Military Operations, Health and Technology [1 ed.] 9781621003793, 9781621003281

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Copyright © 2012. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2012. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

DEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGIES

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MILITARY OPERATIONS, HEALTH AND TECHNOLOGY

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DEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGIES

MILITARY OPERATIONS, HEALTH AND TECHNOLOGY

ALEXANDER L. COBB

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EDITOR

New York Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2012 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Cobb, Alexander L. Military operations, health and technology / Alexander L. Cobb. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN:  (eBook) 1. Military art and science--History--21st century. 2. Military medicine. I. Title. U42.C555 2011 355.4--dc23 2011033105

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CONTENTS

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Preface

vii

Chapter 1

Population Transfer and the Mediation of Insurgent Conflict A.W. Harris

Chapter 2

Understanding Good Coping: A Submarine Crew Coping with Extreme Environmental Conditions Shaul Kimhi

25

Chapter 3

A Review of Telehealth Applications in the Military Community Mary S. McCarthy, Sabrina Ramme and Susan L. Cummings

43

Chapter 4

Resolution of the Bi-Criteria Military Unit Pathfinding Problem Applying MOACO Algorithms A.M. Mora, P.A. Castillo and J.J. Merelo

55

Chapter 5

War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale

89

Index

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1

167

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PREFACE This book presents current research in the study of military operations, health issues, and technology. Topics discussed in this compilation include population transfers and the mediation of insurgent conflicts; the emotional and mental coping skills of a submarine crew in extreme environments; telehealth technologies for the provision of long-distance clinical health care, patient and professional education and health administration; military unit pathfinding problems applying MOACO algorithms and the strategic and military operation issues for conducting the war in Afghanistan. (Imprint: Nova) Chapter 1 discusses a mediated agreement ending civil war between an insurgent separatist group and the state, which can occur if the state accepts an agreement in principle that state sponsored population transfer into the insurgent ―homeland‖ territory does not dilute the legitimacy of insurgent claims to the territory. Such an agreement becomes increasingly possible if the insurgents accept an agreement in principle that minority population homogeneity in the contested territory will not be pursued. On the occasions where the insurgents will have been engaging in hostile acts toward the ―settler‖ population that has arrived as part of a state sponsored population transfer program, the insurgents see their anti-settler campaign as a means of obtaining self-determination. The state sees the population transfer program as a method of strengthening its claim of territorial integrity. Successful conflict mediation by an intervening party will likely require a recasting of population transfer, so that further settler in-migration would be allowed, with the concurrence of the insurgents. The mediation effort would then have to gain an insurgency commitment to end the antisettler campaign, so that it would be not seen as a threat to the territorial integrity or national sovereignty of the entire state. Chapter 2 is based on in-depth interviews with 12 Israeli submarine crew members. The study examines various aspects of coping with submarine service and its unique characteristics from the crew members' points of view. Interview analysis reveals the following salient themes: First, positive perception of submarine service: positive thinking, optimism and sense of humor, accompanied by cynicism. Second, the submarine team is characterized by high moral standards, high team spirit and a sense of the importance of the service. Third, social relationships are characterized by avoidance of conflicts, while maintaining a good atmosphere and high social cohesion. Fourth, crew members perceived separation from home, friends and daily life as the most difficult aspects to deal with. Fifth, they perceived the submarine as dangerous place but reduced aspects of danger by developing

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viii

Alexander L. Cobb

a sense of trust in their submarine and in their ability to control potential dangers. Study results are discussed in light of relevant theories. While nurses may believe that the first documented use of telehealth was the 1969 nurse –-led clinic project at Boston’s Logan Airport set up to that cared for victims of airplane crashes and other accidents by transmitting vital signs, and electrocardiograms, as well as other health information and video images to Massachusetts General Hospital, in reality, telehealth has been around since the 1950’s (Chaffee, 1999). ―Telehealth is the use of telecommunications technologies for the provision of long-distance clinical health care, patient and professional education, and health administration‖. (Chaffee, 1999, p. 27). Technologies include computers, telephones, video monitors, and telecommunication networks that connect two or more sites. The most basic examples of telehealth include nurses phoning report to another nurse on a receiving unit or a nurse calling an ambulatory surgery patient 24 hours post-discharge to evaluate for pain or other symptoms. As discussed in Chapter 3, Telehealth has a place in every area of health care, ranging from emergency medical response systems to hospital and home care, and can be used for direct or remote care delivery. Chapter 4 presents a set of Multi-Objective Ant Colony Optimization (MOACO) algorithms, the hCHAC group. They have been designed to solve a pathfinding problem for military unit, inside a battlefield. The path should minimize the speed in reaching the target point, while maximizing the safety. The objectives have been combined into a different amount (from one to four), applying a different algorithm for solving each of them. The hCHAC algorithms have been tested in two realistic scenarios, modelled in a simulator and compared with a novel multi-objective greedy approach that has been included as baseline for comparisons. The experiments show that all the hCHAC algorithms outperform the greedy approach, yielding in addition very good behaviour in the military tactical sense. As discussed in Chapter 5, with a deteriorating security situation and no comprehensive political outcome yet in sight, most observers view the war in Afghanistan as open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of Members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort—often called ―America’s other war‖—required greater national attention. For the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war is both a struggle for survival and an effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the United States, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a stable regional security balance. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan’s neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war may have a powerful impact on the future balance of power and influence in the region. For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO’s relevance in the 21st century. Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda’s use of the territory of

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Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. In that first phase, U.S. and coalition forces, working with Afghan opposition forces, quickly removed the Taliban regime. After the fall of the Taliban, the character of the war shifted to a multifaceted COIN effort aimed at smothering the diffuse insurgency by shoring up GIRoA efforts to provide security, governance, and economic development. The three areas are generally viewed as interdependent and mutually-reinforcing—security is a prerequisite for some governance and development efforts, and longer-term, sustainable security requires both functional governance and economic opportunity. As one pillar of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan and international military effort aims broadly at defeating the remnants of the Taliban and other insurgents, securing the population, and helping extend the reach of the Afghan government. The international military effort includes both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to which the United States contributes troops, and the separate U.S.-led OEF mission. In his December 3, 2009, speech President Obama identified several objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan: (1) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda; (2) deny al Qaeda a safe haven; (3) reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government; and (4) strengthen the capacity of the Afghan security forces and government to better protect and serve population centers. To accomplish this, President Obama ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops to the region, which will bring the U.S. total to almost 100,000 troops. This deployment will be staged over several months, with the full additional complement being in- country by the end of the summer 2010. Noting that Afghan operations continue to be an international effort, President Obama expressed confidence that some of 42 coalition allies will also be increasing their contributions. NATO SecretaryGeneral Rasmussen echoed this confidence, stating that he expects NATO allies to contribute at least an additional 5,000 troops in 2010. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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In: Military Operations, Health and Technology Editor: Alexander L. Cobb, pp. 1-24

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Chapter 1

POPULATION TRANSFER AND THE MEDIATION OF INSURGENT CONFLICT A.W. Harris Humboldt State, Arcata, CA, US

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Abstract A mediated agreement ending civil war between an insurgent separatist group and the state can occur if the state accepts an agreement in principle that state sponsored population transfer into the insurgent “homeland” territory does not dilute the legitimacy of insurgent claims to the territory. Such an agreement becomes increasingly possible if the insurgents accept an agreement in principle that minority population homogeneity in the contested territory will not be pursued. On the occasions where the insurgents will have been engaging in hostile acts toward the “settler” population that has arrived as part of a state sponsored population transfer program, the insurgents see their anti-settler campaign as a means of obtaining self-determination. The state sees the population transfer program as a method of strengthening its claim of territorial integrity. Successful conflict mediation by an intervening party will likely require a recasting of population transfer, so that further settler in-migration would be allowed, with the concurrence of the insurgents. The mediation effort would then have to gain an insurgency commitment to end the antisettler campaign, so that it would be not seen as a threat to the territorial integrity or national sovereignty of the entire state.

Keywords: insurgency, population, settlers, transfers, territory, migration

Introduction I. The Impetus for Territory The question pursued herein is how to assess the likelihood of a negotiated resolution of insurgent conflict within states where there exists a program of state-sponsored population 

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transfer into a region of the state contested by an insurgency. The current inquiry is interested in the circumstance where the state sponsored settler program, is posed against claims for self-determination or a “homeland,” by an insurgent-led minority population in the contested portion of the state‟s declared territory. One useful definition of the term self-determination has been provided by Herbert Kelman. “At the group level, it is a condition for enabling people to fulfill their cultural aspirations and lead their lives in a way that is consistent with their collective values, as well as a condition for the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups against discrimination, exploitation, and repression” (1997: 332). One objective of a settler program could be to render less likely a demand from an insurgency for a referendum to determine the disposition of the contested territory, because the likelihood of the referendum outcome, or plebiscite, being a minority victory would be diminished to such a large extent after the population transfer had been accomplished (Farley, 1986: 26). The likelihood of a referendum actually occurring can be reduced in the altered demographic circumstances, because the minority population and the insurgents derived there from, being averse to losing, have become opposed to it. The state may then be able to take much stronger “positions” in subsequent negotiations with the insurgency regarding the shape of an agreement ending the conflict. If a referendum remains “on the table” in negotiations, in the face of a settler program, the state may still be able to keep the issue of secession off the ballot. Population transfer would help limit the contours of a possible referendum to matters of voter eligibility and level of autonomy, rather than a vote on an option for or against secession. This appears to have been the motivation of the Moroccan government when it instituted the 1975 “Green March” of Moroccan settlers into the territory of Western Sahara, so that these individuals could take part in a projected referendum (to be conducted under Spanish auspices, as the former colonial power) deciding whether the territory would gain autonomy, remaining part of the Moroccan state, or become an independent sovereign state (Farah, 2003; Franck, 1970; Mundy, 2006). Morocco contended that the “March” participants should be allowed to vote in the referendum, because the government of Morocco held them to be eligible to do so under certain rules. In the immediate aftermath of the Green March most of the participants were returned to Morocco, but a steady influx of settlers into Western Sahara ensued thereafter (Omar, 2008). The Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (POLISARIO) insurgency had been contesting both Moroccan and Mauritanian claims of sovereignty over the territory, in conjunction with the government -in- exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), after the departure of the Spanish administration in 1975/76 (Bhatia, 2001; Stephan and Mundy, 2006). This initial proposed referendum was never held because of Moroccan insistence that the question to be put on the ballot could not include the option of independence for the territory (Omar, 2008). Although Morocco and Mauritania both annexed portions of Western Sahara in 1975 (one-third claimed by Mauritania and two-thirds by Morocco), Mauritania ceded its claim to Western Sahara in 1979 (Smith de Cherif, 1991). In 1988 the UN and the OAU reached agreement on a Settlement Plan for Western Sahara, which included the holding of a referendum through which the Sahrawi people could exercise their right to self-determination (Maddy-Weitzman, 1991). POLISARIO came to believe that even if all challenged applicants for participation in a later referendum proposed by the UN and to be held under the auspices of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), were declared eligible on the Moroccan side, POLISARIO

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would still win the referendum vote (Theofilopoulou, 2006: 15). This second proposed referendum (to be held conducted under UN auspices) has never been held.

Self-determination Other than Secession If self-determination is defined at least in part in territorial terms, it may be that how the territory in question is defined demographically becomes important.

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From a theoretical as well as a practical point of view, people(s) can exercise selfdetermination internally, within an existing state, as well as through establishing a separate state. Moreover, a people would not opt for secession simply because they have the right to do so. Indeed, people are unlikely to opt for the usually difficult and costly struggle for secession, or the prospects of political and economic uncertainties of statehood, if an existing state respects their right to self-determination (An-na‟im and Deng, 2006: 5).

The self-determination sought by populations within existing states with which this inquiry is concerned, is that which occurs when states have failed to put into practice, at a minimum, policies of tolerance and non-interference in the internal political, cultural, and social affairs of a minority population, such that the continued existence of the population as a distinct group, is not endangered (Thornberry, 1989: 880). A possible exception is Western Sahara, given that a colonial situation (Spanish control) was in place in the territory, which once removed, then brought argument between Morocco and Mauritania regarding rightful claims of sovereignty over Western Sahara. The position taken here is that all three of the cases examined are instances where the physical existence of a territorially concentrated group, as a discrete population, is threatened by a state‟s violation (population transfer) of the claim made by the minority population for a “homeland.” Inherent in this assertion is the quest for ethnic homogeneity in the claimed territory; whether this claim is “sufficient” to justify secession or autonomy under international law has received substantial debate (Orentlicher, 1998; Hannum, 1993; Brilmayer, 1991). To be clear, the instances of insurgency presented in this study have not been generated by mere ascription, that is, simply by virtue of the fact that the Sahrawi, Muslim, and Tamil populations in Western Sahara, Mindanao, and the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka respectively, are distinct minorities, and as such are inherently “due” a significant measure of self-determination, often understood as a degree of self-government (Moore, 2001: 165). Rather, these minorities hold that the national government has, by virtue of a population (an “alien” population) transfer program, engaged in an unjust appropriation of territory. This appropriation was unjust, even though the territory in question is nominally at least, under the sovereign control of the national state, because the minority population has a prior claim (occupancy) on the contested territory (Buchanan, 1997: 55; Moore, 2001: 192). The minority population (forming a majority in the contested territory, or having once done so) wishes to dilute that control; the national government wishes to strengthen it through the population transfer program. This unjust appropriation is the primary grievance presented by the minority population. In the theoretical literature this vein of minority population territorial challenges to the state pursued through secession or some variant of autonomy, has been labeled “just cause” or “remedial right” theory, in contrast to theory labeled “choice” or “primary right,” (Buchanan, 2006; Moore, 2001). Choice theory posits that a “people” or “nation,” as such, have the right

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to assert some degree of separation from the state solely by virtue of their distinctiveness as a nation; no demonstration of injustice delivered against the nation is necessary to support this assertion (Moore, 2001: 167). Just cause theory, in contrast, upholds minority efforts to separate from the state based on a belief that a state generated injustice against the minority population has occurred, and in the instances discussed here, the injustice is the insertion of settlers into the minority‟s homeland. This insertion is a discriminatory redistribution of territory by the state, and as such, “voids the claim by the state of territorial sovereignty” over the homeland claimed by the minority population (Buchanan, 1991:112). Lea Brilmayer has proposed that one important test regarding the validity of a minority population‟s claim for outright secession is “the extent to which the disputed territory has been settled by members of the dominant [nationally] group,” (1991: 199). If this “encroachment” by members of the dominant population into the territory claimed as a homeland by a minority population is substantial, then a real and large threat to the cultural survival of the minority population is likely to be posed. This can be understood in the following sense. The continued survival of a distinct population as a nation (and a nation is defined in more than simple lineage terms) may require that members of the majority population be restricted from settling permanently in the minority homeland territory. This is so because if majority population members did take up permanent residence there is almost a certainty the latter would support policies establishing conditions degrading or threatening the existence of the minority population‟s culture. Consequently the preservation of the minority population‟s distinctiveness as a people would face eradication, or at a minimum, suppression. The strength of the minority population‟s claim to the contested territory has been expressed in the following terms. The people who inhabit a certain territory form a political community. Through custom and practice as well as by explicit political decision they create laws, establish individual or collective property rights, engage in public works, [and] shape the physical appearance of the territory. […] All of these activities givem then an attachment to the land that cannot be matched by any rival claimants. This in turn justifies their claim to exercise continuing political authority over that territory (emphasis in original) (Miller, 1998: 68).

It is only through gaining political authority, i.e., achieving self-government, that the minority population has some assurance their nation will endure. Although it is an obvious oversimplification, the initiation of a settler program inserted into contested territory, could be seen as “just cause” for the commencement of a campaign by the minority population to negate an effort by the state to extinguish prior minority claims to that same territory. If an insurgent movement seeks secession, or the creation of an entity with a certain level of autonomy, then a national government opposed to the creation of such an entity, could subsequently choose to begin a non-minority population movement into the territory in question (territory proposed as a homeland by the insurgents) as in the Western Saharan case (Theofilopoulou, 2006: 14). The motivation for such a program would be that in negotiations, the state‟s argument against the creation of such an entity would thereby be strengthened on demographic grounds (Lewer and William, 2002; ICG, 2007). The state could then raise a number of questions regarding the legitimacy of a projected future autonomous entity.

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Population Transfer and the Mediation of Insurgent Conflict

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On the presumption that the population demanding a homeland is a minority nationally, one such question would be whether non-minority group members would be prohibited from immigrating into the territory once the autonomous unit was created. A second question would be whether non-minority population members residing in the autonomous territory prior to its creation, could be expelled from the autonomous region after its formation. A likely key potential bargaining point in negotiations would be ascertaining whether the autonomous unit would have sole authority in determining the answer to the above questions, or whether these answers could only be provided jointly by the autonomous regional government with the participation of the national government. In one sense, the more able the autonomous entity could be in restricting or shaping policy pertaining to migration into the region‟s territory, the more the entity would gain selfdetermination, and the less “sovereign” the central government would be over the entire state. In this paper the disputes under study are those where the origins of the insurgency derive partly from disputes over the legitimacy of settlers‟ residence in the contested portion of the state (Omar, 2008: 10). A proposition of this paper is that with ongoing negotiations to end insurgent conflict, the likelihood of a successful resolution of hostilities increases if the parties can agree to a particular level of state authority in determining the legitimacy of prior arriving (before the conclusion of negotiations) settlers. A second proposition is that the probability of successful resolution of hostilities increases when the question regarding the legitimacy of settlers arriving subsequent to the conclusion of negotiations, will be subject only to the receptiveness of the insurgency, or successor governing entity, created through negotiations. In the negotiations between a discontented minority and the state, the likelihood of successful resolution of the territorial dispute increases if there is mutual recognition that “the question of self-determination should not be divorced from the issues of human rights and the welfare of minorities. To do so is to treat the state and the principle of territorial integrity as absolute self-justifying ends” (Kamanu, 1974: 362).

Effecting Population Transfers This inquiry seeks an answer to a key question: how often was it that the presence of a state sponsored settler program brought about, or contributed to, the failure of negotiations initiated to achieve a peaceful resolution of insurgent conflict. In particular cases where a referendum to settle the matter of minority population self-determination has been placed on the table, the national government will sometimes stipulate in the negotiations that a proposed referendum must not include a question on possible secession (Theofilopoulou, 2006: 2). In the negotiations to end the conflict in Western Sahara, agreement between the parties on the matter of a referendum has not been in the offing in part because the government of Morocco has taken this position (Migdalovitz, 2008: 2). This turn of events is more likely to be the case when either the state is not sure that population transfer has sufficiently turned population demographics in the contested territory in the state‟s favor, or where the insurgency is not sure that population transfer hasn’t done so. It is worth reiterating, even if perhaps obvious, that a principal objective of a population transfer program is to render less likely a demand from an insurgency for a referendum held within the confines of the projected autonomous unit, because the likelihood of the outcome being a minority population referendum victory would be diminished to such a large extent after the population transfer had been accomplished. Despite this intent on the part of the

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Moroccan government, however, (there are estimates placing the number of settlers inside the territory to be within the 200,000–300,000 range, with the Sahrawi population at roughly 150,000), POLISARIO accepted Baker Plan II, which stipulated there should be a referendum for the territory held under UN auspices (Mundy, 2006: 262; Migdalovitz, 2008: 2). Morocco rejected Baker Plan II, because it called for a referendum which had an independence option on the ballot. In this circumstance a determination on the “final status” of the contested territory has to occur through the mechanism of across-the-table negotiations, where the referendum option has been taken “off the table.” The following narrative will draw from certain instances of negotiations to end insurgent conflict in order to buttress the argument presented. These “cases in point” are: Morocco (Western Sahara), Sri Lanka (North and Northeast), and the Philippines (Mindanao). There is not space in this paper to present an extended analysis of the “larger” circumstances, and the history, between the state and the minority population in each case; such an effort would require a separate inquiry. It is important to determine what it was that initially prompted a government settler program targeted toward an area claimed by a minority population as a homeland. Would the simple public statement of such a claim for a homeland by minority population leaders be sufficient to stir such a policy, or would the existence of an insurgency be necessary to initiate the latter step? In the distance between mere public statements of grievance by minority population spokespersons on one hand, and an outright insurgency on the other, it may be that what has been termed a “mobilized” minority population would be sufficient to provoke a settler program (Esman, 1990: 482; Gurr, 2000: 74; Kaufman, 1996: 145; Lichbach, 1995). It could of course be the case that a settler program would be initiated for reasons that are wholly, or nearly so, socio-economic in nature; that is, programs put in place for “development” ends (ICG, 2008b: 23). But the presumption here is that particular settler programs do not occur in a political vacuum. That is, more often than not, “development” settler programs have a parallel (not “secondary”) purpose: the weakening of popular support for anti-government sentiment that has not yet become an insurgency, through national government generated alterations in the existing demographic pattern of the contested territory (Lingaa, 2008: 7). It is possible that an insurgency could be initiated in response to a settler program that had no visible political intent, and was only designed to promote the economic and social development of a “backward” area of a state. But if such an insurgency emerges to counteract a “development” settler program, the state is then forced into a response which by definition will have a political component, i.e., an assertion of state sovereignty over the contested region by supporting the settler program with sustained economic support and, if necessary, military protection. This phenomenon of ostensible economic development programs undergoing an adaptation did occur in Sri Lanka, such that the rural areas in the Northeast region of the country became “militarized” (Korf and Fünfeld, 2006: 398). In these cases the settler program ceases to be only a part of a development policy, and could be categorized, at least in part, as a component of a counterinsurgency strategy.

Role of a Settler Program in the Genesis of Insurgency It may not be possible to determine if an insurgency came about, solely or chiefly, because of a government sponsored settler program, or for that matter, whether a settler

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program has been initiated, solely or chiefly, because of an insurgency. An insurgency may develop because of minority grievances resulting from discriminatory government policies, or social practices, pertaining to religious belief, language choice, historical origin, or lineage (ethnicity) (Darby, 2003; Gurr, 1993; Gurr, 1994; Licklider, 1995; Sambanis, 2001; Smith, 1994). A settler program may be initiated in part as a response to insurgency formation, and claims made by the latter to “ownership” of a contested portion of the state‟s territory, supplemented by acts of violence against instruments of the state; e.g., military outposts, police stations, court houses, and the like (ICG, 2008b: 6; Koprf and Fünfgeld, 2006: 398; Tigno, 2006: 28).The “outposts” of the state may very well have been put in place in defense of settler communities. But once in the field, military outposts in defense of settlers may initiate pursuit of insurgent units. It would be very difficult, if not impossible to ascertain when “insurgent pursuit ” by the national military ceased being part of a defensive mission only, and when that pursuit would be transformed into outright counter-insurgency.

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Before most COIN [counterinsurgency] operations begin, insurgents have seized and exploited the initiative, to some degree at least. Therefore, counterinsurgents undertake offensive and defensive operations to regain the initiative and create a secure environment. However, killing insurgents-while necessary, especially with respect to extremists-by itself cannot defeat an insurgency. Gaining and retaining the initiative requires counterinsurgents to address the insurgency‟s causes through stability operations as well. This initially involves securing and controlling the local populace and providing for essential services. As security improves, military resources contribute to supporting government reforms and reconstruction projects. As counterinsurgents gain the initiative, offensive operations focus on eliminating the insurgent cadre, while defensive operations focus on protecting the populace and infrastructure from direct attacks. As counterinsurgents establish ascendancy, stability operations expand across the area of operations (AO) and eventually predominate. Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government‟s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency. (Petraeus and Amos, 2006).

It is not clear how closely the Sri Lankan manual for counterinsurgency operations conforms with the U.S. military‟s views summarized above, but for both national militaries it is likely the divide between offensive and defensive operations sometimes becomes narrow. In any case, the most likely sequence of events is for an insurgency to coalesce “around,” or in answer to, a settler program, as appears to have been the case in Sri Lanka, even though insurgency formation may actually predate the settler program. Although national governments have sometimes claimed the motivation for a settler program was to promote the economic development of a particular region, the authenticity of such claims is often contested by some portion of the region‟s population. Insurgent groups have challenged the legitimacy of such programs on the grounds that the non-minority population settlers are generally granted “entitlements” to land not offered to minority population members, as was clearly the case in Sri Lanka (ICG, 2008b: 4; Tigno, 2006: 28). Even more fundamentally, however, is the challenge made to settler programs based on the unwillingness of the insurgents to recognize the right of the national government to institute a development program in the contested region of the state at all. That is to say, the insurgents could simply refuse to recognize the state‟s authority to make a decision instituting a development program in the contested region of the country. Something on this order occurred in the Philippines where in a series of Commonwealth Acts instituted in the decades before WWII the Manila government declared Moro ancestral lands

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to be public property, thus negating the Waqaf Islamic tradition whereby land holdings were bequeathed to heirs of the owner, absent written documentation (Abreu, 2008: 62; Aquino, 2009: 43-46). Muslim populations in Mindnao have consistently challenged the above Commonwealth Acts.

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Migration Onset Following the commencement of negotiations between an insurgency and the state, it is not always possible to determine whether a settler program had been instigated during or prior to the onset of hostilities. This could be a key finding because successful negotiations would likely be more difficult if a significant motivation for the insurgency‟s existence was a settler program in the first place (Korf and Fünfgeld, 2006: 399; Peebles, 1990, 37-38). The proposition suggested here is that in this circumstance, the insurgents would strike a “harder” bargain than otherwise, i.e., become more intransigent, regarding the disposition of the settler program, if the hostilities were to be brought to an end. That is, the insurgent emissaries to the negotiations might well take the position that for the hostilities to be brought to end, the settler program, in all of its manifestations, would also have to end. Clearly, an agreement by the state to a termination of a settler program, would be an extremely difficult concession to make, on the grounds that territorial integrity would be enhanced if the program was maintained. This is so in the sense that the state is usually reluctant (at least initially) to accept any diminishment of its authority over the territory within its declared borders. On the premise that an insurgency would base its claim to selfdetermination as flowing from a homeland occupied by a population “different” from the majority, if the state is able to show that the claim of a different population is demographically invalid, then the insurgency claim to self-determination is weakened. Moroccan government intransigence on the matter of self-determination for Western Sahara is grounded in this posture (Zunes, 2007; Omar, 2008). To be sure, there could be “gradations” of termination. One small “measure of termination” would be an agreement to freeze further migrations of majority population members on a certain date, while allowing those who arrived before that date to remain. A large measure of termination would be an agreement that all irrefutability identified persons who migrated to the contested area by virtue of participation in the government settler program would have to be repatriated, regardless of their date of arrival in the contested area. Admittedly, the likelihood of a state concession agreeing to the removal of in-residence settlers would seem low. But if the insurgency had been borne in significant part because of the in-migration and sustained residence of settlers, that insurgency might accept nothing less than the repatriation of in-residence settlers. This circumstance would appear to set the stage for an impasse between the negotiating parties. POLISARIO existed for some years prior to the concerted propagation of settlers into Western Sahara after the departure of Spain in 1976 (Maddy-Weitzman, 1991). POLISARIO emerged as a distinctly anti-colonial movement fighting against the Spanish in 1973 (Seddon 1989: 132) and formed a “state in exile,” the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)( which has won a modest level of international recognition) in 1976 (Hodges, 1983). It is clear that the POLISARIO insurgency did not originally emerge as a response to a settler influx. The history is quite different with Sri Lanka, as well as in the Philippines.

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In the Philippines, the colonial government in the early decades of the twentieth century began to establish agriculture based communities in Mindanao. By and large these were Christian settlers, some of whom were self-motivated to enter a “frontier” area of the country in an effort to gain an improved standard of living (Tigno, 2006). But a high proportion of the settlers received assistance from the independent government of the Philippines after WWII, in the form of “resettlement projects.” The pace of the migration was such that by the 1970s the settlers composed roughly 70 percent of the population of Mindanao. The settler influx from Luzon and other areas of the country brought about a significant displacement of Muslims, and this “marginalization” of the Muslim population coincided with a surge in armed resistance (Tigno, 2006; Gutierrez and Saturnino, 2004: 18). In Sri Lanka, the conditions facing the Tamil population in the Eastern province illustrates the negative response of the Tamils to what they termed the “colonization” of Tamal traditional homelands. In the 1950s, the Federal party (a predominately Tamil organization) issued a resolution at its annual convention to this effect. “The colonization policy pursued by successive Governments since 1947 of planting Sinhalese population in the traditional homelands of the Tamil-speaking peoples is calculated to overwhelm and crush the Tamil-speaking people in their own national areas,” (Peebles, 1990: 38, citing a Federal party internal document). By the 1980s the response of a burgeoning LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) to this infusion of Sinhalese settlers into a claimed Tamil “homeland” had become direct: “LTTE attacks on Sinhalese settlers and army retaliation against Tamil villagers were common practice during these early periods of heightened confrontation” (Korf and Fünfgeld, 2006: 398).

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Insurgency Anti-settler Campaigns On occasion an insurgency will engage in a campaign of violent acts purposefully directed toward members of the majority population often residing in the contested region and identified as “settlers.” Violence by Tamil insurgents was targeted explicitly toward Sinhalese settlers residing in a proclaimed Tamil homeland at least as early as the mid-1980s (Pfaffenberger, 1987:159). From the insurgent point of view such a campaign is meant to end or even reverse the settler program, thus strengthening the ratio of minority versus majority population in the “homeland” region, turning the ratio more in the former‟s favor. In 1985, during the peace conference in Thimpu, the United Tamil groups made it one of their four points to be acknowledged that because they were a nation of their own they had an exclusive right to their homeland in the North and East, where none but they should be entitled to settle. No new Sinhalese settlers should be allowed to cultivate the traditional Tamil areas, although those who were already there could remain. The militant groups underlined this demand with violent and bloody attacks on Sinhalese settlers in the Northeast who dared to defy their order to stay out (Hellman-Rajanayagam, 1990: 80) (emphasis added).

The belief was that a turn in population ratio in favor of a minority population would buttress the insurgent argument for self-determination, due to the resulting increased homogeneity of the homeland resident population. The following comment has been made regarding the movement of Sinhalese settlers into the Northeast part of the country:

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A.W. Harris When inter-ethnic violence increased in the 1980s, these settlement schemes became a theatre of inter-ethnic contestation and violence and became interwoven with military and political strategies of the major conflict parties. After the military contestation between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE aggravated, some segments in the Sinhalese regime and the military used new “strategic” settlement schemes to weaken the basis of Tamil claims to a Northeast homeland (Korf and Fünfgeld, 2006).

In a similar vein, an observation pertaining to the MNLF/MILF insurgency in Mindanao can be included here:

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By the late 1960s and early 1970s, growing land conflicts further escalated into violent Muslim-Christian armed confrontations. Christian vigilante groups, known as the “LLagas,” or “Rats,” and Muslim private armies called “Black Shirts,” and “Barracudas,” emerged in the Cotabato and Lanao Provinces. At this point, the land issue had become the main reason for brewing Muslim-Christian conflicts and animosities that turned into brutal ethnic conflicts (Aquino, 2009: 49).

Interestingly, accounts of POLISARIO attacks against Moroccan settlers are virtually absent (Zunes, 2007). On the contrary, there are reports of attacks on native Sahrawi civilians in Western Sahara by Moroccan settlers (Bhatia, 2001). One explanation for the absence or paucity of POLISARIO attacks on Moroccan settlers is the extreme two to one advantage (at a minimum) in the ratio of settlers to indigenous Sahrawi people in the Western Sahara brought about by the Moroccan population transfer policy ((Farah, 2003: 16). POLISARIO attacks on settlers would likely put the Sahrawi population at greater risk from retaliation by settlers, as well as the Moroccan military, with the latter estimated to be a force of possibly 200,000. The existence of the 2500 km sand berm, or “wall” separating Western Sahara into two sections, one composing four-fifths of the territory controlled by the Forces Armees Royales (FAR), the Moroccan military, and the remaining one-fifth controlled by POLISARIO, has severely limited any potential desire by POLISARIO to mount sustained attacks against the settlers (Weitzman, 1991: 595). In recent years the civilian Sahrawi population within the Moroccan occupied region of Western Sahara has seemingly taken the lead in the selfdetermination struggle, but with a contrasting method, producing a non-violent movement labeled an “intifada,” which has been seen as having two separate “eruptions,” in 1999 and again in 2005 (Stephan and Mundy, 2006).

II. Resisting Opposing Claims to Territory Territorial Integrity and Settlers “Population transfer is often carried out with the purpose or effect of destroying, in whole or in part, the affected group as such. This is done by a range of methods, from demographic manipulation of the group‟s territory (self-determination unit) to eliminating the economic existence of the group…” (Shechla, 1993: 265) (emphasis added). A national government receiving a “petition” for a homeland in a particular region of the state will often insist that the region remain an integral part of the state, whether that be so in the unitary state sense, or through a grant of autonomy, to a greater or lesser degree. The insurgency, in contrast, will

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often demand that the region must regain its character as a homeland for the minority community, whether that homeland takes shape as an autonomous unit or as an independent entity. Each claim is based partly on demographic grounds. The national government believes that by inserting majority population settlers into the contested area, the government‟s claim to be seeking the preservation of the state‟s territorial integrity is strengthened, because the demographic composition of the contested area does not differ significantly from the demographic map of the country at large. This “insertion” effort can be seen as an attempt to achieve contiguity in majority population presence nationally. The insurgency, on the contrary, holds that by limiting the insertion of settlers, the demographic “difference” (and therefore possibly linguistic, religious, or other differences) between the contested region and the state at large is maintained. Obviously then, majority population contiguity across the entire state is prevented. What then sometimes ensues is indeed a “contest,” as in the Sri Lankan example. “The land colonization policy of successive Sri Lankan governments has caused much resentment. It has been Sinhalese policy to establish „colonies‟ of Sinhalese settlers (mostly farmers) in the Eastern province especially, an area traditionally viewed by Tamil nationalists as „theirs‟” (Lewer and William, 2002: 3). The Eastern province of Sri Lanka constitutes a part of what is called the “Dry Zone,” an area requiring extensive irrigation systems in order for agriculture to flourish. At independence the Sinhalese presence in the Dry Zone and in the Eastern province was quite small relative to the rest of the country, although there is belief among some Sinhalese that in past generations there was a much greater presence (Moore, 1985: 45). Sinhalese political leaders have invoked this belief and utilized it as a basis (in part) for the settler program of the post-independence period. “The colonization of the Dry Zone by landless peasant cultivators from the Wet Zone remained one of the highest policy priorities for all governments until 1970”(Peebles, 1990: 37). LTTE apprehension regarding an alleged Sri Lankan government plan to “Sinhalise” the Eastern province was persistent, and may have some justification. Located at the intersection of the eastern and northern provinces, Tricomalee district has been the site of deliberate attempts by Sinhalese nationalists, with support from the government, to break the contiguity of a Tamil-speaking north east by settling additional Sinhalese. Due in large part to irrigation settlements, the ethnic balance shifted considerably over the last century, with Sinhalese increasing from 4 per cent of the population in 1911 to a high of 33 per cent in 1981 and to their current figure of roughly 24 per cent (ICG, 2008b: 23).

National governments have seized upon settler programs as a means of maintaining the territorial integrity of the state by choosing to define the state as a “nation-state,” utilizing the original definition of the latter, as a political entity enclosing a territory wherein resides a relatively homogenous (whether based on religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other grounds) population (Kelman, 1997: 334). In most modern states of course, this condition is decidedly not the case, with most states anything but homogenous. By maintaining fidelity to this ideal, a national government can then go further and say that the nation-state‟s territory must be defended by seeing to it that the territory encompassed by the state‟s defined boundaries is populated, or re-populated, as it were, with members of the national majority (homogeneity would presumably not be feasible in the prevailing circumstances) population. But to reach agreement in negotiations with an insurgency, the state would presumably have to at least

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give thought to an insurgent counter proposal which insisted on different gradations of population density; that is, the creation of areas within the “self-determination unit,” or contested region, where the density of the majority population nationally would be less than the density of the minority population.

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Mindanao Something akin to this sort of proposal was put on the table in the Philippines negotiations between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) which led to the agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding on Ancestral Domain (MoU-AD) in 2008 (McIndoe, 2010). The MoU-AD’s most pivotal element included an expansion of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an administrative unit created in 1989 under the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, although an earlier autonomous unit had been created in 1979. The MoU-AD stipulated that the ARMM would be expanded to more than 700 Muslim majority villages or towns in Mindanao, but also left open the possibility that roughly 1500 “mixed” Muslim-Christian towns were to be given the option of joining the expanded ARMM after a period of years (MoU-AD, 2008). One observer of the Mindanao conflict has interjected that an enlargement of the ARMM, and the creation of genuine autonomy for the Moro population could happen, at least in theory (Tuminez, 2007). But the prospect of possibly increasing the size of the ARMM to such a large extent (decreasing the “reach” of the national government), motivated Christian legislators in the Philippine Congress to petition the Supreme Court to issue a stay on the creation of the expanded ARMM . That petition was granted, and the MoU-AD has been rendered unconstitutional (Supreme Court, 2008). Of particular concern to non-Muslim civil society groups based in Mindanao was the perceived “vulnerability” of those Christians residing in the mixed population towns that would have been scheduled for inclusion in an expanded ARMM, which the MoU-AD termed the Bangsamoro Juridicial Entity (BJE) (Martin, 2008). This concern was explicitly recognized in the negotiations leading to the formulation of the MoU-AD (Ibañez, 2006). But those Christian legislators which brought the petition to the Supreme Court asking for an injunction against the MoU-AD, apparently believed their concerns were not given sufficient voice in the MoU-AD. Government sponsored migration of non-Muslim persons to Mindanao began “in earnest” at least as early as Legislative Act No. 4197 of 1935 (Quirino-Recto Colonization Act), under the colonial Commonwealth government. This Act was “the first law on land settlement in Mindanao under the Commonwealth government, but became the turning point of [the] land settlement program” (Aquino, 2009: 44; Jubair, 1997: 82). “Colonization” began to be seen as the “lasting solution” to the problems in Mindanao. The law “facilitated a massive influx of settlers [to] Mindanao under the full sponsorship of the government” (Aquino, 2009: 44). The growth of the non-Muslim population in Mindanao has been considerable. “A tenfold growth in the Christian population-mainly settlers-between 1918 and 1960 led to nonMuslims outnumbering Moros two-to-one by 1960” (Tuminez, 2007: 80). “Moros” was the term applied (pejoratively) to the Muslim population by the Spanish, derived from the Spanish experience with “Moors” in North Africa. Philippine Christian communities have continued usage of the term, but it has been “appropriated” by Muslim separatist groups, and coupled with the term Bangsa (nation) to form Bangsamoro or “Moro nation” as a positive

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symbol of identity. The Muslim population in Mindanao is currently estimated at roughly 20 percent of the total, with Christian settlers comprising 70 percent, although within the ARMM, Muslims still constitute a majority (Tigno, 2006; Peow, 2009). Relative population densities between Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Mindanao have thus turned decidedly in the latter‟s favor.

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A Mediation Attempt In Western Sahara the Sahrawi population refers to the 1975 Green March of 350,000 Moroccans into the territory as the alghazu or “invasion.” Although most of those 350,000 marchers were not genuine migrants and ultimately returned to Morocco, over the decades the government of Morocco has promoted the migration of an estimated 150,000 settlers into Western Saharan territory (Farah, 2003: 23). It was these settlers that Morocco insisted should be allowed to participate in the UN sponsored referendum that was to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). This referendum was to occur after a September, 1991, ceasefire was reached between POLISARIO and the Moroccan government, following which MINURSO personnel were dispatched in 1992, in conformity with the UN Settlement Plan (Stephan and Mundy, 2006; Jensen, 2005). MINURSO spent several years vetting more than 200,000 applications from individuals seeking eligibility to participate in a referendum, and by the year 2000 eventually determined there were 86, 386 qualified voters in Western Sahara (Migdalovitz, 2008; Omar, 2008). But the UN decided against the referendum, determining there was no means to guarantee the outcome (a likely vote for independence) in the event that “one of the parties” was to not recognize the outcome (Mundy, 2006: 257). Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker agreed to become the Secretary-General‟s personal envoy for the Western Sahara in 1997, and after meeting with all the parties, in 2001 presented a Framework Agreement (Baker Plan I) calling for a vote on limited autonomy after a five year period, with a one-year residence in Western Sahara as the criterion for voter eligibility (Migdalovitz, 2008). This meant that a large proportion of settlers would be eligible voters. Morocco would have retained sovereignty over the territory, while POLISARIO would have “competence” over local affairs. Not surprisingly, POLISARIO rejected the first Baker Plan, while Morocco accepted it, because (importantly) there was no independence option included in the proposal(Jensen, 2005). A second Baker Plan (Baker II) was proposed in 2003 (Peace Plan for the SelfDetermination of the People of Western Sahara) which did contain an independence option (as well as options for integration with Morocco, or “greater” autonomy) in a referendum to occur after a four year period of “limited” autonomy (Mundy, 2006). Once again the Moroccan settlers would be allowed to participate in the vote as long as they met one of the following criteria: inclusion on a December, 1999, provisional voter list; inclusion on a UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) repatriation list of October, 2000; or continuous residence in Western Sahara since December, 1999 ((Migdalovitz, 2008). On this occasion, POLISARIO accepted Baker II, but the government of Morocco rejected it, insisting that the government would not allow the country‟s territorial integrity to be placed on the ballot (Omar, 2008).

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James Baker subsequently resigned his post and was replaced by Peter van Walsum of Denmark as the Secretary-General‟s personal envoy. The dilemma of the UN as described by the Secretary-General‟s report of 16 October, 2006, was that the organization could not put forward a plan that called for a referendum, but did not include independence as a ballet option, while at the same time “claiming to provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara” (Secretary-General, 2006). On 10 April, 2007, POLISARIO presented the Security Council a proposal entitled “Proposal of the Frente POLISARIO for a Mutually Acceptable Political Solution that Provides for the self-determination of the People of Western Sahara” (emphasis added). On 11 April, 2007, Morocco immediately presented its proposal for Western Saharan autonomy entitled “Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Statute for the Sahara Region” (Security Council, 2010) (emphasis added). On 30 April, 2007, Security Council Resolution 1754 called for negotiations without preconditions between POLISARIO and Morocco, which would provide for the selfdetermination of the people of Western Sahara. Subsequently, a series of four negotiating sessions between POSLIARIO and Moroccan government emissaries were held in Manhasset, New York, utilizing the good offices of the UN, in 2007 and 2008, with van Walsum consulting. Following these four sessions, van Walsum was prompted to conclude in April, 2008, that “an independent Western Sahara was not realistic” (Migdalovitz, 2008:3). This statement spurred a negative reaction from POLISARIO, pointing to van Walsum‟s bias in favor of Morocco, and calling for his resignation. After not re-appointing van Walsum, the Secretary-General appointed Christopher Ross as his new personal envoy. The Security Council then passed Resolution 1871 (Security Council, 2009) which called upon Morocco and POLISARIO to find a mutually acceptable political solution providing for the selfdetermination of the people of Western Sahara and to negotiate in good faith and without preconditions. Ross then conducted an “informal” fifth round of consultations between POLISARIO and Morocco in February, 2010, but with little discernible progress being made toward a solution (Security Council Report, 2010b). It should be noted that a majority of the indigenous Sahrawi population of Western Sahara fled from the territory in 1975-76, and took up residence in Algeria near Tindouf, with the blessing of that government, where they have remained over the intervening decades (Stephan and Mundy, 2006). All available estimates suggest that the population of Sahrawis in Algeria (roughly 150,000) is probably twice the size of the Sahrawi population in Western Sahara itself. It is not clear from the negotiations that have taken place to date, what concrete proposals have been put forward regarding the possibility of the repatriation of the “Tindouf” (residing in Algerian camps) Sahrawis to Western Sahara, and then their potential participation in a future referendum on self-determination. This latter issue is potentially significant, given the current demographic picture inside Western Sahara. Since 1976, Morocco has transplanted large numbers of its own citizens, ethnic Berbers, Arabs, and Sahrawis into the territory. Their existence has been heavily subsidised by the state, with government salaries double in Western Sahara. Estimates of the total population in the Moroccan controlled Western Sahara range from 300,000 to 400,000. Given the results of the UN voter-identification effort, the number of ethnic Sahrawis native to Western Sahara is roughly 160,000. Thus Moroccans could easily dominate an autonomous Western Saharan government if it were democratically elected. Without a reduction of its settlers by as much as

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fifty to sixty per cent, it is unlikely that Western Saharan nationalists would consider autonomy (Mundy, 2006: 262).

Here then, is a case where the government of Morocco, despite a population ratio heavily in its favor (settlers to indigenous Sahrawi), is not prepared to submit the question of Western Sahara‟s future to a plebiscite, apparently because by doing so, a degree of validity would be appended to the notion that Western Sahara was possibly not an integral part of Morocco. It is in both the Western Saharan instance, and in the Philippines, where the settler program has created a circumstance in which the minority population (nationally) has also become a minority even in the territory the latter population claims as a homeland, because of the national government sponsored settler program.

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Population Densities In negotiations to end an insurgency where a settler program in the insurgents “homeland area” is ongoing, an important question is whether the state would agree to homogenous “pockets” of majority population settlers in the contested territory, even though this might be regarded as conceding those areas outside the pockets or enclaves, of settlers, to the insurgency. A second question is whether the insurgents would agree to a completely integrated territory, in the sense where the distribution densities of each population would be relatively equal in the contested territory. Agreeing to such distributions could be regarded as foregoing the idea of a self-determination unit being demarcated demographically as a “separate” entity. The state seeks recognition by the insurgents that majority population members nationally must be able to reside “freely” in the contested territory, while the insurgency seeks an admission from the state that, at a minimum, the residence of future settlers in the contested territory must receive insurgent consent. Chaim Kaufman is concerned with the security dilemma faced by minority population “pockets,” sited along side of, or possibly amongst, “enclaves” of the dominant population, both located in a contested region of the state, where the majority population predominates (or the reverse, where in certain regions the majority population nationally is a regional minority, and the minority population at the national level is a regional majority). In the circumstances he investigates, the concern is about the ability of enclaves of the different communities to defend themselves, under the presumption that negotiations have not resolved the security dilemma. He then states that “offense often has an advantage over defense in inter-community conflict, especially when settlement patterns are inter-mingled, because isolated pockets are harder to hold than to take (Kaufman, 1996: 148). He goes on to say that “… until or unless the security dilemma can be reduced or eliminated, neither side can afford to demobilize” (1996, 148). It is this security dilemma confronting minority and majority populations residing in a contested territory, which must be resolved through negotiations. Kaufman tells us: When settlement patterns are extremely mixed, both sides are vulnerable to attack not only by organized military forces but also by local militias or gangs from adjacent towns or neighborhoods. Since well-defined fronts are impossible, there is no effective means of defense against such raids. Accordingly, each side has a strong incentive-at both national and

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A.W. Harris local levels-to kill or drive out enemy populations before the enemy does the same to it, as well as to create homogenous enclaves more practical to defend (1996: 148).

But a major emphasis in negotiations to end insurgent conflict is, or should be, an effort to reduce the likelihood of attack by one community on the other, and consequently make the need for defense less of an overriding concern. There have been instances of insurgent conflict when negotiations have commenced in an effort to minimize the need for military defense. Three of those instances have been given some attention here, and in these, the state has inserted majority population settlers into the region claimed as a homeland by a minority population. In these latter kinds of conflict, where the insurgency and the state have agreed to initiate negotiations in an effort to end the hostilities, the “point” of the talks is to make the need for defensible geographic positions on the part of both the majority and minority populations unwarranted. But my argument holds that state insertion of settlers into the contested territory (either prior to or after the negotiation inception) complicates the negotiations and probably makes the likelihood of a successful negotiation outcome less probable. Kaufman goes on to argue against the creation of “pockets” or “enclaves” of either population behind the other‟s “front,” choosing to favor homogenous enclaves more easily defended.

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Better but still bad, are well-defined enclaves with islands of one or both sides‟ populations behind the other‟s front. Each side then has an incentive to attack to rescue its surrounded coethnics before they are destroyed by the enemy, as well as incentives to wipe out enemy islands behind its own lines, both to pre-empt rescue attempts and to eliminate possible bases for fifth columnists or guerrillas (Kaufman, 1996: 148).

Kaufman considers cases where negotiations have either failed outright or not been seriously mounted. In the examples examined here, negotiations have been conducted at a high level and for extended periods. I would argue, despite the fact that the negotiations have failed to achieve a resolution of the conflict in each of the examples treated here, that the creation of non-homogenous enclaves, where one population is in the majority within the enclave, but where a second population has a not insignificant number of residents, could promote a negotiated settlement. This argument can be made for two reasons. First, the settler programs in each case presented here make the situation “on the ground” such that repatriation of the settlers is virtually impossible, and thus some accommodation for the settlers must be found. Second, allowing non-homogenous settler enclaves to develop, although not mandating them, would satisfy insurgent demands that the minority population maintain a presence throughout the contested territory, while still meeting national government requirements for territorial integrity based on at least a nominal level of demographic contiguity throughout the state generally. There is an obvious proviso that must be made and acknowledged here. In Western Sahara the settlers from the majority population now outnumber the indigenous minority population in the contested “self-determination” unit or territory by a greater than two-to-one margin. But the whole impetus for the settler program was to accomplish this latter circumstance (Omar, 2008). It is now the case that the formerly majority population within the territory as a whole is now a minority in their proclaimed homeland area. Thus, in

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Western Sahara the discussion would likely have to be one which considered the possibility of Sahrawi “enclaves” within their homeland territory, although whether there would be a settler presence even within those enclaves is not clear. In Mindanao, the negotiations which concluded in 2008 took the position, pending the outcome of a future plebiscite, that 1500 mixed Christian-Muslim towns be given the option of inclusion in an enlarged ARMM, which would have maintained the Muslim majority within the ARMM, and which would have made the Christian population subject to the authority of a Muslim dominated autonomous region governing entity . This would have been in addition to 712 Muslim communities that would have immediately been placed into the enlarged ARMM (ICG, 2008b). This prospect was not warmly received by Christian civil society organizations, even though the Christian majority in Mindanao generally would remain intact. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE made it clear that Sinhalese enclaves in the Eastern province would not be made welcome. It is not clear how much, if any, of a Sinhalese presence would have been allowed in the LTTE proposed Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) that was discussed in the 2004/2005 negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government (GOSL, 2005). Ultimately the Sri Lankan government determined there would be no recognition of an ISGA, ended the ceasefire and negotiations, and sought a military solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka. This step was taken despite the urging of mediators to continue negotiations. “Expressing their „strong concerns,‟ the four co-chairs of the peace process – Japan, the U.S., the EU and Norway – repeated their conviction that „there is no military solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka and reiterate[d] their support for a negotiated settlement.” (ICG, 2008a: 3). A military “solution” to the conflict has in fact been attained in Sri Lanka in the sense that the LTTE has been defeated in the field. But the underlying causes of the conflict may not have been eradicated. “To date there is no decisive evidence of a government policy to bring in large numbers of new Sinhalese, just allegations and many worrying signs. Government officials have made no serious effort to respond to allegations of plans to Sinhalese the east, other than occasional pro forma denials” (ICG, 2008b: 27).

Agreements in Principle The MoU-AD in the Philippines was, in effect, an agreement in principle, stipulating that the ARMM should be enlarged to meet the self-determination aspirations of Muslims in Mindanao, while leaving the details of a future BJE for subsequent negotiations. The MoUAD had extensive language referring to future negotiations. Under the heading “Territory,” the document stipulated that “the Parties will endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues…within fifteen (15) months from signing of the MoU-AD” (MoU-AD (2)(d)). Under the heading “Governance,” the document addressed the key issue of how governing authority would be shared between the BJE and the national government. The relationship between the Central Government and the BJE shall be associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions, with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact. A period of transition shall be established in a Comprehensive Compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE (MoU-AD (4)).

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Although the relationship between the national government and the BJE shall be “associative,” the MoU-AD left the details of that association to future negotiations. As Daniel Druckman has suggested can happen, the Philippine negotiations resulting in the MoU-AD, resolved conceptual differences, which led to an “acceptable definition of purpose,” or an agreement in principle (Druckman, 1986: 335). Having reached agreement on conceptual issues, “the parties are ready to consider the shape of the eventual package. Persuasive debating is interspersed with bargaining as the negotiating teams begin to define and refine the issues. At this stage, details are worked out by exchanging concessions on tangible items, and by haggling over the wording of the agreement” (Druckman, 1986: 335). The “shape,” and consequently the demographic composition of an expanded ARMM, because it included a number of towns or villages with significant Christian residents opposed to inclusion in the ARMM, became the undoing of the MoU-AD. Although a majority nationwide, this Christian population would have been a minority within the BJE, and they objected to this prospect (Rood, 2005). The formulation of the BJE was a recognition by the Philippine government that MILF demands for self-determination and a homeland were legitimate, despite the decades of government sponsored non-Muslim settler migration into Mindanao. This made agreement in the negotiations possible. But the Philippine Supreme Court “cancellation” of the MoU-AD due to the lack of adherence to “constitutional processes” by the negotiating teams(Philippine Supreme Court, 2008), came about because Christian civil society groups (including legislators representing Mindanao) mobilized against the agreement provisions for a future plebiscite. This plebiscite was to determine if towns and villages outside the present ARMM boundaries would be included in the future BJE. Christian civil society groups declared they had not been adequately consulted by government negotiating teams regarding the BJE. “The inclusion of North Cotobato in the proposed plebiscite was unilaterally decided by the so-called „peace negotiators‟ without proper consultations with the people and the leadership of the province” (ICG 2008c: 7). With the MILF accepting the potential future incorporation of a large number of towns with significant Christian residents into the BJE, the Muslim bargaining team appeared to be providing an implicit agreement in principle to accept Christian residency in the homeland region. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE offer of an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) received only a very guarded reception by the Sri Lankan government. Because the LTTE insisted that re-starting negotiations in 2005 had to take up the question of an ISGA as the sole issue for discussion, the possibility of an ISGA actually coming to fruition never rose in a serious manner, because the government refused to initiate talks solely on that basis (Chandrasekharan, 2004). The government was prepared to discuss the concept of an ISGA only in the context of a finding a “permanent settlement” to the conflict. [T}he government has agreed to the concept of setting up an Interim Authority within the context of negotiating a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict, on the basis that an Interim Authority will be useful in a transitional period from a situation of conflict to one of democracy. Agreeing to negotiate an Interim Authority in such a context is very different from opening negotiation solely on the basis of the LTTE demand of the Interim SelfGoverning Authority, which prevents the re-opening of direct negotiations (GOSL, 2005).

In the LTTE proposal for the ISGA, the only mention of the Sinhalese community in the Northern and Eastern provinces was under the heading “Composition of the ISGA” where it Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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was noted that “the Muslim and Sinhala communities in the north-east shall have representation in the ISGA” (Chandrasekharan, 2004). The brevity of this notation suggests that the LTTE was only willing to tolerate the presence of Sinhalese settlers arriving prior to the onset of the insurgency, not those who chose to migrate to the Northern and the Eastern provinces after the LTTE had made it know they were not welcome. Thus, there does not appear to have been an agreement in principle on the part of the LTTE regarding the rights of settlers to continue intrusion into the Tamil homeland area. In the early period of the insurgency the LTTE came very close to suggesting that Tamil homogeneity in the Northern and Eastern provinces was the most desirable demographic condition (Bush, 1993: 17). There was insufficient movement away from that belief even in the later years of the insurgency to sustain the view that the LTTE had dispensed with the notion, or principle, of homogeneity in the “North-East.” There has been no perceptible movement by the Moroccan government toward accepting the principle that its settler program does not dilute claims by POLISARIO and the Sahrawi people of a homeland in Western Sahara. Accepting that principle would undoubtedly lead to the placement of “independence as an option” on the ballot of any future referendum regarding the territory‟s status. The government of Morocco continues to rule out any referendum or plebiscite that would include that option (Human Rights watch, 2010). Particularly since the construction of the multiple layered “wall,” sealing off three quarters of the territory, there have been no grounds for POLISARIO to even mount an argument for homogeneity in Western Sahara. That is, conditions “on the ground” would make such an argument seem beside the point. Thus, POLISARIO has had little choice other than to accept the idea in principle that homogeneity in the territory is not feasible or desirable.

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Conclusions A referendum to determine the future status of Western Sahara will not occur until either POLISARIO allows the ballot to remain void of an independence option, or Morocco allows the ballot to contain that option. Negotiations designed to produce an autonomous Western Sahara province within Morocco will be unlikely to succeed because the current demographic map of that province would leave the Sahrawi population in a distinct minority. The LTTE never seemed to renounce either the idea of a homogenously Tamil (or nearly so) “northeast” in Sri Lanka, or the right of the LTTE to utilize violence to realize their idea . The MILF was prepared to accept, in principle, the notion of an expanded predominately Muslim ARMM (the BJE), even with a significant Christian settler population. That settler population, however, objected to their inclusion in the BJE. In each of the three separate “cases in point” presented here, the argument between the national government and the insurgency is one where the latter seeks self-determination in part based on the concept of a homeland having a distinct demographic quality. The state, on the other hand, insists on maintaining national territorial integrity in part based on a sustained, or created, demographic character. Within the “self-determination unit,” the insurgency seeks minority population primacy. This may be achieved through expanding a favorable minority/non-minority population ratio, or by minimizing an unfavorable ratio. The state wants a contiguous presence of the majority population across the expanse of national

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territory. But it is not clear whether homeland self-determination can be achieved within, or along side of, national population contiguity. Even more critical, is the matter of what densities of the minority and majority populations in the contested area, are tolerable to each community. In terms of gauging the likelihood of successful negotiations, it matters whether, and if so, how “hard” the state has pushed for majority population demographic dominance (a population density ratio in its favor) in the homeland area. In each of the three states taken up in this inquiry, minority populations have sought to reverse the respective state‟s decision to “embark on or (continue) all-too-familiar „nation-building‟ programs designed to obliterate minority group identities” (Buchanan, 1997: 55). In each of the contested regions of the three instances canvassed here, the state has indeed worked quite diligently to alter the demographic circumstances “on the ground.” In Western Sahara the Sahrawis have become a minority by a margin of at least two-to-one after the implementation of the Moroccan government population transfer program; in the Philippines, the Moros had become a minority in Mindanao (outside the ARRM) on the order of at least three-to-one by the time negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government began in earnest; and in Sri Lanka, the Tamil population advantage in the Eastern province had been reduced to roughly two-to-one by the time the LTTE insurgency had gained a foothold. It would not be overstating the case to say that what is common in the three instances is that the minority population density in the self-determination unit has been reduced significantly in each. Central to the success of negotiations, as proposed in this paper, is the notion that the dilution of minority population density in the contested area does not, or should not reduce the validity of the insurgent claim of a right to self-determination in that region. There is little evidence which would produce a conclusion that the governments in each instance, except perhaps for the Philippine case, have accepted this principle. This may, at least in part, account for the failure of negotiations thus far in each case, while taking note of the civil society objections to a negotiated agreement in the Philippines. There is evidence indicating that POLISARIO in Western Sahara, and the MILF in the Philippines, had come to accept the inevitability of a settler presence in the contested region, while the LTTE had seemingly not reached an accommodation with this apparent inevitability. This may account, at least in part, for the outright failure of negotiations in Sri Lanka; the obtaining of an agreement but not the acquiescence of non-Muslim civil society in the Philippines, and regarding Western Sahara, the intermittent continuation of talks between POLISARIO and Morocco. The absence of a settler program is no assurance that negotiations to end insurgent conflict will succeed, and the presence of a settler program is no guarantee that such negotiations will fail. But the presence of a settler program does appear to reduce the likelihood that negotiations to end insurgent conflict will succeed. This is particularly so when there is evidence that the insurgency has been generated in significant part because of a settler program.

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Licklider, Roy. 1995. “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 19451993,” American Political Science Review 89: 681-90. Lingaa, Abhoued Syed M. 2008. “Rethinking State Policies and Minority Rights: Getting the Mindanao Peace Process Moving,” Institute of Bangsamoro Studies Occasional Paper n. 2008-02, June, 2008. Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. 1991. “Conflict and Conflict Management in the Western Sahara: Is the Endgame Near?” Middle East Journal 45(4): 594-607. Martin, Eugene. 2008. “Philippines Agreement in Question,” On the Issues: Philippines: United States Institute of Peace at http://www.usip.org/ 0n_the_issues/philippines.html (accessed 12 May, 2010). McIndoe, Alastair. 2010. “Letter From Manila: Ending a Long Insurgency in the Philippines,” Foreign Affairs 89(3) at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/ features/letters-from/letter-frommanila accessed 11 May, 2010. Memorandum of Agreement (MoU-AD). 2008. “Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain,” at http://magdaloparasapagbabago.blogspot.com/ 2008/08/memorandum-ofagreement-on-anc... (accessed 23 October, 2009). Migdalovitz, Carol. 2008. “Western Sahara: Status of settlement Efforts,” CRS Report for Congress, December 11, 2008 at http//:www.crs.gov (accessed 25 May, 2010). Miller, David. 1998. “Secession and the Principle of Nationality,” in National Determination and Secession, Margaret Moore (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 62-78. Moore, Margaret. 1998. “The Territorial Dimension of Self-Determination,” in National SelfDetermination and Secession, Margaret Moore (ed.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 134-157. _____. 2001. The Ethics of Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moore, Mick. 1985. The State and Peasant Politics in Sri Lanka. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mundy, Jacob. 2006. “Autonomy and Intifadah: New Horizons in Western Saharan Nationalism,” Review of African Political Economy 33(108): 255-267. Omar, Sidi M. 2008. “The Right to Self-Determination and the Indigenous People of Western Sahara,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21(1): 41-57. Peebles. Patrick. 1990. “Colonization and Ethnic Conflict in the Dry Zone in Sri Lanka,” The Journal of Asian Studies 49(1): 30-55. Peow, See Hoon. 2009. “Politics of Religious and Ethnic Identity: The Cases of Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines,” The Journal of International Social Research 2(9): 340-348. Pfaffenberger, Bryan. 1987. “Sri Lanka in 1986: A Nation at the Crossroads, “Asian Survey 4(2): 157. Philippine Supreme Court. 2008. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. G.R. 183591 August 14, 2008 at http://zamboanga.com/news/philippine_supreme_ court_asian_on_MoA-AD.htm. (accessed 16 November, 2011). Petreaus, David H. and James F. Amos. 2006. Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24. MCWP 3-33.5. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army. Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert. 2001. “Options in Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive, and Stable Peace,” Asian Survey 41(2): 271-289. Rood, S. 2005. “Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil society,” Policy Studies 17: 1-59.

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Chapter 2

UNDERSTANDING GOOD COPING: A SUBMARINE CREW COPING WITH EXTREME ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS Shaul Kimhi Head of the Department of Psychology, Tel Hai College Upper Galilee, Israel Have you entered into the springs of the sea, or walked in the recesses of the deep? (Job, 38, 16)

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Abstract The present study is based on in-depth interviews with 12 Israeli submarine crew members. The study examines various aspects of coping with submarine service and its unique characteristics from the crew members' points of view. Interview analysis reveals the following salient themes: First, positive perception of submarine service: positive thinking, optimism and sense of humor, accompanied by cynicism. Second, the submarine team is characterized by high moral standards, high team spirit and a sense of the importance of the service. Third, social relationships are characterized by avoidance of conflicts, while maintaining a good atmosphere and high social cohesion. Fourth, crew members perceived separation from home, friends and daily life as the most difficult aspects to deal with. Fifth, they perceived the submarine as dangerous place but reduced aspects of danger by developing a sense of trust in their submarine and in their ability to control potential dangers. Study results are discussed in light of relevant theories.

Keywords: Submarine, extreme environment, Israeli navy, coping strategies, positive thinking, optimism, sense of humor



E-mail addresses: [email protected]; [email protected]. Telephone: 972-505622070.

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Shaul Kimhi

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Introduction The present qualitative study is based on in-depth interviews with Israeli submarine crew members. The main objective of this study was to better understand good coping: how a submarine crew who have undergone extensive selection and training, cope successfully with stressful conditions. Furthermore, we wanted to examine, from the point of view of the crew members themselves, how they coped with the unique extreme environment of a submarine and to compare our results with other extreme environment research. We asked the crew questions about their experiences serving in a submarine. Overall, we assumed that a submarine crew is a unique group of people who are characterized by excellent coping abilities. Studying such a group, which in most case is not exposed to the public, can teach us about characteristics of successful strategies of coping with extreme stress, such as in the case of submarine service. There has been a substantial increase in the number of people living and operating in isolated, confined, and artificially engineered environments, such as spacecraft, deep diving conditions, weather stations, submarines, and polar outposts (Sandal, 1998; 2000). These are often called 'extreme environments' in the professional literature (e.g., Shimamiya et al., 2005; Steel, 2005). For example, according to Paulus et al. (2009) an extreme environment is defined as an external context that exposes individuals to demanding psychological and/or physical conditions, and which may have profound effects on cognitive and behavioral performance. Coping with extreme environments requires the development of high physiological, psychological and social coping skills (Risberg, et al., 2004; Sandal, 1998; Suedfeld and Steel, 2000). Many factors may affect individual differences in coping successfully with extreme environment such as disruption of sleep-wake cycles, high workload, isolation, confinement, stress, and fatigue (Buguet, 2007; Cowings et al., 2007). Not surprisingly, candidates to serve in extreme environments go through different kinds of selection processes and intensive training to prepare them. Research has developed to improve the selection process (e.g., Walter, 1998; Gunderson and Nelson, 1966). Extreme environment service requires various capabilities and coping strategies which enable the individual to deal successfully with the stressors typical to these environments (Sandal, 1999).

Submarine as an Extreme Environment Submarine duty is widely recognized as one of the most stressful and psychologically demanding forms of military service. Salient stressors include an extremely small working and living space, absence of day/night cues, confinement, isolation from all interaction with the external world, monotony in routine, extended separation from family members, and prolonged and potentially dangerous operational responsibilities (Eid, 2002; Suedfeld and Steel, 2000). In order to cope, submarine crew members must have great professional and technical knowledge and individual characteristics which promote performance under such circumstances (Sandal, 1999). In addition, they need to have the ability both for extensive teamwork under stress and for quick decision making (Espevik, Bjorn, Eid, and Thayer, 2006). During periods at sea, the team has to work with full cooperation in order to fulfill the mission and to maintain a high safety level (Sandal et al., 1999). In their detailed literature

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review on capsule environments, Suedfeld and Steel (2000) presented four main potential sources of stress: physical stressors, psycho-environmental factors social factors and temporal factors: duration of the mission. Submarine research is prominent in extreme environment research. This research may be grouped into four domains: (a) research focusing on personality characteristics, coping strategies and the inter-personal abilities of submarine crew members (Espevik et al., 2006; Sandal, 2003; 1999; Sandal et al., 1999), (b) research focusing on the stress situation, anxiety and other stress symptoms as a result of an emergency situation in a submarine. Some of this research has been done in simulators (Berg et al., 2005; Eid , 2004; 2002; Espevik et al., 2006; Slaven and Windle, 1999; Van Wijk, 2001), (c) research focusing on physiological reactions as a result of stress situations during submarine missions and how these affect the human body (Cymerman et al., 2002; Risberg et al., 2004) (d) research focusing on the effect of submarine service on family members, like spouses (Synder, 1978). The first two groups of research are more relevant to the current study. Summing up the research, it may be claimed that submarine crews, like those in other capsule environments are in most cases characterized by very good coping abilities and high ability for teamwork, including avoidance of conflicts. Moreover, longitudinal studies indicate that not only are crew members not negatively affected, but that their long range experiences are positive and strengthen them compared to their situations before the mission, and when measured against control groups (e.g., Palinkas, 1986; Suedfelf and Steel, 2000). Based on the above studies and the salutogenic theory (Antonovsky, 1987), we expected that our subjects would report high level coping ability which would be manifested as perception of service as highly challenging, denying feelings of danger and fears, would report good social relationships with colleagues, based on trust and conflict avoidance, and report job satisfaction.

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Coping with Stress Stress research has found that the ability to cope with prolonged stress situations depends, among others, on personality characteristics and coping strategies. Among the salient personal characteristics that have been identified as relating to good coping ability are: sense of coherence (Antonovsky, 1979) and hardiness (Kobasa, Maddi and Kahn, 1982; Maddi, 2006). In the present study, although we are not focusing on personal characteristics, our basic assumption is that, considering the selection process as well as the very extensive training, our participants are a unique group of people who display very good abilities to cope with the demands of an extreme environment like a submarine. Three theories that provide a general model for coping with stress seem to be relevant to submarine service: (a) According to the cognitive appraisal theory (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984; Folkman and Lazarus, 1985), the impact of stress depends not only on the level of exposure to stress stimulus, but also on their perceived impact on individuals (Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, and Delongis, 1986). Accordingly, we expected that our submarine crew would appraise their jobs as only moderately dangerous and at the same time trust their ability to handle emergency situations. (b) Hobfoll's Conservation of Resources Theory (COR) claims that the impact of stress on a person depends, first of all, on threat or real loss of resources (Hobfoll, 2001). Overall, the balance between loss and gain of resources determines the effect of stress. Based on this theory we expected our subject to report that they felt satisfaction and liked their jobs and felt

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that the gains were higher than losses. (c) Theories that emphasize the connection between the ability to give and to get social support, and coping ability with stress (e.g., Joseph, Yule, Williams, and Andrews, 1993; Pierce, Sarason and Sarason, 1996; Rees and Freeman, 2009). We assumed that crew member would report feelings of social support from their colleagues and mutual trust in each other. In addition, based on research that indicated the importance of sense of humor as an important tool in coping with stress situation (e.g., Abel, 2002; Abel and Maxwell, 2002; Mauriello and McConatha, 2007) we expected that crew members would report the use of much humor as part of daily routine during voyage mission.

The Current Research and Hypotheses

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The Israeli submarine is a "Dolphin," operated by an electric-diesel engine. Dolphins are among the smallest submarines in the world. Israeli submarine teams are composed only of men. According to public sources (Wikipedia Dolphin, 2009; Wikipedia Israeli Navy, 2009; Defense Industry Daily, 2005) the crew includes 35 to 45 members who are grouped into six departments: machine; electricity and control; detection, navigation and communication; weaponry and sonar. In addition, there is a commander, a deputy commander and a cook. Israeli submarine service is on a volunteer basis. The current study examines various aspects of submarine crew coping from the salutogenic (Antonovsky, 1987) and positive (Seligman, 2003) points of view. The study tries to explore, from the crew's standpoint, what strategies are used to cope successfully with extreme environment such as submarine service. Beyond the assumption that our submarine crew is composed of people with high ability to cope with stress situations, which is a general expectation, we have formulated research hypotheses based on the literature review regarding coping with extreme environments and especially submarine as follows: 1. Crew members will perceive the submarine as a highly demanding and challenging. 2. Crew member will cope with fears and feelings of danger during the voyage by minimizing the level of danger on the one hand and by trusting their own abilities as well as those of their team as being capable of coping with the mission. 3. The main coping strategies will be based on sense of humor, positive thinking and optimism. 4. Social relationships among the crew will be based on trust, cooperation and conflict avoidance at all times.

Method Sample The sample consisted of 12 interviewees, among them officers of all ranks including noncommissioned (NCO) officers representing the six submarine departments. Each department was represented by an officer and a NCO. Due to earlier agreement with headquarter unit, we asked for only a few biographical details. Ages ranged from 20 to 40. Most of the subjects had studied physics and\or computer orientation in high school. All

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subjects had completed at least 12 years of education and some had completed higher education. Most participants grew up in big cities; some of them in small community villages. Two persons were married with a child and most of the others had girlfriends but were not married.

Research Tool The research tool was a structured interview constructed in several steps: First, based on research literature regarding submarines, the research goals were defined and accordingly, a first draft of the interview was prepared. Second, the interview was given to three submarine crew members for their comments. Following this, changes were made. Third, step two was repeated with another three crew members. At the end of this step, we constructed the final version as follows: Each domain started with a general open question, followed by specific questions (only if the information was not given in reply to the general open question). In this way, we allowed the interviewees to respond in their own way, with a minimum of guidance from the interviewers.

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Interview Analysis Content analysis of interviews was done by attributing texts to content categories (e.g., Krippendorf, 1980; Jones et al., 2010). The process of building content categories was first based on the interview‟s predetermined four general open questions: A submarine as an extreme environment, coping with fears and danger, coping strategies, social relationships and team work. These questions were selected based on the literature review. The process of attributing text to sub-categories (within each of the main four categories) was conducted as follows: The main researcher and two assistant researchers read the texts and attributed them independently to content categories. Comparison of content categories among the three researchers revealed high agreement of 85%. All texts which indicated no agreement regarding their attribution to categories were brought to further discussion, and only if no agreement was reached (less than 3%) another independent researcher was asked to decide. The main categories and sub-categories analyzed in this study were as follows: (a) the submarine as an extreme environment: separation, crowdedness and lack of privacy, routine and activity. (b) coping with fears and feelings of danger: the submarine as a dangerous place, fears, talking about fears and danger. (c) coping strategies: positive thinking and optimism, cynicism, humor and culture of 'Palavra', night paper. (d) social relationships and teamwork: social relations during voyages, ranks and military hierarchy.

Process The research started after getting permission from the unit headquarters. The interviews took place at the interviewee's home, after receiving their personal permission to be

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interviewed. At the beginning of each interview, it was clarified that the purpose of this study was to explore the personal experiences of submarine service. In addition, complete anonymity was assured. It is important to note that the interviewees displayed special interest in the research and were happy to cooperate. All interviews were recorded and transcribed word for word, excluding any possible identifying details.

Interviews Analysis Analysis of interviews follows the content categories as presented above.

A Submarine as an Extreme Environment Separation experience. There was clear agreement among participants that separation from home, family and friends is the most difficult aspect of submarine service. The following is an example:

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NCO: "It is part of not knowing what is going on the outside; you are completely disconnected regarding telephones. Even news that you do get is very specific. I think that this is the most difficult experience. It is simply complete disconnection. For example, I had a long voyage and, at the time, my wife was pregnant. To see her all of a sudden after a long time means that a lot of things have changed". Officer: "Being in a submarine, which is a closed tube, for a long time, is very difficult work in the long run. You don't have your own corner. A submarine is another world. Disconnection is very difficult. I cannot cope with it. From the minute I go, I am overwhelmed by longing and I am full of guilt feelings until I come back. Disconnection tears you up. You can't talk, you can't call. I try to think about how to blur the disconnection. But as of today, there is complete disconnection".

As mentioned above, separation from daily life, family and friends seems to be the most difficult part of the voyage. This is even truer if the person has a spouse and especially if he has children. It seems that some of the crew members cope with this difficulty mainly by trying to avoid thinking, and by concentrating on the mission as much as possible. Beyond the diverse responses, the salient one is that separation is a 'great difficulty that one forced to live with'. Crowdedness and lack of privacy. As explained, Dolphin submarines are small and congested, and most of their space is used for operating systems. There is very little free space devoted to living conditions. NCO: "There is not so much privacy; only when you go to bed, only when you sleep. When I am alone, I am bored and I prefer not to be alone. You get used to living with congestion; I don't feel congestion. Anyone who needs privacy goes to bed and reads a book. Bed is the most private place you have. No one will open the curtain of your bed; no one will annoy you there. You get your privacy if you want". Officer: "Personally, congestion does not bother me, nor does lack of privacy; you have your own place. You have your bed, your own corner but, of course, it is small. Relatively, for a normal person, it might look crazy. It seems that everyone gets used to it quickly and to many other things. At the beginning, it really looks threatening, but very quickly it seems completely reasonable".

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Our interviewees indicated that crowdedness was an integral part of life in a submarine and that they have learned and have even gotten used to living like that during a voyage. Most participants refer to their beds as the only private place in the submarine, and emphasize its importance: the ability to leave to your own private corner when you feel like it. The overall impression is that coping with crowdedness is perceived by the crew as trivial and understandable so that it almost does not bother them. The voyage: routine and activity. The following is an example of how a crew member experiences the long voyage and how he adjusts to the changes going from routine and monotony to very hectic activity:

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Officer: "There is accumulated tiredness. Every opportunity I have, I go to sleep. I give up many things. I am even willing to give up meals. For example, once we had a three day voyage during which I did not take a shower at all. I was so tired that I didn't care about not taking a shower". NCO: "Many times there are long voyages. There are difficulties in getting back to routine (afterward). The thoughts you have when you are in the submarine… There is this kind of difficulty that you are staying (in the sub) while everyone else (on land) continues with their lives. I think that there is another difficulty: As a department non-commissioned officer I have tremendous responsibilities which continue all the time. You know that you have responsibilities for many things all the time. This is a kind of difficulty".

Beyond the various responses regarding routine and activity, it seems that operational activity is the preferred way to make the time pass quickly, without having time for disturbing thoughts or feelings like yearning for home, boredom, separation etc. The general impression is that crew responses support our first hypothesis: They perceive their service in a submarine as a highly challenging environment but they do not refer to this environment as an extreme or even stressful one. Aside from mentioning lack of sleep, there were hardly any complaints regarding physical or psychological difficulties during a voyage. The conclusion might be that what seems to be an extreme environment for an outside observer seems to the crew as a challenging but manageable routine.

Coping with Fears and Danger A submarine as a dangerous place. This sub-category examined to what extent participants perceived their service in a submarine as a dangerous experience. The following is an example: Officer: "Serving in a submarine is dangerous. Even in training, there are things that you wouldn't tell your mother. For example, we went through an escape course. Overall, I think that if you look at it seriously, not the way we look at it, it is usually dangerous". NCO: "No, you feel very safe. The experience is that you live in a sterile bubble; you don't feel that you are directly swimming in the water. You are not swimming in the water; you don't feel the pressure in your ears. You are OK with it. Sometimes I am worried about having gas in the submarine, or all of a sudden there is pressure in your ears".

The responses in regard to the submarine as a dangerous place were diversified: On the one hand, most participants agreed that a submarine is a dangerous place. On the other, most Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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of them tended to minimize the level of danger. They tend not only to play down the danger, but also to balance it with a feeling of self-confidence in the vessel and in their ability to control potential risks. Sometimes there is also the sense that 'there are things that you can do nothing about' or that risk is 'something you have to learn to live with'. It is a kind of acceptance or "light fatalism". For example, at least one crew member mentioned the Dakar1 disaster, and claimed that somewhere, it is always in the back of his mind. Fears. Participants were asked whether they have fears during voyages. Only a few related openly to fears. More participants replied that they do not have fears:

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NCO: "Let's say that the longer you are in the submarine, the more you really understand how dangerous it is. At the beginning you sail and (you feel) it is not dangerous, here and there… but in time you really understand how every little thing can cause such great damage….. But few people feel it. I, too, feel it less. If, for example, I was operating in the Gaza Strip with a small (commando) unit or something like that…. Here you feel much more comfortable". I don't know; it bothered me that it didn't bother the others. All kinds of things like that… nonsense". Officer: "It seems to me that the more you understand where you are, the more you are afraid to sail. At the beginning you arrive at the submarine and tell yourself everything is terrific and nothing can happen". "I think to myself, you are in a submarine, and you are deep down and you see a small drip from the ceiling and you ask yourself "Shouldn't it bother you a little?" So OK, in the end it is just a drip but…. I don't know; it bothered me that it didn't bother the others. All kinds of things like that… nonsense".

Among the various responses, it was obvious that senior and more experienced crew members were more willing to admit to the existence of dangers and were more willing to talk about fears. Evidently the most common strategy to cope with fears was developing a strong sense that there are professional people around you who can be trusted not to make mistakes operating the submarine systems. The most common response indicated that good training for various emergency situations enhanced feelings of security and safety. It is interesting to note that even those who denied having fears did not deny possible unexpected catastrophic events. At the same time, some of the crew members did not hesitate to express fears which accompany submarine service, openly and honestly. Talking about fear and danger. In this sub-category we analyzed all texts which dealt with the question of whether crew members who live a life of such intensive teamwork talk to each other about their fears. NCO: "Everyone has the same problem and 'misery loves company'. It is good to know that I am not the only one. No talking about fears (since) this is not a matter of support. The support does not come from talking about it, but by finding ways to pass the time. We repress the problems, and overcome them. There is nothing to be done; you are there and that's it, so we try to pass the time together and with fun". Officer: "This is an issue which we do not talk about too much among ourselves. If there is a professional problem, if a mistake was made, then we talk about it, share what happened, what you have done right and wrong; mainly as a professional issue".

In accordance with our second hypothesis, crew members talk very little, if at all, about fears and dangers. It seems that there is silent agreement that discussing these subjects does 1

An Israeli navy submarine that was lost in the Mediterranean in 1968 on its way from England to Israel. All 69 crew members on board were killed.

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not add to the ability to cope. This coping strategy may be defined as "rational denial", meaning: "we know that there are dangers and fears, but to talk about them will not do any good". Moreover, the overall impression regarding risks and fears revealed that crew members felt uneasy talking about these issues to the interviewer; there were hesitations, breaks in the middle of sentences, unfinished sentences and relatively less clear language. These results seem to support our second hypothesis indicating that feelings of danger during the voyage will be minimized.

Coping Strategies Positive thinking and optimism. Interviews revealed clearly that crew members often used positive thinking during the voyage. Moreover, they focused on positive issues while negative ones were almost ignored (unless it was a professional issue). Crew members attributed more importance to the positive side of their work than to the negative.

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NCO: "My work in the submarine fills me with energy no matter how hard and demanding the work is, no matter how many hours. When I come back home from a voyage, I return full of energy. I come back home after long voyage like I am floating on a cloud. This work gives me great satisfaction, it makes me happy. This is the work of a creator, a work of art". Officer: "I think that optimism is a very important characteristic. I think that (when you have optimism) it is hard to act up….. meaning, this is not the right time to act up and you have to stay optimistic, even though there are many opportunities that this service creates. Personally, here and there, there is stress, disappointment …. You often lack information. Personally I think that optimism is something that might solve the problem, to know how to look at the glass which is half-full".

Participants perceived their overall service as positive, meaningful and unique. It is not clear how much of this optimism and positive thinking developed during submarine service and how much existed prior to service. It seems that both are true: positive thinking exists prior to service and is further enhanced during service. Overall, interviews revealed a clearly positive attitude as a basic world perception, and specifically as a way to perceive submarine service. Cynicism, humor and culture of 'palavra'2. One of the most frequently used coping strategies was the culture of humor accompanied by cynicism, which developed among participants. As it turns out, this culture of humor is unique. It appears that those who are not part of the team might find it difficult to penetrate its nuances and connotations. For example: Officer: "Due to cynicism you can say whatever you want and to whomever you want, without being told that you have really said something serious. Palavra is very important, it is team spirit. It is not exactly cynicism. There is cynicism in the submarine which has nothing to do with palavra. Cynicism is the weapon of divers. Using cynicism, you can say whatever you think without sounding as though you are rebuking anyone. Based on that principal, anyone can say anything about me. Everything is only palavra". NCO: "There are friendships, team spirit… everything, but it is covered over with much cynicism, and putting each other down. Things are done in funny ways, but every bit of fun has a bit of truth. It is always like that. I think that everyone takes out his difficulties on 2

Palavra means nonsense. In Spanish, the meaning is "word", and in Ladino, the local meaning developed: nonsense, stupidity, empty talk (Rosental, Maariv, 30-9-05). The English equivalent is “palaver”.

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Shaul Kimhi someone else, in funny ways that will not really insult. A submarine is a place where people accept something stupid you have done, and it does not matter what; it's happened to everyone".

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A possible example of palavra is the following: One day the cook prepared rolls for the team and they were burned. Later on, a story spread among the team that one roll had fallen from the table and the entire crew heard the "bang" noise when it hit the floor. According to participants, they use their sense of humor, their cynicism and their palavra as part of coping with submarine life. Instead of conflict –which is so normal in every system where many people depend on each other without the option of choosing who to work withthere is a culture which allows for indirect expression of disagreements, anger, and frustration in a way that is approved of by all. Moreover, it seems that this culture is an old tradition which is passed down from generation to generation. The high level of cynicism was not part of our hypotheses since, to the best of our knowledge no other submarine research has indicated this before. However, in the case of the Israeli submarine crew, the use of cynicism and ridicule on each other plays an important role as can shown in the case of night paper. Night paper. One of the unique crew expressions is the 'night paper'. It is a comic newspaper published every night and hung on the bulletin board for everybody to read. The paper is composed of magazine articles, journals, photos, and links. It is a unique instrument which allows review of the day's events harmoniously while using cynicism, mutual ridicule and language familiar to crew members. The following is an example: NCO: "The night paper is our way of coping with painful things and expressing cynicism. It reflects cynicism. Instead of someone going and telling others (what he want to tell them), he just adds it to the night paper and that is how everybody knows about it. It is a funny and cynical paper that eases the routine, to create laughter. This is our goal, to turn troubles into cynical things. It eases the time and the atmosphere. It (atmosphere) is more relaxed when things are free and no one is ashamed (to express himself). Officer: "Night papers are a continuation of cynicism, but they are more positive. They (the crew) need something funny and timely. You can make fun of everything, pay someone back and no one will say anything, unless I censor it. This is their (the crew's) way to cope".

An example could be a cartoon or fabricated picture of crew member who speaks loud as a famous opera singer or someone who had slipped on his way to the kitchen and later that day was presented on the night paper as an acrobat in the circus. The night paper has the same purpose as humor and palavra: it enables the expression of different kinds of experiences, whether good or bad, while gently criticizing other person/s. Apparently, the night paper has become an accepted way to express feelings and thoughts without being insulting. These include criticism, humor, ridicule of others and of oneself, as well as of submarine life. Overall, the interviews reveal that, in accordance with our hypothesis, sense of humor and optimism were salient coping strategies. In addition, somewhat unexpectedly, cynicism and mutual ridicule were also salient coping strategies of the submarine crew.

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Social Relationships and Team Work Social relationships during the voyage. During a voyage, the submarine is closed, isolated and disconnected from the outside world. Crew members cannot communicate with their families or friends. The only company they have is each other. As a result, there is no place for unnecessary disputes. A submarine crew, like other extreme environment crews, must maintain a good atmosphere in order to complete the mission.

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NCO: "In a submarine, like any other place with many people, there are groups. Nothing will help; this is something that happens in a large group: there are sub-groups. There are very good friends and those who are not good friends of mine. I think that within these sub-groups the friendships are real. There are some people in the submarine who become very good friends of yours, and will remain so for another 30 years". Officer: "It happens that you have to work and share your life with a person whom you don't like. I try to retain professionalism and also to offer some kind of friendship. I am not a hypocrite; I will not tell this individual 'you are my best friend and I will do anything for you'. But I will be glad to do things for him. Again, at night (at home) I will not go out to drink with him, or call to ask how his wife feels".

Respondents indicated that there are good working relations and a positive social atmosphere. Yet this does not necessarily mean close or intimate relations after the voyage. Only a small number of friendships continue beyond that. It seems that social cohesion among the team is high, even though there are sub-groups. Evidently, there is no social pressure to be friends with all the others. Ranks and military hierarchy. A submarine is a unique military unit in the sense of military hierarchy. Although, like any army unit, there are ranks, the formal relations and distance among the crew members are different compared to other units in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Crew members from all ranks and levels must live and work together very closely. The combination of submarine life and army ranking forces everyone to compromise. Officer: "It is clear to everyone that an officer does not come and tell soldiers to do things only because he is an officer, but because there is something that has to be done. Many times we listen to soldiers, see if they have something better to suggest. It is not that something will happen because you, as an officer, change your mind. Things can change if there is a better suggestion". NCO: "Interaction differs from other commanding styles. You can see a Captain and NCO who are best friends and they talk about everything. There are still some games among guys who are a bit younger and those who are more experienced. I think that compared to other places in the army, this is negligible. During a long voyage, you can see a submarine deputy commander and a NCO doing dining room shift together".

The role of officers is, first of all, work distribution. Ranks represent operational authority, and to a lesser extent, command authority. A submarine captain is the only person on board whose rank is maintained: Crew members address him as "Hamefaked" (in Hebrew, the commander). From the various responses, it seems that the social interaction among crew members does not distinguish rank. The only place where there is a clear distinction according to rank is the 'mess' (eating rooms). In accordance with our fourth hypothesis, social relationships are based very clearly on high trust and cooperation among the team members: It is clear that everyone will do his best to complete the mission perfectly. Many of

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the interviewers emphasized that they will avoid conflict with other colleagues even when there is disagreement and that it is very difficult to make them angry. The ways to handle such disagreements are night paper and “palavaras”.

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Conclusions The most prominent results of the current study seem to be the positive perceptions of submarine service. These include positive thinking, optimism and humor accompanied by cynicism. Using positive thinking, optimism and humor are well known in professional literature as successful coping strategies with stress. These results are in accordance with research indicating that humor, positive attitudes and optimism reinforce resilience against the negative effects of distress (Abel and Maxwell, 2002; Connor and Zhang, 2006; Martinez, Reyes, Garcia, and Gonzalez, 2006; Mauriello and McConatha, 2007; Southwick, Vythilingam, and Charney, 2005; Wooten, 1996). It is possible to view the positive perception of submarine service by the submarine interviewee as corresponding to the salutogenic model research (e.g., Sagy and Anotnovsky, 1986). This model research focuses on a self reported feeling of competence and satisfaction as a valid measure for successful coping with stress (e.g., Dar and Kimhi, 2001, 2004). An additional way to explain the positive attitude to submarine demands by our subjects is by using cognitive appraisal theory (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Accordingly, participants perceive their abilities as appropriate to cope with the submarine service demands. This perception helps them to feel that they can handle emergency situations and that these are challenging rather than dangerous. Nonetheless, this study cannot determine whether these means and mechanisms are unique to Israeli submarines only. More studies of how other navy crews form various cultures are needed to clarify this interesting point. The current study indicated that one of the unique coping strategies used by the crew under study was the culture of "palavra" and the use of the "night paper" as a part of the subculture developed in the submarine. Apparently this strategy has a double goal: On the one hand, an efficient way to vent criticism and frustration which does not insult others consists of bringing up the ridiculous and the absurd sides of submarine life and looking for a special point of view about life on a submarine in all its aspects. On the other, it prevents arguments, disagreements and conflicts in the congested working area, where conflicts and disagreements are undesirable and even dangerous. However, even though this was not said explicitly, it seems that these means are also used to ease worry and fear and to serve as "pressure release" mechanisms. Regarding feelings of danger and fear, the current study indicated that crew members coped with these feelings by "diminishing" their perception of dangers and avoiding talk about fears among themselves. We suggest calling this strategy an "optimal denial": On the one hand, they do not completely deny or ignore the danger. On the other, they do not live with a constant sense of risk that might interfere with their performance (see denial as a coping strategy in Breznitz, 1986). Additionally, crew member expressed high levels of confidence both with the submarine and in their ability to control most potential risks. These results support other studies according to which, expectation of being able to control the situation, characterized crew members coping successfully with extreme environments (e.g., Sandal, et al., 1999; Levine and Ursin, 1991).

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Evidently, the need for extensive teamwork in a submarine, like other teams operating in extreme environments, requires a high ability for social relationships. This research clearly indicated the existence of teamwork, including social cohesion and good working relations without conflicts. Interestingly, good relationships crossed military hierarchy and rank. It appears that, unlike other military units, rank had mainly operational significance but much less social significance. Above all, it appears that submarine crews work harmoniously even though not everyone is a friend of everyone else. This harmony exists even if a person has to work with someone he does not like. The current study results support theories emphasizing personal ability for giving and receiving social support as a coping strategy with stress (Joseph, Yule, Williams, and Andrews, 1993; Pierce, Sarason and Sarason, 1996; Rees and Freeman, 2009). These results also support other submarine research using other methodologies which have indicated the importance of capability for social relationships as a necessary precondition for submarine service (Sandal et al., 1999; Sandal, 2003; 1999), and other studies regarding characteristics of submarine personnel (e.g., Wolfe, 1979). Our research has indicated that high coping and performance under stress situations, like extreme environments, are connected with a personality profile which is characterized by high instrumentality and achievement, together with interpersonal sensitivity. Such a profile has been termed the „right stuff” in the literature, characterizing successful group coping with highly stressful situations (Sandal, et al., 1999; Wolfe, 1979). The current results suggest adding to above profile the ability to avoid conflict as a very essential characteristic of good submarine crew member and probably a helpful feature for other crews operating in extreme environments. Aside from separation difficulties, this study does not support some of the capsule research outcomes. Suedfeld and Steel (2000) emphasized social isolation, confinement and sensory restriction. In the interviews with the team in the current research, there were few reports of these difficulties. On the contrary, our subjects described feelings after a voyage as positive even though it had sometimes been very tough. Some of our results can be explained using Hobfoll's COR theory (2001): Crew members described the feeling of satisfaction they had at the end of the voyage at successfully having completed the mission and at their good functioning during the voyage. These descriptions match the explanation according to which gains of resources (like good feelings, satisfaction, and pride) overcome loss of resources (like separation). Moreover, in accordance with COR theory, respondents revealed the clear perception that, overall, submarine service involved more gain than loss of resources. Beyond our specific hypotheses, additional results indicated high morale, team spirit and values. These included –among others- wide agreement concerning the importance of the submarine and its missions and high unit pride. There is consensus among experts that these psycho/social components are very important in every combat unit and that their importance does not diminish even though the weapons become more and more sophisticated. For example, Holmes (1989) emphasizes the importance of the moral qualities of the combat soldier. According to him, even the most modern weapons systems are limited and depend on the soldiers who operate them. In the end, the soldier's values are basic and most important in every combat unit (see also Griffith, 1988; Kimhi and Sagy, 2008).

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Limitations of the Study Like any other research, this one also has limitations: (a) the small number of interviewees requires caution regarding generalization about Israeli submarine crews and does not allow for generalization to crew members from other navies, (b) difficulties in comparing the current study with other submarine studies using mainly quantitative methodology, (c) some caution should be applied regarding the possibility that significant experiences (e.g., risks, fears) took place during classified missions and, as a result, did not come up during the interviews.

Pragmatic Conclusion What is the main pragmatic conclusion from our study? In essence, it is possible to claim that our study clearly indicates the importance of the human factor in one of the most modern sophisticated war machines such as the submarine: There is no substitute for the crew members operating this system, team spirit, values, and ability for team work and positive attitudes to mission demands (see also Holmes, 1989). These are domains which can be fostered and encouraged in any team and certainly in elite teams such as those on submarines which have been selected after strict processes, and long and extensive training.

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Cymerman, A., Young, A.J., Francis, T.J., Wray, D.D., Ditzler, D.T., Stulz, D., Bovill, M., and Muza, S.R. (2002). Subjective symptoms and postural control during a disabled submarine simulation. Undersea and Hyperbaric Medicine, 29, 204-215. Dar, Y., and Kimhi, S. (2004). Youth in the military: Gendered experiences in the conscript service in the Israeli Army. Armed Forces and Society, 30, 433-459. Dar, Y., and Kimhi, S. (2001). Military service and self-perceived maturation among Israeli youth. Journal of Youth and Adolescence. 30, 427-448. Defense industry daily (2005). Germany may sell 2 more Dolphin Sub to Israel for 1.17B$. Retrieved (October, 15, 2007) from: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/germanymay-sell-2-more-dolphin-subs-to-israel-for-117b-01528/. Eid, J. (2002). Acute stress reactions after submarine accidents. Journal of Military Medicine, 167, 427-431. Eid, J. (2004). Stress and coping in a week-long disabled submarine exercise. Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, 75, 616-621. Espevik, R., Bjorn, H.J., Eid, J., and Thayer, J.F. (2006). Shared mental models and operational effectiveness: Effects on performance and team processes in submarine attack teams. Military Psychology, 18, 23-36. Folkman, S., and Lazarus, R.S. (1985). If it changes it must be a process: Study of emotion and coping during three stages of a college examination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 150-170. Folkman, S., Lazarus, R.S., Gruen, R.J., and Delongis, A. (1986). Appraisal, coping, health status, and psychological symptoms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 571-579. Griffith, J. (1988). Measurement of group cohesion in U.S. army units. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 9, 149-171. Gunderson, E.K. and Nelson, P.D. (1966). Criterion measures for extremely isolated groups. Personnel Psychology, 19, 67-81. Hobfoll, S.E. (2001). The influence of culture, community, and the nested-self in the stress process: Advancing conservation of resources theory. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 5, 337-421. Holmes, R. (1989). Acts of war: The behavior of men in battle. New York: Free Press. Jones, D.K., Evenson, K.R., Rodriguez, D.A., and Aytur, S.A. (2010). Addressing pedestrian safety: A content analysis of pedestrian master plans in North Carolina. Traffic Injury Prevention, 11, 57-65. Joseph, S., Yule, W., Williams, R., and Andrews, B. (1993). Crisis support in the aftermath of disaster: A longitudinal perspective. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 32, 177185. Kimhi, S., and Sagy, S. (2008). Moral justification and feeling of adjustment to military lawenforcement situations: Israeli soldiers serving at army roadblocks. Mind and Society, 7, 177-191. Kobasa, S.C., Maddi, S.R., and Kahn, S. (1982). Hardiness and health: A prospective study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 168-177. Krippendorf, K. (1980). Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology. Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage. Lazarus, R .S. and Folkman, S. (1984). Stress, Appraisal and Coping. New York: Springer.

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Levine, S. and Ursin, H. (1991). What is stress? In M.R. Brown, G.F. Koob, and C. Rivier (Eds.). Stress – Neurobiology and neuroendocrinology (pp. 3-21). New York: Marcel Dekker. Maddi, S.R. (2006). Hardiness: The courage to grow from stresses. Journal of Positive Psychology, 1, 160-168. Martínez-Correa, A., Reyes del Paso, G.A., García-León, A., and González-Jareño, M.I. (2006). Relationship between dispositional optimism/pessimism and stress coping strategies. Psicothema, 18, 66-72. Mauriello, M., and McCopnatha, J.T., (2007). Relations of humor with perceptions of stress. Psychological Reports, 101, 1057-1066. Palinkas, LA. (1986). Health and performance of Antarctic winter-over personnel: A follow up study. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 57, 549-559. Pierce, G.R., Sarason, B.R. and Sarason, I.G. (Eds.). (1996). Handbook of social support and the family. New York, NY.: Plenum Press. Paulus, M.P., Potterat, E.G., Taylor, M.K., Van Orden, K.F., Bauman, J., Nomen, N., Padills, G.A.. and Swain, J.L. (2009). Neuroscience approach to optimizing brain resources for human performance in extreme environments. Neurosciences and Biobehavioral Reviews, 33, 1080-1088. Rees, T., and Freeman, P. (2009). Social support moderates the relationship between stressors and task performance through self-efficacy. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 28, 244-263. Risberg, J., Ostberg, C., Svensson, T., Norfleet, W., Ornhage, H., Mjaavatten, O., and Juvik, T. (2004). Atmospheric changes and physiological responses during a 6-day"disabled submarine" exercise. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 75, 138-149. Sagy, S., and Antonovsky, A. (1986). Adolescents‟ reaction to the evacuation of the Sinai settlements: A longitudinal study. The Journal of Psychology, 120, 543-556. Sandal, G.M. (1998). The effects of personality and interpersonal relations on crew performance during space simulation studies. Life Support and Biosphere Science: International Journal of Earth Space, 5, 461-470. Sandal, G.M. (1999). The effects of personality and interpersonal relations on crew performance during space simulation studies. Human Performance in Extreme Environments, 4, 43-50. Sandal, G.M. (2000). Coping in Antarctica: Is it possible to generalize results across settings? Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, 71, 37-43. Sandal, G.M., (2003). Personality and coping strategies during submarine missions. Human Performance in Extreme Environments, 7, 29-42. Sandal, G.M., Endresen, I.M., Vaernes, R., and Ursin, H. (1999). Personality and coping strategies during submarine missions. Military Psychology, 11, 381-404. Seligman, M.P. (2003). Positive psychology: Fundamental assumptions. The Psychologist, 16, 126-127. Shimamiya, T., Terada, N., Wakabayashi, S., and Mohri, M. (2005). Mood Change and Immune Status of Human Subjects in a 10-Day Confinement Study. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 76, 481-485. Slaven, G.M. and Windle, C.M. (1999). Cognitive performance over 7 days in distressed submarine. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 70, 604-608.

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Southwick, S.M., Vythilingam, M., and Charney, D.S. (2005). The psychobiology of depression and resilience to stress: Implications for prevention and treatment. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 1, 255-291. Steel, G.D. (2005). Whole lot of parts: Stress in extreme environments. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 76, 67-73. Sturgeon, J. (2007). The psychology of isolation. Retrieved (28 February, 2007) from: http://www.space.edu/libraryResearch/undgrant.html. Suedfeld, P. and Steel, J.D. (2000). The environmental psychology of capsule habitats. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 227-253. Synder, A.I. (1978). Sea and shore rotation: The family and separation: Phase II final report. US Department of Defense. Virginia: Technical Information Center. Van Wijk, C. (2001). Submarine escape: The effect of training on anxiety. Journal of Human Performance in Extreme Environments, 5, 7-10. Walter, P.H. (1998). The selection of submarine commanding officers: Leadership in an extreme environment. Human Performance in Extreme Environments, 3, 13-25. Walter, P.H. (1998). The selection of submarine commanding officers: Leadership in an extreme environment. Human Performance in Extreme Environments, 3, 13-25. Wikipedia – Dolphin class submarine. Retrieved (March 9, 2009) from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolphin_submarine. Wikipedia – Israeli Navy. Retrieved (March 9, 2009) from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_navy. Wolfe, T. (1979). The right stuff. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Wooten, P. (1996). Humor: an antidote for stress. Holistic Nursing Practice, 10, 49-56.

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In: Military Operations, Health and Technology Editor: Alexander L. Cobb, pp. 43-53

ISBN: 978-1-62100-328-1 © 2012 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 3

A REVIEW OF TELEHEALTH APPLICATIONS IN THE MILITARY COMMUNITY Mary S. McCarthy, Sabrina Ramme and Susan L. Cummings Madigan Healthcare System, Tacoma, WA, US

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Telehealth: An Old Idea with New Applications While nurses may believe that the first documented use of telehealth was the 1969 nurse –-led clinic project at Boston’s Logan Airport set up to that cared for victims of airplane crashes and other accidents by transmitting vital signs, and electrocardiograms, as well as other health information and video images to Massachusetts General Hospital, in reality, telehealth has been around since the 1950’s (Chaffee, 1999). “Telehealth is the use of telecommunications technologies for the provision of long-distance clinical health care, patient and professional education, and health administration”. (Chaffee, 1999, p. 27). Technologies include computers, telephones, video monitors, and telecommunication networks that connect two or more sites. The most basic examples of telehealth include nurses phoning report to another nurse on a receiving unit or a nurse calling an ambulatory surgery patient 24 hours post-discharge to evaluate for pain or other symptoms. Telehealth has a place in every area of health care, ranging from emergency medical response systems to hospital and home care, and can be used for direct or remote care delivery. Since 1990 there have been great advancements and renewed interest in telehealth technologies and applications. This growth has been driven by progress in computers and telecommunications technologies, as well as the need to improve access to care worldwide (Chaffee 1999). In 2008 the American Telemedicine Association held a global forum that was sponsored by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command and other government-affiliated agencies such as Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center (TATRC), encouraging international dialogue about to creating a platform that



Corresponding Author: Mary S. McCarthy, PhD, RN, 1611 Nisqually St. Steilacoom, WA 98388 253.968.3695

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leverages the telemedicine community to minimize global disparities in healthcare (Pak, Brown-Connolly et al. 2008). It is therefore no surprise that the Department of Defense is one of several government agencies investing resources in novel uses for telehealth. This surge in applications for telehealth coincided with the need for timely, practical, and reliable solutions to healthcare challenges on the battlefield. Using technology to augment health care in the field provides a natural solution to resource and operational constraints in remote and austere locations (McManus, Salinas et al., 2008). According to McManus et al. (2008) the advent and globalization of high-speed networks, both wired and wireless, in combat within Iraq and Afghanistan have equipped health care providers with the tools necessary to institute telemedicine technology to enhance the capabilities of the medical assets in the field. When there is a lack of specialized medical expertise, technology such as portable tele-ultrasound can assist with the care urgently required to save a life in the far-forward environment. Telehealth innovations driven by the goal of improving combat casualty care during Overseas Contingency Operations have contributed to the highest survival rates seen in any previous conflict.

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Telehealth for Veterans In response to the increase in casualties from traumatic brain injury (TBI), the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) has developed telehealth initiatives jointly with the Department of Defense. Researchers at the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center have tested a means to improve early TBI recognition and thereby treatment outcomes by using a Web-based cognitive assessment system. Measurements of criteria such as mental reaction time, processing speed, and memory can be administered by medics with a computer in the field. The results are electronically forwarded to physicians at a distance who make recommendations for a soldier’s treatment and return to duty. A future goal is to make the algorithms and tools available on handheld devices (Girard, 2007). Live video teleconferencing (VTC) is being used to promote interdisciplinary communication worldwide. Because the heterogeneous nature of TBIs requires the coordination of multiple disciplines, the VHA Polytrauma Telehealth Network uses live video teleconferencing (VTC) to interactively link clinicians at VA centers across the country. The VHA is preparing for an influx of TBI patients, and planning telemedicine applications for acute, subacute, rehabilitative, and home care of patients, as well as health education. The DOD uses live VTC along with store-and-forward technology, sometimes necessary due to bandwidth restrictions in the war zone, to coordinate care remotely between specialists and providers at clinics and medical centers. Medical commands in the far-forward environment are using live VTC to link general surgeons for consultations with remote specialists during surgeries (Girard, 2007). The use of telehealth is already commonplace within the VHA, its adoption having been initially driven by the need to serve veterans in remote and rural locations. Tuerk et al. (2007) identify several unique qualities of the VHA that have fostered its utilization, including a universal standardized electronic medical record system, a capitated payment system, and the absence of cross-state licensure restrictions. The lack of these characteristics in the private and other public sectors will likely be a barrier to extensive utilization of telehealth. Currently

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there is a dearth of systematic wide-scale studies, as clinical practice is leading science. It may be incumbent upon the VHA to provide the evidence base for the extensive adoption of telehealth methods throughout our health care system (Tuerk, Fortney et al., 2010).

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Telehealth for Today’s Service Members Most of today’s young service members, much like college and university students, were born after 1975 and are categorized as Generation Y’ers, also referred to as the MTV Generation, Nexters, and Millennials (Arhin and Cormier, 2007). Generation Y has grown up with cell phones, computers, Blackberries, and the Internet (now accessed via smart phones), through which they can constantly review information while performing other tasks. This generation prefers e-mail and text messaging rather than face-to-face communication and prefers Web-based activities and online technology to traditional office or clinic follow-up. This generation also enjoys more freedom during off duty time that allows for social networking, attending online college classes, viewing movies on demand, and maintaining contact with family and friends via the Internet. In addition to the psychosocial gratification achieved through Internet activities, there are many benefits from telehealth interventions for young military personnel: the ability to reach them internationally, while assigned overseas or deployed to a theater of operations, the access 24 hours a day and seven days a week when assignments span many different time zones, the familiarity with the Internet which can be used at specific locations on any installation or even via personal phone or laptop, and the two-way communication about a health condition that allows for immediate feedback or advice from healthcare providers. Using health information and related services on the Internet is now part of our everyday lives. In 2005, approximately 137 million Americans used the Internet to obtain health information or request health care services (An, Hayman et al.,2009). Most young service members today are frequent Internet users and readily access information regarding all aspects of their life including health, fitness, hobbies, recreation, etc. Internet-based counseling is a fairly new realm for nursing and provides an opportunity for the application of nursing science in an innovative manner. Nurses and dietitians are experts at educating clients about health promotion behaviors. Young service members today need continuity in the counseling and coaching they receive from these experts in order to maintain or improve their health and fitness while deployed for long periods of time. Many soldiers take advantage of the numerous distance education opportunities in the military. Traditionally, they were delivered in the form of correspondence courses, using audiotapes, video tapes and compact discs to disseminate information. Now, distance education has become a globalized real-time learning environment that allows for open discussions via email, videoconferencing, and live lectures using videostreaming. Instructors in many settings including the Army Professional Courses at selected medical centers, the affiliated universities such as University of Phoenix or City University, the Military Treatment Facility, or even at the Brigade or Battalion classroom, can use current Web-based technologies to create a forum that can be as effective as traditional face-to-face lectures in terms of imparting information and educating soldiers (Leasure, Davis et al., 2000; Woo and Kimmick, 2000).

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Multidisciplinary Use of Telehealth Technologies Supporting Professional Development Innovative applications of Web-based training for nurses includes education and staff development in areas such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), where it can be used to augment standard preparation by incorporating anatomy and physiology concepts, pretests, training scenarios, simulated experiences with heart sounds and breath sounds, or healthrelated games. Computer-based training programs promote retention of the information as a result of the learners’ seeing, hearing, and interacting with the information on the computer (Peterson, 2006). Most staff members report that computer-based training is a concise yet complete way of giving experienced staff an update on only the new or revised information, and it improves their study efforts prior to the re-certification demonstration and examination. Computer-based training for CPR allows staff to learn the necessary material at their own pace, while working different shifts, and during breaks or down-time. This format also allows an individual to go back and repeat unfamiliar material as often as they wish, and they can email a clinical staff educator if they have questions about the material, receiving almost immediate feedback. If computer-based training can be successfully utilized for CPR recertification, then it could be used for other types of annual or regularly occurring nursing specialty certifications such as Trauma Nursing Core Course, Adult Advanced Life Support, or Pediatric Advanced Life Support.

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Patient and Provider Education Counseling or coaching has been effective when conducted by various health care providers in person, over the telephone, or via email for clients with diabetes, heart failure, and behavioral health conditions. While communication between doctors and patients via email has evolved rapidly in recent years, nurses have had a limited role in Web-based patient-provider interactions. The nurse's role has generally been complementary to the Internet information or programs, but not integral to the programs themselves. With the rapidly expanding number of healthcare consumers seeking information and treatment on the Internet, use of this technology to deliver care should be a vital part of the preparation of any healthcare provider. In particular, nurses should have sufficient informatics competencies to find, collect, analyze, interpret, organize, manage, and evaluate information effectively at the designated level of practice, to develop and implement consumer-oriented Internet interventions for competent care delivery at the one-on-one level, the community level, and the global level (An, Hayman et al., 2009). Counseling is a best practice element of health and wellness promotion activities in many different environments. The widespread availability and convenience of the Internet makes it an attractive option for health promotion with clients, consumers, patients, or coworkers. An Internet-based coaching intervention to enhance patient-provider communication regarding chronic pain, depression, and impaired mobility used principles of self-management and was delivered online by nurse coaches. Results showed e-coaching and Internet information sharing created an innovative opportunity to improve patient-clinician partnerships in managing chronic conditions (Allen, 2008). Several reviews on the effectiveness of Internetbased patient education and supportive interventions indicate that users are satisfied, have

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more knowledge, and have improved behavioral and clinical outcomes compared to nonusers. Successful self-help, community-level programs delivered online include Weight Watchers and Alive!, both fostering a behavior change aimed at improving health and fitness. The Department of Defense has recently adopted the Veteran's Administration MOVE! Program for weight management, which has been effective as a counseling strategy because of its evidence-based advice for healthy diet and exercise choices. Client education tools are numerous and user-friendly. A team of Army dietitians evaluated the effectiveness and acceptance of Web-based learning compared to traditional face-to-face learning regarding nutrition education to improve job performance in active duty U.S. Army soldiers (Margolis, Grediagin et al., 2009). This content was crucial to the soldiers’ understanding of the link between diet and maximal performance. Soldiers were assigned to a face-to-face (FF) group or a Web-based (WB) group and all received a 30-minute lecture on carbohydrate needs for optimizing performance. The WB group was taught through the Web portal Army Knowledge Online (AKO) in a real time lecture, with a live instructor. The FF group lecture was conducted in a traditional classroom. Both groups had the same instructor and both had an opportunity to ask questions. To determine acceptance of the medium in which the lecture was taught, participants completed a 16-question survey using a Likert-type scale. All participants increased their nutrition knowledge. There was no difference between groups regarding acceptance of the medium used for the educational session. There were slightly more distractions reported by the Web-based group but this did not negatively impact knowledge gained for this subgroup (p = 0.688) compared to participants who did not complain of distractions. The research team concluded that WB learning is as effective at increasing nutrition knowledge as traditional FF learning in active duty soldiers. Even though the study only evaluated effectiveness and acceptance of one lecture, these results support the concept of using Web-based learning by dietitians or other healthcare professionals to reach across distance or time to educate Army soldiers.

Decisions at Point of Care In 2004, the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) electronic email system was approved for use as a telemedicine program that began with teledermatology consultations between health care providers in the theater of operations and medical specialists in the U.S. AKO provides a centralized, Web-based data repository and email management tool for information exchange across the U.S. Army and any Department of Defense-designated affiliate.(McManus et al., 2008). Planners of the telemedicine program knew from the beginning that the proposed system had to be accessible from anywhere in the combat zone using existing low bandwidth technology. The choice to use AKO was based on its proven record as a reliable, accessible system from all operational medical facilities. This program was so successful that it subsequently expanded to other clinical specialty services: 1) burn-trauma, 2) cardiology, 3) infectious disease, 4) nephrology, 5) ophthalmology, 6) pediatric intensive care, 7) preventive and occupational medicine, 8) neurology, 9) rheumatology, and 10) toxicology. This program has received enthusiastic support and additional specialty services continue to seek participation in the teleconsultation program. In only three years, more than 2300 consults were performed with an average reply

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time of five hours from receipt of teleconsultation. The majority of consultations were related to dermatology (66%) followed by infectious disease (10%). The program tracked the number of evacuations from theater that were either avoided or prompted based on the consultant’s recommendations, leading to optimal utilization of resources in support of patient care. Oversight of the program is handled by a project manager to who receives and monitors all consultations to ensure compliance with provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and to ensure that recommendations are transmitted within the mandatory 24-hour time period. Other issues that require coordination or modifications range from the quality of the digital camera used, the size of the email file, and the lack of consultants in some specialty areas, to the expanding range of geographic locations and types of disasters serviced by the telemedicine program (McManus, Salinas et al., 2008).

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Using Telehealth to Affect Behavioral Change in Young Adults Results of studies on civilian young adults apply to the military population insofar as it is largely comprised of this age group. Of enlisted soldiers, which make up 84% of the total Army population, 64% are between the ages of 17 and 29 (Office of Army Demographics, 2009). According to the Pew Research Center, “searching for health information, an activity that was once the primary domain of older adults, is now the third most popular online activity for all Internet users 18 and older” (Zickuhr, 2010). In fact, the Pew Internet Project and California HealthCare Foundation have added eight new topics to meet the growing demand for health information. A number of studies have been designed to reach adolescents and college students to impact diet and physical activity behaviors, with mostly positive results. A systematic review of randomized controlled trials regarding Web-based weight management programs for children and adolescents provides insight regarding use of the Web in this population. Not surprisingly, Internet interventions, either as stand-alone programs or as combined interventions with other behavioral approaches, demonstrated clinically meaningful as well as statistically significant, results for reduction of BMI, weight loss, increased physical activity, and decreased dietary fat intake (An, Hayman et al., 2009). A two-year randomized, controlled trial (DeBar, Ritenbaugh et al., 2006) showed improved bone density in adolescent girls using a behavioral intervention to increase dairy, fruit, and vegetable consumption and increase physical activity. The intervention included group meetings, coaching telephone calls and a Web-based study site. The intervention group had significantly higher consumption of calcium, vitamin D, and fruits and vegetables compared to controls, and significantly higher bone mineral density was found in the intervention group after one year (DeBar, Ritenbaugh et al., 2006; DeBar, Dickerson et al., 2009). Despite the website being a secondary element in this multi-component intervention, overall website use was associated with increases in calcium intake and levels of high-impact activity (DeBar, Dickerson et al., 2009). In a large study of 475 college students, an Internet-based nutrition and physical activity education program showed an increase in fruit and vegetable intake and improved motivation for change in exercise and activity after only two or three online sessions in a four-week span.

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Participants were assigned to either zero, two, or three sessions with the study website, which housed questionnaires assessing dietary intake, physical activity levels, and beliefs. The website provided a combination of text and audio-based information and activities delivering education on nutrition and physical activity (Franko, Cousineau et al., 2008). A similar fiveweek study by Poddar et al. (2010) showed increases in self-regulatory strategies and selfefficacy for consuming three servings a day of dairy products in college students, but no changes in behavior after participating in a weekly online course. These studies suggest that online interventions can increase college students’ motivation and confidence to change, but a more sustained and consistent intervention may be needed to effect significant behavior change (Franko, Cousineau et al., 2008; Poddar, Hosig et al., 2010). A unique consideration for young adults is the fact that they may feel shame about being overweight or obese and delay seeking treatment through standard programs; Webbased weight management interventions represent an alternative means of receiving treatment while removing social barriers and providing anonymity (An, Hayman et al., 2009).

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Promoting Weight Management and Physical Activity in Older Adults Via Telehealth Telehealth has been utilized extensively in the older adult civilian population, which resembles the large number of retirees and beneficiaries receiving care in military treatment facilities. Weight loss in particular has been addressed by a number of randomized controlled trials (Gold, Burke et al., 2007; van Wier, Ariens et al., 2009; Bennett, Herring et al., 2010; Webber, Tate et al., 2010). Some studies have combined in-person or telephonic counseling using a health coach with access to a website for maximum participant exposure to messages. These studies found that greater weight loss was observed among those who used the websites most frequently. The magnitude of weight loss was equivalent to studies of traditional in-person coaching, suggesting a similar effectiveness in achieving participant weight loss (Bennett, Herring et al., 2010; Webber, Tate et al., 2010). Another study compared phone intervention, Web-based intervention with e-mail counseling, and a group who received only pamphlets in a work setting (van Wier, Ariens et al., 2009). The authors found that counseling via phone and email is effective for overweight employees in a work setting. The average age was approximately 36 years old, suggesting a somewhat younger population than some of the other studies with middle-aged participants (Morgan, Lubans et al., 2011). Both study and control groups received one face-to-face information session, and then Internet group participants were instructed to use the study website for three months. A significant effect was found for weight, waist circumference, BMI and systolic blood pressure. Once again, higher Internet compliance resulted in greater weight loss results (Morgan, Lubans et al., 2011). The effectiveness of weight management and online support may be largely dependent on how much feedback participants receive. In a study of the relationship between Web features and weight loss, “feedback factors”, such as progress charts, and physiological calculators and other visual representations of progress proved important for weight loss success, while social support such as email/Web chats were most helpful for weight maintenance (Krukowski, Harvey-Berino et al., 2008). Having a facilitator was also found to be an

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important tool, encompassed in the feedback factors, in order to promote behavioral change (Krukowski, Harvey-Berino et al., 2008; Krukowski, West et al., 2009). Improving physical activity and diet quality via Internet-delivered lifestyle intervention has also been achieved in a randomized controlled trial. A short-term one month computertailored intervention for more than 2000 people was effective in reducing saturated fat intake and increasing physical activity among participants. The study used a computer tailoring technique, in which unique characteristics are adapted to participant motivations and behaviors (Oenema, Brug et al., 2008). Studies using personalized data to determine information that is relevant to the a particular individual, whether through computer automation or through a coach, are more successful in producing behavior change than those that provide generic information (Oenema, Brug et al., 2008; Krukowski, West et al., 2009; McTigue, Conroy et al., 2009; Brouwer, Kroeze et al., 2011). Overall, results of the older adult studies resembled those of the adolescent/young adult studies using Internet interventions for weight loss; Web-based interactive interventions appear to hold much potential to improve outcomes in management of adult and childhood obesity, health and wellness. Nurses functioning in hospital, clinic, and community-based settings are key to effective weight management programs across the age spectrum. Empirical and anecdotal evidence clearly support the need for multilevel, innovative, interdisciplinary interventions designed to prevent and manage overweight and obesity in both children and adults. Systematic reviews of Internet-based physical activity interventions in 2006 and 2007 support these interventions as an effective strategy for improving outcomes over a wait-list approach, but suggest that more research is needed on elements that can improve long-term outcomes, as many of the benefits from these shortterm interventions are short-lived (van den Berg, Schoones et al., 2007; Vandelanotte, Spathonis et al., 2007).

Managing Chronic Conditions Using Telehealth Internet-delivered programs for blood pressure have also been shown to be effective in adults (Moore, Alsabeeh et al., 2008; McTigue, Conroy et al,. 2009). An entirely computerautomated program based on the Dietary Approaches to Stop Hypertension (DASH) diet showed an increase in fruit and vegetable consumption and a decrease in blood pressure at the end of the study, though only 26% of the original enrollees were still actively using the program (Moore, Alsabeeh et al., 2008). A pilot program using behavioral tools such as automated weekly progress reports, email prompts, and as-needed communication with lifestyle coaches had 50% of participants still actively using the program at the end of 12 months. The use of weekly chats with coaches and personalized reminders, appears to have improved retention (McTigue, Conroy et al., 2009). As with the previous study, systolic blood pressure was improved at the end of the 12-month study. In a study by Tsang et al. over 10 years ago, the authors showed a significant reduction in hemoglobin A1c when patients with diabetes used an electronic diabetes monitoring system (DMS) programmed into a handheld electronic diary to track meal portions and blood glucose readings over a 3-month period, as compared with the usual paper-based tracking method. The electronic diaries provided feedback on the carbohydrate, protein, and fat content of the subject’s meal after the data were downloaded by telephone. The mean decrease in

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hemoglobin A1c levels during use of the DMS was 0.825% (95% CI, 0.155-1.50%). Use of the DMS was associated with a significant reduction of hemoglobin A1c concentration compared with the control period (n = 19, P < 0.019). The use of personal digital assistants to manage diabetes and other chronic conditions has become widely accepted in both the civilian and military healthcare community.

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Telehealth Applications for the Future Given the long history of telehealth in the military, coupled with the wide prevalence of Internet use among young adults and the success of Internet interventions for weight management, dietary improvements, and engagement in physical activities, the time is right to combine the history with the present and introduce an active duty population to an Internet coaching intervention. A example of an innovative telehealth study currently underway (McCarthy, TSNRP #HU0001-10-1-TS15) is a prospective, longitudinal, clusterrandomized, controlled trial addressing calcium and vitamin D intake, physical fitness, and bone health in 230 male and female deployed soldiers. Eighty-five soldiers have access to an on-demand telehealth coach throughout the deployment period (Treatment group), while the other 145 received general nutrition and fitness information only at pre-deployment (Control group). One integral part of this B2ONE research project is the assumption that coaching of service members throughout their deployment in relation to their nutritional and exercise needs will greatly enhance their health. This on-demand coaching intervention is available through the B2.O.N.E. website using the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) platform, created to assist soldiers participating in the study to access just-in-time information. Another method to access the coach is through e-mail which will be linked to an AKO e-mail address for study coaches. The overall goal is to provide a comprehensive health-oriented Web site that includes reliable health and fitness information, expert advice, and activities to help users make decisions and implement desired behaviors. Measures of nutritional status and bone health include body composition assessments, diet and exercise questionnaires, biomarkers, and heel densitometry; all completed at baseline and upon return. Data will be compared preand post-deployment to evaluate the success of the telehealth coaching intervention. Results will be available in the Summer of 2013. Telemedicine and teleconsultation use cutting-edge technology to offer specialized medical expertise to distant corners of the world where primary care may not be available. The Department of Defense’s model of telemedicine set the example for a robust, sustainable program, that if properly developed and monitored, can satisfy the needs of both patients and providers around the world. It is important that research and vigilance continue to validate the usefulness of telemedicine in order to ensure that its capabilities are expanded smoothly and expeditiously, keeping pace with technological advances.

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References Allen, M., Huang, L.I., Huang A., Huang, L., Leveille, S.G. (2008). "Improving patientclinician communication about chronic conditions. Description of an internet-based nurse E-coach intervention. ." Nursing Research 57(2): 107-112. An, J. Y., Hayman, L.L., et al. (2009). "Web-based weight management programs for children and adolescents: a systematic review of randomized controlled trial studies." ANS Adv. Nurs. Sci. 32(3): 222-40. Arhin, A. O. and Cormier, E. (2007). "Using deconstruction to educate Generation Y nursing students." J. Nurs. Educ. 46(12): 562-7. Bennett, G. G., Herring, S.J., et al. (2010). "Web-based weight loss in primary care: a randomized controlled trial." Obesity (Silver Spring) 18(2): 308-13. Brouwer, W., Kroeze, W., et al. (2011). "Which Intervention Characteristics are Related to More Exposure to Internet-Delivered Healthy Lifestyle Promotion Interventions? A Systematic Review." J. Med. Internet Res. 13(1): e2. Chaffee, M. (1999). "A telehealth odyssey." Am. J. Nurs. 99(7): 27-32; quiz 32-3. DeBar, L. L., Dickerson,J., et al. (2009). "Using a website to build community and enhance outcomes in a group, multi-component intervention promoting healthy diet and exercise in adolescents." J. Pediatr. Psychol. 34(5): 539-50. DeBar, L. L., Ritenbaugh, C., et al. (2006). "Youth: a health plan-based lifestyle intervention increases bone mineral density in adolescent girls." Arch. Pediatr. Adolesc. Med. 160(12): 1269-76. Franko, D. L., Cousineau, T.M., et al. (2008). "Motivation, self-efficacy, physical activity and nutrition in college students: randomized controlled trial of an internet-based education program." Prev. Med. 47(4): 369-77. Girard, P. (2007). "Military and VA telemedicine systems for patients with traumatic brain injury." J. Rehabil. Res. Dev. 44(7): 1017-26. Gold, B. C., Burke, S., et al. (2007). "Weight loss on the web: A pilot study comparing a structured behavioral intervention to a commercial program." Obesity (Silver Spring) 15(1): 155-64. Krukowski, R. A., Harvey-Berino, J., et al. (2008). "Internet-based weight control: the relationship between web features and weight loss." Telemed. J. E. Health 14(8): 77582. Krukowski, R. A., West, D.S., et al. (2009). "Recent advances in internet-delivered, evidencebased weight control programs for adults." J. Diabetes Sci. Technol. 3(1): 184-9. Leasure, A. R.,Davis, L., et al. (2000). "Comparison of student outcomes and preferences in a traditional vs. World Wide Web-based baccalaureate nursing research course." J. Nurs. Educ. 39(4): 149-54. Margolis, L. M., Grediagin, A., et al. (2009). "Effectiveness and acceptance of web-based learning compared to traditional face-to-face learning for performance nutrition education." Mil. Med. 174(10): 1095-9. McManus, J., Salinas, J., et al. (2008). "Teleconsultation program for deployed soldiers and healthcare professionals in remote and austere environments." Prehosp. Disaster Med. 23(3): 210-6; discussion 217.

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McTigue, K. M., Conroy, M.B., et al. (2009). "Using the internet to translate an evidencebased lifestyle intervention into practice." Telemed J. E. Health 15(9): 851-8. Moore, T. J., Alsabeeh, N., et al. (2008). "Weight, blood pressure, and dietary benefits after 12 months of a Web-based Nutrition Education Program (DASH for health): longitudinal observational study." J. Med. Internet Res. 10(4): e52. Morgan, P. J., Lubans, D.R., et al. (2011). "12-Month Outcomes and Process Evaluation of the SHED-IT RCT: An Internet-Based Weight Loss Program Targeting Men." Obesity (Silver Spring) 19(1): 142-51. Oenema, A., Brug, J., et al. (2008). "Efficacy and use of an internet-delivered computertailored lifestyle intervention, targeting saturated fat intake, physical activity and smoking cessation: a randomized controlled trial." Ann. Behav. Med. 35(2): 125-35. Office of Army Demographics, (2009) "FY09 Profile." Pak, H. S., Brown-Connolly, N.E., et al. (2008). "Global forum on telemedicine: connecting the world through partnerships." Telemed J. E. Health 14(4): 389-95. Peterson, R. ((2006)). "Teaching cardiopulmonary resuscitation via the Web." Critical Care Nurse 26(3): 55-59. Poddar, K. H., Hosig, K.W., et al. (2010). "Web-based nutrition education intervention improves self-efficacy and self-regulation related to increased dairy intake in college students." J. Am. Diet Assoc. 110(11): 1723-7. Tuerk, P. W., Fortney, J., et al. (2010). "Toward the development of national telehealth services: the role of Veterans Health Administration and future directions for research." Telemed J. E. Health 16(1): 115-7. van den Berg, M. H., Schoones, J.W., et al. (2007). "Internet-based physical activity interventions: a systematic review of the literature." J. Med. Internet Res. 9(3): e26. van Wier, M. F., Ariens, G.A., et al. (2009). "Phone and e-mail counselling are effective for weight management in an overweight working population: a randomized controlled trial." BMC Public Health 9: 6. Vandelanotte, C., Spathonis, K.M., et al. (2007). "Website-delivered physical activity interventions a review of the literature." Am. J. Prev. Med. 33(1): 54-64. Webber, K. H., Tate, D.F., et al. (2010). "Motivation and its relationship to adherence to selfmonitoring and weight loss in a 16-week Internet behavioral weight loss intervention." J. Nutr. Educ. Behav. 42(3): 161-7. Woo, M. A. and Kimmick, J.V., (2000). "Comparison of Internet versus lecture instructional methods for teaching nursing research." J. Prof. Nurs. 16(3): 132-9. Zickuhr, K. (2010). Generations Online in 2010, Pew Internet.

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In: Military Operations, Health and Technology Editor: Alexander L. Cobb, pp. 55-87

ISBN: 978-1-62100-328-1 c 2012 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 4

R ESOLUTION OF THE B I -C RITERIA M ILITARY U NIT PATHFINDING P ROBLEM A PPLYING MOACO A LGORITHMS A.M. Mora∗, P.A. Castillo† and J.J. Merelo‡ Department of Architecture and Computer Technology University of Granada, Spain

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Abstract This chapter presents a set of Multi-Objective Ant Colony Optimization (MOACO) algorithms, the hCHAC group. They have been designed to solve a pathfinding problem for military unit, inside a battlefield. The path should minimize the speed in reaching the target point, while maximizing the safety. The objectives have been combined into a different amount (from one to four), applying a different algorithm for solving each of them. The hCHAC algorithms have been tested in two realistic scenarios, modelled in a simulator and compared with a novel multi-objective greedy approach that has been included as baseline for comparisons. The experiments show that all the hCHAC algorithms outperform the greedy approach, yielding in addition very good behaviour in the military tactical sense.

Keywords: Ant Colony Optimization, Multi-Objective Optimization, Multi-Objective Ant Colony optimization, Military Problems, Pathfinding Problem, Path Planning, Logistics.

1.

Introduction

In the battlefield, a military unit commander must plan the best path to get to a target point as his main objective, both for avoiding the enemy or to get to an advantageous (in the tactical sense) attacking position over it. This is usually the first step of every mission. In the military logistics units case, they have as main objective to transport items such as fuel, medicines, supplies or ammunition to other allied units. So, the commander has to choose ∗ E-mail

address: [email protected] address: [email protected] ‡ E-mail address: [email protected] † E-mail

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A.M. Mora, P.A. Castillo and J.J. Merelo

the best path to get to the desired point in the battlefield. This decision is constrained mainly by two criteria, speed and safety, which he must evaluate. The choice of a safe path is usually made when the situation of enemy forces is unknown or in scouting missions, where the unit must move through hidden zones in order to avoid detection. These safeguards usually lead to a longer, and thus slower, path. On the other hand, the choice of a fast path is made when there is a strong time constraint or if there are few hidden (safe) zones in the terrain, so that going through it may produce a lot of casualties. In any case, the choice of the best itinerary for the unit to reach the objective point is a very important tactical decision; taking into account that there are no completely safe or absolutely fast paths, and that a balance must be kept among both criteria (in safe paths there is also a time limit, and in fast paths the unit must get to the destination with enough personnel and supplies to assist the other units). In general, this problem is called the military unit pathfinding problem (MUPFP), which is similar to the common pathfinding problem [32] with some additional features and constraints. In this case, the aim is to find the best path from an origin to a destination point inside the battlefield, while keeping a balance between route speed and safety. The problem has associated two objectives to accomplish, so it can be finally denoted as the bi-criteria military unit pathfinding problem (MUPFP-2C). In this chapter we present and tested a set or family of approaches, based on the Ant Colony System (ACS) [12,13] algorithm, adapted to solve the MUPFP-2C, and designed to deal with a different number of objectives, from the original two (speed and safety), to four (defined by dividing each of the objectives in two sub-objectives). In addition, an approach dealing with just one objective (composed as an aggregation) has been implemented. All of them (except the latter) are Multi-Objective Ant Colony Optimization Algorithms (MOACOs) (for a review, see [16]). In order to test these algorithms, some instances of the problem (realistic simulation maps) have been solved applying them; in addition, a novel multi-objective greedy-based method has been introduced and considered as a baseline for the comparison. The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Next Section 2 introduces Ant Colony Optimization algorithms (ACO) and Multi-Objective optimization problems for the nonexper readers; Then, Section 3 describes the features of the problem to solve. In Section 4, the state of the art in pathfinding, ACO, multi-criteria optimization, and military problems is reviewed. The hCHAC family of algorithms is presented in Section 5, followed by the description of the multi-objective greedy algorithm in Section 6. In Section 7 the experiments are performed and the results are commented. Finally, the conclusions are commented in Section 8.

2.

Some Preliminary Concepts

The algorithms to present follow a bio-inspired approach, based on the behaviour of ants, applied to solve a multi-objective problem. In the next subsections, both concepts are introduced.

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2.1.

57

Ant Colony Optimization

The Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) is a meta-heuristic inspired by the naturally observed fact that some species of ants are able to find the shortest path from nest to food sources after a short time of exploring different paths between them [19]. This behaviour has been explained through the concept of stigmergy [17], that is, communication between agents using the environment, so every ant, while walking, deposits on the ground a substance called pheromone which the others can smell and which is evaporated after some time. One ant tends to follow strong concentrations of pheromone caused by repeated passes of ants; a pheromone trail is then formed from nest to food source, so in intersections between several trails an ant moves with high probability following the highest pheromone level. ACO algorithms, introduced by Dorigo et al. [12, 13] in 1991, take this model of ant behaviour as inspiration to solve combinatorial optimization problems using a colony of “artificial ants”, which are computational agents that communicate with each other through the environment using pheromones. Every problem to be solved using ACO must be transformed into a graph with weighted edges. In every iteration, each ant builds a complete path (solution), by travelling through the graph. At the end of this construction (and in some versions, during it), each ant leaves a trail in the visited edges depending on the fitness of the solution it has found. This is a measure of desirability for that edge and it will be considered by the following ants. In order to guide its movement, each ant uses two kinds of information that will be combined: pheromone trails, which correspond to “learnt information” changed during the algorithm run, denoted by τ; and heuristic knowledge, which is a measure of the desirability of moving to the next node, based in previous knowledge about the problem (it does not change during the algorithm run), denoted by η. The ants usually choose edges with better values in both properties, but sometimes they may “explore” new zones in the graph because the algorithm has a stochastic component, that broadens the search space to regions not previously explored. Due to all these properties, all ants cooperate in order to find the best solution for the problem (the best path in the graph), resulting in a global emergent behaviour. ACOs initially took two different shapes: Ant System (AS) and Ant Colony System (ACS). Nowadays there are lots of variants and new approaches, based on these original algorithms, but applying other terms or parameters. 2.1.1. The Ant System This was the initial model proposed by Dorigo et al. for solving the classical Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP) [21]. The building of solutions is strongly based in the State Transition Rule (STR), since every ant uses it to decide which node j is the next in the construction of a solution (path), when the ant is at the node i. This formula calculates the probability associated to every node in the neighbourhood of i, as follows:

P(i, j) =

    

τ(i, j)α · η(i, j)β ∑ τ(i, u)α · η(i, u)β

if j ∈ Ni

u∈Ni

0

,

otherwise

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(1)

58

A.M. Mora, P.A. Castillo and J.J. Merelo

where α and β are weighting parameters to set the relative importance of pheromone and heuristic information respectively, and Ni is the current feasible neighbourhood for the node i. In the AS, the pheromone update is performed once all the ants have built their solutions. This updating is made at a global level by every ant, which retraces its solution path. It consists of an evaporation (left term) and a contribution (right term): τ(i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τ(i, j)t−1 + ∆τ(i, j)t−1 ,

(2)

t marks the new pheromone value and t − 1 the old one. ρ in the range [0, 1] is the common evaporation factor, and ∆τ is the deposited amount of pheromone. As can be seen in Equation (2), there are two steps: first, all the pheromone trails are reduced by a constant factor (evaporation), after this, every ant deposits an amount of pheromone in its path (in the edges) depending on the quality of its solution (the better solution the ant has found, the higher amount of pheromone is added). 2.1.2. The Ant Colony System The ACS is the successor of the AS, and was presented by the same authors. It has three differences with regard to the AS. The first one is the application of a different state transition rule (called pseudo-random proportional state transition rule), defined as: If (q ≤ q0 ) ( ) j = arg max j∈Ni

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Else P(i, j) =

    

∑ τ(i, u)α · η(i, u)β

.

τ(i, j)α · η(i, j)β ∑ τ(i, u)α · η(i, u)β

if j ∈ Ni

u∈Ni

0

(3)

u∈Ni

,

(4)

otherwise

where q is a random number in the range [0, 1] and q0 is a parameter which set the balance between exploration and exploitation. If q ≤ q0 , the best node is chosen as the next one (exploitation), otherwise one of the feasible neighbours is selected, considering different probabilities for each one (exploration). The rest of the parameters are the same as in Equation (1). The second difference is that there is a global pheromone updating, which is only performed for the edges of the global best solution: τ(i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τ(i, j)t−1 + ρ · ∆τ(i, j)GlobalBest

∀ (i, j) in SGlobalBest .

(5)

Finally, there is also a local pheromone updating, which is performed by every ant, every time that a node j is added to the path which it is building. This formula is: τ(i, j)t = (1 − ϕ) · τ(i, j)t−1 + ϕ · τ0

(6)

being ϕ in the range [0, 1] the local evaporation factor, and τ0 the initial amount of pheromone (it corresponds to a lower trail limit). This formula results in an additional Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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59

exploration technique, because it makes the edges traversed by an ant less attractive to the following ants and helps to avoid that many ants follow the same path. Both of these approaches, but specially ACS, have been adapted to particular problems, mainly through the heuristic functions, and possibly also by changing the number of colonies or pheromone matrices. In particular, they are possible ways of approaching multi-objective optimization problems, which will be introduced below. The ACOs dealing with multiple optimization criteria are known as Multi-Objective Ant Colony Optimization algorithms (or MOACOs). See [16] for a review.

2.2.

Multi-Objective Optimization

Multi-Criteria or Multi-Objective Optimization Problems (MOP) [28] are those where several objectives have to be simultaneously optimized. So, there is usually not a single best solution, that is, better than any other with regard to every objective. Moreover, frequently improving the solution for one objective implies a worsening for other one. Solving a multi-objective problem implies maximizing or minimizing a function f (x) composed by k other cost functions (one per objective) and considering n parameters (decision variables): f (x) = (C1 (x),C2 (x), . . . ,Ck (x)), (7) x = (x1 , x2 , . . . , xn ) ∈ X, In a typical multi-objective optimization problem, there is a set of solutions that are better than the remainder considering all the objectives, which is known as the Pareto Set (PS). It is related to an important concept, the dominance, defined as follows for maximizing (a dominates b):

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a ≻ b if : ∀ i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , k | Ci (a) ≥ Ci (b) ∧ ∃ j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , k | C j (a) > C j (b),

(8)

where a ∈ X and b ∈ X are two different decision vectors of n values, and every C is a cost function (one per objective). Hence, the solutions in the Pareto set (PS) are known as non-dominated solutions, while the remainder are known as dominated solutions. Since none of the PS solutions is absolutely better than the other non-dominated solutions, all of them are equally acceptable as regards the satisfaction of all the objectives. The ideal set of solutions in known as the Pareto Front (PF). The interested reader is directed to [10] for a deeper examination of these concepts. As can be seen the problem to address in the present work is a MOP, since it has (initially) two objectives to be minimized: the cost in energy and the cost in resources, which a military logistics unit consumes in a path, from an origin to a destination point.

3.

The Problem to Solve

The Bi-Criteria Military Unit Pathfinding Problem (MUPFP-2C) is a variation of the standard pathfinding (or path planning) problem [32], but placed in a military scope. So, the Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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search of the optimal path from an origin to a destination point is performed inside a battlefield and considering a logistics military unit to be moved. Specifically, the considered unit is a Company, which is the minimum autonomous unit (in the Spanish Army) [1] that can operate independently of the rest, if the conditions require it, without taking into account the coordination lines (virtual areas of the battlefield on which the unit must move) and the action priorities. This way, the problem models a real application one. The aim in this problem is to provide the unit commander, or to a simulated unit in a combat training simulator, tactical decision capability so that he or she will be able to calculate the best path to its target point in the battlefield taking into account the same factors that a human commander would consider. The problem is modelled inside an simulator we have programmed for this purpose, where a realistic battlefield can be designed by setting the terrain properties, placing the enemies, obstacles and so on; in addition to starting and target points for the unit. There are several conditions and restrictions due to the type of problem (tactical constraints), the unit features, and the environment properties. The battlefield has been implemented as a grid of hexagonal cells in order to have a realistic model (in previous versions of the algorithm, presented for instance in [27], the grid was a rectangular lattice). Every cell corresponds to a 500x500 meter zone in the real world, which is the space occupied by an actual deployed unit according to the battlefield manuals of the Spanish Army [1]. The problem unit has the two properties that have to be optimized in the problem: a level of energy (or points of energy), which represents the global health of soldiers, the status of vehicles, and also the status of the supplies (ammunition, food, fuel or medicines) it transports, in this case and a level of resources (or points of resources) which represents the unit’s own supplies such as fuel, food and even moral to accomplish the mission. Every cell has a penalty assigned, a cost in resources which represents the difficulty of going through it, and a cost in energy penalty which means that the unit depletes its human resources, or vehicles suffer damage when crossing over the cell (these are called noncombat casualties in military parlance). Both costs depend on the cell type. In addition, there is another penalty in each case: one in resources if the unit moves between cells with different heights (more if it goes up), and another in energy, lethality, which is the damage that a being in a cell could produce due to enemy weapons impact (calculated as a combination of the probability of enemy shoots, the probability of impact in the unit, and the damage it would produce to the unit). We speak about fast paths (considering constant velocity) when going through them is cheap in total cost in resources, that is, it is not very difficult to travel through the cells, so it takes little time. Safe paths on the other hand are those secure for the unit (little cost in energy). All these features are resumed in Table 1. Besides the cost in energy, and the cost in resources, the cells have some other properties: • Type: normal (flat terrain), forest, water and obstacle (a cell that the unit cannot occupy). • Subtype: it can be the position of an enemy or the problem unit, or can be the target point; it can also represent a cell affected by enemy fire (having associated different damage levels) or lethal for the problem unit.

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Table 1. Unit Energy and Resources description and consumption

Composed of

Consumed by

Energy global soldiers health, global vehicles state transported supplies non-combat casualties, lethality

Resources food, fuel, medicines, general unit supplies, moral difficulty of going through, height difference

• Height: an integer number which represents a level of depth or height of a cell.

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We have implemented a simulator in Delphi 7 for Windows XP, named mss_CHAC1 , in order to create and edit the problem scenarios (battlefields) and also to run the algorithms and visualize the solutions obtained. It is also possible to manage a real world battlefield, but it is necessary to define an underlying information layer by assigning type, subtype, height and lethality (if wanted) for each cell. The enemies, obstacles, origin and destination points can be placed to define completely the problem to solve. Figure 1 shows an example map created by us of a possible real world battlefield, and the information layer associated to it.

Figure 1. Example Map (45x45 cells). The image on the right hand side is a real world picture of a lake surrounded by some hills and lots of vegetation, while the image on the left hand side shows its associated information layer, where it can be seen the types corresponding to the same hexagons in the other image, so there are many water and forest cells and some normal terrain cells. The different shades in the same color models height (dark color) and depth (light color). There are two enemies (red border cells), an origin point (black border cell) and a destination point (yellow border).

This model also includes some constraints: problem and enemy units fill up exactly one cell (which corresponds to their size in real world). The problem unit as well as the target point must be located on the map, but the presence of the enemy is optional. The unit can 1 Available

at http://forja.rediris.es/frs/download.php/1537/mss_CHAC_english.zip .

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cross a cell just once, but cannot go through those occupied by an enemy or an obstacle; or cells with a cost in resources or energy bigger than what the unit has available at that point. There are several rules defined in order to make the simulation more realistic, such as a line of sight algorithm, which behaves as realistically as possible. We also have considered real energy and resources consumption, following the information issued by the Spanish Army staff. Finally, the problem has two additional restrictions that must be considered in the algorithm: the units cannot move through two cells if the height difference between them is greater than a threshold; these cells are what is known as a natural obstacle. Artificial obstacles can also be placed in the map as a type of cell. Another restriction is the consideration of the units acquisition capability (property of problem and enemy units), which is the longest distance an unit can see. This is a limit for the enemies line of sight and a limit for the exploring radius of the problem unit when there is no known enemy in the map. This distance is about nine kilometres in real world for every unit, which corresponds to eighteen cells of radius in the modelled map.

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4.

State of the Art

The pathfinding problem has been addressed using classical techniques like branch and bound or dynamic programming which do not usually scale well with size. There are several proposals to solve this problem, from the classical methods such as the Bellman-Ford’s or the Dijkstra’s algorithms [5, 11], to the A* [24], or many other research works since it was presented as the shortest path problem [9]. Maybe, the most extended problem in this category is the Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP), solved by means of a huge amount of methods and metaheuristics, including the ACO algorithms (since their origin) [13, 29, 30]. In the recent years the studies in relation to the path optimization problems are tending to dynamic environments, parallel approaches and multi-objective optimization. In the latter scope there are mainly two well-known addressed problems: the Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Window (VRPTW), mainly solved using MOACOs [4, 14, 34]; and the Multi-objective extension of the TSP (usually with just two criteria) [6, 15]. There exists some adaptations of classical techniques for solving multi-objective problems, such as a multi-objective A* [33] or an extension of the Dijkstra’s algorithm for dealing with multiple criteria [22], but most of the problems are solved using multi-objective evolutionary algorithms [10] (MOEAs) or ant colony optimization algorithm [16] (MOACOs). With regard to the ACO, it is a rather young metaheuristic in terms of informatics research (as stated in the previous section, it was introduced in 1991). It has been used to solve many different combinatorial optimization problems, due to its implementation simplicity and excellent results in acceptable running time. Nowadays there are many researchers working in this field. Since many of the multi-objective problems can be mapped to graphs, and then solved using MOACOs, most of the presented approaches are specific proposals to solve a specific multi-objective problems. The present work is enclosed in the same line, introducing a set of algorithms which address a multi-objective version of a logistics military unit pathfinding problem attending to two criteria (MUPFP-2C). There are several MOACOs in the literature, for instance, Gambardella et al. [14] first,

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and Barán et al. [4] later, proposed a Multiple Ant Colony System to solve the Vehicle Routing Problem With Time Windows (MACS-VRPTW). Iredi et al. introduced in [18] the Bicriterion Ant (one colony) and Multicolony approaches to solve the Single Machine Total Tardiness Problem. Or the more recent m-ACO by Alaya et al. [3]. García-Martínez et al. presented a review and a comparison of the most known MOACOs in [16]. Focusing on the field of application, the military scope is a source of interesting problems: decision support, battle planning, combat resolution or battlefield pattern recognition; and there are several techniques to solve them, including in the last years, the use of bioinspired ones [23, 25, 31]. The military unit pathfinding is another of these problems and there are many proposed algorithms to solve it, for instance [8, 20]. This problem is a particular example of a more general logistics problem, the deployment planning problem [2] which includes all steps necessary to move units from their quarters to their deployment points. As part of it, the problem we are solving may take into account constraints other than just those in the final deployment terrain; however, we are not considering them here; or the other way round, that the hCHAC algorithms could be used as heuristics for a part of the general deployment planning problem. In addition, our problem presents some differences with regard to the commented above, since it presents a realistic model (based in a real simulator) and considers some constraints and simulation functions that the common (military) pathfinding problems do not show (as can be noticed in Section 3). The hCHAC algorithms family presented in this chapter has been mainly inspired mainly by Barán’s work, with some features also considered of Iredi’s work. We propose this algorithm because, as previously stated, ACO algorithms are efficient and easily implemented and, in addition, they work well in multi-objective problems. Besides, the set of approaches that we propose lets the user easily control the search to find the best path according to the military tactics and the constraints or features of the mission.

5.

The hCHAC Family

In this section, the algorithms included in the hCHAC family are presented, they are: hCHAC[-2] (or just hCHAC), approach designed to deal with the initial two objectives; hCHAC-4, implemented for solving a four objectives problem redefinition; and finally mono-hCHAC, algorithm that considers the objectives aggregation in just one function. Two state transition rules have been defined for each one of the multi-objective approaches, yielding a different behaviour (and solutions) in solving the problem.

5.1.

hCHAC

This approach is the revision of the original CHAC algorithm [26]. It shares with the first the same structure and terms (heuristic functions, state transition rules, pheromone updating policy and evaluation functions), but it has been adapted to a different (and more realistic) topology, an hexagonal grid. That is the reason of the h (hexa) prefix. The CHAC acronym stands for Compañía de Hormigas ACorazadas, in Spanish, (Armoured Ant Company) to combine the fact that it is an ACO algorithm with the military

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A.M. Mora, P.A. Castillo and J.J. Merelo

scope of its application2 . It is an ACS adapted to deal with several objectives (two in the initial/basic problem), that is, a MOACO algorithm. As previously stated in Subsection 2.1, the problem has been transformed into a graph with weighted edges (see Figure 2) in order to solve it using an ACO algorithm. Every cell in the map is considered a node in the graph and six edges connect it to every one of its neighbours (except in border cells). To deal with two objectives, there are two weights in every edge related to the cost of energy and resources, that is, a cost related to the energy expenses (cost assigned to the destination node of the edge) and other related to the consumption of resources if the unit moves from one cell to its neighbour following that edge (which depends on the types of both nodes and height difference between them).

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Figure 2. Converting a grid into a graph. Since it is an ACO algorithm, in each iteration every ant builds a complete path (solution), attending to the constraints, such as the unit cannot go through one node twice in the same path, or the unit has a maximum level of energy and resources to get to destination. This solution building is made travelling through the graph. It follows the ACS scheme in order to have better control of the balance between exploration and exploitation by using the standard parameter q0 (See Equations (3) and (4)). Hence, during the construction, each ant leaves a trail in the visited edges. At the end, a trail is also dropped, but only by for the edges of the best solutions founded. These trails are a measure of desirability for that edges, to take into account for following ants. The problem to solve is a multi-objective one [10] with two independent objectives to minimize. These objectives are named r, minimization the resources consumed in the path (speed maximization or fast paths) and e, minimization the energy consumed in the path (safety maximization or safe paths). In order to achieve that, hCHAC uses two pheromone matrices and two heuristics functions in a single ant colony. There is one Heuristic Function per objective. They try to guide the search considering the key factors for each objective. They assign a value to every edge in the graph that includes the heuristic knowledge of the problem, so that for edge (i, j) they are: ηr (i, j) =

ωrd ωrr + + (ωrh · H( j)) , R(i, j) d( j, T )

(9)

ηe (i, j) =

ωed ωee + + (ωeh · H( j)) . E(i, j) d( j, T )

(10)

In Equation (9), R(i, j) is the cost in resources when moving from node i to node j, d is the Euclidean distance between two nodes (T is the target node of the problem) and H is 2 Although,

this algorithm is not constrained to this application.

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the hiding of a cell, which is a score (in [0, 1] interval), being 1 when the cell is hidden to all the enemies (or to all the cells in a radius when there are no enemies) and decreasing exponentially when it is not (it depends on the number of enemies or cells in a radius, if there are no enemies, which can see the cell). ωrr , ωrd and ωrh are weights to assign relative importance to the terms in the formula. In this case, the most important term is the distance to target point because, when searching for the fastest path, a straight path will be better. The cost in resources is also important, but less so; and finally the visibility has a small influence, because it is disregarded almost completely in the case of trying to follow the fastest path. In Equation (10), E(i, j) is the cost in energy of moving from node i to node j (but it only depends on j), d and H are the same as the previous formula. ωee , ωed and ωeh are again weights to assign relative importance to the terms in the formula, but in this case the main factor is visibility, following by cost in energy (both have to be considered in a safe path), and a little the distance to target point. The State Transition Rule is a very important formula in ACO algorithms, since the quality of the solution strongly depends on it. As stated in Subsection 2.1, each ant uses it to decide which node j (of the feasible neighbours) is the next in the construction of a solution (path), when the ant is at the node i. Two different rules have been implemented, the former based on Iredi’s proposal [18] and the second one based on the domination concept of multi-objective problems (see Subsection 2.2). The Combined State Transition Rule (CSTR) is similar to the pseudo-randomproportional rule used in ACS, but adapted to deal with a two objectives problem by combining the heuristic and pheromone information of both of them: If (q ≤ q0 ) n o j = arg max τr (i, j)α·λ · τe (i, j)α·(1−λ) · ηr (i, j)β·λ · ηe (i, j)β·(1−λ) . (11)

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j∈Ni

Else

P(i, j) =

  

τr (i, j)α·λ · τe (i, j)α·(1−λ) · ηr (i, j)β·λ · ηe (i, j)β·(1−λ) if j ∈ Ni ∑ τr (i, u)α·λ · τe (i, u)α·(1−λ) · ηr (i, u)β·λ · ηe (i, u)β·(1−λ) ,

  u∈Ni 0

(12)

otherwise

where q0 ∈ [0, 1] is the standard ACS parameter and q is a random value in the range [0, 1]. τr and τe are the pheromone matrices, and ηr and ηe are the heuristic functions (also matrices) for the objectives (Equations (9) and (10)). All these matrices have a value for every edge (i, j). α and β are the usual (in ACO algorithms) weighting parameters for pheromone and heuristic information respectively, and Ni is the current feasible neighbourhood for the node i. λ ∈ (0, 1) is an user-defined parameter which sets the importance of the objectives in the search (which one has the highest priority and how much). This algorithm is included in an application created for a military user who decides which objective has more priority in the problem, so for instance, if the user decides to search for a fast path, λ will take a value close to 1, on the other hand, if he wants a safe path, it has to be close to 0. This value is constant during the algorithm for all ants, unlike the other considered bi-criteria

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A.M. Mora, P.A. Castillo and J.J. Merelo

implementations [4, 18] in which the parameter takes a value of 0 for the first ant, and it grows for every ant until it takes a value of 1 for the latter. This way, hCHAC searches always in the same zone of the space of solutions (the zone related to the chosen value for λ). This STR works as follows: when an ant is building a solution path and is placed at one node i, a random number q in the range [0, 1] is generated, if q ≤ q0 the best neighbour j is selected as the next node in the path (Equation (11)). Otherwise, the algorithm decides which node is the next by using a roulette wheel considering P(i, j) as probability for every feasible neighbour j (Equation (12)). The other implemented rule is the Dominance State Transition Rule (DSTR). It is based on the dominance concept of multi-objective problems (which is defined in Subsection 2.2). In our problem there are two cost functions to evaluate the dominance between edges because they have assigned pheromone and heuristic information, which are combined in each function using the same parameters as in CSTR formulas (Equations (11) and (12)), these functions are: Cr (i, j) = τr (i, j)α·λ · ηr (i, j)β·λ , (13) Ce (i, j) = τe (i, j)α·(1−λ) · ηe (i, j)β·(1−λ) .

(14)

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In addition, it has been defined a function which uses the concept presented in Equation (8) (considering the edges in the graph), and which applies Equations (13) and (14) as cost functions, tending to maximization (could be considered as fitness): ( 1 if (i, j) ≻ (i, u) D(i, j, u) = . (15) 0 otherwise At last, the DSTR is as follows: If (q ≤ q0 ) j = arg max j∈Ni

Else

     

(

∑ D(i, j, u)

u∈Ni

 D(i, j, u) +1 ∑ u∈Ni    P(i, j) = D(i, k, u) + 1 ∑ ∑   u∈Ni  k∈N   0 i 

)

∀ j 6= u .

if j ∈ Ni ∧ j 6= u ∧ k 6= u

(16)

,

(17)

otherwise

where Ni is again the current feasible neighbourhood for the node i. The rule chooses the next node j in the path (when an ant is placed at node i) considering the number of neighbours dominated for every one. So a random number q in the range [0, 1] is generated too, and again, if q ≤ q0 the node which dominates more of the other neighbours is chosen (Equation (16)), otherwise anew the probability roulette wheel is used. In Equation (17) we add 1 to avoid a null probability if one node dominates no other of its neighbours. As we previously stated, this rule applies multi-objective problem concepts which allow to compare nodes without using an aggregative expression which combines information of both objectives, but considering separately each objective factors. The DSTR tends to be more “exploratory” (usually there will be some nodes with the same high value for P), so

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it is necessary to use parameter values which tends to exploitation in order to balance the search. The Evaluation Functions are used to assign a global cost value to every solution found by each ant. They consider not only the cost in resources or energy of every node (cell) in the path, but the hiding of the cell too, since that is highly important in military tactics3 . There are two (one per objective, again): h i Fr (S p ) = ∑ R(n − 1, n) + ωFhr · (1 − H(n)) , (18) n∈S p

Fe (S p ) =

∑

n∈S p

h i E(n − 1, n) + ωFhe · (1 − H(n)) ,

(19)

where S p is the solution path to evaluate and n is a node in that path. ωFhr and ωFhe are weights related to the importance of hiding of the cells in the path. In Equation (18) its importance will be small, since it is less important to hide in a fast path; and it will be high in Equation (19) for the opposite reason. The other terms are the same as in Equations (9) and (10). Since hCHAC is an ACS, there are two levels of pheromone updating: local and global, which update two matrices at each level. The equations for Local Pheromone Updating (performed when a new node j is added to the path that an ant is building) are: τr (i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τr (i, j)t−1 + ρ · τ0,r ,

(20)

τe (i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τe (i, j)t−1 + ρ · τ0,e ,

(21)

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where t marks again the new pheromone value and t − 1 the old value. ρ in the range [0, 1] is the common evaporation factor and τ0,r , τ0,e are the initial amounts of pheromone in every edge for every objective, respectively: τ0,r =

1 , (nc · MR )

(22)

τ0,e =

1 (nc · ME )

(23)

with nc as the number of cells in the map to solve, MR as the maximum amount of resources going through a cell may require, and ME as the maximum cost in energy going through a cell may produce (in the worst case). It is also usual to consider the results of a greedy approach as the initial amount of pheromone. The equations for Global Pheromone Updating are: τr (i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τr (i, j)t−1 + ρ/Fr ,

(24)

τe (i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τe (i, j)t−1 + ρ/Fe .

(25)

Only the solutions inside the Pareto set (non-dominated solutions) will make the global pheromone updating once all the ants have finished of building paths in every iteration. So, this updating is performed only for the edges included in these solutions. 3 According

to the military staff which supervised this study.

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5.2.

A.M. Mora, P.A. Castillo and J.J. Merelo

hCHAC-4

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hCHAC-4 is the adaptation of the bi-criteria hCHAC approach to deal with four objectives. The initial objectives have been divided into two subobjectives each one, since, as can be seen in Equations (9) and (10), fast or low resources cost paths mainly depends on the cost in resources, and on the distance to target point reduction. On the other hand, safe or low energy cost paths are devoted to minimize the cost in energy, and the visibility to the enemies (maximize the hiding). With regard to the latter, and as previously stated, we consider a cost in visibility to the enemies, which is minimum if the unit is hidden (at some point) to all the enemies, and it increases exponentially when it is visible to some of them. With no enemy present, it is calculated considering whether it is visible or not to the surrounding cells in a radius, computing a score of visibility, so the more visible the unit is, the higher the score is. As in the previous approach, the battlefield is transformed into a graph where the nodes are the cells in the grid and the edges are the connections between neighbour cells. But this time there are four weights associated to each edge, which correspond with the cost related to every objective. The algorithm working is similar to the hCHAC[-2], with just a colony of ants. It again follows the ACS scheme [12, 13] in order to have better control of the balance between exploration and exploitation by using the standard parameter q0 . All the elements of the algorithm have been adapted to deal with four objectives, so there are four heuristic functions, four pheromone matrices, and four evaluation functions. In addition, and as in the previous algorithm, two different state transition rules have been designed, but working considering four objectives this time. All these elements are defined below. The expressions of the Heuristic Functions are: 1 , R(i, j) 1 , (c) ηe (i, j) = E(i, j) (a) ηr (i, j) =

(b)

ηd (i, j) =

1 , d( j, T )

(26)

(d) ηv (i, j) = H( j).

In Equation (26.a), R(i, j) is the cost in resources when moving from node i to node j, in Equation (26.b), d is the Euclidean distance between two nodes (T is the target node of the problem). In Equation (26.c), E(i, j) is the cost in energy of moving from node i to node j (but it only depends on j), and in Equation (26.d), H is the hiding of a cell, calculated as in the previous algorithm. The State Transition Rules (STRs) implemented guide the search of every ant to get the solution path. They use information about the four objectives of the problem, but the first one combines this information and the second one consider them as independent (it is based on the dominance concept of multi-objective problems). Firstly, the terms related to the objectives, that the state transition rules consider, follow the expression: Tx (i, j) = τx (i, j)α · ηx (i, j)β

(27)

with x = r, d, e, v (initial of each objective). τ is the correspondent pheromone trails matrix, and every η is the correspondent heuristic function (Equations (26.a) to (26.d)). α and β are Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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the usual (in ACO algorithms) weighting parameters for pheromone and heuristic information respectively. So, the Combined State Transition Rule for four objectives (CSTR-4) is: If (q ≤ q0 ) n o j = arg max Tr (i, j)λ · Td (i, j)λ · Te (i, j)(1−λ) · Tv (i, j)(1−λ) . (28) j∈Ni

Else

P(i, j) =

  

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 

Tr (i, j)λ · Td (i, j)λ · Te (i, j)(1−λ) · Tv (i, j)(1−λ) ∑ Tr (i, u)λ · Td (i, u)λ · Te (i, u)(1−λ) · Tv (i, u)(1−λ)

if j ∈ Ni

u∈Ni

0

,

(29)

otherwise

where anew q0 ∈ [0, 1] is the standard ACS parameter, q is a random value in the range [0, 1]. Ni is the current feasible neighbourhood for the node i. λ ∈ (0, 1) is, as in the hCHAC[-2] method, an user-defined parameter which sets the importance of the objectives in the search (which one has the highest priority and how much). This parameter sets the importance of the four objectives at the same time, since they are related with speed (resources consumption and distance to target point) or with safety (energy consumption or visibility to enemies). So for instance, if the user decides to search for a fast path (low resources consumption and short distance to target point), λ will take a value close to 1, on the other hand, if he wants a safe path (low energy consumption and visibility to enemy), it has to be close to 0. This value is again constant during the algorithm for all ants. The STR works as in hCHAC case, so depending on the random value q, the best neighbour (Equation (28)), or one selected using a probability roulette wheel (Equation (29)) is chosen. There is also a Dominance-based State Transition Rule, with four objectives this time (DSTR-4), which is again related to the dominance concept (see Subsection 2.2). In this problem redefinition, there are four cost functions to evaluate the dominance between edges, because they have assigned also four pheromone and heuristic information which are combined in each function using the same parameters as in CSTR-4 formulas (Equations (28) and (29)). (a) Cr (i, j) = Tr (i, j)λ ,

(b)

Cd (i, j) = Td (i, j)λ ,

(c) Ce (i, j) = Te (i, j)(1−λ) ,

(d) Cv (i, j) = Tv (i, j)(1−λ) .

(30) In addition, the algorithm applies a dominance function D similar to the one defined in Equation (15), but taking into account the previous four cost functions (Equations (30.a) to (30.d)). Thus, the DSTR-4 is defined following the same expression proposed in Equations (16) and (17), but considering four cost functions for calculating the dominance score of each feasible neighbour. As previously stated, this rule applies multi-objective problem concepts which allow to compare nodes without using an aggregative expression by combining information of all the objectives, but considering separately each objective factors. The DSTR-4 tends to be

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more “exploratory” (usually there will be some nodes with the same high value for P), so it would be necessary to use parameter values which tends to exploitation in order to balance the search. There are also four Evaluation Functions, which are used to assign a global cost value to every solution found by each ant: (a) Fr (S p ) =

∑ [R(n − 1, n)],

(b)

∑ [E(n − 1, n)],

(d) Fv (S p ) =

Fd (S p ) =

n∈S p

(c) Fe (S p ) =

∑ [d(n, T )/N],

n∈S p

n∈S p

∑ [(1 − H(n))],

(31)

n∈S p

where S p is the solution path to evaluate, n is a node in that path, and N is the total number of nodes. The other terms are those introduced in the heuristic functions (Equations (26.a) to (26.d)). No weight has been considered (as a difference to previous hCHAC[-2]) in any formula, so all the objectives have the same importance in the search, and the user can only decide the priority of the global safety and speed. Since hCHAC-4 is an ACS, there are two levels of pheromone updating, local and global, which update four matrices at each level. The general formula for the Local Pheromone Updating (performed when a new node j is added to the path that an ant is building) is: τx (i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τx (i, j)t−1 + ρ · τ0,x (32) being x = r, d, e, v. ρ in the range [0, 1] is the common evaporation factor, and τ0,r , τ0,d , τ0,e and τ0,v are the initial amounts of pheromone in every edge for every objective, respectively:

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τ0,x =

1 (nc · MX )

(33)

with x = r, d, e, v, and nc as the number of cells in the map to solve, MR as the maximum amount of resources going through a cell may require, MD as the maximum distance between two nodes (the diagonal of the grid), ME as the maximum cost in energy going through a cell may produce (in the worst case), and MV as the maximum visibility value. The expression for the Global Pheromone Updating is as follows: τx (i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τx (i, j)t−1 + ρ/Fx

(34)

once again with x = r, d, e, v. As in hCHAC case, only the solutions inside the PS (nondominated solutions) will make the global pheromone updating once all the ants have finished of building paths in every iteration. So, this update is performed only for the edges included in these solutions. Fx are the correspondent evaluation function (Equations (31.a) to (31.d)). t and t − 1 means the same as in previous formulas.

5.3.

mono-hCHAC

This is an ACS that combines the two initial objectives in just one. It uses similar formulas to those of hCHAC[-2]: heuristic, pheromone updating and evaluation function (see Subsection 5.1), but only one in each case, and having been adapted to consider only one Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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objective (by including specific terms for each objective). This way, the Heuristic Function is as follows: ωe ωd ωr + + + (ωh · H( j)) , (35) η(i, j) = R(i, j) E(i, j) d( j, T ) where R(i, j) and E(i, j) are respectively the cost in resources and energy when moving from node i to node j, d is the Euclidean distance between two nodes (T is the target node of the problem) and H is again the cell hiding. ωr , ωe , ωd and ωh are the weights that assign relative importance to the terms in the formula. The values for the two first are the same as in the hCHAC formulas, and the values for the two last have been calculated as an average of the correspondent parameters in those formulas. In principle, all the terms are equally important. The STR which guides the search is the typical formula in mono-objective ACSs: If (q ≤ q0 ) n o j = arg max τ(i, j)α · η(i, j)β . (36) j∈Ni

Else

P(i, j) =

  

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 

τ(i, j)α · η(i, j)β ∑ τ(i, u)α · η(i, u)β

if j ∈ Ni

u∈Ni

0

(37)

otherwise

as stated, q0 ∈ [0, 1] is the standard ACS parameter, q is a random value in the range [0, 1]. τ is the pheromone trails matrix and η is the heuristic function (Equation (35)). α and β are the usual weighting parameters and Ni is the current feasible neighbourhood for the node i. This STR works as in the previous algorithms, so depending on the q random value, the next node will be chosen considering Equation (36), or by means of a probability roulette wheel, using the Equation (37). The Evaluation Function assigns a global cost value to every solution found by each ant. It considers the cost in resources, the cost in energy, and the visibility of each node (cell) in the path:   F(S p ) = ∑ R(n − 1, n) + E(n − 1, n) + ωFh · (1 − H(n)) , (38) n∈S p

S p is the solution path to evaluate, and ωFh is the weight which sets the importance of visibility of the cells in the path. The other terms are the same as in Equation (35). The Local Pheromone Updating is performed when a new node j is added to the path that an ant is building: τ(i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τ(i, j)t−1 + ρ · τ0 , (39)

where ρ in the range [0, 1] is the common evaporation factor and τ0 is the initial amount of pheromone in every edge: 1 τ0 = (40) nc · ((MR + ME )/2) with the same meaning for the terms in the formula as previously. Finally, the Global Pheromone Updating is performed at the end of every iteration of the algorithm, once all the ants have built a solution path: ρ (41) τ(i, j)t = (1 − ρ) · τ(i, j)t−1 + F

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being F the evaluation function previously defined. Again t and t − 1 refer to the new and old pheromone value respectively.

6.

Multi-objective Greedy Algorithm (GRMO)

This is a novel approach designed to address the MOPFP-2C problem. This algorithm follows the Greedy ideology (choose always the best of the options), but actually it can be considered as a novel Greedy approach adapted to deal with more than one objective. In this work, GRMO have been considered as a two objectives Greedy algorithm. As any other Greedy Algorithm, it searches for a complete solution (path) in just one iteration, starting from the initial node, and going to the target one, choosing in each step the best of the candidate nodes (neighbours). A dominance-based criterion has been applied to compare the neighbours desirability, as in hCHAC algorithms DSTR, considering as cost functions the heuristic functions defined for hCHAC[-2] (Equations (9) and (10)), each one for one of the objectives. Having these cost functions into account, the dominance expression to use is the one defined in Equation (15). This way, the value of each one of the candidates (or neighbours) j, when being in the node i, is calculated as: V (i, j) =

∑ D(i, j, u)

∀ j ∈ Ni and j 6= u,

(42)

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u∈Ni

where Ni is anew the set of feasible neighbours for the node i. So, the value V for a candidate j to be the next in the path building, corresponds to the number of neighbours which it dominates. The most valuable node will be the chosen. If more than one candidate have the same value (as maximum), the next in the path is chosen randomly among them. This fact introduces a stochastic component to the algorithm which is not common to the classical greedy approaches. The algorithm is quite simple, so the loops have been avoided including a constraint for ensure that the path does not move through a cell twice, but in addition it is possible that the algorithm reaches a dead-end path (borders, a cell surrounded by obstacles), so a three level backtracking method has been also implemented. Finally, GRMO runs for several iterations, yielding a solution in each one of them, and composing a global Pareto Set.

7.

Experiments and Results

Two realistic maps have been considered as the scenarios to test the algorithms. They are part of two PC Panzer GeneralTM game maps, and include different features, such as orographic difficulties, forest, rivers and also enemies on watching and firing. They present a medium solving difficulty, attending to the military staff. The parameters and weights of the algorithms affect the results guiding the search by balancing the exploration and exploitation levels, and setting the importance of terms in the heuristics and evaluation functions.

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The parameter setting can be seen in Table 2. They have been fine-tuned in order to yield a good behaviour in almost all the maps using the two state transition rules. They are the same for all the algorithms, in order to compare them in the same conditions. Table 2. Parameter setting considered in all the algorithms mono-CHAC

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iterations ants q0 α β ρ λ

–

hCHAC hCHAC-4 1500 50 0.4 1 2 0.1 0.9 | 0.1

GRMO –

α, β, and ρ take a common value in ACOs. q0 is a key parameter (as can be noticed in Subsection 2.1), since the balance between exploration and exploitation in the search, and thus, the solutions building strongly depends on it. The value it takes promotes exploitation more than usual (it normally takes a 0.1 value in other ACOs), since most of the algorithms presents an extra exploration factor, due to their design and way of working (for instance the DSTR). Normally the user will decide the value for λ parameter, which gives relative importance to one objective over the other (or two over the other two in hCHAC-4), so if it is near to 1, finding fast paths would be more important and if it is near 0, the other way round. In this experiments we will consider a value close to 1 and close to 0, since the aim is searching for (very) fast and safe paths, but it is mandatory (from the military point of view) always to consider the other(s) objective(s) in the search. The values of the weights can be seen in Table 3. Table 3. Assigned weights to the terms in the heuristic functions and in the evaluation functions Resources Consumption (speed objective) ωrr = 0.15 ωrd = 0.80 ωrh = 0.05 ωFhr = 0.5

Energy Consumption (safety objective) ωee = 0.15 ωed = 0.05 ωeh = 0.80 ωFhe = 10

These have been set to give more importance to minimizing the distance to target point and the consumption of resources in the speed objective; and to give more importance to minimizing the visibility (maximizing hiding to avoid future enemy attacks) and the consumption of energy in the safety objective. The first weights (three rows) are applied in the heuristic functions (hCHAC, and mono-hCHAC), the last row presents the weights applied in the evaluation functions, as penalties for the visible cells in the paths. All these values were tuned making an empirical study with the collaboration of the military staff of the project.

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All the algorithms yields a set of non-dominated solutions (they are MO approaches), from which the user chooses one considering his own criteria (based on military tactics), because he usually needs just a single solution (the unit only needs to know one path to the target point). The resulting Pareto Sets are not too big (as expected in MO approaches) for some of the algorithms (about five to ten different solutions on average, depending on the map size) because they only search in the region of the ideal Pareto front determined by the λ parameter and, in addition, they only consider a single solution when there are several with the same cost in both objectives. 30 runs have been performed for each of the algorithms in every scenario, using each state transition rule and using each value for λ (0.9 and 0.1) in order to find fast and safe paths respectively. In each execution, “the best” solution (from a military point of view) of the PS found is chosen. This solution will be the one which has the smallest cost in the objective with more priority. In addition, it is good enough because it has taken into account the restrictions of preserving the unit energy level and unit resources level available which are necessary to carry out the mission (get to target point). In real situations, these solutions (paths) would be selected by the military partners of the project taking into account also tactical considerations and the features of every battlefield. The mean and standard deviation of these 30 best solutions for each objective have been calculated. The mono-hCHAC approach yields a single solution which is evaluated using the same functions as in hCHAC (Fr and Fe ) in order to obtain a multi-objective valuation which can be compared with the solutions of the other algorithms and methods. The hCHAC-4 yield a higher set of non-dominated solutions (100 to 400, close to usual Pareto set size in MO algorithms), but again only one is chosen (following the same criteria). Previously, we evaluate these solution paths considering only two objectives as in the other MOACOs (using again the Fr and Fe evaluation functions), in order to compare all of them. All the experiments have been run in a Pentium M 1.6 GHz processor, taking from 20 seconds for the GRMO to around 180-250 seconds for the other algorithms.

7.1.

Panzer GeneralTM – Forest Map

The first scenario presents a 45x45 cells terrain with some patches of forest, some hills and some small rivers (and bridges). There is only one enemy (watching over) located in the middle of the straightforward path between origin and destination points. There are some hidden zones, but the enemy controls the area the unit must pass in order to get to the target as soon as possible. According to the military staff it has a difficulty of 2 out of 4. It can be seen in Figure 3. The enemy unit’s acquisition capability (what it can see) and hidden zones in the map are shown in Figure 4. It can be noticed that the central area of the map is controlled by the enemy unit, so, in order to ensures the hiding, the logistics unit should move inside the forests or around the enemy’s acquisition capability area. The results on this map for all the algorithms are summarized in Table 4. Firstly we briefly describe the table structure: there are two main columns, the left hand one is devoted to show the solutions considering the speed (cost in/consumption of resources) as the main objective (due to the value of λ parameter). The right hand main

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Figure 3. PG Forest Map. There are some patches of forest and hills. The unit is located on the north (with black border), the destination point on the south (with yellow border), and the enemy is on the centre of the map. On the right hand side figure, the underlying information layer is shown. A darker colour (in the same type) means a higher cell.

Figure 4. PG Forest map. On the left hand side the area corresponding to the enemy’s acquisition capability (in red), and unit’s acquisition capability. On the right hand side, the hidden zones are showed as dark.

column presents the results considering the safety (cost in/consumption of energy) as the prioritized objective. The value for λ has no relevance for the DSTR approaches and GRMO (they do not apply it). As previously stated, all the solutions have been finally evaluated considering Fr and Fe functions, to establish a fair comparative. But they have apply their own evaluation functions during the algorithm running. In addition, since they are cost functions, the best results are those with the lower values. Analyzing the results, Table 4 show that hCHAC-CSTR solutions can be taken as reference, being almost always the best in the objective with the highest priority, but presenting a high cost value for the other objective. An important fact is that, in this map, a fast solution can be also a safe one (if the path moves hidden to the enemy) and vice versa. This is

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A.M. Mora, P.A. Castillo and J.J. Merelo Table 4. Results for all the algorithms in the PG Forest Map

hCHAC-CSTR hCHAC-DSTR hCHAC-4-CSTR hCHAC-4-DSTR GRMO

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mono-hCHAC

Best Mean Best Mean Best Mean Best Mean Best Mean Best Mean

Fastest (λ = 0.9) Fr Fe 68.50 295.40 77.88 ±7.84 166.20±131.08 70.50 295.60 80.47±3.83 269.99±39.39 70.00 305.50 79.52±6.67 322.28±37.59 71.00 305.60 77.28 ±2.57 296.93±31.91 96.00 307.58 156.86±31.40 373.19±43.10 78.00 84.28±4.46

Safest (λ = 0.1) Fr Fe 80.50 7.30 84.67±3.64 8.02 ±0.55 102.50 9.50 107.18±5.72 10.26±0.57 89.00 8.30 110.33±14.18 73.94±86.66 77.37 9.40 107.73±5.36 10.41±0.51 104.13 301.10 162.72±32.55 364.37±42.15 7.50 8.17±0.53

the reason why in the search for safe (and fast) paths some of the algorithms yields a good result for cost in the non-considered objective (Fr ). A big improvement of the four objectives search is that it is more exploratory than the others (it yields a high Pareto set and shows a high mean and standard deviation in hCHAC4-CSTR results), which yields better minimum results than the previous hCHAC-DSTR and GRMO approaches. In addition, the hCHAC-4-DSTR approach is exploratory (lots of solutions) but has a lower mean, and low standard deviation which implies robustness (similar solutions between runs), due to the DSTR-4 rule. Exploration will be a good factor in maps where an optimal solution is difficult to find. Still, DSTR implementations yield worse results than CSTR ones in general, but with a lower mean and standard deviation which means it would need a higher exploitation level to reach better solutions. hCHACDSTR approach is worse for the same reason we explain above. mono-hCHAC is a special case, because it only yields one solution which combines speed and safety. We have represented this solution considering the same costs yielded by it in both searches. It is surprisingly good, since both costs are quite good (small), but they are not the best in comparing with the other approaches, when they search for the fastest or the safest path. hCHAC-4 yields worse results than the original hCHAC-CSTR, but both (hCHAC-4CSTR and hCHAC-4-DSTR) improve the hCHAC-DSTR in some cases. These approaches get better solutions than GRMO and mono-hCHAC in Fr cost and sometimes in Fe . With regard to GRMO, the results are quite bad, overcoat in the cost in energy, surely because the solution is quite straight, so most of the cells in the path are visible to the enemy (which highly increases this cost). In addition, this method do not have any reinforcement mechanism (as the rest of the approaches), nor any refinement of solutions (they are built in just one iteration). Moreover, it is based in the dominance criteria like the DSTR approaches, so the method has an extra exploration factor. All these facts means it yields a small PS, absolutely focused in a small area of the space of solutions, due to the tiny explorative factor that the backtracking includes.

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Figure 5. hCHAC results applying CSTR (top) and DSTR (bottom) in the PG Forest map. On the left hand figure the fastest solution is shown, on the right hand the safest. The cells with pink border are hidden to the enemy, while the black border ones are visible.

Best, mean and standard deviation in the secondary objective are always logically worse, because it has little importance. But in this case the differences between the security cost (Fe ) when it is the primary and secondary objective are huge, the reason being that fast paths are usually unsafe due to cell visibility, and in these experiments we assign a high penalty to the visibility term in the cost function. In the comparison between the ideas of aggregating the initial two objectives into just one (mono-hCHAC), or subdividing them into four subobjectives (hCHAC-4), it seems to be better the latter, looking at the mean and standard deviation of the results. The difficulty of the map can be tested looking at the bad results, and the high difference with the best ones, overcoat in relation to the energy costs. Figures 5 to 7 show the graphical results for each one of the algorithms. The solutions are presented considering the underlying information layer, because it shows more useful information to perform an analysis than the realistic projection. Looking at the Figure 5, the fast paths (on the left) yielded for the hCHAC[-2] method are quite straight from the starting to the target point, avoiding, if possible the visible zones

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Figure 6. hCHAC-4 results applying CSTR-4 (top) and DSTR-4 (bottom) in the PG Forest map. On the left hand figure the fastest solution is shown, on the right hand the safest. The cells with pink border are hidden to the enemy, while the black border ones are visible.

(from the enemy point of view), by moving trough forest patches (which hide the unit). In addition, it avoids move over cells which imply a higher consumption of resources, such as water, crossing them through normal/flat terrain ones (roads, bridges). But as a punishment, this paths moves frequently inside the visible area of the enemy, which means a high cost in safety (as can be seen in the Table 4). The DSTR solutions are less straight, and present some cell which can be considered as superfluous. The reason is the higher exploration factor that this method includes to the algorithm. In the case of the safest paths (on the right), they represents a curve (the distance to target point has little importance) which increases the cost in resources (speed), but on the other hand, the unit goes through all hidden cells having a low cost in energy (safety). With regard to the CSTR and the DSTR solutions, both of them moves in the same zone of the map, surrounding the enemy acquisition capability area and going through some forest cells and behind the hills to avoid to be seen (safe cells), because they obstruct the enemy’s line of sight. This behaviour is excellent from the military tactical point of view. With regard to the rest of the solutions, they are quite similar to the commented, with some superfluous cells (being more exploratory) in hCHAC-4 (Figure 6) and GRMO (Fig-

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Figure 7. GRMO (top) and mono-hCHAC (bottom) results in the PG Forest map. On the left hand figure the fastest solution is shown, on the right hand the safest. The cells with pink border are hidden to the enemy, while the black border ones are visible.

ure 7). The mono-hCHAC solution (Figure 7) tends to be on the safe side, yielding a path similar to those obtained by hCHAC with priority in searching for safe paths, but it is a little more direct in some sections. The reason is that security is more important than speed, so the weights of the aggregative function are set to ensure this.

7.2.

Panzer GeneralTM – River Map

This 45x45 cells map corresponds to a plain landscape with some forest patches, many rivers and some bridges crossing them. There are two enemies watching over, located on two points between the origin and destination (in the clearer zone of the map). Both of them can see all around the destination point excepting the left side where some trees obstruct the vision line. They are shooting their weapons over some bridges and around one of the enemies. The difficulty this time is 3 out of 4. Figure 8 presents the map. The enemy unit’s acquisition capability (what it can see) and hidden zones in the map are shown in Figure 9. This time, the safe area is on the west side of the map, where there are some forest patches (which can hide the unit). The central area is very dangerous due to

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Figure 8. PG River Map. There are some patches of forest and many rivers (and bridges). The unit is located on the south (with black border), the destination point on the north (with yellow border), and there are two enemies watching over and even firing in some areas (in red colour). One of them is in the centre of the map, and the other one on the east. On the right hand side figure, the underlying information layer is shown. A darker colour (in the same type) means a higher cell, or a more lethal cell if the colour is red.

Figure 9. PG River map. On the left hand side the area corresponding to the enemies’ acquisition capability (in red), and unit’s acquisition capability. On the right hand side, the hidden zones are showed as dark.

the visibility and the weapons impact zones (over the bridges). The east side is also visible in a big area, because of the enemy watching over on the top of a hill to have far visibility (no other hill obstructing its line of sight), but there are some patches of forest which could protect the logistics unit. The results for all the algorithms can be consulted in Table 5.

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Table 5. Results for all the algorithms in the PG River Map

hCHAC-CSTR hCHAC-DSTR hCHAC-4-CSTR hCHAC-4-DSTR GRMO

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mono-hCHAC

Best Mean Best Mean Best Mean Best Mean Best Mean Best Mean

Fastest (λ = 0.9) Fr Fe 61.00 244.90 66.42 ±3.29 225.19 ±90.26 66.50 295.20 73.30 ±2.98 249.61 ±57.79 66.00 285.20 71.70 ±3.70 316.66 ±58.73 64.00 304.90 67.18 ±1.76 296.56 ±25.39 74.20 319.69 95.99 ±8.60 349.57 ±32.07 72.00 78.33 ±4.24

Safest (λ = 0.1) Fr Fe 74.00 27.30 84.68 ±4.89 28.36 ±0.48 82.50 28.00 94.22 ±5.90 29.27 ±0.59 81.00 28.00 98.13 ±15.99 108.46 ±63.79 81.00 28.00 90.13 ±4.77 28.85 ±0.44 118.81 226.93 113.30 ±11.92 289.48 ±27.61 27.10 52.23 ±42.97

Looking at the results in the table, the conclusions are quite similar to those of the previous experiment. Again hCHAC-CSTR yields the best solutions in both searches, but only in the main objective. In the fastest path search, for instance, there is an overwhelming increase of the cost in energy (safety) (Fe ), because this path moves through cells affected by enemy weapons impact (cells with a high lethality level). The same fact happens in many solutions yielded by the rest of the approaches. hCHAC-CSTR yields solutions dominated only by mono-hCHAC in the safest case. The latter may seem an odd result, but it is just a stroke of luck, due to the stochastic nature of these approaches. Looking at the mean and standard deviation can confirm this asseveration. But even considering this, the solutions are quite good for that approach, because the solution path moves in the safest area of the map. GRMO has the same problems as in the previous experiment, but performs better (in average) this time. hCHAC-4 yields good results presenting better solutions for the DSTR than for the CSTR, maybe due to the difficulty of the map which needs a higher exploration level. That is the reason why again 4-objectives-DSTR methods get better solutions than 4-objectivesCSTR (attending to mean and standard deviation). In the search for fast paths, the solutions are better, improving GRMO and mono-hCHAC. Figures 10 to 12 show the graphical results for each one of the algorithms. The results which can be seen in these figures are as expected, since the fast paths in almost all the cases moves straightforward from the origin to the destination points, avoiding some dangerous cells, but going through a wide visible area, which increases dramatically the cost in energy (safety), as can be noticed in Table 5. With regard to the safest paths, all of them move on the west side of the map, since there are many hidden cells (due to the forest and hills) avoiding detection and enemy weapon impacts. Again, all this actions correspond to a sensible military behaviour.

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The approaches showing superfluous cells are the same as in the previous experiment (those with a high exploration component).

Figure 10. hCHAC results applying CSTR and DSTR in the PG River map. On the left hand figure the fastest solution is shown, on the right hand the safest. The cells with pink border are hidden to the enemy, while the black border ones are visible.

8.

Conclusion

In this chapter a set of MOACO algorithms composing a family called hCHAC has been described. They have been implemented in order to address a logistics military unit pathfinding problem, considering both a criteria of speed and safety in the search. These objectives could have a relative importance set in advance by an user. There are included three algorithms in the family: hCHAC[-2], hCHAC-4, and mono-hCHAC, dealing with a different number of objectives (two, four and just one in an aggregated function). The first two can also use two different state transition rules: one combining heuristic and pheromone information of the objectives (Combined State Transition Rule, CSTR) and another based on a score of dominance over neighbours (Dominance State Transition Rule, DSTR).

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Figure 11. hCHAC-4 results applying CSTR-4 and DSTR-4 in the PG River map. On the left hand figure the fastest solution is shown, on the right hand the safest. The cells with pink border are hidden to the enemy, while the black border ones are visible.

In addition, other algorithm have been adapted to address the problem, it is a novel multi-objective Greedy approach. The hCHAC family and this algorithm have been tested (and compared) in two different scenarios inside an own-created simulator. These maps have been modelled from some realistic stages of a PC Videogame (Panzer GeneralTM ), taking into account several features and constraints to simulate a real battlefield where perform the pathfinding. The hCHAC algorithms yield very good results, being better for the two objectives approach (just named hCHAC). These results are also excellent, in a subjective assessment by the military staff of the project, which are perfectly compatible with military tactics [7]. They even offer good solutions in complicated maps in less time than a human expert would need. Moreover it is possible to observe an inherent emergent behaviour studying the solutions because they tend to be similar to those a real commander would, in many cases, take.

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Figure 12. GRMO and mono-hCHAC results in the PG River map. On the left hand figure the fastest solution is shown, on the right hand the safest. The cells with pink border are hidden to the enemy, while the black border ones are visible.

In the comparison between them, the hCHAC algorithms with CSTR yields better results in the same conditions, but hCHAC with DSTR is more robust, yielding solutions with similar performance, independently of the random initial conditions. If the exploitation level (parameter q0 ) or the number of iterations of the algorithm are increased, DSTR approach will offer similar results as CSTR.

Acknowledgements This work has been developed within the Junta de Andalucía EVORQ TIC-3903, and TIC3928 Projects.

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[2] Akgün, I. & Tansel, B. Ç. (2005). Optimization of transportation requirements in the deployment of military units. Computers & Operations Research, 34 (4), 1158–1176. [3] Alaya, I., Solnon, C., & Ghedira, K. (2007). Ant colony optimization for multiobjective optimization problems. In 19th IEEE International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence, 2007. ICTAI 2007, Volume 1, pp. 450–457. [4] Barán, B. & Schaerer, M. (2003). A multiobjective ant colony system for vehicle routing problem with time windows. In IASTED International Multi-Conference on Applied Informatics, Number 21 in IASTED IMCAI, pp. 97–102. [5] Bellman, R. (1958). On a routing problem. Quarterly of Applied Mathematics, 1 (16), 87–90. [6] Borgulya, I. (2007). An ec-memory based method for the multi-objective tsp. In GECCO ’07: Proceedings of the 9th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation, pp. 903–903, New York, NY, USA, ACM. [7] Bull, S. (2005). World War II Infantry Tactics. Company and Battalion. Osprey Publishing.

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[8] Carlyle, W. M., Royset, J. O., & Wood, R. K. (2007). Routing military aircraft with a constrained shortest-path algorithm. [9] Cherkassky, B. V., Goldberg, A. V., & Radzik, T. (1996). Shortest paths algorithms: theory and experimental evaluation. Mathematical Programming, 73, 129–174. [10] Coello Coello, C. A., Van Veldhuizen, D. A., & Lamont G. B. (2002). Evolutionary algorithms for solving multi-objective problems. Kluwer Academic Publishers. [11] Dijkstra, E. W. (1959). A note on two problems in connexion with graphs. Numerische Mathematik, 1, 269–271. [12] Dorigo M. & Di Caro, G. (1999). The ant colony optimization meta-heuristic. In D. Corne, M. Dorigo, & F. Glover (Eds.), New Ideas in Optimization, pp. 11–32. McGraw-Hill. [13] Dorigo, M. & Stützle, T. (2002). The ant colony optimization metaheuristic: algorithms, applications, and advances. In G. A. Kochenberger & F. Glover (Eds.), Handbook of Metaheuristics, pp. 251–285. Kluwer. [14] Gambardella, L., Taillard, E., & Agazzi, G. (1999). Macs-vrptw: A multiple ant colony system for vehicle routing problems with time windows. In F. Glover D. Corne, & M. Dorigo (Eds.), New Ideas in Optimization, pp. 73–76. McGraw-Hill.

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[15] García-Martínez, C., Cordón, O., & Herrera, F. (2003). A new moea for multiobjective tsp and its convergence property analysis. In Evolutionary Multi-Criterion Optimization, Number 2632 in LNCS, pp. 342–354. Springer. [16] García-Martínez, C., Cordón, O., & Herrera, F. (2004). An empirical analysis of multiple objective ant colony optimization algorithms for the bi-criteria TSP. In ANTS 2004. Fourth International Workshop on. Ant Colony Optimization and Swarm Intelligence, Number 3172 in LNCS, pp. 61–72. Springer. [17] Grassé, P.-P. (1959). La reconstruction du nid et les coordinations inter-individuelles chez bellicositermes natalensis et cubitermes sp. la theorie de la stigmerie. Insects Soc., 6, 41–80. [18] Iredi, S., Merkle, D., & Middendorf, M. (2001). Bi-criterion optimization with multi colony ant algorithms. In E. Zitzler, K. Deb, L. Thiele, C. A. Coello Coello, & D. Corne (Eds.), Proceedings of the First International Conference on Evolutionary Multi-Criterion Optimization (EMO 2001), volume 1993 of LNCS, pp. 359–372, Berlin: Springer. [19] Deneubourg, J. L., Pasteels, J. M., & Verhaeghe, J. C. (1983). Probabilistic behaviour in ants: a strategy of errors? J. Theor. Biol., 105, 259–271. [20] Karwan, M. H., Thyagarajan, K., Batta, R., & Szczerba, R. J. (2005). Planning dissimilar paths for military units. Military Operations Research Journal, 10 (1), 25–42.

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[21] Lawler, E. L., Lenstra, J. K., Rinnooy Kan, A. H. G., & Shmoys, D. B. (Eds.) (1985). The Traveling Salesman Problem. John Wiley & Sons Ltd. [22] Loui, R. P. (1983). Optimal paths in graphs with stochastic or multidimensional weights. Communications of the ACM, 26 (9), 670–676. [23] Maloney, P. S. (1989). An application of neural net technology to surveillance information correlation and battle outcome prediction. In National Aerospace and Electronics Conference, NAECON 1989, Volume 2, pp. 948–955. IEEE. [24] Manley, K. (2003). Pathfinding: From a* to lpa. http://csci.morris.umn.edu/UMMCSciWiki/pub/CSci3903s03/KellysPaper/seminar.pdf.

[25] Montana, D., Bidwell, G., Vidaver, G. & Herrero, J. (1999). Scheduling and route selection for military land moves using genetic algorithms. In P. Angeline, Z. Michalewicz, M. Schoenauer, X. Yao, & A. Zalzala (Eds.), Congress on Evolutionary Computation, pp. 1118–1123. IEEE Press. [26] Mora, A. M., Merelo, J. J., Laredo, J. L. J., Millán, C., & Torrecillas, J. (2009). Chac, a moaco algorithm for computation of bi-criteria military unit path in the battlefield: Presentation and first results. International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 24 (7), 818–843.

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[27] Mora, A. M., Merelo, J. J., Millán, C., Torrecillas, J., & Laredo, J. L. J. (2006). CHAC. a MOACO algorithm for computation of bi-criteria military unit path in the battlefield. In N. Krasnogor, D. A. Pelta (Eds.), Proceedings of the Workshop on Nature Inspired Cooperative Strategies for Optimization. NICSO’2006, pp. 85–98. [28] Osyczka, A. (1985). Multicriteria optimization for engineering design. In John S. Gero (Ed.), Design Optimization, pp. 193–227. Academic Press. [29] Potvin, J.-Y. (1996). Genetic algorithms for the traveling salesman problem. Annals of Operations Research, 63 (3), 337–370. [30] Reinelt, G. (1994). The traveling salesman: Computational solutions for TSP applications. Springer Verlag, LNCS 840. [31] Shang, G. (2008). Solving weapon-target assignment problems by a new ant colony algorithm. Computational Intelligence and Design, International Symposium on, 1, 221–224. [32] Stentz, A. (1993). Optimal and efficient path planning for unknown and dynamic environments. Technical Report CMU-RI-TR-93-20, Robotics Institute, Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University.

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[33] Stewart, B. S. & White, Ch. C., III. (1991). Multiobjective A*. J. ACM, 38 (4), 775–814. [34] Zhen, T., Zhang, Q., Zhang, W., & Ma, Z. (2008). Hybrid ant colony algorithm for the vehicle routing with time windows. In CCCM ’08: Proceedings of the 2008 ISECS International Colloquium on Computing, Communication, Control, and Management, pp. 8–12, USA, Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society.

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In: Military Operations, Health and Technology Editor: Alexander L. Cobb, pp. 89-166

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Chapter 5

WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: STRATEGY, MILITARY OPERATIONS, * AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Steve Bowman1 and Catherine Dale2 1

2

National Security, International Security

Abstract

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With a deteriorating security situation and no comprehensive political outcome yet in sight, most observers view the war in Afghanistan as open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of Members of Congress, Administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort—often called “America’s other war”—required greater national attention. For the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war is both a struggle for survival and an effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the United States, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a stable regional security balance. For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan’s neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war may have a powerful impact on the future balance of power and influence in the region. For individual members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the war may be about defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and/or demonstrating NATO’s relevance in the 21st century. Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda’s use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. In that first phase, U.S. and coalition forces, working with Afghan opposition forces, quickly removed the Taliban regime. After the fall of the Taliban, the character of the war shifted to a multifaceted COIN effort aimed at smothering the diffuse insurgency by shoring up GIRoA efforts to provide *

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of Congressional Research Service, Publication No. R40156, dated June 8, 2010.

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale security, governance, and economic development. The three areas are generally viewed as interdependent and mutually-reinforcing—security is a prerequisite for some governance and development efforts, and longer-term, sustainable security requires both functional governance and economic opportunity. As one pillar of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan and international military effort aims broadly at defeating the remnants of the Taliban and other insurgents, securing the population, and helping extend the reach of the Afghan government. The international military effort includes both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to which the United States contributes troops, and the separate U.S.-led OEF mission. In his December 3, 2009, speech President Obama identified several objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan: (1) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda; (2) deny al Qaeda a safe haven; (3) reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government; and (4) strengthen the capacity of the Afghan security forces and government to better protect and serve population centers. To accomplish this, President Obama ordered the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops to the region, which will bring the U.S. total to almost 100,000 troops. This deployment will be staged over several months, with the full additional complement being in- country by the end of the summer 2010. Noting that Afghan operations continue to be an international effort, President Obama expressed confidence that some of 42 coalition allies will also be increasing their contributions. NATO SecretaryGeneral Rasmussen echoed this confidence, stating that he expects NATO allies to contribute at least an additional 5,000 troops in 2010. This report will be updated as events warrant.

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Overview Unlike the war in Iraq, which, many argue, has entered its endstate, the war in Afghanistan— where the security situation has deteriorated and no comprehensive political outcome is yet in sight—appears to many observers to be open-ended. By early 2009, a growing number of members of Congress, administration officials, and outside experts had concluded that the effort—often called America’s “other war”—required greater national attention.[1] In his inaugural address, President Obama stated that the United States would “forge a hard-earned peace in Afghanistan.”[2] For the government of Afghanistan, the war is first of all an existential struggle for survival against the Taliban and other insurgents, as well as a longer-term effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the U.S. government, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of both Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a constructive and stable regional security balance.[3] For regional states, including India and Russia as well as Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors Pakistan and Iran, the war is critical because it may have a powerful impact on the future security and balance of power and influence in the region. For individual member states of the NATO Alliance, the war may be about some combination of defeating terrorist networks, ensuring regional stability, proving themselves as contributing NATO members, and demonstrating the relevance of the Alliance to 21st century security challenges. The U.S. government continues to face major strategic and operational decisions about its engagement in the war in Afghanistan. Elements of the debate that continue to attract attention include defining U.S. national interests in Afghanistan and the region; defining clear strategic objectives and a desired end-state based on those interests; Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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determining which diplomatic, economic, and military approaches to adopt, and what resources to commit to support those approaches; prioritizing the Afghanistan war versus other national security imperatives including the war in Iraq and preparing to meet potential threats; and helping marshal a coordinated application of international efforts. Avenues available to Congress for exercising oversight of these issues include authorizing and appropriating funding for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the region; shaping policy through directive legislation; confirming senior administration officials with responsibility for the Afghanistan effort; holding oversight hearings to assess policy formulation and execution; and extending or adjusting administration reporting requirements.[4]

Recent Developments Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan In April, the administration submitted the Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, the fifth in a congressionally mandated semi-annual series. With regard to military operations, selected highlights of the report include the following: 

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









The deployment of additional U.S. forces is expected to be completed in August 2010, bringing the total to about 98,000. NATO and allied countries have pledged over 9, 000 additional troops, for a coalition total of about 150,000 personnel. Many coalition national leaders have noted the lack of public support in their countries for the Afghanistan mission, which has curtailed their ability to meet agreed upon force requirements. The ISAF HQ has identified 80 Afghan districts as “key terrain,” with anther 41 being designated as “Areas of Interest.” These are areas of concentrated population and economic importance, whose stabilization will be the primary focus of ISAF operations. To improve the unity of command, Central Command HQ has transferred operational control (OPCON) of almost all U.S. forces to ISAF’s General McChriystal, retaining operational control of a small special operations personnel. The creation of competent Afghan National Security Forces, both the army and the national police, remains a very high ISAF priority; however, there are significant challenges with regard to recruitment, retention, and corruption, particularly with regard to the police force. Efforts have also been hampered by a notable shortfall in trainers. Though levels of violence in the country are significantly higher than this period last year, owing to the increased tempo of military operations, polls indicate that a majority of the Afghan population believe the security situation has improved.

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Operation Moshtarak On February 13 in Helmand province, ISAF and Afghan forces undertook the largest joint military offensive to date. The 2nd U.S. Marine Expeditionary Brigade composes the bulk of ISAF’s 7,000 troops in the offensive, with the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Civil Order Police providing an additional 8,000 personnel.[5] Intended to regain control of an area long-held by the Taliban, Operation Moshtarek is widely viewed as a crucial test of current counterinsurgency strategy. ISAF officials have repeatedly emphasized the importance of Afghan participation in all facets of the operation, from planning through execution. This includes not only Afghan military forces but also administrative elements of the central government brought in behind the military offensive to take over the political and economic rehabilitation of the region. To date, the offensive has encountered only sporadic active resistance, though some encounters with insurgents have been intense, particularly in the area of Marjah. Many insurgents are believed to have fled the area in advance, leaving behind an extensive array of improvised explosive devices. ISAF commanders have indicated that they expect it to take 25-3 0 days to complete the military objectives, and another six months to judge the overall success in wresting control of the region from the Taliban. Unlike previous occasions, following active combat operations ISAF and Afghan military/police forces will remain to provide security for the population, the governmental administration, and those undertaking the economic reconstruction of the region. If operations go as expected, it is anticipated that within the next six months a similar effort will be undertaken in neighboring Kandahar province.[6]

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London Conference/Istanbul Conference In January, representatives of more than 60 nations met at the International Conference on Afghanistan in London, pledging support and resources to the increased personnel objective and accelerated timeline for the development of Afghan National Security Forces, and announcing new commitment of troops and trainers to ISAF (see “ISAF Troop Contributions” section). In February NATO Defense Ministers met in Istanbul to discuss alliance funding issues, and Secretary Gates continued his efforts to encourage greater allied participation in Afghan operations. Though NATO nations have already committed to sending an additional 9,000 troops to Afghanistan, the administration would like to obtain additional commitments for up to 4,000 more mentors and trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces.[7]

Strategy Review and Conclusions The Obama administration conducted a wide-ranging review of the strategy options and resource requirements for operations in Afghanistan, and the President presented his decisions in a speech at the U.S. Military Academy on December 1, 2009. Ongoing since August, this review was undertaken in response to an initial assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan submitted by General McChrystal, commander of the U.S./NATO International Security Assistance Force, and in response to concerns raised by charges of widespread corruption in the recent Afghan presidential election. Though classified, General McChrystal’s report was leaked to the press and subsequently a redacted unclassified version

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was released by the Administration.[8] The report assessed the security situation in Afghanistan to be deteriorating, with a growing insurgency whose momentum must be turned within 12 months or risk the possibility it could not be defeated. His principal recommendation was a shift in strategy from an emphasis on offensive military operations to a more comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, which would seek to protect the population from both insurgent violence and inadvertent harm from allied military operations, while accelerating the training and reliance upon Afghan National Security Forces. At the same time General McChrystal emphasized the importance of stemming the endemic corruption of the Afghan central government, and its need to significantly improve its ability to provide basic services to the Afghan people. The classified version of General McChrystal’s report also provided his estimate of the personnel and resources that he believes would be required to execute his counterinsurgency strategy. These estimates have not been released in unclassified form, but numerous press reports indicate they include a variety of options requiring from 15,000 up to 80,000 additional troops to be deployed over the next year, with the number of troops deployed determining the extent of the areas that could be stabilized. Over the past few months, President Obama convened nine meetings with the full range of his national security advisors, both civilian and military. The length of time taken to consider the strategy and resource options is indicative of the controversy within the administration. It also reflects the acceptance that the security situation in Afghanistan is closely entwined with that of bordering areas of Pakistan, which both the Taliban and alQaeda cadres are using as staging and training areas, which consequently adds a significant level of complexity to the strategic considerations. Of fundamental importance to the administration is establishing a timeline and process for turning over responsibility for security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).[9] There is, however, a certain tension between seeking to keep the U.S. military commitment from being open-ended and simultaneously seeking to assure both Afghan and international allies of a steadfast U.S. commitment. While General McChrystal’s assessments are based on undertaking a comprehensive counterinsurgency effort to stabilize Afghanistan, there are reportedly those in the administration who believe that a more narrowly focused effort concentrating only on identifying and neutralizing terrorist cells and their facilities is a preferable course of action. They argue that this approach would require fewer resources and could achieve the fundamental goal of deterring further terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies originating from this region. Supporters of the more comprehensive counterinsurgency effort maintain that anything less will run the risk of the insurgency collapsing the Afghan government, resulting in the return of the Taliban ascendency and accommodation of alQaeda in Afghanistan and potentially increased instability in neighboring Pakistan. President’s December 1 Speech: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan[10] The President identified several objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan: (1) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda; (2) deny al Qaeda a safe haven; (3) reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government; and (4) strengthen the capacity of the Afghan security forces and government to better protect and serve population centers. To accomplish this, President Obama is ordering the deployment of an additional

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30,000 troops to the region, which will bring the U.S. total to almost 100,000 troops. This deployment will be staged over the next six months, with the full additional complement being in-country by summer 2010. Noting that Afghan operations continue to be an international effort, President Obama expressed confidence that some of 42 coalition allies will also be increasing their contributions. NATO Secretary- General Rasmussen echoed this confidence, stating that he expects NATO allies to contribute at least an additional 5,000 troops in 2010.[11] The President emphasized the importance of transferring lead responsibility for security to the ANSF by announcing his intent to start withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan by July 2011. This element of the President’s announcement has initially attracted the most attention in the press and in the Congress. Among the questions have been (1) whether this is intended to be a hard and fast deadline, or one subject to amendment; (2) given that the full 30,000 troop increase will not be completed before mid-2010, does that deadline provide sufficient time to achieve the U.S. objectives; (3) what criteria or “metrics” will be used to guide decisions on how fast to draw down; (4) whether a date-specific deadline for the start of a U.S. withdrawal will unsettle potential Afghan and Pakistani allies, causing them to question the steadfastness of the U.S. commitment in the region. President Obama stressed that an effective partnership with the Pakistani government and military is a key element for the defeat of the Afghan insurgency, and that increased attention will be paid to strengthening this partnership through military and economic assistance. The President’s new Afghanistan strategy has received broad consideration within Congress, with multiple hearings being held by both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

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Training Afghan Security Forces In keeping with his intent to improve operational coordination, General McChrystal has consolidated the U.S. and NATO training mission under a single NATO command: National Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM-A) It is hoped that this will encourage other NATO nations to increase their participation in the training effort There are currently about 94,000 personnel in the Afghan army and 91,000 police. NATO commanders hope to raise these numbers to 134,000 and 96,800 respectively by October 2010, with an eventual objective of a total of 400,000 Afghan National Security Forces.[12]

Character of the War in Afghanistan While war is always about the organized use of violence to achieve political ends, the character of a given war may change dramatically over time. Since 2001, the character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved markedly, from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters, to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency (COIN) effort. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in order to end the ability of the Taliban regime to provide safe haven to al Qaeda and to put a stop to al Qaeda’s use of the territory of Afghanistan as a base of operations for terrorist activities. In that first phase, a primarily military effort, U.S. and other

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Source: The University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, Afghanistan Political Map 2003.

Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan.

coalition forces, working closely with Afghan opposition forces, quickly removed the Taliban regime. After the fall of the Taliban, the character of the war shifted to a multifaceted COIN effort aimed at smothering the diffuse insurgency by shoring up the efforts of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to provide security, governance, and economic development. Leading practitioners view efforts in all three areas—and not just kinetic military operations—as essential to any successful counterinsurgency campaign. As U.S. Army General David Petraeus, now Commanding General of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has frequently stated, “You can’t kill your way out of an insurgency.”[13] The three areas are generally viewed as interdependent and mutuallyreinforcing—sufficient security is a prerequisite for some governance and development efforts, and longer-term, sustainable security requires both functional governance and economic opportunity. COIN theorists argue further that these areas require substantial civilian as well as military efforts. As the U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2006 COIN Manual states: “Military efforts are necessary and important to counterinsurgency efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of national power.”[14]

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As a central pillar of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan and international military effort aims broadly at defeating the remnants of the Taliban and other insurgents, securing the population, and helping extend the reach of the Afghan government. The international military effort now includes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to which the U.S. government contributes troops, as well as the separate US-led OEF mission.

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Prospects for the Outcome of the War Afghanistan‘s results to date have been mixed, and no concrete end of the war is yet in sight. Despite the achievement of some major political milestones—including ratifying a new constitution and holding presidential and parliamentary elections—progress to date in extending the rule of law, establishing effective governance, and furthering economic development has been relatively limited, as reflected in the widespread corruption encountered in the summer 2009 presidential elections. Meanwhile, for several years, practitioners and observers have expressed concerns about a worsening security situation on the ground, including the greater frequency and sophistication of attacks, exacerbated by the ability of insurgents to find safe haven across the border in Pakistan. Experts differ on the further prospects for the Afghanistan effort and the war‘s likely outcome, in part because they pose the question in different ways. One approach addresses the relatively short-term goal of defeating the insurgency—that is, ensuring that insurgents cannot directly challenge the authority of the Afghan state. As of late 2009, few if any practitioners or observers expected the war to end in a clear Taliban victory, including Taliban control of the state of Afghanistan. Some suggested that a more likely worst-case scenario would be a reversion to the civil war and chaos of the early 1 990s, including warlordism, a general lack of stability and opportunity for ordinary Afghans, and a proliferation of ungoverned spaces that might be used by terrorists as safe havens. To some extent, these conditions are currently manifested in parts of southern Afghanistan. In late 2008, as a rule, U.S. and other international senior officials in Afghanistan expressed measured optimism regarding near-term results of the counterinsurgency effort. They pointed to some recent progress breaking down insurgent networks and expected further gains, particularly if more resources were made available and greater cooperation from all parties, including neighboring states, achieved. As a rule, international officials did not argue that without more resources, the COIN effort would fail, but rather, that without more resources, the effort would cost more money, more time, and more lives. [15] In August 2009, General Mc Chrystal‘s report carried a notably less optimistic assessment, raising the possibility of failure without timely and adequate resourcing of the allied counterinsurgency efforts. Another approach to the question of Afghanistan‘s prospects takes a broader and longerterm view. Observers from this school of thought point to thirty years of war, occupation, displacement and chaos that have destroyed Afghanistan‘s infrastructure, ravaged its human capital resources, and left most of its relatively youthful population with no memories of living in a society not disrupted by conflict. Some experts caution that even if the insurgency is defeated in the near- term, it is not hard to imagine that some remnants or some later generations might draw inspiration from the current fight, and resume the attack whenever the

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political and security constellation seems more conducive to their success—as Afghans say, ―You have the watches; we have the time.‖ Other observers note that in comparative and historical global perspective, it is quite rare for states to achieve ―stability‖ and ―good governance,‖ and that Afghanistan, given its relative poverty of human and natural resources, faces steep challenges and unlikely odds in aiming at those objectives. Accordingly, some senior U.S. and other international officials have urged a tempering of expectations about Afghanistan‘s long-term prospects.

Purpose of This Report This report provides a examination of the war‘s background, context, and early execution; an analytical discussion of the COIN war to date, including strategy, organization, participation, and key facets of the effort including population security, advising the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), counter-narcotics, reconciliation, community outreach, and civilmilitary coordination; and an analysis of major strategic and operational issues and options that the 111th Congress may opt to consider.

Background: Context and Early History of the War

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Current efforts to support security, governance and development in Afghanistan take place in the aftermath of thirty grueling years of conflict and unrest, followed by OEF military operations that removed the Taliban regime and the rapid creation of a new, post-Taliban political order.

Prelude to War[16] In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to shore up a puppet communist regime. During the 1980‘s, armed Afghan resistance groups known as ―mujahedin‖ waged war against Soviet forces and the Afghan security forces that supported them. [17] During that period, the U.S. government, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), provided covert assistance to mujahedin groups, working through Pakistan‘s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). In 1989, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, and in April 1992, the Soviet-backed Afghan regime in Kabul fell to mujahedin forces, which established a form of rule including a rotating presidency. In November 1994, the ethnically Pashtun-dominated Taliban movement led by Mullah Omar seized the city of Kandahar, in southern Afghanistan.[18] In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and retained control over much of the country until ousted by OEF operations in 2001. However, throughout its tenure, the Taliban continued to face armed opposition, in particular from the Northern Alliance, a loose network dominated by ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks, primarily from northern Afghanistan. Key legacies of Afghanistan‘s years of civil war, conflict, and oppressive rule included the deaths of over a million people, the displacement of millions more, the proliferation of available weapons, and the destruction of key institutions and infrastructure.

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The proximate cause of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan was the linkage of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to al Qaeda, which trained and operated under Taliban protection in Afghanistan. In an address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush stated U.S. demands on the Taliban, warning: ―The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate.‖[19]

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Major Combat Operations On October 7, 2001, following the refusal of the Taliban regime to cease harboring al Qaeda, the U.S. government launched military operations in Afghanistan, with the stated purpose of disrupting the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and attacking the military capability of the Taliban regime. [20] In contrast to the lengthy, iterative preparations that preceded the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. planning process for OEF was extremely condensed. The concept of operations was based on Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld‘s vision of defense transformation, including the idea that a heavier reliance on cutting-edge technology and precision weaponry could make possible the deployment of smaller-sized conventional ground forces. Military operations were preceded and complemented by work by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with Afghan opposition groups on the ground. Initial U.S. operations relied on the use of special operations forces (SOF) on the ground, enabled by air assets, working by, with and through indigenous partners, in particular the Northern Alliance. Many U.S. defense experts regarded the operations as an important demonstration of operational ―jointness‖—the ability of Military Services to work together seamlessly. The United Kingdom and Australia also deployed forces to support the major combat phase of operations, and dozens of other countries provided basing, access and overflight permission.[21] Military victory, including the demise of the Taliban regime, came quickly. In November 2001, the Taliban fled Kabul, and in December they left their stronghold, the southern city of Kandahar. It is generally understood that in December 2001, key al Qaeda and Taliban leaders fled across the border into Pakistan. To fill the political void, in December 2001, in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations hosted the so- called Bonn Conference. Participants included representatives of four Afghan opposition groupings, and observers included representatives of neighboring and other key countries including the United States. The resulting Bonn Agreement created an Afghan Interim Authority to serve as the ―repository of Afghan sovereignty‖ and outlined a political process for producing a new constitution and choosing a new Afghan government. In contrast to the model pursued in Iraq from 2003 to 2004, in Afghanistan there was no period of formal occupation in which an international authority exercised sovereignty on behalf of the Afghans.[22] To help provide security to support the fledgling new regime, in December 2001 the United Nations authorized an international force—the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—with a mandate to help the Afghans maintain security in Kabul and surrounding areas. The United Kingdom agreed to lead the force initially.[23]

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The major combat operations phase was regarded as a quick success by its Afghan protagonists and their U.S. and other international partners, but the challenges were far from over. The new Afghan leadership faced the profound political challenge of consolidating a fractious, scarred state, with very few resources. The new leaders also faced potential violent challenges, both from resurgent al Qaeda and Taliban leaders who were defeated but not eliminated, and from Afghan local power-brokers, strengthened by years of battle-hardened autonomy and resistance, who were displeased by the emerging post-Taliban order.

Counterinsurgency War in Afghanistan to Date Both the security climate—including the composition, strategy, and tactics of the insurgency— and the structure and focus of international efforts designed to support the Afghan government have changed substantially since the end of the major combat operations that ousted the Taliban regime. This section describes and analyzes key developments in the counterinsurgency war in Afghanistan with an emphasis on recent trends and initiatives.

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Strategy In 2008, as international interest in, and attention to, the war in Afghanistan grew, a number of observers stressed the need for clearer or more robust strategy to guide Afghan and international efforts. ―Strategy‖ is commonly understood to include a statement of objectives, or desired ends; the ways and means designed to achieve those ends; and the roles and responsibilities of key players in executing those ways and means.[24] Strategy-making for Afghanistan is particularly complicated, for two main reasons. First, the range of strategic objectives is quite broad, encompassing not only security progress but also, for example, civilian capacity-building, the rule of law, counternarcotics, and economic development. Those fields, in turn, are closely linked empirically—for example, long-term development requires a relatively stable environment, and successful counternarcotics efforts must be predicated on some form of rule of law. Second, strategy-making is complicated by the range of actors providing some support to GIRoA, including NATO, the United Nations, and other international organizations, as well as individual states, each of which may have its own—or even competing sets of—interests and priorities. Military strategy, in turn, is not easily separable from broader grand strategy for Afghanistan, since security is essential for progress in other areas, and since military forces play key supporting roles in the non-security lines of operation.

NATO Strategy At its 20th Summit, held in Bucharest, Romania, in April 2008, NATO issued a streamlined but clear strategic vision for Afghanistan. That vision established four ―guiding principles‖: a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan‘s neighbors, especially Pakistan. The document also included a ―vision of success,‖ which is

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essentially a statement of objectives: ―extremism and terrorism will no longer pose a threat to stability; Afghan National Security Forces will be in the lead and self-sufficient; and the Afghan government will be able to extend the reach of good governance, reconstruction, and development throughout the country to the benefit of all its citizens.‖[25] What the ―strategic vision‖ did not provide in any detail was a clear articulation of the specific ways and means ISAF would use to achieve those objectives. Arguably closing the strategy gap substantially, ISAF, in October 2008, issued a classified Joint Campaign Plan (JCP). The JCP was General McKiernan‘s guidance to the force, and it specified key assumptions, objectives, and approaches to be used to achieve those objectives. It stated that the primary goal is the ―transfer of lead security responsibility‖ to the Afghans, which includes planning as well as conducting operations. The JCP addressed all the lines of operation (LOO) discussed in the Afghanistan Compact but underscored that NATO has the lead only for the security LOO. Importantly, the JCP framed ISAF‘s mission in counterinsurgency (COIN) terms— the mission includes defeating an ―insurgency‖ and the basic approach follows the COIN logic of ―shape, clear, hold, build.‖ ISAF officials considered the use of COIN terminology a breakthrough, following years of NATO preference for framing the effort in Afghanistan in terms of stability operations.[26] In October 2009, NATO Defense Ministers met in Bratislava and adopted four priorities for ISAF operations: (1) focus upon the Afghan population; (2) enhanced efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces; (3) promote better Afghan governance; (4) to engage more effectively with Afghanistan‘s neighbors, particularly Pakistan.[27]

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U.S. Government Strategy The U.S. government plays a significant leadership role in both ISAF and NATO as a whole, and thus helps shape NATO and ISAF strategy and approaches. At the same time, the United States may have national interests in Afghanistan and the region that are not shared by all ISAF contributors, and the relative priority of various interests may differ among the Allies. The U.S. government has not published a formal strategy for Afghanistan, along the lines of the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.[28] Key Obama Administration officials have nevertheless outlined several elements of the U.S. strategy. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michèle Flournoy has stated that ―our strategic objective is a stable and secure Afghanistan in which al Qaeda and the network of insurgent groups, including the Taliban, are incapable of seriously threatening the Afghan state and resurrecting a safe haven for terrorism.‖[29] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has indicated that President Obama‘s Afghanistan strategy focuses on these elements: sending additional troops to Afghanistan; providing a ―major increase‖ in non-military aid to Afghanistan; confronting the drug trade; and developing a coherent Pakistan policy. Furthermore, based on a policy of ―more for more,‖ aid to GIRoA would be tied to better performance.[30] CENTCOM conducted a 100-day comprehensive strategic review of its entire area of responsibility, including Afghanistan. For his part, General McKiernan, then ISAF Commander, suggested that U.S. interests might include ensuring that Afghanistan cannot harbor terrorists; establishing a controlled Afghanistan/ Pakistan border; promoting a degree of regional stability; supporting a constructive role for Iran; and encouraging some form of freedom and democracy for the Afghan people.[31]

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Upon assuming office, President Obama initiated an interagency policy review and consultations with both coalition allies and the governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. On March 27, 2009, President Obama outlined a strategy for continuing operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan based on this review, which included consultations with coalition allied governments and those of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The white paper summarizing the review report listed five objectives:[32]    

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

Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability to plan and launch international terrorist attacks. Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan. Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with reduced U.S. assistance. Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant Pakistani economy. Involving the international community to actively assist in addressing these objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with an important leadership role for the United Nations.

The white paper defined two priority missions for U.S. military forces in Afghanistan: (1) to secure Afghanistan‘s south and east regions against a return of al Qaeda and its allies, and provide a space for the Afghan government to establish effective control, and (2) to provide Afghan security forces the mentoring required to expand rapidly and take the lead in counterinsurgency operations, thereby allowing U.S. forces to ―wind down‖ combat operations.[33] To carry out these missions, the Administration‘s review called for ―executing and resourcing an integrated civilian- military counterinsurgency strategy.‖ In June, 2009 General Stanley McChrystal assumed command of U.S.-NATO forces in Afghanistan and undertook another review of the security situation in Afghanistan, resulting a report submitted to the Department of Defense in August 2009. General McChrystal particularly emphasized (1) a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy focused on the welfare of the Afghan population; (2) improving ISAF ‘s unity of effort and command; (3) increasing the size and capability of Afghan security forces and operational ―partnering‖ with allied forces; (4) improving Afghan civil governance and reducing governmental corruption; (5) gaining the initiative against the insurgency throughout the country; and (6) prioritizing allocation of resources to the most threatened populations.[34] In response to General McChrystal‘s report, and the tenuous political situation in Afghanistan in the wake of the flawed presidential election there, the Obama administration undertook the most extensive review yet of strategy regarding Afghanistan. The review‘s conclusions, outlined in President Obama‘s December 3 speech at the U.S. Military Academy, essentially endorsed the principals of the March white paper. The President‘s decision to augment U.S. forces in Afghanistan with an additional 30,000 troops reflected a desire to accelerate the three main military elements of the strategy: (1) break the momentum of the insurgency, (2) better secure the major population centers, and (3) increase the number and improve the performance of Afghan National Security Forces. The President also announced that the increased U.S. force level (approximately 98,000 troops) would be maintained until July 2011, at which time a withdrawal of U.S. forces would begin. The pace

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and size of the withdrawal will be dependent upon the state of the security environment at that time.

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International Efforts: Organization and Coordination Afghanistan, which lacks sufficient institutional, material and human resources to make substantial progress on its own, relies deeply on the international community to support the three main pillars of the counterinsurgency effort: security, governance and development. However, most practitioners and observers contend that ever since the Bonn Conference, the multi-faceted international effort has suffered from a dearth of resources in each area, and from insufficient coordination among key players and their initiatives. This assessment was reinforced by General McChrystal‘s August 2009 report. The ―lead nation‖ model of international assistance to Afghanistan was agreed to at a donors‘ conference held in Tokyo in early 2002. Five countries each agreed to assume lead coordination responsibility for assistance to a single area of security-related Afghan administration: the United States for the army, Germany for the police, Italy for the judiciary, the United Kingdom for counternarcotics, and Japan for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of militias. The Afghanistan Compact, a formal statement of commitment by the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the international community, finalized in January 2006, shifted responsibility from lead nations to Afghanistan itself. The premise was a shared Afghan and international vision of Afghanistan‘s future, including the commitment of the international community to ―provide resources and support‖ to realize that vision. The Compact established three broad pillars of activity for future efforts—security; governance, the rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development. To ―ensure overall strategic coordination of the implementation of the Compact,‖ the document established the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), co-chaired by a GIRoA representative and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN SRSG).[35] The UN SRSG leads the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which was established by the UN Security Council in early 2002.[36] The current UNAMA mandate confirms the UN SRSG‘s lead coordination role, as described by the Afghanistan Compact, but clarifies that the UN plays a stronger coordination role vis-à-vis civilian assistance efforts, than for military ones. The mandate states that the UN SRSG will ―lead the international civilian efforts‖ to promote ―...more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan government.‖ Concerning military efforts, the UN SRSG will work to ―strengthen cooperation with ISAF at all levels.‖[37]

Security Line of Operation: Organization International military forces in Afghanistan lead support to GIRoA in the field of security— one of the three pillars of the Afghanistan Compact—and support international civilian initiatives in the other two fields, governance and development. Over time, the mandates, structure and composition of the international force presence in Afghanistan have changed significantly, as the role of NATO has increased and the character of the fight has evolved.

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Today, NATO leads the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the United States leads the OEF coalition effort. The U.S. government contributes troops to both missions. The command of these two efforts has now been unified under U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal.

NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)[38] ISAF represents NATO‘s first significant out-of-area deployment, and it is viewed by many observers as a key test for the Alliance—a measure of both its current capabilities and its possible future relevance. On September 12, 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO for the first time invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which confirms the commitment of the allies to collective self-defense in the event of armed attack on any party to the treaty.[39] That action helped clear the way for future NATO operations in Afghanistan. On August 9, 2003, NATO assumed responsibility for the ISAF mission, which had been established by UN mandate in December 2001 and led until mid-2003 by a series of lead nations.

ISAF Stages

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ISAF, initially mandated to support Afghan efforts to secure Kabul and its immediate environs, expanded its geographical scope in four stages. During Stage 1, completed on October 1, 2004, ISAF expanded to the north of Kabul, assuming responsibility for a German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and establishing new PRTs. In Stage 2, completed in September 2005, ISAF expanded to the west. In Stage 3, completed on July 31, 2006, ISAF assumed responsibility for southern Afghanistan. In Stage 4, completed on October 5, 2006, ISAF assumed control of U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan.[40]

ISAF Mandate The focus of ISAF efforts has been a source of contention among the Allies, many of whom agreed to contribute troops on the premise that ISAF ‘s focus would be post-conflict stability operations. That premise may have been valid at the time of ISAF‘s formation, but by several years later, the security climate had changed and an organized, capable insurgency had emerged. ISAF Commanding General, U.S. Army General David McKiernan, stated in November 2008: ―The fact is that we are at war in Afghanistan. It‘s not peacekeeping. It‘s not stability operations. It‘s not humanitarian assistance. It‘s war.‖[41] ISAF‘s mission statement reflects the insurgency challenge: ―ISAF conducts operations in partnership with GIRoA and in coordination with OEF, UNAMA, and the international community in order to assist GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, establish a secure environment, extend viable governance, and promote development throughout Afghanistan.‖[42]

ISAF Phases From the outset, NATO planned that ISAF operations in Afghanistan would have four phases. The first phase was ―assessment and preparation,‖ including initial operations only in Kabul. The second phase was ISAF‘s geographic expansion throughout Afghanistan, completed in

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2006. The final three phases would be stabilization; transition; and redeployment. At the start of 2009, ISAF was operating in Phase III, ―stabilization,‖ and NATO officials were reportedly discussing when to announce the commencement of Phase IV, the ―transition‖ of lead security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Some ISAF officials have expressed the concern that an announcement that ISAF has entered ―transition‖ could trigger a rush by some troop- contributing countries to Phase V—―redeployment.‖ They caution that in practice, the shift from stabilization to transition is likely to vary geographically across Afghanistan as the abilities of various ANSF to execute and then lead missions increase, and to take place in fits and starts, rather than at a clear single point in time.[43]

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ISAF Organization ISAF is led by a four-star combined headquarters, based in Kabul and headed by U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal. NATO‘s North Atlantic Council provides political direction for the mission. NATO‘s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), based in Mons, Belgium, and led by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), U.S. Navy Admiral James Stavridis, provides strategic command and control. NATO‘s Joint Force Command Headquarters, which is based in Brunssum, The Netherlands, and reports to SHAPE, provides ―overall operational control,‖ including many administrative responsibilities. ISAF itself, which reports to SHAPE through Joint Forces Command, exercises ―in-theater operational command.‖ This arrangement, including two levels of operational headquarters, is somewhat unusual. In Afghanistan, ISAF oversees five contiguous Regional Commands (RC), each led by a two-star general: RC-Center, led by France; RC-North, led by Germany; RC-West, led by Italy; RC-South, under rotating lead by Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; and RC-East, led by the United States. Troop contingents from other Allies, and from some non-NATO partners, serve under these Regional Commands. ISAF Troop Contributions As of February 1, 2010, ISAF included 85,795 from 43 countries, including NATO Allies and non-NATO partners.[44] NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, following a meeting of foreign ministers in December 2009, said he expected additional pledges of at least 5,000 troops to be forthcoming. Since then, a number of new NATO pledges not reflected in the above table have been announced: Albania, 125; Croatia, 40; Czech Republic, 100; Germany, 500; Italy, 1,040; Lithuania, 20; Poland, 680; Portugal, 120; Romania, 700; Slovakia, 240; Spain, 500; Turkey (N/A); United Kingdom, 1,200. Non-NATO nations that have made additional commitments are Armenia, 40; Australia, 120; Finland, 25; Georgia, 923; Macedonia, 80; Sweden, 125; Ukraine, 22. Other nations that have indicated possible contributions are Colombia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Montenegro, and South Korea. At the same time, however, Canada and the Netherlands will be withdrawing their contingents in 2011 and 2010, respectively. [45] From the outset, NATO has struggled to secure sufficient troop contributions for ISAF. One consideration for potential troop contributors is cost—NATO‘s long-standing practice, ―costs lie where they fall,‖ typically means that countries pay their

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own costs when they contribute troops to a mission such as Afghanistan. Another consideration is the need for domestic political support.

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ISAF National Caveats From the outset, ISAF operations have been constrained by ―national caveats‖—restrictions that individual troop-contributing countries impose on their own forces‘ activities. Caveats tend to be informed by domestic political constraints—a government may consider, for example, that only by limiting its troops‘ activities, and hedging against taking casualties, can it guard against strong popular domestic opposition to its troop contribution. As a rule, troopcontributing countries state their caveats explicitly; but additional constraints may surface when unanticipated requirements arise and contingents seek additional guidance from their capitals. The nature and extent of national caveats varies greatly among ISAF participants. Senior U.S. military officials point with concern, for example, to constraints on German forces in Afghanistan, which are imposed by Germany‘s parliament the Bundestag. These include restrictions on German training and advisory teams that do not allow them to conduct combined offensive operations with their Afghan counterparts, and on capable German Special Operations Forces (SOF) that are ―FOB-locked,‖ that is, effectively confined to their Forward Operating Base. Not all contingents are so constrained. U.S. officials praise, for example, the 700-strong French infantry battalion that works closely with U.S. SOF and Afghan counterparts in Kapisa province, at the ―north gate‖ into Kabul, which witnessed growing insurgent infiltration in 2008. National caveats frustrate commanders on the ground because they inhibit commanders‘ freedom to apportion forces across the battlespace—to move and utilize forces freely. With caveats, the ―whole‖ of the international force, as some observers have suggested, is less than the sum of its parts. Even more damaging, ISAF officials note, is the impact caveats can have on ISAF‘s relationship with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) counterparts. For

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example, ISAF advisory teams that are unable to accompany ANSF counterparts on offensive operations quickly lose both the Afghans‘ respect, and their own ability to shape and mentor the Afghan forces. Afghan Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak stated that ISAF training teams ―don‘t have the same quality‖ as their U.S. counterparts.[46] U.S. senior military officials in Afghanistan frequently note that the ANSF appreciate their U.S. counterparts because ―we drink from the same canteen.‖[47] The U.S. government has consistently urged ISAF troop contributors to drop or ease their national caveats, with some limited success.

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Coordination within NATO/ISAF ISAF officials note that both command and control, and coordination, within the NATO mission in Afghanistan leave some room for improvement. One challenge is ensuring a full command relationship between ISAF headquarters and the Regional Commands. In RC-South, for example, the major troop contributors—the UK, Canada, the Netherlands—are strong partners relatively unconstrained by caveats. But ISAF officials note that RC-South effectively includes four provincially-based national campaigns—Dutch, British, Canadian, and U.S.—based on the provinces in which their respective troops are deployed. Each of these ISAF countries, in turn, tends to lobby the relevant Afghan Ministers in Kabul for assistance to ―its‖ province. The RC-South commander, ISAF officials underscore, has never been empowered to give comprehensive guidance to the other nations in that RC command. In November 2008, the new RC-South Commanding General, Major General de Kruif from the Netherlands, indicated the relatively low standard of expectations, stating: ―it‘s not about unity of command, but about unity of effort.‖[48]As have his predecessors, General McChrystal has stressed, however, that a more closely integrated effort is necessary, not least because insurgents and tribes do not define their efforts by provincial or district boundaries.[49] An additional challenge is information flow among ISAF participants. Senior U.S. officials at the ISAF HQ in Kabul note that they have a much clearer operational picture of eastern and southern Afghanistan, where most U.S. forces operate, than of northern and western Afghanistan. Constraints on information flow may include the use of different— national and NATO— communications channels, linguistic barriers, and some reluctance on the part of some countries to share information perceived to be especially sensitive. In August 2009, the NATO nations approved a new ISAF command structure to reflect a mission expanded since ISAF ‘s inception in both scope and geographical area. In the new structure, the ISAF Commander (COMISAF), a four-star slot, will also be dual-hatted as commander of U.S. forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom. COMISAF will also focus on strategic political-military mission aspects, coordinating ISAF operations with Afghan security forces and other international organizations. COMISAF will also oversee the NATO training mission and the special operations forces operating in Afghanistan. A new three-star position, ISAF Joint Commander (COMICJ) will be responsible for the full range of daily tactical operations, overseeing the five regional commands and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Another major challenge is maintaining situational awareness of—let alone control over—the activities of the 26 nationally-sponsored Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which foster the ability of Afghan provincial-level officials to provide and promote

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governance, development and security. Officially, the military component of each PRT falls under ISAF command.[50] In practice, despite an ISAF directive that the PRT military components must report to ISAF on their activities, information flow has been spotty. One senior ISAF official speculated that one reason for the historical failure to comply might have been the perception that such efforts were wasted—that is, that the ISAF HQ made little use of such data and provided nothing back to the PRTs in return. The lack of a clear, shared picture of PRT activities has frustrated not only the ISAF leadership, but also Afghan and UN officials, in their efforts to apply resources strategically and effectively.[51] In November 2008, the ISAF HQ restructured PRT oversight, to include the capability to share lessons learned and provide analytical feedback to PRTs. And in December 2008, a long- moribund Executive Steering Committee, including senior leadership from ISAF, GIRoA, and UNAMA, was reconstituted. As a result, the information flow concerning PRTs has improved. One further challenge to full ISAF unity of command is the distinct mandate and role of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR), a position held since July 2008 by Italian Ambassador Fernando Gentilini. The SCR is the representative in Afghanistan of the NATO Secretary-General and reports regularly to the North Atlantic Council. As described by Ambassador Gentilini, the purpose is to ―show that NATO is not just a military organization but that it can contribute to the political process more broadly.‖[52] Some ISAF senior officials view the SCR position—not necessarily any specific incumbent—as a ―free agent,‖ since the SCR is not part of ISAF, and ISAF and the SCR are not required to speak to counterparts in Afghanistan with a single NATO voice.[53]

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U.S. Forces in Afghanistan The U.S. footprint in Afghanistan, and command and control arrangements for U.S. forces deployed there, have evolved over time, partly in response to the expansion of ISAF ‘s area of responsibility to include all of Afghanistan. U.S. Command Structure Since major combat operations in 2001, the U.S. military has maintained a distinct special operations forces (SOF) presence in Afghanistan, reporting to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). By early 2002, some U.S. conventional forces, including a two-star U.S. Army Division Headquarters, had flowed into Afghanistan, but the footprint remained light—only one brigade combat team (BCT)—until early 2007. In October 2003, the U.S.-led three-star Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFCA) was established in Kabul. CFC-A oversaw two U.S.-led two-star commands that also included coalition partners—a training command for the ANSF, and a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) of conventional forces in eastern Afghanistan. CFC-A served until ISAF assumed security responsibility for all of Afghanistan, and was then deactivated, in February 2007. Following the deactivation of CFC-A, its subordinate ANSF training command, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), began reporting directly to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and its subordinate CJTF assumed a dual U.S./NATO reporting chain, to CENTCOM for U.S. issues and to ISAF in its NATO capacity as RC-East. In October 2008, the Department of Defense activated United States Forces-Afghanistan

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(USFOR-A), a new four-star headquarters designed to streamline command and control for U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan. The ISAF Commanding General was given the additional assignment of serving as the USFOR-A Commanding General. As the head of ISAF, General McChrystal reports up the NATO chain of command to SACEUR Admiral James Stavridis; as the head of USFOR-A, he reports to the Commanding General of CENTCOM, General David Petraeus.

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U.S. Force Levels There are currently approximately 72,000 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan serving ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom, including Brigade Combat Teams from the following units: 2nd Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, 25th Mechanized Infantry Division, 38th Infantry Division (National Guard), 82nd Airborne Division, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and elements of the 7th U.S. Army Special Forces Group. Units identified as scheduled for deployment the spring and summer of 2010 include Brigade Combat Teams from the 34th Infantry Division (National Guard), the 101st Airborne Division, and the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Mountain Division, and the U.S. Marine Regimental Combat Team 2.[54] Tracking the evolution of U.S. troop commitments to Afghanistan operations, the December 2008 numbers marked a significant increase from two years earlier, in December 2006, when U.S. forces in Afghanistan included only one BCT. In early 2007, an additional BCT was added, by extending the tour of the 3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division (3/10) by 120 days, flowing in its original replacement, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, on schedule, and later replacing 3/10 with the 173rd Airborne BCT.[55] In January 2008, the Department of Defense announced that President Bush had approved an ―extraordinary, one-time‖ deployment of 3,200 additional Marines to Afghanistan.[56] Those forces included the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), which served as a combat force in southern Afghanistan, and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (2/7) who served as advisors for the ANSF. Both units redeployed in November 2008, but a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), including 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, plus additional logistics and air support, deployed to southern Afghanistan in November 2008 to serve both as battlespace owners— responsible for security in a given area of operations—and as ANSF advisors. For RC-South, General McKiernan requested a U.S. force package similar to the one in RCEast—that is, three BCTs (or equivalents), an aviation brigade, and key enablers including engineers. He argued that in southern Afghanistan, sufficient international and Afghan security forces are simply not available to ―provide for adequate security for the people.‖[57] U.S. military officials in Afghanistan noted that some areas of southern Afghanistan contain known security challenges that still needed to be addressed—these included Kandahar city, and a part of Garmsir District in Helmand province known as the ―fish hook‖ and long used by insurgents as a base of operations. Other areas, including Nimroz province, were ―unknowns‖ given the lack of international and Afghan forces deployed there. Further areas simply had too few forces to fully clear and hold them—for example, when ISAF assumed responsibility for southern Afghanistan, Romanian forces replaced U.S. forces in Zabul province, but the Romanians had been prepared to conduct stability, not counterinsurgency, operations.[58]

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The Obama administration bolstered U.S. forces levels in the spring of 2009 by an additional 21,000 troops, including 3,000 specifically dedicated to the training of Afghan National Security Forces. The additional combat forces, according to U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, flowed primarily into Kandahar, Helmand, and Zabul provinces.[59]

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Key Enablers U.S. commanders and officials in Afghanistan stress the need for sufficient enablers to support the growing force. Engineers are critical, they underscore, to support both the construction of any additional defense infrastructure required by the deployment of additional forces, and to play a supporting role in reconstruction efforts. Aviation is critical for both combat operations and also—especially—for air mobility in a country whose lack of infrastructure and forbidding terrain severely limit the utility of ground transportation. Ground vehicles, in turn, must be well-suited for their proposed use on Afghanistan‘s rugged terrain. Some U.S. troops have reportedly found that Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) armored fighting vehicles, which have provided life-saving protection against improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq, are less well-suited to Afghanistan‘s unpaved roads and off-road requirements.[60] Current Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets are, according to one U.S. commander, ―not even in the ballpark,‖ and, according to a senior ISAF official, ground units ―are screaming for more assets.‖[61] A former U.S. battalion commander in Afghanistan argued after his tour, ―As a rule, each battalion-sized task force should have constant unmanned aerial vehicle and close-air-support coverage.‖[62] In 2008, Secretary Gates, recognizing a need to provide troops in the field with improved ISR assets, formed an ISR task force to assess requirements and speed the process of meeting warfighter needs.[63] A CENTCOM ISR Task Force is in the process of providing additional personnel and assets for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Language capability is also essential, in order to support the ability of U.S. forces to follow the key counterinsurgency injunction to live with the population, and requirements will grow proportionally with increases in U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan. The need is complicated by the fact that Afghanistan‘s two official languages—Dari and Pashto—are not mutually intelligible, and many Afghans know one but not the other. One option is to utilize U.S. servicemembers with local language ability, but such troops may be in short supply. Dari and Pashto are regarded as difficult languages to learn, requiring time to develop the ability to communicate in either of them on substantive matters. Another option is to utilize Afghan interpreters. One challenge is that, in addition to the general challenge of sufficient supply, Afghan languages vary from region to region; in some situations, a non-local Afghan interpreter might be understood but nevertheless regarded with some suspicion as an outsider. Variations in regional dialect English-language instruction now available to members of the Afghan National Security Forces might also ease some milto-mil communication barriers, but will not directly help U.S. forces communicate with local populations.

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Legal Basis for Presence of International Forces Two separate sets of arrangements are in place, for ISAF and for U.S. forces deployed under U.S. command, to provide a legal basis for the presence of those forces in Afghanistan.

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Legal Basis for U.S. Forces In 2002 and 2003, U.S. Embassy Kabul and the Afghan Ministry for Foreign Affairs exchanged diplomatic notes, which together constituted a formal agreement. The notes, which remain in force, confirmed that military and civilian personnel of the Department of Defense shall be accorded a status equivalent to that of Embassy administrative and technical staff under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The notes also addressed freedom of movement, licenses, the wearing of uniforms, the use of vehicles, exemption from taxation, and imports and exports. They confirmed U.S. criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel.[64] Some of the basic provisions of that exchange of notes were reconfirmed by a joint declaration signed by President Karzai and President Bush, in May 2005, in which the two countries committed themselves to a strategic partnership with the goal of ―strengthen[ing] U.S.-Afghan ties to help ensure Afghanistan‘s long-term security, democracy and prosperity.‖ The Declaration confirmed the bilateral intent to work together closely on a range of activities including, in the security sector: ANSF training, security sector reform, counterterrorism operations, counternarcotics programs, intelligence-sharing, border security, and strengthening ties with NATO. The Declaration included the specific, practical commitment that U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan would continue to have access to Bagram Air Base ―and facilities at other locations as may be mutually determined,‖ and that U.S. and coalition forces would continue to enjoy freedom of action to conduct military operations ―based on consultations and pre-agreed procedures.‖[65]

Legal Basis for ISAF Forces United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) provide the legal basis for the presence of ISAF forces in Afghanistan. A December 2001 UNSCR authorized, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the establishment of ISAF to ―assist...in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.‖[66] That mandate was based on a specific appeal for such a force included in the December 2001 Bonn Agreement.[67] In January 2002, the Interim Authority of Afghanistan signed a Military Technical Agreement with the newly formed ISAF. In October 2003, the UN Security Council authorized an expansion of the ISAF mandate to include supporting GIRoA in maintaining security outside Kabul and its environs, and providing security to support the accomplishment of other objectives outlined in the Bonn Agreement.[68] The current UN mandate extends the authorization of ISAF for a period of 12 months beyond October 13, 2009.[69]

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GIRoA Concerns Over time, the Afghan leadership has expressed interest in making sure that ISAF- and U.S.led forces coordinate their operations with the ANSF and with each other. For example, the 2006 Afghanistan Compact, the basic framework for international community engagement in Afghanistan in all sectors, states that all ―OEF counter-terrorism operations will be conducted in close coordination with the Afghan Government and ISAF.‖[70] In August 2008, President Karzai called for a review of the presence of all foreign forces in Afghanistan and the conclusion of formal status of forces agreements.[71] He issued the call during the heated U.S.-Iraqi negotiation process aimed at achieving a status of forces-like agreement, and just after U.S. airstrikes in Azizabad, Afghanistan, had apparently produced a number of civilian casualties. In January 2009, GIRoA reportedly sent a proposed draft agreement to NATO, which outlined terms and conditions for the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan.[72]

Security Situation The year 2009 witnessed an increase in security incidents that led some observers to argue that the insurgency was gaining ground—that the Taliban was ―winning‖—while others argued instead that insurgent tactics were evolving. The insurgency remained a loose and sometimes internally fractious network of Afghans, supported by some outside help including the availability of safe haven across the border in Pakistan.

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Security Trends: Characterization In general, the security climate in Afghanistan has tended to follow cyclical patterns, based on the seasons. The spring poppy harvest season draws some workers-for-hire away from the insurgency; insurgent leaders, who profit from the poppy crop, support this pattern. The forbidding winter cold makes movement and many activities harder, and usually finds some insurgents recuperating across the border in Pakistan. The warmer spring weather provides an opportunity for insurgents to attempt operations. Given the cyclical patterns, changes in security trends are best evaluated by year-to-year rather than month-to-month comparisons. Recent years, by all accounts, have witnessed an upswing in security incidents. Many practitioners date the growing violence from mid-2006, when NATO assumed security responsibility first for southern, and then for eastern Afghanistan. Minister of Defense Wardak, for example, noted that in 2006 the insurgents ―came on in a big way,‖ and suggested that their intent had been to weaken political will in NATO capitals.[73] ISAF officials note that from 2007 to 2008, there was a 33% increase in the overall number of kinetic events. ISAF defines ―kinetic‖ events to include attacks against Afghan or international forces, whether by improvised explosive device (IED), indirect fire, or direct fire; but not, for example, kidnappings or intimidation. IED events, the single largest cause of casualties, increased by 27%. In addition, attacks on GIRoA officials and facilities increased by 119%. Afghan civilian deaths, in turn, increased by between 40 and 46%.[74] The FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act requires the Department of Defense to provide a semi-annual report to Congress describing the state of security and stability in

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Afghanistan. The latest report, released in June 2009, was prepared in coordination with the Department of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Agency for International Development, and the Department of Agriculture. Among the report‘s observations are the following items:    



Insurgent attacks increased 60% over the same reporting period in 2008. Though military casualties, both international and Afghan increased 48%, civilian casualties decreased 9%. Insurgent activities were more widespread and at a higher intensity. Although NATO allies increased their contributions, NATO‘s Combined Joint Statement of Requirements for ISAF remained unfulfilled in terms both personnel and equipment. Many contributing nations continue to maintain ―caveats‖ or restrictions on how their troops be of use, often prohibiting offensive combat, and thereby constraining their forces‘ usefulness.

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Security Trends: Evaluation These developments led some observers to conclude that the balance had tipped in favor of the insurgency. A study by the Paris-based International Council on Security and Development, released in December 2008, concluded that ―...the Taliban has been experiencing a renaissance that has gained momentum since 2005. The West is in genuine danger of losing Afghanistan.‖[75] In a December 2008 Op-Ed, former head of UNAMA Lakhdar Brahimi wrote: ―The [Afghan] government is losing ground every day to insurgents and other outlaws who now control at least a third of the country.‖[76] After embedding with Taliban fighters, journalist Nir Rosen concluded that the Taliban was winning.[77] ISAF officials explain the increased number of security incidents somewhat differently. They point out that the growing presence of ―friendly‖ forces, including international troops and Afghan forces—including 11 new Afghan National Army battalions and 10,000 more ISAF troops, from November 2007 to November 2008—allowed the conduct of more operations, and thus more contact with the enemy. They add that deteriorating control of the border areas of Pakistan provided insurgents with additional safe haven opportunities.[78] ISAF commanders also stress the importance of evaluating insurgent attacks qualitatively, as well as quantitatively. By late summer 2008, under pressure from international and ANSF operations, insurgents abandoned large-scale, relatively conventional-style attacks, because they were suffering heavy losses. Insurgent groups moved instead toward small-unit operations, applying more asymmetrical and more sophisticated tactics. These included attacks on key lines of communication (LOCs) including roads and bridges, more use of IEDs, assassination attempts against Afghan civilian and military officials, and attacks against government facilities such as district centers and schools. Insurgents, officials suggest, are ―getting more effective‖ at these asymmetric activities. The specific impact of insurgent targeting of LOCs is hard to measure, ISAF officials note, since no systematic measure is made of highway traffic.[79]

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At the same time, ISAF officials assess that the Taliban and other insurgents, while gaining some greater tactical facility, are not guided by a single, coherent strategy—the leadership does not appear to be formulating and directing an overall master plan.[80] At the end of 2008, senior officials in Afghanistan tended to hedge their bets when describing the security climate. UN SRSG Kai Eide noted: ―We haven‘t lost... but we haven‘t won...‖[81] A senior U.S. military official described it this way: ―We‘re winning the fight, but not the war.‖[82] Some COIN theorists argue, in turn, that such uncertainty is not neutral— that in a COIN fight, ―not winning‖ is tantamount to losing.

Characterizing the Insurgency[83] While many observers use the term ―Taliban‖ as a short-hand for the insurgency in Afghanistan, senior western officials in Afghanistan stress that the insurgency is not unified. ISAF prefers the term ―insurgent syndicate‖ to refer collectively to all its various strands. Further, insurgent activities are closely linked with criminality, always a potent force in ungoverned spaces, and in particular with drug cultivation and sales.

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Taliban The Taliban itself, Afghan and ISAF officials note, is more a network than a single organization.[84] The Taliban emerged from the Afghan civil war of the early and mid1990‘s, and the organization ruled Afghanistan from its capture of Kabul in 1996 until its defeat in 2001. Mullah Mohammed Omar, the de facto head of state during Taliban rule, is generally assumed to be alive and leading the organization from Pakistan. In December 2008, for example, he reportedly issued new threats over the Internet against international forces in Afghanistan.[85] The Taliban leadership includes two main ―shuras‖ (councils)—a leadership council in Quetta, Pakistan, under Mullah Omar ‘s watch, and another shura based in Peshawar, Pakistan.[86] The Taliban reportedly receives support from some current and/or former Pakistani officials, including members of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), in the form of logistics, medical, and training assistance.[87] Haqqani Network The Haqqani network is closely associated with the Taliban and one of its strongest factions. Reportedly, the network is also particularly closely linked to al Qaeda. Jalaluddin Haqqani fought as a mujahedin leader against Soviet forces, receiving substantial assistance from the CIA by way of Pakistan‘s ISI.[88] When the Taliban came to power, he joined the government as a Minister but retained a separate power base in his home Zadran district and tribe, east of Kabul. His son Sirajudin has reportedly ascended to a key leadership role, and has reportedly called for changes in the leadership of the Quetta shura. U.S. officials in Afghanistan note that Sirajudin, like his father, has focused on his home Zadran district but has also expanded his activities into the areas south of Kabul.

Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was a key mujahedin leader against Soviet forces. His organization, then known as the Hezb-e-Islami, received substantial aid from the U.S. government, which

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reportedly considered him a key ally. He twice held the title of Prime Minister during the early 1990‘s civil war period, before seeking refuge in Iran when the Taliban came to power. He has re-emerged in Afghanistan as the leader of the insurgent group, Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), which is affiliated with both the Taliban and al Qaeda. In 2008, Hekmatyar apparently opened the door to talks with GIRoA, in part through a spring 2008 letter addressed to President Karzai. Some practitioners and observers suggest that there may be good potential for drawing Hekmatyar away from the insurgent fight and into a constructive role.[89] Others caution that his reputation for Islamic extremism and human rights abuses call into question the likelihood and advisability of any reconciliation with him.

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Foreign Groups Foreign groups play critical roles in the insurgency by variously supporting and enabling Afghan insurgents.[90] Al Qaeda, which both enabled and leveraged the Taliban during its years in power, reportedly mobilizes foreign fighters from the Arab world, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, and other locations, to join the fight in Afghanistan. Tehrik Taliban-i Pakistan (TTiP) is an umbrella organization for indigenous Pakistani Taliban commanders, based in Pakistan, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the border with Afghanistan. TTiP is led by Baitullah Mahsud, who is from South Waziristan in the FATA, and who has reportedly built up strongholds in North and South Waziristan by recruiting and training young men, and ―killing uncooperative tribal leaders.‖[91] Lashkar-e-Tayba, a Pakistani insurgent group originally focused on the disputed Kashmir region, reportedly cuts its insurgent teeth along the border with Afghanistan by training insurgents to fight there. Tehrik Nefaz-e Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM) is a Pakistani insurgent group based primarily in the Northwest Frontier Province next to the FATA. Focused primarily on deepening its local control, the TNSM has also supported some Taliban operations in Afghanistan. [92]

Popular Support for the Insurgency? The population is the center of gravity—the primary focus—in counterinsurgency operations. Evaluating a population‘s support, tacit as well as active, for an insurgency, as well as its perceptions of the fight, is one helpful tool for assessing the strength of that insurgency. In general, it is common for insurgents to try to shape popular perceptions. Some experts argue that in 2008 in Afghanistan, the Taliban and other insurgents used high-profile attacks in and near Kabul to sow fear, or create a ―sense of siege.‖[93] Those attacks included, among others, a strike against the opulent and popular Serena Hotel in January, an assassination attempt against President Karzai in April, a bombing at the Indian Embassy in July, and the kidnapping of International Rescue Committee workers in August. Meanwhile, in late 2009, ISAF officials assessed that active Afghan popular support for the Taliban and other insurgents was not increasing—not least because the Taliban‘s ideology had little appeal for most Afghans. At the same time, ISAF assessed that popular support was shifting away from the government of Afghanistan toward ―fence-sitting,‖ driven by

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frustrations with poor governance, lack of economic progress, corruption, and lack of security. COIN theory underscores the importance of at least tacit popular support for the government—that popular neutrality is insufficient to defeat an insurgency.

COIN Operations At least as important to the success of the counterinsurgency as the number of Afghan and international security forces, experts argue, is what those forces actually do. As a rule, counterinsurgencies share an emphasis on ―population security,‖ but circumstances, and therefore the most effective approaches, may vary widely from one COIN campaign to another, or even geographically or temporally within a given COIN campaign.[94] In Afghanistan, COIN efforts have been challenged by especially rugged terrain, by limited forces and resources, and by the need to gain sufficient understanding of local areas to develop situation-specific approaches.

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Shape, Clear, Hold, Build In Afghanistan, COIN terminology, if not yet practice, has become a lingua franca shared by Afghan and international practitioners. The basic tenet of COIN operations in Afghanistan, borrowed and adapted from Vietnam and more recently Iraq, is ―shape, clear, hold, build.‖ In general, that approach includes working closely with Afghan counterparts to target insurgents, kinetically if so required; using Afghan or if necessary international security forces to hold an area once it is cleared; and applying coordinated civil-military efforts to begin building institutions and services once the security landscape in an area so permits. COIN efforts in Konar province in eastern Afghanistan, along the border with Pakistan, are frequently presented as an instructive model of coordinated civil-military action. There, a U.S. Army battalion working with a very capable Afghan National Army (ANA) unit first cleared the area, and then established outposts to provide presence. U.S. forces, supported by a Provincial Reconstruction Team, then negotiated deals with local tribal shuras—if the shuras would provide security, they would receive economic development ―in the form of roads, bridges, schools and health clinics.‖ Central to the approach was the construction of a paved road—a rarity outside big cities in Afghanistan—in which local residents had a vested interest. The road gave forces the access they needed to secure village populations, it made it harder for insurgents to emplace IEDs, it gave civilian assistance agencies freedom of movement, and it gave local residents a critical tool to support economic development. The U.S. Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funded payments to locals to provide security for the road.[95] Practitioners stress, however, that there is no cookie-cutter model for COIN in Afghanistan— roads, for example, cannot always play the role they did in Konar province. In 2009, insurgents stepped up their attacks against Afghanistan‘s major road arteries, include Highway 1 that connects Kabul with Kandahar. Officials speculated that the insurgents attacking the highway in Zabul wanted to tie up the ANA and other forces, forcing them to build check points and leaving them fewer resources to focus on insurgent strongholds. In southern Zabul province, along the Highway 1 artery, military and civilian officials wondered if the ―Konar model‖ approach to roads might be applicable. What they discovered, however,

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is that roads served a different function in Zabul—the highway was used primarily by interstate truck drivers and the insurgents themselves, while local residents required only some passable means for getting to and from local markets. In other words, local residents did not perceive that they had the same, strong vested interest in the security of the main highway as residents of Konar province had in their own road. Operations by the U.S. Marines, in the town of Garmsir in southern Helmand Province also reflected some key COIN approaches including an emphasis on population security, close cooperation with local security forces, the use of both kinetic and soft tools, and the incorporation of civilian resources. By the time operations commenced, Garmsir had become a key insurgent transit and logistics hub, and much of the local population had withdrawn. The action began with a large-scale aerial insertion, followed by a month of clearing and fighting against small but tenacious and well dug-in insurgent groups. As the insurgents were defeated in a given area, the local population began to return, and the Marines increased their focus on population security, including the use of ―gated communities‖ for population control, and reaching out to community leaders. As the fighting wound down, the ANSF joined the Marines on patrols to provide presence and ―hold‖ the area. From the planning stages onward, the Marines worked with the U.S. Agency for International Development, asking, ―What do we want this to look like, afterwards?‖ The AID representative working with the 24th MEU was ready to initiate projects as soon as the security situation so allowed.[96] ISAF commanders stress that through 2009, insufficient international and Afghan forces were available to shape, clear, hold, and build effectively throughout Afghanistan. The ISAF 2009 winter campaign, for example, conducted in selected districts chosen to include the majority of the Afghan population, aimed to ―hold‖ ground and deepen security there, without significantly expanding GIRoA‘s control geographically.

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Living among the Population As a rule, the center of any counterinsurgency is the population, and living among the population is a central tenet of COIN. As CENTCOM Commanding General, General David Petraeus, and many others have stressed, ―You don‘t commute to work.‖[97] Senior officials at U.S.-led RC-East noted that as of late 2008, RC-East had between 130 and 140 combat outposts (COPs) in their area of responsibility (AOR)—―We‘re really out with the people.‖ Most of those COPs were co- located with ANA counterparts or supported nearby Afghan observation posts, although a few were U.S.-only.[98] For some Allies, constrained by national caveats, the premise of living among the population is a challenge. The idea is generally understood to mean getting outside the wire and interacting with the population as much as possible, not merely living adjacent to it. Allied forces that are largely confined to forward operating bases (FOBs) cannot follow the approach. For ISAF in general, a major constraint on living with the population has been insufficient international forces. As one commander argued, ―The strategy doesn‘t work when you don‘t have enough forces to do it.‖[99] Writing about U.S. efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq, leading defense expert Colonel H.R. McMaster noted: ―Decisions against deploying coalition forces in numbers sufficient to secure populations left many commanders with no other option than to adopt a raiding approach to counterinsurgency operations—an approach

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that tended to reinforce the perception of coalition forces as aggressors and conflated tactical successes with actual measures of strategic effectiveness.‖[100] It might seem that by scaling back the size of the force presence at each outpost, the number of outposts could be increased and the overall footprint of forces ―living with the population‖ could be extended. The problem is that, according to commanders on the ground, it takes one platoon to secure an outpost, so getting forces outside the wire to interact with the population requires two platoons at each location. RC-East noted that about 40 of its COPs were single platoon-sized, with 30 Soldiers or fewer. Afghanistan itself presents some particular challenges to living among the population— the Afghan population is much more rural and dispersed than that of Iraq, and many Afghans live in remote, isolated, and barely accessible valleys. Determining how best to live among the population may also sometimes require some discretion. Some practitioners and experts contend that in many long-isolated valleys, the local population is generally hostile to all outsiders, whether ―friendly‖ or otherwise. Insisting on living among them create new tensions, without necessarily strengthening that population‘s resistance to outside insurgents.

Borders In general, successful counterinsurgency requires a closed system, so that COIN can gradually smother the insurgency. As discussed below, Afghanistan‘s open border with Pakistan significantly complicates the COIN effort. The border marks the boundary of the system for Afghan and international security forces, constrained by international law, but not for insurgents who make ample use of safe haven and resupply in Pakistan.

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Role of Special Operations Forces in COIN Special operations forces (SOF) play an essential role in COIN in Afghanistan, through direct action against insurgent leaders. One senior U.S. commander underscored SOF‘s ―continuous disruptive effect on leadership.‖ SOF efforts in Afghanistan include significant Allied as well as U.S. participation, as well as a growing role for elite Afghan ―commando‖ forces. The partnership between U.S. SOF and conventional forces in Afghanistan may differ somewhat from the analogous partnership in Iraq, due to the disparity in the size of the conventional force presence. In Iraq, especially in 2007 and 2008, a large conventional ground forces presence with a widely distributed footprint was able to gain substantial, detailed situational awareness about local conditions, and to provide that insight to SOF for use in targeting, and in planning operations. Further, the much larger conventional presence in Iraq made forces readily available to ―hold‖ a given area once SOF cleared it. The significantly smaller conventional forces presence in Afghanistan may not yet have allowed the development such a robust SOF/conventional synergy.

Role of Air Power in COIN The major combat phase of operations in Afghanistan relied heavily on ground SOF calling in airstrikes on al Qaeda and Taliban targets, and many experts pointed to those operations as a model of jointness—the ability of Military Services to work together seamlessly. Since then, due to Afghanistan‘s forbidding, mountainous geography, and to the relative dearth of Afghan

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and international ground forces, the COIN campaign has continued to rely greatly on the use of kinetic air power. A larger ground forces presence may reduce some of that reliance, but the terrain alone is likely to make air strikes a necessary counterpart to ground-based fires.[101] Civilian casualties resulting from air strikes in Afghanistan have prompted strong expressions of concern from Afghan and international audiences. President Karzai strongly condemned a coalition air strike conducted on August 22, 2008, against the village of Azizabad, in Herat Province in western Afghanistan, which he said killed 95 Afghan civilians. Further complicating the incident were initial reports from the coalition that apparently conflicted with the numbers claimed by Afghan government officials and local residents.[102] UNAMA further raised the stakes by issuing an early statement claiming ―convincing evidence‖ that at least 90 civilians, most of them children, had been killed.[103] UN SRSG Kai Eide later asserted that he had been correct to strongly underscore the UN‘s grave concern with civilian casualties. [104] In a December 2008 interview, Eide warned again of the need to conduct military operations with care, and to guard against civilian casualties, stating, ―I am not convinced that we are‖ listening to the concerns of President Karzai and the Afghan people. [105] In September 2008, General McKiernan issued an ISAF Tactical Directive, which replaced a directive issued by his predecessor General Dan McNeill in June 2007. This Directive stressed ―proportionality, restraint, and utmost discrimination in the use of firepower.‖ It provided specific conditions for the use of air-to-ground munitions, and underscored the need to minimize the risk to civilians.[106] In July 2009, General McChrystal issued a revised Tactical Directive reemphasizing the need for restraint in using close air support. Though the Directive itself remains classified, ISAF Headquarters released portions of it in unclassified form. Specifically, the Directive states: ―The use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions‖[107]

Regional Context Afghan officials, and international practitioners and observers, generally agree that Afghanistan‘s security is intimately linked to its relationships with its neighbors, first of all Pakistan, and to relations among those neighbors. General McKiernan stated in late 2008, ―This is a regional insurgency and it requires regional solutions.‖[108] General Petraeus added in early 2009, ―In fact, those seeking to help Afghanistan and Pakistan need to widen the aperture even farther, to encompass at least the Central Asian states, India, Iran and even China and Russia.‖[109] By the end of 2008, most U.S. strategists had concluded that to be successful, a strategy for ―Afghanistan‖ would need to address the broader region. This assessment was reinforced by the Obama administration‘s policy review and the subsequent March 2009 White House announcements concerning its new Afghanistan strategy.[110] A major challenge to the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan is the fact that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is largely porous, and insurgents fighting in Afghanistan have long relied on safe haven and other forms of support in Pakistan. As a rule, counterinsurgency efforts assume a ―closed system,‖ in which persistent COIN efforts, and growing popular

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support, can gradually smother an insurgency, but Pakistan‘s open border disrupts that premise by giving Afghanistan‘s insurgents a ready escape hatch. The insurgency problem is complicated by the fact that the Government of Pakistan (GoP) has traditionally enjoyed only limited control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that border Afghanistan.[111] The FATA is a legacy of British rule. To boost the border defenses of British India, the British gave semiautonomous status to tribes in that area by creating tribal ―agencies,‖ largely responsible for their own security. The area became the ―FATA‖ after independence. Regional experts Barnett Rubin and Ahmed Rashid have argued that today, the area is used as a ―staging area‖ for militants preparing to fight in both Kashmir and in Afghanistan. [112] Pakistan‘s turbulent recent history may further complicate the GoP ‘s efforts to achieve control. That history has included the assassination of politician and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007, just ahead of scheduled general elections. In February 2008, parliamentary elections brought to power a coalition of former opposition parties including Bhutto‘s Pakistan People‘s Party, led by her widower Asif Zardari. In August 2008, General Pervez Musharraf, who had come to power in a military coup in 1999, resigned as President of Pakistan. In September 2008, Zardari was elected president, completing a transition to civilian- led rule. The ability and will of that civilian-led government to exercise authority over Pakistan‘s security forces, and to take steps to stop insurgent activities, is not yet completely clear. Throughout its short history, Pakistan has had deeply vested interests in Afghanistan. The international border—the British-drawn Durand Line—cuts through territory inhabited, on both sides, by ethnic Pashtuns, with significantly more Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.[113] The Pashtun population of southern Afghanistan provided the primary base of support for the Taliban during it rise. Further, most observers underscore that the Government of Pakistan has a general interest in ensuring that Afghanistan is a regional ally, in part as a balance against Pakistan‘s long-simmering conflict with neighboring India. That broad interest was reflected in Pakistani support for the Afghan mujahedin fighting the Soviet occupiers in the 1980‘s, and later, for the Taliban regime—relationships that have created difficulties in postTaliban Afghan-Pakistani relations. In recent years, the GoP attempted to achieve a measure of stability along the border with Afghanistan by following the example of the British Raj and striking a series ―truces‖ with local power brokers, in 2004, 2005, and 2006. In February 2005, for example, the Pakistani military reportedly reached a peace deal with Baitullah Mahsud, leader of the umbrella organization Tehrik Taliban-i Pakistan (TTiP), and withdrew its forces from check points in the region. In mid-2006, Islamabad struck a major peace deal with insurgents in North Waziristan, agreeing to end military operations and remove local checkpoints, in return for an end to insurgent attacks on government officials.[114] In early- and mid-2008, Pakistani forces, tried a similar approach, pulling back from TTiP‘s stronghold in Waziristan in the FATA.[115] By all credible accounts, these ―deals‖ did not lead to greater stability. In July 2008, the U.S. government reportedly confronted Pakistani authorities with evidence of ties between members of ISI and the Haqqani network in the FATA. At that time, President Bush authorized U.S. military cross-border operations into Pakistan, by ground or Predator unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Observers counted at least 11 attacks by Predator UAV in August and September 2008, in addition to a ground attack in early September.[116]

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ISAF officials have noted that cross-border attacks have yielded big operational and tactical benefits—by causing the insurgent networks to feel disconnected, and prompting local residents in Pakistan to want al Qaeda and other outsiders to leave their communities.[117] At the same time, U.S. civilian and military officials acknowledge that such cross-border strikes have the potential to spark local protest and to destabilize the fragile Government of Pakistan, still struggling to consolidate civilian rule. To be clear, NATO‘s policy for ISAF does not include cross-border strikes. Asked in July 2008 whether the Alliance would go after militants in Pakistan, Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, ―My answer is an unqualified ‗no.‘ We have a United Nations mandate for Afghanistan and that‘s it. If NATO forces are shot at from the other side of the border, there is always the right to self-defense but you will not see NATO forces crossing into Pakistani territory.‖[118] The restriction on ISAF forces does not, however, preclude joint operations with the Pakistan to kill or capture individual Taliban leaders. By late 2008, efforts by the Pakistani military to tackle the insurgency problem had increased noticeably; senior U.S. officials and tactical-level military commanders in Afghanistan attributed the changes to the pressure from U.S. cross-border attacks. In August 2008, the Pakistani military stepped up operations in Bajaur, the northernmost of the seven agencies in the FATA, across from Afghanistan‘s Konar province. ISAF officials with access to imagery noted that after the operations, Bajaur resembled Fallujah, Iraq, after kinetic coalition operations in November 2004—that is, with some allowances for the more rural setting in Pakistan, destruction from the relatively heavy-handed Bajaur operations was considerable. According to ISAF officials, while the Pakistani operations suggested some room for improvement in the ―soft‖ skills of COIN, they had an impact by disrupting insurgent networks.[119] Pakistan‘s counterinsurgency approaches in the FATA also included arming ―lashkars‖— militias—of tens of thousands of local residents, to help maintain security.[120] The lashkars, which draw on the strength and local authority of traditional tribal structures, were intended to help ―hold‖ areas after they were cleared by military operations. 2008 also witnessed an improvement in cross-border coordination. Regional CommandEast reported that cooperation among Pakistani, Afghan, and U.S. forces continued to grow at the trilateral Border Coordination Center (BCC) at the Torkham Gate, one of six planned BCCs. That collaboration benefited from Predator feeds that provided a common picture of the battlespace. ISAF and their Afghan counterparts planned to establish 6 BCCs by FY2010.[121] At the tactical level, U.S. ground forces in eastern Afghanistan reported that, the tenor of their regular tactical-level border coordination sessions has grown more constructive. Tactical-level coordination improved—including cases of direct cross-border coordination with Pakistani forces, to ―fix and defeat the enemy at the border,‖ particularly along the border with Afghanistan‘s Paktika province. [122] Overall, senior U.S. officials in Afghanistan, and outside observers, suggest that substantial improvement of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border situation will require from Pakistan both continued political will and appropriate capabilities. General McKiernan stated in November 2008 that he had seen ―a shift in thinking at the senior levels in Pakistan that this insurgency is a problem that threatens the very existence of Pakistan.‖[123] Other U.S. commanders in Afghanistan noted that they have observed a ―sea change‖ in the views of Pakistani military officials, who increasingly view insurgents as existential threats, and who

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are attempting to improve the COIN capabilities of Pakistani forces to counter the insurgents. Remaining differences, U.S. military officials suggest, tend to include different perceptions of various insurgent groups and the threats they represent. [124] Other observers suggest that the extent of the commitment of senior Pakistani civilian officials to defeat the insurgent challenge is less clear. In October 2009, the Pakistani army undertook offensive operations against Taliban strongholds in Waziristan along the eastern border with Afghanistan. Committing upwards of 30,000 troops, these operations continue; however, little information is publically available concerning their progress. Efforts to enlist the support and participation of local tribal leaders in the offensive have been unsuccessful, and the Pakistani desire to keep substantial military forces focused on the Indian border has limited the resources that could be brought to bear in Waziristan. Though U.S. officials have encouraged the Pakistani government to expand these efforts against the Pakistani Taliban, on January 21, 2010, a Pakistani army spokesman indicated that the army was ―overstretched‖ and that no new offensive operations would be mounted in 20 10.[125] Observers suggest that a key strategic question concerns the fragility of the Pakistani polity, and the extent to which the GoP can be encouraged or pushed to cooperate in counterinsurgency efforts without significant domestic political blowback. For example, in October 2008, the Pakistani parliament unanimously passed a resolution calling for an end to military action against extremist groups, and its replacement with dialogue. The resolution stressed the need for an ―independent foreign policy‖ for Pakistan, and stated that ―the nation stands united against any incursions and invasions of the homeland.‖[126]

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Iran ISAF officials note that the role of Afghanistan‘s large neighbor to the west, Iran, is also critical to its future, and they describe Iran‘s approach as a ―dual-track strategy.‖ On one hand, Iran enjoys close, long-standing cultural, linguistic, and religious ties with significant portions of Afghanistan‘s population. ISAF officials estimate that Iran is the second-largest contributor of reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, after the United States—its efforts are most evident in Herat Province in western Afghanistan. And since Iran is a major destination for Afghan heroin, with all of its attendant concerns about crime and drug addition, Iranian officials share with their Afghan counterparts a vested interest in effective counternarcotics approaches. Some officials also point to the generally positive role Iran played at the 2001 Bonn Conference, to help forge consensus among Afghan factions about the creation of a post-Taliban government, as evidence that Iran can play a constructive role on Afghan matters.[127] At the same time, ISAF officials state that Iran has provided some weapons and training to Afghan insurgents. Some add that Tehran may be concerned about a growing U.S. military footprint along both its eastern and western borders, as additional U.S. military forces flow into southern Afghanistan, and U.S. forces assume battlespaces in southern Iraq that were formerly manned by coalition partners. One official argued that Iran‘s interest is to ―keep it simmering‖ in Afghanistan. [128] Most practitioners and observers suggest that, in some capacity, a comprehensive solution for Afghanistan must take Iran into account.

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Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)[129] A fundamental premise of counterinsurgency operations is the central importance of hostnation forces—including establishing and improving those forces should their quantity or quality be insufficient. Decades of war, displacement, and mismanagement, followed by the defeat of the Taliban regime, left Afghanistan without organized, functioning security forces or equipment, so rebuilding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) has been a high priority of the post-war international assistance effort. ISAF ‘s broad goal is to transition ―lead security responsibility‖ to the ANSF who are focused, as a rule, on the current fight, not Afghanistan‘s long-term security requirements. From a security perspective, one positive legacy of the years of conflict may be the fighting spirit so common among many Afghans, acknowledged by the common refrain of international military officials: ―They will fight!‖

Afghan National Army (ANA) All of the Afghan security forces are still developing, but the Afghan National Army (ANA), under the Ministry of Defense, is currently, by a wide margin, the most capable force.

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ANA Numbers As of December 2009, approximately 97,000 soldiers were assigned to the ANA. ANA units are participating in 90% of ISAF operations and lead 62% of all joint operations. Of the approximately 90 active battalions (Kandaks), 28 are capable of carrying out operations independently, 30 lead operations with ISAF support, and another 30 participate in operations under ISAF leadership [130] The Bonn Agreement established an endstrength target of 70,000 for the ANA. A decision was made in early 2008 to stretch that goal to 86,000. In January 2010, the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board (JCMB)—the body co-led by GIRoA and UNAMA, and charged to oversee implementation of the Afghanistan Compact—endorsed GIRoA‘s plan to increase that target figure to 171,600 by October 2011. Some outside experts have also strongly advocated programming for a larger ANA. COIN theorist John Nagl, who has helped train U.S. personnel to train the ANSF, argued in November 2008 that the ANA should grow to 250,000.[131] For their part, many Afghan officials share the view that a greater number of troops will be needed.. Minister of Defense Wardak stated that Afghanistan had never yet had the proper proportion of troops to the area to be secured and to the population to be protected. Current force sizing, he noted, assumes the presence of a large international force—which will not always be there, and whose capabilities, he argued, are roughly double that of their Afghan counterparts. He concluded that ―between 200,000 and 250,000 would be the proper size for the ANA.‖[132] In a September 2008 analytical report, a former civilian advisor to President Karzai argued that the ANA endstrength should be ―at least 220,000.‖[133] Force Modernization In 2008, the focus of the ANA itself, and of the coalition ANSF training and advisory effort, was counterinsurgency, with an emphasis on the equipment that could be most readily fielded, and the skills that could most readily be developed and applied to the fight. Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

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One shift, in late 2008, was initial ―NATO-ization‖ of some ANA weapons, first of all a shift from the AK-47 assault rifle of Soviet origins, to the M- 16 rifle of U.S. origin, widely used by many NATO countries. The AK-47 was a natural choice, as a starting point—years of Soviet sponsorship and then occupation had made the weapons widely available throughout Afghanistan. In November 2008, the first shipment of M-16‘s arrived in Kabul, and U.S. trainers began training Afghan army trainers. Some critics have noted that the M- 16 is more temperamental to use and maintain than the AK-47, and that it will require an adjustment for Afghan forces. Supporters underscore the operational importance of Afghan interoperability with NATO counterparts. ANA Corps commanders are focused primarily on the current fight—making sure that their soldiers had the equipment and training necessary for counterinsurgency. [134] Minister of Defense Wardak, however, has taken a longer-term look at possible future requirements, including the traditional military role of providing external defense. That outward-looking perspective was reflected in his suggestion to size the ANA by comparing it with the armies of Afghanistan‘s neighbors—Pakistan, Iran, and ―the bear to the north.‖ To balance between current and future requirements, he urged equipping the ANA ―with a mix, right from the beginning, so it works for COIN and later on.‖ Afghanistan needs a force that is ―light but as effective as heavy forces,‖ he added, and should include tanks, and an infantry combat vehicle—protected mobility with some firepower.[135]

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ANA Structure and Organization In contrast to the post-war Iraqi army, which was built from the ground up starting with small units, the ANA has been built from the top down, starting with headquarters leadership and staff, and then gradually fielding units under those headquarters. As of the end of 2009, the ANA had five ground forces Corps Headquarters—the 201st Corps in Kabul, the 203rd Corps in Gardez in the east, the 205th Corps in Kandahar in the south, the 207th Corps in Herat in the west, and the 209th Corps in Mazar-e Sharif in the north. Under those Corps headquarters, the ANA had 19 brigade headquarters, and 87 ―kandak‖ (battalion) headquarters.[136] As of January 2009, according to ISAF officials, the ANA had 56 kandaks capable of battalion- level operations.[137] ANA ―Corps‖ follow the European model, in which a Corps is a two-star headquarters, whose subordinate units are brigades—much like a U.S. Army Division. The five ANA Corps areas of responsibility (AOR), like the ISAF Regional Commands, are situated in the center, east, south, west, and north, but the ISAF and ANA boundaries do not completely correspond. ANA Operations and Capabilities Since the end of 2008, all ANA Corps were engaging regularly in combined operations with ISAF counterparts. The overall percentage of deliberate combined operations that were ANAled had increased from 49%, in the period from October to December 2007, to 62% in the period from July to September 2008. The extent of ANA leadership of such operations varied significantly, however, among ISAF Regional Commands, from ANA leadership of 23% of combined deliberate operations in RC-South, to 43% in RC-North, to 79% in RC-East, and 86% in RC- West. U.S. officials

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responsible for training estimated that the disparities might have more to do with variations in the coalition-Afghan partnerships, from region to region, than with variations in the capabilities of the ANA Corps or security conditions in the various AORs.[138] In qualitative terms, ISAF officials note that ANA operational capabilities have grown markedly. For example, in June 2008, following a prison break in Kandahar, initiated by a suicide bomber, the ANA deployed more than 1,000 soldiers south from Kabul, providing over half of the air lift required to transport them, within 24 hours. RC-East officials noted in November 2008 that in the previous month, they had participated in 35 combined ―air assault‖ missions with the ANA, most of them ANA-led. In one mid-November action in eastern Afghanistan, for example, a combined ANA, ISAF and Afghan police force air assaulted into an area to be cleared. There, the Afghan police knocked on the doors, the ANA provided the inner cordon, and ISAF forces provided an outer cordon.[139] Meanwhile, coalition special operations forces are helping the ANA develop elite ―commando‖ kandaks. In theory, the commando forces would be capable of working with coalition counterparts on high-value targeting lists, and also of playing key roles in broader ANSF COIN operations.[140]

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ANA as a National Institution A number of observers have suggested that the ANA may be Afghanistan‘s only truly ―national‖ institution. The outgoing head of CSTC-A noted that by late 2008 that the ANA was ―very integrated.‖ In the immediate post-Taliban years, ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks— strongly represented in the Northern Alliance—predominated in Afghanistan‘s fledgling army, at the expense of ethnic Pashtuns. But as of the end of 2008, the ANA ethnic balance more closely corresponded to that of the population of Afghanistan—Tajiks, about 27% of the population, accounted for between 30 and 40% of the ANA, while Pashtuns, 42% of the population, made up 41% of the ANA. One caveat is that ethnic balance may not always correspond to geographic balance—for example, instead of recruiting Pashtuns from former Taliban stronghold areas in southern Afghanistan, the ANA may look to Pashtun communities in other parts of the country to achieve balance. [141] Meanwhile, Minister of Defense Wardak underscores that the ANA is well-regarded by the Afghan population. [142] This claim was supported by the results of a major survey of popular opinion conducted in 2008, under the auspices of the Asia Foundation, which identified the ANA as the public institution enjoying the highest level of public confidence in Afghanistan.[143] Key Challenges to ANA Development While ANA operational capabilities, by all accounts, continue to grow, the Army continues to contend with critical gaps and challenges. Like the Iraqi Army, the ANA lacks sufficient enablers, including logistics; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and air capabilities such as close air support (CAS). It continues to rely on U.S. and coalition forces for such support. In addition, the ANA faces a significant demographic gap, of personnel between the ages of 35 and 55, the legacy of Afghanistan‘s recent history of warfare. While the ANA can draw on its ―older‖ personnel now to serve in leadership capacities, it will effectively take a generation to fully train and prepare the next contingent of ANA senior

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leaders. Further, the ANA—like Afghan society as a whole—suffers from a ravaged supply of Afghan human capital. Since a significant majority of new recruits are illiterate, ANA training relies on methodologies that do not utilize written language; and a number of literacy instruction opportunities are available.

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Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) The Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC), effectively Afghanistan‘s air force, is organizationally part of the ANA and is considered its 6th Corps. Afghanistan has an independent air force tradition dating back to 1924—by the 1980‘s, after several periods of substantial Soviet assistance, Afghanistan had built a rather formidable air force. During the Taliban era, Pakistan assumed the foreign patronage role. During the war in 2001 that ousted the Taliban, Afghanistan‘s fleet was largely destroyed. Years of flying experience left the Afghans some human capital to draw on, in building a post-Taliban air force—although the current average age of its pilots, 44.7 years, is approximately the average life expectancy for Afghan males. The ANAAC is trained and mentored by the Combined Air Power Transition Force (CAPTF), part of the CSTC-A. The CAPTF describes its ambitious goals for the ANAAC this way: ―The ANAAC will be focused on the unique demands of Afghanistan but will also be modern, interoperable and sustainable, and integrated with the ANSF, capable of joint and combined operations....‖[144] CAPTF officials note that ANAAC development is proceeding in stages, based on agreements with ANSF leadership, with an initial emphasis on contributing to the COIN fight, first of all through air mobility. Afghanistan‘s unforgiving terrain and dearth of sufficient highway and rail transportation make the ability to move troops and supplies absolutely critical. Later—in the period between FY20 11 and FY20 1 5—it is expected that the ANAAC will begin to acquire limited attack and ISR capabilities. Sometime thereafter, CAPTF officials note, the ANAAC might begin to build external defense capabilities, including air interdiction, but that is not a current focus. That timeline reportedly sits uneasily with some ―legacy‖ Afghan fighter pilots, eager to rebuild the air force they once knew.[145] As of October 2009, the ANAAC included 187 pilots, and the Afghan fleet comprised 29 rotary- winged and 10 fixed-wing aircraft. (20 Mi-17 and 9 Mi-35 helicopters; 5 AN-32 and 1 AN-26, 2 C-27 transport aircraft; and 2 L-39 ―Albatros‖ jet trainer aircraft.) The current fleet, and the donations expected in the near term, almost are all of Soviet-bloc origin—CAPTF officials note that the first priority was to acquire early capability by capitalizing on aircraft familiar to the Afghans. Plans call for shifting the fleet‘s orientation away from former Soviet technology in future acquisitions, including fixed-wing cargo aircraft.[146] By the end of 2008, the ANAAC was making substantial contributions to Afghan and coalition COIN efforts. In October 2008, the ANAAC set new records by transporting 9,000 passengers and 51 tons of cargo, and by flying 908 sorties. At the beginning of 2008, according to CAPTF officials, ISAF met 90% of ANA transport requirements for cargo and passengers, but by November, the ANAAC was meeting 90% of the requirement. [147]

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Afghan National Police The Afghan National Police (ANP) are Afghanistan‘s civilian security forces, which fall under the Ministry of the Interior. The ANP includes several distinct forces: the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), responsible for general policing; the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), a specialized police force that provides quick reaction forces; the Afghan Border Police (ABP), which provides law enforcement at Afghanistan‘s borders and entry points; and the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), which provides law enforcement support for reducing narcotics production and distribution. [148] According to ANP officials, the ANP are being developed as a paramilitary force to contribute to the counterinsurgency effort by joining the ANA in COIN operations, and by protecting the population after the ANA ―clears.‖ As of October 2009, the ANP included approximately 90,100 assigned personnel. [149] The Bonn Agreement established a target ANP endstrength of 62,000; the current target endstrength is 96,800. Police Corruption The most commonly expressed concern of Afghan and international senior officials about the ANP is that they are not merely incompetent but also corrupt.[150] Some observers charge that such corruption is more than an obstacle to a job well done, in that it also alienates the population—the center of gravity in COIN—who may grow to see the Taliban as no worse than equally abusive civilian authorities. [151] Curiously, a major recent survey of Afghan popular opinion indicated that the ANP is the second most highly regarded public institution, after the ANA.[152]

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Focused District Development To address the problem, GIRoA and coalition forces launched the Focused District Development (FDD) initiative to retrain and reform local AUP forces, district-by-district. In the FDD program, the AUP are pulled out of a given district and sent to an intensive training course. Highly skilled ANCOP forces fill in, during their absence. After the AUP return, in order to reinforce their new skills, they operate under the tactical overwatch of, and then with mentoring by, coalition forces. As of January 2009, the AUP in 52 districts were undergoing the FDD process.[153] Coalition officials assess that FDD is generally successful, in that fewer violations by the AUP are reported after the training. Some observers, including senior officials from international organizations, have charged that the program is not comprehensive enough to be effective. ―Taking thugs away for a few weeks,‖ one official observed, ―just gives you better-trained thugs.‖[154] Some outside observers, in turn, noting the urgent need for more and better policing on the streets of Afghanistan, have pushed for accelerated recruitment and fielding of weapons and equipment to the Afghan police. Coalition officials caution, however, that the reform process will take time, since the aim is a fundamental cultural shift. Providing gear, they argue, especially weapons, to ―unreformed‖ districts, without proper accountability, would likely prove counterproductive.[155]

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Afghan Border Police By many accounts, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) may be beset by even greater incompetence and corruption than their AUP counterparts. To counteract these trends, GIRoA, working with coalition counterparts, launched the Focused Border Development (FBD) program, similar to the AUP‘s FDD. The courses are conducted by U.S. private security contractors—Blackwater and DynCorp. The retraining also includes arming the ABP with heavier weapons, including Soviet- origin DShK heavy machine guns.[156] The FBD initiative, like FDD, relies on follow-up mentoring by coalition forces, after the completion of the formal training sessions. Those mentorship responsibilities are assigned to ISAF battlespace owners. As the outgoing head of CSTC-A observed, FBD is possible ―because the 101st is helping me and giving me assets.‖[157] Coalition and Afghan officials readily acknowledge the great challenge of securing Afghanistan‘s borders. Afghanistan has nearly 3,500 miles of borders, primarily in difficult, remote, mountainous terrain. Minister of Defense Wardak flatly observed, ―We will never be able to secure the whole border.‖[158] Protecting the borders, some officials suggest, may require not only trained and professional ABP personnel stationed along the border, but also additional aerial reconnaissance and quick response forces.

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Command and Control Command and control arrangements for the ANSF have been adapted to current COIN efforts, which require ―joint‖ action by multiple Afghan forces together with coalition counterparts. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior maintain formal command authority over their own forces—the ANA and the ANP, respectively. To facilitate coordination, GIRoA created a series of Operations Coordination Commands, at the regional (OCC-R) and provincial (OCC-P) levels. There are 6 OCC-R‘s, one in each of the five ISAF Regional Commands, and one for Kabul city; and 34 OCC-P‘s are being established. OCC‘s at both levels are physical (not virtual) facilities that facilitate monitoring and coordination of operational and tactical-level operations. OCC‘s include representatives from the ANA; the ANP; and the National Directorate of Security (NDS), Afghanistan‘s intelligence service. ISAF and CSTC-A provide mentoring. The command relationships among the participating organizations are purely ―coordination,‖ not ―command.‖ For example, as contingencies arise, OCC members provide direct conduits of information with their respective organizations—OCC-P members reach out to ANA brigades and ANP provincial command centers; while OCC-R members reach out to ANA Corps and ANP regional command centers. OCC-P‘s do not report to OCC-R‘s, and there is no national-level analogue. The ANA serves as the ―lead agency‖ for OCC‘s, although OCC‘s may be physically located in police facilities. Looking to the future, some observers have wondered how appropriate the OCC construct will prove to be for a ―post-COIN‖ context when, for example, the focus of the ANA shifts from domestic to external concerns. A future transition might not prove especially difficult, since the OCC coordination relationships complement but do not replace the formal service command relationships.[159]

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Training the ANSF Since its inception, the international ANSF training effort has been characterized by multiple initiatives adopting sometimes divergent approaches, with a general trend toward greater unity of effort, and a stronger U.S. leadership role, over time. [160] Secretary of State Clinton has underscored President Obama‘s statement ―that we must focus more attention and resources on training the Afghan Security Forces.‖[161]

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Background and Organization of the Training Effort The December 2001 Bonn Conference recognized the need for the international community to help the fledgling Afghan authorities with ―the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.‖ In early 2002, broad agreement was reach on a model in which individual ―lead nations‖ would assume primary responsibility to coordinate international assistance in five different areas of security—these included placing ANA development under U.S. leadership, and police sector development under German leadership. The 2006 Afghanistan Compact transferred formal ―lead‖ responsibility to GIRoA. In 2002, to execute its ―lead nation‖ role, the United States created the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMC-A) to train the ANA. In 2002, to supplement German efforts, the U.S. government launched a police training initiative, led by the Department of State‘s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), through U.S. Embassy Kabul, with contractor support. In 2005, the U.S. government restructured its ANSF training efforts, shifting responsibility for supporting Afghan police development to the Department of Defense, and renaming the OMC-A the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSCA).[162] Early in 2007, when the U.S. three-star military headquarters, the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) was deactivated, OSC-A was re-designated the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and assigned directly to US CENTCOM; CSTC-A was assigned to USFOR-A when that headquarters was established in 2008. Training Teams CSTC-A‘s primary mechanism for training and advising the ANSF is the use small teams that typically live and work with ANSF units. U.S. advisory teams working with the ANA— Embedded Training Teams (ETTs)—include between 12 and 20 personnel. ETTs work for CSTCA but are under the operational command of U.S. battlespace owners during combined operations with the ANSF. Non-U.S. NATO advisory teams are known as Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT). In theory, their functions are similar to those of the ETTs, but due to national caveats, there are great variations in the degree to which OMLTs participate in operations with their Afghan counterparts. Advisory teams working with the ANP are known as Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs). Some officials in battlespace-owning units have argued that the quality of ETT and PMT personnel varies and that, as one official put it, ―the ETTs are better suited to planning than execution.‖[163] In October 2006, the U.S. Army consolidated, at Fort Riley, Kansas, the predeployment training and preparation of U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force personnel for assignments as advisors to Afghan and Iraqi security forces; in October 2008, the Army announced that the program would shift to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk,

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Louisiana.[164] One reason for some reported variation in the quality of U.S. advisors may be that they are selected on an individual basis and come from a wide variety of backgrounds that may or may not include extensive operational experience. Mentoring the ANSF Leadership In addition to tactical- and operational-level training, the coalition ANSF advisory effort also includes mentoring Afghan senior leaders—Ministers, senior ministry officials, and senior ANA and ANP commanders. ISAF and CSTC-A senior leaders invest considerable time in working closely with the senior leadership of the Defense and Interior Ministers, and of their regionally- based commands. President Karzai replaced the Minister of Interior in October 2008, a step favored by a number of senior U.S. and other international officials in Afghanistan, and widely viewed as an effort to curb corruption.[165] The coalition ―advisory‖ role is strong—Afghan regional commanders regularly seek coalition support, and advocacy with their respective ministries, for identified requirements. The fundamental challenge is building institutional capacity—including leadership ability, physical infrastructure, effective systems, and trained and competent human resources.

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Unit Partnering In Iraq, the Iraqi security forces (ISF) training and advisory effort relied on two complementary approaches, embedded teams and ―unit partnering.‖ Unit partnering involved matching a full coalition unit with an Iraqi counterpart of equal or greater seniority in a mentoring relationship. Multi-National Corps-Iraq directed the use of such partnerships where appropriate. Those relationships, in the words of U.S. commanders in Iraq, provided the opportunity to ―show, rather than tell‖—to provide visible examples of a competent unit and staff in action. In Afghanistan in late 2008, the use of unit partnering was more ad hoc, and more contentious. Overall, unit partnering was less widespread than in Iraq, a natural consequence of a far lighter coalition footprint, since unit partnering requires available, locally-based units of appropriate size. Nevertheless, battlespace-owning U.S. units underscored the importance of such partnerships—as one commander noted, ―ANSF capacity-building is our main effort, and we accept some risk in our operational capabilities to focus on this.‖ For example, one U.S. brigade-sized Task Force sends its tactical command post including key brigade staff, for two weeks every month, to co- locate and partner with the nearest ANA Corps headquarters. Its Military Police (MP) battalion headquarters staff, in turn, work closely with the ANP Regional Command Center. Further, the ANP re-training effort, for both AUP and ABP, requires substantial followup in the form of mentoring. Battlespace-owning units were tasked to establish and maintain those mentoring partnerships—a form of unit partnering—with the ―reformed‖ ANP.[166] At the same time, in late 2008, senior Afghan and CSTC-A officials evinced an antipathy toward the concept of unit partnering. Minister of Defense Wardak argued forcefully: ―There is some talk that we should do partnering, but I am against it—our units are standing on their own feet. I will try very hard to push against this partnering. If they have partner units, they would lose their ability to learn and operate independently.‖[167] CSTC-A officials argued, similarly, that ANSF units tended to perform less well when partnered with coalition units,

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and that advisory teams were more effective than ―partners‖ in encouraging the ANSF to take initiative. [168]

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Community and Tribal Outreach Afghan and ISAF officials have undertaken a new community outreach program, sometimes called the ―community guard program,‖ designed to take a bottom-up, community-based approach to security.[169] The premise is that neither international forces nor the ANSF have sufficient numbers to provide full population security, and are not likely to have them in the near future, even with expected increases in ISAF and ANSF troop strength. Minister of Defense Wardak has stated, ―There is still a big gap between forces available, and the space to secure, so we need help.‖[170] In Afghanistan, local community leaders are often tribal leaders, and local community structure is intimately linked with tribal structure, though not necessarily clearly or consistently. Observers describe tribal bonds as ―pragmatic, localized allegiances,‖ which may have been shaped over time by migration, competition for resources, reallocation of land rights as rewards for services, and links to the narcotics trade. While residents of several isolated valleys may all belong to the same tribe, their fiercest rivalries may be with fellow tribesmen in an adjacent valley. Fostering local community support for security initiatives generally involves working with tribal leaders, among others, but given Afghanistan‘s complex tribal affiliations, the risk of ―getting it wrong‖ is relatively high.[171] The community guard program attempts to avoid ―getting it wrong‖ by focusing on the concept of ―community outreach,‖ rather than ―tribal outreach.‖ The initiative began with the recognition of the need to protect Highway 1, the key artery running south from Kabul to Kandahar and the site of escalating insurgent attacks in mid-to-late 2008. The program was expected to begin with a pilot project in Wardak and Logar provinces, just south of Kabul. Muhammad Halim Fidai, Governor of Wardak province, was quoted as saying: ―We don‘t have enough police to keep the Taliban out of these villages and we don‘t have time to train more police—we have to fill the gap now.‖[172] In the program, each local ―community‖—including all relevant tribes—would select representatives to a shura; the shura, in turn, would select project participants to help provide security, for example through neighborhood watch efforts and guarding fixed sites. One goal, U.S. officials noted, is that local residents adopt a ―not in my village‖ attitude toward insurgents and criminals. [173] Funding for the program would be provided by U.S. CERP funds; this funding would not cover arming participants. U.S. accountability requirements mandate formal U.S. oversight, but additional Afghan oversight would be provided by both on-site ANSF representatives, and the moral authority of the community shura. The goal—as U.S. Ambassador William Wood stated— is ―to empower locals, both local governance and tribal structures, to make them work for themselves.‖[174] ―The idea,‖ as Minister of Defense Wardak expressed it, ―is to bridge the gap between the government and the people, and to make the people feel responsible.‖[175] The initiative draws to some extent on the model of ―arbakai‖—a traditional Pashtun institution, in which a tribally-based auxiliary force is formed to defend a village and its surrounding area on a temporary basis. That familiar association may help smooth the

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introduction of community outreach, but it also raises concerns in some quarters that the program might reignite and facilitate local warlordism.[176] Minister of Defense Wardak is reportedly particularly concerned about the danger of a return to the chaos of the early 1990‘s civil war. He stated in late 2008 that the new program must not rearm anyone—―we should not create new warlords or reinforce old ones.‖[177] U.S. officials quoted a senior ANA commander as saying, reflecting cautiously on the initiative, ―The army and police serve a nation, but a militia serves a man.‖[178] The program must also overcome the legacy of similar and more recent initiatives to generate security at the local level. The Afghan National Auxiliary Police program was created in 2006, amidst some controversy, as a stop-gap measure in southern Afghanistan. The locally-recruited force, including many who previously worked for warlords, had an approved size of 11,271. Recruits were given ten days of training, and members received the same salaries as regular ANP street cops—$70 per month.[179] A number of practitioners and observers argued that the training was insufficient to produce a credible security force. At the time, the head of CSTC-A called the program ―an attempt to take short-cuts,‖ and its participants ―a bunch of thugs,‖ and more recently, an RC-East senior official concluded that they ―went brigand.‖[180] By late 2008, the program had been completely dismantled.

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Reconciliation Military theorists and practitioners contend that war is a contest over the terms of an ultimate political settlement. In Afghanistan, both GIRoA and the various insurgent groups are contending to set the conditions for a final settlement. In an early preview of a possible end game for the war in Afghanistan, in late 2008 a rhetoric of ―reconciliation‖ with the Taliban and other insurgents gained momentum. Practitioners and observers have used the word ―reconciliation‖ to refer to two different kinds of efforts in Afghanistan—lower-level efforts to co-opt the fence-sitters and hired guns, and higher-level negotiations aimed at bringing senior leaders in from the cold. Some refer to the first group as ―small-t taliban,‖ those driven by poverty, lack of jobs and other prospects, and general disaffection, who provide their services to insurgent leaders for some price.[181] The purpose of reconciliation efforts would be to ―peel them off‖ from the hardcore insurgency, perhaps through some combination of economic incentives, opportunities for political participation, and removal from targeting lists. To be clear, while U.S. commanders support such ―reconciliation,‖ they stress that any such initiatives would be GIRoA—not ISAF or U.S.— efforts. The second category of reconciliation includes outreach to, and possibly negotiations with, senior leaders of the Taliban and other insurgent groups. President Karzai has stated publicly that efforts to encourage the Saudis to broker contacts have been ongoing for several years, but so far without results.[182] The Saudis have also reportedly facilitated contact with representatives of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his HiG organization. [183] For its part, the Taliban has reportedly named conditions that must be met before it would agree to enter any direct talks. These include the withdrawal of all international forces from Afghanistan, immunity of Taliban leaders from targeting by the ANSF, and the ability to retain their weapons. According to U.S. senior officials, such demands would contradict

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GIRoA principles—for example, that all Afghan citizens must renounce violence and accept the Constitution—and U.S. government views. [184] One further challenge, according to many practitioners and observers, is that despite suffering some tactical-level set-backs, the Taliban leadership appears to feel confident, free to approach any talks from a position of strength. One senior UK official stressed that if negotiations took place today, the Taliban would make unrealistic demands, and he estimated that we are ―many months if not years from the end game.‖ He added, ―there‘s no ‗quick fix‘ through reconciliation.‖[185] Some ISAF officials add that Taliban leaders may be under some pressure from al Qaeda not to participate in negotiations. [186]

Counternarcotics[187]

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The Narcotics Problem One of the things that make the conflict in Afghanistan so intractable is the close linkage between the Afghan insurgency and narcotics. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported that ―warlords, drug lords, and insurgents‖ collect a tax on the cultivation, transportation and processing of opium poppy—taxes that amounted to ―almost $500 million in 2008.‖[188] The twin counternarcotics (CN) and counterinsurgency challenge is most evident in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, which is responsible for about twothirds of Afghan opium production and provides a base of operations for some Taliban insurgents. Narcotics are big business in Afghanistan—with a climate conducive to cultivation, an absence of readily available economic alternatives such as the infrastructure for bringing legitimate crops to market, and permeable borders with neighboring states. Senior U.S. officials note the reluctance of many Afghan officials to challenge the narcotics industry because its tentacles are so deeply entwined with Afghan governing structures at all levels. Furthermore, Afghanistan still lacks the robust judicial system that would be necessary to prosecute offenders.

Counternarcotics Approaches The government of Afghanistan and its international partners have produced no shortage of strategies designed to address Afghanistan‘s narcotics problem. The current GIRoA plan is the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy, issued in January 2006; a previous version was issued in May 2003.[189] In early 2002, as a follow-on to the Bonn Agreement, the United Kingdom assumed ―lead nation‖ responsibility for coordinating international counternarcotics (CN) efforts; that lead responsibility shifted to GIRoA under the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. The first premise of the CN effort is the illegality of narcotics. On January 17, 2002, President Karzai issued a decree banning the cultivation, production, abuse, and trafficking of narcotic drugs. Key Afghan CN organizations include the Afghan Special Narcotics Force (or ―Task Force 333‖), a paramilitary force created in late 2003 to conduct raids; the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, which investigates and helps target networks; an eradication force that physically carries out eradication; and a CN Criminal Justice Task Force created in early 2005 to expedite CN cases through the fledgling criminal justice system. GIRoA has sought the close cooperation of provincial Governors in its CN efforts.

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―Governor-led eradication‖ (GLE) efforts encourage Governors to cooperate by offering them control over the eradication process, and providing them rewards in the form of resources from the central government. Critics have suggested that GLE efforts may selectively target political rivals or small-scale cultivators, while avoiding confrontation with powerful largerscale producers. In 2006, GIRoA launched the Good Performers Initiative to reward provinces for reducing poppy cultivation. To support the Afghan CN strategy, and also in an attempt to shape it, the U.S. government issued its own U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, in August 2007. While GIRoA has tended to favor negotiated eradication—including its collaboration with provincial Governors—the U.S. government has supported the more forceful approach of centralized and enforced GIRoA-led ―non-negotiated forced eradication.‖[190] Since assuming command of ISAF, U.S. commanders have lobbied for a more active NATO role in counternarcotics, including the ability for ISAF forces to target narcotics labs. At an informal meeting of NATO Ministers of Defense, held in Budapest in October 2008, the Allies agreed to stretch the CN role that ISAF can play without changing its formal mandate. After the meeting, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that ―under the existing operational plan, ISAF can act in concert with the Afghans against facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency, in the context of counternarcotics, subject to authorization of respective nations.‖[191] The following month, General McKiernan explained that there was no change to the rules of engagement—just a decision ―to be more aggressive.‖ He added, ―Where I can make the connection between narcotics, personalities, or facilities, and the insurgency, then I can treat that as a military objective.‖[192] In December 2008, a senior ISAF official noted that GIRoA had already asked for ISAF ‘s assistance several times, on the basis of the October 2008 policy update.[193]

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Counternarcotics Results Practitioners and outside experts differ concerning how best to evaluate the results of these counternarcotics efforts. Some simply point to poppy-free provinces—in particular Nangarhar in eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistani border—as successes, and credit a combination of various GIRoA eradication efforts. They suggest in particular the importance of local authorities in discouraging poppy planting. Other observers argue that global food prices may be a more important explanatory variable—in 2008, opium prices were down, while wheat prices, due to a widespread drought, were up, possibly affecting the decision calculus of many planters. They underscore the importance of cultivation trends over time, rather than one-time developments, as better indicators of program effectiveness. Two analysts from this school of thought have argued: ―Sustainable reductions in opium poppy cultivation will only be achieved by a wider process of improved security, economic growth and governance.‖[194]

Capacity-Building as Part of COIN in Afghanistan According to civilian and military practitioners, the three pillars of the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan—security, governance, and development—are inseparably linked. As former advisor to both GIRoA and ISAF Clare Lockhart asserts, ―A country is not stable until it has a functioning state that performs key functions for its citizens.‖[195] International

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military forces in Afghanistan lead the security line of operation, and also play strong supporting roles in the other two fields, governance and development, particularly at the provincial and local levels where their footprint is much greater than that of civilian counterparts.[196]

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The Need for Capacity-Building Practitioners and observers generally agree that improving the capacity of Afghan institutions is essential for making progress in all three lines of operation—security, governance and development. Many further stress that a critical component of capacity-building in Afghanistan is connecting the center to the regions. Popular support—active or passive—is essential to counterinsurgency, and local-level institutions, whether political officials or the ANSF, are often the most readily-available ―face‖ of government. Local capacity, it is argued, should be competent, and should help connect the local population to a larger ―Afghanistan.‖ One fundamental challenge to capacity-building in general is that Afghanistan‘s wouldbe work force was decimated by years of violence and repression, and generally lacks the skills, the professionalism, and often the literacy, to work in a post-Taliban polity or economy. Some observers argue that the human capital problem was exacerbated by bad choices by the international community in the immediate aftermath of Taliban rule. Eager to place responsibility for leading Afghanistan in Afghan hands—and eager in some cases to focus primarily on the counter-terrorist mission—the international community, it is charged, failed to insist on high standards of experience or integrity in the selection of Afghan leaders at all levels. One ISAF official argued in late 2008, ―We need a major housecleaning of GIRoA.‖[197] Other observers have stressed that the international community, and particularly the U.S. government, further aggravates the human capital problem by supporting specific individuals, rather than impartially supporting the Afghan political process as a whole. Such approaches, it is argued, make it difficult to hold such officials accountable. Noting another ramification, NATO SCR Gentilini described such approaches by the U.S. government as ―good but colonialist,‖ because the U.S.-supported officials may be seen as U.S. pawns.[198] A significant challenge to local-level capacity-building is that provincial Governors and district Administrators have very little formal authority, and they receive no budgets of their own from the central government. As one diplomat described it, in the absence of resources, Governors have to negotiate their authority with de facto local power-brokers, which compromises their efforts.[199]

Military Role and Perspectives on Capacity-Building ISAF and U.S. military officials in Afghanistan acknowledge that their role in civilian capacity- building is a ―supporting‖ one, but they stress the importance of their role in helping link together the various levels of government. With a footprint that extends through most of the country, and that includes a presence at the local as well as the national and regional levels, the military is well-placed to make such contributions. For example, the mission statement of the 101st Airborne Division, once the nucleus of ISAF ‘s RC-East, underscored the military‘s role in all three pillars of efforts. It stated that

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RC-East, in conjunction with GIRoA, ISAF and U.S. civilian agencies, ―conducts full spectrum operations to develop Afghan national capability to secure its people, exercise capable governance, and develop a sustainable economy, while defeating terrorists and insurgents, in order to extend GIRoA authority and influence as the legitimate government of the Afghan people.‖[200] A former U.S. brigade commander in eastern Afghanistan noted that his company commanders worked regularly with district-level officials, monitoring their efforts, and that this focus was important because ―the cause of instability in Afghanistan is poor governance.‖[201] In late 2008, a senior ISAF official explained that the military‘s role is to ―facilitate‖ governance, which is ―the long pole in the tent,‖ and harder than either security or development. He added that squad and platoon leaders on the ground ―regularly liaise with local Afghan officials.‖ Their guidance is to work ―bottom-up,‖ to get information, to facilitate shuras, to connect district officials with representatives of Kabul-based ministries... and to follow up assiduously.[202]

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Provincial Reconstruction Teams Provincial Reconstructions Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan grew out of a U.S. military initiative in late 2002. In general, PRTs help Afghan provincial governments develop the capacity and capabilities to govern, provide security, ensure the rule of law, promote development, and meet the needs of the population.[203] The U.S.-led PRT in Zabul province, for example, succinctly states that its mandate is ―to conduct civil-military operations in Zabul to extend the reach and legitimacy of GIRoA.‖[204] As ISAF ‘s area of responsibility expanded geographically, it assumed responsibility for PRTs in each new area. As of early 2009, ISAF maintains 26 PRTs, each led by a single nation. PRT staff may include any combination of civilian and military personnel; the military components formally report to ISAF. The U.S. government leads 12 of ISAF‘s 26 PRTs, 10 of them in RC-East, one in RCSouth, and one in RC-West. PRTs do not currently cover all of Afghanistan‘s 34 provinces. In late 2008, some U.S. officials were considering possible future expansions, including creating two separate PRTs from the single entity currently responsible for Kapisa and Parwan provinces; establishing a PRT-like entity for Kabul city; and creating new PRTs in Dai Kundi and Nimroz provinces in RC- South. U.S. PRTs are primarily military organizations, each led by a military officer—either an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel or a Navy Commander—who reports to the nearest U.S. battlespace owner. Typically, a PRT includes between 80 and 150 staff members, including one representative each from the Department of State, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Department of Agriculture (USDA). Practitioners and observers variously evaluate the successes of PRTs to date. Some argue that while PRTs have carried out useful work, they have not been resourced sufficiently to meet requirements. This may be particularly true for some Allies, for example Lithuania, that have fewer resources available in general for international assistance efforts.[205] Others, including senior GIRoA officials, have argued that PRTs do not coordinate their efforts sufficiently with Afghan authorities. In November 2008, during a visit to Kabul by a U.N. Security Council delegation, President Karzai claimed that PRTs were setting up ―parallel governments‖ in the countryside.[206] Other GIRoA officials reportedly express

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that many international resources channeled through PRTs are effectively ―lost‖ amidst multiple layers of contractors and subcontractors, before they reach the Afghan people.[207]

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Other U.S. Civilian Field Presence In addition to the U.S. government civilian agency presence at PRTs, civilian representatives from the State Department, AID, and USDA also serve at U.S. ―Task Forces‖—division and brigade headquarters under ISAF. Typically, these civilians provide advisory support, in their respective fields of expertise, helping inform military decision-making and operations. U.S. commanders typically express strong enthusiasm for these partnerships.[208] In November 2008, a total of 60 U.S. civilians were serving in ―field positions‖—at PRTs and Task Forces.[209] U.S. civilian experts work with battlespace-owning military units in another capacity, on Human Terrain Teams (HTT), established in Afghanistan in February 2007.[210] HTTs, recruited and employed by the U.S. Army, are small teams of social scientists, from various academic disciplines, who conduct deep anthropological fieldwork in order to understand and ―map‖ demographic, social and economic dynamics. Their analysis, like the advice of the State, AID and USDA civilian advisors, helps inform military decision-making and operations. U.S. commanders praise the work of the HTTs as contributing directly to their understanding of the battlespace and some have noted that more HTTs—as much as one per district—would be welcome.[211] Their work, like that of servicemembers, entails risk—one member of the HTT in Khowst province, Afghanistan, was killed in May 2008 when his vehicle was struck by an improvised explosive device (IED). At the same time, the deployment of HTTs has met with both criticism and complications. HTTs have been criticized, most frequently by the academic community, for ―compromising‖ social science ethical standards.[212] In November 2008, an HTT member, Don Ayala, was charged with murder in connection with the killing of an Afghan man who had set a female HTT member on fire, in Kandahar province.[213]

Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) Particularly in the absence of dedicated provincial or district budgets, U.S. commanders have made use of the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), sponsored by the Department of Defense, to fund governance- and development-related projects. One U.S. commander recently called CERP ―a surrogate for the government‘s failure to provide,‖ and another stated, ―If we didn‘t have CERP, we wouldn‘t be able to do anything.‖[214] Since its inception, CERP has provided relatively unconstrained discretionary funds to military commanders on the ground, to meet relatively near-term needs. With far fewer U.S. forces—and thus fewer senior U.S. commanders entitled to spend CERP funds—Afghanistan has received less CERP funding to date than Iraq. According to U.S. civilian and military officials, and some Afghan provincial officials, decisions about CERP funding allocation are typically based on Afghan priorities and informed by both U.S. civilian and military expertise. The top expenditure to date, by a significant margin, has been road-construction, viewed by Afghans and U.S. officials as critical to security, governance and development.

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Agribusiness Development Teams Supplementing the work of battlespace owners, their civilian advisors, and PRTs in eastern Afghanistan are Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT). ADTs are state-based Army National Guard (ARNG) teams that include ―farmer soldiers‖ who have backgrounds in various facets of agribusiness. The ADTs draw on several decades of similar ARNG experience in Central America, and typically they leverage agricultural expertise from land grant universities in their home states. The teams include organic enablers that allow them to operate independently, including vehicles and force protection. In 2008, the first ADT, from Missouri, deployed to newly poppy-free Nangarhar province, and the second ADT, from Texas, deployed to Ghazni province. Guardsmen and women from Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Tennessee have also been involved in the program.[215]

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A Civilian Surge? Many practitioners and observers have suggested that the capacity-building challenges in Afghanistan may require additional international civilian expertise, as well as the effective integration of such expertise with military efforts. ISAF commanders argue that a stronger commitment to build capacity is required, because it is governance, more than security or development, that is lagging in Afghanistan. RC-East Commanding General MG Schloesser has argued, ―We need an interagency surge!‖[216] Senior officials from other Allies within ISAF echo this argument—in November 2008, RC-North Commanding General, German Major General Weigt, argued that he needed ―civilian advisory teams,‖ as complements to the OMLTs and ETTs. ―The main problem for me,‖ he stated,‖ is not security, but deficits in governance.‖[217] Outside observers have also argued that the civilian capacity-building effort should be as robust as security capacity-building initiatives. State-building expert Sarah Chayes wrote in December 2008 that the problem of governance in Afghanistan is particularly acute. She argued, ―Western governments should send experienced former mayors, district commissioners and water and health department officials to mentor Afghans in those roles.‖[218] Some observers have suggested that Afghanistan might be a useful test case for an integrated, balanced application of all instruments of U.S. national power.[219] In late 2008, U.S. Embassy Kabul outlined a proposal for a ―civilian surge‖ to support provincial- and local-level capacity-building in Afghanistan. The effort is intended to expand the U.S. government civilian field presence at U.S.-led PRTs and Task Forces. Experts are coming from the State Department, AID, USDA, and U.S. law enforcement agencies. The additional personnel are augmenting existing civilian staff functions and establishing a presence at the district level to help mentor sub-provincial-level GIRoA officials. During 2009, the number of U.S. civilian advisors in Afghanistan increased from about 300 to nearly 1,000, and Ambassador Holbrooke has estimated that an additional 300 will deploy during 2010. An FY2009 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 111-32) provided $600 million for this effort. In January 2010, Ambassador Holbrooke‘s office issued a report on the AfghanistanPakistan regional strategy that strongly emphasized the importance of this increased level of civilian assistance.[220]

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Future Options for the War in Afghanistan

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Integrating the Overall Approach: Strategy and Implementation Most Afghanistan observers have pointed to weaknesses in the coordination of the many disparate efforts to support Afghan security, governance or development, including ensuring that those three lines of operation complement one another. Some observers note that leaders of the primary international assistance efforts rarely speak with a unified voice, although their influence might be much stronger were they to do so. The scale of Afghanistan‘s needs, and the number and variety of entities offering help, make coordination a particularly great challenge. To address the coordination challenge, some observers advocate crafting a new, overarching strategy for Afghanistan, which would state objectives for security, governance, and development; specify approaches; and assign roles and responsibilities for implementation. A new single set of guidelines, it is argued, would help focus cooperation and coordination. Many practitioners and observers argue, however, that the basic contours of strategy are already in place. Importantly, GIRoA officials tend to agree with this view. The Afghanistan Compact, an agreement between the Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the international community, identified basic objectives in each of the lines of operation. The 2008 Afghanistan National Development Strategy articulated a strategic vision and key objectives in security, governance, and development; provided multiple individual sector strategies under each of those headings; and stated guidelines for coordinating and monitoring implementation.[221] In the security arena, ISAF‘s 2008 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) clearly stated objectives and approaches. Experts have suggested two alternatives to writing a new strategy, in both of which the U.S. government could play a leadership role. One school of thought suggests that the specific language of a strategy document may be less important than the ―buy-in‖ to its principles and approaches by all relevant players. In the case of Afghanistan, as former head of UNAMA Lakhdar Brahimi argued, those actors would include all of Afghanistan‘s neighbors, other regional leaders ―including India, Iran, and Saudi Arabia,‖ all permanent members of the UN Security Council, and all major donors including Japan.[222] What is needed, this school suggests, are intensified diplomatic efforts to forge a broad consensus on the basic contours of existing strategy. Other experts have suggested a second option—accepting the basic tenets of existing strategy documents and focusing on strengthening monitoring and implementation. Diplomatic efforts might urge contributing countries to more rigorously tailor their assistance efforts to Afghan national priorities, or they might attempt to curb the ―nationalfirst‖ approach of those contributing countries that regularly lobby GIRoA ministers for attention to ―their‖ provinces. New efforts might also support strengthening UNAMA so that it might more effectively play its critical coordination role as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), tasked to oversee coordinate implementation of the Afghanistan Compact.

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Adjusting U.S. and Other International Forces In 2008 and 2009, NATO and U.S. commanders on the ground in Afghanistan requested additional international forces—requests echoed by GIRoA officials. Key policy questions include the scope of the requirement, the likely duration of the requirement, and the options, including possible combinations of U.S. and other NATO forces, for meeting the requirement. For those who advocate troop level increases, the duration of the need for higher international troop levels in Afghanistan is hard to determine in advance. Future requirements might depend on changes in the strength of the insurgency, growth in the capacity and capabilities of the ANSF, adaptations in the approaches used by international forces, and concurrent progress in the areas of governance and development. General McKiernan has argued that international troop levels need to be increased until the ―tipping point‖ is reached when the ANSF assume lead security responsibility—―three or four more years away.‖[223] To be clear, Afghan and U.S. officials do not use the term ―surge,‖ arguing that ―surge‖ refers to a temporary increase in troop strength, while the requirement in Afghanistan is likely to last for some time.[224]

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Requirement for Additional Forces? A first premise of counterinsurgency is conducting operations ―by, with and through‖ indigenous forces. Where such forces are not available, international forces may substitute, support, and/or help build additional indigenous forces. The military effort in Afghanistan was, from the start, an ―economy of force‖ mission, in terms of both international troop strength, and early target endstrength goals for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). That approach provided only limited geographical coverage of Afghanistan. Commanders on the ground, such as General McChrystal, have maintained that significant additional forces are needed to meet the full scope of requirements. At the same time, some key observers have argued against additional U.S. or other international force deployments, on the grounds of general Afghan antipathy to the presence of foreign forces on their soil, exacerbated by any episodes of heavy-handedness by those forces. Thus, they suggest additional deployments will actually prove counterproductive to the COIN effort. Regional expert Rory Stewart has argued flatly, ―the West should not increase troop numbers,‖ because doing so would inflame Afghan nationalism and lend support to the insurgency. ―The Taliban,‖ he adds, ―which was a largely discredited and backward movement, gains support by portraying itself as fighting for Islam and Afghanistan against a foreign military occupation.‖[225] Noted regional scholar Barnett Rubin has argued, similarly, that the ―Afghans don‘t like their country being occupied by foreign soldiers any more than did their ancestors,‖ and that reaching a political solution to the insurgency ―may require decreasing the U.S. and other foreign military presence rather than increasing it.‖[226]

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NATO Forces One option for meeting any identified requirements for additional forces is through contributions from NATO Allies. Key considerations include both the likelihood and the utility of additional NATO contributions. Some experts have raised questions about the utility of possible contributions from some NATO Allies, given the national caveats that still tightly constrain the activities of many contingents. One option for the U.S. government would be to continue to press Allies to relax or eliminate such caveats—Secretary of State Clinton has indicated that the Obama administration intends to pursue this approach.[227] One alternative in some cases would be to focus on contributions less likely to create domestic political opposition. Some contributors, for example, might provide so- called ―niche‖ capabilities such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expertise and medical facilities, while others might choose to ―sponsor‖—that is, pay for and run—branch schools used for training the Afghan National Army.

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U.S. Forces The most likely avenue, however, for meeting any requirements for additional international forces is an increase in U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan. As of the beginning of 2009, an additional brigade combat team (BCT)—3rd BCT, 10th Mountain Division—was flowing into Regional Command-East, and General McKiernan had requested three additional BCTs or equivalents, plus an aviation brigade and all the necessary enablers., General McChrystal increased this request to up to nine additional BCTs, or roughly 40,000 troops. After the latest strategy review, President Obama has authorized the deployment of an additional six BCTs (3 0,000+) troops. Observers have raised several different concerns about the ramifications of substantially increasing the U.S. share of the total ISAF force, as well as strengthening the U.S. role in ISAF command and control arrangements. The more prominent the U.S. role, some argue, the less likely that Allies will increase or perhaps even sustain their own contributions, since it will be easier for them to argue that the United States is meeting the requirement. Other skeptics point to a potential operational challenge—the possibility of a de facto bifurcation of Afghanistan into two distinct sets of approaches, robust COIN by the United States and a few Allies in eastern and southern Afghanistan, and softer stability operations by all other Allies and partners in northern and western Afghanistan. Such visible disparity, if it emerged, would make it much harder for ISAF to speak with a unified voice to GIRoA. Many civilian and military senior ISAF officials from non-U.S. Allies gently caution that, at the very least, the United States should avoid suggesting that the increased U.S. role was made necessary by inadequacies in the performance of their Allies.

Logistics The deployment of additional U.S. forces is likely to raise significant logistics challenges. U.S. forces based in eastern and southern Afghanistan have relied heavily to date on lines of communication (LOC) running across Afghanistan‘s mountainous eastern border into Pakistan, and down to the port city of Karachi. According to ISAF officials, with increased

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force flow, the demand on those LOCs is likely to increase by 500%, posing challenges in terms of both capacity and security. In late 2008, a series of insurgent attacks on those LOCs, on the Pakistani side of the border, underscored their vulnerability. In addition, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) has occasionally closed the primary border crossing, at the Khyber Pass, ostensibly to support GoP military operations in border regions. ―Our biggest vulnerability,‖ said one ISAF senior official, ―is our LOCs.‖[228] One alternative is the use of northern supply routes through former Soviet republics north of Afghanistan. On January 20, 2009, General Petraeus, CENTCOM Commanding General, announced that new agreements had been reached with Russia and Central Asian states regarding the transit of goods and supplies to Afghanistan. These arrangements are intended to complement the Pakistani supply routes—General Petraeus commented, ―It is very important as we increase the effort in Afghanistan that we have multiple routes that go into the country.‖[229] Some experts have raised a concern about this option—the uncertainty about Russia‘s future orientation, its support for the international effort in Afghanistan, and the influence it might choose to exercise over any Central Asian support to that effort. One additional practical consideration is the additional requirement for contractors resulting from increased U.S. troop deployments. ISAF officials noted in late 2008 that the U.S. Army had insufficient engineering assets available to support the construction in southern Afghanistan required by the arrival of large numbers of additional U.S. troops. They added that the availability of local contractors in southern Afghanistan was already scarce, given that the limited pool of qualified personnel was already occupied with work for ISAF and other organizations.

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Sourcing U.S. Deployments With concurrent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) could find it a challenge to source and then sustain larger troop deployments to Afghanistan. One ramification could be delays in the arrival of additional forces in theater. DOD leaders indicated in late 2008 that DOD was working to send additional military forces to Afghanistan but that it would take some time—perhaps half a year—for them to become available. Senior U.S. military officials have indicated that additional force flow into Afghanistan is connected to U.S. force drawdowns in Iraq. Some observers note that such a delay may not prove neutral—that even if the insurgency is held to what some practitioners call its current ―stalemate,‖ Afghan popular opinion, the center of gravity in COIN, may well slide toward greater disaffection. A second implication could be a continuation of stress on parts of the force. Numerous defense strategists have commented on the stress that simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have placed on U.S. military forces, and particularly on the Army and Marine Corps. That pressure has manifested itself in repeated and extended deployments for both units and individual servicemembers, and has affected the personal lives of individual servicemembers through medical conditions and stress on families. One key decision concerning additional U.S. force flow to Afghanistan will be the mix of Military Services and in particular, the Army and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has long advocated a transition of its primary focus from Iraq to Afghanistan, arguing that improved security conditions in Anbar province, its area of responsibility in Iraq, allow a drawdown,

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and that Marine warfighting capabilities are especially well-suited for the growing security challenges in southern Afghanistan.[230] A further decision concerns the type of Army combat forces that would deploy. To date, the U.S. Army has deployed ―light‖ combat units to Afghanistan. If the Army continues to provide the majority of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and if the decision is to continue to deploy exclusively light combat units, then stress on the infantry could become acute. One option might be the introduction of heavy BCTs, but their capabilities might be less well-suited for Afghanistan‘s terrain.

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Updating Counterinsurgency (COIN) Approaches Counterinsurgency approaches, by definition, require continual adaptation to the local environment. One set of COIN military strategy questions in Afghanistan concerns population security, and in particular, how best to balance the need to maintain a dispersed footprint, living among the population, given the antipathy of some parts of that population toward any foreign presence. In Afghanistan, this dilemma has been particularly evident in some isolated mountain valleys. One option is to sustain an international troop presence, coupled with development and governance assistance, aiming to win over the local population eventually. An alternative—diametrically opposed both theoretically and practically—is to accept that ―population security‖ may not work identically in every context, to withdraw the antagonizing foreign force presence in some locations, and to sacrifice some measure of security against insurgents for a different kind of stability—an absence of discord between foreign forces and the local population. Another set of options concerns possible adjustments to the use of kinetic air operations in Afghanistan. The year 2008 witnessed sharp criticism from GIRoA and UNAMA of civilian casualties caused by air strikes. Such incidents have the potential to sharply discourage popular support for the government, essential to the success of any counterinsurgency. In late 2008, ISAF updated its Tactical Directive, carefully articulating rules for the use of fires. In 2009, General McChrystal reiterated the importance of reducing or eliminating civilian casualties in his August ISAF Commander‘s Counterinsurgency Guidance.[231] The year 2010 may prove a good test of the impact on civilian casualties of the new guidelines, and of a larger international forces presence that may allow some reduction in the use of kinetic air power. A further set of options concerns the balance of effort between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces. Some experts have argued that the military effort in Afghanistan would benefit from boosting the role of SOF vis-à-vis conventional forces. In Afghanistan, SOF play the lead role in targeting insurgent leaders, and proponents argue that increasing SOF troop strength might lead to more targeting successes. Other experts counter that successful SOF efforts rely on international conventional forces and the ANSF, both to provide information about a battlespace in advance, and to ―hold‖ that battlespace after kinetic operations. That collaborative partnership, they argue, is essential to the success of overall COIN efforts, and therefore, the utility of unilateral increases in SOF deployments for the overall COIN mission would be limited.

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Developing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Experts generally agree that the development of the Afghan National Security Forces is essential to the future security and stability of Afghanistan.[232] In late 2008, GIRoA, backed by the support of the international community, decided to increase the target endstrength of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Further major policy issues include the size of the total ANSF, the mix of forces within it, the focus of effort of those forces, the timeline for developing those forces, and funding further ANSF development. Practitioners underscore that ANSF development is highly dynamic. As Afghan National Police (ANP) capabilities grow, the ANP may increasingly assume responsibility for some domestic missions now performed by the Afghan National Army (ANA). As total ANSF numbers and capabilities grow, Afghan forces may increasingly assume responsibility from international security forces. And when—as expected—the security challenges from the insurgency diminish, the ANSF may shift from COIN to more traditional peacetime foci, including external defense for the ANA, and civilian law enforcement for the ANP. One critical issue is funding the development and sustainment of the ANSF. Senior Afghan and international officials estimate that it will cost approximately $3.5 billion per year to increase ANSF force structure, and then $2.2 billion per year to sustain it. Unlike Iraq, whose oil revenues have funded an increasing share of the costs of growing and sustaining the Iraqi Security Forces in recent years, Afghanistan has few natural resources and little economic activity, other than poppy production, that could generate significant revenue in the near future. GIRoA, which contributed $320 million to the ANSF in 2008, is not a realistic source of ANSF funding in the near term.[233] International support, and particularly U.S. support, is expected to bear the near-term burden of developing the ANSF, until it reaches its current endstrength targets. Growing the ANA to 1 34,000—or more—raises the twin questions of funding and sustainability. It is expected that the currently planned ANA growth will be funded by the international community; the United States is currently the leading contributor. If GIRoA wanted to sustain the force beyond that time frame, theoretical options would include continued U.S. and international support, or Afghan assumption of some level of financial responsibility. Alternatives could include demobilizing some part of the force—if GIRoA had the ability to do so—or, hypothetically, making part of the force available to serve in multilateral peace operations, in which case the international community might bear some of its costs. For the future, one option, in the absence of GIRoA ability to shoulder the burden, would be sustained international support, a responsibility likely to fall to the U.S. government, based on current patterns. The policy question for the U.S. government, in turn, would concern whether national interests support sustaining that sizable commitment—and if so, at what levels, and for how long. In the absence of either Afghan or international funding sources, one option would be demobilizing some part of the Afghan forces. A conclusive defeat of insurgent forces might increase the plausibility of such an approach, by reducing the requirement for ANSF numbers for the COIN fight. One challenge could prove to be limited ability on the part of the Afghan civilian leadership to direct the security ministries to decrease their forces. One additional option, with some cost implications, would be a future role for Afghanistan as net exporter of security, providing trained, interoperable ANSF to serve in UN

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peace operations or other multi-national coalition efforts around the world. Minister of Defense Wardak suggested this possibility by noting, ―One day we will pay our debt by fighting shoulder to shoulder with you,‖ words that might apply abroad as well as at home.[234] Playing such roles might help GIRoA secure some international support for maintaining its force. A further policy issue concerning the ANSF is force modernization—including the likely future requirements the ANSF will face, and the steps the ANSF might begin taking now, in terms of training and procurement, to prepare to meet those future requirements. While army and police commanders on the ground are fully focused on the current fight, Minister of Defense Wardak has argued in favor of beginning to build a mix of forces that would also be appropriate to the post- COIN environment. One implication for the U.S. government is the impact GIRoA force modernization decisions may have on foreign military sales requests. One final consideration concerning the development of the ANSF, is the nature of emerging civil- military relationships within the Government of Afghanistan. Some civilmilitary experts caution that there is an inherent danger, when a state‘s army is by far its most competent, effective organization, that civilian control of the military may erode. In late 2008, some Afghan officials, including Minister of Defense Wardak, have pointed to a tendency on the part of President Karzai to ask the ANA to play non-military roles—for example, guarding civilian prisons—when civilian personnel are unavailable. U.S. military officials have noted that they spend significant time with senior Afghan security officials, mentoring them on the role of security forces in a democracy.[235]

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Addressing Regional Issues By the end of 2008, a near-consensus had emerged among practitioners and observers that the challenges Afghanistan faces could not be successfully addressed without a ―regional‖ approach. Policy options might include various avenues for influencing the behavior of neighboring states, particularly Pakistan and Iran, in order to shape the security climate in Afghanistan. Some but not all commentators argue, in addition, that because Pakistan and India tend to make use of Afghanistan as a pawn in their own long-simmering conflict, successful ―regional‖ initiatives concerning Afghanistan must also take into account the Pakistan-India relationship. Some commentators also suggest that Iraq is germane as a major security preoccupation for Iran, whose behavior in Afghanistan may be affected by developments across its opposite border. While the exhortation to consider the broader region has widespread support, no consensus on regional strategy has emerged—to date, experts have put forward a very wide range of specific policy prescriptions, some of them mutually contradictory.

Pakistan The U.S. government may wish to address both strategic and operational policy options concerning Pakistan‘s role vis-à-vis Afghanistan. At the strategic level, a central question concerns the most effective ways to encourage Pakistani action against those supporting and fomenting the Afghanistan insurgency. One group of experts urges assistance efforts to support governance and development in ―the

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impoverished areas that have become breeding grounds for militants,‖ in particular along the border, in order to diminish the generation of, and support for, insurgents.[236] This could be of particular importance if intensified counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan drive insurgents across the border into Pakistan. Enhance coordination with the Pakistani military could go some distance toward mitigating this concern, though any such coordination may be constrained by operational security requirements. Several other groups of experts particularly emphasize the importance of the U.S.Pakistani milto-mil relationship, as a tool for shaping Pakistani actions. Some argue that the key is to continue to build Pakistani capabilities and to shape their orientation by strengthening current initiatives— for example, by boosting U.S. efforts to train the Pakistan Army Special Forces for counterterrorism operations, expanding Pakistani participation in military exchange programs, and fostering closer mil-to-mil coordination along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[237] Others agree that mil-to-mil initiatives are key but urge making the provision of the benefits they offer conditional on stronger Pakistani support along the border with Afghanistan.[238] Some experts, in contrast, argue that the close U.S.Pakistan mil-to-mil relationship is part of the problem, as it may tend to diminish Pakistani civilian control over its military. Therefore, one regional expert writes, ―the United States must relinquish, not strengthen, the privileged relationship between the United States and the Pakistani military.‖[239] Another set of experts argues that efforts to shape Pakistani actions vis-à-vis Afghanistan are likely to be successful only as part of a broader approach to Pakistan‘s concerns and its role in the region. Key issues, in this broader perspective, might include Pakistan‘s role as a nuclear power, and its tendentious relationship with nuclear-armed neighbor India—in particular their rival claims to the disputed territory of Kashmir. Policy options might include, for example, more robust U.S. unilateral, or multilateral, diplomatic efforts to help India and Pakistan forge a stable, sustainable relationship. The Obama administration has indicated initial support for a Pakistan policy that includes both increasing non-military aid, and conditioning the provision of mil-to-mil assistance on Pakistani actions such as ―...clos[ing] down training camps, evict[ing] foreign fighters, and prevent[ing] the Taliban and al Qaeda from using Pakistan as a sanctuary.‖[240] Meanwhile, at the operational level, a key question is whether to continue U.S. crossborder attacks while strategic-level dialogue and other attempts to exercise leverage are underway. Continued cross-border attacks might lead to political blow-back in Pakistan, but they might also persuade Pakistani officials to take more decisive steps to end support to insurgents. Options, therefore, might include either accelerating or decreasing the use of cross-border attacks. Options might also include seeking additional avenues for strengthening tactical-level cross-border coordination, including increasing the frequency or scope of regular coordination meetings, establishing further border coordination centers, and improving the ease of tactical-level coordination in actions against insurgent targets.

Iran Practitioners and observers recognize Iran‘s dual track role in Afghanistan—providing both humanitarian and lethal aid. The key issue in U.S. Afghanistan policy debates is how best to leverage concerns that Iran shares with the rest of the international community—including regional security and the impact of the narcotics trade—to shape Iranian choices.

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Options include a more concerted diplomatic outreach to Tehran, by the United States and/or other members of the international community, designed to build on shared regional concerns. Some experts suggest that Tehran may be more likely to respond positively to outreach efforts by the Obama administration, than to those by its predecessor. Another option—not mutually exclusive—is robust countering of any Iranian efforts to provide lethal aid to insurgents in Afghanistan.

Strengthening Counternarcotics Efforts

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Despite the existence of broadly agreed counternarcotics (CN) strategies, and some recent declines in cultivation, many practitioners see little likelihood of significant further CN progress until GIRoA takes major further strides in establishing the rule of law, including both building a formal judicial system and encouraging a pervasive law-based culture. Some observers have further suggested that there may be inherent contradictions between CN and COIN efforts, since a key premise of COIN is fostering popular support for the government, while some CN initiatives may alienate parts of the population, at least temporarily. One near term option is for GIRoA and ISAF to take full advantage of the October 2008 NATO decision expanding the interpretation of the CN role ISAF may play, to include targeting drug facilities when a connection with the insurgency can be shown. Focused diplomatic efforts might prove useful in persuading some Allies to fully embrace this broader interpretation. A further option might be more assiduously cultivating the cooperation of community as well as provincial leaders in CN efforts, including strengthening the system of incentives available to those who lend their support. The Afghanistan Social Outreach Program, designed to foster and focus ground-up capacity-building, might naturally complement any such outreach efforts.

Achieving a NATO Success in Afghanistan? Most NATO observers suggest that ―Afghanistan‖ is a critical test for the Alliance, including its ability to conduct major out-of-area missions, and its relevance to 21st century security challenges, and many have argued that failure in Afghanistan could spell the end of the Alliance. In January 2008, the Afghanistan Study Group argued, ―A failure of the NATO mission in Afghanistan would also damage the future prospects of the organization itself.‖[241] For a number of practitioners, that line of thinking implies an imperative to make sure that the Alliance is successful in Afghanistan—which is not quite the same thing, logically, as making sure that Afghanistan itself succeeds. Key policy considerations include what it would take for the outcome in Afghanistan to be considered a ―NATO success,‖ and what if any differences that might entail from a strict pursuit of security, good governance and development for Afghanistan. In some circumstances, U.S. policy-makers might choose to weigh the imperative of accomplishing the mission against the imperative to support NATO as an institution.

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Some observers suggest that the growing presence of U.S. forces, and possibly a stronger U.S. role in ISAF command and control, may lead to the perception that any progress in Afghanistan is due to U.S. rather than NATO efforts. In that vein, the Afghanistan Study Group argued, ―Burden- sharing among NATO allies is critical to the mission in terms of both available resources and public perceptions—an increasingly unilateral mission will be politically vulnerable in Afghanistan, the U.S., and NATO.‖[242] Options for countering such perceptions, if so desired, might include maintaining U.S. battlespace-owning units under ISAF command; using diplomatic channels to forge stronger consensus on the nature and stakes of the fight in Afghanistan; and soliciting non-military forms of assistance from those countries unwilling or unable to provide large ground force contingents for the counterinsurgency fight.

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Supporting Reconciliation A number of key practitioners and observers have supported ―reconciliation‖ outreach initiatives, to insurgent leaders and/or their foot soldiers, as one avenue toward final settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan. Senior U.S. military officials in Afghanistan underscore that questions concerning to whom to reach out, at what time, with what offers, and with what endstate in view, are policy matters for GIRoA decision. Any ―reconciliation‖ efforts would likely have a direct bearing on security efforts in Afghanistan, because they concern the formal adversary—the insurgents—in the fight. Some experts have argued that leadership-level reconciliation initiatives risk institutionalizing formal political roles in the future Government of Afghanistan for known ―bad guys.‖ Such inclusion, they suggest, might alienate parts of the Afghan population who suffered repression under the Taliban regime. Worse, such alienated constituencies might take up arms to protest such brokered deals. Institutionalizing leading roles for former Taliban or other insurgent leaders might also, it is suggested, push the orientation of the Government of Afghanistan in more repressive directions. U.S. government policy considerations might include determining the U.S. preferred outcome of any such talks, and exercising diplomacy to influence the form and content of any such initiatives. From an operational perspective, U.S. deliberations might include assessing how different military strategies might contribute to bringing Taliban leaders to the negotiations table in a frame of mind conducive to agreeing to conditions acceptable to GIRoA. For example, Taliban leaders might be compelled to come to terms by even more aggressive targeting, or by more strident efforts to cut off the funding support they receive from the narcotics trade.

Applying the Lessons of Afghanistan to Future Force Development For the longer term, defense practitioners and analysts are likely to continue to seek lessons from U.S. military prosecution of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to apply to future U.S. force shaping and sizing. Such conclusions, and they way they are applied, are likely to have a profound impact on how the Military Services fulfill their responsibilities, in accordance

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with Title 10, U.S. Code, to organize, man, train and equip military forces. Critical policy considerations for DOD are likely to include the capabilities required to successfully prosecute complex contingency operations like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, the likelihood that the United States will engage in similar complex contingencies in the future, and the relative importance of such skills compared to more traditional military capabilities. The publication of Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 on ―Irregular Warfare,‖ in December 2008, which stated that ―IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare,‖ reflected and helped institutionalize a growing DOD emphasis on complex contingency capabilities.[243] Should this school of thought continue to hold sway, options might include further increasing the endstrength of the ground forces, and raising the profile of the mission to train and advise foreign security forces. In a resource-constrained environment, any such choices would like entail tradeoffs with other DOD capability areas.

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Balancing and Integrating Civilian and Military Efforts Years of operational experience in Afghanistan, like those in Iraq, have helped fuel debates about appropriately balancing military and civilian capabilities in the U.S. government, and effectively integrating those capabilities with each other. A key short-term policy consideration is the U.S. government response to the appeal from U.S. Embassy Kabul for further civilian resources—personnel and ready funds—to support capacity- building efforts in Afghanistan. One constraint may be the availability of trained civilian personnel with the appropriate expertise, ready to deploy. Another constraint may be the availability of funds—in particular, civilian funding streams relatively free of bureaucratic red tape that allow quick execution. Some U.S. commanders on the ground, while generally welcoming the prospect of civilian expertise, caution that such an initiative would be most valuable if it carefully recruits people with relevant expertise. Simply ―throwing bodies at the problem,‖ they caution, would not be helpful. Some add that it would also be important to ensure that additional civilian personnel are included in clear civilian chains of command, to ensure unity of effort among their various activities. Some outside experts, in turn, caution against any infusion of civilian personnel that might detract from GIRoA efforts to govern their own country. One regional expert, arguing that the U.S. government should not increase its involvement in the Afghan government or economy, has written: ―The more responsibility we take in Afghanistan, the more we undermine the credibility and responsibility of the Afghan government and encourage it to act irresponsibly.‖[244] Another expert has urged, ―Rather than sending in thousands of civilians, the shift in emphasis could be to training Afghans to do the jobs themselves.‖[245] U.S. Embassy appeals for a ―civilian surge‖ are predicated on precisely that advisory approach. Key policy considerations for the longer-term, suggested by U.S. experience in Afghanistan, might include whether the U.S. government requires increased civilian capacity to meet possible future complex contingency requirements, and if so, what capabilities would be required, and how might they best be cultivated and organized. A related consideration concerns the implications of any enhancement of U.S. government civilian capacity for military requirements—whether, for example, increased civilian capacity might decrease the

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missions military forces should be prepared to accomplish. And finally, regardless of the balance in numbers and capabilities between military and civilian personnel, a further policy consideration is how best to effectively integrate military and civilian complex contingency efforts, in both planning and execution.

Additional Reports CRS Report RL33 110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco. CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin. CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman. CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

Author Contact Information Steve Bowman Catherine Dale Specialist in National Security [email protected], 7-5841

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Catherine Dale Specialist in International Security

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See for example the replies to questions for the record, submitted by Secretary of State nominee Hillary Clinton to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), for her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf; and replies to questions for the record, submitted by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy nominee Michèle Flournoy to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), for her January 15, 2009, confirmation hearing, available at http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/January/ Flournoy%2001-15-09.pdf. See also Joseph J. Collins, ―Afghanistan: Faltered But Not Fallen,‖ Armed Forces Journal, January 2009; Michael O‘Hanlon, ―Playing for Keeps,‖ USA Today, January 7, 2009; Nathaniel C. Fick and John A. Nagl, ―Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan Edition,‖ Foreign Policy, January/ February 2009. President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, January 20, 2009, text available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/ read _the _inaugural _address/. In her replies to questions for the record, submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) for her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing, Secretary of

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale State nominee Hillary Clinton stated: ―President-Elect Obama and I believe that Afghanistan and the Pakistani border are the central front in the war on terror.‖ See text available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181, January 28, 2008, §1230 required a ―report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan,‖ no later than 90 days after enactment and every 180 days thereafter until the end of FY2010. That report is to include a ―comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan‖ that addresses NATO and its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and other development initiatives, counter-narcotics activities, the rule of law, and regional considerations. P.L. 110-181, § 1231, required, no later than 90 days after enactment, and annually to the end of FY20 10, a report on sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces. NATO-ISAF Briefing,, Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, February 18, 2010. Ibid. ―Gates Asks NATO for More Trainers and Mentors,‖ American Forces Press Service, February 4, 2010. General Stanley McChrystal, ―COMISAF‘s Initial Assessment,‖ Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan. August 30, 2009 (Available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/Assessment_ Redacted_092109.pdf Gerald Seib, ―Exit Plan Critical to Afghan Build-up,‖ Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2009. Text of the President‘s speech is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-addressnation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan ―NATO Leader Expects Partners to Boost Contributions,‖ American Forces Press Service. December 2, 2009. Jonathan Burch, ―NATO Takes Command of the Afghan Army, Police Training,‖ Reuters, November 21, 2009 Babak Dehghanpisheh and Evan Thomas, ―Scions of the Surge,‖ Newsweek, March 24, 2008. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, para. 2-1. Paragraph 2-2 of the COIN manual adds: ―The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and HN [host nation] government. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.‖ In November 2008, International Security Assistance Force Commanding General, U.S. Army General David McKiernan noted that without additional resources, it would be ―a longer fight with greater sacrifices.‖ General David McKiernan, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. For background see Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004); George Crile, Charlie Wilson‘s War: The Extraordinary

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Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of our Times (New York: Grove Press, 2003); Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Vintage Departures, 2001); and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). The plural noun ―mujahedin‖ (singular ―mujahid‖), borrowed from Arabic and now used in standard English, refers to a group of Muslims waging ―jihad,‖ or ―a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty.‖ See ―jihad,‖ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2008, Merriam-Webster online, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/jihad; and ―mujahideen,‖ MerriamWebster Online Dictionary 2008, Merriam-Webster online, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mujahideen>. The term ―Taliban,‖ in Pashto, is the plural of ―talib‖ (student), which is derived from Arabic. See ―Taliban,‖ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary 2008, MerriamWebster online, available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/Taliban. The full list of demands included ―Deliver to United States authorities all of the leaders of Al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating.‖ See President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. See Statement by President George W. Bush, October 7, 2001, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/10/2001 1007-8.html. Many observers consider that at the launch of OEF, short-term U.S. objectives – including targeting al Qaeda – together with the means to achieve them, were much more clearly articulated than any longer-term U.S. vision for Afghanistan‘s future, together with the approaches necessary to achieve that vision. The United Kingdom‘s publicly stated campaign objectives included bringing Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders to justice; preventing them from posing a further terrorist threat; and ensuring that Afghanistan ceased to harbor terrorists; in pursuit of the broader objective to ―do everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism.‖ See Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, ―Defeating International Terrorism: Campaign Objectives,‖ October 16, 2001, available at http://www.mod.uk. For a detailed discussion of the March 2002 Operation Anaconda, which included SOF and conventional forces, coalition partners, and Afghan forces, see Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: Berkley Books, 2005). For an analysis of the lessons of Afghanistan operations for future warfighting, see Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002. In accordance with the provisions of the Bonn Agreement, a large meeting – a ―loya jirga‖ – was held in June 2002, at which Hamid Karzai was elected head of

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale the new Afghan Transitional Authority. A new constitution was adopted in January 2004; presidential elections, in which Karzai was elected, were held in October 2004; and National Assembly elections were held in September 2005. See the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the ReEstablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, December 5, 2001, available at http://www.mfa.gov.af/ Documents/ImportantDoc/The%20Bonn%20Agreement.pdf. See S/RES/1386 (2001), December 20, 2001. The UK was followed by Turkey, and then Germany, see S/RES/1413 (2002), May 23, 2002, and S/RES/1444 (2002), November 27, 2002. It is a fundamental principle of military theory that war is driven by political goals of one kind or another. The Prussian writer Carl von Clausewitz argued that policy ―...will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.‖ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.) ―Strategic Vision,‖ NATO, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08052e.html. ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. NATO press release, ―NATO Ministers agree on key priorities for Afghanistan,‖ October 23, 2009. National Security Council, National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, November 2005, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html. See replies to questions for the record, submitted by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy nominee to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), for her January 15, 2009, confirmation hearing, available at http ://armedservices.senate.gov/ statemnt/2009/January/Flournoy%2001-15-09.pdf. See the replies to questions for the record, submitted by Secretary of State nominee Hillary Clinton to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), for her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/ KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. General David McKiernan, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Interagency Policy Group, White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’s report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Office of the President, Washington, DC, March 2009, pp. 1-5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/ documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf . Ibid., p. 2 General Stanley McChrystal, ―COMISAF‘s Initial Assessment,‖ Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan. August 30, 2009 (available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/ Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf. See The Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success, London Conference on Afghanistan, London, January 31- February 1, 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf. See S/RES/1401 (2002), March 28, 2002. The mandate is renewed annually.

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See S/RES/1806 (2008), March 20, 2008, which extended the mandate of UNAMA for one year. For further background, including the perspectives of key ISAF troop contributors, see CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin. See Article 5, The North Atlantic Treaty, signed April 4, 1949, Washington, DC, available at http://www.nato.int/ docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. See International Security Assistance Force ―Placemat,‖ dated December 1, 2008, available at http://www.nato.int/ isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isafjlacemat_08 120 1.pdf. General David McKiernan, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 18, 2008, transcript available at http://www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-dmckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript. Interviews with ISAF officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Interviews with ISAF officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. International Security Assistance Force ―Placemat‖ dated October 22, 2009, available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/ docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf. Erlanger, Steven. ―Europe‘s Revolving Door in Afghanistan,‖ New York Times, December 21, 2009. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. General David McKiernan and other U.S. officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. One additional consequence of national caveats is a tendency for U.S. troops in Afghanistan to regard ISAF with a degree of humorous skepticism – ―ISAF,‖ the line goes, stands for ―I Stop At Four,‖ or alternatively, ―I Saw Americans Fighting.‖ Major General de Kruif, Interview, Kandahar, Afghanistan, November 2008. General David McKiernan, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. PRTs are variously civilian- or military-led, and may include any combination of civilian and military personnel, see below. Interviews with ISAF officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. The March 2008 Report of the UN Secretary- General stressed the role of UNAMA in addressing ―how to harmonize the activities of the provincial reconstruction teams.‖ See A/62/722-S/2008/159, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, Report of the Secretary-General, March 6, 2008. Ambassador Fernando Gentilini, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. DOD press release, ―DOD Announces Units for Afghanistan Rotations and Deployments,‖ December 22, 2009. See Matthew Cox, ―10th Mountain Brigade Extended in Afghanistan,‖ Army Times, January 25, 2007. See Ann Scott Tyson, ―3,200 Marines to Deploy to Afghanistan in Spring,‖ Washington Post, January 16, 2008. General David McKiernan, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 18, 2008, transcript available at http://www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-dmckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript.

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale Interviews with ISAF officials, Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan, November 2008. ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul and Kandahar, November 2008. See Nancy A. Youssef, ―U.S. Marines Find Iraq Tactics Don‘t Work in Afghanistan,‖ McClatchy Newspapers, January 11, 2009. For background on MRAPs, see CRS Report RS22707, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. TF Currahee and ISAF officials, Interviews, Khowst province and Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Under General McKiernan‘s predecessor, ISAF went from two to four Predator lines. Christopher D. Kolenda, ―How to Win in Afghanistan,‖ Weekly Standard, October 13, 2008. See Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Remarks, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 21, 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=123 1. Secretary Gates said: ―My concern is that our services are still not moving aggressively in wartime to provide resources needed now on the battlefield. I‘ve been wrestling for months to get more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets into the theatre. ...While we‘ve doubled this capability in recent months, it is still not good enough.‖ See ―Diplomatic Note No.202,‖ Embassy of the United States of America, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 26, 2002; ―Note, Document No.791,‖ Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fifth Political Department, December 12, 2002; and ―Note, Document No.93,‖ Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, American and Canada Political Affairs Department, May 28, 2003. See also Karen DeYoung, ―Only a Two-Page ‗Note‘ Governs U.S. Military in Afghanistan,‖ Washington Post, August 28, 2008. See Joint Declaration of the United States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, May 23, 2005, available at available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2005/05/20050523-2.html. S/RES/1386 (2001), December 20, 2001. See Annex I, ―International Security Force,‖ Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, Germany, December 5, 2001, available at http://www.mfa.gov.af/ Documents/ImportantDoc/The%20Bonn%20Agreement.pdf. The Agreement states: ―This force will assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centers and areas.‖ S/RES/1510 (2003), October 13, 2003. UNSCR 1890 (2009), October 8, 2009. The Afghanistan Compact: Building on Success, London Conference on Afghanistan, London, UK, February 1, 2006, available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf. See Karen DeYoung, ―Only a Two-Page ‗Note‘ Governs U.S. Military in Afghanistan,‖ Washington Post, August 28, 2008.

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See Associated Press, ―Afghanistan Seeks More Control of NATO Troops,‖ Los Angeles Times, January 21, 2009. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. ―Metrics Brief 2007-2008,‖ International Security Assistance Force, January 2009. The range for Afghan civilian deaths reflects differences between ISAF and UNAMA data collection. UNAMA figures reflect a lower percentage increase, but higher absolute numbers of deaths. ISAF explains that UNAMA‘s capacity to investigate and verify reports, inter alia to prevent duplication, is more limited than ISAF‘s, ISAF official, personal communication, January 2009. See Yochi Dreazen, ―Taliban Expanding Foothold in Afghanistan, Report Finds,‖ Wall Street Journal, December 8, 2008. Lakhdar Brahimi, ―A New Path for Afghanistan,‖ Washington Post, December 7, 2008. Nir Rosen, ―How We Lost the War We Won,‖ Rolling Stone, October 30, 2008. Rosen appeared to reach the conclusion that the Taliban was winning in part because they told him so; for example, one of his hosts noted, ―From now on, it‘s all Taliban territory – the Americans and police don‘t come here at night.‖ Of course, the same methodological questions, concerning reliance on the statements of one‘s informants, could also be applied to field interviews with ―friendly‖ forces. Rosen‘s article also prompted some debate concerning the ethics of embedding with insurgent forces. See also Paul Watson, ―Behind the Lines with the Taliban,‖ Los Angeles Times, January 11, 2009. Watson, who briefly embedded with Taliban fighters in Ghazni province south of Kabul, concluded that the area was ―Taliban country‖ where the Taliban were in charge. He quotes one fighter as saying, ―Police and soldiers can never come to our territory. If they do, they won‘t go back safe and sound.‖ General David McKiernan and other ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. See General David McKiernan, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 18, 2008, transcript available at http://www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-dmckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript; and MG Robert Cone, DOD Press Briefing, November 12, 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ transcript. aspx?transcriptid=43 14. Also, U.S. commanders, Interviews, November 2008. ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. General McKiernan added that overall, the Taliban is ―less than the sum of its parts.‖ UN SRSG Kai Eide, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. U.S. military official, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. For background about insurgent groups in Afghanistan, see Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008). On the Taliban in general, see Major Shahid Afsar, Pakistan Army, Major Chris Samples, U.S. Army, and Major Thomas Wood, U.S. Army, ―The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,‖ Military Review, vo. 88, no. 3 (May-June 2008).

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale Reuters, ―Taliban‘s Murderous Mullah Threatens West,‖ New York Post, December 8, 2008. See Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, ―Thwarting Afghanistan‘s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation,‖ United States Institute of Peace, September 2008. Stanekzai, who held a fellowship at the U.S. Institute of Peace, was previously a senior GIRoA official. See Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008). For background about Haqqani, see Jay Solomon, ―Troubled Border: Failed Courtship of Warlord Trips up U.S. in Afghanistan,‖ The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2007. ISAF senior officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. See Anna Mulrine, ―Afghan Warlords, Formerly Backed by the CIA, Now Turn their Guns on U.S. Troops,‖ U.S. News and World Report, July 11, 2008. For a concise discussion of Afghan insurgent groups and foreign groups supporting the insurgency, see Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, ―Thwarting Afghanistan‘s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation,‖ United States Institute of Peace, September 2008. See Jane Perlez, ―Taliban Leader Flaunts Power Inside Pakistan,‖ The New York Times, June 2, 2008; ―Tribal tribulations: The Pakistani Taliban in Waziristan,‖ Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 13, 2009; and ―Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,‖ Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, January 13, 2009. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, ―The emergence of the Pakistani Taliban,‖ Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, December 11, 2007. James Kitfield, ―Progress in Afghanistan gets rockier,‖ National Journal, September 15, 2008. See also Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, ―The Taliban‘s Baghdad Strategy,‖ Newsweek, August 4, 2008. The article cites a ―senior Taliban intelligence operative in Pakistan‖ as stating that by focusing on Kabul ―we can create panic and undermine the last vestiges of support for the regime.‖ General David Petraeus, U.S. CENTCOM Commanding General, recently stated, ―Every case is unique. ...While general concepts that proved important in Iraq may be applicable to Afghanistan....the application of those ‗big ideas ‗ has to be adapted to Afghanistan.‖ General David Petraeus, Interview, Foreign Policy, (January/ February 2009), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587. See David Kilcullen, ―Road-Building in Afghanistan: Part 1 of a Series on Political Maneuver in Counterinsurgency,‖ Small Wars Journal, April 24, 2008, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/04/ political-maneuver-in-counteri/; and David Ignatius, ―Building Bridges in the Back of Beyond,‖ Washington Post, May 1, 2008. 24th MEU officials, Interviews, Kandahar, Afghanistan, November 2008. See for example General David Petraeus, COIN Guidance, Multi-National Force Iraq, 2008. RC-East officials, Interviews, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. RC-East official, Interview, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008.

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H.R. McMaster, ―The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy,‖ World Affairs, Winter 2009. For a recent analysis of the kinetic use of air in Afghanistan, which argues against ―excessive restraint in the use of airstrikes,‖ see Lara M. Dadkhah, ―Close Air Support and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan,‖ Small Wars Journal, December 30, 2008, available at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/12/close-air-supportand-civilian/. See James Kitfield, ―Progress in Afghanistan Gets Rockier,‖ National Journal, September 15, 2008; and Carlotta Gall, ―Afghan Leader Assails Airstrike He Says Killed 95,‖ The New York Times, August 23, 2008. Candace Rondeaux and Karen DeYoung, ―U.N. Finds Airstrike Killed 90 Afghans,‖ Washington Post, August 27, 2008. Kai Eide, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Kirk Semple, ―Official Calls for Sensitivity to Afghan Demands,‖ The New York Times, December 8, 2008. ISAF slide, ‗Tactical Directive,‖ October 2, 2008. Memorandum, ―Tactical Directive,‖ Headquarters ISAF, July 6, 2009. General David McKiernan, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. General David Petraeus, Interview, Foreign Policy, January/ February 2009, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4587. For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. For background and analysis of the FATA, see Daniel Markey, ―Securing Pakistan‘s Tribal Belt,‖ Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report no. 36, August 2008. See Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid, ―From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan,‖ Foreign Affairs, vol. 87, no. 6 (November/ December 2008). The authors add, ―The area is kept underdeveloped and over-armed as a barrier against invaders.‖ According to unclassified CIA estimates from July 2008, ethnic Pashtuns comprise 15.42% of Pakistan‘s population of 172,800,048; and about 42% of Afghanistan‘s population of 32,738,376. See ―Pakistan‖ and ―Afghanistan,‖ The World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pk.html and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. Text of agreement available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/ etc/nwdeal.html. See Jane Perlez, ―Taliban Leader Flaunts Power Inside Pakistan,‖ The New York Times, June 2, 2008, and Jon Hemming, ―NATO Beefs Up Forces Along AfghanPakistan Border,‖ Reuters, May 19, 2008. See also Daniel Markey, ―Securing Pakistan‘s Tribal Belt,‖ Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report no. 36, August 2008, p. 11. See Karen DeYoung, ―Pakistan Will Give Arms to Tribal Militias,‖ Washington Post, October 23, 2008, and Saeed Shah, ―Pakistan Rejects ‗America‘s War‘ on Extremists, The Guardian, October 24, 2008. ISAF, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008.

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale Hamid Shalizi, ―NATO Chief Says Will Not Hunt Taliban in Pakistan,‖ Reuters, July 24, 2008. U.S. military officials, Interviews, Kabul and Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. More than one official cited in this context the phrase from Roman historian Tacitus: ―They make a desert and call it peace.‖ See Karen DeYoung, ―Pakistan Will Give Arms to Tribal Militias,‖ Washington Post, October 23, 2008. Such approaches are not new. Just before independence, in 1946, the British government issued a statement noting a reconsideration of its frontier policy. They would now ―enlist cooperative tribesmen themselves,‖ rather than simply bombing the area. See ―British End Bombing of Indian Tribesmen,‖ The New York Times, September 13, 1946. Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, Interview, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. Task Force Currahee officials, Interviews, Khowst Province, Afghanistan, November 2008. General David McKiernan, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 18, 2008, transcript available at http://www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-dmckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript. U.S. military officials, Interviews, Kabul and Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. ―Pakistani Army: No New Offensives in 2010‖, BBC, January 21, 2010. Saeed Shah, ―Pakistan Rejects ‗America‘s War‘ on Extremists,‖ The Guardian, October 24, 2008. This resolution was passed before the late November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. On Iran‘s behavior at the Bonn Conference, see Ambassador James F. Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan, (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008). ISAF and U.S. officials, Interviews, Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar, Afghanistan, November 2008. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-181, January 28, 2008, § 1230, required the Department of Defense to submit a ―report on progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan,‖ and §1231 required a report on sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces. DOD submitted the first edition of both reports in June 2008. See Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, June 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf; and Department of Defense, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ united_states_plan_for_sustaining_the_afghanistan_national_security_forces_123 1 .pdf. NATO Factsheet, ―Facts and Figures: Afghan National Army,‖ Media Operations Centre, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, December 2009. ―All Things Considered,‖ National Public Radio, November 18, 2008, interview with John Nagl, transcript available at

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http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=97170621: ANA should grow to 250,000. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, ―Thwarting Afghanistan‘s Insurgency: A Pragmatic Approach toward Peace and Reconciliation,‖ United States Institute of Peace, September 2008. ANA Corps Commanding Generals, Interviews, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, November 2008. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. See http://www.mod.gov.af, which calls itself the ―website of the Afghan National Army.‖ ―Metrics Brief 2007-2008,‖ International Security Assistance Force, January 2009. CSTC-A officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Bagram, and Khowst Province, Afghanistan, November 2008. CSTC-A officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008; and see Gordon Lubold, ―Americans Build Elite Afghan Commando Force,‖ Christian Science Monitor, May 1, 2008. MG Robert Cone, other CSTC-A officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Afghanistan in 2008: A Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, 2008, p.25, available at http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2008-poll.php. Other public institutions considered included the media, NGOs, national, provincial and local governing bodies, and community organizations. In the survey, 89% of respondents agreed that the ANA is ―honest and fair with the Afghan people‖ (48% strongly agreed, 41% somewhat agreed), and 89% of respondents agreed that the ―ANA helps improve security‖ (51% strongly agreed, and 35% somewhat agreed). This apparent high regard was not unqualified; 55% of respondents agreed that the ―ANA is unprofessional and poorly trained‖ (18% strongly agreed, and 37% somewhat agreed), see p.35. CAPTF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. CAPTF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. . NATO Factsheet, ―Facts and Figures: Afghan National Army,‖ Media Operations Centre, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, October 2009. CAPTF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. See Department of Defense, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, p.21, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ united_states_plan_for_sustaining_the_afghanistan_national_security_forces_123 1 .pdf. ―Command Changes Hands for Afghan Security Forces Training,‖ American Forces Press Service, December 22, 2008.

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale General David McKiernan, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 18, 2008, transcript available at http://www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-dmckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript. ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Kandahar, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. See Sarah Chayes, ―Clean Up the Afghan Government, and the Taliban Will Fade Away,‖ Washington Post, December 14, 2008. The author lives in Kandahar and runs an Afghan cooperative. She argues: ―Now, Afghans are suffering so acutely that they hardly feel the difference between Taliban depredations and those of their own government.‖ She quotes one local resident of Kandahar as saying: ―The Taliban shake us down at night, and the government shakes us down in the daytime.‖ Afghanistan in 2008 - A Survey of the Afghan People, The Asia Foundation, 2008, p.25, available at http://asiafoundation.org/country/afghanistan/2008-poll.php. In the survey, 80% of respondents agreed that the ―ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people,‖ (40% strongly, 40% somewhat); while 80% agreed that the ―ANP helps improve security‖ (40% strongly, 40% somewhat). At the same time, 60% agreed that the ―ANP is unprofessional and poorly trained‖ (22% strongly, 38% somewhat). ―Metrics Brief 2007-2008,‖ International Security Assistance Force, January 2009. International organization official, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Coalition officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. ―CJTF-101 Campaign Update‖ slides, November 2008. MG Robert Cone, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. The inter-service coordination arrangements in Afghanistan differ from those in Iraq, also designed for the exigencies of a counterinsurgency effort, where provincially-based ―Operations Commands‖ bring together multiple Iraqi security forces under the formal command of the head of each Operations Command. Those arrangements may prove more difficult to rationalize, for a future post-COIN environment, than the OCC‘s in Afghanistan. U.S. government funding support to the ANSF has not followed a smooth trajectory to date. In FY2006, Congress appropriated approximately $1.9 billion for the Afghan Security Forces Fund, and in FY2007 – meeting DOD‘s request based on the need to accelerate Afghan ground forces training and equipping – $7.4 billion. In FY2008, Congress appropriated approximately $2.7 billion for the Fund, again meeting DOD‘s request, which was based on the premise of building on the ANSF acceleration enabled by the FY2007 appropriations. For FY2009, DOD requested an increase – $3.7 billion – in its Global War on Terror bridge request, submitted in May 2008, of which Congress provided $2 billion. See CRS Report RL33 110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco. See also Department of Defense, ―FY 2007 Emergency Supplemental Request for the Global War on Terror,‖ February 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/Docs/ FY2007_Emergency_Supplemental_Request_for_the_GWOT.pdf; Department of Defense, ―FY 2008 Global War on Terror Request,‖ February 2007, available at

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http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/Docs/ FY2008_February_Global_War_On_Terror_Request.pdf; and Department of Defense, ―Fiscal Year 2009 Global War on Terror Bridge Request,‖ May 2008, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2009/ Supplemental/FY2009_Global_War_On_Terror_Bridge_Request.pdf. See the replies to questions for the record, submitted by Secretary of State nominee Hillary Clinton to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), for her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ files/KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. In a 2008 report, regarding the establishment of the OSC-A, DOD noted: ―Efforts prior to this time were not comprehensive and lacked both resources and unity of effort within the international community.‖ See Department of Defense, United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 2008, p.21, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/united_statesjlan_for_sustaining_ the_afghanistan_national_security_forces_123 1 .pdf. The OSC-A, like the OMCA, reported to the U.S. military command in Afghanistan, but received policy guidance from the U.S. Chief of Mission, while contract management authority remained with State INL. ISAF and CSTC-A officials, Interviews, Kabul, Kandahar, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. John Milburn, ―Adviser Mission to Leave Fort Riley,‖ Army Times, October 1, 2008. The U.S. Marine Corps has its own program for preparing Marines for advisory roles. John F. Burns, ―Afghan President, Pressured, Reshuffles Cabinet,‖ The New York Times, October 11, 2008. Task Force Currahee, Interviews, Khowst Province, Afghanistan, November 2008. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. CSTC-A officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. General David McKiernan, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 18, 2008, transcript available at http://www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-dmckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript; and ―U.S. Backs Plan for Engaging Afghan Tribes,‖ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, December 30, 2008. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. ISAF, RC-South officials, and western diplomats, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Jon Boone, ―Afghans Fear U.S. Plan to Rearm Villages,‖ Financial Times, January 12, 2009. ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Ambassador William Wood, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. He added, ―If you make a community responsible,

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale and you given them the feeling that they are sharing in that responsibility, then they will die for it.‖ RC-East official, Interview, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. RC-East official, Interview, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. See Andrew Wilder, ―Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police,‖ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, July 2007. See Jerome Starkey, ―US attacks UK plan to arm Afghan militias,‖ The Independent, January 14, 2008; and Murray Brewster, ―NATO Disbands Afghan Auxiliary Police,‖ Edmonton Sun, May 15, 2008; MG Robert Cone, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008; RC-East official, Interview, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. General David McKiernan, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. See also General David McKiernan, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 18, 2008, transcript available at http://www.acus.org/event_blog/ general-david-dmckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript. See John F. Burns, ―Karzai Sought Saudi Help With Taliban,‖ The New York Times, October 1, 2008; and Anand Gopal, ―No Afghan-Taliban Peace Talks for Now,‖ Christian Science Monitor, October 9, 2008. Kim Sengupta, ―Secret Saudi Dinner, Karzai‘s Brother and the Taliban,‖ The Independent, October 8, 2008. Senior U.S. officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008; and see John F. Burns, ―Karzai Sought Saudi Help With Taliban,‖ The New York Times, October 1, 2008. UK official, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. ISAF officials, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2008. Government of Afghanistan, Afghan National Drug Control Strategy: An Updated Five-Year Strategy for Tackling the Illicit Drug Problem, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Kabul, January 2006. Ambassador Thomas A. Schweich, Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan, U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, August 2007, see especially pp.5-6, and 48. NATO press release, October 10, 2008, available at http://www.nato.int/ docu/update/2008/10-october/e1010b.html. General David McKiernan, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, November 18, 2008, transcript available at http://www.acus.org/event_blog/general-david-dmckiernan-speaks-councils-commanders-series/transcript. Dave Pugliese, ―ISAF Commander Says Afghan Drug Lords to Be on ‗Kill or Capture‘ Target List,‖ Ottawa Citizen, December 23, 2008.

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David Mansfield and Adam Pain, ―Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan: The Failure of Success?‖ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Briefing Paper Series, December 2008, p.3. Clare Lockhart, ―Learning from Experience,‖ Slate, November 5, 2008. The 2006 COIN field manual states: ―Political, social and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately associated with civilian organizations and expertise; however, effective implementation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks. If adequate civilian capacity is not available, military forces fill the gap.‖ Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, para. 2-5. ISAF official, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Ambassador Ferrnando Gentilini, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. ISAF official, Interview, Kandahar, Afghanistan, November 2008. ―CJTF-101 Campaign Update‖ slides, November 2008. Ann Marlowe, ―A Counterinsurgency Grows in Khowst,‖ Weekly Standard, May 19, 2008. Colonel Marty Schweitzer led the 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division, in 6 provinces of RC-East. ISAF official, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. For a current U.S. PRT mission statement, see ―Fact Sheet: Making Afghanistan More Secure with Economic and Reconstruction Assistance,‖ White House, September 26, 2008, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2008/09/20080926-16.html. Zabul PRT officials, Interviews, Zabul province, Afghanistan, November 2008. The constraint of limited resources may also apply to U.S.-led PRTs. In late 2008, the Zabul PRT introduced a new ionizer-based water purification initiative – a scheme developed and proposed by an American Eagle Scout. While that Eagle Scout‘s contributions may be laudable, some suggest that PRTs ought to be able to draw on more readily available expertise. Associated Press, ―Afghan President Complains U.S., NATO Aren‘t Succeeding,‖ Foxnews.com, November 26, 2008. ISAF officials, and Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interviews, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. RC-East, TF Currahee officials, Interviews, Bagram and Khowst province, Afghanistan, November 2008. Zabul PRT officials, Interviews, Zabul province, Afghanistan, November 2008. For information, see the Human Terrain System website, http://humanterrainsystem.army.mil/default.htm. RC-East and TF Currahee officials and HTT members, Interviews, Bagram and Khowst province, Afghanistan, November 2008. To be clear, HTT members state that they ―do not do targeting.‖ See for example, Network of Concerned Anthropologists, ―Anthropologists Up in Arms Over Pentagon‘s ‗Human Terrain System‘ to Recruit Graduate Students to Serve in Iraq, Afghanistan: an interview with David Price,‖ Democracy Now, December 13, 2007, available at http://www.democracynow.org/2007/12/13/ anthropologists_up_ in_arms_over_pentagons.

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale See Jeff Schogol, ―DoD Contractor Charged in Death of Afghan Man,‖ Stars and Stripes, November 22, 2008; and Jerry Markon, ―Contractor Charged,‖ Washington Post, November 20, 2008. RC-East and TF Currahee officials, Interviews, Bagram and Khowst province, Afghanistan, November 2008. RC-East and TF Currahee officials, Interviews, Bagram and Khowst provinces, Afghanistan, November 2008. See also Tom Vanden Brook, ―Harvesting Ties with Afghanistan,‖ Army Times, December 31, 2008. MG Jeffrey Schloesser, Interview, Bagram, Afghanistan, November 2008. MG Weigt, Interview, Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, November 2008. Sarah Chayes, ―Clean up the Afghan Government, and the Taliban will Fade Away,‖ Washington Post, December 14, 2008. See for example ―Afghanistan: Winning the War. Problems, Solutions, and Critical Decisions for the Next Administration,‖ Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, Washington DC, December 4, 2008, panel discussion video transcript available at http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php? option=com_contentandview=articleandid=1 1784099andItemid=385. ―Afghanistan-Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,‖ Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, p. 3. http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/135728.pdf Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387-1391 (2008-2013): A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2008, available at http://www.ands.gov.af/ ands/ands_docs/index.asp. Lakhdar Brahimi, ―A New Path for Afghanistan,‖ Washington Post, December 7, 2008. The Afghanistan Study Group, which released its results in January 2008, called for developing not only ―a long-term, coherent international strategy‖ but also ―a strategic communications plan to garner strong public support for that strategy‖ among NATO countries and regional leaders. If ―strategic communications‖ is regarded as two-way dialogue, then the Group‘s proposal is similar to Brahimi‘s. See General James L. Jones, USMC (ret), Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Co- Chairs, Afghanistan Study Group Report, ―Revitalizing our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies,‖ Center for the Study of the Presidency, January 30, 2008, Page 11. Tom Vanden Brook, ―A ‗Tough Fight‘ Seem for Afghan War in ‗09,‖ USA Today, December 8, 2009. Tom Vanden Brook, ―A ‗Tough Fight‘ Seem for Afghan War in ‗09,‖ USA Today, December 8, 2009. Vanden Brook interviews General McKiernan, whom he quotes as saying: ―I don‘t like to use the word surge here because if we put these additional forces in here, it‘s going to be for the next few years. It‘s not a temporary increase of combat strength.‖ See Rory Stewart, ―How to Save Afghanistan,‖ Time, July 17, 2008. Stewart, the author of The Places in Between, is a former British diplomat and the head of the Turquoise Mountain project in Kabul. Barnett R. Rubin, ―Afghan Dilemmas: Defining Commitments,‖ The American Interest, vol. 3, no.5 (May/June 2008), pp.45-46.

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See the replies to questions for the record, submitted by Secretary of State nominee Hillary Clinton to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), for her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/ KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. ISAF official, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Recent attacks on the supply line from Karachi, Pakistan, to the Afghanistan border included the December 7, 2008, insurgent attacks on two truck stops in Peshawar, Pakistan, destroying over 100 vehicles with supplies bound for Afghanistan, and the November 10, 2008, insurgent hijacking of a convoy of vehicles on the road to the Khyber pass, bound for Afghanistan. See Laura King, ―Suspected Taliban Militants Destroy Supply Trucks,‖ Los Angeles Times, December 8, 2008. Chris Brummitt, ―U.S. Reaches Deal on Afghan Supply Routes,‖ Army Times, January 20, 2009. See Otto Kreisher, ―Marine Commandant Expects Troop Surge in Afghanistan,‖ National Journal, January 15, 2009. See also Gordon Lubold, ―A ‗Surge‘ for Afghanistan?, The Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 2007; Lubold cited General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, as saying: ―The trend lines tell us that it may be time to increase the force posture in Afghanistan. ...If it requires additional US forces, then it goes back to our suggestion that maybe we need more Marines in there with a more kinetic bent.‖ General Conway has also expressed concern that the Marines have ―become, in some ways, a second land army,‖ and may be losing their ―expeditionary flavor,‖ a danger that deployment to Afghanistan might help to avert. See Remarks by General James T. Conway, Commandant of theMarine Corps, Center for a New American Security, Washington DC, October 15, 2007, Available at http://www.marines.mil/units/hqmc/cmc/Documents/ Speeches20071015CNAS.pdf. ISAF Commander‘s Counterinsurgency Guidance, August 2009, ISAF Headquarters, may be found at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_ guidance.pdf. See General James L. Jones, USMC (ret), Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Afghanistan Study Group Report: Revitalizing our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies, Center for the Study of the Presidency, January 30, 2008, p.23. The authors argued for an enhanced international effort: ―The U.S. and its NATO partners also need to focus more efforts and resources on training and standing up the Afghan National Army and recruiting, training, and providing adequate pay and equipment to the Afghan National Police so they can maintain security in an area once coalition forces depart.‖ MG Robert Cone, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Minister of Defense of Afghanistan Abdul Rahim Wardak, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. MG Robert Cone, Interview, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2008. Christopher D. Kolenda, ―How to Win in Afghanistan,‖ Weekly Standard, October 13, 2008. Colonel Christopher Kolenda recently commanded a U.S. Army battalion in Afghanistan along the border with Pakistan.

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Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale See Thomas Lynch, ―Afghan Dilemmas: Staying Power,‖ The American Interest, vol. 3, no.5 (May/June 2008), p.36. U.S. Army Colonel Thomas Lynch has served in Afghanistan. See Vikram J. Singh and Nathaniel C. Fick, ―Surging Statecraft to Save Afghanistan,‖ Small Wars Journal, October 2, 2008. Barnett R. Rubin, ―Afghan Dilemmas: Defining Commitments,‖ The American Interest, vol. 3, no.5 (May/June 2008), p.49. He adds that the United States ―must instead support civilian control over the government and military alike, even by parties that oppose U.S. objectives openly (rather than covertly, like the military).‖ See the replies to questions for the record, submitted by Secretary of State nominee Hillary Clinton to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), for her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/ KerryClintonQFRs.pdf. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy, in replies to questions for the record submitted for her own confirmation hearing, with the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 15, 2009, echoed the same premise, stating: ―The U.S. must have an integrated strategy to promote development and prevent terrorism across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region.‖ See replies to questions for the record, submitted by Under Secretary of Defense for Policy nominee to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), for her January 15, 2009, confirmation hearing, available at http://armedservices.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/ January/Flournoy%2001-15-09.pdf. See for example General James L. Jones, USMC (ret), Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Afghanistan Study Group Report: Revitalizing our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies, Center for the Study of the Presidency, January 30, 2008, Page 17. General James L. Jones, USMC (ret), Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Afghanistan Study Group Report: Revitalizing our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies, Center for the Study of the Presidency, January 30, 2008, Page 17. Department of Defense, ―Irregular Warfare (IW),‖ DoDD 3000.07, December 1, 2008. The Directive defined IW this way: ―A violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary‘s power, influence, and will.‖ It noted that ―IW can include a variety of steady-state and surge DoD activities and operations: counter-terrorism, unconventional warfare; foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency; and stability operations that, in the context of IW, involve establishing or reestablishing order in a fragile state.‖ Rory Stewart, ―How to Save Afghanistan,‖ Time, July 17, 2008. Clare Lockhart, ―Learning from Experience,‖ Slate, November 5, 2008.

Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,

INDEX 2 21st century, viii, 89, 90, 146

9 9/11, 103, 149, 160

Copyright © 2012. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

A abuse, 132 access, 43, 45, 49, 51, 98, 110, 115, 120, 151 accommodation, 16, 20, 93 accountability, 126, 130 acquisitions, 125 Activists, 22 adaptation, 6, 38, 68, 142 adaptations, 62, 139 adjustment, 39, 123 adolescents, 48, 52 adults, 48, 50, 52 advancements, 43 advocacy, 129 Afghan insurgency, 94, 132 Afghanistan, vii, viii, ix, 44, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166 Africa, 24 age, 48, 49, 50, 125 agencies, 43, 44, 115, 119, 120, 135, 137 aggregation, 56, 63 agriculture, 9, 11 Air Force, 128, 135 Al Qaeda, 114, 151 Albania, 104 Algeria, 14

algorithm, viii, 55, 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 anatomy, 46 ancestors, 139 anger, 34 ANS, 52 anther, 91 anthropologists, 163 anxiety, 27, 41 appropriations, 160 Arab world, 114 armed forces, 128 Armenia, 104 arteries, 115 artery, 115, 130 articulation, 100 Asia, 22, 124, 159, 160 assassination, 112, 114, 119 assault, 123, 124 assessment, 44, 83, 92, 96, 102, 103, 118 assets, 44, 98, 109, 127, 141, 152, 154 atmosphere, vii, 25, 34, 35 attachment, 4 attribution, 29 authenticity, 7 authorities, 119, 126, 128, 133, 135, 151 authority, 4, 5, 7, 8, 17, 35, 96, 98, 119, 120, 127, 130, 134, 135, 161 automation, 50 autonomy, 2, 3, 4, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 99 avoidance, vii, 25, 27, 28 awareness, 106, 117

B bandwidth, 44, 47 bargaining, 5, 18 barriers, 49, 106, 109 base, ix, 8, 45, 89, 94, 98, 108, 113, 119, 132 basic services, 93 behavioral change, 50 behaviors, 45, 48, 50, 51 Belgium, 104, 158, 159

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168

Index

beneficiaries, 49 benefits, 45, 50, 53, 120, 145 Bhutto, Benazir, 119 bias, 14 biomarkers, 51 blood, 49, 50, 53 blood pressure, 50, 53 BMI, 48, 49 body composition, 51 bonds, 130 bone, 48, 51, 52 border crossing, 141 border security, 110 boredom, 31 brain, 40, 52 breeding, 145 Bush, President, 108, 110, 119 Bush, President George W., 98, 151

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C Cabinet, 161 calcium, 48, 51 calculus, 133 campaigns, 106 candidates, 26, 72 capsule, 27, 37, 41 carbohydrate, 47, 50 cartoon, 34 ceasefire, 13, 17 cell phones, 45 Central Asia, 118, 141, 151 chain of command, 108 challenges, 3, 44, 90, 91, 97, 99, 108, 117, 124, 137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146 chaos, 96, 131 childhood, 50 children, 30, 48, 50, 52, 118 China, 118 Christians, 12 CIA, 97, 98, 113, 150, 156, 157 circus, 34 cities, 29, 115 citizens, 132, 151 City, 20, 45 civil society, 12, 18, 20 civil war, vii, 1, 96, 97, 113, 114, 131 Civil War, 22, 23, 24 classes, 45 classical methods, 62 classroom, 45, 47 clients, 45, 46 climate, 99, 103, 111, 113, 132, 144 CNS, 38 coaches, 46, 50, 51 coherence, 27 collaboration, 73, 120, 133 college students, 48, 49, 52

Colombia, 104 colonization, 9, 11 commercial, 52 communication, 28, 44, 45, 46, 50, 52, 57, 109, 112, 140 communications channel, 106 communities, 7, 9, 12, 15, 17, 19, 116, 120, 124 community, 4, 11, 16, 18, 20, 29, 39, 44, 46, 51, 52, 97, 99, 101, 102, 103, 111, 116, 128, 130, 131, 134, 136, 138, 143, 145, 146, 159, 160, 161 competition, 130 compilation, vii complement, ix, 90, 93, 127, 138, 141, 146 complexity, 93 compliance, 48, 49 complications, 136 composition, 11, 18, 99, 102 compounds, 118 computation, 85, 86, 87 computer, 28, 44, 46, 50, 53 computing, 68 conditioning, 145 conference, 9, 85, 102 confinement, 26, 37 conflict, vii, 1, 2, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 27, 28, 34, 36, 37, 44, 96, 97, 119, 122, 132, 144, 147, 150 conflict avoidance, 27 conformity, 13 confrontation, 9, 133 consensus, 37, 121, 138, 144, 147 consent, 15 conservation, 39 Constitution, 132 construction, 19, 57, 64, 65, 109, 115, 141 consulting, 14 consumers, 46 consumption, 48, 50, 61, 62, 64, 69, 73, 74, 75, 78 content analysis, 39 contiguity, 11, 16, 20 contingency, 148, 149 control group, 27, 49 controlled trials, 48 convention, 9 convergence, 86 conviction, 17 cooperation, 26, 28, 35, 96, 99, 102, 116, 120, 132, 138, 146 coordination, 44, 48, 60, 94, 97, 102, 103, 106, 111, 112, 120, 127, 138, 145, 160 coping strategies, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, 38, 40 correlation, 86 corruption, 91, 92, 93, 96, 101, 115, 126, 127, 129 cost, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 96, 104, 143 counseling, 45, 47, 49 counterterrorism, 101, 110, 145 criminality, 113 criminals, 130

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Index criticism, 34, 36, 136, 142 Croatia, 104 crop, 111 crops, 132 crossing over, 60 cues, 26 cultivation, 113, 132, 133, 146 culture, 4, 29, 33, 34, 36, 39, 146 cycles, 26 Czech Republic, 104

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D danger, vii, 25, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 112, 131, 144, 165 data collection, 155 deaths, 97, 111, 155 deconstruction, 52 democracy, 18, 100, 110, 144 denial, 33, 36 Denmark, 14 Department of Agriculture, 112, 135 Department of Defense, 41, 44, 47, 51, 101, 107, 110, 111, 136, 141, 148, 158, 159, 160, 166 Department of Justice, 112 deployments, 139, 141, 142 deposits, 57, 58 depression, 41, 46 depth, 61 dermatology, 48 destruction, 97, 120 detection, 28, 56, 81 development policy, 6 diabetes, 46, 50, 51 diet, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52 dietary fat, 48 dietary intake, 49 diplomacy, 147 diplomatic efforts, 138, 145, 146 disappointment, 33 disaster, 32, 39 discrimination, 2, 118 discs, 45 displacement, 9, 96, 97, 122 disposition, 2, 8 distance education, 45 distress, 36 distribution, 15, 35, 126 doctors, 46 dominance, 20, 59, 66, 68, 69, 72, 76, 82 donations, 125 donors, 102, 138 draft, 29, 111 drawing, 114 drought, 133 drugs, 132

E economic activity, 143 economic development, ix, 6, 7, 89, 95, 115 economic growth, 133 economic incentives, 131 economic progress, 115 education, vii, viii, 29, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53 election, 92, 101 electricity, 28 e-mail, 45, 49, 51, 53 emergency, viii, 27, 32, 36, 43 emotion, 39 employees, 49 enemies, 60, 61, 62, 65, 68, 69, 72, 79, 80 energy, 33, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81 energy consumption, 69 enforcement, 39, 126 engineering, 87, 141 England, 32 enlargement, 12 environment, 7, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 41, 44, 57, 60, 99, 102, 103, 142, 144, 148, 160 equipment, 112, 122, 123, 126, 165 ethical standards, 136 ethics, 155 ethnicity, 7 Europe, 104, 153, 161 evacuation, 40 evaporation, 58, 67, 70, 71 evidence, 17, 20, 45, 50, 52, 53, 118, 119, 121 evolution, 108 execution, 74, 91, 92, 97, 128, 148, 149 exercise, 2, 3, 4, 39, 40, 47, 48, 51, 52, 119, 135, 141, 145 exile, 8 expertise, 136, 137, 140, 148, 162, 163 exploitation, 2, 58, 64, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 76, 84 exporter, 143 exports, 110 exposure, 27, 38, 49

F facilitators, 133 faith, 14 families, 35, 141 family members, 26, 27 farmers, 11 fat, 50 fatalism, 32 fear, 32, 36, 114 fears, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 38 feelings, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37 fidelity, 11 financial, 143

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Index

Finland, 104 fires, 118, 142 fish, 108 fitness, 45, 47, 51, 57, 66 flavor, 165 food, 57, 60, 61, 133 force, 10, 91, 98, 100, 101, 102, 105, 108, 109, 110, 113, 117, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 130, 131, 132, 134, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 154, 164 foreign nationals, 151 foreign policy, 121 formation, 5, 7, 103 formula, 57, 58, 65, 70, 71 fragility, 121 framing, 100 France, 104 freedom, 45, 100, 105, 110, 115 friendship, 35 fruits, 48 funding, 91, 92, 130, 136, 143, 147, 148, 160 funds, 130, 136, 148 future orientation, 141

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G gangs, 15 Gaza Strip, 32 general election, 119 general surgeon, 44 geography, 117 Georgia, 104 Germany, 39, 98, 102, 104, 105, 152, 154 globalization, 44 glucose, 50 God, 151 governance, ix, 17, 89, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 115, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 142, 144, 146 government policy, 17, 147 governments, 7, 11, 20, 101, 135, 137 graph, 57, 64, 66, 68 gravity, 114, 126, 141 growth, 12, 43, 139, 143 guidance, 29, 100, 105, 106, 135, 161, 165 guidelines, 138, 142 guiding principles, 99 guilt, 30 guilt feelings, 30

H habitats, 41 handheld devices, 44 harmony, 37 health, vii, viii, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 60, 61, 115, 137

health care, vii, viii, 43, 44, 45, 46 health care system, 45 health condition, 45, 46 health education, 44 health information, viii, 43, 45, 48 health promotion, 45, 46 heart failure, 46 hedging, 105 height, 61, 62, 64 hemoglobin, 50, 51 heroin, 121 high school, 28 history, 6, 8, 51, 119, 124 homogeneity, vii, 1, 3, 9, 11, 19 host, 122, 150 hostile acts, vii, 1 hostilities, 5, 8, 16 House, 94 hub, 116 human, 5, 27, 38, 40, 60, 83, 96, 97, 102, 114, 125, 129, 134 human body, 27 human capital, 125, 134 human resources, 102, 129 human right, 5, 102, 114 human rights, 5, 102, 114 hypothesis, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35

I ideal, 11, 59, 74 identity, 13 ideology, 72, 114 image, 61 imagery, 120 images, viii, 43 immunity, 131 imports, 110 improvements, 51 independence, 2, 6, 11, 13, 14, 19, 119, 157 India, viii, 89, 90, 118, 119, 138, 144, 145 individual character, 26 individual characteristics, 26 individual differences, 26, 38 individuals, 2, 13, 26, 27, 134 industry, 39, 132 inevitability, 20 information exchange, 47 infrastructure, 7, 96, 97, 109, 129, 132 initiation, 4 injury, 52 insertion, 4, 11, 16, 116 institutions, 17, 97, 115, 134, 159 insurgency, vii, ix, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, 20, 89, 92, 93, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 103, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 131, 133, 139, 141, 143, 144, 146, 150, 156 Insurgency, 6, 9, 23, 113, 114, 155, 156, 158

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Index insurgent, vii, 1 integration, 13, 137, 150 integrity, vii, 1, 5, 8, 11, 13, 16, 19, 134 intelligence, 124, 127, 154, 156 international law, 3, 117 International Rescue Committee, 114 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), ix, 90, 96, 103, 150 international terrorism, 151 interoperability, 123 interpersonal relations, 40 intervention, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53 intifada, 10 intimidation, 111 invasions, 121 Iran, viii, 89, 90, 100, 114, 118, 121, 123, 138, 144, 145, 158 Iraq, 44, 90, 91, 98, 100, 109, 115, 116, 117, 120, 121, 129, 136, 141, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 152, 154, 156, 160, 163 irrigation, 11 Islam, 139, 151 Islamabad, 119 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, viii, 89, 95, 102 islands, 16 isolation, 26, 37, 41 Israel, 25, 32, 39 issues, vii, 5, 17, 18, 23, 33, 48, 91, 92, 97, 107, 145 Italy, 102, 104 iteration, 57, 64, 67, 70, 71, 72, 76

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J Japan, 17, 102, 138 jihad, 151 job performance, 47 job satisfaction, 27 journalists, 151 judiciary, 102 jurisdiction, 110 justification, 11, 39

K Karzai, Hamid, 151 Kazakhstan, 104 kidnapping, 114 kill, 16, 95, 120

L landscape, 79, 115 languages, 109 laptop, 45 law enforcement, 126, 137, 143 laws, 4

lead, 2, 10, 19, 56, 94, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 119, 122, 127, 128, 132, 134, 139, 142, 145, 147 leadership, 18, 99, 100, 101, 107, 111, 113, 117, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 132, 138, 143 learners, 46 learning, 45, 47, 52 learning environment, 45 legislation, 91 life expectancy, 125 light, viii, 25, 32, 61, 107, 123, 142 literacy, 125, 134 Lithuania, 104, 135 living conditions, 30 local community, 130 local conditions, 117 logistics, 55, 59, 60, 62, 63, 74, 80, 82, 108, 113, 116, 124, 140 longitudinal study, 40 Louisiana, 129

M Macedonia, 104 magnitude, 49 majority, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 48, 91, 116, 125, 142 man, 131, 136, 148 management, 47, 48, 50, 51, 161 manipulation, 10 marginalization, 9 Marine Corps, 95, 141, 161, 164, 165 matrix, 68, 71 matter, 5, 6, 8, 20, 32, 33, 34 Mauritania, 2, 3 measurement, 38 media, 150, 152, 159 mediation, vii, 1 medical, viii, 43, 44, 45, 47, 51, 113, 140, 141 medical expertise, 44, 51 medicine, 47 Mediterranean, 32 memory, 44 mental model, 39 mentor, 106, 137 mentoring, 101, 126, 127, 129, 144 mentorship, 127 messages, 49 meter, 60 methodology, 38, 39 microgravity, 38 Middle East, 23, 24 migrants, 13 migration, 1, 5, 9, 12, 13, 18, 130 military, vii, viii, ix, 6, 7, 10, 15, 16, 17, 26, 29, 35, 37, 39, 45, 48, 49, 51, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67, 72, 73, 74, 78, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 112, 113, 115, 118, 119, 120, 121,

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Index

122, 123, 128, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 165, 166 military occupation, 139 militia, 131 militias, 15, 102, 120, 161 mil-to-mil, 145 minorities, 3, 5 mission, ix, 7, 26, 27, 28, 30, 35, 37, 38, 55, 60, 63, 74, 90, 91, 94, 96, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 134, 139, 142, 146, 147, 148, 163 Missouri, 137 models, 60, 61 moderates, 40 modernization, 144 modifications, 48 momentum, ix, 90, 92, 93, 101, 112, 131 Mongolia, 104 Montana, 86 Montenegro, 104 moral standards, vii, 25 morale, 37 Morocco, 2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20 motivation, 2, 4, 7, 8, 48, 49 multidimensional, 86 murder, 136 Muslims, 9, 12, 13, 17, 151

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N narcotic, 132 narcotics, 126, 130, 132, 133, 145, 147 National Defense Authorization Act, 111, 150, 158 national interests, 90, 100, 143 National Public Radio, 158 national security, 91, 93 National Security Council, 152 nationalism, 139 nationalists, 11, 15 nation-building, 20 NATO, viii, ix, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 96, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 120, 123, 128, 133, 134, 139, 140, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 natural resources, 97, 143 negative effects, 36 negotiating, 8, 14, 18 Netherlands, 22, 104, 106 networking, 45 neutral, 113, 141 NGOs, 159 nodes, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72 nominee, 149, 150, 152, 160, 164, 165 North Africa, 12 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, viii, 89, 96 Norway, 17 nucleus, 134 null, 66

nurses, viii, 43, 46 nursing, 45, 46, 52, 53 nutrition, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53 nutritional status, 51

O Obama, 92, 100, 101, 109, 118, 140, 145, 146, 149, 150 Obama Administration, 100 Obama, President, ix, 90, 93, 94, 100, 101, 128, 140 Obama, President Barack, 149 obesity, 50 obstacles, 60, 61, 62, 72 offenders, 132 officials, viii, 17, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163 oil, 143 oil revenues, 143 Oklahoma, 137 operating system, 30 Operation Enduring Freedom, viii, 89, 106, 108 operations, vii, ix, 7, 45, 47, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 132, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 148, 150, 151, 152, 166 opportunities, 33, 45, 112, 125, 131 opposition parties, 119 optimism, vii, 25, 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 40, 96 optimization, 55, 56, 57, 59, 62, 85, 86, 87 organize, 46, 148 outreach, 97, 130, 131, 146, 147 oversight, 91, 107, 130 overweight, 49, 50, 53 ownership, 7

P pain, viii, 43, 46 Pakistan, viii, ix, 22, 89, 90, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 125, 137, 140, 141, 144, 145, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 164, 165 parallel, 6, 62, 135 Pareto, 59, 67, 72, 74, 76 participants, 2, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 47, 49, 50, 105, 106, 130, 131 Pashtun, 119, 124, 130 path planning, 59, 87 patient care, 48 pattern recognition, 63

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Index peace, 9, 17, 18, 90, 103, 119, 143, 144, 153, 157 peace process, 17 peacekeeping, 103 penalties, 73 Pentagon, 163 personal communication, 155 personality, 27, 37, 40 personality characteristics, 27 pessimism, 40 Philippines, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24 physical activity, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53 physical fitness, 51 physical stressors, 27 physicians, 44 physics, 28 physiology, 46 pilot study, 52 platform, 43, 51 plausibility, 143 playing, 124 Poland, 104 polar, 26 police, 7, 91, 92, 94, 102, 124, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 144, 155 policy, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 63, 91, 100, 101, 118, 120, 133, 139, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 152, 158, 161 policy issues, 143 policy options, 144 political leaders, 11 political opposition, 140 political participation, 131 politics, 150, 152 popular support, 6, 114, 115, 142, 146 population, vii, ix, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 48, 49, 51, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 100, 101, 109, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 124, 126, 130, 134, 135, 142, 146, 147, 157, 166 population density, 12, 20 Portugal, 104 positive attitudes, 36 positive thinking, vii, 25, 28, 29, 33, 36 postural control, 39 poverty, 97, 131 preparation, 46, 103, 128 preservation, 4, 11 presidency, 97 President, ix, 90, 92, 93, 94, 98, 100, 101, 108, 110, 111, 114, 118, 119, 122, 128, 129, 131, 132, 135, 140, 144, 149, 150, 151, 152, 161, 163 President Obama, ix, 90, 93, 94, 100, 101, 128, 140 prevention, 41 primacy, 19 principles, 46, 132, 138 prisons, 144 probability, 5, 57, 60, 66, 69, 71 producers, 133 professional literature, 26

professionalism, 35, 134 professionals, 47, 52 profit, 111 programming, 62, 122 progress reports, 50 project, viii, 43, 48, 51, 73, 74, 83, 130, 164 proliferation, 96, 97 propagation, 8 property rights, 4 proportionality, 118 proposition, 5, 8 prosperity, 110 protection, 2, 6, 98, 109, 137 psychobiology, 41 psychology, 40, 41 public sector, 44 public support, 91, 164 punishment, 78 purification, 163

R radius, 62, 65, 68 reaction time, 44 reactions, 27 real time, 47 reality, viii, 43 reception, 18 recognition, 5, 8, 15, 17, 18, 44, 130 recommendations, 44, 48 reconciliation, 97, 114, 131, 132, 147 reconstruction, 7, 86, 92, 100, 109, 121, 153 recreation, 45 recruiting, 114, 124, 165 redistribution, 4 Reform, 110, 126, 161, 162 rehabilitation, 92 reinforcement, 76 relevance, viii, 75, 89, 90, 103, 146 renaissance, 112 repression, 2, 134, 147 reputation, 114 requirements, 16, 85, 91, 92, 105, 109, 122, 123, 125, 129, 130, 135, 139, 140, 144, 145, 148 RES, 24, 152, 154 researchers, 29, 62 resentment, 11 resettlement, 9 resilience, 36, 41 resistance, 9, 92, 97, 99, 117 resolution, 1, 5, 9, 16, 24, 63, 121, 158 resources, 7, 27, 37, 39, 40, 44, 48, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78, 90, 92, 93, 96, 99, 101, 102, 107, 115, 116, 121, 128, 130, 133, 134, 135, 136, 147, 148, 150, 154, 160, 163, 165 response, viii, 6, 7, 8, 9, 32, 43, 44, 92, 101, 103, 107, 127, 148 responsiveness, 38

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Index

restrictions, 44, 60, 62, 74, 105, 112 retaliation, 9, 10 revenue, 143 rewards, 130, 133 rhetoric, 131 risk, 10, 32, 36, 92, 93, 118, 129, 130, 136, 147 risks, 32, 33, 36, 38 Romania, 99, 104 root, 150 routes, 141 rule of law, 96, 99, 102, 135, 146, 150 rules, 2, 62, 63, 65, 68, 73, 82, 133, 142 rural areas, 6 Russia, viii, 89, 90, 118, 141

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S safe haven, viii, ix, 89, 90, 93, 94, 96, 100, 111, 112, 117, 118 safe havens, 96 safety, viii, 26, 32, 39, 55, 56, 64, 69, 70, 73, 75, 76, 78, 81, 82 saturated fat, 50, 53 Saudi Arabia, 138 scaling, 117 school, 96, 112, 115, 133, 138, 140, 148 science, 45, 136 scope, 59, 62, 63, 64, 103, 106, 139, 145 search space, 57 Secretary of Defense, 98, 149, 152, 154, 165 security, viii, ix, 7, 15, 32, 77, 79, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 153, 154, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165 security forces, ix, 90, 93, 97, 101, 106, 108, 115, 116, 117, 119, 122, 126, 128, 129, 143, 144, 148, 160 self-confidence, 32 self-efficacy, 40, 52, 53 self-regulation, 53 Senate, 94, 149, 152, 160, 164, 165 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 94, 149, 152, 160, 164, 165 sensitivity, 37 settlements, 11, 40 shame, 49 shape, 2, 4, 11, 18, 100, 106, 114, 115, 116, 133, 144, 145 short supply, 109 shortage, 132 shortfall, 91 showing, 82 signs, viii, 17, 43 simulation, 39, 40, 56, 62, 63 Sinai, 40

Slovakia, 104 smoking, 53 smoking cessation, 53 social coping, 26 social development, 102 social relations, vii, 25, 27, 29, 35, 37 social relationships, vii, 25, 27, 29, 35, 37 social support, 28, 37, 40, 49 society, 17, 23, 96, 125 solution, 12, 14, 17, 44, 57, 58, 59, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 121, 139 South Asia, 21, 22 South Korea, 104 sovereign state, 2 sovereignty, vii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 13, 98 Soviet Union, 97 Spain, 8, 55, 104 specialists, 44, 47 species, 57 speech, ix, 90, 92, 101, 150, 154 Spring, 52, 53, 153 Sri Lanka, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23 stability, viii, 7, 89, 90, 96, 97, 100, 103, 108, 111, 119, 140, 142, 143, 150, 158, 166 stabilization, 91, 104 staff members, 46, 135 standard deviation, 74, 76, 77, 81 standard of living, 9 state, vii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 56, 58, 61, 63, 68, 73, 74, 82, 96, 99, 100, 102, 105, 111, 113, 121, 133, 138, 144, 163, 164, 166 statehood, 3 states, viii, 1, 3, 11, 15, 20, 89, 90, 95, 96, 97, 99, 102, 111, 118, 132, 135, 137, 141, 144, 154, 158, 159, 162 sterile, 31 stimulus, 27 stress, 26, 27, 28, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 109, 112, 113, 115, 116, 131, 134, 141, 142 stress reactions, 39 stressors, 26, 40 stroke, 81 STRs, 68 structure, 17, 63, 74, 99, 102, 106, 130, 143, 151 subacute, 44 submarines, 26, 28, 29, 30, 36, 38 Sudan, 21 suicide, 124 Sun, 161 suppression, 4 Supreme Court, 12, 18, 23 surveillance, 86, 124, 154 survival, viii, 4, 44, 89, 90 survival rate, 44 sustainability, 143 Sweden, 104 symptoms, viii, 27, 38, 39, 43

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T tactics, 63, 74, 83, 99, 111, 112 Taliban, viii, ix, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 130, 131, 132, 134, 139, 145, 147, 151, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 163, 164 tanks, 123 target, viii, 55, 60, 61, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 115, 122, 126, 132, 133, 139, 143 task performance, 40 taxation, 110 taxes, 132 TBI, 44 teams, 18, 28, 37, 38, 39, 105, 106, 128, 129, 130, 136, 137, 153 techniques, 62, 63 technological advances, 51 technologies, vii, viii, 43, 45 technology, vii, 44, 45, 46, 47, 51, 86, 98, 125 teeth, 114 telecommunications, viii, 43 teleconferencing, 44 telephone, 46, 48, 50 telephones, viii, 30, 43 tempo, 91 tension, 93 tensions, 117 tenure, 97 territorial, vii, 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 13, 16, 19 territory, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 89, 94, 119, 120, 145, 155 terrorism, 100, 165 terrorist activities, ix, 89, 94 terrorists, viii, 89, 90, 96, 98, 100, 135, 151 text messaging, 45 Thailand, 23 theatre, 10, 154 Third World, 22 thoughts, 31, 34 threats, 91, 113, 120, 121 time frame, 143 topology, 63 toxicology, 47 trade, 100, 130, 145, 147 trafficking, 132 training, 26, 27, 31, 32, 38, 41, 46, 60, 93, 94, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 113, 114, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131, 140, 144, 145, 148, 151, 160, 165 training programs, 46 trajectory, 160 transcripts, 155 transformation, 98 transport, 55, 124, 125 transportation, 85, 109, 125, 132 traumatic brain injury, 44 treatment, 38, 41, 44, 46, 49

trial, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53 tribesmen, 130, 158 truck drivers, 116 Turkey, 104, 152

U U.N. Security Council, 135 U.S. assistance, 101 U.S. policy, 146 Ukraine, 104 UNHCR, 13 United, viii, ix, 13, 23, 24, 89, 90, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 110, 120, 121, 128, 132, 140, 143, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 162, 165 United Kingdom, 98, 102, 104, 151 United Nations, 13, 24, 98, 99, 101, 102, 110, 120, 132, 162 United States, viii, ix, 23, 24, 89, 90, 93, 94, 98, 102, 103, 104, 107, 121, 128, 140, 143, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 165 universities, 45, 137 updating, 58, 63, 67, 70 urban, 154 USA, 85, 87, 149, 164 USDA, 135, 136, 137 Uzbekistan, 114

V vacuum, 6 valuation, 74 variables, 59 variations, 124, 128 vegetables, 48 vegetation, 61 vehicles, 60, 61, 109, 110, 119, 137, 164 vein, 3, 10, 147 velocity, 60 vested interests, 119 victims, viii, 43 Vietnam, 115 violence, 7, 10, 19, 91, 93, 94, 111, 132, 134 vision, 79, 98, 99, 100, 102, 138, 151 vitamin D, 48, 51 vote, 2, 3, 13 voters, 13 vulnerability, 12, 141

W walking, 57 war, vii, viii, ix, 38, 39, 44, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 103, 113, 122, 125, 131, 150, 151, 152 War on Terror, 149, 160

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Index withdrawal, 94, 101, 102, 131 workers, 114, 151 working population, 53 workload, 26 World War I, 85 World Wide Web, 52 worldwide, 43, 44 worry, 36 wrestling, 154

Y Yale University, 151 yield, 73, 74, 76, 83 young adults, 48, 49, 51

Z Zardari, Asif, 119

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warlords, 131, 132 Washington, 21, 23, 87, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 watches, 97 water, 31, 60, 61, 78, 137, 163 Waziristan, 114, 119, 121, 156 weapons, 37, 60, 79, 80, 81, 97, 121, 123, 126, 127, 131 web, 52 websites, 49 weight control, 52 weight loss, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53 weight management, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53 welfare, 5, 101 well-being, 38 wellness, 46, 50 Western Sahara, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 White House, 118, 163 windows, 85, 87

Military Operations, Health and Technology, edited by Alexander L. Cobb, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central,