De rebus divinis et humanis: Essays in honour of Jan Hallebeek [1 ed.] 9783737007313, 9783847107316

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Harry Dondorp / Martin Schermaier / Boudewijn Sirks (eds.)

De rebus divinis et humanis Essays in honour of Jan Hallebeek

With 4 figures

V& R unipress

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available online: http://dnb.d-nb.de. This publication was made possible by financial support of the Van Coeverden Adriani Stichting and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Afdeling Rechtstheorie en Rechtsgeschiedenis.  2019, V& R unipress GmbH, Robert-Bosch-Breite 6, 37079 Gçttingen, Germany All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Cover image:  Basel, UniversitÐtsbibliothek, A I 14: Thomas von Aquin, Summa theologiae (prima pars) (http://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/de/list/one/ubb/A-I-0014). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage j www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISBN 978-3-7370-0731-3

Contents

Laudatio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

John W. Cairns The legal education of Alexander Mylne, first president of the College of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

Orazio Condorelli Primacy of the Bishop of Rome and dialogue between the churches of east and west. Brief historical notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

Emanuele Conte The order and the Volk. Romantic roots and enduring fascination of the German constitutional history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Niels de Bruijn Das Wissen des Verkäufers im frühneuzeitlichen kastilischen Recht der Sachmängelhaftung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55

Hylkje de Jong Two interpretations of D. 17,1,27,1 in early Byzantine law: Obligation to reddere and unjust enrichment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

Wim Decock De beroepsaansprakelijkheid van de advocaat in Lenaert Leys’ Over rechtvaardigheid en recht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

Harry Dondorp Restitution for wrongs in the civilian tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

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Jacques du Plessis Reception, the law of unjustified enrichment in mixed legal systems, and a curious case of the compelled payment of another’s debt . . . . . . . . 123 Sjoerd Faber J.P. Hooykaas en de afdeling Wetgeving van het Ministerie van Justitie in Den Haag (1939–1946) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Atsuko Fukuoka A Path between Scylla and Charybdis: Ulrik Huber (1636–1694) and the theologico-juridical paradigm of Constantine the Great . . . . . . . . . . 151 Dirk Heirbaut Codification in Belgium from Napoleon to Geens

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Viola Heutger Lieferte die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel einen Beitrag zum Codex Theodosianus? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 David Ibbetson Unjust enrichment and Lord Mansfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Aniceto Masferrer Human dignity in the early sixteenth century Spanish scholasticism. Francisco de Vitoria and Fray Bartolom8 de las Casas . . . . . . . . . . . 203 Ton Meijers Liturgischer Frauengesang? Eine historische Analyse aus kirchenrechtlicher Sicht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Janwillem Oosterhuis A staunch Protestant on an irenic Remonstrant: Matthaeus’s references to Grotius in De criminibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225 Martin J. Schermaier Habebant omnia communia. Überlegungen zum Gemeineigentum in Philosophie, Theologie und Recht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

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Dirk Jan Schoon Truth and obedience. The states of Holland and West Frisia’s 6 August 1702 plakkaat and its repercussions in Rome for the proceedings against Petrus Codde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 E.J.H. Schrage In testamentis plenius testatoris intentionem scrutamur . . . . . . . . . . 279 Louis Sicking / Remco van Rhee Prize law, procedure and politics. The settlement of a prize case before the Admiralty Court and the Great Council of the Netherlands (1554–1555) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 Boudewijn Sirks What did in bonis in the actio Serviana include? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 Peter-Ben Smit A non-political stance as an ecclesial via media in war time? The correspondence between archbishop Andreas Rinkel of Utrecht and bishop Erwin Kreuzer of the German Old Catholic Church from 1937 until the invasion of the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 Konstantin Tanev Observations on the value of naturalis ratio from early Humanism to the Antiquity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 Philip Thomas Critique of the rational agent model: reinventing Roman law?

. . . . . . 365

Leon van den Broeke Setting the right example? Good governance, exemplary law and reformed church polity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375 Tymen J. van der Ploeg De prejudici[le beslissing van de Hoge Raad van 21 april 2017 over omzetting van en in een kerkgenootschap, nader beschouwd . . . . . . . 389 E.G.D. van Dongen Nullus videtur dolo facere, qui suo iure utitur

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403

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Gustaaf van Nifterik Remarks on a reference of Grotius to Vitoria. A scholastic reading . . . . 417 Maurice van Stiphout On the role of the laws of the state and Canon Law in the 19th and early 20th centuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427 Daniel Visser Gerard Noodt and seventeenth-century attitudes to charging interest on money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 Laurent Waelkens Heidenen in de Codex Theodosianus? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457 Tammo Wallinga Creative solutions for enrichment situations among the early Glossators . 471 Bart Wauters Lessius and Grotius on property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483 Alain Wijffels Audiuntur theologi. Legal scholarship’s claim on the “Second Table” in Alberico Gentili’s De Nuptiis (1601) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497 Laurens Winkel Nine remarks on the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita . 513 Jan Hallebeek – Bibliography

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519

Index of sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 535

Laudatio

Every year, at the end of his summer month spent at the Max Planck-Institute for European Legal History in Frankfurt – something he has consistently done for almost thirty years now – Jan Hallebeek visits me at Friedrichsdorf. There, sitting comfortably in the afternoon sun on the balcony, with a glass of red wine in his hand, he recounts, after some chatting, what he had originally planned to do in Frankfurt and what he had eventually achieved: preparing seminars and lectures; writing papers, contributions and reviews; and of course, visiting the various Eppelwoi-pubs. And every time, he finishes with a satisfied expression on his face: all done; ready for a most enjoyable evening of talking and dining. Jan is a man who knows to manage his time most efficiently and over the years he has accomplished quite a lot in his fields of expertise. Jan was born on 5 March 1954 in the city of Utrecht from an Old Catholic family. His father, a hydraulic engineer, worked as senior official for the municipality, his mother, a certified occupational therapist, was active in community-centre work and teaching courses. After having attended schools in Utrecht and passed his final examinations, Jan began to study law in 1972 at the University of Utrecht. He finished his degree at the end of 1977, with specialisations in Legal Theory, Legal Philosophy, Legal Methodology and Legal History. Having, by then, embarked upon a DPhil thesis, an appointment during the years 1980–1985 at the Catholic University of Nijmegen, where he taught Roman law as assistant of Prof. Paul NHve, enabled him to finish and submit his dissertation in 1986 at the University of Utrecht: Quia natura nichil privatum: Aspecten van de eigendomsvraag in het werk van Thomas van Aquino (1225–1274). Prof Govaert van den Bergh was his main supervisor. This work combined several of his specialisations, as would also transpire in his later work. At the beginning of 1986, he moved from Nijmegen to the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, where a research fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences enabled him for some years to investigate the historical development of unjust enrichment as a source of obligation. In 1988, he also began lecturing in ecclesiastical law at the Seminary of the Old Catholic Church, con-

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nected to the Faculty of Theology of Utrecht University ; an activity he continued until 2015, alongside his work in Amsterdam. In 1997, he was appointed extraordinary professor of ‘Ancient Structures of the Catholic Church’ at the Faculty of Theology in Utrecht on behalf of the Old Catholic Seminary and resigned from this teaching commitment in 2006. In 1998, Jan was called to the chair of European Legal History at the Vrije Universiteit as successor to Prof. Eltjo Schrage. In this function he not only taught the legal historical courses, but also developed for the Faculty the compulsory Moot Court for the Bachelor (pleitoefening) and participated in various other courses, such as ‘Science and Religion’ and ‘Religious communities and law’, and in the Summer School ‘Laws in Antiquity’. Jan’s scholarly accomplishments centred around his specialisations on medieval Roman law, the later ius commune and ecclesiastical law, but he did not restrict himself to these areas, which were in themselves rather wide. Moreover, he never approached medieval legal doctrine from a mere contemporary or 19th century perspective, but always studied the texts in their own context, particularly in connection with theology. His studies on unjustified enrichment and other legal concepts show that medieval legal discourse chiefly struggles with the question to what extent the Corpus iuris civilis was acceptable in view of existing standards and the theological teaching of the time. Likewise, his studies on the just price-doctrine show how much reciprocity there was between theology and legal doctrine in the Middle Ages and the Early-Modern Period. The res humanae and the res divinae are inseparably intertwined, both for the Middle Ages as in Jan’s research and life. His studies accomplish Ulpian’s vision (D. 1,1,10,2) of jurisprudence as divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia. Jan also discovered unknown manuscripts. They enriched our knowledge of the activities of the famous criminal law professor of Utrecht, Antonius Matthaeus II (1601–1645), and of legal proceedings before the Court of Holland in the seventeenth century. Moreover, he found in medieval manuscripts sound proof for the conjecture that the Greek text of the constitution Alearum lusus (C. 3,43,1) was translated into Latin by Pedro de Cardona († 1183). In addition to papers on these subjects and on his central fields of research, Jan published on Early Modern Scholasticism and on the colonial legal history of Sri Lanka. Currently, he is engaged in research into Old Frisian Law, more specifically, into the Latin glosses on the Frisian Land Law and the Jurisprudentia Frisica. Furthermore, his teachings managed to bear fruits. Whereas most professors of Legal History do not publish textbooks, Jan produced two: Fons et origo iuris of 2006 and Lijf ende goedt (in collaboration with Dr Harry Dondorp and Dr Hylkje de Jong) of 2014. These books present in an exemplary way the dogmatical development of West-European private law. On top of this, the position at the Seminary and at Utrecht University also yielded well. Besides articles on Church history, ecclesiastical Jansenism, and a

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handbook on Canon Law, Jan collaborated in editing two important manuscripts of the parish priest Ignatius Walvis (1653–1714) from Gouda, which revealed much about how the Catholic Church under the Dutch Republic was afflicted by internal disputes. Jan did not do all of this in splendid isolation, on the contrary. He was guestlecturer in South Africa in 1992, 2002 and 2007; visiting-professor in Bern in 2011; gave guest-lectures in Lüneburg (2003) and Valencia (2013); besides guest lecturing elsewhere. In the case of Sri Lanka, he became involved in the digitalisation-project of the VOC-archives in Colombo. Further, he participated in establishing new national and international fora of scholarly collaboration: in 1998, the “Internationaler Arbeitskreis Altkatholizismusforschung”; in 2001, the “Centre for Religion and Law”; in 2009, the “European Society for Comparative Legal History”; and in 2014, the “Stevin Centre for History of Science and Humanities”. He organised conferences concerning the law during the period the Netherlands were the Kingdom of Holland (1806–1810); part of the French Empire (1810–1813); and in 2012 the second biennial conference of the “European Society for Comparative Legal History”. These scholarly pursuits Jan combined with activities, which placed – and still place – him in the middle of what Non-Academia calls ‘the real life’. He not only belongs to the Old Catholic Church of the Netherlands, but is also committed and active within this small religious community. In numerous memberships of ecclesiastical committees and bodies he bestowed time, energy and knowledge, especially in the field of Canon Law, liturgical music and dialogue with the Roman Catholic Church. Liturgy and church music indeed, because Jan is an expierenced organist and has been playing Sunday after Sunday for more than 45 years now. Having studied some music theory in his younger years, he also composed liturgical music, such as settings of chants and responses, and hymn tunes. In addition to such opera spiritualia Jan dedicated time to opera temporalia, i. e. as deputy judge in the District Court of Utrecht (1996–2014) and as a deputy justice in the Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch (2003 till present). In short: Jan is a present-day uomo universale, who enjoys good company, a good meal, good entertainment, and who is above all a good friend, in and outside Academia. This Festschrift is dedicated to him by all contributors in profound recognition and warm friendship, in the hope that we may share many more years of his companionship. Deus te servet per multos annos, carissime Johanne! On behalf of the editors1, Boudewijn Sirks 1 The editors thank Ms Frances Gilligan for correcting the laudatio.

John W. Cairns*

The legal education of Alexander Mylne, first president of the College of Justice

In this short chapter in honour of Jan Hallebeek I shall briefly examine some aspects of the life of the first president of the College of Justice in Edinburgh, Alexander Mylne (alternatively Milne or Myln) (c. 1470–1548)1. I shall explore in particular the issue of where he acquired his training in law, which was primarily as a canon lawyer. The topic is in line with Professor Hallebeek’s interests in the Middle Ages and the Catholic Church, while also throwing light on the ius commune in Scotland – it is thus a topic not unworthy of our distinguished honorand. The central court that had developed in Scotland by the later fifteenth century out of judicial sessions of the king’s council was reconstituted in 1532 as the College of Justice2. Mylne had already frequently sat on these judicial sessions, along with other ecclesiastical lawyers3. That he was selected as the first president of the new College was undoubtedly significant as a judgment of his ability as a lawyer and administrator4. In legal historians’ minds, Mylne is nowadays commonly associated with the Abbey of Cambuskenneth (the Abbey of St Mary of Stirling), the ruins of which, with an extraordinary free-standing bell tower of around 1300 – an amazing statement of power and authority – lie in a bend in the Forth just below Stirling * The author is grateful to Hector MacQueen for his comments. 1 J.A. Gould, Mylne, Alexander (c. 1470–1548), Abbot of Cambuskenneth and Historian, in: C. Mathew et al. (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 2004, date of access 8 Apr. 2018, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-19693. 2 A.M. Godfrey, Scotland: The Court of Session from its Foundation to 1800, in: A.A. Wijffels/C.H. van Rhee (eds.), European Supreme Courts: A Portrait Through History, London 2013, 190–97; A.M. Godfrey, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland: The Origins of a Central Court, Leiden 2009, 40–160; J.W. Cairns, Revisiting the Foundation of the College of Justice, in: H.L. MacQueen (ed.), Miscellany Five, Stair Society, Edinburgh 2006, 27–50. 3 R.K. Hannay (ed.), Acts of the Lords of Council in Public Affairs, 1501–1554, Edinburgh 1932, 210–11, 238, 256, 292, 349, 368. 4 Hannay (ed.), Acts 1501–1554 (note 3) 373–74.

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Castle5. Mylne acquired the abbacy in 1517, after its resignation into the pope’s hands by Patrick Paniter (alternatively Painter or Panter) (with whom Mylne was already associated), on the request of the Duke of Albany, Regent of Scotland6. The strong association of Mylne with Cambuskenneth in the mind of modern scholars is no doubt because he possessed this abbacy when appointed by James Vas first president of the College of Justice, and he is almost invariably designed “Abbot of Cambuskenneth” in any relevant primary source. But supposing Mylne was born around 1470, much of his youth to early middle age was passed attached to another major ecclesiastical foundation, Dunkeld Cathedral, where, not long after finishing his university studies in arts, he held various offices and became a member of the chapter. Dunkeld Cathedral has a beautiful and picturesque setting among trees close to the river Tay. Leading up to it is what has the appearance of a cathedral close of former prebendaries’ manses, built in the Scottish vernacular style; none of the houses dates back to Mylne’s era, however, as the town was burned in a Jacobite attack in 16897. The cathedral church consists of a roofless nave, rebuilt in stages through the fifteenth century, and a roofed choir, remodelled in the early fourteenth century, which serves as the local parish church of the Church of Scotland. It has a square chapter house of the mid-fifteenth century attached to the choir, and linked to the nave, on its northwest corner, is an impressive bell tower8. This is the setting in which Mylne spent the first part of his adult life. John Gifford has described the tower of 1470–ca. 1500 as “an overpowering statement of ecclesiastical might dwarfing the rest of the church”9. Its ground floor consists of a large vaulted room, with its own door, that has the remains of painted decoration below the vault on two of its walls. One painting depicts the judgment of Solomon, the other the woman taken in adultery. The decor reflects the use of this space as the consistorial courtroom of the diocese10. The setting is now rather bucolic, due to the creation of a designed landscape in the eighteenth century by the Athol family round their now demolished seat at Dunkeld; but in Mylne’s time litigants and those accused of sin were forcefully reminded of the

5 J. Gifford/F.A. Walker, The Buildings of Scotland: Stirling and Central Scotland, New Haven 2002, 303–305. 6 R.K. Hannay/D. Hay (eds.), The Letters of James V, Edinburgh 1954, 32; J.A. Gould, Panter, Patrick (c. 1470–1519), Ecclesiastic and Administrator, in: C. Mathew et al. (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 2004, date of access 8 Apr. 2018, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-9780198614128-e-21234. 7 J. Gifford, The Buildings of Scotland: Perth and Kinross, New Haven 2007, 332. 8 Gifford, Perth and Kinross (note 7) 334–39. 9 Gifford, Perth and Kinross (note 7) 336. 10 Gifford, Perth and Kinross (note 7) 340.

The legal education of Alexander Mylne, first president of the College of Justice

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worldly and spiritual power of the bishop and the chapter to judge, to punish, and to forgive. Alexander Mylne was born in Angus, and, according his biographer, may have been the son of the royal master mason11. He studied at the University of St Andrews, being a determinant in 1494, that is, taking his bachelor’s degree, but he is described as a pauper, non licentiatus, in 149612. We know that Mylne was clerk and notary to the court of the official of Dunkeld for three years during the period that Walter Brown was official. Brown served in this office between 1493/ 1495–150513. Mylne was an apostolic notary public by 1500, and in the same year became clerk to the bishop and chapter of Dunkeld14. In 1513 Mylne was the official of Dunkeld15. Mylne described himself as “agrestis et incultus scriptor”, which has a certain truth, even if intended as an elegant self-deprecation. His Latin is “loose” and, according to R. K. Hannay, gives no indication of any acquaintance with Latin literature16. It is the language of administration, and, of course, like many of the higher clergy, his function was indeed to be, above all other duties, an administrator. Administration involved the law, and it is possible that Mylne may have pursued some legal study prior to his first positions in Dunkeld, perhaps at St Andrews, which had a Faculty of Canon Law17; there is, however, no evidence of his having done so, and he is never described as possessing any degree in law18. But he was clearly a man learned in law, jurisperitus, even without possessing a university degree in the discipline. From an ex libris inscription, we know that he acquired an Infortiatum, printed at Lyons in 1514, when he was serving as official of Dunkeld19. He can certainly be associated with a large collection of the major

11 Gould, Mylne (note 1). 12 J.M. Anderson (ed.), Early Records of the University of St. Andrews: The Graduation Roll, 1413–1579 and The Matriculation Roll, 1473–1579, Edinburgh 1926, 82 and 85. This always supposes it is the same person. 13 R.K. Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense: Being Accounts of the Bishopric (A.D. 1505–1517) with Myln’s “Lives of the Bishops”(A.D. 1483–1517), Edinburgh 1915, 326; D.E.R. Watt/A.L. Murray (eds.), Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae Medii Aevi ad Annum 1638, Edinburgh 2003, 163. 14 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (n. 13) xv ; Gould, Mylne (n. 1). 15 Watt/Murray (eds.), Fasti (n. 13) 163. 16 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) x; the quotation is from Alexander Mylne, Vitae Dunkeldensis Ecclesiae Episcoporum, a prima sedis fundatione ad annum M.D.XV., Edinburgh 1831, 3. 17 A.I. Dunlop (ed.), Acta Facultatis Artium Universitatis Sanctiandree, 1413–1588, 2 vols. Edinburgh 1964, I, cxlix–clv. 18 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) xv. 19 Advocates Library Edinburgh: shelfmark A.79.2. The inscription reads: “Liber Alexandri myln canonicj et officialis Dounkelden[sis] anno 1516”.

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texts of the ius commune20. He was evidently a competent canon lawyer also interested in the ius civile. It is possible to make a suggestion as to where he learned – or at least refined – his knowledge of the utrumque ius. Mylne wrote a history of the bishops of Dunkeld, his Vitae Dunkeldensis Ecclesiae Episcoporum21. In this, almost as a digression, he provided an account of the cathedral clergy under Bishop George Brown, a man to whom he was evidently close and whom he admired. This account, basically of the chapter and the vicars choral, has understandably already been the subject of comment, as it is an important historical source for a topic about which we know little. Hannay translated it into English22. Because of its insights, it has been the subject of two relatively recent discussions, one of which, by John MacQueen, has convincingly argued that Mylne’s Vitae Dunkeldensis Ecclesiae Episcoporum was written in a number of stages23. Thus, at the beginning of the book, Mylne greets his contemporary colleagues, mentioning many members of the chapter ; not all of these men appear in the later account of the chapter and vicars choral, with some holding different offices, differently described, or simply not mentioned24. I shall start with some observations on some of the men mentioned in the greetings to his colleagues with which Mylne prefaced the history. There he noted that David Abercromby, the sub-dean, was jurisconsultissimus, that the prebendary David Wauchope was in utroque jure licenciatus, that another prebendary, Alexander Moncrief, was jurisconsultus multum expertus, and that Walter Leslie was in jure canonico tam literis quam praxi perdoctus et illuminatus. He also observed that the Chancellor, Patrick Paniter, was both royal secretary and orator lepidissimus25. Paniter was educated at Paris and Leuven, and also associated with ownership of standard texts of the ius commune. As already noted, he was also Mylne’s predecessor as Abbot of Cambuskenneth26. Mylne’s later, more detailed, account of the Cathedral clergy of his own day, in 20 J.W. Cairns, English Looters and Scottish Lawyers: The Ius Commune and the College of Justice, in: J.W. Cairns (ed.), Law, Lawyers, and Humanism: Selected Essays on the History of Scots Law, Volume 1, Edinburgh 2015, 22–33. 21 Mylne, Vitae (note 16). 22 In Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 320–34. 23 J. MacQueen, Alexander Myln, Bishop George Brown, and the Chapter of Dunkeld, in: J. Kirk (ed.), Humanism and Reform: The Church in Europe, England, and Scotland, 1400–1643: Essays in Honour of James K. Cameron, Oxford 1991, 349–60; I.B. Cowan/ M.J. Yellowlees, The Cathedral Clergy of Dunkeld in the Early Sixteenth Century, in: A.A. MacDonald/M. Lynch/I.B. Cowan (eds.), The Renaissance in Scotland: Studies in Literature, Religion, History and Culture offered to John Durkan, Leiden 1994, 136–43. 24 Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 1–2; MacQueen, Alexander Myln (note 23) 349–52. 25 Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 1–2. 26 Cairns, English Looters (note 20) 25–26. An ex libris inscription on Paniter’s books describes him as “lepidissimus”, as here, suggesting that whoever wrote the inscription was familiar with this text, or was perhaps even Mylne himself. But further examination is needed.

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which he discussed the chapter and the vicars choral, also paid attention to skills in law, an interest perhaps unsurprising in one who was the official of the diocese27. Mylne noted that David Abercromby, the sub-Dean, earlier mentioned as jurisconsultissimus, had now been appointed as rural dean and commissary general by Bishop George Brown28. This time he described Wauchope, as “licentiate in decrees”29. The prebendary John Young was “…commissary general of the official principal” and “…licentiate in canon law, exceedingly learned and an excellent textualist”30. Walter Leslie was now described as “…commissary general of the see of Dunkeld”31. Walter Brown, the official under whom Mylne had served as clerk of the consistorial court, and of whom he had clearly been fond, was a bachelor of theology, and had a “remarkable knowledge of canon law and a strong sense of justice”; after mass, Brown “devoted the rest of the day to judicial work, study, and reading in the law and theology”. At his table, “there was always reading”32. Another prebendary, William Ireland, was “specially versed in the canon law”, and later became commissary general of the diocese. He was a relative, Mylne stated, of Robert Ireland, doctor of the laws, and a teacher at Poitiers33. He also commented that a former chancellor of the diocese, John Donaldson, had been a “licentiate in decrees”34. Two of the vicars choral, Stephen Young and James Lauder, acted as advocates in the consistorial court; another, Finlay Simpson, was clerk of the consistorial court, presumably to Mylne; another, Alexander Fairfoule, was a notary, while a fifth, John Penicuik, had studied, among other subjects, canon law35. The young Mylne when he came to Dunkeld accordingly found himself in a society in which there were many men skilled in the utrumque ius, particularly in the canon law. There was an active consistorial court with a fine new courtroom. 27 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 320–30; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 54–70. 28 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 324; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 60; Watt/ Murray (eds.), Fasti (note 13) 152, 161, 163. 29 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 325; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 62. 30 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 325; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 62; not listed in Watt/Murray (eds.), Fasti (note 13). 31 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 326; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 63. 32 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 326–27; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 64–65; Watt/ Murray (eds.), Fasti (note 13) 161 and 163. 33 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 327–28; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 66. He later became commissary general: Watt/Murray (eds.), Fasti (note 13) 164. On Robert Ireland, see, e. g., J. Durkan, Ireland [Irland], Robert (d. 1561), Jurist, in: C. Mathews et al. (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 2004, date of access 8 Apr. 2018, http:// www.oxforddnb.com/view/10.1093/ref:odnb/9780198614128.001.0001/odnb-978019861412 8-e-14457. 34 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 328; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 66–67; Watt/ Murray (eds.), Fasti (note 13) 145. 35 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 324–30; Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 68–70.

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In his account he creates the impression that there was a busy and active chapter. Whatever his prior legal knowledge (if any) might have been, he was certainly in a position at Dunkeld to develop and to improve his understanding of law. It is worth noting that Robert Leslie, who had an outstanding career as an advocate in sixteenth-century Scotland, is also linked to this milieu. A secular man who possibly studied at St Andrews, Leslie was probably the son of Walter Leslie, described by Mylne as learned in canon law, and commissary general of the diocese of Dunkeld36. Mylne seems to have been especially close to Walter Brown, the official under whom he served and who died in 1505. His account of Brown has a strong personal, even intimate, feel. He recounted Walter Brown’s deathbed in such detail that it seems likely that he was both present and powerfully affected. He described Brown as having been his dominus and emphasized that he had served as clerk (scriba) and notary public (tabellionatus) in his court and in his presence. He set out Brown’s daily routine of mass, judicial work, study, and reading in law and theology, with readings at his meals. No other member of the cathedral chapter was described so closely or at such length; only Bishop George Brown gets fuller treatment. Brown had been a long time in Dunkeld, having been precentor (1490) and rural dean (?-1505) before becoming official in 1493/ 149537. Both Mylne’s closeness to Brown and knowledge of his quotidian habits suggest he was a member of his household, probably because he had not yet acquired a benefice that brought with it a manse by the Cathedral. Brundage points out that, under the constitution Quoniam contra of the Fourth Lateran Council, ecclesiastical judges, whenever possible, had to use notaries to record proceedings38. As clerk, Mylne certainly would have worked very closely with Brown and taken responsibility for the efficient running of the court, recording its procedures, while also issuing and recording documents and collecting fines and charges39. It was no doubt this practical experience of the court, linked with his academic learning, that later helped qualify him for the office of official, an office whose possessors, Ollivant notes, had “… a high degree of both learning and professionalism”, many of whom “… had acquired experience of the working of the courts”40. It is important to focus on Mylne’s comment that Brown devoted part of his day to reading in the laws and in theology. This cannot mean private study, as that 36 John Finlay, Men of Law in Pre-Reformation Scotland, East Linton 2000, 123–46. 37 Watt/Murray (eds.), Fasti (note 13) 141, 161, 163. 38 J.A. Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession: Canonists, Civilians, and Courts, Chicago 2008, 396. 39 S. Ollivant, The Court of the Official in Pre-Reformation Scotland: Based on the Surviving Records of the Officials of St. Andrews and Edinburgh, Stair Society, Edinburgh 1982, 62–63. 40 Ollivant, Court of the Official (note 39) 50.

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is covered by the gerund studendum. This suggests that when Mylne mentioned Brown’s practice of jura ac theologiam legendum, he meant “reading” in the sense of giving public readings or lessons in the laws, just as a lectio had been given at Brown’s meals. In writing the plural jura, Mylne also suggested Brown gave lessons in both the laws, though this may be to read too much into the wording41. If Mylne studied law with Brown, it may further explain the intimate nature of his account; Brown was his dominus, not just in employing him as clerk and notary, but also as his teacher. It is worth noting that a Walter Brown had determined in arts in St Andrews in 1475, gaining his licence in 1477, before he became a regent in the College in 1478. He was elected as quodlibetarius in 1482, and as an examiner in 1483. He is not mentioned thereafter42. Given the chapter of Dunkeld’s obvious links with the University of St Andrews, it is very probable that this is the future official and dominus of Mylne, especially given that he first appears as precentor of Dunkeld in 1490. From a university position he had made the transition to being a member of the cathedral clergy. It is difficult to judge how typical Mylne’s experience of Dunkeld was of other Scottish cathedral chapters and clergy in his era. More research and rethinking of existing research may throw more light on this. For example, it is worth noting that Mylne’s successor as president of the College of Justice, Robert Reid, Bishop of Orkney, had given a new constitution to his chapter, under which the chancellor of the diocese had to be a doctor utriusque iuris, or at least a bachelor of canon law trained in a “flourishing university”, who each week was to lecture publicly to the chapter on canon law43. There may have been more men who had received systematic instruction in the utrumque ius than is at present evident in the record, men who had attended formal lectures in law in ecclesiastical corporations other than universities. The dominance of canon lawyers among the ecclesiastical senators of the College of Justice may be even greater than is currently obvious. Mylne’s work in Dunkeld included keeping a record of the diocese’s accounts, published under the name Rentale Dunkeldense. This reminds us of the important general administration of the diocese in which he had been involved, and the way in which his work touched, not only on canon law, but also on the administration of the extensive secular landholdings of the diocese44. His strong practical and organizational skills are shown by his acting as clerk of works in the

41 Mylne, Vitae (note 16) 64. 42 Dunlop (ed.), Acta (note 17) II, 195, 198, 203, 214, 215. 43 J. Kirk, Clement Little’s Edinburgh, in: J.R. Guild/A. Law (eds.), Edinburgh University Library, 1580–1980: A Collection of Historical Essays, Edinburgh 1982, 1–42 at 8. 44 Gould, Mylne (note 1).

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building of a bridge over the Tay at Dunkeld45. It was these skills, legal, administrative, and practical, that led to his promotion to the abbacy of Cambuskenneth, where he carried out extensive renovation of the buildings, and into royal service, where he is found acting as an ambassador to England, as well as later scrupulously managing the church property settled on the king’s illegitimate sons46. Further testimony to his qualities is provided by Cardinal Beaton’s appointment of him, with Robert Reid of Orkney, as one of his vicars-general47. It is evident that Mylne’s career at Dunkeld will have led him to develop a good understanding of Scots law and legal practice. The late Archie Duncan’s study of early Scottish formularies shows that they were sometimes owned by ecclesiastical lawyers, probably including, in the case of the important Bute MS, an official of Dunkeld48. This is far from surprising. Lawyers attached to cathedrals, priories, and abbeys would have to deal with baronial rights, baronial courts, and tenants, as well as the issues that came before the consistorial courts. The Abbey of Dunfermline, for example, was not alone among Scottish ecclesiastical corporations in possessing land in the extensive franchise jurisdiction of a regality49. Knowledge of the royal law and its practice would be invaluable for any ecclesiastical administrator, which was no doubt why ecclesiastical lawyers, such as Abraham Crichton and Martin Balfour, both linked to the diocese and university of St Andrews, are found acting as procurators and pleading in royal courts. Both became officials in the diocese of St Andrews, while Crichton later became a senator of the College of Justice50. Men such as Mylne played a crucial role in the development of Scots law. Skilled in legal practice before the church courts, learned in the utrumque ius, knowledgeable in the practice of the secular courts, used to managing property, and involved in the business of government, it is easy to see why such higher clergy dominated the law, operating in the royal courts as well as the consistorial. Gero Dolezalek has described the College of Justice (or Court of Session, as it later became known) as a “ius commune court”, by which he meant that it was a court that followed a version of the romano-canonical procedure of the church courts, and in which the primary and secondary sources of the utrumque ius, or 45 Hannay (ed.), Rentale Dunkeldense (note 13) 279–301. 46 W. Fraser (ed.), Registrum Monasterii de S. Marii de Cambuskenneth A.D. 1147–1535, Edinburgh 1872, xcii; Hannay, Acts (note 3), 213–15; Hannay/Hay (eds.), Letters (note 6) 399–400. 47 M.H.B. Sanderson, Cardinal of Scotland: David Beaton c. 1494–1546, Edinburgh 2001, 101–103. 48 A.A.M. Duncan (ed.), Scottish Formularies, Stair Society, Edinburgh 2011, 115. 49 J.M. Webster/A.A.M. Duncan (eds.), Regality of Dunfermline Court Book, 1531–1538, Dunfermline 1953. 50 Ollivant, Court of the Official (note 39) 173–74; Sanderson, Cardinal of Scotland (note 47) 99.

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ius commune, dominated practice51. There can be no doubt about this and of its significance in the reception of the civil and canon laws in Scotland. As the research of Jim Brundage reminds us, the development of an early modern legal profession out of that of canon lawyer is hardly unique to Scotland52 ; but this exploration of the training of Mylne indicates that more research is both necessary and possible on the personnel of the College of Justice in Scotland, not just on the ecclesiastical lawyers, but also on the “graduate lairds”, as, through the fifteenth century, Scottish secular men started to attend university and acquire degrees53. In this it is particularly interesting to reflect on the career of Robert Leslie, a secular man with links to the Dunkeld chapter. I shall conclude with a further reflection on Dunkeld. It is now a sleepy place, dominated by the remains of the Cathedral, a pretty tourist stop on the road to Pitlochry and ultimately to Inverness, if now bypassed by the main modern road north. But it is necessary to remember that it was not always so. We have to consider that in Mylne’s time it was a hive of activity, the centre for the administration of a large ecclesiastical corporation, a place dominated by bureaucrats and their work, overseeing the collection and dispensing of the revenue of the diocese, and organizing the suppression of sin and the care of souls. It was a place of power and administration, with a cathedral chapter helping govern a large part of Scotland, both highland and lowland, not just through its ecclesiastical authority, but also using its power as a landowner. It is not surprising that the chapter contained so many lawyers, nor that it nourished the first president of the College of Justice.

51 G. Dolezalek, The Court of Session as a Ius Commune Court – Witnessed by “Sinclair’s Practicks”, 1540–1549, in: H.L. MacQueen (ed.), Miscellany Four, Stair Society, Edinburgh 2002, 51–84. 52 Brundage, Medieval Origins (note 38) 488–92. 53 A. Borthwick/H. MacQueen, “Rare Creatures for their Age”: Alexander and David Guthrie, Graduate Lairds and Royal Servants, in: B.E. Crawford (ed.), Church Chronicle and Learning in Medieval and Early Renaissance Scotland, Edinburgh 1999, 227–39.

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Primacy of the Bishop of Rome and dialogue between the churches of east and west. Brief historical notes*

1. A well-known statement made by Joseph Ratzinger has had an enormous echo in the ecumenical reflection of the Catholic Church. I am referring to the idea, expressed in 1976, that “with regard to the doctrine of primacy, Rome must not demand from the East more than it was formulated and lived in the first millennium”1. The resonance that this topic holds within the Catholic reflection is due not only to the authority of the theologian who later became Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and then the Roman Pontiff, but is supported by the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, which represented an implicit point of reference to Ratzinger’s assertion. In the decree Unitatis redintegratio we read, in fact, that “for the restoration or the maintenance of unity and communion it is necessary ‘to impose no burden beyond what is necessary’

* This is a brief account of more extensive researches, which I presented at the 23rd International Congress of the Society for the Law of the Eastern Churches, Debrecen (Hungary) September 3–8, 2017. 1 J. Ratzinger, Prognosen für die Zukunft des Ökumenismus (1976), in: Th. Piffl-Percˇ evic´/ A. Stirneman (eds.), Ökumene, Konzil, Unfehlbarkeit (= Pro oriente 4), Innsbruck/Wien/ München 1979, 208–215, now in: J. Ratzinger, Kirche - Zeichen unter den Völkern. Schriften zur Ekklesiologie und Ökumene, Freiburg in Breisgau 2010, 717–730 (I quote from this edition, 724; the English translation is mine): “Rom muss vom Osten nicht mehr an Primatslehre fordern, als auch im ersten Jahrtausend formuliert und gelebt wurde. Wenn Patriarch Athenagoras am 25. Juli 1967 beim Besuch des Papstes im Phanar diesen als Nachfolger Petri, als den ersten an Ehre unter uns, den Vorsitzer der Liebe, benannte, findet sich im Mund dieses grossen Kirchenführers der wesentliche Gehalt der Primatsaussagen des ersten Jahrtausends und mehr muss Rom nicht verlangen”. Ratzinger intervened on this topic again in 1991 (when he was Prefect of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith), stating that the doctrine and practice of the primacy of the first millennium implicitly contained the whole doctrine of primacy developed in the second millennium and solemnly proclaimed in 1870. The statement of 1976 is now represented as an “ecumenical concession”, which consists in allowing the Orthodox to remain at a level of minor doctrinal development, on the assumption of an identity of doctrine (J. Ratzinger, The Tablet, 26 October 1991, 1310).

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(Acts 15.28)”. According to this teaching, therefore, even for the doctrine of the primacy the point of encounter should be sought in the “necessary things”2. In these pages I intend to outline the canonical regime of ecclesial communion as it appeared at the end of the first millennium. Secondly, I want to examine how the memory of the experience of the full communion of the first millennium has had a significant bearing not only on the attempts of union in the second millennium, but also within the theological and legal developments concerning the primacy inside the Catholic Church. 2. In the first millennium, the exercise of the primacy of the Bishop of Rome (t/ presbe%a)3 towards the Eastern Churches took place in a framework of wide canonical and administrative autonomy4. The interventions of Rome were specific and dictated by the intent to protect, according to the necessity of the times, the Catholic faith and the right ecclesiastical discipline. It is not possible to enter into details, but the historical analysis suggests that such interventions were often asked for by the Churches of the East and were performed in the ecclesiological framework of the communio ecclesiarum. We can take the controversy over the patriarchates of Ignatius and Photius as an example of this mutual relationship. The story took place for about two decades in which two councils were celebrated that saw the participation of the Roman legates alongside the bishops and representatives of the other four sees of the pentarchy (869/870 and 879/880)5. The interventions of the Bishops of Rome did not move on the level of a mere moral authority, but also and specifically on the jurisdictional level. A meaningful evidence of the Byzantine attitudes towards Rome is represented by a 2 Vatican Council II, decree Unitatis redintegratio n. 18. See also n. 14 for the appreciation of the experience of full communion of the first millennium. 3 So is in can. 3 of the first Council of Constantinople (381), which adds the specification tÞs timÞs; the translation of Dionysius Exiguus is honoris primatus. 4 See Y.M.J. Congar, L’eccl8siologie du haut moyen .ge. De Saint Gr8goire le Grand / la d8sunion entre Byzance et Rome, Paris 1968, 358f.; W. de Vries, unter Mitarbeit von O. Bârlea/J. Gill/M. Lacko, Rom und die Patriarchate des Ostens, Freiburg 1963. 5 On the two councils, in the framework of the Photian controversy, see F. Dvornik, Le schisme de Photius. Histoire et l8gende, Paris 1950; D. Stiernon, Constantinople IV, Paris 1967; J. Meijer, A Successful Council of Union. A Theological Analysis of the Photian Synod of 880, Thessaloniki 1975; L. Perrone, Il Costantinopolitano IV (869–870). Primato romano, pentarchia e comunione ecclesiale alla vigilia della separazione fra oriente e occidente, in: G. Alberigo (ed.), Storia dei concili ecumenici, Brescia 1990, 154–181. An analysis of the two councils in an ecclesiological key is offered by P. Stephanou, Deux conciles, deux eccl8siologies? Les conciles de Constantinople en 869 et en 879, Orientalia Christiana Periodica 39 (1973) 363–407. Some prominent Catholic voices believe that the council of 869/870 should be removed from the list of ecumenical councils because it was condemned and annulled by Pope John VIII, and replaced by the council of 879/880: Y. Congar, Diversit8s et communion. Dossier historique et conclusion th8ologique, Paris 1982, 139.

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letter that, at the end of 867, Ignatius addressed to Pope Nicholas I6. The letter expresses clear and unequivocal ecclesiological and canonical principles. With a phrase not very frequent in the Byzantine tradition, Ignatius connects the power of the Bishop of Rome to the words that Christ addressed to Peter (Matthew 16.18–19), the coryphaeus of the Apostles, containing a mandate to be conveyed to all his successors in the See of Rome. According to Ignatius, by virtue of this power, the Bishops of Rome over the centuries had protected the Church from heresies and deviations from the straight discipline. 3. The picture outlined by the two Constantinopolitan councils held in the ninth century can be taken to represent in summary the layout of the canonical relations between the Latin and the Byzantine Churches at the end of the first millennium. The primacy of Rome is integrated into the system of pentarchy and in the context of the conciliar collegiality7. The primacy of honour of the Bishop of Rome is not reduced to a mere privilege of honour but involves the exercise of properly legal functions to guarantee the unity of faith and the respect for the authentic canonical discipline. The events of 1054 were a watershed that marked the beginning of a process of loosening of the ecclesiastical relations between East and West. Progressive mutual estrangement did not prevent both parties from continuing to seek the restoration of the lost unity. However, the interruption of ordinary canonical relations between East and West generated profound consequences on the canonical developments of the Latin Church. The “papal monarchy” was a system of government characterized by a progressive and irreversible centralization of the ecclesiastical administration at the 6 The text is transmitted in the acts of the Council of Constantinople 869/870, which are fully known in the translation of Anastasius Bibliothecarius and only in an epitomized form in the Greek version, which corresponds substantially to the Latin version: J.D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, XVI, Venetiis 1771, respectively coll. 1–208 and 309–409. Anastasius’s translation is now available in critical edition: C. Leonardi/ A. Placanica (eds.), Gesta sanctae ac universalis octavae synodi quae Constantinopoli congregata est Anastasio bibliothecario interprete, Firenze 2012. The letter of Ignatius was sent to Nicholas I but was received by his successor Hadrian I (page 90–92 for the part of the letter to which I refer). The text of the canons of the two councils is available in P. Gemeinhardt, Concilium Constantinopolitanum IV 869–870, and Concilium Constantinopolitanum IV 869–870, in: G. Alberigo/A. Melloni (eds.), Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta. Editio critica. II.1. The General Councils of Latin Christendom. From Constantinople IV to Pavia-Siena (869–1424), Turnhout 2013, 1–48 and 49–71. 7 The literature on the pentarchy is very wide: see F. Gahbauer, Die Pentarchietheorie. Ein Modell der Kirchenleitung von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, Frankfurt am Main 1993, and the recent works by E. Morini, Roma nella Pentarchia, in: Roma fra Oriente e Occidente, Spoleto 2002, II 833–942; Id., “La vista e gli altri sensi”. Roma e le altre sedi patriarcali d’Oriente sino alla met/ dell’XI secolo, in: Chiese locali e chiese regionali nell’Alto Medioevo, Spoleto 2014, II 712–806, with further bibliography.

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head of the Roman Church, which attracted to itself a series of tasks that were consequently subtracted from the ordinary government of the local Churches or their groupings8. The process began in the 11th century and lasted for centuries, reaching its apex with the Council of Trent and the post-Tridentine reorganization of the Roman Curia. The penetrating and wide-ranging government of the Pope and the Roman Curia took place in the bosom of a Latin Church9. If, in analyzing these historical developments, we should use the canonical and ecclesiological categories of the first millennium, we should conclude that in the Latin Church it would be impossible to distinguish the role of the Bishop of Rome as a patriarch of the West and his role as the holder of a universal primacy, that – in the experience of the first millennium – was to protect the unity of faith and authentic ecclesiastical discipline according to the needs of the times. All this caused the obscuration of a distinction which, in fact, was present in the context of the autonomy of the first millennium, when the interventions of the Bishop of Rome were characterized by a different degree of ordinarity, pervasiveness and incisiveness as they took place within the context of the Western Church or with regard to Eastern Churches. These developments have been well highlighted by some acute authors of our time. I share Joseph Ratzinger’s conclusion that “the image of statal centralism offered by the Catholic Church until the Council [i. e. Vatican II] does not simply derive from Peter’s office, but from its close amalgam, developed in history, with the patriarchal task that was entitled to the Bishop of Rome for the whole of Latin Christianity”10. According to

8 The connection between practices of ecclesiastical governance and doctrinal elaboration is well documented by J.A. Watt, The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century. The Contribution of the Canonists, London 1965, and K. Pennington, Pope and Bishops. The Papal Monarchy in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Philadelphia 1984; Id., The Prince and the Law, 1200–1600. Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition, Berkeley – Los Angeles – Oxford 1993. The Colleague to whom these pages are dedicated has explored an important chapter of this history : J. Hallebeek, The Roman Pontiff as direct judge of appeal and the identity of the Latin Church, in: J. Frishman/W. Otten/G. Rouwhorst (eds.), Religious Identity and the Problem of Historical Foundation; The Foundational Character of Authoritative Sources in the History of Christianity and Judaism, Leiden-Boston 2004, 387–404. 9 On the themes summarily recalled in the text, see C. Fantappiè, Storia del diritto canonico e delle istituzioni della Chiesa, Bologna 2011, 185–209, 213–230. 10 J. Ratzinger, Primato ed episcopato, in: Id., Il nuovo popolo di Dio, Brescia 1971, 133–159 (155f.) (original edition: Das neue Volk Gottes. Entwürfe zur Ekklesiologie, Düsseldorf 1969): Rome was “ever less able to distinguish between its ecclesiastical-universal task, traceable to Peter, and its specific position as historical achievement in the Latin West” (my translation). Ratzinger’s opinion is shared by W. Kasper, Introduzione al tema ed ermeneutica cattolica dei dogmi del Concilio Vaticano I, in: W. Kasper (ed.), Il ministero petrino: cattolici e ortodossi in dialogo, Roma 2004, 11–28 (24).

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the synthesis of Yves Congar, “primacy gradually absorbed the patriarchate”11. In this context, the practice of papal primacy and its theoretical shaping interacted in a circular process in which the two profiles fed on each other. In other words, in classical canon law the theoretical elaboration of papal universal primacy was modeled on government practices that corresponded to the role of the Pope as Patriarch (or Primate) of the Latin Church. According to this reconstruction, therefore, there are different modes of action of the Roman Pontiff: the “patriarchal” in the Latin Church, and the “primatial” in the universal Church. The assimilation or confusion of the two levels can lead to unsatisfactory conclusions under the historical or theological point of view. 4. The rupture of full communion and the interruption of ordinary canonical relations between the Churches of East and West did not blur the desire for the lost unit to be restored12. Several attempts to reunion happened in the centuries in which the Latin Church was building its “monarchical” system of government. As is well-known, the union of Lyon had very short-lasting effects13. On the contrary, the process of rapprochement, which ended with the union celebrated in the council of Ferrara-Florence in 1439, is placed on completely different basis. Here the union was anticipated by a theological confrontation lasting over fifteen months, conducted on a basis of parity between the representatives of the two Churches14. This situation is effectively reflected in the decree of union issued on July 6, 1439. The comparison with the past experiences is enlightening. According to the paradigm confirmed in Lyon, the union was understood as a return of the Byzantine Church to the obedience of Rome. Now in Florence, it is the Mother Church who rejoices in the restored unity of her “mutually dissenting children”: the decree ascribes this result not to the mere human work, but to the intervention of the Holy Spirit15. The definition of the Roman primacy is on one 11 Y. Congar, Le Pape comme patriarche d’Occident. Approche d’une r8alit8 trop neglig8e, Istina 28 (1983) 374–390 (389). 12 E. Morini, L’union vue par les “anti-unionistes”. L’orthodoxie eccl8siologique et l’incongruit8 de l’orthodoxie de Lyon / Ferrare, in: M.-H. Blanchet / F. Gabriel (eds.), R8duire le schisme? Eccl8siologies et politiques de l’Union entre Orient et Occident (XIIIe– XVIIIe siHcles), (Paris 2013), 13–39. 13 See B. Roberg, Die Union zwischen der griechischen und der lateinischen Kirche auf dem II. Konzil von Lyon (1274), Bonn 1964; and Id., Das zweite Konzil von Lyon (1274), Paderborn/ München/Wien/Zürich 1990, 219–281. A good survey of events and problems is also given by U. Proch, L’unione al secondo concilio di Lione e al concilio di Ferrara - Firenze - Roma, in: Storia dei concili ecumenici (note 5) 283–319 (at 285–299). 14 Proch, (note 13), 314f. The book of J. Gill, The Council of Florence, Cambridge 1959, still remains the standard account. More recently, see also G. Alberigo (ed.), Christian Unity. The Council of Ferrara-Florence, 1438/39–1989, Leuven 1991, and P. Viti (ed.), Firenze e il Concilio del 1439, I–II, Firenze 1994. 15 G. Alberigo/G. Dossetti/P.P. Joannou/C. Leonardi/P. Prodi/H. Jedin consultante (eds.),

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side dogmatically expressed in terms consistent with the Latin tradition, that refer to Peter prince (koryphaios in the Greek version) of the Apostles and Vicar of Christ, and to the Petrine succession. But it is theologically and canonically important that this definition refers to the way in which primacy was understood and expressed in the acts of ecumenical councils and the tradition of the Sacred Canons16. This clarification brings the union of the two Churches into the experience of the ecclesiastical communion of the first millennium. I think that this clarification intends to evoke the possibility that the papal primacy is exercised differently within the two spheres of the Latin Church and the Byzantine Church and in compliance of the various disciplinary traditions. This interpretation is confirmed by the reading of the passage immediately following in the decree. It also refers to the experience of the canonical relations of the first millennium, by confirming the order of patriarchal precedences – the Patriarch of Constantinople is second after the Roman Pontiff – and preserving their privileges and rights17. It is noteworthy that in the passage on the Patriarchs there is no expression which could imply that the prerogatives of the Patriarch are the result of a concession from the Pope18. It seems appropriate to highlight two aspects of the Florentine union. First of Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta (herafter : COD), 3. ed., Bologna 1973, 524: “Gaudeat et mater ecclesia, que filios suos hactenus invicem dissidentes (t8kna… prks #llela stasi#zonta) iam videt in unitatem pacemque rediisse […] Ecce enim occidentales orientalesque patres post longissimum dissensionis atque discordiae tempus se maris ac terrae periculis exponentes, omnibusque superatis laboribus, ad hoc sacrum ycumenicum concilium desiderio sacratissime unionis et antiquae caritatis reintegrande gratia, leti alacreque convenerunt. Et intentione sua nequaquam frustrati sunt. Post longam enim laboriosamque indaginem, tandem Spiritus sancti clementia ipsam optatissimam sanctissimamque unionem consecuti sunt […] Sunt ista prorsus divina opera, non humane fragilitatis inventa […]”. 16 COD 528: “Item diffinimus sanctam apostolicam sedem et Romanum pontificem in universum orbem tenere primatum (tk prote%on kat8chein), et ipsumque pontificem Romanum successorem (di#dochon) esse beati Petri principis (koryfa&ou) apostolorum et verum Christi vicarium (topoteretHn) totiusque ecclesie caput (kephal8n) et omnium christianorum patrem (pat8ra) et doctorem (did#skalon) existere, et ipsi in beato Petro pascendi (poima&nein), regendi (dieuthy´nein) ac gubernandi (kybern.n) universalem ecclesiam a domino nostro Iesu Christo plenam potestatem (pl8re exous&an) traditam esse, quemadmodum (kath’kn trjpon) etiam in gestis ycumenicorum conciliorum et in sacris canonibus continetur”. This last specification was inserted into the decree by express will of the Greeks, and the request was accepted without difficulty by Eugene IV. A balanced assessment of the Florentine doctrine of primacy is given by J. Gill, The definition of the Primacy of the Pope in the Council of Florence, The Heythrop Journal 2 (1961) 14–29; Proch, (note 13), 309–311. 17 COD 528: “Renovantes insuper ordinem traditum in canonibus ceterorum venerabilium patriarcharum, ut patriarcha Constantinopolitanus secundus sit post sanctissimus Romanum pontificem, tertius vero Alexandrinus, quartus autem Antiochenus, et quintus Hierosolymitanus, salvis videlicet privilegiis omnibus et iuribus eorum”. 18 Cfr. can. 5 of the fourth Lateran Council (1215), that conceives the functions of the patriarchs within the ecclesiology of the plenitudo potestatis, in which the Roman Church is considered the source of patriarchal privileges (COD 236).

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all, it was concluded, on both sides, with the awareness that doctrinal and disciplinary issues that were not discussed in the Council remained open. An example of the greatest importance is that the unresolved issue of divorce was not considered an obstacle to union19. The restored union was more understood as a starting point for a process of further rapprochement than as the final conclusion of an itinerary. In other words, both Churches believed that the persisting differences even on important dogmatic (Filioque) and disciplinary matters were not such as to justify the division, and that the good of unity should overcome the points of contrast. A fair and equitable historical assessment of the Council of Florence must take note of two outcomes which in itself are not contradictory. The effects of the union gradually but quickly vanished in the Byzantine Church. The failure in the reception of the union was undoubtedly conditioned by the fall of the Empire (1453), which took away the guarantor of the “symphony” and of ecclesiastic unity, as well as the historical interlocutor of the Latin Church. The effects of the union continued, however, in the Venetian domains in the East, as well as among the Greeks (not few) refugees in Latin lands between the fifteenth and the following centuries20. At the same time it cannot be denied that the results of the Council of Florence have been felt over a longer period of time, since the Florentine union and its canonical regime made it possible the reunion of some groups of Orthodox faithful with Rome, first in order of time the Ruthenians (1595)21. These facts have to be taken into account when considering an idea of papal primacy that the Churches of East and West can share. In the conscience of the eastern faithful united with Rome – who are no less eastern and orthodox than catholic22 – one could probably catch the most authentic sense of the doctrine of 19 See the account of these discussions in: J. Gill (ed.), Quae supersunt actorum Graecorum Concilii Florentini necnon descriptionis cuiusdam eiusdem, Pars II: Res Florentiae gestae, Roma 1953, 468–472. On this topic see O. Condorelli, Il diritto e dovere delle Chiese d’Oriente di reggersi secondo le proprie discipline particolari (Orientalium Ecclesiarum 5): radici, valore e implicazioni della formula conciliare, in: G.H. Ruyssen (ed.), Il diritto canonico orientale a cinquant’anni dal Concilio Vaticano II, Roma 2016, 33–62 (40f., with further literature). 20 Proch, L’unione (note 13) 313–315. 21 Clement VIII, Bulla unionis Nationis Ruthenae cum Ecclesia Romana, “Magnus Dominus et laudabilis” (23 december 1595), in: Bullarium Pontificium Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide, I, Romae 1839, 15–23 (17, with reference to the Florentine Union). 22 As for understanding the meaning of papal primacy in the Church, Y. Congar considers to be fundamental the “rile de t8moignage et de p8dagogie que des Pglises authentiquement orientales (i. e. the Eastern Catholic Churches) peuvent jouer” [1274–1974. Structures eccl8siales et conciles dans les relations entre Orient et Occident, Revue des sciences philosophiques et th8ologiques 58 (1974) 355–390 (at 365)]. See also P. Szabó, Les normes “de Suprema ecclesiae auctoritate” (CCEO cc. 42–54) peuvent-elles Þtre reformul8es? Quelques brHves r8flexions / partir d’une proposition de la Congr8gation pour la Doctrine de la Foi, alors pr8sid8e par Joseph Ratzinger, pour la codification orientale, in: P. Besson (ed.), Les

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primacy defined in the Council of Florence. If so, the effects of this hypothesis of interpretation should as well be projected on the understanding of the doctrine of primacy as it is defined in the constitution Pastor aeternus by the First Vatican Council. The Florentine definition of primacy is the core from which the teachings contained in chapter III of Pastor aeternus branch off. But, even more upstream, the preamble to the constitution is explicit in affirming that the reason for the institution of primacy lies in Christ’s will to preserve the multitude of believers “in the unity of faith and communion”23. Moreover, it is extremely important from the point of view of hermeneutics that Pastor aeternus repeatedly recalls the tradition of the Church, and intends to propose his teachings “in accordance with the ancient and unchanging faith of the whole church”24. In this perspective, a correct interpretation of the constitution cannot ignore the proper meaning of the words by Gregory the Great, which are textually repeated in the body of chapter III: “My honour is the honour of the universal Church. My honour is the firm strength of my brethren. Then do I really receive honour, when it is denied to none of those to whom honour is due”25. The sense of these words is projected into a twofold direction, both into the inner dimension of the Catholic Church and into the ecumenical perspective, in which it indicates a criterion for the search of a concept of primacy that can find a point of balance in the ecclesiological model of the Church of the first millennium. In the understanding of the Catholic Church, this primacy is exercised in the universal dimension and can undoubtedly require the exercise of jurisdiction, but it is (it has to be) exercised in respect and in the protection of the “honour” of all the brethren in the episcopate. 5. It is time to conclude, although the story I have tried to tell does not have a conclusion, but it continues in the dialogues, and inevitably in the contrasts, of our present. From the Orthodox point of view, the question of the primacy of the Bishop of 8volutions du gouvernement central de L’Pglise. Ecclesia sese renovando semper eadem, Toulouse 2017, 336–353. 23 COD 811f.: “in fidei et communionis unitate”. 24 “secundum antiquam atque constantem universalis Ecclesiae fidem” (COD 812). Ratzinger, Il nuovo popolo di Dio (note 10), 152–155, insists on this point, followed by Kasper (note. 10) 20–23, according to whom “l’ecclesiologia di comunione del primo millennio, di cui il Concilio Vaticano II ha riaffermato la validit/, costituisce la cornice ermeneutica del Concilio Vaticano I” (21). 25 Vatican Council I, const. Pastor aeternus, cap. III (COD 813 s.), reports a fragment of Gregory the Great’s letter to Eulogius of Alexandria in: D. Norberg (ed.), S. Gregorii Magni registrum epistolarum. (I) Libri I–VII, (II) Libri VIII–XIV, Appendix, Turnholti 1982, 552f. (VII.29). Gregory I liked to call himself servus servorum Dei: see S. Kuttner, Universal Pope or Servant of God’s Servants: The Canonists, Papal Titles, and Innocent III, Revue de droit canonique 32 (1981) 109–150.

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Rome is probably the most difficult knot to dissolve in their relations with the Catholic Church. Orthodox theology and canon law – even when they acknowledge (but it is not a unanimous opinion) that primacy belongs to the essence of the Church both in the universal dimension and in the groupings of local Churches – find it difficult to recognize that the primacy itself implies a properly authority of jurisdiction on different levels26. This difficulty, on the one hand, results unsatisfactory from the point of view of the historical reconstruction, on the other hand produces incoherent effects – as Orthodox theologians admit – with the present organization of the Orthodox Churches: the primacy which is rejected universally is recognized on the level of the autocephalous Churches27. The picture is made more complicated by the tendency to understand the juridical aspect of primacy as a “legalistic notion” (in the pejorative meaning of the word), that would in principle be opposed to the function of service (diakonia) which would instead be the essential core of the primacy28. This latter aspect, in particular, implies a disregard of the functional relationship between power (potestas) and service (ministerium) that the Latin ecclesiastical tradition has constantly highlighted and nurtured29. On the Catholic side, the debate on primacy, especially in the ecumenical perspective, has been renewed on the basis of the teachings of the Second Vatican Council, which has integrated the doctrine of papal primacy into the general context of ecclesiology with the teaching of episcopal collegiality and the theology of particular Churches (const. Lumen Gentium n. 18–27); has enhanced the value of the liturgical, theological, spiritual, disciplinary heritage of the Eastern Churches, both Catholic (decree Orientalium Ecclesiarum n. 2–5) and those not in full communion with the Catholic Church (decree Unitatis Redintegratio n. 15–16); has recognized that a legitimate variety exists both in the disciplinary field and in the various ways of expressing theological doctrines (decree Unitatis Redintegratio n. 15–16); has exalted the historical experience of the undivided Church as the foundation of the inter-ecclesial dialogue with the Orthodox (decree Unitatis Redintegratio n. 14–18). To bear witness of the beginning of the new season of dialogue, let us recall a letter from Paul VI to Patriarch Athenagoras of 1967, in which the Pope – taking 26 A good presentation of the theme is offered by I. Zizioulas, Recent Discussions on Primacy in Orthodox Theology, in: W. Kasper (ed.), Il ministero petrino (note 10) 249–264. 27 For a discussion of this topic see O. Condorelli, La distinzione tra potest/ di ordine e potest/ di giurisdizione nella tradizione canonica bizantina, in: G. D’Angelo (ed.), Curiosit/ e rigore. Studi in memoria di Maria Cristina Folliero, I, Torino 2018, 241–271 (255–260). 28 Zizioulas (note 26), 260f. 29 Y. Congar, La hi8rarchie comme service, selon le Nouveau Testament et les documents de la Tradition, in: Y. Congar / B.D. Dupuy (eds.), L’Episcopat et l’Eglise universelle, Paris 1964, 67–99; Id., Quelques expressions traditionelles du service chr8tien, ibidem 101–132.

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up an expression used in the Second Vatican Council (Unitatis redintegratio n. 14) and used by Athenagoras himself in his correspondence with Rome – speaks of the Churches of East and West as Sisters-Churches called by the Lord to overcome divisions and mutual misunderstandings30. Even in this letter the rule for restoring and preserving communion and unity is summarized in the principle that no burden should be imposed beyond what is necessary : this rule, obviously, also reflects on the question of the exercise of primacy. The awareness has matured in the Catholic papal teaching that an effective ecumenical commitment requires that the understanding of the essence of the primacy leads to a reflection on the just and appropriate mode of its operation. The centrality of this problem is affirmed in the encyclical Ut unum sint (1995). Here John Paul II identifies “the essential” of the mission of Peter and his successors in the “office of unity” that the Bishops of Rome exerted in the first millennium31. The existence of a Code of canons for the Eastern Catholic Churches (Codex Canonum Ecclesiarum Orientalium) gives evidence, albeit perfectible, of different forms of exercising the primacy than those related to the Latin Church32. The emphasis of the current Pope Francis for the unity of the Church, and his ability to stand, even in the language he uses, in harmony with the Orthodox interlocutors, can be traced from the beginning of his pontificate. In the first greeting addressed to the faithful after the election, Francis presented himself as Bishop of Rome, the Church “presiding in charity all the Churches”, according to the formula of Ignatius of Antioch with which Athenagoras had greeted Paul VI on 25 July 196733. In the same way – as Bishop of Rome, the Church presiding in charity – Francis presented himself in the apostolic journey at Constantinople in 201434. In expressing the ardent desire of the Catholic Church for the communion with the orthodox Churches, Francis assured them that, “to reach the desired goal of full unity, the Catholic Church does not intend to impose any conditions except that 30 Paul VI, Letter Anno ineunte to Patriarch Athenagoras I (25 july 1967), Acta Apostolicae Sedis 59 (1967) 852–854. 31 John Paul II, Encyclical Ut unum sint, On commitment to Ecumenism (25 may 1995), n. 95, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 87 (1995) 977–978. 32 See O. Condorelli, Il CCEO: un codice autenticamente orientale?, in: G. Ruyssen/S. Kokkaravalayil (eds.), Il CCEO. Strumento per il futuro delle Chiese orientali cattoliche, Roma 2017, 273–306, with further literature. 33 First Greeting of the Holy Father Pope Francis, Central Loggia of St. Peter’s Basilica, Wednesday, 13 March 2013 (www.vatican.va). Cfr. Ignatius of Antioch, ad Romanos, inscriptio, in: P.Th. Camelot (ed.), Ignace d’Antioche, Polycarpe de Smyrne, Lettres, Martyre de Polycarpe, Paris 1969, 107 note 3 and 43f. 34 Apostolic journey of His Holiness Pope Francis to Turkey (28–30 November 2014), Divine Liturgy, Address of Pope Francis, Patriarchal Church of St. George, Istanbul, 30 November 2014 (www.vatican.va).

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of the shared profession of faith. Further, I would add that we are ready to seek together, in light of Scriptural teaching and the experience of the first millennium, the ways in which we can guarantee the needed unity of the Church in the present circumstances”. The memory of the experience of communion of the first millennium returns as an indispensable basis for ecumenical dialogue, with all that this memory also teaches about the contents and the exercise of the primacy of the Bishop of Rome. I wish to conclude by recalling some recent words of Pope Francis, which are particularly well-chosen in terms of method in the ecumenical process. In November 2016 Francis emphasized that unity is neither uniformity nor absorption. But above all “unity, before being an objective, is a journey, with its road maps and rhythms, its slowdowns and accelerations, and even its standstills… For this reason, I like to say that unity is made by walking, in order to recall that when we walk together, that is, when we meet as brothers, we pray together, we collaborate together in the proclamation of the Gospel, and in the service to the least, we are already united”35. What Francis today reminds to Catholics and Orthodox is what they both understood and experienced in the Council of Florence, when, though aware of the differences that persisted between the two Churches, they re-established the full communion.

35 Address of His Holiness Pope Francis to participants in the Plenary Assembly of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, 10 November 2016 (www.vatican.va).

Emanuele Conte

The order and the Volk. Romantic roots and enduring fascination of the German constitutional history*

1.

History and Law after the First World War

When he gave the last academic talk of his life in Berlin on May 4, 19191, Otto von Gierke was, at age seventy-eight, an old and highly respected professor of law in Germany. He had published thousands and thousands of pages: four big volumes of his celebrated “Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht”, three books on “Deutsches Privatrecht” (1895, 1905, 1917), one book on the corporation in German jurisprudence, a six-hundred-page volume of critical essays from 1888 on the draft German Civil Code project, and a number of individual essays2. Nineteen nineteen was a hard year for Germany. It was also a sad one for Gierke himself, who had been a witness to the unification of his country at the beginning of his academic career on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War and who remained an enthusiastic German nationalist. The opening words of his talk offer a vivid portrayal of his mood at the end of the First World War : “We the survivors, who stand in deep shock over the grave of our hopes, do not want to allow the tragedy of a crushing fate rob us of our faith in the irreplaceable value of what our fathers created.”3

* This text is a revised version of a talk to the Law Faculty held at Chicago University in April 2016. I wish to thank William Sullivan for his substantial help in improving my English. 1 O. von Gierke, Der germanische Staatsgedanke. Vortrag gehalten am 4. Mai 1919, Berlin 1919, now reprinted in: von Gierke, Aufsätze und kleinere Monographien, W. Pöggeler (ed.), Hildesheim/Zurich/New-York 2001, 1066 and ss. I give the original pagination. 2 For a general biographic information see the entry Otto von Gierke in: G. Kleinheyer/J. Schröder (eds.), Deutsche und Europäische Juristen aus neun Jahrhunderten. Eine biographische Einführung in die Geschichte der Rechtswissenschaft, 5th ed., Heidelberg 2008, 152–158. 3 “Wir Überlebenden, die wir tief erschüttert am Grabe unserer Hoffnungen stehen, wollen uns durch die Tragik des zermalmenden Schicksals den Glauben an den unersetzlichen Wert der Schöpfung unserer Väter nicht rauben lassen”, von Gierke (note 1) 4.

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These words express a disappointment that is about much more than military defeat. Gierke had insisted for more than fifty years on the peculiarity of the German institutions, in public as well as in private law. Now, after the defeat and the burdensome conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, he encourages Germans to look ahead to the future. At the same time, Gierke argues, he who thinks historically must also look backwards. German identity, the only hope for a safe and fruitful new beginning, is to be found in the historical background of the German nation: “We are a people, with thousands of years of history, who have fulfilled our calling in world culture in part by enriching political and legal life with our own ideas. Before we let foreign cultural attitudes become our masters, we should ask ourselves whether the German idea of the state can still offer us something of higher value for the future. Germanness (Germanentum) is what created, after the downfall of the ancient world, the medieval and modern world in which we now live. We Germans are the core Germanic people, the Urvolk.”4

In this lecture, given right at the outset of the controversial Weimar Republic period, just after the First World War, Gierke – a great lawyer, someone who had left his mark on both public and private law in Germany – points the way forward for his country by turning to the past. As a great legal historian, Gierke relies on the Romantic-era notion of the guiding role of history in shaping national identity and character5. In fact, Gierke had already used the same Romantic notion in a different context some forty-six years earlier, in a lecture given at Breslau in 1873. That earlier lecture starts with the image of Kaiser Wilhelm I being crowned in January 1871 at Versailles, on the throne of the Bourbons. For many Germans, this historic event at the gates of Paris signaled a national revival, the triumph of a wise return to medieval values over the dangerous innovations imposed on European civilization by French culture. For some, Gierke observed, the new German 4 The new Germany should found its new State on the solid base of its history, says Gierke (note 1) 5: “Heute müssen wir alle vorwärts blicken … Aber wer geschichtlich denkt, wird nunmehr … den Blick auch rückwärts … wenden. Sollen wir denn wirklich bei dem Neubau unseres Staates wieder, wie schon oft, uns von fremden Gedanken überfluten lassen? … Wir sind doch ein Volk mit mehrtausendjähriger Geschichte, das in Erfüllung seines weltumspannenden Kulturberufs auch das Staats- und Rechtsleben mit eigenen Gedanken befruchtet hat. Bevor wir fremde Volksgeister zu unseren Herren machen, sollten wir uns doch besinnen, ob nicht der germanische Staatsgedanke uns auch für die Zukunft höhere Werte zu bieten vermag. – Das Germanentum ist es nun einmal gewesen, das nach dem Untergange der antiken Welt die mittelalterliche und moderne Welt, in der wir bis heute leben, geschaffen hat. Wir Deutschen aber sind das germanische Kernvolk, das Urvolk”. 5 The particular importance of history for German national self consciousness is stressed by E.W. Böckenförde, Die Einheit von nationaler und konstitutioneller politischer Bewegung im deutschen Frühliberalismus, in: E.W. Böckenförde (ed.), Moderne deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1815–1918), Köln 1972, 27–39 .

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Empire represented a return to the ancien r8gime. For others, the Second Reich was an absolute novelty, a new experiment in politics, public law, and diplomacy. Yet in Gierke’s vision, Germany was neither reactionary nor revolutionary : it was just true to its national identity. In the victorious 1873 as in the tragic 1919, Gierke developed the same basic argument: that the German idea of law was different in its essence from the Roman one, and that this difference should be enhanced and exploited to free the extraordinary energies of the German people. At the end of his 1919 lecture, Gierke sums up the main points of his vision. And we cannot help but think that the old professor was dictating the terms of his intellectual legacy for the new twentieth century : “Unser Staat soll nationaler Staat sein und bleiben!” “Our state should be based on our national identity!” – meaning also that a common national spirit joins Germany and Austria together. “Unser Staat soll geschichtlich fundamentiert bleiben.” “Our state should stand on an historical foundation”: history does not mean, for Gierke, the historical reconstruction of doctrines and social contexts of public law through time, but the ancient, unchangeable foundations of a distinctly German legal identity. “Unser Staat soll ein organisch aufgebautes Gemeinwesen germanischer Prägung bleiben.” In Germany, Gierke asserts, municipalities and local government entities are autonomous; they do not derive their legal existence or authority from the state. “Unser Staat soll sozialer Staat sein. Sozial, aber nicht sozialistisch!” Our state should remain a community, conceived of by Gierke as an organism. “It should be then a social state. Social but not socialist!” “Unser Staat soll Kulturstaat sein und bleiben.” “Our state should be and remain a cultural state.” The English translation of Kulturstaat does not do justice to the meaning of the German concept, which has deep roots in German constitutional thought6. “Unser Staat soll Rechtsstaat sein.” Rechtsstaat is often translated as “rule of law.” In Gierke’s vision, the concept means more that both public authority and private initiative are never completely free from their legal framework. Embedded in popular feelings, legal rules oblige each person to respect his or her legal duties while enjoying his or her legal rights. Gierke’s last lecture is thus a real roadmap for the construction of the new Germany. It is, in my view, both a foundation stone for the democratic constitution of the Weimar Republic and one of the legal justifications for the Nazi 6 See, among many other studies, in: G. Mettele/A. Schulz (eds.), Preußen als Kulturstaat im 19. Jahrhundert, Paderborn 2015.

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state, the frightening outcome of a large part of interwar German constitutional thought.

2.

Verfassung and History

Gierke was a lawyer but, in the tradition of the German historical school of law, he was also a very important and respected German social historian. As a legal historian, he clearly connected legal history to a sort of legal anthropology, a description of the popular customs that formed a shared heritage for the whole national community. In the Romantic culture of the nineteenth century, the deep grounding of a legal system in the spirit of the nation was the only true pledge of the real lawfulness of the legal order. This tendency to explain the historical development of law as emanating out of the spirit of the people was present in scholarship on both private and public law. In private law, the Pandectistic had built its extraordinary successful school on the assertion that Roman law – the basis for modern German private law – had been “taken over” by the Germanic peoples when they invaded the Roman Empire. The same connection among history, identity and legality was drawn for public law: in public law, historians of German law since the eighteenth century had posited the existence of an ancient German constitution that long predated the creation of a unified German state7. Georg Waitz’s 1844 Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte, one of the earliest classic texts on German constitutional history, is very much in this vein. For Waitz, “constitution” means something very different from what we (continental Europeans) usually understand under this definition. The German Verfassung, for Waitz, could not be reduced to a collection of fundamental constitutional rules on which the state is based. It is much more: it is something that can and must stand also without a state – because after all, in 1844, Germany was not a state. It is, rather, the legal identity of a nation: Waitz describes the customs of the Germans as based on the history of the nation, with a kind of anthropological flavor. Rules governing inheritance, popular games, folk music, peculiar ideas of

7 The public law of Germany was nothing else than its history, wrote Justus H. Böhmer already at the beginning of the 18th century : Ius publicum regiminis Germanici nulla olim lege comprehensum non ab alio fere principio accersitur, quam a longaeva consuetudine: quae quid est, quam antiquitatis Germanicae historia?. J.H. Böhmer, Ius ecclesiasticum protestantium. Usum hodiernum iuris canonici iuxta seriem Decretalium ostendens et ipsis rerum argumentis illustrans, I (quinta editio), Halle, 1756 (first ed. 1714–37) 214–215 § 21. On Böhmer’s book see now E. Conte, Ius ecclesiasticum protestantium… in The Formation and Transmission of Western Legal Culture. 150 Books that Made the Law in the Age of Printing, a c. di S. Dauchy et al., Springer 2016 (Studies in the History of Law and Justice, 7).

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contract and marriage law: all of it was part of the German constitution for Waitz8. Of course, after 1871 a real German state did exist. But, as Gierke had clearly said, it was a peculiar State. Its constitution was not given from above, from the ruler to the people, because the ruler simply gave written form to the feelings of the people. On this point both strands of the German historical school – scholars focused on Germanic law on the one hand and Roman law on the other – shared the same opinion: a legal norm is binding not because of the power given to it by the ruler but because the rule reflects the spirit of the whole people. But the two groups of scholars put different glosses on the concept. For Roman law scholars, this “spirit” had a more active and subjective character : it was identified with the will of the people. In his famous book on customary law, the Romanist Georg Friedrich Puchta developed his theory of Volksüberzeugung (“popular conviction”)9, his basic argument being that the strength of customary law lay in the “common conviction” that a particular behavior was legal. This means that it was not the pure fact that people had been doing something for a long period of time that gave rise to a customary rule. Rather, it was the public’s persuasion of a behavior’s lawfulness that made the behavior into a binding legal rule. Scholars who concentrated on Germanic legal sources, on the other hand, tended to follow the position of Georg Beseler, who stressed much more the fact of an ancient behavior, deemphasizing the importance of the subjective will of the sovereign people10. In his “Volksrecht und Juristenrecht”, the Germanists’ 1843 intellectual manifesto, Georg Beseler wrote: “Law, in its initial formation, is not the product of chance or human discretion, deliberation, or wisdom; it is created neither by legislation nor by philosophical abstraction. Rather, it develops directly in the life of the people, like morals and language,

8 See F. Graus, Verfassungsgeschichte des Mittelalters, Historische Zeitschrift 243 (1986) 539–40: “Nicht mehr in geschriebenen Konstitutionen, die durch Grundgesetze (lois fondamentales-constitutionelles des 18. Jahrhunderts) bemüht waren, die Willkür der Herrscher einzugrenzen, sah man die Lösung. Man interpretierte die Verfassung als gewachsenes Ergebnis des freien Spiels historischer Kräfte – der Begriff wurde dementsprechend erweitert und zugleich auf das ‘staatliche Leben’ begrenzt, gegenüber anderen entscheidenden Gebieten des wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lebens abgegrenzt. Man sucht die Kontinuität in Gesetzgebung und Herrschaftsformen und hob sie lobend hervor. Die Betonung der Kontinuität zeichnet die deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte des Mittelalters von allem Anfang an aus”. 9 P. Landau, Die Theorie des Gewohnheitsrechts im katholischen und evangelischen Kirchenrecht des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ZRG KA 108 (1991) 156–196. 10 E. Conte, Consuetudine, Coutume, Gewohnheit and Ius Commune. An Introduction, Rechtsgeschichte, 24 (2016) 234–243.

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on the broad basis of general human relations; it lives in the common consciousness of the people, from whose individual constitution it also receives its special character.”11

For both Romanists and Germanists, however, the nation was a large community of a people, with its legal system deeply rooted in its history. Knowledge of national law could be obtained only through the study of the national history, which revealed the basic principles of a shared legal inheritance12. Influenced by these accepted theories, legislation promulgated under the Second Reich was thought of largely as the writing down of self-imposed rules whose force and effect derived from their acceptance by the German people.

3.

Verfassungsgeschichte as the history of an “order”

We can understand now how important this self-consciousness of a German national legal tradition was after the defeat of 1918, far beyond any political and military achievements of the German state – and how important the work of historians, their search for the ancient shared roots of Germany’s national legal tradition, was for this self-consciousness. It was thus no accident that, starting in the 1920s, German historians concentrated increasingly on what they called Verfassungsgeschichte, the study of German society as it evolved during the Middle Ages, developing the main legal institutions that would ultimately constitute Germany’s national legal order. An “order” more than a state, because the relationship between the German nation and the German state had been a difficult one already before unification. Even after the First World War and under the Weimar Republic, the dominant German theories of constitutional law refused to accept the idea of a state that imposed legal norms on the people. During the interwar period, a number of medieval historians focused more and more on these “unifying characteristics” of the German nation. Social historians largely took the place of Germanic legal historians, as if they were moving

11 G. Beseler, Volksrecht und Juristenrecht, Leipzig 1843, 59: “Das Recht ist in seiner ersten Entstehung nicht das Produkt des Zufalls oder der menschlichen Willkür, Ueberlegung und Weisheit; weder die Gesetzgebung, noch die philosophische Abstraktion hat es geschaffen. Auf der breiten Basis allgemein menschlicher Verhältnisse entwickelt es sich unmittelbar im Volksleben, wie die Sitte und die Sprache; es ist lebendig in dem gemeinsamen Bewusstseyn des Volkes, von dessen individuellen Beschaffenheit es auch seinen besonderen Charakter erhält”. 12 G. Dilcher, The Germanists and the Historical School of Law: German Legal Science between Romanticism, Realism, and Rationalization, Rechtsgeschichte 24 (2016) 20–72.

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the focus of nineteenth-century historiography in German law into the broader field of German social history13. The Middle Ages were, of course, the core of this new historiography, because the medieval period was seen as the age of the triumph of the German Volk over the Romans and of the establishment of German identity both within German territory and across all of Europe. One of the basic features of the German popular constitution described by Verfassungsgeschichte historians was that it called into question the concept of the state. As we have seen, for the politics and law of the nineteenth century a German nation could very well exist in the absence of a German state. A German constitution existed before the state, and it continued to exist with a degree of independence from the state. This peculiar vision was at the core of historical research into the original characteristics of the German nation, the characteristics that historians could retrace back to the time of the “entrance of the Germans into history”14. The state that did not exist for historians of the Middle Ages was the state described by Gierke as a fictional person created to rule the people, as had been the case for the Roman Empire. In his monumental “Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht” and in a number of minor works, Gierke had insisted on denying the existence of a German state during the Middle Ages, at least in the sense given to the word by the doctrine of natural law. Instead, in the artificial figure of a sovereign state Gierke saw a superstructure imposed on the German people through the evil influence of Roman law. By contrast, the German form of a political corporation was not based on a fiction: it was founded, according to Gierke, on the concrete order of German Verbände and was never transformed into the abstract unity of an all-powerful state. German social historians in the 1920s took up from the legal historians the torch of a history of real, practiced institutions, merging the modern vision of law as a function of society with the old ideas of the legal creativity of the German Volk15. The result was a historiography quite in tune with the ideas that were affirmed by the totalitarian dictatorship in 193316. 13 See the classical book by E.-W. Böckenförde, Die deutsche verfassungsgeschichtliche Forschung im 19. Jahrhundert, 1st. ed. 1961, 2nd ed., Berlin 1995. Italian translation by P. Schiera, La storia costituzionale tedesca nel secolo decimonono, Milano 1970. 14 The German expression “Eintritt der Germanen in die Geschichte”, or “in das römische Culturleben” was pretty diffused since the middle of the 19th century. An example in F. Dahn, Die Könige der Germanen, vol. 4, Teil 7.1 und 7.2, Leipzig 1894, 274. 15 This is clearly said by T. Mayer, Die Ausbildung der Grundlagen des modernen deutschen Staates im hohen Mittelalter (a paper given on August 30, 1938 in Zurich), HZ (1939) 457–487, 457: “Die deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft hat seit etwa einer Generation die Interesse in steigendem Masse den Fragen nach dem Werden von Volk und Staat der Deutschen zugewandt …. Die neue Aufgabe fand eine neue wissenschaftliche Methode zu ihrer Lösung

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In that very year Theodor Mayer, one of the most important representatives of the new Verfassungsgeschichte, stressed a peculiarity of the German state of the Middle Ages, one that marked it as substantially different from the modern state. Whereas the modern state is built as an institutioneller Flächenstaat, – a political organism in which all power is derived from the centre – the German medieval state was a Personenverbandstaat, in which many independent powers were federated in a complex structure17. Every unit that formed part of this complex organism had its own legal autonomy, so that the idea of a German state cannot stand solely on obedience; it must be based on a principle of voluntary collaboration. This feature created an important difference, said Mayer, between Roman and German notions of the state. Whereas the Roman state was a despotic, centralized entity removed from the feelings of the people, the German state was the union of many free and independent corporate bodies, gathered together by the common desire to participate in the larger national community18. Many of the main points of the old legal-historical theories of the Germanists of the nineteenth century were also reworked to form the basis of a new historiography whose results fitted nicely with the ideas of the new Nazi government. As a consequence of this new way of seeing the relationship among the state, the rule of law, and the people, a new term was more and more used to avoid any confusion between the two competing models of state. Instead of being called a “state”, the German political organism was called an “order”, Ordnung19. Ordnung quickly became an extremely successful substitute for Staat. The domestic and international successes of the Third Reich encouraged both historians and political scientists in Germany to think of the Germans as propagators of a new order. In 1942 a book by Karl Richard Ganzer on “Das Reich als europäische Ordnungsmacht” sold more than 850,000 copies, testifying to the

16 17 18 19

und beide haben sich gegenseitig angeregt und befruchtet, so dass das Bild der mittelalterlichen Geschichte sich grundlegend verändert und erweitert hat. Die statische, dogmatisch-institutionelle Betrachtungsweise der Historiker, die auf der Urkundenforschung aufgebaut ist, ist umgestaltet und ergänzt worden”. An extremely useful account of the development of the German historiography after 1930 is H. Lehmann/J. Van Horn Melton, Paths of Continuity. Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s, Cambridge 1994, 263–292. Cfr. R. Heinzel, Theodor Mayer. Ein Mittelalterhistoriker im Banne des “Volkstums”, 1920–1960 Paderborn 2016, 94. The same ideas, probably mediated by the French legal historians of the 20th Century, are still present in the works of B. Kriegel (Barret-Kriegel). See further, text at note. 35. On the very use of the word Ordnung in the Nazi time see L. Raphael, ‘Ordnung’ zwischen Geist und Rasse: Kulturwissenschaftliche Ordnungssemantik im Nationalsozialismus, in: H. Lehmann/O.G. Oexle (eds.), Nationalsozialismus in den Kulturwissenschaften 2., Göttingen 2004, 115–137.

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wide success of the idea of a legal order that could impose itself without the enforcement mechanisms of a modern state20.

4.

Otto Brunner: From German Law to Verfassung and Society

A power that guarantees a social order : that is what the Third Reich wanted to be. This was considered a very “German” ambition, rooted in the spirit of the medieval (and hence German) society studied by historians of the national “constitution”. This is evident particularly for Otto Brunner, whose “Land and Lordship”21 came out in 1939 and remained a great scholarly success up through the end of the century. As recent research has shown, Brunner was an “extremely active and deeply convinced supporter of National Socialism”22. Besides reading newly discovered archival material concerning his attempts to enter the NSDAP23, Hans-Henning Kortüm has also been able to see the unpublished book that Brunner had written for a larger audience, which lay in proof in 1944 under the title “Der Schicksalsweg des deutsches Volkes” but never came out. It is an astonishing piece of militant historiography, which uses the “völkisch” view of medieval history to strengthen the determination of the German people in the hour of their final struggle. Brunner presents himself as a soldier : “The soldier knows his opponent; he is determined to fight him until the destruction. He brings to his opponent the respect he deserves. This soldierly attitude is also valid with respect to the past, that is, the object that deeply concerns the historian.”24

20 T. Vordemayer, Bildungsbürgertum und völkische Ideologie, Berlin / Boston 2016, 309–310; E. Wadle, Visionen vom Reich. Streiflichter zur Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte zwischen 1933 und 1945, in: J. Rückert/D. Willoweit (eds.), Die deutsche Rechtsgeschichte in der NSZeit. Ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Nachwirkungen, Tübingen 1995, 241–300, 254ff. 21 O. Brunner, Land and Lordship: Structures of Governance in Medieval Austria, trans. H. Kaminsky/J. Van Horn, Philadelphia 1992. 22 H. Kortüm, “Gut durch die Zeiten gekommen”. Otto Brunner und der Nationalsozialismus, Vierteljahrschrift für Zeitgeschichte 66 (2018) 117–160, 119: “Die hier präsentierten Quellen zeigen Brunner eindeutiger und stärker als bislang bekannt als äusserst aktiven und zutiefst überzeugten Anhänger des Nationalsozialismus”. 23 Also mentioned by J. Van Horn Melton, From Folk History to Structural History : O. Brunner (1898–1982) and the Radical-Conservative Roots of German Social History, in: Paths of Continuity (note 16) 267. J. Van Horn Melton has also gathered some evidences of a less convinced support of Brunner to Nazism: he also helped a Jew colleague of his wife to escape arrest in 1942 (270). On the other side, Van Horn maintains that “his support for National socialism went well beyond the bounds of political opportunism” (271). 24 Kortüm (note 22), 145, quoting p.11 of the print draft.

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This extreme vision was in fact the natural development of the historical view of Brunner. Medieval German society, for Brunner, was made up of a diverse assortment of powers that, while politically autonomous, all observed a general rule that unified the whole nation. This general rule is called the Ordnung, and is not imposed from above, but felt to be just by the whole of the entire nation. Gadi Algazi has stressed that Brunner’s idea of Ordnung comes through particularly clearly in one important passage of “Land and Lordship”25. In that passage, Brunner writes26 : “[L]aw and justice, Right and law were in the end the same. This reflected a mentality in which all laws, orders, decrees, commands, were considered valid only in the context of ‘Right’ – the sense of the community, for which ideal and positive law were inseparable because law was community law, the community’s conviction about what is right and legitimate, the conviction that dominates the heart of every individual with elemental power. The convictions of the men of that time about the right and the legitimate seemed to them unchangeable and eternal, Þwa, and they felt all ‘positive’ law to be a part of this enduring order. Hence there could be no contradiction between law and justice. That is why Heinrich Mitteis has called medieval legality a ‘conviction of Right’.” [footnotes omitted]

A quick analysis of the sources of this passage reveals that the medieval society described by Brunner was largely seen through the studies of the old Germanistic legal historiography : the assumption that “law was community law” (“Recht war Volksrecht”) harkens back to Beseler (1843) and more recently to the work of historian Fritz Kern, whose article “Recht und Verfassung im Mittelalter” came out in 191927, to be translated into English in 193928 reprinted in German as a book in 1952 and in subsequent editions up through the twenty-first century. The reference to “the community’s conviction about what is right and legitimate, the conviction that dominates the heart of every individual with elemental power” is taken from Claudius von Schwerin, the author of the then most widely read 25 See G. Algazi, Otto Brunner “Konkrete Ordnung” und Sprache der Zeit, in: P. Schöttler (ed.), Geschichte als Legitimationswissenschaft, 1918–1949, 2nd ed., Frankfurt am Main 1998, 166–203. 26 O. Brunner, Land and Lordship, 119 = O. Brunner, Land und Herrschaft (51965), 139–140 = Land und Herrschaft (11939),165–166, und K.G. Hugelmann, “Das Deutsche Recht”, in: O. Brunner u. a. (ed.), Das Mittelalter, Leipzig 1930,217. The passage is also quoted in extenso in J. Rückert, Der Rechtsbegriff der Deutschen Rechtsgeschichte in der NS-Zeit: der Sieg des “Lebens” und des konkreten Ordnungsdenkens, seine Vorgeschichte und seine Nachwirkungen, Die deutsche Rechtsgeschichte in der NS Zeit (note. 20), 207. 27 F. Kern, HZ 120 (1919) 1–79. 28 Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages, transl. with an introduction by S.B. Chimes, Oxford 1939. Especially useful for the understanding of the intellectual world of Kern is J. Liebrecht, Fritz Kern und das gute alte Recht. Geistesgeschichte als neuer Zugang für die Mediävistik, Frankfurt am Main 2016 (St. zur eur. Rechtsgeschichte, 302). For the connections with 19th Century legal history and the germanists see 85–92.

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handbook on German legal history ; similar remarks can be found in many German legal history handbooks from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Brunner also refers explicitly to Heinrich Mitteis, who in 1926 was still applying Puchta’s theory of custom to the study of German law29. The reference to the German word Þwa also has a long history. The word is attested solely in a few Carolingian manuscripts, which use the term as a definition of popular law30 ; noticed by German legal historians in the nineteenth century, the word became more important in the twentieth, because its linguistic root31 seemed appropriate to underline the eternal and unchangeable feature of the German concept of popular law32. The perfect coherence between Brunner’s “Land and Lordship” and the theories of the historical school of law, both of which shared the same strong rejection of positive law, was emphasized in an enthusisatic 1941 review of Brunner’s book by the great legal historian Heinrich Mitteis. The conception that the Urgermanen had of law as a “sacral order” (sakrale Ordnung), wrote Mitteis, has always been the dominant concept of law among the Germanist legal historians, for whom law cannot be altered by state power because it springs directly from the consciousness of the Volk33. To impose this Germanic variety of rule of law, Germany did not need a state, at least not in the abstract sense defined by the learned lawyers, because the legal order was engraved in the hearts of all Germans. At the same time, the pluralism of political entities in Germany could not endanger the essential unity of the German nation because the common legal order could not be altered by any one person or power. As we have already seen, this is the image of the German state that Gierke presented in 1919: a peculiarly 29 H. Mitteis, “Rechtsgeschichte und Machtgeschichte”, in: G.P. Bognetti et al (eds.), Wirtschaft und Kultur. Festschrift zum 70. Geburtstag von Alfons Dopsch, Baden bei Wien/ Leipzig 1938, 547–580: 565–566. 30 Cf. G. Schmitz (ed.), Die Kapitulariensammlung des Ansegis, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Hannover 1996, 35–36, 49–50. 31 See R. Schmidt-Wiegand, “Ewa”, in: H. Jankuhn/H. Beck (eds.) Reallexikon der germanische Altertumskunde, 2.Aufl., Berlin 1994, 35–37. 32 The meaning of the term Þwa had been described in different ways in the different editions of the same book, R. Schröder, Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, Leipzig 1894. I have seen the second edition, where it is defined on page 13 as ewige Ordnung (“eternal order”), whereas in the sixth edition, produced with co-author E. Freiherr von Künßberg (Berlin 1922), it is presented on page 19 as a variant of the word Ehe, meaning in German Billigkeit or in Latin aequum (English “equity”). 33 H. Brunner, Land und Herrschaft. Bemerkungen zu dem gleichnamigen Buch Otto Brunners, Historische Zeitschrift, 163 (1941) 255–281, 270–271: “Das Recht ist in Gott gegründet und mit Gerechtigkeit und Billigkeit identisch …. Diese Auffassung ist aber nicht etwa erst durch das Christentum vermittelt worden, sie ist schon dem Urgermanentum eigen, für die das Recht eine sakrale Ordnung war …. Damit ist die germanische Konzeption des unwandelbaren und unverbrüchlichen, aus der Volksüberzeugung unmittelbar fließenden guten alten Rechts aufgehoben”.

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German state does not impose its laws, but rules a pluralist community that acknowledges the existence of a common order arising from the spirit of the people.

5.

Some examples of the enduring persistence of the idea of a medieval ordo in European historiography

Now it might seem odd that these old, nationalist, even racist ideas, rooted in the nineteenth century and proudly exalted in the Nazi period, still have some currency among historians and lawyers in the twenty-first century. But to our surprise, we can easily recognise in more than one national scholarly tradition this vision of the old school of the Germanist legal historians, mediated by the work of the Verfassungsgeschichte historians. I offer below a few signs of the persistence of this historiographical construct even in current scholarship. (a) Germany. After the war, Germany took pretty seriously the task of getting its universities rid of fascist doctrines. But the German professors who had been loyal to the Nazi government were so numerous that it was not possible to stop every former Nazi from teaching. After being expelled from the Vienna University, Otto Brunner found a chair in Hamburg, and continued to work and publish. His “Land and Lordship” reappeared in multiple editions (reprints in 1939, 1942, and 1943; then new editions in 1959 and 1965, and further reprints in 1973, 1981, 1984, 1990; an Italian translation in 1983; and English translation in 1992), and he also published some short syntheses such as his “Sozialgeschichte Europas im Mittelalter” (1978 and 1984, Italian translation 1980, Spanish 1991, Finnish 1992) where the concepts he had expressed in his main books were summarized for a broader readership. It is interesting to note that a large part of the tradition of German legal history fed into what we now think of as “social history”34. This happened because historians of medieval German law refused to study the abstract constructions of the learned scholastic law, considering them to be mere superstructures imposed by state powers in opposition to the spirit of the people. Instead, they devoted themselves to describing a truly popular law, imposed by custom and formed basically by social behavior, attitudes, and practices. They used the same kind of material on which the German Verfassungsgeschichte constructed their vision of a popular law as opposed to a learned and artificial law imposed on the people by 34 See Lehmann/Van Horn Melton, Paths of Continuity (note 16).

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judges, professors, and finally also kings and emperors, with their officials trained in the study of Justinian’s laws. The very idea of a popular law, which could resist imposed Roman law superstructures over a period of centuries, led historians to disconnect the idea of law from the power of the state. Instead of being the source of law, the state becomes its enemy, committed to choke off the rules naturally produced by the Volksgeist with the ruthless abstractions of Roman law. After the tragic failure of the Third Reich, the German historians were particularly keen on painting a portrait of the German Middle Ages that stressed social structures much more than any construction of a central authority. The Verfassungsgeschichte that had been the premise of a peculiar German Ordnung became the description of a popular order based on anthropological features and on ancient traditions. Brunner’s and Fritz Kern’s books had second lives, and the old image of a stateless order was happily revived. (b) France. The influence of Germanist scholarship arrived relatively early in France, beginning with the work of the early nineteenth-century historian Henri Klimrath, and it became dominant in French legal history with the extraordinary success of FranÅois Olivier-Martin, whose “Histoire du droit franÅais”, first published in 1948, had an extremely large use in the French universities, being reprinted until 2010. Born in 1879, Olivier-Martin was a legal historian educated in the spirit of German legal history : in 1938 he published a book on the corporatist structure of the Kingdom of France during the Middle Ages, following Gierke’s interpretation. In his book of 1947, Les lois du roi, he proposed a distinction between the lois du royaume and the lois du roi, meaning that there are two kinds of legislation in the French tradition: the king made the law, yet he lacked the power to alter the old preexisting legal traditions of the kingdom. There existed, according to Olivier-Martin, a core set of fundamental rules that the monarchy was bound to respect. This is merely a French version of the German idea of a popular Verfassung that lies beyond the power of the central authorities to change. French legal historians tended to reproduce the German division between “Romanists” and “Germanists” by emphasizing the traditional distinction between the pays de droit 8crit and the pays de droit coutumier. Olivier-Martin insisted on his interpretive key, namely that the king had no power to change the private law and that his ordonnances would have been effective only in the areas of public administration, the law of privileges, civil and criminal procedure, and substantive criminal law. The distinction is a French transfiguration of the German distinction between the concepts of Verfassung and Konstitution. As the core set of rules of social intercourse, deep-rooted in the self-consciousness of the people, the Verfassung

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represented the identity of a nation, whereas the Konstitution was an act empowering the king and government. Given this distinction, even the king could not change the identitarian rules. It is the same position that we have seen in Brunner and his predecessors. Law is an Ordnung, an “order,” which escapes the power of the state and therefore exists without the state. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, an influential historian of political thought gave yet again a new impulse to these old nineteenth- and early twentieth-century ideas in France. In 1988 Blandine Kriegel wrote the second book of her tetralogy on the relationship between the French state and historiography, under the title “La d8faite de l’8rudition”35. Recruited to the CollHge de France by Michel Foucault, Blandine Kriegel was fascinated by the constructs of the legal historians in general and of Olivier-Martin in particular. She insisted on the despotic character of Roman law, connecting the development of modern civil liberties to the process of “relegation” of Roman law. Instrument of every despotic power, Roman law was the main obstacle to remove to attain a degree of real liberty and predominance of the law over state power. The vision of Kriegel had been sharply criticized by some great French legal historians: Yan Thomas36 and Jacques Krynen have taken position against this simplistic identification of Roman law with an oppressive system. A vision that came from a mixture between the old fashioned vision of a French Germanist like Olivier-Martin and a simplified idea of law in history that Barret-Kriegel had taken from some old classic like Jules Michelet’s “Histoire de France”37. Yet again, now only a few years ago, a new polemic appeared in the pages of the French journal “Droits”: Andr8 Castaldo published two articles38 in 2008 criticizing Jacques Krynen and G8rard Giordanengo for having stressed the importance of late medieval jurists’ abstract legal constructs for the early modern construction of a national system of private law39. The nineteenth-century idea that Roman law was an imposition of the central power over the “spirit” of a national rule of law could not accept this new way of describing the history of French law as a mixture of local practices and a legal culture that, over time, diffused abstract legal rules that the doctrine had built on the authoritative base of the Roman law sources. 35 B. Kriegel, L’histoire / l’.ge classique, 1, Jean Mabillion; 2, La d8faite de l’8rudition; 3, Les acad8mies de l’histoire; 4, La r8publique incertaine, Paris 1988. Reprint Paris 1996. 36 Y. Thomas, L’institution civile de la cit8, Le D8bat 74 (1993) 21–40, note 8. 37 J. Krynen, L’encombrante figure du l8giste: Remarques sur la fonction du droit romain dans la genHse de l’Ptat, Le D8bat 74 (1993), 44. 38 A. Castaldo, Pouvoir royal, droit savant et droit commun coutumier dans la France du Moyen Age: f propos de vues nouvelles, Droits 46 (2007) 117–58; and 47 (2008) 173–247. 39 J. Krynen, Jus commune et ‘droit commun’ en France, du XIIIe au XVe siHcle, Ptudes d’histoire du droit et des id8es politiques 3 (1999) 219–247; G. Giordanengo, Le droit romain, droit commun de la France, Droits 38 (2003) 21–35.

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Castaldo’s articles have received two detailed responses, one from Yves Mausen, the other from G8rard Giordanengo. Yves Mausen’s 2009 article40 showed the “practical value” of the Roman-law doctrines that the Parlement of Paris used to settle the everyday disputes it had to deal with. Mausen agrees with Yan Thomas, Jacques Krynen, and G8rard Giordanengo that the old interpretive model based on the opposition between people and lawyers, or Roman law against German law, or concreteness against abstraction, must be abandoned. Law is a very complex phenomenon, from which it is impossible to eliminate a high degree of abstraction. This does not mean that law has nothing to do with reality : on the contrary, legal abstractions are a powerful tool for settling disputes for changing the balance of power in real life. G8rard Giordanengo’s response, published in a 2010 article41, is extremely informative. After a long and detailed demonstration of the persistence of learned law in the theory and practice of French law from the twelfth century onward, Giordanengo concludes that “the nationalism of the legal historians of the ninteenth century, which let them see in the customs the real law of France, can no longer be accepted”42. (c) Italy. The lively discussions in French scholarship have no parallel in Italy. More than fifteen years ago I tried to offer a critical point of view43 about a very successful Italian monograph on medieval legal ordering44, but neither the author of the monograph nor anyone else took up the opportunity to enter into a scholarly debate. My critical position is shared and backed up with further analysis by Peter von Moos. In his 2008 work on the concepts of “public” and “private” in medieval 40 Y. Mausen, A demonio merediano? Le droit savant au parlement de Paris, Droits 48 (2009) 159–77. 41 G. Giordanengo, Roma nobilis, orbis et domina: Re´ponse a` un contradicteur, R8vue Historique de Droit FranÅais et 8tranger, 88 (2010), 91–150. 42 Giordanengo (note 41) 150. 43 E. Conte, Droit M8di8val. Un d8bat historiographique italien, in: Annales. Economie, Sciences Sociales, 57 (2002), 1593–1613 (tr. It. Storicit/ del diritto. Nuovo e vecchio nella storiografia giuridica attuale, in Storica 22, 2002, 135–162). More on the topics in: Conte, L’8tat au Moyen ffge, in: P. Bonin/P. Brunet/S. Kerneis (eds.), Formes et doctrines de l’Ptat. Dialogue entre histoire du droit et th8orie du droit, Paris 2018, 123–136. 44 P. Grossi, L’ordine giuridico medievale, Roma-Bari 1995, many reimpressions. In 2006 Grossi signed two pages of introduction to the new issue of his book, reprinted without any change after 10 years from its first issue. Just to say that the discussions that followed the first edition had not changed his ideas, and particularly that (1) the Medieval law, better defined as an “order” to stress its immanence in the European people and the small impact of legislation on it, is basically different from the modern idea of law; and (2) this basic character of Medieval law does not change for 8 centuries, from the 6th to the 14th century. In particular, the birth of legal science within the scholasticism does not change the features of the medieval legal order.

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history and historiography45, Moos remarks a number of braune Relikte of nineteenth- and twentieth-century historiography continue to structure our understanding of medieval society. In particular, von Moos remarks that the exercise of translating some Italian historiographical constructs into German evokes frightening slogans of the 1930s.46 The lack of discussion among the specialized legal-historians has allowed, in Italy, a rather simplistic use of historical arguments in some pretty lively legal debates47.

6.

Conclusions

We could easily go on with other examples of the enduring fortune of a historiographical model that arose in a particular historical situation as a reaction to the liberal state, to the triumph of rational legislation, and to the distinctions between private rights and public legislation and between private and public law. The conservative wing of the German historical school took up position against the exaggerated individualism of capitalist society, clamoring for more social sensitivity in the legal system. Their target was the dichotomy between the state and the individual; their desired reform was a more scattered distribution of public power among many corporate bodies, whose autonomy could provide a legal order that would answer the real needs of society instead of affirming an abstract project of private, individualist rights. It is the conservative answer to the same tensions that gave birth to socialism and communism. But whereas Marxist social doctrines proposed an evolution through capitalism toward the rising sun of a socialist state and a socialist international network, the conservative social doctrines of Gierke were strongly tied to nationalist feeling. It was an essential precedent for the Nazi theories48, as it was certainly for the historiographical stream of Verfassungsgeschichte. The model of the popular origin of medieval law erases much of the com45 P. von Moos, Öffentlich und Privat, Gemeinsames und Eigenes, in: G. Melville (ed.), Gesammelte Studien zum Mittelalter, vol. 3, 3. ed., Berlin 2007, 131–132. 46 von Moos (note 45) 198 and note 194, quotes the expression “sangue, terra, durata” used by Grossi, whose German translation evokes the expression Blut und Boden. 47 Some remarks on the discussion on the commons in: Conte, L’Ptat au Moyen ffge (note 43). 48 See M. Stolleis, Die Rechtsgeschichte im Nationalsozialismus: Umrisse eines wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Themas, in Recht im Unrecht: Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt am Main 1994, 64, note 28. Gierke was very much appreciated by Nazi legal theorists after 1933. See, e. g., R. Höhn, Otto von Gierkes Staatslehre und unsere Zeit: Zugleich eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Rechtssystem des 19. Jahrhunderts, Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1936, which evokes a byword current among scholars immediately after the Nazi rise to power : “Zurück an Gierke!.”

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plexity of medieval law. The model’s defenders treat the doctrinal literature of medieval Roman and canon law as a mere superstructure, useful only for validating legal forms already created by the people. On the contrary, doctrinal abstractions created from the twelfth century onwards have been extremely creative, effective, and in some cases revolutionary. Academic lawyers forced customs to change49, seriously endangered the feudal system, and substantially contributed to the creation of a new model of sovereignty. They made possible a public, rational legal procedure, introduced a right of resistance, constructed a new system of jurisdiction, and defined the powers of public officials. We now understand that viewing all this as a mere superstructure served the political views of German academia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We should be careful, however, not to adhere to old historiographical interpretations just for the sake of keeping alive the feelings of the last century.

49 E. Conte, Roman law vs. customs in a changing society (Italy, 12th-13th centuries), in: P. Andersen/Mia Münster-Swendsen (eds.), Custom. The Development and Use of a Legal Concept in the High Middle Ages, Copenhagen 2009, 33–49.

Niels de Bruijn

Das Wissen des Verkäufers im frühneuzeitlichen kastilischen Recht der Sachmängelhaftung

0.

Einleitung

Mit Freude widme ich diesen Beitrag Professor Jan Hallebeek aus Anlass seiner Emeritierung. Seit 2011 hat Professor Hallebeek mich als Doktorvater betreut. Diese Betreuung war gekennzeichnet von seinem aufrichtigen Interesse an der Arbeit seines Doktoranden und von zahlreichen Ermunterungen, einen eigenen Weg zu wählen. Dies hat auch zu einem Forschungsaufenthalt in Spanien geführt, wo ich im Archiv der königlichen Kanzlei zu Vallodolid (Chanciller&a Real de Valladolid) Prozessstücke jenes Gerichtshofs untersucht habe mit dem Ziel die frühneuzeitliche Rechtstheorie mit der damaligen kastilischen Praxis zu verbinden. So präsentiert dieser Beitrag ein Ergebnis von Professor Hallebeeks Anregungen zu meiner Doktorarbeit über die Entwicklung der Sachmängelhaftung im gemeinen Recht (ius commune). Ich beschränke mich auf die Rolle des Wissens des Verkäufers im frühneuzeitlichen kastilischen Recht. Die Fragestellung wird im ersten Abschnitt erläutert. Der zweite Abschnitt behandelt die frühneuzeitliche kastilische Moraltheologie, die für das Verständnis der Entwicklungen im gemeinen Recht unumgänglich ist1, und die derzeitige kastilische zivile Rechtslehre zur Sachmängelhaftung. Am Ende dieses Beitrags wird dann die Theorie anhand der Ergebnisse einer Recherche nach Prozessstücken und Vollstreckungstiteln im Archiv der königlichen Kanzlei zu Valladolid mit der Rechtspraxis der Zeit verbunden.

1.

Fragestellung

In meiner Doktorarbeit untersuche ich, wie die Regeln für die Sachmängelhaftung des gemeinen Rechts (ius commune) sich seit dem späten Mittelalter entwickelt haben. Mehrere Klagen, die im römisch-justinanischen Recht überliefert 1 W. Decock, Theologians and Contract Law, Leiden/Boston 2013, 25.

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worden sind, spielen dabei eine bedeutende Rolle, nämlich die ädilizischen und zivilen Vertragsklagen für Mängel der verkauften Sache einerseits2 und die Klage für Verletzung über die Hälfte (laesio enormis) anderseits3. Diese abstrakten Begriffe können am besten anhand eines konkreten Beispiels erklärt werden. Wenn jemand ein Pferd kauft, von dem nach dem Kauf klar wurde, dass es an einer Krankheit leidet, die sowohl Käufer als Verkäufer nicht kannten und gekannt haben sollten, ergibt sich die Frage, wer die Schäden zu tragen hat, die von diesem Fehler verursacht sind; der Käufer, der Verkäufer oder beide gemeinsam? Falls beide, dann in welchem Maße? Im mittelalterlichen gemeinen Recht (ius commune) stehen dem Kläger die obengenannten ädilizischen und zivilen Klagen zur Verfügung, deren Inhalt und Gestaltung in Absatz 1.1 beschrieben werden. Ein wichtiges Merkmal dieser Klagen ist, dass sie auf dem Tatbestand gründen, dass die Kaufsache einen Fehler hat oder dass die Abwesenheit des Fehlers zugesichert war. Zusätzlich zu diesen Klagen aber kommt noch eine andere in Betracht. Wenn die Krankheit dazu geführt hat, dass der Preis, der für das Pferd bezahlt worden ist, mehr als anderthalb Mal höher lag als der übliche Marktpreis für ein Pferd in gutem Zustand, steht nach dem ius commune in spätmittelalterlicher Fassung dem Käufer die Klage wegen Verletzung über die Hälfte zu. Diese Klage wird in Abschnitt 1.2 näher erklärt.

1.1

Die ädilizischen und zivilen Klagen wegen Sachmängel

Im römisch-justinianischen Recht konnte der Käufer in vorliegendem Fall sowohl mit den ädilizischen Ediktsklagen als auch mit der zivilen Vertragsklage (actio empti) eine Preisminderung (actio quanti minoris) oder die Rückzahlung des Preises gegen Rückgabe der gekauften Sache erlangen (actio redhibitoria oder Wandlung)4. Das Problem war allerdings, dass die ädilizischen und zivilen Klagen angeblich identisch sind und dass das Corpus iuris civilis keine Aussagen darüber trifft, wann welche Klage in welchen Fälle eingereicht werden sollten. Die ädilizischen Klagen, wie sie in D. 21,1,1,2 genannt sind, scheinen unab2 D. 21,1; C. 4,58; D. 18,5; D. 19,1; C. 4,49; zum mittelalterlichen gemeinen Recht siehe H. Dilcher, Die Theorie der Leistungsstörungen, Frankfurt a/M 1960, 214ff. 3 C. 4,44,2. Im römisch-justinanischen Recht war diese Klage aber nur einem Verkäufer eines Grundstücks vorbehalten, der wegen eines zu billigen Verkaufs über mehr als die Hälfte verletzt worden war. 4 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, Oxford 1996, 320–321; J. Hallebeek, The Ignorant Seller’s Liability for Latent Defects: One Regula or Various Sets of Rules?, in: J.W. Cairns/P.J. Du Plessis (Hg.), The creation of the ius commune: from Casus to Regula. Edinburgh 2010, 183–184; H. Honsell, Quod interest im bonae-fidei-iudicium, München 1969, 82.

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hängig vom Wissen des Verkäufers zu wirken5. Für die zivile Klage erwähnt D. 19,1,13 pr. jedoch einen Unterschied auf Grund der Kenntnisse des Verkäufers; der unwissende Verkäufer haftet höchstens für den Preis, der für die Sache bezahlt worden ist, der wissende Verkäufer aber auch für einen Folgeschaden6. Wie verhalten sich nun die ädilizischen Klagen, in denen das Wissen des Verkäufers keine Rolle spielt, und die zivilen Klagen, deren Inhalt eben vom Wissen des Verkäufers bestimmt wird, zueinander? Die früheren mittelalterlichen Rechtsquellen listen die unterschiedlichen Tatbestände der ädilizischen und zivilen Klagen auf, kommen aber nicht zu einer einheitlichen Auffassung über die Rolle des Wissens des Verkäufers. Abhängig von den Sachen, die er verkauft hat, haftet der unwissende Verkäufer einmal schon, das andere Mal nicht. Die Summa Trecensis (geschrieben um 1150) und der Jurist Placentinus († 1192) zum Beispiel erwähnen die Zuständigkeit der ädilizischen Klagen bei Tieren und Sklaven ohne Bezug auf das Wissen des Verkäufers. Bei anderen Sachen haftet der Verkäufer anscheinend auf Grund der zivilen Vertragsklage, aber nur dann, wenn er eine Zusicherung gegeben hat7. Dieser Unterschied zwischen ädilizischen und zivilen Tatbeständen verschwindet nach und nach. Lo Codi, eine Summa eines unbekannten Autors aus der Provence, geschrieben in der zweiten Hälfte des 12. Jahrhunderts, erwähnt nur die Vertragsklage und scheint darunter auch die ädilizischen Tatbestände zu verstehen. Ohne die Tatbestände zu unterscheiden, lässt Lo Codi den wissenden Verkäufer für alle Schäden haften (totum dampnum), den Unwissenden aber nur für eine Minderung des Kaufpreises8. Also entscheidet die Kenntnis eines Verkäufers nicht darüber, ob er haftet, wohl aber über den Umfang seiner Haftung. Bassianus (Daten unbekannt) und Azo († 1220) sind gleichfalls der Meinung, dass die Kenntnis des Verkäufers unerheblich ist, um dessen Haftung zu bestimmen. Sowohl der wissende als auch der unwissende Verkäufer haften für Sachmängel. Ihr Wissen spielt nur eine Rolle für den Umfang der Ansprüche, die 5 D. 21,1,2: … neque enim interest emptoris cur fallatur, ignorantia venditoris an calliditate; Dilcher (Fn. 2), 217. 6 D. 19,1,13 pr.: … qui sciens quid aut ignorans vendidit, differentiam facit in condemnatione ex empto ait enim, qui pecus morbosum aut tignum vitiosum vendidit, si quidem ignorans fecit, id tantum ex empto actione praestaturum, quanto minoris essem empturus, si id ita esse scissem: si vero sciens reticuit et emptorem decepit, omnia detrimenta, quae ex ea emptione emptor traxerit, praestaturum ei …; Dilcher (Fn. 2), 227. 7 Placentinus, Summa „Cum essem mantue“, hg. von G. Pescatore, Greifswald 1897, 2,22, Nr. 235, 54: Multipliciter quoque et differenter venditor emptori cavere debet. ecce enim in brutis esse, bibere ut oportet … ecce enim si quis sciens vendidit… condempnabitur eitam longe preter rem … si vero ignorans vendidit, non tenebitur, nisi quanto minoris emptor emisset, si scisset….; ders. 2,23, Nr. 243, 57: Urgebitur autem redhibitoria venditor tam ignarus quam conscius…; dazu Dilcher (Fn. 2), 218, 229. 8 H. Fitting (Hg.), Lo Codi in der Lateinischen Übersetzung des Ricardus Pisanus, Halle 1906, 4,62,9.

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der Käufer gegen sie geltend machen kann. Verkäufer, die vor dem Verkauf Kenntnis von den Fehlern hatten, haften auf Grund von D. 19,1,1,13 pr. für das, was von Bassianus und Azo omne interesse genannt wird9. Unwissende Verkäufer haften nur für eine Preisminderung. Es ist aber nicht klar, was beide Juristen genau mit omne interesse meinen. Lo Codi umschreibt interesse als „der Vorteil, den der Käufer von der Übergabe der Sache hätte“10. In dieser Auffassung ist das interesse also beschränkt. Nachteile, die der Käufer wegen der fehlerhaften Sache erlitten hat, bezieht die Lo codi nicht in den Begriff des interesse mit ein. In D. 19,1,1,13 pr. aber haftet ein wissender Verkäufer nicht für omne interesse, sondern für omnia detrimenta. Der Text nennt als Beispiel einen Verkäufer von Vieh, der von der ansteckendenden Krankheit der Tiere wusste. Dieser Verkäufer haftet nicht nur für die von ihm verkauften Tiere, die an der Krankheit sterben, sondern auch für eventuelle andere wegen der Krankheit gestorbene Tiere des Käufers, die von den verkauften Tieren angesteckt wurden. Dieser Umfang der Haftung scheint über den des obengenannten interesse hinauszugegehen. Accursius beschränkt die zivile Klage in D. 19,1,1,13 pr. denn auch auf Betrug (dolus)11. Diese Auffassung verfeinert, was Bassianus und Azo behaupteten, nämlich dass generell alle wissenden Verkäufer für omne interesse haften. Es gibt nach Accurius also nicht nur einen Unterschied zwischen wissenden und unwissenden, sondern auch zwischen wissenden und dolos handelnden Verkäufern. An einer anderen Stelle erläutert Accursius weiter, dass das interesse erstens aus Schäden wegen mangelhafter Lieferung der Sache besteht und zweitens aus Schäden wegen des dolosen Verhaltens des Verkäufers. Deswegen bestehe das interesse in D. 19,1,1,13 pr. in einem Schadenersatz, der „über den Wert der Sache hinaus geht“12. Anderer Auffassung als Accursius waren die ultramontani Jacques de R8vigny († 1226) und Pierre de Belleperche († 1308), vom Standpunkt der italienischen Juristen „die Leute jenseits der Berge“. Hafteten nach Azo und Bassianus ein wissender Verkäufer in D. 19,1,1,13 pr. für omne interesse und nach Accursius für 9 Hallebeek (Fn. 4) 189. 10 Fitting (Hg.), (Fn. 8) 4,62,2, 128: interesse, id est proficuum quod haberet, si res esset ei tradita. 11 Glosse Si venditor (Acc.) zu D. 19,1,1,13 pr. (ed. De la Porta, Lyon 1560): „Si per dolum res minoris aut pluris venditur, habet locum haec actio ad purgandum dolum“; Bartolus ist der gleichen Ansicht: „Et principium huius legis refertur ad illud caput quo venditor tenetur dolum malum abesse praestare, puta de totali interesse loquitur etc.“, In primam digesti veteris partem commentaria, Turin, 1577, zu D. 19,1,13 pr, Nr. 6, Fo. 126v. 12 Glosse Interfuit (Acc.) zu D. 19,1,13 pr : „sed hic venit etiam id quod est extra rem: ut hic dicit. Et sic est contra i. eo. si sterilis. §. cum per venditorem [D. 19,1,21,3]. Sol. hic tradidit et male tradidit. unde intercessit rei vitium et personae. ibi non tradidit. et sic personae tantum, ubi contumacia intervenit“.

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das noch etwas vage „was über den Wert der Sache hinaus geht“, interpretieren die ultramontani die Haftung des Käufers als eine Haftung für Mangelfolgeschäden (damnum extrinsecum). Verkäufer, die von einem Fehler der Sache Kenntnis hatten, haften nach Belleperche und R8vigny für Schäden über den Preis der verkauften Sache hinaus. Der unwissende Verkäufer einer fehlerhaften Sache haftet für Preisminderung, die maximal den Preis der gekauften Sache betragen kann13. Die Wandlungsklage (actio redhibitoria) stellt in dieser Konstellation einen Fremdkörper dar. Die Rückgabe der Sache gegen eine Rückzahlung, die sich auf die Höhe des Kaufpreises beschränkt, ist das Gleiche wie eine Preisminderung über Höhe der ganzen bezahlten Summe14. Die actio redhibitoria ist in dieser Auffassung nicht mehr als eine Variante der Klage für Preisminderung, deren Name keine spezielle Bedeutung trägt. De Belleperche verwendet den Namen actio redhibitoria denn auch anders. Er erwähnt sie als eine Klage, die auf Ersetzung aller erlittenen Schäden (interesse) zielt15. Somit verbleiben nach De Belleperche nur noch zwei Klagen für Sachmängel; eine Klage auf Preisminderung und eine Klage wegen Mangelfolgeschäden, die je nach dem Wissen des Verkäufers zu ersetzen sind. Dass die actio redhibitoria im zivilen Recht des späten Mittelalters als Klage für Mangelfolgeschäden aufgefasst wird, ist auch zu lesen in ley 5,5,64 der Siete Partidas (SP). In diesem Gesetz, promulgiert von Alfonse XI dem Weisen in den Jahren 1254–1265, heißt es: „wenn der Verkäufer wusste [von den Fehlern] und davon dem Käufer nicht Bescheid gesagt hat, haftet er für die Rücknahme des Sklaven. Außerdem muss er dem Käufer den Preis zurückzahlen, erhöht um alle die Schäden und Beeinträchtigungen, die aus dem Fehler gefolgt seien“.16

13 P. de Belleperche, Commentaria in digestum novum, Frankfurt am Main, 1571 (Nachr. Bologna 1967), zu D. 44,2,25,1, Nr. 6, 130: redhibitoria tendit ad hoc, ut interesse consequar, sed quando [sic] minoris tendit ad hoc, ut quantum solvi mihi restituat; J. de R8vigny, Lectura super codice, o. O.,1519 (Nachdr. Bologna 1967), zu C. 4.59, Fo. 206v : Ignorans enim non tenetur nisi de precio servi, sed de damno extrinseco non tenetur… Sed sciens bene tenetur de damno extrinseco…; idem, zu C. 4,49, Fo. 123v : venditor sciens tenetur ad totum interesse. Ignorans tenetur tamen quanto minoris erat empturus. 14 Vgl. die Accursische Glosse zu D. 21,1,43,6: Per actionem quanto minoris fit redhibitio et totalis pretii restiutio quando res empta apparet nullius esse valoris, h.d. facit l. illud, § minus, De tribut. act. [D. 14,4,7,2]. 15 P. de Belleperche, Commentaria in digestum novum (Fn. 13), zu D. 44,2,25,1, Nr. 6, 130: redhibitoria tendit ad hoc, ut interesse consequar, sed quando [sic] minoris tendit ad hoc, ut quantum solvi mihi resituat; für die Interpretation von interesse als allen erlittenen Schaden siehe die zitierte Quelle in Fn. 13. 16 SP 5,5,64, in: Los cjdigos espaÇoles concordades y anotados, Madrid 1872 (ed. A. de San Martín), B. 3, 631: „si el vendedor sab&a esto e no lo dixesse al comprador, tenudo es de

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1.2

Die Klage wegen Verletzung über die Hälfte

Wenn ein verborgener Fehler in einer verkauften Sache dazu führte, dass der Preis, der für die Sache bezahlt wurde, mehr als anderthalb Mal höher war als der übliche Marktpreis für derartige Sachen ohne Fehler, steht nach dem ius commune in spätmittelalterlicher Fassung dem Käufer die Klage wegen Verletzung über die Hälfte zu17. Stand diese Klage im römisch-justinianischen Recht nur einem Verkäufer zur Verfügung, der für einen zu niedrigen Preis Land verkauft hatte, erweiterten die mittelalterlichen Rechtsgelehrten die Klage auf bewegliche Sachen und außerdem auf Käufer, die durch irgendeinen Kauf verletzt worden waren. In dem Fall, dass ein Fehler zur Folge hatte, dass der objektiven Wert der Sache niedriger war als die Hälfte des bezahlten Preises, konnte der Käufer deswegen fordern, dass der Verkäufer sich dafür entschied, entweder den Minderwert zu kompensieren oder die verkaufte Sache gegen Rückzahlung des Preises zurückzunehmen. Wem wir diese Erweiterung der Klage wegen Verletzung über die Hälfte während des Mittelalters verdanken, ist schwer nachzuvollziehen18. Sicher ist allerdings, dass die Konkurrenzfrage zwischen den ädilizischen und zivilen Klagen für Sachmängelhaftung und der Klage für Verletzung über die Hälfte bis ins 20. Jahrhundert Anlass für mancherlei Debatte gegeben hat19. In der Geschichte der Sachmängelhaftung äußern juristische Quellen sich einmal zugunsten der einen Klage, dann wieder zugunsten der anderen. So scheinen die Quellen des frühen Mittelalters die Klage wegen Verkürzung über die Hälfte wegen Sachmangels völlig auszuschließen20. Auch im Kastilien des 13. Jahrhunderts war die Klage wegen Verletzung über die Hälfte im Fall man-

17 18

19

20

recebir el siervo, e deve al comprador tornar el precio, con todos los daÇos e los menoscabos que le vinieron ende [meine Hervorhebung]“. Zur Interpretation des Marktpreises als gerechten Preis, siehe J.W. Baldwin, The medieval theories of the just price, Philadelphia 1959, 28; J. Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, Oxford: 1991, 65. Vorschläge: G. Dolezalek, The Moral Theologians’ Doctrine of Restitution and its Juridification in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Acta Juridica 104 (1992); J. Hallebeek, Some Remarks on Laesio enormis and Proportionality in Roman-Dutch Law and Calvinistic Commercial Ethics, Fundamina 21, Iss. 1 (2015), 21. Neulich in Österreich. Siehe die Jurisprudenz des Obersten Gerichtshofs OGH 17 April 2007, 10Ob21/07x. Dazu A. Riedler, Systemfragen zum Verhältnis von laesio enormis und Gewährleistung, Juristische Blätter 130, Nr. 6 (2008), 4; P. Bydlinksi, Ein letztes (?) Mal: Zum Anwendungsbereich der Laesio-enormis-Vorschriften, Juristische Blätter 130, Nr. 11 (2008), 46. G. Hänel (Hg.), Lex Romana Visigothorum, Leipzig 1849, 3.1.1, 72; idem, 3.4.1, 76; K. Zeumer (Hg.), Formulae merowingici et karolini aevi, Hannover 1886, 580–581; E. von Schwind (Hg.), Lex Baiwariorum, Hannover 1926, B. 5, T. 2, 16.9, 437; T. Mayer-Maly, Pactum, Tausch und laesio enormis in den sog. leges Barbarorum, ZRG RA 108 (1991), 225ff.

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gelhafter Leistung nicht gestattet. Im Fuero Juzgo, einer Art Mustergesetz für autonome Gemeinden (fueros)21 auf der iberischen Halbinsel, wird die Klage schlichtweg verneint22. Zeitgenössische Urteile von Richtern in Toledo bestätigen dies in der juristischen Praxis23. Zu Beginn der frühen Neuzeit änderte sich das Vertragsrecht aber grundlegend. Die Klage wegen Verkürzung über die Hälfte wurde immer mehr als geeignetes Mittel angesehen, um Kaufgeschäfte zu lösen, in denen die verkaufte Sache sich als fehlerhaft erwiesen hatte. Diese Entwicklung war eng verbunden mit der christlichen Moraltheologie und der davon beeinflussten Schuldlehre der Zeit. Der nächste Abschnitt beschreibt daher, wie die Moraltheologie dazu beitrug, dass die Klage wegen Verletzung über die Hälfte die Rolle der ädilizischen und zivilen Klagen wegen Sachmängel übernahm und diese sogar verdrängte.

2.

Christliche Moraltheologie

Ein Auslöser für die Entwicklung der Klage wegen Verkürzung über die Hälfte zur überlegenen Klage für Sachmängel in der frühen Neuzeit war die moraltheologische Gestaltung der Beichtlehre. Wer sich ein reines Gewissen sichern wollte und zur Beichte ging, bekam vom Beichtvater Antworten aus Manualen, deren Regeln nach Form und Inhalt denen des gelehrten Rechts ähnelten. Je nach der Art der Sünde hatten die Beichtenden die von der Sünde verursachten Nachteile wiedergutzumachen (zu restituieren), im Einklang mit detaillierten, kasuistisch ausgearbeiteten Vorschriften in den Konfessionsmanualen24. Genauso wie in der weltlichen Gerichtsbarkeit Richter und Parteien auf Grund der Rechtssicherheit Regeln verlangten, benötigte die Beichtpraxis ebenfalls möglichst eindeutige Normen, damit die Beichtväter zu entscheiden und die Beichtenden zu handeln wussten. Die Aufgabe derartige Regeln zu formulieren, 21 F. Tomas y Valiente, Manual de historia del derecho espaÇol, Madrid 1996, 162. 22 Fuero Juzgo 5,4,7 = Liber Iudiciorum 5,4,7, in: Los cjdigos espaÇoles concordades y anotados, B. 1, 143, 37: [FJ] „Si algun omne vende algunas casas otierras o vinnas o siervos o animalias o otras cosas, non se deve por ende desfazer la vendicion, porque diz quelo vendik por poco“; [LI] „Venditiones hace forma servetur, ut seu res aliquae sive terrae, vel mancipia, vel quodlibet animalium genus venditur, nemo propterea firmitatem venditionis inrumpat, eo quod dicat rem suam vili pretio vendidisse“. 23 M. Luz Alonso, La compraventa en los documentos toledanos de los siglos xii–xv, Annuario de historia del derecho espaÇol 49 (1979), Anhang 13, Nr. 3, 510–511: „RenunÅiamos que nos non podamos aprovechar en esta rason en ninguna nin en alguna manera de las leyes nuevas que el rey don Alfonso, que Dios perdone, fiso en las cortes de Alcala de Fenares en que dise que la vendida que fuere fecha por la meytad mas o menos del justo preÅio que non vala e nos renunÅiamos esas leyes e todas otras leyes e fueros e derechos que contra eso sean que nos non aprovechemos…“. 24 Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 69ff.

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wurde auf der iberischen Halbinsel vor allem von Moraltheologen unternommen. Dabei ließen diese Theologen sich vom gemeinen Recht (ius commune) inspirieren25. Seit dem Mittelalter hatten Rechtsgelehrte sich ausführlich beschäftigt mit konkreten Rechtsfragen und auf Grund des römisch-justinianischen Rechts Regeln formuliert, die in der weltlichen Gerichtsbarkeit, repräsentiert vom kanonischen und zivilen Recht (forum externum), zu gelten hatten. Die Theologen nun, die sich mit der Beichte oder der geistlichen Gerichtsbarkeit, dem „Tribunal des Gewissens“ (forum internum), beschäftigten, nutzten diesen Reichtum an zivilistischer Kasuistik bei ihrer Suche nach geeigneten Regeln für die Lossprechung aus26. Dieser Ansatz, Sünden in fast juristischer Weise aufzudecken und zu bewerten, verstärkte sich in der Zeit der Reformation. Als Antwort auf Luthers Reformationsgedanken, in dem er die formelle juristische Vorgehensweise bei der Beichte kritisierte27, entfaltete die katholische Kirche eine Gegenreformation. Unter anderem unter Anwesenheit von Domingo de Soto (1494/5–1560)28 bestätigte, ja sogar verfestigte das Konzil von Trient (1545–1563) die juristische Annäherung der Beichte an die Rechtsprechung. „Wer behauptet, dass die sakramentale Lossprechung des Priesters kein richterlicher Akt sei … lasst ihn exkommuniziert sein“29. Weiter hieß es, die Lossprechung ist „nicht ein bloßer Dienst der Verkündigung des Evangeliums oder der Erklärung, dass die Sünde vergeben sind. Nein, nach dem Vorbild eines juristischen Akts wird von dem Priester als wäre es von einem Richter ein Urteil ausgesprochen“.30

Neben der weltlichen Gerichtsbarkeit (forum externum), entwickelte sich demzufolge ein juristisch geprägtes „Tribunal des Gewissens“ (forum internum) unter Einfluss der Kontrareformation in starkem Maße31. Zusätzlich bedienten sich die Theologen, die sich in ihrer Forschung mit dem forum internum beschäftigten, des Naturrechtsdenkens, wie es in der christlichen Moraltheologie im späten Mittelalter definiert wurde32. Die Frage, wie das 25 26 27 28 29 30

31 32

W. Decock, Katholische Moraltheologie und Vertragsrecht, in: FHI 7 (2013), Nr. 9. Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 38ff. Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 46. Für bibliograpische Daten siehe M. del Pilar Cuesta Domingo, „Soto, Domingo de“, in: Real Academia EspaÇol, Diccionario Bibliogr#fico EspaÇol, B. 47, 178–182. Gallemart et al. (Hg.), Sacrosanctum Concilium Tridentinum, 1781, sessio XIV, canon IX, 184: si quis dixerit, absolutionem sacramentalem Sacerdotis non esse actum judicialem … anathema sit; Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 59. Gallemart et al. (Hg.) (Fn. 29), sessio XIV, cap. VII, 171: absolutio Sacerdotis … non est solum nudum ministerium vel annuntiandi Evangel. vel declarandi remissa esse peccata, sed ad instar actus judicialis, quo ab ipso, velut a judice sententia pronuntiatur ; Decock, Moraltheologie (Fn. 25), Nr. 7. Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 55ff. Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 49ff.; Gordley (Fn. 17) 14ff.

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Gewissen eines Menschen auf Erden rein bleiben könne, damit der Mensch das Jüngste Gericht bestehen kann, beantworteten iberische Theologen wie Juan de Medina (1490–1546)33, Francisco de Vittoria (1483/1492–1546)34, Domingo de Soto, Diego de Covarrubias y Leyva (1512–1577)35, Bartolom8 Fr&as de Albornoz (c. 1525–?)36 und Pedro de OÇate (1568–1646)37 folglich mit Hilfe einer Regelkonstellation, die sowohl stark juristisch als auch naturrechtlich geprägt war.

2.1

Annäherung beider fora

Rechtsgelehrte auf der iberischen Halbinsel nun, die sich um dieselbe Zeit mit weltlicher Gerichtsbarkeit beschäftigten, machten sich bekannt mit den Entwicklungen in der Moraltheologie. Das Ergebnis war ein lebendiger Austausch zwischen Gelehrten der beiden fora. Theologen entnahmen Regeln der zivilrechtlichen Jurisprudenz und entwickelten diese für den Gebrauch im Tribunal des Gewissens weiter. Juristen ihrerseits informierten sich über das Geschehen in der Konfessionspraxis und zögerten nicht, moraltheologische Innovationen in der weltlichen Gerichtbarkeit anzuwenden. Konkret bedeutete dies, dass die Moraltheologie und das gelehrte Recht zu einander wuchsen38. Diese Annäherung des forum internum und externum ist deutlich zu beobachten im Recht der Sachmängelhaftung. Wie oben schon erwähnt, war eine Frage, die in der Frühen Neuzeit im gelehrten Recht in Bezug auf die Sachmängelhaftung ständig wieder auftauchte, die nach der Rolle des Wissens bei der Bestimmung der Haftung des Verkäufers. Es ist bereits angedeutet worden, dass die Juristen des spätmittelalterlichen ius commune schlussfolgerten, dass auch unwissende Verkäufer für Fehler in der verkauften Sache hafteten, sei es auch auf beschränkte Weise39. Dies aber änderte sich im frühmodernen kastilischen Recht unter Einfluss der christlichen Moraltheologie, eine Entwicklung die ihren Grund in der Moraltheologie der Zeit hatte. Inspiriert von Thomas von Aquino (1225–1274) zögerten die iberischen Moraltheologen immer mehr, einen Verkäufer, der nicht vom Fehler der Sache wusste, für die Folgen des Fehlers verantwortlich zu ma33 Für biographische Daten siehe Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 54. 34 R. Hernández Martín, Vitoria Compludo, Francisco de, in: Real Academia EspaÇol (Fn. 28), B. 50, 308–314. 35 Für biographische Daten siehe L. Pereña Vicente, „Covarrubias y Leyva, Diego de“, in: Real Academia EspaÇol (Fn. 28), B. 15, 106–112. 36 Für biographische Daten siehe J.M. García Añoveros, „Fr&as de Albornoz, Bartolom8“, in: Real Academia EspaÇol (Fn. 28), B. 20, 693. 37 Für biographische Daten siehe Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 67. 38 Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1), 44. 39 Siehe 1.1.

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chen. Aquino, der sich mit der Frage beschäftigte, was eine Sünde darstellt, schreibt in seiner Summa Theologiae in Bezug auf die Pflichten des Verkäufers Folgendes: „Der Verkäufer sündigt nicht, wenn ohne, dass er das weiß, die verkaufte Sache einen der erwähnten Fehlern innehat, weil, obwohl er etwas getan hat, das an sich ungerecht ist, seine Handlung nicht ungerecht ist, wie in obengenannten Stellen [q. 59, a. 2]. Allerdings ist der Verkäufer gehalten, den Käufer schadlos zu halten, sobald er davon Kenntnis erhält“.40

Es waren diese Wörter Aquinos, die manche Moraltheologen dazu veranlassten, Verkäufer, die nicht vom Fehler wussten, dafür nicht haften zu lassen. Bei de Medina kann man diesbezüglich lesen, dass der Verkäufer, der den Fehler nicht kennt und die Sache bona fide für einen Preis verkauft, als hätte die Sache keinen Fehler, keine Schuld trifft41. De OÇate schreibt, dass „Unkenntnis … und Treu und Glauben eine Pflicht zur Wiedergutmachung ausschließen und eine Sünde entschuldigen“42. Die spätmittelalterlichen Klagen, die unabhängig vom Wissen der Verkäufer erhoben werden konnten, wurden denn auch für ungeeignet gehalten, um im forum internum Verkaufgeschäfte, in denen die Sache sich als fehlerhaft erwiesen hat, zu lösen. De Vittoria spricht solchen Klagen schlichtweg jede Brauchbarkeit ab43. Das löste aber die Frage aus, wie Kaufgeschäfte, in denen die verkaufte Sache mangelhaft war, denn behandelt werden sollten. Eine Antwort auf diese Frage formuliert Covarrubias: „Darum ist jener, der nach Treu und Glauben einen Vertrag vereinbart hat und später erfährt, dass sein Nächster von der Sache geschadet ist, gehalten diese Schäden wiedergutzumachen und zu entschädigen, entweder mit der Sache oder mit dem Betrag, mit dem der gerechten Preis überschritten worden ist, weil das ihm zufällt“.44

40 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII edita, Rome 1888–1906, B. 9, IIaIIae, q. 77, a. 2, 151: si vero eo ignorante aliquis praedictorum defectuum in re vendita fuerit, venditor quidem non peccat, quia facit iniustum materialiter, non tamen eius operatio est iniusta, ut ex supradictis [q. 59, a. 2]: tenetur tamen cum ad eius notitiam pervenerit, damnum recompensare emptori. 41 J. de Medina, De poenitentia, restitutione et contractibus, Ingolstadt 581, B. 2, 213: si venditor ignorans re defectum, eum cum bona fide vendit pro pretio, quod res si talem defectum non haberet, valeret, a culpa excusatur. 42 P. de OÇate, De contractibus, Rome 1654, B. 3, Tract. 21, Disp. 66, 119: …quia ignorantia … et bona fides obligationem restituendi excludit et peccatum excusat. 43 F. de Vittoria, Contratos y usura (Übers. I. Zorrosa, Ms. 43, Salamanca, J. XVI), BaraÇ#in 2006, 109: „si el defecto fuera una razjn por la que no valiera una venta, se seguir&a que muy raramente ser&an validas las compraventas“. 44 D. de Covarrubias y Leyva, Variae ex jure pontificio, regio et Caesareo resolutiones, in: Opera omnia, Frankfurt a/M 1583, B. 2, 2.4, Nr. 11, Fo. 57r : Et ideo cum is, qui bona fide contraxerit, postmodum cognoverit reipsa proximum laesisse, tenebitur ad huius laesionis restitutionem et

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Also sollte man nachforschen, in welchem Maße der gerechte Preis über- oder unterschritten worden ist. Das heißt, Fälle der Sachmängelhaftung sollten eher als Problem der laesio enormis aufgefasst werden. Diese Präferenz für die Klage wegen Verkürzung über die Hälfte ist auch bei manchen anderen Autoren vorhanden. Wenn es um Sachmängel geht, wird regelmäßig mit dem Missverhältnis von Sache und Preis argumentier45. Eine mittelbare Folge dieser Ansicht war, dass die Klagen, die auf der Anwesenheit eines Fehlers basierten und unwissende Verkäufer haften ließen, im zivilen Recht (forum externum) gleichfalls weniger genutzt wurden. Wenn der Verkauf einer fehlerhaften Sache durch einen unwissenden Verkäufer im forum internum keine Sünde darstellt, wäre es sonderbar, im forum externum trotzdem anzunehmen, dass ein unwissender Verkäufer in vergleichbaren Fällen haftet. De Molina, einer der führenden iberischen Jesuiten des 17. Jahrhunderts, behauptete denn auch, dass derartige subtile Wirkungen des römisch-justinianischen Rechts im forum externum einfach zur Seite gelegt werden sollten46. Die Tendenz zur Annäherung der beiden fora ist auch spürbar in der zivilrechtlichen Theorie der iberischen Halbinsel in Bezug auf die Rolle des Wissens des Verkäufers. Bei den Juristen, die sich mit dem forum externum beschäftigten, ist – wie bei ihren Kollegen, die für das forum internum schrieben – deutlich ein Zögern spürbar, unwissende Verkäufer für Fehler in der verkauften Sache haften zu lassen. De Albornoz zum Beispiel redet nur noch über die Möglichkeit, eine Preisminderung zu fordern, wenn der Verkäufer „den Fehler nicht bekannt gemacht hat, obwohl er davon wusste“47. Villadiego VascuÇana y Montoya (c. 1550–?)48 erwähnt solches, anders als für das ius commune, explizit für das kastilische Recht49. Juan de Hevia BolaÇo (c. 1570–c. 1623)50 beschränkt die

45

46

47 48 49

compensationem, quandoquidem ad eum pervenerit, vel res ipsa empta, vel pecunia, quae iustum pretium excesit. D. de Soto, De iustitia et iure, Lyon 1569, q. 3, a. 2, Fo. 198r.: quod non pluris rem vendat quam cum vitio valet; S. de la Calle, Instrucion de mercaderes muy prouechosa, Medina del Campo 1547, Fo. 21r.: „Verniale daÇo solamente si la cosa defetuosa por razon del defeto vale diez, la vendiesse por veyntecomo sino tuviesse tal defeto ni tache… porque le vendieron la cosa por mas de lo que val&a le viene daÇo“; J. de Molina, De iusitia et iure opera omnia, Geneva 1733, B. 2, disp. 353, Nr. 19, 247: cum ex vitio nullum damnum emptori sequatur et contractis equalis sit. Molina (Fn. 45), disp. 258, Nr. 9: quae… de contractibus innominatus et nominatus subtiliter potius quam utiliter de iure civili ab ethnicis hominibus inventa atque introducta sunt aboleri deberent… exteriusque forum conscientiae for aequari debet; Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1) 142; vgl. De OÇate (Fn. 42), B. I, 1.2.5, Nr. 166, 40: Quare ius canonicum et ius Hispaniae corrigunt ius commune …; zitiert nach Decock, Theologians (Fn. 1), 1. B.F. de Albornoz, Arte de los contratos, Valencia 1573, 2.14.1, Fo. 61v : „El que vende qualquiera bestia con tacha o enfermedad (si sabiendo la no lo dize)“. Für biographische Daten siehe M. Santana Molina, „Villadiego BascuÇana y Montoya, Alonso de?“, in: Real Academia EspaÇol (Fn. 28), B. 50, 19–21. Villadiego VascuÇana y Montoya, Instruccijn politica y practica judicial conforme al estilo

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redhibitoria und quanti minoris, wie es scheint, ebenfalls auf Verkäufer, die die Abwesenheit von Fehlern gewährleistet haben51.

3.

Praxis der Chancillería Real de Valladolid

Ein weiteres Zeichen von einer Annäherung der beiden fora, ergibt sich aus der frühneuzeitlichen Rechtspraxis der königlichen Kanzlei zu Valladolid. Im Rahmen meiner Doktorarbeit habe ich im Archiv der Kanzlei 37 Prozessstücke gelesen und bewertet, um zu untersuchen, in welchem Umfang Maßstäbe, die für das Tribunal des Gewissens (forum internum) erdacht worden sind, in die zivilrechtliche Praxis (forum externum) eindrangen. Zusätzlich habe ich anhand des digitalen Katalogs „Portal de archivos espaÇoles“52 eine Recherche nach Vollstreckungstiteln durchgeführt. In diesem Abschnitt werde ich darlegen, in welchem Maße ich den oben erwähnten Entwicklungen in der Moraltheologie und Rechtslehre in den Manuskripten der zivilen Praxis der königlichen Kanzlei begegnet bin. Die königliche Kanzlei zu Valladolid war seit der Herrschaft Juans des Ersten (1379–1390) die höchste berufliche Instanz in Kastilien nördlich des Flusses Tajo53. Los Reyes Catjlicos Ferdinand der Zweite und Isabel die Erste (Herrschaft: 1474–1516) verordneten 1485, dass die Prozessstücke der von der Kanzlei behandelten Fälle in einem dafür geeigneten Raum aufbewahrt werden sollten54.

50 51

52 53 54

de los Consejos, Madrid 1656, K. 9, Nr. 67, Fo. 150v : „Es obligado assimismo el vendedor a declarar al comprador al tiempo de la venta las hypothecas, servidumbres, y otras cargas que tenga la cosa vendida, si es raiz, y si es mueble, o esclavo, o bestia, o ganado, las tachas, y defectos que tuviere, con especialidad, y distincion, sin callar, ni encubrir ninguna: y de otra suerte, por derecho comun …“. Für biographische Daten siehe M. Luque Talabán, „Hevia BolaÇo, Juan de“, in: Real Academia EspaÇol (Fn. 28), B. 26, 216–271; ich verwende den Nachnamen dieses Autors im Einklang mit der Schreibweise auf dem Titelblatt der Edition 1619 ohne „s“. J. de Hevia BolaÇo, Laberinto de comercio terrestre y naual. Madrid, 1619, 1.13, Nr. 24, 151: „Tambien ha lugar la redhibitoria o quanto minoris en otro qualquiera defeto de la cosa que el vendedor prometa o assegure no tener…“; Der Autor scheint sich selbst zu widersprechen, wann er schreibt, dass „esta redhibitoria o quanto minoris ha lugar… ora sea conciencia o ignorancia que dellos tenga el vendedor“, ibidem, 1.13, Nr. 10, 146. Dieser Satz könnte aber auch so verstanden werden, dass der Verkäufer etwas gewährt, wie zum Beispiel die Abwesenheit einer Krankheit. Kenntnis davon, ob das verkaufte Tier tatsächlich an einer Krankheit leidet ist nach einer Zusicherung für die Haftungsfrage unerheblich. . Der Katalog wird gefördert vom spanischen Ministerium für Bildung, Kultur und Sport. F. Mendizabal, Investigaciones acerca del origen, historia y organizacijn de la Real Chanciller&a de Valladolid, Madrid 1914, 2, 14. A. Varona García, La Chanciller&a de Valladolid en el reinado de los reyes catjlicos, Valladolid 1981, 59, 63, 230.

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Also entstand schon im 15. Jahrhundert das Archiv der königlichen Kanzlei zu Valladolid. Dem katholischen Herrscher hat die Gegenwart eine große Anzahl an Dokumenten zu verdanken, die einen Einblick ermöglichen in die Rechtsgeschäfte einer Zeit, in der eine christliche praxisbezogene Moraltheologie ihren Aufschwung erlebte. Die Jurisprudenz der Kanzlei stellt damit eine Fundgrube dar für jede Person, die an die Entwicklung des Rechts unter Einfluss der Moraltheologie in der frühen Neuzeit interessiert ist. Wie oben bereits angedeutet wurde, zögerten die Moraltheologen, im Tribunal des Gewissens den Verkauf einer fehlerhaften Sache durch einen unwissenden Verkäufer als Sünde zu qualifizieren. Dies hatte eine Verdrängung der ädilizischen und zivilen Klagen für Sachmängel zu Folge, und zwar zugunsten der Klage wegen Verletzung über die Hälfte. Die erstgenannten Klagen erlaubten es ja einen Anspruch gegen einen unwissenden Verkäufer zu erheben, was sich aber kaum vereinbaren ließ mit der Lehre des forum internum. Manche Gelehrten, die sich mit dem gemeinen Recht des forum externum beschäftigten, schienen diese Sichtweise übernommen zu haben, indem sie die römisch-justinianischen Sachmängelklagen zu Klagen umgestalteten, die nur gegen einen wissenden Verkäufer erhoben werden konnten55. Dass allerdings auch in Zivilsachen vor der Kanzlei auf das christliche Verhalten der Parteien Rücksicht genommen wurde, zeigt wohl ein Fall aus dem Jahr 1575. Francisco de CastaÇero, der angeblich einen Baumgarten zu teuer verkauft hatte, beruft sich als Verteidigung auf sein aufrechtes christliches Verhalten: „ich bin ein guter Christen mit Ehrfurcht vor Gott und meinem Gewissen nach bin ich nicht daran gewöhnt etwas zu verkaufen für mehr als den gerechten Preis“56. Vielsagend über die Überlegenheit der Theorie der ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit ist, dass hier in einer zivilistischen Praxissituation eine Prozesspartei ihr christliches moralisches Verhalten in einem Kaufgeschäft mit dem Begriff „gerechten Preis“ verknüpft. Ein weiterer Punkt, der auf eine Durchwirkung der Moraltheologie bzw. die Verdrängung der Klage für Sachmängel unabhängig vom Wissen des Verkäufers in der Praxis der Kanzlei hindeuten könnte ist, dass es unter den untersuchten Prozessstücken nur eines gab, in dem eine ähnliche Klage erwähnt wurde, ge-

55 Siehe 2.1. 56 EspaÇa. Ministerio de Educacijn, Cultura y Deporte. Archivo de la Real Chanciller&a de Valladolid, PL CIVILES, FERNANDO ALONSO (F), CAJA 971,7 (1575), Bild 1: „soy buen j christiano temeroso de dios y de mi con- j sciencia y no suelo ni acostumbro j vender … j … mas de por el justo prescio“; siehe Anlage B für digitale Kopien des Prozessstücks. Die Abbildungen sind freundlicherweise zur Verfügung gestellt vom spanischen Bundesministerium für Bildung, Kultur und Sport.

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genüber einer großen Zahl von Fällen, die mittels der Klage für Verkürzung über die Hälfte entschieden wurden57. 1571 klagt Antonio de la Vega Sanz bei der Kanzlei wegen des Kaufes eines mangelhaften Pferdes. Während eines Besuchs der kastilischen Königin in Toledo, wobei sich alle Honoratioren auf dem Marktplatz versammelt hatten, verhielt sich das Pferd „sehr zänkisch“ und der unglückliche Käufer sah sich demzufolge „gezwungen, den Platz zu verlassen“58. Nach dieser Enttäuschung reicht De la Vega Sanz eine Klage ein. Er fordert, dass der Verkäufer Pedro Hortiz das Pferd zurücknehme und ihm die 1000 Reales, die er für das Pferd bezahlt hatte, zurückerstatte59. De la Vega Sanz scheint also einen Anspruch auf Wandlung (redhibitoria) geltend machen zu wollen. Vielsagend aber ist, dass De la Vega Sanz seinen Anspruch mit einem Verschweigen des Fehlers verknüpft. Er begründet seine Klage damit, dass „Pedro Hortiz de Villalon jene [Fehler] verschwiegen (callado) hat“60. Ein ähnliches Bild ergibt sich aus der Recherche unter den Vollstreckungstiteln. Diese Untersuchung wies ebenso wenige Fälle aus, in denen unwissende Verkäufer für eine fehlerhafte Sache haften61. Eingetragene Suchbegriffe wie „tacha, vicio, defeto, redhibitoria, quanto minoris“ in allen Varianten ergaben keine Ergebnisse. Eine erweiterte Suche mit dem Suchbegriff „venta“ deckte zwar Kauffälle auf, bei denen es um fehlerhafte Sachen ging. Diese aber wurden alle entweder anhand der Klage wegen Verkürzung über die Hälfte gelöst oder mittels einer Klage wegen falscher Zusicherungen. Die untersuchten Vollstreckungstitel zeigen, dass in Prozessen, in denen es sich um Sklavenkauf handelte – Kaufgeschäfte also, in denen man gerade die ädilizischen Klagen erwarten würde – der Käufer einen Anspruch auf Wandlung hatte, aber nur dann, wenn der 57 Siehe Anlage A für eine Auflistung der untersuchten Prozessstücke. 58 EspaÇa. Ministerio de Educacijn, Cultura y Deporte. Archivo de la Real Chanciller&a de Valladolid, PL CIVILES, FERNANDO ALONSO (F), CAJA 494,3 (1571), Bild 1: „quando la reyna nuestra seÇora j vino a esta villa de Toledo en laj placa con el dicho Antonio Sanz j que estava en el dicho cavallo j le vio el testigo que hico muy rrixo j e se empuÇo dos veces con el j e fue nescesario salirse della j placa por el alborado j que hacia en ella“; siehe Anlage B für digitale Kopien des Prozessstücks. 59 EspaÇa. Ministerio de Educacijn, Cultura y Deporte. Archivo de la Real Chanciller&a de Valladolid, PL CIVILES, FERNANDO ALONSO (F), CAJA 494,3 (1571), Bild 2: „a rrescivir el dicho cavallo j e volver al dicho mi parte j los mill rreales que por el j le dia porque pido e suplico j ansi mande condenar e condene j al dicho pedro hortiz e de villalon“; siehe Anlage B für digitale Kopien des Prozessstücks. 60 EspaÇa. Ministerio de Educacijn, Cultura y Deporte. Archivo de la Real Chanciller&a de Valladolid, PL CIVILES, FERNANDO ALONSO (F), CAJA 494,3 (1571), Bild 2: „compro y al cara conto quel j dicho cavallo no sufre es- jpuelas y se comporte muy rri- j xoso por las quales j tachas j e por cada una dellas por j avia las callado el dicho pedroj hortiz de villalon [meine Hervorhebung]“; siehe Anlage B für digitale Kopien des Prozessstücks. 61 Siehe Anlage A für eine Auflistung der untersuchten Vollstreckungstitel.

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Verkäufer Zusicherungen gemacht hatte, die er nicht halten konnte. Immer wieder liest man, dass der Sklave verkauft wurde, als wäre er „gesund und gut (sano et bueno)“62. Klageschriften, in denen behauptet wird, der Verkäufer hafte für Fehler in der verkauften Sache, ohne dass es Zusicherungen oder eine Verkürzung über die Hälfte gab, bin ich in meinen Untersuchungen nicht begegnet. Waren im mittelalterlichen gelehrten Recht die ädilizischen Klagen noch unabhängig vom Wissen der Verkäufer anwendbar, scheint es in der frühneuzeitlichen kastilischen Rechtspraxis der königlichen Kanzlei nicht länger möglich, erfolgreich wegen Mängeln zu klagen, wenn der Verkäufer davon nicht wusste oder die Abwesenheit der Fehler nicht zugesichert hatte. Dem Käufer stand in solchen Fällen nur noch die Klage für Verkürzung über die Hälfte zur Verfügung.

4.

Fazit

In diesem Beitrag habe ich vorantastend untersucht, wie die Theorie des gemeinen Rechts und der christlichen Moraltheologie im frühneuzeitlichen Kastilien die Rechtspraxis beeinflusst haben. Dies ist geschehen anhand einer Untersuchung der Rolle, die das Wissen vom Verkäufer im Recht der Sachmängelhaftung für seine Haftung hat. Zunächst sind im ersten Abschnitt die Klagen dargestellt, die einem Käufer nach dem gemeinen Recht (ius commune) im späten Mittelalter zur Verfügung standen. Zu Beginn waren das die ädilizischen Klagen und die zivilen Vertragsklagen bei Sachmängeln. Nach und nach verringerte sich aber der Unterschied zwischen diesen Klagen. Nach Belleperche verblieben nur noch zwei Klagen für Sachmängel; eine Klage auf Preisminderung und eine Klage wegen Mangelfolgeschäden. Allerdings schlussfolgerten die Juristen des spätmittelalterlichen ius commune, dass auch unwissende Verkäufer für Fehler in der verkauften Sache hafteten, sei es auch auf beschränkte Weise. Andererseits erweiterten die spätmittelalterlichen Juristen den Bereich der Klage für Verletzung über die Hälfte (1.2). Im römischjustinanischen Recht stand sie nur Verkäufern eines zu billig verkauften Grundstücks zur Verfügung. Die spätmittelalterlichen Juristen aber dehnten den Bereich der Klage auf bewegliche Sachen und Käufer aus, die mehr als anderthalb Mal den gerechten Preis bezahlt hatten. Wie eng diese Entwicklungen mit der christlichen Moraltheologie und der 62 EspaÇa. Ministerio de Educacijn, Cultura y Deporte. Archivo de la Real Chanciller&a de Valladolid, REGISTRO DE EJECUTORIAS, CAJA 352, 37, (1521), Bild 1: „en al tiempo que le vendio la dicha esclaba se la j vendio e entrego por sana e buena e no hera ansy“; siehe Anlage B für eine digitale Kopie dieser Vollstreckungstitel.

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davon beeinflussten Schuldlehre verbunden war, die für das Tribunal des Gewissens (forum internum) erdacht worden waren, ist in 2.1 behandelt worden. Inspiriert von Thomas von Aquino zögerten die iberischen Moraltheologen immer mehr, Verkäufer, die während der Beichte gestanden eine fehlerhafte Sache verkauft zu haben ohne dass sie von dem Fehler wussten, für die Folgen des Fehlers verantwortlich zu halten. Rechtsgelehrten auf der iberischen Halbinsel die sich mit der weltlichen Gerichtbarkeit (forum externum) beschäftigten, nahmen Kenntnis von diesen Regeln der Beichtlehre, die in ihrer Fassung und ihrem Stil dem ius commune sehr ähnelten. Das Ergebnis war, dass die ädilizischen Klagen und die zivile Vertragsklage wegen Sachmängeln, die von den spätmittelalterlichen Juristen zu Klagen modifiziert wurden, nach welchen auch unwissende Verkäufer auf beschränkte Weise hafteten, in der frühneuzeitlichen kastilischen Rechtslehre allmählich von den Klagen für Verletzung über die Hälfte und die Vertragsklage für Betrug verdrängt wurden. Der dritte und letzte Abschnitt beschäftigte sich mit der Frage, was diese Entwicklung in der Rechtstheorie für die frühneuzeitliche kastilische Praxis bedeutete. Dafür ist Rücksicht genommen auf die Ergebnisse einer Recherche unter Prozessstücken und Vollstreckungstiteln der königlichen Kanzlei zu Valladolid, der höchsten Berufungsinstanz in Zivilsachen im frühneuzeitlichen Kastilien. Es fiel auf, dass es in der Rechtspraxis der königlichen Kanzlei anscheinend nicht möglich war, erfolgreich wegen eines Fehlers zu klagen, wenn der Verkäufer nicht von dem Fehler wusste oder die Abwesenheit des Fehlers nicht zugesichert hatte. Weder in den untersuchten Prozessstücken, noch in den Vollstreckungstiteln wurden Rechtstreite wegen Sachmängeln anders gelöst als über das Wissen des Verkäufers oder ein Missverhältnis zwischen Preis und Leistung. Die sehr selten erwähnte actio redhibitoria wurde in Klageschriften als eine Klage gegen einen wissenden Verkäufer aufgefasst. Damit scheint auch die Praxis der königlichen Kanzlei beeinflusst von der moraltheologischen Vorgehensweise im Tribunal des Gewissens.

Anlage A. Übersicht von untersuchten Prozessstücke und Vollstreckungstitel der Königlichen Kanzlei zu Valladolid 1)

Prozessstücke (pleitos)

No. 1 2

Pleitos eingetragen von dem Gerichtsschreiber Fernando Alonso Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 54, 4 (1541–1547) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 70, 2 (1580–1581)

3

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 128, 4 (1586–1587)

Das Wissen des Verkäufers

(Fortsetzung) No. Pleitos eingetragen von dem Gerichtsschreiber Fernando Alonso 4 Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 370, 4 (1556–1557) 5 Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 401, 1 (1553–1557) 6 7

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 447, 1 (1589–1590) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 449, 2 (1553–1556)

8 9

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 494, 3 (1570–1571) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 524, 4 (1549–1550)

10 12

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 550, 2 (1597–1599) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 555, 3 (1602–1603)

13 14

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 559, 3 (1579–1581) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 770, 3 (1496–1498)

15 16

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 792, 2 (1543) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 849, 2 (1564)

17 18

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 922, 4 (1597–1598) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 971, 7 (1575)

19 20

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 1079, 7 (1580–1583) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 1135, 3 (1505–1506)

21 22

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 1218, 2 (1566–1567) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 1313, 2 (1583–1584)

23 24

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 1429, 8 (1579–1580) Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 1448, 2 (1523)

25

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 1558, 1 (1591–1604) Pleitos eingetragen von dem Gerichtsschreiber P8rez Alonso

26 27

Pl. civ., P. Alonso (f.), caja 1135, 3 (1531) Pl. civ., P. Alonso (f.), caja 189, 2 (1589)

28 29

Pl. civ., P. Alonso (f.), caja 1454, 2 (1597–1599) Pl. civ., P. Alonso (f.), caja 1009, 2 (1562–1564)

31

Pleito eingetragen von dem Gerichtsschreiber Alonso Rodr&guez Pl. civ., A. Rodr&guez (olv.), caja 223, 9 (1628) Pleitos eingetragen von dem Gerichtsschreiber Ceballos Escalera Pl. civ., C. Escalera (d.), caja 116, 5 (1699)

32 33

Pl. civ., C. Escalera (d.), caja 51, 2 (1603) Pl. civ., C. Escalera (d.), caja 87, 3 (1564)

34 35

Pl. civ., C. Escalera (f.), caja 2490, 5 (1669) Pl. civ., C. Escalera (f.), caja 2690, 2 (1762)

36

Pl. civ., C. Escalera (f.), caja 3090, 2 (1732) Pleito eingetragen von dem Gerichtsschreiber Moreno

37

Pl. civ., Moreno (olv.), caja 546, 3 (1511)

30

71

72 2)

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Vollstreckungstitel (ejecutorias)

No. 1

Ejecutorias (in chronologischer Anordnung) Reg. ej., caja 307, 41 (1516)

2 3

Reg. ej., caja 308, 65 (1516) Reg. ej., caja 316, 11 (1517)

4 5

Reg. ej., caja 324, 46 (1517) Reg. ej., caja 332, 8 (1518)

6 7

Reg. ej., caja 333, 17 (1518) Reg. ej., caja 338, 68 (1519)

8 9

Reg. ej., caja 349, 13 (1521) Reg. ej., caja 352, 37 (1521)

10 11

Reg. ej., caja 360, 49 (1521) Reg. ej., caja 362, 44 (1523)

12 13

Reg. ej., caja 364, 6 (1523) Reg. ej., caja 374, 20 (1524)

14 15

Reg. ej., caja 392, 28 (1526) Reg, ej., caja 835, 69 (1555)

16 17

Reg, ej., caja 837, 27 (1555) Reg, ej., caja 850, 8 (1555)

18 19

Reg, ej., caja 1072, 24 (1564) Reg. ej., caja 1175, 43 (1570)

20 21

Reg. ej., caja 1595, 2 (1587) Reg. ej., caja 1606, 42 (1588)

22

Reg. ej., caja 1679, 4 (1590)

Das Wissen des Verkäufers

73

Anlage B. Digitale Kopien der Prozesstücke und Vollstreckungstitel

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f), caja 971, 7.

74

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f.), caja 494, 3 (1571), Bild 1.

Niels de Bruijn

Das Wissen des Verkäufers

Pl. civ., F. Alonso (f), caja 494, 3, (1571), Bild 2.

75

76

Reg. ej., caja 352, 37 (1521).

Archivo de la Real Chanciller&a C/Chanciller&a, n8 4 47003 Valladolid A la atencijn de seÇora A.M. Teller&a e-mail: [email protected]

Niels de Bruijn

Hylkje de Jong*

Two interpretations of D. 17,1,27,1 in early Byzantine law: Obligation to reddere and unjust enrichment

1.

Introduction

A contract of mandatum may cease to exist in various ways before it has been fulfilled. For example, a mandate dissolves by the death of one of the parties1. Further, the mandatory can terminate the mandate, provided that the mandator retains the right to perform the same task by himself or through someone else2. An iusta causa can also be a reason for a mandatory not to complete the mandate3. The mandator, on the other hand, may on the basis of D. 17,1,12,16 cancel the mandate4 when he no longer wants the mandate to be (finita voluntate)5. According to Marcellus the actio mandati is in this case not possible anymore, because the required condition of consensus has disappeared. In the next fragment the mandator wants to withdraw because of his regretting his act: D. 17,1,27,1 (Gai. 9 ad ed. prov.): Si servum ea lege tibi tradidero, ut eum post mortem meam manumitteres, constitit obligatio: potest autem et in mea quoque persona agendi causa intervenire, veluti si paenitentia acta servum reciperare velim.

* Department of Legal Theory and Legal History, Faculty of Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Nederland; [email protected]. – Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at the Goethe University Frankfurt and Max-Planck-Institute for European Legal History in Frankfurt. 1 D. 17,1,26 pr.; D. 17,1,27,3. 2 D. 17,1,22,11. 3 D. 17,1,25. 4 Cf. Gaius 3,159; I. 3,26,9. 5 D. 17,1,12,16 (Ulp. 31 ad edictum): Si mandavero exigendam pecuniam, deinde voluntatem mutavero, an sit mandati actio vel mihi vel heredi meo? Et ait Marcellus cessare mandati actionem, quia extinctum est mandatum finita voluntate. Quod si mandaveris exigendam, deinde prohibuisti, exactamque recepisti, debitor liberabitur. Cf. also D. 15,4,1,2. For revocation of the mandate, see Ph. Meylan, R8vocation et renunciation du mandate en droit romein classique, in: Studi in onore di Giuseppe Grosso, Vol. I, Torino 1968, 465–482.

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“If I have delivered a slave to you on the terms that you should manumit him after my death, an obligation has been constituted; however, there may be occasion for an action by me also, for example, if, having regret, I wish to recover the slave6.”

In this case the mandator transferred (tradidero) a slave in ownership in order to manumit him after his death. Before this manumission, because of his paenitentia (a change of mind), the mandator wants his slave back. To recover the slave the mandator can apply an action. It is unclear what specific action is meant. Is it the rei vindicatio because the mandator becomes owner of the slave again? Or does ownership not revert to the mandator and another claim applies? In early Byzantine law it appears that the mandator in D. 17,1,27,1 disposes of two different actions to reclaim the slave7, namely the actio mandati and the condictio causa data causa non secuta. What is the reason that the Byzantine scholars disagree in the interpretation of this fragment? In this article I shall discuss the two different interpretations of D. 17,1,27,1 in early Byzantine law. In (2) I deal with the early option by Cyrillos and an anonymous author for the actio mandati. Cyrillos appears to be explicitly conscious of his choice for the actio mandati because of its place in the Digest. In (3) the later condictio causa data causa non secuta is the central point. The later Byzantine jurists Stephanos and Enantiophanes explain their choice for the reclaim by condiction by referring to D. 12,4, the title about the condictio causa data causa non secuta. This will be followed by concluding remarks (4). I present the results of my investigation with great pleasure in honour of Jan Hallebeek.

2.

The actio mandati

2.1

An anonymous author and Cyrillos

In the Basilica two authors in their scholia at B. 14,1,27,1 (D. 17,1,27,1) call the unspecified action the actio mandati8. The two scholia are placed in the outside margin9. The first one is anonymous: 6 Translations from the Digest are based on A. Watson, The Digest of Justinian, Philadelphia 1985. 7 For the terms early (and later) Byzantine law see H. de Jong, Using the Basilica, ZRG RA 133 (2016) 286–321. 8 It has to be noted that D. 17,1,27,1 in the Littera Bononiensis reads: consistit obligatio mandati. The Basilica text does not have this addition: Sum_statai 1mow^, 5mha paq\swy soi doOkom 1p· t` 1keuheq_sai aqt¹mlet± h\mat|m lou· (BT 748/17–18). 9 See fol. 138v in Codex Graecus Coislinianus. For the manuscript, see L. Burgmann/ M.Th. Fögen/A. Schminck/D. Simon, Repertorium der Handschriften des byzantinischen Rechts, Teil I: Die Handschriften des weltlichen Rechts [No 1–327], Frankfurt 1995, nr. 203.

Two interpretations of D. 17,1,27,1 in early Byzantine law

79

Sch. Ca 14 ad B. 14,1,27,1 = D. 17,1,27,1 (BS *755/23–26): OQj]tgm 1p· to}t\ soi t` fq\ 1tqad_teusa, Vma let± tµm 1lµm tekeutµm aqt¹m 1keuheq~s,r. Sum]stg t¹ lamd\tom, ja· 1n 1loO pqos~pou dumat¹m jimgh/mai tµm lamd\ti, eQ tuw¹m hek^sy letalek|lemor t¹m 1l¹m oQj]tgm !makabei˜m. “I have delivered a slave with that premiss, that you should manumit him after my death. The mandate came into being, and in my name it is possible that the actio mandati can be applied, when I, for example having regret, wish to recover my slave.”

It appears that the anonymous author because of the word tuw¹m (for example) thinks about more than one reason to recover the slave. The author clearly and without reservations states that the contract mandatum is constituted (Sum]stg t¹ lamd\tom). Apparently the mandate in D. 17,1,27,1 creates directly an obligation, although the condition (the death of the mandatory) has not yet been fulfilled10. The jurist may find his confirmation for the existence of the mandate in D. 17,1,12,17 in which the mandatory raises already before the mandator’s death an actio mandati against him to claim his expenses11. The second scholion is by Cyrillos12 : Sch. Ca 15 ad B. 14,1,27,1 = D. 17,1,27,1 (BS *755/27–28 [Cyrillos]): Juq_kkou. EQ d~sy soi oQj]tgm 1v’ è let± h\mat|m lou 1keuheq_sai, eQ letalekgh_, jim_ lamd\ti. “By Kyrillos. When I give you a slave under the condition that after my death you manumit him, when I change my mind, I apply the actio mandati.”

Cyrillos does not refer to other possibilities for reclaiming the slave. He strictly follows the Digest fragment. He mentions the actio mandati but it is not clear whether according to him the contract was existing or dissolved, an action remaining to mind off its effects13. Both authors don’t clarify their choice for the actio mandati. Apparently they did not feel a need to explain. 10 See also W.W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, Cambridge 1975, 517–518. 11 D. 17,1,12,17 (Ulp. 31 ad ed.) Idem Marcellus scribit, si, ut post mortem sibi monumentum fieret, quis mandavit, heres eius poterit mandati agere. Illum vero qui mandatum suscepit, si sua pecunia fecit, puto agere mandati, si non ita ei mandatum est, ut sua pecunia faceret monumentum. Potuit enim agere etiam cum eo qui mandavit, ut sibi pecuniam daret, ad faciendum, maxime si iam quaedam ad faciendum paravit. Cf. also D. 17,1,30 where a iusta causa may justify an actio mandati to forbid the commissioned manumission, discussed below. 12 For Cyrillos, see H.J. Scheltema, L’enseignement de droit des ant8cesseurs, Leiden 1970 (repr. in: Van der Wal et al., H.J. Scheltema Opera minora, 58–110), 4–5, 5 (62): “Ceci est notamment 8trange vis-/-vis de Stephanos, parce qu’il mentionne quelques sentences d’un savant qui a enseign8 avant le rHgne de Justinien / B8ryte, / savoir de Kyrillos l’a%n8, b Fqyr, et qu’il le fait de telle maniHre que nous avons l’impression que Stephanos lui-mÞme aurait entendu ces sentences de la bouche du ma%tre”; 5 (62) note 16: “Il a en tout cas v8cu dans l’8poque des ant8cesseurs; il est mentionn8 par Kobidas: BS 1455/26”. 13 Cf. the existence of the actio ex empto, although the contract of sale does not exist anymore in

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2.2

Cyrillos: D. 17,1,27,1 and D. 12,4,3,pr. are different

It is striking that Cyrillos, in a remark at B. 24,1,3,2 (D. 12,4,3,2) with a case similiar to D. 17,1,27,1, gives a different interpretation14 : D. 12,4,3,2 (Ulp. 26 ad ed.): Sed si tibi dedero, ut Stichum manumittas: si non facis, possum condicere, aut si me paeniteat, condicere possum. “But if I pay you to manumit Stichus, I can bring a condictio if you do not do it. The same if I change my mind.” Sch. Ca 1 ad B. 24,1,3,2 = D. 12,4,3,2 (BS 1720/17–23 [Cyrillos]): Juq_kkou. (…) EQ d³ d~sy soi, Vma 1keuheq~s,r doOkom, ja· 1n !qc_ar sou ja· 1j letaleke_ar lou t_jtetai jomdijt_jior. (…) “By Cyrillos. (…) When I give you a slave to release him, a condictio arises not only because of your laziness, but also because of my regret. (…)”

In this case Cyrillos proposes a condictio in stead of the actio mandati. What is the difference between D. 17,1,27,1 and D. 12,4,3,2? Comparing the Latin texts, does the difference seem to lie in the use of ea lege in D. 17,1,27,1 and the lack of it in D. 12,4,3,215 ? Cyrillus explicitly expresses this difference in the use of different conjunctions in his two remarks. In his remark at D. 17,1,27,1 he uses 1v’ è (under the condition) to introduce the manumission of the slave. In his remark at D. 12,4,3,2 he uses the Vma (in order that). These conjunctions have juridically exactly the same meaning, but the emphasis seems to be different. The anonymous author at B. 14,1,27,1 uses Vma (in order that) in combination with the actio mandati16, as Cyrillos for example does in BS 744/29–31 at D. 17,1,22,7 (B. 14,1,22,7)17. The reason for a different interpretation has to be the place of the fragment in the Digest, which apparently leads Cyrillos (and the anonymous author). Since D. 17,1,27,1 is located in the title on mandate, the corresponding action has to be the actio mandati; with D. 12,4,3,2 it has to be the condictio. How can we explain the recovery in D. 17,1,27,1 by the actio mandati?

14 15 16 17

D. 18,1,62,1. For the interpretation of D. 18,1,62,1 see N. Kuonen, La culpa in contrahendo: un colosse aux pieds d’argile? Une ex8gHse de Modestinus D. 18,1,62,1, TvRg 73 (1995) 267–278. Cf. 11,7,6,1 and D. 18,4,6. In D. 17,1,27,1 the actio mandati is not applied because of a culpable act of the other party, like the mentioned fragments with culpa in contrahendo. In a scholion at B. 24,1,16 (D. 12,4,16) an anonymous author refers by using the same words as Cyrillos to the fact that no contract has arised. The repetitio can be applied (BS 1726/ 20–1727/7). For ea lege als Fiduziaklausel im klassischen Recht, see W. Erbe, Die Fiduzia im römischen Recht, Weimar 1940, 182–183. In the anonymous scholion in (2.1) (BS *755/23–26) Vma is also used, but after the notion the scholion reads 1p· to}t\ (..) t` fq\ which refers to ea lege. The Basilica text reads here ‘9±m d~sy soi mol_slata 1p· t` doOmai P]tq\’ (BT 746/17).

Two interpretations of D. 17,1,27,1 in early Byzantine law

2.3

81

D. 17,1,27,1 and D. 17,1,30: originally cases of fiducia

To solve the problem of the application of the actio mandati it is necessary to take the whole title on mandate into account. In D. 17,1 there is another fragment concerning the manumission of a slave, namely D. 17,1,3018. This fragment resembles D. 17,1,27,1 and may give clarity : D. 17,1,30 (Iul. 13 dig.): Si hominem tibi dedero, ut eum manumitteres, et postea procurator meus prohibuerit, ne manumitteres, an mandati agere possim, si tu eum manumiseris? Respondi, si procurator iustam causam habuit interpellandi manumissionem servi, quem in hoc solum acceperam, ut manumitterem, veluti si compererit eum postea falsas rationes confecisse, insidias vitae prioris domini struxisse, tenebor, nisi denuntiationi procuratoris paruero: si vero nulla iusta causa procuratori fuit denuntiandi, ne servus manumitteretur, non poterit mecum agi, quamvis ad libertatem eum perduxerim. “If I gave you a slave so that you might manumit him and afterward my procurator forbade you to do so, can I sue on mandate if you manumit him? I gave the opinion that if the procurator had a just cause for forbidding the manumission of the slave whom I had received for the sole purpose of manumitting him if, for example, he discovered that afterward he had made up false accounts [or] that he had plotted against the life of his former owner-I shall be liable if I do not follow the instructions of the procurator ; but if the procurator had no just cause for giving his instructions that the slave should not be manumitted, he [the principal] will not be able to sue me, although I gave him [the slave] liberty.”

In the Romanist literature it is maintained that this fragment, just as D. 17,1,27,1, originally does not deal with mandatum, but with fiducia manumissionis causa19. Watson adduces two arguments for this. Firstly, Julian’s book 13 concerns fiducia and book 14 mandatum20. Secondly, the mutilated Vatican Fragment 334a seems to comprise the same text and gives the actio fiduciae21. Buckland states that before the introduction of the bonae fidei contracts a fiducia cum amico was used in these cases22. It was common to transfer slaves under a fiducia for manumission in order to evade restrictive legislation23. In the fiducia cum amico the 18 A. Watson, Contract of Mandate in Roman law, Oxford 1961 (repr. Aalen 1984), 71. Cf. Haymann interprets D. 17,1,30 as an attempt by the compilators to mediate between the right of revocation (fiducia cum amico contracta) and the classical exclusion to revocate by the application of the constitution of divi Marci mentioned in D. 40,8,1 (F. Haymann, Freilassungspflicht und Reurecht. Ein Quellenkritischer Beitrag zur Konditionenlehre, Berlin 1905, 50). See also infra Fn. 24. 19 See Erbe (note 15) 144–147; Watson (note 18) 70–71; B. Noordraven, Die Fiduzia im römischen Recht, Amsterdam 1999, 66–73. 20 O. Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, I. Leipzig 1889 (repr. Graz 1960), Fr. 218. 21 Watson (note 18) 70–71. 22 For the difference between fiducia cum creditore and fiducia cum amico, see Gaius, 2,60. 23 Buckland, A Text-Book (note 10), 431–433.

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principal has a right of withdrawal24, also in case he has changed his mind25. The action to reclaim the object was the actio fiduciae. Watson correctly states that it is difficult to maintain that the compilers retained by an oversight from fiducia a qualification that had no relevance for mandatum. The question now is: Are there more fragments concerning the actio mandati with a recovery?

2.4

Other fragments with recovery in D. 17,1

In title D. 17,1 two fragments refer to a similar reclaim. The first fragment is D. 17,1,8 pr.: D. 17,1,8 pr. (Ulp. 31 ad ed.): Si procuratorem dedero nec instrumenta mihi causae reddat, qua actione mihi teneatur? Et Labeo putat mandati eum teneri nec esse probabilem sententiam existimantium ex hac causa agi posse depositi: uniuscuiusque enim contractus initium spectandum et causam. “If I appoint a procurator and he does not return the documents relating to the case to me, under which action may he be liable to me? Labeo takes the view that he is liable on mandate and that the opinion of those who hold that an action on deposit can be raised on these grounds is not probable; for one must look to the origins of each and every contract and the factors lying behind it.”

In this fragment Ulpian explicitly chooses for the actio mandati and not for the actio depositi, because the origin of the contract should be followed and this was a mandatum. Ulpian points to other jurists who prefer the actio depositi. That is, in his opinion, not likely because ego deposited the documents in the context of a mandate to act as procurator. The next fragment with an action to recover is D. 17,1,55: D. 17,1,55 (Pap. 1 resp): Procurator, qui non res inclusas subtraxit, sed traditas non reddidit, iudicio mandati, non furti tenetur. “A procurator who has not taken away things that were locked up but has failed to hand back things delivered to him is liable to an action on mandate, not for theft.”

In this fragment too there are things left in the care of the mandatory. To recover these things the mandator disposes of the actio mandati and not the actio furti. 24 See for example D. 24,1,49. For the constitution of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus at Aufidius Victorinus from around 177–180 about the exclusion of the right of withdrawal in cases of sale, see D. 40,8,1 (Paul. 5 ad Plaut.): Si servus venditus est, ut intra certum tempus manumitteretur, etiamsi sine herede decessissent et venditor et emptor, servo libertas competit: et hoc divus Marcus rescripsit. Sed et si mutaverit venditor voluntatem, nihilo minus libertas competit. See for example also C. 4,57,1–3. See Erbe (note 15) 147–151. 25 W.W. Buckland, The Roman law of slavery. The condition of the slave in private law from Augustus to Justinian, Cambridge 1908 (repr. 1970), 632–634.

Two interpretations of D. 17,1,27,1 in early Byzantine law

83

In these two fragments it appears that there is a full and valid mandate. The recovery element of the actio mandati does not appear to exist only in cases which originally concerned a fiducia. It is therefore not odd that the fragments of D. 17,1,27,1 and D. 17,1,30 were included in D. 17,1. This leads to the question: How can this recovery application of the actio mandati be explained?

2.5

Similarity to depositum and commodatum

In D. 17,1,8 pr. and D. 17,1,55 the mandator can reclaim objects. In D. 17,1,8 pr. the mention of jurists who according to Ulpian interpret the fragment incorrectly may provide a hint. These jurists prefered the actio depositi, because a depositor can reclaim things put in somebody’s care as if a depositum. Apparently D. 17,1,8 pr. seems a similar case to them. It is not surprising that these jurists thought of the actio depositi, because returning things given in deposit is the depositary’s obligation. In classical Roman law in Gaius 4,47 a double formula for this recover is found for the actio depositi26 : Gaius 4,47: Sed ex quibusdam causis praetor et in ius et in factum conceptas formulas proponit, ueluti depositi et commodati. illa enim formula, quae ita concepta est: (…). at illa formula, quae ita concepta est: ivdex esto. si paret avlvm agerivm apvd nvmerivm negidivm mensam argenteam deposvisse eamqve dolo malo nvmerii negidii avlo agerio redditam non esse, qvanti ea res erit, tantam pecvniam, ivdex, nvmerivm negidivm avlo agerio condemnato. si non paret, absolvito, in factum concepta est. similes etiam commodati formulae sunt. “There are also certain cases in which the praetor sets out actions framed both in law and on the facts, for instance those on deposit and loan for use. The formula which is drafted as follows framed in law: (…). But the next formula, drafted as follows, is framed on the facts: “Let a judge be appointed. If it appears that Aulus Agerius deposited a silver table with Numerius Negidius and that the same was not returned to Aulus Agerius by the bad faith of Numerius Negidius, let the judge condemn Numerius Negidius to pay the value of the matter to Aulus Agerius. If it does not so appear, exonerate”. The formulas for actions on loan for use are similar27.”

The explanation for the double formula is according to Steiner the fact that the recovery of the things can not be the content of the formula in ius concept.28 For 26 A. Steiner, Die römischen Solidarobligationen: eine Neubesichtigung unter aktionenrechtlichen Aspekten, München 2009, 226–230. Cf. also O. Lenel, Das Edictum perpetuum: Ein Versuch zu seiner Wiederherstellung, Leipzig 19273, 288ff. 27 The translation from Gaius’ Institutes is based on W.M. Gordon/O.F. Robinson, The Institutes of Gaius. Translated with an Introduction; with the Latin Text of Seckel and Kuebler, London 1988. 28 Steiner (note 26) 226–230. Steiner compares the condictio and the actio depositi in factum,

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this claim the formula in factum concepta is needed29. Steiner suggests that this double action formula can apply to mandate too. In her explanation for this she refers to D. 27,3,15 and D. 17,1,55. With reference to D. 27,3,15 Steiner shows that depositum, commodatum and mandatum have a common frontage: D. 27,3,15 (Ulp. 1 disp.): (…) licet enim doli ambo rei sint, tamen sufficit unum satisfacere, ut in duobus, quibus res commodata est vel deposita quibusque mandatum est. “(…) Although both are guilty of fraud, nevertheless, it is sufficient that one should pay as in the case of two persons to whom things are lent or deposited with or who are given a mandate.”

To arrive at her statement that the double action formula can also apply to mandate Steiner combines D. 27,3,15 with D. 17,1,55 (see above in 2.3) in which she correctly reads a reddere-obligation. She concludes that mandate has to fall under Gaius’ quaedam causae in Gaius 4,47, where Gaius does not give an exhaustive account with the actio depositi and the actio commodati30. In conclusion, a mandator can use the actio mandati to recover property after the mandate has been executed or before the execution of the mandate upon changing his mind. The recovery by the actio mandati in D. 17,1,27,1 cannot be explained as a survival of the classical Roman actio fiduciae with the right to withdraw. In Justinianic law, on the other hand, this has to fit other fragments in D. 17,1. Cyrillos and the anonymous author may merely interpret the recovery by analogy with the characteristics of the actio mandati, i. e. the enforcement of the mandatory’s reddere-obligation. They found their analogical solution in the mandate’s classical roots within title D. 17,1, probably just like Justinian’s compilators wanted to interpret this fragment.

229: “Erklären läßt sich dies für die klassische Zeit vielleicht damit, daß mit der condictio als abstrakter Klage alle möglichen Rechtsgründe für die Sachherausgabe, also etwa auch ein mutuum, uno actu überprüft werden konnten, während die actio depositi in factum sich auf den Umstand der Hinterlegung einer Sache stützt und folglich einen schmaleren Anwendungsbereich aufweist (…) (230) daß die Rückgabe der Sache selbst entweder durch eine condictio, wenn die causa der Rückgabeverpflichtung unklar war, oder durch die formula in factum der actio depositi geltend gemacht werden konnte, während Gegenverpflichtungen des Hinterlegers zum Aufwendungsersatz oder die Pflicht zur Herausgabe von Sachfrüchten oder Zinsen mit der formula in ius (…) umzusetzen ware”. 29 Cf. M. Kaser/K. Hackl, Das römische Zivilprozeßrecht, München 19962, 334 Fn. 50. 30 Steiner (note 26) 252–253, 253: “Alles in allem scheint es möglich, daß auch die actio mandati eine doppelte Klageformel aufwies und damit unter die quaedam causae fällt, für die Gaius in 4.47 nur exemplarisch die actiones depositi und commodati aufzählt”.

Two interpretations of D. 17,1,27,1 in early Byzantine law

3.

The condictio causa data causa non secuta31

3.1

Stephanos: the transfer of ownership

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The sixth-century Byzantine jurist Stephanos gives the mandator in D. 17,1,27,1 the condictio causa data causa non secuta to reclaim the slave32 : Sch. Ca 18 ad B. 14,1,27,1 = D. 17,1,27,1 (BS *756/14–16 [Stephanos]): Stev\mou. D/kom d], fti t¹m jaOsa d\ta jaOsa m¹m sejoOta 1j letaleke_ar jimei˜ jomdijt_jiom, ¢r 5cmyr 1m t` a$. bib. toO paq|mtor sumt\clator tit. d$. dic. e$. paqadedol]mym soi paq’ 1loO33. “By Stephanos. It is clear that he applies the condictio causa data causa non secuta because of regret, as you have learnt in the first book of this pars, title 4, fragment 5 taught you by me.”

Stephanos refers in his remark to the title D. 12,4 (De condictione causa data causa non secuta), especially to the next fragment34 : D. 12,4,5,1 (Ulp. 2 disp.): Si servum quis tradiderit alicui ita, ut ab eo intra certum tempus manumitteretur, si paenituerit eum qui tradiderit et super hoc eum certioraverit et fuerit manumissus post paenitentiam, attamen actio propter paenitentiam competit ei qui dedit. (…) Suppose someone delivers a slave to another to be manumitted within a certain time and then, though the deliveror changes his mind and tells the deliveree, the slave is manumitted after the change of mind. Nevertheless, an action is available for the deliveror on account of the change of mind. (…)

The use of the word attamen (nevertheless) is striking. Apparently Ulpian finds the action that he has in mind strictly speaking illogical in this case. He might 31 For the condictio causa data causa non secuta, see M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht II [RPR II], Munich 19752, 422–424, 423 Fn. 16: “Hierher gehört auch die unrömisch sog. ‘condictio ex paenitentia’, wenn sich der Geber für den Fall, daß der mit der Gabe bezweckte Erfolg nicht eintritt, den Rücktritt vorbehalten hat. Den Hauptfall bildet die Übereignung eines Sklaven zum Zweck der Freilassung durch den Empfänger ; hier wird ein solches ‘Reurecht’ sogar ohne Vereinbarung über die Rücktrittsbefugnis angenommen”. Cf. R. Zimmermann, The law of obligations. Roman foundations of the civilian tradition, Oxford 1996, 843–844 and F. Schwarz, Die Grundlage der Condictio im klassischen römischen Recht, Münster/Köln 1952, 267. 32 Cf. BS 1543/6–18 [Stephanos] at B. 23,1,19 pr. (D. 12,1,19,pr.) and BS 1543/22–24 at B. 23,1,19 pr. (D. 12,1,19 pr.). See for Stephanos, H. de Jong, Stephanus en zijn Digestenonderwijs, The Hague 2008. 33 This sentence is repeated at the end of BS 754/11–18, also a scholion at B. 14,1,27,1 (D. 17,1,27,1). In this scholion the anonymous author says that the intention to manumit makes arise the actio mandati. 34 See also BS 1722/5–6 at B. 24,1,5 pr. (D. 12,4,5 pr.). For a comparison with the exclusion of a revocation in case of sale, see BS 1727/8–20 at B. 24,1,16 (D. 12,4,16) and BS *755/29–756/8.

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emphasize the moment of the manumission, i. e. after the change of mind. Because of its place under the specific condiction title in the Digest the action meant must in Justinianic law be the condictio causa data causa non secuta. In several other similar texts this specific condictio rises35. Stephanos links D. 17,1,27,1 with D. 12,4,5,1 as being similar cases with the same outcome. Unfortunately, at D. 12,4,5,1 no remarks by Stephanos are handed down, but it is possible to surmise his interpretation of this text from another scholion at D. 17,1,27,1, which helps to explain the link with D. 12,4,5,1. In this remark Stephanos explains what is happening with the ownership of the slave: Sch. Ca 1 ad B. 14,1,27,1 = D. 17,1,27,1 (BS 754/2–10 [Stephanos]): Stev\mou. Tradidero – Tqadite}sy ja· 1p· s³ letah^sy tµm despote_am· eQ c±q lµ B despote_a letet]hg, oqd³ 1keuheqoOm b kab½m Ad}mato t¹m oQj]tgm. Oq d}matai c\q tir di± pqojouq\tyqa oQj]tgm Udiom, tout]stim ox 1stim 5ti desp|tgr, 1keuheqoOm. Ovtyr owm m|gsom ja· t¹ eQqgl]mom t` Youkiam` 1m t` a$. (30) dic. toO paq|mtor tit. si ominen tidi dedery, d~sy, tout]stim desp|tgm se to}tou poi^sy· l\kista l]m, fti t¹ d\qe dgkoi˜ despote_ar let\hesim· 5peita d], fti ja· 1m aqt` t` dic. dgkoi˜ despote_am letemewhei˜sam 1p· t¹m kab|mta 1p· fq\ 1keuheq_ar, di’ ¨m b Youkiam¹r Qdij_r 1jei˜s] vgsim. “By Stephanos. Tradidero. I will deliver and I will transfer the ownership on you; for when the ownership is not transferred, the receiver could not release the slave. For nobody can release his own slave, that is whose owner he still is, by a procurator. In this way understand also that is said by Iulianos in fragment 30 of this title, si hominem tibi dedero, I will give, that is I will make you owner of him; especially, that dare means transfer of ownership; what follows, that in this fragment too he makes clear that ownership is transferred on the receiver with the premiss for manumission, for that reason Iulianos it especially says there.”

Stephanos refers to D. 17,1,30 (see 2.3), in which a procurator forbade the mandatory to manumit the mandator’s slave. This has only legal consequences if the procurator has a just cause (iusta causa) for giving his instructions that the slave should not be manumitted. Stephanos explains that the ownership is transferred to the mandatory, the receiver of the slave. Only in this case the mandatory can manumit the slave. The causa for transferring ownership in D. 17,1,27,1 is according to Stephanos the consensus about the manumission (manumissionis causa) of the slave, but not the mandate. In the final sentence he emphasizes this. Apparently, the only ground by which the slave could be recovered is the unjust enrichment of the receiver (due to the dissolved mandate), and in this sense the condiction must be explained36.

35 D. 12,4,3,2; D. 12,4,3,3; D. 12,4,5 pr.; D. 12,4,5,2. Cf. D. 12,4,12; D. 39,6,30. 36 See for example H. de Jong, Development of Enrichment Liability : Byzantine Law in the Teaching of the Digest of Stephanus, Fundamina 16 1 (2010) 12–22.

Two interpretations of D. 17,1,27,1 in early Byzantine law

3.2

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Enantiophanes: lack of obligation and change of mind

In early Byzantine law Enantiophanes discusses the same solution37, although he focuses on other items of the text: Sch. Ca 20 ad B. 14,1,27,1 = D. 17,1,27,1 (BS *756/21–24 [Enantiophanes]): ToO 9mamtiovamoOr. Oq p\mtyr 1mowµ t_jtetai, oute letalek|lemor !makalb\my, !kk± jat± tµm di\stinim toO ig$. dic. toO e$. tit. toO kh$. bib. ja· bib. l$. tit. m$. (2?) dic. c$. ilo_yr ja· bib. ib$. tit. d$. dic. c$. ja· paq± lm^lgr dic. ib$. to}tou toO tit. 1m t` t]kei. By Enantiophanes. Not in the least an obligation arises, and neither having regret I get it back, but on the basis of the distinction of fragment 18, title 5 of book 38 and book 40, title 2, fragment 3. In the same way also book 12, title 4, fragment 3 and in memory fragment 12 of this title at the end.

Enantiophanes gives two ways how to interpret D. 17,1,27,1. The first one is: no obligation arises. The second claim interprets the reason for recovering the slave: this is not the change of mind. To clarify the first way Enantiophanes refers to D. 39,5,18,138 : D. 39,5,18,1 (Ulp 71 ad edictum): Denique refert aristonem putare, si servum tibi tradidero ad hoc, ut eum post quinquennium manumittas, non posse ante quinquennium agi, quia donatio aliqua inesse videtur : aliter atque, inquit, si ob hoc tibi tradidissem, ut continuo manumittas: hic enim nec donationi locum esse et ideo esse obligationem. Sed et superiore casu quid acti sit, inspiciendum Pomponius ait: potest enim quinquennium non ad hoc esse positum, ut aliquid donetur. “Next he quotes Aristo as thinking that if I deliver a slave to you on the understanding that you manumit him after five years have passed, no action can be brought before the five years is up since an element of gift is held to be involved. The situation is different, he says, from the one in which I deliver the slave to you on the understanding that you manumit him immediately since in that case no element of gift comes into it and an obligation exists. But Pomponius says that even in the former case the nature of the act should be investigated since it may be that the five-year period was not imposed with a view to the making of a gift.”

In this fragment according to Aristo in the first case no obligation arises, because the condition is not yet fulfilled. He speaks about the period before the moment of manumission as ‘an element of gift’ (donatio aliqua). Enantiophanes agrees with Aristo and ignores the opinion of Pomponius in this fragment who in37 For Enantiophanes, see N. van der Wal, Wer war der ‘Enantiophanes’?, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 48 (1980), 125–136. 38 See also his remark at D. 39,5,18,1 in BS 2758/24–25 [Enantiophanes]. This must be the same reference as in in BS 2916/22–33 [Enantiophanes] at D. 40,8,3. Cf. also BS 2758/18–19 [Anonymos]. For a discussion about this fragment in classical Roman law, see Erbe (note 19), 151–156; Noordraven (note 19), 74–78.

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troduces a refinement. Enantiophanes implies that the mandator cannot apply the actio mandati because the condition is not yet fulfilled39. To explain his second claim, a simple change of mind is not a sufficient ground to recover the slave, Enantiophanes refers to D. 40,2,3, but it must certainly be D. 40,8,3. This follows from the cross-reference of Enantiophanes’ remark at D. 40,8,3 where he refers to D. 12,4,5,2(1) and D. 17,1,27,2(1)40 : D. 40,8,3 (Call. 3 cognit.): Eum, qui ita venit, ut intra tempus manumitteretur, cum dies praestandae libertatis venerit vivente venditore et perseverante in eadem voluntate, perinde haberi, ac si ab eo, a quo debuit manumitti, manumissus esset: mortuo autem venditore non esse heredum eius voluntatem explorandam divus Marcus cum filio suo rescripsit. “By a rescript of the deified Marcus and his son, a slave sold with a covenant for his manumission within a given time, once the day for the grant of freedom has come with the seller alive and his wish unchanged, is to be treated as if he had been manumitted by the man bound to manumit; but if the seller is dead, the wishes of his heirs are not to be ascertained.”

From this fragment it follows that it is the change of mind ((non) in eadem voluntate) that brings about an action to recover the slave. That implies that paenitentia has indeed to be interpreted as change of mind. With his two claims Enantiophanes resolves D. 17,1,27,1 which is on these two points a bit obscure or could be misunderstood. At the end of his remark Enantiophanes refers to two fragments, D. 12,4,3 and D. 17,1,12. D. 12,4,3,3 regulates that one’s change of mind makes recovery possible41, as states D. 17,1,12,16 as well42. The consensus is the central point in Enantiophanes’ interpretation of D. 17,1,27,143. The mandate did not exist. Here too, the application of the condiction apparently refers to the unjust enrichment of the receiver. In short, Stephanos and Enantiophanes ignore the existence of the mandate, because the condition has not been fulfilled. Stephanos emphasizes the transfer of ownership, whereas Enantiophanes focuses on the absence of an obligation and the change of mind. They both base the condiction on the principle of unjust 39 Cf. BS 187/2–192/2, 188/3–5: (…) C 1±m lµ bo}kgtai, d¹r t¹m jaOsa d\ta jaOsa non secata jomdijt_jiom, 5mha b dedyj½r Qmtecqa N³ dgkom|ti letal]ketai ja· oq h]kei c_meshai t¹ sum\kkacla. (…) or when he does not want, give the condictio causa data causa non secuta, in case the giver integra re of course regrets and he does not want that there is a contract. (…). 40 BS 2916/22–33 [Enantiophanes] at B. 48,6,3 (D. 40,8,3). 41 D. 12,4,3,3 (Ulp. 26 ad ed.): Quid si ita dedi, ut intra certum tempus manumittas? Si nondum tempus praeteriit, inhibenda erit repetitio, nisi paeniteat: quod si praeteriit, condici poterit. Sed si Stichus decesserit, an repeti quod datum est possit? Proculus ait, si post id temporis decesserit, quo manumitti potuit, repetitionem esse, si minus, cessare. 42 See supra, note 5. 43 Cf. BS *708/1–20. In this scholion consensus is called the mother of the contract.

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enrichment, although they do not say this in so many words. They connect their interpretation of D. 17,1,27,1 to title D. 12,4.

4.

Conclusion

If a mandator regrets giving a slave to be manumitted after his death, he can use an action on the basis of D. 17,1,27,1. In early Byzantine law there are two possibilities for this action, the actio mandati and the condictio causa data causa non secuta. Cyrillos and an anonymous author call the action in D. 17,1,27,1 the actio mandati. Cyrillos makes a distinction between D. 17,1,27,1 and D. 12,4,3,2, that is in the title where Stephanos and Enantiophanes found their specific condiction. For Cyrillos it seems to be decisive in which Digest title the fragment is located. D. 17,1,27,1 is found in the mandate title and reads the actio mandati, whereas D. 12,4,3,2 is found in the title de condictione causa data causa non secuta and reads therefore the mentioned condiction. In this interpretation of D. 17,1,27,1 the mandate exists before the condition is fulfilled. Apparently the anonymous author and Cyrillos conservatively interpret the fragments in the context of their own titles. The recovery by the actio mandati in D. 17,1,27,1 cannot be explained as a simple imitation of the actio fiduciae with a right of withdrawal just because of its origin as a fiducia. D. 17,1,8 pr. and D. 17,1,55 indicate that the actio mandati appears to enforce the reddere-obligation to reclaim things. The choice for the actio mandati in D. 17,1,27,1 lies in the similar characteristics of this action. Cyrillos and the anonymous author choose to connect to these classical Roman characteristics within D. 17,1, there by probably interpreting this fragment in the same way as Justinians compilers did. By contrast, the later Byzantine jurists Stephanos and Enantiophanes choose the condictio causa data causa non secuta. In their interpretation no mandate is established because the condiction has not yet been fulfilled. Stephanos focuses on the transfer of ownership done manumissionis causa, whereas Enantiophanes emphasizes the absence of any obligation before the death of the mandator and the change of mind. In these interpretations, with references to D. 12,4, the basis of the condictio causa data causa non secuta must be the unjust enrichment of the transferee. Both jurists ignore for their interpretation the specific location of D. 17,1,27,1 in the title on mandate.

Wim Decock

De beroepsaansprakelijkheid van de advocaat in Lenaert Leys’ Over rechtvaardigheid en recht

1.

Inleiding

Met zijn talrijke studies op het kruispunt van ius commune en vroegmoderne scholastiek heeft Jan Hallebeek een fundamentele bijdrage geleverd tot een in de Nederlanden nog steeds bloeiende reflectie over de intellectuele en morele grondslagen van de Westerse rechtscultuur. Tegelijkertijd heeft Jan Hallebeek met de plichtsgetrouwheid tegenover de gemeenschap die hem eigen is steeds oog gehad voor de praktijkrelevantie van zowel zijn eigen wetenschappelijk werk als dat van de geleerde juristen uit de antieke, middeleeuwse en vroegmoderne tijden. Het past dan ook om in deze korte bijdrage enkele aspecten te belichten van een breder onderwerp dat de laatste jaren aan actualiteitswaarde heeft gewonnen, namelijk de deontologie en de daaraan gekoppelde aansprakelijkheid van de juridische beroepen. Daarbij gaan we het niet over de moraal van het rechterambt hebben – een doorgewinterde raadsheer in het Gerechtshof ’sHertogenbosch zoals de gevierde hoeft men niet de les te spellen (ius novit curia) – maar wel over een cruciale fase in de ontwikkeling van een deontologie voor de advocatuur. Een van de rijkste tradities rond de plichten en aansprakelijkheid van de advocaat vinden we in de moraaltheologische werken van de zogenaamde “theologen-juristen” uit de vroegmoderne tijd1. Deze vaststelling kan bij de moderne lezer verbazing wekken, omdat de scheiding tussen recht en religie een van de grondwettelijke basisprincipes van Westerse, geseculariseerde rechtsstaten is. Zoals Jan Hallebeek in zijn vele geschriften heeft aangetoond, was dit echter vele eeuwen anders, zodat de oorsprong van vele rechtsbeginselen en substanti[le rechtsdoctrines in een christelijke moreel-religieuze context ligt, bijvoorbeeld inzake ongerechtvaardigde verrijking en aansprakelijkheidsre1 Over het belang van deze “theologen-juristen” voor de ontwikkeling van het privaatrecht, zie J. Hallebeek/T. Wallinga, Fons et origo iuris, versio belgica. Een historische inleiding tot het vermogensrecht, Amsterdam 2013, 281–282.

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gimes2. Dit zal ook blijken uit onderhavige bespreking van enkele relevante passages betreffende de deontologie van de advocatuur uit het werk “Over gerechtigheid en recht” (De iustitia et iure) van de Zuidnederlandse jezu"et Lenaert Leys, alias Leonardus Lessius (1554–1623). Voortbouwend op het ius commune en het werk van andere moraaltheologen ontwikkelde Lessius een algemene aansprakelijkheidsleer voor adviseurs 8n een deontologie van de juridische beroepen. Het is geen toeval dat we bij Lessius een probleemstelling (dubium) vinden die expliciet aan de vraag naar de beroepsaansprakelijkheid van raadslui zoals advocaten gewijd is. Lessius stond omwille van zijn succesvolle adviespraktijk zelf bekend als het “Orakel der Nederlanden.” Hij was de alom geprezen raadsman van de aartshertogen Albrecht en Isabella (1598–1621), de financi[le expert voor de zakenlui op de Antwerpse beurs en de biechtvader van vele nobele onbekenden uit de high society van zijn tijd. In het eerste deel van zijn verbintenissenrecht zoals ontwikkeld in De iustitia et iure gaat Lessius in op de aansprakelijkheid uit onrechtmatige daad (iniuria) in het algemeen, waarna hij een aantal specifieke vraagstukken behandelt. De zevende bijzondere probleemstelling luidt als volgt: “Ontstaat een verbintenis tot herstel op grond van de schade ontstaan door lichte schuld of lichtste schuld begaan in het uitoefenen van het beroep of het geven van advies?”3 Deze vraag biedt Lessius de gelegenheid om zijn visie op meerdere facetten van de beroepsmoraal van de advocaat toe te lichten: zijn algemene verantwoordelijkheid, de met de cli[nt gedeelde aansprakelijkheid voor adviesverlening, de prijs van incompetentie en onwetendheid, en de onthoudingsplicht in hoogst dubieuze zaken.

2.

Aansprakelijkheid voor zware fout

Van Lessius kan men geen directe en na"eve antwoorden verwachten. Geheel in de traditie van de scholastiek maakt hij distincties en nuanceert. Zijn betoog maakt ook gebruik van de laat-middeleeuwse terminologie van het aansprakelijkheidsrecht, die onderscheidde tussen verschillende graden van fout

2 J. Hallebeek, Lijf ende goedt. De juridische bescherming van de menselijke persoon en diens vermogen. Een schets van de westerse rechtsgeschiedenis, Amsterdam 2016; J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism, Nijmegen 1996. 3 L. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, p. 69: Utrum nascatur obligatio restituendi ex damno culpa levi vel levissima in officio vel consilio dando commissa. Voor deze bijdrage is gebruikgemaakt van de online-uitgave van de tweede, herwerkte editie van Lessius, De iustitia et iure, Parijs 1606 in de Digital Library of the Catholic Reformation.

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(culpa): culpa lata of gravis, culpa levis en culpa levissima4. In de lijn van theologen-canonisten zoals Sylvester Prierias (ca. 1456–1523) en Mart&n de Azpilcueta (1491–1586) definieert Lessius deze begrippen als volgt5 : culpa lata is de fout die overeenkomt met het schenden van de zorgvuldigheidsnorm die mensen van dezelfde “conditie” altijd en overal respecteren. Een voorbeeld van grove fout is een uitgeleend boek buiten op de stoep laten liggen. Lichte fout (culpa levis) komt overeen met een gebrek aan de zorgvuldigheid die van de meer zorgvuldige beroepsbeoefenaars verwacht kan worden, terwijl de lichtste fout (culpa levissima) ontstaat door de uiterste zorgvuldigheid, aangewend door de meest zorgvuldigen, niet na te leven. Lessius stelt dat men, tenzij op grond van bijzondere contractuele bepalingen, in het geweten slechts voor culpa lata verantwoordelijk is, omdat van nature uit niemand zorgvuldiger moet zijn dan de mensen van zijn slag6. Lessius stelt dus dat in het gewetensforum niemand aansprakelijk kan gesteld worden voor lichte of lichtste fout in de uitoefening van zijn beroep. Niemand moet in zijn beroep of ambacht voorzichtiger en zorgvuldiger zijn dan andere mensen van zijn stand gewoonlijk zijn. Lessius geeft expliciet het voorbeeld van de advocaat: een advocaat moet niet zorgvuldiger of voorzichter zijn dan goede advocaten doorgaans plegen te zijn7. Als je dus je zaak verliest, omdat de advocaat niet gepresteerd heeft wat een uitzonderlijk geleerd en zorgvuldig advocaat zou presteren, kan je je advocaat toch niet aanspreken, zolang hij te goeder trouw gehandeld heeft zoals de doorsnee advocaat in gelijkaardige rechtszaken zou gehandeld hebben. De advocaat kan enkel voor grove fout aansprakelijk zijn. Hij nuanceert wel deze algemene regel. Stel dat de advocaat met zijn buitengewone competentie praalt en uitdrukkelijk verkondigt dat hij een uitzonderlijke prestatie zal neerzetten. Dan is hij tot herstel van schade op grond van lichte en lichtste fout gehouden, althans indien hij door zijn grote verklaringen een cli[nt die expliciet om een dergelijke hoogstaande dienst vroeg, voor zijn kantoor heeft kunnen winnen, en die cli[nt zich daardoor niet langer de moeite getroost heeft om een betere advocaat te zoeken8. De advocaat is echter

4 Hallebeek/Wallinga, Fons et origo iuris (noot 1) 207–216; R. Feenstra, Romeinsrechtelijke grondslagen van het Nederlands privaatrecht, Leiden 1994, nrs. 310–314, 188–191. 5 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, nr. 23, 69. 6 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, nr. 24, 69: Quando non intercessit aliquis contractus, non oritur obligatio restitutionis ratione damni dati (saltem in foro conscientiae) nisi ex culpa lata, non autem ex levi vel levissima. 7 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, nr. 31, 71: V.g. advocatus non tenetur esse diligentior aut prudentior, quam passim boni advocati esse solent. Unde si contingat te cadere causa, eo quod non praestitit quod doctissimus et diligentissimus praestitisset: tamen bona fide praestitit quod solent diligentes et docti in similibus causis, non tenetur ad restitutionem. 8 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, nr. 32, 71.

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niet tot compensatie van de volledige schade gehouden, maar enkel van de waarde van de hoop op een meer dan doorsnee dienst.

3.

Adviesverlening en de eigenverantwoordelijkheid van de cliënt

Vervolgens gaat Lessius nader in op het specifieke probleem van de aansprakelijkheid voor adviesverlening (consultatio) in het kader van de beroepsuitoefening. Hij stelt in de lijn van Juan de Medina (1490–1547), een theoloog uit Alcal# de Henares die bekend was omwille van zijn traktaat over restitutie en contracten, dat de jurist, theoloog, pastoor, biechtvader, predikant of andere beroepsmatige adviesverstrekker slechts voor grove fout of grove onwetendheid aansprakelijk gesteld kan worden9. Lessius geeft een voorbeeld van de aansprakelijkheid voor advies van de biechtvader: die is tot betaling van de schade gehouden wanneer hij beweert dat een bepaald contract geoorloofd is terwijl dat het niet is, tenminste wanneer zijn nalatigheid of gebrek aan competentie ernstig te noemen is. Op grond van ambt en beroep is men namelijk gehouden om bepaalde zaken te weten en bepaalde fouten te vermijden. Bovendien verwachten de cli[nten dat ze met een competent iemand te doen hebben, zodat de incompetente consultant die toch advies verleent de klant in feite misleidt10. Tegelijkertijd perkt Lessius de aansprakelijkheid van de adviseur sterk in. Wie raad geeft op basis van een opinio probabilis kan niet gehouden zijn voor schade, net zo min als wie gewoon zijn persoonlijke mening te kennen geeft zonder te willen adviseren of wie aangeeft dat hij twijfelt en zelf niet zeker is. Bovendien vindt Lessius dat een cli[nt die raad vraagt aan een expert die eigenlijk bevoegd is op een ander gebied zelf moet instaan voor de schade die hij eventueel lijdt op basis van dit advies, tenminste als hij weet of moet weten dat de adviseur niet competent is op dit gebied11. Lessius verdedigt dit standpunt op grond van het beginsel dat wie wetens en willens schade lijdt, de fout maar aan zichzelf moet wijten. Dit is een principe dat Lessius wel vaker toepaste bij de oplossing van

9 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, nr. 33, 71: Dico secundo, qui praebet consilium, tenetur ad restitutionem damni sequuti ratione ignorantiae crassae vel culpae latae, si erat parochus, confessarius, concionator, theologus, iurisconsultus vel eius professionis, ad quam talis consultatio spectabat. Ita Ioan. Medina, Cod. de restit. q.7. 10 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, nr. 33, 71: Probatur primo, quia talis ex officio et professione tenebatur hoc scire et in respondendo, hunc errorem vel negligentiam vitare, et non fecit: ergo censetur causa damni sequuti. Secundo, quia ratione suae professionis vel officii, habetur sufficiens ab eo, qui consilium petit: ergo si non sit sufficiens, et tamen respondeat, decipit alterum. 11 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, nr. 34, 71.

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concrete gevallen, wat ertoe geleid heeft dat zijn economisch denken vaak als uiterst liberaal ervaren werd12. Nochtans sluit Lessius’ pleidooi voor waakzaamheid in hoofde van de cli[nt goed aan bij de traditie van het ius commune. “Er ontstaat geen verbintenis uit een advies dat niet bedrieglijk is”, aldus een Romeins rechtsbeginsel (D. 50,17,47 pr.)13 dat als canoniekrechtelijk adagium overgenomen werd door Paus Bonifatius VIII (VI 5,13,62)14. De vroegmoderne juristen volgden onverdeeld deze Romano-canonieke beginselen. Zo stelde de Zuidnederlandse jurist Johannes Wamesius (1524–1590), professor aan de Leuvense universiteit en een beroemd adviseur15, dat raadgeving (consilium) niet onder het mandatum sensu stricto valt en daardoor slechts in geval van bedrog tot aansprakelijkheid aanleiding kan geven16. In navolging van een vroegmoderne glosse17 op een glosse van Accursius bij D. 3,2,20 breidde Wamesius het toepassingsveld van dit beginsel uit tot de aanbeveling (commendatio)18. In feite had hij deze regel ook kunnen koppelen aan D. 17,1,12,12, waar aanbevelingsbrieven voor niet-verbindend verklaard worden19. De Franse jurist Pierre Gr8goire (ca. 1540–1597) stelde in zijn invloedrijke “Syntagma iuris universi” dat de zorgvuldige keuze van een goede raadsman door het beginsel van D. 50,17,47 pr. des te dringender gemaakt werd. De cli[nt draaide namelijk alleen op voor slecht advies, niet zijn advocaat, tenminste als de laatste te goeder trouw had gehandeld20. Gelijkaardige standpunten 12 W. Decock, A historical perspective on the protection of weaker parties: Non-state regulators, colonial trade, and the market for junk bonds (16th–17th centuries), in: A. Keirse/ M. Loos (eds.), The Optional Instrument and the Consumer Rights Directive – Alternative ways to a new Ius Commune in contract law, Antwerpen/Oxford 2012, 49–64. 13 D. 50,17,47 pr. in: D. Godefroy (ed.), Corporis Iustinianaei Digestum novum, Lyon 1604, tom. 3, col. 1883: Consilii non fraudulenti nulla obligatio est. Caeterum si dolus et calliditas intercessit, de dolo actio competit. Bemerk dat de oorsprong van deze precieze formulering (“Consilii non fraudulenti nulla obligatio”) onterecht in D. 17,1,10,7 gezocht wordt in D. Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln und Rechtssprichwörter, München 2007, 51, nr. 70. 14 VI 5,13,62 in: Corpus iuris canonici emendatum et notis illustratum. Gregorii XIII iussu editum, Rome 1582 (=ed. Gregoriana), col. 841: “Nullus ex consilio dummodo fraudulentum non fuerit obligatur.” Bemerk dat dit adagium fout vertaald werd in Liebs (noot 13) 162, nr. 175. 15 W. Druwé, Loans and Credit in the Canon Law Consilia of Wamesius (1524–1590), TR 85 (2017) 230–271. 16 J. Wamesius, Responsa sive consilia, Antwerpen 1651, centuria 2, cons. 58, 211, nr. 7. 17 Gl. Non mandat ad Gl. Exhortatur ad D. 3,2,20 in: D. Godefroy (ed.), Corporis Iustinianaei Digestum vetus, Lyon 1604, tom. 1, cols. 353–354. Vgl. Gl. nullam esse actionem ad D. 16,3,1,14 in: Corporis Iustinianaei Digestum vetus, tom. 1, col. 1607. 18 Wamesius, Responsa sive consilia (noot 16), centuria 2, cons. 62, 226–227, nrs. 5–6. 19 D. 17,1,12,12 (met glosse Quia commendandi) in: D. Godefroy (ed.), Corporis Iustinianaei Digestum vetus, Lyon 1604, tom. 1, col. 1644 – met dank aan Prof. Dr. Boudewijn Sirks voor deze verwijzing. 20 P. Gr8goire, Syntagma iuris universi, Veneti[ 1593, part. 3, lib. 47, cap. 7, 675, nr. 8: Caeterum provide deligendi sunt consultores, qui periti sint in ea re quae deliberatur. Quia consilium in

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werden vertolkt door Jean Domat en Robert-Joseph Pothier21. In de Noordelijke Nederlanden zien we dat rechtsgeleerden zoals Cornelis van Bijnkershoek (1673–1743)22 het Romeinse beginsel “consilii non fraudulenti nulla obligatio” rabiaat verdedigden. Wie zou anders nog bereid zijn om advies te verlenen23 ? Nochtans voegt Lessius een regeling toe die de bescherming van derdenbelangen moet garanderen: in beginsel draait de cli[nt zelf op voor zijn onzorgvuldige keuze van een slechte raadsman, maar de consultant die door het verstrekken van raad op een hem ongekend gebied, bv. inzake een contract, indirect aan derden schade toebrengt, is in elk geval tegenover derden rechtstreeks voor die schade aansprakelijk24. Die derden stellen zich immers niet wetens en willens bloot aan schade. Dat de consultant zonder enige fout de expertise waarnaar hij gevraagd werd niet in huis had, kan niet aan derden tegengeworpen worden, omdat uiteindelijk niemand zich mag bemoeien met zaken waarin hij niet thuis is. Dat brengt ons meteen tot een volgend belangrijk punt in Lessius’ discours, namelijk de aansprakelijkheid van de advocaat wegens gebrek aan competentie.

4.

De prijs van onbekwaamheid: imperitia culpae adnumeratur

Lessius is van oordeel dat de advocaat die door onkunde (imperitia) of nalatigheid (negligentia) een zaak verliest die zijn cli[nt manifest moest gewonnen hebben – met name in een zogenaamde “gerechte zaak” (iusta causa) – volledig aansprakelijk is voor de schade die daaruit volgt25. Ambtshalve is de advocaat

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caput tantum consulentis, non eius qui consilium dat, vertitur. Et consilii non fraudulenti nulla est obligatio. Quia consilium non imponit necessitatem, et quilibet explorare debet, an consilium sibi expediat. Qui consilium dat, quod melius sibi videtur dicit, si mala fide non consulat: ideo non tenetur ob bonam fidem. Si autem ea absit, tenetur. J. Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, Luxemburg 1702, vol. 1, lib. 1; tit. 15, sect. 1, par. 13 (“du conseil et recommendation”), 138; R.J. Pothier, Trait8 du contrat de mandat, chap. 1, sect. 2, art. 1, par. 6 (“l’affaire ne doit pas concerner le seul int8rÞt du mandataire”), nrs. 15–16, in: A. Dupin (ed.), Œuvres de Pothier, Parijs 1824, vol. 4, 215–216. B. Sirks, Cornelis van Bijnkershoek as author and elegant jurist, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 79 (2011) 229–252. C. van Bijnkershoek, De rebus varii argumenti, cap. 2, in: Opera omnia, Napels 1767, tom. 3, 423: In omnibus publicis privatisque causis valere debet illud Ulpiani in l. 47, ff. de reg. iur. consilii non fraudulenti nulla obligatio est, etiam nunc, quum consilium ei, cui datur, non expediat, ut recte addit Gajus in l. 2, par. ult. ff. mandat. Si quis rebus in arduis consilium desideret, plures sunt, qui dare possunt, sed nemo unus eventum praestiterit; si et hunc exigas, ecquis erit, qui consilio suo tibi adesse velit? vel duo, vel nemo. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 7, dub. 7, nr. 34, 71. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 31, dub. 8, nr. 47, 370: Respondeo et dico primo, quando ex negligentia vel imperitia ipsius cliens iusta causa excidit, tenetur de damno, quod ipsi inde obvenit. Ratio est, quia lege iustitiae tenetur suo clienti pro causae conditione diligentiam praestare, ut si sit difficilis, si magni momenti, tenetur magis laborare quam si facilis vel parvi

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namelijk gehouden om het recht te kennen wanneer hij zich voor een bekwaam advocaat laat doorgaan en zich overeenkomstig laat betalen. Voor een moeilijke zaak moet de advocaat zich ook meer inspannen dan voor een gemakkelijke. Ook hier vertolkt Lessius een standpunt dat wijdverbreid was in zijn tijd. Het vloeit in wezen voort uit het Romeinse adagium dat “onbekwaamheid gelijkgesteld wordt met een fout” (imperitia culpae adnumeratur) (D. 50,17,132; I. 4,3,7)26. Bartolus de Saxoferrato paste dit beginsel, dat oorspronkelijk in de Romeinsrechtelijke context van locatio conductio werd ontwikkeld (bv. D. 19,2,9,5), bij uitbreiding toe op schadegevallen voortvloeiend uit slecht advies geleverd door een incompetente advocaat27. In de vroegmoderne tijd is de toepassing van “imperitia culpae adnumeratur” bij schadegevallen veroorzaakt door onbekwame raadslui gemeengoed geworden. Zo stelt Pierre Gr8goire dat de advocaten steeds moeten voor ogen houden dat God hen bij het laatste oordeel rekenschap zal vragen voor verkeerd of slecht advies dat voortvloeit uit hun onwetendheid (per ignorantiam)28. Hij maant hen dan ook aan om zorgvuldiger te zijn dan ze spontaan zouden geneigd zijn. Gr8goire stelt dat de advocaat in de rechtbank van het geweten tot herstel gehouden is wanneer de rechter op basis van zijn advies een vonnis uitspreekt dat schadelijk is voor zijn cli[nt. Onbekwaamheid staat immers gelijk met fout (non culpa caret imperitus)29. Men is aansprakelijk wanneer men een taak op zich neemt waarvoor men niet bekwaam is, en weet of behoort te weten dat dat gebrek aan expertise de cli[nt zal schaden. In Arnold Vinnius’ (1588–1657) commentaar op de Instituten lezen we dat iemand die zich uitgeeft voor een deskundige aansprakelijk is indien hij schade berokkent wegens gebrek aan vakbekwaamheid30. De Friese rechtsgeleerde Jacob Bouricius (1544–1622) had ondertussen in zijn “Advocatus”, een invloedrijk werk over de plichtenleer van de advocaat, precies hetzelfde standpunt tot uiting gebracht met betrekking tot onbekwame advocaten31.

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momenti. Similiter ex officio tenetur esse instructus convenienti peritia, cum pro ideoneo advocato se gerat et ut talis stipendia exigat, vide supra cap. 7 dub. 7. Liebs (noot 13) 98, n. 19. In de editie van Godefroy gaat het evenwel om de maxime met nummer 174; zie D. 50,17,174 in: Godefroy (ed.), Corporis Iustinianaei Digestum novum, tom. 3, col. 1915: Imperitia culpae adnumeratur. Bartolus de Saxoferrato, In secundam Digesti veteris partem commentaria, Veneti[ 1570, f. 110r. Gr8goire (noot 20) part. 3, lib. 47, cap. 7, 676, nr. 12. Gr8goire (noot 20) part. 3, lib. 47, cap. 7, 676, nr. 12. Hallebeek (noot 2), Lijf ende goedt, 439. J. Bouricius, Advocatus, Leuven 1643, vertaald door J. Nauwelaers met een inleiding en opmerkingen, Brussel 1942, 37: “De l’avis g8n8ral des docteurs, l’avocat qui, par une imp8ritie caract8ris8e ou par n8gligence, perd la juste cause de son client, a l’obligation, tant en conscience qu’en droit, de r8parer le pr8judice subi par celui-ci.”.

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De advocaat als eerste rechter: onthoudingsplicht in ongerechte zaken

Naast beschouwingen die expliciet aan het vraagstuk van de aansprakelijkheid van de advocaat als adviesverlener gewijd zijn, behandelt Lessius in een sectie over de deontologie van de procespartijen andere aspecten van de plichten en de aansprakelijkheid van de advocaat32. Daarbij gaat het onder meer om het armenrecht, het behartigen van dubieuze gevallen en de vraag of de advocaat in een strafzaak de getuigen in diskrediet mag brengen door hun verborgen misdaden aan het licht te brengen. Eveneens aan de orde is de vraag naar de aansprakelijkheid van de advocaat voor het behartigen van een zaak die manifest ongerecht of onbillijk is (causa iniusta). Deze vraag hangt samen met een van de hoofdopdrachten die de advocaat traditioneel toevertrouwd werd, met name het optreden als rechter vjjr de rechter. De advocaat is de eerste die als een soort rechter zijn advies over de rechtmatigheid van de eis of de verdediging moet uitspreken. Hoewel Lessius zelf niet in detail op deze thematiek ingaat, wijdt zijn tijdgenoot Bouricius er een uitvoerige bespreking aan. Volgens Bouricius zijn de eerste twee taken van de advocaat de volgende: 1) de partijen afraden om hun geschil voor het gerecht uit te vechten; 2) optreden als eerste rechter door het afwijzen of aannemen van de zaak. De typisch Romano-canonieke aanmaning tot buitengerechtelijke geschillenbeslechting verdient een behandeling op zich die hier niet aan de orde is. Daarentegen verdient de plicht van de advocaat om als eerste rechter op te treden onze volle aandacht. Deze verantwoordelijkheid wordt sterk benadrukt in deontologische traktaten zoals dat van de Friese rechtsgeleerde Bouricius, maar ook in praktijkgerichte decisiones-literatuur, bv. door de Mechelse jurist Paul van Christijnen (1553–1631)33. De advocaat moet zijn taak van eerste rechter bijzonder ernstig nemen – zowel in het belang van zijn cli[nt als in het belang van zichzelf en zijn beroepsgroep. Volgens Bouricius is het gebrek aan oordeelkundig afwijzen van bepaalde zaken bij veel van zijn confraters de hoofdreden waarom de advocatuur in zo een slecht daglicht staat bij verstandige en deugdzame mensen. Door uit winstbejag ongerechte zaken te bepleiten, verspelen de advocaten namelijk niet alleen hun eigen geloofwaardigheid maar ook die van hun confraters, zelfs in de ogen van hun verachtelijke cli[nten34. De advocaat die ongerechte zaken bepleit, brengt

32 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 31. 33 P. Christinaeus, Practicae quaestiones, Antwerpen 1626, tom. 2, tit. 6, decis. 99, 194, nrs. 9–17. Over Paul van Christijnen, zie A. Wijffels, Christinaeus’ “Practicae quaestiones”, in: S. Dauchy et al. (eds.), The Formation and Transmission of Western Legal Culture. 150 Books that Made the Law in the Age of Printing, Cham 2016, 177–180. 34 Bouricius (noot 31) 46–47.

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zijn zieleheil in gevaar en haalt zich de toorn Gods op de hals35. Bouricius vindt dat de advocaat die zijn taak als eerste rechter niet goed uitoefent de bal alleen maar mis kan slaan: als hij een ongerechte zaak bepleit en wint, dan is hij tot herstel tegenover de tegenpartij gehouden; als hij een ongerechte zaak verliest, dan is hij tegenover zijn eigen cli[nt tot restitutie verplicht36. Met deze nuchtere vaststelling komen we opnieuw bij Lessius. Ook Lessius stelt onomwonden dat de advocaat die een ongerechte zaak bepleit daar enkel bij kan verliezen. Zodra de advocaat inziet dat hij een ongerechte zaak behartigt, is hij gehouden tot het betalen van een schadevergoeding aan de tegenpartij37. Als zijn cli[nt zelf te goeder trouw is, maar de advocaat hem niet inlicht over de onbillijke aard van zijn vordering, dan is de advocaat ook tegenover zijn eigen cli[nt tot herstel verplicht. De advocaat heeft er dus alle belang bij om zijn taak als eerste rechter ernstig te nemen. Net zoals Bouricius raadt Lessius de advocaat verder af om toe te geven aan de druk van een partij die wetens en willens een ongerechte zaak wil bepleiten. De advocaat moet een dergelijke cli[nt laten vallen38. Verder biedt buitengerechtelijke geschillenbeslechting in het geval van een ongerechte zaak geen uitweg. Advocaten en andere raadgevers die tijdens het proces vaststellen dat ze een onbillijke zaak verdedigen, begaan een zware zonde wanneer ze de andere partij tot een vergelijk in der minne onder de vorm van een dading (transactio) proberen te overhalen. Een dading veronderstelt immers dat de zaak nog twijfelachtig is, wat niet het geval is bij een causa iniusta.

6.

Grepen uit het Nachleben van Lessius

De deontologische traditie waar Lessius voor staat, bleef buitengewoon veerkrachtig in de eeuwen die volgden op de verschijning van zijn werk. In de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw bleven talloze juristen en moraaltheologen bespiegelingen wijden aan de plichten van de advocaat-raadsman. In de katholieke traditie zijn de deontologische beschouwingen in het werk “Over rechtvaardigheid en recht” van de kardinaal-jurist Juan de Lugo (1583–1660) het vermelden waard. In de voetsporen van Lessius bespreekt Lugo in zijn “De iustitia et 35 Bouricius (noot 31) 40. 36 Bouricius (noot 31) 42. 37 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 31, dub. 8, nr. 48, 370: Quando tuetur causam quam advertit esse iniquam, tenetur ad restitutionem omnium damnorum, quae parti obveniunt ratione illius patrocinii, ut expensarum factarum, et eorum omnium quae per litem amisit. 38 Lessius, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 31, dub. 8, nr. 49, 370. Vgl. Bouricius (note 30) vertaald door J. Nauwelaers, 42: “Si le client insiste et le presse, l’avocat doit refuser son concours et ne pas courir les dangers dont on vient de parler. Ainsi du moins, il ne souillera pas son .me, ce qui arrivera si, flattant son client de fallacieux espoirs, il le pr8cipite dans la proc8dure et lui cause des frais et des soucis.”.

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iure” het vraagstuk van de aansprakelijkheid van de advocaat-adviesverlener. Zijn uiteenzetting over de beroepsaansprakelijkheid op grond van slecht advies is nauwgezet en systematisch, al lijkt hij meer aandacht te besteden aan de aansprakelijkheid van de arts dan van de advocaat39. Lugo behandelt de deontologie van de advocaat en de notaris tezamen en gaat daarbij nog veel meer in de details dan Lessius40. Hij volgt Lessius’ standpunt dat de beroepsbeoefenaar niet op grond van lichte en lichtste fout aansprakelijk kan gesteld worden, tenzij wanneer hij een cli[nt lokt door reclame te maken voor zijn uitzonderlijke expertise41. Meer nog dan Lessius gaat Lugo in op de medeplichtigheid van adviseurs in de uitlokking van misdrijven of het geven van de opdracht ertoe (delictueel mandaat)42. Een goed voorbeeld van hoe deze traditie in de zeventiende eeuw ook in de protestantse wereld succes kende, biedt het juridisch-theologische traktaat “Forum conscientiae” van de hand van de Utrechtse raadsheer Johannes van der Meulen (1635–1702)43. Ook hij sneed het vraagstuk van de morele plichten van de advocaat aan. Bij momenten toonde hij zich echter begripsvoller dan de vroegmoderne juristen en theologen. Zo wijst hij erop dat zelfs de meest bekwame en toegewijde advocaat een geding kan verliezen door de onbekwaamheid van de rechter (imperitia judicis)44. Is de advocaat wel competent, dan kan het nog altijd zijn dat hij zich in bepaalde zaken vergist en toch niet moet aansprakelijk gesteld worden. Niemand is namelijk vrij van vergissingen en black-outs. Dat de zaak verloren wordt, moet dan aan de “menselijke zwakheid” toegeschreven worden, of zelfs aan de cli[nt, die maar een betere advocaat had moeten raadplegen45. Wat dit laatste punt betreft, deelt hij dus het standpunt van 39 J. de Lugo, Disputationes de iustitia et iure, Lyon 1646, tom. 1, disp. 8, sect. 7 (Ex quali culpa in officio commissa oriatur obligatio restituendi?), 224–226. 40 De Lugo (noot 39) tom. 2, disp. 41, 678–685. 41 De Lugo (noot 39) tom. 1, disp. 8, sect. 7, nrs. 90–91, 224. 42 De Lugo (noot 39) tom. 1, disp. 19, sect. 1, 525–536. – Bemerk dat in de moraaltheologische traditie consilium tegen het einde van de negentiende eeuw bijna uitsluitend benaderd werd vanuit de problematiek van de strafrechtelijke deelneming; bv. in G. Waffelaerts (1847–1931), Tractatus de iustitia, Brugge 1886, vol. 2, 258–260, nrs. 281–284 (met uitdrukkelijke verwijzing naar Lugo’s discussie), of in A. Lehmkuhls (1834–1918), Casus conscientiae, Freiburg i. Br. 19134, casus 225, 373–374. Reeds in de vroegmoderne tijd vindt men uitgebreide uiteenzettingen over de strafrechtelijke aspecten van raadgeving; zie bv.: D. Tuschi, Practicae conclusiones iuris, Frankfurt 1621, tom. 2, concl. 762–763, 124–125. 43 Over Johannes Van der Meulen, zie W. Decock, The Law of Conscience in the Reformed Tradition: Johannes A. van der Meulen (1635–1702) and his “Tractatus theologico-juridicus”, in: M. Germann/W. Decock (eds.), Conscience in the Legal Teachings of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, Leipzig 2017, 87–110. 44 J. van der Meulen, Forum conscientiae seu jus poli, hoc est tractatus theologico-juridicus, Utrecht 1693, part. 1, quaest. 22, 314. 45 Van der Meulen (noot 44) part. 1, quaest. 22, 313–314: Secundo enim casu ex animi sui sententia secundum ingenii sui modulum ac prout ejus conscientiae dictavit, consilium dedit,

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een Lessius, Gr8goire of Bijnkershoek. Slechts in het geval van manifest onbekwaam of lichtvaardig advies, of wanneer de advocaat een bedrieger is die zijn doctorstitel gekocht heeft, is hij volgens Van der Meulen gehouden tot schadevergoeding. In de achttiende eeuw verscheen een standaardwerk over moraaltheologie van Alfonso de’ Liguori (1696–1787), een Italiaanse advocaat en theoloog die later tot patroonheilige van de moraaltheologen gekroond werd. In zijn “Theologia moralis” heeft Liguori een relatief kleine sectie over de plichten van de advocaat voorzien waarin hij zeer beknopt de discussies van zijn voorgangers samenvat. Omwille van het grote Nachleben van dit werk verdient het echter de nodige aandacht. Volgende vragen komen aan bod in Liguori’s uiteenzetting: 1. de voorwaarden voor de beroepsuitoefening; 2. de personen die het beroep niet mogen uitoefenen; 3. de ongerechte zaken; 4. het armenrecht; 5. het pleiten van een minder waarschijnlijke zaak; 6. de restitutieplichten van de advocaat; 7. het pactum de quota litis; 8. de vergoeding van de prestaties van de advocaat; 9. de zonden tegen het beroep46. Inzake het verdedigen van ongerechte zaken is hij min of meer dezelfde mening toegedaan als Lessius: de advocaat is tot het betalen van een schadevergoeding aan de tegenpartij en aan zijn eigen cli[nt gehouden, tenzij de cli[nt op de hoogte was van de ongerechte aard van zijn vordering47. In ieder geval hecht ook Liguori belang aan de taak van de advocaat als eerste rechter48. Het eerste advies dat de advocaat aan zijn cli[nt verleent betreft de billijkheid en waarschijnlijkheid van zijn rechtsvordering. Vooral voor het abusief rekken van de procedure en het vorderen van buitensporige erelonen neemt Liguori de advocaten zwaar op de korrel49. Tot de zonden tegen het beroep rekent hij verder gebrekkige competentie, verwaarlozing van kennis van de lokale wetgeving en het gewoonterecht, het verdedigen van een ongerechte zaak, excessief gebruik van vertragingsmanoeuvres die manifest de belangen van de tegenpartij schenden, omkoping van getuigen, optreden als advocaat voor beide partijen, in dezelfde zaak als advocaat en rechter of bijzit dienen, valsheid in geschrifte, verdraaien van de wetten, citeren van valse of afgeschafte wetgeving, gebruik van tergende, dilatoire excepties, excessieve verloning, advies geven tot het sluiten van woekerachtige contracten, en schending van de geheimhoudingsplicht. Bijgevolg is de advocaat aansprakelijk voor de schade in hoofde van zowel zijn cli[nt als de tegenpartij die

46 47 48 49

quod si erravit forte, humanae imbecillitati id imputandum, cui condonandum est. jo. Cliens quoque sibi imputet, quod illum et non alium consuluerit. A. de Liguori (ed. Gaud8), Theologia moralis, Rome 1907, tom. 2, lib. 4, cap. 3, dub. 3 (Quod sit officium advocati?), 641. De Liguori (noot 46) tom. 2, lib. 4, cap. 3, dub. 3, nr. 223/18, 643. De Liguori (noot 46) tom. 2, lib. 4, cap. 3, dub. 3, nr. 223/48, 644. De Liguori (noot 46) tom. 2, lib. 4, cap. 3, dub. 3, nr. 226/118, 646.

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ontstaat door zijn gebrek aan competentie (imperitia), verdorvenheid (malitia) of onzorgvuldigheid (negligentia). Wat de zorgvuldigheidsnorm betreft, merkt Liguori op dat die geconcretiseerd moet worden al naar gelang het geval, omdat niet elke zaak even veeleisend is. Hoewel Liguori’s bespreking van de plichten van de advocaat beknopt was, zinderde het lange tijd na bij zowel juristen als theologen. In zijn boek over de geschiedenis van de advocatuur uit 1951 citeert Bernard Hermesdorf niet alleen Bouricius maar ook Liguori. Uitgerekend wanneer hij de aansprakelijkheid van de advocaat voor gebrek aan competentie bespreekt, verwijst Hermesdorf naar “Sint Alfonsus”50. Ondertussen hadden ook een aantal lexica het licht gezien die het werk van Liguori toegankelijker moesten maken, bijvoorbeeld het “Lexicon theologiae moralis” uit 1846. Daarin werden een aantal plichten van de advocaat in vraag- en antwoordvorm aan de lezer bijgebracht. Zo luidt de eerste vraag: “Welke zijn de vereisten waaraan de advocaat moet voldoen?” Op basis van Liguori is het antwoord: “Vereist zijn kennis, een gerechte zaak, trouw en een gerechte prijs”51. Dit zijn vereisten die ondertussen gemeengoed waren, ook in de deontologische literatuur uit niet-katholieke hoek. Zo stelt de gereformeerde praktijkjurist Johannes van der Linden (1756–1835) in “De ware pleiter” (1827) dat het aanvaarden van ongerechte zaken alleen maar tot credibiliteitsverlies kan leiden52. Verder benadrukt hij het belang van de expertise van de advocaat zowel op het vlak van het geldende recht als het natuurrecht en het Romeinse recht53.

7.

Besluit

In een christelijke rechtscultuur zoals die van het vroegmoderne Europa spelen het geweten en het alziende oog van God op de achtergrond steeds mee, ook bij de uitwerking van een beroepsethiek voor advocaten54. De grens tussen het vraagstuk van de beroepsaansprakelijkheid van de advocaat en de ontwikkeling 50 B.H.D. Hermesdorf, Licht en schaduw in de advocatuur der Lage Landen, Leiden 1951, 53. 51 R. Vercellensis, Lexicon theologiae moralis, ex operibus S. Alphonsi Mariae de Ligorio depromptum, s.l. 1846, s.v. advocatus, 30. 52 J. van der Linden, De ware pleiter, Amsterdam 1827, 18. Over de figuur Van der Linden, zie: T. Wallinga, Johannes van der Linden and his draft Code for Holland, Fundamina. A Journal of Legal History 16 (2010) 563–577; over zijn deontologie in het bijzonder, zie R. Verkijk, De eer van de stand, in: G. Martyn/G. Donker/S. Faber/D. Heirbaut (eds.), Geschiedenis van de advocatuur in de Lage Landen, Hilversum 2009, 171–190. 53 Van der Linden (noot 52) 28. 54 E. Döhring, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtspflege seit 1500, Berlijn 1953, 156–162. Over de metafoor van het alziende oog van God en haar belang voor de ontwikkeling van de Westerse rechtscultuur, zie M. Stolleis, Das Auge des Gesetzes. Geschichte einer Metapher, München 2004.

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van een moreel-deontologische code voor het officium nobile was in de vroegmoderne tijd flinterdun. Auteurs zoals Lessius gingen vanuit hun bezorgdheid om recht en rechtvaardigheid uitdrukkelijk in op kwesties betreffende de aansprakelijkheid van de advocaat. Daarbij stond de vraag naar de beroepsaansprakelijkheid ten gevolge van het verlenen van schadelijk advies centraal. Er werd echter niet alleen van de advocaat, maar ook van zijn cli[nt zorgzame oplettendheid vereist. De taak van de advocaat als eerste rechter impliceerde dan weer een toename van zijn aansprakelijkheid voor het aanvaarden van dubieuze zaken. Een cli[nt in een ongerechte zaak adviseren om toch juridische stappen te ondernemen werd gelaakt, net zoals het nodeloos rekken van procedures. In het licht van de professionalisering van de advocatuur hoeft het ten slotte niet te verbazen dat in de loop der tijden de nadruk op aansprakelijkheid wegens gebrek aan competentie alsmaar toenam. Die competentie omvatte naast kennis van essenti[le morele beginselen, gewoontes, wetgeving en rechtspraak in de eerste plaats een gedegen opleiding in de beide rechten, zijnde het Romeinse recht en het canonieke recht, aangevuld met redelijk inzicht in het natuurrecht. Danzij zijn vele publicaties en het uitstekende handboek Fons et origo iuris heeft Jan Hallebeek tot de blijvende vertrouwdheid van vele generaties juristen met deze rijke rechtstradities bijgedragen.

Harry Dondorp

Restitution for wrongs in the civilian tradition

I.

Introduction

Restitution of unjust enrichment is a recurring topic in Jan Hallebeek’s studies1. He describes that there was no general enrichment action in Roman law: the condictio indebiti was used only for the recovery of undue payments and performances, the actio de in rem verso for restitution of the enrichment of a pater familias by a contract entered into by his slave or son under paternal control, and some actions were in specific circumstances limited to the extent of the defendant’s enrichment. Hallebeek lists two, one regarding the actio negotiorum gestorum contraria (Ulp. D. 3,5,5,5), the other regarding the hereditatis petitio (Ulp. D. 5,3,20,6c). The Roman law of delict, however, does provide a third example. If a wrongdoer dies before joinder of issue, proceedings continue (or commence) against his heirs, but their liability is limited to their enrichment. The principle is expressed in Pomp. D. 50,17,38: “Just as the heir of the deceased cannot be bound to pay the fine arising from a delict, he cannot benefit from it, if anything came to him as result thereof”. Examples of such delictual claims against heirs can be found in Ulp. D. 4,3,26 (actio de dolo), Ulp. D. 9,2,23,8 (actio legis Aquiliae), and Ulp. D. 4,2,16,2 (actio quod metus causa). Common lawyers distinguish between restitution of unjust enrichments where the cause of action to which the restitution responds is an unjust enrichment of the defendant at the claimant’s expense, and restitution for wrongs where the cause of action is the defendant’s breach of contract or tort that enriched him. Heirs of wrongdoers are, therefore, liable at Roman law because of 1 Cf. J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism, Nijmegen 1996; J. Hallebeek, Developments in Medieval Roman Law, in: E.J.H. Schrage (ed.), Unjust Enrichment, The comparative legal history of the law of restitution, Berlin 1995, 59–120; J. Hallebeek, The Condiction as Enrichment Action in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Century Legal Scholarship, TRG 63 (1995) 263–272; J. Hallebeek, Unjust Enrichment as a Source of Obligation, The Genesis of a Legal Concept, Restitution Law Review 10 (2002) 92–99.

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(and to the extent of) their own enrichment, at common law because of (and to the extent of) their testator’s. As Lord Mansfield pointed out in Hambly v. Trott (1776) “where the cause of action is a tort or arises ex delicto, supposed to be by force and against the King’s peace, there the action dies (with the person).” But he went on to say that the claim against the executor of the estate would not have failed, if a different form had been used. “Where, besides the crime, property is acquired which benefits the testator, there an action for the value of the property shall survive against the executor. As for instance, the executor shall not be chargeable for the injury done by his testator in cutting down another man’s trees, but for the benefit arising to his testator for the value or sale of the trees he shall”2.

II.

Actio personalis moritur cum persona

The common-law maxim Actio personalis moritur cum persona expresses that the cause of action extinguishes with the death of the plaintiff or defendant. Once being of general application, pertinent to both contractual3 and delictual actions, the rise of assumpsit significantly changed the rule and eventually reversed it4. Nowadays “all causes of action subsisting against or vested in a deceased person shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of the estate”5. 2 Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 Cowp 371 (KB) as quoted in: W. Swadling, Philips v Homfray (1883), in: C. Mitchell/P. Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in the Law of Restitution, Portland 2006, 163–183 at 169. 3 With regard to the intransmissibility of contractual actions, see Pinchon’s case (1611) 9 Co Rep 86b, discussed in: A.W.B. Simpson, A history of the common law of contract, the rise of the action of assumpsit, Oxford 1975, 558 ff (chapter 11: transmission of liability on death) at 571: “Pinchon’s Case established that contractual liability was transmissible. This conformed to the line of authority in the King’s Bench since Cleymond v. Vincent in 1523. Pinchon’s Case did not decide that personal representatives could be sued for breach of any promise made by the testator. In Elizabeth’s reign the Court of King’s Bench did allow such actions where the deceased had owed no debt, but the practice was disapproved in the King’s Bench in Hughes v. Rowbotham (1592) 2 by Popham C.J. (…) In Pinchon’s Case (1611) actions against executors on such ‘collateral promises’, as they were called, were expressly excluded from the scope of the decision. (…) Not long after Pinchon’s Case the question was raised again in Sanders v. Easterby (1616) upon a writ of error in the Exchequer Chamber from the King’s Bench, and after some doubt it was held that executors were liable on the collateral promises of their testator. The point was argued again a year later with the same result in Beresford v. Woodruff (1617), and again in Fawcett v. Charter (1623). But by the end of James I’s reign the principle was established, though the action for breach of promise of marriage remained an exception”. 4 Cf. B. Markesinis et al., Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law, Oxford 2007, 854; J. Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences, Oxford 2013, 134. 5 Cf. Section 1(1) & 4(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, as amended by section 4 of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954, and later modified by the Limitation Act 1968.

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The maxim is not taken from Roman law, though the rule Est enim certissima iuris regula, ex maleficiis poenales actiones in heredem non competere in Justinian’s Institutes may have suggested it6. Henry Goudy (1848–1921), Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, argued in 19137, that its origin is a confused8 passage in Bracton’s De legibus et consuetudinis Angliae on the extinction of obligations9. In the list taken from Azo’s summa Institutionum Henry de Bracton (c. 1210–1268), without warrant in the books that were before him10, introduced as mode of extinction the death of one of the parties: “An obligation is extinguished by the death of the other of those between whom it subsists, or of both, especially if it is penal and single; if it is double, penal and recuperatory, it is extinguished in so far as it is penal and to that extent does not lie against heirs, because penalties bind those who cause them, nor for heirs, [but] dies with the person”11. The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona is first quoted in 1479 by Sir William Catesby, who argued in a case of trespass for cutting an abbot’s trees, that the action does not lie for his successor “because actio personalis moritur cum persona, that this was a “personal tort” and that the action was ended by the plaintiff ’s death”12. In 1497 Sir John Mordaunt quoted the same maxim in a case of slander, where the perpetrator had died13. The very argument is sometimes used without quoting the maxim,14 e. g. by Newton CJ in 1440: “If one doth a 6 Cf. D. Ogg, Introduction to: Ioannis Seldeni ad Fletam dissertatio, Cambridge 1925, xliv ; W.W. Buckland/ A.D. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law, A Comparison in Outline, Cambridge 1936, 334; ed. Cambridge 1952, rev. F.H. Lawson, 417. 7 Cf. H. Goudy, Two Ancient Brocards, in: P. Vinogradoff (ed.), Essays in Legal History read before the International Congress of Historical Studies held in London in 1913, London 1913, 215–232 at 222. 8 Kantorowicz considered the manuscript text corrupt. He suggested that the text (quoted in the next footnote) should end: “nec denegatur (corr. datur) heredibus, quia peccatum (corr. poena) suos tenet auctores et extinguitur cum persona”; Cf. H. Kantorowicz, Bractonian Problems, Glasgow 1941, 99. In this interpretation, Bracton did not say that contractual obligations extinguish through the creditor’s death. 9 Cf. [Bracton], Bracton on the laws and customs of England, ed. G.E. Woodbine and transl. S.E. Thorne, 4 vols., Cambridge Mass., 1968–1977, II, 288: Item tollitur obligatio morte alterius contrahentium, uel utriusque, maxime si sit poenalis et simplex. Si autem duplex, poenalis et rei persecutoria, in hoc quod poenalis est tollitur, et non extenditur contra heredes, nec datur heredibus, quia poena suos tenet auctores et extinguitur cum persona. 10 Cf. W. Maitland (ed.), Select Passages from the Works of Bracton and Azo, London 1895, 163. 11 Transl. Thorne, Bracton, II, 288. 12 Cf. P.H. Winfield, Death as affecting liability in tort, Columbia Law Review 29 (1929), 239–254 at 244 citing Y.B. Mich. 18 Edw. IV f. 15, pl. 17. See also Simpson (note 3) 562. 13 Cf. Winfield (note 12) 244 citing Y.B. Trin. Hen. VII f. 22 pl. 2. For a description of the case see Simpson (note 3) 562; J.H. Baker/S.F.C. Milsom, Sources of English legal history. Private law to 1750, London 1989, 686. 14 Cf. Goudy (note 7) 225; Winfield (note 12) 245.

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trespass to me and dieth, the action is dead also, because it should be inconvenient to recover against one who was not party to the wrong”15. In his Doctor and Student, first printed in 1523, Christopher St. Germain (1460–1540) put the question, whether executors are bound in conscience to make amends for the trespasses of a testator. He answers that they should do so, but only after they have paid legacies and contractual debts, “for they were not compellable by no law to make amends for the trespass, because every trespass dieth with the person”16. In 1583, Lord Roger Manwood, Chief Baron of the Exchequer, ruled that the maxim did not apply, if the testator had profited from the tort17. In the case at issue Sir Henry Sherrington had cut down a hundred oaks and seized twenty cows belonging to Queen Elizabeth I. Sometime after his death, the AttorneyGeneral exhibited an information against his widow and executor. Plowden, counsel for Sir Henry’s widow, averred that an action of tresspass dies with the person. Lord Manwood favoured a middle course: executors should be chargeable, if the testator had benefited from his tort, but they were not be liable for his causing damage (damnum) e. g. by trampling herbage18. He said: “In each case where any price or value is placed on the thing in respect of which the offence has been committed, though he who committed the offence has died, the executors shall be charged for that offence. In this case the cutting of oaks of the value of £ 100 and for taking twenty oxen of the queen worth £ 20”19. In his Selden lecture Common law and Ius commune David Ibbetson asserts that “exactly the same distinction” was taken in the Parlement de Paris in a case of 1604, reported by Georges Louet20. Meant is the distinction between reparation and damages on the one hand, and restitution of dishonest gains on the other. Ibbetson emphasizes, that “however much the English and French results con15 (1440–41) Y.B. 19 Hen. VI f. 66 pl. 10 as quoted in translation in Swadling (note 2) 173. 16 Doctor and Student, dial. II chap. 10. Consulted edn. Doctor and Student, W. Muchall (ed.), Cincinatti 1874, available online at lonang.com/library/stgermain-doctor-and-student, at 128. 17 See Lord Mansfield in Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 Cowper 371: “Here is a fundamental distinction. If it is a sort of injury by which the offender acquires no gain to himself at the expence of the sufferer, as beating or imprisoning a man, etc. there, the person injured has only a reparation for the delictum in damages to be assessed by a jury. But where, besides the crime, property is acquired which benefits the testator, there an action for the value of the property shall survive against the executor. As for instance, the executor shall not be chargeable for the injury done by his testator in cutting down another man’s trees, but for the benefit arising to his testator for the value or sale of the trees he shall”. 18 Cf. (1583) Sherrington’s Case, Savile 40 123 ER 1000. “Mes quant l’action ou Information est pur defouler des herbs etc. ad dampnum l’executor ne serra charge”. 19 Transl. W.S. Holdsworth, A history of English law, London 1909, III, 580. 20 Cf. D. Ibbetson, Common law and ius commune, Selden Society Lecture delivered July 20th 2000, London 2001, 15–16.

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curred, so far as the reasoning goes we are in different worlds”. In France too, the question was whether an heir could be held liable to pay damages caused by a wrong committed by his now-deceased ancestor. The Paris court, as Ibbetson says, favoured a middle position between Roman and Canon law, “the heir being liable but only to the extent that he had benefitted”21. Ibbetson’s description of the “case of 1604 from the Parlement de Paris” raises several questions. Firstly, whether “the heir being liable to the extent he had benefitted” is a middle position between Roman and Canon law. Was the basic rule of Roman law that heirs were not liable, despite the fact that they had profited from their testator’s wrong? Secondly, whether “exactly the same distinction” was taken as in the English Sherrington’s case. Perhaps the wrongdoer did not pass on the profit to his heirs. Would they nevertheless be liable to the extent of their testator’s gain?

III.

Restitution for wrongs in the civilian tradition

As Francesco Giglio, Professor of Civil and Private law at the University of Surrey, argued in 2007, Roman law “furnishes a different, yet useful perspective for the study of restitution for wrongs”22. He cautions that the Roman law of delict was developed first to punish the wrongdoer. But in the claims for what came into one’s hands (actiones in id quod ad eum pervenit) Giglio traces classical-law examples of restitution for wrongs, “although their restitutionary nature is arguable”23. His foremost example is the claim against the heirs of a defrauder24. Ulpian said it is given only for what has 21 22 23 24

Ibbetson (note 20) 15. F. Giglio, The foundations of restitution for wrongs, Oxford 2007, 127. Giglio (note 22) 127. His other examples do not concern claims against heirs. One concerns a claim against a minor, whose guardian has committed a wrong, the other against a pater familias, whose slave or son breached a contract. See Giglio (note 22) 136: “Another such action was brought against the minor, who was liable for obligations which the tutor impuberis had accepted willfully in his stead”, citing D. 14,4,3,1. The text concerns a penal claim, the actio tributoria against the owner (here: a minor) who (here: whose guardian) has wronged the creditors in the liquidation of the commercial stock (merx peculiaris) of a slave, who traded with his consent. Cf. W.W. Buckland, Elementary Principles of the Roman Private Law, Cambridge 1912, 330. Giglio’s other example concerns a breach of contract. Cf. Giglio (note 22) 136: “The pater familias would have limited liability in the case of delicts committed in his name by a member of the familia” citing Kaser, RPR I, 605ff. Kaser, however, discusses the liability arising not from delict, but contract. See M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, I, Munich 1971, 606: “Vorausgesetzt ist bei allen adjektizischen Klagen eine Geschäftsführung (negotium gestum), sei es ein Vertrag oder ein vertragsähnliches Verhältnis, mit dem sich der Gewaltunterworfene oder Angestellte dem Dritten verpflichtet hat”.

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fallen into their hands25 (D. 4,3,17), Gaius that it is given to the extent the inheritance has profited (D. 4,3,26). Giglio expounds that “the praetor found himself before cases in which the wrongdoer had caused a relevant damage to the claimant and yet the latter had no claim because the wrongdoer died before the victim could sue him. This situation, albeit resting on a valid principle of personality of the poena, produced an outcome which was unfair to the victim. (…) Weighing the position of the heir on the one hand and of the victim of the other, the praetor decided that it would have been unjust if the heir had derived an undeserved windfall from a wrongful act, even though it was the act of another person”26. There are, however, more examples than fraud. Heirs of calumniators who have been paid to bring a false claim, are liable to the extent of what has fallen into their hands (Ulp. D. 3,6,5 pr), so are heirs of tax collectors who have seized goods (Paul. D. 39,4,4 pr), heirs of extortioners (Ulp. D. 4,2,16,2), and heirs of those who in case of shipwreck, collapse, or fire have carried away goods or received them (Paul. D. 47,9,4,2). Even a claim for wrongful damage is given, if “per chance, the heir has been made richer as a result of the damage done” (Ulp. D. 9,2,23,8)27. In 294 the emperors Diocletian and Maximian ruled that the heirs of a wrongdoer are liable for the whole sum due, if he died after joinder of issue, “otherwise only to the extent of what has fallen into their hands28, so that they may not be enriched by the crime of another” (C. 4,17,1)29. The same is expressed in the Digest title De diversis regulis iuris antiquis. From Pomponius’ commentary to Sabinus the compilators took as general principle of law: Just as the heir of the deceased cannot be bound to pay the fine arising from a delict, he cannot benefit from it, if anything came to him as result thereof (Pomp. D. 50,17,38)30. 25 Giglio (note 22) 136, refers to the fact that the nature of the claim is controversial, without taking sides between Kaser, who qualifies the actio ex dolo defuncti as the very same actio de dolo which could have been brought against the wrongdoer if he had still been alive, and Brasiello, who rejects any identification of both claims. 26 Giglio (note 22) 134–35. 27 Transl. Watson. Consulted edn. The Digest of Justinian, ed. T. Mommsen and P. Krueger, transl. A. Watson, Philadelphia 1985. On the question whether this is true for classical law, see R. Gamauf, Vindicatio nummorum. Eine Untersuchung zur Reichwelle und praktischen Durchführung des Eigentumsschutzes an Geld im klassischen römischen Recht [Habilitationsschrift 2001], 283–294. Available online at: https://roemr.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_ upload/i_roemisches_recht/Publikationen/Gamauf-Vindicatio_nummorum.pdf. 28 Blume erroneously translated in quantum ad eos peruenit with “for that proportion which they inherit”. His translation is available online at: http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-ju stinian. 29 Cf. C. 4,17,1: Post litis contestationem eo qui vim fecit vel concussionem intulit vel aliquid deliquit, defuncto successores eius in solidum, alioquin in quantum ad eos pervenit conveniri iuris absolutissimi est, ne alieno scelere ditentur. 30 Cf. D. 50,17,38: Sicuti poena ex delicto defuncti heres teneri non debeat, ita nec lucrum facere, si quid ex ea re ad eum pervenisset.

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In their commentaries to D. 50,17,38 the medieval glossators justified this rule with an argument found in Ulp. D. 3,6,5 pr : turpia enim lucra ab heredibus sunt extorquenda31. Johannes Bassianus († 1197) remarked that the principle does not apply to heirs of thieves (fures) – the broad Roman-law definition of theft (furtum) embracing not only simple stealing, but also embezzlement, knowingly receiving a mistaken payment, and the like. For the owner can bring a condictio ex causa furtiva for recovery of goods stolen by their testator even though none of these had fallen into the heirs’ hands,32 and even though they no longer exist at the time of their testator’s demise (Ulp. D. 13,1,7,2). In other words, their liability is independent of any enrichment on their part. Such notion can already be found in the Casus Codicis of William de Cabriano, who is said to have faithfully reported the lectures on the Code of Bulgarus de Bulgarinis (1085–1166)33. Accursius too listed the liability of heirs of robbers and thieves as one of the exceptions, found in Justinian’s Corpus iuris, to the rule that actiones ex delicto can only be brought against heirs to the extent of their enrichment34. The reason of their liability he could not subsume under the Roman sources of obligations: anomalam et separatam quandam habet naturam35. The Roman delictual claims against the heirs of wrongdoers provide an example of restitution of unjust enrichments, not of restitution for wrongs – save perhaps the condictio ex causa furtiva against the heirs of robbers and thieves. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the decretal In litteris tuis of Pope Alexander III (1Comp. 5.14.6; X 5.17.5) prompted many canonists to assert that Canon law diverged from the roman-law rule, which limited the heirs’ liability to their enrichment. They derived from this decretal that the wrongdoer’s heirs must compensate the damage done, although neither their testator, nor they 31 Cf. Bulgarus, Ad Digestorum titulum de diversis regulis iuris antiqui commentarius, ed. Beckhaus, Bonn 1856, 35: Actionibus quae sunt ex maleficio heres non tenetur nisi lis contestata fuerit contra defunctum. Si quid tamen ad eum peruenerit, ad id restituendum tenetur. turpia enim lucra ab heredibus sunt extorquenda; Johannes Bassianus, De regulis iuris, ed. Caprioli, Rimini 1983, 25; Gloss Sicuti ad D. 50,17,38 : … Si tamen qui turpiter quaesitum peruenit ad heredem, ei aufertur. Consulted edn. Corpus iuris civilis cum glossis, 6 vols., Lyon 1604, available online at http://amesfoundation.law.harvard.edu/digital/CJCiv/CJCivMeta data.html#ed. 32 Cf. Johannes Bassianus (n. 31) 25 (ad D. 50,17,38): et tamen ex furto defuncti rei subtracte nomine condictione tenetur heres, et si nihil ad eum peruenerit ex re furtiua. 33 Cf. William de Cabriano, The Casus Codicis of Wilhelmus de Cabriano, T. Wallinga (ed.), Frankfurt 2005, 256 (C. 4,17,1): nisi tale sit delictum in quo condictio furti locum habeat, ut rapina et furtum, tunc enim siue lis contestata fuerit siue non, siue ad heredes peruenerit siue non, condictione furtiua nihilominus tenentur. 34 Cf. Gloss scelere ditentur ad C. 4,17,1. 35 Cf. Gloss successoribus ad D. 13,1,7,2. Similarly Odofredus de Denariis, Lectura super Digesto Veteri, 2 vols, Lyon 1550–1552 repr. Bologna 1967–1968, II, fol. 45v. On the condictio furtiva in classical Roman law, see W. Pika, Ex causa furtiva condicere im klassischen römischen Recht, Berlin 1988.

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themselves profitted from the wrong36. In the case at issue the deceased, a Norman knight, who was guilty of many crimes, had been excommunicated for having set fire to churches. On his deathbed he had confessed his sins to his chaplain, who had lifted the excommunication and given absolution. When he was denied a Christian burial, his son turned to the pope. In a letter to the bishop of Clermont Alexander III instructed him to bury the now absolved knight and to compel his heirs to satisfy those who suffered loss because of his arson and other crimes37. Here the heirs’ liability cannot be based upon their enrichment by the crime. For, as Bartholomew of Brescia (c. 1200–1258) said, where arson is committed nothing falls into his heirs’ hands38. In his lectures on the Institutes, which Jacques de R8vigny († 1296) gave around 1260–1280 in Orl8ans, he pointed out that some canonists taught that the wrongdoer’s heir, into whose hands his goods fall, must compensate the damage done39. In other words, the heirs should use the inheritance to satisfy the victims of the deceased’s crimes. Is the estate meant with the words id quod ad eos peruenit in C. 4,17,1? If the wrongdoer dies before joinder of issue, his successors are liable “to the extent of what has fallen into their hands”. The ill-gotten goods the wrongdoer has passed on to his heirs, are meant, R8vigny explained, as derives from the subsequent “so that they may not be enriched by the crime of another”. It seems equitable, R8vigny added, that heirs use the inheritance to satisfy the victims of his crimes, but this he considered a lay notion of equity40. It was, however, as Pierre de 36 See Laurentius, gloss compellas ad 1Comp. 5,14,6, Tancredus, gloss ab herede ad 1Comp. 2,20,41, and Johannes Teutonicus, gloss ab heredibus ad C.12 q.2 c.34, discussed in J.H. Dondorp, Die Haftung für Delikte des Erblassers nach klassischem kanonischem Recht, Österreichisches Archiv für Recht und Religion 62 (2015), 1–23 at 13, 15–16. 37 Cf. X 5,17,5: … heredes eius moneas et compellas, ut his, quibus ille per incendium vel alio modo damna contra iustitiam irrogaverat, iuxta facultates suas condigne satisfaciant, ut sic a peccato valeat liberari. Consulted edn. Corpus iuris canonici, ed. E. Friedberg, 2 vols, Leipzig 1881, II, c. 809. 38 Cf. Bartholomeus Brixiensis, Quaestiones dominicales et veneriales (Hs. Madrid, BNE 283, fol. 34v): Queritur utrum heredes defuncti teneantur ex maleficio defuncti, si lis non sit contestata cum defuncto nec aliquid peruenit ad heredes. Videtur quod sic per decretalem extra de rapt. In litteris (X 5.17.5), quia ibi incendium factum erat, de quo nihil ad heredes peruenit. 39 Cf. Jacobus de Ravani, Lectura super Inst. 4,12,1 s.v. Non autem omnis in Ms. Paris BN 14350, fol. 182rb: Quidam canoniste dicunt quod tenetur heres ad quem bona perueniunt, ad michi resarciri dampnum. Seruent hoc in iure suo. De iure ciuili non tenetur ex quo lis non est contestata nec aliquid ex eo delicto ad eum peruenit. 40 Cf. Jacobus de Ravani, Lectura super Codice, Paris 1519, Bologna 1967, fol. 176vb (ad C. 4,17,1): Et non intelligas quod hoc casu teneantur de eo quod ad eos peruenit, scilicet ex bonis defuncti, sed in quantum ad eos peruenit, scilicet ex delicto defuncti. (…) Hec certe prima expositio magis respicit rusticanam equitatem : ut si pater meus dedit tibi damnum et mortuus est antequam lit(em) contesta(vit) reus contra ipsum, quod ego qui succedo sibi, quia habeo bona delinquentis, si tanta fuerint ut possit sibi satisfieri, quod tibi satisfaciam.

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Belleperche († 1304), his younger colleague, said, a notion, which Bernard endorsed41. Meant is the author of the Glossa ordinaria to the decretals, who derived from the decretals In litteris and Parochiano tuo – in the latter Pope Gregory IX confirmed Alexander III’s ruling – that delictual claims were passively transmissible at Canon law42. As Jean Faure († c. 1340) reports,43 Bernard’s view was not uncontested among the canonists. Sinibaldo Fieschi (Innocent IV; c. 1195–1254) for instance, interpreted these decretals differently, arguing that the heirs’ duty to make amends did not rise from their testator’s wrong, as Bernard of Parma taught, but from his promise to his confessor, made at his deathbed, to satisfy the victims of his crimes. In other words: Innocent IV construed a contractual liability44. Roman law and Canon law provided, therefore, two different basic rules with regard to the liability arising from a wrong. On the one hand, the basic rule of Roman law, that heirs were to restitute their enrichment (id quod ad eos pervenit) by the wrong of the deceased. On the other hand, the basic rule of Canon law, that heirs, irrespective of any enrichment on their part, should use the inheritance to amend the wrongs of their testator, who at his deathbed had confessed his sins and gained absolution. In the civilian tradition Roman law granted a claim against heirs for restitution of their (own) enrichment, Canon law a claim against heirs for reparation and damages. Common law, as derives from Sherrington’s case (1583), allowed a claim against heirs for restitution of the goods that had fallen into the wrongdoer’s hands, Roman law for restitution of the ill-gotten goods the wrongdoer had passed on to his heirs. In Sherrington’s case (1583) the English court distinguished between claims for damages, which do not lie against the wrongdoer’s heirs, and claims for restitution (which do). “Exactly the same distinction” Ibbetson found in the

41 Cf. Pierre de Belleperche, Repetitio on C. 4,17,1: “To the decretal I cannot answer : it is all layjustice and Bernard (of Parma) approves of it.” Transl. Bezemer. Cf. K. Bezemer, Pierre de Belleperche, Portrait of a legal puritan, Frankfurt 2005, 125. 42 Cf. Gloss et eius heredes ad X 3,28,14: Similem casum habes infra de rap. In Litteris (X 5,17,5). Et ita ex hoc capitulo et illo patet quod heredes conueniuntur ex maleficio defuncti, licet nihil inde pervenerit ad eos, quamvis lis contestata non fuerit cum defuncto, cum ad eos bona defuncti pervenerint. (…). 43 Cf. Johannes Faber, Commentaria super Codice, Lyon 1537, fol. 90vb (ad C. 4,17,1) s.v. peruenit: (…) Item de iure canonico uidetur hoc correctum extra de sepul. c.fi. (X 3,28,14). Vel dic quod ibi predecessor confessus fuerat, ut notatur in Speculo. de interrog. et iur. fa. §.Nunc de interrog. uers. Quid si is, de accusat. §.i. uers. Quid si latro. Immo etiam promiserat, ut ibi notant Innocentius et Hostiensis. 44 For a detailed discussion of the canonists, see J.H. Dondorp, Transmissibility of Delictual Claims, Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law 33 (2016), 145–184.

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Recueil de plusieurs arrests notables du Parlement de Paris45 of Georges Louet (1540?-1608), a catholic prelate and advocate to the Parlement de Paris.

IV.

Restitution for wrongs in early modern France

Which basic rule was applied by the Parlement de Paris46 ? The roman-law or the canon-law principle? Around 1560, Jean Papon (1507–1590), while revising his compilation of French case law, included Jean Faure’s reference to the fourteenth century court practice47: For Faure, who preferred the basic rule of Canon law, had reported that he had witnessed the Parlement de Paris doing so48 : The latter implied that heirs must use the inheritance to amend their testator’s wrongs, irrespective of any enrichment (by the wrong) on their part49. Judgements to the contrary Papon does not cite50. A side remark, made by an advocate to the Parlement de Paris, Ren8 Choppin (1537–1606), in his Privilegia rusticorum, published in 1575, suggests, however, that it was not certain which basic rule the court followed. While discussing modes of proof, Choppin cited a case of 5 July 1566, in which heirs of wrongdoers were not held liable beyond their own enrichment; immediately thereafter he cited a case of 29 April 1571 to the opposite51. Choppin did not choose sides, but his reference to the 1566 case prompted 45 His work was first published posthumously in 1609. Consulted edn. Georges Louet, Recueil de plusieurs arrests notables donnez en la cour de Parlement de Paris, Paris 1610. The third 1612 and later editions contain additions by Julien Brodeau. The 1665 and later editions contain a second version, the 1712 edn. additions. Ibbetson (note 20) 15 cites the 1644 edn. 46 On the heirs’ liability for wrongs in the early modern France, see O. Descamps, Les origines de la responsabilit8 pour faute personelle dans le code civil de 1804, Paris 2005, 360–364. 47 Jehan Papon, Recueil d’arrestz notables des courts souveraines de France, Lyon 1562, 637 (XXIV, 11 nr. 3), The first edition, Lyon 1556, 498 (XXIV.11) but contains two arrests. 48 Papon (note 47) 637: “Ioan. Faber in § Poenales. Inst. de perpet. act. num. 3 et 7 dit, que ceste equit8 canonique se doit observer et que en France elle s’observe. Dont par arrest de Paris ha est8 iug8 de son temps.” See Johannes Faber, Lectura super Institutionum, Lyon 1531, fol. 377v (ad Inst. 4,12,1 nr. 8): Dic ergo quod actiones ex delicto descendentes non transeunt in heredes, nisi lis fuerit contestata, ut hic, vel pro contestata habita, ut scripsi supra in princ. §. (Inst. 4.12 pr), vel nisi quantum peruenerit, subaudi ex delicto vel occasione ipsius, C. si ex delict. defunct. l.i. (C. 4,17,1) secundum rigorem iuris, vel ex bonis defuncti secundum equitatem iuris canonici, que est servanda etiam in curia laicali. Et hoc uidi parlamentum parrhisius obseruare. …. 49 Papon (note 47) 637 “Vray est que pour le regard du fiscque la peine est esteinte avec la personne selon l’opinion de Paul de Castro. et de Barto. in l.ii. § Quod si actor. ff. de iureriur. propt. cal. dand. (C. 2,58,2,6) qui ha lieu pour ce regard, et non autrement.” The fourth 1621 edn. contains an addition by Tillier, citing the judgment of 29 April 1571 (cited infra, note 50). 50 Contra Descamps (note 46) 361: “La n8cessit8 d’un profit tir8 du d8lit par les successeurs (…) admet la jurisprudence” quoting Jehan Papon (referring, however, to not to case law, but jurisprudence). 51 Cf. Ren8 Choppin, De privilegiis rusticorum libri tres, Paris 1575, 149 (III.2.1.5): Ex eo

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Guy Coquille (1523–1604), at that time advocate to the Parlement of Nevers (Burgundy), to argue that France as Christian nation should adhere to the canonists’ rule52. In his Quaestiones, first published posthumously in 1611, Coquille substantiated his view, distinguishing between wrongs (i) aimed at enriching the wrongdoer, such as theft, fraud, usury and extortion, (ii) wrongs harming the person wronged without profit for the perpetrator, such as arson, assault and manslaughter, and (iii) wrongs causing neither loss nor gain, such as outrage and insult53. There is no obligation for heirs to compensate insults (category iii), he said, but France being a Christian nation, the courts should compel heirs to compensate the damage caused by crimes like arson which death had prevented contrite testators from amending themselves. To shorten his time in purgatory, the inheritance should be used to make amends54. With regard to wrongs which profit the wrongdoer (category i), Coquille build his case in a different way. Here, he primarily used Roman law texts to argue that the French secular courts should decide in concord with the canonists’ teaching. His point of departure are Ulp. D. 13,1,9 and Inst. 4,1,19 (21), which state that a quoque sciendum obiter, haeredem rei criminis nulla teneri actione pecuniaria uel persecutoria quidem eius quod intersit, nedum poena crimini indistincte, nisi aut actio prius cum defuncto contestata, aut bonorum raptorum furtiue mota fuisset accusatio, ex quo locupletior ad haeredem peruenerit haereditas, ne in alterius praemium uertatur alienum scelus et cum alieno dispendio facultatibus impune quis augeatur. Atque ita obtinui forensi actione pro haeredibus delinquentis, Hamelio contra accusatoris causam orante, in auditorio Quaestionum, Senatus decreto 3 Cal. Maias An. 1571. Explanatory note in edn. Paris 1606: “Iudicium curiae Parisiensis die 29 April An. 1571 in Tornella Parlamenti Parisiensis”. 52 Cf. Guy Coquille, Les Co0tumes du Pa"s & Comt8 de Nivernois, in: Les oeuvres de maistre Guy Coquille, Bordeaux 1703, II, 13 (Ch I Art VIII Arson): “Maitre Ren8 Choppin au Trait8 de privilegiis rusticorum lib. 3 par. 2 cap. 1 num. 5 dit avoir 8t8 jug8 par Arrest selon le droit Civil Romain. Or il me semble, que nous Chr8tiens par raison devons tenir l’opinion des Canonistes, non pour l’autorit8 […] mais parce que selon l’Etat de nous Chr8tiens, nitre Religion nous sermond d’adherer / cette opinion.” See also Guy Coquille, Questions et responses sur les coutumes de France, Paris 1622, 23. 53 Coquille (note 52) 1622, 23–24: “Premierement soit faicte distinction des delicts qui se commettent pour augmenter les biens du delinquant, comme le furt, le ravissement, le dol, l’usure, le faux, le peculat, les repetondes, l’abigeat, et autres tels. Secondement des delits qui portent dommage pecuniaire / autruy sans qu’il en revienne rien au delinquant, comme l’incendie, la blessure, le meurtie. Tiercement des delicts qui sont en pure vengeance, esquels nec delinquenti quidquam adest nec delictum passo abest, ut iniuria uel conuitio”. 54 Coquille (note 52) 1622, 25: “Quant au seconde ordre des delicts, qui portent dommage et n’en revient rien au delinquant, comme l’incendie, je croy, pource que nous sommes Chrestiens qui devons croire que les ames des delinquants apres la mort sont afflig8es, quand du vivant on n’a satisfait du dommage iusques / concurrence du defunct ( …), qu’en en ce cas le droit canonique estre suivi.” In this case ‘le charactHre civil de l’action (pour dommages)’ which Coquille uses to justify the heirs liability (Descamps, note 46, 361) does not seem to play any role. The passage Descamps quotes in his footnote 518 concerns crimes, such as theft and fraud, which profit the perpetrator.

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condictio furtiva lies against heirs of fures (thieves, embezzlers, etc), even though the stolen goods never came into their hands; the claim also lies, if these goods have perished, because a thief is in default (in mora) in returning the stolen goods (Ulp. D. 13,1,20). From Paul. D. 42,5,10 he derived, that the same applied in case of fraud55. Coquille thus extended the Roman rule regarding furtum to other delicts which profit the perpetrator. In his interpretation, heirs are liable because of the wrongdoer’s enrichment, not because of their own. In this respect, his line of thought differs from that of the medieval glossators and commentators, who considered Ulp. D. 13,1,9 an exception to the basic rule of law found in C. 4,17,1 and Pomp. D. 50,17,38. For heirs of robbers and thieves (fures) were to restore the stolen goods or their value to the owner, even if these had never fallen into their hands (D. 13,1,9). In this respect they differ from heirs of other wrongdoers, among them defrauders and extortioners, who are liable only to the extent that they (the heirs themselves) benefit from the wrong. If ill-gotten goods that have fallen into their hands subsequently perish, their liability ends (D. 4,2,18), if these goods are subsequently consumed or sold, their liability remains (D. 4,2,17 & 18) and passes on to their own heirs. Coquille, however, averred, that Roman law said that dishonest gains are to be restituted by one’s heirs, even if their testator had not passed them on. Of the same opinion was his contemporary, Georges Louet, advocate to the Parlement de Paris. In his compilation of arrests of the Parlement de Paris, first printed in 1609, Louet included his answer to question of law at issue. Mid-August 1604, he wrote, the question had come up in chambers, whether a claim for reparation and damages, because of a cruel crime, could be filed against the heirs of the deceased perpetrator56 – meant is, most likely, an arsonist or murderer. In his Recueil Louet did not report the court’s judgement, but included his own answer57. First, Louet posed (what he said were) the basic rules of Civil and Canon law. 55 Coquille (note 52) 24–25 : “Or quand on agit civilement pour le delit, l’heriteir en est tenu, ores qu’il n’en soit rien parvenu / luy, et que la chose fut perdue sans sa coulpe, par la raison de la loy Si pro fure § ult. ff. de cond. furt. (D. 13,1,9) et ult. Inst. de obl. quae ex delict. (I. 4,3,19[21]). Et quia fur semper in mora esse dicitur, ideo eius periculo semper est res furtiva. l. ult. ff. de cond. furt. (D. 13,1,20). Sed et si quid ad defunctum peruenit, licet haeres non sit factus locupletior, l’heritier en seroit tenu per l. Praetor § ult. cum lege sequenti (D. 42,5,9,8 & 10) notando dictionem ‘eum’ quae referri non potest nisi ad delinquentem, quia de haeredibus loquiturnomen pluralis. ff. de bonis auct. iud. possidendis… ”. 56 Cf. Louet (note 45) 24: “Au mois d’Aoust 1604 i’ay veu demander aux Chambres une question de la deuxiesme, si l’action qui provenoit d’une delict fort cruel, n’ayant est8 intentee du vivant du delinquant se pouvoit poursuivre contre l’heritier, c’estoit pour reparations, dommages et interests”. 57 Contra Ibbetson (note 20) 15: “a case of 1604 from the Parlement de Paris, reported by George Louet. The question here was whether an heir could be held liable to pay damages for an unintentional wrong”.

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In Roman law, he said, the cause of action dies with the wrongdoer. Here, Louet did not state the regula iuris found in D. 50,17,38; instead he used D. 50,17,111,1: “Penal actions arising from delicts do not pass against the heir”58. Against this rule Louet contraposed the canon-law principle that heirs must relieve the conscience of their deceased ancestor – apparently by satisfying the victims in his stead – and restitute dishonest gains59. Subsequently, Louet described a middleposition, viz. heirs being liable to the extent of their own enrichment, which Louet ascribed to Filippo Decio († 1535)60. This is, in fact, the rule found in Ulp. D. 50,17,38, which Decio himself quoted verbatim61: “Just as the heir of the deceased cannot be bound to pay the fine arising from a delict, he cannot benefit from it, if anything came to him as result thereof”. One should therefore, Louet added, distinguish like Charles Dumoulin (1500–1566), between a claim for reparation and damages, arising from a wrong (which does not lie against heirs), and a claim for what has fallen into the hands of the wrongdoer as a result of his wrong (which does)62. It was undisputed that 58 Louet (note 45) 24: “et la regle du droict y est l. Pupillum 111 § Heredes de reg. iuris (D. 50,17,111,1) qui parle de actionibus ex maleficio venientibus comme ex furto, damno dato, iniuria illata”. 59 Louet (note 45) 24: “et au contraire la disposition canonique au chapitre dernier de sepult. extra (X 3.28.14) veut que haeredes teneantur exonerare conscientiam defuncti et que turpia lucra ad haeredem non pertinent et a est8 de cest aduis Alexandre en son conseil 77 lib. 6”. Louet suggested that Alexander de Imola (Tartagnus) adopted the rule of canon law, that heirs must compensate the victims of their ancestors’ crimes. Cf. Ibbetson (note 20) 15. Alexander, however, discussed whether heirs can bring a defence of limitation, if the ill-gotten goods that have fallen into their hands are reclaimed by the owner after thirty years. For the negative answer canon law provided an additional argument. Cf. Alexander de Imola, Consilia seu responsa, vol. VI, Venice 1590, 37 (cons. 77 nr. 3): haeres non potest se tueri praescriptione, quando defunctus cui ipse succedit, fuerat in mala fide, (…), quia haeres uniuersalis tenetur exonerare conscientiam defuncti. 60 Louet (note 45) 24: “Neanmoins Dynus (lege Decius) sur le § In haeredes no. 3 suiuant l’opinion de Jean Faure sur la loy unique C. ne ex delict. defunct. (C. 4,17,1) est de contraire auis pour ce qui est des dommages et interests, et non pour ce qui est paruenu du delit / l’heritier du defunct”. 61 Cf. Philippus Decius, De regulis iuris, Lyon 1553, 339 (ad D. 50,17,111,1 nr. 3): Et regula ista limitatur primo: non procedere in eo quod ad haeredem ex delicto defuncti peruenisset, quia pro eo tenetur haeres et conueniri potest. l. In haeredem supra de calum. (D. 3,6,5) l. In haeredem supra de dolo (D. 4,3,17) cum similibus alleg. supra in reg. Sicuti poena supra eod. (D. 50,17,38). Et ratio ibi naturalis allegatur, quia sicut haeres non tenetur ad poenam ex delicto defuncti, ita pariter ex tali delicto lucrari non debet. 62 Cf. Louet (note 45) 25 : “J’ai to0jours estim8, que la distinction que M. Charles du Moulin apporte en l’annotation de Dynus (lege Decius) sur ledit § In haeredes num. 7 verbo Canonico est la plus equitable, et je l’ai veu auctoriser par arrest, que l’action n’estant point intentee contre celui qui a commis le delict, on ne peut demander a son heritier aucuns dommages et interests, reparations, ni autres peines provenans du delicit. (…) Mais s’il agit de la repetition de ce qui est parvenu au defunt par le moien de tel delit, persecutoria est in rem actio que datur in haeredem, qui doit turpia lucra a defuncto facta restituere, conscientiam defuncti exonerare…” See Charles Dumoulin, Adnotatio super Decio, De regulis

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heirs were liable, if these goods had been passed on to them. Some even argued, Louet wrote, that heirs were liable, if it could be proved by witnesses (or instrument) that the wrongdoer himself had sold the goods or consumed them63. Louet went one step further : the heirs were to restitute the goods of which it could be proved that they had fallen into the hands of the wrongdoer, irrespective of whether (it could be proved) that these goods had profited him64. Louet maintained that the wrongdoer’s obligation to give up his profit passes over to his heirs. The claim, being repersecutory, is passively transmissible. To substantiate his view Louet quoted D. 3,6,5 pr, in which he read that an action on account of calumnia lies against an heir for the deceased’s gain65 – passing over the opening line of D. 3,6,5 pr. which limits the heir’s liability to the extent of his own enrichment66. Julien Brodeau (1585–1653), who revised Louet’s Recueil, expounded in 1612 that there are three civil–law maxims with regard to the heirs’ liability. Claims for pecuniary punishment are not granted against heirs of wrongdoers (Inst. 4.12.1), claims for pecuniary punishment lie against heirs to the extent of their enrichment and (without restriction) in case the wrongdoer dies after joinder of issue (C. 4,17,1), and a third: “dishonest gains are to be taken from heirs”: Turpia lucra ab heredibus extorquentur. If the wrongdoer himself has been enriched by his crime, his heirs are liable, even if he has consumed the goods and not passed the enrichment on to his heirs67. The latter, he said, derives from D. 4,2,17 pr. –

63

64

65

66

67

iuris, Lyon 1553, 340 s.v. canonico (ad D. 50,17,111,1): (…) Ego noue dico has leges ciuiles de non transmissione actionis ex delicto de poenalibus intelligendas, non autem de rei persecutoriis, ut suo loco plenius dixi. Cf. Louet (note 45) 25: “Sed quid si ex tali delicto nihil ad heredem pervenit? Il y a plus de difficult8. Aucuns ont voulu dire que aut scripto constat que le defunct en a faict son profit, ou a consum8 ce qu’il en a eu et en ce cas que haeres tenentur defuncti conscientiam exonerare ou bien lon le veut verifier par tesmoins, ce que aucuns n’ont voulu admettre, comme estant renouveler l’instance criminelle”. Cf. Louet (note 45) 25: “Je trouve l’opinion de Dynus (lege Decius) 8quitable, quoquomodo probari possit quid ad defunctum pervenisse, soit qu’il en ait fait son profit ou qu’il l’ait perdu, que l’heritier en est tenu actione in rem et rei persecutoria, quae semper datur in heredem”. Cf. Louet (note 45) 25: “La loi In haeredem de calumn. ff. (D. 3,6,5 pr) dit que ‘datur hec actio in haeredes, de eo quod defunctum peruenit, ut turpia lucra ab heredibus extorqueantur, licet crimina extinguantur’. La loi ne dit pas, ‘si talis lucra ad heredes peruenerint’, mais ‘turpia lucra a defuncto facta, ab herede exigenda’”. Cf. D. 3,6,5 pr.: In heredem autem competit in id quod ad eum pervenit. Nam est constitutum turpia lucra heredibus quoque extorqueri, licet crimina extinguantur : ut puta ob falsum vel iudici ob gratiosam sententiam datum et heredi extorquebitur et si quid aliud scelere quaesitum. J. Brodeau, Additio A in: Louet, Recueil des notables arrets de Parlement de Paris, Paris 1614, 34: “Car c’est une autre maxime, que turpia lucra ab heredibus extorquentur, licet enim crimine careant, lucrum tamen sentient, comme dit Ulpian in l. Si cum exceptione 14 § In hac actione (D. 4,2,14,3), l. Quod diximus 16 § fin. de eo quod metus causa (D. 4,2,16,2) l. 3 in

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overlooking the fact that in this text it is the heir who consumes the ill-gotten goods, not the extortioner himself. Brodeau added, that the distinction Louet made, viz. between claims for reparation and damages on the one hand, and those for restitution of dishonest gains on the other, implied that victims of capital crimes like arson and manslaughter (from which a wrongdoer does not benefit) could not proceed against his heirs, if the accused died before his trial had ended68. This was undoubtedly in accordance with Roman law, he said, but not observed in France. In countless cases, where someone accused of a capital crime had died prior to judgement, proceedings continued against his heirs. Though heirs are not liable to punishment, they are liable for reparation and damages, unless they clear their testator’s name69. In the 1633 edition Brodeau enhanced that the deceased arsonist and murderer are presumed to have ordered their heirs to make amends in order to gain absolution of their sins. On the one hand this favoured heirs who hoped to clear their testator’s name. On the other hand this helped the victims of his crimes, who sought reparation and damages, e. g. the widow of Pierre de Prouville, the bailiff of the citadel of Amiens, who had been murdered by the Marquis d’Ancre, Concino Concini. In 1610 the court awarded her a sum of 24.000 Paris pound70. In the 1665 edition of Louet’s Recueil an arrest of 29 July 1628 is added71. Nicolas Lacor8e and his brother Antoine had cut off the nose of Adrienne Fouquet in a quarrel on the streets of Pontoise, a Paris commune. The judge of Pontoise ordered their arrest and awarded her a sum of a hundred Paris pound. When Nicolas died shortly after he had filed an appeal against both his arrest and

68

69

70 71

princ. de ui et ui arm. (D. 43,16,3 pr) l. Sicuti 30 de reg. iur. (D. 50,17,38), adeo ut semel sufficiat pervenisse ad defunctum, qui(a) licet consumpserit aduersus heredem omnimodo competit actio quoniam hereditariam suscepit obligationem, sing. tex. in l. Videamus 17 in pr. de eo quod metus causa (D. 4,2,17 pr.)”. Brodeau (note 67): “Il est ais8 d’inferer de tout ce que dessus, qu’aux crimes capitaux, aprHs la mort de l’accus8 non condamn8, on ne peut demander / son heritier aucuns dommages et interÞts, r8parations, ni aucunes peines provenantes du d8lit. Maix aus autres crimes, on peut repeter ce qui est 8chu / l’heritier par le moyen de tel d8lit, encore qu’il l’ait dissip8 et consumm8, mÞme / l’heritiier de l’heritier, suivant la resolution de notre Auteur. Quando autem ad haeredem peruenisse dicatur, habes in l. Quod autem 20 et seq. de eo quod met. causa. (D. 4,1,20) et cette resolution est indubitable en termes de Droit”. Brodeau (note 67): “De forte, que si un accus8 d’un crime capital decede, mesmes auparavant sentence de condemnation, (…) pour ce qui est de la reparation civile, et des dommages et interests, ils peuvent estre demandez / l’heritier de l’accus8, lequel ne s’en peut exempter, si non en purgeant la m8moire du defunct, comme il a est8 jug8 par infinis arrests”. Brodeau (note 67) 34. J. Brodeau, Additio A in: Louet, Recueil des notables arrets de Parlement de Paris, Brussels 1665, I, 31. This revision is published posthumously. The case is reported in: Pierre Bardet, Recueil d’arrests du Parlement de Paris, 2 vols., Paris 1690, I, 321–22. A reference to this arrest fails in the earlier editions I consulted (1614, 1616, 1644).

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the award of 100 pounds, the judge summoned his heirs, who refused to answer the accusation, while asserting that both the claim for punishment and the claim for reparation and damages (the awarded 100 pounds) die with the wrongdoer. When the judge called their behaviour contumacious, the heirs appealed to the Parlement de Paris. Brodeau, who pleaded on behalf of the victim, Adrienne Fouquet, averred that one should distinguish between punishment and compensation, and that the duty to pay reparation and damages passed on to the heirs of the accused. J8rome Bignon too, the advocat-general to the Parlement de Paris, advised to dismiss the appeal. He argued that France, being a Christian nation, did not follow the provisions of Roman law, but the rule of Canon law (X 3.28.14), that the inheritance should be used to amend the crimes of the deceased72. The Parlement followed his advice.

V.

Conclusions

Brodeau’s limitation of the basic rule of Canon law to capital crimes, like murder, arson and battery of persons of rank, indicates that he, like Louet, preferred the basic rule of Roman law, that heirs are liable to the extent of their enrichment. He acknowledged that victims of capital crimes could in France claim reparation and damages, but regarding crimes not-punishable by death, he followed the basic rule of Roman law, that heirs were liable to the extent the deceased’s inheritance had been enriched by his wrong73. Here, he used the distinction Louet had made between a claim for reparation and damages (which does not lie) and a claim for restitution (which does). It is, however, not exactly Louet’s distinction, because Brodeau contraposes damages and restitution of what falls into the hands of the heirs. He thus followed the basic rule of Roman law, while Louet had chosen a middle course, heirs being liable to the extent of the wrongdoer’s enrichment by the crime – even if he did not pass his enrichment on to his heirs. In this respect, Louet stands alone. Exactly the same distinction was taken some twenty years earlier, in an English court. In 1583 Lord Manwood contraposed a claim for damages, e. g. trampling herbage, (which does not lie) and a claim for the value of cut oaks and seized oxen – which had apparently fallen into the wrongdoer’s hands.

72 Bardet (note 71) 322: “L’ancienne Jurisprudence n’a point souffert qu’apres le dec8s de l’accuse; on peut rien demander, n’y intenter action contre les heritiers, mais au Christianisme il n’en pas ainsi; la reparation civile ne se prend pas de la disposition du droit Romain, mais de celle du droit Canon, cap. ult. extra de sepulturis (X 3.28.14), oF il est dit ‘Haeredes et propinqui ad quos bona peruenerunt pro eodem satisfaciant’”. 73 See above, note 65.

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In England the distinction flourished, but not in France74, where it was outmatched by the distinction between punishment and damages. Thus, for instance, distinguished Francois H8lo, advocate to the Parlement de Paris, in his comparison of Roman law and French case law, first published in 1663: “Inst. 4,12,1 is not observed in France, because one may file a claim for damages against the wrongdoer’s heirs, while with regard to claims for corporeal and pecuniary punishment we follow Roman law”75.

74 Perhaps because Ibbetson (note 20) 15 seems to equate Decius’ distinction with that of Lord Manwoord in the Sherrington’s case, Meagher and Maroya assert ‘that the equitable motification in England of the ancient maxim of the ius commune preceded a similar development in the French and other Continental jurisprudence’. Decius, however, only restated the Roman law maxim. Cf. R.P. Meagher/A. Maroya, Cripto-fiduciary duties, University of New South Wales Law Journal 26 (2003) 348–356 at 348. 75 F. Helo, La jurisprudence franÅoise conf8r8e avec le droit Romain sur les Institutions de l’empereur Justinien, Paris 1665, II, 320 (ad Inst. IV.12): “Pour la derniere partie oF I’ay dit que les actions penales ne passent point aux heritiers, cela ne s’observe pas parmy nous, car on peut poursuivere les heritiers du defunt pour l’interest civil, quoy qu’ils n’ayent point profit8 du crime, et qu’ils n’y aient point particip8, soit que la cause ait est8 contest8e, soit qu’elle n’ait pas est8 entre les parties principales, en quoy nous suivons le droit canon, cap. Si episcopum 16 q.6 (C.16 q.6 c.2[3]) et cap. fin. de sepulturis extra (X 3,28,14). Je dis pour l’interest civil, car pour la peine corporelle ou pecuniaire on ne les peut conuenir, en quoi nous suiuons aussi le droit Romain”.

Jacques du Plessis

Reception, the law of unjustified enrichment in mixed legal systems, and a curious case of the compelled payment of another’s debt

1.

Introduction

Jan Hallebeek has made a major contribution to our understanding of the development of the civil law of unjustified enrichment1. This essay seeks to pay homage to his scholarship by focussing on certain developments in this field in uncodified “mixed” jurisdictions, which apply civilian rules whose origins he has so ably commented upon, but which also have also experienced processes of reception of the English common law. The field is broad. The focus will consequently be on a single case, but in the expectation that it could illustrate some of the main themes in debates in enrichment law, and at the same time touch on some of the research interests of the Jubilar, such as processes of reception, codification and the development of the civil law. The case, Saibo v The AttorneyGeneral2, has been decided almost a century ago in Ceylon, the present day Sri Lanka, whose legal system still applies uncodified Roman-Dutch law and has also attracted the Jubilar’s scholarly attention3. The judgement by Chief Justice Bertram is a mere five reported pages, but it serves as an unusually sharp lens through which to view some key issues in the field. We will start with the facts and the decision, and then proceed to its implications.

1 See e. g. J.J. Hallebeek/E.J.H. Schrage, Ongerechtvaardigde Verrijking – Grepen uit de geschiedenis van de algemene verrijkingsactie van het NBW, Amsterdam, 1989; J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism, Nijmegen, 1996; J. Hallebeek, Developments in Mediaeval Roman Law, in: E.J.H. Schrage (ed.), Unjust Enrichment – The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution 2 ed, Berlin, 1999, 59; J. Hallebeek, The condiction as enrichment action in twelfth and thirteenth century legal scholarship, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 63 (1995) 263–272. 2 (1923) 25 N.L.R. (= New Law Reports, Sri Lanka) 321. See G.L. Peiris, Some Aspects of the Law of Unjust Enrichment in South Africa and Ceylon, Colombo, 1972, 152 and C.G. Weeramantry The Law of Contracts, Colombo, 1967, vol. 2, para 1032. 3 See B. Sirks/J. Hallebeek, Uit het Archief van de Raad van Justitie te Colombo: Rechtsbedeling in Ceylon in de 18e Eeuw’, Fundamina 16(1) (2010) 390.

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2.

Saibo v The Attorney-General

2.1

The facts

According to Romans 13 verse 7, we must pay to all what is owed to them: taxes to whom taxes are owed, and revenue to whom revenue is owed. But it does not say that we have to pay what others owe. Yet this is what the zealous Customs Department expected of Mr Saibo. After finding rice hidden away in his “lighters” (boats used to transport goods at harbours), the Customs Department concluded that the rice was stolen by four of his employees who worked on the boats. The Customs Department thereupon fined them for attempting to defraud the revenue by preventing customs being paid on the rice. One would have thought that the employees would have paid the fines, and that would be the end of the matter. But the Customs Department thereafter curiously informed Saibo about the offence and the fine imposed on his crew and required that he should recover the fines from the crew and remit the fines to the Customs Department. Crucially, it further notified Saibo that his boats had been detained pending payment. In fact, the boats were not yet detained, but after fruitless negotiations with the Customs Department, Saibo was concerned that this would happen, and he paid the fines out of his own pocket, but under protest. Although the fines were minimal, Saibo clearly did not take kindly to the Customs Department’s heavy-handed behaviour. He subsequently instituted action to obtain repayment of the fines, claiming that the crew had not committed any offence, and that his boats were not liable for detention. The court of first instance dismissed Saibo’s action for the refund of the money. However, Saibo was not deterred and he appealed. The appeal was heard by Chief Justice Bertram and Judge Porter. The Solicitor-General, who represented the Customs Department on appeal, argued that while the threatened detention of Saibo’s lighters may have been unlawful, the Customs Department was nonetheless entitled to retain the money, and that Saibo should rather have pursued a claim in tort or delict against the officer responsible for the threatened detention.

2.2

The judgement

To Bertram CJ, the Solicitor-General’s contention that the Government should be able to retain the money had “on the face of it a certain ingenuity and plausibility”. However, this contention was ultimately rejected because “it is not the law that an officer of the Government may enforce a lawful claim by unlawful pressure, and that the Government may thereupon retain the money so en-

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forced”. Of particular interest for present purposes is what “the law” is that this conclusion is based upon. The judgement commences by focussing on the condictiones in Roman-Dutch law4. Saibo’s action is said to be the condictio ob iniustam causam. rather than the condicito indebiti. However, hardly missing a beat, the Chief Justice then proceeds to state that “in English law, the action [the condictio of Roman-Dutch law] is known as the action for money had and received”5. He thereafter cites a passage from the famous judgment of Lord Mansfield in the eighteenth-century English case of Moses v Macferlan6 and endorses the view of Evans (the translator of Pothier) that for every material phrase of this passage, Lord Mansfield “had the authority of an express provision of the Civil law”. Thus, the Chief Justice concludes, “the English law on the subject may be treated as identical with the law of this Colony”7. Having built a bridge between the civil law of the condictiones and the English action for money had and received, Bertram CJ proceeded to examine nineteenth-century English cases, some of which recognise an action in tort, and more specifically an action in trespass, if a lawful claim has been enforced in an unlawful manner8. After reviewing these judgments, the Chief Justice concluded that they support Saibo’s claim, and that he was entitled to repayment.

3.

Introducing the common law: commonality as a justification for borrowing in mixed legal systems

While all of this may come as a surprise to jurists in more “pure” legal systems, it actually is a familiar practice of judges in mixed jurisdictions to regard the civil law and common law as so similar on a particular point that it is permissible to transplant the common law in a civil law environment9. This practice may 4 On the condictiones in Sri Lankan law, see C.G. Weeramantry, The Law of Contracts, Colombo, 1967, vol. 2, 1027–1038; P.T.B. Kohona, The Condictio Indebiti and Payment under a Mistake of Law, Colombo Law Review 2 (1971) 94. 5 (1923) 25 N.L.R. 324. 6 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005; 97 E.R. 676. 7 (1923) 25 N.L.R. 325. 8 Sowell v. Champion (1838) 6 A. & E. 407; 112 E. R. 156; Clark v. Woods (1848) 2 Ex. 395; 154 E. R. 545 and Pitt v. Coomes (1835) 2 A. & E. 459; 111 E. R. 178. 9 See generally V.V. Palmer, A Descriptive and Comparative Overview, in: V.V. Palmer (ed.), Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide – The Third Legal Family, 2 ed., Cambridge, 2012, 67–68; J.E. du Plessis, Common law influences on the law of contract and unjustified enrichment in some mixed legal systems, Tulane Law Review 78 (2003–2004) 219. In the context of Sri Lankan law see A. Cooray, Sri Lanka: Oriental and Occidental Laws in Harmony, in: E. Örücü/ E. Attwooll/S. Coyle (eds.), Studies in Legal Systems: Mixed and Mixing, London, 1996, 71 at 77.

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sometimes result in creative and carefully reasoned selection from these traditions, but it could also be rather crude, and involve overly generous assumptions of similarity that only provide a fragile foundation for reception10. How are we to view the application of this practice in Saibo? An important lesson is that it may still be relatively easy to find commonality between civil law and common law at high levels of abstraction, but that such a finding could ultimately lead to rather strained reception of more detailed rules. Thus, at such a high level, Chief Justice Bertram could with some justification say that both Roman law and English law recognise the principle that an action “lies for money which ex aequo et bono the defendant ought to refund.”11 But the crucial question remains why precisely money may be reclaimed. Where systems have different views on how to answer this question, the commonality is more apparent than real. Let us return to the speech of Lord Mansfield, which to Bertram CJ provides the bridge between the civil law and common law. In essence, Lord Mansfield first stated that an action for money had and received is barred in a variety of circumstances which, from a civil-law perspective, could be described as involving payment of a natural obligation (e. g. a prescribed debt). In these circumstances payment cannot be enforced, but if a payment is made, it cannot be reclaimed. Having given an indication when the action would fail, Lord Mansfield proceeded to list cases where it would succeed. These examples include “money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for money got through imposition, (express, or implied;) or extortion; or oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff ’s situation, contrary to laws made for the protection of persons under those circumstances.”12

But how do these very general observations assist in determining when it is equitable that money paid to another should be reclaimed? Do these observations really build a bridge to the English cases dealing with payments made under unlawful pressure that Bertram CJ ultimately relied on in awarding restitution to Saibo? To answer this question we need to consider this case more closely. After first indicating that under English law, unlawful pressure may not be used to enforce an “unlawful claim”, Bertram CJ considered three cases that deal with unlawful pressure being used to enforce a “lawful claim”. However, two 10 See Palmer (note 9), 67–68. 11 For more recent judicial findings of commonality at such a broad level see Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC (HL) 349 at 408–409. 12 For discussion see P. Birks/G. McLeod, The Implied Contract Theory of Quasi-Contract: Civilian Opinion Current in the Century Before Blackstone, (1986) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 46, 59–64; G. Dannemann, Unjust Enrichment by Transfer : Some Comparative Remarks, 79 (2001) Texas LR 1837 at 1839.

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of these cases actually do not deal with the action for money had and received, but with actions for trespass, leading to an award for damages13. To Bertram CJ this did not present a problem: “There is nothing in this. The measure of the plaintiff ’s right is the same, whether it is determined in contract or in tort. What he may recover as damages in one action he may recover on the implied contract in the other.”14

There are at least two problems with the way in which Bertram CJ relied on these cases. First, it will be noted that on his interpretation of English law, it does not matter whether a party subjected to unlawful pressure made a transfer in fulfilment of an “unlawful claim”, i. e. where no debt is owed, or in fulfilment of a “lawful claim”, i. e. where a debt is owed. Furthermore, where a debt is owed, it does not matter whether the debt is owed by the transferor himself (as in the cases cited) or by a third party (like the employees in the Saibo case). To him, all these cases ultimately require that repayment must be ordered. The unlawfulness of the pressure warrants it, irrespective of whether a debt is actually owed to the party exerting the pressure, or by whom it is owed. This finding is difficult to square with Moses v Mcferlan. As indicated above, that case accords great relevance to whether there was an obligation underlying the transfer of money ; if the obligation was fulfilled (even if it was only an unenforceable natural obligation), restitution is denied. The implication in the context of the Saibo cases is that if the obligation to pay the fines was fulfilled (as the Solicitor General argued in favour of the Customs Department), no claim for restitution would be available. So why did the question whether there was an underlying obligation not enjoy more attention in the Saibo case? The answer, it seems, is that after Moses v Macferlan some important developments took place in the common law. The notion that an obligation excludes an action for money had and received became less prominent15, and considerations or factors such as whether the transferor was mistaken or, as in the present case, acted under some form of compulsion became more prominent. Chief Justice Bertram’s interpretation of the English cases reflects this development in the common law, particularly inasmuch as these cases supposedly suggest that a payment made under compulsion could be recovered even though it was owed. The significance of this finding extends beyond merely identifying a few English cases that happen to deal with a fact pattern that required of the court to determine whether restitution should be awarded. It is not possible to enter the major recent debates here, but suffices to say that nowadays this difference in 13 Sowell v Champion (1838) 6 A. & E. 407; 112 E.R. 156; Clark v. Woods (1848) 2 Ex. 395; 154 E.R. 545. 14 (1923) 25 N.L.R. 326. 15 See Dannemann, Texas Law Review (2001) 79 1837 at 1850.

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emphasis on whether a transfer is owed is regarded as a vital difference between the way in which civil law and common law systems generally structure enrichment liability16. Unfortunately, Bertram CJ was not particularly concerned with this crucial dimension of the case, and hardly engaged with the relevant civil law before commencing with the exploration of the common law. It therefore seems appropriate, especially in a contribution honouring a foremost exponent of the uncodified civil law, to explore the relevant civil law further. But before doing so in the next section, a brief comment is called for on one further problem with way in which Bertram CJ finds sufficient commonality between the civil law and common law to warrant relying on English cases on compelled payments. It will be recalled that even though some of these cases concerned claims in tort (the equivalent of the civilian law of delict), they were applied in a case involving a claim for repayment based in “implied contract”, but that this did not concern Bertram CJ, since “the measure of the plaintiff ’s right is the same”. However, just because the measure of the action for money had and received, or a claim based on implied contract, may be the same as the measure of a claim in tort, it does not follow that the circumstances under which these distinct categories of claim may be awarded are the same. Certainly, nothing in Lord Mansfield judgement, which is supposed to be the basis for commonality between the civil and common law in this context, supports this notion. To this issue, and especially whether delictual liability has any place in the context of relief where transfers are obtained by compulsion, we will also return later.

4.

Returning to the civil law: some neglected first principles

4.1

Was the transfer retained with legal ground; did it serve to fulfil another’s obligation?

Although this is not expressly recognized in the Saibo judgement, the civil law tradition has since Roman times acknowledged that one person could validly pay another’s debt, and that the payor cannot subsequently seek reimbursement from the creditor. The classic text is Paulus D. 12,6,44, which, in the title on the condictio indebiti, contains the suum recepit rule. It states that repetitio nulla est 16 For a relatively recent debate, held in Edinburgh in January 2014, on this difference in emphasis see the E. Descheemaeker, New Directions in Unjustified Enrichment: Learning from South Africa, ELR 18.3 (2014) 414–416; H. Scott Rationalising the South African Law of Enrichment, ELR 18.3 (2014) 433; J. du Plessis Labels and Meaning: Unjust Factors and Failure of Purpose as Reasons for Reversing Enrichment by Transfer, ELR 18.3 (2014) 414–416.

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ab eo qui suum recepit, tametsi ab alio quam vero debitore solutum est (“there is no restitution from him who received what is owed to him even though it was given as payment by someone other than the true debtor”)17. However, this formulation is very broad. Greater precision is required as to when a creditor is entitled to retain transfers made by non-debtors. For present purposes, the following comment by the Roman-Dutch author Johannes Voet in his Commentarius ad Pandectas 12,6,9, which deals with the field of application of the condictio indebiti, is especially relevant. Referring to D. 12,6,44 above, Voet states that “… generally if a person has paid what he did not himself owe but another owed, then if indeed he paid in his own name as though he were himself the debtor, he rightfully employs this action. But if he paid in the name of the debtor this action falls away and the debtor will have release from the creditor, who has gotten back his own; and the debtor will start to be bound to the payor for a refund in the judicial proceeding on management of affairs or other like proceeding.”18

Thus, restitution would be denied if the third party paid in the debtor’s name; only then may the creditor retain the payment, and does the payor have to seek reimbursement from the debtor. In the present context, the implication is that if Saibo validly paid the fines owed by his employees in their names, he could not claim restitution from the Customs Department. Saibo would have to seek reimbursement from his employees, by relying on some form of action based on managing another’s affairs19 (an action whose development Hallebeek has commented on extensively)20. However, in the Saibo matter we have an added complication, namely that the creditor used unlawful threats to induce the transfer. It may be regarded as desirable to protect a creditor who received payment from a third party in the bona fide belief that such a party intended to fulfil the debtor’s obligation. And such a bona fide belief could even be present where the creditor used lawful threats to induce payment of another’s debt21. But in Saibo there was no basis at 17 P. Birks translates suum recepit as receipt by the creditor of “his own property” (see A. Watson, The Digest of Justinian vol. 1, Philadelphia 1998, 386). But the context suggests that suum refers to receiving what is due or owed to him, rather than to “what is his” or “what he owns”. 18 J. Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, Paris, 1829, 12.6.9 (P. Gane translation, The Selective Voet, Durban, 1955, vol 2. 843). Also see Pomponius D. 12,6,19,1. 19 See Odendaal v van Oudtshoorn 1968 (3) SA 433 (T) 437 and authorities quoted there; J. du Plessis, The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment, Cape Town, 2012, 254ff, 262. 20 See Hallebeek (note 1, Developments in Mediaeval Roman Law), 106–110, 118–120. 21 For example, a supplier could refuse to contract with the purchaser of a business unless the purchaser pays the debts of the seller (the previous owner); inasmuch as the supplier is not obliged to contract with the purchaser, the refusal to contract could be a lawful threat. See the South African case of Odendaal v van Oudtshoorn 1968 (3) SA 433 (T), although there the

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all for the threats of detaining the boats. In these circumstances it is less apparent that the creditor could receive a transfer as valid payment of another’s debt. If this were possible, a creditor could in effect compel any third party to act as a de facto surety of the debtor and leave the payor to seek reimbursement from the debtor. Note that we are not concerned here with a two-party case, where a creditor subjects his own debtor to unlawful pressure to induce payment of a valid debt. According to Professor Peiris, in his comment on the Saibo case, “the principle to be inferred from the decision appears to be that restitution is permissible under the condictio indebiti in cases where money was paid on consequence of an unlawful threat, notwithstanding the existence of a legal obligation to pay”22.

He then seems to suggest that it is unacceptable to award this remedy if the payor is not impoverished, since his debt is discharged, and the payee merely received what was owed to him. But this comment clearly indicates he has in mind a twoparty case, where the payor is also the debtor. In a three-party case, the third party who makes a transfer to a creditor does not enjoy the benefit of the discharge of any debt owed by him. The enticing question in these two-party cases, which we unfortunately cannot deal with here, is to what extent payments owed by the debtor under unlawful pressure are recoverable. Suffice it to say that some believe that these payments may be retained by the creditor, since they will in any event have to be made later, while others maintain that there cannot be valid payment if the creditor applies unlawful pressure, and that in these cases of self-help the payment may be reclaimed even though it was due23. Irrespective of whether we are dealing with a two-party or three-party case, Peiris rightly suggests that a payor subjected to unlawful threats could potentially lay criminal charges or claim in delict against the creditor24. However, the mere fact that the measure of a claim in delict, i. e. the loss arising from the wrongful threats, may be the same as the measure of a claim for restitution, i. e. the amount by which the recipient is enriched and the claimant is impoverished, does not mean that courts may ride roughshod over the requirements for these distinct forms of relief.

supplier had already accepted the new order and denied delivery, which may have amounted to an unlawful threat. Further see Du Plessis (note 19) 316–317. 22 See Peiris (note 2) 153. 23 See Du Plessis (note 19) 147–148. 24 See Peiris (note 2) 153.

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131

If the transfer did not serve to fulfil an obligation, on what grounds could the transfer be recovered?

If the civil law maintains that a creditor cannot achieve payment of a debt by unlawfully pressurizing third parties, what relief would be available to a third party who succumbs to the pressure and makes a transfer? The creditor cannot point to the valid debt owed to him as basis for retaining such a transfer. Given that we are dealing with an act of giving or transfer (datio) that has no basis for retaining it, it is understandable that Bertram CJ’s first port of call in his overview of the civil law was the group of actions that cover this fact pattern, i. e. the condictiones. Since the various condictiones have different requirements, and could be subject to different defences, it was vital to determine which condictio applied. In this regard it will be recalled that Bertram CJ favoured the idea that Saibo should succeed with the condictio ob [turpem vel] iniustam causam. This condictio can be relied on to reclaim transfers tainted by illegality or immorality. For support, he referred to Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 12,5,4, which in turn can be traced to D. 12,5,7, where Pomponius deals with payments made in fulfilment of a promise (stipulatio) obtained by force (per vim). However, it does appear rather strained to link the misguided, over-zealous attempts by tax officials to enforce payment, on the one hand, with contracts concluded under force, on the other. It certainly never has been the case in the civil law tradition that every transaction concluded due to unlawful threats is automatically tainted by illegality.25 Given these problems with the condictio ob [turpem] vel iniustam causam, let us turn to a second potentially applicable condictio, which has already been referred to earlier in the context of payment of another’s debt. It can be argued that Saibo’s transfer was supposedly aimed at fulfilling a valid obligation, but that it failed to do so; technically, it therefore not owed or was an indebitum. This suggests that the apposite remedy is rather the condictio indebiti; this was also assumed to be applicable action when the case was argued. Why did Bertram CJ not simply award this condictio, and thereby avoid strained findings of illegality and immorality? The answer is that a strand of civil law authority does not regard it as sufficient to prove that a transfer was not owed in order to obtain restitution with the condictio indebiti; it further has to be established that the transfer was made due to a mistake as to liability. Since Saibo never mistakenly thought that he was liable to pay the fine, and in fact knew he was not liable, the condictio

25 Du Plessis (note 19) 293.

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indebiti could not apply26. This explains why Bertram CJ regarded it as more attractive to revert to the condictio ob [turpem vel] iniustam causam.27 But was it the only option available to him? Here we again encounter one of the unusual tales of reception in mixed legal systems. Barely eight years before Saibo was decided, the South African Appellate Division, which also had to apply uncodified civil law, was faced with a claim for restitution of an undue payment made under pressure. Even though there was no mistake as to liability, it was held that the appropriate action for reclaiming the transfer was the condictio indebiti28. This development was fully in line with the general movement in civillaw systems, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, towards general categories of claims for the restitution of undue transfers. These categories were not confined to liability mistakes, as the strand of civil law that Bertram CJ subscribed to would have it. Nowadays, a number of civil-law systems show that it is quite possible to adopt a simple approach, whereby all transfers which are not due are regarded as recoverable in principle, subject to some general defences; these claims are either recognised parallel to, or within a general enrichment action. So what caused South African law to release its action for reclaiming undue transfers from the limitation that the transferor had to make a mistake as to liability? The answer, curiously, lies in the influence on South African law of nineteenth-century English cases that support claims for restitution in the event of “duress of goods”, which would cover the type of unlawful detention which Saibo was subjected to29. Thus, English law actually “nudged” South African law to extend the ambit of the condictio indebiti to include a broader range of undue payments, and thereby follow a route more in line with modern civil-law systems. Arguably, the potential also existed in Saibo to take its lead from the “duress of goods” cases, and bring the claim for restitution home under the ambit of an extended condictio indebiti. This would reflect that the primary reason why Saibo could reclaim the payment made to the Customs Department was simply that he did not owe it, rather than that it was tainted by illegality or immorality.

26 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations – Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, Cape Town, 1990, 837–848, 866–871; cf. D. 12,6,50. 27 This practice enjoys (or rather enjoyed) some support in the mixed jurisdiction of Scotland, which also is mainly based on uncodified civil law; for details see J. du Plessis, Compulsion & Restitution, Edinburgh, 2004, 80–83, 175, 179. 28 Union Government (Minister of Finance) v. Gowar 1915 AD 426 at 444. 29 See White Brothers v Treasurer-General 1882 2 SC 322; Du Plessis (note 27) 107–108; Du Plessis (note 19) 139–140.

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Conclusions

The law of unjustified enrichment often is regarded as one of the most intractable fields of law – a reputation which is especially deserved if, as some argue, awarding restitution ultimately depends meeting some exalted standard of equity or fairness30. And yet, experience shows that many enrichment problems prove to be less challenging if regard is had to certain basic rules and principles, and creative use is made of the opportunities for gradual, organic growth which its norms allow. This is also true of mixed legal systems, where judges and jurists can continue the tradition, so ably traced by Hallebeek, of incrementally evolving uncodified rules of civil law, but may also at times seek guidance from the rich casuistry of the common law. However, cases like Saibo show that care must be exercised when relying on commonality in these traditions in order to justify common-law receptions, especially when the relevant civil law is not properly explored31. One is not surprised by Professor Weeramantry’s statement in his discussion of Saibo that “we must not lose sight of the fact that there is much uncertainty still attending the topic of unjust enrichment in English law”32, an observation which still holds true to this day, despite remarkable attempts at attaining greater doctrinal sophistication in the field. Nonetheless, as experiences in Sri Lanka’s sister mixed jurisdiction of South Africa show, sometimes these influences can be beneficial, and testify to the richness that borrowing in these systems could create.

30 We have seen above that this type of thinking is reflected in dicta of Lord Mansfield on the scope of the action for money had and received in the common law. The German jurist Otto von Gierke is also reputed to have observed that in viewing the law of unjustified enrichment one stood “at the threshold of the most holy” (as quoted in J.P. Dawson, Erasable Enrichment in German Law, Boston University Law Review 61 (1981) 271, 276; also see Zimmermann (note 26) 835 note 6. On the modern approach of relying on rules, rather than recognizing that equity ultimately determines whether to award restitution, see Dannemann 79 (2001) Texas L Rev 1837 at 1841. 31 See De Costa v The Times of Ceylon Ltd (1959) 62 Cey. New L.R. 265, 269–270; Cooray (note 9) 78. 32 (note 5) 1032.

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J.P. Hooykaas en de afdeling Wetgeving van het Ministerie van Justitie in Den Haag (1939–1946)

1.

Hooykaas 1925–1939

Vermoedelijk heeft geen ambtenaar bij het departement van Justitie bij en na zijn leven zoveel kritiek ondervonden als mr. J.P. Hooykaas. Niet alleen tijdens zijn jaren bij Justitie (1925–1946), maar ook daarna was hij controversieel.* Hooykaas1, geboren in 1900, studeerde in 1923 af aan de juridische faculteit van de Universiteit Utrecht en promoveerde in Leiden op stellingen. Enkele jaren was hij in Utrecht repetitor en bovendien assistent van professor J.Ph. Suijling2. In 1925 ging Hooykaas als adjunct-commies aan het werk bij de Tweede afdeling (publiek recht) van het departement, waar hij het in 1937, na de gebruikelijke tussenstappen, tot raadadviseur bracht. Twee gebeurtenissen die hij op dat moment achter de rug had, verdienen hier vermelding. In de jaren 1927–1932 was Hooykaas een van de vele kandidaten voor de vacante leerstoel strafrecht aan de Gemeente Universiteit van Amsterdam. Eind 1931 werd hij zelfs na allerlei verwikkelingen als tweede op de voordracht geplaatst, maar hij fungeerde in die rol slechts als willoos werktuig. De Amsterdamse rechtenfaculteit wilde beslist mevrouw Hazewinkel-Suringa op die plaats en hoopte dit doel te bereiken door de kansloos geachte Hooykaas in te zetten3. Het moet een vernederende ervaring geweest zijn. Wel eervol was het verzoek dat hij kreeg om een preadvies te schrijven voor de vergadering van de Nederlandse Juristen Vereniging van 1934 * Met dank aan Gretha Donker voor commentaar. 1 In deze bijdrage wordt de spelling van de achternaam gebezigd waaraan Hooykaas zelf de voorkeur gaf. 2 P. Weenink, Mr.J.P. Hooykaas, 1934–1940–1945, doctoraalscriptie juridische faculteit Universiteit van Amsterdam, p. 5. Met dank voor inzage aan dr.J.P. Meihuizen. De onbekende bijzonderheden die Weenink vermeldt geeft gaan niet altijd vergezeld van bronvermelding, zoals het feit dat Hooykaas’ roepnaam Piet was. 3 S. Faber, De vacante leerstoel strafrecht aan de Gemeente Universiteit van Amsterdam (1927–1932). De kandidaten: F.W. Goudsmit, D. Hazewinkel-Suringa, J.P. Hooykaas, B.J. Stokvis, M.P. Vrij en vele anderen, Pro Memorie. Bijdragen tot de rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden 10.2 (2008) 143–145.

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over de vraag: “Komt bij de bescherming van de individueele vrijheid in ons huidig strafrecht en strafprocesrecht de gemeenschap te kort? Zo ja, welke wijzigingen dienen dan in onze wetgeving te worden aangebracht?” Volgens Hooykaas diende deze vraag bevestigend te worden beantwoord. De uitslag van de stemming hierover was onduidelijk voor zover het om het strafprocesrecht ging, maar wat het strafrecht aangaat kreeg Hooykaas de vergadering niet mee. Zijn pleidooi voor de opheffing van het analogieverbod (art. 1 Wetboek van Strafrecht) speelde daarbij een grote rol4. Tot het weinige dat over het priv8leven van de ongehuwd gebleven Hooykaas bekend is, behoort het feit dat hij zich vanaf zijn studententijd en zeker nog in de jaren dat hij nog niet aan Justitie verbonden was aan de dichtkunst heeft gewijd. Tot volle artistieke ontplooiing is de jonge dichter echter niet gekomen. Misschien omdat hij toen al niet gemakkelijk van zijn standpunten was af te brengen, zoals blijkt uit een brief, gedateerd 4 februari 1922, aan Willem Kloos, de hoofdredacteur van De Nieuwe Gids. Daarin dankt Hooykaas Kloos voor diens bereidheid gedichten van zijn hand in De Nieuwe Gids op te nemen, maar maakt hij duidelijk bezwaar tegen een door Kloos voorgestelde verandering5. Voor zover viel na te gaan is het tot publicatie niet gekomen.

2.

1939, geboortejaar van de afdeling Wetgeving

Het wordt tijd de naaste collega van Hooykaas op de Tweede afdeling ten tonele te voeren. Dat was J.C. Tenkink (1899–1986), die eveneens in Utrecht had gestudeerd en in 1926, een jaar later dan Hooykaas, was benoemd. Toen Hooykaas al raadadviseur was, was Tenkink nog referendaris, maar laatstgenoemde werd eind 1938 hoofd van de Tweede afdeling en niet Hooykaas. Mr. J.R.M. van Angeren (1894–1959), in december 1937 secretaris-generaal geworden, zag in Tenkink waarschijnlijk meer een bestuurder dan in Hooykaas. Hij, de meest geleerde van de twee, kreeg enige genoegdoening doordat hij van het begin af aan, in augustus 1939, deel ging uitmaken van de nieuwe Zesde afdeling (Wetgeving)6. Het hoofd van die afdeling werd Hooykaas niet. Zij “stond – zolang door den Minister niet anders wordt bepaald – rechtstreeks onder leiding van den Secretaris-Generaal”. Deze formule uit 1939 vindt men na de oorlog weer terug in de Staatsalmanak van 1946, het jaar waarin Hooykaas het departement

4 Zie in het bijzonder Weekblad van het Recht 12770 en 12771 (beide juli 1934). 5 Hooykaas aan Kloos, 4 februari 1922 (Koninklijke Bibliotheek 69 E 9). 6 M. E. Verburg, Geschiedenis van het Ministerie van Justitie, deel II (1898–1940) 462–465.

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verliet. In die van 1947 wordt hieraan kortweg toegevoegd: dat de secretarisgeneraal hoofd van de afdeling Wetgeving was7.

3.

J. van Kan

Voor het opnieuw passeren van Hooykaas en voor de uitzonderlijke oplossing die Van Angeren koos zijn verschillende verklaringen te bedenken. Speelde bijvoorbeeld een rol dat zowel Hooykaas, als ook mevrouw mr. L.C. SchönfeldPolano (geb. 1884) – nota bene al 15 jaar eerder dan Hooykaas bij Justitie in dienst8 – als raadadviseur tot de nieuwe afdeling toetrad? Van verder speculeren kunnen we afzien, omdat bij het onderzoek 88n vaststaand feit aan het licht kwam: Van Angeren had een verborgen agenda. Hij had namelijk iemand van buiten het departement op het oog. Dat was de veelzijdige jurist en rechtshistoricus prof.mr. J. van Kan (1877–1944)9. Van Kan was achtereenvolgens hoogleraar Romeins recht in Leiden (vanaf 1913), hoogleraar privaatrecht aan de Rechtshogeschool te Batavia (vanaf 1925) en lid van de Raad van Indi[ (vanaf 1930). Na zijn terugkeer in Nederland, in 1936, was hij onder meer betrokken bij de viering van het 100-jarig bestaan van het Burgerlijk wetboek in 1938. In eerste instantie, begin 1939, dacht Van Angeren in Van Kan een geschikte adviseur wetgevingsaangelegenheden gevonden te hebben. Voor zijn diensten zou Van Kan een gratificatie van f 1.000 ontvangen. Dat was minder dan oud-minister van Justitie en lid van de Hoge Raad mr. J. Donner ontving (f 1.238 over het jaar 1938), maar meer dan de gratificaties voor de adviseurs mr. W.J. Berger, ProcureurGeneraal bij de Hoge Raad (f 561) en prof. mr. G. van den Bergh, hoogleraar Staatsrecht aan de Amsterdamse Gemeente Universiteit (f 428). Laatstgenoemde kwam deze gratificatie toe als beloning voor “werkzaamheden van wetgevende aard”. Donner en Berger werden beloond voor hun lidmaatschap van de commissie Strafwetgeving, terwijl Donner ook nog “wetgevende arbeid op politioneel en ander gebied” had verricht. Later in 1939 veranderde Van Angeren van gedachten, vermoedelijk omdat intussen de afdeling Wetgeving op de rails stond. Hij deed een nieuw aanbod aan Van Kan, te weten aanstelling als raadadviseur in buitengewone dienst. Van Kan zou niet als ambtenaar maar als tijdelijk arbeidscontractant verbonden worden aan de nieuwe afdeling, tegen een salaris van f5.000 per jaar. Tevens deed hij de 7 Staatsalmanak voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 1946, 74; 1947, 94. 8 Verburg (noot 6) 196. 9 De nu volgende gegevens zijn, tenzij anders vermeld, ontleend aan Nationaal Archief 2.09.22 (Ministerie van Justitie: Verbaalarchief 1915–1955; Kabinetsarchief 1915–1940, inv.nr. 16312, Kabinet 1939, 24. Zie ook http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn/BWN/lemmata/bwn3/ka nahmj (13-9-’18).

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tot op heden onbekend gebleven toezegging dat Van Kan “waarschijnlijk” ook met het leiden van deze afdeling zou worden belast.Volledige zekerheid kon Van Angeren hierover niet geven. Het was weliswaar zo dat men op het departement bij tijdelijke benoemingen met een vergoeding tot de genoemde f5.000 per jaar zijn eigen gang kon gaan. De benoeming kon dan per ministerieel besluit geschieden. Met andere woorden, een KB, waaraan de commissie-Woltman10 en de Ministerraad te pas moesten komen – was dan niet vereist. Het kon dus wel, maar of er voldoende dekking was? Alleen al daarom zal Van Angeren zijn best hebben gedaan die toezegging te maskeren door te benadrukken dat hij de leiding van de afdeling Wetgeving tot nader order voor zichzelf behield. De benoeming van Van Kan ging door, maar hoofd van de afdeling Wetgeving is hij niet geworden. Hoe dat kwam is niet duidelijk geworden en ook niet hoe en wanneer hij precies hij het departement heeft verlaten. Als we even op de ontwikkelingen tijdens de bezetting vooruitlopen is vast te stellen dat Hooykaas in mei 1941 als waarnemend secretaris-generaal een brief stuurde aan alle afdelingschefs, daaraan toevoegend dat deze ten behoeve van de afdeling Wetgeving “in handen van” Van Kan diende te komen11. Al spoedig ontstond er tussen Van Kan en de op 1 juli als secretaris-generaal begonnen prof.dr. J.J. Schrieke onenigheid over de aanpak van de herziening van het echtscheidingsrecht die Schrieke nastreefde. Vermoedelijk heeft Van Kan de eer aan zichzelf gehouden12. Wanneer precies bleek onvindbaar. Misschien al voor 5 september, de dag waarop Schrieke mr.dr. W.M. Westerman (1892–1950) voordroeg ter benoeming als opvolger van Van Kan, of anders voor 12 november 1941, de dag waarop Westerman in dienst trad13. De hiervoor genoemde brief uit mei 1941 is te beschouwen als bewijs dat Van Kan toen nog feitelijk als afdelingschef werd gezien. Een andere uitleg is niet uitgesloten, namelijk dat Hooykaas die positie toen formeel al had verworven. Waarschijnlijker lijkt het dat hiermee is gewacht totdat Van Kan was vertrokken. Hoe het zij, op 20 november 1941 diende hij als afdelingschef een voorstel tot bevordering van een viertal ambtenaren van de afdeling in14.

10 Zie noot 49. 11 NA 2.09.22 (noot 9) inv.nr. 16312, A.S. 23 mei 1941, 1612. 12 M. E. Verburg, Geschiedenis van het Ministerie van Justitie 1798–1998, deel III (1940–1945), Amsterdam 2016, 804, noot 29. Gebruikt is de digitale versie, die een afwijkende paginering heeft. 13 Ministerie van Justitie, “Kabinetsarchief (geheim), 1941–1957”, inv.nr. 36 (1941/0016) en inv.nr. 58 (1941/0058), lijst met namen, rangen en jaarwedden (6e afdeling). Dit archief is volledig ge"nventariseerd. De inventaris (2006) ontbeert echter onder meer nog een inleiding en was in juli 2018 nog niet overgebracht van het ministerie van Justitie naar het Nationaal Archief. Zie over Westerman Verburg (noot 12) 1141–1144. 14 In Kabinet en Geheim (noot 13), inv.nr. 58 (Kabinet 1941/0058).

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139

Werkers bij Wetgeving tijdens de bezetting

Het opbouwen van de nieuwe afdeling bracht uitbreiding van het aantal ambtenaren met zich mee. De drie plaatsen bezet door Hooykaas, Schönfeld-Polano en Van Kan, groeiden uit tot een zevental15. De ambtenaren en arbeidscontractanten die deze plaatsen gedurende langere of kortere tijd hebben ingenomen waren groter in getal wegens de mutaties die tijdens de bezetting plaatsvonden. Zij zullen het hierna met slechts enkele gegevens moeten doen. Voor de hoofdpersoon van deze bijdrage zijn meer woorden nodig. Hooykaas behoorde tijdens de bezetting tot de top van het departement en combineerde die positie met het geven van leiding aan de afdeling Wetgeving. Het begon echter in mei 1940 opnieuw met een nederlaag, in elk geval naar zijn eigen beleving. Op 13 mei 1940 moest secretaris-generaal Van Angeren met de ministersploeg mee naar Londen. Dat hoorde hij op het laatste moment en daarom had hij maar weinig tijd om afscheid nemen van gezin en departement. Het staat vast dat Van Angeren Tenkink toen telefonisch heeft opgedragen als waarnemend secretarisgeneraal op te treden. Hij zou eerst tevergeefs geprobeerd hebben Hooykaas aan de lijn te krijgen. Hooykaas reageerde verontwaardigd, want minister Gerbrandy zou hem, en niet Tenkink, mondeling als eerste loco-secretaris-generaal aangewezen hebben. Dit protest haalde niets uit. Wel relativeerden Tenkink en Hooykaas hun aanvankelijke standpunten en zegden zij elkaar toe eendrachtig samen te gaan werken. Dat telefoontje van Van Angeren is met alles wat daaraan vastzat, een veelbesproken kwestie geworden16. Aan de website “Parlement & Politiek” (www.parlement.com) is een mooie samenvatting te ontlenen van de twee visies over hetgeen op 13 mei was gebeurd. Over Hooykaas wordt onder “wetenswaardigheden” gemeld: “Was na het vertrek van secretaris-generaal Van Angeren naar Engeland de eerstaangewezene om de leiding van het departement op zich te nemen, maar omdat Van Angeren hem telefonisch niet kon bereiken werd Tenkink secretaris-generaal”, terwijl van Tenkink wordt gezegd dat hij “in de meidagen van 1940 als veertigjarige min of meer toevallig secretaris-generaal werd”. Dit standpunt wordt verdedigd door Duk: Hooykaas en Tenkink werden “bij hetzelfde besluit benoemd tot loco-secretaris-generaal en daarbij was tussen hen geen onderlinge rangorde bepaald. Weliswaar werd Hooykaas het eerst in het besluit genoemd, maar dat kwam door het toeval van de alfabetische volgorde van hun namen”17. 15 Bestuursalmanak voor het bezette Nederlandsche gebied 1942–1943, 14. De Staatsalmanak van 1946 geeft hetzelfde aantal (p. 76). 16 L. de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, dl 3, Den Haag 1970, 311. W. Duk, Eindverslag. Herinnering aan mensen, beesten, toestanden en voorvallen, Zutphen 2007, 346–347; Verburg (noot 6) 489–490; Verburg (noot 12) 86–87. 17 Duk (zie noot16) 346. Het Ministerieel besluit waarop Duk doelt behelsde “machtiging op”

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Het is verleidelijk naar aanleiding van het citaat dat op Parlement.com aan Tenkink is gewijd nog aan een derde mogelijkheid te gaan denken. “Min of meer toevallig”18 ? Was hier puur toeval in het spel, of heeft Van Angeren het toeval een beetje geholpen? In deze richting dacht misschien ook de archivaris van het departement, L.G. Karper, die zich in 1983 in een artikel in Vox Justitiae, blad voor werknemers van het departement afvroeg waarom Van Angeren niet via Tenkink Hooykaas als waarnemer had aangewezen. En dan is er nog een ander merkwaardig feit. Van Angeren schrijft in zijn “Memoires”(1952) dat hij eerst telefonisch contact met Hooykaas had gezocht en toen dat niet lukte met Tenkink. Van Angeren heeft deze terugblik op zijn verblijf in Londen op verzoek van het Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie vervaardigd. Bij het opstellen ervan maakte hij gebruik van dagboekaantekeningen die hij in Londen had gemaakt. Merkwaardig is dat hij in die aantekeningen in het geheel niet melding maakt van zijn poging Hooykaas telefonisch te bereiken. Over de “vijf minuten” die hij kreeg om zijn vrouw en het departement in te lichten, schrijft hij daarin: “Ik zeg haar dat ik mijn plicht moet doen, dat ik het ontzettend vind, vraag haar de kinderen te zoenen. Ik kon geen slot aan mijn gesprek maken. Na even wachten bel ik Tenkink op en geef hem bevel voor mij te fungeren als ware hij S.G”19. Deze aantekeningen van Van Angeren zijn veel gedetailleerder dan de latere, daarop gebaseerde “Memoires”. Alleen al daarom rijst de vraag of die poging om Hooykaas te bereiken werkelijk heeft plaatsgevonden. Hoe het zij, na deze ongelukkige start gingen Tenkink als hoofd van het departement en Hooykaas als “loco” aan het werk20, en wel Tenkink op de kamer van de minister, en Hooykaas op die van de secretaris-generaal. Op Justitie deed na de oorlog het verhaal de ronde dat Tenkink wat de kamerverdeling betreft Hooykaas te slim af was geweest. Duk vertelt daar in zijn herinneringen in geuren en kleuren over21. In werkelijkheid was volgens De Jong op 14 mei 1940 in een bijeenkomst van de secretarissen-generaal afgesproken dat zij de ministerskamers zouden gaan gebruiken om te voorkomen dat deze door Duitsers zouden worden bezet22. Het lijkt erop dat Tenkink en Hooykaas inderdaad nauw hebben samengewerkt. Daar kwam bij, aldus mr. H.J. Woltjer (1911–1990), Tenkinks opvolger als

18 19 20 21 22

Hooykaas en Tenkink tot het tekenen in naam van de minister van alle stukken die niet door de minister zelf moesten worden ondertekend, en dat alleen bij ontstentenis, verhindering of afwezigheid van de secretaris-generaal. Zie 2.09.22 (noot 9) inv.nr.16313, Kabinet 22 december 1939, 103C). In de praktijk werd de gemachtigde loco-secretaris-generaal genoemd. Deze term is afkomstig van De Jong (noot 16) deel 4, 149. Nationaal Archief 2.21.183.02 (archief Van Angeren, 1940–1955) inv.nr. 24. Circulaire van waarnemend secretaris-generaal Tenkink, nr. C.1, 14 mei 1940. Zie bijv. NA 2.21.183.02 (noot 19) inv.nr. 2. Duk (noot 16) 346–347. De Jong (noot 16) 311.

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hoofd van de Tweede afdeling, dat onder Tenkink en Hooykaas het vinden van de juiste lijn niet moeilijk was. Omdat zij “van de goede kant” waren, was alles open te bespreken. Bij problemen plachten zij de verantwoordelijkheid over te nemen, terwijl er van een gezamenlijke beslissing sprake was23. Aan deze eerste periode kwam een einde toen Tenkink in maart 1941 besliste dat hij deze verantwoordelijkheid niet langer wilde dragen. Hem werd eervol ontslag verleend, met een Gnadenpension, wegen mangelhaften Verständnisses für die Erfordenisse der jetzigen Sonderverhältnisse24. Hooykaas werd, zoals door Tenkink aanbevolen, waarnemend secretarisgeneraal totdat een definitieve voorziening zou zijn getroffen. Dat gebeurde per 1 juli 1941, toen prof.dr. J.J. Schrieke als hoofd van het departement aantrad25. Kort voor de bevrijding verliet Schrieke Apeldoorn, waar het grootste deel van het departement sedert februari 1942 was gevestigd. Hoewel Schrieke menige botsing met Hooykaas had gehad, wees hij deze toch als zijn vervanger aan. Tijdens de bezetting werd van de overige werkers bij de afdeling Wetgeving een aantal tot vertrek gedwongen: mevrouw Schönfeld-Polano, omdat zij “van Joodschen bloede” was26 ; mr. A. Stoop, die “niet het volle vertrouwen (genoot), waarop (hij) meende aanspraak te mogen maken”27; mr. M.W. Scheltema (geb. 1910), die “op last van de Duitschers van de 6e afdeeling werd verwijderd”. Deze werd daarna rechter-plaatsvervanger bij de rechtbank Amsterdam, ontving daarvoor na de bevrijding financi[le compensatie, en werkte weer op de afdeling Wetgeving, nu niet meer als hoofdcommies, maar als raadadviseur28. Eerder al werd het vertrek van Van Kan aangeroerd en de komst van zijn opvolger Westerman. Westerman op zijn beurt werd van het echtscheidingsproject gehaald en kreeg andere taken. In het voorjaar van 1943 werd mr. B.E. Wielenga (geb. 1909) aangetrokken, van wie Schrieke verwachtte, evenals van Westerman, dat hij in de gewenste nationaal-socialistische richting te werk zou gaan29. Uit eigen gele23 Zie het Verslag van mr B.I.A.A. ter Veer, gevolmachtigde van deMinister-President, houdende verslagen van besprekingen met afdelingshoofden van het Ministerie van Justitie in de periode 19 april tot en met 22 mei 1945 betreffende de zuivering van het personeel, werkzaam op het Ministerie van Justitie, 1945. In mei 1971 is het overgebracht van het semi-ambtelijk archief van mr. I. Samkalden naar het Centraal archief van het ministerie (depot nr. 168), waar het zich in 2016 volgens Verburg (noot 12) 647, noot 52 nog bevond. Van dit verslag heb ik in en na 2000 een kopie kunnen gebruiken. 24 “Uitkeering” op grond van art. 99 van het Algemeen Rijksambtenarenreglement. Zie stukken in Kabinet en Geheim (noot 13), inv.nr. 94 (1941/0118). 25 Verslag Ter Veer (noot 23) 10. 26 Daarover Verburg (noot 12) 637–638. 27 Kabinet en Geheim (noot 13), inv.nr. 56 (1941–055). Behoorde hij tot het “vertaalbureau”, dat ressorteerde onder de bibliotheek, maar werkte hij speciaal voor de afdeling Wetgeving? 28 Verslag Ter Veer (noot 23) 58, 140. Kabinet en Geheim (noot 13), o. a. inv.nrs. 1535 (1943/ 0108), 1900 (1943/0670), 2647 (1945/0083), 3003 (1945/0678). 29 Verburg (noot 12) 806.

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deren kwam J.C. Faber de afdeling Wetgeving versterken. Dat was nodig, vanwege de enorme toeneming van het aantal kwesties en taken, waarmee de afdeling tijdens de bezetting te maken kreeg. Tevens werd, mogelijk om dezelfde reden, bij de afdeling tewerkgesteld mr. Th.K.J.M. Sasse van Ysselt, hoofdcommies bij de Eerste afdeling (privaatrecht)30. Tot slot zijn te noemen de drie ambtenaren die gedurende de hele bezetting aan de afdeling Wetgeving verbonden zijn geweest, te weten, afgezien van Hooykaas, de mrs. B.H. Kazemier (1907–1983)31 en H.K.A. Stoffels (geb. 1913)32.

5.

Een greep uit de productie van de afdeling Wetgeving

De afdeling Wetgeving kreeg in 1939 niet alleen tot taak wettelijke regelingen op het terrein van Justitie voor te bereiden, maar diende ook de andere departementen met aanwijzingen en adviezen bij te staan. Vooral dat laatste zou geleidelijk moeten worden opgebouwd, wat eveneens gold voor de personele bezetting van de nieuwe afdeling.33 Zij kwam inderdaad langzaam op gang. Correspondentiegegevens laten bijvoorbeeld zien dat het eerste ingekomen stuk dat na de offici[le start op 1 augustus 1939 werd geregistreerd, dateert van 7 september. Tot 10 mei 1940 nam het aantal ingekomen stukken toe tot ongeveer tien per week. Als daar al op werd gereageerd, volgde regelmatig 88n antwoord op een aantal ingekomen stukken die op hetzelfde onderwerp betrekking hadden. Vandaar dat bij de afdeling Wetgeving de omvang van de uitgaande post kleiner was dan die van hetgeen binnenkwam. De Nederlandse wetgevingsjuristen kregen in de eerste oorlogsjaren aanzienlijk meer te doen. Een topmaand was november 1940, met 160 binnenkomende en 60 uitgaande stukken. Van 1 januari 1941 tot en met augustus 1944 waren de desbetreffende aantallen betrekkelijk constant, gemiddeld per maand respectievelijk 84 en 40. Daarna kwam een kentering: beide aantallen bleven beneden de 10.34 30 NA 2.09.22 (noot 9), inv.nr. 16344, Kabinet 1940, nr. 85. Het was in 1940 de bedoeling dat S. aan de Eerste afdeling verbonden bleef. In de Bestuursalmanak 1942–1943 komt zijn naam alleen voor bij de afdeling Wetgeving voor, volgens de Staatsalmanak van 1946 is hij hoofd van de Eerste afdeling. 31 Kazemier speelde als secretaris een belangrijke rol in de zuiveringsadviescommissie. Hij was na zijn tijd bij Justitie onder andere buitengewoon hoogleraar methodologie en wijsbegeerte in Rotterdam, en vice-president van de Hoge Raad. In 1967 was hij mikpunt van W.F. Hermans’ Wittgenstein is in de mode en Kazemier niet. 32 Stoffels was o. a. vanaf 1946 secretaris, later lid van de staatscommissie Bezettingsrecht (zie Nationaal Archief 2.09.58) en werd in 1974 president van de Rechtbank Den Haag. 33 Verburg (noot 6) 462–465. 34 Bron van de genoemde cijfers: NA 2.09.22 (Ministerie van Justitie1915–1955) inv.nr. 15813

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Behalve met het onderhandelen over en het bewerken van verordeningen die de Duitse juristen ingevoerd wensten te zien, en met het ontwerpen van besluiten te nemen door de secretaris-generaal, kreeg de afdeling te maken met verzoeken om inlichtingen over onderdelen van het bezettingsrecht en met bezwaren van belanghebbenden daartegen. Bovendien werd de afdeling betrokken bij de uitvoering van bepaalde voorschriften. Omdat Tenkink en Hooykaas de verantwoordelijkheid ervoor namen dat de ‘ari[rverklaringen’ door alle werknemers werden ingevuld, lag het voor de hand dat de afdeling Wetgeving met de organisatie van deze operatie werd belast. Vanwege al dat extra werk werd de eerder genoemde J.C. Faber (1882–1962), die vertrouwd was met de verwerking van grote aantallen stukken, aan de afdeling toegevoegd35. In deze bijdrage beperk ik me tot een bespreking van enkele verordeningen en besluiten op strafrechtelijk terrein, waarmee de afdeling Wetgeving op een of andere manier te maken heeft gehad. Dit alleen voor zover dat van belang lijkt voor een beoordeling van de rol van Hooykaas tijdens de bezetting36. Het gaat in de eerste plaats om verordeningen waarmee de Duitse juristen beoogden de Nederlandse strafrechtspleging van in hun ogen te zachte of in ander opzicht ongewenst geachte kenmerken te ontdoen. Hiertoe zijn ondermeer te rekenen de Verordening van de Rijkscommissaris voor het bezette Nederlandse gebied ter bestrijding van de ontucht tussen twee mannen (VO 81/’40), het Besluit van de secretarisgeneraal van Justitie dat opneming van het nieuwe delict “bloedschande” (incest) in het Wetboek van Strafrecht (art. 248a) behelsde (VO 87/’42)37, de verordening van de Rijkscommissaris waarbij de artikelen 12 en 13 van het Wetboek van Strafvordering “tot nader order” buiten werking werden gesteld (VO 197/’40), het besluit van drie secretarissen-generaal, onder wie Schrieke, waarin op een aantal economische misdrijven minimumstraffen werden gesteld (VO 174/’41), het Besluit van secretarisgeneraal Schrieke, waarmee art. 1 van het Strafwetboek werd uitgebreid (VO 62/’43) en de verordening van de Rijkscommissaris waarin de voorwaardelijke veroordeling en invrijheidstelling werden afgeschaft (VO 2/’41)38.

35

36

37 38

(agenda, index, klapper 1939–1940); inv.nrs. 15814–15816 (agenda’s, indices 1941, 1942, 1943–1945). Faber begon bij Justitie in 1905 als tweede klerk, was tot de oorlog voornamelijk werkzaam bij verschilende onderdelen van het secretariaat en nam in 1948 (met de persoonlijke titel van administrateur) afscheid van het departement. In Vox Justitiae 1.9 (1948) zwaait Tenkink hem veel lof toe en dankt hij Faber ook speciaal voor bijzondere diensten, onder moeilijke omstandigheden aan hem bewezen. Met dank voor enige inlichtingen aan de heer Hans Faber, secretaris van het bestuur van de stichting Faber Geslachten en verwant van J.C. Faber. Zie voor meer uitvoerige bespreking van sommige van de hier te noemen verordeningen en besluiten Verburg (noot 12) vooral hoofdstuk 14 en D. Venema, Rechters in oorlogstijd. De confrontatie van de Nederlandse rechterlijke macht met nationaal-socialisme en bezetting, Den Haag 2007, voor o. a. hoofdstuk 4. Verburg (noot 12) 789–803. De mate of wijze van toepassing van deze verordeningen is nog niet volledig onderzocht. Zie

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Daarnaast zijn een aantal besluiten genomen om de sterk groeiende toevloed van (vooral economische) zaken de baas te worden. Ze hielden in: beperking van het gebruik van rechtsmiddelen, uitbreiding van de rechtspraak met enkelvoudige kamers en berechting van bepaalde misdrijven door de kantonrechter39. In verband met de noodzaak om achterstanden weg te werken en verder te voorkomen dient ook de Verordening van de Rijkscommissaris betreffende strafbevelen, strafbeschikkingen en aan kosten onderworpen waarschuwingen genoemd te worden40.

Deze tweede categorie van besluiten en verordeningen kan verder buiten beschouwing blijven. Het gaat hier namelijk niet om maatregelen die kenmerkend zijn voor de jaren 1940–194541. Het doen en laten van Hooykaas met betrekking tot de eerste categorie werd hem, zoals we nog zullen zien, na de bevrijding door de zuiveringsadviescommissie niet aangerekend.

6.

De Bevrijding en daarna

Op 19 april 1945, twee dagen na de bevrijding van Apeldoorn, arriveerde daar reserveluitenant-kolonel mr. B.I.A.A. ter Veer, hoofd van de sectie Juridische zaken van het Militair Gezag. Ter Veer was gemachtigd door minister-president Gerbrandy, tevens minister van Justitie, om op het departement van Justitie orde op zaken te stellen. Dat hield allereerst zuivering in en daarna vaststelling wie al dan niet voorlopig als afdelingshoofden en als loco-secretaris-generaal zouden optreden42. Al direct op 17 april had Hooykaas met de andere afdelingshoofden afgesproken dat aan hogere ambtenaren die “om politieke redenen” door Schrieke waren benoemd, zou worden gezegd dat het wenselijk was dat zij hun werkzaamheden zouden staken. En dat gebeurde. Onder het drietal ambtenaren

39 40 41

42

in verband met de betrekkelijk geringe toepassing van VO 81/’40 P. Koenders, Tussen christelijk r8veil en seksuele revolutie. Bestrijding van zedeloosheid in Nederland, met nadruk op de repressie van homoseksualiteit, Amsterdam 1996 en A.C.M. Tijsseling-Stek, Schuldige seks. Homoseksuele zedendelicten rondom de Duitse bezettingstijd, dissertatie Utrecht 2009; zie over de wegen die men vond om een mouw te passen aan VO 2/’41 Venema (noot 36) vooral hoofdstuk 4 en zie in verband met de relativering van VO 62/’43 het slot van deze bijdrage (punt 3). VO 79/’43, 13/’43 en 3/’45. VO 99/’42. De betrokkenheid van het departement bij deze verordening was niet gemakkelijk te onderzoeken, doordat ten tijde van het onderzoek op het departement wettendossier 461 ontbrak. Zie overigens wel Venema (noot 36) 227, noot 198. Zie S. van Ruller/S. Faber, Afdoening van strafzaken in Nederland in wetgeving, beleid en praktijk, Amsterdam 1995, over wettelijke en buitengerechtelijke wegen, van Napoleon tot nu, om de steeds maar groeiende aantallen strafzaken te kunnen afdoen zonder de kosten van de strafrechtspleging evenredig hoger te laten worden. Verslag Ter Veer (noot 23) 2–3.

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waarom het ging bevond zich de eerder genoemde Westerman. Niet Wielenga, die zich al enige tijd elders bevond. Deze voorlopige maatregel werd door Ter Veer bekrachtigd43. Op 21 april werd uit het in Apeldoorn aanwezige personeel een commissie ingesteld die moest adviseren over de door Ter Veer te nemen voorlopige zuiveringsmaatregelen. Op 14 mei was na vele vergaderingen het verslag van die adviescommissie klaar. Hooykaas, die – anders dan Tenkink44 – ook door de commissie was onderzocht, kreeg een tamelijk goede beoordeling45. Geroemd wordt de wijze waarop hij het bewerken en invoeren van verordeningen traineerde en “politieke klippen” wist te omzeilen. Bovendien konden de betrokken ambtenaren altijd rekenen op zijn hulp en morele steun46. Ofschoon de commissie niet aan de zuiverheid van Hooykaas’ intenties twijfelde, rees toch de vraag “of Mr. Hooykaas niet te ver is gegaan bij zijn verleende medewerking en of niet de naar buiten gewekte verkeerde indruk meer moreele schade deed dan wezenlijk gewin werd verkregen”. Over deze beeldvorming en over het aanblijven van Hooykaas, na het vertrek van Tenkink en na de komst van Schrieke, wordt tot slot ietwat vaag opgemerkt dat “de vragen welke hier zouden kunnen rijzen, problemen van zoo algemene aard (raken), dat […] de commissie in deze bezwaarlijk een beslissend oordeel zal kunnen uitspreken”. Enkele dagen later, op 17 mei, werd duidelijk wat Ter Veer met het verslag van de adviescommissie wilde doen. Wat Hooykaas betreft besloot hij “geenerlei maatregel” te nemen, terwijl het slot van het advies van de commissie werd verdisconteerd in de verwachting dat Hooykaas “vanzelf nog nader ter verantwoording zal worden geroepen”. Verder bleef Hooykaas belast met de leiding van de afdeling Wetgeving en werd hij samen met Woltjer benoemd tot loco-secretaris-generaal. Van Tenkink stond al vast dat hij als vervanger zou optreden van Van Angeren, die na zijn ministerschap in Londen weer secretaris-generaal was geworden47. Bij zijn conclusie dat Hooykaas nog wel verantwoording zou moeten afleggen, had Ter Veer de minister op het oog, maar op 22 mei was het Tenkink die deze taak op zich nam. Voordat we het resultaat daarvan bezien, eerst iets over de wederwaardigheden van Tenkink na zijn ontslag in maart 1941. Er is toen tussen

43 Verslag Ter Veer (noot 23) 2. 44 Zie noot 51. 45 Verslag van de commissie van advies voor de zuivering van het Departement van Justitie, bijlage 19. Het origineel van dit verslag bevindt zich in het “archief Ter Veer”, in een map “Zuivering van het Ministerie van Justitie”. (Dit archief is naar het Nationaal Archief overgebracht en is maar ten dele ge"nventariseerd.) 46 Vgl. de eerder al genoemde uitspraken van Woltjer (noot 23). 47 Zie noot 53.

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hem en Hooykaas op zijn minst enig schriftelijk contact geweest48. Daaruit blijkt dat Tenkink na zijn ontslag in maart 1941 van de hem aangeboden mogelijkheden van vervangende werkzaamheden alleen het lidmaatschap had aanvaard van de Commissie van onderzoek naar de formatie van de departementen van algemeen bestuur, in de wandeling commissie-Woltman genoemd49. Het zitting nemen in deze commissie leverde Tenkink minimaal het recht op om gebruik te blijven maken van zijn Fongers. Of en zo ja hoe hij in commissievergaderingen en op deze fiets actief is geweest heb ik niet onderzocht. Het zal niet heel lang geweest zijn, want naar eigen zeggen heeft Tenkink ook nog “een klein jaar” ondergedoken gezeten50. Verder heeft hij in illegale kringen en op verzoek van de Vertrouwensmannen een rol gespeeld bij de voorbereiding van maatregelen die na de bevrijding nodig zouden zijn op het terrein van justitie en politie.51 Na bevrijdingsdag 5 mei 1945 was Tenkink, die was aangewezen als waarnemend secretaris-generaal, voor die taak aan het werk, met een secretaresse, in een pand aan het Plein 181352. Op 22 mei 1945 kwam Tenkink uit Den Haag naar Apeldoorn, waar de offici[le heropening van het departement, dat ruim een maand gesloten was geweest, zou plaats vinden. Daarvjjr had hij nog overleg met Ter Veer en Woltjer, hetgeen tot een tweetal wijzigingen van de op 17 mei door Ter Veer getroffen voorzieningen leidde. Beide hadden betrekking op Hooykaas. Hij werd uit het driemanschap dat tekeningbevoegdheid was toegekend geschrapt. Bovendien werd wat de leiding van de afdeling Wetgeving aangaat de situatie van vjjr 10 mei 1940 hersteld, zodat niet Hooykaas maar secretaris-generaal Van Angeren weer hoofd van die afdeling zou zijn. Wel werden hij en de teruggekeerde mevrouw SchönfeldPolano raadadviseur in algemene dienst, wat meebracht dat hun namen in de 48 2.09.56 (Archief Hooykaas) inv.nrs. 20, 21, 22. 49 Verburg (noot 12) 729. Mr. J. Woltman was van 1922 tot 1933 secretaris-generaal van het departement van Oorlog en was daarna voorzitter van deze genoemde commissie. Hij overleed in 1941 (Haagsche Courant 7 juni 1941). 50 Ministerie van Justitie, archief S-G, 1946, nr. 46. 51 H.W. van Asten, “Jetzt kommen die Vertrauensmänner unter dem Kommissar aus Utrecht”, Amsterdam 1982, 43, 46, 183. Zuivering van Tenkink vonden de Vertrouwensmannen niet nodig, maar in verband hiermee was de benoeming – door het Militair Gezag – voorlopig. – In die tijd kon Tenkink beschikken over “illegale gelden”. Daarvan was na de oorlog nog ongeveer f 2000 over, welk bedrag Tenkink in oktober 1946 aan de Stichting 1940–1945 ter beschikking stelde (Ministerie van Justitie, Archief SG, 1946, nr. 391). 52 NA 2.04.67 (BiZa/Zuivering ambtenaren, 1945–1959) inv.nr 13. De ongehuwde Tenkink woonde al ruim voor de oorlog in bij de familie Regoort op de Laan van Meerdervoort 653. Tot zijn dood in 1986 bleef dat zijn woonadres. Dochter des huizes Annigje Teuntje Regoort (geboren in 1911) werd in 1940 als abeidscontractante tewerkgesteld op de afdeling Algemeen Secretariaat van Justitie (NA 2.09.22 (noot 9), Kabinet 1940 nr. 3). Na de bevrijding, mogelijk ook al eerder, verleende zij Tenkink secretari[le hulp. Toen Tenkink op 1 november 1945 secretaris-generaal werd, werd zij zijn secretaresse. Haar naam staat in een overlijdensadvertentie waarin de overleden haar “zo gewaardeerde huisgenoot” wordt genoemd.

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Staatsalmanak van 1946 niet alleen bij de afdeling Wetgeving stonden, maar ook werden gevoegd bij die van de leiding van het departement, minister Kolfschoten en de per 1 november 1945 tot secretaris-generaal benoemde Tenkink (met hun respectieve secretaresses)53. Een motivering van deze koerswijziging in mei 1940 – waarbij trouwens ook de informele titel van loco-secretaris-generaal werd geschrapt – is in het verslag van Ter Veer niet te vinden. Men kan er tot op zekere hoogte een eerbetoon in zien, dat zowel aan Hooykaas als mevrouw Schönfeld-Polano toekwam, maar het is niet gewaagd om wat Hooykaas betreft te denken aan voorlopige disciplinaire terugzetting, in afwachting van het definitieve oordeel van de minister. Van invloed is misschien ook geweest dat in de stukken van de adviescommissie die in het Haagse deel van het departement onderzoek had gedaan, behoorlijk negatieve uitlatingen over Hooykaas te vinden zijn. Weliswaar kwam deze commissie ten aanzien van niemand tot een negatief advies, maar de onderliggende stukken kunnen in Apeldoorn best een rol gespeeld hebben, ook al kwamen ze een pas een aantal dagen na de 22e mei binnen. De bedoelde kritiek uit Den Haag was afkomstig van medewerkers van het Algemeen Secretariaat. De belangrijkste klacht betrof de “te vlotte medewerking” van Hooykaas met de bezetter en zijn ontevredenheid over het lage werktempo in Den Haag, dat juist was bedoeld om de belangen van Nederlanders te dienen. Om Hooykaas’ haastige spoed te saboteren werd door de in Den Haag achterblijvende werknemers zelfs een zo groot mogelijk gedeelte van het archief van de afdeling Wetgeving tegen de zin van Hooykaas achtergehouden. We kunnen hier ook anders tegenaan kijken. Volgens het verslag van de Apeldoornse adviescommissie sleepte Hooykaas bij de bestudering en bewerking van de Duitse opdrachten tal van ‘irrelevante details’ aan. Daarbij zal hem het lange wachten op archivalia die uit Den Haag moesten komen, vaak meer dan een week, behoorlijk dwars gezeten hebben.

7.

Hooykaas vertrekt en wordt uiteindelijk hoogleraar

Hooykaas werd dus bij de eerste zuiveringsronde gehandhaafd, zij het niet helemaal zonder kleerscheuren. Een definitieve formele bevestiging door de minister van Justitie heeft waarschijnlijk niet plaatsgevonden54. Per 1 november 1946, precies een jaar nadat Tenkink was begonnen aan het tijdvak van de bijna 20 naoorlogse jaren waarin hij secretaris-generaal zou zijn, vertrok Hooykaas 53 Verslag Ter Veer (noot 23) 142. 54 Wel is er een al evenzeer positief advies van het Centraal orgaan op de zuivering van overheidspersoneel (Nationaal Archief 2.04.67 (archief van het ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Zuivering ambtenaren en Nederlandse Orden) inv.nr. 12656.

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naar het gerechtshof in Den Haag. Twee jaar later was hij raadsheer af, weer op 1 november, toen hij advocaat-generaal bij de Hoge Raad werd. Weer twee jaar later , op 1 november 1950, zei hij de magistratuur vaarwel om hoogleraar te worden in Utrecht, eerst in het administratief recht, later ook in staatsrecht, algemene staatsleer en inleiding55. Hij werkte daar een kleine twintig jaar, bijna net zo lang als bij het ministerie van Justitie. In 1969 nam hij ontslag nadat hij in opspraak geraakt was door discriminerende uitlatingen. Hij overleed in 1971.

8.

Tot besluit

Hooykaas was een “kleurrijk” persoon, “met een intellectuele bagage die je nu niet meer vindt, en die je toch voor het leven wat meegaven, niet alleen de negatieve dingen die vooral het publicitaire beeld bepaald hebben …”. Aldus in 2005, in een interview rechtshistoricus O. Moorman van Kappen, die assistent van Hooykaas is geweest in Utrecht56. Men mag wel zeggen dat Hooykaas het slachtoffer is worden van beeldvorming. Daar heeft hij uiteraard zelf een aandeel in gehad. Of hij dit ook heeft gecultiveerd zou ik niet durven zeggen, maar in elk geval is dat beeld ook autonoom een eigen leven gaan leiden. De scherpste negatieve uiting komen we tegen in de memoires van Duk (1918–2012), die Hooykaas niet heeft meegemaakt bij Justitie, want toen Duk daar in 1949 bij de afdeling publiekrecht in dienst trad, was Hooykaas daar niet meer werkzaam, maar was hij er bepaald nog niet vergeten. E8n voorbeeld: Duk noemt Hooykaas een jurist met onmiskenbare verdiensten, en vervolgt: “Daartoe behoorde echter geen voorkeur voor houdbare standpunten”. Wie een discussie niet goed had gevolgd “hoefde […] alleen maar even aan Hooykaas te vragen wat hij ervan vond. Je kon er dan zo goed als zeker van zijn, dat het tegengestelde standpunt het juiste was”57. Nog scherper is de wijze waarop hij daarna schetst hoe Hooykaas in 1946 van het departement verdween, “waar hij te veel last bezorgde”, en hoe de Hoge Raad in 1950 van hem werd “verlost” dankzij zijn benoeming tot hoogleraar. Meer genuanceerd zijn, zoals te verwachten, de levensbeschrijving van de hand van Stolwijk en de door hem aangehaalde herdenking van Hooykaas in het Nederlands Juristenblad van 1971 door G.E. Langemeijer, die het enerzijds en het anderzijds van Hooykaas op fraaie wijze in evenwicht brengt58. Toch zullen ook 55 Deze gegevens zijn afkomstig van Parlement.com. 56 E.C. Coppens/S. Faber, Rechtshistorici uit de Lage Landen (7): interview met O. Moorman van Kappen, Pro Memorie. Bijdragen tot de rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden, 7.1 (2005) 16. 57 Duk (noot 16) 345. 58 http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880–2000/lemmata/bwn3/hooijkaas.

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herinneringen met het kaliber van het Eindverslag van Duk kernen van waarheid bevatten. Lang zoeken in archieven en literatuur kan daarover meer laten zien, ook ten aanzien van leidinggevenden als Hooykaas en Tenkink, geneigd om persoonlijke omstandigheden, emoties en opvattingen voor zich te houden. Een mooi voorbeeld van een detail dat van belang is voor het duiden van iemands persoon en werk is een passage in een notitie van G.C.M. van Nijnatten (1908–1987), hoofd van het Bureau Bijzondere Rechtspleging: “Dr. De Jong zegt terecht dat Tenkink van mei 1940 tot 14 maart 1941 geheel op de verkeerde weg was”59. “Zelf”, zo stelt Van Nijnatten daar tegenover, “kan ik van hem geen kwaad zeggen. Integendeel, hij is de enige geweest die mij openlijk terzake van mijn werk heeft geprezen”. Uiteraard zegt dit niets over de omgang van Hooykaas met zijn ondergeschikten. Voor een drietal punten wordt hier tot slot aandacht gevraagd, mede met het oog op nog te ondernemen onderzoek, De rol van Tenkink , in vergelijking met die van Hooykaas, kan daarbij niet buiten beschouwing blijven. 1. Als niet alleen Hooykaas, maar ook Tenkink direct na de bevrijding aan zuivering zou zijn onderworpen60, was het eerste jaar van de bezetting – met inbegrip van een van de grootste pijnpunten, de ari[rverklaringen en het ontslag van Joodse werknemers61 – vast ook aan de orde gesteld. Het is de vraag of Tenkink dan wat zijn medewerking aan Duitse maatregelen betreft even positief was beoordeeld als Hooykaas, zeker als toen bekend zou zijn geweest wat Verburg recentelijk schreef over “Duits-loyale”, “opvallend proactieve” en andere uitingen en acties van Tenkink62. 2. Een belangrijk onderdeel van het beeld dat is ontstaan van Hooykaas, gaat terug op zijn preadvies in 1934 over het gewicht in het strafrecht van enerzijds het individu, anderzijds de gemeenschap. In een nota die hij in 1941 schreef over het voornemen om minimumstraffen in te voeren ging hij niet, zoals te verwachten, uit van de noodzaak aan de belangen van de gemeenschap voorrang te geven, maar stelde hij zich op het standpunt dat minimumstraffen “geheel vreemd” zijn aan het Nederlandse strafrecht en “daarin ook nauwelijks passen”. Hij voorzag dat deze straffen veelvuldig als te zwaar zouden worden gezien, wat alleen maar zou leiden tot minder processenverbaal en meer sepots en vrijspraken. Het was tevergeefs, de minimumstraffen kwamen er. Wat er in de praktijk gebeurde is nog niet onderzocht. 59 Nationaal Archief 2.21.183.61 (archief Van Nijnatten) inv.nr. 3. Het directoraat-generaal Bijzondere Rechtspleging (DGBR) ging aan het eind van de jaren vijftig, toen het merendeel van de politieke zaken afgedaan was, verder als bureau van de afdeling publiek recht. 60 Zie wat Tenkink betreft noot 51. Het is de vraag of een formele procedure volgens het Zuiveringsbesluit op dat moment had gekund. 61 Zie bijv. interview met Bas De Gaay Fortman in NRC Handelsblad van 13 mei 2016. 62 Verburg (noot 12) 595.

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3. Tijdens de bezetting gold allereerst dat een ambtenaar pas zijn post moest verlaten als met aanblijven de belangen van het Nederlandse volk niet zouden zijn gediend. Het betekende dat andere principes minder gewicht kregen en opportunistisch handelen meer. Ook de visie van degenen die kennisnamen van de nieuwe regels veranderde. Over de toevoeging tijdens de bezetting aan art. 1 van het Strafwetboek van een bepaling die de rechter de bevoegdheid gaf niet een wettekst, maar de “grondgedachte” van een strafbepaling of “gezond rechtsgevoel” van toepassing te verklaren, schrijft Stolwijk dat deze wijziging “gematigde reacties (uitlokte). De toon was vooral die van berusting en overbodigheid. Wat zou deze bevoegdheid nog kunnen bijdragen aan misbruik wanneer op vele andere terreinen het recht op zo’n onmetelijke schaal wordt genegeerd?63”

63 S.A.M. Stolwijk, Artikel 1,eerste lid en het legaliteitsbeginsel, Gedenkboek Honderd jaar Wetboek van Strafrecht, Arnhem, 1986, 166–167. De Bijzondere rechtspleging moest het zelfs geheel zonder art. 1 doen (p. 168). Vgl. ook noot 38.

Atsuko Fukuoka

A Path between Scylla and Charybdis: Ulrik Huber (1636–1694) and the theologico-juridical paradigm of Constantine the Great

It belongs to a coincidence of history that young Ulrik Huber had only several months to learn from Antonius Matthaeus II (1601–1654) at the University of Utrecht, to which he moved from Franeker at the end of July/beginning of August 1654. Matthaeus’s illness since November of that year and his death on Christmas Day deprived this Frisian student of the opportunity to establish a deeper, more lasting relationship1. Later, as the author of De jure civitatis libri tres and the Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt, Huber needed to address the issue of jus circa sacra and the socio-religious tension that had surrounded and complicated the issue since Matthaeus’s lifetime. Matthaeus could have been a good teacher for Huber regarding not only the Digest, but also the jurisprudential wisdom needed to achieve a balance between secular and religious orders, between the peace of a multi-confessional society and the claims for religious purity of the publieke kerk2. This short essay offers a preliminary examination of how Huber coped with the tension just mentioned, while, in consideration of the space granted, narrowly focusing on the methodological aspect of the matter, namely on Huber’s use of the paradigm of the first Christian emperor, Constantine the Great, in his discussion of the church-state relationship. The method of argumentation used in a work is an excellent mirror of the social and intellectual constellation within which the author was thinking and 1 F. Akkerman/Th.J. Veen/A.G. Westerbrink (eds.), Ulrici Huberi Oratio (III): qu. disseritur quamobrem jus publicum olim in academi. nostra professione public. non sit honoratum, Zwolle 1978, 2–3; Th.J. Veen, Recht en nut: Studi[n over en naar aanleiding van Ulrik Huber (1636–1694), Zwolle 1976, 35, 249. 2 It has been well documented how Matthaeus, as an authority of criminal law, practically saved Phillip Rovenius (1572–1651), the apostolic vicar at Utrecht, from being condemned to death for crimen laesae majestatis at his trial of 1639–1640. M. Hewett/J. Hallebeek, The Prelate, the Praetor and the Professor : Antonius Matthaeus II and the Crimen Laesae Majestatis, Utrecht 1639–1640, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 66 (1998), 115–150. See also M. van de Vrugt, Antonius Matthaeus II (1601–1654), in: T.J. Veen/P.C. Kop (eds.), Zestig juristen: Bijdragen tot een beeld van de geschiedenis der Nederlandse rechtswetenschap, Zwolle 1987, 166–170 (167–169).

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writing. The contemporary method used to discuss jus circa sacra was a kind of proxy war in which each theoretician fought by attempting to produce an interpretation of a commonly shared historical text that was more persuasive than his predecessors’. As such, the method simultaneously serves historians as a tool for detecting hidden rivalry and friendship3. However, the method used by Huber to articulate jus circa sacra differs from other Dutch lay theoreticians at one important point: he only sparingly refers to the Old Testament topics which were functioning as a highly complex political paradigm among his contemporaries4. In this regard, Huber does not follow Hugo Grotius, whom he otherwise regarded as his predecessor in the project to separate jus publicum from politica5. Indeed, when defending the sovereign’s right over religion, Huber mentions only a few, rather far-fetched loci communes of the respublica Hebraeorum tradition, such as the destruction of idolatrous monuments by pious kings of the Jews6. He uses them as very simple examples, without particularly differentiating his interpretation from those of his contemporaries by elaborating grammatical, contextual, and historical points, such as Grotius had meticulously done in De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra7. Huber is certainly conscious of the 3 A. Fukuoka, The Sovereign and the Prophets: Spinoza on Grotian and Hobbesian Biblical Argumentation, Leiden 2018, 8–9, 93–94. 4 E. g. A. Pecˇ ar (ed.), Die Bibel als politisches Argument: Voraussetzungen und Folgen biblizistischer Herrschaftslegitimation in der Vormoderne, Munich 2007; G. Schochet/F. OzSalzberger/M. Jones, Political Hebraism: Judaic Sources in Early Modern Political Thought, Jerusalem 2008; E. Nelson, The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought, Cambridge MA 2010. 5 On Huber’s view of Grotius as a forerunner in the separation of jus publicum and politica, see U. Huber, De jure civitatis libri tres, novam juris publici disciplinam continentes: Insertis aliquot de jure sacrorum et ecclesiae capitibus; Editio tertia, priore multo locupletior, cum indice rerum necessario, Franeker 1694 [=Bibliografie Franeker, no. 150], “praefatio”, 4; See also Veen, Recht en nut (note 1) 13–14. Hereafter references to De jure civitatis will be mainly on the basis of this third and final edition of 1694, while mentioning the first edition (1672/ 1673=Bibliografie Franeker nos. 145/146) and the second edition (1684=Bibliografie Franeker, no. 149) when necessary. The number in parenthesis added after De jure civitatis refers to the year of publication. “Bibliografie Franeker” refers to R. Feenstra/M. Ahsmann/ Th.J. Veen (eds.), Bibliografie van hoogleraren in de rechten aan de Franeker universiteit tot 1811, Amsterdam 2003. 6 See U. Huber, De jure civitatis (1694), 1.5.3, §. 15, 157. Huber argues here about the right of the sovereigns who share the faith of their citizens, such as the one to fight against heresy and to defend the true religion. He briefly refers to examples of pious kings, including the destruction of idolatorious monuments by kings Hezekiah and Joshiah (2 Kings 18,23), as well as Nebuchadnezzar’s prohibition to blaspheme the Hebrews’ God (Dan. 3,29). 7 The commentaries by E. Rabbie/H.J. van Dam to Grotius’s writings on the church-state relationship offer a valuable insight into Grotius’s dialogue with his predecessors and rivals, conducted through the medium of Hebrew and Greek grammar and the details of biblical antiquities. H. Grotius, Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae Pietas (1613), trans. E. Rabbie (ed.), Leiden 1995, 243–403; H. Grotius, De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra, trans.

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paradigmatic question that had crucial importance for deciding the jus circa sacra issue, especially among the Remonstrants and the Hobbesiani: “who stands at the position immediately under God to mediate His will?”8 And yet he does not try, like the Remonstrants’ leader Johannes Wtenbogaert (1557–1644), as well as Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, to present an alternative interpretation for controversial biblical loci regarding God’s disclosure of His will and laws directly to Moses, but not to Aaron or others9. Huber defends his view (that sovereign power is limited by unchangeable divine laws) by an appeal to an immediate tie between God and His subjects, demonstrating this point not by joining his rivals’ battle of political Old Testament exegesis, but by making a doctrinal argument, mainly on the basis of apostolic words, that the authentic testimony of the Holy Spirit is bestowed on every believer in their conscience10. While thus keeping curious distance from the use of Old Testament arguments as shared political paradigm, Huber does take up another paradigmatic theme from the history of the early church: Constantine the Great’s church policy. Noteworthily, Huber’s treatment of this subject shares the methodology characteristic of Remonstrant and Hobbesian Old Testament argumentation: he, too, dialogues with other theoreticians of jus circa sacra, siding with one and rejecting another, via his own interpretation of a shared historical text and uses the proxy of minutely grammatical and historical details. Even while sharing the rules of the game, however, Huber is playing in a different milieu, one consisting mainly of Calvinist theologians. The following investigation into Huber’s discussion of the first Christian emperor and the context that lies behind that discussion will shed light on another front at which Huber needed to defend his theory11. Huber as the author of jus publicum universale did not attempt to create his jus circa sacra theory ex nihilo, nor did he totally ignore the paradigmatic function of certain key texts for discussing the subject. He presents his standpoint, entailing a distinction between internal and external aspects of church governance, as rooted in the famous words of Constantine the Great, recorded in the Vita Constantini by Eusebius of Caesarea, at chapter 24 of book 1: !kk’ rlei˜r l³m t_m eUsy t/r 9ÁÁkgs¸ar, 1c½ d³ t_m 1Át¹r rp¹ ¢eoO Áa¢est²lemor 1p¸sÁopor #m eUgm

8 9 10 11

H.-J. van Dam (ed.), 2 vols., Leiden 2001, 2:623–882. See also M. Somos, Secularisation and the Leiden Circle, Leiden 2011. Fukuoka (note 3) 14–15 (on Grotius and his colleagues), 59–60 (on Hobbes), 311, 319–334, 341–345 (on Huber). E. g. Exod. 4,10–17, Exod. 20,18–21, Deut. 5,23–27, Num. 12. For examples of these verses’ interpretations, see Fukuoka (note 3) 171–181. See Fukuoka (note 3) 327–334. Huber’s need to defend his theory with respect to the Hobbesian thread has been studied in detail in Fukuoka (note 3) 317–319, 334–343.

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(“You are bishops of those within the Church, but I am perhaps a bishop appointed by God over those outside”)12. Huber adds a detailed analysis of this dictum and its historical context to the second (1684) and the ultimate (1694) editions of De jure civitatis, deploring that it has so far not been satisfactorily clarified as to how Constantine himself understood the distinction he made between the internal and the external13. Huber investigates Eusebius’s narrative to learn more about the context of the emperor’s utterance, and to show that he prohibited idolatry by law, ordered the days related to Christ’s deeds to be celebrated and the sabbath to be observed, and introduced religious education for his armies14. The passages appear to be a digression, and yet they betray Huber’s awareness of a debate that had been fought around this important paradigm for jus circa sacra by his predecessors. Especially symptomatic of Huber’s awareness is his explanatory translation of the imperial words that follow his study of its context. According to Huber, the emperor said to a group of bishops at a banquet that they were bishops “of those people who, or of matters which, are in the church” [eorum, qui vel quae[,] sunt in Ecclesia] and he himself was a bishop constituted by God “of the people who, or of the matters which, are outside the church” [eorum qui, vel quae, sunt extra Ecclesiam]15. Grammatically the expression t_m eUsy/1jt¹r can be interpreted either as the genitive plural of the masculine noun oR eUsy/1jt¹r, or as that of the neuter noun t² eUsy/1jt¹r. Huber opts to offer both possibilities instead of choosing one as the definitive translation. The question of which option constitutes the correct translation is still perplexing for today’s Eusebius commentators16, but in Huber’s day it was to take sides in a religio-political con12 Eusebius, De vita Constantini, 1.24, F. Winkelmann (ed.), Berlin 1975, 128; English translation: Eusebius, Life of Constantine, trans. A. Cameron/S.G. Hall (eds.), Oxford 1999, 161. 13 Huber, De jure civitatis (1684), 1.25, §§. 16–21, 187–189; De jure civitatis (1694), §§. 21–28, 150–151. 14 Huber, De jure civitatis (1684), 1.25, §. 17, 187–188; De jure civitatis (1694), §. 22, 151. 15 Huber, De jure civitatis (1684), 1.25, §. 18, 188–189; De jure civitatis (1694), §. 23, 151: Sed vos quidem eorum, qui vel quae[,] sunt in Ecclesia, ego vero eorum qui, vel quae, sunt extra Ecclesiam Episcopus a Deo constitutus esse videor. Emphasis original to this and all subsequent quotations unless otherwise noted. 16 Some commentators mention the interpretation’s prehistory in the Early Modern period: D. De Decker/G. Depuis-Masay, L’“8piscopat” de l’Empereur Constantin, Byzantion 50 (1980) 118–157. Henricus Valesius (Henri de Valois, 1603–1676), the translator of Eusebius’s works into Latin, is held up as an advocate of the translation from the neutral t² 1jt¹r, and S8bastian Le Nain de Tillemont (1637–1698) is named as a proponent of its translation from the masculine oR 1jt¹r. H. Valesius, Eusebii Pamphili ecclesiasticae historiae libri decem, Paris 1659, 536–537; [S. Le Nain de Tillemont], Histoire des empereurs, tome IV, Paris 1697, §. 87, 293. For further Early Modern translations of the dictum of Constantine the Great, see W. Musculus, Ecclesiasticae historiae autores, Basel 1562, 209; J. Christopherson, Historiae ecclesiasticae scriptores graeci, nempe Eusebius, cognomento Pamphilus, Caesareae Palaestinae episcopus, Socrates Scholasticus, Constantinopolitanus, Theodoritus, Cy-

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frontation. Central to this controversy was Nicolaus Vedelius (1596–1642), a former professor of theology at Franeker, and his work De episcopatu Constantini Magni, seu de potestate magistratuum reformatorum, circa res ecclesiasticas dissertatio (1642)17. Huber affiliates his own standpoint with this controversial mid–century treatise most overtly in the Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt (1686), while adding explicit and implicit qualifications in De jure civitatis (1672, 1684, 1694)18. References to Vedelius appear in the context of Huber’s introduction of what he regards to be the most moderate stance regarding the jus circa sacra of the sovereign. As mentioned, this position makes a distinction between internal and external aspects of religion, or between worship (Godtdienst) and church-order (kercken-ordre)19, subjecting the latter to the sovereign. Huber believes this is the golden middle way, exempt both from the errors of the Pontifici and Presbyterii, who excessively magnify the church’s independency (in excessu peccantes), and from the errors of the Erastiani and Hobbesiani, who enfeeble the same (in defectu peccantes)20. Vedelius’s work is offered here as representative of this standpoint. Why Vedelius? Huber’s choice causes some wonder. The distinction between the internal and the external, understood in association with Constantine the Great’s dictum, is not Vedelius’s invention. A classical formulation by the Heidelberg Calvinist David Pareus (1548–1622) articulates the distinction between potestas ecclesiastica interna and externa as between the spiritual power ex-

17

18 19 20

renensis Episcopus, Hermias Sozomenus, Euagrius Scholasticus, Epiphanensis, Cologne 1581, 255. N. Vedelius, De episcopatu Constantini Magni, seu de potestate magistratuum reformatorum, circa res ecclesiasticas dissertatio: repetita cum responsione ad interrogata quaedam, Franeker 1642. The Short-Title Catalogue Netherlands records three issues that appeared in 1642, each from different publishers: Ulderick Balck, Idzard Albertsz (both in Franeker), and Gysbert Sybes (in Leeuwarden). Balck’s issue probably appeared first, given that on the titlepage Balck declares himself as the official printer of the States of Friesland and the University of Franeker (Frisiarum Ordinum eorundemque Academiae Typographus). The quotations in this article are based on a comparison between the issues by Balck and Albertsz. On Vedelius, and on the university’s publishers, see W.B.S. Boeles, Frieslands Hoogeschool en het Rijks Athenaeum te Franeker, Leeuwarden 1879, 2.1:163–167, 1: 309–311. For the controversy pro and contra Vedelius, including its second phase after the publication of Grallae, an anonymous pamphlet defending Vedelius, see J.Th. de Visser, Kerk en staat, Leiden 1926–1927, 2:374–403; D. Nobbs, Theocracy and Toleration: A Study of the Disputes in Dutch Calvinism from 1600 to 1650, Cambridge 1938, chapters 3–5; Van Dam (note 7) 1:82. U. Huber, Heedendaegse [sic] rechtsgeleertheyt, soo elders, als in Friesland gebruikelijk, Leeuwarden 1686 [=Bibliografie Franeker (n. 5) no. 212], 1.10.9, 42, note (a). This distinction is according to Huber, Heedendaegse rechtsgeleertheyt (note 18), 41. See respectively the titles of chapter 5 and 6 of book 1, section 5 in Huber, De jure civitatis (1694), 165, 169.

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ercised by clerics in preaching, administrating sacraments, etc., and the legislative power exercised in a secular way concerning things and persons related to the church21. According to him, this distinction is what the first Christian emperor intended to express by characterizing himself “a bishop constituted by God outside the church or temple”22. These words, understood as implying two sorts of ecclesiastical power, functioned as a convenient platform to express a balance between the responsibilities of secular rulers and ministers, without dishonoring the tasks pertaining solely to ordained clerics. As such, the Constantinian paradigm went on to receive further articulations within the Dutch milieu, on both the Remonstrant and the Contra-Remonstrant sides23. Among the latter camp, Andr8 Rivet (1572–1671) elaborated the distinction between magistracy’s and ministers’ responsibilities by refining the translation of the Eusebian text: “For judging and deciding this question [of the magistracy’s right regarding religion], much help is offered in my opinion by what Constantine the emperor used to say to bishops. Eusebius tells us about this in Book 1 of Vita Constantini, Chapter 24. ‘You are bishops in the church; I am outside the church or temple, constituted by God.’ Its Greek text is the following: rlei˜r l³m t_m eUsy t/r 1jjkgs¸ar, 1c½ d³ t_m 1jt¹r. That is to say ‘You are indeed [bishops] of the matters which are inside, namely are done in the church, that is, in the temple. I am, on the other hand, [the bishop] of the matters which are outside: that is, which are outside the temple or, in yet other words, not related to the administration of sacred matters.’ In any case, he declared himself to also be a bishop in relation to the church: he drew however a correct distinction between the matters that are carried out inside by pastors, categorized as so-called divine tasks, and between the matters that belong to external administration and order, i. e. to organize and to reg-

21 D. Pareus, In divinam ad Romanos S. Pauli apostoli epistolam commentarius, Heidelberg 1613, col. 1392/ in editio tertia, Heidelberg 1620, col. 1380–1381: Quaerit adversarius [a reference to Thomas Stapleton (1535–1598), a Jesuit controversialist born in England], an in Principe laico sit potestas ecclesiastica? Respondeo: Potestas ecclesiastica dupliciter dicitur, proprie vel improprie, seu interna et externa: quae distinctio ex memorabili dicto Constantini M. ad episcopos petitur : ‘Vos estis episcopi in ecclesia: Ego extra ecclesiam seu templum episcopus a Deo sum constitutus: Euseb. lib. 4. c. 24 de vit. Const.’ Proprie dicta seu interna, quae ab ecclesiasticis ecclesiastice in ecclesia exercetur docendo, solvendo, ligando, administrando sacramenta etc. in Principe laico non esse conceditur, iuxta praecognitum III. et de hac sola argumenta adversarii consistunt. Improprie dicta seu externa potestas ecclesiastica est potestas molohetijµ, quae circa ecclesiasticas res et personas extra templum civiliter exercetur iuxta praecognitum V. Hanc in Principe laico esse asseveramus, iuxta propositionem VIII. hactenus confirmatam. 22 Pareus (note 21). 23 For an example from the Remonstrant camp, see G.J. Vossius, Letter to Grotius on 10 February 1616, no. 447, in: P.C. Molhuysen et al. (eds.), Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius, 17 vols, The Hague 1928–2001, 1:462–497 (478).

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ulate what would effectuate a proper administration of the divine matters in the church”24.

Vedelius explicitly referred to this interpretation by Rivet among his authorities and employed the Constantinian dictum to prove his bold thesis “the power of the magistracy includes every part of the office of bishops or ministers of the church”: “And this is what Constantine the Great, in Eusebius’s Book 4, Chapter 24 in the Vita of the emperor, said to bishops with the renowned remark: ‘You are bishops inside the church, I am [a bishop] outside the church’, that is to say temple, as the eminent Rivet correctly explained. To summarize: the power of a magistrate is, when it concerns certain parts of ministers’ offices, only of objective or directive and not of a formal nature. He does not himself administer sacraments etc., but only takes care that they are carried out properly. When other matters are concerned, the magistracy owns the right of both natures, formal as well as objective. Just as pastors have the right to call on other pastors, to give counsel to their pastor colleagues, to judge in synods, to enact churchorders in synods, to preside over church gatherings, and to dismiss ministers; thus the magistracy both posseses these same rights with the pastors, and moreover, because of the authority and external coercive power which it has, takes leadership regarding the external order, and arranges and issues orders so that the ministers carry out all those tasks correctly or discharge their activities correctly”25. 24 A. Rivet, Praelectiones in cap. xx. Exodi, in quibus ita explicatur Decalogus, ut casus conscientiae, quos vocant, ex eo suborientes, ac pleraeque controvesiae magni momenti, quae circa legem moralem solent agitari fuse et accurate discutiantur, Leiden 1632, 260/in editio secunda, Leiden 1637, 205: Ad eam discernendam et dijudicandam multum ad rem mihi facere videtur, quod Constantinus Imperator Episcopis dicebat, referente Euseb. lib. 4. de vita Constant. cap. 24. ‘Vos Episcopi estis in Ecclesia, ego extra Ecclesiam seu Templum, Episcopus a Deo constitutus sum.’ Graece sic habetur, rlei˜r l³m t_m eUsy t/r 1jjkgs¸ar, 1c½ d³ t_m 1jt¹r. Id est. Vos quidem eorum quae intus, nempe geruntur in Ecclesia, id est, in templo; Ego vero eorum quae extra: Id est, quae extra templum, vel rerum sacrarum administrationem. Alioqui Episcopum etiam se dicebat relate ad Ecclesiam: sed recte distinguebat inter ea quae intus aguntur a Pastoribus in officio, ut loquuntur, divino; et ea quae pertinent ad externam administrationem et ordinem, sive dispositionem et constitutionem eorum quae ad res divinas in Ecclesia recte administrandas faciunt. 25 To quote Vedelius’s argument in full: Vedelius (note 17) 24: Contra [Bellarminum] formamus hanc propositionem: Potestas Magistratus sese extendit ad omnes partes officii Episcoporum seu ministrorum Ecclesiae. Hanc totius Ecclesiae Reformatae doctrinam esse patebit ex sequentibus[.] After extensive quotations from William Ames, Petrus Martyr, and Sibbrandus Lubbertus, the author continues as follows (26–27): Vide etiam Cl. Rivetum in Explicatine Decal. p. 260. 261. Et hoc est, quod Constantinus Magnus apud Eusebium lib. 4. cap. 24. de Vita ipsius, dicebat memorabili voce Episcopis: ‘Vos estis Episcopi intra Ecclesiam, ego extra Ecclesiam’, hoc est, templum, ut recte Cl. Rivetus exponit. Summa: Magistratus potestas habet se ad quasdam partes officii ministrorum objective tantum seu directive, non autem formaliter, non enim ipse administrat Sacramenta etc. sed tantum curat, ut illa recte fiant. Ad alias autem habet se et formaliter et objective; ut enim Pastores habent jus vocandi alios pastores, monendi suos Symmystas officii, judicandi in Synodis, constitutiones Ecclesiasticas in Synodis sanciendi, praesidendi in conventibus Ecclesiasticis, deponendi ministros; ita Magistratus et

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In view of earlier interpretations, Vedelius could perhaps be seen as simply reproducing his predecessors’ arguments26. And yet Vedelius’s work was confronted with furious opposition inside the Dutch Reformed Church when it was published in 1642. He met such harsh criticism because he maximized the implications of the conventional concepts of lay princes’ roles as custodes utriusque tabulae and praecipuum membrum ecclesiae. In particular, while respecting tasks that solely pertained to pastors, Vedelius nevertheless asserted that over the rest of the pastoral tasks the magistracy fully – not only objective (indirectly or improperly) but also formaliter (inherently or properly) – possesses power and can exercise it jointly with pastors. Rivet, his authority, had not asserted that the magistracy formaliter possesses any ecclesiastical or spiritual power27. Vedelius’s adversaries attacked such an expansive interpretation, understanding his entire argument as directed not at doctrina pontificia as the preface declares28, but in truth at their own church29. The international situation in the 1640s also contributed to the unfavorable reception of the generally pro-magistracy stance of Vedelius. Not only the veteran fighters against the Remonstrants, such as Jacobus Trigland (1583–1654) and Jacobus Revius (1586–1658), but also younger Zeeland preachers, such as Willem Apollonius (1603–1657), who sympathized with their

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una cum ministris omne illud jus habet, et praeterea, pro imperio & potestate sua coactiva externa, quam habet, dirigit ordinem externum et curat, jubet, ut ministri omnia illa recte faciant, seu actionibus illis recte defungantur. For a typical example, see the following passage from Vedelius (note 17) sig. (?) 3v–4r (Alberti version: 3r–v): Habet enim, secundum doctrinam Ecclesiarum Reformatarum omnium, Magistratus sceptrum duos veluti apices, potestatem nimirum Ecclesiasticam externam, non quidvis pro libitu faciendi, sed secundum verbum Dei externe gubernandi Ecclesiam; quam potestatem Constantinus Magnus egregie expressit distinctam a potestate formali interna et ministeriali Pastorum, dicendo: ‘Vos estis Episcopi intra Ecclesiam, ego Episcopus extra Ecclesiam a Deo constitutus.’ Hic unus apex est. Alter est potestas civilis. Ita ut si Magistratui eripiatur potestas Ecclesiastica, non integer amplius Magistratus, sed ex parte tantum sit […]. Rivet (note 24) 261: Quam igitur jurisdictionis potestatem in Ecclesiasticis et Spiritualibus rebus ei [i. e. magistratui] adscribamus, videndum est. Eam, Spiritualem et Ecclesiasticam si quis dicat, id ita intelligi debet, ut non formaliter[,] ut ita dicam, Spiritualis et Ecclesiastica dicatur ; est enim pars potestatis politicae et temporalis; sed objective ita appelletur, quia exercetur circa res Ecclesiasticas et Spirituales, tenditque ad eas asserendas et conservandas. For the distinction between formal and objective powers, see also Nobbs (note 17) 109–110, 123–127. Vedelius (note 17) sig. (?) 2r. See e. g. J. Revius, Examen dissertationis D. Nicolai Vedelii de Episcopatu Constantini Magni, seu de potestate magistratuum reformatorum circa res ecclesiasticas, Amsterdam 1642, 47: quicquid dicit de potestate objectiva et directiva, probamus, quicquid de formali prorsus negamus. See also the statement made by the Classis of Walcheren that was inserted after the title page to W. Apollonius, Pars posterior juris majestatis circa sacra, sive tractatus theologici de jure magistratus circa res ecclesiasticas, oppositi Cl. D. professoris Nicolai Vedelii tractatui, De episcopatu Constantini Magni, ex authoritate, et jussu Classis Walachriana adornati, Middelburg 1643, sig. § 2.

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Presbyterian brothers struggling in the Civil War of Britain took up their pens to refute Vedelius30. Thus both old and new generations of Dutch Calvinist ministers stood up against this Palatinate-born theologian, who had originally been introduced to their milieu as an adamant critic of Arminianism31. The memory of this controversy was long-lived, surviving even after the death of Huber and beyond the Dutch border32. It is therefore interesting that Huber aligned himself with this controversial figure Vedelius, especially given that Huber as a young student at Utrecht in 1654–1655 received religious education from Jodocus van Lodenstein (1620–1677) and Justus van den Bogaert (fl. 1654), both of whom belonged to the inner circle of Gisbertus Voetius33. This group, the Voetians, were actively reinforcing the rigorously orthodox tradition, represented by opponents of Vedelius, and turning it further into a Dutch form of pietism (the nadere reformatie)34. Near the end of his life, Huber was to recall that 30 J. Trigland, Dissertatio theologica de civili et ecclesiastica potestate, Amsterdam 1642. For Revius and Apollonius, see the previous note. The treatise by Apollonius mentioned in the previous note was preceded by the following: W. Apollonius, Jus majestatis circa sacra, sive tractatus theologicus de jure magistratus circa res ecclesiasticas, oppositus Cl. D. professoris Nicolai Vedelii tractatui, De episcopatu Constantini Magni, ex authoritate, et jussu Classis Walachrianae adornatus, Middelburg 1642. 31 Nobbs (note 17) 130–131; Voetius (note 32) 129. 32 A Dutch translation of Vedelius’ De episcopatu Constantini Magni appeared from a Remonstrant publisher Johannes Naeranus (1634–1670) about twenty years after its first publication: N. Vedelius, Het bisdom van Constantyn de Groote: Waar in vertoond werd de magt der hooge overheid in kerkelyke zaken, Rotterdam 1663. In the same year, Gisbertus Voetius in the first volume of his Politica ecclesiastica presents the controversy pro and contra De episcopatu Constantini Magni as the most significant incident to occur since the Remonstrant controversy : G. Voetius, Politicae ecclesiasticae partis primae libri duo priores, Amsterdam 1663, 129. A detailed account of the controversy, including its later development into the so-called Grallen-strijd, is found in Ch. Thomasius, Historia contentionis inter imperium sacerdotium breviter delineata usque ad seculum xvi. cum appendice supplemantorum ad cap. 17. […] de jure summarum potestatum circa sacra, et monitorum necessariorum de methodo, et aliis supplementis continuationis historicae, Halle 1722, 349–406. 33 C. Vitringa, Oratio funebris recitrata in exsequiis amplissimi et gravissimi viri Ulrici Huber […] A. D. xiii. kal. dec. anni 1694, Franeker 1724, 11; Boeles (note 17) 2.1:224; J. Reitsma, Geschiedenis van de Hervorming en de Hervormde Kerk der Nederlanden, Groningen 1893, 291. Boeles compares Vedelius with two other individualistic Calvinists, Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644) and Samuel Maresius (1599–1673). Mentioning an unsuccesful attempt to call Maresius to the University of Franeker, he wittingly comments: “waren hunne [Vedelius and Maccovius’s] ijverige pogingen gelukt om Maresius van ’s Hertogenbosch naar Franeker te lootsen, dan zou men in zekeren zin daar een voortreffelijke drie[enheid hebben ontmoet” (Boeles note 17, 2.1:166). 34 Hewett/Hallebeek (note 2) 121–122; for the close relationship between Voetius and Willem Teellinck, the minister representing Calvinism at Middelburg (to which belonged Apollonius), see J. van den Berg, Het stroomlandschap van de Gereformeerde Kerk in Nederland tussen 1650 en 1750, in: E.G.E. van der Wall/F.G.M. Broeyer (eds.), Een Richtingenstrijd in de Gereformeerde Kerk: Voetianen en Coccejanen 1650–1750, Zoe-

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he had undergone a religious “rebirth” exactly during this stay at Utrecht, around the time of Matthaeus’s death35. Nevertheless, the confrontational attitude toward the magistracy, which often accompanied the Voetian ministers’ activities to purify society from “sins”, is negatively evaluated by Huber in De jure civitatis as erroneously going too far36. He critically refers to the historical example of “some preachers” publicly denouncing the sovereigns of the Republic for impiety when they were going to discontinue the war against Spain through the Peace of Munster37. Arguably Huber’s sympathy to the basic stance of Vedelius centrally concerns the rejection of such politically aggressive actions which were especially characteristic of the mid-century Zeeland and Utrecht ministers. He warns against establishing within a state “two mutually independent powers that both have jurisdiction over the external action of the citizens”38.

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termeer 1994, 9–27 (14); for repercussions of the Voetians’ activities in the Catholic community of Utrecht, see J. Hallebeek, Questions of Canon Law Concerning the Election and Consecration of a Bishop for the Church of Utrecht, International Journal for Philosophy and Theology 61 (2000) 17–50. U. Huber, Historia vitae meae vernacule scripta ob certam rationem, in: Veen, Recht en nut (note 1), appendix 1, 247–264 (251): “Anno 1654 in Augusto ben ick van Franeker vertrocken naer Wtrecht, ter studie bij Antonius Matthaeus, onder wien ick een Collegium Pandectarum hebbe aengenoomen. Doch gekoomen zijnde aen ’t 19e boeck is hij gesturven; dies ick d’ overige tijdt in een Collegio bij D. Cyprianus Regneri besteede. Ontrent de selve tijt hebb’ ick gevoelt groote veranderinge in mijn gemoedt en hebbe mij ten avontmaele begeeven. Regenitus sum in exitu anni 1654 et initio sequentis. Det Deus ne fallax spes sit.” See also Akkerman/Veen/Westerbrink, Oratio [III] (note 1) 2–3; Fukuoka (note 3) 312; A. Goudriaan, Ulrik Huber (1636–1694) and John Calvin: The Franeker Debate on Human Reason and the Bible (1686–1687), Church History and Religious Culture 91 (2011) 165–178. See especially Huber, De jure civitatis (1684), 1.28, §. 12, 211; De jure civitatis (1694), 1.5.5, §. 17, 166: Ad hujus igitur sententiae excessum referemus eos, qui negant, Imperantibus in ejusmodi rebus quicquam negotii esse cum Ecclesia; qui vim putant sibi fieri, cum legati politici conventibus eorum intersunt; quando Summae Potestates decreta Synodalia negant esse Leges, nisi a se confirmentur ; qui gloriae sibi reputant, quod imperia Potestatum, de non concinando certis locis et temporibus, audent contemnere; qui se ingerunt in consilia Principum, bellique et pacis negotia suae quoque censurae esse putant, et id genus alia multa, nimis usu atque opinionum conflictu nota. Thijssen-Schoute considers Huber to have been among conservative Cartesians. See C.L. Thijssen-Schoute, Nederlands Cartesianisme, rev. Th. Verbeek, Utrecht 1989, 131–133, 529–531. Huber, De jure civitatis (1694), 1.5.5, §. 25, 167. For the oppositions of Voetius and his colleagues to the Peace of Munster, see D.E.A. Faber/R.E. de Bruin, Tegen de vrede: De Utrechtse ambassadeur Godard van Reede van Nederhorst en de onderhandlingen in Munster, in: J. Dane/S. Groenveld (eds.), 1648: Vrede van Munster, feit en verbeelding, Zwolle 1998, 106–131; G. Groenhuis, De predikanten: De sociale positie van de gereformeerde predikanten in de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden voor :1700, Groningen 1977, 89–92. Huber, De jure civitatis (1694), 1.5.5, §. 2, 165: Cavendam esse, tanquam scopulum hanc positionem, quod in una civitate sint duae Potestates sibi mutuo non subjectae, quae jus habeant, externas civium actiones regendi[.]

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And yet the manner in which Huber opposes imperium in imperio is much milder compared to the radicality of the criticisms that Dutch students of Hobbes, like Spinoza and his friends, undertook against those ministers39. Correspondingly, Huber’s endorsement of Vedelius’s stance is also very cautious, and his analysis of the context and the meaning of Constantine’s dictum reflects that caution. An important key for recognizing the signals that Huber sends to his contemporaries through his discussion of the Eusebian testimony is found in one of the treatises published against Vedelius, Jacobus Revius’s Examen dissertationis D. Nicolai Vedelii40. Revius delves into the wider context of Constantine’s utterance to show that the emperor’s words cannot be used as evidence for Vedelius’s point. Firstly, Constantine was not a full member of the church at that time because he had not yet been baptized41. Secondly, the emperor’s words do not constitute an official statement like an announcement at a senate or a churchgathering, but were simply spontaneous utterances at a banquet he had organized. Given this context, so Revius argues, it is not clear what importance the emperor considered his words to have when he uttered them42. Thirdly and most importantly, Vedelius mistranslated the quotation itself, which Revius insinuates may have been intentional: “Vedelius quotes Constantine’s statement as follows: ‘You are bishops inside the church, I am one outside the church’. Vedelius probably knows, however, that this is an incorrect translation. The emperor’s words were: rlei˜r l³m t_m eUsy t/r 1jjkgs¸ar, 1c½ d³ t_m 1jtºr. That is to say (according to the translation by the learned Rivet) ‘you are certainly [bishops] of those things that are internal, namely, done in church, I am however [a bishop] of those which are outside’. Nevertheless – hopefully the very learned [Rivet] would not be offended – I do not doubt that the words must be translated as ‘those who are inside’ and ‘those who are outside’”43

39 In this regard it is interesting that even the non-radical liberalist Christian Thomasius (1655–1728) found Huber’s stance too conservative and left frustrated commentaries throughout the chapters of De jure civitatis concerning jus circa sacra: U. Huber/Ch. Thomasius, De jure civitatis libri tres, novam juris publici universalis disciplinam continentes: Insertis aliquot, de jure sacrorum et ecclesiae, capitibus; Editio quarta, priore multo locupletior, cum novis adnotationibus et novo indice in usum auditorii Thomasiani, Frankfurt and Leipzig 1708 [=Bibliografie Franeker, no. 156], 164–220. 40 See above note 26 for bibliographical information. 41 Revius (note 29) 16–17, 43–44. 42 Revius (note 29) 44. 43 Revius (note 29) 44: Dictum Constantini ita Vedelius citat: ‘Vos estis Episcopi intra Ecclesiam, ego extra Ecclesiam.’ Sed sciat Vedelius, perperam ita verti. Verba imperatoris fuerunt: rlei˜r l³m t_m eUsy t/r 1jjkgs¸ar, 1c½ d³ t_m 1jtºr. id est (ut vertit Cl. Rivetus) ‘vos quidem eorum quae intus, nempe, geruntur, in Ecclesia, ego vero eorum quae extra.’ Sed, quod pace tanti viri dictum velim, vertendum non dubito: eorum qui intra, et, eorum qui extra.

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These two options, eorum quae by Rivet and eorum qui by Revius, are exactly what Huber gave in his translation of Eusebius’s passage. In Revius’s opinion, the emperor was only speaking of his activity with regards to non-Christian people, far from declaring his responsibilities regarding matters related to the governance of the church, the community of people already “inside the church”.44 A grammatical distinction between neuter and masculine genitives simultaneously divided the two ideological camps and it should be supposed that Huber, in offering both choices, was conscious of this fact. And within this war by grammatical proxy, Revius himself could not escape the fate of being retaliated against with the same weapon. The weakness of Revius’s interpretation is wittily summarized in a book dedicated to Cromwell (1656) by Louis Du Moulin (1606–1680), who was then a Camden Reader in History at Oxford and later attracted still more attention in the Netherlands for his polemic against Voetius as Papa Ultrajectinus45 : “Extraordinary is the keenness of Jacobus Revius: the words of Constantin, t_m eUsy t/r 1jjkgs¸ar, and t_m 1jt¹r, are not neuter but masculine: ‘of those who are inside of the church, and those who are outside of the church’, according to which Constantin were referring to people and not to things. If Revius’s interpretation were true, even Constantine should be deprived of the care of the matters that exist outside of the church and be denied the right to summon a synod”46.

Indeed, the history of Christianity would have been very different if Constantine the Great could not have legitimately summoned the First Nicaean Council. Given this context of a quarrel about the neuter and the masculine, it can be supposed that by quoting both of the interpretative alternatives, eorum qui, vel quae sunt, Huber made himself less vulnerable to possible criticisms both from the strictly orthodox group of the Reformed Church and from the more secularminded branch of it. This translation was not the product of a pure undecidedness, but of the caution of a man who knew he was sailing between Scylla and Charybdis. A further confirmation of Huber’s sensitivity to possible criticisms from the orthodox camp can be found in his rejection of the interpretation that Con44 Revius (note 29) 43–45. 45 L. Coluinus [Louis Du Moulin], Papa Ultrajectinus seu mysterium iniquitatis reductum a clarissimo viro Gisberto Voetio in opere Politiae ecclesiasticae, London 1668. 46 Ludovicus Molinaeus [Louis Du Moulin], Paraenesis ad aedificatores imperii in imperio, in qua defenduntur jura magistratus adversus Mosem Amyraldum, et caeteros vindices potestatis ecclesiasticae presbyterianae, London 1656, 26 (Cap. 2): Mirificum est acumen Iacobi Revii, verba Constantini t_m eUsy t/r 1jjkgs¸ar, et t_m 1jt¹r, non neutro genere, sed masculino, eorum qui sunt intra Ecclesiam, et eorum qui sunt extra Ecclesiam, ad homines non res referentis; cujus si vera interpretatio, etiam a Constantino abjudicabitur cura rerum quae extra Ecclesiam existunt, jusque synodos convocandi, ei denegabitur.

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stantine’s episcopal role was “only against Pagans”, as expressed by Cardinal Perronius (Jacque Davy Duperron, 1556–1618), despite the fact it substantially resembles Revius’s interpretation47. In contrast to Huber’s criticism of the strictly orthodox theologian, which was camouflaged under the cover of a Catholic name, he openly declares the interpretation of Constantine’s dictum by Vedelius incorrect. He argues that the emperor did not mean external church governance (regimen ecclesiae externum) “as is commonly thought and earlier by Vedelius in his erudite book De episcopatu Constantini Magni48.” Nevertheless, he then twists the course of his argument in a way which amounts to rehabilitating the conclusion of Vedelius that has just been rejected: “1. However, even if Constantine by these words did not mean to say anything about the external government of the church [regimen externum Ecclesiae], on other occasions he always thought that the external church government did, nevertheless, belong to him; and he did not refrain from exercising that power via his own action, which even the unique history of the Nicaean Council, and the things that followed the council, can amply demonstrate.”49

47 Huber, De jure civitatis (1684), 1.25, §. 21, 189; De jure civitatis (1694), 1.5.1., §. 27, 151: [following a comment on Vedelius] nec etiam contra Paganos solos, ‘ut destrueret eos,’ sicut Perronius Cardinalis in sermonibus Pithoeanus, loquitur, ‘pour les destruire, comme l’Empereur dit nommement,’ ut ‘Caesar nominatim loquitur,’ inquit; Ubi? Non usus est illis verbis, neque similibus, etsi verum est, idolatriam ab eo fuisse abolitam. By Perronius Cardinalis in sermonibus Pithoeanis, Huber probably refers to the following collection of Duperrons’ remarks or “table talk”, written down, according to the frontmatter, by brothers Jacobus and Petrus Puteanus (Jacques and Pierre Dupuy, 1586–1656 and 1582–1651): Jacque Davy Duperron, Perroniana sive excerpta ex ore Cardinalis Perronii per F.F.P.P. [=Fratres Puteanos], Geneva 1667. It reads at p. 110: “Episcopus ad extra: ce n’est pas qu’il fust Evesque de choses spiritueles au dehors, mais il veut dire, qu’il seroit Evesque au dehors contre le payens, non pas au spirituel, mais pour les destruires; car il dit nommement, qu’il mettra par terre leurs temples, et qu’il r’enversera leurs idoles [minime vero episcopus ad extra, quia ordinis et disciplinae vindex, cujus est 1p¸sÁopei˜m, ne quid Ecclesia detrimenti capiat, nam hae sunt Principis partes. Dal.]” 48 Huber, De jure civitatis (1684), 1.25, §. 21, 189; De jure civitatis (1694), 1.5.1., §. 27, 151. 49 Huber, De jure civitatis (1684), 1.26. §. 1, 190; De jure civitatis (1694), 1.5.2, §. 1, 152: 1. Etsi vero Constantinus Episcopatum suum iis verbis ita non intellexerit, ut regimen externum Ecclesiae significarent, nihilo secus tamen id ipsum sibi competere semper alias sensit, neque destitit ipso actu exercere, quemadmodum vel sola Concilii Nicaeni historia, quaeque deinde secuta sunt, edocere possunt. See also chapter abstract on the same pages: Nihilominus tenendam esse distinctionem inter jus regendi Ecclesiam internum et externum, in hunc modum, ut ea quae Deus determinavit et ad suum judicium immediate pertinere voluit, Imperio civili non subjaceant, secus ac illa, quae aliter ac aliter se habere possunt. Thomasius frustratedly comments on the flow of Huber’s argument here. See Huber/Thomasius (note 39) 176 (note b): Mallem, ut Autor [=Huber] melius observasset leges bonae disputationis. […] Hic ante omnia debuisset Autor explicare, quid intelligatur per jus regendi externam, quid per internum.

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This is how Huber starts the following chapter. He even goes on to use the example of the First Nicaean Council and the history following it – an example which is implicitly adversary to Revius’s interpretation of the dictum, as Du Moulin’s text quoted above suggests. These facts show that in truth Huber basically shares with Vedelius a recognition that “the external church government” is a legitimate right of the magistracy or the sovereign, to use Huber’s own terminology. Still, Huber once again emphasizes a difference between his position and Vedelius’s on the matter of how the foundation of this right should be understood: “We do not employ the argument by the highly regarded man Vedelius that the right to ecclesiastical matters conducted in the church belongs to the authority because they are the foremost members of the church, which argument he asserts passim in his treatise, De episcopatu Constantini Magni. Belonging to the church and being its most important member cannot actually increase one’s right except on the basis of the consent of the church, in so far as their membership is a part of the whole. However, eminence as the cause to obtain the right in question through consent is only a question of desirability and probability, rather than that of immediate effect and necessity in its own right”50.

Instead of the status of the magistracy as the foremost member of the church, Huber asserts that external church governance is the consequence of uniting the following two principles together : the principle that the sovereign power is basically absolute, except with respect to the pristine social contract, and the idea that any mortal governor, even the supreme, cannot alter necessaria Dei praecepta. Those necessary precepts are both natural (divine natural law) and revealed (divine positive law). They set boundaries for sovereign power, which is otherwise absolute, and leave the realm of conscience (jus internum constientiae) immediately subject to no human authority, but to God alone51. This concept of boundedness applies to sovereigns qua sovereigns, whether they are infidel, female, infant, or even the foremost member of the church. This, Huber asserts, distinguishes his theory from Vedelius’s argument of praecipuum membrum ecclesiae. This investigation into the various interpretations of the Constantinian 50 Huber, De jure civitatis (1672/1673), 303 [annotation to p. 200, l. 8]: Ratione Clar[i]ss. Vedelii; quod potestatibus ecclesiarum jus in Ecclesiam competat, eo quod praecipua sint Ecclesiae membra, quod ille passim urget in tract. de episcop. Constant[.] M. nos non utimur ; quia de jure quod Potestati jure potestatis et qua tali adeoque et infideli competit, agimus. Ecclesiae membro utcunque praecipuo, quatenus pars totius est, nihil juris quam ex consensu Ecclesiae adscribi potest; Eminentia autem ad illud jus ex consensu acquirendum ratio magis suasoria et probabilis est quam sua vi efficax et necessaria. Emphasis in translation added. Huber integrated this note into the main text in the second and later editions: De jure civitatis (1684), 1.26, §§. 6–7, De jure civitatis (1694), 1.5.2, §§. 9–10. 51 For further details of the dichotomy thus modified, see Fukuoka (note 3) 331–334.

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paradigm and Huber’s explicit and implicit comments on them sheds light on the social and intellectual tension which surrounded Huber’s theory of jus circa sacra. Textual clues seen so far suggest that Huber was already highly conscious of possible criticisms from the orthodox milieu when he expressed sympathy for Vedelius, although he was by no means a heterodox theologian. It can be supposed that this caution also made it necessary for Huber to even more strongly differentiate himself from the emerging radical rationalists whom he grouped under the names of Hobbes and Spinoza. Huber’s harsh confrontation with the Hobbesiani, as previously traced in The Sovereign and the Prophets, stemmed from there52. The new facets explored in this essay reaffirm viewing Huber as a defender of moderate sovereignty, that is, comprising the autonomy of the secular ruler who acts within the boundary of inviolable divine precepts, but is simultaneously not overwhelmed by clerical agency. This stance leaves only a narrow path to tread between the philosophically and the theologically uncompromising minds, and, if he can eventually be called Vedelian, it was principally in this sense. Huber’s sensitivity to orthodox critics also hints at why extensive Old Testament argumentation is almost absent in his theory. Suggestive in this regard is Voetius’s skeptical opinion, expressed in his book published in 1663, regarding the value of the biblical arguments offered by his opponents. According to Voetius, they mostly concern “examples and deeds of magistrates who themselves were extraordinary prophets (like Moses, David, Solomon), or at least those who were immediately guided or aided by prophets”53. Indeed the Remonstrants, and later Hobbes, tended to emphasize the initiatives that Moses and Hebrew kings exercised regarding religious matters. They inferred from these examples the supremacy of their contemporary sovereigns. Voetius here rejected such an argument as invalid, because, unlike Moses and other kings, the sovereigns of his day did not receive revelation from God. If they nevertheless were entitled to exercise religious leadership, it should only be with the support of “prophets” – meaning, practically, according to the judgment of ministers. The popularization in the 1660s and 1670s of even more radicalized biblical arguments in the form of Parts III and IV of Leviathan by Hobbes (Dutch 52 Fukuoka (note 3) 334–343; see also Veen, Recht en nut (note 1) 160–214. 53 Voetius (note 32) 149. To quote Voetius’s argument in full: Accedamus ad argumenta adversariorum. Ducuntur ea 1. Ex Scripturis. 2. Ex Rationibus. 3. Ex Autoritate humana dictorum aut factorum […]. 1. Ad testimonia Scrpturae,fontes hos solutionum suggerimus: 1. Quod nihil habeant de illa Potestate quam nos negamus: sed tantum de indirecta illa, exteriori et mediata circa sacra, immediata vero circa ea quae sacris connexa, quamvis formaliter non sint sacra: quam nos concedimus. 2. Aut quod exempla et facta sint Magistratuum, qui fuerunt extraordinarii Prophetae (ut Moses, David, Salomon) aut saltem habuerunt immediatam directionem et assistentiam Prophetatum.

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translation in 1668, Latin translation in 1669), as well as the Tractatus theologicopoliticus by Spinoza (1670)54, probably confirmed within the Dutch Reformed milieu a negative evaluation of the Grotian, or better now Hobbesian, method of Old Testament argumentation55. In contrast, arguments from early church history, which had certainly existed but were less conspicuous in their treatises, could have been seen as relatively safe to employ. Knowledge of Old Testament antiquities did not become obsolete even after Huber’s lifetime56. Given this fact, it can arguably be pointed out that Huber sensitively reacted to this radicalized atmosphere when he chose to engage with Constantine’s dictum, but remain distant from biblical loci, sometimes even sacrificing clarity and depth in his arguments as he attempted to avoid what he regarded as extremes.

54 Noel Malcolm, Hobbes and Spinoza/ Hobbes and the European Republic of Letters, in: Aspects of Hobbes, Oxford 2002, 27–25, 457–545. 55 For Voetius’s reaction to Leviathan, see Fukuoka (note 3) 239–240. 56 Interesting in this respect is the fact that Thomasius, annotating De jure civitatis, deplored that Huber had insufficiently evidenced his argument on excommunication. Thomasius therefore inserted long quotations from important contemporary studies of biblical history, including Paraenesis ad aedificatores imperii in imperio by Pierre Du Moulin (note 46) and De synedriis et praefecturis juridicis veterum (Book 1, 1650) by John Selden (1584–1654). See Huber/Thomasius (note 39) 186 (note c), [211]–220.

Dirk Heirbaut*

Codification in Belgium from Napoleon to Geens

Codification is one of the subjects in which Jan Hallebeek takes a great interest. His country, the Netherlands, can be proud of one of the best modern codes, the 1992 Civil Code, which is a model of codification and the envy of its neighbours, most of all the Belgians. However, as this article will show, it looks like Belgium is finally making national codifications and getting rid of Napoleon’s legacy.

I.

Codification before Belgium

Although Belgium as an independent state only exists since 1830, the history of its current territories is much older. After the dissolution of the Carolingian empire, the area now covered by Belgium and the Netherlands consisted of several principalities. From 1386, French princes, the dukes of Burgundy, and their Habsburg successors united these principalities, with the major exception of the ecclesiastical principality of LiHge. The Burgundian-Habsburg state in the Low Countries fell apart at the end of the sixteenth century. The Northern Netherlands, the Dutch Republic, became independent, whereas the Southern Netherlands, more or less today’s Belgium, remained in the hands of the Habsburg dynasty, though moving from the Spanish to the Austrian branch in the early eighteenth century. Although the Low Countries had become politically unified, legal unification never followed. Local customs prevailed. However, the dukes, who were after all a cadet branch of the French royal family, had introduced to their lands the homologation of customs, i. e. their official registration and promulgation. This allowed them to weed out some customs, but still left many others. Homologation can be seen as a first step towards codification, though most homologated customs were still too unsystematic compared to later

* This article describes the situation until 1 January 2018. The author would like to thank Gerard Sinnaeve, Am8lie Verfaillie and Matthias Van der Haegen for reading and correcting his text.

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codes1. A major exception are the four Antwerp homologated customs of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The third and fourth are impressive texts, which had a considerable impact on the development of commercial law2. Eighteenth century Enlightenment should have brought codification to the Southern Netherlands. They belonged to the Austrian Habsburgs and the latter had ambitious plans for their lands. When Emperor Joseph II came to power, the number of new statutes doubled and the emperor planned sweeping changes in the administration of the Southern Netherlands, especially in regard to the administration of justice, which was to be accompanied by codes for civil and criminal procedure3. A criminal and civil code would undoubtedly have followed, if by 1795 the Southern Netherlands had not become French. Even before 1795, however, it had already become clear that the emperor’s reforms would come to nothing. In October 1789, a revolt in the Southern Netherlands put a halt to the reforms. Even though Joseph’s successor could restore Austrian power, it had become clear that resistance against Austrian innovations was too strong. There is a remarkable contrast between the Austrian failure and later French successes. The Southern Netherlands were Austrian for eighty years and French for only a quarter of that time. Yet, there is no Austrian legacy, whereas even today, Belgium’s law is strongly French. Several elements may explain this contrast. Almost half of Belgium’s population speaks French and France is a neighbouring country. From the thirteenth century on, French law had permeated the Low Countries. However, even more important is the military aspect. The population also rose against French reforms, but the French were more thorough in eliminating resistance and they had more troops to do so. When they annexed the Southern Netherlands, their armies counted one soldier for every ten inhabitants4. This greater military presence was a decisive factor. The Austrian Habsburgs were not truly interested in the Southern Netherlands. In their 1 P. Godding, Nouveaux itin8raires en droit “dans l’espace belge du 12e au 18e siHcle”, in: Nouveaux itin8raires en droit. Hommage / FranÅois Rigaux, Brussels 1993, 242–244; R. Van Caenegem, An historical introduction to private law, Cambridge 1992, 36–38. 2 B. Van Hofstraeten, Juridisch humanisme en costumiere acculturatie. Inhouds- en vormbepalende factoren van de Antwerpse Consuetudines compilatae (1608) en het Gelderse Land- en Stadsrecht (1620), Maastricht, 2008; D. De Ruysscher, Naer het Romeins recht alsmede den stiel mercantiel. Handel en recht in de Antwerpse rechtbank (16de-17de eeuw), Heule 2009. 3 On the Austrian Habsburgs in the Southern Netherlands, see L. Dhondt, Verlichte monarchie, Ancien R8gime en revolutie: een institutionele en historische procesanalyse van politiek, instellingen en ideologie in de Habsburgse, de Nederlandse en de Vlaamse politieke ruimte (1700/1755–1790), 5 Vol., Brussels 2002. See more in particular on plans for codification, J. Monballyu, L’id8e d’un code criminel chez Goswin de Fierlant, in: G. Macours/R. Martinage (eds.), Les d8marches de codification du Moyen-Age / nos jours, Brussels 2006, 61–72. 4 M. Rapport, Belgium under French occupation: between collaboration and resistance, July 1794 to October 1795, French history 16 (2002), 62.

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empire, the administration of the Southern Netherlands fell under the foreign ministry, which communicated with the former in French, even with the German speaking territories in Luxemburg5. To some extent, the Austrians themselves were responsible for making Belgian soil more fertile for French than for Austrian ideas. In 1795 the French Code Merlin abolished all existing law and introduced French legislation6. From then on, Belgium’s legislative history is French7. Thus the great Napoleonic codifications: the Code civil (1804), the Code de Proc8dure civile (1806), the Code de Commerce (1807), the Code d’Instruction criminelle (1808) and the Code p8nal (1810) also entered into force in Belgium. In 1815 North and South found themselves together again in one state, the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. New codes were written8. They would have entered into force in 1831, but by then Belgium had already seceded from the Netherlands and the Belgians decided not to have the new codes enter into force. In 1904, Bol, a Dutch lawyer, claimed that the Belgian decision to abolish the law on the coming into force of the new codes was invalid. At the time, no one in Belgium took him seriously9. Recently, however, young researcher Johan Vandevoorde has shown, after extremely thorough research, that, even following Belgian law, the decision not to have the United Kingdom codes was taken by an incompetent authority10. However, no one in Belgium cared about that in 1830–1831, no one cared in 1904 and no one cares today.

5 R. Willemyns, Het verhaal van het Vlaams. De geschiedenis van het Nederlands in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, Antwerp 2003, 142–143. 6 C. Coppens, E8n grote onzekerheid. De invoering van de Franse wetgeving in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden na 1795, in: O. Moorman van Kappen/C. Coppens (eds.), De Bataafse omwenteling en het recht, Nijmegen 1997, 197–218. 7 Unless mentioned otherwise, the following paragraphs are based on: D. Heirbaut, Het “civiel beleid”: een stiefkind van de ministers van justitie, in: M. De Koster/D. Heirbaut/X. Rousseaux (eds.), Tweehonderd jaar justitie. Historische encyclopedie van de Belgische justitie. Deux siHcles de justice. Encyclop8die historique de la justice belge, Bruges 2015, 165–190. 8 F. Stevens, Y aura-t-il un code pour tout le royaume? La codification du droit p8nal dans le territoire de la Belgique et des Pays-Bas (1781-1835), in X. Rousseaux/M.S. Dupont-Bouchat/C. Vael (eds.), R8volutions et justice p8nale en Europe. ModHles franÅais et traditions nationales. 1780-1830, Paris 1999, 71–84. 9 For the short debate this engendered, see Journal des tribunaux 23 (1904), 381–382, 425–426, 449–450, 479–481. 10 J. Van de Voorde, Zijn de Belgen Napoleons trouwste onderdanen? Een onderzoek naar de mogelijke opheffing van de Code Napoleon in Belgi[ en zijn vervanging door het Burgerlijk Wetboek van het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Pro memorie 19 (2018), 233–266. This article only contains the historical part of a more elaborate study. Journals of contemporary law so far have not been interested in publishing, the rest of Van de Voorde’s research, which deals with the very important question of the actual validity in Belgium of the codes of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.

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The failure of indepedent Belgium as a codifying state

The lack of attention for this problem in 1830–1831 was probably due to the wish to write new Belgian codifications. After all, a newly independent country needs symbols of its autonomy, including its own national law. Hence, the 1831 constitution of Belgium decreed that new codes would be written as soon as possible, but surprisingly, not much was actually done in practice. Belgian jurists were quite happy with French law. They spoke French and followed French fashion. Using French law also saved time, effort and money. Belgium could just have a free ride using French law. Brussels’ publishing houses printed pirated editions of French law books, so that Belgian jurists could fill their libraries at a discount. In the first decades after independence, the constitutional call for new codifications only led to a revision of bankruptcy law and real securities in 1851. Thereafter, Belgium became more active. For criminal procedure, this led only to a new preliminary title in the criminal code in 1878, even though this text was part of a new draft code. That text, however, was not accepted in parliament. Some members of parliament stuck to the inquisitorial trial, whereas many members of the liberal party in parliament preferred an accusatory procedure11. Later, it seems that politicians just lost interest. For criminal law, however, a new code came into force in 186712. Its importance should not be overestimated. Belgium changed its law only after France itself had already done so and the revisions remained limited13. In commercial law the changes were greater. The commercial code was not abolished, but between 1867 and 1891 a series of Acts replaced every part of the code, apart from bankruptcy law, which had already been reformed. Acting swiftly seems to have been the main consideration. New phenomena like transport by train could be integrated into the code, but also left out, e. g. the cheque. It was also possible that a revised part of the old code became a separate statute, as happened with protests of bills of exchange. In the code itself, continuous numbering was replaced by a numbering for each separate part and coordination amongst them was lacking. In part, the context of rapid industrialisation was responsible for this chaotic revision of the commercial code. The pace of evolution was so fast, that company law was even revised several 11 J. Gilissen, Codification et projets de codification en Belgique au XIXe siHcle (1804–1915), Belgisch tijdschrift voor nieuwste geschiedenis 14 (1983), 252–254. 12 F. Stevens, La codification en Belgique. H8ritage franÅais et d8bats n8erlandais, in : Le p8nal dans tous ses 8tats, Brussels 1997, 287–302. 13 J. Monballyu, Zes eeuwen strafrecht. De geschiedenis van het Belgische strafrecht (1400–2000), Leuven Acco, 2006, 52. See more in general, B. Dubois/T. Le Marc’hadour, Un code pour la Nation. La codification du droit p8nal au XIXe siHcle (France, Belgique, Angleterre), Lille 2010.

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times. This shows that the main stimulus for the change of commercial law was external pressure and that without it Belgium would have remained faithful to the Napoleonic code. That radical change was not desired, is evidenced by the history of two failed and very innovative projects, the Allard draft for civil procedure14 and the Laurent draft for private law. Once again, a draft code for procedure only led to a new preliminary title in the Napoleonic code. Alb8ric Allard, author of the draft code, had been very progressive. His text eliminated the proctors, the middlemen between lawyers and the court, and gave power over the civil trial to the judges instead of the lawyers. In a European context Allard’s text was not that extraordinary. It went in the same direction as the 1899 Austrian Code of Civil Procedure, which became the European model for reform in the twentieth century15. Unfortunately for Allard, the proctors (avou8s) disliked his draft and their lobbying against it proved successful. An even more revolutionary document was the Laurent draft16. Laurent wanted a new civil code to be a weapon of the anticlerical liberals against the Catholic Church. As he finished his text only after a Catholic victory in the 1884 elections, after which Belgian governments would be exclusively Catholic until 1914, it could never be adopted. Moreover, even for most of his liberal friends, Laurent’s draft was hard to accept because it was too progressive for its time. For example, Laurent’s draft code already wanted to award full equality to married women. Many of the changes Laurent pleaded for only became law in the second half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, it was impossible to shelve Laurent’s text immediately. In 1884, the newly elected Catholic government appointed a commission of its own to write a new civil code. Its members wrote several texts, but they worked slower than Laurent and parliament lost interest. The first half of the twentieth century was generally an era of lethargy in Belgium as far as codification is concerned. The main initiative came from a Study Centre for the Reform of the State, which produced several volumes on the reform of civil procedure, but nothing happened with them due to the outbreak World War II. The same fate befell a text on insurance law. After the war, most efforts at codification failed, even though commissions or royal commissioners wrote several draft codes. For criminal law, a commission presented a report in 1979 and royal commissioner Legros a draft in 1985, but without any result. The draft by Bekaert, the royal commissioner for the revision of the Code of Criminal 14 M. Vankeersbilck prepares a thesis on the 1967 Judicial Code, which will also deal extensively with the Allard draft. 15 See D. Heirbaut, Kontinentaleuropäisches Zivilprozessrecht. 19.–20. Jahrhundert, in P. Collin/W. Decock/D. von Mayenburg/A. Seelentag, Geschichte der Konfliktlösung, IV (forthcoming). 16 Elisabeth BruyHre prepares a thesis on the Laurent draft.

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Procedure who finished his work in 1974, witnessed the same conclusion17. The so-called ‘Great draft’ of company law was ready in 1968, submitted to parliament in 1979 and by then obsolete. For private law, appeals for a new code remained unanswered. A major element in the political disinterest in new codes was the idea that European unification would make Belgian codes superfluous anyway. The 1967 Judicial Code proved to be the major exception, although its main achievement lies solely in its existence. The code is not innovative. In fact, it strengthened the position of lawyers in the civil trial and stimulated appeal procedures, thus going against the general trend in Europe. Very soon, law professors and even the assistant to the royal commissioner who wrote the code, called it a failure. Judicial delay only has become a bigger problem after the code and ever since 1967, the legislator has tried to amend the code in order to accelerate civil trials. Major acts in 1992 and 2007 did not solve the problem however18. From the 1990s onwards, the codification idea revived in Belgium. Several new codes have entered into force: the Code of Company Law (1999), the Code of Private International Law (2004) and the Code of Economic Law (2013–2015). Moreover, work has also started on an ambitious project for a new Code of Maritime Law19. This codification wave cannot be seen as the sign of a new codification ideal. In fact, some of the new codes are actually part of a decodification process. The Code of Company Law, the Code of Private International Law, the Code of Economic Law and the planned Code of Maritime Law, together with statutes on bankruptcy and arrangements with creditors (1997, revisions 2009, 2013), have robbed the Commercial Code of its content. The code is almost empty except for a few titles, including the one on merchants. Thus, mini-codes and statutes have replaced a larger code. Moreover, they are not always very innovative. The Code of Company Law is actually more of a compilation than a true codification. The Code of Economic Law is a major code in itself, but only because it has integrated many other economic regulations and consumer protection. Interestingly, this code was not the work of the ministry of justice, but of the ministry of economic affairs. Until very recently, the conclusion that the ministry of justice in Belgium is no longer the agent of great codifications, was justified. The fate of a draft code for criminal procedure confirms this. In 1991, the then Minister of Justice appointed a commission to write this new code. This

17 References to these drafts can be found in C. Van den Wijngaert/B. De Smet/S. Vandromme, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht in hoofdlijnen, Antwerp 2009, 13–14. 18 D. Heirbaut/M. Vankeersbilck, L’histoire de la proc8dure civile en Belgique: un vassal fidHle de Napol8on (forthcoming). 19 See www.zeerecht.be.

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resulted in one new statute in 1998 for some urgent issues, the commission finishing the actual draft in 2002. Parliament shelved it a few years later20.

III.

The Geens reforms

Sometimes, one event may suddenly turn the tables and change both the course of history and our perceptions. That moment in Belgian codification history arrived on 6 December 2016. Minister Koen Geens unveiled his plans for a codification project that would be worthy of Justinian or Napoleon21. The plan was part of a larger program of reform. Geens, a famous business lawyer in Belgium and professor of company law at the University of Leuven, was one of the two drafters of the 1999 Code of Company Law. In later publications, he deplored that politicians did not allow him to use this occasion in order to change Belgian company law fundamentally and solve the many problems it was facing22. An unexpected turn of events finally opened up the possibility for him to do so. In 2013, the Catholic minister of finance in the Federal Government had to resign. The Catholic party CD& V then offered this position to Koen Geens, even though the latter had never run for office. Geens managed to do well both as a minister and in the 2014 elections, and in the new government he received the position he really aspired: minister of justice. His plan for reform was a triple jump: first the hop, then the step and finally the jump. The hop can be seen as putting the judicial system in good order, for example by ensuring that the ministry of justice settles its own bills on time. The step focuses on quick wins in order to enhance the efficiency of the administration of justice. The jump was the third step to be taken. This third step is a breath-taking recodification project. The minister plans: – a new Criminal Code; – a New Code of Criminal Procedure; – a Code of Enforcement of Penalties; – a new Civil Code; – a revision of the Code of Economic Law and the dismantling of the Commercial Code; – a revision of the Code of Companies. 20 Van den Wijngaert/De Smet/Vandromme, Strafrecht en strafprocesrecht, 14–15. 21 K. Geens, De sprong naar het recht voor morgen. Hercodificatie van de basiswetgeving, consulted at 6 December 2016 on: https://www.koengeens.be/beleid/hercodificatie. 22 K. Geens, 200 jaar vennootschapsrecht in perspectief: Quo vadis ius societatum, Tijdschrift voor privaatrecht 73 (2007), 75–90; K. Geens, Tweehonderd jaar vennootschapsrecht in vogelvlucht, in: J.P. Buyle/W. Derijcke/J. Embrechts/I. Verougstraete (eds.), Bicentenaire du Code de commerce, Brusels 2007, 97–108.

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The Code of Private International Law is not included, because it is still relatively recent, but amendments will be necessary anyway due to the new codes. For Maritime Law the secretary of the North Sea is responsible. The latter’s hope was to have that draft approved by parliament in 201723. Another absentee from the minister of justice’s recodification plan is insurance law, because a law professor, Herman Cousy, is already preparing a draft and European unifying initiatives in this field also have to be taken into account. Finally, the codification plan does not foresee a new Judicial Code, despite all the defects of the current one. The minister has already made or planned several changes in judicial law. He focuses mostly on the digitalisation of the administration of justice and increased autonomy in the administration of the courts24. It makes sense to wait with drafting a new judicial code until these other major reforms have been realised. A spontaneous remark of the reader will of course question the feasibility of these plans. The history of a codification is a graveyard littered with failed projects. The minister himself hopes that he will be able to realise two or three codes and dreams of being able to bring four codes to a close. By 1 January 2018, Parliament had already approved the new law of succession25 and the new law of insolvency26 and was looking at other texts, such as a major reform of the Code of Economic Law and the abolition of the Commercial Code27 and a new law of matrimonial property28. Drafts of a new property law29, a new law of obligations30 and the first book of the new criminal code have been published31. The minister’s modus operandi has heightened the chances of parliamentary approval of his plans. Firstly, experts, together with the minister’s cabinet and 23 For information on the draft, see www.zeerecht.be (consulted on 12 April 2017). 24 K. Geens, Court of the future: toegankelijker en stipter, en daarom rechtvaardiger, 25 oktober 2017 (https://www.koengeens.be/policy/court-of-the-future, consulted on 10 January 2018). 25 Loi du 31 juillet 2017 modifiant le Code civil en ce qui concerne les successions et lib8ralit8s (Moniteur belge, 1 September 2017). 26 Loi du 11 ao0t 2017 portant insertion du Livre XX “Insolvabilit8 des entreprises”, dans le Code de droit 8conomique (Moniteur belge, 11 September 2017). 27 Projet de loi portant r8forme du droit des entreprises, Chambre des Repr8sentants de Belgique, Documents parlementaires, 7 December 2017, nr. 2828/001. 28 Proposition de loi modifiant le Code civil en matiHre de droit des r8gimes matrimoniaux, Chambre des repr8sentants de Belgique, 13 December 2017, nr. 2848/001. 29 Commission de r8forme du droit des biens, Avant-projet de loi portant insertion du Livre II “Droit des biens” dans le nouveau Code civil, 7 December 2017 (https://justice.belgium.be/ sites/default/files/avant-projet_de_loi-_droit_des_biens.pdf; consulted on 15 December 2017). 30 Commission de r8forme du droit des obligations, Avant-projet de loi portant insertion du Livre VI “Les obligations” dans le nouveau Code civil, (https://justitie.belgium.be/sites/ default/files/avant-projet_loi_-_les_obligations.pdf; consulted on 15 December 2017). 31 Commissie voor de hervorming van het strafrecht, Voorstel van voorontwerp van Boek I van het Strafwetboek, Bruges 2016.

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the administrative staff of the Ministry of Justice, write down the great principles underpinning the reform. These are then discussed within the government and the competent commissions of parliament32. Afterwards, experts, cabinet and administration write a draft, which is then submitted to the Legislation Department of the Council of State, which checks the draft’s quality, and finally to parliament. Broad consultation with all stakeholders in the previous stages should ensure that at that stage a consensus has been achieved. An enormous number of people are involved in drafting the new texts. For the experts, the greatest variety exists. In some cases older existing groups of professors have been co-opted into the minister’s plan, in others the groups are more recently formed. The names and roles of the experts can vary, e. g. expert, advisor, coordinator, collaborator, redactor, member of a working group, member of a steering group. Every part of the great recodification project seems to have its own combination of these roles. It seems that elegance has given way to achieving results as soon as possible. This flexibility may actually be a major factor in the success of the recodification project. The general motive for the recodification is the fact that current law is outdated. True, the case law of the courts has remedied this to a certain extent, but this only contributed to the chaos. Moreover, the courts have not been able to solve all problems, because the case law is divided on some issues. Last but not least, some new theories break completely with the past that a legislative intervention is necessary in order to introduce them into Belgian law. Reading the currently available texts, it soon becomes clear that they are in many ways the dreams of law professors come true. Finally, they have a chance to turn into law what they have been advocating in their books. Needless to say, comparative law plays an important part. Neighbouring countries are the main foreign example, with a place of honour for France.33 The latter should not be surprising, as almost half of Belgium’s population is French speaking and much of its law is still French in origin. However, although recent French reforms are well-known in Belgum,34 their biggest impact is in removing internal Belgian resistance against a new code. If even the French think Napoleon’s Code has

32 Generally, the documents of this process will only become available when the final draft is submitted to parliament. For an exception, see Echange de vues avec le ministre de la Justice et des experts du Centre belge du droit des soci8t8s sur la modernisation du droit des soci8t8s, Chambre des Repr8sentants de Belgique, Documents parlementaires, 3 December 2015, nr. 1500/1. 33 For a detailed comparison of the French and Belgian reforms, in particular for the law obligations, see T. Gisclard/D. Heirbaut/E. Bruyère, Regards crois8s sur la r8forme du droit des obligations en France et en Belgique, Revue de droit prospectif (forthcoming). 34 See S. Stijns/S. Jansen (eds.), The French contract law reform. A source of inspiration?, 2016.

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become obsolete, why should the Belgians remain loyal to it?35 Surprisingly, the Draft Common Frame of Reference seems to be absent. However, references to foreign law are very dangerous to interpret. Absence of references in the currently available texts does not necessarily mean that there was no influence at all. Neither does a reference to foreign law signify that the latter was the true source of inspiration. It may also be that the foreign law is only quoted in order to convince critics. Given the importance of the Civil code, it may be interesting to end this article with an overview of its structure. Whereas the current code still follows the plan of the Institutes, the new code will have nine books: – Bk I General Part – Bk II Persons, family and matrimonial property law – Bk III Property law – Bk IV Law of succession, gifts and testaments – Bk V Law of Obligations – Bk VI Special contracts – Bk VII Securities – Bk VIII Evidence in civil cases – Bk IX Prescription As this list makes clear, the new Belgian Code will have a structure sui generis, that is neither determined by abstract theories nor inspired by foreign examples, but rather by pragmatism. For example, prescription and securities have their own books, because on these topics recent legislation exists that can easily be integrated into the new code. As things currently stand, some points of family law are not yet settled, either because some cases are still pending for the Constitutional Court or because a political consensus is still lacking. These parts will be integrated at a later stage. That should not be a problem. There is so much to be done and so many sub-commissions are involved that there will be a separate numbering for each book. For those books which are not yet ready when the new code enters into force, the articles of the old code will remain. For example, it was deemed wise to first write the general law of obligations and to have the special contracts follow afterwards. Of course, it may be that the great codification plan will suddenly come to a halt leaving a lot of unfinished business. For example, there is a lot of opposition to the direction the new code of criminal procedure will take36. Nevertheless, even 35 Cf. P. Lecocq, Le Code Napol8on, un modHle conserv8, Le Code civil des FranÅais comme modHle, in T. Revet (ed.), Code civil et modHle. Des modHles du code au code comme modHle, Paris 2005, 470. 36 Waarom aanpassing strafprocedures op zoveel weerstand botst, De Standaard 3 February 2018.

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if only a part of Geens’ codification plan can be realised, the history of codification in Belgium will never be the same again.

Viola Heutger*

Lieferte die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel einen Beitrag zum Codex Theodosianus?

1.

Ein Rekonstruktionsversuch

Im Jahr 425 verfügte Kaiser Theodosius II die Ausstattung des Lehrbetriebs1 in der Hauptstadt Konstantinopel mit 31 Lehrstühlen. Zwei dieser 31 Professoren sollten das Recht lehren2. Die Rechtsschule3 war eingebettet in eine höhere Lehranstalt, die weitgehend institutionalisiert den zunächst sehr personell gestalteten Lehrbetrieb beherbergte. Studierende und Lehrende konnten sich im 5. Jahrhundert bereits an einer Infrastruktur erfreuen, die zu einer Metropole passte. Es gab nicht nur eine Vielzahl an Lehrstühlen an der vielseitig ausgerichteten Hochschule, sondern auch eine Bibliothek, die Mitte des vierten Jahrhunderts gegründet sein muss4, denn wir wissen von der Anstellung von bereits sieben Antiquaren im Jahr 372 und von einer Erwähnung der Bibliothek in der IV. Lobrede des Themistius aus dem Jahr 357. An die Bibliothek angeschlossen war ein Skriptorium, wo Manuskripte vervielfältigt werden konnten. Über das Skriptorium sprechen die Quellen bereits zur Zeit der Regierung des Kaisers Constantius (317–361), einem Sohn von

* Mein Dank gilt dem Deutschen Archäologischen Institut in Istanbul. Dort durfte ich während meiner Vorlesungstätigkeit an der Türkisch Deutschen Universität ungestörte Studienwochen verbringen. Eine Überarbeitung des Textes fand in Rom statt. Ich danke dem Istituto Svizzero für die Gastfreundschaft und A.J.B. Sirks für seine wertvollen Anmerkungen. 1 Eine Hochschule im heutigen Sinne ist es nicht gewesen. Das spätantike Hochschulwesen war viel stärker personell als institutionell. Man könnte von einem Bildungsbetrieb sprechen, Siehe A. Demandt, Geschichte der Spätantike, München, 2008, 387, 388, 392 und 405. 2 CTh. 14,9,3,1. 3 Siehe dazu T. Giaro, Rechtsschulen, Der neue Pauly (= DNP), Band 10, Stuttgart/Weimar 2001, 818–819. Sowie D. Liebs, Juristenausbildung in der Spätantike in Ch. Baldus et al. (Hg.): Juristenausbildung in Europa zwischen Tradition und Reform, Tübingen, 2008, 31–45. 4 In CTh. 14,9,2. werden bereits vier griechische und drei lateinische Antiquare benannt. Ausführlich C. Wendel, Die erste kaiserliche Bibliothek in Konstantinopel, Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen 5 (1942), 193–209, auch abgedruckt in C. Wendel, Kleine Schriften zum antiken Buch- und Bibliothekswesen, Köln, 1974.

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Kaiser Konstantin, dem Gründer der Hauptstadt5. Es wäre denkbar, dass in der großen Bibliothek von Konstantinopel zunächst alle Schriftstücke gesammelt wurden, also auch juristische Schriften6 und die ständig wachsende christliche Literatur. Diese Annahme wird dadurch verstärkt, dass unter Kaiser Julian7 die Bibliothek einen großen Ausbau erfuhr. Schnell wuchsen Bibliothek und Skriptiorium in der Stadt, die im Jahr 330 zur Hauptstadt erhoben worden war und bereits 395 das Zentrum des oströmischen Reichs war. In diesem Beitrag soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, ob in dieser Bibliothek eventuell auch juristische Schriften zu finden waren, die einen Beitrag zur Erstellung der Arbeiten am Codex Theodosianus, der im Jahr 438 vollendet und veröffentlicht worden war, geliefert haben können. Zunächst soll das damalige Studienumfeld in Bezug auf Bibliothek und Skriptorium untersucht werden und Überlegungen angestellt werden, in welcher Form den Studierenden und Lehrenden Quellen zur Verfügung standen. Darüber hinaus soll eine Antwort auf die Frage gefunden werden, ob in der Bibliothek juristische Schriften aufbewahrt wurden, die später bei Kodifikationsarbeiten verwendet wurden.

2.

Das rechtswissenschaftliche Studienmaterial

Über den Rechtsunterricht an der Hochschule in Konstantinopel ist bekannt, dass in den verschiedenen Studienjahren die klassische Rechtsliteratur unterrichtet wurde8. Es ist anzunehmen, dass nicht nur aus Mitschriften gelehrt und gelernt wurde, sondern auch Texte als Nachschlagewerke vorhanden waren. Wie diese Texte den Studierenden zugänglich gemacht wurden und wo sie aufbewahrt wurden, das ist bisher nicht abschließend geklärt.

5 Themistius orat. IV, 59b–61d. Siehe auch H. Schlange-Schöningen, Kaisertum und Bildungswesen im spätantiken Konstantinopel, Historia Einzelschriften, 94, Stuttgart, 1995, 150. Eine gelungene Übersetzung findet sich bei C. Wendel, Kleine Schriften zum antiken Buchund Bibliothekswesen, Köln, 1974, 46–49. Themistius hielt die Rede am 1. Januar 357 vor dem Senat in Konstantinopel. 6 Es muss in Konstantinopel ein großes Archiv juristischer Schriften gegeben haben, der Ort, wo sich dieses befand ist bislang nicht geklärt. So A.J.B. Sirks, The Sources of the Code, in J. Harries/I. Wood (Hg.), The Theodosian Code, London, 1993, 45–67, 56. So auch J.F. Matthews, Laying down the law, A study of the Theodosian Code, New Haven/London, 2000, 61. Allerdings geht Matthews von einem kleineren Archiv als Sirks aus. 7 Dieser wurde am 6. November 355 zum Caesar ernannt und förderte die Bibliothek im Jahr 356 unter Kaiser Constantius zunächst mit einer Bücherschenkung und während seiner eigenen Regierungszeit mit einem Ausbau. 8 Zum Studienprogramm Liebs (Fn. 4) 31–45.

Lieferte die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel einen Beitrag zum Codex Theodosianus?

3.

181

Das Skriptorium und die Bibliothek

Die Einrichtung des Skriptoriums ist auf den Sohn von Kaiser Konstantin, auf Constantius zurückzuführen. Der Rhetor Themistius (ca. 317– ca. 388) überliefert in einer Rede aus der Mitte des vierten Jahrhunderts, dass Constantius ein Skriptorium mit Kalligraphen mit Staatsmitteln ausgestattet hat9. Die Aufgabe der Schreiber sollte es sein, die in vielen Privatbibliotheken verstreuten Werke der griechischen Literatur von Dichtern, Philosophen und Grammatikern abzuschreiben. Man strebte nach einer umfangreichen Sammlung der antiken Schriften in der Hauptstadt. Diese griechischen und auch lateinischen Schriften mussten natürlich anschließend aufbewahrt und zugänglich gemacht werden. Diese Sammlung war wichtig für das Hochschulwesen des neuen Roms und der kulturpolitischen Bedeutung der Stadt. Konstantinopel sollte nicht nur ein politisches Zentrum sein, sondern auch ein kulturelles. Was man unter einer Bibliothek versteht, hat Sextus Pompeius Festus10 im 2. Jahrhundert in seinem Wörterbuch De verborum significatu wunderbar definiert: Bibliothecae et apud Graecos et apud nos tam librorum magnus per se numerus, quam locus ipse, in quo libri collocati sunt, appellatur11.

Nach der Übersetzung von Blanck: Bei den Griechen wie bei uns nennt man Bibliotheken sowohl eine große Anzahl von Büchern als auch den Ort, an dem diese Bücher untergebracht sind12.

Hinweise auf eine Bibliothek gibt es in den juristischen Quellen13 der zweiten Hälfte des vierten Jahrhunderts. In Berichten zur Topographie der Stadt Konstantinopel kommt neben vielen Gebäuden auch immer wieder eine Bibliothek vor. Die Schriftsteller Zosimus (um 500) und Georgius Cedrenus (11. bzw. 12. Jahrhundert) berichten davon und weisen auch den Platz am zentralsten Ort der jungen Hauptstadt an14. In den 9 Themistius orat. IV, 59b–61d. Siehe auch H. Schlange-Schöningen (Fn. 5) 150. Constantius selber verweilte im angesprochenen Zeitraum allerdings gar nicht in Konstantinopel. Zwischen 350 und 359 war er dort nicht anwesend. 10 Über Festus: P. Lebrecht Schmidt: Sex. Pompeius Festus, in K. Sallmann (Hg.): Die Literatur des Umbruchs. Von der römischen zur christlichen Literatur, 117 bis 284 n. Chr. (= Handbuch der lateinischen Literatur der Antike, Band 4), München 1997, S. 240–245, auch P. Lebrecht Schmidt, Festus 6, in: DNP, Band 4, 1998, Sp. 495f. 11 Sextus Pompeius Festus, De verborum significatu quae supersunt cum Pauli epitome, 34–36. 12 H. Blanck, Das Buch in der Antike, München 1992, 133. 13 CTh. 14,9,2. 14 Zosimus, Historia nova, lib.III ed. L. Mendelssohn, Leipzig 1887, sowie D. Chr. Seybold/ L.H. Heyler (Hgg.), Geschichte des Zosimus. Erster Band und zweiter Band. Aus dem Griechischen zum Erstenmale übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen begleitet, Frankfurt am Main 1802, Bericht zur Bibliothek sind im dritten Buch im elfte Kapitel zu finden und bei Gregorius

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Quellen des Zosimus15, der auch Jurist war, wird von einer öffentlichen kaiserlichen Bibliothek in Konstantinopel berichtet. Es wird also eine Stiftung des Kaisers gewesen sein, die öffentlich zugänglich war. Die Quellen sprechen in Bezug auf Konstantinopel allerdings immer nur von einer einzigen Bibliothek. Unter Kaiser Julian wurde dieser Bau erweitert, wohl im Jahr 362. In Rom dagegen gab es mit Sicherheit mehrere Bibliotheken. Aus konstantinischer Zeit ist bekannt, dass es damals schon um die 28 Bibliotheken in der Stadt gab16. Mitgezählt wurden auch die Bibliotheken, die in den Thermen anwesend waren17. Über die eine Bibliothek in Konstantinopel wissen wir im Gegensatz zur Situation in Rom recht wenig. Nach 372 werden dort sieben Antiquare und eine unbekannte Anzahl von Personen als Aufsichtspersonal gearbeitet haben. Die Antiquare wurden anders finanziert als das Aufsichtspersonal. Die Bibliothek verfügte über griechische und lateinische Bestände und die Bibliothekare arbeiten jeweils nur in einer Sprache. Bücher wurden dort erstellt und repariert. Soviel verrät uns der Erlass des Kaisers Valens im Codex Theodosianus 14,9,2.

4.

Das Bibliotheksgebäude

Wie das Gebäude der Bibliothek in Konstantinopel aussah, dass lässt sich in groben Zügen rekonstruieren. Die Quellen, die über die Bibliothek von Konstantinopel berichten, sprechen von einer Stoa. Das ist ein hallenartiges Gebäude18. Als Anhaltspunkt zur Bauweise dieser Hallen können vergleichbare Gebäude in der Region herangezogen werden, von deren Nutzung als Bibliothek wir wissen. Die bekannten Gebäude sind recht großzügig gebaut. So war die Celsusbibliothek in Ephesos bereits mehrstöckig19. In der Hauptstadt wird man nicht geringer als in Ephesos gebaut haben. Der uns überlieferte Buchbestand, der zu Ende des vierten Jahrhunderts über 100.000 Schriften betragen haben soll20, legt die Vermutung nahe, dass es sich entweder, um ein sehr großes und langes Gebäude oder ein mehrstöckiges Gebäude gehandelt haben muss. Ausgrabungsfunde und Stadtbeschreibungen

15 16 17 18 19 20

Cedrenus, Compendium der Geschichten von der Schöpfung bis 1057, ed. F.W. Unger, Quellen der byzantinischen Kunstgeschichte, 1. Band, I.-III. Buch, Wien 1878, 80. F. Paschoud, Zosimos, RE X A (1972) Sp. 795–841. Blanck (Fn. 12) 165. So verfügte zum Beispiel die Caracallatherme über zwei Bibliotheken, wovon eine Bibliothek heute noch gut ersichtlich ist. Diese misst 38 mal 22 Metern und an den Wänden befinden sich 32 Nischen für Schriftrollen und Bücher. Zosimus, Historia nova, lib. III. V.M. Strocka, Römische Bibliotheken, Mit Tafeln XIII–XXIV, in: Gymnasium: Zeitschrift für Kultur der Antike und humanistische Bildung 88 (1981), 324. Gregorius Cedrenus, ed. Unger (Fn. 14) 80.

Lieferte die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel einen Beitrag zum Codex Theodosianus?

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berichten von keinem sehr langen Gebäude21, dessen Nutzung unbekannt ist, oder wo eventuell eine Bibliothek gestanden haben soll. Das spräche für die Annahme, dass es sich um ein mehrstöckiges Gebäude mit keiner besonders großen oder langen Grundfläche gehandelt haben muss. Rekonstruktionsversuche der Stadt gehen von den verschiedensten mehrstöckigen Gebäuden in Konstantinopel aus. Es war also nichts Besonderes, in die Höhe zu bauen22. Die Stoa, in der die Bibliothek untergebracht gewesen ist, wird zumindest ein doppelstöckiges, wenn nicht sogar mehrstöckiges Gebäude gewesen sein. Für einen Ausbau in die Höhe spricht auch, dass die Grundfläche der Stadt Konstantinopel recht begrenzt war und in der zentralen Lage, direkt beim Milion23, wo die Bibliothek wohl zunächst gestanden hat, nicht mehr viel Bauplatz frei gewesen ist.

5.

Der Buchbestand

Man kann davon ausgehen, dass Bibliothek und Schreibstube im vierten Jahrhundert schnell mit der zunehmenden Größe der Stadt mitwuchsen. Zosimus berichtet, dass Julian alle seine Bücher der Bibliothek in Konstantinopel übergab und für diese eine neue Halle in der Gestalt eines Zirkels errichten ließ24. Diese Schenkung fand im Jahr 356 statt25. Zosimus spricht von einer zum Hafen führenden Halle und berichtet, dass Julian anschließend den Krieg gegen die Perser vorbereitete. Dieser Hinweis lässt auf das Jahr 362 für den erweiterten Bau schliessen. Cedrenus wiederum spezifiziert diese Aussage einige Jahrhunderte später und nennt die Basilika als Ort von zwei Hallen26. Zwei Hallen würden für eine Aufteilung in eine griechische und eine lateinische Sammlung sprechen. Cedrenus überliefert uns die Zahl von 120.000 Büchern27 für die Bibliothek. Es ist zu erwarten, dass diese Bestandsgröße durch die reichen Schenkungen des Kaisers Julian bereits im Jahr 363, dem Todesjahr von Kaiser Julian, bestand. 21 Unter anderem wurde das Buch von W. Mu¨ ller-Wiener, Bildlexikon zur Topographie Istanbuls: Byzantion – Konstantinupolis – Istanbul bis zum Beginn des 17. Jahrhunderts, Tu¨bingen 1977 durchgesehen. 22 Einen Eindruck vermittelt an Hand von Computersimulationen das Buch von R. Ousterhout, Walking thru Byzantium, Great Palace Region, Istanbul 2008. 23 Zosimus, Historia nova, lib. III, Berichte zur Bibliothek sind im dritten Buch im elfte Kapitel zu finden und bei Georgius Cedrenus, ed. Unger (Fn. 14) 80. 24 Zosimus, Historia nova, lib. III, elftes Kapitel. 25 A. Demandt, Die Spätantike, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaften, Dritte Abteilung, sechster Teil, 2007, 470. 26 Aus der Notitia Urbis Constantinopolitanae wissen wir, dass rund um das Jahr 440 in der Stadt bereits 52 Säulenhallen gestanden haben müssen. 27 Georgius Cedrenus, ed. Unger (Fn. 14) 80.

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Es müssen aber keineswegs 120.000 verschiedene Werke gewesen sein. Häufig bestand ein Werk aus verschiedenen Bänden. Auch zählte jede Schriftrolle einzeln für sich. Es ist ebenso denkbar, dass Duplikate mitgezählt wurden28. Die benannte Menge der vorhandenen Schriftstücke lässt nicht notwendig auf die Variation des Inhaltes der Kollektion schließen. Für ihre Zeit war die Bibliothek von Konstantinopel eine gewaltige Bibliothek. Natürlich strebte sie nach dem großen Vorbild der Antike, der Bibliothek von Alexandria. Den Umfang der Bibliothek von Alexandria erreichte die Bibliothek von Konstantinopel jedoch niemals29. Auch zu den Blütezeiten betrug der Bestand wohl nur ein Drittel der Masse von Alexandria. Die Bibliothek von Alexandria ging allerdings bereits während eines Aufstandes um das Jahr 270 zugrunde30. Konstantinopel war gut 150 Jahre später dann die einzige Bibliothek im römischen Reich, die nach Vollständigkeit strebte. Durch ein systematisches Kopieren von Schriftrollen in Kodexform31, die Schenkung Kaiser Julians und weiteren Zugängen, deren Ursprung uns nicht überlieferte wurde, erwarb die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel eine große und gute zugängliche Sammlung und strebte sicher nach einem umfangreichen Bestand.

6.

Der Standort der Bibliothek

Zur Zeit Kaiser Julians war die Bibliothek, so ist anzunehmen, in der Stoa Basileos untergebracht und diese wurde wohl ausgebaut. Das Gebäude diente auch als Gericht und dort wurden ebenso die Studierenden von Rechtslehrern unterrichtet. Neben der Bibliothek gab es auch ein Skriptorium, um Abschriften der Bestände herstellen zu können. Die Stoa Basileos war mitten im Zentrum der Stadt, neben dem Milion, der die Entfernungen zu anderen wichtigen Orten des Reiches angab. Die Quellen sprechen immer nur von einer Bibliothek. Es ist erstaunlich, dass es nicht zu vermehrten öffentlichen Bibliotheken kam32. Die Bevölkerung wuchs schnell. Im vierten Jahrhundert auf etwa 350.000 und um das 28 Siehe zur Zählung der antiken Bestände, L. Casson, Bibliotheken in der Antike, Düsseldorf und Zürich, 2002, 56. 29 Man schätzt, dass in Alexandria beinah eine halbe Million Bücher anwesend waren. Casson (Fn. 28) 56. In Pergamon waren 200.000 Bücher in der Bibliothek anwesend. Casson (Fn. 28) 135. Allerdings ging diese Bibliothek spätestens im Jahr 31 v. Chr. unter. Casson (Fn. 28) 152. 30 Casson (Fn. 28) 71. 31 Siehe L.D. Reynolds/N.G. Wilson, Scribes and scholars, Oxford 1991, 34–35 zur Verdrängung der Schriftrolle durch das Buch. 32 Als christliche Stadt gab es in Konstantinopel bald viele Klöster, dort wird es auch christliche Literatur und Schreibstuben gegeben haben. Auch gab es umfangreiche Privatsammlungen. Aus dem vierten Jahrhundert ist der Palast des Lausus bekannt. Seine Bibliothek war auch sehr groß und wie die öffentlich Bibliothek ging auch sein Wohlstand im großen Brand unter.

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185

Jahr 500 auf etwa eine halbe Million Einwohner33. Es kam zu Umsiedlungen und Neubauten. Bei einem großen Stadtbrand rund um das Jahr 475 verbrannte das Bibliotheksgebäude und damit große Teile der Bibliothekssammlung34. Dieser Brand muss verheerend gewesen sein und muss mehrerer Quadratkilometer der Stadt vernichtet haben. Ein Wiederaufbau folgte35.

7.

Rolle oder Codex?

Was genau in dieser Bibliothek stand, das wissen wir nicht. Es sind uns keine Inventarlisten überliefert worden. Die thematische Einteilung der Kollektion können wir nicht rekonstruieren. Seit dem vierten Jahrhundert wird der Bestand bereits überwiegend aus Büchern bestanden haben. Nur ältere, bewahrt gebliebene, Schriften werden noch in Rollenform in der Bibliothek zu finden gewesen sein36. In den Skriptorien wurden allerdings viele Rollen auch in Buchform übertragen und kamen so in Buchform in die öffentlich zugängliche Kollektion. In Bezug auf die Stabilität ist ein Pergamentcodex einer Papyrusrolle überlegen. Pergament bietet überdies mehr Möglichkeit zur Buchmalerei37 und Ausstattung. Unter Kaiser Konstantin war der Pergamentcodex bereits gebräuchlich38. Durch den Einband hat ein Kodex einen weiteren Vorteil gegenüber der recht ungeschützten Rolle, neben dem Vorteil, dass eine Nummerierung der Seiten

33 Im Jahr 361 geht man von einer Bevölkerung von etwa 300.000 bis 350.000 Einwohnern aus. T. Chandler, Four Thousand Years of Urban Growth: An Historical Census, Lewiston/NY 1987 und T. Chandler/G. Fox, 3000 Years of Urban Growth, New York 1974. 34 H. Schlange-Schöningen (Fn. 5) 106. Auch wird das Jahr 476 bei M. Lechner, Erziehung und Bildung in der griechisch-römischen Antike, München 1933, 114 genannt. Für diese Annahme spricht der Hinweis von Georgius Cedrenus, der den Brand historisch in das Jahr der Ausrufung des Kaisers Basilikos setzt, s. Georgius Cedrenus, ed. Unger (Fn. 14) 79–80. Ohne weitere Spezifizierung des Jahres nennt Blanck für den Brand das Jahr 473, Blanck (Fn. 12) 177. Das Archäologische Museum in Istanbul legt den Brand für das Jahr 475 auf einer Schautafel zum Universitätswesen in Konstantinopel fest. Demandt legt den Brand auf das Jahr 476 fest. Demandt (Fn. 26) 445. 35 Blanck (Fn. 12) 177. Anthologia Palatina 16.70–1. Die Anthologia ist digital einzusehen: https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/cpgraec23/0001/image. 36 Reynolds/Wilson (Fn. 31) 34 gehen von einer Lebensdauer eine Rolle von etwa 300 Jahren aus. 37 Weiterführende Ausführungen zur Buchmalerei in der Spätantike bei O. Mazal, Justinian I. und seine Zeit, Wien 2001, 596–635. 38 Eusebios berichtet uns von der Anfertigung von 50 Pergamentkodizes für den liturgischen Gebrauch. Eusebios, Vita Constantini IV, 36. Diese sollen allerdings im Skriptorium von Caesarea hergestellt werden. Für den Transport werden zwei Staatswagen zur Verfügung gestellt. Diese Information weist darauf hin, dass es sich wohl nicht um 50 Bücher gehandelt hat, sondern um Abschriften des Werkes in mehreren Bänden, wohl 2 bis 3 Bänden pro liturgischer Schrift.

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möglich war, welches das Auffinden von Textstellen leichter ermöglichte39. Das Studium wird durch die Kodexform erleichtert, da sich eine Textstelle in einem Kodex leichter als auf einer Rolle auffinden lässt40. Man geht davon aus, dass in den Schreibstuben von Konstantinopel auch Klassikertexte von Papyrusrollen auf Pergamentkodizes umgeschrieben wurden41. Auch kann ein Kodex mehr Text fassen, da hier im Gegensatz zur Rolle beide Seiten beschrieben wurden. Daher passt mehr Text in einen Kodex als auf eine Rolle. Studienliteratur von Juristen wird bevorzugt in Kodexform zu finden gewesen sein42.

8.

Die sieben Antiquarii

Im Jahr 372 erfolgte der Erlass, der die Anstellung von sieben antiquarii, in diesem Fall Schreiber, die Schriftstücke für die Bibliothek erstellen sollten und die auch Manuskripte reparieren konnten, festsetzte. Der Erlass ist von Kaiser Valens (364–378) an den Stadtpräfekten Clearchus gerichtet und datiert vom 8. Mai 372 und wurde auch von den anderen Cäsaren mitunterschrieben. Dies geschah zu einer Zeit, in der der Kodex die Buchrolle massiv verdrängte43 und zunehmend Buchrollen auf Kodizes übertragen wurden. Es ist daher denkbar, dass diese Neueinzustellenden später auch die Leitung darüber hatten, die Bestände in Konstantinopel auf Kodexformat umzustellen. Fünfzig Jahre später, zurzeit von Kaiser Theodosius II wird der Großteil der Bücher bereits in Kodexform vorgelegen haben. Zur Zeit Kaiser Justinians werden nur noch einige antike Schriftrollen in der Bibliothek gestanden haben und alle weiteren Bestände werden in Kodexform in der Bibliothek vorhanden gewesen sein. Die Bibliothekare werden auch die Aufgabe gehabt haben, die Schenkung des Julian, insoweit das noch nicht geschehen war, in die Bibliothek einzugliedern.

39 Reynolds/Wilson (Fn. 31) 35. 40 Um das Jahr 300 lag der Anteil des Kodex gegenüber der Schriftrolle um die 50 %. Um 400 bereits um die 80 %. Schätzungen von Casson (Fn. 28)169. 41 Blanck (Fn. 12) 95. 42 Es ist erstaunlich, dass in der Literatur sich die Einteilung in Bücher hielt, auch wenn nun mehrere Bücher sich in einem Werk zu finden sind. So bestehen die Digesten aus 50 Büchern. Denkbar ist, dass Werke in kleinen Einheiten gebunden wurden. Reynolds und Wilson weisen auf gebräuchliche notebooks, also kleine gebundene Einheiten hin, Reynolds, Wilson (Fn. 31) 34. Vielleicht verweist liber auch auf eine Längeneinheit, die typisch für den Rollengebrauch war und sich dann sprachlich auch einbürgerte oder eben einfach weitergeführt wurde, nachdem der Kodex bereits verwendet wurde. 43 Der Codex Theodosianus und später auch der Codex Justinianus waren gleich in Buchform erstellt worden.

Lieferte die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel einen Beitrag zum Codex Theodosianus?

9.

187

Die Aufbewahrung

Wir kennen keine Einzelheiten zur Einrichtung der Bibliothek in Konstantinopel. Aus Ausgrabungen ist bekannt, dass es offene Regale zur Aufbewahrung der Bücher und Rollen gab, häufig waren es Nischen, sowie es zum Beispiel noch heute in den Caracallathermen in Rom sichtbar ist. Auch verschließbare Bücherschränke, wie noch heute in italienischen Universitätsbibliotheken üblich, gab es damals schon44. Die Quellen sprechen nur von einer Halle und nie von irgendeiner Dekoration oder weiterer Ausstattung. Es könnte sich also um einen schmucklosen Raum oder mehrere Räume gehandelt haben45. Es wird sich um eine Präsenzbibliothek gehandelt haben. Um den Bestand zu sichern, wird eine Ausleihe nicht möglich gewesen sein. Wir wissen, dass Aufsichtspersonal zum Schutz der Bestände eingesetzt wurde46. Sollte jemand Bücher für den privaten Nutzen haben wollen, so wird er einen Kopisten ans Werk gesetzt haben.

10.

Die Kopisten

Wo es Bibliotheken gab, dort fand man auch Schreibstuben, die sogenannten Skriptorien. Kopisten werden als Kalligraphen oder Skriptoren bereits im Höchstpreisedikt von Diokletian (7,39–40) erwähnt47 und waren auch in Konstantinopel anwesend48. Aus dem Höchstpreisedikt wissen wir, dass die Skriptoren für jeweils hundert Zeilen schönster Schrift mit 25 Denaren und mit 20 Denaren für normale Schrift bezahlt wurden49. Die Gebrauchsschrift unterschied sich von der Kanzleischrift. Seit dem vierten Jahrhundert war die Gebrauchsschrift eine Minuskelkursive, die flott geschrieben werden konnte und ohne Worttrennung aufgezeichnet wurde. Diese wurde aber nicht für Bücher verwendet50. 44 Weitere Nachweise bei Blanck (Fn. 12) 183–185. 45 Etwas Ähnliches ist uns aus Pergamon bekannt. Blanck (Fn. 12) 186. 46 CTh. 14,9,2: …ad eiusdem bibliothecae custodiam condicionalibus et requirendis et protinus adponendis. 47 Zur Vergütung der verschiedenen Dienstleistungen siehe M.J. Groen-Vallinga/L.E. Tacoma, The value of labour: Diocletian’s Prices Edict, in C. Laes/K. Verboven (Hg.), Work, labor and professions in the Roman World, Leiden 2016. 48 Dort werden Sie uns im Jahr 372 als antiquarii überliefert. Diese wurden allerdings nicht per abgeschriebener Zeile bezahlt, sondern waren angestellt. Ihre Kollegen dagegen, die sicher auch in Konstantinopel zugegen waren, wurden wie Handwerker für ihre Arbeit bezahlt und zwar nach abgeschriebenen Zeilen. CTh. 14,9,2. 49 Der Maximaltarif des Diocletian, H. Blümner/Th. Mommsen (Hg.), Berlin 1958, 112. Hier wird der Nachdruck auf die Abrechnung nach jeweils 100 Zeilen gelegt. Siehe auch Blanck (Fn. 12) 124. 50 Siehe die für Bücher verwendeten Schrifttype Reynolds/Wilson (Fn. 31) 35f.

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Angesichts des überlieferten Umfangs der Sammlung ist zu vermuten, dass die angestellten sieben Antiquare ausschließlich für die Bibliothek selber gearbeitet haben und daneben noch Skriptoren arbeiteten, die Privatabschriften erstellten. Eine der Aufgaben beider Gruppen war sicher die Übertragung von Texten von alten Papyrusrollen auf neue Pergamentkodizes.

11.

Eine zweisprachige Bibliothek

Aus den Quellen wissen wir für das Jahr 372 von wie bereits erwähnt sieben Antiquaren, vier des Griechischen mächtig, und drei des Lateinischen, die auch Bücher reparierten51. Die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel bestand also aus einer bibliotheca latina und einer bibliotheca graeca. Aufgrund der Zweisprachigkeit der Stadt und der späteren Umstellung auf Griechisch als Amtssprache erscheint das selbstverständlich. Ebenso ist ein großer Teil des Bestandes auf Kaiser Julian und den Redner Themistius zurückzuführen, welche beide das Griechische bevorzugten. So ist es zu erklären, dass mehr Mitarbeiter für das Griechische notwendig waren. Als Konzept kennen wir die Aufteilung in lateinische und griechische Schriften auch aus Rom52. Nicht bekannt ist allerdings, ob die griechischen und lateinischen Schriften in Konstantinopel miteinander oder getrennt verwahrt wurden. Da die Quellen immer nur von einer Bibliothek sprechen, werden die Bestände wohl gemeinsam aufbewahrt worden sein, eventuell unterteilt in verschiedene Flügel als bibliotheca graeca und bibliotheca latina. Da ganz bewusst griechische und lateinische Bibliothekare angestellt wurden, ist davon auszugehen, dass diese jeweils immer nur in einer Sprache arbeiteten.

12.

Die Bibliotheksbesucher

Bedenkt man, dass es in der Mitte des fünften Jahrhunderts 31 Professoren gab, sieben Bibliotheksmitarbeiter und von einem Professor etwa ein guter Dutzend Student betreut wurden, so kommt man auf eine relativ kleine Gruppe von Menschen, die höher ausgebildet war. Daneben wird es noch einige Bibliophile gegeben haben. Aus Rom wissen wir, dass ein Großteil der Bevölkerung lesen 51 CTh. 14,9,2, Valentinian, Valens und Gratian vom 8. Mai 372. Federführend für diesen Erlass war Valens. Der Erlass ist adressiert an den Stadtpräfekten Clearchos, der wiederum ein Freund von Themistius gewesen ist, welcher sich bereits mit der Gründung der Bibliothek im Jahr 356 beschäftigt hatte und diese bereits in einer Rede im Jahr 357 erwähnte. 52 Blanck (Fn. 12) 160. Solch eine Aufteilung ist zum Beispiel auch nachgewiesen für die Bibliothek beim Marcellustheater in Rom.

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und schreiben konnte. Zahlreiche Graffiti erinnern an diese Fähigkeit, auch wurde Elementarunterricht überliefert53. Da Konstantinopel das neue Rom werden sollte, wird der Bildungsstand in Konstantinopel ähnlich hoch gewesen sein. Wir wissen, dass von Senatsmitgliedern auch eine gewisse Bildung erwartet wurde. Die Laufbahn eines Senators begann häufig im Notariat, das war eine Stellung als Schreiber. Es wurde erwartet, dass dieser auch die Kurzschrift beherrscht. Geschätzt waren literarische Bildung sowie rhetorische Fähigkeiten54. Im Jahr 385 gab es 2000 Senatoren in Konstantinopel55. Dazu werden wir noch Mitarbeiter der kaiserlichen Kanzleien rechnen dürfen, sowie Kopisten des Skriptoriums. Insgesamt wird es aber dennoch eine deutliche Minderheit der Bevölkerung gewesen sein, die überhaupt die Bibliothek hat nutzen können. Ein prominenter Leser von Büchern in Konstantinopel war Kaiser Julian. In einem Brief äußert er : „Seit meiner frühen Jugend bin ich ein Büchernarr gewesen“56. Sein Bestand bildete dann auch einen Großteil der Sammlung in Konstantinopel. Auch von anderen Kaisern und kaiserlichen Familienmitgliedern wissen wir, dass sie belesen waren57.

13.

Die vorhandenen Schriften

Aus den Berichten über das Leben von Kaiser Julian können wir Rückschlüsse darauf ziehen, was er gelesen hat. Da er einen Großteil seiner Bibliothek an die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel schenkte, ist zu vermuten, dass diese Werke dann auch dort anwesend waren. So las er in seiner Jugend Homer und Hesiod. Später auch Chrysippos, Zenon und Kleanthes58. In seinen eigenen Schriften berichtet Julian von einer Schenkung der Kaiserin Eusebia an ihn. Er erhielt beträchtliche 53 Blanck (Fn. 12) 30–33. 54 Weitere Nachweise bei Demandt, Spätantike (Fn. 25) 447. Allerdings ohne weitere Nachweise. 55 Demandt, Spätantike (Fn. 25) 447, unter Verweis auf eine Lobrede des Themistius or. 34,13. 56 Weitere Nachweise bei A.J. Festugière, Julian in Macellum, in: R. Klein (Hg.), Julian Apostata, Darmstadt 1978, 245. 57 Theodosius der Große wird bekannt gewesen sein mit den Werken der Kirchenväter, der Kirchengeschichte und weiterer Glaubensliteratur. Bezüglich dieser Literatur lässt sich allerdings vermuten, dass der Kaiser Abschriften im Palast hatte und weitere Schriften dieser Art in einer kirchlichen Bibliothek verwahrt wurden. H. Leppin, Theodosius der Große, Darmstadt 2003, 230. Aber auch Theodosius II, seine Frau Athenais sowie seine Schwester Pulcheria lasen sowohl griechische wie lateinische Bücher. Auf Grund des Lebensstils dieser Mitglieder der kaiserlichen Familie ist auch hier zu vermuten, dass sie Abschriften im Palast selber lasen und nicht die öffentliche Bibliothek nutzten. Möglich ist es allerdings, dass die Abschriften für die kaiserliche Familie im Skriptorium von Konstantinopel erstellt wurden. 58 Mit weiteren Nachweisen, J. Bidez, Julian der Abtrünnige, München 1940, 25. Verweise auf die Werke von Chrysippos, Zenon und Kleanthes, 58.

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Mengen an Werken großer Philosophen, Historiker, Redner und Dichter59. Den gallischen Krieg von Caesar las er sowie Plutarchs Lebensbeschreibungen großer Männer60. Gerne las er auch in den Selbstbetrachtungen des Marc Aurel61. Gelesen hatte er auch die Schriften von Diogenes, Aristoteles und Plato62. Julian schrieb auch selber viel. Es ist zu vermuten, dass diese Schriften sich auch in Abschriften in der Bibliothek befanden. In der Bibliothek werden wir Schriften zur Poesie, Lyrik, Philosophie und den Kirchenvätern erwarten dürfen. Angesichts der vielen Konzilien, die in und um Konstantinopel abgehalten wurden, werden kirchliche Schriften in hohem Maße anwesend gewesen sein. Allerdings ist es auch gut möglich, dass diese in einer eigenen Sammlung verwahrt wurden. Sicher wird es Abschriften des Homer, Vergil, Komödien, Texte von Cicero sowie Livius, Plinius, Sueton, Catull, Horatius und Ovidius und vieles mehr in der Bibliothek von Konstantinopel gegeben haben63. Eventuell werden auch Bücher durch Plünderungen nach erfolgreichen Feldzügen mitgebracht worden sein64. Nirgends wird von juristischer Literatur in Bezug auf die Bibliothek gesprochen. Der Verwaltungsapparat war in Konstantinopel im vierten Jahrhundert bereits sehr groß. Es ist daher zu vermuten, dass es eine Kanzlei gab, in der juristische Schriften aufbewahrt wurden. Diese war räumlich getrennt von der Bibliothek, denn nie wird etwas in Bezug auf solch eine juristische Kanzlei in den Quellen über die Bibliothek erwähnt.

14.

Die Rechtsliteratur

Nirgends können wir lesen, dass die Bibliothek in Konstantinopel beitrug zur Entstehung der Gesetzeswerke von Theodosius II. Die Quellen vermelden nie etwas über anwesende Rechtsliteratur in Konstantinopel. Zur Erstellung des Codex unter Kaiser Theodosius waren Rechtsquellen nötig. Im Codex sind auch Gesetze aufgenommen, die nicht in Konstantinopel erlassen wurden65. Es ist nicht abschließend erklärt, wo diese Texte aufbewahrt wurden und wo sie zugänglich waren. Die Erstellung des Codex Theodosianus liegt vor dem großen Brand der Bibliothek. Es wäre also möglich, dass damals Rechtsliteratur in der Bibliothek aufbewahrt wurde. Allerdings scheint die Rechtsliteratur nicht beim Brand untergegangen zu sein, denn unter Justinian stand sie noch zur Verfü59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Bidez (Fn. 58) 142. Bidez (Fn. 58) 142. Bidez (Fn. 58) 223. Bidez (Fn. 58) 272. Blanck (Fn. 12) 125. So geschah es in zumindest in Rom. Casson (Fn. 28) 97. T. Honore, Law in the Crisis of the Empire, Oxford 1998, 136, 139.

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gung66. Diese Tatsache spricht dafür, dass die Rechtsliteratur nicht in der Bibliothek oder in der räumlichen Nähe zur Bibliothek aufbewahrt wurde. Es ist daher zu vermuten, dass die in den Quellen benannte Bibliothek in Konstantinopel keine Rolle bei der Aufbewahrung von Material spielte, welches auch für die Gesetzgebung Verwendung fand. Das ist erstaunlich, da zu Beginn Rechtsprechung, Rechtsunterricht und die Aufbewahrung von Büchern in unmittelbarer Nähe zueinander in der Stoa Basileos stattfanden. Zumindest kaiserliche Erlässe hätte man in der Bibliothek als Abschrift erwarten können. Auch sagen die Quellen nichts über möglich anwesende spezifische Rechtsliteratur in der Bibliothek von Konstantinopel. Die Studenten werden wohl bei den Vorlesungen mitgeschrieben haben und die wohlhabenderen werden eventuell einen Kopisten ans Werk gesetzt haben, um von einer Kopie des Rechtslehrers die Rechtsquelle abzuschreiben. Da die Universität und auch die Rechtslehrer staatlich gestützt waren, vom Kaiser eingesetzt und vom Senat mit auserwählt, ist es auch denkbar, dass es eine offizielle Sammelstelle der Rechtsliteratur gab, zu der die Professoren und die Studenten Zugang hatten. Für so eine Sammlung von Rechtstexten in den Rechtsschulen spräche die Mitarbeit von Juraprofessoren an den Kompilationsarbeiten unter Justinian. Nur mit einem reichen vorhandenen Fundus konnte so ein großes Werk in einer so kurzen Zeit zusammengestellt werden. Diese Sammelstelle wäre dann aber wohl außerhalb der öffentlichen Bibliothek gewesen oder eine neue systematische Sammlung wurde nach dem Stadtbrand Ende des fünften Jahrhunderts neu aufgebaut67. Ebenso wäre es aber möglich, dass bei einer Neueinteilung der Stadt unter Theodosius II und bei einem Umzug der Universität zum Kapitol die juristische Sammlung aus der Bibliothek beim Milion entfernt wurde, und diese auch im Hinblick auf seinen vorgenommenen Codex apart gehalten wurde und als eigenständige Sammlung weitergeführt wurde und wir daher dann auch unter Justinian ein reiches Archiv an juristischen Schriften vorfinden. Anders als die Bibliothek selber, wäre diese juristische Sammlung durch die räumliche Trennung von der Bibliothek nicht beim Stadtbrand rund um das Jahr 475 untergegangen. Diese juristische Sammlung 66 Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass es eine kaiserliche Kanzlei in Konstantinopel gab, in der Abschriften von amtlichen Schreiben aufbewahrt wurden und aus diesen könnten auch ein Grossteil der Masse des Codex Theodosianus zusammengestellt worden sein. Angesichts der Anordnung in CTh. 1,4,3 müssen auch die Schriften von Papinian, Paulus, Gaius, Ulpian und Modestinus zugänglich gewesen sein. Es wird ein Senatsarchiv gegeben haben. Allerdings kann es sein, dass dieses sich in der Mitte des 4. Jahrhunderts noch im Aufbau befand, da der Senat ein junge Einrichtung in Konstantinopel war. 67 Einen Hinweis auf den Aufbau gibt die Anthologia Palatina 16.70–1. Darüber, woher die Buchbestände kamen lässt sicht nur mutmassen. Es können Kriegsbeuten, Bestände aus den Provinzen oder Abschriften aus noch bestehenden öffentlichen Bibliotheken oder Privatsammlungen gewesen sein.

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wird aber keinesfalls bei der Stoa Basileos aufbewahrt gewesen sein, da der Ort mehrfach von zerstörerischen Ereignissen getroffen wurde, zunächst bei einem der vielen Stadtbrände und dann beim Nikaaufstand im Jahr 532. Es bedarf noch einer Analyse der Topographie der Stadt, um den Ort der juristischen Sammlung zu bestimmen, muss es doch ein Ort gewesen sein, der zwischen den Arbeiten am Codex Theodosianus und den Arbeiten unter Tribonian keiner oder zumindest fast keiner Verwüstung zum Opfer gefallen ist.

15.

Abschließende Würdigung

Die Blütezeit der Bibliothek in Konstantinopel war zwischen dem Jahr 356 und dem Jahr 475, also nach der reichen Bücherschenkung des Kaisers Julian und vor dem großen Brand. Aus den überlieferten Quellen lässt sich vermuten, dass in der Bibliothek der Schwerpunkt mehr auf der Literatur gelegen hat und dort kaum systematisch gesammelte juristische Bestände zu finden gewesen sein werden. Die Erstellung der Rechtstexte unter Theodosius wird eher in einer kaiserlichen Kanzlei oder einer Art Archiv stattgefunden haben68 und nicht durch Material, welches in der öffentlichen Bibliothek verwahrt wurde und in dem daran verbundenen Skriptorium erstellt wurde. In Konstantinopel dürfen wir erwarten, dass es folglich neben der Bibliothek auch noch ein Archiv69 für die Dokumente des Staates und der Verwaltung gegeben haben wird, und dieses beim großen Stadtbrand im fünften Jahrhundert nicht untergegangen ist. Die in der Bibliothek vorhandenen Werke selber werden bei den Gesetzgebungsarbeiten unter Theodosius keine Rolle gespielt haben70.

68 Blanck (Fn. 12) 133. 69 A.J.B. Sirks, The Theodosian Code, A study, Friedrichsdorf 2007. 70 Weimann ist davon überzeugt, dass die kaiserliche Bibliothek im Laufe der Jahre zu einer Regierungs- und Behördenbibliothek ausgebaut wurde und spricht sich für eine Ausweitung der juristischen Sammlung aus und ist der Meinung, dass die Bibliothek einen Beitrag für die Arbeiten an der Kodifikation von Justinian lieferte. K.H. Weimann, Bibliotheksgeschichte, 46.

David Ibbetson

Unjust enrichment and Lord Mansfield

As an English lawyer who started teaching in Oxford almost 40 years ago I could not fail to be aware of the late Peter Birks’ work on the law of restitution with its focus on unjust enrichment1. I had read his main work and thought I understood the subject, at least in outline. In the early 1990s I took part in a project on the comparative legal history of the law of restitution with, among others, Jan Hallebeek2. We two had responsibility for medieval law, and it was soon clear that we were talking to some extent at cross-purposes, and it was clear to at least one of us (and perhaps both) that the narrow perspective of the English legal historian left many, too many, comparative issues unresolved. One thorny question was why lawyers in the continental tradition(s) spoke of unjustified enrichment while English lawyers spoke of unjust enrichment. Was this just a linguistic quirk, or did it indicate a more fundamental distinction? Other work of Jan’s, not least his “The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Late Scholasticism”3, cast some light on the problem by bringing in the Aristotelian dimension alongside that of Roman law, though the comparative history still remains to be written. A short paper is not the place to attempt to write that history, but I hope these few remarks will add something to its elucidation. The basic building blocks of the modern law are found in three interlocking features of Roman Law: – The principle of Pomponius, found already in Cicero, that none should be enriched at the expense of another ; found in another text in the form that none should be enriched wrongfully (iniuria) at the expense of another4 ; – The condictio, a remedy when one person claimed back from another a determinate amount of money or other property, divided into several sub-forms in the Digest; 1 P. Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Oxford 1985. 2 E.J.H. Schrage (ed.), Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, Berlin 1995. 3 J. Hallebeek, The Concept of Unjust Enrichment in Later Scholasticism, Nijmegen 1996. 4 D. 12,6,14; D. 50,17,20,6; Cic. off. 3,21.

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– A category of obligations quasi ex contractu in Justinian’s Institutes5, including inter alia one species of condictio, the condictio indebiti, where one person had paid money to another in the mistaken belief that it was due, and the actio negotiorum gestorum where one person had done some act for the benefit of another without there being any contractual relationship between them. Quasi-contract was a useful category which could be used to bring together obligations imposed by law which were not based on wrongful conduct, and it was in this form that the condictio indebiti and the actio negotiorum gestorum were brought together in the French Code Civil of 18046. The Code Civil was of course immensely influential and the same categorisation is found in other nineteenth-century codes passed in its wake. It was, however, no more than a convenient category which masked any common features of its component elements and which was sufficiently elastic to allow in other types of non-contractual and non-delictal obligations: in Chile, for example, the final version of the Codigo Civil of Andres Bello had expanded the two forms of the proyecto of 1847 (which had simply followed the French Code Civil) by adding a third covering the relationship between co-owners of property7. Alongside the convenient but unrevealing grouping of quasi-contracts, the Roman principle that one should not be [wrongfully] enriched at the expense of another and the Roman condictiones continued to play their part. Jan’s work shows the way in which the two elements existed in an uncertain relationship to each other in the writings of the medieval learned lawyers, coming into contact with the Aristotelian ideas analysed by the later scholastics8. The development of this into the modern period must be glossed over, but the crystallisation into a theory of unjustified enrichment, building on the generalised condictio sine causa, can be traced back to Savigny’s “System des heutigen Römischen Rechts”9. It was picked up by the pandectists, and as ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung found its way into the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch10. In France the general principle that none should be enriched “injustement” was borrowed from the French translation of Pufendorf ’s “De Officio Hominis Civis” and Burlamaqui’s “Principes de 5 6 7 8

I. 3,27, picking up the terminology of Gaius in D. 44,7,5,1. Art. 1371–1381. Art. 2285; Codigo Civil de la Republica de Chile, Caracas 1955, 893. J. Hallebeek, Developments in Mediaeval Roman Law, in: Schrage (note 2), 59–120; Hallebeek (note 3). 9 F. von Savigny, System des heutigen Römischen Rechts, Berlin 1841, 5.525–26 (“grundlose Bereicherung”). 10 Arts. 812–822; N. Jansen, Farewell to Unjustified Enrichment, Edinburgh Law Review 20 (2016) 123–148.

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Droit Naturel”, but after the publication of the French translation of Savigny’s “System” the language of enrichissement ill8gitime becomes common, uniting the Pomponius principle that none should be enriched wrongfully at the expense of another and the idea that property transferred without legal ground should be returned11. A linguistic turn towards enrichissement sans cause occurred in the wake of the appearance of Raymond Saleilles’ commentary on the draft BGB of 1888, and after the Affaire Boudier of 1892 this term (originally as enrichissement sans juste cause) became canonical, finally being adopted in the new Code Civil of 201612. Italy followed the French lead, codifying as arrichimento senza giusta causa in 194213 ; and in Holland the theorising of scholars culminated in its recognition in the New Dutch Civil Code of 199214. The Swiss Obligations code of 1881, much influenced by the draft BGB, generalised its German version in terms of ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung while the French retained the more ambiguous enrichissement ill8gitime (substituting for the enrichissement sans cause of the draft)15, with case-law ensuring the dominance of the German model of unjustified enrichment. Spain was slightly unusual since the thirteenth-century Siete Partidas had contained the Pomponius principle that none should be wrongfully (torticeramente) enriched at the expense of another in its final pages as well as an orthodox treatment of the condictio16. In the 1850s case-law began to build on the general principle, though only in 1926 did the Catalan Luis Borel i Soler begin to derive a generalised analytical framework from the decisions. But it was too late. Within a few years there appeared the first monograph on the subject in Spain, adopting the German and French theories of causeless enrichment, enriquecimento sin causa, with only the most cursory nod in the direction of the earlier Spanish law17. And so on. Anglo-American law has – so far – remained an outsider to this development18. After a long dalliance with quasi-contract, in 1888 the Harvard professor James Barr Ames identified the principle of unjust enrichment lying behind noncontractual and non-delictal obligations19. No source was identified, but there is little doubt that it was the same Natural law thinking as had precipitated the use 11 R. Saleilles, Ptude sur les Sources de l’Obligations dans le Projet de Code Civil Allemand, Paris 1889. 12 D. (= Dalloz) 92.1.596, S. (= Sirey) 93.1.281 note Labb8. 13 Codice Civile, art. 2041. 14 Art. 212. 15 Obligationenrecht/Code des Obligations, Art. 62. 16 SP. 5,14,29–30; SP. 7,34,19. 17 M. Borrell i Soler, Revista Jur&dica de Catalunya 27 (1926), 10, 12–50; R. Nuñez Lagos, Enriquecimiento sin Causa en el Derecho EspaÇol, Madrid 1934. 18 But see P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, Oxford 2005, xii–xiii. 19 J.B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit: Implied Assumpsit, Harvard Law Review 2 (1888) 53–69, 63–64, 66–69.

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of the same thinking in France. The terminology rapidly caught on in the United States, less rapidly in England; and the modern law has come to be structured in terms of a series of unjust factors. More than a century before Ames, though, Lord Mansfield had formulated a general principle in the case of Moses v Macferlan20, and it is only really possible to make sense of Ames’ espousal of the principle of unjust enrichment against the background of this decision and the remarks of Lord Mansfield. The facts of Moses v Macferlan show it to have been a problematic case. Moses had indorsed four promissory notes, made out to him by one Chapman Jacobs, to Macferlan, ostensibly to allow Macferlan to recover on them against Jacobs. The legal effect of this was that Moses himself would be liable to Macferlan on the notes if he should choose to sue him, and to give comfort to Moses Macferlan wrote to him to the effect that the indorsement would not be prejudicial to him and that no action would be brought against him; an agreement was drawn up to this effect. Notwithstanding this agreement Macferlan sued Moses in a lower court, the Court of Conscience, a court created in 175021 to expedite the recovery of small debts in the county of Middlesex. The court was not bound by strict rules of law – it should proceed ‘according to equity and good conscience’ according to the statute which set it up – and it held that the agreement not to sue was ineffective to bar the claim on the promissory notes, and judgment was given for Macferlan. Not only was the court not governed by strict rules of law, the governing statute had provided that its judgments were final and, moreover, that any person who refused to perform the award of the court could be summarily imprisoned. Moses could, and probably should, have brought an action on Macferlan’s agreement not to sue him, but instead he brought an action for money had and received claiming that Macferlan return to him the £6 which had been recovered in the Court of Conscience. No doubt because of the statutory provision that the judgment of the Court of Conscience was final and the existence of the threat of imprisonment for those who refused to perform the court’s award, the correctness of the judgment was not in issue. The action for money had and received had originated in the early seventeenth century,22 allowing the plaintiff to allege that the defendant had received money for his or her benefit. It was a variety of the action of assumpsit, an action normally used to enforce contracts, and as such had a number of procedural ramifications which it is not necessary to go into here. The issue in Moses v

20 1760 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676. 21 Stat 23 Geo II c.33. 22 J.H. Baker, The Use of Assumpsit for Restitutionary Money Claims, in: Schrage (note 2) 31, 47.

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Macferlan, put simply, was whether the action for money had and received arose on these facts. At the trial of the matter at the Guildhall Lord Mansfield was clearly of the opinion that the merits of the case lay firmly with the plaintiff and the jury gave a verdict accordingly23. The law, however, was not at all clear, and Lord Mansfield reserved the question for further argument before the full court of King’s Bench. After due consideration by the judges, judgment was given in favour of the plaintiff Moses, with the court’s reasons being given by Mansfield himself. Three sentences in Mansfield’s reasoning as reported summarise the principle underlying the decision: – If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of natural justice, to refund, the law implies a debt, and gives this action, founded on the equity of the plaintiff ’s case, as it were upon a contract (quasi ex contractu as the Roman law expresses it). – The gist of this kind of action is that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money. – The plaintiff ex aequo et bono ought to recover no more [than was withheld from him]: agreeable to the rule of the Roman law – Quae condictio indebiti non datur ultra quam locupletior factus est, qui accepit. There has been considerable discussion of the source of Lord Mansfield’s thinking. There can be no doubt that the judgment had some basis in law and was not simply an immediate response to the merits of the case; it had been argued before the full court of King’s Bench, and if Mansfield had simply wanted to reach what he thought to be the right result he could have done so when the case came before him at the Guildhall. It follows that it is highly unlikely that he was doing no more than basing the decision on the apparent fairness of the result. An old view was that the decision was based on implied contract24. This is unsatisfactory, since it proves either too little or too much. If ‘implied’ means ‘imposed by law’, then it was trivially true that the action was based on an implied contract in so far as all actions for money had and received were based on implied contracts or at least implied promises. The explanation simply collapses into the bare assertion that money had and received would lie. On the other hand, if ‘implied’ means ‘inferred from the evidence’, then it was trivially false. The evidence showed that there was an express promise not to sue, inconsistent with any inference that there was a promise to return the money which was recovered after bringing suit for it. 23 J. Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts, Chapel 1992, 227, 258. 24 R.M. Jackson, The History of Quasi-Contract in English Law, Cambridge 1936, 118–119.

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There was clearly no basis for the decision in earlier Common-law cases on the scope of the action for money had and received. The references to equity in James Burrow’s report of the case might suggest a paternity for the decision in the law as applied by the Court of Chancery, which was by this time (and long before) generally known as equity. It has been cogently argued by Warren Swain that this was indeed the source of his thinking25. It would not be surprising if this were so: the boundary between the law as applied in the King’s Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer on the one hand and the Chancery on the other, more generally between Common law and equity, was becoming blurred by Mansfield’s time; and only three years before Moses v Macferlan Lord Mansfield himself had said in Decker v Pope that the Common law courts had jurisdiction over any matter normally triable in Chancery if the Common-law court was cognisant of the facts which lay at the base of the equitable claim26. Moreover, as Professor Swain points out, Mansfield had himself had a broad practice in Chancery before becoming a judge and would therefore have had a knowledge of equity as well as, perhaps, a sympathy with it. That said, despite the plausibility of the argument, it seems unlikely that the reasoning was based on any shift of jurisdiction from the Chancery. To begin with, the references to ‘equity’ in the judgment do not equate easily to the “equity” of the Chancery, which was by this time becoming substantially rule-based; on the contrary, the collocation of ‘equity’ and ‘natural justice’ points to ‘equity’ being used here in its more abstract sense of fairness. As well, there is no evidence that the Court of Chancery would give a remedy in these circumstances, where the defendant had recovered money from the plaintiff by the judgment of a competent court; if there had been a practice to this effect in the Chancery, or even a general practice to the effect that whenever money was due to somebody in fairness the Chancery would give a remedy, we should undoubtedly have expected Lord Mansfield to have referred to it. It might of course have been an implicit part of his argument – it is assuredly not explicit – that the remedy should have been available at Common law and not only in Chancery ; but this would get us no further towards an understanding of why a remedy should be available at all. If the judgment in Moses v Macferlan was not simply an attempt to get what was seen as the right result and not something which flowed from previous English authority, we are left with the possibility that there was some external influence at work. This is not to say that the Court of King’s Bench was doing no more than deciding to borrow some foreign law without admitting that it was doing so. If there was some external influence it is more likely that it took the 25 W. Swain, Moses v Macferlan, in: C. Mitchell/P. Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in Restitution, Oxford 2006, 19–37. 26 Swain (note 25) 27.

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form of the adoption of a general principle which could explain the basis of the action for money had and received. There can be no doubt that the action for money had and received was in need of such an explanation: in the century and a half since its recognition in English law it had come to be applied in a disparate set of circumstances which had not hitherto been based upon any general principle. We might say that the position in England in 1760 was very like that which prevailed in Germany when Savigny built upon the condictio sine causa to create his general principle of unjustified enrichment. The obvious place to look for the principle which Lord Mansfield identified as that applicable in England is Roman law. Two hints of this are visible in the quotations from his judgment given above: the reference to the Romans’ category of obligations quasi ex contractu, and the supposed quotation from Roman law (the actual source is unclear) about the limitation of the condictio indebiti to the amount by which the defendant had profited. Undeniably, Roman law was in the air27. There is a problem in seeing this as lying at the base of Lord Mansfield’s analysis, however. In so far as Roman law might have been treated as being of central importance, this might have been expected of Wilmot J rather than Lord Mansfield. In the leading contract case Pillans v van Mierop,28 just five years after Moses v Macferlan, Wilmot J reasoned directly from the Roman stipulatio to English Law whereas Lord Mansfield’s inventiveness was located more closely within the English tradition. So too in Moses v Macferlan. According to the inferior report of the case ascribed to William Blackstone,29 Wilmot did rely directly on Roman law, citing I. 3,28,6 and C. 4,5,1 pr. to justify a dissent from Mansfield’s judgment on the grounds that money had and received would not lie to claim back money paid in accordance with the judgment of a competent court. Roman law was a reference point, but it cannot in truth be the source of the rule that wherever money was due by natural justice and equity an action for money had and received would lie. A second possible influence has been suggested, the Scottish writer Lord Kames30. Lord Mansfield was a Scot, though he left for England at the age of eleven, and was a friend and correspondent of Lord Kames. Kames’ Principles of Equity, published in the same year as Moses v Macferlan, contains only the blandest explanation of the condictio indebiti, justifying it by reference to the general principle pf Pomponius,31 and references in the book to natural justice or 27 P. Birks, Roman and English Learning, in: Moses v. Macferlan, Current Legal Problems 37 (1984) 1–28. 28 (1765) 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035. 29 1 W. Black. 219, 96 Eng. Rep. 120. 30 H. MacQueen/D. Sellar, Unjust Enrichment in Scots Law, in: Schrage (note 2) 289, 314–316. 31 Henry Home/Lord Kames, Principles of Equity, Edinburgh 1760, 116.

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equity are sufficiently commonplace that we need not strain ourselves to find their source in Kames. While we cannot rule out the possibility that Kames’ mind was working along the lines found in Mansfield’s judgment and he had communicated this with him, we would have expected there to have been some hint of this in the first edition of Principles of Equity if it were to have been the source of Moses v Macferlan. We are left with a third possibility, which takes us back to Jan’s work on the Middle Ages. Already in Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Pomponius’s principle was said to be “fair by nature” (natura aequum)32 or “good and fair” (bonum et aequum),33and Ulpian described it as “very fair” (aequissimum) that none should be enriched at the expense of another34 while Celsus had described it as bonum et aequum that I should repay to you your money which had come to my hands.35 Fairness, or abtural justice and equity, could be seen as the justification for the principle applicable in concrete cases, though having no independent force according to which the concrete remedies of the Corpus Iuris could be extended. Medieval lawyers found ways to build upon the Justinianic actions, and by the fifteenth century we find reference to an actio in factum ex aequitate and a condictio ex aequitate36. The idea that aequitas could serve as an independent source of obligation, and not simply as a justification of the Roman principle, is found in the writings of post-medieval jurists. Writers of the usus modernus pandectarum referred to the claim ex aequitate, based on Celsus’ text, D. 12,1,3237. The terminology is found in France too38, and by the beginning of the eighteenth century it had a firm foothold in the Netherlands, first in the writings of the Frisian Ulrich Huber and then in the jurisprudence of the Hoge Raad as reported by Bijnkershoek and Pauw39. It is possible that Lord Mansfield was acquainted with this tradition of liability ex aequitate through the work of Huber, for there is good reason to believe that he was familiar with Huber’s work40. However, we can only really be confident that he knew Huber’s theory 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

D. 12,6,14. D. 23,3,6,2. D. 2,15,8,22. D. 12,1,32. Hallebeek, in: Schrage (note 2) 92, 102, 119, 120; The Condiction as Enrichment Action in Twelfth and Thirteenth Century Legal Scholarship, TvR 63 (1995) 263. B. Kupisch, Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung, in: Schrage (note 2) 237, 256–257. E.J.H. Schrage/B. Nicholas, Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Restitution, in: Schrage (note 2) 9, 22 n.21, citing Dumoulin; Donellus, Ad Tit Inst XXXIV, in: Opera Omnia, Macerata 1830, vol. 6 col. 861. R. Feenstra, Grotius’ Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment as a Source of Obligation, in: Schrage (note 2) 197, 222–233. A. Watson, Lord Mansfield: Judicial Integrity or its Lack: Somerset’s Case, Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade 1 (2006), 18; Bramley v Alt (1797) 3 Ves. Jun. 620, 30 Eng. Rep. 1186. Mansfield’s principal library was burned down in 1780, but he had a copy of

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relating to the conflict of laws, so it is as well to be agnostic about Huber’s more general direct influence on Mansfield’s thinking: there is simply not enough evidence. That said, Huber may have had an indirect influence. His work was very well-known in Scotland,41 and before 1760 liability ex aequitate, and more generally in equity, is found there in relation to the condictio indebiti42. Lord Mansfield may, perhaps, have come across any of these sources, but there is no real evidence that he actually did. One continental author with whom he was almost certainly acquainted was the German Johannes Gottlieb Heineccius, whose works were well known in England and which Mansfield might well have come across as a student in Oxford43. That condictiones might be based on aequitas appeared already in his “Syntagma Antquitatum Romanorum”44 but it is given a sharper focus In his “Elementa Iuris Civilis Secundum Ordinem Pandectarum”, having dealt with specific condictiones he turned to the condictio sine causa, which for him was the general residuary condictio given where none other was available et aequitas tamen alterum cum alterius damno locupletiorem fieri haud patitur45. The mapping of this onto Lord Mansfield’s analysis is clear. There were no specifically designated varieties of the action for money had and received, so the residuary nature of Heineccius’ condictio sine causa was irrelevant; what was left was the additional feature that equity would not suffer the one person to be enriched at the expense of another. Of crucial importance, for both Heineccius and Mansfield, consonance with equity was a condition for the granting of a remedy, not a general justification for the reversal of enrichment. Curiously, therefore, it may be that Lord Mansfield’s rooting of liability in equity and Savigny’s rooting of liability in a causeless transfer may have had a common source in the condictio sine causa; only, their interpretations of the condictio sine causa were wildly different. For neither was the generalisation wholly satisfactory. Within years Mansfield’s formulation was recognised as being too wide, and over time Savigny’s analysis in terms of unjustified enrichment has come to be thought of as too narrow.

41

42 43 44 45

Huber’s Praelectiones in his surviving library at his chambers in Lincoln’s Inn Fields: C. Rogers, Continental Literature and the Development of the Common Law, in: V. Piergiovanni (ed.) The Courts and the Development of Commercial Law, Berlin 1987, 161, 171. A. Watson, Joseph Story and the Comedy of Errors, Athens 1992, 81–84.; J. Cairns, Importing our Lawyers from Holland: Netherlands Influences on Scots Law and Lawyers in the Eighteenth Century, in: G. Simpson (ed.) Scotland and the Low Countries, Aberdeen 1996, 136, 146. J. Erskine, The Principles of the Law of Scotland, Edinburgh 1754, vol. 2, 301. J. Barton, Legal Studies, in L. Sutherland/L. Mitchell (eds.), The History of the University of Oxford: The Eighteenth Century, Oxford 1986, 593, 599; C.H.S. Fifoot, Lord Mansfield, Oxford 1936, 27. IV,6,31. I have used the edition printed at Geneva 1747, 541 (First published 1718). Elementa Iuris Civilis III,12,7. I have used the sixth edition, Geneva 1747, 255 (first published 1728).

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Human dignity in the early sixteenth century Spanish scholasticism. Francisco de Vitoria and Fray Bartolomé de las Casas

1.

Introduction

The expression “human dignity”– or “dignity of the individual”– appeared in a legal text for the first time in 1937, with the promulgation of the Constitution of Ireland1. Some years later, it was introduced in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations that was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945: “We the people of the United Nations determined … to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small …”.

Three years later, the expression “dignity” appeared several times in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the Preamble and in some provisions (1, 22 and 23)2. Art. 1 demonstrates clearly the relevance of human dignity in the new legal order, both national and international, after the Second World War : 1 On the history of human dignity, see M. Rosen, Dignity : Its History and Meaning, Cambridge 2012; S. Moyn, The Secret History of Constitutional History, in: Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 17.1 (2014), Article 2; the Preamble of the Irish Constitution reads as follows: “In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred, We, the people of Pire, Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this Constitution”. 2 On the origins and the drafting of the UDHR, see the works by J. Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Origins, Drafting and Intent, Philadelphia 1999; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a norm for societies in transition, in: S. Horowitz/A. Schnabel (eds.), Human Rights and Societies in Transition. Causes, consequences, res-

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“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”

From that moment onwards the expression proliferated both in other international legal instruments and declarations, and in national constitutions3. As it is well known, the notion of human dignity that was positivized in the middle of the last century was greatly indebted to Immanuel Kant. However, the German philosopher was not the first author who connected the notions of human dignity, human nature and human rights. In fact, he took and developed a doctrinal legacy of the 17th and 18th centuries that not only linked the aforesaid notions, but also used the expression “dignity of human nature”4. The history of the notion of human dignity can be traced back to the Middle Ages, even though the precise expressions “human dignity”, “dignity of man” or “dignity of human nature” may not appear in contemporary sources, in the way they do in 17th- and 18th-century writings. In this regard, the “Oration on the Dignity of Man” (1486), by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, is well known5. A careful reading of the text is more than enough to realize that, despite the author’s beautiful apology for the “dignity of man” – as the work’s own title reflects –, he did not consider it appropriate or necessary to use the expression “dignity” throughout the work. By distinguishing, with clear and elegant prose, between the human condition and that of the animal, he thanked God for conferring on mankind freedom and autonomy (“Oh wondrous and unsurpassable felicity of man, to whom it is granted to have what he chooses, to be what he wills to be”6 !), however he did not use the expression “dignity”.

3 4

5 6

ponses, Tokio/Nueva York/Paris 2004, 29–51; Inherent Human Rights. Philosophical Roots of the Universal Declaration, Philadelphia 2009. On this matter, see A. Masferrer, Una historia retrospectiva de la dignidad humana. De la Constitucijn espaÇola al Descubrimiento de Am8rica, GLOSSAE. European Journal of Legal History 14 (2017) 493–545 (available at http://www.glossae.eu). On this matter, see A. Masferrer, Taking Human Dignity more Humanely : A Historical Contribution to the Ethical Foundations of the Constitutional Democracy, in: A. Masferrer/ E. García-Sánchez (eds.), Human Dignity of the Vulnerable in the Age of Rights: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York 2016, 221–256. G. Pico della Mirandola, Oratio de hominis dignitate (1486); I use the English version: Oration on the dignity of man (available at http://bactra.org/Mirandola/). Pico della Mirandola (note 5) 3–4: “At last, the Supreme Maker decreed that this creature, to whom He could give nothing wholly his own, should have a share in the particular endowment of every other creature. Taking man, therefore, this creature of indeterminate image, He set him in the middle of the world and thus spoke to him: ‘We have given you, O Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor endowment properly your own, in order that whatever place, whatever form, whatever gifts you may, with premeditation, select, these same you may have and possess through your own judgement and decision. The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature. I have placed you at the very center of the world, so

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Similarly, when referring to the duty to behave in accordance with man’s birthright of being “born to a high position” which is in contrast with “the estate of brutes”, he also did not mention the term “dignity”7. The absence of the expression “dignity” should not be understood as an irrefutable sign of ignorance of that concept. And vice versa: its use does not necessarily guarantee the meaning that the drafters of the UDHR had in mind after the Second World War. In this vein, it cannot be assumed that medieval authors had no concept of the notions of human dignity – or natural human dignity – although they did not use the expression “dignity”8. To this end, this paper will examine to what extent medieval authors were aware that each human being is the bearer of “inherent” rights that should be the object of respect and protection in the legal sphere9. that from that vantage point you may with greater ease glance round about you on all that the world contains. We have made you a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer. It will be in your power to descend to the lower, brutish forms of life; you will be able, through your own decision, to rise again to the superior orders whose life is divine’. Oh unsurpassed generosity of God the Father, Oh wondrous and unsurpassable felicity of man, to whom it is granted to have what he chooses, to be what he wills to be! The brutes, from the moment of their birth, bring with them, as Lucilius says, ‘from their mother’s womb’ all that they will ever possess. The highest spiritual beings were, from the very moment of creation, or soon thereafter, fixed in the mode of being which would be theirs through measureless eternities. But upon man, at the moment of his creation, God bestowed seeds pregnant with all possibilities, the germs of every form of life. Whichever of these a man shall cultivate, the same will mature and bear fruit in him. If vegetative, he will become a plant; if sensual, he will become brutish; if rational, he will reveal himself a heavenly being; if intellectual, he will be an angel and the son of God. And if, dissatisfied with the lot of all creatures, he should recollect himself into the center of his own unity, he will there become one spirit with God, in the solitary darkness of the Father, Who is set above all things, himself transcend all creatures”. 7 Pico della Mirandola (note 5): “But what is the purpose of all this? That we may understand – since we have been born into this condition of being what we choose to be – that we ought to be sure above all else that it may never be said against us that, born to a high position, we failed to appreciate it, but fell instead to the estate of brutes and uncomprehending beasts of burden”. 8 Rosen (note 1) shows how Thomas Aquinas, for example, used the expression “dignity”; according to the medieval philosopher, “Dignity means something that is good by itself”; M. Beuchot, in his Derechos humanos, historia y filosof&a, Ciudad de M8xico 1999, dealt with human dignity and human rights in Thomas Aquinas (49–60), Francisco de Vitoria (61–69), Fray Bartolom8 de Las Casas (70–79), Fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz (80–89), Jacques Maritain (90–98), in the Social doctrine of the Catholic Church (99–110); see also I. Gonzalo Alarcón, La Dignidad como Valor y como Derecho en la Perspectiva Constitucional, in: XV Congreso Nacional de Abogados de la Barra Mexicana. A cien aÇos de la Constitucijn de 1917, in: Coleccijn Foro de la Barra Mexicana, Ciudad de M8xico 2016, 2441–2455, particularly 2446. 9 The “inherent” nature of human rights constitutes a relevant reason to study the history or development of such rights, as J.A. Escudero maintains in his work titled Sobre los derechos

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The notion of human dignity in the 16th century

The leading figures of the School of Salamanca, theologians and jurists Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546), Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), Mart&n de Azpilcueta (1491–1586), Tom#s de Mercado (1525–1575), and Francisco Su#rez (1548– 1617), were all scholars of natural law and of morality, who sought to reconcile the teachings of Thomas Aquinas with the new politicaleconomic order10. The concept of human nature came from antiquity and was particularly developed in the 16th century11, in the context of the Spanish colonization of America (Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Francisco Su#rez, etc.). Lawyers, philosophers and theologians of that century, in relating human nature and natural rights, argued that the dignity of man emanated precisely from human nature12. The development of the notion of human dignity goes beyond the use of the expression “human dignity” throughout time. There is no doubt that that notion can be defended without making use of the term “dignity”. In this sense, the famous sermon delivered by Fray Antonio Montesinos on 21 December 1511,

humanos, in: C. Hermida/J.A. Santos (eds.), Una filosof&a del Derecho en accijn. Homenaje al profesor Andr8s Ollero, Madrid 2015, 1045–1050: “Y si los derechos humanos son los inherentes a la persona, y el hombre de la gleba o el remero de galeras era portador en su tribulacijn de tan egregio depjsito moral, no parece razonable la ligereza de echar al desv#n los diecisiete siglos anteriores al XVIII (con sus Declaraciones) o los dieciocho anteriores (con sus Constituciones). Los derechos humanos han sido reconocidos o negados histjricamente de muchas maneras y no sjlo sub specie de Declaraciones y Constituciones. Por ello reclamo, yo que no soy medievalista, una mayor atencijn a lo medieval y al mundo antiguo, tal como lo hizo un sector bastante poco conocido de la historiograf&a alemana de los aÇos treinta” (1046–1047). 10 See, for example, W. Decock et al. (eds.), Law and Religion. The Legal Teachings of the Protestant and Catholic Reformations, Göttingen 2014; on the economic order, see also W. Decock, Theologians and Contract Law: The Moral Transformation of the Ius Commune (ca. 1500–1650), Leiden/Boston 2013. 11 H.C. Baker, Image of man: a study of the idea of human dignity in classical antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, New York 1961; J. Yacoub, The Dignity of the Individual and of Peoples: The Contribution of Mesopotamia and of Syriac Heritage, Diogenes, 2007, vol. 54, n. 3, 19–37; J. Giltaij, Existimatio as “human dignity” in late-classical Roman law, Fundamina 22–2 (2016) 232–249. 12 On this matter, see J. Chavarino Carmona, Leyes de Burgos (aÇo 1512) El descubrimiento de los derechos humanos en la conquista de Am8rica, Burgos 1991; J. Höffner, La 8tica colonial espaÇola del siglo de Oro. Cristianismo y dignidad humana, Madrid 1957; J. Belda Plans, La Escuela de Salamanca y la renovacijn de la teolog&a en el siglo XVI, Madrid 2000; I. Sánchez de Movellán Torent, La dignidad humana como base de los derechos humanos fundamentales: de los escritos de los tejlogos-juristas del s. XVI a la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unijn Europea, in: La Eficacia de los Derechos fundamentales de la UE. Cuestiones avanzadas, Pamplona 2014, 593–611.

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criticizing the practices of the colonial system of encomienda, and “the cruelty and tyranny they practice[d] among (…) innocent peoples”: You are all in mortal sin! You live in it and you die in it! Why? Because of the cruelty and tyranny you use with these innocent people. Tell me, with what right, with what justice, do you hold these Indians in such cruel and horrible servitude? On what authority have you waged such detestable wars on these people, in their mild, peaceful lands, where you have consumed such infinitudes of them, wreaking upon them this death and unheard-of havoc? How is it that you hold them so crushed and exhausted, giving them nothing to eat, nor any treatment of their diseases, which you cause them to be infected with through the surfeit of their toils, so that they ‘die on you’ […] – you mean, you kill them – mining gold for you day after day? And what care do you take that anyone catechize them, so that they may come to know their God and Creator, be baptized, hear Mass, observe Sundays and holy Days? Are they not human beings? Have they no rational souls? Are you not obligated to love them as you love yourselves? Do you not understand this? Do you not grasp this? How is it that you sleep so soundly, so lethargically? Know for a certainty that in the state in which you are you can no more be saved than the Moors or Turks who have not, nor wish to have, the faith of Jesus Christ13.

Montesinos did not use the expression “dignity” in his sermon, but it is undeniable that the notion of human dignity was at the core of Montesinos’ message, just as it was present in the thoughts of the second Spanish Scholastics, regardless of whether the expression (human) “dignity” appears explicitly in their works. This is not to claim that no 16th-century author used that expression: it can be found in some texts, but not with the assiduity that it appears in sources of the 17th and 18th centuries. However, it is clear that the notion and understanding of “dignity” were indeed present in the 16th century. Two examples include the defense of the Indians by Francisco de Vitoria – as well as Fray Bartolom8 de las Casas, as will be seen – constituted a defense of the natural human dignity14, with all its consequences. Let us compare below the doctrines of these two authors.

13 See the text in Bartolom8 de las Casas, Witness: Writing of Bartolome de Las Casas, ed. by G. Sanderlin, Maryknoll 1993, 66–67; available also at https://walktheway.wordpress.com/ tag/antonio-de-montesinos/. 14 On this matter, see A. Savignano, Di#logo intercultural y derechos humanos. El debate entre Sepffllveda, Vitoria y Las Casas, in: J. Cruz Cruz (ed.), Razjn pr#ctica y Derecho. Cuestiones filosjfico-jur&dicas en el Siglo de Oro espaÇol, Pamplona 2011, 99–115; see also L. Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indian. A Study of Race Prejudice in the Modern World, Bloomington/London 1970; J. Brufau Prats, Juan Gin8s de Sepffllvera y su controversia con Bartolom8 de las Casas, in: M. Fartos Martínez (ed.), La filosof&a espaÇola en Castilla y Lejn: de los or&genes al Siglo de Oro, t. 1, Valladolid 1997, 207–217.

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Francisco de Vitoria

Francisco de Vitoria wondered if the Native Americans were owners of their property, both in the public and in the private sphere15. This question led him to the notion of human dignity16, as will be seen. Maintaining that the human dignity of the Native Americans came from nature, and not from grace was a notable advance in the development of the expression “dignity of human nature” that authors would use in the 17th and 18th centuries. Indeed, although Thomas Aquinas drew the distinction between nature and grace17, it was “merit of Vitoria having seen in its own time its political and legal implications”18. In this line, it has been rightly affirmed that “although the bases flowed from the previous doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, [Vitoria] knew how to apply them to the field of practical theology and law, giving legal form to

15 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de Indis, ed. by L. Pereña/J. M. Pérez Prendes, Madrid 1967, 17; on this work, see N. Brieskorn & G. Stiening (ed.): Francisco de Vitorias “De Indis” in interdisziplinärer Perspektive (= Politische Philosophie und Rechtsphilosophie des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit. Reihe II, Band 3, Frommann-Holzboog. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2011. 16 On this matter, see J.B. Scott, The Spanish origin of international law. Francisco de Vitoria and his law of nations, Oxford 1934; F. Puig Peña, doctoral thesis titled “La influencia de Francisco de Vitoria en la obra de Hugo Grocio (muerto en 1645), los principios del Derecho Internacional a la luz de la EspaÇa del siglo XVI”, 1934; R. Hernández Martín, Francisco de Vitoria y su “releccijn sobre los indios”. Los derechos de los hombres y los pueblos, Madrid 1998; J. Goti Ordeñana, Del Tratado de Tordesillas a la doctrina de los Derechos Fundamentales en Francisco de Vitoria, Valladolid 1999. 17 Thomas Aquinas, In III sententiarum, d. 29, q. 1, a. 7: “Grace does not change nature, but it fully realizes it”; Vitoria took from Thomas Aquinas some ideas in applying the Indians the following three principles: “1) Each man, as imago Dei, has a personal dignity and therefore is subject to fundamental rights irrespective of whether or not he shares the Christian faith, to which he is free to adhere, as he is also free for the election of political government; 2) The forms of power and dominion were introduced with the human – or positive – law, which is not nullified by divine law; 3) The Church has no power over unfaithful peoples who are not subject to de iure et de facto, or who do not occupy lands of Christian kings. That is why she cannot force them to choose or change the political regime. Which does not exclude an indirect intervention of the Church herself, appealing to her spiritual purposes” (Savignano, note 14, 107); translations of Spanish texts are mine; see also Summa Theologica I–II, q. 93, a.3: “Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence” (for the texts of Summa Theologica, by Thomas of Aquinas, I use an English version, available at https://www. ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa). 18 H.G. Justenhoven, Las ra&ces teoljgicas del Derecho internacional segffln Francisco de Vitoria, in: J. Cruz Cruz (ed.), Cuestiones filosjfico-jur&dicas (note 14) 87–98, particularly 89; see also U. Matz, Vitoria, in: Klassiker des politischen Denkens, I, München 1968, 277.

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the principles of the evangelical message: equality, universal fraternity of men and their dignity as free people”19.

The Thomistic distinction between nature and grace led Vitoria to defend that the nature of the “Indians” could also be “fully realized by the grace of God: the dignity and the value of the nature of the Indian are supported by the disposition of that nature in each human being, a disposition that can be fully fulfilled by the grace of God. In other words, the fact that Indians can convert to Christianity shows that God has given them a nature that is open to divine grace. The Indians, then, must have the same created nature as the Europeans, since they are endowed with sufficient reason to understand the meaning of the gospel. The foundation of human dignity and the rights of the Indians lies in the fact that they have a nature that is obviously endowed with a sufficient reason to understand the gospel, and therefore they are images of God”20.

That Vitoria upheld the crucial distinction between nature and grace does not mean that he situated human dignity away from God, especially when man enjoyed dignity as being imago Dei. In his opinion, “[f]or his condition of being rational and free, [man] is not a simple vestige of his Creator, but is his image. Being imago Dei involves, by its elevation to the supernatural order, the divine filiation reached by the redeeming work of Christ”21.

Vitoria’s development of the political and legal implications of the distinction between grace and nature had important consequences. It has been affirmed – and rightly so – “[t]hat conception leads him [Vitoria] to establish a far-reaching principle: that the rights he enunciates do not depend on or belong to a religion, a culture, or a determined people, but they have their foundation in the same human nature – rational – and, therefore, [the rights] can be established as universal criteria for all men and peoples. It is a human being who distinguishes the natural and supernatural spheres, on the principle that grace does not destroy nature, but only perfects it”22.

19 C.B. Mora Hernández, Los derechos humanos en Francisco de Vitoria, En-claves del pensamiento, Vol. 7, n. 14, 2013, 35–62, particularly 37; see also L. Pereña, La idea de justicia en la conquista de Am8rica, Madrid 1992, 106–109, pointing out that Vitoria, according to the Thomistic doctrine, maintained that reason leads to the knowledge of the truth and to the virtuous life in society – accepting that these are “natural inclinations”. 20 Mora Hernández (note 19) 90; see also H.G. Justenhoven, Francisco de Vitoria zu Krieg und Frieden, Köln 1991, 60f; J. Goti Ordeñana, Del Tratado de Tordesillas a la doctrina de los derechos fundamentales en Francisco de Vitoria, Valladolid 1999. 21 De Vitoria (note 15) 18; according to Mora Hernández (note 19) 38, Vitoria “lays the foundation of the dignity of man, and this because it is the image of God by its rational powers”. 22 Mora Hernández (note 19) 37–38.

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Human nature is characterized, according to Vitoria’s doctrine, by three notes or features: rationality, language and sociability. Indeed, for Vitoria “rationality is the radical constituent; but the reason in the case of man, at least is needed by another characteristic equally constitutive, although derived from the reason or demanded by it: language, and that through the word, implies and demands a third reality, equally constitutive: sociability. Then, rationality, being the specific, what really constitutes the human being, of each man, indivisibly brings together, in a compact braid of unity, the word and sociability. Hence, for Vitoria, if the Indians are men, it cannot be said that they lack rationality, or consequently, lack of reason; reason that will be manifested by the language and by the social organization in which they live; rationality that will show that they are partakers of the same human nature as the Spaniards, endowed, consequently, with the same rights and prerogatives that from such a nature derive”23.

If the Indian was characterized – like every human being – by rationality, language and sociability, he should enjoy freedom. Indeed, “it is he who freely decides in his life, is a created freedom and, therefore, limited and dependent; but true freedom”24. In addition, Vitoria argued that since possession and dominion are founded on natural law, they could not be destroyed for theological matters or reasons. If the “Indians” had reason – as it is the case – they could claim the same natural rights of any Christian. These natural rights gave them the right to be possessors of their property before the arrival of the Spaniards, “both in the private and in the public sphere”25. God, by creating humans in his image and likeness, put man at the center of Creation as a responsible subject of law by its rational nature, as well as the holder of rights as a rational being, regardless of faith and culture26. That is why Vitoria departed “from the moral and faith theses, to reason from natural law, because man remains the image of God even though he ignores it and even mocks it”27. For Vitoria, the fact that the “Indians” had not had the opportunity to know the Christian faith should not entail the deprivation of rights that correspond to every human being according to the natural order28. It has been rightly affirmed that, “with this formulation [,] [Vitoria] conceptualizes the dignity of the human being – rationality, language and friendly sociability, free will – as a source of rights, charac23 M. Ocaña García, El hombre y sus derechos en Francisco de Vitoria, Madrid 1996, 78–79, in Mora Hernández (note 19) 38, note 3. 24 De Vitoria (note 15) 19, in Mora Hernández (note 19) 38, note 4. 25 De Vitoria (note 15) 14–31; see also Mora Hernández (note 19) 38, note 6f. 26 De Vitoria (note 15) 14–31. 27 Mora Hernández (note 19) 39. 28 De Vitoria (note 15) Relectio de Indis, 31.

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terized as innate and personal and, at the same time, establishes the principles of freedom and equality. Therefore, it can be considered that has left described and defined human rights that are inherent in human nature, but it must be added that has qualified these rights with the notes of: inalienability, inviolability, equality and universality”29.

Vitoria maintained that “the duty to evangelize carried with it respect for the freedom of adherence to the faith; since the act of faith, to be such, must be essentially free”30. On the other hand, that natural dignity was not compatible with slavery. In this sense, in defending the dignity of the Native American people, he distinguished between natural slavery and civil or legal slavery, affirming – contrary to Aristotle’s opinion – that no one could be a slave by nature. He also never permitted legal slavery, even for those “Indians” who, for lack of education, may have seemed – as Vitoria pointed out – “stupid or idiot”31.

2.2.

Fray Bartolomé de las Casas

Bartolom8 de las Casas also defended the natural dignity of the Native Americans32. He rejected “with forcefulness the use of irrationality and coercion so that the other inserts himself into a community of communication, in which progress is made through the rational method and the dialogue, from the basic presupposition of recognition of equal dignity and equal rights”33.

29 Mora Hernández (note 19) 44. 30 Savignano (note 14) 105–106; and adds: “The defense of the rights of the Indians seems evident when it puts the question of the principle, in the three fundamental chapters (in Vitoria’s Relectio de indis (note 15)): those that refer to the recognition of the ’human dignity’ of the Indians, to the right of those peoples to the defense of their sovereignty (dominium), and to the right of the world to collaborate constructively in solidarity among peoples”. 31 Savignano (note 14) 108–109; see de Vitoria (note 15) 30–31. 32 A. Lobato, Dignidad del hombre y derechos humanos en Fray Bartolom8 de Las Casas y en la doctrina social de la Iglesia, Communio: revista semestral publicada por los Dominicos de la provincia de Andaluc&a, Vol. 18, n. 1, 1985, 59–81; A. ]vila Martínez, El iusnaturalismo de Bartolom8 de Las Casasuna defensa a la dignidad individual del ind&gena, Magistro, Vol. 6, n. 11, 2012, 103–113. 33 Savignano (note 14) 113, citing the work by Bartolom8 de Las Casas, Del fflnico modo de atraer a todos los pueblos a la verdadera religijn, 1536 M8xico 1975, 343; on this matter, see L. Hanke, La Humanidad es Una. Estudio acerca de la querella que sobre la capacidad intelectual y religiosa de los ind&genas americanos sostuvieron en 1550 Bartolom8 de las Casas y Juan Gin8s de Sepffllveda (Translation from English by J. Avendaño-Inestrilla and M. Sepúlveda de Baranda), M8xico 1985.

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Indeed, Las Casas made a defense of human freedom and dignity that prevented the forced conversion of indigenous people: “But the rational creature has a natural aptitude to be led, directed or attracted in a soft, sweet, delicate and gentle way, by virtue of his free will, so that he voluntarily hears, voluntarily obeys and voluntarily lends his adhesion and his gift to what is heard. Then the way of moving, directing, attracting or orienting the rational creature to good, to truth, to virtue, to justice, to pure faith and to true religion, must be a way that is in accordance with the mode, the nature and condition of the rational creature itself, that is, a sweet mode, soft and gentle, so that from its own motive, with his free will and natural disposition and faculty, listen to everything that is proposed and notified about faith, true religion, truth, virtue and other things that refer to faith and religion.”34

The idea that evangelization should be reasoned and persuasive, while respecting the freedom and free will of others appears constantly in Las Casas’ writings: “… it is unique, only and the same, the way that Divine Providence established to communicate its truth and to attract and invite men to the true religion at all times; namely, a persuasive mode by reason of understanding, and mildly attractive in relation to the will.”35

In his Apolog8tica historia sumaria (1539), Las Casas argued that natural rights and human rights derive from a nature “of all individuals marked by equal dignity. Each man is defined as a rational animal that has intelligence, will and freedom [libre albedr&o]”36. That equal dignity led him – like Francisco de Vitoria – to reject slavery37. After insisting that what defines man is his rationality38, “that all have understanding and their will and free will as they are formed in the image and 34 Bartolom8 de las Casas, Del fflnico modo de atraer a todos los pueblos a la verdadera religijn, 1536 (I use the Mexican edition, Fondo de Cultura Econjmica 1942, § II, 15). 35 Bartolom8 de las Casas (note 34) § XIII, 339; on this matter, see particularly §§ XV–XVI, 373–393; see also 17–23, 35, 39.45, 51, 63, 79–81, 87–89, 111–115, 203, 211, 309, 327, 335, 343, 349, 357–359, 363, 367); see also P. Castañeda, Las doctrinas sobre la coaccijn y el “idearium” de Las Casas, in: Fray Bartolom8 de Las Casas, Obras Completas, 2. De unico vocationis modo, Madrid 1990, XVII–XLII. 36 Savignano (note 14) 114, citing in note 58 the work by Bartolom8 de las Casas, Apolog8tica historia sumaria, 1539, edited by E. O’Gorman, M8xico 1967, t. III, c. 48. 37 Savignano (note 14) 114, note 60, citing the work by Bartolom8 de las Casas, Algunos principios que deben servir de punto de partida en la controversia destinada a poner de manifiesto y defender la justicia de los indios, in: Tratados, Mexico 1965, 1249–1250, showing that all men, equal by nature, are free, and thus rejecting slavery ; see also Bartolom8 de las Casas, Tratado comprobatorio del imperio soberano, 1522, in: Tratados, M8xico 1965, t. II, 1069–1071. 38 On this matter, see M. Beuchot, Bartolom8 de las Casas, el humanismo ind&gena y los derechos humanos, Anuario Mexicano de Historia del Derecho 6 (1994) 37–48, particularly 45–47.

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likeness of God”39, “that every lineage of men is one, and all men (…) are similar and nobody is born taught”40, “that all the nations of the world have understanding and will, and these two faculties in man turns out to be free will”41, Las Casas went even beyond that. He did not limit himself to defending the natural dignity of all human beings, but even used the expression “dignity”, meaning: “the rational creatures, as they are formed in the image and likeness of God, their dignity and excellence over the other creatures …”.42

3.

Concluding remark

It has been shown that the notion of human dignity was present in the early 16thcentury Spanish Scholasticism in the context of the colonization of America, particularly in the writings of Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolom8 de las Casas. Both made a clear defense of natural human dignity – or “inherent” dignity – as derived from human nature itself, using the expression “dignity” although less frequently than 17th- and 18th-century authors43. A more exhaustive analysis – including other sources and authors (like Domingo de Soto, Mart&n de Azpilcueta, Francisco Su#rez, among others) and papal documents44 – could be done, but this undertaking would go beyond the limits of the present study in honor of my dear colleague and friend Jan Hallebeek. 39 40 41 42 43 44

Bartolom8 de las Casas (note 36) book III, ch. 48, 257–258. Bartolom8 de las Casas (note 36) 258. Bartolom8 de las Casas (note 36) 258. Bartolom8 de las Casas (note 36) 259; emphasis is mine. A. Masferrer (note 3 & 4). In 1537 Paul III, for example, issued three documents on the condition of native Indians: the bulls Sublimus Dei (also called Unigenitus and Veritas ipsa); Altituda divini consolii; and Pastorale officium, the brief for the execution of Sublimus Dei; the Sublimus Dei (March 29, 1537), one of the most important papal document – addressed to all Christians – concerning the native Indians, stated as follows: “Desiring to provide ample remedy for these evils, We define and declare by these Our letters, or by any translation thereof signed by any notary public and sealed with the seal of any ecclesiastical dignitary, to which the same credit shall be given as to the originals, that, notwithstanding whatever may have been or may be said to the contrary, the said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property ; nor should they be in any way enslaved; should the contrary happen, it shall be null and have no effect”. In addition to these papal documents, others – concerning the treatment of native Indians and slavery – were issued from 1435 onwards: Eugenius IV “Sicut Dudum” (1435), ordering the liberation of slaves in the Canarian Insel; in 1458 and 1462 Pius II declared slavery to be “a great crime” (“Magnum scelus”); Gregory XIV: “Cum Sicuti” (1591); Urban VIII: “Commissum Nobis” (1639); Benedict XIV (1741); etc. on this matter, see J. Andrés-Gallego/J.M. García, La Iglesia y la esclavitud de los negros, Pamplona 2002.

Ton Meijers

Liturgischer Frauengesang? Eine historische Analyse aus kirchenrechtlicher Sicht

Kirchenmusik gehört zur Kirche. Christliche Kirchen pflegen ihre Kirchenmusik und besonders ihren Kirchengesang. Der liturgische Gesang gehört zum eigenen Kulturerbe der christlichen Kirche. Das Neue Testament zeigt schon, dass die frühchristliche Gemeinde zur Ehre Gottes und Christus sang. Im Epheserbrief werden die Christen aufgerufen im geistlichen Gemüt Psalmen, Hymnen und Lieder zu singen. Der Kolosserbrief preist den Dankgesang zum Lobe Gottes (Eph. 5,19; Kol. 3,16). Zurückdenkend an die geistlichen Gesänge, die er in der Kirche von Milan mit Rührung, Trost und Ermunterung hörte, begutachtet der bezüglich des Genusses einigermaßen wankelmütige Kirchenvater Augustinus den religiösen Gesang der Gemeinde, weil er die Seele erhebt und die Frömmigkeit fördert1. Auch der Kirchenlehrer Thomas von Aquin billigt den Kirchengesang, d. h. den Gesang zum Lobe Gottes. In Bezug auf Augustinus betont er, dass der kirchliche Lobgesang sowohl die Sänger als auch ihre Zuhörer ermutigt2. Weil sich der mit dieser Festschrift geehrte Jan Hallebeek, wie auch der Autor dieses Beitrages, ehrenamtlich um die Kirchenmusik kümmert und beide berufsmäßig Kirchenrechtler sind, stehen in diesem Beitrag das Kirchenrecht und der Kirchengesang zentral, auch wenn sich diese Darlegungen nicht auf das altkatholische, sondern auf das römisch-katholische kanonisches Recht bezieht. Der heutige Kodex enthält keine Bestimmungen bezüglich der Kirchenmusik. Das heißt aber nicht, dass es keine rechtlichen Bestimmungen dazu gäbe. Im Jahr 1967 veröffentlichte die Ritenkongregation des Apostolischen Stuhls die Instruktion Musicam sacram. Die Instruktion betont die große liturgische Bedeutung des Kirchenchors. Dem Kirchenchor kommt es zu, die ihm zugeteilten liturgischen Texten zu singen und die aktive Beteiligung der Gläubigen in der Liturgie zu unterstützen. Was die Chorsänger angeht, bestimmt die Instruktion, dass der Chor ent1 Augustinus, Confessiones, IX, 6, 14–15; X, 33, 49–50. 2 Th. von Aquin, Summa Theologiae, II, II, 91, 1–2.

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weder aus Männern und Knaben, ausschließlich aus Männern oder Knaben, oder aus Männern und Frauen besteht3. Aus dieser Reihenfolge ergibt sich, dass Männerstimmen bevorzugt werden. Nur erforderlichenfalls kann der Kirchenchor ausschließlich aus Frauen bestehen. Außerdem wird für den Fall, dass Frauen im Kirchenchor singen, bestimmt, dass der Chor außerhalb des Priesterchors aufgestellt wird4. Es stellt sich die Frage, was der Hintergrund dieser Reglung bezüglich des liturgischen Frauengesangs ist. Für uns, so nehme ich an, sind diese Einzelbestimmungen schwierig zu verstehen. Auch was den Gesang angeht, sind ja nach unserer Einsicht Männer und Frauen gleich. In diesem Beitrag wird die diesbezügliche kirchliche Gesetzgebung aus historischer Sicht analysiert und bewertet. Dabei wird nur die kanonische Gesetzgebung untersucht und in der Regel nicht die Frage, ob und wie die Reglung befolgt wurde und wird5.

1.

Das Motu proprio von Pius X (1903)

Die erste vollständige kanonische Gesetzgebung zur Kirchenmusik wurde 1903 erlassen. Am 22. November 1903, also am Festtag der Patronin der Kirchenmusik S. Caecila, veröffentlichte Papst Pius X das Motu proprio Tre le sollicitudene. Das Motu proprio charakterisiert die Reglung als allgemeinen Rahmen (quadro generale) und als Codice giuridico della musica sancta6. Die Gesetzgebung bezieht sich auf die Gesamtkirche7. Das Hauptanliegen des Motu proprio ist die Sakralität der Kirchenmusik zu schützen. Dazu enthält dieses Dokument neben einer doktrinären Einleitung eine Instruktion mit näheren Bestimmungen. Die Instruktion hebt den sakralen und liturgischen Charakter der Kirchenmusik hervor. Die Kirchenmusik wird als integrierender Teil (parte integrante) der Liturgie typisiert8. Mit Kirchengesang ist also liturgischer Gesang gemeint. Dieser Gesang bezieht auf strikt liturgische Texte, die nicht gesprochen, sondern monoton oder polyphon gesungen werden9. Besonders der gregorianische Choral und die Polyphonie des 16. Jahrhunderts sind zur Wahrung der Sakralität 3 Instruktion Musicam sacram, n. 19, AAS 59 (1967) 306; Leges Ecclesiae III, n. 3541, 5114. 4 Instruktion Musicam sacram, n. 22–23, AAS 59 (1967) 307; Leges Ecclesiae III, n. 3541, 5115. 5 Was die heutige niederländische kirchliche Praxis angeht, ist die Reglung überholt, siehe A.H. Eijsink/H. van de Kerk: De Parochie, Deel I, Leuven 1995, 111. 6 Motu proprio Tra le sollicitudine, ASS 36 (1904) 331, 339; CIC-Fontes/1917 III, n. 654, 609. Motu proprio heißt „aus eigenem Antrieb“. 7 Ritenkongregation Urbis et Orbis (1904), CIC-Fontes/1917 VIII, n. 6328. Der Originaltext ist auf Italienisch. Die lateinische Ausgabe bezieht sich auf eine Übersetzung. 8 Motu proprio Tra le sollicitudine, art, 1, ASS 36 (1904) 332, CIC-Fontes/1917, III, n. 654, 610. 9 Es handelt sich also nicht um Gesang, der parallel oder an Stelle des liturgischen Textes gesungen wird.

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der Liturgie geeignet. Moderner liturgischer Kirchengesang wird aber nicht ausgeschlossen. Dem Kirchenchor kommt der ihm zugeteilte liturgische Gesang vor allem während der Messe zu. Der liturgische Gesang war ursprünglich Klerikern vorbehalten10. Demnach typisiert die Instruktion den liturgischen Chor als Levitenchor, d. h. Chor der Geistlichen oder Kleriker. Streng genommen nimmt also ein Kirchenchor, der keine Kleriker umfasst, die Stelle des liturgischen Klerikerchors ein. Was den liturgischen Gesang der Frauen anbetrifft, bestimmt die Instruktion prinzipiell, dass, weil sie unfähig sind eine liturgische Funktion zu übernehmen, sie nicht zum liturgischen Chor zugelassen werden können. Der Kirchenchor ist also ein liturgischer Männerchor. Für die Besetzung der hohen Stimmen soll man Knaben im Chor aufnehmen11. Ein anderes Anliegen der päpstlichen Instruktion betrifft die Wiedereinführung der aktiven Beteiligung der Gläubigen (participatio actuosa) an der Liturgie. Die Teilnahme und der liturgische Volkgesang waren in der Zeit vor und nach dem Trienter Konzil fast völlig zurückgedrängt und verschwunden. Zur Wiedereinführung einer alten kirchlichen Tradition fordert die Instruktion die Gläubigen dazu auf, die ihnen zugeteilten liturgischen Texten zu singen12. Dies betrifft insbesondere den alternierenden gregorianischen Choral des Ordinariums der Messe13. Die Grundnorm ist also die Unfähigkeit der Frauen zum liturgischen Gesang, weil ihnen keine liturgische Funktion zukommt. Der Hintergrund dieser Unfähigkeit und demnach des liturgischen Sangverbots ist, dass liturgische Funktionen strikt Männern vorbehalten sind, also dem zelebrierenden Priester, seinen Assistenten und Ministranten und dazu auch dem liturgischen Chor, die alle auf dem Priesterchor die Liturgie feiern. Das ist die eine Seite. Die andere Seite ist der dringliche Wunsch, dass die Gläubigen, also sowohl Männer als auch Frauen, die ihnen zugeteilten Texte der Messe (mit)singen. Damit wurde die Vorschrift, dass der liturgische Gesang nur Männern vorbehalten sei, einigermaßen gemildert. Dass das Sangverbot keine Neuerung war, sondern die damalige Norm bestätigt, zeigt das Utrechter Provinzialkonzil vom Jahre 1865. Auf feierliche Weise bestimmt das Konzil Frauen vom liturgischen Gesang ferne zu halten. Dieses Verbot stützt sich nach Ansicht des Konzils nicht nur auf die liturgischen Ge10 P. Bayart, Chantres, DDC III (1942) 512–513. 11 Motu proprio Tra le sollicitudine, art. 12–13, ASS 36 (1904) 336, CIC-Fontes/1917 III, n. 654, 612–613. 12 Motu proprio Tra le sollicitudine, art. 3, ASS 36 (1904) 332–333, CIC-Fontes/1917, III, n. 654, 611. 13 Das Ordinarium umfasst die festen Gesänge der Messe (Kyrie, Gloria, Credo, Sanctus, Agnus Dei).

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setze, sondern ebenfalls auf die Hoheit der Liturgie und des kirchlichen Gesangs. Trotz dieses prinzipiellen Verbots wird es Frauen erlaubt, in der Jungfrau Gottes gewidmeten Kirchen und Kapellen zu singen14. Auf die strikte Grundnorm der päpstlichen Instruktion folgte bald eine Ausnahme. Im Jahre 1908 wendete sich ein mexikanischer Bischof zur Ritenkongregation. Sich beziehend auf die erwünschte aktive Teilnahme der Gläubigen kam die Frage auf, ob es erlaubt sei, dass ein Frauen- oder Mädchenchor in den Kirchenbänken getrennt von Männern sitzend das Ordinarium der Messe vorsingen könnte. Die Ritenkongregation begutachtet diese Praxis, sei es, dass ein Männer- oder Knabenchor bevorzugt wird, oder der Bischof es genehmigt und Unordnung vermieden wird. Es ist gestattet, wenn tatsächlich kein Männerund Knabenchor anwesend ist15. Man denke dabei an Messfeiern während der Woche16. Eine Anfrage aus den Vereinigten Staaten bezüglich des liturgischen Gesangs während der feierlichen Messfeier durch ein fern vom Altar stehend gemischtes Frauen- und Männerchor wurde 1908 abgelehnt17. Die Forderung der aktiven Teilnahme der Gläubigen führt also zu einer weiteren Lockerung des strengen Verbots, sei es, dass die Frauen außerhalb des Priesterchors stehen. In diesem Fall, so könnte man sagen, nimmt ein Frauenchor die Stelle des liturgischen Männerchors ein, aber nur für das Ordinarium und nicht das Proprium der Messe18. Der liturgische Gesang eines gemischten Männer- und Frauenchores während der feierlichen Messe wurde abgelehnt. Im Jahren 1928, 25 Jahre nach dem Motu proprio, promulgiert Papst Pius XI die Apostolische Konstitution Divini cultus, die sich um die nähere Durchführung des Motu proprio bemüht. Die Frage bezüglich des liturgischen Frauengesangs lässt die Konstitution unberührt. Die Errichtung von Knabenchören an Kathedral- und Pfarreikirchen wird aber nachdrücklich empfohlen19. Die erwünschte Errichtung von Knabenchören ist nachteilig für die Position der Frauenchöre in der Kirche. Wie oben erwähnt, ist der liturgische Gesang der Frauenchöre nur gestattet, wenn ein Männer- oder Knabenchor fehlt. Die Ein14 Acta et Decreta Synodi Provincialis Ultrajectensis, Gestel Micha[lis 1865, 220–221. – Der feierliche Charakter des Entschlusses zeigt sich aus der verwendeten Formel decernimus itaque et mandamus („wir entscheiden und befehlen“). 15 Ritenkongregation, Angelopolitana, ASS 41 (1908) 114–116. Das Frauen und Männer in der Kirche geschieden sind, war derzeit der Regel (siehe c. 1262 § 1 CIC 1917). 16 A.C.M. Schaepman, Vrouwenzang bij godsdienst-oefening, Nederlandsche Katholieke Stemmen 28 (1928) 304–210. 17 Ritenkongregation, Neo-Eboracen, AAS 1 (1909) 175. 18 Das Proprium betrifft die variable Gesänge der Messe (Introitus, Graduale, Tractus, Alleluia, Offertorium, Communio). 19 Constitutio Apostolica Divini cultus, n. VI, AAS 21 (1929) 38–39, Leges Ecclesiae I, n. 868, 978.

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richtung von Knabenchören beschränkt also den Raum für den liturgischen Gesang der Frauen. Die weitere und wirksame Durchführung der aktiven Teilnahme der Gläubigen wird aber verordnet, damit die Gläubigen, also Männer und Frauen, nicht als Außenstehende, leere Zuhörer oder nur murmelnd während der Liturgie anwesend sind20.

2.

Der Kodex 1917

Im Jahr 1917 promulgiert Papst Benedikt XV den Codex Iuris Canonici. Nur einige Bestimmungen dieser Kodifizierung der kirchlichen Gesetzgebung verweisen auf die Kirchenmusik21. Was die Kirchenmusik anbetrifft, verweist der Kodex auf die diesbezügliche Gesetzgebung, also vor allem auf das Motu proprio von Papst Pius X und die Apostolische Konstitution von Papst Pius XI22. Zur Durchführung der Kodex-Bestimmungen in der niederländischen Kirchenprovinz fand 1924 ein Utrechter Provinzialkonzil statt. Bezüglich des liturgischen Frauengesanges bestätigt das Konzil die strengen Anordnungen des Utrechter Provinzialkonzils aus dem Jahr 186523. Die päpstliche Gesetzgebung aus den Jahren 1903 und 1928 gab offenbar keinen Anlass zur Milderung oder Nuancierung der strengen Norm. Die Kodex-Kommentare folgen der kirchlichen Gesetzgebung. Die Grundnorm, den liturgischen Gesang als liturgischer Funktion Männern vorzubehalten, wird bestätigt. Einige Kirchenrechtler vertreten die Meinung, dass dort, wo eine andere Praxis existiert, diese mit Vorsicht aber ohne Verzögerung zurückgedrängt werden soll24. Die Tatsache, dass die päpstliche Gesetzgebung neulich auf die Errichtung von Knabenchören insistiert, bestätigt den prinzipiellen Vorbehalt25. Die Entscheidung der Ritenkongregation vom Jahr 1908, die ausnahmsweise den liturgischen Frauengesang genehmigt, wird zwar erwähnt, aber als Ausnahme der Regel strikt interpretiert26. Die Tatsachen, dass weibliche Religiöse seit Jahrhunderten den liturgischen Gesang vollziehen und der Kodex ausdrücklich auf den liturgischen Gesang der 20 Constitutio Apostolica Divini cultus, bes. n. IX, AAS 21 (1929) 34–35, 39–40, Leges Ecclesiae I, n. 868, 976, 978. 21 Cc. 1185, 1264, 1365 § 2, 2271 n. 2 CIC 1917. 22 C. 1264 § 1 CIC 1917. 23 Acta et Decreta Concilii Provincialis Ultraiectensis anno 1924 celebrati, S. Micha[lis : 1924, 156, 158. 24 Wernz-Vidal, Ius Canonicum ad Codicem Normam Exactum, Tomus IV, Vol.1, Romae 1934, n. 404, 500; F. Romita, Ius Musicae Liturgicae, Taurini 1936, 220–221. 25 Bayart (Fn. 10) 516. 26 Bayart (Fn. 10) 515–516; Romita (Fn. 24) 221; M. Conte a Coronata, Institutiones Iuris Canonici, Vol II, Taurini 1931, 163.

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weiblichen Religiösen verweist, sind kein Anlass zur näheren Reflexion27. Die Kodex-Bestimmung bezüglich des liturgischen Gesangs weiblicher Religiöse ist in einem Kommentar sogar die Stelle, wo das Verbot des liturgischen Frauengesangs kommentiert wird28. Außerdem, so wird betont, sind gemischte Männer- und Frauenchöre in der Liturgie niemals offiziell genehmigt worden. Diese Chöre können demnach niemals die Funktion des liturgischen Kirchenchors übernehmen29. Wo es Frauenchöre gibt, können sie weiterhin existieren, wenn ihre Funktion nur nicht der des liturgischen Kirchenchors gleicht30. Diese Chöre singen also nicht den liturgischen Text, sondern einen in der Liturgie eingeschobenen Gesang, parallel an der Liturgie, oder einen Gesang an Stelle des liturgischen Textes. Was Frauen wohl zusteht, ist das Mitsingen des den Gläubigen zugeteilten liturgischen Gesangs. Nur erforderlichenfalls kann ein Frauen- oder Mädchenchor die Gläubigen repräsentieren31. Die Frauen singen dann also nicht an Stelle des liturgischen Chors, sondern nach Meinung des Autors, an Stelle der Gläubigen32. Obwohl die päpstliche Gesetzgebung die aktive Teilnahme der Gläubigen an der Liturgie und das Mitsingen des ihnen zugeteilten gregorianischen Chorals als wünschenswert dringend befürwortet, sind diese Wünsche kein Anlass, den liturgischen Frauengesang neu zu erwägen, geschweige denn zu fördern. Zum Schluss bemühen sich die Kirchenrechtler zu betonen, dass, was sich ebenfalls auf den Kirchengesang bezieht, Männer und Frauen während der Liturgie voneinander getrennt werden sollten. Dies dient der Vermeidung moralischer Unordnung33. Diese kurze Darlegung der Kodex-Kommentare zeigt, dass in Bezug auf den liturgischen Frauengesang, zur Wahrung der Grundnorm, dass Frauen keine liturgische Funktion zugeteilt werden kann, die kirchliche Gesetzgebung eng und strikt interpretiert wird. Tatsachen wie die gewünschte aktive Beteiligung der Gläubigen sowie der liturgische Gesang von weiblichen Religiösen und die beschränkte Zulassung von Frauen- und Mädchenchören führen nicht zur näheren Reflexion. Die Norm wird also breit, die Ausnahme aber eng interpretiert.

27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Corpus Iuris Canonici, C. XVIII, q. 2, c. 25; c. 1264 § 2 CIC 1917. H. van Groessen/Cl. van Vlissingen, Het Kerkelijk Recht, Roermond 1958, 725–726. Bayart (Fn. 10) 516. K.G. Fellerer, LThK1 1933, Bd. V, 1016. Bayart (Fn. 10) 516. Siehe Romita (Fn. 24) 218–219. Conte a Coronata (Fn. 26) 163; Romita (Fn. 24) 220–223; Bayart (Fn. 10) 516; gemäß c. 1262 § 1 CIC 1917.

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Vom Kodex 1917 bis zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil

Im Jahr 1947 veröffentlicht Papst Pius XII die Enzyklika Mediator Dei über die Liturgie. Diese Enzyklika äußert sich zwar nicht direkt über den liturgischen Frauensang, lässt dieses Thema aber indirekt nicht unberührt. Unter Bezug auf das volkstümliche Sprichwort: Wer gut singt, betet doppelt (qui bene cantat, bis orat) wird die aktive Teilnahme der Gläubigen am liturgischen Gesang des gregorianischen Chorals hochgeschätzt34. Obwohl der gregorianische Choral und die Polyphonie den Vorzug genießen, wird auch geeignete moderne Kirchenmusik empfohlen. Neu ist die positive Bewertung des traditionellen Kirchenlieds35. Das Kirchenlied hat sich aus und neben dem gregorianischen Choral entwickelt. Die religiösen Texte dieser Lieder sind in der Volkssprache verfasst worden. Die Melodien sind relativ einfach und damit singbar (z. B. Weihnachts- und Osterlieder). Der Volkgesang von Kirchenliedern, sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb der Liturgie, gehörte zur Tradition der Kirche, wurde aber in der Zeit vor und nach dem Trienter Konzil fast nicht mehr praktiziert. Im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert wurde das Kirchenlied als Volksgesang in der katholischen Kirche wiederum eingeführt36. Die Wiedereinführung des Kirchenlieds und des Volksgesangs in der Liturgie führt dazu, den liturgischen Gesang weniger als strikt liturgische Funktion, sondern mehr als Sache der sich aktiv an der Liturgie beteiligenden Gemeinde zu betrachten, was den Raum für den kirchlichen Frauengesang natürlich begünstigt. Am Weihnachtstag 1955 erscheint die Enzyklika Musicae sacrae von Papst Pius XII. Diese Enzyklika beschäftigt sich mit der kirchlichen Doktrin der Kirchenmusik als Kunstform. Sie ist aber auch disziplinarisch. Neben dem gregorianischen Choral, der Polyphonie und dem Kirchenlied fordert die Enzyklika die Kirchenmusik in Missionsgebieten zu pflegen37. In Bezug auf den liturgischen Chor folgt die Enzyklika den früheren Bestimmungen. Wenn aber kein liturgischer Männer- oder Knabenchor vorhanden ist, genehmigt die Enzyklika auch den Einsatz eines gemischten Männer- und Frauen oder Männer- und Mädchenchors. Damit ist der gemischte Männer- und Frauenchor beschränkt als liturgischer Chor akzeptiert worden. Der gemischte Chor soll außerhalb des Priesterchors stehen und Frauen und Mädchen von Männern trennen. Die Be34 Enzyklika Mediator Dei, AAS 39 (1947) 560, 575–577, Leges Ecclesiae II, n. 1963, 2460, 2467. 35 Enzyklika Mediator Dei, AAS 39 (1947) 589–590, Leges Ecclesiae II, n. 1963, 2473. 36 J. Götzen, Kirchenlied, LThK1 (1933) Bd. V, 1008–1014; W. Luger, Kirchenlied, LThK2 (1961) Bd. 6, 231–233; K.G. Fellerer, Volksgesang, LThK1 (1938) Bd. X, 675; ders., Volksgesang, LThK2 (1965) Bd. 10, 851–854; P. Bayart, Chant, DDC III (1942) 503. 37 Enzyklika Musica Sacra, AAS 48 (1956) 13–14, 16–17, 20–22, Leges Ecclesiae II, n. 2541, 3429–3433.

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stimmungen bezüglich des liturgischen Chors berücksichtigen aber nur die feierliche Messfeier38. Zur Durchführung der Enzyklika erließ die Ritenkongregation 1958 die Instruktion De Musica sacra. Bezüglich des liturgischen Chors werden die Bestimmungen der Enzyklika und die frühere Gesetzgebung wiederholt39. Der Einsatz von Männerchören in der Liturgie wird also bevorzugt. Ein Frauen- oder gemischter Männer- und Frauenchor ist nur erlaubt, wenn kein Männerchor anwesend ist. Die liturgische Position der Männerchöre ist damit primär, die der Frauenchöre sekundär. Diese Reglung betrifft aber nur die feierliche Messfeier. Die Instruktion typisiert die feierliche Messfeier (Missa solemnis) als gesungene Messe (Missa cantata) wobei Kleriker dem zelebrierenden Priester assistieren. Die übrigen Messen sind nur gesungene Messen (Missa in cantu) oder gelesene Messen (Missa lecta)40. Während einer nur gesungenen oder gelesenen Messe gibt es also Raum für kirchlichen Gesang von gemischten Männer- und Frauenchören und von Frauen- oder Mädchenchören. Dieser Raum wurde in der Praxis auch genutzt. Da die Bestimmung bezüglich des liturgischen Chors sich auf die feierliche Messfeier beschränkt, entsteht Raum für liturgischen Frauengesang und dazu zur Einfügung von Kirchenliedern und Volksgesang41.

4.

Das Zweite Vatikanische Konzil

Die Konstitution vom Jahre 1963 über die Liturgie Sacrosanctum concilium des Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzils beschäftigt sich nur kurz mit der Kirchenmusik. Was die Kirchenchöre angeht, macht die Konstitution einen großen Schritt. Die Kirchenchöre werden im Kontext der erforderlichen aktiven Teilnahme der Gläubigen in der Liturgie erwähnt. Die Kirchenchöre stehen also nicht mehr aufseiten der die Liturgie zelebrierenden Kleriker, sondern aufseiten der Gläubigen, d. h. aufseiten der die Liturgie feiernden Gemeinde. Dazu werden das Kirchenlied und der Volksgesang als Mittel zur aktiven Teilnahme gefordert42. Die Einführung der Volkssprache in der Liturgie hat dazu geführt, dass das liturgische Kirchenlied die Stelle des gregorianischen Chorals eingenommen hat43. 38 Enzyklika Musica Sacra, AAS 48 (1956) 23. Leges Ecclesiae II, n. 2774, 3433–3434. 39 Instruktion De Musica sacra, nn. 99, 100, 114, AAS 50 (1958) 658–659, 662, Leges Ecclesiae II, n. 2774, 3850–3851. 40 Instruktion De Musica sacra, n. 3, AAS 50 (1958) 633, Leges Ecclesiae II, n. 2774, 3849. 41 Instruktion De Musica sacra, n. 14, AAS 50 (1958) 635, Leges Ecclesiae II, n. 2774, 3850–3851. 42 Konstitution Sacrosanctum concilium, n. 113, 118, AAS 56 (1964) 128–129. 43 W. Aymans, Kontinuität und Entwicklung der kirchlichen Gesetzgebung zum gregorianischen Choral im Lichte des II. Vatikanischen Konzils, AfkKR 151 (1982) 410–423.

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Zur Durchführung der Konzilskonstitution veröffentlichte die Ritenkongregation 1964 die Instruktion Inter oecumenici. Im Anschluss an die Konzilskonstitution wird bestimmt, dass, was den Platz des Chors in der Kirche angeht, deutlich sein soll, dass der Chor einen Teil der feiernden Gemeinde ausmacht, damit die feiernden Gläubigen sich aktiv an der Liturgie beteiligen können44. Der geeignete Platz des Kirchenchors ist also nicht mehr der Priesterchor, sondern ein Raum außerhalb des Priesterchors in der Nähe der Gemeinde. Die Forderung der aktiven Teilnahme hat also dazu geführt, dass der Kirchenchor mehr aufseiten der feiernden Gemeinde als aufseiten der zelebrierende Kleriker steht. Der Kirchenchor hat damit seine liturgische Funktion nicht verloren. Die liturgische Funktion wird aber vor allem aus der aktiv feiernden Gemeinde heraus verstanden.

5.

Der Kodex 1983

Bevor zur Instruktion Musicam sacram vom Jahre 1967 zurückgekehrt wird, soll noch kurz auf den Kodex vom Jahre 1983 hingewiesen werden. Wie oben schon erwähnt, kennt der Kodex keine Einzelbestimmungen bezüglich der Kirchenmusik. Der Kodex regelt aber die mögliche Zuteilung liturgischer Funktionen an Frauen, die in der Liturgie die Funktion von Lektor, Kommentator und Kantor erfüllen können. Dazu kann ihnen die Funktion des Akolythen zugeteilt werden45. Das bedeutet erstens, dass Frauen fähig sind bestimmte liturgische Funktionen zu übernehmen, und zweitens, dass sie diese Funktion im Priesterchor erfüllen. Liturgische Funktionen und der Priesterchor sind demnach nicht mehr Männern vorbehalten.

6.

Die Instruktion Musicam sacram 1967

Die Fragen dieses Beitrags beziehen sich auf die 1967 erlassene Instruktion Musicam sacram der Ritenkongregation. Anhand der historischen Analyse der kirchlichen Gesetzgebung können die Fragen beantwortet und bewertet werden. Dass ein Kirchenchor nur erforderlichenfalls aus Frauen bestehen kann, lässt sich als ein Relikt der alten Gesetzgebung betrachten, die den Männergesang vor dem Frauengesang bevorzugt. Die Forderung der aktiven liturgischen Beteiligung der Gemeinde hat nicht nur dazu geführt, dass Frauen sich singend an der 44 Instruktion Inter oecumenici, n. 97, AAS 56 (1964) 899. 45 C. 230 § 2 CIC 1983; PCLT, Responsio ad propositum dubio, AAS 86 (1994) 541–542.

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Liturgie beteiligen, sondern auch dazu, dass der Kirchenchor aus der feiernden Gemeinde heraus zu verstehen ist. Der Kirchenchor ist damit liturgisch eine Gestalt der feiernden Gemeinde, die Männer und Frauen umfasst. Ein Männerchor ist demnach nicht anders als ein Frauenchor einzuschätzen. Auch wenn man den liturgischen Gesang als liturgische Funktion betrachtet, dann kommt den Frauen keine sekundäre oder Ausnahmestellung zu, weil ihnen die liturgische Funktion des Kantors anvertraut werden kenn. Das „erforderlichenfalls“ des Frauenchors ist also als überholt zu betrachten. Gleiches gilt der Bestimmung, dass, falls Frauen im Kirchenchor singen, der Chor außerhalb des Priesterchors aufgestellt werden soll. Auch diese Bestimmung ist überholt, weil der Platz des Kirchenchors nicht in der Nähe der zelebrierenden Kleriker, sondern in der Nähe der feiernden Gemeinde ist. Der geeignete Platz des Kirchenchors ist also nicht der Priesterchor, sondern ein Raum außerhalb des Priesterchors. Da Frauen jedoch bestimmte liturgische Funktionen auf dem Priesterchor erfüllen können, lässt sich außerdem nicht verstehen, warum ein Frauenchor nicht auf dem Priesterchor aufgestellt werden könne, etwa aus disziplinären Gründen (Vermeidung von Unordnung), die aber ebenfalls für die Männerchöre gelten. Die Beschränkungen des liturgischen Frauengesangs in der katholischen Kirche sind demnach aus historischer Sicht wohl zu verstehen, aber auch aus historischer Sicht als überholt zu betrachten.

Janwillem Oosterhuis

A staunch Protestant on an irenic Remonstrant: Matthaeus’s references to Grotius in De criminibus

1.

Introduction

Antonius Matthaeus II (1601–1654), the first professor of law at Utrecht University, is most famous for his extraordinary De criminibus (1644)1. Hewett and Hallebeek have characterized this Matthaeus as a “staunch but balanced Protestant”2 and others made similar characterizations3. Matthaeus was indeed born into a staunchly Reformed family : his father, Antonius Matthaeus I and also a professor of law, relocated several times, from Herborn to Marburg and ultimately to Groningen also – and importantly – for confessional reasons: in 1625 the Marburg University became Lutheran4. After Matthaeus II moved to Utrecht, he became a practicing member of the Reformed Buerkerk, where he thrice served as an elder. In this time, he moreover agitated against the practice of high interests by Lombards5. His reputation of a balanced Protestant, he earned on various occasions, 1 For translation and references the reprint of the fifth 1761 Antwerp edition is used, A. Matthaeus, De Criminibus, introduction and English translation by M.L. Hewett and B.C. Stoop, vols. I–IV, Cape Town 1987–1996. Book, title, chapter and section references apply to any edition; the page references to the 1761 edition unless indicated otherwise. I would like to thank Wim Decock for his critical comments. 2 M. Hewett/J. Hallebeek, The Prelate, the Praetor and the Professor : Antonius Matthaeus II and the Crimen Laesae Majestatis, Utrecht 1639–1640, The Legal History Review 66 (1998) 115–150, here 122. 3 F. Schlüter, Antonius Matthaeus II. aus Herborn, der Kriminalist des 17. Jahrhunderts, der Rechtslehrer Utrechts, Breslau 1929, 2; M. van de Vrugt, Aengaende Criminele Saken, Deventer 1982, 27 and 35; M. van de Vrugt, “Antonius Matthaeus II 1601–1654, Utrechts eerste primarius iuris”, in: G.C.J.J. van den Bergh/J.E. Spruit/M. van de Vrugt (eds.), Rechtsgeleerd Utrecht, Levensschetsen van elf hoogleraren uit driehonderdvijftig jaar Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid in Utrecht, Zutphen 1986, 23–35, here 24–25, 28–31; M. van de Vrugt, Antonius Matthaeus II (1601–1654), in: T.J. Veen/P.C. Kop (eds.), Zestig juristen, Bijdragen tot een beeld van de geschiedenis der Nederlandse rechtswetenschap, Zwolle 1987, 166–170. 4 Schlüter (note 3) 7–8; Van de Vrugt, Primarius iuris (note 3) 24–25. 5 Van de Vrugt, Primarius iuris (note 3) 29–30.

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notably for defending the academic freedom of the Utrecht University against the authority of local churches6 and for the tactical way he solved the potentially extremely disruptive dispute between Gijsbert Voet and Ren8 Descartes. Voet, professor of Divinity in Utrecht, argued vehemently against the rationalist method of methodical doubt of Descartes, whereupon the latter replied with rather personal attacks as well, on the Utrecht Academy and Voet respectively. Precisely these personal attacks provided the City Council (vroedschap) assisted by Matthaeus as assessor and later as rector, the opportunity to just formally reproach Descartes, without having to deal with the matter substantively7.

2.

Matthaeus and the conflict between Arminians and Calvinists

Indeed, the dispute between Descartes and Voet could easily have evolved into similar proportions as the dispute between the Arminians8 and Gomarists or Calivinists9, no more than a decade ago in neighboring Holland10. There, the religious controversy ultimately concerned the issue of predestination: was faith the result of predestination, as Gomarus – in line with Calvin – learned? Or was predestination the result of faith, as Arminius learned11? Calvinism radically chose for the primacy of God’s grace and will – but consequently had to reconcile itself with inexplicable mysteries, such as the origin of evil12. Arminianism chose not to make God the author of sin and stressed mankind’s free will to choose for God – and thus limited God’s almightiness13. Because of the deep interrelation between church and state in this period14, this religious controversy between 6 Van de Vrugt, Primarius iuris (note 3) 28. 7 Hewett/Hallebeek (note 2) 121–2; Van de Vrugt, Primarius iuris (note 3), 30–31; M. van de Vrugt, Antonius Matthaeus II (note 3) 167–168. 8 Also termed Remonstrants; hereafter generally the terms Arminians or Arminianism will be used. 9 Also termed Contra-Remonstrants; hereafter generally the terms Calvinists or Calvinism will be used. 10 See M. van de Vrugt, Antonius Matthaeus II (note 3) 168. On the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists, see fundamentally and still unsurpassed, A.Th. van Deursen, Bavianen en Slijkgeuzen. Kerk en kerkvolk ten tijde van Maurits en Oldebarnevelt, Franeker 1991. 11 See A.Th. van Deursen, Maurits van Nassau, 1567–1625. De winnaar die faalde, in: A.Th. van Deursen (ed.), De Gouden Eeuw compleet, Amsterdam 2010, 839–1128 here 1035. 12 See Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 227–8. 13 See Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 228–9. 14 See Hewett/Hallebeek (note 2) 123–126; Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 298–309; Van Deursen, Maurits (note 11) 1035–1078. For Early Modern Calvinist ideas and theories on the relation between church and state see e. g. , John Witte Jr, The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism, Cambridge 2008, 62–76, 89–94, 122–134.

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Calvinist “voluntarism” and Arminian “rationalism” unavoidably obtained political dimensions as well. Although since the beginning of the Dutch Revolt around 1568, the Reformed Church had developed relatively independent from the authorities, soon the various States started to take more and more control in Church matters15. In Holland, before and during the Troubles of the Truce Years (Bestandstwisten, 1609–1621), mainly the Arminians benefitted from this sovereignty of the States in religious matters; after the Synod of Dordt in 1618, the victorious Calvinists would be the main beneficiaries of governmental intervention16. Many Arminians – and also Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) – considered sovereignty in religious matters belonging to the Staten of Holland17, while most Calvinists considered the States-General sovereign in these matters18. In De criminibus, Matthaeus indeed resolutely defended the sovereignty of StatesGeneral in religious matters and thus their legitimacy in convicting Oldenbarnevelt, Grotius and Hoogerbeets19. Importantly, for Grotius and the Staten of Holland at the time, this sovereignty did not mean that only the Calvinist religion had to be admitted in the Reformed Church, but that other Protestant confessions were to be tolerated as well, if this was in the public interest – even if this tolerance had to be enforced. This meant that the State’s sovereignty in these matters went above that of e. g. local churches or lower magistrates20. Traditionally, for many Calvinists the authorities had to protect the true religion – Calvinism – within the Church. If the authorities failed to do so, they acted against God’s will and betrayed a mayor, if not the main cause for the Dutch Revolt – particularly, but not only, for Reformed refugees such as French and Flemish Calvinists21. Several Calvinist scholars, such as Lubbertus from Franeker and the already mentioned Voet from Utrecht, were adamantly against Arminianism and all other deviations from true Calvinism22. 15 See e. g. E. Rabbie, in: H. Grotius, Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae pietas. Critical edition with English translation and commentary by E. Rabbie, Leiden 1995, 11–16. 16 Rabbie (note 15) 13–16; Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 298–309. 17 Grotius, Ordinum (note 15) VII. §§ 97–199 (174–239). 18 See Hewett/Hallebeek (note 2) 123–126; Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 298–309; Van Deursen, Maurits (note 11) 1035–1078. 19 48.II.V.1 (264). See also Van de Vrugt, Criminele Saken (note 3) 31; Van de Vrugt, Primarius iuris (note 3) 27–28. 20 Grotius, Ordinum (note 15) VII. §§ 97–199 (174–239); C. van der Woude, Hugo Grotius en zijn “Pietas Ordinum Hollandiae ac Westfrisiae vindicata”, Kampen 1961, 24–25; Rabbie, in: Grotius, Ordinum (note 15), 13–16; Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 298–309; Van Deursen, Maurits (note 11) 1035–6. 21 See e.g Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 218–220; Van Deursen, Maurits (note 11) 1035–6. 22 See Rabbie, in: Grotius, Ordinum (note 15), 27, 34–35, 66–69. See on Lubbertus e. g. C. van der Woude, “Lubbertus, Sibrandus”, in: D. Nauta et al. (eds), Biografisch lexicon voor de geschiedenis van het Nederlands protestantisme I, Kampen 1978, 143–145. See again Hewett/Hallebeek (note 2) 121–122.

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Indeed, although Matthaeus – coming from a Reformed refugee family himself – generally scrupulously mentioned his sources, he allegedly chose not to reveal an Arminian source for his opinion on torture. Apparently, Matthaeus had founded this opinion importantly on Tribunal reformatum (1624) of Johannes Grevius, who had written his work in 1620, while in captivity by the Staten of Holland for Arminian heresy23. However, Matthaeus’s prudence evidently did not hold for another convicted Remonstrant, the already mentioned irenic Christian humanist Hugo Grotius24. In his main text Matthaeus referred to Grotius more than ten times25 and in the marginal notes around another twenty times26. That may not seem a lot in a work the size of Matthaeus’s magnum opus, counting more than 700 pages in the 1761 edition. But other slightly older and contemporary writers, such as Joost de Damhouder, Melchior Winhoff, and Fransicus Zypaeus, are only referred to directly once or twice27 – even though the first two had specifically written on criminal law28. Matthaeus’s references to Grotius therefore provide an excellent opportunity to see if and how religious convictions could play a role in contemporary legal scholarship: though Grotius was almost twenty years the elder, he and Matthaeus were still contemporaries, publishing in the same period; obviously, Grotius and Matthaeus belonged to different denominations within Protestantism – roughly the Arminian versus the Calvinist or, here probably more correct, Reformed denomination; finally, Grotius and Matthaeus were both legal scholars, though not in exactly the same field of law, making a more nuanced confrontation on the legal merits possible29. Therefore, in the following Matthaeus’s references to

23 48.XVI.V (559–562). According to Schlüter (note 3) 2. On Grevius, see Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 355; S.J.B. Zilverberg, “Grevius, Johannes”, in: D. Nauta et al. (eds), Biografisch lexicon voor de geschiedenis van het Nederlands protestantisme II, Kampen 1983, 226–227. 24 Grotius is hard to classify denominationally : to do him justice is to consider him as a Christian humanist. See G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, Hugo Grotius as an irenicist, in: The World of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). Proceedings of the International Colloquium … Rotterdam, 6–9 April 1983, Amsterdam 1984, 43–63, here 44. 25 Matthaeus, De Criminibus (note 1) IV, Index IX Jurists, historians, theologians and other later writers, 791. 26 These references will be listed and discussed below. 27 Matthaeus, De Criminibus (note 1) IV, Index IX Jurists, historians, theologians and other later writers, 791–792. 28 J.Ph. De Monté Verloren, Geschiedenis van de wetenschap van het strafrecht en strafprocesrecht in de Noordelijke Nederlanden vjjr de Codificatie, Amsterdam 1942, 108–129. 29 Even as late as 1698, Johannes Voet, grandson of Gijsbert Voet, still criticized Grotius for his rationalist approach, entertaining man’s free will instead of God’s will. See H.J. Erasmus, Natural Law: Voet’s Criticism of De Groot, Fundamina 22 (2016) 40–52 here 47–50. On the difference between the terms ‘Calvinist’ and ‘Reformed’ see e. g. Witte (note 14) 18.

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Grotius and his works – De iure belli ac pacis (1625), the Inleidinge (1631) – will be analyzed30. From this analysis it will be concluded that Matthaeus used Grotius’s Inleidinge as an undisputed source of reference for the laws of Holland. For Matthaeus’s references to De jure belli ac pacis the picture is more nuanced. Matthaeus fundamentally disagreed on several points with Grotius, importantly and unsurprisingly on a state’s sovereignty and the role of Divine Law.

3.

On Grotius in general: ‘A most learned man’

Matthaeus referred a few times to Grotius’s trials and tribulations, perhaps also to engage his students: De criminibus largely resulted from Matthaeus’s lectures on criminal law since his appointment in Utrecht in 163431. When discussing breaking out of prison, and more specifically what must be decided about those by whose intent or negligence an accused person escaped, Matthaeus amused his students with a gently ironic reference to the famous escape of Grotius in the bookchest in 162132 : “Indeed, in our day, the wife of a most leaned man who had been imprisoned for treason got her husband out of prison by the clever device of enclosing him in a chest and that with impunity.”33

Matthaeus’s next general reference to Grotius was in the extensive title on laesa majestas, in the chapter ‘Concerning usage relating to certain edicts of the illustrious staten’. Fundamentally, Matthaeus agreed with the conviction of majestas of Oldenbarnevelt ‘and those who conspired with him’ by a court constituted by all provinces34. Admittedly, however, Matthaeus had no strong personal resentment against Grotius for his treason. In the same title, Matthaeus namely also discussed whether the legitimate portion must be left to children of a traitor. There he explained that nowadays:

30 In the 1644 edition, the index of topics and words contained a separate entry on Hugo Grotius, being praised and noted, viz: Hugo Grotius laudatur 92, 480, 565, 566, 380 (corresponding with 65, 336, 394, 395, 267 in the 1764 edition), notatur 275, 931ff, 960 (corresponding with 194, 649, 668 in the 1764 edition). 31 See Hewett/Hallebeek (note 2) 120, 123. 32 On this famous escape, instead of many, see H. Nellen, Hugo Grotius. A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State, 1583–1645, Leiden 2015, 302–312. 33 47.XVI.IV.5 (201): Nostra vero aetate etiam prorsus impune fuit uxori viri doctissimi, quae maritum majestatis reum cistae inclusum callidissimo commento e carcere eduxerat. Here cistae is translated as “in a chest”, rather than “in a basket”. 34 48.II.V.1 (264).

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“Only the property of the father is confiscated. And there are indeed some towns that enjoy as a special privilege the concession that either the traitor’s property is not confiscated at all, or the citizen whose possessions are to be confiscated can buy them back for a certain sum, usually not a large one. Such is the privilege of the city of Delft and by it a most learned man is said to have saved himself from confiscation of his property. The charter runs almost as follows: (…) ‘Let no citizen of Delft be punished in any manner or way with a greater part of his possessions than 60 pounds.’”35

Indeed, on 17 May 1630, the Court of Holland allowed Grotius to use this old privilege to buy his property back for sixty pounds36. Even for a moderately informed student of Utrecht University, Matthaeus’s gently ironic reference to Grotius outsmarting the people of Holland must have been crystal clear. In none of these instances Matthaeus directly mentioned Grotius; twice, however, he referred to him as a “most learned man”, and admittedly not as false or sarcastic flattery. Matthaeus’s use of Grotius as an authority on the laws of Holland, discussed below, testifies that Matthaeus genuinely considered Grotius “most learned”.

4.

References to the Inleidinge: “most experienced in local law”

Although Matthaeus’s main subject was criminal law as found in the libri terribiles (D. 47 and 48), he regularly transgressed to local customary law, particularly to the laws of Utrecht but also to those of surrounding states and countries37. For the local laws of Holland, Grotius’s Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid (Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Holland, 1631) was his main source. For a range of crimes and related subjects Matthaeus referred, either marginally or in the main text, to the Inleidinge: theft38, damage unlawfully inflicted39, harbouring40, adultery41, public and private violence42, murder (kill-

35 48.II.V.7 (267): publicanturque sola patris bona. Quin etiam civitates nonnullae singulari privilegio gaudent, ut aut bona omnino non publicentur, aut civis cujus bona publicanda sunt, redimere ea certo pretio, & plerunque non magno possit. Tale est privilegium civitatis Delphensis, quo vir doctissimus publicationem bonorum a se defendisse dicitur, in hunc ferme modum conceptum : Ne quis civis Delphensis ullo modo casuve majore parte bonorum mulctetur, quam libris LX. Here “most learned” should be preferred over “very clever” as a translation of doctissimus. 36 See Nellen (note 32) 438; G. Moll, “De confiscatie der goederen van Hugo de Groot”, In: Oud-Holland. Nieuwe bijdragen voor de geschiedenis der Nederlandsche kunst, letterkunde, nijverheid, enz., 20 (1902), 83–112, especially 99–100. 37 See Hewett/Hallebeek (note 2) 122. 38 47.I.IV.4 (82). Marginal reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 2.4.36. 39 47.III.III.4 (102). Matthaeus remarked that in practice assessing of damage as done by the Lex Aquilia had been given up. Assessment of damages was currently at its value on that day on

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ing a “monster”43, forty days survival of a victim44, former procedures on settlement45), inquiries (the right of accusation46, the Schout47, confiscation of feudal property48). Unsurprisingly, Matthaeus mainly referred to those parts of the Inleidinge that explicitly dealt with crimes: book 3, parts 32 to 39, on “Obligations out of delict” (Verbintenisse uit misdaad)49. However, for theft and adultery, Matthaeus also referred to instances where Grotius discussed an entirely different subject. These references illustrate that Matthaeus apparently had integrally studied Grotius’s Inleidinge. Moreover, Matthaeus’s discussion of these crimes also shows that he looked into the merits of local customs. In the title on theft, Matthaeus eventually discussed whether the fisc (more or less equivalent to treasurer/public prosecutor) could claim stolen property for itself. Matthaeus appeared to be adamantly against such practice:

40

41 42

43 44 45 46

47 48 49

which the damage was done, for which he referred i.a. to Grotius for the Low Countries, Grotius, Inleidinge 3.34 and 3.37. 47.X.II.1 (171). Matthaeus observed a great variety of laws concerning the punishment of harbourers, resulting in some hesitation about the punishment of this crime. Marginal reference to the Inleidinge, where Grotius stated that as of old in Holland someone who harboured a criminal was obliged to pay damages to the injured, as soon as he knew about the crime, Grotius, Inleidinge 3.32.22. 48.III.VII.15, 17, 24 and 25 (330, 331, 334 and 336), reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 3.33.9, 3.35.8, 2.12.(6) (marginally), and 1.5.12 respectively. 48.IV.IV.8–9 (361). Matthaeus stated that the view can be defended that by our customs – including that of Holland – he who abducted his betrothed was not to be punished capitally, because a man who abducted a woman with her consent was not punished capitally either. Marginal reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 3.35.8. 48.V.I.6 (365). Is he who killed a “monster” a murderer? Grotius bore witness that of old our Batavians used the law that monstrous children could be killed with impunity and that they suffocated malformed babies immediately after birth. Grotius, Inleidinge 1.3.5. 48.V.III.18 (381). Matthaeus stated that our customs – including that of Holland – have laid down that one who survived to the fortieth day should be considered to have died, not of the wound, but at the hand of fate. Marginal reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 3.34.8. 48.V.VII.6 (394–5). Matthaeus referred to Grotius when explaining what formerly the procedures to be observed in a case of murder were. Grotius, Inleidinge 3.32.7 (and not Willem de Groot, Isagoge). 48.XX.II.2 (668). Unlike most of the Low Countries, including Utrecht, the customs of Holland do not confer the right of accusing solely to the fisc, because there it is also granted to those to whom the iniuria pertains, e. g. if a married man is killed, his widow or children or, failing these, the next of kin are able to accuse the murderer as Grotius attests. Reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 3.33.3, and Inleidinge 3.4.5 (marginally). 48.XX.II.3 (668). Reference to Grotius for the derivation of the word Schout and the Schout’s powers. Grotius, Inleidinge 2.28.7 (not 2.27.7). 48.XX.IV.22 (689). Matthaeus marginally referred to Grotius when stating that in our customs – including those of Holland – (feudal) property can only be confiscated in case of majestas. Grotius, Inleidinge 2.43 (Hoe leen verloren word).2–3 (not 2.13.2–3). See also De Monté Verloren (note 28) 130.

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“not even the emperor, who has supreme power and is above the law, can take something away from private citizens without cause, … . For natural reason, the precepts of the law and also the eight commandment state that no one must be harmed, that no one’s property shall be taken away without cause. That which is ours cannot be transferred to another, without our own cooperation. Moreover, the emperor is not above Divine Law, nor the Law of Nature, and furthermore, he voluntarily submits his preeminence to the Civil Law, … .”50

And somewhat further : “There is an utterly intolerable avarice on the part of the fisc: and should we try to appease it with this kind of robbery, the state will truly suffer the same as the human body. For as the body is wasted away by the swelling of the spleen, so the members of the state, bit by bit, waste away and are starved by the swelling of the fisc.”51

Matthaeus thus strongly disapproved of the law among the Batavi, that property thrown into the sea to lighten a ship must be raised within one year and six weeks, and if that was not done, it awards the property to the fisc52. However, at the place marginally referred to, Grotius actually only discussed how a res nullius, more specifically, goods cast up by the sea, could be appropriated53. Matthaeus’s reference shows not only his integral study of Grotius’s Inleidinge, but also a certain preoccupation with sovereignty and the role of the state: a rule that awards abandoned – for whatever reason – goods to the fisc after a certain time, is admittedly something else entirely than a rule that authorizes the fisc to claim stolen property. Here Matthaeus’s indignation about interference with individual property was in any case not directed towards Grotius personally but to the customs of Holland. This theme – sovereignty in accordance with Divine Law – will be discussed in somewhat more detail when Matthaeus’s substantive references to Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis are dealt with further below. In the title on adultery, Matthaeus again extensively discussed the customs of the States of Utrecht and neighboring customs. Here, Matthaeus disapproved of the custom of Holland, where the husband still had the right to kill both adulterer and adulteress when caught in the act: it was harsh and departed from equity, it 50 47.I.IV.4 (81): nam si ne princeps quidem, cujus potestas summa atque legibus soluta est, cuiquam privatorum suam sine causa auferre potest, … . Naturalis enim ratio, atq ; secundum juris praeceptum, nec non praeceptum divinum octavum dictant, neminem esse laedendum ; nemini rem suam sine causa auferendam : id quod nostrum est, sine facto nostro ad alium transferri non posse. Princeps autem neque divinis, neque naturalibus legibus solutus est : quin etiam civilibus ultro submittit principatum ; … . 51 47.I.IV.4 (82): quin prorsus intolerabilis fisci aviditas: quam si hujusmodi rapinis explere conabimur, nae idem tum patietur resp. quod corpus humanum : ut enim hoc lyene excrescente tabescit : ita crescente fico ordines reipubl. sensim tabescunt atque emoriuntur. 52 47.I.IV.4 (82). Marginal reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 2.4.36. 53 Grotius, Inleidinge 2.4(Van ’t bekomen van ongeeigend goed).36.

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displeased others in the Low Countries, and it was disproportionate54. Matthaeus was more understanding for the custom of Holland to no longer follow Divine Law – making a violated girl respectable with marriage and dowry (Exodus 22,16) – but to separate marriage and dowry ; which separation was admitted also by Divine Law itself, according to Matthaeus. Because poor and completely wanton girls schemed for marriage with rich youths by relying on the Divine Law, as Grotius narrated for Holland55. Somewhat further, Matthaeus discussed whether punishment for a second marriage did have a place in customs of Utrecht, here that a widow had to transmit all the property from her former husband to her children (C. 5.9.3; C. 5.9.6). Matthaeus referred with approval to the customs of Holland where no distinction was made between first and second or third marriages in respect of the community of property ; dotal agreements could obviously be made, but this had to be done explicitly56. When Matthaeus finally turned from stuprum to incest, he chose to interpret the local statutes of Utrecht in such way, that he who married the daughter of his wife’s sister committed incest. One of Matthaeus’s arguments was that Grotius had interpreted the laws of Holland in such a way as well57. These references again show Matthaeus’s familiarity with the Inleidinge, as these are derived from property law and marriage law respectively – subjects not exactly directly related to criminal law. Moreover, the last reference testifies of Matthaeus’s deep respect for Grotius’s knowledge on the customary law, as he called him, together with Zyphaeus, ‘most experienced in the local laws of the Low Countries’. Though belonging to opposing Protestant denominations, Matthaeus thus appeared to have genuine respect for Grotius’s legal scholarship, particularly in respect of local customary law.

5.

References to De jure belli ac pacis

Matthaeus referred less frequently to De jure belli ac pacis. Moreover, these references are also partly of a different nature. A few times – when discussing iniuria58, perjury59, laesa majestas60 and parricides61 – Matthaeus again referred 54 55 56 57 58

48.III.VII.15 (330). Reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 3.33.9. 48.III.VII.17 (331). Reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 3.35.8. 48.III.VII.24 (334). Marginal reference Grotius, Inleidinge 2.12.(6). 48.III.VII.25 (336). Reference to Grotius, Inleidinge 1.5.12. 47.IV.II.2 (127). Matthaeus marginally referred to Grotius to substantiate that the Hebrews were allowed to request talio for injury from their judges, for the sake of avoiding greater evil, because it was a nation which was very prone to revenge. See Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 1.2.8 and 2.20.10. 59 47.XVI.I.7 (195). Matthaeus marginally referred to Grotius in support of the opinion that an

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to Grotius essentially as an authority on the content of the law. However, in at least three occasions, Matthaeus took the opportunity to deal more substantively with Grotius’s arguments in De jure belli ac pacis. These discussions indeed seem to point towards Matthaeus’s different, admittedly more Calvinistic, perception of law, state and society.

5.1.

Knowledge of the Divine Will

In Matthaeus’s time, several local customs still accepted that in certain cases thieves were punished by hanging. Matthaeus extensively argued against a death penalty for thieves62. According to Matthaeus, it was important not to just count authorities but to weigh up reasons and arguments in this matter. However, he could still win the argument just by counting authorities: theologians – Petrus Martyrus, Wolfgang Musculus, Franciscus Junius, Lambertus Daneau, Johannes Piscator, Andreas Rivet, Guillelmus Amesius – and other proved authorities – Plato, Thomas More, Theophilus, Alciatus and finally Grotius: “And recently still Hugo Grotius wrote that it is not right for someone to be condemned to death except for crimes which the law, given through Moses, punished by death, or which by sound reasoning, are equal to them. For in a matter as serious as this, a knowledge of the Divine Will, which alone calms the mind, cannot be obtained from anywhere other than from that law which certainly did not establish the penalty of death for a thief.”63

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62 63

oath to do something impossible is excused or temporarily excused if something is for the present impossible, though subject to punishment because of the indiscretion of swearing. See Grotius, De jure belli as pacis 2.13.8 & 9. 48.II.I.5–6 (213–214). The majestas of a people could be diminished by an alliance or treaty, and therefore Matthaeus also discussed allies. The majestas or dignity of allies strongly depended on the type of alliance, which Grotius detailed in the section of De jure belli as pacis marginally referred to by Matthaeus. Grotius, De jure belli as pacis 1.3.21. 48.VI.II.13 (412). Matthaeus referred to Grotius, when discussing the punishment for parricide; more specifically the question whether he who killed a father who is a traitor to the fatherland was worthy of a reward. Matthaeus’s marginal reference to Grotius (De jure belli ac pacis 2.18.4) seems a bit obscure, because there Grotius actually discussed the inviolability of an ambassador. Grotius argued that only if an ambassador made an armed assault it was lawful to kill him, not indeed by way of punishment, but in our defense. Grotius subsequently referred to Cicero (off. 3,23) who eventually referred to a son accusing a father. 47.I.II.6 (58–65). 47.I.II.6 (65): Et nuper admodum Hugo Grotius scripsit, fas non esse, quenquam ad mortem damnari, nisi ob delicta, quae lex per Mosen data morte punivit, aut quae his sunt paria recta aestimatione: Nec enim posse notitiam divinae voluntatis, quae sola animum tranquillat, aliaunde in hoc negotio tam gravi haberi, quam ex illa lege, quae certe mortis poenam in furem non constituit. Reference to Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.1.14.

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Here, Matthaeus referred to Grotius with unqualified agreement, to underscore the importance of law’s ultimate source, God’s will. He not only mentioned Grotius in the same breath with some legal giants, but also alongside an impressive list of Reformed theologians – some very dear to Grotius, such as Franciscus Junius64, and some sworn enemies, such as Andreas Rivet65. At the place referred to, Grotius discussed the more general question whether the Civil Law – permitting murder in one’s own defense – gave a right to the fact, or only dispensed with the punishment of it. Grotius argued the latter, namely that the Civil Law only dispensed the punishment of a murder in one’s own defense. In support of his own opinion, Grotius turned to Scotus who affirmed that it was only lawful to condemn to death for crimes that were capitally punished by the Law of Moses or for those equal to these66. However, just shortly before, Grotius had argued that killing someone who tried to seize our goods was permitted according to Natural Law or expletive justice67. Grotius’s distinction between expletive justice and attributive justice appears to be one of the key elements to properly understand De jure belli ac pacis68. Grotius had written De jure belli ac pacis namely also as a kind of mirror of princes69. His ideal was peace and thus the reduction of war. Therefore, he tried to construct potential reasons for war as strictly as possible – only if Natural rights were violated: (i) self-defense, (ii) recovery of one’s property (iii) or one’s debt, (iv) or punishment of an offence70. This expletive justice or Natural Law, on which he founded his laws of war and peace, was ultimately based on reason. This 64 65 66 67

See Posthumus Meyjes (note 24) 48; Nellen (note 32) 35–36. See e. g. Nellen (note 32) 699–710. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.1.14. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.1.11 (Murder in defense of our goods, permitted by the Law of Nature). 68 Grotius’s distinction between expletive and attributive justice resulted in a rather limited set of rules as well as an emphasis on individual rights, see e. g. R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories. Their origin and development, Cambridge 1979, 67–75; R. Tuck, Grotius, Carneades and Hobbes, Grotiana 4 (1983) 43–62, here 52–58. For those reasons, Grotius has been considered as a secularizer of Natural Law and thus a precursor of modern thinkers such as Hobbes, see instead of many Tuck, Natural Rights (note 68) 58–81. Others, emphasizing i.a. the unity between expletive and attributive justice in Grotius’s work, consider him more as a premodern thinker, see e. g. B.P. Vermeulen/G.A. van der Wal, Grotius, Aquinas and Hobbes. Grotian Natural Law between Lex Aeterna and Natural Rights, Grotiana 16 (1995) 55–83, here 78–83. 69 Grotius made no genuine, qualitative distinction between individuals and the state or sovereign – in his time indeed still mainly princes – wherefore he also could employ a mainly private law framework in De jure belli ac pacis. See e. g. A.C. Eyffinger/B.P. Vermeulen in: H. de Groot, Denken over oorlog en vrede. Uitgegeven, ingeleid en van aantekeningen voorzien door A.C. Eyffinger en B.P. Vermeulen, Baarn 1991, 26–27. 70 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.1, 2.2–10, 2.11–19, 2.20–21. See e. g. Tuck, Natural Rights (note 68) 73–75; Eyffinger/Vermeulen (note 69) 18; Vermeulen/Van der Wal (note 68) 81.

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limited, rational set of rules would even exist without God71 – although such was unthinkable for Grotius72. Indeed, after explaining the rights according to Natural Law or expletive justice, Grotius consequently expanded on rights and duties according to attributive justice, law in the broader sense. Justice in this broad sense was also determined by the Divine Law. However, the Divine Will and Law were primarily to be known by revelation, not by reason, hence Grotius’s unconcerned reference to the Law of Moses73. For Matthaeus, the Divine Will was indeed a decisive argument. This already became clear in Matthaeus’s refutation of the fisc’s right to claim stolen property : Divine Law ranked highest, above Natural Law or Civil Law74. Typically, Matthaeus referred precisely to Grotius where the latter alluded to the Divine Will; this nicely fits in with an admittedly more Calvinist, voluntarist approach75. Matthaeus did not follow Grotius in his distinction between expletive and attributive justice, limiting the Divine Law or Will to the realm of attributive justice. On the contrary, Matthaeus referred without reservations to Grotius to stress the importance of God’s will as the ultimate source of law.

5.2.

Voluntarism versus rationalism

Matthaeus also made some substantive references to Grotius when discussing perjury. The more specific question was when exactly an oath was also binding the descendants of a person making an oath. By a fiction of the Civil Law, by which an heir represented the person of the deceased, the heir was regarded as the one who called upon God and had to fulfil the obligation76. Grotius distinguished between a person who had bound himself to God alone and one who had bound himself to a person calling on God as a witness. According to Grotius, only in the latter case the heir was bound as to a burden on the inheritance77. With reference to Ulpian (D. 50,12,2,1) Matthaeus rejected this distinction because vows were binding whether made to God alone or to a person. Because an oath

71 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, Prolegomena § 11. See e. g. Tuck, Grotius (note 68) 55–56; Vermeulen/Van der Wal (note 68) 70–72. 72 See fundamentally L. Besselink, The Impious Hypothesis Revisited, Grotiana 9 (1988) 3–63. See also e. g. Eyffinger/Vermeulen (note 69) 24; Vermeulen/Van der Wal (note 68) 71. 73 See e. g. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.20.45–50. See also Eyffinger/Vermeulen (note 69) 23; Vermeulen/Van der Wal (note 68) 82–83. 74 See e. g. 47.I.IV.4 (81). 75 See e. g. Tuck, Natural Rights (note 68), 42–44; Van Deursen, Bavianen (note 10) 227–8. 76 47.XVI.I.3 (193). 77 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.13.17; Grotius, Inleidinge 3.1.6.

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was usually compared with a pact, decisive was whether the maker of the oath wanted to bind only himself or also his heir, according to Matthaeus78. Admittedly, also this disagreement can be traced back to Grotius’s fundamental distinction between expletive and attributive justice. According to Grotius, obligations that are only the result of mere piety, gratitude or sincerity do not pass to an heir : “For these have nothing to do with what is strictly termed Right …”79. This can be understood in the broader context of Grotius’s attempt to create a minimal set of rights: the enforcement of obligations constituted Grotius’s third possible just cause for war80. Matthaeus, on the other hand, seemed to focus on a person’s will to bind himself – regardless of a possible motive – and thus arrived at a different, probably broader set of obligations. This disagreement on the bindingness of obligations returned in Matthaeus’s discussion of Joshua’s oath to the Gibeonites to spare them, despite them being inhabitants of Canaan that the Israelites had to wipe out (Joshua 9,15 and 24). Grotius suggested that Joshua and the Israelites would have sworn an oath with the Gibeonites to spare them anyway, even if they had known about their deceit. Grotius’s main argument was that these pacts were admissible in the first place81. “Nothing is more vague or ineffectual than this conjecture,” thus Matthaeus82. Rather, Matthaeus agreed with Petrus Martyrus Vermilius. This Reformed theologian stated that Joshua and the Israelites could have seen the oath as invalid, but preferred to keep it, since God wished this, also because of their rashness in making the oath in the first place (Joshua 9,14)83. One is maybe tempted to read too much in this discussion, but here the “rational” solution of Grotius – trying to find the rationality behind Joshua’s and God’s approach – is rejected in favor of the more “voluntarist” approach of Martyrus Vermilius – the oath should kept simply because God wanted this84.

78 47.XVI.I.3 (193). 79 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.13.17. 80 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.11–19. See e. g. Tuck, Natural Rights (note 68) 73–75; Eyffinger/Vermeulen (note 69) 18. 81 47.XVI.I.5 (194). Reference to Grotius, De jure belli as pacis 2.13.4 (not 2.13.3). 82 47.XVI.I.5 (194): Qua conjectura nihil incertius aut inanius est. 83 47.XVI.I.5 (194). Reference to Petrus Martyrus Vermilius, Loci communes 2.13.4.2. 84 Grotius also acknowledged that God wished the Israelites to keep their oath: the point is that Grotius also sought a rational explanation for God’s command. See on the relation between God, will and reason in Grotius’s Natural law, e. g. B.P. Vermeulen, God, wil en rede in Hugo de Groots natuurecht, Wijsgerig Perspectief 23 (1982/3) 54–58.

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Janwillem Oosterhuis

Contractarianism versus absolutism

Admittedly, however, the most fundamental disagreement between Matthaeus and Grotius appeared to be on a state’s sovereignty. In the chapter on imperial pardon, Matthaeus stated that emperors had no right to pardon those crimes that had to be capitally punished according to Divine Law. More precisely : “that the emperor may rightly grant pardon for those crimes which are punished in terms to the Civil Law rather than in terms of Divine Law, but that pardon for those crimes which Divine Law or right reason and the consent of the Ius Gentium wish to be punished capitally, can in no way be granted by the emperor. The basis for this view is firm and immovable, namely because the emperor is only above the Civil Law and not above Divine and Natural Law to which, as a human being, he is also liable. Nor is he above the Ius Gentium to which he is bound as a member and part of the human society.”85

Matthaeus then went on at some length giving mainly biblical references to argue his case86. He then introduced his opponents: “Now let us see how we must satisfy those who in their zeal to show their dutifulness to their lords and masters grant them more than right reason and public utility demand. Of these a certain most learned gentleman has recently philosophized on the whole question as follows.”87

Matthaeus then reproduced the three grounds for punishment, as elaborated by this “most learned man”: (i) the reformation of the offender; (ii) the interests of him in whose interest it was that the offence should not have taken place, so that he should not again suffer the like at the hands of the same man or at the hands of others; (iii) the interests of the other citizens so that they should not suffer anything at the hands of the same man and so that others be deterred from committing crimes88. According to Grotius, if either all these ends fell away or could for instance be reached in another way, a penalty – including capital punishment – could be remitted89. Matthaeus then went on to extensively refute 85 48.XIX.V.2 (647): recte largiri principem indulgentiam eorum criminum, quae civili magis, quam divino jure vindicantur ; quae autem divina lex, aut recta ratio, gentiumque consensus capitis supplicio puniri jubet, eorum indulgentiam a principe tribui nullo modo posse. Cujus sententiae fundamentum firmum & immotum est, quod princeps legibus duntaxat civilibus solutus sit, non divinis & naturalibus, quibus obligatur tanquam homo; non gentium legibus, quibus tanquam membrum & pars humanae societatis obnoxius est. 86 48.XIX.V.2 (647–8). 87 48.XIX.V.2 (649): Videamus quemadmodum satisfaciendum sit illis, qui dum dominantibus obsequium approbare student, plus iisdem largiuntur, quam aut recta ratio, aut pubica utilitas postulat. Ex his vir quidam doctissimus de re tota novissime ita philosophatus est. 88 48.XIX.V.2 (649). See Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.20.6–9. 89 48.XIX.V.2 (649). See e. g. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.20.13–20.

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these three arguments90. He was particularly offended by Grotius’s argument that Natural Law did not order to punish offenders, but only permitted punishment, i. e. did not forbid it91 – which again illustrates Grotius’s limited conception of Natural law as expletive justice92. Moreover, Matthaeus added a fourth end to punishment: “Namely that the evildoer must be removed from our midst, that the earth be not polluted by crimes, and lest the Supreme Judge exact punishment from those who have neglected to vindicate crimes.”93

These passages, admittedly, illustrate most clearly the difference between Matthaeus’s and Grotius’s approach of a state’s sovereignty. Matthaeus considered the sovereign to be subject to Divine and Natural Law; rather, a sovereign had to promote a Christian realm, because Matthaeus apparently considered it inconceivable that a state would not set an example for the common herd94. Matthaeus’s approach resembles some of the ideas of certain Reformed scholars, such as FranÅois Hotman, Theodorus Beza and Philippe du Plessis-Mornay, who had strong contractarian ideas about the relation between people and state or sovereign95. Building on earlier medieval ideas Hotman had argued that rulers ultimately were constituted by the people96. Beza subsequently argued that a three-way political covenant existed between God, the rulers, and the people. Political rulers had to abide by the law of God and the law of Nature; the best source and summary of the law of God and Nature was the Decalogue97. If a sovereign did not fulfil his duties but violated existing laws and privileges, foremost the First and Second Tables of the Decalogue, his people would be free to oppose him, according to Beza98. Ultimately, he could then be lawfully removed, although Matthaeus admittedly offered no opinion on this exact consequence. Grotius, wary of the religious and political disputes causing endless conflicts and wars in his native Holland and the rest of Europe, attached far greater importance to a strong sovereign allowing him greater power – here exemplified 90 91 92 93 94 95

96 97 98

48.XIX.V.3 (649–652). 48.XIX.V.3 (649). See Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.20.21. See e. g. Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis 2.20.10. 48.XIX.V.3 (650): nempe, ut malus e medio tollatur ; ut ne terra inquinetur flagitiis, neve vindictam ab iis, qui neglexere scelera vindicare, supremus judex sumat. 48.XIX.V.3 (650). Matthaeus was at least familiar with two of these authors, Beza and Hotman, as he referred to their work, see Matthaeus, De Criminibus (note 1) IV, Index IX Jurists, historians, theologians and other later writers, 791. See on Hotman and particularly Beza, Witte (note 14) 81–141. See Witte (note 14) 124–125. See Witte (note 14) 126–127. Compare also Matthaeus 48.XIX.V.2 (647–648). See Witte (note 14) 133–134. See also e. g. Eyffinger/Vermeulen (note 69) 15.

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by the imperial pardon – and consequently denied a broad right of resistance against a sovereign; only for instance in case of self-defense99. Grotius considered the sovereign to be only bound to Natural law, which was understood by Grotius as expletive, strict justice. Principally a sovereign was not bound by his own laws and was above lower magistrates. A state was the highest community and thus ranked also above the individual: a contract between sovereign or state and people legitimized a people’s duty to obey. Popular sovereignty was rejected100. Here, Matthaeus thus acutely singled out the more “absolutist” approach of Grotius in De jure belli ac pacis, of which Grotius was indeed accused of by some of his Reformed contemporaries101.

6.

Conclusions

Matthaeus’s references to Grotius indeed confirm that Matthaeus was a “staunch, but balanced Protestant”. Matthaeus completely overlooked their opposing confessional backgrounds when it came to Grotius’s authority on the laws of Holland, testifying of his open-mindedness. Admittedly, Matthaeus did not follow Grotius’s distinction between expletive and attributive justice, because he referred with agreement to Grotius’s allusion to Divine Law in the latter’s description of attributive justice, but criticized Grotius for excluding Divine Will as a relevant norm in describing expletive justice. Here, Matthaeus Reformed background might explain his preference for the more voluntarist, Calvinist approach, contrasting with Grotius’s more rationalist, irenic take on the matter. However, when it came to a typical controversy of their era – Divine will in relation to a state’s sovereignty – Matthaeus resolutely took a staunchly Protestant approach: also for sovereigns Divine Will and Law had ultimate supremacy as a source of law – whether in terms of attributive or expletive justice.

99 Grotius appeared to have limited a people’s right to resistance over the course of the years: in De jure praedae he had granted a more extensive right of resistance, whereas he mitigated this position in De jure belli ac pacis to a stronger role of the sovereign. See e. g. Tuck, Natural Rights (note 68); Vermeulen (note 84) 55–57; Eyffinger/Vermeulen (note 69) 15–16. 100 See e. g. Tuck, Natural Rights (note 68) 78–80; Eyffinger/Vermeulen (note 69) 15. 101 Such as Johannes Felden in 1653, on whose critique see e. g. Tuck, Natural Rights (note 68) 75, 79.

Martin J. Schermaier

Habebant omnia communia. Überlegungen zum Gemeineigentum in Philosophie, Theologie und Recht

1. Die Tagung der Soci8t8 International d’Histoire des Droits de l’Antiquit8 im September 1987 war die aufregendste meines Lebens. Es war die erste, an der ich, gemeinsam mit zwei anderen jungen Wissenschaftlern aus Salzburg, teilnehmen durfte. Plötzlich sah ich all die großen Namen, die ich aus Büchern und Aufsätzen kannte, als lebendige Wesen herumgehen und -stehen. Ich hörte sie sprechen und diskutieren, sah sie lachen und essen und lernte, dass gute Artikel zu schreiben eine zwar notwendige aber keine hinreichende Bedingung dafür war, im hierarchischen Gefüge des Kongresses einen der vorderen Plätze zu besetzen. Wenn man noch gar nichts publiziert hatte, war man aber ein hoffnungsloser Fall, im wahrsten Sinn des Wortes ein unbeschriebenes Blatt. Da freute man sich über jede kleine Aufmerksamkeit, etwa wenn manche mit einem großen Namen nach dem Thema der Doktorarbeit fragten. Es gab aber überraschende Ausnahmen, etwa die Delegation aus den Niederlanden. Da war vor allem Hans Ankum, der die Neuen herzlich begrüßte und sie allen möglichen Bekannten und Unbekannten vorstellte, so dass man sich fühlen konnte, als gehörte man seit Jahren dazu. Die junge Generation der niederländischen Romanistik stand ihm in nichts nach. Sie nahm uns in der Mittagspause mit an den Strand, schwamm mit uns um die Wette, und tingelte abendelang mit uns durch die Bars der Innenstadt. Zu dieser Gruppe gehörte Jan Hallebeek. Die damals begründete Freundschaft war dauerhaft. Zwar schwimmen wir heute nicht mehr um die Wette und lange Abende in dunklen Bars sind selten geworden. Aber gemeinsame Projekte, gemeinsame Forschungsinteressen und nicht zuletzt die Altkatholische Kirche, die Jan einmal jährlich nach Bonn reisen lässt, bringen uns in schöner Regelmäßigkeit zusammen. Kaum aus San Sebastian nach Nijmegen zurückgekehrt schickte mir Jan mit einer Sammlung von Sonderdrucken auch ein Exemplar seiner Utrechter Proefschrift1 – „as a remembrance of our pleasant encounter at San Sebastian“. Das Buch, in niederlän1 J. Hallebeek, Quia natura nichil privatum. Aspecten van de eigendomsvraag in het werk van Thomas van Aquino (1225–1274), Nijmegen 1986.

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discher Sprache verfasst, habe ich damals nur durchgeblättert, weniger interessiert als verwundert darüber, womit ein Rechtshistoriker sich beschäftigen mag. Erst als ich später bei der eigenen Arbeit entdeckte, welche wichtige Rolle Thomas von Aquin für die Ausbildung der neuzeitlichen Rechtswissenschaft spielt2, studierte ich Jans Proefschrift genauer. Zuletzt hat sie mir wichtige Hilfe bei der Ausarbeitung meiner Untersuchung über die willenstheoretischen Grundlagen des modernen Eigentumsbegriffs geleistet3. 2. Jetzt liegt das Buch wieder vor mir : Quia natura nichil privatum – „Von Natur aus ist nichts Privateigentum“, so könnte man die dem Irnerius zugeschriebene4 Glosse distincta ad D. 1,1,5 übersetzen, die dem Buch den Titel gibt. Mit diesem Satz hatte sich auch Thomas von Aquin, wie Jan Hallebeek zeigt, wiederholt auseinandergesetzt. Thomas nahm dabei einen recht pragmatischen Standpunkt ein5. Die rigorosen Forderungen von Basilius und Ambrosius, wonach Gott alleine die Herrschaft (dominium) an den äußeren Gütern zustehe und den Menschen lediglich ein – gemeinsam auszuübendes – Nutzungsrecht, weist er, sich auf Aristoteles6 stützend7, zurück: Für das Wohlergehen von Mensch und Gesellschaft sei privates Eigentum sinnvoll, weil es Streit um die Güter vermeide und sicherstelle, dass sie nicht nur genutzt, sondern auch gepflegt werden. (…) Et quantum ad hoc licitum est quod homo propria possideat. Et est etiam necessarium ad humanam vitam, propter tria: primo quidem, quia magis sollicitus est unusquisque ad procurandum aliquid quod sibi soli competit quam aliquid quod est commune omnium vel multorum: quia unusquisque, laborem fugiens, rdlinquit alteri id quod pertinet ad commune; sicut accidit in multitudine ministrorum. Alio modo, quia ordinatius res humanae tractantur si singulis immineat propria cura alicuius rei procurandae: esset autem confusio si quilibet indistincte quaelibet procuraret. Tertio, quia per hoc magis pacificus status hominum conservatur, dum unusquisque re sua

2 Vgl. M. Schermaier, Die Bestimmung des wesentlichen Irrtums von den Glossatoren bis zum BGB, Wien/Köln/Weimar 2000, 54ff. 3 M. Schermaier, Dominus actuum suorum. Die willenstheoretische Begründung des Eigentums und das römische Recht, in: SZ 134 (2017) 49ff. 4 Dazu E. Besta, L’opera d’Irnerio: Contributo alla storia del diritto romano, vol. II, Turin 1896, 3; R. Weigand, Die Naturrechtslehre der Legisten und Dekretisten von Irnerius bis Accursius und von Gratian bis Johannes Teutonicus, München 1967, 87f.; Hallebeek, Quia natura (Fn. 1) 85f. 5 STh. II–II qu. 66. 6 Aristot. Pol. II 5, 1267ff.; dazu etwa P. Garnsey, Thinking about Property. From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution, Cambridge/New York 2007, 6ff. 7 STh. II–II qu. 66 art. 2 resp.; dazu Hallebeek, Quia natura (Fn. 1) 87ff.; mit den aristotelischen Argumenten hatte sich Thomas aber auch schon in seinem Kommentar zur Politik des Aristoteles (Sententia libri politicorum, lib. II, cap. 4) auseinandergesetzt, vgl. Hallebeek 62ff.

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contentus est. Unde videmus quod inter eos qui communiter et ex indiviso aliquid possident, frequentius iurgia oriuntur.

Die beinahe modern klingenden Argumente des Thomas überraschen nur, wenn man sie mit dem Satz des Irnerius vergleicht. Wie aber kam Irnerius zu diesem Satz? Welche Überlegungen stecken hinter ihm? Gab es gar einen Disput zwischen Juristen und Theologen über die Erlaubtheit von privatem Eigentum? 3. Die Erfahrung, dass die Güter der Welt endlich sind und dass jeder für sich und die Seinen um die lebensnotwendigen Dinge kämpfen muss, ist der westlichen Kultur tief eingeprägt. Vielleicht handelt es sich überhaupt um eine anthropologische Konstante, eine Erfahrung, die alle menschlichen Gemeinschaften machen und verarbeiten müssen. In der westlichen Geistesgeschichte spiegelt sich diese Erfahrung wieder in Mythen und Sagen ebenso wie in Gründungsgeschichten und Utopien, die von einem Leben ohne Leid und Mühe erzählen. In populärer Form begegnet sie uns im Märchen vom Schlaraffenland, in dem alle im Überfluss leben8 und, weil für alle mehr als genug da ist, ohne Kampf um das tägliche Brot. Eine weniger pralle, man könnte auch sagen: politisch korrekte Form des Schlaraffenlandes finden wir in der Erzählung vom „Goldenen Zeitalter“, in dem es weniger kalorienreiche Nahrungsmittel als vielmehr Bescheidenheit und Genügsamkeit der Menschen sind, die sie ohne Streit und Mühsal miteinander auskommen lassen. Schon in Hesiods „Werke und Tage“ (=qca ja· Bl]qa) ist dieses Zeitalter gesegnet dadurch, dass die Menschen in Eintracht und ohne Gewinnsucht leben9, und deswegen die natürlichen Ressourcen für alle ausreichen10. Denselben Topos kennen wir aus Ovid11. Bei ihm steht im Vordergrund, dass die Menschen weder Waffen benötigten, um sich gegeneinander zu verteidigen, noch Gesetz und Strafe, um ihr Gemeinwesen zu ordnen. Tibull und Vergil ergänzen das Idyll um das Bild, dass für die Häuser keine Türen, für die Äcker keine Grenzsteine erforderlich waren12. Dass die Menschen eigentumslos lebten oder, besser, alles miteinander teilten, wird in solchen Gedichten zwar angedeutet; entscheidend ist regelmäßig, dass Verteilungskämpfe unbekannt waren.

8 Dazu etwa D. Richter, Schlaraffenland. Geschichte einer populären Utopie, Frankfurt 1995; G.D. Caie/N.H. Ott, Schlaraffenland, LMA 7, 1995, Sp. 1477–1479. 9 Hes. erg. 77–105. 10 Auf weitere griechische Quellen weist hin B. Töpfer, Urzustand und Sündenfall in der mittelalterlichen Gesellschafts- und Staatstheorie, Stuttgart 1999, 7f. 11 Ov. met. 1,89–112. 12 Tib. carm. 1,3,43–44; Verg. Georg. 1,125ff.; vgl. auch Sen. epist. 90,37.

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4. Das ändert sich mit der antiken Philosophie. Auch Platon kennt die Vorstellung einer ursprünglichen und harmonischen Gesellschaft13, die in seiner Utopie des Philosophenstaates zwar nicht ausdrücklich wiederkehrt14, darin aber die besten Voraussetzungen für ein konfliktarmes, gedeihliches Auskommen findet. Zumindest für den Wächterstand ist die Gemeinschaft der Güter sowie der Kinder und Frauen vorgesehen15. In der Stoa, jedenfalls in der Überlieferung ihrer Lehre bei Cicero und Seneca, wird für die utopische Frühzeit, als die Menschen ihrer Natur gemäß lebten, die Gütergemeinschaft ausdrücklich vorausgesetzt16. Von Chrysipp berichtet Cicero, er habe nicht nur die Gemeinschaft der Güter gelehrt17, sondern die aller Vor- und Nachteile18. Erst Habsucht und Neid führten zur Verteilung der Güter, zum Streit um die Grenzen der Grundstücke19. Das Naturrecht fordere zwar die Gemeinschaft aller Güter20, doch habe sich ihre Aufteilung durchgesetzt und müsse – ebenfalls nach Naturrecht – geschützt werden, um Unfrieden und Streit zu vermeiden21. Allerdings sind alle die Dinge miteinander zu teilen, die dem Empfänger hilfreich, dem Geber nicht lästig sind (qui sunt iis utilia, qui accipiunt, danti non molesta)22. Dazu zählen jedenfalls Wasser und Feuer, außerdem der gute Rat23. Es lohnt sich darüber nachzudenken, warum just die Philosophie versuchte, die Utopie eines konfliktfreien und für alle glücklichen Zusammenlebens mit der Vorstellung vom „Gemeineigentum“ zu verbinden. Es ist doch, könnte man sagen, einer jeden Sozialutopie eigen, dass sie bestehende Ordnungsvorstellungen ignoriert oder ablehnt. Allerdings setzt die Negation einer Ordnung voraus, dass sie als untauglich erkannt ist, ein ideales Zusammenleben anzuleiten. Um dieses Ideal in Begriffe zu fassen, die zugleich das Defizit der bestehenden Ordnung ausdrücken, müssen „Gegen-Begriffe“ zu dieser Ordnung 13 Plat. Polit. 269 a ff., insb. 271a–272d; Hinweis auch in leg. 713a–e. 14 Aber in den Nomoi, etwa Plat. leg. (III) 678e–680a. 15 Plat. rep. (IV) 415d–417b; 421e–422a sowie (V) 457c ff.; dazu im Überblick P. Garnsey, Thinking about property. From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution, Cambridge 2007, 6ff. 16 Vgl. etwa Cic. off. 1,21; 1,50–52; dazu und mit weiteren Quellen A. Pernice, Die sogenannten res communes omnium, Berlin 1900, 7–15. 17 So gehört zwar das Theater allen gemeinsam, doch schließt das nicht aus, dass jeder einen Platz „besetzen“ darf; Cic. fin. 3,67. 18 Cic. fin. 3,69: emolumenta et detrimenta (…) communia esse voluerunt … incommoda autem et commoda (…) communia esse voluerunt. Zur Bedeutung von emolumentum bzw. commodum K. Howald/Th. Fuhrer, Wer nützt wem im stoischen Gemeinwesen? Zu Cicero De finibus 3,69, in: Museum Helveticum 57 (2000) 81ff. 19 Etwa Sen. epist. 90,38–9. 20 Sen. epist. 80,12: ,hoc quod tenes, quod tuum dicis, publicum est et quidem generis humani‘; ähnlich epist. 79,6. 21 So jedenfalls Cic. off. 1,21; 2,73 und 78. 22 Cic. off. 1,52. 23 Cic. off. 1,52; im Ansatz auch Sen. benef. 4,29.

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etabliert werden. Wenn man also, wie Platon, erkannt hat, dass privater Reichtum dem Gemeinwohl abträglich sein kann24, wird man für eine ideale Gemeinschaft annehmen, sie würde privates Eigentum entweder gar nicht oder nur in Grenzen dulden. Wer sich, wie die Sozial- oder Staatsphilosophen, nicht nur über die privaten Lebensverhältnisse Gedanken macht, sondern über den normativen Rahmen einer Gesellschaft oder eines Staates, der wird Gemeineigentum fordern, wenn und soweit Privateigentum als für die ideale Gesellschaft schädlich angesehen wird. Für Platons Wächter gilt Güter- und Frauengemeinschaft deshalb, weil sie Zeit und Kraft nicht auf Erwerb und Sicherung ihres Besitzstandes vergeuden, sondern sie ganz dem Gemeinwohl widmen sollen25. Im Übrigen fällt auf, dass die römischen Dichter, darin den Philosophen ähnlich, das Schlaraffenland oder das „Goldene Zeitalter“ als einen gesellschaftlichen Zustand ohne Recht und Richter schildern. Offenbar erlebten sie das Recht als stabilisierenden Faktor ihrer als defizitär erkannten Ordnung stärker als die griechischen Denker, die in ihren Schilderungen des Goldenen Zeitalters auf das Recht insgesamt oder auf einzelne Rechtsregeln nicht eingehen26. Wenn dieser Unterschied zwischen römischer und griechischer Literatur kein Überlieferungszufall ist, lässt sich daraus auf die unterschiedliche Rolle des Rechts und der Rechtspflege in der griechischen und der römischen Gesellschaft schließen. 5. Auch bei den römischen Juristen lassen sich Spuren eines utopischen Gemeineigentums feststellen – allerdings auch Formen gemeinsamen Eigentums in der Gegenwart. Der unter Diokletian schreibende Hermogenianus27 erwähnt eher beiläufig, dass das ius gentium geteiltes Vermögen (dominia distincta) kenne28. Die Einleitung des Fragments (Ex hoc iure gentium introducta …) lässt vermuten, dass Hermogenian das ius gentium (und damit das Privateigentum) in eine Entwicklungsreihe stellt; dem ius gentium ging bei ihm vielleicht eine Ordnung voraus, die keine dominia distincta, keine Grundstücksgrenzen (agris termini positi) und keinen Handel (commercium) kannte. Wer Hermogenians Schrift nur aus den Digesten Justinians kennt, wird diesen Schluss schon deshalb ziehen, weil unmittelbar zuvor Ulpian dem ius gentium das Regime des ius

24 Etwa in Plat. rep. (IV) 421 c-422 d. 25 Vgl. Plat. rep. (V) 461 e ff. 26 Das gilt auch für Hesiod, der allerdings erg. 274ff. das Recht als von Gott dem Menschen gegeben deutet; den Tieren aber sei es verweigert. 27 Zu ihm und seinem Hauptwerk insb. D. Liebs, Hermogenians iuris epitomae. Zum Stand der römischen Jurisprudenz im Zeitalter Diokletians, Göttingen 1964; ders., Hofjuristen der römischen Kaiser bis Justinian, München 2010, 85f. 28 D. 1,1,5 (Hermog. 1 iur. epit.).

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naturale voranstellt29. Ulpian bringt beide Rechtsordnungen einerseits in eine Hierarchie30, andererseits in eine zeitliche Abfolge. So klingt Hermogenians Text, als würde er einen Zustand des ius naturale kennen, in dem es weder Privateigentum noch Handel gab31. Eine gewisse Bestätigung für ein solches Verständnis bietet ein Text des Aelius Marcianus, in dem er eine Gruppe von Gütern vorstellt, die iure naturali gemeinschaftlich sind (communia sunt omnium), also allen Menschen zur Verfügung stehen32. Als solche Güter nennt er die Luft, fließendes Wasser, das Meer und die Meeresküsten33. Diese knappe Liste stimmt überein mit dem, was die gebildete Literatur der Zeit34 als gemeinsames Eigentum aller Menschen ansieht. Bei Cicero wird der Zusammenhang zwischen einem ursprünglichen Gemeineigentum aller an allem und diesen besonderen, gleichsam ewigen Gemeingütern klargestellt: Sie seien der Natur nach für alle Menschen geschaffen und deshalb dem Privateigentum entzogen (in qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas)35. Cicero bietet zugleich, neben der rechtsphilosophischen Begründung, eine ökonomische Rechtfertigung: Die Nutzung solcher res communes durch andere schmälert nicht ihren Wert für jeden einzelnen36. Der Bezug aber auf die Natur oder das Naturrecht, den sowohl die Philosophen als auch die römischen Juristen herstellen, hat nicht nur auf die spätere juristische sondern auch auf die philosophische und die theologische Diskussion enormen Einfluss. Er verleiht der idealen Vorstellung vom gemeinschaftlichen Zusammenleben eine wirkmächtige normative Komponente. 6. Die biblische Erzählung vom Paradies spiegelt erst in der Deutung der Kirchenväter die Vorstellung einer allen Menschen gemeinsamen Welt wider : Gott habe die Welt nicht einem einzelnen Menschen, dem Adam, sondern der 29 D. 1,1,4 (Ulp. 1 inst.): … qua res (i. e. manumussio) a iure gentium originem sumpsit, utpote cum i8ure naturali omnes liberi nascerentur nec esset nota manumissio, cum servitus esset incognita: sed posteaquam iure gentium servitus invasit, secutum est beneficium manumissionis. 30 Vgl. auch D. 1,1,1,3 (Ulp. 1 inst.). 31 Weitere Quellen zum Inhalt des ius naturale führt an Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 23f. 32 D. 1,8,2 (Marc. 3 inst.): Quaedam naturali iure communia sunt omnium, quaedam universitatis, quaedam nullius, pleraque singolurum, quae variis ex causis cuique adquiruntur. Et quidem naturali iure omnium communia sunt illa: aer aqua profluens, et mare, et per hoc litera maris. 33 Ähnlich, wenn auch nicht so vollständig, D. 43,8,3 (Cels. 39 dig.): maris communem usum omnibus hominibus, ut aeris; D. 47,10,13,7 (Ulp. 57 ad ed.): quidem mare commune omnium est et litora, sicuti aer. 34 Sen. benef. 4,28,3; Cic. pro S. Rosc. Am. 71–72; Ovid met. 4,349–352; Verg. Aen. 7,229; vgl. auch Quint. inst. 6,4. 35 Vgl. Cic. off. 1,51. 36 Cic. off. 1,52 (vgl. oben bei Fn. 21); vgl. auch Sen. benef. 4,28,2–4 und 4,29,1.

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Menschheit insgesamt überantwortet. So folgert Ambrosius aus Gen. 1,28–30, wonach Dominus Deus noster terram hanc possessionem omnium hominum voluerit esse communem, et fructus omnibus ministrare37. Diese Deutung ist von der Stoa beeinflusst, vor allem von den Werken Ciceros und Senecas38. Jüdischer Tradition entspricht sie nicht. Weder privates Eigentum noch Reichtum werden in den alttestamentlichen Schriften verpönt. „Dem Reichen ist seine Habe eine feste Burg“, liest man etwa in der Salomonischen Spruchsammlung39. Allerdings enthält schon das Deuteronomium zahlreiche Vorschriften über die Armenfürsorge: etwa dass der Zehnte in jedem dritten Jahr an die Armen zu geben sei (Dtn. 14,28–29), in jedem siebten Jahr die Schulden zu erlassen sind (Dtn. 15, 1–6), Armen mit Krediten beizuspringen ist (Dtn. 15,7–11), jüdische Sklaven in jedem siebten Jahr freizulassen und mit lebensnotwendigen Gütern auszustatten sind (Dtn. 15,12–18) oder dass das Zinsnehmen (unter Juden) verboten ist (Dtn. 23,20–21). Bemerkenswert ist auch die Regel, dass jeder in fremden Feldern und Weinbergen die Früchte abernten darf, die er benötigt, um seinen Hunger zu stillen (Dtn. 23,25–26), oder die über das Recht der Nachlese, das nicht dem Eigentümer, sondern den Fremden, Witwen und Waisen zusteht (Dtn. 24,20–22). Außerdem appellieren die Psalmen40 und die prophetischen Schriften41 gleichermaßen an die Gläubigen, die irdischen Güter nicht höher zu schätzen als die göttliche Verheißung. Mit der Ankunft des Messias sieht auch die jüdische Lehre wiederhergestellt, was mit dem Sündenfall verloren ging. Dabei steht die Sammlung des versprengten Volkes im Heiligen Land im Mittelpunkt. Im Protojesaja reproduziert die heilsgeschichtliche Erwartung aber ähnliche Bilder, wie wir sie aus den griechischen und römischen Erzählungen vom Goldenen Zeitalter kennen: Mensch und Tier leben friedlich miteinander, keiner tötet ein Lebewesen, niemand übt Gewalt oder tut Böses42. Im Tritojesaja wird dieses Bild wiederholt43, ergänzt aber um den Hinweis, dass jeder die Früchte seiner eigenen Arbeit wird genießen können44. Es fehlt aber auch nicht an Mahnungen, ja Drohungen gegen 37 Ambr. expos. in psalm. 118, 8,22 (Migne, PL 15, 1303C-D); ähnlich Ambr. de off. ministr. 1,28 (PL 16, 67 A-B): natura enim omnia omnibus in commune profudit. Sic enim Deus generari iussit omnia, ut pastus omnibus communis esset, et terra foret omnium quaedam communis possessio. 38 Darauf weist schon hin J. Stelzenberger, Die Beziehungen der frühchristlichen Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa. Eine moralgeschichtliche Studie, München 1933, 132f.; kurz auch Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 308. 39 Vulg. prov. 10,15: substantia divitis urbs fortitudinis eius. 40 Vgl. etwa Psalm 49 (insb. 14–21). 41 Etwa Am. 6,1–7; Micha 2,1–11; Hab. 2,6–10. 42 Jes. 11,6–9. 43 Jes. 66,25. 44 Jes. 66,21–23.

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die Reichen, die Grundbesitzer, die ihr Vermögen zum Schaden ihrer Glaubensbrüder mehren45. In der hellenistischen Zeit tritt die Exilerfahrung hinter das Gebot des sozialen Ausgleichs zurück. Das dürfte den wirtschaftlichen Verwerfungen der drei letzten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderte geschuldet sein, in denen die kleinbäuerliche durch eine Latifundienwirtschaft ersetzt wird, das Heer der Landpächter und Tagelöhner anschwillt und die Kluft zwischen Arm und Reich als Bedrohung der Glaubenseinheit empfunden wird46. Von der Ächtung privaten Eigentums oder dem Ideal der Gütergemeinschaft findet man in den Quellen dieser Zeit gleichwohl nichts47. Daher mag es überraschen, wenn es von der Sekte der Essener und von der mit diesen vielleicht im Austausch stehenden oder gar identischen Gemeinschaft von Qumran48, heißt, sie hätten alles gemeinsam besessen und Privateigentum gemieden49. Doch gilt es zu bedenken, dass wir unsere Kenntnisse über die Essener weitgehend hellenistischen Autoren verdanken, insbesondere Philon von Alexandrien50 und Josephus Flavius51. Beide stellen in ihrem Bericht einen Zusammenhang zwischen den Essenern und der griechischen, insbesondere der pythagoreischen Philosophie her. Außerdem müssen wir damit rechnen, dass sie das bei den Essenern beobachtete Ideal des Zusammenlebens in Bildern ausmalen, die einer griechisch gebildeten Leserschaft bekannt sind. Von den Essenern könnte die frühe Jerusalemer Christengemeinde inspiriert gewesen sein, deren Mitglieder nach dem Zeugnis der Apostelgeschichte erant pariter et habebant omnia communia52. In der älteren Literatur wurde darüber diskutiert, ob das Gemeineigentum, von dem die Apostelgeschichte berichtet, verbindliche Regel war53. Das wird heute meist abgelehnt, indem man den 45 Vgl. Jes. 1,8–10 und Jes. 10, 1–3; dazu M. Hengel, Eigentum und Reichtum in der frühen Kirche: Aspekte einer frühchristlichen Sozialgeschichte, Stuttgart 1973, 21f. (= in: Studien zum Urchristentum. Kleine Schriften VI, hg. v. C.-J. Thornton, Tübingen 2008, 364). 46 Dazu mit zahlreichen Nachweisen Hengel, Eigentum (Fn. 45) 23ff. 47 Im Überblick P. Christophe, Les devoirs moraux des riches. L’usage du Droit de Propri8t8 dans l’Ecriture et la Tradition Patristique, Paris 1963, 25ff. 48 Über den Stand der Diskussion über das Verhältnis der Essener zur Gemeinschaft von Qumran etwa R. Bergmeier, Die Qumran-Essener-Hypothese. Die Handschriftenfunde bei Khirbet Qumran, ihr spezifischer Trägerkreis und die essenische Gemeinschaft, Neukirchen 2013; Ch. Metzenthin, Jesaja-Auslegung in Qumran, Zürich 2010, 33ff. 49 Vgl. Philo prob. 72–91 (ed. M. Petit, Paris 1973); Jos. bell. iud. 1,119–161; zu den Essenern etwa Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 28ff.; dort 32ff. zur Gemeinschaft von Qumran. 50 Philo apol. 11, 1ff. (bes. 11,5); prob. 75ff. (bes. 76f.). 51 Jos. bell. iud. 2,122; dazu insb. R. Bergmeier, Die Essener-Berichte des Flavius Josephus, 1993; J.C. VanderKam, Einführung in die Qumranforschung: Geschichte und Bedeutung der Schriften vom Toten Meer, Göttingen 1998, 92ff. 52 Act. apost. 2,44; ähnlich 4,32: erant illis omnia communia. 53 Vgl. Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 40ff. Das legt die Erzählung über Hananias und Saphira nahe, Apg. 5,1–11.

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„Liebeskommunismus“ der Urgemeinde54 aus der Endzeiterwartung heraus erklärt, in der sie ihr Gemeindeleben organisierte. Womöglich ist es aber auch hier der Erzähler (Lukas), der die Gemeinde im Licht eines hellenistischen Ideals schildert55. Griechische und jüdische Quellen verbindet auch die jüdische Sibylle zu einem tröstlichen Bild anarchischer Einheit56 : Quellen entspringen von Wein und von Milch und flüssigem Honig. / Gleich ist die Erde für alle, und nicht durch Mauern und Schranken / Abgeteilt: bringt dann sie hervor noch reichere Früchte / Ganz von selber : gemeinsam das Leben in herrnlosem Reichtum! / Denn kein Bettler wird dort mehr sein, kein Knecht und kein Herrscher, / Auch wird niemand jetzt weder mächtig und groß noch gering sein: Dann ist nicht König noch Führer; es leben ja alle gemeinsam.

7. Nach den kanonisierten Evangelien empfahl Jesus weder die Gütergemeinschaft noch verbot er Eigentum57. Allerdings berichten die Evangelisten übereinstimmend, dass er Reichtum als ein Hindernis bei der Nachfolge ansah. Das Bild, es gehe eher ein Kamel durch ein Nadelöhr als ein Reicher in den Himmel58, unterstreicht Jesus noch mit dem Satz, es sei schwer für Reiche, in der Reich Gottes zu kommen59. In der Bergpredigt gibt Jesus, nach dem Zeugnis des Lukas, dafür eine Begründung: Ubi enim est thesaurus tuus, ibi est et cor tuum60. Auf diese Formel konzentrieren sich auch die Kirchenväter, etwa Clemens von Alexandrien in seiner Predigt T¸r b syfºlemor pko¼sior61 über die Erzählung vom reichen Jüngling62 : Nicht der Reichtum selbst ist es, der den Weg ins Himmelreich erschwere, sondern die Sorge um sein Vermögen, die den Reichen vom Streben nach dem Reich Gottes abhält63. In der frühchristlichen Pastoral wird dieser Topos in verschiedenen Varianten wiederholt: Der an irdischen Gütern Arme ist reich vor Gott, andererseits aber kann der Reiche als „fröhlicher Geber“64 sich Schätze im Himmelreich erwerben. Von Harnack hatte anhand der 54 Hengel, Eigentum (Fn. 45) 39ff. 55 Hengel, Eigentum (Fn. 45) 39 weist hin auf Aristoteles. 56 Sib. 2, 318–324 (Übersetzung von A. Kurfeß, Sibyllinische Weissagungen. Griechisch und deutsch, München, 1951, 65f.); zu dem Text auch Hengel, Eigentum (Fn. 45) 56. 57 Ähnlich auch Weigand, Naturechtslehre (Fn. 4) 307f. 58 Mk. 10,25; Lk. 18,25; Mt. 19,24. 59 Mk. 10,23f.; Lk. 18,24; Mt. 19,23; Hinweise auf weitere einschlägige Texte bei Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 34ff. 60 Vulg. Mt. 6,21. 61 Clem. Quis dives salvetur, bes. cap. 14f. (PG 9, 603, 617ff.); dazu etwa Hengel, Eigentum (Fn. 45) 79ff. 62 Mk. 10,17–27; Mt. 19,16–22; Lk. 18,18–24. 63 Ganz ähnlich Orig. contra Cels. 7,23; dazu kurz O. Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum in der Altkirchlichen Literatur. Ein Beitrag zur sozialen Frage, Freiburg 1908 (Nachdr. Frankfurt 1985) 49. 64 2 Kor. 9,7.

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Quellen des 2. und 3. Jahrhundert gezeigt65, dass etwa die Gemeinde in Rom ein großes Netz der Armenfürsorge aufgebaut hatte, das ohne die regelmäßige Beteiligung von Wohlhabenden nicht hätte aufrechterhalten werden können66. 8. Die Fürsorge der Christen untereinander fiel auch Nichtchristen auf67 und wird von Tertullian (ca. 150 – ca. 220)68 als Verwirklichung des Jesus-Wortes gerühmt69, dass man die Jünger an der Liebe erkennen werde, die sie untereinander üben. In derselben Passage fallen zwei entscheidende Bemerkungen: Zunächst erwähnt Tertullian, zwar eher beiläufig, dass alle Menschen, auch die Heiden, nach dem Naturrecht (ius naturae) Brüder seien70. Dann vergleicht er die freigiebige Nächstenliebe mit der communicatio der weltlichen Güter : Alles sei den Gläubigen gemeinschaftlich, nur nicht die Frauen71. Dieser Versuch, die Einheit der Christen von der platonischen Utopie abzugrenzen, ist so bemerkenswert, dass die Passage wörtlich wiedergegeben sei72 : (11) Itaque qui animo animaque miscemur, nihil de rei communicatione dubitamus. Omnia indiscreta sunt apud nos praeter uxores. [12] In isto loco consortium solvimus, in quo solo ceteri homines consortium exercent, qui non amicorum solummodo matrimonia usurpant, sed et sua amicis patientissime subministrant – ex illa, credo, maiorum et sapientissimorum disciplina, Graeci Socratis et Romani Catonis, qui uxores suas amicis communicaverunt, quas in matrimonium duxerant liberorum causa et alibi creandorum, nescio quidem an invitas; [13] quid enim de castitate curarent, quam mariti tam facile donaverant? O sapientiae Atticae, o Romanae gravitatis exemplum: leno[n] est philosophus et censor!

Tertullian setzt die christliche Heilsbotschaft in scharfen Gegensatz zu römischer Sitte und griechischer Philosophie, die in der Person von Cato dem Älteren und Platon in der Frauengemeinschaft ein Ideal sehen. Beinahe modern scheint der Zweifel, dass auch Frauen diese gutheißen mochten (nescio quidem an invitas). Nach christlicher Auffassung stehen Frau und Mann vor Gott gleich73, und deshalb kann nur die Frau selbst entscheiden, ob sie (aus christlicher Sicht) 65 A. von Harnack, Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten, Bd. I: Die Mission in Wort und Tat, Leipzig 1924 (Nachdr. Frankfurt 2018) 170ff., bes. 182f. 66 Vgl. auch Hengel, Eigentum (Fn. 45) 70ff. (= Studien zum Urchristentum 403ff.). 67 Etwa Lucian peregr. 10. 68 Tert. apol. 39,7 (CCSL I, 151): „Vide“, inquiunt, „ut invicem se diligant“, ipsi enim invicem oderunt, „et ut pro alterutro mori sint parati“; ipsi enim ad occidendum alterutrum paratiores erunt. 69 Vulg. Joh. 13,35: In hoc cognoscent omnes quia discipuli mei estis, si dilectionem habueritis ad invicem. 70 Tert. apol. 39,8: Fratres autem etiam vestri sumus iure naturae matris unius … 71 Zu dem Text ausführlich Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 56f. 72 Tert. apol. 39,11–13 (CCSL I 151f.). 73 Vgl. Gal. 3,28.

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sündigen will. Wichtiger ist für unseren Zweck aber ein anderer Punkt: Die Freigiebigkeit der Gläubigen wird mit dem philosophischen Ideal der Gütergemeinschaft illustriert. In älteren Quellen wird ein solcher Vergleich kaum gezogen74 ; darin geht es – in pastoraler Absicht – regelmäßig darum, die Gläubigen vom uneigennützigen Umgang mit privatem Vermögen zu überzeugen. Bei Tertullians Zeitgenossen und Nachfolgern wird das gemeinsame Eigentum aller zwar als gottgewolltes Ideal oder als Schöpfungszustand geschildert75, Folgerungen für das private Eigentum werden daraus aber nicht gezogen76. Clemens von Alexandrien (ca. 150–215) argumentiert etwa in seinem Paedagogus, Gott habe alles für alle geschaffen, weshalb auch allen alles gemeinsam ist (joim± owm t± p²mta)77. Diesen Satz variiert Clemens im Protreptikos dahin, dass Gott dem Menschen alles überlassen habe, ihm also zusammen mit den Menschen Gemeineigentum an dieser Welt zukomme78. Auch Cyprian von Karthago († 258) sieht die Güter der Erde im Gemeineigentum der Menschen, weshalb sie gemeinschaftlich zu nutzen seien (quodcumque Dei est in nostra usurpatione commune est)79. Wichtiger ist ihm aber, ähnlich wie Clemens, dass nicht der Besitz selbst die Verderbnis des Reichen sei, sondern dass er vom Reichtum besessen ist (possideri magis, quam possidere)80. In allen diesen Texten wird einerseits die Auseinandersetzung der Theologen mit der griechischen (vor allem der stoischen81) Philosophie deutlich, andererseits der Glaube, dass alleine die christliche Gemeinschaft verwirklichen könne, wovon die Heiden träumen. Obwohl das ideale Gemeineigentum bei diesen Kirchenvätern im Hintergrund bleibt, prägt es für die spätere Theologie jedenfalls die Form, in der die von Gott geplante Weltordnung und die von Jesus geforderte Nächstenliebe ausgedrückt werden sollen. Ähnlich wie Tertullian setzt Laktanz (ca. 250 – ca. 320) sich mit der platoni74 Auch wenn die Schilderung in der Apostelgeschichte (o. Fn. 52) solche Assoziationen geweckt haben dürfte. 75 Neben dem Buch von Schilling (o. Fn. 63) sind für das Auffinden einschlägiger Texte geeignet P. Christophe, L’usage Chr8tien du droit de propri8t8 dans l’8criture de la tradition patristique, Paris 1963, und Ch. Avila, Ownership: early Christian teaching, Maryknoll/ London 1983. 76 Im Ansatz ähnlich R.W. Carlyle/A.J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, 5. Aufl., Edinburgh/London 1962, 132ff. 77 Clem. paed. 2,12 (§ 120,3); dazu etwa Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 77ff. 78 Clem. prot. 12 (§ 122,3). 79 Cypr. de opere 59,10 (ed. CSEL 3/1, 1868, 393 Z. 24); kurz dazu Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 59f. (dort aber fälschlich als epist. 59,10); vgl. außerdem Hengel, Eigentum (Fn. 45) 83ff. 80 Cypr. ad Donat. 12 (ed CSEL 3/1, 1868, 13f.). 81 So auch M.J. Wilks, The Problem of Private Ownership in Patristic Thought and an Augustinian Solution in the Fourteenth Century, in: F.L. Cross (ed.), Studia Patristica VI, Berlin 1962, 533.

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schen Utopie einer Güter- und Frauengemeinschaft auseinander. Er lehnt allerdings beide ab, auch wenn er die Gütergemeinschaft immerhin für denkbar hält82. Doch wäre der Unterschied zwischen arm und reich eingeebnet, wären frugalitas (Sparsamkeit), abstinentia (Enthaltsamkeit), temperantia (Mäßigung) und castitas (Uneigennützigkeit) nicht mehr gefordert und damit wären gerade die Tugenden in Frage gestellt, die ein gottgefälliges Leben ausmachen. Daher seien nicht Gut und Geld zu verbannen, sondern Habsucht und Geiz. An anderer Stelle bringt er ein ökonomisches Argument gegen die Gütergleichheit vor: Fleiß und Faulheit blieben gleichermaßen unbelohnt83. In seinen institutiones divinae aber schildert Laktanz, dass die Menschen nach der Vertreibung aus dem Paradies begonnen hätten, Hab und Gut aufzuteilen und einander vorzuenthalten84. Bei der Schilderung des Urzustandes hält er sich an Cicero, sieht ihn aber in Übereinstimmung mit christlicher Schöpfungslehre85 : Gott habe die Erde allen gemeinsam übergeben, damit alle ihre Bedürfnisse damit stillen konnte und nicht Raub und Habsucht alles an sich rafften und keinem fehle, was für alle entstanden ist86. Die Utopie vom Gemeineigentum wird nicht ausdrücklich erwähnt, doch ist sie in diesen Zeilen ebenso erkennbar wie in denen, die die Zeit nach dem Sündenfall, die Zeit der Gottesferne (sublata Dei religione) schildern, in der die cupiditas der Menschen zur Quelle allen Übels geworden sei87: … aliena quoque rapiebant, in privatum lucrum trahentes omnia, et quae antea in usus hominum etiam singuli laborabant, in paucorum domos conferebantur.

Außerdem ist bei Lactantius klar erkennbar, dass die Goldene Zeit mit dem Sündenfall, der Abwendung von Gott, endet, mit dem Erlösertod Christi aber wieder anbricht. Für diese Zeit, die Zeit des erlösten Volkes Gottes, fordert Laktanz kein gemeinsames Eigentum aller, sieht aber, dass es niemandem an den Lebensgrundlagen fehlt, dass Reichtum und Armut unbekannt sind88. Während auch Basilius (ca. 330–379) die tätige Nächstenliebe in den Vordergrund seiner theologischen Überlegungen zu Reichtum und Eigentum 82 Dazu und zum Folgenden Lact. inst. 3,21–22; ausführlicher Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 74ff.; knapper Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 101f. 83 Vgl. Lact. inst. epit. 33,2: nec enim aut obesse cuiqum debet, si sua industria plus habet, aut prodesse, si sua culpa minus. 84 Ausführlich dazu Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 31ff. 85 Lact. inst. 5,5 (PL 6, 565 = CSEL 19, 413): ut Cicero in suo narrat, quod est proprium nostrae religionis. 86 Lact inst. 5,5 (ibid.): Quippe cum Deus communem omnibus terram dedisset, ut communem dgerent vitam, non ut rabida et furens avaritia sibi omnia vendicaret, nec ulli deesset quod omnibus nasceretur. 87 Lact. inst. 5,6 (PL 6, 567 = CSEL 19, 415). 88 Lact. inst. 5,15 (PL 6, 598 = CSEL 19, 447, 4): Nemo Deo pauper est, nisi qui iustitia indiget; nemo dives, nisi qui virtutibus plenus est.

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stellte89, bemühte sich Gregor von Nazianz (ca. 329–390), ähnlich wie Laktanz, die materielle Ungleichheit als eine dem göttlichen Schöpfungsplan widersprechende Entwicklung zu deuten90. Auch er gibt der Vorstellung einer paradiesischen Gleichheit aller Menschen eine normative und heilsgeschichtliche Bedeutung91. Erst der Sündenfall nämlich habe zu einer Ausdifferenzierung in arm und reich geführt und zur Einführung der Sklaverei. Noch deutlicher stellt Johannes Chrysostomos (ca. 344–407) heraus, dass Gottes Schöpfung Gemeineigentum aller an allem vorsehe. Die 12. Predigt zum 1. Timotheus-Brief beschließt Johannes mit einer Mahnung gegen die Habsüchtigen92. Darin argumentiert er, Gott habe die Erde für sich und die Menschen insgesamt geschaffen, friedlich hätten sie das gemeinsame Gut genutzt. Denn was Gott gehört, gehöre allen. Doch die Habsucht einzelner habe zur Unterscheidung von Mein und Dein geführt, wodurch Streit und Uneinigkeit entstanden seien. Johannes weist darauf hin, dass Städte und Häfen, die Luft, das Meer, das Wasser, Himmel und Erde und auch die Sterne Gemeingut seien und sich daran erkennen lasse, dass die Güter dieser Welt allen zustünden. Nur gemeinsames Eigentum sei daher der Natur gemäß (jat± v¼sim)93. Daran ist zweierlei bemerkenswert. Zunächst fällt die Aufzählung der noch heute im Gemeineigentum befindlichen Sachen auf; darin finden sich nicht nur die in der Philosophie geläufigen Dinge wie Luft, Wasser und Meer94, sondern auch Städte und Häfen, die die Juristen jener (oder jedenfalls der späteren) Zeit zu den res publicae oder universitatis rechnen95, also zu den Einrichtungen, die dem Zugang und Gebrauch aller offen stehen. Dann überrascht das Argument, das Gemeineigentum sei der Natur gemäß. Das natura nihil privatum des Irnerius96 scheint darin vorweggenommen. Zwar ist nicht vom „Naturrecht“ die Rede, von dem Paulus sagt, es sei den Menschen in das Herz geschrieben (opus legis scriptum in cordibus97), aber die Natur, die Johannes adressiert, wird als normativ verstanden. Sie geht also über den Gedanken hinaus, wie noch Cicero formulierte, dass die Natur alles zum gemeinschaftlichen Gebrauch geschaffen 89 Vgl. Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 86, 92ff.; ausführliche Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 107ff., bes. 112ff. 90 Etwa Greg. theol. or. 14 (de pauperum amore) cap. 25–26 (PG 35, 889 ff.). 91 Ausführlich Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 102ff.; vgl. auch Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 39f.; Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 130ff. 92 Joh. Chrys. hom. XII in 1 Tim., cap. 4 (PG 62, 562ff.; Zitat 564); dazu auch Wilks, Private Ownership (Fn. 81) 534; Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 43f. 93 Dazu auch Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 119ff.; Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 135ff. 94 Vgl. die Hinweise o. in Fn. 33. 95 Vgl. I. 2,1,2 und 2,1,6. 96 Dazu o. bei und in Fn. 4. 97 Vulg. Rom. 2,15.

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habe98. Nicht klar wird indes, um wessen „Natur“ es geht, um die des Menschen, die der Gesellschaft oder die der Schöpfung. Der Hinweis auf die v¼sir macht aber deutlich, dass die stoische Lehre von der natürlichen Gemeinschaft der Menschen sich nicht nur in der fachtheologischen sondern auch in der Allgemeinbildung fest etabliert hat. 9. Eine ganz ähnliche Sicht vertrat Ambrosius von Mailand (339–397). In seinem an Ciceros de officiis orientierten Werk de officiis ministrorum lehrt er99, Gottes Schöpfung sehe vor, dass die Güter der Erde allen Menschen zur Verfügung stünden. Wörtlich schreibt er100 : Deinde formam iustitiae putaverunt, ut quis communia, id est publica pro publicis habeat privata pro suis. Nec hoc quidem secundum naturam. Natura enim omnia omnibus in commune profudit. Sic enim Deus generari iussit omnia, ut pastus omnibus communis esset, et terra foret omnium quaedam communis possessio. Natura igitur ius commune generavit, usurpatio ius facit privatum. Quo in loco aiunt placuisse Stoicis, …

Der Satz, dass die Natur ein ius commune geschaffen habe, also ein allgemeines (Gebrauchs-) Recht, die usurpatio aber ein privates Recht, verstärkt – im Vergleich mit Johannes101 – den normativen Impetus von Gottes Schöpfung. Die Güter sind nicht nur, sie sollen auch Gemeineigentum sein. Die usurpatio spielt auf den Sündenfall an, ohne dies ausdrücklich zu sagen102. Beides, das Gemeineigentum als göttliche Norm und das Privateigentum als Ausdruck der menschlichen Schwäche, kehrt im Psalmen-Kommentar wieder103 : Cum praesertim Dominus Deus noster terram hanc possessionem omnium hominum voluerit esse communem et fructus omnium ministrare; sed avaritia possessionum iura distribuit.

Die Anlehnung an die stoische Philosophie ist hier nicht zu überhören104. Die avaritia ist nun aber Sünde und steht sinnbildlich für den Sündenfall Adams. Sie 98 Vgl. nur Cic. off. 1,51: Ac latissime quidem patens hominibus inter ipsos, omnibus inter omnes societas haec est. In qua omnium rerum, quas ad communem hominum usum natura genuit, est servanda communitas, …. 99 Eine eindrucksvolle Gegenüberstellung der einschlägigen Passagen bei Cicero und Ambrosius bietet Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 167ff., 169f. 100 Ambr. off. 1,132 (PL 16, 62 = CCSL 15, 2001). 101 Und auch im Vergleich zu Cic. off. 1,21; dazu auch Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 49ff. (insb. dort in Fn. 258). 102 Zu diesem Text kurz auch Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 142; J. Stelzenberger, Die Beziehungen der frühchristlichen Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa, Bd. 1, München 1933 (Nachdr. Hildesheim 1989), 132f.; Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 308. 103 Ambr. expos. psalmi 118, cap. 8,22 (PL 15, 1303f. = CSEL 62/V, 163, 22–25). 104 Vgl. Sen. epist. 90,38: Inrupit in res optime positas avaritia et, dum seducere aliquid cupit

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macht Gottes Plan einer allen gemeinsamen Erde zunichte. Der paradiesische Zustand wird vom Menschen korrumpiert105. Die sozialethische Forderung von Nächstenliebe und Freigiebigkeit ist eingebettet in ein heilsgeschichtliches Programm: Mit dem Sündenfall ist die gottgewollte Gütergemeinschaft aufgehoben, mit dem Erlösertod Christi soll sie wieder entstehen. Bei Augustinus von Hippo (354–430) treten die bei Johannes und Ambrosius erkennbaren Anleihen bei der stoischen Sozialethik in den Hintergrund. Gemeineigentum als historische oder als ideale Form der Güterverteilung propagiert er nicht, jedenfalls nicht ausdrücklich. Vielmehr kontrastiert er den gerechten Umgang mit den Gütern dieser Welt mit der zivilrechtlichen Eigentumsordnung, die alleine privates Eigentum vorsehe106. Einschlägige Überlegungen stellt er in jenem Brief an, in dem er postulierte, dass derjenige nicht von seiner Sünde freigesprochen werden könne, der das, was er zu Unrecht erworben hat, nicht restituiert (non remittitur peccatum, nisi restituatur ablatum)107. Das auferre einer Sache setzt voraus, dass man sie einem anderen zuordnen kann, dass man also aus der Sicht des Restitutionspflichtigen von einer res aliena, einer fremden Sache, sprechen kann108. Was aber ist „fremd“? Augustinus führt dazu aus, dass eine gerechte Verteilung der Güter daran gemessen werde, wie jemand ein Gut nutzt. Nutzt er es „gut“, setzt er es für seine eigenen Bedürfnisse wie für die seiner Nächsten ein, steht ihm auch das Recht daran zu (hoc autem iure, quod iuste, et hoc iuste, quod bene). „Schlecht“ und daher ungerecht genutzte Güter aber stehen ihm nicht zu. Das Zivilrecht allerdings, so Augustinus, nutze einen anderen Maßstab; es schütze nämlich auch eine nach diesem Maßstab bestehende Ungerechtigkeit (iniquitas), und zwar deswegen, um dem ungerechten Besitzer Schranken zu setzen (… ut male utentes minus molesti sint), sein Eigentum für andere also erträglich zu machen109. In diesen Ausführungen wird der sozialnützliche Umgang mit Eigentum für eine christliche Ordnung ebenso vorausgesetzt wie bei den älteren Kirchenvätern. Die zivilrechtliche Güterordnung aber wird als notwendiges Übel, als Mittel

105 106 107 108 109

atque in suum vertere, omnia fecit aliena et in angustum se ex inmenso redegit. Avaritia paupertatem intulit et multa concupiscendo omnia amisit. Dazu und mit weiteren Belegen aus dem Werk des Ambrosius Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 144ff.; Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 175ff. Zahlreiche Quellen zu Augustins Eigentumslehre bei Christophe, Devoirs moraux (Fn. 47) 183ff. Aug. epist. 153, cap. 6,20 (PL 33, 663 = CSEL 44, 419, 7–8). Die Passage beginnt mit der Feststellung: Si enim res aliena, propter quam peccatum est, cum reddi possit, non redditur, non agitur poenitentia, sed fingitur. Aug. epist. 153, cap. 6,26 (PL 33, 665 = CSEL 44, 426f.). Die ersten Sätze und die aus dem vorhergehenden Kapitel (6,25) hat Gratian in sein Decretum aufgenommen (C. 14, qu. 4, c.11). Zu dem Text (tw. mit Übersetzung) Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 176f.

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gegen allzu schamlose Habsucht akzeptiert, solange, bis die Gläubigen, denen nach dem Recht alles zusteht110, zu jener Stadt gelangen, in der sie die Erbschaft des ewigen Lebens erwartet (donec fideles et pii, quorum jure sunt omnia … perveniant ad illam civitatem, ubi hereditas aeternitatis est). Dass den Gläubigen dann alles gehört, verbindet Augustinus zwar nicht ausdrücklich mit dem Gedanken vom Miteigentum aller, doch in dem quorum iure sunt omnia kling diese Vorstellung an. Weil es Augustinus nicht um den Verlust der paradiesischen Ordnung geht, sondern um die Perspektive auf das ewige Heil, fehlt bei ihm der Bezug zur natura oder zum ius naturae. Der Satz, dass den Gläubigen alles gehört, ist auf „richtiges“, göttliches Recht gegründet. Das wird auch in einer anderen Passage deutlich, in der Augustinus ein Privateigentum nach ius divinum ablehnt, weil alles Gott gehöre. Nur nach menschlichem Recht (iure humano) lasse sich sagen, dass dieses Haus oder jener Sklave mir gehört111: Ecce sunt villae: quo iure defendis villas? divino an humano? Respondeant: Divinum ius in Scripturis habemus, humanum ius in legibus regum. Unde quisque possidet quod possidet? nonne iure humano? Nam iure divino, Domini est terra et plenitudo eius: pauperes et divites Deus de uno limo fecit, et pauperes et divites una terra supportat. Iure tamen humano dicit: Haec villa mea est, haec domus mea, hic servus meus est. Iure ergo humano, iure imperatorum. Quare? Quia ipsa iura humana per imperatores et reges saeculi Deus distribuit generi humano. Vultis legamus leges imperatorum, et secundum ipsas agamus de villis? Si iure humano vultis possidere, recitemus leges imperatorum: videamus si voluerunt aliquid ab haereticis possideri. Sed quid mihi est imperator? Secundum ius ipsius possides terram. Aut tolle iura imperatorum, et quis audet dicere: Mea est illa villa, aut meus est ille servus, aut domus haec mea est?

Nur das Recht des Kaisers gestattet es, von „Mein“ und „Dein“ zu reden; das göttliche Recht lässt eine solche Zuordnung nicht zu. Aber der gegenwärtige Zustand des Zivilrechts, der Privateigentum erlaubt, werde vergehen; die Heilsgeschichte vollende sich in einem Zustand, in dem den Gläubigen alles gehört. Weigand will den Text anders verstehen; er sieht darin keinen Gegensatz sehen zwischen einem „(Natur)Recht des Gerechten“ und einem Privateigentum gestattenden menschlichen Recht112. Vielmehr betont er, dass auch das privatrechtliche Eigentum auf Gottes Willen ruhe, weil Gott dem Kaiser ermöglicht habe, solche Regeln zu erlassen. Dafür beruft er sich auf Schilling, dem es aber vor allem darum geht zu zeigen, dass Augustinus keinen „Kommunismus“ predigte113. Weigands Verständnis birgt einen richtigen Kern; die theologische 110 Die ganze Passage nimmt ihren Ausgang bei LXX proverb. 17,6/2: fidelis hominis totus mundus divitiae sunt infidelis autem nec obulus; der Spruch fehlt in der Vulgata. 111 Aug. in evang. Ioh. tractatus 6,25 (PL 35, 1436f.). 112 Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 309f. 113 Vgl. Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 179f. (bei Weigand, 310 Fn. 10, fälschlich: „Schilling 199“).

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Diskussion bis zu den Spätscholastikern zeugt von den Schwierigkeiten, das Verhältnis zwischen göttlichem Recht und staatlichem Recht zu bestimmen. Und Augustins hat insoweit wohl auch die frühmittelalterliche Diskussion (insbesondere bei Isidor) über das Verhältnis von ius naturale, gentium und civile beeinflusst. Die zentrale Aussage des Augustinus zur Aufteilung des Eigentums wird davon aber nicht überdeckt: Göttliches Recht kennt kein Privateigentum, weltliches schon114. Im Übrigen müssen wir voraussetzen, dass Augustinus belastbare Kenntnisse des Zivilrechts hatte. In einer seiner Predigten kontrastiert er den iurisconsultus Paulus des Zivilrechts mit dem Evangelisten Paulus, dem iuris divini consultus, dem Gelehrten des göttlichen Rechts115. 10. Zu Beginn des 5. Jahrhunderts hat die Theologie das philosophische Konzept des Gemeineigentums mit der von Christus geforderten Nächstenliebe verschmolzen, andererseits Ansätze gefunden, göttliche und menschliche Ordnung oder natürliches Recht und Zivilrecht zu hierarchisieren. An den Theologen der nachfolgenden Jahrhunderte lag es nun, diese Bilder zu festigen und in den philosophischen und juristischen Diskurs einzuspeisen. Bei Gregor dem Großen (ca. 540–604) wird aus der Verbindung von Nächstenliebe und dem paradiesischen Gemeineigentum das Argument, dass, weil allen alles gemeinsam gehört, der Reiche dem Armen keine Almosen gebe, sondern das ohnehin ihm Gehörende restituiere116. Damit wird aus einem moralischen Appell ein rechtliches Sollen117. Isidor von Sevillas (ca. 560–636) Enzyklopädie enthält im 5. Buch eine im Wesentlichen aus den Digesten und Institutionen Justinians geschöpfte allgemeine Rechtslehre. Wie eine Zusammenschau von Ulpian (D. 1,1,1,2–3 und D. 1,1,4) und Hermogenian (D. 1,1,5) klingt seine Hierarchisierung von ius naturale, ius gentium und ius civile118. Zwar wird das ius civile vor dem ius gentium genannt, doch ist dies seiner Apposition zum ius naturale geschuldet; die 114 Ähnlich wie hier auch Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 76. 115 Aug. serm. 52,9 (PL 38, 358): Paulum recito, idoneum juris divini consultum. Nam et causidici habent hodie Paulum dictantem jura litigatorum, non Christianorum. Recito, inquam, Paulus dictantem pacis jura, non litis. 116 Greg. regulae pastoralis 3,21 (= admonitio 22) (PL 77, 87f.), etwa: Admonendi sunt … ut sciant sollicite quod ea de qua sumpti sunt, cunctis hominibus terra communis est, et idcirco alimenta quoque omnibus communiter profert. Incassum ergo se innocentes putant, qui commune Dei munus sibi privatum vindicant; qui cum accepta non tribuunt, in proximorum nece grassantur, quia tot pene quotidie perimunt, quot morientium pauperum apud se subsidia abscondunt; weitere Hinweise bei Wilks, Private Ownership (Fn. 81) 534. 117 Das formulierte bereits Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum (Fn. 63) 193: „Wenn Gregor davon ausgehend geneigt ist, die Pflicht des Almosens als Gerechtigkeitspflicht aufzufassen, so ist dies begreiflich …“; allerdings schwächt Schilling das unter Heranziehung anderer Texte bei Gregor wieder ab; vgl. auch Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 85f. 118 Isid. orig. 5,4,1.

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Qualifikation des ius gentium als humanum oder divinum bleibt dagegen undeutlich. Angereichert ist die Darstellung der Rechtsschichten durch den theologischen Satz einer von Gott geschaffenen Natur119. Interessant sind die Beispiele, die Isidor für die einzelnen Rechtsmassen bildet. Zum ius naturale zählt er – wie Ulpian – die Verbindung von Frau und Mann oder die Aufzucht und Erziehung der Kinder. Dann folgt sogleich (und in ergänzender Deutung von Hermogenian120) die communis omnium possessio121. Demgegenüber gehört dem ius gentium an erster Stelle die occupatio an, wie Isidor (in Anlehnung an Gaius122) ausführt und damit das Privateigentum. Für die spätere Auseinandersetzung über das Verhältnis von ius naturale und ius civile ist wichtig, dass nach Isidor das ius divinum der Natur eingeschrieben ist123 und das ius naturale aus dem „Naturinstinkt“ (instinctu naturae) erkannt werde124. Dadurch wird, was schon bei den Kirchenvätern angedeutet ist, das Naturrecht als göttliche Ordnung beschrieben: Weil Gott die Natur erschaffen hat, wohnen ihr die von ihm gewollten Regeln inne. Ähnlich versteht auch Weigand diese Texte125, doch ist seine Deutung in verschiedener Hinsicht unscharf oder missverständlich. Zunächst ergibt sich der Sinn von Isidors communis omnium possessio keineswegs aus Marcian126. Dieser sagt in D. 1,8,2 pr. lediglich, dass gewissen Sachen, an denen die römischen Juristen Gemeingebrauch annehmen, nach Naturecht allen gehören. Isidor aber schildert ein Naturrecht, nach dem alles gemeinsam war und den insgesamt frei lebenden Menschen gehörte. Mit Letzterem nimmt Isidor auf Ulpian Bezug (D. 1,1,4), der tatsächlich – und anders als Marcian – natura und ius gentium hierarchisiert. Die Einführung der Sklaverei erklärt Isidor an anderer Stelle mit dem Sündenfall127, in orig. 5,6 ordnet er Gefangenschaft, Sklaverei und postlimium als Erscheinungen des ius gentium ein. Dasselbe muss für die communis possessio gelten, da Isidor auch die occupatio zum ius gentium zählt. Die zum ius naturale erwähnte adquisitio eorum quae caelo, terra marique capiuntur hat für Isidor nichts zu tun mit einer „Inbesitznahme herrenlosen Gutes“128, sondern 119 Isid. orig. 5,2: Omnes autem leges aut divinae sunt, aut humanae. Divinae natura, humanae moribus constant; ideoque haec discrepant, quoniam aliae aliis gentibus placent. … 120 Vgl. oben bei Fn. 27 f. 121 Das folgende Beispiel, die omnium una libertas scheint aus D. 1,1,4 geschöpft, die adquisitio eorum quae caelo, terra marique capiuntur, gemahnt an D. 41,1,3 (Gaius 2 rer. cott.). 122 Vgl. D. 41,1,1 (Gai. 2 rer. cott.). 123 Isid. orig. 5,2 (o. Fn. 118). 124 Isid. orig. 5,4,1. 125 Vgl. Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 126ff. 126 So aber Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 128; wie hier bereits Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 89f. 127 Isid. sent. 3,47,1 (CCSL 111, 295); dazu wieder Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 86f. und 90. 128 So aber Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 128.

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mit der gleichen Möglichkeit der Menschen, von den Früchten dieser Erde zu leben. Die Rückgabe hinterlegten oder geliehenen Gutes, die Isidor ebenfalls zum ius naturale zählt, setzt Eigentum an diesen Gütern nicht notwendig voraus129. Zu beachten ist, dass es Isidor hier um die restitutio geht, nicht um die Aufteilung der Güter in Privateigentum, dessen Qualität in der theologischen Tradition ja gerade darin gesehen wird, dass es ein Recht gibt, die Güter der Welt für sich zu behalten und andere davon auszuschließen. In Isidors Darstellung der Rechtsschichten steckt also durchaus mehr Theologie als Weigand ihr zubilligen möchte. 11. Zustimmen wird man Weigand darin, dass Isidors Naturrechtsbegriff unscharf ist130, dass er insbesondere zwischen einem normativen Naturverständnis (im stoischen Sinn) und einem in Gottes Schöpfungsplan gelegten Naturrecht nicht unterscheidet. Erst die Kanonistik des Hochmittelalters, die sich um eine begrifflich wie inhaltlich trennscharfe Beschreibung der Rechtsschichten bemühte, sonderte die unterschiedlichen Aspekte des ius naturale131. Dass nach Gottes Schöpfungsplan die Welt und ihre Güter allen Menschen anvertraut sind und erst der sündige Mensch sie in privates Eigentum aufteilte, gehört allerdings zum antiken Erbe der mittelalterlichen Theologie. Nichts illustriert das besser als ein Clemens von Rom zugeschriebener Satz, wonach nur das Gemeineigentum menschlicher Bestimmung entspräche, Privateigentum nicht: Communis enim usus omnium quae sunt in hoc mundo omnibus esse hominibus debuit, sed per iniquitatem alius suum dixit esse, et alius illud, et sic inter mortales facta divisio est.

Dieser Text, der vermittels der pseudo-isidorischen Dekretalen (aus der Mitte des 9. Jahrhunderts)132 in Gratians Sammlung gelangte (C. 12, qu. 1 c. 2), soll aus einem Brief des Vaters von Clemens I an seinen Sohn stammen, in dem er ihm die 129 Anders Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 128. 130 Ähnlich Töpfer, Naturzustand (Fn. 10) 90f., dort allerdings bezogen auf das Verhältnis von ius naturale und ius gentium. 131 Grundlegend Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 131ff.; zuletzt A. Thier, Heilsgeschichte und naturrechtliche Ordnung: Naturrecht vor und nach dem Sündenfall, in: M. Armgardt/ T. Repgen (Hgg.), Naturrecht in Antike und früher Neuzeit, Symposion für Klaus Luig, Tübingen 2014, 151, 153ff. 132 Zu Datierung und Autorschaft vor allem K. Zechiel-Eckes, Ein Blick in Pseudoisidors Werkstatt. Studien zum Entstehungsprozeß der falschen Dekretalen, in: Francia 1: Mittelalter. Bd. 28, 2001, 37ff.; ders., Auf Pseudoisidors Spur, oder : Versuch, einen dichten Schleier zu lüften, in: W. Hartmann/G. Schmitz (Hgg.), Fortschritt durch Fälschungen? Ursprung, Gestalt und Wirkungen der pseudoisidorischen Fälschungen (= MGH, Studien und Texte. 31), Hannover 2002, 1ff. und zuletzt ders., Fälschung als Mittel politischer Auseinandersetzung. Ludwig der Fromme (814–840) und die Genese der pseudoisidorischen Dekretalen, Paderborn 2011.

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platonische Staatslehre erläutert133, weshalb darin (jedenfalls in der auf uns gekommenen lateinischen Übersetzung durch Rufinus) auch die Frauengemeinschaft als Ideal geschildert wird. Für uns ist nicht interessant, aus welchem Kontext die Aussage stammt und ob sie tatsächlich auf Clemens zurückgeht. Viel wichtiger ist die Frage, warum der Autor des Pseudoisidor sie in seine Sammlung aufnahm, und warum sie später Gratian als Leitbild für die klösterliche Gemeinschaft sah. Für die frühmittelalterlichen Theologen ist es selbstverständlich, dass das aus der antiken Philosophie stammende Bild von der verlorenen Harmonie in einer eigentumslosen Gesellschaft mit dem Sündenfall zusammenhängt. Die beiden Erzählungen werden miteinander verknüpft, die eine zur Erläuterung der anderen verwendet. Die anima naturaliter christiana134, die aus der bei Cicero und Seneca bewahrten stoischen Moralphilosophie spricht, beförderte diese Verknüpfung zusätzlich. 12. Auch Gratian erzählt den Sündenfall als Verlustgeschichte, aus der sich einerseits begründen lässt, warum neben das ius divinum oder naturale die menschlichen consuetudines und das ius constitutionis traten135, andererseits, warum die Güter dieser Welt – entgegen dem Schöpfungsplan Gottes – in Mein und Dein aufgeteilt sind. Die Distinctio VIII im ersten Teil seines Dekrets eröffnet er mit einer die zeitgenössische Lehre zusammenfassenden Schilderung136 : Differt autem ius natura(l)e a consuetudine et constitutione. Nam iure naturae sunt omnia communia omnibus quod non solum inter eos servatum creditur, de quibus legitur : Multitudinis autem credentium erat cor unum et anima una etc.137 verum etiam ex precedenti tempore a philosophis traditum invenitur. Unde aput Platonem illa civitas iustissime ordinata traditur, in qua quisque proprios nescit affectus iure vero consuetudinis vel constitutionis hoc meum est, illud vero alterius.

Was die Urgemeinde praktizierte, sei, so Gratian, schon von den Philosophen über den Urzustand berichtet worden: allen habe alles gemeinsam gehört. Damit spricht Gratian aus, worauf auch die spätantike und die frühmittelalterliche Theologie wiederholt hingewiesen hatte138. Platon sticht unter den philosophischen Vorbildern hervor, obwohl die stoische Gesellschaftstheorie die maßgeblichen Bausteine für die christliche geliefert hatte. Jedenfalls aber ist Gratians 133 Dazu Wilks, Private Ownership (Fn. 81) 535. 134 Vgl. Tert. apol. 17,6 (PL 1, 388 = CCSL 1, 117,27). 135 Ausführlich zum Gegenüber (und Nacheinander) von göttlichem und natürlichem Recht einerseits und menschlichen Gesetzen andererseits Töpfer, Urzustand (Fn. 10) 164ff. und Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 132ff. 136 DG D. 8, c. 1. 137 Vulg. act. 4,32. 138 Etwa bei Tertullian, Laktanz und in dem bei Pseudo-Isidor überlieferten Klemensbrief.

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dictum eine Kurzfassung der zeitgenössischen Eigentumslehre ebenso wie der Lehre über das Verhältnis von ius naturae und menschlichem Recht. Wie aber standen die frühen Legisten zu diesen Lehren? Verteidigten sie die klassischen Texte oder assimilierten sie das in Justinians Sammlungen enthaltene römische Recht mit der zeitgenössischen Weltsicht? Diese Frage ist schwierig zu beantworten. Das liegt nicht nur daran, dass wir über die Wissenschaft vom römischen Recht vor Gratian nur spärlich unterrichtet sind. Vor allem liegt es daran, dass schon die Darstellung der Rechtsschichten bei Ulpian philosophisch inspiriert ist, und Hermogenians Erwähnung einer Aufteilung der Güter im ius gentium an die stoische Lehre vom Urzustand erinnert. Nur daraus, dass die Stellungnahmen der frühen Glossatoren einander nicht immer entsprechen, lässt sich auf eine Diskussion schließen, die zwischen Treue zum Quellentext und zeitgenössischer Theologie hin und her gerissen scheint. Der Satz des Irnerius139, dass natura nichil privatum, verrät für sich genommen wenig. Zunächst hört er sich an, als hätte Irnerius Cicero zitiert140. Aufschlussreicher aber ist der Kontext, in dem die Glosse sich findet; sie erklärt dominia distincta in D. 1,1,5. Wir hatten bereits gesehen, dass der HermogenianText über das Recht eines wie immer gearteten „Naturzustandes“ nichts verlautet. Aus dem Vergleich mit Ulpian D. 1,1,4 lässt sich zwar schließen, dass dem ius gentium historisch oder systematisch ein ius naturale vorangeht, über die Eigentumsordnung eines solchen ius naturale erfährt man daraus allerdings nichts. Auch aus Marcian (D. 1,8,2) lässt sich kein eigentumsloser Naturzustand folgern, vielmehr wird dort geschildert, die Güter seien nach Naturrecht unterschiedlich zugewiesen, entweder allen Menschen, einer bestimmten Gemeinschaft (universitas), einzelnen Menschen oder niemandem. Es ist daher nicht richtig, dass Irnernius mit seiner Glosse lediglich „die im Römischen Recht überlieferte Ansicht übernahm“141. Viel wahrscheinlicher ist, dass der knappe Hinweis der allgemeinen zeitgenössischen Auffassung zu danken ist, wonach es nach Naturrecht kein Alleineigentum gab142. Irnerius hat, was für seine Zeit ganz selbstverständlich ist, die der Heiligen Schrift abgelesene Weltdeutung seiner Interpretation der römischen Quellen zugrunde gelegt. Noch deutlicher sieht man das daran, wie Irnerius den Dualismus von Naturrecht und menschlichem Recht erklärte, nämlich – ebenfalls herrschender theologischer Ansicht entsprechend – mit dem lapsus hominum, dem Sündenfall143. 139 140 141 142

Dazu schon bei und in Fn. 4. Cic. off. 1,21: sunt autem privata nulla natura. So Töpfer, Naturzustand (Fn. 10) 152. R.W.Carlyle/A.J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, vol. II, 4. Aufl., Edinburgh/London 1962, 43, denken als Vorbild eher an Seneca als an die Patristik. 143 Vgl. Töpfer, Naturzustand (Fn. 10) 153 unter Hinweis auf A. Rota, La concezione irneriana dell’aequitas, in: Rivista internazionale de filosofia del diritto 26 (1949) 241, 251.

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Unsicher sei, wie Weigand meint, ob auch eine von Besta144 dem Irnerius zugeschriebene Gl. detrahimus ad D. 1,1,6 dem Irnerius gehört – oder nicht vielleicht doch Henricus de Baila145. Darin heißt es, dass das Privateigentum der iniquitas zu verdanken sei146. Die Ähnlichkeit mit C. 12, qu. 1, c. 1,2 legt aber nicht notwendig eine nachgratianische Entstehung der Glosse nahe. Die pseudoisidorische Dekretalensammlung, aus der jener Text des Dekrets stammt, dürfte Juristen wie Irnerius bekannt gewesen sein; außerdem ist an Augustinus zu denken, der die zivilrechtliche Eigentumsordnung als Erscheinung der iniquitas charakterisierte147. Selbst wenn Irnerius kein unmittelbares Vorbild für die Gleichsetzung von Privateigentum und Ungleichheit hatte, so entspricht es doch traditioneller philosophischer und theologischer Anschauung, dass der Unterschied zwischen Arm und Reich die Unterscheidung von Mein und Dein voraussetzt. Die Wortwahl mag Zufall sein, weil es Irnerius um die Paarformeln materia/forma und aequitas/iniquitas ging; in der Sache besteht aber kein Anlass, ihm die Formulierung abzustreiten. 13. Überhaupt ist es wenig plausibel aus einem in Gratians Sammlung aufgenommenen Text zu schließen, gleich oder ähnlich lautende Texte der Legisten müssten später als diese Sammlung entstanden sein. Die Kommunikation zwischen Kanonisten und Legisten war keine Einbahnstraße. Die römischen Rechtstexte waren für Gratian eine wichtige Referenzgröße, und umgekehrt sahen die Legisten diese Texte als Emanationen einer gottgewollten Ordnung an. Die Theologie saß, wenn man das Bild eines Gesprächs zwischen beiden Rechten ergänzen will, ständig mit am Tisch. Beide, Kanonisten wie Legisten, teilten die Überzeugung, dass die Heilige Schrift Fundament und Rahmen allen menschlichen Ordnungsstrebens bildet. Zu diesem Streben gehörten für beide jene klassischen Texte, die Institutionen, Codex und Digesten überliefern. Es ist ein moderner Reflex, wenn man theologische Anmutungen in Texten der Legisten auf den Einfluss der Kanonistik zurückführen will. Selbstverständlich ist zu beachten, dass Legisten und Kanonisten sich auf unterschiedliche Textkorpora konzentrierten, und dass es jenen um die Ordnung der vergänglichen Dinge, diesen um die Ordnung der himmlischen ging. Aber das eine war mit dem 144 Besta, Irnerio II (Fn. 4) 3. 145 In den von Weigand konsultierten Handschriften ist die Glosse zwar mit y gezeichnet, doch kann diese Siegle auch für Henricus verwendet worden sein, Weigand, Naturrechtslehre (Fn. 4) 88. Zur Glosse des Irnerius jetzt H.H. Jakobs, Irnerius’ Sigle, ZRG RA 134 (2017) 444ff., der weniger skeptisch im Hinblick auf die Originalität von mit y gezeichneten Glossen ist. Für Henricus sei eher yr gebräuchlich. 146 Gl. detrahimus ad D. 1,1,6: Tum nova materia ut tutela, tum forma ut servitus, tum equitas ut matrimonium, tum iniquitas ut dominium. 147 Vgl. oben bei und in Fn. 109; insoweit ist der Text nicht in C. 14, qu. 4, c. 11 eingegangen.

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anderen untrennbar verbunden: Das irdische diente der Vorbereitung auf das ewige Leben, und daher konnte sich das weltliche Recht mit seinen Regeln und Wertungen nicht gegen die Heilsbotschaft stellen. Dabei war die christliche Umformung der „heidnischen“ Texte keine Aufgabe, vor die die Glossatoren sich gestellt sahen. Es sind Texte, die Justinian in nomine Domini Dei nostri Ihesu Christi verlautbart hatte148, an ihrer Übereinstimmung mit theologischer Lehre bestand daher kein Zweifel. Außerdem spiegeln sie an entscheidenden Stellen die stoische Sozialethik wider, die in ganz besondere Weise auch die christliche Moraltheologie geprägt hat. So fand man in den klassischen Texten und in doppelter Weise ohne weiteres christliches Gedankengut vor. So lässt sich zwar nicht beweisen, aber doch mit einiger Wahrscheinlichkeit annehmen, dass die prägnante Sentenz des Irnerius, natura nichil privatum, der zeitgenössischen Theologie entspringt. In der Überzeugung, göttlicher Schöpfung entspräche ein Gemeineigentum aller an allem, vermählten sich stoische und platonische Sozialutopie mit biblischer Heilslehre. Was an stoischer Philosophie schon in den Texten von Marcian und Hermogenian steckte, ließ sich für die frühe Legistik daher mühelos im Sinne der zeitgenössischen Lehre deuten. Erst die nachgratianische Legistik besann sich einer davon abweichenden, den zivilrechtlichen Gehalt der Quellen betonenden Erklärung der einschlägigen Texte. Vielleicht suchte man die Abgrenzung von den theologi später deswegen, um den Eigenwert der römischen Quellen gegenüber Gratians Sammlung hervorzuheben und den eigenen Aufgabenbereich zu sichern. Das aber ist eine andere Geschichte, der auch an anderer Stelle nachgegangen werden soll.

148 Const. Tanta pr.; fast wortgleich Const. Imp. pr.

Dirk Jan Schoon

Truth and obedience. The states of Holland and West Frisia’s 6 August 1702 plakkaat and its repercussions in Rome for the proceedings against Petrus Codde

In September 2013 Jan Hallebeek celebrated his twenty-five-year jubilee as a lecturer in canon law at the Old Catholic Seminary at Utrecht University. To mark the occasion, his students and friends presented him with a festschrift entitled “Master in Church and Law” (Meester in kerk en recht)1. The title not only referred to the mastery of his profession but also celebrated his love for the subject and his work as a competent and gifted teacher. The result of a quarter century’s honorary work had appeared two years earlier under the title “Canon law in ecclesiological context” (Canoniek recht in ecclesiologische context)2. Anyone who encounters this landmark text becomes acquainted with the ecclesiastical tradition in which Jan himself is rooted, as well as learning that church law takes place not in a theological vacuum but rather in the context of ecclesiology, the systematic reflection on the nature of the Church and the consequences for its organization and functioning. This article considers how an ecclesiastical procedure can mirror a particular vision for the organization and functioning of the Church. This thesis is derived from an element of the proceedings against the apostolic vicar Petrus Codde (1648–171) conducted in Rome between 1700–1703, to which Jan alludes in his notes: the States of Holland and West Frisia’s 17 August 1702 plakkaat3. Because 1 L.M.A. van Buuren/P.B. Smit (eds.), Meester in Kerk en Recht. Vriendenbundel voor Jan Hallebeek bij zijn 25-jarig jubileum als docent kerkelijk recht. [Publicatieserie Stichting OudKatholiek Seminarie 50], Amersfoort/Sliedrecht 2013. I would like to thank the editors for their critical comments on my present contribution and Edward Jacobson for the translation from Dutch into English. 2 J. Hallebeek, Canoniek Recht in Ecclesiologische Context. Een inleiding tot het kerkelijk recht van de Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland [Publicatieserie Stichting Oud-Katholiek Seminarie 49], Amersfoort/Sliedrecht 2011. 3 Hallebeek, Canoniek Recht (note 2) 68–69. Also J. Hallebeek, What was the influence of Zeger-Bernard van Espen in the Northern Netherlands through Joan Christiaan van Erckel? in: G. Cooman/M. van Stiphout/B. Wauters (eds.), Zeger-Bernard van Espen at the crossroads of canon law, history, theology and church-state relations [Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium CLXX], Leuven 2003, 177–190, here 179–182.

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church historian Pontianus Polman has already considered this plakkaat, I will only discuss the repercussions of it becoming known in Rome, especially by Pope Clement XI (1649–1721) and the cardinals tasked with judging Codde4. In addition to the existing literature, I draw on the diaries that the apostolic vicar and his companions kept during their stay in Rome5. In order to elucidate the background to the trial against Codde, however, what follows is a short sketch of the Catholic Church’s role in the Dutch Republic in the second half of the seventeenth century.

1.

Catholics in the Dutch Republic in the second half of the seventeenth century

On 9 October 1688 Petrus Codde, son of a well-to-do Catholic Amsterdam merchant, was appointed apostolic vicar of Catholics in the Republic by Pope Innocent XII (1615–1700). In February 1689 he was ordained bishop in Brussels and received the title of “Archbishop of Sebaste i. p.i.” The appointment procedure had lasted over two years, which was already a sign that Codde would not receive it easily. Although the Catholic Church was tolerated in the Republic after the Peace of Münster (1648), public worship was still forbidden and anti-Catholic sentiment could easily surface. More serious, however, were the internal conflicts that had plagued the Church for decades. Regular clergy of an order or congregation such as the Franciscans and Jesuits did not always respect the authority of the apostolic vicar and frequently clashed with their secular colleagues, who considered themselves priests of a diocese and therefore recognized the authority of the vicar as their bishop. Under apostolic vicar Philippus Rovenius (1573–1651), the Concordia agreement of 1624 sought to regulate how many regular clergy were allowed to work in which cities of the Republic and how those 4 On this plakkaat (literally “placard” or “poster”, a public notice of the resolutions made by the government of the Dutch Republic or one of its provinces), see P. Polman, Cleresie en staatsgezag. Het plakkaat van 17 augustus 1702, in: Mededelingen van het Nederlands Historisch Instituut te Rome, 3rd series, 9 (1957) 163–189. Also published in: J.A.H. Bots/ A.E.M. Janssen/J.J. Poelhekke/M.G. Spiertz/C.P. Voorvelt (eds.), Adversaria Pontiana. Verspreide geschriften van P. Pontianus Polman, Amsterdam 1975, 209–231. 5 Codde’s Diarium can be found in several versions: Het Utrechts Archief (hereafter : HUA), entry 1003: J. Bruggeman/Y.E. Kortlever, Inventaris van de archieven van de Apostolische Vicarissen van de Hollandse Zending en hun secretarissen 1579–1728, numbers 414–416. The diaries of Codde’s travel companions Benedictus de Wael (died 1709) in HUA 1003, 422, and Jacob Krijs (1673–1724) in the Archief van de Parochie van de HH. Petrus en Paulus, Johannes en Willibrordus te Amsterdam (hereafter : PAA), OBC 1593. An edition of the annotated translation of the combined diaries is planned for 2018. A monograph on Codde’s stay in Rome–based in part on these diaries–is planned for 2019.

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clergy should relate to the apostolic vicar. The number of regular clergy had steadily increased since then, accompanied by an increasing number of conflicts with secular clergy. In 1670 Codde’s immediate predecessor, Johannes van Neercassel (1626–1686), had travelled to Rome to justify the policies of his governance6. He was evidently successful, seeing as the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide – Rome’s governing body in mission areas, which from the Roman perspective also included the Republic – ruled that the agreements outlined in the Concordia were binding. However, the question of how to limit or reduce the number of regular clergy in the Republic remained unanswered. Before Codde assumed office in 1689, Rome had already received complaints from the Republic about the apostolic vicars’ course of action. According to the complainants, strict adherence to the Concordia hampered the ability of Franciscans and Jesuits to develop missionary activities and to contribute to the reconstruction of the Catholic Church. They accused the vicar and his clergy of various “curiosities” (nieuwigheden) such as encouraging the reading of the Bible in the vernacular, criticizing the veneration of saints, and taking a too strict stance to confession, all of which made it unnecessarily difficult for believers to the point of alienating them from the Church. The complaints were summarized in the Breve Memoriale of 1697, with which Codde’s opponents attempted to influence Rome’s opinion to their advantage using foreign envoys during the peace negotiations in Rijswijk7. It appeared to work, as in 1699 Codde was invited to Rome to celebrate the Holy Year 1700. The vicar suspected something was wrong, but after a long hesitation he arrived in the Eternal City at the end of 1700. He hoped for a quick settlement of his case; he would not leave until April 1703.

2.

The proceedings against Codde

The case concerning Codde’s administrative policies was handled by a committee of ten cardinals, five from the congregation of the Propaganda Fide and five from the Holy Office. After an initial meeting, the panel delegated the task to a subcommittee of three cardinals to which Codde testified over the course of five sessions during the spring of 1701. However, questions were not asked by the delegated cardinals but by Agostino Fabroni (1651–1721), the powerful secretary 6 On Van Neercassels journey to Rome, see D.J. Schoon, Geloof dat recht doet aan God en mens. Johannes van Neercassel (1626–1686) en de doorwerking van zijn spiritualiteit in de oudkatholieke traditie, Trajecta. Religie, cultuur en samenleving in de Nederlanden 23 (2014) 145–168, especially 149–154. 7 On the Breve Memoriale, see M.G. Spiertz, Achtergronden van het Breve Memoriale, een geruchtmakend anti-jansenistisch geschrift uit 1697, Archief voor de Geschiedenis van de Katholieke Kerk in Nederland 26 (1984) 180–207.

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of the Propagande Fide who, along with a colleague on behalf of the Holy Office, had been added to the committee as a secretary. In addition to leading the questioning during the hearings, Fabroni had also organized them and afterwards reported about them to the pope. After the five oral interrogation sessions, Codde was given the opportunity to reply in writing to the accusations made against him. His response appeared in the autumn of 1701, printed in two parts by the papal printing press under the titles Declaratio and Responsiones8. These were then given to three theologians (qualificatores) for review, who issued a report to the commission of cardinals in the spring of 1702. Although traces of Jansenism were found in Codde’s teachings, none of the theologians could identify any real errors or heresies. Due to insufficient knowledge of the situation on the ground, they were unable to judge the conflicts in the Republic and Codde’s governance. One thing that played a continuous background role – but was not raised in any of the interrogation sessions or in the questions Codde received in writing – concerned the signing of the Formulary of Alexander VII. Those who signed this document, an appendix to the 1665 apostolic constitution Regiminis apostolici, agreed to condemn five theses said to have originated in the book Augustinus by the Leuven professor Cornelius Jansenius (1585–1638) as intentionally heretical. When signing this Formulary, various theologians distinguished between lawful right and fact. While the lawful right of the pope to condemn these theses as heretical was freely admitted, the fact that they could be found in Jansenius’ book at all (and that the author had intended them in their heretical meaning) was not. During his audiences with the pope, Codde declared that he could only sign the Formulary in the manner customary in Leuven: that is, not admitting to the fact. At the end of February 1702 Codde, at request from the pope, put his reasoning in writing and, at further request from the pope, sent them to Cardinal Tommaso Ferrari (1647–1716) with the expectation that they would be discussed in the committee9. 8 [P. Codde] Declaratio Archiepiscopi Sebasteni, Apostolici in Hollandiae Missione Vicarii, super pluribus quae tum ad ipsum, tum ad illam pertinent interrogationibus. Roma 1701. P. Codde, Responsiones Archiepiscopi Sebasteni, In Belgio Foederato Vicarii Apostolici, Ad Scriptum varia accusationum capita continens, jussu Eminentissimorum Deputatorum, ei traditum. Roma 1701. Both works can also be found in the so-called Causa Coddaeana: [P. Codde] Declaratio et Responsiones ab Archiepiscopo Sebasteno, Cum in Urbe esset, EE. DD. Cardinalibus tradita; Et jam Orbi pandita Christiano: ut censeat de censura per Romanam Inquisitionem illis inflicta 3. Aprilis 1704. [Sine loco] 1704. 9 HUA 1003, 350: Animadversiones super clanculario nonnullorum Cleri Hollandici aemulorum molimine quo conantur efficere ut Alexandri VII. contra quinque famosas propositiones Formularii pura ac simplex subscriptio, jurejurando firmata tam ab ipso quam / reliquis Missionariis exigatur [27 februari 1702], with the accompanying letter to Ferrari from the same day. Here Codde notes that on 3 March Ferrari had told him that he had read it himself and that the following day he had given it to the pope, whom the cardinal promised would read it as well.

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The full committee of ten cardinals finally met on Sunday, 7 May 1702 and decided to suspend Codde and appoint Theodorus de Cock (1650–1720), a former colleague of Codde now part of the opposition, to the position of provicar with the power of apostolic vicar. A week later the apostolic breve dated 13 May appointing De Cock was sent to Brussels, after which the internuncio had it forwarded to the new provicar on 5 June. All of this was kept secret in Rome. Codde and his colleagues heard the news on 5 July via post from the Republic and were officially notified on 22 July. Yet even then the import of the decision was not clear : was Codde suspended only for the duration of his stay in Rome and De Cock appointed ad interim? Or was De Cock appointed to replace the four provicars that Codde himself had appointed shortly before his departure from the Republic? Some cardinals even hinted that they knew nothing about the decision after the meeting on 7 May, leaving open the possibility that Fabroni had made the decision independently with or without consulting the pope. He had in any case left the Eternal City for an unknown destination on the night of 20 July, a few days after a heated confrontation with the pope and a day before the official announcement of the measures taken against Codde. To put it bluntly, there was tremendous confusion and no one knew how to proceed. Fabroni and those he favoured (that is, the Jesuits and Codde’s other opponents in the Republic) would not accept it if the pope cancelled Codde’s suspension and allowed the vicar to return home triumphantly. On the other hand, based on the oral interrogations and the investigation into the written defence of Codde, nor was there enough evidence to detain the vicar for any longer or to punish him more severely.

3.

The plakkaat from 17 August 1702

The suspension of Codde and the appointment of De Cock sparked great unrest in the Republic. The Haarlem Chapter and the Vicariate of Utrecht – the governing bodies of the Church – repeatedly informed the internuncio and the pope that they could not recognize De Cock before they had received more information about the circumstances. They also entreated the pope to allow Codde to return home to help quell the unrest. In reply they received only calls for obedience and submission to De Cock, who was, incidentally, unpopular due to his clumsy behaviour, having deposed the four provicars appointed by Codde to replace them with his own friends. Public opinion was subjected to a flood of pamphleteering on both sides, both for and against Codde and De Cock, leading even the Protestant ministers of South Holland to discuss the disturbance among their fellow Catholic citizens in their meetings. Organized resistance to these measures appeared during the summer months. In Rome, Codde’s companion Jacob Krijs was the first to insist that the help of the

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States of Holland should be invoked; he received support from Codde’s personal secretary Theodorus Doncker (1670–1731) and from his principal adviser LouisPaul du Vaucel (1640–1715). In the Southern Netherlands, Codde’s friends turned to Johannes Hulft (1646–1709), representative of the Republic in Brussels, who immediately forwarded the case to The Hague. There, secretary of state Antonie Heinsius (1641–1720) invited the archpriest of South Holland deposed by De Cock, Joan Christiaan van Erckel (1654–1734), to discuss the matter at the meeting of the States of Holland. In preparation for this meeting, Van Erckel drew up five documents in which he defended the rights of the local Church. In these documents, Van Erckel emphasized the danger of foreign interference and singled out the Jesuits, who, as internationally operating schemers, had been undermining the apostolic vicars and their clergy for decades. The States would have been receptive to this argument, since on 12 May England and the Republic had declared war on France, one day before the issue of the apostolic breve appointing De Cock. It is unknown whether Van Erckel actually presented the five documents on the 16 August meeting of the States. Nevertheless, the plakkaat that the States approved the next day and published in mid-September indeed reflects the regalist perspective on the protection that the monarch or state should offer Catholic citizens, a vision that Van Erckel shared with his teacher, the Leuven canonist Zeger-Bernard van Espen (1646–1728)10. The plakkaat contained four decrees11. First, no one was permitted to obey a summons to go to Rome. Second, “nobody shall be recognized as vicar if that person was not reasonably chosen in the manner traditional to this country and admitted by the Lords of the Provincial Government [de Heeren Onse Gecommitteerde Raaden]” The third decree forbade De Cock to act as provicar, forbade anyone from recognizing or obeying him as such, and nullified everything he had already done in that position. The fourth and final decree stated that no regular clergymen were allowed to enter the Republic.

10 On Van Erckel and Van Espen’s ecclesiological Jansenism, conciliarism, and regalism, see J. Hallebeek, Canoniek Recht (note 2) 59–70 and the literature mentioned on pages 103–104. On Van Erckel’s role in the creation of the plakkaat, see J.Y.H.A. Jacobs, Joan Christiaan van Erckel (1654–1734). Pleitbezorger voor een locale kerk, Amsterdam 1981, 121–130. Van Espen’s change in perspective regarding the help of non-Catholic secular governments, see J. Hallebeek, Recursus ad principem. Zeger Bernard van Espen on the rile of secular courts in preventing the abuse of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in: J. Hallebeek/B. Wirix (eds.), Met het oog op morgen. Ecclesiologische beschouwingen aangeboden aan Jan Visser, Zoetermeer 1996, 64–71, here 69–70, and J. Hallebeek, Influence (note 3) 184–186. 11 Groot Placaetboeck, vol. V, Den Haag 1725, 558, cited by M.Th.J. van der Vorst, Holland en de troebelen in de Hollandse Zending 1702–1727, Nijmegen 1960, 13, summarized by Jacobs, Van Erckel (note 10) 126 and by Hallebeek, Influence (note 3) 180.

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Repercussions in Rome

People in Rome became aware of the plakkaat in the first half of September 1702, even before its official publication in the Republic. The diaries of Codde and his companions reveal how Rome responded. Roman ministers were initially shocked by what they considered to be an interference from a foreign, secular power, an interference that was, moreover, heretical. Thus did Cardinal Sebastiano Tanara (1650–1724) exclaim to Codde: “May the magnanimous God forgive those who have appealed to a government of heretics against the Holy See!”12 Codde replied laconically that the cardinal was apparently indifferent to the fact that he, an innocent bishop, was persecuted under false accusations and that his and his clergy’s reputation suffered. Accusations from both sides also appeared in a conversation that Krijs conducted with Henricus Johannes van Susteren (1668–1742)13. Van Susteren, who – like Krijs – was born in Amsterdam, had come to Rome as a representative of the archdiocese of Mechelen with an assortment of suspicious books that he wanted to denounce as proof of the pervasive Jansenism in the Southern Netherlands14. Just prior to his return home he told Krijs that, unlike in the Southern Netherlands, an appeal to the secular government in the Republic was not possible. Krijs does not mention why this was the case, but we may speculate that Van Susteren did not consider the Republic’s Protestant government to be the legitimate successor to the King of Spain. In response to Van Susteren, Krijs insisted that the actions of Van Susteren’s friends demonstrated that they did not share his opinion. After receiving his appointment, De Cock had, for example, sought the support of the council pensionary Heinsius and the mayors of Amsterdam and Leiden15. Similarly, the Amsterdam merchant and anti-Codde firebrand Francesco Mollo (1648/9–1721) had asked the mayors of Amsterdam to withdraw their support of Codde and give it to De Cock in June 1702. Both parties were 12 Diary entry of De Wael (note 5) from 12 October 1702. De Wael notes that the Jesuits La Fontaine and Callenberg had visited the cardinal just before Codde. 13 Codde’s Diarium and Krijs’s diary (note 5) from 18 September 1702. 14 G. Cooman/B. Wauters, Jus Ecclesiasticum Subversum. La condamnation du magnum opus de Zeger-Bernard van Espen par le Saint-Office Romain (1704), in: G. Cooman e.a. (eds.), Van Espen (voetnoot 10) 71–94, here 82–83. 15 Van der Vorst, Holland (note 11) 9. In a letter dated 27 June, De Cock reported the success of his visits to Heinsius, the council pensionary in The Hague, and the mayors of Amsterdam. Of the mayors, only Joannes Hudde (1628–1704) had demanded the return of Codde. In fact, Hudde assumed that Codde was imprisoned by the Holy Office in Rome, information that, according to De Cock, came from Codde’s sister Maria. According to a note in Krijs’s diaries, the visit to an unspecified mayor of Amsterdam took place on 23 June 1702. P. Polman, Romeinse Bronnen voor de Kerkelijke toestand der Nederlanden onder de Apostolische Vicarissen 1592–1727. Deel III: 1686–1705 (hereafter : RB III), ’s-Gravenhage 1952, 595, 596 footnote 1, 633.

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therefore guilty of invoking government support, whether it was requested from the States of Holland or the city council of Amsterdam. One might wonder, incidentally, at what point maintaining good relations with secular authorities transformed into an evidently controversial invocation of their help16. Codde also valued good relations with the Amsterdam mayors, as evidenced by a letter to his niece, Catharina Bloemert, from August 1701, long before his suspension or the plakkaat17. “From the writing of a few friends I understand that you are working diligently to aid in my return. Your persistence, to speak plainly, I cannot say is unwelcome, because I am sufficiently ensured that it comes from a loyal affection. Even so I would like to admit that I am very much looking forward to leaving this city and returning to Holland. […] Among many other reasons that make me wish to be back in Amsterdam as soon as possible must include my strong desire to express my indebted respect and gratitude in person to Mayor Corver18, who with an uncommon magnanimity wants to declare himself my protector. When you have the pleasure to encounter his eminence, please try to make known to him the situation of my feelings in the best way.”

The cardinals soon recovered from their initial shock. On 13 October 1702 they met again for the first time after Codde’s suspension, now without Fabroni19. Although they were disappointed in De Cock and found that he deserved to be reprimanded by the internuncio for his imprudent behaviour, nobody was in favour of restoring Codde to his office. They did not, however, discuss what prompted the plakkaat in the first place: their decision to suspend Codde and appoint De Cock and the opaque communication that followed the meeting on 7 May. Furthermore, the cardinals gave no indication that they had read Codde’s arguments against signing the Formulary unconditionally. They considered the signing compulsory even though they did not give an order to sign it. The meeting lasted five and a half hours and in the end it was decided only that Codde should be informed that his case was still pending. At their next meeting on 11 January 1703, the cardinals once again refused to grant the wishes of the Re16 Jan Hallebeek argues that Codde viewed an intervention by the secular government “only” as a means to speed his return home. Whether this was possible or even desirable if he was not going to be reinstated in his office with the removal of De Cock cannot be gleaned from the account in Codde’s diary. 17 HUA 1003, 362: letter from Codde to Catharina Bloemert, 26 August 1701, copy. Catharina (ca. 1670–1731) was the daughter of Codde’s sister Maria and Frederik Bloemert. Because she was a filia devota, her relationship with Codde’s servant Gerard Rademaker caused a scandal. For more on this affair see, H.J.W. Verhey, Codde’s knecht en Codde’s nicht, De OudKatholiek 64 (1948) 236, 259–260. 18 The wealthy merchant Joan Corver (1628–1716) was one of the mayors of Amsterdam between 1681 and 1715. Corver, via the aforementinoed Johannes Hulft, representative of the Republic in Brussels, exerted pressure on the internuncio to have Codde return home. 19 The report of the meeting can be found in RBB III (note 15) 622–626. Fabroni returned to Rome in early November.

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public20. Three questions were considered: did Codde have to stay suspended; could he return home and if so, in what capacity ; and what was to be done with De Cock? Cardinal Giuseppe Renato Imperiali (1651–1737), a friend of the Jesuits, felt that Codde’s suspension should be converted into a permanent deposition. Others advocated once more the signing of the Formulary, with only the previously indignant cardinal Tanara now taking some of Codde’s objections into account. In the end, it was decided that Codde could not yet return home and that De Cock should remain in his position. Pope Clement XI’s reaction to the plakkaat can be gleaned from two audiences he granted to Joseph van Eijk, a Carmelite who enjoyed the pope’s confidence. Van Eijk was also a close friend of Codde and in September 1702 relayed to Codde what the pope had told him on 11 September, before the plakkaat had become known in Rome21. The pope told Van Eijk that to him De Cock had always been characterized as an angel sent from heaven who could save the Church in the Republic of Jansenism and rigorism. Although Clement now knew that this was not the case, he could not grant the wishes of the States to drop De Cock and restore Codde. He was afraid that once the vicar returned to his homeland he would, with the backing of his friends, seek revenge on the pope. As long as Codde remained suspended he depended on the pope; if the suspension were lifted, the pope would depend on him. During an audience two weeks later – when the plakkaat was now known – the pope asked Van Eijk for a solution to the new problems. The priest argued that Codde should return to his homeland as apostolic vicar in order to restore the peace22. Van Eijk considered the pope’s fear of revenge unfounded, since he believed Codde more humble than ambitious, one who once home would fulfil the orders of Rome with care. This reassurance came to nothing, for evidently the pope now harboured an even greater suspicion than he had shown during the previous audience. Because of the many statements in support of Codde that had been received from the Netherlands, Germany, and France, he was convinced of an international Jansenist conspiracy against the Holy See. The pope concluded that Codde was a part of this conspiracy after his refusal to sign unconditionally the anti-Jansenist touchstone, the Formulary of Alexander VII. The pope ended the audience with a sigh that no bishop had opposed Rome in over a hundred years – of course this would happen under his pontificate! Van Eijk’s audiences reveal how the pope’s long cherished mistrust was strengthened by the plakkaat issued by the States. By believing in a conspiracy 20 RB III (note 15) 670–673. The authorship of this report is unclear. 21 Codde’s Diarium and Krijs’s diary (note 5) entries from 11 and 12 September 1702, respectively. The birth and death years of Van Eijk are not known. 22 Codde’s Diarium (note 5) from 5 October 1702.

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theory against the Holy See, Clement placed himself in a tradition in which particularly Jesuits from the second half of the seventeenth century made their opponents look suspicious and fought them through allegations of Jansenism. The diary entries from the final months of 1702 and the first months of 1703 reveal that no one appeared to be looking for solutions. Though the pope admittedly recognized that the decision to suspend Codde and replace him with De Cock was wrong, he could not reverse it. He feared the alleged international Jansenist coalition and believed it impossible to find a solution acceptable to all parties. He could not and did not want to bow to the States of Holland and weaken his own international standing, but at the same time he could not continue to hold Codde in Rome without organizing a meeting to find a solution to the impending exile of the regular clergy in the Republic. Rome did not, therefore, make a decision about the nebulous futures of Codde and De Cock. The permission eventually granted to Codde to return home is illustrative of this lack of clarity. On 16 February – one week before the new plakkaat of 24 February 1703 in which the States demanded Codde’s return within three months23 – Cardinal Secretary of State Fabrizio Paolucci (1651–1726) summoned Codde and, in order to prevent any worse measures from the States, implored him and his companions to write to Holland that Codde was free to leave24. When Codde asked whether he would be reinstated to his office, the cardinal replied that nothing had been decided yet. The pressing nature of this issue was implicitly revealed a month later during the cardinals’ meeting on 30 March, the last to take place during Codde’s stay in Rome25. Fabroni had resumed his old duties after returning to Rome, and in this meeting he made Codde appear untrustworthy by reading the letters of Codde’s companions and their relatives, from which it had to be inferred that Codde himself had elicited the help of the States and that he was the main cause of the unrest in the Republic. This trick did not succeed, however, because the cardinals well disposed toward the suspended vicar asked for proof of the letters’ authenticity. Such evidence was not produced. Codde later believed that had cardinal Galeazzo Marescotti (1627–1726) not been prevented from attending the meeting due to a death in his family, the votes would have been tied and Codde would have been acquitted of all charges and reinstated to his office. Because this was unfortunately not the case, he had no choice but to return home. He bid farewell to the cardinals and received the blessings and various indulgences for himself and his relatives from the pope during his last audience on 3 April. On 12 April the party left Rome behind and travelled back to 23 Van der Vorst, Holland (note 11) 24–25. 24 Codde’s Diarium and Krijs’s diary (note 5) on 16 February 1703. Codde considered this the pope’s official permission that he could return home. Cf. his letter to Van Heussen, 17 February 1703, in: Van der Vorst, Holland (note 11) 28. 25 Codde’s Diarium and De Wael’s diary (note 5) on 30 March 1703.

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the Republic via Venice, Vienna, Prague, Leipzig, and Hannover, eventually reaching his home in ’s-Graveland on 27 June.

5.

A case of opposing Church visions

When Pope Clement XI assumed office in November 1700, just prior to Codde arriving in the Eternal City, the party of the zelanti had gained power in the College of Cardinals26. The cardinals adhering to this movement wanted to rid the Church of two practices that had been plaguing it over the previous decades: the influence of foreign secular governments and nepotism at the papal court. The first of these is most interesting for our concerns, with the zelanti emphasizing the independence of the Church from secular powers, especially Austria, Spain, and France. The war waged by these countries for the Spanish crown allowed Rome prudently to maintain its relative independence. Yet given this protectionist stance it is equally understandable that Rome would not tolerate the relatively independent course struck by the Church in the Republic, nor would Rome allow the secular – and, importantly, heretical – government of the States of Holland to call the shots. From the beginning it was clear the Codde would have to demonstrate his subservience to Rome. As outlined earlier in this article, the position of the Catholic Church in the Republic was a precarious one. Anti-Catholic feelings could easily surface, and Catholics needed to be careful not to act in such a way as to excite such feelings. The modest attitude demanded of Catholics dovetailed with the theological Augustinianism being taught in Leuven. Through a renewed study of church history and patristics, the priests trained in Leuven – including Codde and his clergy – learned how the ecclesiastical tradition had undergone continuous development over the previous centuries. They were also taught that the work of Saint Augustine had always offered the clearest guide to the great controversy with the Protestants: namely, the relationship between God’s omnipotence and human free will. From this Augustinian perspective the Leuven theologians criticized the morality of the Jesuits, who, according to them, prized human free will too highly and therefore discounted God’s grace. In the struggle between anti-Jansenists and Jansenists, a counter-reformatory attitude of faith and a triumphalist view of the temporal Church and the power of the pope – hallmarks 26 G. Signorotto, Lo squadrone volante. I cardinali ‘liberi’ e la politica europea nella secondo met/ del XVII secolo, and S. Tabacchi, Cardinali zelanti e fazioni cardinalizie tra fine Seicento e inizio Settecento, in: G. Signorotto/M.A. Visceglia (eds.), La Carte di Roma tra Cinque e Seicento “Teatro” della politica europea (“Europa delle Corti”, Centro studie sulle societ/ di antico regime. Biblioteca del Cinquecento 84), Roma 1998, 93–137 and 139–165, in: G. Cooman/B. Wauters (eds.), Condamnation (note 14) 81.

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of the Jesuits – clashed with the more introspective Augustinian view of faith that characterized the Leuven theologians. This latter attitude demanded a stronger personal responsibility from every believer, responsibility outlined in the accusations against Codde in Rome: the reading of the Bible in the vernacular and the seriousness with which one needed to confess one’s sins in order to partake of the Eucharist. It is this personal, conscientious attitude toward faith that in Rome gave Codde some respect while at the same time causing difficulties for him and his Church in the Republic. The question arises, then, as to whether or not Codde had a fair trial. Considering the aforementioned interests of Rome and the international circumstances at the time, this question can be answered in the affirmative. Codde could move about Rome freely, the Holy See supplied his livelihood, and he was free to visit the cardinals. He also was given ample opportunity to defend himself against the accusations. This was first done during the five oral hearings in the spring of 1701 and then in the writing of his Declaratio and Responsiones in the following autumn. The written defence was then reviewed by theologians, whose judgment informed the verdict of the cardinals during their meeting on 7 May 1702. Many comments can be made about these proceedings from Codde’s perspective, however. The first complaint that Codde would later note in his writings concerned the pope’s initial summons, which merely invited Codde to celebrate the Holy Year in Rome and to pray at the tombs of the apostles; no mention had been made about an investigation into policies or governance. Nor was this charge ever articulated clearly during the procedure. Nor did anything come of Codde’s oft repeated request to know the names of his accusers so that he could properly defend himself. Moreover, the allegations varied considerably in nature and severity. Some concerned the liturgical or devotional practices in those parishes labelled as Jansenist, while others concerned books published in the Republic that Codde should have prevented. There were other complaints about opinions, quotations, or statements made by certain clergymen that were unfavourable in Rome for which Codde was held responsible. The most important explanation for Codde’s suspension, however, seems to be an issue never explicitly raised during the interrogations or in the questions that Codde had to answer in writing: the unconditional signing of the Formulary of Alexander VII. It is precisely this lack of transparency that renders the entire case against Codde so tragic and made a solution satisfactory to both parties impossible from the start. Differing views on the structure and function of the local Church in the Republic and central Church government in Rome led to a disappointing outcome of the proceedings against Codde for all concerned. Given the long and complicated history that Rome had already experienced with the Formulary, it could neither lift the requirement to sign it nor allow a signature to be qualified by a reservation. Rome attempted to enforce obedience and unconditional

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signing, but by not stating this explicitly Codde was deprived of the opportunity to satisfy this requirement and thereby weaken the primary argument for his suspension. On the other hand, Codde did not offer Rome much opportunity for that. His Dutch candour and honesty – along with the thorough theological knowledge that he, with the help of his colleagues, brought to bear on the often complex implications of the accusations against him – offered Codde no possibility for a blind obedience to Rome without betraying his own theological truth, his conscience and the integrity of the Church he served in the Republic.

E.J.H. Schrage

In testamentis plenius testatoris intentionem scrutamur

1.

Inleiding en probleemstelling

Christiaan Rodenburg is een van de grote zonen van de stad Utrecht. Hij werd daar geboren in 1608 en overleed er in 1668. Na aldaar (en in Leiden) rechten te hebben gestudeerd werd hij in 1649 benoemd in het Hof van Utrecht. Hij was kanunnik van Sint Pieter te Utrecht en werd in 1660 deken van het kapittel. Hij wordt algemeen beschouwd als degene op wie de uitdrukking conflictenrecht teruggaat1. Hij gebruikte dat woord in zijn hoofdwerk, een tractaat over het huwelijksrecht, nader bepaald in een daaraan voorafgaand, min of meer afzonderlijk te lezen, preliminair tractaat over het recht dat ontstaat uit een conflict tussen verschillende statuten of rechtsgewoonten: Tractatus de jure quod oritur ex statutorum vel consuetudinum discrepantium conflictu. De eerste druk van zijn hoofdwerk bevatte reeds dit tractaat. Die druk verscheen in Utrecht in 16532. Er is over Rodenburg tamelijk veel geschreven. De latere Utrechtse hoogleraar J.P. Suyling wijdde in zijn disseratie een belangrijk aantal pagina’s aan Rodenburg3, evenals R.D. Kollewijn in zijn Geschiedenis van het internationaal privaatrecht4. Ook elders bestond aandacht voor hem: Hessel Yntema schreef een overzichtsartikel over het conflictenrecht, waarin hij Rodenburg, Paulus en Jo1 Aldus ook F.K Juenger, General course on private international law [Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 193], Leiden/Boston 1985, 148; B. Edwards, Statutism: The Historical Antecedents, Fundamina 13 (2007) 26–53, voetnoot 99. 2 C. Rodenburg, Tractatus de jure conjugum : in quo de viri in uxorem potestate, eorumque obligationibus, judiciis, mutuis gratificationibus, bonorum communione, pactisque dotalibus, illustriores controversiae, ad usum fori patrii, vicinarumque regionum expenduntur : cum tractatione praeliminari De jure, quod oritur ex statutorum, vel consuetudinum discrepantium conflictu, Trajecti ad Rhenum 1653. 3 J.P. Suyling, De Statutentheorie in Nederland gedurende de 17e eeuw, [Prft UU], Den Bosch 1893, 13 e.v. 4 R.D. Kollewijn, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse wetenschap van het internationaal privaatrecht tot 1880 [Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche rechtswetenschap 1], Amsterdam 1937, 49/70.

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hannes Voet, alsmede Ulric Huber vermeldde5 ; Max Gutzwiller wijdde in diens Geschichte des Internationalprivatrechts een aantal pagina’s aan Rodenburg6, evenals Th.M. de Boer7. Dat gegeven alleen al rechtvaardigt in een afscheidsbundel voor Jan Hallebeek, ook een van de grote zonen van de stad Utrecht, enige aandacht voor Rodenburg. Maar er is nog iets meer. Op een tweetal plaatsen in zijn werk geeft Rodenburg enige opmerkingen over een procedure voor het Hof van Utrecht over de afwikkeling van de boedel van Anthony van Diemen, in leven gouverneur-generaal van Indi[8. Zijn weduwe, Maria van Aelst, weigerde niet alleen aan de zwager van Van Diemen, Pieter de Gruyter, een bedrag uit te keren voor diens werkzaamheden ter behartiging van de belangen van haar overleden echtgenoot, maar zij verlangde bovendien overdracht aan haar van een aantal in het Sticht van Utrecht gelegen onroerende goederen die deel uitmaakten van het vermogen van wijlen haar echtgenoot. Partijen maakten hun vorderingen in rechte aanhangig. In hoger beroep kwam de zaak voor het Hof van Utrecht. Witteveen schrijft in zijn recente proefschrift over Van Diemen, dat de uitspraak daarvan niet meer is te achterhalen9. Zijn belangrijkste overweging is wel, dat alleen de Recueil in die zaak van Pieter de Gruijter (pro se en q.q. als man en voogd van zijn echtgenote, een zuster van Van Diemen) en Dirck van Ravenswaeij te ener zijde, impetranten van revisie, tegen Carel Constans in diens hoedanigheid van man en voogd van Jor. Maria van Aelst, weduwe van Anthonis van Diemen te anderer zijde, te vinden is in het archief van het Hof van Utrecht en uit die Recueil laat zich volgens Witteveen de uitkomst van het geding nu eenmaal niet aflezen10. Bij nader toezien ontbreekt ook het (voorstel voor) een 5 H. Yntema, Basic Issues in Conflicts Law, The American Journal of Comparative Law 12 (1963) 474–482 [Proceedings of the 1963 Annual Meeting of the American Foreign Law Association, Part II]. 6 M. Gutzwiller, Geschichte des Internationalprivatrechts. Von den Anfängen bis zu den grossen Privatrechtskodifikationen, Basel/Stuttgart 1977, 130–135. 7 Th.M. de Boer, Living apart together: the relationship between public and private international law, Netherlands International Law Review 57 (2010), 183–207. 8 C. Rodenburg, Tractatus de jure quod oritur e statutorum diversitate (in diens Tractatus de jure conjugum, noot 2), Tit. II, Cap. II, § IV, resp. III, IV, VII. 9 W.M. Witteveen, Antonio van Diemen: de opkomst van de VOC in Azi[, [Prft. UL], Amsterdam 2011, 309. 10 Witteveen was zo vriendelijk mij een transscriptie ter hand te stellen van deze: Recueil in de zaak van Pieter de Gruijter voor hem zelve en als man en voogd van zijn huisvrouw mitsgaders Dirck van Ravenswaeij impetrant van revisie op en jegens Carell Constans als man en voogd van Jor. Maria van Aelst, tevoren weduwe en boedelhoudster van de heer Anthonis van Diemen, in zijn leven generaal van de Compagnie van OostIndien, door hem voorzien van de signatuur: Het Utrechts Archief, Hof van Utrecht, inv.nr. 239–1, cap. LXXX, f. 309–331. Langs die weg is het origineel echter niet te vinden. Ik maakte dankbaar gebruik van de mij ter beschikking gestelde transcriptie.

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dictum in het arrest: de Recueil is kennelijk incompleet. Witteveen heeft echter geen gebruik gemaakt van de opmerkingen van Rodenburg over precies deze zaak, terwijl Rodenburg wel raadsheer in het Hof van Utrecht was toen deze zaak speelde en hij haar beslist heeft gekend. In deze bijdrage willen wij onderzoeken of Rodenburg in zijn boek misschien nader licht werpt op de uitkomst dit geding. Wij zullen daartoe eerst ons afvragen in welke context Rodenburg dit geding in zijn boek te berde brengt en we zullen daartoe zijn voornaamste stellingen samenvatten. Die betreffen in deze context de statutenleer, de doctrine inzake de reikwijdte van locale rechtsregels en de vraag of mensen die elders hun woonplaats hebben daaraan zijn gebonden. Vervolgens zullen de opmerkingen van Rodenburg over de zaak op de snijtafel leggen om die te confronteren met de stellingen in de genoemde Recueil11. Er zal blijken van een verrassende overeenstemming, zelfs zozeer dat de vraag rijst of Rodenburg misschien ook nog de auteur van de Recueil was. Uit de vergelijking lijkt ook een antwoord te resulteren op de vraag naar de uitkomst van het geding. Daarmee sluiten we dan ook af.

2.

De tractatus de jure, quod oritur ex statutorum vel consuetudinum discrepantium conflictu

De aanleiding voor Christiaan Rodenburg om een afzonderlijk tractaat te wijden aan het conflictenrecht was het ook voor hem destijds bekende gegeven dat op het gebied van het huwelijksrecht veel onzeker is, omdat het geschreven recht van een stad of een regio op de ene plaats regelingen blijkt te behelzen, die elders niet gelden. Een eenvoudig voorbeeld is reeds de overgang van de vrouw in de maritale macht van haar echtgenoot. Op de ene plaats vindt men die wHl in een statuut neergelegd, elders echter niet. Dikwijls ook treft men een statutaire of gewoonterechtelijke regel van beperktere strekking, namelijk dat het vermogen van de vrouw bij huwelijk overgaat op de man. Wat dan nog aan beschikkingsbevoegdheid voor de vrouw resteert is ook dikwijls voorwerp van plaatselijke, wettelijke regeling en die regelingen zijn plaatsgebonden. Al sinds de dagen van de Glossatoren was dit verschijnsel bekend, overigens allerminst beperkt tot het huwelijksrecht, zoals ook Rodenburg zich realiseerde. De opkomende steden hadden in eigen kring wetgevende bevoegdheid en het 11 Een Recueil is een samenvattend overzicht van de hoofdzaken van een rechtszaak, samengesteld door een raadsheer-rapporteur, door de president van het hof aangewezen nadat partijen de complete stukken van het geding voor het wijzen van arrest aan het hof hebben overgelegd. J. van der Linden, Regtsgeleerd, Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek …, Amsterdam 1806, 365.

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logisch gevolg daarvan is dat verschillende steden dan ook onderscheiden gewoonterecht of in statuten neergelegde wetgeving hadden. In een tijd waarin tussen die steden handelsbetrekkingen ontstonden kon dus gemakkelijk de vraag rijzen naar het recht dat toepasselijk zou zijn op een conflict in die verhouding. Voor de gedachte dat over een inwoner van Bologna die in Modena voor het gerecht wordt gedaagd zou moeten (mogen) worden geoordeeld naar het statutaire recht van Modena bestond niet onmiddellijk sympathie, zeker niet bij de inwoners van Bologna. Per slot van rekening was het een feit van algemene bekendheid, dat zekere rechtsregels van de plaats van herkomst de persoon bleven volgen, waarheen hij zich ook begaf of waar hij zich ook maar bevond. Paulus mocht als Romeins burger niet worden gegeseld, ook niet in Jeruzalem. Dat wist men ook in Bologna. In die stad werden vanaf de 11e eeuw de beide rechten onderwezen. De Glosse, neerslag van dat onderwijs in Bologna, behandelde dan ook de vraag, wat rechtens zou zijn in geval van botsing van verschillende rechtsstelsels, statutaire of gewoonterechtelijke regels. Een aanknopingspunt in de tekst van het Corpus iurs civilis of het Decretum Gratiani was niet eenvoudig te vinden, reeds omdat het probleem van het conflictenrecht zich in de Oudheid niet had voorgedaan. Het onderwijs sloot daarom voor de behandeling daarvan aan bij de beginwoorden van de Codex Justinianus, de lex Cunctos populos, meer speciaal bij het pronomen relativum die (quos) uit die tekst: Wij (de Keizer) verlangen dat alle volken die onder de heerschappij van onze welwillendheid staan de godsdienst aanhangen die de heilige apostel Petrus aan de Romeinen heeft bekend gemaakt en tot op de huidige dag door hem is uitgelegd en waarvan duideljk is dat ook Paus Damasus die aanhangt12. In het onderwijs werd de eerste gedachte uit deze tekst geheel losgemaakt uit de contekst: het zinsdeel “alle volken die onder de heerschappij van onze welwillendheid staan” kreeg aparte nadruk, zodat toch een verband met de keizerlijke wetgeving kon worden verondersteld13. De gedachtengang liep aldus: Er is uiteindelijk slechts 88n Romeinse keizer. Aan hem zijn alle burgers onderworpen; zij kunnen ook onder de jurisdictie van de lokale overheid vallen, maar dan toch niet onder de jurisdictie van een andere locale overheid, waar de betrokkene niet thuishoort. Dat zegt met zoveel woorden al de Accursische glosse, die aan deze redenering als grondslag geeft, dat iemand uit Bologna wel onder de heerschappij van’s keizers welwillendheid staat, maar niet onder de heerschappij van een andere, een lagere overheid, zodat hij ook niet hoeft te gehoorzamen aan de 12 C. 1,1,1: Cunctos populos, quos clementiae nostrae regit imperium, in tali volumus religione versari, quam divinum Petrum apostolum tradidisse Romanis religio usque ad huc ab ipso insinuata declarat quamque pontificem Damasum sequi claret […]. 13 C. Schott, “Cunctos populos” – Metamorphosen eines kollisionsrechtlichen Schlüsseltextes, in: I. Meier/K. Siehr (eds.), Rechtskollisionen. Festschrift für Anton Heini zum 65. Geburtstag, Zürich 1995, 379–388.

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wetgeving van die stad14. Aldus vonden de Glossatoren een oplossing voor het allerminst louter theoretische probleem van de verhouding tussen het keizerlijke recht van de Codex, de Digesten en de Instituten aan de ene kant, en dat van de plaatselijke statuten en gewoonten aan de andere. Voor hen was het keizerlijke recht als ius commune van subsidiaire aard tegenover het ius speciale van de individuele steden en de gedachte dat een bijzondere regel derogeert aan een algemene vond al vroeg uitdrukking in verscheidene glossen, waaronder de glosse Si generali bij D. 34.5.1 of de glosse emendandi bij Inst. 3.9pr. Bovendien kwam op deze manier een oplossing voor een tweede probleem binnen bereik: de vraag naar de reikwijdte van de locale statuten, respectievelijk het locale gewoonterecht kon ook worden beantwoord. Niet altijd en overal konden rechtssubjecten erop rekenen dat zij naar hun eigen recht zouden worden beoordeeld; het personaliteitsbeginsel kent zekere grenzen. Azo was nog van mening van dat de lex fori op iedere litigant van toepassing zou moeten zijn (qui elegit judicem elegit jus)15, maar in C.1.14.1, een constitutie van Keizer Constantijn, las men al spoedig dat in geval de aequitas van het ius afwijkt allereerst een harmoniserende interpretatie nodig is, maar indien die niet mogelijk is, het, ten laatste, de rechter is die beslist aan welke van de twee de voorrang gegeven moet worden, want uiteindelijk rust op hem de plicht goed recht te spreken: respondeo eam quae potior et utilior videtur, debet enim judicare secundum quod melius ei visum fuerit16. Een uitgebreide bespreking van het probleem wordt reeds vroeg gegeven door Guillelmus de Cabriano, naar de uitmuntende editie van Tammo Wallinga leert17. De in Noord-Itali[ bekende diversiteit in plaatselijke, statutaire wetgeving dwingt tot bezinning. De Accursische glosse heeft daartoe zijn steentje bijgedragen; even later volgde Bartolus de Saxoferrato, die geldt als de vader van de statutenleer en wiens opvattingen zich wijd en zijd over Europa hebben verbreid. Het procesrecht (ordinatio litis), zo onderscheidde hij, was geregeld in de lex fori. Materi[le beslispunten (decisoria) daarentegen vereisten verdere analyse. Had het geschil betrekking op de vorm of het onderwerp van contracten, dan diende het beslist te worden aan de hand van de lex loci contractus, was daarentegen de 14 Gl. quos ad C. 1,1,1: Argumento: Quod si Bononiensis conveniatur Mutinae, non debet iudicari secundum statuta Mutinae quibus non subest, cum dicat, quos nostrae clementiae regit imperium. 15 K. Neumeyer, Die gemeinrechtliche Entwicklung des internationalen Privat- und Strafrechts bis Bartolus II, München 1901–1916 (herdrukt Berlin 1969), 63ff. 16 Magister Aldricus (tussen 1170 en 1200): sed quaeritur, si homines diversarum provinciarum, quae diversas habent consuetudines, sub uno eodemque iudice litigant, utram earum iudex qui iudicandum suscepit sequi debeat? respondeo eam quae potior et utilior videtur, debet enim judicare secundum quod melius ei visum fuerit. Geciteerd naar Neumeyer (noot 15) 67. 17 T. Wallinga, The Casus Codicis of Wilhelmus de Cabriano [Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte 182], Frankfurt am Main 2005, 13–14.

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grondslag van het geschil gelegen in een aan gedaagde toe te rekenen tekortkoming in de nakoming van diens contractuele verplichting of in een onrechtmatige daad, dan leverde de lex loci delicti de motivering voor het vonnis. De lex rei sitae behelsde het recht ten opzichte van goederen, in ieder geval de onroerende, zelden ook de roerende, terwijl het personeel statuut het personenen familierecht van de rechtssubjecten beheerste. De opvattingen van Bartolus verbreidden zich tot buiten Noord-Itali[ en werden als Romeins recht gerecipi[erd. E.M. Meijers publiceerde al ruim een eeuw geleden een aantal teksten, in het bijzonder uit de school van Orl8ans, waarin deze statutenleer wordt uitgelegd, waaronder een commentaar van Jacques de R8vigny op de genoemde lex: Cunctos populos (C.1.1.1)18. Het boek van Meijers besteedt ruimschoots aandacht aan wat wel de Franse school wordt genoemd, maar het stopt ruim voordat hij aan Rodenburg toe is. In zijn onlangs verschenen proefschrift heeft N. Peters nog eens de aandacht gevestigd op het belang daarvan voor de geschiedenis van het internationaal privaatrecht19. Hij stelt zich op het standpunt van de heersende leer, dat het in het bijzonder de de Italiaanse en Franse statutenleer zijn die het conflictenrecht op de kaart hebben gezet, maar dat voor de verdere ontwikkeling ervan de bijdrage van de Nederlandse rechtsgeleerden zeer belangrijk is geweest. De Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Nederlanden kende een complex juridisch systeem, want die republiek was in wezen een confederatie, bestaande uit soevereine gewesten (en Generaliteitslanden) die elk in meer of mindere mate hun eigen recht hadden ontwikkeld, dat onderling sterk kon verschillen. Bovendien werd er vanuit de Republiek wereldwijd handel gedreven en dat gaf aanleiding tot tal van conflictus legum. Hij beschouwt Christiaan Rodenburg als een noodzakelijke schakel tussen de Franse school en de Hollandse school, waarvan hij overigens Paulus en Johannes Voet en Ulrik Huber als de belangrijkste representanten beschouwt.

3.

De jure conjugum

Daarmee zijn we toe aan het hoofdwerk van Rodenburg, zijn werk over het huwelijksrecht: De jure conjugum. De statutentheorie komt daarin op tal van plaatsen aan de orde. Naar Rodenburg meedeelt: ter vermijding van overbodige herhalingen, maakt hij derhalve de statutentheorie in haar algemeenheid voor18 E.M. Meijers, Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van het internationaal privaat- en strafrecht in Frankrijk en de Nederlanden, Haarlem 1914, Bijlage IV. Schott (noot 13) publiceerde nog een kleine tekst van Pierre de Belleperche: Lex ista dicit, quod praeceptum imperatoris solum ligat subiectos. 19 N. Peters, IPR, Proces & Arbitrage: Over grondslagen en rechtspraktijk, [prft RUG], Antwerpen/Apeldoorn 2015, 16, paragraaf 2.3.6.

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werp van het inleidend tractaat. De eerste titel daarvan behelst de klassificatie van de statuten in personele en re[le; de tweede beschrijft dan de effecten van beide, en wel allereerst bij ongewijzigde woonplaats van de betrokkene, vervolgens na wijziging daarvan: Deinde de jure ipso quod oritur ex diversitate statutorum, et quidem vel immoto personarum domicilio … mutato domicilio.. Dezelfde onderverdeling hanteert Rodenburg in de derde titel, die is gewijd aan de invloed van overeenkomsten op het conflictenrecht. Opvallend is, dat de klassificatie in personele en re[le statuten voor hem kennelijk uitputtend is: aan een derde categorie, bijvoorbeeld die van gemengde statuten, heeft hij, anders dan Bartolus de Saxoferrato, Dumoulin, d’Argentr8 en Burgundus vjjr hem, geen behoefte. Deze derde categorie doet hij zelfs in honende bewoordingen af: hij verwijt Bartolus de tekst van Codex 1,1,1 futuli verborum ancupio te interpreteren, dus met futiele haarkloverij20. Doorslaggevend en onderscheidend criterium voor Rodenburg voor deze klassificatie in twee[n is het onderwerp van het desbetreffende statuut. Heeft een statuut de persoon als zondanig tot onderwerp (betreft het statuut het personenen familierecht van de plaatselijke wetgeving), dan spreekt men van een personeel statuut; dat beheerst de juridische status van personen die hun woonplaats hebben in de stad waar het desbetreffende statuut gold. Dat personeel statuut wijzigt niet naar gelang van de (tijdelijke) verblijfplaats: de woonplaats is doorslaggevend. Tegenover de personele statuten staan de re[le: heeft het statuut de rechtspositie van onroerend goed tot onderwerp, dan spreekt men van een re[el statuut. Het onderscheid tussen roerend en onroerend is in de verband van belang: roerende goederen blijven onderworpen aan het recht waaraan ook de persoon van de eigenaar is onderworpen: mobilia personam sequuntur. Het re[el statuut is gebonden aan het territorium: immobilia sequuntur situm. Ongeacht de persoon van de eigenaar beheerst het re[el statuut de rechtspositie van het binnen de stad (enz.) gelegen onroerend goed. Is het onderwerp van de locale wetgeving een handeling, dan is het onderscheidend criterium daarin gelegen, dat een handeling die de staat of de bevoegdheid van een persoon betreft of een persoonlijke verbintenis schept geregeld is in een als personeel te kwalificeren statuut, doch een handeling die als zakelijk is te beschouwen daarentegen geregeld is in een als re[el aan te merken statuut. Dit leidt er, uiteraard, toe, dat voor Rodenburg een statutaire bepaling die de handelingsbekwaamheid van een persoon regelt aan te merken is als een personeel statuut, ook wanneer in die context speciale regels zijn gesteld voor de beschikking over onroerend goed.

20 Het woord ancupius schijnt samen te hangen met auceps, vogelvanger, en gebruikt te worden voor de sperwerjacht.

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Antonio van Diemen

Wij komen nu toe aan Antonio van Diemen. Sinds enige jaren zijn wij dank zij het hierboven (voetnoot 9) vermelde proefschrift van Witteveen over zijn leven en werk zeldzaam goed onderricht21. Hij werd in 1593 geboren als zoon van de burgemeester te Kuilenburg (thans: Culemborg), Bartolomeus (‘Meeuwis’) van Diemen en Elisabeth Hoevenaer. Vast staat wel, dat hij zich al op jeugdige leeftijd, in 1616, vestigde te Amsterdam om aldaar als koopman actief te worden. Evenzeer staat vast, dat na ruim een jaar zijn faillissement werd uitgesproken. Witteveen heeft het (door van Diemen zelf in de wereld geholpen) verhaal gedemonteerd dat de jonge Van Diemen in de handen was gevallen van een weinig scrupuleuze vriend, Jan Engels genaamd, die hem tot speculaties had verleid, die tot zijn financi[le ondergang leidden. De werkelijkheid is aanzienlijk gecompliceerder, maar in ieder geval staat wel vast dat voor Van Diemen als bankroetier in het vaderland geen goede toekomst meer was weggelegd. Dus ging hij zijn geluk in Indi[ beproeven en monsterde hij aan als soldaat, en wel onder de naam Thonis Meeuwszoon. De gebroeders Algra zagen in de vorige eeuw daarin geen kwaad. Zij noteren: “Geen bedrog, want zijn vader heette werkelijk Meeuwis en Anthonie en Thonis is ook hetzelfde.”22 De Heren XVII dachten daarover in hun tijd echter anders. Na de ontdekking van de persoonsverwisseling zonden zij per eerstvolgende gelegenheid de gouverneur-generaal Jan Pieterszoon Coen een gepeperde brief waarin zij hem ondubbelzinnig voor Van Diemen waarschuwden23 : Wy en kunnen niet laten U.E. by desen te waerschouwen, alsoo onder de soldaten, door recommandatie van goede vrienden, ofte oock by onbekende namen, sommaels eenige gedebaucheerde quanten met onse schepen der waerts gesonden werden, die ofte alhier -gefailleert sijn ofte hun anderszins groflick hebben verloopen … Van deser soorte is eene Anthony van Diemen onlangs binnen Amsterdam gefailleert, die hem, soo wy verstaen, onder den naem van Thonis Meeusen van Utrecht onder de soldaten op het schip Mauritius heeft op-doen schryven … daerom ghylieden tegens syne ende sijnsgelijcken voornemen ende pratijcken overal goede ordre dient te stellen.

De brief arriveerde in Jakarta echter als de spreekwoordelijke mosterd na de maaltijd. Op 23 augustus 1618 was Van Diemen geland in Jakarta; Jan Pieterszoon Coen deed hem al spoedig het zwaard (de musket) verwisselen voor de pen, naar de gebroeders Algra met een fraai anachronisme schrijven24. Hij werd 21 Daarnaast zijn de levensbeschrijvingen door Mulert in Nieuw Nederlands Biografisch Woordenboek, respectievelijk Van der Aa in: A.J. van der Aa e.a., Biographisch Woordenboek der Nederlanden inmiddels zelfstandige betekenis komen te missen. 22 A.Algra/H. Algra, Dispereert niet. Twintig eeuwen historie van de Nederlandsen, Franeker 1956, 95. 23 Witteveen (noot 9) 98. 24 De woorden “De pen is machtiger dan het zwaard” worden in de Oxford Quotation Dic-

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aangesteld als klerk en in die hoedanigheid kreeg hij de brief van de Heren XVII op zijn schrijftafel. Op 1 augustus 1619 schreef hij zelf een antwoord, en daarin geeft hij op ondubbelzinnige wijze blijk van zijn teleurstelling over de hem toebedachte kwalificatie van gedebaucheerde quant25 en de daarmee gepaard gaande ontkenning van zijn goede intenties26, die –naar zijn zeggen– strekten “Tot profijt van de generaele Compagnie, contentement van mijn crediteuren, t’mijnder eere,ende tot verdriet van mijn benijders.” Coen zelf laat er in een brief van 5 augustus 1619 geen twijfel over bestaan, dat hij het volste vertrouwen had in Van Diemen27. Hij bevorderde hem dan ook aanvankelijk tot koopman, op 31 januari 1623 tot opperkoopman. Daarmee ving een briljante carriHre in dienst van de VOC aan, die uiteindelijk via een benoeming tot ordinair-raad van Indi[ (1625), tot directeur van de handel (1626) en plaatsvervangend gouverneurgeneraal (1633) in 1636 culmineerde in zijn benoeming tot de 9e gouverneurgeneraal van de Indische bezittingen van de VOC. Die functie zou hij blijven uitoefenen tot zijn dood in 1645. Hij had inmiddels (in 1629) van zijn VOCsalaris zijn schulden volledig betaald28, en –minstens zo belangrijk – hij was op 17 januari 1630 gehuwd met de toen circa 25 jaar oude Maria van Aelst, en wel in voor haar derde echt. Twee eerdere huwelijken van Maria van Aelst (telkens met een opperkoopman van de VOC) waren door de dood ontbonden en zij gold als vermogend. Niet was te voorzien dat dit huwelijk uiteindelijk slechts 15 jaar zou duren29 ; wel maakten zij op 4 oktober 1632 te Culemborg een testament, waarin zij uitdrukking gaven “aan huyn gevoelen … aenmerckende de brosheijt der menselijcke natuere die niet seckerder onderworpen is dan de doot, ende niets

25 26

27

28 29

tionaries toegeschreven aan Edward Bulwer-Lytton. In diens toneelstuk Richelieu van 1839 laat hij de kardinaal Richelieu na de ontdekking van een complot om hem te doden zich bezinnen op een reactie en die komt er ook: “De pen is machtiger dan het zwaard… Laat dat zwaard toch achterwege.” ‘Richelieu’ (1839) act 2, sc. 2, l. 307. gedebaucheerd: volgens het Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse taal o.m.: verkwistend, dan wel: door liederlijkheid in een slechte toestand terechtgekomen. Witteveen (noot 9) 333 (Bijlage 1): Doch tot mijn groot leetwesen en discourage van mijn goede intentie, is mij voor weijnich dagen bij gevalle ter notitie gecomen de recommandatie, die UEd over mijn persoon (int artickel van de gedebautscheerde quanten) aen de Ed. H. Generael ende zijnen Raet, per den brief van dato 10 April 1618, met t’schip Haerlem gesonden, sijn doende, genoechsaem om mij van alle hoope t’ontblooten. Witteveen (noot 9) 99: ’t is waer en billijck dat U.E. haer goederen vertrouwen moogen die het haer gelieft, maer een mensche, die gevallen is ende geerne opstaen soude, sal men die onderhouden? Die gedebausscheert sijn geweest connen met de penne wel gebruyct worden, sonder dat men haer daeromme U.E. middelen vertrouwe. Witteveen (noot 9) 46, voetnoot 30, maakt melding van de brief Van Diemen aan Pieter de Carpentier met de afrekening uit Batavia, gedateerd op 20 november1629. De brief bevindt zich in het Nationaal Archief, VOC OBP 1098 544–546. Maria van Aelst zou na de dood van haar derde man in 1645 nog twee keer zou trouwen (op 9 oktober 1646 te Amsterdam met Carel Constant en op 10 oktober 1661 te Utrecht met Gijsbert van der Hoolck), tot zij zelf in 1674 overleed.

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onseckerder dan de uure derselver, willende daeromme van onse tijtelijcke goederen ons bij Godt almachtich verleent, ende noch te verleenen, disponeeren alleer wij door de doot daer van geprevenieert werden …”30 Dit testament zou echter niet het laatste van Van Diemen blijken te zijn; op 16 april 1645, enkele dagen voor zijn overlijden op woensdag 19 april, herriep hij alle eerder gemaakte testamenten en beschikte hij opnieuw over zijn “tijdelijcke middelen … opdat om de selve nae sijn overlijden, tuschen de erffgenamen geen different quame te vallen.”31 Bij dat testament heeft hij zijn vrouw, Maria van Aelst, tot enige en wettige erfgenaam benoemd, nadat hij eerst een aantal legaten, waaronder zeer substanti[le, had gespecificeerd. Zo bedacht hij zijn volle neef Dirck van Ravenswaaij, de zoon van wijlen zijn zuster Hendrickje van Diemen en haar man, Johannes van Ravenswaaij, in leven predikant in Culemborg, met een fideicommis, een legaat over de hand, van zesendertig duizend gulden, waarbij Van Diemen echter had bepaald dat Dirck van Ravenswaaij noch bij leven, noch na dode over dat kapitaal zou mogen beschikken, maar dat na de dood van Dirck dit bedrag zou toekomen aan diens wettelijke kinderen. Ook bedacht hij zijn zuster Anna van Diemen, gehuwd met Pieter de Gruyter, met een legaat groot 20.000 guldens en haar vier kinderen ieder met een legaat van 15.000 guldens. Tevens maakt Van Diemen melding van vorderingen die hij nog had op de Compagnie, niet zijnde loonvorderingen. Inzake de loonvorderingen had hij namelijk reeds bij brief van 20 januari 1645 aan de Heren XVII verzocht om 40.000 gulden op naam van zijn zwager, Pieter de Gruyter, te zetten, zijnde het loon voor het in 1644 verlopen driejarig dienstverband. De overige vorderingen vermaakte bij helfte aan zijn weduwe en bij andere helfte aan de kinderen van zijn zusters, ieder voor een gelijke portie. Die werden bij resolutie van oktober 1647 bepaald op 31.000 gulden, te vermeerderen met de door uit Jakarta meegenomen goederen32.

5.

Zeg nooit dat ge iemand kent, alvorens een erfenis met hem te hebben gedeeld

De hoop van Van Diemen “dat nae sijn overlijden, tuschen de erffgenamen geen different quame te vallen” bleek echter al spoedig ijdel te zijn geweest. Dat ligt al bij enkele lezing van het testament voor de hand. Dirck van Ravenswaaij was bedacht met een fideicommis, waaruit hijzelf geen enkel voordeel zou kunnen 30 Het testament is als Bijlage 7 gepubliceerd door Witteveen (noot 9) 361 e.v. 31 Dit testament is als Bijlage 8 gepubliceerd door Witteveen (noot 9) 365 e.v. 32 Geciteerd door Witteveen (noot 9), 308, met een beroep op P. van Dam/F.W. Stapel, Beschryvinge van de Oostindische Compagnie, dl. III, [Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatie[n 87], ’s-Gravenhage, 1943, 14.

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trekken, en dat terwijl hij zich zozeer had ingespannen om de belangen in patria van zijn oom te behartigen. Was dan het met de loonvordering op de Heren XVII gemoeide bedrag mogelijk voor hem bestemd, of moest hij dat toch aan de erfgenaam, Maria van Aelst, afdragen? Bovendien had ook Pieter de Gruyter, zwager van van Diemen door het huwelijk met diens zuster Anna, in tal van opzichten zich de belangen van Van Diemen aangetrokken, onder meer door beleggingen in onroerend goed. Kwam het saldo van zijn bemoeienissen aan hem toe als een soort bezoldiging of moest hij dat afdragen aan Maria van Aelst? Daarbij moet worden bedacht dat Maria van Aelst al op 9 oktober 1646 hertrouwd was, en wel met Carel Constant, oud-directeur van het VOC-kantoor in Perzi[. Zij had het voorgeschreven treurjaar van de weduwe weliswaar in acht genomen, maar toch: zij had de familie van haar man wel heel spoedig verlaten. Pieter de Gruyter en Dirck van Ravenswaaij hadden dus gemeenschappelijke belangen, nog eens versterkt door het feit dat Pieter de Gruyter de wettelijke vertegenwoordiger (man en dus voogd) van de ene zuster van Van Diemen, en Dirck van Ravenswaaij (bij staak) de wettelijke vertegenwoordiger van de andere, immers overleden zuster van de erflater, Hendrickje. Zij traden dan ook gezamenlijk op in een procedure tegen Carel Constant, de wettelijk vertegenwoordiger, immers man en voogd, van Maria van Aelst. De procedure leek aanvankelijk te eindigen met een schikking: Pieter de Gruijter zou aan Maria van Aelst en haar man overleveren “alle de obligati[n, penningen en meubelen onder hem berustende, competerende de boedel van de voorn. Van Diemen, mitsgaders de helft van de plechten in de landen van Utrecht, alsook de penningen op de domeinen belegd”33, maar daar stond tegenover dat Pieter de Gruyter uit die schuld wel de legaten aan zijn vrouw, Anna van Diemen, en hun kinderen mocht betalen. Of Pieter de Gruyter de andere helft van de plechten in de landen van Utrecht alsmede de opbrengsten daarvan zou mogen houden, dan wel of hij die, in overeenstemming met de tekst van het testament aan Maria van Aelst (vertegenwoordigd door haar nieuwe echtegenoot: Carel Constant) zou moeten afdragen, was een vraag die partijen overeenkwamen voor te leggen aan de bevoegde rechter, die dan in 88n moeite door zou kunnen beslissen over het salaris van Pieter de Gruyter voor zijn administratieve werkzaamheden ten gunste van Van Diemen. Bij sententie van 18 april 1648 verklaarde echter het hof requirant Carel Constant niet ontvankelijk en zijn vorderingen niet gefundeerd. Op de tegenvordering van Pieter de Gruijter en Dirck van Ravenswaaij tot rekening en verantwoordingen van de kapitalen en renten en betaling van salaris

33 Plechten zijn de voorlopers van hypotheekrechten op huizen als zekerheid voor de nakoming van geldleningen. de desbetreffende akten werden geregistreerd bij het gerecht. Plechten waren overdraagbaar.

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werd derhalve niet beslist. Mitsdien kwamen Pieter de Gruyter en Dirck van Ravenswaaij in appHl.

6.

Het geding voor het Hof van Utrecht naar de beschrijving door de raadsheer-rapporteur en door Christiaan Rodenburg

De raadsheer-rapporteur vat in diens Recueil de centrale, ter beslissing voorliggende vraag van het geding als volgt samen: “Zulks dat alhier alleenlijk staat te examineren of de gemelde sententie van het Hof ten respecte van het ontzeggen van de requirant respectevelijke conclusien behoord te worden geconfirmeerd of geretracteert.”34 Over dit proces heeft Rodenburg in zijn hierboven vermelde Tractatio praeliminaris De jure, quod oritur ex statutorum, vel consuetudinum discrepantium conflictu, het een en ander opgemerkt, en wel op twee, hieronder in § 7.2 te vermelden plaatsen. Uit de gedingstukken blijkt ondubbelzinnig de kern van het probleem. De Gruyter had gelden van Van Diemen te diens behoeve belegd in onroerend goed in Utrecht. De universeel erfgenaam van Van Diemen was, naar hij had bepaald in zijn laatste testament, zijn vrouw Maria van Aelst. De Gruyter stelde zich echter op het standpunt, dat de (in 1550 geapprobeerde) Costumen van Utrecht een schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten (met uitzondering van wederzijdse lijfrenten) behelsden35. In de Recueil leest men dan ook, dat de raadsheer-rapporteur de zaak kernachtig samenvat: Ende aanvattende daar mede het eerste lid van de requiranten conclusie zo komt dienaangaende eerstelijk te discutieren of de generaal van Diemen bij zijn vz. laatste testament op Batavia gemaakt, instituerende zijn huisvrouw tot zijn universele erfgenaam, zulks wel heeft vermocht te doen ten regarde van de vz. plechten en renten in het Sticht van Utrecht, geconstitueert en beleijt, aenschouw nemende dat de oudste der stad Utrecht rub. van huwelijkse voorwaarden art. ult. mede brengt man en wijf malkanderen geen goed geven noch te maken zullen staande de echte dan lijftocht alleen en dat ten wederzijden.

Kennelijk stelde de Gruyter zich simpelweg op het standpunt, dat Van Diemen de desbetreffende in het Sticht gelegen onroerend goederen niet aan zijn vrouw had kunnen nalaten, omdat een dergelijke testamentaire making in strijd met het in Utrecht geldende recht (het schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten) zou zijn. Zou 34 Recueil nr. 17. 35 Costuymen ende usantien, vergadert by den schout, borgemeesteren, ende regeerders der stad Vtrecht, : dewelke volgens den inhoud van de missive van sijn excellentie. den hartoge van Alba … gelevert zijn aen den præsident van den raade van den hove van Utrecht, in dato den 3 Februarij 1570, Utrecht, 1718: Art. XXXI: Man en Wijf houden geenerhande recht in des anders goed na het overlijden van een van hun beyde, ten ware de langstlevende ettelijke goederen in lijftogt gegeven ofte gemaakt waren en elk zijn voordeel volgens de Ordonnantie.

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hij gelijk hebben, dan zijn er in de literatuur onmiddellijk tal van plaatsen te vinden die aangeven, wat in een dat of een dergelijk geval moet geschieden. De desbetreffende goederen komen dan niet toe aan de testamentair als zodanig aangewezen erfgenaam (die bevoordeling is in strijd met de wet), maar aan hen die, ware er geen testament zijn gemaakt, van rechtswege als erfgenaam zouden zijn opgekomen, de wettelijke erfgenamen. Zie bijvoorbeeld Bartolus de Saxoferrato in diens commentaar op de l. Hereditas C. de his quibus ab indig. [C. 6,35,4]: aut instituitur heres omnino non capax, aut instituitur capax sed est indignus. Primo casu locus est venientibus ab intestato, ut l. I supra de here. inst. secundum opi[nionem]. doctorum, l. Si in metallum supra de his quae pro non scripto [D. 34,8,3], de iure fisci, l. In metallum [D. 49,14,12]. De inzet van de procedure is daarmee duidelijk: komen die onroerende goederen niettegenstaande het statutaire schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten desalniettemin toe aan de testamentair erfgenaam (Maria van Aelst) of aan hen die als ab-intestato erfgenaam zouden zijn geroepen (bij gebreke van kinderen uit het huwelijk van Van Diemen en Van Aelst dus beide zusters Van Diemen, Anna (vertegenwoordigd door Pieter de Gruijter) en wijlen Hendrickje (bij staakvervulling gerepresenteerd door Dirck van Ravenswaay))?

6.1

Statutum reale an statutum personale?

De Recueil houdt zich, evenals Rodenburg, bezig met de criteria, toepasselijk op deze casus. Beide concentreren rond de vraag of het statutaire schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten moet worden opgevat als een statutum personale (in welk geval de desbetreffende statutaire bepaling slechts de inwoners van het Sticht) zou binden, dan wel als een statutum reale (in welk geval de woonplaats van de beschikker irrelevant zou zijn). In de woorden van de Recueil: 15. Zijnde alzulks de kwestie daarin bestaande of dit statuut alleen comprehendeert de ingezetenen van deze landen van Utrecht dan of daar aan mede zijn gehouden alle uitheemse personen woonachtig buiten dezelve lande voor zoveel aangaat haar goederen in deze provincie gelegen.

Het ligt voor de hand om te onderzoeken, wat de doctrine omtrent deze vraag te melden heeft. Tal van schrijvers passeren de revue. Zowel de raadsheer-rapporteur als Rodenburg beginnen met de Thesaurus questionum forensium van Gaspar Antonius, die in boek II, questio 4 onder de paragrafen 4 en 5 op basis van het Commentaar (questio 6) van Bartolus op C. 1,1,1. de distinctio tussen statuta in rem vel in personam bespreekt. Hij begint met de mededeling dat een statuut in de regel vreemdelingen niet bindt, maar dat die regel uitzondering lijdt wanneer het gaat om goederen gelegen in het territoir waar het statuut is uitgevaardigd.

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Bij iedere rechtsopvolging in die goederen moeten de statuten van de plaats waar de desbetreffende goederen zich bevinden in acht genomen worden. Ter verklaring daarvan bewijst de distinctie van Bartolus goede diensten: nam si personam statuta comprehendant … tunc, quia statutum in forenses nullam habet potestatem, illi non ligentur verbis statuti, sed iuxta iuris communi dispositionem succedant; si vero disponant de rebus, quia super illis facultatem et imperium statuentes habent, statuti verba sint omnino servanda et custodienda.

Vervolgens rijst uiteraard de vraag of een statuut dat regels uitvaardigt omtrent de rechtsopvolging in onroerende goederen als personeel dan wel als re[el moet worden gekwalificeerd. Gaspar Antonius deelt mede dat omtrent die vraag de meningen van de geleerden uiteengaan en hij noemt tal van schrijvers die omtrent die vraag positie hebben gekozen. De raadsheer-rapporteur en Rodenburg volgen hem daarin met dien verstande dat zij aan beide kampen nog de nodige namen toevoegen. Eerst worden voorstanders van de kwalificatie van dit statuut als personeel statuut vermeld. Na de zojuist genoemde Thesaurus van Gaspar Antonius volgen bij beiden verwijzingen naar Merlin, Coras, Radelantius, Carpanus, Mattheus de Pisis, Pinzinger en Rochus Curtius. Voor zover ik de werken heb kunnen identificeren, vermeld ik de volledige titelbeschrijving in de voetnoot36. De overeenstemming is te groot om toevallig te zijn. Hetzelfde geldt voor de bij beiden, zowel de raadsheer-rapporteur als bij Rodenburg, gegeven opsomming van auteurs die de tegengestelde mening zijn toegedaan en die het 36 Bij Merlin: de legit. lib. 3. tit. 1 q. 19 n: 14 vers. Jason tamen gaat het om Mercurialis Merlin, De legitima tractatus absolutissimus, Geneve 1564, lib. 3, tit. 1, q. 19 n. 13 [tweede alinea: Iason tamen … ita distinguit (vriendelijke aanwijzing van Mr J.H. Dondorp]; bij de vermelding van Coras de arte juris part 3. cap. 13 circa fin. gaat het om Jean de Coras, De juris arte libellus quo instituuntur legum studiosi, universum jus populi Romani dispersum antea, diuulsum, et dissipatum, in artis rationem, formamque reducere, Lyon 1560, bij Radel decis. 126 gaat het om Radelantius, Decisiones Curiae Provincilis Trajectinae 126, n. 12; bij Carpan ad statut cap 295 n. 16, 17 en 18 om Horatius Carpanus, Leges et Statuta ducatus Mediolanensis commentariis illustrat, Milaan 1616; Pis: var: resol: lib. 1: cap. 1 n: 16, 17 staat mogelijk voor Hartmann Pistoris, Quaestionum juris tam Romani quam Saxonici libri quattuor, Leipzig 1586 lib. 1, q.1 n. 16–17 (vriendelijke aanwijzing van Mr. J.H. Dondorp); bij Pingitzer q. n: 49, 51, 52 et 55 gaat het om Virgil Pingitzer, Illustrium quaestionum Saxonicarum, iam primum in summis & amplissimis electoratus ducatuumque Saxoniae dicasteriis pleno senatu, in gravissimis causis civilibus, criminalibus … decades sex, [Leipzig] 1607; De raadsheer-rapporteur vermeldt in zijn Recueil nog extra Mascard de statut. concl b: n. 14, 15 et 16, daarbij mogelijk verwijzend naar Alderano Mascardi, Communes i[uris] u[triusque] conclusiones, Ferrara 1607 conclusio III (Abrogatum statutum, an et quando possit allegari et es eo argui), nummer 14–16 en Roch. Curt in cap. Cum tanto q. 20 Sect. q. n. 13 versic. Statutum. staat voor Rochus de Curtius, Enarrationes In celeberrimu[m] Iuris cap.: CFm tantk. Tit. de consuetudine, Lyon 1550, waar Curtius op fo. 114 ro. onder nr. 20 de vraag behandelt: Consuetudo an liget subditos extra territorium, om na de dwaling van de geleerden uit Milaan te hebben vermeld, een ontkennend antwoord te geven: Statutum vel consuetudo non ligat subditos extra territorium.

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ervoor houden dat een statuut dat regels uitvaardigt omtrent de rechtsopvolging in onroerende goederen als een re[el statuut moet worden gekwalificeerd. Beiden beginnen met hetzelfde citaat van Argentraeus, die in zijn Commentarii in Patrias Britonum Leges, seu Consuetudines Generales Antiquissimi Ducatus Britanniae, Paris 1621 onder de titel De donationibus bij arikel 218, als opmerking 6 onder randnummer 9 vermeldt: Quae realia aut mixta sunt, haud dubie locorum et rerum situm sic spectant, ut aliis legibus quam territorii judicari non possint, terminos quidem legislatoris populi non excedunt, sed nec vicissim exceduntur ipsa et ut infinita sit commerciorum libertas jure Romano, contractibus, testamentis, negotiationibus, tamen ea sic infringitur, ut moribus et legibus locorum cedat.

Argentraeus (1519–1590) geldt wel als de voornaamste vertegenwoordiger van de Franse school; hij heeft de ontwikkeling die door de Ultramontani, in het bijzonder Jacques de R8vigny, in gang was gezet verder ontwikkeld en de autonomie van de territoriale wetgever beklemtoond. Zijn belangrijkste werk is dan ook ook een commentaar op de Coutumes van Bretagne, veel meer dan een commentaar op de lex Cunctos Populos, waarmee de Codex van Justinianus begint. Weliswaar erkende hij naast de peronele en de re[ele statuten ook nog een derde categorie, die der statuta mixta, maar als er twijfel bestaat over de aard van het statuut dient het als re[el te worden aangemerkt. Naast Argentraeus vermelden zowel de raadsheer-rapporteur als Rodenburg nog werken van Burgundus, Molinaeus, Christinaeus, Papon, Dassel, Cheval, Mart, Peck, Cuijck en Bouvat37. Wederom is de overeenstemming wel heel opmerkelijk; weliswaar 37 Burgund: ad consult Flandr : tract. I: n. 36 et 41 betreft: N. Burgundus, Ad consuetudines Flandriae aliarumque gentium, tractatus controversiarum, Antwerpen, 1621 [Nam statuta quae de modo divendarum haereditatum constituuntur, et Argentraeus ipse dixit esse realia, et vere quidem si dumtaxat agatur de rebus immobilibus in eodem territorio constitutis]; Molin ad L 1. Cod de sum. trinit. betreft C. Dumoulin, Commentarius ad Codicem, Hannover, 1604 (ook in diens Opera Omnia, Parijs 1681, maar die editie kan niet zijn bedoeld; materieel niet afwijkend zijn Molinaeus’s Conclusiones de Statutis et Consuetudinibus Localibus, eveneens in diens Omnia Opera I, 554–557); Christin ad. l. Mech. t. 17 art. 3 n. 4, betreft P. Christinaeus, ad leges Mechlinienses Commentaria ac notae, Antwerpen 1626; Papon lib. II. t.I. arr. 3 & 4 betreft J. Papon, Recueil d’arrests notables des cours souveraines de France (Ik zag de 7e druk, Lyon 1595); Dass ad consult Enneburg cap. 8 n. 20, 21, 22 betreft Hardewich A Dassel, Commentaria in Consuetudines Luneburgenses, Hamburg, 1592 (4e druk 1598); Chaeval que. 724 (dit werk heb ik niet kunnen vinden), Peck de test. conjug. lib 4 cap. 28 b. 6 et 7 betreft P. Peck, Tractatus de testamentis conjugum, in quinque libros distinctus, Coloniae Agrippinae 1614; Cuijck ad cons. Crav. 844 betreft T. van Cuyck, Ad Aymonis Cravettae responsa annotationes. Et singularum responsorum argumenta iuxta ordinem titulorum Iustinianei Codicis disposita, Utrecht 1623, consilium 844; Bouvt 44, not. in verb: Instit. de heretier q. 3 betreft waarschijnlijk question 3 onder het hoofd Soci8t8, Communaut8 (Si deux residans en pays de droit escrit, y contractant marriage, ont convenu qu’il seroit regl8 suivant la coutume de Bourgogne, n’y ayant reserve de se pouvoir donner, le mari legue / sa femme tous les meubles et acquests qu’il avoit au pays de droict escrit par testament, le legat peur

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verschilt de volgorde enigszins en is Rodenburg iets uitgebreider in zijn literatuuropgave dan de raadsheer-rapporteur, maar minstens veelzeggend lijkt mij, dat beiden onder Bouvot verwijzen naar een lemma dat Institution de l’h8ritier zou moeten luiden, maar de druk die ik heb ingezien bevat niet een dergelijk lemma; het probleem dat het onderwerp van het proces vormt wordt elders behandeld38. De parallellie tussen beide gaat verder. De Recueil (§ 23) geeft als argument vjjr de kwalificatie nog de volgende redenering: Eerstelijk uit dien ’t vz statuut met zulks disponeert dat hetzelve kracht kan hebben zonder dat daar toe concurreert aliquis actus factum aut dispositio hominis uti fit in successionibus ab intestato que fere ab omnibus responuntur inter jura realia maer veel eer legem imponit certo actu a persona faciendo sine cujus actus [interventu] non potest contraveniri statuto en alzulks een reglement makende dat omtrent een daad bij zekere personen te doen ofte te laten hetzelve statuut verstaan zoude moeten worden personeel te zijn.

Bij Rodenburg leest men materieel hetzelfde: Quod Statutum vel Consuetudo normam praescribens certo actui a persona peragendo, sine cujus actus interventu contra Statutum nil quaeat committi, in personam, non in rem scripta esse videatur.

Wanneer zekere personen met een bepaalde hoedanigheid (echtgenoten) bij statuut een bepaald gedrag wordt verboden (zodat zij geen inbreuk maken op het statuut als zij dit nalaten) moet dit statuut als personeel worden aangemerkt, zo vinden zij in de literatuur verdedigd. Zij werken beiden dit argument nog iets nader uit, maar beiden komen vervolgens uiteindelijk tot de conclusie dat het hele argument niet doorslaggevend is, omdat het uiteindelijk niet zozeer gaat om de vraag of de wetgever de handelende persoon op het oog had, maar veeleer om de aard van de handeling die wordt verboden. Is die zakelijk van aard en worden daarbij regels gegeven over de het gebruik of de vervreemding van die goederen (ook de vervreemding tussen echtgenoten), dan moet het statuut als re[el worden aangemerkt. Rodenburg merkt dan ook op Eamque sententiam hoc argumentum tuetur, quod, ut personale dicitur Statutum, non oporteat inspicere rationem, quae moverit forsan legislatores, nec non quibus personis, aut quorum intuitu jus ejusmodi sit comparatum, verum quid qualeve illud ipsum sit quod prohibeatur : ut si reale sit prohibitum, qualis est rerum inter conjuges alienatio, reale audiat Statutum, adeoque denominatio Statuti desumenda sit ab objecto, seu re ad quem applicatur personae, vel inhibita vel permissa agendi facultas. Unde certissima estre debatu de nullit8), in J. Bouvot, Nouveau recueil des arrests de Bourgongne, oF sont contenues diverses notables questions de droict, tant coustumier que Romain …Tome Second, Geneve 1623. 38 Zie de vorige noot.

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usu ac observatione regula est, cum de rebus soli agitur, et diversa sunt diversarum possessionum loca et situs, spectari semper cujusque loci leges ac jura ubi bona sita esse proponuntur, sic ut de talibus nulla cujusquam potestas sit, praeter territorii leges.

Wederom is de gelijkenis met de redenering van de raadsheer-rapporteur in het oog lopend. Zo lezen we in § 27: Dat omme de tweten off een statuut re[el is of principaal disponeert omtrent de goederen niet en moet worden ingezien de rede die de statuten tot het doen van de dispositie heeft gemoveerd: “Vel minus quibus personis vel quorum intuitu vel contemplatione” zulks geschied maar alleenlijk “quid et quale illud sit quod prohibeatur, ut si quid reale statuto prohibetur statutum sit reale, si prohibitum sit personale quoque personale habeatur, adeoque denominationem statuti desumendam esse ab objecto vel actu ad quem habitatem vel inhabitatem personae statutum applicat.”

Niet de bedoeling van de wetgever is doorslaggevend voor de kwalificatie als personeel of re[el statuut, wel de aard van de regeling. Betreft die de beschikking over grond, dan is het statuut re[el. Beiden vinden voor die conclusie bevestiging bij Argentraeus (op de hierboven al aangehaalde plaats), maar bovendien bij Frederic / Sande (Commentarius in Gelriae et Zutphaniae Consuetudines feudales, Arnhem 1637, tract. I tit. 3 c.2 par. 4 num 9); Rodenburg wijst dan nog op Lambertus Goris tractatus quatuor, un/ cum commentariolo ad leg. Observandum. 19. digest. de officio præsidis, Arnhem 1651, tract. ca. 6). Het zesde Caput gaat onder het hoofd: conjugalis omnium bonorum communio patriae nostrae Gelriae utrum afficiat etiam bona alibi sita, ubi lege loci nulla hujusmodi inter conjuges est communio? En dan komt het antwoord in par. 11: Bona immobilia reguntur jure loci ubi sita sunt, quatenus fallat. Annot. 12 Removetur objectio. En als we dan par. 12 lezen, dan is het duidelijk: Unde consequens foret, consuetudinem illius provinciae in qua maritus domicilium habet, circa bonorum immobilium inter conjuges communicationem, alibi nec operari, nec etia attendi oportere, sed legibus territorii insistendum esse.

6.2

Privilegium militis?

Daarmee lijkt het pleit beslecht. Het Utrechts schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten is het voorwerp van een statuut met re[le werking. Derhalve bindt het statuut ook buitenstaanders, niet zijnde inwoners van het Sticht. Dat uitgangspunt wekt ook niet veel verbazing, want in de Utrechtse Consultati[n is ook een beslissing in diezelfde richting te vinden, waaronder de naam van Rodenburg is vermeld (samen met die van zijn vriend Moreelse): zelfs huwelijkse voorwaarden

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(met een clausule van retour) laten het schenkingsverbod onverlet39. Maar zo gemakkelijk blijkt het resultaat van het geding toch niet te voorspellen, want er is geen regel zonder uitzondering. Op een andere plaats, namelijk in de Tratatus de Jure Conjugum zelf, Boek I, titel 2, caput 4, behandelt Rodenburg de principi[le vraag naar de bevoegdheid van de man om zijn vrouw iets na te laten en of en hoe de man zijn vrouw iets kan schenken of nalaten, en hij wijdt dan § IX aan de vraag of voor een soldaat mogelijkerwijs een uitzondering moet worden gemaakt. Dat is exact de vraag de ook de raadsheer rapporteur stelt. Na in § 38 ter hebben uitgemaakt dat na afweging van de motieven ervan het statuut inzake het schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten moet worden geacht re[el te zijn40, stelt hij in het vervolg het kennelijk in de stukken opgeworpen punt aan de orde of niet voor Van Diemen, “zijnde generaal in Indien en zijn vz, testament aldaar op Batavia gemaakt hebbende” een uitzondering op het schenkingsverbod geldt. Daartoe is in de stukken kennelijk (dat lezen we althans zowel in de Recueil als bij Rodenburg) een beroep gedaan op C. 6,21,5, juncto 13,2 en Inst. 2,1,25: onder de soldaten toekomende bijzondere bevoegdheden hoort immers ook de vrijheid om na te laten aan wie zij maar willen, zelfs aan hen die zijn gedeporteerd of aan wie anderszins de bevoegdheid om te erven is komen te ontbreken41. Zulks uiteraard tenzij hun bij speciale wettelijke maatregel die bevoegdheid is ontzegd, maar een in algemene termen vervat verbod geldt niet als zodanig. Zowel voor de raadsheer-rapporteur als voor Rodenburg faalt echter dit argument. Nog daargelaten dat Carel Constans te weinig had gesteld om aan te kunnen nemen dat Van Diemen als generaal (soldaat) zou moeten worden aangemerkt geldt in ieder geval dat aan Van Diemen dus niet een privilegium militis op grond waarvan hij zou zijn uitgezonderd van het schenkingsverbod toekomt, en wel op grond van het bepaalde in C. 5.16.2: de ratio van het schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten 39 Utrechtsche Consultatien II, 49 De clausule van Retour, by Huwelijxe voorwaerden, non adimit liberam testantdi voluntatem, sed designat ordinem succedendi ab intestato, excludit tamen conjugem superstitem a Legitima. A. weduwenaer van B, ende C. weduwe van D. hebben op den laetten May 1645 opgerecht seecker huwelijx Contract ende daer by geconditioneert in manieren als volght; met expres bedingh, Indien de toekomende echteluyden ofte eenige van hem komen te overlijden sonder geboorte by den anderen verweckt na te laten, of dat sy al geboorte hadden ende deselve geboorte storve sonder vorder geboorte, dat alsdan die goederen aen weder zijden aengebracht, ende elx van hem noch aen-erven sullen mogen,weder sullen gaan ende keren aen de zijde daer die van gekomen zijn, …. 29 October 1647, H. Moreelse, Christ. Rodenburg. 40 (38) Welke laatste redenen de motieven bij ons jegens de eerste voor de personaliteit van dit statuut geallegeerd ‘gepondereert’ zijnde, hebben verstaan dat dit statuut gehouden moet worden te wezen re[el [Ende dat diensvolgende de uitheemsen voor zoveel belangt haar goederen alhier liggende de dispositie vandien mede zijn onderworpen]. 41 Recueil § 39: die geen testamenti factionem passivam en hebben ofte die incappabel sijn om eenige goederen ex testamento te erven ten ware de wetten de institutie van dien specialijck aan haer mede hadden verboden,

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strekt zich ook uit tot soldaten, want, zo stelt keizer Caracalla, ik wil niet dat mijn soldaten, zelfs al zijn ze niet wettig getrouwd, door hun bijzitten met gefingeerde vleierijen worden uitgeplunderd. Derhalve zijn schenkingen tussen soldaten en hun vrouw of hun bijzit gewoon nietig.

7.

De litis decisoire overwegingen

7.1

De raadsheer-rapporteur

Hierna wordt het spannend. De raadsheer-commissaris vervolgt zijn Recueil met een beschouwing over de aard van de litigieuze goederen. De onderhavige beleggingen zijn gedaan in plechten en grondrenten; in het Utrechtse gelden zij uit hun aard als onroerend, omdat het rechten op onroerende goederen zijn. Hij verbindt daaraan (§ 70–71) de hypothese “soo soude daar uijt volgen dat de plechten ende renten de impetranten van revisie behoorden te worden geadjudiceert”. Maar hij vindt een, voor hem doorslaggevend, tegenargument in de interpretatie van het testament als zijn zodanig (§ 71) “Ende souden wij oock ’t selve alsoo hebben verstaan gehadt, ten ware wij daer jegens hadden overwogen dat den testateur de impetranten van revisie hadden gehonoreert met importante legaten” (vet toegevoegd e.s.). Een vergelijkbare beschouwing over het onroerende karakter van de desbetreffende rechten is ook te vinden bij Rodenburg, en wel in Titel II, Caput II, waar Rodenburg eerst meedeelt, dat Reditus hypothecae innixi perpetui temporalesque iuxta immobilibus annumerantur, vervolgens (§ II) De reditibus peculiaris esto consideratio. Et illi quidem, qui a re praestantur, vel cujus nomine consituta Hypotheca est, collocantur a Doctoribus in immobilium numero, ita tamen si perpetui sunt (secus si temporales) … Op het eerste gezicht gaan beiden dan verschillende wegen. De raadsheer-rapporteur roept in herinnering dat dat Dirck van Ravenswaaij, de neef van Van Diemen, een legaat had gekregen van 36.000 gulden, te vermeerderen met een vijfde deel van de nog door de Heren XVII te betalen gage, terwijl mevrouw de Gruijter was bedacht met 20.000 gulden voor ieder van haar vier kinderen en hij merkt op dat kennelijk “den testateur sulcx gedaen hadde in plaetse en tot compensatie van ’t gheen op de selve impetranten als zijn erfgenamen soude hebben gesuccedeert in voegen dat zijns testateurs huijsvrou alle vordere goederen zoude hebben behouden”. Het is een vernuftige constructie. Om het testament als zodanig te redden (en dat is nastrevenswaard, want –zo schrijft de raadsheer-rapporteur – de wil van de erflater moet als een koningin worden gehoorzaamd volgens Nov. 22 cap. 2, en het openbaar belang eist de uitvoering van de laatste wil van de testator, naar luid van C. 6,23,29) constateert de raadsheer-rapporteur twee[rlei. Allereerst merkt

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hij op dat volgens de tekst van de coutume het schenkingsverbod zich niet uitstrekt tot “ettelijke goederen in lijftogt gegeven” en dat dus een schenking bij wege van lijfrente geldig zou zijn geweest. Plechten en renten kunnen tot dat doel worden aangewend. Had Van Diemen dat maar tijdig gedaan en expliciet gezegd dat de schenking voor dat doel bestemd was, dan was er geen vuiltje aan de lucht geweest. Er is echter nog een tweede, belangrijker punt: Testator non praesumitur frustra testari voluisse (cf. D. 34,5,24, Marcellus). Aan alles is duidelijk dat Van Diemen beoogde zijn zusters substanti[el te bevoordelen. Het had in zijn macht van gelegen om die bevoordeling te concretiseren door de renten en plechten aan zijn beide zusters te legateren. Had hij zich het probleem van de heredis institutio in verband met het schenkingsverbod gerealiseerd, dan zou hij dat probleem ongetwijfeld hebben willen voorkomen en deze bevoordeling niet van een in een ab-intestato verkrijging wortelende vordering afhankelijk gemaakt, dus de renten en plechten aan zijn zusters gelegateerd. Dat heeft hij echter niet gedaan. Hij heeft een andere weg gekozen. In plaats van een dergelijk legaat van de renten en plechten heeft Van Diemen compensandi animo, mede ter compensatie voor deze zakelijke rechten, de voor zijn zusters bestemde legaten op de genoemde, zeer hoge bedragen laten luiden. Zo begrijpt de raadsheerrapporteur de strekking van het testament en de wil van de erflater. Boven de exacte bewoordingen van het testament kiest hij voor de veronderstelde wil van de erflater en dus, zouden wij tegenwoordig zeggen, voor de conversie van een ongeldige making in 88n waarvan hij meent te mogen aannemen, dat die overeenstemt met de bedoeling van de erflater en dat de erflater die ook zou hebben gekozen, ware hij zich van de nietigheid van de gekozen constructie bewust geweest. Hij meent daarvoor in de tekst van het testament ook de nodige aanwijzingen te hebben gevonden, maar het zou te ver voeren die hier ged8tailleerd te bespreken. Kortom, voor de raadsheer-rapporteur ligt de vordering van de impetranten voor afwijzing gereed.

7.2

Rodenburg

Rodenburg is geheel op de hoogte van de zienswijze van de raadsheer-rapporteur en hij komt op twee plaatsen terug op diens redenering. Na eerst (Titel II, Caput 2, § II) betoogd te hebben dat de opbrengsten (reditus temporales) van plechten en renten uit hun aard onroerend zijn (ille quidem, qui a re praestantur… collocantur a Doctoribus in immobilium numero) trekt hij de logische consequentie uit dat betoog, dat op de verdeling van de opbrengst de lex loci toepasselijk is. Belasting over vervreemingen van die rechten (40e penning) wordt dus ook geheven overeenkomstig het recht van de provincie of stad waar zij zijn gelegen. Vervolgens stelt hij de vraag of de man der opbrengsten van plechten en renten

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aan zijn vrouw mag schenken (Titel II, Caput 2, § IV: An vir eos leget uxori). Hij beantwoordt die vraag bevestigend onder verwijzing naar twee arresten van het Hof van Utrecht, het eerste in de zaak die ons hier bezighoudt, de tweede in een kennelijk vergelijkbare42 : [Chopinnus] … compluscula recenset arresta, quibus decisum est annuos reditus, quos de plebeis nummorum indictionibus solvendum assignasset Rex debitor …dividi ea lege, quae obtinet ubi fiscales isti nummi, de quibus reditus praestari convenerat, a Regiis coactoribus exiguntur. Eaque sententia et apud nos duplici judicio probata fuit. Primo a revisoribus in causa satis momentosa, van Carel Constant, als ghetrouwt hebbende de Weduwe van den Ghenerael Van Diemen ende Peter de Gruyter cum sociis Anno 1649, intellectumque, professos a Provinciae nostrae Ordinibus reditus, quoad succedendi causam, dijudicandos esse a more nostrate.

Een dergelijke schenking is belast bij de ontvanger. Als de fiscus een bepaalde transactie belast, waarom zou die dan naar burgerlijk recht nietig moeten zijn? De vraag stellen is haar beantwoorden.Als de fiscus de verkrijging van de renten en de plechten krachtens het testament bij de weduwe belast, dan kunnen de zusters niet alsnog de nietigheid van de bevoordeling inroepen. Vervolgens komt Rodenburg in Titel III, Caput IV, § VII terug op het arrest dat ons hier bezighoudt en hij stelt de vraag wat rechtens is als mensen van elders goederen opvorderen, waarvan het de echtgenoot vrijstond die aan anderen te schenken. Moet dan daaruit gesuppleerd worden wat naar het ten onzent geldende gewoonterecht de echtgenoot verboden was te schenken? Rodenburg vermeldt het expliciet ontkennende antwoord van Joannes / Sande, die de mening is toegedaan dat een bevestigend antwoord contra legem zou zijn en een inbreuk op het schenkingsverbod. Ook verwerpt Sande een eventueel beroep de wil van de erflater, want die wordt voorondersteld niet iets anders gewild te hebben dan wettelijk geoorloofd is43. Kennelijk acht Rodenburg de mening van van den Sande niet doorslaggevend, want hij vervolgt zijn betoog nog vijf bladzijden. Evenmin kan Rodenburg zich verenigen met de zienswijze van iemand (aliquis) dat als een testator genoeg andere, niet door het schenkingverbod bestreken, goederen zou hebben nagelaten,in dat geval – wanneer deze zou 42 De tweede zaak beschrijft Rodenburg als volgt: Dein altero Curiae nostrae nuperrimo judicato, huisus anne 1651, die 22 Martij in causa van Ian Iacobsz van Ienvelt, appellant, ende Beernt Hendricksz Munster, geappelleerde, quo placitum est rerum immobilium nomine, de quibus in commodum curatorum minoribus interdicta esset testatio, venire et nomina provincialia (obligatien op de Generale middelen): eo magis existimante Curia hac rerum tempestate sententiam illam sequendam esse, quod plurimorum hominum summa divitiae in his reditibus consistat, qui eosdem in Provincia debitrice perinde esse voluisse videntur, atque si res soli ibidem comparassent. 43 J. van den Sande, Decisiones Frisicae : sive rerum in suprema Frisiorum curia iudicatarum libri V, Leeuwarden 1639. lib. 4. tit.4. defin. 4. [Ne aestimationem quidem deberi rei contra prohibitionem statuti legati].

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hebben bedacht dat de door hem gedane schenking te eniger tijd zou kunnen worden vernietigd – uit die andere goederen aangevuld moet worden, wat de ontvanger overigens ten titel van schenking niet zou kunnen ontvangen. Op die manier zou de legataris toch al te gemakkelijk de desbetreffende wettelijke bepalingen kunnen omzeilen, maar bovendien: de wil van de erflater is verre van duidelijk. Het gebeurt te vaak dat mensen naarstig een opdracht geven die allerminst verbergt dat zij de kracht niet hebben om zich te bevrijden van de echtelijke koppelarijen van erfenisjagers of andere dergelijke kwellingen. Rodenburg bouwt zijn eigen betoog zorgvuldig op. Pacta dotalia waarbij een afspraak gemaakt betreffende een schenking zijn, in geval een schenkingsverbod geldt, nietig indien de schenking staande het huwelijk nog moet worden voltooid, maar wel degelijk geldig als de rechtshandeling compleet is afgewikkeld vjjr de huwelijkssluiting: suam quippe firmitatem et complementum stipulatio ista habet, nec ullus postmodum actus tempore prohibito venit celebrandus, sed sola prommittentis expectanda mors, quae promissi dotalitii dies veniat. Aan het opnemen van een dergelijk beding in het testament komt dan geen zelfstandige betekenis toe, want voor het intreden ervan is geen aparte rechtshandeling meer vereist: de dood van de erflater is zowel noodzakelijke als voldoende voorwaarde voor het intreden van de making. En van de dood geldt nu eenmaal: certum an, incertum quando. Rodenburg vervolgt het betoog met de vraag of dergelijke pacta dotalia staande het huwelijk met onderling goedvinden herroepbaar zijn en in navolging van Choppin beantwoordt hij die vraag ontkennend, reeds omdat een dergelijke herroeping materieel op een bevoordeling neer zou kunnen komen, die nu eenmaal aan het schenkingsverbod onderworpen is. Het maakt ook geen verschil of de vader van de vrouw nu wel of niet bij dergelijke voltooid te achten pacta dotalia was betrokken. Voltooid is voltooid en de testamentaire making die deze pacta nog eens opschrijft kan niet worden aangetast op grond van het schenkingsverbod. De ratio daarvan, het voorkomen van benadeling van schuldeisers en ongeoorloofde be"nvloeding door de andere echtgenoot, verzet zich daartegen ook allerminst. Aldus komt Rodenburg, zij het langs een andere weg, tot hetzelfde resultaat als de raadsheer-rapporteur.

8.

De tegenvordering

Daarover kunnen we kort zijn. De Gruijter vordert loon voor zijn werkzaamheden in patria ten behoeve van (het vermogen van) Van Diemen. De raadsheer-rapporteur stelt zich op het standpunt dat de grondslag van die vordering niet anders dan een overeenkomst van opdracht (mandatum) kan zijn. De Gruijter heeft echter nimmer enige post van hem toekomend loon in de voor Van Diemen gehouden administratie opgenomen. Niet gebleken is dat “zijn professie

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zou wesen andere lieden goederen mercede conventa te administreren”. Uit D. 17,1,1 en enige andere teksten volgt dat mandatum een contract om niet is; ware sprake van loon, dan zou het contract een locatio-conductio moeten zijn en dat is het kennelijk niet. Op die grond zou ook de tegenvordering voor afwijzing gereed hebben gelegen, ware het niet dat Van Diemen en zijn vrouw verscheidene malen, laatstelijk bij missive van 9 Juli 1645 met zoveel woorden schriftelijk aan De Gruijter hebben toegezegd hem voor zijn werkzaamheden te zullen compenseren. De raadsheer-rapporteur oordeelt Van Aelst gehouden die toezegging na te komen en rekening houdende met alle omstandigheden van de zaak stelt hij het daarmee gemoeide bedrag vast op 3.000 gulden. Rodenburg wijdt geen woord aan de tegenvordering.

9.

Conclusie

Het blijft onbevredigend, dat het arrest zelf in deze zaak kennelijk niet te vinden is. Het heeft er echter wel alle schijn van dat de impetranten in het ongelijk zijn gesteld, want zowel het betoog van de raadsheer-rapporteur als dat van Christiaan Rodenburg lijken in die richting te wijzen. Maar zijn dat wel twee verschillende figuren, of was Christiaan Rodenburg in de zaak van Pieter de Gruijter (in persoon en q.q.) en Dirck van Ravenswaeij tegen Carel Constans q.q. de raadsheer-rapporteur? We zullen het nooit helemaal zeker weten. Vast staat wel, dat Rodenburg bij het schrijven van zijn Tractaten de Recueil op zijn schrijftafel had liggen. Hij kent immers het gehele dossier, inclusief de afloop en de wijze waarop hij telkenmale met de Receuil omgaat, daaruit citeert, de bronvermeldingen ervan uitbreidt (en in 88n geval een onjuiste vermelding copi[ert) verraadt op zijn minst een grote vertrouwdheid. De argumentatie van de eindbeslissing van elk van beiden verschilt, maar het resultaat is hetzelfde. Voortschrijdend inzicht bij Rodenburg, of is daarvoor het verschil in waardering van het belang van de wil van de erflater te groot? En vervolgens, verliest met deze beslissing het schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten nu wel of niet veel van haar betekenis? In ieder geval moet het niet al te ruim worden ge"nterpreteerd. Die consequentie lijkt al spoedig ook elders geaccepteerd te worden. Bernhard van Zutphen is (slechts luttele jaren later) daarover duidelijk: het heeft geen zin het statuut een extensieve interpretatie te geven; schenkingen aan zwagers of schoonzusters zijn geldig; slechts als sprake is van fraus legis, zijn zij van onwaarde44. Het zou nog tot 2003 duren voordat hier 44 B. van Zutphen, Practycke der Nederlandsche rechten van de daghelijcksche, soo civile als criminele questien, Leeuwarden 1655, s.v. Donatie, § XV: Wort gevraeght; indien by Statuyt verboden is dat Man en Vrouw malkander geen Goederen mogen maken, of als dan mach

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ten lande het schenkingsverbod tussen echtgenoten uit het Nederlands recht verdween. Ook al mist daarom de zaak actuele betekenis, toch wijd ik graag deze beschouwing aan Jan Hallebeek, met wie ik in zoveel projecten op het gebied van de vergelijkende rechtsgeschiedenis heb mogen samenwerken op een wijze waaraan ik de beste herinneringen bewaar en die tot dankbaarheid stemt. Van die dankbaarheid geeft deze bijdrage blijk.

bestaen een Donatie by de Man geaen aan de Voorkinderen ofte Suster ofte eeenige andere Bloedtverwanten van sijn Vrouwe; ende ter contrarie of de Vrouwe mach doen een Donatie aan de Voorkinderen ofte de Broeder ofte aen andere Bloedtverwanten van haren Man. Ick antwoorde dat soodanige Donatien mogen bestaen en dat sy niet strijden tegen het Statuyt, verbiedende dat Man ende Vrouw malkander geen goederen mogen maecken, ten ware consteerden dat de Donatie gedaen ware in fraude van het Statuyt, want sy alsdan sode wesen van geender weerden.

Louis Sicking / Remco van Rhee*

Prize law, procedure and politics. The settlement of a prize case before the Admiralty Court and the Great Council of the Netherlands (1554–1555)

1.

Introduction

When the English merchant James Gilford set sail for Poole in Dorset in April 1554 he was unaware of the tribulations he would experience before his merchandise would arrive safely in his country of origin. Before he set sail, he had bought a quantity of cloth1 in Saint Malo in France2 and stored it on board the ship (“barcke”) he had hired on Alderney, one of the Channel Islands which were subject to the English crown. He must have encountered some problems in communicating with his crew, since he was an English speaker and the local crew only spoke a Norman dialect which was perceived by Gilford as a mixture of French and English3. Along the French coast, more precisely, in the waterway between Alderney and a series of rocks known as Les Casquets4, his ship was

* The authors would like to thank Alain Wijffels, Amaranth Feuth and Randolph Davidson for their valuable comments. Research by Louis Sicking was carried out within the context of his internationalisation project Maritime Conflict Management in Atlantic Europe, 1200–1600, which is funded by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and the partner universities of Santander, La Laguna, La Rochelle and Nova Lissabon. See https://www. universiteitleiden.nl/en/research/research-projects/humanities/maritime-conflict-manage ment-in-atlantic-europe. 1 BH (= Beroepen uit Holland) 921, C,3: “57 fardeelen ende eene ballote cannevetz”. The value of the merchandise was 754 Pounds Sterling (BH 921, C, p. 4). 2 BH 921, hII, 7: “tselve goedt was St Malo gescheept by nachte”. 3 BH 921, E, 3: “wesende een eylant (gelyck meer diegelicke dairontrent als Gernisee ende Jernisee) wesende van corrupter taele tusschen Ingels ande Franchoys, nochtans ondersaten van der Co. Mat van Ingelant”. The privateers, however, thought differently. See BH 921, B, 1: “Nemaer alzoe gheen certhepartie noch eenich bescheet by den scepe en was ende daer maer een persoon, te weten dezen impetrant, en was die Inghels sprack ende alle de reste niet en consten dan Franchoys.”. 4 BH 921, hII, 7: “uut Orne [= Norman name of Alderney] gecomen is in zee omtrent den Kiskasse [= Les Casquets]”. Also BH 921, A, 1: “Ende wesende in zee omtrent twee mylen van Garnezee.”.

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taken by a privateer (“jacht” or “serloupe”)5 from Middelburg in the Netherlands6. Its captain, Adriaen Adriaensz, alias Joris Schenck, and skipper, Jan Lievensz, acted with a letter of marque, or commission, to privateer. Gilford, and also one of the members of his crew, was transferred to the vessel of the privateers. After having given his wallet for “safekeeping” to a crew member of the Netherlandish vessel7, he was interrogated (and allegedly threatened to be thrown overboard) and stated that part of his cargo belonged to French merchants8 (a statement he later reiterated before the bailiff of the town of Middelburg). Schenck and Lievensz then ordered part of the “French” merchandise to be transferred to their ship, but since their ship was too small they left the remainder on board Gilford’s vessel9. In order to make sure that all of the French merchandise could be sent to the Netherlands, Schenck and Lievensz decided that eight of their crew would take charge of Gilford’s ship. Both ships would travel together to the Netherlands10. However, Gilford’s ship would never reach the Netherlands. The ship was taken a second time, on this occasion in foggy, early morning weather conditions11 by a French warship from Dieppe12. The French allegedly transferred the “French” merchandise that Schenck and Lievensz had left on board Gilford’s ship to their own vessel in addition to four of the 5 BH 921, B, 1: “zeker scip van oirloghen toegerust up vrijen beut omme te crancken de vianden der K. Mt”. 6 The territories in the Low Countries united by the successive Dukes of Burgundy and the Habsburgs Philip the Fair and Charles V were referred to as “Netherlands” at the time (“Nederlanden” in Dutch, “Pays-Bas” in French; the adjective used in this article is “Netherlandish”, meaning “from the Netherlands”). 7 This happened at the initiative of that crew member. See BH 921, hI, 4: “Jan Lievenss [This is a mistake, since the document is signed with a different name: Jan Heerensen [?]; accordingly, the witness is not the same person as the skipper.], woonachtich op Armuden, oudt ontrent 43 jaeren, verclaert by eede geweest te zyn scryveynt op den jacht van oorlooge.”. From BH 921, B, 5, it appears that this scribe was later taken into custody in Middelburg at the request of Gilford. Gilford denies that this happened at his initiative: see BH 921, E, 10. For the role of the scribe (“scryveynt”), see M. van Alphen, Het oorlogsschip als varend bedrijf. Schrijvers, administratie en logistiek aan boord van Nederlandse marineschepen in de 17de en 18de eeuw, Leiden 2014, 14. 8 He indicated the marks by which these goods could be identified, see BH 921, B, 2. Later he declared that the merchandise was not French. He stated that all merchandise belonged in reality to English merchants. 9 Two parcels which appeared to belong to Gilford were immediately returned after they were transferred to the warship: BH 921, HII, 7, also BH 921, B, 2. 10 This was not problematic as regards the English cargo since, according to Schenck, “zal tzelve aldaer [i. e. the Netherlands] zoe vele gelden als in Ingelandt.” (BH 921, B, 3). 11 BH 921, hI, 2: “des maendachs smerges met den daegeraet, wesende duyster ende wat mistich.”. 12 BH 921, hII, 7: “een groot scip met drie meersschen”. See also BH 921, hI, 2: “dat hy deponent benodicht was deselve barcke te laten dryven oft anders hadden apparent geweest beede genomen te werden”.

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eight Netherlandish crew members. The other four crew members were issued a passport in order to allow them to help navigate Gilford’s ship with the original crew and remaining merchandise to England13. Upon arrival in England in the harbour of Rye, the ship and cargo were taken into custody by the captain of Camber Castle so that they might be returned to their lawful owner14. During the journey to the Netherlands, Schenck ordered Gilford and his crew member to be put on aboard a passing English fishing boat, which carried them home to England. When leaving the Netherlandish ship, the wallet given for safekeeping was returned to Gilford, but later it appeared that most of the valuables inside had disappeared. After arriving in England, Gilford travelled to the Netherlands in an attempt to recover his ship, his merchandise and his valuables. The whereabouts of his ship after it had been taken for a second time by the French were unknown to him at the time. On 4 May 1554 he initiated a lawsuit at the Netherlands Admiralty Court15. The present article discusses the lawsuit initiated by Gilford at the Admiralty Court in the town of Veere in Zealand and the appeal against an interlocutory judgment of this court brought by Schenck and Lievensz at the Great Council at Malines, the superior central court of the Netherlands at the time. The preserved case file is part of the series “Appeals from Holland” (BH 921) in the records of the Great Council of Malines (GRM), which are preserved at the General Archives of the Realm in Brussels (ARA)16. Some of the case files in this series contain documents that were originally submitted to the Admiralty Court17: these documents had to be transferred to the Great Council after an admiralty case arrived there on appeal. Of the files in the series that contain materials from the Admiralty Court, the file relating to Gilford’s case is relatively comprehensive: of the 39 documents that remain in the file, the majority was originally submitted to the Admiralty Court. Even though little is left of the records of the Admiralty Court itself18, the file under consideration allows us to reconstruct the procedure before the Admiralty Court. The case under discussion here not only provides interesting insight into the 13 BH 921, e. Gilford claimed that the passport was false: BH 921, E, 7. 14 BH 921, hI, 3; BH 921, A, 2. 15 BH 921, g. It is interesting to note the short time span between the taking of the ship in the second half of April 1554 (BH 921, f, 1) and the appearance of Gilford in Middelburg (on or before 1 May 1554). 16 Beroepen uit Holland, No. 921, Archief Grote Raad van Mechelen, Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussel. As the series “Appeals from Holland” contains files from both Holland and Zealand, it explains why files from the Veere Admiralty can be found here. 17 ARA (=Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussel), GRM (= Grote Raad van Mechelen), BH 919–926. 18 L. Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands. State, Economy and War at Sea in the Renaissance, Leiden and Boston 2004, 437. F.A. Gooskens, De admiraliteit te Veere. Inventaris van het archief en een kort overzicht van de geschiedenis tot 1559, Middelburg 1983, x–xi.

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practice of privateering in early modern Europe, but also allows us a glance at the role of the learned ius commune at the Admiralty Court. The role played by the ius commune in the practice of the Admiralty Court is relevant, since the 1488 and 1540 ordinances on the Admiralty specifically state that the procedure of this court should be the same as that of the Great Council. Since the procedure at the Great Council was Romano-canonical in nature19, the implementation of these ordinances meant that the Admiralty Court would also adopt such a procedure. In a study of a 1547 prize case, we concluded that in practice the Admiralty Court indeed followed the procedure of the Great Council where it concerned the valuation of the litigation costs. At the same time it appeared that the procedure at the Admiralty Court knew fewer written elements than the same procedure at the Great Council. The rules on default of appearance also differed slightly. The Admiralty Court allowed litigants to purge a first default before sunset, whereas the rule at the Great Council was that this could be done before the end of the hearing at which the defendant had initially defaulted20. The present article focuses on the way a case was actually litigated at the Admiralty Court and how the case can be contextualized. This article thus aims to contribute to the history of prize law in particular, and more generally to the wider field of conflict resolution and conflict management21. After all, the adjudication of prizes is a mode of judicial dispute settlement amongst other judicial and non-judicial methods of conflict management22. The study of prize cases which were adjudicated at first instance by prize courts such as the Admiralty and appealed at the Great Council and in which English and Netherlandish subjects were involved are of particular interest for the study of the role of prize law in the development of international law. A two-tiered jurisdiction 19 L. Sicking/C.H. van Rhee, Prijs, procedure en proceskosten. De afhandeling van een prijszaak volgens de romano-canonieke procedure voor de Admiraliteit en de Grote Raad van Mechelen tijdens de Engels-Schotse oorlog van 1547, TR 71 (2003) 337–357, esp. 339 note 10. 20 Sicking/van Rhee, TR 71 (2003) 352, 354. 21 C.G. Roelofsen, Studies in the History of International Law. Practice and Doctrine in particular with regard to the Law of Naval Warfare in the Low Countries from circa 1450 until the early 17th century, Utrecht 1991; M. Tranchant/S. Hamel, Le d8ploiement de l’Amiraut8 de France / La Rochelle / la fin du Moyen ffge, Revue d’histoire maritime 19 (2014) 33–48, S. Musa, Victim Reparation under the Ius Post Bellum: A Historical and Normative Perspective (PhD Tilburg University 2016) and S. Musa, Victims of maritime conflict, compensation claims and the role of the admiralty court in the early modern period, Comparative Legal History 5 no. 1 (2017), 138–140. On conflict management, see the special issue: Maritime Conflict Management, Diplomacy and International Law, 1100–1800, in: Comparative Legal History 5 no. 1 (2017). 22 See for instance A. Cordes, Die Erwartungen mittelalterlicher Kaufleute an Gerichtsverfahren: Hansische Privilegien als Indikator, in: A. Cordes/S. Dauchy (eds.), Eine Grenze in Bewegung. Private und öffentliche Konfliktlösung in Handels- und Seerecht, München 2013, 39–64.

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concerning prizes was often laid down in seventeenth-century maritime treaties, such as those between Great Britain and the Netherlands, and the present case is an example of such practice in the sixteenth century23. Moreover, recent historiography on the fast-growing field of conflict resolution and conflict management is more interested in the process of dispute resolution and conflict management and its (diplomatic) context than in its outcomes24. In this article we will discuss the following issues: litigation practice and the ius commune at the Netherlands Admiralty Court in relation to litigation practice at the Great Council in Malines in the case Gilford v. Schenck and Lievensz; the extent to which the legal arguments used in the case are based on the teachings of the ius commune; the enforcement of a judgment of the Admiralty Court and the practical problems encountered in this respect; and finally the political and diplomatic context of the case. However, before discussing these issues, the dramatis personae and the maritime context will be discussed.

2.

Dramatis Personae and Maritime-Diplomatic Context

Little is known about the dramatis personae in this case. As stated, both Joris Schenck and Jan Lievensz were from Middelburg in Zealand. In 1554 they were respectively about 32 and 28 years old25. A few years earlier, around 1547, Joris Schenck had acted as skipper on a vessel called Sampson, which had been rented from its Antwerp-based owner and was used for transportation of merchandise to Leith in Scotland26. Jan Lievensz, in his turn, would appear in another prize case at the Veere Admiralty Court in 1555 in which he demanded his share of booty captured by the captain of a ship of which he was one of the co-owners27. We have not been able to obtain further information on merchant James Gilford from Poole in Dorset. At the time of the case under discussion he was circa 24 years old28. Joris Schenck and Jan Lievensz represent pre-modern maritime 23 J.H.W. Verzijl/W.P. Heere/J.P.S. Offerhaus, International Law in Historical Perspective IX–C The Law of Maritime Prize, Dordrecht 1992, 663–667, 671–672. Roelofsen (note 21) xvii. More recently on these treaties and the role of Admiralties, Musa, Victim Reparation (note 21). 24 Compare the historiography on new diplomacy in which a similar interest can be detected. See M. Ebben/L. Sicking, Nieuwe diplomatieke geschiedenis van de premoderne tijd. Een inleiding, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 127 no. 4 (2014) 541–552. 25 BH 921, hI, p. 1 and 3. 26 H.J. Smit (ed.), Bronnen tot de handel met Engeland 1558–1585 RGP Grote Serie 91, Den Haag 1950, 797, Document nr. 969. See the witness deposition of a certain Gerard Cornelisz., crew member of the Sampson around 1547, submitted to the local court of the town of Bergen op Zoom in 1560. 27 Zeeuws Archief Middelburg, Archief Admiraliteit Veere, inv. no. 39. 28 BH 921, f.

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entrepreneurs acting as peaceful skippers, privateers, or as investors in ships hunting for booty, depending on the opportunities and circumstances29. The capture of Gilford’s ship took place during the fifth Habsburg-Valois War (1551–1556), which was part of a series of wars between the Habsburgs and Valois France. These had originally centred on Italy but had become more and more focused on north-western Europe after 1547. Although political tension did exist between France and England, the two countries were not at war in 155430. When Gilford initiated litigation at the Netherlands Admiralty Court on 4 May 1554, the relationship between England and the Netherlands was largely defined by the preparations for the marriage of Mary Tudor, Queen of England, and Philip, son of emperor Charles V31. The latter was also lord of the Netherlands. Philip would travel from Spain to England by ship, and his fleet would be welcomed in the English Channel by squadrons from England and the Netherlands. Originally it was planned that Philip would arrive in April 1554, but in actual practice he only arrived in Southampton on 19 July 1554. For months the English and Netherlandish squadrons of fourteen ships each had navigated the English Channel aimlessly in attendance to greet the royal fleet from Spain32. Privateering seems not to have been hindered by the forthcoming celebrations. The commander of the Netherlands squadron in attendance on Philip, Vice-Admiral Adolph of Burgundy-Wakken, stated in June 1554 in a message from Dartmouth in Devon, that the English Admiral, William Howard, had sent several yachts to welcome Philip upon his arrival in the English Channel. However, these ships were also used for privateering and the Netherlands ViceAdmiral was not sure whether only French ships were targeted. One of the yachts, whose captain was a certain Prat or Brad, had taken a prize valued at 200 angels33. Skipper Schoone Jan (Handsome John) from the town of Flushing (Vlissingen) in Zealand34, had witnessed payment of this amount upon the sale of the prize in 29 On maritime entrepreneurship, see for instance D. Parrott, The Business of War. Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge 2012, 39–40. 30 D. Loades, The Tudor Navy. An administrative, political and military history, Aldershot 1992, 159. 31 On this marriage M.J. Rodriguez-Salgado, The changing face of empire. Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg authority, 1551–1559, Cambridge 1988, 79–85; F. Postma, Viglius van Aytta. De jaren met Granvelle, 1549–1564, Zutphen 2000, 72–73. 32 Sicking, Neptune (note 18), 336–338. A ship called De Moriaan (125 tonnes) was part of the Netherlandish war fleet. It had 110 crew members. The captain was Robert Cuper. He was also the owner of this ship, which had been leased for 5 months and 9 days to serve as a ship of war, from 15 March until 20 August 1554. The crew was hired on 5 May. This ship must have been larger than the yacht with the same name in the present article. See Rekening oorlogsvloot 1554, ARA Brussel, Rekenkamer, inv. no. 26114f.20r and f.39v. 33 An angel is an English golden coin introduced by Edward IV in 1465. 34 Admiral Maximilian of Burgundy to Mary of Hungary (Veere, 28 February 1549 ns), ARA Brussels, Raad van State en Audi[ntie (Aud.) inv. no. 1659/2f.131r. Schone Jan was a suc-

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Portsmouth. When questioned about his prize, Prat had stated, somewhat mysteriously, that in his opinion a loss could be better borne by others than by himself35. As the case Gilford v. Schenck and Lievensz shows, Netherlandish privateers also partook in this game.

3.

Institutional context

The Netherlands ordinance on the Admiralty of 1488 determined that privateering was only allowed with the consent of the Admiral. The Admiral had the exclusive right to issue letters of marque, i. e. a permission allowing private parties to equip a ship at their own cost in order to lawfully acquire booty – a prize – from enemies of the sovereign. In 1540 this exclusive right was revoked. From then on, the Admiral was only allowed to endorse letters of marque issued in the name of the sovereign. This was in line with actual practice, which meant that the Admiral would execute the policies of the sovereign as regards privateering. It should also be noted that the powers of the Admiral were not undisputed. The province of Holland did not recognize the Admiral in this respect. In Holland, letters of marque were issued by the stadholder in the name of the sovereign. This meant that when Admiral Maximilian of Burgundy was appointed stadholder in 1547, he had the power to issue letters of marque in all three main coastal regions of the Netherlands – Flanders, Holland and Zealand – either as Admiral or as stadholder36. Theoretically, both the central government and the privateers would profit from privateering. The naval power of the sovereign was enlarged, while the privateers would have the chance to acquire a good prize. In practice, however, booty was so much sought after that not only subjects of the enemies of the sovereign but subjects of his allies or neutral powers would be attacked by privateers too37. This must also have been the case regarding James Gilford, who came from a country on the verge of being joined to the Netherlands in a personal union. In order to prevent such abuses, from 1554 onwards the Admiral would require security from the privateers when issuing letters of marque. The money they deposited would not be returned to them if they transgressed the bouncessful privateer himself. In 1558 he initiated a case at the Admiralty on the occasion of the capture of a ship carrying French goods. During the capture Schone Jan had pretended to be a French privateer. Register Vierschaar, Zeeuws Archief, Archief Vierschaar Veere, inv. no. 341f.195v–197r. 35 R. Tyler, Calendar of letters, despatches and state papers relating to the negotiations between England and Spain XII, London 1949, 294–295. 36 Sicking, Neptune (note 18) 124, 126, 203. 37 Sicking, Neptune (note 18) 422–423, 425.

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daries of their letters. This measure would increase the sovereign’s control over the privateers, and it also served as protection for the owners of the ships used for privateering. Since most privateers were of very limited means, any possible damage inflicted by them would be recovered from the shipowners38. The problem with the requirement to provide security was that not all potential privateers had the means to do so. The Admiral did not want to abolish the requirement, however, since he could be held personally liable when captains of ships of war acquired prizes illegally39. In order to determine whether a prize could be considered just, the Admiral and his Admiralty Court had to evaluate the taking. When a prize was indeed considered a good prize by the Admiral, the privateers could divide it amongst themselves and had to pay the so-called tenth penny, ten per cent of its value to the Admiral. Whether a prize would be declared just depended on many different criteria. Obviously the privateers wished for a flexible assessment. The bailiff of the town of Flushing, who at the time acted as mouthpiece for many privateers from the province of Zealand, advocated that these privateers should be able to act under the same flexible conditions as their French counterparts. These conditions had been fixed in the French 1544 ordinance on the Admiralty which declared shipowners exempt from liability for the acts of the captains and crew of warships. The French ordinance also laid down that all ships that were taken having goods on board of which only a small part belonged to the enemy should be declared to be good prizes entirely. This approach would later become known as the principle of “infection hostile” (in French) or “hostile infection”40. The

38 Although privateers could also be shipowners as the examples of Jan Lievensz, who was involved in this capacity in another prize case at the Admiralty in 1555, and Adriaen Crol illustrate. In the case on which the present article is based, Adriaen Crol from Enkhuizen was the shipowner (“reeder”) of the yacht that captured Gilford’s vessel (BH 921, i: “Adriaen Crol als reeder van denselven jacht”). He acted as privateer himself in 1553. He was also active in the waters around the Channel Islands. In 1553 he even occupied the island of Sark for a while. Sicking, Neptune (note 18) 334–335. 39 Sicking, Neptune (note 18) 431. For an example of an Englishman who files a request for Netherlandish letters of marque, see Mary of Hungary to Maximilian of Burgundy, 13–09–1554, ARA Brussels, Aud 1659/2f.317–318. Mary of Hungary stated that the Englishman must submit himself to the “loix de l’amiralit8”, provide security and should abstain from taking subjects of the emperor and ships belonging to subjects of friendly powers. Compare the bond and bail mechanism of the English Court of Admiralty in the seventeenth century : S. Musa, Victims of maritime conflict, compensation claims and the role of the admiralty court in the early modern period, Comparative Legal History 5 no. 1 (2017), 138–140. This mechanism was already included in the regulations for the Admiral of Sicily in 1239, the oldest known regulations in Europe. L.V. Mott, Seapower in the medieval Mediterranean. The Catalan-Aragonese Fleet in the War of the Sicilian Vespers, Gainesville etc. 2003, 65–68. 40 A. Wijffels, Consilium facultatis juridicae tubingensis, Leiden 1993, 3. K.H. Böhringer,

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principle does not safeguard the transport of enemy property by neutrals, nor does it safeguard the transport of neutral property by the enemy. However, even though the Admiral supported the proposal of the bailiff of Flushing41 and suggested amending the Netherlandish ordinance on the Admiralty accordingly, this did not happen42. Although this principle would have been advantageous for the privateers, (the lawyers of) Schenck c.s. must have estimated that this argument was not acceptable for the Admiralty and, as a consequence, it was not present in the documents of the lawsuit.

4.

Litigation Practice and the Ius Commune at the Admiralty Court

The documents that have been preserved in the file of James Gilford’s case were submitted to the Great Council. As already noted, most of these documents were originally produced in litigation initiated by Gilford on 4 May 1554 before the Admiralty Court. After the Admiralty Court had issued an interlocutory judgment dated 20 June 155443, in which Gilford was allowed to recover that part of his merchandise which had been taken to Middelburg by Schenck and Lievensz on condition that he would provide sufficient security44, Schenck and Lievensz filed an appeal against this judgment at the Great Council45. On request of the parties, the Great Council decided not only to hear the appeal, but to have the whole case transferred to Malines in order to provide a final judgment46. Most likely this was done because transferring the case back to Veere would have resulted in additional litigation costs and delay. The deliberations on the case at the Great Council would to a large extent be based on the documents that were part of the case file submitted to the Admiralty Court, but the parties were allowed to submit an additional brief to supplement what had been submitted to the court in Veere47. The inventories of the files submitted by each party to the Admiralty Court have been preserved48. The documents that are listed in these inventories, the

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48

Das Recht der Prise gegen Neutrale in der Praxis des Spätmittelalters, Hamburg 1972, 12–14. See also the section “Legal arguments” in this article. The bailiff of Flushing was subject to the admiral Maximilian of Burgundy as lord of Flushing. Sicking, Neptune (note 19) 432. BH 921, BBI. The parties had petitioned for judgment on 28 May 1554. See BH 921, J. BH 921, BBI. BH 921, BBII. BH 921, FF. The brief of Gilford has been preserved: BH 921, KK. We do not discuss this brief in the present article, which focuses on the Admiralty Court. BH 921, a and b. Such an inventory had to be drafted when the file was submitted to the court.

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terminology used and the procedural model of which they are evidence coincide with those at the Great Council of Malines, which was, as mentioned, a court where a procedure based on the learned Romano-canonical model was applied. Documents that coincide with those at the Great Council are first of all the inventories themselves of the files that were submitted to the Admiralty. Such inventories were a necessary part of case files at the Great Council. Furthermore, there is the mandement, the official document by which the case was initiated at the Admiralty Court49, as well as the report documenting the fact that the bailiff summoned the opponent party to court based on the mandement50. We also find such documents as a necessary part of litigation at the Great Council. Furthermore, we find the terminology “venue en court” in the inventory of Gilford, indicating the initiation of the case. Additionally, the briefs submitted by Gilford, in which the facts of the case are listed, in which factual and legal arguments are advanced and in which replies are provided to arguments advanced by Schenck c.s., are indicated with a terminology that one also encounters at the Great Council: “memorien”, “additien” and “solutien”51. Schenck c.s. submitted the same set of briefs to the Admiralty Court52. Content-wise, these briefs also coincide with their equivalents at the Great Council. In addition, we find an interlocutory ruling of the Admiralty Court in which it was decided that the case was ready for judgment (“acte van conclusie in rechte”)53. Such a ruling, like the other documents in the file as well as the further terminology used at the Admiralty Court, strongly reflects the procedural model of the Great Council of Malines.

5.

Legal Arguments

In the briefs submitted by the parties we find a series of (legal) arguments being used in relation to the question whether the cargo taken by Schenck and Lievensz could be qualified as a good prize, and who was liable for the damage resulting from the second taking of Gilford’s ship by the French privateers and the loss of the valuables that had been in Gilford’s wallet. These arguments are partly based on what a modern observer may qualify as customary international law, and more specifically on the rules governing prize law. In one of the briefs submitted

49 50 51 52 53

The corresponding documents were referred to by way of a letter in the inventory which was also noted down on the relevant document. BH 921, g. BH 921, i. BH 921, C, E, I. BH 921, B, D, H. See BH 921, J.

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by Schenck c.s. this body of law is referred to as the law of war54. We also encounter arguments based on or influenced by the learned ius commune. The use of these arguments may in our opinion serve as proof of the legal sophistication of the Admiralty Court. As stated, prize law governed the case of Gilford v. Schenck c.s. Schematically put, four contradictory systems or principles could determine the adjudication of a prize: “treatment of the goods according to their nature”, “unfree ship, unfree goods”, “free ship, free goods” and the “double-edged system of hostile infection”. These systems may help to understand the arguments put forward by the parties in the case under study. The first system was the oldest – adopted by the Catalan Consulado de Mar in the fourteenth century – and governed the relations between belligerent states and states not involved in the war and their subjects. It entailed that vessels belonging to subjects of a state at war with the captor state – “enemy vessels” – and cargoes belonging to such subjects – “enemy goods” – were liable to confiscation, even if the latter were carried on board a neutral ship. Conversely, neutral vessels and neutral cargoes, even when carried on board an enemy ship, were exempt from confiscation. The second system, “unfree ship, unfree goods”, meant that the intertwinement of neutral and enemy interests in the same ship operated to the detriment of neutral owners of goods carried in an enemy ship. This system, representing one of the forms of “hostile infection”, was mostly but not exclusively applied by France when it was introduced in a French ordinance in 1543, but also by Britain during the Second and Third Anglo-Dutch Wars. The third system of “free ship, free goods”, protected enemy goods carried on neutral vessels against confiscation. This system was particularly popular in the Dutch Republic. The second and third principles were often combined in treaties, exposing neutral cargoes on enemy vessels to confiscation, but leaving enemy cargoes on neutral ships unaffected. The second system in combination with a denial of the third system, resulted in the fourth system, which declared a neutral vessel carrying enemy goods to be a good prize in its entirety, also including the neutral goods on board. As according to this system hostile infection was applied to both the neutral vessels containing enemy goods and the enemy vessels containing neutral goods, it is called the “doubleedged system of hostile infection”55. The above systems or principles co-existed in different variations, and were often included in treaties, during the late medieval and early modern periods. According to Verzijl, “It is impossible to sketch a picture of a constant and 54 BH 921, B, 6–7: “verclaerende de goeden questieux van goeder prinse omme dezelve ofte penningen van dien gepart ende gedeelt te worden naer der oirloghen recht.” For the meaning of the law of war, see Roelofsen, Studies (note 21). 55 Verzijl/Heere/Offerhaus (note 23) 299, 301–302, 306–308, 320 and 326.

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consistent development because there is none.”56. We may, however, try to determine how the arguments of the two parties in the Gilford case correspond with one or more of the four systems. The actions of Schenk and Lievensz, who searched a neutral ship for merchandise belonging to the enemy, correspond to the first system. They considered the French merchandise identified by Gilford as a good prize, but not the English merchandise which was also present on board Gilford’s ship. Gilford, however, argued along the lines of another system. In his initial brief submitted to the Admiralty Court, he emphasizes the good relationship between the Low Countries and England which in his opinion results in a situation in which the subjects of the sovereigns of the respective lands may not harm each other57. Gilford repeats this argument in a second set of briefs submitted to the Admiralty Court and adds that according to the letters of marque Schenck c.s. should even have assisted him in order to prevent harm58. He then claims that Schenck c.s. were not entitled to board an English (i. e. a neutral) ship regardless of whether this ship was transporting neutral or enemy merchandise59. He explains his statement by maintaining that his ship should be treated as English territory. Since the enemies of the lord of the Netherlands and their goods are free within the confines of the English kingdom, and French and English subjects may not harm each other within that territory, the same should hold for his ship60. Apparently therefore, his arguments are in line with the principle “free ship, free goods”. Since Gilford is of the opinion that his ship has been taken without cause by 56 Verzijl/Heere/Offerhaus (note 23) 299 (citation), 320, 331. 57 BH 921, C, 1–2: “Alvooren zo is de voors. impetrant presupponerende de goede aliancie ende confederatie jegenwoirdich wesende tusschen de K. Mat, zynen ondersaten ende den Co. Mat van Ingelant, metgaders hueren ondersaten, duer oirsaicke van welcke confederatie nyement van beeden partien respectivelick en vermueghen den een den anderen eenege molest, tzy te lande oft te water, in hueren lyfve ofte goeden te doene”. 58 BH 921, E, 1–2: “secht dimpetrant dat uuyt crachte van de zelve commissie oft bestellinge niet bevonden en sal woirden dat zy gedaechde eenichsins vermuegen de geallierde van der Mat. eenege empeschement oft molestatie te doene in huerlieder persoon ofte goet in eeneger manieren, mair dat meer is zyn sculdich by derzelver bestellinghe de geallierde alle assistentie ende behulsamheyt te doene up dat hemluyden geen andere scade oft molestatie gedaen en werde”. 59 BH 921, E, 2: “Item, dat meer is, zo en vermochten de gedaechde den impetrant oft anderen geallierden, wesende in Ingelsche scepen oft boodemen met wat goed dattet waere (al wairt oick dat Fransche goede waeren), niet tamborderen oft dezelve goeden hemluyden dairvan te ontvremden”. 60 BH 921, E, 2: “Ende omme tzelve naerder te deduceerne, zo moet geconsidereert wesen dat de vianden van den Mat ende huere goeden vry ende vranck zyn binnen den landen van Ingelant ende den resorte van dien, zonder dat die ondersaeten van der Mat ende van den Coninck van Vranckryck elcanderen vermuegen binnen de vryheyt van Ingelant yet te molesteren oft bescadeghen”.

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Schenck c.s., he claims damages. He states that the fact that his ship and part of his cargo have according to Schenck c.s. been taken by a French ship of war after the taking by Schenck c.s. is irrelevant where it concerns the damages. To this end he refers to a general legal rule stating that he who creates the opportunity for damage, will be held liable for that damage61. Although a reference to the sources of this rule is omitted since the rule is considered to be generally known, Digest title 9.2 on the Lex Aquilia may have served as a starting point62. Another argument why the second taking by French privateers does not matter is, according to Gilford, that the acts of the privateers can legally be defined as spoliation. Spoliation occurs where someone has been dispossessed of his goods in an unlawful manner. This argument, again based on the learned ius commune, implies, according to Gilford, that he does not have to litigate in France for the merchandise taken by the French, but that he can claim all of his losses at the Netherlands Admiralty Court from those involved in the first taking, i. e. Schenck c.s., and from any of them individually for the whole amount of his losses63. He denies that he is revindicating his merchandise (as stated by Schenck c.s.), since in that case he would have been obliged to litigate at the various courts where his goods are situated (so, also in France)64. Gilford implores the court to believe him even though proof for his statements is scarce given the fact that the events occurred at sea, which is a place, as he states, where proving something is difficult65. This argument is not supported by a reference to the learned laws, but as we will see below some learned references are supplied in a brief submitted by Schenck where Schenck introduces a similar argument. Schenck c.s. in their turn request the Admiralty Court in their initial brief to 61 BH 921, E, 6: “Zonder dat in desen regardt genomen mach woirden ten ghuenen dair de gedaechde poseren de resterende goeden ende barcque genomen te zyne by zekere Frans scip … gemerct tzelfve den impetrant niet en raect mair zyn de gedaechde als tongelyck tzelfve scip geapprehendert thebbene ende alzo occasie wesende van den impetrans verliese gehouden in alzucke scaden, interresten metgaders restitucie van den goeden die dimpetrant (duer zulcke quade prinse) verlooren mach hebben, secundum illud vulgare iuris, qui dat occasionem dampni de dampno tenetur”. 62 Cf. e. g. D. 9,2,5 pr.; D. 9,2,5,1 and D. 9,2,31. 63 BH 921, E, 10: “want secht dimpetrant dat in materie van spoliatie ende beroovinghe elcken van den spoliateuren insolidum verbonden zyn tot restitucie van dien”. 64 BH 921, E, 11: “dat de gedaechde of die tot huerlieder raide zyn behoiren hem nairder tinformeren oft studeren up de materie van reivendicatie, gemerct men niet bevinden en sal dat een coopman reivendert [?] zyn goet, byzundere dair blyct van voorgaende detentie oft spoliatie gelyck int cas subject aldair pena talionis van dief te wesen of dief te leveren geobserveert wordt, mair alleenlick gedisputert wordt super dominio bonorum spoliatorum”. 65 BH 921, E, 11: “Ende gemerct nu dimpetrant inne de manieren als vooren op zee wesende, plaetse van difficilder probatie … hem impetrant vulle gelove gegeven sal woirden”.

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declare the taking of Gilford’s merchandise to be just and that this merchandise or the proceeds from the sale of it be divided between those having an entitlement to it according to what they define as the law of war66. They refer to Gilford’s confession that part of his cargo is enemy property (i. e. French) and they hold, with references to concepts of the ius commune (e. g. the exceptio doli), that consequently Gilford litigates without cause67. Gilford cannot, in their opinion, maintain that he confessed under pressure that part of his cargo is French since he repeated this confession before the bailiff in Middelburg. According to the law, they state, force is considered to be absent if a confession is made in the presence of a legal officer. They also state that Gilford’s two confessions, the first on board the warship and the second before the bailiff (where he reiterates his earlier confession), have the same force as a single confession in court. This statement is accompanied by explicit references to Canon Law (Panormitanus) and the Digest68. Schenck c.s. deny the applicability of the principle “free ship, free goods”, especially outside the territorial waters of England69. If that principle applied, the English would be able to transport as much enemy property to the Netherlands as they wished, which in the opinion of Schenck c.s. would give rise to many inconveniences70. As stated, it seems that they advocate the applicability of the treatment of the goods according to their nature, since they only make a claim as regards the French merchandise and not as regards the ship and the remaining cargo. 66 BH 921, B, 6–7. 67 BH 921, H, 9–10: “Want by gebreke van den voers justifficatien obsteert den impetrant nyet alleen iusta exceptio doli overmidts het verclairs ende confessie by hem gedaen …, maer werdt oyck alhier bevonden zonder actie te ageren absque qua nullius experiri potest”. 68 BH 921, H, 18–19: “[Gilford cannot pretend to have been forced to confess under threat of force in the presence of the bailiff of Middelburg] cum presentia praetoris faciat cessare omnem doli et metus presumptionem. [Since Gilford has reiterated his confession made on board the warship, this time in Middelburg in the presence of the bailiff, that part of his cargo was French, his two confessions have the same force as a single confession before a court of law] maxime cum geminatio actis preiudicet ubi nudus non potest operari, textus est in l. quinquaginta [sic] ff. De proba. [D. 22,3,12] l. iunc. [?] l. Balista ff. Ad Trebelli. [D. 36,1,33]. Hinc est quod confessio extraiudicialis geminata habet vim et effectum confessionis iudicalis unice. Quod sequitur Panor. et alii dic. canoniste in c. si cautio de fide instru. [Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Abbas Panormitanus), comm. in X. 2.22.14]”. 69 BH 921, H, 7: “Ghemerct de gedaeghden wel ende expresselick ontkennen dat een scip oft bodem van den gealieerden der Key. Mat zoude moegen bevryen de Fransche goeden, bysundere op zee ende buyten den stroomen van den heer oft prince van denzelven geallieerde, gelyck de impetrant byden voers articulen is pretenderende”. 70 BH 921, H, 7–8: “Ende indien zulcx mochte gebueren ende verstaen worden, des neen, zoe zouden de Ingelsche alhier in desen landen onder tdecxel van huere aliance moegen brengen alzo vele Fransche goeden alst hen beliefde ende die eximeren van confiscatie, waerduere vele inconvenienten souden mogen gebueren, quare etc.”.

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Schenck c.s. also claim that Gilford has instituted court action to revindicate his merchandise. They state that revindication can only be successful if the claimant first proves that he is the owner of the goods at stake, which in their opinion is a generally accepted legal rule71. They feel that Gilford has not provided such proof and that therefore his claim should be denied. Obviously, here again the author of the brief submitted by Schenck (i. e. his lawyer) shows his knowledge of the teachings of the ius commune. As regards the valuables that disappeared from the wallet, Schenck c.s. hold (referring most likely to the ius commune)72 that Gilford handed over this wallet out of his own free will and that consequently the reason for his damage is his own negligence. Therefore the privateers are not liable for this damage73. Finally, Schenck c.s. claim (referring to the learned law) that even though all the facts stated by them have occurred at sea, which means that proof of these facts is difficult to provide, their statements should be accepted by the court based on the proof they have been able to furnish74. They also hold that given their role of defendants in the present prize case where they claim to litigate to avoid damage, they should be treated by the court with preference over Gilford, who in their opinion litigates merely for the sake of taking a profit75.

6.

Enforcement

When deciding that it would hear the case on the merits after the appeal from the provisional ruling, the Great Council confirmed the provisional judgment of the Admiralty Court dated 20 June 1554 allowing Gilford to recover his merchandise after the marks of the merchants on the merchandise had been checked, the merchandise had been valued, and on the condition that he would provide security for its value76 since the final judgment would not necessarily be in favour of Gilford. The case file contains a lengthy report of a bailiff of the Great Council77 71 BH 921, H, 5–6: “dat naer rechte nyemande en is gequalificeert in materien van revendicatie te ageren ten waere hy hem alvoren souffissantelick gedoceert waere dat de dominie, proprieteyt ende eygendom van den goeden die hy pretendeert te vendiceren hem eygen toebehoirden, prout de hoc iura sunt vulgaria”. 72 Cf. D. 50,17,20. 73 BH 921, H, 15: “maer en connen alsucken verlies op den verweerders nyet verhaelen iuxta theoricam damnum quod quis sua culpa sentit sibi imputetur”. 74 BH 921, H, 16–17: “Maer oyck gemerct alle dese acten ende fayten gebuert zyn op zee, aldaer men geen copie ende overvloedicheyt van getuygen en can gecryghen, quare lex in causis difficilis probationis ea est contenta probatione que fueri potest”. 75 BH 921, H, 17: “His accedat quod impetrans agat de lucro captando et rei de damno evitando, cuius ex parte rei sunt favorabiliores actore.” Cf. C. 6,30,22,5. 76 BH 921, BBI. 77 BH 921, GG.

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who accompanied Gilford to the town of Middelburg, where part of the merchandise had been located in an inn named “De Baerse” (i. e. “The Perch”)78. Most of the cloth was readily found in a main room of the inn, but later additional items were located hidden in the attic, under straw in the alcoves. In the end, 22 of the items that had been transferred to Schenck’s ship were located; 2 items could not be located since they had allegedly been sold by Schenck, and the whereabouts of 1 item were unknown. All the merchandise was checked and valued by three local merchants hired for this purpose. This is, however, not an easy task, since various quarrels arise during the enforcement proceedings. One of these quarrels occurs when Gilford makes an attempt to remove his merchandise from the inn in order to take it to the harbour. He is stopped by the innkeeper and his wife79. The couple claim custodian fees since the merchandise had been in their inn for a considerable amount of time. After the original, excessive fees claimed are lowered, Gilford pays the fees and successfully removes the merchandise from the inn. He also provides security for the value of the merchandise as originally ordered by the Admiralty Court. When leaving the harbour of Middelburg, he has to pay duties to the local tax collector.

7.

Diplomacy, political pressure and the judgment of prizes

The adjudication of prizes in late medieval and early modern Europe was largely determined by diplomatic and political circumstances, which is widely recognized amongst (legal) historians80. The actions of Schenck and Lievensz, who searched a neutral ship for merchandise belonging to the enemy, corresponds to the general view amongst Netherlandish crews from the end of the fifteenth century that in wartime the transport of enemy goods by neutral ships was forbidden. This is in line with the magnus intercursus of 1496, which was con78 Also “Barghie” at the dam in Middelburg. 79 BH 921, GG, 7: “Soe hebben Lambert Mol ende Neelken, zyn huysvrouwe, waerdt ende waerdinne van der selver herberge van den Barghie, nyet willen gedoogen dat de voers. Jammes eenige ballotten meer zoude lichten”. 80 See for instance Roelofsen, Studies (note 21) 7–8; Sicking/van Rhee, Prijs, TR 71 (2003); A. Wijffels, Alberico Gentili and Thomas Crompton, Leiden 1992 15; J. Wubs-Mrozewicz/ A. Wijffels, Diplomacy and Advocacy. The case of the King of Denmark v. Dutch skippers before the Danzig City Council (1564–1567), TR 84 (2016) 1–53; H. van Nieuwenhuize, Prize law, international diplomacy and the treatment of foreign prizes in the seventeenth century : a case study, Comparative Legal History 5 no. 1 (2017) 142–161 and Th. Allain, International treaties versus “bonne prise”: the case of the Dutch merchant ship De Vriendschap in the Mediterranean in 1745, Comparative Legal History 5 no. 1 (2017) 162– 176.

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firmed by Charles V, and which dominated Anglo-Netherlandish commercial relations up to the English Navigation Acts of the seventeenth century. The treaty of 1496 considered enemy cargo on board a neutral ship, i. e. a ship from England or the Netherlands, to be a good prize81. Nevertheless, political conditions may have contributed to an exception in favour of English merchants transporting enemy goods82. It may well have been possible that the English continued to enjoy a privileged position favourable for Gilford83. As already mentioned, Anglo-Habsburg relations in 1554 were crowned by the royal marriage of Mary and Philip, and they must have had a favourable influence in support of English victims of Netherlandish captures. Although we found no direct evidence concerning diplomatic pressure to come to a determination of Gilford’s case, as stated, his lawyer did refer to “the good alliance and confederation existing at present” between the emperor and the king of England84. If the nature of the relations between the sovereign lords of the parties involved was used in arguments exchanged in a lawsuit concerning a prize case, diplomatic or political pressure could be very real. For example, Mary of Hungary, regent in the Netherlands for her brother Charles V, wrote in November 1554 to her Admiral that the English king – at that time her nephew Philip – had asked for the return of an English ship named Eduard Bonaventura that had been taken by Netherlandish privateers, amongst whom was Cornelis Ewoutsz from Flushing. She had been approached on this matter by the emperor, who had been contacted by his son Philip, and she ordered the Admiral to judge the responsible privateers, “administering such good and brief justice to the English who had suffered damage that the Lord King [i. e. Philip] would be content”85. She added that as a result Philip would not have reasons to file complaints with her. Even though this example does not concern the case under consideration here, this Habsburg family party shows that the judicial authorities of the country of origin of the privateers could be put under political pressure to have them judged and those who had suffered damages – in this case the English – compensated. Apart from legal considerations, diplomatic circumstances worked in favour of Gilford’s interests. His case will have been considered benevolently by the Netherlands 81 Roelofsen, Studies (note 21) xx–xxi, xxxiii, 6. On the English preference for this system in the late Middle Ages, Verzijl/Heere/Offerhaus (note 23) 302. 82 This has been shown for the Franco-Burgundian war of 1477–1482 when prize goods belonging to Englishmen had to be restored to them by a decree of the Netherlandish government. Roelofsen, Studies (note 21) 7, 9. 83 Roelofsen, Studies (note 21) 6, 173–174. 84 BH 921, C, 2–3: “presupponerende de goede aliancie ende confederatie jegenwoirdich wesende tusschen de K. Mat, zynen ondersaten ende den Co. Mat van Ingelant”. 85 Mary of Hungary to Maximilian of Burgundy (Brussels 20 November 1554), ARA Brussels, Aud. 1659/2, f.328–329: “faisant administrer aux Anglois endommaig8s si bonne et briefve justice que ledit sr Roy en puist avoir contentement”.

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Admiralty and the Great Council. Unfortunately, a final judgment of the Great Council could not be located by us. A so-called “extended judgment” – i. e. a judgment recounting the various procedural steps taken in the case, a selection of the arguments of the parties and the actual judgment (dictum) – was not drafted, whereas the registers of dicta, i. e. the actual rulings of the court, have not been inventoried yet, which makes finding a final judgment in the case at hand a daunting task. Neither an extended judgment nor a dictum would, however, contain the reasons for the judgment since it was thought that this would give rise to discontent and other “inconveniences”86.

8.

Conclusion

In the present article we have shown that the Admiralty Court followed the same, sophisticated, Romano-canonical inspired procedure as the Great Council of Malines. Remarkably quickly, within a few weeks after capture, Gilford managed to bring his case before the Admiralty, where the case was litigated rather speedily and where the lawyers of the parties exchanged arguments that were based on what could be qualified as customary international law and the teachings of the learned ius commune. As this article focused on the process rather than on its outcome, we have tried to connect the case with the circumstances of the time. The case Gilford v. Schenck c.s. confirmed that political and diplomatic circumstances determined the way in which prize cases were judged. Even though no direct evidence concerning diplomatic pressure to come to a determination of the case could be found, Gilford’s lawyer did refer to the good relations between the sovereigns of the two countries involved and their respective subjects. The example of the regent of the Netherlands writing at the instigation of her brother Charles V to her Admiral in 1554 to judge another case in favour of an English victim of a Netherlandish privateer proves that diplomacy and Habsburg family relations were used to influence the adjudication of prizes. This had a favourable influence in support of English victims of Netherlandish captures. The fact that judgments did not contain grounds may have helped the judges of the Admiralty and the Great Council to judge according to the wishes of the sovereign or his regent. This is, however, not to say that judges were always willing marionettes of the sovereign, or that admirals were always willing to execute his wishes. The 86 C.H. van Rhee, Litigation and Legislation. Civil Procedure at First Instance in the Great Council for the Netherlands in Malines (1522–1559), Brussels 1997; W.G.Ph.E. Wedekind, Bijdrage tot de kennis van de ontwikkeling van de procesgang in civiele zaken voor het Hof van Holland in de eerste helft van de zestiende eeuw, Assen 1971, 128–130, 166. Roelofen, Studies (note 21) xxx–xxxi, note 55.

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Netherlands admiral had interests in the privateering business and close relations with many privateers, especially those in Zealand. As local influence may have been at work, the possibility of appeal at the Great Council may have been in the interest of the foreign parties – subjects of either former belligerents or neutrals – aiming for damage redress. The study of prize cases in which English and Netherlandish subjects were involved, and which were adjudicated at first instance by prize courts such as the Admiralty (and on appeal by the Great Council), are of particular interest for the study of the role of prize law in the development of international law. After all, they allow us to study examples of “precedents” of what later was laid down in later maritime treaties, such as those between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century.

Boudewijn Sirks

What did in bonis in the actio Serviana include?

The actio Serviana has in its formula the condition that at the time of the pledge agreement the pledged good has to be in bonis of the debtor. The dominant view is that this refers to quiritary ownership, be it pleno iure or bonitary (i. e., possession of the usucapient). That would mean that provincial land or property of peregrines could be pledged but not be claimed by the pledgee-creditor with this action. That does not make sense and so the more since in early Byzantine law the tHs hupothHkHs agjgH was not so restricted. Is it possible that in bonis included at least the protected possession of provincial land? It will be argued that it is indeed so. 1. The actio Serviana is the action with which a creditor can claim the object which has been pledged to him by his debtor. The pledge may be with his debtor or a third person, that does not matter : he can gain possession of it and sell it. It may be a moveable thing or an immoveable object like land or a house. Hence it is a real action. With the actio Serviana utilis a creditor can claim a pledged claim or a servitute. That is a personal action. Apart from the contract between creditor and debtor to pledge, a necessary condition in order to be able to exercise the actio Serviana was that the pledged object had to be in the bona of the debtor at the time of the contract. The relevant words are: in bonis debitoris fuisse (e. g., Gaius D. 20,1,15,1), “have been in the assets of the debtor”, viz. at the time of the contract. The question now is: what should we understand by assets, bona? Does it refer to whatever the debtor was full quiritary owner of or does it also refer to things of which the debtor was merely a bona fide possessor and on his way of becoming owner by usucapio – a bonitary owner, thus things which could be owned in Roman law by Romans only?1 Or did it comprise things of which the debtor was merely bona fide possessor? In that latter case the debtor might be a Roman or peregrine who 1 Leaving aside the question whether commercium might comprise this, since this legal possibility was of no importance after the Late Republic.

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possessed provincial land, protected by the praescriptio longi temporis, or on his way to be protected by that. It is an important question because it touches the entire economy of the Roman empire, not just until the constitutio Antoniniana, but also after that because this constitution merely made peregrines into Romans, it did not turn provincial land into land of which ownership according to Roman law (as res mancipi) was possible. And it is also important because the actiones iuris gentium, which cover the essential commercial activities, would be without an effective means to realise real securities given. Opinions have differed on this point. Although Wieacker and Wubbe defended the last possibility, the dominant position as incorporated in Kaser’s manual is that bona concerned only ownership ex iure quiritium, be it pleno iure or bonitary. Its latest formulation we find in the impressive three article survey by Ankum, Pool and Van Gessel-de Roo.2 They have investigated and analysed all relevant texts on the expression in bonis habere or esse, including those connected with the Serviana. I restrict myself to these in view of my research question. It is not impossible that outside of the Serviana in bonis may have had a different meaning, it does not concern us here. If we find at least one text in which it does not undoubtedly follow that in bonis implies only and exclusively quiritary ownership, pleno iure or bonitary, it follows that the theory has become untenable. For that I shall discuss several texts, either for arguing that another interpretation is not impossible, or that the term dominium is wider than assumed, or that the text unmistakably refers to seizure of provincial land. An analysis of all texts with in bonis is unnecessary : in many the term will refer to quiritary ownership pleno iure or bonitary ; it suffices however, to demonstrate that in other texts it is not the case. Besides, the restrictions of this contribution, dedicated to my colleague and friend Jan Hallebeek, does not allow for such an exercise. Although at the centre of Jan’s research are medieval Roman and Canon law, in which he is an excellent and distinguished scholar, he never restricted his interest to these subjects. The colonial law of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) holds also his interest and in the period he worked with Paul NHve he occupied himself with classical Roman law, and possession and ownership were his earliest interests. 2. First C. 7,73,4, where the land had left the debtor’s ownership (distraxit, e dominio) before he became obliged to the fisc. The possessor asks whether this land is obliged pignoris iure. The emperor declares that since the land was sold before the seller became obliged, the supplicant does not have to fear seizure by 2 I refer to the impressive survey and analysis of Ankum, Pool and Van Gessel-de Roo, which remains the latest word on this subject: H. Ankum/M. Van Gessel-de Roo/E. Pool, Die verschiedenen Bedeutungen des Ausdrucks in bonis alicuius esse/in bonis habere im klassischen römischen Recht, in: ZRG RA 104 (1987) 254–436; Part II in: ZRG RA 105 (1988) 334–435; Part III in: ZRG RA 107 (1990) 155–215. Cited hereafter as Ankum e.a. I, II and III.

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the fisc. He adds that even if the seller became obliged afterwards, goods which had already left his ownership (dominium) are for that reason not seizable.3 Ankum e.a. assume the land had been mancipated to Quintus and was no longer part of the bona of the seller. They probably base the mancipatio on the use of the word dominium and interpret this as quiritary ownership.4 Questions, however, arise. Had the debtor indeed pledged his goods to the fisc?5 And mancipated? And why would Quintus bother about the seizing? The text is included in the title De privilegio fisci. The privilege implied that the fisc could satisfy itself before all other creditors in an insolvency by selling property of the debtor. A general hypothec it was not, but it was applied as if a pledge. The land will not have been pledged by contract. So what action will the fisc have used? And what against peregrines (who could be fiscal debtors too)? I shall return to this question. As to the case, the rescript emphasises that the privilege does not extend to things, alienated before the fiscal debt came into existence. For that reason Quintus’ question may have been whether the privilege, which in principle always and already rested on the tax payer’s goods, became effective only upon the creation of the debt and only upon the assets, in the debtor’s disposition at that time. Or, another possibility, that, though becoming effective only upon the creation of the debt, it became effective also upon goods already out of the disposition of the debtor ; a kind of droit de suite. But that suggests that Quintus had possession and feared seizure. The phrase about dominium does not have to relate to the land sold, it is in the nature of a general statement (it refers to ea quae, whereas the case was about a fundus) and such a statement could also have comprised provincial land and movables. After all, fiscal debtors were present in the entire empire: would the fisc have differentiated between Romans and provincials, between land in Italy and provincial land, where it concerned its privilege? We do not see any sign of this in the texts.

3 C. 7,73,4 (Ant. A. Quinto): Si debitor, cuius fundum fuisse et ipse confiteris, prius eum distraxit, quam fisco aliquid debuit, inquietandum te non esse procurator meus cognoscet. nam etsi postea debitor extitit, non ideo tamen ea, quae de dominio eius excesserunt, pignoris iure fisco potuerunt obligari. PP. iii K. Iul. Laeto ii et Cereale conss. [a. 215]. 4 Ankum e.a. I, 384–385: “Jemand hatte dem Quintus einen fundus verkauft und (mittels mancipatio) übereignet; danach war er Schuldner des fiscus geworden. Die Kanzleijuristen entscheiden, das vom Fiskalschuldner dem Fiskus bestellte Pfandrecht sei – wie der procurator fisci einsehen werde – an diesem zuvor von ihm veräußerten Grundstück nicht wirksam. Auch hier war das Grundstück nicht (mehr) in den bona des Schuldners. Hier wird dieser Grund der Unwirksamkeit des Pfandrechts so formuliert, daß die Sache vor der Pfandbestellung aus dem Eigentum des Schuldners ausgeschieden sei.” 5 As Ankum e.a. I, 385 assume: “das vom Fiskalschuldner dem Fiskus bestellte Pfandrecht”.

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3. That dominium might comprise merely quiritary ownership, pleno iure or bonitary, is unwarranted. It could comprise also the exclusive entitlement to provincial land. Then, dominium had a wider meaning than that of quiritary or bonitary ownership according to Gai. 2,40–41, as follows from the implications of C. 7,73,4. For example, in C. 7,33,5 the dominium of land claimed cannot be resisted with a praescriptio longi temporis if the possessor had no title: otherwise, possession of provincial land was called dominium.6 If it had been land in Italy, the praescriptio would not have applied, since ownership was established there positively by usucapio.7 In C. 7,33,3 the proprietas is acknowledged notwithstanding any longi temporis praescriptio.8 Here the word proprietas is used, again as the exclusive entitlement to possession of provincial land. In later sources, proprietas and dominium become equivalents for such possession of provincial land.9 C. 3,19,2, directed by Constantine to all provincials, orders everyone who possesses an immoveable in the name of another to name the dominus if summoned in court.10 That this was not inaccurateness on the part of the imperial chancery proves C. 6,1,1 of 286, where usucapio and praescriptio longi temporis are put next to each other, both in connection with dominium.11 It is best to 6 C. 7,33,5 (Diocl. et Maxim. AA et CC Sotericho): Nec petentem dominium ab eo, cui petentis solus error causam possessionis sine vero titulo praestitit, silentii longi praescriptione depelli iuris evidentissimi est. S. Sirmi xi k. mai. AA. conss. [a. 293]. 7 There were cities outside of Italy with the ius Italicum, where according to Crook the land was res mancipi. This, however, is not likely. See note 24. 8 C. 7,33,3 (Diocl. et Maxim. AA et CC Antonio): Si vineae, quas mater tua vitrico in dotem dedit, tuae proprietatis sunt nec ulla praescriptio ex transacti temporis prolixitate adolevit, praeses provinciae restitui tibi eas efficiet. [a. 293]. 9 For example, CTh. 2,25,1; CTh. 4,8,9; CTh. 5,13,1. 10 C. 3,19,2 (Const. A. ad universos provincials): Si quis alterius nomine quolibet modo possidens immobilem rem litem ab aliquo per in rem actionem sustineat, debet statim in iudicio dominum nominare, ut, sive in eadem civitate degat sive in agro sive in alia provincia sit, certo dierum spatio ab iudice finiendo eoque ad notionem eius perducendo, vel ipse in locis in quibus praedium situm est perveniens vel procuratorem mittens actoris intentiones excipiat. (…) D. x k. Aug. Basso et Ablabio conss. [a. 331]. Other texts: C. 3,44,6 [a. 224]; C. 5,73,4 [a. 303]; C. 7,35,3 [a. 290]; C. 7,39,8 [a. 528]; C. 7,71,4,1 [a. 293–304]. See Kaser I, 424 note 66 on the longi temporis praescriptio either introduced or confirmed in 199 AD. Required was a iustum initium possessionis, which comprised a iusta causa and bona fides. It was also applied to moveables and open to both peregrines and Romans. 11 C. 6,1,1 (Diocl. et Maxim. AA. Aemiliae): Servum fugitivum sui furtum facere et ideo non habere locum nec usucapionem nec longi temporis praescriptionem manifestum est, ne fuga servorum dominis suis ex quacumque causa fiat damnosa. PP.v id. Dec. Maximo ii et Aquilino conss. [a. 286]. Similarly C. 7,29,4 [a. 294]. On the other hand, in C. 7,34,5 [a. 293–304], where a slave boy was claimed, the praescriptio longi temporis could not ward off the claim of its dominus. If Roman law were purely applied, usucapio should have been argued. We see here probably the influence of the rule for immoveable filtering through into the rules for moveables, which would result in Justinian’s novation of C. 7,31,1 [a. 531]. This, however, argues for my view that dominium comprised also bona fide possession of provincial land and apparently already around 300 in parts of the empire of slaves and moveables. See how this

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interpret dominium as ‘the exclusive right’, where it depends on the object what kind of right it is. As to ownership, we must distinguish between a) the duplex dominium of the Romans, consisting of both ownership ex iure quiritium and bonitary ownership (usucapient possession), and b) ownership ex longi temporis praescriptione (ex l.t.p.) of provincial land, which applied to both Romans and peregrines (while we see that this prescription was also applied to slaves, see below, C. 6,1,1). After 212 almost all peregrines, now Roman citizens, could enjoy the first kind too. To avoid confusion, I shall not use the term here. And this meaning of exclusive entitlement is already for the classical period attested in D. 7,2, where we find dominium proprietatis and dominium ususfructus.12 Here the word cannot mean ownership but the exclusive entitlement to the thing after the usufruct has ended resp. the ususfruct itself. There is no ownership of these. That entitlement may comprise of what we call ownership in the usual sense, but also of usufruct or proprietas (what we call the nude ownership), as long as there is no other person entitled.13 We see it also used for the exclusive or better entitlement to provincial land as possessor. Thus the assumption that the debtor in C. 7,73,4 transferred the land by mancipatio is not impossible, but neither cogent. It is not probable, considering that it concerns fiscal debts. It is possible that Quintus had fiscal debts on other accounts than the land tax, in which case Italic land might have been seized; but more likely it concerned a debt for the land tax, in which case it concerned provincial land of which Quintus had only possession. 4. Another text is also not unambiguous. C. 8,15(16),614 of 293 is about a mother who transferred land to her sons by way of gift, then pledged it to a creditor. The emperors declare that this cannot hurt the owners (dominis), since the land was no longer in her bona. Again Ankum e.a. assume a mancipatio (without traditio) provincial institution finally took over and influenced the selection of the compilers, L. Vacca, La riforma di Giustiniano in materia di ‘usucapio’ e ‘longi temporis praescriptio’ fra concezioni dommatiche classiche e prassi postclassica, BIDR 35/36 (1993/1994) 147–186. 12 For example, in D. 7,4,17 (Iul. 35 dig.): Si tibi fundi usus fructus pure, proprietas autem sub condicione Titio legata fuerit, pendente condicione dominium proprietatis adquisieris, deinde condicio extiterit, pleno iure fundum Titius habebit neque interest, quod detracto usu fructu proprietas legata sit: enim dum proprietatem adquiris, ius omne legati usus fructus amisisti. 13 The term proprietas must have been designed to indicate the dormant remnant of the quiritary right (Gaius’ nudum ius quiritium) which will revive and distinguish it from the full quiritary right. Derived from proprius, it indicated well that the object was in the end closer to the proprietarius than to another person. 14 C. 8,15(16),6 (Diocl. et Maxim. AA. et CC. Zosimo): Quae praedium in filios a se titulo donationis translatum creditori suo dat pignori, se magis contrario pigneraticio obligavit iudicio, quam quicquam dominis nocet, cum Serviana etiam actio declarat evidenter iure pignoris teneri non posse, nisi quae obligantis in bonis fuerint, et per alium alienam rem invito domino pignori obligari non posse certissimum est. S. v Id. Iul. Philippopoli AA. conss. [a. 293].

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had taken place, adducing a constitution of the same year (Consultatio 6,10) as argument for this and probably again because of the word dominis.15 The same argument as for C. 7,73,4 can be given. The mother had donated by transfer (translatum) and the effect had been that it had become a res aliena, viz. property of her sons. After the gift she pledged it to her creditor who then probably sued one son, Zosimus, with the Serviana. Zosimus then applied for a rescript.16 Because it was transferred she could no longer dispose of it and so it was no longer part of her bona at the time of the pledge.17 Therefore her pledge was invalid. The only argument to assume that the land fell in quiritary ownership and thus for a mancipatio is the interpretation of the word dominus. In the light of this word having a wider meaning (see above) that is not warranted. On the contrary, the word translatum suggests a transfer of provincial land. The best one may say is: it referred to an exclusive entitlement. Unfortunately there is in all the three articles by Ankum e.a. no discussion of the meaning of dominium.18 15 Ankum e.a. I, 385: “Ein dritter Fall einer Verpfändung einer zuvor vom Schuldner übereigneten Sache gab dem Zosimus Anlaß zu seiner an die Kanzlei der Kaiser Diokletian und Maximian gerichteten Rechtsfrage. Das von der Kanzlei geschriebene, aus 293 datierende Reskript, das einen in bonis-Ausdruck enthält, läßt über die Antwort auf die Frage, wann der Schuldner die verpfändete Sache nicht in seinen bona hat, nicht den geringsten Zweifel: C. 8,15(16),6: Quae praedium in filios a se titulo donationis translatum creditori suo dat pignori. se magis contrario pigneraticio obligavit iudicio, quam quicquam dominis nocet, cum Serviana etiam actio declarat evidenter iure pignoris teneri non posse, nisi quae obligantis in bonis fuerint, et per alium alienam rem invito domino pignori obligari non potuit. Eine Frau hat ihren Söhnen ein Grundstück geschenkt und übereignet (wahrscheinlich, wie in den beiden vorigen Fällen [D. 13,7,2 and C. 7,73,4], mittels einer mancipatio) und es darauf ihrem Gläubiger (vermutlich dem Zosimus) verpfändet. Die Kaiser entscheiden, daß dieser die actio Serviana nicht mit Erfolg gegen die Eigentümer erheben könne, da es dafür notwendig sei, daß die Sache in den bona der Schuldnerin sei, was hier nicht der Fall sei, weil sie keine Eigentümerin des verpfändeten Grundstücks mehr war.” – As to Cons. 6,10, the emperors mention three ways of transfer of goods: donatio, mancipatio and in iure cessio. It is therefore not said that a gift had to be done by mancipatio or in iure cessio. The donatio may have sufficed as causa adquirendi. Only later on donation was considered to be a contract. The text cannot serve as evidence. 16 Ankum e.a. I, 385, suggest Zosimus was the creditor. 17 Ankum e.a. maintain that one could pledge goods, belonging to another and that the contract was valid (Ankum e.a. 385 note 381) but this of course did not validate the claim for the pledge: see the following text where already the sale itself makes the pledge leave the bona of the debtor : D. 20,6,8,12 (Marcian. l.s. ad form. hypoth.): Si debitor vendiderit rem nec tradiderit, an non repellatur creditor, quasi adhuc res in bonis sit debitoris, an vero, cum teneatur ex empto, pignus exstinguatur? quod et magis est. sed quid si pretium venditor consecutus non sit nec paratus sit emptor dare? tantundem potest dici. 18 Only in Ankum e.a. I, 283, there is some reflection, but merely that dominium included bonitary ownership: “Diese Ulpianstelle [D. 37,1,1] hat zu vielen textkritischen Behauptungen Anlaß gegeben. Viele Romanisten haben, außer dem Satzteil nam … coniuncta, das Wort dominium für interpoliert gehalten. Das erklärt sich zum Teil aus der Tatsache, daß das Wort dominium allgemein als quiritisches Eigentum aufgefaßt wird. Diese Interpretation ist jedoch keineswegs zwingend. Wir werden unten zeigen, daß die römischen Juristen seit

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5. An example that provincial land, which thus could not be in quiritary or bonitary ownership, yet was claimed with the Serviana or an analogue action, is C. 8,(15)16,2, a rescript of 205 to Latina. In it the emperors state that if the gardens which had been pledged by a third party and which were subject to litigation, are proved to be hers (hortos tuos esse), the claim will be ineffective;19 she has to prove this before the provincial governor, hence it concerned provincial land.20 The question is not whether the gardens could be pledged at all, but merely whether the pledgor was entitled to pledge. In another rescript, C. 8,27(28),5 of 231, before a praeses provinciae, also provincial land is claimed by a creditor-pledgee.21 Sossianus’ land, referred to as his proprietas, may have been unjustly sold by his creditor-pledgee. These details confirm that it concerned real estate in a province, thus not a res mancipi, which was considered to be owned (tuos esse) and that it could be pledged as such. The creditor wanted to seize them with the actio Serviana or an analogue action.22 In any case, this text too cannot be exclusively interpreted in the sense that it concerns land of which pleno iure or bonitary ownership only is possible, or one must include the assumption that if provincial, it fell under ius Italicum. That is very unlikely. We do not know anything about this ius. Since it figures in D. 50,14, De censibus, it will have concerned immunity of the land-tax. Tax-immunity was important; not the right to treat provincial land as a res mancipi.23 If it were the Serviana, in bonis must have covered also bona fide possession ex iusta causa, which entitled to exclusive possession. If it were an action, specially

19 20

21

22

23

Gaius bonitarisches Eigentum als eine Art von dominium aufgefaßt und es auch als dominium bezeichnet haben.” C. 8,15(16),2 (Sev. et Ant. AA Latinae): Si probaveris praesidi hortos de quibus agebatur tuos esse, intellegis obligari eos creditori ab alio non potuisse, si non sciens hoc agi in fraudem creditoris ignorantis dissimulasti. PP. prid. id. Oct. Antonino A. ii et Geta ii conss. [a. 205]. Latina is entangled in proceedings about the gardens and has to prove her ownership against the claim that it was pledged. The explanation has to be that the creditor-pledgee sued for her gardens which she possessed. It is even suggested that she might have been involved in the fraudulent pledge, which also implies that she was in possession of them. C. 8,27(28),5 (Alex. A. Sossiano): Si residuum debiti paratus es solvere, praeses provinciae dabit arbitrum, apud quem, quantum sit quod superest ex debito, examinabitur : et sive ad iudicem venire diversa pars cessaverit sive oblato superfluo ad venditionem prosiluerit, improba alienatio proprietatis tuae ius non auferet. pp. xii k. aug. Pompeiano et Peligno conss. [a. 231]. O. Lenel, Edictum Perpetuum, Leipzig 1927, 493–495, rejects the existence of an edict on the Serviana. The praetor must have included without more the formula itself. As to the designations formula hypothecaria and actio quasi Serviana, both he supposes to be probably byzantine. Lenel does not consider the possibility of a parallel action for provincial land. Neither does he examine the meaning of in bonis fuisse in note 1 on 494, he just mentions texts as testimonies. J. Crook maintains this in his Law and life of Rome, London 140 jo 40, but without any argument. Already Bijnkershoek in his Observationes Juris Romani V,XXI (Leiden 1733) underlined that it only referred to tax immunity.

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made for the provinces and modelled after the Serviana, – for which the formula hypothecaria is the most likely – its formula should have had at least eius fuisse. Eius would comprise the provincial property of protected possession, which would fit the tuos in the text. But such a formula would also cover the quiritary ownership, be it pleno iure or bonitary, or else we have to assume that a creditor had to use two actions, one for quiritary and one for provincial or peregrine property. But if such an analogue, wider formulated action existed, we may expect that it was used in all cases since such an entitlement of the debtor-pledgor is easier to prove. Indeed, C. 6,1,1 of 286 (when all inhabitants were Romans) argues for this in the case of revindication: it shows that the praescriptio was used next to the usucapio to prove exclusive entitlement to a slave, i. e., against a rei vindicatio or an action analogue to the rei vindicatio.24 Are we to assume two such actions, restricting ourselves for the moment to the Serviana? It will be clear that such an analogue action would have driven out the Serviana since it required merely bona fide possession ex iusta causa. This might, by the way, explain why we do not find any trace of the Serviana as such in the Byzantine texts. The only action mentioned is the agjgH tHs hupothHkHs.25 6. Were there indeed two actions? For that we turn to two texts, D. 20,1,15pr.26 and D. 20,4,11,327. They are both from Gaius’ book on the formula hypothecaria. In 24 C. 6,1,1 (Diocl. et Maxim. AA. Aemiliae): Servum fugitivum sui furtum facere et ideo non habere locum nec usucapionem nec longi temporis praescriptionem manifestum est, ne fuga servorum dominis suis ex quacumque causa fiat damnosa. PP.v id. Dec. Maximo ii et Aquilino conss. [a. 286]. The usucapio would have comprised after one year any praescriptio based on bona fide acquisition iusta causa of a res mancipi, hence the mention of the praescriptio implies that next to the rei vindicatio an action was used, based on such an acquisition. Similarly in C. 7,29,4 [a. 294] the usucapio pro herede cannot be replaced by a praescriptio longi temporis against the claim of the dominus for his inheritance if there is no real title. On the other hand, according to C. 7,34,2 [a. 293–304] the applicability of usucapio made the praescriptio superfluous. It is not said that the praescriptio could not be used. On the other hand, C. 7,34,5 [a. 293–304], where a slave boy was claimed, the praescriptio longi temporis could not ward off the rei vindicatio of its dominus. If Roman law were purely applied, usucapio should have been argued in all cases. Is it possible that if a rei vindicatio was raised, usucapio was required, while if an actio in rem was raised, the praescriptio sufficed? The latter was used for provincial land and could also be used for res nec mancipi. Apparently (see C. 6,1,1 and C. 7,34,2) it was also used for res mancipi like slaves, which shows how the rule for provincial immoveables infiltrated the rules for moveables, which would result in Justinian’s novation of C. 7,31,1 [a. 531]. See how this provincial institution finally took over and influenced the selection of the compilers, L. Vacca, BIDR 35/36 (Fn. 11) 147–186. 25 Indeed: D. 20,1,15,1 has in bonis, B. 25,2,15,1 has tou chreijstou einai to hupotethen; and D. 20,6,8,12 has in bonis debitoris sit, B. 25,8,8,12 has this phrase not. In other Basilica texts of Book 25 the term does not occur. The word Serviana occurs in the titles B. 25,1–8 only once: in a scholion to B. 25,1,41 (= D. 13,7,41). 26 D. 20,1,15pr. (Gai. l.s. de form. hypoth.): Et quae nondum sunt, futura tamen sunt, hypothecae dari possunt, ut fructus pendentes, partus ancillae, fetus pecorum et ea quae nascuntur sint

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the first text it is said that a hypothec may include future fruits, if either the dominus fundi or he who has a right to the usufruct settles a usufruct or makes an agreement on what will be born; in the second that a debtor can pledge future fruits if the slave woman or fundus was in bonis at the time of the agreement, or if he had a right to the fruits. Ankum e.a. combine these two texts as dealing with the same matter, viz. a pledge on future objects.28 They conclude from them that the debtor should be dominus or have the thing in bonis, or29 be a usufructuarius or tenant. They find it remarkable that Gaius uses as identical expressions that the fundus is in bonis debitoris, is debitoris and that the debtor is dominus of it. They think that Gaius on purpose avoided to use the phrase in bonis debitoris at the end of the second text because the usufruct could not be in bonis whereas the term in bonis esse in the actio Serviana indicates a property position (“ein Eigentumsausdruck”). Hence it was only applicable to corporeal things.30 Fruits could be claimed with the actio Serviana utilis. As they will argue later on, dominus indicates Roman ownership pleno iure or bonitary.31 To say that Gaius avoided the term in bonis debitoris on purpose is of course impossible: we do not know what Gaius thought on this matter.32 Then, did Gaius

27

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29 30

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hypothecae obligata: idque servandum est, sive dominus fundi convenerit aut de usu fructu aut de his quae nascuntur sive is, qui usum fructum habet, sicut Iulianus scribit. D. 20,4,11,3 (Gai. l.s. de form. hypoth.): Si de futura re convenerit, ut hypothecae sit, sicuti est de partu, hoc quaeritur, an ancilla conventionis tempore in bonis fuit debitoris: et in fructibus, si convenit ut sint pignori, aeque quaeritur, an fundus vel ius utendi fruendi conventionis tempore fuerit debitoris. That is remarkable: it is a monograph, one roll long, and it is not impossible but equally not obvious that Gaius would repeat himself in such a context. Further, it is about the formula hypothecaria, which they without hesitation read as identical with the formula of the Serviana. However, in the first text the hypothec may have been settled on the object and the fruits came naturally, while in the second the agreement included expressly also future fruit. Ankum e.a. have ‘und’ but presumably ‘oder’ is meant. Ankum e.a. I, 402: “Auffallend ist, daß Gaius die Wendungen, daß das fruchttragende Grundstück zum Zeitpunkt der Pfandbestellung in bonis debitoris ist, daß es debitoris ist und daß der debitor dessen Eigentümer (dominus) ist, als vollkommen identische Ausdrücke verwendet. Auffallend ist auch, daß Gaius am Ende der zweiten Stelle die Wendung in bonis debitoris bewußt vermeidet, weil in der Schlußfrage an fundus … fuerit debitoris das Grundstück und das ius utendi fruendi daran zusammengefügt sind. Gaius konnte hier die Worte in bonis debitoris esse, die im Rahmen der actio Serviana einen Eigentumsausdruck bilden, nicht für das Recht zur Nutzung und Fruchtziehung anwenden. Der technische weite Eigentumsausdruck war für diese res incorporalis nicht anwendbar.” Ankum e.a. I, 402–403: “Auch hier hat der Ausdruck in bonis debitoris esse, sowie debitoris esse, wenn sie mit einer res corporalis wie einem Grundstück verbunden sind, die Bedeutung, daß der Schuldner daran volles oder bonitarisches Eigentum hatte. Auch mit dem Substantiv dominus wurde von Julian und Gaius in der ersten der zitierten Stellen – wie wir später (10.4.b.10) zeigen werden – die Position des vollen oder bonitarischen Eigentümers bezeichnet.” It happens several times that Ankum e.a. sustain that a Roman jurist or praetor did something on purpose where this cannot be ascertained at all: I, 285, 324 (“wahrscheinlich be-

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use the three terms in an identical sense? Only if one takes the two texts together and assumes, as they do, that dominus is an owner pleno iure or bonitary, and in bonis refers to bonitary ownership, one may assume that Gaius on purpose avoided in bonis in the end. But by doing that one establishes a harmonie pre8tablie, the outcome is the same as the input. The text should be read in its context. It is a monograph on the formula hypothecaria. The term hypothecaria does occur in the Digest. Yet Lenel’s suggestion that hypothecaria were a Byzantine interpolation is untenable: 19 texts with Serviana opposite 14 with hypothecaria, of which 10 from monographies of the formula hypothecaria, argue against this.33 That is inconsistent with a general interpolation. More probable is that the Byzantines knew of a general action, applied in the provinces. That action would have been the one Gaius and Marcianus wrote about as the formula hypothecaria and which we find referred to as quasi Serviana34 or ad exemplum Servianae.35 The text allows for such a provincial application: Dominus does not necessarily refer to Roman ownership. The expression fundus debitoris leaves open that it concerns provincial land of which the debtor has firm possession. Similarly he might have by way of conventions and stipulations a usufruct of it. Moreover, would the version an fundus in bonis vel ius utendi fruendi conventionis tempore fuerit debitoris have been impossible? There is therefore no need to assume that in bonis was left out. Moreover, Marcianus says in his monograph on the formula hypothecaria that goods had to be in bonis debitoris for a valid pledge.36 Thus we may assume that the hypothecaria required that goods were in bonis at the time of the pledge contract. The Basilica have indeed 1m oqs_ô in B. 25,4,11,3 (= D. 20,4,11,3). That again implies that it comprised also provincial land, otherwise such an action

33

34 35

36

wußt”), 325, 326, 327 (“offensichtlich bewußt”), 330, 335, 347, 351, 360, 403, 411 n. 574; III, 205, 209. D. 10,2,29, D. 10,4,3,3, D. 16,1,13,1 and D. 44,4,4,30 mention Serviana and hypothecaria as equal, so this cannot be an interpolation; 14 merely mention hypothecaria, but 10 derive from monographies on the formula hypothecaria; the Serviana is, on the other hand, mentioned in 19 texts (excluding the four in which it is mentioned as equal to the hypothecaria). In the Codex hypothecaria occurs only twice (in 209 and 230) before Justinus and Justinianus; the Serviana three times before Justinus. D. 16,1,13,1 (Gai. 9 ad ed. provinc.). C. 8,9,1 (Gord. A. Aristoni): Si te non remittente pignus debitor tuus ea quae tibi obnoxia sunt venumdedit, integrum tibi ius est ea persequi, non interdicto Salviano (id enim tantummodo adversus conductorem debitoremve competit), sed Serviana actione vel quae ad exemplum eius instituitur utilis adversus emptorem exercenda. pp. vi id. sept. Pio et Pontiano conss. [a. 238]. D. 20,6,8,12 (Marcian. l.s. ad form. hypoth.): Si debitor vendiderit rem nec tradiderit, an non repellatur creditor, quasi adhuc res in bonis sit debitoris, an vero, cum teneatur ex empto, pignus exstinguatur? Quod et magis est. Sed quid si pretium venditor consecutus non sit nec paratus sit emptor dare? tantundem potest dici.

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would make no sense. Yet, if that were the case, there would be no reason for a separate real action to recover provincial property. In short, both the Serviana and the quasi Serviana comprised also possession, acquired bona fide and with iusta causa. It was apparently called in the provinces the hypothecaria and that became its Byzantine name. Gaius confirms this for the provincial edict: quasi Serviana quae et hypothecaria vocatur.37 Theophilos’ digression on the Serviana fits this. In his Paraphrasis 4,6,7 (I. 4,6,7) he distinguishes between the Serviana and the quasi Serviana (also hypothecaria). The first action is based on the agreement between landlord and tenant, that the first has a security on the property of the latter. The second action is the right of security, granted by a debtor to his creditor.38 The distinction is the classical one between interdictum Salvianum and actio Serviana. It shows that for the Byzantines the quasi Serviana or hypothecaria had become the standard action and that the name Serviana now was applied to an action, restricted to a particular contract. It also shows that there had been no difference in the meaning of in bonis. 7. Popper’s falsification principle requires only one counter proof to make a proposition false. Here we have more evidence that the reigning opinion regarding in bonis in the Serviana is highly questionable. There are certainly texts which refer to quiritary or bonitary ownership in the term in bonis. But there are also texts which do not so. The exegesis of these texts do not indisputably and unequivocally refer to quiritary ownership, be it pleno iure or bonitary, but indicate or leave open the possibility of the exclusive entitlement to possession of provincial land, that is: bona fide possession ex iusta causa. Other texts unequivocally deal with provincial land, hence not with quiritary or bonitary ownership. Yet the land can be seized with a real action. But the possibility of a special action to seize pledged provincial land remains theoretical: there is no trace of this in the texts, whereas, had it existed, it would have driven out the Serviana. The action applied was modelled after the Serviana and required that pledged goods were in bonis. That means that in bonis in the Serviana comprised indeed of quiritary ownership, pleno iure and bonitary, but also of bona fide possession ex iusta causa of provincial land and, probably, also of moveables. The term bonitary comprises therefore now of more, it includes ownership of provincial land, and in bonis covers the wide Roman ownership (which becomes

37 D. 16,1,13,1 (Gai. 9 ad ed. provinc.): De pignoribus prioris debitoris non est creditori nova actione opus, cum quasi serviana (quae et hypothecaria vocatur) in his utilis sit: quia verum est convenisse de pignoribus nec solutam esse pecuniam. 38 He distinguished between the pledge, transferred by the debtor to his creditor, and the nonpossessory hypothec, which fits the terms BtoO 1mewuqou !cyc^ and B peq· 1mew}qou !cyc^. In the end there was no difference.

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the standard ownership of the later empire and the Byzantines). This conclusion rehabilitates partly Wubbe’s opinion.

Peter-Ben Smit

A non-political stance as an ecclesial via media in war time? The correspondence between archbishop Andreas Rinkel of Utrecht and bishop Erwin Kreuzer of the German Old Catholic Church from 1937 until the invasion of the Netherlands*

1.

Introduction

One of the more persistent issues in the field of canon law and the (broader) field of law and religion is that of the relationship between church and state or church and politics. In his many publications, Jan Hallebeek has addressed this subject a number of times1, and it also plays a significant role in his introduction to “canon * The files that have been used in this study are kept in the archives of the Old Catholic Church of the Netherlands, Amersfoort, in box N.1 (O.K.K.-Duitsland, 1938–1966), factually also including correspondence from 1937. – The sources are reproduced uncorrected, i. e. the German of one of the protagonists, Andreas Rinkel, has retained its Dutch accent. – I am grateful to Mr. Edward Jacobson, MA of Vuurtoren Editing for his linguistic assistance. Excerpts of this essay were presented at the conference of the Societas Oecumenica (Ludwigshafen/Heidelberg, 23–28 August 2018), particularly insightful comments were received from Dr. Jutta Koslowski (PH Ludwigshafen) concerning the role of censorship and the need to attempt to read between the lines for (veiled) comments on the political state of the world. Attempts to engage in such a kind of reading have been included into footnotes mainly, given their hermeneutically challenging character. 1 A few examples include: J. Hallebeek/M.A.H.P. van Stiphout, De verhouding tussen canoniek recht en wereldlijk recht in Europees perspectief: een historische verkenning, in: L.C. van Drimmelen/T.J. van der Ploeg (eds.), Geloofsgemeenschappen er recht, Den Haag 2014, 197–218; J. Hallebeek, Godsdienst(on)vrijheid in de Gouden Eeuw? Het proces tegen Johan Wachtelaer (1583–1652), Trajecta 23 (2014) 123–144; ibid., Church Asylum in Late Antiquity, Concession by the Emperor or Competence of the Church?, in: E.C. Coppens (ed.), Secundum Ius. Opstellen aangeboden aan prof. mr. P.L. NHve, Nijmegen 2005, 163–182; J. Hallebeek/H. Dondorp, The Church as Promotor of the Law: The Emergence of Canon Law as a Separate Discipline in the Middle Ages, in: J. Wolff (ed.), Kultur- und rechtshistorische Wurzeln Europas, Mönchengladbach 2005, 43–62; J. Hallebeek, The Roman Pontiff as direct judge of appeal and the identity of the Latin Church, in: J. Frishman/ W. Otten/G. Rouwhorst (eds.), Religious Identity and the Problem of Historical Foundation; The Foundational Character of Authoritative Sources in the History of Christianity and Judaism, Leiden 2004, 387–404; J. Hallebeek, Recursus ad principem, Zegers Bernard van Espen on the rile of secular courts in preventing the abuse of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in: J. Halebeek/B. Wirix (eds.), Met het oog op morgen, Ecclesiologische beschouwingen aangeboden aan Jan Visser, Zoetermeer 1996, 64–71; J. Hallebeek: Verbondenheid van Kerk en Staat in het vroegmoderne regalisme. Over het ius placiti en de recursus ad principem, NTKR.

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law in ecclesiological context”2, the crowning achievement of his service as lecturer in canon law at the Old Catholic Seminary, as it is affiliated with Utrecht University. At this institution, Jan Hallebeek also served as extraordinary professor of Ancient Catholic Church Structures from 1997–2006. He continues to serve as an associate researcher at the Old Catholic Seminary. In the history of the Old Catholic Churches (of the Union of Utrecht)3, the topic of church-state relationships has played a role of considerable significance. Here, particular attention will be given to the role of church-state relationships – or, more precisely, the relation between church and both party politics and the politics pursued by states at large – in the correspondence between the Archbishop of Utrecht, Andreas Rinkel (1889–1979, in office: 1937–1970) and the bishop of the Old Catholic Church of Germany (Katholisches Bistum der AltKatholiken), Erwin Kreuzer (1878–1953, in office: 1935–1953) just prior to the Second World War and up until the invasion of the Netherlands by German (National Socialist) troops in 1940. In doing so, this essay offers insight into the concrete ways in which these two key protagonists of European Old Catholicism negotiated the relation between the ecclesial and political sphere at a time when their respective countries existed in an antagonistic relationship. Prior to doing so, we will first outline aspects of the relationship between church and state and church and politics in the broader history of the Old Catholic Churches, before introducing both the structure of the Union of Utrecht and the two main protagonists, Rinkel and Kreuzer. In the end, this essay contributes to the history of the Old Catholic Churches in the twentieth century, building on research by Ring and Smit4 while also preTijdschrift voor Recht en Religie 2017:1, 21–36. See also studies such as: J. Hallebeek, Questions of canon law concerning the election and consecration of a bishop for the Church of Utrecht: The casus resolutio of 1722, Bijdragen: International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 61 (2000) 17–50; ibid., Die Autonomie der Ortskirche im Denken von Zeger Bernard van Espen, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 92 (2002) 76–99; ibid., Alonso “El Tostado” (c. 1410–1455). His doctrine on jurisdiction and its influence in the Church of Utrecht, Amersfoort 1996; ibid., “Omnis jurisdictionis fons ecclesia, An eighteenth-century debate on the origin of jurisdiction”, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 85 (1995) 114–133. 2 See J. Hallebeek, Canoniek recht in ecclesiologische context, Amersfoort 2011, 21–55 (on the church in the world from a legal perspective) and 57–105 (on the ecclesiological basis of canon law, with particular reference to traditions such as Gallicanism, in which church-state relations played a critical role). On the occasion of 25 years of service as lecturer in canon law, Jan Hallebeek was presented with a Festschrift: Peter-Ben Smit and Lidwien van Buuren, Meester in Kerk en Recht, Sliedrecht 2013. 3 On which, see, e. g., the outlines in: P.B. Smit, Old Catholic and Philippine Independent Ecclesiologies in History. The Catholic Church in Every Place (Leiden: Brill, 2011), see also J. Hallebeek Canon Law Aspects of the Utrecht Union, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 84 (1994) 114–27. 4 The most complete study of the history of the Old Catholic Church of Germany during the Third Reich is M. Ring, “Katholisch und Deutsch.” Die alt-katholische Kirche Deutschlands

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senting a case study that concerns the relationship between ecclesiology and ecclesiological ideals (including “apolitical Catholicism”) and (public and state) politics. As we shall see, the “apolitical” stance seemed to serve as an alternative to the political order, however na"ve or unsatisfactory one may judge it to be in retrospect. Particular attention will be given to Rinkel’s perspective, as part of an ongoing research project on him5.

2.

The Union of Utrecht

The Union of Utrecht is the international communion of Old Catholic Churches that was first established in 1889 (Convention of Utrecht). Since its establishment, it has brought together (1) the Catholic Church of the Netherlands as it had existed since the schism with Rome in 1723; (2) the Catholics that continued the catholic faith following the First Vatican Council (1870), who, having been excommunicated from the Roman Catholic Church due to their refusal to comply with the new teaching of papal infallibility and universal jurisdiction, had established themselves as national catholic churches in Germany, Switzerland and Austria (out of which the Czechoslovakian, since 1993: Czech, Old Catholic Church also emerged); and (3) the so-called Polish National Catholic Churches, which emerged in the early twentieth century in North America, where groups of Polish Catholic immigrants felt compelled to establish their own church structures, which subsequently led to the founding of a daughter church back in Poland. Among the churches that were only temporarily a member of this union, the Old Catholic Church of the Mariavites is of particular significance; this church, having grown out of a Marian revival in Poland/Lithuania in the late nineteenth century, was unable to continue its existence within the Roman Catholic Church and joined the Old Catholic communion. Its special teachings, devotions and disciplinary practices led to its removal from the union in the 1920s, but ties remained close. The central organ of the Union of Utrecht is the International Bishops’ Conference (IBC), which, as its name indicates, is a conference of bishops that seeks to discern a common way forward in matters of und der Nationalsozialismus (Bonn: Alt-Katholischer Bistumsverlag, 2008). For a study of the life and work of Andreas Rinkel, including his ministry during the Second World War, see F. Smit, Andreas Rinkel (1889–1979), in: W.B. van der Velde/F. Smit/P.J.J. Visser (eds.), Adjutorio Redemptoris. Dr. Andreas Rinkel. Aartsbisschop van Utrecht 1889–1979, Amersfoort 1987, 3–197. 5 A first study of Rinkel’s (somewhat cautious, if not wavering) style of leadership can be found in Smit, Rinkel (note 4) 66–107.124–125, on the latter pages, it is also noted that there was intra-Old Catholic criticism of the rather circumspect modus operandi of the church as a whole and of its leadership in particular.

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faith and order6. The IBC has no jurisdiction over any churches; rather, decisions reached by the IBC should be understood to express the minds of these churches so that they can be easily received by them. Though the Archbishop of Utrecht acts as the president of the IBC, that does not make him the Archbishop of the Old Catholic Churches; the archiepiscopal title only applies to the Old Catholic Church of the Netherlands as the continuation of the ecclesiastical province of Utrecht, established in 1559.

3.

Church, Politics and the State in the History of the Old Catholic Churches

In brief – and therefore in broad strokes – the relationship between church and state (and, more generally, church and politics) in the history of the Old Catholic Churches up to the Second World War can be primarily understood in three ways. First, in the experience of what is now the Old Catholic Church of the Netherlands, church-state and ecclesial-political relationships played a role in five ways. (1) To begin with, this church is the historical continuation of the preReformation catholic church in the Northern Low Countries and as such bears the marks of the “medieval” establishment and the sixteenth-century attempts at reform. For example, the territorial organization of the church has its roots in a 1559 restructuring of the church (bull Super universas, with the pope appointing bishops and the king, Philipp II, proposing candidates)7. (2) This heritage became problematic following the Protestant Reformation in the Netherlands and the introduction of a (factually) Protestant government, and thus the once selfexplanatory coalition between church and state had to be renegotiated: catholics could worship only in hidden churches8 ; they needed to redefine their place in the public sphere9, to revise the manner in which they were organized,10 and also to find ways to manage issues at the interface of church as state, such issues 6 Cf. Hallebeek, Canon Law (note 3). On the Union of Utrecht and its history in general, see Smit, Ecclesiologies (note 3 and the literature referenced there). 7 Cf. in general: F. Postma, Nieuw licht op een oude zaak: de oprichting van de nieuwe bisdommen in 1559, Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 103 (1990) 10–27. See also Hallebeek, Recht (note 2) 180–182. 8 Cf. on a process against a cleric providing for such a church: Hallebeek, Godsdienst(on)vrijheid (note 1). 9 G. Yasuhira, Confessional Coexistence and Perceptions of the ’Public’: Catholics’ Agency in Negotiations on Poverty and Charity in Utrecht, 1620s–1670s, BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review 132 (2017), 3–24. 10 Cf. the broad account of this period by : C.H. Parker, Faith on the Margins: Catholics and Catholicism in the Dutch Golden Age, Cambridge 2008.

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concerning marriage law11. In practice these renegotiations led to an existence more independent from and less reliant on the state than had previously been the case, though at the same time, the “Augustinianist” controversies prior to and following the Council of Trent12 were causing troubles for the Archbishop of Utrecht (who was at this time serving in the guise of an “apostolic vicar” for political reasons: the use of the title Archbishop of Utrecht, certainly ad extra, would have given the impression of subversive intentions – ad intra was quite another matter). (3) These controversies concerned the Roman (curial) attempts to influence the life of the church in the Netherlands – issues such as the regulation of regular clergy in the Netherlands (Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, etc.) and the appointment of new archbishops – which forced the Dutch Catholic Church to develop a policy of invoking the protection of the “secular” (i. e. Protestant) government against the abuse of power and the unjust application of canon law by Vatican authorities, using the so-called recursus ad principem in some cases and the ius placet in others13. (4) Following the formal separation of church and state in the Netherlands in 1795, the disestablishment of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, and the (for the Dutch Catholic Church) traumatic introduction of both an additional episcopal hierarchy for Roman Catholics in 1853 and the novel dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary in 185414, the Dutch Catholic Church, until then usually referred to as the Cleresie, began to transform into the kind of church it is today, the Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland. Its new name derived from the Altkatholische Bewegung in (especially) Germany, the Habsburg Monarchy and Switzerland. (5) It also and came with a commitment to a certain separation between church and state and a “non-political” stance of the catholic church. This non-political stance should be understood as “non-partisan”, as many of the proponents of the Altkatholische Bewegung had a strong affinity for the liberal politics of that time. It should also be understood to mean that the faithful were referred to their own (Christian) conscience and not to the “party-line” of the church when it came to voting and other forms of political action. It is this tradition that will become particularly relevant in the correspondence between Rinkel and Kreuzer, as it was dominant in the Old Catholic Church of the Netherlands at the time and certainly in

11 Cf. D.J. Schoon, Van bisschoppelijke Cleresie tot Oud-Katholieke Kerk. Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van het katholicisme in Nederland in de 19e eeuw, Nijmegen 2004, 648–654 – this came with papal permission, cf. the brief Matrimonia quae of Benedict XIV [1741]. 12 The misnomer “Jansenism” is avoided here on purpose; it is high time to bury this concept as a term of any historiographical usefulness, cf. M. Cottret, Histoire du jans8nisme, Paris 2016. 13 Cf. Hallebeek, Recursus (note 1) and ibid., Verbondenheid (note 1). 14 Cf. on this era Schoon, Cleresie (note 11).

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Rinkel’s own thought15. In general, it led the Old Catholic Church of the Netherlands to steer away from political involvement, notwithstanding the political involvement of individual members, both lay and clergy. Second, the Old Catholic Churches emerging out of the Altkatholische Bewegung – i. e. those of Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Czechoslovakia) – were characterized by an apolitical Catholicism that can be best summarized by quoting from Ring’s dissertation; in brief, it was the outcome of liberal catholic reflection on the essence of religion and the church and their relationship to the public sphere, politics and (individual) morality and personal responsibility. Ring underlines two aspects: An erster Stelle steht ein Religionsbegriff, der Religion von der persönlichen Gottesbeziehung her definiert und deshalb stark individualistisch geprägt ist, der Zwang ausschließt und Religion auf den Bereich der Innerlichkeit beschränkt. Politik hingegen betrifft den Bereich der Außenwelt; es ist dies die Welt des Zwanges und des Scheins. Wegen dieses Unterschiedes dürfen Religion und Politik nicht miteinander vermischt werden; die Religion darf sich nicht in die Politik einmischen und die Politik nicht in die Religion. Zwischen beiden gibt es trotzdem eine Beziehung, insofern die sittliche Persönlichkeit beide miteinander verknüpfen muss; so tritt im Tun des Christen die Religion nach außen hervor. Diese Verbindung muss jedes Individuum für sich leisten, weshalb es unmöglich ist, ein allgemeinverbindliches politisches Programm zu formulieren, das mit dem Anspruch des Christlichen auftreten kann. Dieser individualistische Ansatz macht es möglich, dass die Gläubigen aller politischen Richtungen in der alt-katholischen Kirche Heimat finden können. Es ist zudem deutlich geworden, dass der unpolitische Katholizismus ein Gegenkonzept zum politischen darstellt, wobei die römisch-katholische Kirche und der politische Katholizismus als miteinander identische betrachtet werden16.

This “unpolitical” catholicism would, as Ring has shown extensively, be interpreted by Kreuzer and others (notably theologians such as Hütwohl, Keussen and Küppers)17 in a way that allowed its representatives to discern a “natural” affinity for National Socialism in terms of principles and ethics. Third, a word should be said about church, state and politics in the third Old 15 E. g. in A. Rinkel, Dogmatische Theologie I–IV (typescript; Amersfoort 1956), the topic of church-state relationships is not addressed. 16 Ring, Katholisch (note 4) 25–26. 17 R. Keussen (1877–1944), an Old Catholic priest and theologian, served from 1936 at the Old Catholic theological institute in Bonn and from 1942 onwards as professor of Old Catholic theology at Bonn University. H. Hütwohl (1893–1973), was one of the key clergypersons pushing a more völkisch agenda, for instance by leading the so-called Kirchlich-Nationale Bewegung (see Ring, Katholisch, 211). On W. Küppers (1905–1980), from 1938 onwards a key figure at the Old Catholic theological training institute in Bonn, see: A. Hensmann-Eßer (ed.), “Abenteuer in Rom”. Texte aus dem Nachlass Werner Küppers im Alt-Katholischen Seminar der Universität Bonn, Bonn 2017. More detail can be found in Ring, Katholisch (note 4).

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Catholic tradition that was part of the Union of Utrecht: the Polish National Catholic tradition. As indicated above, this tradition grew out of communities of catholic Polish immigrants in North America, who established themselves ecclesially in an autonomous catholic church under the liberal and nationalist leadership of personalities such as Franciszek Hodur; the political involvement of this church, therefore, developed along lines similar to those in Germanophone Europe and the Netherlands.

4.

Andreas Rinkel and Erwin Kreuzer: Biographical Backgrounds

Prior to addressing their correspondence, Andreas Rinkel and Erwin Kreuzer need to be introduced, though due to space limits only the briefest contours of their life can be given here. Rinkel was born in 1889 in an Old Catholic family in Ouderkerk aan de Amstel18 but grew up in Amsterdam. After attending the Old Catholic seminary in Amersfoort, he was ordained to the diaconate and priesthood, serving as parish priest in Enkhuizen and Amersfoort. Beginning in 1921, he taught dogmatic theology (and liturgical studies) at the Old Catholic Seminary, making a name for himself as a person who put Old Catholic systematic theology on a new academic footing, drawing on a broad array of ecumenical sources. In 1937 he was elected to the See of Utrecht, a ministry that he would fulfill until 1970. He died in 1979. He must be regarded as one of the most influential Old Catholic theologians of the twentieth century, who, as president of the Union of Utrecht, faced and successfully managed challenges in international cooperation posed by the Second World War, the Iron Curtain, and the ecumenical movement (the former two being divisive, the latter unifying in nature). Erwin Kreuzer was born in Berlin in 1878 and, following studies in theology at Bonn University, was ordained to the diaconate and priesthood in 1900. He then served in pastoral positions in Cologne, Passau and Kempten, where he became parish priest in 1903, serving until 1915, when he was elected parish priest in Freiburg in Breisgau. In 1934, he was elected as bishop of the German Old 18 For this and the following, see in particular : Smit, Rinkel, and Peter-Ben Smit, Ecumenical and International. Anglican – Old Catholic Relationships in the Correspondence Between Andreas Rinkel and Urs Küry (1955–1970), in: P.B. Smit (ed.), One Small Village? Church History in International Perspective, Trajecta 26 (2017), 133–168, idem, Recht doen aan jezelf en de ander: Aartsbisschop Andreas Rinkel en oecumenische theologische vernieuwing binnen de Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland, Trajecta 23 (2014), 201–218., and idem, Vrienden in het bisschopsambt. De correspondentie tussen Andreas Rinkel en Urs Küry (1955–1970), in: Publicatieserie Oud-Katholiek Seminarie 56, Sliedrecht/Amersfoort 2016.

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Catholic Church, with his see in Bonn. He served in this capacity until his death in 1953. Politically, Kreuzer was active in the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (1919–1922) and had strong affinities for völkisch ideas and, accordingly, with the ideals of National Socialism, as has been researched by Ring19. Following the war, he distanced himself from his close proximity to National Socialism, into which he had also led his church.

5.

The Correspondence Leading up to the Second World War

The correspondence between the two bishops begins at the time of Rinkel’s election and consecration in 1937, with Kreuzer congratulating him and stating his intention to participate in the consecration20. In this context, Rinkel asks Kreuzer whether he can provide a German translation of the rite of consecration for the participating Anglican bishops of Gloucester (Arthur Headlam) and Fulham (Basil Batty)21. The focus then shifts, as far as international relations are concerned, to further internal matters of the Union of Utrecht (notably the consecrations of other bishops and the problematic relationship with the second Old Catholic Church in Poland, i. e. the Old Catholic Church of the Mariavites) and to ecumenical contacts. For our purposes here, we cannot provide not a full survey of their correspondence, as the focus will be confined to those instances in which the interfaces of church-state or church-politics play a role. The first ecumenical conference that is mentioned and that seems to pass without significant issues is the Faith and Order Conference of 1937 (Edinburgh) – one of the two main ecumenical bodies of the era – in which Kreuzer participated personally ; Old Catholics had been particularly involved in this part of the ecumenical movement22. This, however, was only one of two important ecumenical conferences of that year ; the other one took place in Oxford and was part of the “Life and Work” movement, which focused on practical cooperation as a means for furthering ecclesial unity. The German theologian Rudolf Keussen (1877–1944) took part in this conference, and his participation is mentioned first

19 Cf. Ring, Katholisch (note 4) passim, esp. 367–707. 20 See Kreuzer-Rinkel 20 April 1937, expressing his intention to participate in the consecration and brief notes dates 9 and 16 April 1937 wishing Rinkel much strength first and congratulating him subsequently. 21 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 26 May 1937. 22 See Kreuzer-Rinkel, 27 June 1937: the department in charge of religious affairs in Berlin wishes that Kreuzer goes himself. Kreuzer doesn’t want to: he is too busy, his health is too poor, his knowledge of foreign languages is insufficient and people are telling him to get some rest. Cf. Kreuzer-Rinkel, 8 July 1937, confirming his participation.

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in a letter by Rinkel, who comments both on a recent pastoral letter by Kreuzer and on Keussen’s speech at the Oxford conference: Der wird sicher auch im Ausland einen ausgezeichnetsten Eindruck machen und die Überzeugung noch verstärken, dass die Leitung unserer deutschen Schwesterkirche in den besten Händen ist. Auch der Vortrag des Herren Dr. Keussen wird dazu beitragen, sei es auch, dass wir nicht alle seine Ansichten teilen23.

In fact, as Ring has described, ecumenical and intra-Old Catholic reactions to Keussen were such that Keussen decided to withdraw from the World Conference on Life and Work as Old Catholic representative. One contributing factor was Keussen’s report on this conference’s meeting in Oxford, which was dedicated to the politically sensitive topic “Church, Community, and State” and at which he had protested vocally against the critical stance of the conference vis-/-vis the Reichskirche and the German political developments of which this church was a result. In his report, submitted to the periodical Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift (at that point the key outlet for Old Catholic theology), Keussen did not only dismiss the conference as a somewhat trivial event but also argued vocally for the acceptance of the fundamental differences between “kulturlosen Rassen und Stämmen und kulturell hochstehenden Rassen”24. Churches should not involve themselves with politics, however, but rather align themselves with what he saw as the God-given (racial) order and focus on spiritual care. As the editor of the Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift, the Swiss bishop Adolf Küry (1870–1956; in office: 1924–1955) was neither inclined to accept Keussen’s view of the Oxford conference’s triviality nor willing to align himself with Keussen’s racial views. So the report was rejected, causing considerable anger on Keussen’s part. In this situation, Rinkel attempts to mediate and argue that Keussen should not be deterred by this refusal: Es steht nicht an mir zu beurteilen, ob der ihm erbetene Aufsatz für die I.K.Z. geeignet war oder nicht, wir sind hier der festen Meinung, dass er um der Sachen willen sich darüber hinwegsetzen sollte25.

He asks whether Kreuzer cannot convince Keussen to reconsider his decision to withdraw and to overcome his hurt pride. In his response Kreuzer refuses, because, as he says:

23 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 10 March 1938. 24 Cf. Ring, Katholisch (note 4) 616, quotation from: Rudolf Keussen, Die Weltkirchenkonferenze in Oxford, Alt-Katholisches Volksblatt 69 (1938), 292–293.297–299.308–308, 298. 25 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 7 October 1938.

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zu stark haben wir Deutschen in Zürich den nachdrücklichen Hinweis auf die Grenzen der Möglichkeit einer internationalen Zusammenarbeit empfunden. Wir wollen die Kirche nicht durch unsere politische Ideologie kompromittieren26.

Here, Zürich refers to the international Old Catholic Congress of that year, during which a fierce discussion broke out between the Dutch professor C.G. van Riel, the Swiss theologian and priest Urs Küry (son of bishop Adolf Küry) and Kreuzer himself: Van Riel had spoken strongly against NS racial views (and völkisch thinking in general) and in favor of a political involvement of churches, while Küry had suggested that churches’ alignment with political forces should have its limits if the church were to remain true to itself. Kreuzer had protested vehemently against both of these perspectives in the name of his church27. For Kreuzer, this debate was another reason to support withdrawing from close international Old Catholic cooperation because of the (national-socialist) political preferences that he (and many within his church) had. In the same letter, he also comments on the annexation of the Sudetenland by NS Germany, which involved the “incorporation” of the largest part of the Old Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, given that this church was largely Germanophone and located in the annexed regions. In this context, Kreuzer remarks the following, indicating that the areas and people involved were indeed German: “Man sieht, daß es doch keine Provokation war, wenn man früher von sudetendeutschen Gemeinden sprach.” Continuing in this vein, he notes the challenge that now faces him and others (presumably the Austrian and Czechoslovakian bishops, the latter having his see in Varnsdorf): “Wir stehen jetzt vor der Aufgabe, unsere drei deutschen Bistümer unter eine Dachorganisation zu bringen”28. Reacting to this letter, Rinkel pleads once more with Kreuzer to see whether he can get Keussen to return to the Life and Work movement and offers to mediate the conflict between the latter and Adolf Küry29. The Old Catholic voice in ecumenism is at stake, and he promises that another Dutch cleric, Engelbertus Lagerwey, will also do his best to assist with such mediation – Lagerwey was a trusted theological adviser to Rinkel and the parish priest of the cathedral church of Utrecht; from 1941 onwards he would serve as [titular] bishop of Deventer. He also makes two comments on the stance of the Dutch Old Catholic Church vis-/-vis developments across the eastern border of the Netherlands. First, he refers to the “case of Niemöller”, referring to Martin Niemöller’s imprisonment by Adolf Hitler as the latter’s “personal prisoner”, and states

26 27 28 29

Kreuzer-Rinkel, 8 October 1938. For an account, see Ring, Katholisch (note 4) 642–653. Kreuzer-Rinkel, 8 October 1938. Rinkel-Kreuzer, 15 October 1938.

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Als vor einigen Monaten der Ökumenische Rat in Nederland [sic] eine Kundgebung in der Sache des Niemöllers äussern wollte, hat unser Vertreter, Kan. Lagerwey, auf meiner Instigation hin, sich dagegen so energisch widersetzt und den geplanten Schritt als ausser der Kompetenz des Rates stehend gekennzeichnet, dass die ganze Geschichte zurückgezogen wurde30.

The comment on the church’s competence may be regarded as typical for an apolitical attitude. In addition, he states Wir, in der Utrechter Kirche, die Bischöfe und die international und ökumenisch arbeitende Männer, sind darauf bedacht Verständnis für die Lage ihrer Kirche zu haben und den Band der Einheit zu sichern, auch wenn andere ausser der holl. Kirche schärfer urteilen31.

The task of bishops, Rinkel stresses, is to work for unity, and he does not hide the fact, as this quotation indicates, that others in Dutch society are of a different opinion. He does not say that there was also substantial opposition to NS ideals within the Dutch Old Catholic Church, in fact; Lagerwey, who, in this case, argued for abstinence from any political involvement, would come to champion a Christian internationalist vision (rather than of a pagan nationalist one32), and the outspoken Amsterdam parish priest and seminary professor Van Riel (in the latter function a direct colleague of Rinkel) actively published in the periodical De Oud-Katholiek, taking a pacifist and decidedly anti-fascist position33. His own vision and hope was outlined by Rinkel in the same letter : Der Glaube soll doch die Gegensätze, die die Welt zerteilen, überwinden zu können beweisen. Jedenfalls wollen wir das Unserige tun, damit diese Gegensätze nicht in die Kirche sich eindringen. Wenn dasselbe von jeder Seite geschieht, dann soll es sich erwiesen, dass die Grenzen der Zusammenarbeit nicht so eng sind als Sie, Herr Bischof, fürchten34.

In the same breath, he also sympathizes with the now marginalized Czechoslovakian bishop Alois Paschek (1869–1946; in office: 1924–1946) and also ex30 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 15 October 1938. 31 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 15 October 1938. It can also be observed that Rinkel both stresses his own goodwill and efforts and indicates that his stance is certainly not the only one. 32 On which, see Wietse van der Velde, Working for Things Eternal: Engelbertus Lagerwey (1880–1959), Bishop of Deventer, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 96 (2016), 153–179, and P.B. Smit, Literair leiderschap? Helden en heiligen bij pastoor Engelbertus Lagerweij in 1940 en 1941, TussenRuimte 2017: 2, 40–44. 33 As was recognized widely, obituaries in newspapers abounded. Cf., representatively, Prof. dr. G.C. van Riel †, De Telegraaf (8 September 1939), 7 (evening edition). 34 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 15 October 1938. Rinkel’s emphasis on doing ‘das Unserige’ is clearly intended as an appeal to Kreuzer to do the same, which may well mean that Rinkel seeks to suggest that Kreuzer should tone down his political attitude somewhat – it is difficult to read between the lines like this, however.

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presses his understanding for Kreuzer’s new challenges, while also indicating that the churches that have now been incorporated into the German Old Catholic Church retain certain rights of their own: Ich verstehe welche Schwierigkeiten es heute für Sie gibt die geeignete Organisation für die dreigliedrige deutsche Kirche herauszufinden; das historisch Gewachsene hat sein Recht, jedoch wird eine Annäherung nötig sein35

Kreuzer’s answer to this moves into two directions, it seems. On the one hand, he notes that he had not considered limits to international Old Catholic cooperation, but he also indicates “Aber nachdem man in Zürich so beflissen war, uns auf diese Grenzen aufmerksam zu machen, wollten wir niemanden durch unsere Mitarbeit in Verlegenheit bringen”36. He also comments on the situation of Paschek, stating that he will keep his salary and that the three dioceses will be retained, even if the “Bischof von Bonn” will be tasked with representing all of them vis-/-vis government authorities and will also exercise leadership within this communion of Old Catholic dioceses. Other developments take place in the meantime. Rinkel, for example, is awarded a doctorate honoris causa by the Faculty of Catholic Theology (later, Old Catholic) of the University of Bern, for which Kreuzer congratulates him. When Rinkel expresses his thanks for this, he also gives his view of the Bernese faculty, noting that he has his doubts about some professors but is particularly happy with the exegete Ernst Gaugler37, who “bringt den Studenten – gleichwie Dr. Keussen in Bonn – den fehlenden dogmatischen Katholizismus bei”38. He also returns to what he had expressed earlier already, after stating that “Wir beten und vertrauen”, i. e.: Die verwirrenden Geschehnisse zwischen Völkern und Ländern dürfen uns in keiner Weise auseinander treiben. Unsere Kirche davor zu hüten ist an erster Stelle Aufgabe und Pflicht von uns Bischöfen39.

Also, Rinkel has received news concerning bishop Paschek, which he conveys to Kreuzer, noting that Paschek is happy with both Kreuzer and the stance of the German authorities:

35 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 15 October 1938. 36 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 23 October 1938. 37 On whom, see now Thomas Scheibler, Ju¨disch-christliche Hoffnung im Abschied von antiju¨discher Apathie: eine Studie zu Ernst Gauglers Auslegung der Israelkapitel im Ro¨ merbrief (Herisau: Scheibler, 2015). 38 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 5 December 1938. 39 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 5 December 1938. Rinkel refrains from judging the historical events, either out of consideration of Kreuzer or of the censor ; instead, he stresses the calling and responsibility of bishops.

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Es freut mich, dass es ihm gut geht; er ist sehr dankbar, dass Sie sich für ihn ‘als einen wahren Freund und zuverlässigen Berater’ erweisen. Er hat schwere Tage erlebt und nicht jeder Heisskopf weiss ihn nach Würde zu schätzen. Er rühmt das korrekte Benehmen der Reichsregierung40.

In his response, Kreuzer is much less enthusiastic about the Bernese faculty than Rinkel (one may suspect that this also has to do with the conflict between Keussen in Bonn and Küry in Bern), noting that “Meine Eindrücke von der Berner Fakultät sind leider nicht so vertrauensvoll wie die Ihren. Ich habe doch das Gefühl, dass hier die Barth’sche Theologie allerhand Verwirrung verursacht hat”41. In the same letter, he also reviews his own stance vis-/-vis Paschek: Bischof Paschek hat bei seinem Alter Manches noch schwerer genommen, als es an sich schon ist; ich habe ihm aber sehr stark zugeredet, seine ganz unnötigen Bedenken von sich zu werfen und seinen ruhigen geraden Weg weiter zu gehen42.

In the meantime, another topic begins to play a role: the Polish Catholic Church’s relation to the Old Catholic Church of the Mariavites. Rinkel attempts to inquire through Kreuzer about this church and receives occasional, though hardly detailed, updates, perhaps because Kreuzer himself does not possess much information43. The contentious topic of the “Oxfordausschuss” (i. e. Life and Work) continues to play a role in the correspondence, such as when Rinkel mentions that Adolf Küry has inquired whether a replacement for Keussen in the commission has already been found. He also suggests holding some sort of event or at least a meeting of the International Bishops’ Conference on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Union of Utrecht (established in 1889)44. Kreuzer reacts to this by writing Einen Ersatz für Dr. Keussen im Oxfordausschuss habe ich noch nicht. Es wird auch nicht leicht sein, aus der deutschen Kirche jemanden zu gewinnen, da die Gründe, die Keussen zum Rücktritt veranlasst haben, mehr oder weniger für uns alle gelten45.

On the other hand, he is in favour of marking the 50th anniversary of the international communion of Old Catholic Churches and would prefer an event in Utrecht: “wiewohl sie [sc. Eine Zusammenkunft] für uns Deutsche infolge der 40 41 42 43 44

Rinkel-Kreuzer, 5 December 1938. Kreuzer-Rinkel, 14 December 1938. Kreuzer-Rinkel, 14 December 1938. Kreuzer-Rinkel, 14 December 1938. Rinkel-Kreuzer, 11 March 1939. Rinkel also compliments Kreuzer with a contribution in the ecclesial press by one of his priests: “Der Aufsatz des Pfr. Pfisters im Volksblatt hat mich sehr gefreut; es ist gut, dass Ihre geschulte Geistliche der Oberflächlichkeit widerstehen und gründlich sagen, was katholisch ist.” 45 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 15 March 1939.

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noch wieder verschärften Devisenbestimmungen nicht einfach durchzuführen wäre.” He indicates that he will follow the lead of Rinkel and Küry in this matter. In the next exchange of letters between the two bishops the topic of the Second World War enters into the conversation. It dates to mid-September 1939 – the invasion of Poland had begun on 1 September – and concerns the illness and death of two Dutch priests, one of which was the professor, parish priest and pacifist Fr. Van Riel. Kreuzer expresses his devastation at his sudden passing46. Rinkel thanks him for his condolences and notes “Unsere Kirche trauert sehr um diesen Verlust; er war einer der tüchtigsten unter uns und hinterlässt eine Leere, die sich schwer ausfüllen lässt”47. In addition to Van Riel, the Hilversum parish priest Willem Jan de Vrij (1883–1939) has a heart attack and dies shortly thereafter. In the midst of these personally distressing events, Rinkel also comments on the outbreak of the war, which is still quite distant: Einstweilen ist das grosse Elend des Krieges gekommen, die uns allen zum tiefsten besorgt macht. Mein tägliches Gebet gilt unseren Kirchen in allen Ländern; Gott schütze sie und…disponat pacem in diebus nostris. Sie, lieber Herr Bischof, werden viel Stärke und Weisheit bedürfen in dieser Zeit. Gott leite Sie und Ihre Kirche durch alle Dunkel dieser Tage; Er bringe Licht48

Kreuzer reacts to this by commenting on the fact that both of the deceased priests coincidentally had German wives49 and thanks Rinkel for his prayerful support: “Für Ihre freundlichen Wünsche und die Zusage Ihres betenden Gedenkens danke ich Ihnen herzlich! Ich muß mir täglich neue Kraft erbitten”50. Kreuzer’s remark sets the tone for much of what will follow, as he indicates that he is also enduring much hardship as part of the new order. A new topic is introduced in October 1939, when Rinkel invites Kreuzer to attend the commemoration of the 1200th anniversary of the death of Willibrord – the founder of the Church of Utrecht – who had become a key saint in the history 46 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 11 September 1939. The sentiment may be somewhat surprising given the massive disagreement between Kreuzer and Van Riel at the Old Catholics’ Conference in Zürich. 47 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 14 September 1939. 48 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 14 September 1939. Indicating that the war is a disaster is not necessarily in line with the NS view – possibly Rinkel is being critical in a veiled manner here. The same is true for the reference to darkness later on. 49 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 14 September 1939: “Wie seltsam übrigens, dasz die beiden, die deutsche Frauen hatten, zu gleicher Zeit ausscheiden!” – The fact that both had German wives was not a coincidence: both married German wives while abroad and while clerical celibacy was still compulsory in the Dutch Old Catholic Church, cf. A. Berlis, Einde aan een kaste buiten de maatschappij. Rond de opheffing van de celibaatsverplichting in de Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland, in: M. Monteiro/G. Ackermans (eds.), Mannen Gods. Klerikale identiteit in verandering (Hilversum: Verloren, 2007), 53–71. 50 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 14 September 1939. Cf. Rinkel-Kreuzer, 19 September 1939 for Rinkel’s confirmation of De Vrij’s passing.

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of the Old Catholic Churches51. The celebrations would consist of a Eucharist in the Old Catholic Cathedral in the morning of 7 November and a national service in the Dom Church of Utrecht (medieval cathedral, used for Protestant worship); a day prior, the Old Catholic synod would meet52. Rinkel is aware that travelling is not easy in a time of war – he may also have at the back of his mind the way in which the aforementioned Lagerwey had created a Christian internationalist focus for the celebrations53 – so he allows for a negative answer to his invitation from the start: Ich weiss schon, dass es sehr schwer sein wird für die ausländischen Brüder der Einladung Folge zu leisten; wenn also ein ‘non possumus’ folgt, werden wir das verstehen und hoffen, dass die Gebetsgemeinschaft bleibt. Möchte es aber doch möglich sein, dass Sie kämen, dann werden Sie vom ganzen Herzen unser Gast sein in diesen Tagen. Das Herz ist einem schwer in der heutigen Zeit. Gott möge die Völker leiten in den Frieden und seine Kirche und die ganze Welt schützen. Vom ganzen Herzen bete ich Ihnen Stärke und Bewahrung zu, Ihnen mit Ihrer Familie, Kirche und Vaterland54.

Kreuzer also appears to be sensitive to the political situation and responds as follows: Ihre freundliche Einladung hat mich herzlich gefreut, doch ich habe noch eine Frage, auf dem Herzen und bitte, sie ganz rückhaltlos zu beantworten. Ich könnte mir gut vorstellen, daß Sie in der gegenwärtigen Lage wohl das Bedürfnis haben, mir die Freundlichkeit der Einladung zu erweisen, aber im Grund Ihres Herzens denken müssen: hoffentlich sagt er ab. Deshalb frage ich: Würde das Erscheinen eines Gastes aus einem kriegsführenden Land keinerlei Peinlichkeit für Sie mit sich bringen? Ich würde es sehr gut verstehen, wenn Sie mir schreiben: bleiben Sie lieber zu Haus [sic]55.

He does note that he will have to accept the offer of Rinkel’s hospitality should he be able to come, because it also depends on whether he gets a visa and the 51 Cf. Wietse van der Velde, “Koomt dezen dag blijmoedig vieren aan Willibrordus toegewijt”, Perspectief 35 (2017), 18–35. 52 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 15 October 1939. 53 See Smit, Leiderschap (note 32). See in general also: A.H.M. van Schaik, “Waar alle richtingen samenkomen”. De Willibrordherdenking van 1939’, Jaarboek Oud-Utrecht 1981 (1981), 325–356. 54 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 15 October 1939. Rinkel’s offer of hospitality has, likely, also to do with the difficulty of exporting money when travelling abroad; the hope that a fellowship of prayer may be retained, indicates that the church is a communion that somehow transcends political vicissitudes and can be read as somewhat critical of the political state of affairs. Similarly, the emphasis on peace runs counter against more militaristic options and Rinkel’s heavy heart sits uneasily with those propagating war as a logical means of extending one’s Lebensraum. 55 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 20 October 1939. Kreuzer’s reference to current situation may be all he can say given censorship; the comment on his lack of students is probably even critical: the lack of students had to do with the fact that young men were called up for military service – statistically, religiously affiliated men were called up more frequently than others.

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necessary funds for the journey to the Netherlands56. In the meantime, not too many Old Catholic bishops appear to be able and willing to attend the celebrations in Utrecht, as Rinkel reports to Kreuzer : Jetzt beeile ich mich Sie zu antworten. – Ihr Brief macht uns viel Freude. Bischof Küry hat schon abgesagt, er hat Beschwerde gegen die Reise und steht mitten in der Universitätsarbeit; Bischof Paschek brach eine Rippe, schrieb mir und ‘darum kann er nicht kommen’ (Luk. 14,20!); Bischof Tüchler hat noch nicht geantwortet. Darum ist Ihre vorläufige Zusage doppelt erfreulich. Ich kann Sie völlig beruhigen. Hier ist jedermann uns willkommen; weder innerkirchlich noch ausserkirchlich, noch bei den Behörden der Stadt oder des Staates wird Ihre Anwesenheit etwas anderes als selbstverständlich sein. Sie können davon überzeugt sein, dass vor allem unsere Kirche es sich als eine Ehrung rechnet. Selbstverständlich sind Sie unser Gast, und ich hoffe dass Sie bei mir, Emmalaan 8, wohnen wollen57.

Rinkel adds to these liturgical instructions concerning the (Old Catholic) Eucharist in St. Gertrud’s Cathedral and the national (i. e. ecumenical) service in the Dom Church, still doubting what to wear on that occasion (the choice is between a suit and a cassock with a purple [band] cincture). Such considerations are more than expressions of clerical fuzziness: they are indicative of the early stages of the ecumenical movement that this event takes place in58. In this letter, it is still uncertain whether Anglican bishops could attend, with Rinkel himself having declined an invitation to preach in Westminster Abbey on 19 November due to the war (n.b.: the U-boat war was already going on in the North Sea): Von den Anglikaneren sollten die Bischöfe von Gloucester (Headlam) und Iron kommen, und ich war für den 19. Nov. zur Predigt in West Minster [sic] Abbey eingeladen; hatte es angenommen, aber habe es heute des Krieges wegen absagen müssen; auch die Anglikaner werden jetzt nicht kommen können; leider59.

A day later, Rinkel again has occasion to write, given that the Anglicans have confirmed their attendance: Ich meinte, dass Ihnen dieses schreiben musste, da ich Ihnen erst schrieb, dass die Anglikaner nicht kommen sollten. Wir hoffen einstweilen, dass diese keine Abänderung in Ihren Plänen machen wird; unsererseits gibt es keinerlei Beschwerden. Vielleicht ist es gerade gut, wenn man einander gerade in diesen Zeiten begegnet auf neutralem Boden. Möchte doch Gott unserer Welt den rechten Frieden geben60 ! 56 57 58 59

Kreuzer-Rinkel, 20 October 1939. Rinkel-Kreuzer, 25 October 1939. On this aspect, see: van Schaik, Richtingen (note 54). Rinkel-Kreuzer, 25 October 1939. “Iron” is a typo; Rinkel corrects this in his letter of 26 October (it should be Ripon). 60 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 26 October 1939.

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The problem solves itself, in the sense that Kreuzer’s exit visum is refused and he is, as he indicates, restricted to being present in the spirit only61. Rinkel received this letter somewhat late, only after the festivities on 12 November62. He can therefore report on the celebrations themselves: Die Feier ist würdig verlaufen, sowohl kirchlich als national. Anwesend waren die Bischöfe von Gloucester und Fulham, Canon Douglas und Rev. Usher, vier Bekannte also. Gloucester predigte bei uns am Abend des 6. in der Vesper. Fulham bedauerte insbesondere Ihre Abwesenheit. Auf der Nationalfeier in der Domkirche sass ich, in Mitten des Gloucester und Fulham dem römischen Erzbischof gegenüber! Die Anwesenheit der Anglikaner war vor allem auch für das protestantische Niederland eine Freude, Rom gegenüber63.

He also wonders when he will be able to meet Kreuzer again, promises to pray for him and also requests his prayer, concluding with: “Wir beten und hoffen, dass Gott der Welt den Frieden gebe, damit die Völker und Gottes Kirche Ruhe haben und gedeihen. Warum sind die Menschen so verblendet?”64 When Kreuzer responds to this, commenting on the delay of his letter and that of Rinkel with “…wir müssen uns halt in die Zeitverhältnisse fügen”, a further dimension of the international contacts reveals itself: Wenn der Bischof von Fulham mein Fehlen bedauert hat, so hängt dasz wohl mit folgendem zusammen. Er hatte mich durch Bischof Küry bitten lassen, dasz sich unsere Geistlichen der anglikanischen Amerikaner und geborenen Engländerinnen annehmen möchten. Im Einverständnis mit unserem Ministerium und mit dem Auszenamt der evangelischen Kirche haben wir das denn auch in die Wege geleitet. … Sollten Sie einmal an Fulham schreiben, so können Sie ihn also darüber beruhigen. Ich würde ihn allerdings um einen Gegendienst bitten: In England sind die dort wohnenden evangelischen Geistlich der deutschen Gemeinden sämtlich verhaftet gewesen; nunmehr ist Nachricht da, dasz sie bis auf einen wieder freigelassen worden sind, nur steht noch nicht fest, ob sie ihren Gemeinden wieder dienen können. Der Eine, er noch gefangen gehalten wird, ist der 67jährige Pfarrer Wehrhan, der trotz seines Alters nun schon am dritten Internierungsort ist. Wenn Fulham sich erkenntlich zeigen will, dann möchte er doch dahin wirken, dasz auch dieser alte Herr freigelassen wird. Wenn Sie das vermitteln könnten, wären ich und die evangelische Kirche Ihnen dankbar dafür65.

61 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 1 November 1939: “Nun mußs ich aber leider doch absagen und zwar, weil zur Zeit ein Ausreise-Visum grundsätzlich nicht erteilt wird. Ich habe heute die Ablehnung bekommen.” 62 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 13 November 1939. 63 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 13 November 1939. 64 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 13 November 1939. 65 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 25 November 1939.

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Kreuzer concludes by expressing his desire for the day in which he will be able to meet Rinkel face to face again and by greeting him “in ungestörter Gebetsgemeinschaft”66. These developments leave Rinkel in the middle of a number of international relations that he attempts to negotiate in his role as president (and spokesperson) of the International Bishops’ Conference, at this time only his second year in office. Concerning the request of Kreuzer with regard to Wehrhahn, he does take action and writes to the bishop of Fulham with a request for assistance. Simultaneously, he is concerned about the Old Catholics, both Polish National Catholics and Mariavites, in Poland, now an occupied country. He received communications from bishop Padewski from the former and heard nothing about the latter67, commenting Hoffentlich hat seine Kirche nicht zu viel bei dem Streit in Polen gelitten und können diese Leute zusammenhalten. Wie wird es indessen den Mariaviten gegangen sein; es ist zu hoffen, dass sie dem deutschen Teil des alten Polen angehören68.

Again, a prayerful wish concludes the letter, and this reference to peace may be intended on multiple levels: “Ich bete, dass Ihre Kirche den Frieden des kommenden Weihnachtsfestes erhalte und dadurch stark und treu sei”69. In response, Kreuzer mentions a communication from the Mariavite bishop Philipp Feldmann on a subject different than the fate of his church and thanks Rinkel for his efforts with the bishop of Fulham, noting further : “Im ganzen geht das kirchliche Leben seinen ungestörten Gang, nur einige von meinen jüngsten Geistlichen sind ihrem Amt entzogen, aber bisher haben wir immer noch ausreichende Aushilfe schaffen können”70. The correspondence with the bishop of Fulham turns out to suffer from wartime delays in communication as well: the German pastor had already been released before Rinkel’s letter reached him71. In the meantime, Kreuzer also tries to find out what has become of the Polish Old Catholics, inquiring with the (Old Catholic) governor-general of Poland, Hans Frank72, to whom he wrote “einen orientierenden Brief über die Nationalkirche und die

66 67 68 69 70

Kreuzer-Rinkel, 25 November 1939. Rinkel-Kreuzer, 7 December 1939. Rinkel-Kreuzer, 7 December 1939. Rinkel-Kreuzer, 7 December 1939. Kreuzer-Rinkel, 23 December 1939. – Rinkel remembers this and comments on it as follows (Rinkel-Kreuzer, 27 December 1939), by hoping “dass Sie in diesen schweren Zeiten Ihre Kirche ruhig weiter führen können und dass Ihre Geistlichen nicht zu stark ihrem Amt entzogen werden.”. 71 On 23 December 1939, Rinkel forwards his correspondence with the bishop of Fulham to Kreuzer, to wit, Fulham-Rinkel of 18 December 1939. 72 On whom, see in brief: Ring, Katholisch (note 4) 272.

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Mariavieten”73. He received a grateful letter for this from the Polish National Catholic bishop: Dafür hat mir Padewski gedankt, der daraufhin zum Generalgouvernement gerufen worden war, und mir mitgeteilt, dasz seine Gemeinden ohne Schaden davongekommen seien. Von den Mariaviten habe ich noch keine Nachricht.

When Rinkel receives his response from the bishop of Fulham, he forwards it to Kreuzer, noting “Ich bin immer bereit Ihre Kirche und die Evangelische in solchen Angelegenheiten, nach besten Kräften zu dienen.”74 He adds to this: Heute bekam ich eine Karte vom Bischof Feldmann aus Plock, der mir berichtete, dass sie allen in Sicherheit waren und dass drei Kirchen (zwei in Warschau und eine in Lowiez) sehr beschädigt waren; sonst arbeiteten sie allen in ihren Gemeinden75.

In these days, the correspondence is concluded with Fulham, who reports to Rinkel that all (seven) German pastors in England have been released again, including “Pastor Wehrhan whose Nazi views I gather were more pronounced than the others”76. News also arrives about the Czechoslovakian bishop Paschek, who has been suffering from “Ohnmachtsanfälle”77. Kreuzer reacts to this with concern, given that Paschek had already broken a rib when falling due to fainting. Otherwise, all is well: Bei uns geht es in Anbetracht des Ernstes der Zeit gut; bisher haben wir auch die Seelsorge noch voll aufrecht erhalten können. Nur Studenten hätte ich gern einige mehr78.

The war does not prevent people from having jubilees, and so Rinkel congratulates Kreuzer with the 40th anniversary of his ordination to the priesthood on 1 April 1940: “Das ist ein Zeitraum, der einem das Recht gibt, die Arbeit niederzulegen und sich zur Ruhe zu setzen”, however, according to Rinkel, this does not apply to bishops: “wenn es nur einigermassen möglich ist, stirbt der Bischof im Harnisch.” As Kreuzer is, according to Rinkel, the right man for the

73 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 12 December 1939. 74 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 19 December 1939. 75 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 19 December 1939. Rinkel also comments on a problematic “episcopus vagans” in this letter : “Vor einigen Wochen bekam ich einen Brief vom ‘Bischof ’ Fatime, der mir beteuerte, dass seine Weihe tadellos war ; nur der Kowalski hatte gesprochen ‘Accipe Spiritum Sanctum’; also die Anwesenheit der Weiber verneint er nicht! Ich habe dem Charlatan nicht geantwortet.” – This subject had appeared earlier in the correspondence and surfaces a number of times afterwards, but does not concern the topic of this essay. 76 Fulham-Rinkel, 15 December 1939, cf. also Rinkel-Kreuzer, 23 December 1939. 77 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 27 December 1939. 78 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 5 January 1940.

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position, there is no reason to think of retiring anyway79. Kreuzer reacts to this as follows: Mir selbst ist an solchen Tagen nie nach ‘jubilieren’ zu Mute, denn mich bedrückt in der Rückschau viel zu sehr das Bewusstsein, wie vieles man in der langen Zeit versäumt hat, wieviel man von dieser Zeit vergeudet hat. Man kann dem lieben Gott nur bitten, nicht streng zu sein, wenn man einmal Rechenschaft geben muss von der Verwaltung einer so reichlich berechneten Zeit80.

With this, the correspondence prior to the invasion of the Netherlands, which may well be considered as a rupture in the relationship between the German and Dutch Old Catholic Churches, comes to an end. The materials that have been presented so far permit a number of general observations, which will be offered by way of conclusion.

6.

Concluding Observations: Themes and Topics

First, in terms of stance, it is more than apparent that Rinkel attempts to mediate between Kreuzer (and through him other German theologians, such as Keussen) and other Old Catholic theologians outside of the Old Catholic Church of Germany. He wants to converse with Kreuzer – who may feel excluded by others – in such a manner that communion is preserved, lines of communication are being kept open and cooperation is ensured. And such cooperation does take place, at least, for example, when Rinkel and Kreuzer search for information on Old Catholics in Poland (both Polish [National] Catholics and Mariavites) and the fate of German clergy in England. Second, it is also apparent that both bishops attempt to steer clear of politics. This, it seems, is not only a matter of expediency, but a matter of theological principle. Rinkel especially is keen to express thoughts that have their roots in the tradition of apolitical Catholicism, a tradition with which Kreuzer also identified (though his particular interpretation allowed him to side strongly with National Socialism). The bond that exists among Christians ought not to be affected by political differences or to be influenced by the course of political, even military events. It ought to transcend these barriers and offer an alternative way of relating to each other (i. e. an alternative to political partisanship). Third, these two items relate to each other, as is apparent over the course of the correspondence. The virtual abstinence from political positioning – apart from a kind of “non-positioning” or, even better, a lack of explicit positioning that may 79 Rinkel-Kreuzer, 28 April 1940 (the date of this letter is wrong, is has to be 28 March; Kreuzer responds to it in his letter of 9 April 1940). 80 Kreuzer-Rinkel, 9 April 1940.

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have given offense – creates the space to continue the correspondence and cooperation. Alternatives to this stance were certainly available – such as the aforementioned stances of Van Riel and Lagerwey, both people close to Rinkel – at least in terms of work (as seminary professor and Utrecht parish priest respectively). One may say, certainly in retrospect, that Rinkel’s conciliatory, mediating and apolitical stance came at the price of being unable to hold Kreuzer accountable. Yet that was apparently a price Rinkel was willing to pay, at least for the time being81.

81 For an account of Rinkel’s holding accountable of Kreuzer following the war, see Smit, Rinkel (note 4) 116–119. Also in Smit, Vrienden (note 18), it is apparent throughout that there have been instances in which, in a post-war situation, Rinkel and others did hold their German colleagues accountable.

Konstantin Tanev

Observations on the value of naturalis ratio from early Humanism to the Antiquity

1.

Introduction*

In the commentaries of Jacques Cujas, we discern an old discourse between two ancient philosophic schools, the Stoics and the Epicureans. This debate had influenced the Roman intellectual elite in the times of the late Republic and the early Principate and as we see from the commentaries of the eminent French master had been revived during the dawn of modern European Humanism. In his commentary on Gaius’ Institutes Cujas had expressed his own point of view on the source of law and he declared himself a follower of ancient Stoicism (Nos Stoicos sequimur, qui ius commune omnium hominum deducunt a natura …)1. His fascination with Aristotle, whose doctrine was perceived an element of the Stoic school is clear. This provides an opportunity to follow the influence of Stoic doctrines in legal commentaries of ancient literature. Xavier Prevost2 has described Cujas’ philosophy as strongly influenced by Stoicism quoting his words “Iurisconsulti sunt imbuti a Stoicis” and concludes “…Cujas lui-mÞme est imbu de sto"cisme”. The interpretation of Roman legal sources made by Cujas drew on his rich knowledge of the ancient culture in all its genre from the poetry to the prose and to the scientific literature as well. In his studies he clarified that the scientific * I am grateful for the help of Professor Philip Thomas who read through this paper in order to correct my English wherever necessary. 1 J. Cuiacius, Jacobi Cuiacii. IC praestantissimi. Operum postumorum. Tomi quarti. Pars prior. Lutetiae Parisionum. 1658. Col. 48, ad. Ad legem L. IX. Omnes populi, qui legibus & moribus reguntur… 2 X. Prevost, Jacques Cujas (1522–1590), Jurisconsulte humaniste, pr8face d’Anne RousseletPimont et Jean-Luis Thireau, Droz, GenHve 2015, p. 199–210 ; L. Winkel, Cujas (Cujacius) Jacques, n8 en 1522 / Toulouse, mort le 4 octobre ou le 4 d8cembre 1590 / Bourges, in: P. Arabeyre/J.L. Halpérin/J. Krynen (eds.), Dictionnaire historique des juristes franÅais (XIIe XXe siHcle), Paris 2007, 220–222. P.A. Vander Waerdt, Philosophical Influence on Roman Jurisprudence? The Case of Stoicism and Natural Law, W. Haase/H. Temporini (eds.), ANRW II 36/7, Berlin/New York 1994, 4851–4900.

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framework of Roman law was beholden to Aristotelian philosophy for the description of the legal terms by etymology, systematic structure and primarily by its original historic context. The search for the original working of the jurisprudential mind had redirected the scholars of the 16th century to the classical origin of Roman law sources, which started the criticism of the emblemata Triboniani (just like the rival of Cujas, Hotman). Moreover, the renewed knowledge of the Greek language empowered the jurists with a vast panorama of information and scientific paradigms in law and philosophy. The scuola culta was famous for its good classic education conform with the ancient sources, which the jurists knew even by heart. The humanist scholars used their knowledge of antiquity to resolve problems of their actual juridical practice, which provides a good opportunity to study antiquity and classical texts in an empiric environment. Their reconstruction was mainly based on literary sources, since the Romans themselves expressed their legal convictions in different narratives which could be found in many texts outside professional legal literature. Thus, poetry and philosophy entered into the juridical debate and the study thereof improved our understanding of technical legal questions.

2.

The famous § 1 of Gaius’ Institutes and their interpretation by Cujas

The text, Gai. inst. 1.1, itself is so well-known that most of the academic fellows can cite it by heart. It relates to the discussion regarding the origin of law, the links with the nature and sources of law and the Republic as a basis of normative regulation. Gai. inst. 1,1 Omnes populi, qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur : nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium est vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium civitatis; quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes populos peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur3.

Cujas’ discussion has started with a compliment for Gaius’ division of law, insisting that nothing more could be added to the distinction among ius civile and 3 The translation as of Gaius, Institutes of Roman Law, E. Poste (translation and commentary), Whittuck, E.A. (revised and enlarged), Calderon, Oxford 1904: “The laws of every people governed by statutes and customs are partly peculiar to itself, partly common to all mankind. The rules established by a given state for its own members are peculiar to itself, and are called jus civile; the rules constituted by natural reason for all are observed by all nations alike, and are called jus gentium. So the laws of the people of Rome are partly peculiar to itself, partly common to all nations; and this distinction shall be explained in detail in each place as it occurs.”

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ius gentium (… omnes populi & est lex elegantissima, distinctio iuris civilis a iure gentium elegantissima, & nihil aliud quam ea distinctio)4. Thereafter, he mentions that Gaius had meant not all the people, but only those who formed a political entity, and that he used the words ius commune instead of ius gentium. Here the interpretation relies on Aristotle and his eminent division of common law, shared by every nation and local law, proper for any specific nation. As for the local one the Greek philosopher used the division of written and non-written law. Notwithstanding the general stoic ideology of Cujas5 here he had underlined the impact of Epicurus referring to the term utility (Atque ipsa utilitas iusti prope mater et aequi. Epicureum est, ex qua familia erat quoque Horatius). Although he states that this division of Gaius derives from what he refers to as the naturalis ratio (ius commune esse, quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit), the interpretation of the French professor draws attention to the fact that the argument of Epicurus differs from that of Gaius, because the philosopher from Samos implies that the law originates from usefulness, utilitas. Gaius understood naturalis ratio to be a theoretical value deduced from common utility such as the profit (sed id deducebat ab utilitate communi, a compendio, emulomento, fructu, necessitate quae & nos impulit ad ius gentium …)6. The Epicurean family, to which the Roman poet Horace belonged, used another meaning of utility – to which Cujas referred to as “simple utility” (utilitas simplex)7. We can deduce that he understood this to be personal utility and not the common one for every nation. In his comment the learned humanist referred to a famous rhyme from Horace’s Satires referring to the importance of individual profit for the formation of equity. Hor. sat. 1,3: ob hanc rem, aut positum ante mea quia pullum in parte catini sustulit esuriens, minus hoc iucundus amicus sit mihi? quid faciam, si furtum fecerit aut si prodiderit conmissa fide sponsumve negarit? quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant, cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moresque repugnant atque ipsa utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.8

4 5 6 7 8

J. Cuiacius, Op. cit. J. Cuiacius, Op. cit. J. Cuiacius, Op. cit. J. Cuiacius, Op. cit. “Or if he has taken in his hunger a chicken set down before me in my part of the plate, this young friend will be lesser for me? What I will do, if he commits a theft, or betrays the things entrusted to him denying his promise? These ones who want to equalise the sins, should feel

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The last line of the text is significant in order to understand the source of justice prior to the establishment of law as a structure of the society. This empirical doctrine diverges from stoic understanding, which views Nature as the primordial source of law, establishing the basis for what is just and fair. Although according to Cujas law always exists, legislation (in Latin “Lex”) is strictly related to the state and is characteristic only for nations organised into states. Once again, he refers to Aristotle stating: Et recte Aristotel. 4. Politic. Ubi lex est, inquit, ibi est respublica (“where ordinance is, there is the democracy”9 ; it is important to note that Aristotle used democracy as a form of a good state, but not the word state in general). Thus, the French master had presumed that not all peoples have formed a society, although their soul is not less strong than the ours (Cujas suggested that Gaius had regarded the Romans as a part of those who have formed a state). Therefore, peoples without a State have no less ability than us for the best management of affairs and just reason (sed tamen non inest minus, quam in nostris ad maximas res gerendas & recta ratio)10. To clarify his explanation the author continues with the example that it is possible to distinguish the fire from the ashes. At the end of his argumentation he concludes that even in wild and monstrous creatures natural reason existed, although it was lulled to sleep (consopita est in quibusdam & quasi consopita ratio illa naturalis, quod est gentes omne ius, & et quamvis non regantur, est tamen insitus in eis, quantumuis feris, eius rationis, lumen, quod facile excitari potest)11. One of the theoretical sources of Cujas is the Roman Stoic and poet Seneca, who emphasised (Sen. epist. 66,12) that ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini Spiritus mersa. Thus, for Seneca this term (divini Spiritus) had the same value as animus, the soul, has for us now.

the trouble when it comes to the truth, they will oppose to the sense and the morale, and utility itself is mother properly of just and equal.” 9 Perhaps Cujas referred to Aristot. Pol. 4.1292a: fpou c±q lµ m|loi %qwousim, oqj 5sti pokite_a. dei˜ c±q t¹m l³m m|lom %qweim p\mtym t_m d³ jahû 6jasta t±r !qw\r, ja· ta}tgm pokite_am jq_meim. ¦stû eUpeq 1st· dglojqat_a [35] l_a t_m pokitei_m, vameq¹m ¢r B toia}tg jat\stasir, 1m Ø xgv_slasi p\mta dioijei˜tai, oqd³ dglojqat_a juq_yr: oqh³m c±q 1md]wetai x^visla eWmai jah|kou. t± l³m owm t/r dglojqat_ar eUdg diyq_shy t¹m tq|pom toOtom. – Aristotle (Loeb Classical Library) Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham, Cambridge, MA/London 1944: “And it would seem to be a reasonable criticism to say that such a democracy is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not govern there is no constitution, as the law ought to govern all things while the magistrates control particulars, and we ought to judge this to be constitutional government; if then democracy really is one of the forms of constitution, it is manifest that an organization of this kind, in which all things are administered by resolutions of the assembly, is not even a democracy in the proper sense, for it is impossible for a voted resolution to be a universal rule.” 10 J. Cuiacius, Op. cit. 11 J. Cuiacius, Op. cit.

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Richard Tuck12 has pointed out that later humanists such like Hugo Grotius had used the same argument of Horace in respect of utility to maintain the coherence of the Epicurean and the peripatetic theory of the origin of law. Grotius13, who had read Cujas, came to the conclusion that there is no difference between the two philosophies since both acknowledge ius gentium, which was an argument for the Dutch erudite to confirm the principles of the right to punish the and the duty to refrain from taking belongings of another. Grotius saw in the personal utility the fundament of correct behaviour. This was also used in his most famous work De iure belli ac pacis14. Overall Grotius saw in the divine love the principle source for the harmony between utility and the value of natural law. We can explain Grotius’ approach to this topic by referring to the practical goal of his first analysis of a Natural law basis for correct behaviour in The Right of Booty (De jure praedae). He justified before the Admiralty court in Amsterdam the actions of Jakob van Heemskerk in capturing the Portugal ship “Santa Catarina”. It remains interesting to investigate the true position of Roman jurists regarding the merits of natural law and the utility principle.

3.

The attitude of Roman law about natural law and the utility principle

As a rule, the discussion in Roman law is less dogmatic than that of Humanism. In the previous paragraphs we have seen some fine examples of deductive method in scientific reasoning. The humanists built their knowledge from general philosophic principles implying their validity as a cognitive instrument. However, the ancient jurists utilised a more inductive approach, starting from practical cases and when necessary developed broader and abstract values. Logically the implementation of inductive and deductive methods should entail similar results if the guiding principle is right. However, reverting to Horace’s Satires we see that it is difficult to use the natural reason when evalu12 R. Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace. Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant, Oxford/New York 1999, 85–87. 13 H. Grotius, De iure praedae commentarius, ed. The Hague 1868, 9–11. 14 H. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis libri tres, Paris 1625, Prolegomena 1–2: at ius illud, quod inter populos plures aut populorum rectores intercedit, sive ab ipsa natura protectum, sive moribus et pacto tacito introductum attigerunt pauci, universum ac certo ordine tractavit hactenus nemo: cum tamen id fieri intersit humani generis.Vere Cicero praestabilem hanc dixit scientiam, sed federibus, pactionibus, conditionibus populorum, regum extraterarumque nationum, in omni denique belli iure ac pacis: Et Euripides hanc scientiam rerum divinarum et humanarum cognitioni praeponit. sic enim Theoclymenem compellari facit: Nam turpe id esset, cum scias hominum ac Deum. Quod est eritque, iusta te haut cognoscere.

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ating the misbehaviour, because there the sense of the perpetrator is not right as it should be as of Cujas’ maxim for maximas res gerendas & recta ratio15. Horace’s problem had been how to differentiate the bad manners of his friend from cases of theft (quid faciam, si furtum fecerit aut si prodiderit conmissa fide sponsumve negarit? quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant, cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moresque repugnant)16. Thus, the only solution to reach judgement would be to use public utility. The problem becomes more complicated with the introduction of Seneca’s opinion regarding the ratio, which implied the divine element in human behaviour. This ultimately demonstrates that correct behaviour entails rational thinking, while unjust behaviour is irrational. Similar argumentation can be found in Cicero, one of the leading authorities for both Cujas and Grotius. In de officiis (3,35)17 he contrasted nature and utility, concluding that it is not possible to combine disgrace and utility. Aristotle himself used another concept to describe the difference between honest and dishonest behaviour, namely the cause. In his treaty, the Art of Rhetoric (Aristot. rhet. 1,10,8) he described seven negative causes, differentiating them from right intentions18. The line of reasoning used by Gaius in his argumentation is interesting. In his later manual the Everyday jurisprudence (D. 41,1,7,7)19 he used the same logical 15 J. Cuiacius, Op. cit. 16 J. Cuiacius, Op. cit. 17 Cic. off. 3,35: Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri necesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas adiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, turn non utilitas relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitude sit, ibi utilitatem esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo (recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem re utilitas et turpitudo esse non potest. 18 Aristot. rhet. 1,10,8: 5stim dû B l³m bo}kgsir !cahoO eqenir (oqde·r c±q bo}ketai !kkû C ftam oQgh0 eWmai !cah|m), %kocoi dû aq]neir aqcµ ja· 1pihul_a: ¦ste p\mta fsa pq\ttousim !m\cjg pq\tteim diû aQt_ar 2pt\, di± t}wgm, di± v}sim, di± b_am, diû 5hor, di± kocisl|m, di± hul|m, diû 1pihul_am. – “Rational desire is a desire for good, that is, a wish – no wishes for anything unless he thinks it is good. Irrational desire is twofold, namely anger and appetite. Thus every action must be due to one or the other of the seven causes: destiny, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite.” 19 D. 41,1,7,7 (Gai. 2 rer.cott.): Cum quis ex aliena materia speciem aliquam suo nomine fecerit, Nerva et Proculus putant hunc dominum esse qui fecerit, quia quod factum est, antea nullius fuerat. Sabinus et Cassius magis naturalem rationem efficere putant, ut qui materiae dominus fuerit, idem eius quoque, quod ex eadem materia factum sit, dominus esset, quia sine materia nulla species effici possit: veluti six auro vel argento vel aere vas aliquod fecero, vel ex tabulis tuis navem aut armarium aut subsellia fecero, vel ex lana tua vestimentum, vel ex vino et melle tuo mulsum, vel ex medicamentis tuis emplastrum aut collyrium, vel ex uvis aut olivis aut spicis tuis vinum vel oleum vel frumentum. est tamen etiam media sententia recte existimantium, si species ad materiam reverti possit, verius esse, quod et Sabinus et Cassius senserunt, si non possit reverti, verius esse, quod Nervae et Proculo placuit. ut ecce vas conflatum ad rudem massam auri vel argenti vel aeris reverti potest, vinum vero vel oleum vel

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argumentation – naturalis ratio. In this text we see that it had been used by the masters of the school to which Gaius belonged – Sabinus and Cassius – albeit perhaps with a different context. The argument is famous for its application to the famous discussion between the Proculians and the Sabinians regarding ownership in the context of specificatio. The first considered the person who had made the thing to be the owner, while the latter on the basis of natural reason believed that the owner of the raw material should own the thing produced. Eventually, a compromise was reached based on the possibility to revert the thing to its primordial state. This decision entails the utility principle, because the attempt to revert the wine into grape is useless and has no practical value. Here Peter Stein20 readily accepts naturalis ratio as common sense. Max Kaser21 following a similar trend compares the different ways of acquiring ownership as described by Gaius. He contraposed the formal (typical Roman) and the informal (natural) means of acquisition. It was emphasised that the latter are common for all people and should derive from the “natural norms”. Here naturalis ratio is referred to in German as “natürliche Vernunft”, exactly as Gaius uses this term in his Aurea, while in the Institutes he preferred ius gentium. Though this term is still in the ambit of Stoic doctrine, it entails a more practical meaning as an argument to fill the gap in the civil law system, which was not explicit about the owner in the discussed cases. It is very close to the function of the utility argument. A similar idea of utility is expressed by Hans Ankum22.

4.

Conclusions

The works of the French humanist Cujas constitute a vehicle, which brought the ancient law to his contemporaries and to their successors and even into modern law. He viewed his task to be restoration of the original content of works inherited from the Roman jurisprudence. In doing so he looked to the natural context of the law as an element of ancient culture and is attracted by ideas and frumentum ad uvas et olivas et spicas reverti non potest: ac ne mulsum quidem ad mel et vinum vel emplastrum aut collyria ad medicamenta reverti possunt. Videntur tamen mihi recte quidam dixisse non debere dubitari, quin alienis spicis excussum frumentum eius sit, cuius et spicae fuerunt: cum enim grana, quae spicis continentur, perfectam habeant suam speciem, qui excussit spicas, non novam speciem facit, sed eam quae est detegit. 20 P. Stein, Interpretation and Legal Reasoning in Roman Law, Chicago-Kent Law Review 70 (1995), 1539 = http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol70/iss4/7 (21. 06. 2018); V. Scarano Ussani, L’Utilit/ e la certezza: compiti e modelli del sapere giuridico in Salvio Giuliano, Milan 1987, 3ff. 21 M. Kaser, Ius gentium, Böhlau, Köln 1993, p. 91–115. 22 H. Ankum, Utilitatis causa receptum, On the pragmatical Methods of Roman Lawyers, Symbolae Martino David 1, Leiden/Amsterdam, 1968.

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schools rediscovered during his times. Using his analysis, present-day scholars could be sure that classical jurists made a substantial use of Greek philosophy, though implementing it in a carefully made amalgam with the typical juridical techniques practiced by the old schools going back to the primordial law practices in archaic Rome. Nonetheless, the Greek rhetoric and philosophy helped them to systematise the law science within a complicated set of principles and rules surviving until present day.

Philip Thomas

Critique of the rational agent model: reinventing Roman law? Nescire autem quid antequam natus sis acciderit, id est semper esse puerum1.

1.

Introduction

The award of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel to Thaler2 should be linked to the oeuvre of a previous Nobel laureate, Kahneman3. Both scientists have reached identical conclusions after a lifetime of world-ranking research in two different disciplines4, namely that the actions of mankind and womankind are only to a certain degree steered by reason. It is hardly adventurous to speculate that this critique of the rationalagent model applies through the ages and is not limited to 20th and/or 21st century United States of America or Western cultures, but of general and eternal significance. This subversion of the reasonable man will in time certainly have repercussions in the legal sphere, and I want to proffer the hypothesis that if rationality cannot be assumed to be one of the core beliefs of legal science5, 1 Cic. orat. 119. 2 R.H. Thaler, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2017; https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/t/richard-h-thaler ; https://www.economist. com/blogs/freeexchange/2017/10/nobel-prize-economic-sciences; https://www.forbes.com/ sites/johnwasik/2017/10/09/4-reasons-richard-thaler-won-the-nobel-prize/#27aaf346756e; https://www.forbes.com/sites/frankarmstrong/2017/10/13/richard-thaler-a-giant-in-econom ics-awarded-the-nobel-prize/#303dfb9e3a10; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/ 11/richard-thaler-nobel-prize-winner-behavioural-economics (on 28/10/2017). 3 D. Kahneman, https://www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/; www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ economic-sciences/laureates/2002/kahneman-bio.html (on 28/10/2017); D. Kahneman, Maps of bounded rationality : Psychology for behavioral economics, The American Economic Review, 93 (2003) 1449–1475. 4 Kahneman is Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology, Emeritus, and Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs, Emeritus; Thaler is Charles R. Walgreen Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business. 5 A. Celano, Medieval Theories of Practical Reason, in: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition); https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2014/entries/practical-reason-med/ (on 28/10/2017); for an interesting historical and comparative survey see E. Nyst, The Development and Formation of International law, The American Journal of International Law, 6 1 (1912) 1–29 (Translated by courtesy of Mr. Clement L. Bouv8, of the Bar of the District of Columbia); http://cdi.ulb.ac.be/a-propos-du-centre/

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namely that law itself is founded on reason and as a result contains comprehensive coherence, is now open to debate since this derives from an unrealistic conception of rationality.

2.

The pursuit of justice

It is a truism that the majority of the cupida legum iuventus commence their studies with great expectations regarding justice. Duncan Kennedy has explained how legal studies blunt this enthusiasm and are geared to prepare graduates for social reality6. However, some students manage to keep the flame burning during and after graduating and find niches – inside and outside academia – in which to continue their pursuit of justice, examples of which are Human Rights law, International Criminal law, Canon law, Legal History or Roman law. My good friend Jan excels in several of the above and it is with trepidation that I assume the role of devil’s advocate or in other words the subversive legal historian as proposed by Danie Visser7.

3.

Ratio recta

Since the Middle Ages the communis opinio doctorum has explicitly and implicitly held the belief that human reason or ratio recta has been the stone on which legal science has built her structure8. The implicit conviction that Roman law represented ratio recta is reflected by the fact that the “scientific” models of natural law relied on the classics and the rules and principles of Roman law9. The Enlightenment and the resulting French revolution and the Napoleonic codifi-

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historique/historique-de-lenseignement-du-droit-international-public-a-lulb/ernest-nys1851–1920/ (11/4/2017). D. Kennedy, Legal education as training for hierarchy, in: D. Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law. A Progressive Critique, New York 1982, 38–58. Kennedy is the Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard Law School. He is a founding member of the Critical Legal Studies movement. D. Visser, The Legal Historian as Subversive or: Killing the Capitoline Geese, in: Visser (ed.), Essays on the History of Law, Cape Town 1989, 1–31. J. Dewey, Nature and Reason in Law, International Journal of Ethics, 25 1 (1914) 25–32; http:// www.jstor.org/stable/2989560 (04–11–2017); J.S.M. Mendelson, Saint Augustine, in: Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ; https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2016/entries/augustine/; M. Murphy, The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, in: Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/ent ries/natural-law-ethics/. See for example H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Paris 1625 and S. Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium, Lund 1672.

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cation followed this model, which explains why during the 19th century Roman law was extensively taught in codified jurisdictions as a tool to teach correct understanding and interpretation of the codes. However, subconsciously the idea that Roman law and law as such required more than reason, led von Savigny to the identification of Rechtsbewusstsein10, the common legal mentality of the people, von Jhering introduced Rechtsgefühl11 and Radbruch Rechtsgewissen12. Though these concepts were not meant to be synonymous, the quest of these scholars adds an element to reason, which addition has a common denominator, namely “sense of justice” or “legal conscience”.

4.

New research question

After “God is dead” of the late twentieth century, the announced capitis deminutio of reason imposes a new research question on the dwindling legions of Roman law, namely “what were the driving forces within Roman law”? The usual suspects, such as religion, politics, economics and other social dynamics have all had their five minutes of glory in the past13, but did not make a lasting impression. First, it should be kept in mind that the development of Roman law had a time span of more than a thousand years, from Twelve Tables to Justinian in a world in which the mantra “the only certainty is change” applied as much as in the modern world. Thus Romanists from Diliberto14 to Pitsakis15 applied themselves 10 F.C. von Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts I, Berlin 1840 (repr. Aalen 1981) 14–16. Savigny emphasized that legal systems were an organic part of the culture and the people and not disconnected rational constructions; he held that law had to refer to Rechtsbewusstsein, the sense of justice of a people. This sense could not be reduced to “mere” reason. 11 R. von Jhering, Der Kampf um’s Recht, Wien 1872. 12 G. Radbruch, Politische Schriften aus der Weimarer Zeit 2, Justiz, Bildungs- und Religionspolitik. (collected by A. Baratta, Heidelberg 1993) 63–64, 181. 13 For example Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, GenHve 1748, which work is justly famous for the theory of the separation of powers, but argues moreover that customs, climate, economy and all influence a legal system; K. Marx, Das Kapital, Berlin 1867 (II and III, ed. F. Engels, 1885, 1894) placed the accent on the economic system. J. Habermas’ critical social theory, his many contributions to a variety of disciplines and his publications are accessible at https:// www.britannica.com/biography/Jurgen-Habermas (21/2/2018). 14 O. Diliberto is an Italian romanist who specialises on the Twelve Tables: Considerazioni intorno al commento di Gaio alle XII Tavole, Index 18 (1990) 403–434; Contributo alla palingenesi delle XII Tavole. Le “sequenze” nei testi gelliani, Index 20 (1992) 229–277; Materiali per la palingenesi delle XII Tavole I Cagliari 1992; I destinatari delle Noctes Atticae, Labeo 42 (1996) 277–286; Conoscenza e diffusione delle XII Tavole nell’et/ del Basso Impero. Primo contributo, in: S. Romano (ed.) Nozione formazione e interpretazione del diritto

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to extremely different societies, but with identical beliefs concerning the excellence of Roman law, irrespective of the widely varying, political, religious and socio-economic circumstances. It is today accepted that the late republic represented a determining phase in the development of Roman law. Focus on this period brings the romanist as well as the classicist, by necessity to the multitalented barrister Cicero. The last republican, who paid for his credence in Plus ratio quam vis16 with his life, bequeathed an enormous treasure of wisdom and information to posterity, for which he gained centuries of admiration and respect17, until a negative review by a blind admirer of Caesar, as well as publication of his private correspondence, lost him respect18. The slow but incremental restoration of Cicero’s authority, makes an investigation into his legal beliefs of interest all the more in view of his acceptance of the hegemony of human reason. At this stage it is apposite to draw attention to the work of Martha Nussbaum, who views Cicero’s de officiis as the primary source of our theories of justice19. In her essay “Duties of Justice, duties of material aid” Nussbaum criticises Cicero’s restrictive and to her mind para-

15 16 17 18 19

dall’et/ romana alla esperienza moderna. Ricerche dedicate al prof. Filippo Gallo I, Napoli 1997, 205–227; Bibliografia ragionata delle edizioni a stampa della Legge delle XII Tavole (sec. XVI–XX) Roma 2001; Di un modesto e (quasi) sconosciuto tentativo di palingenesi decemvirale del principio del XVI secolo, in: M. Mancini (ed.), Iuris vincula. Studi in onore di M. Talamanca II Napoli 2002, 447–468; A New Chinese Translation of XII Tables Law: Some Reflection on the Situation of Our Researches (in Chinese) Roman Law and Modern Civil Law. The Annals of Institute of Roman Law Xiamen University 3 (2002) 51–57; Una miniatura medioevale in tema di decemvirato legislativo (a margine di Vat. Lat. 3340) Miscellanea Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae 9 (2002) 103–114 and BIDR 100 (1997) 517–523; Una palingenesi “aperta”, in: M. Humbert (ed.), Le Dodici Tavole. Dai Decemviri agli Umanisti, Pavia 2005, 217–238; La palingenesi decemvirale: dal manoscritto alla stampa, in: M. Humbert (ed.), Le Dodici Tavole, 481–501; Le XII Tavole nel Digesto, Ius Antiquum, Accademia Scienze di Mosca 2 (16) (2005) 50–54; Umanesimo giuridico-antiquario e palingenesi delle XII Tavole. 1. Ham. 254, Par. Lat. 6128 e Ms. Regg. C. 398, AUPA 50 (2005) 83–116; “Lex de magistratibus”. Cicerone, il diritto immaginato e il diritto reale nella tradizione palingenetica delle XII Tavole, in: L. Labruna/M.P. Baccari/C. Cascione (eds.), Tradizione romanistica e Costituzione II Napoli 2006, 1469–1482; La palingenesi della Legge delle XII Tavole e le codificazioni a domino, in: P. Gentili/P. Negri Scafa (eds.), Dallo Stirone al Tigri, dal Tevere all’Eufrate. Studi in onore di C. Saporetti, Roma 2009, 119–148. http://www. ius-sapienza.org/drupaluni/sites/default/files/docente_cv/diliberto_cv.pdf. C.G. Pitsakis devoted his studies to Byzantine law. http://dirittoestoria.it/memorie/Curri cula/Constantinos%20G.%20Pitsakis.htm. The motto of the Jagiellonian University (Universitas Iagellonica Cracoviensis) also known as the University of Krakjw, which was founded in 1364 and is the oldest university in Poland. For example from English Victorian novelist Anthony Trollope (1815–1882), The life of Cicero, London 1880. See Trollope (note 17), Chapter I, Introduction, at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/8945-h/ 8945-h.htm (23/5/2017). M. Nussbaum, Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: Cicero’s Problematic Legacy, The Journal of Political Philosophy 8/2 (2000) 176–206.

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doxical philosophy on beneficence, after an analysis of his general theory of justice20. This is not the place to enter into this debate, but two observations should be made. First, it appears that Nussbaum breaks with the age-old tradition to classify Cicero into one of the Greek schools of philosophy, but recognises Cicero as a Roman philosopher in his own right21. The second point concerns Nussbaum’s analysis of Cicero’s de officiis and how she indicates the influence of this work on some of the greatest thinkers in Western culture, Aquina, Suarez, Gentili, Grotius22, Pufendorf23, Wolff, Kant24, and Adam Smith25. Nussbaum is not alone in her re-evaluation of Cicero26. Nicgorski’s essay on Cicero and the latter’s impact on later Western thinkers27 adds Locke and Hume. It is impossible to mention and fruitless to summarise the secondary literature on Cicero’s theory of justice and a reference to the website Natural Law, Natural Rights and the

20 Nussbaum, The Journal of Political Philosophy 8/2 (2000) 181–185. 21 See Cic. off. 1,6: I shall, therefore, at this time and in this investigation follow chiefly the Stoics, not as a translator, but, as is my custom, I shall at my own option and discretion draw from those sources in such measure and in such manner as shall suit my purpose. – Cicero freely acknowledged building on the great Greek thinkers but introduced a distinctive Roman approach. A comparison with Grotius may be appropriate. Nussbaum shows how this great jurist derived many of his ideas from his predecessors, for example Cicero. Feenstra indicated the Spanish scholars of Salamanca as another source of inspiration. Nevertheless, Grotius has held on to his fame as one of great jurists in the Western legal tradition. 22 Nussbaum, Journal of Political Philosophy 8/2 (2000) 179 n. 7. See H. Grotius, De Jure Praedae Commentarius, Hagae Comitum 1868, Ch. 2; De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Parisiis 1625, Prologemena, para 8 and 12, Inleidinge, s’ Gravenhage 1631, 1,2,4 and 5; H.J. Erasmus, Natural law: Voet’s criticism of de Groot, Fundamina 22 1 (2016) 40–53; J. Hallebeek, Lijf ende Goedt. De jurische bescherming van de menselijke persoon en diens vermogen, Amsterdam 2014, 137f. 23 Ibid. 24 M. Nussbaum, Kant and stoic cosmopolitanism, Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1997) 1–25. 25 Nussbaum, Journal of Political Philosophy 8/2 (2000) 179 n. 8. 26 See also E.W. Clayton (Professor in the Department of Political Science and Public Administration of Central Michigan University) in his essay Cicero (106–43 BC): “While Cicero is currently not considered an exceptional thinker, largely on the (incorrect) grounds that his philosophy is derivative and unoriginal, in previous centuries he was considered one of the great philosophers of the ancient era, and he was widely read well into the 19th century. Probably the most notable example of his influence is St. Augustine’s claim that it was Cicero’s Hortensius (an exhortation to philosophy, the text of which is unfortunately lost) that turned him away from his sinful life and towards philosophy and ultimately to God. Augustine later adopted Cicero’s definition of a commonwealth and used it in his argument that Christianity was not responsible for the destruction of Rome by the barbarians”. IEP (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy) http://www.iep.utm.edu/cicero/#H2 (consulted on 31/ 10/2017). This site sets out the development of natural law in sections: classical and medieval, early modern, American constitutionalism, contemporary and critics, and in the document archive translations of excerpts of the texts of the author discussed, are available. 27 At http://www.iep.utm.edu/cicero/#H2 (consulted on 1/11/2017).

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American Constitution28 and the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy29 must suffice. Jan will forgive that I use this tribute to summarise and simplify Cicero’s main thoughts on nature, reason, conscience and natural law. Cicero reached a synthesis between Greek philosophy and Roman pragmatism and tradition30. This practical orientation did not mean an abdication of moral judgment but led to his beliefs on nature and natural law, which is equivalent to moral law and sets a higher standard than the civil law31. The essence is that nature has endowed man with reason as well as with conscience32, which in combination make it possible to discover the principles and rules of natural law33, a system which is universal and eternal34. It is his conscience which makes man measures his own behaviour against this law, which is not manmade, but decreed by nature and according to which he may not be judged, but will judge himself. Thus reason and conscience reveal the natural law, which joins men together and imposes morality on them. The hypothesis is submitted that Cicero developed his theory of justice as the result of the events during his lifetime. The failure of the republican institutions and the concomitant manipulations of the legal system, brought Cicero to the 28 http://www.nlnrac.org This site is dedicated to the development of natural law and set out in sections: classical and medieval, early modern, American constitutionalism, contemporary and critics, and in the document archive translations of excerpts of the texts of the author discussed, are available. 29 See supra note 26. 30 R. Fiori, The vir bonus in Cicero’s de officiis: Greek philosophy and Roman legal science, Aequum ius 2014 (?c UadXVZ Y [_\\VT [ 50-\VcYo `a_eVbb_aQ 5.3 . 5_WUVSQ) 187–202 at 197ff. 31 Cic. rep. 3,33: Est quidem vera lex recta ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat; quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet taut vetat nec improbos iubendo aut vetando movet.. Huic legi nec obrogari fas est neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet neque tota abrogari potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus,, neque est quaerendus explanator aut interpres eius alius, nec erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus, ille legis huius inventor, disceptator, lator, cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac, naturam hominis aspernatus, hoc ipso luet maximas poenas, etiam si cetera supplicia, quae putantur, effugerit. Also Cic. leg. 1,42; 2,8; 2,11 and 2,14. 32 D.H. van Zyl, Justice and equity in Cicero, Pretoria 1991, 49f in particular the citation of R.G. Tanner, Cicero on Conscience and Morality, in: J. Martyn (ed.), Cicero and Virgil: Studies in honour of Harold Hunt, Amsterdam 1972, 87–112; Also Van Zyl, 97; In the first book of de officiis Cicero sets out the various duties and gives his son guidelines how to choose between conflicting duties. The subtext is that reason, imparted by nature, gave humankind a sense of right and wrong. Reason helps us to formulate the law of nature. This law is standard against which one can judge the correctness of positive law and one’s own behaviour. 33 Cic. leg. 1,18 and 19. 34 Cic. rep. 3,33; Cic. leg. 1,42; 2,8; 2,11 and 2,14.

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realisation that the rule of law implies more than adherence to the letter of positive law. This submission explains the influence Cicero exercised on later generations who had to deal with similar situations throughout history, such as the Dutch rebellion, the English civil war, the creation of an international legal order and the Third Reich. This raises the question why in apartheid South Africa, Cicero and his epigones remained in obscurity. Cicero’s theory of justice did not limit itself to private law, but dealt with public and international law as well35 and knowledge and adherence to his beliefs in natural law could have created a barrier against apartheid legislation. This possibility was pre-empted by the particular development of legal science in South Africa.

5.

South African legal science

It is undeniable that legal science in South Africa would be unthinkable without the figure of JC de Wet. In “A man of Principle The life and legacy of JC de Wet”36 a wide range of scholars testify how this Romanist, legal historian, pandectist, virtually single-handedly reformed modern South African law by placing it on a scientific basis. In spite of the fact that de Wet himself is on record as stating that legal philosophy would be unnecessary if good encyclopaedias were available37, Ackermann38 points out the similarities of the Kantian method in de Wet’s approach39. De Wet structured the major parts of South African law40 on the basis of pandectism and his utmost belief in his own rationality. The resulting legal science was opposed to the pragmatic English case based method of reasoning and established within Afrikaner academia an empathy for the abstract, rational, system-based, individualistic civilian legal culture. This rational and utilitarian vision of law constructed private law as a rationality-based system independent of time and place; in other words, unrelated to the political, socio-economic and legal development of apartheid. This facilitated the appeasement of individual

35 Cic. off. 1,34–41. 36 J. du Plessis/G. Lubbe (eds.), A Man of Principle The life and legacy of JC de Wet, Claremont 2013. 37 L. Ackermann, JC de Wet: Genius Loci, Magister, Mentor and Friend – A Personal Reflection, in: du Plessis/Lubbe (eds.), A Man of Principle (note 36) 54. 38 Op. cit. 53. 39 It is also held that Grotius was the only jurist de Wet unconditionally admired. Loc.cit. 40 The law of contract and mercentale law (JC de Wet/JP Yeats, Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg, Durban 1947) as well as criminal law (JC de Wet/HL Swanepoel, Strafreg, Durban 1949).

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legal consciences, by ignoring the legal conscience of the people, which both Savigny and Wieacker believed to be reflected and represented by the jurist class. It is of interest to contrast de Wet’s atheistic rationality to Radbruch’s work relating to German legal science under the Third Reich. Radbruch had strong religious convictions and had radically converted from his previous positivist stance to natural law41. That de Wet had an individual legal conscience is proven by his intervention in national politics during the 1950’s42, but his analytical positivism allowed him belief in rationality and nothing else. The link between legal conscience and natural law was never made and South African legal science as well as practice fully embraced analytical positivism, which left no place for natural law. In South Africa Cicero’s torch has been carried by the erudite academic and judge DH van Zyl43 but within the new curricula Cicero will fade into the invisible man again.

6.

Conclusion

Through the above runs a red line: in times of failing states, dramatic societal changes and abuse of law, belief in an eternal, universal law with a strong moral content arises or revives. Thus, Cicero, faced with the collapse of the Roman republic and the rule of law during his lifetime developed a theory of justice founded on natural law. Of particular interest is the fact that Cicero’s ideas are open to an interpretation making provision for both reason and attempt to fuse conscience, morality and utility. However, the belief in and the absolute rule of positivism smothered the post-World War 2 revival of natural law and resulted in national, international and supranational codification of natural or human rights. Legal historians should redefine themselves and take the research results of Nobel laureates into consideration. This implies switching roles; from being worker bees to the queen of ruling legal doctrines who attempt desperately to show their relevance in a post-modern positivistic legal environment, the legal historian should critically analyse the axiomata of the past. The above short walk with Cicero has shown that the answers to the enigmas of law and legal history are 41 W.G. Friedmann, Gustav Radbruch, Vanderbilt Law Review 14 (1960) 191–209. Radbruch attempted to enable the post-War German jurisprudence to be based on moral foundations. 42 H. Corder, JC de Wet; A Personal view, in: du Plessis/Lubbe (eds.), A Man of Principle (note 36) 35ff. 43 Emeritus judge and emeritus professor D.H. van Zyl, Cicero’s Legal Philosophy, Roodepoort 1986, Justice and equity in Greek and Roman thought, Pretoria 1991, Justice and equity in Cicero, Pretoria 1991, Cicero’s eclecticism and originality, http: akroterion.journals.ac.za/ …article/download/563/626.

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the paradoxes at the basis of legal science. To close the circle I want to refer to Kahnemann’s research on intuition44, which provides Kaser’s reliance on intuition45 a modern scientific basis. I sincerely hope that these thoughts may amuse Jan in his more leisurely mode of life and will bring Cicero, Aquinas, the Spanish scholastics and our own de Groot closer together.

44 http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people7/Kahneman/kahneman-con4.html; http://globetrot ter.berkeley.edu/people7/Kahneman/kahneman-con5.html. 45 M. Kaser, Zur Methode der römischen Rechtsfindung, Göttingen 1962, 49–78 at 54: “Nach den Eindrücken, die die juristische Überlieferung zuverlässig vermittelt, steht vielmehr im Vordergrund die Intuition, also die Gewinnung der richtige Entscheidung durch ein unmittelbares Erfassen, das des rationalen Argumentierens nicht bedarf”. At 55f. Kaser conceded modern scepticism regarding intuition as a scientific method.

Leon van den Broeke

Setting the right example? Good governance, exemplary law and reformed church polity

1.

Introduction

In 1955 the Swiss theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968)1 formulated four characteristics of reformed church polity2. According to him it should be liturgical law, service law, living law, and exemplary law. He asserts that church polity should be an example for the education and training, maintenance of human law in general, and political, economic, cultural communities. It is malapropos or even unjust if a church is of the opinion it is a goal in itself. The church has both an internal and an external responsibility : for the inner organization and for the world. Moreover, it goes beyond responsibility. It is something that the church owes the world. Church polity is ius sui generis and in comparison with other communities toto coelo a different kind of law. This does not imply that the church is a goal in itself and that church polity should be only an instrument for and of the church. Barth stated that the church is the example for the state, and the Christian community as inner circle prefiguration (Urbild) and example (Vorbild) for the civil community. As a consequence church polity should be exemplary law. Eight years before the German jurist Erik Wolf (1902–1977) stated that if church polity is not more than a spiritual transformation of secular books of law without the real and original witnesses of the fellowship of Christ’ disciples, they will be worthless and useless3. The church has not only the assignment to organize itself, but also the assignment with view to the word4. There-

1 K. Barth, Die Ordnung der Gemeinde: Zur dogmatischen Grundlegung des Kirchenrechts, München 1955; ibid. in: Kirchliche Dogmatik IV/2: Die Lehre von der Vers öhnung, Zü rich 1955, 765–824. 2 I would like to express my gratitude to Allan Janssen (New Brunswick Theological Seminary, New Brunswick NJ, USA) who helped me with my English. 3 E. Wolf, Rechtsgedanke und biblische Weisung: Drei Vorträge, Tübingen 1948, 93. 4 Wolf (note 3) 93.

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fore, church polity should be exemplary law (Beispielsordnung) as an expression of the law of the neighbor (Nächstenrecht)5. Although I agree with them we cannot neglect that the ecclesiastical and societal context has changed rapidly since then. Many mainstream denominations are diminished. Others grow and flourish. Nevertheless the position of denominations in the public domain in Western-Europe is diminished and religion is heavily debated. Although I agree with them that the church should try to develop such a such a system of church polity that is or will be exemplary, I would like to be both realistic and modest, and to moderate high expectations. Today people do not await ecclesiastical exemplary for the education and training, maintenance of human law in general, and political, economic, cultural communities6. Barth and Wolf were not of the opinion that the church should prescribe neither the state nor the social, economic and cultural life what to do. Their views have to be understood against the context of the Second World War, e. g. the Nazi-regime, the Bekennende Kirche and its confession (Barmen Thesen). Barth stated that the church is not able to present a complete, definite type of law, but only an imperfect, temporary type of law. The church attests the gospel of Jesus Christ. This church acts in an imperfect world. Exemplary law is also living law: as imperfect law it is on its way from worse to better (law). I like to combine their statements with view to reformed church polity as exemplary law and good governance7. Reformed church polity shares the main multilevel structure with constitutional law. It also contains elements of rule of law and democracy. Today this is not sufficient. Like in constitutional law reformed church polity could want to include guarantees such as in good governance. Constitutional law includes more and more good governance, not only as an appendix, but as a part of the three pillars of the modern state alongside rule of law and democracy. The Dutch jurist G.H. Addink states that rule of law “starts with the norm of the legal base of the governmental actions and the need for protection of fundamental rights of the citizens”8, and it “holds that a government’s exercise of power is conditioned by law only, and that the state’s subjects shall not be exposed to any arbitrary will of rules. Further, rights are protected by the law”9. “Democracy gives the rule of law depth and especially concerns the transparency

5 E. Wolf, Kirchenrecht, in: Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Handwörterbuch für Theologie und Religionswissenschaft 3, Tübingen 1959, 1506–1510. 6 Barth, Kirchliche Dogmatik (note 1) 815. 7 I would like to thank Mariette van der Tol MA LLM for her discussions on good governance. 8 G.H. Addink, Good Governance: Concept and Context, 1 (publication forthcoming). I thank him for sharing his manuscript with me. 9 Addink, (note 8) 2.

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and the participation of the citizens”10. A distinction can be made between direct and representative democracy. Legislation by parliament, ministerial accountability to the parliament, transparency of administration, participation for interested parties, and protection of minorities are seen as the most important elements of democracy. Two key elements in, and topics related to, democracy are the participation of and the election by the people, and the transparency of the government. Care for minorities, protection and promotion of diversity is essential in a pluralist democracy. The concept of good governance is a meta-concept: it is built on several notions. There are several lists of good governance. I make use of Addink’s list which includes six notions: properness, transparency, participation, effectiveness, accountability, and (economic, social and cultural) human rights. They overlap and complement each other. They are necessary to prevent maladministration and corruption, to have good and correct attitude of institutions of public governance, and to facilitate the participation of citizens. Reformed church polity could benefit from good governance by including and operationalizing its principles. There is too little space to elaborate on all of them. Here I focus on the participation of and the election of people as a notion that is closely related to democracy. It is tempting to raise the question how good governance can be an example for reformed church polity. The contextualization of church polity in the global North is an increasing problem. The presbyterialsynodical system of reformed church polity is challenged today, because it seems that there is a gap between this sixteenth-century system and the requirements and expectation of congregants in the early twenty-first-century. This system can be considered as a system of oligarchy. Neither one office, as in the episcopalhierarchic (hierarchy) system of church polity, nor the whole community of believers, as in the congregational-independent system (democracy), but a few office-bearers together (oligarchy or aristocracy) in the general assemblies – consistory, classis assembly, particular/provincial synod, and general synod – are in charge. This system of church polity can be characterized by collegial episkopH – supervision – in the general assemblies, e. g. the consistory, the classis assembly, the particular and/or the general synod(s). They make decisions as they are the ecclesiastical authorities and in charge. This raises the question about the relationship between office-bearers and church members, and the position, the rights, and the participation of the latter ones. Today the two other main systems of church polity, the episcopal-hierarchic and the congregational-independentist systems, seem to be more attractive. The first one is attractive because an era of mediacracy requires an ecclesiastical face or figurehead, and strong leadership, not only for the sake of the church 10 Addink (note 8) 1.

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(members) itself, but also for the participation in civil society. On the other hand, some church members are in favor of the second system because the emphasis is on both the local congregation and the congregatio, e. g. the gathering of the congregants. That implies that the voice of every church member counts. However, usually churches in this system do have a board for the daily management and there is a variety in the relationship between the congregation and the board11. Still, in general, the position of the congregant in the congregationalindependentistic system of church polity is or might be stronger than in the presbyterial-synodical system. Also, churches in a secularized society can be(come) so much uncertain that they want to implement anything which will help them to be accepted by society. Of course, research of good governance can help to improve our understanding of reformed church polity. However, even in the process of (self-)criticism the church should not forget about its nature. The church ought not to feel obliged to implement anything just to be able to play a role in civil society and be accepted by other protagonists in civil society. On the other hand, the church should not want to act as the – only – prophetic – one which confronts if necessary both the government and other organizations in civil society without organizing criticism regarding itself12. So, reformed church polity ought to try to find balance between not ignoring good governance and being an example for other organizations in civil society with view to good governance. This leads to my question: why can (Dutch) reformed church polity be regarded as exemplary law with view to participation as a notion of good governance? This article includes a paragraph on participation as a notion of good governance and in reformed church polity, and concluding remarks.

2.

Participation in good governance

The notion of participation in good governance has to do with the involvement of all citizens in actions of administrative authorities. Addink makes use of a definition which is formulated by the African Development Foundation: Participation, in the development context, is a process through which all members of a community or organization are involved in and have influence on decisions related to development activities that will affect them. That implies that development projects will address those community or group needs on which members have chosen to focus, and 11 L. van den Broeke, De organisatorisch opbouw van een congregationele gemeente, in: L.C. van Drimmelen/T.J. van der Ploeg, Geloofsgemeenschappen en recht, Zoetermeer 2014, Den Haag 2014, 113–132. 12 Background information Van den Broeke (note 11).

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that all phases of the development process will be characterized by active involvement of community or organization members.13

This includes the whole process of making decisions, also being involved in preliminary arrangements, discussing with authorities, and/or taking part in the process of actual decision-making. It needs to be emphasized that although citizens are involved in whatever phase of the process of decision-making, this process is managed by public entities. On the basis of research Addink concludes that there are four motives for participation of citizens: democratic (to influence and regulate policy), constitutional (“to protect the individual interests in the context of the balance of powers in the State”)14, corporatist (“means for social organizations to realize their own responsibility”)15, and administrative (participation serves the interests of the public body). Another type of distinction can be made with view to the forms of public participation: popular initiative, citizens’ panel, referendum16, and communitylevel participation. The popular initiative is used if a citizen is successful in having put a certain topic on the agenda of the administrative authorities. Of course, this cannot be only the topic of just one single citizen. It must be supported by more citizens. Administrative authorities can make use of citizen’s panels. These panels are permanent and a fairly large number of citizens are included in order to make recommendations during the various phases in the policymaking process. The panel is good in fulfilling the role of consultant. There is also this disadvantage: the permanent status of the panel. Also the costs can be regarded as a disadvantage. However, democracy has it price. Besides, the panel can become a skewed representation of society. When it comes to a referendum the electorate is invited to vote on a proposed decision. The fourth form of participation is the community-level participation. Addink describes this as “an informal or structured opportunity for individuals and organizations who are not affiliated with the public authorities, to express their views and thoughts regarding policy principles and policy proposals as well as to engage in debate about these matters with public representatives”17. This can lead to several types of outcome, for example public hearings, the right to speak during meetings and surveys. However, the outcome of this form of participation is not binding. The disadvantage is mainly concerned with the uncertainty of the outcome of the 13 Addink (note 8) 105; http://adf.gov/Training/documents/Participatory%20Development/ Participatory%20Development%Handout_Definition.pdf [accessed July 16, 2014]. 14 Addink (note 8) 105. 15 Addink (note 8) 105. 16 See also: J. Verhulst/A. Nijeboer, Directe democratie: Feiten, argumenten en ervaringen omtrent het referendum, [Direct Democracy : Facts, Arguments and Experiences concerning the Referendum] Brussel 2007. 17 Addink (note 8) 111.

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participation of people in the process of decision-making by the administrative authorities. Nonetheless, this type of participation is important as it offers citizens a platform to share their ideas with and to influence the process of the decision makers. It has to be said that not all forms of participation are equal. The choice for any type of participation depends on both the issue and the desired degree of participation, so the phases in the process of policy-development. Whereas the popular initiative can be regarded as a minimum type of participation the referendum can be considered as the maximum kind of participation18. Types of average participation are citizen’s panel and community-level participation. The latter one is a slightly more and broader kind of participation than the citizen’s panel. Despite the several wages on the scale all four forms of participation can be implemented by the authorities for the various phases and issues in the process of policymaking. In case of far-reaching decisions it is recommendable to have the citizens involved early in the process of decision-making.

3.

Participation in Reformed church polity

From the perspective of church (polity) one more motive could be added to the above-mentioned four motives. Congregants participate and share the responsibility for the church of Christ because of their belief. In this way they want to express that they serve Christ. This additional motive is more than just an expression of the struggle for power. Although, it must be said that even this struggle is latent present by believers who say they just want to serve Christ. Moreover, this motive is not something additional in the sense of better or higher than the other motives. A religious motivation to participate might be latent present as well in (one of) these four motives. A believer can also feel the responsibility or willingness to participate in the society of non-religious community because of his spirituality. Still, religion as a motive to participate in church should not be neglected. To set the stage I want to look at this relationship through the lens of the election of office-bearers. In reformed churches is it not a supra-local officebearer (bishop or superintendent), not a gathering of such office-bearers, and also not a congregation who or which elects the office-bearers. It was quite new that the sixteenth-century reformed church polity did not authorize a supralocal office-bearer to elect elders, deacons and ministers. It was the consistory (ministers and elders) together with the deacons which became responsible for the election. It is the question to what extent the congregants did take part in this 18 Addink (note 8) 114.

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process. The answer to this question depends also on the difference between the elections of the minister on the one hand and the elections of the elders and deacons on the other hand. When it comes to the elections of ministers the congregants were involved in one way or the other. It depended on the local regulations, as art. 4 of the Dort Church Order of 1619 states. In the ecclesiastical practice it were the civil authorities who wanted (to have) control over or the Dutch Protestant Church wanted to influence the elections of the ministers. Different was the case when elders and deacons had to be elected. Three streams are present in the reformed DNA. One of the experts in Dutch reformed church polity, Joh. Janssen (1873–1956), stated in 1952 that section 22 as deficit, because it left too little room for the rights of the congregants alongside the consistory19. Christ attributed the power of election of office-bearers to the congregation. The meaning of article 22 (elders) was that the elections took place under the authority of the consistory with cooperation of the congregants. Janssen pointed out to the revision the Synod of Utrecht had made in 1905. Alongside the aristocratic and aristocratic-democratic ways of election this synod added the more democratic way20. According to the first, aristocratic, system – based on the French church, the Convent of Wesel 1568, and the Synod of Emden 1571 – it is the consistory which elects without the participation of the congregants. The latter ones only have the right to silently accept or decline this election. In the second, aristocratic-democratic, system the consistory makes dual lists of candidates for the offices of elder and deacon. The congregants can make their choice with the help of this list. This system was made possible by the Synod of Dordrecht of 1574 and most probably it extracted this system from the French refugee-congregation in London which was served by its pastor Vallerandus Pollanus (1520–1577). This congregation borrowed it from the Strasbourg congregation. The democratic system was practiced in the Dutch refugee-congregation in London which had Johannes / Lasco (1499–1560) as its pastor. After fasting and praying the congregation made a gross list. Afterwards the consistory made its choice. The election of ministers, elders and deacons touches the topic of the active and passive rights of the congregants: the right to elect and being elected, the right to be admitted to the Lord’s Supper, the right to have one’s child being baptized. When it comes to the rights of church members there is always this distinction between baptized members and full members (who had made profession of faith). Full members have more rights, at least when they are not object of admonition and/or discipline. Apart from this the congregants as subjects are hardly mentioned in the Dort 19 Jo. Jansen, Verklaring van de kerkorde, 3e dr., Kampen 1952, 98. 20 Jansen (note 19) 96–106.

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Church Order of 1619. They are mentioned, but mostly as objects, especially with view to admonition and discipline. Of course, the church order also deals with the rights of the congregants, such as the right to present children for baptism, or to receive a blessing concerning marriage, but not so much the right to participate in the process of decision-making of the consistory let alone of the classis assembly, the particular synod and/or the general synod. The same goes still for twenty-first-century revisions of the Dortian Church Order of 1619 or “new” reformed church orders. Yet, the church order of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands states that every congregant is called and authorized to invest their talents in order to fulfil the assignment Christ gave to the congregation, art. IV.2. This article is placed before the article on the office and the assemblies of offices, art. V. Moreover, this church order does not only include some rights of the congregants, but they are also included in the assignments the church order attributes to the congregation. Not only the ecclesiastical, but also the societal and political context has changed since 1619. Today congregants have difficulties to understand the presbyterial-synodical church system. If the consistory today invites congregants for a meeting, for example for the election of a (new) minister, they think they have the right to vote and that the consistory has to obey the opinion of the congregants like in a democratic society. This touches the (limitations of the) authority and the power of the consistory and the rights of the congregants. Of course, there are many ecclesiastical tasks to fulfil. The church should want to make use of the human resources. Congregants can be part of committees, working groups, sections or whatsoever in the church, or be appointed to be the new janitor, or organist. Our question deals with the process of decision-making and the way the consistory includes congregants. Whether or not the congregants dislike the fact that the consistory is in charge, there is or should be a process of cooperation between office-bearers and congregants in the congregation, in one way or the other. The ecclesiastical boards can make their decisions concerning anything, but they will have their effect on the congregants. It is necessary to include congregants in the ecclesiastical process of decisionmaking. Still, it is the consistory – on the local level – that takes the decisions, but on the basis of the advice of congregants. In what way does reformed church polity already include elements of participation as a notion of good governance? It seems to me that referendum – at least as the version of the referendum that is still applied in Switzerland: public representatives ask the approval of a legislative proposal from the electorate – is not practiced in reformed churches in the Netherlands. Of course, ecclesiastical governments include congregants in the process of decision making. This is also safeguarded by the book of church order, for example, in case of elections of office-bearers, or the church building which needs to be restored, sold or de-

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molished. But that is not similar to a referendum. As far as legislation is concerned the congregants are indirect involved. It is the general synod which has the assignment to take care of the church order. The synod has to ask the considerations of the classis assemblies whenever it wants to make changes in church order. The classis assemblies invite the consistories to send in their considerations with view to the proposed changes in church order. Indirectly the congregants are involved, because they elect the office-bearers. However, the consistories do not organize a referendum to ask the opinion of congregants with view to proposed changes in church order – if ever any congregant would appear at such a gathering. However, there is another occasion when consistories hold a kind of a referendum with regard to legislation. This happens in the Protestants Church in the Netherlands if the consistory needs to make internal rules for the local congregation, Ord. 2–11–6. The merger or federation of a Netherlands reformed (hervormde) and a reformed (gereformeerde) and/or a Lutheran congregation requires decisions concerning the internal rules21. The same goes for the regulations with regard to the election of office-bearers, Ord. 3–2–3. This article deals with the question whether the consistory also allows baptized members the right to vote. Before the consistory can take this decision it needs to involve the congregation by informing and hearing the voice of the congregants. This is consistent with the general rule of church polity of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands, art. VI-5: the consistory does not take decisions which are essential to the life of the congregation without involving and hearing the congregants. The other three instruments of participation are practiced in one way or the other in reformed churches. However, citizen’s panels are seldom used in reformed churches. However, I came across something similar in this local congregation, the (Netherlands) Reformed Congregation at Veenendaal which belongs to the Protestants Church in the Netherlands22. The stated clerk mentioned that they do not call them “panels”. From the perspective of Appreciative Inquiry the congregation has organized six groups around six themes. In short, Appreciative Inquiry is an organization method that transfers the focus from the question what goes wrong to the question what is going good. In this con21 See also the General Regulations Concerning Federation, art. 3–3 and 3–4: decisions concerning federation will only be taken after having involved and heard the voice of the congregants. And the decision is codified in the domestic regulations of the congregations. Art. 5–1 states that changes in the agreement are only possible after the consistory has involved and heard the voice of the congregants. 22 E-mail contact with the stated clerk of the general consistory of the Hervormde Gemeente te Veenendaal on June 30, 2014. See also the webpage of the congregation; http://www.her vormd-veenendaal.nl/143-algemeen/laatste-nieuws/352-hervormd-veenendaal-op-weg-naa r-6-wijken [accessed June 30, 2014].

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gregation the method of Appreciative Inquiry is called Appreciative Congregational Development23. The committee that had to write the policy plan for 2014–17 suggested to work according to this method. It organized these groups around the themes which were suggested in a meeting of the congregation. The chairpersons of these groups were appointed and instructed by the consistory. Members of these groups could be any congregant who is willing to participate. Besides these six groups the general consistory also instituted committees on financial and juridical matters. These committees can advise the consistory on request or unsolicited. The above mentioned themes are: 1. to be church today and tomorrow; 2. the congregation as a home for anyone; 3. diaconal congregation now; 4. a good pastoral congregation; 5. congregation with and for young people; and 6. small flexible organization. So, these groups were active in order to help to write the policy plan for 2014–17. This was not a plan of the consistory or a committee, but the result of a joint venture of congregants and consistory. The church should try to organize panels as to learn more of and from the congregants. The governments make use of setting up panels in which they can share their knowledge, wisdom and advise. Those panels can also be made online. The church could consider to set up similar panels either digital or in real life on pastoral work, mission work, youth work, the organization of the church or whatever theme. Congregants will gain the feeling that their opinion is welcome and that they belong to the church. And also that when the official boards make their decisions it is on the basis of the ideas of the congregants. Also the PCN gives an example of using a panel. In 2012 it started an internetpanel. Church members can share their ideas with view to the service and products of its institute which concern all the church members in general, and all congregations24. It is used to improve the service of the church. However, this panel does not have (direct) binding effect with regard to the process of decisionmaking of the synod. There are hardly popular or citizens initiative’s in the church. Although, it occurs that a congregant is successful in putting a topic on the agenda of the consistory, the classis assembly and/or the general synod. Besides, it also happens that a congregant asks admittance to the meeting of the consistory and/or the right to speak. Congregants have to be aware that they are already represented by their office-bearers. Still, these elected office-bearers should take care of support of all the church members, not for themselves, but for the sake of the community, and more specific the church of Jesus Christ. It happened recently in 23 http://www.waarderendegemeenteopbouw.nl [accessed July 7, 2014]. 24 http://www.pkn.nl/overons/protestants-panel/Panel-Protestantse-Kerk/Paginas/default.as px [accessed July 21, 2014].

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our congregation that a young committed congregant asked admittance to the gathering of the consistory and the right to share his vision with view to the church buildings25. Community-level participation is also an essential demonstration of participation. And government has invested a lot in community participation as it suggests that it results in strong(er) networks between people who live in the same village or city. Also, it leads to better and more responsive services, and also it prevents citizen’s disengagement from politics and the democratic process. However, research (in the United Kingdom) makes clear that this kind of participation can easily be dominated by a small group: “no matter how hard people try, existing forms of community participation in governance will only ever mobilise a small group of people”26. Nevertheless, this should not lead to discard, but to rewiring of the ambition of community participation. This involves maximizing the value from the small group that is already participating and at the same time looking for the creation of “a broader bedrock of support for governance activity”27. This includes that if people do not show up this does not mean that they are not interested. Transferred to the church this means that when people do not come to or joint the church, the church should visit the people, not only at home, but wherever it can encounter them. It also implies that the consistory could consider to be open for creating facilities for community-level participation.

4.

Exemplary law?

Reformed church polity could benefit from implementing participation as a notion of good governance, but the preliminary question is in what way it already can be regarded as exemplary law with view to these notions of good governance. The four instruments of participation are in one way or the other already present in reformed church polity, but no so much because of the aspect of binding. Popular initiative and citizen’s panel are seldom used in reformed church polity. They occur, but quite rare. So, from this perspective reformed church polity is not quite exemplary law. These instruments could increase in number and could be used much more for the sake of commitment of congregants, and organizing contradiction for the office-bearers. I regard the gathering of members of the congregation in reformed congregations as a kind of 25 http://www.pgsp.nl [accessed July 21, 2014]. 26 P. Skidmore/K. Bound/H. Lownsbrough, Community Participation: Who Benefits?, York, 2006, xiii. See also xv–xvi, and 61–62. 27 Skidmore et al. (note 26) xiii.

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community-level participation. In case congregants are involved in the process of decisions with view to legislation, more specific the internal rules, I tend to say that the gathering of members of the congregation can be considered as an example of referendum. This does not necessarily include that the congregants make the decisions. According to the presbyterial-synodical system it is still the consistory that takes the decisions. The church order of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands prescribes that the consistory informs the congregants in a gathering of the congregation and listens to them and hear their voice before it takes important decisions with view to the (change in) internal rules concerning the essence of the congregation. It is a system of aristocratic or oligarchical way of governing. Because such a system is ideal-typical there are varieties possible within this system. This appears from the election of office-bearers and the participation of congregants. So, it is a challenge to office-bearers how to involve congregants in the process of decision-making, and also how to be as transparent as possible. Of course, it will be hard to find one hundred percent participation. Ecclesiastical authorities should not so much strive for quantitative participation but at least for qualitative participation. Although reformed church polity is about the office, it also relates to the position of members of the church and their participation. It feels like kicking an open church door, but still, gatherings of office-bearers need to communicate properly with church members. They already communicate via church bulletin, a weekly newsletter, via social media and/or website, not only about the (announcement of their) meetings, but also about their acts, and by sharing information. If congregants do not know what is happening in their church they will not be quite motivated to participate and will not feel themselves committed, unless they reclaim transparency very much because of their commitment. The opposite is also true: if the consistory is (more) transparent towards congregants they will be more committed and willing to participate. The consistory needs to give openness with view to issues as soon as possible. It might prevent congregants to think that they decide over them without listening to and talking with them. In that scenario there will be no basis for important decisions that have to be taken. The same goes for the other types of general assembly : the classis assembly, the particular/provincial, and the general synod. If important decisions are communicated in an early process of decision-making and this is rooted in the congregation by all the members it will increase commitment and participation. This has to do with legitimacy. A few people in the top can decide anything, but their decisions have impact on all the members. For this very reason it is important to include church members in the process of ecclesiastical decision-making. In short, reformed church polity is not the example of good governance with view to the notions of participation. Reformed church polity is far from perfect.

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The church operates in a broken world and better be modest. One of Barth’s characteristics for reformed church polity is that it is also living law. As it is work in progress, it should be open to criticism and improvement, and learn and benefit from good governance in order to make the system stronger. This goes especially for popular initiative and citizen’s panel. However, reformed church polity already includes elements of participation, like community-level participation and referendum. It is an ongoing challenge for reformed church polity finding balance between the (gatherings of) office-bearers on the one hand and the congregants on the other hand. For office-bearers it is a challenge how to involve church members, and it is a challenge for church members how to deal with ecclesiastical authority of (gatherings of) office-bearers. Participation and transparency need to be meaningful and in balance with the responsibility and power of the office-bearers. It also requires that they need to be in accordance with the Scripture and the confession. They ought not to be a goal in itself, but be an expression of service law. Service is also the essence of the office, and therefore of the gatherings of office(-bearers). It is important for congregants that instruments of participation can have binding effect. That will increase the participation of congregants. For the ecclesiastical authorities it will not necessarily make the process of decision-making easier, and it might even become tougher to organize contradiction. Anyhow, participation as a notion of good governance can prevent reformed churches from be(com)ing careless and being far from an example. Indeed, reformed church polity could set an example with view to good governance.

Tymen J. van der Ploeg

De prejudiciële beslissing van de Hoge Raad van 21 april 2017 over omzetting van en in een kerkgenootschap, nader beschouwd

0.

Woord vooraf

De band tussen Jan en mij wordt vooral bepaald door ons beider interesse in de verhouding kerk en recht. Zo gaf Jan het onderdeel over de historische ontwikkeling van de verhouding tussen kerk en staat in het keuzevak aan de VU, dat aanvankelijk Kerk en recht heette en later is omgedoopt tot Geloofsgemeenschappen en recht, van welk vak ik coördinator was, aanvankelijk met Leen van Drimmelen en later met Leon van den Broeke. Daarnaast komen Jan en ik elkaar regelmatig tegen bij vergaderingen van CIO-plenair, hij als vertegenwoordiger van de oud-katholieke kerk en ik als vertegenwoordiger van de protestantse kerk in Nederland. Ik had gehoopt dat het me zou lukken om een historische bijdrage over de verhouding van kerk en staat in Nederland voor deze bundel in te leveren. Ik word altijd zeer geboeid door de historische stukken van Jan. Dat bleek echter niet mijn stiel. Ik heb daarom alsnog iets geschreven over een onderwerp uit het rechtspersonenrecht, dat mij meer na staat.

1.

Inleiding

In zijn beschikking van 21 april 20171 heeft de Hoge Raad uitgesproken dat een kerkgenootschap (of zelfstandig onderdeel of lichaam waarin kerkgenootschappen zijn verenigd) kan worden omgezet in een andere rechtspersoon – en omgekeerd. Art. 2:18 BW is op grond van art. 2:2 BW van overeenkomstige toepassing. Daarmee is een controverse die omtrent dit onderwerp bestond beslecht. Op zich juich ik de beslissing toe. Hiermee krijgt het kerkgenootschap en volwaardiger plek als privaatrechtelijke rechtspersoon.

1 ECLI:NL:2017:771.

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In deze bijdrage plaats ik kanttekeningen bij de argumenten voor en mogelijkheden tot omzetting van en in kerkgenootschappen2.

2.

Historische ontwikkeling van de omzetting

De regeling van omzetting vindt zijn historische grond in het bewaken van de materi[le kenmerken van rechtspersonen. Het is de echter de vraag of dit een belemmering moet vormen voor toepassing van de regeling op kerkgenootschappen3. Kort geef ik hier de ontwikkeling van de regeling van omzetting van rechtspersonen in ons recht weer. Sinds de wet op stichtingen van 1956 kennen we een regeling van omzetting van rechtspersonen. Besturen van stichtingen werden in art. 19 van die wet in de gelegenheid gesteld om omzetting te vragen van de stichting in een NV, vereniging of coöperatie wanneer de stichting feitelijk aan de wettelijke omschrijving van die rechtsvorm voldeed. Er ontstond dan een nieuwe rechtspersoon waarop het vermogen van de oude rechtspersoon onder algemene titel overging. Deze wet was een voortrein van boek 2 BW over rechtspersonen. De ontwerper van het nieuwe boek 2 BW, E.M. Meijers, wilde een wettelijk systeem van rechtspersonen waarin de rechtspersoonsvormen niet alleen van elkaar onderscheiden werden door formele kenmerken (zoals tot dan het geval was) maar ook van elkaar onderscheiden zouden worden door materi[le kenmerken. Een rechtspersoon diende slechts die rechtsvorm te kiezen waarvoor de wettelijke regeling gezien zijn materi[le kenmerken geschreven was4. In het ontwerp BW was er geen omzettingsregeling; die kwam eerst bij de Nota van Wijziging5. Zonder omzettingsregeling dreigden rechtspersonen die niet voldeden aan de materi[le kenmerken van hun soort, alleen maar ontbonden te kunnen worden6. Het Openbaar Ministerie kon ontbinding vorderen van een rechtspersoon die niet aan zijn materiele kenmerken – in de wet vertaald met “wettelijke omschrijving” – voldeed, waarna eventueel omzetting kon volgen. Ook kon het bestuur van een rechtspersoon dat vreesde dat ontbinding om die 2 Tenzij anders uit de tekst blijkt, worden zelfstandige onderdelen en lichamen waarin kerkgenootschappen zijn verenigd mede onder “kerkgenootschappen” begrepen. 3 Zoals J.M. Blanco Fernández, noot onder HR 21 april 2017 in het tijdschrift Jurisprudentie Ondernemingsrecht (JOR) 2017/192, punten 4–9. 4 Zie E.M. Ontwerp voor een nieuw burgerlijk wetboek,Toelichting eerdte gedeelte, ( boek 1–4), 131. 5 Zie C.J. van Zeben/W.G. Belinfante/O.W van Ewijk (eds.), Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het nieuwe BW, Boek 2 Rechtspersonen, Deventer/Antwerpen 1962, 182. 6 Voor de goede orde: nog steeds is in art. 2:21 BW de regel dat een rechtspersoon waarvan de statuten niet aan de eisen der wet voldoen of die niet onder de wettelijke omschrijving van zijn rechtsvorm valt, door de rechtbank wordt ontbonden.

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reden zou kunnen plaatsvinden, zelf aan de rechtbank om machtiging tot omzetting verzoeken. Er vond overgang van vermogen onder algemene titel plaats7. Door omzetting werd weliswaar ontbinding niet voorkomen, maar konden de activiteiten van de oude rechtspersoon worden voortgezet door de rechtspersoon waarin deze was omgezet. In 19878 werd art. 2:20a BW ingevoerd, waarin werd bepaald dat een vereniging, coöperatie, en onderlinge waarborgmaatschappij te allen tijde zich konden omzetten in een stichting en omgekeerd9. Hierbij bleef de rechtspersoon bestaan. Bij deze omzettingsregeling stond het handhaven van de materiele kenmerken niet voorop. De rechtspersonen konden te allen tijde een machtiging tot omzetting vragen. Bij de Invoeringswet NBW, zesde gedeelte, in 1992 werd de thans nog geldende tekst van de omzettingsregeling geformuleerd. In art. 2:18 BW kwam een uniforme omzettingsregeling voor alle privaatrechtelijke rechtspersonen10. De eis dat er ontbinding dreigt, omdat de materi[le kenmerken van de rechtsvorm waarin de rechtspersoon is gegoten niet meer in acht worden genomen, is vervallen. Alleen de rechtspersoon kan de omzetting in gang zetten. Het tot statutenwijziging bevoegde orgaan moet met tenminste negen tiende van de uitgebrachte stemmen (uitgezonderd bij de stichting) voor de omzetting hebben gestemd. Er moet dus alleen een ontegenzeggelijke wens van de bevoegde instantie tot omzetting bestaan. Door deze regeling is de omzetting – in het vervolg van art. 2:20a BW – feitelijk losgezongen van de functie van bewaker van het systeem van materi[le kenmerken. Rechtspersonen kunnen vrijuit kiezen voor omzetting en behoeven zich daarvoor niet in de gevarenzone van overschrijding van materi[le kenmerken van hun rechtspersoonsvorm te begeven11. Voor alle omzettingen geldt nu – anders dan in de vorige regeling – dat de rechtspersoon blijft bestaan (art. 2:18 lid 8 BW). Wanneer Blanco Fern#ndez in zijn noot onder het arrest12 bezwaar maakt tegen het (overeenkomstig) toepassen van de omzettingsregeling op kerkgenootschappen, omdat deze regeling moet worden verstaan tegen de achtergrond van het systeem van materi[le kenmerken van boek 2 BW, dan wordt door hem 7 Zie art. 2:19 (2.1.10e) en 2:20 (2.1.10f) BW. 8 Ter gelegenheid van de regeling van fusie van verenigingen en stichtingen, Wet van 21 april 1987, Stb. 209. 9 Grotendeels gold de regeling ook voor omzetting van een coöperatie of onderlinge waarborgmaatschappij in een vereniging of omgekeerd. Zie art. 2:20a lid 8 BW. 10 Coöperaties en onderlinge waarborgmaatschappijen waren sinds de wet van 16 juni 1988 Stb. 305 geen ondersoorten van de vereniging meer maar zelfstandige soorten rechtspersoon. 11 Voor alle omzettingen krachtens art. 2:18 BW geldt – anders dan in de vorige regeling – dat de rechtspersoon blijft bestaan. 12 Blanco Fernández, (noot 3) punt 7.

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m.i. onvoldoende op waarde geschat dat bewaking van de materi[le kenmerken niet meer de drijfveer voor omzetting is maar de vrijheid van rechtspersonen om indien dit gewenst wordt, van rechtspersoonsvorm te veranderen.

3.

De omzettingsregeling is niet geschreven voor kerkgenootschappen, maar kan overeenkomstig worden toegepast13

Art. 2:18 BW is niet geschreven voor kerkgenootschappen. In art. 2:2 BW staat ten aanzien van overeenkomstige toepassing van de bepalingen van titel 1 boek 2 BW dat deze geoorloofd is onder de voorwaarden dat toepassing is te verenigen met het statuut en met de aard van de onderlinge verhoudingen. De vraag is dan of overeenkomstige toepassing van de omzettingsregeling op kerkgenootschappen wel geoorloofd is14. Uit het feit dat art. 2:18 BW niet voor kerkelijke rechtspersonen is geschreven,volgt, anders dan Blanco Fernandez suggereert15, niet dat het artikel niet daarop niet kan worden toegepast. Ook volgens de AG Timmerman en de Hoge Raad in genoemde zaak van april 2017 is dat in principe geen probleem16. Bovendien kan een geloofsgemeenschap kiezen uit kerkgenootschap, stichting of vereniging, zo stellen zij. Het zou op gespannen voet staan met inrichtingsvrijheid van een kerkgenootschap ex art. 2:2 BW om kerkgenootschappen te belemmeren zich door omzetting anders in te richten. Bij deze formulering plaats ik wel een vraagteken.

13 Omzetting geldt ingevolge art. 2:1 lid 3 BW ook niet voor ‘omzetting’ van en in publiekrechtelijke rechtspersonen. Dan is niet de notaris en eventueel de rechter erbij betrokken, maar de wetgever. 14 Zie de literatuur, vermeld in de conclusie AG Timmerman, 08, 91 e.v.. Blanco Fern#ndez is in navolging van Asser-van der Grinten-Maeijer van mening dat omzettingsregeling niet van overeenkomstige toepassing is op kerkgenootschappen. B. Snijder-Kuipers, Omzetting als rechtsvormwijziging, [prft.RUG], Deventer 2010, 248 e.v en T. van Kooten, Het kerkgenootschap, in: L.C. van Drimmelenen/T.J. van der Ploeg (eds.), Geloofsgemeenschappen en recht, Den Haag 2014, 349–382, 376 e,v. menen dat omzetting wel analoog kan worden toegepast op kerkgenootschappen. 15 Blanco Fernández (noot 3) punten 1–9. 16 Blanco Fernández (noot 3) pt. 8, meent dat de Hoge Raad hier niet analoog toepast maar extensief interpreteert, iets waartoe de rechter niet gelegitimeerd is; de wetgever zou hier de stap moeten zetten. Ik zie niet in waarom de geoorloofdheid van het analoog toepassen van art. 2:18 BW niet uit art. 2:2 BW zou volgen.

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Iets meer over de kenmerken van het kerkgenootschap

De wetgever heeft herhaaldelijk aangegeven dat niet de wetgever maar de rechter de instantie is die moet bepalen wat de materi[le kenmerken van een kerkgenootschap zijn17. De rechter heeft hier ook wel uitspraken over gedaan en in de literatuur zijn verschillende omschrijvingen gegeven18. In een veel gehanteerde omschrijving zijn de elementen dat er organisatie moet zijn van aangeslotenen die een gemeenschappelijke religieuze verering (of bezinning) op basis van gemeenschappelijke godsdienstige opvattingen ten doel stelt en die als kerkgenootschap in het leven moet zijn geroepen19. In de jurisprudentie zijn uitspraken te vinden waarin het karakter van kerkgenootschap wegens het ontbreken van (een van de) elementen aan een organisatie werd ontzegd20. Het merkwaardige van art. 2:2 BW dat aan het kerkgenootschap is gewijd, is dat dit zonder meer bepaalt dat een kerkgenootschap en haar zelfstandige onderdelen en lichamen waarin zij zijn verenigd, rechtspersoon zijn. Alsof iedereen weet wat een kerkgenootschap is. Van Schilfgaarde stelt terecht naar aanleiding van het eerdergenoemde arrest dat de vraag blijft wanneer is er sprake van een kerkgenootschap21. Zolang de betrokken geloofsgemeenschap er niet voor heeft gekozen (durven kiezen) om kerkgenootschap te zijn, kan men haar m.i. niet als zodanig duiden. Art. 2:2 BW lijkt anders te suggereren, maar een dergelijke benadering is m.i. juridisch en maatschappelijk niet aanvaardbaar. In art. 2:2 BW gaat het alleen om kerkgenootschappen. Wanneer het artikel zou slaan op alle geloofsgemeenschappen, dan zouden zij kerkgenootschappen zijn zonder dit expliciet te willen. Dan zouden geloofsgemeenschappen die kiezen voor de verenigings – of stichtingsvorm eigenlijk altijd een omzetting moeten bewerken, omdat ze al kerkgenootschap geacht werden te zijn. Dit zou natuurlijk heel onwenselijk zijn. 17 Bijv. de Minister van Justitie in de M.v.A. aan de Tweede Kamer bij de behandeling van de Invoeringswet, zesde gedeelte. Cf. J.M.M. Maeijer/J.A.W. Schreurs, Parlementaire geschiedenis rechtspersonen – en vennootschapsrecht: in verband met de invoering van de boeken 3, 5 en 6 NBW op 1 januari 1992, Den Haag, 1991, 20. Zo heeft de Raad van state onlangs bepaald dat het geloof in het spaghettimionster geen godsdienst is. Zie ECLI:NL:RVS:2018:2715 Raad van State, 15-08-2018, 201707148/1/A3. Er is dan ook geen sprake van een kerkgenootschap. 18 Vgl. verder T. van Kooten, Het kerkgenootschap in de neutrale rechtsstaat, [prft. VU], Den Haag 2017, 166 e.v. 19 Pitlo-Löwensteyn, IA, Het rechtspersonenrecht, 1978, 24 voor het laatste element. AsserVan der Grinten-Maeijer, II De rechtspersoon, 8e druk 1997, nr. 205 formuleert dit iets vager: als zelfstandig kerkgenootschap wil gelden. Zie ook Asser-Rensen 2-III Overige Rechtspersonen, 2017, 378 e.v., (bewerkt door J.M. Blanco Fern#ndeze). 20 Zie HR 31 oktober 1986 NJ 1987, 173 (Satanskerk) en Hof Den Haag 6 oktober 2007 (ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2009) (Ephraim genootschap). 21 P. van Schilfgaarde noot onder HR 21 april 2017, NJ 2017, 297.

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De redenering van de Hoge Raad dat uit de inrichtingsvrijheid van art. 2:2 BW voortvloeit dat geloofsgemeenschappen de vrijheid hebben om ook een privaatrechtelijke rechtsvorm22 te kiezen, komt mij bij nader inzien toch als merkwaardig voor. Immers geloofsgemeenschappen die voor een privaatrechtelijke rechtsvorm – vereniging of stichting – kiezen, doen dat niet omdat ze zich vrij voelen om geen kerkgenootschap te zijn, maar omdat ze niet zeker weten of ze zich wel kerkgenootschap en daarmee rechtspersoon mogen noemen. Als kerkgenootschap heeft de geloofsgemeenschap meer inrichtingsvrijheid dan in de vorm van een vereniging of stichting23, maar bij de keuze voor vereniging of stichting krijgt ze zekerheid dat ze rechtspersoon is en kan ze zich zonder problemen in het rechtsverkeer/handelsverkeer presenteren. Die zekerheid biedt de regeling van het kerkgenootschap niet. Wanneer de regeling betreffende kerkgenootschappen meer duidelijkheid zou bieden, zouden geloofsgemeenschappen niet kiezen voor de vereniging of stichting. Ik zou de vrijheid om te kiezen voor een van deze rechtsvormen derhalve niet baseren op art.2:2 BWmaar op de vrijheid van godsdienst en van vereniging (art. 6 en 8 Grondwet). De inrichtingsvrijheid heeft een geloofsgemeenschap alleen als het de rechtsvorm kerkgenootschap heeft, niet als het in een vereniging of stichting wordt omgezet. Dan wordt de rechtspersoon aan de regels voor de vereniging of stichting onderworpen.

5.

De omzetting van een kerkgenootschap praktisch beschouwd24

5.a. Het kerkgenootschap. De eerste vraag is wie het besluit tot omzetting bij een kerkgenootschap neemt. Uit de regeling van art. 2:18 BW valt m.i. af te leiden – zie art. 2:18 lid 2a BW – dat dit het orgaan moet zijn dat bevoegd is tot statutenwijziging (dus wijziging van de kerkorde) te besluiten. De bevoegdheid om tot omzetting te besluiten zal zelf niet in het kerkelijk statuut zijn geregeld. Ook bij andere soorten rechtspersonen is de bevoegdheid tot omzetting normaal gesproken niet in de statuten geregeld. Ik ben het dus niet eens met SnijderKuipers25 die stelt, dat het kerkgenootschap in haar statuut moet neerleggen dat omzetting mogelijk is. Waarom zou het tot statutenwijziging bevoegde orgaan

22 Zie Overweging 3.3.2. 23 Zie mijn Past een heilig lichaam wel in een gewoon bed? , in: A.P.H. Meijers/T.J. van der Ploeg (eds.), De rechtspersoonlijkheid van geloofsgemeenschappen, Den Haag 2012, 81 e.v. 24 Alleen de omzetting in een vereniging of stichting wordt behandeld. 25 Noot onder HR 21 april 2017 in Ondernemingsrecht (JOR) 2017/98.

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eerst die statutaire bepaling moeten maken en vervolgens het omzettingsbesluit nemen? Wanneer een kerkgenootschap wordt omgezet in een stichting is ingevolge (overeenkomstige toepassing van) art. 2:18 lid 4 BWeen rechterlijke machtiging vereist. Uit overweging 3.4.6. van de Hoge Raad in zijn arrest van april 2017 kan worden afgeleid dat wanneer een kerkgenootschap wordt omgezet in een vereniging en er in principe alleen een notaris aan te pas komt, de notaris het kerkgenootschap kan instrueren alsnog een rechterlijke machtiging te verzoeken wanneer dit kerkgenootschap intern een grote gelijkenis heeft met een stichting. Die gelijkenis met een stichting zal samenhangen met een structuur waarin de gelovigen/leden van het kerkgenootschap geen zeggenschap hebben. De kans dat een kerkgenootschap om omzetting van zichzelf in een private rechtspersoon vraagt, is zeer klein. Een geloofsgemeenschap heeft de grootste interne vrijheid in deze rechtsvorm en zal wel heel specifieke redenen moeten hebben om de wens tot omzetting te hebben. 5.b. Zelfstandige onderdelen van kerkgenootschappen vormen een bijzondere categorie rechtspersonen. Kerkgenootschappen hebben de vrijheid gekregen om net zoveel zelfstandige onderdelen=rechtspersonen te cre[ren als zij zelf dienstig achten. Dat de Hoge Raad uitspreekt dat ook zelfstandige onderdelen kunnen worden omgezet in een vereniging of stichting moet men wel restrictief opvatten. Een zelfstandig onderdeel is een deel van de kerkelijke organisatie dat krachtens de kerkorde zelfstandige taken en rechtspersoonlijkheid heeft. Die zelfstandige organen ontlenen hun rechtspersoonlijkheid aan de kerkorde van het kerkgenootschap. Veel zelfstandige onderdelen zijn bij name in de kerkorde genoemd; met denke aan de diaconie, de gemeente, de parochie, de parochi[le instelling. Een dergelijke zelfstandig onderdeel kan zich niet op eigen gezag onttrekken aan het kerkgenootschap. Daarvoor zou wijziging van de kerkorde (het kerkelijk statuut) nodig zijn, iets waarin het desbetreffende zelfstandig onderdeel geen zeggenschap heeft. Zo’n besluit wordt van hogerhand genomen; het hangt van de kerkorde af in hoeverre de leden die bij dat zelfstandig onderdeel behoren er ook over hebben kunnen meepraten, of hier ook van een stichtingsachtige figuur sprake is waarvoor rechterlijke machtiging nodig zou zijn, ook wanneer er omzetting in een vereniging plaatsvindt. Iets meer voor de hand ligt de omzetting van een zelfstandig onderdeel dat niet mede de structuur van het kerkgenootschap bepaalt, maar waarbij het zelfstandig onderdeel binnen het kerkgenootschap een specifieke taak heeft en op grond van een incidenteel besluit van een hogere kerkelijke autoriteit is ingesteld. Men kan hier denken aan het landelijk dienstencentrum van de protestantse kerk in Nederland. De generale synode heeft op grond van ord. 11–26 de bevoegdheid om zo’n kerkelijke instelling met rechtspersoonlijkheid bij ge-

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nerale regeling in te stellen. Die generale synode kan deze ook weer opheffen. Het is dus de generale synode die over een eventuele omzetting zou moeten besluiten. Nu ligt een omzetting van het dienstencentrum, dat geheel dienstbaar is aan de kerk, in een seculiere rechtsvorm al wel heel weinig voor de hand. Maar er zijn in kerkelijk Nederland vast wel specifieke zelfstandige onderdelen te vinden met een kerkelijke meer naar buiten gerichte taak waarbij zo’n omzetting eerder denkbaar is, bijvoorbeeld om subsidie of donaties van buiten de kerk te ontvangen. Iets dergelijks deed zich voor in de zaak naar aanleiding waarvan de Hoge Raad in april 2017 zijn beslissing heeft gegeven. In deze gevallen zal het veelal om omzettingen in een stichting gaan, waarvoor rechterlijke machtiging nodig is. Het is m.i. echter de vraag of het voor een kerkgenootschap wel zo aantrekkelijk is wanneer een van haar zelfstandige onderdelen door omzetting buiten de kerkelijke structuur geraakt. Er is immers een beproefd ander middel om min of meer hetzelfde te bereiken zonder dat een kerkelijk onderdeel (met haar vermogen) buiten de kerk raakt. Ten behoeve van activiteiten die kerkgenootschappen op maatschappelijk terrein verrichten, al dan niet met andere partijen, werden (en worden) door kerkgenootschappen of hun zelfstandige onderdelen stichtingen opgericht. Deze stichtingen zijn dan het vehikel om subsidies en donaties van buiten de kerk te ontvangen. Waar nodig kunnen de kerkelijke rechtspersonen door benoeming van bestuursleden en goedkeuren van jaarstukken en vaststellen of goedkeuren van statutenwijziging zorgen voor nauwe banden met de desbetreffende stichtingen. De kerkelijke rechtspersoon kan ook zelf een deel van haar vermogen aan de desbetreffende stichting overdragen/lenen. De gevolgen van deze aanpak zijn minder ingrijpend dan omzetting. Er zullen bijzondere redenen moeten zijn wil omzetting van een zelfstandig onderdeel de beste oplossing zijn. 5.c. Bij een lichaam waarin kerkgenootschappen zijn verenigd, zou het besluit tot omzetting in een vereniging of stichting moeten worden genomen door de gezamenlijke kerkgenootschappen die het lichaam hebben gevormd26. De omzetting heeft ten gevolge dat de kerkgenootschappen die het lichaam vormden nu lid of aangeslotenene worden in de vereniging dan wel stichting waarin het lichaam wordt omgezet. De kans dat een lichaam waarin kerkgenootschappen zijn verenigd wordt omgezet in een vereniging of stichting is dunkt me klein. Na de omzetting blijven het kerkgenootschappen die of in een vereniging of in een stichting met elkaar te maken hebben. De meeste lichamen waarin kerkgenootschappen zijn verenigd zijn kerkelijke verbanden van kerkgenootschappen die een gezamenlijke belij26 Zie over het lichaam waarin kerkgenootschappen zijn verenigd laatstelijk: Van Kooten (noot 18) 223 e.v.

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denis en kerkorde hebben. Die kerkgenootschappen zijn dan de plaatselijke geloofsgemeenschappen27. De kerkgenootschappen kunnen zich aan het verband onttrekken, als zij zich er niet meer bij thuisvoelen. De functie van het kerkelijk verband (lichaam) valt weg wanneer het zich omzet. Voor dit soort lichamen is omzetting in feite ondenkbaar. Er zijn ook enkele lichamen waarin kerkgenootschappen zijn verenigd met een specifieke taak, onderwijs bijvoorbeeld28. Het zou kunnen dat de wetgever voor de uitvoering en/of subsidi[ring van bepaalde activiteiten de stichtings – en/of verenigingsvorm voorschrijft. In zo’n geval zou omzetting meer voor de hand liggen. 5.d. Bescherming van het vermogen voor religieuze doelen. Zoals ter wille van het beschikbaar blijven voor het doel waarvoor het vermogen van een stichting is bijeengebracht de wetgever – in art. 2:18 lid 6 BW – na omzetting een vermogensklem in de statuten van de omgezette rechtspersoon verplicht stelt, zo ligt het ook voor de hand dat het vermogen van een kerkgenootschap voor een vergelijkbaar religieus doel beschikbaar blijft. Het kerkgenootschap dat zich omzet in een stichting of in een vereniging kan een dergelijke vermogensklem in de statuten opnemen, of een bepaling dat wijziging van het doel niet mogelijk is. Ook kan in de statuten van de stichting – of vereniging – waarin een zelfstandig onderdeel van een kerkgenootschap wordt omgezet worden bepaald dat statutenwijziging – althans in ieder geval doelwijziging – de goedkeuring van het kerkgenootschap behoeft.

6.

Omzetting van een vereniging of stichting in een kerkgenootschap

In de praktijk zal de omzetting vooral gebruikt gaan worden, schat ik in, door geloofsgemeenschappen die in de vorm van een vereniging of stichting zijn gegoten. Immers voor hen is het kerkgenootschap vanwege de inrichtingsvrijheid aantrekkelijker dan een vereniging met een vrij uitgebreide wettelijke regeling of een stichting met rechterlijk toezicht. Het betreft hier islamitische moskeegemeenschappen en religieuze organisaties van immigranten en nieuwe religieuze bewegingen. Het is dan de rechter of de notaris (als het een vereniging betreft) die moet vaststellen dat het kerkgenootschap waarin de organisatie zich 27 In de protestantse kerk in Nederland en de Rooms Katholieke kerk zijn de plaatselijke geloofsgemeenschappen zelfstandig onderdelen. 28 Vgl. J.T. van den Berg, Lichamen waarin kerkgenootschappen zijn verenigd in: A.P.H. Meijers/T.J. van der Ploeg (eds.), De rechtspersoonlijkheid van geloofsgemeenschappen, Den Haag 2012, 50 e.v.

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omzet inderdaad gezien haar statuut/statuten aan de eisen van een kerkgenootschap voldoet. Een notaris heeft meestal weinig of geen ervaring met het opstellen van het statuut van een kerkgenootschap. Voor de oprichting van een kerkgenootschap is geen notari[le akte nodig. In geval van omzetting in een kerkgenootschap is wel een notari[le akte nodig. Uit de nieuwe statuten die deel uitmaken van de notari[le akte van omzetting moet voor de notaris voldoende vaststaan dat hier sprake is van een kerkgenootschap. De meeste notarissen zullen geen hulp kunnen bieden bij het opstellen van een kerkelijk statuut. Voor christelijke kerken zijn er wel voorbeeldkerkorden, maar ook dan nog blijft ieder kerkgenootschap vrij in zijn inrichting. Bij omzetting van een vereniging of stichting waarin een geloofsgemeenschap van andere aard is gehuld, kunnen de statuten van de bestaande rechstpersoonsvorm wel enige aanknopingspunten bieden, maar er zal behoefte zijn om meer van de inrichtingsvrijheid gebruik te maken. Een notaris kan m.i. niet zonder meer het door de omzettende rechtspersoon aangeboden statuut (de statuten) notarieel vastleggen. Om de omzettende rechtspersoon optimaal van dienst te zijn, zal hij m.i. een globale toets op organisatorische consistentie moeten verrichten. Het zou effici[nt zijn wanneer een beperkt aantal ter zake kundige notarissen zich met deze omzettingen bezig houdt. Wanneer de notaris twijfelt of de rechtspersoon waarin omzetting wordt beoogd een kerkgenootschap is, zal hij m.i. de partij die om omzetting vraagt naar de rechter moeten verwijzen voor een verklaring voor recht hieromtrent. Immers de rechter heeft in deze in ons rechtssysteem autoriteit. Bij omzetting van een stichting in een kerkelijke rechtspersoon moet in de statuten zijn aangegeven dat het vermogen dat de rechtspersoon bij omzetting heeft en de vruchten daarvan slechts met toestemming van de rechter anders mogen worden besteed dan voor de omzetting was voorgeschreven (de zogenaamde vermogensklem). Wanneer een geloofsgemeenschap in stichtingsvorm zich omzet in een kerkgenootschap zal dit weinig problemen opleveren. Dit is wellicht anders wanneer zo’n soort stichting zelfstandig onderdeel van een kerkgenootschap wordt. Binnen dat grotere geheel kunnen allerlei financi[le regels gelden, waar de vermogensklem haaks op staat. Blanco Fernandez meent dat hierdoor ten onrechte het burgerlijk recht boven het kerkelijke recht wordt gesteld29. Deze redenering volg ik niet. De stichting heeft immers vrij uit gekozen voor omzetting30 ; als stichting is zij aan het burgerlijk recht onderworpen. Omzetting in een kerkgenootschap wordt toegestaan, maar dat dan de waarborg van de bescherming van het vermogen voor het doel wordt gesteld, lijkt me redelijk. Wanneer de situatie van het kerkgenootschap/zelfstandig onderdeel – na omzetting – noopt tot andere besteding kan de rechter om toestemming 29 Blanco Fernández (noot 3) pt. 14. 30 Aldus ook AG Timmerman, conclusie nr. 4.16.

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worden gevraagd. Het is denk ik in dit soort gevallen van belang om de statuten van de stichting op het punt van de besteding van het vermogen al zoveel mogelijk aan te passen aan de situatie na omzetting. Dan zal de vermogensklem niet zo klemmen.

7.

Wanneer weigert de notaris medewerking en de rechter een rechterlijke machtiging?

7.a. De rechter zal de omzetting van een kerkelijke rechtspersoon in een civiel rechtspersoonsvorm weigeren wanneer de omzetting niet is te verenigen met haar statuut of met de aard van de onderlinge verhoudingen. M.i. dient ook de notaris in zo’n geval zijn medewerking weigeren. Dit is immers een norm uit art. 2:2 BW die altijd geldt. Eerlijk gezegd zie ik niet hoe een omzetting van een kerkgenootschap –met haar interne inrichtingsvrijheid – in een vereniging – met veel meer regels – of een stichting – met rechterlijk toezicht – is te verenigen met haar statuut of met haar onderlinge verhoudingen. Daar zullen bijzondere redenen voor moeten zijn. Als een levend kerkgenootschap zou verzoeken om in een vereniging of stichting te worden omgezet, zal de rechter of notaris m.i. naar de reden(en) dienen te vragen. Bij omzetting van een zelfstandig onderdeel met een specifieke taak zou omzetting eerder voor de hand kunnen liggen, maar de rechter of notaris zou m.i. dienen te vragen waarom omzetting gunstiger is dan de optie van het oprichten van een stichting naast het zelfstandig onderdeel. Ik besef dat ik de rechter en de notaris in deze een wat betuttelende taak toedenk, maar dit is ingegeven door het feit dat er ten aanzien van kerkgenootschappen veel onwetendheid is. 7.b. Bij omzetting van een stichting in een kerkgenootschap zal de rechter ook geen machtiging verlenen en zal de notaris niet meewerken wanneer de rechtspersoon waarin wordt omgezet niet voldoende kenmerken van een kerkgenootschap heeft. 7.c. De rechter zal de machtiging weigeren en de notaris zal zijn medewerking weigeren wanneer het besluit31 nietig is of een vordering tot vernietiging aanhangig is32. Bij overeenkomstige toepassing van deze regel op kerkgenootschappen kan men denken aan het gegeven dat er een interne procedure met 31 Blanco Fernández (noot 3) pt. 11 vraagt zich af welk besluit het zou moeten betreffen. Dit zal, vergelijkbaar met de civielrechtelijke rechtspersonen het besluit tot wijziging van de kerkorde betreffen. 32 Zie art. 2:18 lid 5 BW.

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betrekking tot dat besluit aanhangig is. Het lijkt me zeer passend bij de verhoudingen dat niet vereist is dat iemand het besluit voor vernietiging bij de rechter heeft voorgedragen maar dat ook het aanhangig zijn van een interne procedure hieromtrent reden voor de rechterof de notaris tot weigering van de machtiging is. Ter aanvulling: de rechter zal bij omzetting van een kerkgenootschap (zelfstandig onderdeel) moeten controleren of alle noodzakelijke goedkeuringen van kerkelijke organen zijn verkregen; bij omzetting van een vereniging of stichting in een zelfstandig onderdeel van een kerkgenootschap zal de rechter (bij een omzetting van een vereniging de notaris) moeten controleren of de daartoe bevoegde kerkelijke autoriteit(en) heeft/hebben ingestemd met het zelfstandig onderdeel worden van de rechtspersoon. Door een oordeel over de kwestie of een kerkgenootschap zich aan haar eigen formele regels heeft gehouden overschrijdt de rechter niet de scheiding kerkstaat33. In geval van twijfel kan de rechter nog een deskundige vragen voor een advies. Zolang deze goedkeuringen of instemmingen niet zijn verleend, zal de notaris medewerking moeten weigeren en kan de rechter de machtiging tot omzetting niet verlenen. 7.d. De rechter weigert de machtiging ook wanneer de belangen van stemgerechtigden die niet hebben ingestemd of van anderen (nl de leden van de desbetreffende kerkelijke rechtspersoon) van wie iemand zich tot de rechter heeft gewend, onvoldoende zijn ontzien. In dit verband kan aan de rechter blijken dat er binnen de rechtspersoon die omzetting verzoekt (een kerkgenootschap of een vereniging of stichting) godsdienstige verschillen van mening bestaan omtrent de omzetting of de modus waarin deze moet plaatsvinden. In zo’n geval zal de rechter de machtiging moeten weigeren34. Rechters moeten zich sowieso vanwege de scheiding tussen kerk en staat onthouden van uitspraken over godsdienstige kwesties35. M.i. geldt ook voor de notaris dat hij zijn medewerking moet weigeren wanneer hem blijkt dat binnen de rechtspersoon de omzetting niet breed gedragen wordt, al dan niet op theologische gronden.

33 Blanco Fernández (noot 3) pt. 13 acht een onderscheid tussen formele eisen en religieuze – niet toetsbare – eisen bij kerkgenootschappen niet goed doenbaar, gezien de autonomie van de laatsten ten aanzien van de eigen regels. 34 A. Timmerman, conclusie als AG bij HR 21 april 2017, nr. 4.15. 35 Zie A.H. Santing-Wubs, Kerken in geding, [prft. RUG], Den Haag 2002, 187 e.v.

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Conclusie

Uit systematisch oogpunt is het aantrekkelijk dat ook omzetting van en in kerkgenootschappen mogelijk is. Vanwege de inrichtingsvrijheid lijkt omzetting van kerkgenootschappen weinig voor de hand liggend. Omzetting van zelfstandige onderdelen zou in verband met maatschappelijke behoeften wellicht eerder kunnen plaatsvinden, maar het is de vraag of niet in plaats daarvan oprichting van een stichting met een sterke band met het zelfstandig onderdeel een goede optie is. De omzetting van verenigingen en stichtingen in (een zelfstandig onderdeel van) een kerkgenootschap zal vaker plaatsvinden. Notarissen zullen nu notari[le akten moeten verleden met het statuut/de kerkmorde van het kerkgenootschap waarin wordt omgezet. Het lijkt zinvol om dit werk bij een beperkt aantal deskundige notarissen neer te leggen36. In het arrest van 21 april 2017 legt de Hoge Raad de nadruk op de inrichtingsvrijheid. Deze leidt er volgens hem toe dat de omzettingsregeling van overeenkomstige toepassing is op kerkgenootschappen, maar ook dat titel 7 van boek 2 BW betreffende fusie en splitsing op kerkgenootschappen overeenkomstig toegepast kunnen worden. Aan het begin van deze bijdrage heb ik al aangegeven dat ik het merkwaardig vind om te zeggen dat de omzettingsmogelijkheid van en in kerkgenootschappen is terug te voeren op de inrichtingsvrijheid van art. 2:2 BW. Die inrichtingsvrijheid zou wel een reden kunnen zijn om het geloofsgemeenschappen in andere rechtsvorm gemakkelijk te maken zich tot kerkgenootschap om te vormen. Wat betreft de overeenkomstige toepassing van titel 7 boek 2 BW doelt de Hoge Raad, neem ik aan, in de eerste plaats op fusie en splitsing door de bevoegde kerkelijke autoriteit van zelfstandige onderdelen van het kerkgenootschap, met name dus gemeenten en parochies. Dat valt geheel onder de inrichtingsvrijheid van kerkgenootschappen en daar hebben zij veelal regelingen voor. Dat na het volgen van deze interne procedures, waarbij ook de toedeling van leden een rol speelt, het vermogensrechtelijk effect bereikt wordt dat het vermogen waar nodig onder algemene titel overgaat op de blijvende rechtspersoon, zoals bij de juridische fusie ex art. 2:307 BW zou men op een redelijke rechtstoepassing kunnen baseren37. Immers overeenkomstige toepassing van titel 7 van boek 2 BW op kerkgenootschappen valt niet uit boek 2 BW af te leiden. Het zou echter wel zeer ongelukkig zijn dat kerken hun inrichting vrijelijk kunnen regelen, maar niet het 36 Bij omzetting in een zelfstandig onderdeel van een bestaand kerkgenootschap is de statutaire structuur een gegeven; hierbij moet vooral worden gecontroleerd of de interne goedkeuringen zijn verleend. 37 Zie hierover ook Van Kooten (noot 18) 386.

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effect, de algemene overgang van het vermogen, zouden kunnen bewerken. In dit verband wijs ik er op dat voor 1992 de overgang onder algemene titel bij de fusies en splitsingen binnen kerkgenootschappen op art. 3:80 lid 3 BW was te baseren. Daarin stond dat men goederen onder algemene titel verkrijgt door opvolging in het vermogen van een rechtspersoon, die heeft opgehouden te bestaan. Deze regel kon rechtstreeks op interne fusies en splitsingen in kerkgenootschappen worden toegepast. Die bepaling is echter bij de invoeringswet boeken 3, 5 en 6 BW vervangen door een bepaling waarin specifiek de juridische fusie en de juridische splitsing, zoals geregeld in boek 2 BW, worden genoemd38. Terwille van de rechtszekerheid worden binnenkerkelijke fusie en splitsingen zoals bij fusies en splitsingen ex titel 7 BW overigens veelal in een notari[le akte vastgelegd. Maar ook fusies van verschillende kerkgenootschappen, waarop dus het interne recht slechts van toepassing kan zijn op de besluitvormingsprocedure in het eigen kerkgenootschap, worden uitgevoerd mede met behulp van de regels uit titel 7 boek 2 BW. Dat is heel nadrukkelijk gebeurd bij de fusie van de samenop-weg kerken tot de Protestantse Kerk in Nederland39. De kerkgenootschappen zijn toen zo vrij geweest de juridische fusieregeling waar passend te volgen. Dat is maatschappelijk aanvaard en de praktijk werkt ermee. Door de uitspraken van de Hoge Raad is de overeenkomstige toepassing van de wettelijke regelingen op fusie en splitsing van kerkgenootschappen in ieder geval als geldend recht erkend. De inrichtingsvrijheid ligt zonder meer ten grondslag aan de overeenkomstige toepassing van de fusieregeling (met name de overgang onder algemene titel) op interne fusies en splitsingen. Ten aanzien van andere fusies van kerkgenootschappen is die toepassing veeleer te baseren op het maatschappelijk belang40.

38 Uit de M.v.T. bij invoering van deze wijziging van art. 3:80 lid 2 werd meegedeeld dat het niet de bedoeling was materieel iets te wijzigen. 39 Zie mijn artikel in WPNR 6582 (2004). 40 Splitsingen en scheuringen van kerkgenootschappen en de mogelijke analoge toepassing van titel 7 boek 2 BW is een complex onderwerp, waarop ik hier niet inga. Zie Van Kooten (noot 14) 366 e.v.

E.G.D. van Dongen*

Nullus videtur dolo facere, qui suo iure utitur

1.

Introductie

Het grondbeginsel alterum non laedere wordt als een grondbeginsel van het huidige Nederlandse aansprakelijkheidsrecht beschouwd1. Toch werd de gedachte dat een ander geen schade mag worden toegebracht (neminem laedere) in de negentiende eeuw nog enkel als een zedelijk (niet afdwingbaar) voorschrift beschouwd – indien iemand een handeling onderneemt waartoe hij gerechtigd is en daarbij een ander schade veroorzaakt is niet tot vergoeding gehouden2. Dit past goed bij de sinds de Franse Revolutie prominente rol van autonomie van het individu, en bij het grote belang van het eigendomsrecht3. Het eigendomsconcept was in Frankrijk, geheel in lijn met de gedachten van de 18de eeuwse rechtsfilosofie, absoluut, stelde het individu voorop, en ging uit van het beginsel neminem laedit, qui suo jure utitur4. Een notie ‘misbruik van recht’ was nog afwezig in de Franse codificatie van 18045 en ontstond pas aan het einde van de 19de eeuw in de doctrine en jurisprudentie6. * Het onderzoek voor deze bijdrage is grotendeels verricht tijdens een verblijf als visiting scholar bij LUISS Universit/ Guido Carli, Rome, in oktober 2017. Dit verblijf werd mede mogelijk gemaakt door een Visiting Fellowship Grant 2017–2018, van de Universiteit Utrecht. 1 Zie, e. g., A. Keirse, Alterum non laedere; voorkom schade! Grondbeginsel van het aansprakelijkheidsrecht, in: S.D. Lindenbergh (ed.), Een nieuwe aanpak, Den Haag 2010, 1–26, in het bijzonder 6. 2 G. Diephuis, Het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk regt, Groningen 1849, VI, 331, 372. 3 Zie artt. 4 en 17 van de D8claration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen, 26 augustus 1789. 4 D.J. Devine, Some Comparative Aspects of the Doctrine of Abuse of Rights, Acta juridica 1964, 153. Volgens F. Parisi, Alterum non laedere: An Intellectual History of Civil Liability, American Journal of Jurisprudence 39 (1994) 1, 349, verschijnt het Aristotelische voorschrift van alterum non laedere tweeduizend jaar later opnieuw, nu als het algemene paradigma neminem laedere, in de moderne Romanistische codificaties. 5 De term misbruik van recht komt voor de eerste keer voor in het Allgemeine Landrecht van Pruissen van 1794 (zie ALR I.8.27 en 28); J. Voyame/B. Cottier/B. Rocha, Abuse of Rights in Comparative Law (1), in: Council of Europe, Abuse of Rights and Equivalent Concepts: The Principle and Its Present Day Application, Strasbourg 1990, 25.

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Het eigendomsrecht heeft in het huidige Nederlands recht een centrale plaats gekregen. Het staat de eigenaar met uitsluiting van een ieder vrij van zijn zaak gebruik te maken, maar dit recht vindt zijn begrenzing (onder meer) bij de rechten van anderen (art. 5:1 lid 2 BW). Volgens art. 3:13 BWechter mag iemand aan wie een bevoegdheid toekomt deze niet inroepen voor zover hij haar misbruikt7. In de periode voor de codificatie van het Burgerlijk Wetboek van 1992 werd deze rechtsfiguur echter niet als misbruik van bevoegdheid maar als misbruik van recht aangeduid. Het leerstuk van het misbruik van recht heeft zich in Nederland, in literatuur en jurisprudentie, nog later dan in Frankrijk, namelijk pas in de twintigste eeuw ontwikkeld8. Toch is het beginsel alterum non laedere al eeuwen oud. Het wordt al in het Corpus Iuris genoemd als een algemene grondregel van het recht, zij het zonder uitwerking in praktisch toepasbare rechtsnormen9. Het beginsel dient in verband met twee andere, reeds in de Griekse filosofie10 bekende, en ook door Ulpianus11 vermelde beginselen gelezen te worden, namelijk honeste vivere12 en suum cuique tribuere13. Het beginsel alterum non laedere wordt echter in het Romeinse recht in twijfel getrokken door D. 50,17,55: nullus videtur dolo facere 6 P. Ancel/C. Didry, L’abus de droit: une notion sans histoire? L’apparition de la notion d’abus de droit en droit franÅais au d8but du XXe siHcle, in: P. Ancel/G. Aubert/ C. Chappuis, L’abus de droit. Comparaisons franco-suisses, Saint-Ptienne 2001, 52 e.v.; L. Eck, Controverses Constitutionelles et Abus de Droit, conference paper for the CongrHs de l’Association FranÅaise de Droit Constitutionel (A.F.D.C.), Montpellier 2005, 2 e.v. Zie ook, uitvoerig, W.B. Helmich, De theorie van het rechtsmisbruik in het Romeinsche, Fransche en Nederlandsche recht (diss. RKU te Nijmegen), 1945, 36 e.v., 46 e.v., 83 e.v. 7 Volgens lid 2 van dit artikel kan een bevoegdheid onder meer worden misbruikt door haar uit te oefenen met geen ander doel dan een ander te schaden of met een ander doel dan waarvoor zij is verleend of in geval men, in aanmerking nemende de onevenredigheid tussen het belang bij de uitoefening en het belang dat daardoor wordt geschaad, naar redelijkheid niet tot die uitoefening had kunnen komen. 8 P. Rodenburg, Misbruik van bevoegdheid (diss. VU Amsterdam), Deventer 1985, 3–4. 9 J. Hallebeek, Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid aan de vooravond van de moderne samenleving, in: B. Debaenst/B. Delbecke (ed.), Vangnet of springplank? Het buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheidsrecht in een moderne samenleving, Brugge 2004, 19. 10 E. Levy, Natural Law in the Roman Period, Univ. of Notre Dame Natural Law Inst. Proceedings 2 (1949) 67. Volgens L. Winkel, De rol van algemene rechtsbeginselen in het Romeinse recht, AA 40 (1991) 10, 67–69 zijn deze beginselen uitvloeisels van de gerechtigheidsdefinitie, en vervullen ze een geheel andere functie dan de overige rechtsbeginselen in het Romeinse recht. Het is daarom niet toevallig, aldus Winkel, dat de Digesten geen rechtstreekse praktische toepassingen van de praecepta iuris bevat. 11 D. 1,1,10,1. Zie ook Inst. 1,1,3. 12 Volgens J. Wiarda, Twee der mooiste geboden, grondregels van recht in vergetelheid geraakt?, NJB 13 (1991) 581 is dit het eerste gebod, de grondregel van het recht. 13 J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Onrechtmatige daden, D8lits, Unerlaubte Handlungen, Torts. Buitencontractueel aansprakelijkheidsrecht in Europees perspectief, Deventer 2003, 25–26. Zie over het laatstgenoemde beginsel G.C.J.J. van den Bergh, Jedem das Seine, in: J.B.J.M. ten Berge et al. (ed.), Recht als norm en als inspiratie, Nijmegen 1986, 258–265.

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qui suo iure utitur. Nadat in deze bijdrage eerst kort aandacht zal worden besteed aan het al dan niet bestaan van “misbruik van recht” in het Romeinse recht, zal de betekenis en de oorspronkelijke (klassieke) context van D. 50,17,55 worden gereconstrueerd, om daarna te besluiten met enkele opmerkingen over de latere doorwerking van deze tekst en van het concept misbruik van recht.

2.

Enkele opmerkingen over misbruik van recht in het Romeinse recht

Sommige juristen voeren de oorsprong van de doctrine van misbruik van recht terug tot het Romeinse recht14, anderen bestrijden dit15. Er wordt ook wel gesteld dat er verboden tot misbruik van recht bestonden onder het Romeinse recht, maar dat zij in feite enkel ad hoc werden toegepast en niet als een algemeen rechtsbeginsel16, maar ook wordt er wel gesteld dat er enkel sprake was van een algemeen geaccepteerde doctrine van misbruik (maken) van het proces(recht)17. Waarschijnlijk echter was misbruik van recht(en)18 als concept en als algemeen verbod onbekend bij de klassieke Romeinse juristen19 – en behandelden zij 14 D. 6,1,38 (malitiis non indulgendum esse), D. 50.17.144; – Eck (note 6) 2–3; Voyame/Cottier/Rocha (noot 5) 25. Zie ook L. Campion, La th8orie de l’abus des droits, 1925, 5 e.v. 15 Met wijzing naar, bijv., D. 50,17,55. Zie ook J.E. Spruit, “Malitiis non indulgendum esse”, in: J.E. Spruit/M. van de Vrugt, Brocardica in honorem G.C.J.J. van den Bergh, Deventer 1987, 95–101; – Zie ook P.E. de Morree, Rights and Wrongs under the ECHR. The Prohibition of Abuse of Rights in Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights (diss. UU), 2016, 122. 16 J.H. Crabb, The French Concept of Abuse of Rights, Inter-American Law Review 6, no. 1, (1964) 4–5. Zie ook Devine (noot 4) 150 e.v., 183; – A.A. Correa, Remarques sur l’abus des droits en droit romain classique, in: Atti del seminario romanistico internazionale 1971, Perugia 1972, 141, 145 e.v., stelt dat de wortels van de theorie van rechtsmisbruik te vinden zijn in het Romeinse recht. 17 Devine (note 4) 153. 18 M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, I, München 1955, 195, noemt het “Schikane”, in het italiaans emulazione, geconstrueerd naar het woord aemulatio zoals vermeld in Mac. D. 50,10,3 pr., waar het echter wedijver betekent; – zie ook uitvoerig H. Kreller, Die Theorie des Mißbrauchs der Rechte in der römischen Rechtslehre, Sonderheft z. Zeitschr. für ausl. und int. Privatrecht XI (1937) m.n. 24. 19 Zie ook M. Markovitch, La th8orie de l’abus des droits en droit compar8 (thHse Universit8 de Lyon), Lyon 1936, 27. Volgens Kaser (note 18) 195 heeft dit verbod filosofisch-retorische wortels, en kan het via de schooljuristen (hij verwijst naar Gaius‘Inst. I. 53) pas in de naklassieke bronnen terug worden gevonden (Cels. D. 6,1,38; zie ook Pomp. D. 12,6,14 en D. 50,17,206); – Interessant is ook nog Ps. Quint. decl. 13,10, waarin de rijke aanvoert dat de schade (het doden van bijen middels het vergiftigen van bloemen) rechtmatig op zijn eigen terrein was toegebracht. Zie voor de tekst, vertaling en uitleg, E. van Dongen/L. Nellissen (eds.), De bijen van de arme man. Apes pauperis, Quintilianus Declamatio maior XIII, Tilburg 2014.

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veeleer ieder geval naar zijn omstandigheden. Er bestond ook geen Latijns equivalent voor “misbruik van recht” noch een aanzet tot het komen tot een dergelijke formulering door de Romeinse juristen – en dat terwijl een mogelijk bruikbare term wel in de Latijnse taal aanwezig was (namelijk abutor)20. In die gevallen die wij tegenwoordig zouden scharen onder rechtsmisbruik, deden de Romeinse juristen waarschijnlijk een beroep op de hen voor handen zijnde juridische concepten, vooral de bona fides of de exceptio doli21. Toch dient men, gezien de aanwezigheid van kennis van het Sto"sch gedachtengoed bij de Romeinse intellectuele elite, ook aan te nemen dat – hoewel niet in geschreven regels, maar wel als ongeschreven, ethische en maatschappelijke normen – het besef aanwezig was dat men in het belang van het maatschappelijk verkeer terughoudend diende te zijn tegenover met op zichzelf geoorloofd handelen als dat inbreuk maakte op de vrijheid van anderen en/of het belang van de Romeinse staat22. In de late keizertijd werd, blijkens D. 39,3,1,12, gesteld dat krenkend gebruik van een recht niet was toegestaan, dat wil zeggen een handelen niet om eigen belangen te beschermen maar puur vanwege de bedoeling om een ander schade te berokkenen (animus nocendi)23. Een tekst van Gaius, D. 50,17,55, lijkt erop te duiden dat een voorloper van de huidige misbruik van bevoegdheid niet aanwezig was in het Romeinse recht24. Deze tekst wordt echter op diverse manieren opgevat25, en roept bovendien op het eerste oog verbazing op, gezien

20 Spruit (noot 15) 97. 21 Kaser (noot 18) 195–196. Volgens Jovanovic´ bestond het beginsel van misbruik van recht, hoewel niet expliciet gedefinieerd, wel reeds in het Romeinse recht, en werd in de rechtspraktijk opgebouwd door het gebruik van de beginselen van aequitas en bona fides, zie M. Jovanovic´, Aequitas and bona fides in the Legal Practice of Ancient Rome and the Prohibition of the Abuse of Rights, Facta Universitatis. Series: Law and Politics 1, no. 7 (2003) 767, 787. 22 Spruit (noot 15) 98–100. 23 F. Pringsheim, Animus in Roman Law, L. Quart. R. 49 (1933) 51; – Men dient overigens het engere begrip, de zgn. handelingen ad aemulationem, waaronder het uitoefenen van recht met als enig doel de ander te benadelen valt, te onderscheiden van het ruimere begrip rechtsmisbruik, i. e. het toepassen van een geldende wettelijke regel terwijl hetzij het rechtsbewustzijn hetzij de economische of sociale voorwaarden veranderd zijn op welke de wettelijke regel berust. Zie M. Kaser, Mitteilungen, ZRG RA 59 (1939), 714–715. 24 Zie ook M. Bartosˇek, Sul concetto di atto emulativo specialmente nel diritto romano, in: Atti del congresso internazionale di diritto romano, Verona 1948, III, Mailand 1953, 206 en E.J.H. Schrage, Misbruik van bevoegdheid, 2e ed., Deventer 2012, 39 (die ook verwijst naar D. 50,17,151). 25 S. Riccobono, La teoria dell’abuso di diritto nella dottrina Romana, BIDR 5 (1939) 23–24, stelt dat Gaius, een der Sabinianen, niet bereid was een actio de dolo te verlenen tegen de eigenaar die van zijn eigen recht gebruik had gemaakt (vgl. ook Marcellus in D. 39,3,1,12) – hij plaatst het vervolgens in de scholenstrijd tussen de Sabiniani (zonder grenzen bevoegdheid uitoefenen) en de Proculiani (Marcellus: verbieden enkel vanwege met de bedoeling een ander schade te berokkenen).

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Gaius’ opmerking dat wij ons recht niet verkeerd dienen te gebruiken (male enim nostro iure uti non debemus, Gai. Inst. I. 53)26.

3.

The tekst van D. 50,17,55

D. 50,17,55 luidt als volgt: (Gaius libro secundo de testamentis ad edictum urbicum): Nullus videtur dolo facere, qui suo iure utitur. “(Gaius op het stadsedict, in het tweede boek over testamenten): Niemand wordt geacht onbehoorlijk27 te handelen, die van zijn recht28 gebruik maakt.” [mijn vertaling, EvD]29

Aangezien er zo goed als geen tekstuele bijzonderheden zijn aan deze tekst, zal direct worden overgegaan tot de bespreking van de inscriptie en de Romeinse jurist Gaius30.

3.1

Inscriptio

De passage komt uit een commentaar van Gaius op het stadsedict - het praetorisch edict gepubliceerd in Rome. Lenel, in zijn Palingenesia, plaatste het fragment van D. 50,17,55 in het commentaar van Gaius op het edict van de praetor urbanus onder de titel De testamentis31. Het stadsedict bevatte twee boeken over testamenten. Dit fragment is het laatste fragment van liber II (De testamentis), bestaand uit vier Digestenteksten. Boek twee bestaat uit twee rubrieken, een over 26 F. Longchamps de Bérier, L’abuso del diritto nell’esperienza del diritto privato romano, Turijn 2013, 141. Zie uitvoerig over Gai. inst. 1,53 in 3–45 van het werk van B8rier. 27 Heumann/Seckel (eds.), Handlexikon zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts, Jena 1907, 156 s.v. dolus: s. dolus malus (im Gegensatz von dolus bonus … Arglist, Gefährde, rechtswidriger Vorsatz, böser Wille, nämentlich 1) im allgemeinen der Wille, das Verbotene zu tun bezw. das Gebotene nicht zu tun … (met verwijzing naar D. 50,17,55 en D. 50,17,167,1). 28 Heumann/Seckel (noot 27) 300–301, s.v. ius: Recht … b) im subjective Sinn: die auf dem Recht im objektiven Sinn beruhende Berechtigung oder Befugnis, z. B. im Gegens. von factum … oder von corpus … met verwijzing naar, o. a., D. 50,17,55. 29 Heumann/Seckel (noot 27) 607–608, s.v. uti: gebrauchen, such bedienen … überhaupt ein Recht geniessen, ausüben, davon Gebrauch Machen, z. B. iure suo uti. Er wordt vervolgens verwezen naar D. 37,4,3,5, D. 39,2,24,12, D. 40,7,1,1, D. 44,4,5,6, D. 50,17,55, D. 50,17,155,1, Gai. inst. 1,53 in fine. De laatste tekst en D. 6,1,38 worden door Bartosˇek, Atti Verona 1948 (note 24) 207 genoemd als teksten die corrigerend werken op het absolute adagium van D. 50,17,55. 30 In de Basilica (B. 2,3,55) staat echter het Griekse equivalent van dolo in accusativus: d|kom. 31 O. Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, I, Lipsiae 1889, col. 183, pal. nr. 13.

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de voorwaarden waaronder de erfgenamen kunnen worden ingesteld (De conditionibus institutionum), en de ander over problemen aangaande het in bezit nemen van een erfenis bij versterf (ab intestato) door degenen die bij testament als erfgenaam werden ingesteld (Si quis omissa causa testamenti) – D. 50,17,55 behoort bij de laatste rubriek (en volgt op D. 29,4,14 en 16, en D. 29,4,18)32. Het betreft in D. 50,17,55 zowel de testamentaire erfopvolging33 als ook – indien het testament verworpen wordt of ongeldig is – de erfopvolging bij versterf. Later hebben de Justiniaanse compilatoren het fragment uit de context van het erfrecht gelicht en geplaatst in de titel De diversis regulis iuris antiqui (diverse regels van oud recht) – D. 50,17 – en daardoor werd de tekst getransformeerd tot een adagium met een algemeen karakter34.

3.2

De Romeinse jurist Gaius

Gaius leefde tijdens het Principaat35, en schreef omstreeks 160/161 zijn bekende leerboekje genaamd de Institutiones. Hij was in zijn tijd geen jurist van groot formaat, hij wordt immers door tijdgenoten niet genoemd of geciteerd, maar wordt later wel in de Lex citandi (426 na Chr.) als een van de toonaangevende juristen genoemd36. Wellicht schreef Gaius zijn werken ver weg van Rome, in de provincie – daaronder vallen o. a. een Commentaar op de XII Tafelen, een Commentaar op het stadsedict, een Commentaar op het provincie-edict, en monografie[n over diverse onderwerpen37. Gaius schreef zijn commentaar op het stadsedict in tien boeken38 waarschijnlijk ten tijde van de heerschappij van keizer Antoninus Pius39 ; het werd gepubliceerd rond 138–152 na Chr40. 32 Lenel (noot 31) col. 182–183. Zie ook B. Santalucia, L’opera di Gaio “Ad edictum praetoris urbani”, Milaan 1975, 67 e.v., 71 e.v. en F. Kniep, Der Rechtsgelehrte Gajus und die Ediktskommentare, Jena 1910, 321. De compilatoren hebben Gaius’ commentaren op beide edicten, het provinciale en het stadsedict, samengenomen; de huidige tekst van D. 29,4,13–19 is gebaseerd op het provinciaal edict en het stadsedict is erin meegevlochten. 33 Zie hierover uitvoerig Kaser (noot 18) 567 e.v. 34 Zie ook P. Stein, Regulae iuris. From Juristic Rules to Legal Maxims, Edinburgh 1966, 120. 35 Zie uitvoerig W. Kunkel, Die römischen Juristen. Herkunft und soziale Stellung, 2e ed., Keulen/Weimar/Wenen 2001, 186 e.v. Zie over Gaius ook uitvoerig F. Kniep, Der Rechtsgelehrte Gajus und die Ediktskommentare, Jena 1910; A.M. Honoré, Gaius, Oxford 1962; G. Diósdy, Gaius, der Rechtsgelehrte, ANRW II 15 (1976) 605–631; O. Stanojevic´, Gaius noster. Plaidoyer pour Gaius, Amsterdam 1989. 36 J.E. Spruit, Enchiridium. Een geschiedenis van het Romeinse privaatrecht, 4e ed., Deventer 1994, 177. 37 Spruit (noot 36) 178–179. 38 Aldus de Index Florentinus. Volgens Lenel (noot 31) col. 182 is dat “het enige wat daarvan gevonden is”. Zie ook P. Krüger, Geschichte der Quellen und Litteratur des römischen Rechts, 2e ed., München 1912, 202. 39 Lenel (noot 31) col. 182.

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4.

Exegese

4.1

Introductie

409

D. 50,17,55 wordt in de literatuur als voorbeeld genoemd van enkele in de regulae iuris opgenomen elegantia verborum, van op een korte ritmische en expressieve wijze geformuleerde juridische beginselen41. Wat daar ook van zij, twijfelachtig is of D. 50,17,55 ook als een beginsel heeft te gelden in de oorspronkelijke context (uitvoeriger hierover par. 3.2). Toen Gaius de regel van D. 50,17,55 schreef, die later, vrijgemaakt van context, in de Digesten werd opgenomen als een adagium42, maakte deze regel deel uit van een groter deel wat later verloren is gegaan. Hoewel wordt gezegd dat de tekst niet wordt verdacht van postklassieke bewerkingen43, wordt ook gesteld dat de compilatoren waarschijnlijk de vermelding van een beperkte groep van personen hebben vervangen door het gebruik van nullus in D. 50,17,5544. Inderdaad is het zeker mogelijk dat de tekst, mede gezien de gedecontextualiseerde algemene formulering, door de compilatoren is ingekort. De tekst heeft een bredere toepassing gekregen, toen de compilatoren deze tekst opnamen in de Digesten. Men kan aannemen dat dit fragment, net zoals alle regulae, oorspronkelijk betrekking had op een concrete context45. Uit Lenel’s reconstructie wordt duidelijk dat de zinssnede oorspronkelijk het erfrecht, specifieker nog het recht betreffende testamenten, betrof46. Aangezien de enige manier om zinvolle betekenis te geven aan D. 50,17,55 is het uitgaan van deze palingenetische context, zal Lenel’s reconstructie als hypothese worden genomen en de context in het navolgende nader worden bestudeerd.

40 Honoré (noot 35) 72. 41 B. Lapicki, Le rile du droit dans la Rome antique, RIDA III (1949) 7–36. 42 Anders Stanojevic´ (noot 35) 156, die stelt dat reeds Gaius deze regel als een adagium had geformuleerd. 43 Santalucia, (noot 32) 75. Er staan ook geen interpolatie(vermoeden)s vermeld in E. Levy/ E. Rabel, Index interpolationum quae in Iustiniani Digestis inesse dicuntur, III, Weimar 1935, col. 594. 44 Stein (noot 34) 120: “The compilers were attracted by dogmatic statements introduced by omnis or nemo but they did not find many of them in the works of the classical jurists. Out of thirty-one fragments in the whole Digest beginning with nemo, fourteen occur in the title de regulis”. 45 Over de ontwikkeling van de betekenis van regulae zie onder meer Stein (noot 34). 46 Lenel (noot 31) col. 182–183; – Een andere reconstructie kan men vinden bij U. Elsener, Les racines romanistes (thesis Universit8 de Neuch.tel), Bruylant 2004, 188 e.v., die de tekst in verband brengt met het interdict de homine libero exhibendo en Ulp. D. 43,29,3,2.

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Het probleem in D. 50,17,55

4.2.1 Het edict, het erfrecht en dolo malo Gaius schreef een commentaar op een bepaalde passage uit het edict van de praetor (het Edictum Perpetuum). De relevante passage uit Lenel’s reconstructie van de relevante passage uit het praetorisch edict, gebaseerd op het commentaar van Ulpianus op dat edict, luidt als volgt: Si quis omissa causa testamenti ab intestato hereditatem partemve eius possidebit dolove malo fecerit, quo minus possideret, causa cognita de legatis perinde actionem dabo atque si hereditatem ex testamento adisset47. “Indien iemand, nadat hij de wilsbeschikking heeft verworpen, bij versterf de erfenis, of een gedeelte daarvan, in bezit zal nemen of met boos opzet gehandeld zal hebben opdat hij daardoor minder bezat, zal ik, nadat de zaak bekend is geworden, op dezelfde wijze de actie geven met betrekking tot de legaten alsof hij op grond van het testament had aanvaard [mijn vertaling, EvD].”

Deze passage uit het edict zorgde ervoor dat degenen die krachtens de aanvaarding door (de) erfgena(a)m(en) recht zouden hebben op een legaat, de legatarissen, dat recht geldend kunnen maken tegen de erfgenaam die geweigerd heeft de nalatenschap te aanvaarden, maar ofwel de erfenis alsnog bij versterf in bezit had genomen ofwel op slinkse wijze (dolo malo) erin is geslaagd het bezit niet te hebben verkregen48. Gaius zal, in zijn commentaar op de zojuist genoemde passage uit het praetorisch edict, een op een bepaalde context toegesneden betekenis van de uitdrukking dolo malo hebben gegeven49. In deze context zou het moeten hebben gegaan om de welbewuste verwerping van het testament door de bij testament ingestelde erfgenamen, om aldus op deze manier de nalatenschap, bevrijd van de geroepenheid op grond van het testament, alsnog te kunnen accepteren, nu bij versterf, bevrijd van bijzondere makingen50. Aanvaarding van 47 O. Lenel, Das edictum perpetuum, 3e druk, anast. herdruk Aalen 1956, 364, die verwijst naar Gai. D. 29,1,17,3; – F. Stella Maranca, In tema di divieto dell “aemulatio”, in: P. Ciapessoni (ed.), Studi in memoria di Aldo Albertoni, II, Padova 1937, 469–470, legt de link tussen D. 50,17,55 en (het commentaar van Gaius op) het praetorisch edict, maar werkt het echter inhoudelijk niet verder uit. 48 G. MacCormack, Dolus in decisions of the mid-classical jurists (Julian-Marcellus), BIDR 35–36 (1993–1994) 142. 49 Zie ook M. Balzarini, Cic. pro Tullio e l’editto di Lucullo, in: Studi in onore di Giuseppe Grosso, I, Turijn 1968, 351, noot 89; – Voor de betekenis van dolo malo in het edict verwijst Lenel (noot 47) 364, noot 3, expliciet naar D. 50,17,55. 50 Zie ook Longchamps de Bérier (noot 26) 144–145; G. Grosso, s.v. Abuso del diritto (diritto romano), in: Enc. Dir., I, 162; D. Daube, Zur Palingenesie einiger Klassikerfragmente, ZSS RA LXXVI (1959), 215; MacCormack, BIDR 35–36 (1993–1994) 142; – Anders E.J.H. Schrage, Un droit port8 trop loin devient une injustice. Misbruik van bevoegdheid uit historisch perspectief, VrA 1 (2007) 49, die over deze tekst schrijft dat de erflater die binnen

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het testament impliceerde immers de aanvaarding van de schulden en verplichtingen die de erflater had nagelaten. Iemand kon ook onder een bepaalde voorwaarde tot erfgenaam worden aangewezen en er konden ook beschikkingen (legaten, fideicommissen, voogdbenoemingen) worden opgenomen in het testament. Bij verwerping van de nalatenschap vervalt voor de erfgenaam die verwerpt de aan het testament verbonden verplichting om, bijvoorbeeld, de legaten te voldoen. 4.2.2 Dolo malo en calliditas D. 29,4,1 pr. luidt als volgt: (Ulpianus libro quinquagesimo ad edictum): Praetor voluntates defunctorum tuetur et eorum calliditati occurrit, qui omissa causa testamenti ab intestato hereditatem partemve eius possident ad hoc, ut eos circumveniant, quibus quid ex iudicio defuncti deberi potuit, si non ab intestato possideretur hereditas, et in eos actionem pollicetur. (Ulpianus in het vijftigste boek op het Edict): De praetor beschermt de laatste wilsbeschikkingen van de gestorvenen en roept een halt toe aan de sluwheid van personen die nadat nadat zij de wilsbeschikking hebben verworpen,51 de erfenis, of een gedeelte daarvan, bij versterf in bezit nemen, met het doel hen te om de tuin te leiden, aan wie op grond van een beslissing van de overledene iets moest toekomen, indien de nalatenschap niet bij versterf in bezit genomen werd. En tegen hen zegt een actie toe. [mijn vertaling, EvD]

Uit Ulpianus’ weergave van het edict van de praetor urbanus in D. 29,4,1 pr.52 blijkt dat de praetor kijkt naar de wensen van de overledene persoon en een actie (met een formula fictitia, namelijk dat de erfgenaam is opgevolgd volgens het testament) verleent tegen hen die door sluwheid (calliditas) degenen die op grond van het testament iets zouden moeten zijn toegekomen om de tuin leiden. Uit Ulpianus’ weergave van het edict blijkt de gerichtheid op het tegengaan van calliditas en het tegengaan van het circumvenire van degene die op grond van het de door de legitieme portie gestelde begrenzingen zijn testament opstelt niet behoeft te vrezen dat de gezamenlijke erfgenamen door een teleurgestelde verwachter wordt aangesproken. 51 Zie ook J.A. Ankum/A.S. Hartkamp, Romeinsrechtelijk handwoordenboek, Zwolle 1973, 43, s.v. edictum: ‘geen gebruik gemaakt hebben van het testament’. 52 De tekst komt oorspronkelijk uit een context passend bij de genoemde context van enkele (door Lenel genoemde) teksten uit Ulpianus’ vijfde boek van zijn Commentaar op het edict, namelijk Ulp. D. 29,4,1,5 en Ulp. D. 29,4,6,1& 3; zie Lenel (noot 31) col. 183, noot 1. Volgens E.J.H. Schrage, Actio en subjectief recht. Over Romeinse en Middeleeuwse wortels van een modern begrip (rede VUAmsterdam), Amsterdam 1977, 21, zegt deze tekst niet meer dan dat ‘de erflater die met inachtneming van positiefrechtelijke bepalingen een testament maakt, of erfgenaam die aanvaardt, in het geheel niet (zelfs niet met de actio de dolo) kan worden aangesproken’.

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testament recht zou hebben op een legaat. Gaius’ opmerking dient men waarschijnlijk zo uit te leggen dat een ieder in beginsel het recht heeft een erfenis te verwerpen (de weigering op zichzelf leidt niet tot dolus malus), maar dat de praetor het frustreren van de wil van de erflater wilde voorkomen. Wat houdt calliditas in? Calliditas kan op twee, geheel tegenovergestelde, wijzen vertaald worden: enerzijds als slimheid53, anderzijds tegenovergesteld als pejoratief namelijk als sluwheid, bedrog54. Callidus en calliditas treden bij de klassieke (literaire) schrijvers regelmatig op als nevenbegrip van dolosus en dolus – en zo ook komt deze verbinding veelvuldig voor in de christelijke literatuur55. De term calliditas komt ook al eerder voor, namelijk in Cicero’s Partitiones oratoriae, onder meer in de passage waarin Cicero de dianoetische deugden (virtutes) opsomt:56 voorzichtigheid (prudentia), slimheid (calliditas)57 en wijsheid (scientia)58.

4.2.3 Dolo malo en iniuria Als gevolg van de gewelddadige turbulente jaren aan het einde van de Republiek introduceerde praetor peregrinus M. Terentius Varro Lucullus in 76 v. Chr. de actie tegen schade veroorzaakt dolo malo vi hominibus armatis coactisve.59 Cicero’s Pro Tullio (72–71 v. Chr.) betrof het doden van een aantal van Marcus Tullius’ slaven en het verwoesten van zijn akker en villa, door het gewelddadige optreden (naar aanleiding van een kwestie inzake betwist grondbezit) van gewapende, bijeen verzamelde mensen, nl. Quintus Fabius’ familia60. Dat zou volgens Cicero zijn gebeurd met boos opzet (dolo malo). Volgens Fabius’ patronus, L. Quinctius, was er geen sprake van boos opzet maar was de zelfver-

53 A. Ernout/A. Meillet, Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue Latine. Histoire des mots, 3e ed., Parijs 1953, 156, s.v. callum; L.J. ter Beek, Dolus. Een semantisch-juridische studie (diss. KUN), I, 1999, 28. 54 Heumann/Seckel (noot 27), s.v. calliditas: Schlauheit, Hinterlist (met verwijzing naar Ulp. D. 4,1,1, Ulp. D. 4,3,1 en Ulp. D. 4,3,1,2, incl. de mededeling dat het woord in de Digesten enkel bij Ulpianus voorkomt). Zie ook ter Beek (noot 52) 33. 55 Ter Beek (noot 53) 28–32. 56 Zie ook K.W. Piderit (ed.), Partitiones oratoriae, Leipzig 1867, p. 64. 57 In [Cicero] Her. 3,2,3, wordt prudentia uitgelegd in termen van calliditas: prudentia est calliditas quae ratione quadam potest dilectum habere bonorum et malorum. 58 Cic. part. orat. 22.76. Zie ook Cic. part. orat. 39.137. 59 Zie over het edict van Lucullus ook S. Galeotti, L’editto di Lucullo e il processo a C. Antonius Hybrida. Osservazioni in tema di “edictum de vi hominibus armatis coactisve”, Revista di diritto romano XVI–XVII (2016–2017), 1 e.v. 60 Cic. pro Tullio 7; 31. Zie over deze redevoering ook W. Drumann/P. Groebe, Geschichte Roms, V, 2e ed., herdruk Hildesheim 1964, 272–277.

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dediging rechtmatig (ergo er was geen iniuria)61. In situaties waarin iniuria ontbreekt in de formula62 zal men vaker een beroep doen op logische kunstgrepen – Quinctus verwijst waarschijnlijk naar een locus communis, een principe dat we nu terugvinden in D. 50,17,55: er is geen sprake van opzet in situaties waarin iemand op grond van eigen recht handelt63. Aangezien de schade met boos opzet door de familia van Quintus Fabius, door geweld van gewapende bijeen verzamelde mannen toegebracht was, kon dit nooit gebeuren met recht64.

4.2.4 De oorspronkelijke context van D. 50,17,55 De edictspassage aangaande het afzien van de verkrijgingsgrond uit testament zag enkel toe op die erfgenamen die het testament hebben verworpen om de nalatenschap te kunnen verkijgen bij versterf en zo te ontsnappen aan de lasten die hen op zijn gelegd bij testament (dat is hun calliditas)65. De aanwezigheid van calliditas van de erfgenaam is nodig voor de toepasselijkheid van het edict. Indien de praetor na kennisneming van de zaak (causae cognitio)66 tot het oordeel kwam dat de oorzaak van de kwestie bij de erflater zelf lag, i. e. dat hij persoonlijk toegestaan heeft bij versterf op te volgen,67 of dat zich enige andere geldige reden (iusta causa) heeft voorgedaan om niet te aanvaarden, dan had de 61 J.W. Crawford, M. Tullius Cicero. The Lost and Unpublished Orations, Göttingen 1984, 47–48. 62 Zie voor een weergave van de vermoedelijke formula in het geschil van Tullius en Fabius, G. Broggini, L’orazione per M. Tullio. Introduzione, in: Tutte le opere di Cicerone, I, Verona 1964, 378: Recuperatores sunto. Quantae pecuniae paret dolo malo familiae P. Fabii vi hominibus armatis coactisve damnum datum esse M. Tullio, dumtaxat sestertium tot milium, tantae pecuniae quadruplum recuperatores P. Fabium M. Tullio condemnato. Si non paret, absolvunto [mijn onderstreping, EvD]. 63 Broggini (noot 62) 384; S. Schipani, Responsabilit/ ex lege Aquilia. Criteri di imputazione e problema della culpa, Turijn 1969, 80. 64 Broggini (noot 62) 388. 65 Zie ook D. 29,4,1 pr. 66 R. Martini, Il problema della causae cognitio pretoria, Milaan 1960, 58–59, stelt dat de uitdrukking causae cognitio niet kan begrepen worden als verwijzing naar de zuivere en eenvoudige bepaling door de praetor van de voorwaarden voor de actie zoals opgenomen in het edict, zoals Lenel stelt in zijn Edictum Perpetuum (3e ed., p. 364); – Als iemand nadat hij de erfenis had verworpen, de nalatenschap alsnog bij versterf in bezit nam, verleende de praetor niet zonder meer een actie (tegen deze persoon). Hij zou het namelijk ook kunnen weigeren, i. e. in de situatie waarin het gedrag van de erfgenaam hem op een of andere manier gerechtvaardigd leek. 67 Uitdrukkelijk of stilzwijgend. Zie ook D. 29,4,6,1 resp. D. 29,4,1,5; – Santalucia (note 32) 75–76. De bevoegdheid om de testamentaire geroepenheid tot de nalatenschap te weigeren wordt, aan de andere kant, niet geacht stilzwijgend te zijn toegekend als de testateur de zoon of de slaaf van de ingestelde heeft aangewezen als substitutus (D. 29,4,26 pr.; D. 29,4,25); hetzelfde geldt wanneer de erflater de erfgenaam heeft belast met een fideicommissum in een codicil bedoeld om geldig te zijn bij de erfopvolging ab intestato, zie D. 29,4,6 pr.

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betrokken legataris geen actie jegens degene die de nalatenschap bij versterf verkregen heeft68. Daarom heeft Gaius, in de passage van zijn commentaar op het edict gewijd aan de verworpen wilsbeschikking, op een bepaald moment kunnen bevestigen dat de erfgenaam die zijn recht uitoefent niet handelt met arglist (zoals het is in het geval waarin hij werkt met toestemming van de erflater)69. Mogelijk was iemand bij testament als erfgenaam ingesteld (institutus), maar was dezelfde persoon tegelijkertijd als substituut-erfgenaam (heres substitutus) ingesteld.70 In dit geval had de erflater er rekening mee gehouden dat erfopvolging bij versterf zou gaan plaatsvinden, namelijk als de eerstingestelde zou weigeren. In dat geval is het edict niet van toepassing omdat de erflater die de erfgenaam (eveneens) tot substituut heeft ingesteld hem de mogelijkheid heeft gegeven aan de erfstelling voorbij te gaan. Het edict werd niet toegepast – niet aanvaarden van de nalatenschap gold niet als arglist – , aangezien hij van zijn recht, hem verleend krachtens testament, gebruik maakte.71 Een andere situatie doet zich voor indien de eigenaar van een tot erfgenaam ingestelde slaaf weigerde zijn slaaf de opdracht te geven de erfenis te aanvaarden om zo vervolgens zelf ab intestato te erven (praetermittere causam testamenti, D. 29.4). De praetor ging een dergelijke calliditas tegen door in zijn edict aan de legataris, na kennisneming van de zaak (causae cognitio), actiones fictitiae te verlenen.72 Gaius’ uitspraak uit D. 50,17,55 verwijst naar een dergelijke situatie, namelijk die specifiek zag op de doortraptheid (calliditas) of fraude van legaten73.

68 Zie D. 29,4,6,3; – Santalucia (noot 32) 76–77. 69 De frase is niet goed begrepen door B. Beinart, The relationship of iniuria and culpa in the lex Aquilia, in: Studi Arangio-Ruiz, I, Napels 1953, 300, die haar plaatst in de verschuiving van het gebruik van het woord iniuria naar culpa in de context van de lex Aquilia (hij verwijst overigens ook naar een andersoortige zaak, namelijk Ulp. D. 43,29,3,2), noch door A. Carcaterra, La definizione dei giuristi romani. Metodo mezzi e fini, Napels 1966, 71–72, die haar ziet als een uitdrukking van het beginsel qui suo iure utitur, neminem laedit en het vergelijkt met Paulus D. 50,17,151 en 173,3, en die het woord dolus wenst te vertalen alsof er damnum zou staan; noch door C. Giofreddi, I principi del diritto penale romano, Turijn 1970, 91, die de verbinding niet legt met de oorspronkelijke context. Giofreddi stelt dat de tekst strikt genomen niet verwijst naar legitieme zelfverdediging, maar wel goed op die wijze zou kunnen worden uitgelegd. Hij stelt dat D. 50,17,55 naar opzet verwijst en dat in deze tekst de uitoefening van eigen recht wordt gezien als de uitsluiting van de onrechtmatigheid. 70 Zie ook Daube, ZRG RA 76 (1959) 215. De betrokkene had, na het overlijden van de erflater, het testament verworpen en de substitutie aanvaard (die, zo moet men aannemen, met minder lasten (legaten) verbonden was). 71 D. 29,4,1,5. 72 J.C. van Oven, Leerboek van Romeinsch privaatrecht, Leiden 1948, 547, die ook nog andere voorbeelden geeft. 73 Zie ook MacCormack, BIDR 1993–1994, 142, die ook schrijft dat men Gaius’ uitspraak niet te algemeen dient te formuleren, aangezien er ook andere zaken uit de het midden van de klassieke periode zijn waarin het uitoefenen van een recht, als beschouwd als misbruik, behandeld werd als een voorbeeld van dolus.

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Het ontstaan van het beginsel neminem laedit qui jure suo utitur

In de literatuur wordt het (bestaan van het) beginsel van qui suo iure utitur neminem laedit gebaseerd op meerdere teksten in het Corpus Iuris74. Zoals bleek uit het voorgaande was dit geen algemeen uitgangspunt in het klassieke Romeinse recht75. De tekst van D. 50,17,55 werd echter in de zesde eeuw door de compilatoren gegeneraliseerd, mogelijk door het interpoleren van nullus in de bestaande tekst, maar in ieder geval door de plaatsing in D. 50,17. Daardoor werd deze regel later een retorische topos, die de advocaat of raadsman kon hanteren telkens wanneer het paste bij het standpunt dat zij naar voren wensten te brengen, bijv. in een discussie over misbruik van bevoegdheid76. Het bestaan van het principe dat iemand die van zijn rechten gebruik maakt nooit aansprakelijk is heeft terrein gewonnen onder het Justiniaanse recht77. Dan is deze regel immers een algemene regel geworden. Het adagium verkrijgt namelijk duidelijk algemene waarde enkel door de afsplitsing uit de context waarin dit oorspronkelijk figureerde. Het beginsel hierin geformuleerd kan ook worden teruggevonden in andere Digestenteksten78. Blijft iemand binnen de grenzen van zijn rechten dan handelt hij niet arglistig79 en evenmin brengt hij claimbare schade toe aan een ander80. In Inst. 1,8,2 – de parallelplaats van Gai. inst. 1,53 – haalt Justinianus bovendien Gaius’ tekst uit de privaatrechtelijke context en plaatst het in de sfeer van het publieke welzijn81. Ondanks deze uitbreiding en generalisatie 74 Zie ook G.I. Luzzatto, Procedura civile Romana, I, Bologna 1946, 10 e.v., die onder meer verwijst naar D. 50,17,55, D. 19,1,42, D. 50,17,155,1, D. 50,17,151, D. 43,29,3,2 en D. 47,10,13,1 en D. 47,10,33. 75 Zie ook Maranca, Studi Albertoni (noot 47) 470–471; – Stein (noot 34) 120 stelt dat D. 50,17,55 een beginsel bevat dat we ook terugvinden bij andere Romeinse juristen bij diverse bijzondere situaties, zoals bijv. in D. 39,2,24,12. Zie ook reeds Daube, ZRG RA LXXVI (1959) 215, die ook nog verwijst naar D. 39,2,26. 76 Maranca, Studi Albertoni (noot 47) 470–471. 77 Zie bijvoorbeeld E.-H. Perreau, Origines et d8veloppement de la th8orie de l’abus du droit, Revue g8n8rale du droit 1913,483, die naast D. 50,17,55, ook naar D. 50,17,155, D. 50,17,151 en D. 50,17,129 pr. verwijst; – Hoewel sommige teksten geen aansprakelijkheid lijken aan te nemen voor misbruik van recht (D. 39,2,24,12, D. 50,17,55 en D. 50,17,151), blijkt uit andere teksten dat er een verbod bestond op sommige vormen van misbruik van recht en fraus legis (zoals bijv. misbruik van het recht om te procederen). Zie A. Saydé, Abuse of EU Law and Regulation of the Internal Market, Oxford 2014, 33–34. 78 Santalucia (noot 32) 75 verwijst naar D. 50,17,151, D .50,17,155,1; D. 43,29,3,2; D. 47,10,13,1; – Zie ook Grosso, ED I, 161–162. 79 D. 50,17,155,1; D. 43,29,3,2. 80 D. 50,17,151; – Luzzatto (noot 74) 10–11. Zie voor de voor of een doctrine van misbruik van recht aanwezig was in de periode van de receptie, en daarna, J.E. Scholtens, Abuse of Rights, S. African L.J. 75 (1958) 39–49. 81 Spruit (noot 15) 96.

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zijn de Justiniaanse compilatoren niet gekomen tot een (begin van een ontwikkelde) leer van rechtsmisbruik – algemene regels daaromtrent ontbreken in de titel D. 50,16 en 17 en dat terwijl het gebod malitiis non indulgendum esse gemakkelijk had kunnen worden veralgemeniseerd. Dit is niet gebeurd, dit gebod is desalniettemin in D. 6,1,38 blijven staan82. Op basis van het Corpus Iuris kan men stellen dat de vereiste onrechtmatigheid bij zaaksbeschadiging (damnum iniuria datum) werd weggenomen door bijzondere omstandigheden, zoals blijkt uit D. 50,17,55 en andere teksten – in de latere Europese rechtsgeschiedenis werden deze teksten samengevat in de bekende latere formulering neminem laedit qui suo iure utitur83. In de Middeleeuwen heeft de regel neminem laedit qui jure suo utitur voorspoed gekend, en is het een regel van gewoonterecht geworden84. Ook later, in de negentiende eeuw in Nederland, werd naar D. 50,17,55 verwezen, en wel bij de voor art. 1401 (oud) BW vereiste onrechtmatigheid. Deze tekst werd toen begrepen (en dus ge"nterpreteerd) als zijnde een uitdrukking van het beginsel dat wie handelt in de uitoefening van zijn recht, niet onrechtmatig handelt85. De verwijzing in de 19de eeuw bij art. 1401 (oud) BW naar D. 50,7,55 volgt de zojuist beschreven gerecipieerde betekenis van deze tekst, een tekst die enkel nog woordelijk overeenkomsten vertoont met de klassieke context waarin hij ontstaan is.

82 83 84 85

Spruit (noot 15) 98. Helmich (noot 6) 26. Markovitch (noot 19), 34–35. C.L. Schüller, Burgerlijk wetboek, met aantekeningen, Utrecht 1841, 257; G. van Maanen, Onrechtmatige daad tussen BW en NBW. Overeenkomsten en verschillen in de wettelijke struktuur van de artt. 1401 en 1402 BW 1838 en art. 6.3.1.1 NBW, GROM 2 (1985) 10.

Gustaaf van Nifterik

Remarks on a reference of Grotius to Vitoria. A scholastic reading

1.

Introduction: Grotius, Vitoria, Vázquez, Jan Hallebeek and I

Grotius in one of his most radical chapters, chapter xiii of his De jure praedae (written 1604–1606, first published 1868), referred to the Spaniards Francisco Vitoria and Fernando V#zquez to substantiate the claim that the power of the state (respublica) remains intact even after the establishment of a principate. So truly intact indeed, he continued, that according to Vitoria a state may change princes or dynasties1. Grotius is on his way to argue for the legitimacy of the war fought by the States Assembly of Holland against the Spanish King, heading for the argument that “[i]f the absence or negligence of the prince makes it permissible for inferior magistrates to undertake a war, how much more surely is this permissible when the prince himself does the state an injury that can be checked only by resort to arms”2 ? In the light of my recent research I could stay with Grotius. But in this paper in honor of Jan Hallebeek I turn to the two Spaniards instead. For Grotius the reference to the Spaniards was of course particularly spicy since he was writing in defense of an act of war against the king of Spain. For me the references are of particular value since Jan and I meet in Spain if it comes to scholarly interest, more specifically in the town of Salamanca in the sixteenth century. But apart from this shared scholarly interest, the references caught my attention for substantive reasons also. The saying that “the power of the state remains intact even after the establishment of a principate” does not seem to fit in Vitoria’s ideas on “constitutional law”3. So what to make of Grotius’ references 1 I have used the English translation that can be found in the Liberty Fund: H. Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, M.J. van Ittersum (ed.). Based on the translation and edition by G.L. Williams/W.H. Zeydel, Indianapolis 2006. The reference is in chapter xiii, 393. 2 Grotius (note 1) 394. 3 I place “constitutional law” between marks, because I think the sixteenth-century theologian Vitoria himself would not know he had views on this topic at all; not only because he was a

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in chapter xiii of his De jure praedae? Was he only decorating his text, or did he have a point in calling in Spanish views on constitutional law to substantiate his claim? I turn to V#zquez first, for he is relatively easy to handle (in this respect). Next I’ll turn to Vitoria.

2.

Vázquez

The reference to Fernando V#zquez should not surprise us. The reference is to his collection of illustrious controversies of his time, Controversiae illustres (1564). In this collection V#zquez (who by the way lectured in Valladolid, not in Salamanca) tackled legal controversies, many of them on constitutional issues. He grounded his solutions in his general rule that precedes all his theoretical endeavors, the principle saying that princes exist for the sake of the people, and not the other way round4. Grotius’ reference is to Controversiae illustres I.47.11, a paragraph in which V#zquez answered the difficult question formulated earlier in the chapter (paragraph 9): do the people still have the power to make law when they have a prince5 ? V#zquez answered that if the people have the practice of making laws or customs for themselves, and of proclaiming them without the prince’s approval, it must be assumed that they have indeed reserved this power for themselves at the time they choose the prince to rule over them. If on the other hand it can be proved, or if there is a tradition, that only the prince has the power to proclaim laws, or that the people’s laws and customs only get into force after the prince’s approbation, than the opposite must be assumed, i. e. that the people have not reserved anything of the kind for themselves. If neither can be approved, than we must assume that the people have preserved for themselves the power to make laws. For, generally speaking, it would be unfavorable for a people to abdicate this power completely, which therefore is not to be presumed: populo autem hanc potestatem a se ex toto abdicasse nocentissimum esset, & contra praesumptionem. These are the conclusions V#zquez drew from some constitutional commonplaces in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, such as D. 1,1,9 (lex Omnes populi, saying theologian, but also because the discipline itself by then did not exist. It is, I hope, a necessary and therefore excusable anachronism. 4 This regula is most clearly and explicitly stated in Controversiae illustres I.1.10: omnes omnino principatus (…) ob publicam ipsorum civium utilitatem, non etiam ob regentium commoda, inventos, craetos, receptos, admissosque fuisse and is repeated and rephrased over and over again throughout the book. I’ve made use of the Latin/Castilian edition F. Vasquius Menchacensis/F. V#zquez de Menchaca, Controversiarum illustrium aliarumque usu frequentium libri tres/Controversias fundamentals y otra de m#s frequente uso expuestas en tres libros, transcription, translation and notes D.F. Rodriguez Alcalde, Valladolid 1931–1934. 5 Controversiae illustres I.47.9: Populus regem habens, an leges sibi ferre possit? Ardua questio.

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inter alia that the law which each nation has set up as a law unto itself is special to that particular civitas and is called jus civile, civil law, as being that which is proper to the particular civil society ; quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque ius civile), Inst. 1,2,11 (par. Sed naturalia, saying that those laws which each state establishes for itself are liable to frequent change whether by tacit consent of the people, or by subsequent legislation; quae ipsa sibi quaeque civitas constituit, saepe mutari solent vel tacito consensu populi vel alia postea lege lata) and D. 1,2,2,9 (par. Deinde quia difficile, in which we find that necessity imposed upon the senate trusteeship of the commonwealth; necessitas ipsa curam reipublicae ad senatum deduxit)6. For his final conclusion that a total abdication of legislative authority is contra preasumptionem, V#zquez turned to the title in the Digest on proof and presumptions, in particular to D. 22,3,25 pr (lex Cum de indebito), a text on the burden of proof in case of an alleged unjust payment. The relevance of this particular text for the question at hand is at first sight less obvious, as the fragment is not on constitutional law at all. But between the lines of the fragment we read that no payer is ever so careless as to throw his money around and waste it on debts not owed (qui enim solvit numquam ita resupinus est, ut facile suas pecunias iactet et indebitas effundat). Men are apt to keep for themselves all that’s precious to them, among which, according to V#zquez, freedom7. Therefore we must assume that the people will always be prudent in attributing legislative power to their prince. If in doubt, the benefit is on the side of the people, or indeed: on the side of freedom. One could say that’s the substance of V#zquez’ theory. We can conclude that V#zquez’ paragraph on the people’s power to legislate, is indeed relevant in the context of Grotius’ discussion on the people’s authority to enter into a war “even when they are ruled by a prince”. The asserted authorities of the people differ, but the underlying ideas are more or less identical (V#zquez’s is in fact more variegated): it might well be the case that a prince shares (some of) his powers with the people he rules over, and that indeed “the power of the state remains intact even after the establishment of a principate”.

6 The translation of the Digest-fragments are by A. Watson; the translation from the Institutes is by J.A.C. Thomas. 7 See especially A.S. Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature. Individual Rights in Later Scholastic Thought, Cambridge 1997, chapter 5 and G.P. van Nifterik, Vorst tussen volk en wet. Over volkssoevereiniteit en rechtsstatelijkheid in het werk van Fernando V#zquez de Menchaca (1512–1569), Rotterdam 1999, passim.

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Vitoria

As indicated above, the text of Vitoria that Grotius referred to is not so easy to incorporate in the broader context of Vitoria’s constitutional ideas. In De jure praedae (chapter xiii) we find Grotius saying that Vitoria “proves that the state may change one prince for another or transfer the principate from one dynasty to another. In this connexion, Victoria mentions as an example [the deposition of Childeric by] the Franks”. Grotius’ reference is to Vitoria’s Relectio V (better known as De indis, relectio prior), sectio III (“On the lawful titles whereby the aborigines of America could have come into the power of Spain”)8. The paragraph Grotius refers to, paragraph 16, says that the Indian aborigines could have come under the sway of the Spaniards through true and voluntary choice. The relevant phrases read: It follows that if there was a Christian majority in any community or country, and they wished to have a Christian prince for the sake of the faith and for the common good, I believe they could elect such a prince and abandon their allegiance to their infidel masters, even against the opposition of the remainder of the population. By this I mean that they could elect a prince not only for themselves, but for the whole commonwealth. In this way the Franks changed princes for the good of their commonwealth, and transferred Childeric’s crown to Pepin, the father of Charlemagne; this change of dynasty was approved by Pope Zacharias.

The words themselves are clear enough and fit to substantiate Grotius’ claim that a people might still have certain “constitutional” powers – such as making war, legislation, or (as is the case here) the power of choosing their prince – even if they actually are ruled by a prince. My problem is to fit the words in Vitoria’s ideas on civil power. Let’s first have a look at the deposition of Childeric mentioned by Vitoria. Childeric III was the last of the Merovingians, the king – so the story goes – whose hair, symbol of the magical power of the Frankish kings, was cut off in 751 by Pepin III. Although Chelderic had been king before the haircut, he had always had only the title of King (nomen regis) but no regal power (potestas regia); the power had always rested with the maior domus, the Mayor of the Palace9. Originally the manager of the household, the office of Mayor of the Palace had by 751 become the archetypal of a power behind the throne. Pepin, also known as Pepin the Short, and maybe even better known as the father of Charles the Great, had 8 Throughout this section, the references are to F. de Vitoria, Political Writings, A. Pagden/J. Lawrance (ed.), Cambridge 2010. The quote is from his On the American Indians 3.6 (par. 16), 289. 9 R. Schneider, Königswahl und Königserhebung im Frühmittelalter. Untersuchungen zur Herrschaftsnachfolge bei den Langobarden und Merowingern, Stuttgart 1972, 186.

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succeeded his father Charles Martel as Mayor of the Palace of Neustria, and from 747 ruled over the entire Frankish realm, after his brother had withdrawn to a monastic life. There are several versions of what had happened in 75110. One version is the story as told by Vitoria De indis 3,16: the Franks wanted to change sovereigns, deposed Childeric and elected Pepin in his place; Pepin’s kingship was subsequently sanctioned by Pope Zacharias. There is however another version that we can find in Vitoria’s De potestate ecclesiae I11. In the context of the question of the power of the pope in temporal matters, Vitoria discussed the opinion of some who argue that the pope has such powers indeed, and who substantiate their view by arguing that pope Zacharias deposed Childeric III and raised Pepin III to the throne; Vitoria’s source here is the canon Alius item (Decretum C.15, qu.6, c.3). In this canonical version the initiative lies with pope Zacharias. A third version of the story starts with Pepin, who was “eager to adorn his authority with the robes of monarchy”12. Pepin, who desired the Church’s blessings for the coup he had planned, asked pope Zacharias in advance if it was right that a king without power should continue to be a king? The bishop of Rome, in need of (armed) protection to secure his feeble position, answered that it was not right at all, whereupon Pepin terminated Childeric’s authority with a haircut. As he wished to legitimate his brute actions afterwards, a great assembly of the Frankish peers was subsequently summoned, by whom Pepin was elected king. Even if we, with the editors of the Cambridge edition Political Writings of Vitoria13, assume that Vitoria himself clung to the first version and left the initiative with the Frankish nobles, the story sits haphazardly in his ideas on civil power, for which we should turn to his Relectio De potestate civili14. From a legal point of view the constitutional theory told in that Relectio is quite clear. God created men “frail, weak, helpless and vulnerable, destitute of all defense and lacking all things” (paragraph 4) and hence in need of social cooperation; therefore civil society must be part of God’s plan. Since a body, such as the civil society or commonwealth, cannot persist without a head, i. e. a governing power, also the power to rule this body must be ordained by God. Because it is troublesome for the multitude of men to act and speak with one voice, the voice of the entire body, it happens that societies delegate the authority (auctoritas) to wield this power (potestas) to rule to one (or a few), elected for that purpose. The main 10 For an overview of the sources see E. Perels, Pippins Erhebung zum König, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 53 (1934), 400–416. 11 Vitoria, On the power of the church I, 5.9, par. 19 (Vitoria, note 8, 99). 12 This is the story as told by T. Holland, Millenium. The End of the World and the Forging of Christendom, London 2008, 21–23. 13 Vitoria (note 8) 289, note 85. 14 Vitoria (note 8) 1–44: On civil power.

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points for Vitoria are that civil power itself is divinely instituted, that consequently resistance to legitimate rulers is resistance to the ordinance of God, and that there is no question of two powers, one belonging to the sovereign and another to the community15. So we find only one civil power in each civil society, and the authority to wield this power can either be with the community, or with a few, or with only one. It is here that we reach the critical point: should we not consider the deposition of one ruler and election of another ruler an exercise of (civil) power? But if a society’s civil power has been delegated to a ruler, and if there is no question of two powers, should we not consequently assume that the people (or society, or commonwealth, or respublica) ruled by a prince does no longer have the power to depose one ruler and elect another? And if so, would then not Vitoria’s De indis as quoted by Grotius be in contradiction to what Vitoria had said in his De potestate civili? Let’s have a closer look at the relevant fragments. The canonical version of the deposition in De potestate ecclesiae I, the one in which the initiative lies with pope Zacharias, appears in the paragraphs where Vitoria discussed the pope’s power over temporal matters and over worldly princes, kings and emperors (questio 5). His conclusion: the pope has temporal power only in cases of necessity, that is, when the salvation of souls and religion is at stake (to be found and deduced from questio 5.9). It follows that deposition of one prince and raising another to the throne might indeed be within the pope’s power “in cases where it is necessary for the avoidance of disturbances in the realm, or the protection of religion against pagans or other such matters”16. The version of the “Childeric-Pepin-Zacharias” story in which the initiative lies with the Frankish people, the text Grotius referred to and probably the version that Vitoria himself favored, is found in question 3 of Vitoria’s De indis, on the just titles by which the barbarians of the New World passed under the rule of the Spaniards. In the sixth article to that question (paragraph 16) Vitoria envisages the possibility that the barbarians “recognized the wisdom and humanity of the Spaniards’ administration, and one and all, both masters and subjects, spontaneously decided to accept the king of Spain as their prince.” And, he continued, we don’t even need the decision of “one and all”: a majority is sufficient. Then follows the text that I quoted in the Introduction. Apart from these two passages in which Vitoria refers to Childeric, Pepin and Zacharias, there is yet another fragment that is important in our context. In his commentaries on Saint Thomas known as De lege (also known as his Lectiones in ST I–II, 90–105) we find in paragraph 137, concerning the question of a people that wants to change the form of government or rulership, an explicit con15 These conclusions are drawn in paragraph 8 (Vitoria, note 8, 16–7). 16 Vitoria (note 8) 100.

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firmation of what we already deduced from the De potestate civili, namely that since there is no question of two powers, the commonwealth that has transferred its power to a king unconditionally “cannot later ask for its authority back (…). It is no longer lawful for it to change its rule, even if it is expedient to do so”17. However – and this is something we have not and could not have deduced from his De potestate civili, for the simple reason that it’s not in it – if the king turns out to rule tyrannically the commonwealth can depose him, “because even if the commonwealth had given away its authority it keeps its natural right to defend itself.” The right of the commonwealth to defend itself, we may conclude, is not alienated when the authority to rule is delegated. As it is, I suggest three possible approaches to our interpretations of Vitoria’s thoughts on the question of the deposition of a legitimate ruler. I label these approaches “modern”, “contextual” and “scholastic”. First the modern approach, an approach that we for instance find in the Introduction to the edition of Vitoria’s Political Writings18. One could conclude that there is a contradiction, or an impasse, in Vitoria’s work where he on the one hand concedes the Frankish nobles a right to change sovereigns of their own free will, while on the other hand saying that after having transferred its power to a prince the people cannot later ask for its authority back. And one could leave it like that: a contradiction. A contextual approach could be based on what Hasso Höpfl denotes a characteristic feature of scholastic writings and teachings, the “insulating power of context”. By this he means that often in scholastic thought a statement (for instance: “man is naturally free”) that is important or even fundamental in one context (slavery), has no specific argumentative value in another (the topic of political power)19. If we return to our subject: in the context of Spanish rule over the Indians voluntary submission could be relevant and permissible even if this would imply the deposition by the people of a previous heathen prince, while in the context of a discussion on political power a people must be denied the authority of changing rulers at its own free will. Finally, a scholastic approach would demand the interpreter to harmonize the texts. One could suggest, for instance, that “apparently” Vitoria supposed an urgent need for the Franks to change kings out of self-defense, or a papal concern 17 On article 2 of Thomas, STh. I–II, 105 (Vitoria, note 8, 200). 18 The Introduction, so the Editor’s note says, is by A. Pagden. I refer here to Vitoria (note 8) xx where we read that concerning the subjects’ right to resist a king or pontiff versus the duty not to question any duly constituted authority for Vitoria “there was no way out of this impasse”. 19 H. Höpfl, Scholasticism in Quentin Skinner’s Foundations, in: A. Brett/J. Tully/H. Hamilton-Bleakley (eds.), Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Cambridge 2006, p. 113–129. Höpfl derived the concept from C.S. Lewis (126: “what C.S. Lewis somewhere describes as the ‘insulating power of context’”). The example of man being naturally free is used by Höpfl on 127.

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for the salvation of Frankish souls or Christian religion, that prompted the people, or the pope, to depose Childeric and to elect or raise Pepin in his place.

4.

Concluding remarks

It’s time to draw some conclusions. I started this query by asking whether Grotius in his De jure praedae was only decorating his position with Spanish references, or whether he really had a point in calling in Spanish constitutional thought to substantiate his claim that the power of the state remains intact even after the establishment of a principate. We concluded that he certainly had a point in calling V#zquez as his witness. Unless proven otherwise, popular power must indeed be assumed concerning legislation, so concluded V#zquez. And we may safely presume that we can read this statement far more generally : if in doubt, the benefit is always on the side of the people and of freedom. As for Grotius’ reference to Vitoria, things are a bit more complicated. Either approach we choose, the reference is troublesome. The modern approach leads to the conclusion that Grotius might not have misinterpreted the text he is referring to, but it would at the same time entail that the reference is of not much value since the source is unreliable for being contradictory (on this specific point). A critic of Grotius could point to Vitoria’s De potestate civili saying the exact opposite, which would undermine Grotius’ position seriously. From a contextual approach Vitoria’s story on Childeric and Pepin would be relevant in the specific context of (Spanish?) titles to rule over Indians, but not necessarily so in the context of the right of inferior magistrates (i. e. the States Assembly of Holland) to make the war Grotius is writing on. Approaching the question as a scholastic would give the story of Chileric, Pepin and Zacharias significance if we assume self-defense on the side of the Frankish people, or a need for salvation of souls or religion; otherwise the text would not be in harmony with Vitoria’s thought on civil government. But such a situation of urgent need is not what Grotius had in mind when claimed that the power of the state remains intact even after the establishment of a principate. Therefore, the reference would in this reading not be of much worth. There is however an escape. The more specific and more important conclusion that Grotius wants his readers to reach with him just a little further along the track, was that the Dutch were permitted to resort to arms because their prince had done the state an injury. On another occasion, years after writing his De jure praedae, Grotius in De jure belli ac pacis (1625) referred to Vitoria to underscore the statement that “all statements, no matter how general, are to be

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interpreted in the light of equity (aequitatem interpretem)”20. The reference here is to Vitoria’s Relectio VI (De Indis, relectio posterior, commonly referred to as De jure belli), paragraph 921. In these fragments both Grotius and Vitoria discussed the question of the right of lesser magistrates to wage war (identical contexts), and both hold as a rule that they don’t have this right, since only highest authorities do. But in addition, Vitoria said “this license and authority to wage war may be conferred by necessity”, and necessitas may indeed legitimate wars by cities or dukes, wars waged for self-defense. If we return to where we started, the context of De jure praedae and the legitimacy of the States Assembly of Holland’s war against the Spanish King, we find that this more profound claim of Grotius can find explicit and contextual support in the reference to Vitoria’s De jure belli. And Grotius’ claim that the power of the state remains intact after the establishment of a principate could be supported by a scholastic reading of Vitoria’s reference to Childeric and Pepin, if we read “the right of self-defense of the state [remains intact]” for “the power of the state”. Even if strictly speaking it was not a situation of necessity that Grotius had in mind in the lines to which the reference was specifically added, he was well on his way to claim that the Dutch indeed had to defend themselves against their injurious ruler – just as the Franks, according to the scholastic reading, in 751 had to defend themselves against their king Childeric. It is doubtful whether Vitoria would have agreed on the Spanish king having injured the Dutch people; but that’s a topic beyond the scope of this contribution in honor of Jan Hallebeek.

20 Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis I.3.4.3. The translation of F.W. Kelsey, Oxford/London 1925, has “in the light of justice” for aequitas. 21 Vitoria (note 8) 301–2.

Maurice van Stiphout

On the role of the laws of the state and Canon Law in the 19th and early 20th centuries “Only in history this fundamental desacralization releases all its implications” E. Schillebeeckx O.P.1

1.

Introduction

Our friend Jan Hallebeek has always been a keen scout and promoter of young researchers in the field of legal history, especially the history of canon law in relation to ecclesiology2. It is our aim to show in this short article, written in his honor, that there is always a direct link between the inner life of churches – or better : groups with all philosophies of life – and the society in which they exist, even if this fact seems to contradict the “official” view of that church, religion or philosophy of life3. Object of this study is the Roman Catholic Church in NorthWestern Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The oldest adage for the separation of church and state, formulated at the end of the 18th century expressed the intention to bring about freedom of religion for all citizens. It read: “no dominant church”. At the time, the Roman Catholic Church could not immediately formulate a suitable theological answer to the new developments in politics and society, since theological reflection requires a great deal of time and a stable framework. The Church’s “theological answer” to the new developments could for this reason be nothing other than a combination of post-Tridentine theology, notably expressed by the famous theologian Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621), and prejudices that had developed in the period prior to the revolution. Nevertheless, the Church was able to phrase legal answers to the new challenges as shown at the end of this article4. 1 E. Schillebeeckx, Het leed der ervaring van Gods verborgenheid, in Vox Theologica, XXXVI, no. 2, 1966, 92–124. The citation concerns Gen. 1, 15 can be found on page 97 (own translation). 2 J. Hallebeek, Bericht über die kirchenrechtsgeschichtliche Forschung im Gebiet der Niederlande und Belgien, ZRG KA 91 (2005) 421–445. 3 In the rest of this article I mostly use the term “church” or “churches”. These words can however also stand for churches, structured religions and also philosophies of life which are, from a sociological viewpoint, similar to churches and religions. 4 This article is based on the thesis I presented on 12 May 2011 to obtain the doctorate of laws at

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The structure of this paper is as follows: firstly it argues that the introduction of democracy and the possibility of social upward mobility for all posed one of the most important challenges for churches during the last two centuries, especially for the Roman Catholic Church – a relationship hardly noticed by theologians and church lawyers in scientific literature5. The fact that a person had been granted a right to vote and thus to make his voice heard in politics – the motor of civil society – and, at least in theory, was now free in choosing his profession, confronted the church with the fundamental question why civil society as a whole can change, but not the church within it, at least in certain aspects of its organization. It is especially this obvious paradox, which caused theological and philosophical problems in all Christian churches during the slow transformation process of Western societies into democracies during the 19th and 20th centuries. Secondly, the focus is on the role of the socio-juridical context of the local church in the given period, since the framework of secular legislation could both provide possibilities for churches to develop internally, or prohibit their development. This process of change will be illustrated by capita selecta from the history of the Roman Catholic Church in France in the period 1790–1924. The paper closes with a summary of the role of Roman Catholic Canon law in this process.

2.

General aspects of the separation of church and state

a.

Gelijktijdige ongelijkheid (concurrent disparity)

The first outcome of the separation of church and state – the situation in which there is no longer a direct link between the state and a specific (dominant or sometimes non-dominant) church and in which formally citizens of all denothe University of Groningen. In my thesis I focused on the legal and ecclesiological developments in the Roman Catholic Church in the period 1790–1965 as a result of and in reaction with changes in the socio-juridical context both on the levels of the hierarchy in Rome and the local churches, especially in France and Germany. The choice for France and Germany was the result of the fact that the most influential Roman Catholic theological thinking during the late 19th and early 20th centuries came from these countries: M.A.H.P. van Stiphout, Scheiding van kerk en staat en de ontwikkeling van de kerk tot een zelfstandige geloofsgemeenschap. Studies over de rooms-katholieke kerk vanuit juridisch perspectief (1790–1965), Den Haag, 2011 (with English summary). For this paper especially (parts of) the chapters V and VI are used. Jan Hallebeek always regretted that this study was not available in English, therefore I here offer him my most important findings and conclusions. 5 For example: when in Prussia in 1807 dependency and serfdom were abrogated by law this fact had consequences for two third of the total population of that country.

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minations have equal opportunities to participate in the organs of state – is that all churches as groups and their members as individuals have the fundamental right, often laid down in the national constitution, to be different from each other. Churches and their members do not only have the right to be different, they may as well freely express different opinions – as consequence of the freedom of expression – orally, in writing, and by all other means, found political parties, pressure groups etc., as long as these activities stay within the boundaries of the secular laws protecting public order and the rights and freedoms of others in the state in which this church is operative. It is possible to hold opinions on the structure and quality of civil society that totally diverge from the dominant ones. Even criticizing the existing civil society is for this reason a legally accepted possibility. The limits of this freedom are, however, reached – from the viewpoint of the state – when the religious or philosophical group propagates the use of force to realize its ideals. The safety valves protecting the state also apply, when the democratic process is used to change the structure of society and the possible winner is on forehand indicating that he will completely change the structure of the democratic system according to his own theological or philosophical ideas.

b.

Gelijktijdige ongelijktijdigheid (Concurrent non-synchronism)

The second outcome of the separation of church and state is that every church – but also the state – develops at its own pace in a process of reflection to its own dogma’s and structures, and in the light of the changes of the socio-juridical context. The results of this reflection may differ from church to church, and the moment they are reached as well. Here, the developments are always affected by the material possibilities of a given church, such as finances, manpower, legal know how etc. There is a danger here that a dominant party – this may be a church but most often it is the state – tries to apply its (specific) views on the other parties without taking into account these internal differences.

c.

The development of legitimate internal diversity

In the context of a democratic society with freedom of speech and separation of church and state, sooner or later – because the process of democratization is slow – in every church different opinions will develop among its members about their own situation as believers and that of their church as a whole within the socio-juridical context of the given country. As result of this process – on the basis of either the Bible and Tradition, other fundamental Holy texts, or even

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fundamental legal texts in as far as non-religious philosophies of life are concerned – the participation of the believers or members of these groups in the political field will cover the whole political party spectrum from the far right to the far left, and everything that is inbetween. This process is inevitable. The only exceptions are very small churches or other similar groups with the opportunity of maintaining a strong social control on the thinking of their believers or members. For the majority of churches, however, there is no possibility of escaping this development. This implies that on the basis of the (dogmatic) fundaments proper to a certain church its church leaders, theologians and canon lawyers must develop a whole gamma of compatible models connecting the possible options for the community of believers in this church6. The social and political situation in which it is possible to present only one model for each church, religion of philosophy of life, is definitely over : the [Roman] Catholic, the Calvinist, the Humanist does not and cannot exist any longer. Consequently, it is impossible to return to the “one model” option yearned for by conservative groups of Catholics (or Christians in general) and – at the other side of the spectrum – proponents of a so called “modern” church vision, heavily influenced by the views of the secular state and its laws. The interaction between the church and the socio-juridical context in a specific country results in internal diversity in that church. It is this legitimate internal diversity that makes theological development in the church possible7. On the other hand: in a context where dictatorship is providing a stable, but unchangeable social context, it seems there are no possibilities for inner church developments, because the interaction with changes in civil society are lacking. The clearest example for this phenomenon can be found in the differences in Roman Catholic thinking that surfaced during the Second Vatican Council 6 Difference of opinion concerning the (interpretation of) dogmas and (the ideal) structure of the own church is normal in every church, religion and philosophy of life. Difference of opinion and discussions do not necessarily mean that these are signs of decline or leading to separation as one might think reading the websites and blogs nowadays especially of conservative Christians and Muslims. In every sound theological or political system there are always several – Barion says always two – options to formulate answers for basic questions. See in defense of this opinion very explicit the German canon lawyer Hans Barion (1899–1973): H. Barion, “Weltgeschichtliche Machtform”? Eine Studie zur Politischen Theologie des II. Vatikanischen Konzils, in: H. Barion/E.W. Böckenförde/E. Forsthoff/W. Weber (eds.), Epirrhosis. Festgabe für Carl Schmitt, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1968 (2 vol.), vol. I, 13–59, here especially § 9, 17–18. 7 The use of the term “developments” in this paper – as in my doctoral thesis – does not necessarily mean “progression”. For example: the legitimate demand to freely use the old – Tridentine also called usus antiquor – liturgy in the Roman Catholic church is an expression of the diversity within the community of believers. This is however – how ironically it may sound – a modern development, although not a sign of a progressive view on the life of the church by these specific members of the community of believers.

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(1962–1965): no input for possible church renewal was coming out of countries such as Spain (Franco regime), Portugal (Salazar regime), Poland and the rest of Eastern-Europe and Russia, or Latin America. Only the North-Western European and Northern American (USA & Canada) countries – all democracies with separation of church and state and freedom of religion, which provide the sociojuridical background for catholic reflection on the position of the church in a modern world – brought input.

d.

Ecumenism, interreligious dialogue and mutual cooperation of the churches

The separation of church and state has also changed the mutual contacts between the concerned churches, religions and philosophies of life in that country. Firstly, the possibilities of keeping good relations and the striving for collaboration between the churches and other religious or philosophy based groups should be mentioned. This is the focus of ecumenism and interreligious dialogue8. Ecumenism and interreligious dialogue can only take shape where the state no longer protects a specific (dominant, or in some cases non-dominant) church and where the other churches and philosophy based groups are equally protected by the fundamental rights of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, etc. This is a process that cannot be realized in a short period of time, but needs a prolonged period to bear fruit. Unfortunately, the dominant influence of the fact that the political aims in Western society must be realized faster and faster every year, encumbers the process of ecumenism between churches and the processes of interreligious dialogues between churches, religions and philosophies of life. The obvious decline of ecumenism and religious dialogue in our days is not only a result of the aging of the people engaged in it; there is a more structural problem involved, namely the fact that this process needs a longer time to be able to flourish. Secondly, the separation of state and church influences the situation of the churches on the one side and the secular state on the other. Here, churches are able to work together much faster than in ecumenism, because this type of cooperation is of a more formal kind; the participants need not agree on theological aspects. Normally this form of cooperation exists side by side with the 8 The actual lack of protection of the Christian churches in Northern-Africa and the Middle East can be the reason why real ecumenism between these churches is not possible and also why a real interreligious dialogue with Islam in those countries is impossible. Ecumenism and interreligious dialogue in these regions are only possible when separation of church – or better : of mosque – and state are introduced, together with freedom of religion, freedom of speech etc. and especially real democracy which is the first – and hardest! – step to be taken.

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attempts to come to ecumenism and interreligious dialogue, often even by the same people. Getting to know and appreciate each other is a very important element of this collaboration. After describing the different facets that can and will occur sooner or later within a local church or similar philosophy based group against the background of separation of church and state, democracy, and freedom of religion etc., etc. it is time to look at some capita selecta from the history of the Roman Catholic Church in France during the 19th and early 20th centuries to distinct different phases in the process of ‘living apart together’ legitimately and formally of church and state in the same civil society.

3.

Developments of and within the Roman Catholic community of believers in a changing socio-juridical context (1789–1924)

When we speak of the developments in the Roman Catholic Church in the 19th and early 20th centuries we must keep in mind that there are two groups of separated developments in this period: On the one hand, the reaction of local churches in countries where the principle of separation of church and state had been instituted together with the gradual introduction of freedom of press, freedom of speech, assembly, etc. In general, one can speak here of an emancipation opportunity, especially in countries where Roman Catholics formed a minority, such as the United States of America, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and parts of Germany. However, also in regions where Catholics were dominant the new context led to developments unseen during the Old Regime. This was for example the case in France (from 1830 onwards), Belgium (from 1831) and the western part of Prussia (from 1848 till 1870)9. On the other hand, the reaction of the pope and the Holy See in Italy, where the Church until 1870 combined spiritual and worldly power. The developments here, especially from the pontificates of Pope Gregory XV (1831–1846) and Pius IX (1846–1878) onwards, are partly a defense of the existing political order in the Papal States, and partly an endeavor to cope with the developments in countries where separation of church and state and other liberties had been introduced. The latter resulted not only in an increase of international contracts concluded between the Holy See and individual states – the so called concordats10 – to regulate the situation in those countries “top-down” by-passing emerging 9 Notably the Rhineland and Westphalia. 10 The most famous concordat is the one conducted between Pope Pius VII (1800–1823) and Napoleon in 1801 introducing a concordatorian system in France that would last until 1905 when the Law on the Separation of Churches and State abrogated this system.

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democratic tendencies. It also triggered the development of a meta-juridical framework in defense of the political and legal position of the pope and the Church in the context of liberal states, the so called Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum – a great innovation, because during the Old Regime all Roman Catholic ecclesiastical law had been public law in catholic countries as a result of the fact that there had not been a separation of church and state – and finally the development of a philosophical/theological theory about the possibility of church and states existing alongside each other, as so called Societates Perfectae. Ironically, all these developments alongside with conservative ideas about how the ideal relation between the Roman Catholic Church and state should be, could only be spread over all of Europe as a result of freedom of press introduced by liberal states. The consequence of these publications was, however, that the developments and theories on the highest ecclesiastical level overshadowed the local.

4.

Phases of the developments in France

The interaction between state and church on a local level – id est the level of a specific country or substantive part of it – differs from country to country. Therefore, it is unfeasible to provide a general blueprint for all countries and all times. It is possible, however, to roughly distinguish several phases in this process of interaction. Particularly the French case shows that these are related to changes in the socio-juridical context, especially in the form of government during the 19th century. Many people suppose, that because France became a republic after the Revolution and because it is too nowadays, it always has been a republic during the 19th century. This is not true. France has known many forms of government before it became definitely a republic in 1870. The tragic of France was that the 1789 Revolution had destroyed both the structures of civil society and the Church. This had also effects on Roman Catholic theology : the revolutionaries closed down the Sorbonne, the University of Paris, and its Faculty of Theology. This faculty was the most important Roman Catholic center for the study of theology during the Old Regime. The void in the field of study of Roman Catholic theology was filled some years later, from the 1820s onwards, by the modernized Collegium Romanum in Rome – nowadays called Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana – which was able to mould a “Roman school” of canon lawyers and theologians that would dominate Roman Catholic theology during the second half of the 19th century till the dawn of the Second Vatican Council in the early sixties of the 20th century. A result of this destruction of civil society was – especially among con-

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servative philosophers such as Joseph De Maistre (1753–1821)11 – that thinking of a new civil society was often automatically combined with the restoration and integration in the state of the Roman Catholic Church. This ensured the fact that for all of the 19th century in France the term “Catholic” became the equivalent of “conservative”.

a.

First phase: rebellion and opposition

At the start of the Revolution most Catholics – clergy and laypeople alike – rebelled against the Revolution and the breakdown of the structures of the Old Regime, or fled the country if they were rich enough12. There was no opportunity for theological reflection. The theology in use was the theology that had been developed during the Old Regime. Some common reactions were: peaceful protests against the introduction of the Constitution civile du clerg813 and against the refusal of the Assembl8e Nationale to restore the Roman Catholic Faith as the national religion, but there were also fights. The best known example of this was the uprise in 1793 in the Vend8e region (in the west of France) lasting till 1796 and killing more than 100.000 people.

b.

Second phase: catholic politics, the way through the Courts of Law, critical publications

As soon as the circumstances allowed it, the leading Catholics – not yet the masses, because the development of democracy for all is a slow process – realized that it was necessary to participate in politics in order to defend the positions of the Roman Catholic Church and the individual Roman Catholics in the new context. These Catholic politicians – proper parties did not yet exist – usually defended the views of the pope and the Holy See as described in Encyclicals of the popes and in the commentaries in Catholic newspapers, magazines and pamphlets. They were, therefore, called the Ultramontanes. For many years most of the Catholic politicians – not only in France but also in the rest of Europe – had this orientation. Note that there still was no opportunity to develop a new theology adapted to the new political and socio-juridical context. 11 J. De Maistre, Consid8rations g8n8rales sur la France, 1796; Etude sur la souverainit8, 1797; Du Pape, 1819; De l’Eglise gallicane dans ses rapports avec le Souverain Pontife, 1821. 12 G. de Diesbach, Histoire de l’8migration 1789–1814, Paris 1984. 13 D8cret de l’assembl8e constituante sur la Constitution civile du Clerg8 et la fixation de son traitement; 12 july-24 august 1790. See for the text: Z. Giacometti, Quellen zur Geschichte der Trennung von Staat und Kirche, Tübingen 1926, 3.

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To be heard, entering into politics was not the only means for churches and believers. Other options were the court-room14 and publications against the regime15. Especially during the period of the Second Restoration (1815–1830) there were many developments in this field. Not because the regime – which was very restrictive and on the way back to installing an exclusive combination of State and Roman Catholic Church both with Gallicane influences and a severe clericalism; hence its name – made this possible by liberal legislation, but because of the oppression of diverging opinions. The result of this were actions against the regime especially by publications in the press. It is interesting to see that in this period of oppression the priest F8licit8 de Lamennais (1782–1854) – who had started his career as a very conservative publicist – while analyzing the changes in French society, became more liberal, asking for freedom of press, freedom of education and even separation of church and state. By doing so, he became the founder of liberal Catholicism16.

c.

Third phase: granting of civil rights, internal developments within the community of believers

The regime in 1830–1848 differed from the Second Restoration. The change brought more liberty in civil society by introducing constitutional liberties such as freedom of press and the right of assembly. This led to the introduction of liberal Catholicism in politics – a clear sign of internal diversity in the Catholic community of believers – and to the establishment of the magazine L’Avenir [The Future] that in its publications rallied for separation of church and state and the freedom of education. In addition to this, religious orders that had been abol-

14 See G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, La Restauration, Paris 1955, especially pages 43–44 where the case is described of a Protestant who refused to embellish his house when the procession of the Holy Sacrament went by as required by civil law. His barrister defended his behavior with the words: “The law in France protects all convictions, all forms of public worship, she does not identify with them…Liberty is the equality [for all] in the law, is the neutrality of the law”. And this more than half a century before the introduction of the concept of the “la"cit8” during the Third Republic (1870–1940). 15 See J. Lecler, les controversies sur L’Eglise et l’Etat au temps de la Restauration (1815–1830), in: M. Nédoncelle et al (ed.), L’Eccl8siologie au XIXe SiHcle, Paris 1960, 297–307. 16 A step for which he was excommunicated by the pope in 1834. See extensively on the international influence of Lamennais both in catholic circles and for the development of democracy and on the ecclesiastical process against him: K. Jürgensen, Lamennais und die Gestaltung des belgischen Staates. Der liberale Katholizismus in der Verfassungsbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts, Wiesbaden 1963; M.J. Le Guillou/L. Le Guillou, La Condemnation de Lamennais, Paris 1982.

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ished during the aftermath of the 1789 Revolution, were reestablished, and numerous new religious communities, especially of women17, were formed. In view of not only church order, but also of theological reflection something quite astonishing happened in this period18 : the study and publications of a French Benedictine Monk on the Roman liturgy lead to a renewed interest – at first only with the clergy – in liturgy as the source and culmination point of Roman Catholic church life, giving a new dynamic to the church community19. Or in other words: for the first time since Late Antiquity the liturgy gathered together the community of believers as Catholics no longer automatically associating with a certain state such as France or the Holy Roman Empire, but as a real – still visible – community of baptized believers separated from the state.

d.

Fourth phase: clash with the state and emigration of religious orders

This phase is not a necessity in the relation between churches and a state, but can occur when the civil legislation on churches turns so hostile that there is no other option for religious orders and institutes than leaving the country20. This happened in France from 1870 onwards till the early twenties of the 20th century, especially after 1905, when the law on the Separation of Churches and State was promulgated21. We cannot analyze here all the consequences of this law, and the

17 There already had been a period of establishment of new religious societies, both of male and female, at the beginning of the 19th century. The difference between those religious societies and the ones established from the 1830 onwards was that the first group aimed at activities in the missions as a result of the belief that Christianity had ceased to exist in the Old World after the French Revolution, whereas the second group found its reason for existence in the European society especially in the field of education (catholic schools) and medical care (catholic hospitals). See extensively on the mission activities in the early 19th century : A. Camps, De katholieke missionaire beweging van 1789 tot 1962, in: A. Camps et al (eds.), Oecumenische inleiding tot de missiologie. Teksten en konteksten van het wereldchristendom, Kampen 1988, 236–243. For the religious institutes in Europe see: J. De Maeyer et al (eds.), Religious Institutes in Western Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Historiography, Research and Legal Position, Leuven 2004. 18 Although at that time bishops, clergy and believers alike probably not realised that a new situation for the church had emerged out of the formal separation of church and state. 19 P. Guéranger, Institutions liturgiques, 3 vol. Le Mans – Paris 1840–1851 (2nd print 1878–1885); Ibid., L’Ann8e liturgique, 9 vol., Le Mans – Paris 1841–1866. Of the main work of Gu8ranger – L’Ann8e liturgique – 500.000 copies were sold. 20 This phenomenon is known under the German name Kulturkampf and displayed itself not only in France, but also in Italy, Austria, Switzerland Bavaria and Prussia and in a lesser form in Baden, Hessen and Saxony. See G. Franz, Kulturkampf. Staat und katholische Kirche in Mitteleuropa von der Säkularisation bis zum Abschluss des Preussischen Kulturkampfes, München 1954. 21 See on this topic the still authoritative work of M. Larkin, Church and State after the Dreyfus

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politics of the French government in this period22. What was relevant for the development of a theological vision of the community of believers on the state, was that the leading Catholic circles in church and society during this period could develop no other perspective then the negative vision on the separation of church and state. All over Europe conservative catholic newspapers wrote that it was impossible to live as Catholics in a secular republic23.

e.

Fifth phase: return of the religious orders and theological reflection

This unfruitful situation came to an end when Pope Pius XI (1922–1939) in 1924 accepted the Law on the separation of Churches and State in France; as a result thereof, church life in France could be normalized again24. This led to the return from abroad of the training institutes for priests of the major religious orders such as the Dominicans and the Jesuits. Consequently, from that moment on, little by little, it became possible to start a theological reflection on the new situation of the Roman Catholic Church and the community of believers in France in the context of separation of church and state. This fundamental reflection on the church from the thirties till the mid-fifties of the 20th century became known under the misleading name Nouvelle Theology/New Theology and was one of the most important theological influences – together with the “Liturgical Movement” and the “Bible Movement” – on the Second Vatican Council that was held from 1962–196525.

22

23 24

25

Affair. The Separation Issue in France, London 1974 and M. Larkin, Religion, Politics and Preferment in France since 1890. La Belle Epoque and its legacy, Cambridge 1995. See extensively on the topic of the Catholic church in France and the anticlerical laws: E. Lecanuet, L’Eglise de France sous la troisiHme R8publique / la fin du XIXe siHcle, Paris 1967, and P. De Meyere, Frankrijk en zijn Antiklerikale Wetten (1880–1910), in Acta Comparanda XXII (2011), Antwerpen, 11–29. E. Lamberts (ed.), The Black International. 1870–1878. The Holy See and Militant Catholicism in Europe /L’Internationale noire. 1870–1878. Le Saint-SiHge et le Catholicisme militant en Europe, Leuven 2002. Already in 1892 Pope Leo XIII (1878–1903) in his encyclical Inter sollicitudines advised the French Catholics with the so called Ralliement to adhere to the French Republic. This did not mean the acceptance of legislation hostile to Catholicism, but merely a rallying to republican institutions in which Catholics now could endeavour to weigh with all their weight. Given the French local context and feelings as described above, this encyclical did not get a positive reception from both Roman Catholic bishops and Roman Catholic believers. J. Mettepeningen, Nouvelle Th8ologie – New Theology. Inheritor of Modernism, Precursor of Vatican II, London/New York 2010; R. Kaczynski, Theologischer Kommentar zur Konstitution über die Heilige Liturgie, in: Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Zweiten Vatikanischen Konzil vol. 2, Freiburg, Basel, Wien 2004, 1–227, here: 11–38; P.G. Müller, Die Römisch-Katholische Bibelbewegung und Ihre Vorgeschichte, in: T. Berger/E. Geldbach (eds.), Bis an die Enden der Erde, Neukirchen 1992, 38–69.

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5.

The role of civil law & the function of church law in the community of believers

a.

The direct influence of the socio-juridical context and especially of legislation

The example of the developments within the Roman Catholic community of believers during the 19th and early 20th centuries in France shows that the sociojuridical context – not only politics, the constitution and other legislation, but the actual participation of citizens/members of a church in the political life as well – plays a very important role in the formation of possible reactions or answers in the community of believers to developments of the state, but also to other churches. Churches are an integral part of the civil society, even if they or the state do not want to be aware of this fact, or even try to give an impression of the opposite. This means that not only the laws specifically focusing on churches have an impact on them, but also, to give just one example, laws concerning suffrage. It is clear that the more severe the legislation of the state is for churches, the more these churches will try to campaign against the organs of the state that made such law. In such a context the best, and often the only thing a church as a community of believers can do, is to try to retain the ideas, structures, and liturgical celebrations they by tradition hold from the period preceding the present-day situation (as the Roman Catholic Church did in Poland during the Communist regime). Developments, let alone improvements in thinking or proper theological reflection about the own church as a community of believers is (almost) not possible here. The worst situation thinkable in this context is the situation in which the clergy have to leave the territory of the state leaving the other members of the community of believers bereaved behind. Again, it is clear that such a situation is not positive for fundamental theological reflection – especially ecclesiology but also church law – or the development of a new vision on the relation between church and state. A new vision on the relation between church and state and on internal ecclesiological changes can only be developed and lived after, when the members of the community of believers are at liberty to do so. Such a situation is much likely to be the fruit of a constitutional state, liberal civil legislation and a well working democracy to which all citizens of the state have access. Members of communities of believers in such a situation can develop ecclesiological improvements such as, for example, the rediscovery of the Roman liturgy as source and fundament of all Roman Catholic Church life as we have seen in the case of 19th century France.

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b.

439

The influence of the codification of Roman Catholic canon law

What now was the role of canon law in all this? During the 19th century with all its changes in the relations between the churches and the states in general and especially in the position of the Roman Catholic Church in the countries of the Western World, it became clear that the old collections of canon law that had gradually grown during the Middle Ages could no longer be used in the new context. This was also a result of the fact that secular legislation introduced during the 19th century had expelled canon law from the juridical life in civil society. Already during the First Vatican Council, held in Rome in 1869–1870, plans arose to codify the canon law of the Latin Rite26. They were postponed, because of the sudden closure of the Council and the fall of Rome as capital of the Papal States in 1870. When Pope Pius X (1903–1914) became pope, he decided the time had come to codify the law of the Roman Catholic Church. What was the influence of 1917 Code of Canon Law on all these external and internal developments of the Roman Catholic Church? There are several important aspects: the new Code contributed overwhelmingly to the uniformity of the juridical-administrative side of Catholic Church life worldwide. Secondly, the central position of the pope in the church was brought forward in a way that could not be misunderstood. Thirdly, the central elements of the legal theory of the Ius Publicum Ecclesiasticum that had been developed by the Italian school of church lawyers and the Holy See from 1820 onwards were fully integrated in the code of canon law. An example thereof can be found in canon 329 § 2 stating: “The Roman Pontiff freely appoints them [= diocesan bishops worldwide]”. A bold statement written at a moment when the direct appointment by the pope of the diocesan bishops everywhere in the world was not at all already self-evident27. Fourthly, as a result of the changes in the relation between the Roman Catholic Church and the states during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the new codification became an inner ecclesiastical subject of study for all candidates to the priesthood and for priest specializing in canon law after their ordination. The code was a mirror of the ecclesiology of the Church as developed in the Roman school during the 19th century and could influence the view of the clergy, and 26 R. Naz, Codex Iuris Canonici, in: R. Naz (ed.), Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique, Paris 1942, vol. 3, 909–940. 27 I. Linden, Global Catholicism. Diversity and Change since Vatican II, London 2009, 5 gives an impression of the developments in the field of direct nomination of diocesan bishops by the pope as a result of the separation of church and state during the 19th and 20th century : in 1829 there were 646 dioceses worldwide for the Latin Roman Catholic Church. Only 24 of these diocesan bishops at that moment were directly appointed by the pope. States controlled the appointment of 555 bishops and local chapters 67.

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through them of the majority of believers in the local churches worldwide. The code was also the bridge between the age old theories about the Roman Catholic Church and the new context of democratic states where church and state are separated of each other. By adopting this Roman model de facto, the separation of church and state was adopted by Catholics all over the world, because the model presented to them was that of the pope as the king-pope-legislator and infallible head of a community of believers separated from the influence of every profane state. A structural problem of the code of canon law – still perceptible in our days – was that the classical view on the church of the Roman school did not take into account the developments in the local churches in the Western World in the field of democracy and local participation of members of the Roman Catholic community of believers.

6.

Conclusions

On the basis of historical analysis certain internal consequences for the church can be deduced depending on the socio-juridical context in society, such as concurrent disparity, concurrent non-synchronism, the development of legitimate internal diversity, and finally the development of ecumenism, interreligious dialogue and mutual cooperation of the churches. We discovered also that the practical political answers given by a variety of members of the community of believers in the new context for the church of separation of church and state preceded the possibility of theological reflection. One could cautiously conclude from this that fundamental theological reflection is only possible in a stable context and needs more time than the formulation of juridical responses. In this gradual process the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church formed the bridge between immediate, mainly political, action and theological reflection.

Daniel Visser

Gerard Noodt and seventeenth-century attitudes to charging interest on money

1.

Introduction

Charging interest on money has since ancient times animated debate amongst philosophers, lawyers and the clergy, spurred interventions by worldly and spiritual powers, and served as an excuse for persecuting and ostracising those who engaged in it. Evaluating the different views – especially those against the charging of interest (often expressed very firmly) – is not made easier by the fact that some were against charging any interest at all, while others were only against the charging of excessive interest, although the term “usury” was used (mostly without definition) by all the protagonists to describe what they were against. The blurred features of this picture are exacerbated by uncertainties about the methods used to calculate interest at various points in time and the many ingenious arguments that were developed to exclude specific practices from the prohibition or curtailment of the charging of interest. The literature is substantial, but in this short contribution my limited aim is specifically to consider a notable intervention by Gerard Noodt on the subject, namely his De Foenore et Usuris, published at the end of the seventeenth century1. My choice is actuated not only by the importance of Noodt’s contribution, but 1 G. Noodt, De Foenore et Usuris Libri Tres, in quibus multa juris civilis aliorumque veterum auctorum loca aut illustrantur aut emendantur, Leiden 1698. I cite from the third edition of this work as contained in G. Noodt, Opera Omnia, Leiden 1724, 173–264. It is interesting to note that this work also circulated further afield. For instance, Chareles Ereskine’s Edinburgh library contained a copy of De Foenore et Usuris: see K. Baston, Charles Areskine’s Library : Lawyers and Their Books at the Dawn of the Scottish Enlightenment, Leiden 2016; see also K. G. Baston, Lawyers’ Libraries in Early Eighteenth-century Scotland: Charles Areskine’s of Alva’s Library, in P.J. du Plessis/J.W. Cairns (eds.), Reassessing Legal Humanism and its Claims – Petere Fontes?, Edinburgh 2016, chapter 13. For an assessment of this work of Noodt, see G.C.J.J. van den Bergh, The Life and Work of Gerard Noodt (1647–1725). Dutch Legal Scholarship between Humanism and Enlightenment, Oxford 1988, 181f. Van den Bergh explains that usury was an extremely popular subject amongst humanists and that it is therefore not surprising that Noodt, who was not only a prominent Humanist but also “the scion of a Nijmegen merchant family”, should have taken up this subject (ibid at 182).

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also by the intersection between it and the work to which our honorand has devoted his academic life. Noodt’s erudite book draws on, and analyses, Roman law, the Bible, the views of the church fathers, Canon law, the medieval and early modern scholastics, and Roman-Dutch law – all of which feature in Jan Hallebeek’s impressive scholarly oeuvre. A further motivation is the fact that his mentor, Professor Govaert van den Bergh penned an important biography of Noodt2, which inspired a group of South Africans to translate De Foenore et Usuris into English because of its importance as background to modern South African banking law3. Thus my choice also pays homage to the bonds of friendship between Professor Hallebeek and my country. Lastly, my choice is intended to underline our honorand’s approach to legal history : in his writing on legal history, Jan Hallebeek always takes account of the wider context in which law develops, which allows him to draw particularly sharp pictures of the law of bygone ages because he combines his deep knowledge of ancient, medieval and later ius commune law with an equally profound insight into the factors that influence the law in different places and times. In his biography of Noodt, Van den Bergh characterises him as being probably “the first jurist to discuss the arguments of men of the trade and thus introduced a ‘sociological’ argument in a debate which till then had centred exclusively on the correct interpretation of authoritative texts from the Bible and the Corpus Iuris, in principle ignoring the opinions of the participants in the respective social field”.

2.

Brief notes on the history of the thinking on interest

From a modern perspective, interest is the price of money – what we pay to have the immediate use of money that would not otherwise be available to us; what we give up if we keep our money in a current account in order have liquidity ; and what we earn if we make our own money available to others. In contractual situations the parties agree on the interest payable and some interference with the autonomy of the parties to protect vulnerable borrowers through the device of imposing maximum interest rates is a feature of most legal systems. In some situations, a court can award interest on the principal sum owed. The interest rate set by a central bank or equivalent monetary authority is a vital part of realising the economic policy of a country by balancing current and future consumption and ensuring the structural health of the economy as a whole. 2 van den Bergh (note 1). 3 G. Noodt, The Three books on interest-bearing loans and interest (foenus et usurae), S.J. van Niekerk/ J.T. Pretorius/D.M. Kriel/D.H. van Zyl (eds.), Pretoria 2009: translated from the third edition in Noodt’s Opera Omnia.

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Without interest there would be little incentive to extend credit and an inevitable shortage of capital to finance growth. The central role of interest in the economy since ancient times is evident from the fact that interest-bearing loans were the most commonly recorded transactions in Mesopotamia, starting in the latter part of the third millennium BCE4. The control of interest rates by law, too, has very old roots: thus we see maximum interest rates prescribed in the Code of Hammurabi, almost two millennia before the Common Era, (confirming the customary Babylonian interest rates as legal maxima: 331\3% on loans of grain and 20 % on loans of silver)5. Lending at interest was also a common activity in Rome and Roman law, too, restricted interest rates from a very early stage. Although the inconsistent use of terminology and uncertainty about methods of calculation of interest have obscured the picture of the Roman rates of interest, it can be said with reasonable certainty that from the end of the Republic until the sixth century a maximum rate of 12 % per annum was maintained6, although since the monetary reforms of Constantine in the fourth century it ceased to be an absolute rate and interest rose marginally to 12.5 %7. In the Eastern Roman Empire, Justinian was stricter and limited the maximum rate of interest to 6 % (4 % for Senators)8. Capping interest rates – even though it was often not as effective as intended – constituted an obviously suitable way to protect borrowers while acknowledging the necessity for commercial credit in a functioning economy. The attempt by the Tribune of the Plebs, Lucius Genucius, to ban interest-bearing loans completely in 342 BCE did not succeed and the Lex Genucia de feneratione was mainly honoured in the breach9. The same issues that make the determination of interest rates during Roman times difficult, also muddled the discussions about medieval interest rates10. Despite its vital role in the economy, the practice of charging interest on money has been contested terrain. For instance, in the Bible, the Old Testament is disapproving of interest, grudgingly allowing it to be charged to those outside the

4 M. van de Mieroop, The Ancient Mesopotamian City, Oxford 1997, 197. 5 S. Homer/R. Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, 4th ed., New Jersey 2005, 30. (The medieval rates of interest cited by these authors must, however, be treated with caution: see A.R. Bell/ C. Brooks/T.K. Moore, Interest in Medieval Accounts: Examples from England 1272–1340, History 94 (2009) 411–433. 6 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, Cape Town 1990, 168–172. 7 D. Gofas, The Byzantine Law of interest, in: A.E. Laiou (ed.), The Economic History of Byzantium: From the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century, Volume 1, Washington 2007, 1095 (describing the demise of the centesimae usurae in the post-classical period). 8 On the factors influencing the setting of interest rates, see M. Hudson, How interests rates were set, 2500BC to 1000 AD, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 43 (2000), 132–161. 9 Zimmermann (note 6) 167–168. 10 Bell/ Brooks/Moore (note 5) 411–433.

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fold11. Later, these texts and the actions and pronouncements of Jesus12, as recorded in the New Testament, would serve as anchors for the arguments that led to the outlawing of the usury in the Middle Ages by the Church – an approach that was adopted by the civil law and had an influence right up to the early modern period. As influential as the Bible on the medieval approach to interest were the arguments of Aristotle (due to his “rediscovery” in the Middle Ages and the reconcilliation of his pronouncements with Christian views by Thomas Aquinas). Aristotle famously argued against interest-bearing loans13 : “[U]sury is most reasonably hated, because its gain comes from money itself and not from that for the sake of which money was invented. For money was brought into existence for the purpose of exchange, but interest increases the amount of the money itself.”

It is important to understand the finer nuances of Aristotle’s approach, since his views provided “external” backing to the biblical condemnation of interest and would have a direct bearing on Thomas Aquinas’s views on interest – and, because of this influence, would play a role in the thought of the late Scholastics, who in turn were particularly influential in the Netherlands by virtue of Grotius’s reliance on their writings. Aristotle’s point is that money, as coin, is merely an invention to enable equivalence between various commodities – how many cattle equal how many horses – and it has no value in itself. It is barren/sterile and cannot bear fruit as cattle and horses can; it has no other purpose than facilitating a just exchange by measuring the value that which is being exchanged14. 11 Deut. 23,20. “Unto a foreigner thou mayest lend upon interest; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon interest; that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all that thou puttest thy hand unto, in the land whither thou goest in to possess it.” And see also Exodus 22:24 (25): “If thou lend money to any of my people, even to the poor with thee, thou shalt not be to him as a creditor ; neither shall ye lay upon him interest.” Lev. 25,36: “Take thou no interest of him or increase; but fear thy God; that thy brother may live with thee.” Lev. 25,37: “Thou shalt not give him thy money upon interest, nor give him thy victuals for increase.” Deut. 23,20 (19): “Thou shalt not lend upon interest to thy brother : interest of money, interest of victuals, interest of anything that is lent upon interest.” Ezekiel 18,17: “That hath withdrawn his hand from the poor, that hath not received interest nor increase, hath executed Mine ordinances, hath walked in my statutes; he shall not die for the iniquity of his father, he shall surely live.” Ps. 15,5: “He that putteth not out his money on interest, nor taketh a bribe against the innocent. He that doeth these things shall never be moved.” (King James version). 12 Mt. 21,12: “And Jesus went into the temple of God and cast out all them that bought and sold in the temple. He overthrew the tables of the money changers and the seats of them that sold doves.” Lk. 6,35: “ … lend, hoping for nothing again …”. 13 Arist. pol. 1, 1258b. 14 I am indebted to M. Wykes, Devaluing the Scholastics: Calvin’s Ethics of Usury, Calvin Theological Journal 38 (2003) 27–51 for an excellent exposition of both Thomas Aquinas’s and Calvin’s views on interest, of which I am able to render only the briefest of summaries here.

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Wykes shows convincingly that that Aristotle’s approach is based on his view of the nature of money, namely that its sole purpose is to effect “justice-in-exchange,” so that for him “money acts as a measure which, by making things commensurable, [and thus] enables us to equate them. Without exchange there would be no association, without equality there would be no exchange, without commensurability there would be no equality”15. Of course this is one of the functions of money, but clearly it could, and does, have other functions, so that this was in fact not a strong argument. Aristotle further defends his stance by distinguishing between ordinary “transactions of the polis, transactions that were necessary for the proper functioning of a household” and the accumulation of money for its own sake, which he regarded as unnatural16. These views are inextricably part of Aristotle’s wider conceptualisation of commutative or corrective justice. Aristotle’s views (supported by the interpretation of biblical references antithetical to interest-bearing loans17 by the early church fathers) directly influenced the medieval gainsayers of interest-bearing loans. Thus Thomas Aquinas, in arguing that usury is a sin in itself (secundum se), relies on Aristotle in developing his own ideas. His central point of departure is Aristotle’s emphasis on equality in exchange18. He cites Aristotle’s assertion that the nature of money is different from natural things in that it cannot bear fruit and that it is therefore no more than a medium of exchange19, but, clearly unconvinced that this argument has sufficient intellectual force, he develops the case against usury by making two further important assertions in his more sophisticated analysis of the nature of property and its relation to equality in exchange20. 15 Wykes (note 14) 31. 16 Ibid. See also, for instance, the Stoic philosopher Seneca, who describes lending at interest as follows: “What is an interest-bearing loan, what is an interest-book of a moneylender, what is interest – other than terms for human cupidity sought beyond the bounds of nature? … What is the meaning of all those account-books, records, time for sale and bloodstained 12 % p.a.? They are merely voluntary evils deriving from our system, in which there is nothing that can be scrutinised by our eyes, that can be held in our hands – mere dreams of empty avarice”. Sen. benef. 7,10,3–4: Quid enim ista sunt, quid fenus et calendarium et usura, nisi humanae cupiditatis extra naturam quaesita nomina ? … quid sunt istae tabellae, quid computationes et venale tempus et sanguinulentae centesimae? Voluntaria mala ex constitutione nostra pendentia, in quibus nihil est, quod subici oculis, quod teneri manu possit, inanis avaritiae somnia. (Niekerk/Pretorius/Kriel/van Zyl (note 3).) These sentiments did not prevent Seneca from being one of the most active moneylenders in Rome: fabulously wealthy, he employed a whole set of specialist slaves to run his banking business. (J. Andreau, Banking and Business in the Roman World, Cambridge 1999, 14.) 17 See note 11 above. 18 Thomas Aquinas, STh. II–II, qu. 77. 19 See also Zimmermann (note 6) 170. 20 Wykes (note 14) 34–35.

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First, he identifies money with other objects of mutuum (i. e. fungibles such as wheat or wine) as things that are consumed in their use, as opposed to nonfungibles (such as a house or a silver vessel), which are not consumed in their use. You cannot sell wine and the use of the wine, he argues, and so too with the use of money, which, he asserts, “is nothing other than its substance, therefore either the lender sells something which doesn’t exist, or he sells the same thing twice, namely the money itself whose use is its consumption, and this is manifestly against the principles of natural justice”21. However, the fact is that the money is in fact not sold twice, but once and the interest is the price – but that insight would come much later in the work of Leonardus Lessius. Secondly, however, he makes a stronger socio-economic argument by drawing a distinction between what you actually have and what you may acquire, which goes back to the distinction of Roman law between damnum emergens and lucrum cessans: one could claim for losses suffered by, for instance, the late payment of a loan (damnum emergens) but not for the lost opportunity to make a profit (lucrum cessans), so as to preserve the equality that commutative justice demands22. The non-recognition of lucrum cessans as a ground to charge interest would be abandoned by later interpreters of Aquinas, as we will see below, but, for now, it is important to register that the key to understanding both Aquinas’s as well as the late Scholastics’ arguments was that usury was understood to be the sin of taking interest without a legal ground and the rules developed in respect of it were part of the overall quest of bringing about commutative justice23. Aquinas’s views capture the essence of the prohibition of the charging of interest on money in Canon law. It is important to note that the Church did not entirely prevent – or seek to prevent – such agreements from being entered into. A sophisticated set of exceptions and alternative options were developed that allowed credit to be extended at a price, but interest-bearing loans had to be within the limits set by the church and the worldly law. The loan had to be in one 21 Usus autem pecunie ut dictum est non est aliquid quam eius substantia, unde vendit id quod non est vel vendit idem bis, ipsam scilicet pecuniam cuius usu est consumptio eius, et hoc est manifeste contra rationem iustitienaturalis. Thomas, STh. II–II, qu. 78. See Wykes (note 14) 35, with reference to O. Langholm, Economics in the Medieval Schools, New York 1992, 244. 22 Thomas, STh. II–II, qu. 78,2: “A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought to have …. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his money : because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in many ways from having.” (Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui mutuum dat potest absque peccato in pactum deducere cum eo qui mutuum accipit recompensationem damni per quod subtrahitur sibi aliquid quod debet habere, hoc enim non est vendere usum pecuniae, sed damnum vitare. … Recompensationem vero damni quod consideratur in hoc quod de pecunia non lucratur, non potest in pactum deducere, quia non debet vendere id quod nondum habet et potest impediri multipliciter ab habendo.) See Wykes, (note 14) 36. 23 Thomas, STh. II–II, qu. 77,1. See Wykes (note 14) 31.

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of the forms that was approved from time to time (and many of the institutions that had formerly been seen as evasions of the law against usury were in fact carefully considered and expressly sanctioned)24. To decide whether a loan was usurious or not, general principles were developed to distinguish licit from illicit agreements. For instance, following Aquinas, compensation which was due to the lender for loss actually incurred when a borrower was in mora (damnum emergens) was excluded from the ambit of the prohibition against usury ; so was compensation that was due to the lender in a joint venture (because the lender bore some of the risk of loss the transaction was not considered a straight loan, entitling the lender to some compensation)25. For those who were found to have intentionally circumvented the laws on usury there could be, and often were, severe consequences, both spiritual and secular, e. g. the refusal of communion and even excommunication – and the effectiveness of exclusion from the company of the faithful in medieval times should not be underestimated. There are different views on how strictly the ban was enforced, but there is good evidence that it was by no means an empty shell, as some have argued26. The development of both Canon law, and, in its wake, civil law, in regard to the charging of interest on loans was a nuanced and constantly evolving one, influenced by “the transition from an agrarian, market-based, feudal economy to one of international discovery and trade.”27 The accepted view now is that the period saw both “financial innovation and widespread access to credit”28, as opposed to the picture painted in the older literature, namely that the Middle Ages represented a long credit crunch with a low growth rate29. Thus Zimmermann describes the position in the late eleventh and early twelfth century as follows: “The rise of commercial capitalism, in its vigour and in the relative rapidity of its development, has been compared with the industrial revolution in the 19th century. Money came to be lent for production or investment, large sums were needed for funding venturesome economic and military enterprises. The crusades, launched by the Church itself, are one obvious example. Thus ‘legitimate trade based on good faith was distinguished from illegitimate trade based on avarice; lawful credit devices were distinguished from the sin of usury’”30. 24 E.S. Tan, An Empty Shell? Rethinking the Usury Laws in Medieval Europe, Journal of Legal History 23 (2002) 177–196, here 180f. 25 Tan (note 24) 179f.; This rule is also to be traced back to Aquinas: Wykes (note 14) 37; Thomas, STh. II–II, qu. 77,2,5. 26 Tan (note 24) 177–196. 27 Wykes (note 14) 29. 28 Bell/ Brooks/Moore (note 5) 411–433. 29 See, e. g. R. H. Helmholz, Usury and the Medieval Church Courts, Speculum 56 (1986) 364–80. 30 Zimmermann (note 6) 171 (footnotes omitted).

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As mentioned earlier, this development was happening within a context that sought to provide a framework (consisting of an in-principle ban, accompanied by carefully formulated exceptions) to deliver commutative justice. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the late Scholastics of the School of Salamanca introduced ever-more sophisticated economic thinking to ensure, as part of a revival of interest in Thomas Aquinas, the continued compatibility between the Thomist teachings and the rapidly expanding world of trade and commerce31 – a period which saw a long, and at the time puzzling, period of continued inflation32. Contributing to this development of economic theory and its moral dimensions was the originator of the school, Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546), as well as Domingo de Soto (1494–1560), Mart&n de Azpilcueta (“Dr Navarrus” 1491–1586), Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva (1512–1577), Tom#s de Mercado (1525–1575), Luis Molina (1535–1600) and Francisco Su#rez (1548–1617). However, one of the younger generation of this group, Leonardus Lessius (Lenaert Leys, 1554–1623), a Jesuit from the Southern Netherlands (which was under the rule of the Spanish king) formed the undisputed avant-garde in respect of the understanding of the role of money and interest in the functioning of the economy and its reconciliation with religious precepts. Thus Noonan states that he is “the theologian whose views on usury most decidedly mark the new era … [and who] probably would have felt completely at ease in the modern financial world … the master of scholastic economic analysis”33. The insightful and thorough work of Van Houdt and Decock on Lessius has established that his key contribution to the debate on interest was his addition of a third reason (apart from damnum emergens and lucrum cessans) as a legitimate ground for charging interest, namely carentia pecuniae (“absence of money”), that is to say, that the inconvenience of being without one’s money for a period of time constitutes a detriment for which one can legitimately ask to be compensated. He explained that there is a detriment built into having to wait for one’s money34 (because the 31 W. Decock, Spanish Scholastics on Money and Credit, in: D. Fox/W. Ernst (eds.), Money in the Western Legal Tradition: Middle Ages to Bretton Woods, Oxford, 2016, 267 at 268–270. 32 Decock (note 31) at 270 in fine – 271. 33 J.T. Noonan, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Cambridge, MA, 1957, 222; also cited by B. Gordon, Economic Analysis before Adam Smith: Hesiod to Lessius, London, 1975, 244. See also T. Van Houdt/W. Decock, Leonardus Lessius: Traditie en vernieuwing, Antwerp 2005. 34 See T. van Houdt, Leonardus Lessius over lening, intrest en woeker. De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 20. Editie, vertaling en commentaar, Brussel 1998; and see L. Lessius, De justitia et jure caeterisque virtutibus cardinalibus libri IV, Louvain, 1605, 3.21.8 (at marginal note 66), arguing that the discount selling of bonds or securities do not fall foul of the rule against charging interest: Quia talia iura, dum proponuntur venalia instar mercis, communi hominum iudico, minoris aestimatur, quam pecunia praesens, ut experientia patet: eo quod haec multarum rerum facultatem praebeat, quam iura illa non tribuunt: ero monoris emi possunt. Patet consequentia, quia illud censetur iustum cuiusque rei venalis pretium, quod communis

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risks involved in not having control of one’s resources – “periculum sortis”, the danger of (losing) the capital)35, thus giving birth to the notion of the time value of money, which is to be determined by the objective valuation that the money market accorded to it. “As such”, Decock remarks, “interest became the market price of money, ensuing from the economic fact, later theorized by Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk (1851–1914), that present money is worth more than absent money”36. He adds: “Accordingly, money has a time value fixed through common estimation in the market. Money becomes a commodity, like any other good, to be bought and sold at a just price in a depersonalized market”37. Zimmermann has said that the “history of the prohibition of usury from the Middle Ages onwards could well … be written as the history of its gradual erosion”38. The work of Lessius (which, as already mentioned, was to have a profound impact on Hugo Grotius)39 was the most important stage of this erosion40. It was visible not only in the tomes of learned philosopher-jurists, but also in the practical actions of the Church. Tan points to the creation of the montes pietatis (“public not-for-profit pawnshops financed by charitable donations … [that] charged fees for the care of pawns and for administrative and labour expenses”)41, which originated in Northern Italy in the fifteenth century, where a culture of lending and pawnbroking had been developing since the thirteenth

35

36 37 38 39

40

41

hominum aestimatio statuit. Si enim in caeteris rebus censetur iustum pretium, quod ex communi aestimatione statuitur, cur non etiam in chirograhis? Decock’s translation: “As is evident from experience, when such bonds are offered for sale like merchandise, they are estimated by the common judgment of people to be worth less than ready money. After all, ready money offers many opportunities that bonds do not. Consequently, it is allowed to buy them at a lower price. This inference is right, because the just price of any saleable good is the price settled by the common estimation of men. Why not apply the common estimation to the bills of debt, if in all other cases the just price is held to be the price based on that estimation?”(See the footnote immediately below.) See Lessius (note 34) 2.20.13 (in which he discusses the notion of periculum sortis) and 2.20.14 (at marginal notes 126–127). See W. Decock, Introduction to his translation of Lessius, De Iustitia et de Iure, Book 2, 21 (On Buying and Selling (1605), Journal of Markets & Morality 10 (2007) 453 (xxi of the Introduction). Decock (note 35). Decock (note 35). Zimmermann (note 6) 171. See generally R. Feenstra, L’influence de la Scolastique espagnole sur Grotius en droit prive’: quelques expe’riences dans des questions de fond et de forme, concernant notamment les doctrines de l’erreuret de l’enrichissement sans cause. in: P. Grossi (ed.), La seconda scolastica nella formazione del diritto privato moderno. Atti del Incontro di studio (Firenze, 16–19 ottobre 1972), Milan, 1973, 386. See W. Decock, Lessius and the Breakdown of the Scholastic Paradigm, Journal of the History of Economic Thought 31 (2009) 57. See also T. van Houdt, Lack of Money : A Reappraisal of Lessius’ Contribution to the Scholastic Analysis of Money-lending and interest, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 5 (1998) 1–35. Tan (note 24) 191f.

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century. However, the charitable donations could not sustain these institutions and they were in due course permitted to raise funds by paying interest – initially 6 % but rising over time42. The Church rationalised its approval of this form of interest-bearing loans by arguing “that cheap loans from the charitable fund were preferable to going to a professional moneylender ; a view made official in 1515 by the Lateran Council, in effect setting aside traditional doctrine”43. One should also not miss the anti-Semitic backdrop to this development. Because Jews were discriminated against in the general commercial world on so many levels, providing banking facilities through moneylending and pawnbroking was one of the few options open to them44. By approving of the institution of the monte di piet# the Church was in effect also muscling in on the one area of commerce where Jews had up to that stage had the strongest foothold – and by the sixteenth century these institutions had spread across all of Europe. The further erosion of the ban on charging interest was brought about by the Reformation and the simultaneous acceleration of market capitalism, which allowed theological and legal arguments in favour of charging interest to be advanced with new vigour45. While Luther was still very close to the Thomist tradition46, Calvin (who was said to be astute in financial matters) explicitly defended the charging of interest by reinterpreting the biblical texts that had hitherto been used to underscore the rules against charging interest to show that the scriptures did not declare usury a sin secundum se (as Aquinas had taught) but only if it were to be contrary to equity and charity47. He rejects the notion of the sterility of money as well as the difference between mutuum of things that can be consumed and locatio-conductio of things that cannot, asserting “a moral equivalence between an entitlement to rent from leasing a field and an entitlement to interest from lending money” and positing that “the value of money comes from its employment and human industry, if someone is prepared to borrow, they ought to be prepared to repay more than the principal”48 – as long as the activity of lending did not lead to economic oppression.

42 43 44 45 46 47 48

Zimmermann (note 6) 175, n. 111; Tan (note 24) 191–192. Tan (note 24) 192. Zimmermann (note 6) 172. See Noonan (note 33) 365f.; Zimmermann (note 6) 174. Wykes (note 14) 38f. Wykes (note 14) 43 and 44. Wykes (note 14) 44.

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In spite of the erosion of the ban on charging interest as well as the new approach to interest in the wake of the Reformation, the rhetoric of its undesirability continued to influence thinking. This happened especially in Catholic countries but also in Protestant areas, and as late as the seventeenth century we observe influential thinkers in principle accepting the ban, but then, in the time-honoured way, explaining what would be regarded as legitimate exceptions to this ban. In the Netherlands, Grotius took this “conventional” approach to interest, that is to say, he accepted the correctness of the notion that charging interest is to be condemned from a moral point of view, but worked with the notion that it is not wrong to stipulate compensation for having to part with one’s money for an extended period of time49, (although there is more than a trace of vacillation in his approach, as we will presently see). Thus, in De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius answers the question “By what right is interest forbidden?” by first outlining that interest is not forbidden by the law of nature and that the argument against it based on the sterility of money is also not convincing, noting that “the right of repaying money or wine only after a certain time is something capable of being evaluated; for he pays less who pays later”. However, he then counters these sentiments by saying that, “whatever one might think of the matter, the law given to the Jews by God, which prohibits Jews from giving money to Jews at interest, should suffice for us”, because (citing the Psalms and Ezekiel) it is “if not essential, certainly morally honest”50 and “ought now to be performed by every person, [because] all manner of distinction between peoples has been lifted by the Gospel, and [the concept of] ‘neighbour’ is understood more broadly”51. Having outlined the moral position, as he interpreted it from the scriptures, he proceeds to outline instances which he describes as closely related to interest and commonly viewed as constituting interest, although, they are in fact agreements of a different kind, namely those aimed at recompense of the loss suffered by a moneylender because he will be without his money for a long time (quod diu 49 See Van den Bergh (note 1) 185. 50 Hugo Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (curavit B.J.A. de Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp, annotationes novas addiderunt R. Freenstra & C. E. Persenaire, Aalen 1993) 2.12.20: Sed quicquid hac de sentire libeat, sufficere nobis debet lex a Deo Hebrais data, quae vetat Hebraos Hebrais pecuniam dare foenori. Est enim huius materia si non necessaria, certe honesta moraliter, unde aliis maxime moralibus annumeratur Psalmo qui apud Hebraos est decimus quintus, apud Latinos decimus quartus, et apud Ezechielem capite decimo octavo…. 51 Ibid: … ea nunc praestanda sunt homini cuivis, omni popularum discrimine per Euangelium sublato, latiusque extensor proximi intellectu.

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pecunia careat) or the loss of profit as a result of the loan (de lucro ob mutui dationem cessante), noting that it does not amount to interest if a professional moneylender demands something in return for his expenses and the danger of losing the capital (pro impensis … et pro periculo amittendae sortis)52. He ends off by indicating that human laws allow that an amount be stipulated for the use of money (or any other object) – the limit in Holland being 8 % for ordinary citizens and 12 % for businessmen – and states that if what these laws allow is compensation for that without which a person must actually or potentially do, they would not be in conflict with natural or divine law (siquidem vere stant intra compensationem eius quod abest, aut abesse potest, non pugnat cum naturali aut divino iure)53. In his Inleydinge tot de Hollandse Rechtsgeleertheyt, he devotes very little space to the moral arguments against interest and is even more direct in his approval of charging interest54. He notes that “all jurists agree in stating the general principle that a debt immediately due is more than the same amount due at a future date”55 and adds that “therefore it is not surprising that this valuable thing should be measured by the common measure of value, namely money”56 and he stresses that “the use also of money on the terms of repaying it has a money value”57. Grotius does not cite Lessius directly, but he uses his language and the prominence that he gives to the time-value of money means that it would not be far-fetched to assume that Lessius also influenced Grotius on the issue of interest. Let us come now to Gerard Noodt and his defence of the practice of charging of interest. Although his treatise is produced at the end of seventeenth century, when the Netherlands was one of the world’s most advanced and active commercial hubs, he is writing in a social atmosphere that was still charged with strong opposing views about interest. Since the sixteenth century the occupation of “Lombardhouder” had been established in the Netherlands. It was simply the montes pietatis spilling over to the Low Countries (as the allusion to Lombardy in the name suggested) and the business of these institutions (pawnbroking/ banking/lending) was held in very low esteem, even in protestant circles, reaching a high point in the seventeenth century (between 1620 and 1660) in the

52 53 54 55

Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 2.12.21. Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis 2.12.22. Grotius, Inleydinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyt, 3.10.8–10. Lee’s translation, Inleydinge 3.10.10: “In’t gemeen by alle rechtsgheleerden werd verstaen, dat die iet dadelick schuldig is meer schuldig is dan die iet schuldig is over zeeckeren tijd”. 56 Lee’s translation, Inleydinge 3.10.10: “Zoo en is niet vremd dat het zelve mede door de gmeene mate, te weten door geld werd afgemeten”. 57 Lee’s translation, Inleydinge 3.10.10: “Zoo is dan dat hebben van het geld op weder-gheven mede geld waerd”.

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battle between those attacking and those defending interest-bearing loans58. The minutes of the Synod of Antwerpen at the end of sixteenth century (15 September 1578) could just as well have been those of a meeting in Noodt’s time: A decision had to be taken in regard to the question whether a “Lombardhouder”, his wife, and his employees should be allowed to take communion, and it was as follows: in regard to the banker himself the answer was a straightforward “no”; in regard to his wife it was a qualified “yes”, provided she was prepared publicly to condemn her husband’s profession; and in respect of the employees it was also “no”, because they were free to seek alternative employment59. In 1658 the Estates of Holland withdrew the right from ecclesiastical organisations to condemn the occupation of banking or those that engaged in it, and the controversy retreated from formal platforms to informal ones60. That the issue is still very much alive in his day also emerges from the fact that Noodt writes in his preface to De Foenore et Usuris61 that “no other issue has to the same extent been subject to contradictory judgements of men”62, explaining that “interest was at one time held to be just and honourable, at another godless and disgraceful”63. Noodt himself does not vacillate at all and is firm in his belief that that the charging of interest is vital to successful commerce and “commerce is man’s only protection against poverty in peace and in war”64 and he proceeds to put together a comprehensive and systematic defence and exposition of interest. How does Noodt go about his task? In the first book he examines interest from a philological, historical and moral-philosophical perspective, including the views advanced by ancient philosophers, the Bible, the church fathers and the Scholastics. The second book collates and considers the treatment of interest in Roman law, including such issues as the terminology used, the limits imposed on the charging of interest, the recognised exceptions to maximum rates of interest, the role of judicial discretion in awards of interest, the relationship between legal constructs such as antichresis and interest, the fate of anatocismus (compound interest), the various remedies against those who charged excessive interest, and Justinian’s innovations. The third and concluding book deals with the sources whence obligations to pay interest arise in various situations, the role of judicial 58 P.E.H. Bodel Bienfait, Bijdragen tot de kennis van den vromen zin der Vadern, Archief voor Nederlandsche Kerkgeschiedenis 7 (1899) 393–401 at 400. 59 Bodel Bienfait (note 58) 398. 60 Bodel Bienfait (note 58) 401. 61 (note 1), Praefatio 175. 62 nulla aeque experta est contraria hominum judicia (Niekerk/Pretorius/Kriel/van Zyl, note 3). 63 Fuit enim, cum justa et honesta, fuit cum impia et flagitiosa haberetur usura (Niekerk/ Pretorius/Kriel/van Zyl, note 3). 64 quia ea commercium unicum humanae indigentiae subsidium, pace et bello (Niekerk/ Pretorius/Kriel/van Zyl, note 3).

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discretion, and what events affect the running of interest. To continue the main thread of this contribution, I will deal only with Noodt’s treatment of the Canonlaw prohibition of interest and the interpretation thereof by the Scholastics and Grotius. Chapter 12 of Book 2 of De Foenore et Usuris is devoted to a rebuttal of the Canonic prohibitions: Noodt begins by acknowledging the strict prohibition emanating from the pontifical decretals was ameliorated by the interpretation of these prohibitions in practice. He summarises the notions that in order to compensate for harm suffered or a profit forfeited (“pro repensando damno quod pati, item pro lucro quo carere”) interest was held to be chargeable by authorities such as Covarruvias65, noting that Grotius is in agreement with this approach and summarising the latter’s exposition of interest in De iure belli ac pacis. However, he considers these solutions (rather than being part of a serious search for a reasonable construction of the decretals that are compatible with economic reality – which their authors certainly intended them to be) as empty legal interpretations that preserve the words of the pontiffs but circumvent their intention and sentiment or true meaning66. He reserves the same judgement for (as advised by, for instance, Molina)67 the device of selling a property with a right of repurchase at the same price, while allowing the purchaser to enjoy the fruits of the property (instead of entering into a loan agreement with interest) – this is nothing else, he concludes, than a contract for interest masquerading as a contract of sale. As for the distinction drawn between a forced loan (for example, one decreed by the state, as often happened when a potentate issued bonds to finance his latest fancy) and a voluntary loan – the expectation of interest being acceptable in the former but not in the latter, since in the former it merely compensates for an involuntary loss and there is no intention to lend at interest – Noodt points to the fact that the Digest text on which the proponents of this distinction68 rely (D. 12,1,14) does not support their conclusions and argues that there is no basis upon which to consider the one “more just or less despicable” than the other. It was important to Noodt to make the case for interest without the crutch of the religiously inspired moral arguments against interest. Thus he excoriates 65 Noodt (note 1) 1.12. He cites Diego Covarruvias e Leyva, Variarum resolutionum ex jure pontificio regio et cæsareo libri IV (1561) c.1 n.2. 66 Inani juris interpretatio servari Pontificum verba, mentem ac sententiam circumveniri. (Niekerk/Pretorius/Kriel/van Zyl, note 3). 67 Noodt cites Loduvicus Molina, De Justitia et de Iure (1593 – 1609) vol. 2, disputatio 320, marginal note 4. 68 He cites, amongst others, Andreas Gail, Practicae observationes ad processum iudiciarium imperialis camerae (1578) 2.5.17, who, Noodt notes, is following the lead of Dominicus de Soto in this regard.

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Grotius for resorting to biblical justifications in De Iure Belli ac Pacis when he says that “the laws given to the Jews by God … should suffice for us”, remarking that “it is something to be marvelled at that such an outstanding man was able to have recourse to this opinion, especially since he wrote the contrary in his Annotationes ad Lucam, chapter 6.”69 Noodt himself gives a socio-economic reason for the biblical prohibition against charging interest between Jews (namely that the undeveloped early Jewish state could do without internal discord)70. He adds the legitimate point that when interest is charged openly it is usually subject to legal limits, whereas the “more moral” alternatives are not and can thus be very much more burdensome71. However, Noodt does not take the substantive arguments for recognising the legitimacy of charging interest any further than Lessius, who espoused his insights on interest almost a century before this book of Noodt was published72. Noodt has, as Van den Bergh rightly observes73, complete command of the sources from antiquity to his time and argues his case lucidly and convincingly, but it is disappointing that he does not emphasise the most important justification of interest, namely the notion that money itself has a time value. He foregrounds the two most common external justifications for charging interest, namely damnum emergens and lucurm cessans, but not the third, carentia pecuniae, so superbly argued by Lessius and embraced by Grotius. Noodt, however, fully understands that interest is the price of money. Earlier, in chapter 6, he states the following, with express acknowledgement that “this is what the moneylenders urge, and rightly so”: “Now this will be the position if you were to use my money subject to the payment of interest: you certainly manage with that [money of mine] to make a profit which you would have been unable to make without it; but if I were to receive interest in exchange for the use of my money, I would be receiving nothing other than that which compensates for its use. I will therefore not prove to be unjust if I were to receive interest, because I am not receiving something which is yours but something which is mine. For I am receiving the price of the use [of my money] which I have granted to you”74. 69 Noodt (note 1) 1.10. The reference is to Hugo Grotius, Annotationes In Novum Testamentum: Continens Annotationes Ad Marcum Et Lucam, Amsterdam and Paris 1641–50: Est tamen quod mireris, potuisse egregium illum virum ad hanc decurrere sententiam; quum praesertim ei contraria scripserit, Annotationes ad Lucam, cap. 6. (Niekerk/Pretorius/ Kriel/van Zyl, note 3). 70 See Van den Bergh (note 1) 184–185. 71 Noodt (note 1) 1.12; Van den Bergh (note 1) 184. 72 Noodt does not cite Lessius. 73 Van den Bergh (note 1) 184. 74 Noodt (note 1) 1.12: Id autem futurum est, si mea pecunia sub usuris utaris: quippe consecutus ea, ut facias lucrum quod sine ea non potuisti facere: ego vero si usuras accipiam pro usu meae pecuniae, nihil aliud acciperim, quam quod ad pensandum ejus usum respiciat; non igitur ego, si usuras accipiam, fuero iniustus: quia non quod tuum sit accipio, sed quod meum. (Niekerk/Pretorius/Kriel/van Zyl, note 3) Van den Bergh (note 1) cites this passage as

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However, he does not repeat this central bit of reasoning when he deals with the views of the late Scholastics in chapter 12. In countering their arguments, he elides the fact that one of their number, exhibiting advanced economic reasoning, had developed the notion that interest is simply the price of money almost a hundred years earlier. One cannot assume that Noodt had access to Lessius’ work, but, given Noodt’s deep knowledge of the literature on interest, including that of the late Scholastics, coupled with the fact De Iustitiae et de Iure was reprinted no fewer than seventeen times in the century after its first publication, and taking into account the demonstrated tendency at the time of authors not adequately revealing their reliance on the Spanish moral theologians75, the fact that the most advanced thinker on the topic is not cited by Noodt presents a puzzle that is worth further investigation.

an indication of Noodt’s direct invocation of the views of businessmen in his consideration of what the law should be. 75 See the literature cited by W. Decock, Jesuit Freedom of Contract, The Legal History Review 77 (2009) 423–458, at 425 note 8.

Laurent Waelkens

Heidenen in de Codex Theodosianus?

Romanitas en christianitas zijn in de oudheid en de middeleeuwen samen vergroeid tot latinitas. Die werd een pijler van onze beschaving. Die latinitas is een beschermd monument en het is delicaat er nog aan te tornen. Wie een kunstwerk of een antiek bouwsel van te dichtbij bekijkt, wordt er weggehaald. Dat geldt ook voor de “m8lange intime” van het Romeinse recht en het christendom. Historici en humanisten weten er alles over en elke poging een jota aan die kennis toe te voegen wordt meewarig beschouwd als onwetenschappelijk. Anderzijds vormt kerk en recht wel een link met Jan Hallebeek, aan wie dit artikel opgedragen is. Wij hebben het voordeel dat wij er in het geheim kunnen over praten: in het Nederlands.

1.

Inleiding

Het christelijke keizerrijk boeide de middeleeuwers. Bezoekers, bedevaarders en vanaf de elfde eeuw kruisvaarders zagen Constantinopel als een centrum van het christendom. Een bezoek aan de Haya Sophia of de relikwie[nkapel van het paleis en deelname aan processies of erediensten waren diepe ervaringen. En was de keizer geen christelijke voorman? Hij had rechtsmacht in religieuze aangelegenheden. Sinds de Novelle 123 behandelde zijn kanselarij beroepen tegen de beslissingen van de patriarchen, tot rond 750 ook tegen de paus van Rome. Wie beslissingen van de paus kon terugdraaien, was toch wel de grootste christen op aarde. Bij de juristen werd al tijdens de investituurstrijd gesteld dat de keizer de beschermheer van de christelijke kerken was. Een oude vraag is hoe en wanneer hij dat geworden is. Veel middeleeuwse antwoorden worden nu nog herhaald. De keizers zouden in de vierde eeuw de ware godsdienst geadopteerd hebben. Drie belangrijke fasen waren daarbij de erkenning van het christendom door Constantijn, het opleggen ervan als rijksgodsdienst door Theodosius de Grote en de

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actieve bestrijding van het heidendom door diverse keizers. De rechtsteksten rond die kerstening waren te vinden in de Latijnstalige Codex van Theodosius1. Wij hebben herhaaldelijk onze twijfels geuit over die christelijke visie op het vierde-eeuwse keizerrijk. Daar werd veel over gefantaseerd, zeker over het uitroeien van het heidendom: wat werd daar dan bestreden? Laten wij kritisch blijven. Wij herhalen hier even onze visie op de beweerde kerstening door keizer Constantijn en keizer Theodosius en focussen dan op “antiheidense wetgeving” in de Codex Theodosianus, in titel CTh. 16,10. Dat laatste is het nieuwe in deze bijdrage.

2.

Keizer Constantijn en de kerstening

Vooreerst Constantijn. Die zou de veldslag bij de Ponte Milvio gewonnen hebben als gevolg van een belofte aan de God van de christenen en zou vervolgens de Kerk erkend en bevoorrecht hebben2. De geromanceerde verhalen daarover komen vooral uit Constantinopel. In Milaan zou Constantijn in 313 met Licinus afgesproken hebben de “christenvervolging” van Diocletianus te laten ophouden. Een erkenning van “de Kerk” stak daar niet in. Die bestond nog niet als een erkenbare structuur. De Kerk als verbond van de bisschoppen dateert van de elfde eeuw3. De Lateraanse schenking aan het corpus christianorum is exclusief bij de bisschop van Rome terechtgekomen. De historici nemen aan dat Constantijn in constituties van 318 en 333 rechtsmacht gegeven heeft aan de bisschoppen. Hij heeft in werkelijkheid de bisschoppelijke audi[nties aan zijn eigen rechtsmacht onderworpen. De keizers bestuurden veel materies via de rechtspraak. Elk conflict dat een ambtenaar behandelde of veroorzaakte, kon in beroep tot bij de pretorische prefectuur komen. Die herzag de zaken in hoogste aanleg in naam van de keizer. Haar uitspraken waren precedenten voor alle lagere rechters en ambtenaren. 1 Klassieke bibliografie: J. Gaudemet, L’8glise dans l’empire romain (4e-5e siHcle), 2. Aufl., Parijs 1989; B. Biondi, Il diritto romano cristiano, 3 vol., Milaan 1952–1954; A. Barzano, Il cristianesimo nelle leggi di Roma imperiale, Milaan 1996; L. Di Giovanni, Chiesa e stato nel Codice Theodosiano, Napels 1980; E. Dovere, Ius principale e catholica lex (V secolo), Napels 1999; P.R. Coleman-Norton, Roman state and Christian church, A collection of legal documents to AD 535, 3 vol., Londen 1966. 2 Een klassiek overzichtsartikel met bibliografie: M. Lätzel, Konstantin I. (der große), Flavius Valerius Constantius, Biografisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexicon 23, Bautzen 2004, 841–845; cf. D. Liebs, Die Konstantinische Wende und das Recht, in: Das Recht der Römer und die Christen, Tübingen 2015, 75–97. 3 In de vierde eeuw verwees ecclesia naar de viering van een eredienst, een kerkgebouw of de particuliere gemeenschap die rond een bisschop verenigd was: B. Szabó-Bechstein, Libertas Ecclesiae, Ein Schlüsselbegriff des Investiturstreites und seine Vorgeschichte, Rome 1985, passim.

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Constantijn heeft na een revolutionaire periode de rechtspraktijk opnieuw gestabiliseerd. Daarbij heeft hij ook rekening gehouden met de bisschoppelijke audi[nties, de eigen conflictbemiddeling van de christenen die gegroeid was uit de rabbijnse traditie4. In een regime van besturen via de rechtspraak was bisschoppelijke rechtspraak een domper op de macht van de keizer. Die rechtspraak uitroeien was een onderdeel van de gerechtelijke hervorming van Diocletianus5. In zijn rijksdeel heeft Constans Chlorus, Constantijns vader, dat aspect van de gerechtelijke hervorming nooit afgedwongen. De audi[nties kaderden in de vrijheid van handelen van de burgers, kostten de overheid niets en de bestrijding ervan had veel kwaad bloed gezet. Constantijn heeft ze laten bestaan, maar heeft de uitspraken van de bisschoppen geklasseerd als arbitrage6. Als ze verzoening brachten, des te beter. Als ze afgedwongen dienden te worden, was er echter een exequatur nodig van een keizerlijke rechter. Zo bleef de rechtsmacht keizerlijk. Die controle van de audi[nties leidde inderdaad tot een zekere erkenning van de christelijke bisschoppen. Als de keizer beslissingen van bisschoppen ging afdwingen, was uiteraard de volgende dag iedereen bisschop. Om de audi[nties zinvol te controleren, bekeek de exequaturrechter dan ook in de eerste plaats de bevoegdheid: kwam de zaak van bij een christelijke bisschop? Daar kwam dus rechtspraak over, die veel historici als keizerlijk ingrijpen in de theologie zagen. Uiteraard controleerde de exequaturrechter eerst of er een beslissing tot stand gekomen was. Dat betekende een controle op de procedure. Het is daarom niet verwonderlijk dat de bisschoppelijke rechters de keizerlijke cognitie-procedure overnamen en in beginsel volgens Romeins recht oordeelden. Het vereiste respect voor de procedure was verregaand. Op het concilie van Sardica van 342 stonden de audi[nties op de agenda van de aanwezige bisschoppen en werd het beroep tegen hun beslissingen bij de bisschop van Rome ingevoerd. Welk probleem uit de praktijk van de audi[nties werd daar opgelost? Het hoger beroep was een essenti[el element van de Romeinse procedure en was het eerste middel om de willekeur van ambtenaren te vermijden7. Hadden keizerlijke rechters exequaturs geweigerd voor beslissingen waar geen beroep tegen mogelijk was, omdat die procedureel niet in 4 Een goed overzicht over die gerechtelijke activiteit: G. Vismara, La giurisdizione civile dei vescovi (secoli I–IX), Milaan 1995. 5 Bronnen om tot die conclusie te komen vindt men bijv. bij D. Liebs, Die Jurisprudenz im spätantiken Italien (260–640 n. Chr.), Berlijn 1987, 81–119. 6 Dat karakter hebben ze behouden: zie A. Lefebvre-Teillard, Justice publique, justice priv8e, Les origines canoniques de quelques grands traits caract8ristiques de l’arbitrage, in: F. Roumy/M. Schmoeckel/O. Condorelli (eds.), Der Einfluß der Kanonistik auf die europäische Rechtskultur, II, Öffentliches Recht, Keulen/Weimar/Wenen 2010, 133–154. 7 Zie daarover A. Padoa Schioppa, Studi sull’appello nel diritto intermedio, 2 vol., Milaan 1967–1970, misschien wel de mooiste studie die er is over het Romeinse recht. Het eerste deel is aan het hoger beroep in de oudheid gewijd.

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orde waren? Door af te spreken dat de bisschop van Rome de beslissingen van zijn collega’s in beroep kon herzien, heeft het concilie van Sardica als neveneffect in het westen het primaat van de paus op zijn medebisschoppen ingevoerd. De kerkelijke orde werd daar dus sterk be"nvloed door de keizerlijke orde. De Romeinse christenen zagen echter in elke structurering door de overheid een grondwetsartikel voor de christenen. Zij onthielden vooral dat Constantijn de bisschoppen liet uitspreken. En die benepen interpretaties van de eerste kerkhistorici is bijgebleven. Valentianus III herhaalde in 352 duidelijk dat de audi[nties slechts arbitrages waren, voor beperkte materies golden en dat de administratie maatregelen kon treffen rond de uitvoering ervan8. De kwestie van het exequatur werd omstandig herhaald door Justinianus in zijn Nov. 123,21 van 546. Daar lezen wij dat er ook inhoudelijk beroep mogelijk was tegen een geschilbeslechting van een bisschop. In de brieven van Gregorius de Grote ontdekken wij dat de toenmalige paus effectief ingeschakeld was in de rechtspraak van de keizer9. Dat systeem bleef overeind in het oosten: daar werd in de middeleeuwen nog veel recht in de kerken uitgesproken onder toezicht van de keizerlijke administratie10. Dat model vinden wij tot in de negentiende eeuw terug in de orthodoxe en islamitische landen die de Grieks-Romeinse traditie van Constantinopel overgenomen hebben. Er werd recht gesproken door geestelijken onder toezicht van tsaar, sultan of bey11. Heeft Constantijn dan de erkenning van de bisschoppen opgestart of hun inlijving?

3.

Keizer Theodosius de Grote en de kerstening

De historici zien een tweede groot moment van kerstening van het keizerrijk in het Edict van Thessaloniki van 380, waarin Theodosius de Grote het christendom als rijksgodsdienst zou afgekondigd hebben. Deze kwestie hebben wij al omstandig behandeld. Theodosius was zelf geen christen en stelde ook na 380 virulent antichristelijke medewerkers aan als ambtenaren met hoge rechtsmacht,

8 Nov. Val. 35 (452). 9 J.Y. Pertin, Justice et gouvernement dans l’Pglise d’aprHs les lettres de saint Gr8goire le Grand, Parijs 2015. 10 Voorlopige conclusie uit mijn zoektocht naar Oost-Romeinse gerechtelijke archieven. Daar duiken ook voortdurend elementen op in recente studies. Zo bijv. D. Penna, The Byzantine imperial acts to Venice, Pisa and Genoa, 10th-12th centuries, A comparative legal study, ’s Gravenhage 2012, passim: de Venetianen krijgen in het middeleeuwse Constantinopel jurisdictie in hun kerk, terwijl de Genuezen direct onder de keizerlijke jurisdictie vielen. 11 Zo bijvoorbeeld in de recente bundel van X. Perrot/J. Péricard (ed.), La rencontre des droits en M8diterran8e, L’acculturation en question, Limoges 2014, met een opvallend artikel van M. Mahfoudh, Acculturation et codification en Tun8sie / partir du XIXe siHcle, 51–63.

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zoals Symmachus of Tatianus12. In zijn tijd bestond het regeren via het opleggen van algemene normen niet. Zeker het opleggen van een denkkader zou bijzonder on-Romeins geweest zijn. De uitspraak van 380 is eenvoudiger te begrijpen. Theodosius’ hoofdbekommernis was toen de eenmaking van het westelijke en het oostelijke rijk. Zijn kanselarij behandelde in het zogenaamde edict van Thessaloniki een prejudici[le vraag van de prefect van Constantinopel. De kanselarij besliste geen exequaturs meer te geven aan uitspraken van monofysitische bisschoppen. Dat zou immers de eenmaking van het rijk bemoeilijken. Die tekst werd bewaard in CTh. 16,2, maar is een nieuw leven gaan leiden in de twaalfde eeuw. Hij werd toen ingelast in de Codex van Justinianus, samen met meer dan tweehonderd andere teksten die de rechtsmacht van de paus gestalte moesten geven na het Concordaat van Worms13.

4.

De titel CTh. 16,10

Maar, als Constantijn en Theodosius niet zo christelijk waren als de middeleeuwers dachten, wat dan met die talloze wetten die dienden om de heidense godsdiensten uit te roeien? In boek 16 van de Codex Theodosianus is veel rechtspraak opgenomen die de rechten van de christelijke bisschoppen vestigde14. Als je dat boek 16 doorleest, krijg je evenwel de indruk dat het vooral rechtspraak bevat over de niet-rechten van de niet-christelijke niet-bisschoppen. In boek 16 lees je vooral welke audi[nties in aanmerking komen voor een keizerlijk exequatur. Het is opvallend dat boek 16 vlotter leesbaar is dan de vijftien voorgaande boeken van de Codex Theodosianus. De tekst berust ook meer op de latere handschriften van de Codex Theodosianus. Je krijgt de indruk dat boek 16 sterk geredigeerd werd in de karolingische tijd. Onze verwondering werd kritiek op de kerkhistorici toen wij titel CTh. 16,10 doornamen. In de vakliteratuur wordt gesteld dat de constituties van CTh. 16,10 belangrijk waren voor het uitroeien van het heidendom door de keizers. Die titel komt echter niet voor in het Breviarium van Alarik, dat een verkorte versie van 12 A. Lippold, Theodor der Große und seine Zeit, München 1980, 45–46; C. Sogno, Q. Aurelius Symmachus, A political biography, Ann Arbor 2006. 13 L. Waelkens, L’Pdit de Thessalonique, droit romain antique ou ius commune? In: S. Grodziski/D. Malec/A. Karabowicz/M. Stus (eds.), Vetera novis augere, Studia i prace dedykowane professorowi Waclawowi Uruszczakowi, Krakau 2010, 1099–1112; Idem, L’h8r8sie des premiers titres du Code de Justinien, Une hypothHse sur la r8daction tardive de C. 1,1–13, TR 79 (2011) 253–296. 14 Een mooi resum8 van de traditionele kijk op CTh. 16 is die van M.R. Salzman, The evidence for the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity in Book 16 of the Theodosian Code, Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 42 (1993), 362–378. Cf. voor de meest recente stand van zaken A.J.B. Sirks, The Theodosian Code, A study, Friedrichsdorf 2007, 45, 81 en 185–187.

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boek CTh. 16 bevat15. Mommsens editie ervan is gebaseerd op handschriften van de negende, tiende en de elfde eeuw16. Hij gaat bovendien helemaal niet over rechten van de bisschoppen. Het is niet onze bedoeling in deze korte bijdrage de hele literatuur te herzien over de “christelijke keizers” van de vierde en vijfde eeuw en ook niet een kritische analyse te maken van de kerkgeschiedenis die gebaseerd werd op Socrates Scholasticus, Eusebius van Cesarea, Gelasius Cyzicenus, Zosimus en zoveel andere schrijvers uit de oudheid. Wij willen wel onze scepsis uitdrukken tegenover wat de vakliteratuur leest in titel CTh. 16,10. Wij overlopen die titel hier tekst na tekst en geven aan wat wij er zelf in lezen. Er is jammer genoeg geen ruimte om de Latijnse tekst hier af te drukken met onze vertaling ertegenover. De lezer neme best zijn Mommsen bij de hand of de online versie ervan en leze elke tekst voor onze interpretatie ervan te bekijken17. Wij houden rekening met de Engelse vertaling van Pharr en de Franse van Roug818. CTh. 16,10 De paganis, sacrificiis et templis. – Dit kopje werd door Pharr vertaald als “pagans, sacrifices and temples” en door Roug8 als “les pa"ens, les sacrifices et les temples”19. Wij lezen “over procedures en openbare gebouwen in afgelegen dorpen”. Paganus is het adjectief van pagus en hoort bij sacrificiis. Het is het stamwoord voor “paysan”, maar ook voor “payen” en “pagan”, heidebewoners, boskanters, keuters waar je cultuur noch geloof aan kwijt kan. Tertullianus gebruikt die laatste betekenis al in het Latijn: deorum falsorum multorumque cultores paganos uocamus20. Ook Sint Augustinus gebruikt het woord zo21. Je mag er evenwel niet van uitgaan dat de kanselarij een afgeleide betekenis of kleinerende taal gebruikt heeft in een woord dat ook zinvol in zijn oorspronkelijke betekenis gelezen kan worden. Het woord sacrificia zaait bijkomende verwarring. Niet-juristen denken daarbij aan offers en verzeilen in de sfeer van oosterse godsdiensten. Sacrificium is echter afgeleid van sanciri, sanctioneren, en facere. Het imperfectief deelwoord sacer betekent “te sanctioneren”22. Sacrum facere verwijst naar een procedure, een offici[le werkwijze en

15 Daar staat de actuele titel CTh. 16,12 aangeduid als CTh. 16,5. 16 De teksttradities E en V van Th. Mommsen, Codex Theodosianus, I,1, Prolegomena, Hildesheim 1990, p. VII. 17 Bijvoorbeeld http://ancientrome.ru/ius/library/codex/theod/liber10.htm (laatst geconsulteerd op 27 augustus 2018). 18 Zie volgende noot. In het Frans was er toen ook al de vertaling van P. Noirou-Mortier, Le Code de Th8odosien, Livre XVI, Parijs 2002. 19 C. Pharr, The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions, A translation with commentary, glossary and bibliography, Princeton 1952 (herdruk New York 2001); [R. Delmaire et J. Rougé,] Les lois religieuses des empereurs romains de Constantin / Th8odose II, I, Code th8odosien XVI, Paris 2005, p. 427. 20 Tertullianus, De corona militis, 11. 21 Bijvoorbeeld in zijn Retractationes 2,34. 22 De betekenis die H. Bennett, Sacer esto, Transactions of the American Philological Asso-

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soms naar de uitvoering van een vonnis. Een Romeinse sacerdos is een rechter uit het niet-civiele ius sacrum, te onderscheiden van de iudex uit de civiele rechtbanken. Als Latijns woord voor rabbijn of christelijke rechter is het in de middeleeuwen priester gaan betekenen, net zoals pontifex maximus in het christendom van “hoogste rechter” tot paus is vergroeid en vervolgens in oude teksten als hogepriester gelezen werd23. De jurist Hieronymus, een tijdgenoot van de Codex Theodosianus waarvan wij in het verleden al vaststelden hoe nauwkeurig hij met gerechtelijke woordenschat omging24, gebruikt in zijn bijbelvertaling sacrificium enkel voor rituele handelingen en niet voor offers25. In de middeleeuwen was ook het doopsel nog een sacrificium26. Het derde verwarrend woord in die titel is templum. Dat verwees niet naar een kerk, maar naar een overheidsgebouw dat toegankelijk was voor het publiek. De censoren bestuurden de conscriptielijsten in hun templum libertatis. Het politieke centrum van de patrici[rs was de tempel van Jupiter op het Capitool en voor de plebejers was dat de tempel van Ceres op de Aventijn. Gerechtsgebouwen waren altijd templa. Tempels kwamen ook in de steden voor als bestuurlijke gebouwen, maar enkel in het oosten lezen wij over tempels als gebedshuizen, zoals in Egypte of Jeruzalem, en dan gaat het meestal om een vertaling. Vele tempels werden later gerecycleerd tot gebedshuizen, maar de idee dat ze dat in de oudheid al waren is van de nieuwe tijden. CTh. 16,10,1 [320] – Van in de eerste tekst valt op dat die titel inderdaad niet over heidenen en heidense liturgie gaat. Traditioneel wordt in deze tekst een verbod gelezen op waarzeggerij en heidense offergangen (sacrificiis domesticis). Geen van beide staan erin. Een openbaar gebouw werd getroffen door de bliksem. In het dossier dat aan de centrale overheid gestuurd werd, diende een omstandig verslag te steken, met inbegrip van een advies van weerkundigen

23 24 25

26

ciation, 61 (1930) 5–18, eraan gaf, werd door veel romanisten gevolgd, maar is te onprecies om juridisch te zijn. Voor pontifex zie J. Gaudemet, Formation du droit canonique et gouvernement de l’Pglise de l’antiquit8 / l’.ge classique, Straatsburg 2008, 235–251. L. Waelkens, Medieval family and marriage law. From actions of status to legal doctrine, in: J. Cairns e.a. (ed.), The creation of the ius commune, From casus to regula, Edinburgh 2010, 100–122: Hieronymus gebruikt de termen coniugium, nuptiae en matrimonium accuraat. In de Vulgaat troffen wij het woord sacrific* 285 maal aan in het Oud Testament. Telkens slaat het woord op de procedure van cultus of offergang. Voor het offer zelf wordt holocausta gebruikt. Sacrificium komt bij Hieronymus slechts viermaal voor in het Nieuw Testament en eenmaal in de Handelingen der Apostelen. Dat zijn telkens verwijzingen naar de cultushandelingen uit het oude testament. Daarnaast vind je het woord vijfmaal in de brieven van Paulus. In Hebr. 2,14 is het de vertaling van hus_a. Het komt voor in de Neovulgaat in Hebr. 10,6 et 10,8, maar die passages staan niet in de Neovulgaat, zodat we er geen Griekse versie van hebben. Voor Hebr. 5,1 et 9,6 hebben wij die wel en dan staat sacrificium voor resp. hus_a et katqe_a. Het gaat dus ook telkens over een liturgische procedurehandeling. Zie bijvoorbeeld Hostiensis ad X. 3,42,4, ed. Veneti[ 1585, 170rb.

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(haruspices). De kanselarij herinnert er hier de prefect aan dat afwijkende plaatselijke werkwijzen uit den boze zijn. In casu stelt de kanselarij vast dat de centrale overheid uiteindelijk toch een correct verslag ontvangen heeft met interpretatie van de feiten. In de traditionele vertaling van die passages worden die haruspices waarzeggers. Die nemen de hara waar, de vlucht der vogels. Het enige wat je daarmee kan voorspellen is het weerbericht van de eerstvolgende uren. Een haruspex is dus een meteoroloog. Zijn advies kan bij een militaire operatie winst of verlies betekenen en de senaat heeft altijd haar militair karakter beklemtoond door de vergadering te starten met een haruspex. Niets over heidendom in deze tekst. CTh. 16,10,2 [341] – Ook in de tweede tekst komen geen heidenen voor. Er staat te lezen dat men moet ophouden met het overdrijven en gek doen met procedures. “Wie durft een procedure te voeren tegen het precedent van Constantijn of tegen onze weloverwogen voorliggende beslissing, zal zowel de eerste veroordeling ondergaan als de voorliggende beslissing.” Hier werd een beroep bij de kanselarij afgewezen. In de rechtsgeschiedenis is verwarring ontstaan door de nieuwtijdse betekenis van de woorden superstitio en sacrificia27. Superstitio betekende toen niet bijgeloof of “superstition”, maar “overdreven beklemtonen” of “in opstand komen”. De uitspraak kwam er in een tergend en roekeloos geding, maar waarover is niet duidelijk. Ook niet waarom het epitome van het arrest in deze titel werd opgenomen. Was het een zaak van te lande? Of werd het in de middeleeuwen ingelast? CTh.16,10,3 [343] gaat over besparen op het onderhoud van openbare gebouwen. Alhoewel alle overdreven kosten geschrapt dienen te worden, wil de keizer toch dat ook openbare gebouwen buiten de muren onderhouden worden, zeker als ze herinneren aan oude spelen en wedstrijden en getuigen van de grootsheid van vroegere liefhebberijen. Er wordt blijkbaar over een amfitheater geprocedeerd, maar jammer genoeg wordt het niet met name ermeld. Er is wel duidelijk geen sprake van heidense ritus. CTh.16,10,4 [354?] behandelt de gevolgen van de executie van onderkeizer Flavius Claudius Constantius Gallus, de neef en schoonbroer van keizer Constans28. Zijn bureaus dienden overal gesloten te worden en door iedereen toegang te weigeren moest aan zijn slachtoffers de kans ontnomen worden ook in de fout te gaan. De keizer wilde dat iedereen zich van procedures onthield, waarschijnlijk omdat de troebelen in Antiochi[ en ommeland onder Gallus precies ontstaan waren door een reeks onrechtvaardige vonnissen. Wie er toch op een of 27 Zowel Pharr als Roug8 vertalen dat het hier om een verbod van bijgeloof gaat en van heidense offers. 28 Over deze episode zie T.M. Banchich, Gallus Caesar (15 March 351–354 A.D.), in: De imperatoribus romanis, An online Encyclopedia of Roman Emperors.

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andere manier mee doorging, zou ook sterven door het zwaard. Pharr vermeldt Gallus niet in zijn vertaling en maakt ervan dat heidense tempels moeten gesloten worden, zodat niemand daar nog kan zondigen. Maar… Gallus zelf zou christen geweest zijn en “zijn tempels” sluiten was dus niet zeer antiheidens. Waarom is deze tekst in CTh. 16, 10 opgenomen? Het gaat over rechtspraak in verafgelegen dorpen, tegen Perzi[, waar de justitie tijdelijk opgeschort werd. CTh.16,10,5 [353] zit in dezelfde sfeer. De usurpator Magnentius, die in Galli[ naar de macht gegrepen had, was verslagen en zijn administratie werd opgedoekt. Sacrificia nocturna verwijst niet noodzakelijk naar nachtelijke esbattementen, dat kan ook “duistere procedures” betekenen. Het probleem doet zich weer voor in een afgelegen gebied. CTh.16,10,6 [356] is een grammaticaal manke zin. Pharr vertaalt poena capitis als doodstraf, maar het kan op elke capitis diminutio slaan en subiugare is niet letaal. Van simulacra colere maakt Pharr “to worship images”. Als je echter die woorden begrijpt als “beelden frequenteren”, doet dat denken aan het ad statua confugere van Gaius 1,53 en D. 1,6,2, waar het betekent “bescherming zoeken bij de rechtbank”. De Julianus die als consul vermeld wordt, is de latere Apostaat. Zou hij iets tegen de heidenen gehad hebben? Het is niet duidelijk wat de tekst beoogt, ook niet wat er landelijk aan is. CTh.16,10,7 [381] is de eerste van enkele teksten die uitgaan van Theodosius de Grote. In de tekst komt het woord sacrilegus voor, dat in de middeleeuwen “godslasteraar” betekent. In de vierde eeuw heeft het een ruimere betekenis. Zo is een echtbreker van 326 een sacrilegus nuptiarum in C. 2,9,29,4. Het woord preces wordt bij Sint Augustinus het smeekgebed, maar in het Romeinse recht betekent het “verzoekschrift”29. Moeilijker is die deus in de tekst. In inscripties is dat in die tijd nog een courant voorkomend epitheton van de keizer, maar het woord verwijst ook al naar de God van hebree[n en christenen. Als je h]or en deus bij de kerkvaders nagaat, stoot je nog op die betekenis van “de verhevene”30. Proscribere wordt in de middeleeuwen begrepen als rechteloos en vogelvrij verklaren, maar in een tekst uit de oudheid is proscriptio de term voor onontvankelijkheid. In deze tekst wordt aan de prefect van Oriens gesignaleerd dat brutaliteit in de rechtbank en ongemanierdheid in een verzoekschrift, dat tenslotte tot de keizer gericht is, tot onontvankelijkheid leidt, ook in het verre Oriens. Het christendom komt er niet aan te pas. CTh.16,10,8 [382] bevestigt de vergunning om een templum met kunstzinnige beelden in Osdroena (nu Diar Mochar) in Mesopotami[ tot museum om te 29 Over preces: J. Gaudemet, Le droit romain dans la litt8rature chr8tienne occidentale du IIIe au Ve siHcle, Milaan 1978, 141–142. 30 Een goed overzicht dat zowel de Griekse als Latijnse kerkvaders opneemt, vind je bij C.W.H. Lampe, A patristic Greek lexicon, Oxford 1961, 632–635.

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vormen. Er mogen geen procedures meer gevoerd worden, maar het gebouw blijft open voor volksvergaderingen en dergelijke meer. CTh.16.10.9 [385] gaat over ueritas, bewijsrecht31. In een offici[le procedure is het totaal uitgesloten voort te gaan op gegevens die berusten op het onderzoek van ingewanden. Het is niet duidelijk hoe je daarmee het heidendom bestrijdt, zoals de klassieke literatuur het verwoordt, maar het is wel duidelijk dat dit op pagana sacrificia slaat, op een procedure in een afgelegen gebied. CTh.16,10,10 [391] is een zeldzame constitutie van die titel die in meerdere handschriften van de Codex Theodosianus voorkomt. Hier wordt duidelijk gesteld dat de oosterse praktijk om dieren te offeren niet welkom is in offici[le gebouwen en bij standbeelden. Als iemand voor de deur van de rechtbank (pro fano ritui) zoiets voltrekt en dan binnenkomt, zal de rechter hem vijftien gulden boete opleggen. Doet hij dat niet, valt die som ten laste van zijn ambt. Dat is niet noodzakelijk christelijk ge"nspireerd. De uitspraak dateert van het consulaat van Symmachus en Tatianus, twee notoire bestrijders van het christendom. Het is begrijpelijk dat de kanselarij het Romeins recht niet wil verward zien met oosterse mystiek. In de tekst worden diuinae et humanae sanctiones vermeld. Dat onderscheid verwijst niet naar O.L. Heer of het christendom. Gaius 2,2 gebruikt het al. CTh. 16,10,11 [391] behandelt hetzelfde probleem voor Egypte, waar dierenoffers een oud zeer waren voor de Romeinse bestuurders. Toparchen en nomarchen distancieerden zich daar beter van. Pharr en Roug8 vertalen ten onrechte dat offergaven door deze tekst verboden worden. Wij lezen: men benoeme geen rechters meer die zich met een dergelijke cultus inlaten en geve vijftien gulden boete aan de rechters die erediensten bijwonen tijdens hun ambtsperiode. Dat dit christelijk ge"nspireerd is, is twijfelachtig. Het is wel herkenbaar de stijl van Symmachus en Tatianus. Die tekst past bij de vorige, maar komt enkel in de late handschriften van de Codex Theodosianus voor. CTh. 16,10,12 [392] is een lange tekst van Theodosius en zijn zonen Arcadius en Honorius. Daarin komt eerst de vorige tekst weer, maar dan gaat het verder. Wie in de keizerlijke procedure magie en waarzeggerij inroept, kan schuldig verklaard worden aan majesteitsschennis, ook al heeft hij niets concreets tegen de keizer ingebracht of gewenst. Dat geldt eveneens voor wie een procedure buiten de rechtbank probeert te be"nvloeden door magische handelingen in een private ruimte te stellen en daarbij bijvoorbeeld beelden aanbidt die hij zelf 31 In de middeleeuwen is dat “de waarheid” geworden, maar de Vulgaat werd door een Romeinse jurist opgesteld. Het ego sum […] ueritas van Io. 14,6 betekent nog “ik ben er het bewijs van”. De mooiste passages die in de Digesten voorkomen over ueritas zijn D. 22,3,13 (tijdens het proces moet je tot een bewezen toedracht komen) en D. 22,3,29 pr.–1, met dat prachtige respondit ueritati locum superfore (de prefectuur antwoordde dat de werkelijkheid voorging op de ueritas).

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gemaakt heeft. Hier komt voor het eerst in de titel het woord religio voor : plena iniuria religionis, door schadelijke religieuze praktijken; reus uiolatae religionis, schuldig aan religieus geweld. Wie zoiets in eigen huis organiseert, riskeert confiscatie van de woning. Wie het in andermans huis of in de rechtbank doet, riskeert vijfentwintig gulden boete. Dus ook niet paternosteren in de rechtbank. Nochtans, zo beslisten diezelfde vorsten, is religio iets voor de bisschoppen, daar komen de keizerlijke rechters niet in tussen32. Het in twijfel trekken van de keizerlijke rechtsorde werd echter altijd als majesteitsschennis gezien en was de klassieke steen des aanstoots bij martelaren. Hier staat dus helemaal niet te lezen dat de heidense godsdienst verboden werd. Aan deze tekst had men kunnen toevoegen: christenen wezen gewaarschuwd… CTh.16,10,13 [395] Arcadius en Honorius herhalen de beslissing van 380 om enkel nog exequaturs te geven aan bisschoppelijke audi[nties van de juiste leer33, met uitsluiting van heretici en landlieden. Het toezicht daarop wordt bij de provinciale moderatores gelegd. Men kan vermoeden dat die de exequaturs gaven. Het is opvallend dat Mommsen vanaf hier aan het einde van de titel tien constituties enkel in de traditie E gevonden heeft, die dateert van het einde der negende eeuw. CTh.16,10,14 [396] Een reeks voorrechten van rechters worden ingetrokken. Een verband met het christendom is er niet. CTh.16,10,15 [399] De keizers hebben een reeks procedures verboden, maar dat betekent niet dat openbare vieringen afgeschaft werden. CTh.16,10,16 [399] gaat over het hoger beroep voor of tegen een vergunning om een templum af te breken die op akkerland staat. De prefectuur bevestigt de vergunning. CTh.16,1,17 [399] gaat over hetzelfde als constitutie 15. Ravenna heeft een reeks evenementen afgeschaft, maar dat betekent niet dat er geen feesten met volksvermaak meer kunnen georganiseerd worden. Als die gevraagd worden, mogen ze doorgaan, maar dan zonder offici[le dimensie en zonder overdrijven (absque sacrificio atque superstitione). CTh.16,10,18 [399] is een rescript aan de proconsul van Carthago. Rijksgebouwen die leeg staan, moeten gerespecteerd worden. Als iemand daar een cultus in houdt, is hij strafbaar. De beelden die hij erin aangebracht heeft, worden er uitgehaald. Hier is sacrificium duidelijk een private kwestie. Idolum is evenwel geen “idol”, zoals Pharr vertaalt, maar een afbeelding. Idolatrie is een probleem voor de kerkvaders, maar de idola zijn dat niet. Misschien werd hier wel een christelijke priester uit zijn kerk gezet… 32 CTh. 16,11,1 van 399. 33 Dit betekent aan trinitari[rs en niet aan monofysieten: Waelkens, Vetera novis augere (noot 13).

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CTh.16,10,19 [407] is een ontnuchtering. Overheidsgebouwen moeten opbrengen voor de annona of, waar ze ook staan, zinvol gebruikt worden voor het openbaar nut. Als landlieden daar een ritus in onderhouden, gaan ze eruit. Altaren die ze erin geplaatst hebben worden vernietigd. Er staat wel niet in de tekst dat het over heidense ritussen gaat… CTh.16,10,20 [415] We lezen hier over sacerdotales paganae superstitionis, die in de literatuur priesters van een heidens bijgeloof werden. Het gaat in werkelijkheid over de aanstokers van een volksopstand. Na de moord op Stilicho veroorzaakte Heraclius in Itali[ een volksopstand. Die werd in 413 neergeslagen en Heraclius vluchtte naar Carthago. In 414 werd hij daar opnieuw verslagen. Zijn goederen werden aangeslagen en door de keizer aan Flavius Constantius toegekend34. Er staken evenwel goederen bij die door Constantijn aan de christiana religio toegbedeeld waren, aan de ecclesia (beide termen worden vermeld). De bisschop van Rome heeft ze blijkbaar voor de rechtbank terugge[ist. Hier hebben we een beslissing van de kanselarij waarbij sommige confisquaties teruggeschroefd worden. Er is in de beslissing ook sprake van militaire tribunen en honderdmannen die zich goederen voor het volk toege[igend hebben. Heidens versus christelijk was deze uitspraak dus helemaal niet. CTh.16,10,21 [416] heeft iets tegen de gentiles, die niet in het leger of in hogere overheidsdienst mogen aantreden. Sinds Thomas van Aquino’s Summa contra gentiles van 1259–1265 ziet iedereen daar heidenen in. In de bijbelse sfeer betekende het woord in de oudheid niet-Joods, maar in het Romeinse recht nietRomeins35. Hier gaat het over vreemdelingen die zich bezondigd hebben aan een misdrijf of aan een gerechtelijke overtreding die volgens plaatselijke recht beoordeeld werd (profano pagani ritus errore). CTh. 16,10,22–24 [423] zijn drie mysterieuze teksten die dezelfde dagtekening hebben en waar weinig vat op te krijgen is. 22 en 23 lijken twee versies van dezelfde beslissing te zijn, namelijk om ergens een plaatselijke bevolking uit te roeien. Het moet te maken hebben met de vijandigheden die Vararanes V in 421 aan de oostgrens opgestart heeft. In constitutie 24 vraagt de keizer prefect Asclepiodotus niemand omwille van zijn godsdienst te discrimineren. Asclepiodotus was toen net prefect van Oriens geworden. Hij zou in 425 afgezet worden omdat hij als anti-christen de christenen liet discrimineren36. Dat was dus in 423 alvast geen constitutie om het heidendom uit te roeien! CTh.16,10,25 [435] is gericht aan de nieuwe prefect van Oriens. Het is de enige tekst van de hele titel waarin verordend wordt dat de praktijk van een plaatselijke 34 Zie hierover A. Demandt, Die Spätantike, Römische Geschichte von Diocletian bis Justinian, 284–565 n. Chr., München 1989, 148. 35 Cf. A. Cameron, The last pagans of Rome, New York 2011, 16–21; cf. Thesaurus linguae latinae VI 2, Leipzig 1927–1934, col. 1868. 36 J.R. Martindale, The prosopography of the Later Roman Empire I, Cambridge 1992, 160.

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sekte aan de oostgrens uitgeroeid diende te worden en dat op de ruines van hun offici[le gebouwen een kruisbeeld zou geplaatst worden.

5.

Besluit

CTh. 16,10 gaat dus helemaal niet over bestrijding van het heidendom. Dat zou ook moeilijk gekund hebben, want wat was “heidens” voor een jurist van de vijfde eeuw? Alles wat niet dogmatisch correct bevonden werd door de paus van Rome of door de oosterse patriarchen? En hoe dwing je het juiste symbolum des geloofs af ? De optiek was evenwel helemaal anders in de negende tot elfde eeuw, de periode waarin in enkele handschriften het materiaal is opgedoken waarmee CTh. 16,10 opgezet werd. Toen woedde in sommige streken de investituurstrijd en was het nuttig te argumenteren dat de keizer, wiens macht de feodale heren deelden, de beschermheer van het christendom was. De discussie ging ook toen niet over een op te leggen geloofsovertuiging, maar over de rechtsmacht en de libertas van de bisschoppen. Daarbij was dan wel duidelijk wat heidens was: alles wat niet christelijk was en de rechten van de bisschoppen beperkte. Er stonden toch ook haeretici in de antieke teksten vermeld? Onder invloed van de Latijnse kerkvaders was het woord paganus ge[volueerd van “paysan” naar “payen”. Wie dat woord dan las in rechtsteksten uit Augustinus’ tijd begreep het volgens de nieuwe betekenis van “heidenen”. In het verleden bleek al dat een deel van de Codex van Justinianus, C. 1,1–13, pas in de twaalfde eeuw samengesteld werd en dat er zelfs nog teksten aan toegevoegd zijn in de negentiende eeuw37. Het is waarschijnlijk dat ook de Codex Theodosianus maar gedeeltelijk uit de oudheid stamt. In een tijd van handschriften moest je nemen wat er was. Een editie van Torelli laten liggen voor de editie van Gothofredus zat er niet in. Als je vervolgens als jurist je handschrift nodig had om je bisschop bij te staan met argumenten uit CTh. 16, ging je misschien wat vlug denken dat het onvolledig was. “Er steken in diverse novellencollecties nog andere constituties van vjjr 438 over dit onderwerp die niet in mijn Codex Theodosianus voorkomen; die horen er vast bij. En zoveel teksten over de pagani, Theodosius II heeft die destijds vast een plaats gegeven in zijn codex.” Quod non. CTh. 16,10 is een van de vele elementen van het Romeins recht van de oudheid die nooit bestaan hebben. Of toch… Op grond van de regel semel dictum semper dictum bouwen de romanisten voort op elkaars gedachten. Het neoplatonisme van de twaalfde eeuw heeft ertoe geleid dat idee[n in de westerse cultuur tot de werkelijkheid zijn gaan behoren. Het klassieke Romeinse recht is 37 L. Waelkens, L’h8r8sie (noot 13), waar de oorsprong van elke fragment van C. 1,1–13 vermeld wordt.

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een kathedraal die in de idee[nwereld eeuwenlang uitgebouwd werd bij het lezen van het Corpus iuris. In het onkruid eromheen is ook titel CTh. 16,10 ontstaan. Over die is intussen voldoende geschreven om hem onuitwisbaar te maken in de historiografie. Maar… laten wij toch vooral voortbouwen op wat juristen gelezen hebben in rechtsteksten en de interpretaties van historici aan enige scepsis onderwerpen. Gelukkig zij die de leerstoel mogen verlaten en terugkeren naar de werkelijkheid. Ad multos annos!

Tammo Wallinga

Creative solutions for enrichment situations among the early Glossators

There are a number of connections between Jan Hallebeek and myself1. We were colleagues at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam for several years, when he had a fellowship of the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences in order to study the history of unjust enrichment2 and I substituted him in his teaching duties. Later, I had a similar fellowship myself3, for making a critical edition of the Casus Codicis of Wilhelmus de Cabriano. We are both veteran visitors of the MaxPlanck-Institut für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte in Frankfurt am Main. I sold him my house in Utrecht – we remain friends. And we are two of the relatively few Romanists outside Spain or Latin America who speak Spanish4. We have both done our main research in the field of the medieval reception of Roman law, especially in the pre-Accursian era, bringing to light some of the hidden sources of knowledge about this formative period in the reception of Roman law. Logically, this will be the theme of the lines that follow. For this contribution, I found inspiration in an article by Jan Hallebeek published in 19955. He wrote it around 1 There is, however, a marked difference between us as well: Jan always manages to have his conference papers finished months in advance, which to me seems to be nothing short of magic. 2 Probably the most notable results may be found in his long contribution Developments in Mediaeval Roman Law to E.J.H. Schrage (ed.), Unjust enrichment: the comparative legal history of the law of restitution, Berlin 1995, 59–120, and in his book The concept of unjust enrichment in late scholasticism, Nijmegen 1996. 3 T. Wallinga, The Casus Codicis of Wilhelmus de Cabriano, Frankfurt am Main 2005. 4 As we did not so long ago at a conference in Getafe, organised at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid: International Conference “Unjustified Enrichment at the Crossroads: History, Comparative View and Proposals of Modernisation”, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, September 23, 2016. The conference papers have been published: X. Basozabal Arrue/ P. del Olmo García (eds.), Enriquecimiento injustificado en la encrucijada: historia, derecho comparado y propuestas de modernizacijn, Cizur Menor 2017. 5 J. Hallebeek, The condiction as enrichment action in twelfth and thirteenth century legal scholarship, TR 63 (1995) 263–272. The Vrije Universiteit’s research website wrongly dates it to 1996: https://research.vu.nl/en/persons/j-hallebeek/publications/?page=3 (visited March 15, 2018).

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the time when the plan for an edition of Wilhelmus de Cabriano’s Casus Codicis was being conceived, but long before the edition was finished. It may well be interesting to see whether the Casus Codicis throw more light on the question Jan deals with. In this article, Jan describes the search for a general enrichment action that went on in the Middle Ages among Glossators and Commentators, with a focus on the pre-Accursian period and on the condictio. This action was, in theory, a perfect candidate for becoming the general enrichment action, given that its formula – in the times of the formulary procedure in classical Roman law – was phrased in fairly general terms that did not postulate any specific requirement for bringing the action. However, the classical Roman lawyers had come to agree that the condictio could only be brought if a negotium (a payment or a performance) had taken place between the claimant and the defendant. This requirement was maintained in Justinian’s Corpus Iuris, even if by then, the formulary procedure had been replaced by the cognitio extraordinaria. Other actions that could be used in enrichment situations were the actio de in rem verso and the actio negotiorum gestorum, but their use was also limited to specific circumstances. The former could only be used when a contract had been made by a slave or a son in potestate and resulted in enrichment of the pater familias. The latter could be used in cases of unauthorised administration, however, not to claim all the expenses incurred by the manager but the amount by which the principal was enriched – and ‘only if the manager had acted in the interest of the principal and with the intention of binding this principal towards himself ’6. With all these restrictions in place, none of these actions can be considered a general enrichment action. Justinian’s Corpus Iuris formed the basis for the reception of Roman law once its texts were rediscovered and studied, beginning in Bologna in 1088. The initial century and a half of this process is a particularly interesting period, culminating in Accursius’ Glossa Magna, an extensive apparatus of glosses in the margins of the manuscripts of Justinian’s Corpus Iuris, which eventually became the standard commentary. Accursius made a selection from the glosses produced since the beginning of the School of Bologna, and his great commentary tended to overshadow and make obsolete the opinions of lawyers that he had decided not to incorporate. Bringing to light those other opinions from this formative period of medieval legal scholarship is a fascinating task, and Jan Hallebeek has certainly done his share of this work on the subject of enrichment. In his article, he points out a specific dynamic of this period. Parallel to the development of the study of Justinian’s Corpus Iuris, Canon law started to become an independent discipline. It tended to have more general rules and principles, one of these being that it was 6 Hallebeek (note 5) 264.

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necessary to pay compensation to a person at whose expense someone else had been enriched – this principle was firmly based on the doctrine of restitution7. The civilian lawyers logically and necessarily moved in the same direction, but it took a long time to develop more general rules and principles from the Roman law texts with their more restricted application. The 12th century glossator Martinus Gosia tried to turn the actio negotiorum gestorum into a general enrichment action, but this idea was rejected by the majority of his colleagues. Eventually, the so-called condictio Juventiana of D. 12,1,32 became a generally applicable enrichment action, under different names, like actio in factum ex aequitate or condictio certi ex aequitate. But a lot of water had to pass under the bridge first.

1.

C. 4,51,1

The Glossators found several cases in the Corpus Iuris Civilis where unspecified actions are given in enrichment situations. One of these is C. 4,51,1: C. 4,51 (De rebus alienis non alienandis et de prohibita rerum alienatione vel hypotheca),1: Imp. Alexander A. Cattiano militi. Si praesidi provinciae probatum fuerit Iulianum nullo iure munitum servos tuos scientibus vendidisse, restituere tibi emptores servos iubebit. quod si ignoraverint et eorum facti sunt, pretium horum tibi solvere Iulianum iubebit. D. VIII Id. Iul. Iuliano et Crispino conss. “C. 4,51 (Concerning the Prohibited Alienation and Hypothecation of the Property of Others),1: The Emperor Alexander to the soldier Cattianus. If it should be proved before the Governor of the province that Julian, without any right, sold your slaves to persons who knew that they did not belong to him, he must order the purchasers to restore your slaves to you. If, however, they were ignorant that this was the case, and the slaves have become their property, the Governor shall order Julian to pay you the price of said slaves. Given on July 8 during the consulate of Julian and Crispin. [224]”8

Julian sells A’s slaves to B and C, and in case they do not know Julian is not the owner, and they eventually acquire ownership of the slaves through prescription, according to this text, Julian is then liable to A for the selling price of the slaves, but it is not stated with which action. An old interlinear gloss in one manuscript suggests that it is a condictio9. 7 Hallebeek (note 5). 8 English translations of texts from Justinian’s Code are based on the Scott translation of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, with corrections where necessary : S.P. Scott, Corpus juris civilis, Cincinnati 1932; reprinted New York 1973. Those of the Digest texts are from the Watson translation: A. Watson, The digest of Justinian (second edition), Philadelphia 1998. 9 Hallebeek (note 5) 266 and note 8 on that page: Ms Firenze BML, Redi 179 fol. 57ra.

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The Casus Codicis of Wilhelmus de Cabriano give the standard solution also mentioned by Jan: contra eum qui uendidit in defectum negotiorum gestorum decernitur tibi – a subsidiary action based on the management of another’s affairs. However, there is more: two references (allegationes) to other texts are given, one to a text on management of another’s affairs: D. 3,5,48(49). The other is to D. 12,1,23, a case of sale of a slave by a non-owner : D. 12,1 (De rebus creditis, si certum petetur et de condictione),23 (Africanus libro secundo quaestionum): Si eum servum, qui tibi legatus sit, quasi mihi legatum possederim et vendiderim, mortuo eo posse te mihi pretium condicere Iulianus ait, quasi ex re tua locupletatus factus sim. “D. 12,1 (Things credited giving rise to fixed claims and the condictio),23 (Africanus, Questions, book 2): I possess and sell a slave as though bequeathed to me when he was actually bequeathed to you. Julian holds that if he dies, you can bring a condictio against me for his price, as on the ground of my enrichment from your property.”

This text says that if the slave dies, which makes it impossible to reclaim him by means of a reivindicatio, the owner can claim the price from the seller with a condictio. This is not necessarily the opinion of Bulgarus – the Casus Codicis of Wilhelmus de Cabriano being, in fact, a Lectura of Bulgarus’ teaching on the Codex – since it is not in the text of the Casus Codicis in so many words. The allegatio itself may be a later addition; the manuscripts are somewhat younger than the text of the Casus Codicis itself10, so we should not attribute it to Bulgarus automatically. All we know is that he proposed the actio negotiorum gestorum, which obviously is the first solution the Glossators came up with. But the idea that the action in C. 4,51,1 may be a condictio is present in the Casus Codicis.

2.

C. 4,26,7,3(1)

Jan gives a second example of an enrichment situation which is particularly interesting: C. 4,26 (Quod cum eo qui in aliena est potestate negotium gestum esse dicitur, vel de peculio seu quod iussu aut de in rem verso),7,3(1): [Impp. Diocletianus et Maximianus AA. et CC. Crescenti] Alioquin si cum libero rem agente eius, cuius precibus meministi, contractum habuisti et eius personam elegisti, pervides contra dominum nullam te 10 The two main manuscripts date from the late 12th or early 13th century (Düsseldorf, Heinrich Heine Institut, E.9a) and from the 13th century (Hereford Cathedral Library. P.5.VI), respectively ; the lectures by Bulgarus which the Casus Codicis report were most likely given in 1156–1157: Wallinga (note 3) xxi–xxiv ; xlii; xlv.

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habuisse actionem, nisi vel in rem eius pecunia processit vel hunc contractum ratum habuit. D. non. April. Byzantii AA. conss. “C. 4,26 (When business is said to have been transacted with one who is under the control of another, or with reference to peculium; or where something has been done by the order of another ; or where anything is employed for the benefit of the property of the person in control),7,3(1): [Emperors Diocletian and Maximian and the Caesars to Crescens] On the other hand, if you have made a contract with a freeman, who transacted the business of the person whom you mentioned in your request, and chose the former as your debtor, you will understand that you have no right of action against the principal, unless the money was employed for the benefit of the property of the latter, or he ratified the contract. Given on April 5 at Byzantium during the consulate of the emperors. [293]”

Person A enters into a contract with B, a freeman whom he knows to be acting on behalf of C, but A chooses to view the contract as one with B. The text says that an action is not normally possible against the principal, except in two cases, but does not specify which action it is. Jan notes that, given that title C. 4,26 deals with the actiones adiecticiae qualitatis, this could be the actio de in rem verso, or rather an actio utilis variant on it, given that the intermediary was a free person and not a slave or a child in potestate. Apparently, however, this opinion was only defended by a minority of the civilians. It was ascribed to Bulgarus in an old interlinear gloss, and Roffredus Beneventanus was of the same opinion. The majority preferred to see it as an actio negotiorum gestorum, albeit in the form of an actio utilis, since A cannot be considered to have acted on behalf of C, since he chose to have B as his contract partner11. This opinion is found in several glosses on the words ratum habuit in the text, contained in different manuscripts. Some of these glosses were composed by Azo and contain sigla which attribute the opinion either to Guillelmus (de Cabriano?) or to Irnerius. Jan considers the latter more likely, although he suggests also that Irnerius’ opinion may have been taken over by Wilhelmus de Cabriano. One anonymous gloss credits Azo with the authorship of this opinion. Many glosses also mention a third possibility : that the action is a condictio certi utilis. This option is always ascribed to anonymous alii. Now let us see if the Casus Codicis of Wilhelmus de Cabriano throw any light on the matter, and whether they may be used to corroborate or refute one of these opinions and its authorship. The text of their commentary on C. 4,26,7,3 runs as follows:

11 In his article, Jan states that “primus cannot be regarded as having acted for the sake of tertius whose existence he was not even aware of.” This unawareness seems unlikely to me; the text does not say that, and the term elegisti rather implies the opposite.

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Wilhelmus de Cabriano, Casus Codicis ad C. 4,26,7,3: (…) Cum autem libero homini qui negotia aliena gerebat pecuniam dedisti, si quidem eius personam tantum elegisti – id est: contemplatione tantum gestoris dedisti – ipsum quidem gestorem obligatum habes. Contra dominum uero nullam actionem habes, nisi in defectum* in duobus casibus, scilicet quando dominus hunc contractum ratum habuit et quando in rem eius fuerit uersum: et tunc habebis uel utilem institoriam uel negotiorum gestorum actionem. Si uero etiam domini contemplatione gestori dedisses, utrumque obligatum haberes. * in defectum desunt in H “(…) But when you have given money to a free man who was managing another’s affairs, if you have chosen only him – that is, you have given it with just the manager in mind – then you will have the manager himself bound to you. Against the principal, however, you have no action at all, unless as a subsidiary action in two cases, that is, when the principal has ratified this contract and when he has been enriched: and then you will have either the actio institoria utilis or the actio negotiorum gestorum. On the other hand, if you have given to the manager with the principal in mind as well, you will have both of them bound to you.”

The remarkable thing here is that Wilhelmus de Cabriano, beside the tried and trusted variant of the action for the management of another’s affairs (actio negotiorum gestorum utilis), comes up with yet another solution: the actio institoria utilis. In classical Roman law, the actio institoria could be brought against the principal of someone (who could be a freeman or a slave) whom the principal had put in charge of a shop (taberna) or some form of trade (negotiatio). This action, therefore, was not limited to the situation where a son in potestate or a slave had acted on behalf of his pater familias or dominus; the institor could also be someone else’s slave, or a freeman12. On the other hand, it did suppose a situation where the institor ran his shop or trade for the principal during a certain period of time, which is probably the reason why Wilhelmus de Cabriano does not grant the action in its pure form, but rather as an actio institoria utilis, given that we are dealing with a single transaction by someone on behalf of another rather than with a real institor in a more permanent position – although the text does not explicitly exclude the latter possibility. It is not too difficult to understand where the idea to employ this particular action came from: it is dealt with in the previous title, C. 4,25 De institoria et exercitoria actione. And of course, the legal relationship between the institor and his principal is such that the institor is able to create an obligation that binds his principal, so it is not illogical that it should be brought forward here. Nevertheless, the glosses Jan mentions in his article which give the opinion of Guil12 M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, Erster Abschnitt: Das altrömische, das vorklassische und klassische Recht, München 1971, 264; 605f.; 608f.; Zweiter Abschnitt: Die nachklassischen Entwicklungen, München 1975, 103; 107; 604.

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lielmus present him as favouring (just) the actio negotiorum gestorum utilis. So is the actio institoria utilis an isolated opinion that was soon forgotten, or did it leave its traces in the works of others?

3.

Echoes of the actio institoria (utilis)

Odofredus (saec. XIII inc. – 1265) treats C. 4,26,7,3 in his Lectura super Codice 13. He gives his students an interesting example to illustrate the text: rich students often do not do their business themselves, but send their clericus, who may even make a contract on their behalf with the professor. Then he adds a third case where the principal is bound to the two mentioned in C. 4,26,7,3: Quia contra dominum nullam habuisti actionem, nisi in tribus casibus. si dominus mandaverit illam pecuniam mutuari, vel ratum habuerit, vel si in rem eius versa est. “Because you had no action against the principal, except in three cases: when the principal gave a mandate to borrow the money, or gave his approval, or was enriched.”

Towards the end of his commentary on C. 4,26,7,3 it becomes clear where he found the idea of the mandate by the principal; he says: Si autem est liber homo, si est suus institor, agitur institoria, ut supra tit. prox. l. Si mutuam. “But if he is a freeman, if he is his institor, an actio institoria will be brought, as above in the previous title, the fragment Si mutuam (C. 4,25,5).”

Odofredus mentions the possibility of granting a direct action against the principal in the form of an actio institoria, albeit the normal one, which is available in case the gestor is indeed the free institor of the principal. To corroborate his opinion, he gives an allegatio to C. 4,25,5. This particular fragment runs as follows: C. 4,25 (De institoria et exercitoria actione): Iidem AA. et CC. Gaio. Si mutuam pecuniam accipere a te Demetriano Domitianus mandavit, et hoc posse probare confidis, ad exemplum institoriae eundem Domitianum apud competentem iudicem potes convenire. Dat. IV Kalend. Novemb. ipsis CC. et coss. “C. 4,25 (About the actio institoria and exercitoria) The Same Emperors [Diocletian and Maximian] and Caesars to Gaius. If you are sure you can prove that Domitian directed Demetrianus to borrow a certain sum of money from you, you can bring suit against Domitian before a competent judge in the same 13 Odofredus, Lectura super Codice, Bologna [1968], reprint of the edition Lyon 1552, fol. 224ra. On Odofredus in general: H. Lange, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter I, Die Glossatoren, München 1997, 323–334.

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way as in an actio institoria. Given on October 29, during the Consulate of the Caesars. [294]”

The situation in this text is slightly different in that there does not seem to be a more permanent relationship between principal and institor ; we are rather dealing with an isolated transaction. Therefore, the action granted is an action derived from the normal actio institoria, namely, an action ad exemplum institoriae. But once again, the institor is used as an example of someone who may bind a third party by a contract that he makes, as is the case in C. 4,26,7,3. Jacques de Revigny († 1298)14 is another author who mentions the actio institoria utilis in a lengthy fragment of his commentary on C. 4,26,7,315 : … Set quomodo tenetur dominus in istis duobus casibus? Quidam dicunt quod utili neg. gest. act. nam ille contraxit cum libero homine ex quo in rem domini versum est. aget contra dominum act. neg. gest. utili. Sed ego dico quod in uno casu indubitanter convenitur institoria utili et in alio casu idem dico, si recepisset mandatum a domino de recipiendo pecuniam indubitanter teneretur dominus institoria utili, ut supra ti. i. l. Si mutuam. Sed l. ista dicit ubi sine mandato domini recepit domino postea ratum habente (…) ergo indubitans tenetur utili institoria in hoc casu. Sed ubi est versum in rem domini, que actio habebit locum? (…) hic dicunt quod agetur condictione sine causa ex equitate illius si certum pet. l. Si et me et Ticium et hoc esset verum si ille ex quo contractum est non esset solvendo. (…) Sed in lege ista loquitur etiam ubi est solvendo quia loquitur indistincte, sed tu potes dicere quod habet locum institoria (…) “… But how is the principal held in these two cases? Some say with the actio negotiorum gestorum utilis, because he made a contract with a freeman as a result of which the principal was enriched. He will bring the actio negotiorum gestorum utilis against the principal. But I say that in one case undoubtedly he will be taken to court with the actio institoria utilis, and in another case I say the same, when he received a mandate from the principal to receive the money, then undoubtedly the principal will be held by the actio institoria utilis, as above in the first title, the fragment Si mutuam (C. 4,25,5). But that fragment speaks in case he received it without a mandate from the principal, who later gave his approval (…) So in this case he will undoubtedly be held by the actio institoria utilis. But when the principal is enriched, for which action will there be room? (…) Here they say that the condictio sine causa ex equitate will be brought which is based on that fragment ‘When you asked both me and Titius’ from the title ‘When a certain demand is made’ (D. 12,1,32), and this would be true if the one with whom the contract was made was insolvent. (…) But in the other fragment one speaks even when he is solvent, because one speaks without distinction; but you may say that there is room for the actio institoria (…)” 14 H. Lange/M. Kriechbaum, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter II, Die Kommentatoren, München 2007, 518–546. 15 I. de Ravanis, Lectura super Codice, repr. Bologna 1967, fol. CLXXXVIvb. As indicated in this edition, the first editor ascribed this work to Pierre de Belleperche, but it is really the work of Revigny ; cf. Lange/Kriechbaum, 542.

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On the one hand, Revigny says that some jurists opt for the actio negotiorum gestorum utilis, but he himself has different ideas. He appears to follow Odofredus’ extension to three cases, adding that of the principal who gives a mandate to borrow the money. In case there is a mandate, he prefers the institoria utilis, on the basis of C. 4,25,5; though he seems to apply the same action if there is no initial mandate, but only approval of the principal after the act. For the case where the principal is simply enriched, he mentions that others interpret the action as the special condictio of D. 12,1,32, but he himself initially limits the use of that action to the case where the gestor was insolvent. The text is not entirely clear, but one thing that follows from it is Revigny’s firm support for the actio institoria utilis. Albericus de Rosate (ca. 1290–1360)16 also refers to this action in his commentary on C. 4,26,7,3 towards the end17: Alii ut Cyn. secundum Pet. dicunt, quod hic loquitur de utili institoria eo casu, quo non habeo animum obligandi dominum, nec contrarium, sed indifferens sum, puta quia eum non cognoscebam; tunc enim si versa sit pecunia in utilitatem domini, uel ratum habeat, obligatur utili institoria, et ita intelligitur haec lex secundum Petrum. “Others, like Cynus, say in accordance with Peter that here they speak of the actio institoria utilis in case I do not have the intention to bind the principal, nor the opposite, but am indifferent, say, because I did not know him; because then, if money has been paid for the benefit of the principal, or he gives his approval, he is bound by the actio institoria utilis; and the fragment is to be understood this way according to Peter.”

Note that the Peter to whom Albericus refers is Pierre de Belleperche18, to whom the commentary of Jacques de Revigny has long been wrongly ascribed; therefore, the reference is really to the text of Revigny quoted above. Albericus mentions it as an alternative interpretation, without specifically approving or disapproving of it.

4.

Conclusion

The comparison of Jan’s article with a few texts of Wilhelmus de Cabriano that became available only later yields some interesting new information especially in the commentum on C. 4,26,7,3. There, the actio institoria utilis is brought forward as an alternative remedy – alongside the actio negotiorum gestorum utilis – for the person who made a contract with a freeman who acted on behalf of a 16 Lange/Kriechbaum (note 14) 665ff. 17 A. de Rosate, Commentarii in primam Codicis partem, Venice 1586 (repr. Bologna 1979), fol. 211va-212ra (fol. 212 is incorrectly numbered as 112). 18 Lange/Kriechbaum (note 14) 546–570.

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principal, in order to proceed directly against the latter. This is a solution for a specific situation – there is no attempt to develop this action into a general remedy for unjust enrichment. But it is an interesting alternative solution for this specific text that Jan apparently had not come across elsewhere. It probably did not meet with universal approval, although it is present in the works of Odofredus, Jacques de Revigny and Albericus de Rosate. That the actio institoria utilis did not become a general action for unjust enrichment is not surprising; as we noted already, it functions in a fairly limited situation where a freeman acts on behalf of a principal, and therefore lends itself best to situations where it is useful to establish a direct action against a third party who is somehow indirectly involved in a contract made by others. It could be said that the concept of negotiorum gestio provides a framework that could be more widely applied, so that the actio negotiorum gestorum (utilis) was a better candidate to become the general action for unjust enrichment. If that is true, it might be considered surprising that eventually the condictio of D. 12,1,32 became the general enrichment action, since the situation of that text is also a rather specific financial transaction: D. 12,1 (De rebus creditis, si certum petetur et de condictione),32 (Celsus libro quinto digestorum): Si et me et Titium mutuam pecuniam rogaveris et ego meum debitorem tibi promittere iusserim, tu stipulatus sis, cum putares eum Titii debitorem esse, an mihi obligaris? subsisto, si quidem nullum negotium mecum contraxisti: sed propius est, ut obligari te existimem, non quia pecuniam tibi credidi (hoc enim nisi inter consentientes fieri non potest): sed quia pecunia mea quae ad te pervenit, eam mihi a te reddi bonum et aequum est. “D. 12,1 (On credits, when a certain sum is claimed, and the condictio),32 (Celsus, Digest book 5): You asked for a loan of money from both myself and Titius, and I told my debtor to make a promise to you. You took a stipulation from him thinking him to be the debtor of Titius. Are you under an obligation to me? My position remains unchanged if, indeed, you have contracted no transaction with me; but it is nearer the mark to suppose that you are under an obligation to me, not because I have lent you money (that can only happen between parties who are agreed) but because my money has come into your hands and it is right and fair that you should give it back.”

Nevertheless, the final sentence of the text contains a very general rule that may be applied to a lot of situations: when A’s money has ended up in B’s hands, it is right and fair that it should be given back. That could well have been an essential element in the development of this rather exceptional condictio into a general enrichment action. However that all may be, I think we can safely say that this article shows once again that whenever we dig into the manuscripts and bring to light new texts of the early Glossators, we find some unexpected things that inspire new thoughts

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and enrich our knowledge of these ancestors of ours who started the academic tradition that we are still a part of. It is good to know that there is yet more material out there to be discovered – even by a professor emeritus, should he choose to keep looking for it.

Bart Wauters

Lessius and Grotius on property

In Distinctio 1 the Decretum Gratiani picked up Isidore of Seville’s definition of natural law. It portrays natural law as including both “the common possession of all things” and the “acquisition of things that are taken from the heavens, earth or sea” (D. 1 c. 7)1. In Distinctio 8 Gratian goes on that by natural law “all things are common to all people” but that private property is introduced by custom and enactment (D. 8 dict. ante c. 1), emphasizing that customs and enactments are to be “held null and void” if “contrary to natural law” (D. 8 dict. ante c. 2). Gratian’s statements on the legitimacy of the regime of private property were puzzling and in one way or another property theories ever since have tried to formulate answers to the challenges raised by Gratian2. Among the long list of authors who worked out a coherent theory on the relationship between the pre-civil natural state of common possessions and the civil regime of private property, Hugo Grotius takes pride of place. The master from Delft is sometimes credited for having developed a feature that was going to be very influential in explaining the 1 Translations from Gratian, The Treatise on Laws (Decretum DD. 1–20) with the ordinary gloss, A. Thompson/J. Gordley/K. Christensen (eds.), Washington 1993, 7. On Gratian see A. Winroth, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum, Cambridge 2000. 2 J. Coleman, Property and poverty, in: J.H. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought c. 350 – c. 1450, Cambridge 1988, 607–652; P. Garnsey, Thinking about Property. From Antiquity to the Age of Revolution, Cambridge 2007, 84–136, 195–203, 215–221; J. Kilcullen, The Origin of Property : Ockham, Grotius, Pufendorf, and some others, in: J. Kilcullen/J. Scott (eds.), ATranslation of William of Ockham’s Work of Ninety Days, Lewiston 2001, Bd. II, 883–931; V. Mäkinen, Rights and duties in late scholastic discussion on extreme necessity, in: V. Mäkinen/P. Korkman (eds.), Transformations in Medieval and Early-Modern Rights Discourse, Dordrecht 2006, 37–62; V. Mäkinen, Property Rights in the Late Medieval Discussion on Franciscan Poverty, Leuven 2001; C. Pierson, Just Property. A History in the Latin West. Volume One: Wealth, Virtue and the Law, Oxford 2013, 77–95; S. Swanson, The medieval foundations of John Locke’s theory of natural rights: Rights of subsistence and the principle of extreme necessity, History of Political Thought 18 (1997) 399–455; B. Tierney, Medieval Poor Law: A Sketch of Canonical Theory and its Application in England, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1959; B. Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights. Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law, 1150–1625, Atlanta 1997, 131–203; B. Tierney, Liberty and Law. The Idea of Permissive Natural Law, 1100–1800, Washington 2014, 15–156.

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legitimacy of private property and wider political theory3. This feature was that, underlying the civil regime of private property there was an agreement to the principle of first occupation. By this agreement “all men were supposed, and ought to be supposed to have consented, that each should appropriate to himself, by right of first possession, what could not have been divided” (DJBP 2.2.2.5)4. However, Grotius was not the first to come up with the idea of a compact underlying private property. As I have shown elsewhere, it was standard doctrine among the sixteenth-century scholastic theologians5. Even so, there is a sense in which Grotius’ conception of the agreement to the principle of occupation was innovative. In this article, I will compare Grotius’ property theory with the one offered by Leonardus Lessius. Lessius can be placed firmly in the tradition of sixteenth-century scholastic theologians, a tradition Grotius himself refers to as a source of inspiration. There is no particular reason to single Lessius out for our comparison with Grotius – we could have chosen others like Soto or Molina as well – but Lessius’ property theory is interesting in itself, as Francisco Su#rez reminded us6, and as I will point out below. My aim isn’t so much to prove whether, or to what extent, Grotius made use of the ideas of Lessius. It is rather to find out the distinctive traits in the property theory of both thinkers. Like many thinkers before them, both our authors situate the origins of the civil property regime in a distant past. In their opinion, the civil regime of private property had emerged out of a state of nature where everything was held in common. Somewhere in this transition from a state of nature to a civil regime an agreement was struck that formed the basis of private property. The structure of this article will largely follow this account. First, I will zoom in on our authors’ ideas on property rights in the state of nature; then I’ll discuss their justification 3 S. Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property. Grotius to Hume, Oxford 2002, 42; R. Feenstra, Der Eigentumsbegriff bei Hugo Grotius im Licht einiger mittelalterlicher und spätscholastischer Quellen, in: O. Behrends (ed.), Festschrift fu¨ r Franz Wieacker zum 70. Geburtstag, Göttingen 1978, 209–234; A. Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000, Cambridge 2014, 85–101; J. Salter, Hugo Grotius: Property and Consent, Political Theory 29 (2001) 537–555; B. Straumann, Roman Law in the State of Nature. The Classical Foundation of Hugo Grotius’ Natural Law, Cambridge 2015, 175–188; Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (note 2) 332; R. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories. Their Origin and Development, Cambridge 1979, 55–81. 4 Translations and works of Hugo Grotius used and cited in this article: Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, M.J. van Ittersum (ed.), Indianapolis 2006; De veritate religionis christianae, J. Clericus (ed.), Amsterdam 1709; Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, S. van Groenewegen van der Made/W. Schorer (eds.), Middelburg 1767; The Free Sea, D. Armitage (ed.), Indianapolis 2004; The Rights of War and Peace, R. Tuck (ed.), Indianapolis 2005, 3 Bd. 5 B. Wauters, Grotius, Necessity and the Sixteenth-Century Scholastic Tradition, Grotiana 38 (2017) 129–147. 6 F. Su#rez, De opere sex dierum, M. André (ed.), Paris 1856, lib. 5, cap. 7, n8 18, 418.

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of the civil regime of private property ; finally, I’ll have a closer look at the conception of the agreement in our authors. For Lessius, I base my analysis almost exclusively on the textual evidence found in his massive De iustitia et iure7. For Grotius I rely primarily on his works of political theory De jure praedae (DJPC), Mare liberum (ML) and the De iure belli ac pacis (DJBP), and to a lesser extent on his theological and jurisprudential writings De veritate religionis christianae (De ver.) and Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid (IHR). Even if some authors have made quite some fuzz about Grotius making two distinct theories of property, one in his early writings, and another in his more mature publications, for the purpose of this article I take Grotius’ property theory to be consistent8.

1.

The state of nature

Both Lessius and Grotius are of the opinion that in the state of nature everything is held in common. Both use the term dominium to identify the property rights of people in the state of nature. Grotius elaborates explicitly on the exact structure of the property rights in the state of nature; Lessius, much less, although it is clear that he conceives of dominium in the state of nature quite similarly as Grotius. Grotius is candid about the fact that he uses the term “ownership” (dominium) because of a lack of alternative: “owing to the poverty of human speech, it has become necessary to employ identical terms for concepts which are not identical” (DJPC, cap. 12, fol. 100v ; ML, cap. 5, p. 21). In the state of nature, some kind of ownership (dominium quoddam) does exist, but it is “ownership in a universal and indefinite sense” (DJPC, cap. 12, fol. 101; ML, cap. 5, p. 22). Grotius identifies dominium in the state of nature with usus facti, a technical term that can be traced back to the Franciscan poverty disputes, and implying a factual use but not a civil right to use. Dominium in the state of nature is then factual detention over goods while one is in control over them, but without possibility to recover the goods once one loses this control. Lessius does not explicitly identify dominium in the state of nature with usus facti, but from his discussion of the natural right to sustain one’s life it is possible to derive the conclusion that his conception of dominium in the state of nature is broadly the same. Lessius distinguishes dominium in the state of nature from dominium completum. The former is a kind of “preparation” to the latter, and implies a power to occupy 7 L. Lessius, De iustitia et iure caeterisque virtutibus cardinalibus libri IV, Lovanii 1605. 8 See for instance J. Selden, Mare clausum, seu de dominio maris libri duo, London 1635, lib. 1, cap. 4. I explain elsewhere my reasons for the position that Grotius essentially did not change his theory. B. Wauters, Grotius on Property, in: R.C.H. Lesaffer/J.E. Nijman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hugo Grotius, Cambridge (forthcoming).

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natural resources (De iustitia et iure, 2.4.8.53)9. This natural right is a ius, “a legitimate power to obtain a certain thing […] the violation of which would be an injury” (De iustitia et iure, 2.2.1). Such power is legitimate if it is granted by virtue of a certain law, and it is natural law that grants the right to food and drink to sustain one’s life (ibid.). This compares very well with the concept of usus facti, which implies the absence of any civil right to the use of goods, but not of a natural right to nourishment10. Life in the state of nature is a life of subsistence: Grotius envisions that men are running around naked or in animal skins, are sleeping in caves and hunt or gather food but do not cultivate it (DJBP 2.2.2.4). Lessius and Grotius both highlight the use of consumables, because using food and drink inevitably means using up, thereby denying others to make use of the same thing. The power to exclude others inherently forms part of the concept of dominium in the state of nature, and it is in this sense that Lessius understands it to be a kind of “preparation” to civil ownership. As to the exclusionary powers inherent in dominium, Lessius is content to state that no one can take what is already occupied by others (De iustitia et iure, 2.4.8.53), while Grotius explains at length that once an individual is in control over a thing, “no man could justly take from another what [the latter] had thus first taken to himself” (DJBP 2.2.2.1). To illustrate this, Grotius introduces the example of the seats in the theater : the seats are open to all citizens, but once a citizen occupies a seat he can’t be evicted from it (DJPC, cap. 12, fol. 101v ; DJBP 2.2.2.1). Individuals living in the state of nature all have a natural use-right or dominium over the common. “Common” dominium in the state of nature refers to the fact that the produce of the earth is up for grabs by anyone and that no individual can exclude others from the use of it. Individuals have no specific rights or claims on particular goods but each is at liberty to use the common. This power to seize things from the common is held equally by every individual in the state of nature. No individual can stop another from accessing the common, and everyone can use the world’s resources as he sees fit11. The reason is that God has given the earth to the human race as a whole, and “not upon individual men” (DJPC, cap. 2, fol. 6). Lessius thinks that by natural law all external things are subject to man (De iustitia et iure, 2.4.8.52). Implicitly they both reject the theory of Adam’s sole dominium, which asserts that God has given individual ownership over the whole world to Adam. In the seventeenth century this theory was still con9 Lessius (note 7) 2.4.8.53: Adverte tamen, cum dicitur hominem iure naturae habere dominium in res inferiores, non esse id ita intelligendum quasi singuli habeant completum dominium a natura, sed quia potestatem habent res inferiores occupandi, et earum dominium completum comparandi. 10 Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (note 2) 173–174. 11 D. Klimchuk, Grotius on Property and the Right of Necessity, Journal of the History of Philosophy 56 (2018) 239–260.

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troversial, where it played most notoriously a role in Filmer’s political theology of patriarchal kingship12, although its roots lay in the fourteenth-century Franciscan poverty dispute13. Lessius’ statement that man can use the world’s resources by natural law, was important. Ever since Wycliff had challenged the legitimacy of human dominium because man lived continuously in a state of mortal sin after the Fall of Adam, theologians had to find an answer to Wycliff. They came up with the idea that God had given the world to man as a natural creature, and not as a special gift to the prelapsarian man. Francisco de Vitoria, for instance, explained that even if God had expulsed Adam and Eve from Paradise and therewith had taken from them dominium over the Garden of Eden, man still kept a natural dominium over his actions. Man’s capacity of dominium was inherent to his nature and essence, for man was created in the image of God (Gen. 1,26)14. The reference to Genesis enabled theologians to make the link between man’s capacity of dominium and man’s powers of reason. Having been created in the image of God means having been endowed with intellect and free will. Man’s intellect and free will give him responsibility over his actions, and, through his actions, also a power over external things and resources that can be put to use (De iustitia et iure, 2.4.1.1). That Lessius, a Jesuit, stresses free will as one of the grounds for man’s capacity of dominium should come as no surprise15, but it is interesting that also Grotius shares the view that man’s autonomy and liberty is at the heart of dominium: “liberty in regard to actions is equivalent to ownership in regard to property” (DJPC, cap. 2, fol. 10). Natural liberty is “nothing else than the power of the individual to act in accordance with his own will” (ibid.). God has created man “free and sui juris, so that the actions of each individual and the use of his possessions were made subject not to another’s will but to his own” (ibid.). It is Grotius’ interpretation of imago Dei that is the ground of his conception of man as a fundamentally free and rational creature16. 12 J.P. Sommerville, Absolutism and royalism, in: J.H. Burns/M. Goldie (ed.), The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700, Cambridge 1991, 347–373, at 358. 13 Kilcullen, The Origin of Property (note 2) 900. 14 Francisco de Vitoria, Relectio de Indis, 1.3 [= q.1 a.2 ad 6] in: U. Horts et al. (eds.), Vorlesungen II. Völkerrecht – Politil – Kirche, Stuttgart 1997, 388–393. For more details on Wycliff ’s position on civil dominium, see E. Boreczky, John Wyclif ’s Discourse On Dominium in Community, Leiden-Boston 2008. 15 On the relationship between free will, grace and dominium in other Jesuit writers, see for instance J.A. Tellkamp, Rights and dominium, in: M. Kaufmann/A. Aichele (eds.), A Companion to Luis de Molina, Leiden-Boston 2014, 125–153; T. Pink, Action and freedom in Su#rez’s ethics, in: D. Schwartz (ed.), Interpreting Su#rez. Critical Essays, Cambridge 2012, 115–141. 16 J. Nijman, Grotius’ imago Dei Anthropology : Grounding Ius naturae et gentium, ACIL Research Paper 2015–16, available at www.acil.uva.nl and SSRN, 5–8. For the Roman law and medieval roots of the will theory in the concept of ownership, see M.J. Schermaier, Dominus

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What sets Grotius’ account apart from Lessius’ is how he combines the doctrine of imago Dei with the Stoic concept of self-love. Grotius relies on Cicero to elaborate the concept17. All things in nature are “tenderly regardful of self, and seek their own happiness and security” (DJPC, cap. 2, fol. 5va). Grotius distinguishes between “true and divinely inspired self-love” (verus et divinus sui amor), and the vicious vikaut_a, or immoderate and excessive self-love (ibid.). Self-love, then, is not the same as self-interest. Self-love is a duty. The just man’s highest concern ought to be for himself. This means not only self-preservation, such as the avoidance of death, mutilation or disease, but also the preference “to see acquired for himself rather than for another, that which is important for the conduct of life” (DJPC, cap. 2, fol. 6). This includes “honour, riches and pleasure” (DJPC, cap. 2, fol. 5vav). Therefore it is permissible to acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things which are useful for life. If the doctrine of imago Dei explains that man has the capacity to acquire things, the concept of self-love explains that it is licit for man to make use of this capacity. It makes seizure, the “joining of body to body” (DJBP 2.8.6), legitimate. Grotius is careful, however, to stress also the divine origin of this “function of attachment”. God “bestowed upon living creatures their very existence” and therefore also “bestowed the things necessary for existence” (DJPC, cap. 2, fol. 6). Seizure, or occupation, is the only way to turn the natural resources to use, and therefore it is licit.

2.

The end of the common and the introduction of private property

For both Lessius and Grotius, the transition towards a regime of private dominium had been a historical process. At a certain moment man decided to give up living in a state where everything was held in common, and instead to keep things for himself. The common was thereupon divided. In practical terms the division was effectuated by occupatio. Sacred history described the process in more detail. According to Lessius, the descendents of Adam had come in this world “as if in a giant house full of resources, so that everyone who occupied a thing first also became the dominus of the thing” (De iustitia et iure, 2.5.1.1). Also after the Flood, the descendents of Noah had divided goods by occupation. In case there were doubts about who had occupied a thing first, or when there were more people who aspired to occupy the same goods, Lessius thinks that the decision about who-occupied-what was taken by drawing actuum suorum. Die Willenstheoretische Begründung des Eigentums und das römische Recht, ZRG RA 134 (2017) 49–105. 17 Straumann (note 3) 103–107.

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lots (sortitio). Grotius as well uses biblical history to describe the process of the division of the common, but where Lessius’s reference to the Genesis is meant to be self-explaining and authoritative in itself, Grotius explains what exactly in the biblical story made the institution of a private property regime inevitable: scarcity. There was just not enough land and drinkable water for a growing number of people and cattle. Men could not remain in common “any longer than whilst [its] fruits are sufficient for the wants of men, and which, after the increase of mankind … could not long continue” (IHR 2.3.2). Following the increase in the number of people, everyone rushed to appropriate those water-wells he could seize, a scarce but necessary good in the dry countries that formed the background of Old-Testamental history (DJBP 2.2.2.3). Grotius emphasizes the role of scarcity because it allows him to contrast it with those resources that are abundant, such as air, light and the sea. His point is of course that the sea can not be occupied, because it was not scarce. Lessius doesn’t explicitly discuss the role of scarcity, because he doesn’t need to argue in favour of the principle of the freedom of the seas. He emphasizes two other aristotelian arguments to justify the institution of private property : economic efficiency and order. Division of the common is very useful, because otherwise man would leave uncultivated large parts of the common. As man shuns hard labour and pursues leisure, the common would remain underproductive (De iustitia et iure, 2.5.2.3). This “tragedy of the free rider” is also stressed by Grotius (DJBP 2.2.2.4). Private property also increases stability and public order. As it is clear who owns what, people are less inclined to fight over resources. Productivity and public order are thus two instrumental arguments in favour of dividing the common and introducing private property. Grotius goes a step further and discusses also the role of man’s sinfulness in explaining why these utilitarian arguments make sense. In the state of nature, man is “ignorant of vice and unacquainted with deceit” (DJBP 2.2.2.1), but man loses his integrity and innocence once he is capable to distinguish between good and evil. This knowledge opens up a new world of vices, where man primarily pursues pleasures, wine and “abominable lusts”, leading to jealousy, murder and a “savage sort of life” (DJBP 2.2.2.2). Apart from these savage vices, Grotius distinguishes a “more noble vice”: ambition (DJBP 2.2.2.3). Ambition is what drives people to abandon their caves and to pursue a lifestyle above the level of subsistence. A regime of private property as an answer to man’s sinfulness has a strong Stoic component and taps also into a canonistic tradition that goes back as far as Gratian and his immediate commentators18. It is moreover consistent with 18 C. Pierson, Just Property. A history in the Latin West. Volume I: Wealth, Virtue and the Law, Oxford 2013, 88–89. For a comparison between the account of Grotius and Seneca, see

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Calvinist ideas on the relationship between industriousness and the fallen nature of man19. Lessius discusses the role of man’s sinfulness only indirectly, while he considers the challenge of the Pelagians and others regarding the legitimacy of human dominium after the Fall of Adam, but he summarily dismisses the challenge as heresy (De iustitia et iure, 2.5.2.2). Instead he offers the standard account of the permissibility of the division, even when according to natural law the default position is one of common dominium20.

3.

Agreement

For Grotius, the transition towards a civil regime of private property is a gradual process of small incremental steps. Somewhere along this gradual process, people enter into one or more agreements about the adjudication of resources, “pacts” that could be explicit, as in the case of a division such as between Abraham and Lot (Gen. 13.9), or tacit. The tacit agreement presupposes that “each should appropriate to himself, by right of first possession, what could not have been divided” (DJBP 2.2.2.5)21. There is a sense in which Grotius’ conception of the agreement was innovative. That is the subject matter of this section. That consent in one way or another underlies the institution of private property was standard doctrine among the commentators of Aquinas’ Summa Theologica. The Doctor Angelicus had spoken about the agreement (condictum) to introduce private property (STh. II–II, q. 66, art. 2, ad 1). This agreement was of human law (ius positivum), which basically meant “that what had been agreed upon or consented to by men” (STh. II–II, q. 57, art. 2). Aquinas used the terms pactum, consensus and condictum. These terms were also used by the sixteenthcentury theologians to explain how a primeval state of common property could licitly evolve into a regime of private property22. Lessius discusses the division of the common in similar terms. Given the nature of man, who tends to look only

19

20 21

22

J. Barbeyrac in notes 19 and 21–22 to DJBP, 2.2.2.2. For the Stoic tradition in general see Straumann (note 3). A. Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000, Cambridge 2014, 95. For a critical appraisal of the Weberian theory on the relationship between Calvinist doctrines and industriousness, see H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Traditions, Cambridge, Mass./London 2003, 24–28. On this permissibility, see Tierney, Law and Liberty (note 2), passim. Grotius elaborated on the idea of an agreement to introduce private property only in De jure belli ac pacis, and omitted it in his early works such as De jure praedae, Mare liberum and Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerheid. For a discussion, see Tuck (note 3) 77; Wauters (note 8). Wauters (note 5) 139.

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after his own interest, the institution of private property allows for more order and efficiency. Therefore, all peoples have reached the same conclusion that it is preferable to make an end to common property. Lessius labels as consent (consensus) this convergence among peoples on the need to introduce private property (De iustitia et iure, 2.5.3.9). Lessius doesn’t explicitly state that it was an agreement that introduced the civil regime of private property. Consensus for him seems to be only a factual convergence of behaviour of different peoples. Nevertheless, when he says that the common was split up by either division or allotment, he doesn’t explain why division or allotment were normative in the first place. He refers exclusively to the postive outcomes of efficiency and order. Grotius, on the other hand, does explain why the agreement is normative. He brings up two reasons. First, the core of the agreement is the consent to the principle of first occupation. It is not an agreement assigning specific goods to particular persons. To the extent that Grotius does speak about such explicit division, as when he invokes the story of Abraham and Lot, it is only another expression of the underlying principle “that each should appropriate to himself, by right of first possession, what could not have been divided” (DJBP 2.2.2.5). Second, the process towards a regime of private property has taken place “under the guidance of nature itself” (DJPC, cap. 12, fol. 101; ML, cap. 5, p. 22); the agreement itself is “patterned after nature’s plan” (DJPC, cap. 12, fol. 101v). The essential feature in that pattern, as we have seen, is seizure as the primary means of acquiring things. Seizure of a thing excludes others from its use, and this exclusivity is what property is all about (DJPC, cap. 12, fol. 101; ML, cap. 5, p. 22). Seizure is of course very close to civil occupatio23. What the conventional, civil occupatio adds to physical control is the possibility to recover goods once one’s physical control over them is lost. In the state of nature others can be excluded from the use of one’s goods only while the individual has physical control. Once the individual loses physical control over a thing, he also loses the right to use it, for the use-right is “derived not from a mere internal act of the mind” (DJBP 2.2.2.5). What the agreement to the principle of first occupation adds, then, is the possibility to recover lost possessions, for which the “establishment of courts of justice was undertaken” (DJPC, cap. 8, fol. 39). The possibility to recover goods in spite of loss of physical control over them requires others to subscribe to the idea of continuation of rights by the mere internal act of the mind, and therefore some kind of agreement is necessary. There is another sense in which Grotius’ conception of the agreement is innovative. When the master from Delft states that “all men were supposed, and ought to be supposed to have consented” (DJBP 2.2.2.5) to the principle of first occupation, he clearly knows that he needs to explain the binding force of the 23 Tuck (note 3) 61, 77.

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agreement on those who are no party to it, such as future generations or latecomers. Grotius’ answer is basically that no one has something to lose by underwriting to the principle of first occupation. Everyone gets what he or she would already have in the state of nature: the recognition that seizure of unoccupied goods is rightful. On top of what they already have in the state of nature, the civil property regime adds the possibility to recover goods over which one has lost physical control. This extra feature provides real advantages in terms of economic efficiency and public order. However, these positive outcomes are not the only reason why one would subscribe to them, because these benefits could not be expected to be to the equal advantage of each. Nevertheless, even if you don’t benefit from these advantageous consequences of the compact and end up in a situation of abject poverty, Grotius postulates that you still have a right of necessity. This right of necessity is the liberty of a person in extreme need to take from the surplus of others what is needed in order to stay alive. This liberty is a clause to the agreement that introduces private property, as it is “supposed to have been established with this favourable exception, that in such cases one might enter again upon the rights of the primitive community” (DJBP 2.2.6.4)24. The right of necessity was already an ancient feature in the property theories of the scholastic theologians, and Lessius’ conception of it is quite interesting. He thinks that it would not have been reasonable to divide the common had there not been some kind of provision that recognized each individual’s natural right to take what was needed to survive25. For Lessius this provision is attached to the agreement underlying the private property regime itself (De iustitia et iure, 2.12.12.71), something he is more explicit about than other scholastic theologians26. Because the right of necessity is a provision to the agreement, it can therefore also be tailored to require the person who had taken something out of the surplus of others to return or replace the thing to the owner once the emergency situation had passed (De iustitia et iure, 2.16.1.9). Grotius and Lessius both include the right of necessity in their theories. They had practical reasons for doing so: Lessius wanted to see if a person in extreme need who took someone else’s property in order to survive was a thief. He also wanted to determine the extent of such person’s obligation of restitution. Grotius used the 24 On the right of necessity in Grotius, see Buckle (note 3) 34, 47; Klimchuk (note 11); J. Salter, Grotius and Pufendorf on the right of necessity, History of Political Thought 26 (2005) 284–302; J. Udi, Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf on the power of necessity to override property rights, ]gora. Papeles de Filosof&a 33 (2014) 1–18; Wauters (note 5). 25 Lessius (note 7) 2.12.12.68: Censeri itaque debet divisio esse facta, reservato cuique iure naturali, quatenus erat necessarium ad vitam tuendam: alioquin non esset rationabili modo facta. 26 For instance, Lessius points also at the ultimate consequences of such a right of necessity : in his opinion a person in extreme need is allowed to kill the owner if the latter impedes access to his property. See Lessius (note 7) 2.12.12.69.

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analogy of the right of necessity to conclude that in times of war a belligerent who found himself in a situation of extreme need could occupy neutral territory (DJBP 2.2.10). Apart from the difference between Lessius and Grotius over the practical use of the right of necessity, there is also a difference at a conceptual level. For Lessius the right of necessity seems something accessory to his property theory ; as a matter of fact, he discusses it in the sections on theft and restitution, not in the section where he elaborates his property theory. Grotius on the other hand, discusses it in conjunction with his property theory, as it plays a crucial role in explaining the binding force of the agreement on those who are no party to it. The right of necessity assures everyone of the level of subsistence that they would have had anyway in the state of nature. This is the key to explain why all, including those who were no party to the agreement, are “supposed, and ought to be supposed to have consented” (DJBP 2.2.2.5): when no one looses by leaving the state of nature because subsistence is guaranteed by the right of necessity, and all stand to gain because of increased efficiency and public order, there is no reason why we should doubt the consent of all to the agreement to the principle of occupation and the introduction of private property.

4.

Justice, self-love and sociability

What sets Grotius apart from Lessius is not only the theoretical elaboration on the agreement underlying the regime of private property. On a deeper level, the two authors manage different conceptual frameworks of their property theories. Lessius develops his property theory largely as a kind of guidance towards a life of virtue and justice. As a matter of fact, he structures his De iustitia et iure in four books according to the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, courage and temperance, and discusses his property theory in his book on justice. For the Antwerp Jesuit, dominium is ius, and ius is object of justice (De iustitia et iure, 2.2.1). God, in virtue of having created the world, has the highest absolute and independent dominium over each and every creature. Inherent to this divine dominium is the normative order, which aims at God and perfection, precisely because God has created it27. Man participates in this divine dominium thanks to a grant from God; however, human dominium is much lower than divine domi-

27 Lessius (note 7) 2.4.1.2: Deus quidem summum quoddam, absolutissimum, ac prorsus independens in omnes creaturas habet dominium, ratione creationis et conservationis, per quam tota creatura et secundum substantiam et secundum omnes suas perfectiones, est ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipsum. On this passage see M.-F. Renoux-Zagamé, Origines th8ologiques du concept moderne de propri8t8, GenHve 1987, 49.

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nium, on which it depends and to which it is subordinated28. Reason enables man to identify the normative design of God, not only because the human capacity of reason participates in the divine recta ratio, but also because of natural law, the inherent rectitude of which does not depend on a direct precept from God or man but “from the nature of things itself” (De iustitia et iure, 2.2.2.9). Because private property is permitted by natural law, and because private property is befitting to justice, it is in itself not unjust. Unlike Lessius, Grotius doesn’t mean to provide rules that lead to some eudemonic final good. Instead, he develops his property theory primarily for practical reasons: to find out what kind of infringements of property rights can justifiably lead to war, and the boundaries of property rights that belligerents have to respect during a war. Even so, it is interesting to come back to the theological framework in which the master from Delft develops his theory. We already saw how self-love is a divinely inspired duty : the just man’s highest concern ought to be for himself. Self-love implies at the very least that people should seek their own preservation, but it also implies a life in community. A life in community enables the pooling of resources for defense against outside threats. The political community is the institutional embodiment “for selfprotection through mutual aid, and for equal acquisition of the necessities of life” (DJPC, cap. 6, fol. 27). It is also the expression of a principle of “universal fellowship of mankind and the communion established by nature, that will still cause us to be affected in our turn by ills inflicted upon others” (ibid.). Just like self-love, so is universal fellowship a divinely inspired duty. For “God judged that there would be insufficient provision for the preservation of his works, if he commended to each individual’s care only the safety of that particular individual, without also willing that one created being should have regard for the welfare of his fellow beings, in such a way as that all might be linked in mutual harmony as if by an everlasting covenant” (DJPC, cap. 2, fol. 6v). Self-love and universal fellowship are then two sides of the same coin and reinforce each other. We participate in the universal fellowship because we want others to treat us the same way when we are ourselves in distress. There’s nothing “more useful (utilius) for man than his fellow man” (DJPC, cap. 6, fol. 27), and in that sense ills inflicted on others are regarded as injuries to oneself, so while “striving for the goods of others we are striving for our own good” as well (DJPC, cap. 9, fol. 54v). Participating in the universal fellowship of mankind enables each individual to freely fulfil the responsibility over his or her own life, which includes the preservation of God’s works. There is no way an individual can opt out. Defining and 28 Lessius (note 7) 2.4.1.2: Itaque omne dominium quod creaturis communicatur, infinitis partibus est minus; ac essentialiter dominio divino circa unamquamquam rem subordinatum, ab eoque dependens.

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pursuing one’s choices is only possible within the framework of the community, provided that conditions in the community are set up in such a way that no one by design ends up in a situation of dependency, for man is “free and sui juris” (DJPC, cap. 2, fol. 10). The regime of private property does not contravene the preservation of God’s work, because it includes a feature, the right of necessity, that protects people from living a life of dependency, below subsistence level.

5.

Conclusion

In this paper we have highlighted some similarities and differences in the property theories of Lessius and Grotius in order to find out the distinctive features of the Grotian theory. It is clear that, as Grotius himself recognizes, many elements of his theory could not be understood without the scholastic tradition, a tradition that goes back to Gratian and Aquinas. In that sense it is no surprise that Lessius and Grotius share ideas such as the agreement as the normative basis for the civil regime of private property ; the chronological transition from an original state of nature to a civil regime of private property ; the increased efficiency and public order that can be expected from a regime of private property ; or the right of necessity. Two major elements in Grotius’ property theory make his particularly innovating: consent and self-love. Grotius offers a deeper foundation for consent as the normative basis for the civil regime of private property. Consent is not linked to a precise historical event, nor to some particular contracting parties, but it is enduring and is inclusive of all men of all ages. That is because, when compared to a natural state of common possessions, we’re not losing anything by introducing a civil regime of private property, as the right of necessity guarantees our subsistence just like in the state of nature. Therefore we can only win by consenting to a regime of private property, and hence, we’re presumed to do or have done so. Grotius also offers an account that links private property with the duty of selflove. Self-love implies that we take or seize what is needed to survive, and that ultimately we live in a community for self-protection and in a universal fellowship for the preservation of God’s works. Self-love requires that we take responsibility for our actions and that we do not submit to the will of others, that we be free and autonomous (“sui juris”). It is also by participating in the universal fellowship of mankind that we’re capable to freely fulfill our responsibility over our lives. It is property that makes the link between self-love and universal fellowship. Being able to do as one pleases with one’s possessions is a mark of liberty and autonomy ; sharing one’s possessions with those in need enables us to fulfill our responsibility over our own life because we contribute to the preser-

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vation of God’s works. At the same time, not being subjected to another’s will also requires some possessions of one’s own: at least enough to keep one above subsistence level, so as not to depend on the charity of others.

Alain Wijffels

Audiuntur theologi. Legal scholarship’s claim on the “Second Table” in Alberico Gentili’s De Nuptiis (1601) Hoc experimentum hominis, opus eius.1

The main title of this brief contribution in honour of Professor Jan Hallebeek is taken from Alberico Gentili’s Disputationum De nuptiis Libri VII (1601), where it appears as the heading of Chapter 6 of the fourth book2. Audiuntur theologi may seem a far cry from Gentili’s most famous soundbite, his Silete theologi… exclamation which had appeared a few years earlier in De iure belli (1598)3. The Silete line, which few scholars writing about Gentili are able to resist quoting, is often mentioned as a short-hand for Gentili’s endeavours to reduce the influence of theology in the areas covered by secular law scholarship4. As with Grotius’s Etiamsi… non daretur quote, historians are also quick to point out that Gentili’s exclamation ought to be read in context5, while opinions differ whether or to what extent it expresses a more general view on the respective provinces of theological and civil law expertise, or even more generally on the autonomy of secular law. The present contribution’s central theme is that Gentili’s views expressed in De nuptiis fit in the author’s attempts to argue in favour of an extensive understanding of the 1 Albericus Gentilis, De armis Romanis (new edition, see hereafter, note 15, 122). 2 Albericus Gentilis, Disputationum De nuptiis Libri VII, Hanoviae (Apud Guilielmum Antonium) 1601, 399f. 3 Albericus Gentilis, De iure belli libri tres, Hanoviae (Excudebat Guilielmus Antonius) 1598. For a comprehensive bibliography of Alberico Gentili’s published (and some unpublished) work, the study of reference is I. Maclean, Learning and the Market Place: Essays in the History of the Early Modern Book, Leiden 2009, Ch. 11: Alberico Gentili, his publishers, and the vagaries of the book trade between England and Germany, 1580–1614, 291–337. 4 The quote has been used in recent years for the main title of two collections of essays: G. Minnucci, “Silete theologi in munere alieno”. Alberico Gentili tra diritto, teologia e religione, Milano 2016, and M. Ferronato/L. Bianchin (eds.), Silete theologi in munere alieno. Alberico Gentili a la seconda scolastica. Atti del Convegno Internazionale Padova, 20–22 novembre 2008, Padova, 2011. Gentili’s De nuptiis (note 2) contains a few echoes of the silete exclamation: 25 (Sileant theologi: nec alienam temnant temere disciplinam. Aliae sunt leges Caesaris, aliae Christi. Aliud Papinianus, aliud Paulus noster praecipit …); 84: Sileant, qui negant aptam rationem a iurisdictione ad baptismum : quia iurisdictio in invitos exercetur. Iurisconsultus sane nec sileat hic, ubi sic audit theologum verbis iuris non bene uti. 5 N. Malcolm, Alberico Gentili and the Ottomans, in: Alberico Gentili. La salvaguarda dei beni culturali nel diritto internazionale. Atti del Convegno Dodicesima Giornata Gentiliana, San Ginesio, 22–23 Settembre 2006, Milano 2008, 63–90.

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areas governed by civil law, without drawing entirely a definite borderline between the realm of civil law scholarship and that of theology6. Perhaps (but such speculation is beyond the theme of the present contribution) that as a native from San Ginesio, the very concept of Marches was also part of his intellectual identity and approach to the topics of his scholarly work7. The currently fashionable theme of the relationship between law and religion was bound to become an area of interest in Gentilian studies. Conversely, Gentili’s work was bound to attract the interest of historians working on the law and religion theme. A brief preliminary historiographical survey may help to understand how that theme has drawn the converging attention of various currents of Gentilian scholarship.

1.

A very short introduction to historiography on Alberico Gentili

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Gentili’s work was not entirely forgotten, but his books on the law of nations were overshadowed by the appeal of Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis as the standard work on the law of international relations. The relative decline in interest for Gentili was probably also determined by changing patterns in legal methods. Gentili had been the exponent of a wider transition in Western legal thinking. Educated at Perugia, he started his career as a legal scholar in the 1580s advocating the more traditional (“Italian”) approach against the claims and demands of the legal-humanistic methods. By the late 1580s and early 1590s, however, Gentili’s work had become more eclectic, incorporating many of the features of that legal-humanistic approach, while still relying on the “bartolist” approach for much of his reasoning and arguments. However, whereas in his works on the law of nations, he may have adopted more resolutely the approach of the modern systematic treatise, in other works, he experimented with other formats. The flexible argumentative format of “disputations” appears to have been a favourite model of Gentili. It may well have reflected the specific reasoning 6 On Gentili, De nuptiis (note 2), see G. Minnucci, “Silete theologi in munere alieno” (note 4), Chapter 4, 181–222 ; G. Minnucci, La nuova metodologia di Alberico Gentili nel I Libro del “De nuptiis” (1601), in: Alberico Gentili. L’uso della forza nel diritto internazionale. Atti del Convegno Undicesima Giornata Gentiliana, San Ginesio, 17–18 Settembre 2004, Milano 2006, 399–432. 7 As in several other works, Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) also refers regularly to his former teachers and identifies them as his praeceptores: M.A. Eugenio, T. Nonio, Sforza degli Oddi, and (659) G. Lancelotti. Some regional feeling may be recognised in the fact that when Gentili refers to both G.F. Ozeri and G.B. Caccialupi, he identifies them as Piceni. For a single page including references to his brother Scipione’s Parerga, his own commentaries on De verborum significationibus, Ozeri and Eugenio: 473. On a few occasions, Gentili refers to his own family relations, but only, it seems, in England through his in–laws: 518, 547.

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skills of a civil lawyer Gentili wished to highlight, but its less systematic features would not have contributed to make the resulting books easily accessible works of reference providing readily available authorities in a progressively more rulebased legal culture. In that respect, Gentili’s works are a testimony of a legal scholar’s sustained efforts to overcome the sixteenth-century divide between “antiqui” and “moderni”8, and to some extent (in international law) to work out a systematic subject-based approach. Beyond international law, however, his legacy did not point out to the early-modern systematic methods which were to prevail later on during the seventeenth century. Those early-modern methods would also gradually entail the obsolescence of the traditional late-medieval authorities which had remained a major source of reasoning in Gentili’s books. The Oxonian legal scholar Thomas Erskine Holland is usually credited with launching the modern historiographical revival of Alberico Gentili’s work9. Erskine Holland’s lecture appealed to a more general sustained interest at the time for the (mainly, early-modern) historical roots of international law science. Thus, three of Gentili’s books on international law topics were eventually incorporated in the canon of “The Classics of International Law”10. Until recently, legal historiography associated Alberico Gentili mainly or exclusively with the history of international law. In 1937, even the most comprehensive monograph on Gentili, by the Dutch scholar Gesina van den Molen, displayed a bias for Gentili as an early representative of international law – albeit his religious opinions also played a nonnegligible role in Van den Molen’s treatment of her subject11. In the same year, Guido Astuti published a monograph which would cast a long shadow over legalhistorians’ understanding of Gentili’s work, pitting Gentili as a champion of the mos italicus against the challenges of sixteenth-century legal humanism12. In recent times, a fresh view on Gentili originated with a monograph published in 1981 by Diego Panizza, professor at Padua and a scholar of early-modern political thought13. Panizza’s studies paved the way to the creation of an international centre of Gentilian studies based in Gentili’s native town. From its modest beginnings in the late 1980s, the Centre grew to become a significant meeting place 8 A. Wijffels, Antiqui et recentiores: Alberico Gentili – Beyond Mos Italicus and Legal Humanism, in: P. du Plessis/J.W. Cairns (eds.), Reassessing Legal Humanism and its Claims. Petere fontes?, Edinburgh 2015, 11-40. 9 Th. Erskine Holland, An Inaugural Lecture on Albericus Gentilis delivered at All Souls College November 7, 1874, London, 1874. 10 See www.lawbookexchange.com/carnegie.htm: Nos. 9 (Hispanicae advocationis Libri II, 1921), 12 (De legationibus Libri III, 1924), and 16 (De iure belli Libri III, 1933). 11 G.H.J. van den Molen, Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law. His life, work and times. Academish proefschrift, Amsterdam, 1937. 12 G. Astuti, Mos italicus e mos gallicus nei Dialoghi “De iuris interpretibus” di Alberico Gentili, Bologna, 1937. 13 D. Panizza, Alberico Gentili, giurista ideologo nell’Inghilterra elizabettiana, Padova, 1981.

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at the biennial conferences organised in San Ginesio. Panizza, who played a pivotal role in the success of the Centre over more than two decades, established during the 1990s the principle that the Centre’s conferences (and the ensuing proceedings) would bring together specialists in modern international law, speaking on current issues (but whose contributions did not address specifically or directly Gentili’s work); scholars specialising in the history of (early-modern) political thought; and legal historians; in addition, historians from other fields, whose research touched upon Gentili, would also take part and enrich the discussions14. Yet, for all these interdisciplinary efforts, the contributions over the years of the two main interest groups of historians (viz. the history of political thought and the history of law) tended more often to diverge than to converge. As a participant and direct witness to most of those conferences, I long believed that this was due to essentially different perspectives: the historians of political thought would often present Gentili’s concerns primarily as those of a political thinker, minimising or ignoring the specifically legal register of his work and arguments, whereas the legal historians would insist that Gentili was first and foremost a civil lawyer, whose writings had to be read as part of the legal-literary canon and tradition. As a result of those contrasting vantage-points, and in spite of the intensive discussions at the San Ginesio conferences involving all sides, two different figures of Gentili emerged, largely independently from each other, with only few cross-overs. As a legalhistorian myself, I often wondered whether Gentili would indeed end up as a milestone of political thinkers, while his role as a legal scholar might eventually be obscured and forgotten. With hindsight, I look upon those developments during the 1990s and the first decade of our century differently. One of the reasons why historians of political thought and legal historians developed at the time relatively little common grounds, it seems to me now, is that on both scores, so many new grounds were being uncovered during those years. Both historians of legal thought and legal historians were in some way too preoccupied to reassess their own view of Gentili within their own discipline in the light of fresh readings of his work. A good example in the field of the history of political ideas is the growing interest, in the late 1990s, for a work which had received until then rather scant attention, De armis romanis. Within a few years, as a spin-off of the discussions at San Ginesio, an international initiative resulted in two companion volumes on De armis romanis, one comprising a modern edition of the text and an English translation, the other a 14 For an overview of the series of proceedings, see A. Gentili. Giustizia, guerra, impero. Atti del Convegno XIVGiornata Gentiliana. In occasione della presentazione dell’edizione inglese del De Armis Romanis – The Wars of the Romans, San Ginesio, 24–25 settembre 2010, Milano 2014, on the two pages preceding the title-page, and www.giuffre.it (altogether 16 volumes, 1988–2014, and, in addition, the Italian translation of De jure belli). The Collana has since then been continued as Studi Gentiliani, published by the Edizioni Universit/ di Macerata: two volumes at the time the present article was written, see eum.unicm.it).

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collection of essays, in which the majority of contributions on topics of the law of nations appears to be addressing a broader scholarly audience interested more in the history of international relations and early-modern political thought on an increasingly globalised world than in traditional legal history15. That traditional legal history, however, was undergoing its own transformations, although along different lines of scholarship. In that context, Giovanni Minnucci’s unrelenting flow of innovative articles and monographs has fundamentally changed the legalhistorical view on Gentili. Apart from editing previously unpublished work by Gentili, Minnucci has convincingly repositioned Gentili in the superseded mos italicus and mos gallicus divide16, suggesting how Jean Hotman’s disparaging campaign against Gentili in the 1580s should be linked to the latter’s revision of his own dismissal of the benefits of legal-humanistic expertise to civil law reasoning, and a gradually more extensive use of the humanists’ philological and historical repertoire in his own writings17. Even more fundamentally, Minnucci has also argued that Gentili’s adoption of the legal-historical repertoire – combined with his continuing adherence to essential features of the late-medieval “Italian” method – reflects a gradual transformation of Gentili as a lawyer, expressed by Minnucci as Gentili’s quest for a model of interpres iuris, the latter expressing the civil lawyer’s ambition to have the capacity to deal with the entirety of legal norms – and their purpose in the polity –, not only with the texts of the corpus iuris civilis18. Minnucci developed this new perspective on Gentili by widening the scope of legal-historical studies to other writings than those on international law, in particular to writings and publications which had previously been largely neglected and dismissed as opera minora, not only in the canon of late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth legal literature, but in Gentili’s work as well. At that stage, Minnucci became interested in the controversy which had opposed in 1593–1594 Gentili (regius professor of civil law at Oxford since 1587) to the Oxford theologian John Raynolds, a controversy which had already retained the attention of Panizza 15 B. Kingsbury/B. Straumann (eds.), Alberico Gentili, The Wars of the Romans. A Critical Edition and Translation of De armis Romanis (D. Lupher, transl.), Oxford 2011; B. Kingsbury/B. Straumann (eds.), The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the Justice of Empire, Oxford, 2010. 16 G. Minnucci, Alberico Gentili tra mos italicus e mos gallicus: l’inedito commentario Ad legem Juliam de adulteriis, Bologna, 2002. 17 G. Minnucci, “Silete theologi in munere alieno” (note 4), Chapter 1, 25–82 (with references to the author’s previous studies on the Gentili-Hotman relationship). 18 G. Minnucci, Alberico Gentili iuris interpres della prima Et/ moderna, Bologna, 2011; for a synthesis: G. Minnucci, Per una rilettura del metodo gentiliano, in: F. Treggiari (ed.), Alberico Gentili, la tradizione giuridica perugina e la Fondazione del diritto internazionale, Perugia 2010, 29–56; G. Minnucci, Diritto canonico, diritto civile e teologia nel I libro del De nuptiis di Alberico Gentili, in: U.R. Blumenthal/K. Pennington/A.A. Larson (eds.), Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law, Wahington D.C, 1–7 August 2004, Citt/ del Vaticano 2008, 423–445.

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in his earlier work. As in the case of the Hotman-Gentili quarrel in the 1580s, Minnucci was able to draw on partly unpublished correspondence in order to establish, beyond the at times virulent personal attacks against Gentili, that the controversy challenged the legitimacy of civil law learning in areas of interests where theologians such as Raynolds claimed that their expertise ought to prevail19. The bitterness of the controversy appears to have deeply impressed Gentili, who, as Minnucci has shown, would still in his later work occasionally refer to some of the attacks he had experienced during the early 1590s. This was still true in 1600, when he was about to publish De nuptiis. The enhanced attention for Gentili’s contributions to both political and legal scholarship reached its high-water mark in 2008, on the occasion of several commemorations of Gentili’s death in 1608. By that time, partly along the lines of “law and religion” as a renewed area of interest in legal studies20, partly as a result of increased interest in the connections between the theologies of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and of the “second scholastics”, both in international law and in private law, several contributions around the quatercentenary discussed the relations between legal and religious normativity in the works by Gentili and his contemporaries21.

2.

De nuptiis

The structure of De nuptiis is a subdivision in seven books, in which a topic of the law of marriage is discussed through a sequence of chapters22. Some chapters are more specifically related to the specific substantive law on a particular subject, 19 G. Minnucci, “Silete theologi in munere alieno” (note 4), Chapter 3, 129–180 (including the edition of some unpublished correspondence). 20 The second conference in San Ginesio (in 1987) had already dealt with the theme of politics and religion: D. Panizza (ed.), Alberico Gentili. Politica e religione nell’et/ delle guerre di religione. Atti del Convegno Seconda Giornata Gentiliana, San Ginesio, 17 Maggio 1987, Milano, 2002. 21 In addition to several contributions published in the proceedings of various conferences commemorating the quatercentenary, see also V. Lavenia (ed.), Alberico Gentili. Diritto internazionale e Riforma. Atti del convegno della XVI Giornata Gentiliana, San Ginesio, 19–20 settembre 2014, Macerata 2017; and D. Pirillo, Filosofia ed eresia nell’Inghilterra del tardo Cinquecento. Bruno, Sidney e i dissidenti religiosi italiani, Roma 2010, passim. 22 Liber I is titled De interprete. Liber II ad Definitiones, dealing with forms of engagements (sponsaliae, nuptiae), consent, conditions, representation. Liber III De errore et metu, Liber IV De filiisfamilias, Liber V De aetate et gradibus, Liber VI De repudiis et secundiis nuptiis (including several chapters on separation and divorce), and Liber VII De probationibus. The book is 853 pages long, is preceded by an Epistola dedicatoria to Thomas Egerton, Keeper of the Great Seal; at the end of the volume follows an 11-page long Epistola apologetica ad lectorem.

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others are more focused on specific issues around a particular subject. As in some of the other (later) works by Gentili, this book reflects the transition between the traditional late-medieval method, which did not operate on the basis of a systematization of the law by subject-matter, to the systematized presentation of later early-modern legal literature. De nuptiis thus offers a more organised presentation of the law of marriage than what may be found in the late-medieval commentaries on civil (and even canon) law, and the purpose of discussing specifically the law of marriage in a single treatise mirrored as such the author’s will to move to a new format of legal literature. Yet, it falls short of providing a comprehensive systematic outline (or detailed presentation) of the substantive law of marriage as one may find in later early-modern treatises. Moreover, Gentili’s purpose was not, as in later early-modern legal literature, to merge civil law with the particular law of one or more jurisdiction23. Although he mentions at an early stage that he addresses an English audience (a claim which may well have been true at an earlier stage of the work’s preparation, if he presented these disputations to his students in Oxford), references to English law or other particular laws appear only rarely throughout the seven parts of De Nuptiis24, and the 23 Iura propria are mentioned only occasionally and in passing, without any attempt to incorporate systematically substantive rules of particular law in the argument. Recurrent references to “Italian” or “German” consilia are sometimes linked to regional practices, but sometimes as authorities similar to other consilia-collections. For other references, see e. g. p. 188 (on kisses as a form or evidence of consent, or not, in Italy, France, England); p. 232 (on married women exercising trade on behalf of their husband’s business, in Italy and in the Low Countries); p. 361 (on paternal authority in Britanny, England, France) and utut sit aliquod in totaque receptum Europa, see also p. 401. Gentili also refers to a disputation by him on the marriage of Philip III of Spain (537–538). In addition, oblique references to foreign cases appear through Gentili’s use of foreign legal literature, for example cases of the Paris Parliament reported by Papon (pp. 277 and 427). In the first book (p. 37), Gentili had already argued that the real subject-matter of jurisprudence could not be restricted to a specific legal system, not even Roman law: … quoniam ius aliquod iurisconsulto dare oportet. Neque enim dicere sive Romanum, sive Anglicanum, sive aliud potes tale. 24 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 112–113 (on the need to consider also canon law: … quod magna ex parte scriptum est ad Anglos meos). However, specific references to English law and practice only appear rarely throughout the book. For example on 122 (the English practice that a woman is being presented to be married to her future husband); 329 (Gentili’s criticism on the English law of wardships); 549 (from a reference by Petrus de Ancharano?); 563 (from a reference by Angelus Perusinus?); 615 (criticism on wedding-related social practices); and several references to the issues around the marriages of Henry VIII: 528 (opinions in omnibus academiis Europae), 536 (Wittenberg theologians, including Luther and Melanchton, and a suggestion of their political calculations), 545, 654 (Catharine Howard). More intriguing are references made to an English case in which Gentili was asked to submit a legal opinion (on the issue whether a putative husband could be held liable for debts on behalf of the woman whom he believed was his wife), apparently decided in 1599–1600, 262–264; and an unidentified case in which Gentili expresses with great emphasis his unwillingness to express a personal or professional opinion, p. 710. In other passages, Gentili refers briefly to the Anglican Church (e. g. 80, 88, 363, 582).

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publication in Hanau suggests that a more cosmopolitan readership was targeted when Gentili decided to proceed to its publication. The books 2 to 7 of De nuptiis nonetheless follow a sequence and are on the whole expressed in a legal style which would have been easily recognisable to contemporary lawyers familiar with mainstream practical legal literature. The work also illustrates how Gentili constantly combined traditional and legalhumanistic authorities and methods. The focus on discussing the rationes of the civil law rather than the substantive law itself means that as the book does not fit in the genre of practical works of reference on the subject which would eventually prevail. The lack of any index at the end of the work almost seems to confirm that the author’s aim was not to provide a ready-to-use practical manual for a reader seeking directly applicable positive rule on any specific issue. Book 1 (and at the very end of the volume, the “apology” to the reader) follows a different format and expresses a different register. In a more polemical tone, Gentili justifies his treatment of the law of marriage on the basis of civil law. The polemical justification appears to gainsay claims from theologians who would seek to subordinate – or perhaps even neutralise – the civil lawyers’ expertise in that area of the law25. In the course of that counter-blast, canon law becomes a collateral target for Gentili’s arguments championing the necessity to consider the law of marriage by civil law standards.

3.

The Second Table

A substantial part of the arguments in De nuptiis is intended to justify the claims of civil lawyers to deal with the book’s topic – indeed, throughout the book, even the more technical discussions of various aspects of the law of marriage tend to justify the need to use legal authorities according to the standards of civil law reasoning. Gentili’s specific argument with regard to marriage is based on a broader argument about the civil lawyers’ areas of expertise. Arguably, Gentili’s concept of the interpres iuris at the time was already transcending that of the civil lawyer as a legal scholar or professional trained in the study of the corpus iuris civilis. In one famous passage, Gentili answered the criticism (possibly going back to the Oxford controversy with Raynolds) with regard to his refusal, in his first published work, De iuris interpretibus dialogi sex (1582), to broaden the expertise of civil lawyers to the scholarship required by legal humanists. In De nuptiis, he appears to introduce a distinction between the civil lawyer who focuses his interest and craft on the law in Justinian’s compilations, and the jurisprudential expert, whose aim is to transcend the understanding of those 25 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 89.

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texts in pursuing a higher ideal of justice and scholarship26. Gentili’s willingness to include the scholarship required by legal-humanistic methods fitted in his strategy aiming at securing a central position for civil lawyers in public governance. In England, the status of the common law and its professionals from the Inns of Court restrained the prospects of civil lawyers much more than on the European continent, where non-academic legal professionals did not (except where legal scholars failed to prevail) easily gain access to the decisive institutions of government and justice. Gentili therefore appears to have avoided challenging the common lawyers on their own turf. In areas where civil law (including canon law) scholarship was still considered a necessary expertise – such as the law of marriage –, he tried to strengthen the grip of the civil law. In De nuptiis, the main directions of his efforts were twofold: on the one hand, he confronted the concurrent claims of theologians and therefore argued that (the law of) marriage was primarily a matter to be dealt with by jurists trained in civil law; on the other hand, he also acknowledged that in order to buttress their claims (in marital affairs but also more broadly in areas of governance), civil lawyers had to step up their expertise beyond the study of Roman law. The general argument in contrast to the theologians relies on the distinction between the two tables of the Decalogue. The essence of the argument consists in claiming the civil lawyers’ competence in the areas covered by the Second Table. Referring to Giacomo Zabarella, Gentili identifies theology and jurisprudence (iurisprudentia) as both sciences and arts27. They differ from each other as sciences because of their respective subjects, God in the case of theology, human actions in the case of legal science. They also differ as arts because of their respective finality, which Gentili defines as divine law for theology, human law for jurisprudence. The division he operates on that basis is that the theologian should deal with the commandments of the first table, the jurist with those of the second table. At that stage, Gentili takes care to define human law: whereas, he argues, civil law (ius civile) is the law which a polity produces for its citizens, and the law of nations (ius gentium) which natural reason establishes between all people (inter omnes gentes), human law is the law which applies between men, 26 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 91–92 (… Et de iuris Iustinianici interprete illic [viz. in De interpretibus] egi, non simpliciter de interprete iuris). Compare with what Gentili wrote in the same Book I, 58–59: Ea scientia claudi libris Iustiniani non potuit: cum et novae indies emergant species, quibus novae aptandae sint leges …, a remark which may be linked to an obiter Gentili expresses in a different context, 708: Sic est autem potestas regia, ut, quod lex scripta videre nequit per dies, videat lex viva casus, qui sub generalitate scripti iuris possunt non concludi: et eosdem sua definiat aequitate. My argument is that Gentili’s concept of jurisprudence informed and inspired by civil law studies aims precisely at providing the ruler with the expertise required for advising and assisting the policies of public governance. 27 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 37. A little further, Gentili questions the status of theology as science or art, but sees it as a sapientia (41).

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and founded in the community of human beings (in generis humani societate). Divine law, in contrast, is essentially the law which applies in the relation between God and man. Among the theological authorities Gentili mentions to back up the distinction, he refers to both Philip Melanchton and Corneille Bertram. An obvious objection against Gentili’s claim of the Second Table’s precepts on behalf of the jurist is that as both tables are the expression of God’s will, they belong to divine law, as the Decalogue is included in the sacred texts. Gentili nonetheless persists in maintaining what he sees as a clear distinction between divine and human affairs28. Human law, he argues, is such, whoever enforced it, wherever it has been written down or recorded. Not the source of the law (whether its author or the instrument through which it is conveyed) is decisive, but its nature as it has been defined29. Somewhat implicit in Gentili’s argument seems to be his reliance on theology and jurisprudence as distinct established disciplines (as “sciences and arts”), which therefore need to be allocated to distinct areas. The argument appears to pave the way to some overlapping: not according to “subject” or “finality”, but because each other’s areas of interest may be expressed in various authorities. Thus, the theologians’ inquiries are not restricted to the sacred books30, and jurists may also recognize their areas of expertise in human law in other authorities than the law books31. Such overlapping of the sources both experts use, however, does not warrant any overlapping of the object of their respective studies: lawyers should stand by the law that governs relations between men, theologians to the norms that govern the relation between man and God.

4.

The imperfect congruence between God’s purpose and Roman law

Gentili was aware that the severance between the two tables entailed the risk, at least in theory, of severing the whole normativity of social life from the Christian religious norms. To some extent, he anticipated the objection by extolling the

28 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 41: … nam et multa loquitur Deus, quae non pertinent ad theologiam. 29 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 40–41. 30 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 66: Audimus theologos in ecclesia etiam tractantes secundam tabulam. 31 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 82: Atque haec ut ita sint, pertinent tamen et ad nos, quae etiam sunt primae tabulae, et ea sic nos tractavimus. Scilicet qua agitur de publici status disciplina, et de salute, et de quiete publici, privatique, sic illa statuit legislator; 88: Atque haec satis sunt, de quibus intelligas, quomodo potest ICtus tractare etiam primam tabulam. Sic tractat saepe de blasphemia, periurio, ceteris, pro re civitatis, et singulorum.

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virtues of the civil law. Allowing for the many cases where, apparently, the civil law seems to be more tolerant towards sinful behaviour than religious norms would allow, Gentili argues that the three fundamental rules of the civil law (live honestly, do not harm your neighbour, give to everyone his due)32 cover whatever may otherwise qualify as a sin. In several chapters, Gentili deals with various accusations levelled at the civil law on issues where it is said to allow or condone sinful actions (such as usury, acquisitive prescription, lawful killing, extra-marital relations and “other lewd conduct”). Gentili’s analysis of these topics tends to show that the accusations are ill-informed, unfounded, inaccurate, and that a closer analysis of the textual and doctrinal authorities of the civil law do not sanction sinful behaviour. The issue of the Second Table reappears in this context, as Gentili refers to a controversy with a theologian who had argued that civil lawyers were disqualified to deal with that table because the civil law permitted having a concubine and other indecent practices. In rebutting these allegations, Gentili makes two points. First, that the Second Table belongs to a greater degree (“more”) to the sphere of jurists than that of theologians (the word magis being enhanced by full capitals, perhaps in order to highlight that Gentili at that point did not mean to exclude theologians altogether from dealing with the Second Table’s precepts)33. The sacred texts, says Gentili in this argument, are a common source for theologians and jurists – though at this stage, he falls short of explaining to what extent is may allow the former to enter into the realm of the Second Table. The second point is that the theologian opposing Gentili wrongly asserted that civil lawyers will 32 This is expressed at the outset of his defence of the civil law: Iuris enim civilis praecepta sunt, Honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. In quibus praeceptis ratio vertitur omnis peccati. Et a quibus sane non discedit ius nostrum, dum post descendit ad omnes species definitionum; aut discederet nimis turpiter a fundamentis suis (Gentilis, De nuptiis, note 2, 6). Throughout De nuptiis, Gentili turns back to these principles, especially the precept of honestas and honeste vivere: see e. g. 47 (identifying the Second Table’s essential precept as the suum cuique tribuere; however, in another passage, Gentili asserts that Leges omnes secundae tabulae comprehendi verbo hoc, Diliges proximum (Gentili, De nuptiis, note 2, 60–61). 389, 565, 571f., 715. 33 Thus, the distinction remains relative, which Gentili in different passages expresses by using the word “more” in capitals: … et opinor etiamnum, pertinere [secundam] tabulam ad nos MAGIS, quam ad theologos (Gentilis, De nuptiis, note 2, 21); Et igitur quia hanc artem legum periti MAGIS tenent, propria scilicet, quam theologi: propterea periti legum sunt peritiores in secunda tabula. Nescio, si audeat quisquam negare, legum peritos magis tenere propriam illam legum artem. Et igitur magis nos pertinet secunda tabula: qui illic periti MAGIS (Gentilis, De nuptiis, note 2, 54). See also on 83 and 88–89: de secunda tabula visi sumus eam pertinere ecclesiasticos MINUS, at ad nos MAGIS. Idque ratione subiecti, finis, exquisitioris interpretationis, ceterorum, quae dicta sunt. Et itaque doctores nostri scribunt, quod si theologi quid tradunt de his, quae sunt extra articulos fidei, et spectant ad civilem, et moralem philosophiam, puta de matrimoniis, usuris, id genus aliis, curandi sint nihil. Aut in illis standum magis esse doctoribus iuris, quam theologis ….

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provide from the corpus iuris civilis doctrines on matters governed by the Second Table. Gentili counters that charge by explaining that, precisely because jurists will consider the Second Table, they will avoid drawing the wrong principles from the civil law. Moreover, on the issue of keeping a concubine and authorising indecent acts, he refers to his previous analysis showing that these are not allowed by the civil law. That does not mean that human law can reach the same perfection as God’s law34. The essential purpose of human law is to secure peace among men (pax humani generis)35. Human law may therefore refrain from prohibiting or repressing types of behaviour which God’s law will punish. Whereas human law is thus less perfect than God’s law, it cannot be contrary to it. Several discriminations which are unknown to God, appear nevertheless necessary in the polity (in relation to marriage law, Gentili refers to discriminatory regulations in secular law between men and women, freemen and serfs or freedwomen, legitimate and illegitimate children, natives and aliens, individuals of different political status or social class). Gentili here introduces a general consideration of public policy : although the general principle of honeste vivere implies that dishonest actions are prohibited, not all that is illicit will be treated as an offence by the law, because that would burden the state (res publica) with countless proceedings36. The theologian’s attacks on Justinian’s compilations prompted Gentili to develop counterarguments from different positions. On the one hand, Gentili argued on the basis of the evolving character of the civil (including ecclesiastical) law over the centuries, with its improvements, but also its corruptions37. On the other hand, he also developed a more ideological argument, stating that the most eminent Roman jurists, even though they were pagan, had been capable of recognising the (natural) principles which God has instilled in any human being, and that insight was expressed in the civil law they had developed in their reasoning. As a result, although these pagan jurists did not seek any direct inspiration in Christianity, their work expressed nonetheless a Christian spirit38.

34 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 21. On the other hand, the focus of the jurist on the Second Table will ensure that his jurisprudence will acquire a greater degree of perfection (55f.). 35 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 22. For a specific application (the pax domestica), 228. 36 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 24. 37 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 28, 37. 38 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 31: Dicam autem, et quidem audenter, ius Iustinianeum esse huiusmodi, ut non rectius, non honestius, non sanctius universa theologorum omnium schola rogare, atque sancire valuerit. Fuerunt maximi illi iurisconsulti (ut de his notem solis, quos iuris nostri licet nunc primos nominare auctores) ethnici quidem fere omnes: sed qui naturae vocem secuti, et legis eius, quam insculpsit Deus animis nostris, sua hic conscripserunt, ut nec unguiculum a recto tramite iustae omnis legislationis aberrarint. Sunt, qui contulerunt libris

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De nuptiis, Books 2–7: legal business as usual?

If, after reading the first book, the reader may have feared or hoped to find the same polemical tone in Gentili’s treatment of the law of marriage in the following books of De nuptiis, these books will not, for better or for worse, entirely meet his expectations. Gentili’s acerbic style and comments – a regular feature in several of his other works – is not absent, especially when he criticises an argument or opinion he disagrees with. However, his position towards theology and canon law is much more moderate than one would have anticipated after reading the first book of De nuptiis. Canon law, which in Book I Gentili had thrown on a bonfire in one of his characteristic expletive outbursts39, provides many arguments throughout the work, according to the conventional standards of civil law literature in general. Critical assessments40 often do not step beyond the sound genre of differentiae41, and the canonists’ literature is a main source of references42. In general, however, and in line with Gentili’s main purpose, canon law is subordinated to the civil law inspired standards of jurisprudence43. Gentili refers in De nuptiis to a wide range of theologians. Some theologians are referred to recurrently, others only exceptionally. Precise references refer to specific authors and works, but Gentili’s argument also often refers to theologians, or groups of theologians (e. g. the “Sorbonne theologians”44). Without surprise, protestant theologians receive more praise than Roman-Catholics, but in neither camp is a theologian’s opinion beyond praise or above criticism45.

39

40 41 42 43

44 45

integris Mosaicam, e t Iustinianicam sanctionem : et qui adfirmant vere, quod si Christianum nomen iurisconsultis illis non Christianis deferas, Christiana omnia in eis facile deprehendes. Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 112: At ego haec etiam recito: Flammis, flammis libros spurcissimos barbarorum, non solum impiissimos Antichristi. Flammis omnes, flammis, ut Lutherus magnus facere docuit bonos omnes, ipse in medio foro flammis delens eos omnes libros…. For an example of a more sustained criticism, see Ch. 7 of Book V,’ 516f.: Sed non inepta tantum est canonica computatio, iniqua etiam est. Quae concedit nuptias in gradu quincto…. For example, in Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 179f. on the possibility to marry through a proxy. Conversely, on the status of ‘common (or customary) law’ wives, Gentili notes that vix differant civilistae a canonistis (724). Even when critical of the canon law’s provisions, Gentili occasionally admits that the (positive) law of marriage is governed by canon law, e. g. Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 382; and occasionally, he suggests that he follows a particular canon law principle (e. g. 576). What may appear an eclectic use of authorities is therefore consistent with Gentili’s emphasis on analysing arguments on their own merits, irrespectively of the area or ‘school’ of scholarship they belong to: see e. g. De nuptiis, 474, where Henricus de Segusio’s (Hostiensis) opinion is preferred to that of Cujas. Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 519. The text is nevertheless clearly that of a committed protestant author, who regularly attacks the “papists” and “popery” as instruments or figures of the Antichrist (see e. g. Gentilis, De nuptiis, note 2, 228, 328, 440 – papistae hi iam peiores sunt diabolis -, 446, 779. See also 588, a jibe at the phanatica ecclesia Graeca.

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Among the Protestants, Th8odore BHze is a favourite authority (though occasionally censured), while among the catholic theologians, Cardinal Bellarmino figures most often as Gentili’s bÞte noire (being the target of the more insulting epithets, richly sprinkled with superlatives; yet, even his opinions may at times meet Gentili’s approval)46. Contemporary politically committed Roman-catholic theologians will not find much favour, as in the case of Gilbert G8n8brard47. On controversial issues such as the admissibility of divorce, the religious fault-lines also appear to divide the legal scholars’ opinions48. On other controversial issues, which may not be as sensitive to religious beliefs, such as the admissibility of marriage by old people, Gentili seems to muster a more commonly held opinion beyond the confessional divisions49. In any case, not all the issues discussed in De nuptiis refer with the same intensity to theological opinions. Book VII on evidence contains little input from theology. Book IV, Ch. 8, which looks into canon law and divine law on parental consent, in spite of the reference to the divine will, discusses only few theological opinions. Chapters where theological authorities play a much more significant part are those on the impediment of different religious beliefs50 or on fraudulent statements made when contracting a marriage51. Gentili’s discussion of the law of marriage in De nuptiis reflects a much more elaborate repertoire than he displayed in his early work52. Yet, De nuptiis is more than an exercise in dealing with the multi-normativity of civil law, canon law, divine and natural law. As the contentious First Book makes clear, the whole work is intended to display the specific expertise drawn from civil law in order to deal with matrimonial issues. The key-word throughout De nuptiis is that of ratio. 46 For a contrast between optimus Beza and pessimus Bellarminus, see e. g. 590. 47 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 67: Nam illa Genebrardi canis ridicula: theologos esse Pharisaeis pares, canonistas scribis. Et itaque theologos penitius cum Phariseis scrutari mysteria legis: canonistas cum scribis eandem legem secundum corticem interpretari … (with reference to Th. BHze). 48 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 686f.; see also, 533f. (on affinity as an impediment). 49 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 485f., where the argument partly depends on theological expertise in interpreting passages from the Old Testament. Scholarly expertise nevertheless does not appear to be a decisive factor in Gentili’s arguments. One exception seems to be the Flemish scholar Johannes van den Driesche (Drusius), with whom Gentili appears to have been on friendly terms at the time, regularly deferring to his expert opinion on Hebrew texts and history, in De nuptiis and in other works (here, see e. g. p. 645 s., 779). 50 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 219f. 51 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 279f. (including a characteristic criticism – uncharacteristically, directed at an argument from BHze – on the way a theologian has on this issue to borrow his rationes from the civil law: 283). 52 See for example the (much shorter) treatment on issues of matrimonial law in Albericus Gentilis, Lectionum & Epistolarum quae ad ius civile pertinent Liber I[-IV], Londini (Excudebat Iohannes Wolfius) 1583, Book III, Ch. 7-8 (De patris consensu, qui in nuptiis filiorum requiritur).

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The word may have different (partly non-exclusive) meanings, and the meaning of “ground”, “justification”, “reason (why)” certainly plays a prominent part53. However, rationes in such a sense necessarily also implies a reasoning, a reasoning brought to its conclusion, and these forms of reasoning present the distinctive feature of De nuptiis. Gentili’s purpose is to show that the civil lawyer’s ability to confront different lines of reasoning, drawing from (but at the same time transcending) his civil law expertise based on his understanding of Roman law texts, is the superior scholarly expertise to deal with the law of marriage as a mainly secular (in the sense of: human) institution. The civil lawyer’s aim is to assess different lines of reasoning leading to a specific answer to issues on marriage. The interpres iuris commands therefore a meta-juristic method which will enable him to work out not only the best answer, but also the better reasoning which supports that answer54. That is perhaps why De nuptiis (books 2–7) does not turn up as a systematic proto-positivistic treatise on marriage in the fashion of early-modern legal literature. It does not provide so much a survey of the positive law on marriage (with due account of its controversies and uncertainties), but reasoned arguments towards diverging answers proposed to various issues, whereby Gentili champions as a rule a particular civil law reasoning he favours. One might sum up his approach as a science of legal reasoning rather than a science of normative statements or positive rules: “Lex est ratio, non oratio”55. The exercise has its limits. Gentili, as it has already pointed out, avoids including (apart from a few obiter references) the municipal laws, at least explicitly. One may wonder, for example, to what extent his position on the requirement of paternal or parental consent to the marriage of a father’s or parents’ child may have been informed by wide-spread social and political concerns in England and elsewhere in Europe. Yet, the general policy considerations behind those concerns are included in the more abstract rationes he defends in favour of paternal consent, but they are mostly supported by civil law based arguments. The author’s point is to show that the civil lawyer’s reasoning is generally valid, and more sustainable, on such an issue, than that of the theologian or canonist. Gentili’s claim of the Second Table on behalf of the civil lawyers therefore fits in his strategy to give an unimpeachable authority to the civil lawyer’s expertise 53 Mihi reiecta in perpetuuum sint, quae rationem non habent (Gentilis, De nuptiis, note 2, 532). 54 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 566, with an emphasis on the relevance of the ratio of a law for the individual’s conscience: … et quod insipida est conscientia, quae rationis, et scientiae salem non habet. Nimis scrupulosa: quam sequi haud oporteat: quia deceat informare conscientiam ex iuribus, et se informare conscientiae legis: cum sint leges per ora principum divinitus promulgatae, et quod non debet quis sibi de eo facere conscientiam, quod non potest explicare secundum rationem veri, et perfecti, et constantis iudicii…. 55 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 342f.

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transcending Justinian’s laws. At the same time, he emphasises that the spirit of the great Roman jurists met the essential standards set out in the Second Table. In different words, those Roman jurists had already expressed the fundamental vocation of the interpres iuris when they coined the phrase identifying the jurist’s science as of fostering what is “good and fair”56. That, arguably, was in Gentili’s time all over Europe the “Great Game” among scholars within and beyond the established areas of scholarship: which science was, in the reallocation of political powers, to play a decisive role in the exercise of public governance?

56 Gentilis, De nuptiis (note 2) 57: … ita nostra philosophia Iustinianismus non est, sed ars boni, et aequi, cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet. Iustitiam namque colimus: et boni, et aequi notitiam profitemur … Corruptus ille est usus disciplinae nostrae: qui non istam artem aequi, et boni, sed legum Iustinianicarum notitiam solam profitetur …; 93 Sic tamen teneo cum doctissimo Molinaeo, neque civilistae, hoc est Iustinianico, competere ius supradictum, neque canonistae, sed iurisperito. Quem humanarum, et divinarum rerum scientem, ad iusti, et iniusti, aequi et boni interpretationem definio, et definivi.

Laurens Winkel

Nine remarks on the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita

1. In this short article dedicated to my friend and distinguished colleague Jan Hallebeek I would like to give a short overview of the history of the ideas on a well-known distinction in English and American criminal law: the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita.1 This topic seems to be appropriate for the occasion because medieval learned law and Thomas Aquinas play a considerable role in the rise and development of this doctrine, next to classical philosophy and classical Roman law, all fields of interest of the jubilee. 2. For the first time this distinction appears clearly in a judicial decision during the reign of Henry VII in England.2 In the literature there has been quite much attention to the actual meaning of this doctrine, but the history of the distinction has been more or less neglected. William Blackstone (1723–1780) has paid some attention to it,3 but later literature is rather scarce4 and not always uncritical about the sense of the distinction.5 Generally speaking mala in se are closely linked with morality, their forbidden content follows from nature, mala prohibita are instituted by incidental statutory provisions. 3. The roots of the dichotomy mala in se/mala prohibita are to be found in the philosophy of Classical Antiquity, where the notion of natural law is developed. 1 [Anonymous], The distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita in criminal law, Columbia Law Review 30 (1930) 74–86. 2 Y.B. Mich. 11 Hen.VII f. 35, pl. 35 (1496), see W. Holdsworth, History of the Common Law, vol. VI, London 1924, 218. 3 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I [originally published in 1765], republished by David Lemmings, Oxford 2016, 43–45. 4 J. Hall, Ignorantia legis, Revue internationale du droit p8nal 26 (1955) 293–352. 5 R.L. Gray, Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between Malum In Se and Malum Prohibitum, Washington University Law Review 1995, 1369–1398, at 1396 the author concludes “Modern law deals exclusively with statutory crime; unwritten, common law crimes are but a memory, antiquated relics relegated to sections in Criminal Law casebooks.”

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Especially Aristotle is important here. In the 5th book of the Nicomachean Ethics we read: EN V 7, 1134 b 18–24 : toO d³ pokitijoO dija_ou t¹ l³m vusij|m 1sti t¹ d³ molij|m, vusij¹m l³m t¹ pamtawoO tµm aqtµm 5wom d}malim, ja·oq t` dojei˜m C l^, molij¹m d³ d 1n !qw/r l³m oqd³m diav]qei ovtyr C %kkyr, ftamd³ h_mtai, diav]qei, oXom t¹ lm÷r kutqoOshai, C t¹ aWca h}eim !kk± lµ d}o pq|bata, 5ti fsa 1p· t_m jahû 6jasta molohetoOsim, oXom t¹ h}eim Bqas_dô, ja· t± xgvislat~dg. Political Justice is of two kinds, one natural, the other conventional. A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first instance may be settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once being settled is not indifferent: for example that the ransom for a prisoner shall be a mina, that a sacrifice shall consist of a goat and not of two sheep; and any regulations enacted for particular cases, for instance the sacrifice in honour of Brasidas and ordinances in the nature of special decrees. [translation H. Rackham, Loeb ed.]

This well-known text on the opposition of natural and positive law has many other important implications,6 it plays around with a few other opposite notions in the Greek legal sphere like m|lor/vusir7 and m|lor/xgvisla.8 Villey deduces from this text that there are two competing notions of natural law in Antiquity, the Aristotelian concept and the Stoic concept, the latter belonging exclusively to the sphere of morals, not to law. According to Villey it is the Aristotelian concept of natural law which is received in Roman law. 4. In Roman law the term ius naturale is well-defined9 and there is a lot of secondary literature on this notion. In this article we only would like to refer, however, to a text of Papinian which has interesting aspects from the point of view of natural law. In this text rules concerning incestum in Roman civil law and in other legal orders are discussed: D. 48,5,39 (38),2 (Papinianus 36 quaest.): Quare mulier tunc demum eam poenam quae mares sustinebit, cum incestum iure gentium prohibitum admiserit : nam si sola iuris nostri observatio interveniet, mulier ab incesti crimine erit excusata.

This text must be understood in the reality of the practice of marriage in the Eastern part of the Roman Empire within the family in degrees that were for6 R.A. Gauthier/J.Y. Jolif, L’Ethique / Nicomaque, vol. II 1, 2Louvain/Paris 1970, 391ff.; W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2Oxford 1980, 203–205. 7 Cfr. F. Heinimann, Nomos und Physis, Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts, Basel 1945, repr. Darmstadt 1978, 76 n. 49; 163 n. 1. 8 L. Lepri Sorge, Ai confini fra nomos e psephisma, Symposion 1974, Milano 1978, 307–326, on our text of Aristotle: 312f. 9 See my forthcoming article Remarks on the uniformity of natural law concepts in the history of legal philosophy, Fundamina (2018) 161–173.

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bidden in Rome.10 These problems became even more acute after the Constitutio Antoniniana of 212 in which nearly all free inhabitants of the Roman Empire acquired Roman citizenship. The Constitutio Antoniniana was promulgated almost simultaneously with Papinian’s death.11 This text of Papinian also teaches us the phenomenon which Hans Julius Wolff once called “die Konkurrenz von Rechtsordnungen”12 here between social practice in the East and rules on marriage in the Roman ius civile. 5. At the end of Antiquity St Augustine (354–430) summarizes in his works many topics of Ancient Philosophy. He discusses at various occasions the doctrine of Natural Law and its epistemological background culminating in the question how we know the content of Natural Law. This follows from St Augustine, De libero arbitrio I 6,15: Aug. Quid? illa lex quae summa ratio nominatur, cui semper obtemperandum est, et per quam mali miseram, boni beatam vitam merentur, per quam denique illa quam temporalem vocandam diximus, recte fertur, recteque mutatur, potestne cuipiam intellegenti non incommutabilis aeternaque videri? An potest aliquando iniustum esse ut mali miseri, boni autem beati sint; aut ut modestus et gravis populus ipse sibi magistratus creet, dissolutus vero et nequam ista licentia careat? Ev. Video hanc aeternam esse atque incommutabilem legem. Aug. - Simul etiam te videre arbitror in illa temporali nihil esse iustum atque legitimum, quod non ex hac aeterna sibi homines derivaverint: nam si populus ille quodam tempore iuste honores dedit, quodam rursus iuste non dedit; haec vicissitudo temporalis ut iusta esset, ex illa aeternitate tracta est, qua semper iustum est gravem populum honores dare, levem non dare: an tibi aliter videtur? Ev. Assentior. Aug. Ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo verbis explicem, ea est qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima: tu si aliter existimas, prome. Ev. Quid tibi vera dicenti contradicam non habeo. Aug. Cum ergo haec sit una lex, ex qua illae omnes temporales ad homines regendos 10 See insufficiently my Error Iuris nocet – Rechtsirrtum in der griechischen Philosophie und im römischen Recht bis Justinian, Zutphen 1985, 126f. and my more elaborated forthcoming article: Gnomon Id. § 39, § 46, § 47: Neue oder althergebrachte Beurteilung des (Rechts)Irrtums in den römischen Provinzen? in a volume to be edited by Th. Kruse on the Gnomon Idiologi in the series of the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften in Vienna. 11 W. Kunkel, Herkunft und soziale Stellung der römischen Juristen, 2Graz/Wien/Köln 1967, 224. 12 H.J. Wolff, Das Problem der Konkurrenz von Rechtsordnungen in der Antike, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1979, Abh. 5. On the problem of Private International Law in Antiquity see my article : Quelques remarques sur les trait8s d’assistance juridique et sur l’existence du droit international priv8 dans l’Antiquit8, in: M8langes Fritz Sturm, LiHge 1999, 431–440.

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variantur, num ideo ipsa variari ullo modo potest? Ev. Intellego omnino non posse: neque enim ulla vis, ullus casus, ulla rerum labes unquam effecerit ut iustum non sit omnia esse ordinatissima.

According to St Augustine the notion of eternal law is innated (impressa) in human beings. This doctrine of St Augustine was conserved in the Church and played therefore a role in the emerging medieval legal science.13 6. In the Accursian Glossa Ordinaria “regula est” on D. 22,6,9 pr. the content of D. 48,5,39 (38),2 has led to a more refined distinction between ignorantia iuris naturalis, ignorantia iuris quasi naturalis et ignorantia iuris civilis14, apparently independently from the philosophical and scholastic tradition. This follows from Accursius, Gl. regula est ad D. 22,6,9 pr.: Dic quod ignorantia alia facti alia iuris et facti, alia probabilis, alia non probabilis, item iuris alia iuris naturalis, alia quasi naturalis alia civilis.

Somewhat later in the 13th century we read in St Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae (written : 1270): Thomas, STh. I–II, q.100, a 3: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa duo praecepta sunt prima et communia praecepta legis naturae, quae sunt per se nota rationi humanae, vel per naturam vel per fidem. (Lottin II, 97)

A more concise description of ethical intellectualism could hardly be given. According to Lottin15 Thomas Aquinas took this opinion from his theologian predecessors in the XIIth and XIIIth century, especially from his master Albertus Magnus. This doctrine of ethical intellectualism itself stems from Aristotle.16 This implies that the knowledge of good and bad is not immediately implanted in human beings, but can be known by human intellect only.17 Thomas got ac13 R.A. Markus, Marius Victorinus and Augustine, in: A.H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek & Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1970, 327ff. and 362ff. All this has consequences for imputation in ethics and in law. This touches the problem of free will and determination and the problematic relation between human will and human ratio. In this light it is understandable that the notion of will as we have it since the Middle Ages goes back according to some scholars to St Augustine, see A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Berkeley 1982, passim. 14 L. Winkel, Remarques marginales sur la glose ordinaire Regula est (ad D. 22.6,9 pr.), in: B. d’Alteroche c.a. (8d.), M8langes en l’honneur d’Anne Lefebvre-Teillard, Paris 2009 [published 2010], 1047–1055. 15 O. Lottin, La loi naturelle depuis le d8but du XIIe siHcle jusqu’/ Saint Thomas d’Aquin, in: Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siHcles, II, Gembloux 1948, 71–100, esp. 97 where a summary is given. 16 W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory, 2Oxford 1980, 203–205; A. Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will, London 1979, 102ff. 17 J. Hallebeek, Quia natura nichil privatum, Diss. Nijmegen, 1986, 106. Since then this difficult epistemological problem has been discussed on a philosophical basis by R. Piz-

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quainted with the works of Aristotle trough Albertus Magnus who commented on the Latin translation of Aristotle’s Ethics made by Robert Grosseteste.18 7. Interestingly enough we find in the 16th century in the works of Francisco de Vitoria a text which accentuates the volitional element in parts of natural law. Context here is the war waged against the Indians in America who apparently prevented the Spanish from natural law based trade relations. Apparently this text is a compromise between the two extreme opinions later used in the 1550–1551 debate in Valladolid between Sepffllveda and De las Casas on the character of the war waged in America against the Indians, where De las Casas defended the human character of the Indians, but Sepffllveda pleaded that the war against the Indians was a just war, because the Indian population was not really human (homunculos illos) and were not open for the preaching of Christian (catholic) belief:19 Francesco de Vitoria, Relectio de Indis, III, 4: Et quidem multa hic videntur procedere ex iure gentium, quod, quia derivatur sufficienter ex iure naturali, manifestam vim habet ad dandum ius et obligandum. Et, dato quod non semper derivetur ex iure naturali, satis videtur esse consensus maioris partis totius orbis, maxime pro bono communi omnium. Si enim, post prima tempora creati orbis aut reparati post diluvium, maior pars hominum constituerit, ut legati ubique essent inviolabiles, ut mare esset commune, ut bello capti essent servi, et hoc ita expediret, ut hospites non exigerentur, certe hochaberet vim, etiam aliis repugnantibus. And, indeed, there are many things in this connection that issue from the law of nations, which, because it has a sufficient derivation from natural law, is clearly capable of conferring rights and creating obligations. And even if we grant that it is not always derived from natural law, yet there exists clearly enough a consensus of the greater part of the world, especially in behalf of the common good of all. For if after the early days of the creation of the world or its recovery from the flood the majority of mankind decided that ambassadors should everywhere be reckoned inviolable and that the sea should be common and that prisoners of war should be made slaves, and, if this, namely, zorni, La conoscenza della legge o diritto naturale “per connaturalitatem” o “per inclinationem”, Apollinaris 58 (1985), 47–67. Cfr. B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, reprint Oxford 1973, who interestingly enough deals with the perception of matter, general principles and universals, but does not go into the problem of the knowledge of norms. See also my short article: Das erneuerte Interesse für die erkenntnistheoretischen Aspekte der aristotelischen Ethik in Deutschland und England im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert in: A. Földi/I. Sándor/I. Siklósi (ed.), Ad geographiam historico-iuridicam ope iuris romani colendam – Studia in honorem G#bor Hamza, Budapest 2015, 405–408. 18 See G. Wieland, The reception and interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics, and D.E. Luscombe, Natural Morality and natural law, both in N. Kreztmann/A. Kenny/J. Pinborg (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1982, 657ff. resp. 705ff. 19 See on this debate A.E. Pérez Luño, La pol8mica sobre el Nuevo Mundo, Madrid 1992, 27ff. and 77ff.

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that strangers should not be driven out, were deemed to be a desirable principle, it would certainly have the force of law, even though the rest of mankind objected thereto. (Translation J.P. Pawley Bate, The Classics of International law)

8. The distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita has consequences for the publication and the addressee of the legal norm. For a legal norm based on mala in se the publication is not a prerequisite for its validity, the norm is internalised in everyman’s conscience.20 For the legal norms based on mala prohibita it is different. For them publication is essential. We could also compare this distinction with what the German legal philosopher Max Ernst Mayer called Rechtsnormen and Kulturnormen21 which is more or less the same. Mala in se are embedded in culture (and in morality), mala prohibita in a specific legal order. Curiously enough another important distinction in German legal philosophy, between Werthöhe and Wertstärke once introduced by Nicolai Hartmann plays a role here as well. Examples of norms with “Wertstärke” are basic traffic rules: not respecting them is lethal, e. g. when one does not to know that you have to drive at the right (or elsewhere on the left) side of the road. 9. So we see two lines in the history of acquiring knowledge of right and wrong: the Aristotelian, Augustinean and Thomistic line based on intuitive knowledge of right and wrong combined with ethical intellectualism at one hand and the more technical approach of Roman law at the other hand. Both lead to immediate knowledge of natural law and a duty to inform oneself about positive legal norms. How all this relates to the Jewish-Christian myth in the Old Testament about Adam and Eve who by eating from the “tree of knowledge of right and wrong” were driven out of Paradise, cannot be dealt with by the present author, but remains intriguing. May these few lines please Jan Hallebeek who is interested in law and theology alike.22

20 J. Hall, Ignorantia legis, Revue internationale du droit p8nal 26 (1955) 293–352. 21 M.E. Mayer, Rechtsnormen und Kulturnormen, Breslau 1903 (repr. Darmstadt 1965) esp. 19ff. 22 The topic of this short article has been discussed during the 72th session of the Soci8t8 d’Histoire des Droits de l’Antiquit8 in September 2018 in Cracow. The author thanks the discussants and especially Dr Ren8 Brouwer for his comments and help with finding relevant (electronic) information.

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10. [with T. Wallinga] Fons et origo iuris Versio Belgica; Een historische inleiding tot het vermogensrecht, Amsterdam 2009, XX + 455 pp. Idem, second, revised edition, Amsterdam 2013, XX + 455 pp. Idem, third edition, Amsterdam 2015, XX + 455 pp. 11. Canoniek recht in Ecclesiologische Context. Een inleiding tot het Kerkelijk Recht van de Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland [Publicatieserie Stichting Oud-Katholiek Seminarie, 49], Sliedrecht/Amersfoort 2011, X + 265 pp. 12. Lijf ende goedt. De juridische bescherming van de menselijke persoon en diens vermogen. Een schets van de westerse/continentale rechtsgeschiedenis, Amsterdam 2014, XX + 592 pp. Idem, second revised edition, Amsterdam 2016, XX + 464 pp. Idem, third edition, Amsterdam 2017, XX + 465 pp. 13. “ModHle de tous les autres”; de kerkvergadering van Handelingen 15 in de traditie van het jansenisme en oud-katholicisme (valedictory lecture Old Catholic Seminary) [Publicatieserie Stichting Oud-Katholiek Seminarie, 55], Sliedrecht/Amersfoort 2016, 42 pp.

Volumes edited 14. [with B. Wirix] Met het oog op morgen: Ecclesiologische beschouwingen aangeboden aan Jan Visser, Zoetermeer 1996, XXI + 241 pp. 15. [with M.F.G. Parmentier] Ignatius Walvis, Het Goudsche Aarts Priesterdom 1712 [Verzameling bijdragen van Oudheidkundige Kring ‘Die Goude’, 28], Delft 1999, 275 pp. 16. [with H.J. Schepen & S.J.G.N.M. Willard] Duizend jaar Utrechtse rechtspraak: Van Sint-Paulusabdij tot Hamburgerstraat, Deventer 2000, XII + 155 pp. 17. Gezag als gave; Gezag in de kerk in oecumenisch spanningsveld; Symposium op 13 december 2003 [Publicatieserie Stichting Oud-Katholiek Seminarie, 37], Sliedrecht 2004, 80 pp. 18. [with R. van den Bergh, G. van Niekerk, Ph. Thomas, M. Nöthling Slabbert, J.F. Gerkens & L. Winkel] Ex iusta causa traditum; Essays in honour of Eric H. Pool (Fundamina, editio specialis), Pretoria 2005, XVII + 441 pp. 19. A.J. van den Bergh, De drie Hoofdgeschillen van Het Zwarte Boek [Publicatieserie Stichting Oud-Katholiek Seminarie, 38], Amersfoort/Sliedrecht 2005, 72 pp. 20. [with A.J.B. Sirks] Nederland in Franse schaduw; Recht en bestuur in het Koninkrijk Holland (1806–1810), Hilversum 2006, 298 pp.

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21. [with J.H. Dondorp] Contracts in favour of a third-party beneficiary. A historical and comparative account, [Legal History Library, 1; Studies in the History of Private Law, 1], Leiden-Boston 2008, VII + 171 pp. 22. [with E.C. Coppens, D. Heirbaut, Th. van der Meer & C.H. van Rhee] Fabrica iuris, Opstellen over de ‘werkplaats van het recht’ aangeboden aan Sjoerd Faber [Rechtshistorische reeks van het Gerard Noodt Instituut, 51], Nijmegen 2009, XXXVI + 512 pp. 23. [with J.H. Dondorp] The Right to Specific Performance. The Historical Development [Ius Commune Europaeum, 82], Antwerp-Oxford-Portland 2010, XII + 189 pp. 24. [with J.H. Dondorp, T. Wallinga & L.C. Winkel] Ius Romanum – Ius Commune – Ius Hodiernum; Studies in honour of Eltjo J.H. Schrage on the occasion of his 65th birthday, Amsterdam-Aalen 2010, XXXV + 469 pp. 25. [with A.M.J.A. Berkvens & A.J.B. Sirks] Het Franse Nederland: de inlijving 1810–1813, De juridische en bestuurlijke gevolgen van de ‘R8union’ met Frankrijk, Hilversum 2012, 206 pp. also edited as Pro Memorie 13.2 (2011) 26. [with L. Berkvens, G. Martyn & P. NHve] Recto ordine procedit magister. Liber amicorum E.C. Coppens [Iuris Scripta Historica, XXVIII], Brussels 2012, 364 pp. 27. [with P.H.A.M. Abels & D.J. Schoon] Ignatius Walvis, Goudsche en andre daartoe dienende katolijke kerk-zaaken (1525–1712) [Historische vereniging die Goude, publicatienummer 36], Delft 2012, 661 pp. Second revised edition, Delft 2012, 661 pp. 28. [with M. Schermaier, R. Fiori, E. Metzger & J.P. Coriat] Inter cives necnon peregrinos. Essays in honour of Boudewijn Sirks, Göttingen 2014, 856 pp.

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102. The ignorant seller’s liability for latent defects. One regula or various sets of rules? in: J.W. Cairns & P.J. du Plessis (eds.), The creation of the ius commune. From casus to regula [Edinburgh Studies of Law, 7], Edinburgh 2010 (reprint 2012) 175–217 103. [with A.J.B. Sirks] Uit het archief van de Raad van Justitie te Colombo. Rechtsbedeling in Ceylon in de 18e eeuw, in: R. van den Bergh e.a. (eds.), Libellus ad Thomasium. Essays in Roman Law, Roman-Dutch Law and Legal History in Honour of Philip J Thomas [Fundamina, editio specialis], Pretoria 2010, 390–412 104. Artificial gold, sold as natural. Francisco de Vitoria on a latent defect in the merchandise, in: J.H. Dondorp e.a. (eds.), Ius Romanum – Ius Commune – Ius Hodiernum; Studies in honour of Eltjo J.H. Schrage on the occasion of his 65th birthday, Amsterdam-Aalen 2010, 161–176 105. Direct enforcement of obligations to do. Two local manifestations of the ius commune, in: M. Gubbels & C.J.H. Jansen (eds.), Regio. Rechtshistorische opstellen aangeboden aan dr. P.P.J.L. van Peteghem, Nijmegen 2010, 33–44; French summary of the same, RIDA 57 (2010) 582 106. The Old-Catholic Synods. Traditional or innovative elements within the constitution of the Church? Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 101 (2011) 65–100 107. Dispositions ad pias causas in Gratian’s Decretum. Should the portio Christi be restricted to the child’s share? in: R. Zimmermann (ed.), Der Einfluss religiöser Vorstellungen auf die Entwicklung des Erbrechts, Tübingen 2012, 79–102 108. De iustum pretium-leer en het evenredigheidsbeginsel, Ars Aequi 62 (2013) 59–64; reprinted in: L. van den Berge e.a. (eds.), Historische wortels van het recht, Nijmegen 2014, 3–11; French summary of the same, RIDA 70 (2013) 395 109. Recovering gambling debts in classical Canon law, in: L. Berkvens e.a. (eds.), Recto ordine procedit magister. Liber amicorum E.C. Coppens, Brussels 2012, 143–159 110. On the origin of the constitution Alearum lusus (C. 3,43,1) and its insertion into the Codex Justinianus, TR 81 (2013) 129–143; French summary of the same, RIDA 59 (2012) 441 111. Cumplimiento forzoso de las obligaciones de hacer. Dos ejemplos de la tradicijn roman&stica, Glossae: European Journal of Legal History 10 (2013) 216–225 112. Buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid aan de vooravond van de moderne samenleving, in: B. Debaenst & B. Delbecke (eds.), Vangnet of springplank? Het buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheidsrecht in een moderne samenleving (1804–heden), Brugge 2014, 15–25

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113. Godsdienst(on)vrijheid in de Gouden Eeuw? Het proces tegen Johan Wachtelaer (1583–1652), Trajecta, Religie, cultuur en samenleving in de Nederlanden 23 (2014) 123–144 114. Een nieuw compendium van het canoniek recht, Nederlands Tijdschrift Kerk & Recht 8 (2014) 64–69 (internet) 115. [with M. van Stiphout] De verhouding tussen canoniek recht en wereldlijk recht in Europees perspectief: een historische verkenning, in: L.C. van Drimmelen & T.J. van der Ploeg (eds.), Geloofsgemeenschappen en recht, Utrecht 2014, 197–218 116. De rechtvaardiging van verlies van recht door verjaring. Overwegingen uit de vroegmoderne scholastiek, in: Rechtszekerheid in het ondernemingsen vermogensrecht. Enkele concrete dilemma’s van rechtszekerheid versus billijkheid nader bezien, Deventer 2014, 90–105 117. Madrigal, Alonso (oder Alfonso) Fern#ndez de, in: Lexikon zur Geschichte von Magie und Hexenverfolgung (internet, 2014) 118. Some remarks on laesio enormis and proportionality in Roman-Dutch law and Calvinistic commercial ethics, Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History 21 (2015) 14–32 119. Los remedios de ‘amende honorable’ y ‘amende profitable’. ¡Seguramente recibidos en nuestras costumbres!, – ¿pero de djnde?, Glossae: European Journal of Legal History 13 (2016) 329–341 120. Verbondenheid van Kerk en Staat in het vroegmoderne regalisme. Over het ius placiti en de recursus ad principem, NTKR, Tijdschrift voor Recht en Religie 2017/1, 21–36 121. Wat herbronning ons kan leren over de receptie van het Conciliarisme, in: P.B. Smit (ed.), Herbronning. 40 jaar bijzondere leerstoel ‘oude katholieke kerkstructuren’. Bijdragen van het symposium ‘Herbronning’ van 9 december 2016 [Publicatieserie Stichting Oud-Katholiek Seminarie, 58], Amersfoort/Sliedrecht 2017, 23–36 122. [with A. Zwart-Hink], Claiming apologies. A revival of amende honorable?, Comparative Legal History 5–2 (2017) 194–242 123. La formacijn de la idea de ‘enriquecimiento injustificado’ como concepto jur&dico en la Escuela de Salamanca, in: X. Basozabal Arrue, P. del Olmo Garc&a, A. Ju#rez Torrejjn (eds.), Enriquecimiento injustificado en la encrucijada: Historia, derecho comparado y propuestas de modernizacijn, Cizur Menor 2017, 37–47 124. Recht en organisatiestructuur, in: P.B. Smit (ed.), De Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland. Een inleiding, Utrecht 2018, 133–157 125. Structure of Medieval Roman Law: Institutions, Sources, and Methods, in: H. Pihlajamäki, M. Dubber & M. Godfrey (eds.), Oxford Handbook of European Legal History, Oxford 2018, 286–308

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126. The Last Will of Hector Tambie (Colombo 1772–1773), in: V. Vitharana & P. Fonseka (eds.), Prof. K.D. Paranavitana Felicitation Volume, Colombo 2018, 105–114 (forthcoming) 127. Synodality and Authority. Canon law doctrines and practices in the tradition of Old Catholicism, in: P. Avis, A. Berlis & N. Knoepffler (eds.), Incarnating Authority. A Critical Account of Authority in the Church, Munich 2018, p. 42–53 (forthcoming) 128. Fides integra, sana, non vaccilans. Mancio de Corpus Christi († 1576) on the (in)compatibility of doubt and good faith, Glossae: European Journal of Legal History 15 (2018) (forthcoming) 129. The Gloss to the “Seventeen Statutes” (Saunteen Kesta) of the Freeska Landriucht, TR 86 (2018) (forthcoming) 130. Early Modern Scholasticism on acquisitive and extinctive prescription, in: E.J.H. Schrage e.a. (eds), Praescriptionibus iura tolluntur [Comparative studies in continental and Anglo-American legal history], Berlin 2019 (forthcoming) 131. Appel comme d’abus dans l’oeuvre de Zeger-Bernard van Espen. Principes, contexte, d8veloppements, in: A. Bonzon & C. Galland (eds.), Appel comme d’abus (forthcoming)

Book reviews 132. K. Jacobs, Die Regula Benedicti als Rechtsbuch: Eine rechtshistorische und rechtstheologische Untersuchung, TR 57 (1989) 175–176 133. R. Stolmar, Die Genesis der actio utilis aus der celsinischen Durchgangstheorie, TR 58 (1990) 457–458 134. S. Weyand, Der Durchgangserwerb in der juristischen Sekunde: Systemdenken oder Problemdenken im klassischen römischen Recht, TR 59 (1991) 378–379 135. J. Maifeld, Die aequitas bei L. Neratius Priscus, TR 60 (1992) 475–476 136. M. Rennpferdt, Lex Anastasiana: Schuldnerschutz im Wandel der Zeiten, TR 60 (1992) 484–485 137. R. Stolmar, Die formula der actio utilis, TR 61 (1993) 532–535 138. H. Warnink (ed), Ius propter homines: Kerkelijk recht op mensenmaat, Nederlands Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis 74–1 (1994) 124–127 139. H. Kalb, Laesio enormis im gelehrten Recht: Kanonistische Studien zur Läsionsanfechtung, TR 62 (1994) 395–398 140. O.M.D.F. Vervaart, Studies over Nicolaas Everaerts (1462–1532) en zijn Topica, Millennium: Tijdschrift voor Middeleeuwse studies 9 (1995) 164–168

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141. [with T. Wallinga] A. Mart&nez Sarrijn, Monjos i clergues a la recerca del notariat: Estudi dels documents llatins de l’abadia de Sankt Gallen (segles VIII–XII), Volum I, ZRG RA, 113 (1996) 706–707 142. H. Walter, Actio iniuriarum: Der Schutz der Persönlichkeit im südafrikanischen Privatrecht, ZRG RA, 115 (1998) 745–748 143. J.M. Gay Escoda, El corregidor a Catalunya, ZRG RA, 116 (1999) 545–546 144. J.D. Harke, Argumenta Iuventiana: Entscheidungsbegründungen eines hochklassischen Juristen, TR 69 (2001) 145–147 145. P.L. Landolt, “Naturalis obligatio” and bare social duty, TR 70 (2002) 154–158 146. A. Masferrer Domingo, La pena de infamia en el derecho histjrico espaÇol, TR 70 (2002) 356–360 147. J.H.A. Lokin, Prota/J.E. Spruit, Cunabula iuris, Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 163 (2002) 223–226 148. B. Wauters, De controverse rond de jurisdictie van de nuntius, Pro Memorie; Bijdragen tot de rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden 5 (2003), 200–202 149. C.H.F. Meyer, Die Distinktionstechnik in der Kanonistik des 12. Jahrhunderts, Anuario de Historia del Derecho EspaÇol 73 (2003), 762–764 150. R. Feenstra, Bibliografie van hoogleraren in de rechten aan de Franeker Universiteit tot 1811, Pro Memorie; Bijdragen tot de rechtsgeschiedenis der Nederlanden 7 (2005) 185–186 151. D. Müller, “Ketzerinnen” – Frauen gehen ihren eigenen Weg, Millennium: Tijdschrift voor Middeleeuwse studies 19 (2005), 203–205 152. G.P. van Nifterik, Vorst tussen volk en wet, Revista de Estudios HistjricoJur&dicos (Valpara&so) 28 (2006) 769–772 153. A.J.B. Sirks (ed), Van Bijnkershoeks Observationes 2018–2913 (deel III) in het Nederlands samengevat … and Index in Observationes tumultuarias Cornelii van Bijnkershoek et Wilhelmi Pauw, TR 74 (2006) 398–399 154. O. Descamps, Les origines de la responsabilit8 pour faute personelle dans le Code Civil de 1804, TR 75 (2007) 64–66 155. S. Sudmann, Das Basler Konzil; Synodale Praxis zwischen Routine und Revolution, TR 75 (2007) 61–64 156. S. Sudmann, Das Basler Konzil; Synodale Praxis zwischen Routine und Revolution, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 97 (2007) 223–224 157. H.H. Jakobs, Magna Glossa. Textstufen der legistischen glossa ordinaria, TR 75 (2007) 409–411 158. B. Wauters, Recht als religie. Canonieke onderbouw van de vroegmoderne staatsvorming in de Zuidelijke Nederlanden, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 98 (2008) 158–161 159. Biedt het huidige constitutionele bestel van Zuid-Afrika ruimte voor de rechtsfiguur van punitive damages. Andr8 Mukheibir, The wages of delict –

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160.

161. 162. 163. 164. 165.

166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176.

177. 178.

179.

531

Compensation, satisfaction, punishment?, Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis 169 (2008) 187–188 V. Ochsenfahrt, Die staatskirchenrechtliche Stellung des Katholischen Bistums der Alt–Katholiken in Deutschland, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 98 (2008) 324–326 K. Wloemer, Geschichte der Christkatholischen Kirchenmusik der Schweiz, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 98 (2008) 326–328 R. Timmer, Profeet in eigen land, Philips van Leiden en het publiek belang, TR 77 (2009) 554–555 B. van Hofstraeten, Juridisch humanisme en costumiere acculturatie, TR 78 (2010) 241–242 T. Bremkamp, Causa. Der Zweck als Grundpfeiler des Privatrechts, TR 78 (2010) 257–259 J. de Churruca, Cristianismo y mundo romano. Nuevos estudios. Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Rom. Abt.), 128 (2011) 738–739 Iglesia Ferreirjs, CataluÇa Medieval I–II, TR 79 (2011) 563–564 J. Giltaij, Mensenrechten in het Romeinse recht?, TR 80 (2012) 510–512 K.W. Nörr, Romanisch-konisches Prozessrecht. Erkenntnisverfahren erster Instanz in civilibus, TR 81 (2013) 303–304 R. Somerville, Pope Urban II’s Council of Piacenza, TR 81 (2013) 313–314 W. Decock, Theologians and contract law. The moral transformation of the ius commune (ca. 1500–1650), TR 81 (2013) 660–662 Iglesia Ferreirjs, Liber Usaticorum Barchinone Vol. I, TR 81 (2013) 665. M. Ascheri, The laws of late medieval Italy (1000–1500), TR 82 (2014) 182–183 J. Gordley, The jurists. A critical history, TR 82 (2014) 332–333 L. Koffeman, In order to serve, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 105 (2015) 86–88 J. Marko & W. Schleifer (eds), Staat und Religion, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 105 (2015) 255–256 E. Peijnenburg, Het kapittel van Haarlem (1561–1953) – de eerste geschiedenis van het Haarlemse kapittel, Nederlands Tijdschrift Kerk & Recht 9 (2015) 89–91 G. Drossbach, Die collectio Cheltenhamensis, TR 84 (2016) 343 S.P. Donlan & D. Heirbaut (eds), The laws’ many bodies: Studies in legal hybridity and jurisdictional complexity c1600–1900, Comparative Legal History 5–1 (2017) 177 L. Kunz, Postmortale Privatautonomie und Willensvollstreckung, TR 85 (2017) 632–633

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180. S. Demel, Das Recht fließe wie Wasser, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 108 (2018) 70–72 181. Ph. Tull (ed), 60 Porträts aus dem Kirchenrecht. Leben und Werk bedeutender Kanonisten, Internationale Kirchliche Zeitschrift 108 (2018) (forthcoming) 182. L. Beck Varela, Literatura jur&dica y censura. Fortuna de Vinnius en EspaÇa, TR 87 (2019) (forthcoming) 183. J.M. Milo & E.G.D. van Dongen, Procesgids Hof van Utrecht, TR 87 (2019) (forthcoming)

Liturgical Music 184. [review of:] Uit het stof van de aarde: 13 beurtzangen naar oude wijzen, De Oud-Katholiek 95 (1979) 56 185. Gregoriaans en liturgievernieuwing, De Oud-Katholiek 96 (1980) 23–25, 32–33 186. [with others] Gregoriaanse Gezangen voor de Eucharistie en de Vespers, [s.l.] 1982, 61 pp., idem, second improved edition, [s.l.] 1983 187. Over noten en neumen, De Oud-Katholiek 99 (1983) 92–93, 107 188. Gezangen voor liturgie: Enige kanttekeningen bij het nieuwe roomskatholieke liedboek, De Oud-Katholiek 101 (1985) 14–15 189. Oud-katholieke liturgie en kerkmuziek, Eredienstvaardig 6 (1990) 133–135 190. Zingen tussen schepping en wederkomst, De Oud-Katholiek 106 (1990) 75–77 191. [with others, edition of:] Gezangboek van de Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland, Hilversum 1990, 1499 pp., containing translations of hymns, adaptations of choral Masses and musical settings of liturgical chants and hymn tunes (see 1493); second enlarged edition, Baarn 2007 (see 1520) 192. [with others, edition of:] Kerkboek van de Oud-Katholieke Kerk van Nederland, Baarn 1993, 1115 pp., containing musical settings of responses (see 1111) 193. [with G. Beemster] ‘1.3 Uitvoeringspraktijk aan de hand van voorbeelden’ and ‘1.4 Overzicht repertoire van Gotiek en Renaissance’, in: M. Breij (ed), Vocale Kerkmuziek: Koormuziek in historisch en liturgisch kader, UtrechtAnsen 1997, 13–26 194. [collaboration in the edition of:] Dienstboek, een proeve. Schrift – Maaltijd – Gebed, Zoetermeer 1998, 1288 pp. (see 1276) 195. [review of:] K. Ouwens, Het boek der psalmen, De Oud-Katholiek 116 (2000) 149

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196. [with K. Ouwens] n. 86 “Gij die de wereld hebt gered” (Jesu salvator saeculi) and n. 87 “Heer Jezus, die de waarheid kroont” (Jesu, corona celsior), in: Zingend geloven; Bijdragen tot de ontwikkeling van het nieuwe kerklied 8, Zoetermeer 2004, 126–129; Idem, harmony edition, 124–125 197. [melody of:] ‘Daal op ons neer’, Lied en liturgie; Driemaandelijks tijdschrift voor liturgische muziek 3 (2005) 19 198. [translations of hymns, with K. Ouwens, in] K. Ouwens, Liederen in opdracht. Een selectie van vertalingen en bewerkingen, Krommenie 2008, 35–37, 41–42, 49–50

Supervision of doctoral theses 1. D.J. Schoon, Van bisschoppelijke Cleresie tot Oud-Katholieke Kerk. Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van het katholicisme in Nederland in de 19de eeuw (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1 June 2004) 2. M. Ploeger, Celebrating Church. Ecumenical Contributions to a Liturgical Ecclesiology (Utrecht University, 16 June 2008) 3. M.L. Hewett, Ulric Huber (1636–1694) De ratione juris docendi & discendi diatribe per modum dialogi nonnullis aucta paqakipoleuoir with a translation and commentary (University of Amsterdam, 19 May 2010) 4. J. Oosterhuis, Specific performance in German, French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century. Remedies in an Age of Fundamental Rights and Industrialisation (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 6 April 2011) 5. E.G.D. van Dongen, Contributory negligence. A Historical and Comparative Study (Maastricht University, 18 June 2013) 6. C.J. de Bruijn, Latent defect or excessive price? Exploring early modern legal approach to remedying defects in goods exchanged for money (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 26 October 2018)

Index of sources

I. Antiquity and Early Middle Ages

1. Compilations/collections of law Basilica (Basiliken) B. 2,3,55 40730 B. 14,1,22,7 80 B. 14,1,27,1 78, 80, 8533 B. 23,1,19 pr. 8532 B. 24,1,3,2 80 B. 24,1,5 pr. 8534 B. 24,1,16 8014, 8534 B. 25,2,15,1 33025 B. 25,4,11,3 332 B. 25,8,8,12 33025 B. 28,1,41 33025 B. 48,6,3 8840 Basilicorum Scholia (ed. Scheltema) BS 187/2–192/2 8839 BS 188/3–5 8839 BS *708/1–20 8843 BS 754/2–10 86 BS 754/11–18 8533 BS *755/23–26 79, 8016 BS *755/27–28 79 BS *755/29–756/8 8534 BS *756/14–16 85 BS *756/21–24 87 BS 1543/6–18 8532 BS 1543/22–24 8532 BS 1720/17–23 80 BS 1722/5–6 8534 BS 1726/28–1727/7 8014 BS 1727/8–20 8534 BS 2758/18–19 8738

BS 2758/24–25 BS 2916/22–23

8738 8738, 8840

Codex Theodosianus 1,4,3 19166 2,25,1 3269 4,8,9 3269 5,13,1 3269 14,9,2 1794, 18113, 182, 18746, 18851 14,9.31 1792 16,2 461 16,5 46215 16,10 458, 461–469 16,10,1 463 16,10,2 464 16,10,3 464 16,10,4 464 16,10,5 465 16,10,6 465 16,10,7 465 16,10,8 465 16,10,9 466 16,10,10 466 16,10,11 466 16,10,12 466 16,10,13 467 16,10,14 467 16,10,15 467 16,10,16 467 16,10,17 467 16,10,18 467 16,10,19 468 16,10,20 468 16,10,21 468

536 16,10,22–24 468 16,10,25 468 16,11,1 46732 16,12 46215 Consultatio veteris cuiusdam iurisconsulti 6,10 328 Corpus Iuris Civilis (Justinian) Constitutio Imperatoriam pr. 263148 Constitutio Tanta pr. 263148 Codex 1,1–13 469 1,1,1 28212, 284 1,14,1 283 2,9,29,4 465 3,19,2 32610 3,44,6 32610 4,5,1 pr. 199 4,17,1 110, 112, 116, 118 4,25,5 477, 479 4,26,7,3 474–478 4,44,2 563 4,51,1 8224, 473–474 4,57,2 8224 4,57,3 8224 4,58 562 4,59 562 5,73,4 32610 6,1,1 326, 327, 330 6,23,29 297 6,30,22,5 31775 7,29,4 32611, 33024 7,31,1 32611, 33024 7,33,3 326 7,33,5 326 7,34,2 33024 7,34,5 32611, 33024 7,35,3 32610 7,39,8 32610 7,71,4,1 32610

Index of sources

7,73,4 324, 3253, 326–328 8,9,1 33235 8,15(16),2 329 8,15(16),6 327 8,27(28),5 329 18,5 562 Institutiones 1,1,3 40411 1,2,11 419 1,8,2 415 2,1,2 25395 2,1,6 25395 3,26,9 774 3,27 1645 3,28,6 199 4,1,19 (21) 115 4,3,7 97 4,6,7 333 4,12,1 118 Digesta 1,1,1,2 257 1,1,1,3 257, 24630 1,1,4 24629, 257f., 261 1,1,5 242, 24528, 257, 261 1,1,6 262 1,1,9 418 1,1,10,1 40411 1,2,2,9 419 1,6,2 465 1,8,2 24632, 261 1,8,2 pr. 258 2,15,8,22 20034 3,2,20 95 3,5,5,5 105 3,5,48(49) 474 3,6,5 pr. 110f., 118 4,1,1 41254 4,2,16,2 105, 110 4,2,17 116 4,2,17 pr. 118 4,2,18 116 4,3,1 41254 4,3,1,2 41254 4,3,17 110

537

Index of sources

4,3,26 105, 110 5,3,20,6c 105 6,1,38 40514, 19, 40729, 416 7,2 327 7,4,17 32712 9,2,5 pr. 31562 9,2,5,1 31562 9,2,23,8 105, 110 9,2,31 31562 10,2,29 33233 10,4,33 33233 11,7,6,1 7913 12,1,19 pr. 8532 12,1,23 474 12,1,32 200, 480 12,4 78 12,4,3 88 12,4,3 pr. 80 12,4,3,2 8635, 89f. 12,4,3,3 8635, 88 12,4,5 pr. 8534, 8635 12,4,5,1 85f. 12,4,5,2 8635, 88 12,4,12 8635 12,4,16 8014, 8534 12,5,7 131 12,6,14 20032, 40519 12,6,44 129 13,1,7,2 111 13,1,9 115, 116 13,1,20 116 13,7,41 33025 14,4,3,1 10924 15,4,1,2 775 16,1,13,1 33233f. , 33337 17,1 82–84 17,1,1 301 17,1,8 pr. 82f., 89 17,1,10,7 9513 17,1,12 88 17,1,12,12 95 17,1,12,16 77, 88 17,1,12,17 79 17,1,22,7 80 17,1,22,11 772 17,1,25 773

17,1,26 pr. 771 17,1,27,1 77–89 17,1,27,3 771 17,1,30 7911, 81, 83, 86 17,1,55 82–84, 89 18,1,62,1 7913 18,4,6 7913 19,1 562 19,1,13 pr. 57 19,1,42 41574 19,2,9,5 97 20,1,15 pr. 330 20,1,15,1 323, 33025 20,4,11,3 330, 33127, 332 20,6,8,12 32817, 33025, 33236 21,1 562 21,1,1,2 56 21,1,2 575 22,3,13 46631 22,3,25 pr. 419 22,3,29 pr.–1 46631 22,3,29,1 46631 22,6,9 pr. 516 23,3,6,2 20033 24,1,49 8224 27,3,15 84 29,1,17,3 41047 29,4,1 pr. 411, 41365 29,4,1,5 41152, 41367, 41471 29,4,6 pr. 41367 29,4,6,1 41152, 41367 29,4,6,3 41152, 41468 29,4,13 40832 29,4,14 408 29,4,15 40832 29,4,16 408 29,4,17 40832 29,4,18 408 29,4,19 40832 29,4,25 41367 29,4,26 pr. 41367 34,5,24 298 37,4,3,5 40729 39,2,24,12 40729, 41575, 77 39,3,1,12 40625 39,4,4 pr. 110

538 39,5,18,1 87 39,6,30 8635 40,7,1,1 40729 40,8,1 8118, 8224 40,8,3 8738, 88 41,1,1 258122 41,1,3 258121 41,1,7,7 362 42,5,10 116 43,8,3 24633 43,29,3,2 40946, 41469, 41574, 78, 41579 44,4,4,30 33233 44,4,5,6 40729 44,7,5,1 1945 47,9,4,2 110 47,10,13,1 41574, 41578 47,10,13,7 24633 47,10,33 41574 48,5,39(38),2 514, 516 50,7,55 416 50,10,3 pr. 40518 50,12,2,1 236 50,14 329 50,17,20 31772 50,17,38 105, 110f., 116f. 50,17,206 40519 50,17,47 pr. 95 50,17,55 404f., 407, 409f., 413, 41469, 415 50,17,111,1 117 50,17,129 pr. 41577 50,17,132 97 50,17,144 40514 50,17,151 40624, 41469, 41574,77f., 80 50,17,155,1 40729, 41574, 78f. 50,17,167,1 40727 50,17,173,3 41469 50,17,174 9726 Novellae 123 457 123,21 460 Edictum (Diocletiani) de pretiis rerum venalium (ed. Lauffer) 7,39–40 187

Index of sources

Gaii institutiones 1,1 358 1,53 40726, 29, 415, 465 2,2 466 2,40–41 326 3,159 774 4,47 83f. Leges Barbarorum Lex Baiuvariorum B. 5, T. 2, 16.9 6020 Lex Romana Visigothorum 3.1.1 6020 3.4.1 6020 Novellae Valentiniani 35 4608 Theophilus, Paraphrasis institutionum 4,6,7 333 2. Non-legal writings Ambrosius de officiis ministrorum 1,28 24737 1,132 254100 exposition psalmi CXVIII 8,22 24737, 254103 Aristoteles (zit. nach ed. Bekker) ethica Nicomachea 1134 b 18–24 514 politica 1258b 44413 1267ff 2426 1292a 3609 rhetorica 1,10,8 362 Augustinus Hipponensis epistulae 153, cap. 6,20 255107

539

Index of sources

153, cap. 6,25 255109 153, cap. 6,26 255109 in evangelium Ioannis tractatus 6,25 256111 de libero arbitrio I 6,15 515 sermones de novo testamento 52,9 257115 Cicero, M. Tullius de finibus bonorum et malorum 3,67 24417 3,69 24418 de legibus 1,18 37033 1,19 37033 1,42 37031, 34 2,8 37031, 34 2,11 37031, 34 2,14 37031, 34 de officiis 1,6 36921 1,21 24416, 21, 254101, 261140 1,34–41 37135 1,50–52 24416 1,51 24635, 25498 1,52 24422f. , 24636 2,73 24421 2,78 24421 3,23 23461 3,35 362

72

24634

librorum de re publica quae exstant 3,33 37031, 37034 pro M. Tullio orationes quae exstant 7 41260 31 41260 Clemens Alexandrinus paidagogjs 2,12 25177 protreptikks eis toFs H8llenas 12 25178 quis dives salvetur cap. 14f. 24961 Cyprianus, Thascius Caecilius ad donatum 12 25180 de opere et eleemosynis 59,10 25179 Eusebius Caesariensis de vita Constantini I, 24 15412 IV,36 18538 Flavius Josephus bellum iudaicum 1,119–161 24849 2,122 24851

de oratore (ad M Brutum) 119 3651

Gregorius Magnus regulae pastoralis 3,21 257116

partitiones oratoriae 22.76 41258 39.137 41258

Gregorius Nazianzenus oratio 14, 25–26 25390

pro Sex. Roscio Amerino oratio 71 24634

Hesiod 274ff. 24526

540 77–105 2439 Johannes Chrysostomos hom. XII in 1 Tim., cap. 4 25392 Isidorus Hispalensis etymologiae sive origines 5,2 258119, 123 5,4,1 257118, 258124 5,6 258 sententiae 3,47,1 258127 Lactantius institutiones divinae 3,21–22 25282 5,5 25285, 25286 5,6 25287 5,15 25288 epitome divinarum institutionum 33,2 25283 Lucian of Samosata peregrinus 10 25067 Origenes Adamantius contra Celsum 7,23 24963 Ovidius Naso metamorphoseon libri 1,89–112 24311 4,349–352 24634 Philo Alexandrinus apologia pro Iudaeis/Hypothetica 11,1ff. 24850 11,5 24850 quod omnis probus liber sit 72–91 24849 75ff. 24850 76f. 24850

Index of sources

Platon leges 678e–680a 24414 713a-e 24413 politicus 269a ff 24413 271a–272d 24413 res publica 415d–417b 24415 421c–422d 24524 421e–422a 24415 457c ff 24415 461e ff 24525 Quintilianus, M. Fabius institutio oratoria 6,4 24634 declamationes maiores 13,10 40519 Rhetorica ad Herennium 3,2,3 41257 Seneca, L. Annaeus de beneficiis 4,28,2 24636 4,28,3 24634, 36 4,28,4 24636 4,29 24423 4,29,1 24636 7.10,3–4 44516 epistulae morales ad Lucilium 66,12 360 79,6 24420 80,12 24420 90,37 24312 90,38 254104 90,38–39 24419 Oracula Sibyllina Sib. 2,318–324 24956

541

Index of sources

Tertullianus, Q. Septimius Florens apologeticum 17,6 260134 39,7 25068 39,8 25069 39,11–13 25072 de corona militis 11 46220 Testamentum vetus Amos 6,1–7 24741 Daniel 3,29 1526 deuteronomium 5,23–27 1539 14,28–29 247 15,1–6 247 15,7–11 247 15,12–18 247 23,20 44411 23,20 (19) 44411 23,20–21 247 23,25–26 247 24,20–22 247 exodus 4,10–17 1539 20,18–21 1539 22,24 (25) 44411 Ezechiel 18,17 44411 genesis 1, 26 487 13,9 490 Habakuk 2,6–10 24741 Isaia 1,8–10

24845

10,1–3 24845 11,6–9 24742 66,21–23 24744 66,25 24743 Leviticus 25,36 44411 25,37 44411 Micha 2,1–11

24741

Numeri 12 1539 proverbia 10,15 24739 proverb. 17,6/2 256110 psalmi 15,5 44411 49,14–21 24740 regibus II 18,23 1526 Testamentum novum actus Apostolorum 2,44 24852 4,32 24852, 260137 5,1–11 24853 epistula ad Romanos 2,15 25397 13,7 124 epistula ad Corinthos II 9,7 24964 epistula ad Galatas 3,28 25073 epistula ad Hebraeos 2.14 46325 5,1 46325 9,6 46325

542 10,6 46325 10,8 46325 Iohannes 13,35 25069 14,6 46631 Lucas 6,35 44412 18,18–24 24962 18,24 24959 18,25 24958 Marcus 10,17–27 24962 10,23f. 24959 10,25 24958 Matthaeus 6,21 24960 19,16–22 24962 19,23 24959 19,24 24958 21,12 44412 Themistius orationes IV, 59b–61d 1819 Tiberianus carmina 1,3,43–44 24312 Vergil Aeneis 7,229 24634 georgica 1,125ff 24312 Zosimus historia nova lib. III 18114, 18218 lib. III,11 18323f.

Index of sources

II. Middle Ages and Early Modern Age

1. Legal writings and laws a) Profane Law Albericus de Rosate ad C. 4,26,7,3 479 Bartolus a Saxoferrato ad C. 1,1,1 291 ad C. 6,35,4 291 ad D. 19,1,13 pr. Nr. 6 5811 ad D. 19,2,9,5 9727 Bulgarus ad D. 50,17,38

11138

Fuero Juzgo 5,4,7 6122 Glossa ordinaria (Accursius) Gl. quos ad C. 1,1,1 28314 Gl. sclere ditentur ad C. 4,17,1 11134 Gl. successoribus ad D. 13,1,7,2 11135 Gl. detrahimus ad D. 1,1,6 262146 Gl. exhortatur ad D. 3,2,20 9517 Gl. nullam esse actionem ad D. 16,3,1,14 9517 Gl. quia commendandi ad D. 17,1,12,12 9519 Gl. interfuit ad D. 19,1,13 pr 5812 Gl. si venditor ad D. 19,1,13 pr. 5811 Gl. ad D. 21,1,43,6 5914 Gl. si generali ad D. 34,5,1 283 Gl. emendandi ad Inst. 3,9 pr. 283 Grotius Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid 1,2,4,5 36922 1,3,5 23143 1,5,12 23141, 23357 2,3,2 489 2,4,36 23038, 23252f. 2,12,(6) 23141, 23356 2,28,8 23147 2,43,2–3 23148

543

Index of sources

3,1,6 23677 3,4,5 23146 3,10,10 45255ff. 3,32,7 23145 3,32,22 23040 3,33,3 23146 3,33,9 23141, 23354 3,34 23039 3,34,8 23141f., 44, 23355 3,37 23039

de jure praede commentarius cap. 2 486ff., 494f. cap. 6 494 cap. 8 491 cap. 9 494 cap. 9–11 36113 cap. 12 36922, 485f., 491

de jure belli ac pacis proleg. 1–2 36114 proleg. 8 36922 proleg. 11 23671 proleg. 12 36922 1,2,8 23358 1,3,4,3 42520 1,3,21 23460 2,1 23570 2,1,11 23557 2,1,14 23463, 23566 2,2–10 23570 2,2,2,1 486, 489 2,2,2,2 489 2,2,2,3 489 2,2,2,4 486, 489 2,2,2,5 484, 490f., 493 2,2,6,4 492 2,2,10 493 2,8,6 488 2,11–19 23570, 23780 2,12,20 45150 2,12,21 45252 2,12,22 45253 2,13,17 23677, 23779 2,13,4 23781 2,13,8 23359 2,13,9 23359 2,18,4 23461 2,20–21 23570 2,20,6–9 23888 2,20,10 23358, 23992 2,20,13–20 23889 2,20,21 23991 2,20,45–50 23673

Jacobus de Ravanis lectura super Codice ad C. 4,17,1 11240 ad C. 4,26,7,3 478 ad C. 4,59 5913

mare liberum cap. 5 485, 491

lectura super Inst. 4,12,1 11239 Johannes Bassianus ad D. 50,17,38 11131f. Lessius, Leonardus de iustitia et iure 2,2,1 486, 493 2,2,2,9 494 2,4,1,1 487 2,4,1,2 49327, 49428 2,4,8,52 486 2,4,8,53 486 2,5,1,1 488 2,5,2,2 490 2,5,2,3 489 2,5,3,9 491 2,7,7 923 2,7,7,23 935 2,7,7,24 936 2,7,7,31 937 2,7,7,32 938 2,7,7,33 949f. 2,7,7,34 9411, 9624 2,12,12,68 49225 2,12,12,69 49226 2,12,12,71 492 2,16,1,9 492

544 2,20,13 44935 2,20,14 44935 2,31 9832 2,31,8,47 9625 2,31,8,48 9937 2,31,8,49 9938 3,21,8 44834 Lo Codi (ed. Fitting/Suchier) 4,62,2 5810 4,62,9 578 Odofredus lectura super Codicem ad C. 4,26,7,3 477 lectura super Digesto vet. ad D. 13,7,1,2 11135 Petrus de Bellapertica ad C. 4,17,1 11341 ad D. 44,2,25,1 n. 6 5913, 15 Placentinus summa “cum essem mantue” 2,22 577 2,23 577 Siete Partidas 5,5,64 59 5,14,29–30 19516 7,34,19 19516 St. Germain, Christopher Doctor and Student dial. II chap. 10 10816 Wilhelmus de Cabriano casus Codicis ad C. 4,17,1 11133 ad C. 4,26,7,3 476 b) Canon Law Compilatio prima Decretalium Gl. compellas (Laurentius) ad 5,14,6 11236

Index of sources

Gl. ab herede (Tancredus) ad 2,20,41 11236 Concilia Constantinopel I can. 3 263 Lateranensis I can. 5 3018 Tridentinum, sessio XIV cap. VII 6230 canon IX 6229 Decreta conciliorum oecumenicorum COD 236 3018 COD 524 2915 COD 528 3016f. COD 811f. 3223 COD 812 3224 COD 813 s. 3225 Decretum Gratiani C. 12 q. 1 c. 1,2 262 C. 12 q. 1 c. 2 259 C. 14 q. 4 c. 11 255109, 262147 C. 15 q. 6 c. 3 421 C. 18 q. 2 c. 25 22027 Gl. ab heredibus ad C. 12 q. 2 c. 34

11236

D. 1 c. 7 483 D. 8 c. 1 483 D. 8 c. 2 483 D. 8 c. 11 260136 Liber Extra X 3,42,4 46326 X 3,28,14 120 X 5,17,5 111, 11237 Gl. et eius heredes ad X 3,28,14 c) Non-legal sources Gregorius Cedrenus 79–80 18534 80 18114, 18220, 18323, 27

11342

545

Index of sources

Thomas Aquinas summa theologica I–II qu. 93,3 20817 I–II qu. 100,3 516 I–II qu. 105,2 42317 II–II qu. 57,2 490 II–II qu. 66 2425 II–II qu. 66,2 resp. 2427 II–II qu. 66,2,1 490 II–II qu. 77 44518 II–II qu. 77,1 44623 II–II qu. 77,2 6440 II–II qu. 77,2,5 44725 II–II qu. 78 44621 II–II qu. 78,2 44622 II–II qu. 91,1–2 2152 scriptum super sententiis III d. 29, qu. 1, a. 7 20817 Vermilius, Petrus loci communes 2,13,4,2 23783

III. Manuscripts and Archives

Amsterdam, Archief van de Parochie van de HH. Petrus en Paulus, Johannes en Willibrordus te BC 1593 2665 Anthologia Palatina 16.70–1 19167 Brussels, Algemeen Rijksarchief Aud. 1659/2 31985 Beroepen uit Holland (BH) 919–926 30517 Beroepen uit Holland (BH) 921 303–321 inv. no. 1659/2f. 30834 Rekenkamer, inv. no. 26114 30832 Den Haag, Koninklijke Bibliotheek 69 E 9 1365 Den Haag, Ministerie van Justitie Archief S-G, 1946, nr. 46 14650 S-G, 1946, nr. 391 14651

Den Haag, Ministerie van Justitie “Kabinetsarchief (geheim), 1941–1957” inv.nr. 1535 (1943/0108) 14128 inv.nr. 1900 (1943/0670) 14128 inv.nr. 2647 (1945/0083) 14128 inv.nr. 3003 (1945/0678) 14128 inv.nr. 36 (1941/0016) (Kabinet en Geheim) 13813 inv.nr. 58 (1941/0058) 13813f. inv.nr. 56 (1941/055) 14127 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief 2.04.67, inv.nr. 13 14652 2.04.67, inv.nr. 12656 14754 2.09.22, inv.nr. 15813 14234 2.09.22, inv.nrs. 15814–15816 14234 2.09.22, inv.nr. 16312, Kabinet 1939, 24 1379 2.09.22, inv.nr. 16312, Kabinet 1940 nr. 3 14652 2.09.22, inv.nr. 16312, A.S. 23 mei 1941, 1612 13811 2.09.22, inv.nr. 16313, Kabinet 22 december 1939 13917 2.09.22, inv.nr. 16344, Kabinet 1940, 85 14230 2.09.56 (Archief Hooykaas), inv.nrs. 20–22 14648 2.21.183.02, inv.nr. 2 14020 2.21.183.02, inv.nr. 24 14019 2.21.183.61, inv.nr. 3 14959 VOC Overgekomen Brieven en Papieren (OBP) 1098, 544–546 28728 Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de EspaÇa BNE 283, fol. 34v 11238 Middelburg, Zeeuws Archiev inv. no. 39 30727 Utrecht, Het Utrechts Archief 1003,350 2689 1003,362 27217 1003,414–416 2665 1003,422 2665 inv.nr. 239–1, cap. LXXX, f. 309–331 28010

546

Index of sources

Valladolid, Archivo de la Real Chancillar&a CAJA 352,37 6862, 76 CAJA 494,3 6858ff. , 74f. CAJA 971,7 6756, 73

IV. Modern law

1. Laws and acts a) Chile Codigo Civil art. 2285 1947 b) England Acts of Parliament Stat 23 Geo II c.33 19621

Law Reform Act 1934 section 1 (1) & 4 (2) 1065 Law Reform Act 1954 section 4 1065 Law Reform Act 1968 1065 c) France Code Civil art. 1371–1381

1946

D8claration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen art. 4 4033 art. 17 4033 d) Italy Codice Civile Art. 2041 19513 e) Netherlands Burgerlijk Wetboek art. 2:1 lid 3 39213 art. 2:2 389, 392ff., 399, 401 art. 2:18 389, 391f., 394 art. 2:18 lid 2a 394 art. 2:18 lid 4 395 art. 2:18 lid 5 39932 art. 2:18 lid 6 397 art. 2:18 lid 8 391

art. 2:19 3917 art. 2:20 3917 art. 2:20a 391 art. 2:20a lid 8 3919 art. 2:21 3906 art. 2:307 401 art. 3:13 404 art. 3:80 lid 2 40238 art. 3:80 lid 3 402 art. 5:1 lid 2 404 art. 6:212 19514 (oud) BW (1838) art. 1401 416 Grondwet art. 6 394 art. 8 394 Verordening van de Rijkscommissaris voor het bezette Nederlandse gebied 2/’41 143 3/’45 14439 13/’43 14439 62/’43 143 79/’43 14439 81/’40 143 87/’42 143 99/’42 14440 174/’41 143 197/’40 143 Wetboek van Strafrecht Art. 1 143 Art. 248a 143 Wetboek van Strafvordering Art. 12 143 Art. 13 143 f) Switzerland Obligationenrecht (OR) Art. 62 19515

547

Index of sources

g) United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1,22 203 1,23 203 h) Roman Church Acta Apostolicae Sedis 1 (1909) 175 21817 21 (1929) 34–35 21920 21 (1929) 38–39 21819 21 (1929) 39–40 21920 39 (1947) 560 22134 39 (1947) 575–577 22134 39 (1947) 589–590 22135 48 (1956) 13–14 22137 48 (1956) 16–17 22137 48 (1956) 20–22 22137 48 (1956) 23 22238 50 (1958) 633 22240 50 (1958) 635 22241 50 (1958) 658–659 22239 50 (1958) 662 22239 56 (1964) 128–129 22242 56 (1964) 899 22344 59 (1967) 306 2163 59 (1967) 307 2164 59 (1967) 852–854 3430 86 (1994) 541–542 22345 87 (1995) 977–978 3431 Acta Sanctae Sedis 36 (1904) 331 2166 36 (1904) 331–332 2168 36 (1904) 332–333 21712 36 (1904) 336 21711 36 (1904) 339 2166 41 (1908) 114–116 21815 Corpus Iuris Canonici 1917 c. 1185 21921 c. 1262 § 1 21815 c. 1264 21921 c. 1264 § 1 21922 c. 1264 § 2 22027 c. 1365 § 2 21921 c. 2271 n. 2 21921

CIC/Fontes 1917 III, n. 654 2166, 8, 21711f. VIII, n. 6328 2167 Corpus Iuris Canonici 1983 c. 230 § 2 22345 Vatican Councils CV I PA III 3225 CV II UR 14 262 CV II UR 18 262 2. Court decisions a) Named Cases Bramley v Alt (1797) 3 Ves. Jun. 620 20040 (1797) 30 E.R. 1186 20040 Clark v Woods (1848) 154 E. R. 545 1258, 12713 (1848) 2 Ex. 395 1258, 12713 De Costa v The Times of Ceylon Ltd (1959) 62 Cey. N.L.R. 265 13331 Decker v Pope

198

Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 Cowper 371 (KB) 1062, 10817 Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council (1999) 2 AC (HL) 349 12611 Moses v Macferlan 198, 200 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005 1256, 196 (1760) 97 E.R. 676 1256, 196 Odendaal v van Oudtshoorn 1968 (3) SA 433 (T) 12919, 21 Pillans v van Mierop (1765) 3 Burr. 1663 199 (1765) 97 E.R. 1035 199

548 Pinchon’s case (1611) 9 Co Rep 86b

Index of sources

Union Government (Minister of Finance) v Gowar 1915 AD 426 13228

1063

Pitt v Coomes (1835) 111 E. R. 178 1258 (1835) 2 A. & E. 459 1258

White Brothers v Treasurer-General 1882 2 SC 322 13229

Robinson v Bland 1 W.Black.2019 19929 96 E.R. 120 19929 Saibo v The Attorney-General (1923) 25 N.L.R. 321 1232 (1923) 25 N.L.R. 324 1255 (1923) 25 N.L.R. 325 1257 (1923) 25 N.L.R. 326 12714

123

Sherrington’s case (1583) 113 Savile 40 123 ER 1000 l0818 Sowell v Champion (1838) 112 E. R. 156 1258, 12713 (1838) 6 A. & E. 407 1258, 12713

b) Anonymous Cases European Case Law Identifier (ECLI) NL:GHSGR:2009 39320 NL:HR:2017:771 3891 NL:RVS:2018:2715 39317 Hoge Raad (Netherlands) 21 april 2017, Ondernemingsrecht (JOR) 2017/98 39425 31 oktober 1986, NJ 1987, 173 39320 Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria) 10Ob21/07x 6019 Year Books (U.S.A.) Y.B. 19 Hen. VI f. 66 pl. 10 10815 Y.B. Mich. 18 Edw. IV f. 15, pl. 17 10712 Y.B. Trin. Hen. VII f. 22 pl. 2 10713