Defending NATO’s Northern Flank: Power Projection and Military Operations (Contemporary Security Studies) [1 ed.] 1032381930, 9781032381930

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Contemporary Security Studies

DEFENDING NATO’S NORTHERN FLANK POWER PROJECTION AND MILITARY OPERATIONS Edited by Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

Defending NATO’s Northern Flank

This book investigates several aspects of military power and security in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions. NATO’s northern flank is a large maritime and littoral theater, where NATO directly borders Russia’s Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory, which is the location of some of Russia’s most potent air, sea, and land power capabilities. While military tensions on the northern flank had been relatively low for years, the Ukraine war and increased great-power rivalry have altered that dynamic, with heightened geopolitical tensions. This has increased the focus on military-strategic competition in this northernmost region of the alliance. This book presents new assessments of several aspects of military power and security in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions. With an analysis of the security and political climate in the High North and of developments in Western military strategies, capabilities, doctrines, and operational concepts, the volume seeks to bring together an holistic understanding of the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the North Atlantic states and NATO in this dynamic area of responsibility for the alliance. In doing this, the book provides key insights into the role of branch-specific and joint approaches to power projection and operations in the High North, which also include selected country case studies. This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, military studies, security studies, and International Relations. Lon Strauss is an associate professor of Military History at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Njord Wegge is a professor of Political Science at the Norwegian Defence University College/Norwegian Military Academy.

Contemporary Security Studies Series Editors: James Gow and Rachel Kerr King’s College London

This series focuses on new research across the spectrum of international peace and security, in an era where each year throws up multiple examples of con­ flicts that present new security challenges in the world around them. Drones and Global Order Implications of Remote Warfare for International Society Edited by Paul Lushenko, Srinjoy Bose, and William Maley Understanding Russian Strategic Behavior Imperial Strategic Culture and Putin’s Operational Code Graeme P. Herd International Legitimacy and the Domestic Use of Force A New Theoretical Framework Megan Price Security Cooperation between Western States Openness, Security and Autonomy Olivier Lewis Serbian Paramilitaries and the Breakup of Yugoslavia State Connections and Patterns of Violence Iva Vukušić Contesting Torture Interdisciplinary Perspectives Edited by Rory Cox, Faye Donnelly and Anthony F. Lang Jr. Defending NATO’s Northern Flank Power Projection and Military Operations Edited by Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Contemporary-Security-Studies/book-series/CSS

Defending NATO’s Northern Flank Power Projection and Military Operations Edited by Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 selection and editorial matter, Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Strauss, Lon, editor. | Wegge, Njord, 1976- editor. Title: Defending NATO’s northern flank : power projection and military operations / edited by Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge. Description: London ; New York, NY : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2024. | Series: Contemporary security studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023026085 (print) | LCCN 2023026086 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032381930 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032381947 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003343905 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: North Atlantic Treaty Organization‐‐Scandinavia. | Scandinavia‐‐Military relations‐‐United States | United States‐‐Military relations‐‐Scandinavia. | National security‐‐Scandinavia. | Scandinavia‐‐Strategic aspects. | Scandinavia‐‐Foreign relations. Classification: LCC UA646.3 .D418 2024 (print) | LCC UA646.3 (ebook) | DDC 355/.0310948‐‐dc23/eng/20230911 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023026085 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023026086 ISBN: 978-1-032-38193-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-38194-7 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-34390-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905 Typeset in Galliard by MPS Limited, Dehradun

Contents

Acknowledgments List of Contributors 1 Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank: An introduction

viii ix

1

LON STRAUSS AND NJORD WEGGE

SECTION I

Security, power projection, and operations on NATO’s northern flank

13

2 The strategic challenge of expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank

15

LON STRAUSS AND NJORD WEGGE

3 A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma: Norway, the United States, and the defense of Northern Norway, 1960–1980

32

STIAN BONES

4 The Russian way of regular warfare and the Arctic

50

AMUND OSFLATEN

5 National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route: Additional elements of domestic and interna­ tional importance TROY J. BOUFFARD

67

vi Contents

6 NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic

84

PALLE YDSTEBØ

7 Norwegian problems of confidence building: Geopolitical exposure and military vulnerabilities in the High North

103

TORMOD HEIER

SECTION II

Strategic interests and the Arctic 8 US national strategy in the Arctic

121 123

DAVID AUERSWALD

9 Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic: Deterring Russian aggression through US-Norwegian cooperation

142

WALTER BERBRICK AND LARS SAUNES

10 Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities for growing problem sets in the Arctic region

167

RYAN BURKE AND JAHARA MATISEK

11 Special operations forces in the Arctic: From heroes to zeroes?

183

MARIUS KRISTIANSEN, NJÅL HOEM, AND LEO BLANKEN

SECTION III

Nato’s northern flank states

203

12 Norway’s strategic role and interests at NATO’s northern flank: Finding a new balance?

205

JOACHIM BENTZEN

13 Finnish and Swedish NATO membership: What does it hold for the Arctic?

225

HANNA OJANEN AND ARTO VÄISÄNEN

14 A kingdom divided against itself: The Kingdom of Denmark and the rise of Arctic security dynamics LISELOTTE ODGAARD

250

Contents vii

15 The UK as a near-Arctic state and essential regional security ally

266

DANITA CATHERINE BURKE

Index

289

Acknowledgments

This project had not been possible without various sources of support. We would especially like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the Norwegian Defence University College, the Marine Corps University, and the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare. We would also like to thank our chapter contributors as well as our patient and supporting families!

Contributors

David Auerswald is a professor of Security Studies at the US National War College as well as a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has published extensively on a variety of national security and foreign policy topics, most recently on the geopolitics of the Arctic, as well as on civilian oversight of the military in democracies. Dr. Auerswald has worked as a congressional staff member on three separate occasions. He received his PhD and MA degrees in political science from the University of California, San Diego, and undergraduate degrees in political science and English literature from Brown University. Joachim Bentzen works as a senior advisor on security policy with the Norwegian Armed Forces. At the time of writing, he was a guest researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS) working under the Norwegian security policy in strategic perspective research program. Walter Berbrick is an associate professor in the War Gaming Department, founding director of the Arctic Studies Group, and co-lead scholar of the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative. He served as the senior arctic policy advisor to the secretary of the Navy and special representative for the Arctic Region at the US State Department. Berbrick is an International Affairs Fellow and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a doctorate degree from Northeastern University, and served 10 years in the US Navy. Leo Blanken is an associate professor in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he is the academic lead for the “Applied Design for Innovation” graduate curriculum. He has authored work on military innovation, great power competition, defense economics, and metrics/assessment. He is the author of Rational Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion (University of Chicago Press) and is co-editor of Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure (Georgetown University Press). Leo collects and DJs rare soul and funk records from the 1960s.

x Contributors Stian Bones (b. 1972) is a professor of Modern History at UiT—The Arctic University of Norway. He has written extensively on political, security, and diplomatic topics related to Norway and the European Far North during the Second World War and the Cold War. Among his latest publications is The Struggle for Freedom. He is the editor of The Second World War in the High North published in 2022. The subject of his doctoral thesis (2007) was North Norway during the Cold War. Bones has also worked on the history of Norway’s relations to the United States, Norwegian-Russian relations, and the history of Norway’s polar politics. Troy J. Bouffard is the director of the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience (CASR) at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he has been full-time faculty member since 2014. He retired from the US Army in 2010 after 22 years of service worldwide. He continues to conduct research and work with USNORTHCOM, NATO StratCom CoE, the North American and Arctic Security and Defence Network, 11th Airborne Division (Arctic), various national labs, the Arctic Council EPPR Working Group, Geneva Center for Security Policy, and many others. Additionally, he co-leads the Arctic eTalks with USNORTHCOM. His current research involves Russian NSR nexus of defense and international law. Dr. Danita Catherine Burke is a research fellow at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, and a Northern Scholars Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh. Dr. Burke’s research addresses topics including Arctic diplomacy and security, environmental and animal rights activism legacies, stigma, and cultural violence. She is the author of International Disputes and Cultural Ideas in the Canadian Arctic (Palgrave Macmillian), Diplomacy and the Arctic Council (McGill-Queens University Press), WWF and Arctic Environmentalism (Manchester University Press), and Cultural Violence, Stigma and the Legacy of the Anti-Sealing Movement (Routledge). Dr. Ryan Burke is a professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies (MSS) at the US Air Force Academy (USAFA), research director of USAFA and USNORTHCOM’s Homeland Defense Institute, co-director of Project 6633 at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, and an affiliate professor with the University of Alaska—Fairbanks (UAF) Center for Arctic Security and Resilience. Ryan holds graduate degrees from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, the University of Delaware’s Joseph R. Biden School of Public Policy and Administration, and Saint Joseph’s University. He is also a veteran Marine Corps officer. Tormod Heier is a professor of military strategy and operations at the Norwegian Defence University College/Command Staff College, Oslo. He has served 32 years as an army officer with tenure in the Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Intelligence Service, Afghanistan, and Brigade North.

Contributors xi Heier has published extensively on security- and defense-related issues related to Norwegian and allied strategies in out-of-area operations and in the Arctic. He received the Army’s Medal of Merit in 2023 and Norwegian PEN’s Ossietzky Price in 2017. Njål Hoem is an active-duty Norwegian army officer. He currently serves at the Norwegian Special Operations Command. He holds a BA degree in Military Leadership and Land Warfare from the Norwegian Military Academy, has studied Leadership and Organizational Psychology at BI Norwegian Business School, and holds an M.Litt. degree in War Studies from the University of Glasgow. He is one of the founding members of the editorial staff of the Norwegian electronic journal Stratagem. Marius Kristiansen is an active-duty Norwegian army officer whose military service began in the Norwegian Navy. He currently serves as the Norwegian exchange officer of USSOCOM J3-International Division. Kristiansen holds a PhD degree in Political Science and Strategy, an MSc degree in Defence Analysis—Irregular Warfare, a BA degree in Land Warfare and Military Leadership, and an Advanced Certificate in Terrorism Studies. He was a 2022 non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, is a 2023 non-resident fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, and is one of the founding members of the editorial staff of the Norwegian electronic journal Stratagem. US Air Force Lt. Col. Jahara Matisek PhD, is a military professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the US Naval War College and is a command pilot with over 3,700 hours in the C-17, E-11 BACN, T-6, and T-53. He most recently served at the US Air Force Academy as an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department, the research director for the Strategy and Warfare Center, and a senior fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute. He has published over 90 articles on strategy and warfare in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant outlets. Liselotte Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo and a non-resident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Her work focuses on US-China-Europe relations, including NATO-China relations; Chinese foreign, security, and defense policy; Indo-Pacific security; and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. Dr. Odgaard has been a visiting scholar at institutions such as Harvard University, Woodrow Wilson Center, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute. She is the author of numerous monographs, books, peer-reviewed articles, and research papers on Chinese and Asia-Pacific security, and is a frequent commentator on these issues in the media. Dr. Hanna Ojanen is the research director at Tampere University, where she leads the STRAX research consortium on the change of strategic culture, and an adjunct professor at the Department of Warfare, Finnish National Defence

xii

Contributors University. She holds a doctorate degree in Political and Social Sciences from the European University Institute. Her research focuses on European security and defense, EU-NATO relations, and Nordic countries’ security policies. Her publications include “The EU’s engagement with international organisations. NATO’s impact on the making of EU security policy,” in Roberta N. Haar et al. (eds.) The Making of European Security Policy. Between Institutional Dynamics and Global Challenges (Routledge 2021).

Amund Osflaten is an officer in the Norwegian Army and a tutor/researcher at the Norwegian Military Academy/Norwegian Defence University College. His fields of expertise are strategic culture, war studies, and, in particular, Russian military theory and conventional warfare. Previous education includes a BA degree in Military Studies, a BA degree in International Studies, and an MA degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. Currently, he is conducting a PhD at King’s College London in which he looks at “The Russian Way of Regular Land Warfare after the Cold War.” RADM(R) Lars Saunes is a professor and a Distinguished International Fellow at the US Naval War College. As Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy from 2014, he changed the Navy’s course toward high readiness, renewed its aim on warfighting skills, and strengthened the allied team on the northern flank of NATO. During his 37 years of military career, he has held the highest positions in submarine service, naval operations, and coast guard operations. He has held flag positions as Commandant of the Norwegian Coast Guard and Chief of Royal Norwegian Navy. His role as professor includes co-leading The Newport Arctic Scholar Initiative, teaching and lecturing on strategy and leadership, mentoring students, and facilitating international cooperation and friendship. Dr. Lon Strauss is an associate professor of Military History at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. His work focuses on US Arctic security, the First World War, and military intelligence’s homefront surveillance in the early 20th century. He co-authored War: Contemporary Perspectives on Armed Conflicts Around the World, was an editor for 1914–1918 Online, and has published several articles and book chapters. Arto Väisänen is a PhD fellow at the ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo and a former researcher at Tampere University and the ENGAGE project. He has previous work experience at the European Institute of Peace and the European Parliament and received degrees from the College of Europe, Bruges, and Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. His research focuses on European foreign, security, and defense policy as well as small states, EU climate policy, climate security, and the Arctic region. Njord Wegge is a professor in Political Science at the Norwegian Defence University College/Norwegian Military Academy, where he leads several

Contributors

xiii

research projects related to security and military power in the Arctic. Wegge has earlier been “Chair of Arctic Security” at the Marine Corps University, he has been a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley, and he has worked as a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) as well as at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI). Wegge finished his PhD on International Relations in the Arctic in 2013 at the University of Tromsø, the Arctic University of Norway. Palle Ydstebø is a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the Norwegian Army and holds a PhD degree in War Studies from the University of Glasgow. His main field of interest is the emergence and development of military strategy and operational art, and Soviet and Russian military operations. Ydstebø has served in the Norwegian Corps of Engineers, Army Headquarters, Norwegian Intelligence Service, and the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College before his current position at the Military Academy. He has had field and staff assignments in Afghanistan, Germany, and South Sudan, and he edited the two recent editions of the Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine.

1

Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank An introduction Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

NATO’s northern flank is a large maritime theater, often understood as the region stretching from Greenland in the west to Norway and the Barents Sea in the east, confined by the Arctic Ocean in the north, and with the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap making a natural borderline in the south. At this northern flank, NATO directly borders Russia and its “Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory,” which hosts some of Russia’s most potent air, sea, and land power capabilities, including the main bulk of that great power’s strategic submarines (Kjellén, 2022, p. 43; Wall and Wegge, 2023). Thus, it is easy to imagine a threat to this part of NATO’s territory coming from the northeast. During the Cold War, NATO’s command for its northernmost flank area was the “Allied Forces Northern Europe” (AFNORTH), which was located at Kolsås outside Oslo. It was responsible for allied operations in Denmark and Norway (with the exception of Svalbard, Jan Mayen, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands) and the northern parts of West Germany and their adjacent seas and oceans (Berdal, 1994, pp. 39, 79; Solvang and Wegge, 2023, p. 17). However, with the end of the Cold War, AFNORTH and the other regional commands were disbanded (Solvang and Wegge, 2023, p. 17). Yet, with the increased tension in Europe after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO decided to open Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC Norfolk). As JFC Norfolk is designated to focus on the protection of the North Atlantic sea area and the “trans-Atlantic link,” as well as “the Arctic,” JFC Norfolk today stands out as a key NATO operational command, responsible for protecting this part of the alliance, including what can be labeled its northern flank (see Figure 1.1) (JFC Norfolk, 2023). NATO’s northern flank has several unique features, both with respect to its rather remote northern location, where climatic and logistical challenges tend to complicate military operations, and also in its strategic location close to one of Russia’s most important (if not the most important) military-strategic complexes, located on the Kola Peninsula (Wegge and Halsne, 2022, p. 32). In a political context, the Arctic is usually defined as all areas north of the Arctic Circle, that is, north of the 66°33′ latitude. NATO’s northern flank DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-1

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Figure 1.1 NATO’s northern flank. Source: Created for the Editors by Julie Nord.

overlaps substantially with the European parts of the Arctic region (Andrysiak and Newton, 2022, p. 24). NATO’s border with Russia in the north The Russian defense concept for its Northern Fleet and its joint forces’ strategic assets in the Kola Peninsula is often referred to as the “bastion defense.” The bastion defense (see Figure 1.2) is a multilayered anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) defense system covering the Kola Peninsula with its surrounding seas, coastal areas, and islands, including access to the North Atlantic, the Barents Sea, parts of the Arctic Ocean, and the Norwegian Sea as far south as the GIUK gap (Nordenman, 2019, pp. 128–155; Kjellén, 2022, p. 40). In this area, Russia is assumed to have an ambition of sea denial or sea control in the area closest to its home bases (Expert Commission, 2015). For NATO, the northern flank stands out as a remote, cold, littoral area where, for substantial parts of the year, it is difficult to operate due to harsh climatic conditions and other challenges, such as limited daylight during the winter season. Hence, the flank represents a unique challenge to NATO with respect to the need for cold-weather tactical and operational skills, including cold-weather-adapted gear, in order to project power and operate successfully in this region over time. In addition, the proximity to some of the most capable Russian forces and their A2/AD capabilities, in combination with long logistical lines back to the population centers and industrial hubs in Western Europe and the United States of America, make sustaining forces

Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 3

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Figure 1.2 The Russian bastion and the reach of the bastion defense. Source: Expert Commission, 2015, p. 21.

there extremely challenging, particularly during conflict. These factors explain why NATO has historically considered its northern flank one of the most difficult to defend against Russian attacks (Berdal, 1994; Nordenman, 2019). As Russia in recent years has conducted significant rearmament programs in its Arctic region, including introducing brand-new high-tech weapons such as the Kinzhal and Zircon hypersonic missiles, the region also houses new, complicated defensive problems for NATO (Boulègue, 2019; Lavikainen, 2021; Arctic Today, 2022). Russia has refurbished many of the Soviet era’s old Cold War bases in the Russian Arctic. According to a CSIS report from 2020, the number of reopened bases or facilities is assumed to be around 50: “Russia’s military posture in the Arctic emphasizes air and maritime early warning and defense […]. This includes the refurbishment of 13 air bases, 10 radar stations, 20 border outposts, and 10 integrated emergency rescue stations” (Conley et al., 2020, p. 6). However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has substantially affected its force posture and priorities in the Arctic, specifically with respect to its land power components, which today are being depleted in the Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory. As the majority of the Northern Fleet’s naval

4 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge infantry and land forces appear to have been transferred south to the battlefields in Ukraine, where they are incurring significant casualties, Russia’s ability to make a surprise intrusion over land into NATO’s northern flank has been weakened (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2023; Wall and Wegge, 2023). Yet, while the war has changed Russia’s land power military dispositions, the Northern Fleet appears to retain operational control of their main strategic weapon systems, which are typically bound to naval and airborne platforms. The future of NATO in the north In the western part of the Arctic as well, there is a renewed focus on military security and the ability to operate and project power. Increased interest in NATO’s northern flank is not least exemplified by Finland and Sweden gaining NATO membership, an expansion of NATO that has dramatically increased the alliance’s border with Russia. Particularly, with Finland, the expansion opened up new Arctic territories in near proximity to the Kola Peninsula. Inclusion of the two Nordic states also creates significant new logistical opportunities for the defense of NATO’s northern flank (Wegge, 2022). However, this expansion also raises new questions on how NATO should plan to defend this enlarged northern area of responsibility. While the dominant perception has been that military tensions on the northern flank have been relatively low for quite some time, e.g. when compared to the Baltic Sea region or NATO’s eastern flank, heightened geopolitical tensions and the war in Ukraine have changed the political and strategic situation in this part of the world in recent years (Wegge and Halsne, 2022, p. 32). When assessing to what degree there is still a cooperative political climate in the Arctic, the Arctic Council—the region’s premier intergovernmental forum, which is comprised of the eight Arctic states, several indigenous peoples organizations, as well as state and non-state observers—is of particular interest. While the Arctic Council has been a success story in inter-state cooperation in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War, and even to some extent was able to remain an open forum for discussion and collaboration after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, this is not the case anymore. The manner in which the work of the Council was put on hold, with the seven democratic states (A7) deciding to “resume work together on some of the forum’s projects, but without Russia,” is also illustrative of the general political situation in the Arctic (US Department of State, 2022; Barents Observer, 2022). This unusual circumstance is particularly telling given the fact that Russia represents about 50% of the Arctic region, measured in both landmass and oceanic area. Russia has similarly denounced any plans for future cooperation with the west in the Arctic Council, prioritizing her own national interest and removing references to cooperation within the Arctic Council from its newest Arctic strategy (High North News, 2023).

Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 5 Thus, the idea of an “Arctic exceptionalism” with respect to lower geopolitical tension, which sometimes persisted in academic forums, is no longer fitting (Pezard et al., 2017, pp. 7–25; Henninen, 2019, p. 231; Käpylä and Mikkola, 2019). In general, there is uncertainty over where international relations in this strategically important part of the world are heading. For example, General Wayne Eyre, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, characterizes the Arctic as being “at an inflection point” after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine (High North News, 2022). Also, in the 2023 threat assessment from the US intelligence community, one finds concerns over what might follow after the split between Russia and the A7: “Contested economic and military activities in the Arctic have the potential to increase the risk of miscalculation, particularly while there are military tensions between Russia and the other seven Arctic countries following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023, p. 22). In this uncertainty, one finds Arctic scholars like Professor Timo Koivurova at the University of Lapland warning against an unnecessary securitization of “everything” in the Arctic, pointing to the likelihood of a new version of the Cold War in the region (Koivurova, 2022). While Koivurova makes a timely remark, one could also argue that the situation in the Arctic region simply reflects the overall geostrategic landscape in Europe following the Kremlin’s aggressive and unprovoked war against Ukraine. Strategic challenges and opportunities facing the North Atlantic states and NATO In a statement to the US House Armed Services Committee on 8 March 2023, General Glen D. VanHerck, Commander of US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), stated the following on key concerns and priorities pertaining to the Arctic: The ability of the joint force to operate and campaign in the Arctic remains a pressing concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The PRC and Russia continue to invest in Arctic capabilities as both seek to increase presence and influence in the region while shifting the rules-based international order to their advantage. More than 50 percent of USNORTHCOM’s area of operations is in the Arctic, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD’s priorities in the region continue to focus on increased presence, campaigning through joint training and exercises, and close collaboration with allies and partners. (VanHerck, 2023) By analyzing the security-political situation in the High North, combined with assessments of developments in western military strategy, capabilities, and operational concepts fitted for NATO’s northern flank, this book will seek to bring together a holistic understanding of the strategic challenges and

6 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge opportunities facing the alliance in this northern part of its area of responsibility. In this respect, questions on how the alliance and its member states should train and develop capabilities and concepts, enabling them to operate and effectively project power in this dynamic area of responsibility for the alliance, will be scrutinized. This context will inform an investigation of identified problems related to a lack of domain awareness and resilience in infrastructure affecting NATO and the joint force’s ability to project power, which also includes the role of bilateral defense relationships. With Finland’s NATO membership and Sweden’s, the consequences of this expansion will be addressed. One element of this likely future evolution of NATO potential is changes to the role and status of allied presence in the northern parts of Fennoscandia. While today there are no traditional allied bases on NATO’s northern flank to ensure permanent American or other non-local allied stand-in forces operating within the “Weapon Engagement Zone” of Russia’s military complex in the Kola Peninsula, change is likely to be underway (Behrmann et al., 2022). One such development is found through the recently signed ten-year contract ensuring a training camp for Royal Marines Commandos in Inner Troms (Joint-forces.com, 2023). However, the future Finnish and Swedish policies on the issue of foreign bases remain to be seen. This book will contribute to the discussion with an updated and uniquely composed research-based investigation of the strategic situation on NATO’s northern flank. It will focus on both the political-strategic as well as the military-operational levels, investigating to what degree national forces and NATO are prepared to project power and operate in this region. In this context, the book will assess to what degree current security strategies, as well as changes in operational concepts, are developed to fit both the technological and military-strategic challenges, hence ensuring that the North Atlantic states and NATO have the ability to operate and project power throughout the competition spectrum, from peace to crises and war on its northern flank. The structure and research tasks of this book This book will be divided into three sections. In the first section—I: Security, power projection, and operations on NATO’s northern flank—scholars address some important topics related to overall security and defense on this northernmost flank of the alliance, also including insight into Russian strategic thinking. The section starts out with Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge analyzing the security environment in the Arctic, giving an overall assessment of NATO’s ability to defend its northern flank. In this assessment, challenges to expeditionary warfare in a multi-domain operational setting will be discussed. Following this, Stian Bones presents important aspects of the historical background of the United States and its Arctic operational and strategic planning, including defense cooperation with Norway. In this chapter, security

Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 7 dilemmas from the height of the Cold War, particularly from the time period 1960–1980, will be addressed. Amund Osflaten comes next with a chapter discussing Russian defense thinking and how this relates to the Arctic region. In a situation with soaring tensions between Russia and NATO, the Russian way of regular warfare, combined with the strategic realities of the Russian Arctic, indicates a strong Russian inclination to strike preemptively if war is seen as imminent or highly likely. As the Northern Strategic Bastion on the Kola Peninsula is central to the Russian second-strike capability and thus is perceived as central to state survival, an assessment of the likelihood of pre-emptive attack in order to thwart a NATO buildup is discussed. The Norwegian strategic predicament lies in avoiding inadvertently triggering a pre-emptive strike, while still being able to mount an adequate defense of Norwegian territory. This strategic dilemma is important to understand for Norwegian and NATO decisionmakers before a crisis develops. Then, Troy J. Bouffard examines additional components that help define the overall national security priority that is Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR). The chapter provides insights into how the Kremlin has developed powerful justification regarding the NSR’s strategic importance through four exploratory themes, including a brief history of the NSR and its importance in international law, the role of Article 234 of UNCLOS, efforts and tensions involving maritime tonnage goals, and impacts concerning freedom of navigation. As the NSR remains a top national priority for Moscow—in general and especially in the Arctic—an increased understanding of all relevant factors will help analysts, decision-makers, and enthusiasts consider the complex circumstances more effectively as NSR-related geopolitical and maritime competition inevitably increases. In Palle Ydstebø’s chapter, a discussion on NATO’s doctrinal development pertaining to the Arctic is conducted. The chapter focuses on the different roles and function of doctrine in light of joint operational experiences in the European Arctic. Finally, for this section, Tormod Heier points out challenges to East-West relationships and confidence building, particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the years before the Ukraine War, Norway’s geostrategic exposure and its military vulnerability reinforced each other. This was because US-Russian rivalry intensified and thus coincided with grave operative deficiencies inside Norway’s force structure. As Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in 2022, Norwegian confidence-building efforts have therefore been exposed to a dual pressure: externally, from two assertive powers characterizing each other as strategic rivals outside the coast of Norway; and internally, from military vulnerabilities originating from a feeble force unable to sustain a credible national presence in its own areas of operations. In the second section of the book—II: Strategic interests and the Arctic—focus will be put on some key dimensions of the strategic role of the Arctic for the US and its key allied partners of relevance to the northern flank, also including investigation of specific services. In this section, David Auerswald

8 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge starts out by exploring the evolution of US policy toward the Arctic. By structuring the investigation into three periods: the early Cold War, the postCold War era, and the recent rise of great power competition, the chapter investigates the evolution of US policy regarding Arctic cooperation and collaboration, resource extraction, power-projection capabilities, and preparation for Arctic combat. In Chapter 9, Walter Berbrick and Lars Saunes analyze the contribution of United States and Norwegian naval power to deterring Russian military aggression and malign influence in the Arctic. While there is broad agreement that Norway and the United States should form the foundation of allied efforts to deter Russian high-end military threats in the Arctic, it is unclear what this looks like operationally. The chapter also discusses how the United States and Norway can strengthen cooperation through denial, resilience, and cost-imposition actions. In Chapter 10, Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek outline the time and processes to achieve US policy coherence in the Arctic and the steps taken for each military branch in outlining strategies and objectives in the region. While they identify the role of the US Air and Space Force in the Arctic, the lack of dedicated resources and the perceived threat have translated into a joint force solution in the Arctic. Most notably, they describe how Joint All-Domain Operations and Joint-All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) are being developed to fit the realities of the Arctic, because the future of US and allied space power is dependent on access to the region and the support of multi-domain awareness through JADC2. This chapter is followed by an investigation by Marius Kristiansen, Njål Hoem, and Leo Blanken suggesting that special operation forces (SOF) have a key role in the utilization of military means in the Arctic. However, mentally bound by a generation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the authors discuss how new cognitive models are necessary to understand their role in the Arctic, giving SOF a potential as strategic enablers in the Arctic. In the book’s third and final section—III: NATO’s northern flank states—chapters from key states on NATO’s northern flank are presented. The section starts out with a Norwegian perspective by Joachim Bentzen. This chapter highlights elements of both continuity and change in Norway’s strategic position on NATO’s northern flank after the Cold War. Three external drivers of change make Norway’s strategic position now different from that of the latter half of the past century: shifting great power dynamics, a transformed theater of operations, and a forthcoming geostrategic shift due to an expanding NATO. Importantly, the chapter also demonstrates how Norway finds itself having a different strategic role and interests due to changes within the country itself. Norway’s small but potent military capabilities, its economic muscle, and, not least, its energy supplies give the country an ability to “punch above its weight.” Combined, these developments call for novel strategic thinking for the small state on the alliance’s northern flank. In the following chapter, Hanna Ojanen and Arto Väisänen investigate Finland and Sweden. Their chapter both discusses how these northern states

Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 9 increase NATO’s Arctic territory and bring a longer land border with Russia, and how they also bring strong new contributions to NATO’s defense. The link between the Baltic Sea and the Arctic also becomes clearer. The chapter argues that inclusion of all five Nordic countries in NATO increases contributions to NATO’s thinking around Arctic strategy and wider resilience. In Chapter 14, Liselotte Odgaard shows that although minor differences exist between Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands on issues such as trade relations due to different export dependencies, disagreements on Arctic security mainly arise from differences on decision-making influence rather than substantial differences on the role of NATO, China, and Russia in security and defense policies. In the final chapter, Danita Catherine Burke provides an overview of the UK approach to Arctic/northern security, arguing that there are two fundamental reasons why the UK is interested in and willing to be a regional security leader: (1) the position affords it status in global politics as a major power player; and (2) as a self-described nearest Arctic neighbor, the UK government views security issues in the Arctic as national security issues with a risk of impact on the UK. The chapter presents the UK’s two-pronged approach to structuring its Arctic/northern defense engagement: (1) participation in NATO-focused Arctic defense and other multilateral northern-focused security arrangements such as the UK-led Northern European Joint Expeditionary Force; and (2) forging bilateral Arctic-specific military/security alliances with Arctic states such as Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland. Furthermore, this chapter introduces the leading role that the Royal Navy plays in the UK’s ability to be a global security leader in the Arctic/north and the challenges that the Scottish independence movement poses to the UK’s capacity and position in Arctic defense. References Andrysiak, P. B. and R. D. Newton. (2022) “Landpower and Security in the European Arctic.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs September–October, pp. 24–29. Arctic Today (2022) “Russia Shows off Zircon Hypersonic Cruise Missile in Arctic TestLaunch.” 30 May 2022. Available from: https://www.arctictoday.com/russia-showsoff-zircon-hypersonic-cruise-missile-in-arctic-test-launch/ [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Barents Observer (2022) “Seven Western Countries on Arctic Council to Resume Limited Work in Forum.” 8 June 2022. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ arctic/2022/06/seven-western-countries-arctic-council-resume-limited-work-forum [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Behrmann, J., L. Strauss and N. Wegge (2022) “Getting the Joint Force and NATO Ready to Defend the Arctic.” The KCIS Insight 2-1. Available from: https://www. thekcis.org/publications/insights/insight-211 [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Berdal, E. (1994) “AFNORTH in NATO’s Military Command Structure.” In: Sandvik, A. (ed.), Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe 1951–1994. AFNORTH. Boulègue, M. (2019) Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment. Chatham House Research Paper.

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Conley, H., M. Melino and J. B. Alterman (2020) “The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence.” CSIS report. Available from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Expert Commission (2015) “Unified Effort” Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy. Norwegian MoD. High North News (2022) “Arctic Chiefs of Defence Meet to Discuss New Security Situation in the Region.” 9 August 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews. com/en/arctic-chiefs-defence-meet-discuss-new-security-situation-region [Accessed 27 March 2023]. High North News (2023) “Russia Amends Arctic Policy Prioritizing ‘National Interest’ and Removing Cooperation within Arctic Council.” Available from: https://www. highnorthnews.com/en/russia-amends-arctic-policy-prioritizing-national-interest-andremoving-cooperation-within-arctic [Accessed 27 March 2023]. JFC Norfolk (2023) “About us. Joint Force Command Norfolk.” Available from: https://jfcnorfolk.nato.int/about-us [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Joint-forces.com (2023) “New UK Commandos Arctic Operations Base.” Available from: https://www.joint-forces.com/uk-news/62479-new-uk-commandos-arcticoperations-base [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Käpylä, J. and H. Mikkola (2019) “Contemporary Arctic Meets World Politics: Rethink in Arctic Exceptionalism in the Age of Uncertainty.” In: Finger, Matthian and Heninen, Lassi (eds.), The Global Arctic Handbook. Cham: Springer. Kjellén, J. (2022) “The Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re)militarisation of the Arctic.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13(2022): pp. 34–52. Koivurova, T. (2022) “Hard Security Focus May Once Again Come to Dominate the Arctic, Researcher Fears.” High North News, 29 March 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/hard-security-focus-may-once-again-comedominate-arctic-researcher-fears [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Lavikainen, J. (2021) “Strengthening Russia’s Nuclear Forces in the Arctic: The Case of the Kinzhal Missile. Report CSIS.” Available from: https://www.csis.org/ analysis/strengthening-russias-nuclear-forces-arctic-case-kinzhal-missile [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Nordenman, M. (2019) The New Battle for the Atlantic. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press. Norwegian Intelligence Service (2023) “Fokus [Focus].” Annual report. Available from: https://www.etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/fokus/innhold/ Russland [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2023) “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.” Available from: https://www.intelligence.senate. gov/sites/default/files/documents/unclassified_2023_ata_report.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Solvang, Ø. and N. Wegge (2023) “«Hvordan skal Nord-Norge forsvares? En analyse av landmakten på NATOs nordflanke» [How Should Northern Norway Be Defended? An Analysis of the Land Power on NATO’s Northern Flank].” In: Wegge, Njord (ed.), Sikkerhetspolitikk og militærmakt i Arktis [Security Policy and Military Power in the Arctic]. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk. US Department of State (2022) “Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” Available from: https://www.state.gov/

Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank 11 joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-ofukraine/ [Accessed 27 March 2023]. VanHerck, G. D. (2023) “Statement of General Glen D VanHerck, United States Air Force Commander, United States Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command before the House Armed Services Committee, 8 March 2023.” Available from: https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans. armedservices.house.gov/files/03.08.23%20VanHerck%20Statement.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Wall, C. and N. Wegge (2023) “The Russian Arctic Threat: Consequences of the Ukraine War.” CSIS Brief, January 2023. Available from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ russian-arctic-threat-consequences-ukraine-war [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Wegge, N. (2022) “The Strategic Role of Land Power on NATO’s Northern Flank.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13: pp. 94–113. Wegge, N. and S. Halsne (2022) “Introduction: Security and Military Power in the Arctic.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13: pp. 32–33.

Section I

Security, power projection, and operations on NATO’s northern flank

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The strategic challenge of expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge

Introduction States can project power beyond their borders through their military capabilities. Records of military power projection and expeditionary warfare are about as old as the state itself. Stories from the ancient Greek city-states about their alliances and their joint naval–army operations in the Peloponnesian War are well known. In more recent times, significant events such as the battles for the numerous islands in the Pacific during the Second World War, the D-Day landings on the beaches of Normandy, or the British battle to retake the Falkland Islands in the 1980s illustrate expeditionary warfare and power projection as modern features of warfare. Defending NATO’s northern flank presents political and strategic challenges as well as operational and technological challenges. As the alliance’s northern flank has a small population, a harsh climate with relatively little infrastructure, and no permanent foreign military bases in the Scandinavian Peninsula, the northernmost region of the NATO alliance is a difficult area to project power and operate in. The need for the West to improve its ability to conduct operations in an Arctic winter climate is a challenge at the individual, organizational, and strategic levels (Nordenman, 2019, pp. 156–183; Strauss et al., 2022). Additionally, as substantial parts of this northern region are located in the shadow of a potent Russian A2/AD (anti-access/aerial denial) system, Western air superiority and control of the air and sea domains cannot be taken for granted. Finally, the region’s proximity to Russia makes it politically sensitive, especially in the area close to the Russian border. With all of this in mind, this chapter asks the following research question: How can NATO and its member states improve their ability to compete and operate on NATO’s northern flank, enabling them to project power in a way that deters Russia while also reassuring Moscow of the alliance’s defensive purpose? In answering this research question there is a need to clarify some key terms. As laid out in the introduction of this book, “NATO’s northern flank” DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-3

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can be defined as the northernmost part of the North Atlantic, that is, the seas, islands, and littoral regions north of the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap and the Arctic Ocean, in addition to the northernmost member states’ adjacent landmass. We will apply this understanding in this chapter. With the term “Arctic” we will refer to all areas north of the Arctic Circle. In addition to the delimitation of NATO’s northern flank and the Arctic, the concept of “power projection” should also be clarified. While “power projection” is a general term, not necessarily involving expeditionary air, land, or amphibious force components, this chapter will focus on the concept through that latter lens, through what is often referred to as an “expeditionary force.” In its simplest form an “expeditionary force” can be defined as “[a]n armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country” (Department of Defense, 2018, GL-9). An alternative definition, emphasizing distance and logistics, is “long-range operations which are not connected to a continuous supply line” (Gladius, 2020). US Marine Corps doctrine MCDP 3 defines expeditionary operations as “the projection of force into a foreign setting. By definition, an expedition thus involves the deployment of military forces to the scene of the crisis or conflict and their requisite support some significant distance from their home bases” (US Marine Corps, 2018, pp. 2–5). The term expeditionary also tends to imply “… austere conditions and support. This does not mean that an expeditionary force is necessarily small or lightly equipped, but that it is no larger or heavier than necessary to accomplish the mission. Supplies, equipment, and infrastructure are limited to operational necessities; amenities are strictly minimized” (MCDP 3, 2018, pp. 2–9). This would, for the US Marines, most often imply an internally joint service, usually involving amphibious capabilities of a certain size and mechanized land forces, usually in combination with organic air-fight and airlift capabilities with the ability to conduct forcible entry on a foreign shore (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019, I.1– I.10). We will employ the US Marines’ and the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s understanding of the concept of expeditionary forces in this chapter. Given the limited space available, this chapter will focus on the US and its joint forces, including their relationships to local forces relevant to power projection on NATO’s northern flank. Also, for military units preparing to operate in an Arctic winter environment there are several unique demands. First, on the individual level, challenges pertain not in the least to the simple tasks of staying warm and having efficient clothing both for physical activity and rest (Sullivan-Kwantes et al., 2021). There are also unique demands for many types of gear including lubricants and other materials that need to withstand very low sub-zero temperatures—equipment generally not in stock for average units. There are also mobility challenges regarding how to move on snow and ice and in the mix of ice, snow, and mud in the towing season and in the fall. Other wellknown challenges in cold-weather operations are that batteries die very fast when not kept warm, computers stop working or slow down, and optics become frozen over when exposed to a mix of moisture and freezing

Expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank 17 temperatures (e.g., as in a tent), just to mention a few basic challenges that a light reconnaissance patrol deployed in the fields, seeking to operate in the snow, away from housing and electricity, would face. In addition, satellite coverage in high Arctic latitudes tends to be less developed, as does distributed supply of food and fuel. For most expeditionary units exercising in the Arctic during wintertime, especially those without capabilities for over the snow mobility, they will be overly reliant on the road networks. Units bound for roads are more vulnerable to enemy detection and, therefore, more targetable (Strauss et al., 2022). Structure of the chapter This chapter starts with a brief recapturing of the political situation in the Arctic, focusing on issues of state security. In this section we will briefly address key development trends in the region before looking more carefully at Russia’s military posture, as well as some key aspects of deterrence and reassurance pertaining to the relationship between Russia and NATO. The chapter will continue with a presentation of the US Marine Corps (USMC) and their restructuring initiative, “Force DesignForce Design 2030 (FD2030) 2030.” The USMC is the United States’ primary expeditionary force and, hence, is also NATO’s most robust expeditionary force. In this section, the socalled “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation” (EABO) concept will be presented and used as the analysis’s point of departure, addressing how the joint force and NATO potentially could operate on NATO’s northern flank (Department of the Navy, 2020). After presenting the USMC’s EABO concept we will address how this concept relates to the US Army’s “multi-domain operations” (MDO) concept, the “U. S. Air Force approach to Joint AllDomain Operations,” while also looking into important aspects and capabilities of other NATO allies operating on its northern flank. The contextual and conceptual outline will be followed by an analysis and conclusion. The chapter will use qualitative methods in the analysis, assessing official strategies, military doctrines, and concept developments, but will also, from open sources, investigate developments in military capabilities and state behavior. The security politics of the Arctic The security environment in the Arctic is currently undergoing dramatic changes, characterized by increased tensions as well as unprecedented political–strategic uncertainty following the war in Ukraine. While most democracies regarded Russia up to 2022 as a “partner” in world affairs—even after their Crimean annexation in 2014—this description is no longer accurate. Following Russia’s war in Ukraine, a new type of relationship is forming between Russia and the West. NATO’s Madrid Summit Declaration in the summer of 2022 addresses this new situation. It directly states that “[t]he Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area” (NATO, 2022).

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With Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine from 2022, a significant number of conventional forces normally commanded by the Northern Fleet’s headquarters in Severomorsk have been transported southward to support the war effort. This includes large volumes of Russia’s naval infantry and regular land forces. As an example, reports of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade, normally stationed in Pechenga on the Kola Peninsula, have observed the brigade in the war theater in Eastern Europe as having taken significant war losses and almost been destroyed entirely (Wall and Wegge, 2023). Other accounts document how the Arctic brigade and related units have been degraded, worn out, or simply destroyed in the war in Ukraine (Barents Observer, 2022a; Saue and Drabløs, 2022; Kristoffersen, 2022a). The Norwegian Intelligence Service puts forward estimates that of the three Battalion task groups of land forces sent from Kola to Ukraine close to 50% have been lost, while close to 100 main battle tanks and armed personnel carriers has been destroyed (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2023). At the same time, while the conventional land forces in Russia’s Arctic are weakened, the importance of Russia’s navy and air force, and particularly its nuclear forces and their delivery systems, such as the Kola-based strategic submarines, stands to be more important than ever before for the Kremlin (Kristoffersen, 2022b; Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2023). The importance of Russia’s Arctic forces was also well illustrated on July 31, 2022, as Russia presented its new Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. This is a document that together with the National Security Strategy of 2021 constitutes the most important security-related Russian doctrines or strategies for the Arctic (President of Russia, 2021, 2022). As one could expect in the more tense relationship with the West, USA and NATO forces were presented as the main threat to Russia (Janes, 2022). With respect to the Arctic, it is the Maritime doctrine that particularly spells out Russia’s role as a maritime power in the north, particularly stressing the growing importance of the Arctic Ocean (Buchanan, 2021; Barents Observer, 2022b). Nevertheless, while the latter document is rich in grand ambition and has an assertive tone in the need to counter the West, commentators have pointed out that the strategy is short on clear and realistic deliverables to support the Kremlin’s desire to be a key global power (Weber, 2022; Barents Observer, 2022b). In addition, while the Ukraine war might have demonstrated a somewhat less efficient and capable conventional Russian military apparatus than what has often been assumed, the Kremlin’s willingness to take risks and ignore international norms, using brute force and violence, has, on the other hand, surprised analysts and Western policymakers, a factor certainly relevant in analysis of the Russian security posture in the Arctic (Jenssen, 2022). Throughout the Cold War and to today, deterrence has remained a key concept at NATO’s northern flank. For NATO’s northernmost flank country, Norway, deterrence through NATO membership (extended deterrence) has been accompanied by certain unique self-imposed restrictions in order to reassure the USSR/Russia of the country’s defensive intention (Tamnes, 2019). Such restrictions have pertained to limitations on how far east NATO troops can

Expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank 19 exercise and operate on Norwegian soil in order “to not unnecessarily provoke” the Soviet Union and later Russia. Norway has also refrained from having permanent foreign bases on Norwegian soil in peacetime and has banned nuclear weapons from being stationed on its territory (Tamnes, 2019). Currently, there is an ongoing debate as to what would be the best way to deter Russia in the Arctic, such as deterrence by punishment or denial, which includes the role of allied forces in Norway in peacetime (Wegge, 2022, p. 104; Friis, 2018). Important questions on how Norwegian future defense concepts should be developed are also being assessed (Wegge, 2022; Solvang and Wegge, 2023). This debate includes questions about how extensively the NATO joint forces and components of US forces can be integrated. It also concerns what a potential future “mechanized maneuver,” versus “sensorshooter” concept, could look like, seen in the light of allied development, including US force restructuring such as the Marine Corps FD2030 (Wegge, 2022; Solvang and Wegge, 2023). The US Department of Defense (DoD) recognizes China and Russia as the most important challengers to US security interests and future prosperity, in its 2019 Arctic strategy, which also identifies the need for deterrence. “The Joint Force must be able to deter, and if necessary, defeat great power aggression. DoD must prioritize efforts to address the central problem the NDS identifies—i.e., the Joint Force’s eroding competitive edge against China and Russia” (DoD, 2019). Also, in the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the US reemphasized security and defense as the most important issues in the Arctic, a region to which NATO as an alliance has not given priority in the last two decades (White House, 2022a; Reuters, 2022). Nevertheless, in parallel with a resurgent Russia and the Western focus on deterrence to meet the Russian security challenge in the Arctic, there is a need to acknowledge that deterrence must take into account the special sensitivity Russia is likely to experience in this region. Russia’s strategy of keeping most strategic submarines ensuring a nuclear second-strike capability just 100 kilometers from the Norwegian–Russian border—a key element ensuring the Putin regime’s survival—needs to be taken into account when designing Western force posture (Eyal and Harries, 2022; Kaushal et al., 2022). In sum, the Arctic has uncertain times ahead, a situation that to a large extent involves increased focus on military security and heightened tensions. However, while no party has much to gain from an enhanced armament race in the North or the escalation of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine to a direct NATO-Russia conflict, questions related to security and defense have to a large extent come to dominate the relationship between East and West in the Arctic region. Conceptual developments and military operations on NATO’s northern flank The North Atlantic states have in recent years given the Arctic and NATO’s northern flank a gradually higher priority. Through new Arctic security

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strategies, the Arctic region is today figuring higher on the security agenda in this region compared to the situation just a few years ago (Wegge, 2020). This development has gradually intensified, with incidents and developments such as the Russians planting their flag on the sea floor at the North Pole in 2007, the thawing of the Arctic sea ice, and the evolution of a more capable Russian A2/AD system and more silent submarines all functioning as important factors. More recently, Russia’s offensive military behavior in Ukraine has created an urgent focus on the threat of the East to large parts of Europe. However, while the Arctic and NATO’s northern flank have become more prominent in both Western states’ strategic documents and in large-scale military exercises like Trident Juncture 2018 and Cold Response 2022, there is from the western side a significant need to improve joint capabilities and operational skills along with strategies relevant to cold weather and Arctic operations (Reuters, 2022; Burke, 2022, pp. 201–230). US command Before discussing the important US service concepts on how to fight and how they pertain to NATO’s northern flank, it is also important to consider how these concepts fit into the US command structure. Most obvious to those dealing with the US Armed Forces and their national command authority is that the US President is the Commander in Chief. The President delegates the day-to-day operations of the Armed Forces to the Secretary of Defense. Under the Secretary are the services, Unified Commands, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The latter also has an advisory role directly to the President and the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs do not have command authority. Combatant commanders, however, do have authority to command units that are assigned to them. The military services are in charge of manning, training, and equipping their respective forces. The individual service concepts become important because, ideally, they influence how a service decides on their force design and the way they will train and equip themselves. Thus, if a combatant commander desires a specific type of unit, one or several of the services have to have produced that unit in the first place. For instance, as of 2022, if Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) needed a tank unit, it would not be able to get it from the US Marine Corps. Thus, Joint Publication 5-0 states that: “If there is a reasonable expectation that required resources will not be available, the CCMD (Combatant Commands) will develop an alternative approach with available resources or resources that are expected to be available. CCMDs should solicit the advice of the Services, other CCMDs, JFPs, Joint Staff J-35 [Joint Force Coordinator], joint functional managers (JFMs) as applicable, and other FPs in identifying preferred forces” (DoD, 2020: I-21).1

Expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank 21 The US Marines, Force Design 2030 In March 2020, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, General David H. Berger, released his first iteration of Force Design 2030, followed by The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations (EABO) in February 2021. These two documents set the US Marine Corps on a path to dramatic change in response to perceptions of emerging great power competition or strategic competition with China and Russia. The National Defense Strategy of 2018 and President Joseph Biden’s most recent National Security Strategy both drive home these threats (White House, 2022b). The US Marine Corps perceives their greatest relevance in the Indo-Pacific, where the US Navy would also take the lead where maritime lines of communication between the United States and allies will be of the utmost importance. Much like the maritime debates prior to open conflict in the Pacific Theater of the Second World War, the USMC predicts geographic and technological challenges in this region, this time against China. Force Design 2030 (FD2030) is hyper-focused on this. “With the shift in our primary focus to great power competition and a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific region, the current force has shortfalls in capabilities needed to support emerging joint, naval, and Marine Corps operating concepts” (Department of the Navy, 2020, p. 2). The change should be seen in direct relationship with the Navy’s “Distributed Maritime Operations” (DMO) that together with EABO should be considered the future concepts of operation for the two services where forces will be dispersed “across the battlespace rather than power being concentrated on a single carrier strike group” (Naval Warfare, 2021). This is a concept the Navy’s “Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic” also specifies as relevant for their Arctic operations: “We must anticipate the challenges of a Blue Arctic and develop and test operational concepts to sharpen our advantage at sea. This will include concepts for DMO, Littoral Operations in Contested Environment (LOCE), and EABO” (Department of the Navy, 2021, p. 20). In order to grapple with the growing scale and reach of adversaries’ A2/AD capabilities, the USMC is shifting to a force that can disperse within an adversary’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ) and survive in a contested area, with a light footprint to avoid detection. The concept of EABO focuses on the Marines acting as a “stand-in force,” or a force that is already within a potential enemy’s WEZ, thereby creating a dilemma that an adversary must contend with (Berger, 2021a). This has meant divesting the Marine Corps of battle tanks and other heavier equipment. FD2030 and EABO, rather, put an emphasis on smaller units capable of fighting in littorals and sustaining themselves in an austere environment. Such forces would equip themselves with more missile artillery capable of anti-air, anti-land, anti-ship, and potentially also anti-submarine warfare (USNI News, 2020). Thus, the USMC seeks the capability to stand up their own A2/AD zones within an adversary’s active WEZ or A2/AD. This would enable the USMC to deny

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access to an adversary while they open corridors for their own forces (Strauss et al., 2022, pp. 79–80). While divesting to invest in newer technology has not completely worked the way General Berger envisioned, his goal is controversial if admirable. Ridding themselves of heavy tanks, other tracked vehicles, and even infantry units has raised questions about how much the USMC can continue to be the “fight tonight” force of the United States. Debates have emerged over whether the Marines will be able to maneuver on the modern battlefield, going up against heavier opponents, or if they have become more of a niche reconnaissance force with extremely advanced technology only fitted to conduct and counter C5ISR2 (Barrick, 2022; Marinus, 2022). The controversy reached a fever pitch in 2022 when over two dozen retired USMC Generals, including all the living former Commandants, spoke out against FD2030 as taking the wrong direction (McLeary and Hudson, 2022). In giving priority to high-tech, remote sensor capabilities run by lighter, dispersed, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance units executed as a part of the Navy’s “DMO”, littoral contested areas have been assumed to be the main operational theater. In this setting, having their eyes in the “contact zone,” directing long-range precision fires as well as disrupting enemy nodes of communication, was suggested as the core mission of the Marines in the future (Berger, 2021b). This development would “help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance (RXR) battle at every point on the competition continuum” (Marine Corps, 2022, p. 2). As the Marines would focus on winning the RXR battle, the Navy fleet commander would as a consequence be given a better maritime and littoral theater awareness, something that would allow him to engage the Navy’s more powerful capabilities like aircraft carriers, frigates, and submarines to target them from a position of less exposure. Questions still remain, however, as to how all of this might work in an Arctic scenario. For instance, Marines are not permanently stationed on NATO’s northern flank. Therefore, they are not a stand-in force (Qviller et al., 2022). If EABO and FD2030 assume that a potential adversary will use surprise to catch the United States unaware or create a fait accompli (e.g., by rapidly occupying Finnmark in northern Norway—as was feared during the Cold War), then the USMC and Navy will likely have to fight their way to their northern NATO allies through an extended Russian bastion defense (Wegge, 2022, p. 100; Strauss et al., 2022). Neither EABO nor updated versions of FD2030 shed light on how this might be done. NATO exercises and capability assessments have also regularly uncovered a need for improved cold-weather skills among allied forces, including the USMC (Strauss et al., 2022; Budai, 2019; Burke and Matisek, 2019). However, ideas about how regional allied forces, like the Norwegian Armed Forces, might play the role of an integrated, allied stand-in force have recently come to the forefront (Qviller et al., 2022; Thorvaldsen et al., 2022).

Expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank 23 US Army and MDO While the US Marines’ response to the growing scale of peer competitors’ A2/AD is a lighter, distributed force conducting EABO, the US Army has begun to transition toward “large-scale combat operations” (LSCO) with a similar flavor. To do this in the 21st century, they are cultivating the concept of MDO, which the US Army lays out in Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1: The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028. The pamphlet states, “the central idea in solving this problem (layered standoff) is the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we compete short of armed conflict” (Department of the Army, 2018, iii).3 Much of MDO is geared toward the same problem that the US Marine Corps is wrestling with: how best to deter an adversary with similar capabilities while at the same time also being able to swiftly shift to open conflict and win. To do this, MDO states that “the Army solves the problems presented by Chinese and Russian operations in competitions and conflict by applying three interrelated tenets: calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence” (US Army, 2018, vii). In identifying a new operating concept, the US Army seeks to deter and, if deterrence fails, win in a conflict against China or Russia, then transition back into competition from a position of advantage. To accomplish this, MDO defines a calibrated force posture as one where the US Army has the ability to position itself for maneuverability in strategic depth. They cannot assume superiority across domains, as US forces have been able to in the past. Thus, they will need to have more maneuverable cross-domain capabilities to win when a peer adversary contests them in any or all domains. Finally, success will require “rapid and continuous integration in all domains … that optimizes effects to overmatch the enemy through crossdomain synergy and multiple forms of attack” to create convergence (US Army, 2018, vii). As Frank Hoffman recently noted, “convergence best describes what is being done by the Army but does not describe the impact on the adversary” (Hoffman, 2021, p. 55). The US Army Chief of Staff, General James C. McConville, elaborated upon MDO in March 2021 when he released “Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict” as Chief of Staff Paper #1. He set 2035 as the year to achieve the Multi-Domain Army and 2028 as the goal to work through “Waypoints” (Department of the Army, 2021, i, pp. 1, 20). In this document McConville points out that “Future conflicts will manifest at longer range, across all domains, and at much greater speed, both physical and cognitive,” where the answer for the Army would be “to continue to implement a 21st century talent management system, develop and field new weapon systems, transform our doctrine, build new organizations, and change the way we train” (Department of the Army 2021, i). The MDO concept should hence be seen not only as an update of doctrines adjusted for new technologies in time and space but also as a complete transformation of the way the Armed Forces train, operate, and evolve.

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Interestingly, similarly to the US Marine Corps’ EABO, the Army’s MDO proposes that they need to persevere within an adversary’s A2/AD zone as an “inside force” as well as an “outside force” (Department of the Army, 2021, pp. 6-7). “Ground forces can defeat sophisticated adversary defensive schemes from inside positions, creating corridors for air, maritime and all-domain forces to exploit” (Department of the Army, 2021, p. 1). In a similar vein to EABO, General McConville argues that forces already inside an adversary’s A2/AD create a deterrent effect on their decision-making. Thus, forces inside a contested area can mitigate an adversary’s movement, targeting, and command and control (C2) along with outside assets that have strategic reach, thereby expanding the battlespace. Hence the US and its allies can impose a high cost on an adversary’s attempts to either achieve nefarious aims short of conflict or preclude a fait accompli (Department of the Army, 2021, p. 10). The Army plans on achieving this through a forward posture and reliance on host nations, along with “survivable and lightweight power sources, and dispersed caches as a part of Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)” (Department of the Army, 2021, p. 14). Ideally, since MDO is a theater-agnostic concept, it should be applicable to an Arctic setting. Until recently the US Army has, however, lacked a significant force component trained for Arctic winter warfare. With the US Army’s newly launched Arctic strategy, accompanied by the re-designation of the Alaskan-based 11th Airborne Division, these capacity flaws may be reversing (Department of the Army, 2021; US Army, 2022). US Air Force Joint All-Domain Operations In July 2020, the US Air Force launched its own Arctic strategy. In recognizing the region’s “vast distances and challenges to surface operations,” the strategy points out how air power is key to joint operations in the region (Department of the Air Force, 2020). Also, in the US Air Force, a somewhat similar situation can be observed as in the USMC, the US Navy, and the US Army, as the renewed great power competition has eroded the Air Force’s edge versus emerging technologically advanced great powers (Mulgund, 2021, p. 2). With the challenge from great powers like China and Russia, air superiority can no longer be taken for granted. For the Air Force these insights have prompted the need for better integration and synchronization of US air power with the full spectrum of the joint capabilities. Hence as seen in the FD2030 and MDO concepts, the Air Force has also increasingly oriented itself toward closer integration and cooperation with the other US branches and allied forces; “Joint All-Domain Operations” (JADO) has hence emerged as a parallel conceptual operational approach to the new challenges seen in the air domain (Department of the Air Force, 2021, p. 4). In the Air Force/Space Force Doctrine Publication 3-99, JADO is defined as operations: “[c]omprised of air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space

Expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank 25 domains, plus the EMS […] synchronized in execution, at speed and scale needed to gain advantage and accomplish the mission” (Department of the Air Force, 2021, p. 4). The JADO concept is also put forward as a pervasive planning tool relevant to all stages in the competition continuum, stretching from cooperation (e.g., improving partner nation interoperability), through competition (e.g., incorporating all-domain approaches into flexible deterrent options) to all-out armed conflict (e.g., gaining information advantage and overmatching adversary forces) (Department of the Air Force, 2021, p. 3). Working to improve American air power readiness for peer competition, particularly from China, Secretary of the US Air Force, Frank Kendall, has identified what have been labeled the “seven operational imperatives” (Air Force, 2022). These are seven points that seek to ensure the development of an air force ready for the challenges of the future, where, particularly, the need for “Defining Resilient and Effective Space Order of Battle and Architectures” has been identified, as “the U.S. cannot project power successfully unless our space-based services are resilient enough to endure while under attack” (Air Force, 2022). European allies Besides the US, the UK is the NATO country with the greatest ability to project power through expeditionary warfare at NATO’s northern flank. With an aircraft carrier group designated to the European/Atlantic theater, along with the Royal Marines, who for decades have trained regularly in winter warfare in Northern Norway, the British military is in the best position to conduct large-scale expeditionary operations in the Arctic (Depledge, 2020; Willett, 2022; Wegge, 2020, pp. 371–371, 376–377). With the British strategy paper, “The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North,” the UK’s Ministry of Defence has also put operations in the Arctic and the defense of Arctic allies high on the agenda (UK MoD, 2022). In addition, the Dutch Marine Corps also possesses significant operational experience in the Arctic, even though its capabilities are less extensive in terms of overarching size compared to the British. In the context of FD2030/MDO/JADO, Norway’s, Finland’s, and Sweden’s forces could be regarded as “stand-in forces” on NATO’s northern flank, where operational capabilities such as sensors and command and control assets potentially could be integrated to the greatest possible degree for future NATO and joint force operations (Qviller et al., 2022; Thorvaldsen et al., 2022; Bruøygard and Qviller, 2020). Analysis and concluding remarks This chapter has pointed out that there are several challenges associated with power projection and expeditionary warfare in the Arctic. These are challenges

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that refer to the individual and tactical levels, where harsh and often very cold weather combined with lack of infrastructure demand experience as well as special equipment for troops to survive, conduct missions, and thrive. In addition, there is also a need to improve operational procedures and strategic thinking, including joint concepts with respect to power projection into the Arctic. Several of the US military services are, as laid out above, currently making significant reforms both in force structure, like the Marines FD2030, and in their operational concepts, like EABO, the Army’s MDO, or as found in the Air Force’s JADO. The changes are designed to respond to peer competition, where both the acute threat from Russia as well as the pacing long-term threat from China are highlighted (DoD, 2022). However, particularly addressing the long-term threat from Beijing, the service’s new fighting concepts are generally designed for temperate climate zones, being largely untested and unrehearsed for the Arctic theater. Hence questions about to what degree the new concepts can work for this northernmost part of the globe have been raised (Bruøygard and Qviller, 2020). In practice, extreme cold-weather operations conducted from remote locations with lack of heated shelters and with no connection points to the electrical grid are difficult even for experienced and specialized cold-weather units. Add the general difficulty with getting interactions in real time to work on an operational level to the challenges (e.g., as envisioned in FD2030/ MDO/JADO operations), and the conduction of large-scale Arctic operations stands out as very difficult even in temperate climates, not to mention in sub-zero temperatures and winter darkness. The challenges of getting the full strength of the joint force and the NATO alliance to fight at NATO’s northern flank also include difficulties with respect to logistics. This is particularly seen at the strategic level, where very long supply chains and Russian A2/AD capabilities make supply and resupply hard (Nordenman, 2019). In addition, as there are no permanent foreign NATO bases on its Northern flank and most of NATO’s forces are not trained for an arctic climate, there is a need for more permanent training as well as ensuring the acquisition of cold-weather equipment, also including logistical support, in order to be able to operate effectively in a joint fashion over time in this region. This also includes developing the capacity to establish expeditionary bases with long-range reconnaissance units capable of winning the RXR battle. Finally, at the political-strategic level also, this chapter has illuminated hard choices that need to be made, not least of which are related to force posturing and the relationship with Russia. Decisions hence will have to be made on how to deter Russia while not unnecessarily provoking Moscow, thereby creating an unstable arms spiral. Norway’s decision to not allow foreign bases on its territory in peacetime while also putting general restrictions on allied activity in the easternmost part of its Arctic regions is one such feature influencing planning of how the joint force and NATO could fight in this region. However, with Finland’s and Sweden’s

Expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank 27 addition to NATO re-assessments and changes might be pertinent, pending on the policies of the two in the not-too-distant future. In an ideal military operational context, US force in the Arctic should be able to work within a unity of effort that makes joint and interagency synchronization a reality. Also, both the US Marine Corps’s and the Army’s concepts lean toward a vision of expeditionary warfare that plans to establish forces within an adversary’s WEZ, forward positioned in advance of a conflict. Such a stand-in force will be a disbursed and maneuverable force, prepositioned with supply (Berger, 2021a, p. 8). Therefore, according to standard planning, they will be harder to target and more survivable. However, doing so generally requires establishing basing, forward-positioned supplies, and/or foraging practices, a situation that does not apply to NATO’s northern flank due to political limitations. On the other hand, there are strong indications pointing to a picture that the main bulk of the joint force and NATO is not prepared for challenging Arctic operations. Having prioritized the global war on terror for nearly 20 years, the NATO alliance is at time of writing not ready for peer competition in the Arctic (Reuters, 2022). The lack of preparedness is not only visible at the individual and operational levels but also in the higher echelons of the command chain. As Norway, being the alliance’s northern flank country, does not want foreign bases on its soil in peacetime, alternatives to stand-in forces must be developed. As developing winter combat skills across the joint force and the NATO alliance takes time, there is a need to invent practical solutions to alleviate the current situation. One possibility for alleviating these problems might be that Finland or Sweden might adopt a different foreign base policy than Norway and establish US or allied bases in northern parts of their countries. However, this can at present not be taken for granted. Another alternative is that US expeditionary forces could be developed with the capability of penetrating or slipping into an active Russian WEZ, both with respect to the general technological and material challenge this might imply but also with respect to the climatic factors. However, another and perhaps more cost-effective option might be to look to the local forces already present at the northern flank today. Instead of developing very hard to obtain cold-weather capabilities a more viable solution might be to rather work harder to integrate and further develop military cooperation with winter-accustomed local armed forces. This should, among other force components, include reconnaissance units as well as the distributed home guard units in states like Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark (Faeroe Islands/Greenland), to be seamlessly interoperable with their joint forces. Such intra-alliance integration should be able to deter and convince Russia of NATO’s ability to operate its joint fighting power on its northern flank, including the alliance’s ability to defend and strike back, even from within an activated A2/AD system and from a contested zone. In such a scenario the combination of local “stand-in forces” combined with an

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additional later-arriving expeditionary NATO force could effectively deter Russia while at the same time seeking to keep the necessary distance in times of peace to avoid unnecessary escalations and the creation of unintended events. Notes 1 Joint Force Provider (JFP), Force Provider (FP). 2 Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 3 Italics in the original.

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military years behind] Forsvarets forum [Norwegian Defence Journal]. 17 August 2022. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (2018) “MCDP 3.” Expeditionary Operations. Marine Corps (2022) “Force design 2030 annual update May 2022.” Available from: https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Docs/Force_Design_2030_Annual_ Update_May_2022.pdf [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Marinus (2022) “Expeditionary advanced base operations.” Maneuverist Papers. April 2022. Available from: https://mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Maneuverist-19. pdf [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Mcleary, P. and L. Hudson (2022) “How two dozen retired generals are trying to stop an overhaul of the Marines.” Politico. Available from: https://www.politico.com/ news/2022/04/01/corps-detat-how-two-dozen-retired-generals-are-trying-tostop-an-overhaul-of-the-marines-00022446 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Mulgund, S. (2021) “Evolving the command and control of air power.” Wild Blue Yonder, Online Journal Air University, April 21. Naval Warfare (2021) “Navy’s path to distributed maritime operations unclear: Govini.” 7 September 2021. Available from: https://breakingdefense.com/2021/09/navyspath-to-distributed-maritime-operations-unclear-govini/ [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Nordenman, M. (2019) The new battle for the Atlantic. Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press. Norwegian Intelligence Service (2023) “Fokus [Focus], annual report.” Available from: https://www.etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/fokus/innhold/Russland [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. NATO (2022) “Madrid summit declaration.” Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government, the North Atlantic Council, Madrid, 29 June 2022. President of Russia (2021) “National security strategy of the Russian Federation.” Decree of 02.07.2021 No. 400. President of Russia (2022) “Maritime doctrine of the Russian Federation.” Decree of 31.07.2022 Nr. 512. Qviller, J., S. Rusten, A. Vedul and K. Lamptey (2022) “Stand-in forces and integrated deterrence.” Marine Corps Gazette May 196(5), pp. 43–47. Reuters (2022) “Dark Arctic. NATO allies wake up to Russian supremacy in the region.” Report 16 November 2022. Available from: https://graphics.reuters.com/ ARCTIC-SECURITY/zgvobmblrpd/index.html?fbclid=IwAR2v1GK5jvSwbtk55W Uaq1H9d61vmfF7v2n99vprwPI0OROkeTpgcWPw1H0 [Accessed: 2 March 2023] Saue, O.A. and Ø. Drabløs (2022) “Soldater fra den norsk-russiske grensen skal ha lidd store tap i Ukraina.” [Soldiers from the Norwegian-Russian border are supposed to have suffered big losses in Ukraine] Aftenposten, 11 March 2022. Available from: https://www.aftenposten.no/verden/i/k6Gqwj/soldater-fra-den-norsk-russiskegrensen-skal-ha-lidd-store-tap-i-ukrai [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Solvang, Ø. and N. Wegge (2023) “Hvordan skal Nord-Norge forsvares? En analyse av landmakten på NATOs nordflanke.” [How should Northern Norway be defended? An analyses of the land power at NATO’s northern flank]. In: Wegge, Njord (Ed). Sikkerhetspolitikk og militærmakt i Arktis [Security Politics and Military Power in the Arctic]. Oslo, Cappelen Damm Akademisk. Strauss, L., R. Gordinier and M. Byrne (2022) “U.S. marines and NATO’s northern flank.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13, pp. 72–93.

Expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank 31 Sullivan-Kwantes, W. et al. (2021) “Human performance research for military operations in extreme cold environments.” Journal of Science and Medicine in Sport 24, pp. 954–962. Tamnes, R. (2019) “Småstatsrealisme i 70 år.” [Small state realism in 70 years]. Internasjonal Politikk 77(1), pp. 49–59. Thorvaldsen, J-E, Z. Løken-Gheziel and C. Kjølstadmyr (2022) “Hæren i multidomain operations.” [The Norwegian Army in multi-domain operations]. Bachelor Thesis, Norwegian Military Academy. UK MoD (2022) “The UK’s defence contribution in the High North.” US Army (2018) “The U.S. army in multi-domain operations in 2028.” Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1. US Army (2022) “Army re-activates historic airborne unit, reaffirms commitment to Arctic strategy.” Army News Service, 8 June 2022. Available from: https://www. army.mil/article/257356/army_re_activates_historic_airborne_unit_reaffirms_ commitment_to_arctic_strategy [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. US Marine Corps (2018) “Expeditionary operations.” MCDP3. USNI News (2020) “CMC berger outlines how marines could fight submarines in the future.” 8 December 2020. Available from: https://news.usni.org/2020/12/08/ cmc-berger-outlines-how-marines-could-fight-submarines-in-the-future [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Wall, C. and N. Wegge (2023) “The Russian Arctic threat—Consequences of the Ukraine War.” CSIS report. Available from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-arctic-threatconsequences-ukraine-war [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Weber, Y. (2022) “Russia’s new maritime doctrine, MES insights.” 13(4). Available from: https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/MES%20Insights_Weber_13_4.pdf [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Wegge, N. (2020) “Arctic security strategies and the North Atlantic states.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 11, pp. 360–382. Wegge, N. (2022) “The strategic role of land power on NATO’s northern flank.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13, pp. 94–113. White House (2022a) “National strategy for the Arctic region.” October 2022. White House (2022b) “National security strategy.” October 2022. Willett, L. (2022) “Heading North—NATO build maritime capacity on its northern flank.” Naval Forces XLIII(II), pp. 48–51.

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A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma1 Norway, the United States, and the defense of Northern Norway, 1960–1980 Stian Bones

Two emerging dilemmas In 1972, US Ambassador Crowe to Norway reported to the State Department that “over the past year the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Foreign Minister have all spoken out on the possible implications for Norway of the development of the massive naval complex around Murmansk, adjacent to Norwegian soil.” All these ministers had—“privately, at least”—welcomed the reassurances the United States provided through increased US naval activity in the Norwegian Sea and through visits of several high-level defense and military officials. This underlined the strong relations between the United States and Norway (NARA, 1972). However, other developments also called for attention by the State Department. Crowe noted that there was a tendency in Norway of simultaneously pursuing defense and détente within NATO. This was, in fact, “to a marked degree” noticeable in Norway. For instance, Ambassador Crowe found it a bit strange that Foreign Minister Cappelen, after having described the growing Soviet military threat to the northern flank, went on to argue that the Soviet build-up called for a continued search for détente. What Crowe wanted was clearly for Cappelen to use more of his time to argue in favor of expanding deterrent capacities. This chapter shows that the questions raised by Ambassador Crowe can best be understood as two emerging dilemmas, although the ambassador perhaps did not fully grasp this himself. On the one hand, Norway faced a defense dilemma. As a small state, bordering the Soviet Union, Norway could not even hope to defend herself against the Soviet Union without the larger NATO effort. Assistance from other NATO—countries—especially the United States—was essential. But the combined effects of the proximity to the Soviet Union as well as the peripheral location with respect to large US military bases and facilities represented a problem. In case of war, Norway would have to prolong her initial resistance to a degree that would enable the United States and other NATO countries to come to Norway´s assistance before the Soviet Union was able to present a fait accompli. While this clearly represents a defense DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-4

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 33 problem, it can also be seen as a defense dilemma. An ever-increasing Soviet military capacity in the north meant that the time factor associated with allied reinforcements became an increasingly critical factor. Norwegian defense planning had to take this into account, which brought the concept of “holding time” to the center of attention. This defense problem could only be solved by strengthening the policy of invitation to key allies, which required an active choice on part of Norwegian (and allied) decision-makers. The defense problems related to North Norway visualized this dilemma most clearly. On the other hand, strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union in the High North also represented a possible security dilemma. In this chapter, I argue that managing the security dilemma was a crucial aspect of Norwegian security policy during the Cold War. On the one hand, Norway opened the doors to American military protection in a way that can be described as extended deterrence (Haaland et al., 2021, p. 221). On the other hand, Norwegian politicians attempted to prevent Norwegian territory from sparking unwanted political competition between the superpowers. Norway´s desire for stability and low tension in the High North did not rule out deterrence, however. On the contrary, the establishment of a credible deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, without fueling the security dilemma, was seen to have a stabilizing effect (Holst, 1985a, p. 60). The studies and discussions of the emerging defense dilemma and the security dilemma during the 1960s and 1970s are still highly relevant. To be sure, the international system has changed substantially since the Cold War. But the major security issue for Norway is still the asymmetric neighborly relations to Russia, and the fact North-West Russia is home to the Northern Fleet, which holds Russia´s most powerful strategic military capabilities. In a rapidly changing security environment, where Finland and Sweden have become NATO members allied reinforcements are still a cornerstone in Norwegian defense policy. That is why studies of the bilateral NorwegianAmerican planning of allied reinforcements during the Cold War can offer crucial insights even today. Central concepts and previous studies This chapter investigates in detail two phases of Norwegian-American bilateral studies aiming to reinforce the defense of Northern Norway. The bilateral study groups have also been studied by others (Tamnes, 1991; Tamnes, 1997; Maaø, 2014). Historian Rolf Tamnes´ contributions provide a good overview of the work of the study group. Tamnes has shown how the study group can be understood as a tangible expression of an active Norwegian invitation and integration policy. In this connection, he refers to the central security policy analyst Johan Jørgen Holst, who wrote that it was important to “plug Norwegian interests and considerations into the American decision-making process” at an early stage (Tamnes, 1997, p. 83). As we shall see, Holst was also one of the most central figures in the defense planning which is under discussion here.

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Tamnes describes how the question of American military reinforcements to Norway—and to Northern Norway in particular—was connected to a larger alliance perspective. In the early Cold War years, the High North had been regarded as a flank to the central front on the continent. From the second half of the 1960s, however, the study group contributed to raising NATO’s attention to the northern flank. A Soviet military advance in the north would threaten the lines of communication between North America and Europe. Seen in a European continental context, the threat to the northern flank therefore represented a significant strategic problem for NATO (Tamnes, 1991, p. 246). In a doctoral thesis on the Systems Group at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (NDRE), historian Ole Jørgen Maaø has given a thorough account of the central importance that this department had for the design of Norwegian defense policy in the period 1959–1980. The Systems Group’s collaboration with American colleagues, including analysts from the RAND Corporation, was close and significant, Maaø shows. The RAND Corporation was a pioneering institution for systems analysis, and the contacts it had to several American government bodies were close and manifold. While expanding contacts with American colleagues, NDRE also included security policy analyses in its portfolio. The most central person here was the political scientist Johan Jørgen Holst, who from 1964—among other things—worked on a project called “Some factors of importance for defense planning.” This project also provided important insights to the further collaboration between Norwegian and American analysts who studied the Northern Norwegian defense problem (Maaø, 2014, pp. 134 ff., pp. 279 ff.). It is clear from previous research that the joint studies contributed substantially to improve foundations for US reinforcements to Norway. However, no attention has been drawn to the connection between allied reinforcements along with the dual concepts of deterrence and reassurance, which were introduced by Holst in Norwegian security studies simultaneously. Also, the fact that reassurance, confidence-building, and political “signaling” were supported and strengthened by active diplomacy deserves more attention. The Norwegian “High North dialogs”—aimed at informing some states and gaining political support from others—were intended to serve this purpose. Also, neither Tamnes nor Maaø identifies the concept of the security dilemma as central to this process, and how Norway strove to manage the regional security dilemma also led to specific policy considerations, for instance, toward the Soviet Union, Finland, and the United States. In fact, the security dilemma remains to this day a neglected concept in the literature on the history of Norwegian foreign and security policy. This is even more striking, as the international literature on this phenomenon is very rich (Jervis, 1978; Jervis, 2001; Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Tang, 2009). Scholars have different views on how to define and describe the concept. However, many would agree that it somehow describes a situation where decision-makers have

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 35 limited insights of the intentions of other decision-makers. This situation is a driver for uncertainty and fear, which in turn creates a need to increase one’s own power base, particularly militarily. Therefore, a state that has no intention of threatening another state (but only securing itself) can still appear threatening, as other states perceive it, which in turn can lead to a decline in security. Still, some directions within international relations theory claim that it is possible for decision-makers to reduce uncertainty and increase trust between states. Therefore, under given conditions, it is possible to handle and keep in check some of the driving forces behind the security dilemma. Reassurance is a way of doing that (Montgomery, 2006). The historical background Having a border with the Soviet Union significantly impacted Norway’s relations with Western powers. This was instrumental in shaping Norway’s NATO profile, but also Nordic collaborations. One repercussion was that Norwegian politicians restricted activities by both Norwegian and allied military forces in Norway. Although the practice of these “self-imposed restrictions” was relatively stable, it is also important to note that the restrictions were “self-imposed”, and that Norway was in principle free to make any changes and develop new practices. Norwegian policy within the alliance aimed to bind other Western countries, especially the United States, to the defense of Norway. On the one hand, Norway arranged for American military protection, i.e., a form of “extended deterrence” (Haaland et al., 2021, p. 221). On the other hand, Norway had to try to prevent the country or the surrounding areas from becoming a starting point for unwanted great-power political competition. This form of security policy in the north also had consequences for other policies in relation to the west, such as exercising authority on Svalbard and the maritime zones, resource management, and scientific research. The restrictions imposed by Norway on her own activities and those of Western nations in areas close to the Soviet Union are also highly indicative of the threats faced by Norway. If the Soviet Union had, without any exceptions, been perceived merely as an expansionist neighbor, it is unlikely that Norwegian politicians would have supported such a comprehensive set of self-imposed restrictions, as was the case over several decades. While the Soviet Union—no doubt—was regarded as a major threat to Norway, it was even more likely that war could emerge because of distrust and great-power competition spiraling out of control. In 1948, the year before Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Halvard Lange stated that the greatest threat to world peace was the deep-rooted distrust and hostility prevailing between the superpowers. Even though none of the central state leaders aimed at conflict, the process could ultimately drive them into war. There was always the potential that one party could misinterpret the other; that one party could imagine that the opposite party wanted to gain a lead or incorrectly assess where the border lay for certain activities

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without triggering a war between the superpowers (Bones et al., 2015). Bearing the security dilemma in mind, it is easy to understand that military planning and development involving the United States or implying more activities by Americans in Norway are very sensitive issues—both with regard to domestic policy and in a wider security policy context. With the military power base Norway commanded during the Cold War, the country could not in itself pose any threat to the Soviet Union. That could only happen if other states, especially the United States, increased their military power and influence in Norway. For a long time, however, it proved difficult to get the United States to commit conventional forces to the defense of Norway. The security guarantee therefore rested on the US nuclear forces, guided by the doctrine of “massive retaliation”. Back in 1953–1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had vowed that a direct military confrontation would be met with a major nuclear attack on central locations in the Soviet Union and China. This represented a “New Look” on US national security policy, where nuclear weapons were considered “to be as available for use as other munitions” (Holloway, 2010). Seen from an allied perspective, this doctrine implied that some of the Norwegian military forces could be considered as support elements in connection with a nuclear operation against the Soviet Union. From a Norwegian perspective, the most important defense priorities were of a different kind. The Norwegian defense planning aimed at developing a peripheral defense, i.e., to protect large parts of the country and at the same time facilitate for allied reinforcements (Gjeseth, 2011, p. 23). But for as long as massive retaliation was the applicable doctrine in NATO, however, there was great uncertainty in Norway about the possibility of bringing major allied reinforcements to Northern Norway at all. But when dedicated conventional allied reinforcements to Northern Norway finally materialized, this also had the potential to fuel a possible security dilemma in the High North. This happened during the 1960s. The second half of the 1960s saw comprehensive military changes in the High North. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union’s Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea fleets had reached a size and strength that could pose a genuine threat to United States’s and Great Britain’s naval dominance in the northeastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Up to this point in time, the Western powers had dominated the Atlantic Ocean. The United States had the capacity to secure a lifeline to Western Europe in the event of a war and could also provide military reinforcements to exposed countries in Western Europe. This position was now under threat. From 1963 and onwards, Norwegian surveillance aircraft recorded progressively more complex Soviet military exercises year after year in the Norwegian Sea (Klevberg, 2012). The development also brought significant changes to the Soviet military posture. In 1959, the Norwegian Intelligence Service noted that the number of submarines in the Northern Fleet had increased notably in only a few years, from 74 in 1956 to 109 in 1959 (Klevberg, 2012, p. 195). This reinforcement

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 37 of the Northern Fleet only accelerated during the 1960s; simultaneously, the Soviets coupled this with the introduction of new and more advanced types of submarines. NATO was particularly focused on the phasing-in of the “Yankee” class, which became operational from 1967 to 1968. The Yankee class could carry 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and was comparable to the Polaris submarines used by the United States and the UK. Thus, these Soviet submarines were seen as somewhat of a “game-changer” (Dyndal, 2011, p. 572). These strategic submarines provided the main platform for deliveries of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the most important weapons in terms of nuclear deterrence between the superpowers. The submarines were a guarantee of the Soviet Union’s second-strike capability—thus a convincing display that the Soviet Union, on a par with the United States, had the capacity to respond to a nuclear attack with destructive nuclear retaliation. Furthermore, the Soviet submarines—from 1973 and onwards—were no longer forced to move out of the North-East Atlantic to reach targets in North America. By that time, any targets in North America could be reached from practically any location in the Barents Sea or Arctic Ocean. Since these submarines were able to slide under the ice where they were difficult to detect, the strategic importance of the Arctic Ocean increased. The certainty that both parties had the capability for mutual destruction created some form of stability. At the same time, however, it generated the need to innovate in terms of military doctrine, resulting in the concept of “flexible response” replacing the doctrine of “massive retaliation” in the 1960s. The logic behind the “flexible response,” which was introduced by President Kennedy, was to develop a credible deterrent that could encompass several scenarios below the threshold of a general nuclear war. Kennedy wanted to explore other options than the ones “massive retaliation” offered to him (Holloway, 2010). Consequently, the NATO forces had to develop credible and customized responses to various military threats, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, and also focus more on the production of conventional forces. The doctrine of flexible or graded responses was based on the certainty of the parties’ capabilities for mutual destruction and the fact that it no longer seemed credible that the United States would meet limited Soviet military operations with a massive retaliation. Instead, “controlled escalation” would be the preferred strategy (Trachtenberg, 2010, p. 490). Introduction of the studies It was against this major strategic backdrop that the NDRE contacted American military authorities in 1964, aiming to carry out bilateral studies. The study program was approved by the Norwegian Minister of Defense, Gudmund Harlem (National Archives of Norway, 1964a). Harlem had made a good impression both in the State Department and the Pentagon. In May 1961, as the newly appointed Minister of Defense, he met

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with Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze. The meeting developed into an open discussion of defense and security policy issues, with a focus on Norway. Paul Nitze, who was a central figure in the US security policy establishment, was “extremely impressed with Harlem.” One of the topics discussed by the two men was the need to reinforce the conventional military forces in Norway. Nitze and Harlem agreed that “the Western Alliance must in each area be willing and prepared to put up the best possible fight, and to have the enemy know that they will put up the best possible fight, even though in any one area the odds may be overwhelming” (NARA, 1961b). Harlem’s reasoning matched the evolving new orientation in the United States, known as flexible response. Harlem had also exchanged similar views with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. These views held by both Harlem and Nitze coincided with the ideas promoted at that time by Lauris Norstad, the American Supreme Allied Commander for the NATO forces in Europe. Moreover, Harlem had made it clear that he wanted to launch studies into how Norway could produce optimal fighting strength from their own military forces and that he was keen to coordinate such a study with the United States (NARA, 1961a). It was Harlem that laid the political foundation for the bilateral NorwegianAmerican studies. The initiative was part of a wider pattern. During his period as Minister of Defense, the military connection to the United States was significantly strengthened. Harlem developed a close connection with US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. According to the US ambassador to Norway, Margaret Joy Tibbets, the close relationship rested partly on a common understanding of the strategic doctrine’s flexible response. In a comprehensive report from 1965, Tibbets expressed that Norway basically regarded its NATO membership as a bilateral defense cooperation with the United States. This was of course an exaggeration, but she still meant to see that Norway increasingly “identifies NATO with the United States and in reality turns to the United States for security“ (NARA, 1965). Several years passed before such studies were implemented. The reason for this is perhaps that it took time to develop the required group of resources in Norway. The NDRE’s Systems Group had recently (in 1959) been established to carry out operational and system analyses. After only a few years, the group, headed by Erik Klippenberg, gained a significant influence over planning of Norway’s defense. In 1963, political scientist Johan Jørgen Holst was recruited to the Systems Group, after spending some time at Harvard. For the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s, Klippenberg and Holst were the most central participants from Norway in the bilateral studies. Both concentrated on topics such as Norway’s military relations with the United States and the issue of defending North Norway, not least the problem of reinforcements. During his time at the NDRE, Holst carried out a major research project entitled “Several significant factors for defense planning.” Obviously, the factors foremost in Holst’s mind related to security policy (Maaø, 2014, p. 134 et seq.).

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 39 In March 1966, Holst and Klippenberg traveled to the headquarters of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, USA. There they met analysts from the Office for International Security Affairs (ISA) at the Pentagon, and also members of the State Department—and naturally also from the RAND Corporation. The Norwegian military authorities were particularly interested in studies of two principal issues. First, the changes in weapon technology and how these military changes affected the issue of bringing reinforcements to North Norway. Second, the development of plausible scenarios for a Soviet attack on Norway in the north. Only a small group of people in Norway knew of this initiative—and for good reasons. It was unusual for representatives from the United States to sit around a table with representatives from another country to study that country’s defense issues in this way. Henry S. Rowen in the Pentagon characterized the initiative as “unique in its concept and in the manner, it will be executed and an unusual step forward in international understanding” (National Archives of Norway, 1964b). The NDRE’s representatives were very much aware of how politically sensitive their work was, in that it implied that Norwegian and American analysts would be studying Norway’s defense capabilities in light of the self-imposed restrictions. The Americans absolutely took this seriously. Rowen was keen to make sure that no pressure would be exerted on the Norwegian participants, for example, on the question of nuclear force (National Archives of Norway, 1964c; Maaø, 2014, p. 146). In 1965, both sides produced many studies. The most central issue was the development of scenarios in the north, particularly with a view to military fighting strength and endurance. This also comprised reinforcement plans for North Norway. Moreover, the NDRE had prepared studies on geography, natural resources, and economic life. The Norwegians also presented confidential studies of the self-imposed restrictions in Norway to their American colleagues. Available sources indicate that this informal meeting between analysts from the two nations was genuinely productive. Joseph O. Fletcher from the RAND Corporation summarized some of the key issues: Norwegian military forces would not be able to prevent the Soviet Union from capturing the region of Finnmark. Support for allied reinforcements arriving in Norway was underdeveloped on the Norwegian side, and NATO’s deployment capacity was also substantially inadequate. Moreover, it was of major importance to reinforce western airpower in the north, also in the form of airport capacity. Following up on these findings and strengthening defense on the northern flank would be the best way to prevent a future surprise attack by the Soviet Union in the north. It was imperative to make deterrence work also under new conditions (NARA, 1966). With this in mind, it was agreed that the NDRE had to assume main responsibility for developing more detailed scenarios, while the Americans would continue to provide analytical capacity when needed, for example, within war games. During the discussions, Klippenberg also addressed other uncertainties. Did Norway have insufficient focus on the outflanking

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alternative—in other words, the risk that the Soviet Union could cut off Northern Norway or Trøndelag south of the Norwegian main forces in Indre Troms and Ofoten. Klippenberg also made it clear that the transfer of forces from Southern Norway and the stockpiling of material in the north required more detailed studies. But, as it turned out, systematic bilateral studies of these questions would have to wait a few years. Holst’s study of Norwegian security policy In the meantime, Holst worked hard on his study of Norwegian security policy. His main product was Norwegian security policy from a strategic perspective, published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in two volumes in 1967. It was in this publication—and in an article published the year before—that Holst introduced the dual concept of “deterrence and reassurance” (Holst, 1966; 1967). Although this dual concept was initially introduced in 1966, Norwegian historians have also used the concepts to describe Norwegian security policy prior to the 1960s, i.e., from the date when Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 (Eriksen and Pharo, 1992, p. 35). This is in line with Holst’s own perspective, and he wrote: “Deterrence and reassurance effectively imply exploiting the possibility of inflicting harm and inconvenience on the other party as well as providing ‘rewards’. The system that Norway has followed of unilateral but conditional restrictions regarding the issue of foreign bases, nuclear weapons and military maneuvers illustrates this.” (Holst, 1967, p. 33) For Holst, however, it was primarily the contemporary security policy issues that made these concepts relevant. Holst observed that major changes were taking place on both the American and Soviet sides. This compelled changes in Norway’s military power, but without allowing these to undermine the fundamental objectives of security policy. Holst assumed that one important goal was for Norway to contribute to “the local containment of Soviet power in North Europe.” At the same time, it was essential to present the Soviet leaders with “an environment in which they will prefer to expand within the Soviet Union rather than resort to territorial expansion.” It was also important to avoid a situation whereby the Soviet leaders were “conduced to use of force out of the fear of threats against the build-up of the Soviet Union” (Holst, 1967, pp. 33–34). As neighbors with the major Soviet bases in the north, Norway’s security policy had to comprise these types of strategic considerations. Here Holst touched on matters that can be linked to the concept of security dilemma, which however was a term he himself did not normally use. He undoubtedly knew the term, as it was well known in the research community where he felt at home. Instead, he used the term security calculus. The concept of security calculus, as Holst used it, was calibrated to describe the

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 41 international system differently than the concept of security dilemma, which often emphasizes the intentions and perceptions of actors. Holst’s point was that the security calculus, made, for example, by the Soviet Union, was about grasping and relating to the totality of the other party, i.e., to a unified NATO force (which could be referred to as the military balance). Of course, the Soviet leaders would also be highly interested in understanding the evolving political and military process evolving in other states, but this nevertheless had to be seen in a holistic perspective. Thus, Holst was able to clarify some important points. Norwegian security policy, the relationship between deterrence and reassurance, always had to be seen in a broader international context. But while the concept of the security calculus helped to understand and amplify certain aspects of the security policy process, it might on the other hand have been less suitable as tool for studying other parts of the security policy. For instance, the concept of the security dilemma opens more for considering intentions and interaction between fewer actors. Also, in recent IR literature, trust appears to be a core issue to bear in mind while studying the security dilemma. Some IR scholars also argue that actors, such as states, can implement strategies leading to increased confidence. Under certain conditions this can be developed through reassurance, especially when clarifications of intentions appear consistent, credible, and involve bindings on the part of oneself (Montgomery, 2006; Glaser and Kydd, 2015). While Holst chose not to address questions like this through the concept of the security dilemma, he was confident that Norway could in fact contribute to stability and low tensions in the north. If such a goal were to be achieved, Norway could certainly not afford to leave developments in the north to the great powers alone. Norway had to pursue an active policy in the north (“nordpolitikk”), thereby preventing competition considerations between the major powers from pushing aside stability considerations (Holst, 1985a, p. 15). Because of the neighborliness of the large Soviet base complexes in the north, Norwegian security policy was particularly linked to this type of strategic considerations. Second period of the studies It is difficult to quantify the significance of the efforts of the first bilateral study group. It provided the Americans with increased insight and understanding. The NDRE’s gains must have been of high value, as they intensified their work on system and operational analyses. Analysts in the United States had invested time and resources in the studies, and this was of much higher value for Norway than merely a quality control and a second look. The network that was already in place was strengthened, and contacts were maintained. In the summer of 1971, Klippenberg spent some time with the RAND Corporation. Then, in 1973, Klippenberg, Holst, and Colonel Tønne Huitfeldt, chief of planning and budget staff at the Norwegian High Command, joined a major American project studying potential conflict situations in numerous countries.

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According to historian Rolf Tamnes, the project’s objective was to “give flexible response a more credible substance” (Tamnes, 1997, p. 83). A well-known expert in international relations from the United States, Albert Wohlstetter, was also invited to join the project. Holst already knew Wohlstetter well. He had the impression that this project could be important for Norway, as it provided Norwegians with the opportunity to “incorporate Norwegian interests and considerations into the American decision-making process before any decisions obstruct developments” (Tamnes, 1997, p. 83). At the same time, the NDRE continued to analyze threats, scenarios for attacks, and credible military deterrence in the north. Two problems came to the fore: To increase the endurance of the Norwegian forces and to facilitate allied reinforcements at the earliest possible stage of a conflict (Maaø, 2014, p. 172). In this respect, the NDRE’s Systems Group developed the analytical concept of “holding time,” i.e., the amount of time the Armed Forces expected they would be able to maintain control over defined areas in specific operational scenarios. This analysis of scenarios thus illustrated the size of attacking force that the Norwegian Armed Forces was able to withstand (“critical attacking force”) and for how long (Dalmo, 2013, p. 31). During the Cold War, the Norwegian Armed Forces did not define any formal doctrine (in addition to NATO doctrines), but according to the political scientist Harald Høiback, there was still an informal national doctrine that was well known in the armed forces. It shaped “military exercises, material procurements and operational planning” (Høiback, 2012, p. 414). In practice, the concept of “holding time” can be said to have had the function of a Norwegian doctrine. When writing that holding time “became a core element of the Norwegian defense concept,” historian Rolf Tamnes has also made an observation that supports this view (Tamnes, 2015, pp. 387–388). The doctrine of “holding time,” which was linked to certain key areas, emphasized the need to clarify probable attack scenarios and alternative defense plans (“contingency planning“). The work on such scenarios, which were also based on war games and computer simulations, went through various phases. Several conflict situations were discussed under some main scenarios. NDRE consistently placed the most emphasis on a main scenario which involved the Soviet Union seeking to gain control over Northern Norway down to Ofoten and the Vestfjorden. Another main scenario described an attack on Northern Norway combined with an advance also further south in the country, either in Trøndelag or in the Arendal–Stavanger area. A holding period of 20 days for the most dominant conflict situation, an attack on Northern Norway, was repeated in several studies. Internally, there was great uncertainty as to whether 20 days was a realistic goal, but analyses from 1977 to 1978 indicated that “a holding time of 20 days for the Bardufoss area can be achieved under favorable circumstances” (Maaø, 2014, p. 240). This specific calculation was conducted in connection with the Defense Commission (Forsvarskommisjonen) in 1974, resulting in a recommendation in 1978. Holst, who was still State Secretary at the Ministry of Defense at that

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 43 time, was unsure about the national methodological framework applied on the analysis in the work. He believed that there was excessive focus on the endurance of the Norwegian Armed Forces and not enough emphasis on allied reinforcements. The Defense Commission’s recommendation therefore failed to reflect the United States’s intentions, as expressed in the bilateral study group (Tamnes, 1997, p. 85). By the time the Defense Commission’s report was published in 1978, the bilateral study group had been under way for two years. The first party to contact Norway was the United States’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Ellsworth. He was interested in a bilateral study of how precision-guided munitions could help strengthen Norway’s defense. At that time, Holst and Klippenberg were also enthusiastic about a bilateral arrangement but replied that “the program needs to be more comprehensive and based on agreed scenarios for future conflicts in this area.” In particular, it was important to incorporate issues involving reinforcements (National Archives of Norway, 1976; Maaø, 2014, p. 301 et seq.). Once again, it was essential that no other countries gained knowledge of the studies. From 1977, the concept of earmarking a brigade as an allied reinforcement for North Norway became a key component in discussions. Historian Ole Jørgen Maaø finds it very likely that this suggestion came from Norway (Maaø, 2014, p. 307). He also shows, however, that it was the specific analyses that convinced the Americans. After detailed studies and meetings in North Carolina and Tromsø, the leaders of the US Marine Corps came to the conclusion “that limited efforts at an early stage are more important than massive efforts much later“ (National Archives of Norway, 1978). Once the idea of earmarking a brigade had first been conceived, the issue of stockpiling also emerged as an important question. It was also most likely that this suggestion originated in Norway. Norway had extensive experience at stockpiling of material for national reinforcements in the north. The bilateral study group agreed that stockpiling was also a potential model for the foreign brigade and that the material should be stored in a location north of the Ofotfjorden (Maaø, 2014, pp. 310–312). This did not occur, however. The announcement of the bilateral study group and its proposal for stockpiling immediately gave rise to an intense political debate in Norway. Opponents of the proposal claimed that the plans threatened both the nuclear policy and low-tension policy, and that the measure would certainly provoke the Soviet Union. There was the risk of undermining nuclear policy as the Marine Corps material included the A-6 Intruder aircraft, designed to carry nuclear weapons. As a result of the opposition, the Norwegian Government took a step back and proposed stockpiling in Trøndelag, at a greater distance from the border with the Soviet Union. Although the A-6 Intruder aircraft was eventually removed from the actual agreement, the aircraft would still be used in the region in the event of a major conflict (Tamnes, 1997, pp. 107–110).

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Dialogs regarding the High North Based on its own premises, the military invitation policy has to be characterized as “an unconditional success,” as Rolf Tamnes has claimed (Tamnes, 1997, p. 86). It resulted in substantial allied reinforcements for Norway. The crowning achievement was the reinforcement agreement that included the US Marine Corps, which the Storting adopted in 1981. However, other reinforcements had also been implemented. In 1971, Norway and the United States signed the so-called Invictus Agreement, a continuation of former agreements regarding stockpiling material for the US military. In 1974, the agreement on Co-located Operating Bases (COB) was signed, which facilitated aircraft reinforcements from the United States. Initially, four airports in South Norway were fitted out to receive five air force squadrons, but this agreement was extended just one year later to include air bases in Northern Norway. In 1977, the COB agreement was extended once again to include the US Marine Corps. Other close allies—in particular Great Britain and Canada—committed to providing defense reinforcements in the north as well. The opposition to the reinforcement plans in 1980 was a clear illustration of the importance of incorporating the allied reinforcements within a more comprehensive security policy framework. In principle, the bilateral study group—and not least the key figure of Johan Jørgen Holst—paid attention to this. Nonetheless, he underestimated how strong the political reactions would become domestically. In relation to other nations, key objectives such as low tension and stability in the north were primarily communicated via normal political and diplomatic channels. This also applies to the United States. Moreover, a separate bilateral dialog on foreign policy emerged in this area, with a focus on Svalbard and the High North. This was established in 1975. When the second bilateral study group started its work, State Secretary Holst gave a lengthy presentation which dealt with principles of Norwegian security policy in the north. Holst emphasized the importance of finding a reasonable balance between deterrence and reassurance in Norway´s security policy. Through cooperation with allies—especially the United States—it was possible to establish a credible deterrent. Holst underlined that the reason why Norway had placed particular emphasis on preparing for a possible limited attack against Northern Norway was not the likeliness of it. But seen from a Norwegian perspective, this was something Norway had to prepare for, also seen in the context of NATO’s wider deterrence. Holst further emphasized that the reassuring elements—the base policy and other self-imposed restrictions—ensured that Norway had the main responsibility for the military presence on Norwegian territory. Considerations for stability should not give way to great-power competition. Military exercises in the north, and the prioritization of military resources, also had to be characterized by stability. Of course, this did not prevent from re-evaluations and necessary changes within the military (Holst, 1985b).

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 45 The starting point for the political dialog on the High North, which took shape during regular high-level meetings, was primarily the issue of Svalbard. Both the US State Department and the NSC set up a group of experts to assess the US approach to questions relating to Svalbard. This dialog evolved rapidly, however, and soon comprised other issues involving the High North (Tamnes, 1991, p. 238 et seq.). Unlike the work of the bilateral study group, which was not publicly announced until February 1980, there were no problems in disclosing the Norwegian–American dialog regarding the High North. On the contrary, this had a positive impact, as it emerged that other nations such as the United States, Great Britain, and Western Germany—not only Norway and the Soviet Union—had political interests in protecting Svalbard and the High North. This was inherently beneficial. Transparency about the dialog also provided the opportunity to communicate important messages to other nations. During a meeting between the Norwegian diplomat Kjeld Vibe and Russian Charge d’Affaires Smirnov in 1976, Vibe was able, for example, to state that the United States, alike Norway “is interested in sustaining the present peace and stability in the area and does not want to take any action in the area that would disturb this stability” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976a). In doing so, Vibe communicated to the Soviet Union the same message that the Americans had conveyed to the Norwegians. In December 1975, Richard Vine had led a delegation from the State Department on a visit to Oslo. During the meeting, Vine clearly stated that “the United States does not want any party to take any steps that may be provocative or upset the balance in the area”. It was also in the United States’ interests that Norway could efficiently maintain its sovereignty and that “the area must not provide a basis for future Soviet bases or military activity” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1976b). During the second half of the 1970s, when the Cold War climate once again deteriorated, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Knut Frydenlund attempted to prevent this from driving a wedge between Norway and Finland or impairing the relationships with Finland in terms of security policy. When Johan Jørgen Holst was appointed Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1979, he and Secretary of State in the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Keijo Korhonen, developed a close dialog. The two men met regularly and exchanged ideas “on an informal and personal basis.” Holst wrote a memorandum to Frydenlund expressing his concerns about safeguarding against new military adaptations and modifications—stockpiling, exercises, earmarking of allied forces—having negative consequences for Finland. “It is in Norway’s interests to take into account Finland’s position when modifying our security policy, in order to prevent pressure on Finland’s position in a way that would change the equilibrium in the Nordic region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980a). Naturally, Finland was very much anxious about the Soviet authorities’ reactions to stockpiling for the US Marine Corps. Holst was able to confirm

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that he had discussed the issue with Ustinov, the Soviet Union’s Minister of Defense, but that there “had been no scathing comments in this regard.” Despite Holst’s claims, Finland had received certain signals from Ustinov that Helsinki could perceive as pressure. Ustinov was of the opinion that Finland should “assume a more admonitory role” in relation to Norway and also spoke vaguely of joint Soviet-Finnish military exercises. This increase in tension within security policy resulted in Finland reinstating the proposal for a Finnish-Norwegian border treaty for the Cap of the North, which was initially presented by President Urho Kekkonen in November 1965. The question was raised by Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Väyrynen and Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto during meetings with Frydenlund on 10 October 1980. As a result, Norway assessed the situation in detail, with Secretary of State Holst taking an especially active role. He implied in an internal memorandum that a “Norwegian twist” on the issue could be successful. He envisaged a scenario whereby Norway could expand their self-imposed restrictions by means of a self-declaration stating that Norway “would not allow the use of Norwegian areas as a base for military attack operations against any neighboring country that is not in itself involved in an attack against Norway” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980b). Nonetheless, Holst’s proposal for a potential solution was also rejected, partly with reference to Norway’s obligations to NATO. The issue was finally closed when Knut Frydenlund commented on an internal memorandum by Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office Kjell Eliassen with the words: “I am of the opinion that this matter should now be laid to rest, not least as a result of the work on nuclear-weaponfree zones” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980c). Conclusion Historically, Norway has repeatedly pursued an active policy of invitation, particularly toward the United States, to become more secure. This chapter shows that Minister of Defense Gudmund Harlem very early on saw the possibility of conducting an invitation policy based on the new strategic concept of “flexible response.” NDRE played a significant role during the operationalization of the invitation policy. During this process, US military authorities decided to earmark significant reinforcements for the northern flank—reinforcements that were built around the doctrine of “holding time.” On a conceptual level, consideration of the external environment was particularly expressed through Holst’s innovative analysis of Norwegian security policy. His thoughts became very important in Norwegian security policy, and this chapter points out how Holst’s perspective was developed hand in hand with the bilateral dialog in the 1960s. By the 1970s, Holst had reached political positions which enabled him to shape and convey his specialist knowledge also on a diplomatic level (Tjelmeland, 2012; Dramstad, 2021). As a politician he then integrated the allied reinforcements into an overall Norwegian security policy strategy. During a 15-year period, Holst

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 47 managed to make a mark in the field through security policy conceptualization, military system analyses, and security policy. Holst’s contribution also illustrates that concepts such as deterrence and reassurance have a history, that this history is linked to changing contexts, and thus that the content has changed over time. From the outset, Norway´s efforts in the bilateral study group were guided by concerns over the (possible) emerging security dilemma. Norway had witnessed the rise of Soviet Union to a major naval power and seen how the military base complex on the Kola Peninsula grew over time. In a more challenging security environment, Norway reached a new level of extended deterrence through increasing level of airborne support, increased stockpiling of material (which in part decoupled the reinforcement from the timeconsuming maritime transport operations), along with an overall improved Norwegian military capacity. While this undoubtedly was a success for the invitation policy, Norway also succeeded on another level. While it cannot be conclusively confirmed that Norwegian confidence-building measures led to Soviet restraint, Holst did find much evidence that pointed in that direction. Although the forces on the Kola Peninsula were extensive, Holst wrote in 1983, they were not of startling size. There was no D-Day capacity, and Soviet airpower was also obviously aimed at defense (Holst, 1983). Norway’s political and military signaling, which also found support in US decision-making circles, seemed to have been interpreted by the other party in a way that preserved stability and thus also basic Norwegian security policy objectives. Note 1 This subject has also been discussed in another article by the author (in Norwegian). See Bones (2023).

References Bones, S. (2023) Et forsvarsproblem og et mulig sikkerhetsdilemma. Allierte forsterkninger og sikkerhetspolitikk i nord, 1960–1980. In: Njord Wegge (Ed.) Sikkerhetspolitikk og militærmakt i Arktis. Oslo, Cappelen Damm Akademisk. Bones, S., A.R. Eriksen, S.G. Holtsmark, A.A. Komarov and O. Riste (2015) Kald krig. In: Sven G. Holtsmark (Ed.) Naboer i frykt og forventning. Norge og Russland 1917–2014. Oslo, Pax Forlag AS. Booth, K. and N. Wheeler (2008) The security dilemma: Fear, cooperation and trust in world politics. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. Dalmo, K.H. (2013) En norsk Maginotlinje? Forsvarets utbygging av permanente stillinger i Lyngen-området med vekt på Frøy-stillingene. Masters’ thesis in history, the Arctic University of Norway. Dramstad, A. (2021) Beroligelses- og avskjermingsaspektet i støpeskjeen? Utviklingen av de selvpålagte restriksjonene innen norsk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk 1970–1999. Masters’ thesis in history, the Arctic University of Norway.

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Dyndal, G.L. (2011) How the High North became central in NATO strategy: Revelations from the NATO archives. Journal of Strategic Studies 34(4), pp. 557–585. Eriksen, K.E. and H.Ø. Pharo (1992) Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk som etterkrigshistorisk forskningsfelt. Norwegian Research Center in Organization and Management Memorandum 92/13. Glaser, C. and A. Kydd (2015) To the editors (Correspondence). International Security 40(3), pp. 197–202. Haaland, T.L., R. Hobson and K.I. Bjerga (2021) Den militære profesjonen, staten og samfunnet. Introduksjon til militære studier. Oslo, Cappelen Damm Akademisk. Holloway, D. (2010) Nuclear weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945–1962. In: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I, Origins. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Holst, J.J. (1966) Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv. Internasjonal Politikk no. 3. Holst, J.J. (1967) Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv, volume 1. Oslo, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Holst, J.J. (1985a) Om utenrikspolitikk og Norge. In: Johan Jørgen Holst and Daniel Heradstveit (Eds.) Norsk utenrikspolitikk. Oslo, TANO AS. Holst, J.J. (1985b) Ensidige bindinger i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk. In: Johan Jørgen Holst and Daniel Heradstveit (Eds.) Norsk utenrikspolitikk. Oslo, TANO AS. Høiback, H. (2012) Militære doktriner. In: Harald Høiback and Palle Ydstebø (Eds.) Krigens vitenskap—en innføring i militærteori. Oslo, Abstrakt forlag AS. Jervis, R. (1978) Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics 30(2), pp. 167–214. Jervis, R. (2001) Was the Cold War a security dilemma? Journal of Cold War Studies 3(1), pp. 36–60. Klevberg, H. (2012) «Request TANGO». 333 skvadron på ubåtjakt. Maritime luftoperasjoner i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget. Maaø, O.J. (2014) Vitenskap for politikk? Systemgruppen ved Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt og norsk forsvarspolitikk fra 1950 til 1980. PhD thesis in history, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1976a) Memorandum. Forholdet mellom Norge og Sovjetunionen, 5 January 1976. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) 1970–1979, 36 1/12, volume 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1976b) Memorandum, 16 January 1976, after meeting 18–19 December 1975. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1970-1979, 36 1/12, volume 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1980a) Holst memorandum dated 10 March 1980. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1980–1989, 34.4/45, volume 8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1980b) Holst memorandum dated 29 October 1980. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1980–1989, 34.4/45, volume 8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1980c) Comments on Eliassen’s memorandum dated 9 February 1981. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1980–1989, 34.4/45, volume 8. Montgomery, E.B. (2006) Breaking out of the security dilemma. Realism, reassurance, and the problem of uncertainty. International Security 31(2), pp. 151–185. NARA (1961a) Military assistance plan for Norway, FY 1962-67, 18 September 1961 (with Appendix). National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) RG 59, EUR, NE, Records Relating to Norway, 1956–1975, box 3.

A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma 49 NARA (1961b) Nitze-Harlem Conversation, 15 May 1961. NARA, RG 59, EUR, NE, Records Relating to Norway, 1956–1975, box 3. NARA (1965) NORWAY – Political-Economic Assessment – July 1964 to July 1965. NARA, RG 59 SNF, CFPF 1964–66, Political & Defense, box 2533. NARA (1966) Joint U.S.–Norwegian study, 11 May 1966. NARA, RG 59, EUR, NE, Records Relating to Norway, 1956–1975, box. 2. NARA (1972) Reflections on the state of Norwegian-Russian relations, 22 March 1972. pp. 247 ff. National Archives of Norway (1964a) Finn Lied to NATO ambassador Georg Kristiansen, 3 September 1964. National Archives of Norway (RA) RAFA-3543/ Dab/L0067, “204.2” National Archives of Norway (1964b) Henry S. Rosen to Erik Klippenberg, 12 November 1964. National Archives of Norway/RAFA-3543/Dab/L0067, “204.2” National Archives of Norway (1964c) Memorandum, 28 September 1964. National Archives of Norway/RAFA-3543/Dab/L0067, “204.2” National Archives of Norway (1976) Memorandum, 8 November 1976. National Archives of Norway/RAFA-3543/Daa/L0055, “204.2” National Archives of Norway (1978) Memorandum, 12 June 1978. National Archives of Norway/RAFA-3543/Daa/L0054, “204.2” Tamnes, R. (1991) The United States and the Cold War in the High North. Aldersoth, Dartmouth. Tamnes, R. (1997) Oljealder 1965–1995. Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, volume 6. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget. Tamnes, R. (2015) Et lite land i stormaktspolitikken. Internasjonal Politikk 73(3), pp. 384–393. Tang, S. (2009) The security dilemma: A conceptual analysis. Security Studies 18(3), pp. 587–623. Tjelmeland, H. (2012) The belief in personal diplomacy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War: The cases of Andreas Andersen, Finn Moe and Johan Jørgen Holst. In: Kari Aga Myklebost og Stian Bones (Eds.) Caution & Compliance. Norwegian-Russian Diplomatic Relations 1814–2014. Stamsund, Orkana Forlag. Trachtenberg, M. (2010) The structure of great power politics, 1963–1975. In: Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Eds.) The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II, Crisis and Détente. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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The Russian way of regular warfare and the Arctic Amund Osflaten

Introduction The invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, brutally displayed Russia’s use of regular warfare. However, the Russian inclination for using brute conventional force has been consistently present since the end of the Cold War. While it has been primarily post-Soviet countries at the receiving end of Russian military might until now, the possibility of Russian use of large-scale force against NATO cannot be ruled out. In that case, NATO’s northern flank will become a potential area of confrontation. This chapter will discuss how such an incident may come to pass and how the Russian Armed Forces, observing their way of regular warfare, would likely conduct such an undertaking. In other words, the chapter aims to answer: How will the Russian way of regular warfare shape a potential conflict between NATO and the Russian Federation on NATO’s northern flank? In the case of NATO’s northern flank, this chapter argues that the Russian way of regular warfare, in combination with Russia’s preference for using conventional force, suggests a Russian inclination for pre-emption before any NATO buildup is possible. First, the Russian way of regular warfare is characterized by the effort to achieve a rapid penetration of the defensive system and quickly reach decisive objectives. This puts great stress on measures that can support the rapid penetration. In the Russian way of regular warfare, surprise, rate of advance, and the exploitation of the initial period of conflict are particularly emphasized. Second, in order to exploit this kind of approach, a powerful conventional force is necessary. Without it, even modest defenses will be able to block the penetration. Russian campaigns in Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine all point toward a preference for regular warfare. They are all examples of Russian use of large-scale conventional force rather than irregular or non-military means. In other words, when faced with a choice, the Kremlin will choose conventional warfare over, for example, solely guerrilla or cyber warfare. Further, the Russian nuclear second-strike capability, closely connected to the Northern Fleet facilities on the Kola Peninsula, is a Russian core security interest. This, combined with the modest size of the permanently deployed Russian forces in the area, creates strong strategic incentives for Russia DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-5

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to strike first if war is perceived as imminent or highly likely. The Russian military potential on the Kola Peninsula will not be able to match NATO after a prolonged buildup; consequently, striking first to thwart this potential NATO buildup would be both strategically beneficial and in accordance with the Russian way of regular warfare. This illustrates the Norwegian strategic predicament—on one hand, its vulnerability to Russian military pre-emption, and, on the other, the danger of unintentionally provoking such pre-emption when implementing countermeasures. While a Russian attack on NATO has a very low probability, this predicament’s implication for NATO is significant when designing a strategy to achieve sufficient deterrence, defense, and in-war risk management. The method utilized in this chapter is inductive in nature, with all the accompanying methodological challenges of this approach. The analysis looks at previous Russian military behavior and extrapolates this behavior to apply it to the characteristics of NATO’s northern flank and a potential confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation in this area. This approach, reliant on induction, is not able to predict a future conflict precisely but can inform what is likely Russian behavior. Additionally, the propositions laid out here presuppose that Russian forces, in the event of a conflict with NATO, will behave similarly to previous conflicts. Therein lies the realization that there are both continuity in and a systematic component to any armed force’s behavior; in other words, armed forces have a specific way of warfare. This assumes that there are general characteristics to how the Russian Armed Forces conduct warfare that are different from other armed forces and that these characteristics stay valid over a long timeframe. As a generalized construct that includes behavior, a way of warfare is not simply the same as the explicit military thought found in a country’s militarytheoretical discourse; in other words, one cannot unlock the Russian way of warfare by simply analyzing the Russian military-theoretical discourse. Consequently, while this chapter could benefit from including more of the “Russian perspective,” its inductive method, primarily relying on behavior, would be sufficient to produce valuable inferences. In fact, an “outside perspective,” represented by the Western analyses used in this chapter, has its own benefits. Those who are part of a certain way of warfare do not easily see its peculiarities—to them, those peculiarities are self-evident. Further, this analysis will be limited to regular warfare, which includes conventional and battlefield nuclear warfare. Consequently, “conventional” is a subcategory of “regular” and will be used interchangeably within the framework of this analysis. Beyond the challenges of way of warfare studies, there are still some issues influencing this analysis that should be clarified. First, the war in Ukraine has already reshaped the security structure of the Nordic region. As Finland received full and Sweden have NATO membership, the balance of power has changed, both in terms of geography and capabilities. While Finland and Sweden have membership status, even prior to Sweden’s admittance they attained security guarantees from several NATO countries, including the

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United States (U.S. Offers Assurances, 2022). Consequently, this analysis will treat Sweden and Finland as part of the NATO block. Second, any Russian learning process from the ongoing war in Ukraine is left out of this analysis. It is Russian military behavior, included the initial few months of the 2022 Russo–Ukrainian War, that constitutes the foundation of the proposed Russian way of warfare. This chapter is divided into four parts: First, it will provide an overall description of the Russian way of regular warfare. Second, the chapter will argue that Russian conflict behavior after the Cold War shows a persistent emphasis on conventional force. Then, the Russian forces and geography of the Russian Arctic are presented. And finally, this is all used as a frame of reference to understand the Russian disposition and potential course of action given a conflict with NATO. Characteristics of the Russian way of regular warfare Overall, the Russian way of regular warfare, admittedly a broad generalization, follows a fundamental logic that includes two central aims. The first aim is the rapid penetration of the defensive system. Second, the penetration is a prerequisite for quickly reaching decisive objectives. As a result, the rapid and forceful penetration and subsequent decisive outcomes reduce or thwart the defender’s ability to resist. This emphasis on affecting the depth of the enemy’s defensive system is not new in Soviet and Russian military theory. In the 1920s and 1930s, the “deep operations” theory, which devised a method for penetrating the incredibly strong elastic defenses of the Western front in WWI and which reintroduced the operationally decisive maneuver to the battlefield, was developed by Tukhachevsky, Isserson, and other military theorists (Kelly and Brennan, 2009, pp. 43–48). The introduction of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in the early phase of the Cold War made access to the enemy depth and achieving decisive effects less of a problem. However, at the end of the Cold War, the realization that nuclear warfare would be detrimental for all parties involved made the Soviets again consider conventional approaches to warfare. Consequently, deep operations theory increased again in importance (Hines, 1988, pp. 54–56). In addition, the emerging technologies of the 1980s, primarily precision-strike weaponry and information technology, induced a generation of Soviet military theorists to look for new methods of gaining access to the depth of the enemy system. Non-contact warfare, of which Ogarkov and Slipchenko were well-known proponents, described the use of long-range precision strike weapons and real-time targeting, without contact between large regular formations, as a new method of warfare (McDermott and Bukkvoll, 2017). While these concepts were not fully implemented, they show an enduring emphasis on gaining access to the depth of the enemy. The fundamental aims of the Russian way of regular warfare are achieved through a set of measures and methods. There are three trademark Russian methods for penetrating the enemy’s defenses. First, surprise has been a central

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part of the Soviet and Russian way of warfare (Boston and Massicot, 2017; Glantz, 1988). The emphasis on surprise is recognizable in several of the Russian military operations after the Cold War. The 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 invasion of Crimea, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine all showed efforts to delay the opponent’s realization of an imminent or ongoing attack. Second, and related to surprise, the initial period of war is exploited to insert the conventional force before the defenders are fully organized (See Cimbala, 2002; Gerasimov, 2019; Kofman et al., 2021, p. 10). Importantly, exploitation of the uncertainties in the initial period of conflict makes ultimatums and political signaling less likely. This was clearly visible in the Russian invasions of Georgia and Crimea and, to some extent, in the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine (See Barabanov et al., 2010, pp. 37–75; Flikke, 2015). On the other hand, final warnings and political efforts, such as those made by the US coalition before the wars against Iraq in 1991 and 2003, would be less likely to be made before a similar Russian operation. Finally, in order to effectively exploit any surprise effect and the defender’s imbalance, a high rate of advance is necessary. That is, the time spent before the attacker has reached decisive objectives needs to be as small as possible. This is traditionally achieved by several approaches. First, mechanization and airmobility are exploited to allow fast-paced maneuvers (Harris and Kagan, 2018; Isby, 1988, pp. 30–42). Second, tactics are, to a larger extent than in the West, reduced to norms and procedures (Donnelly, 1988, p. 221; Grau and Bartles, 2016, pp. 51–58). This facilitates rapid decision-making and responsiveness on the operational level of war. Analyzing Russian military utilization of modern information technology, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) argues that “Russia’s [network-centric] system is … like a flow chart or computer algorithm” and “the Russian armed forces are moving to rapidly expedite staff estimates for force and operational requirements through automated command and control” (Barrie and Hackett, 2020, p. 156). The speed of decision-making has primacy over the ability to tailor the plan to the specific tactical situation. In other words, flexibility in the lower command levels is forsaken for operational-level efficiency—tactics are subordinate to the operational level of war. And third, the early and rapid insertion of the conventional force is often conducted by multiple methods and categories of forces. For example, in the Russian invasion of Crimea, the Russian forces were inserted by aircraft into Simferopol Airport, ships into the port of Sevastopol, and landing craft along the coastline of Crimea or ferried across the Kerch Strait. Additionally, significant forces were already in-country through the permanent deployment of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (NIB) at Sevastopol (Kofman et al., 2017, pp. 6–12). Consequently, in a typical Russian attack, forces are attacking from multiple vectors at a high rate of advance, in an effort to overwhelm the defender. While the above-described bold approach can quickly reach decisive outcomes, it also produces risks and vulnerabilities. For example, the Russian forces airlifted into Simferopol Airport in the early stages of the invasion of Crimea

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could have been easily surrounded by superior Ukrainian forces (Kofman et al., 2017, p. 9). The high level of Russian casualties in the opening days of the 2022 Russo–Ukrainian War is another example of these vulnerabilities (Watling and Reynolds, 2022). Therefore, the Russian way of regular warfare includes several characteristics aimed at mitigating these risks and vulnerabilities. First, secrecy and deception, known as maskirovka in Russian, are crucial (Bruusgaard, 2014, p. 83; Glantz, 1988). Rapid and procedural decision-making, combined with centralization of command at the expense of flexibility, creates predictable behavior if the operation is revealed. Consequently, secrecy and deception are necessary in order to delay the enemy’s realization of impending operations. Second, and closely connected to secrecy and deception, the Russian forces often use large-scale exercises and other means of pre-conflict deployment to shuffle large forces around in peacetime. This extensive use of unannounced exercises and mobilization inspections in peacetime creates less sensitivity to large troop movements in a potential opponent. Consequently, in case of a Russian decision to use military force, the deployment of a large conventional force, under the pretext of an exercise, does not drift far from what is normally expected (Norberg, 2015, pp. 50–56). For example, this approach seems to have been used before the invasions of Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and Ukraine in 2022, in which a large part of the forces used in the invasions had been recently mobilized for large exercises or mobilization inspections. The primacy of conventional force The 2022 Russo–Ukrainian War has shown that the Kremlin sees the use of offensive conventional land power as a relevant means in international politics. However, while few would contest that the Russian Federation was partly relying on its conventional capabilities in previous conflicts, the degree of this reliance is more debated. Arguably, conventional force is not only important to the Russian Federation, but it is also, within the constraints of any particular situation, its preference (See Osflaten, 2021). In the following section, a historical argument for the Russian preference for conventional force is presented. In this regard, it is often equally interesting to analyze what the Russian Federation is not doing as its factual actions. In circumstances where nonconventional approaches are equally or better suited to achieve Russian goals, a Russian choice of conventional approaches would show a marked preference. Finally, a Russian preference for conventional force, albeit conditional to the situation at hand, would, hypothetically, increase the probability of Russian use of conventional force in the Arctic. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Chechen Republic tried to secede from the newly established Russian Federation. This was the origin of a long and bloody war between Chechen separatists and federal forces. In this conflict between a militarily superior counterinsurgent and the Chechen insurgency, the Russian Federation chose a strategy of counterinsurgency by punitive conventional firepower. This

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conventional and indiscriminate firepower was aimed at subduing the Chechen forces and population in general (Miakinkov, 2011, pp. 673–674). The Russians could have chosen a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, popularly known as a “hearts-and-minds” approach, capitalizing on political and other non-military means; however, the Russians preferred using their superior conventional firepower. Interestingly, a similar punitive and firepower-centric approach was observed in Russia’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War. The destruction of Aleppo, by stand-off artillery and air power, can be compared to the destruction of Grozny in 1999 (Shield, 2018, pp. 234–236). Later, when the long-lasting conflict between South Ossetia and Georgian central authorities made a turn toward open hostility in 2008, the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Georgia. Again, a conflict which was local in scope was resolved through the extensive use of conventional force. Moscow could have chosen to isolate the conflict to South Ossetia, which, in turn, could have created more international sympathy for the Russian-declared objective of protecting the South Ossetian population from atrocities (IIFFMCG, 2009, pp. 24–25). However, it chose a purely conventional invasion over irregular approaches or a locally fought war. The Russian invasion involved a joint force constituting 40,000 soldiers, which was a large portion of the available combat-ready Russian forces (Bukkvoll, 2009, p. 57). In the end, the Russian advance halted just short of the Georgian capital. The Russian invasion of Crimea is another example of Russian large-scale use of regular force. While there were minimal casualties on both sides, the invasion was largely conducted by regular elite forces and not by, for example, covert irregular forces. The bulk of the Russian servicemembers participating in the invasion were from regular forces, albeit light and elite in character. Some of the Russian units in Crimea were the 810th NIB based in Sevastopol and several units from the VDV, the airborne troops (Kofman et al., 2017, pp. 5–10). The practice of removing badges, flags, and other marks from their uniforms and equipment was not sufficient to hide their nationality from the Ukrainian forces, authorities, and local population. A Russian soldier with Russian uniform, equipment, and a Moscow accent would not be mistaken as an ad hoc locally mobilized militiaman, even if the Russian flag on his arm was removed. The Ukrainian address to the UN Security Council, made on 1 March 2014, only two days after the start of the invasion, demonstrates this clearly. The Ukrainian UN Permanent Representative claimed that “[Russian] troops were already in country and their numbers were increasing, constituting an act of aggression” (United Nations Security Council, 2014). It was primarily the strategic circumstances that caused Ukraine’s restraint. As Russian forces were flowing into Crimea, a large invasion force was simultaneously deployed at the eastern border of Ukraine (Kofman et al., 2017, p. 8). The tangible threat of invasion, combined with the experience of Georgia in 2008, made the Ukrainians very wary of unnecessary escalation. These considerations were the primary reason for Ukrainian restraint during the Russian invasion of Crimea, not any

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ambiguity about Russian presence on the peninsula. In fact, a successful Russian denial of any involvement in Crimea would have increased the possibility of Ukrainian resistance. Even more importantly, a successful denial would also have increased the possibility of NATO or any other foreign assistance to Ukrainian authorities. If the forces in Crimea had been perceived as local militiamen and not forces from a nuclear-armed major military power, the risk to Ukraine and NATO of intervening militarily would have been lower. In the Donbas conflict, starting in 2014, a similar preference for conventional force is visible. The pro-Russian separatists, heavily supported by the Russian Federation, were organized and equipped as regular forces and chose an approach of retaining territory by a continuous defensive frontline. This is a symmetrical confrontation in which the separatists exposed themselves to conventional firepower. In other words, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, significantly militarily stronger than the separatists if unsupported, would have smashed the separatist forces in the case of a full-scale confrontation. This was clearly seen in the initial phase of the Ukrainian Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), in which the Ukrainian forces were close to neutralizing the separatists before regular forces from the Russian Federation intervened (The White Book of the ATO, 2017, pp. 30–31). The separatists could have chosen an approach of guerrilla warfare, using the porous border with Russia to deploy into Donbas and then retreat back to the safety of Russian territory. Also, a terrorist approach including “false flag” assassinations and terrorist acts toward Ukrainian civil society, which would have created a divide between the Russian and Ukrainian ethnicities within the Ukrainian state, would have been a possibility. In such counterfactual approaches, the pro-Russian separatists would have, to a larger degree, used irregular methods to avoid direct regular confrontation. Yet, Ukrainian and Western restraint in combating the separatists in Donbas was again caused by the Russian potential of regular warfare. Thus, it was the tangible specter of full-scale invasion that protected the separatists from destruction. Finally, when looking at the broader historical picture, the Russian preference for conventional force appears to be a Soviet legacy. The Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979 all followed a similar pattern. A large conventional force, both “in country” and inserted in the initial period of war, rapidly and with a relatively low signature completed the occupation with low opposition. Importantly, politically sensitive situations were resolved with brute conventional force, and the Soviets left little room for concessions when the operations were ongoing. While it is less likely that the Russian Federation will use conventional force against NATO countries than it did toward Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022, this preference for conventional force, argued above, increases the possibility. The posture of Russian land forces along NATO’s northern flank The Russian Arctic, stretching from the Kola Peninsula in the east to the Kamchatka Peninsula in the west, is a large and remote region of the world.

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While climate change has made this area less inaccessible in recent years, mostly by gradually opening up the Northeast Passage, it is still characterized by harsh and unwelcoming conditions. However, while the northeastern part of Russia remains very remote, the northwestern part with the Barents Sea and adjacent land areas, is more developed. The Kola Peninsula, with its many military bases, is central to the Russian military structure. While there is no Arctic military district, Russia’s Northern Fleet is a military district in most ways except in name (Figure 4.1). Its area of responsibility includes both its own dedicated territory, but also parts of the Central and Eastern Military Districts (Kjellén, 2022, pp. 36–38, 43). This is relevant for how Russian forces utilize land forces in the Arctic. The Northern Fleet’s primary mission is to provide the Russian submarine-based second-strike capability. While there is no proclaimed Northern Strategic Bastion (NSB) concept of the Russian Armed Forces, both previous discourse and physical dispositions point to a NSB concept in place in and around the Barents Sea (Åtland, 2007; Bey, 2020, p. 22). Thus, the land forces subordinate to the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command (JSC) would be expected to provide an element to the NSB. The land component of the Northern Fleet JSC is led by the 14th Army Corps and consists of the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (MRB) and the 80th Separate Arctic MRB. Additionally, the 61st Separate NIB is part of the coastal defense forces of the Northern Fleet. Beyond the naval forces, the Northern Fleet includes the 45th Air and Air Defense Army, the 536th Separate Coastal Defense Missile Artillery Brigade, and an air component, which primarily consists of the 98th Mixed Air Regiment and the Carrier Air Group, which is usually aboard the RFS Admiral Kuznetsov (Kaushal et al., 2022, pp. 72, 87–95). The 200th MRB is organized as a traditional motor rifle brigade with four maneuver battalions, four artillery battalions, and support units designed to conduct independent operations. Its main equipment includes T-80BVM main battle tanks and MT-LBT armored personnel carriers (Gennad’yevich, 2022). The brigade is well equipped by Russian standards and has substantial combat power. The 61st NIB consists of two maneuver battalions: an air landing battalion and support units (Kaushal et al., 2022, pp. 88–92). Finally, the 80th MRB consists of three maneuver battalions, but they lack tanks. On the other hand, the brigade’s equipment is well adapted to Arctic conditions, with snowmobiles, tracked logistical vehicles, and perhaps most notably, the Pantsir-S2 air-defense system mounted on DT-30 large tracked vehicles designed for deep snow and marshes (Kaushal et al., 2022, pp. 90–92). Overall, the brigades of the Northern Fleet are highly mechanized and have sufficient support for independent combined arms operations. In addition to tactical land formations, such as the motor rifle brigades, there are several semi-static units spread around the remote areas of the Russian Arctic. These are smaller tactical groups that are deployed in permanent installations to maintain Russian force presence. The trefoil structures at Franz Josef Land, Kotelny Island, and Wrangel Island are examples of such

Kola Peninsula

Langfjorden Pechenga

Alakurtti

Svetliy

Tana

BARENTS SEA

Varanger Peninsula

Source: Created for the Editors by Julie Nord.

Figure 4.1 Northern Russia.

Troms

Finnmark

Svalbard Archipelago

KARA SEA

Novaya Zemlya

Franz Josef Land Severnaya Zemlya

Kotelny Island

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permanent installations. These are typically manned by a small contingent and include Bastion-P anti-ship missiles, Pantsir-S2 short-range air defense systems, and Arctic infantry (Kjellén, 2022, pp. 42–45). While the Northern Fleet’s primary mission is to constitute the subsurface part of the Russian second-strike capability, clearly the responsibility of the submarine force, other units in the Northern Fleet are, to a large extent, tasked to provide support and protection for the submarine force. This is visible in the posture of the Northern Fleet units—they are protecting both the submarines’ facilities on the Kola Peninsula and their primary staging area, the Barents Sea. Long-range air defense and anti-ship missile units are deployed at Kola, Novaya Zemlya, and Franz Josef Land, effectively embracing the Barents Sea. The combat brigades are located close to the Norwegian and Finnish borders, along the only main road axis leading directly into Kola from foreign territories (E105 and Finnish Route 82). In other words, they are guarding the gates of Kola. While the ground forces permanently deployed to the Russian Arctic are modest, there are potential Russian forces that could reinforce this area in a crisis situation. Most prominently, Russian airborne forces (VDV) have both been conducting exercises in the Arctic and are, by design, meant to be rapid reaction forces that could be sent to vulnerable areas of the Russian Federation, such as the Russian Arctic (Kaushal et al., 2022, p. 92). However, in the case of a crisis or armed conflict with NATO, the Russian Armed Forces have many vulnerabilities to cover and a limited number of available forces. Although a regional conflict between the Russian Federation and NATO on its northern flank is conceivable, Russian Armed Forces can never assume that such a conflict may not escalate horizontally to other vulnerable areas such as the Baltics. Consequently, the risk of escalation acts as a deterrent and, admittedly, reduces the risk of open conflict between Russia and NATO. A fundamental premise for a Russian pre-emptive strike in the Arctic is that the Kremlin considers a war with NATO as imminent, inevitable, or highly likely; if not, the rationale disappears. This reduces the overall probability of the scenario presented here. However, if the Kremlin decides to act pre-emptively in such a way, an attack from the Kola would logically be accompanied by attacks, for example, in the Baltics. Consequently, in the event of a crisis or armed conflict, the Russian scarcity of forces and many perceived vulnerabilities make a large influx of ground forces to the Kola Peninsula unlikely. Reinforcements from the VDV are plausible; however, the scarcity of these forces and their role as a central reserve will likely make their presence in the Arctic temporary and aimed at achieving specific operational objectives. The rapid redeployment of forces between strategic directions is a crucial part of Russian military strategy. The Russian way of regular warfare and the Arctic The Russian way of regular warfare will, of course, influence how the Russian Armed Forces are used in the event of a conflict with NATO in the Russian

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Arctic. The Russian preference for regular force indicates a forceful and symmetrical response to any NATO threat. This preference is also a natural consequence of the Russian aim of accessing the depth of the enemy. An approach based on surprise and the exploitation of the initial period of conflict, combined with penetration of the defensive system, high rates of advance, and the rapid fulfillment of decisive objectives, are all reliant on using a powerful mechanized force. However, in the case of NATO’s northern flank, there are particularities, such as the terrain, climate, and specific mission set of the Northern Fleet, that will modify Russian behavior. This will be elaborated on below. First of all, the Russian forces located in the Arctic, and their possible reinforcements, are limited. The three combat brigades, the 200th MRB, the 80th MRB, and the 61st NIB, have limited combat power in relation to the areas they are supposed to cover. These brigades’ potential area of operations includes the western and central parts of the Russian Arctic and the Norwegian and Finnish borders. Additionally, without a lengthy mobilization phase, the combat-ready part of these brigades will typically be two Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) each. More precisely, approximately half of each brigade will be available for immediate operations (Grau and Bartles, 2022). The number of reinforcements that would be designated to the defense of the Kola Peninsula could also be limited. In fact, other parts of the Russian Arctic may receive reinforcements from Kola in a crisis situation. One of the 61st NIB’s primary missions is to intercept amphibious and airborne incursions into the Russian Arctic (Kaushal et al., 2022, p. 88). Equally, parts of the 80th MRB, with its equipment and training especially adapted to an Arctic environment, could also be used in harsher parts of the Russian Arctic. Thus, while some Russian reinforcements to the Kola Peninsula are likely, force movements away from the Kola are also possible. Still, the Kola Peninsula, with its adjoining maritime areas, is a vital part of the Russian Federation and an area that will be well defended. However, the Russian Federation has other important and vulnerable areas. In fact, the Russian strategic sentiment is to a large part rooted in a deep-seated feeling of geographical vulnerability (Covington, 2016, pp. 13–25). For example, the Baltic region, with NATO countries in close proximity to Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad, is strategically vulnerable and an area that NATO forces can quickly deploy to. Examples of other vulnerable hotspots are the Caucasus, Ukraine, and the Sino–Russian border. Additionally, while single NATO countries may fear ending up in a bilateral conflict with the Russian Federation, lacking support from their allies, Russia itself would hardly anticipate such a conflict to remain bilateral and would likely deploy forces to meet the threat of NATO as a whole. This is consistent with Howard’s dictum: In very simplified terms, the effect of deterrence on an opponent does not automatically and proportionally translate into reassurance for one’s allies (Howard, 1983). As a consequence, in the case of impending conflict with NATO, it is unlikely that there would be large reinforcements available to surge into the Russian Arctic.

The Russian way of regular warfare and the Arctic 61 The limited amount of Russian ground forces on the Kola Peninsula and the low probability of large reinforcements point to a defensive posture of the ground forces in this area. Still, the brigades on the Kola Peninsula are able to conduct limited offensive operations as a BTG or, alternatively, as a full brigade after some time. However, there are three factors suggesting limited offensive use of Russian ground forces in NATO territory in that region in the event of open hostilities. First, in the Norwegian territory bordering Russia, there are several consecutive lines of canalizing terrain, many with only one crossing across wet gaps. The Pechenga Valley, containing several Russian garrisons close to the Norwegian border, does not present equally favorable terrain. From the 200th MRB’s garrison in Pechenga, the first defensive line is Langfjorden, only 10 km west of the border. This area contains highly defendable terrain and is situated not far from Høybuktmoen Airport. The second area is the Tana River Valley 95 km west of the Russo–Norwegian border. It is also highly defendable and provides access to the Varanger Peninsula, with several Norwegian intelligence installations (Ravndal, 2016, pp. 64–68). There are additional defensive lines farther west; however, access from Finland into Norwegian territory has made these lines less relevant since the Finnish NATO membership. Additionally, there are axes leading into Kola from the Finnish border. Most notably, Finnish Route 82 crosses the Russo–Finnish border and runs through Alakurtti. Together with a secondary axis farther north, running through Svetliy, these are the only axes, discounting terrain axes, that give access directly to the Kola Peninsula from the Finnish border. While farther away from sensitive areas, the Finnish border farther south has several axes leading into the only land line of communications (LLOC) to Kola from central parts of Russia. However, the advantages of seizing Finnish territory are not as clear-cut as in the Norwegian case. Still, a form of forward defense, within or outside Finnish territory, would be necessary to create stand-off between Finnish forces, the Kola Peninsula, and the LLOC south toward central parts of Russia. Second, the NSB concept, primarily aimed at preventing NATO antisubmarine warfare (ASW) assets from operating in the Barents Sea, could benefit from Russian deployment of long-range air defense, anti-ship, and land attack missiles farther west from their peacetime deployment. As such, the Svalbard Archipelago and Bear Island on the western rim of the Barents Sea are possible areas for such forward deployments. If the seizure of NATO territory is to be successful, it needs to be conducted early and without much warning. Otherwise, NATO’s air and naval power would make such endeavors impossible. These forward deployments would be hard to supply and protect but would greatly extend the area over which NATO ASW aircraft and surface vessels would be threatened. Finally, and most importantly, the Russian way of regular warfare prescribes offensive and decisive action. Because of Russia’s perceived vulnerability and limited forces, a rapid and forceful achievement of important operational

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objectives, pre-empting NATO offensives and force buildup, would be seen as very advantageous to the Russian Armed Forces in the Arctic. Then, the sparce forces, temporarily deployed, could be redeployed to other vulnerable areas or to the strategic reserves. The Russian preference for rapidly reaching decisive objectives, however limited in the case of NATO’s northern flank, requires surprise and a high rate of advance. Consequently, the initial period of a conflict would be of immense importance to such an approach. Additionally, it would also presuppose the use of powerful regular forces to neutralize smaller forces and, at a later stage, repel counterattacks. This leads to an inclination to pre-emption and to striking first. All of the Russian offensive opportunities, described above, are dependent on acting before larger NATO forces are deployed to the area and can provide an organized defense. If NATO has managed to establish an adequate defense, a large force is needed to achieve the necessary superiority to allow forward deployment of Russian forces to Finnmark and the Svalbard Archipelago. As the Kremlin sees NATO as conventionally superior to the Russian Armed Forces, the nuclear second-strike capability becomes a guarantee for state survival. Thus, it is of utmost importance to protect the nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet and to avoid NATO buildup of forces that could threaten the NSB. In cases where war between NATO and the Russian Federation is perceived as imminent or highly likely, there is a strong motivation for Russian forces to strike first, both derived from their perceived vulnerable strategic situation and from their way of warfare. As mentioned earlier, this incentive for pre-emptive strikes is significant on NATO’s northern flank. In other words, in cases of soaring NATO–Russian tensions, the likelihood of a Russian pre-emptive attack increases significantly. Another mechanism increasing the volatility of NATO’s northern flank is the substantial advantage of unleashing the first volley of cruise missiles. Russian and NATO forces in the Arctic are scattered and often located at static facilities. This makes them vulnerable to long-range precision strike weapons. Additionally, due to the large and remote areas involved, launch platforms, such as submarines and stealth bombers, are reasonably easy to infiltrate close to the opponent’s installations. Consequently, the first volley of missiles, achieving some degree of surprise, would have the potential of destroying large parts of the opponent’s combat power in the Arctic (Kaushal et al., 2022, pp. 82–86). This will contribute to the inclination to strike first. Importantly, NATO movement of significant forces to this area would not achieve deterrence until they are in place. On the contrary, it will increase the Russian inclination to act pre-emptively in the time period before they arrive. The relatively modest potential of Russian forces on the Kola Peninsula would mean that a NATO buildup on its northern flank quickly would increase beyond what the Russian forces could handle. Subsequently, this would threaten the Russian submarine-based second-strike capability on the Kola. Consequently, if the Russian forces are going to seize NATO terrain in order

The Russian way of regular warfare and the Arctic 63 to increase the buffer of their bastion, it has to be done before a NATO buildup is effective—that is, pre-emptively or in the initial part of a conflict. In this context, a NATO buildup does not only include US and British reinforcements to Northern Norway but also reinforcements from Sweden and Finland. In fact, even a deployment of the main Norwegian land force, Brigade “Nord,” to the Russian border would significantly alter the balance of forces. Brigade “Nord,” a mechanized brigade with its garrisons in Southern Norway and Troms, 450 km west of the Russian border, is equipped with Leopard 2A4 MBTs, CV90 IFVs, and K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers; this brigade alone is comparable to the 200th MRB in combat power. Consequently, Brigade “Nord” in defensive positions at the Russian border, combined with allied air power, would likely thwart any prospects of a Russian pre-emptive strike. This implies that the Russian window of opportunity for acting pre-emptively is potentially closing even with the deployment of substantial Norwegian land forces to Finnmark. While northern Finland also borders Russia, the distances and limited infrastructure to the Russian sensitive areas make a NATO build-up there less precarious, but undoubtedly still concerning to the Kremlin. This problem of effectively defending Norwegian territory without inadvertently provoking a Russian pre-emptive strike is a Norwegian strategic predicament. While any country should be able to mount unrestrained defense of its own territory, the Russian way of regular warfare, combined with the strategic realities on NATO’s northern flank, may nevertheless cause some approaches to be unwise. If the bastion falls and the Russian facilities on the Kola Peninsula are threatened, the probability of Russian use of nuclear weapons is significant, either in an instrumental way, destroying threatening land forces or carrier strike groups, or as a demonstration. Thus, how to design NATO’s defense of its northern flank is not as straightforward as destroying any Russian attack. On one side, the risk of inadvertently inciting hostilities through a Russian pre-emptive strike and provoking the use of nuclear weapons has to be balanced with the need to mount an effective and deterrent defense of Norwegian and Finnish territory. Conclusion While the probability of open military conflict between Russia and NATO is small, the consequences would be severe. Thus, it is crucial to analyze how such a situation would develop. In a situation with soaring tensions between Russia and NATO, the Russian way of regular warfare, combined with the strategic realities of the Russian Arctic, indicate a strong Russian inclination to strike pre-emptively if war is seen as imminent or highly likely. As the Northern Strategic Bastion on the Kola Peninsula is central to the Russian second-strike capability, and thus perceived as central to state survival, a preemptive attack might be considered in order to thwart a NATO buildup. The Norwegian strategic predicament lies in avoiding inadvertently triggering a

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pre-emptive strike, while still being able to mount an adequate defense of Norwegian territory. This strategic dilemma is important to understand for Norwegian and NATO decision-makers before a crisis develops. In an uncertain and fast-developing crisis, the ability to tailor NATO responses and force buildup on the northern flank is limited. Consequently, to solve the Norwegian strategic predicament, the most obvious method will be to design a permanent defense of Finnmark with resilience and depth but without large, mechanized formations that could pose a threat to the NSB. In order to pose a credible deterrent and thus avoid escalation, these defenses need to be able to survive heavy artillery fire, air and missile attacks, and nuclear warfare. Whether this is best achieved by a static or mobile concept, with or without long-range precisions-strike weapons or other capabilities is beyond this analysis; however, this issue needs to be addressed before a hightension crisis develops. References Åtland, K. (2007). The introduction, adoption and implementation of Russia’s “Northern Strategic Bastion” concept, 1992–1999. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 20(4), 499–528. 10.1080/13518040701703047 Barabanov, M., Lavrov, A., Pukhov, R., & Tseluyko, V. (2010). The Tanks of August (R. Pukhov, Ed.). Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. Barrie, D., & Hackett, J. (Eds.). (2020). Russia’s Military Modernisation: An Assessment. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. 10.4324/9781003143383 Bey, E. V. (2020). Obespecheniye voyennoy bezopasnosti Rossii v Arktike: Istoriya voprosa. Voyennaya Mysl, 2020(12), 14–25. Boston, S., & Massicot, D. (2017). The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer. RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/ PE200/PE231/RAND_PE231.pdf Bruusgaard, K. V. (2014). Crimea and Russia’s strategic overhaul. Parameters, 44(3), 81–90. Bukkvoll, T. (2009). Russia’s military performance in Georgia. Military Review, 89(6), 57–62. Cimbala, S. J. (2002). The initial period of war: Russia’s Soviet heritage. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 15(2), 59–88. 10.1080/13518040208430520 Covington, S. (2016). The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia’s Modern Approaches to Warfare. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. http:// search.proquest.com/docview/1923919377/?pq-origsite=primo Donnelly, C. (1988). Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War. Jane’s Information Group Ltd. Flikke, G. (2015). A Timeline for the Conflict and War in Ukraine: Vol. 2015: 4. The Norwegian Atlantic Comittee. Gennad’yevich, V. (2022). Voyskovaya chast’ 08275, 200-ya Otdel’naya Motostrelkovaya Brigada. Armiya Sevodnya. https://army-today.ru/vch/08275 Gerasimov, V. (2019). Vektory razvitiya voyennoy strategii. Krasnaia Zvezda, 24. https://dlib-eastview-com.libproxy.kcl.ac.uk/browse/doc/52886228

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Shield, R. (2018). Russian airpower’s success in Syria: Assessing evolution in kinetic counterinsurgency. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 31(2), 214–239. 10.1080/ 13518046.2018.1451099 The White Book of the Anti-terrorist Operation in the East of Ukraine in 2014–2016. (2017). Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, General Staff and Research Institutions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. United Nations Security Council. (2014). Security Council Meeting Report 7124. United Nations. U.S. offers assurances to Sweden, Finland over NATO application. (2022, May 5). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-offers-assurances-swedenfinland-over-nato-application-2022-05-05/ Watling, J., & Reynolds, N. (2022). Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion [RUSI Special Report]. RUSI. https://static.rusi.org/special-report202204-operation-z-web.pdf

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National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route Additional elements of domestic and international importance Troy J. Bouffard

Introduction The Russian Northern Sea Route (NSR) represents more than just a shipping lane of economic potential. The rich history of northern maritime development defines much of the Arctic identity for the Russian Federation today. Until recent years, inaccessibility caused by sea ice helped manage expectations for most defense-related concerns regarding surface waters, especially coastal. Scientific models and natural resource estimates changed that confidence quickly in 2008 though. As a result, Russian strategic, longterm views adopted priorities based on expected increases in access and activities in Arctic waters necessitating stronger protection and positions. Since then, the Russian Federation has published various related national strategies and policies that update and reinforce Kremlin NSR objectives nearly every year (Gavrilov, 2020). For Russia, the NSR represents the center of gravity in terms of providing a programmatic-like strategic focus to pursue the many critical Arctic objectives. Moscow landed on three primary categories of importance based on economic, shipping, and military interests as justification to invest in the NSR, including 1) natural resource development and protection, 2) environmental protection, and 3) shipping lane development. For the West, however, military buildup for stated resource, environmental, and route protection purposes quickly became a larger regional issue concerning Russian military capabilities and intent (Бобылёв and Сергунин, 2019; Конышев and Сергунин, 2019). Regardless, Russia did not wait for permission to develop its northern bastion defense. In short time, the Kremlin confirmed worst fears which manifested through published updates to the national regulatory regime, presenting all too clearly that the entire Arctic surface waters—from the coast to the exclusive economic zone (EEZ; 200 nm) and between the Novaya Zemlya and Bering Strait longitudes—would be under control of Russia (see Figure 5.1). Effectively, authorities would be in complete control of about three million square kilometers of surface waters normally and freely open to innocent maritime passage. The issue is not limited to what Russia defines as internal waters either, mostly involving the various straits near the coastline. The conflict involves the fact that there is no situation where a foreign DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-6

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Article 5.1. Navigation in the area of the Northern Sea Route. Статья 5.1. Плавание в акватории Северного морского пути 1. The area of the Northern Sea Route means a water area adjoining the northern coast of the Russian Federation, including internal sea waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation, and limited in the East by the line delimitating the sea areas with the United States of America and by the parallel of the Dezhnev Cape in the Bering Strait; in the West, by the meridian of the Cape Zhelanie to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, by the east coastal line of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the western limits of the Matochkin Shar, Kara Gates, Yugorski Shar Straits. 1. Под акваторией Северного морского пути понимается водное пространство, прилегающее к северному побережью Российской Федерации, охватывающее внутренние морские воды, территориальное море, прилежащую зону и исключительную экономическую зону Российской Федерации и ограниченное с востока линией разграничения морских пространств с Соединенными Штатами Америки и параллелью мыса Дежнева в Беринговом проливе, с запада меридианом мыса Желания до архипелага Новая Земля, восточной береговой линией архипелага Новая Земля и западными границами проливов Маточкин Шар, Карские Ворота, Югорский Шар Source: The Federal Law of July 28th, 2012, N 132-FZ Источник: Федеральный закон от 28 июля 2012 г. N 132-ФЗ

Water Areas of the Northern Sea Route Водные районы Северного морского пути 1. South-western part of the Kara Sea Юго-западная часть Карского моря 2. North-eastern part of the Kara Sea Северо-восточная часть Карского моря

200nm EEZ Boundary 200-мильная зона из исходные линии

3. The western part of the Laptev Sea Западная часть моря Лаптевых

A: Strait of Karski Gates Пролив Карские ворота B: Vilkitsky Straits Пролив Вилькицкого C: Strait of Sannikovo Пролив Санниково D: Strait of Long Пролив Лонга E: Strait of Dmitry Laptev Пролив Дмитрия Лаптева

4. The eastern part of the Laptev Sea Восточная часть моря Лаптевых Source:

Administration of the Northern Sea Route (subordinate to) Federal Agency of Maritime and River Transport (subordinate to) Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation

Источник: Администрация северного морского пути (подчиненный) Федеральное агентство морского и речного транспорта (подчиненный) Министерство транспорта Российской Федерации

5. South-western part of the East Siberian Sea Юго-западная часть Восточно-Сибирского моря 6. North-eastern part of the East Siberian Sea Северо-восточная часть Восточно-Сибирского моря 7. The Chukchi Sea Чукотское море

Figure 5.1 Northern Sea Route, as defined by Russian Federal Law. Source: Author’s Creation.

vessel is not required by the Kremlin to gain permission for access to NSR surface waters out to the EEZ boundary. The United States and others officially contest the status through normal channels, which is common practice globally. To put this into relative scale though, the amount of NSR surface waters in dispute equals far more than the rest of the world’s similarly controlled waters combined. This chapter offers a few additional components that contribute to how and why the NSR is a national priority for Russia through several themes in order to provide additional awareness to the many prevalent factors. First, the history of the Russian Arctic and NSR plays an essential role for Moscow in two ways, including 1) the role of history for international law in general and 2) NSRrelated history as part of Russia’s official international legal position (Arkhipov et al., 2022; Avkhadeev, 2018; Gunnarsson and Moe, 2021; Northern Sea Route Administration, 2020). Second, Article 234 of UNCLOS established the foundation of the Russian current legal premise (Fahey, 2018). Article 234 is a short clause providing extra sovereign-related consideration for ice-covered waters and allows Russia significant interpretative latitude for implementation purposes. It also means that the Kremlin feels the urgency to have their position become customary law sooner rather than later because ‘ice-covered waters’

National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route 69 continuously lose justification power. Third, in 2018, Putin announced a tonnage goal for the NSR which caused concern for many Russian officials. In response, authorities domestically advocated to redefine the NSR several times. However, each instance was met with instant rejection when failing to realize the most important aspect: the definition of the NSR cannot be changed without marginalizing the entire official legal position. This section provides further details concerning the goals. Fourth and final, the ultimate goals of Russia to control surface waters have potentially profound impacts on global principles involving freedom of navigation. For many critical maritime reasons, Russia’s NSR status represents legal challenges to global shipping enterprises and naval maritime norms which significantly conflict with the US position and others. By unpacking these factors involving one of Russia’s top national strategic priorities—and the top priority for the Russian Arctic—this chapter endeavors to provide contributing elements and related issues to expand the understanding of the national security-related interests of the NSR. The importance of history for the contemporary position of Russia’s NSR As early as the 11th century, the first versions of the civilian wooden vessels known as “koch” (коч) supported access to Arctic waters for the Pomor peoples, with the 15th and 16th centuries seeing more widespread use in the White Sea and Siberian rivers. However, in the 17th century, the single- or dual-mast rowing vessels achieved notoriety only recently acknowledged. The 53 miles that separate Russia from the United States in the Bering Strait is often thought to have been discovered by its cartographic namesake—Vitus Bering. The legacy of this credit largely persevered as a result of the strong documentation and official state sponsorship behind the discovery. Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia from 1682 to 1725, sanctioned Vitus Bering’s first expedition in 1724 specifically to determine if land connected Russia to another landmass. To that end, Vitus Bering confirmed the narrow passage in August 1728. However, six years later, the truth emerged concerning a Cossack who actually first made the discovery 80 years earlier than Bering—namely Semyon Ivanovich Dezhnyev in 1648 (Баскаков, 1941; Белов, 1948; Fisher, 1981; 1984; Pastusiak, 2016). In 1898, at the recommendation of the Russian Geographical Society, Nicholas II officially recognized the achievement at the 250th anniversary by renaming the Eastern Cape after Dezhnyev (Подвиг до востребования, 2019). Dezhnyev’s accomplishment marks a moment in history that helped establish the NSR as the key component of the 21st-century Russian Arctic identity. Rarely will a Russian discuss the domestic importance of the North without mentioning “севморпуть” (sevmorput), which is common shorthand for “северный морской путь” (severny morskoy put) or NSR. Another major development occurred on 15 April 1926, when Lenin proclaimed sovereign authority of the islands in its part of the Arctic Ocean, stating (Арктический регион, 2013):

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Troy J. Bouffard “Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union The SSR decides: All lands and islands, both open and may be discovered in the future, that do not constitute, by the time of the publication of this Decree, the territory of any foreign states recognized by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, located in the Arctic Ocean, to the north from the coast of the USSR to the North Pole within the limits between the meridian thirty-two degrees four minutes thirty-five seconds east longitude from Greenwich, passing along the eastern side of Vaida Bay through the triangulation mark at Cape Kekursky, and the meridian one hundred and sixty-eight degrees forty-nine minutes thirty seconds west longitude from Greenwich, passing along the middle of the strait separating the islands Ratmanov and Kruzenshtern of the Diomede Islands in the Bering Strait.”

Throughout the centuries, Russia maintained an ardent history of steady and increasing Arctic presence and development of interests which complement the major periods mentioned above (История освоения российской Арктики, 2019). Such history plays a critical role in international law also, especially with regard to sovereign authority over a “defined territory” as stated in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. Altogether, Russia’s Arctic history effectively supports much of the Kremlin’s legal foundation involving control over NSR waters, even in direct conflict with UNCLOS as a full party member. Moreover, Russia benefits from leveraging a powerful perspective that “states should follow international law, but have no moral obligation to do so (Goldsmith and Posner, 2005, p. 185).” When defending control over the maritime area, the Kremlin will invariably reference NSR history as the legal foundation for its case, while a lack of understanding and appreciation for this critical point will only weaken opposition. The complexity of this topic goes well beyond the scope of this chapter but hopefully provides useful initial impressions as well as the need for further exploration to properly understand the fuller context. Article 234 of UNCLOS UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Section 8: Ice-Covered Areas Article 234 “Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological

National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route 71 balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence.” Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea represents the legal foundation of Russia’s NSR surface water policies, regulatory regimes, and rhetoric. The short clause resulted mainly from bilateral negotiations between Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union during UNCLOS development. The particular origins can be traced back to Canada’s initiative following the 1969 voyage of the SS Manhattan after discovery of a huge oil reserve in Northern Alaska, which meant to test one of many proposed methods of getting the commodity to market (Solski, 2021). In 1974, Canada endeavored to gain international support for its 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act by introducing the idea of “special circumstances” as part of debate over the Arctic part of what was being considered as UNCLOS language involving “special areas.” However, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union debated over potential issues with the language for a couple years and decided that removing the aspect of “ice-covered waters” from the “special areas” provisions was key to acceptance of Article 234. Ultimately, all three agreed to resist connections between the Article and “special areas,” which would “prevent other states from arguing for similar rights in vulnerable areas (Solski, 2021).” Solski provides a contemporary summarized idea of the clause in its current understanding, stating that (Solski, 2020, p. 388), “it suffices to underline that Article 234 is a unique clause, although not the only one in UNCLOS, which, owing to its ambiguous language, managed to satisfy multiple delegations with divergent interests. The provision leaves extensive discretion to the coastal State to balance opposing interests, subject to unclear limitations, primarily the requirement to have due regard to navigation. At the same time, Article 234 includes normative standards that, in the event of dispute settlement, may be subject to interpretation by an international court or tribunal.” The phrase “due regard” within Article 234 represents the main point of ambiguity and vagueness, allowing for interpretive latitude and flexibility at the root of issues that challenge international norms such as Russian absolute control of NSR surface waters out to its EEZ boundary. Such total control normally does not extend beyond the established and accepted boundaries of internal waters, although there are considerable enforcement rules allowable within territorial waters (Bouffard, 2021). Beyond territorial waters, control changes even more, where Fahey explains that “vessels do not [normally] need coastal State permission to navigate waters in either the contiguous zone (12–24 nm seaward of a straight baseline) or the EEZ (by default, 24–200 nm seaward from a straight baseline) (Fahey, 2018, p. 164).” Article 234 allows for

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modifications of the norm though, but within reason. As explained by Williams, “while Article 234 of UNCLOS does allow Coastal States to promulgate and enforce navigational laws in the EEZ, the language requiring due regard for navigation implies that Coastal States must still allow ships some opportunity for navigation and that they may not bar ships from passing through either their own territorial waters or EEZs (Williams, 2017).” Yet “due regard” is not recognized when Russia requires permission for passage, especially when such passage is also articulated as necessary by the legally binding IMO Polar Code. Some consider that even Russian legal acts do not offer purposeful language for such a position, with one exception of an explanatory note introducing amendments to NSR regulations in 2012 (Explanatory Note to Draft Law, 2012). Additionally, “some experts argue that Russia interprets UNCLOS too broadly and the Russian NSR legislation hardly meets the requirements of ‘due regard to navigation’ and ‘presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year’ set out in Article 234 (Todorov, 2022, p. 2).” Whereas Russian legislation might be deficient in legal articulation, the Kremlin’s regulatory regime continued to develop regardless. Under the assumption that Russia has the right to control access to passage, media outlet Independence reported in March 2019 that “(f)rom now on warships and vessels of foreign countries have to inform Russia 45 days in advance about their plans to pass through the NSR. Rules require to specify names of warships and [state] vessels, purpose of their movements, routes and sailing dates. In addition, the basic parameters of watercrafts must be reported, including displacement, length, width, draft and characteristics of the power plant. Military ranks and names of their captains are also required (Россия не намерена сдавать Арктику, 2019).” However, to date the regulation has not been established into power (i.e., codified) (Moe, 2020). Bumping up requirements, the Russian government submitted a bill in August 2022 to the State Duma requiring foreign warships to provide a 90-day notice to transit the NSR (Foreign Warships to Send 90-Day Notice, 2022). The following year, Moscow published a decree (Sep 18, 2020 - № 1487) involving extensive rules for navigation in the waters of the NSR (NSR Administration). The decree also illustrates, through geographic coordinates and feature names, a breakdown of the NSR into 28 districts (Appendix 3). Additionally, Appendix 2 specifies criteria for admission of ships in the NSR, which include ice class of the ship (12 types), ice navigation method (independent or with icebreaker), four types of ice conditions (none, light, medium, and heavy) with indications for prohibited (-) or permitted (+) navigation in each district. Of note, the decree also demonstrates two distinctly critical issues of legal and principle concern, including the excessive maritime claims involving internal waters through various straits as well as the enormously disparate intent to control over NSR surface waters to the EEZ.

National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route 73 Meeting Putin’s goal: Tonnage forecasts and NSR expansion attempts On the national goals and strategic objectives of the development of the Russian Federation for the period of 2024 07 May 2018 Decree № 204 15. The Government of the Russian Federation on the basis of the strategy of spatial development of the Russian Federation to develop with the participation of public authorities of the subjects of the Russian Federation and by October 1, 2018. Approve a comprehensive plan for the modernization and expansion of main infrastructure, providing for the provision in 2024: a Development of the West-East and North-South transport corridors for freight transportation, including through: • Development of the Northern Sea Route and increase in cargo traffic through it to 80 million tons The portion of the decree (Президент Путин, 2018) above drew significant international surprise and attention because the previous record the year prior resulted in 10.7 million tons shipped through the NSR (Staalesen, 2018). By the end of 2021, predictions estimated almost 20 million tons. Eight times that amount in six years—when no obvious shipping enterprise developments supported such a goal—seemed beyond the usual Kremlin-inflated numbers game. While internationally, the West was bemused and skeptical, domestic authorities seemed very concerned about the ability to meet Putin’s newly stated goal under the circumstances. Officials with the Ministry of Natural Resources—representing one of the four main competing entities developing forecasts—went into the new year “concerned that the President’s 80 million-ton target for the Northern Sea Route simply cannot be achieved … with estimates that the maximum possible volumes on the route by year 2024 is 52 million tons (Staalesen, 2019a). In April 2019, Rosatom, one of two Russian state corporations, presented estimates in St. Petersburg at the Arctic Forum that shipments in 2024 will amount to 92.6 million tons (Staalesen, 2019b). End of July 2019, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnyev, leading the State Commission for the Arctic, reported details to the Ministry of Transport that allowed an alternative forecast supporting the ability to achieve the objective by 2024 (Минтранс предусмотрел удвоение, 2019). Finally, the Ministry for the Development of the Far and the Arctic reported that 95 million tons would be reached by 2024. In all cases, Novatek LNG development on the peninsulas of Yamal and Gydan provides the majority of tonnage growth expectations. Throughout the forecasting efforts, interest over a novel solution toward meeting Putin’s objective lingered in curiosity: why not just expand the NSR?

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In particular, a significant amount of tonnage could be achieved by expanding West to include the Russian part of the Barents Sea. The number of vessels going to and from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk alone would boost tonnage numbers easily. Additionally, relatively warmer waters from the Gulf Stream and North Atlantic allow much of the Barents Sea to remain ice free yearround in many places (Figure 5.2). In May 2020, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Trutnyev instructed several executive agencies along with Rosatom to discuss the concept for expanding the NSR to include the waters of the Barents, White, Pechora, Bering, and Okhotsk Seas (Власти отказались, 2020). However, a couple months later, in

Figure 5.2 Sea ice extent on 04 May 2023. Source: Image/photo courtesy of the National Snow and Ice Data Center, University of Colorado, Boulder.

National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route 75 0

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80 180

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Current extent of NSR routes Proposed Northern Sea Transport Corridor

Figure 5.3 Proposed Northern Sea Transport Corridor. Source: Author’s Creation.

June, agency authorities reported back to Trutnyev that such a plan must be refused. The reasoning from the ministers and Rosatom focused on one issue: the need to avoid contradictions with international law (more on that later). At the same time, authorities considered the idea of proposing a new route expansion overlapping the NSR called the “Northern Sea Transport Corridor” (Staalesen, 2020) (see Figure 5.3). Again, potential issues conflicting with international law as well as shifting Putin’s goals from the NSR to a newly named and established route presents other complications, including impacts to legitimization of the Russian status and national security importance of the NSR. Finally, the most recent NSR expansion proposal came from regional leaders in a February 2021 letter to Trutnyev suggesting that the NSR stretch from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok in order to include the Baltic and Pacific seas (Губернаторы предложили, 2021; Staalesen, 2021). Once more, such a plan cannot be accepted without risking incongruity with international law. The legal origins of the NSR (relevant to this chapter) can be traced to the establishment of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route by Decree No. 1873 of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR on 17 December 1932, (Østreng, 2010) which, at the time, defined the task of managing the NSR to “finally lay the Northern Sea Route from the White Sea to the Bering Strait, equip this route, keep it in good condition and ensure safety sailing along this path (Филин, 2019; Peresypkin, 2008).” Although previous origins of the NSR exist, Decree No. 1873 was the first to establish an official administrative and operational management system for the NSR under the appointed authority of Otto Yulievich Schmidt (Шмидт), that continues to develop till today. Fast

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forwarding to contemporary times, the definition of the NSR was most recently and substantially updated by Russian Federal Law No. 132-FZ on 28 July 2012, adding the following Article 5.1 on Navigation in the Waters of the Northern Sea Route (Президент Путин, 2012): “The water area of the Northern Sea Route is understood as the water area adjacent to the northern coast of the Russian Federation, covering the internal sea waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation and limited from the east by the line of delimitation of maritime spaces with the United States of America and the parallel of Cape Dezhnev in Bering the strait, from the west by the meridian of Cape Zhelaniya to the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, the eastern coastline of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and the western borders of the straits Matochkin Shar, Karskie Vorota, Yugorsky Shar.” The importance of this final definition involves designating the maritime area where sea ice can be regularly expected, which is key to being able to leverage Article 234 of UNCLOS as previously described. Waters to the west of Novaya Zemlya would likely cause comparison problems with ice-covered waters to the east in terms of meeting intent and provisions of the Article. The earlier attempts to expand the NSR ran into Kremlin resistance each and every time, no matter how clever the proposal, in order to avoid complications with international laws. Putin’s ultimate goal seems to involve establishing full control of NSR surface waters out to the EEZ as customary law. In order to do so through a soft-power/legal approach, Moscow needs to conform to and leverage international law and norms to its advantage. This starts with understanding that customary law is one of the four recognized forms of international law in accordance with Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The Restatement (Third) on the Foreign Relations of the United States helps provide a working definition of customary law in Section 102 which explains that “custom must result from a general and consistent practice of states that is followed out of a sense of legal obligation (opinion juris sive necessitates),” with a general interpretation including 1) widespread repetition of the practice, 2) by a significant number of states, and 3) and has not been rejected by a substantial number of states (Public International Law, 2023). In this case, Putin knows that substantially changing the definition of the NSR would risk compromising decades of efforts carefully structured around the required characteristic of consistency. While Russia continues to develop the means to defend and enforce NSR control through hard power, the Kremlin also realizes that consent and compliance matter as a soft-power advantage, as explained by Goldsmith and Posner (Goldsmith and Posner, 2005b, p. 26): “states abide by customary international law because they perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy, where legitimacy is understood as a property of a rule or rule-making

National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route 77 institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.” One additional component that remains core to issues involving the importance of the NSR to Russia and tonnage goals includes the vast territory of Siberia. The hundreds of thousands of people that live within hundreds of communities throughout the interior of Siberia remain extremely dependent on the NSR for maritime shipment of goods via three main rivers (Yenesei, Ob, and Lena) and dozens of tributaries. Such communities do not have road access and very limited rail access to the far south only (Figure 5.4). Air transport of goods generally costs far more and winter transport options over frozen ice offer marginal value—leaving ships and barges as the primary means of transporting goods, supplies, and equipment to an area that is 9% of the world’s dry landmass. Further discussion of customary law would help to explore endless complex details. However, the purpose of this section of the chapter focuses on providing an introduction involving key components of the issue. In this case, being aware of the role of customary law in supporting Russia’s strategic goals and national security priorities involving the NSR provides crucial insight into the fuller circumstances. The role and importance of Article 234 for Moscow also become more accessible for analytical

Figure 5.4 Graphical representation of landmass area dependent on NSR. Source: Author’s Creation

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purposes. In the end, it became apparent that Putin would not accept any notions of changing the definition of the NSR, so authorities focused on ways in which to meet the goals, even if plans and reports rely on highly skeptical ambitions and estimates. Threats to international and operational aspects of freedom of navigation This section will focus on the perspectives based on some of the challenges involving the United States as the main competitor regarding freedom of navigation and the NSR. Part of the difficulty with freedom of navigation interests managed within existing international law often centers around environmental protection versus navigation rights. For the NSR, Russia prioritizes the environment as justification for controlling navigation access, while the United States and others contend that freedom of navigation must be upheld as the priority. Freedom of navigation decision-makers struggle with two main legal categories, including 1) principles of international law, as well as 2) issues guided by operational law. Often, the freedom of navigation problem involves access to disputed territory (surface waters) for innocent or transit passage, where consent from a coastal state denies normal access in accordance with international law (i.e., UNCLOS). Such is the case with the NSR where Russia maintains total control of access and transit over the entire surface waters up to the EEZ maritime boundary (up to 200 nm on the surface). States normally do not have that amount of control over surface waters in the territorial waters (0–12 nm from a straight baseline) and even less in the contiguous zone (12–24 nm from a straight baseline). Beyond the contiguous zone, attempts to control access to open, surface waters—not specially protected or occupied—remain rare, except for Russia over the NSR and China over the South China Sea. Russia continues to treat the NSR up to the EEZ as a legally protected area primarily through Article 234 of UNCLOS. Although Moscow does not claim the NSR waters beyond the contiguous zone as territorial or internal, their behavior and requirements are basically the same. For the United States and others, this represents a textbook “excessive maritime claim” which is detailed in the US Navy Maritime Claims Manual (Russian Federation Maritime Claims, 2021). In order to prevent Russia’s claim from becoming customary law, the United States (and others) ensures to keep the issue active through a counter-position that officially does not recognize Russia’s claim. Usually, the competing position is communicated via official communique through diplomatic channels as well as high-level public pronouncements, articulating the principles, norms, and values involving international law. Other times, when a counter-position needs to be emphasized—for effect or otherwise—surface vessels might pursue a Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP), conducted through operational law within authorities provided by National Security Directive 49 of October 1990 and managed through the

National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route 79 US Freedom of Navigation Program of 1979 (Fisher, 2022). Other ways counter-positions might be delivered include strategically communicating an associated perspective for public and media consumption, such as remarks in 2019 from Secretary of State Pompeo and Secretary of the Navy Spencer (Auerswald, 2019). For the United States, freedom of navigation in the NSR remains an issue of principle first and foremost. Operationally, the need to navigate in the NSR is not a pressing concern currently as much as the desire to uphold international norms. It remains unclear what effect allowing Russia to maintain its claim will result in also. Since there are no other “ice-covered” waters being contested currently, what hypothetical precedent could be reasonably invoked by another state to this effect? In the long term, a lack of sea ice altogether might also render the issue moot, which seems to be the approach that China maintains with regard to challenging Russia’s control over the NSR. Eventually, trans-Arctic shipping could be possible, and Russia’s control over the NSR will become unconcerning. Conclusion The Arctic remains a critical part of the Russian national identity, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union. Within its Arctic, the NSR represents the central priority of the Kremlin, acting as the focal and rally point from which to vaunt critical national security interests to both the international and domestic audiences. Slowly but surely, Moscow has built a solid enterprise and case to support their national security endeavor. In some cases, Russia’s position regarding the NSR conflicts with various norms and interests of others. In such competitive circumstances, a full understanding of all the factors contributing to national security importance of the NSR becomes paramount if there is any hope to reach an amicable compromise with the Russian Federation. The NSR is a dynamic topic though, where even current events continue to impact its importance as international use of the route plummeted during 2022 in response to the Ukraine invasion (Goldstein, 2023). This chapter hopes to provide useful, if abstract, value involving a few aspects of relevance concerning the importance of the NSR for Russia. Together with other works of scholars and authorities, actors representing interests in competition with the Kremlin might be better prepared to achieve agreeable outcomes in the future concerning the NSR. References Arkhipov, A., E. Grigoriev and M. Sinitsyn (2022) “The Northern Sea Route: A Retrospective, Strategic Solutions and Prospects of Development.” In: E3S Web of Conferences, vol. 164, p. 11020. Les Ulis, EDP Sciences.

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Auerswald, D. (2019) “Now Is Not the Time for a FONOP in the Arctic.” War on the Rocks, 11 October 2019. Available from: https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/ now-is-not-the-time-for-a-fonop-in-the-arctic/ [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Avkhadeev, V. R. (2018) “Northern Sea Route: Development of Legal Regulation.” Kutafin Law Review, 5(2018), pp. 240–255. Bouffard, T. J. (2021) “A Developing Maritime Operational Environment: Forward Presence and Freedom of Navigation in the Arctic.” Strategic Perspectives, (2021), pp. 7–8. Explanatory Note to Draft Law (2012) “On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of Russian Federation in Terms of State Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Northern Sea Route.” Available from: http://www.nsra.ru/en/ofitsialnaya_informatsiya/zakon_ o_smp.html [Accessed: 2 March 2023] Fahey, S. (2018) “Access Control: Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic and the Russian Northern Sea Route Regime.” Harvard National Security Journal, 9 (2018), pp. 154, 164. Fisher, R. (2022) Operational Law Handbook. Charlottesville, Virginia, National Security Law Department, Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Fisher, R. H. (1981). The Voyage of Semen Dezhnev in 1648: Bering’s Precursor, with Selected Documents. London, University Press, Cambridge; The Hakluyt Society. Fisher, R. H. (1984). “The Early Cartography of the Bering Strait Region.” Arctic, 37(4), pp. 574–589. Foreign Warships to Send 90-day Notice to Russia to Travel Along Northern Sea Route—Bill, (2020), TASS, 4 August 2022. Available from: https://tass.com/ politics/1489659 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Gavrilov, V. (2020) “Russian Legislation on the Northern Sea Route Navigation: Scope and Trends.” The Polar Journal, 10(2), pp. 273–284. Goldsmith, J. L. and E. A. Posner (2005) “International Law and Moral Obligation.” in The Limits of International Law, Chapter 7. London, Oxford University Press, pp. 26, 185. Goldstein, E. (2023) “Eclipsed Again: Russia’s Northern Sea Route Will Have to Wait.” Harvard International Review, 24 February 2023. Available from: https:// hir.harvard.edu/eclipsed-again-russias-northern-sea-route-will-have-to-wait/ [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Gunnarsson, B. and A. Moe (2021) “Ten Years of International Shipping on the Northern Sea Route: Trends and Challenges.” Available from: 10.23865/arctic.v12. 2614 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Moe, A. (2020) “A New Russian Policy for the Northern Sea Route? State Interests, Key Stakeholders and Economic Opportunities in Changing Times.” The Polar Journal, 10(2), pp. 209–227. Northern Sea Route Administration (2020), “Rules of Navigation in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route.” Available from: http://www.nsra.ru/en/ofitsialnaya_ informatsiya/pravila_plavaniya/f137.html [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Pastusiak, T. (2016) A Brief History of Navigation on the Northern Sea Route. In: The Northern Sea Route as a Shipping Lane. Cham, Springer. Available from: 10.1007/ 978-3-319-41834-6_2 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Peresypkin, F. and A. Yakovlev (2008) “The Northern Sea Route’s Role in the System of International Transport Corridors.” Focus-North, 2(6).

National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route 81 Public International Law: Customary Law. (2023) University of Hawaii. Available from: https://law-hawaii.libguides.com/c.php?g=125471&p=821811 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Russian Federation Maritime Claims, Maritime Claims Reference Manual, U.S. Navy Judge Advocates General’s Corps. (March 2021). https://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/ documents/mcrm/RussianFederation2021.pdf [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Solski, J. J. (2020) “The Northern Sea Route in the 2010s: Development and Implementation of Relevant Law.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 11, p. 388. Solski, J. J. (2021) “The Genesis of Article 234 of the UNCLOS.” Ocean Development & International Law, 52(1), pp. 1–19. Staalesen, A. (2018) “It’s an Order from the Kremlin: Shipping on the Northern Sea Route to Reach 80 Million Tons by 2024.” The Barents Observer, 15 May 2018. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2018/05/its-orderkremlin-shipping-northern-sea-route-increase-80-million-tons-2024 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Staalesen, A. (2019a) “Northern Sea Route: Officials Worry Putin’s Ambitions are Unrealistic”. Radio Canada International, 18 January 2019. Available from: https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2019/01/18/russia-northern-searoute-shipping-expectation-objective-realistic/ [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Staalesen, A. (2019b) “Kremlin’s Prophesy for the Northern Sea Route is Keeping Moscow Officials Busy.” Arctic Today, 8 August 2019. Available from: https:// www.arctictoday.com/kremlins-prophesy-for-the-northern-sea-route-is-keepingmoscow-officials-busy/ [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Staalesen, A. (2020) “Russian Arctic Shipping Could Follow the New Route”. Barents Observer, 19 May 2020. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/ 2020/05/russian-arctic-shipping-could-follow-new-route [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Staalesen, A. (2021) “North Russian Regions Want Extension of Arctic Shipping Route.” Barents Observer, 1 April 2021. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ arctic/2021/04/north-russian-regions-want-extension-arctic-shipping-route [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Todorov, A. (2022) “Dire Straits of the Russian Arctic: Options and Challenges for a Potential US FONOP in the Northern Sea Route.” Marine Policy, 139, p. 2. Williams, L. C. (2017) “An Ocean between Us: The Implications of Inconsistencies between the Navigational Laws of Coastal Arctic Council Nations and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for Arctic Navigation.” Vanderbilt Law Review, 70(1), 378–411. Østreng, W. (2010) “The Northeast Passage and Northern Sea Route”, Arctis. Available from: http://www.arctis-search.com/The+Northeast+Passage+and +Northern+Sea+Route+2 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Арктический регион: проблемы международного сотрудничества. (2013) [Arctic Region: Problems of International Cooperation], ред. И. С. Иванов, 3 томах, ст. 242. Баскаков, Н. А. (1941) Подвиг Семена Дежнева: повесть. Ленинград; Москва: Главсевморпуть. Белов, М. И. (1948) “Семён Дежнёв: 1648-1948: к трехсотлетию открытия пролива между Азией и Америкой”, [Semyon Dezhnev: 1648–1948: On the Tercentenary of the Opening of the Strait between Asia and America], Москва: Издательство Главсевморпути.

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Бобылёв, Николай Геннадьевич, and Александр Анатольевич Сергунин. (2019) “Принципы стратегического планирования устойчивого развития российских арктических городов“, [Principles of Strategic Planning for the Sustainable Development of Russian Arctic Cities], Вестник Северо-Восточного федерального университета имени МК Аммосова. Серия: «Экономика. Социология. Культурология» 2, pp. 7–15. Власти отказались от расширения границ Северного морского пути (2020) [Authorities Refused to Expand the Borders of the Northern Sea Route], RBK, 20 June 2020. Available from: https://www.rbc.ru/business/20/06/2020/ 5eecb19f9a7947cfd9e8abaf [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Губернаторы предложили расширить Севморпуть от Петербурга до Бладивостока (2021) [Governors Proposed to Expand the Northern Sea Route from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok], RBK, 31 March 2021. Available from: https://www. rbc.ru/business/31/03/2021/60630b3e9a79478dd10d80cf?from=column_28 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. История освоения российской Арктики, (2019) TASS, updated 9 April 2019, Available from: https://tass.ru/info/6311508, [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Конышев, Валерий Николаевич and Александр Анатольевич Сергунин. (2019) “Черный кокус Конгресса США: роль в формировании внутренней и внешней политики“, [Congressional Black Caucus: Role in Shaping Domestic and Foreign Policy], Мировая экономика и международные отношения 63, no. 10, pp. 67–77. Минтранс предусмотрел удвоение грузопотока Северного морского пути за год. (2019) [The Ministry of Transportation Announced a Doubling of Cargo Flow of the Northern Sea Route in a Year], RBK, 30 July 2019. Available from: https:// www.rbc.ru/business/30/07/2019/5d3f06829a7947abc5c4a123 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. “Подвиг до востребования: что открыл Семён Дежнёв и почему его открытие не замечали почти 90 лет,” (2019) [A Feat on Demand: What Semyon Dezhnev Discovered and Why His Discovery Was Ignored for almost 90 Years], Русское географическое общество, 12 March 2019. Available from: https://www.rgo.ru/ ru/article/podvig-do-vostrebovaniya-chto-otkryl-semyon-dezhnyov-i-pochemuego-otkrytie-ne-zamechali [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Президент Путин (2012) “О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части государственного регулирования торгового мореплавания в акватории Северного морского пути” [On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Regarding the State Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Waters of the Northern Sea Route], № 132-ФЗ, 28 July 2012. Available from: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/ 0001201207300027 [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Президент Путин (2018) «О национальнах целях стратегических задачах развития Российской Федерации на период до 2024 года, [On the National Goals and Strategic Objectives of the Development of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2024], 17 May 2018. Available from: http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/ files/0001201805070038.pdf [Accessed: 2 March 2023]. Россия не намерена сдавать Арктику (2019) [Russia Does Not Intend to Give Up the Arctic], Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 March 2019. Available from: http://www.ng.ru/ armies/2019-03-11/8_7527_regulations.html [Accessed: 2 March 2023].

National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route 83 Филин, Павел Анатольевич (2019) “Главное управление Северного морского пути в истории управления Арктикой”, [General Directorate of the Northern Sea Route in the History of Arctic Management], Полярные чтения на ледоколе «Красин» 6, pp. 237–261. Шмидт, Отто Юльевич [Otto Yulievich Schmidt], Encyclopedia, ТАСС. Available from: https://tass.ru/encyclopedia/person/shmidt-otto-yulevich [Accessed: 2 March 2023].

6

NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic Palle Ydstebø

Introduction There has been growing military interest in the Arctic in the past years. Arctic strategies have been developed, new “Arctic” formations have been stood up, intelligence gathering in the High North bordering Russia has increased, and NATO training and exercises in the region have commenced once more after they were halted following the end of the Cold War. On the Russian side, the Northern Fleet and its nuclear role as Russia’s second-strike capability have similarly increased the Arctic’s relative importance. The attrition of Russia’s conventional forces in the Russian-Ukraine War, especially its land forces, will likely cause a relative increase in the importance of nuclear deterrence, including the second-strike capabilities of the Northern Fleet. Norway established its Cold War military presence following NATO’s response to the security situation in Europe after the Berlin crisis and the Korean War. The Norwegian Brigade in Germany was withdrawn in 1953, and the lead elements of the new brigade in Northern Norway arrived in its area of operations the year after (Lundesgaard, 1995, pp. 35–42). By 1955 the new garrisons in Troms County were almost completed, and the brigade moved in. The garrisons were located around the main air base in the region, Bardufoss, which played a key role in both air operations and reception of Allied reinforcements. Naval forces and maritime patrol aircrafts (MPA) were deployed to stations and bases in the area (Gjeseth, 2011, pp. 121–127; Klevberg, 2012, pp. 139–144; Skogrand, 2004, pp. 38–48). The Norwegian Armed Forces have developed a vast knowledge and experience in Arctic operations. These are the kinds of operations and activities that Norwegian forces always train and prepare for. Nothing special needed to be developed into doctrine; Arctic warfare is what Norway always does in Northern Norway. NATO forces that were to deploy to Northern Norway in war trained and exercised regularly in their assigned areas to gain and maintain proficiency, especially in winter warfare. There were exchanges of experience and lessons learned, and field manuals were developed (Børresen et al., 2004, pp. 46–66). Norwegian operational-level doctrine during the Cold War was partly indirect and partly tacit. The indirect doctrine was expressed in the plans at the DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-7

NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic 85 military-strategic and operational levels, where the uniqueness of the joint operational area was taken care of. The tacit joint and operational knowledge consisted of the knowledge and experience of commanders and staff officers, which was exchanged when they rotated in and out of positions at Norway’s two joint headquarters. The doctrine was known as “the holding time doctrine,”1 i.e., holding key ground to gain time for Allied reinforcements (Tamnes, 2015, pp. 387–388). It set the direction for the Norwegian Armed Forces, from peace time alert standards and refreshment training to procurement and mobilization plans. It was a doctrine. It even had its name but was not written or published (Johansen, 2009, pp. 13–34; Slensvik and Ydstebø, 2016, pp. 298–299). Nearly two decades without large-scale NATO field training exercises in the Arctic has created a gap in knowledge and experience in planning and conducting large joint operations in the High North. It is acknowledged that the Arctic is a unique joint operational environment that combines several special operating environments, which will demand a multitude of specialized skills from the forces operating in the region (NATO, 2022a).2 Even if NATO has some tactical Arctic and cold weather publications, it has no operational-level Arctic doctrine. Given this gap, NATO should therefore develop an operational-level doctrine to enable a joint force to operate in the Arctic and provide a framework for the existing tactical publications on Arctic and cold weather activities. An Arctic doctrine may also provide the Alliance with an agreed direction for lower-level publications, procurement, education, and training. This chapter will initially explore different roles and purposes of doctrine and briefly describe the peculiarities of the Arctic and some joint and operational experience in modern war in the High North. It will then consider how military doctrine can contribute to preparing and informing Allied joint operations on NATO’s northern flank and discuss what roles an Arctic doctrine could fulfil to enable NATO’s Arctic warfare capabilities. Does the Arctic need doctrine? The Arctic is a unique and varied operational environment. It spans from tundra, boreal forests, and alpine mountains to rugged littoral waters and the Arctic Ocean, with its ice cap and polar storms. These conditions are very demanding to operate in and require troops and equipment to be both adapted and acclimatized. Books and articles on Arctic warfare emphasize the uniqueness of the Arctic climate, weather, and terrain, especially its vastness and lack of human footprints, such as communications (Ziemke, 1960; Gebhardt, 1990; Ruef, 1984; Kaltenegger, 2003; Suprun, 2007). In 2004, the Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Sergei Viktorovitsj Simonenko, wrote an article in Voennaia mysl’ (Military Thought), where he presented seven lessons learned from the 1944 Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation, which is the largest military operation in Arctic conditions. The role

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of naval forces and close cooperation between the services is of vital importance in large-scale joint operations. This issue is repeatedly underlined by Russian authors writing about the Arctic since Russian operations usually are dominated by land forces. The role of long-range precision munitions will play a decisive part, but the services’ regular capabilities are still valid in modern warfare. One needs especially to be able to develop and maintain manoeuvre forces, since warfare is more than just an exchange of long-range fires. Jointness, logistics, and the necessity to learn from history are further emphasized (Simonenko, 2004). In Voennaia mysl’ No.12 December 2020, Lieutenant Colonel E.V. Bey retraces the history of Russia’s Arctic interests and foreign powers’ ambitions in the region. He emphasized the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation as the only Soviet strategic offensive operation north of the Arctic Circle, as well as its, in the Soviet experience, unique joint dimension: “without which decisive success cannot be achieved in the conditions of the polar theater of operations” (Bey, 2020). Bey further noted the importance of the ice-free port of Murmansk, as well as the northern sea route during the Second World War. The increased importance of the region for Russia over the previous two decades caused the Russian Government in 2014 to establish the Northern Fleet as an operational strategic command (OSK), which also included land and air assets in the region. In January 2021, it became the Northern Military District, which is responsible for the northern part of the former Leningrad Military District, from the Norwegian and Finnish borders to the Ural mountains (Humpert, 2021; Warsaw Institute, 2021; President of the Russian Federation, 2020). The recent proposal from the Russian Minister of Defence to re-create Leningrad Military District to cover the Finnish border, in addition to re-establishing Moscow Military District, may also indicate an increased Russian concern and interest in the Arctic (Defence Express, 2022; Luzin, 2023). Strategic assets, such as the air-landed forces, deploy and train regularly in Arctic conditions (Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021). Consequently, Russia has developed and trained its forces that are designated for the Russian Arctic. In theory, those forces should master the Arctic climate and conditions far better than non-Arctic forces. The Pechenga-based 200th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade’s combat record in winter conditions by Kharkiv in FebruaryMarch 2022 indicates on the other hand that something was lacking (Butusov, 2022; Nilsen, 2022). Experience of modern war and peace time operations and exercises in the north have shown that military activities in the physical conditions in the region demand forces specifically trained and equipped for this environment to be able to function beyond their sheer survival. Large-scale Allied field training exercises in Northern Norway were reduced after the end of the Cold War. The exercise Trident Juncture 2018 was the largest of its kind since 2002, following the 2015 exercise in the Mediterranean. Even if Trident Juncture 2018 was in mid-Norway, not in the Arctic, it was an important step

NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic 87 in the direction of re-establishing NATO Arctic expertise (Birkemo et al., 2019; NATO, 2015; Ramsey, 2019). To understand what role doctrine can play in bridging this gap in NATO’s collective knowledge and experience regarding Arctic operations, the next section will begin by describing various roles and functions doctrine can possess. Doctrine and roles of doctrine In the introduction of his book Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Harald Høiback acknowledges, “There is no commonly recognized definition of doctrine, and we thus have to figure out what doctrine actually is in order to be in a position to look at its nature and character” (Høiback, 2013, p. 2). He then sets out listing a set of good reasons to avoid (military) doctrine but concludes the book by listing six arguments in favor of doctrine: • An effective doctrine reduces the effect of Clausewitzian friction. • Doctrine-like patterns of thought and cultural idiosyncrasies pop up and flourish whether we like it or not. By developing doctrine formally, we get a kind of control. • Sometimes, systematic strategic thinking does not point unambiguously in one direction, and we therefore need a deliberate and approved choice as our bedrock for planning, procurement, and collective action. • The process of making and issuing doctrine can sharpen our language and clarify our concepts. (This is particularly important for alliances and coalitions). • A doctrine can provide a steady platform for improvisations. • A doctrine can, in given strategic cultures, serve as an academic punch bag (Høiback, 2013, pp. 185–186). The first argument encapsulates the rest. If doctrine can contribute to reducing friction in war, it is worth the effort to develop and maintain it. Friction is the main curse in all military endeavor; there is not even any need for an enemy for friction to grind an operation to a halt. The challenge is to avoid doctrine becoming dogma, or as General James Mattis stated it: “[…] the last refuge for the unimaginative” (Wright, 2009, p. 25). NATO has an agreed understanding of the role and purpose of doctrine: NATO defines doctrine as: ‘fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.’ Doctrine enhances the operational effectiveness of the Alliance by providing authoritative guidance relevant to preparing and employing military forces. Doctrine promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train and conduct operations and represents what is taught, believed and advocated as best practice. Doctrine

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The key phrases are “authoritative but requires judgement,” “authoritative guidance,” and “a common perspective,” which should prevent doctrine from becoming dogmatic or an excuse for a commander to pursue objectives according to personal preferences. Clausewitz initially related friction to the commander and his headquarters, where the commander “is paralyzed by constant friction with the opinions of others” (Høiback, 2013, pp. 95–96). NATO’s means to manage friction between its members is known as interoperability: “The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives” (NATO, 2018a, p. 68). Allied administrative publication, AAP-47, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT is NATO’s guidance for doctrinal development to achieve interoperability, where “Doctrine focuses on how not what to think (emphasis in original). Allied joint doctrine should therefore be sufficiently definitive to guide operations and versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations” (NATO, 2019, p. 1). Doctrine is one of several means to achieve interoperability and operational efficiency in Allied operations, a subject that is emphasized throughout AAP-47 and that also guides doctrine development and implementation. Høiback has set doctrine to link strategy to manuals, regulations, and procedures, and by that provide tactical, functional, and technical guidance to the practical conduct of tactics and the various functions an operation is built upon (Figure 6.1). Doctrine’s role in providing guidance for subordinate manuals, regulations, and procedures will be emphasized, while doctrine itself will have to be guided by strategy. I will also discuss how tactical manuals and other documents can influence doctrine and to some degree compensate for lack of an operationallevel Arctic doctrine. These subordinate documents, together with Arctic capabilities, NATO concepts,3 and training, will contribute to developing the qualities the units and staffs need to operate according to doctrine in the Arctic. The development process in NATO is basically the same for doctrines, manuals, and regulations (NATO, 2019, pp. 7–14). The NATO doctrinal development process is also outlined in AAP-47 and is tasked by the Military Committee, while the committee’s Joint Standardization Board (MCJSB) is delegated to do the tasking and oversee the process. It usually works through a custodian,4 which is a group of NATO member nations and/or partner nations,5 and led by one nation that is responsible for the development or revision of a specific doctrine. Doctrine development in NATO is a collective process, and drafts are sent for comments and adjustments before

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Constitutive

National strategy

Doctrine

Regulative

Manuals

Regulations

Procedures

Figure 6.1 The doctrinal heap. Source: Høiback, 2013, p. 21.

the doctrine is approved wholly or partly by the individual member states (NATO, 2019, pp. 10–22). NATO operational-level doctrines are not classified; they are open documents and not screened by a classification and security regime (NATO, 2019). They will therefore naturally be limited in content, especially regarding specific operational areas and capabilities, such as the Arctic. A wide definition of doctrine will be used in further analysis: “institutionalized beliefs about what works in war and military operations” (Høiback, 2016, p. 187). The purpose is to try to cover tacit doctrine and doctrinal elements stated in non-doctrinal documents, such as war plans and strategic concepts. Several Arctic strategies have been developed in recent years (Konyshev et al., 2017; U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, 2020; The Department of the Air Force, 2020; Department of the Navy, 2021; UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2018). There are also some tactical and service tactical publications on cold weather and Arctic operations (NATO, 2018; U.S. Army, 2016; The Swedish Armed Forces, 2019), but no specific operational level or joint doctrine, either NATO or national. An important role for doctrines is to reduce friction, in NATO that equals creating interoperability between the different Allied forces. Operational doctrine shall therefore contribute to reduce friction in Headquarters planning and conducting operations, supported by the framework of NATO Defence Planning (NATO, 2022b). A NATO operational-level doctrine for Arctic operations may therefore be a specific Arctic Joint Operational Doctrine. It can also be a combination of existing doctrines, tacit knowledge that is institutionalized in defense plans, procurement strategies, and Arctic-specific tactical publications, etc., all of which will contribute to NATO’s “institutionalised beliefs about

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what works in war and military operations” (Høiback, 2016, p. 187) regarding Arctic joint operations. The greatest advantage of a NATO operational-level doctrine for the Arctic will be its role as one overarching comprehensive document to guide and direct planning, preparations, and operations in the Arctic. NATO’s joint and operational doctrine shall guide joint and multinational operations. The NATO joint force is multinational and directed by one of NATO’s operational commands, which themselves are multinational. Operations are the means to secure the strategic objectives within the strategic direction provided by SHAPE as NATO’s strategic command for operations: “Operations by Allied joint forces are directed at the military-strategic level and planned and executed at the operational and tactical levels” (NATO, 2017, pp. 1–8). Any joint operational-level Arctic doctrine must thus enable planning and execution of Allied joint operations in an Arctic environment. Given these elements, the next section will therefore describe some of the most important features of the Arctic operational environment. The European Arctic area of operations The Arctic is generally understood as the part of the globe north of the Arctic Circle (66° 33′ 45″ N), but the climate zone north of 60° N and 10° Celsius (50° Fahrenheit) may also be included. (Burke, 2022, pp. 5–7) This chapter will limit its scope to the European Artic, from the Denmark Strait between Greenland and Iceland to the European continent east to the Urals, which include the islands of the Russian Arctic that are part of the Northern Military District. This region is regarded as the most likely joint area of operations for an Allied multinational joint force. Light conditions vary from midnight sun in mid-summer to dim daylight for a few hours a day during mid-winter. The Arctic climate is conditioned by the region’s proximity to the North Pole and the Arctic Ocean. As a result, summers are short, while winters may well last for more than half the year. Winter temperatures vary from just below freezing at the coast to 30 or more below zero less than one hour’s drive inland. In addition to the general features of the Arctic, European Arctic is a conglomerate of geographical zones. These vary from the dry and flat part of the boreal forest to alpine formations and barren islands bordering the Barents Sea. In between are rocky shores and occasionally sandy beaches, marshes, rocky hills, valleys of pasture lands, and forests. Roads, which are channeled by valleys and coastlines, are few and exposed to snowdrifts during the winter. Cities and settlements are few and separated by vast and partly inhospitable terrain, fjords, and stretches of open water (Figure 6.2). Freezing temperatures are common in the Arctic, but the coastline eastward, including the Kola Peninsula, is ice-free even in the winter due to the warm Atlantic water. Other parts of temperate zones are just as cold as the Arctic but lack the unique and fluctuating weather conditions that characterize the northern coastal regions. Polar storms that approach the coast will

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66°33’42,5”

+8C° -¯¥

Figure 6.2 Terrain and climate in the European Arctic. Source: NATO, 2023c.

influence and often instantly change the weather conditions hundreds of kilometers inland (Norsk Telegrambyrå [Norwegian News Agency], 1993). A personal experience from a field training exercise in February in Northern Norway: Monday began with 35 degrees below zero and a clear sky. Tuesday emerged with 5 degrees above zero, misty and rainy, melting snow, and everything got wet. The temperature then dropped to 20 below during the next night, and on Wednesday, everything that had become wet was frozen solid. Vehicles that were parked overnight in deep, wet snow were subsequently frozen to the ground. During the final day of the exercise, drivers had to navigate slippery roads that had a frozen surface caused by melting water the previous days. The ability to master the Arctic is mandatory for military units operating under Arctic conditions. The practical matters in my example are managed by acclimatization, field training, and adapted gear and equipment, underpinned by field manuals, regulations, and technical handbooks. The role of operational-level doctrine is to guide the planning, preparations, and conducting operations with joint forces that have proven themselves capable of tactical action in Arctic conditions. Modern military experiences in the European Arctic will emphasize the need to master Arctic conditions to be able to operate as an efficient joint force in the region. Operations in the Arctic The latest wartime operations in the Arctic were conducted during the Second World War. In 1960, the US Army published The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945, Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-271 by

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Earl F. Ziemke (Ziemke, 1960). The book covers the Second World War in Norway, Finland, and the Soviet Union’s north-western area of operations. Its greatest limitation is the reliance on mainly German archives and Norwegian and Finnish official histories, in addition to German books. Despite these limitations, the book is a valuable source of Arctic warfare. The Soviet perspective is well covered by James Gebhardt classic study The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation (Gebhardt, 1990), which is based on Soviet sources and to some extent balanced against German secondary literature. These two books together will provide a comprehensive picture of modern Arctic warfare. There are several books written on the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, but only those that cover the operations around Narvik and winter conditions in Finland are relevant for Arctic operations (Dyke, 1997; Harvey, 1990; Lunde, 2017). There are several German and Austrian books about the operations and fighting both around Narvik in 1940 and in the Soviet Union and Finland from 1941 to 1944 (Kaltenegger, 2003; Ruef, 1984; Ruf, 1957; Thorban, 1989). During the Second World War, the Arctic was a strategic flank for both the Allies and Nazi Germany. The German invasion of Norway, Operation Weserübung, was both the world’s first three-service joint operation, where all services played important roles in different phases of the operation, and the first modern operation in the Arctic. The operations and actions in Northern Norway converging on Narvik were conducted in Arctic conditions varying from late winter snowstorms and mist to bright summer weather and midnight sun (Kiszely, 2017; Lunde, 2017). The Germans launched two land offensives as part of Operation Barbarossa, beginning in late June 1941, toward Murmansk and Kandalaksha on the White Sea. Both offensives grounded to a halt against mounting Soviet resistance and were to remain static until the Soviet offensives in 1944. The “Winter Battle in May” 1942 is an illustrating example of how Arctic conditions directly influenced operations. It was a Soviet attempt to break the German defenses anchored on the river Litsa. It is a very useful reminder of the unpredictability and influence of the Arctic weather on operations. In addition to their two regular divisions, the Soviets had stood up two naval infantry brigades in the Northern Fleet and transferred two ski brigades to the 14th Army, which was the land force command in area of operations. The Germans had deployed the 6th Mountain Division in strong points defenses resting on the river, even if constructing fortifications was difficult in the rocky terrain. The weather in late April was winterly, ten centigrade below zero, one meter of snow covered the ground, and large snow drifts limited all movements (Manninen, 2004, pp. 101–103, pp. 116–122; Ruef, 1984, pp. 130–136; Ziemke, 1960, pp. 223–225). The Soviets launched their offensive on 27 April with their main effort against the German’s open southern flank, supported by attacks against the front and landing naval infantry against the northern flank. A polar storm struck the area of operations on 30 April and literally froze the fighting on

NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic 93 both sides. Snow blindness and frost bite affected both sides, but the Germans had their fortifications to shield them from the elements. Counter-attacks stalled in the snow, supplies did not reach the troops, and a Soviet division to follow up the attack was not able to reach the front. On 10 May the Soviets called off the offensive, partly because of the weather but also because the upcoming thaw would make roads and terrain impassable (Kaltenegger, 2003, pp. 39–74; Manninen, 2004, pp. 105–106; Ruef, 1984, pp. 296–300; Ziemke, 1960, pp. 225–226). The Soviet Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation is still used by the Russians to discuss and argue for the uniqueness of Arctic warfare. Especially authors from the Navy and naval infantry argue for more jointness in the unique Arctic operational environment. There is also an underlying tone of service rivalries in the texts, where the uniqueness of the Arctic and the need for jointness are used by the Navy, as a junior service, to forward its unique role in the region (Bey, 2020; Kuroyedov, 2005; Simonenko, 2004). A telling observation by two Soviet corps commanders is that troops that were not trained and equipped for Arctic warfare could not be used in offensive combat. The Red Army reinforced the attacking forces just a few weeks before the offensive to prevent the Germans from noticing it, but too late for them to be properly acclimatized. This was not mid-winter, but in October, temperatures varied around zero, and there was also fog and precipitation in all forms. But even those conditions were too severe for the newcomers (Gebhardt, 1990, pp. 11–12; Mikulsky and Absalyamov, 1959, pp. 8–15). Based on these historical experiences, how can a NATO operational-level doctrine contribute to operational efficiency in the Arctic? The role of doctrine in Allied operations in the Arctic NATO’s Allied Administrative Publication AAP-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development “describes how NATO develops operational-level Allied joint doctrine” (NATO, 2019). The function of NATO doctrine is that “Allied joint doctrine enhances the interoperability of Alliance forces, and fosters initiative, creativity and conditions enabling commanders to adapt to varying and evolving circumstances” (NATO, 2019, p. 1). In regard to the Arctic, NATO doctrine should contribute to enabling adaptation to the unique conditions in the High North. Doctrine is not the only means, and AAP-47 clarifies the role NATO doctrine has in relation to other elements: “Strategy, policy, capabilities, NATO concepts, training, lessons learned, and doctrine are related, but separate, factors. It is important to understand their relationships to doctrine” (NATO, 2019, pp. 3–5). Doctrine alone will not be sufficient to prepare NATO and NATO members’ militaries for operations in the Arctic. It is therefore necessary to understand the role and purpose of doctrine considering the other factors, and how doctrine contributes to not only interoperability but also the physical ability of soldiers and units to gain an operational advantage in the Arctic.

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NATO’s main purpose with doctrine is to enhance interoperability, and the current series of doctrines will provide the general framework for Allied joint operations. The lower-level tactical publications that provide specific knowledge of the different conditions in an Arctic area of operations are instrumental to informing operational and higher tactical-level doctrine. NATO has already been publishing these publications for some time, but there is not yet any operational-level doctrine to align these publications into a coherent approach for Allied Arctic joint operations or to provide a framework for interoperability for different Allied units in Arctic conditions. NATO has for years issued the Allied Technical Publication ATP-17 Naval Arctic Manual, the latest and fifth (E) edition published in 2018 (NATO, 2018b). The manual is a thorough description of all naval elements of the Arctic but covers several land and air elements as well. It also contains some chapters with to-do lists of how to operate equipment in Arctic conditions, how to train and prepare personnel, as well as naval technical and tactical issues, such as convoying. There is also a chapter covering Arctic aviation, which provides some general aviation recommendations, even if the short chapter covers naval aviation. The initial chapters on the Arctic environment, climate, and oceanography are of interest for an operational-level doctrine to provide knowledge of the unique conditions in planning and conducting operations, especially in and near the maritime domain. AJP-3.2 Allied Doctrine for Land Operations describes the Alliances land operations in general. It then describes seven “specific land environments have significant employment considerations for land forces.” Northern Norway, NATO’s current northern flank,6 is an operations environment that includes three of the specific land environments combined; cold weather, mountainous, and riverine environments, including wide littoral waters with large islands and deep fiords. There are also some forested areas and a few minor urban centers, which are usually located at hubs for air, land, and sea communications. Any joint force will include land forces, but even air and maritime forces will encounter these specific environments that will influence both joint and single-service operations. These specific types of environments will demand units specially equipped and trained just to survive, not to mention to operate against an enemy permanently stationed in the region (NATO, 2022a). The NATO Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations (COE CWO) at Terningmoen garrison in Norway is tasked with developing NATO’s first cold weather tactical publication for land operations. It is one of a number of other studies for special operating environments (MC Land Standardization Board, 2020). The Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)—3.2.1.2—Conduct of Land Tactical Operations in Cold Weather Environment (NATO, 2023) will supplement the existing land publications for land operations in the Arctic, and “give guidance for CWO at planning level, as well as the command level of CWO-operating units, and CWO-capable units.” It will further “provide knowledge and mind-set, which will be used at planning levels, as well as for

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executing and assessing tactical activities in a cold weather environment” (NATO, 2023, p. 1). Even if the publication is land tactical, its intention is doctrinal in scope since its description of the environment is of value also for operational planning. The publication’s first chapter covers the cold-weather environment. Even if it is a cold-weather publication, the uniqueness of the Arctic region compared to other cold weather environments is highlighted throughout the publication. It is therefore a useful source to study how NATO’s doctrinal approach to joint operations in the Arctic might evolve. The first working draft was presented in December 2022, and the publication is planned to be finalized in 2023. The writing team consists of approximately 30 participants, including other NATO COEs, Air, Sea, and Special Forces, and NATO partner nations Finland and Sweden (NATO Cold Weather Centre of Excellence, 2022; Simensen, 2022). The inclusion of many participants is, on the one hand, a bit cumbersome but, on the other hand, valuable both for the quality and variety of the content and to create ownership to both process and product. The second chapter, “Fundamentals for operations in a cold weather environment,” is more detailed on CWOs relevance for NATO and lists and discusses basic principles for CWOs. These are to a large extent recognizable military principles and tenets but framed in a cold-weather environment that also include the Arctic. Since the publication is written by Norwegians, it presents of course some Norwegian national Arctic, as well as Antarctic experience: “Victory awaits him who has everything in order. Luck, people call it. Defeat is certain for him who has neglected to take the necessary precautions. Bad luck, they call it …” “The quote is said to be Roald Amundsen’s sarcastic reply to British critics, after returning from the South Pole in 1912” (NATO, 2022, p. 20). The Draft ATP-3.2.1.2 is emphasizing that it is the combination of “cold weather and/or temperature” that constitute the defining conditions for coldweather operations. Cold weather, as defined in the ATP, is present in Arctic, sub-Arctic, and temperate sub-regions. The uniqueness of the Arctic is a recurring theme, and the variations in terrain and terrain formations, which will demand great flexibility to operate from the Arctic Ocean, through littoral seascapes to alpine formations, open tundra, and when Finland joins the Alliance, deep extensive forests, and a multitude of lakes (NATO, 2023, 1). The third chapter uses joint functions as the framework for discussing “factors that need greater emphasis in a cold weather environment,” such as force employment, command and control, and intelligence (NATO, 2023, pp. 38–68). The next two chapters will supplement NATO’s AJP-3.2—Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations and ATP-3.2.1—Conduct of Land Tactical

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Operations by emphasizing how “the specific circumstances of operating in the CWE [Cold weather Environment]” must be considered when applying the procedures and principles in these documents in cold weather and Arctic conditions (NATO, 2023, pp. 69–95). These chapters describe offensive and defensive operations and tactical activities in cold-weather conditions. The purpose is to provide specific guidance to cold-weather land tactical activities within the established NATO framework. The United States and British Armies have published some cold-weather doctrinal documents. These are tactical publications, which will inform operational-level joint operations planning and conducting operations. They are comparable to the above-mentioned NATO publications but also reflect national priorities and issues. Sweden, a long-time NATO partner nation and on the doorstep to become a NATO member, has also published some of their national winter field service regulations in English (The Swedish Armed Forces, 2019; The Swedish Armed Forces, 2021). The US Army and Marine Corps published the field manual ATTP 3-97.11/ MCRP 3-35.1D Cold Region Operations in 2011 (U.S. Army, 2011). Its first chapter “Definition and characteristics of cold regions” provides a thorough description of cold-weather environments, Arctic, sub-Arctic, and temperate. It also briefly covers Full Spectrum Operations in cold regions, while most of the publication deals with individual soldiers and small units, as well as technical issues related to the effect of temperature, snow, and ice. In 2016 the US Army published the ATP 3-90.97 Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations, which is the Army’s doctrinal publication for operations in mountain warfare and cold weather operations. It provides doctrinal guidance and direction for how United States (U.S.) forces conduct mountain and cold weather operations and is to arm leaders and Soldiers with the information necessary to operate in mountain and cold weather environments. (U.S. Army, 2016) Its description of the environment is in line with the ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 3-35.1D Cold Region Operations, just structured differently and supported with more illustrations and tables, which makes it more informative. The publication’s main chapters address land operations and the challenges land operations face in mountainous and cold-weather conditions. It further discusses the different joint functions (the NATO term) and how they are influenced by the conditions covered by the publication. The publication is applicable to any service or joint function, such as intelligence or logistics, which are operating in cold weather and mountainous conditions. These also make it relevant for large parts of the Arctic land mass. The 20-14-Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations Leader’s Book (U.S. Army CALL, 2020) is on the other hand a more tactical warfare manual for mountainous and cold-weather conditions. Although it briefly mentions

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the Arctic, it is not an Arctic publication as such, but its tactical scope and in combining cold weather and mountainous issues, it will cover many relevant elements for Arctic operations. The British Army’s Doctrine Note 10/01 Cold Weather Operations’ second chapter is titled “Operational factors in cold weather operations” (British Army Head of Warfare Development, 2018). It is still about tactical functions (equals NATO’s joint function) applied to land warfare but is comprehensive in dealing with cold weather, emphasizing that “The cold should be exploited as an additional weapon.” The publication has a brief but specific introduction that includes definitions and specific description of climatic conditions in countries where British forces might deploy. That part is useful in highlighting the uniqueness of different cold-weather regions and in emphasizing the uniqueness of the Arctic (British Army Head of Warfare Development, 2018). Even though there exist many cold-weather operating manuals, they are largely tactical in nature and fail to address the operational level of command or joint operations in the Arctic. Neither the NATO nor US or British examples of Arctic/cold weather publications are directed toward the operational level of command or joint operations. But much of the information provided can be utilized to inform existing joint and operational doctrines to support planning and conduct of Allied joint operations. NATO’s aim with its doctrines is to be “sufficiently definitive to guide operations and versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations” (NATO, 2019, p. 1). A specific joint operational doctrine for Arctic operations needs therefore to be sufficiently definitive but also adaptable to fit within the scope and purpose of NATO doctrine. An operational-level Arctic doctrine must also interact with lower-level Arctic tactical and functional publications to provide the best possible knowledge base and direction for NATO forces’ preparations and operations in the Arctic. Furthermore, will a NATO operational-level Arctic doctrine be able to provide a coherent framework for development of service and functional NATO publications for operations and activities in the Arctic. Summary Given the uniqueness of both the Arctic at large, the different parts of the Arctic, and the large seasonal variations, the most valuable role of a NATO operational-level Arctic doctrine will be as a general guidance for planning and conducting operations. Strategic and operational plans will in addition be the best means to cover the uniqueness of different Arctic conditions in each case, whether Northern Norway with its fjords, alpine formations, scarce vegetation, and direct exposure to the Arctic Ocean, or the wide boreal forests and thousands of lakes in Finland. The different NATO and national tactical publications for Arctic and cold weather operations will inform both planners and trainers and assist in developing forces capable of mastering a very demanding environment to gain an upper hand over an adversary.

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Operational-level NATO doctrines, both the capstone AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine and the keystone series AJP-2 to 6, are domain-independent doctrines and not related to any specific environment. Given the large variations in geographical features, climate, weather, and light conditions, a too-specific joint operational Arctic doctrine might easily become a straightjacket instead of “versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of situations.” The different approaches to specific operating environments that the services will take might also contribute to a higher-level doctrine that dives too much into too many details, which themselves will need even more service-specific solutions. Mastering the many different Arctic conditions is a practical task that is best-taken care of by tactical forces that adapt and acclimatize themselves to the region. NATO reinforcement forces for the Arctic might have to differentiate between different parts of an Arctic area of operations, whether close to the coast or in dry inland conditions. On the other hand, a NATO agreed training level for cold weather conditions can provide a base line for rapid adaptation to any specific Arctic area. The role of an operational level doctrine will, together with defense plans and war gaming, provide the framework for adapting preparations and planning to each unique deployment or joint operation. Strategic and joint operational planning will provide direction and guidance for tactical-level training, skills development, and procurement. Joint operational doctrine might therefore be given a similar role for Arctic operations to the rest of the Alliance. The versatility of NATO joint operational doctrine and planning processes in Afghanistan is a good example of how adaptable the processes are, even if both policy and strategic direction perhaps were not tailored to the task (Johnston, 2019). But Arctic conditions are not only too demanding to be mastered without prior acclimatization and practice, but they will also kill anyone not prepared for them. A NATO joint operationallevel doctrine for Arctic operations is therefore needed to provide the Alliance with coherent operational framework for interoperability among NATO member forces that are preparing for and operating under different Arctic conditions. Notes 1 Norwegian: “holdetidsdoktrinen,” see also Stian Bones’ chapter “A Defence Dilemma and a Possible Security Dilemma. Norway, the United States and the Defense of North Norway, 1964–1981.” pp. XX. 2 While NATO’s Land Operations Doctrine (AJP-3.2) acknowledges several special operating environments, such elements are not mentioned in either the Maritime (AJP-3.1) or the Air (AJP-3.3) Operations Doctrines. 3 Concepts in this discussion equal operational concepts: “[…] proposed solutions to operational- or tactical-level problems. These concepts will be validated first through the normal concept development and experimentation process before considering the need to develop supporting doctrine” ( NATO, 2019, p. 4). 4 A volunteer nation or NATO body mandated by a tasking authority to manage and carry out a standardization task ( NATO, 2019).

NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic 99 5 The author was part of the writing team for the AJP-01 in the 2010s. The secretary for the Allied Joint Doctrine Working Group was a Swedish naval officer, even if Sweden was then just a partner nation. 6 NATO’s northern flank is about to be strengthened by the entrance of Finland and Sweden into the Alliance.

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Norwegian problems of confidence building Geopolitical exposure and military vulnerabilities in the High North Tormod Heier

Introduction Russia’s European neighbors are often forced to balance between deterrence and reassurance. Deterrence is achieved by inviting US and other NATO forces closer to its border; reassurance is achieved by keeping the same forces at an arm’s length to avoid tension. But as Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, how easy is it for Russian rim states to maintain this delicate balance? After all, the Ukraine war is Russia’s third violation of the international rule-based order in 14 years; a war that has caused immense human and material damage for generations to come. The war thereby undermines Europe’s security architecture and the institutional norms on which Russia’s neighbours rely upon. This chapter therefore discusses the following question: What are the prospects for confidence building in the High North, as seen from a Norwegian small-state perspective? Building on empirical evidence from the period 2014–2022, efforts to comprehend non-antagonist behavior are particularly important. First, because very few stakeholders in Europe and the United States want the Ukraine war to spread into other states, containing the violence therefore requires more attention to strategies aiming to preclude unintended tension. A “horizontal escalation” into other theatres, such as the Baltic or Barents Region, may otherwise end up in a new World War. Second, NATO’s response to Russian aggression has, since the 2014 Crimean annexation, by and large emphasized reassurance. Not toward Russia but toward NATO members. Reassuring NATO enemies thereby seems to be left in the dark. This has, according to politicians, academics, and defense officials on both sides of the Atlantic (Burns, 2019; Galindo, 2022; Mearsheimer, 2022), fueled Europe’s security dilemma because Russia perceives NATO as a potential threat. Third therefore, by exploring prospects for confidence building in the High North, NATO forces may expand their doctrinal knowledge on how deterrence and reassurance may be combined into a broader, more flexible, and coherent strategy. This was one of the reasons why Norway’s Prime Minister was invited to the White House in 2022, to inform the US President on how a small NATO member can have political disputes with Russia—but, according to the Norwegian Prime Minister, “… without creating insecurity or uncertainty for the neighbour” (NTB, 2022). DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-8

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Exploring non-antagonist efforts is nevertheless a daunting challenge. Signaling benign intentions toward Russia falls within the realm of reassurance, not deterrence. Rooted in Russian military weaknesses and operative needs rather than the Kremlin’s opportunism and cynicism, Western politicians and academics occasionally stigmatize scholars of reassurance as Russian apologists or Putinverstehers (see McDonald, 2022). Nevertheless, the value of exploring confidence building fits into a broader field of reassurance literature. Among the most prominent works are those of Robert Jervis’ Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma (1978), Andrew Kydd’s Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation (2000), Janice Gross Stein’s Reassurance in International Management (1991), and Shiping Tang’s A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (2010). This chapter starts by presenting a theoretical model of explanation. Thereafter, prospect for Norwegian non-antagonist behavior vis-à-vis Russia is described within a geopolitical and military context. Thereafter, the chapter analyzes Norway’s prospects for confidence building before conclusions are drawn. Theory and methods What is confidence building, and how can it be explained theoretically? Conceptually, confidence can be defined as “mutual expectation of nonantagonist behaviour.” This definition was proposed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in 1988, as the Cold War gradually ended and a similar behavior had proved successful between Western and Soviet land forces further south on the continent (Hæsken et al., 1988, pp. 5–6). More specifically, non-antagonist behavior is a collective expression for a series of measures of both political and military nature for the purpose of creating more confidence between states. … Ideally the target for such measures should be to reduce, or even eliminate, the causes for lack of confidence, fear, tension and antagonism, thereby reducing important causes for armament and risk of war. (ibid., p. 9) Theoretically, the definition is rooted in the school of defensive realism, which assumes that states are not necessarily aggressive. On the contrary, instead of claiming that states are inherently assertive and revisionist by nature and that other states therefore always must assume the worst about everyone else (Mearsheimer, 2001), states are inclined to cooperate. But only if uncertainty is reduced, i.e., by a balancing behavior seeking to maintain status quo rather than exclusive gains at the cost of your opponent (Waltz, 1979, pp. 123–128). This school of thought deviates from related concepts, such as abandonment and entrapment (Snyder 1984), because the analysis emphasizes potential adversaries rather than close allies.

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Confidence building through cooperation is nevertheless risky. For small states, a too benign approach may easily be interpreted as a sign of weakness or leniency. Confidence building may therefore have grave repercussions as assertive neighbors may induce more rather than less pressure toward your own interests (Stein, 1991, pp. 435–437). An example is Norway’s skepticism toward Soviet bilateral cooperation during the Cold War; Norway did not want a too close cooperation related to Svalbard as this could spur increased bilateral dependencies on highly unequal terms (Tamnes, 1997; Skogrand, 2004). But security interests may also be improved if performed skillfully. This is because, according to the Chinese professor Shipping Tang (2010, p. 129), reassuring your opponent may avoid security dilemmas on your doorstep. Confidence building may accumulate trust, lay foundation for more cooperation, and signal benign intentions. This strategy may also help to evaluate your opponent’s real intentions—by interpreting their reactions to your own invitations. Moreover, in the psychological sphere, important causes for armament and war are overcome because one-sided deterrent strategies often provoke rather than prevent an attack. This point is underscored by Canadian professor Janice Gross Stein (1991, s. 434), who claims that deterrence theory seldom takes misinterpretations and limited rationality into consideration. On the contrary, the American political scientist Robert Jervis (1978, p. 296) claimed that deterrence theory is developed by Americans and West Europeans; it is ethnocentric and “does not consider that people from other cultures might develop quite different analysis.” Avoiding western ethnocentrism and misperception may therefore favor strategies of reassurance. Signaling non-hostile intentions may as such become a balancing component inside a strategy that often seeks to scare adversaries (deterrence is Latin for scaring). As pointed out by Tang (2010, pp. 148–154), this can be done by words which calls for dialogue and calmness; it can also be done by military deeds, like self-imposed restraints on own forces along your neighbor’s border; or by non-military deeds, like forging cooperative efforts toward your opponent. A similar approach is proposed by the Canadian professor Janice Gross Stein (1991, pp. 432–444). Proposing four strategies of reassurance (exercise restraint, create norms of competition, make irrevocable commitments, and forge regime building), she convincingly lay the ground for mutual trust and confidence building between antagonizing powers. Theories are, however, only a simplified version of complex social interaction in the real world. As deterrence and reassurance take place in a social and political context, some relationships are emphasized while others are downplayed. Geopolitical exposure may be one such cause. It means that reassurance not necessarily succeeds if the Lilliputian is sandwiched between larger rivals competing for control and dominance in the same area. In such cases, small states may be overruled by great power rivalry outside their own doorstep. This is likely to complicate own efforts of reassurance. Aspects of military vulnerability may be another cause that often are neglected. Since the end of the Cold War, endemic shortages of military forces have become a

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well-known phenomenon among European states, which are hesitant to pay for their own defense. As tension rises in your neighborhood, absence of credible forces increases dependency on larger states. Particularly so as national situation awareness withers and control outside your borders disintegrates due to neighboring assertiveness. For smaller states that neither can nor will pay for a larger force, this may lead to outsourcing of military operations. Larger allies that need to maintain their credibility as a security guarantor may as such be more inclined to fulfil their commitments. But the larger ally may also perceive its client’s neighbor as a strategic rival. Dependency and a subsequent outsourcing of military tasks may therefore, from a small state perspective, increase strategies of deterrence rather than reassurance. For smaller states that suffer from military shortages, outsourcing may easily be interpreted as a non-friendly act by suspicious or reversionistic neighbors. This, again, may complicate small states’ efforts to install norms of non-antagonist behavior. Based on the two theoretical shortcomings above, prospects for confidence building will be analyzed along the two dimensions of Geopolitical Exposure and Military Vulnerability. Geopolitical exposure is defined as military rivalry between US and Russian forces outside the Norwegian coast. The rivalry is operationalized by scrutinizing evidence of mutual provocations and the use of a classical “tit-for-tat” logic increasing mistrust and antagonist perceptions. Military vulnerability is defined as the Lilliputian’s lack of sustainable forces required to provide situation awareness in its own area of operation. Absence of sustainable forces is operationalized even more into outsourcing in the lower end of the conflict spectrum, where US capabilities are invited in to alleviate the shortages, i.e., in the air outside Norway’s coast or on national territories. Before the analysis starts, however, Norway’s room for maneuvre must be outlined. How can prospects for non-antagonist strategies in the High North be described? Preconditions for confidence building in the Barents Sea region As explained in the previous section, Norway’s prospects for confidencebuilding measures toward Russia can be described as a function of geopolitical exposure and military deficiency. Together, the two dimensions represent external and internal perspectives delineating the Lilliputian’s confidencebuilding efforts in a post-Ukrainian security environment. The external perspective

As pointed out by the two historians Eriksen and Pharo (1997, p. 77), larger allies like the United States often exert pressure on smaller patrons if needed. That is also the case with Russia, which occasionally seeks to increase their leverage on Norway, i.e., by exercises signaling hostile attacks toward military intelligence installations, such as the US-built Globus-II radar close to

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Russia’s border (Lunde, 2018). Situated 40–120 km from some of Russia’s most sophisticated nuclear weapons, Norwegian confidence-building efforts are therefore cautiously scrutinized by defense officials in Moscow and Washington, D.C. Norway’s strategic significance implies that American and Russian authorities will have a great interest in what flavor Norwegian defense officials put on its strategies, particularly as an atmosphere of low-tension in the High North is the Centre-Left Government’s “most crucial peace project” (Regjeringen, 2022a). Russia would favor Norwegian reassurance, as this provides the Northern Fleet with longer warning time vis-à-vis US forces in the Barents Region. The United States, on the other hand, would favor a credible Norwegian deterrent posture. In that way, US forces may more easily maintain a global flexibility rather than being tied to one specific theatre (The Joint Staff, 2018, p. 14). Hence, as US and Russian forces operate in international waters outside Norway, Norway has limited influence on how military rivalry instigate fear, antagonism, and the risk of war in the Barents Sea and Norwegian Sea. As seen from a US perspective, this is particularly so because Russia’s Northern Fleet, with its submarine launched ballistic nuclear missiles, may pose an existential threat to US territory in perilous times. Every time crises occur between US and Russian forces, such as after Russia’s Crimean annexation in 2014 or the Ukraine war in 2022, questions concerning Russia’s first- and second-strike capability on the Kola Peninsula are likely to be exalted. This is due to the shortest trajectory distance between the United States and the Northern Fleet’s nine strategic submarines, which each can launch up to 10 ballistic missiles equipped with 16 nuclear warheads (Nilsen, 2021). These forces are located on the western side of the Murmansk Fjord. From sites in the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, or under the Ice Cap, the missiles’ trajectory line crosses above Spitzbergen, Greenland, and the North Atlantic toward the United States’ East Coast. Norway is therefore occasionally seen as an important early warning and listening station for US defense officials (Tamnes, 1985; 1997; Børresen et al., 2004). Containing the Northern Fleet at the Kola Peninsula will also make it easier for US and NATO forces to control the transatlantic sea lines of communication. In times of peril, these sea routes are of great importance. The risk of having Russian submarines or drones operating in the deep waters outside Norway’s coast or in the ocean gap between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom may undermine the credibility of US security guarantees to Europe. This again may weaken the collective sentiments holding NATO together in a potential stand-off with Russian forces on the Continent. As seen from a Russian perspective, the nuclear force on the Kola Peninsula has increased its strategic value after the Ukraine war. This is because Russia’s conventional forces are exposed to severe strain in Ukraine, Europe’s secondlargest state. Here, a substantial part of Russia’s forces is soaked into a quagmire consisting of approximately 43 million Ukrainian citizens and approximately 750,000 troops—Europe’s second largest army. As the war may go on for years, operations in Eastern Europe will severely undermine

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Russian reinforcement and readiness plans along its North-Western borders, particularly so as stockpiles of weaponry, ammunition, spare parts, combat support, and combat service support elements are exposed to a war of attrition. The Ukraine war thereby increases Russia’s sense of strategic and geopolitical vulnerability, making the Northern Fleet’s nuclear deterrence in the High North more precarious. The war may as such have Norwegian defense officials and force commanders grappling with a more paranoid, insecure, and isolated neighbor. Why is this so? First, because Russia’s primary rival, the United States has refocused much of its military arsenal toward the European theatre after the invasion. As of 2022, US forces possess a more credible conventional and nuclear force not seen in Europe since the end of the Cold War, leaving an already strained Russian conventional force structure under severe pressure. Second, two of the most important buffer states in Northern Europe, Sweden and Finland, have abandoned their long-term neutrality—or alliance freedom—and have joined NATO. Such a move will instantly double NATO’s borderline with Russia, thereby adding additional strain on Russia’s conventional force. Even though the World’s largest state possesses Europe’s largest force of approximately 850,000 troops, Russia’s force structure is already stretched along its western frontiers from Kaliningrad, throughout Russia’s Western Military District in the Baltic Region, toward the Kola Peninsula and Russia’s Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory. Third, the decision-making process in NATO seems to function more effectively as compared to the ambiguous situation following Russia’s hybrid takeover of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 (Heier, 2019, p. 202). NATO’s political and military cohesiveness may as such impede Russia’s long-term strategy of pitting Western states up against each other to divide the Alliance. Fourth, Russia’s war has also fueled the German Bundeswehr with economic muscle unprecedented for our time. If the 100 billion euro fund is sustained over the next ten years and Germany delivers, as promised, 2% of its GDP on defense, German forces may be more visible in the Central and Eastern European theatre, not far off Russia’s borders. In sum, Kremlin’s Ukraine war has made Russia’s national security situation more precarious, leaving the country more vulnerable than ever since the Second World War (Kim, 2022). As Russia’s geopolitical rival, the United States, increases its presence in the High North, outside the Northern Fleet’s primary area of operations, Norway is likely to be exposed to increased great power rivalry. However, prospects for a Norwegian non-antagonist behavior cannot solely be ascribed to Russian vulnerability and increased US presence in the High North. The internal perspective

Norway’s room for maneuvre, or lack of it, may also be due to Norway’s twotier strategy, which gradually emerged from the late 1990s. This is a strategy

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where Norwegian forces incrementally throughout the 2000s were exposed to two parallel theatres at the same time: One at home and one abroad (Heier, 2020). For an increasingly shrinking force, the overstretch problématique derived from this strategy was uncontroversial. At least as long as Russia seemed to partner with the West. As the Soviet Union dissolved itself in 1991, it became clear that US attention to Norwegian security concerns would decline. The new Russian regime did not pose a threat to the transatlantic security community. Instead, new wars unfolded on the continent. As former Yugoslavia collapsed into civil war in 1991, NATO’s European members still possessed approximately 1.5 million troops and more than 50,000 tanks (NATO, 2002). But Europe’s military was based on a territorially bound conscript force, unable to perform crisis management operations outside their own continent. Looking back at the 1990s, NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson claimed in the early 2000s that “mighty Europe remained a military pygmy” (ibid.). It was therefore, according to the Norwegian government, more important than ever—almost ten years after the Cold War—to transform the Armed Forces. Partly so, to address the endemic imbalance between operating costs and an oversized force structure originating from the Cold War (NOU, 2000:20; MoD, 2001, p. 12, pp. 60–61). But also, to forge a more professional force able to undertake operations abroad. In that way, Norway could contribute with its fair share in what was to become NATO’s risk- and burden-sharing abroad, operations that in hindsight were to become a long-standing engagement in allied outof-area operations. For a dependent ally on the outskirt of Europe, outside the EU, and with a shared border with Russia, this was regarded a good investment. Primarily so for safeguarding NATO’s consultancy mechanisms; but also, for keeping the United States inside NATO. A smaller but more professional force could thereby preclude the grim prospects of marginalization, not least within an Alliance that became increasingly affected by informal rather than formal decision-making processes (MoD 2004, p. 26; Heier, 2006). The American transformation program presented to NATO in 1999, the Defence Capability Initiative, should—together with NATO’s strategic concept “… constitute the overarching guidance for the national military authorities in their military planning” (Heier, 2006, p. 96). The risk of tilting the military strategy toward international operations, i.e., toward theatres on the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, in Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean, in Iraq, over Libya, and in Mali, was acceptable to Norwegian authorities. At least as long as Russia displayed benevolence toward the West. Norway’s national force would acquire valuable combat experience from operations abroad; skills and competence that were impossible to gain in arctic theatres. Thus, a more professional warrior culture would also emerge, which again underscored a more competent allied component in NATO’s defense on the northern flank. However, according to the Russian political scientist and former FSB Colonel Dimitri Trenin (2006), Russia started gradually since 2005 to “leave the Western solar system and created its own Moscow-centered system.”

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Norwegian authorities were among the first in Europe to notice Russia’s slide. In 2006, the Stoltenberg-II government initiated the so-called Core Area Initiative to “bring NATO back to its roots” from Afghanistan (Haraldstad, 2013; Gittmark, 2014). Two years later, the Cold War’s Threshold Defence Concept was re-introduced to prepare for a busier operational environment in the High North (MoD, 2008). But according to former Chief of the Defence Staff (2014–2019), Lieutenant General Erik Gustavson, the slim-manned force structure from the early 2000s was overloaded with imminent tasks related to operations abroad as well as sustaining basic peace-time activities at home (Heier, 2020, p. 441). This concern was also voiced by Chief of Operations at the Defence Staff (2015–2021), Major General Yngve Odlo, who later commanded Norway’s Joint Operative Headqurters: “As we look back at the years between 2008 and 2014, we could have been more responsive” (ibid). The operative vulnerabilities were voiced by the Chief of Defence, Admiral Haakon BruunHanssen (2013–2021) in 2014. Admitting that operative units in the Chainof-Command suffered from lack of sustainability, critical shortages would severely “affect our ability to address crisis management operations and defense against an armed attack” (Bruun-Hanssen, 2014). The rather one-sided tilt toward international operations was also echoed by the Centre-Right government in 2014, claiming that “10 years of international engagements had severely deprived the Armed Forces of national resilience and combat agility” (Søreide, 2014). According to the defense minister, the Armed Forces had “… slipped too low. The backbone in our ability to defend Norway and allies in crisis and war, with sufficient sustainability and robustness is not as solid as we would have wished” (ibid). As tension rose outside the Northern Fleet’s primary area of operations, the Centre-Right government admitted that Norwegian forces had been exposed to an unsustainable overstretch problématique: “The combination of decades with low tension at home and demanding tasks abroad has resulted in insufficient priorities regarding readiness, maintenance and logistics for combat operations” (MoD, 2008, p. 5). The tilt toward international operations, to make NATO relevant for the United States, also meant that forces at home had to be rationalized. Governmental reports showed that Norwegian forces received top grades (6 out of 6) in international operations but hardly a pass (2.5 out of 6) when it came to national operations (MoD, 2018, p. 56). According to the Chief of Defence, various governments had throughout the Millennium reduced the number of “submarines, mine vessels, corvettes, tanks and maritime patrol aircraft to the least sustainable level” with fewer capabilities left, the operative availability in Norway’s primary area of operations “… will rapidly decline to zero.” At the same time, increased Russian assertiveness put a higher demand on sustained availability and presence (Forsvaret, 2019, s. 20). Governmental demands urging operative units to maintain a parallel readiness for NATO operations abroad and national tasks at home were not possible (ibid).

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The military overstretch problématique arising from the two-tier strategy had, according to the Armed Forces, facilitated a power vacuum in Norway’s most important region. This vacuum would for sure, according to the Chief of Defence, be filled by the larger powers (Lysberg, 2019). The vacuum arose because the Norwegian Armed Forces did not have access to other forces than those available for peace-time operations; “these units could neither defend the fatherland nor contribute in NATO-operations,” the Chief of Defence claimed (Gilbrant, 2019). Prospects for confidence building Analyzing the external and internal perspectives above may indicate that Norway’s room for maneuvre is limited. How may aggregated effects from great power rivalry and military vulnerability impact Norwegian efforts of signaling benign intentions, trust accumulation, and prospects for nonantagonist behavior toward Russia? On geopolitical exposure

Using geopolitical exposure as a starting point, it seems as if US-Russian rivalry outside Norwegian territorial waters is out of bound for a small state. Norwegian strategies aiming to balance deterrence with reassurance may drown in mutual provocations and a spiraling tit-for-tat logic between US and Russian forces outside Norway’s coast. No matter what reassuring policies Norwegian defense officials may forge, confidence-building efforts may easily be subjected to US and Russian national interests. This assessment is based on three examples derived from US and Russian operations in the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea between 2018 and 2020: In October 2018, the United States’ Navy deployed USS Harry Truman on short notice to an operational area North of the Arctic Circle in the Norwegian Sea. This was the first time ever a US Carrier Strike Group (CSG) operated that close to Russia’s Northern Fleet; CSG operations during the Cold War normally ended further south, in the Westfjorden south of Lofoten. Outside the region’s largest city of Tromsø, Harry Truman was tasked to protect Norway’s northern flank while its joint operative headquarter commanded the Trident Juncture further South, in what was NATO’s largest exercise since the Cold War. While NATO forces embarked toward mid-Norway, not far from pre-positioned stockpiles of US warfighting material in Trøndelag, Norwegian forces that normally operated in North-Norway provided Host Nation Support to the allied landing further South. Filling the vacuum in the North, aircrafts from the CSG performed joint operations with land forces from the US Marine Corps, thereby displaying a protective Northern Screen toward plausible adversaries that could attack from positions further North, in the Barents Sea. The unexpected deployment of USS Harry Truman was anchored in the 2018 National Defense Strategy (DoD, 2018, p. 7). Based on Joint Chief of

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Staff acknowledgements from 2016, indicating that US forces were about to lose its competitive edge (Rodihan et al., 2021, p. 3), the unexpected deployment was the first effort to put the new Dynamic Force Employment into practice. More importantly for this analysis, “Northern Europe had been the focal point for the United States to test it and other concepts in the practice of developing a global strategy and posture suited to a more agile model” (ibid., p. 10). On board Harry Truman, NATO’s Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, explained to the media that US authorities did not want to announce when and where such a powerful instrument would deploy (Holmes, 2018). Such announcements would, according to the US strategy, visualize a more predictable pattern and thereby be less frightening as seen from a Russian perspective. The key point is to set the adversary into a dilemma, “to generate uncertainty” and “impact adversary thinking” (Rodihan et al., p. 4, 9; DoD, 2017, p. 7). The unprecedented CSG deployment nevertheless led to unprecedented Russian responses. Two weeks later, Russian aviation authorities declared a socalled Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) to its Norwegian counterpart, Avinor. The Northern Fleet would conduct missile testing on three sites in the Norwegian Sea, outside the cities of Ålesund, Kristiansund, and Molde (Lysberg and Tallaksen, 2018). The missile sites were neatly located around the Norwegian oil and gas fields named Kristin, Heidrun, and Norne. Norway’s role as a strategic and predictable energy supplier to Europe was thereby put under pressure. Russia’s missile test sites were also placed in the centre of NATO’s naval embarkment corridor during the Trident Juncture exercise. Russian sources have so far declined to explain why the NOTAM was announced. Even though the missile tests were cancelled, the timing, placing, and type of exercise nevertheless indicate a plausible tit-for-tat logic, as Russia got provoked by the unprecedented and highly unexpected CSG deployment. The Russian NOTAM nevertheless provoked the United States Navy’s top officer in Europe. In May 2020, Admiral James Foggo III, who commanded the Trident Juncture, deployed a Naval Battle Group with five vessels from the US Six’ Fleet close to the Northern Fleet’s second-strike capability in the Murmansk fjord (Nilsen, 2020a). Narrated as a “maritime security operation,” the deployment was, according to Foggo, to retaliate for the unfriendly and provocative Russian NOTAM set up during Trident Juncture in 2018 (McCarthy, 2021; U.S. 6th Fleet, 2020). The operation resonates with the operative guidelines codified in the National Defense Strategy’s doctrine of “calculated risk-taking” (DoD, 2018, p. 7). The operation also underscores the principles of agility, tempo, and surprise—in a combined effort to challenge an adversary’s calculus (Rodihan and Fairbanks, 2021, p. 17). According to Norway’s Commander of Joint Operative Headquarters, Lieutenant General Rune Jakobsen, Norwegian forces did not want to participate in such operations: “If we participate with U.S. forces outside Russia’s nuclear bases, it will increase the tension … The Russians will see this as a pure provocation” (Johnsen and Lech, 2020).

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The empirical evidence from 2018 to 2020 indicates that Norwegian efforts of reassuring Russia are complicated by its geopolitical exposure. As US and Russian forces see each other as strategic rivals, deterrence and great power rivalry are likely to dominate over Norwegian confidence-building efforts. Reassurance toward Russia, as part of Norway’s “most important peace project” (Regjeringen, 2022a), may therefore be seen as less credible, as seen from Russia. The Russian perception is, however, also influenced by Norwegian decisions; as Russia became more assertive since 2006, Norwegian defense authorities have actively tried to tie US forces closer to Norway, partly by lobbying for NATO to arrange its Trident Juncture exercise in Norway, and by deploying a frigate deep into Russia’s economic zone in September 2020 as part of yet another US-led Naval Battle Group (Nilsen, 2020b). On military vulnerability

Using military vulnerability as an analytical starting point, prospects for confidence-building efforts may seem ambiguous. On the one hand, it can be claimed that Norwegian forces have been more intimately tied to US strategies in the High North. This is not necessarily due to geopolitical exposure or great power rivalry only. It may also be due to shortcomings within the Armed Forces. Lack of submarines, frigates, corvettes, combat forces, and maritime patrol aircrafts, as well as a robust support and combat support framework with adequate manning, means that Norwegian visibility and presence in the High North are unattainable. Shortcomings thereby stir increased US dependency due to a dire need for more military support in the sensitive border areas toward Russia. This may increase prospects for credible deterrence toward Russia. But it may also be harder to forge a credible reassurance strategy. Partly, because Russian forces are likely to be on a higher alert due to own vulnerabilities following the Ukraine war. Partly also, because Norway is inviting Russia’s primary rival closer to their second-strike capability, as visualized in the Norwegian 2020Defence Concept (MoD, 2020, p. 24): bilateral reinforcement plans with US forces have become more precarious in crisis and conflict. The empirical evidence is found by two so-called “agreed areas” at Evenes Air Base and Ramsund Naval Base, which allows US forces to operate more sustained in the Barents Sea region (Edvardsen, 2022a). The “agreed areas,” as codified in the Supplementary Defence Cooperation Agreement (Regjeringen, 2021), are thus underpinned by enhanced military infrastructure at Tønsnes, outside Tromsø, where US submarines may resupply to sustain their presence and agility in the Barents Sea (Edvardsen, 2022b). The increased US submarine activity out of North-Norway is thereby consistent with the 2018 operational pattern presented by Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, claiming the numbers of US and other allied submarines had quadrupled over the past years (Selnes et al., 2018). In 2018, there were three to four submarines each month operating out of North-Norway toward Russia (Nilsen, 2018). The year before,

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more than 8,000 allied forces, including special forces from the United States and United Kingdom, exercised in Finnmark, Norway’s northernmost county (Nilsen, 2017). Evidence of military vulnerabilities and US dependency is primarily gained from military rather than governmental sources. In 2015, the report Chief of Defence’s Military Advice 2015 claimed that parts of the Armed Forces are already now reduced to a critically low level. Further reductions are neither operative responsible nor economically beneficial … The risk of downsizing the operative first-line of defence is real. The risk can, however, be compensated by allowing allies to compensate for our shortages … Short strategic warning-time will require a daily presence of allied forces on Norwegian soil, or access to airborne reinforcements that can influence the front-line on short notice. (Forsvaret, 2015, p. 72) Allied dependency materialized two years later, as combat forces from the United States’ Marine Corps ensued a permanent presence with six months rotational deployments to Mid- and North-Norway. Operating on Norwegian soil in peace-time, from 2017 to 2020, the small size and tactical posture of the Marines did not pose a direct threat to Russia’s strategic fleet. Norwegian defense officials claimed US forces had to relearn cold weather training after years in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is a valid argument but does not necessarily address the strategic context. The presence may also indicate that Norwegian shortcomings within the land component made it impossible for Norway to operate even at the lowest level in the conflict spectrum, i.e., by addressing national episodes, incidents, and minor crisis alone. As tension rose after Russia’s Crimean-Annexation in 2014, increased US presence became more pressing: “Norway depends upon operative cooperation and committing bilateral agreements in order to attain necessary support in crisis and conflict” (MoD [Ministry of Defence] 2020, p. 24). The political explanation is consistent with the military advice provided by the Chief of Defence in 2019. According to the Chief of Defence’s Military Advice 2019, and consistent with the 2015 report noted above, critical shortages necessitated more allied presence: Portraying non-antagonist intentions toward Russia while also compensate for own deficiencies by allowing the rival access to base facilities closer to Russia is difficult to reconcile. Military vulnerabilities thereby make a consistent confidence building approach toward Russia difficult. (Forsvaret, 2019, pp. 26–29) This inconsistency may also be evident within the Norwegian Air Forces. Difficulties in sustaining a detailed and updated situation awareness by means of the old Norwegian Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), particularly during

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search operations for Russia’s submarines, may have made MPAs from US Navy closer to Russia’s nuclear force more urgent (Bentzrød, 2018; Monrad, 2020). As far as a non-antagonist behavior is concerned, operations with US Maritime Patrol Aircrafts, which often are nicknamed “submarine hunters,” in and out of North-Norway, on the outskirts of Russia’s most important staging area for its maritime nuclear force, may be regarded as threatening, as seen from Moscow. According to Boeing, such aircrafts are equipped with precision guided anti-ship cruise missiles which can attack targets on land at sea from long distances. Coupled with Sting Ray homing torpedoes (Boeing, 2020; Advance, 2021), the US forces operating out of Norway may be, as seen from Russia, regarded as a direct threat to the Northern Fleet’s strategic submarines in a crisis. In this sense, compensating national shortcomings by facilitating a more deterrent US posture in the Barents Sea may not necessarily be consistent with non-antagonist behaviors. On the contrary, effort to reduce the underlying causes of fear, tension, and antagonism seems to be undermined by operative requirements for allied support and reinforcements from the United States. Using a constructivist model of explanation, Wilhelmsen and Gjerde explain Russia’s perception of Norway as a “… representative of NATO and the USA in the region. Indeed: Norway is NATO in the region” (Wilhelmsen and Gjerde, 2018, p. 400). On the other hand, despite operative vulnerabilities, Norwegian defense officials also try to limit Russian fear, tension, and antagonism. This is partly so by restricting the American MPAs to operate East of the 24th longitude, when flying out from Norway. This is a self-imposed regulation with long traditions dating back to 1957 when US patrol aircrafts became more interested in the Northern Fleet (Klevberg, 2012, pp. 149–150). The Norwegian decision not to equip its new Poseidon MPAs with anti-ship cruise missiles may also be interpreted as a sign of non-antagonist behavior (Nordhagen, 2021, p. 45, 46). This is because such missiles may signify a more potent profile, thereby also posing a bigger threat toward Russian forces operating on a daily basis in the Barents Sea (ibid., p. 49). Hence, the absence of anti-ship missiles may also lower the risk for Russian pre-emptive strikes during a crisis (Jervis, 1978; Nordhagen, 2021, p. 45, 46). This may from a Norwegian perspective be a pertinent choice to induce trust, avoid unnecessary tension, and maintain its own forces intact during a crisis. The reassuring efforts above seem to be consistent with other strategic assessments. Despite grave vulnerabilities in terms of lacking air defense against Russian missiles (Forsvaret 2019, p. 28), the Centre-Right Government declined a 2019 US proposal to merge Norway’s frigates with its AEGIS radars, into the US missile defense system. Even though the government was a strong proponent for NATO’s Joint Ballistic Missile Defence System, system integration into a broader US system would likely undermine the strategic balance between US and Russian forces in the Barents Sea Region. The government therefore announced that “… Norway will not consider acquiring sensors or defence missiles which can participate in Nato’s missile defence system” (MoD, 2019).

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Conclusion This chapter discussed Norwegian prospects for confidence-building efforts in the High North. What conclusions can be deduced? Geostrategic exposure and military vulnerability seem to reinforce each other. This is because US-Russian rivalry coincided with operative deficiencies inside Norway’s force structure. As Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in 2022, Norwegian confidence-building efforts have been exposed to a dual pressure: externally, from two assertive powers characterizing each other as strategic rivals outside the coast of Norway; and internally, from military vulnerabilities originating from a feeble force unable to sustain a credible national presence in own areas of operations. A militarily vulnerable force that, according to the former Chief of Defence, Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen, only can execute peace-time operations has therefore made Norway more exposed to a security dilemma in its most valuable area in the High North. Lack of navy vessels, air crafts, manning, and logistics in the vast air and sea space outside Norway has increased US dependency. This dependency makes it difficult to forge a consistent nonantagonist strategy toward Russia because Russia’s foremost security challenge, the United States’ Armed Forces, is invited into Norwegian waters and airspace closer up to Russia’s border. This is not to say that non-antagonistic behavior toward Russia is impossible. On the contrary, Centre-Left as well as Centre-Right government are keeping US forces close, but still at an arm’s length, West of the 24th longitude. This is done to avoid unnecessary provocations toward Russia and thus enhance the Northern Fleet’s survivability in crisis. The Centre-Left government of 2021 also urged the United States and other allied forces to perform better coordination with Norwegian defense officials in the North “to reduce tension” vis-à-vis Russia (Hem, 2021). The previous Centre-Right Government’s 2019 decision not to integrate its own frigates into the US Missile Defence also sends a signal of benevolence toward Russia. A different choice could easily have reduced Russia’s second-strike credibility, thereby causing less rather than more stability in the Barents Sea region. References Advance (2021) Poseidon Conduct First Torpedo Test. Available from: https://www. adsadvance.co.uk/poseidon-conducts-first-torpedo-test.html?play=1 [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Bentzrød, S. (2018) Krever svar på hvorfor amerikanske overvåkningsfly flyr fra Andøya [Demands Answers Regarding Why American Surveilance Plains Flies Out of Andæya] Aftenposten, 12 June 2018. Available from: https://www.aftenposten. no/norge/i/OnJvaq/krever-svar-paa-hvorfor-amerikanske-overvaakingsfly-flyr-fraandoeya [Accessed 4 February 2022].

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Boeing (2020) P-8: A Proven Multi-Mission Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Available from: http://www.boeing.com/defense/maritime-surveillance/p-8-poseidon/index. page [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Bruun-Hanssen, H. (2014) Forsvaret ved inngangen i 2014 – status og utfordringer [The Norwegian Armed Forces at the Entrance of 2014—Status and Challenges], Speech at Oslo Militære Samfund, 13 January 2014. Burns, W. (2019) The Back Channels. A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal. New York, Hurst & Co. Børresen, J., Gjeseth, G., & Tamnes, R. (2004). Norsk forsvarshistorie. Allianseforsvar i endring. Vol. 5. Bergen: Eide forlag. DoD [Department of Defense] (2017) National Secuirty Strategy of The United States of America. Washington D.C., December. DoD [Department of Defense] (2018) Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Available from: https://dod.defense.gov/ Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Edvardsen, A. (2022a) USA Defense Agreement Allows Extensive US Authority in the North, Highnorthnews.com., 8 June 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews. com/en/new-norway-usa-defense-agreement-allows-extensive-us-authority-north [Accessed: 4 February 2023]. Edvardsen, A. (2022b) Nytt amerikansk ubåtanløp i Tromsø [New American Submarine Visit in Tromsø], Highnorthnews.com., 1 August 2022. Available from https://www.highnorthnews.com/nb/nytt-amerikansk-ubatanlop-i-tromso [Accessed 4 February 2023]. Eriksen, K. E., & Pharo, H. O. (1997) Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 1949-1965, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, Vol. V. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Forsvaret (2019) Forsvarssjefens fagmilitære råd. Oslo: Forsvarsstaben, 8 October. Galindo, G. (2022) Macron: Putin Shouldn’t be Humiliated Over ‘Historic’ Mistake, Politico, 4 June 2022. Available from: https://www.politico.eu/article/macronputin-ukraine-invasion-mistake/ [Accessed 4 February 2023]. Gilbrant, J. (2019) Forsvaret er på et minstenivå for et forsvar i fredstid [The Norwegian Armed forces Is at a Minimum Level for a Defence in Peace Time], Dagbladet, 9 October 2019. Available from: https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/ innenriks/2014/03/21/slik-jobbet-de-i-nato-kulissene/ [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Gittmark, H. (2014) Slik jobbet de i NATO-kulissene [This Is How They Worked in the Corridors of NATO], Dagsavisen, 21 March 2014. Available from: https:// www.dagsavisen.no/innenriks/slik-jobbet-de-i-nato-kulissene-1.282097. [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Hæsken, O. et al. (1988) Tillitsskapende tiltak til sjøs. FFI Rapport 5002, Kjeller, Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt. Haraldstad, M. (2013) Nærområdeinitiativet i NATO – embedsverkets rolle i utformingen av norsk sikkerhetspolitikk [NATO’s Core Area Initiative, the Role of the Bureacucracy in the Making of Norwegian Security Policy]. Master Thesis, University of Oslo. Heier T. (2006) Influence and Marginalization – Norway’s Adaptation to U.S. Transformation Efforts in NATO, 1998–2004. PhD Thesis, University of Oslo.

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Heier, T. (2019) Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends? In: Johnson, R. and J. H. Matlary, eds. The United Kingdom’s Defence After Brexit. Britain’s Alliances, Coalitions, & Partnerships. London, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 189–214. Heier, T. (2020) Norway’s Military Strategy After the Cold War: Between Demise and Revival. In: Johnson, R. and J. H. Matlary eds. Military Strategy in the Twenty-First Century. The Challenge for NATO. London: Hurst & Co., pp. 433–455. Hem, M. (2021) Diskuterte bedre koordinering for å dempe spenning i nord. [Discussed Better Coordinating to Lower Tension in the North] Available from: https:// forsvaretsforum.no/forsvarsministeren-usa-utenriks/diskuterte-bedre-koordinering-fora-dempe-spenning-i-nord/227166 [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Holmes, M (2018) Gigantskip øver på å redde Norge fra angrep. [Gigantic Ship Exersise to Secure Norway from Attack] Available from: https://www.vg.no/ nyheter/utenriks/i/L07ndJ/gigantskip-oever-paa-aa-redde-norge-fra-angrep [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Jervis, R. (1978) Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30 (2), 176–214. Johnsen, A.B. and K. Lech (2020) FOH-sjefen: Ønsker ikke allierte krigsskip og fly i Barentshavet [The Head of the Norwegian Joint Headquarters: Do Not Want Allied Warships and Airplanes in the Barents Sea] Available from: https://www.vg.no/ nyheter/innenriks/i/Jok9O7/foh-sjefen-oensker-ikke-allierte-krigsskip-og-fly-ibarentshavet [Accessed 22 November 2022]. Kim, L. (2022) Russa Isolated in Its Postimperial Phantasism. The Moscow Times, 6 June 2022. Klevberg, H. (2012) Request Tango. 333 skvadron på ubåtjakt. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Lunde, M.H. (2018) Etterretningstjenestens årlige situasjonsvurdering». [Norwegian Intelligence Service Annual Threat Assessment]. Speech in Oslo Militære Samfund. Available from: https://www.oslomilsamfund.no/foredrag-etterretningstjenestensarlige-situasjonsvurdering-3/ [Accessed 22 November 2022]. Lysberg, M. (2019) Kan miste grepet i nord [Might Loose the Grip in the North]. Klassekampen, 25 January 2019. Lysberg, M. and S. Tallaksen (2018) Russisk øvelse utenfor Møre [Russian Exersice Outside Møre] Klassekampen, 30 October 2018. McCarthy, D. (2021) Episode 54. Power and Presence: The US & the Arctic with Admiral James Foggo and Ambassador (and SECNAV) Kenneth Braithwaite. Available from: https://generalambassadorpodcast.org/054 [Accessed 16.02.2023]. McDonald, S. (2022) Russia’s War on Ukraine: Western Apologists for Vladimir Putin. The Scotsman. Available from: https://www.scotsman.com/news/opinion/ columnists/russias-war-on-ukraine-western-apologists-for-vladimir-putin-putinversteher-on-extreme-right-and-left-must-be-ignored-stewart-mcdonald-mp-3844631 [Accessed 22 November 2022]. Mearsheimer, J. (2022) The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis. The National Interest, 23 June 2022. Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, W.W. Norton. Monrad, C. (2020) Utviklingen i nordområdene påtvinger amerikanske baseløsninger i nordområdene [The Development in the High North Forces American Bases to be Established in the Region]. Vesterålen, 5 November 2020. Available from: https:// www.blv.no/utviklingen-i-nordomradene-patvinger-amerikanske-baselosninger-inorge/o/5-9-288039 [Accessed 4 February 2023].

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MoD [Ministry of Defence] (2001) Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005 [The Defence Reform in the Period 2002–2005]. St.meld.nr.45 (2000–2001), Oslo, 16 February 2001. MoD [Ministry of Defence] (2004) Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret for perioden 2005–2008 [The Continued Modernizing of the Norwegian Armed Forces for the Period 2005–2008]. St.meld.nr.42 (2003–2004), Oslo, 12 March 2004. MoD [Ministry of Defence] (2008) Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier. St.prp.nr.48. Oslo, 28 March. MoD [Ministry of Defence] (2018) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak) [White paper], Prop. 1 S (2018–2019), Oslo, 21 September 2018. MoD [Ministry of Defence] (2019) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak) [White paper], Prop. 1 S (2019–2020). Oslo, 20 November 2019. MoD [Ministry of Defence] (2020) Vilje til beredskap – evne til forsvar, [Will to Contingency – Ability to Defence]. Prop. 62 S (2019–2020), Oslo, 17 April 2020. NATO (2002) George Robertson: The Pursuit of Enhanced Defence Capabilities. Speech at the First Magazine Dinner, London, 24 January 2002. Available from: https://www. nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020124b.htm [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Nilsen, T. (2017) Norway Kicks Off Exercise in Finnmark. The Barents Observer, 3 March 2017. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2017/ 03/norway-kicks-exercise-finnmark [Accessed 4 February 2023]. Nilsen, T. (2018) Nuclear Submarines Inshore Norway 3 to 4 Times Monthly. The Barents Observer, 27 January 2018. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver. com/en/security/2018/01/nuclear-submarines-inshore-norway-3-4-timesmonthly. [Accessed 4 February 2023]. Nilsen, T. (2020a) U.S. Sixth Fleet Enters the Barents Sea with Missile Defence Destroyer. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/ 05/us-sixth-fleet-enters-barents-sea [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Nilsen, T. (2021) Northern Fleet Gets Priority Receiving New Ballistic Missile Subs. Barents Observer, 15 May 2021. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/ en/security/2021/05/northern-fleet-gets-priority-receiving-new-ballistic-missilesubs [Accessed 4 February 2023]. Nilsen, T. (2020b) In a Controversial Move, Norway Sails Frigate into Russian Economic Zone Together With U.K. and U.S. Navy Ships. Available from: https:// thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/09/norwegian-frigate-sails-near-russiasfishermen-peninsula-together-uk-and-us-ships [Accessed 24 November 2022]. Nordhagen, M.N.H. (2021) Sikkerhetspolitiske implikasjoner ved antioverflatebevæpning av norske P-8 [Security Implications of Anti-surface Weapons at Norwegian P-8’s]. Master thesis, Norwegian Defence University College. NOU 2000:20 (2000) Et nytt forsvar [A New Defence], Oslo, 29 June. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2000-20/id143225/sec1 [Accessed 24 November 2022]. NRK (2018) Amerikanske eksperter: Marinesoldater på Værnes er et signal [American Experts: Marines at Værnes Is a Signal]. Available from: https://www.nrk.no/norge/ amerikanske-eksperter_-marinesoldatene-pa-vaernes-er-et-signal-til-russland-1. 13857433 [Accessed 24 November 2022]. NTB (2022) Biden fikk høre om Norges naboskap med Russland [Biden Got to Know About the Norwegian Neighbour-Relationship with Russia]. Available from: https://www.aftenbladet.no/utenriks/i/BjnOKe/biden-fikk-hoere-om-norgesnaboskap-med-russland [Accessed 24 November 2022].

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Regjeringen [The Government] (2021) Undertegning av tilleggsavtale mellom Norge og USA om forsvarssamarbeid [The Signing of the Bilateral Defence Agreement Between Norway and the USA]. Kongeleg resolusjon nr. 18/10760, Oslo 16. April 2021. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/ kglres_forsvarssamarbeid/id2845034/ [Accessed 4 February 2023]. Regjeringen [The Government] (2022a) Nordområdene., 8The High North]. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/nordomradene/id1154/ [Accessed 4 February 2023]. Rodihan, C. and M. Fairbanks (2021), Predictable Strategy and Unpredictable Operations: The implications of agility in Northern Europe. Available from: https:// issuu.com/atlanticcouncil/docs/predictable_strategy_and_unpredictable_operations [Accessed 2 September 2022]. Selnes, Ø.G., I.M. Eikelmann and I. Amundsen(2018) Endringer i trusselbildet [Changes in the Threat Scenario]. Strålevernrapport No. 10, 13 September 2018. Available from: https://www.dsa.no/publikasjon/straalevernrapport-2018-10endringer-i-trusselbildet.pdf [Accessed 4 February 2023]. Skogrand, K. (2004) Allierte i krig og fred [Alklied in War and Peace]. In: Norsk forsvarshistorie, [Norwegian defence history] vol. 4. Bergen, Eide forlag. Snyder, J. (1984) The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics, 36 (4), pp. 461–495. Søreide, I. M. E. (2014) Et åpnere forsvar – en mer bærekraftig forsvarspolitikk, [A more open defence – a more sustainable defence poicy]. Speech at Oslo Militære Samfund, 6 January 2014. https://www.oslomilsamfund.no/foredrag-et-apnereforsvar-en-mer-baerekraftig-forsvarspolitikk/ [Accessed 20 November 2022]. Stein, J. G. (1991) Reassurance in International Conflict Management. Political Science Quarterly, 106 (3), pp. 431–451. Tamnes, R. (1985) Norway’s Struggle for the Northern Flank. In: O. Riste, ed. Western Security. The Formative Years. Oslo, Universtetsforlaget, pp. 215–246. Tamnes, R. (1997) Oljealder [Oil-age]. In: Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie, vol 6. Oslo, Universitetsforlaget. Trenin, D. (2006) Russia Leaves the West. Foreign Affairs, 85 (4), pp. 85–96. The Joint Staff (2018) National Military Strategy Description. Available from: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_ National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf [Accessed 10 November 2022]. U.S. 6th Fleet (2020) U.S., U.K. Ships Operate in the Barents Sea. Available from: https://www.c6f.navy.mil/Press-Room/News/Article/2174342/us-uk-shipsoperate-in-the-barents-sea/ [Accessed 10 November 2022]. Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York, McGraw-Hill. Wilhelmsen, J. and K. Lundeby Gjerde (2018) Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination? Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 9 (1), pp. 382–407.

Section II

Strategic interests and the Arctic

8

US national strategy in the Arctic 1 David Auerswald

Introduction The Arctic has become a more important region for US strategists as climate change and renewed geopolitical competition accelerate. The recent creation of the Defense Department’s Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security, the department’s sixth and latest regional center, is but one example of the Arctic’s growing importance to the US national security community.2 That said, what themes run through US Arctic policies and to what extent is there continuity or change over time? This chapter answers that question by arguing that US Arctic policy has cycled through four large themes since the Second World War, which for the purpose of this chapter are called the cooperative Arctic, the extractive Arctic, Arctic power projection, and the Arctic fight. Each theme has had its heyday at some point in the last several years, either as part of a US national strategy for the region or in one or more military service’s strategy. Sometimes, a particular theme has been championed by one part of government while a different theme might be pushed by another government entity. And each theme’s ascendance represents ever-evolving Arctic realities as well as the outcome of a bureaucratic debate within the US government. This chapter first defines each Arctic theme in terms of its core components. Next, I review the history of US Arctic policy and explore the degree to which each theme is emphasized in specific policies. I explore three specific periods in Arctic history: the early Cold War Years, the late post-Cold War years when climate change was increasingly evident in the Arctic, and the recently emerging era of great power competition. From the end of the Second World War II through the 1950s, the United States was coming to grips with a new geopolitical reality of military, economic, and political competition with the Soviet Union. That competition affected US behavior and Arctic relations. The next period comes toward the end of the post-Cold War era in the mid-twenty-teens, when relations with the Russians and Chinese were competitive but not overtly hostile. As important, there was a widespread scientific consensus by the midtwenty-teens that climate change was real and an accelerating phenomenon with potentially dramatic implications for the Arctic (NASA, 2023). The final period covers the past three years, from 2019 to 2022, in what could be called DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-10

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the new era of great power competition, pitting China and Russia against the United States and its allies. Arctic themes I argue that the United States has emphasized four major themes in its Arctic policies. These are the cooperative, extractive, power projection, and conflictual Arctic. Each is considered in detail below. The cooperative arctic

One theme in US government policy focuses on the Arctic as a cooperative region for scientific research, soft-security policy coordination, and relatively small-scale (and often aspirational) economic development projects. The cooperative Arctic has been most strongly advocated for within the US government by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Oceans Bureau at the State Department, and the US Coast Guard. Scientific cooperation has occurred in studies on Arctic climate, glacier and permafrost melt, animal and marine migration patterns, and electromagnetic peculiarities, just to name a few areas. Multilateral scientific exchange is often coordinated through the Arctic Council and its working groups and has seen consistent progress over the last 25 years.3 The United States has valued scientific exchanges for their own sake and because no one country can understand this vast region’s changing characteristics absent collaboration. Soft-security cooperation includes subjects like maritime search and rescue responsibilities, cataloging pollution risks and mitigation strategies when pollution occurs, and shipping standards in Arctic waters. One international venue for such cooperation is the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, with representatives from each Arctic state’s coast guards.4 Soft-security cooperation has yielded international agreements on Arctic search and rescue responsibilities, oil spill protocols, and maritime operating standards, though the bulk of those agreements deal with voluntary standards rather than binding commitments (Auerswald, 2020; Atomic Heritage Foundation, 2018).5 Cooperative initiatives on economic development are motivated by poor infrastructure, lower standards of living, and bleak economic opportunities for northern and rural Alaskan residents and more generally for Arctic residents outside relatively well-established and well-resourced communities in northern Norway, Sweden, Finland, and western Russia. Economic progress in northern communities has been stymied by competing domestic priorities within Arctic nation-states, divergent attitudes toward environmental protection or economic development across the region, and because so much of the private sector’s Arctic attention is on extractive ventures rather than building sustainable local and pan-Arctic markets for goods and services. In general, then, the cooperative

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Arctic is most realized in scientific research, somewhat realized in soft-security, and less so in economic development. The extractive arctic

A second theme focuses on resource extraction. The Arctic has plentiful oil and gas deposits, minerals that include rare earth elements, and fisheries in sub-Arctic and Arctic waters. At the federal level, the US government is increasingly focused on the need for and access to rare earth mineral deposits, many of which can be found in the Arctic. In particular, southern Greenland is the target of increasing international interest for its mineral deposits, and the United States wants to minimize Chinese control of those resources in the emerging era of so-called great power competition (Auerswald, 2019). In terms of fisheries, the fear is that as Arctic ice recedes and waters warm, subArctic fish stocks will migrate north into Arctic waters. Fish trawlers will follow, leading to potential illegal or unregulated harvesting and potential damage to sustainable fisheries and Arctic ecosystems (U.S. Coast Guard, 2019, p. 34; Osthagen, 2020). That has led to a need for greater US presence in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, according to the US Coast Guard (Doyle, 2021), to protect Alaskan fisheries and US sovereignty. Not all Arctic extractive policies are made at the federal level. The State of Alaska has benefited from harvesting fish and drilling for oil and gas. The US government estimates that Alaskan fisheries produce roughly $4.5 billion per year in revenue and are a major employer in Alaskan coastal communities.6 State and federal entities share management responsibilities for Alaska’s fish stocks, including specific management plans for salmon, scallops, crab, and groundfish, which can set up competing incentives. Locals often want unconstrained harvests to boost revenue, while the federal government has at times limited harvests to protect future species viability.7 For a more detailed example of federal-state interactions on resource extraction, consider Alaskan hydrocarbons. Oil and gas revenue has supplied 80% of the State of Alaska’s general fund revenue between 1977 and 2019, according to the Alaska Oil and Gas Association.8 Oil and gas extraction has also contributed to much of Alaska’s infrastructure, particularly in the Prudhoe Bay area, down through the Fairbanks-Anchorage corridor, and into Valdez, the route of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS).9 At its peak in 1988 the TAPS carried more than two million barrels of oil per day, though volumes have decreased significantly since then, down to 478,000 barrels in 2021 (Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, 2022). Lower throughput is worrisome to Alaskan business and government. The reason is that oil must be heated to flow through the 800-mile pipeline, and it becomes very difficult to maintain appropriate temperatures with low throughput. By some estimates the pipeline needs to pump at least 300,000 barrels per day to remain viable, though others believe the TAPS can continue operating even with 200,000 barrels per day with appropriate engineering (Alaska Pipeline Service Company, 2020). Decreased

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extraction, then, puts at risk a major Alaskan infrastructure project. And that, in turn, has led to interest in offshore oil exploration by industry and State of Alaska officials. Offshore drilling is not controlled by the State of Alaska, however. The federal government controls access to offshore resources from the coast out 200 nautical miles through the US exclusive economic zone (EEZ). And the federal government has had a decidedly on-again, off-again attitude toward offshore drilling. For example, President Donald Trump’s administration proposed 19 offshore drilling leases in Alaska. President Joe Biden’s administration reversed that decision, curtailing offshore drilling leases to one site in Cook Inlet, southwest of Anchorage, rather than in the Alaskan Arctic per se (McConnaughey, 2022). Oil companies may hesitate to invest in expensive extraction projects given this regulatory uncertainty, particularly when the breakeven price of Alaskan offshore extraction is so high, between $150 and $250 per barrel by one estimate (McKinnon, 2015). Whatever the actual breakeven cost, companies would need oil prices to stay relatively high for years if not decades for there to be a return on investment, and there is no assurance of that as the world increasingly transitions to renewables. This is perhaps why Shell abandoned offshore exploration in Alaskan waters in 2015 (Ottery, 2015). And it is one reason that the US government received no viable bids for the offshore lease in Cook Inlet (Nilsen and Vazquez, 2022). Arctic power projection

A third policy theme focuses on military power projection from the Arctic into non-Arctic regions. This theme is not about fighting a war in the Arctic. Instead, this theme is about taking advantage of geography to get military assets quickly to non-Arctic conflicts. US Air Force General Billy Mitchell most famously articulated this point in 1935 when he said, “I believe that in the future, whoever controls Alaska controls the world. I think it is the most strategic place in the world” (Murkowski, 2018). The reason is that modern aircraft based in Alaska can reach almost anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere within roughly seven hours, making Alaska an ideal place from which to project national military power. Not coincidentally, the United States maintains significant numbers of advanced aircraft in Alaska for potential use in defending US allies in the Indo-Pacific and European theaters, as I discuss below. The same calculus, of being able to quickly reach anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere from Arctic locales, holds true for any Arctic nation and their planes, missiles, or naval vessels operating in Arctic waters. That puts a premium on being able to detect and defend against power projection by adversaries that might attack the United States from across the Arctic. The United States has built a series of radar networks across Alaska, Canada, and Greenland for just that reason, the most recent iteration being called the North Warning System (NWS), a series of 11 long-range and 36 short-range

US national strategy in the Arctic 127 radars built in partnership with Canada during the 1980s (Machi, 2018; The Economist, 2021; Teeple and Dean, 2021). The United States also maintains over-the-horizon, early-warning radars in Alaska and Thule, Greenland to warn of missile attacks from across the North Pole.10 Finally, the United States has stationed missile defense interceptors in Alaska to defend against North Korean attack, a system that could be potentially useful against a very small, perhaps unauthorized Russian missile launch across the pole.11 I detail examples of power projection capabilities in the policy sections below. Arctic conflict

A final theme focuses on military conflict in the Arctic itself. As we will see when reviewing specific US policies, Arctic conflict was seen as a real possibility during the Cold War. That is in contrast to the first 30 years of the postCold War era, when Arctic conflict was inconceivable for most policymakers, based on my interviews with more than 200 officials from western-oriented Arctic nations. Conflict perceptions may be changing for the worse as Arctic waters become more accessible, Russia overtly challenges the liberal international order with unpredictable and aggressive behavior, and geopolitical tensions increase between the United States, Russia, and China. Spillover from a Russia-NATO conflict outside the Arctic is the most likely cause of war in the Arctic, and the Arctic theater would likely focus on air-seacyber conflict in the Barents and Kara Seas according to my interviews with Arctic officials. The reason is that Russia’s Northern Fleet is based in the Kola Peninsula and can attack most of Europe with long-range, ship-based, or submarine-launched cruise missiles. In the event of a war between Russia and NATO, Russia might use those forces against NATO assets or to hold NATO population centers at risk in a coercive maneuver. NATO certainly would have to act as if the Northern Fleet were combatants, which would bring conflict into the Arctic. Potential spillover scenarios might include, but are not limited to, Russia’s war in Ukraine escalating into Poland, Romania, or another nearby NATO member, a Russian attack against one or more of the Baltic States, or a dispute between Russia and Norway over sovereign control of the waters around the Svalbard archipelago (Auerswald, 2015; Auerswald, 2022). An Arctic military conflict could also result from escalation of hybrid activities (i.e., aggressive use of national power below the threshold of war) (Conley and Wall, 2021) or an accident or miscalculation arising from provocative military behavior. With regard to the hybrid scenario, one could imagine a cyberattack against critical infrastructure or military systems causing a breakdown in the military chain of command and exchange of fire by frontline commanders. Hybrid activities could also lead to local instability in frontline states (e.g., Estonia, Latvia, or Finland) that tempts Russian leaders into acting opportunistically. With regard to miscalculations, Russian forces have engaged in innumerable aggressive incidents over the last several years involving close flybys of NATO planes and ships, mock bombing runs against NATO territory, and

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jamming or spoofing of global positioning systems (GPS) and maritime automatic identification systems (AIS). Any one of these actions could lead to military conflict if perceived as the beginning of an actual military attack. The evolution of US strategy in the Arctic The early Cold War years

The antecedents of today’s Arctic policies derive from as far back as a classified January 1947 State Department document titled, “United States Policy with regard to the Polar Regions” (Department of State, 1947). The document reflected the circumstances of the era. Though the Second World War was over and the United Nations had met for the first time the previous year, the new Cold War was an increasingly important driver of US policy. For example, George Kennan had sent his famous Long Telegram from Moscow, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had given his Iron Curtain speech in early 1946.12 The 1947 strategy was consistent with the growing western emphasis on containing Soviet power and the realization that containment was a longterm, perhaps generation-spanning challenge. For example, the 1947 strategy noted that “mineral resources, particularly rare minerals,”13 were a valuable Arctic asset, the subtext being that they should be denied to the Soviets and instead used to advance western technology. Perhaps more importantly, the Soviets had argued that they should control large parts of the Arctic based on the “sectoral claim” principle, essentially a sphere of influence argument for all waters north of Soviet territory. The 1947 strategy rejected those Soviet claims.14 That did not prevent the United States from trying to set up its own sphere of influence across the Arctic, from Alaska to Iceland. For example, President Harry Truman attempted to buy Greenland from the Danes in 1946 (Farzan, 2019). When his offer was rejected the United States used other means to secure access to that part of the Arctic. In the words of the 1947 document, “efforts are, therefore, being made to secure the necessary cooperation and rights from the governments controlling those areas.”15 The United States agreed to recognize the limited claims to Arctic territory from Denmark and Norway, for instance, because those claims fit with US conceptions of territorial rights and for broader geopolitical reasons.16 Recognizing Denmark’s claims was a sweetener to US military plans for Greenland (discussed below). Reaffirming Norway’s claims to the Svalbard Archipelago after the Second World War reinforced a western outpost adjacent to Russia’s Arctic maritime border. Interestingly, the 1947 US document rejected Canadian sectoral claims to waters containing the Northwest Passage (NWP).17 Were the United States to have recognized those claims, it would deny US warships unfettered access to North American Arctic waters in the Canadian archipelago and around Greenland.

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The 1947 strategy advocated building military infrastructure across the North American Arctic and into the North Atlantic, particularly airfields and communications, navigation, and weather stations.18 The United States believed then, as it does now, that it needed better domain awareness across the region. The US military built the Aircraft Control and Warning System radar constellation across Alaska between 1951 and 58, followed by the Distant Early Warning Line radars between 1954 and 59. At the same time, the Air Force and Army built a series of large military bases near Fairbanks and Anchorage to house B-36 strategic bombers and more than 200 fighter aircraft with the mission of intercepting Soviet bombers. The US Army established cold weather training facilities in Alaska and Nike-Hercules missile defense stations (Department of Interior, 2014). In Greenland, the United States received Denmark’s permission to build airfields at Thule, Sondestrom, and Marssarsuaq in the early 1950s. Camp Century followed in 1959–60, a military base intentionally buried in Greenland’s northern icepack and powered by a smallscale nuclear reactor (also under the ice). The idea was to eventually field hundreds of Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in similar ice-tunnel facilities across Greenland, an initiative known as Project Iceworm (Hauptman, 2022; Miller, 2019; Atomic Heritage Foundation, 2018).19 As this brief summary suggests, US Arctic policy in the early Cold War era was dominated by the Arctic Conflict theme, or at least the potential for Arctic conflict. A secondary theme was of an Extractive Arctic, focused on the potential for rare earth mineral deposits. The combination of themes led the Truman Administration to offer to purchase Greenland from Denmark, which, had it been successful, held the potential to advance the US ability to extract minerals and prepare for war. When that failed, the United States and Denmark reached a fallback agreement to militarize Greenland. At the same time, the United States engaged in a significant military buildup across Alaska in preparation for a possible nuclear war with the Soviets. The post-Cold War years

The first formal Arctic strategy in the modern era came from President Barack Obama.20 The May 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region appeared at a time of urgency but hope for the Arctic. The urgency came from increasingly dire warnings about the inevitability of climate change, with then-record low Arctic ice in 2012 (Lindsey, 2012). The hope was based on good working relations within the Arctic Council. Arctic Council members had just negotiated two cooperative agreements for the region, on Arctic search and rescue in 2011 and oil pollution preparedness and response in 2013. Another sign of regional progress was the peaceful settlement of the Russian-Norwegian maritime border in 2010.21 Domestically, however, there was little political consensus on the reality or urgency of climate change. The US government was also in the throes of longstanding partisan disputes over budget priorities, which meant that any Arctic strategy would be resource-constrained.22

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Internationally, the Obama administration was engaged in their so-called reset with Russia and had had some success on that front with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.23 Though Vladimir Putin resumed the Russian presidency in May 2012, he had not yet ordered the invasion and occupation of Crimea by May 2013 publication of Obama’s Arctic strategy. This, then, was the context within which the Obama strategy was written and released. The Obama administration’s desired end state was for the Arctic to remain peaceful, stable, and free of conflict. The strategy specified a series of US interests that included security, free trade, environmental protection, support for indigenous peoples, and the importance of scientific knowledge.24 Note that four of those five interests were cooperative in nature, suggesting that the administration’s thinking was consistent with the Cooperative Arctic theme. Of the three lines of effort discussed in the strategy, two of them, stewardship and international cooperation, fit squarely into a Cooperative Arctic theme. That emphasis was not surprising. Arctic environmental stewardship was consistent with the Obama administration’s broader environmental priorities and one of the focal points of Arctic Council activities. It was also a relatively easy position to take given that there was no new oil or gas extraction going on in the US Arctic at that time, at least when we consider offshore extraction. International cooperation was another administration priority. It was a centerpiece of Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy, which read, “Our closest partners and allies will remain the cornerstone of our international engagement. Yet, we will continuously expand the scope of cooperation to encompass other state partners, non-state and private actors, and international institutions.”25 That cooperative language was previewed in the 2013 Arctic strategy when it promised that the United States would “advance common objectives in a manner that protects Arctic states’ interests and resources,” a statement that included rather than excluded Russia.26 The Arctic strategy’s third line of effort, advancing security interests, did not prioritize power projection or Arctic conflict. Instead, it prioritized vague actions like altering infrastructure and capabilities to fit evolving circumstances, enhancing domain awareness, supporting freedom of navigation, and developing energy resources (including renewables). The strategy argued that the United States should, “Identify, develop and maintain the capacity and capabilities necessary to promote safety, security, and stability in the region,” and “develop, maintain, and exercise the capacity to execute Federal responsibilities in our Arctic waters, airspace, and coastal regions.”27 This does not read like an extractive, power projection or conflictual strategy, all of which would require significant capability investments. It reads like a cooperative strategy. Russia’s February 2014 invasion and eventual annexation of Crimea began to change European perceptions of Russia’s Arctic intent for the worse, though there were those on both sides of the Atlantic that believed the Arctic could remain compartmentalized from broader geopolitical trends (Auerswald, 2016, p. 359; Auerswald, 2022). The Obama administration came down on the latter

US national strategy in the Arctic 131 side of the debate, as they demonstrated in the implementation plan associated with the 2013 Arctic strategy and in the administration’s agenda for the rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015. I have reviewed and critiqued those documents elsewhere (Auerswald, 2015). Here I will focus on the president’s January 2015 executive order titled, “Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic,” as emblematic of the administration’s continued emphasis on the Cooperative Arctic theme.28 Two parts of the document demonstrated continuity in the administration’s thinking, despite newly aggressive Russian behavior. The executive order’s policy section listed US national interests in the Arctic as only slightly changed from 2013. The new document no longer mentioned indigenous peoples and free trade but emphasized national responsibilities, maritime safety, energy and economics, and the Law of the Sea. Perhaps more interesting was the creation of the Arctic Executive Steering Committee, a policy coordinating body between federal agencies and between federal, state and local, and tribal governments on Arctic issues (Rogin, 2010). The administration named the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy as the chair of the Steering Committee rather than naming someone from the national security community. In terms of Steering Committee membership, representatives from domestically oriented, non-security agencies vastly outnumbered those from the National Security Council or Defense Department. In short, the Obama administration continued to use a Cooperative Arctic theme as a guiding principle in official policy despite Russia’s more aggressive international behavior (Auerswald, 2016). Arctic great power competition 29

US policy toward the Arctic changed as competition between the United States, Russia, and China increased, particularly since 2019. US policy became increasingly focused on Arctic Power Projection and Conflict themes, with a brief flirtation with the Arctic Extraction theme during the Trump administration, as I review below. The Trump administration quickly abandoned the Obama administration’s cooperative approach to the Arctic in favor of more extractive and confrontational rhetoric. In terms of extraction, the Trump administration focused attention on Alaska and Greenland. In Alaska, the administration opened bidding on oil and gas leases in Alaska’s National Wildlife Refuge, as mentioned earlier (McCormick, Brower, and Jacobs, 2020). Receding glaciers in Greenland had the potential to (and would eventually) uncover significant rare earth mineral deposits (Marsh, 2022; Cho, 2022). The Trump administration worked to provide American companies access to those minerals rather than ceding them to Chinese state-owned companies. For instance, the United States signed a joint statement with the Nuuk government on cooperative mineral development in June 2019 (Government of Greenland, 2019). Then in a surprise move, President Trump offered to buy Greenland from

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Denmark in August (Paletta and Itkowitz, 2019). The offer was angrily rejected in Copenhagen and Nuuk (Noack and Parker, 2019). Perhaps to mend fences, the administration provided $12.1 million in development aid to Greenland in April 2020 and reopened the US consulate in Nuuk in June (Cammarata, 2020). The goal all along appears to have been extraction, or at least denying the Chinese extraction opportunities.30 Great power competition was a theme across many Trump administration initiatives at the most senior levels. The administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy began with the claim, “This National Security Strategy puts America first,” not the sort of statement that engenders cooperation (White House, 2017). The same attitude extended to Arctic regional relations, as demonstrated at the May 2019 Arctic Council ministerial meeting when thenSecretary of State Mike Pompeo said, “the region has become an arena for power and for competition. And the eight Arctic states must adapt to this new future” (Pompeo, 2019b). He argued that Russia’s attempts to unilaterally control the Northern Sea Route along the Siberian coast were, “part of a pattern of aggressive Russian behavior here in the Arctic. Its actions deserve special attention … because we know Russian territorial ambitions can turn violent” (Pompeo, 2019b). He also called out China by saying, “Chinese activity, which has caused environmental destruction in other regions, continues to concern us in the Arctic” (Pompeo, 2019b).31 This followed remarks a day earlier when he said, “China’s words and actions raise doubts about its intentions” in the Arctic (Pompeo, 2019a). Arctic strategy documents published during the last two years of the Trump administration by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Air Force, Navy, and Army took slightly less confrontational approaches, largely utilizing the Arctic Power Projection theme rather than the Arctic Conflict theme. The June 2019 OSD Arctic Strategy argued, for example, that the US military must defend the homeland and US sovereignty in the Arctic, but also shape the Arctic’s geopolitical landscape, maintain flexibility to project power, and limit Chinese and Russian malign behavior. In the strategy’s words, “The U.S. will require agile, capable and expeditionary forces with the ability to flexibly project power into and operate within the region.”32 The military services published separate Arctic strategies that gave similar emphasis to power projection capabilities. The US Air Force’s July 2020 Arctic Strategy emphasized power projection as one of its four lines of effort.33 The strategy noted, “Alaska’s unparalleled concentration of fifth generation fighters will present a highly effective power projection capability,” and allow the Air Force to reach otherwise unreachable parts of the Arctic when combined with the Air Force’s strategic airlift and refueling capabilities.34 The US Navy’s January 2021 Arctic strategy, A Blue Arctic, also focused on power projection. It began by warning that, “Peace and prosperity in the Arctic requires enhanced naval presence and partnerships.”35 The document’s title, a blue Arctic, suggested that the navy’s approach would be to focus on ice-free waters, similar to naval strategy in the Cold War. The strategy focused

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on surface ships engaging in “day-to-day competition,”36 across the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea, with submarines patrolling under the Arctic ice. Note the emphasis on power projection in the strategy’s language: “We will organize, train, and equip as a naval expeditionary force capable of operating in Arctic littorals,” and “Our forces must be unified in their preparedness to maintain sea control and project naval power in, from, and to the Arctic Region.”37 In terms of concrete actions, the navy rejected creating a separate Arctic fleet (Burgess, 2020) or acquiring ice-capable surface ships and instead focused on the North Atlantic mission with a reconstituted 2nd Fleet and NATO Joint Forces Command (Lewis, 2021). The navy also began experimenting with unmanned maritime surface and subsurface vessels for North Atlantic and Arctic operations (Trevithick, 2020). The US Army’s January 2021 strategy, Regaining Arctic Dominance, focused on the prerequisites for army power projection; namely relearning how to operate in very cold and austere environments. In terms of concrete actions, the army began conducting more extensive training in very cold conditions and recasting two heavy Striker Brigades into the 11th Airborne Division, all with the purpose of being able to project power into and across the Arctic (Baldor, 2022). As the army’s strategy document noted, “The Army will be able to project power from, within, and into the Arctic to conduct and sustain extended operations in competition, crisis, and conflict from a position of advantage.”38 All this was so that “these formations could be employed in other subarctic, extreme cold weather and mountainous environments anywhere in the world.”39 The army began testing its power projection capabilities to move troops from Alaska to Norway in exercises like 2022’s Swift Response (Judson, 2022). As of late 2022, the Biden administration had continued the US focus on the Power Projection theme, focused again on the Cooperative Arctic theme regarding western Arctic nations (but not Russia), and deemphasized the unfettered Arctic Extraction theme prized by the previous administration. The context behind the Biden administration’s thinking was, of course, Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in late February 2022. Ukraine focused Western energies on being able to project power from North America into Europe and from one part of Europe to another. The other contextual element was accelerating climate change with potentially dramatic effects on the Arctic. The main Arctic policy statement under the Biden administration was the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, released in October 2022.40 This was the first national Arctic strategy released since 2013. It largely reiterated the same desired end-state as the 2013 document, namely a peaceful Arctic that was stable, prosperous, and cooperative. The strategy listed four lines of effort, or pillars. The security pillar, the first pillar discussed in the strategy, focused on deterring international threats, deeper cooperation with allies, and showing presence.41 This was squarely in line with the administration’s broader policies in response to the Ukraine war. The environmental pillar focused on cooperative partnerships with state and local entities on improved

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resilience and with international partners on cooperative climate change mitigation and scientific initiatives.42 The economic development pillar focused on Alaskan initiatives, with mention of critical minerals, as well as coordinating with allies and partners on environmentally responsible development and transparent investment, with another mention of critical mineral extraction.43 The final pillar focused on cooperation to support international Arctic institutions and the rule of law.44 In short, the strategy’s initiatives emphasized cooperation, responsible rather than unfettered extraction, and power projection capabilities. The Biden administration took a series of actions above and beyond that document and consistent with the themes mentioned earlier. The administration prioritized international cooperation among NATO and EU members in an effort to maintain a united front against Russia. One result was that western governments banned investment and technological support for Russian oil and gas extraction, the lifeblood of the Russian economy. The non-Russian members of the Arctic Council agreed to cease all council activities that involved Russia.45 This was a major departure from the idea that the council should be compartmentalized from broader international affairs (Auerswald, 2020). The administration also provided early and full support for Sweden and Finland joining NATO, with the understanding that their membership would dramatically affect the security picture in northern Europe. The Biden administration made changes to US government decisionmaking processes related to the Arctic. These included creating a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense position for Arctic security and resilience,46 a new Arctic Ambassador position,47 and a new defense department regional research center on Arctic Security.48 The administration also reconstituted the Arctic Executive Steering Committee that had been disbanded in the Trump years. And finally, the US military accelerated training missions in the Arctic to improve their ability to project power from Alaska across the northern hemisphere (Winkle, 2022; Nilsen, 2022). Conclusion As this chapter has shown, the United States has cycled through a series of guiding principles for US Arctic policy. The cooperative policy theme focuses on international partnerships and coordinated actions. The extractive theme prioritizes resources like mining, oil and gas drilling, and fishery harvests. The power projection theme emphasizes the need for and ability to move military forces from one part of the Arctic to other Arctic and non-Arctic locales. The Arctic conflict theme involves preparations for expected military exchanges in the Arctic itself. Different US administrations have emphasized one or more of these themes depending on geopolitical circumstances and the amount of activity in the Arctic due to climate conditions. In the early Cold War period, US policy centered on preparing for Arctic combat with Soviet bombers and then on

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detecting Soviet missile launches from their Arctic sub-region. US policy also recognized the importance of rare earth minerals, though American leaders did not make that a central facet of US Arctic policy. In the late post-Cold War period, the Obama administration made international cooperation and environmental protection cornerstones of its Arctic policy. President Trump personally focused on resource extraction, senior administration officials spoke about the potential for Arctic conflict, and the military services focused on power projection. The Biden administration has once again embraced Arctic cooperation among all Arctic states except Russia. The military services have continued their focus on power projection. And though the Biden team has not embraced Arctic oil and gas extraction, they have repeatedly emphasized the need for western interests to improve their ability to mine rare earth minerals, or at least keep those minerals from China. Finally, the Biden administration seems to accept that failing to compete across the region will invite China and Russia to fill the void. In sum, then, US policy cycled through different Arctic themes, with today’s policy at least partially coming back to where it was in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. What, then, are the implications for future US policies in the Arctic? The Biden administration has focused significant attention on countering the immediate military security threat from Russia and the longer-term pacing threat from China.49 That suggests two avenues of future US Arctic policy. To counter Russia, the United States will likely continue enhancing its military power projection capabilities and expertise to deploy from, through and to the Arctic and to visibly demonstrate that capability as a deterrent to malign behavior. Expect more frequent, intense, and larger exercises and rotational deployments to the European Arctic. To counter China, expect the United States to focus on western cooperative enforcement of transparent investment standards to prevent predatory Chinese economic policy. This will be particularly the case with mining, critical infrastructure, and scientific research initiatives. Finally, expect the United States and its Arctic allies to resist calls for global governance in the Arctic as a hedge against deeper Chinese regional influence. Notes 1 Disclaimer: The views in this chapter are those of the author and not the National War College, the Department of Defense, or any other entity of the US government. 2 I discuss other developments later in this chapter. 3 The International Cooperative Engagement Program for Polar Research is another coordinating mechanism for scientific cooperation, available at: https://www.onr. navy.mil/Science-Technology/ONR-Global/Press-Releases/2020/ICE-PPRMOU. Also see Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, available at: https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1916. 4 https://www.arcticcoastguardforum.com. 5 The agreements are formally called the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (signed 2011), Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (signed 2013), and Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific

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Cooperation (signed 2017). Text of these agreements are available at https:// www.arctic-council.org/explore/work/cooperation/. A related agreement, the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), was agreed to by member states in the International Maritime Organization of the United Nations. See https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/safety/pages/polar-code.aspx. https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/region/alaska. https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/rules-and-announcements/plans-and-agreements? title=&management_area%5BAlaska%5D=Alaska&sort_by=title. See: https://www.aoga.org/state-revenue/. The US military has also been a major driver of Alaskan infrastructure. The United States has five long-range, early-warning radars in total. The other three are in California, Massachusetts, and the United Kingdom. The US Missile Defense Agency’s webpage ( https://www.mda.mil/index.html) does not mention—or exclude—specific countries in their review of the threat environment. For commentary on the effectiveness of the system, see Puzzanghera, 2022. The Long Telegram was sent on 22 February 1946 and is available at https:// nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm. Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech was given on 5 March 1946 and is available at https://www. nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/cold-war-on-file/iron-curtain-speech/. Department of State, p. 1046. Ibid. “United States Policy with regard to the Polar Regions,” p. 1045. “The claims of Norway to Spitsbergen and Bear Island, as well as to Jan Mayen, and the Danish claim to Greenland have, as noted below, been recognized by the United States.” Quoted from “United States Policy with regard to the Polar Regions,” p. 1045. “United States Policy with regard to the Polar Regions,” pp. 1044–1045. “United States Policy with regard to the Polar Regions,” p. 1045. Project Iceworm was abandoned in 1966 as too expensive, without having deployed a single ICBM. The White House, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” May 2013. The Obama strategy was preceded by a 2009 executive order by the George W. Bush administration, titled “National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) – 66: Directive on Arctic Region Policy, January 9, 2009,” and the Bill Clinton administration’s executive order “Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-26 (PDD-26).” In the author’s view, though NSPD-66 introduced many of the same initiatives that were in the Obama 2013 strategy, NSPD-66, as an executive order, was a much more inward-facing document rather than an outward-facing strategy meant for international consumption. Other initiatives, such as the creation of the Arctic Council, occurred during Clinton’s presidency. Space constraints prevent me from discussing these here. For a review, see Auerswald, 2020. The five Arctic coastal states, including the United States and Russia, had also embraced a mini-multilateralist form of regional maritime governance, as demonstrated in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, followed by a similar statement signed in Chelsea, Canada in 2010. Budget disputes culminated in the 2011 Budget Control Act which triggered 5–6% budget cuts to federal discretionary spending in early 2013 (via so-called budget sequestration). The budget impasse would continue through the year and result in a 16-day federal government shutdown in October 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-resetfact-sheet. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, p. 4, May 2013. The White House, National Security Strategy, p. 3, February 2015.

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26 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, p. 10. 27 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, p. 6. 28 The White House, “Executive Order – Enhancing Coordination of National Efforts in the Arctic,” 21 January 2015. 29 This section draws heavily from Auerswald, 2020, especially p. 267; and Auerswald, 2021. 30 Note that the administration signed the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean ( https://www.state.gov/theagreement-to-prevent-unregulated-high-seas-fisheries-in-the-central-arcticocean-enters-into-force/) in 2018, an agreement that halts commercial fishing in the high Arctic Ocean until 2027. Yet, the agreement does little to constrain existing US commercial behavior given that most fishing of US origin is done in less ice-encumbered waters within the EEZ of Arctic states. 31 Pompeo also rejected Canada’s assertion that the Northwest Passage was an internal waterway. 32 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Arctic Strategy, p. 8, June 2019. 33 The other three were vigilance, cooperation with allies and partners, and preparation for (non-lethal) Arctic operations. 34 US Air Force, Arctic Strategy, 9. When the strategy was published, the United States had 48 F-22s from the 90th and 525th Fighter Squadrons stationed at Elmendorf airbase in Anchorage and plans for 54 F-35s from the 355th and 356th Fighter Squadrons at Eilsen airbase outside of Fairbanks. 35 U.S. Navy, A Blue Arctic, 2021, p. 4. 36 Ibid. 37 A Blue Arctic, p. 13. 38 U.S. Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance, 2021, p. 22. 39 Regaining Arctic Dominance, p. 10. 40 The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy has a brief mention of the Arctic on page 44, but it reads like an abbreviated version of the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic. 41 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, p. 9. 42 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, pp. 10–11. 43 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, pp. 11–13. 44 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, pp. 13–14. 45 https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-followingrussias-invasion-of-ukraine/, and https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-limitedresumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation/. 46 https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3172196/ dod-establishes-arctic-strategy-and-global-resilience-office/. 47 https://www.state.gov/establishing-an-ambassador-at-large-for-the-arctic-region/. 48 http://tedstevensarcticcenter.org. 49 The term “pacing threat” is the current term-of-art for US-China competition. Colin Kahl, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, defined a pacing threat in the following way: “It means that China is the only country that can pose a systemic challenge to the United States in the sense of challenging us, economically, technologically, politically and militarily.” Quoted in Garamone, 2021.

References Alaska Pipeline Service Company (2020) TAPS Turns 44. Alaska Business Magazine [Internet], 26 May 2020. Available from: https://www.akbizmag.com/industry/ oil-gas/taps-turns-44/. [Accessed on 24 January 2023].

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Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (2022) Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) [Internet]. Available from: https://www.alyeska-pipe.com/trans-alaska-pipelinesystem-taps-overview/. [Accessed on 24 January 2023]. Atomic Heritage Foundation (2018) Camp Century. [Internet] 19 July 2018. Available from: https://atomicheritage.org/history/camp-century. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Auerswald, D. (2015) Geopolitical Icebergs. Proceedings, 141,12, 1, December, pp. 354–361. Auerswald, D. (2016) The High North. In Hooker, R., ed. Charting a New Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, pp. 355–375. Auerswald, D. (2019) China’s Multifaceted Arctic Strategy. War on the Rocks [Internet], 24 May. Available from: https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/chinasmultifaceted-arctic-strategy/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Auerswald, D. (2020) Arctic Narratives and Geopolitical Competition. In Weber, J., ed. Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic. Switzerland, Springer, pp. 251–269. Auerswald, D. (2021) A U.S. Security Strategy for the Arctic. War on the Rocks [Internet], 27 May. Available from: https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/a-u-ssecurity-strategy-for-the-arctic/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Auerswald, D. (2022) All Security Is Local: Arctic Defense Policies and Domain Awareness, Atlantic Council. Atlantic Council [Internet], March 2022. Available from: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/all-security-islocal-arctic-defense-policies-and-domain-awareness/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Baldor, L. (2022) Army Poised to Revamp Alaska Forces to Prep for Arctic Fight. Associated Press [Internet], 12 May. Available from: https://apnews.com/article/ russia-ukraine-alaska-weather-army-05c4bf5097a566a60b7f4c0ddb71150c. [Accessed on 24 January 2023]. Burgess, R. (2020) Admiral Cool to Notion of Separate Arctic Fleet. Seapower [Internet], August 4. Available from: https://seapowermagazine.org/admiral-coolto-notion-of-separate-arctic-fleet/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Cammarata, S. (2020) U.S. Reopens Consulate in Greenland Amid White House’s Arctic Push. Politico [Internet], 10 June. Available from: https://www.politico. com/news/2020/06/10/us-reopens-greenland-consulate-310885. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Cho, R. (2022) What Lies Beneath Melting Glaciers and Thawing Permafrost. Columbia Climate School, Columbia University [Internet], 13 September. Available from: https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2022/09/13/what-lies-beneath-meltingglaciers-and-thawing-permafrost/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Conley, H. and C. Wall (2021) Hybrid Threats in the Arctic. European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats [Internet], August 2021. Available from: https://www.hybridcoe.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/20210826_Hybrid_ CoE_Strategic_Analysis_28_Hybrid_Threats_in_the_Arctic_WEB.pdf. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Department of the Interior (2014) Cold War in Alaska. Available from: https://www. nps.gov/common/uploads/teachers/lessonplans/Cold%20War%20In%20Alaska %20Resource%20Guide_ADA508%20compliant.pdf. [Accessed 24 January 2023].

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Department of State (1947) United States Policy with regard to the Polar Regions, document #800.014/1-2747. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, volume 1. Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, pp. 1043–1049. Doyle, J. (9 August 2021) While Useful Tools, Unmanned Systems Don’t Equal Presence in the Arctic, Coast Guard Advisor Says. Seapower. Available from: https://seapowermagazine.org/while-useful-tools-unmanned-systems-dont-equalpresence-in-arctic-coast-guard-adviser-says/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Farzan, A. (2019) Trump Reportedly Wants to Buy Greenland. So Did the Truman Administration. The Washington Post [Internet], 16 August 2019. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/16/trump-greenlandpurchase-harry-truman-denmark/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Garamone, J. (2021) Official Talks DOD Policy Role in Chinese Pacing Threat, Integrated Deterrence. Department of Defense [Internet], 2 June. Available from: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2641068/ official-talks-dod-policy-role-in-chinese-pacing-threat-integrated-deterrence/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Government of Greenland (2019) Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Mineral Resource Sector Development and Governance, 4 June 2019 [Internet]. Available from: https://govmin.gl/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/MoU_Govt_ of_Greenland_USA_2019.pdf. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Hauptman, M. (2022) The Army Once Built an Underground Ice Fortress During the Cold War. Task and Purpose [Internet], 27 October 2022. Available from: https:// taskandpurpose.com/history/us-army-camp-century-greenland-cold-war/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Judson, J. (2022) US Army Looks to Address Capability Gaps as it Rebuilds Arctic Operations. Defense News [Internet], 20 June. Available from: https://www. defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/eurosatory/2022/06/20/us-army-looksto-address-capability-gaps-as-it-rebuilds-arctic-operations/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Lewis, A. (2021) Strengthen the Transatlantic Alliance. Proceedings, Vol. 147/3/1, pp. 417–421. Lindsey, R. (2012) Arctic Sea Ice: 2012 Record Low was 18% Smaller than Previous Record, Nearly 50 Percent below Average. NOAA Climate.gov [Internet], 5 December 2012. Available from: https://www.climate.gov/news-features/ featured-images/arctic-sea-ice-2012-record-low-was-18-smaller-previous-recordnearly. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Machi, V. (2018) United States, Canada Studying Options to Replace Arctic Early Warning Radars. National Defense [Internet], 27 July 2018. Available from: https:// www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/7/27/united-states-canadastudying-options-to-replace-arctic-early-warning-radars. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Marsh, R. (2022) Billionaires Are Funding a Massive Treasure Hunt in Greenland as Ice Vanishes. CNN [Internet], 8 August 2022. Available from: https://www.cnn. com/2022/08/08/world/greenland-melting-mineral-mining-climate/index. html. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. McConnaughey, J. (2022) Biden Offshore Drilling Proposal Would Allow up to 11 Sales, Including 1 in Alaska. The Associated Press [Internet], 5 July 2022. Available from: https://alaskapublic.org/2022/07/05/biden-offshore-drilling-proposalwould-allow-up-to-11-sales-including-1-in-alaska/. [Accessed 24 January 2023].

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Puzzanghera, J. (2022) After Four Decades and $200 Billion, the US Missile Defense System Is No Match for a Russian Nuclear Attack. Boston Globe [Internet], 12 March 2022. Available from: https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/03/12/nation/ after-four-decades-200-billion-us-missile-defense-system-is-no-match-russiannuclear-attack/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Rogin, J. (2010) Who’s in Charge of Arctic Policy. Foreign Policy [Internet], 7 May 2010. Available from: https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/05/07/whos-in-chargeof-arctic-policy/. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Teeple, N. and R. Dean, eds. (2021) Shielding North America: Canada’s Role in NORAD Modernization. Canada: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network. The Economist (2021) North America’s Arctic Radar Shield is Due for an Upgrade. The Economist [Internet], 31 July 2021. Available from: https://www.economist. com/the-americas/2021/07/31/north-americas-arctic-radar-shield-is-due-for-anupgrade. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. The White House (2017) National Security Strategy of the United States of America [Internet], December. Available from: https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12–18-2017-0905.pdf. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Trevithick, J. (2020) The Navy is Building a Network of Drone Submarines and Sensor Buoys in the Arctic. The Drive [Internet], 1 October. Available from: https://www. thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36821/the-navy-is-building-a-network-of-dronesubmarines-and-sensor-buoys-in-the-arctic. [Accessed on 24 January 2023]. United States Coast Guard (2019) Arctic Strategic Outlook [Internet]. Available from: https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_ 2019.pdf. [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Winkle, D. (2022) CTC on Ice: Army Holds First Arctic Brigade-level Training Rotation. Army Times [Internet], 9 March. Available from: https://www.armytimes.com/news/ your-army/2022/03/09/ctc-on-ice-army-holds-first-arctic-brigade-level-trainingrotation/. [Accessed on 24 January 2023].

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Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic Deterring Russian aggression through US-Norwegian cooperation Walter Berbrick and Lars Saunes

Introduction Preventing wars is central to US and Norwegian Maritime Strategy. This emphasis coupled with renewed Russian aggression and malign influence has generated new interests on how international maritime forces can strengthen cooperation for conventional deterrence in the current and emerging Arctic security environment. The growing trans-Arctic bond between the United States (US) and Kingdom of Norway (Norway) has made NATO stronger and more united than at any time in history. Both countries share similar priorities and are committed to each other’s defense—especially in the Arctic region. Chief among these interests are deterring Russian aggression and malign influence at and from the sea. The difficult balance for the United States and Norway centers on deterring Russia while avoiding miscalculation and unintended conflict (Berbrick et al., 2020). The geostrategic position of Norway and the United States in the Arctic, as an Arctic bridge linking Asia, Europe, and North America, the East and the West, should form the foundation of Allied efforts to deter Russian high-end military threats in the Arctic. Because it is unclear what unintended conflicts looks like operationally, this chapter analyzes the contribution of US and Norwegian naval power to deter Russian military aggression and malign influence in the Arctic and how the United States and Norway can strengthen cooperation through denial, resilience, and cost imposition actions. We address two central research questions in this study: • What is the role and contribution of US and Norwegian naval forces in integrated deterrence in the Arctic region? • How can the United States and Norway strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation between their naval services to deter Russian aggression and malign influence in the Arctic region? The high-level findings and recommendations in this chapter aim to provide a conceptual framework and initial insights for follow-on analysis by governments and researchers from the United States and Norway, especially concrete DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-11

Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic 143 actions for developing and implementing a cooperative maritime strategy for the Arctic region. This analysis is based on a review of publicly available strategy documents, defense agreements and speeches, news articles, and academic literature on recent developments in the Arctic region. Aligning US and Norwegian interests and strategy in the Arctic Norwegian interests and strategy

The Norwegian Ministry of Defense posits that the current rule-based order challenged by foreign powers threatens to marginalize the security of smaller states such as Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2020). Norway’s strategic position in the Arctic is key to US security concerns and aspirations in the region and beyond. As a maritime nation and an Arctic nation, one-third of Norway’s territory, 10% of its population, and approximately 80% of its maritime space are located within the Arctic region—corresponding to the combined land area of France, Germany, and Spain (Arctic Council, 2023). The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arctic policy blends Norwegian foreign and domestic policy in the Arctic, prioritizing defense and security, sustainable development, and strengthening international cooperation (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Østhagen underscores that increased Russian military activity and modernized capabilities in the Arctic have shifted the balance of power, renewing Norwegian defense commitments and capabilities in the region (Østhagen, 2021). Unlike the Soviet Union in the Cold War, Russia is a different and increasingly more unpredictable actor now (Trenin, 2016). Despite being a small state, Norway remains Europe’s most important energy supplier (European Commission, 2022). These developments coupled with Norway’s geostrategic location close to Russian strategic weaponry in the High North make cooperation with NATO nations more important than ever. To this end, Norway’s overall objective is to strengthen resilience and defense in the “High North” by increasing Allied support to deter Russian aggression and defend Norwegian territory and maritime infrastructure in both peace and war. The Norwegian Ministry of Defense aims to achieve this by strengthening national total defense, collective defense in NATO, and bilateral support and reinforcement (Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2020). For Norway, limited resources are a critical driving force for bilateral reinforcement agreements and cooperation with close allies. Over 70 years of defense and security cooperation between the United States and Norway underscores how basing and posture secures friends and enhances deterrence in peace (Lostumbo et al., 2013). Most notably, the 2022 US-Norwegian defense cooperation agreement calls for dual use of naval bases and airports while limiting permanent basing of foreign forces and stockpiling nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory to prevent unintended escalation by Russia (Cullen and Stormoen, 2020).

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Norway’s “High North” plays a central role in deterring and responding to conflict between NATO and Russia—mainly because of Russian strategic force deployments to the North Atlantic, Arctic, and swinging to North Pacific through the Bering Strait. This is why Russia conducts military exercises close to Norway—a reminder and warning to Norway, the United States, and NATO to keep their distance (Åtland et al., 2022). While it is in Russia’s long-term interests to keep the Arctic peaceful and stable, Oslo and Washington should consider how the Kremlin could challenge Norwegian sovereignty and test the US and Norway’s military capabilities and NATO’s cohesion in the North over the short term. Due to the geostrategic position of Norway to Russian strategic military installations, Norway’s long-term security dilemma is managing risk of horizontal escalation in the Arctic relative to major power conflict outside the region (Boulègue, 2019). Potential disputes regarding the Svalbard Treaty and gray zone sabotage to maritime infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines and undersea cables, should be prioritized. US interests and strategy

Although the concept of deterrence has been a key pillar of US and Norwegian military strategy, analysis of the contribution of naval forces to integrated deterrence as a discrete strategic concept has not been warranted until the United States released its National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2022. The NDS categorizes the threat from Russian naval forces, and by default the Russian government, as “acute,” with a keen focus on today’s operational environment. This strategy seeks to deter Moscow from attempting to forcefully revise the status quo by denying it the speed, surprise, and conventional military superiority required to achieve quick and decisive victory. The defense department prioritizes improvements to early warning and ISR capabilities, partnering with Canada to enhance North American Aerospace Defense capabilities, and working with Allies and partners to increase shared maritime domain awareness. The desired end state is a peaceful and stable Arctic region whereby internationally agreed-upon rules and norms are preserved. As Pincus and Berbrick conclude, competitors’ gray zone activities—coercive approaches that fall below the threshold for US military action—will increasingly challenge the status quo rules and norms in the Arctic region (Pincus and Berbrick, 2018). Adversaries employ state-controlled forces, cyber and space operations, and economic coercion against the United States and its Allied and partners (O’Rourke, 2022a). No one country can deter Russia alone, which is why US defense strategy centers on integrated deterrence: “using every tool at the Department’s disposal, in close collaboration with our counterparts across the US Government and with Allies and partners, to ensure that potential foes understand the folly of aggression” (Department of Defense, 2022). As Commander, US Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richards underscores,

Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic 145 “if strategic deterrence fails, no other plan or capability in DOD will work as designed” (Hudson, 2021). Practically, this means combat-credible naval forces must be prepared to fight and win together. Taken together, Norway and the United States are more closely aligned than ever before on the need to take a collective approach to deterrence in the Arctic region. This shared understanding is driven by Russia’s efforts to challenge the Alliance’s increased demonstration of resolve on NATO’s northern flank and a growing recognition in both Oslo and Washington that the United States and Norway can no longer defend the regional order by itself. While there is broad agreement that Norway and the United States should form the foundation of Allied efforts to deter Russian high-end military threats, it is unclear what this looks like operationally, especially how nonArctic countries should be integrated into defense arrangements and specific operations. The United States’ concept of “integrated deterrence” provides defense and naval leaders with a useful framework for confronting multidimensional challenges Russia poses to the Arctic region. However, the lack of persistent, credible US naval combat power in the Arctic has forced Washington to rely on non-military tools, which has weakened deterrence and increased Moscow’s confidence to preserve its national interests through acts of aggression and malign influence. From Oslo’s perspective, leveraging Norway’s strategic geography to support a robust US forward naval presence is a key contribution to deterring Russian aggression and malign influence in the Arctic region. However, US and Norwegian policy and strategy documents do not clearly identify the types of Russian activities the United States and Norway seeks to deter, nor do they define the roles and relationships of their naval forces in this framework. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underscores why credible Allied combat power remains essential in the Arctic region. The changing Russian threat environment In Russia’s 2022 Maritime Doctrine, the US and NATO are explicitly called out as the primary threat to Russia’s security and ability to sustainably develop Russia’s Arctic (Vest and Davis, 2022). The document recognizes the strategic discourse of the US to dominate the Arctic—politically, economically, and militarily—and the ways in which the US uses its influence to shape the development of international processes in the region in its favor. It further underscores US and NATO aspirations to limit Russian access to resources and critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs). At the same time, NATO military infrastructure expansion, the increase in the number of NATO exercises near Russian waters, and US and NATO aspirations to achieve overwhelming naval superiority through its navies all threaten Russia’s ability to project military power and maintain control of its SLOCs. Russia also sees various efforts by states to weaken Russian control over the Northern Sea Route and to discredit and reduce Russian maritime activity—including through enhanced presence of foreign navies in the Arctic (Todorov, 2022). Given these threats, several key

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factors underpin Russia’s rationale for making the Arctic its number one priority maritime region. These reasons include the following: • significant mineral and hydrocarbon resources, which are abundant, and they claim are in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation (Kirsanova et al., 2018); • the increasing importance of the Northern Sea Route in the world transport communications network (Liu and Kronbak, 2010); • the increasing role of the Russian Navy to ensure national defense in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (Kjellén, 2022); and • the transformation of the Arctic into a region of global competition in economic and military domains. Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine demonstrates to Allies both the will and ability of Russia to use military force and malign influence to achieve its national objectives. Finnish and Swedish NATO membership further strengthens the collective geopolitical weight of the West against the Russian Federation (Alberque and Schreer, 2022). Operationally, Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO grows Russia’s border with NATO considerably. Moscow will now need to account for the alliance’s presence along the Finnish border, including near St. Petersburg and vital Russian supply routes to the Kola Peninsula. Increased NATO military operations on, below, and above Arctic waters coupled with the potential of NATO troops and facilities in Sweden and Finland could lead Russia to believe that its access/area denial (A2/AD) defensive ring and Northern Fleet are at increased risk from Allied forces. Assuming Russia organizes its land, air, and naval forces in a layered defense, the Northern Atlantic and the Arctic will likely be home to Russian naval deployments and forward operating bases for surface-to-air missiles, coastal-artillery missiles, and fighter aircraft (Bredesen and Friis, 2022). As a result, Russia may assess its naval operations in the Arctic to be at higher risks, especially threats to Kaliningrad’s maritime connection from the North sea to the Baltic. Russia’s increased reliance on nuclear weapons following conventional military losses in Ukraine—demonstrated by Putin’s nuclear threats and exercises—could force Russia to further increase its nuclear force posture in the Arctic theater (Van Bruusgaard, 2021). With conventional forces supporting the war in Ukraine, Moscow may also be more inclined to increase their use of nonconventional tools of aggression against sea ports, undersea communication cables, and energy infrastructure at sea. This is evident by recent suspected Russian sabotage to the Nordstream pipelines and undersea cables near the Faroe and Shetlands Islands, as well as drone sightings near Norwegian oil and gas fields (Reuters, 2022; Humpert, 2022; Rauhala, 2022). In the event of crises, Russia could use hybrid tactics to disrupt, delay, and possibly deny Allied naval activity, especially in the waters around Norway. This includes jamming, sabotage, and the use of civilian shipping for irregular

Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic 147 activities, such as mine-laying and cutting undersea cables (Lokker et al., 2023). At the same time, Russia will likely continue to modernize its bastion defense and strategic nuclear forces, including new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, new ballistic missile submarines, upgraded heavy bombers, and new bombers carrying hypersonic weapons (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022). Taken together, increased sea-denial and sea-control capabilities of Russia’s Northern Fleet provide Moscow with the combat power and confidence to attack Allied territory and forces at sea (Gallagher, 2019). The Russia challenge is further compounded by a rapidly ascending Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Navy). Most concerning, and less known, are the implications of a stronger Russia-China naval partnership—characterized today by increasingly sophisticated annual exercises between the two navies—to counterbalance the United States and by extension NATO (Sheldon-Duplaix, 2022). Understanding why Moscow is enhancing its conventional and nuclear force posture in the Arctic region is critical to maintaining effective deterrence. To this end, Russia’s rationale for expanding its military combat power in the Arctic provides policymakers and planners with a starting point for developing defense planning scenarios for the region. Chief among these is the potential use of Russian military force to contest Norway’s governance of Svalbard, expand Russia’s outer boundaries of its continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, and limit freedom of navigation of foreign military vessels along Northern Sea Route. Taken together, Russia could become more assertive and aggressive with its conventional force, especially in regional conflicts (and most notably over Svalbard), thinking that its nuclear forces provide Moscow an ability to control and prevent escalation. Russia could also rely more heavily on its strategic forces to threaten nuclear escalation in order to end the conflict on favorable terms to Russian interests. In these scenarios, Russia may be more likely to use conventional capabilities to achieve its national interests, with its nuclear forces in the shadows. A framework for integrated naval deterrence The changing Russian threat environment is creating new challenges for deterrence. The nature of these changes suggests that the United States and Norway should revisit their approach to deterrence through the lenses of denial, resilience, and cost imposition or punishment. Deterrence—the threat of force intended to convince adversaries not to pursue undesired actions because the costs and risks outweigh the potential benefits—is a central principle by which the US and Norwegian naval forces have attempted to prevent conflict (Mearsheimer, 1985). Deterrence operations can take place during peacetime, in crises, and throughout conflict. As Colin Kahl, the US undersecretary of defense for policy, said, “We need to think about deterrence differently given the existing security environment, and the potential scenarios for conflict that we’re trying to deter” (Garamone, 2021). For example, in

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peacetime, US and Norwegian naval forces may seek to prevent a surprise Russian attack or deter actions that might lead to a crisis. During a crisis, their main goal of deterrence may be to prevent Russia from pursuing specific actions or operations in the maritime Arctic. In the event a crisis occurs, Russia’s initial objectives could focus on controlling escalation and setting conditions for a rapid cessation of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States, Norway, and its Allies. Nonetheless, no one-size-fits-all solution can deter Russia from every action, which is why actions should be tailored to specific acts of aggression and malign influence (Bunn, 2007). Deterrence by denial

Conventional deterrence has largely been based on “deterrence by denial”—the threat to deny an adversary or competitor the ability to achieve its military and political objectives through military aggression (Wilner et al., 2021). Persistent US-Norwegian naval presence on, below, and above Arctic waters as part of a layered maritime defense in depth complicates and reduces Russian aggression and malign influence to achieve their national objectives. During steady state, forward-postured naval forces in the region should be capable of operating in contested areas and transitioning rapidly from competition to crisis and crisis to conflict, and back again (Watts et al., 2022). Forward-postured naval forces can have deterrent effects in competition by signaling their commitment to allies, providing conventional capabilities to neutralize attempts at military intimidation, and supporting other instruments of national power. Although forward-postured forces might deter aggression and malign influence, they could increase Russia’s sense of threat, force them to operate at levels below armed conflict, and provide incentives for third parties, like non-Arctic states, to act in ways that increase the likelihood of confrontation (Huth and Russett, 1988). In competition through conflict, operating within Russia’s weapons engagement zone (WEZ) places US and Norwegian naval forces at risk but is necessary to deny Russia the ability to seize territory, hold Allied territory at risk, defend its second-strike capability, and project power to other theaters (Strauss et al., 2022). By cultivating relationships with Norway and other NATO nations, operationalizing unique enabling capabilities, and enhancing modernization efforts, US naval forces can create positional advantages to enhance freedom of action and extend operational reach into contested Arctic environments. The United States and Norway must leverage sustainment capabilities and operational enablers across each naval service and all domains to project and sustain forces in remote, cold, and dark locations in the region. To this end, Allied naval forces should adopt a more holistic approach that synchronizes national naval services’ sustainment strategies and leverages national prepositioned stocks and distribution capabilities. Sustainment is critical to enable persistent deterrence and reduce the need for rapid deterrence—to deter and dissuade Moscow to the point that hesitation to attack becomes habit.

Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic 149 There is broad agreement between Oslo and Washington that a strategy of conventional deterrence by denial must be resourced with far greater urgency (Bye, 2020). For the United States, this requires greater investments in forward basing, precision strike capabilities, fuel and munitions stockpiles, and integrated air and missile defense. Norway has a growing role to play in supporting this agenda through bilateral force posture initiatives. While growing defense budgets and an updated Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) are encouraging signs of stronger US-Norwegian relations, the extent to which the United States and Norway are willing and able to tailor and integrate their naval forces to meet NATO force requirements is less clear (Lundesgaard, 2022). Deterrence by resilience

In the context of deterring Russian aggression, resilience is the ability to anticipate and withstand a disruptive event, and to rapidly restore core functions and services in its wake, whether it be a physical or digital attack (Flanagan et al., 2019). Russian aggression and malign influence pose a direct and indirect threat to Allied critical maritime infrastructure, especially key infrastructure that enables commercial and military vessels to deploy and sustain operations in the Arctic region (Department of Homeland Security, 2022). Ports, undersea communication cables, and energy infrastructure at sea and ashore remain a target for Russia as it aims to sew divisions among Allies and compel Europe to remain reliant on Russian energy. Resilient infrastructure at sea and shore must be able to absorb, adjust, predict, and quickly overcome a possibly disruptive incident. As Allies thwart Russian attacks on critical infrastructure or quickly return to normal operating conditions after an attack, Russia would be forced to regain the initiative and set new conditions, requiring additional energy and resources toward developing new tactics and technologies. The challenge for Allies becomes deconflicting and synchronizing missions, functions, and tasks between the private sector and Allied naval forces to maximize effects, mitigate risks, and prevent gaps and unnecessary redundancy in effort. While it is not possible to prevent every threat, the United States and Norway should reorient their thinking around a risk management approach to resilience at sea. Persistent engagement between Allied industries and governments fosters mutual understanding and trust and promotes information sharing and practical exchanges. Engagements that promote planning, prioritization of resources, exercises, and training greatly contribute to their ability to anticipate and respond to Russian attacks. Such engagements also foster shared understanding of roles and responsibilities, national laws, and threats to a specific sector, as well as whether, when, and how a nation or its naval services choose to take action to protect Allied critical infrastructure at sea and shore. To facilitate collaboration and information sharing within and across critical infrastructure sectors and government agencies at different

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levels, the United States and Norway should spearhead a regional information sharing and analysis center to gather, analyze, and disseminate threat information on critical national infrastructure. Deterrence by cost imposition

Denial will likely continue to be influential, but the threat of imposing unacceptable costs in response to Russian naval aggression—“deterrence by cost imposition”—may also play an increasingly important role in the maritime-centric Arctic region. The success of cost imposition approaches rests on threatening or imposing costs with naval forces on Russia with the aim of influencing the Kremlin’s strategic calculus to attack or cease attacking. Today, the United States and Norway, along with Allies and partners, have imposed severe economic costs on Russia in response to Putin’s illegal war against Ukraine. For example, unprecedented export control measures are cutting off more than half of Russia’s high-tech imports, restricting Russia’s access to vital technological inputs, deteriorating its industrial base, and undermining Russia’s strategic ambitions to exert influence on the world stage (Graves, 2023). The Arctic maritime feature and the resulting condition of constant contact between Russian and Allied naval forces on, below, and above Arctic waters—combined with technological advances—produce an operational and strategic imperative to act persistently. As a result, states do not have a choice but to act if they want to secure their national interests in, through, and from the Arctic region. By ceding the initiative to act, Allies will always be playing catch-up. Allies are also incentivized to maintain persistent presence in competition and crises because strategic gains can be realized through operations, activities, and investments that minimize the risk—and justification—of armed attack responses. Persistent engagement among Allied naval forces operating regionally and continuously is crucial to creating operational advantage for Allies while denying the same to Russia. Persistent Allied naval engagement could strive to reduce Russia’s confidence in their naval capabilities; cause confusion and friction in their political, military, or intelligence organizations; and shift Russia’s focus and efforts to defense in the maritime Arctic. To achieve the perceived benefits of this cost-imposition approach, Oslo and Washington must establish clear political and military risk thresholds to govern alliance naval actions—conventional and nuclear—in the Arctic. Operationalizing integrated naval deterrence At the heart of the Department of the Navy’s Blue Arctic Strategy lies integrated naval deterrence—the synchronization of actions performed by naval forces of Arctic and non-Arctic states at the strategic and operational levels from day-to-day competition through conflict that aim to convince adversaries that the costs of conducting aggression and malign activity outweigh the

Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic 151 benefits (Department of the Navy, 2021). As the United States seeks to balance its naval force posture in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, it will increasingly rely on Allies and partners in Europe to serve as the frontline deterrent to military aggression and conflict in Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) Area of Operation. Naval contribution to integrated deterrence

Maritime powers including the United States and Norway have long used their navies to influence the behavior of adversaries during times of peace. The United States is one of only a handful of countries that have a so-called bluewater navy—which can operate across the open ocean—while Norway maintains a fleet for both open water and coastal missions. The power of their navies is rooted in their capacity to use or threaten force, but it also has significant diplomatic and constabulary functions. In fulfilling these missions, both their navies regularly deploy with their respective Coast Guards, which enforces maritime law and conducts search and rescue operations among other functions. American and Norwegian navies and coast guards contribute to enhancing maritime domain awareness and prosecuting illegal activity in the maritime Arctic. Coast Guards, however, focus on private commercial actors as part of a whole government approach to deter and respond to malign activities. Taken together, the United States and Norway regularly conduct naval operations—unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally—to support, reassure, deter, or threaten the use of force to discourage adversaries from acting against them and their allies and partners. In the Arctic, Norway is the strongest Allied naval power postured and ready to rapidly deploy against conventional military threats in the European and Central Arctic (Markowitz, 2020). Denying Russia its objectives through credible combat power makes Norwegian naval forces most influential in Russia’s calculations about its ability to achieve its objectives. When the balance of naval power favors Russia, deterrence is more likely to fail because the Kremlin will calculate that it can achieve success. Deterring Russia is more likely to succeed when the local naval balance favors NATO maritime forces. Demonstrating how the sea services of Norway and the United States will modernize and prepare for more access into the Arctic regions is part of the whole government approach to deterrence regarding Russia. This requires greater alignment of naval capabilities and missions and a framework for modernizing Arctic capabilities and cooperation, as depicted in Figure 9.1 (Hoffmann, 2023). Synchronizing innovation and capabilities in the maritime and defense industries of both nations can increase Alliance capabilities and capacity. This is further multiplied with basing configuration and logistic support, the common use of ISR, and other joint enablers. The naval contribution to integrated deterrence will enhance the joint combined warfighting capability and increase governance and future security cooperation in the Arctic region.

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Modernization

Joint Warfighting Capability

Industrial base

Naval integrated deterrence Enablers (ISR,Strat, Mob)

Alliance capabilities

Basing posture

Alliance capacity

Figure 9.1 A framework for integrated naval deterrence. Source: Adapted from Figure 4 of Guest Post: Dr. Frank Hoffman on “Conceptualizing Integrated Deterrence” in Lawfire, Duke University Press, 2022.

Aligning naval capabilities

US and Norwegian capabilities remain foundational to NATO’s goal to deterring Russian aggression in the Arctic region (Tamnes, 2017). Together, US and Norwegian naval forces must have the ability to communicate to potential adversaries by fielding capabilities, demonstrating readiness, and conducting visible operations that convey information about their resolve and ability to impose punishment. Building off the work of Gerson and Whiteneck, we identified 11 specific abilities that the US and NATO maritime forces could communicate to Russia that contribute to credible deterrence (Gerson and Whiteneck, 2009). If properly signaled, these abilities can influence the Kremlin’s cost/benefit analysis for using military aggression to pursue its national objectives. They include the following: • • • • • • • • • •

Prompt denial/defeat Prompt punishment Forcible entry Project and sustain power Active/passive defenses Major combat operations Fisheries enforcement Critical maritime infrastructure protection Environmental enforcement Distributed logistics at sea

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The F-35 and JSM improves Norwegian defense and deterrence by denial by contributing to situational awareness, NATO’s collective defense, and maritime operations. They also enable deterrence by punishment, contributing to improving crisis stability by raising the threshold for Russian aggression (Tørrisplass, 2018). Coast Guard operations—grounded in Arctic agreements in fisheries, oil spill response, and search and rescue and facilitated through the Arctic Coast Guard Forum—are a mission of Norway and the United States in the Arctic region. Figure 9.2 aligns these abilities by compatible national and service roles and missions in the Arctic. While these abilities are depicted in specific locations, this does not mean that other naval services of the United States and Norway are not capable of communicating these abilities in the region. This framework is an initial step in creating a balanced force that leverages the right mix of capabilities and contributions from each nation’s naval services. Moreover, the focus on conventional naval deterrence capabilities rather than air and land forces is driven largely by two distinct factors: • Naval forces can project credible combat power and maintain forwarddeployed, ready forces in competition through conflict. • Naval power is less invasive and does not require a permanent presence on land.

Norwegian Navy

US Navy

Project and sustain power

Prompt punishment Undersea Detection & Denial

Prompt denial/defeat

Mobility & Reach Forcible entry

Active/passive defenses Major combat operations Fisheries Enforcement Critical Maritime Infrastructure Protection

Distributed Logistics at Sea

Environmental Enforcement

US Coast Guard

Norwegian Coast Guard

Figure 9.2 Abilities of US and Norwegian naval forces. Source: Author’s Creation.

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Taken together, these two factors provide the United States and Norway with critical tools to assert national power and dissuade the Kremlin from using naval power to achieve its national objectives in the Arctic region. In order to successfully deter Russia, the Kremlin must believe that Norway and the United States not only have the necessary naval capabilities, but the political will to apply and integrate their forces to deny Russian leadership benefits and impose punishment. Gray argues that when it comes to credibility, “an ounce of will is worth a pound of muscle” (Gray, 1990). Similarly, Byman and Waxman have argued that will and credibility are just as important as the overall balance of forces (Byman and Waxman, 2002). Aligning naval missions

The role of maritime forces in defending NATO territory and interests rests on two pillars. First, the Alliance must have robust naval power, including US maritime forces present and ready forward in Europe. Second, the US, in concert with NATO Allies, must be able to reinforce and resupply the European continent with materiel and personnel in times of crisis or war (Breedlove, 2018). Accordingly, the foundation of a future US-Norwegian cooperative maritime strategy for deterring Russian aggression in the Arctic could be built on four key missions: • • • •

Defending Norway (and the United States) from the sea; Theater anti-submarine warfare (ASW); Securing transatlantic sea lanes of communications; and Protecting maritime infrastructure and repairing undersea cables.

Defending Allied territory from the sea

For the United States, defending forward through offensive sea power means that US naval forces, operating alongside NATO forces, must be in position for early and decisive operations (Department of the Navy, 2020). Maritime forces play a critical role in defending Allied territory. Norway is critical to denying Russia’s ability to achieve its objectives. Many scenarios could be posited, but emphasis should be placed on defending Norway and, if required, restoring the territorial integrity of Norway in the High North (Mustin, 1986). Norway’s ability to achieve this objective in the Arctic has been called into question by the rapid modernization and growth of Russian naval forces over the last decade. With this in mind, the primary objectives of NATO maritime forces in the Norwegian Sea can be delineated along four lines of effort: • • • •

deter and counter an amphibious assault on Norway; support land forces in the defense of Norway; deny Russia from using Norwegian ports; and contain and destroy the Russian fleet at sea.

Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic 155 Taken together, these four lines of effort could fall under a combination of NATO Commands, most notably Joint Forces Command Norfolk (JFCNF), and if necessary, JFCNF’s Maritime Component Commander, Striking Forces NATO, and Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM). How they work together to achieve these objectives in both peace and war requires further inquiry. NATO maritime forces could also play a critical role in defending the United States from attack, yet whether and how JFCNF achieves this mission remains to be seen. Deterring the Russian Northern Fleet—surface, subsurface, and air forces—from launching missiles is critical to defending Allied territory. This explains American investment in nine new battle-force ships and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines and why the Ford-class nuclear-powered carriers made its first transit to Europe (O’Rourke, 2022b; Austin, 2022). Deterring Russian naval forces also helps explain why Norway has invested in F-35 Aegis systems and the P-8, purchased new submarines from Germany, and is enhancing both active and passive defense systems for their basing. As Laird suggests, Norway also moved their Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) base much further North from Bodoe to Evenes while regenerating their Total Defense concept to improve the integration of civilian assets for national and allied defense efforts (Laird, 2022). Norwegian-led air defense exercises have been conducted under NATO command, integrating naval, air, and ground forces against modern adversary aircrafts and air defense systems. This is evident by inaugural exercises with US fifth-generation F-22s in Norway and the deployment of US B-1B Lancers to Ørland air base in Norway as part of their first Bomber Task Force (BTF) mission in and around the Barents Sea (Edvarsen, 2022; Durbin, 2021). Nonetheless, a war involving NATO may become a matter of national survival, and US and Norwegian decision-makers should thus keep all options open for using F-35s in defensive, tactically offensive, and strategically offensive roles. A revamped Exercise Cold Response, renamed Nordic Response, could improve a broader regional approach to air and maritime integration—including testing joint concepts and capabilities to defend F-35 bases from long-range Russian strikes launched by manned or unmanned platforms at sea. Ukraine has reportedly found a way to strike Russia’s long-range Tu-95 and Tu-22M aircraft with an astonishing 1,000-km range strike drone, threatening Moscow’s asymmetric advantage to launch cruise missiles safely from deep inside Russia itself (Harding, 2022). The employment of Ukrainian suicide drones in the air and at sea is responsible for attacking Russia’s Black Sea fleet (Maritime Executive, 2022). US-Norwegian cooperation in developing and employing naval drones—on, under, and above the surface—could serve as force multipliers for NATO forces, enable persistent and prompt intelligence collection to inform real-time decision-making, and provide a lower-cost capacity to extending weapon ranges and rapidly deploying buoys over Arctic waters (Moreira et al., 2020). Perhaps the biggest potential for defense integration with Finland and Sweden can be found in air defense, but how Norway, Finland, Sweden, and the

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United States cooperate and integrate for the defense of Norway remains to be seen (Bye, 2022). Norway must meet the NATO goal of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense. Today, Norway does not have enough ships to defend its coast and secure allied reinforcement to Northern Norway on their own (Barrie et al., 2019). As Nilsen suggests, Norway’s four Norwegian Fridtj of Nansen class frigates lack the air defense capability to protect the shooter and maritime installations (Nilsen, 2021a). To reduce this risk, the Royal Norwegian Navy has prioritized improving its offensive capabilities by ordering naval strike missile (NSM) for its frigates and corvettes and developing a solid fuel ramjet (SFRJ) vehicle with the United States to extend the range and precision of both supersonic and hypersonic weapons (United States Department of Defense, 2021). Moreover, new procurements are strategically tied to cooperation with the United States and UK, including British submarines tracking Russian submarines in the North Sea (Couzens, 2022). For example, Norway is receiving the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, Norwegian frigates have been deployed with the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, and Norwegian F-35 fighters and US B-2 bombers exercise together. Since 1981, Norway has stored Marine Corps equipment in facilities near Trondheim. The inclusion of Sweden and Finland in NATO places a premium on the integration of these capabilities as Allies look to defend Allied reinforcements at sea. Taken together, forward commitment of Allied maritime forces is critical to NATO’s defense of Norway. Strengthening maritime cooperation for the defense of Norway should be a priority for US and NATO strategy in the Arctic region. Theater ASW

The principal threat facing NATO maritime forces today is Russian submarines (Foggo and Fritz, 2016). At both the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw NATO Summits, ASW was identified as a critical focus area the Alliance must address to maintain its advantage and freedom of movement in the maritime domain (Perkins, 2018). Needless to say, Allies have let their ASW capabilities atrophy to dangerous levels (Roughhead, 2018). Russia is building and deploying more advanced and significantly quieter attack submarines and frigates armed with the long-range Kalibr cruise missiles (Alleslev, 2019). These capabilities are highly reliant on sophisticated industrial defense base and supply chain, which are not immune to global economic sanctions resulting from Russia’s war in Ukraine (Sand and Freeman, 2022). Former head of the Russian Navy, Viktor Chirkov, admitted that Russian submarine patrols have grown by 50% since 2013 (LaGrone, 2015). While recent claims of “missing” Russian submarines remain unverified, the prospects and consequences of losing track of the Severodvinsk in the Atlantic remain a real concern for US naval leaders (Sutton, 2022; Correll, 2021). Russia’s submarines provide a wide geographical coverage dilemma for NATO across many strategic locations. As Lasconjarias suggests, their first

Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic 157 strike capabilities complement existing Russian anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities situated in the Arctic and Baltic through Kaliningrad and Crimea in the Black Sea (Lasconjarias, 2019). The Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap is becoming more important and contested between Russia and NATO. Securing this area for NATO is critical in order to track and counter Russian submarines from targeting the US homeland and European continent from the Atlantic and defending US convoys reinforcing Europe during conflict. Together with P-8 maritime patrol aircrafts, ASW vessels, sea bottom sensors, and intelligence ships from the Norwegian intelligence service, the United States and Norway are partnering up with Allied forces to reduce the chances of a Russian submarine slip undetected south in the Norwegian Sea. Needless to say, the relationship between JFCNF, Striking Forces NATO, and MARCOM when executing NATO ASW missions in the Atlantic and High North deserves special attention. Equally important is the deployment of Russian submarines in the Arctic through the Bering Strait, which can hold America’s northern and western coasts at risk. Meeting competing ASW demands across SACEUR’s theater of operations requires a more deliberate, coordinated, and persistent NATO submarine force posture and an array of new antisubmarine technologies and tactics to build better situational awareness across NATO. Developing and maintaining robust fleets of manned and unmanned tactical submarines, MPAs, ASWcapable surface vessels, maritime ASW helicopters, and acoustic detection systems deserve special attention. Norway’s growing fleet of F-35s and P-8 surveillance aircraft will play a critical role in keeping track of the Russian Northern Fleet’s submarines sailing out from the Kola Peninsula to the North Atlantic—a critical priority for US and Norwegian submarines. Over the last few years, US nuclear-powered submarines have increased sailings in the north, including new allied access for resupply and crew changes at Tønsnes harbor facility just north of Tromsø (Nilsen, 2021b). While NATO works to keep up with a growing Russian fleet, it fails to acknowledge and understand its own miscalculations in the making of a growing Russo-Chinese naval partnership. As a consequence, NATO’s submarine fleet, which includes the United States and Norway, may not be optimally postured to tackle a combined Chinese and Russian submarine challenge augmented by new unmanned technologies. Norway is a leading nation regarding commercial R&D and innovation in the offshore maritime industry, many of which have demonstrated the ability to modify and turn this technology to support the Navy missions (Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2021). Sharing innovation and developing a common industrial base are essential to developing and integrating future capabilities in the underwater domain. Securing transatlantic sea lanes of communications

Sea lines are critical to the survival and prosperity of NATO Allies, and securing them is in the interests of all regional countries. Maritime forces play

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a critical role in protecting naval vessels and ports and supporting operations on land and at sea. The use of maritime forces to guarantee fuel, food, and supplies onboard civilian vessels, especially close to the littorals, should be given special attention. The addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO demands a renewed emphasis on the missions and tasks required of Allied naval forces, including establishing sea control along the Norwegian littorals and protecting the safe arrival of Allied forces in Norway in route to the Scandinavian peninsula. To this end, US and Norwegian naval leaders, in concert with Allied forces, should focus on developing new concepts and training opportunities to strengthen Allied naval cooperation to deter Russian aggression and malign influence against air and naval points of debarkation, lines of communication, logistic bases, convoy support centers, staging areas, and forward logistics sites on land and at sea. In practice, cooperative approaches should be tailored for SLOC protection, especially public-private partnerships to deal with non-ventional threats to US and Norwegian seaports. NATO’s Joint Logistics Support Group played a critical role in planning Trident Juncture in 2018, but whether and how they help sustain NATO maritime forces in conflict remains to be seen. Regional SLOC security cooperation falls under the mission of JFCNF. Norway was one of the NATO members pushing hard for the recreation of an Atlantic command that led to the Brussels Summit confirming the establishment of JFCNF that same year. In response to the rise and resurgence of the Russian Northern Fleet and their capabilities in the undersea domain, JFCNF focuses on coordinating Allied activity in the North Atlantic and High North, from seabed to space (Birkeland, 2021). The standup of US Second Fleet (2F) and Allied JFCNF occurs as allies significantly refine their operational approaches to naval deterrence and warfighting in the North Atlantic and High North. Protecting strategic lines of communication across the Atlantic, however, are not solely linked to traditional threats posed by submarines sinking surface ships but also to nonkinetic attacks on critical maritime infrastructue. Protecting critical maritime infrastructure and repairing undersea cables

Middleton and Rønning contend that undersea cables are starting to advance farther north, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans through the perilous Arctic Archipelago and supplying stable internet to Arctic port towns (Middleton and Rønning, 2022). Destroying fiber-optic cables between the United States and Europe could significantly impact the world’s economy, well beyond the threat of a single missile employed from sea (Griffiths, 2019). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine coupled with “gross sabotage” of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea has caused Norway, the United States, and NATO to reconsider the vulnerabilities of undersea infrastructure in the Arctic from potential Russian attacks (Rauhala and Francis, 2022). To this end, Russia’s large and growing fishing fleet is purposefully making large, capable trawlers and fishing vessels available to its Navy, which it could use for

Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic 159 coercive influence in contested areas along the Northern Sea Route and around the island of Svalbard (Staalesen, 2022). Many of them are active in international waters, including along the Norwegian coast. In 2022, Norwegian authorities concluded that a Russian fishing trawler most likely severed an undersea cable, limiting communication from the island of Svalbard to mainland Norway (Kirk, 2022). The use of fishing trawlers represents a clear example of how Russia could challenge the rights of coastal states and their claim on the resources of their economic exclusion zones. In the last few years, Russia has also significantly increased the employment of a fleet of special-purpose submarines and surface oceanographic vessels’ activities around undersea data cables in the North Atlantic (Sutton, 2021). Morcos and Wall found that threats from foreign powers can come in the form of “cutting off military or government communications in the early stages of a conflict, eliminating internet access for a targeted population, sabotaging an economic competitor, or causing economic disruption for geopolitical purposes” alongside “tapping [these cables] to record, copy, and steal data, which would be later collected and analyzed for espionage” (Morcos and Wall, 2021). In light of this threat and recent sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, Norway has announced efforts to increase security around vulnerable undersea fiber optic cables that are critical to the country’s oil and gas production (Treloar, 2022). Investments in new technology will help monitor key stretches of submarine fiber cable and identify potential threats. Repair is just as important as prevention. Options to repair and restore undersea cables in both peace and war are limited. First, this mission does not fall under the purview of US and Norwegian naval forces. The US government implemented the Cable Security Fleet (CSF) in 2022, providing two commercial US-flagged and crewed cable ships for repairs when activated in peacetime and wartime. Maintaining a robust and resilient repair civilian capability requires a strong industrial base, which today consists of a single US manufacturing company with the mariners and cable ships to install and maintain global submarine cable communications (Burnett, 2022). Moreover, despite the existence of both the 1884 Convention on the Protection of Submarine Cables and the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the NATO alliance has paid little attention to the legal frameworks that govern the usage of undersea cables in wartime or when damaged (Hinck, 2022). Simply put, the US and Norwegian governments, in concert with likeminded nations from Europe and Asia, must take immediate and strong action to protect and repair undersea cables. Despite national efforts, US and Norwegian governments should take more responsibility for repairing undersea infrastructure, making undersea cable defense and repairs a matter of national security, and developing a joint public-private operational plan that assigns responsibilities, allocates resources, and invests in technologies that detect and deny undersea espionage (Schadlow and Helwig, 2020). Accordingly, host nations should be responsible for protecting arrival points of embarkation and critical maritime

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infrastructure ashore. Delineating responsibilities and supported/supporting relationships among Allied governments and NATO for the protection of undersea communication cables, ports, and energy infrastructure at sea and shore requires further study. Conclusion and recommendations The forward maritime deterrence strategy of NATO and the United States was the lynchpin to ending the Cold War. Today, integrated deterrence with NATO allies and partners may be the only effective conflict prevention mechanism left in the High North. US-Norwegian naval cooperation will play a growing and essential role in integrated deterrence in the Arctic—and should serve as the foundation of US and Norwegian Arctic strategy in the years ahead. The United States and Norway are cooperating in many critical areas already, but the growing strategic significance of the Arctic increases Norway’s geostrategic importance in the European Arctic and America’s geostrategic importance in the North American Arctic. A cooperative USNorwegian maritime strategy for deterring Russian aggression in the maritime Arctic should center on denial, resilience, and cost imposition. This requires an unprecedented level of critical thinking, planning, integration, and interoperability between US and Norwegian maritime commanders, planners, and operators. Political consultations, tabletop exercises (TTXs), commandpost and live military exercises, and day-to-day operational planning all contribute to cooperation and integrated naval deterrence in competition, crisis, and conflict. Recent developments in the Arctic region and the growth of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral frameworks provide a robust foundation for enhancing defense and deterrence. Several implications for the future direction of naval cooperation between the United States and Norway require consideration: • Continue to elevate the US-Norwegian bilateral cooperation between naval services and selectively expand multilateral cooperation with different combinations of other Allies and Nordic partners, especially Germany, Sweden, Finland, France, and the UK. • Continue integrating Norwegian naval forces in the United States and UK lead carrier groups operating in the North Atlantic. • Create a NATO center of excellence for defending critical national infrastructure. • Solidify multilateral cooperation through Allied Maritime Command, Joint Force Commanders, and Striking Forces NATO, as the default mode of naval cooperation, with bilateral dialog held on an as-needed basis. • Develop a multi-year schedule for policy-level TTXs to strengthen defense relations, identify areas for enhanced naval cooperation, generate a cycle of learning, and provide practical insights to inform Allied maritime support plans.

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• Pursue additional planning opportunities in the following areas: deterring and responding to Russian fishing trawlers and covert threats in the underwater domain; protecting maritime infrastructure; undersea cable protection and repair; port security; ASW detection and control measures; naval strike missile integration; and maritime domain awareness. • Pursue common investments in ISR, communications, and logistics enablers. • Expand the US National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) to include Norway in order to support naval operations, conduct advanced R&D and systems development, secure reliable sources of critical material, and develop industrial preparedness to support operations in wartime or during a national emergency. References Arctic Council (2023) Norway. Available from: https://www.arcticcouncil.org/ about/states/norway [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Alberque, W. and B. Schreer (2022) Finland, Sweden and NATO Membership. Survival, 64 (3), pp. 67–72. Alleslev, L. (2019) NATO Anti-submarine Warfare: Rebuilding Capability, Preparing for the Future. Science and Technology Committee (STC). Åtland, K., T. Nilsen and T. Pedersen (2022) Military Muscle-Flexing as Interstate Communication: Russian NOTAM Warnings off the Coast of Norway, 2015–2021. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). Austin, L. (2022) The Decisive Decade: Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III at the Reagan National Defense Forum (As Delivered). 3 December 2022, Simi Valley, California. Barrie, D., B. Barry, L. Béraud-Sudreau, H. Boyd, N. Childs and B. Giegerich (2019) Defending Europe: Scenario-based Capability Requirements for NATO’s European Members. International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 3. Berbrick, et al. (2020) Conflict Prevention and Security Cooperation in the Arctic: Frameworks of the Future. Newport, RI, U.S. Naval War College, p. 3. Birkeland, J.O. (2021) Maritime Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance in the High North—The Role of Anti-submarine Warfare-1945 to the Present. Doctoral dissertation, University of Glasgow. Boulègue, M. (2019) Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment. Available from: https://www.chathamhouse.org/ sites/default/files/2019-06-28-Russia-Military-Arctic_0.pdf [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Bredesen, M.G. and K. Friis (2022) Missiles, Vessels and Active Defence: What Potential Threat Do the Russian Armed Forces Represent?. The RUSI Journal, 165 (5–6), pp. 68–78. Breedlove, P. (2018) “Foreword” In: Security in Northern Europe: Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue, ed.: Olsen, John Andreas, Royal United Services Institute. Bruusgaard, K.V. (2021) Russian nuclear strategy and conventional inferiority. Journal of Strategic Studies, 44(1), pp. 3–35. Bunn, M.E. (2007) Can Deterrence be Tailored?. Washington, DC, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

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Burnett, D. (2022) Repairing Submarine Cables Is a Wartime Necessity. October 2022. Proceedings Vol. 148/10/1, p. 436. Bye, H.G. (2020) Leaving Its Arctic Reluctance Behind: The Re-emergence of US Security Policy Focus Towards the European High North and Its Implications for Norway. The Polar Journal, 10 (1), pp. 82–101. Bye, H.G. (2022) With All the Nordic Countries in NATO, the Region Will Have a Formidable Air Force. High North News, 8 December 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/all-nordic-countries-nato-region-will-haveformidable-air-force [Accessed 21 December 2022]. Byman, D. and M. Waxman (2002) The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Correll, S. (2021) A ‘Persistent, Proximate Threat’: Why the Navy is Preparing for a Fight Under the Sea. Navy Times, 10 September 2021. Available from: https://www. navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/09/10/a-persistent-proximate-threat-whythe-navy-is-preparing-for-a-fight-under-the-sea/. [Accessed 21 December 2022]. Couzens, J. (2022) Royal Navy Tracks Two Russian Submarines in North Sea. BBC News, 22 July. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-62271528. [Accessed 21 December 2022]. Cullen, P. and O.M. Stormoen (2020) US-Norway Bilateral Defense Agreements: A Partnership that Strengthens NATO. Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI). Department of Homeland Security (2022) State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure. 9 May 2022. Available from: https://www.cisa. gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-110a [Accessed 23 January 2023]. Durbin, H. (2021) B-1s Fly First Mission from Norway. US Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa Public Affairs Ramstein Air Base, Germany. 26 February 2021. Available from: https://www.eucom.mil/article/41125/b-1s-fly-first-missionfrom-norway [Accessed 21 December 2023]. Edvarsen, A. (2022) NATO Practiced Defense of Norwegian Airspace. High North News, 22 September 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/ nato-practiced-defense-norwegian-airspace. [Accessed 22 December 2023]. European Commission (2022) Joint EU-Norway Statement on Strengthening Energy Cooperation. 23 June 2022. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_3975 [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Flanagan, S.J., J. Osburg and M. Kepe (2019) Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States through Resilience and Resistance. RAND Corporation. Foggo III, J. and A. Fritz (2016) The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic. Proceedings Magazine, 142 (6). https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/june/ fourth‐battle‐atlantic Gallagher, M. (2019) “State of (Deterrence by) Denial.” The Washington Quarterly, 42 (2), pp. 31–45. Garamone, J. (2021) “Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says.” DOD News, 8 December 2021. Available from: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2866963/ concept-of-integrated-deterrence-will-be-key-to-national-defense-strategy-dod-o/ [Accessed 20 December 2022]. Gerson, M. and D. Whiteneck (2009) Deterrence and Influence: The Navy’s Role in Preventing War. Washington, CNA.

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Graves, D. (2023) America’s Hidden Tool is Hobbling Russia’s War Machine with Multilateral Impact. War on the Rocks, 1 February 2023. Gray, C.S. (1990) The Definitions and Assumptions of Deterrence: Questions of Theory and Practice. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 13 (4), pp. 1–18. Griffiths, J. (2019) The Global Internet is Powered by Vast Undersea Cables. But They’re Vulnerable. CNN, 26 July 2019. Available from: https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/ 25/asia/internet-undersea-cables-intl-hnk/in&,133. [Accessed 21 December 2022]. Harding, L. (2022) Strikes Deep Inside Russia Highlight Ukraine’s Tactical Ingenuity. The Guardian. 5 December 2022. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2022/dec/05/strikes-deep-inside-russia-highlight-ukraines-tacticalingenuity [Accessed 30 November 2022]. Hinck, G. (2022) Cutting the Cord: The Legal Regime Protecting Undersea Cables. Lawfare blog. Hoffmann, F. (2023) Conceptualizing Integrated Deterrence, Lawfire. Available from: https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2022/01/08/guest-post-dr-frank-hoffmanon-conceptualizing-integrated-deterrence/ [Accessed 8 March 2023]. Hudson, A. (2021) Richard Says Nuclear Deterrence Connected to All Other DOD Capabilities. Air and Space Forces, 7 May 2021. Available from: https://www. airandspaceforces.com/richard-says-nuclear-deterrence-connected-to-all-otherdod-capabilities/ [Accessed 30 November 2022]. Humpert, M. (2022) “Fiber-optic Submarine Cable Near Faroe and Shetland Islands Damaged; Mediterranean Cables also Cut.” High North News, 24 October 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/fiber-optic-submarine-cablenear-faroe-and-shetland-islands-damaged-mediterranean-cables-also-cut [Accessed 22 December 2022]. Huth, P. and B..Russett (1988) Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation. International Studies Quarterly, 32 (1), pp. 29–45. Kirk, L. (2022) Mysterious Atlantic Cable Cuts Linked to Russian Fishing Vessels. EU Observer, 26 October 2022. Available from: https://euobserver.com/nordics/ 156342. [Accessed 29 December 2022]. Kirsanova, N.Y., O.M. Lenkovets and A.Y. Nikulina (2018) The Role and Future Outlook for Renewable Energy in the Arctic Zone of Russian Federation. European Research Studies Journal. Kjellén, J. (2022) The Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re) Militarisation of the Arctic. Arctic Review, 13, pp. 34–52. LaGrone, S. (2015) Russian Navy Chief: Submarine Patrols Up 50 Percent Over Last Year. USNI News, 19 March 2015. Available from: https://news.usni.org/2015/ 03/19/russian-navy-chief-submarine-patrols-up-50-percent-over-last-year. [Accessed 25 December 2022]. Laird, R. (2022) Norway Should be at the Center of Change in Northern European Defense. Breaking Defense, 9 November 2022. Available from: https://breakingdefense. com/2022/11/norway-should-be-at-the-center-of-change-in-northern-europeandefense/. [Accessed 22 December 2022]. Lasconjarias, G. (2019) NATO’s Response to Russian A2/Ad in the Baltic States: Going beyond Conventional? Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 2 (1), pp. 74–83. Liu, M. and J. Kronbak (2010) The Potential Economic Viability of Using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as an Alternative Route between Asia and Europe. Journal of Transport Geography, 18 (3), pp. 434–444.

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Lokker, N., J. Townsend, H. Hautala and A. Kendall-Taylor (2023) How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat. Center for a New American Security, 24 January 2023. Available from: https://www.cnas.org/ publications/reports/how-finnish-and-swedish-nato-accession-could-shape-thefuture-russian-threat [Accessed 27 January 2023]. Lostumbo, M.J., M.J. McNerney, E. Peltz, D. Eaton and D.R. Frelinger (2013) Overseas Basing of US Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and Strategic Benefits. Rand Corporation. Lundesgaard, A.N. (2022) High Profile, Low Availability: The Emerging US Maritime-Strategic Approach to NATO’s Northern Flank. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 5(1), pp. 334–349. Maritime Executive (2022) Video: Suicide “Drone Boats” Attack Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet. Available from: https://maritime-executive.com/article/video-suicidedrone-boats-attack-russian-navy-s-black-sea-fleet [Accessed 21 December 2022]. Markowitz, J.N. (2020) “Descriptive Statistics and Cross-National Comparisons of Arctic Power Projection.” Perils of Plenty: Arctic Resource Competition and the Return of the Great Game. New York, 2020; online edn., Oxford Academic, 21 May 2020. Available from: 10.1093/oso/9780190078249.003.0004 [Accessed 12 March 2023]. Mearsheimer, J.J. (1985) Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press. Middleton, A. and B. Rønning (2022) Development of Data Centres in the Nordic Arctic. In Non-state Actors in the Arctic Region, pp. 153–178. Cham, Springer International Publishing. Morcos, P. and C. Wall (2021) Invisible and Vital: Undersea Cables and Transatlantic Security. Center for Strategic & International Studies, 11.available from https:// www.csis.org/analysis/invisible-and-vital-undersea-cables-and-transatlanticsecurity, [accessed 7 July 2023]. Moreira, M.Â.L., C.F.S. Gomes, M. Dos Santos, M. do Carmo Silva and J.V.G.A. Araujo (2020) PROMETHEE-SAPEVO-M1 a Hybrid Modeling Proposal: Multicriteria Evaluation of Drones for Use in Naval Warfare. In: Industrial Engineering and Operations Management: XXVI IJCIEOM, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, July 8–11, 2020 26, pp. 381–393. Cham, Springer International Publishing. Mustin, H. (1986) The Role of the Navy and Marines in the Norwegian Sea. Naval War College Review, 39 (2), pp. 2–6. Nilsen, T. (2021a) NATO Ships with Missile Defence Drill Off Northern Norway. The Barents Observer, 2 June 2021. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/ en/security/2021/06/nato-ships-missile-defence-drill-northern-norway. [Accessed 23 December 2022]. Nilsen, T. (2021b) Tromsø Makes Ready for Port Call by U.S. Navy Nuclear Sub. The Barents Observer, 7 May 2021. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ security/2021/05/tromso-makes-ready-us-navy-sub. [Accessed 23 December 2022]. Norwegian Ministry of Defense (2020) The Defense of Norway: Capability and Readiness. Long Term Defence Plan 2020. Norwegian Ministry of Defense (2021) Future Acquisitions for the Norwegian Defense Sector 2021–2028. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/ 09d83a5cbefd4fb68064e6ca871acccb/faf-2021-2028-engelsk-versjon-__.pdf. [Accessed 23 December 2022].

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Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2022) The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy. Available from: https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ ud/vedlegg/nord/arctic_strategy.pdf. [Accessed 30 November 2022]. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2022) Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, p. 11. Available from: https://docs.house.gov/ meetings/IG/IG00/20220308/114469/HHRG-117-IG00-Wstate-HainesA20220308.pdf [Accessed 23 January 2023]. O’Rourke, R. (2022a) Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for DefenseIssues for Congress. Washington, DC, Library of Congress. O’Rourke, R. (2022b) Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC, Library of Congress. Østhagen, A. (2021) Norway’s Arctic policy: Still High North, Low Tension?. The Polar Journal, 11 (1), pp. 75–94. Available from: 10.1080/2154896X.2021.1911 043 [Accessed 24 January 2023]. Perkins, W. (2018) Unmanned Air Systems in NATO Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW): Potential Future Applications and Concepts. Journal of Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC). March 2018. Edition 25, pp. 27–31. Pincus, R. and W.A. Berbrick (2018) Gray Zones in a Blue Arctic: Grappling with China’s Growing Influence. War on the Rocks, 24 October 2018. Rauhala, E. (2022) “Norway on Edge Over Drone Sightings, Arrest of Son of Putin Confidant.” Washington Post, 20 October 2022. Available from: https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/20/norway-drones-russia-arrests-gas/ [Accessed 22 December 2022]. Rauhala, E. and E. Francis (2022) Sweden Finds Explosive Traces at Nord Stream Blast Sites, Confirms Sabotage. Washington Post, 18 November 2022. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/11/18/nord-stream-swedenexplosives-sabotage/. [Accessed 21 December 2022]. Roughead, A.G. and U.S. Navy (2018) The Trident Returns. Reuters (2022) “U.S., Allies Need to Be ‘Concerned’ about Attacks on Western Infrastructure.” Available from: https://www.reuters.com/world/us-allies-need-beconcerned-about-attacks-western-infrastructure-2022-09-30 [Accessed 22 December 2022]. Sand, E. and S. Freeman (2022) The Russian Sanctions Regime and the Risk of Catastrophic Success. War on the Rocks, 8 March 2022. Available from: https:// warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-russian-sanctions-regime-and-the-risk-ofcatastrophic-success/. [Accessed 22 December 2022]. Schadlow, N. and B. Helwig (2020) Protecting Undersea Cables Must be Made a National Security Priority. DefenseNews, 1 July 2020. Sheldon-Duplaix, A. (2022) “Russia-China Naval Partnership and Its Significance.” Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals, pp. 101–120. Staalesen, A. (2022) Russia Outlines Militarization of Fishing Fleet and Icebreakers. The Barents Observer, 24 May 2022. Available from: https://thebarentsobserver. com/en/security/2022/05/russia-militarizes-its-fishing-fleet-and-icebreakers. [Accessed 30 November 2022]. Strauss, L., R. Gordinier and M. Byrne (2022) US Marines and NATO’s Northern Flank. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 13, pp. 72–93. Sutton, H. (2021) Russia’s Growing Secret Submarine Fleet Key to Moscow’s Undersea Future. USNI, 30 November 2021. Available from: https://news.usni. org/2021/11/30/russia-growing-secret-submarine-fleet-key-to-moscowsundersea-future. [Accessed 24 December 2022].

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Sutton, H. (2022) New Images Reveal Russia’s ‘Missing’ Submarine Belgorod. In Arctic Available from: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/10/new-imagesreveal-russias-missing-submarine-belgorod-in-arctic/. [Accessed 24 December 2022]. Tamnes, R. (2017) The Significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Contribution. In NATO and the North Atlantic, pp. 8–31. Abingdon, Routledge. Todorov, A. (2022) “Dire Straits of the Russian Arctic: Options and Challenges for a Potential US FONOP in the Northern Sea Route.” Marine Policy 139. Treloar, S. (2022) Norway to Improve Security Around Submarine Fiber Cables. Bloomberg. November 29, 2022. Available from: https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2022-11-29/norway-to-improve-security-around-submarine-fibercables?leadSource=uverify%20wall [Accessed 23 December 2022]. Trenin, D. (2016) Should We Fear Russia?. Hoboken, New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons. Tørrisplass, O.M. (2018) Deterrence and Crisis Stability–The F-35 and Joint Strike Missile’s Effect on the Norwegian Security Policy Toward Russia. Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 1(1), pp. 19–32. United States Department of Defense (2022) National Defense Strategy. P.2. Available from: https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF [Accessed 23 December 2022]. United States Department of Defense (2021) DOD Working With Norway to Develop High-Speed Propulsion Technologies. 14 March 2021. Available from: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2540400/dodworking-with-norway-to-develop-high-speed-propulsion-technologies/ [Accessed 23 December 2022]. United States Department of the Navy (2021) A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic. Available from: https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/displaypressreleases/Article/2463000/department-of-the-navy-releases-strategicblueprint-for-a-blue-arctic/ [Accessed 22 December 2022]. United States Department of the Navy (2020) Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. Washington, DC, Department Of The Navy. Vest, R. and A. Davis (2022) Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Russia Maritime Studies Institute, 31 July 2022. Newport, RI, U.S. Naval War College. Watts, S., B. Rooney, G. Germanovich, B. McClintock, S. Pezard, C. Reach and M. Shostak (2022) Deterrence and Escalation in Competition with Russia. Available from: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA720-1.html [Accessed 27 March 2023]. Wilner, A., A. Wenger, P.M. Morgan, J. Gross Stein, R. Levi, J. Sawyer, J.J. Wirtz, J. Trexel, D. Adamsky and M. Libicki (2021) Deterrence by Denial: Theory and Practice. Amherst, New York, Cambria Press.

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Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities for growing problem sets in the Arctic region Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek

Introduction On 6 June 2022, the US Army activated the 11th Airborne Division, composed of 12,000 soldiers with a primary focus on militarily dominating the Arctic (Lacdan, 2022). Alongside this, the US Air Force had just completed its bed-down project that stationed more fifth generation stealth fighters in Alaska, giving the state over 100 F-22 and F-35 aircraft, making it “home to the world’s largest concentration of fifth-generation fighter jets” (Woody, 2022). Moreover, in March 2022, US joint forces (to include the Coast Guard) conducted a three-week Arctic military exercise, known as Ice Exercise (ICEX) to practice cold-weather military operations, which also included forces from the Canadian Air Force and Navy, and UK Navy (Koenig, 2022). Finally, the US Space Force in September 2022 began construction at its gateway site, Clear Space Force Station, Alaska, to support a 2023 Norwegian-partner Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) program, enabling Enhanced Polar Systems-Recapitalization (EPS-R) for uninterrupted multi-domain communication and operations for US and NATO forces in the Arctic Circle (Erwin, 2022).1 Giving such “teeth” to Arctic defense and preparation was long overdue. Given growing investments in the Arctic, American policymakers and military leaders appear to have demonstrated the willpower to commit to an “American Polar Pivot”—committing hard military power explicitly for Arctic military operations (Burke and Matisek, 2019). This did not happen overnight. Current military and defensive operations in the Arctic region still have a long way to go. Aging radar arrays and sensors in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland are a vulnerability and homeland defense liability in terms of struggling to adequately detect advanced adversarial systems, such as fifth generation stealth aircraft, drones, balloons, and hypersonic weapons (Wolfe, 2020). Such a susceptible radar system means that older Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) might not work as advertised in a future Arctic Region crisis.2 Hence, Canada has already signaled its willingness to spend at least $1 billion to help modernize the “North Warning System [that]. is made up of 47 unmanned long and short-range radar stations, that extend across the North, from Labrador to Alaska” (Tukker, DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-12

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2022). According to interviews with NORTHCOM/NORAD officials in 2022, modernization may not necessarily mean replacement, but some hardware and software upgrades to ensure a multidomain picture can be maintained, to include being capable of identifying stealthier adversarial drones, nontraditional platforms like slow moving balloons, and hypersonic weapons. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov proclaimed in 2015 that “China is one of the priority partners” (Bell, 2020) in the Arctic for Russia. An evolving state of strategic competition is occurring in the High North, which is an enduring problem for the United States and its NATO allies and partners in the Arctic Circle (TASS, 2015; Rehman, 2022). Acknowledging Russia’s Arctic basing and resurgence of military activity—to include growing efforts by China to increase its commercial, economic, and military presence in the region—US political and military leaders can no longer accept Arctic apathy as modus operandi (Doshi et al., 2021; Associated Press, 2022). America needs to devote substantial resources to strategic thinking and cold-weather capabilities to out-perform China and Russia in the High North and defend its Arctic territory and support the rules-based order in the region (Burke, 2022). Most importantly, given the ability of the US Air Force to be the most mobile and flexible in the region and Space Force reliance on Arctic access for satellite communications, both branches are critical for joint warfighting efforts and Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), especially in ensuring unobstructed access across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) and seamless communications for Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) (Maxwell Air Force Base, 2020). To illustrate the disconnects between American thinking and action, we describe the way contemporary American policy and strategies have evolved over the last two decades. Section “Past as prologue: maintaining arctic inertia to establish capable joint warfighting” identifies US military operations in the Arctic region as centering on Alaska—and how that history still informs current thinking on multi-domain operations and influences the next phase of establishing JADO across the joint force. Finally, we conclude with recommendations for US policymakers and military leaders to advance certain Arctic policies and weapon systems that promote national interests, liberal rules-based order, supports allies and partners, and defends the American Homeland. The evolution of American Arctic strategy and policy One of the biggest steps in establishing some semblance of Arctic inertia on developing plans and institutions for the defense and security of the region is having presidential leadership first identify the Arctic as a priority. Before leaving office, President George W. Bush released NSPD-66/HSPD-25, a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) and Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD), which proclaimed for the first time in national security policy that the “United States is an Arctic nation” with six “National Security and Homeland Security Interests in the Arctic” (Bush, 2009). This action gave the

Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities 169 US Navy the impetus to publish the Navy Arctic Roadmap in October 2009, which provided vague plans on future strategic objectives for the Arctic (Greenert, 2009). Despite this roadmap being ambiguous, it was notable in recalling the importance of an October 2007 strategic document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century—first for the US Coast Guard, US Navy, and the US Marine Corps, jointly publishing a strategic document—which had one mention of the Arctic due to opportunities for “new resource development, but also to new shipping routes that may reshape the global transport system” (Conway et al., 2007, p. 5). In one sense, performative policy about different branches cooperating in the Arctic was merely a smokescreen for “kicking the can” down the road to avoid any short-term investment in cold-weather capabilities. It would take another four years for any meaningful progress as President Obama released the first-ever National Strategy for the Arctic Region on 10 May 2013 with explicit national security interests of “supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to national defense” (Obama, 2013, p. 2). This was timed similarly with the US Coast Guard that same month, which was the first uniformed service to ever release an Arctic Strategy, which made clear their service was the most experienced in the region and that their “unique authorities, capabilities, competencies and partnerships as a military, law enforcement, regulatory and humanitarian Service are central [sic]” (U.S. Coast Guard, 2013, p. 4). Later in November 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) released its first-ever Arctic Strategy, which acknowledged a need to align with Obama’s policy document, echoing concerns (and implications) about melting ice caps, but most importantly, highlighted the need for “Security cooperation activities and other military-to-military forms of engagement establish, shape, and maintain international relations and the partnerships necessary to meet security challenges and reduce the potential for friction” (Hagel, 2013, p. 10). However, after 2013, policy documents, congressional (in)action, and military (dis)interest on the Arctic, have waxed and waned within the US government. In fact, by 2018, the National Defense Strategy omitted any reference to the Arctic—leading Congress to call out Secretary of Defense James Mattis, ordering updated Arctic strategies by June 2019 (Schreiber, 2018). The US Navy was the first to release a strategy document, Strategic Outlook for the Arctic, in January 2019, but was short on details and explicit outcomes as it vaguely considered long-term outlooks to assess naval abilities to operate in the region for “power projection” purposes (Richardson, 2019, p. 12). The Department of the Air Force released its first-ever Arctic Strategy in July 2020 noting the region as “critical to US national security and homeland defense,” and explicitly identified China and Russia as engaging in “Great Power Activity in the Arctic” (Department of the Air Force, 2020, p. 6). Similarly, the US Department of the Army released its own Arctic strategy document, Regaining Arctic Dominance, in January 2021 noting needs for “our forces to execute extended, multi-domain operations in extreme conditions in support of the Joint warfighter” (Department of the Army, 2021, p. 20).

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In line with these documents, the US Air Force (and Space Force) and the US Army, appear to have the most vested interest in the Arctic region broadly defined, with a total of 9 bases in Alaska—the US Navy and Marine Corps do not have any bases—and the US Coast Guard has 4 active stations in Alaska.3 The US Navy does have an Acoustic Measurement Facility Static Site in Ketchikan, but even in 2021 “Navy training and testing in Southeast Alaska will stay at similar levels for the next 7 years” (Smiley, 2021). Notwithstanding a lack of naval and marine bases, the Navy has taken an expeditionary mindset, rotating the 6th and 2nd Fleets through the High North and the US Marine Corps has, since 2018, continued and expanded its Rotational Force-Europe 21.1 in Norway. Outside of Alaska, Thule Air Base in Greenland is maintained by the US Space Force and is jointly operated with personnel from Canada, Denmark, and Greenland.4 Compared with Russia’s Arctic ground presence, basing posture, and naval presence, the US lacks sufficient persistent military presence to demonstrate sustained commitment and ability to operate. Hence, many US military policies and strategies are merely words on paper absent corresponding action: Washington must do better. Past as prologue: maintaining Arctic inertia to establish capable joint warfighting An American military presence in the Arctic region began in 1867, when the 9th Infantry Regiment of the US Army was sent to Sitka for a ceremony to assume control of the Alaskan territory from Russia. By 1877, the Army transferred territorial control to the US Treasury Department, and later civilian authorities established a local government in 1884. While no US Army bases existed, the Army had a minor presence in terms of operating weather stations and leading expeditions for mapping purposes (US Army, 2016). The Navy in 1902 was the first to establish a permanent base by placing a Navy coaling station on Japonski Island across from Sitka (National Park Service, 2021). The birth of Arctic relevance for “multi-domain” capabilities came about in 1903 with the establishment of the Washington-Alaska Military Cable and Telegraph System (WAMCATS), which connected all outposts and stations in Alaska to the continental United States (Treadwell and Holshouser, 2019). As tensions with Japan mounted around 1940 alongside World War II beginning, Alaska became important again for two reasons. First, with proximity to Japan and threat of Japanese occupation, the US military established a large presence in Alaska, to even include mobilizing non-traditional forces for homeland defense. In 1942, Japanese forces bombed Dutch Harbor in Alaska and seized the Aleutian Islands of Attu, Kiska, and Adak. In response, the US military built an all-volunteer force of over 6,300 indigenous Alaskans. Known as the Alaska Territorial Guard (ATG), these volunteers spotted Japanese ships and aircraft and even assisted in shooting down Japanese balloon bombs that were launched into the jet stream meant to cause forest fires in the Pacific Northwest (Hendricks, 1985). Second, due to the American-Soviet Lend-Lease

Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities 171 in 1941, Ladd Field (later renamed Fort Wainwright in 1961) and Big Delta (eventually renamed Fort Greely in 1953) were established in 1942 as a site for training Soviet pilots and transferring aircraft (Hardee, 2014). Both locations proved important for cold weather training and exercises, ensuring military operational proficiency in Arctic conditions. In 1943, Mile 26 Satellite Field (renamed Eielson Air Force Base in 1948) was constructed near Ladd Field as an auxiliary operating location, but saw little use during the war. Following World War II—and with the Soviets placing sizable numbers of threatening forces in Siberia—Alaskan Command (ALCOM) was established on 1 January 1947 to act as a first line of defense and to minimize inter-service tensions. The first initiative set by ALCOM, besides consolidation of bases and outposts, was holding major cold-weather exercises to validate joint force capabilities to respond to a Soviet invasion. Between November 1947 and February 1948, Operation YUKON was conducted with over 1,000 military personnel: To develop air transportability methods for the Arctic. To develop methods of training and indoctrination of ground force units for Arctic operations. To carry out a series of maneuvers in Alaska involving air transportability and defense of airfields. To make observations and records of all operations in order to furnish a basis for the development of doctrines, tactics, techniques, and organization for future Arctic operations. (Moore, 1948, p. 12) Operation YUKON was considered successful, with many lessons learned about cold-weather issues impacting mobility, protection, cooking, and equipment. Moreover, it lent weight to the establishment of the Arctic Indoctrination School, which began training courses for all branches in the winter of 1948–1949 (Thomas Leonhardt collection, 1953b). In July 1949, the Big Delta base was renamed the Army Arctic Training Center (AATC), with an emphasis on maintaining the base and responding to Soviet threats—and also to serve as a testing facility for army equipment in sub-zero temperatures (Thomas Leonhardt collection, 1953a). Many of the Alaskan bases held similar types of smaller Arctic military exercises annually as part of basic military readiness expectations. For example, following the experience of the Korean War and extensive cold weather casualties, the US Army held a much larger Arctic military exercise in February 1954 with approximately 5,000 troops. Continued cold weather operations illustrated a lack of preparation as 243 troops were “casualties” due to frostbite (Cash, 1965, p. 55). Later in February 1965, the largest winter weather annual maneuver was conducted at the Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Greely. Known as Exercise POLAR STRIKE, about 14,000 personnel participated with units from the US Air Force, “US Army, Alaska;

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Alaskan Air Command U.S. Strike Command; 2d Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment; and elements of the Army National Guard from Alaska, Minnesota, and Washington” (Wiant, 1965, p. 22). These sorts of annual exercises would continue on a smaller scale up through the 1980s. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the so-called “over the Arctic” threat perception eroded. As the global leader and military hegemon in the mid1990s coming off a Cold War Victory and a decisive kinetic defeat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Washington began retrenchment and peace dividends. Arctic presence contracted as the US sought to spread democracy through soft power approaches, leaving military deterrence as a secondary consideration. A brief period of positive and opportunistic international relations emerged, enabling the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996 with an emphasis on nonmilitary issues to positively engage a post-Soviet Russia in a non-military context. By 2001 however, the US would launch the Global War on Terror (GWOT). It defined Washington’s defense posture and priorities for the next 20 years. An emphasis on Iraq, Afghanistan, and GWOT meant strategic competitors could gain a comparative advantage in the Arctic. Today, Russia has built up more military infrastructure in the Arctic than anywhere else. This is largely due to about 15,000 miles of Arctic coastline and an estimated $35 trillion worth of untapped Arctic natural resources, coupled with Moscow’s need to establish a credible nuclear deterrent along the Kole Peninsula (Dillow, 2018). In contrast, the US has about 1,060 miles of national coastline along the Arctic Ocean. From economic tensions to homeland defense concerns, military activity off the Alaskan coast by a strategic competitor such as China or Russia must be taken seriously. However, this is easier said than done, as the US Coast Guard is not designed for power projection or homeland defense. Washington cannot afford to allow the inertia of the past to slow and leave the Arctic unattended. The same risk and vulnerabilities apply to America’s Arctic allies and partners. The United States desires an Arctic that it can act in by choice rather than be compelled by consequence. The US must continue increasing Arctic power projection and attention on the region by leveraging its unrivaled ability to marshal resources and improve defense while simultaneously relying on its robust network of capable partners and allies for enhanced Arctic training, readiness, and presence. Future as fate: shape the environment you want or operate in the environment others create Unbeknownst to many, most military fuels (Jet A-1 and JP-8) freeze at −47°C and diesel gelling occurs below −12°C. Why is this relevant information for modern military operations? The coldest temperature ever recorded in the Arctic was −69.6°C, meaning that extra measures must be taken to protect fuel sources and storage sites, not to mention military equipment and vehicles that might struggle to operate if not winterized accordingly. Temperatures like these also mean military personnel will equally struggle with mobility, be it as a pilot

Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities 173 or as infantry on patrol, due to the wearing of cold-weather gear. Moreover, with increasing amounts of military equipment utilizing touchscreens, this will necessitate further adaptations by military personnel to ensure they can rapidly and accurately conduct military operations. Given enumerable Arctic challenges at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, there are numerous reforms needed, to include establishing clear plans that will ensure the US establishes Arctic supremacy. The problem? The US does not have a sufficient Arctic presence from which to learn these lessons, identify solutions, and execute improvements. At present, the US lacks sufficient standoff capabilities in the Arctic. It has no reliable air defense systems in the Arctic region capable of intercepting known Russian missile threats. For example, Thule Air Base, Greenland is within the Arctic Circle on borrowed land, but lacks capabilities for stopping a coordinated attack. Thule Air Base is critical for enabling Arctic JADC2, domain awareness, and missile warning. It is a vital operational node contributing to both the strategic deterrence and tactical execution elements of North American defense. An attack would produce considerable disruptions to Arctic security operations and make the US more vulnerable. Washington’s reliance on a single military base north of the Arctic Circle is tenuous. If the US and its Arctic-interested partners and allies insist on maintaining stability and security in the Arctic, they must be present and engaged. Arctic-interested states can act now to demonstrate Arctic commitment and dissuade strategic competition that may devolve into conflict. Absent presence and integrated deterrence through JADO, the Arctic region may be more influenced by Chinese and Russian activities, because they have repeatedly demonstrated their disregard for international laws and norms. In strategic parlance, presence equals influence. If the US and other Arcticinterested states insist on Arctic influence, they must be Arctic present. But simply suggesting more military presence falls short. Whereas the “old way” of power projection seemed to emphasize maintenance of supply lines while navigating the threat of static enemy defenses at the point of debarkation, the “new way” must now contend with modern area denial systems and increased standoff ranges as well as more sophisticated threats en route, rather than simply dealing with obstacles upon the objective. Moreover, increasing fiscal competition among defense priorities cannot address all requirements for overseas power projection, adding additional pressures to effective forward military posturing in the Arctic (Mazarr, 2020). In this way, the US cannot rely on good relations with partners and allies to enable freedom of maneuver and navigation as its sole method of maintaining its polar influence. The US and Canada—as an example—continue agreeing to disagree on the status of the Northwest Passage as an international waterway or sovereign domain, respectively. Because of this and other reasons, Washington must also seek new arrangements, preferably with its existing network of partners and allies to help balance against evolving Arctic challengers. Beyond continued military Arctic operations, the US must maintain its joint forces commitment alongside international military exercises in both

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Alaska and Northern Europe. These exercises demonstrate visible willingness of the US military to engage in extreme cold-weather environments and serve as necessary posturing and presence deterrents for an increasingly confident Russia while also promoting and maintaining favorable conditions for balancing Arctic behaviors. Strategic commitments of such visible military force posture via air, land, and maritime domains signal a willingness to counter Russian and Chinese expansionism. Networked Arctic security

Expanded security agreements, such as Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO), generate a perception of comparative advantage for states that, absent such mechanisms, cannot compete with Russia and China in the Polar Regions; the US is no exception. A robust network of states committed to ensuring freedom of navigation, to include protection of resources and the environment, in the contested commons where claims compete will be necessary to avoid the otherwise uncontested rise of geographically or economically advantaged states intent on securing influence in the Arctic for their own national interests. The US defends the global commons now; but it cannot defend the Arctic commons and ensure regional stability on its own. A new approach to polar leadership is needed; one that operates in the evolving reality of increasingly self-interested state behavior as the main driver of Arctic activities. In pursuing more beneficial networks and balancing, the US and other states can interact and benefit from these arrangements, achieve greater Arctic presence and influence, and simultaneously send signals of resilience and resolve to revisionist powers such as China and Russia. To do this, the US does not need more icebreakers or more skibirds. It could benefit from platform modernization, but a purely numbers-based acquisition plan to have more without an associated need is myopic and wasteful. It does, however, require a more robust, deliberate policy agenda that guides Arctic posture and informs increased and sustained presence and commitment to long-term Arctic power projection. Among the most important integration efforts for the US centers on its joint air defense capabilities, especially as JADC2 is pursued between all NATO members bordering the Arctic to achieve a more networked Arctic security blanket that extends through the Baltic Sea, which will become a “NATO lake” once Finland and Sweden admit to NATO (Jonsson and Häggblom, 2022). Planners must recognize the reality of the inseparability of the US Air Force, Space Force, and Army within the air defense mission set. Unlike many foreign militaries whose air defense missions fall under their Air Force’s purview, US air defense integrates Army, Air Force, and Space Force capabilities to achieve integrated and layered defense. This means the services must work through JADC2 to achieve multi-domain awareness and effective defense. With each of these demonstrated commitments, the US will expand its Arctic capabilities and intent to maintain its place as an Arctic power with influence well into the future.

Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities 175 However, the current political and defense budgetary climates are such that the poles have been an afterthought in policymaking, only coming into clearer focus since 2019 and the proceeding Arctic strategies released since. Despite the US status as an Arctic state, Arctic force posturing is relegated in favor of nearterm threats instead of long-term strategic problems. As we have noted, Arctic emphasis ebbs and flows; it rises and falls with the changing of administrations (Orttung and Weingartner, 2019). This is ironic given the billions of dollars spent on foreign military assistance efforts thousands of miles removed from the US while Russia and China continue their unchecked advance toward Arctic influence.5 Without consistency in budgeted commitment to realizing the many promises contained in the flurry of recent Arctic strategies, Washington’s ability to achieve networked Arctic security through its own balancing efforts will continue to languish. Emerging threats to the homeland should compel change. Russian Arctic missile sites are close enough to launch missiles capable of reaching the US homeland and its naval vessels can navigate uncontested via Arctic routes right up to American coastlines. Russia also maintains an electronic warfare system that covers the entirety of the Arctic Circle (Staalesen, 2019). Beyond Russia, aggressive and antagonistic actions by China in the South China Sea demonstrate their resolve to control and exploit maritime routes. While China may not take the same approach in the Arctic and Antarctica, this is not a sign of passivity. Beijing is investing in military capabilities to operate in the Arctic (Pincus, 2018). Beyond such concerns, Arctic orientation must contend with the unique bureaucratic and logistic hurdles specific to the region. Arctic logistical operations are extraordinarily complex. Everything slows in the cold; construction of infrastructure takes two to three times longer and is four to eight times more expensive than a similar project elsewhere.6 The Arctic presents challenging climates, seasonally limiting conditions, and general unpredictability. Between bifurcated combatant command boundaries and budgetary, bureaucratic, environmental, and logistic limitations, one can understand why the United States does not yet have an executable Arctic strategy. Instead, American rhetoric and hyperbole about Arctic commitments are the norm. Without actionable policies, the US will accelerate its retreat from its global leadership position and find itself in a strategic disadvantage elsewhere by extension. Absent demonstrable commitment to achieving Arctic security through a layered, networked approach, these challenges and limitations—from budgets to missile defenses—will inevitably put the United States in a weakened security position in the Arctic and elsewhere. The solution for networked security relies on innovative solutions and integrated deterrence through a multi-domain approach. JADO and JADC2

The future of the America’s ability to compete in the Arctic region—and confront and contest where necessary—rests, in part, on ensuring JADO

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principles are integrated across the joint force. Be it sea, land, air, space, and cyberspace domains, such military and interagency and allied capabilities and resources are vital when it comes to planning, analysis, and executing missions, especially in the Arctic. However, for JADO to be effective, organizational, budgetary, and doctrinal JADC2 must be incorporated in a way that utilizes current and future weapon systems platforms in a seamless and data agnostic fashion to deter and defeat any challenger in the Arctic by virtue of having a quicker OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop (Air University, 2021). While JADO and JADC2 may appear to be the next generation of buzzwords, they are being robustly funded and researched as a way of creating real time pictures of the battlespace across the joint force and with allied forces. For instance, Project Overmatch is the Navy’s contribution to JADC2 as a way of collecting data and information and providing commanders the ability to visualize the battlespace in real time and enable the maneuver of combat forces, especially in the Arctic (Eckstein and Demarest, 2022). NATO forces are similarly trying to achieve this as the Arctic poses C2 challenges due to communications issues, equipment operability, and general lack of experience among those seeking to operate in the region in the future. Thus, commercial software and AI technologies will be needed across the NATO alliance to ensure JADC2 interoperability and also the coordination of forces in case of a future crisis (OneWeb, 2021). Immediate impacts of a well-executed approach to JADO via coordinated JADC2 policies will increase military effectiveness and also the ability of Arctic policing patrols in the air domain to counter Russian bombers that regularly fly into the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) seemingly as a test of US response protocol. While these flights remain in international airspace and thus do not violate sovereignty, they occur six to seven times a year on average and indicate Russian probing of the US Arctic region (Best, 2022). Conclusion: overcoming Arctic apathy to establish American dominance in the Arctic Given enumerable Arctic challenges at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, reforms and rebalancing of resources and policy is needed, to include establishing clear Arctic plans that ensure American supremacy. There are five lines of effort needed to achieve long-term viability in the region. First, with NATO accession pending for Sweden and Finland, this provides a tremendous opportunity to expand and evolve existing partnerships for the US military to learn cold-weather operations from their military personnel. Additionally, it presents the opportunity for the ideational forming of “Joint Expeditionary Forces – Arctic (JEF-A).” Such multilateral security cooperation could take the form of joint military units with an interest and expertise in defending and operating in the High North (Monaghan, 2022). Opportunities such as forming multilateral fighter squadrons among Arctic allies would

Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities 177 enhance friendly cooperation and interoperability, while also giving US pilots and personnel an opportunity to hone their Arctic military capabilities in Northern Europe. Second, each US military branch must continue specialization in multidomain capabilities to succeed with JADO in the Arctic. Already, the US Army plans to establish one Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) unit for the Arctic, which would be crucial for enabling the joint force to “counter antiaccess/area-denial capabilities across the spectrum of competition, crisis and conflict; and identifies challenges and considerations moving forward” (McEnany, 2022). Achieving optimal joint warfighting capabilities requires the US military to seamlessly integrate JADO concepts to operationalize capabilities and achieve maximum combat power. This requires commitment to achieving JADC2 between US joint forces and multinational forces. However, with the US Air Force phasing out the short-lived “Multi-Domain Warfare Officer (13O) career field” (2018–2022), the Department of the Air Force will need to invest more heavily in JADO education (Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, 2022). According to numerous interviews, air and space professionals are repeatedly told to “to do some JADO,” but with little guidance or education on how to do so.7 This type of engagement demonstrates dissonance between senior leadership and operators that lack JADO awareness. It is problematic because the US Air Force is tasked with operationalizing JADC2 for the rest of the joint force and NATO member states. Thus, a future bridging function would require the forming of a JADO career field (or JADC2 task force units) for air and space professionals to become subject matter experts, ensuring future multi-domain operations maximize joint warfighting abilities. Third, since American space power is so dependent on communication stations and relays in the Arctic Circle, the US Air Force and Space Force must develop integrated JADC2 capabilities that leverage data and information from allies and partners in the region. For instance, in July 2022 interviews with Canadian defense officials, they described issues of achieving data and information synchrony with NORAD/NORTHCOM, especially with integrating and exchanging data with the US Navy. Agnostic data sharing will also be an issue as September 2022 interviews with Swedish and Finnish defense officials indicated their concern with JADC2 and the sort of security and protocols that would enable interoperability within NATO. In a future Arctic crisis scenario, an adversary would likely target US (and allied) relay and sensor stations to degrade JADC2 and deny American space power capabilities. Creating redundancies, cooperating with private industry, and developing battleplans to operate with limited to no space power abilities should be included in future Arctic military exercises so that planners and operators can figure out solutions to “working in the blind” (i.e., limited GPS, degraded EMS access, etc.). Fourth, the vastness of the Arctic necessitates a coordinated approach to protecting the region because the US Air Force and Space Force do not have enough dedicated resources to be effective in the region. Future Arctic planning

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means thinking beyond current military units and allied and partner security forces. Incorporating NGOs, commercial and tourist vessels, indigenous tribes, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and a host of other non-traditional security actors facilitates buy-in from vested actors, enabling a rules-based order in the High North. Such actions would reduce the likelihood of future escalation and militarization of the Arctic region. Fifth, future US strategic documents should make the Arctic a clear priority for each uniformed service to align their lines of effort and objectives toward maintaining security and deterring challengers in the region. This should emphasize an explicit Joint Cooperative Arctic Strategy document for the US Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Space Force, Coast Guard, and NOAA. Such documents could detail assets, future acquisitions, military exercise schedule, and cold-weather capabilities, to ensure maximal maneuver of personnel and flexibility of forces. Moreover, such strategic documents could outline the integration of allies and partners to deter future aggression, while having the capability to rapidly respond to a future crisis. Ultimately, joint warfighting in the Arctic requires an inter-agency effort that is collaborative within the US government and works through allies and partners. Such efforts should align with promoting integrated deterrence. Achieving integrated deterrence and homeland defense are US national security priorities. It cannot be done in information silos, through service parochialism, or through policy platitudes. The Pentagon needs to emphasize capabilities acquisition and service integration through JADO and principled JADC2 as an unconditional approach to Arctic security in the 21st century. Notes 1 For more information on Norwegian ASBM, see https://nextspaceflight.com/ launches/details/2022. 2 For information on GMD and BMDS, see https://www.mda.mil/system/gmd. html. 3 Notably, none of the US Air Force or Army bases in Alaska are actually within the Arctic Circle. Most of these locations are, however, north of 60° north latitude and considered within the US-defined Arctic Region (considering climate zones and other legally defined and delineated zones). 4 For more information on the base in Greenland, see https://www.afspc.af.mil/ News/Photos/igphoto/2001041112/. 5 Since 2001, the US has spent over $200 billion on security assistance just to Afghanistan and Iraq ( Security Assistance Monitor, 2023). 6 Conversation with a NORTHCOM Arctic official, May 2020. 7 Commonly repeated phrase in the US Air and Space Force communities since the introduction of the JADO concept.

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Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities 181 Available from https://www.ponarseurasia.org/u-s-arctic-policymaking-undertrump-and-obama-implications-for-russia-and-china/ [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Pincus, R. (2018) China’s Polar Strategy: An Emerging Gray Zone? The Diplomat. Available from https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/chinas-polar-strategy-anemerging-gray-zone/ [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Rehman, M. (2022) Changing Contours of Arctic Politics and the Prospects for Cooperation between Russia and China. The Arctic Institute. Available from https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/changing-contours-arctic-politics-prospectscooperation-russia-china/ [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Richardson, J. M. (2019) The United States Navy: Strategic Outlook for the Arctic. Washington, DC: Chief of Naval Operations. Available from https://media. defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002302034/-1/-1/1/NAVY_STRATEGIC_ OUTLOOK_ARCTIC_JAN2019.PDF [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Schreiber, M. (2018) Congress Calls for a New US Arctic Defense Strategy. Arctic Today. Available from https://www.arctictoday.com/congress-calls-new-us-arcticdefense-strategy/ [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs (2022) Air Force to Phase Out 13O Career Field, Strengthen All Airmen Joint Capabilities. U.S. Air Force (official website). Available from https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2938234/airforce-to-phase-out-13o-career-field-strengthen-all-airmen-joint-capabilities/ [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Security Assistance Monitor (2023) Security Aid Dashboard. Available from https:// securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard [Accessed 5 March 2023]. Smiley, S. (2021) Navy Training and Testing in Southeast Alaska Will Stay at Similar Levels for the Next 7 Years. KTOO (Local News). Available from https://www. ktoo.org/2021/10/04/navy-training-and-testing-in-southeast-alaska-will-stay-atsimilar-levels-for-the-next-7-years/ [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Staalesen, A. (2019) Russia Says Its Radio-Electronic Shield Now Covers the Arctic. Barents Observer. Available from https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arcticsecurity/2019/05/russia-says-its-radio-electronic-shield-now-covers-arctic [Accessed 9 March 2023]. TASS (2015) China Is Russia’s Priority Partner in Arctic Cooperation—Lavrov. TASS: Russian News Agency. Available from https://tass.com/russia/816048 [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Thomas Leonhardt Collection (1953a) Arctic Test Branch Army Field Forces Mission. Archives, University of Alaska – Fairbanks. Thomas Leonhardt Collection (1953b) History of Big ‘D’. Archives, University of Alaska – Fairbanks. Treadwell, M. and T. D. Holshouser. (2019) Bridging the Gap: Fostering MilitaryCivilian Collaboration to Improve Marine, Aviation and Telecommunications Infrastructure in the US Arctic. In D. R. Menezes and H. N. Nicol, eds. The North American Arctic: Themes in Regional Security. London: UCL Press, pp. 158–168. Tukker, P. (2022) The DEW Line at 65: Future Unclear for the North’s Aging Radar Sites. CBC News. Available from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/dewline-65-years-norad-1.6446875 [Accessed 9 March 2023]. U.S. Army (2016) USARAK History. U.S. Army (Official Website). Available from https://www.army.mil/article/163011/usarak_history [Accessed 4 March 2023].

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U.S. Coast Guard (2013) United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy. Washington, DC: U.S. Coast Guard. Available from https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Strategy/cg_ arctic_strategy.pdf [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Wiant, J. (1965). Polar Strike. United States Army Combat Forces Journal, 15 (1), pp. 22–90. Wolfe, F. (2020) Air Force Examining Modernization of Early Warning Radars. Aviation Today. Available from https://www.aviationtoday.com/2020/11/23/air-forceexamining-modernization-early-warning-radars/ [Accessed 9 March 2023]. Woody, C. (2022) Why Is the Air Force sending So Many F-22 and F-35 Fighters to Alaska? 19FortyFive. Available from https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/08/ why-is-the-air-force-sending-so-many-f-22-and-f-35-fighters-to-alaska/ [Accessed 9 March 2023].

11

Special operations forces in the Arctic From heroes to zeroes? Marius Kristiansen, Njål Hoem, and Leo Blanken

Since 9/11, Special Operations Forces (SOF) primarily focused on countering terrorists, while our state adversaries sought to counter our capabilities and national interests. (USSOCOM, 2022)

Strategic competition among great powers—commonly referred to as “great power competition” (GPC)—is the new normal on the international stage. The Liberal Democracies of the world have come to this realization quite late, while revisionist powers relentlessly have sought to increase their edge in all domains and regions. After two decades of being fixated on the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the NATO alliance must reorient itself toward global competition and the wide array of geographic regions in which this contest will take place—to include the Arctic. The Arctic region has certainly captured the publics’ attention in recent years, but its strategic importance in GPC seems less well understood. The Arctic may be geographically peripheral, but politically, economically, and militarily it is competitively quite essential. In short, the Arctic represents NATO’s northern flank in many respects. Although NATO has substantial presence on the borders of the Arctic circle, a presence that will be reinforced now when Finland and Sweden gets integrated as a NATO member the Arctic problem-complex remains a challenge. Our competitors have already stated their objectives, started their positioning, and initiated their first moves. This makes the Arctic an active competitive arena. Succeeding in the Arctic competition will be challenging. As an active arena of GPC, it will require application of the entire DIME(FIL),1 as military means—though critical to success—are not the sole solution. The sensitivity of the GPC context, the proximity to competitors’ vital interest and sources of strengths, as well as direct influence on the security and freedom of action (FOA) for the alliance—all set in the extremely challenging environment of the Arctic—call for firmness and precision in action. This description could suggest special operation forces (SOF) has a key role in the utilization of military means in the Arctic. However, mentally bound by a generation of counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) in the GWOT, the cognitive models necessary to understand their role in Arctic DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-13

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GPC may not be fully developed. Indeed, some suggest the importance of SOF is declining as the peer competition is increasing. In this chapter, we therefore ask: what is the potential for SOF as a strategic enabler in the Arctic, and what are implications of the characteristics of the future operating environment for SOF in the Arctic? This chapter suggests that SOF is key to overcoming the challenges in the Arctic arena. This will require well-known tactics and techniques—but perhaps drawn to the more extreme. It will also require SOF to take on unfamiliar roles and conduct unfamiliar operation-sets (Taft et al., 2019). This will require SOF developing new capabilities that would enable swift and precise action and information dominance within an extremely difficult operating environment. It will require a comprehensive approach that spans allies, services, and organizational structures that currently are siloed from one another. Further, SOF activities will need to be nested within the strategic concepts of integrated deterrence and escalatory control. Achieving this demands focus, dedication, and a clear vision. Finally, achieving these goals will take time, which is in short supply as the race to the Arctic has already begun. Strategic and operational context: polar bears and snow dragons GPC in the Arctic involves many actors but, outside the NATO alliance, the main players are Russia and China. Both of these states are steadily moving away from the norms that have managed international politics since the end of the Cold War (Owen, 2020). Both have demonstrated a willingness to utilize any and all instruments of power (IoP) to reach their goals (Lepore, 2022). And, as discussed elsewhere in this book, for the last decade, they have also done their utmost to prepare for influence and competition in the Arctic. The combined actions of Russia and China pose a significant challenge to the alliance (NATO, 2022d), creating global strategic dilemmas (Pincus, 2020). With their eyes northward, we are witnessing a Realpolitik “opening” of the Arctic. The questions of resources and shipping lanes in the Arctic have over time brought about tension even among friends and allies (Steinsson, 2016). Cases such as the Elektron-incident demonstrate how close simple resource disputes have been to instigating military actions with potentially political and strategic consequences (Åtland & Bruusgard, 2009; Kristiansen et al., 2021). The many layers of possibly disputable rights, the extreme sensitivity tied to strategic nuclear facilities, strategic intelligence operations, strategic lines of communication access and dominance, as well as the plethora of actors and interests create a wicked-problem in which discerning actual intent and second-order effects for the Arctic region will be extremely difficult to untangle (Camillus, 2008). The physical aspects of the Arctic also offer its own set of challenges, which set it aside from other environments. The Arctic can be seen as the geographical center separating Russia, Europe, and Northern America. This vast area is mainly a maritime domain. It is marked by poorly developed logistical and

Special operations forces in the Arctic 185 communication infrastructure (Arctic Council, 2017), with a sparse population. The climate is “one of the most severe and forbidding in the world” (Neill, 2011, p. 34), with “winters characterized by continuous darkness” and summers “by continuous daylight” (CIA 2021). During the winter the average temperature in many areas can drop to –40°C, and the summers in most parts are cool by any measure. The weather conditions change quickly—from clear sky to stormy—in all seasons. At sea, the coastal waters are considered among the most dangerous (Humpert, 2019). On land, the largely open terrain with little vegetation combined with the climate makes the Arctic a region within which it is difficult to merely survive outside established infrastructure. For military land forces this means that in winter one must operate in snowy terrain that does not allow non-augmented movement on foot for any significant distance, while in summer the vast marshlands will significantly reduce mobility options. Very few military formations have the training or equipment to operate over time either at land or at sea. Adding that Arctic operations in most cases will demand excessively long logistical lines of communication, potentially into a contested environment, very few units operate in this area with confidence. Communication options are hampered by lack of infrastructure, unforgiving topography, weather and precipitation, atmospheric disturbance and the share fact that very few satellite options actual cover the Arctic. Proximity to adversary intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities further challenges the security, reliability, and signature of communications. In this environment, units will be fighting the distance and fighting the climate, with few means of communication, with little support of enabling units and with severe difficulties regarding signature reduction and concealment, all of which interact with the (other) complexities of this operating environment. Adding to the constant layer of friction offered by the Arctic, what does the future operating environment look like? The answer is not a clear-cut, and some argue the trends are not coalescing with any level of certainty (Roberts, 2019, p. 76). However, it will most likely be one of intense state competition (Skjelland et al., 2022, p. 64), with activities, conflicts, and confrontations that are part of that competition, but likely to hover under the threshold of largescale combat operations. As depicted in Figure 11.1 (Hæren, 2021), the degree of influence will vary over time—continuously operating along the threshold for perceived crisis (or confrontation) with multiple means—creating a “definitionproblem.” Such “liminal warfare” has become a trademark of Russia and China (Kilcullen, 2020). Although conventional war is believed to remain less frequent and likely (Horncastle & MacLennan, 2021, p. 51), the war in Ukraine also serves as a stark reminder that “special military operations” are well within the scope. This conflict environment is not likely to end with a “victory parade” (Garamone, 2021), but will persist as an apparent perpetual wicked problem not solvable by applying the logic of old paradigms. In line with the “definition-problem,” this indicates that we must think of military activity

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Figure 11.1 Depiction of threshold for perceived crises in relation to degree of influence and conflict level/intensity. Source: Hæren (2021).

“in terms of campaigning (an ongoing activity) rather than campaigns (activities with clear start and end points)” (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 5). Thus, focus should be on developing an understanding of similarities rather than discrepancies across the conflict spectrum, and for the military components to create effective and effectful capabilities that strengthen their utility as part of a sustained effort across the range of possible future outcomes (Mazarr, 2022, p. 38). This is a challenging exercise for those of us who have a proclivity toward linear logic. A vast body of authors and researchers have their different takes on the future operating environment, emphasizing different aspects or dimensions (Palmer & Smith, 2018, pp. 22–23; Lawson, 2019a, p. 10, 2019b; Kaushal, 2019, p. 47; Stickings, 2019; Bronk, 2019; Angevine et al., 2019; Renz, 2016; Robinson, 2016). They all point to levels of complexity, but highlighting different parts of the spectrum as the sizing challenge. However, if one were to attempt to simplify this extensive data, some specific themes are both re-occurring and noteworthy. The lethality of the modern operating environment through proliferation of state-like capabilities and democratization of technology, the compression of time and decision levels, the real advent of the information age, and the compound characteristics of problems and intentions drives certain demands: (1) comprehensive approach in a more incisive manner is required; (2) information overmatch is critical; and (3) swift and precise actions will be of decisive importance. These characteristics are not exhaustive but represent a starting point for understanding the operational requirements in GPC. With regards to the Arctic, it may only be one of NATO’s flanks, but its strategic importance is expanding; politically, economically, and militarily. The Chair of the NATO Military Committee has stated a clear ambition; “NATO will do everything it can to make sure the Arctic remains free and open” (NATO, 2022a). However, the ongoing war in Europe and the global dilemmas posed by GPC does not allow the Alliance to over-emphasis any one region or flank. Achieving NATO’s ambitions therefor motivates a regionalization of alliance responsibility (Horn, 2022, p. 56). That is, meeting the

Special operations forces in the Arctic 187 compound strategic challenges requires that everyone can “hold their own.” This entails that those with localized knowledge and capabilities can focus where they presumptively add the most value (Horn, 2022, p. 56), but at the same time it demands more of them in doing just that. NATO will still face GPC collectively, and all alliance activities must be nested within the appropriate logic of deterrence (NATO, 2022d, p. 1), but the strategic reality dictates that all members must be able to compete effectively in their own region. To do so one must identify how the military component can contribute, even (and perhaps especially so) in the harsh environment of the Arctic competition. Arctic special operations forces and the pivot toward GPC Military forces obviously have utility across the whole panoply of GPC, and the future operating environment. But, in the words of General Sir Rupert Smith, “for force to be effective the desired outcome of its use must be understood in such detail that the context of its use is defined as well as the point of application” (2005, p. 398). The “wickedness” of the GPC problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p.161) seems to be the reason for the conceptual bush-whacking we are now witnessing, where all branches are trying to restate their purpose and utility, and in which contexts they can be applied. Nowhere is this more evident than within the SOF community, and toward the Arctic competitive arena. For simplicity, SOF in this context can be understood along the lines described by NATO in terms of being “specially designated, organized, selected, trained and equipped forces using unconventional techniques and modes of employment” (NATO, 2019, p. 1). Special operations are intended to complement conventional forces, not compete with or replace them, and are intended to achieve effects that contribute to achieving operational or strategic objectives (Ljøterud, 2016, p. 221; Schoomaker, 2004, p. 166; Spulak, 2007). The conceptual basis for special operations is to carry out smaller, unconventional and unorthodox operations that involve a high degree of physical and political risk, but with potentially large gains, and which normally lie outside the limits of what is possible or desirable with conventional forces. (Ljøterud, 2016, p. 222) The unique qualities of SOF allow them to do what no one else can with a very favorable cost-benefit equation (Spulak, 2007), a characteristic that requires constant adaptation in tune with a continuously developing context (Schoomaker, 2004). Offering this constant flexibility to decisionmakers is what being a strategic enabler entails. As such, the contextual sensitivity, the harsh environment, and challenges of the future operating environment all point to SOF as the natural spearhead in the search for utility of military force in the Arctic competition.

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After 20 years of being the “heroes” of the GWOT, the parameters for supplying political decisionmakers flexibility has changed, and SOF are lagging behind. It seems that in GPC, they are no longer offering something unique—if they have anything to offer at all. The rather one-sided focus on countering terrorism, the argument goes, has left SOF ill-equipped to deal with the current state of competition and the (near-) peer adversaries and operating environment of the 21st century (Irwin and Wilson III, 2022, p. 47). The value of SOF is unavoidably tied to what the rest of the military force, the alliance, civilian society, and the other IoPs can contribute. In this “unequal dialogue” (Cohen, 2003), it is essential that SOF demonstrate how they can uniquely contribute to winning the competition and identify what this will entail in terms of fulfilling the definition of SOF as a strategic enabler moving forward (Schoomaker, 1998, p. 4). SOF have always adapted and developed in accordance with political, strategic, and tactical demands (Moyar, 2017, p. 330). The last two decades, SOF adapted to and excelled in GWOT, but it is now time to re-focus toward the new strategic reality (USSOCOM, 2022), and profoundly discuss and define SOF role and applicability in the new security paradigm (Moon, 2018, p. 1). There is no lack of competent assessments on SOF future roles; the problem with most of them, however, is that they suffer from an increasingly outdated conceptual paradigm where the point on the conflict spectrum was set, while the geography was fluctuating. Today, the reverse might be closer to the truth. Thus, one-sided focus on hybrid/grey-zone challenges (Moon, 2018; Horncastle & MacLennan, 2021) or the role of SOF in full-scale armed conflict (Palmer & Smith, 2018; Koven & Mason, 2021), basically ignores the realities of GPC. The statement that the need is for “more specialization rather than homogeneity” (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 1) might hold true, but in a slightly different manner than perhaps intended. Rather than focusing on specialization locked to a part of the conflict spectrum, we suggest focusing on characteristics across the scale (Schroden, 2022; Prop. 14S, 2020, p. 107), and specializing on regionally relevant capabilities. Specialization means adapting to the reality in which one is operating. Beyond pure military prudence, the logic is that the quickly changing character of competition (and future operating environment) requires continuity in roles and responsibility. By looking at the problem-complex as a whole, identifying similarities and synergies creates a higher degree of utility for SOF. Not as a “built-for-purpose” component for war or peace, but as an instrument with inherent robustness and flexibility that allows its application in both and the rapid transitions between. This should set SOF apart from other military components, and it is within this framework SOF must identify what it entails “to do what no one else can” (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 2). This requires true critical thinking. The “cult of creativity” that characterized GWOT, where due to tactical and technological overmatch creativity was sufficient to succeed and elevated to doctrine, has outlived its value—not unlike the culmination of the “cult of the offensive” in World War I. GPC

Special operations forces in the Arctic 189 represents a different paradigm. Creativity is still a key component, but it is not the solution, and not a substitute for planning and strategic thinking (Yarger, 2007). Abilities central to alliance effectiveness, like (partial) interoperability or “mission command” (in name only) cannot be faked when a capable (near-) peer adversary is actively targeting such abilities. Many of the preconditions for the perceived GWOT tactical edge are in many respects invalid—from C4IS expectations to fire support. The tactical “invincibility” of SOF may not be replicable under what are very different circumstances. We must realign tactical capabilities all the way up the chain to the political level within the realities of GPC. SOF cannot simply look to do what they excelled in during GWOT in a GPC environment. In the following section, we address the most important strategic considerations and guidance on the Arctic competitive arena, and how SOF can contribute to cope with the characteristics of the operating environment. This should create the foundation for identifying where to prioritize efforts to close the gap between GWOT assumptions and GPC reality. The logic is that the considerations must cope with (near-)peer competitors in the highend scenarios and have applicability across the spectrum. Outliers that do not conform to this logic have not been prioritized here, as they should not be prioritized in practice. That is, what is omitted is just as important as what is stated. This point is exceedingly important. The first challenge we are facing is cultural heritage. SOF need leaders who are capable of shouldering the full weight of leadership, not those who will attempt to fit a large “square” GWOT-peg into the much smaller “round” Arctic peg hole. Guidance and conceptual prioritization must be enforced down to the smallest detail until GPC becomes as much a part of our culture and nature as GWOT has been. Strategic considerations Given the complexity of the Arctic operating environment, and the lingering “nuclear potential,” there are two overarching strategic considerations that should be seen as indirect guidance on any and all application of the military instrument: the duality of deterrence and escalatory control. The first is an integral part of the alliance’ strategic concept (NATO, 2022d) wherein the military instrument has a prominent role. As the competitive arena stretches over different sovereign territories and vast distances, it is by default an adventure that needs to be both combined (cooperation with partners) and joint (all services). USSOCOM’s slogan “Campaigning with partners for integrated deterrence” is remarkably fitting for the Arctic. This overarching guidance is in line with the identified need for a more incisive comprehensive approach and must be seen in relation with the ability to ensure swift and precise action. The latter is also relevant in relation to escalatory control. Escalatory control must not be misunderstood as a purely diplomatic or passive matter.

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As Russian doctrine suggests, “escalation to deescalate” represents a brute forcing of escalatory control (Ball, 2022). Being able to deter, swiftly and precisely coerce competitors and adversaries, and, if necessary, compel and defeat enemies might prove the most effective means of escalatory control. This is true both if seen over longer periods of time (as is the case of GPC) where the absence of response might embolden a competitor—leading to escalation, and in specific incidents where (re-)seizing the initiative is necessary to terminate the situation. Doing so in a reality where the Doomsday Clock is set to 100 seconds to midnight (Mecklin, 2022) requires fully understanding the utility of force (Smith, 2005, p. 398). This leads us to the third identified characteristic that information overmatch is critical to understand why, when, how, with and against who actions should be taken, to ensure the ability to influence the relevant actors for escalatory control. Comprehensive approach With the increased demand for integration on all levels (Skjelland et al., 2022, p. 46; Erickson, 2021, p. 51), generating integrated deterrence requires combined-joint operational interoperability. SOF cannot “be decisive in and of themselves” (Kiras, 2006, p. 9). “Winning” requires integration of the system as a whole (Vego, 2008, pp. V–99), in which the sum creates the desired strategic effects (Kiras, 2006, p. 112). This is valid in the whole conflict spectre, and with the expected complexity SOF cannot expect to be utilized as a strategic tool in the same manner as during GWOT (Moyar, 2017, p. 338). Thus, as USSOCOM also acknowledges, a closer integration with conventional forces is necessary (2022, p. 5). SOF represent an agile element throughout the spectrum of conflict which is both technically and cognitively interoperable with a wide array of partners; other nations’ SOF, other nations’ conventional joint forces, other nations’ strategic level assets and the international “interagency” (Lamb & Munsing, 2011), as well as national civilian assets (Kristiansen et al., 2021). Indeed, special operations are joint operations by nature (Skinnarland & Gråtrud, 2020), and there is a clear interdependence between SOF and conventional forces (Wesbrock et al., 2016). Thus, a comprehensive approach may not be seen as anything new. Apart from the fact that we must do it without “cheating,” the difference from GWOT is that the “enabler–enabled” relationship in many instances will be reversed. More emphasis should be put on how SOF can contribute to make other means and military forces more effective (Kiras, 2006, p. 115), resulting in SOF having more of a supporting role (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 3). This does not negate the strategic role of SOF as a key asset in handling urgent and politically sensitive problems, but SOF actions within a competitive environment is more likely to be nested within a comprehensive approach. This is particularly true on the Arctic arena where climate, geography, and competitors’ capabilities dictate the need for both joint and combined

Special operations forces in the Arctic 191 cooperation and operations. This is a necessity for integrated deterrence. Within this frame, there are specific tasks that are largely preconditions for combined-joint operations, and for which SOF are uniquely capable. For instance, creating credible Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) solutions for advanced air platforms in such an environment is difficult but important (Ayers & Wahlman, 2021). Indeed, establishing such system capabilities might very well be seen as a precondition for committing the most technologically advanced and sensitive platforms to operate in a potentially volatile environment. Such instances may be both politically sensitive and urgent, but at the same time it is a supporting action for the combined-joint force. Similarly, demonstrating resolve, through testing and exercising allied systems (technical and procedural) in a contested environment without exposing one’s own capabilities is both important and challenging (Bronk, 2019, p. 66; Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 7; Angevine et al., 2019, pp. 19–20). Ensuring deterrence, reassuring partners, but avoiding losing the competitive edge requires a level of finesse. Unlike conventional forces, SOF have the ability to support such tasks, but with an acceptable signature and necessary endurance. Thus, combining SOF with the “right” strategic assets can generate (integrated) deterrence and demonstrate resolve in the Arctic (Elwell, 2017, p. 39) at a manageable but sufficient scale. At the same time, it provides allied systems experiences that are strategically relevant across the spectre and a range of competitive arenas and serve as internal reassurance of commitment and capability within the alliance. Strengthened cooperation and interoperability for deterrence will again increase the ability for SOF to support critical processes such as joint targeting, “where SOF should be integrated at every phase” (Hester, 2003, p. 53). Such integration is a prerequisite for successful actions such as strategic raids. Contrary to other operations, like crisis response, strategic raids “involves a deliberate, planned effort to access a target, conduct a tactical military action, and then depart” (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 9), and usually requires a comprehensive effort. That is, SOF can be both the effector and the enabler, but will always require integration with other services. In some instances, SOF’s role may simply be to make sure that the right competencies are made available in the right location at the right time. The capability to conduct strategic raids is, of course, a useful tool when the threshold to conflict has been crossed. But more importantly the ability can serve as both an effective deterrent and contribute to escalatory control. Such raids are not necessarily decisive in themselves but can create the window of opportunity needed for other forces (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 9), or create a desired asymmetry in time or space. It also has an important cognitive side; the very threat posed by strategic raids can discourage escalation or commit a disparate amount of resources to protect perceivably vulnerable targets. The targeted attack on the Kerch Strait bridge in October 2022 is a recent example of such an action in which critical infrastructure was targeted. In the Arctic, the scarcity of infrastructure and the presence of numerous military and strategic

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installations in difficult accessible locations (Halsne, 2022, pp. 32–34) make similar actions a possible important contribution for SOF. Conducting strategic raids can require the ability to operate undetected and for prolonged periods in contested areas, thereby increasing the demand on personnel and equipment. Small SOF units may have a higher survival and success rate, and given the right organic capabilities offer higher flexibility (Angevine et al., 2019, p. 22). In severe Arctic conditions in which our competitors might dominate all warfighting domains, control infrastructure and logistical lines, the task of supporting allied strategic raids is definitely within the scope of doing “what no one else can” (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 2). And, with their regional specialization Arctic nation SOF are most likely the only units capable of consistently and reliably supporting such undertakings. Regionalization also has added effects for a more incisive comprehensive approach. SOF from nations that border the Arctic region have the local knowledge and savvy that will support allied endeavors in several ways. First, as this is taking place near or within the Arctic nations’ sphere of interest, SOF can provide the critical interagency-link that is necessary for effective efforts in theater. This is especially important if NATO were to adopt the notion of “campaigning” as a perpetual effort, to ensure the alignment of efforts. A similar role has already been demonstrated in GWOT and should be carried over to GPC. In the example of Norway, the Total Defence Concept is a mechanism that allows the coordination and synchronization of civilian and military resources to meet challenges along the whole conflict spectrum. Being able to work effectively within this framework, in support of a wider conception of security, has already proven the utility of SOF in lower ends of the spectrum (Kristiansen et al., 2021). Building on such mechanisms should be prioritized to ensure the understanding of SOF utility and facilitating early SOF involvement with a wider range of stakeholders where necessary—either as enabler or enabled. Second, SOF historically consist of personnel with traits, skills, values, knowledge, and characteristics that make them capable of exercising the role as strategic advisors and potential negotiators (Hedenstrom & Kristiansen, 2017). Combined with local knowledge and military proficiency, this makes for an effective tool in interpreting the situation, and in some instances be used actively in informal discussions, formal meetings, diplomatic meetings, or just “conversations” between military forces and other “entities.” Lastly, to avoid fait accompli if the situation escalates, it is important to have a relevant and realistic system for reception, staging, onwards movement and integration (RSOMI) of partners and allies. The role of regional SOF is to ensure that partners are given the best possible preconditions for getting their capabilities in play. This is especially important when pulling on strategic resources or SOF counterparts, which are very capable but sparse resources. Arctic nation SOF must ensure that the utility of these resources is maximized through contributing to clarifying the desired outcome, the context and the “point of application” relative to own capabilities (Smith, 2005, p. 398). The key terms here are “enabling” and “augmentation.”

Special operations forces in the Arctic 193 Swift and precise action Integrated deterrence with a comprehensive approach to the problemcomplex is fundamental for alliance competition on the northern flank. The problem does, however, require the ability to respond more quickly and with a higher level of precision than the mass power associated with alliance deterrence capabilities, or the lengthy process associated with actions such as strategic raids. This is key both as an escalatory control measure, and to avoid fait accompli should the situation continue to escalate. In many instances, risk mitigation and effect are more reliably achieved through the speed and precision offered by SOF, than by conventional formations. Thus, crisis response will remain a key role and mission for SOF also in the Arctic. This is something that SOF rarely will do alone (Kristiansen et al., 2021) and the relevance of having credible crisis response options in a competitive environment will most likely increase in the future (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 8). To some extent, crisis response is a continuity that builds on the extensive experience from GWOT (Moyar, 2017, p. 333; USSOCOM, 2022, p. 3). But in addition to the routinely support to the plethora of national security needs, it may take place in a more volatile environment, for other purposes and against different opponents, and with potential strategic and political consequences that are difficult to foresee. In a cluttered strategic environment, the very use of military force may be seen as high risk—both for failure and escalation. In such cases, the use of SOF can be the middle road; it allows for a small military footprint, but swift, capable and precise. In a competitive reality this can be an important risk mitigation (NATO, 2021, pp. 4–57), where tactical ability makes possible choosing a higher degree of strategic risk (Metz, 1991, p. 80). However, this risk calculation may be skewed if the chosen force does not have the organic ability to properly handle the situation (Kiras, 2006, p. 117). If the baseline expectation is that any or all actors in the future operating environment possess “state-like capabilities” (Leaf, 2021, p. 492), this has serious implications for SOF preparing for and conducting crisis response. The whole idea of response options is to influence the opponents’ costbenefit analysis (Skjelland et al., 2022, p. 53). Thus, SOF must organically represent a credible “cost imposer” to reduce an opponent’s willingness to pursue their objectives in the short and the long term (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 8), or be able to quickly facilitate other efforts (Erickson, 2021, p. 51). SOF’s ability to create effects normally associated with larger formations is important (Deptula, 2011, p. 411), and should be further developed to make SOF a more flexible and autonomous cost imposer (Erickson, 2021, p. 55), with the ability to create effects in all domains (USSOCOM, 2022, p. 6). This will make the use of SOF a response that is more calibrated to the fluctuating threat and conflict scale of GPC, and that is able to face actors with state-like capabilities in addition to those missions that have become so familiar over the last few decades (Kristiansen et al., 2021).

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The fact that one must expect to face actors with state-like capabilities adds significant friction to the task. SOF must, for instance, be prepared to conduct their operations in CBRN environments, face more complex or hardened targets than what it has become used to, and concealed insertion/extraction that will be more demanding. All this should motivate doubling down on core (but somewhat neglected) skills (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 5). Crisis response often entails shorter time to tune and coordinate a plan and this was not really a problem in what was formerly known as “peace-time,” or even during GWOT. SOF’s superior ability to communicate at least alleviated the problem. Now, such operations are potentially taking place within a denied or contested area (across domains) (Elwell, 2017, p. 40), irrespective of where SOF finds itself on the conflict spectrum. Further, the opponents in GPC will be continuously adapting and implementing technology and techniques that challenge allied SOF’s formerly assumed “tactical invincibility.” Thus, SOF must ensure that it remains in motion—organized and poised to continuously evolve to offset competitors’ strengths (Elwell, 2017, p. 40). Where others might create those momentary cases of asymmetry and overmatch, SOF must be able to do so systematically. SOF must “harden” to survive in the 21st century (Leaf, 2021, p. 492), and this is a moving target. This reality also puts the need for real mission command (back) on the agenda (Bronk, 2019, p. 65). “Ordinary” decision processes are not ideal without the communication possibilities we have grown accustomed to, and especially when faced with complex environments (Zweibelson, 2015, p. 19). Communication options in the Arctic are scant and vulnerable to opponent influence and exploitation, and the problem-set is notoriously difficult. This creates a dilemma. A high degree of autonomy reduced the perception of control, which can be seen as necessary to coordinate comprehensive actions and ensuring conformity with politically acceptable actions and risks (Roberts, 2019, p. 80). In contrast, the lack of delegated authority may lead to irrelevance (Erickson, 2021, p. 53), with vulnerable decision cycles that can be exploited by an opponent (Roberts, 2019, p. 76). The whole purpose of mission command is to “enable disciplined initiative and synchronise operations” (Elwell, 2017, p. 38). Arguably, mission command has been exercised through the entirety of GWOT, but with the important difference of having the option to seize control at commanders’ leisure. We have become accustomed to an unrealistic ability to exchange information (Elwell, 2017, p. 38). We have become victims of our own excellence to the extent that mission command is no longer exercised as intended, and the absence of communications is likely to cause a rather unfavorable cognitive dissonance at all levels—quite the opposite of initiative and synchronization. This is not a purely technical problem. Within SOF, and in the jointcombined force, it is first and foremost a question of culture—and especially command culture (Elwell, 2017, p. 41). It also means that SOF must train differently and re-discover how to do what they have done for 20 years with

Special operations forces in the Arctic 195 basic premises completely uprooted. We must operate based on intent, with a clear understanding of what actions should be withheld, what authorities are granted, and which actions are required as the situation evolves. This is a matter of both planning and conditioning—where the target training audience is as much political and strategic decisionmakers as the military force. And perhaps we must go further, discuss “distributed mission command” (Erickson, 2021, p. 56), with “starfish qualities” that can retain viable C2 when severed from the main body (Zweibelson, 2015, p. 19). In the end, it is a question of balancing the tangible and deterrent value of swift and precise action against the need for controlling the escalatory potential inherent in utilizing military means. Information overmatch Maintaining situational awareness is a decisive condition in order to ensure the right composition of means and methods, and to plan the conduct of operations (NATO, 2021, bullet.1.7.b). As illustrated by the “definitionproblem,” this ability will be actively challenged by our competitors (Karlsen, 2022). This will occur through deception and dis-information, as well as through technical means to influence or deny the ability to exchange and distribute information. This directly influences military operations, but just as importantly, it will influence the ability to ensure a coordination between IoPs and may ultimately also whittle away on the very foundation of alliance cohesion and popular support. Thus, generating timely and precise information is both more challenging and more important than ever before (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 6). Emerging technological solutions obviously play an important role in gathering, analyzing, and distributing information (Hæren, 2021, p. 41). However, such solutions do not offer omnipresence or perfect analysis. Priority of limited resources, inaccessibility in some instances/areas (Angevine et al., 2019, p. 21), or requirements for multiple sensors or (human) physical presence to provide contextual accurate assessments (Chapa, 2021, pp. 205–206) are all simple (but relevant) examples where even the most advanced technology is insufficient. Physical presence directly or indirectly through local partnerships may prove indispensable (Martin et al., 2022). This is where SOF, once again, can do “what no one else can.” Through strategic reconnaissance (SR), SOF can contribute to generate a strategic situational awareness that makes it possible to make the right choices at the right time in order to generate the intended effects. Indeed, SR will in many instances be a prerequisite for successfully conducting tasks such as strategic raids and swift and precise crisis response measures (Westberg, 2016, p. 21). Aside the contested reality of GPC, this does not seem principally different from GWOT. However, in this context, it is not merely a task that feeds into a grinding F3EAD2 wheel. SR in this sense is a continuous task intended to support both immediate actions and the perpetual task of understanding the

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environment and changes in it (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 6). With emphasis on regional responsibility (Moon, 2018, pp. 11–12), it follows that Arctic nations have the primary responsibility for SR on NATO’s northern flank. In peacetime, SOF has proven capable of creating inter-agency networks of information gathering and intelligence development and has proven highly capable of coordinating with partners across borders through the construct “the global SOF network” (Lamb, 2014; Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 7; USSOCOM, 2022, p. 9). Historic strategic focus and theater expertise makes SOF a highly appropriate fit for SR in the Arctic (Fagins, 2019). This, however, means that just as the armed forces must be prepared to take lead in coordinating other IoPs (Skjelland et al., 2022, p. 66), SOF must be prepared to take lead in their areas of expertise and responsibility. Doing so obviously implies focusing on systemic capabilities, but it also means permanent physical presence in areas of strategic importance. This does not necessarily mean within the Arctic circle, but where SOF will be able to support information gathering and analysis, and at the same time partaking in shaping the information domain. One part of this involves measures that directly address the information accessible (or not) by target audiences. Another is conducting activities that shape competitors’ perception, and thereby imposing costs (tangible and intangible) (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 8). The first is the most intuitive approach. Since the Arctic region is (very) sparsely populated it might be challenging to influence the local narrative to the same extent, with the same level of efficiency and with the necessary speed, compared to other regions around the world. This is a challenge that SOF can alleviate, and handle on behalf of the combined joint force—either alone or alongside the indigenous population (Martin et al., 2022). By utilizing local knowledge and local military-to-military and military-tointeragency cooperation, SOF can support efforts like this, and at the same time, maybe more importantly, counter influence from other actors. SOF located in the Arctic often represent cross-functional professionals living on the tactical edge with a wide network of partners—partners who might represent someone who can generate strategic options. Nevertheless, it is not possible to isolate this challenge to the Arctic region alone. Because of the fact that the relevance of the Arctic region and the actual interests in play, the influence-challenge concerning the Arctic extends further than its own region. The combination of a sparse population and a quite limited capability to counter or contradict a message or narrative that is wrong, or fake, makes it important to have a credible presence, that cannot only work locally—but partake in disseminating information to relevant audiences elsewhere, such as Europe or the United States. Maintaining the ability to precisely and credible do so requires relevant level of knowledge and insight from the region the narrative concerns. When it comes to the other part, shaping the competitors’ perception and impose costs, this is “a result of actions that can take a wide variety of forms” (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 8). In its simplest form, it can be showcasing

Special operations forces in the Arctic 197 capabilities, conducting exercises, showing joint-combined integration and force. In such a framework, the SOF role is basically conducting the tasks and roles as already described, but with a calibrated visibility in order to shape the competitors’ perception. This can be reinforced or supplemented by using the same network of local access to distribute information, although such efforts should be balanced against risk of losing access and credibility. In its more advanced form, SOF could work in closer conjunction with EW and cyber capabilities (USSOCOM, 2022, p. 6), in order to deny competitors access to information, disrupt information, or even implant information that favors own intentions. The ability to conduct such operations requires similar augmentation as is required for being a tangible “cost imposer” and is based on the Arctic nation SOF unique access and knowledge of their operating environment. If our age is the “information age,” SOF must be prepared to use information both “as a weapon and a warfighting space” (Jones & Sinnott, 2021). Conclusion: Arctic heroes? If special operations forces are to have a bright future, the deciding factors will lie not in the realm of gadgets, money or selection ordeals. Rather, they will be found in the talents and character of the people to whom the privilege of command is given. (Moyar, 2017) As others have stated before us, “for SOF to remain relevant in a new strategic reality, dormant capabilities must be revitalized, new capabilities pursued, and doctrinal adjustments made” (Brands & Nichols, 2020, p. 6), and nowhere is this truer than in the Arctic competitive arena. Here we have attempted to describe both the Arctic competitive arena as part of GPC and NATO’s northern flank, and the critical characteristics of our current and future operating environment. Based on this we have outlined areas that should be emphasized by Arctic nation SOF to ensure that they are able to continue to deliver strategic flexibility and contribute to maintaining competitive advantage in the ongoing competition. SOF will continue to have great potential as a strategic enabler. SOF offers the ability to create strategic options to compete in the Arctic at relatively low cost and risk, while at the same time potentially creating asymmetrical costs for opponents to stay in the competition. At the core of this potential is the ability to maintain utility across the spectrum and to ensure the flexibility the operating environment requires. By adhering to the strategic intent of integrated deterrence and escalatory control, emphasizing the tasks and roles that contribute to a comprehensive approach, information overmatch, and maintaining the ability for swift and precise action—SOF will persist as a key strategic asset in the current (and future) strategic security paradigm in the Arctic. But this comes at a cost. If the alliance shall succeed in dominating GPC, we must think differently. Rather than duplicating general capabilities, we must face realities, and recognize that those who inhabit the different regions

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and flanks of the alliance are contextually specialized. There is strength in (the right kind of) differences across the members of the NATO alliance. For SOF in the Arctic nations this means both a return to core skills and a strengthening of capabilities that are contextually valuable. By doing so, SOF will play an important role in securing the alliance’ northern flank—and ensuring that “the Arctic remains free and open” (NATO, 2022b). This approach requires tough prioritization with ramifications for everything from training and education to procurement and equipment. And it will require leadership, especially since the refocusing we are describing will be an enduring challenge. Just as GPC can be seen as a perpetual state in international relations, the concept of campaigning also means a continuous process of adaptation. Whether SOF succeeds or not is not a question of individual technologies nor personnel, it is a question of cognition and leadership. Notes 1 Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Law Enforcement. 2 Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate.

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Section III

Nato’s northern flank states

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Norway’s strategic role and interests at NATO’s northern flank 1 Finding a new balance? Joachim Bentzen

Norwegian security and defence policy are often framed as an act of balancing (Prop. 14S, 2020–2021, p. 22; Søreide, 2017; Hurdalsplattformen, 2021; Hilde and Widerberg, 2014).2 Bordering Russia in the North, Norway has, since shortly after the Second World War, sought to offset its formidable neighbor’s military might through being an active NATO member and close ally of the United States. However, as frequently highlighted by Norwegian academics and security policy practitioners alike, while doing this, the country has attempted to strike a delicate balance between deterrence and reassurance (Holst, 1966; Hilde & Widerberg, 2014; Hilde, 2019; Oma, 2021a, 2021b). While facilitating allied activity in the High North, Norway has also maintained certain self-imposed restrictions to avoid provoking or directly threatening Soviet, and later Russian, security interests. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the need for such balancing acts has been a less pronounced feature of Norwegian security discourses. However, as Russia continues to pursue a revisionist foreign policy, and particularly following its annexation of Crimea and later invasion of Ukraine, the Cold War strategic frameworks have had their renaissance (Oma, 2021a). The balance between deterrence and reassurance is now highlighted in official documents as a guiding principle for Norwegian strategy toward Russia (Prop. 14S, 2020–2021, p. 94). However, as Stian Bones elaborates in Chapter 3, these Cold War frameworks, concepts, and strategies were created in a specific historic context and strategic environment. It is far from given that they are suitable to guide today’s security policy. Based on this observation, this chapter explores the following question: How has Norway’s role and strategic interests as a small state on NATO’s northern flank changed since the Cold War? This chapter argues that while Norway still faces the same fundamental security predicament—a small nation between great powers—the strategic environment on NATO’s northern flank has changed significantly since the Cold War, and so has Norway. A new balance must therefore be struck to face a milieu that is very different to that of the latter half of the past century. This chapter begins by outlining the particularities of Norway’s geopolitical position and military challenges. It proceeds to discuss four trends that shape DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-15

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Norway’s current strategic role and interests in the High North. It concludes that these trends imply a markedly different strategic context for Norwegian security policy than during the Cold War and hence a need for novel concepts and strategy. Enduring challenges for a small state As a small state, Norway is forced to accept that the strategic context it operates in is defined by the prevailing competition between great powers. Its small demographic base sets natural boundaries for its foreign and security policy ambitions. Seen from a military perspective, Norway provides a challenging theater of operations. On land and at sea, a harsh climate and varied topography provide ample opportunities and challenges for military commanders (Ydstebø, 2021). Norway has a large territory to defend. Its mainland stretches for more than 1,700 km from North to South. A maritime nation facing the North Atlantic, with Arctic Islands Jan Mayen and Svalbard, the country has approximately a five times larger maritime territory than landmass. Expansion of territorial waters in the post-World War II period, including the eventual extension into 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zones, has greatly influenced Norway’s welfare, and position on the international arena (Eriksen & Pharo, 1997; Tamnes, 1997). Its 100,915-km coastline (including islands) provides abundant access to the waters of the north, including the Barents Sea. Its deep fjords and numerous inlets keep mostly ice-free year around by the warm waters of the Gulf Stream. A constant of Norwegian geopolitics is its shared border with great power, Russia. Despite the power asymmetry, this historical experience has been peaceful coexistence and trade rather than conflict. The countries have never been at war with each other. As often highlighted by Norwegian foreign ministers, Northern Norway was liberated from Nazi occupation by Soviet troops in 1944 (Friis, 2018, p. 158). But while Norway’s experience with its eastern neighbor has been one of peaceful coexistence, the proximity to a great power still bears weight on Norway’s security policy choices. The prevailing logic of the balance of power established during the Cold War dictated that Norway and the High North would become an integral part of the great power rivalry between the United States, its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union. In the geostrategic contest between West and East, the North Atlantic and High North were to play a role as essential maritime theaters (Berdal, 1993). The Atlantic links between the United States and its European allies were vital for both commerce and military strategy. Any threat that could sever these sea lines of communications could not just halt trade between the continents but also threaten any American reinforcement able to stop a Soviet invasion in Europe. From the base complexes of the Kola Peninsula, the Soviet Northern Fleet could project force into the Atlantic (Tamnes, 2017, pp. 9–11). As weapons technology evolved in the 1960s and 1970s, NATO’s northern flank became increasingly important. The Barents

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Sea became home to the Soviet Union’s second-strike capability in the form of its strategic submarines (the first DELTA-class SSBNs introduced in 1973).3 The High North, therefore, became of the utmost importance to the strategic balance between the superpowers (Tamnes, 2019, pp. 51–56). Within this new system, Norway chose a firm western orientation. Political and military thinking

Norway, therefore, by virtue of geography, is a small nation between great powers. As a result of its limited resource base, it is entirely dependent on allied support and reinforcement in case of conflict. But as a next-door neighbor, it also seeks to avoid triggering an arms race where its territory becomes center stage for a security dilemma between greater powers (Heier, 2019, 2021). To act as a predictable neighbor, Norway has, at the politicalstrategic level, sought to strike a balance between deterrence and reassurance toward Russia and the Soviet Union (Holst, 1966). It has maintained selfimposed restrictions on basing, storage of nuclear weapons, and allied exercise activity in Northern Norway. Toward the United States and allies in NATO, Norway has followed a policy of integration and screening (Tamnes, 1987), facilitating allied support but setting restrictions on form and geography. Through this balancing act, Norway has soughtto secure allied support while avoiding direct provocations. At the military-operational level, this balancing act has naturally presented several challenges to the Norwegian Armed Forces High Command, and later the Joint Operational Command. To a large extent, Norwegian forces have adjusted their concepts and posture to fit with NATOs. When the Alliance shifted to a doctrine of massive retaliation in 1954, Norway adjusted its concept and infrastructure to facilitate offensive air operations against Soviet air defence and control systems. These operations would enable the use of nuclear weapons against the USSR. In the latter half of the 1960s, the introduction of the flexible response strategy led to a similar shift in focus as this increased the importance of conventional ground troops (Børresen, 2019). With the creation of the Bastion in the 1970s, the Soviet Union sought to protect its SSBNs within a layered defence stretching from the base complexes of the Kola Peninsula through the Barents Sea and down toward the GIUK gap and the North Atlantic (Expert Commission, 2015). Norway further adjusted its concepts and posture to fit with NATO’s overall strategy in this period. While most of its defences were geared toward a potential land invasion, it also facilitated for intelligence and ASW efforts against the Northern Fleet that were of great value to the overall strategy of the Alliance. As threat perceptions in NATO placed greater emphasis on the North from the late 1960s onward, Norway held key terrain (Dyndal, 2011). At the peak of activity in the 1980s, after the US shifted to its forward maritime strategy, Norway facilitated the exercise of carrier operations against the Soviet Union from inside its fjords (Grove, 1991).

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While present-day Russia does not hold the same military prowess as the Soviet Union, the Russian threat of maritime force projection into the Atlantic and second-strike capability still emulates from its Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula. Although the fleet is now a fraction of its historical predecessor, Russian military modernization and in particular its investment into new quiet modern multirole (Yasen-class) and strategic submarines (Borey-class) means the United States and NATO will continue to have vital security interests in the High North (Parnemo, 2019; Tamnes, 2017). With the war in Ukraine depleting Russian conventional power, nuclear deterrence and maritime force projection becomes of increased importance for Russia’s confrontation with the United States and NATO (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2023). Norway remains at the maritime front line against a revisionist Russia and key terrain in the rivalry between the great powers. Changes in the Great Power game While the fundamentals of Norwegian security policy remain much the same as they did during the Cold War, international politics has changed markedly since. The most important factor is the change in the power dynamic and relationship between the United States and Russia. While it remains a rival of the United States, challenging its vision of global order and at times directly intervening in US politics, Russia is not the Soviet Union. Russia neither has the economic resources, military might or ideological basis to be a system competitor on par with the United States. Instead, as is made clear by US strategy documents, China now has priority on the US defence and security policy agenda. The Biden administration’s new National Security Strategy presents China as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and … power to do it” (The White House, 2022, p. 23). Were as Russia is presented as a fomenter that “plays a disruptive role on the world stage” (The White House, 2021, p. 8). Russia poses an “immediate threat,” but China is the long-term strategic challenge (The White House, 2022, p. 8). There is little doubt that the US will remain heavily invested in the High North due to its strategic implications (Tamnes, 2022, p. 4), but Norway and its Armed Forces must adjust to a different strategic setting compared to the Cold War. US strategy, concepts, and posture to counter the Russian threat in the North Atlantic build on a different set of premises. Amund Nørstrud Lundesgaard argues that despite a resurgence of Russian naval power, and the subsequent increase in US maritime-strategic interest in the Northern Flank and Norway, a grand return of US naval forces to this region is unlikely. Instead, the US Navy’s primary focus has now tilted toward the Pacific and South China Sea, where it faces the world’s largest maritime force, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (Lundesgaard, 2022). Consequently, European states must take greater responsibility for providing a naval presence in the Atlantic region.

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To compensate for a widening gap between force structure, threats, and interests, the 2018 US National Defence Strategy introduced the concept of Dynamic Force Employment. The concept seeks to deter adversaries globally by being “strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable” (US Department of Defence, 2018, p. 5). The US military cannot maintain a permanent presence sufficient to always deter Russian aggression against its European allies and must rely on shorter and more robust deployments to demonstrate its commitments. But for countries bordering Russia, this challenges their valued practices of transparency and predictability toward their neighbor (Ellehuus et al., 2020). A less permanent presence necessitates that US demonstrations of military capabilities will have a higher profile once they first operate in the region. Arguably, for Norway, this means that the dual policy of deterrence and reassurance is put under pressure as its principal ally will seek to increase pressure on Russia with larger and more unpredictable deployments. For a country that aims to be a guarantor of stability and predictability in the Arctic, this naturally presents a challenge (Prop. 14S, 2020–2021, pp. 24–25; Regjeringen, 2017, p. 13). A further complicating factor for Norwegian strategists is that US concepts of operations are no longer tailored to fit the North Atlantic theater. Instead, the US service and joint concepts are now, to a large part, aimed toward countering the threat they see in the Indo-Pacific. The United States Marine Corps, which forms the backbone of the US reinforcement plans for Norway, are modernizing its operational concepts and force design in support of US Navy operations against China. Operating under a new concept of warfighting, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), these highly mobile forces will conduct expeditionary warfare “within a contested or potentially contested maritime area in order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment” (US Marine Corps, 2021). While this new structure and concept may ultimately deliver, as the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps puts it, critical ASW effects “bottling Russian submarines in the Norwegian Sea and keeping them out of the North Atlantic” (Berger, 2020), pressing challenges remain for this concept to be operationalized effectively in the High North. As Strauss et al. highlight, significant inconsistencies arise when a US military service’s operational concept for one region of the world is laid on top of an entirely different geography and strategic context. For this strategic concept to be successful in the North, it sets high requirements for readiness and presence for other allied forces (Strauss et al., 2022, p. 89). Just as in the past, Norway must be prepared to alter its military concepts following changes in US and NATO strategic thinking. However, in the future Norwegian strategists will have to take into account a more complex set of US plans and concepts. As the country’s most crucial ally shifts its focus toward the Indo-Pacific and its competition with China, Norwegian military planning must consider that its home theater will neither be the center of gravity nor the model for American force design for the coming decades. This puts increased pressure on Norway and other Northern European allies to “fill

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the gap” needed to balance the Russian military build-up in the High North. If not in numbers alone, then in key capabilities. The sustained presence needed to make allied wartime concepts credible will put increased demands on NATO’s northern nations. Norwegian policymakers must be prepared to shoulder a significant portion of that burden. A transformed theater of operations Climate change transforming the Arctic

Not only have the key actors changed the power dynamics in Norway’s surroundings, but the theater of operations is also undergoing radical changes, as seen through the lens of military planners. These changes are driven by two factors contributing to increased activity and complexity in the North: climate change and evolution in weapons technology. The Arctic is greatly affected by a warming climate. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change highlights the region as the hardest hit by rising temperatures (Meredith et al., 2019, pp. 205–208). On the flip side, this means that the Arctic is also becoming more accessible and heightened strategic interest has followed suit with the great powers reassessing their commitments. The rising temperatures opens the region to a broader set of actors and interests. Resource extraction, notably hydrocarbons and minerals, new sea routes, and economic opportunities such as tourism are drawing interest to an area of the world that, due to its harsh climate and remote geography, was mainly considered inaccessible during the past century (Borgerson, 2008). A flurry of new Arctic strategies by both Arctic and near-Arctic States have followed suit (Wegge, 2020). For Norway, this implies that its surroundings are part of a changing strategic landscape. Importantly, analysis of western strategies reveals that there is a distinct difference in how the United States now frames its Arctic ambitions, compared to its European allies. To the United States, the Arctic region is seen as part of its wider global strategy. Securing access to maritime sea lanes and maintaining a favorable regional balance of power is an integrated part of their overall national security strategy (Wegge, 2020, pp. 367–369). While the overall Chinese presence in the Arctic may still be limited, the United States has repeatedly voiced concerns that vital national security interests may, over time, come under threat (Reuters, 2019). Recent administrations have in turn put increased emphasis on the Arctic region as part of global great power competition (The Washington Post, 2018). This does not, however, mean that Norway can bank on a massive resurgence of US presence in the North Atlantic. The emerging power rivalry in the Arctic is markedly different from that of the Cold War. From being a region principally of interest due to the deployment of Soviet strategic capabilities and connected to the North Atlantic theater, it is transforming into a region with a plurality of actors and interests. Containment of Russia is not the only game in town, rather a warming climate is likely to foster

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increased economic and military activity from a larger variety of actors in coming decades. Tailoring a balanced security policy for the small state will therefore be a more challenging endeavor. Importantly for Norway, Russia continues to invest in its Arctic strategic position. While the country has not managed to reach its key development objectives for the region, including transforming it into the nation’s foremost strategic base for natural resources by 2020, the area has been a focal point of its military modernization program over the past decade (Zysk, 2021). A string of new northern bases now spans from the Barents Sea to the tip of Kamchatka, where the Arctic theater meets the Far East. The bases are meant to assert Russian control over the Northern Sea Route and support Russia’s stakes in resource competition (Baev, 2019, p. 78). A recent military balance of power analysis by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) concluded that over the next decade, Russia would enjoy “effective peacetime control over most of the High North” and that in a conflict scenario, Russia would hold a “significant offensive advantage over NATO” (Kaushal et al., 2022, p. 2). Russia is unlikely to cut back on investments in the coming decades as the sea route and resources will arguably become even more important to Russian national strategy after the war in Ukraine (Odgaard, 2022, pp. 89–90). Evolution in weapons technology

The military strategic landscape of the North is also changing due to an evolution in weapons technology. Just as technological advancements created a new strategic logic during the 1970s, making the High North a deployment area for Soviet SSBNs, changes in weapons technology are again altering the theater in the North Atlantic. In the 21st century, increased ranges of sensor and weapon systems are effectively “shrinking the battle space” and merging the strategic logic that underpins operations in the Arctic, North Atlantic, and wider North European theater. Arguably, long-range precision-guided weapons have the most pervasive strategic, operational, and tactical implications for NATO in the North Atlantic. Russia has invested heavily in these systems that challenge both NATO’s strategic concept for conflict in the High North and Norway’s operational approach. As highlighted by the Norwegian Intelligence Service, one of the critical elements of the Russian military modernization program has been the development of long-range-precision strike systems capable of hitting targets at strategic depth. In recent years, Russia has fielded several new missiles in the High North. These systems are now also being complemented with new hypersonic missiles challenging existing air defence systems (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2022, pp. 41–45). Notably, the Russian Navy has also received several modern platforms capable of carrying and employing these missiles. While much attention has been given to the modernization of SSBNs and the introduction of the new

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Borei-class (Baev, 2019, pp. 80–81), the new multirole submarines (SSGNs) bring about an arguably even more significant strategic shift. The new Yasenclass SSGNs give the Northern Fleet an ability to hold targets in the North Atlantic region at risk with long-range precision strike systems. Modern surface vessels compliment this capability above surface (Kaushal et al., 2022). Overall, the modernization of maritime capabilities, in combination with the comprehensive infrastructure development on the Arctic Islands, has resulted in an increased Russian ability to project force from the High North into the North Atlantic and beyond. The practical implications of these new systems are that Russia is now capable of striking all of Norwegian territory and most of continental Europe, with dual-capable long-range precision strike systems. The hypersonic versions of which are capable of reaching nearly any target within minutes of flight (Lavikainen, 2021; Ulriksen, 2021; Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2022, pp. 41–45).4 These challenges are recognized in the Norwegian defence and analytic community. As Ørjan Askvik writes, the advent of these systems means that Norway must complement its traditional regional focus on Northern Norway with a greater understanding of handling threats against all the country’s territory in crisis or conflict (Askvik, 2020). Norway can no longer rely, as it did during the Cold War, on a defence concept centered around the static defence of territory. There is no longer sufficient strategic depth to shield its fixed infrastructure. For Norway, this means having the ability to deal with a scenario in which the opponent can strike static critical targets in all its territory, both military and civilian (Ulriksen, 2021, pp. 25–43). Technological developments, therefore, dictate a more flexible and resilient defence concept capable of either shielding or absorbing damage across vital infrastructure and economic and political institutions. Norway needs to develop new concepts for deterrence and warfighting that can sustain operational capability even after absorbing a first strike by Russian forces. This entails a renewed focus on hardening key infrastructure and creating redundancies for critical systems. While this was not lost on Cold War planners, the speed and scope of longrange precision strike mean that today’s plans must take a more holistic approach. Combined, the effects of climate change and the evolution in weapons technology make it harder to talk about the Arctic as an isolated regional theater. While in the past century, it was meaningful to distinguish between the permanently frozen areas within the Arctic Circle and the ice-free areas of the North Atlantic Ocean, this is no longer the case. The Russian development of new long-range strike capabilities, in effect, makes these regions part of the same military problem. The range, speed, and precision of these weapons make it more difficult to separate the North Atlantic, Baltic region or the Arctic as distinct theaters of operations. Land, submarine, and airlaunched cruise missiles challenge NATO’s ability to reinforce both continental Europe and Scandinavia (Breitenbauch et al., 2019). As Rolf Tamnes points out, Russia’s anti-access strategy emanating from the Northern Fleet

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could affect all of Europe (Tamnes, 2017, p. 31). Overall, these developments make it less meaningful to talk about NATO’s northern flank as isolated from the rest of the European theater. Norway’s role in an expanded NATO At the time of writing, Sweden and Finland seem set to join NATO.5 While some commentators argue that this will accentuate the political split in NATO—between the Euro-positive block seeking “strategic autonomy” for Europe, led by France, and those emphasizing the transatlantic bond with the United States (Zelden, 2022)—it is arguably the military strategic shift in the North that will have the greatest impact on Norwegian security policy. The enlargement will further strengthen the aforementioned trend of theater integration. An expanded NATO will also lead to a new strategic reality in NATO’s North and an altered role for Norway in the Alliance. While the integration of Sweden and Finland has already gone a long way through their participation in the Partnership for Peace program and their role as Enhanced Opportunity Partners, there is no doubt that a formal NATO membership with reciprocal security guarantees will fundamentally alter the strategic landscape (Alberque & Schreer, 2022). The latest NATO expansion has some marked differences from the late 1990s and early 2000s enlargements (Zelden, 2022). A Finish membership in the Alliance would expand NATO’s border toward Russia by approximately 1,340 km, creating both defensive challenges and offensive opportunities in a conflict. Although statements that the Baltic Sea would effectively become a “NATO lake” (Jonsson & Häggblom, 2022) seems somewhat hyperbolic, it is without a doubt that NATO forces would heavily dominate the region. The goal of maintaining secure sea and air lines of communication to the enclave in Kaliningrad (Westerlund, 2015) seems highly challenging in crisis or war. The Russian Baltic Fleet will in such circumstances be unlikely to maintain maritime freedom of action for Russian forces and commercial shipping. This arguably challenges the survivability of Kaliningrad and any Russian forward deployment into western parts of the Baltic Sea. Conversely, on the Allied side, this greater level of control of the Baltic Sea reduces the challenges related to the reinforcement of the Baltic states (Shlapak and Johnson, 2016). Reinforcement will be less dependent on the Suwalki corridor, the vulnerable 65-km land-bridge between Poland and Lithuania, often heralded by strategists as a critical challenge for NATO’s defence of the Baltics (Hodges et al., 2018). For Russia, their Baltic Sea and central Europe strategic position will likely worsen further as the German government is set to rapidly increase defence spending in coming years. Germany is intent on becoming the guarantor of European security (Scholz, 2023). As the country moves toward investing 2% of GDP in defence, this will lead to a significant rebalancing of conventional forces in Europe. It is too early to tell how Russia may seek to counter these developments. But analysts

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highlight how long-range missile systems and tactical nuclear weapons might fill the gap during a time when Russia is draining conventional fighting power in Ukraine (Alberque and Schreer, 2022). For Norway, the expansion of the Alliance presents both significant opportunities and several dilemmas. Former Chief of Defence Sverre Diesen argues that Scandinavian defence integration is both a strategic and economic imperative (Diesen, 2020). Strategic because Scandinavian countries share the same fundamental security challenge; they have small defence forces and are geopolitically linked to the strategically important areas of Northern and Western Russia. Any military operation in one country would likely involve the territory of the others. Norway is the critical staging area for US or NATO forces coming to Sweden’s or Finland’s assistance. At the same time, any Russian operation into Norway will be significantly hampered if NATO has total freedom of manoeuvre in Sweden and Finland. From the economic side - small countries struggle greatly to maintain a balanced force containing the full suite of capabilities. Modern weapon systems and platforms are simply too expensive to sustain. Pooling resources, combining logistics and acquisitions, if not fully integrating plans and command, are therefore not only strategically beneficial but also an economic necessity (Diesen, 2020). Seen from a Norwegian perspective, the inclusion of its two neighbors into the Alliance opens significant opportunities to benefit from the economics of scale and creates a more balanced military posture against Russia. A prerequisite for reaping these benefits is a major rethink of defence planning in Norway. With Finland and Sweden’s entrance into the Alliance, the Norwegian defence concept, centered mainly around a defence of Finnmark (Friis, 2018), needs a to be revised. Norwegian strategists and planers must seek to integrate Norway into a broader concept for deterrence and defence of the entire Scandinavian peninsula. This includes thinking about keeping vital land, and sea lines of communications open in the face of Russian aggression. This is an imperative both for Norway and its neighbors alike. Importantly, it is crucial to consider how Russian planners will seek to counter NATOs expansion. It is far from given that Norwegian politicians now can lean back and cut defence expenditures. Instead, the new strategic logic of the North will present its own set of challenges. Seen from a purely national perspective, Norway may also find itself with a bit of a “branding problem” within NATO. Senior officers have warned that Norway’s strategic position within the Alliance could become marginalized over time as the country no longer can present itself as “NATO in the North” (Halvorsen, 2022). Analysts have long pointed out that this slogan has hardly ever been true in terms of deterrence or combat ability (Friis, 2018). But Norway did play a key role during the Cold War as a surveillance and intelligence collector for the Alliance, its geography providing NATO and the United States with an ability to closely monitor Russia’s Northern Fleet (Tamnes, 1991). Norway has also worked consistently to turn the Alliance focus toward the threat emanating from Russia, even at times when this was

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out of fashion (Haraldstad, 2014). Seen from a national perspective, the expansion allows Norway to play up its main comparative advantages, namely its direct access to the Barents Sea and North Atlantic. While Sweden and Finland are well positioned to cover the Baltic Sea and strengthen forces in the land and air domain, Norway’s strategic position gives it an edge in being the primary maritime nation in the North. Intelligence, surveillance, and ASW efforts will still depend on the use of Norwegian waters and land territory. Additionally, Norway’s wartime responsibilities to protect lines of communications at sea and land may expand further once its neighbors enter the Alliance. Norway as a different actor on the international stage Ultimately, the reasons why Norway finds itself in a different strategic position than during the Cold War has as much to do with Norway itself as its changing surroundings. Norway remains, by most standards, a small nation in international power politics. However, it is a different actor on the international stage compared to when the country entered NATO shortly after the Second World War. One should not overestimate the power and influence of a small state, but Norway has considerably more interests to defend and arguably more leverage than what is typically recognized. Norway has the capacity to use Barak Obama’s proclamation; “punch above its weight” (The White House, 2009). This is evident in the country’s military capabilities, economic muscle, and especially in energy, were it now is a vital supplier to Europe. Resultingly, Norway now has a broader role to play, not just as key terrain on NATO’s Northern flank, but as an active military ally and provider of strategic resources. Small but potent military capabilities

Despite Norway at times constructing its foreign policy as that of a peace promoter (Stokke, 2010), this has not stopped the country from pursuing its security interests with hard power means. Norway’s Armed Forces have been active participants in several “out of area operations” in UN, NATO, and coalition campaigns in the decades after the Cold War. Since 1990, Norway has taken part in 87 international military operations (Leraand, 2023). While the Norwegian Armed Forces are relatively small, its niche capacities and highly trained personnel mean that its able to deliver potent effects. This was illustrated when Norwegian F-16s lead the charge in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011. Norwegian fighters accounted for between 15% and 18% of the bombing during the initial air operation. Its aircraft dropping 588 bombs for the duration of the campaign (Libya-utvalget, 2018, p. 113). This more active use of military force in “out of area” operations must be seen as an expression of how Norwegian security policy interests are now framed to span much broader than during the middle of the last century.

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Official Norway strategy documents highlight the need to face not only threats emanating from Norway’s immediate geographic surroundings but also for Norway to play a more active role in peace and security operations in partnership with its allies abroad (Prop. 14S, 2020–2021, pp. 87–94). Norway’s participation in counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria were framed through this lens. Furthermore, as a small nation, Norway is heavily dependent on a rules-based international system to defend its interests. Actively upholding key norms of international relations, even with the use of armed force, is now seen as part of Norwegian foreign policy (Prop. 14S, 2020–2021, pp. 87–94). Overall, there has been a significant shift in Norway’s capability and willingness to use hard power in its foreign and security policy. This is a significant development for a country that during the Cold War had its forces focusing on territorial defence. Today Norwegian forces are deployed to the Baltics as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) and contribute to NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture toward Russia (NATO, 2022b). Alongside other allies, Norway has supported Ukraine with both substantial financial and military donations including air defence, MLRS, and Hell Fire Rockets (Regjeringen, 2022). This type of weapons support and active engagement was inconceivable during the Cold War era. A key difference between the period 1949–1990 and today is therefore that Norway is far more forward leaning in its use of military power. Economics

In the decades since the end of the Cold War, Norway has grown increasingly affluent, largely due to export of its natural resources. While the country has a long tradition of trade with other European nations, petroleum exports from the 1970s onward has made it among the richest countries in the world (Eriksen and Pharo, 1997, pp. 107–122; Tamnes, 1997, pp. 185–195). Norway is deeply economically integrated with global, and especially European, economies. This provides Norway export opportunities, but also vulnerabilities as the country’s prosperity and supplies are dependent on external forces outside its immediate geographic surroundings. The COVID-19 pandemic provided Norwegian decision-makers with an apt reminder of the vulnerabilities that come with having critical national supplies delivered through complex global value chains that deliver goods according to a just-in-time principle (NRK, 2020). There is, however, little doubt that Norway has been a net beneficiary of open market trade. As of 2022, Norway had the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund amounting to nearly 1200 billion Euros (NBIM, 2022). This makes the country among the wealthiest in the world on a per capita basis. Wealth does not automatically lead to greater influence in international politics. In Norwegian political circles, there is also a great taboo surrounding the notion of “politicising” its petroleum fortune and using it for other purposes

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than maximizing returns. But, as the Director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Ulf Sverdrup, convincingly argues, there is a great need for a deeper understanding of the foreign policy implications of Norway’s enormous fortune. The sovereign wealth fund is the “gorilla in the room” in the country’s foreign policy. Little debate is had around how it yields influence or how Norway’s foreign policy is affected by its exposure to world markets (Sverdrup, 2016). Through the financial management of the fund (NBIM), Norway owns a staggering average of 1.3% of all publicly listed companies in the world (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2021). This implies that Norway holds, if only latent, power and influence. In the words of Norway’s prime minister Jonas Gahr Støre: “… 10.000 billion [Norwegian]. kroner is politics” (Teknisk Ukeblad, 2019). Energy

Arguably, Norway’s greatest source of international power comes from resources that the country has sought to keep apolitical. Since it began largescale petroleum and natural gas exploitation in the 1970s, Norway has grown into a major power in energy. In 2021, it produced approximately 2,500 terawatt-hours in the form of oil, natural gas, and hydroelectric power. Of this, it exported 90% of the oil, and all its natural gas. In 2021, Norway was the second largest exporter of natural gas to Europe after Russia (total Norwegian exports amounted to 115 Billion Cubic Meters yearly) (Austvik, 2022). After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and following supply disruptions, it has become crucial for European energy security (The Washington Post, 2022). The link between national strategy and energy, however, has not at all been made clear in Norwegian strategic discourse. The North Stream sabotage in September 2022 forced the relationship between gas supplies and security policy to the very top of the agenda (Office of the Prime Minister, 2022). But in Norwegian political debate up until then energy was largely described as a regular good, traded like any other commodity. The country’s sizeable energy supplies were for decades framed as apolitical, governed solely by market mechanisms (Austvik, 2022; Kibsgaard, 2001). Government strategies and whitepapers recognized the link between Norway’s energy exports and security policy. However, more often than not, these documents framed Norway as a subject to the influence of external forces, not as an actor itself. Shocks and crises could influence Norway’s market access or reduce revenue. Little emphasis was put on how Norway could influence the market itself (Meld. St. 36 (2016–2017)). It is a paradox that Norwegian decision-makers thus far have frame their defence policy through a geopolitical lens but reject the same logic when it comes to energy policy. As illustrated clearly in the standoff between Russia and the EU over Ukraine, energy is about far more than market mechanisms of supply and demand. It is a strategic good intimately connected to the ends, ways and means of national strategy (O’Sullivan, 2013). As such, it is a key component

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of the security politicizes of both Norway’s allies and NATO’s rivals. This was made very clear during the 2022 State of the Union address by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen. She highlighted how there was an ongoing fight between autocracy and democracy in which Russia was currently waging “a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values, and a war on our future.” Russia is “actively manipulating our energy market” and “[this] market is not functioning anymore.” For a Norwegian Prime Minister, it is not an everyday event to be called out at the center of a major geo-political stand-off (European Commission, 2022a).6 Norway’s strategic position in European energy is far from a fad. With the European Commission’s REPowerEU plan seeking to rapidly reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels, cutting them rapidly and becoming independent well before 2030, Norway will play a vital role for European energy supplies for years to come (European Commission, 2022b). While the political room for manoeuvre is restricted through Norway’s participation in the European Single Market, it can still yield influence through innovative strategies within these boundaries. The country’s long history of active state intervention in energy resource extraction has shown that the state has both the competence and the know-how to act strategically when it comes to energy exploitation (Austvik, 2019). As a result of Russia’s revisionist foreign policy over the past decade, the link between energy and national security has received renewed attention not just in the EU but also in NATO. The Alliance’s new strategic concept, adopted at the Madrid Summit in the summer of 2022, highlights the need to increase national and collective resilience within the Alliance. As rooted in the collective commitment to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Allies pledge to “work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies.” Importantly, enhancing “energy security and invest[ing]. in a stable and reliable energy supply, suppliers, and sources” (NATO, 2022b, p. 7). Harmoniously, robust energy supplies are listed as part of NATO’s Seven Baseline requirements for enhancing resilience (Hall and Sandeman, 2022). As such, securing energy supplies is a vital function in strengthening NATO’s resistance to hybrid threats and forming an alliance capable of operating in a conflict spectrum that spans from everyday interstate competition to armed conflict (Johnson, 2020). Arguably, for Norway, this implies not just an obligation to reduce vulnerabilities in its own infrastructure, but importantly, to secure the supply to its allies in times of crises and war. Being a major European exporter of energy, Norway plays a key role as a provider to some of its most important allies. Norwegian gas accounted for between 20% and 25% of all demand in the United Kingdom and EU in 2021 (Norwegian Petroleum, 2022). As is often the case with natural gas, a lot of it is enriched and transported along highly vulnerable infrastructure, often relying on single nodes or single installations. Norway, therefore, not only plays a central role in NATO’s strategy due to its geography but also because of its strategic resources. Much like the

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merchant fleet the country built in the 19th and 20th century, energy has now become a major Allied strategic asset controlled by the small state on NATO’s northern flank.7 Conclusion As this chapter has demonstrated, there are elements of both continuity and change in Norway’s strategic position on NATO’s northern flank after the Cold War. For a small state bordering a great power, security policy will inevitably remain a challenging balancing act. However, at least four drivers of change make Norway’s strategic position different from that of the latter half of the past century. First, shifting great power dynamics are changing the “rules” of the rivalry between Russia, the United States, and NATO. This effects how military strategy is played out in Norway’s geographic surroundings. Second, the military theater of operations is being transformed due to climate change and evolutions in weapons technology. Third, an expanding NATO will lead to an equally important geostrategic shift in the coming years as the Nordic countries now unite within the Alliance. Together these trends strengthen the propensity toward theater integration, bringing the High North, Baltic region, and North Atlantic closer together. Finally, Norway has a different strategic role and interests due to changes within the country itself. Norway’s small but potent military capabilities, its economic muscles and not least its energy supplies give the country an ability to “punch above its weight.” As shown, Norway thus finds itself in a markedly different strategic context than during the Cold War. Consequently, there is also an urgent need for novel concepts and strategy. While the full ramifications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are yet to be known, the need for fresh thinking has only been strengthened. Combined, these developments call for a new balance for small state on NATO’s northern flank. Notes 1 The author would like to thank friends and colleagues at the Norwegian Defence University College and the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies for their valued input and feedback. Any remaining mistakes are solely my own. 2 While the use of the term “balance” in Norwegian political discourse has some interconnectedness to the concept of balancing in realist IR theory, the term is primarily used to suggest striking a balance between seemingly contradictory policy goals. 3 The Soviet Union’s SSBNs were split between bastions in the Barents Sea and Pacific Ocean. The bastion defence concept was a layered defence concept developed to shield the Soviet second-strike capability. 4 From an arms control perspective, this rapid strike capability can become highly strategically destabilizing, leading some analysts to call for a control system to limit their proliferation ( Speier et al., 2017). 5 As of mid-November 2022, 28 of the Alliance members states had voted to ratify the expansion.

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6 Norway had to endure harsh criticism for profiting from increased energy prices after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Norway has been accused of war profiteering ( The Washington Post, 2022; The Economist, 2022) and there have been calls for the country to put a cap on gas prices ( Sheppard, 2022). 7 The author would like to thank Palle Ydstebø for this point.

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Leraand, D. (2023) Norges deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner, Store norske leksikon. Available from https://snl.no/Norges_deltakelse_i_internasjonale_ operasjoner [Accessed 6 February 2023]. Libya-utvalget (2018) Evaluering av norsk deltakelse i Libya-operasjonene i 2011. Lundesgaard, A.N. (2022) Navigating High-Profile and Low Availability: Norway and the Emerging US Maritime-Strategic Approach, Policy Brief 1-2022. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Meld. St. 36 (2016–2017) Melding til Stortinget. Veivalg i norsk utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Meredith, M., M. Sommerkorn, S. Cassotta, C. Derksen, A. Ekaykin, A. Hollowed, G. Kofinas, A. Mackintosh, J. Melbourne-Thomas, M.M.C. Muelbert, G. Ottersen, H. Pritchard and E.A.G. Schuur (2019) Polar Regions. In Pörtner, H.-O., Roberts, D.C., Masson-Delmotte, V., Zhai, P., Tignor, M., Poloczanska, E., Mintenbeck, K., Alegría, A., Nicolai, M., Okem, A., Petzold, J., Rama, B. and Weyer, N.M. (eds.), IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (pp. 203–320). Cambridge, UK and New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. NATO (2022a) A “Comprehensive Approach” to crises. Available from https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm [Accessed 3 March 2023]. NATO (2022b) Deterrence and Defence. Available from https://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natohq/topics_133127.htm [Accessed 3 March 2023]. Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) (2021) Statens pensjonsfond utland: Årsrapport 2021. Norwegian Intelligence Service (2022) Fokus 2022. Available from https://www. forsvaret.no/aktuelt-og-presse/publikasjoner/fokus/rapporter/Fokus-2022-til-web. pdf/_/attachment/inline/ec6bec00-d2d3-41c0-af08-02b3b494e8b7:e4014ab4d0e 3bd8b2509e7974430fe121e0473ba/Fokus-2022-til-web.pdf [Accessed 3 March 2023]. Norwegian Intelligence Service (2023) Fokus 2023. Available from https://www. etterretningstjenesten.no/publikasjoner/fokus/fokus-norsk/Fokus2023%20%20NO%20-%20Weboppslag%20v3.pdf/_/attachment/inline/c1a9a458-aa1d4bf6-a558-9cec57acde8f:9b2050d897a2b2db1bddc8e505db7b666e608b98/ Fokus2023%20-%20NO%20-%20Weboppslag%20v3.pdf [Accessed 3 March 2023]. Norwegian Petroleum (2022) Exports of Oil and Gas. Available from https://www. norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/ [Accessed 3 March 2023]. NRK (2020) Beredskapen som forsvant. Available from https://www.nrk.no/ dokumentar/beredskapen-som-forsvant-1.14963372 [Accessed 3 March 2023]. Odgaard, L. (2022) Russia’s Arctic Designs and NATO. Survival, 64(4), 89–104. Office of the Prime Minister (2022) Statement by Prime Minister Støre at a press conference about the gas leak in the Baltic Sea. Available from https://www. regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/statement-at-a-press-conference-on-damage-on-thenord-stream-1-and-2-pipelines/id2929262/ [Accessed 15 November 2022]. Oma, I.M. (2021a) Avskrekking og beroligelse – den «doble strategi» som kom inn fra kulden, IFS Insights, 7 2021. Oslo, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies. Oma, I.M. (2021b) Sikkerhetspolitikk på kjente stier. In Pharo, B., Engh, H. and Offerdal (eds.), Historiker, strateg og brobygger. Festskrift til Rolf Tamnes 70 år. Oslo, Pax Forlag.

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Finnish and Swedish NATO membership What does it hold for the Arctic? Hanna Ojanen and Arto Väisänen1

Introduction This chapter aims to outline what Finland’s and Sweden’s positions as NATO members might be when it comes to the Northern areas, or the Arctic. It examines the ways in which Finland and Sweden can contribute to transatlantic security and looks at how their NATO membership changes the military strategic dynamic in the Nordic region. This chapter will first put the Arctic2 in the context of the two countries’ foreign, security, and defense policies prior to the decision to apply for NATO membership. This background also explains the context of Nordic cooperation in security and defense, including the bilateral cooperation between Finland and Sweden. This chapter then goes on to analyze the rapid changes during the year 2022 in the two countries’ security and defense policies, doctrines, and strategies. Next, this chapter looks closer at Finland and Sweden as NATO members. What kind of members will these countries be, what could be their contribution to NATO? This chapter takes up the expectations of other NATO countries on their contributions. Highlighting Arctic issues in particular, this chapter looks for early answers to the questions of what might change in how the two countries now see the Arctic area, how they see their roles in the defense of NATO’s northern flank, how they see the role of NATO in the High North and in the Arctic region, and how they see their own part in potentially shaping NATO’s future role there. When it comes to our analysis and the conclusions we can draw, it is important to highlight the timing of the writing of this chapter. This chapter has been finalized in a period in which Finland acceded into NATO, but Sweden has not yet become a NATO member. This means, first, a certain degree of speculation: there are many questions that have not been answered, or not even asked yet. Second, the time of the two countries’ application to NATO has been characterized by a strong tendency to stress the positive consequences of these countries’ membership in NATO, both for the countries themselves, as well as for NATO, and even for Nordic cooperation. The underlining motivation is the outstandingly dire security situation in Europe with the ongoing Russian war on DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-16

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Ukraine. This aggression highlights the need to ensure in this very uncertain situation both the rapid acceptance of these countries into NATO and the continued strong support of the two countries’ populations for NATO membership. Finally, while there has been a very intense discussion on various aspects of NATO membership in both countries, questions related to the Arctic have not yet been addressed in any detail. The Arctic in Finnish and Swedish foreign, security, and defense policy prior to the decision to apply for NATO membership Finnish and Swedish national strategies for the Arctic

Both Finland and Sweden have published specific Arctic strategies at least since the early 2010s. This chapter examines the most recent strategies and sheds light on the similarities and differences between the two countries. Background will help the reader understand the context in which the militarystrategic approaches of the countries have evolved, and where NATO membership then will come to play a role. Finland

For Finland, being an Arctic country forms, in a sense, the basis of its defense, foreign, and security policies (Government of Finland, 2021a, p. 12). Finnish foreign and security policies in the Arctic region have traditionally relied on three basic assumptions. First, Finland has sought to ensure primacy of non-military issues. Second, and relatedly, Finland has tried to ensure that Arctic issues are dealt with multilaterally, notably in the Arctic Council. These foreign policy priorities have rested on a third assumption regarding defense policy the core principle of Finnish defense and security policy is ensuring a strong territorial defense of the whole country. Whole country, including the Arctic. The most recent Arctic strategy of the Finnish government is from 2021. It follows the tradition of putting environmental and socioeconomic issues at the core of Finnish Arctic policy (Government of Finland, 2021a). The Finnish government stresses the priority of addressing the negative impacts of environmental degradation and climate change at both the national and international decision-making levels. Climate adaption and combatting environmental degradation should be done in a socially sustainable manner. The Arctic is a region with communities with specific economic and political needs (Government of Finland, 2021a, p. 17). The strategy, aimed to extend to the year 2030, sets the following priorities: (1) climate change mitigation and adaptation; (2) well-being of inhabitants (promotion of well-being and the rights of the Saami as an indigenous people); (3) Arctic expertise (livelihoods and leading-edge research); and (4) infrastructure

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 227 and logistics. The Arctic areas account for one-third of the total national territory, and have a population of 520,000, which makes up 10% of the national population (The Arctic Council, 2022a, 2022b). Compared to Sweden, which has relatively smaller Arctic population,3 socio-economic matters seem to play a more prominent factor in the Finnish thinking, while the logistic challenges of long distances play an important role both in terms of security of supply and territorial defense. In this strategy, NATO is not mentioned. The strategy does mention NATO countries in the context of describing the increased military presence in the area. On Finnish defense, it states the following: The Finnish Defence Forces participates in Arctic research cooperation and conducts military exercises in the north, both nationally and together with its international partners. Finland’s strength lies in capable Defence Forces, developed to operate in Arctic conditions, and possessing Arctic expertise of a high international level. (Government of Finland, 2021a, p. 19) In addition to multilateralism, the Finnish approach has emphasized the need to maintain good bilateral relations with all Arctic states, including Russia, even if Russia’s activities in Ukraine since 2014 and its increasing military activities in the Arctic are seen to have a negative impact on the overall stability and security of the region (Lavikainen, 2021a). The focus of bilateral relations with Russia used to center mostly on environmental, climate, and nuclear safety issues (Lavikainen 2021b). Recent Finnish strategies have also addressed the need for continued and increased cooperation with the US and Canada on Arctic issues. International cooperation, training, and interoperability constitute integral parts of the Finnish Arctic defense and security policies (Government of Finland, 2021a). To this end, the Finnish Defense Forces have participated in various multinational exercises, within and outside of NATO structures. These have included the Arctic Lock and the Arctic Challenge, with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and, in a lesser role, the US participating. Finnish defense and security policy has for years been highly integrated with NATO and its allies in the Arctic, as reflected in its participation in NATO’s Cold Response exercise in 2016 and early 2022. The Host Nation Support (HNS) agreement with NATO, signed in 2014, aims to ensure eased logistical and operational coordination with NATO forces on Finnish territory, including in the Arctic (Lassenius, 2022, p. 109). Integration with NATO has been furthered with various bilateral exercises with NATO countries, such as the US, the UK, and Norway in the Arctic (Kuusela, 2020; Government of Finland, 2021a). While the bilateral FinnishSwedish defense cooperation is particularly deep, further trilateral agreements have been signed between Finland, Sweden, and the US (a Statement of Intent in 2016 and agreement on deepening relationship in 2018), as well as between Finland, Sweden, and Norway in 2020. These documents formalize existing defense cooperation between the three countries, aiming to “pursue

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an enhanced trilateral defense relationship” (Government of Sweden, 2018). When it comes to bilateral cooperation with the US, Finland has actively aimed at maintaining a close relationship with the US (Ministry of Defence Finland, 2022a). In practice, this cooperation has taken the form of ensuring US participation in military exercises and maintaining strong connections between different levels of officials at the defense ministries and between the military command structures (Saxi, 2019). When it comes to trilateral or international training, the Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian Air Forces train almost weekly (50 events per year) under the Cross Border Training (CBT) program. The US Air Forces occasionally participates in the CBT events, in addition to the bigger exercises such as the bi-annual Arctic Challenge Exercise (ACE). As a result of regular training, the Finnish and Swedish Air Forces are fully interoperable with the NATO forces (Solli and Solvang, 2021). Finnish cooperation with Sweden, and other countries, has not been limited to Air Forces only: during the Cold Response exercise in 2022, with the US Marines among others, Finnish and Swedish land forces operated as a joint brigade of 2100 personnel and 600 vehicles. Sweden

The starting point of Swedish Arctic policies has been that it is an Arctic country (Government of Sweden, 2022, p. 5) which sees itself as having a special international responsibility for the Arctic region. The key policy priorities for Swedish Arctic policy are as follows: (1) international collaboration; (2) security and stability; (3) climate and the environment; (4) polar research and environmental monitoring; (5) sustainable economic development and business interests; and (6) securing good living conditions (Government of Sweden, 2020a, p. 6). From a foreign and security policy perspective, the Swedish government has placed multilateral efforts and institutions at the core of a stable and peaceful Arctic, and as tools of pursuing Swedish policy preferences in the region. Second, in accordance with Swedish foreign policy overall, Swedish Arctic security and defense policies are based on a range of forms of international cooperation and collaboration, and on aiming at maintaining armed force presence in the Arctic area. This presence was strengthened with the reestablishment of a regiment in Arvidsjaur, following an overall shift back to territorial defense from a focus on expeditionary operations (Pyykönen and Forss, 2019, pp. 34–39). Third, the Swedish government has prioritized addressing climate and environmental issues in the Arctic emphasizing international scientific and research cooperation. For the Swedish government, the Arctic constitutes an area which should be governed through multilateral institutions, such as the Arctic Council, and international law, including UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and various UN Climate agreements. This applies particularly to issues pertaining to security in a broad sense. As for Finland, stability in the region is an intrinsic interest of Sweden and a precondition for cooperation

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 229 and collaboration on issues of sustainable development and addressing climate and environmental challenges (Government of Sweden 2020a). For Sweden, the Arctic Council constitutes a central multilateral forum (Government of Sweden, 2020a, p. 11) essential in ensuring continued communication and collaboration among the Arctic countries. The challenges have grown since 2014 as relations with Russia have deteriorated. Sweden has not been interested in expanding the Council’s mandate on security and military issues. In addition to cooperation with Finland, the Swedish government has also sought to strengthen cooperation with other Nordic countries in security and defense policies in the Arctic (Government of Sweden, 2020a; Brommesson et al. 2022, pp. 4–5). The US constitutes a strong and important security and defense partner for Sweden, in and outside of the Arctic. In the Arctic, Sweden has both hosted and participated in various exercises with US participation, such as the Swedish exercise, Northern Wind, in 2019. Sweden also highlights the need for bilateral ties with Canada. Canada is seen as an “important partner” and Sweden seeks to build closer ties based on foreign policy priorities, including a stable and peaceful Arctic (Government of Sweden, 2020a; Government of Canada, 2022). With Canada, Sweden prioritizes environmental, research, and indigenous issues, while security and defense policies are part of wider transatlantic NATO framework (Government of Sweden, 2020a, 2020b; Government of Canada, 2022). Swedish Arctic security and defense policies have been more pronounced after 2014, as demonstrated by the gradually increased capabilities and continued building of a patchwork of alliances. Still, the Swedish Arctic policies are not only geopolitical, as environmental and socio-economic aspects also play a significant part. New strategic importance of the Arctic and implications for the Finnish and Swedish defense forces Strategic perception

Before examining the ramifications of 2022 and eventual NATO membership on Finnish and Swedish Arctic policies, it is necessary to discuss the two countries’ strategic perceptions of the Arctic, which are for the most part shared. Both Finland and Sweden had adopted a more defense and securityoriented approach to the Arctic before 2022, with Sweden announcing major Arctic capabilities in 2021 (re-establishment of an Arctic brigade and increased priority of the Arctic in planning documents). Furthermore, as Pesu and Iso-Markku (2022, p. 17) underline, Finnish and Swedish Arctic areas constitute a “shared strategic space.” For the Finnish and Swedish governments, the Arctic strategic environment has grown more unstable, with several negative trends (Government of Finland, 2021a; Government of Sweden, 2020a). Climate change is opening new maritime routes in the region and potentially enabling economic activities, especially resource extraction, but it also poses economic challenges to existing

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local communities and military infrastructure (Government of Finland, 2021a, 2021b; Government of Sweden, 2020a). All this contributes to increased attention given to the Arctic by the US, Russia, and China. This links the Arctic region with rising global geopolitical tensions. The gradual increase in regional friction and competition erodes the idea presented in the literature of the Arctic as a separate “zone of peace” (Government of Finland, 2021a; Government of Sweden, 2020a; Koivurova et al., 2022; Käpylä and Mikkola, 2019). This links to the second main factor driving the changing Arctic strategic situation, namely Russia’s Arctic military build-up and aggression in Ukraine since 2014. Russia’s modernization of its Arctic-based and military capabilities, along with increased positioning of nuclear forces in the Kola Peninsula, such as submarines, constitutes a significant challenge for both Finnish and Swedish military planning and operations. In a case of conflict, Russia would likely push forward their A2/AD capabilities in the Arctic region, especially in the Kola peninsula (Saxi, 2019, p. 67; Wieslander et al., 2023). For NATO and the US ability to support its allies through Northern Europe, Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian capabilities are essential in countering Russia in the Arctic (Pesu and Iso-Markku, 2022, p. 17). In addition, the illegal Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent attempts to establish a new European security order based on “spheres of influence” or establishing a “bastion strategy” are seen as detrimental to both the Finnish and Swedish national security environments, and to the wider Arctic strategic environment (Government of Sweden, 2020a; Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2020a; Government of Finland 2021b; Granholm, 2019; Pesu and Paukkunen, 2022). The response by NATO and the US such as the US decision to re-establish the US Second Fleet with an operational area in the Northern Atlantic may increase not only military activity in the Arctic but also the possibility of an arms race. However, Finnish and Swedish military and defense decision-makers assess that the NATO’s current engagement and planning capabilities for the Arctic are not sufficiently developed. As such, despite the challenges of the US Arctic capabilities, both Finland and Sweden see ensuring continued US engagement in the region essential for their security (Paukkunen and Mikkola, 2021; Toveri, 2022). While Finland and Sweden for the most part agree in their assessments of the Arctic strategic environment before 2022, the position and prominence of the Arctic in their strategic planning differs (Granholm, 2019; Lassenius, 2022; Government of Sweden, 2020a, p. 24; Government of Finland, 2021b). The Finnish Defense Forces do not maintain a separate Arctic strategy but perceive their own Arctic territory as an intrinsic part of their national defense. As such, the Finnish military aims to ensure that all of its armed forces are capable of acting in the Arctic environment (Kuusela, 2020). For Finland, the Arctic and the Baltic Sea area are viewed as single strategic area. The Arctic has only recently, in the late 2010s and early 2020s, started being re-integrated into Sweden’s strategic thinking and defense policy considerations (Swedish Defence Committee (Försvarsberedningen) 2019, p. 50; Granholm,

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 231 2019). As such, Sweden is currently catching up with Finnish thinking, while also re-constituting the Arctic part of a “continuous front” with the Baltic and Black Seas (Försvarsmakten, 2022b, p. 25; Khorrami, 2021). Defense capabilities Finland

For Finland, the Arctic region does not constitute a separate area of activity but is an integral part of Finnish defense planning and capabilities (Kuusela, 2020; Ossa and Koivula, 2022; Government of Finland, 2021b, see Annex 1 for Finnish defence spending). Finnish defense capabilities have been built on armed forces with a relatively small active component of around 19,000 soldiers, plus 3,000 in the paramilitary Border Guard, who would be incorporated into the Defense Force under mobilization (Ossa and Koivula, 2022). Outside mobilization, the Border Guard maintains the responsibility of monitoring the 380 km of Arctic border between Finland and Russia (Rajavartiolaitos, 2020). With their constant presence and understanding of local conditions, the Border Guard remains an essential part of Finnish defense and security capabilities in the Arctic. Fully mobilized, the Finnish field army has around 280,000 personnel, with a reserve of an additional couple hundred thousand well-trained conscripts (IISS, 2022, p. 102). Specific to the Arctic area, the Finnish Defense Forces maintain the Jaeger Brigade, located in Sodankylä. The Jaeger Brigade has special responsibilities to further develop Arctic warfare tactics and capabilities. In addition to land forces in Sodankylä, the Finnish Air Force has located one of its main operating bases in Rovaniemi at the Arctic Circle, currently housing F-16s and airdefense capabilities. In the future, it will house some of the F-35s that Finland will be procuring from the US beginning in 2026. Finally, while Finland does not maintain as significant naval capabilities as Sweden does, it does possess a state-owned fleet of eight icebreakers, along with a significant industrial base with the ability to construct more (Lassenius, 2022, p. 96). Sweden

In response to calls to reintegrate the Arctic into Swedish defense and strategic thinking, the Swedish government started to enhance its national defense capabilities and advance planning before 2022. In the early 2000s and 2010s, Sweden significantly downsized its land forces, including those operating in the Arctic. The Swedish Army’s Arctic capabilities were largely based on the Jaeger Battalions located in Arvidsjaur, along with a mechanized brigade located around the Boden Military Base (Government of Sweden, 2020b, pp. 114–115; Lassenius, 2022, p. 95). In 2021, the Swedish government agreed that the two Jaeger Battalions would be reorganized under the re-established Norrland’s Dragoon Regiment (K4). The new regiment was designed to operate in the Northern Calotte region in a sub-Arctic environment.

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The Swedish Arctic defense capabilities also include an Air Force base located in Luleå. The Norrbotten Wing operates two divisions of JAS Gripen 39 aircrafts, with the necessary support staff (Försvarsmakten, 2022a; Lassenius, 2022, p. 96). The Swedish Air Force maintains regular exercises with the Finnish and Norwegian Air Forces operating in the Arctic. Finally, the Swedish Navy continues to maintain diesel-powered submarines, along with Visby-class corvettes that can operate in the Arctic waters, alongside with five privately and stateowned Swedish icebreakers (Lassenius, 2022, p. 96; Government of Sweden, 2020a, p. 24). Despite the process of re-integrating the Arctic dimension into broader Swedish strategic thinking and re-establishment and increase in existing military capabilities prior to 2022, analysts argued that many challenges still exist. For example, Granholm (2019, pp. 17–21) argues that Sweden needs to adjust its priorities to more clearly countering Russian actions against key strategic infrastructure, such as transport and sea-bed data cables. Instead of re-building the scale of land forces, the focus should be on a more specialized and high readiness forces, supported by strong early warning and intelligence assets (Granholm, 2019; Pyykönen and Forss, 2019, pp. 42–43; Barrie et al., 2022). Finnish-Swedish bilateral cooperation

The cooperation between Finland and Sweden has advanced to a point where they undertake joint operational planning across all branches of the armed forces. Such integration enables joint air and maritime surveillance and defense, along with shared operational updates (Lassenius, 2022, p. 107). The Swedish and Finnish Air Forces maintain various bilateral exercises in the Arctic, which are supplemented with the shared use of air forces bases if necessary (Brommesson et al., 2022, p. 4; Solli and Solvang, 2021). Sweden has sought to ensure that one of its three operational land force brigades maintains a capacity to support Finland in the form of a shared joint brigade, should the need arise (Lassenius, 2022, p. 107; Brommesson et al., 2022, p. 4). Finally, there are currently plans for further development of a joint Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG), which reached its initial operational capacity in 2017. The Naval Task Group, which is expected to reach its full operational capacity in 2023, is a “tactical unit, covering all warfare areas except for submarine warfare” (Forsberg, 2022; Villikari, 2019). As with their Air Forces, Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation also entails shared of use of naval bases (Brommesson et al., 2022, p. 4). The momentous year, 2022, in Finnish and Swedish security and defense Reorientation, but not without continuity

The Russian war of aggression on Ukraine at the end of February 2022 changed the European security landscape in a dramatic way. One country was

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 233 attacked, but all sensed the danger: Russia abandoned what were thought to be shared rules and agreements and used massive force against a neighboring country. The consequences were immediately felt in the North. What would Finland and Sweden do? Their analysis and conclusion was quick: in a matter of months, the two countries decided to apply for NATO membership, and thereby leave their long-lived policies of military non-alignment, opting for alliance. As late as 16 February, the Swedish Prime Minister still said Sweden would stay non-aligned, yet on 18 May, both countries handed in their letters of application to the NATO Secretary General in Brussels, and Finland became a NATO member on 4 April 2023. While the seemingly sudden decision to join a military alliance certainly means an end to the non-alignment (and before that neutrality) that the two countries were known for, and which had been at the core of their security and defense policies for decades, it may not mean a total reversal. It is important to put the decision into context and a longer time perspective. In fact, it would be wrong to say that their policies had been somehow unchanging in the years and decades prior to the years 2022 and 2023. Both countries’ policies have been evolving at a considerable pace. There are some important elements of change that the two countries share, notably, the way in which they have increasingly stepped up their participation in defense-related cooperation and how they have prepared and updated their legislation defense, notably concerning giving and receiving military aid. Of the two, Sweden has changed course more often. It reoriented in the early 2000s toward crisis management, emphasis on intervention forces, reduction of conscript numbers and eventually the abolition of conscript service in peacetime in 2010, transitioning to a small professional military. In 2014, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, Sweden increased military spending and committed to a partial reactivation of mandatory military service (Forsberg et al., 2022). The socalled Hultqvist Doctrine also included seeking broader and deeper defense cooperation with other states (Brommesson et al., 2022). Both countries have adjusted their legislation to allow for this cooperation, enabling both the giving and the receiving of military aid, and thus the use of military force abroad for other than crisis management purposes. Compared to Sweden, Finland kept its emphasis on territorial defense throughout. In Finland, taking part in international crisis management operations was seen as important; interestingly, participation was typically justified by the capability-enhancing nature of the operations. Finnish thinking then shifted toward a more direct leaning on defense and military cooperation as part of defense proper, moving away from “credible national defense.” For Finland, two important notions in this context are the so-called former “NATO option” and room for maneuver. For a long time, the Finnish security and defense policy documents have been referring to the possibility of seeking NATO membership (Hämäläinen, 2022).4 This might appear to be merely stating the obvious: Finland, as a European country, would have that possibility—without binding NATO in any way, of course. But there was

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more to it. It was an important statement in the sense that it kept NATO membership firmly among the possible policy choices. It was also what “freedom of maneuver” meant in practice. It was important for Finland to demonstrate its sovereign decision-making power and freedom to choose its security and defense policy orientation. Thus, the room for maneuver was the freedom to choose at any stage between military non-alignment and military alliance—independently, not because of external pressure. Why this doctrine was so important was shown at the end of 2021 when Russia was proposing to the US that the two countries could agree on matters concerning European security without consulting the Europeans, and that this agreement would include a stop to further NATO enlargement (Pifer, 2021). This was directly sensed in Finland as a serious threat to Finnish policy options and even sovereignty (YLE, 2021). Russia was threatening to reduce the room for maneuver that is so important for Finland, and the country needed to signal without delay that Russia has no say in its policy choices. The New Year’s speech of the President of the Republic, Sauli Niinistö, took this up and very interestingly, the President directly mentioned Sweden too. It was not only Finland, but both countries, whose options were threatened. Quite soon, then, the idea of room for maneuver was given a new kind of meaning: it was noted that there was a danger that this room was diminishing, but now the option of NATO membership was there precisely to save it. From now on, the room for maneuver that Finland needed, and wanted to have, was to be found inside NATO, guaranteed by membership in the Alliance (Government of Finland, 2022). Following the events of 2022, it is possible to argue that Finnish strategic culture changed, prompted by the threat of war and the fear of being left alone. But there are many elements of continuity (Seppo, 2022). Finland is keen on keeping the principles of conscription, trained reserve, and high defense willingness intact as the basis of its national defense capability (Ries, 2022). The difference with NATO membership is that the overall organization of national defense includes taking into consideration the Alliance, its goals and its interests (Pesu, 2022). The way NATO is talked about now is clearly something new; suffice it to say that in Sweden, depicting NATO as an organization of collective security only started with the end of the Cold War; before that, it was of programmatic importance not to discuss the benefits of NATO in an open and uncommitted manner. To recognize the stabilizing effect of NATO for all of Europe would have reduced the credibility of neutrality (af Malmborg, 2001, pp. 300–301). In many ways, the two countries’ security and defense political thinking has been reversed. In Sweden, the traditional formulation of non-alignment ‘serving the country well’ no longer served. In Finland, thinking about suitable conditions for entering an alliance were reversed. The prevailing understanding in Finland had been that if it were to join NATO, it could only happen when the security situation was calm—that is, under quite different conditions from what then was to be the case (Tiilikainen, 2022).

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 235 A final important point is that the two countries’ defense budgets have gradually increased since 2014 (see Annex1 and Figure 13.1). In April 2022, the Swedish parliament decided that military defence will receive further SEK 2 billion (€175 million). For procurement, the Swedish Armed Forces will receive additional SEK 30.9 billion (€2.6 billion) for period of 2022–2025 (Government of Sweden, 2022, p. 20). The Finnish government also agreed to provide additional €669.4 million to Ministry of Defence and the Finnish Defence Forces (Ministry of Defence Finland, 2022b). This additional funding includes €490 million for rapid procurement projects and outlined the need for additional €1.7 billion for longer procurement processes for 2022–2027. These would include anti-armor, anti-air capabilities, along with artillery shells and missiles for air–and sea-defense. The government is also aiming to provide €3.2 million for voluntary national defence activities (Ministry of Defence Finland, 2022b). Moreover, the Finnish parliament in October 2022 approved of a plan to build a fence on the Eastern border, starting as a pilot project. The country’s border guard authority has said it ultimately aims to construct between 130 and 260 km of fences, covering 10–20% of the overall length of the border, focusing primarily on border crossing points and adjacent areas in southeast Finland (Reuters, 2022a). Quick reorientation, quick process

The main driver of the shift was the dramatic change of public opinion in Finland. Traditionally, around 25% had been in favor of NATO membership, and the majority were always against. As the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine started on 24 February, the polls—which have been very frequent—immediately showed a change: at that time, 53% were in favor; in March, 62% were in favor, and the margin was growing (YLE, 2022a). Political decision-makers quickly prepared a “process” of wide consultations both internationally and domestically. And they drew Sweden along in a very concrete way—President Niinistö in a visit to Washington in early March 2022, together with President Biden, called the Prime Minister of Sweden to discuss NATO membership. Swedish opinion has traditionally been more positive toward NATO membership than Finnish opinion has been. Therefore, it was expected that Sweden might eventually lead Finland on the path to NATO. What was notable was that this time Finland was leading —unlike the EU accession process which was led (and brought about) by Sweden. One reason for the quick change of opinion was a strong identification with Ukraine and the Ukrainians, which brought up collective Finnish wartime memories and highlighted that Ukraine was not getting all the help it would get if it were a NATO member. The main line of thought, therefore, came to be that Finland needs to have stronger security guarantees and to achieve this, the most reliable alternative is NATO membership. The reason the whole process then went so quickly, resulting in the accession protocols being signed on 5 July 2022, has to do with the fact that

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the two countries were already as close to NATO as a country can be without being a member—“informal allies,” as Wieslander (2019) puts it. To demonstrate this, Finnish membership in April 2023 marked the end of fastest NATO accession process in the history of the Alliance. The two countries’ relations with NATO gained pace with Partnership for Peace in 1994, although Finland had been an observer of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council since 1991, and further developed through becoming Enhanced Opportunities Partners in 2014. Wieslander notes the “win-win” character of this relation as the two countries both contributed to and gained from cooperation (Wieslander 2019). On 25 February 2022, they were asked to take part in deeper information exchange, becoming part of Modalities for Strengthened Interaction (MSI). Once the accession protocols were signed, the two became observers and now take apart in the defense and foreign ministers’ meetings in that capacity (defense ministers 13 October, foreign ministers in November) (Ilta-Sanomat 14.10.2022). From NATO’s side, too, the process was quick: there was need to show unity of purpose and resolve, and to maintain an open door policy. As the situation was tense and negative Russian reactions were expected, there was also need to ensure help during the membership process. Various actions were taken, including a bilateral political declaration in May with the United Kingdom (Government of United Kingdom, 2022) and larger military exercises enhanced by special visits such as that of USS Kearsarge in Helsinki and Stockholm (Svenska YLE, 2022). In spite of this internal support for both Finnish and Swedish memberships, Turkey and Hungary lifted their blockage only for Finland, leaving Sweden still out of the Alliance. President Niinistö stated in his accession speech that “Finnish membership is not complete without Swedish membership” (Niinistö, 2023), and the very first action Finland took as a NATO member was to ratify the Swedish accession (NATO, 2023). Continued importance of bilateral cooperation

A peculiarity of this accession is that the two countries wanted to become members at the same time, but were not successful in this. The two countries considered it important to join together as that would have ensured good conditions for their bilateral defense cooperation, which has deepened quite a lot in recent years. Following the Finnish NATO membership, Swedish defence policymakers indicated that while separate Finnish NATO membership does not in short term change the cooperation, in medium-to-long term it could have a detrimental impact (Sippola, 2023). The Military strategic concept for deepened defense cooperation from 2019 defines military cooperation as possible beyond peace, and without any pre-set restrictions.(Ministry of Defence Finland, 2022c). The main elements would be organizing brigade-size common training exercises, a joint Amphibious Task Unit, and the joint Naval Task Group reaching full

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 237 operational capability by 2023 (Forsberg et al., 2022). What is notable is that they can use each other’s naval and air force bases; furthermore, they organize joint anti-submarine exercises, and are developing a concept for deploying a joint army force the size of a brigade. In all, their cooperation borders on a defense alliance (Brommesson et al., 2022). In June 2022, the two countries signed a Host Nation Support Memorandum of Understanding (Ministry of Defence Finland, 2022d). Expectations on Finnish and Swedish NATO membership Expectations from inside NATO, close by and further away

The discussions in 2022 give some ideas about what would be expected of Finland and Sweden as NATO members, beyond being overall security contributors (Ojanen, 2022). Starting from the Baltic Sea region, the two countries’ abilities to control the sea and air space is one such contribution; they can importantly contribute to the defense of the Baltic countries. What Finland and Sweden can bring to NATO above all is their capabilities in the Baltic Sea region: capable vessels for the archipelago, coastal anti-ship missile batteries, and Swedish shallow-water submarines. They can close the Gulf of Finland to hostile ships, including movement between Kaliningrad and mainland Russia. They also contribute to the situational picture with valuable intelligence, and the air force capability is notable particularly with the Finnish purchase of 64 F-35A multi-role fighters to be delivered between 2026 and 2030 (Forsberg et al., 2022). Finland and Estonia have already agreed on integrating coastal defense as NATO members (Jonsson and Häggblom, 2022). Swedish contributions in particular include military capabilities for direct support, its central location, and important means of indirect support, including for protecting sea transport; it might also adapt some air bases to F35 systems (Neretnieks, 2022). What might be particularly needed is their icebreaking capacity. Considering that the US has capacity shortage in the Arctic, the excess icebreaking capacity in summertime that Finland and Sweden have may be of interest when the Northern Sea Route is commercially navigable (Lundqvist, 2020, p. 26). Space capabilities are also a significant part of Arctic defense capabilities. This is because the huge distances within the region, which along with sparse population, limit the utility of other forms of intelligence and information sources. Both Finland and Sweden are part of the European Space Agency (ESA), and their respective space-based capabilities can possibly serve as basis for further cooperation (Lassenius, 2022, p. 97). Sweden hosts the Esrange space center located near Kiruna in the Arctic. Finland maintains cutting-edge satellite technology. The Esrange space center is an important part of Europe’s independent access to space, but even NATO, and the US, could be interested in such access (France24, 2022). Finland, in turn, heads to establishing a national space situation center by 2026 (Ministry of Transport and Communications of Finland, 2022; Suomenmaa, 2023).

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Not only the Baltic States but also Norway’s defense can be strengthened by Finland and Sweden as NATO members. The question that may come up, however, is that of overstretch, both for Finland, in terms of trying to be both Baltic and Arctic, and for Sweden’s naval forces, which are not enough for both the Baltic Sea and the west coast (cf. Granholm, 2019, p. 21). Another issue could be that the expectations from other NATO members differ and may be contradictory. As Solvang writes in this book, Denmark does not expect Finland and Sweden to make any difference in the Arctic, but rather to contribute in the Baltic area. Bentzen, also in this book, notes that the expansion of the Alliance presents both significant opportunities and several dilemmas; Russian operation into Norway would be hampered if NATO can operate in Finland and Sweden; at the same time, a broader concept for deterrence and defense of the entire Scandinavian peninsula would be created including greater responsibility for security lines of communication being needed to facilitate the defense of Finland and Sweden. And, Norway may find itself with a ‘branding problem’ within NATO: it would no longer be NATO in the North.5 The third problem might be increasing friction inside the Alliance in case the other allies see too much of a Northern emphasis (Alberque and Schreer, 2022). Finland’s response would seem to be that a strong and wellfunctioning alliance is among Finland’s special interests (Honkanen, 2022), and here “well-functioning” means without friction. How do Finland and Sweden see NATO’s role in the Arctic?

What role do Finland and Sweden see for NATO in the Arctic? The question is difficult to answer as as only one of them has become NATO member as of yet and have not expressed themselves on this issue. What is clear, however, is that NATO membership has consequences for the defense of the Arctic regions of these countries as well as for the role of their defense forces in the High North in general. What would NATO’s role be in concrete terms? There are two sides to this question: first, possible concrete NATO presence; second, the role of NATO among other international organizations and cooperation in the region. The question of permanent NATO presence has been discussed in both countries. Neither has made reservations when applying (and this has been important for the sake of a quick process, too; see also the Swedish Supreme Commander in SVT Nyheter, 2022). Both considered it possible in actual terms to decide for themselves on whether there will be a NATO presence, and in what form. Sweden’s membership application contained a reference to the fact that Sweden will not station permanent bases nor troops. The Swedish government’s position is that Sweden will not host permanent NATO troops nor nuclear weapons, although the Supreme Commander would not rule these out, either. The Swedish Defence Commission’s report on security policy 2023 notes that Sweden is expected to be able to grant territory, for

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 239 instance providing base, supply and transit areas, to the NATO Allies (p. 199). On nuclear weapons, it notes that all Allies, including Sweden, are expected to support NATO’s common doctrine of deterrence, including the function of nuclear weapons for the alliance’s deterrence and defense. The Defense Committee notes that Sweden’s application for membership in NATO has been submitted without reservations and believes that, in the same way as in other Nordic countries, there is no reason to have nuclear weapons on Swedish territory in peacetime (Swedish Defence Commission, 2023, p. 189) The Finnish government has not pronounced itself. In Finland, the discussion has been sustained in particular by the National Coalition Party (in opposition at the time) which in August 2022 spoke in favor of some form of NATO presence in Finland, be it a NATO base, HQs or a Centre of Excellence; the Left Alliance responded that it is against permanent bases and stationing of troops (YLE 2022b). However, the new Finnish Government will seek to host a “NATO organisation” in Finland, for example a centre of excellence (Government of Finland, 2023, pp. 178–179). How would NATO then relate to other institutions, organizations, and forms of cooperation in the Arctic? The institutions that were set up in the 1990s with the specific intention to facilitate new forms of cooperation with Russia: the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, and the Council of the Baltic Sea States are now frozen or in a phase of deep reconsideration. At the same time, the need for cooperation increases: especially when it comes to matters of climate change, environment, and energy. New constellations for cooperation might still emerge.6 At the same time, bilateral relations continue playing an important role. Alongside the NATO membership processes, Finnish and Swedish bilateral relations with the US are deepening through the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that will provide a framework and a legal basis for regular defence cooperation, with the aim of agreeing on the conditions under which US troops could be stationed in these countries (Ministry of Defence Finland, 2022a; Reuters, 2023). The Finnish ongoing DCA negotiations include giving the US the possibility of using Finnish territory and Finnish bases. The DCA between the US and Norway is mentioned as a model or point of comparison (Helsingin Sanomat, 2023). What do Finland and Sweden, or the Nordics together, want to achieve in NATO?

The discussions in 2022 have been characterized by large agreement on the two countries’ potential, their contributions, and their role as security providers (even though there may at first have been voices in the US saying otherwise); NATO would be strengthened, as would Finnish and Swedish security and defense, and even Nordic cooperation. What has also been discussed is the role of bilateral Swedish-Finnish defense cooperation and Nordic cooperation. The contacts between Finland and

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Sweden as well as between the five Nordic countries have been really intense throughout 2022. There has been less discussion as of yet on what the two countries will and might strive at, once in NATO. There are many unknowns. Even though the two countries were for a long time very close to NATO and took part in the planning process as observers (NDPP), this is different than directly taking part in decisions. Equally, participating in an alliance which has access to nuclear weapons and being actively involved in NATO’s decisions about the region, including the Arctic, are new roles for the two countries. The topic of small member states’ influence inside NATO was, however, a topic that gained interest in Finland already some 20 years ago. At that time, attention was paid to the question of Danish and Norwegian capacity to influence decisions or policies important for themselves, and the nuclear and troop-stationing clauses were taken up as a sign of actual influence of small member states (Honkanen and Kuusela, 2003). Finnish and Swedish influence inside NATO depends on what kind of members they will be—change-makers or adaptive allies? It also depends on the degree of Nordic cooperation, the Nordic countries’ ability, and willingness to work together within NATO. The Nordic Prime Ministers said in their meeting in August 2022 that Nordic cooperation will not become redundant as Finland and Sweden join NATO: it will actually become more binding than before through Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. All say, however, that there will be no Nordic bloc in NATO (Norden, 2022). In the discussion on what the Nordics together could contribute to NATO’s agenda, resilience is often mentioned, and situational awareness and security of supply in particular. The Nordic countries already have experience in cooperation with NATO on crisis preparedness and resilience (Wigell et al., 2022). Particular issues could include security of supply, different aspects of hybrid warfare and civil preparedness capacity (Kronman and Bynander, 2022). The prime ministers also listed enhanced political cooperation, active contribution to NATO exercises and training, defense planning harmonization, classified communications, and cooperation with the UN and the EU. Their Joint statement on Nordic cooperation in security and defense mentions the aim of contributing actively to the development and strengthening of NATO as a military and political alliance.7 An interesting question is whether NATO Command Structure will be changed or complemented somehow after the accession, and how easy it will be for the Nordics to agree among themselves on such a change. Furthermore, there might be a Nordic joint view emerging on discussing arms control and nuclear deterrence in the Arctic (Lindgren, 2022, p. 47) and at some stage, confidence and security-building measures might make a comeback (cf. Granholm, 2019). The five countries might have something to contribute in terms of the variety of actors in the Arctic, by way of being multilateralists, and defenders

Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 241 of a rules-based international system. Finally, and interlinked, their views on Russia, and perhaps particularly that of Finland’s, might be important for them to bring to NATO (on NATO Finland’s Russia policy, see Pesu and IsoMarkku, 2022). Conclusions Writing at a moment in time that when Finland recently acceded, but before Sweden joined NATO, it is admittedly speculative to say how this Northern NATO enlargement will affect the Arctic. What can be said, however, is that the two countries will bring to NATO not only a lot of new Nordic and Arctic territory, but also a strong contribution to defense. At the same time, the thinking in these countries about the defense of their northernmost parts will change. As NATO members, the defense planning will cover the whole region, from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic. The importance of defending these territories, and the importance of developing the needed capabilities, has become clear in recent years. Now, however, the context will become quite different. All Nordic countries will in all likelihood soon be members of NATO. There might be different, even conflicting expectations of the consequences, but it looks clear that the defense of the Baltic states and Norway will be strengthened, and there will be new possibilities for cooperation. Nordic cooperation in air defense may deepen into what Häggblom (2023) calls a “borderless Nordic air base system.” At the same time, the two new NATO countries have increased their military spending in a historic way. The Swedish defense spending will reach 2% by 2026 (Reuters, 2022b). At the same time, we see differences between Finland and Sweden. Finland is noteworthy for the volume of its land forces, while Sweden has more specifically Arctic capabilities. One can see both change and continuity: once allied, the two will be part of joint defense planning—but they will also continue their deep bilateral cooperation. Together, they can contribute with cold weather capabilities, air, land, and naval forces, but also Arctic knowledge, research, analysis, and knowhow. Strategic awareness and foresight are in ever greater need. While it is early to foresee where the Finnish and Swedish footprints will first show inside NATO, we see some several possibilities. In the future, one tangible Nordic footprint in NATO could be a new knowledge hub emerging, perhaps complementary to the Cold Weather Centre of Excellence in Norway (Forsvaret, 2022). Space is another domain where the Nordic Arctic NATO members might be active, including the use of satellites in civilian and military security and intelligence. Further domains where the Nordics might take a significant role could be in NATO’s role in resilience and in combatting climate change. Eventually, discussions on Russia will be shaped by Finland and Sweden alongside other NATO members. Their approach to Arctic security may be for some time to come orient toward strong deterrence, rather than steps toward trust and confidence-building.

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Notes 1 Dr. Hanna Ojanen is research director and Arto Väisänen is a researcher in the ENGAGE research project (H2020) at Tampere University (Faculty of Management and Business). The authors would like to thank Dr. Niklas Granholm, Deputy Director of Studies, at the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI), and Brigadier General (ret.) Juha Pyykönen for their very valuable insights which they kindly shared in December 2022. 2 We define Arctic here as the area north of the 66th latitude. 3 Sweden has around 153,000 km2 of Arctic territory, which accounts for one-third of Sweden, but the population of 52,000 inhabitants is only 5% of the total Swedish population. 4 While the Government’s White Paper on defence policy had taken up the “option” in 2004, it appeared for the first time in a Government Program in 2007 (Finland keeps the option of joining NATO). 5 Note the Finnish General in domestic interview: NATO does not expect Finland to defend the Baltics ( Juonala, 2022). 6 The Finnish Border Guard serves as chair of the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum (NACGF) in 2023. 7 See the NORDEFCO Vision 2025 on improving defense capability and cooperation, including in crisis and conflict, setting the goals of, among others, minimal restrictions on military mobility and more cooperation in military security of supply.

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Finnish and Swedish NATO membership 249 YLE. (2021), “Yhdysvallat torjui pikaisesti Venäjän yrityksen neuvotella turvallisuustakuista ilman liittolaisia.” [The US quickly rebuked Russian attempts to negotiate security guarantees without allies]. Available from: https://yle.fi/a/3-12237673 [Accessed 6 February 2023]. YLE. (2022a), “Ylen kysely: Nato-jäsenyyden kannatus vahvistuu – 62 prosenttia haluaa nyt Natoon.” [YLE survey: Support for NATO membership getting stronger – 62 per cent now wants to join NATO]. Available from: https://yle.fi/a/312354756 [Accessed 6 February 2023]. YLE. (2022b), “Kokoomus haluaa Suomeen pysyviä Nato-joukkoja ja tukikohdan.” [National Coalition Party wants permanent NATO troops and a base in Finland]. Available from: https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-12588784 [Accessed 23 February 2023].

ANNEX 1

FINLAND & SWEDEN: DEFENCE SPENDING % OF GDP

PERCENTAGE OF GDP

Finland

3 2.75 2.5 2.25 2 1.75 1.5 1.25 1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0

Sweden

1.46 1.3

1.26

1.28

1.12

1.11

1.12

2016

2017

2018

1.19

2019

2.01

2.07

1.3

1.34

1.34

2020

2021

2022

1.54

YEAR

Figure 13.1 Compiled from the IISS military balance data.

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A kingdom divided against itself The Kingdom of Denmark and the rise of Arctic security dynamics Liselotte Odgaard

Introduction This chapter discusses the interplay between decision-making dynamics within the Kingdom and the views of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands on geopolitical and geoeconomic developments in the Arctic. Denmark is responsible for security and defence in the Kingdom of Denmark, which also encompasses Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Figure 14.1). The Kingdom is an Arctic state because Greenland has territories north of the Arctic Circle. Greenland and the Faroe Islands have had home rule since 1979 and 1948, respectively. The arrangements have been continuously modernized. Russia’s announcement of the establishment of a new Arctic command in 2014 as its foreign policy was becoming increasingly militarized has contributed to the rise of geopolitics in the Arctic. The United States is enhancing defence cooperation with Arctic NATO allies and partners in response to Russia’s strengthened military presence in the Arctic and China’s strategic civilian presence. In security and defence terms, the Arctic region of the Kingdom of Denmark does not only encompass Greenland which has a coastline bordering the Arctic Ocean but also the Faroe Islands because of its location at the eastern entrance to the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. During the Cold War, this ocean gap was vital for keeping the sea lines of communication between North America and Europe open for transport, supply, and reinforcement. The United States took the leadership in maintaining maritime superiority to protect the supply route, strongly supported by the United Kingdom. From the 1960s, the Soviet Union accorded equal priority to the Arctic and the sea route to the Atlantic Ocean through the GIUK gap. The bastion concept centered on defending and securing its sea-based nuclear forces located in the vicinity of the Kola Peninsula and protected by the Northern Fleet. The Soviet Navy sought control of the area between northern Norway and the eastern coast of Greenland, and sea-denial down to the GIUK gap choke points (Olsen, 2017, pp. 3–6). In 2014, Russia made it a strategic priority to re-establish an offensively oriented navy for operations in the North Atlantic. Russia has engaged in a major upgrade of its sea-based deterrent forces and is strengthening its DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-17

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Figure 14.1 A map showing the location of the Norwegian Sea in the North Atlantic Ocean. Source: Created by Norman Einstein, 25 August 2005. Wikipedia Commons.

sea-based anti-ballistic missile systems. Moreover, it is investing in strategiclevel anti-surface warfare capability. These high-end strategic capabilities could potentially disrupt sea operations and project force into the Atlantic Ocean and deny NATO maritime operations between the GIUK gap and Norway. NATO’s political status as a North Atlantic alliance legitimizes its protection of the GIUK gap and Norway’s coastline. Since 2014, NATO has enhanced its strategic reach, readiness, and deterrence in the Arctic. Strengthened defence and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are needed to protect NATO assets in the GIUK gap from Russian submarine attacks and the US mainland from Russian missile attacks through unsurveilled airspace over Greenland. Capabilities such as frigates, submarines, and air and missile defences are essential. In addition, inter-operability among NATO allies and partners is a priority. Once again, Greenland and the Faroe Islands occupy

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strategic locations in the security and defence dynamics between Russia and NATO and engender a greater focus in Denmark on providing security and defence for the two countries. As great power competition plays an increasingly prominent role in regional dynamics, different relations with Arctic actors such as NATO, Russia, and China and asymmetric influence on security and defence decisions have deepened tensions between its three constituent countries. The Kingdom of Denmark is the only Arctic state that has not been able to agree on an updated strategy that takes into account the rise of geopolitics and replaces the roadmap that defined its Arctic policy until 2021 (Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, 2011). The Danish draft proposal is awaiting the completion of Greenland’s national foreign and defence policy strategy, a process that may take years (Krog, 2022). The Kingdom is not likely to agree on a joint strategy again (Kingdom Government Officials, 2022). The delay testifies to the difficulties finding common ground between Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands on how to manage the rise of geopolitics in the Arctic. The research of this chapter shows that although minor substantial differences exist within the Kingdom on issues such as trade relations due to different export dependencies, disagreements on Arctic strategy mainly arise from differences between Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands on decision-making influence rather than substantial differences concerning the role of NATO, China, and Russia in security and defence policies. This chapter addresses the following questions: Which differences and similarities exist on how to manage security and defence issues within the Kingdom of Denmark? Which consequences do the Kingdom’s internal dynamics have for its role in Arctic security and defence? To address these issues, this chapter is divided into four sections. First, I investigate the views of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands on their security and defence responsibilities. Second, I examine the perspectives of the three countries on the role of NATO and allies and partners in Arctic security and defence. Third, I address the views of the Kingdom’s constituents on how to manage relations with Russia and China. Fourth, I discuss the implications of the Kingdom’s internal and external political and security dynamics for its contribution to Arctic security and defence. Security and defence responsibilities of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands As geopolitical tensions rise, Denmark’s responsibility for security and defence has engendered disagreements between the constituents of the Kingdom. One incident illustrating the dynamics of discord is the plans for construction of a new international airport in Qaqortoq in Greenland and upgrading existing airports in Nuuk and Ilulissat. In 2018, Greenland announced China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) as one of five finalists for the contract. Pushed by US dissatisfaction with Chinese involvement, Denmark

A kingdom divided against itself 253 defined airport construction as a security issue and offered to finance the project. Subsequently, CCCC had difficulties obtaining visas for their staff and withdrew from the bidding process in 2019. Greenland interpreted Denmark’s behavior as undue interference in Greenland’s affairs (Danish Diplomat, 2019). On the Faroe Islands, a new NATO radar station caused similar popular uproar. In 2019, the Danish authorities informed the Faroe Islands that NATO requested opening a radar station on Sornfelli mountain 12 km from the capital city Tórshavn. The Faroese government demanded that approval of the radar was postponed until it had reached a decision (Joensen, 2022; Veal, 2021). Before Denmark sent a formal request to Tórshavn to start the Faroese approval process in early 2021, the Danish government presented an Arctic defence capacity package of 1.5 billion Danish kroner (approximately 202 million euros) in late 2020 which included funding for the Faroese radar. The Faroese public and parliament were taken aback, learning about the radar from Danish media, leading to public demonstrations and ongoing debates about decision-making procedures on security and defence issues (Kingdom Government Officials, 2022). In June 2022, the Faroese government signed on to the installation. A survey of Faroese views on foreign, security and defence issues finds that 46.0 per cent of respondents think that the Faroese parliament should decide on the installation. 28.7 per cent think the Faroese people should decide. The survey also finds that 58.2 per cent of respondents support installation, whereas 19.9 per cent are against it (Skorini, 2022a, p. 34). These findings indicate that decision-making procedures rather than substantial differences cause cracks in cooperation between Copenhagen and Tórshavn. Denmark has taken steps to integrate Greenland and the Faroe Islands politically and administratively in security decisions although Copenhagen remains the centerpiece of decisions. When former US Secretary of State Pompeo visited Denmark in 2020, for the first time all three countries participated in a foreign ministers meeting. Moreover, a permanent contact committee at ministerial level has been established to institutionalize annual dialogue on foreign, security, and defence policy with emphasis on topics related to Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Regeringen, 2022, p. 57). In May 2022, Denmark and Greenland reached agreement on how to spend Greenland’s share of the 1.5 billion Danish kroner allocated to strengthen the Kingdom’s Arctic defence posture. In addition to investments in surveillance drones and satellites, an emergency management education will be established educating Greenlanders to participate in performing nonmilitary defence responsibilities, such as search and rescue and surveillance (Lindstrøm, 2022). It remains to be seen if the efforts at integrating Greenland and the Faroe Islands into Denmark’s decision-making structures result in greater convergence of the views of the Kingdom’s three constituents on security and defence. Allowing Nuuk and Tórshavn more influence and positions may help the Kingdom remove barriers to cooperation.

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The Kingdom’s perspectives on the role of NATO in Arctic security and defence When Denmark decided to join NATO in 1949, Greenland and the Faroe Islands automatically became alliance members. The two countries approve of NATO’s collective defence commitments. Nevertheless, differences regarding how to manage alliance relations exist between the constituents of the Kingdom which cause cracks in cooperation. NATO does not have an Arctic strategy. Until 2021, the High North was not mentioned in the alliance’s summit communiqués. At the Brussels summit, NATO agreed to continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities in support of the alliance’s security interests in the High North (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2021). Like the term the North Atlantic, which is a blurred concept encompassing the ice-free part of the Arctic, the High North is a political concept (Skagestad, 2010). Using this language, NATO avoids commitment to the security of a particular geographical area. It reflects intra-alliance disagreement on NATO’s Arctic role, which prevents the adoption of an Arctic strategy although most regional states, except for Russia, are NATO allies or partners. Since NATO’s area of responsibility is the North Atlantic, it can operate in the areas of greatest importance for alliance security without an official Arctic strategy. The alliance can protect the vulnerable naval chokepoint the GIUK gap, the Faroe Islands situated at the east entrance to the GIUK gap, and Norway’s coastline which form part of the supply line between North America and Northern Europe without operating out of area. NATO can also improve surveillance over Greenland to prevent Russia from using its airspace to fire missiles targeting North America. The strategic location of Greenland and the Faroe Islands between North America and Russia’s Arctic region is useful for enhancing their influence on security and defence decisions. Their growing importance is reflected in the decision in 2021 to list Greenland as the first country to speak as representative of the Kingdom in the Arctic Council, while the Faroe Islands is second and Denmark third (Skydsgaard and Jones, 2021). The suspension of Arctic Council meetings following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 imply that the decision is of little immediate significance. Nevertheless, it signals a greater balance in the relative foreign policy influence of the Kingdom’s constituents in future. In 2021, the Faroese government visited NATO headquarters in Brussels as part of efforts to lobby for formal alliance representation (Joensen, 2021). Greenland announced the same ambitions. Growing bilateral relations with the United States without Danish interference are seen as insufficient to protect their interests. Tórshavn intends to prevent a replay of the lengthy decision-making process on a military radar. Nuuk got a crash course in protecting Greenland’s interests from outside interference when former US President Trump offered to buy the country in 2019. Moreover, as NATO’s

A kingdom divided against itself 255 de facto Arctic presence expands, the United States aims to strengthen its presence in Greenland with investments in Greenland’s infrastructure. At present, the US base in Pituffik is the only area US defence can use largely as they see fit without asking for permission from the Kingdom of Denmark. To increase maritime and air situational awareness, the United States negotiates with the Kingdom for permission to install more radars along Greenland’s coastline (Nathansen and Møller, 2022). Greenland is determined to influence the scale and contents of an extended US presence and Washington’s freedom to operate. The Faroe Islands and Greenland wants a seat at the alliance’s table to protect their security interests as the Arctic attracts increased activity from a growing number of actors. They are concerned that a militarization of their countries will make them vulnerable to growing tensions between NATO and Russia because of their strategic locations. Tórshavn and Nuuk demand more influence on how to manage this enhanced vulnerability (Kingdom Government Officials, 2022). If their plans for independent NATO representation are realized, differences of opinion with Denmark on security issues may be more out in the open. A crisis in Greenland’s relations with Denmark broke out in May 2021 when Greenland’s then foreign minister Pele Broberg stated that Nuuk would establish its own coastguard to speed up independence. The coastguard would be civilian and not under the command of Danish defence, which is currently responsible for performing coast guard duties in the Kingdom. The statement caused ripples internationally. The plans would most likely be accompanied by a larger US defence presence in Greenland since Nuuk would have difficulties managing coast guard responsibilities on its own. Such US involvement was expected to engender higher tension levels (Wenger, 2021). In September 2021, Prime Minister Mute B. Egede demoted Broberg from office, a decision which shelved the plans (Holm, 2021). Conflicts over relations between NATO, the United States, and the Kingdom are not completely off the table. In its 2022 foreign and security strategy, Denmark announces closer cooperation with Arctic allies and support for NATO’s increased Arctic focus such as efforts to protect supply lines between North America and Europe. The alliance’s enhanced Arctic role is considered a necessary consequence of the increasing geopolitical challenges in the region, driven especially by Russia (Regeringen, 2022). Influential voices on foreign policy and defence issues, such as PhD student, former leader of Inuit Ataqatigiit and former member of the Danish parliament Sara Olsvig, argue that Greenland should demand that the North Atlantic and the Arctic regions are treated as separate entities to prevent a greater NATO role in Greenland (Jonassen, 2021). Similarly, Faroese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Industry and Trade and Deputy Prime Minister Høgni Karsten Hoydal argues that the Faroese rather than Denmark negotiates and operates the NATO radar and emphasizes the necessity of civilian cooperation with all Arctic states, including Russia (Hoydal, 2022).

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Most Greenlanders and Faroese have a favorable view of NATO and support a larger US regional role. When survey data are available for the period after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine views are most likely even more favorable (Skorini, 2022b). The 2022 survey on foreign policy views in the Kingdom finds that 75.5 per cent of Greenlandic respondents and 59 per cent of Faroese respondents perceive NATO as a positive organization (Skorini, 2022a, p. 13). On US cooperation, the survey finds that 69.1 per cent of Greenlanders and 41.9 per cent of Faroese respondents support enhanced cooperation with the United States (Skorini, 2022a, p. 9). On which issues to prioritize, the survey finds that 52.6 per cent of Greenlanders and 39.9 per cent of the Faroese respondents favor having a clear standpoint in relation to the United States in foreign policy and security matters. 37.9 per cent of Greenlanders and 47.4 per cent of Faroese respondents prioritize having good economic relations with the United States (Skorini, 2022a, p. 15). The data on the views of Greenlanders and Faroese suggest considerable support for prioritizing a NATO and US presence. The principal cause of disagreement within the Kingdom appears to be the ability of Nuuk and Tórshavn to exercise independent influence on security and defence rather than substantial policy differences. Denmark is a staunch supporter of strengthening NATO’s role in Arctic security and defence. Copenhagen defines the alliance’s area of operation as encompassing the Arctic. Nuuk and Tórshavn are also committed to a strengthened NATO presence, but they want first-hand influence on a more visible NATO presence in their countries because it might encourage increased confrontations with Moscow at the expense of vulnerable Arctic countries without independent defence capabilities such as Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Denmark’s Arctic strategy seeks to accommodate Greenlandic and Faroese demands for more influence on NATO’s Arctic presence. Moreover, Denmark demands that increased surveillance and other NATO initiatives are tailored to the security situation to maintain low tension levels and sustain broad regional cooperation (Regeringen, 2022, p. 19, 23). It remains to be seen if this is enough to satisfy Nuuk and Tórshavn’s demands for greater influence on their security as they become more vocal about their preferences. The Kingdom’s perspectives on China and Russia’s role in the Arctic China has shown interest in investing in infrastructure projects and mining and quarrying in Greenland. Greenland’s natural resources and infrastructure investment needs intended to speed up economic development are befitting China’s vision of global economic development, the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing’s white paper on China’s Arctic policy calls for developing a “polar silk road,” linking Arctic interests with the Belt and Road Initiative. Exploration and development of Arctic resources may have a large impact on China’s

A kingdom divided against itself 257 economic development, and China’s capital, technology, market, knowledge, and experience is expected to facilitate economic and social progress of Arctic coastal states (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). Greenland emphasizes its need for economic development. The country should not be seen as a giant national park (Bagger, 2019). Chinese investments are one potential source of economic development that might help Greenland become more independent (Simpson, 2018). In Greenland’s far north at Citronen fjord, a zinc mine is planned which would be overseen by Australian-based Ironbark. The company has signed a memorandum of understanding with China Nonferrous Metal to assist with the project. However, the Chinese company has been replaced with a US company to prevent China from controlling strategic resources (Bennett, 2022). General Nice, a Hong Kong based company, currently holds the rights to a potential iron mine at Isua in western Greenland. The same company ran afoul when it attempted to buy an abandoned US navy base at Grønnedal. Denmark blocked the buy because China might reopen the base, posing a threat to US and the Kingdom’s security (Shi and Lanteigne, 2018). Kuannersuit’ deposits of rare earths, uranium, and zinc are the most highprofile investment with Chinese participation. Chinese Shenghe Resources has a 9 per cent stake in the Australian company Greenland Minerals and Energy, which has invested in Kuannersuit. In April 2021, Greenland’s government halted the mine project due to popular concern about the mine’s environmental consequences. Greenlanders feared that radioactive waste from uranium extraction would jeopardize their access to basic resources such as clean water and their livelihoods such as farming, hunting, and fishing. At Kuannersuit, uranium is an intrinsic part of mining. It is impossible to mine rare earths without also extracting uranium deposits (Odgaard, 2021). None of the projects involving Chinese companies have yet been realized, and Chinese investments have been very limited (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, 2021). US security concerns pushed Denmark to define strategic projects with Chinese involvement, such as airport construction and the Grønnedal base, as security issues, thereby transferring decision-making power to Copenhagen. China has largely remained silent about Denmark’s obstruction of investment projects. As a newcomer to the Arctic with a limited presence, Beijing seems disinterested in becoming entangled in geopolitical rivalry (Fravel et al., 2022, pp. 147–149). In Greenland, Danish interference engendered resentment because it is seen as inappropriate meddling in Greenlandic decision-making processes which might jeopardize efforts to increase exports to China (Chen, 2022). In 2021, Greenland’s government opened a permanent representation in Beijing. The Faroe Islands has had a representation there since 2019 in addition to one in Moscow opened in 2015. The representations focus on all of Asia. However, China is the largest Asian export market for Greenlandic and Faroese products. The representations operate direct channels of

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communication with Asian authorities and companies to enhance knowledge about Greenland and the Faroe Islands and how to do business with them (Krog, 2019; Wenger, 2020). Fish such as halibut, shrimp, and salmon is the main export product. Compared to Denmark, China is an important export destination for Greenland and Russia an important export destination for the Faroe Islands. 5.72 per cent of Danish exports in 2020 went to China, while Russia accounted for 1.32 per cent (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2020a). In 2020, China accounted for 19.2 per cent of Greenland’s exports, while Russia accounted for 3.88 per cent (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2020b). In 2020, China accounted for 3.8 per cent of the Faroe Islands’ exports, while Russia accounted for 22.9 per cent (Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne, 2021, p. 116). Despite the importance of trade with China for the Greenlandic economy, Nuuk shares Faroese and Danish concerns about China’s influence (van Brunnersum, 2022). Denmark’s 2022 foreign policy and security strategy states that a China that defines itself as a “near-Arctic state” contributes to increasing the risk of military and political escalation in and around the Arctic (Regeringen, 2022, p. 23). Although Copenhagen applied the EU’s definition of China as a partner, rival, and competitor, Denmark’s strategy reflects rising security concerns about China. Greenland has mixed views of Chinese investments. Greenlanders criticizing Chinese neo-colonial practices are quite vocal. They accuse China of leaving countries it invests in with enormous debts which they cannot repay and of using Chinese rather than local labor (Retired Greenlandic politician, 2018). On the Faroe Islands, Beijing failed to leverage economic influence and secure Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei a 5G network contract. Reacting to US demands for excluding Huawei as a provider due to security concerns, China offered a free trade agreement to boost trade with the Faroe Islands if Huawei got the 5G assignment (Satariano, 2019). Huawei provided 4G network in the Faroe Islands. Nevertheless, in 2021 Tórshavn chose Swedish Ericsson to build its 5G network. The 2022 survey of foreign, security, and defence policy views shows that 72.2 per cent of Faroese respondents agree with this decision (Skorini, 2022a, p. 25). 49.9 per cent think that less cooperation with China is desirable compared to 16.1 per cent, who prefer more cooperation. 46.5 per cent of Greenlandic respondents prefer less cooperation with China and 38.6 per cent support more cooperation (Skorini, 2022a, p. 26). 53.6 per cent of Greenlandic respondents and 40.6 per cent of Faroese respondents prioritize good economic relations with China. 33.4 per cent of Greenlandic respondents and 45 per cent of Faroese respondents see a clear standpoint toward China in foreign policy and security matters as the main priority (Skorini, 2022a, p. 30). Considerable Greenlandic support for fostering economic relations with China most likely reflects that trade with China plays a larger role in Greenland’s economy compared to the Faroe Islands. Russia has been a thorn in the side of the Kingdom for a while due to overlapping claims to the extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical

A kingdom divided against itself 259 miles from the northern shores in the Arctic Ocean. Russia filed its first claim to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2001 and extended it the first time in 2015. In April 2021, Moscow extended its claim to the Arctic Ocean seabed a second time to cover approximately seventy per cent of the central parts of the ocean and stretching to Canada and Greenland’s exclusive economic zones. By now, Russia’s claim overlaps with the Kingdom’s claim by 800,000 km2. The underlying interests are substantial. A successful claim results in exclusive rights to all resources below the seabed, such as oil and gas, minerals, and other resources, except for resources in the water column, on the ocean surface and in the airspace above. With the right to the resources on the seabed also follows rights to regulate traffic in the area to protect economic interests (Breum, 2021). Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has become a security concern for all the constituents of the Kingdom. Moscow’s claim to the central Arctic Ocean is a security challenge because of the rights to resources that accompany a successful claim. Nevertheless, EU sanctions against Russia contain loopholes because of dependency on energy imports and fish exports (European Council, 2022). As an EU member, Denmark follows EU sanctions policies against Russia. Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not EU members. Nevertheless, they have adopted most of the union’s sanctions against Russia. The two countries have not levied sanctions against another country before. Due to the importance of fish exports to Russia for the Faroese economy, Tórshavn has been allowed to exclude measures that could harm fish exports or fisheries agreements (Nolsøe, 2022). Nuuk has stopped all exports to Russia. Tórshavn has stopped all fish exports, but it maintains a fisheries agreement allowing Russia to harvest Faroese fishing quotas for blue whiting while the Faroe Islands are allowed to harvest Russian cod quotas in the Barents Sea. In consequence, exports to Russia continue in the form of blue whiting and fuel and other supplies sold to Russian ships fishing Faroese quotas (Hagstova Føroya, 2022). This agreement was renewed in 2022. Greenlandic sanctions toward Russia are stricter because Greenland is much less dependent on Russia for export earnings than the Faroe Islands (The Editor, 2022). Russia’s adversarial relations with NATO increase Arctic tension levels, as both NATO member states and Russia take steps to strengthen their defence postures. Despite an ailing economy, in July 2022 Russia announced that it will expand the Northern Fleet headquartered in Murmansk near the Norwegian border (Humpert, 2022). In the event of armed conflict with NATO, Russia is likely to direct military aircraft to the north of Scandinavia to enter the North Atlantic and disrupt supply lines between North America and Europe. The Faroe Islands’ strategic position at the entrance to the GIUK gap makes it vulnerable to Russian military operations. Greenland also occupies a key strategic position because of poor surveillance of Greenland’s airspace. If Russia plans to hit America with long-range missiles, Moscow is likely to do so through Greenland’s airspace to avoid being detected (Odgaard, 2022).

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Despite their vulnerable position vis-à-vis Russia, Greenland and the Faroe Islands agree with Denmark that a political rapprochement with Moscow is not desirable. Many Faroese see strengthened economic cooperation with Russia as important to protect the country’s economic interests. However, survey data collected after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine would most likely reveal less appetite for closer economic ties (Skorini, 2022b). The 2022 survey of the Kingdom’s foreign, security, and defence policy views finds that 58.4 per cent of Greenlandic respondents believe their country should cooperate less with Russia compared to 23.9 per cent who favor enhanced cooperation. By comparison, 36.6 per cent of Faroese respondents support less cooperation with Russia, while 28.5 per cent support more cooperation. 67.7 per cent of Faroese respondents consider Russia an economic ally, but not a political ally which the Faroe Islands should cooperate with on foreign policy and security matters. Only 5.1 per cent of Faroese respondents see Russia as both an economic and political ally that their country should cooperate with on foreign policy and security (Skorini, 2022a, pp. 21–22). 24.9 per cent of Greenlandic respondents prioritize having good economic relations with Russia, while 59.0 per cent prioritize a clear standpoint toward Russia in foreign policy and security. Reflecting Russia’s economic importance, 46.3 per cent of Faroese respondents favor good economic relations with Russia compared to 39.3 per cent favoring a clear standpoint toward Russia in foreign policy and security (Skorini, 2022a, p. 23). Both Greenland and the Faroe Islands are NATO members and depend even more than Denmark on the alliance in the event of armed conflict with adversaries. Denmark’s vote to drop its EU defence opt out in June 2022 and become a full member of the Common Security and Defence Policy allow Copenhagen to hedge its bets. Denmark can prioritize enhanced support for NATO defence forces and for the EU’s efforts to achieve defence autonomy without choosing sides (Murray, 2022). Greenland and the Faroe Islands do not have independent defence forces and they have small populations and limited resources. The two countries need support from NATO if they are caught in the middle of an armed conflict. As militarization and tension levels continue to grow in the Arctic, Nuuk and Tórshavn have little choice but to support a reinforced NATO defence posture in the region. However, their vulnerable strategic position and the fact that security issues form integral parts of issue areas such as telecommunications and trade which are the responsibility of the Greenlandic and Faroese governments engender demands in Nuuk and Tórshavn for having the final word in decisions on their security and defence. Repairing the cracks: the prospects of security and defence agreement within the Kingdom The centrality of Greenland and the Faroe Islands for NATO deterrence of Russia makes agreement on Arctic security and defence policies in the Kingdom significant for regional security. NATO deterrence of Russia in the

A kingdom divided against itself 261 Arctic involves strengthening the alliance’s defence and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. To this end, NATO member states enhance their capacity to defend reinforcement and supply lines in the GIUK gap from Russian submarine and air attacks and protect the US mainland from Russian missile attacks. Frigates, submarines, and strengthened air and missile defences are central capabilities in this military reinforcement to protect NATO convoys and prevent Russia from attacking the US mainland through unsurveilled airspace in Greenland. In addition, strengthening interoperability within NATO should have priority. The UK’s 2022 Arctic defence strategy emphasizes increased training and operations in the region with allies and partners as a priority. London also prioritizes protecting critical underwater national infrastructure and ensure freedom of navigation through international waters and exclusive economic zones. It plans to maintain a periodic Royal Navy presence in the High North (Ministry of Defence, 2022). The UK’s commitment to deeper integration and interoperability is an example of how NATO member states can counter growing Arctic security challenges. Arctic defences can also be strengthened by expanding existing and creating new bilateral and trilateral agreements between alliance members and partners in the High North. The Kingdom of Denmark needs to contribute to these efforts for its own security. The Kingdom’s facilitation of more equal involvement of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands in security and defence decisions pertaining to the Arctic is essential for its contribution to a stronger NATO defence posture in the region. However, the terms of involving the three constituents have yet to be defined. It remains unclear which specific issues the three should negotiate to reach a common stance. Procedures for dispute resolution if consensus cannot be found are also not in place. The process of working out these procedural questions is likely to entail additional disagreements. For example, in February 2021, Copenhagen decided to spend 1.5 billion Danish kroner on expanding airspace surveillance in Greenland and set up a training program for Greenlandic recruits, assuming it had heard Greenland’s politicians sufficiently by consulting its government and by including wording that the outcome would be shaped by Greenland’s input. After the Danish parliament had approved the plan, members of Greenland’s national assembly said that they had not been fully informed. Consequently, Greenland’s government is still reviewing the spending plans to make sure they are in keeping with Nuuk’s goal of keeping the country demilitarized (McGwin, 2022). This delay in implementation because of disagreement over procedural issues between the Kingdom’s constituent parts resembles the decision-making process on installing a radar in the Faroe Islands. Ongoing internal disputes over security and defence responsibilities is the main reason that at present, the Kingdom is trailing behind the efforts of other Arctic NATO members and partners at revising Arctic strategies and contributing to an Arctic presence. Denmark’s constitutional responsibilities for

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security and defence means that legality may trump political will, especially in a Danish setting where constitutional breaches can have severe consequences for politicians and civil servants. At a time when security and defence decisions are closely entwined with non-military issue areas where Greenland and the Faroe Islands have sole decision-making powers, the conflict between political demands and legal barriers is likely to engender additional disagreements on security and defence decisions (Kingdom Government Official, 2022). However, as Russia assisted by Chinese financial and technological resources give rise to a growing number of threats in domains such as the sea, air, cyber and space, the notion of the Arctic as a low-tension area where nations can afford to insist on demilitarized status is likely to gradually disappear (Odgaard, 2022). In this environment, Greenland and the Faroe Islands may draw closer to Denmark, provided Denmark delivers on its promise of greater Greenlandic and Faroese inclusion in security and defence decisions. As three small countries in a region of growing great power rivalry, Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Tórshavn may find they have a greater chance of protecting their security interests if they coordinate management of security issues on the basis of a common roadmap for how to handle security and defence. References Bagger, A. L. (2019) Speech by Minister of Education, Culture, Church and Foreign Affairs of Greenland, 11 October. Reykjavik, Iceland, The Arctic Circle Assembly. Bennett, M. (2022) The US is using a mine in Greenland to counter China. Cryopolitics, 20 June 2022. Available from: https://www.cryopolitics.com/2022/ 06/20/us-mine-greenland-china/ [Accessed 5 August 2022]. Breum, M. (2021) Russia extends its claim to the Arctic Ocean seabed. Arctic Today, 4 April 2021. Available from: https://www.arctictoday.com/russia-extends-its-claimto-the-arctic-ocean-seabed/ [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Chen, C. (2022) China’s engagement in Greenland: mutual economic benefits and political non-interference. Polar Research, 16 March 2022. doi: 10.33265/polar. v41.7706 [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Danish Diplomat (2019) A nonymous interview, 4 October 2019. Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands (2011) Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020. Copenhagen, Nuuk and Tórshavn, Ministries and Department of Foreign Affairs. European Council (2022) EU Restrictive Measures Against Russia over Ukraine (since 2014). Available from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/ [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (2021) Udsyn 2021 [Outlook 2021] Annual Report, December. Available from: https://www.fe-ddis.dk/globalassets/fe/dokumenter/ 2021/udsyn/-fe-udsyn-pages-.pdf [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Fravel, M. T., K. Lavelle and L. Odgaard (2022) China engages the Arctic: a great power in a regime complex. Asian Security, 18 (2), pp. 138–158. Hagstova Føroya. (2022) Fish exports worth DKK 5.3 billion in first half of 2022. Statistics Faroe Islands, 19 August.

A kingdom divided against itself 263 Holm, A. O. (2021) Broberg demoted from foreign minister post in Greenland. High North News, 28 September. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/ broberg-demoted-foreign-minister-post-greenland [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Hoydal, H. K. (2022). Interview, 23 August 2022. Humpert, M. (2022) Control over Arctic Ocean top priority of new Russian naval doctrine. High North News, 4 August 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews. com/en/control-over-arctic-ocean-top-priority-new-russian-naval-doctrine [Accessed 8 August 2022]. Joensen, K. (2021) Færøerne vil være mere aktive i NATO [The Faroe Islands wishes to play a more active role in NATO]. FO Nyhedsbureau, 29 September. Available from: https://www.fonyhedsbureau.dk/faeroeerne-vil-vaere-mere-aktive-i-nato/ [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Joensen, K. (2022) Fortsat drama om radar på Færøerne [Drama about radar on the Faroe Islands continues]. Sermitsiaq, 26 January. Available from: https:// sermitsiaq.ag/node/234938 [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Jonassen, T. (2021) Greenland wants to take the lead: “we have to pick the right friends”. High North News, 26 November. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/ en/greenland-wants-take-lead-we-have-pick-right-friends [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Kingdom Government Officials (2022). Anonymous Interviews, 22–24 August 2022. Krog, A. (2019) Færøerne får repræsentation i Kina [The Faroe Islands open a representative office in China]. Altinget, 30 October 2019. Available from: https:// www.altinget.dk/arktis/artikel/faeroeerne-faar-repraesentation-i-kina?fbclid= IwAR2Ezvwn7Fka2NG9dGSOryuapza8jpZYXzUuckPw3Kw6aopsCjxUpMleBYM [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Krog, A. (2022) Grønlandsk travlhed blokerer allerede forsinket arktisk strategi [A busy schedule in Greenland delays an Arctic strategy that is already late]. Altinget, May 23 2022. Available from: https://www.altinget.dk/forsvar/artikel/groenlandsk-travlhedblokerer-allerede-forsinket-arktisk-strategi [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Lindstrøm, M. (2022) Naalakkersuisut underskriver aftale om øget forsvar [Greenland’s foreign minister signs agreement on strengthened defence]. Sermitsiaq, 10 May 2022. Available from: https://sermitsiaq.ag/naalakkersuisut-underskriver-aftale-oeget-forsvar [Accessed 14 June 2022]. McGwin, K. (2022) Greenland is concerned over Denmark’s defence-spending increase. Polar Journal, 25 March 2022. Available from: https://polarjournal.ch/ en/2022/03/25/greenland-is-concerned-over-denmarks-defence-spendingincrease/ [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Ministry of Defence (2022) Press release: defence secretary announces new UK Defence Arctic Strategy in Norway. Gov.uk., 29 March 2022. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-announces-new-ukdefence-arctic-strategy-in-norway [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Murray, A. (2022) Denmark votes to drop EU defence opt-out in ’historic’ referendum. BBC News, 1 June 2022. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-61644663 [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Nathansen, B. and L. Møller (2022) Naalakkersuisut reagerer: Flere amerikanske radarer i Grønland er ok, men … [Naalakkersuisut reacts: More US radars in Greenland is ok, but …]. Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa (KNR), 8 June 2022. Available from: https://knr. gl/da/nyheder/naalakkersuisut-reagerer-flere-amerikanske-radarer-i-gr%C3%B8nlander-ok-men%E2%80%A6 [Accessed 19 July 2022].

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Nolsøe, E. (2022) Faroe Islands heads into turbulent waters with first sanctions against Russia. Financial Times, 9 May 2022. Available from: https://www.ft.com/ content/ce338699-238f-4a65-bce6-ee18b3dca773 [Accessed 14 June 2022]. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (2021) Brussels Summit Communiqué, 14 June 2021. Available from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) (2020a) Denmark. Available from: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/dnk [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) (2020b) Greenland. Available from: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/grl [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Odgaard, L. (2022) Russia’s Arctic designs and NATO. Survival, 64 (4), pp. 89–104. Odgaard, L. (2021) Greenland’s national election and the US-China tech competition: the rare earth challenge. Research. Washington, DC, Hudson Institute, 9 April 2021. Available from: https://www.hudson.org/research/16820-greenland-snational-election-and-the-us-china-tech-competition-the-rare-earth-challenge [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Olsen, J. A. (2017) Introduction: the quest for maritime supremacy. In NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising Collective Defense, ed. John Andreas Olsen, Whitehall Paper 87, pp. 3–7. London, RUSI. Regeringen [The Government] (2022) Foreign and Security Policy Strategy. Copenhagen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January. Available from: https://um.dk/en/foreignpolicy/foreign-and-security-policy-strategy-2022 [Accessed 19 July 2022]. Retired Greenlandic politician (2018) Anonymous Interview, 6 December. Rigsombudsmanden på Færøerne [National ombudsman on the Faroe Islands] (2021) Beretning [Report]. Søborg, Statsministeriet. Satariano, A. (2019) At the edge of the world, a new battleground for the U.S. and China. The New York Times, 20 December 2019. Available from: https://www. nytimes.com/2019/12/20/technology/faroe-islands-huawei-china-us.html [Accessed 8 August 2022]. Shi, M. and M. Lanteigne (2018) The (many) roles of Greenland in China’s developing Arctic policy The Diplomat, 30 March 2018. Available from: https:// thediplomat.com/2018/03/the-many-roles-of-greenland-in-chinas-developingarctic-policy/ [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Simpson, J. (2018) How Greenland could become China’s Arctic base. BBC News, 18 December 2018. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe46386867/ [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Skagestad, O. G. (2010) The ’High North’: An Elastic Concept in Norwegian Arctic Policy. FNI Report, 10 August 2010. Available from: https://www.fni.no/getfile. php/131978–1469869945/Filer/Publikasjoner/FNI-R1010/pdf [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Skorini, H. (2022a) The Faroe Islands, foreign policy and security: what do Faroese people think? Working Paper, February. Tórshavn: Faculty of History and Social Sciences, University of the Faroe Islands. Skorini, H. (2022b) Interview. 23 August. Skydsgaard, N. and G. Jones (2021) Denmark agrees to give Greenland front seat at Arctic table. Reuters, 10 June 2021. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/ world/europe/greenland-faroe-islands-get-more-active-role-arctic-council-danishpm-2021-06-10/ [Accessed 14 June 2022].

A kingdom divided against itself 265 The Editor (2022) Greenlandic businesses stop all exports to Russia. High North News, 4 March. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/greenlandic-businessesstop-all-exports-russia [Accessed 14 June 2022]. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2018) China’s Arctic policy. Xinhua, 26 January. Available from: http://english.www. gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Van Brunnersum, S.-J. (2022) China failed its Arctic ambitions in Greenland. Politico, 22 October. Available from: https://www.politico.eu/article/china-arcticgreenland-united-states [Accessed 15 January 2023]. Veal, L. (2021) Faroes islanders protest new NATO radar station. War Resisters’ International, 9 August. Available from: https://wri-irg.org/en/story/2021/ faroes-islanders-protest-new-nato-radar-station [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Wenger, M. (2020) Greenland plans representation in Beijing from 2021 on. Polar Journal, 10 September. Available from: https://polarjournal.ch/en/2020/09/ 10/greenland-plans-representation-in-beijing-from-2021-on/ [Accessed 14 June 2022]. Wenger, M. (2021) A own coastguard for Greenland? Polar Journal, 25 May. Available from: https://polarjournal.ch/en/2021/05/25/a-own-coast-guard-forgreenland/ [Accessed 14 June 2022].

15

The UK as a near-Arctic state and essential regional security ally Danita Catherine Burke1

Introduction The Arctic has fascinated the world for generations as a frozen landscape of unimaginable beautiful juxtaposed with its climate dangers and cultural complexities. In the post-Cold War era, the area gained the moniker as a “zone of peace,” however, the region is now gaining a lot of attention as a reemerging military security arena as tensions with Russia rebound (Polar Regions Department, 2023; Humpert, 2023). While the UK may appear an unlikely actor in Arctic security, it is in fact a major player. The UK government sees the country as “the Arctic’s nearest neighbour” (Polar Regions Department, 2013; UK Parliament, 2015; British Antarctic Survey, n.d.). While historically the UK has been considered a sub-Arctic state (Depledge and Dodds, 2011; Scottish Government, 2017), in contemporary times it has reinforced its role in northern and Arctic geopolitics by capitalizing on its geostrategic position in the North Atlantic between North America and Northern Europe and using its military expertise and capabilities to become an essential regional security ally (HM Government, 2021, p. 7; House of Commons Defence Committee, 2018). With the Arctic region and any tensions there bordering the UK, the two fundamental reasons why the UK is interested and willing to be regional security leader appears to be that (1) the position affords it status in global politics as a major power player; and (2) as a selfdescribed nearest Arctic neighbor, the UK government view security issues in the Arctic as national security issues with a risk of impact on the UK. Given the dual motivations for the UK’s engagement in the Arctic, to bolster its influence in global affairs and to ensure national security through monitoring border areas, this chapter introduces the UK’s two-pronged approach to structure its primary engagement in Arctic/northern defence. The two-pronged approach is a layering of multilateral and bilateral military cooperation: (1) participation in NATO-focused Arctic defence and other multilateral northern-focused security arrangements such as the UK-led Northern European Joint Expeditionary Force and (2) forging bilateral Arctic-specific military/security alliances with Arctic states, such as Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland. Furthermore, this chapter introduces the leading role that the Royal Navy plays in the UK’s DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905-18

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capacity to be a global security leader in the Arctic and Circumpolar North more broadly, as the UK capitalizes off of its geostrategic position as the self-styled nearest Arctic neighbor. However, this chapter also notes that the Scottish independence movement is a threat to the UK’s status in Arctic geopolitics, most especially its ability to be a big player in traditional Arctic security arrangements at least in the short term. Scotland is home to critical military infrastructure essential to the UK’s military capabilities and status in European and NATO defence. Therefore, while the UK presently enjoys a strong position in Arctic politics by virtue of its importance in regional security provision and its proximity to the European Arctic, this status is not static and could decline if Scotland becomes independent. The Arctic and Circumpolar North: is the UK in the Arctic? While UK government acknowledges that the “vast majority of territory in the Arctic falls clearly within the sovereign jurisdiction of the eight Arctic States [Canada, Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Russian Federation and United States]” (Polar Regions Department, 2013, p. 13), the Arctic and the North, specifically the Circumpolar North, lack fixed definitions. The most common definition in general usage is for the Arctic is the area north of the Arctic Circle (Britannica, n.d.), but definitions of the Arctic and subArctic are not fixed. Definitions used to describe the Arctic vary depending on factors such as the time period under discussion, historical homelands of Indigenous peoples (e.g. Inuit Nunangat2), climatic features (e.g. permafrost), vegetation (e.g. treeline), wildlife habitat (e.g. polar bears, Arctic char), and historical connection to activities in the Arctic region (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, n.d.; Pilon, 2001; Roussel and Payette, 2011; Holly, 2002; Arctic Centre University of Lapland, n.d.; Government of Canada, 2021). Depledge and Dodds (2011, p. 72) state that “[w]hile the UK is not an Arctic Ocean coastal state, it is geographically proximate.” The authors go further to state that the UK is not an Arctic state per se, [but] it should still be considered part of the sub-Arctic and is clearly influenced by the physical geographies and climatic systems of the High North, such as the ‘Arctic Oscillation’ which triggered the UK’s severe weather in the winter of 2009 and December 2010 (Depledge and Dodds, 2011, p. 73). Historical acknowledgment of the UK’s status in the northern polar region is reinforced, for example, by depictions of the Circumpolar North, which Burke (2018) outlines make up the Arctic and the sub-Arctic, such as the 1894 universal atlas map of the Polar Regions. The map includes the UK as part of the lower portion of the northern Polar Regions, which amounts to the sub-Arctic (The Universal Atlas, 1894).

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However, in scholarship about the Canadian North, for example, authors such as Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel (1998) and Shelagh Grant (1989) point out that the concept of the North is shrinking northward and has been since the end of the Second World War. For many sub-Arctic places, the geographic locations alone are not automatically qualifying them for inclusion; more is required of them.3 The implication of the narrowing definition of the North to become more synonymous with the Arctic in academic and policy discussions is that areas and peoples traditional in the sub-Arctic are being required to demonstrate their northern-ness more in actions, cultural expressions and statements, and added value to more entrenched regional actors to justify their inclusion into diplomatic discussions, alliances, and cooperation related to northern and Arctic affairs. As of 2022, the UK’s Ministry of Defence frames its northern focus as being on the High North. To the UK government, the High North region includes the Arctic and parts of the North Atlantic … it notes that the region is contiguous with the North Atlantic and cannot be isolated from UK interests in adjacent regions, including Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region, and the rest of the world (Ministry of Defence, 2022c, p. 4). The 2022 UK defence ministry document emphasizes the expansiveness of the High North to include and extend beyond the Arctic builds on the nearest Arctic state idea that the UK government has publicly used to frame the UK’s positionality to the Arctic since at least 2013. This both aids in the promotion of UK’s relevance in Arctic governance while simultaneously signaling deference to state sovereignty and sovereignty claims in the Arctic by the established Arctic states, all of whom—minus Russia—are close allies of the UK. Overview of UK interest in contemporary northern defence The UK government’s position on the governance of the Arctic is that “[g]overnance of the Arctic rests with the sovereign Arctic States, supplemented and complemented by international agreements and treaties” (Polar Regions Department, 2013, p. 13). However, as a country bordering the Arctic region, the UK has also taken the position that the security and relative peacefulness of the Arctic is strategically significant for the UK’s national defence and the defence of its allies in the region (Polar Regions Department, 2013, 2023; Ministry of Defence, 2022c). Knack et al. (2020) argue that the UK is focusing on the High North, as now outlined in the Ministry of Defence (2022c) The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North document. The current government framing includes the Arctic Circle but also includes “more southerly territories, waters, and airspace of strategic interest towards Scotland and into the North Atlantic” (Knack et al., 2020), as previously noted, and illustrates that the UK government has positioned its concept High North to maximize its proximity and inclusion into the area and its governance.

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In 2021, the UK government asserted the connection between its proximity and involvement in the region to outline why the UK plays a role in Arctic affairs. The UK is the nearest neighbour to the Arctic region. Through our role as a State Observer to the Arctic Council, we will contribute to maintaining the region as one of high cooperation and low tension. We will also maintain a significant contribution to Arctic science, focused on understanding the implications of climate change. We are committed to working with our partners to ensure that increasing access to the region and its resources is managed safely, sustainably and responsibly (HM Government, 2021, p. 64).4 The UK’s cooperation agenda in the Arctic is both traditional security and non-security focused. For example, the UK government offered its services to the Government of Canada to “take part in cold-weather exercises and bring in some of its more advanced capabilities—such as nuclear-powered submarines—to help with surveillance and defence in the [Canadian] Far North” (Brewster, 2021).5 While the Canadian government has reportedly shown hesitancy to letting in allies into Canada’s Arctic region due to sovereignty concerns (Brewster, 2021), cooperation between Canada and the UK on non-military Arctic matters is increasing. In May 2021, for example, a memorandum of understanding was announced between the UK and Canada Inuit Nunangat focusing on partnership in “the development and administration of the new research programme” with signatories including the “Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, United Kingdom Research and Innovation, POLAR Knowledge Canada, the National Research Council of Canada (NRC), Parks Canada Agency, and Fonds de recherche du Québec” (Polar Knowledge Canada, 2021). For all its non-military cooperation in the Arctic, however, a House of Commons Defence Committee (2018) reflected that there “is little doubt that the Arctic and High North are seeing an increasing level of military activity.” Importantly, the UK’s position is that its declarations of Arctic commitment and diplomacy must be “underwritten by the credibility of our deterrent and our ability to project power” (HM Government, 2021, p. 7).6 This means that the UK is keen to have its talk on Arctic cooperation and security be seen as backed by its ability to step up and follow through on its commitments, and threats of deterrence, if called upon to do so. As the next section will illustrate, the UK has woven itself into Arctic security as a leader in multilateral and bilateral agreements, but security agreements mean little if the ability to enact them is not there. For the UK, it is the Royal Navy that is leading the way in which the UK is able to back up its diplomacy with hard power, in conjunction with the other elements of the UK’s armed services.7 In much the same what that it played a pivotal role for the UK’s exploration of the Arctic during the 1700–1800s (Sandler, 2006; Sale and Potapov, 2010; Depledge, 2013), the Royal Navy leads the UK’s Arctic capabilities today (Wallace, 2022; Rosamond, 2015).8 As of March 2022, the UK government announced that the Royal Navy will maintain a “periodic Royal Navy presence in the High North” for the purpose

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of reinforcing “Arctic Allies to preserve the stability and security of the Arctic region” (Wallace, 2022). This announcement on the Royal Navy’s presence in the North is a statement of reality rather than intent as it is already happening. The strategic decision to have the Royal Marines9 and Royal Navy lead the UK’s Arctic presence is connected to the polar expertise that the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy has and is fostering and reinforcing through regional partnerships and alliances. According to Brigadier Richard Cantrill RM, Commander of the UK Commando Force, “British Commandos have been training and operating in the High North for more than five decades” (Royal Navy, 2022) while the Royal Navy has over 400 years of experience venturing into and exploring the Arctic (Depledge, 2013, p. 1445; Cory, 1936; Sandler, 2006).10 The UK’s participation and acceptance in multiple aspects of Arctic/northern military exercises and research sharing/generation shows the UK’s value and growing role in Western Arctic affairs. For example, in 2020, the “Royal Navy Type 23 frigate HMS Sutherland led the Norwegian frigate Thor Heyerdahl and the U.S. Navy destroyer Ross in an exercise to the Barents Sea” (Chuter, 2020).11 The underpinning of the UK’s status in Arctic politics vis-à-vis the Arctic states and other northern state actors continues is grounded in its role as a regional security ally, provider, and leader. It is the Royal Navy that leads the UK’s ability to show up and have a significant presence in regional diplomacy and security. The Royal Navy and the UK in multilateral and bilateral Arctic cooperation The Royal Navy positions the UK as an essential strategic ally in the Western portion of the North and Arctic due to its capabilities and skillset compared to neighboring northern ally states.12 The Royal Marines and the Royal Navy act as the primary operating arm of the UK in the Arctic Ocean and Arctic region and lead the UK’s cooperation with regional security allies, such as Norway: Every year, members of the Royal Marines and Royal Navy leave the relative comfort of the UK for Arctic Norway to train in the art of cold weather warfare. Working in partnership with personnel from other militaries, they rehearse cold weather fighting techniques in a range of training scenarios, from high-intensity warfare to terror threats and mass demonstrations. Enduring temperatures as low as −30°C, the participants are instructed in cold weather survival techniques, avalanche safety procedures, and even ‘ski warfare’. (Royal Navy, n.d., Cold War Training) The annual winter exercises include cooperation with personnel from Norway, as well as other Arctic and northern allies such as Canada, Sweden, Estonia, the US, Finland, and Denmark (Royal Navy, n.d., Cold War Training). As Table 15.1 depicts, the Royal Navy has a wide array of combat ready surface and sub-surface vessels, including nuclear submarines and nuclear weapons.

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Table 15.1 Combat Vessels and Submarines (as of August 2021) in the Royal Navy Class (Surface Vessels) Queen Elizabeth Class (Aircraft Carriers) Daring Class (Type 45 Destroyers)

Duke Class (Type 23 Frigates) 1

Number 2 6

13

Anti-submarine warfare and surface warfare/anti-surface warfare

Hunt Class

6

Patrolling and counter-mining ships; mine hunting Sandown Class

6

Patrolling and counter-mining ships; mine hunting

Scimitar Class

2

Patrolling and counter-mining ships River Class

8

Offshore patrolling vessels

Names HMS Queen Elizabeth HMS Prince of Wales HMS Daring HMS Dauntless HMS Diamond HMS Dragon HMS Defender HMS Duncan HMS Argyll HMS Northumberland HMS Kent HMS Lancaster HMS Montrose HMS Westminster HMS Richmond HMS Somerset HMS Sutherland HMS Portland HMS St Albans HMS Iron Duke (named after the Duke of Wellington) *HMS Monmouth (decommissioned June 2021) HMS Cattistock HMS Middleton HMS Brocklesby HMS Chiddingfold HMS Ledbury HMS Hurworth HMS Shoreham HMS Bangor HMS Grimsby HMS Pembroke HMS Penzance HMS Cromer (training ship at the Britannica Royal Naval College in Dartmouth) HMS Scimitar HMS Sabre HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS

Forth Mersey Tyne Medway Trent Severn Spey Tamar (Continued)

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Table 15.1 (Continued) Class (Surface Vessels)

Number

Names

Archer Class

16

HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS HMS

Operate in ports and constricted waterways; guarding UK’s nuclear submarine

Albion Class Landing Platform Dock—amphibious operations Astute Class (Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines)

2

4

Trafalgar Class (Nuclear-Powered Submarines)

2

Vanguard Class (Nuclear-Powered Submarines) 2

4

Armed with nuclear weapons

Archer Biter Smiter Pursuer Blazer Dasher Puncher Charger Ranger Trumpeter Example Explorer Express Exploit Tracker Raider Albion Bulwark

HMS Astute HMS Audacious HMS Ambush HMS Artful HMS Talent HMS Triumph *HMS Trenchant (Decommissioned in March 2021) HMS Vanguard HMS Vengeance HMS Victorious HMS Vigilant

Allwood (2021), Royal Navy (n.d., City Class), and Royal Navy (n.d., Ships). Notes 1 The Royal Navy has eight City Class Type 26 Frigates designed for anti-submarine warfare, but these vessels are slated for replacement with eight Duke Class vessels. The process of replacing the City Class vessels started in 2017 and is ongoing. According to the Royal Navy, “the 26s are being designed to protect the nation’s strategic deterrent and new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers from hostile submarines” ( Royal Navy, n.d., City Class; Royal Navy, n.d., Ships). 2 According to the Royal Navy: “A new class of ballistic submarine—the Dreadnought class—is currently under construction and is expected to replace the Vanguard-class by the 2030s, ushering in a new era of at-sea deterrence” ( Royal Navy, n.d. Continuous at Sea Deterrent).

But since the UK is not an Arctic state, even with a large naval and military capacity able to operate in the region, its ability to justify a military presence relies on positive cooperation with, and invitation from, the recognized Arctic states, most especially with the seven Western Arctic states with which the UK is a

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security ally. Therefore, this section illustrates, the two-prong approach the UK has adopted to lead in Arctic/northern defence relied on multilateral and bilateral defence cooperation and its ability and desirability to lead in these contexts. Multilateral cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and NATO

One dimension to the UK’s approach to the Arctic is to emphasize and demonstrate leadership in multilateral cooperation.13 For example, the UK established the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). JEF was established in 2014 at the NATO summit in Wales for NATO and non-NATO partners to “develop military capabilities, doctrine, interoperability, training, and exercising” (Monaghan, 2022).14 According to UK’s Ministry of Defence, the maritime dimension of JEF “is the Royal Navy’s high-readiness global task force” (Royal Navy, n.d.) and JEF is a security alliance focused on Northern Europe (e.g. Baltics) and the High North (European Arctic). JEF includes the “collaboration of like-minded nations led by the UK, with nine other partners: Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, Greenland and Faroe Islands), Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden” (Beckett, 2021; Ministry of Defence, 2022c), which includes five Nordic Arctic states (Polar Regions Department, 2023, p. 21). The rationale behind the cooperation is to operate together and help solve the burden of security challenges by sharing “through bottom-up collaboration between likeminded allies” (Monaghan, 2022). While any state can propose a defence alliance in theory, in the context of JEF, it is the UK’s ability to back up its suggestion with the know-how and resources to develop expertise and respond to a security problem that enables it to get traction with core regional actors such as the European Arctic states. The UK’s logic behind JEF is straightforward: Through exercising regularly, developing common plans, improving interoperability, and conducting activity, the JEF will ensure it maintains an ability to operate in the High North, in support of its Participating Nations’ goals and priorities (Polar Regions Department, 2023, p. 21). Through JEF UK is demonstrating leadership in northern security, as well as the UK’s status in global affairs. In 2021, for example, JEF ran an exercise near Älvdalen, Sweden called Joint Protector which tested JEF’s operation ability during crisis (Monaghan, 2021). Specifically, the exercise aim was “to explore how the temporarily relocated JEF headquarters [from the UK to Sweden] can interact with a host nation, and how integration and interoperability of JEF partner nations can be strengthened” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021b). Approximately 700 personnel from JEF participating nations were part of the exercise (Government Offices of Sweden, 2021b). In November 2022, it was announced that “JEF has increased its military activities in Northern Europe in 2022 to provide greater levels of security

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assurance to our members and the wider region” (Ministry of Defence, 2022a). The Royal Navy’s starring role in the UK JEF presence was made clear during an exercise in the Baltics in which the “HMS Northumberland and sister ship HMS Richmond joined Danish frigate HDMS Niels Juel and warships from Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for maritime patrols” (Ministry of Defence, 2022b). Incidentally, JEF is tied to NATO with the JEF deployments comprising of “a series of demanding exercises that are designed to ensure that NATO allies are ready to deal with any emerging crisis, from anywhere in the world” (Royal Navy, n.d.). As with JEF, the UK also has a central role in NATO’s Arctic and Northern European defence and the Ministry of Defence (2022, p. 7) has publicly stated that “[a]s a leading European NATO Ally, the UK is prepared to defend our Arctic Allies and respond to aggression” (NATO, n.d.).15 Of the NATO allies, presently five Arctic states are members (Ministry of Defence, 2022c), with two more Arctic allies—Finland and Sweden—now joining (NATO, 2023; Reuters, 2023). The UK is also one of only three NATO members which are nuclear armed (the US and France being the other two) and it is the second largest financial contributor to the alliance (only the US spends more), spending approximately “2 per cent of GDP on defence” in addition to investing “20 per cent or more of defence expenditure on major equipment” (Saxi, 2018, p. 1). Presently the UK “operate[s] nuclear submarines in Arctic waters for the purpose of deterrence against potentially hostile states, and remains militarily committed to the region through NATO and other EU allies, such as Sweden and Finland” (Depledge and Dodds, 2011, p. 74). In the past decade increasing Russian aggression on the global stage, as exemplified by its aggression and attacks on Ukraine, has refocused NATO on the protection of its allies and neighboring countries (House of Commons Defence Committee, 2018, p. 5). In the Arctic, as of 2023, the UK’s position is that the 2022 invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed UK-Russian Arctic cooperation (Polar Regions Department, 2023, p. 19). As part of the NATO response to Russia, the Arctic region has risen to prominence due to Russia compromising approximately half of the Arctic and it has significant military infrastructure and economic ambitions in the region (Polar Regions Department, 2023; Laruelle, 2014). In 2022, for example, the Royal Navy and Royal Marines returned to Northern Norway to take part in NATO’s Operation Cold Response (Ministry of Defence, 2022, p. 10).16 The 2022 Operation Cold Response exercise was the “largest military exercise in Norway in a generation” (Royal Navy, 2022). Approximately “30000 personnel from 27 nations” worked together to hone their skills operating under harsh polar conditions and demonstrate NATO’s collective fighting capability in the Arctic (Royal Navy, 2022). There were over 3,000 UK sailors and Royal Marines deployed and the Royal Navy vessel HMS Prince of Wales led the NATO fleet as the command ship for the exercise (Abbas, 2022), once more illustrating the centrality of the Royal Navy to the UK role in

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Arctic security and the rationale for its inclusion into intricate aspects of Arctic and northern security cooperation, alliances, and diplomacy.17 The UK’s military capabilities are quite large compared to some of its northern NATO allies, such as Iceland, with whom the UK has signed an agreement on defence and security cooperation (Hunt, 2019; Ministry of Defence, 2022c, p. 7).18 Iceland does not have a military and has a comparatively small civil coast guard that provides law enforcement and coastal protection (NATO, 2016).19 The UK and Iceland’s current bilateral defence and security relationship was agreed to within the context of NATO defence coverage for allies in the Northern European Arctic. This includes cooperation on areas such as “policing, counter-terrorism, search and rescue, risk and crisis management, and cyber security” with the UK leading NATO air policing for Iceland to guard NATO’s northern flank (Hunt, 2019). The UK Arctic defence approach of layering of bilateral agreements and NATO defence reassurance with respect to Nordic allies, like Iceland, is further displayed in the next section on bilateral alliances. Forging bilateral Arctic-specific military alliance

As the UK-Iceland defence agreement mentioned in the previous section illustrates, there is overlap between the UK’s multilateral and bilateral cooperation, in that case working with Iceland both bilaterally and in the context of cooperating within the NATO alliance. This overlap is a reoccurring theme in UK bilateral Arctic cooperation as allies with whom the UK has bilateral defence agreements are also frequently multilateral allies in NATO and JEF. In the Nordic region in particular, the UK is actively working multilaterally and bilaterally with nation-states on national and regional security matters, especially in light of increasing concerns with Russia in Europe and the Arctic as a result the 2022 invasion of Ukraine (Polar Regions Department, 2023; Ministry of Defence, 2022c). For example, the UK works closely with Norway in Arctic defence and polar training, as previously noted. The UK has annual winter deployment above the Arctic Circle in Norway for tri-service exercises which are part of the UK’s over 50-year presence in the area. Exercise Clockwork in Northern Norway in 2020, for example, was a joint “air exercise between the RAF [Royal Air Force], Army and Royal Navy” 200 miles above the Arctic Circle (Ministry of Defence, 2020). The UK Ministry of Defence (2020) reports that Exercise Clockwork has enabled to the UK armed forces to train over 16,000 “military personnel to survive, operate and fight in extreme cold weather environments.” The UK also works with other Nordic states such as Denmark. In December 2021, the British and Danish defence ministers signed a joint declaration to work together to tackle security problems within NATO (which they are both members) and bilaterally. The cooperation includes

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areas [such as] as air and maritime surveillance, joint training, disaster relief, intelligence-sharing and anti-submarine operations” and “training, the operational use and maintenance of frigates based on the similar designs of the UK Type 31 frigates and the Danish Ivar Huitfeldt-class frigates (Wallace, 2021).20 Furthermore, as tensions mount in Europe as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the UK is stepping up in Northern European defence as a bilateral partner with Arctic state NATO and non-NATO members (Chatterjee, 2022; Stubb, 2022; Gibbons, 2022). On 11 May 2022, for example, the UK signed “mutual security assurances … to tackle traditional, hybrid and cyber threats” with Finland and Sweden (Kauranen, 2022; Prime Minister’s Office, 2022). On 13 May 2022, the UK signed a new joint declaration with Norway to reinforce their cooperation to advance “‘security, sustainability and prosperity’ in Europe and beyond” (Gibbons, 2022). These bilateral agreements and declarations are in addition to the UK’s cooperation with Finland, Sweden, and Norway through participation in JEF and NATO (Saxi, 2018; Puolustusministeriö Fösvarsministeriet/Ministry of Defence, 2017; Government Offices of Sweden, 2021a). The May 2022 defence cooperation statements reinforce the idea that a central element of the UK’s inclusion into Arctic affairs is its ability to be a key military ally. As Saxi (2018, p. 1) notes, while the UK may no longer punch above its weight in world affairs, but it “remains a key security and defence actor in the Euro-Atlantic area” with its military having “a reputation for being well-equipped, experienced and highly professional.” The fact is that in May 2022 the governments of Finland, Sweden, and Norway decided that reaffirmation and reinforcement of their bilateral security alliances with the UK was needed and were willing to publicly affirm the UK’s capacity and necessity in a leadership role in continental defence. Furthermore, the bilateral reaffirmations illustrate the continuing belief in the UK’s capacity and leadership to help in emergency situations independent of NATO and JEF is useful which re-enforces the notion that the UK in Western Arctic and Northern European security goes beyond its role in collective alliances and extends to it as an individual actor able to make decisions, operate, and be useful independently in the Arctic security landscape. The implications of the Scottish independence movement Scotland is the northernmost part of the UK and the UK government is aware that the Scottish government is focusing on the Arctic, and the North more broadly, as a geostrategic advantage for its future national (Scottish) economic and political development (Polar Regions Department, 2023, p. 32; Scottish Government, 2017, 2019). In the UK’s 2023 Polar Regions Department Arctic policy framework, Looking North: The UK and the Arctic, for example, the UK government acknowledges that the UK’s involvement in the Arctic needs to respect and involve the region’s Indigenous peoples and enhance its

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collaboration with rural northern communities which “is also a focus for the Scottish Government, given the common challenges presented by rurality in Scotland and the Arctic States” (Polar Regions Department, 2023, p. 32). For its part the Scottish government has emphasized that Scotland is geographically and culturally connected to the Arctic and has been for centuries; with Scotland’s northernmost areas perhaps being more connected to the Arctic than to England. In its 2019 Scottish Arctic framework, Arctic Connections: Scotland’s Arctic Policy Framework, the Scottish government opens its document by stating: Scotland’s northernmost islands are closer to the Arctic Circle than they are to London. Connections between Scotland and the Arctic, however, go much further than geographical proximity. Our communities share deep cultural and social links as well as similar challenges and outlooks (Scottish Government, 2019, p. 5). Scotland’s emphasis of its cultural, geographic, economic, and diplomatic northern credentials (Scottish Government, 2017, 2019) serve a purpose beyond expressing interest in the Arctic/Circumpolar North and its immediate opportunities for Scotland; it also part of a crafted vision for an independent Scotland more closely connected to the Nordics, the European Union, and potentially even with North America (Scottish Government, 2019). Therefore, the Scottish independence movement must be considered when discussing the UK’s positing of itself as the Arctic nearest neighbor and its future in Arctic affairs, particularly its involvement in regional security. The 2014 Scottish referendum signaled the serious contemporary interest in Scottish independence (Torrance, 2022; UK Parliament, n.d.; Schnapper, 2015), and despite the unsuccessful results in 2014, the Government of Scotland is pushing for another referendum (Scottish Government, 2022; Institute for Government, 2021; Blackwell, 2022). From a UK perspective, if Scotland becomes independent, it could have serious implications for the UK’s defence infrastructure, which will have a knock-on effect on the UK’s northern status and ability to participate in bilateral and multilateral defence agreements.21 First, Scotland is the northern portion of the UK and is, therefore, the nation within the UK closest to the Arctic. As the Scottish Government’s External Affairs Fiona Hyslop noted in 2017: “Scotland is the closest neighbour to the Arctic States and we have many shared interests and challenges” (Scottish Government, 2017; Johnstone, 2012). Unimpeded access and proximity to the Arctic region and ocean are essential to the UK’s status in northern security provision. Without Scotland, there is likely to be a debate over the future of the UK in Arctic diplomatic and security affairs, but as independence has not happened, there is no clear answer to the terms of independence and the implications in the short and long term. Second, Scotland is the base of a substantial portion of the Royal Navy and the UK’s security infrastructure. For example, Scotland is the home of HM Naval

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Base (HMNB) Clyde. HMNB Clyde “is home to the core of the Submarine Service, including the nation’s nuclear deterrent, and the new generation of hunter-killer submarines” (Royal Navy, n.d., HMNB Clyde). The Sandown Class vessels are also based in Scotland (Allwood, 2021). Presently, it is unclear to what extent the Scotland and UK/England-Wales-Northern Ireland will cooperate on security and defence issues if Scotland becomes independent, but there is debate about whether the UK (minus Scotland) will have to relocate its nuclear-powered submarines and weapons, and if so, where (The Scotsman, 2018; Andrews, 2021; BBC, 2014; Gregory, 2021; Sabbagh, 2021). If Scotland leaves the UK, the UK will immediately have a less salient claim to being the nearest Arctic neighbor and will have to find accommodations for the impact that a lack of Scotland in the union will have on the UK’s defence infrastructure. The impact of independence on Royal Navy’s placement in Scotland, for example, will cause short term uncertainty about the capabilities and immediate readiness of the UK in Arctic and northern security. In particular, the Royal Navy and the UK’s nuclear deterrence capabilities through the Trident missile system will be impacted as there are loud calls for their removal (Barnaby, 2011; Stando, 2021; Royal Navy, n.d.; Defence Nuclear Organisation and Ministry of Defence, 2021).22 While the UK presently has a large role in northern defence, Scottish independence will likely undercut the feasibility of it maintaining the role in the future. Conclusion Overall, this chapter provides a brief overview of the UK’s role in the Arctic, emphasizing its role in Arctic security and the importance of the UK’s military capabilities in its ability to be a prominent player in the region despite not being an Arctic state. Specifically, this chapter highlights that the Royal Navy is the leading asset the UK has to play a sizable role in Arctic defence bilaterally and in alliances, namely NATO and JEF. The UK has used its military assets, leading with the Royal Navy, to entrench itself into the security framework of Northern Europe, with the current tensions with Russia helping the UK to solidify its regional role. The UK is also looking to expand its influence beyond Europe and has extends its services from NATO member such as Canada; however, the UK’s status and capabilities in northern security provision may be undermined by Scottish independence. Scotland is the northern portion of the UK. At this stage, assessing the degree of the impact of Scottish independence is speculative since it is too soon to assess the terms of possible separation and the nature of the bilateral relationship afterward are all unknown. However, without a doubt given Scottish political sentiments about the placement of nuclear submarines and weapons on their soil, Scottish independence will affect the UK’s defence infrastructure, which will impact the UK’s capacity in global military defence roles, including in the Arctic.

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Notes 1 Dr. Burke is a Research Fellow at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark. This research was completed while Dr. Burke was supported by the J.R. Smallwood Foundation Fellowship and the Northern Scholars Visiting Research Fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh. 2 The Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami states that the “Inuit Nunangat is a distinct geographic, political and cultural region that includes the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (Northwest Territories), Nunavut, Nunavik (Northern Quebec) and Nunatsiavut (Northern Labrador)” and represents the Canadian Inuit homeland ( Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, n.d.). 3 The shrinking North trend is noticeable even within established Arctic states with internal areas and actors now needing to bolster their sub-Arctic status through proactive iterations of their Arctic/sub-Arctic connections, heritage, and plans ( Roussel and Payette, 2011). In Canada, for example, provinces such as Manitoba and Quebec now have provincial northern strategies ( Government of Manitoba, 2017a, 2017b; Société du Plan Nord Québec, 2014, 2016) and there is a call for Newfoundland and Labrador to develop a northern strategy for the whole province ( Burke, 2021), which like the UK has been impacted by the shrinking conceptualization of the North resulting in much of the province’s exclusion from contemporary national and international northern diplomacy and academic exploration. 4 The UK also is one of the oldest observer members to the Arctic Council, having had its position in the forum since 1998, where it contributes to diplomacy on Arctic environmental protection and sustainable economic development ( Arctic Council, n.d.; HM Government, 2021; Watson, 2014). 5 Canada has a long history of difficulty independently defending its Arctic region due to factors such as its size (the Canadian Arctic is larger than Western Europe), Canada’s limited operational capabilities to operate in the climatic conditions of the Arctic and reliance on neighboring United States to ensure the defence of continental North America ( Elliot-Meisel, 1998, 2009; Killaby, 2006; Huebert, 2005-2006; Byers, 2009, 2010; Burke, 2017, 2018; Williams and Burke, 2015). 6 Joesph Nye’s (2019) work on hard and soft power offers insight to the dynamics between the UK’s expression of interest in cooperation and science in the Arctic while simultaneously stating that its diplomacy is backed by deterrent capabilities and power projection. Nye (2019, p. 16) states that: “Even the military can sometimes play a role in the generation of soft power. In addition to the aura of power that is generated by its hard-power capabilities, the military has a broad range of officer exchanges, joint training and assistance programmes with other countries in peacetime.” 7 Nye defines hard power to be “behavior based on coercion or payment” which includes the use of military force (p. 200), which is in contrast with soft power which “is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment” ( Nye, 2019, p. 7). Nye goes on to state that “[h]ard power is push; soft power is pull” with hard power being “like brandishing carrots or sticks; soft power is more like a magnet” (p. 201). Nye’s work can help to frame and consider the UK’s approach to Arctic issues and its particular emphasis on positioning itself as a leader in regional security. The UK’s interests in the Arctic extend beyond security to include economic opportunities and environmental concerns as well, but its military capabilities and experience in Arctic operations, in addition to its long-standing trusted position as a key western security provider through NATO, for example, empower the UK to have a larger role comparatively to other actors with interests in Arctic

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diplomacy and governance. The hard and soft power of the UK is interwoven in its attractiveness as a regional partner for Western Arctic states. While many other states like China, for example, are equally interested in pushing their interests and agendas in Arctic politics and governance and also have hard power Arctic capabilities (e.g. icebreakers) ( The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). But from the Western Arctic state perspective, China lacks the soft power attractiveness to play a significant role in Western Arctic security, hence the controversy around the Chinese telecoms company Huawei and its role in the UK’s 5G network. As of 13 October 2022 Huawei the UK government has ordered that “Huawei technology must be removed from the UK’s 5G public networks by the end of 2027 under legal documents handed to broadband and mobile operators today” due to national security concerns and concerns about Huawei’s impact the UK’s security alliances, such as Five Eyes ( Donelan, 2022; Warrell et al., 2020). Concerns with China as a security ally include its increasingly close relationship with Russia, its authoritarian regime and human rights record, and its not being a western security ally with active interests counter to existing security allies. The Royal Air Force also plays a significant role in the UK’s Arctic and northern capabilities, as signified by the state’s commitment to purchase 138 next generation F-35 fighter jets and plans to buy P-8 Poseidon aircraft to aid on coastal patrols ( Rosamond, 2015). However, given the prominence of the Royal Navy and marines in the UK’s northern capabilities, they are the focus of this chapter. The Royal Marines are an elite force operating as part of the Royal Navy and they are the commando force and amphibious troops of the Royal Navy ( Royal Navy, n.d.). British fascination with and attempts to explore the Arctic date back to at least 1497 when Giovanni Caboto (John Cabot) received royal patronage from Henry VII in search of an alternative route to China but he ended up landing upon the present day Island of Newfoundland, Canada ( Caldwell, 1990). The Barents Sea exercise “also included the British oiler RFA Tidespring. It’s the first time the Royal Navy has led a multinational task group in the High North region in more than 20 years, and the move is part of a growing British effort in the region” ( Chuter, 2020). There are 70 combat vessels and submarines in the Royal Navy, not including noncombat vessels such as the Echo Class ships (HMS Echo and HMS Enterprise) which “conduct survey missions which includes the support of amphibious and submarine operations” and the HMS Protector which is an ice-patrol vessel, as well as vessels in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ( Allwood, 2021; Royal Navy, n.d.). The UK is also poised to obtain a Type 32 frigate. Details on Type 32 frigate are few at this stage with their procurement allegedly appearing “without the usual years-long process of announcing and refining requirements” ( Axe, 2020; HM Government, 2021). However, what is known is that the Type 32 vessel will “protect territorial waters” and is portrayed as a “general-purpose frigate, rather than a specialized anti-submarine or anti-air warfare platform” and will see the “UK destroyer and frigate numbers rise from 19 to 24 ships” ( Willett, 2022). Though not examined in this chapter, the UK also established “The Northern Group,” a “forum in which members come together informally for discussions on defence and security issues common to us as Northern European nations” ( Wallace, 2020). The Northern Group consists of Denmark (Kingdom of Denmark including Greenland, Faroe Islands and Denmark), Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the UK ( Wallace, 2020; Polar Regions Department, 2023, p. 35; Ministry of Defence, 2022c, p. 10).

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14 According to Monaghan (2022), JEF was signed into effect in 2015 and became fully operational in 2018 with its first deployments focusing on Baltic security. 15 NATO is an alliance meant to “guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means” ( NATO, n.d.). 16 The UK also took part in the Exercise Trident Juncture. 17 The HMS Prince of Wales is also the NATO command ship for 2022. 18 According to the UK Ministry of Defence, the UK “plays a particular role in protecting underwater critical national infrastructure and ensuring freedom to operate in the North Atlantic, especially in the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) Gap” (Ministry of Defence, 2022, p. 7). 19 Iceland’s coastal patrols, search and rescue, and maritime law enforcement are conducted by its coast guard, which is a civilian law enforcement agency ( NATO, 2016). 20 The UK (through HM Coastguard) also works closely with the Kingdom of Denmark to ensure security of the Faroe Islands. In 2019, the Faroe Islands and the UK signed an agreement to cooperate on search and rescue operations ( MRCC Torshavn and HM Coastguard, 2019). 21 Independence will also impact Scottish defence capabilities and northern status too, but in the context of this chapter the focus is on the potential impact on the UK. 22 There has been ongoing debate in the UK about whether Trident should be ended.

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Index

Note: italic page numbers refer to figures A2AD see anti-access and area denial AATC see Army Arctic Training Center abandonment and entrapment 104 ACE see Arctic Challenge Exercise AFNORTH see Allied Forces Northern Europe agreed areas 113 AIS see automatic identification systems Alaska Oil and Gas Association 125 Alaska Territorial Guard (ATG) 170 Alaskan Command (ALCOM) 171 ALCOM see Alaskan Command Allied Administrative Publication AAP47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development 88, 93 Allied Doctrine for Land Operations 94 Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) 1 Allied joint doctrine 88, 93, 98 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations 95 Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 94–96 Allied Technical Publication ATP-17 Naval Arctic Manual 94 American Arctic strategy and policy 168–170 American Polar Pivot 167 Amundsen, Roald 95 anti-access and area denial (A2AD) 2, 157 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 61, 154, 156, 157, 161, 207, 209, 215 APS see Army Prepositioned Stocks Arctic Challenge Exercise (ACE) 228 Arctic: conflict 127–130, 132, 134, 135; exceptionalism 5; fight 123; Joint Operational Doctrine 89; military

conflict 127; northern defense engagement 9; power projection 123, 126–127, 131, 132, 172, 174; winter environment 16–17 Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) 167 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 71 Army Arctic Training Center (AATC) 171 Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) 24 ASBM see Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission Askvik, Ørjan 212 ASW see anti-submarine warfare ATG see Alaska Territorial Guard ATP see Allied Tactical Publication automatic identification systems (AIS) 128 Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) 167 Barents sea 1, 2, 37, 57, 59, 61, 74, 90, 106, 107, 111, 113, 115, 116, 155, 206, 207, 211, 215, 259, 270 bastion defense 2, 3, 22, 67, 147 bastion strategy 230 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTG) 60, 61 Berger, David H. 21, 22, 27 Bering, Vitus 69 Biden, Joseph 21, 126 A Blue Arctic 21, 132 BMDS see Ballistic Missile Defense System Bomber Task Force (BTF) 155 bombers that regularly fly into the Alaskan 176

290

Index

Brigade “Nord” 63 Bruun-Hanssen, Haakon 110, 116 BTF see Bomber Task Force BTG see Battalion Tactical Groups Cable Security Fleet (CSF) 159 Canada 44, 71, 126, 127, 144, 167, 170, 173, 227, 229, 259, 267, 269, 270, 278 Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 111, 112 CCCC see China Communications Construction Company China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) 252–253 COB see Co-located Operating Bases COIN see counterinsurgency Cold Region Operations 96 Cold War 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 18, 22, 33, 34, 36, 42, 45, 50, 52, 53, 84, 86, 104, 105, 108, 109–111, 123, 127–132, 134, 135, 143, 160, 172, 184, 205, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214–216, 219, 234, 250, 266, 270 cold-weather environment 94–96, 174 cold-weather operations 16, 26–27, 176 Co-located Operating Bases (COB) 44 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 191 combatant commander 20 comprehensive approach 184, 186, 189, 190–192, 197 confidence building 7, 34, 47, 104–105, 241 contingency planning 42 controlled escalation 37 cooperative Arctic 123–125, 130–131, 133 Core Area Initiative 110 counterinsurgency (COIN) 8, 54, 55, 183 counterterrorism (CT) 8, 183, 216 COVID-19 pandemic 216 creativity 93, 188, 189 crisis response 191, 193–195 critical attacking force 42 Cross Border Training (CBT) program 228 CSAR see Combat Search and Rescue CSF see Cable Security Fleet CSG see Carrier Strike Group CT see counterterrorism cult of creativity 188 cult of the offensive 188

DCA see Defence Cooperation Agreement Defence Capability Initiative 109 Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) 239 defense dilemma and security dilemma 32–33; US reinforcements to Norway 33–34 defensive system 50, 52, 60 Denmark 1, 9, 27, 90, 92, 128, 129, 132, 170, 227, 238, 250, 252–262, 267, 270, 273, 275 Department of the Navy’s Blue Arctic Strategy 150 deterrence 17–19, 23, 33–35, 37, 39, 40–42, 44, 47, 51, 60, 62, 84, 103–106, 108, 111, 113, 172, 173, 175, 178, 184, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 205, 207–209, 212, 214, 216, 238–241, 251, 260, 269, 274, 278; cost imposition 150; denial 148–149, 153; resilience 149–150 Dezhnyev, Semyon Ivanovich 69 Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) 21–22 DMO see Distributed Maritime Operations due regard 71–72 Dulles, John Foster 36 Dynamic Force Employment 112, 209 EABO see Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation EFP see Enhanced Forward Presence Eisenhower, Dwight D. 36 electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) 25, 168, 177 electronic warfare (EW) 175, 185, 197 Eliassen, Kjell 46 Elliot-Meisel, Elizabeth 268 Ellsworth, Robert 43 EMS see electromagnetic spectrum Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) 216 Enhanced Polar Systems-Recapitalization (EPS-R) 167 EPS-R see Enhanced Polar SystemsRecapitalization ESA see European Space Agency escalatory control 184, 189, 190, 191, 193, 197 European Space Agency (ESA) 237 EW see electronic warfare

Index excessive maritime claim 72, 78 Expeditionary Advanced Base Operation (EABO) 17, 21–24, 26, 209 expeditionary force 9, 16, 17, 27, 132, 133, 176, 266 expeditionary warfare and power projection: developments and military operations 19–20; European allies 25; security politics of the Arctic 17–19; US Air Force Joint All-Domain Operations 24–25; US Army and MDO 23–24; US command 20; US Marines, Force Design 2030 21–22 extended deterrence 18, 33, 35, 47 extractive Arctic 123, 125–126, 129 Eyre, Wayne 5 fait accompli 22, 24, 32, 192, 193 Faroe Islands 1, 9, 250–262 Faroese government 253, 254, 260 Finland 4, 6, 8, 9, 25, 26, 27, 33, 34, 45, 46, 51, 52, 61, 63, 92, 95, 97, 108, 124, 127, 134, 146, 155, 156, 158, 160, 174, 176, 183, 213, 214, 215, 225–241, 266, 267, 270, 273, 274, 276 Finnish and Swedish NATO membership: expectations on 237–241; security, and defense 226–237 Finnish defense capabilities 231 Fletcher, Joseph O. 39 flexible response 37, 38, 42, 46, 207 FOA see freedom of action FONOP see Freedom of Navigation Operation Force Design 2030 21 Force Design 2030 (FD2030) 17, 19, 21, 22, 24–26 freedom of action (FOA) 148, 183, 213 Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) 78 Frydenlund, Knut 45, 46 Gebhardt, James 92 geopolitical exposure 105, 106, 111–113 Germany 1, 45, 84, 92, 108, 143, 155, 160, 213 GIUK see Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom global positioning systems (GPS) 128, 177

291

Global War on Terror (GWOT) 27, 172, 183, 188, 189, 190, 192–195 GMD see Ground-based Midcourse Defense GPC see great power competition GPS see global positioning systems Grant, Shelagh 268 great power competition (GPC) 8, 21, 24, 35, 44, 123–125, 131–134, 183, 184, 186–190, 192–195, 197, 198, 210, 252 Greenland 1, 9, 27, 90, 107, 125–129, 131, 132, 167, 170, 173, 250–262, 273 Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) 1, 2, 16, 157, 207, 250, 251, 254, 259, 261 Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 167 Gustavson, Erik 110 GWOT see Global War on Terror Harlem, Gudmund 37, 38, 46 “hearts-and-minds” approach 55 HM Naval Base (HMNB) 277–278 HMNB see HM Naval Base HNS see Host Nation Support Høiback, Harald 42, 87–90 holding time 33, 42, 46 holding time doctrine 85 Holst, Johan Jørgen 33, 34, 38–47, 205, 207 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 168 horizontal escalation 103, 144 Host Nation Support (HNS) 111, 227, 237 House of Commons Defence Committee 266, 269, 274 HSPD see Homeland Security Presidential Directive Huitfeldt, Tønne 41 Hultqvist Doctrine 233 ICBMs see intercontinental ballistic missiles Ice Exercise (ICEX) 167 ice-covered waters 68, 71, 76, 79 Iceland 9, 90, 107, 128, 266, 267, 273, 275 ICEX see Ice Exercise IISS see International Institute for Strategic Studies

292

Index

information overmatch 186, 190, 195–197 integrated deterrence 142, 144, 145, 151–152, 152, 160, 173, 175, 178, 184, 189, 190, 191, 193, 197 integrated naval deterrence in Arctic: the changing Russian threat environment 145–147; framework for 147–150; Norwegian interests and strategy 143–144; operationalizing 150–160; US interests and strategy 144–145 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 144, 151, 161, 261 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 37, 129, 147 intergovernmental panel, climate change 210 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 53, 231, 249 International Security Affairs (ISA) 39 inter-operability 88, 251 ISA see International Security Affairs ISR see intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance JADC2 see Joint-All Domain Command and Control JADO and JADC2 175–176 JADO see Joint All-Domain Operations Jaeger Brigade 231 Jan Mayen 1, 206 JEF see Joint Expeditionary Force JEF-A see Joint Expeditionary Forces–Arctic Jervis, Robert 34, 104, 105, 115 JFC Norfolk see Joint Force Command Norfolk JFCNF see Joint Forces Command Norfolk Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) 8, 168, 173–178 Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO) 8, 17, 24–26, 168, 173, 175–178 Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) 9, 266, 273–276, 278 Joint Expeditionary Forces–Arctic (JEFA) 176 Joint Forces Command Norfolk (JFCNF) 1, 155, 157, 158

Joint Operational Command 207 Joint Strategic Command (JSC) 57 JSC see Joint Strategic Command Kekkonen, Urho 46 Kendall, Frank 25 Kennan, George 128 Kingdom of Denmark 251, 252, 255, 261, 273 Kingdom’s perspectives: on China and Russia’s role in the Arctic 256–260; on role of NATO in Arctic security and defence 254–256 Klippenberg, Erik 38–41, 43 koch 69 Koivisto, Mauno 46 Koivurova, Timo 5 Kola peninsula 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 18, 47, 50, 51, 56, 57, 59–63, 90, 107, 108, 127, 146, 157, 206–208, 230, 250 Kremlin 5, 7, 18, 50, 54, 59, 62, 63, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 76, 79, 104, 108, 144, 150–152, 154 Ladd Field 171 land line of communications (LLOC) 61 Land Tactical Operations in Cold Weather Environment 94–96 large-scale combat operations (LSCO) 23 Lavrov, Sergei 168 liminal warfare 185 Littoral Operations in Contested Environment (LOCE) 21 LLOC see land line of communications LOCE see Littoral Operations in Contested Environment London 261 LSCO see large-scale combat operations Maaø, Ole Jørgen 34, 43 maritime patrol aircrafts (MPA) 84, 113–115, 157 maskirovka 54 massive retaliation 36, 37, 207 Mattis, James 87, 169 McConville, James C. 23, 24 MCJSB see Military Committee Joint Standardization Board McNamara, Robert 38 MDO see multi-domain operations MDTF see Multi-Domain Task Force

Index mechanized maneuver 19 Medvedev, Dmitry 130 Military Committee Joint Standardization Board (MCJSB) 88 military power projection 15, 126 military strategic shift 213 military vulnerability 7, 105, 106, 111, 113–115 Mitchell, Billy 126 Modalities for Strengthened Interaction (MSI) 236 modernization 154, 168, 174, 211, 212, 230 Montevideo Convention of 1933 70 Motor Rifle Brigade (MRB) 57, 60, 61, 63 Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations 96–97 MPA see maritime patrol aircrafts MRB see Motor Rifle Brigade MSI see Modalities for Strengthened Interaction multi-domain operations (MDO) 17, 23–26, 168, 169, 177 Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) 177 Multi-Domain Warfare Officer (13O) career field 177 multilateral cooperation 142, 160, 273 multilateralism 227 National Defense Strategy (NDS) 19, 21, 111, 112, 144, 169 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 124, 178 National Research Council of Canada (NRC) 269 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 168 National Security Strategy 18, 21, 130, 132, 208, 210 National Strategy for the Arctic Region 19, 129, 133, 169 NATO Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations (COECWO) 94 NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic; Allied operations in the Arctic 93–97; Arctic need doctrine 85–87; doctrine and roles of doctrine 87–90, 89; European Arctic area of operations 90–91, 91; operations in the arctic 91–93

293

NATO option 233 NATO’s eastern flank 4 NATO’s Joint Ballistic Missile Defence System 115 NATO’s missile defence system 115 NATO’s northern flank 1, 2; future of NATO in the north 4–5; strategic challenges and opportunities 5–6; structure and research of 6–9 NATO’s northern flank, Norway: challenges for a small state 206–208; changes in the Great Power game 208–210; Norway as different actor on international stage 215–219; Norway’s role in an expanded NATO 213–215; transformed theater of operations 210–213 Naval forces 57, 84, 86, 144–155, 158–160, 208, 238 naval strike missile (NSM) 156 NDRE see Norwegian Defense Research Establishment NDS see National Defense Strategy networked arctic security 174–175 Nitze, Paul 38 NOAA see National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NORDEFCO see Nordic Defence Cooperation Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) 174 North Atlantic Treaty 35, 40, 218 North Warning System (NWS) 126, 167 Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory 1, 3–4, 15–16, 108 Northern Sea Route (NSR) 7, 67–79, 86, 132, 145–147, 159, 211, 237 Northern Sea Transport Corridor 75, 75 Northern Strategic Bastion (NSB) 7, 57, 61, 62 Northwest Passage (NWP) 128, 173 Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (NDRE) 34, 37–39, 41, 42, 46, 104 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 40, 217 Norwegian Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) 84, 114 Norwegian Ministry of Defense 143 Norwegian problems of confidence building: definition of 104–105; external perspective 106–108;

294

Index

geopolitical exposure 105, 106, 111–113; internal perspective 108–111; military vulnerability 106, 113–115 Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 113 Norwegian security and defence policy 205 NOTAM see Notice to Airmen Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 112 NRC see National Research Council of Canada NSB see Northern Strategic Bastion NSM see naval strike missile NSPD see National Security Presidential Directive NSR see Northern Sea Route NUPI see Norwegian Institute of International Affairs NWP see Northwest Passage NWS see North Warning System Obama, Barack 129–131, 169 Odlo, Yngve 110 Operation Barbarossa 92 Operation Weserübung 92 operational strategic command (OSK) 86 operations forces in Arctic: comprehensive approach 190–192; information overmatch 195–197; and pivot toward GPC 187–189; strategic and operational context 184–187; strategic considerations 189–190; Swift and precise action 193–195 OSK see operational strategic command Oslo 1, 45, 144, 145, 149, 150 peace-time 110, 111, 114, 116, 194 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 208 Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation 85, 86, 92–93 PLAN see People’s Liberation Army Navy Pompeo, Mike 132, 253 power projection 15, 16, 25, 26, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 132, 133, 134, 169, 172, 173, 174 Project Iceworm 129 proximity 2, 4, 60, 90, 170, 183, 185, 206, 267, 268, 269, 277 Putin, Vladimir 19, 69, 76, 78, 130

QRA see Quick ReactionAlert Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) 155 reassurance 17, 34, 41, 44, 60, 103–107, 111, 113, 191, 205, 207, 209 reception, staging, onwards movement and integration (RSOMI) 192 Regaining Arctic Dominance 133, 169 regionalization 186 resource extraction 8, 125, 218, 229 Rowen, Henry S. 39 Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) 211 RSOMI see reception, staging, onwards movement and integration RUSI see Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Rusk, Dean 38 Russia: Arctic forces 18; Crimean annexation (2014) 107, 114; war in Ukraine 3, 17–18, 127, 156 Russian Arctic 3, 7, 52, 56, 57, 59–62, 69, 86, 90, 175 Russian attack 3, 51, 53, 63, 127, 148 Russian Federation Maritime Claims (2021) 78 Russian Northern Sea Route (NSR) 7, 67–79, 68; contemporary position of 69–72; freedom of navigation 78–79; meeting Putin’s goal 73–78, 74, 75, 77 Russian way of regular warfare: and the Arctic 59–62; characteristics of 52–54; conventional force 54–56; posture of Russian land forces 56–59, 58 Russian-Ukraine War 52, 54, 84, 107 Russo–Finnish border 61 SACEUR see Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s Schmidt, Otto Yulievich 75 SDCA see Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 107, 145 security and defence agreement, within the Kingdom 260–262 security and defence responsibilities: of Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands 252–253 sensorshooter 19

Index SFNTG see Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group SFRJ see solid fuel ramjet SLBM see submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLOCs see sea lines of communication SOF see special operation forces soft-security cooperation 124 solid fuel ramjet (SFRJ) 156 Soviet submarines 36–37 Soviet Union 19, 32–37, 39, 40–43, 45, 46, 54, 71, 92, 109, 123, 143, 172, 205–208, 250 special operation forces (SOF) 8, 183, 184, 187–197 SR see strategic reconnaissance stand-in forces 21, 22, 27 state security 17 state-like capabilities 186, 193–194 Stein, Janice Gross 105 strategic autonomy 213 strategic blueprint for the Arctic 21 strategic perception 229–231 strategic reconnaissance (SR) 195–196 submarine hunters 115 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) 37 Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) 113, 149 Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) 151 Svalbard 1, 35, 44, 45, 61, 62, 105, 127, 128, 144, 147, 159, 206 Sverdrup, Ulf 217 Sweden 8, 27, 33, 51, 52, 63, 95, 96, 108, 124, 134, 146, 155, 156, 158, 174, 176, 183, 213, 214, 215, 225, 227, 228–240, 267, 270, 273, 274, 276 Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) 232 swift and precise actions 186 tactical invincibility 194 Tamnes, Rolf 33, 34, 42, 44, 212 Tang, Shipping 105 TAPS see Trans-Alaska Pipeline System The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations 21 Threshold Defence Concept 110 Thule 127, 129, 170, 173 Tibbets, Margaret Joy 38 Tórshavn 253–256, 258–260

295

Total Defence Concept 192 TRADOC see Training and Doctrine Command Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 23, 89 Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) 125 trans-Atlantic link 1 Trident Juncture 20, 86, 111–113, 158 Truman, Harry 111–112, 128, 129, 156 Trump, Donald 131, 132, 134, 135, 254 Trutnyev, Yuri 73–75 UK Ministry of Defence 275 UK: “the Arctic’s nearest neighbour” 266; Arctic and circumpolar North 267–268; implications of the Scottish independence movement 276–278; interest in contemporary northern defence 268–270; Ministry of Defence 268; and Royal Navy in multilateral and bilateral Arctic cooperation 270–276 UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North 268 Ukrainian Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) 56 US Air Force 24–25, 126, 167, 168, 170, 171, 174, 177 US Department of Defense (DoD) 19, 145, 169 US exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 67–69, 71, 72, 76, 78, 126 US Freedom of Navigation Program of 1979 79 US Marine Corps (USMC) 16–18, 20–24, 43–45, 111, 114, 169, 170, 209 US national strategy in the Arctic: Arctic conflict 127–129; Arctic great power competition 131–134; Arctic power projection 126–127; cooperative arctic 124–125, 130–131; early Cold War years 128–129; extractive arctic 125–126; post-Cold War years 129–131 US Navy Maritime Claims Manual 78 USMC see US Marine Corps VanHerck, Glen D. 5 Väyrynen, Paavo 46 Vibe, Kjeld 45

296

Index

victory parade 185 Voennaia mysl’ 85–86 WAMCATS see Washington-Alaska Military Cable and Telegraph System Washington-Alaska Military Cable and Telegraph System (WAMCATS) 170 Washington DC 107, 144, 145, 149, 150, 170, 172, 173, 175, 235, 240, 255

weapons engagement zone (WEZ) 6, 21, 27, 148 WEZ see weapons engagement zone Wohlstetter, Albert 42 Yankee class 37 Ziemke, Earl F. 92 zone of peace 230, 266