peace with one another. The idea that the Europeans were transients, whereas Creoles were citizens of the Spanish American communities, led to the classification of Creoles as ‘‘natives’’ and European Spaniards as ‘‘foreigners.’’ Writing in New Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Servando Teresa de Mier suggested that Creolism was the attribute of people who identified with America rather than with Spain.≤∂ He included among Creoles those individuals who had

148

The Crisis of an Empire

immigrated to Spanish America from Spain and had lived there most of their lives, shared the local customs, married native wives, acquired properties in the jurisdiction and who were in all other ways ‘‘well rooted’’ in the continent. According to him, these factors indicated that these individuals transferred their loyalties from Spain to Spanish America. They learned to love their adoptive community, and this love eventually became as strong, or even stronger, than their love for their community of origin. Spaniards who had decided not to return to Spain but to reside permanently in Spanish America were therefore Creoles. Their decision to do so could be inferred, Teresa de Mier said, from a ten-year residence in the jurisdiction. Explained in this way, the distinction between Creoles and European Spaniards perfectly replicated Castilian and Spanish debates on both local citizenship (vecindad) and nativeness (naturaleza). It attested that status depended, first and foremost, on individual integration in a local community (citizenship), and it specified that this integration also transformed people into members of a larger community (the community of natives). Like all other foreigners, European Spaniards who immigrated to Spanish America could undergo a civic conversion. This conversion required that they abandon their previous condition as European Spaniards and become American Spaniards. European and American Spaniards were thus placed in opposition to one another, and individuals were either European, or they were American. Among other things, this meant that individuals permanently living in Spanish America could no longer maintain their citizenship or their nativeness in Spain. Servando Teresa de Mier openly confessed this fact when he argued that Spaniards could be converted into Creoles and Creoles could be converted into Spaniards and then classified these persons as ones who had ‘‘naturalized.’’ He concluded that the Creole community was formed and maintained by the free association of people. What really mattered was not where an individual was born, but his decision to associate himself permanently with the Spanish American community. This idea of transformation was also invoked in a local journal in 1810 in Buenos Aires. It was then argued that the political community had two types of members: some members were ‘‘natural,’’ while others were ‘‘members by adoption.’’≤∑ Among the first were individuals born in the province; among the second were persons who came to Buenos Aires at a later stage. In both cases, membership required being part of the community and regarding it as one’s own. These attitudes could be demonstrated by giving the community personal as well as financial services, observing the local laws and customs, and respecting the local government. European Spaniards who truly transferred their loyalty from their community of birth to Buenos Aires would be wel-

The Crisis of an Empire

149

comed as members of this community.≤∏ Indeed, the patria was not a place of birth; instead it was a community to which one belonged.≤π But how could the Creole community be distinguished from the Castilian community if Spanish America was formally and legally integrated within the later? The need to create new boundaries and to insist on an independent Spanish American citizenship and nativeness dramatically influenced the Creole discourse. Instead of simply reproducing the existing legal categories, as early as the middle of the seventeenth century Creoles claimed that natural law, as well as divine law and the law of nations, distinguished between people born in one territory and those born in the other, even if by civil law they belonged to the same kingdom.≤∫ ‘‘Spain’’ was a conglomerate of many different communities, each with its own laws, institutions, and natives. All Spaniards were tied to the monarch, but they were foreigners to one another. This reality persisted even if civil law did not recognize it. The conclusion was clear: because Spanish America was a territory with its own traditions, laws, and institutions, it therefore, by implication, had its own community of natives. Implied in these ideas was the claim that Creoles were no longer Castilians; they were now instituted as natives and citizens of an independent and distinguishable Spanish kingdom (or perhaps various kingdoms; this issue was never truly resolved). This independent existence was supported by natural law, and therefore it could not be denied. Since the power of civil law does not reach the sphere of natural effects, we experience that sons of the Old Spain are foreign to the New Spain, even if this is not recognized by civil law. Among these natural effects we include, with much reason, the love that people have to the land in which they were born and their lack of care to all others, these motives being two solid principles that argue in favor of granting offices to natives and not foreigners. . . . Although they [European Spaniards] are not considered by civil law foreigners in the Indies, the truth is that they did not obtain their nature in them. They have in the Old Spain, and not in the New, their houses, fathers, brothers, and all that is capable of influencing the inclination of a man. When they are exiled to this distant land to serve an office, they do not change their nature, nor do they become insensitive to the impulses with which they were born. Because of these impulses by necessity they do not lose sight of nor [discontinue] attention to their own people by being here, and because they wish to consult and help them (if not enrich them), they regard themselves as temporary in America, and they wish to return to the quietness of their patria and the comfort of their home.≤Ω

As long as European Spaniards did not make a deliberate decision to change their political and emotional adhesions, they remained European and thus

150

The Crisis of an Empire

foreigners in Spanish America. Whether legally classified as natives or not, their true and natural condition as foreigners disqualified European from holding offices in Spanish America. Writing in 1792, Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán clearly espoused this theory. Explaining that Spanish American vindication was an ordinary vindication within Hispanic structures, he compared the status of Lowlanders in Castile to that of Castilians in Spanish America. In the early fifteenth century, Castilians rejected the penetration of Lowlanders into their territory because, although they were vassals of the king, Lowlanders were deemed foreigners. The same could be said now with regard to European Spaniards in Spanish America. Although European Spaniards were vassals of the king, they were foreigners in Spanish America and should be excluded from offices reserved to natives.≥≠ Once the Spanish American community was instituted as a separate Spanish kingdom and European Spaniards were classified as foreigners, Spanish Americans became exclusive candidates for office holding. This monopoly was ‘‘part of divine and natural law as printed on human hearts.’’ It was an ‘‘ancient law, also recognized in Castilian legislation and applied by both pope and king.’’ It was a law that was followed in all the Iberian kingdoms and was adopted by all nations because it replicated ‘‘simple principles that were part of human reason.’’≥∞ Based on natural law, the monopoly on office holding, as well as the identification of Spanish Americans as the only people who should enjoy this monopoly, could exist despite the absence of supportive legislation. Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Creole claims thus embodied a struggle against the inclusion of Spanish America in Castile. Although Creoles identified this inclusion as a breach in the ‘‘ancient constitution’’ of Spain, such was not the case.≥≤ Rather than maintaining the status quo, Creole discourse advocated a change that amounted to a new interpretation of the Spanish state. Instead of accepting their status as Castilians—a status that they once embraced and even forcefully defended—Creoles now claimed membership in an independent Spanish kingdom or kingdoms. They thus placed themselves in opposition to Castile, rather than Spain. Creole vindication of a separate kingdom or kingdoms within the Spanish structure was laid out clearly during the 1808–14 crisis. After the abdication of the Spanish king and the French occupation of Spain, the Spanish American communities and their representatives in Spain constantly insisted that they were subjected not to ‘‘Spain,’’ but to the Spanish monarch. The European Spanish kingdoms, which included Castile, could not exercise power over them because once the king was gone, the Spanish American community was as sovereign and as free as they were.≥≥ This enabled Spanish Americans to

The Crisis of an Empire

151

freely decide whether to obey the central junta, the regency, or the parliament. Contrary to accepted wisdom, Spanish Americans were not fighting simply for equality. During the crisis, Spanish Americans affirmed their uniqueness and stressed their refusal to follow the path taken by other Castilians. All this happened without Creoles ever negating their Spanishness. In the words of Camilo Torres, recorded in 1809: ‘‘We are as Spanish as the descendants of Don Pelayo and, because of it, we are worthy of all distinctions, privileges, and prerogatives as the rest of the nation.’’≥∂ Or, as one of the Spanish American delegates to the cortes of Cádiz proclaimed: ‘‘We Americans, as sons of Europeans, suckle from birth a love of the peninsula, and since childhood we call and consider ourselves its children. Its names and the names of its town and villages sound well to our ears, and we are not only Spaniards, but we are proud of being ones.’’≥∑ As happened before, Spanishness also meant entitlement to office. Yet the question of how Spanish Americans could be eligible for offices in Spain (as they demanded) while peninsular Spaniards were excluded from offices in the Americas was never confronted.≥∏ The most problematic aspect of this Creole discourse was found in the illdefined borders of the new, natural community it instituted. In some cases, this community seemed to embody the entire American continent, as the confrontation between ‘‘American’’ and ‘‘European’’ Spaniards would indicate. In others, the boundaries enclosed possibly a vice-royalty, a province, or even a single city. This lack of clarity was possible because the new kingdom was instituted by natural and not civil law. This allowed those proposing it to ignore formal definitions and boundaries and to place emphasis instead on the ‘‘natural ties’’ that united people who loved one another. Most such ties were created through daily association and were instituted by residence and integration in a specific local community. This would indicate that Creolism was a municipal identity, with a limited extension. Yet love was not necessarily restricted to this local sphere. As I argued in previous chapters, in both Spain and Spanish America integration in a local community was always, by extension, an act of integration into larger structures, such as the kingdom.≥π Love of the local community and citizenship could thus lead to nativeness. But nativeness of what? The question of scope thus remained unsolved. This was evident in the parliamentary debates in Cádiz, where Spanish American delegates disagreed about what constituted a political unit worthy of representation and selfgovernment. The boundaries of the new natural community were equally frail during the Spanish American wars of independence. In some cases, these wars were not fought against a European power but instead pitted Spanish American communities against one another.≥∫ Each community struggled to assert

152

The Crisis of an Empire

its autonomy, and in some cases its supremacy. Yet none wanted to be isolated from the others. While insisting on their natural right to a separate existence, most Spanish American communities tried to construct the larger political structures that they considered as natural and normal. This tension between local aspirations and global constructions, and the belief that beyond the municipal realm was a wider community to which one belonged, was present in the colonial period, but it was particularly difficult to manage during the independence period when the organization of polities was justified by a discourse that constructed communities by natural and not civic law, and that stressed, above all, love and natural ties. Indeed, the early nineteenth-century disintegration of a once united Spanish America began in the eighteenth century with the introduction of what came to be known as Creolism.

The European Scene: The Identification of Spaniards and Spanish Citizens War, foreign occupation, and the abdication of the king, as well as the wish to produce a written constitution for Spain, offered an occasion for both European and American Spaniards to review the past and to examine ideas of community. One of their first tasks was to decide on whose behalf the cortes of Cádiz was speaking. It was generally agreed among the delegates that the parliament spoke for the ‘‘nation,’’ yet it was unclear who belonged to this nation. The first article of the new constitution resolved this matter. It set the rule that the ‘‘nation’’ included ‘‘Spaniards of both hemispheres.’’ Article 5 followed and defined Spaniards as ‘‘all free men born and domiciled in Spanish domains and their children, all foreigners with naturalization letters, all foreigners who, without such letters, were citizens (vecinos) of local communities for at least ten years, and all freemen who obtained their liberty in Spain.’’≥Ω Except for the status of freemen, which I discuss later, Spanishness as defined in Cádiz was a restatement of Castilian nativeness. Since its standards for ‘‘Spanishness’’ were identical to the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century view of ‘‘nativeness,’’ persons born and domiciled in the kingdom and also foreigners who had obtained their naturalization, either formally or implicitly, were now declared Spaniards. Having set the rule defining who the Spaniards were, the cortes proceeded to institute a new distinction between Spaniards and Spanish citizens. Citizenship was granted to Spaniards who ‘‘on both sides descended of Spanish families from Spain and Spanish America’’ and who had their domicile in the kingdom (art. 18); to naturalized foreigners who had obtained, after their naturalization, letters of citizenship (art. 19); and to sons of foreigners domi-

The Crisis of an Empire

153

ciled in Spain who had never left the kingdom without license and who— when reaching twenty-one years of age—had obtained citizenship (vecindad) in a Spanish municipality and were exercising a useful profession, office, or industry (art. 21).∂≠ Naturalized foreigners who wished to obtain citizenship letters were required to meet one of several conditions: to have brought to Spain some important invention or industry, to have purchased taxable property in Spain, to have established commerce there with their own capital, or to have rendered services to the Spanish nation (art. 20).∂∞ Citizenship was required for office holding (art. 25) and in order to participate in elections. The cortes also defined the right to be represented in the national assembly, as only citizens were considered worthy of representation (art. 29). Citizenship could be legally suspended for moral and educational reasons (art. 25), but it could not be easily revoked.∂≤ It could be lost only through acquiring another nativeness (they use the term naturaleza), by living for five consecutive years outside Spain without a government commission or a permit, the acceptance of employment by a foreign government, or following certain criminal convictions (art. 24).∂≥ Whereas Spanishness as defined in Cádiz adopted nativeness as a guide, citizenship as outlined by the cortes was a new invention that included a variety of traits. The maintenance of a domicile was still a main consideration, as was its abandonment, which continued to be interpreted as an act that terminated the relationship between the individual and the community. Also important was the traditional idea that people could be loyal to only one community at a time. Obtaining another nativeness or serving another government were therefore sufficient reasons to revoke an individual’s citizenship. In all these cases, the early modern idea that held certain external acts to prove the existence of an internal decision was still operative. Abandoning one’s residence and establishing a relationship with a foreign community or a foreign government demonstrated (by way of legal presumption) that the citizen no longer loved his homeland and had established permanent ties with a foreign community. In early modern terms, he was no longer a native; in modern terms, he ceased to be a citizen. The continuity with the past and the association between nativeness and modern citizenship were noteworthy.∂∂ Persons born of Spanish parents and who, according to the Constitution of Cádiz, were worthy of automatic citizenship, would have been referred to in early modern debates as ‘‘old,’’ ‘‘legitimate,’’ ‘‘properly original,’’ and ‘‘true’’ natives of Spain. In these debates, however, the councils and courts consistently insisted that they were equal to, not preferable to, all other natives. The status of sons of foreigners, who were included in the category of Spaniards but whose citizenship depended on the

154

The Crisis of an Empire

fulfillment of certain requirements, also followed previously elaborated guidelines. In fact, their citizenship was conditioned by considerations that in the eighteenth century would have granted them nativeness: the establishment of a domicile by both the petitioners and their parents and the attainment of local citizenship (vecindad). The grant of citizenship to naturalized foreigners also utilized many traditional membership presumptions, such as marriage; it also retained the idea that exceptional aliens were worthy of special treatment because of services rendered to the nation, as they had been formerly rendered to the king. Given this continuity with the past, and the implicit and explicit references to both vecindad and naturaleza, some of the Cádiz delegates found it hard to understand why certain people were ‘‘Spaniards’’ but not ‘‘Spanish citizens.’’ Many of them asked how someone could be a ‘‘native’’ or ‘‘be naturalized’’ yet not be a ‘‘citizen.’’∂∑ They attested that the grant of citizenship was simply ‘‘the rights to the city’’ (los derechos de la ciudad) and argued that it had to be extended to all natives who permanently resided in Spain and Spanish America.∂∏ The nation itself was nothing more than a ‘‘collection of vecinos’’ and all Spaniards must also be citizens.∂π Under the Old Regime, those who were citizens were also natives, and these delegates criticized the current arrangement for making some people Spaniards and non-Spaniards at the same time. Especially striking was the delegates’ refusal to adopt a regime of legality and their unwillingness to admit the possibility of defining Spanishness and citizenship in a clear and conclusive way. Referring to the Old Regime interplay between behavior and intentions, legal presumptions and their interpretation, some delegates attested that, before rights were allocated, it was essential to verify people’s ‘‘true intentions.’’ True intentions were too diverse and too individual to be fully codified by law. Therefore, the constitution could never conclusively determine who was a Spaniard and who was a citizen. Discussing what criteria should be adopted in order to define Spanish citizens, Oliveros pointed out that birth (which the constitution adopted as a guide) should be deemed insufficient for the acquisition of citizenship. In spite of the natural love individuals felt for their birthplace, education, he remarked, was also important and often influenced persons as much, if not more, than their place of birth.∂∫ Gutiérrez de la Huerta thought that naturalization as stipulated in the constitution implemented unwelcomed and unnecessary peninsular practices in Spanish America.∂Ω He insisted on the qualitative difference between ‘‘true’’ (verdaderos) Spaniards and all others, stating that it was essential to verify the roots (arraigo) foreigners had established in the country and criticizing the proposed constitution for neglecting to do so. Especially important from Gutiérrez de la Huerta’s viewpoint was the need to

The Crisis of an Empire

155

guarantee that aliens truly intended to remain in the jurisdiction permanently and that they felt loyal and attached to ‘‘national interests.’’ Gutiérrez de la Huerta also determined that the exercise of certain professions or the making of certain investments could indeed testify to a foreigner’s attachment to Spain, yet he insisted that these behaviors could be motivated by other reasons, such as economic utility.∑≠ Feliú pointed out that foreigners always remained attached to their community of origin, and he expressed the opinion that this attachment could be harmful to Spanish interests. Such an attachment could be counterbalanced only by an attachment to the adoptive community as well. This second attachment, based on such notions as arraigo and apego, would guarantee that the foreigner was no longer ‘‘dangerous’’ to the national community and that he could be granted citizenship.∑∞ Apprehension was expressed with regard to the idea that a prolonged residence would justify naturalization. One cannot assume that foreigners living nine hundred years or more in Spain were indeed Spaniards, since one had to always look beyond external acts to discover their true meaning.∑≤ The wish to continue adhering to traditional categories was also expressed by other delegates who believed that it was possible to define the categories Spaniard and citizen in legal terms, but who criticized the proposed constitution for failing to codify fully the existing regime. Under a regime of legality, they argued, it was essential to enumerate the exceptions in favor of Spaniards born abroad to parents on royal service.∑≥ It was also important to openly state that only Catholics could be naturalized in Spain.∑∂ Further, it was necessary to define the ways by which Spanish descent could be proved and the number of generations that would be examined for this purpose.∑∑ The definition of Spaniard and Spanish citizen was also required to clarify the status of Spanish Americans.∑∏ This clarification for the most part brought European Spaniards into conflict with American Spaniards, although neither camp was monolithic and both represented a plurality of opinions. The central junta having already declared in 1809 that Spanish America was an ‘‘integral part of Spain,’’ the Cádiz delegates now had to decide how to cast this integration into reality.∑π Many of them agreed that the ‘‘nation’’ consisted of all royal vassals and that it included both American and European Spaniards. They explained that Spanish America was absorbed into Castile and that, consequently, its natives shared the same constitutions and honors ( fueros y honores) enjoyed by all other Castilians.∑∫ The acceptance of Spanish Americans was also based on the idea that ‘‘they were loyal and enthusiastic, that their religion, confraternity and intimate union with the metropolis were some of many titles that made them worthy of such just consideration. They are citizens of the same nation, they fulfill the obligations of vassals, and they

156

The Crisis of an Empire

contribute efficiently with their property and persons to conserve our independence.’’∑Ω The practical difficulties inherent in distinguishing European from American Spaniards was also invoked: ‘‘We have used their soil, as they did ours, we exchanged products, they contributed and obeyed as was requested of them, we have there and they have here a large ascendance and descendants, and a common language, interests and religion . . . they are our brothers, Spaniards of 300 years.’’∏≠ Although this was the majority opinion, some delegates believed that European and American Spaniards did not form part of the same nation. Spanish Americans were vassals of the same king but not natives of Spain. Once the monarch was absent there was nothing necessary or natural about their association with European Spaniards. This view was mainly motivated by prejudice. At stake was the question of whether the Spanish nation could include ‘‘people of color and mixed blood’’ who were abundant in the New World. The admission of such people, these delegates argued, would introduce confusion into a nation which was ‘‘homogeneous and without internal rivalries.’’∏∞ Following the debate, a compromise was reached (October 1810) according to which the European and American territories were participants in the same monarchy, and their ‘‘natives and originals’’ were members of the same nation.∏≤ When the parliament turned to deal with Spanishness and Spanish citizenship on September 1811, the stage was therefore set for the acceptance of Spanish Americans as both Spaniards and citizens. But which Spanish Americans would qualify and according to what criteria? The question had important practical consequences. All those participating in the debate were aware of the fact that the Spanish American population was much larger than the European one. Therefore, if Creoles, Indians, mestizos, mulattos, and Africans were all admitted as full members to the community, the majority of Spaniards would be American.∏≥ Spanish Americans who were descendants of Spanish families posed no problem. During the early modern period Spaniards born in Spain formed one and the same community with Spaniards born in Spanish America. By definition, they both equally loved the Iberian peninsula and were both equally loyal to the monarch.∏∂ They could therefore be easily admitted as both Spaniards and Spanish citizens. They were true and original natives of Spain and Spanish America and, indeed, were always considered part of the community of Spanish natives. But what about the Indians? Since the middle of the sixteenth century it was generally agreed that Indians were rational human beings and free vassals of the king.∏∑ As they had converted to Catholicism, theoretically there was nothing to bar them—even

The Crisis of an Empire

157

during the colonial period—from membership in the community of Spanish natives. Indeed, in the Spanish American setting, Indians were the quintessential ‘‘natives.’’ They were constantly referred to as ‘‘natives,’’ and their condition as members of a political community was commonly asserted. In 1598, Baltasar Alamos de Barrientos indicated that two types of natives existed in the New World: the Indians, who were native by origin, and the Spaniards, who were native by birth.∏∏ If ambitions had existed to separate the Indian community from the Spanish one by creating two different republics in Spanish America (the Republic of Indians vs. the Republic of Spaniards), these ambitions had failed from the start. Indians migrated to Spanish settlements, and Spaniards invaded the Indian countryside. There was an ongoing process of cultural and biological miscegenation (mestizaje) that was formally permitted and even encouraged.∏π Mixed unions between Spaniards and Indians were allowed, and mixed offspring, as long as they were of legitimate birth, were theoretically granted treatment as natives. The two-republic system itself was based on the assumption that in some unknown moment in the future the Indians, now treated as minors in need of protection, would come of age.∏∫ They would eventually fully convert—religiously, culturally and linguistically —from ‘‘miserable’’ vassals into full-fledged Spaniards, and then they would qualify as members of the community. Because of this wish, the desire to separate Indians from Spaniards was accompanied by the contradictory impulse to Hispanize the Indians and make them ‘‘ordinary’’ Spaniards. Following this understanding, during the sixteenth century there were many cases where both Indians and mestizos were accepted as citizens (vecinos) of Spanish local communities (chapter 3). During the entire colonial period, it was theoretically possible for Indians—in their condition as natives and vassals— to hold public and ecclesiastical offices.∏Ω Yet, although legally granted the rights of natives in Spanish America, the capacity of Indians to act as natives was constantly contested. To counter this reluctance, the king periodically reaffirmed Indian rights, for example, in 1696, 1697, 1703, 1725, and 1766. At least on one of these occasions (1697), royal jurists openly stated that there was no need for royal intervention as no laws existed that would bar (legitimate) Indians and mestizos from enjoying the rights of all natives and vassals.π≠ Although discrimination did exist and it was widespread, it was based on social practices not on law. Given this background, the Cádiz delegates declared Indians both Spaniards and Spanish citizens. Most of them affirmed that Indians were original members of the Spanish community. Their communal existence, their personal liberty, and their vassalage were recognized from the early colonial period.π∞ Since then, they were allowed rights traditionally reserved for natives, such as

158

The Crisis of an Empire

office holding.π≤ ‘‘Nothing new do I find in these decrees, because our laws of the Indies considered them equal in all respects to the Spaniards, and allowed them to hold offices and honors.’’π≥ This was the correct legal interpretation, but it was also a compelling moral and political solution. Because of their condition as true natives, Indians necessarily loved their homeland, which was also the homeland of their forefathers. This love guaranteed their obedience, fidelity, and ‘‘good intentions’’ towards Spain.π∂ Most discussants indeed pointed out that Indians were ‘‘natives and originals’’ of the Americas, and they expressed the opinion that they had to be accepted as original members of a ‘‘national’’ community that now formally extended to the New World. The existence of an Indian republic during the colonial period demonstrated that Indians were capable of taking upon themselves membership privileges and duties. As both original and qualified members of the community, there was no reason to deny them citizenship. Linguistic and cultural differences should not stand in their way. These differences also existed in European Spain, yet no one pretended that the Basques or the Galicians should be denied citizenship on account of them. There was no reason to believe that a native of Galicia and a native of Andalusia were not as different, or even more different, than a Spaniard and an Indian.π∑ Some deputies, fearing the practical consequences of the inclusion of Indians among Spanish citizens, suggested a ‘‘separate but equal’’ regime.π∏ Others, despite recognizing the nativeness of Indians, simply stated that Indians were unworthy of citizenship.ππ Nevertheless, the majority opinion ruled that Indians and American Spaniards together formed a single community with European Spaniards and all were Spaniards and citizens. In spite of its importance, this conclusion was highly theoretical. Articles 25(2) and (3) of the constitution stipulated that citizenship could be suspended in cases of debt, domestic servitude, lack of employment, and from 1830 onward, illiteracy.π∫ Given the social and economic conditions of most Indians in early nineteenth-century Spanish America, it was clear from the start that many of them could be denied the exercise of their citizenship. Despite their formal inclusion among the category of citizens, in practice they could still be noncitizens and therefore remain as marginal members of the political community.πΩ Although the status of Indians provoked relatively little debate, the inclusion of individuals of mixed descent among Spanish citizens was highly controversial. Many of those opposed to it insisted that most mestizos were of illegitimate birth and that they differed from Spaniards not only in race but also in customs. They were naturally inept to exercise political rights, which was the reason they were traditionally excluded for many offices and occupa-

The Crisis of an Empire

159

tions.∫≠ But how could one deny citizenship to people who descended from citizens? The solution adopted was to distinguish between mestizos, on one hand, and mulattos and Africans, on the other. Included in the first group were people of purely Indian and Spanish descent. These people, even when they were ‘‘mixed blood’’ inherited the rights of their forefathers and were declared both Spaniards and Spanish citizens.∫∞ Included in the second group were individuals with partial or complete African descent. These individuals could be recognized as Spaniards, but not citizens. They could acquire citizenship only under special circumstances, which included special services to the nation or special talents; legitimate birth; marriage to a legitimate wife; the establishment of domicile; and the holding of a useful office, profession, or industry.∫≤ Why discriminate against people of African descent? During the colonial period it was generally agreed that, as slaves, Africans’ lack of legal capacity prevented them from obtaining citizenship and nativeness. Once freed, their status remained unclear. Theoretically, Africans were foreigners. They were vassals of foreign kings and ‘‘natives and originals’’ of Africa who had no ties with the Spanish monarch or with the Spanish community. This perception of Africans as foreigners first appeared in the sixteenth century, and it persisted to the eighteenth century.∫≥ Writing to the king in 1796 to protest recent legislation that allowed Africans to purchase the status of whites, the city council of Caracas espoused this idea.∫∂ Pointing to the their origin as slaves, their frequent illegitimate birth, their ongoing relationships with other Africans still in state of slavery, as well as to their ‘‘inferior state,’’ the local authorities of Caracas expressed their opinion that persons of African descent were foreigners. Their loyalty to king and kingdom was doubtful because ‘‘far from looking to Spain as the center of their interests, they keep their eyes on the dark people of Africa (which is where they come from) to patronize them and raise them against the Spaniards, the authors, so they say, of all their grievances.’’ The council also suggested that Africans did not contribute to the king and the city by paying taxes as other citizens did. Since they were unburdened with duties, they should not enjoy privileges: ‘‘the mulattos of this province, then, enjoy the benefits of society without contributing a maravedí to its revenues and finances, or to its public and charitable institutions. This has come about because the laws regulating the conduct of mulattos, making them contribute and ordering them to pay a moderate tax to the treasury, are completely ignored, either because officials are unaware of their existence or indifferent to their application, or ignorant of their origin.’’ The assimilation between Africans and foreigners, which was already suggested in colonial documents, was reproduced in the Cádiz debates.∫∑ In their condition as natives of another region, individuals of African ancestry never

160

The Crisis of an Empire

truly joined the Spanish community.∫∏ Like other foreigners, they were unable to use their prolonged residence in Spain to transform them into natives. Residence itself was meaningless unless accompanied by the intention to create permanent ties with the adoptive community. As slaves, Africans lacked legal capacity and could not express a legally binding wish to abandon their community of origin and become Spanish. As freemen, they failed to do so. Independent of the decision individual Africans might have taken, it was well known that Africans were brought to Spanish territories against their will. Because their immigration was involuntary, their residence in these territories could not serve as an indication (presumption) to their intentions. Neither could their behavior as Spaniards or as citizens. In short, Africans and their descendants lacked both the legal capacity and the (presumed) will to be naturalized in Spain and Spanish America. ‘‘The king always wanted to maintain separate this foreign caste which proceeds from different parts of Africa, either Muslim or pagan from other classes of Americans, and without allowing it even the minor access to offices and civic decorations. He prohibited the bishops from exempting them of the impediment they had to hold ecclesiastical offices, and they were incapable in summary to a legal naturalization, or obtaining the title of citizen. In this way, our kings used the faculty that all nations have to fix on foreigners who were introduced into it restrictions and impediments which lead to the best order and security.’’∫π Indeed, although by virtue of birth and domicile Africans could be recognized as ‘‘Spaniards,’’ they could not be included among Spanish citizens. The argument equating Africans with foreigners first appeared during the discussion on the right of Africans to be represented in the national assembly (cortes). On that occasion (January 1811), some of the delegates who opposed this concession cited examples from other European countries, but all these examples dealt with the treatment of foreigners.∫∫ Africans were designated as foreigners again in August 1811 during the debate on the status of freed slaves who, according to article 5 of the constitution, would become Spaniards upon their emancipation. One delegate expressed his surprise: it was insensible, he determined, to ask foreigners to comply with a ten-year residence before allowing them to naturalize, yet to admit Africans to Spanishness immediately upon their freedom. Africans should not receive preference because, unlike other foreigners, they had never manifested their wish to come to Spain and Spanish America. Their immigration was carried out against their will, and before they were admitted to the nation, the nation must verify that they indeed loved it sufficiently, and that they were willing to subject themselves to its laws. Freedom in itself was not a sufficient guarantee because it gave no

The Crisis of an Empire

161

indication of the wish (ánimo) to become a member of the community. In short, freed Africans, like all other foreigners, should be required to comply with the ten-year residence requirement before being admitted to the nation.∫Ω Other delegates suggested that manumission was a civic birth. As a result, Africans freed in Spain could be considered born in the territory even if their material birth occurred elsewhere. However, as with all those born in Spain, they could become Spaniards only after they acquired vecindad.Ω≠ By the time the debates on citizenship took place (September 1811), the classification of Africans as foreigners was so obvious to some of the speakers that they protested against the need to set specific rules for Africans. Spaniards of African decent, they insisted, were foreigners and their status could be inferred by reference to the clauses dealing with all other foreigners.Ω∞ In the debate, Africans were also compared to Gypsies, yet distinguished from them. Gypsies, also of a foreign origin, entered Spain some three hundred years earlier. Yet unlike the Africans, they chose to do so. It was even argued that they also integrated into the community by voluntarily remaining in Spain and by intermarrying with other Spaniards. As a result, contrary to Africans, Gypsies could be considered natives and be worthy of citizenship.Ω≤ Even those favoring citizenship for Spaniards of African descent argued their case by reference to nativeness and foreignness. Mentioning the traditional association between citizenship, domicile, and naturalization, they declared that membership in the Spanish community was obtained, first and foremost, by virtue of integration in a local community. Spaniards of African descent who were already vecinos of Spanish communities or who acted as citizens by paying taxes and complying with other obligations were necessarily both vecinos and naturales, both Spaniards and Spanish citizens.Ω≥ Other delegates affirmed that local birth to parents and grandparents born in the kingdom was sufficient to establish nativeness. The investigation of the family tree beyond two generations would be ill advised because, if ancestry was to be taken back to the ‘‘foundation of the Peninsula,’’ no one would qualify as sufficiently Spanish ‘‘because Spain, like other countries of the world, has suffered its own revolutions and was mixed with foreign nations.’’Ω∂ Three generations of vassalage to the king, Catholicism, and local citizenship should be considered sufficient to constitute nativeness and thus citizenship because according to the legal presumptions, they proved the existence of an individual decision to integrate in the community.Ω∑ In the case of freed Africans, this was also a just solution. Most Africans were freed after long years of service. This fact guaranteed that by the time they obtained their freedom, they had acquired the customs and ways of the nation. It was only fair that the nation that

162

The Crisis of an Empire

deprived them of their natural patria would give them an adoptive one.Ω∏ A third group of delegates stated that it was utterly unthinkable that African descent would be waived in cases of complete foreigners—who were never asked about their genealogy—but would hinder (true) Spaniards from obtaining citizenship.Ωπ A fourth group suggested that, from a practical point of view, distinguishing between individuals of African ancestry and all others was an impossible task.Ω∫ This practical concern brought about the only modification introduced in the article following the parliamentary debate. Whereas the original project spoke about ‘‘individuals of African origin,’’ the final text included ‘‘individuals reputed and held to be of African descent.’’ This modification was introduced largely because it was feared that unless citizenship was tied to reputation rather than to hard facts, all Spaniards would have to prove that they had no African blood in order to obtain citizenship. The ghost of the limpieza de sangre debates reappeared. But relying on reputation, other deputies said, was just as problematic.ΩΩ This parliamentary discussion demonstrated that the solution adopted— recognizing Creoles, Indians, and mestizos as both Spaniards and citizens and granting individuals of African descent the status of Spaniards but not of citizens—could be legally justified as much as it could be legally rebuffed. Based on early modern discussions of vecindad and naturaleza, these debates allowed different and often contradictory interpretations. As happened before, the interests at stake conditioned the interpretation adopted. At the end of the day, the inclusion of Spaniards and Indians and the exclusion of Africans was a compromise adopted to avoid a direct confrontation between European and American Spaniards, as well as between conservatives and liberals. It ensured that the bulk of Spanish citizens would still reside within the confines of the Old World. It established an apparent equality between Spain and Spanish America—Africans of both jurisdictions were equally discriminated against—yet it clearly favored the Spanish European population whose memory of African slavery and African origin was extremely dim. The Cádiz discussions also demonstrated that legal theories could be employed to justify what were in fact racial and ethnic prejudices. The delegates were aware of these issues, and many of them openly stated that, whether natives or foreigners, Africans were simply inferior to both Europeans and Indians and were unworthy of citizenship.∞≠≠ Indeed, as happened in the cases of the Gypsies and the Chuetas, Africans could be excluded from the community because of their condition as members of a group rather than as individuals (chapter 6). As members of a group their wishes could be inferred by a society that, independently of its declared intentions and ignoring the usual emphasis on personal choice, simply refused to treat them equally.

The Crisis of an Empire

163

Conclusions In both Spain and Spanish America, the distinction between permanent members and transient foreigners remained operative in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In both Spain and Spanish America, this distinction defined the boundaries of new communities and distinguished insiders from outsiders. In Spanish America, these boundaries were defined in order to exclude European Spaniards and to institute the community as an independent kingdom or kingdoms within Spanish structures. In Spain, the same boundaries were used to affirm the unity of the Spanish world and to classify Spaniards and citizens, eventually including Indians but not Africans among the second. The distinction between permanent members and transient foreigners lacked references to culture, language, race, and genealogy. In both Spain and Spanish America it presented the ‘‘nation’’ as a group of people who wanted to live together and was subjected to the same law. Commonalities based on language, culture, race, and genealogy were both raised and rejected in the name of a ‘‘discourse of love’’ that naturally sprang among people sharing the same space for a sufficient length of time. The image of the community as a small conglomerate of people who intimately knew one another, and trusted one other, was overpowering. It was advocated in both Spain and Spanish America, and in both cases, the construction of a wider (‘‘national’’) community was still based, first and foremost, on the inclusion in a local one. The consideration of Creolism on one hand, and the constitutional debate in Spain on the other, within a larger historical context, questions our ability to view these instances as moments of national affirmation or as indicators for the coming of a new age. What comes to light is, first and foremost, continuity. This continuity was not a failure, nor was it due to an ill design. It was intentional and meaningful, as contemporaries continued to adhere to a basic distinction between people who ‘‘could be trusted’’ and those who could not, and as they interpreted trust in the same old manner. What was different was not the discourse, but whom it was applied to and how. By using the traditional criteria, late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Spaniards and Spanish Americans did create new divisions. They distinguished American from European Spaniards, and they formally included the Indians, yet not the Africans, as full members of the Spanish community.

8

Was Spain Exceptional?

The question of whether Spanish eighteenth-century citizenship practices were exceptional involves not just an exercise in comparative history. Within Spanish scholarship and Spanish history, this is an essential question, one that—whether it is explicitly stated or not—is still present in the minds of many historians. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Spanish exceptionalism was an accepted fact. It was cherished and lamented by Spaniards and foreigners alike.∞ ‘‘Europe’’ served as the standard against which Spain was measured, and it appeared that Spain was indeed different. For some people, this difference meant that Spaniards were superior to other Europeans. For others it signaled, on the contrary, Spain’s relative decline and backwardness. Uniqueness and integration in Europe were thus two different expressions of the same inquiry. Those who felt content with Spain’s distinctiveness expressed their position against integration in Europe, whereas those holding the contrary view called for the ‘‘Europeanization of Spain.’’ Spanish exceptionalism was explained by Spain’s unique history. Claudio Sánchez Albornoz and Américo Castro tied it to the Muslim occupation during the Middle Ages and the subsequent struggle to bring Spain under Christian control.≤ For Sánchez Albornoz, this struggle affirmed, as well as enhanced, Spain’s Christian origins; for Castro, it demonstrated the importance

164

Was Spain Exceptional?

165

of Muslim and Jewish heritage in the construction of Spain. Ortega y Gasset tied Spanish exceptionalism to the absence of ‘‘true’’ feudalism, which had deprived Spaniards of ‘‘habits of obedience.’’≥ Hilgarth specified that Spain lacked a true merchant class, and thus it failed to experience during the Middle Ages an economic, political, and social growth similar to that of other European countries.∂ Other authors related Spanish exceptionalism to less tangible factors, such as the existence of a unique autochthonous national character that—for better or for worse—made Spaniards different from other Europeans. This character forced Spaniards into choosing whether to be loyal to their ‘‘true nature’’ or to betray it by adhering to modernity.∑ Spanish exceptionalism was a convenient historical and political tool. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Dutch and English used it in their struggle against Spanish hegemony. They argued that Spain exhibited an especially intense religious intolerance—as embodied, for example, in the activities of the Inquisition—and that it was particularly cruel towards the Indian population in the Americas. This ‘‘Black Legend’’ persisted to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.∏ It produced an opposing ‘‘White Legend’’ that, accepting Spanish distinctiveness, nevertheless argued that Spanish behavior in the New World was more humane and benevolent than that of other European powers.π Spanish exceptionalism was also supported by foreigners in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when, in the view of many, Spain represented a romantic country, with people more exotic, more temperamental, and truer to themselves. Both foreigners and Spaniards used Spanish exceptionalism to explain how a great early modern empire became, later, a secondary European power and to justify its accompanying economic decline and political instability.∫ Last but not least, exceptionalism was used to exalt a ‘‘Hispanic spirit,’’ shared by both Spaniards and Spanish Americans. It served to enhance the Spanish reputation and advance Spanish interests in Spanish America against the menace of expanding U.S. influence.Ω Debates about Spanish exceptionalism, which occupied much of the Spanish cultural and political scene during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, continue to be an important issue in present-day Spain. Instead of stressing the uniqueness of Spain, contemporary historians affirm that Spain is indeed European and argue that it has always been a part of Europe.∞≠ Highlighting Europe’s internal diversity, they assert that previous generations erred in their characterization because they compared Spain with central and northern Europe. Insisting that Spain needs to be evaluated as a southern European and Mediterranean country and measured against such countries as Italy and Greece, they continue to ask if Spain is European and to what a degree. They

166

Was Spain Exceptional?

conclude that Spanish history is a variation of European history, and that developments in Spain were in tune with developments in other (comparable) European countries. The degree to which Spanish practices of citizenship and nativeness were exceptional can be explored from two perspectives. First, did Castilians and Spaniards perceive their practices as exceptional? Second, were these selfperceptions justified? To answer the first question, I looked at what Castilians and Spaniards said about their own practices. In order to answer the second question, I examined the existing literature on citizenship and nativeness in Italy, England, and France. In Italy, municipal citizenship defined the relationship of individuals to local communities. In England, freedom, first practiced in corporate cities and then constituted as the right of all persons born in England, allowed individuals to enjoy a special regime of rights and duties. In France, the same was true with regards to the status of the bourgeois. Although none of these institutions were identical to Castilian vecindad, all of them were similar to vecindad in that they defined the rights of individuals visà-vis the local community by adopting a discourse of belonging. In Italy, categories of membership in the kingdom failed to emerge, yet there are many indications that the construction of such categories was at least underway in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Naples. In England and France, subjection to the monarch was the main factor defining the rights of individuals in the kingdom. Again, none of these categories were identical to Spanish naturaleza, but all of them included the idea that certain people (‘‘subjects’’ or ‘‘natives’’) were worthy of certain rights. By comparing Spain and Spanish America to Italy, England, and France I also wish to encourage those working on these countries, as well as other scholars, to inquire about the relation between membership in a local community and membership in the community of the kingdom, between local and common law, and between formal legal categories and social practices, all questions that have not yet received sufficient attention in the literature.

Spanish Exceptionalism: Spanish and Spanish American Contemporary Perceptions Eighteenth-century Spaniards consistently asserted that both citizenship and nativeness were categories based on natural law. Litigants who claimed they were worthy of citizenship argued that they had a ‘‘natural liberty’’ to change their adhesion from one community to another and that communities could not refuse to admit them to citizenship.∞∞ This natural liberty preceded the laws and was independent of them. The same was true of the relation

Was Spain Exceptional?

167

between the establishment of domicile and citizenship and the effect of absenteeism on communal membership. Both were universal and natural, and both existed whether or not they were explicitly upheld in legislation. Even the tenyear residency presumption was presented by litigants as a universal rule, since it was ‘‘well known’’ and ‘‘accepted’’ throughout Europe; it had, after all, originated in Roman law. The idea that Castilian practices were natural and universal also applied to nativeness and foreignness. The distinction between natives and foreigners was based on ‘‘natural’’ factors: it was natural that those born in the community loved it, as much as it was natural that those born outside it did not. This love was part of human nature and was not based on free choice. It was automatically generated in all people once certain circumstances coincided. Similar assertions were made with regard to the presumption regime, which allowed foreigners to demonstrate their intention to integrate into the community through their behavior. This regime was the embodiment of a ‘‘common sense’’ that was both reasonable and necessary. Because civil or human law, which reproduced this regime, merely expressed a more general rule, it could be set aside or new elements could be introduced into it. One such element, for example, was the distinction between children of transient and integrated foreigners born in Spain. Although this distinction was not explicitly stated in the law, it could be adopted because it was part of a common law that was followed throughout Europe.∞≤ Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spanish authors provided us additional keys to this analysis. The exclusion of ‘‘dangerous’’ foreigners, especially merchants, and the inclusion of ‘‘beneficial’’ ones, they said, were policies followed ‘‘all over the world’’ and had been practiced for as long as human memory could recall.∞≥ Spanish customs were thus presaged in a remote past shared by all Europeans, and references to them were found in the Bible and in Greek and Roman precedents. These customs were the natural consequence of an accumulated experience about the nature of both man and society. Rejection and inclusion were so well entrenched in human consciousness and so widely practiced that they were part of both natural law and the laws of nations.∞∂ Therefore, the king could not modify the procedures and requirements for naturalization: since the transformation of foreigners into natives was a matter of natural and not civil or human law, it was beyond royal sphere of action and was independent of royal wish.∞∑ The conviction that citizenship and nativeness were categories based on natural and consensual criteria led Spanish and Spanish Americans to say little about them. They rarely discussed their specific contents or explained their meaning. They were convinced that citizenship and nativeness represented a truth too obvious to ignore and too consensual to have to be supported by

168

Was Spain Exceptional?

proofs. Indeed, because citizenship and nativeness were so clear to contemporaries, early modern literature hardly dedicated attention to the study of these categories, and they eventually remained opaque to historians, who tended to ignore them. The need to affirm that Spanish practices were natural and universal was tied to the way that Spaniards conceived of the world around them. For most people living in eighteenth-century Spain, nature, reason, justice, and universality were different expressions of the same reality, which, embodied in a natural law, united religion, morality, and politics in a single body of thought.∞∏ Guided by Roman and canon law and by the scriptures and clergy, early modern Spaniards lived in a universe where there were no simple, human laws. Instead, people’s behavior was guided and evaluated by a system of thought that embodied human reason as accumulated by experience and as devised through divine revelation. As Manlio Bellomo once put it, this was a system that expressed unshakable certitudes. It guided early modern Europeans, aided their understanding of the world, and provided their communities with notions of unity and order. It contained ideals that molded intellectual attitudes, but it also formed behavioral patterns. People living under this system constantly sought out absolute and eternal values and attempted to practice them in everyday life. Under such a system, local norms were always a reflection of higher norms. These higher norms were not legal, but moral. They were common to all Christians, and they were valid whether legislation recognized them or not.∞π Three types of laws existed in the universe: divine, natural, and human. Divine law embodied divine reason and was inaccessible to humans. Natural law was that part of divine law that humans could grasp by using their reason. It was inscribed in their hearts and in their consciousness and, by definition, it was both natural and reasonable. Human law governed the legal arrangements devised by humans. Yet these arrangements were never arbitrary. They did not depend on human decision or on the mutual agreement between individuals. Instead, as Bernice Hamilton once put it, ‘‘human positive law is binding in conscience, firstly because its precepts are in harmony with natural or divine law, and secondly, because its very binding power comes largely from the natural law.∞∫’’ The law of nations (ius gentium) was also a human law. But contrary to other human laws, it was shared by more than a single community.∞Ω The relation between nature, justice, reason, and universality was also reflected in early modern Spanish political theory.≤≠ Communal construction and communal governance were theorized by reference to classic and religious texts. Most Spanish political theorists accepted the Aristotelian and Thomist view of humans as social animals and as creatures that could develop only in

Was Spain Exceptional?

169

the context of an organized society. Many of them doubted that a presocial and even a prepolitical stage of humanity ever existed. In their view, God gave humans reason. This reason, which accompanied man from birth, forced him to live in society, which was the only way he could guarantee his survival and happiness. Early modern Spanish legal discussions also reflected this reality. Litigants and lawyers quoted the Bible rather than legal enactments when they asserted their rights.≤∞ They expected royal and municipal judges to apply the same criteria that God would apply, and they wanted officials to be—to the best of their abilities—as just, as compassionate, and as wise as he was. From the litigants’ point of view, justice was never a legal matter. It was a moral issue where the views of theologians were just as important as those of jurists.≤≤ Indeed, even as late as the eighteenth century in both Spain and Spanish America, a person trained in theology was considered as good a candidate to be judge as was a person trained in the law. People living in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spain thus perceived natural law, including the law of nations, as quotidian legal and political tools.≤≥ Whether faithfully reproduced in human law or not, as a reflection of divine law, natural law was an instrument that was applicable in everyday circumstances and that regulated all social relations. The existence of natural law meant that legal arrangements were never accidental and human communities were never artificial. Rather than arbitrary creations of men, human communities were an expression of human nature and human reason as created by God. By definition, then, the rules governing human communities were universal and natural, as well as reasonable and unchangeable. It was within this system that people were identified as members of communities. Membership reflected an understanding of both men’s duties to God and men’s nature as described in the scriptures and in classical and legal texts. Under these circumstances, the affirmation that Spanish practices of citizenship and nativeness were natural and universal not only reflected the community, but also expressed ideas about society and human nature. But were Spaniards right in their assertions that a common practice existed in Europe?

Spanish Exceptionalism: The View from Italy, England, and France Municipal communities existed in other parts of Europe, and membership in them defined who could hold public office and participate in government and who could trade and enjoy tax reductions. These similarities were especially noteworthy during the Middle Ages. Comparing practices in

170

Was Spain Exceptional?

England, France, Germany, and northern Italy, Susan Reynolds concludes that a common heritage indeed existed in medieval Western Europe.≤∂ In the territories included in her survey, communities of inhabitants consolidated in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. They were recognized or acted as corporations, and they received foundational charters with jurisdiction over communal lands, the right to exercise special commercial privileges, and the right to establish local institutions and elect local officials. Both rural and urban communities enjoyed these privileges, and towns, rather than having a different institutional character than villages, simply had more privileges and freedoms. In both towns and villages, community members were typically adult male heads of households who resided permanently in the jurisdiction. The concession of local citizenship to newcomers depended on immigration policies and varied according to local needs and circumstances. In many places, the residence of a year plus one day was necessary to transform potential members into true members. In these cases, residence functioned as a legal presumption: those who could reside in a settlement for a year without their lord seeking them out could be presumed free—or, at least, they could be constituted as freeman by virtue of prescription. In some communities, residence created an obligation on the part of a newcomer to become a member, while in others it implicated the community in an obligation to accept the newcomer. In many areas it was held that only those complying with duties could enjoy rights. Similarities between the different communities in medieval Western Europe also extended to the realm of the kingdom. By the tenth century, the idea of ‘‘people’’ as a community of customs, law, and descent was well entrenched in Western society, and individuals who permanently resided in the territory were classified as belonging to it. Affirming the unity of Western European political and social organization in the Middle Ages, Reynolds leaves unexplored the relation between local communities and the community of the kingdom. She also argues that the commonalties she describes ended with the thirteenth century. From the fourteenth century onward, different local citizenship practices emerged in different parts of Europe, and citizenship, which was a regime that formerly had applied to the majority of people, became a status associated with the privileged few. Other authors agree with this analysis.≤∑ They point out the similarity of European practices during the Middle Ages and suggest that by the thirteenth, fourteenth, or fifteenth century, local citizenship underwent important transformations, leaving it impoverished (since it was granted to fewer individuals) and highly diversified (as different practices emerged in different parts of Europe). Nevertheless, an important group of historians argues that the citizenship regime that evolved in Western Europe from the eleventh to the thirteenth

Was Spain Exceptional?

171

century persisted with slight modifications until the eighteenth century.≤∏ According to this view, municipal communities continued to be associations of free individuals during the early modern period. These communities were defined by a common legal regime that closely tied membership to the ability to exercise rights. Village communities also continued to enroll members, maintain their assemblies, and operate in a way not radically different from urban communities. During this period the distinction between rural and urban continued to be unclear: it basically denoted a difference in the number, not the existence, of rights. Community members—usually identified as resident heads of households possessing property—were allowed to use communal land and could actively participate in decision making. Rather than changing, in the early modern period local citizenship was simply overshadowed by the appearance and consolidation of kingdoms. This development restricted the liberty of local communities and integrated them in larger structures. These larger structures subjected people to a sovereign power instead of allowing them to participate in it, as was the case previously. Although still members and citizens, individuals were now instituted first and foremost as subjects.≤π The level of analysis adopted and the willingness to stress similarities or differences can explain at least partially this disagreement among scholars. As always happens with comparison, no two cases are alike. Given the diversity of practices in each European jurisdiction, and how comparisons are generally constructed by using a secondary literature that is highly influenced by different historiographical traditions, personal agendas, and types of available sources, it is far from surprising that conclusions may vary. These difficulties do not disappear when one attempts to compare a single country, such as Spain, to the rest of Europe. Clearly, no other European country had institutions identical to vecindad and naturaleza. It is equally clear that all of them had categories of belonging that allowed people to enjoy a specific regime of rights and duties in a local community on one hand, and a larger community on the other. Comparing Spain to Europe also involves choosing some examples that would ‘‘represent’’ Europe. In the discussion that follows, my choice of Italy, England, and France was motivated by both practical and theoretical considerations. On the practical side, all three countries enjoy an abundant literature covering membership in both local communities and the community of the kingdom. On the theoretical side, each of these countries is traditionally thought to represent a very distinct case. In Italy, local communities were extremely powerful as expressed by the rise and persistence of the city-state. England is usually portrayed as a centralized state where parliamentary control over the king was especially strong and local communities maintained at least some of their vigor. France is often presented as the prototype of an

172

Was Spain Exceptional?

absolutist state, in which a centralist and interventionist king systematically revoked the power and autonomy of local communities. These cases thus allow us to question Spanish exceptionalism from three very distinct European perspectives. ITALY

In the late Middle Ages Italy was the birthplace of a new legal science, the ius commune.≤∫ Although this science was highly influential and it guided citizenship practices in the different Italian towns, it was insufficient to bring these practices into conformity.≤Ω Some basic premises, such as the idea that citizenship depended on a contract and that communities could convert noncitizens into citizens, were common to all cities, but individual cities implemented them differently. During the early modern period, in many cities several types of citizenship coexisted, and different institutions could declare people citizens without that declaration necessarily binding the other authorities. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Naples, citizenship (cittadinanza) was granted by the municipal tribunal (eletti del tribunale della città), which was acting for the king, or in the case of clergy by the ecclesiastical authorities.≥≠ It could be obtained either by ‘‘justice’’ or by ‘‘grace.’’ Citizenship by justice depended on the fulfillment of certain requirements stipulated in the laws. These requirements included conception and birth in the city or marriage to a wife conceived and born in the city, coupled with a ten-year residence and the possession of a house. Although in most cases citizenship by justice was acknowledged formally by the appropriate body, this process often explicitly affirmed that citizenship was actually generated on its own by virtue of the newcomer’s activities, his intention ‘‘to remain in the city permanently,’’ and his integration in the local community; all the municipal body did was to recognize its preexistence. Citizenship by grace depended on the authorities’ discretion so candidates petitioning for it were not generally required to meet any specific requirements. The proliferation of discretionary grants in the seventeenth century provoked opposition, and by the eighteenth century, royal authorities introduced restrictions on the power to issue these grants. In addition to these formal mechanisms for citizenship acquisition, people living in Naples could obtain the rights of citizens in other ways as well. Because citizens enjoyed tax exemptions, the fiscal court (regia camera della sommaria) had to examine whether taxpayers were citizens or not. Over the years, this court gradually became the main authority for recognizing (or refusing to recognize) the citizenship of individuals. Its activities gave Neapolitans a second practical method by which they could obtain the privileges of citizenship. The criteria the court employed were similar, although not identi-

Was Spain Exceptional?

173

cal, to the ones employed by the municipal tribunal. Beginning in the midsixteenth century and especially throughout the seventeenth, the court generally held that permanent residence was the principal method for citizenship acquisition. Residence had to be accompanied by an animus permanendi, that is, by the wish to remain in the jurisdiction ‘‘for good’’ and by the promise to establish a stable home in the territory. This wish could be orally attested, or it could be deduced by observing the behavior of petitioners. Citizenship practices in Naples and Castile were thus quite similar. In both places citizenship could be obtained by either formal or implicit means. In both places, it was essential to verify the ‘‘true’’ intentions of newcomers, which could be done by using legal presumptions meant to help the authorities interpret persons’ behavior. In both places, the authorities normally did not grant citizenship but only issued a formal recognition of an existing condition. Nevertheless, Naples was different from Castile in some respects. In Naples, several authorities rather than a single one were qualified to determine formally the status of individuals. Also different was the existence of citizenship by grace. Castilian communities could elect to sell citizenship to individuals who could never meet the standards of legal proof, yet these sales were highly exceptional and their practice was constantly questioned. Indeed, citizenship by grace as practiced in Naples seemed closer to Castilian nativeness than to Castilian vecindad. As mentioned in previous chapters, the Castilian kings insisted on exercising the power to naturalize foreigners who were personally attached to them. People naturalized by royal decree often could not pass the legal tests for naturalization, so their attainment of this status was a sign of royal sovereignty. The same could be said of Naples, whose authorities demonstrated their sovereignty by converting ‘‘nondeserving’’ foreigners into citizens. Fewer similarities can be found between Castile and other Italian cities. In sixteenth-century Venice, a distinction existed between people who obtained their citizenship after a few years or many years of residence (citizens de extra and de intus) and between these and others who acquired it by way of a particular grant or by birth.≥∞ Citizenship by birth was granted to individuals born in the city of a legitimate marriage and whose father and paternal grandfather were ‘‘original citizens.’’ Citizenship by birth could also be awarded to persons born elsewhere if they were descendants of ‘‘old families.’’ In all these cases, citizenship depended, above all, on the reputation of the family. Tautologically defined as a condition possessed by those who descended from original citizens, citizenship by birth was in fact a public recognition of the family’s role and place in the city. It denoted a social status, and it became increasingly tied to a noble way of living that could exclude people born in the city if they exercised ‘‘vile occupations’’ or were occupied in ‘‘mercantile activities.’’ Once

174

Was Spain Exceptional?

a family obtained recognition as ‘‘native,’’ its members were no long required to prove their estate. For all other people, citizenship acquisition or verification procedures were instituted. They involved petitioning the signoria (the local governing body) and obtaining a favorable decision of the senate, the merchants, and the fiscal authorities. Among other things, these authorities examined the candidate’s integration in the local community and his economic, military, and civic contribution to it. A high degree of integration could compensate for insufficient residence or tax payment. Fifteenth-century Florence also allowed foreigners to become citizens by way of a particular grant, by virtue of a treaty, or by verifying residence and marriage to a local person.≥≤ Citizenship could also be granted to a person holding an office. Each one of these types of citizenship brought with it a different set of rights and obligations, and each set could be modified according to the particular circumstances of each individual case. Conditions in the city of Pescia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries illustrate these points.≥≥ There were two types of citizenship. The first depended on birth, and the second on the establishment of a domicile, the exercise of a profession, or an economic contribution to the community. Passage from one type of citizenship to the other depended on the permission of the general council; likewise, the sovereign could grant it. In early sixteenth-century Rome, citizenship was conditioned by the possession of real estate, residence, and a legitimate birth.≥∂ By the middle of the century, a parallel mechanism for citizenship acquisition was also instituted. This mechanism required no prerequisites other than ‘‘virtue,’’ ‘‘honor,’’ and ‘‘dignity.’’ In 1614, the distinction between citizens by residence and citizens by ‘‘honor’’ was formalized, and each received a different set of rights and duties. ‘‘Normal’’ citizens (whose status was attained by virtue of residence) could no longer enjoy many rights, among them the right to hold public office. Citizenship criteria in sixteenth- and seventeenthcentury Torino were unclear, and citizenship lists were short in comparison to the number of people actually titled ‘‘citizens.’’ According to Simona Cerutti, this indicated that, besides the formal procedures for citizenship declaration, other processes existed allowing people to consider themselves citizens.≥∑ Residence and tax payment were the most obvious criteria for inclusion among citizens, as was the wish to establish a permanent domicile in the city, which could be proved by the purchase of real estate. In seventeenth-century Brescia, citizens were divided among ‘‘original’’ citizens, and citizens by virtue of domicile, which required owning a house one would inhabit with his family.≥∏ Petitioners also had to prove that they actively participated in local life and that they had lived in the community for at least ten years. The attainment of

Was Spain Exceptional?

175

citizenship was considered the last and most formal aspect of a social process begun long before: citizenship was granted to foreigners who were already well integrated in the community. In eighteenth-century Mantova, citizenship could be acquired by a particular grant ( grazia) or by the fulfillment of certain requirements stipulated in the laws ( per incolato).≥π Grants were given to people whose presence in the city was deemed desirable because of their profession, wealth, or prestige. All others could acquire citizenship once they had established domicile in the city and integrated into the community. Codified in the early sixteenth century, this second procedure—which survived to the eighteenth century—required a ten-year residence, a minimum economic activity, payment of taxes, and the observance of local laws. The existence of various types of citizenship and the emphasis on the nobility of citizens were lacking in Castile. Nevertheless, like Castile, Venice, Florence, Pescia, Rome, Brescia, Torino, and Mantova stressed the importance of residence, integration, and reputation for the purpose of obtaining citizenship. These Italian city-states maintained a duality between citizenship by birth and citizenship by integration, and they allowed the authorities to affirm their sovereignty by granting citizenship to people who did not comply with the normal requirements. In some cases it was clear that, as in Castile, citizenship was constituted on its own, and its declaration by the authorities was only a formal act of verification, not of creation. Legal presumptions were also used in Italy to verify the existence of integration. But in Castile the native born were required to integrate into the community if they wished to obtain recognition as citizens, whereas in Italy birth appears to have granted persons this status automatically. Historians of late medieval and early modern Italy have often questioned the actual importance of citizenship in Italian cities, arguing that by the early modern period most cities paid little attention to citizenship.≥∫ This lack of interest was demonstrated by the scarcity of legislation on matters of citizenship and by the absence of disputes over the correct classification of people as citizens or foreigners. Citizenship was rarely denied to people and, at any rate, most petitioners originated from the immediate province (contado), not from other cities. Evidence also suggests that in some cases at least, citizenship regulations were ignored, while in others people could claim that they were citizens by reputation, thus bypassing all formal procedures.≥Ω One reason for this ‘‘decay’’ of the status of citizen was the fact that citizenship became insufficient for the acquisition of many rights and unnecessary in order to have others. Some historians have also stressed that throughout Europe, citizenship was mainly a condition sought for economic reasons and that political rights,

176

Was Spain Exceptional?

such as the ability to vote and hold office, were less crucial aspects of it.∂≠ They have therefore reasoned that the attraction to citizenship became weaker as its economic benefits diminished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Other historians nevertheless affirmed that citizenship continued to be an important social and political tie in early modern Italian cities, with a meaning broader than the individual privileges attached to it. Above all, citizenship implied the subjection of individuals to a sovereign power or to a municipal authority.∂∞ According to this view, most early modern Italian cities attributed a great deal of importance to citizenship, and citizenship continued to be an essential prerequisite for obtaining many rights. This debate among Italian historians is useful from a comparative point of view, because it hints that Italy, like Castile, experienced the tension between social and implicit categorizations on one hand, and legal and formal on the other. Indeed, the criticism the first group of historians makes when its members describe the decay of citizenship practices reproduces with surprising fidelity many of the claims made in the past by historians of Castile. But if we use the Castilian case as our model, the lack of legislation, the actions contrary to laws, and even the absence of recorded conflicts do not necessarily reflect the demise of citizenship. Instead, in Castile they were the result of the application of doctrines not openly confessed in the legislation. They reflected the absence of disputes in a society that appears to have been more consensual than we first imagine, or that had other mechanisms—oral and extralegal means—of conflict resolution. The same factors also demonstrated the privileging of social classification and implicit identities over legal and formal categories. One wonders, therefore, if what Italian historians describe as decay was indeed a gradual disappearance of citizenship, or whether what they observed can be explained in other ways. Beyond this debate it is nevertheless clear that citizenship in Italy was a regime restricted not only to a few cities, but also to a small portion of the population within these cities. In Castile, on the contrary, citizenship operated in both rural and urban communities, in places both large and small, and it was granted to all heads of households. It has also been suggested that Italian city-states never extended their citizenship regime beyond the realm of the urban enclave, and that they never developed notions analogous to Castilian naturaleza.∂≤ Pacts existed between cities allowing the mutual bestowal of citizenship rights to their inhabitants, and city-states like Florence and Venice dominated other communities. But unlike the linkages in the kingdoms of Spain, no Italian, or even a provincial, community of natives came into existence. Instead, different communities belonging to the same state each maintained its separate communal institutions, statutes, councils, and officers and its own citizenship criteria. The in-

Was Spain Exceptional?

177

habitants of each community were considered a separate group and were treated as foreigners in all other jurisdictions.∂≥ It is nevertheless plausible that at least some movement towards the creation of a single community of natives similar to Castilian naturaleza did take place in southern Italy. Naples, for example, was a kingdom consisting of a main city (Naples) and various settlements of different sizes and importance.∂∂ The Neapolitan authorities recognized this reality and admitted that each local community included in the kingdom had its own citizenship regime. Nevertheless, on different occasions, these authorities attempted to constitute a single homogeneous community for the kingdom. This was especially clear in the activities of the fiscal court, which was the body responsible for tax collection. Tax collection depended on citizenship, and so the court was often charged with distinguishing citizens from noncitizens. Actively pursuing this goal within the confines of the city of Naples itself, its organs complained that the criteria for exempting people living in the province were insufficiently clear. The fiscal authorities thus suggested charging the court with the duty of identifying people as citizens throughout the kingdom. Local citizenship criteria would continue to exist, yet there would be a single body responsible for determining how these criteria would be applied so that, in spite of local differences, people could attain recognition as citizens of the kingdom. In reality, the path towards constituting a common citizenship regime in the kingdom of Naples had been forged before. The fact that from the early sixteenth century the fiscal court could declare people as citizens was in itself a sign for the consolidation of state structures. It meant that the power to recognize people as citizens was no longer only in municipal hands but now, because of the involvement of the court, was shared between the municipality and the king. Also in the early sixteenth century, a monopoly on office holding in favor of ‘‘natives,’’ was instituted in Naples. For this purpose, in 1550 natives were defined as those recognized by the municipal court as citizens, as well as other people who possessed castles or ‘‘feudal properties’’ in the kingdom. Thereafter ‘‘citizenship’’ and ‘‘nativeness’’ were treated as synonyms. Until the eighteenth century, people could be ‘‘naturalized to become citizens,’’ and foreigners could obtain citizenship and be declared natives after a ten-year residency, marriage to a native, and the purchase of property. The local municipal court of Naples bestowed foreigners with both citizenship and nativeness, and it rarely distinguished between one status and the other. At the same time, Neapolitan jurists developed a constitutional discourse that distinguished the kingdom from the monarch.∂∑ This discourse presented the kingdom as a community of natives that had an ‘‘immemorial’’ existence and was therefore previous to and independent of the monarch.

178

Was Spain Exceptional? ENGLAND

Most literature on local citizenship in England during the early modern period focuses on London.∂∏ In it, freeman is the equivalent of citizen. The story this literature tells is quite clear. In thirteenth- and fourteenth-centuries London, the body of citizens was defined by charters that allowed only freemen to practice crafts and trades, to participate in political life by electing and being elected to office, and to enjoy legal privileges, such as the right to trial by the local courts. There were five ways by which to obtain freedom in London: patrimony, apprenticeship, redemption, grant, or office. Freedom by patrimony was granted to sons of citizens who requested admission to freedom under the auspices of the gild to which their father belonged. Freedom by apprenticeship was granted after a seven-year training period, with the apprentice’s master, or his company, paying the necessary costs. Freedom by redemption consisted of purchasing freedom, with the cost varying according to the trade or craft the newcomer wished to exercise. This means of acquiring freedom provoked lengthy debates, which centered on the question of whether the sums newcomers paid were equal to the privileges they received. As a result of this periodic questioning, freedom by redemption was prohibited at times, or its legal implications were restricted. Those freed by redemption were forced to provide sureties that they would fulfill the obligation of residing in the jurisdiction and paying taxes. Freedom by grant was usually given to individuals on the basis of petitions by the king, queen, bishops, or other dignitary to London’s authorities, requesting that one of their clients be admitted to freedom. This admission could take on the form of redemption, or it could involve reduced fees or no fees at all. Freedom by office holding was mainly bestowed on people working in the common council, such as clerks, butlers, and valets of the city. London’s historians tell us that during most of the early modern period, citizenship was mainly identified with apprenticeship and the exercise of a specific trade, craft, or occupation. Most admissions to freedom were acquired on the basis of apprenticeship (up to nearly 90 percent in the 1550s), placing most of the control over citizenship acquisition in the hands of the gilds and companies.∂π If in the fourteenth century their fellow tradesmen admitted to gilds persons who were already freemen, by the early sixteenth century membership in a gild was a requirement for obtaining freedom. As a result of this shift, the gilds and companies effectively determined who would be admitted as freemen and allowed to possess economic and political rights in the city. This situation changed only in the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, when, for the first time, the numbers of individuals admitted to

Was Spain Exceptional?

179

freedom by patrimony and redemption grew substantially. Although during this period apprenticeship remained the most common instrument for the acquisition of freedom, the immediate association between freedom and occupation was fading away. By that time, freedom became a mark of social prestige sought by merchants, government officials, and professionals. Its main significance was that it conferred membership in a corporate community. The growing importance of freedom by patrimony and redemption was paralleled by the weakening of the gilds’ control over the crafts and trades. Many people who resided outside the municipal boundaries yet within greater London exercised the trades without acquiring freedom or gild membership. This situation reduced the number of people willing to serve as apprentices. Attempts to increase these numbers by offering advantages to individuals willing to work within municipal boundaries mostly failed, as did campaigns to locate and expel noncitizens practicing crafts and trades in the city. The number of people admitted each year to the guilds and companies steadily declined, from 2,100 persons a year in the 1670s to 1,250 a year in 1745. In 1750, a new system of licensing emerged, allowing nonfreemen to practice certain offices. As the economic benefits of freedom diminished, so did interest in becoming free. Freedom was now viewed mostly as a bothersome status involving the payment of fees and the duty—rather than the privilege—of holding municipal offices. There are some indications that similar developments occurred in other early modern English corporate cities where only freemen were allowed to trade.∂∫ In all of them, freedom usually entailed membership in a gild, and freedom and gild membership could not be separated. As was the case in London, the gilds, rather than the municipal authorities, yielded most of the power to admit people as freemen, although the grant of freedom to magnates and their clients and the concession of freedom by redemption and patrimony also existed. By the late seventeenth century, gild control over urban economic activity considerably diminished, and by the eighteenth century, the association between freedom and gild membership became weaker than ever before. Nevertheless, at least in some jurisdictions, such as Leicester, York, Nottingham, Boston, Oxford, Southampton, Lincoln, and Yarmouth, the struggle to maintain the privileges of freemen was particularly intense until at least the eighteenth century. Chartered cities in the English North America apparently followed the same practice.∂Ω New York City, for example, recognized three ways by which people could become freemen: birth, apprenticeship, and redemption. The differences between this regime and the one practiced in London were minimal, residing mainly in the adoption of a four-year apprenticeship instead of the

180

Was Spain Exceptional?

seven years required in London and in the admission of the poor. Attempts to create a public registry of freemen failed in New York, and people often referred to themselves as ‘‘freeman by reputation.’’ There is some discussion whether the exercise of crafts and trades in the city was indeed restricted to freeman. According to some, it was not, and citizenship in New York mainly implied political, not economic, privileges. Similar practices were followed in other chartered cities, such as Annapolis, Maryland, where a five-year apprenticeship allowed people to become freemen. English freedom was substantially different from the Castilian vecindad. It mainly implied an economic insertion and, although this insertion gave rights to other privileges, commercial interests and economic agency heavily controlled it. Freedom was a formal regime that depended on formal declarations. It existed only in chartered towns and was applied almost equally in England and its colonies. In Castile, on the contrary, local citizenship existed in all settlements. Although it carried with it some economic advantages—such as the right to use the communal pasture or to introduce certain products into the local market—the idea of citizenship as discussed within the community was fairly distanced from these factors. Economic interests and agency might have prompted some to question the status of certain people; yet rejection was always couched in terms of a discourse of love. This discourse allowed declaring that those who acted as members had the right to be members. As a result, formal declarations were not required in Castile. When applied to Spanish America, Castilian citizenship was seriously modified. As in the case of Italy, in some odd way English freedom resembled Castilian nativeness and not citizenship. This is especially true if we consider the idea of nativeness as it was applied in Spanish America, where mercantile interests and agency dominated the discussion. Indeed, in Spanish America the definition of nativeness was largely controlled by the merchant guilds, which acted as both eyewitness and expert witness. This definition implied the right to trade, and the classification of people as merchants or artisans could determine whether they would be accepted or rejected. Yet even in Spanish America, obtaining rights depended on integration. Whether artisans or merchants, whether allowed to trade or not, it was consistently claimed that people became members of the community first and foremost by virtue of their decision, which was evident in their activities. Royal naturalization letters only formally sanctioned a situation that was generated on its own. These very real differences between Castilian citizenship and English freedom are somewhat mitigated by a recent literature that questions the nature and extension of English freedom. According to Jonathan Barry, in the Middle Ages freedom was a highly localized regime that designated emancipation

Was Spain Exceptional?

181

from feudal ties of people who became citizens in free towns.∑≠ Over time, however, freedom became an institution common to all Englishmen. In the early modern period, freedom was claimed as a birthright and was constituted as a key component of English political discourse and the ‘‘ancient constitution.’’ Regulated by local customs and legislation, it depended on royal orders, parliamentary decisions, and the common law. It was meaningful in national contexts, such as the parliamentary elections. As early as the seventeenth century, common images if not common criteria for the admission of freemen were consolidated. Most important among them were financial independence and the establishment of a domicile. Freemen were now identified as those having property in their places of residence. Eventually, a rule was set according to which all inhabitant householders paying ‘‘scot and lot’’—the locally levied tax—had the right to vote. Concurrent also were common law decisions stipulating that those who abandoned the community also abandoned their freedom.∑∞ Under common law, in the late seventeenth century and in the following century, men who owned property or who served as apprentices for seven years could be considered free even if they did not obtain a formal admission to the community.∑≤ Indeed, common law restricted the ability of gilds’ and municipal authorities to reject ‘‘worthy’’ candidates. A candidate’s incapacity to comply with duties was the only consideration that could justify exclusion. The common law courts also stated that freedom could never be sold. Buying freedom by paying redemption fees was a fiction. Although presented as a purchase, in reality this transaction consisted of formally recognizing that people were already free. Indeed, people who were truly unfree could not purchase their freedom in this way.∑≥ In summary, in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England a local, actual freeman and an abstract ‘‘national’’ freeman existed side by side. Included in the common regime of freedom were many of the rights recognized in Castile: the right to obtain freedom, the importance of residence and marriage to a native, and the payment of an entrance fee, as well as the payment of taxes. Furthermore, common law courts explained that these factors were not important on their own: their significance was tied to the fact that they proved the willingness of newcomers to become members of the community and to comply with the subsequent duties. Once an applicant demonstrated his compliance with these requirements, communities could not refuse to grant him freedom.∑∂ This portrait of English freedom reveals a regime that had closed much of the gap between Castilian citizenship and freedom. The English practice demonstrated that, despite the importance of local arrangements, a common regime could also exist. It argued that freedom (or at least the right to freedom) could exist independent of formal declarations. It stated that what appeared to

182

Was Spain Exceptional?

be conditions were actually presumptions. Finally, the English practice argued that communities and guilds were limited in their ability to reject candidates, and it set the rule according to which people who acted in certain ways became worthy of freedom. The relation between membership in a local community and membership in the community of the English kingdom has not yet won extensive treatment. We are generally told that during the early modern period a distinction was introduced separating aliens—those of another allegiance—from foreigners —Englishmen not enjoying the freedom of the city. Concurrent with this distinction was the rise of a process that gradually restricted the eligibility of aliens to freedom.∑∑ London set the example by establishing, in 1427, that no one could be made a freeman of the city unless he was under allegiance to the king. Parliamentary acts of 1523 and 1530 extended this measure by prohibiting the employment of aliens as apprentices and as practitioners of crafts and trades.∑∏ During this period, London’s citizens were also concerned with the status of the sons of aliens born in the kingdom. Although these sons were legally English (see below), they were often suspected of maintaining an inclination in favor of their parents’ country of origin. Londoners stated that native-born persons should always be preferred over naturalized aliens. They proposed a distinction between young bachelor aliens and elderly people who had lived in the city for a long time and who were married and whose children had been born in the city. Desiring to expel the first, they offered limited tolerance to the second by allowing their admission into London’s companies, although not into London’s freedoms. Until 1737, London’s statutes forbade the sons of foreigners, even those born in the kingdoms to naturalized parents, to become freemen by apprenticeship; they could obtain recognition as freemen only through redemption.∑π The situation in Castile could not have been more different. In Castile, aliens were easily admitted to local communities, and this admission converted them by extension into natives. Despite these differences, the preoccupations expressed in London were surprisingly similar to the ones expressed in Castile, Spain, and Spanish America. In all these places locals wished to guarantee that people who received the rights of members were indeed loyal to the community. Integration in the community through residence and marriage became a measure of the ability to trust a newcomer. Attempts to establish a permanent distinction between natives and the naturalized were also present, as locals called to restrict the rights of people legally considered natives but whose loyalty remained questionable. Most discussions regarding the classification of individuals as ‘‘English’’ or ‘‘aliens’’ were related to the ability to own and inherit real estate.∑∫ During the

Was Spain Exceptional?

183

late Middle Ages, this ability was restricted to individuals born in the kingdom as a practical rather than an ideological matter.∑Ω Birth in the kingdom allowed parties to prove their genealogy, which assured their right to inherit land. Over the years, what was initially a rule of evidence became a substantial guideline, and the courts began to identify those born in the kingdom as the only people eligible to inherit. With the consolidation of state structures in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, emphasis on birth gave way to emphasis on allegiance. It was now claimed that what made people born in the kingdom ‘‘English’’ was their subjection to the monarch. By the end of this process and from the seventeenth century onward, the ability to inherit came to depend on allegiance to the king.∏≠ This allegiance was owed to the monarch in person and not to the crown as an institution. It ignored the division of the monarchy into different kingdoms, and people born under allegiance to the monarch were considered members of a single community independent of whether they were born in one kingdom or another. As natural subjects of the king, they could demand equal rights and equal liberties in all royal domains. Changes in dynastic unity and territorial losses and gains could thus unite the subjects of various kingdoms into a single community, just as it might divide them into several.∏∞ The adoption of allegiance as the sole criterion for membership in the community also meant that sons of Englishmen born abroad would be considered English as long as their parents did not abandon their subjection to the monarch. The general assumption was that they never did, and by the seventeenth century it was repeatedly asserted that allegiance could not be abandoned without royal approval. Allegiance also implied that people born in royal domains were by definition original members of the community, irrespective of their decent. On occasions, domicile was also invoked, but mostly as a presumption. For example, in 1576 a royal decree ordered that people who have lived in England for more than twenty years could be ‘‘reputed natural subjects of the realm,’’ as long as their linguistic capacities, religion, and customs did not contradict this assumption.∏≤ During the seventeenth century, two different mechanisms allowing foreigners to enjoy the rights of Englishmen emerged. The king on the advice of his council granted the first, called ‘‘denization.’’ The parliament by a private bill granted the second, titled ‘‘naturalization.’’ Both mechanisms had no fixed formula, nor were they regulated by law. Considered acts of sovereign bodies, they depended on the discretion of the king or the parliament, and either actor could decide when to grant them and to whom. There were no precise prerequisites and no clear procedures. In most cases, however, naturalization generated greater benefits than denization. It usually included more rights,

184

Was Spain Exceptional?

and it operated retrospectively by legally constituting those naturalized as natives from the day of their birth. Yet because it was granted by parliament, contrary to denization, naturalization could have an effect only in the kingdom that issued it. Different naturalization procedures existed, for example, in Ireland, Scotland, and England. The king was obliged to respect them all, yet none had value outside the territory in which it was granted: naturalization granted by the Scottish parliament could be ignored in England and vice versa. The issuing of naturalization in parliament also meant submitting to long procedures, including committees’ reports and a parliamentary vote. Naturalization was also substantially more expensive than denization and was practically closed to non-Protestants because it required making an oath to the crown and participating in the sacraments of the Church of England. Membership in the community of the kingdom of England was substantially different from community membership in Spain. In England, emphasis was placed on the relationship between subjects and the king. In Spain, royal attempts to recast the community as one containing vassals mostly failed, as different organs attested that the kingdom was, first and foremost, a structure linking individuals to one another within local communities. These different visions of the community had important consequences. Because natural allegiance to the monarch could not be abandoned without royal consent, status in the English case was permanent. Because the relationship between individuals and the community could modify continuously, status could be changed automatically and without royal intervention in the Spanish case. In the English case, several kingdoms could create a single community. In the Spanish case, this singularity was impossible, and it continued to be elusive even after the early eighteenth-century decrees that were intended to institute a united community in Spain. England in the New World Englishmen who immigrated to the colonies maintained their birthright, and as individuals born under allegiance to the king, they and their children were part of the same community of subjects regardless of their domicile.∏≥ The status of people naturalized in the colonies was less clear. In question was the ability of the colonial authorities acting on behalf of the king and the colonial assemblies acting as parliaments to grant denization or naturalization to foreigners. This question reflected a wider constitutional debate that raged throughout the colonial period regarding the authority of the English parliament in the colonies and the power of governors and local assemblies in America. Another question that had no clear answer in English North America was the relation between freedom, company membership, and the rights of

Was Spain Exceptional?

185

Englishmen. These terms—freedom, membership, rights—were often treated as synonyms. Some colonial charters explicitly stipulated that companies were allowed to transport aliens to their territories. Others stated that foreigners could be admitted to freedom and company membership. Although none specifically granted the companies the power to naturalize aliens, many people assumed that admission to freedom and attaining naturalization were one and the same thing. In New England, admission to freemanship usually replaced naturalization and, although Massachusetts and New Hampshire limited freemanship to Englishmen in 1664 and 1680, respectively, Connecticut and Rhode Island did not.∏∂ In both of these latter colonies, freedom was only conditioned by the consent of municipal deputies, and it could indeed be extended to aliens. Municipal authorities thus proceeded to integrate aliens, and they considered that their admission to freedom or their long residence made them worthy of the rights of Englishmen. In 1676 and 1678, New York followed this vein. In other colonies, governors as well as local assemblies assumed the right to grant denization and naturalization to aliens. They did so by way of individual acts or by legislation. In 1669 and 1691, South Carolina passed laws allowing domiciled aliens, upon their registration, to receive the rights already enjoyed by settlers classified as subjects. Virginia and Pennsylvania did the same soon after. The metropolitan authorities in England fought to eliminate these practices or to limit their effects. After the 1680s, and especially in the eighteenth century, they repeatedly asserted that naturalization granted in the colonies was valid only in the jurisdiction of the granting body. They insisted on making a distinction between naturalization with a general effect, which was any naturalization granted by the parliament, and naturalization with a limited effect, which applied to naturalization granted in the Americas. Back in England, different people and groups expressed a growing dissatisfaction with the existing naturalization regime, which had no clear rules and no clear procedures. They demanded that the government adopt a general naturalization act to make petition handling an administrative matter rather than an individual act of sovereignty. In the debates that preceded the enactment of this legislation, discussants reviewed different immigration policies and questioned whether admitting aliens into the community would be beneficial. Especially contentious were the status of alien merchants and the desirability (or not) of their integration. The population of the kingdom, the economic benefits of the enrollment, and its fiscal and religious implications were all considered. Questions of culture and loyalty were also mentioned. Could aliens ever abandon their natural love to their place of origin and truly come to love the English community? In response, some people affirmed that all Englishmen at some

186

Was Spain Exceptional?

stage of their past had been aliens, whereas others insisted on a true qualitative difference between natives and aliens. At stake was also the question whether society was made of free, rational, and autonomous individuals or whether it was organic in nature, grounded in natural distinctions, and headed by a paternalist monarch.∏∑ Bills proposed in 1664, 1672, and 1694 were rejected. A general naturalization act was passed in 1709, but it was repealed three years later. This act promised all Protestants born outside royal allegiance naturalization if they were willing to come and settle in England permanently, pay a fee, take the sacraments, and swear allegiance to the monarch. Eventually, the first permanent general naturalization act was passed in 1740. This act, which covered only aliens residing in the colonies, stated that Protestants born outside royal allegiance could be considered native Englishmen all over the empire after they had lived in the colonies for seven years without a substantial absence. Similar privileges were extended in the next decades to alien Protestants serving in the colonial armies. Developments in English North America closed some of the gaps between England and Spain. In both England and Spain, people who immigrated to the New World maintained their status as subjects and natives. In English North America as in Spain, a close relation existed between local integration and the rights and privileges of natives. Similarly, both local communities were willing to define the rights of individuals with regard to the king and kingdom. Yet, the English authorities reacted against these developments. To limit their effects, they ruled that American naturalization was merely a local license to enjoy the rights of an Englishmen. This had the effect of making North American naturalization in English colonies equivalent to the Spanish American composición. This naturalization allowed people to be treated de facto as natives without transforming them into (true) natives; their rights and duties were restricted to the jurisdiction of the granting body. Discussions leading to the enactment of general naturalization acts resonate with solutions adopted in Spain. They adhered to the idea that people of the ‘‘right’’ religion who established a permanent domicile in the jurisdiction were worthy of treatment as natives. Yet they questioned their loyalty at the same time they affirmed the ability of people to change their nature and come to love their adoptive community. Indians and Africans The status of Indians and Africans in English North America was highly ambiguous. During the colonial period, Indian tribes were usually treated as sovereign political communities and as alien nations. Tribes living under effective English jurisdiction and accepting subjection to the king enjoyed royal

Was Spain Exceptional?

187

protection yet remained external to the English community. Individual Indians who left their tribes could theoretically merge into the English population through their naturalization.∏∏ The status of Indians as foreigners persisted after the American Revolution. Matters related to the Indians were classified as federal affairs, and treaties concluded with several Indians tribes allowed their members to be collectively naturalized. The degree to which Indian communities were indeed ‘‘foreign’’ was nevertheless debated. For example, in 1831, Chief Justice John Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court argued that Indians formed part of ‘‘domestic dependent nations.’’ There were also suggestions about creating a separate Indian state to be added to the confederation, or allowing Indian tribes to elect their own representatives to the U.S. Congress. Again, as individuals, Indians could be naturalized. Born under allegiance to a foreign community (the Indian community), they needed to renounce their status as members of that community before they could be admitted to the American one. Racial prejudices also operated, affirming that, independent of their ‘‘correct’’ legal classification, Indians were simply unfit to be citizens.∏π In Spanish America, Indians were treated as vassals of the king and as natives. Whether viewed as individuals or as members of groups, they were never considered foreigners. This did not mean that they were treated with equality. On the contrary, Indians were classified as minors in need of protection, and they were initially placed in special communities where Spaniards could not reside. Nevertheless, theoretically at least, they would come of age and become full members of the community. Their admission in the Spanish community was affirmed in 1812, when the Cádiz constitution declared the Indians and their mixed-blood offspring both Spaniards and Spanish citizens. The status of freed Africans in English North America was also highly ambiguous.∏∫ On one hand, the rights of freed Africans—initially quite significant—were gradually restricted. Freed Africans were progressively excluded from many privileges traditionally associated with citizenship, such as office holding, voting, and serving on a jury. On the other, these restrictions arose from local legislation and were more substantial in some places than in others. This ambiguity permitted some freed Africans to claim rights as ‘‘freeborn subjects.’’ It also allowed colonial authorities to promise freed Africans the rights of English-born subjects under certain conditions as in 1765 when they were invited to settle, for example, in Georgia. Yet on some occasions it was specifically stated that the discrimination against freed Africans was directly tied to their being perceived as outsiders and was motivated by the belief that they were unworthy of equal treatment. The ambiguous status of freed Africans continued after the colonies gained

188

Was Spain Exceptional?

independence from England.∏Ω In late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century America, it was often suggested that the general assumptions governing citizenship allowed considering Africans as birthright citizens. This was the opinion of several people engaged in legal and political debates in the 1820s and 1830s, who affirmed that freed Africans were neither aliens nor slaves, but instead free citizens. According to their perceptions, freed Africans could not be considered foreigners because they had been born under allegiance to the same authority and because they enjoyed many rights and suffered many duties attached to citizenship. Since there was no intermediary status between natives and foreigners, if they were not foreigners, they were necessarily natives. Nevertheless, other people argued that, despite their local birth and freedom, individuals with any portion of African ancestry were not members of the political community; they were either aliens or denizens. In this view, manumission was insufficient to acquire citizenship, and the state could tolerate the presence of people who were neither natives nor aliens but instead ‘‘subjects’’ or ‘‘quasicitizens.’’ The question remained open until the Civil War and, as in the case of the Indians, the legal debate took place in a social reality of racism, discrimination, and prejudice. The status of Africans as foreigners, or semiforeigners was also adopted in Spanish America, as was the assumption that Africans had to be treated differently than other people. Indeed, conditions that in other cases would have easily worked to convert foreigners into natives did not function in their case. Africans, it was decided, either lacked the capacity or the will to become natives. This situation persisted into the early nineteenth century. Because of these perceptions, which operated alongside racial and ethnic prejudices, although Africans were classified as Spaniards in 1812, they were not granted Spanish citizenship. FRANCE

Most studies on local citizenship in France indicate that until the fourteenth century, citizenship (citadinage) was a condition given to inhabitants of corporate towns (bourgs). With citizenship came local privileges and duties and the right to hold public office.π≠ People who wanted to obtain this status had to petition the local authorities and express their willingness to comply with the obligations of citadinage. They were required to take an oath and to make a deposit against their pledge to comply with duties, especially the duty to buy or build a house within a year and a day. The French kings also created a unified general citizenship regime by establishing the status of ‘‘royal bourgeois’’ (burgesias regni nostri). This status was open to free single men and women and to married couples. It implied the obligation to reside perma-

Was Spain Exceptional?

189

nently in a settlement unless legitimate reasons justified the petitioner’s absence. It allowed citizens to change their residence from one community to another, but it prohibited them from having citizenship in two different communities at the same time. Although the king’s bourgeoisie were originally citizens of royal jurisdictions, since status was attached to people and not communities, the bourgeoisie who left royal towns and settled in fiefs of lords could maintain this status. As direct dependents of the monarch, they were protected by him and subjected to his courts. The evolution of local citizenship practices in France after the fourteenth century is mostly described either vaguely or by reference to Paris. In general, by the early modern period the status of bourgeois became irrelevant. Although citizenship petitions were still heard in a few cities, especially large urban commercial centers such as Bordeaux, Lyon, and Marseilles, this was the exception. In these cities, people could become bourgeois after they had resided in the territory for a prolonged period with no substantial absence, and once they demonstrated that they were capable of paying the local taxes, either because they owned a house or because they were able to pay entrance fees.π∞ In other French communities, the status of bourgeois was ill defined, and it was seldom requested. In most of them, it no longer prescribed economic advantages and was instead an honorary title void of practical implications, one that was constituted independent of formal declarations. By the eighteenth century, bourgeois status signaled a certain social and political distinction of belonging to the community. It was mainly granted by reputation to members of the local elite, and it was associated with people living from their rents, a fact that distinguished them from both nobles and workmen. During the eighteenth century, royal intervention in municipal government grew exponentially, and in 1764–65, a common regime was instituted in cities and towns (bourgs and villes) throughout France. During this period, and especially in large urban centers, residency became more important than citizenship. In most cases, people wished to obtain the droit d’habitantage rather than the rights of citizens because the former status was less expensive to acquire and maintain. It required petitioning the local council for a lettre d’habitant. These letters of residency allowed people to reside in the community and permitted them to enjoy some of the privileges traditionally associated with citizenship. Most of these privileges, however, were civic rather than political. Unlike citizens, inhabitants were excluded from participating in local assemblies, and they could not vote or be elected to office. This genealogy of local citizenship is largely confirmed by studies centered on Paris.π≤ From the late sixteenth century through the seventeenth century, Parisian heads of households residing with their families in the jurisdiction for

190

Was Spain Exceptional?

a year and paying taxes were eligible for citizenship. Paris, it was then argued, was unique among French towns because it encouraged inward immigration by allowing all ‘‘integrated’’ individuals to become bourgeois. The liberty of Paris to define its own community was nevertheless restricted. Because citizenship allowed individuals to enjoy tax exemptions, the monarchy often wished to control who the citizens were and pursued this goal through several paths: by attempting to change the definition of citizenship, by applying a reductionist interpretation to existing statutes, and by imposing first the purchase of letters of citizenship and then the elaboration of a public registry of bourgeois. These measures were resented by the local authorities, who wanted to retain control over the enrollment of citizens and who hoped for a more lax definition that would allow more people to become citizens and thus increase the number paying the local municipal fees (boues et lanternes). Parisian citizenship practices were modified considerably in the passage from the Middle Ages to the early modern period. These modifications were the result of social, economic, and bureaucratic developments. As Paris changed from a mainly commercial center into a highly complex court society, the bourgeois gradually became identified with a small social sector that included individuals of independent means (rentiers). This identification was linked initially to the idea that people of independent means were capable of paying local taxes. By the seventeenth century, however, this identification acquired a social meaning. Tied to the increasing importance of bureaucrats and noblesse de robe in the city on one hand, and to the growing economic power of the rentier class on the other, citizenship became associated with a certain type of urban nobility. This association was also hastened by the fact that the rights of citizens and nobles became quite similar. At the end of this process, citizenship implied a certain lifestyle that excluded all those engaged in manual labor or in commercial activity. It thus became divorced from its original constituency, the merchants. The distinction between merchants and citizens was publicly acknowledged in 1701, when, for tax purposes, merchants were subjected to the lieutenant general of the police, while citizens were placed under the jurisdiction of city officials. It was again confirmed in 1714, when the royal courts stated that in order to enjoy tax exemptions as bourgeois, individuals needed to comply with four requirements: reside in Paris at least seven months a year, cultivate nothing by hand except their land and vineyards, sell none other then the fruits of their land, and do nothing to degrade the status of citizen.π≥ In 1721 and 1738, these perceptions of citizenship were again invoked when it was declared that, as people living from rents, retired merchants and their widows should be included in the tax rolls among ‘‘citizens’’ rather than ‘‘merchants.’’

Was Spain Exceptional?

191

By that time, many Parisians were no longer interested in acquiring citizenship. Foremost among these disinterested persons were royal bureaucrats, whose status and privileges by virtue of office were more ample and more important than those they could possess by virtue of citizenship. Local citizenship practices in France and Castile differed dramatically. As was the case in Italy, in early modern France citizenship became an honorary title that was linked to the possession of important economic means and to the practice of a certain lifestyle. It became the status of the few and privileged. As citizenship was gradually dissociated from residence and integration, a new regime had to be invented to regulate residence. These developments were very different from developments in Castile, where until the end of the Old Regime citizenship was a condition that implied certain rights and duties. In Castile, citizenship was granted to individuals of all qualities and all economic means as long as they were independent heads of households. No parallel regime of residency emerged. If any similarity existed between Spain and France, it was mainly with respect to the way Castilian citizenship was implemented in Spanish America. In Spanish America, as in France, citizenship was emptied of many of its practical implications. In both realms it became an honorary title, linked to reputation. The relation between local citizenship and the community of the kingdom in France was highly complex. Most French communities denied aliens the right of citizenship. Although in Marseilles and Lyon aliens could become citizens, their admission to the municipal community was insufficient for their naturalization. This inability of French communities to admit foreigners was explained by reference to royal sovereignty. According to most historians of France, by the sixteenth century the subjection of local communities to the king was complete. Instead of a territory composed of different local communities, France became a kingdom. One consequence of this development was that the status and rights of people were no longer determined by reference to their local membership. Instead, they were determined by their relationship with the monarch. Letters of citizenship (lettres de bourgeois) gave way to letters of naturalization (lettres de naturalisation) and the term aubain, which during the Middle Ages denoted all outsiders, now specifically designated foreigners to the kingdom. Because of this process the king obtained a monopoly over the classification of people as natives or foreigners, which had earlier been exercised by local communities, and he gained control over alien property (droit d’aubain), which earlier had belonged to local lords. This royal monopoly on the composition of communities was unknown in Castile, where local communities could admit foreigners to citizenship and, by extension, to nativeness. The king never achieved a monopoly over the

192

Was Spain Exceptional?

classification of people as natives or foreigners as this classification took place automatically and without his intervention. Yet, however substantial these differences might be, there are some indications that even in France local integration was essential to the assimilation of foreigners also as members of a larger, kingdomwide community. Claudine Billot affirmed in the past that this assimilation was social rather than legal and political, and that it operated only on a local level and independent of the state.π∂ Yet the proof she supplies is found in legislation rather than in actual practice. Furthermore, Billot acknowledges that most letters of citizenship and naturalization were granted to members of elite groups, and that most other foreigners and aliens obtained status (and enjoyed rights and complied with duties) independently of them. Her description thus suggests that practices in France may not have been radically different from practices in Spain. The distinction between natives (régnicole) and foreigners (aubains) had many practical implications in France.π∑ Most important among them was the inability of foreigners to bequeath or inherit estates (droit d’aubain).π∏ As a result of this inability, upon their death or the death of their loved ones, the estates of foreigners passed to the king. The relation between inheritance and Frenchness was such that, according to Marguerite Vanel, individuals were classified or declassified as French according to contemporary perceptions about who should or should not inherit. Instead of allowing Frenchmen to inherit, those whom the magistrates considered worthy of an estate were eventually recognized as French. Over the years, the French monarchs gradually exempted many individuals or groups of individuals from the droit d’aubain. These exemptions were expressed in particular acts, in laws, and in ‘‘international’’ treaties, and they targeted individuals by virtue of their occupation, place of residence, or origin. As a result of their enactment, the ability to use inheritance as a marker distinguishing French from foreigners substantially diminished, as did royal revenues from the droit d’aubain. Nevertheless, the droit d’aubain persisted. It became endowed mainly with a symbolic meaning: it now marked the sovereignty of the king and it designated the precarious frontier between natives and foreigners. Historians agree that for the purpose of inheritance a person was French if he or she resided in the territory and had been born there to at least one French parent. This definition required the combination of two conditions: descent and birth in the territory. Descent was usually proved by employing presumptions and reputation rather than supplying hard facts. Although some candidates presented their baptismal records and marriage certificates, most people invoked their public image and the public image of their parents. Birth in the territory was equally proved by supplying documents or by public renown. On

Was Spain Exceptional?

193

occasions, it required defining the exact extent of French territories, which were usually identified as those under royal jurisdiction.ππ This meant that the boundaries of the community could vary according to territorial gains or losses. Once territories were lost, their natives who were formerly French became foreigners and once territories were gained, individuals who were formerly foreign became French. People born under royal allegiance were therefore French, and they could maintain this condition if they came to France when the territory where they were born changed hands.π∫ In the French case, even people born in territories claimed by the French king but not currently under his actual domination could be considered French. The same happened with people born in French colonies, who, independent of their genealogy, were considered French natives and were eligible to inherit property. Another condition for Frenchness was religion. It was assumed that the French community was Catholic and that only Catholics could become French natives. Nevertheless, recent research indicates that the naturalization of Protestants continued after the revocation of the Edict of Nante in 1685, and that in some cases at least, Jews could be naturalized.πΩ The idea that Frenchness depended on birth in a certain territory was initially linked to the belief that individuals loved the land where they were born. But after the French kings ascertained their sovereignty, the importance of birth diminished. Progressively, emphasis was shifted from territoriality to subjecthood and from community to king. In the sixteenth and especially the seventeenth century, individuals who left the kingdom and their sons—even if born abroad—could maintain their Frenchness as long as they continued to subject themselves to the king. It was then argued that immigration did not justify the conversion of French persons into aliens. This conversion could only take place when a French native living outside France made a deliberate decision to obey another lord. The legal assumption was that he never did. By definition, immigrants always had an esprit de retour. Initially, proof to the contrary could be admitted, demonstrating that in specific cases individuals did abandon their allegiance to the king. Legal presumptions could be invoked, arguing that accepting employment by a foreign government or being naturalized in a foreign jurisdiction demonstrated that the immigrant indeed wanted to severe his ties with the king and with France. The establishment of domicile was also deemed important, and many argued that a person who established a domicile in another jurisdiction where he wished to remain permanently implicitly abandoned his allegiance to the king. Yet the ability to rely on domicile was questioned. Domicile, it was argued, was accidental while allegiance and blood ties were permanent. As a result of these perceptions, by the mid-seventeenth century the ability

194

Was Spain Exceptional?

to argue against the esprit de retour diminished substantially. It was under these circumstances that Frenchness was portrayed as a quality that could not be lost without an explicit declaration ending the subjection to the king. Also during this period it was determined that sons of immigrants should not be ‘‘punished’’ by their parents’ betrayal. Even if born abroad, they could be considered native French if they proved their allegiance to the monarch. A proper and common proof was the decision to return to France, especially if it were made before the ability to inherit came under legal scrutiny. The only exception to this rule was the status of sons of French merchants married to foreigners born abroad.∫≠ During the eighteenth century, these offspring were increasingly classified as foreigners because it was assumed that by marrying a foreigner their fathers had dissociated themselves from the French community. Theoretically, in question was their allegiance to France. In practice, however, equally important were French commercial policies aimed at pressuring ‘‘useful’’ merchants to return to France. Unlike the French community, the community of Spanish natives was not a community of allegiance. Territorial gains and losses did not automatically modify its extension, nor was it expanded by royal claims to territories not under actual royal control. Despite these differences, several elements were common to France and Spain. Both communities required their natives be Catholic, although it appears that this rule was more closely observed in Spain than in France. In both communities, natives could become foreigners and foreigners natives. The conversion of people from one status to the other depended on similar factors and on similar presumptions that linked behavior to intention. Accordingly, membership in the community of the kingdom depended on what people wanted. Nevertheless, the key question in France was the wish to preserve or abandon allegiance to the monarch; in Spain the problem hinged on intention to continue or sever the association with the community. In France, the assumption was that people who were no longer in residence did not want to change their status; in Spain the contrary was true. Another point common to both Spain and France was the adherence to categories and ideas elaborated by ius commune jurists. In both countries, these categories and ideas clashed with royal wishes that often perceived naturalization as a royal prerogative. In France, foreigners who wanted to be naturalized had to petition the crown, and the royal chancellery could issue letters of naturalization after the Chambre des Comptes (the royal court responsible for supervising the droit d’aubain) reviewed the petition. In principle, foreigners who wanted to obtain their naturalization had to have resided in France for a certain period and possess real estate. These factors served as proof that they intended to remain in France permanently. Two types of natu-

Was Spain Exceptional?

195

ralization existed. The first allowed foreigners to become citizens in the municipality where they resided. The second truly naturalized them and was either limited to the right to inherit or to enjoy ecclesiastical benefices, or it admitted foreigners to all rights and privileges of natives. Despite the existence of these formal criteria, the French kings insisted that naturalization was a discretionary act. The tension between Roman law doctrines focused on alien integration and royal prerogatives that included the right to an alien’s estate was constantly present. French jurists argued that foreigners who were integrated in the kingdom had the right to receive naturalization, yet even they understood that this right could be restricted by the king. Furthermore, although foreigners had to be formally naturalized before they were admitted to the rights of Frenchmen, in some cases at least, even the king recognized that certain foreigners could automatically convert into natives, as was the case in Spain. This happened, for example, in 1715 with foreign soldiers who had resided in the kingdom for a sufficient length of time.∫∞ The tension between integration and royal sovereignty also existed in reference to other practices. As in Spain, the French king could favor foreigners who were royal servants and could grant them naturalization despite the fact that they were not integrated into the kingdom. But unlike circumstances in Spain, the French kings could declare that certain foreigners would be treated as natives only in certain prescribed ways without ever granting them naturalization. For example, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, foreigners could obtain exemption of droit d’aubain—equating them, de facto, to natives—by virtue of specific royal grants. Such exemptions were granted to groups of ‘‘beneficial foreigners,’’ such as merchants coming to fairs and natives of allied countries who enjoyed the protection of ‘‘international’’ treaties. These exemptions were also granted to individuals and to French cities. Although they enjoyed the most important right of nativeness—the right to inherit—foreigners benefiting from these exemptions were still considered alien. The same was true with regard to office holding. In France, yet not in Spain, foreigners could obtain royal letters allowing them to be employed in offices and benefices ordinarily reserved for natives without this permit implying their naturalization. It was also the case in France that letters of naturalization and even birth in the territory could fail to transform foreigners into natives. On different occasions during the seventeenth century, for example, alien taxation was levied on ‘‘true’’ foreigners, ‘‘naturalized’’ foreigners, and native French who descended from foreign families.∫≤ Stressing the foreignness of these individuals, many of whom were legally French, these decrees explained that their taxation was justified because the presence of foreigners on French soil was profoundly

196

Was Spain Exceptional?

illegal and because foreigners ‘‘usurped’’ the privileges of natives. Following this logic, in 1769, campaigns to distinguish true natives from actual (and legal) foreigners were launched. In these campaigns, locally appointed commissioners cataloged people as foreigners according to their local reputation. Despite the existence of a kingdom, as many as 40 percent of those identified as foreigners were Frenchmen originating from another French jurisdiction whose foreignness, in the eyes of their neighbors, was as real as the foreignness of people born outside royal allegiance. Periodically, the liberty of the king to act as he pleased was questioned in France. Some early modern writers agreed that the kingdom was a community of allegiance and that both nativeness and naturalization established, first and foremost, a relationship with the king. Others on the contrary insisted, especially in the eighteenth century, that France was also a community of natives living under a single legal regime. According to them, nativeness and naturalization mainly embodied a relationship between particular individuals and the community. They even suggested that the ability to inherit must be distinguished from both nativeness and naturalization. Inheritance was a question of private law, whereas nativeness and naturalization defined the rights of individuals vis-à-vis the state and the crown. The officers of the Chambre de Comptes joined in this discussion. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they occasionally refused to register the naturalization of foreigners exempted from the residence requirement. They revised the contents of royal decrees ordering the naturalization of foreigners, and they verified the circumstances of each petitioner. They perceived naturalization as a pact between a foreigner and the state, and they determined that this pact depended on the foreigner’s relationship not only with the king but also with the community. In both Spain and France, the principles of ius commune allowed jurists and royal officials to argue in favor of naturalization by integration, and against naturalization at the sole discretion of the king. Yet in the Spanish case, ius commune was presented as a natural law, and it was invoked extensively not only by jurists and officials but also by individuals, municipalities, merchants, and merchant guilds. Indeed, the struggle against royal naturalization policies seems to have been more successful in Spain than in France. This could be partially explained by the different point of departure. In Spain, local communities could admit foreigners and convert them also into natives. In France, this was not possible; to admit foreigners local communities had to secure royal license. In Spain, communities closely monitored the naturalization activities of the king, and protested against them. In France, at least according to existing literature, such was not the case, and the king enjoyed the right to grant offices to foreigners at his sole discretion.

Was Spain Exceptional?

197

Spanish Exceptionalism: Conclusions Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spaniards were convinced that their practices were natural and universal. According to them, citizenship and nativeness were the automatic reflection of a higher truth dictated by God. Comparison with practices in Italy, England, and France demonstrates that contemporaneous European society did not share the exact same practices, at least not to the degree Spaniards believed. There were many similarities between Italian and Spanish municipal citizenship. Yet citizenship in Italy was not as pervasive as it was in Spain, and its practice never conformed to a clear common pattern as it did in Spain. In Naples at least, some progress was made towards the creation of a kingdomwide community. Yet, this community was often mistakenly equated with the local community, from which it never gained a true independence. Like Spanish litigants, French jurists adapted ius commune doctrines to the realm of the state; however, instead of insisting on the integration of newcomers in the community, they stressed allegiance to the monarch. Instead of linking local citizenship to membership in the community of the kingdom by making citizenship a necessary step in communal construction, they recreated the kingdom without reference to the municipal sphere. In the process, local communities lost much of their power to define their own members, and, among other things, they lost the ability to admit aliens as citizens unless they obtained a special grant from the crown. Because of these developments, the typical foreigner (aubain) in France was a permanent resident; in Spain a person meeting the same criteria would be classified as a native. In England, a variety of practices emerged that stressed the power of commercial corporations in the municipal realm and the sovereignty of the king in the kingdom. Despite these apparent differences, English common law doctrines were not as alien to Spanish practices as it might be initially suspected. Similarities were especially noteworthy during the eighteenth century, when English freedom, like Spanish liberty, was equated with the birthright of all natives and was associated with a kingdomwide rather than a local regime. Similarities between developments in the English colonies and Spanish America were also great. In the English colonies, the distinction between the municipal and the English community was not as clear as it was in England, and the establishment of a domicile could transform aliens into natives. This transformation could take place on the municipal level, on the company level, or after 1740, on an empirewide scale. All of these traits were present in Spain but were especially prominent in Spanish America. Other similarities between Spain and England also existed. Spanish and English cities both participated in

198

Was Spain Exceptional?

discussions concerning the naturalization of foreigners and lobbied for certain solutions. But Spanish municipalities intervened in these processes directly by naturalizing foreigners and indirectly by voting against (or in favor) of the naturalization of foreigners by the king. In England, local communities could only intervene indirectly. They participated in public debates, and by the eighteenth century they expected their representatives to vote in parliament in favor of one solution or the other. In both England and Spanish America, the role of merchants and mercantile interests was important and, in both of them, merchant gilds were able to exert an enormous, although in some ways informal, influence over the definition of the community. But while the power of Spanish guilds was mainly exercised in cases concerning nonnative aliens, the power of English gilds was mainly applied in questions of local citizenship (freedom). Last but not least, both England and Spain maintained regimes that extended the metropolitan citizenship laws to the colonies yet allowed for the ongoing development of different practices in the New World. This diversity was especially clear with regard to the status of naturalized foreigners, whose naturalization in the colonies did not necessarily guarantee their treatment as natives in European Spain and England. England, however, wished to close its doors to foreigners in Europe but pursued a more open policy in the colonies, whereas Spain wanted to achieve exactly the opposite. Beyond the specific nature of each case and the details of each country, all four examples coincided on several issues. In Italy, France, England, and Spain, communal construction was often described by reference to a ‘‘discourse of love’’ that acknowledged people’s heartfelt attachment to their community of birth and to their sovereign; they were required to obtain love of their new surroundings if they wished to become members of a new community or subjects of a new monarch. Residence and tax payment were presumptions that gave proof of love and allowed the community to trust the newcomers. Reputation and the passage of time fulfilled the same role. They enabled communities to comprehend (or assume to comprehend) the nature of the relationship that now linked individuals to the collectivity. It was in the axis between natural love and free choice, determinism and liberty, preference for natives and equality for immigrants that naturalization policies were debated and measures were taken, in both local communities and in the kingdoms of Italy, England, France, and Spain. Under these circumstances, those wishing to encourage immigration insisted that all members of the community were once foreigners, and those opposing it claimed that the contrary was true. In all four countries efforts were continuously made to strike a balance between authority and community, king and people, municipality and residents. This effort was expressed in the constant interplay between local and

Was Spain Exceptional?

199

global and between municipal statutes and kingdomwide laws. Although local laws that defined both citizenship and naturalization existed in all jurisdictions, these laws were matched by other systems that were just as efficient in defining members. Whether called common law, Roman law, ius commune, or simply natural law, these other systems were external to both municipal and royal control. They were part of a communal heritage and were characterized as ancient, widely held, and universally applicable. They operated to modify local and regal arrangements, and without ever being formally adopted, they were essential to the construction of communities and to the definition of their boundaries. The tension between authority and community in Italy, France, England, and Spain was also expressed in the existence of citizenship and naturalization by local and customary law on one hand, and citizenship and naturalization by sovereign act on the other. Citizenship and naturalization by law expressed local customs and local legal traditions, which represented the community and its ‘‘ancient constitution,’’ which had preceded the installation of authorities and the king. Citizenship and naturalization by sovereign act allowed the authorities, whether local or royal, to act on the margin or even in opposition to legal arrangements. Invoking the power to naturalize by fiat allowed the authorities to ignore the community and to assert that they were not subject to its laws. In spite of these similarities, Spain was indeed exceptional in the vigor of its local citizenship during the eighteenth century. Evidence from Italy, England, and France suggests that local communities in these countries gradually lost or surrendered their ability to impose a citizenship regime. Eventually, membership in the community became a social or honorary title, void of immediate practical implications. In Spain, although not in Spanish America, local communities continued to examine the citizenship status of inhabitants and to insist on the application of a regime that discriminated against noncitizens. Also in Spain, people continued to refer to themselves as citizen and noncitizen and to consider themselves first and foremost members of local communities and only secondarily as part of a kingdomwide association. Another (related) point of Spanish exceptionalism was Spanish resistance to royal sovereignty and the inability of royal interests to recast Spain as a community of allegiance. Evidence suggests that in both early modern England and France the community of the kingdom was gradually identified with the monarch and the centralizing state. This identification allowed royal bureaucrats to modify the definition of the community according to territorial gains and losses and according to dynastic unity and dynastic inheritance. It permitted English jurists to ignore the composite nature of the state and overlook

200

Was Spain Exceptional?

a constitutional reality of a multiplicity of kingdoms, each with its own laws and institutions. In both Spain and Spanish America, royal efforts to do the same were only partially successful. The authority of the king in issues of naturalization was indeed strengthened during the eighteenth century, yet the power of municipalities to naturalize foreigners, and the idea that integrated foreigners could automatically became natives, persisted to the liberal revolution (1808–14) and beyond. The transfer from citizenship to naturalization, from local to national, as described in France and as operative in England, never took place in Spain. Local citizenship and naturalization continued to be closely associated with one another, and foreignness still operated on both the local and the kingdom level. The sovereignty of Spanish kings was limited in other respects as well. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the Spanish parliament and the cities with a vote in parliament continued to exert at least some control over the king’s power to naturalize foreigners. Just as limited was the ability of Spanish kings to create a single community of natives in Spain. Although such a community existed in the New World from the late sixteenth century, its success in European Spain was only partial. Even after the nueva planta decrees (1706–16), the Spanish community was, at least in some respects, a ‘‘composed’’ community. Natives of Majorca still held the monopoly on office holding in their community, and they were likewise excluded from benefices in Spain; Castilians could occupy offices in Catalonia only by virtue of a fiction that maintained that they were collectively naturalized. Last but not least, Spanish practices never denied people the right to change their community because of their permanent and unalterable allegiance to the monarch, as was the case in England and France. On the contrary, Spanish debates affirmed again and again that people could migrate to or depart from the community and in doing so recreate themselves anew. There was no presumption of an esprit de retour as in France and no obligation to continue under royal allegiance as in England.

9

Conclusions and Afterthoughts

In February 2001, Spanish television aired a mock newscast staged by a comedy puppet troupe.∞ It presented Spain’s minister of the interior on board a helicopter. Looking down at boats carrying immigrants trying to reach the Spanish coastline and illegally enter the country, he ordered the ‘‘good’’ immigrants who wanted to work and integrate into Spain to stay on the boats. He then instructed the ‘‘bad’’ immigrants, those who wanted to commit crimes, to jump in the water and disappear. The same idea was expressed years earlier in a pop song that invited immigrants to integrate into Spain. The song suggested that immigrants are welcomed to Spain with their ‘‘eyes, dances, and lips that promise kisses,’’ but it rejected those who come with ‘‘smoke that does not allow to breathe, with anger and bad dreams.’’≤ Although the newscast and song represented the feeling of many both inside and outside Spain, they left unsolved the problem of how to distinguish good immigrants from bad, and who has the authority to make this decision. It also failed to address the problem of how in the process of distinguishing good from bad immigrants the receiving society defines itself by establishing its criteria of membership and fixing its boundaries. The question of which immigrants should be accepted and which should not was also important to early modern Spaniards. The distinction between citizens and noncitizens, natives and foreigners was ultimately presented as an

201

202

Conclusions and Afterthoughts

opposition between goodwilled people who were integrated into the community, wished to remain in it permanently, and were willing to comply with its duties and bad-intentioned people who did not. These latter were transients who refused to tie themselves permanently to the community, who avoided integration into it, and who wished only to benefit from privileges. The distinction between good and bad people was reproduced on all levels. It first appeared in Castilian and Spanish American local communities, and by the seventeenth century, it operated throughout the realm of the kingdom of Castile and in the Spanish kingdoms. This distinction originally defined attitudes towards immigration, yet it eventually constructed notions of membership and belonging. Independent of their origin and place of birth, in order to qualify as members, people had to be want to be members, to act as members, and to comply with duties. These requirements were applied to both newcomers and the native born, yet those born into a community usually enjoyed a presumption of goodwill. Although they did not receive a truly differential treatment, on a day-to-day basis, social norms and understandings that rarely questioned their status protected their standing. This lack of conflict made the condition of native born as both citizens and natives appear automatic. However, such was not the case. Native-born persons could be required to prove that they were ‘‘good’’ if and when their condition came under scrutiny. Therefore it should not surprise us that the distinction between good and bad immigrants was determinant in the construction of the category of ‘‘Spaniard’’ and ‘‘Spanish citizen’’ as defined in the first Spanish constitution (1812). Nor should it surprise us that, in Spanish America, the same distinction was helpful to the elaboration of a Creole discourse that eventually justified the break with Spain and the formation of new states and nations. The distinction between good and bad immigrants allowed the easy inclusion of foreign Catholics to the community, and it provided a means of explaining the rejection of other people who were classified as ‘‘bad.’’ The classification of people as good or bad depended on the identities of the parties and their interests and on the circumstances of place and time. It was linked to the willingness to presume the presence of goodwill or to demand that candidates supply ample proof of their situation and intentions. In some cases people classified as bad—for example, the Chueta, the Gypsies, and Spaniards of African decent—were different in ethnicity, race, and customs from most other citizens and natives. Yet even though discussants recognized the importance of these differences, their exclusion was still argued by reference to their quality as bad. This quality did not truly depend on individual behavior but was a byproduct of membership in a group to which Spanish society attributed certain intentions and certain ways of being.

Conclusions and Afterthoughts

203

This differential treatment resulted in some people acting as citizens and natives without their status being questioned or verified, while others had to fight for recognition. For some, these challenges were random and singular; others were scrutinized again and again. A discourse focused on integration, and one that apparently allowed people to become members by virtue of their decision and their decision alone, could thus justify exclusion. Indeed, as the eighteenth century drew to a close, it became increasingly clear that either people acted as citizens and Spaniards or they lost the right to remain in local communities and, by extension, in Spain. Apparent agreement on criteria did not mask real differences in their application. Individuals, collectivities, and authorities could disagree about what ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ meant and who should be classified in which way. This disagreement confronted real actors with real interests, possibilities, desires, and fears. These actors engaged in long and often tedious discussions in which they attempted to ‘‘discover,’’ but also to construct and imagine, the intentions of their fellowmen. This process of discovery had formal rules and ceremonial procedures, but it also depended on the interests at stake, the capacity of the parties to negotiate or impose their views, and the dynamics among several actors. Commonsense assumptions, ideas about justice, and perceptions of the common good were also important. Under circumstances of disagreement, identifying the authority that could decide on these issues became crucial. Yet in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Spain and Spanish America no such authority existed. Citizenship and nativeness were generated on their own by the mere fact that people acted and were allowed to act as members. In most cases, no official recognition followed, and there was no final arbiter who could decide who was worthy of which treatment. Written law gave some indication as to how these processes should happen, the courts intervened when requested to do so by the parties, and municipal and royal authorities voted in favor of one solution or the other. Nevertheless, the question of who was good and who was bad could never be resolved conclusively. No single authority could decide it; it was negotiated socially, in day-to-day interactions, and depended on reputation and on changing circumstances. Rather than a status, citizenship and nativeness were a situation. They crystallized in a certain moment and were lost in another. Over the years, different individuals and groups in both Spain and Spanish America expressed frustration with this situation. According to them, the Spanish regime did not obtain a sufficient guarantee that people who enjoyed the rights of membership would also comply with the corresponding duties. First in Spanish America—because of the alleged need to protect the community from greedy newcomers—and then in Spain—because of the desire that

204

Conclusions and Afterthoughts

permanent residents would comply with membership obligations—these individuals and groups called for the institution of formal procedures and permanent classifications. Yet until the early nineteenth century and probably beyond, in both Spain and Spanish America a regime of legality defining citizens and ‘‘nationals’’ failed to emerge. Discussions in 1812 in Cádiz demonstrated that the categories adopted by the first Spanish constitution continued to rely on reputation: that is, they continued to classify people by reference to their activities as comprehended and measured by the other members of the community. The same was true to with regard to the Creole discourse, which defined people as members of the Spanish American commonwealth. In Castile, Spain, and Spanish America, citizenship and nativeness depended on social negotiation and on an ongoing conversation among different actors, local groups, and even royal agencies. Rather than imposed from above, the distinction between citizens and noncitizens, natives and foreigners came from below. It was a byproduct of the activities of people and groups fighting to defend their interests and to best protect what they argued was the common good. These people and groups might have not been interested in fixing immigration policies or in defining the boundaries of their community. Nevertheless, their activities did both. State and king were to a large degree external to these processes. In the normal course of things, people became citizens and natives, or lost their status as such, without any official intervention. Royal and municipal authorities intervened only when the members of the community failed to negotiate these arrangements on their own. Unable to control the economics of the Spanish American trade, Spanish monopolist merchants demanded the assistance of the state to distinguish natives from foreigners and to expel the latter from Spanish America. Not only did they initiate these classifications and insist on their faithful application, the monopolist merchants also prompted the state’s action by elaborating lists of foreigners and by appearing in the courts and supplying proofs and arguments. At the same time, these merchants rejected the intervention of the state when royal organs claimed the right to decide who the foreigners were, or to convert them into natives. While the royal administration helped the merchants by guaranteeing protection of commerce, the monopolist merchants aided the administration by allowing its intervention in some cases, by recognizing its authority, and by helping it implement certain measures. Mercantile activity also forced the royal administration to refine and clarify its position, for example, with regard to the differences between naturalization by integration and by royal letter. The same dynamics was also present in Spain: local communities requested the help of royal courts when they disagreed with candidates about their correct classification. Royal intervention in these cases of unresolvable conflict

Conclusions and Afterthoughts

205

was justified and legitimate—and was even requested by individuals, groups, corporations, and local communities—in all other cases it was not. The authorities, it was endlessly argued, did not create the community but simply administered it. Therefore, while naturalization by integration was natural, letters of naturalization were artificial. While naturalization by integration was a regular practice, letters of naturalization were extraordinary grants. They confirmed royal sovereignty precisely because they ignored law and custom and because they modified the community in ways that were otherwise impossible. Looking at official records and the legislation in order to examine the citizenship and nativeness of people is therefore insufficient. These records only include the minority of cases that provoked debate and they only describe how a person should be treated in a given moment governed by the existence of a specific set of circumstances. In the vast majority of cases, on the contrary, individuals were subject to classification by people around them in day-to-day interactions. This classification was social rather than legal, implicit rather than formal. Belonging to a local community or to the community of the kingdom allowed individuals to enjoy the rights allocated to members; enjoying these rights automatically converted foreigners into citizens and natives. Rather than an aberration, the transformation of people in this way was considered natural. Society was not governed by man-made law, nor was it truly controlled by the authorities. It was organic, and it experienced natural processes of inclusion and exclusion. The study of vecindad and naturaleza thus demonstrates the degree to which the early modern state, at least in Spain and Spanish America, was far from commanding or engineering society. Rather than imposed from above, pressures from below generated vecindad and naturaleza. Rather than being identified in law and legislation, vecindad and naturaleza were defined by social practices applied by individuals, groups of individuals, and corporations. These called upon the local authorities and the king to intervene only on certain occasions; intervention was rejected at other times. The interplay between the state and local communities, authorities and individuals, implicit and formal categorizations demonstrates that rather than communities creating a state, or states creating communities, it was the dynamic relation between one and the other that mutually constructed both. From the perspective of vecindad and naturaleza, the Spanish communities, as well as ‘‘Spain,’’ were neither a natural phenomenon nor an artificial creation. They were continuously constructed by a multiplicity of agents working to defend particular interests, yet through this process constructing a community. Individual engagement in fixing communal boundaries both constituted

206

Conclusions and Afterthoughts

and confirmed these boundaries. ‘‘Centralized’’ state structures legitimized the privileges and duties discussed and helped to impose them. Yet the conservation, meaning, and application of these privileges and duties depended on social interaction and day-to-day encounters between individuals and corporations with similar or contrasting interests. The community that emerged in consequence was a social and not an institutional or a legal creation. It depended on a complex relation between interests and norms, individual agency, and social and theoretical constraints. It was in this nexus between legal arrangements and their instrumentalization, state mechanisms and private initiatives, local arrangements and kingdomwide solutions, everyday interactions and larger issues that eighteenth-century Spanish communities and ‘‘Spain’’ came into existence. The implementation of the categories vecindad and naturaleza also demonstrate that, in Spain and Spanish America at least, there was no inherent opposition between local communities and the community of the kingdom. Invoking human law arrangements and natural law doctrines, individuals, local communities, and merchants insisted that integration was the principle mechanism that allowed individuals to enjoy rights. Because integration was always carried out within the confines of the specific local community where one settled, owned a house, and demonstrated in other ways that one sought and deserved membership, it was through their adhesion to local communities that people, both native born and immigrants, became eligible to rights in both the local community and the community of the kingdom. This association between local membership and kingdomwide membership was clear in Spanish America in the seventeenth century, and it was formally declared in Spain in the eighteenth century when local citizenship—attained either by formal letters of citizenship or through activities as a citizen—was instituted as a mechanism also allowing the naturalization of foreigners. At the end of this process, a general regime of citizenship and naturalization was created in Spain and Spanish America without excluding local definitions and without truly limiting the power of local communities to define the kingdom and its natives. Royal attempts to transform this conglomerate of local communities into a single kingdom and then a single Spain, and to reduce the complex relationship between citizenship and nativeness into a simple relationship of vassalage and subjection, mostly failed. Until the end of the Old Regime and in both Spain and Spanish America, individual municipal communities continued to be essential participants in the definition of both natives and subjects. Nineteenth-century Spain and Spanish American states thus inherited a strong localism that recognized at the same time that larger structures, such as kingdoms, also existed. Through integration in a locality, one became by ex-

Conclusions and Afterthoughts

207

tension a member of the kingdom. This heritage privileged social classification over legal definitions and constituted society as a body autonomous of government and responsible, among other things, for identifying people as insiders and outsiders. It looked with suspicion at the intervention of the state, and it embodied a conviction that local society can and must regulate itself. This heritage stressed social consensus regarding a few basic premises, yet it allowed for acute conflicts regarding their interpretation. Embracing the ideal of freedom of immigration, it demanded conformity and argued that either integration is complete, or it does not exist at all. Many of these factors might have been particular to Spain and Spanish America, yet there are many indications that similarities between them and practices in Italy, France, and England might have been greater than recognized by the current literature. Integration was an important element also in Italy, France, and England, and in all of them a common and often unwritten law coexisted with formal legal arrangements. There was some relation in all three countries between local definitions of membership and kingdomwide categories of belonging. There were also clear indications that status depended on social interaction as much as it depended on laws and formal definitions. The reading of Spanish history from Spanish America and vice versa demonstrates that the one cannot be understood without the other. Castile exported to the New World many of its practices. Implemented in the Americas, these practices underwent important modifications. These modifications reflected the American reality as much as they revealed the potentialities inherent to the practices themselves. The operation of the Castilian citizenship regime in Spanish America, for example, seems more natural and more in tune with Castilian theory and its implications than its operation in Castile. On occasion, developments in the New World preceded similar developments in Spain. A community of natives of the kingdoms of Spain appeared in Spanish America in the late sixteenth century but in Spain only at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The same happened with the identification between citizenship and domicile and citizenship and nativeness. Both were crucial factors in eighteenth-century Spain, yet indications for their existence were already present in seventeenth-century Spanish America. Spanish American practices were also revealing because authorities and litigants involved in their implementation often explained their understanding of the nature and meaning of Old World practices in order to distinguish them from those of the New World. Consensual and obvious notions, which were never explained in Spain, were spelled out in Spanish America. Such was the case, for example, regarding the requirement that all Spaniards be Catholic and the importance of naturalization by integration (prescription). If Spanish America is

208

Conclusions and Afterthoughts

instrumental to the understanding of Spain, the reverse is also true. Citizenship as practiced in Spanish America cannot be understood without grasping its meaning in Castile. Nor can we really understand debates about the rights of foreign merchants to trade in the New World if we fail to grasp the meaning of Spanishness as generated within peninsular Spain. Even Creolism, which is traditionally interpreted as a genuinely American phenomenon, should not be divorced from concurrent debates taking place elsewhere in the Spanish world. Indeed, the colonial experience was instrumental to the understanding of Spain, and vice versa, in ways we have not yet sufficiently explored.

Abbreviations

AA AC ACV AGI AGN/L AGN/BA AGS AHN AJ AM/Q AM/S AM/V AN/Q AP/LP ASSCE

AVM BNE

Sección Autos Acordados of the AN/Q Sección Archivo del Cabildo of the AGN/BA Archivo de la Chancillería de Valladolid Archivo General de Indias Archivo General de la Nación/Lima, Lima, Peru Archivo General de la Nación/Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina Archivo General de Simancas, Simancas, Spain Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Spain Sección Acuerdos de Justicia del SG Archivo Municipal, Quito, Ecuador Archivo Municipal de Sevilla, Seville, Spain Archivo Municipal de Valladolid, Valladolid, Spain Archivo Nacional, Quito, Ecuador Archivo Provincial, La Plata, Argentina. Actas de las Sesiones Secretas de las Cortes Extraordinarias de la Nación Española (1810–13), Madrid, J. A. García, 1874 Archivo de la Villa de Madrid, Madrid, Spain Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Spain

209

210

Abbreviations

BN/L BPR Ced/Prag. CSCI DDACC DGT DSCGE EC E.Cab.XVII E.Cab.XVIII FA(F) FA(O) FE GJ GM IG MMHCQ PA(F) PA(O) PC PE RH RTC SA SG SV

Biblioteca Nacional, Lima, Peru Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid, Spain Sección Cédulas y Pragmáticas of the SA Sección Consejos Suprimidos—Consejo de Indias of the AHN Diario de las discusiones y actas de las Cortes de Cádiz, Cádiz, Imprenta Real, 1811 Sección Dirección General del Tesoro of the AGS Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes generales y Extraordinarios (1810–13), Madrid, J. A. García, 1870 Sección Escribanía de Cámara of the AGI Escribanía del Cabildo, siglo XVII del AM/S Escribanía del Cabildo, siglo XVIII del AM/S Sección Escribanía de Fernando Alonso (Fenecidos) of the PC Sección Escribanía de Fernando Alonso (Olvidados) of the PC Sección Fondo Especial of the AN/Q Sección Gracia y Justicia of the AGS Sección Gobierno Municipal-Siglo XVIII of the AM/V Sección Indiferente General of the AGI Sección Miscelánea—Museo de Historia de la Ciudad de Quito of the AM/Q Sección Escribanía de Pérez Alonso (Fenecidos) of the PC Sección Escribanía de Pérez Alonso (Olvidados) of the PC Sección Pleitos Civiles of the ACV Sección Papeles de Estado of the BPR Sección Real Hacienda of the AN/Q Sección Real Tribunal del Consulado del AGN/L Sección Secretaría del Acuerdo of the ACV Sección Superior Gobierno of the AGN/L Sección Sala de Vizcaya del ACV

Notes

Chapter 1. Introduction 1. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Anderson, Imagined Communities; Greenfeld, Nationalism; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism; Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism; Smith, Ethnic Origin of Nations; and Hastings, Construction of Nationhood. These issues are also treated in Tilly, ‘‘States.’’ 2. Viroli, For Love of Country; Brading, ‘‘Patriotism’’; and Godechot, ‘‘Nation.’’ See also Elliott, ‘‘Revolution,’’ 122–23; Shennan, ‘‘The Rise’’; and Bjorn, Grant, and Stringer, Nation, Nationalism and Patriotism. 3. Tönnies, Community and Civil Society. 4. Blickle, Resistance, Representation, and Community; Te Brake, Shaping History, 15–16 and 181–86; and Tilly and Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of States in Europe. Criticism of this model is included in Sahlins, Boundaries, 7–9, and Portillo Valdés, Monarquía y gobierno, 36–38. 5. Vanel, Histoire de la nationalité; Wells, Law and Citizenship; Cockburn, Nationality; Parry, British Nationality Law; and Marías, La corona y la comunidad hispánica. 6. Billot, ‘‘L’assimilation,’’ 273, and Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 68. 7. Riesenberg, Citizenship in Western Tradition, 208, and Costa, Civitas, 76–80. 8. Clark, Small Towns; Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds; and Babeau, Les villes. 9. Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 25 and 67. 10. Nicolet, ‘‘Citoyenneté’’; Rétat, ‘‘Evolution,’’ 3; and Boone, Cerutti, Descimon, and Prak, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 4–6. 11. Weber, General Economic History, 315–37; Dilcher, Brady, Blockmans, Van

211

212

Notes to Pages 3–10

Nierop, Issacs, and Mussi, ‘‘Urban,’’ 217–18, and Blickle, ‘‘Conclusions,’’ 325. See also Schulze, States, Nations, and Nationalism, and Strayer, On the Medieval Origins. 12. Bossenga, ‘‘Rights,’’ 217, and Wells, Law and Citizenship, xv–xvi. 13. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood. 14. Scott, Seeing Like a State, 65. 15. Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 1–2, 111, and 113–14. 16. Cerutti, ‘‘Giustizia.’’ 17. Billot, ‘‘L’assimilation,’’ 276; Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 68; and Schultz Beerbühl, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 512. 18. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class; Walzer, Spheres of Justice, 36; Tilly, ‘‘Citizenship,’’ 8. 19. Somers, ‘‘Citizenship,’’ 589 and 611. I disagree with Somer’s affirmation that early modern citizenship had clear rules that were normatized by the national authorities and then implemented locally, according to local circumstances. See also Gaudemet, ‘‘Préambule,’’ 17; Tilly, ‘‘Citizenship,’’ 5 and 6; and Cerutti, Descimon, and Prak, ‘‘Premessa,’’ 281–83. 20. Brubaker and Cooper, ‘‘Beyond,’’ 14–16. 21. Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain, 27–29. 22. Losa Contreras, El consejo de Madrid, 479–84; Fuente Pérez, Palencia, 29–33, and Navarro de la Torre, ‘‘Avecindamientos.’’ 23. Vassberg, Village and the Outside World, 14–23, and Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain, 27–29. 24. Monsalvo Antón, Ordenanzas medievales de Avila, 85; and Alvarez y Valdés, La extranjería, 186–229. The absence of similar ‘‘definitions’’ in Spanish America led scholars to search for them in royal laws, where they were equally absent: Moore, Cabildo in Peru under the Habsburgs, 15–16 and 141, and López Beltrán, ‘‘Intereses,’’ 37. 25. Ruiz Ibáñez, ‘‘Sujets,’’ 129 and 135. 26. Tomás Ortiz de la Torre, ‘‘Derecho’’; Pecourt García, ‘‘Una institución,’’ 884–93; and González Jiménez, ‘‘Genoveses,’’ 118–23. 27. Sánchez Bella, Los reinos, 25–26, and Lalinde Abadía, ‘‘De la nacionalidad.’’ 28. Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 68. 29. García Cárcel, Historia de Cataluña, 132–35, and in ‘‘Las fronteras,’’ 71; Sesma Muñoz, ‘‘El sentimiento’’; and Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 31–79. See also Torres i Sans, ‘‘Nacions,’’ 84–86. 30. Pike, Hispanismo, 73–127; Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘Les traditions’’; Barton, ‘‘Roots’’; Boyd, Historia Patria; Koenigsberger, ‘‘Spain,’’ and in ‘‘National’’; Linehan, ‘‘Religion’’; Herr, ‘‘Evolution’’; and Mar Molinero and Smith, Nationalism and the Nations. 31. Marías, La corona y la comunidad hispánica; Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘El problema,’’ 190–94; García Cárcel, ‘‘Las fronteras’’; Maravall, El concepto de España; and Thompson ‘‘Castile and the Monarchy,’’ 127–30. 32. Menéndez Pidal, El imperio hispánico and in Los españoles en la Historia; Sánchez Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico; Maravall, El concepto de España; and Marías, España inteligible. 33. Herr, ‘‘Evolution,’’ and Ucelay-de Cal, ‘‘Nationalism,’’ 18–21.

Notes to Pages 10–17

213

34. Ladero Quesada, ‘‘El poder’’ and in ‘‘Monarquía’’; Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘Cities’’; and Thompson ‘‘Patronato.’’ 35. Castro, España en su historia and in La realidad histórica de España. 36. Liss, Mexico under Spain; Pagden, ‘‘Identity’’; Demélas, L’invention politique; Brading, ‘‘Nationalism’’; Guerra, ‘‘La nation’’; Chiaramonte, ‘‘La formación’’; and König, ‘‘Nacionalismo y nación.’’ 37. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, and Lalinde Abadía, ‘‘L’inserimento.’’ 38. Martínez San Pedro, ‘‘Repobladores’’; Ruano Eloy, ‘‘La participación’’; Gautier Dalché, ‘‘Les colonies’’; Domínguez Ortiz, Los extranjeros; Poitrineau, ‘‘La imigración’’; Pradells Nadal, ‘‘Italianos’’; Iglesias Rodríguez, ‘‘Las colonias’’; Ozanam, ‘‘Les étrangers’’ and ‘‘La colonie’’; Gómez de Orozco, ‘‘Italianos’’; Langé, ‘‘L’immigration’’; Brito González, Extranjeros en Lanzarote; Rodríguez Vicente, ‘‘Los extranjeros’’; Armas Asin, ‘‘Herejes,’’ 362–63; Pike, Enterprise and Adventure; Kellenbenz, ‘‘Mercaderes’’; Campbell, ‘‘Foreigners’’; Gómez Pérez, ‘‘Los extranjeros’’; Nunn, Foreign Immigrants; Gould, ‘‘La condición’’; Israel, ‘‘Portuguese’’; Langue, ‘‘Los franceses’’; Lavallé, ‘‘Les étrangers’’; Varela, Ingleses en España y Portugal; García-Mauriño Mundi, La pugna entre el consulado, 141–90; and Diz, Idea, 326–48. 39. Pradels Nadal, ‘‘Italianos,’’ 72 and 74; García-Baquero González and Collado Villalta, ‘‘Les français,’’ 174, García-Baquero González, Cádiz y el Atlántico, 491–92; Domínguez Ortiz, La sociedad española, 174; Lafuente Marchain, Los portugueses, 85– 86; and Fradklin, ‘‘Vecinos,’’ 123–47. 40. Cuneo Vida, ‘‘Extranjeros,’’ 60–61; Rosa Olivera, ‘‘Francisco,’’ 150–52; Pérez Rodríguez, Los extranjeros en Canarias, 71–72; Poitrineau, ‘‘La imigración,’’ 106; Domínguez Ortiz, Los extranjeros, 83; Girard, Le commerce française, 203–334; and Dias Avelino, ‘‘A naturalização,’’ 389–92. 41. Balancy, ‘‘Les immigrés,’’ 50–52; Armas Asin, ‘‘Herejes,’’ 373–85; Domínguez Ortiz, Los extranjeros, 180–81; Molina, ‘‘La expulsión’’; and Poitrineau, ‘‘La imigración,’’ 122–28. 42. Corral garcía, Las comunidades castellanas, 203, and Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain, 28–29. 43. Riesenberg, Citizenship in the Western Tradition and Costa, Civitas. 44. Chiaramonte, ‘‘Ciudadanía,’’ 99. 45. Mariana, Del rey, 552, and González de Cellorigo, Memorial de la política necesaria y útil, 66. This literature is studied at some length by Carzolio, ‘‘En los orígenes,’’ 7–8 and 14, and in her ‘‘Aspectos,’’ 5–6. I would like to thank the author for allowing me to cite her work. 46. Castrillo, Tractado de república, 24–29.

Chapter 2. Vecindad: Citizenship in Local Communities 1. MacKay, Spain in the Middle Ages; Hillgarth, Spanish Kingdoms; and García Cortázar, Organización social del espacio. 2. García Rives, ‘‘La condición,’’ and Alvarez y Valdés, La extranjería, 153, 189–212, and 319–70. 3. González, Repoblación de Castilla; Hinojosa, El orígen del régimen; Gibert,

214

Notes to Pages 17–19

‘‘Libertades urbanas’’; and Lacarra de Miguel, ‘‘Acerca.’’ The evolution of Castilian local law is described in Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, Historia del derecho español, vol. 2, 670–78. 4. Ius commune is described in Bellomo, Common Legal Past. The codification of citizenship practices is described in Torres Balbas, ‘‘La edad’’; Ladero Quesada, Historia de Sevilla, 128–29, 133, and 137–40; Losa Contreras, El consejo de Madrid, 479–84; Izquierdo Benito, Un espacio desordenado, 39–47; Fuente Pérez, Palencia, 29–33; Bonachia Hernando, El consejo de Burgos; and Navarro de la Torre, ‘‘Avecindamientos.’’ 5. Corral García, Las comunidades castellanas, 203–4, and Domínguez Lozano, Las circunstancias, 33–59 and 221–22. 6. Vassberg, ‘‘La comunidad,’’ and in Village, 14–23; and Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain, 27–29. 7. Gibert y Sánchez de la Vega, El consejo de Madrid; García Ulecia, Los factores de diferenciación; Gacto Fernández, Estructura de la población; Sacristán y Martínez, Municipalidades de Castilla, 258–63; and Carte, Del consejo medieval, 81–87. 8. Bernardo Ares, ‘‘El régimen municipal,’’ includes a survey of the most recent bibliography on early modern local communities. The article briefly mentions citizenship (vecindad) on page 51, yet it does not cite any examples of studies analyzing it. Indeed, the only study I know of that deals with these issues is Carzolio, ‘‘La construcción.’’ 9. Izquiero Martín, ‘‘Vecinos,’’ and Chiaramonte, ‘‘Ciudad, provincia, nation.’’ 10. Alvarez y Valdés, La extranjería, 186–229. 11. Monsalvo Antón, Ordenanzas medievales, 85, Ordinance 17 of 1487. The original reads: ‘‘y declaramos que los vecinos de la ciudad y su tierra se pueden llamar y llamen para el efecto de dicha nuestra ordenanza aquel que en la dicha ciudad viviese continuamente y tuviese su casa poblada en la dicha ciudad o tierra, o la mayor parte del año y que el tal contribuya y pague con los vecinos de la dicha ciudad en aquellas cosas que otros semejantes de su estado o calidad pecheren y contribuyeren.’’ 12. Porras Arboledas, ed., Ordenanzas, 94–95, Ordinance 55. The original reads: ‘‘Por quanto algunos vecinos de fuera de la jurisdicción de esta ciudad de Jaén se vienen a vivir y morar a esta dicha ciudad e se avezindan en ella, por ende, ordena y manda Jaén, justicia y regimiento, que el tal vezino que nuevamente viniere a se avezindar, que venga con su mujer, si la tuviere y casa poblada, e si no tuviere mujer por no ser casado, que tenga casa poblada y conocida. Que si trajere ganado, que antes que coma el ganado en el término desta ciudad, se avezinde en el cabildo, y recibido en el cabildo por vezino por la ciudad, de fianza en que se obligue de vivir y morar en esta ciudad diez años primeros siguientes.’’ 13. Espejo Lara and Morales Gordillo, Ordenanzas de Archidona, 86. The original reads: ‘‘Ordenamos y mandamos que ninguna persona sea avido por vezino desta villa sin que primero sea recibido por el consejo della y dado fianzas de asistir en la dicha vezindad y comprar casa y viña dentro de un año de su recebimiento y que aya de traer y tener en ella su casa, mujer y familia . . . y que con esto asimismo sean obligados a bivir quatro años continuos en la dicha vezindad con casa poblada.’’ 14. Recopilación de Castilla, law 1, title 9, book 7, and Novísima Recopilación, laws 1–3 and 6, title 26. The original reads: ‘‘Qualesquier personas que viven y moran en qualesquier ciudades, villas y lugares destsos nuestros reinos y señoríos, así de realengo como de abadengo, órdenes y señorío y behetrías, que se quisieren pasar a vivir de ellos a

Notes to Pages 19–21

215

otros lugares y partes con sus bienes y hacienda, lo puedan hacer y avecindarse en ellos y sacar sus ganados, pan y vino y otros mantenimientos y todos los otros sus bienes muebles.’’ The term ‘‘liberty’’ was specifically mentioned in a provision given by King Fernando on July 5, 1477, reproduced in Cayetano Martín, Documentos del Archivo, 111– 14, which stated ‘‘each one of these, my vassals, using his liberty, [may] pass to live and reside in the said town and its hinterland . . . [and prohibiting it would be] against justice and reason and against their liberty, which is notorious to all.’’ The original reads: ‘‘algunos de los tales sus vasallos, usando de su libertad, se pasan a vivir y morar a la dicha villa y a su tierra [y prohibirlo es] contra justicia y razón y contra su libertad, la cual como a todos es notorio, es cosa de mal ejemplo.’’ 15. López de Tovar, Indice de las leyes, 161 and 732. 16. Castrillo, Tractado de república, 24–29; Morel d’Arleux, ‘‘El concepto’’; and the definition of ciudadano and ciudad in Covarrubias, Tesoro de la lengua castellana, where the term vecino is not defined. A definition of the term vecino is also lacking in Celso, Las leyes. 17. Mariana, Del rey, 477–78 and 485, and González de Cellorigo, Memorial de la política necesaria, 66. 18. This archival material can be found in several main depositories: the municipal archives of Seville, Madrid, and Valladolid; the archives of the appellate court (chancillería) of Valladolid (which include cases from some hundred communities in the jurisdictions of Cantabria, Zamora, Burgos, León, La Rioja, Valladolid, Madrid, Segovia, Cáceres, Palencia, Salamanca, Toledo, and Guadalajara); and the national archives in Madrid. I also consulted manuscripts in the national library of Spain and the Royal Library in Madrid. 19. The case of Simón Manino, discussed in Seville’s town meeting, dated November 29, 1655, in AGI, contratación 51B. In this case, the procurador mayor de los caballeros viñeros was called upon to express his opinion. 20. Evidence for this practice are included, for example, in the files on ‘‘vecindades 1700–1719,’’ ‘‘vecindades 1720–1738’’ and ‘‘Vecindades de 1739 a 1474’’ in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vols. 294, 295, and 296, respectively. 21. The cases of Joseph Torresillas, discussed on May 18, 1767, and Miguel Martínez Aparicio, studied on October 23, 1769, both in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298. 22. The case of Joseph Torresillas, AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298. The oath made by the newcomers was: ‘‘to keep domicile in this city, having a settled house in it with his family, during the whole year, without leaving it, changing his home.’’ The original reads: ‘‘guardar la vecindad en esta ciudad teniendo su casa poblada en ella con su familia . . . todo el tiempo del año sin hacer ausencia mudando dicha su casa.’’ 23. Petition of Juan Joseph Martín, dated December 9, 1767, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298, and the case of Felix Durán, discussed on May 27, 1768, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298. The distinct procedures instituted for petitioners who were native born, immigrants, or immigrants married to native-born spouses were described in ‘‘Parecer del señor procurador mayor y varios apuntes sobre el modo como han de conceder las vecinades’’ in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298. 24. Discussions of April 1 and May 5, 1773, and the opinion of the city’s legal adviser in AHN, estado 629–3/63.

216

Notes to Pages 22–26

25. The Spanish monopoly in the Americas and the role of Seville will be discussed in chapter 5. Conditions in Seville during this period are described in Guichot, Historia de la ciudad de Sevilla, and in his Historia del exmo. ayuntamiento; Aguilar Piñal, La Sevilla; Domínguez Ortiz, Orto y Ocaso; and Pike, Aristocrats and Traders, 1–13 and 136. On 13–14, Pike studies the influence of immigration on municipal citizenship policies. 26. His petition was studied on April 27, 1735, and May 13, 1735, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 295. 27. A brief summery of Roman law citizenship practices as implemented in Italy is included in Bizzarri, ‘‘Ricerche’’; Quaglioni, ‘‘Legal’’; Riesenberg, Citizenship in Western Tradition, 118–86; Dilonardo Buccolini, ‘‘Note’’; Bonfiglio Dosio, ‘‘La condizione’’; Bowsky, ‘‘Medieval Citizenship’’; Panero, Comuni e borghi, 137–63; and Dini, Città e corporazioni, 148–51. 28. Kirshner, ‘‘Civitas,’’ and Ullmann, ‘‘Personality.’’ 29. Kirshner, ‘‘Between,’’ and Canning, ‘‘Fourteenth.’’ 30. Riesenberg, ‘‘Civism,’’ 240. 31. Font Rius, ‘‘La recepción,’’ 99–102; Clavero, ‘‘Notas’’; Petit, ‘‘Derecho’’; and Alonso Romero, ‘‘Del amor.’’ The relation between the Castilian municipal regime and Roman law is described in Domínguez Lozano, Las circunstancias, 57–59 and 221–28, and Asenjo González, ‘‘Las ciudades.’’ 32. Kagan, Students and Society, 135 and 212; Reig Peset, ‘‘Derecho’’; Pelorson, Les letrados, 33–57; and Petit, ‘‘Derecho.’’ 33. Bernal de Bugeda, ‘‘El derecho.’’ 34. Clavero, Institución histórica, 55–56; Daza, ‘‘Los principios’’; and García Gallo, ‘‘La ciencia.’’ 35. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, 152–55, book 5, chap. 9, points 57–68. 36. Opinion of Luis Verdugo, dated February 10, 1702, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–23. The original reads: ‘‘conforme a la libertad que conforme a derecho natural tenemos, cada uno puede renunciar la vecindad que tuviese en un lugar y vivir y avecindarse en otro el que eligiese.’’ 37. Opinion of Luis Verdugo, dated February 10, 1702, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–23. The original reads: ‘‘y para admitirsele por vecino no necesita de otra circunstancia más que la expresión de su voluntad.’’ 38. Petition of Germán Salcedo, dated July 20, 1788, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 3522–1. The original reads: ‘‘[The town] no tiene arbitrio para dejar de concederla [la vecindad] por ser acto libre según leyes el pasarse de una vecindad a otra.’’ Santayana Bustillo, Gobierno político, 7, citing the works of Acevedo, Avedaño, and Paz arrived at a similar conclusion—that individuals ‘‘must be received as citizens.’’ 39. Petition of Juan de Ocaña, dated August 14, 1717, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–32, and ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–3. The original reads: ‘‘el derecho permite a cualquiera avecindarse donde más le acomode’’ and ‘‘Para que cualquier persona que quisiera mudar de vecindad de unos lugares a otros . . . lo pueda hacer libremente.’’ 40. Those living with a mother-in-law or a brother, or as dependents in someone else’s quarters, could not be citizens: ACV, PC-PA(F) 2656–3; PC-PA(O)173–2; PC-PA(O) 413–3; PC-PA(O) 134–7; and the case of Miguel de Zayas y Brenes of January 9, 1797, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298.

Notes to Pages 26–30

217

41. García Gallo, Curso de historia, vol. 1, 87–91; Friedman, ‘‘El estatus; La condición; Muñoz García, Las limitaciones; and Bermejo Castrillo, Parentesco, 230–44 and 262–304. 42. AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 295, nos. 3, 66, and 87; AVM, secretaría 2– 349–1; and ACV, PC-PA(O)34–6. 43. The city council of Seville, on April 22, 1739, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), libro 296, and ACV, PC-FA(F) 3059–3. 44. Alvarez y Valdés, Los extranjeros, 153 and 183–262. In 1476, Abenjamin Abenyahion, a Jew, became vecino of Murcia, where another Jew was also accepted in 1479: Rubio García, Los judios, 94 and 143, docs. 908 and 1009. Similar examples can be found in Pimenta Ferro Tavares, Os judeus, vol. 1, 224, 407, and 447n1. I would like to thank David Nirenberg for sending me this information. 45. The cases of Bartolomé French and Diego Roberto Tolosa, discussed in the city council meeting of May 22, 1743, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 296 and on January 22, 1785, in AGS, GJ 873, respectively. See also ACV, PC-PA(O) 579–10. 46. Allegations of Joseph Corvillos on January 22, 1783, in ACV, PC-PA(O) 579–10. The original reads: ‘‘no solo a los naturales de estos reinos . . . sino aun a los extranjeros el poderse avecindar en cualquier pueblo de estos vuestros dominios sin que los consejos en manera alguna se lo puedan impedir ni contradecir como expresamente se previene y manda por vuestras reales órdenes que hablan en el asunto.’’ 47. Originally, behetrías were communities allowed to elect their lord. They were titled cerradas when the electee could fall only in a member of certain lineages or in a native born: Clavero, ‘‘Behetría.’’ Nevertheless, in eighteenth-century discussions behetrías mainly designated communities that could exclude people of certain estates from citizenship. During this period there were behetrías cerradas of nobles that excluded all simple folk, and behetrías of simple folk that excluded nobles. 48. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2616–1. Similar arguments were also evoked in ACV, PC-FA(F) 3122–2 and ACV, PC-PA(O) 731–3. 49. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3327–2. The original reads: ‘‘de estado noble de hidalgo y tener sus cartas y ejecutorias.’’ 50. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2641–5. See also Maravall, ‘‘Trabajo.’’ 51. AVM, secretaría 2–348–23. 52. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 87. The original reads: ‘‘Como son vagantes y sin domicilio seguro, ni sirven la república, ni contraen matrimonio, ni pagan pechos ni tributos, siendo solo carga y gravamen de los pueblos.’’ 53. ACV, PC-PA(O) 640–6. 54. ACV, PC-FA(F) 3149–2. 55. ACV, PC-PA(O) 196–7; ACV, PC-PA(O) 413–3; ACV, PC-PA(O) 196–7; ACV, PCPA(O) 248–6; ACV, PC-PA(O) 156–4; and ACV, PC-PA(O) 738–2. See also Rodríguez Fernández, Alcaldes y regidores, 34–36. 56. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–3. 57. ACV, PA(F) 3508–1. 58. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–1, pp. 15–16. The original reads: ‘‘sin la solemnidad de un recibimiento expreso a la vecindad hecho por el consejo, se le debía considerar riguroso vecino de continua residencia como que tenía su casa abierta poblada.’’

218

Notes to Pages 30–34

59. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–1, and ACV, PC-PA(F) 3508–1. In some places, formal procedures were required by law: Merino Urrutia, Ordenanzas, 97, Ordinance 34; Porras Arboleda, Ordenanzas, 94–95, Ordinance 35; and Espejo Lara and Morales Gordillo, Ordenanzas, 86–87. 60. AHN, estado 629–3/63. The original reads: ‘‘el que mora con casa poblada en estos reinos debe considerarse por vecino . . . tiene contra si la presunción y debe ser de su cargo hacer constar, por algunos hechos o casos, el haber estado sin ánimo de permanecer.’’ 61. The case of Joseph Sánz, discussed on July 1, 1719, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–33. 62. ACV, PC-PA(O) 406–9. 63. ACV, PC-FA(F) 3149–2. 64. Juan Mechado, petitioning on October 8, 1686, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 2889–3. 65. Joseph Corvillos, on January 22, 1783, in ACV, PC-PA(O) 579–10, and Joseph Colmenar in 1753 according to AVM, secretaría 2–348–47. 66. His petition of July 12, 1776, in AM/V, GM caja 57–4. 67. Santayana Bustillo, Gobierno político. 68. Answer of the council of Uruñuela in ACV, PA(O) 196–7. The original reads: ‘‘es tan corto y limitado que en él no pueden contener los vecinos que hoy le componen, los ganados necesarios a sus haciendas y cultivo de sus haciendas y se experimentaría mayor prejuicio dando lugar a la contraria.’’ 69. ACV, PC-PA(O) 413–3. 70. Power of attorney, dated September 9, 1782, in ACV, PC-PA(O) 576–10. The original reads: ‘‘gravamen al común su manutención en esta tierra estéril y mortificada anualmente de copiosas nieves por su estrechez y natural elevación en que por lo mismo sucede con frecuencia no poder salir de nuestras casas en los cuatro rigorosos meses del invierno.’’ See also ACV, PC-PA(O) 857–5. 71. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3402–3. 72. ACV, PC-PA(O) 196–7. 73. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3062–2. According to the local authorities, he was ‘‘inquieto y cabiloso’’ and litigious. 74. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2619–5. The council accused José of being ‘‘de genio litigioso, soberbio, altivo y dominante, acostumbrado a injuriar gravamente de obra y palabra a cuantos la ocasión le proporcionaba, no respetando aun los sacerdotes.’’ ACV, PC-PA(F) 3402–3 is a similar case. 75. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–3. 76. These cases are described in ACV, PC-PA(F) 3401–1; ACV, PC-PA(F) 2947–1; and ACV, PC-PA(O) 134–7. See also ACV, PC-PA(F) 2656–3 and PC-PA(O) 173–2. 77. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2889–3; ACV, PC-PA(F) 3522–1; and ACV, PC-PA(O) 134–7. 78. AVM, secretaría 2–348–43. This ‘‘script’’ appeared in dozens of the cases reviewed. 79. ACV, PC-PA(O) 298–10. 80. ACV, PC-FA(F) 3149–2. 81. ACV, PC-PA(F) 3522–1. A similar thing also happened to Juachin Alonso, resident in Orión (Valladolid) in 1748: ACV, PC-PA(O) 200–6.

Notes to Pages 35–38

219

82. Ringrose, Madrid and the Spanish Economy; Domínguez Ortiz, ‘‘Una visión’’; López García and Madrazo Machazo, ‘‘Capital’’; and Ringrose, ‘‘Madrid, capital imperial.’’ 83. Ringrose, ‘‘Madrid, capital imperial,’’ 196. 84. Deleito Piñuela, Solo Madrid, 125–27, and Núñez de Castro, Libro histórico. 85. His petition, probably dated 1714, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–31. 86. ‘‘Copia de la instrucción para la comisión de vecinos según la expone Marcelino de Vergara en la recopilación que hizo,’’ inserted in a discussion that took place from July to December 1798 in AVM, secretaría 2–348–62. The original reads: ‘‘por no saber los forasteros la utilidad que les tiene o porque en la confusión de la corte se hace poco aprecio de esta circunstancia.’’ There were many examples for candidates requesting their admission as citizens some thirty or forty years after their arrival at the court, e.g., AVM, secretaría 2–348–52 (of 1663) and 2–348–54 (of 1785). López de la Plaza, ‘‘De la tierra,’’ 167, mentions some 100 citizenship petitions between 1480 and 1499. Ringrose, ‘‘Madrid, capital imperial,’’ 201–2 found some 600 citizenship petitions between 1600 and 1663. Whereas in the period 1600–1630 most of them came from artisans and other service providers (68 percent), in the later period (1631–63) the percentage of these sectors dropped (to 36 percent) and the percentage of royal officials augmented. 87. Riesenberg, Citizenship in Western Tradition, 131. The ius commune origin of many of these presumptions is also described in Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 24. 88. Response of January 19, 1774, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 2480–3. The original reads: ‘‘para adquirirla y conservarla [la vecindad] basta el tener casa formada con familia y criados capaces para soportar y acudir a las cargas y obras concejiles, contribuir y pagar como cada vecino en lo que le tocara, sin que a ninguna persona se la pueda obligar a que habite y resida precisa y personalmente en ningún lugar, porque esto repugna a la libertad natural y es prohibido y reprobado por derecho.’’ 89. ACV, PC-PA(O) 413–3, pp. 24–26: allegations of José Martínez Izquiero. The original reads: ‘‘como el ánimo es un acto interno que solo puede saberlo el supremo autor a quien nada se le oculta, por lo que únicamente puede manifestarse o descubrirse por los actos exteriores no verificándose otros en mi parte que él de una voluntad continua de permanecer en el pueblo.’’ 90. In both Seville and Madrid, petitioners who were native born were required to formally request citizenship and, on these occasions, they had to affirm orally, or prove in another way, their continuing engagement with the community: AVM, secretaría 2–348– 36 and AM/S, sección 2 (contaduría), carpeta 336: petition of Nicolás Tersero of 1715. In the 1750s, at least, Lozoya followed the same rule: ACV, PC-FA(F) 3059–3, p. 7. The membership of Diego Bajarano, born in Serrejón (Cáceres) was questioned in 1752 because his intention to remain in the community was not clear: ACV, PC-PA(O) 260–1. 91. The case of Tomás del Corral, dated January 19, 1774, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 2480–3. 92. The petition of the duke of Medinaceli, presented to the town council of Seville on September 9, 1776, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298. Similar allegations, both with regard to impersonal residence and royal service, were also made by the representative of the duke of Alba according to the town meeting of April 16, 1788, in the same archive, section, and book.

220

Notes to Pages 38–44

93. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2619–5; ACV, PC-PA(O) 738–2 and 413–3; and ACV, PC-PA(F) 2947–1. 94. Such were the allegations of the council of Arisgotas, received by the court on October 25, 1769, in ACV, PC-PA(O) 413–3, pp. 19–23. The original reads: [The community was required to check whether the person was moved by] ‘‘motivos temporales, amovibles y casuales que en ninguna providencia pueden estimarse por legítimos para que mediante ellos, se entienda que dicho . . . haya adquirido derecho a la vecindad . . . porque siendo principalísimo requisito el ánimo de permanecer, notoriamente le excluían las puras casualidades y el contrario de que se presume de no subsistir ni continuar en quien no ha tenido más destino que el servicial que indiferentemente se busca y se toma donde se halla, y con la misma facilidad e indiferencia se deja.’’ 95. ACV, PC-PA(F) 2480–3; ACV, PC-PA(O) 631–1; ACV, PC-PA(F) 2591–3; and ACV, PC-PA(F) 2929–3. 96. The original expression used was: ‘‘la mayor parte del año’’: the case of Miguel de Zayas y Brenes, in AM/S, sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vol. 298; ACV, PC-PA(O) 173–2; and ACV, PC-PA(F) 2656–3. 97. Petition of Claudio Blanco of January 15, 1678, in AVM, secretaría, 2–349–16. 98. Tomás del Corral, on January 19, 1774, in ACV, PC-PA(F) 2480–3. The original reads: ‘‘con lo que manifiesta su ánimo de querer asistir y residir y asentar domicilio, habitación y morada en dicho lugar.’’ 99. ACV, PA(F) 3508–1. 100. ACV, PC-PA(O) 731–3. 101. Sala (Bañuls), Ilustración del derecho real, 53. The original reads: ‘‘Se llama vecino al que tiene establecido en algún lugar su domicilio o habitación con ánimo de permanecer en él. Conforme al derecho de las Partidas, este ánimo se presume y reputa probado por el transcurso de 10 años aunque Gregorio López dice que también se prueba por hechos que lo manifiestan sin necesidad de este transcurso poniendo el ejemplo de él que vende las posesiones que tenía en un lugar comprando otras en otro al que traslada su habitación; y todavía con más claridad si es recibido como vecino por el común de algún lugar dándo fiadores de que permanecerá en él 10 años y sujetándose, según Acevedo, a los tributos vecinales.’’ A similar definition is included in Escriche y Martín, Diccionario razonado, 969.

Chapter 3. Vecindad: From Castile to Spanish America 1. Hardoy, El proceso de urbanización; Romero, Latinoamérica; Domínguez Compañy, Política del poblamiento; Aguilera Rojas, Fundación de ciudades. 2. Kicza, ‘‘Patterns’’; Hardoy, ‘‘European,’’ 227–28; Morse, ‘‘Introducción’’; García Gallo, ‘‘De la ciudad’’; and Muro Orejón, ‘‘El ayuntamiento.’’ 3. Rumazo González, Libro primero, 49–50, and Sáenz de Santa María, 19–20. 4. On June 17, 1536, Hernando Sarmiento presented himself to the authorities of Quito and asked to be accepted as citizen. He attested that, as was well known, he would like to remain in the city: Rumazo González, Libro primero, 173–74. From 1541 onward, the authorities also demanded that newcomers supply a monetary guarantee that

Notes to Pages 44–48

221

they would keep their promise to remain in the city: town council meeting of May 27, 1541, in Rumazo González, Libro segundo, vol. 2, 255. 5. I could only find one study of Spanish American citizenship: Domínguez Compañy, ‘‘La condición.’’ 6. These cases were located mainly in municipal records and in published town council meetings (Actas de Cabildo). Some were also found in the national archives of Peru, Argentina, and Ecuador, in the Archivo de Indias of Seville, and in the National Library in Lima. 7. Ferry, Colonial Elites, 1–68; Lombardi, Venezuela, 70–94; and Hacienda y comercio, vol. 5, 47–56. 8. Petitions of Fernando Sanz, dated June 22, 1592, and Bartolomé Masbel, dated December 7, 1592, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 1, 192–93 and 210–11, respectively. 9. Petitions of Iñigo de Sosa and Baltazar García, of May 8 and 24, 1593, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 1, 258–59. 10. His petition of May 22, 1597, is in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 1, 456–57 and 459–60. 11. Petition of Lope Díaz de León on October 20, 1608, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 3, 141–42. 12. The case of Manuel de Lemos, studied on September 28, 1651, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 8, 97–98. 13. Petitions of Jorge Amaro, dated January 16, 1655, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 9, 13–14; Benito Hernández, dated January 12, 1609, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 3, 165–66; and Bernave de Oñate Mendisabal, dated December 6, 1611, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 3, 332. 14. García Gallo, ‘‘Territorio,’’ 360, and Gerhard, Geografía histórica, 13. 15. His petition of May 22, 1597, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 1, 457. 16. His petition of January 30, 1606, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 3, 8–9. 17. Petitions of Cristóbal Martínez, dated January 16, 1649, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 7, 281–82; Josepha Contreras, dated August 12, 1663, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 11, 299; and Luis Fernández Angel, dated March 26, 1648, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 7, 193–94. 18. Petition of Francisco López, dated January 27, 1652, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 8, 147, and the discussion in the council meeting of March 11, 1652, concerning Juan Rodríguez Agras in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 8, 154–211, esp. 163–64, 175–76, and 192. 19. Mörner, La corona española, and Morse, ‘‘Urban,’’ 179–88. 20. Lutz, Santiago de Guatemala; Mörner, ‘‘Ethnicity’’; Bouysse-Cassagne, ‘‘Etre métise’’; and Poloni-Simard, ‘‘Formación,’’ and in his La mosaïque indienne. 21. The case of Juan Alonso of April 7, 1616, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 4, 101–3. 22. The cases of Margarita, India, Francisca Diez, Mestiza, and Antonia, freed mulata, dated March 11 and June 10, 1617, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, Caracas, vol. 4, 166, 189, and 192–94, and of April 24, 1648, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 7, 230–31, respectively.

222

Notes to Pages 49–51

23. Gelman, ‘‘Cabildo’’; Lafuente Marchain, Los portugueses; Assadourian, Beato, and Chiaramonte, Historia de Argentina; Rock, Argentina, 1516–1987, 1–74; and Céspedes del Castillo, Lima y Buenos Aires. 24. This was the second foundation of the city. The first one (1535–41) failed, as settlers abandoned the jurisdiction. 25. Petitions of Amador Baes (1603) and Gil Gonzáls (1603) in AGN/BA, AC 19–1–4, 168 and 171; Town council meetings of May 8, 1589, petitions of Bartolomé Ramírez of May 14, 1590, and Pedro García of May 23, 1605, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 1, libro 1, 20–21, 63, and 138, and the power of attorney granted by Juan Ortíz de Zárate to Juan Ramírez de Abreu, cited in García, La ciudad indiana, 74. Although citizens of other Spanish American towns were also required to have horse and arms (Domínguez Compañy, ‘‘Obligaciones’’), this obligation was especially important in Buenos Aires: Garretón, La municipalidad colonial, 64. 26. Petition of Domingo Santos, dated June 12, 1607, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 1, libro 1, 383, and the case of Lucas Pacheco, studied in the meeting of December 12, 1618, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 4, libro 3, 129. 27. The meaning of this term will be studied in chapters 4 and 5. 28. The case of ‘‘Jacques cirujano,’’ discussed in the meeting of June 10, 1619, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 4, libro 3, 231. Jacques, native of Flandres, was a surgeon. He had resided in Buenos Aires for many years and was a person of importance ( persona de importancia). He had always cared for the ill, including the poor. The original reads: ‘‘por el cuidado que ha tenido y tiene de acudir a curar los vecinos de ella y los pobres y porque se espera de él que lo hará mejor en las cosas de adelante.’’ 29. The Portuguese Gil González y Amador Váez was received in 1611 as a citizen: meeting of May 9, 1611, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 2, libros 1–2, 348. 30. Petitions of Pedro Fernández de Ocampo of July 1, 1611, and Miguel Pérez of July 15, 1617, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 2, libros 1–2, 379 and libros 2–3, 451, as well as the case of Luis de Navarrete, according to the meeting of April 30, 1618, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 4, libro 3, 55–56. 31. Petitions of Julián Mixel, dated January 11, 1610, and Rodrigo Alonso del Granado, dated June 21, 1610, in Acuerdos del cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 2, libros 1–2, 230 and 266; and Petition of Rodrigo Nuñez de León of February 10, 1614, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 3, libros 2–3, 62. 32. Petition of Antonio Heris Gabiria, dated August 19, 1619, and April 6, 1620, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 4, libro 3, 280–81 and 373–74. See also the petition of Rafael Maldonado, dated July 19, 1617, in AGN/BA, AC 19–1– 4, 69. 33. Lockhart, Spanish Peru; Bromley, La fundación de la Ciudad de los Reyes; Hampe Martínez, ‘‘Sobre encomenderos’’; Bronner, ‘‘Peruvian’’; Moya Pons, El cabildo y la vida local; and Durán Montero, Lima en el siglo XVII. 34. Petitions of Hernando de Villanueva, dated October 8 1549, in Libros de cabildo

Notes to Pages 51–53

223

de Lima, libro 4, 185, and Pedro Sánchez, of June 19, 1553, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, Lima, Consejo Provincial de Lima, 1935, libro 5, 423. 35. Town council of August 14, 1570, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 7, 28. 36. Encomienda was a Spanish institution that subjected a group of Indians to a Spaniard. He was supposed to defend them and ensure their conversion to Christianity, and they were forced to work for him or pay him tribute: Lockhart, Spanish Peru, 11–37, and Puente Brunke, Encomienda y encomenderos. 37. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 3, chap. 27. Behind the legal requirement of ‘‘residence’’ was the social reality that encomenderos were usually important members of the community and often dominated the city socially, economically, and politically: Matienzo, Gobierno del Perú, 270–72. 38. Town council meeting of September 5, 1671, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 7, 169–71, and petition of April 29, 1596, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 12, 481. When the encomienda belonged to a woman, her husband had the right to be accepted as citizen: petition of Diego Nuñez de Campoverde, dated October 9, 1598, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 13, 176. 39. The case of Lorenzo de Estupiñan, whose residence obligation (originally in Guanuco) was transferred to Lima: town council of March 7, 1560, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 6/1, 271. The grant of citizenship by the viceroy was also mentioned in Moor, Cabildo in Peru, 143. 40. His petition of January 11, 1562, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 6/2, 20–21. A somewhat similar case was debated in Lima on September 16, 1577, according to Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 8, 497–98. 41. Town council meeting of September 18, 1570, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 7, 40, and December 1, 1590, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 10, 475–76. 42. Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 6/2, 532. Juan de Matienzo criticized the practice of calling these people ‘‘caballeros no vecinos,’’ stating that these non-encomendero citizens were indeed true and full citizens: Matienzo, Gobierno del Peru, 270–71. According to Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 3, chap. 27, point 6, in Spanish America, vecino-encomenderos were distinguished from all other vecinos, who were usually called domiciliarios. The usage of caballeros in order to designate vecinos was already present in medieval Spain: García de Valdeavellano, Orígenes de la burgesía, 191–93. 43. In 1576, for example, Antonio López was admitted as an ‘‘ordinary’’ vecino of Lima: town council of December 17 in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 8, 342. 44. Marzahl, Town in the Empire, 37–40; Ferreiro, ‘‘Elites’’; Levillier, Ordenanzas, 53; and Lohmann Villena, Francisco de Toledo, 131. 45. Recopilación de Indias, law 6, title 10, book 4. 46. Domínguez Compañy, La vida en las pequeñas ciudades, 51; Rosenblat, La población indígena, 135; and López Beltrán, ‘‘Intereses,’’ note 37. 47. Developments in Mexico City were somewhat similar to those in Lima. Early citizenship petitions were tied to land grants, and the municipal community suffered from frequent vice-regal intervention. During the sixteenth century, Mexico City recognized the division between citizens and vecinos encomenderos, and it permitted some

224

Notes to Pages 53–57

overlapping between the municipal and the provincial spheres, admitting people residing in ‘‘New Spain’’ to local citizenship. Newcomers had to guarantee their residence in the city or exchange residence for a monetary payment: petition of Francisco de las Casas, dated December 6, 1527, in Primer libro de Actas [del cabildo de México], 154; petition of Diego Orpesa, dated May 11, 1543, in Libro cuarto de las actas del cabildo [de México City], 341–42; Ordenanzas de buen gobierno; and Himmerich y Valencia, Encomenderos of New Spain, 8–9 and 102. 48. Marzahl, Town in the Empire, 37, 70–71 and 162–64. 49. Morelli, ‘‘Territorio o nazione,’’ 171, and Poloni-Simard, ‘‘Problèmes,’’ 13. 50. The existence, despite local variations, of an ‘‘American pattern of development’’ was also noted in García Bernal, ‘‘Las elites.’’ See also Cédula of September 13, 1621, reproduced in Konetzke, ‘‘Colección,’’ vol. 2/1, 265. 51. Town council meeting of February 1, 1549, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 9, 61–63; meetings of September 23, 1558, and March 7, 1560, in Libros de cabildo de Lima, libro 6/1, 99 and 271; meeting of June 17, 1536, in Rumazo, Libro primero de cabildos de Quito, 173–74; and meeting of June 16, 1617, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 3, libros 2–3, 441, respectively. This practice was also confirmed by Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 4, chap. 1, point 7, who explained that in Spanish America, local municipal judges (alcaldes ordinarios) could be (rather than had to be) citizens. 52. Town council meeting of February 5, 1599, in Garcés, Libro del ilustre cabildo . . . de Quito, 241–42, and Noble Cook, Numeración general. 53. Recopilación de Indias, laws 82 and 83, title 16, book 2, and cédulas of July 23, 1627, and October 2, 1764, in Konetzke, Colección de documentos, vol. 2, 301–5 and vol. 3, 321. These questions were also treated by Herzog in ‘‘Identidades,’’ and in Ritos de control, chap. 4, point 11. 54. AGI, EC 926A; AGI, Quito 73, cuaderno 3, 309–37; AGI, Quito 74, cuaderno 5, 25–26; AHN, CSCI 20.620, 283–95 in p. 291. I also found AGI, Quito 73, 291 and 306 helpful. 55. AGI, EC 926A, 76. The same position was adopted by Nicolás Andagoya y Otalora, a witness in a 1685 case, who asserted that the lady in question was ‘‘avecindada en esta ciudad’’: his testimony in AGI, Quito 73, cuaderno 3, 315–17. 56. Diego Inclán Valdés on December 9, 1670, in AGI, EC 926A, 3–4 and 26. The original reads: ‘‘y siempre estuvo el dicho gobernador [who was the father of the bride] con ánimo de volverse a los reinos de España.’’ According to the attorney of Inclán Valdés, the father of the bride changed his place of residence ‘‘en servicio de vuestra alteza con el oficio de gobernador de ella sin ánimo de perseverar, ante bien de partida para estos reinos con que no se puede dudar que conservaba la vecindad y domicilio de la ciudad de Cádiz de donde partió a servir el dicho gobierno.’’ 57. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 5, chap. 9, points 57–68, 152–55. 58. Report dated October 13, 1701, in AN/Q, gobierno 12, expediente 23.10.1723, 12. The original reads: ‘‘usando del derecho natural que les asiste, de vasallos libres de vuestra real persona y querer voluntariamente jurar domicilio a este cabildo.’’ 59. Cansanello, ‘‘De súbditos,’’ 117–18. 60. AGI, EC 914B, cuaderno 8, 308R and V and 914C, and cuaderno 9, 50V.

Notes to Pages 57–60

225

61. The original reads: ‘‘lo cierto es que habiendo ido a Lima bien mozo se mantuvo mucho tiempo y connaturalizó en aquella ciudad, teniendo más relación y estrachez con sus vecinos, que con los de esta ciudad.’’ 62. AGI, EC 914B, cuaderno 8, fols. 311R and V and 914C, and cuaderno 9, fol. 50V. The relation between domicile and citizenship, on one hand, and nativeness, on the other, and the wish to institute a monopoly on office holding favoring the native born will be explored in chapters 4 and 5. 63. Discussions of March 11 and 20, 1652, in Actas del cabildo de Caracas, vol. 8, 154, 161–69, 174–76, 178–79, 185–87, 192–94, 204, and 207–11. 64. AGN/BA, 9–17–2–1; AGN/BA 9–19–2–6; town council meetings of January 15 and 22, February 2, September 17 and 25, October 1, 9, and 22, and December 7, 1756, as well as February 2, 1757, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, vol. 2, libros 30–3, 15–22, 33–34, 126–42, 147, 155–56, and 161; and Superunda, Relación de Gobierno, 274–76 and 423. This episode was also studied by Mariluz Urquijo, ‘‘El diputado.’’ 65. Proceedings in Lima on June 28, 1756, in AGN/BA, 9–17–2–1. The original reads: ‘‘sin embargo de no ser casados ni viudos arraigados con casas o bienes raices, pues el requisito único para la vecindad, no es más que la traslación del caudal y bienes de fortuna con la persona, que viene a residir de nuevo con ánimo de vivir allí perpetuamente y que sucediendo esto con ellos deben ser regulados por tales vecinos.’’ 66. The original reads: ‘‘siendo forasteros, el destino que los trae es el de vender los géneros y mercaderías que conducen sin ánimo de residir perpetuamente, pues expendidos sus frutos y cobradas sus dependencias, se vuelven a las partes de sus antiguas residencias.’’ 67. Letter written by Antonio Portier to the city council of Buenos Aires on July 8, 1789, and in the subsequent appeal by the council to the viceroy in AGN/BA 9–19–3– 11, 653, 659, and 723. See also town council on January 15 and February 4, 1789, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, libros 49–52, 20–24, and 35– 37. 68. Petitions of Marcos Riglos in the meeting of January 3, 1777, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, libros 40–44, 17; Martín de Alzaga in AGN/BA, 9–19–3–12, 16–19; AGN/BA 9–19–4–9, 41–53; and Jerónimo Morales in AGN/BA, 9–19–4–8. Eventually, entire groups of people requested to be exempt from officeholding on a regular basis: meetings of October 18 and November 7, 1796, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, vol. 11, libros 54–57, 153–55, and 168, and the orders of November 12, 1783, and July 8, 1784, in AGN/BA, 9–19–4– 2, 173. 69. AGN/BA, 9–19–3–12, 181–84. 70. AGN/BA, 9–19–2–8. 71. The original reads: ‘‘han tenido su mansión y residencia continua en esta ciudad y ésta les constituye la vecindad según la misma ley.’’ The idea that a prolonged residence in an independent house constituted citizenship remained in force as late as 1794, as is apparent from the royal decree that instituted the local merchant guild in 1796: Fradklin, ‘‘Vecinos.’’ 72. Such a feeling is expressed, e.g., in Erauso, Memoir of a Basque Lieutenant Nun.

226

Notes to Pages 60–65

73. Barrero García, ‘‘De los fueros’’; Domínguez Compañy, ‘‘Ordenanzas municipales hispanoamericanas’’; Vázquez Pando, ‘‘Derecho’’; Tau Anzoátegui, ‘‘El derecho’’; and Herzog, ‘‘La Recopilación.’’ 74. References to citizenship were lacking, for example, in the municipal ordinances of Quito (1568), Guayaquil (1590), and many Peruvian and Mexican communities: AMQ, Miscelánea 00012, 63–72; the residencia of Joseph Clemente y Mora in AGI, EC 911B, 15–23; Levillier, Ordenanzas de Don Francisco de Toledo; Libros de Cabildo de Lima, libro 11, 781–813 and libro 12, 647–88; and Ordenanzas de buen gobierno. When citizenship was mentioned in Spanish American law, it was usually to explain its administrative and political implications, such as deciding how to count the inhabitants of a new settlement in order to know what status it should receive: Recopilación de Indias law 6, title 10, book 4, and the Nuevas ordenanzas de descubrimiento, población y pacificación of July 13, 1573, reproduced in Solano, Normas y leyes, 208. Ordinance 93 reads: ‘‘Declaramos que se entienda por vecino el hijo o hija o hijos del nuevo poblador o sus parientes, dentro y fuera del cuarto grado teniendo sus casas y familias distintas y apartadas y siendo casados y teniendo cada uno casa por sí.’’ 75. Spalding, ‘‘Social Climbers’’; Sánchez Albornoz, ‘‘Una dicotomía’’; Robinson, ‘‘Indian Migration’’; Wightman, Indigenous Migration and Social Change; Viera Powers, Andean Journeys; Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens; and Poloni-Simard, La mosaïque indienne, 153–64 and 340–46.

Chapter 4. Naturaleza: The Community of the Kingdom 1. Sánchez Bella, Los reinos en la historia. 2. Floristán, ‘‘Conquista,’’ 481–89. 3. Gibert, ‘‘La condición’’; Alvarez Valdés, Los extranjeros, 422–26; Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, ‘‘La recopilación,’’ 155; and Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 66–67. 4. The so-called Spanish monopoly in the Americas was instituted through a series of royal decrees, later reproduced in the main Spanish colonial legal code, the Recopilación de Indias, title 27, book 9. Initially, the decrees simply referred to ‘‘natives of our kingdoms,’’ and it was unclear whether natives of the crown of Aragon could immigrate and trade in the New World. This question was formally settled in 1596 when King Philip II declared that the term included natives of Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Majorca, Minorca, Navarra, and the three Basque provinces: Recopilación de Indias, law 28, title 27, book 9. These questions will be dealt with in greater length in chapter 5. 5. Novísima Recopilación, law 5, title 14, book 1. These decrees are known as the decretos de nueva planta: Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, Historia del derecho español, vol. 2, 861–65; Morales Arrizabalaga, La derogación de los fueros de Aragón; and Giménez López, Gobernar con una misma ley. Some of the consequences of these decrees are studied in Jiménez Sureda, ‘‘Alienígenas’’; Molas Ribalta, ‘‘Magistrados’’; Heras, ‘‘La problemática’’; and Dedieu, ‘‘Los gobernadores.’’ 6. Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 328, and Castro y Bravo, ‘‘Los estudios,’’ 219. In 1645, the parliament (cortes) of Navarre affirmed as much and mentioned that, since 1513 and 1515, natives of Navarres are eligible to offices in Castile and vice versa.

Notes to Pages 65–69

227

This affirmation won official recognition in 1647 when King Philip IV issued a royal decree to that effect: Actas de las cortes de Navarra, book 3, 74 and 81 and books 15–16, 63–65. 7. Ladero Quesada, Los reyes católicos; España. Reflexiones; and Fusi, España. 8. García Fuentes, El comercio español con América, 37, and Campbell, ‘‘Foreigners,’’ 153. 9. García Cárcel, Historia de Cataluña, 132–35, and in ‘‘Las fronteras,’’ 70–76; Sesma Muñoz, ‘‘El sentimiento’’; and Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica. 10. García Fuentes, for example, specifies that nativeness was either by ‘‘origin and birth,’’ or it was obtained through a royal naturalization letter: El comercio español con América, 36. See also Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 2, and Cremades Griñán, ‘‘Cartas de naturaleza,’’ 42–44. 11. Molinari, ‘‘Naturalidad,’’ 701. The meaning of nativeness in other, non-Castilian Iberian kingdoms is studied in Lalinde Abadía, ‘‘De la nacionalidad’’ and in his ‘‘L’inserimento’’; Roca i Trias, ‘‘Unde cathalanus’’; Langé, ‘‘L’immigration’’; Sales, ‘‘Naturalizações’’ and in ‘‘Naturals’’; Planas Rosselló, Recopilación del derecho de Mallorca, book 1, title 1, 88; Sanz Camañez, ‘‘Algunas’’; Ginebra Molins, ‘‘L’aplicació’’; Jiménez Sureda, ‘‘Alienígenas,’’ 1110–11; Piña Homs, ‘‘La condición.’’ 12. Campbell, ‘‘Foreigners,’’ 153–54, and Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 1. 13. Recopilación de Indias, law 28, title 27, book 9. According to García-Mauriño Mundi, La pugna, 41, ‘‘Despite doubts, the definition of foreignness was clear-cut (tajante) in the Recopilación de Indias, which declared that all those who were not natives of the kingdoms of Castile, Aragon, Catalonia [and so forth] were foreigners.’’ 14. Cuarta Partida, title 24, preface and law 1. I use my own translation for the preface and the translation of Burns and Scott, Las Siete Partidas, vol. 4, 990, for law 1. The original reads: ‘‘Uno de los grandes debdos que los homes pueden haber unos con otros es naturaleza; ca bien como la natura los ayunta por linage, asi la naturaleza los face seer como unos por luengo uso de leal amor.’’ And also ‘‘Naturaleza tanto quiere decir como debdo que han los homes unos con otros por alguna derecho razón en se amar y se querer bien. Et el departimiento que ha entre natura e naturaleza es este, que natura es una virtud que face seer todas las cosas en aquel estado que Dios las ordenó, et naturaleza es cosa que semeja a la natura, et que ayuda a seer et a mantener todo lo que decende deella.’’ 15. Cuarta Partida, title 24, law 2. 16. Cuarta Partida, title 25. These issues will be discussed at greater length in chapter 6. 17. Hermann, ‘‘Naturales,’’ 189–201. 18. Recopilación de Castilla, laws 14, 18, and 25, title 3, book 1; laws 1 and 2, title 10, book 5; law 1, title 5, book 6; laws 2, title 2, book 7; and law 27, title 3, book 7. See also García Ulecia, ‘‘Naturaleza,’’ 88–97. 19. Cuarta Partida, title 24, law 2. This law was cited, for example, by Hugo de Celso, Las leyes, fol. CCXLIII (R) in 1538. It was invoked again in the 1720s in ‘‘Por el fiscal de su magestad en defensa de la respuesta que dio a las pretensiones introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros’’ in AGI, IG 2301, fol. 4R. 20. Recopilación de Castille, law 19, title 3, book 1. The original reads: ‘‘Aunque por leyes de estos reinos esta proveído que los que no fueren naturales de ellos no puedan tener prelacias, dignidades ni otros beneficios, porque se ha dudado y se duda cuales se

228

Notes to Pages 69–72

dirán naturales para poder tener los dichos beneficios: ordenamos y mandamos que aquel se diga natural que fuera nacido en estos reinos y hijo de padres que ambos a dos o al menos el padre sea asímismo nacido en estos reinos, o haya contraído domicilio en ellos y demás de esto haya vivido en ellos por tiempo de diez años. Con que si los padres, siendo ambos o al menos el padre, nacido y natural en estos reinos, estando fuera de ellos en servicio nuestro o por nuestro mandado o de paso y sin contraer domicilio fuera de estos reinos hubiere algún hijo fuera de ellos, este tal sea habido por natural de estos reinos.’’ 21. Cédula of July 14, 1561, BNE MSS 20.067–12. 22. Recopilación de Indias, law 27, title 27, book 9. 23. Recopilación de Castilla, law 66, title 4, book 2, also reproduced in the Novísima Recopilación, law 1, title 11, book 6. 24. Acevedo, in his Commentariorum iuris civilis in Hispaniae (1594), as cited in Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, ‘‘La recopilación,’’ 155; Celso, Las leyes, CCXLIII (R); Hevia Bolaños, Curia Philipica, 266; Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 330–31; López de Tovar, ‘‘Indice de las leyes,’’ 105 and 536–37; Antunes y Acevedo, Memorias históricas, 281 and 293; Sala (Bañuls), Ilustración del derecho real, 54–55; and Alvarez, Instituciones de derecho real, 82–83. 25. Celso, Las leyes, CCXLIII (R). The original reads: ‘‘Aunque nacer o criarse o morar por mucho tiempo en alguna tierra sean las principales naturalezas que puede haber el hombre . . . empo de las dichas maneras de naturaleza [también] adquierese naturaleza por vasallaje . . . y si casase allí, o si hay hubiere heredamiento, o si el señor de la tierra le sacare de cautiverio o le librare de muerte o de deshonra . . . o si siendo mozo o turco se tornare Christiano y por morar diez años en algún lugar.’’ 26. López de Tovar, ‘‘Indice,’’ 105. 27. Castro y Bravo, ‘‘Los estudios,’’ 228. 28. Alvarez, Instituciones de derecho real, 82, and Uztariz, Theory and Practice, 39. 29. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 25. The original reads: ‘‘Los extranjeros no se hallan obligados, ni con fe, ni con amor.’’ 30. Recopilación de Castilla, law 14, title 3, book 1. The original reads: ‘‘Como estos extranjeros habidas las dignidades y beneficios de las iglesias de nuestros reinos quieren más estar en sus tierras que en la ajena, sacase para ellos la moneda de oro de nuestros reinos en gran daño y pobreza de ellos y con la renta de nuestros reinos se enriquecen los reinos extranjeros y aun a las veces los enemigos . . . y el otro es que estos prelados y otros beneficiados, estando en su naturaleza socorriría a Nos . . . para la guerra de los Moros y para la defensa de la corona real de nuestors reinos: lo cual cessa cuando los prelados y beneficiados no son nuestors naturales.’’ 31. Alamos de Barrientos, Discurso político, 14–16; Uztariz, Theory and Practice, 37– 40; and Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 126. See also Maravall, ‘‘Del régimen,’’ 120–21. 32. Uztariz, Theory and Practice, 38. 33. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 126. The original reads: ‘‘que fuesen prendas seguras de su fidelidad.’’ 34. ‘‘Discurso anónimo en defensa de los extranjeros y su comercio,’’ anonymous, undated pamphlet, partially reproduced in Domínguez Ortiz, Los extranjeros, 175–78,

Notes to Pages 72–74

229

on 177. The original reads: ‘‘casi todos los extranjeros . . . están muy naturalizados en esa ciudad, unos por los muchos años que ha que viven en ella, otros por haber nacido también en ella, otros porque se van casando y hay muchos que lo están con hijas de naturales, y los naturales con sus hijas, con que tienen muy grandes raíces echadas para amar y desear el bien de estos reinos.’’ 35. Lorenzo Herrera Betancur in his petition dated May 12, 1642, reproduced in Sancho de Sopranis, ‘‘Las naciones,’’ 869–71. The original reads: ‘‘se regulan por naturales porque la mayor parte de ellos viven en ella de 20, 30, 40 y 50 años a esta parte, siendo casados con naturales, teniendo sus haciendas y familias sin tener dependencia con las cosas de Portugal.’’ 36. Antunes y Acevedo, Memorias históricas, 294–95, and José de Cadalso, as cited in Diz, Idea, 340. The original reads: ‘‘viene a ser en sustancia lo mismo que declararles naturales por privilegio’’ and ‘‘ha legado a formar un excelente medio entre la gravedad española y la ligereza francesa,’’ or, in another case, ‘‘ha llegado a unir la sólidez española con la amabilidad francesa.’’ 37. Consulta of March 11, 1769, in AGS, GJ 873. The same was asserted by Gregorio López according to Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 66. 38. Consulta of March 21, 1769, in AGS, GJ 873. 39. Consulta of September 3, 1785, ibid. 40. Decision dated November 19, 1785, and correspondence of December 8, 1785, in ibid. 41. The original reads: ‘‘por no haber pruebas efectivas del ánimo de permanecer y tener algunas probables noticias de lo contrario, no vengo en conceder esta naturalización.’’ 42. Consulta of January 18, 1762, in AGS, GJ 873. 43. García Ulecia, ‘‘Naturaleza,’’ 96. 44. ‘‘Por el fiscal de su magestad en defensa de la respuesta que dio a las pretensiones introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros,’’ in AGI, IG 2301, fols. 3V, 4R, and 6R. The original read: ‘‘poderse dar caso de que aunque concurran estas circunstancias de hecho, de derecho no se le pueda declarar la naturaleza ni concederle licencia para el comercio como debe practicarse con aquellos extranjeros que, aunque hayan habitado el tiempo referido, se reconoce que están transeuntes y sin ánimo de permanecer, ni constituir domicilio’’; ‘‘Y asi entendida la disposición de la ley de partida que prescribe la habitación de diez años para la naturaleza, tiene la inteligencia de que esta regla corre cuando la diurna habitación hace que se presuma el ánimo de permanecer perpetuamente. Y así, aviendo presunción o conjeturas contrarias, no se induce naturaleza. Con que los que habitasen en España, siempre que las presunciones manifiesten el ánimo de volverse, no podrán obtener naturaleza’’; and ‘‘Porque la ley de Partida . . . hablando de las naturalezas une estas palabras: la dezena por moranza de diez años, que faga en la tierra maguer sea natural de otra. Y si se hubiese de atender al sonido de las palabras, la moranza de diez años constituyera naturaleza y es indisputable que no lo constituye sin ánimo de permanecer segun las doctrinas referidas.’’ 45. His case, included in AGS, GJ 873. 46. The cases of Diego Roberto Tolosa and Juan Lastache, natives of France, discussed on January 22, 1785, and April 23, 1758, respectively, in AGS, GJ 873. 47. López de Tovar, ‘‘Indice,’’ 536, and Hevia Bolaños, Curia Philipica, 266. The

230

Notes to Pages 74–76

original reads: ‘‘y si el natural del reino o habido por tal se fuera de él a vivir en otro extraño donde constituye domicilio, si después pretendiere ser natural del reino, no se dice serlo.’’ 48. Feijóo y Montenegro, ‘‘Amor,’’ 145 and 147. The original read: ‘‘España es el objeto propio del amor del español . . . esto se entiende cuando la transmigración a otro país no los haga miembros de otro estado, en cuyo caso este debe prevalecer al país donde nacieron’’ and ‘‘también entiendo que esta obligación no se la vincula la república porque nacimos en su distrito, sino porque componemos su sociedad. Así, el que legítimamente es transferido a otro dominio distinto de aquel en que ha nacido y se avecinda en él contrae respecto de aquella república la misma obligación que antes tenía a la que le dió cuna y le debe mirar como patria suya.’’ 49. The cases of Bruno Francisco de Pereira in AGN/L, SG, varios 4, 1–20, and Juan Francisco de Urrea described in cédula of April 16, 1719, in AGI, IG 1536. See also Casado Alonso, ‘‘Las colonias.’’ 50. His case, debated on November 11, 1787, in AGS, GJ 873. 51. His letters and petitions, as well as the letters of the marquis of Lede of May 5, 1720, and Gaspar de Narbona of May 8, 1720, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–25. 52. Royal service—considered a duty and not a right—allowed people to argue that they maintained their membership in the community despite their actual absence: see chapter 2 and cédula of 1565 cited in the decision of the cámara of Castile dated November 12, 1787, in AGS, GJ 873. 53. Recopilación de Castilla, book 1, title 3, law 19 of 1565. The original reads: ‘‘Con que si los padres . . . estando fuera de ellos en servicio nuestro, o por nuestro mandado o de paso y sin contraer domicilio fuera de estos reinos hubiera algun hijo fuera de ellos, este tal sea habido por natural de estos reinos.’’ 54. Consulta of the cámara of Castile, September 19, 1768, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘de lo que pudiera presumirse deliberado ánimo de establecer en ella [Roma] su domicilio . . . antes de cumplir los diez años que se necesitan para ello fue empleado por Vuestra Majestad como queda referido, conservando por este medio la naturaleza de España que se retiene con el servicio de la corona’’ and ‘‘acredita la misma posesión y convence el ánimo e intención de retenerla y conservarla [la naturaleza].’’ 55. Decision of March 5, 1624, in AGI, contratación 50B. The original reads: ‘‘no se atreve a hacerlo por las molestias que continuamente le hacen, así por el nombre extranjero que tiene.’’ 56. Cédula of February 12, 1788, in AGS, GJ 873 reproducing his petition. 57. Consulta of November 3, 1770, in AGS, GJ 873. 58. The original reads: ‘‘Estos antecedentes no aquietan su temor de no poder obtener con seguridad beneficio o renta eclesiástica en estos reinos sin proceder formal declaración de su aptitud . . . Tampoco le aquieta que su hermano Miguel de Olavide, residente de Lima, se le permitió comercian en Indias’’ and ‘‘impracticable por hallarse tan connaturalizado en ellos que con dificultad hallaría otra lengua que la española.’’ 59. Consulta of February 26, 1772, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘para que en ningún tiempo se le tenga por extranjero.’’ 60. His petition in AGS, GJ 873. 61. The relationships between the king and the parliament was studied by Jago, ‘‘Habs-

Notes to Pages 76–77

231

burg’’ and in ‘‘Philip’’; Thompson, Crown and Cortes; Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, Cortes de Castilla; and Dios, ‘‘Corporación.’’ 62. Bello León, Extranjeros en Castilla, 18–19, 31–55 and 77–171. 63. Cremades Griñán, ‘‘Cartas,’’ 41, 47, and 56–57. Examples of such cases are included in AVM, secretaría 2–349–23 and a note written by the marquis of Grimaldi on September 21, 1772, in AGS, GJ 873. 64. Early episodes (1520 and 1525) of this battle are described in Belmonte Díaz, Los comuneros, 74 and 107–8, and Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, ‘‘La recopilación,’’ 153– 57. See also Dios, Gracia, merced y patronazgo, 327–28, and Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 275–323. 65. The servicio de millones was a form of taxation introduced at the end of the sixteenth century: Cáceres de Gea, Reforma y fraude fiscal; Andrés Ucendo, La fiscalidad en Castilla; Fortea Pérez, Monarquía y cortes and in ‘‘Las ciudades’’; and Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘Cities and State,’’ 175–76. Thompson, ‘‘Castile: Polity’’ and in ‘‘Castile: Absolutism’’ studies the institution of a series of formal contracts between the king and the kingdom that set out the terms and conditions for the granting of fiscal services. These contracts—in existence since the 1590s—had been applied to the millones tax since 1601. After 1618, they included conditions concerning the naturalization of foreigners. 66. Royal agreement was expressed, for example, in condition 33, of the fifth type, of 1618 that stipulated that ‘‘ninguna persona que no fuere natural de estos reinos pueda tener las dichas venticuatrias, regimientos, juradurías ni otros oficios y que Su Majestad en ninguna forma ni manera ni por ningunas causas ni razones, aunque se diga son por el bien público, conceda a los dichos extranjeros cartas de naturalezas para tener los dichos oficios, y que no se les den ni puedan dar para gozar pensiones, canonjías, dignidades ni otros cualesquier beneficios eclesiásticos’’: Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, vol. 32, 529– 30. This condition was reproduced again in 1632 (condition 32 of the fifth type) and was followed by a cédula of July 27, 1632, in which the king specifically determined that ‘‘mando al presidente y los de mi consejo de la cámara que desde el día de la data de esta mi carta en adelante no me consulten ninguna de las dichas naturalezas, y al reino junto en cortes no den en manera alguna consentimiento para ello’’: Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, vol. 51, 54–55 and 333–36. These conditions were frequently cited. For example, they were mentioned in the discussion on the case of Angelo Garretón, in the manifest elaborated by Joseph de Ledesma in 1657, in AVM, secretaría 2–350–14. 67. Petition of May 25 and 26, 1632: Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, vol. 51, 47–48 and 61. Discussions in 1632 also demonstrated another point of contention: whether the representatives of the cities were authorized to vote on this matter, or whether the decision could only be taken by the towns they represented. This question was openly debated on September 22, and October 5, 1632: Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, vol. 52, 181 and 227. This discussion and the nature of ‘‘representation’’ during this period were studied by Fortea Pérez, ‘‘Las ciudades.’’ 68. The case of Juan Bapista Fini y Manzano, who was granted naturalization ‘‘in these kingdoms’’ in order to enjoy an ecclesiastical rent in Teruel (Aragon) in ‘‘Cortes de Madrid,’’ 339–40. 69. Letter of Agustín de Montiano y Luyando in AM/V, GM 54–2, 56–57, and the case of José Dovia AVM, secretaría 2–348–24. The exceptionality of these cases was stressed

232

Notes to Pages 77–79

by the king in his answer to the consulta of the cámara of Castile dated February 10, 1715, in BPR, II 2832, no. 15, 279R–279V. This practice was also mentioned in Cremades Griñán, ‘‘Cartas.’’ 70. The naturalization of Francisco Fariña (1721) in AGS, GJ 873. 71. Novísima Recopilación, law 6, title 14, book 1. 72. Such opposition was voiced, for example, in the response of the city of Córdoba, dated June 14, 1714, in BPR, II 1431, no. 53, fols. 332R–334V. Similar protests were also voiced by Toledo (undated document in AGS, GJ 873), Salamanca (AM/V, GM 51–4, 85–86) and Madrid (different documents dated May 1716 in AVM, secretaría 2–394– 63; discussion of 1747 and 1755 in AVM, secretaría, 2–348–42; manifest of Joseph de Ledesma [1657] in AVM, secretaría 2–350–14; and AM/V, GM 51–4, 85–86). The response of the council of Murcia was studied in Cremades Griñán, ‘‘Cartas.’’ The royal councils often agreed with this stand: consulta of the cámara of Castille of September 26, 1715, included in BPR, II 2832, no. 15, 278R–279V. See also the discussions of May 12, 1760, and February 1, 1764, in the cases of Carlos Saveli Spinola and Manuel y Genario Conforto in AGS, GJ 873. 73. Manifest elaborated by Joseph de Ledesma in 1657, reproduced in AVM, secretaría 2–350–14, 3. 74. Recopilación de Castilla, law 14, title 3, book 1. The original reads: ‘‘otrosí mandamos y damos facultad a todos y cualesquier nuestros súbditos y naturales que sobre esto se pueda oponer y hacer resistencia pues la tal oposición es sobre la exepción y honra y guarda de las preeminencias de su rey y de su patria.’’ 75. Cámara of Castile on July 5, 1783, in AGS, GJ 873. 76. Discussion of October 9, 1771, in AGS, GJ 873. 77. Cámara of Castile on May 12, 1760, in AGS, GJ 873. These concerns were already invoked in 1528 according to the Recopilación de Castilla, law 20, title 3, book 1, which determined that the ability of naturalized foreigners to enjoy ecclesiastical benefices in the kingdom was conditioned in their local residence. In the same legal code, law 6, title 5, book 3, natives and residents (naturales o moradores en estos reinos) were equated in their right to obtain seignorial jurisdiction and distinguished from people who continued to reside elsewhere. See also the response of Madrid to the royal letter dated November 9, 1734, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–39; the manifest written by Juan de Peralta on September 28, 1713, in AVM, secretaría 2–394–63; and the case of Antonio Ventura, debated in the cámara of Castile on March 28, 1770, in AGS, GJ 873. 78. The fiscal of the cámara of Castile on September 4, 1773, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘Don Bernardo de Begue goza de los privilegios de naturaleza de estos reinos por haber tenido residencia y domicilio permanentes en ellos por muchos años . . . y por hallarse casado con hijos y arraigado en el principado de Asturias. . . . Que la carta de naturaleza que solicita no puede ser otra que la declaración de naturaleza . . . que siendo esta declaración quasi debida de justicia a quien ya tiene como el don Bernardo Buegues la participación de los privilegios de natural de estos reinos y no necesitandose para la concesión de esta limitada gracia el consentimiento de las ciudades de voto en cortes.’’ See also the decision of the cámara of Castile on February 4, 1778, in AGS, GJ 873. 79. Consulta of June 21, 1776, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘sera muy justo y

Notes to Pages 79–82

233

conveniente al estado que por la concesión de esta y de las demás naturalezas semajantes no se grave con servicios alguno pecuniario a los extranjeros ya avecindados en España, para que con este estímulo se animan otros a solicitar igual gracia y avecindarse en estos reinos.’’ 80. Consulta of February 1, 1764, in AGS, GJ 873. 81. AGS, GJ 873, for example, contains many different types of dispensas, covering the period 1759–88, among which are naturalization letters. 82. ‘‘Razón que puede ofrecer sobre concesiones de naturaleza de estos reinos,’’ an anonymous pamphlet, probably dated in the 1710s in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘es evidente que los soberanos son legisladores que según las circunstancias de los sujetos y como más bien les agradare pueden sin nota y sí con maduro acuerdo excepcionar a algunos extranjeros para las dignidades eclesiásticas y mandando a la cámara los naturalice en vista de la gracia, porque de lo contrario se seguiría una total subordinación o sujeción de la soberanía, lo que es absurdo y muy nocivo y por la misma razón se han visto infinitos ejemplares en todos los reinos cristianos con singular acierto.’’ See also opinion of the cámara of Castile dated March 21, 1769, in AGS, GJ 873, and Dios, Gracia, merced y patronazgo, 327–28. 83. Castro y Bravo, ‘‘Los estudios,’’ 288. 84. Correspondence of the cámara of Castile with the audiencias of Barcelona, Aragon, and Valencia in AGS, GJ 873. See also cédula of July 7, 1723, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.10–128. 85. Discussion concerning the case of Ramón Ri, a clergyman native of Majorca who wished to hold an ecclesiastical office in Córdoba: consulta of November 11, 1787, in AGS, GJ 873. 86. Letter of Juan Colón dated Madrid June 26, 1788, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘[they are attached] a lo reducido del peñasco y no pueden pensar en otra parte para su colocación . . . se quedan estancados en la isla y preocupados de un error hereditario se persuaden que se les haría grave injuria si se abriese la puerta al forastero para ocuparles su corto caudal, cuando ellos tampoco habían de disfrutar del continente aunque se les abriera la puerta. Así discurren ya porque no han visto más tierra y se les figura que no son aquí de la misma naturaleza los hombres, ya porque tiemblan por falta de uso al pensar que han de salir de su casa, bien como aquel que habiendo estado toda su vida encerrado entre cuatro paredes creyera que poniendo sólo el pie en la calle habían de acometerle mil monstruosos. . . . Como en el cuerpo natural la circulación de la sangre, así en el eclesiástico y político la correspondencia mutua y participación de oficios lo que conserva su constitución sana y complexión robusta.’’ 87. The opinion of the fiscal dated September 24, 1772, was included in the deliberations in the case of Pedro Carlos Aball in AGS, GJ 873. 88. Jiménez Sureda, ‘‘Alienígenas,’’ 1110. 89. ‘‘Discurso contra la idea de poner en práctica los antiguados fueros del reino de Aragón y privilegio de que sólo sus nacionales obtuviesen los empleos de administración de justicia,’’ dated in Zaragoza on July 30, 1748, in BPR, II 2832, no. 16, 283R–290V. 90. The opinion of the fiscal, dated September 24, 1772, in the case of Pedro Carlos Aball, in AGS, GJ 873.

234

Notes to Page 83

91. The French Council in the Canary Island, writing to the French minister of foreign affairs in 1797: Guimerá Ravina, Burguesía extranjera, 115n57. 92. This regime was called fuero de extranjería. It included the liberty to enter and leave Spain with or without goods, to open shops, and to carry arms. Foreigners could also trade with enemy nations and even sell them Spanish goods. They either paid reduced taxes or none at all. They were exempt from lodging soldiers in their houses, could freely decide on the price of their goods, and their shops and books could rarely be inspected by local officials. Foreigners could also have their own lawyers, representatives, agents, and notaries, and they usually had their own consul and judge ( juez conservador). They could inherit and give property in inheritance. In fact, the only serious disadvantage was their inability to engage in the Spanish American trade or to hold public office or ecclesiastical benefice. A list of the benefits enjoyed by foreign merchants is included in Alvarez y Valdés, Los extranjeros, 401–13; Eugenio Larruga y Boneta, ‘‘Historia de la Real y General Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Minas y Dependencias de Extranjeros,’’ Madrid, 1799 (MSS Bell Library, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities Campus), vol. 3, book 2, chap. 2, 133R–8R; the prologue to the ‘‘Indice cronológico de los reales decretos, consultas, órdenes y expedientes que existen en el Archivo de la Secretaría de Dependencias y Negocios de Extranjeros’’ in AHN, estado, libro 683; letter of the Junta de Comercio y Agricultura of Valencia dated April 3, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66; and consulta of the Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Dependencias de Extranjeros dated December 22, 1778, in AHN, estado 5042. The origin of these privileges was mentioned, for example, in ‘‘Indice de los capítulos de la obra Comercio de extranjeros en España . . .’’ in AHN, estado 647/16. The importance of international treaties as guideline for the treatment of foreigners was mentioned in the opinion of the teniente primero of Sevilla of 1773 in AHN, estado 629–3/63, 13–14. The fuero de extranjería was studied by Percourt García, ‘‘Una institución.’’ 93. Letter dated April 3, 1773, AHN, estado 629–3/66. The original read: ‘‘ellos participan (aunque no lo quieren confesar) en los mismos beneficios que los naturales en el interior del reino, y aunque no lograsen otro que venir a él con tan humildes y bajos principios y labrarse su fortuna con perjuicio de vuestros vasallos, que en su defecto harían lo mismo y tomarían este carrera, parece que eran suficientes para que abrazasen gustosos las leyes fundamentales de este reino y obedeciesen vuestras suaves y soberanos preceptos ciegamente. Al contrario, señor: los resisten con todas sus fuerzas y no omiten medio por irregular que sea para no observarlos’’; ‘‘Llegue, pues, señor, el día claro y feliz en que renazca el antiguo y floreciente comercio de nuestra España. Vengan en hora buena a ella extranjeros comerciantes, artesanos e industriosos, que se sujetan a nuestras leyes y cargas del estado y disfruten con nosotros los beneficios’’; and ‘‘La razón y las buenas máximas de política claman y dicen que el que participa de los beneficios de la república esté también a las cargas de ella.’’ 94. Recopilación de Castilla, law 66, title 4, book 2. The original reads: ‘‘y que sean admitidos como los demás vecinos de él a los pastos y demás comodidades.’’ See also ‘‘Indice de varias leyes . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042 and the draft of cédula where a 1722 decree is mentioned, in AHN, estado 5042. The same issue was raised by Francisco Cobarrus and Antonio Ponz in the early 1780s according to Diz, Idea, 335 and 339. 95. The junta de extranjeros was established in 1714, abolished in 1717, and re-

Notes to Pages 83–86

235

established in 1721. In 1748 it became part of the Junta de Comercio. The history of the junta is described in ‘‘Indice cronológico de los reales decretos, consultas y órdenes y expedientes que existen en el archivo de la secretaría de dependencias y negocios de extranjeros . . .’’ in AHN, estado libro 683. See also Tomás Ortiz de la Torre, ‘‘Derecho,’’ 712–13, and Alvarez y Valdés, Los extranjeros, 413–18. 96. Opinion of the fiscal of the council of state dated March 12, 1766, in AHN, estado 5042. The original reads: ‘‘Han pasado a ser vasallos de esta corona, sujetos a la clase y leyes de españoles.’’ 97. The text of the 1716 instruction was reproduced in the Novísima Recopilación, law 3, title 11, book 6. Its importance over time is evident from its continuous citation. See, e.g., the royal order sent to the governor of Cádiz on March 10, 1762, in AHN, estado 647/17, and the letter of the Junta de Comercio y Agricultura of Valencia, dated April 3, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66, 3–4. 98. Instructions were sent to different authorities in Catalonia, Valencia, Aragon, Navarre, Granada, Galicia, Guipúzcoa, Castile, Extramadura, Campo de Gibraltar, Majorca, Orán, Ceuta, Canarias, Bilbao, Madrid, Andalusia, Ciudad Real, and Oviedo: AHN, estado 629–1/2. See also Villar García, ‘‘Un siglo.’’ 99. Cédula of June 28, 1764, cited in ‘‘Indice de varias leyes que existen y están en práctica en la monarquía española, relativas al establecimiento de extranjeros en estos reinos,’’ in AHN, estado 5042, 5–6. 100. AHN, estado 629–1/3 to 629–1/19; 629–2/20 to 629–2/57; and 629–3/61 to 629–3/79. These lists cover the following municipal communities: Orán, Madrid, San Sebastián, Jaén, Puerto Santa María, San Lúcar, Cádiz, Málaga, Teruel, Palma (Majorca), Pamplona, Campo de Gibraltar, Tenerife, Zaragoza, Catalonia, La Coruña, León, Valladolid, Tordesillas, Segovia, Zamora, Valencia, Ciudad Real, Bilbao, Seville, and Murcia. The difficulties faced by municipal communities wishing to implement this classification are described, for example, in AHN, estado 629–3/63. 101. Letter of the marquis de Croix to the Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Dependencias de Extranjeros, dated March 16, 1765, in AHN, estado 647/21. See also discussions concerning the cédula of June 28, 1764, in AHN, estado 629–1/2, and Larruga y Boneta, ‘‘Historia de la Real y General Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Minas y Dependencias de Extranjeros,’’ Madrid, 1799 (MSS Bell Library, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities Campus), vol. 3, book 2, chap. 1, 137R and V. 102. AHN, estado 629–1/4. 103. AHN, estado 629–3/63. 104. Letter of the Junta de Comercio y Agricultura of Valencia, dated April 3, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66, 11. 105. Letter of Gregorio Portora, judge (alcalde de crímen) of the court (audiencia) of La Coruña, dated April 19, 1766, in AHN, estado 629–2/39, and Seville’s town council meetings of April 1, 1773, and May 5, 1773, reproduced in AHN, estado 629–3/63. 106. AHN, estado 629–1/1. 107. AHN, estado 2893, and Novísima Recopilación, law 4, title 11, book 6. 108. Cédula of June 28, 1764, in ‘‘Nota de varias leyes . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042, 5. 109. Discussion in the junta on May 25, 1765, and June 21, 1971, in AHN, estado 647/21 and 5042, respectively.

236

Notes to Pages 86–88

110. His opinion dated March 12, 1766, in AHN, estado 5042. The original reads: ‘‘si con casa poblada, no hubieren tácita ni expresamente declarado su ánimo de permanecer, porque como el domicilio por sí solo es un hecho equívoco que se puede verificar en el transeunte y en el que se traslada o fija de una vez su residencia en estos reinos, no era fácil distinguir el verdadero sistema de los domiciliados sin valerse de otras circunstancias y conjeturas aprobadas por el derecho’’ and ‘‘si les conviene restituirse con sus padres o sin ellos a su originaria nación, o permanecer avecindados entre los españoles declarando su ánimo inscribiéndose en la matrícula.’’ 111. Letter by Bartolomé Muños dated July 28, 1807, in AVM, secretaría 2–166–64. The original reads: ‘‘la mente de ésta es que en los empadronamientos se aclaren las dudas que haya con respecto a los franceses existentes en España sobre si son transeuntes o naturalizados, dejando a su arbitrio en esta ocasión el que eligen el concepto bajo cual quieren ser considerados, a fin de que previa dicha elección puedan ser tratados con la distinción correspondiente a la clase elegida y según lo prescripto en las leyes de estos reinos, asi en lo favorable, como en lo gravoso.’’ 112. Teniente primero of Seville, on March 17, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/63, 13, 19, and 25. The original reads: ‘‘el reputarse el extranjero por domiciliado no es solo a beneficio suyo, sino también de la corona y de los vasallos, por tener este vecino más que les ayude a llevar las cargas y consecuentemente, una vez adquirido este derecho por los medios que se hallan prevenidos por él, no está en su arbitrio el hacer dimisión de él, como sucederá si se le estimase transeundo por sólo el hecho de alistarse por tal aunque concurriese alguna de las circunstancias para reputarlo por domiciliado’’ and ‘‘es cosa más extraña y repugnante al espíritu de la misma real cédula, y aun a la letra de ella apenas se puede dar, que por lo propio si se verificase, no podría menos de ocupar una gran novedad y aun alteración en el pueblo mayoritariamente que ya se ha advertido sólo con el rumor de que se entendía e iba a practicarse asi . . . que no siendo asi la causaría una exorbitante alteración que siempre debe evitarse.’’ 113. The junta’s letter of April 3, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66, 2–3 and 5. 114. The fiscal of the council of state in 1766. The fiscal also stated that among the alleged ‘‘foreigners,’’ there were in fact many (true) Spaniards. The foreigners, he said ‘‘suponen una porción numerosa de verdaderos españoles’’: his opinion, inserted in the consulta of the Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Dependencias de Extranjeros of June 7, 1766, in AHN, estado 5042. The wish to bring to Spain ‘‘useful’’ Catholic foreigners was especially strong during the eighteenth century: Domínguez Ortiz, La sociedad española, vol. 1, 249–51. Contemporary writers echoed this interest: Uztariz, Theory and Practice, 37–40, and Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 123–33. 115. Opinion of the representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) of the council of state, as reproduced and adopted in the consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN, estado 5042, fols. 75–80. The original reads: ‘‘dos naciones enemigas, en virtud de dichas leyes, se convirtieron en una, guerrera y poderosa . . . acudían personas de toda la cristianidad según crónicas antiguas.’’ Present-day research partially affirms this image, insisting, for example, on the role of foreigners in both the reconquista and the resettlement of Castile. 116. This was the opinion of the council of state in a draft of a letter it wrote to the Conde de Floridablanca in July 1791 in AHN, estado 5042. The confusion apparently

Notes to Pages 88–90

237

continued into the 1800s: see, e.g., the letter of Bartolomé Muñoz, dated July 28, 1807, in AVM, secretaría 2–166–64. 117. A copy of the 1791 instructions is inserted in AGI, consulados 53. The 1791 instruction was also reproduced in the Novísima Recopilación, laws 8 and 9, title 11, book 6. The implementation of the 1791 instruction was studied by Salas Ausens, ‘‘Les Français,’’ and Ozanam, ‘‘Le recensement.’’ 118. Cédula of July 20, 1791, in AHN, estado 5042. The oath was as follows: ‘‘to observe the Catholic religion and to be loyal to it and to the king, wishing to become his vassals and subjecting themselves to the laws and practices of these kingdoms.’’ The original reads: ‘‘observar la religión católica y guardar fidelidad a ella y al rey Nuestro Señor y querer ser su vasallo, sujetándose a las leyes y prácticas de estos reinos.’’ 119. Letter of Conde de Floridablanca to Manuel Ximénez Bretón, dated July 12, 1971, in AHN, estado 5042. The original reads: ‘‘renunciándose a todo fuero de extranjería y a toda relación, unión y dependencia del país en que hayan nacido y prometiendo no usar de la protección de él, ni de sus embajadores, ministros o cónsules.’’ 120. ‘‘Instrucción que debe servir de regla para distinguir los extranjeros transeuntes y domiciliados . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042. The original reads: ‘‘se deben entender y reputar en la clase de vasallos españoles, separados de su originario fuero y pabellón.’’ 121. ‘‘Puntos contenidos en la real cédula . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042. The oath of transitory foreigners included ‘‘respecto, sumisión y obediencia al soberano y leyes del país.’’ 122. Salas Ausens, ‘‘Les Français,’’ 169, and Villar García, ‘‘Un siglo,’’ 922–23. 123. The 1791 instruction clearly stated that foreigners who had declared themselves domiciled would have to be accepted by the municipalities where they lived: ‘‘Instrucción que debe servir de regla . . .’’ in AHN, estado 5042. The same idea was expressed in Larruga y Boneta, ‘‘Historia de la Real y General Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Minas y Dependencias de Extranjeros,’’ Madrid, 1799 (MSS Bell Library, University of Minnesota– Twin Cities Campus), vol. 3, book 2, chap. 1, 133V. 124. ‘‘Puntos contenidos en la real cédula, instrucción y declaraciones posteriores expedidas sobre la salida de extranjeros o su permanencia en España’’ in AHN, estado 5042. The original reads: ‘‘esta libertad es una gracia particular que ha querido conceder el rey por pura moderación y equidad, pues estando señalados en las leyes de España los extranjeros que deben reputarse por avecindados, pudiera su majestad haber mandado desde luego que se les sujetara a las cargas y obligaciones de tales . . . que son propios de su soberanía.’’ A similar idea is expressed in the letter of Bartolomé Muñoz, dated July 28, 1807, in AVM, secretaría 2–166–64. 125. Letter of the legal adviser to the captain general of Málaga dated July 16, 1765, and the answer of the junta in AHN, estado 629–2/23. 126. ‘‘Family pacts’’ were celebrated in 1733, 1743, and 1762 between the kings of France and Spain. A summary of their contents is included in Díaz Plaza, La historia de España, 174–75, 189–91, and 228–34. The third pact (1762), which lasted until 1793, included direct reference to the status of individual vassals. It was studied in Pont de Nemours, Le pacte de famille; Palacio Atard, El tercer pacto; Ozanam, ‘‘Les origines’’; and Hernández Franco, ‘‘Del tercer.’’ The pact was invoked by litigants, e.g., by Nicolás

238

Notes to Pages 90–94

Campe, a Sicilian, in AN/Q, FE 34 vol. 94 no. 3643, 102–3. In 1782, Joseph de Copons attested that his family immigrated to France because of the family pacts, but that despite this immigration it continued to be Spanish: the cámara of Castile on July 20, 1782, in AGS, GJ 873. 127. The activities of the French consul in Valencia were described in the letter of the local Junta de Comercio y Agricultura of April 3, 1773, in AHN, estado 629–3/66, 4–5. The response of the French community to these measures is briefly mentioned in Girard, Le commerce française, 571–78. A similar position was adopted by the English consul in 1714 according to Carrasco González, ‘‘La colonia,’’ 334–35. The consul specifically rejected the idea that individuals could be transformed into Spaniards without openly expressing a desire to permanently reside in Spain. 128. Letter of the French ambassador addressed to the marquis of Grimaldi, dated Madrid March 25, 1771, in the ‘‘Consulta General’’ of February 26, 1744, AHN, estado 5042, 18–22. The French ambassador was again active in 1807, according to the letter of Bartolomé Muñoz dated July 28, 1807, in AVM, secretaría 2–166–64. See also Grandmaison, L’ambassade Française, 48–54. Although the measure was general, the French ambassador believed that it specifically targeted the French community and was motivated by the fear of the spreading of revolutionary ideas. He complained that the Spanish authorities were inflexible, and he argued that it was the end of Spanish tolerance of foreigners. Rather than supporting integration, these measures aimed at expelling foreigners from Spain. 129. Consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN, estado 5042, 73–75. A similar opinion was expressed by the procurador general del reino, who in 1768 requested the king to grant special privileges to domiciled foreigners: Consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN, estado 5042, fols. 17–18 130. Alvarez, Instituciones de derecho real, 66–67 and 82–84. The original reads: ‘‘Por naturaleza entendemos una inclinación que reconocen entre sí los hombres que nacen o viven en una misma tierra y bajo un mismo gobierno. . . . Esta consideración tiene tanta fuerza que hace imitar perfectamente la naturaleza; pues así como ésta admite en el gremio de parientes a los extraños que se hacen adoptivos, así también aquella abriga en su seno a los extranjeros que legítimamente se domicilian.’’ 131. ‘‘Por el fiscal de su magestad en defensa de la respuesta que dio a las pretensiones introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros’’ in AGI, IG 2301, 4R. 132. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación, 132. 133. Novísima Recopilación, law 3, title 11, book 6.

Chapter 5. Naturaleza: From Castile to Spanish America 1. Recopilación de Indias, law 28, title 27, book 9 refers to ‘‘natives of our kingdoms of Castile, León, Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, Navarre, Majorca and Minorca.’’ Nevertheless, administrative and judicial records identify this group as including ‘‘natives of the kingdoms of Spain.’’ It is unclear whether previous to this declaration, natives of the crown of Aragon were permitted to immigrate and to trade in the New World: Ramos Pérez, ‘‘La aparente’’; Morález Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 22–24; and Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 328–29.

Notes to Pages 94–98

239

2. Haring, Trade and Navigation; Hernández Ruíz de Villa, Emigración a Indias; García-Baquero González, Cádiz y el Atlántico; García Fuentes, El comercio español; Bordejé Morencos, Tráfico de Indias; Ruiz Rivera and García Bernal, Cargadores a Indias; and Oliva Melgar, ‘‘Realidad.’’ 3. Ayala, Diccionario de Gobierno, vol. 6, 111–31; Konetzke, ‘‘Legislación’’; and Morales Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 25–95. 4. Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 62 and in his Foreign Immigrants, 1–2, 111, and 113–14; García-Mauriño Mundi, La pugna, 41; Campbell, ‘‘Foreigners,’’ 53. 5. Morales Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 33 and 53, and Parrón Salas, ‘‘El nacionalismo.’’ 6. Campbell, ‘‘Foreigners,’’ 158–63, and Gómez Pérez, ‘‘Los extranjeros,’’ 295–97. 7. Smith, Spanish Guild Merchant, 91–111; Real Díaz, ‘‘El consulado’’; Heredia Herrera, ‘‘Apuntes’’; and ‘‘Ordenanzas del consulado.’’ See also Recopilación de Indias, title 46, book 9. 8. The House of Trade was established in 1503. Originally, both the merchant guild and the House of Trade were located in Seville. In the beginning of the eighteenth century both institutions were moved to Cádiz, which, contrary to Seville, was an ocean and not a river port and was better able to service larger vessels. Despite these changes, most people continued to refer to the guild as ‘‘Seville’s merchant guild,’’ and so will I: Girard, La rivalité commerciale; Zumalacarregui, ‘‘Las ordenanzas’’; Gildas, ‘‘La casa’’; Crespo Solana, La casa de contratación; and Cerrera Pery, La casa de contratación. 9. Auke P. Jacobs, Los movimientos migratorios and in his ‘‘Legal.’’ See also Recopilación de Indias, book 9, titles 27 and 46. 10. Bernal, La financiación de la carrera; Lynch, Hispanic World, 243–49; and Domínguez Ortiz, Los extranjeros, 48–49. 11. Domínguez Ortiz, ‘‘La concesión,’’ 233. 12. Opinion of the fiscal on February 23, 1762, in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61. A similar claim was made by Seville’s merchant guild in 1592 according to the cédula of April 27, 1592, reproduced in BNE MSS 20.067–12, 4R. The position of the Castilian cortes with regard to foreign presence in Spanish America was described in Martínez Cardós, Las Indias y las cortes, 32–43 and in his ‘‘Asuntos.’’ 13. Cédulas of July 14, 1561, and February 21, 1562, in BNE, MSS 20.067–12 and cédula of July 24, 1566, in BNE, MSS 3045, 213–14. Molinari, ‘‘Naturalidad,’’ 705 mentions a 1505 ruling according to which foreigners who had lived in Seville, Cádiz, and Jeréz for fifteen or twenty years, were married, and had property would be considered natives of the kingdoms and allowed to trade in Spanish America. 14. Trueba, Sevilla, 93–95. 15. Cédula of October 2, 1608, in BNE, MSS 20.067–12, 1R–9R reproduces both the petitions of merchants and royal responses. See also ‘‘Extracto de las reales cédulas . . . para que los extranjeros no se embarcasen a Indias ni tratasen en ellas’’ in AGI, consulados 892A, carpeta 2/1, and Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 331–34. The legal changes introduced as a result of the guild’s activities are inserted in the Recopilación de Indias, laws 31–34, title 27, book 9. 16. Luque, ‘‘La avería.’’ 17. Cédula of July 7, 1592, reproduced in BNE, MSS 20.067–12, 4R–5R. The original reads: ‘‘Item que porque a causa de la naturaleza a que con el tiempo han adquirido

240

Notes to Pages 98–101

muchos extranjeros . . . tienen libertad de tratar y cargar . . . en que se entiende que ha resultado mucho daño y perjuicio . . . para remedio de lo suso dicho su majestad será servido de mandar con graves penas que de aquí en adelante solo puedan tratar en las Indias aquellos extranjeros que conforme a cédulas y ordenanzas de su majestad lo pueden hacer . . . y porque el número de los dichos extranjeros va creciendo en dicha contratación su majestad mandara que de aquí adelante no se les dé ni conceda la dicha libertad a los dichos extranjeros en general ni en particular de poder tratar en las Indias, ni se dé licencia a ninguno para poder pasar a ellas.’’ 18. Rodríguez Vicente, ‘‘Los cargadores,’’ and Bernal, La financiación de la carrera, 213–19. Posterior negotiations are studied by Oliva Melgar, ‘‘La negociación.’’ 19. Cédula of October 2, 1608, in BNE, MSS 20.067–12, 5V–9R, which describe what had happened after 1592. See also Recopilación de Indias, law 31, title 27, book 9. 20. These considerations were still present in the 1750s and 1760s according to an undated petition by the merchant guild of Seville and the printed manifest titled ‘‘noticias de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros,’’ both in AGI, consulados 892A. 21. Opinion of the representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) of the House of Trade in 1635, cited in Girard, Le commerce français, 575. 22. The merchant guild on March 10, 1764, in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 77, 27–28. The original reads: ‘‘cuan diverso es el derecho de la residencia en Indias, que en los reinos de España, porque allá la residencia de 10 años, el matrimonio y bienes raices hace que el extranjero se tenga por natural, introduciéndose la naturaleza por vía de prescripción si concurren los requisitos. Pero en Indias ni el matrimonio ni los bienes raices ni la habitación de 10 años ni la habitación de 20, hacen naturaleza, sino un mérito para que el rey en su supremo consejo la dispensa, despachando la carta, que es el único medio por donde se adquiere la naturaleza en Indias.’’ 23. ‘‘Draft and notes’’ on naturalization in Spanish America in BNE, MSS 20.067–12, 10R–11R. 24. The case of Joseph Morales Frabeva in AGI, Quito 4, 8–13. Similar arguments were also invoked in 1640 concerning the status of Portuguese resident in Spanish America: Consulta of December 27, 1640, in AGI, IG 761. 25. The original reads: ‘‘con que parece se desmiente el cariño de la patria, se afianza la perpetuidad y domicilio en aquellas provincias y cesan muchos de los recelos e inconvenientes que suele amenazar su vaga habitación.’’ 26. Ayala, Diccionario, vol. 6, 126; Gómez Pérez, ‘‘Los extranjeros,’’ 290–92; and AN/Q, gobierno 270, expediente 19.11.1779. See also Tau Anzoátegui, ‘‘Una defensa.’’ 27. AN/Q, gobierno 21, expediente 19.11.1763. The original reads: ‘‘porque me hizo constar ser irlandés católico y porque en sus costumbres y procederes no hallé cosa en contrario, ni he tenido la menor experiencia y no ignorando los privilegios que gozen los de esta nación y que profesan la religión católica en los dominios de nuestro soberano en Europa,’’ and ‘‘una vez logrado el hallarme distante del riesgo que huí y he conseguido el seguro de la tranquilidad en mi cristiana profesión, gozando de este beneficio el espacio de diez años a que moro entre españoles y sus tierras, pretendo y protesto jurar domicilio y vecindad en el lugar que más cómodo me fuese de los de esta provincia de Quito . . . se sirva de admitirme al gremio de la nación española y conferirme venía de que pueda

Notes to Pages 101–04

241

avecindarme en cualquier lugar que jurase domicilio sin más contradicciones ni estorbos con pretexto de ser extranjero, pues yo no debo denominarme por tal.’’ 28. His petition of October 13, 1775, in AN/Q, FE 34, vol. 94, no. 3643, 102–3. 29. Petitions of Gerardo Antonio Pose of April, 18, 1805, in AGN/BA, 9–30–7–7, and Antonio de Quiros in Molinari, Documentos para la historia, vol. 12, 209–10. 30. Both examples are mentioned by García Fuentes, El comercio español, 53–54. 31. The case of Joseph Valois, debated in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 77, 28–29. The original reads: ‘‘Este disimulo es limitado, concedido para aquellos que después de 20 años arraigaron su hacienda en bienes muebles y fundaron con un matrimonio casa y familia. Esta especie de extranjero es de otra calidad que la de los extranjeros no arraigados sino sueltos.’’ 32. Cédula of October 17, 1743, in AGI, consulados, libro 445, 164–67. The original reads: ‘‘este requisito lo pidiese la ley más para excluir de la naturaleza al extranjero casado con natural de otros reinos y no de estos, como motivo que persuade el ánimo transeunte que para negar este goce al perfecto estado de celibato, podía dispensarse respecto de que con la edad de este interesado y demás actos externos, se manifiesta su constante ánimo de permanecer en España.’’ 33. AGI, consulados, libro 445, 176–78. The original reads: ‘‘con que ha acreditado su ánimo de permanecer en estos dominios explicado antes por haber vivido más de 33 años con casa poblada y estar recibido por vecino en el ayuntamiento de la mencionada ciudad de Cádiz desde el 1739 . . . por noticias extrajudiciales [se sabe] de que el pretendiente no era de los extranjeros transeuntes, sino es de los domiciliados . . . y de quien tenía bastantes fundamentos para persuadirse a que no volvería a su orígen.’’ 34. BPR, II 2755, no. 6, 38R–39V. 35. His petition in AGI, contratación 51B. The original reads: ‘‘estando como está connaturalizado y con el efecto y servicios que ha hecho pues no lo excede ninguno de los naturales en sus buenos deseos y es la disposición de las ordenanzas pues por ellos se conoce el ánimo de permanecer, que es la razón que hubo para la prohibición.’’ 36. Cédula of November 5, 1790, in AGI, IG 1536. The original reads: ‘‘obstuviste desde el principio de asistir a las juntas nacionales de los napolitanos y contribuir a sus gastos, sin permitir se os incluye en la matrícula de ellos y que os haveis portado siempre como verdadero español en vuestro giro, negociaciones y demás actos.’’ 37. AGI, consulados, libro 445, 164–65. 38. Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 65–66. 39. Consulta of February 25, 1644, in AGI, IG 764; letter of the guild to the king, dated March 15, 1645, attached to the consulta above mentioned; and royal decree of April 22, 1645, inserted in the proceedings initiated by Pedro Colarte in AGI, contratación 50B, 25–30. Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 333–34, mentions the willingness of the merchant guild to pay compensation to these foreigners whose naturalization would be revoked. See also Domínguez Ortiz, ‘‘La Concesión,’’ 234–35. 40. Cédula of July 28, 1634, in AGI, IG 1536. 41. The decree that eventually revoked the letters indeed caused problems in Seville, as witnessed, for example, by the petitions of Domingo Rodríguez and the brothers Gaspar and Antonio Reales Passano whose letters were revoked: AGI, IG 764. 42. These practices continued well into the eighteenth century: the case of Santiago

242

Notes to Pages 104–08

Garbey in BNE, MSS 19.512, 436–37. See also Domínguez Ortiz, ‘‘La Concesión,’’ 236–37. 43. Ayala, Diccionario, vol. 10, 8–10. See also Morales Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 205. 44. Escalona y Agüero, Arcae limensis, 158. 45. Cédula of February 10, 1795, in AGI, IG 821. Gracias al sacar were royal decrees that declared, for example, that a mestizo was white, or that allowed minors to act as though they were of age: Santos, El régimen de las ‘‘gracias al sacar.’’ 46. The fiscal of the audiencia of Lima on February 23, 1762, in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 63–64. The original reads: ‘‘y otros nacidos en reinos y provincias no sujetas al dominio y jurisdicción del rey, aunque naturalizados en España por responder a exigencias de las leyes de Castilla o por privilegios particulares de ellos para residir y habitar en España, para el efecto de tratar y contratar en Indias deben ser tenidos por extranjeros.’’ 47. Boissonnade, Histoire de la réunion. 48. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 66; cédulas dated January 21, 1788, and January 18, 1785, in AGI, IG 1536 and Morales Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 380–82. I will return to these issue in chapter 6. 49. Recopilación de Indias, law 27, title 27, book 9. See also Hevia Bolaños, Curia philipica, 266. 50. AGI, consulados, libros 445 and 446 and legajos 788 and 892A; AGI, IG 1538 and 2301; AGI, EC 1057A; and AGI, contratación 50B. See also consultas of the Council of the Indies of February 9, and November 9, 1742, in BPR, II 2755, nos. 23 and 24, 149V– 160V, and the dissertation of Juan Antonio Enrique, minister of the navy in San Sebastián, dated October 10, 1785, in BPR, II 12.868, no. 4, 39R–46V. Some of these documents were published by Muro Orejón, Cedularios americanos, vol. 3, 303–7 and 317–19. This conflict was studied by Gutiérrez de Rubalcava, Tratado histórico, 122–28; García Bernal, ‘‘Los españoles’’; Morales Alvarez, Los extranjeros, 119–246; and García-Mauriño Mundi, La pugna. 51. As early as 1624, Guillermo Bequer requested a declaration stating that he was allowed to participate in the Spanish American trade despite being the son of a foreigner. This declaration was necessary, he explained, because people believed the contrary: his petition of March 5, 1624, in AGI, contratación 50B. 52. A summary of the guilds’ arguments is included, for example, in ‘‘Respuesta que dan algunos hijos de Españoles antiguos a un papel que se ha divulgado con título de noticia . . . de las vejaciones y daños que los hijos de extranjeros naturales del reino ha hecho y causado el consulado’’ (undated and anonymous), in AGI, consulados 892A. 53. ‘‘Noticia de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros en grave dependencia que se subscitó en el año 1719 y se feneció en el de 1728’’ in AGI, consulados 892A, 4. The original reads: ‘‘porque ni el tiempo de la residencia ni el nacimiento dan naturaleza y solo la confiere el ánimo de permanecer continuado por el tiempo que prescriben las leyes del reino.’’ 54. The burden of proof was specifically mentioned in the ‘‘Respuesta que dan algunos hijos de españoles los antiguos a un papel de las vejaciones y daños que a los hijos de extranjeros naturales del reino han hecho y causado el consulado.’’ in AGI, consulados 892A, 14. This was also the regular practice in subsequent years.

Notes to Pages 108–09

243

55. The case of Feliz Linze, debated on December 15, 1727, in AGI, consulados, libro 446, 88, and the cases of Juan Francisco Agens, Francisco Derbao, and Andrian Pedro Barnes, of 1722 and 1723 in AGI, IG 1538. The term used in Spanish was ‘‘natural y originario de estos reinos y capaz para comerciar en Indias.’’ This was the practice until 1812: AGI, consulados 892A, and ‘‘Dictamen de Juan Antonio Enrique, ministro general de marina . . . que explica los requisitos que deben concurrir en los genizaros para obtener los privilegios de naturalización y que con sus embarcaciones y bandera española pueden comerciar en Europa y América,’’ dated in San Sebastián on October 10, 1785, in BPR, II 12.868, no. 4, 39R–46V. 56. His petition discussed on April 6, 1772, in AGI, consulados 892A, carpeta 2/2. 57. Letter of Domingo Orrante to the audiencia of Lima, dated February 4, 1762, in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 60–64, on pp. 61–62 and the discussion that follow, especially on pp. 64 and 66–67. 58. Consulta of the Council of the Indies dated February 9, 1742, in BPR, II 2755, no. 23, 149V–153V; cédula of April 20, 1742, in AGI, consulados, libro 446, 335–40; and different documents in AGI, consulados 892A, mostly from the 1760s. This issue was also mentioned in the ‘‘Noticia de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros’’: AGI, consulados 892A, 30–61. 59. ‘‘Noticia de las diligencias . . . ,’’ AGI, consulados 892A, 7, 48, and 51. The original reads: ‘‘naturaleza nativa y propiamente originaria’’ and ‘‘era mejor la naturaleza de aquel que así él como los ascendientes de quienes venía, fueron e moraron allí en la tierra donde es el señor.’’ The question of whether the conversion of foreigners into natives was ever complete and whether it gave the community sufficient assurance that those who were once external can now be trusted had already been invoked by ius commune jurists: Riesenberg, ‘‘Civicism,’’ 240. 60. ‘‘Por el fiscal de su majestad en defensa de la respuesta que dio a las pretensiones introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros.’’ in AGI, IG 2301, 6V and 7R. The original reads: ‘‘Además, de que si se mira con reflexión esta materia, no es dudable hay razón de diferencia entre los naturales originarios y los hijos de extranjeros, pues aquellos siempre han estado en el dominio de su majestad, sirviéndole como también sus ascendientes, sin tener conecciones extrañas y asi su amor es más radical y perfecto y los hijos de extranjeros no pueden dejar de tener la afección al propio orígen que el derecho le considera aun más fuerte que el de la natividad. . . . Tienen en los dominios extranjeros los ascendientes y parientes a quienes miraran con el cariño que induce la propia sangre. . . . De esta razón de afección, resulta otra de política de cualquiera bien ordenada república, pues teniendo estos naturales el conocimiento con las potencias extranjeras por las conecciones de parentezco y amistad . . . podrán participar las noticias del estado del reino, sus disposiciones, progresos y resoluciones, lo cual debe prohibirse como tal perjudicial al bien público.’’ 61. Undated answer of the ‘‘sons of foreigners,’’ in AGI, consulados 982A, 14–15. The original reads: ‘‘despues de su nacimiento, establecimiento y demás circunstancias que aseguran la permenencia y sin haber conocido otro soberano ni tributándole, ni otra patria, domicilio, vecindad o habitacion . . . por hallarse calificados con los requisitos tocados de nacimiento, establecimiento y demás y sin experiencia de alguno que se haya revocado o vuelto a los dominios de sus mayores y ascendientes.’’

244

Notes to Pages 110–12

62. Consulta of November 9, 1742, in BPR, II 2755, no. 24, 153V–160V, 157V. The original reads: ‘‘nadie podrá probar ser descendiente de los compañeros de Tuval que de resulta de la confusión de las lenguas vinieron a poblar a España, habiendo sido ésta tan inundada de inumerables naciones que por gran timbre el más lingudo suele alegar su orígen de la nación goda (mucho posterior a otras que dominaron la España) . . . hasta ahora, nadie ha imaginado ni pensado en formar un árbol genealógico declarando qué grados de antiguedad en el orígen se necesita para comerciar en Indias.’’ 63. His case, discussed in 1771 and 1772, in AGI, consulados, libro 445, 338–42. The original reads: ‘‘se le tenga y repute por español nacido y procreado en estos reinos.’’ 64. The argument that different immigration policies produced a different regime in Spain and Spanish America was included, for example, in ‘‘Noticia de los diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros,’’ undated pamphlet in AGI, consulados 892A, 1–2. 65. Recopilación de Indias, laws 12–4 and 16–24, title 27, book 9, and title 23, book 3. The effects of these measures were studied by Rodríguez Vicente, ‘‘Los extranjeros’’; Ortíz de la Tabla y Ducasse, ‘‘Extranjeros’’; Moreno, ‘‘Los extranjeros’’; and Herzog, ‘‘Stranger.’’ The extraordinary nature of these grants and their revocability were mentioned in Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 336. The relation between these grants and naturalization was explored in Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 62–63 and in his Foreign Immigrants, 98. 66. Lima’s merchant guild on December 16, 1761, in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 1–5, on pp. 3–4. 67. Cédula of October 14, 1676, in AGI, IG 1536. 68. Cédula of September 15, 1784, in AGN/BA 9–30–3–5. 69. Lima’s guild was studied by Moreyra y Paz Soldán, El tribunal del consulado de Lima, sus antecedentes and in El tribunal del consulado de Lima: Quaderno de juntas; Malca Olguín, ‘‘Gobierno’’ and in his ‘‘El tribunal’’; Rodríguez Vicente, El tribunal del consulado de Lima en la primera mitad; Melzer, Bastion of Commerce; and Smith, ‘‘Estudio histórico del consulado.’’ In pp. 139–44 and 155 Smith studies the guild’s involvement in the prosecution of foreigners during the eighteenth century. Mercantile activities in other parts of the Spanish America are described in: AGI, consulados 788; AGN/BA, 9–33–3–7; AGN/BA, 9–39–7–3; Town council meetings of February 6, July 1, November 24, 1730, and October 23, 1732, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 2, vol. 6, libros 11–13, 17–18, 241, 294, and 554–58; meetings of April 12, 1734, and June 9 and 17, 1738, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 2, vol. 7, libros 23–24, 51, 63–66, 281, 470, and 472–73; meetings of June 30, July 6 and 14, 1740, and May 24 and July 1, 1743, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 2, vol. 8, libros 14–25, 151–55, 420–21, and 427–28, and so forth. See also Nunn, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 61. 70. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 51–52; document of March 1, 1760, in AGI, consulados 892A; and the guild’s letter of March 1, 1759, in AGI, consulados 794. See also Campbell, ‘‘Foreigners,’’ 156. 71. Cédula of May 10, 1761, in AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122 (another copy of the same cédula is inserted in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 53–56), and decision of February 23, 1764, in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 77, 10–11.

Notes to Pages 112–14

245

In his memoirs, Viceroy Manuel de Amat y Juniet recognized the guild’s contribution to the expulsion campaigns: Rodríguez Casado and Pérez Embid, Manuel de Amat y Juniet, 225–26. Examples of lists elaborated by the guild are found in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61. See also the representation of the merchant guild of Cádiz, dated 1789 in AGI, consulados 62, 6 bis, and AGI, consulados 92, no. 3. 72. AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 148. 73. AG/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 66. The original reads: ‘‘Qué daño es el que hago yo al tribunal del consulado ni al comercio de esta ciudad y reino, cuando desde que vine de España la mayor parte del tiempo la he ocupado en asistir y ayudar a los principales mercaderes.’’ 74. Cédula of March 11, 1723, in AGI, consulados, libro 445. 75. Document dated October 13, 1775, in AN/Q, FE 34, vol. 94, no. 3643, 102–3; AN/ Q, gobierno 26, expediente 31.5.1777; and AN/Q, gobierno 29, expediente 31.10.1780. Campe himself used similar strategies. In 1795 he invoked the military fuero in order to avoid paying his own debts: AN/Q, gobierno 46, expediente 9.2.1795. 76. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 3. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid., 2 and 46–49. 79. Allegations of Carlos Magron in AN/Q, gobierno 42, expediente 22.10.1790. 80. Nunn, Foreign Immigrants, 110–13. 81. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 2, and AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuadernos 67. Although the Recopilación de Indias, law 10, title 27, book 9, ruled that artisans with ‘‘useful offices’’ could be allowed to remain in Spanish America, more important than the legal authorization was the fact that merchants and mercantile interests were not threatened by the presence of artisans. 82. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 35–36 and 43, respectively. 83. His petition, presented in Lima on January 8, 1762, in AGN/L, SG, varios 3, cuaderno 107, 1–2. The original reads: ‘‘Pues mi nacimiento fue en la villa de Cangas del reino de Galicia sujeta al rey católico de las Españas, y nacido de padres notoriamente calificados e ilustres por serlo del capitán de granaderos don Pedro Mariño y de doña María Barrieros y Figueroa, naturales de dicha villa . . . este testimonio denigrativo a mi persona y haciendo injuria a mis padres cerca a su naturaleza y nobleza que es de la primera jerarquía en el reino de Galicia y que mis padres y abuelos han servido a su majestad.’’ 84. AGN/L, SG, varios 3, cuaderno 107, and AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 77. 85. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 1–2. The same allegation was also reproduced in AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122. The original reads: ‘‘no se necesita para saber que es francés más ejecutoria que la firma que pone en el escrito de dicha hoja . . . porque es letra tan extranjera, como es su habla, de modo que en habla y letra tiene dos irrefragables testigos de su extranjería.’’ 86. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 76, 14–16, on p. 14. The original reads: ‘‘es notoria su extranjería en primer lugar . . . no porque no habla el castellano, sino porque no lo habla seguido, tropieza en las palabras sin que esto venga de defecto en las articulaciones y le falta aquella extensión de términos que es propia de quien los ha

246

Notes to Pages 114–16

adquirido después de la edad mayor.’’ Similar claims were made against Francisco Vasalo in the same cuaderno, 38–41 on p. 42. Another example is the case of Juan Bautista Placert, narrated in AGI, Quito 126, 224–25. Juan was suspected of foreignness because of his surname. But following legal procedures, he was declared native. In 1722, Andrian Pedro Barnes was classified as a foreigner because of his surname. It was later made clear that he was the son of foreigners born in Spain and thus, a ‘‘true Spaniard’’: his case, discussed on August 1722, in AGI, IG 1538. The case of Guillermo Béquer was similar: decision of March 5, 1624, in AGI, contratación 50B. 87. The problems inherent in using cultural traits as proofs for membership was openly discussed in the allegations of the merchant guild of January 21, 1762: AGN/L, SG, varios 3, cuaderno 107. See also AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 51, and AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122, especially the opinion of the fiscal dated December 10, 1761. This was also the conclusion of the Cádiz merchant guild according to ‘‘Acuerdo del comercio de Cádiz,’’ August 21, 1721, in AGI, consulados 892A, 10. 88. AGN/L, SG, varios 3, cuaderno 107. 89. Town council meetings of January 3, and June 27, 1795, and meeting of January 12, 1796, in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, vol. 10, libros 49– 54, 465 and 515 and vol. 11, libros 54–57, 16, respectively. 90. Letter of the interim viceroy of Peru to the king, dated August 11, 1681, in AGI, Lima 81, cuaderno 4, no. 20. The original reads: ‘‘la averiguación de esta materia es muy dificultosa, pues en las Indias pocos o ningunos solicitan mantenerse en ellas confesando ser franceses, ingleses, holandeses ni de otra nación, sino la de castellanos, andaluces, navarros y vizcaínos, usando la cautela de mudarse el nombre por si llegase el caso de la pesquisa de averiguarles la patria.’’ The complaint of Lima’s merchant guild on December 16, 1761 was similar, according to the information it supplied the viceroy in AGN/L, RTC, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122. An additional copy of this information is inserted in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 65, 10–20. 91. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 77, 1–9. The original reads: ‘‘porque yo soy español, siendo nativo de la ciudad de Valencia.’’ 92. Other authorities, under different circumstances, were nevertheless willing to accept licences of passage as proofs. For example, in 1678 Buenos Aires, the city council refused to proceed against several ‘‘Greek merchants’’ because the licences they carried certified that they were Spaniards: Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, vol. 15, libro 10, 216–17. 93. ‘‘Public fame’’ and ‘‘public knowledge’’ were categories of proof: Lévy, La hiérarchie des preuves; Ghisalberti, ‘‘La teoria’’; and Herzog, La administración, 255–78. 94. AGN/BA, 9–39–7–3. 95. The case of Joseph Labordiva in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuadernos 61, 3 and 77, and cuaderno 65, 15. 96. Carta ejecutoria of March 20, 1723, in AGI, consulados, libro 446, and AGI, consulados, libro 445, unattached document. 97. AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 76, 32–36. The original reads: ‘‘lo que se trata en este proceso es distinguir el extranjero del natural, lo que no puede hacerse sin prueba y no porque el tribunal cometa algún error de lista en que se incluyen muchos que no son extranjeros se puede resolver sobre sola su consulta.’’

Notes to Pages 119–23

247

Chapter 6. The Other 1. García Cárcel, ‘‘Las fronteras.’’ 2. Portillo Valdés, ‘‘Los límites’’ and in La nazione cattolica, 128, and Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘Católicos,’’ 103–27. 3. Koenigsberger, ‘‘National’’ and in ‘‘Spain,’’ 144–72; Payne, Spanish Catholicism, 3–70; Continisio and Mozzarelli, Repubblica e virtú; and Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘El problema.’’ 4. Fernández Albaladejo, ‘‘Rey.’’ 5. Recent studies indicate that the traditional reading of late medieval developments was greatly influenced by early modern and modern perceptions. The reconquest of Spain, we are now told, involved many foreigners and was not necessarily an exclusively Spanish affair: Ruano Eloy, ‘‘La participación.’’ Many of its heros, such as the legendary El Cid, frequently crossed religious boundaries and alternatively fought on Christian and Muslim side: Fletcher, Quest for el Cid. Among settlers of territories liberated from Muslim control were many non-Christians: Clemente Ramos, La sociedad. These issues are also treated in Linehan, ‘‘Religion.’’ 6. Mariana, Del rey, 570–71. The original reads: ‘‘Es pues la religión un vínculo de la sociedad humana, y por ella quedan sancionadas y santificadas las alianzas, los contratos y hasta la misma sociedad que constituyen.’’ 7. Armas Asin, ‘‘Herejes.’’ 8. ‘‘Indice de los dos tomos de comercio de extranjeros en España,’’ in AHN, estado 647/16, capítulo 33, and the rejection of Protestants in 1803 Buenos Aires, as expressed in AGN/BA 9–35–3–6. See also Castelnau, ‘‘Les étrangers,’’ 143–62, and Alberti and Chapman, ‘‘English.’’ 9. ‘‘Noticias de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros en grave dependencia que se subscitó en el año 1719 y se feneció en el de 1728,’’ in AGI, consulados 892A, 6. The same argument was repeated in 1785 when it was clearly stated that nativeness could not be granted to sons of Moors, atheists, or gentiles: ‘‘Dictámen de Juan Antonio Enrique’’ dated San Sebastián October 10, 1785, in BPR, II 12.866, no. 4, 39R–46V, on fols. 41V–42R. 10. Siete Partidas, law 2, title 24, partida 4. 11. Opinion of the fiscales in the consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN, estado 5042, 106–11. 12. The cámara of Castile on July 24, 1782, in AGS, GJ 873. 13. Letter of November 28, 1803, in AGN/BA 9–35–3–6. The original reads: ‘‘se reconcilió con la iglesia para vivir entre nosotros . . . y que si ahora vuelve a su tierra se concidera aborrecido.’’ 14. Novísima Recopilación, law 2, title 11, book 6; cédulas of April 16, 1701, and July 6, 1701, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.9–15 and C.9–46; and cédula of March 18, 1734, quoted by Joseph Valloise in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 61, 58; and the cases of Arturo Francisco Poner and Juan Flores mentioned in AGN/L, SG, varios 4, cuaderno 122. 15. Cámara of Castile on February 14, 1761, in AGS, GJ 873. Similar arguments were considered by the Council of Castile on March 2, 1762, according to the ‘‘Real decreto . . .

248

Notes to Pages 123–26

privilegios que gozen en España los naturales irlandeses,’’ dated May 4, 1792, in AGI, consulados 53. 16. AN/Q, gobierno 21, expediente 19.11.1763. The original reads: ‘‘una vez he logrado el hallarme distante del riesgo de que huí, y he conseguido el seguro de la tranqulidad en mi cristiana profesión, gozando de este beneficio el espacio de 10 años a que moro entre españoles y sus tierras, prentendo y protesto jurar domicilio y vecindad en el lugar que más cómodo me fuese de este provincia’’ and ‘‘a más de lo que decí lleva la religión y el derecho natural y el amparo y protección que de más de católico de un sujeto, que desde sus tiernos años huyendo de que lo infestasen las diversas sectas de herejía, ha que se hallaba expuesto en un reino y nación protestante.’’ 17. The cases of Juan Valois, Diego Poner, and Arturo Alejandro, who defended their right to remain in Peru in 1761: AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuadernos 64 and 77, and AGN/L, SG, varios 4. 18. The opinion of the fiscal of Quito, dated March 1, 1763, in AN/Q, gobierno 21, expediente 19.11.1763. The same position was also adopted by Antunes y Acevedo, Memorias históricas, 293–95. 19. This became the common practice: AGI, consulados, libro 445, 244–46 and 262– 65. 20. The Spanish version identified the Chueta as ‘‘de estirpe hebraica.’’ Eighteenthcentury Chuetas are studied in Paz, ‘‘Reclamaciones’’; Moore, Those of the Street, 153– 54; Cortés Cortés, Historia de los judíos mallorquines, vol. 2, 333–47; Selke, Conversos of Majorca; Isaac, Els jueus de Majorca, 58–59; González Esquerdo, ‘‘Orígines’’; and Poqueres i Gené, Lourde alliance, 244–51. Their petition dated February 12, 1773, as well as the proceedings that followed it, are found in AGS, GJ 1021. Many of these documents were published by Pérez Martínez, Revindicación de los judíos mallorquines. Their contents are also summarized in Riera, Carlos III y los Chuetas mallorquines. 21. Petition of the Chuetas of February 12, 1773, in AGS, GJ 1021. The original reads: ‘‘todos los hijos de Adán descienden de judíos o gentiles’’ and ‘‘Cuál era la causa para la exclusión . . . que si por a caso era el que viniesen los suplicantes de un orígen que tal vez es común a toda la nación y sin duda a la mayor parte.’’ 22. The report of the audiencia dated May 4, 1774, in AGS, GJ 1021. 23. The original reads: ‘‘denigran en general a la nación española, con uno de los mayores demuestros que conocían las leyes, afirmando en su memorial que el orígen de que ellos venían era tal vez común a toda la nación y sin duda a la mayor parte? Qué se podía prometer de los que tenían la loca osadía de suplicar a su rey que los sacase de su bajesa y los enlasase a todos los honores reputándole precisado a ello, cuando ni los vasallos del más alto carácter hablan en este tono a su soberano?’’ 24. The original reads: ‘‘humillados . . . los individuos de la calle aspirarían siempre a ser conservados en la patria en que nacieron, por medio de una conducta justificada, porque a tales gentes solo les contenía el temor de perder sus intereses y conveniencias y no el amor al príncipe que les defendía ni al estado con cuya substancia vivían, ni tenían por honor otro objeto que su interés.’’ 25. Opinion of July 2, 1774, in AGS, GJ 1021. Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes (1723– 1803) was a well-known figure in Spanish enlightened circles and was personally respon-

Notes to Pages 126–29

249

sible for many eighteenth-century reforms: Rodríguez Díaz, Reforma e ilustración; Llombart, Campomanes; and Vallejo García-Hevia, Campomanes, 143–52. 26. Opinion of March 1, 1775, in AGS, GJ 1021. 27. Consulta of November 15, 1778, in AGS, GJ 1021. 28. The original reads: ‘‘encender un violento fuego de emulación y odio inexinguible porque en la aprehensión de la gente popular se interpreta como una mancha de honor.’’ 29. Opinion of October 1, 1782, in AGS, GJ 1021. The status of Minorca during that period is described in Piña Homs, La reincorporación de Menorca and the cédula of March 11, 1799, in AN/Q, gobierno 51, expediente 21.10.1799. 30. The discrimination of converso in late medieval and early modern Spain was the subject of innumerable studies. For my purpose, I found the following most useful: Sicroff, Les controverses des status de ‘‘pureté de sang’’; Domínguez Ortiz, Los judeoconversos; Riandiere la Roche, ‘‘Du Discours’’; Contreras, ‘‘Limpieza’’; Molas Ribalta, ‘‘El exclusivismo’’; Gutiérrez Nieto, ‘‘El reformismo’’; Kamen, ‘‘El ámbito’’ and in his ‘‘Limpieza’’; Cuart Moner, Colegiales mayores y limpieza de sangre; Hernández Franco, Cultura y limpieza de sangre, 11–21 and 175–78; and Netanyahu, Origins of the Inquisition, 351–661 and 1003–4. 31. Dedieu, ‘‘Hérésie.’’ 32. These orders were mentioned in a cédula of November 11, 1692, in ACV, SACed/Prag. C.8–66. The literature on anti-Gypsies legislation in Spain is abundant. Some of the most important titles are: Sánchez Ortega, Documentación sobre la situación and Los gitanos españoles; Leblon, ‘‘Les gitans dans la péninsule,’’ in Les gitans d’Espagne, and in ‘‘Les gitans: Une société fermée?’’; and Peñafiel Ramón, ‘‘Gitanos.’’ Anti-Gypsies perceptions were also mentioned by Herrero García, Ideas de los españoles, 641–55, and García Martínez, ‘‘Otra.’’ 33. Pragmática of June 12, 1695, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.8–88. 34. Pragmáticas of January 14, 1717; October 1, 1726; October 30, 1745; July 19, 1746; October 28, 1749; and February 28, 1784, citing that of September 19, 1783, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.10–88; C.10–139; C.12–8; C.12–18; and C.12–53, and in AGS, GJ 1004, respectively. The contents of many of these pragmáticas are enumerated in the Novísima Recopilación, title 16, book 12. AGS, GJ 1005 and 1006 include additional information about the prosecution of Gypsies. See also Alvarez Valdés y Valdés, La extranjería, 491–96. 35. According to the legislation, a Gypsy family could include three generations, as long as the younger ones were unmarried. 36. Recopilación de Indias, law 20, title 26, book 9 and law 5, title 4, book 7. Law 5 states that Gypsies could easily trick the Indians because of their natural simplicity, and that because of the great distances in Spanish America, they would be virtually uncontrollable. The original reads: ‘‘entre los indios a los cuales engañan facilmente por su natural simplicidad . . . y conviene que, en las Indias, por las grandes distancias que hay de unos pueblos a otros y teniendo mejor ocasión de encubrir y disimular sus hurtos, apliquemos el medio más eficaz para librarlas de tan perniciosa comunicación y gente mal inclinada.’’ 37. Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 300. 38. These considerations were still present in the eighteenth century: Gómez Alfaro, ‘‘La polémica.’’

250

Notes to Pages 129–33

39. Petition of the cortes of Castile in 1619, reproduced in the cédula of November 11, 1692, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.8–66. 40. Cédula of November 11, 1692, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.8–66. Gómez Alfaro, La gran redada, 13, also reproduces a 1677 opinion according to which there were once ‘‘legitimate Gypsies’’ in Spain, but none of them had survived to the present. 41. Sancho de Moncada (1619), as cited by Borrow, Zincali, 98–106. Other contemporary opinions are cited by Leblon, Les gitans d’Espagne, 226–27 and 229–31. 42. Chapter 1 of the pragmática of September 19, 1783, cited in the pragmática of February 28, 1784, in AGS, GJ 1004. The original reads: ‘‘declaro que los que llaman y se dicen gitanos no lo son por orígen ni por naturaleza ni provienen de raíz infecta alguna.’’ 43. Pragmática of July 19, 1746, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.12–18. The original reads: ‘‘pues habiendo nacido tales [vasallos] y debiendo ser comprehendidos en todos los tributos y cargas reales y personales, no es justo parezcan otra cosa.’’ 44. Martínez Martínez, La minoría gitana, 47–48 and 54–62. 45. Some of these questions are treated in the reports of the audiencias of Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, and Granada dated 1783 and cited by Sánchez Ortega, Documentación sobre la situación, 188–218. 46. Petition of December 16, 1745, cited by the royal delegate and council of Jerez de la Frontera and inserted in the pragmática of July 19, 1746, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.12– 18. 47. Martínez Martínez, La minoría gitana, 119–21. 48. Petition of Baltazar Vargas, dated May 1797 in AVM, secretaría 2–348–62. 49. The original reads: ‘‘modelo del buen ciudadano y leal vasallo.’’ 50. This petition and many others were included in the discussions that preceded the issuing of the pragmática of July 19, 1746, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.12–18. These types of petitions were not new. They were already voiced as early as the 1590s according to ACV, PC-PA(F) 561–4. Apparently, Seville also reacted against the strict implementation of anti-Gypsy measures in 1749: Guichot, Historia de la ciudad de Sevilla, vol. 4, 378– 79. 51. A similar decision was included in a decree dated October 28, 1749, in ACV, SACed/Prag. C.12–53, that determined that anti-Gypsy measures should have never been applied to ‘‘good Gypsies.’’ On that occasion, ‘‘good Gypsies’’ were classified as those with a fixed domicile who were well behaved or Gypsies already holding royal decrees classifying them as Castilians. 52. The faith of the Gypsies was thus similar to that of other itinerant people: Geremek, Truands et misérables, 69–110, and Pérez Esteve, El problema de los vagos. 53. Sánchez Ortega, Los gitanos españoles, 159–60 and 163–65. 54. Undated petition by Manuel Blas Ortíz, cited in Sánchez Ortega, Documentación sobre la situación, 248–50. The original reads: [their petition to include them in the] ‘‘fueros, excepciones y privilegios de naturales de estos reinos’’ [and to recognize that] ‘‘el nombre que les había querido dar de gitanos había sido por el pretexto, no porque en la realidad lo fuesen, pues no eran extranjeros’’ and the 1718 decree that agreed that they were ‘‘originarios de nuestros reinos y no de nación de gitanos.’’ 55. Petition of Cayetano Diez Montoya and his wife in 1739, cited in Saborit Banderas, ‘‘Gitanos,’’ 310–12.

Notes to Pages 133–35

251

56. Vaux de Foletier, ‘‘La rafle,’’ 6–7. Similar considerations also guided the authorities of Seville in 1745–46 according to Pérez de Guzmán, Los gitanos, 75. 57. This expression was used, for example, in the pragmática of June 12, 1695, in ACV, SA-Ced/Prag. C.8–88. Gypsy ‘‘foreignness’’ was also mentioned by Vassberg, Village, 143–46. 58. Obliged to proceed despite their protest, the judges came up with five names. Two of them were elderly and sick, and the other three were classified as useful members of the local community: AGN/BA 9–19–2–10, and Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 3, vol. 5, libros 36–60, 70–71 and 424–25. 59. Martínez y Martínez, La minoría gitana, 102–4. The original reads: ‘‘con traje desaliñado, poca limpieza en el vestido, moreno color y dichas señales les daban de gitanos.’’ 60. Gómez Alfaro, La gran redada, 48 and 54–55; and Martínez y Martínez, La minoría gitana, 106–8 and 119–29. 61. This distinction is clear in the Siete Partidas, which dedicates different titles (titles 24 and 25, partida 4) to vassalage and nativeness. See also Fuero Viejo, book 1, title 3, law 1, and Celso, Las leyes, 243 (R and V) and 353 (R). 62. Siete Partidas, law 2, title 24, partida 4. 63. Maravall, ‘‘Del régimen,’’ 120–26, and Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, ‘‘Los criterios,’’ 1041–53, and ‘‘La obsesión.’’ 64. Lalinde Abadía, ‘‘L’inserimento,’’ 52–53. Early modern Spanish legislation and legal and political practice continued to refer to people as ‘‘vassals,’’ rather than as ‘‘subjects’’ of the king. 65. Naturalization letter of November 5, 1740, in AGI, IG 1536. The original reads: ‘‘nació en ella [Milán] . . . cuando estaba en mi legítimo dominio, siendo su padre . . . uno de mis más fieles vasallos y natural de ella. Luego que se apoderaron de aquel estado las armas de Alemania (1707) por no querer reconocer ni tener otro soberano que a mí, dejó su patria y adandonándola se vino a España, avecindado en Cádiz, trayendo su familia y al suplicante muy niño con él.’’ 66. Naturalization letter of March 31, 1708, in AVM, secretaría 2–345–26. The original reads: ‘‘a lo que ha padecido por fiel vasallo de Su Majestad habiendo salido desterrado de aquella ciudad por el principe Eugenio . . . sacrificando su persona, bienes y hacienda al furor de los enemigos.’’ 67. The case of Pedro de la Mesta (s/f) in AN/Q, gobierno 12, expediente 25.6.1731. The original reads: ‘‘con el ardor de fiel vasallo, porque en mi primera edad, servía vuestra real persona con toda la fidelidad necesaria, con las tropas, en los reinos de España, en las campañas de los años de 6, 7, y 8 de este siglo, en los sitios de Barcelona, Lérida, Cartagena de Levante y en otras funciones de guerra a que en el transcurso de dichas campañas se ofrecieron, arriesgando sangre y vida en defensa de vuestros derechos y de vuestras banderas reales.’’ 68. AN/Q, FE 34, vol. 94, no. 3643, 102–31, expediente 13.10.1775. An identical claim was made by Francisco Lafariña y Madrigal in 1720 according to the consulta of the cámara of Castile, dated December 11, 1720, in AGS, GJ 873. 69. Petition of Juan and Joseph Benavides, of April 6, 1740, in AGI, IG 1536. The original reads: ‘‘que se reputa por agregado a la corona de Aragón.’’

252

Notes to Page 135

70. Petition of Luis Melloni, cited by the cámara on August 27, 1777, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘le favorecía también y persuadía una especie de equidad y memoria antigua a que no se entendiera con los sardos tan rigorosamente como con otros extranjeros la disposición de la ley 14, título 3, libro 1 de la recopilación.’’ 71. ‘‘Súplica hecha a S.M. por los flamencos establecidos en Sevilla que se les reconociera tener los mismos derechos que los españoles’’ in AGI, EC 1057A, 428R–431R on fols. 428V–429R and discussed by the Council of the Indies in 1722 and 1723. An additional copy of the same súplica can be found in BNE MSS 18.649–62. The original reads: ‘‘Los flamencos han sido de algunos siglos a esta parte vasallos de esta corona, lograron siempre la primera estimación entre cualesquiera súbditos por el singular aprecio que los predecesores de Vuestra Majestad han hecho de su dominio. Queda al escrutinio de los anales los méritos que tuvieron para desfrenar la violencia de sus príncipes, pero no pueden omitir la representación que hacen de los muchos servicios que frequentaron en su país a la corona y de los poco inferiores que han repetido sus individuos en Castilla. En el feliz reinado de vuestra majestad se ha visto con más claridad su celo y su servicio, asi en las contribuciones que han ejecutado, como en el dictámen con que resolvieron abandonar su patria y sus intereses. . . . Tan conforme y tan genial ha sido su trato con los españoles siempre, que jamás han oído en este país el nombre de extranjeros y los españoles han vivido siempre en Flandres como naturales.’’ The same question was also studied in ‘‘Explicación de la última determinación del rey y superior consejo de las Indias en el pleito entre el comercio de España y los hijos de extranjeros nacidos en estos dominios’’ in AGI, consulados 892A, 1 and 7 and in the opinion of the representative of royal interests ( fiscal ) in the Council of the Indies dated March 6, 1723, in AGI, EC 1057A, pieza 5, 416R–7V. 72. Vietia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 329–30, and Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 4, chap. 19, point 37. 73. It was literally asserted ‘‘que la denominación solo que usa Su Magestad de ser señor de aquel reino [Sardinia] no es suficiente como se verifica en otros varios y habría la misma razón a favor de los naturales de Milán y Flandres’’: letter of Manuel de Rodó to Manuel Figueroa, dated September 5, 1777, in AGS, GJ 873. Similar assertions were made in the cases of Francisco de la Fariña and Luis Melloni, debated on July 1721 and August 27, 1777, respectively, both in AGS, GJ 873 and in the literature, e.g., Alamos de Barrientos, Discurso político, 8–11. 74. ‘‘Noticia de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros en grave dependencia que se subscitó en el año 1719 y se feneció en él de 1728’’ in AGI, consulados 892A, 17. The original reads: ‘‘aun cuando los países de Flandes de que eran naturales sus padres se conservasen en el dominio de la corona de España y no estuviesen ocupados por las armas del señor emperador conforme a la ley que queda citada que previene cual hayan de estimarse naturales de España para el comercio de las Indias, no lo podrían ser los flamencos, como ni los napolitanos, milaneses ni demás, para lo que acordó la distinción legal que hay entre los estados, que se unen accesoriamente y los que aquae principaliter se agregan, pues los primeros perdiendo todos sus fueros, privilegios y leyes se hacen un cuerpo indiviso e indistinto con el resto de la monarquía en sus originarios dominios para gozar y padecer sin diferencias los mismos privilegios contribuciones y cargas como que es conexo y consiguiente lo uno a lo otro, y los que aquae

Notes to Pages 135–38

253

principaliter se agregan, como que se retiene las excepciones y privilegios que o tenían antes o se les concedieron al tiempo de admitirlos y que no están gravados con las pensiones y cargas que los naturales, no deben gozar de sus privilegios bien, si solo de los que se les hubieren concedido en fuerza de gracia o pacto al tiempo de su agregación, los que sirven de limitación para que queden excluidos los demás.’’ The same view was also expressed in ‘‘Por el fiscal de su majestad, en defensa de la respuesta que dió a las pretensions introducidas por los hijos nacidos en España de padres extranjeros.’’ AGI, IG 2301, 7R: ‘‘Y la razón de vasallos, aunque hoy están debajo de diverso dominio, no les da privilegios alguno, como no le han tenido y pretendido napolitanos, sicilianos y milaneses, porque estos se unieron a la corona de Castilla aquae principaliter y asi, conservaron sus fueros y privilegios y los mismo sucedió a los flamencos.’’ This point was also treated by the representative or royal interests on March 6, 1723, in AGI, EC 1057A, 416R–417V, and by Dedieu, ‘‘Los gobernadores,’’ 493–95. 75. These terms were mentioned in Puerto Santa María: the cases of Guillermo MacDonnel and Wencenlau Helm in AHN, estado 629–1/8. See also the draft of a consulta, based on the decree of November 24, 1763, and a cédula of June 28, 1764, in AHN, estado 5042, and AHN, estado 629–1/2. 76. These terms were used in Orán and San Sebastian according to AHN, estado 629– 1/4 and 1/6. 77. The case of Domingo French in AHN, estado 629–1/10. 78. Consulta of February 26, 1774, in AHN, estado 5042, 155. Pérez Collados, Una aproximación histórica, 67, and Castro, ‘‘la legislación,’’ 247–51, express similar opinions. 79. Pedro Vidarte and Juan Atey in 1761 in AGN/L, RTC, contencioso 252, cuaderno 66, and Francisco Aguirre on January 18, 1785, in AGI, IG 1536. According to Pedro: ‘‘aunque ésta se separó de las otras [merindades] cuando el santo rey don Fernando el católico desposeyó de Navarra la alta a Juan III de Navarra, pero con todos los reyes de España, nunca han querido perder su derecho a esta merindad, haciendo y ejecutando actos positivos de dominio para conservarla en él. . . . El rey es dueño de sus dominios y el mejor autor de los límites de su corona . . . [y por su decisión] los naturales de Navarra la Baja no son extranjeros sino españoles y sujetos a los dominios de España.’’ According to Francisco: ‘‘desde que se incorporó el reino de Navarra con los de Castilla, se han conservado en ellos todos los derechos de españoles a los naturales de la sexta merindad, llamada comúnamente Navarra la Baja que actualmente se halla bajo denominación de los reyes de Francia.’’ Other Lower Navarres accepted their classification as foreigners: e.g., Juan Pablo Carrense and Bernardo Cros, whose cases were discussed on January 21, 1788, and May 5, 1798, both in AGI, IG 1536. 80. Consulta of the cámara dated July 20, 1782, in AGS, GJ 873. The original reads: ‘‘virtualmente se contemplan iguales a los naturales de España o comprendidos bajo el dominio de esta corona, y aun por esto conservan la recepción en la orden militar de San Juan bajo el concepto de naturales o caballeros de la lengua de Aragón.’’ 81. Consulta of the cámara of Castile, June 16, 1770, in AGS, GJ 873. Minorca was ceded to Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and was formally incorporated to Spain only in the Treaty of Versalles (1783). It was briefly reoccupied by Britain in 1798: Piña Homs, La reincorporación de Menorca, 45–47. See also cédula of March 11, 1799, in AN/Q, gobierno 51, expediente 21.10.1799.

254

Notes to Pages 138–43

82. Assadourian, Beato, and Chiaramonte, Historia de Argentina, 159, 167–68, 248, and 282–86. 83. The case of Manuel Zipirana de Melo, debated in 1786 in Buenos Aires in AP/LP 7–3–115–6, esp. 40V–42V, 46V–47V, and 63R–66R. The originals read: ‘‘Nadie está obligado a sujetarse a más de lo que ha convenido y un ciudadano que se constituyó a vivir en sociedad en un estado libre e independiente, puede muy bien mudado ésta de naturaleza y sometiéndose a dominio extraño, abandonarla y ausentarse de ella . . . porque se rompieron y cortaron por este medio los lazos de la sociedad y la obligación que esto ha con ésta. En una palabra: quedó entera y naturalmente libre para elegir y someterse al imperio y dominación que le plazca’’ and ‘‘Naturaleza . . . es aquella obligación de amarse y quererse bien por algún justo motivo. Extranjería por el sentido opuesto es una precindencia de aquella calidad introducida por derecho de gentes, de que nació la distinción de dominios, establecimientos de reinos, fundación de pueblos y separación de provincias. De suerte que a no ser esta división, todos seríamos naturales de todas tierras y de ninguna extranjeros. La obligación de amarnos sería una misma en todos y se conociera la pertenencia de unos a los otros. El hombre, para cuyo servicio, utilidad y recreo formó Dios esta gran máquina del universo, tiene derecho natural de habitar y vivir en todas y cada cual de sus partes. Toda la tierra es su patria y de toda ella es originario y natural. Ahora pues, este derecho que puso raya a las naciones y sujeta a cada cual de ellas dentro de los términos de su pertenencia, aunque hijo primogénito de la razón, está sujeto a las contigencias del tiempo y puede padecer sus alteraciones, quiero decir, que la división o separación de dominios que inventaron hoy, puede enmendarse mañana por nueva determinación de sus autores y como esta circunstancia hace en el hombre la cualidad de nacional o extranjero, siempre que ellas se muden o se alteren los dominios se muda también la condición o estado civil del hombre hablando en términos jurídicos y el que ayer fue natural puede ser hoy extranjero o viceversa.’’ 84. The cases of Antonio Rivero de los Santos and Manuel Ferreiro de la Cruz in AGN/BA 9–35–3–3, expediente 105, and cédula of April 30, 1773, in AGI, IG 1536, respectively. AGI, IG 1536 contains many other examples.

Chapter 7. The Crisis of an Empire 1. Fontana i Lázaro, La crisis; Hermann, Les révolutions dans le monde ibérique; Artola, Los orígenes, vol. 1, 152–205; Suárez, El proceso; Rodríguez, El experimento de Cádiz; and Hamnett, La política española. 2. Quintana, cited in Suárez, El proceso, 73. The original reads: ‘‘Conservar el precioso depósito de libertad que les habían legado sus mayores,’’ ‘‘Mis padres me dejaron como herencia la esclavitud y la miseria, yo dejo a mis descendientes la libertad y la gloria’’ and ‘‘Porque no se edifica bien sobre la arena y sin leyes fundamentales y constitutivas que defiendan el bien ya hecho y contengan el mal que se intenta hacer.’’ 3. Sospedra, La constitución española; Varela Suánzes-Carpegna, La teoría del estado; and the collection of articles published in Anuario de historia del derecho español 65 (1995). 4. Stoetzer, Scholastic Roots; Halperín Donghi, Reforma y disolución; Annino, Castro Leiva, and Guerra, De los imperios; Rodríguez, Independence; Chiaramonte, Ciuda-

Notes to Pages 143–46

255

des, provincias, estados; and Guerra, Modernindad e indepenencia and in his most recent ‘‘Implosion.’’ 5. Liss, Mexico under Spain; Pagden, ‘‘Identity Formation’’; Lavallé, ‘‘Hacia’’; and Lynch, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 34–37. 6. Brading, Origins; Guerra, ‘‘La nation’’; and Harwich Vallenilla, ‘‘Construcción.’’ Criticism of this analysis can be found in Bertrand, ‘‘Comment,’’ 99–101. Creolism won prominence in the Anglo-speaking world in the 1980s after its inclusion in Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, where it was classified as an early example of a modern national identity. Lomnitz, ‘‘Nationalism,’’ includes a critique of his use and understanding of Creolism. 7. Lavallé, Las promesas, 25; Lafaye, Quetzalcoátl et Guadalupe, 20; Pietschmann, ‘‘Los principios,’’ 88; and Pastor, ‘‘Criollismo,’’ 265. 8. Lavallé, ‘‘Hispanité’’; Pagden, ‘‘Old Constitutions’’; and Alberro, Les espagnols, 11. Recently some historians have affirmed that until the independence Creoles perceived themselves as Spaniards: Brading, ‘‘Nationalism’’; Guerra, ‘‘Implosion’’ and in his ‘‘Identidad,’’ 221–24. 9. Minguet, ‘‘Nationalisme’’; Lavallé, ‘‘Conception’’ and in his Las promesas, 105– 27 and 129–41; Clément, ‘‘La connaissance’’; and Brading ‘‘Patriotism,’’ 30–33 and 39–40. 10. See note 1 and 3, above. 11. Guerra, ‘‘El soberano,’’ 41–44 and 47–48. 12. Liss, Mexico under Spain, 25–26. 13. Tibesar, ‘‘Alternative,’’ and Lavallé, Recherches sur l’apparition and in his Las promesas ambiguas. 14. Lavallé, ‘‘Hispanité,’’ 96–99. 15. Burkholder and Chandler, From Impotence. Current research indicates that, despite Creole vindications, Creoles did obtain many offices and in fact controlled most of the local church, government, and judicial institutions: Kicza, ‘‘Social’’; Brading, ‘‘Government,’’ 400–405; Pérez Herrero, ‘‘Beneficiaries’’; and Morelli, ‘‘Las reformas.’’ 16. ‘‘Representación hecha por los americanos a nuestro rey Carlos III lamentándose de que no se les mira y distingue como sus méritos piden solo por residir allí,’’ an anonymous pamphlet dated Madrid May 30, 1774, in BN/L, MSS C4321 and ‘‘Discurso del abad Don Ramón Dios . . . sobre la oposición que los escritores extranjeros fingen y exageran entre los españoles europeos y americanos,’’ undated pamphlet in BPR II 2851, no. 10, 270R–296R. Similar issues were raised in British North America: Breen, ‘‘Ideology,’’ 23 and 26–30. 17. ‘‘Representación hecha por los americanos a nuestro rey Carlos III lamentándose de que no se les mira y distingue como sus méritos piden solo por residir allí,’’ an anonymous pamphlet dated Madrid May 30, 1774, in BN/L, MSS C4321. The original reads: ‘‘los originarios privilegios de sangre con que pasaron a aquellos reinos sus abuelos’’ and ‘‘a fin de que asi formasen un solo cuerpo político, sin alguna diferencia en el goze de sus antiguos prerrogativas de Castilla.’’ See also Alonso de Solórzano y Velasco, ‘‘Discurso legal e información en derecho a favor de los nacidos en los reinos del Perú y conveniencias para que en él, sin el obice de haber nacido allí, pueden obtener plazas de oidor y demás que les están prohibidas,’’ (1652) in BPR MSS 2848, 27R–57V.

256

Notes to Pages 146–49

18. Manzano Manzano, La incorporación and in his ‘‘La adquisición’’; Konetzke, ‘‘La condición’’; and Pietschmann, ‘‘La resistencia.’’ 19. This rule was affirmed on many different instances. It was clear from the treatment of native Spaniards in Spanish America, but was also clearly stated in legislation, e.g., cédula of January 2, 1788, reproduced in Konetzke, Colección de documentos, vol. 3/1, 434–35. 20. Pagden, ‘‘Identity,’’ 60–65. 21. Pedro de Bolívar y de la Redonda, ‘‘Memorial, informe y discurso legal, histórico y político . . . en favor de los españoles que en ellas nacen, estudian y sirven’’ (Madrid, 1667), the Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, 3V, 25R, 32R-V, 45V, 53R and 56R. 22. Juan Antonio de Ahumada, ‘‘Representación político-legal a la majestad del señor don Felipe V en favor de los empleos políticos, de guerra y ecclesiásticos’’ (1725), reproduced in Documentos selectos el centro de estudios, 87–105. Another intervention by Ahumada, this time affirming the Spanishness of Creoles, is described in Baeza Martin, ‘‘La Condena,’’ 461. 23. Letter of November 28, 1796, reproduced in Blanco, Documentos para la historia de la vida pública, 267–75, on 269–70 and 272. Among the quotations are: ‘‘y cuando ya se saben [las leyes], impede a los magistrados aquella natural flojedad con que mira el hombre los intereses ajenos y de un país en que solo se halla transeunte y a que solo se condujo por el deseo de adquirir bienes suficientes para concluir su carrera en su propio país o en otra parte . . . manifestando su desaplicación o dificultad en ordenar las cosas y remediar los males, sin otro motivo que él de no tener necesidad de permanecer aquí y de que habiendo de dejar la América, importa poco su destrucción.’’ The king has to maintain the loyalty of ‘‘los naturales y vecinos españoles que por estar casados o tener sus bienes en ella, procuran vivir en paz y en la religión y subordinación en que nacieron y solo solicitan de V. M. los conserve con el honor de sus ascendientes.’’ A similar distinction, which divided the Franciscans of Mexico into ‘‘Spaniards,’’ ‘‘sons of the province’’ (persons who were born in Spain, yet were ordained in the New World), and ‘‘Creoles,’’ was examined by Morales, Ethnic and Social Background, 45–75. 24. Teresa de Mier, Memorias, 281, and in his Historia de la Revolución, 524–25 and 462. I would like to thank Gabriela Gómez Cárcamo for calling to my attention to these sources, which she analyzed in a seminar paper titled ‘‘Fray Servando de Mier: Meaning and Nuance,’’ presented to the Department of History of the University of Chicago in 1999. A similar affirmation was made with regard to the English in British North America: Wahrman, ‘‘The English,’’ 1256. 25. Gaceta de Buenos Aires, September 17, 1810, cited in Vogel, ‘‘New Citizens,’’ 111. 26. Galmorini, ‘‘La situación.’’ Although this situation continued in early 1811, as demonstrated by the town council records of March, April, and May 1811 in Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires, ser. 4, vol. 4, libros 65–67, 427–31, 433–35, 437, 445–54, 460–64, and 470, at a later date the distinction between natives and naturalized reemerged, and the council affirmed the exclusive right of those born in the city to be deputies in the congress. 27. Mariano Beristáin de Souza, cited in Brading, ‘‘Patriotism,’’ 32.

Notes to Pages 149–50

257

28. The political use of natural law in colonial and republican Spanish America was also analyzed by Chiaramonte, ‘‘Fundamentos.’’ 29. ‘‘Representación que hizo la ciudad de México al rey don Carlos III en 1771 sobre que los criollos deben ser preferidos a los europeos en la distribución de empleos y beneficios de estos reinos,’’ dated March 2, 1711, and reproduced in Hernández Dávalos, Colección de documentos para la historia, vol. 1, no. 195, pp. 427–55, quotation on pp. 429–30. The original reads: ‘‘Pues obran contra ellos las mismas razones, porque todas las gentes han defendido siempre el acomodo de los extraños. Lo son en lo natural, aunque no en lo civil en la America los europeos; y como no alcance la fuerza civil a la esfera de los efectos naturales, hemos de experimentar estos de los hijos de la antigua España, por más que civilmente se entiendan no extraños de la nueva. Entre los efectos naturales se cuenta con mucha razón el amor que tienen los hombres a aquel suelo, en que nacieron y el desafecto a todo otro, siendo estos dos motivos los más solidos principios, que persuaden la colocación del natural y resisten la del extraño.’’ ‘‘Representación que hizo la ciudad de México al rey don Carlos III en 1771 sobre que los criollos deben ser preferidos a los europeos en la distribución de empleos y beneficios de estos reinos,’’ dated March 2, 1711, and reproduced in Hernández Dávalos, Colección de documentos para la historia, vol. 1, no. 195, 427–55, quotation on p. 430. The original reads: ‘‘Estos por más que no se consideren civilmente extranjeros en Indias, los cierto es que no recibieron el ser en ellas: que tienen en la antigua España, y no en la nueva, sus casas, sus padres, sus hermanos y quanto es capaz de arrastrar la inclinación de un hombre; que cuando a esta distancia se destierran a servir un empleo, no muden de naturaleza, ni se hacen insensibles a los impulsos de la con que nacieron y por todo ello es fuerza, que desde estas regiones no pierdan de vista la atención a los suyos, y sobre consultar a socorrerlos (si ya no es a enriquecerlos) se contemplan pasajeros en la América, teniendo por objeto el volverse a la quietud de su patria, y casa acomodadas.’’ 30. Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán, ‘‘Carta a los españoles americanos,’’ (1792) reproduced in Sánchez, Fuentes documentales sobre la ideología, 41–59, quotation on pp. 44–46. 31. ‘‘Representación que hizo la ciudad de México al rey don Carlos III en 1771 sobre que los criollos deben ser preferidos a los europeos en la distribución de empleos y beneficios de estos reinos,’’ dated March 2, 1711, reproduced in Hernández Dávalos, Colección de documentos para la historia de la guerra, vol. 1, 427–55, quotation on p. 429. A copy of the same document is found in BN/L, MSS C4321. The originals read: ‘‘trae su antigüedad desde antes de la ley evangélica y el mismo dios la reconoció altamente impresa en los corazones de su pueblo’’ and ‘‘Es una máxima apoyada por las leyes de todos los reinos, adoptada por todas las naciones, dictada por sencillos principios, que forman la razón natural e impresa en los corazones y votos de los hombres. . . . Es un derecho, que si no podemos graduar de natural primario, es sin duda común de todas las gentes y por esto de sacratísima observancia.’’ 32. Brading, ‘‘Patriotism,’’ 22–23 and 29–30. 33. Guerra, ‘‘Identidad y soberanía,’’ 225. On February 11, 1812, an article published in the newspaper El Censor (Buenos Aires) and cited by Ternavasio, ‘‘Política,’’ chap. 1, n. 11, declared that ‘‘las provincias de la América española están declarads por ley iguales en

258

Notes to Pages 150–53

todo con las de España. En virtud de esto se niegan varias de ellas, a reconocer por soberano a un gobierno constituído en la península por las provincias españolas, y sin la anuencia de las americanas.’’ I would like to thank Marcela Ternavasio for allowing me to cite her work. 34. Torres, Memorial, 9. The original reads: ‘‘Tan españoles somos como los descendientes de Don Pelayo y tan acreedores, por esta razón, a las distincciones, privilegios y prerrogativas del resto de la nación.’’ 35. Guridi y Alcocer on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 318. The original reads: ‘‘Los americanos como hijos de los europeos, mamamos al nacer el amor a la península y desde la niñez nos llamamos y nos tenemos por hijos de ella. Suenan bien en nuestros oídos sus nombres y hasta los de sus villas y lugares y no solo somos españoles, sino que nos gloriamos de serlo.’’ 36. The decree of February 9, 1811, reproduced in Armellada, La causa indígena, 59, declared the rights of Spanish Americans to hold public offices in the court and anywhere else in the monarchy. 37. Annino, ‘‘Ciudadanía,’’ 68, and Carmagnani and Hernández Chávez, ‘‘La ciudadanía,’’ 374–76. 38. Rieu-Millan, Los diputados americanos, 246–50; Ramos, ‘‘Las cortes,’’ 437–53; Fisher, ‘‘Monarquismo’’; Guerra, Modernidad e independencia and in his ‘‘Identidades y soberanía’’; Estrada Icaza, La lucha; Chiaramonte, ‘‘Modificaciones’’ and in Ciudades, provincias, estados, 371–73; Annino, ‘‘Soberanías’’; Morelli, ‘‘Territorio’’ and in her ‘‘El espacio.’’ The way rivalries between Spanish American jurisdictions propelled both localism and Creolism is described in Liss, Atlantic Empires, 88–90, and Lafaye, Quetzalcoátl, 22–24. 39. The original reads: ‘‘La nación española es la reunión de todos los españoles de ambos hemisferios,’’ (art. 1) and ‘‘los españoles son: primero, todos los hombres libres nacidos y avecindados en los dominios de las Españas y los hijos de estos. Segundo: los extranjeros que hayan obtenido de las Cortes carta de naturaleza. Tercero: los que sin ella lleven diez años de vecindad, ganada segun la ley en cualquier pueblo de la monarquía. Cuarto: los libertos desde que adquieren la libertad en las Españas’’ (art. 5). 40. ‘‘Son ciudadanos aquellos españoles que por ambas líneas traen su orígen de los dominios españoles de ambos hemisferios y están avecindados en cualquier pueblo de los mismos dominios’’; ‘‘Es también ciudadano el extranjero que gozando ya de los derechos de español, obtuviere de las cortes carta espacial de ciudadanía’’; and ‘‘Son asi mismo ciudadanos los hijos legítimos de los extranjeros domiciliados en las Españas, que habiendo nacido en los dominios españoles, no hayan salido nunca fuera sin licencia del gobierno, y teniendo veinte y un años cumplidos, se hayan avecindado en un pueblo de los mismos dominios, ejerciendo en él alguna profesión, oficio o industria útil.’’ 41. ‘‘Para que el extranjero pueda obtener de las cortes esta carta, deberá estar casado con española, y haber traído o fijado en las Españas alguna invención o industria apreciable, o adquirido bienes raíces por los que pague una contribución directa o estableciendo en él comercio con un capital propio y considerable a juicio de las mismas cortes o hecho servicios señalados en bien y defensa de la nación.’’ 42. Citizenship could also be suspended for physical or moral incapacity, bankruptcy,

Notes to Pages 153–55

259

unemployment, employment in domestic service, criminal charges and, from 1830 onwards, illiteracy in the case of new citizens: ‘‘El ejercicio de los mismos derechos [de ciudadanía] se suspende, primero: en virtud de interdicción judicial por incapacidad física o moral. Segundo: por el estado de deudor quebrado, o de deudor a los caudales públicos. Tercero: por el estado de sirviente doméstico. Cuarto: por no tener empleo, oficio o modo de vivir conocido. Quinto; por hallarse procesado criminalmente. Sexto: desde el año 1830 deberán saber leer y escribir los que de nuevo entren en el ejercicio de los derechos de ciudadano.’’ 43. ‘‘La calidad de ciudadano español se pierde: primero: por adquirir naturaleza en país extranjero. Segundo: por admitir empleo de otro gobierno. Tercero: por sentencia en que se imponga penas aflictivas o infamantes si no se obtiene rehabilitación. Cuarto: por haber residido cinco años consecutivos fuera del territorio español sin comisión o licencia del gobierno.’’ 44. This continuity was also noted by historians, e.g., Castro, La revolución liberal, 71–73. 45. Gutiérrez de la Huerta and García Herrero on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 135–36; Uría on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 148; and Larrazábal on September 6, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 198–99. Argüelles answered this question arguing that Spanishness and citizenship were two different things and that each promised a different regime of rights. Explaining the consequences of this distinction, he nevertheless failed to address the issue of how would these categories be distinguished and why should they be distinguished: DDACC, vol. 8, 136–37. 46. Gutiérrez de la Huerta on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 140, and Fernández De Leyva on September 6, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 195. 47. Guridi y Alcocer on August 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 16. 48. Oliveros on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 146–47. The original reads: ‘‘los hombres no sólo reciben el ser por el nacimiento, sino muy principalmente por la educación. Siempre se conserva inclinación aun más decidida hacia aquel país en el que se han perfeccionado nuestras potencias y en los hábitos que duran por toda la vida influyen particularmente las ideas recibidas en la educación.’’ 49. Gutiérrez de la Huerta on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 135–36 and 138– 40. Somewhat similar was the intervention of Guridi y Alcocer in the same session. 50. Gutiérrez de la Huerta on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 139–40. The original reads: ‘‘la necesidad de arraigo, que han considerado siempre las leyes como el fundamento menos equívoco de presumir en el extranjero la intención de permanecer, la fidelidad y adhesión a los intereses nacionales.’’ 51. Feliú on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 187. The original reads: ‘‘Es de suponer que conservará [el extranjero] siempre por su país nativo una predilección que puede en ocasiones ser opuesta a los intereses de España y que se contrabalanceará por el arraigo o apego que es natural contraiga respecto al suelo español en que ha nacido su mujer.’’ 52. Terreros and García Herrero on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 100–101. 53. Aner on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 99. Argüelles, responding, argued that this rule was well known and was not abrogated by the constitution: 99–100.

260

Notes to Pages 155–56

54. Veladiez, Muñoz Torrero, Castillo, and Argüelles, on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 100. 55. Castillo on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 134, and Villafañe’s answer in the same session, 134–35. 56. King, ‘‘Colored’’; Ramos (Pérez), ‘‘Las Cortes’’; Armellada, La causa indígena; Pérez Guilhou, La opinión pública; Berruezo, La participación americana; Rieu-Millán, Los diputados americanos; Castillo Meléndez, Figallo Pérez, and Serrera Contreras, Las Cortes de Cádiz; Blanco Valdés, El problema americano; García Godoy, Las cortes de Cádiz y América; and Chust, La cuestión nacional. 57. Session of October 3, 1810, ASSCE, 8 and DDACC, vol. 1, 26–27. The relation between Spain and Spanish America was also discussed on January 9 and 11, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 316–30 and 346–72. This question was included in the consulta al país. The consulta al país was a round of consultation with royal councils, juntas, authorities, municipalities, tribunals, universities, ecclesiastics, and other individuals, concerning some of the most important issues facing Spaniards in the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was sent on June 1809 to some 150 entities. Of the 68 answers currently available, about 40 refer to question 8 concerning the (future) status of America. Most of these answers suggest that the inhabitants of the Americas were native Spaniards, citizens, and members of the same political community: Pérez Guilhou, La opinión pública, 47–58. 58. Morales Duárez on January 11, 1811, DDACC, vol. 1, 370, and Fernández de Leyva on January 16, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 432–34. The ‘‘Castilianness’’ of Spanish America was studied by Manzano Manzano, La incorporación and in his ‘‘La adquisición’’; Pietschmann, ‘‘La resistencia’’; Levene, Las Indias; and Pagden, Lords of All the World, 126–36. 59. Answer of Fernando Andrés Benito, relator de crímen in the royal court of Granada to the consulta al país, dated November 23, 1809, reproduced in Artola, Los orígenes de la España, vol. 2, 416–34, in 432. The original reads: ‘‘Su fidelidad, su entusiasmo, su religión, su confraternidad, su unión íntima con la metropoli son otros tantos títulos que los hacen acreedores a tan justa consideración. Son ciudadanos de una misma nación, llenan todos los deberes de vasallos, contribuyen eficazmente con sus bienes y personas a conservar la independencia.’’ 60. Quintana on January 11, 1811, DDACC, vol. 1, 361 and 363. The original reads: ‘‘nosotros hemos utilizado su suelo y ellos el nuestro. Hemos cambiado nuestros productos. Nos han contribuído y obedecido cuanto se les ha mandado. Tenemos allá y ellos aquí una larga serie de ascendencia y descendencia, idioma, interés y religión igual . . . señor: que son hermanos nuestros, españoles de 300 años.’’ 61. Argüelles literally said on January 23, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 66 that ‘‘la población de España europea no ofrece estos inconvenientes, porque toda ella es homogénea. No hay aquí rivalidades, esas diferencias de castas de donde dimana el espíritu funesto de partido.’’ Other delegates such as Guridi y Alcocer resented this implication and argued that Spain was just as diversified as Spanish America: his opinion on January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 90. 62. Sessions of October 3, 10, 11, and 14, 1810, in ASSCE, 8–19, quotation on p. 19.

Notes to Pages 156–57

261

The resolution voted upon on October 14, 1810, stated: ‘‘las cortes generales y extraordinarias confirman y sanccionan el inconcluso concepto de que los dominios españoles en ambos hemisferios forman una misma y sola monarquía, una misma y sola nación y una sola familia y que por lo mismo los naturales que sean originarios de dichos dominios europeos y ultramarinos, son iguales en derechos a los de esta península.’’ 63. This consideration was openly mentioned, e.g., by Argüelles on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 323. According to ‘‘El Observador,’’ a local paper covering the sessions, it produced highly theatrical scenes. In one of them, an American delegate (Mexia) kneeled and implored for his miserable compatriots. Answering him, a peninsular delegate (Muñoz Torrero) resented this theatrality and complained that Americans simply wanted to achieve a majority in the parliament: Castro y Rossi, Cortes de Cádiz, 178–79. 64. Guridi y Alcocer on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 318. The original reads: ‘‘los americanos como hijos de los europeos, mamamos al nacer el amor a la península y desde la niñez nos llamamos y nos tenemos por hijos de ella. Suenan bien en nuestros oídos sus nombres y hasta los de sus villas y lugares y no solo somos españoles, sino que nos gloriamos de serlo. . . . [Los americanos] se quejan, no de las leyes, no de la nación, no de los monarcas cuyo paternal amor han experimentado. Se quejan de su desgraciada situación, de que separados de la península en tan grande distancia se forman ideas erradas de todas las cosas, no se conoce a los sujetos de mérito y aun cuando son conocidos, quedan postergados por no estar cerca de la fuente.’’ According to Quintana (a peninsular delegate), ‘‘we give them [Spanish Americans] nothing which isn’t already theirs by recognizing that they are equal to us’’ (nada que no sea suyo les damos con igualarles en todo a nosotros): his intervention on January 1, 1811, DDACC, vol. 1, 363. 65. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chap. 1; Llaguno, La personalidad jurídica; and García Gallo, ‘‘La condición.’’ 66. Alamos de Barrientos, Discurso político, 14. 67. Mörner, ‘‘La política,’’ in La Corona española, and ‘‘Ethnicity’’; Lutz, Santiago de Guatemala; and Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chap. 26, point 44; chap. 30, points 18–57; and book 4, chap. 20. The permissibility of mixed marriages and the equal treatment of mestizos, as long as of legitimate birth, were guaranteed by a series of royal decrees, e.g., those dated October 19, 1514; March 19, 1525; February 27, 1549; June 1, 1549; and November 1, 1591, reproduced in Konetzke, Colección de documentos, vol. 1, 61–63, 77, 256, 259, and 617–19. 68. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chaps. 28–29; Bayle, El protector de indios; Borah, Justice by Insurance; and MacLeod, ‘‘La situación.’’ The hope that Indians would ‘‘grow’’ was expressed in Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chaps. 25– 26, and Mörner, ‘‘La difusión.’’ This hope was described in the Laws of Burgos (1512– 13). Article 4 of the amendment dated July 28, 1513, declared: ‘‘and whereas it may so happen that in the course of time, that with their indoctrination and association with Christians, the Indians will become so apt and ready to become Christians, and so civilized and educated, that they will be capable of governing themselves and leading the kind of life that the said Christians lead there, we declare and command and say that it is our will that those Indians who thus become competent to live by themselves and govern themselves, under the direction and control of our said judges . . . shall be allowed to live

262

Notes to Pages 157–59

by themselves and shall be obliged to serve [only] in those things in which our vassals in Spain are accustomed to serve, so that they may serve and pay the tribute which they [our vassals] are accustomed to pay to their princes.’’ In this quotation, I used the translation included in Gibson, Spanish Tradition, 81. 69. Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chap. 29, points 25–34. 70. Cédulas of December 19, 1696; March 26, 1697; November 27, 1703; February 21, 1725; and September 11, 1766, in Konetzke, Colección de documentos, vol. 3/1, 64– 69, 93–94, 186, and 333–34. See also Muro Orejón, Cedulario Americano, vol. 1, 602– 5. The struggle to reaffirm Indian eligibility to office was studied by Muro Orejón, ‘‘La igualdad,’’ 268–69 and 367–75, and Olaechea Cabayen, ‘‘Política’’ and in his ‘‘La ciudadanía.’’ A similar decision was reached by the Supreme Council of the Inquisition around the same time: Martínez, ‘‘Religion.’’ I would like to thank María Elena for allowing me to cite her paper. 71. Feliú on January 30, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 163–68. 72. Guridi y Alcocer on January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 92, and Castillo on August 21, 1811, DDACC, vol. 7, 461–62. 73. Castillo on August 21, 1811, DDACC, vol. 7, 461–62. The original reads: ‘‘nada encuentro nuevo en este decreto porque nuestros leyes de Indias los consideran iguales en todo con los españoles y les abren la puerta a los empleos y a los honores.’’ 74. Morales Duárez on January 11, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 370–72. 75. Pérez de Castro and Feliú, both in the session of January 30, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 159 and 161–62. According to the first, ‘‘me hace fuerza que los indios, generalmente hablando, ignoran el castellano . . . y si eso no pudiera ser un óbice, no sé que diríamos del pueblo vascongado, que en general, hablando de las clases bajas, no sabe más que vascuence que ciertamente no es más inteligible que las lenguas de los indios.’’ According to the second, ‘‘y no puedo dejar de decir de paso, que son igualmente si no más heterogéneos un gallego y un andaluz que un español y un indio.’’ Guridi y Alcocer also mentioned the heterogeneity of peninsular Spain, where there were—according to him—also Gypsies and Africans: His opinion in the session of January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 90. 76. Quintana on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 317. 77. Valiente on January 23, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 75–76. 78. Article 25(2) spoke about ‘‘el estado de deudor quebrado o de duedor a los caudales públicos,’’ article 25(3) mentioned ‘‘estado de sirviente doméstico,’’ and article 25(4) spoke about those who have no ‘‘oficio o modo de vivir conocido.’’ From 1830 onwards, suspension could also come about because of illiteracy: article 25(6). 79. Apparently, despite this rule, at least in some jurisdictions, such as New Spain, about 91 percent of the population was considered citizens in the immediate aftermaths of these decrees: Guerra, ‘‘El Soberano,’’ 45. 80. Valiente on January 23, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 75–76. 81. The distinction between Spaniards, Indians, and the mixed blood, on one hand, and people with even partial African descent, on the other, was invoked with regards to both citizenship and the right for representation. It was declared on October 15, 1810, and February 7, 1811, and was commonly cited by different delegates, for example, Morales Duárez on January 11 and February 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 367–68, and vol. 3, 281, and Guridi y Alcocer on January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 90–95. A decree

Notes to Pages 159–60

263

dated January 26, 1814, inserted in AM/Q, MMHCQ 001210, vol. 3, 8–9, stipulated that participating in the parliament were Spaniards but also ‘‘los domiciliados y avecindados en aquellos países [América y Asia] y así mismo los indios y los hijos de españoles y así mismo los indios y de los hijos de españoles e indios.’’ 82. Article 22, which dealt with Spaniards of African descent, stipulated: ‘‘A los españoles que por cualquiera línea son habidos y reputados por originarios del Africa les queda abierta la puerta de la virtud y el merecimiento para ser ciudadano. En su consecuencia, las cortes concederán carta de ciudadano a los que hicieren servicios calificados a la patria, o a los que se distinguen por su talento, aplicación y conducta, con la condición de que sean hijos de legítimo matrimonio, de padres ingenuos, de que estén casados con mujer ingenua, y avecindados en los dominios de las Españas, y de que ejerzan alguna profesión, oficio o industria útil con un capital propio.’’ 83. Parry, Age of Reconnaissance, 317; Bernand, ‘‘Negros, esclavos y libres,’’ 9–10 and 50–51. Martínez, ‘‘Space,’’ also clarifies the different treatment given to individuals of African descent. 84. Letter of November 28, 1796, reproduced in Blanco, Documentos para la historia de la vida, vol. 1, 267–75. In the citation, I used the translation of Lynch, Latin American Revolutions, 181–87. The originals read: ‘‘y ha de creerse que la intención de V. M. es entregar la confianza y dejar la seguridad de los derechos a unos hombres que lejos de mirar hacia España como al centro de su felicidad han de fijar su vista en los oscuros habitantes del Africa, de donde proceden para protegerlos y sublevarlos contra los españoles de quienes dicen que han recibido mil agravios? Podrán acaso ser más fieles los blancos nuevos que los viejos? Por ventura procurarán el bien de España aquellos de orígen africano que éstos de orígen español?’’ and ‘‘Luego los mulatos gozen en esta provincia de los beneficios de la sociedad, sin contribuir un maravedí para sus rentas y fondos, establecimientos públicos y píos: y si se procura saber de qué depende esto, siendo ellos dos veces más que los blancos, se hallará que el orígen es el no uso de las leyes que arreglan la conducta de los mulatos, previenen los remedios para lo futuro y los hacen contribuyentes, mandándoles que tributen una moderada pensión a favor del real fisco, lo cual no ha tenido efecto, o porque lo han ignorado los que debieran ejecutarlas, o por el poco interés que se ha tomado en este punto tan sustancia.’’ The purchase of ‘‘whiteness’’ was possible by obtaining a royal decree called gracias al sacar, meaning, literally, ‘‘thanks for rescuing me’’: Santos, El régimen, and Langue, ‘‘El indiano.’’ 85. The term ‘‘foreigner’’ (extranjero and casta extranjera) was used by Morales Duárez on February 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 282; Fernández de Leyva on September 3, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 134; and Guridi y Alcocer on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 150–51. 86. Aner on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 181–84. 87. Morales Duárez on February 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 281–82. The original reads: ‘‘Su voluntad [del rey] era mantener siempre a esta casta extranjera procedente de varios puntos de Africa o mahometanos o gentilicios, en prescindencia de las otras clases americanas sin el menor acceso a los empleos o decoraciones civiles, prohibidos los obispos de dispensar el impedimento que tenían para todo orden sacro, incapacitada en fin para una naturalización legal o el logro de título de ciudadano. En este plan nuestros reyes han usado aquella facultad de toda nación para fijar a los extranjeros introducidos en su seno

264

Notes to Pages 160–62

las restricciones y trabas que entiendan conducentes a su mejor orden y seguridad.’’ These questions were also discussed by Cisneros on September 6, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 200– 204 and Calatrava on September 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 241–43. 88. Espiga on January 9, 1811, DDACC, vol. 2, 327–28. 80. Borrull on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 101–2. 90. Gallego on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 102. 91. Guridi y Alcocer on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 150, and Ostolarza on September 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 239–40. 92. Espiga on September 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 219–20. The Gypsies were also invoked by Señor el Inca during the same debate, 222, and by Fernández de Leyva on the previous day, DDACC, vol. 8, 195. 93. Uría and Fernández de Leyva on September 4 and 6, 1811, respectively, DDACC, vol. 8, 148–50 and 195–96. Guridi y Alcocer on January 25, 1811, DDACC, vol. 3, 91, was willing to distinguish between Africans who were worthy of citizenship and those who were not. 94. Castillo on October 9, 1811, DSCGE, 1810. The original reads: ‘‘porque España, como otros países del mundo, ha padecido sus revoluciones y se ha mezclado con naciones extranjeras.’’ Guridi y Alcocer used a similar argument on September 4, 1811: in their origin, he said, the English are Saxons and the Spaniards are Goths, and we are all sons of Noah and Adam: DDACC, vol. 8, 151. The original reads: ‘‘Si hubiéramos de atender a éste y remontarnos en su inquisición, a los ingleses los llamaríamos saxones, a los españoles diríamos godos . . . y a todos los hombres los tendríamos por naturales de la patria de Noa sino es que también subíamos hasta Adán.’’ 95. Guridi y Alcocer and Castillo on September 4 and 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 152– 53 and 238–39. 96. Guridi y Alcocer on August 31, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 102. The original reads: ‘‘es muy justo que ella [la nación] le dé una patria adoptiva en su nacimiento civil, cuando lo despojó de la natural.’’ 97. Uría and Gordoa, on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 148 and 159–60; Feliú on September 5, 1811, DDAACC, vol. 8, 187; and Terreros on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 179. Other delegates, on the contrary, thought that foreigners had to be preferred to Africans: whereas Africans were totally different than Spaniards, European foreigners were of the same education, customs, and religion as Spaniards and could easily integrate into Spain: Aner on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 184, and Creus on September 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 233. 98. Castillo on September 4, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 162, and Salazar on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 176. 99. These considerations were openly invoked in the session of September 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 231–46, where some of the delegates, e.g., Ramos Arispe, Mendiola, and Ostolarza, also expressed their fear of the contrary situation: the practical consequences of relaying on reputation. 100. Dou on September 5, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 173; Espiga and García Herrero on September 7, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 215–20 and 223–25; Creus on September 10, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 233–34. Lisperguer also mentioned these prejudices in his intervention of September 15, 1811, DDACC, vol. 8, 329.

Notes to Pages 164–68

265

Chapter 8. Was Spain Exceptional? 1. Rucqoi, ‘‘Genèse,’’ 25–31; Varela, La novela de España; and Brinkmann, ‘‘La España.’’ 2. Sánchez Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico, and Castro, Structure of Spanish History, 3–11 and 642–57. 3. Ortega y Gasset, Invertebrate Spain, 58–87. 4. Hillgarth, ‘‘Spanish Historiography,’’ 38–39. 5. Bennassar, Spanish Character; Kagan, ‘‘Prescott’s,’’ 426 and 430–32; and Hillgarth, Mirror of Spain, 528–44. 6. Juderías y Loyot, La leyenda negra; Maltby, Black Legend in England; Ragussis, ‘‘Birth’’; and García Cárcel, La leyenda negra. 7. Nuix, Reflexiones imparciales; Keen, ‘‘Black Legend’’ and ‘‘White Legend’’; Hanke, ‘‘Modest’’; Halizcer, ‘‘Inquisition’’; and Gibson, Black Legend. 8. Debates about Spanish exceptionalism were especially important in the aftermaths of the 1898 war, in which Spain lost Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, its last American colonies: Ramsden, 1898 Movement; Blinkhorn, ‘‘Spain’’; and Pan-Montojo, Más se perdió en Cuba. 9. Diffie, ‘‘Ideology,’’ and Pike, Hispanismo 1898–1936. 10. Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the ‘‘Spanish Miracle’’; Fusi and Palafox, España, 1808–1996; Burdiel ‘‘Myth’’; Fusi, España: La evolución de la identidad nacional; and Diz, Idea. 11. Opinion of Luis Verdugo, official in charge of citizenship-related matters in the city council of Madrid, dated February 10, 1702, in AVM, secretaría 2–348–23. The original reads: ‘‘conforme a la libertad que conforme a derecho natural tenemos, cada uno puede renunciar la vecindad que tuviese en un lugar y vivir y avecindarse en otro el que eligiese . . . y para admitirsele por vecino no necesita de otra circunstancia más que la expresión de su voluntad’’: see chapter 2. 12. ‘‘Noticias de las diligencias hechas entre el consulado y los hijos de extranjeros en grave dependencia que se subscitó en el año 1719 y se feneció en el de 1728,’’ in AGI, consulados 892A. This discussion is studied in length in chapter 5. 13. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación de monarquías, 123–25. Similar affirmations are included in Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, chap. 9, points 57–68, 152–55; Veitia Linaje, Norte de la contratación, 327; and Gutiérrez de Rubalcava, Tratado histórico, 75–76. See also ‘‘Razón que puede ofrecer sobre concesiones de naturaleza de estos reinos,’’ an anonymous pamphlet, probably dated in the 1710s in AGS, GJ 873. 14. Gutiérrez de Rubalcava, Tratado histórico, in ‘‘advertencia’’ and in 121, and Antunes y Acevedo, Memorias históricas, 267. 15. Opinion of Joseph de Ledesma (1657), reproduced in AVM, secretaría 2–350–14, 3. 16. Jara, Derecho natural, 42. See also Madden, Political Theory. 17. Bellomo, The Common Legal Past, xii–xiii; Barrientos García, El tratado ‘‘De justitia et jure,’’ 118–40; and Marín y Mendoza, Historia del derecho natural, 16–32 and 60–61. 18. Hamilton, Political Thought, 52.

266

Notes to Pages 168–76

19. Vitoria, Derecho natural y de gentes, 113–40, and Hamilton, Political Thought, 43–58. 20. Costa, Gobierno del ciudadano; Sánchez Arévalo, Summa de la política; Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, book 2, chap. 24, points 1–10; Alvarez, Instituciones de derecho real, 46–50; Maravall, La teoría española del estado; Rommen, La teoría del estado; Brufau Prats, El pensamiento político; Noroña, Studies in Spanish Renaissance Thought; Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentos de monarquía, 76–84; and Fernández Santamaría, La formación de la sociedad. 21. Herzog, ‘‘Sobre.’’ The relation between law and justice is also described in Maravall, ‘‘Del Régimen,’’ 120–21. 22. Herzog, ‘‘Letrado’’ and in La administración, 40–45. 23. The persistence of these views in eighteenth-century Spain was also mentioned by Portillo Valdés, Revolución de nación, 78–146. Portillo Valdés insists on the importance of a superior (Catholic) order in Spanish (even enlightened and liberal) thought. 24. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities and in Introduction to the History. 25. Berengo, ‘‘La città’’ and in L’Europa delle città; Pauffin, Essai sur l’organisation, 92–94; Benedict, ‘‘French,’’ 19–20; Viollet, ‘‘Les communes’’; Petit-Dutaillis, Les communes françaises; Vermeesch, Essai sur les origines, 79–183; and Dini, Città e corporazioni, 148–51. 26. Dietrich, ‘‘City,’’ 65–68; Friedrichs, Early Modern City, 48–51 and 143–44; Dilcher, Brady, Blockmans, Van Niereop, Issacs, and Musi, ‘‘Urban’’; Blum, ‘‘Internal’’ and in ‘‘European’’; Manning, ‘‘Rural’’; Follain, ‘‘Les communautés,’’ 35–38; and Clark, Small Towns. 27. Costa, ‘‘A propósito,’’ and in Civitas. 28. Bellomo, Common Legal Past; Robinson, Fergus, and Gordon, European Legal History, 42–123; and Lewis and Ibbetson, Roman Law Tradition, 1–14. 29. Bizzarri, ‘‘Ricerche’’; Riesenberg, Citizenship in Western Tradition, 118–86; Kirshner, ‘‘Civitas’’ and in ‘‘Between’’; Canning, ‘‘Fourteenth’’; Ullmann, ‘‘Personality’’; and Quaglioni, ‘‘The Legal.’’ These issues are described in greater length in chapter 2. 30. Capasso, Catalogo ragionato, parte 2, 75–84; Ventura, ‘‘La ambiguità’’ and in ‘‘Mercato’’; and Peytavin, ‘‘Aduanas.’’ 31. Casini, ‘‘La cittadinanza’’; Zannini, Burocrazia e burocrati; Molà and Mueller, ‘‘Essere’’; Mueller, ‘‘Veneti’’; Bellavitis, ‘‘Per cittadini’’; and Trivellato, ‘‘Intorno.’’ 32. Guidi, Il governo, vol. 1, 113–25. 33. Martelli, ‘‘Cittadini.’’ 34. Mori, ‘‘Tot reges.’’ 35. Cerutti, ‘‘Giustizia.’’ 36. Tedoldi, ‘‘Servizio,’’ 84–89. 37. Belfanti, Mestieri e Forastieri, 21–24. 38. Waley, Italian City Republics, 64–67. 39. Dilonardo Buccolini, ‘‘Note.’’ 40. Riesenberg, ‘‘Citizenship and Law,’’ and the essays included in Rossetti, Dentro della città. 41. Quaglioni, ‘‘Legal.’’

Notes to Pages 176–83

267

42. Bizzarri, ‘‘Ricerche,’’ 72–75; Chittolini, La formazione dello stato and in ‘‘Cities’’; Fasano Guarini, ‘‘Potere’’; and Zorzi, ‘‘Material.’’ 43. Storti Storchi, Ricerche sulla condizione and in ‘‘Legal.’’ 44. Capasso, Catalogo ragionato, parte 2, 76–78; Bellomo, Società e istituzioni, 111– 15; Peytavin, ‘‘Españoles’’ and in ‘‘Aduanas’’; and Ventura, ‘‘Privilegi,’’ and in ‘‘Mercato,’’ 279–83. Chittolini, ‘‘Poteri’’ also argues that the introduction of a princely authority in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to important transformations in Italian regional states, which reorganized the relation between the capital city and other enclaves. 45. Villari, Per il re. 46. Kahil, ‘‘Apprenticeship’’; Kellett, ‘‘Breakdown’’; Veale, ‘‘Craftsmen’’; Barron, ‘‘Government’’; Pearl, ‘‘Social’’; and Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds. In the earlier period, citizenship in English corporate municipalities was called ‘‘burgesship’’ (in boroughs) or ‘‘citizenship’’ (in cities): Stephenson, Borough and Town, 136–37 and 143–44, and Tait, Medieval English Borough, 194–220. 47. Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds, 76–77. 48. Kramer, English Craft Guilds, 139–44 and 197–98; Clark and Slack, ‘‘Introduction,’’ 24 and 37–38; Dyer, City of Worcester, 181–82; Dobson, ‘‘Admissions’’; Palliser, ‘‘Crisis,’’ 116–17; Found, ‘‘Validity’’; Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds, 29–31: Krausman Ben Amos, ‘‘Failure’’; Gauci, Politics and Society; and Patterson, Urban Patronage. 49. Miller, ‘‘Legal’’; Seybolt, Colonial Citizen; and McAnear, ‘‘Place.’’ 50. Barry, ‘‘I significati.’’ 51. Merewether and Stephens, History of the Boroughs, vol. 1, 103, and vol. 3, 1746– 47 and 1968. 52. Ibid., vol. 1, 102–8. 53. Ibid., vol. 3, 1487. 54. Ibid., vol. 1, 536–41, and vol. 3, 1487. 55. Scouloudi, ‘‘Alien’’; Lloyd, Alien Merchants; Thrupp, ‘‘Aliens’’; and Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law, 23–59. The situation in Colchester might have been different: Goose, ‘‘The Dutchy,’’ 92–94. 56. Barron, ‘‘Government,’’ and Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds, 45–47, 54–55, and 57–60. 57. Statt, ‘‘City,’’ 58. 58. Other restrictions on foreigners included the inability to obtain freedom, hold office, address the royal courts, and even trade with the North American colonies: Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law, 60–88. Trading rights as an incentive to naturalization was mentioned in Schulte Beerbühl, ‘‘Naturalization,’’ 511–12. 59. Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law. 60. Cockburn, Nationality; Haycraft, ‘‘Alien’’; Carpenter, ‘‘Naturalization’’; Shaw, Letters of Denization; Thomas and Bellot, Thomas and Bellots Leading Cases, 68–76; Parry, British Nationality Law; Robbins, ‘‘Note’’; Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship; Resnik, ‘‘John Locke’’; Statt, ‘‘Birthright,’’ in ‘‘City,’’ and in Foreigners and Englishmen; Clark, Language of Liberty, 46–54 and 93–110; Price, ‘‘Natural’’; and Baseler, Asylum for Mankind.

268

Notes to Pages 183–95

61. Campbell, ‘‘From’’; Russel, ‘‘Gran Bretaña’’; and Brockliss and Eastwood, Union of Multiple Identities. 62. Sales, ‘‘Naturalizações,’’ 46. 63. Morris, Studies in the History, 11–15 and 62–68; Beloff, ‘‘British’’; Greene, Peripheries and Center; Kettner, Development of American Citizenship; and Baseler, Asylum for Mankind. 64. Start, ‘‘Naturalization’’; Hoyt, ‘‘Naturalization’’; Miller, ‘‘Legal’’; and Kettner, Development of American Citizenship, 83 and 86–89. 65. Resnik, ‘‘John Locke,’’ 374–81. Statt, ‘‘The Birthright’’; O’Reilly, ‘‘Naturalization Act,’’ 493–94. 66. Stitt Robinson, ‘‘Legal’’; Merrell, ‘‘Custom’’; Berman, ‘‘Perspectives’’; and Berkey, ‘‘United States.’’ 67. Lien, ‘‘Acquisition’’; Smith, ‘‘History’’; Berman, ‘‘Concept’’; Frickey, ‘‘Marshalling’’; Harring, Crow Dog’s Case; and Smith, Civic Ideals, 59–67. 68. Russel, Free Negro; Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen; Litwach, North of Slavery; Jordan, ‘‘American’’; and Berlin, Slaves without Masters. 69. See note 68. 70. Babeau, La ville sous l’ancien régime, 18–26; Perrin, ‘‘Le droit’’ and in ‘‘La bourgeoisie’’; Petit-Dutaillis, Les communes françaises; Vovelle, Ville et campagne, 137–43: Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France, 66–67; Peronnet, ‘‘Bourgeois’’; Small, ‘‘Royal’’; and Rigaudiere, ‘‘Universitas.’’ 71. Gascon, Grand commerce, 365–66 and Dubost, ‘‘Les Italiens,’’ 92–93. 72. Vidier, ‘‘Les origines’’; Corcia, ‘‘Bourg’’; Descimon, ‘‘Paris,’’ in ‘‘Bourgeois,’’ in ‘‘Milice,’’ in ‘‘Le corps,’’ and in ‘‘Corpo cittadino.’’ 73. Corcia, ‘‘Bourg,’’ 224. 74. Billot, ‘‘L’assimilation.’’ 75. Foreigners were restricted in office and land holding, and they could not serve as tutors, adopt French children, marry natives, or engage in the colonial trade: Laprat, ‘‘Aubains,’’ vol. 1, 1332–79, and Emmanuelli, Etat et pouvoir, 102–3 76. Vanel, Histoire de la nationalité française; Hildesheimer, ‘‘Aubains’’; Nicolet, ‘‘Citoyenneté’’; Benoehr, ‘‘Le citoyen’’; Billot, ‘‘Les italiens’’; Bayard, ‘‘Naturalization’’; Dubost, Significations de la lettre de naturalité, in Les étrangers en France, and in La France Italienne; Lequin, Histoire des étrangers; Lefebvre-Teillard, ‘‘Ius sanguinis’’; Sahlins, ‘‘Fictions,’’ and ‘‘La nationalité’’; Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood; Wells, Law and Citizenship; Bossenga, ‘‘Rights’’; Bonner, ‘‘French’’; Dubost and Sahlins, Et si on faisait payer les étrangers. 77. The degree by which the boundaries of this territory were unclear is explored in Nordman, Frontières de France. 78. Gascon, Gran commerce, 366–67. 79. Vanel, Histoire de la nationalité française, 93–94; Dubost, Significations de la lettre de naturalité, 31–33; Sahlins, ‘‘Fictions’’ and in ‘‘La nationalité,’’ 1086 and 1103; and Merrick, ‘‘Conscience.’’ 80. Labourdette, La nation française à Lisbonne, 27–35. 81. Sales, ‘‘Naturalizações,’’ 45.

Notes to Pages 195–201

269

82. Dubost, Significations de la lettre de naturalité, 23–25, and Dubost and Sahlins, Et si on faisait payer les étrangers.

Chapter 9 1. ‘‘Noticias del Guiñol,’’ Canal Plus, February 7, 2001. 2. ‘‘Contamíname,’’ words and music by Pedro M. Guerra and interpreted by Ana Belén and Víctor Manuel in 1994. The original reads: ‘‘Contamíname pero no con el humo que asfixia el aire. Ven pero sí con tus ojos y con tus bailes. Ven pero no con la rabia y los malos sueños. Ven pero sí con los labios que anuncian besos. . . . Contamíname, mézclate conmigo que bajo mi rama tendrás abrigo.’’

Glossary

Alcalde ordinario—Local annually elected nonjurist judge. Audiencia—Royal court acting mainly as an appeal court and as a corporate governing body. Behetría—A community that could freely elect its lord. Behetría cerrada—When the election of the lord could fall only in a certain lineage or on a native born. By the eighteenth century, it also designated communities that could bar people of certain estates from citizenship. Cámara—A standing committee, usually the title given to the advisory body of the different councils in the court. The cámara de Castile included some of the members of the Council of Castile, the cámara of the Indies had members from the Council of the Indies, and so forth. Castile—The crown of Castile, including different kingdoms and provinces. Cities with a vote in parliament—Cities granted the privilege of being called to parliament and having the right to vote, as representatives of themselves and of the kingdom as a whole. Such cities existed in each of the Iberian kingdoms. Composición—A license to remain in Spanish America issued by the local authorities to illegal aliens residing in the jurisdiction. Corregidor—A district governor and a judge. Cortes—The parliaments of the different Spanish kingdoms: the cortes of Castile, of Aragon, and so on. Council of Castile (consejo de Castilla)—A council charged with overseeing the administration of the crown of Castile; it also acted as a court of appeal. Council of State (consejo de estado)—A council charged with foreign and state affairs. Among other things, it was responsible for the administration of foreigners in Spain.

271

272

Glossary

Council of the Indies (consejo de Indias)—A council charged with overseeing the administration of the Spanish American territories and also acting as a court of appeal. Dispensa—A legal instrument that exempted people from certain requirements and enabled them to carry out a certain activity. Dispensas could allow minors to act as if they were of age, allow illegitimate children to inherit as if they were legitimate, and so forth. Domicile—A legal residence. According to Spanish law, it required the intention to remain in the community permanently. Encomienda—A Spanish institution that subjected a group of Indians to a Spaniard (called encomendero), who was supposed to defend them and ensure their conversion to Christianity while they were forced to work for him or pay him tribute. Forastero—A foreigner. In Castile this term designated people who were foreign to the local community. In Spanish America it designated nontribute-paying Indians who no longer belonged to or resided in their community of origin. Fuero de Extranjería—The rights and obligations inherent to the status of foreignness in Spain. Genízaros—Sons of foreigners born in Spain. Gracias al sacar—Another name for dispensas. Hidalgo—A member of the minor nobility, gentry. House of Trade (Casa de Contratación)—The royal court charged with directing and controlling communication and trade between Spain and Spanish America, located first in Seville and then in Cádiz. Ius commune—A European legal science originating in the twelfth century that combined Roman, cannon, and feudal law and adapted them to contemporary circumstances. Junta de Extranjeros—A dependency of the Council of State, established in 1714, abolished in 1717, and reestablished in 1721. In 1748 it became part of the Junta de Comercio and from then on it was called Junta de comercio y de extranjeros. The junta was charged with overseeing the treatment of foreigners in Spain. Local Community—An urban or rural community with some measure of self-government. The term includes lugares, aldeas, pueblos, villas, and ciudades. Merchant guild (consulado)—A corporation comprising all merchants legally trading in a city, acting as court for commercial litigation and as a commercial lobby. Monopoly (Spanish)—A series of laws and regulations allowing only natives of the kingdoms of Spain to immigrate and trade in Spanish America, only certified ports to maintain communication between these territories, and only Spanish ships manned by Spaniards to travel between them. Naturaleza—The status of native (natural ), a member of the community of the kingdom. Naturalization by integration or prescription (naturaleza por vía de prescripción)—Naturalization automatically obtained by foreigners by virtue of integration in a local community or in the community of the kingdom. Open house (casa abierta)—A house where one lives with his family most of the year. Pechero—A tax-paying folk. Presumptions—A legal regime linking behavior to a state of mind and allowing people to prove their intentions by acting in certain ways. Público y notorio—Evidence, including facts that needed no proof and that could not be legally contradicted.

Glossary

273

Purity of blood (limpieza de sangre)—A Spanish doctrine allowing only people whose genealogy included no heretics (to the third generation) and no Jewish or Muslim ascendancy to belong to certain corporations. Recopilación de Indias—The main recompilation of Spanish American law, dated 1680. Regalía—A faculty dependent only on the monarch and which he could dispose of at his free will. Representative of royal interests ( fiscal )—An official existing in most Spanish councils and courts, charged with representing royal interests. Reserve of offices (reserva de oficio)—Translated here as monopoly on office holding. A medieval rule shared by all peninsular kingdoms that restricted the use of public offices and ecclesiastical benefices to natives of the jurisdiction. Siete Partidas—A thirteenth-century Castilian code, also implemented during the early modern period. Vecindad de indios—Citizenship dependent on an encomendero status. People whose citizenship was acquired in this way were called vecinos encomenderos. Vecino—Member of a local community, a citizen.

Bibliography

Unpublished Archival Sources ACV ACV ACV ACV AGI AGI AGI AGI AGI AGI AGN/BA

AGN/BA AGN/BA AGN/BA AGN/BA

Fondos del AM/V 629–33 SA-Ced/Prag. C.5–75; C.8–66; C.8–88; C.9–15; C.9–46; C.9–49; C.10– 88; C.10–28; C.10–139; C.12–8; C.12–18; and C.12–53 PC-FA(F); PC-FA(O); PC-PA(F); and PC-PA(O) SV 453–3 and 466–4 Contratación 50A; 50B; 51A; 51B; 596A; and 596B EC 579B; 598; 911B; 924B; 926A; and 1057A Quito 4; 73; 74; and 126 IG 761; 764; 821; 1536; 1538; and 2301 Consulados legajo 53; 62; 91; 92; 788; 792A; 794; and 892A; and libro 445 and 446 Lima 60, and 81 9–4–7–4; 9–4–7–8; 9–17–2–1; 9–19–1–4; 9–19–1–5; 9–19–1–6; 9– 19–2–6; 9–19–2–8; 9–19–2–9; 9–19–2–10; 9–19–2–11; 9–19–3–11; 9–19–3–12; 9–19–4–2; 9–19–4–5; 9–19–4-8; 9–19–4–9; 9–19–21–1; 9–30–3–5; 9–30–6–8; 9–30–7–7; 9–31–3–6; 9–33–3–7; 9–35–3–3; 9– 35–3–6; 9–35–7–1; and 9–39–7-3 AC 19–1–4 Tribunal Civil, ser. 2, Legajo T Tribunal Criminal, ser. 1, Legajo B Fondo Biblioteca Nacional 218; 219; 448; 7356; and 7364

275

276

Bibliography

AGN/L

RTC, contencioso 252 (cuadernos 61–67 and 76–80); 253 (cuadernos 69– 73, 75, 81–84, and 86–89); and 255 AGN/L SG, contencioso 10 C206, varios 3 and 4; and acuerdos de justicia 4 AGN/L SG, varios 3, cuaderno 107; and varios 4, cuaderno 122 AGS GJ 873; 1004; 1005; 1006; and 1021 AGS Consejo Supremo de Hacienda 386 AGS Secretaría de Marina 701 AGS Secretaría y Superintendencia de Hacienda 555 AHN Estado legajo 629–1; 629–2; 629–3; 637/17; 647; 859; 3954; and 5042; and libro 229 and 683 AHN CSCI 20.620 AM/Q Miscelánea 00012 AM/Q MMHCQ 001210 vol. 3 AM/S Sección 4 (E.Cab.XVII), vol. 38 (microfilms nos. 250 and 251) AM/S Sección 5 (E.Cab.XVIII), vols. 294; 295; 296; 297; and 298 AM/S Sección 2 (Contaduría), carpeta 336 AM/V GM 51–4; 54–2; 56–3; 57–2; 57–4; 61–1; 62–2; 64–2; 65–2; and 65–3 AN/Q Gobierno 12; 15; 21; 26; 27; 29; 42; 46; 50; 51; and 63 AN/Q Notaría primera 24 AN/Q FE 21; 26; and 34 AP/LP 7–2–113–43; 7–2–113–46; 7–3–115–6; and 7–3-115–11 AVM Secretaría 2–166; 2–345; 2–348; 2–349–1; 2–350–14; and 2–374–92 BNE MSS 2989; 3045; 4321; 11.326; 13.112; 18.647–62; 19.512; and 20.067– 12 BPR II 2755; II 2832; II 2848; II 2851; II 2868; and II 12.868 DSCGE vol. 1 Eugenio Larruga y Boneta, ‘‘Historia de la Real y General Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Minas y Dependencias de Extranjeros,’’ Madrid, 1799 (MSS Bell Library, University of Minnesota–Twin Cities Campus)

Published Sources Actas del cabildo de Caracas. Caracas: Elite, 1943. Actas del cabildo de Caracas. Caracas: Consejo Municipal del Distrito Federal, 1950–69. Actas de las Cortes de Castilla. Madrid: Imprenta de archivos, bibliotecas y museos, 1910. Actas de las Cortes de Castilla. Madrid: Imprenta de archivos, bibliotecas y museos, 1932–33. Actas de las Cortes de Navarra, ed. Luis Javier Fortún Pérez de Ciriza. Pamplona: Parlamento de Navarra, 1991–95. Acuerdos del extinguido cabildo de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires: Archivo General de la Nación, 1907–34. Aguilar Piñal, Francisco. La Sevilla de Olavide (1767–1778). Seville: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1966.

Bibliography

277

Aguilera Rojas, Javier. Fundación de ciudades hispanoamericanas. Madrid: Mapfre, 1994. Alamos de Barrientos, Baltasar. Discurso político al rey Felipe III al comienzo de su reino. Madrid: Anthropos, 1990 [1598]. Alberro, Solange. Les espagnols dans le Mexique colonial: Histoire d’une acculturation. Paris: Armand Collin, 1992. Alberti, Leonora de, and A. B. Wallis Chapman. ‘‘English Traders and the Spanish Canary Inquisition in the Canaries during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth.’’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3d ser., 3 (1909): 237–53. Alonso Romero, María Paz. ‘‘Del ‘amor’ a las leyes patrias y su ‘verdadera inteligencia’: A propósito del trato con el derecho regio en la universidad de Salamanca durante los siglos modernos.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 67, no. 1 (1997): 529–49. Alvarez, José María. Instituciones de derecho real de Castilla y de Indias. México: UNAM, 1982 [1818]. Alvarez y Valdés, Manuel. La extranjería en la historia del derecho español. Oviedo: Universidad de Oviedo, 1992. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 1991 [1983]. Andrés Ucendo, José Ignacio. La fiscalidad en Castilla en el siglo XVII: Los servicios de millones. Lejona: Universidad del País Vasco, 1999. Annino, Antonio. ‘‘Soberanías en lucha.’’ In De los imperios a las naciones: Iberoamérica, ed. Antonio Annino, Luis Castro Leiva, and François Xavier Guerra, 229–53. Zaragoza: Ibercaja, 1994. ———. ‘‘Ciudadanía ‘versus’ gobernabilidad republicana en México: Los orígenes de una dilema.’’ In Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones: Perspectivas históricas de América Latina, ed. Hilda Sábato, 62–93. Mexico: Colegio de Mexico, 1999. Annino, Antonio, Luis Castro Leiva, and François-Xavier Guerra, eds. De los imperios a las naciones: Iberoamérica. Zaragoza: Ibercaja, 1994. Antunes y Acevedo, Rafael. Memorias históricas sobre la legislación y gobierno del comercio de los españoles con sus colonias en las Indias occidentales. Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1981 [1797]. Argüelles, Agustín. Discursos, ed. Francisco Tomás y Valiente. Oviedo: Junta General del Principado de Asturias, 1995. Armas (Asin), Fernando. ‘‘Herejes, marginales e infectos: Extranjeros y mentalidad excluyente en la sociedad colonial (siglos XVI y XVII).’’ Revista Andina 15, no. 2 (1997): 355–86. Armellada, Césaro de. La causa indígena americana en las Cortes de Cádiz. Caracas: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 1979. Armstrong, John A. Nations before Nationalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982. Artola, Miguel. Los orígenes de la España contemporánea. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1959. Asenjo Gonzáles, María. ‘‘Las ciudades,’’ In Orígenes de la monarquía hispana: Propaganda y legitimación (ca. 1400–1520), ed. José Manuel Nieto Soria, 105–40. Madrid: Dykinson, 1999.

278

Bibliography

Assadourian C. S., G. Beato, and J. C. Chiaramonte. Historia de Argentina de la conquista a la independencia. Buenos Aires: Paidos, 1996. Ayala, Manuel Josef de. Diccionario de Gobierno y legislación de Indias. Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1988. Babeau, Albert. La ville sous l’ancien régime. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997 [1880]. Baeza Martín, Ascensión. ‘‘La condena de españoles a obrajes en Nueva España en 1721: Su secuela en la provisión de oficios en las audiencias indianas.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 57, no. 2 (2000): 449–74. Balancy, Elisabeth. ‘‘Les immigrés français devant le tribunal de l’inquisition de Barcelone (1552–1692).’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’epoque moderne (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle), 45–69. Paris: CNRS, 1990. Barrero García, Ana María. ‘‘De los fueros municipales a las ordenanzas de los cabildos indianos: Notas para su estudio.’’ Revista Chilena de Historia del Derecho 11 (1985): 29–41. Barrientos García, José. El tratado ‘‘De justitia et jure’’ (1590) de Pedro de Aragón. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1978. Barron, Caroline M. ‘‘The Government of London and Its Relations with the Crown, 1400–1500.’’ Ph.D. diss., University of London, 1970. Barry, Jonathan. ‘‘Introduction.’’ In The Middling Sort of People: Culture, Society and Politics in England, 1550–1800, ed. Jonathan Barry and Christopher Brooks, 1–27. New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1994. ———. ‘‘I significati della libertà: La libertà urbana nell’Inghilterra del XVI e XVII secolo.’’ Quaderni Storici 30, no. 89 (1995): 487–513. Barton, Simon. ‘‘The Roots of the National Question in Spain.’’ In The National Question in Europe in Historical Context, ed. Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, 106–27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. Baseler, Marilyn C. ‘‘Asylum for Mankind’’: America, 1607–1800. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998. Bayard, Françoise. ‘‘Naturalization in Lyon during the Ancien Régime.’’ French History 4, no 3 (1990): 277–316. Bayle Constantin. El protector de indios. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1945. Belfanti, Carlo Marco. Mestieri e forastieri: Immigrazione ed economia urbana a Mantova fra sei e settecento. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1994. Bellavitis, Anna. ‘‘ ‘Per cittadini metterete’: La stratificazione della società veneziana cinquecentesca tra norma guiridica e riconoscimento sociale.’’ Quaderni Storici 30, no. 89 (1995): 360–83. Bello León, Juan Manuel. Extranjeros en Castille (1474–1501): Notas y documentos para el estudio de su presencia en el reino a fines del siglo XV. Laguna: Universidad de la Laguna, 1994. Bellomo, Manlio. Società e istituzioni in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna. Catania: Giannota, 1977. ———. The Common Legal Past of Europe, 1000–1800, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995.

Bibliography

279

Belmonte Díaz, José. Los comuneros de la Santa Justa: La ‘‘Constitución de Avila.’’ Avila: Caja de Ahorros de Avila, 1986. Beloff, Max. ‘‘The British Background of American Constitutionalism.’’ In The Constitution of the United States, 1787–1962, ed. Putnam F. Jones, 5–22. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962. Benedict, Philip. ‘‘French Cities from the Sixteenth Century to the Revolution: An Overview.’’ In Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France, ed. Philip Benedict, 7–64. London: Unwin Hayman, 1989. Bennassar, Bartolomé. The Spanish Character: Attitudes and Mentalities from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries, trans. Benjamin Keen. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979 [1975]. Benoehr, Hans Peter. ‘‘Le citoyen et l’étranger en droit romain et droit français.’’ In La nozione di ‘‘romano’’ tra cittadinanza e universalità: Seminario internazionale di studi storici da Roma alla terza Roma, 175–93. Naples: Edizioni Scientifische Italiane, 1982. Berengo, Marino. ‘‘La città di antico regime.’’ Quaderni Storici 9, no. 27 (1974): 661–92. ———. L’Europa delle città: Il volto della società urbana europea tra medioevo ed età moderna. Turin: Einaudi, 1999. Berkey, Curtis G. ‘‘United States–Indian Relations: The Constitutional Basis.’’ In Exiled in the Land of the Free: Democracy, Indian Nations, and the U.S. Constitution, ed. Oren R. Lyons and John C. Mohawk, 189–225. Santa Fe: Clear Light, 1992. Berlin, Ira. Slaves without Masters: The Free Negro in the Antebellum South. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974. Berman, Howard R. ‘‘The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States.’’ Buffalo Law Review 27 (1977–78): 637–67. ———. ‘‘Perspectives on American Indian Sovereignty and International Law, 1600– 1776.’’ In Exiled in the Land of the Free: Democracy, Indian Nations and the U.S. Constitution, ed. Oren R. Lyons and John C. Mohawk, 125–88. Santa Fe: Clear Light, 1992. Bermejo Castrillo, Manuel Angel. Parentesco, matrimonio, propiedad y herencia en la Castilla altomedieval. Madrid: Universidad Carlos III, 1996. Bernal, Antonio Miguel. La financiación de la Carrera de Indias (1492–1824): Dinero y crédito en el comercio colonial español con América. Seville: Fundación El Monte, 1992. Bernand, Carmen. ‘‘Negros, esclavos y libres en las ciudades hispanoamericanas.’’ In Nuevas Aportaciones a la historia jurídica de Iberoamérica [CD-ROM], ed. José Andrés Gallego. Madrid: Fundación Tavera, 2000. Bernardo Ares, José Manuel. ‘‘Las ordenanzas municipales y la formación del estado moderno.’’ In La ciudad hispánica durante los siglos XIII al XVI: Actas del coloquio celebrado en La Rábida y Sevilla del 14 al 19 de septiembre de 1981, vol. 3, 15–38. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1987. ———. ‘‘El régimen municipal de la corona de Castilla.’’ Studia Storica 15 (1996): 23–61. Bernal de Bugeda, Beatriz. ‘‘El derecho romano en el discurso de Antonio de León Pinelo sobre la importancia, forma y disposición de la recopilación de las leyes de las Indias occidentales.’’ Anuario histórico jurídico ecuatoriano 5 (1980): 147–71.

280

Bibliography

Berruezo, María Teresa. La participación americana en las Cortes de Cádiz (1810– 1814). Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1986. Bertrand, Michel. ‘‘Comment peut-on être créole? Sur les relations sociales en Nouvelle Espagne au XVIIIe siècle.’’ Caravelle 62 (1994): 99–109. Billot, Claudine. ‘‘L’assimilation des étrangers dans le royaume de France aux XIVe et XVe siècles.’’ Revue historique 548 (1983): 273–96. ———. ‘‘Les italiens naturalisés français sous le règne de François 1er (1514–1547).’’ In Strutture familiari, epidemie, migrazioni nell’Italia medievale, ed. Rinaldo Comba, Gabriella Diccinni, and Giuliano Pinto, 477–91. Naples: Edizioni Scientifische Italiane, 1984. Bizzarri, Dina. ‘‘Ricerche sul diritto di cittadinanza nella costituzione comunale.’’ Studi Senesi 7, no. 32 (1916): 19–136. Bjorn, Claus, Alexander Grant, and Keith J. Stringer. Nations, Nationalism, and Patriotism in the European Past. Copenhagen: Academic Press, 1994. Blanco, José Félix, ed. Documentos para la historia de la vida pública del libertador. Caracas: ‘‘La Opinion Nacional,’’ 1875. Blanco Valdés, Roberto L. El problema americano en las primeras cortes liberales españolas, 1810–1814. Mexico: UNAM, 1995. Blickle, Peter. ‘‘Conclusions.’’ In Resistance, Representation, and Community, ed. Peter Blickle, 325–38. New York: European Science Foundation, 1997. Blinkhorn, Martin. ‘‘Spain: The ‘Spanish Problem’ and the Imperial Myth.’’ Jorunal of Contemporary History 15 (1980): 5–25. Blum, Jerome. ‘‘The Internal Structure and Polity of the European Village Community from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century.’’ Journal of Modern History 43, no 4 (1971): 541–76. ———. ‘‘The European Village as Community: Origins and Functions.’’ Agricultural History 45, no. 3 (1971): 157–78. Boissonnade, Prosper. Histoire de la réunion de la Navarre à la Castille: Essai sur les relations des princes de Foix-Albert avec la France et l’Espagne (1479–1521). Paris: A. Picard et fils, 1893. Bonachia Hernando, Juan A. El consejo de Burgos en la baja edad media (1345–1426). Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1978. Bonfiglio Dosio, Giorgetta. ‘‘La condizione giuridica del civis e le concessioni di cittadinanza negli statuti bresciani del XII e XIV secolo.’’ Atti dell’Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti 137 (1978–79): 523–32. Bonner, Elizabeth. ‘‘French Naturalization of the Scots in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries.’’ Historical Journal 40, no. 4 (1997): 1085–115. Boone M. , S. Cerutti, R. Descimon, and M. Prak, ‘‘Introduction.’’ In Statuts individuels, statuts corporatifs e statuts judiciaires dans les villes européenes (moyen âge et temps modernes), 3–10. Leuven: Garant, 1996. Borah, Woodrow. Justice by Insurance: The General Indian Court of Colonial Mexico. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Bordejé Morencos, Fernando de. Tráfico de Indias y política oceánica. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992.

Bibliography

281

Bordes, Maurice. ‘‘Les communautés villageoises des provinces méridionales à l’époque moderne.’’ Flaran 4 (1982): 143–64. Borrow, George. The Zincali: An Account of the Gypsies of Spain. London, Dert and Sons, 1924 [1841]. Boscolo, Alberto, and Bibiano Torres Ramirer, eds. La Presenza Italiana in Andalusia nel basso medioevo. Bologna: Cappelli, 1986. Bossenga, Gail. ‘‘From Corps to Citizenship: The Bureau des Finances before the French Revolution.’’ Journal of Modern History 58 (1986): 610–42. ———. ‘‘Rights and Citizens in the Old Regime.’’ French Historical Studies 20, no. 2 (1997): 217–43. Bouysse-Cassagne, Thérèse. ‘‘Etre métise ou ne pas être: Les symptôms d’un mal identitaire dans les Andes des XVIe et XVIIe siècles.’’ Cahiers des Amériques Latines 12 (1991): 7–23. Bowsky, William B. ‘‘Medieval Citizenship: The Individual and the State in the Commune of Siena, 1287–1355.’’ In Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, ed. William B. Bowsky, 195–243. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967. Boyd, Carolyn P. Historia Patria: Politics, History, and National Identity in Spain, 1875– 1975. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997. Brading, David A. ‘‘Government and Elite in Late Colonial Mexico.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 53, no. 3 (1973): 389–414. ———. ‘‘Nationalism and State Building in Latin American History.’’ IberoAmerikanisches Archiv 20, nos. 1–2 (1994): 83–108. ———. ‘‘Patriotism and the Nation in Colonial Spanish America.’’ In Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres, Latin American Paths, ed. Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, 13–45. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998. Breen, T. H. ‘‘Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve of the American Revolution: Revisions Once More in Need of Revising.’’ Journal of American History 84, no. 1 (1997): 13–39. Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982. Brinkmann, Sören. ‘‘La España revisada: Historia, memoria y solución del ‘problema español.’ ’’ Notas 7 (2000): 2–13. Brito González, Alexis. Extranjeros en Lanzarote (1640–1700). Lanzarote: Cabildo de Lanzarote, 1997. Brockliss, Lawrence, and David Eastwood, eds. A Union of Multiple Identities: The British Isles, c. 1750–1850. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. Bromley, Juan. La fundación de la Ciudad de los Reyes. Lima: Ayuntamiento de Lima, 1935. Bronner, Fred. ‘‘Peruvian Encomenderos in 1630: Elite Circulation and Consolidation.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 57, no. 4 (1977): 633–59. Brown, Scott James. The Spanish Origins of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934. Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994 [1992].

282

Bibliography

Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper, ‘‘Beyond ‘Identity,’ ’’ Theory and Society 29 no. 1 (2000): 1–47. Brufau Prats, Jaime. El pensamiento político de Domingo de Soto y su concepción del poder. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1960. Burdiel, Isabel. ‘‘Myth of Failure, Myths of Success: New Perspectives on Nineteenth Century Spanish Liberalism,’’ Journal of Modern History 70 (1988): 892–912. Burkholder, Mark A., and D. S. Chandler. From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977. Burns, Robert I., ed. Las Siete Partidas. Volume 4: Family, Commerce and the Sea: The World of Women and Merchants, trans. Samuel Parsons Scott. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Cáceres de Gea, Beatriz. Reforma y fraude fiscal en el reinado de Carlos II: La sala de millones (1658–1700). Madrid: Banco de España, 1995. Campbell, Ian. ‘‘From the ‘Personal Union’ between England and Scotland in 1603 to the European Communities Act 1972 and Beyond—Enduring Legal Problems from a Historical Viewpoint.’’ In Legal Visions of the New Europe, ed. B. S. Jackson and D. McGoldrick, 37–104. London: Graham and Trotman, 1993. Campbell, Leon G. ‘‘The Foreigners in Peruvian Society during the Eighteenth Century.’’ Revista de historia de América 73–74 (1972): 153–63. Canning, J. P. ‘‘A Fourteenth Century Contribution to the Theory of Citizenship: Political Man and the Problem of Created Citizenship in the Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis.’’ In Authority and Power: Studies on Medieval Law and Government Presented to Walter Ullmann on His 70th Birthday, ed. Brian Tierney and Peter Linehan, 197–212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Cansanello, Oreste Carlos. ‘‘De súbditos a ciudadanos: Los pobladores rurales bonarenses entre el antiguo régimen y la modernidad.’’ Boletin del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani 11, no. 1 (1995): 113–39. Capasso, Bartolomeo. Catalogo ragionato dei libri, registri e scritture esistenti nella sezione antica o prima serie dell’Archivio Municipale di Napoli. Naples: Giannini, 1899. Carmagnani, Marcello, and Alicia Hernández Chávez. ‘‘La ciudadaanía orgánica mexicana, 1850–1910.’’ In Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones: perspectivas históricas de América Latina, ed. Hilda Sábato, 371–404. Mexico: Colegio de Mexico, 1999. Carpenter, A. H. ‘‘Naturalization in England and the Colonies.’’ American Historical Review 9 (1903–4): 288–303. Carrasco González, María Guadalupe. ‘‘La colonia británica de Cádiz entre 1650 y 1720.’’ In Monarquía, imperio y pueblos en la España moderna: Actas de la IV reunión científica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna (Alicante 27–30 de mayo de 1996), ed. Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, 331–42. Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1997. Carte, María del Carmen. Del consejo medieval castellano-leonés. Buenos Aires: Instituto de Historia de España, 1968.

Bibliography

283

Carzolio, María Inés. ‘‘En los orígenes de la ciudadanía en Castilla: La identidad política del vecino durante los siglos XVI y XVII.’’ Hispania (forthcoming). ———. ‘‘Aspectos de continuedad y de descontinuedad entre vecindad y ciudadanía española del siglo XVII a la constitución de 1812.’’ In Actas de las II jornadas de historia de España [CD-ROM], 2002. ———. ‘‘La construcción de identidades políticas en los siglos XVI y XVII. Súbditos y vecinos en Liébana.’’ Anales de historia antigua, medieval y moderna 35 (2003). Casado Alonso, Hilario. ‘‘Las colonias de mercaderes castellanos en Europa (siglos XV y XVI).’’ In Castilla y Europa: Comercio y mercaderes en los siglos XIV, XV y XVI, ed. Hilario Casado Alonso, 15–56. Burgos: Diputación Provincial de Burgos, 1995. Casini, Matteo. ‘‘La cittadinanza originaria a Venezia tra i secoli XV e XVI: Una linea interpretativa.’’ In Studi veneti offerti a Gaetano Cozzi, ed. Gino Benzoni, Marino Berengo, Gherardo Ortalli, and Giovanni Scarabello, 133–50. Venice: El Cardo, 1992. Castelnau, Charlotte de. ‘‘Les étrangers protestants dans l’Espagne moderne (16e–17e siècles).’’ In Recherche sur l’histoire de l’état dans le monde ibérique (15e–20e siècle), ed. Jean Frédéric Schaub, 143–62. Paris: Presses de l’Ecole Normale Supérieur, 1993. Castillo Meléndez, Fernando, Luisa Figallo Pérez, and Ramón Serrera Contreras. Las Cortes de Cádiz y la imágen de América (La visión etnográfica y geográfica del nuevo mundo). Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1994. Castrillo, Alonso de. Tractado de República. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1958 [1521]. Castro, Américo. España en su historia: Cristianos, moros y judíos. Buenos Aires: Losada, 1948 (The Spaniards: An Introduction to Their History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). ———. La realidad histórica de España. Mexico: Porrúa, 1954 (The Structure of Spanish History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954). Castro, Concepción de. La revolución liberal y los municipios españoles (1812–1866). Madrid: Alianza, 1979. Castro (y Bravo), Federico. ‘‘La legislación sobre nacionalidad y el sentido nacional.’’ Anuario de la asociación Francisco de Vitoria 6 (1943–45): 235–59. ———. ‘‘Los estudios históricos sobre la nacionalidad (Apostillas y comentarios).’’ Revista española de derecho internacional 8 (1955): 217–33. Castro y Rossi, Adolfo de, ed. Cortes de Cádiz: Suplementos de las sesiones verificadas en la isla de León y en Cádiz. Madrid: Secretaría del Congreso de Diputados, 1913. Cayetano Martín, María del Carmen, ed. Documentos del Archivo de la Villa: Reyes Católicos I (1475–1479). Madrid: Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 1992. Celso, Hugo de. Las leyes de todos los reinos de Castilla, abreviadas y reducidas en forma de repertorio decisivo [1538], In Textos clásicos para la historia de Castilla y León II [CD-ROM], ed. Luis Miguel Enciso. Madrid: Fundación Histórica Tavera, 1999. Cerrera Pery, José. La casa de contratación y el consejo de Indias (las razones de un superministerio). Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 1997. Cerutti, Simona. ‘‘Giustizia e località a Torino in età moderna: Una ricerca in corso.’’ Quaderni Storici 30, no. 89 (1995): 445–86. Cerutti, Simona, Robert Descimon, and Maarten Prak. ‘‘Premessa.’’ Quaderni Storici 30, no. 89 (1995): 281–86.

284

Bibliography

Céspedes del Castillo, Guillermo. Lima y Buenos Aires: Repercuciones económicas y políticas de la creación del virreinato de la Plata. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1947. Chambers, Sarah C. From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, Peru, 1780–1854. University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1999. Chevalier, Bernard. Les bonnes villes de France du XIV au XVI siècle. Paris: AubierMontaigne, 1982. Chiaramonte, José Carlos. ‘‘Ciudad, provincia, nación: Las formas de identidad colectiva en el Río de la Plata colonial.’’ In Nuevo mondo e area mediterranea a confronto, ed. Massimo Ganci and Rosa Scaglione Guccione, 415–41. Palermo: Società Siciliana per la Storia Patria, 1993. ———. ‘‘Modificaciones del pacto imperial.’’ In De los imperios a las naciones: Iberoamérica, ed. Antonio Annino, Luis Castro Leiva, and François Xavier Guerra, 107–28. Zaragoza: Ibercaja, 1994. ———. ‘‘La formación de los estados nacionales en Iberoamérica.’’ Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani ser. 3, 15 (1997): 143–65. ———Ciudades, provincias, estados: Orígenes de la nación argentina (1800–1846). Buenos Aires: Ariel, 1997. ———. ‘‘Ciudadanía, soberanía y representación en la génesis del estado argentino (c. 1810–1852).’’ In Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones: Perspectivas históricas de América Latina, ed. Hilda Sábato, 94–116. Mexico: Colegio de Mexico, 1999. ———. ‘‘Fundamentos iusnaturalistas de los movimientos de independencia.’’ Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani 22, no. 2 (2000): 33–71. Chittolini, Giorgio. La formazione dello stato regionale e le istituzioni del contado: Secoli XIV e XV. Turin: Einaudi, 1979. ———. ‘‘ ‘Cities,’ ‘City-States,’ and Regional States in North-Central Italy.’’ Theory and Society 19 (1989): 689–706. ———. ‘‘Poteri urbani e poteri feudali-signorili nelle campagne dell’Italia centrosettentrionale tra tardo medioevo e prima età moderna.’’ Società e storia 81 (1998): 473–510. Chust, Manuel. La cuestión nacional americana en las Cortes de Cádiz (1810–1814). Valencia: Biblioteca historia social, 1999. Clark, J. C. D. The Language of Liberty, 1660–1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo American World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Clark, Peter. Small Towns in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Clark, Peter, and Paul Slack. ‘‘Introduction.’’ In Crisis and Order in English Towns, 1500–1700: Essays in Urban History, ed. Peter Clark and Paul Slack, 1–56. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972. Clavero, Bartolomé. ‘‘Behetría, 1255–1356: Crisis de una institución de señorío y la formación de un derecho regional en Castilla.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 44 (1974): 201–34.

Bibliography

285

———. ‘‘Notas sobre el derecho territorial castellano, 1367–1445.’’ Historia, instituciones, documentos 3 (1976): 3–25. ———. Institución histórica del derecho. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1992. Clément, Jean-Pierre. ‘‘La connaissance de la périphérie péruvienne par les créoles à la fin du XVIIIe siècle.’’ In Relations entre identités culturelles dans l’espace ibérique et ibéro-américain: Centre et périphérie. Actes du colloque organisé à la Sorbonne par le GRIMESREP les 3, 4, et 5 mars 1994, ed. Augustin Redondo, 177–89. Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1995. Clemente Ramos, Juan. La sociedad en el fuero de Cáceres (siglo XIII). Cáceres: Institución Cultural el Brocense, 1990. Cockburn, Alex. Nationality or the Law Relating to Subjects and Aliens Considered with a View to Future Legislation. London: William Ridgway, 1869. Colley, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. Continisio, Chiara, and Cesare Mozzarelli, eds. Repubblica e virtú: Pensiero politico e Monarchia Cattolica fra XVI e XVII secolo. Rome: Bulzoni, 1995. Contreras, Jaime. ‘‘Limpieza de sangre, cambio social y maniplación de la memoria.’’ In Inquisición y conversos, 81–101. Toledo: Caja de Castilla-La Mancha, 1984. Cook, David Noble, ed. Numeración general de todas las personas de ambos sexos, edades y calidades que se ha hecho en esta ciudad de Lima, año de 1700. Lima: Cofide, 1985. Corcia, Joseph di. ‘‘Bourg, Bourgeois, Bourgeois de Paris from the Eleventh to the Eighteenth Centuries.’’ Journal of Modern History 50, no. 2 (1978): 207–33. Corral García, Esteban. Las comunidades castellanas de la villa y tierra antigua de Cuéllar. Salamanca: The Author, 1978. ‘‘Cortes de Madrid, celebradas por el Sr. Don Carlos IV en 1789.’’ In Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España, ed. Miguel Salvá and Pedro Sainz de Baranda, vol. 17, 19–442. Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1850. Cortés Cortés, Gabriel. Historia de los judíos mallorquines y de sus descendientes cristianos. Palma de Majorca: M. Font, 1985. Costa, Juan. Gobierno del ciudadano, ed. Antonio Ubach Medina. Zaragoza: Fernando el Católico, 1998 [1575]. Costa, Pietro. ‘‘A proposito dell’idea moderna di cittadinanza: Un itinerario illuministico.’’ In De la ilustración al liberalismo: Symposium en honor al profesor Paolo Grossi, ed. P. Cappellini, G. Gazzeta, B. Clavero, P. Costa, S. de Dios, B. González Alonso, A. M. Hespanha, P. Grossi, C. Petit, A. Romano, and F. Tomás y Valiente, 299–316. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1995. ———. Civitas. Storia della cittadinanza in Europa: Dalla civiltà comunale al settecento. Rome: Laterza, 1999. Covarrubias, Sebastián. Tesoro de la lengua castellana o española. Barcelona: Alta Fula, 1987 [1611]. Cremades Griñán, Carmen María. ‘‘Cartas de naturaleza: Concepto, privilegios y repercusión en el estado eclesiástico.’’ Cuadernos de investigación histórica 9 (1986): 41–62.

286

Bibliography

Crespo Solana, Ana. La casa de contratación y la intendencia general de la marina en Cádiz (1717–1730). Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1996. Cuart Moner, Baltasar. Colegiales mayores y limpieza de sangre durante la edad moderna: El estatudo de San Clemente de Bolonia (siglos XV–XIX). Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1991. Cuesta Martínez, Manuel. La ciudad de Córdoba en el siglo XVIII: Análisis de la estructura del poder municipal y su interdependencia con la problemática socio-económica. Córdoba: Caja Provincial de Ahorros de Córdoba, 1985. Cuneo Vida, Rómulo. ‘‘Extranjeros: su admisión a las colonias españolas de América durante los primeros siglos de la conquista.’’ Revista histórica 6 (1918): 60–70. Daza, Jesús. ‘‘Los principios del ius commune en el contexto sociocultural del nuevo mundo.’’ Seminario complutense de derecho romano 7 (1995): 107–32. Dedieu, Jean-Pierre. ‘‘Hérésie et pureté de sang: L’incapacité légale des hérétiques et de leurs descendants en Espagne aux premiers temps de l’inquisition.’’ In Pouvoir et société dans l’Espagne moderne: Hommage à Bartolomé Bennasar, ed. Jean-Pierre Amalric, 161–76. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 1993. ———. ‘‘Los gobernadores de Lérida, Barcelona y Gerona en el siglo XVIII.’’ Pedralbes 8, no. 2 (1998): 491–508. Deleito Piñuela, José. Solo Madrid es corte (La capital de dos mundos bajo Felipe IV). Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1953. Demélas (Bohy), Marie Danielle. L’invention politique: Bolivie, Equateur, Pérou au XIX siècle. Paris: Recherche sur les Civilisations, 1992. Descimon, Robert. ‘‘Paris on the Eve of Saint Bartholomew: Taxation, Privileges and Social Geography.’’ In Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France, ed. Philip Benedict, 69–104. London: Unwin Hayman, 1989. ———. ‘‘ ‘Bourgeois de Paris’: Les migrations sociales d’un privilège, XIVe–XVIIIe siècles.’’ In Histoire social, histoire globale? Actes du colloque des 27–28 janvier 1989, ed. Christophe Charle, 173–82. Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1993. ———. ‘‘Milice bourgeoise et identité citadine à Paris au temps de la ligue.’’ Annales ESC 48, no. 4 (1993): 885–906. ———. ‘‘Le corps de ville et les élections échevinales à Paris aux XVIe et XVII siècles: Codification coutumière et pratiques sociales.’’ Histoire, économie et société 13, no. 3 (1994): 507–30. ———. ‘‘Corpo cittadino, corpi de mestiere e borghesia a Parigi nel XVI e XVII secolo: La libertà di borghesi.’’ Quaderni storici 30, no. 89 (1995): 417–44. Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1953. Dias Avelino, Yvone. ‘‘A naturalização de mercaderes-banqueiros portugueses para o exercício do comércio na América dos Austrias.’’ Revista de história 42, no. 86 (1971): 389–415. Díaz Plaza, Fernando. La historia de España en sus documentos: El siglo XVIII. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1955. Dietrich, Gerhard. ‘‘The City within the Context of the Old European Order.’’ Gesammelte Aufsätze, ed. Gerhard Dietrich, 55–70. Göttingen: Max Planck Institut für Geschichte, 1997.

Bibliography

287

Diffie, Bailey W. ‘‘The Ideology of Hispanidad.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 23 (1943): 457–82. Dilcher, Gerhard, Thomas A Brady, Wim Blockmans, Henk Van Niereop, Ann Katherine Issacs, and Aurelio Musi. ‘‘The Urban Belt and the Emerging Modern State.’’ In Resistance, Representation, and Community, ed. Peter Blickle, 217–323. New York: European Science Foundation, 1997. Dilonardo Buccolini, Gabriella. ‘‘Note sul popolazionismo a Viterbo nel secolo XV: La concessione della cittadinanza.’’ In Studi in Onore di Amintore Farfani, vol. 2, 477–90. Milan: Giuffré, 1962. Dini, Antonio Ivan. Città e corporazioni nel medioevo italiano. Bologna: Cooperativa Libreria Universitaria Editrice, 1986. Dios, Salustiano de. Gracia, merced y patronazgo real: La cámara de Castilla entre 1474– 1530. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993. ———. ‘‘Corporación y nación: De las cortes de Castilla a las Cortes de España.’’ In De la ilustración al liberalismo: Symposium en honor al profesor Paolo Grossi, ed. P. Cappellini, G. Gazzeta, B. Clavero, P. Costa, S. de Dios, B. González Alonso, A. M. Hespanha, P. Grossi, C. Petit, A. Romano, and F. Tomás y Valiente, 197–298. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1995. Diz, Alejandro. Idea de Europa en la España del siglo XVIII. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000. Dobson, R. B. ‘‘Admissions to the Freedom of the City of York in the Later Middle Ages.’’ Economic History Review 26, no. 1 (1973): 1–21. Documentos selectos del Centro de Estudios de Historia de México. Mexico: Condumex, 1992. Domínguez Compañy, Francisco. ‘‘La condición de vecino: Su significación e importancia en la vida colonial hispanoamericana.’’ In Crónica del VI congreso histórico municipal interamericano (Madrid-Barcelona 1957), 703–20. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, 1959. ———. ‘‘Obligaciones militares de los vecinos hispanoamericanos en el siglo XV [según se desprende de las actas capitulares].’’ Revista de historia de América (México) 79 (1975): 37–61. ———. La vida en las pequeñas ciudades hispanoamericanas de la conquista, 1494–1549. Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1978. ———. ‘‘Ordenanzas municipales hispanoamericanas.’’ Revista de historia de América 86 (1978): 9–60. ———. Ordenanzas municipales hispanoamericanas: Recopilación. Madrid: Asociación venezolana de cooperación intermunicipal, 1982. ———. Política del poblamiento de España en América. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, 1984. Domínguez Lozano, Pilar. Las circunstancias personales determinantes de la vinculación con el derecho local: Estudios sobre el derecho local alto-medieval y el derecho local de Aragón, Navarra y cataluña (siglos IX–XV). Madrid: UAM, 1986. Domínguez Ortiz, Antonio. La sociedad española en el siglo XVIII y otros artículos. Seville: Diputación de Sevilla, 1996 [1955].

288

Bibliography

———. ‘‘La Concesión de ‘naturaleza para comerciar en Indias’ durante el siglo XVII.’’ Revista de Indias 19, no. 76 (1959): 227–39. ———Los extranjeros en la vida española durante el siglo XVII. Madrid: CSIC, 1960 (also published as Los extranjeros en la vida española durante el siglo XVII y otros artículos. Seville: Diputación de Sevilla, 1996). ———. ‘‘Una visión crítica del Madrid del siglo XVIII.’’ In Hechos y figuras del siglo XVIII español, ed. Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, 151–76. Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1980. ———. Orto y Ocaso de Sevilla. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1981. ———. Los judeoconversos en la España moderna. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992. Dubost, Jean François. Significations de la lettre de naturalité dans la France des XVIe et XVIIe siècles. Florence: EUI Working Papers in History, 1990. ———. Les étrangers en France XVI siècle—1789: Guide des recherches aux archives nationales. Paris: Archives Nationales, 1993. ———. ‘‘Les Italiens dans les villes françaises: XVIe–XVIIe siècles.’’ In Les immigrants et la ville: Insertion, intégration, discrimination (XIIe–XXe siècles), ed. Denis Menjot and Jean Luc Pinol, 91–105. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996. ———. La France Italienne XVIe–XVIIe siècle. Paris: Aubier, 1997. Dubost, Jean François, and Peter Sahlins. Et si on faisait payer les étrangers? Louis XIV, les immigrés et quelques autres. Paris: Flammarion, 1999. Durán Montero, María Antonia. Lima en el siglo XVII: Arquitectura, urbanismo y vida cotidiana. Seville: Diputación de Sevilla, 1994. Dyer, Alan D. The City of Worcester in the Sixteenth Century. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1973. Eastwood, David, Lawrence Brockliss, and Michael John. ‘‘Conclusions. From Dynastic Union to a Unitary State: The European Experience.’’ In A Union of Multiple Identities: The British Isles, c. 1750–1850, ed. Lawrence Brockliss and David Eastwood, 193–212. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. Eisenstadt, S. N., and Bernhard Giesen. ‘‘The Construction of Collective Identities.’’ European Journal of Sociology 36 (1995): 72–102. Elliott, J. H. ‘‘Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe.’’ In The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, ed. Geoffrey Parker, 110–33. London: Routledge, 1978. ———. ‘‘A Europe of Composite Monarchies.’’ Past and Present 137 (1992): 48–71. Emmanuelli, F. X. Etat et pouvoir dans la France des XVIe–XVIIIe siècles: La métamorphose inachevée. Paris: Nathan, 1992. Erauso, Catalina de. Memoir of a Basque Lieutenant Nun: Transvestite in the New World, trans. Michele Stepto and Gabriel Stepto. Boston: Beacon Press, 1996. Escalona y Agüero, Gaspar. Arcae limensis gazophilacium regium. Madrid, 1647. Escriche y Martín, Joaquín. Diccionario razonado de legislación civil, penal, comercial y forense. México: Libería de Galván, 1842 [1831]. España: Reflexiones sobre el ser de España. Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1998. Espejo Lara, Juan Luis, and Eva Morales Gordillo, eds. Ordenanzas de Archidona (1598). Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1998. Estrada Icaza, J. La lucha de Guayaquil por el estado de Quito. Guayaquil: Banco Central, 1984.

Bibliography

289

Fagel, Raymond. ‘‘Cornelis Deque: Un mercader flamenco en la Castilla del siglo XV. Un debate sobre el concepto de ‘vecindad’ y ‘naturaleza’ entre mercaderes.’’ In Castilla y Europa: Comercio y mercaderes en los siglos XIV, XV y XVI, ed. Hilario Casado Alonso, 241–63. Burgos: Diputación Provincial, 1995. ———. ‘‘Charles Quint comme ‘Roi Catholique’: Les nominations d’évêques originaires des Pays-Bas en Espagne (1516–1555).’’ Publications du Centre Européen d’Etudes Bourguignonnes 38 (1998): 207–27. Fasano Guarini, Elena. ‘‘Potere centrale e comunità soggette nel granducato di Cosimo I.’’ Rivista storica italiana 89 (1977): 490–538. Feijóo y Montenegro, Benito Gerónimo. ‘‘Amor a la patria y pasión nacional.’’ In Obras escogidas del Padre fray Benito Jerónimo Feijóo y Montenegro, ed. Agustín Milares Carlo, 141–48. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1883 (Biblioteca de autores españoles, vol. 56). Fernández Albaladejo, Pablo. ‘‘Cities and the State in Spain.’’ Theory and Society 18 (1989): 721–31 (also published in Cities and the Rise of States in Europe A.D. 1000– 1800, ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans, 168–83. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). ———. Fragmentos de monarquía: Trabajos de historia política. Madrid: Alianza, 1992. ———. ‘‘Les traditions nationales d’historiographie de l’état: L’Espagne.’’ In Visions sur le développement des états européens: Théories et historiographies de l’état moderne, ed. Wim Blockmans and Jean Philippe Genet, 219–33. Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1993. ———. ‘‘ ‘Rey católico’: Gestación y metamorfosis de un título.’’ In Repubblica e virtú: Pensiero politico e Monarchia Cattolica fra XVI e XVII secolo, ed. Chiara Continisio and Cesare Mozzarelli, 109–21. Rome: Bulzoni, 1995. ———. ‘‘Católicos antes que ciudadanos: Gestación de una ‘política española’ en los comienzos de la edad moderna.’’ In La imágen de la diversidad: El mundo urbano en la corona de Castilla (siglos XVI–XVIII), ed. José Ignacio Fortea Pérez, 103–27. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1997. ———. ‘‘El problema de la ‘‘composite monarchy’’ en España.’’ In Identities: Nations, Provinces, and Regions, 1550–1900. Proceedings of the Third Anglo-Spanish Historical Studies Seminar 25–6 October 1996, ed. Isabel Burdiel and James Casey, 185– 201. Norwich: University of East Anglia, 1999. Fernández Navarrete, Pedro. Conservación de monarquías y discursos políticos, ed. Michael D. Gordon. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1982 [1792]. Fernández Santamaría, J. A. La formación de la sociedad y el orígen del estado: Ensayos sobre el pensamiento político español del Siglo de Oro. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1997. Ferreiro, Juan Pablo. ‘‘Elites urbanas en la temprana colonia: La configuración social de Jujuy a principios del siglo XVII.’’ Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 33 (1996): 63–98. Ferry, Robert J. The Colonial Elites of Early Caracas: Formation and Crisis, 1567–1767. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. Fisher, John ‘‘Monarquismo, regionalismo y rebelión en el Perú colonial, 1808–1815.’’ Historia y Cultura 15 (1982): 117–39.

290

Bibliography

Fleming, Peter, Anthony Gross, and J. R. Lander. Regionalism and Revision: The Crown and Its Provinces in England, 1200–1650. London: Hambledon Press, 1998. Fletcher, Richard. The Quest for el Cid. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Floristán, Alfredo, ‘‘Conquista o restauración? La incorporación de Navarra a la monarquía española,’’ Hispania 59, no. 202 (1999): 457–91. Follain, Antoine. ‘‘Les communautés rurales en France: Definitions et problèmatiques (Xve–XIXe siècle).’’ Histoire et sociétés rurales 12, no. 2 (1999): 11–62. Font Rius, José María. ‘‘La recepción del derecho romano en la peninsula ibérica durante la edad media.’’ In Recueil des mémoires et travaux publiés par la Société d’Histoire du Droit et des Institutions des Anciens Pays de Droit Ecrit 6 (1967): 85–104. Fontana i Lázaro, Josep. La crisis del antiguo régimen, 1808–1833. Barcelona: Ariel, 1979. Fortea Pérez, José Ignacio. Monarquía y cortes en la corona de Castilla: Las ciudades ante la política fiscal de Felipe II. Salamanca: Cortes de Castilla y León, 1990. ———. ‘‘Las ciudades, las cortes y el problema de la representación política en la Castilla moderna.’’ In Imágenes de la diversidad. El mundo urbano en la corona de Castilla (siglos XVI–XVIII), ed. José Ignacio Fortea Pérez, 421–45. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1997. Found, J. F. ‘‘The Validity of the Freemen’s Lists: Some Norwich Evidence.’’ Economic History Review 34, no. 1 (1981): 48–59. Fradklin, Raúl, ‘‘Vecinos, forasteros y extranjeros: Las élites locales coloniales y su identidad social (Buenos Aires a fines de la era colonial).’’ In El otro en la historia: El extranjero, ed. Susana Murphy, 123–47. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1995. Frickey, Philip P. ‘‘Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law.’’ Harvard Law Review 107, no. 2 (1993): 381– 440. Friedman, Ellen G. ‘‘El estatus jurídico de la mujer castellana durante el antiguo régimen.’’ In Ordenamiento y realidad social de las mujeres, siglos XVI a XX, ed. María Carmen García Nieto, 41–53. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 1986. Friedrichs, Christopher R. The Early Modern City, 1450–1750. New York: Longman, 1995. Fuente Pérez, María Jesús. Palencia: Cien años de vida y gobierno de la ciudad (1421– 1521) a través de las actas municipales. Palencia: Diputación Provincial de Palencia, 1987. Fusi, Juan Pablo. España: La evolución de la identidad nacional. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 2000. Fusi, Juan Pablo, and Jordi Palafox. España, 1808–1996: El desafío de la modernindad. Madrid: Espasa, 1997. Gacto Fernández, María Trinidad. Estructura de la población de la Extremadura leonesa en los siglos XII y XIII. Salamanca: CSIC, 1977. Galmorini, Hugo Raúl. ‘‘La situación de los comerciantes españoles de Buenos Aires después de 1810.’’ Revista de Indias 44, no. 173 (1984): 273–90. Garcés, Jorge A. Libro del ilustre cabildo, justicia y regimiento de este muy noble y muy leal ciudad de San Francisco de Quito. Quito: Archivo Municipal, 1937.

Bibliography

291

García, Juan Agustín. La ciudad indiana. Buenos Aires: Ciudad Argentina, 1998 [1900]. García-Baquero González, Antonio. Cádiz y el Atlántico, 1717–1778: El comercio colonial español bajo el monopolio gaditano. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1976. García-Baquero González, Antonio, and Pedro Collado Villalta. ‘‘Les français à Cadix au XVIIIe siècle: La colonie marchande.’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’epoque moderne (XVIe–XVIIe siècle), 173–96. Paris: CNRS, 1990. García Bernal, Manuela Cristina. ‘‘Los españoles, hijos de extranjeros en el comercio indiano.’’ In La burguesía mercantil gaditana (1650–1868): Ponencias en el XXXI Congreso Luso-Español para el Progreso de las Ciencias, 175–82. Cádiz: Instituto de Estudios Gaditanos, 1976. ———. ‘‘Las elites capitulares indianas y sus mecanismos de poder en el siglo XVII.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 57, no. 1 (2000): 89–110. García Cárcel, Ricardo. Historia de Cataluña, siglos XVI–XVII: Los carácteres originales de la historia de Cataluña. Barcelona: Ariel, 1985. ———. ‘‘Las fronteras mentales y culturales: Los problemas de identidad de la España moderna.’’ In Fronteras y fronterizos en la historia, by Emilio Mitre Fernández, Ricardo García Cárcel, Manuel Lucena Giraldo, Friedrich Edelmayer, and Borja de Riquer i Permanyer, 63–82. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1997. ———. La leyenda negra: Historia y opinión. Madrid: Alianza, 1998. García Cortázar, José Angel, ed. Organización social del espacio en la España medieval: La corona de Castilla en los siglos VIII a XV. Barcelona: Ariel, 1985. García de Valdeavellano, Luis. Orígenes de la burgesía en la España medieval. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1969. García Fuentes, Lutgardo. El comercio español con América, 1650–1700. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispánoamericanos, 1980. García Gallo, Alfonso. Curso de historia del derecho español. Madrid: Gráfica Administrativa, 1950. ———. ‘‘La ciencia jurídica en la formación del derecho hispanoamericano en los siglos XVI al XVIII.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 44 (1974): 157–98. ———. ‘‘La condición jurídica del indio.’’ In Antropología de España y América, ed. Miguel Rivera Dorado, 281–92. Madrid: Dosbe, 1977. ———. ‘‘Territorio y término en el ámbito local castellano e indiano (notas sobre su naturaleza).’’ In VII congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano: Actas y estudios, vol. 1, 357–72. Buenos Aires: Pontificia Universidad Católica, 1984. ———. ‘‘De la ciudad castellana a la indiana.’’ In Los orígenes españoles de las instituciones americanas: Estudios de derecho indiano, ed. Alfonso García Gallo, 1005–23. Madrid: Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación, 1987. García Godoy, Teresa. Las cortes de Cádiz y América: El primer vocabulario liberal español y mejicano (1810–1814). Seville: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1998. García Martínez, Sebastián. ‘‘Otra minoría marginada. Los gitanos en Valencia bajo los Austrias.’’ In Primer congreso de historia del país valenciano celebrado en Valencia del 14 al 18 de abril de 1971, vol. 3, 251–65. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 1976.

292

Bibliography

García-Mauriño Mundi, Margarita. La pugna entre el consulado de Cádiz y los jenízaros por las exportaciones a Indias (1720–1765). Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1999. García Rives, Moisés. ‘‘La condición jurídica de los extranjeros en Castilla y León desde el fuero de León (1920) al código de las Partidas.’’ Revista de ciencias jurídicas y sociales 3, no. 9 (1920): 245–83 and 320–55. García Ulecia, Alberto. Los factores de diferenciación entre las personas en los fueros de la Extramadura castellano-aragonesa. Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1975. ———. ‘‘Naturaleza y extranjería en las corredurías de Lonja del antiguo régimen.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 61 (1991): 87–109. Garretón, Adolfo. La municipalidad colonial. Buenos Aires desde su fundación hasta el gobierno de Lariz. Buenos Aires: Jesús Menéndez, 1933. Gascon, Richard. Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle: Lyon et ses marchands (environs de 1520–environs de 1580). Paris: SEVPEN, 1971. Gauci, Perry. Politics and Society in Great Yarmouth, 1660–1722. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Gaudemet, J. ‘‘Préambule: L’étranger: de l’image au statut.’’ In Histoire des étrangers et de l’immigration en France, ed. Yves Lequin, 17–59. Paris: Larousse, 1992. Gautier Dalché, Jean. ‘‘Les colonies étrangères en Castille: I. Au nord du Tage.’’ Anuario de estudios medievales 10 (1980): 469–86. Gavira Márquez, Concepción. ‘‘Administración y jurisdicción en el valle de Soba a finales del siglo XVIII. Altamira: Revista del Centro de Estudios Montañeses 54 (1998): 141– 65. ———. ‘‘La emigración en el valle cantábrico de Soba a finales del siglo XVIII: La ‘Casa Gutiérrez’ y el comercio con Indias.’’ Andes—antropología e historia 10 (1999): 139– 69. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982. Gelman, Jorge. ‘‘Cabildo y élite local: El caso de Buenos Aires en el siglo XVII.’’ Revista latinoamericana de historia económica y social 6, no.2 (1985): 3–20. Genet, Jean-Philippe, ed. L’état moderne: Genèse. Bilans et perspectives: Actes du colloque tenu au CNRS à Paris les 19–20 septembre 1989. Paris: CNRS, 1990. Geremek, Bronislaw. Truands et misérables dans l’Europe moderne (1350–1600). Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, 1980. Gerhard, Peter. Geografía histórica de la Nueva España, 1519–1821. Mexico: UNAM, 1986. Ghisalberti, C. ‘‘La teoria del notorio nel diritto comune.’’ Annali di storia del diritto 1 (1957): 403–51. Gibert y Sánchez de la Vega, Rafael. El consejo de Madrid: Su organización en los siglos XII a XV. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, 1949. ———. ‘‘La condición de los extranjeros en el antiguo derecho español.’’ Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin 10 (1958): 151–99. ———. ‘‘Libertades urbanas y rurales en León y Castilla durante la edad media.’’ In Les libertés urbaines et rurales du XIe au XIVe siècle: Colloque international Spa 5– 8.IX.1966. Actes, 187–218. Brussels: Pro Civitate, 1968. Gibson, Charles, ed. The Spanish Tradition in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Bibliography

293

———. The Black Legand: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New. New York: Knopf, 1971. Gil Bermejo García, Juana. ‘‘Naturalizaciones de italianos en Andalucía.’’ In Presencia italiana en Andalucía, siglos XIV–XVII: Actas del I coloquio hispano-italiano, 175– 86. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1985. Gildas, Bernard. ‘‘La casa de contratación de Sevilla y luego de Cádiz en el siglo XVIII.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 12 (1955): 253–86. Giménez López, Enrique. Gobernar con una misma ley: Sobre la nueva planta borbónica en Valencia. Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1999. Ginebra Molins, Esperança. ‘‘L’aplicació del dret civil de Catalunya: La qualitat juridica de catalá.’’ Ph.d. diss., Derecho Civil-Universitat de Barcelona, 1998. Girard, Albert. Le commerce française à Séville et Cadix au temps des Habsbourgs: Contribution à l’étude du commerce étranger en Espagne au XVI et XVII siècles. Paris: Boccard, 1932. ———. La rivalité commerciale et maritime entre Séville et Cadix jusqu’à la fin du XVIIIe siècle. Paris: Boccard, 1932. Godechot, Jacques. ‘‘Nation, patrie, nationalisme et patriotisme en France au XVIII siècle.’’ Annales historiques de la révolution française 63, no. 206 (1971): 481–501. Gómez Alfaro, Antonio. ‘‘La polémica sobre la deportación de los gitanos a las colonias de América.’’ Cuadernos hispanoamericanos 386 (1982): 308–36. ———. La gran redada de gitanos. España: La provisión general de gitanos de 1749. Madrid: Presencia Gitana, 1993. Gómez de Orozco, Federico. ‘‘Italianos conquistadores, exploradaores y pobladores en México en el siglo XVI.’’ Memorias de la Academia de la Historia 8, no. 3 (1949): 190– 210. Gómez Pérez, Carmen. ‘‘Los extranjeros en la América colonial: Su expulsión de Cartagena de Indias en 1750.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 37 (1980): 279–97. González, Alfonso F. Instituciones y sociedad guipuzcoanas en los comienzos del centralismo (1680–1730). San Sebastián: Diputación Foral de Guipuzkoa, 1995. González, Julio. Repoblación de Castilla la Nueva. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1976. González de Cellorigo, Martín. Memorial de la política necesaria y útil restauración a la república de España y estados de ella y del desempeño universal de estos reinos. Madrid: ICI, 1991 [1600]. González de San Segundo, Miguel Angel. ‘‘Sobre los aragoneses y la provisión de oficios de Indias en el reinado de Felipe II.’’ In Centralismo y autonomismo en los siglos XVI– XVV: Homenaje al profesor Jesús Lalinde Abadía, ed. Aquilino Iglesia Ferreiros and Sixto Sánchez Español, 195–212. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1989. González Esquerdo, Alejandro. ‘‘Orígines del problema Chueta.’’ Historia y vida 24, no. 275 (1991): 30–36. González Jimenez, Manuel. ‘‘Genoveses en Sevilla.’’ In Presencia italiana en Andalucía, siglos XIV–XVII: Actas del I coloquio hispano-italiano, 114–30. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1985. Goose, Nigel, ‘‘The Dutch in Colchester in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Opposition and Integration.’’ In From Strangers to Citizens: The Integration of Immi-

294

Bibliography

grant Communities in Britain, Ireland, and Colonial America, 1550–1750, ed. Randolph Vigne and Charles Littleton, 88–98. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2001. Gould, Eduardo Ricardo. ‘‘La condición del extranjero en América: Los portugueses en Córdoba del Tucumán entre 1573 y 1640.’’ Revista de historia del derecho 19 (1991): 245–79. Grandmaison, Geoffroy de, L’ambassade française en Espagne pendant la révolution (1789–1804). Paris: Plon, 1892. Greene, Jack P. Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the U.S., 1607–1788. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986. Greenfeld, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. Guerra, François Xavier. Modernidad e independencia: Ensayos sobre las revoluciones hispánicas. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992. ———. ‘‘Identidades e idependencia: La excepción americana.’’ Cuadernos de historia latinoamericana 2 (1994): 93–134. ———. ‘‘Identidad y soberanía: una relación compleja.’’ In Revoluciones hispánicas: Independencias americanas y liberalismo español, ed. François-Xavier Guerra, 207–39. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1995. ———. ‘‘La nation en Amérique Espagnole: Le problème des origines.’’ In La pensée politique: La nation, 85–106. Paris: EHESS, 1995. ———. ‘‘El soberano y su reino: Reflexiones sobre la génesis del ciudadano en América Latina.’’ In Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones: Perspectivas históricas de América Latina, ed. Hilda Sábato, 33–61. Mexico: Colegio de México, 1999. ———. ‘‘The Implosion of the Spanish American Empire: Emerging Statehood and Collective Identities,’’ In The Collective and the Public in Latin America: Cultural Identities and Political Order, ed. Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog, 71–94. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000. Guerra, François-Xavier, and Mónica Quijada, ed. Imaginar la nación: Cuadernos de historia latinoamericana 2 (1994). Guichot, Joaquin. Historia de la ciudad de Sevilla y pueblos importantes de su provincia. Seville: Josée María Ariza, 1882. ———. Historia del exmo. ayuntamiento de la muy noble . . . ciudad de Sevilla. Seville: La Región, 1897–98. Guidi, Guidubaldo. Il governo della città-repubblica di Firenze del primo quattrocento. Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1981. Guimerá Ravina, Agustín. Burguesía extranjera y comercio atlántico: La empreza comercial irlandesa en Canarias (1703–1771). Tenerife: CSIC, 1985. Gutiérrez de Rubalcava, Joseph. Tratado histórico, político y legal del comercio de las Indias occidentales. Primera parte: compendio histórico del comercio de las Indias desde su principio hasta su actual estado. Cádiz: Imprenta Real de la Marina, 1750. Gutiérrez Nieto, J. F. ‘‘El reformismo social de Olivares: El problema de la limpieza de sangre y la creación de una nobleza de mérito.’’ In La España del conde duque de Olivares: Encuentro internacional sobre la España del conde duque de Olivares, cele-

Bibliography

295

brado en Toro los días 15–18 de septiembre de 1987, ed. John Elliott and Angel García Sanz, 417–41. Valladolid: Universidad de valladolid, 1987. Hacienda y comercio de Venezuela en el siglo XVII, 1601–1650. Caracas: Banco Central de Venezuela, 1986. Halizcer, Stephen. ‘‘Inquisition Myth and Inquisition History: The Abolition of the Holy Office and the Development of Spanish Political Ideology.’’ In The Spanish Inquisition and the Inquisitorial Mind, ed. Angel Alcalá, 523–49. Highland Lakes, N.J.: Atlantic Research and Publications, 1987. Halperín Donghi, Tulio. Reforma y disolución de los imperios ibéricos 1750–1850. Madrid: Alianza, 1985. Hamilton, Bernice. Political Thought in Sixteenth Century Spain: A Study of the Political Ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suárez, and Molina. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. Hamnett, Brian R. La política española en una época revolucionaria, 1790–1820. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1985. Hampe Martínez, Teodoro. ‘‘Sobre encomenderos y repartimientos en la diócesis de Lima a principios del siglo XVII.’’ Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 23 (1986): 121–43. Hanke, Lewis. ‘‘A Modest Proposal for a Moratorium on Grand Generalizations: Some Thoughts on the Black Legend.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 51 (1971): 112–27. Hardoy, Jorge E. El proceso de urbanización en América Latina. Havana: Oficina Regional de Cultura para América Latina y el Caribe, 1974. ———. ‘‘European Urban Forms in the Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries and their Utilization in Latin America.’’ In Urbanization in the Americas from Its Beginning to the Present, ed. R. Schaedel, J. E. Hardoy, and N. Scott Kinzer, 215–48. The Hague: Mouton, 1978. Haring, Clarence H. Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Habsburgs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. Harring, Sidney L. Crow Dog’s Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law and the United States Law in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Harwich Vallenilla, Nikita. ‘‘Construcción de una identidad nacional: El discurso historiográfico de Venezuela en el siglo XIX.’’ Revista de Indias 54, no. 202 (1994): 637–53. Hastings, Adrian. The Construction of Nationhood. Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Haycraft, Thomas W. ‘‘Alien Legislation and the Prerogative of the Crown.’’ Law Quarterly Review 13 (1897): 165–86. Heras, José Luis de. ‘‘La problemática incorporación de los territorios de la corona de Aragón a las Cortes de Castilla en el marco de las reformas administrativas de Felipe V.’’ In El mundo hispánico en el siglo de las luces, vol. 2, 771–87. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1996. Heredia Herrera, Antonia. ‘‘Apuntes para la historia del consulado de la universidad de cargadores a Indias en Sevilla y Cádiz.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 37 (1970): 219–74.

296

Bibliography

Hermann, Christian. ‘‘Naturales y forasteros: Les exclusives d’acces au bénéfices de l’Eglise dans l’Espagne Moderne.’’ In Les sociétés fermées dans le monde Ibérique (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles): Définitions et problématiques. Actes de la table ronde des 8 et 9 février 1986, 189–201. Paris: CNRS, 1986. ———. Les révolutions dans le monde ibérique (1766–1834). Soulèvement national et révolution libérale: Etat des questions. Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1989–91. Hernández Dávalos, J. E. ed. Colección de documentos para la historia de la guerra de independencia de México de 1808 a 1821. Mexico: José María Sandoval, 1877. Hernández Franco, Juan. ‘‘Del tercer pacto de familia al tratado de Aranjuez. Afirmación de la separación exterior respecto a Francia.’’ In Actas del I symposium internacional estado y fiscalidad en el antiguo régimen, ed. Carmen María Cremades Griñán, 193– 209. Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1989. ———. Cultura y limpieza de sangre en la España moderna. Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1996. Hernández Ruíz de Villa, Rafael. Emigración a Indias: Leyes reguladoras. Segovia: Instituto Andrés Laguna, 1965. Herr, Richard. ‘‘The Evolution of Spanish Regionalism from the Habsburg to the Present.’’ In Homenaje a José Antonio Maravall, ed. María Carmen Iglesias, Carlos Moya, and Luis Rodríguez Zúñiga, 291–303. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1985. Herrero García, Miguel. Ideas de los españoles del siglo XVII. Madrid: Gredos, 1996 [1927]. Herzog, Tamar. ‘‘La Recopilación de Indias and Its Discourse: The Spanish Monarchy, the Indies, and the Seventeenth Century.’’ Ius Commune 20 (1993): 143–63. ———. ‘‘¿Letrado o teólogo? Sobre el oficio de la justicia a principios del siglo XVIII.’’ In Fallstudien zur spanischen und portugiesischen Justiz (16.-20. Jahrhundert), ed. Johannes Michael Scholz, 697–714. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994. ———. ‘‘Sobre la cultura jurídica de la América colonial (siglos XVI–XVIII).’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 65 (1995): 903–11. ———. La administración como un fenómeno social: La justicia penal de la ciudad de Quito, 1650–1750. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1995. ———. ‘‘Identidades colectivas, fronteras comunitarias y derecho: La domiciliación de mujeres de oidores quiteños durante el siglo XVII.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 67, no. 2 (1997): 1423–31. ———. ‘‘A Stranger in a Strange Land: The Conversion of Foreigners into Members in Colonial Latin America (Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries).’’ Social Identities 3, no. 2 (1997): 247–63 (also published in Constructing Collective Identities and Shaping Public Spheres: Latin American Paths, ed. Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, 46–64. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998). ———. Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación: Pesquisas, visitas y residencias y las relaciones entre Quito y madrid (1650– 1750). In Nuevas Aportaciones a la historia jurídica de Iberoamérica [CD-ROM], ed. José Andrés Gallego. Madrid: Fundación Tavera, 2000. Hevia Bolaños, Juan de. Curia Philipica. Madrid: Pedro Marin, 1771 [1603].

Bibliography

297

Hildesheimer, Françoise. ‘‘Aubains ou régnicoles? La capacité de succéder de Niçois en Provence.’’ Nice Historique 3 (1980): 122–26. Hillgarth, Jocelyn N. The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250–1516. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976–78. ———. ‘‘Spanish Historiography and Iberian Reality.’’ History and Theory 24, no. 1 (1985): 23–42. ———. The Mirror of Spain, 1500–1700: The Formation of a Myth. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. Himmerich y Valencia, Robert. The Encomenderos of New Spain. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991. Hinojosa, Eduardo. El orígen del régimen municipal en León y Castilla. Madrid: Asilo de Huérfanos del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús, 1896. Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Hoyt, Edward A. ‘‘Naturalization under the American Colonies: Signs of a New Community.’’ Political Science Quarterly 67 (1952): 248–66. Iglesias Rodríguez, Juan José. ‘‘Las colonias extranjeras en el Puerto Santa María durante el reinado de Carlos IV.’’ In La España de Carlos IV, ed. Pere Molas Ribalta, 91–102. Madrid: Tabapress, 1991. Irles Vicente, María del Carmen. Al servicio de los borbones: Los regidores valencianos en el siglo XVIII. Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1996. Isaac, Lionel A. Els jueus de Majorca. Palma de Majorca: M. Font, 1986. Israel, Jonathan I. ‘‘The Portuguese in Seventeenth Century Mexico.’’ Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 11 (1974): 12–32. Izquierdo Benito, Ricardo. Un espacio desordenado: Toledo a fines de la edad media. Toledo: Diputación Provincial, 1996. Izquiero Martín, Jesús. ‘‘Vecinos ante que campesinos: La constitución del sujeto y el problema de la cooperación en el orden social castellano durante el antiguo régimen.’’ In Campesinos, artesanos, trabajadores, ed. Santiago Castillo and Roberto Fernández. Lleida: Milenium, forthcoming. Jacobs, Auke P. ‘‘Legal and Illegal Immigration from Seville, 1550–1650.’’ In To Make America: European Migration in the Early Modern Period, ed. Ida Altman and James Horn, 59–84. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. ———. Los movimientos migratorios entre Castilla e Hispanoamérica durante el reinado de Felipe III, 1598–1621. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995. Jago, C. ‘‘Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile.’’ American Historical Review 86 (1981): 307–26. ———. ‘‘Philip II and the Cortes of Castille: The Case of the Cortes of 1576.’’ Past and Present 109 (1985): 24–43. Jara, Andreu. Derecho natural y conflictos ideológicos en la Universidad española (1750–1850). Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Administrativos, 1977. Jiménez Sureda, Montserrat. ‘‘Alienígenas, regnícolas y naturales: Monarquía y élite en una catedral catalana del siglo XVIII.’’ Hispania 52, no. 3 (1998): 1097–112. Jordan, Winthrop D. ‘‘American Chiaroscuro: The Status and Definition of Mulattos in the British Colonies.’’ William and Mary Quarterly 19 (1962): 183–200.

298

Bibliography

Jover Zamora, José María. ‘‘Sobre los conceptos de monarquía y nación en el pensamiento político español del XVII.’’ Cuadernos de historia de España 13 (1950): 101–15. Juderías y Loyot, Julián. La leyenda negra: Estudios acerca del concepto de España en el extranjero. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1997 [1914]. Kagan, Richard. Students and Society in Early Modern Spain. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. ———. ‘‘Prescott’s Paradigm: American Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain.’’ American Historical Review 101, no. 2 (1996): 423–46. Kahil, William F. ‘‘Apprenticeship and the Freedom of London Livery Companies, 1690– 1750.’’ Guildhall Miscellany 7 (1956): 17–20. Kamen, Henry. ‘‘El ámbito jurídico de la oposición a la limpieza de sangre en España.’’ In Perfiles jurídicos de la inquisición española, ed. J. Antonio Escudero, 627–32. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1989. ———. ‘‘Limpieza and the Ghost of Américao Castro: Racism as a Tool of Literary Analysis.’’ Hispanic Review 64, no. 1 (1996): 19–29. Keen, Benjamin. ‘‘The Black Legend Revisited: Assumptions and Realities.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 49 (1969): 703–19. ———. ‘‘The White Legend Revisited: A Reply to Professor Hanke’s ‘Modest Proposal.’ ’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 51 (1971): 336–55. Kellenbenz, Herman. ‘‘Mercaderes extranjeros en América del sur a comienzos del siglo XVII.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 28 (1971): 377–403. Kellett, J. R ‘‘The Breakdown of Gild and Corporation Control over the Handcraft and Retail Trade in London.’’ Economic History Review 10, no. 3 (1958): 381–94. Kettner, James H. The Development of American Citizenship. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978. Kicza, John E. ‘‘Patterns in Early Spanish Overseas Expansion.’’ William and Mary Quarterly 49 (1992): 229–53. ———. ‘‘The Social and Political Position of Spanish Immigrants in Bourbon America and the Origins of the Independent Movement.’’ Colonial Latin American Review 4, no. 1 (1995): 105–28. Kim, Keechang. Aliens in Medieval Law: The Origins of Modern Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. King, James F. ‘‘The Colored Castes and American Representation in the Cortes of Cádiz.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 33 (1953): 33–64. Kirshner, Julius. ‘‘Civitas Sibi Faciat Civem: Bartolus of Sassoferrato’s Doctrine on the Making of a Citizen.’’ Speculum 48 (1973): 694–713. ———. ‘‘Between Nature and Culture: An Opinion of Baldus of Perugia on Venetian Citizenship as Second Nature.’’ Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 9 (1979): 179–208. ———. ‘‘Donne maritate altrove: Genere e cittadinanza in Italia.’’ In Tempi e spazi di vita femminile tra medioevo ed età moderna, ed. Silvana Seidel Menchi, Anne Jacobson Schutte, and Thomas Kuehn, 377–429. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999. Koenigsberger, Helmut. ‘‘Spain.’’ In National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe, ed. Orest Ranum, 144–72. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.

Bibliography

299

———. ‘‘National Consciousness in Early Modern Spain.’’ In Politicians and Virtuosi: Essays in Early Modern History, 121–47. London: Hambledon Press, 1986. Konetzke, Richard. ‘‘Legislación sobre inmigración de extranjeros en América durante la época colonial.’’ Revista internacional de sociología 11–12 (1945): 269–99. ———. ‘‘La condición legal de los criollos y las causas de la independencia.’’ Estudios americanos 2 (1950): 31–54. ———. Colección de documentos para la historia de la formación social de hispanoamérica, 1493–1810. Madrid: CSIC, 1953. König, Hans-Joachim. ‘‘Nacionalismo y nación en la historia de iberoamérica.’’ Cuadernos de historia latinoamericana 8 (2000): 7–47. Kramer, Stella. The English Craft Guilds: Studies in Their Progress and Decline. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. Krausman Ben Amos, Ilana. ‘‘Failure to Become Freemen: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern England.’’ Social History 16, no. 2 (1991): 155–72. Labourdette, Jean-François. La nation français à Lisbonne, 1669–1790: Entre colbertisme et liberalisme. Paris: Fondation Calouste Gulbenkian, 1988. Lacarra de Miguel, José María. ‘‘Acerca de la atracción de pobladores en las ciudades fronterizas de la España cristiana (siglos XI–XII).’’ In En la España medieval: Estudios en memoria del prof. don Salvador de Moxó, vol. 2, 485–98. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1982. La condición de la mujer en la edad media. Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 1986. Ladero Quesada, Miguel Angel. ‘‘El poder central y las ciudades en la España del antiguo régimen.’’ Revista de administración pública 94 (1981): 173–98. ———. Historia de Sevilla: La ciudad medieval (1248–1492). Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 1989. ———. Los reyes católicos: La corona y la unidad de España. Valencia: Asociación Francisco López Gomara, 1989. ———. ‘‘Monarquía y ciudades de realengo en Castilla: Siglos XII a XV.’’ In Principi e città alla fine del medioevo, ed. Sergio Genesi, 357–412. Rome: Ministero per i Beni Culturali e Ambientali, 1996. Lafaye, Jacques. Quetzalcoátl et Guadalupe: La formation de la conscience nationale au Mexique (1531–1813). Paris: Gallimard, 1974. ———. ‘‘L’éveil des nationalités dans l’Europe moderne: Le cas de l’Espagne.’’ In Nations et nationalités en Espagne XIX–XXe siècles: Actes du colloque international organisé du 28 a 31 mars 1984 à Paris, 21–34. Paris: Fondation Singer-Polignac, 1985. Lafuente Marchain, R. de. Los portugueses en Buenos Aires (siglo XVII). Madrid: Tipología de Archivos, 1931. Lalinde Abadía, Jesús. ‘‘De la nacionalidad aragonesa a la regionalidad.’’ Revista jurídica de Cataluña 72, no. 1 (1973): 537–80. ———. ‘‘La reserva de magistraturas indianas al reino de Aragón.’’ In Estructuras, gobierno y agentes de la administración en la América española (siglos XVI, XVII, y XVIII): VI Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano, 277–89. Valladolid: Casa Museo de Colón, 1984. ———. ‘‘L’inserimento dello straniero nella comunità politiche della Spagna: Un profilo

300

Bibliography

guiridico.’’ In Dentro de la città: Stranieri e realtà urbane nell’Europa dei secoli XII– XVI, ed. Gabriella Rossetti, 47–60. Naples: Liguori Editore, 1989. Langé, Christine. ‘‘L’immigration française en Aragon XVIe siècle et première moitié du XVIIe siècle,’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’époque moderne (XVIe–XVIIIe siècles), 25–44. Paris: CNRS, 1990. Langue, Frédérique. ‘‘Los franceses en Nueva España a finales del siglo XVIII: Notas sobre un estado de opinión.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 46 (1989): 219–41. ———. ‘‘ ‘El indiano de la comedia es moreno’ ou de la multitude servile à l’aristocratie blanche: Venezuela, XVIe–XVIII siècle.’’ In Transgressions et stratégies du métissage en Amérique coloniale, ed. Bernard Lavallé, 223–48. Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1999. Laprat, R. ‘‘Aubains (incapacité bénéficiales des).’’ In Dictionnaire de droit canonique, ed. R. Naz, vol. 1, 1332–79. Paris: Librairie Letouzey, 1935. Lavallé, Bernard. ‘‘Les étrangers dans les Régions de Tucuman et Potosi (1602–1610),’’ Revue Hispanique 76 (1974): 125–41. ———. ‘‘Conception, représentation et rôle de l’espace dans la revendication créole au Pérou.’’ In Espace et identité nationale en Amérique Latine, ed. Joseph Perez, 67–93. Paris: CNRS, 1981. ———. Recherches sur l’apparition de la conscience créole dans la vice-royauté du Pérou: L’antagonisme hispano-créole dans les ordres religieux (XVI-XVII). Lille: Université de Lille, 1982. ———. ‘‘Hispanité ou americanité? Les ambiguïtés de l’identité créole dans le Pérou colonial.’’ In Identités nationales et identités culturelles dans le monde ibérique et ibéroamericain: Actes du XVIIIeme congrès de la société des hispanistes français, Perpignan 20–22 mars 1982, 95–107. Toulouse: Université de Toulouse–Le Mirail, 1983. ———. ‘‘¿Hacia una ‘demanda de nación?’ (Aportes, perspectivas e hipotecas del criollismo colonial en los siglos XVI y XVII).’’ In America Latina: Dallo stato coloniale allo stato nazione, ed. Antonio Annino, Marcello Carmagnani, Gabriella Chiaramonti, Alberto Filippi, Flavio Fiorani, Alberto Gallo, and Giovanni Marchetti, vol. 2, 11–26. Turin: Franco Angeli, 1987 (also published in Elementos para un balance del criollismo colonial, ed, Bernard Lavallé, 11–26. Quito: Editora Nacional, 1992). ———. Las promesas ambiguas. Criollismo colonial en los Andes. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1993. Leblon, Bernard. ‘‘Les gitans dans la péninsule ibérique.’’ Etudes Tsiganes 10, no. 1 (1964): 1–24. ———. Les gitans d’Espagne: Le prix de la différence. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1985. ———. ‘‘Les gitans: Une société fermée?’’ In Les Sociétés Fermées dans le Monde Ibérique (XVI–XVIII siècles): Actes de la table Ronde des 8 a 9 Février 1985, 223–35. Paris: Maison des Pays Ibériques, 1986. Lefebvre-Teillard, Anne. ‘‘Ius sanguinis: L’émergence d’une principe (éléments d’histoire de la nationalité française).’’ Revue critique de droit international privé 82, no. 2 (1993): 223–50. Lequin, Yves, ed. Histoire des étrangers et de l’immigration en France. Paris: Larousse, 1992.

Bibliography

301

Levene, Ricardo. Las Indias no eran colonias. Buenos Aires: Austral, 1951. Levillier, Roberto. Ordenanzas de Don Francisco de Toledo, Virrey del Perú, 1569– 1581. Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1929. Lévy, J. P. La hiérarchie des preuves dans le droit savant du moyen âge depuis la renaissance du droit romain jusqu’à la fin du XIVe siècle. Paris: Sirey, 1939. Lewis, A. D. E., and D. J. Ibbetson. The Roman Law Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Libro cuarto de las actas del cabildo (de México City). Mexico: Municipio Libre, 1859. Libros de cabildo de Lima. Lima: Consejo Provincial de Lima, 1935–62. Lien, Arnold J, ‘‘The Acquisition of Citizenship by the Native American Indians.’’ Washington University Studies—Humanistic Series 13, no. 50 (1925): 121–79. Linehan, Peter. ‘‘Religion, Nationalism, and National Identity in Medieval Spain and Portugal.’’ In Religion and National Identity: Papers Read at the 19th Summer Meeting and 20th Winter Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, Studies in Church History 18, 161–99. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Liss, Peggy K. Mexico under Spain, 1521–1556: Society and the Origins of Nationality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975. ———. Atlantic Empires: The Network of Trade and Revolution, 1713–1826. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. Litwack, Leon F. North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Llaguno, José A. La personalidad jurídica del indio y el III concilio provincial mexicano (1585). Mexico: Porrúa, 1963. Llombart, Vicente. Campomanes: Economista y político de Carlos III. Madrid: Alianza, 1992. Lloyd, T. H. Alien Merchants in England in the High Middle Ages. Sussex: Harvester, 1982. Lockhart, James. Spanish Peru, 1532–1560: A Social History. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1994 [1968]. Lohmann Villena, Guillermo. Francisco de Toledo: Disposiciones gubernativas para el virreinato del perú, 1575–1580. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1989. Lombardi, John V. Venezuela: The Search for Order. The Dream of Progress. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Lomnitz, Claudio. ‘‘Nationalism as a Practical System: A Critique of Benedict Anderson’s Theory of Nationalism from a Spanish American Perspective.’’ In In the Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America, ed. Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López Alvarez, 329–59. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Loomis, Louise R. ‘‘Nationality at the Council of Constance: An Anglo-French Dispute.’’ American Historical Review 44 (1938–39): 508–27. López Beltrán, Clara. ‘‘Intereses y pasiones de los ‘vecinos’ de La Paz durante el siglo XVII: La élite provinciana en Charcas, virreinato del Perú.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 52, no. 1 (1995): 37–56. López de la Plaza, Gloria. ‘‘De la tierra a la villa. Desplazamientos de corto alcance vinculadas a la función administrativa de Madrid: Las vecindades.’’ In Caminos y

302

Bibliography

caminantes por las tierras de Madrid medieval, ed. Cristina Segura Graíño, 165–72. Madrid: Al Mudayna, 1994. López de Tovar, Gregorio. Indice de las leyes y glosa del mismo. In Los códigos españoles concordados y anotados, vol. 5. Madrid: La Publicidad, 1848 [1757]. López García, José Miguel, and Santos Madrazo Machazo. ‘‘A Capital City in the Feudal Order: Madrid from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century,’’ In Capital Cities and Their Hinterland in Early Modern Europe, ed. Peter Clark and Bernard Lepetit, 119– 42. Hants: Scholar Press, 1996. Losa Contreras, Carmen. El consejo de Madrid en el tránsito de la edad media a la edad moderna. Madrid: Dykinson, 1999. Luque, Miguel. ‘‘La avería en el tráfico marítimo mercantil indiano: Notas para su estudio (siglos XVI–XVIII).’’ Revista complutense de historia de América 24 (1998): 113–45. Lutz, Christopher H. Santiago de Guatemala, 1541–1773: City, Caste, and the Colonial Experience. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994. Lynch, John. The Hispanic World in Crisis and Change, 1593–1700. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994 [1969]. ———. Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. ———. ‘‘Introduction.’’ In Latin American Revolutions, 1808–1826: Old and New World Origins, ed. John Lynch, 5–38. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994. Lynch, John, ed. Latin American Revolutions, 1808–1826: Old and New World Origins. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994. MacKay, Agnus. Spain in the Middle Ages: From Frontier to Empire, 1000–1500. London: Macmillan, 1977. MacLeod, Murdo. ‘‘La situación legal de los indios en América central durante la colonia: Teoría y práctica.’’ América indígena 45, no. 3 (1985): 485–504. Madden, Marie R. Political Theory and Law in Medieval Spain. New York: Fordham University Press, 1930. Malca Olguín, Oscar. ‘‘Gobierno colonial: Tribunal Mayor del Consulado de la Ciudad de los Reyes.’’ Revista del Archivo Nacional del Perú 20 (1956): 3–41 and 273–88. ———. ‘‘El Tribunal del Consulado y los grandes servicios prestados con sus entradas y empeños a la corona española.’’ Revista del Archivo Nacional de Perú 20 (1956): 6– 10. Maltby, William S. The Black Legend in England: The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558–1660. Durham: Duke University Press, 1971. Manning, Roger B. ‘‘Rural Societies in Early Modern Europe.’’ Sixteenth Century Journal 17, no. 3 (1986): 353–60. Manzano Manzano, Juan. La incorporación de las Indias a la corona de Castilla. Madrid, Cultura Hispánica, 1948. ———. ‘‘La adquisición de las Indias por los reyes católicos y su incorporación a los reinos castellanos.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 21 (1951): 5–170. Maravall, José Antonio. La teoría española del estado en el siglo XVII. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1944. ———. El concepto de España en la edad media. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1954.

Bibliography

303

———. ‘‘Del régimen feudal al régimen corporativo en el pensamiento de Alfornso X.’’ In Estudios de historia del pensamiento español. Edad Media, Jose Antonio Maravall, 89–140. Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1967. ———. ‘‘Trabajo y exclusión: El trabajador manual en el sistema social español de la primera modernidad.’’ In Les problèmes de l’exclusion en Espagne (XVIe–XVIIe siècles): Idéologie et discours. Colloque international (Sorbonne, 13, 14, et 15 mai 1982), ed. Augustin Redondo, 135–59. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1983. Mariana, Juan de. Del rey y de la institución real. Madrid: Biblioteca de autores españoles, 1950 [1598]. Marías, Julián. España inteligible: Razón histórica de España. Madrid: Alianza, 1985 (Understanding Spain, trans. Frances M. López Morillas. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990). ———. La corona y la comunidad hispánica de naciones. Valencia: Asociación Francisco López de Gomara, 1992. Mariluz Urquijo, José María. ‘‘El diputado del consulado de Lima en Buenos Aires.’’ In ‘‘Obras de José María Mariluz Urquijo,’’ in Nuevas Aportaciones a la historia jurídica de Iberoamérica [CD-ROM], ed. José Andrés Gallego. Madrid: Fundación Tavera, 2000. Marín y Mendoza, Joaquín. Historia del derecho natural y de gentes, ed. Manuel García Pelayo. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1950 [1770s]. Mar Molinero, Clare, and Angel Smith, ed. Nationalism and the Nations in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities, Oxford: Berg, 1996. Marshall, T. H. Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950. Martelli, Francesco. ‘‘Cittadini, nobiltà e riforma comunitativa a Pescia.’’ In La comunità negli stati italiani d’antico regime, ed. Giovanni Tocci, 221–32. Bologna: Cooperativa Libreria Universitaria Editrice, 1989. Martínez, María Elena. ‘‘Space, Order, and Group Identities in a Spanish Colonial Town: Puebla de los Angeles.’’ In The Collective and the Public in Latin America: Cultural Identities and Political Order, ed. Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog, 13–36. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2000. ———. ‘‘Religion, Purity, and ‘Race’: The Spanish Concept of Limpieza de Sangre in Seventeenth Century Mexico and the Broader Atlantic World.’’ Paper presented at the International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World, Harvard University, August 8, 2000. Martínez Cardós, José. Las Indias y las Cortes de Castilla durante los siglos XVI y XVII. Madrid: CSIC, 1956. ———. ‘‘Asuntos americanos tratados en las Cortes de Castilla y León.’’ In Las Cortes de Castilla y León, 1188–1988: Actas de la tercera etapa del Congreso Científico sobre la Historia de las Cortes de Castilla y León, León, del 26 al 30 de septiembre de 1998, vol. 1, 627–43. Valladolid: Cortes de Castilla y León, 1990. Martínez de San Pedro, María de los Desamparados. ‘‘Repobladores portugueses en Almería según el libro de repartimento.’’ In Actas das II jornadas luso-espahnolas de história medieval, vol. 2, 721–36. Port: Instituto Nacional de Investigação Científica, 1987.

304

Bibliography

Martínez Martínez, Manuel. La minoría gitana en la provincia de Almería durante la crisis del antiguo régimen (1750–1811). Almería: Instituto de Estudios Almarienses, 1998. Marzhal, Peter. Town in the Empire: Government, Politics, and Society in Seventeenth Century Popayan. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978. Matienzo, Juan de. Gobierno del Perú, ed. Guillermo Lohmann Villena. Paris: Institut Français d’Etudes Andine, 1967 [1567]. McAlister, Lyle N. Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492–1700. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. McAnear, Beverly. ‘‘The Place of Freeman in Old New York.’’ New York History 21 (1940): 418–30. Melzer, John T. S. Bastion of Commerce in the City of Kings: The Consulado de Comercio de Lima, 1593–1887. Lima: Concytec, 1991. Menéndez Pidal, Ramón. Los españoles en la Historia. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1982 [1947]. ———. El imperio hispánico y los cinco reinos. Dos épocas en la estructura política de España. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1950. Merewether, Henry Alworth, and Archibald John Stephens. The History of the Boroughs and Municipal Corporations of the United Kingdom from the Earliest to the Present Time. London: Stevens and Sons, 1835. Merino Urrutia, José J. Bautista. Ordenanzas de Ojacastro (Rioja) (siglo XVI). Madrid: Instituto de Administración Local, 1958. Merrel, James H. ‘‘The Custom of Our Country: Indians and Colonists in Early America.’’ In Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First Empire, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, 117–56. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991. Merrick, Jeffrey. ‘‘Conscience and Citizenship in Eighteenth Century France.’’ Eighteenth Century Studies 21, no. 1 (1987): 48–70. Miller, Frank Hayden. ‘‘Legal Qualification for Office in America.’’ Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1899, vol. 1, 89–153. Minguet, Charles. ‘‘El concepto de nación, pueblo, estado y patria en las generaciones de la independencia.’’ In Recherches sur le monde hispanique au 19e siècle, 57–71. Lille: Université Lille III, 1973. ———. ‘‘Nationalisme continental et ‘patria chica.’ ’’ In Nationalisme et littérature en Espagne et en Amérique Latine au XIXe siècle, ed. Claude Dumas, 169–78. Lille: Université Lille III, 1982. Molà, Luca, and Reinhold C. Mueller. ‘‘Essere straniero a Venezia nel tardo medioevo: Accoglienza e rifiuto nei privilegi di cittadinanza e nelle sentenze criminali.’’ Le migrazioni in Europa secc. XII–XVIII: Atti della venticinquesima settimana di studi 3–8 maggio 1993, ed. Sionetta Cavaciocchi, 834–51. Florence: Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica F. Dantini, 1993. Molas Ribalta, Pere. ‘‘El exclusivismo en los gremios de la corona de Aragón: Limpieza de sangre y limpieza de oficios.’’ In Les sociétés fermées dans le monde ibérique (XVI– XVIII siècles): Définitions et problématique. Actes de la table ronde des 8 et 9 février 1985, 63–80. Paris: CNRS, 1986.

Bibliography

305

———. ‘‘Magistrados foráneos en la Valencia borbónica.’’ Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 192, no. 2 (1995): 265–332. Molina, Raúl Alejandro. ‘‘La expulsión de los portugueses de santa Fe (1649–1650).’’ Historia 9, no. 31 (1963): 91–97. Molinari, Diego Luis. ‘‘Naturalidad y connaturalización en el derecho de Indias.’’ Revista jurídica y de ciencias sociales 32 (1915): 698–714. Molinari, Diego Luis, ed. Documentos para la historia argentina. Buenos Aires: Compañía Sudamericana de Billetes de Banco, 1919. Monguio, Luis. ‘‘Palabras e ideas: ‘Patria’ y ‘nación’ en el virreinato del Perú.’’ Revista iberoamericana 44, nos. 104–5 (1978): 451–70. Monsalvo Antón, José María. Ordenanzas medievales de Avila y su tierra. Avila: Instituto Gran Duque de Alba, 1990. Moore, John Preston. The Cabildo in Peru under the Habsburgs: A Study in the Origins and Powers of the Town Council in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1530–1700. Durham: Duke University Press, 1954. Moore, Kenneth. Those of the Street. The Catholic-Jews of Majorca: A Study in Urban Cultural Change. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976. Morales, Francisco. Ethnic and Social Background of the Franciscan Friars in Seventeenth Century Mexico. Washington: Academy of American Franciscan History, 1973. Morales Alvarez, Juan M. Los extranjeros con carta de naturaleza de las Indias durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII. Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1980. Morales Arrizabalaga, Jesús. La derogación de los fueros de Aragón (1707–1711). Huesca: Diputación Provincial, 1986. Morel d’Arleux, Antonia, and Francisca Pizarro Maya. ‘‘El concepto de ‘ciudadano’ en los siglos XVI y XVII: Evolución semántica y dimensión política. La república perfecta de mayores, menores y yguales, de Diego de Guerra.’’ In La ville dans le monde ibérique et ibéro-américain (espace-pouvoir-mémoire), ed. Jean-Pierre Clément and AnneMarie Capdeboscq, 47–65. Poitiers: UFR Langues Littérature Poitiers, 1995. Morelli, Federica. ‘‘Territorio o nazione. Riforma e dissoluzione dello spazio imperiale in Ecuador, 1765–1830.’’ Ph.D. diss., Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitari di Perfezionamenti S. Anna, Classe di Scienze Sociali, Settore di Scienze Politiche, 1997. ———. ‘‘Las reformas en Quito: La redistribución del poder y la consolidación de la jurisdicción municipal (1765–1809).’’ Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 34 (1997): 183–207. ———. ‘‘El espacio municipal: Cambios en la jurisdicción territorial del cabildo de Quito, 1765–1830.’’ Dinámicas de antiguo régimen y orden constitucional. Representación, justicia y administración en Iberoamérica. Siglos XVIII–XIX, ed. Marco Bellingeri, 261–94. Turin: Otto, 2000. Moreno, Laudelino. ‘‘Los extranjeros y el ejercicio del comercio en Indias,’’ In Colección de estudios históricos, jurídicos, pedagógicos y literarios (Melanges Altamira), 364– 85. Madrid: Manuel Aguilar, 1936. Moreyra y Paz Soldán, Manuel. El tribunal del consulado de Lima, sus antecedentes y fundación. Lima: Lumen, 1950. ———. El tribunal del consulado de Lima: Quaderno de juntas (1721–1727). Lima: Instituto Histórico del Perú, 1959.

306

Bibliography

Mori, Elisabetta. ‘‘ ‘Tot reges in urbe roma quot cives’: Cittadinanza e nobiltà a Roma tra cinque e seicento.’’ Roma moderna e contemporanea 4, no. 2 (1996): 379–401. Mörner, Magnus. ‘‘La política de segregación y el mestizaje en la audiencia de Guatemala.’’ Revista de Indias 24, nos. 95–96 (1964): 137–51. ———. ‘‘La difusión del castellano y el aislamiento de los indios: Dos aspiraciones contradictorias de la corona española.’’ In Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives, 435–46. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1967. ———. La Corona española y los foráneos en los pueblos de indios de América. Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1999 [1970]. ———. ‘‘Ethnicity, Social Mobility, and Mestizaje in Spanish Colonial History.’’ In Iberische Welten. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Günter Kahle, ed. Felix Becker, Holger M. Meding, Barbara Potthast-Jutkeit, and Karin Schüller, 301–14. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1994. Morris, Richard B. Studies in the History of American Law. New York: Columbia University Press, 1930. Morse, Richard M. ‘‘Introducción a la historia urbana de Hispanoamérica.’’ Revista de Indias 32, nos. 127–39 (1972): 9–53. ———. ‘‘Urban Development.’’ In Colonial Spanish America, ed. Leslie Bethell, 165–202. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987 (also published in Cambridge History of Latin America, vol. 2, 67–104). Moya Pons, Frank. El cabildo y la vida local de Lima en el siglo XVI (1534–1553). Santo Domingo: Corripio, 1985. Mueller, Reinhold C. ‘‘Veneti facti privilegio: Les étrangers naturalisés à Venise entre XIVe et XVIe siècle.’’ In Les étrangers dans la ville: Minorité et espace urbain du bas moyen age à l’époque moderne, ed. Jacques Bottin and Donatella Calabi, 171–81. Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1999. Muñoz García, María José. Las limitaciones a la capacidad de obrar de la mujer casada, 1505–1975. Madrid: UNED, 1991. Muro Orejón, Antonio. Cedulario americano del siglo XVIII. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1956–77. ———. ‘‘El ayuntamiento de Sevilla modelo de los municipios americanos.’’ Anales de la Universidad Hispalense 20 (1960): 69–85. ———. ‘‘La igualdad entre indios y españoles: La real cédula de 1697.’’ In Estudios sobre política indigenista española en América, vol. 1, 365–86. Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1975. Nader, Helen. Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516–1700. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. Navarro de la Torre, Luisa. ‘‘Avecindamientos en Huete al comenzar el siglo XV.’’ In 1490. En el umbral de la modernidad: El mediterráneo europeo y las ciudades en el tránsito de los siglos XV–XVI, ed. José Hinojosa Montalvo and Jesús Pradells Nadal, vol. 2, 693–711. Valencia: Generalitat Valenciana, 1994. Netanyahu, Benzion. The Origins of the Inquisition in Fifteenth Century Spain. New York: Random House, 1995. Nicolet, Claude. ‘‘Citoyenneté française et citoyenneté romaine: Essai de-mise-en perspective.’’ In La nozione di ‘romano’ tra cittadinanza e universalità. Seminario inter-

Bibliography

307

nazionale di studi storici da Roma alla terza Roma, 145–73. Naples: Edizioni Scientifische Italiane, 1982. Noiriel, Gerard. La tyrannie du national: Le droit d’asile en Europe (1793–1993). Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1991. Nordman, Daniel. Frontières de France: De l’espace au territoire, XVIe–XIXe siècle. Paris: Gallimard, 1998. Noroña, Carlos G. Studies in Spanish Renaissance Thought. The Hague: Martirus Hijhoff, 1975. Nuix, Juan. Reflexiones imparciales sobre la humanidad de los epsañoles en las Indias contra los pretendidos filósofos y políticos, trans. Pedro Varela y Ulloa. Madrid, 1782. Núñez de Castro, Alonso. Libro histórico político solo Madrid es corte y el cortesano en Madrid. Madrid, 1669. Nunn, Charles F. ‘‘Naturalization in New Spain, 1700 to 1760: The Case of Jean Malibran.’’ SECOLAS Annals 8 (1977): 61–71. ———. Foreign Immigrants in Early Bourbon Mexico, 1700–1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Olaechea Cabayen, Juan B. ‘‘Política social y política racial de España en orden a los indios.’’ Revista internacional de sociología 27 (1969): 101–22. ———. ‘‘La ciudadanía del indio en los dominios hispanos.’’ Cuadernos de investigación histórica 5 (1981): 113–33. Oliva Melgar, José María. ‘‘Realidad y Ficción en el monopolio de Indias: Una reflexión sobre el sistema español en el siglo XVII.’’ Manuscrits 14 (1996): 321–55. ———. ‘‘La negociación del nuevo asiento de la avería (circa 1643–1667).’’ In Actas del XI congreso internacional de AHILA (Liverpool, 17–22 de septiembre de 1996), ed. John R. Fisher, vol. 2, 44–69. Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1998. Ordenanzas de buen gobierno dadas por Hernando Cortés para los vecinos y moradores de la Nueva España 1524. Madrid: José Porrúa, 1960. ‘‘Ordenanzas del consulado de Sevilla.’’ Archivo Hispalense 173 (1973): 171–73. O’Reilly, William, ‘‘The Naturalization Act of 1709 and the Settlement of Germans in Britain, Ireland, and the Colonies.’’ In From Strangers to Citizens: The Integration of Immigrant Communities in Britain, Ireland, and Colonial America, 1550–01750, ed. Randolph Vigne and Charles Littleton, 492–502. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2001. Ortega y Gasset, José. Invertebrate Spain, trans. Mildred Adams. New York: W. W. Norton, 1937 [1921]. Ortiz de la Tabla, Ducasse. ‘‘Extranjeros en la audiencia de Quito (1595–1603).’’ In América y España del siglo XVI: Homenaje a Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, ed. Francisco Solano and Fermín del Pino, 93–113. Madrid: CSIC, 1983. Ozanam, Didier. ‘‘Les origines du troisième pacte de famille (1761).’’ Revue d’histoire diplomatique 75, no. 2 (1961): 305–40. ———. ‘‘La Colonie Française de Cadix au XVII siècle d’après un document inédit (1777).’’ Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez 4 (1968): 259–348. ———. ‘‘Le recensement des étrangers en 1791: Une source pour l’histoire des colonies étrangers en Espagne.’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’époque moderne (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle), 197–214. Paris: CNRS, 1990.

308

Bibliography

———. ‘‘Les étrangers dans la haute administration espagnole au XVIII siècle.’’ In Pouvoir et société dans l’Espagne moderne: Hommage à Bartolomé Bennasar, ed. Jean-Pierre Amalric, 215–29. Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail, 1993. Pagden, Anthony. ‘‘Identity Formation in Spanish America.’’ In Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800, ed. Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, 51–93. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. ———. ‘‘Old Constitutions and Ancient Indian Empires: Juan Pablo Viscardo and the Language of Revolution in Spanish America.’’ In Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish American Social and Political Theory, 1513–1830, Anthony Pagden, 117–32. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990. ———. Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, c. 1500–c.1800. Yale: Yale University Press, 1995. Pagden, Anthony, and Jeremy Lawrance eds. Francisco de Vitoria: Political Writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Palacio Atard, Vincente. El tercer pacto de familia. Madrid: CSIC, 1945. Palliser, D. M. ‘‘A Crisis in English Towns? The Case of York, 1460–1640.’’ Northern History 14 (1978): 108–25. Pan-Montojo, Juan, ed. Más se perdió en Cuba: España, 1898 y la crisis de fin de siglo. Madrid: Alianza, 1998. Panero, Francesco. Comuni e borghi franchi nel Piemonte medievale. Bologna: Cooperativa Libreria Universitaria Editrice, 1988. Parrón Salas, Carmen. ‘‘El nacionalismo emergente y el comercio. La expulsión de extranjeros de América: Perú, 1745–1778.’’ In Actas del XI congreso internacional de AHILA: Liverpool 17–22 de septiembre de 1996, ed. John Fisher, vol. 1, 200–218. Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1998. Parry, Clive. British Nationality Law and the History of Naturalization. Milan: Giuffré, 1954. Parry, J. H. The Age of Reconnaissance: Discovery, Exploration, and Settlement, 1450– 1650. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981 [1963]. Pastor, María Alba. ‘‘Criollismo y contrareforma: Nueva España entre 1570 y 1630.’’ Ibero-Amerikanisches Archiv 22, nos. 3–4 (1996): 247–66. Patterson, Catherine F. Urban Patronage in Early Modern England: Corporate Bouroughs, the Landed Elite and the Crown, 1580–1640. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. Pauffin, Henry. Essai sur l’organisation et la jurisdiction municipales au moyen âge. Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1886. Payne, Stanley G. Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. Paz, Julián. ‘‘Reclamaciones de los mallorquines llamados de la calle sobre su condición social.’’ Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos 16 (1907): 184–200. Pearl, Valerie. ‘‘Social Policy in Early Modern London.’’ In History and Imagination: Essays in Honor of H. R. Trevor-Roper, ed. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl, and Blair Worden, 115–31. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982. Pelorson, Jean-Marc. Les letrados. Juristes castillans sous Philippe III: Recherches sur leur place dans la société, la culture, et l’état. Poitiers: Université de Poitiers, 1980.

Bibliography

309

Peñafiel, Ramón Antonio. ‘‘Gitanos en Murcia en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII: ¿Integración o extinción?’’ Anales de historia contemporánea 4 (1985): 7–34. Percourt García, Enrique. ‘‘Una institución singular en la historia del derecho internacional privado español: El ‘fuero de extranjería.’ In Estudios de derecho internacional público y privado: Homenaje al prof. Luis Sela Sampil, vol. 2, 883–904. Oviedo: Universidad de Oviedo, 1970. Pérez Collados, José María. Una aproximación histórica al concepto jurídico de nacionalidad. Zaragoza: Fernando el Católico, 1993. Pérez de Guzmán, Torcuato. Los gitanos herreros de Sevilla. Seville: Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1981. Pérez Esteve, María Rosa. El problema de los vagos en la España del siglo XVIII. Madrid: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1976. Pérez Guilhou, Dardo. La opinión pública española y las cortes de Cádiz frente a la emancipación hispanoamericana, 1808–1814. Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1981. Pérez Herrero, Pedro. ‘‘The Beneficiaries of the Bourbon Reforms: Spain versus the New Spain Elite.’’ In Economic Effects of the European Expansion, 1492–1824, ed. José Casas Pardo, 333–86. Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1992. Pérez Martínez, Lorenzo, ed. Revindicación de los judíos mallorquines (Documentos para su estudio I). Palma de Majorca: Fontes Rerum Balearius, 1983. Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco, José Manuel. Cortes de Castilla. Barcelona: Ariel, 1974. ———. ‘‘La ‘Recopilación’ de las leyes de los reinos castellano-leoneses. Esbozos para un comentario a su libro primero.’’ In Felipe II y su época: Actas del simposium en San Lorenzo del Escorial 1/5–IX–1998, vol. 2, 127–215. Escorial: RCU Escorial María Cristina, 1998. ———. ‘‘Los criterios jurídicos de Cristóbal Colón.’’ In José Manuel Pérez Prendes Muñoz Arraco—Pareceres (1956–1998), ed. Magdalena Rodríguez Gil. Interpretatio: Revista de historia del derecho 7, no. 2 (1999): 1035–62. ———. Historia del derecho español. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1999. ———. ‘‘La obsesión de la ‘nueva planta.’ ’’ Revista de la facultad de historia de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid 94 (2001): 129–50. Pérez Rodríguez, Manuel J. Los extranjeros en Canarias: Historia de su situación jurídica. Laguna: Universidad de la Laguna, 1990. Peronnet, Michel. ‘‘Bourgeois, Bourgeoisie: Les définitions du Dictionnaire de l’Académie (1762–1802).’’ Il pensiero politico 19, no. 1 (1986): 103–12. Perrin, Edmond. ‘‘Le droit de bourgeoisie et l’immigration rurale à Metz au XIIIe siècle.’’ Annuaire de la société d’histoire et d’archéologie de la Lorraine 30 (1921): 513–85 and 33 (1924): 148–52. ———. ‘‘La bourgeoisie dauphinoise d’après les chartes de franchise.’’ Annales de l’Université de Grenoble 2 (1925): 155–250. Peset Reig, Mariano. ‘‘Derecho romano y derecho real en las universidades del siglo XVIII.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 45 (1975): 273–339. Petit, Carlos. ‘‘Derecho común y derecho castellano. Notas de literatura jurídica para su estudio (siglo XV–XVIII).’’ Tijdschrift Voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 50, no. 2 (1982): 157– 95.

310

Bibliography

Petit-Dutaillis, Charles. Les communes françaises des origines au XVIIIe siècle. Paris: Albin Michel, 1947. Peytavin, Mireille. ‘‘Naples au miroir espagnol: Une contemplation amoureuse.’’ In Observation and Communication: The Construction of Realities in the Hispanic World, ed. Johannes Michael Scholz and Tamar Herzog, 271–98. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997. ———. ‘‘Españoles e italianos en Sicilia, Nápoles y Milán durante los siglos XVII y XVIII. Sobre la oportunidad de ser nacional o natural.’’ Relaciones 19, no. 73 (1998): 85– 114. ———. ‘‘Aduanas locales y privilegios de ciudadanía. Tentativas de intervención institucional de la monarquía española en las provincias de Nápoles.’’ In Felipe II y su tiempo: V reunión científica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna, ed. José Luis Pereira Iglesias, vol. 1, 329–34. Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1999. Pietschmann, Horst. ‘‘Los principios rectores de organización estatal en las Indias.’’ In De los imperios a las naciones: Iberoamérica, ed. Antonio Annino, Luis Castro Leiva, and François Xavier Guerra, 75–103. Zaragoza: Ibercaja, 1994. ———. ‘‘La resistencia española al imperio: Las Indias en los años iniciales del reinado de Carlos V.’’ In Estudios de historia del derecho europeo. Homenaje a A. G. Martínez Diez, vol. 2, 13–30. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1994. Pike, Fredrick B. Hispanismo, 1898–1936: Spanish Conservatives and Liberals and Their Relations with Spanish America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971. Pike, Ruth. Enterprise and Adventure: The Genoveses in Seville and the Opening of the New World. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966. ———. Aristocrats and Traders: Sevillian Society in the Sixteenth Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pimenta Ferro Tavares, José María. Os judeus em Portugal no século XV. Lisbon: Universidade Nova, 1982–84. Piña Homs, Román. La reincorporación de Menorca a la corona española, 1781–1798 (Medidas de gobierno y administración). Majorca: Universidad de Palma de Mallorca, 1983. ———. ‘‘La condición de natural del reino de Mallorca: Base para una aproximación histórica a la ciudadanía mallorquina.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 55 (1985): 307–32. Planas Roselló, Antonio, ed. Recopilación del derecho de Mallorca 1622 por los doctores Pere Canet, Antoni Mesquida y Jordi Zaforteza. Majorca: Miquel Font, 1996. Poitrineau, A. ‘‘La imigración francesa en el reino de Valencia (siglos XVI–XIX).’’ Moneda y Crédito 137 (1976): 103–33. Poloni-Simard, Jacques. ‘‘Formación, desarrollo y configuración socio-étnica de una ciudad colonial: Cuenca, siglos XVI–XVIII.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 54, no. 2 (1997): 413–45. ———. ‘‘Problèmes et tentatives d’identification des métis à travers la documentation coloniale: L’exemple de Cuenca.’’ In Transgressions et stratégies du métissage en Amérique coloniale, ed. Bernard Lavallé, 11–21. Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1999.

Bibliography

311

———. La mosaïque indienne. Mobilité, stratification sociale et métissage dans le corregimiento de Cuenca (questionnaire) du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle. Paris: EHESS, 2000. Pont de Nemours, Pierre Samuel du. Le pacte de famille et les conventions subséquentes entre la France et l’Espagne avec les observations sur chaque article. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1790. Poqueres i Gené, Enric. Lourde alliance: Mariage de Juifs convertis à Majorque (1435– 1750). Paris: Kimé, 1995. Porcel, Baltasar. Los Chuetas mallorquines: Quince siglos de racismo. Palma de Majorca: M. Font, 1986. Porras Arboleda, Pedro A., ed. Ordenanzas de la muy noble, famosa y muy leal ciudad de Jaén guarda y defendimiento de los reinos de Castilla. Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1993 [1573]. Portillo Valdés, José María. Monarquía y gobierno provincial: Poder y constitución en las provincias vascas (1760–1808). Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1991. ———. ‘‘Imaginación y representación de la nación española (el debate sobre la naturaleza de la representación nacional y la tentativa de Francisco Xavier Uriortua).’’ Anuario de historian del derecho español 65 (1995): 267–320. ———. ‘‘Los límites de la monarquía: Catecismo de estado y constitución política en España a finales del siglo XVIII.’’ Quaderni Fiorentini 25 (1996): 183–263. ———. La nazione cattolica. Cadice 1812: Una constituzione per la Spagna. Mandurias: Pietro La Caita, 1988. ———. Revolución de Nación: orrígenes de de la cultura constitucional en España, 1780– 1812. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2000. Pradells Nadal, Jesús. ‘‘Italianos en la España del siglo XVIII.’’ In Españoles en Italia e italianos en España: IV encuentro de investigadores de las universidades de Alicante y Macerata (mayo, 1995), ed. Enrique Giménez, Miguel A. Lozano, and Juan A. Ríos, 61–75. Alicante: Universidad de Alicante, 1995. Price, Polly J. ‘‘Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608).’’ Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 9 (1997): 73–145. Primer libro de Actas [del cabildo de México]. N.p.: n.d. Puente Brunke, José de la. Encomienda y encomenderos en el Perú: Estudio social y político de una institución colonial. Seville: Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1992. Quaglioni, Diego. ‘‘The Legal Definition of Citizenship in the Late Middle Ages.’’ In City States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy, ed. Anthony Molho, Kurt Raaflaub, and Julia Emlen, 155–67. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991. Ragussis, Michale. ‘‘The Birth of a Nation in Victorian Culture: The Converted Daughter and the ‘Secret Race.’ ’’ Critical Inquiry 29 (1994): 477–508. Ramos (Pérez), Demetrio. ‘‘Las Cortes de Cádiz y América.’’ Revista de estudios políticos 126 (1962): 433–639. ———. La fundación de Caracas y el desarrollo de una fecunda polémica: Cauces jurídicoconsetudinarios de la erección de las ciudades americanas. Caracas: Italgráfica, 1967. ———. ‘‘La aparente exclusión de los aragoneses de las Indias: Una medida de alta política de don Fernando el Católico.’’ Estudios (1976): 7–40. Ramsden, Herbert. The 1898 Movement in Spain: Towards a Reinterpretation with

312

Bibliography

Special Reference to En Torno al Casticismo and Idearium Español. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974. Rappaport, Steve. Worlds within Worlds: Structures of Life in Sixteenth Century London. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Real Díaz, José Joaquín. ‘‘El consulado de la universidad de cargadores a Indias: Su documento fundacional.’’ Archivo Hispalense 147–52 (1968): 179–291. Reig Peset, Mariano. ‘‘Derecho romano y derecho real en las universidades del siglo XVIII.’’ Anuario de historia del derecho español 45 (1975): 273–339. Resnik, David. ‘‘John Locke and the Problem of Naturalization.’’ Review of Politics 49, no. 3 (1987): 358–81. Rétat, Pierre. ‘‘The Evolution of the Citizen from the Ancien Régime to the Revolution.’’ In The French Revolution and the Meaning of Citizenship, ed. Renée Waldinger, Philip Dawson, and Isser Woloch, 3–15. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. Reynolds, Susan. An Introduction to the History of English Medieval Towns. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. ———. Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900–1300. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Riandiere la Roch, Josette. ‘‘Du discours d’exclusion des Juifs: Antijudaism ou Antisémitism.’’ In Les Problèmes de l’exclusion en Espagne (XVIe–XVIIe siècles), ed. Augustin Redondo, 51–75. Paris: La Sorbonne, 1983. Riera, Juan. Carlos III y los Chuetas mallorquines. Valladolid: Cuadernos Simancas de investigación histórica, 1975. Riesenberg, Peter. ‘‘Civism and Roman Law in Fourteenth Century Italian Society.’’ Explorations in Economic History 7, nos. 1–2 (1969): 237–54. ———. ‘‘Citizenship and Equality in Late Medieval Italy.’’ Studia Gratiana 15 (1972): 423–39. ———. ‘‘Citizenship and Law in Late Medieval Italy.’’ Viator 5 (1974): 333–46. ———. Citizenship in Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992. Rieu-Millán, Marie Laure. Los diputados americanos en las Cortes de Cádiz (igualdad o independencia). Madrid: CSIC, 1990. Rigaudiere, Albert. ‘‘Universitas, corpus, communitas et consulatus dans les chartes des villes et bourgs d’Auvergne du XIIe au XVe siècle.’’ In Gouverner la ville au moyen âge, ed. Albert Rigaudiere, 21–51. Paris: Anthropos, 1993. Ringrose, David R. Madrid and the Spanish Economy, 1560–1850. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. ———. ‘‘Madrid, capital imperial (1561–1833).’’ In Madrid. Historia de una capital, ed. Santos Juliá, David Ringrose, and Cristina Segura, 121–251. Madrid: Alianza, 1994. ———. Spain, Europe, and the ‘‘Spanish Miracle,’’ 1700–1900.’’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Robbins, Caroline. ‘‘A Note on General Naturalization under the Later Stuarts and a Speech in the House of Commons on the Subject in 1664.’’ Journal of Modern History 34 (1962): 168–84. Robinson, David J. ‘‘Indian Migration in Eighteenth Century Yucatan: The Open Nature

Bibliography

313

of the Close Corporate Community.’’ In Studies in Spanish American Population History, ed. David J. Robinson, 149–73. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. Robinson O. F., T. D. Fergus, and W. M. Gordon, eds. European Legal History: Sources and Institutions. London: Butterworths, 1994. Roca i Trias, Encarna. ‘‘ ‘Unde cathalanus quasi in Cathalonia stans’: La condición de catalán en el derecho histórico.’’ Revista jurídica de Cataluña 77 (1978): 7–44. Rock, David. Argentina, 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. Rodríguez, Jaime O. The Independence of Spanish America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Rodríguez, Mario. El experimento de Cádiz en Centroamérica, 1808–1826. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984. Rodríguez Casado, Vicente, and Florentino Pérez Embid, eds. Manuel de Amat y Juniet— virrey del Perú, 1761–1776: Memoria de gobierno. Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1947 [1776]. Rodríguez Díaz, Laura. Reforma e ilustración en la España del siglo XVIII: Pedro Rodríguez de Campomanes. Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1975. Rodríguez Fernández, Agustín. Alcaldes y regidores: Administración territorial y gobierno municipal en Cantabria durante la edad moderna. Santander: Instituto Cultural de Cantabria, 1986. Rodríguez Vicente, María Encarnación. El tribunal del consulado de Lima en la primera mitad del siglo XVII. Madrid: Cultura Hispánica, 1960. ———. ‘‘Los extranjeros en el reino del Perú a fines del siglo XVI.’’ In Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives, vol. 2, 533–46. Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1967. ———. ‘‘Los cargadores a Indias y su contribución a los gastos de la monarquía, 1550– 1750.’’ Anuario de estudios americanos 34 (1977): 212–19. Romano, Ruggiero. ‘‘Algunas consideraciones alrededor de nación, estado y libertad en Europa y América centro-meridional.’’ In America Latina: Dallo stato coloniale allo stato nazione (1750–1940), ed. Antonio Annino, Marcello Carmagnani, Gabriella Chiaramonti, Alberto Filippi, Flavio Fiorani, Alberto Gallo, and Giovanni Marchetti, vol. 1, 1–21. Milan: Franco Angeli, 1987 (also published in Ruggiero Romano, Consideraciones: Siete estudios de historia, Lima: Pomciencias, 1992, 229–75, and in Robert Blancarte, ed., Cultura e identidad nacional, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994, 21–43). Romero, José Luis. Latinoamérica: Las ciudades y las ideas. Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1976. Rommen, Heinrich A. La teoría del estado y de la comunidad internacional en Francisco Suárez. Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1951. Rosa Olivera, Leopoldo de la. ‘‘Francisco de Riberol y la colonia genovesa en Canarias.’’ Anuario de estudios atlánticos 18 (1972): 61–198. Rosenblat, Angel. La población indígena y le mestizaje en America. Buenos Aires: Nova, 1954. Rossetti, Gabriella, ed. Dentro della città: Stranieri e realtà urbane nell’Europa dei secoli XII–XVI. Naples: Liguori, 1989. Ruano Eloy, Benito. ‘‘La participación extranjera en la guerra de Granada.’’ Revista de archivos, bibliotecas y museos 80, no. 4 (1977): 679–701.

314

Bibliography

Rubio García, Luis. Los judíos de Murcia en la baja edad media (1350–1500). Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1992. Rucqoi, Adeline. ‘‘Genèse médiévale de l’Espagne moderne: Du pouvoir et de la nation (1250–1516).’’ In L’état modene: Genèse. Bilans et perspectives. Actes du Colloque tenu au CNRS à Paris les 19–20 septembre 1989, ed. Jean Philippe Genet, 17–31. Paris: CNRS, 1990. Ruiz Ibáñez, José Javier. ‘‘Sujets et citoyens: Les relations entre l’état, la ville, la bourgeoisie, et les institutions militaires municipals à Murcie (XVIe–XVIIe siècle).’’ In Statuts individuels, statuts corporatifs, e statuts judiciaries dans les villes européenes (moyen âge et temps modernes), ed. Marc Boone and Maarten Prak, 129–57. Leuven: Garant, 1996. Ruiz Rivera, Julián B., and Manuela García Bernal. Cargadores a Indias. Madrid: Mapfre, 1992. Rumazo González, José. Libro primero de cabildos de Quito. Quito: Archivo Municipal, 1934. ———. Libro segundo de cabildos de Quito. Quito: Archivo Municipal, 1934. Russel, Conrad. ‘‘Gran Bretaña a comienzos del siglo XVII: Monarquía compuesta y reinos múltiples.’’ In Las monarquías del antiguo régimen, ¿monarquías compuestas?, ed. Conrad Russell and José Andrés Gallego, 31–43. Madrid: Editorial Complutense, 1996. Russel, John Henderson. The Free Negro in Virginia, 1619–1865. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1913. Saborit Banderas, Pere. ‘‘Gitanos en Castellón, 1717–1745.’’ Estudios castelloneses 1 (1982): 291–312. Sacristán y Martínez, Antonio. Municipalidades de Castilla y León: Estudio históricocrítico. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, 1981. Sáenz de Santa María, Carmelo. Libro viejo de la fundación de Guatemala. Guatemala: Academia de Geografía e Historia de Guatemala, 1991. Sahlins, Peter. Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. ———. ‘‘Fictions of a Catholic France: The Naturalizaiton of Foreigners, 1685–1787.’’ Representations 47 (1994): 85–110. ———. ‘‘La nationalité avant la lettre: Les pratiques de naturalisation en France sous l’Ancien Régime.’’ Annales ESC 55, no. 5 (2000): 1081–1108. Sala (Bañuls), Juan. Ilustración del derecho real de España. Mexico: Imprenta de Galván, 1831 [1803]. Salas Ausens, José Antonio. ‘‘Les Français en Espagne dans le second moitié du XVIIIe siècle.’’ In Les français en Espagne à l’époque moderne (XVIe–XVIIIe siècle), 155–71. Paris: CNRS, 1990. Salas Ausens, José Antonio, and Encarna Jarque Martínez. ‘‘Extranjeros en España en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII.’’ In Coloquio Internacional Carlos III y su Siglo. Actas, vol. 2, 985–97. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1990. Sales, Núria. ‘‘Naturalizaçães catalãs sécolos XV a XVIII.’’ Ler História 9 (1986): 41– 63. ———. ‘‘Natuals i alienígenas: Un cop d’ull a algunes naturalizacions dels segles XV a

Bibliography

315

XVII.’’ In Studia in honorem prof. M. de Riquer, vol. 1, 675–705. Barcelona: Quaderns Crema, 1986. Salvá, Miguel, and Pablo Sainz de Baranda, ed. Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España. Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1850. Sánchez, Luis Alberto, ed. Fuentes documentales sobre la ideología de la emancipación nacional. Lima: Editorial Pizarro, 1980. Sánchez Agesta, Luis. ‘‘Concepto histórico político de nación.’’ Revista general de legislación y jurisprudencia 170 (1941): 535–66. Sánchez Albornoz, Claudio. España, un enigma histórico. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1953. Sánchez Albornoz, Nicolás. ‘‘Una dicotomía indígena: Originarios y forasteros en el alto Perú.’’ Ibero-Americana Pragensia 10 (1976): 87–100. Sánchez Arévalo, Rodrigo. Summa de la política, ed. Juan Beneyto Pérez. Madrid: CSIC, 1944 [1454–55]. Sánchez Bella, Ismael. Los reinos en la historia moderna de España. Madrid: Ateneo, 1956. ———. ‘‘Reserva a aragoneses de plazas de justicia y gobierno en Indias (siglo XVII).’’ In Actas del IV symposium de historia de la administración, 683–701. Madrid: Instituto de Administración Pública, 1983. Sánchez Ortega, María Elena. Documentación sobre la situación de los gitanos españoles en el siglo XVIII. Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1976. ———. Los gitanos españoles: El período Borbónico. Madrid: Castellote, 1977. Sancho de Sopranis, Hipólito. ‘‘Los genoveses en la región gaditano-xericiense de 1460 a 1800.’’ Hispania 8, no. 32 (1948): 355–402. ———. ‘‘Las naciones extranjeras en Cádiz durante el siglo XVII.’’ Estudios de historia social de España 4 no. 2 (1960): 643–877. Santayana Bustillo, Lorenzo. Gobierno político de los pueblos de España y el corregidor alcalde y juez en ellos. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, 1979 [1742]. Santos, Rodolfo. El régimen de las ‘‘gracias al sacar’’ en Venezuela durante el período hispánico. Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1978. Sanz Camañez, Porfirio. ‘‘Algunas reflexiones sobre la condición de natural y extranjero en el Aragón a finales del siglo XVI.’’ In Felipe II y su tiempo: V reunión científica de la Asociación Española de Historia Moderna, ed. José Luis Perreira Iglesias, vol. 1, 349– 59. Cádiz: Universidad de Cádiz, 1999. Schulte Beerbühl, Margrit. ‘‘Naturalization and Economic Integration: The German Merchant Community in Eighteenth-Century London.’’ In From Strangers to Citizens: The Integration of Immigrant Communities in Britain, Ireland, and Colonial America, 1550–1750, ed. Randolph Vigne and Charles Littleton, 511–18. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2001. Schulze, Hagen. States, Nations, and Nationalism from the Middle Ages to the Present, trans. William E. Yuill. Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell, 1996. Schwaller, John Frederick. The Church and Clergy in Sixteenth-Century Mexico. Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1987.

316

Bibliography

Scott, James C. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. Scouloudi, Irene. ‘‘Alien Immigration and Alien Communities in London, 1558–1640.’’ Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of London 16, no. 1 (1941): 1937–41. Selke, Angela S. The Conversos of Majorca: Life and Death in a Crypto-Jewish Community in Seventeenth Century Spain. Jerusalem: Magness Press–Hebrew University, 1986. Sesma Muñoz, José Angel. ‘‘El sentimiento nacionalista en al corona de Aragón y el nacimiento de la España moderna.’’ In Realidad e imagenes del poder: España a fines de la edad media, ed. Adeline Rucquoi, 215–31. Valladolid: Ambito, 1988. Seybolt, Robert Francis. The Colonial Citizen of New York City: A Comparative Study of Certain Aspects of Citizenship Practice in Fourteenth Century England and Colonial New York. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1918. Shaw, William A., ed. Letters of Denization and Acts of Naturalization for Aliens in England and Ireland, 1603–1700. Ipmington: Huguenot Society of London, 1911. Shennan, J. H. ‘‘The Rise of Patriotism in the Eighteenth Century.’’ History of European Ideas 13, no. 6 (1991): 689–710. Sicroff, Albert A. Les controverses des status de ‘pureté de sang’ en Espagne du XVe au XVIIe siècle. Paris: Didier, 1960. Small, Carola M. ‘‘The Royal Bourgeoisies in the Dutchy of Burgundy.’’ Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History 13 (1986): 1–9. Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Origin of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. Smith, Michael T. ‘‘The History of Indian Citizenship,’’ Great Plains Journal 10, no. 1 (1970): 25–35. Smith, Robert Sidney. The Spanish Guild Merchant: A History of the Consulado, 1250– 1700. Durham: Duke University Press, 1940. ———. ‘‘Estudio histórico del consulado de Lima, 1593–1887.’’ In El índice del archivo del tribunal del consulado de Lima con un estudio histórico de ésta institución, ed. Robert Sidney Smith. Lima: Ministerio de Hacienda y Comercio, 1948. Smith, Rogers M. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997. Solano, Francisco de, ed. Normas y leyes de la ciudad hispanoamericana (1492–1600). Madrid: CSIC, 1996. Solórzano Pereira, Juan. Política Indiana. Madrid: Compañía Iberoamericana de Publicaciones, 1972 [1648] (also published in Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. 255). Somers, Margaret R. ‘‘Citizenship and the Place of the Public Sphere: Law, Community, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy.’’ American Sociological Review 58, no. 5 (1993): 587–620. Sospedra, Manuel. La constitución española de 1812: El constitucionalismo liberal a principios del siglo XIX. Valencia: Universidad de Valencia, 1978. Spalding, Karen. ‘‘Social Climbers: Changing Patterns of Mobility Among the Indians of Colonial Peru.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 50, no. 4 (1970): 645–64. Start, Cora. ‘‘Naturalization in the English Colonies in America.’’ Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1893, 319–23. Statt, Daniel. ‘‘The Birthright of an Englishmen: The Practice of Naturalization and

Bibliography

317

Denization of Immigrants under the Later Stuarts and Early Hanoverians.’’ Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of Great Britain and Ireland 25, no. 1 (1989): 61–74. ———. ‘‘The City of London and the Controversy over Immigration, 1660–1722.’’ Historical Journal 33, no. 1 (1990): 45–61. ———. Foreigners and Englishmen: The Controversy over Immigration and Population, 1660–1760. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1995. Stephenson, Carl. Borough and Town: A Study of Urban Origins in England. Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1933. Stitt, Robinson W. ‘‘The Legal Status of the Indian in Colonial Virginia.’’ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 61, no. 3 (1953): 247–59. Stoetzer, Carlos O. The Scholastic Roots of the Spanish American Revolution. New York: Fordham University Press, 1979. Storti Storchi, Claudia. Ricerche sulla condizione giuridica dello straniero in Italia dal diritto comune all’età preunitaria: Aspetti civilistici. Milan: Guiffré, 1990. ———. ‘‘The Legal Status of Foreigners in Italy (Fifteenth to Sixteenth Centuries): General Rules and their Enforcement in Some Cases Concerning the Executio Parata.’’ In Of Strangers and Foreigners (Late Antiquity—Middle Ages), ed. Laurent Mayali and Maria M. Mart, 97–135. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Strayer, Joseph R. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. Suárez, Federico. El proceso de la convocatoria a Cortes (1808–1810). Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 1982. Superunda, Conde de. Relación de gobierno—Perú (1745–1761), ed. Alfredo Moreno. Madrid: CSIC, 1983. Tait, James. The Medieval English Borough—Studies on Its Origin: A Constitutional History. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1936. Tannenbaum, Frank. Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas. New York: Vintage Books, 1946. Tau Anzoátegui, Víctor. ‘‘El derecho municipal del Perú: Apuntes sobre su configuración.’’ In IX congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano, Madrid, 5 a 10 de febrero de 1990, vol. 1, 111–36. Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1991. ———. ‘‘Una defensa de los extranjeros en el Buenos Aires de 1743.’’ In La ley en la América hispana: Del descubrimiento a la emancipación, 277–91. Buenos Aires: Real Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1992. Te Brake, Wayne. Shaping History: Ordinary People in European Politics, 1500–1700. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Tedoldi, Leonida. ‘‘Servizio pubblico e cittadinanza: Il caso degli zerlotti bresciani dal seicento al settecento.’’ In Le regole dei mestieri e delle professioni: Secoli XV–XIX, ed. Marco Meriggi and Alessandro Pastore, 75–98. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2000. Teresa de Mier, Servando. Cartas de un americano, 1811–1812. Mexico: SEP, 1987. ———. Memorias, 1818–1819. Madrid: Ed. América, undated. ———. Historia de la Revolución de la Nueva España, antiguamente Anahuác. Paris: La Sorbonne, 1990 [1813]. Thomas, Ernst Chester, and Hugh H. Bellot. Thomas and Bellots Leading Cases in Constitutional Law, ed. E. Slade. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1934.

318

Bibliography

Thompson, I. A. A. Crown and Cortes: Government, Institutions, and Representations in Early Modern Castile. Aldershot: Variorum, 1993. ———. ‘‘Castile: Polity, Fiscality, and Fiscal Crisis.’’ In Fiscal Crisis, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450–1789, ed. Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg, 140– 80. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. ———. ‘‘Castile: Absolutism, Constitutionalism, and Liberty.’’ In Fiscal Crisis, Liberty, and Representative Government, 1450–1789, ed. Philip T. Hoffman and Kathryn Norberg, 181–225. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. ———. ‘‘Castile and the Monarchy: The Political Community from Patria Natural to Patria Nacional.’’ In Spain, Europe, and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of J. H. Elliott, ed. Richard Kagan and Geoffrey Parker, 125–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. ———. ‘‘Patronato real e integración política en las ciudades castellanas bajo los austrias.’’ In La imágen de la diversidad: El mundo urbano en la corona de Castilla (siglos XVI–XVIII), ed. José Ignacio Fortea Pérez, 475–96. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria, 1997. Thrupp, Sylvia L. ‘‘Aliens in and around London in the Fifteenth Century.’’ In Studies in London History Presented to Philip Edmund Jones, ed. A. E. J. Hollaender and William Kellaway, 251–72. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969 (also published in Raymond Grew and Nicholas H. Stenech, eds. Society and History: Essays by Sylvia L Thrupp. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977, 101–27). Tibesar, Antoine. ‘‘The Alternative: A Study in Spanish Creole Relations in Seventeenth Century Peru.’’ Americas 11, no. 3 (1955): 229–83. Tierny, Brian. The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and Church Law, 1150–1625. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997. Tilly, Charles. ‘‘States and Nationalism in Europe, 1492–1992.’’ Theory and Society 23 (1994): 131–46. ———. ‘‘Citizenship, Identity, and Social History.’’ International Review of Social History 40 supp. 3 (1995): 1–17 (also published in Charles Tilly, ed. Citizenship, Identity, and Social History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 1–17). Tilly, Charles, and Wim P. Blockmans eds. Cities and the Rise of States in Europe A.D. 1000 to 1800. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. Tomás Ortiz de la Torre, José Antonio. ‘‘Derecho español de extranjería en un manuscrito del siglo XVIII.’’ Temis 33–36 (1973–74): 711–24. Tönnies, Ferdinand. Community and Civil Society, trans. Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001 [1887]. Torres Balbas, Leopoldo. ‘‘La edad media.’’ In Resumen histórico del urbanismo en España, by L. Torres Balbas, L. Cervera, F. Chueca, and P. Bidagor, 3–107. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios de Administración Local, 1954. Torres i Sans, Xavier. ‘‘Nacions sense nacionalisme: Pàtria i patriotisme a l’Europe de l’Antic Régim.’’ Recerques 28 (1994): 83–89. Trivellato, Francesca. ‘‘Intorno alla corporazione: Identità professionale e stratificazione sociale tra Murano e Venezia nel sei e settecento.’’ In Le regole dei mestieri e delle professioni: Secoli XV–XIX, ed. Marco Meriggi and Alessandro Pastore, 52–74. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2000.

Bibliography

319

Trueba, Eduardo. Sevilla: Tribunal de Océanos (siglo XVI). Seville: Gráficas del Sur, 1988. Ucelay-Da Cal, Enric. ‘‘Nationalism in Spain: Some Interpretative Proposals.’’ In Identities: Nations, Provinces, and Regions, 1550–1900. Proceedings of the Third AngloSpanish Historical Studies Seminar 25–6 October 1996, ed. Isabel Burdiel and James Casey, 31–40. Norwich: University of East Anglia, 1999. Ullmann, Walter. ‘‘Personality and Territoriality in the ‘Defensor Pacis’: The Problem of Political Humanism.’’ In Law and Jurisdiction in the Middle Ages, ed. George Garnett, chap. 10. London: Variorum, 1988. Uztariz, Gernónimo de. The Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs, trans. John Kippax. Dublin: George Faulkner, 1752 [1742]. Vallejo García-Hevia, José María. Campomanes y la acción administrativa de la corona (1762–1802). Oviedo: Real Instituto de Estudios Asturianos, 1998. Vanel, Marguerite. Histoire de la nationalité française d’origine: Evolution historique de la notion de français d’origine du XVe siècle au code civil. Paris: Imprimerie de la Cour d’Appel, 1945. Varela, Javier. La novella de España: Los intelectuales y el problema español. Madrid: Taurus, 1999. Varela Suánzes-Carpegna, Joaquín. La teoría del estado en los orígines del constitucionalismo hispánico (las Cortes de Cádiz). Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1983. Vassberg, David E. Land and Society in Golden Age Castile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. ———. ‘‘La comunidad rural en España y en el resto de Europa.’’ Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez 28, no. 2 (1992): 151–66. ———. The Village and the Outside World in Golden Age Castile: Mobility and Immigration in Everyday Rural Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Vaux de Foletier, François de. ‘‘La rafle des gitanos d’Andalousie en 1749 d’après des documents français.’’ Etudes Tsiganes 23, nos. 1–2 (1977): 5–9. Vázquez Pando, Fernando Alejandro. ‘‘Derecho español en América, derecho castellano vulgar y derecho indiano (una posible interpretación histórica).’’ Revista de la facultad de derecho de México 26, nos. 101–2 (1976): 785–94. Veale, Elspeth M. ‘‘Craftsmen and the Economy of London in the Fourteenth Century.’’ In Studies in London History Presnted to Philip Edmund Jones, ed. A. E. J. Hollaender and William Kellaway, 135–51. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969. Veitia Linaje, Joseph de. Norte de la contratación de las Indias occidentales. Buenos Aires: Comisión Argentina de Fomento Interamericano, 1945 [1672]. Ventura, Piero. ‘‘La ambiguità di un privilegio: La cittadinanza napoletana fra cinque e seicento.’’ Quaderni Storici 30, no. 89 (1995): 385–416. ———. ‘‘Privilegi, identità urbana e politica: Le capitali dell’Italia spagnola durante il regno di Filippo II.’’ In Felipe II (1527–1598), Europa y la monarquía católica, ed. José Martínez Millán, 739–71. Madrid: Parteluz, 1998. ———. ‘‘Mercato delle risorse e identità urbana: Cittadinanza e mestiere a Napoli tra XVI e XVII secolo.’’ In Le regole dei mestieri e delle professioni: Secoli XV–XIX, ed. Marco Meriggi and Alessandro Pastore, 268–304. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2000.

320

Bibliography

Vermeesch, Albert. Essai sur les origines et la signification de la commune dans le nord de la France (XI et XII siècles). Huele: Commission Internationale pour l’Histoire des Assemblées d’États, 1966. Vidier, A. ‘‘Les origines de la municipalité parisienne.’’ Mémoires de la Société d’Histoire de Paris 49 (1927): 250–91. Viera Powers, Karen. Andean Journeys: Migration, Ethnogenesis, and the State in Colonial Quito. Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995. Vila Villar, Enriqueta. ‘‘Extranjeros en Cartagena (1593–1630).’’ Jahrbuch für Geschicte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas 16 (1979): 147–84. Vilar, Pierre. ‘‘Patria y nación en el vocabulario de la independencia española.’’ In Hidalgos, amontinados y guerilleros: Pueblos y poderes en la historia de España, Pierre Vilar, 211–52. Barcelona: Crítica, 1982. Villar García, María Begoña. Los extranjeros en Málaga en el siglo XVII. Córdoba: Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Córdoba, 1982. ———. ‘‘Un siglo de control sobre los extranjeros de Málaga: Matrícula y listas consulares entre 1765 y 1863.’’ In Migraciones internas y medium-distance en la península ibérica, ed. Antonio Eiras Roel and Ofelia Rey Castelao, vol. 2, 921–44. Santiago: Xunta de Galicia, 1994. Villari, Rosario. Per il re o per la patria: La fedeltà nel seicento. Bari: Laterza, 1994. Viollet, Paul. ‘‘Les communes françaises au moyen âge.’’ Mémoires de l’Institut National de France 36, no. 2 (1901): 345–502. Viroli, Maurizio. For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Vitoria, Francisco de. Escritos políticos. Buenos Aires: Depalma, 1967 [1539]. ———. Derecho natural y de gentes. Buenos Aires: Emecé, 1946. Vogel, Hans. ‘‘New Citizens for a New Nation: Naturalization in Early Independent Argentina.’’ Hispanic American Historical Review 71, no. 1 (1991): 107–31. Vovelle, Michel. Ville et campagne au 18e siècle, Chartres et la Beauce. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1980. Waley, Daniel. The Italian City Republics. London: Longman, 1988. Wahrman, Dror, ‘‘The English Problem of Identity in the American Revolution.’’ American Historical Review 106, no. 4 (2001): 1236–62. Weber, Max. General Economic History, trans. Frank H. Knight. Glencoe: Free Press, 1950. Wells, Charlotte C. Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books, 1983. Wightman, Ann M. Indigenous Migration and Social Change: The Forasteros of Cuzco, 1570–1720. Durham: Duke University Press, 1990. Yergas Cobos, Juan Alonso. ‘‘La naturalización en Cádiz por ley y por nacimiento en el siglo XVIII,’’ Tésis de Licenciatura, Departmento de Historia de América, Universidad de Sevilla, 1984. Zannini, Andrea. Burocrazia e burocrati a Venezia in età moderna: I cittadini originari (sec. XVI–XVIII). Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 1993.

Bibliography

321

Zorzi, Andrea. ‘‘The ‘Material Constitution’ of the Florentine Dominion.’’ In Florentine Tuscany: Structures and Practices of Power, ed. William J. Connel and Andrea Zorzi, 6–13. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Zumalacarregui, Leopoldo. ‘‘Las ordenanzas de 1531 para la Casa de Contratación de las Indias.’’ Revista de Indias 30 (1957): 749–82.

Index

Africans: in English North America, 187–88. See also Spaniards of African descent Aubain, 191–92. See also Droit d’aubain Baldus of Perugia, 24 Bartolus of Sassoferrato, 24 Behetrías cerradas, 27, 40 Bourgeois, 166, 188–91 Caballeros diputados de vecindades, 21 Casa de Contratación. See House of Trade Castellanos viejos. See Gypsies Catholics, foreign, 26–27, 101, 120–24, 138 Chuetas, 120, 124–28 Cities with voting rights, 78, 96 Citizenship: changes over time, 18–20, 55–57; definitions of, 6–9, 14, 41–42, 44, 70, 110, 205–06; in Brescia, 174– 75; in Buenos Aires, 49–50, 55, 57, 58,

115–16; in Caracas, 45–48, 55, 57– 58; in Castile, 24–42, 60–62, 173, 175–76, 180–81; in England, 15–16, 166, 171, 178–88, 197–200; in Florence, 174, 176; in France, 15–16, 166, 171, 188–96, 197–200; in Italy, 15– 16, 166, 171–77, 197–200; in Lima, 50–52, 112–13, 115; in London, 178– 79; in Madrid, 35–36; in Mantova, 175; in Naples, 172–73, 177; in North America, 179, 197; in Paris, 189–91; in Pescia, 174; in Quito, 53, 57; in Rome,174; in Seville, 20–23, 30–31, 41; in Spain, 61; in Spanish America, 43–63; inTorino, 174; in Venice, 173– 74, 176 Citizenship and naturalization. See Naturalization and citizenship Composición, 95, 111, 117, 186 Constitution of Cádiz, 142, 143, 145, 153 Constructed communities, 1, 2, 10, 68, 144

324

Index

Consulado. See Merchant guild Converso Jews, 120, 124–28 Cortes of Cádiz, 152 Cortes, 69 Creolism, 143–52, 163 Cryptojews, 125, 126

Ius sanguinis, 4, 11 Ius soli, 4, 11

Denization, 183–84 Descent, 27–28, 69–70, 75, 107–10, 114, 161, 173. See also Chuetas; Ius sanguinis; Mestizos Documentary sources, limits of, 5, 7, 13, 19–20, 23, 67, 95, 167–68 Droit d’aubain, 191–92, 194, 195

Letters of citizenship, 4–5, 98, 132, 153, 191 Letters of naturalization, 4–5, 14, 65– 67, 78–80, 104, 134, 136, 205; in France, 191, 196; in Spanish America, 99–100, 124, 139 Limpieza de sangre, 28, 125, 162 Love: discourses of, 9, 71–74, 93, 118, 139, 145, 153–54, 163, 198; documentary evidence, 100, 109, 149, 151; of Indians and Africans, 158, 160

Ecclesiastical benefices, 64, 69, 81–82, 104, 146 Expulsion campaigns, 97, 111–16 Forastero Indians, 61 Foreigners, 64–66, 70–73, 82–91, 147– 50, 155, 167; in Spanish America, 45, 50, 54, 57, 60, 95, 105, 111–16. See also Catholics, foreign; Vassals, foreign Freeman, English 178–81 Fuero de extranjería, 83, 88 Genizaros, 106, 108 Gypsies, 12, 120, 128–33, 161 House of Trade, 22, 96, 103, 106, 108, 116 Immigrants, bad vs. good, 1, 2, 12–13, 100, 201–03 Implicit categorizations, 10, 25, 42, 47, 55, 73, 121, 167–68. See also Documentary sources, limits of Indians: in English North America, 186– 87; in Spanish America, 15, 44–45, 48, 51–54, 60–62, 145, 156–58, 188 Inquisition, 127 Ius commune, 18, 24–25, 36–37, 172, 194, 196

Judaizantes. See Cryptojews Juntas, 141–43, 151, 155 Junta de extranjeros, 83, 84, 90

Majorca, 81–82, 124–28, 200 Merchant guild, 96, 99, 103–12, 115, 116 Merchants, 21, 82–83, 91, 95–99, 101, 106–07, 111–12, 116–17, 185, 190– 91 Merchants and naturalization, 82–83, 91 Mestizos, 44, 48, 53–54, 60, 157–59 Minorca, 127, 138 Minors, 25–26, 80 Monopoly on office holding, 64, 68–77, 79, 90, 96, 147, 150 Nationalism, 2, 11, 63, 65, 95, 144, 201– 03 Nativeness, 6–9, 66, 75, 95, 110, 133– 34, 167, 205–06; in Aragon, 9, 65, 77, 81; in Buenos Aires, 57, 148; in Caracas, 57–59; in Castile, 8–9, 64–65, 69, 77–91, 96, 100, 137, 152, 180–82; in England, 186; in France, 90, 166, 191–92, 194–95; in Lower Navarre, 106, 137; in Naples, 177; in Quito, 56–57; in Spain, 8–9, 65–67, 81, 91, 95–97, 106, 134–36, 152–53, 156,

Index 184, 194–96; in Spanish America, 180, 186. See also Naturalization Natural communities, 2, 10 Natural law, 11, 25, 77, 90, 144–45, 149–50, 166–69, 199 Naturaleza. See Nativeness Naturalization and citizenship, 9, 55–57, 74, 84, 92, 97, 101, 148, 153–54 Naturalization: in England, 183–84; in English North America, 185–86; in France, 191–92, 194–96 Naturalization: as royal prerogative, 11, 65–68, 76–82, 90–91, 93, 96, 98, 100–01, 103–04, 134, 136, 204–05; in England, 183–94; in France, 191– 92, 194–96 Nobles, 27, 34, 40 Nueva planta decrees, 200

325

Roman law. See Ius commune Royal servants, 37–38, 69, 75, 77–78, 155 Salaried professionals, 38–40 Slaves. See Spaniards of African descent Spain, concept of, 8–10, 15, 65, 67–68, 144, 149–50, 164–66, 205–06 Spaniards of African descent, 13, 44, 48, 53–54, 145, 159–62, 188 Spanish monopoly in the Americas, 22 Subjecthood: in England, 182–83; in English North America, 184–89; in France, 188–89, 191, 193–95 Transients, 57, 83, 85–86, 99, 101, 144, 147, 163, 167. See also Gypsies

Patriotism, 2, 11 Permanent residents, 57 Presumption regime, 24, 29, 41–42, 47– 48, 72, 75, 89, 92, 167; in Spanish America, 95, 98, 101, 107, 116,

Vassalage, 10, 15, 19, 67–69, 87, 91, 124, 156–57 Vassals, foreign, 11, 68, 76–82, 120–21, 133–39, 159–60 Vecindad. See Citizenship Vile occupation, 28, 173

Regency, 141–42 Régnicole, 192 Religion, 9, 26–27, 84, 101, 119–28, 145–46, 155, 193

War of independence: American, 187; Spanish, 144; Spanish America, 143, 151 Women, 25–26