Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean 9780755623648, 9781780761336

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For my parents Gregorios and Niki

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

1.

Native girls working at the asbestos mines, 1912. Courtesy of the Marfin Laiki Bank Cultural Centre.

2

Workers at the asbestos mines, 1912. Courtesy of the Marfin Laiki Bank Cultural Centre.

3.

A view of Limassol city, circa 1930. Courtesy of the Marfin Laiki Bank Cultural Centre.

4.

View of Government House, Nicosia, after its destruction during the October 1931 disturbances. Courtesy of the Public Information Office.

5.

Winston Churchill’s visit at Government House, Nicosia, 1 February 1943. In foreground (from left to right) Bishop Leontios, the Mufti, Winston Churchill and Governor Sir Charles Woolley. Courtesy of the Archbishopric of Cyprus.

6.

A group of A.K.E.L. volunteers, 1943. Courtesy of the Progressive Party of Working People (A.K.E.L.).

7.

A.K.E.L. volunteers parade in the streets of Limassol under the supervision of Ploutis Servas. June 1943. Courtesy of the Progressive Party of Working People (A.K.E.L.).

8.

The first Cypriot company to depart abroad. Courtesy of the Cyprus Veterans’ Association, World War II.

9.

A group of Cyprus Regiment soldiers in Italy during the war. Courtesy of the Cyprus Veterans’ Association, World War II.

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10. The British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden inspects men of the Cyprus Regiment in the Middle East. Courtesy of the Cyprus Veterans’ Association, World War II. 11. Cypriot volunteers arriving at Piraeus Port, Athens, December 1940. Courtesy of the Cyprus Veterans’ Association, World War II. 12. A group of Cypriot women, volunteers of the Auxiliary Territorial Service (A.T.S.), serving in North Africa, reading news of war developments. Courtesy of the Cyprus Veterans’ Association, World War II. 13. Celebrations for the Red Army Day, Nicosia, 21 February 1943. The Acting Governor John Shaw is heading the celebrations. The occasion gained a special meaning as it was honoured by colonial officials, the Locum Tenens, municipal councilors, Munir Bay on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, the Greek Consul Eleftherios Mavrokefalos, members of the Trade Unions and an enthusiastic crowd cheering for the Allied cause. Courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 14. Celebrations for the Red Army Day, Nicosia, 21 February 1943. A closer view of the guests attending the event. Prayers for the Allies were also said by clergymen of the Anglican, the Maronite and the Armenian Churches. Courtesy of the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 15. A scene from the Chrysorogiatissa Monastery, prior to the conduct of the Archiepiscopal elections of June 1947. (Seated from Right to Left): the Locum Tenens Leontios, the Bishop of Derkon, Ioakim, and the Abbot of the Monastery, Cyril. Courtesy of the Archbishopric of Cyprus.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.K.E.L.: Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού – Progressive Party of Working People A.O.N.: Αντι-φασιστική Οργάνωση Ναυτικού – Anti fascist Navy Organization A.S.O.: Απελευθερωτική Στρατιωτική Οργάνωσις – Liberating Military Organization E.A.M.: Εθνικό Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο – National Liberation Front E.D.E.S.: Εθνικός Δημοκρατικός Ελληνικός Σύνδεσμος – National Republican Greek League E.K.A.: ΄Ενωσις Κυπρίων Αποστράτων – Union of Cypriot Ex-servicemen E.K.K.A.: Εθνική και Κοινωνική Απελευθέρωση – National and Social Liberation E.L.A.S.: Ελληνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός – Greek People’s Liberation Army E.M.E.K.E.L.: Ενιαίο Μέτωπο Εργατών και Εργαζομένου Λαού – United Front of Workers and Working People K.A.T.A.K.: Kipris Adasi Türk Azinlik Kurumu – Association for the Protection of the Turkish Cypriot Minority K.E.K.: Κυπριακό Εθνικό Κόμμα – Cypriot National Party K.K.E.: Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος – Communist Party of Greece K.K.K.: Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κύπρου – Communist Party of Cyprus K.T.M.B.P.: Kibris Türk Milli Birlik Partisi – Turkish Cypriot National Party P.E.E.A.: Πολιτική Επιτροπή Εθνικής Απελευθέρωσης – Political Committee for National Liberation P.E.K.: Παναγροτική ΄Ενωση Κύπρου – Pan Cyprian Farmers’ Union P.E.S.P.: Παγκύπρια Ελληνική Σοσιαλιστική Πρωτοπορία – Pan Cyprian Greek Socialist Vanguard P.O.R.O.I.: Παγκύπρια Οργάνωσις Θρησκευτικών Ορθόδοξων Ιδρυμάτων – Pan Cyprian Organization of Religious Orthodox Institutions

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P.S.E.: Παγκύπρια Συντεχνιακή Επιτροπή – Pan Cyprian Trade Union Committee S.E.K.: Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Κύπρου – Confederation of Cyprus’ Workers S.O.E.: Special Operations Executive

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the result of my doctoral research at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, at the University of London. During my research I acquired invaluable assistance from many individuals to whom I would like to express my deep gratitude and appreciation. First and foremost I would like to acknowledge the constant encouragement and firm support of my supervisor, Professor Robert Holland. I have benefited immeasurably from working with a scholar equipped with such deep knowledge of Cypriot affairs and such genuine affection for Cyprus and its people. Our long conversations in his 28 Russell Square office, where the Institute was housed, until recently, for many decades, have been critical to my development, both as a young scholar and as an individual. I am also deeply honoured by the foreword he has written for this book. Many thanks to Dr. James Ker-Lindsay, of the LSE University and Dr. Martin Shipway of Birkbeck, University of London, for acting as my viva examiners, and for providing feedback and fruitful comments that helped me bring the original manuscript to its final form. I am also extremely grateful to Dr. Diana Markides, of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, and to Dr. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, of the Department of History, University of Athens, for their genuine interest in my work throughout the years. The late Dr. Stavros Panteli, a historian with true concern for his homeland, and the late Andreas Loris, former Judge of the Supreme Court of Cyprus, both happily made their extensive knowledge available to me – both were always willing to discuss their many experiences while I was in the early stages of this work. Many thanks to Ruth Keshishian of Moufflon Bookstore for her continued interest in my work, and to Joanna Godfrey, my editor at I.B.Tauris, whose constructive cooperation, support and patience have been invaluable. I also want to thank, deeply, the A.G. Leventis Foundation, which awarded me a generous scholarship during my doctoral studies and which was crucial with regard to my archival research in Athens, Greece.

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The courtesy and generosity of a number of people made possible the images section of this book. Many warm thanks to the President of the Cyprus Veterans’ Association, Mr. Loizos Demetriou, for kindly agreeing to provide me with images of Cypriot war volunteers, and warm thanks, also, to Mrs. Ourania Pissaridou for her assistance with these images. I also owe many thanks to the Marfin Laiki Bank Cultural Centre for providing me with a number of photographs of pre-War Cyprus. Mr. Costas Theodotou and Mr. Georgios Araouzos at the Archbishopric of Cyprus not only gave me images of Archbishop Leontios but enthusiastically embraced my research. I am also grateful to Mr. Yiannakis Kolokassides of AKEL’s Political Bureau for images of the party’s war volunteers. Also, to the Bodleian Library, Oxford, for providing two images from Sir John Valentine Shaw’s private papers. Many thanks for hospitality and services beyond the call of duty go to the staffs of the National Archives of the United Kingdom in London (P.R.O.), the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Library, the Rhodes House Library in Oxford (especially Mrs. Lucy McCann), the British Library, the Lambeth Palace Library, the Modern Records Centre at Warwick University, the Greek General State Archives and the Contemporary Social History Archives in Athens, the Cyprus’s State Archives, the Library of Archbishop Makarios III, and the Archbishopric of Cyprus Archives. One of the best things about publishing this book has been the new people to whom it brought me closer. Thanks to David Porter for his friendship and for his excellent copy-editing and proofreading of my manuscript, and to his wife, Antigone – much love and appreciation for her encouragement and her hospitality at their cozy flat. Also, to Christalla Pitta many thanks for efficiently working on the CRC version of the original manuscript. None of this would have been possible without the help of my family and loved ones. I would like to thank my parents, Gregorios and Niki, for their never-ending love and interest in my well-being, and for bringing up me and my brother, Kyriakos, in the best way possible. I have always looked up to my brother, Kyriakos, and my admiration and love for him were an inspiration throughout this project. My closest friends have been exceedingly patient and supportive since I began my research, and to them I send all my love and gratitude. Last but not least, I would like to emphasize that nothing would have been possible without Constantinos - his love, his solid support, and his endless encouragement have helped make this dream of mine reality. Needless to say, as the author of this book, I am solely responsible for any errors or inaccuracies. Anastasia Yiangou, Nicosia, April 2010

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FOREWORD

In his sweeping study, Britain and Decolonisation: the retreat from Empire in the post-war world, John Darwin identified the Second World War as the ‘trigger’ for the redefining of the international order after 1945. An extensive literature has come into being on how the ‘trigger’ of war after September 1939 impacted on the societies and politics of many countries then under British (and indeed French) colonial authority. Suggestively, neither the pattern nor the consequences were often identical. In this absorbing book, Anastasia Yiangou shows how that process, with its own distinctive traits, unfolded in Cyprus. Almost invariably the colonial and post-colonial transformations unleashed by war operated at multiple and interlocking levels, international, regional and local. One of the fascinations of Yiangou’s wide-ranging analysis is to see how such a complicated triptych of forces and perspectives applied in the Cypriot case. Successive phases of her narrative blend the wider history of the war, developments in the eastern Mediterranean and events on the island itself. This book captures how the largely stagnant political landscape of Cyprus during the 1930s was reconfigured under war conditions into a more dynamic but also more unstable phenomenon. The emergence of AKEL in April, 1941, at a time when an inflationary war economy destabilized labour relations, is for the first time traced in detail. Thereafter the evolving rhythms of Left-Right rivalry form a crucial thread in the treatment. Other historians have previously shown how this competition shaped Cypriot affairs in the later 1940s. One of the significances of Yiangou’s achievement is to illustrate how that political logic was already firmly in place by the end of the European War in May 1945. At the heart of Yiangou’s analysis lies the subtle interweaving of Hellenic and colonial narratives within Cypriot life. Throughout the shadow of Greece’s own bitter experience of war lies over developments. Greek resistance to Italian aggression after October 1940, the roller-coaster experience of the spring of 1941, the dilemmas of the exiled Greek Government, the ramifications of

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fragile attempts to forge unity between Greek factions feeding into the breakdown of December 1944 (the Dekemvriana), are all put in a Cypriot context. But this is also a study necessarily of an island under British colonial rule. We are shown that the colonial power was compelled under the circumstances to allow the recrudescence of organized politics in the island. In doing so however, the administration felt more than ever uncertain and nervous of the future. For the British, as for some Cypriots, AKEL in particular was a new and challenging opponent. Yiangou conjures up this brittle atmosphere, and reveals that already from 1944 the colonial regime was beginning to calculate the odds on an ultimate outbreak of violence. The author proves conclusively that although in colonial terms the essential dilemmas in Anglo-Cypriot relations remained consistent with the long period since 1878, the years between 1939 and 1945 greatly heightened their intensity and contradictions. In covering these complex themes, Anastasia Yiangou makes use of a highly original blend of Cypriot, British and Greek sources, including extensive Government records in Kew and Nicosia, private papers, newspapers, materials of the Anglican Church in Lambeth Palace Library in London, oral interviews, and by no means least the papers of Archbishop Leontios – the latter, in particular, emerges as a central figure in modern Cypriot history. Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean will surely take its place as a seminal contribution to our understanding of the trajectory of the island’s tangled politics in the twentieth century. Professor Robert Holland Institute of Commonwealth Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London and Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College London.

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“ …Wheat does not take long to ripen, it doesn’t take much time for the years of bitterness to rise it doesn’t take much time for evil to raise its head… … Friends of the other war, on this deserted and cloudy beach I think of you as the day turns… …Who can change the attitude of those with power? who can make himself heard? each dreams separately without hearing anyone else’s nightmare. …”

George Seferis, Salamis in Cyprus, November 1953

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Anastasia Yiangou holds a PhD from the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London in 2009. She has taught at the University of Cyprus and the European University Cyprus.

Trim: 138mm × 216mm

P1: PHB IBBK035-FM

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IBBK035-Serieslist-Demis

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ISBN: 978 1 84885 227 3

June 11, 2010

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY Series ISBN: 978 1 84885 227 3 See www.ibtauris.com/ILTCH for a full list of titles 29. Britain and the Weimar Republic: The History of a Cultural Relationship Colin Storer

35. Constructing a Post-War Order: The Rise of US Hegemony and the Origins of the Cold War Andrew Baker

978 1 84885 140 5

978 1 84885 636 3

30. Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean Anastasia Yiangou

36. The Rise of Women’s International Activism: Identity and Sisterhood Between the World Wars Marie Sandell

978 1 84885 436 9

978 1 84885 671 4

31. Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since WWII William Mallinson

37. An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus James Ker-Lindsay, Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen (Eds)

978 1 84885 456 7

32. Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire: Diplomacy and Strategy during the Great Game Christopher M. Wyatt

978 1 84885 678 3

38. Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build Up to the Russian-Japanese War Nicholas Papastratigkis

978 1 84885 610 3

33. Non-Alignment and its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge Rinna Kullaa

978 1 84885 691 2

39. Chelmno and the Holocaust: A History of Hitler’s First Death Camp Patrick Montague

978 1 84885 624 0

34. Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars Daniel Laqua (Ed)

978 1 84885 722 3

40. Frantz Fanon: The Militant Philosopher of Third World Liberation Leo Zeilig

978 1 84885 469 7

978 1 84885 724 7

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean ANASTASIA YIANGOU

TAURIS ACADEMIC STUDIES an imprint of I.B.Tauris Publishers LONDON ● NEW YORK

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Published in 2010 by Tauris Academic Studies An imprint of I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2010 Anastasia Yiangou The right of Anastasia Yiangou to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. International Library of Twentieth Century History 30 ISBN 978 1 84885 436 9 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Printed and bound in India by Thomson Press (India) Camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

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1 BRITAIN AND CYPRUS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1878-1939

1.1 British Motives for the Acquisition of Cyprus in 1878 To comprehend the complexity and fragility of British colonial policy in Cyprus during 1939-1945, it is essential to understand the motives that drove Britain to first acquire Cyprus. In 1878, for the second time, the British became occupiers of the island.1 Under the Cyprus Convention,2 Britain assumed control of the administration of the island from the Ottoman Empire in exchange for British support in the event of a renewed Russo-Turkish war. London’s decision to acquire the island was inextricably tied to diplomatic fluctuations in Europe. The balance of control between the Great Powers, as established by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, had allowed Britain to concentrate on her Empire beyond Europe, particularly India. However, she remained poised to react to emergencies in Europe that endangered the Great Powers’ equilibrium.3 Inevitably, the balance of power was threatened by the reopening of the Eastern Question,4 and in these circumstances preserving the Ottoman status quo was a prerequisite for European stability. In the event of the possible collapse of the Ottoman state, the British might conceivably keep Constantinople and the Straits out of Russian hands, but any road through Eastern Anatolia to the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf open to Russian arms would be potentially devastating to British interests in Asia. Whitehall therefore needed to preserve Ottoman stability to safeguard against these risks.5 Russian expansion and influence in the Balkans increased tremendously leading up to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, which culminated with Russian troops approaching the land defences of Constantinople, despite fierce resistance by the Ottoman army. One effect of these events was the modification of the strategic consensus in Britain. Colonel Home, who had been sent to Constantinople by London in 1876 to report on its defences, urged his

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superiors that Britain should not waste her time propping up a falling Empire: “the time has come to cut it up, and let us have our share of it”.6 On the other hand, the British Ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Austen Layard, insisted it would better suit Britain’s purposes if Turkey’s integrity were retained, as a solvent Turkey would be a bulwark against Russia while further encouraging Ottoman reform.7 Indeed, in addition to its military strategy, Britain’s acquisition of Cyprus was part of its intensified reformation of the Ottoman state. Disraelian policy now required a base which could provide the lynch pin for larger regional development, the beneficent reform of Asia Minor under British supervision. The transformation of Ottoman economy, government and society would reconstitute Asiatic Turkey as a deterrent to Russian expansionism.8 Cyprus, therefore, would serve as a potential base for the reconfiguration of Asia Minor. British circles considered the acquisition of a base in the eastern Mediterranean since the 1830s. In 1869, however, London purchased a considerable number of shares in the Suez Canal Company, thereby confirming the major imperial significance of the Eastern Question, as such a base might watch over both the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal.9 However, it was only in March 1878 that the British took further and definite steps for acquiring a fortress in the East.10 The base in question had to serve commercial, military, naval and political purposes; it had to provide Britain with the ‘keys to Asia Minor’ and a location where enemy advances from the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal could be checked.11 The British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, is thought to have first suggested the possibility of taking Cyprus as late as the end of March 1878.12 In May he wrote to Queen Victoria that ‘Cyprus is the key of Western Asia’.13 Even at this stage there were those such as Sir Austen Layard in Constantinople and a medley of senior military experts who doubted the real strategic value of the island. After all Cyprus did not have adequate naval facilities, and it would take time before it could be utilized.14 There were also other alternatives under consideration, such as Alexandretta, Crete, Lemnos and Mohammerah.15 Nevertheless, London shortly instructed Layard to present the Sultan Abdul Hamid with its terms. Whilst sovereignty over the island would remain theoretically in Hamid’s name, British troops should take over the island, and any refusal by Hamid to accept Britain’s terms would clearly prejudice any further British protection of the Ottoman state. London demanded an answer within forty-eight hours, leaving the Sultan little choice but to accept. That Hamid did not issue the essential firman for the agreement until July 6th, despite acute pressure from the British, indicated his intense reluctance.

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According to historian Christopher Howard, no feature of the ensuing Eastern Question settlement was more bitterly criticized in Britain than the Cyprus Convention, which sanctioned British dominion over the island.16 Lord Derby, who had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, severely objected to this new acquisition in the House of Commons,17 whilst Gladstone, characterized the Convention as ‘an insane covenant’ during the 1880 general election.18 Even General Sir Garnet Wolseley, the first British High Commissioner appointed on the island, had his reservations. “I have thought it over for many an hour since I was told the secret”, he wrote in his personal diary, “anxious to find out good reasons for the move, and yet never able thoroughly to satisfy myself of the wisdom of the measure… .”19 In fending off their criticisms, Disraeli, amongst various contentions, pronounced that “in taking Cyprus the movement is not Mediterranean but Indian”,20 thereby trying to draw onto his side the powerful Indian lobbies at home. However, the occupation of Cyprus would enable the British to respond effectively to any crisis arising within or along the borders of the Ottoman Empire. The election of William Gladstone as Liberal Prime Minister in the 1880 general elections, combined with the reactionary impulse increasingly expressed by Sultan Abdul Hamid, scuttled Britain’s ambitious plans for reform in Asia Minor. It was in this shifting and uncertain milieu that Britain found itself responsible for administering an island territory with a substantial Greek majority for the first time since abandoning the Ionian Islands in 1864. Doubt surrounded the strategic rationale of the possession of Cyprus; this doubt continued to plague London even after 1939. 1.2 The Dynamic of Enosis On 10 July 1878, Admiral Sir John Hay disembarked at Larnaca, the most important port in Cyprus, and a few days later Sir Garnet Wolseley took over his duties as the first High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of British troops on the island. Both men were greeted by the majority Greek population of the island with enthusiasm and excitement, as Greek Cypriots glimpsed the possibility of their release from Turkish rule which had lasted for over three centuries. The Greeks of Cyprus saw Great Britain as a Christian power that espoused progressive and liberal ideas and generally believed the British were sympathetic to Hellenic aspirations. Furthermore, Britain’s act of generosity and philhellenism, when it ceded the Ionian Islands to Greece in 1864, had become part of the collective Greek Cypriot consciousness. Greek Cypriots therefore held firm to the belief that the arrival of British authority was the first step towards the accomplishment of their own national desire, Union with Greece (Enosis – ΄Ενωσις). Thus the question of Enosis was present even at the outset of British rule in Cyprus.

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One Cypriot historian, describing the festive atmosphere in Larnaca during the arrival of Admiral Hay and of Sir Garnet Wolseley, wrote that the crowd, which included foreign merchants and traders as well as local people, generated an excitement not seen on the island for in many years.21 As far as the new rulers of Cyprus were concerned, some of the hesitations about the usefulness of the island to Britain were reflected in a pejorative assessment of the island itself. Wolseley observed in his diary that Nicosia was a ‘filthy hole’ and soon afterwards arranged for his residence to be built outside the walls of the city; this marked the establishment, it has been observed, of the distance – both physical and psychological – between the British and their Cypriot subjects, a distance neither party managed to bridge.22 Nevertheless, the representatives of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus cordially welcomed the new masters of their island. Bishop Kyprianos of Kitium and then Archbishop Sofronios addressed the new High Commissioner hospitably; both also, expressed their expectations for the future. Kyprianos explicitly asked for Union with Greece. He stated: “We accept the change of Government inasmuch as we trust that Great Britain will help Cyprus, as it did the Ionian Islands, to be united with Mother Greece, with which it is naturally connected”.23 Archbishop Sofronios discreetly incorporated the immediate hopes of the Cypriot population for a better future into his welcome speech. These hopes included the improvement of economic and social conditions, equal treatment in law, and the prospect of full liberty for the island thereafter.24 C. Kyrris points out the difference between the approaches of Kyprianos and Sofronios on the question of Enosis, one direct and at least potentially insistent, the other more moderately couched. This enables a rough and preliminary classification of Greek Cypriot attitudes towards Enosis, one of an absolutist inclination, the other marked by a more collaborationist impulse.25 This was a typology that fed almost imperceptibly into the creation of political groups, most distinctly during the turbulent archiepiscopal issue of 1900-1910.26 By the early years of the twentieth century, once the possibility of any retrocession to Ottoman authority evaporated, an in-built limitation to GreekCypriot expression of Enosis aspirations was commensurately lifted. Enthusiasm for Greek-Cypriot volunteering to fight in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 and in the Balkan wars of 1912-13,27 played an important part in shaping an Enosis movement on the island. However, the Greek defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 had a contrary effect, especially as Cypriot Enosis did not feature in the regional settlement effected by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Turkish Cypriots were distinctly unsettled by the alteration of the regime in 1878, since their status was automatically reversed from the dominant

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BRITAIN AND CYPRUS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1878-1939 11 minority to a subordinate one. However, they soon realized their position was not without advantage under the British. Over time the Colonial Government came to lean on the Turkish Cypriot community for support, which was made apparent by the composition of the Legislative Council established in 1882. The gap between the two communities widened as Greek Cypriots came to advocate Enosis more openly, while Turkish Cypriots objected to what they saw as an increasing threat. The Balkan War of 1912, which heightened ethnic fears throughout much of the region, was occasion for the first large-scale physical confrontation between the two communities. Five people were killed in the riots and 134 others were injured or wounded, and the High Commissioner had to dispatch an additional body of 120 policemen to restore the peace.28 As the Enosis movement matured, its demands took various forms. Greek Cypriots often promoted their national aspirations concurrently with their requests for the amelioration of the economic and social conditions on what was still a very poor island. These requests took the form of memorandums submitted to the colonial authorities, while a number of formal delegations visited London to present their petitions at the Colonial Office. Much closer interaction between Cyprus and Greece eased by more frequent shipping connections, with Athens as the ‘national centre’, facilitated the growth of the Enosis movement, of which war volunteering was the most efficient vehicle. Despite the hopes Cypriots had originally entertained when the British first arrived on the island, the latter were unwilling to satisfy the rising demand for Enosis for a number of reasons. Up until 1914, when Britain formally annexed Cyprus, there was an uncertainty in policy because the sovereignty of the island was still vested in the Ottoman Empire. The British responded to the demand for Enosis only once, in October 1915, when they officially offered to cede Cyprus to Greece if the latter agreed to help Serbia against Germany and its ally, Bulgaria, but the short-lived government of Prime Minister Zaimis decided to remain neutral and declined the offer. The 1915 offer disproves the repeated claim of British officialdom that Cyprus could not be handed to Greece because its sovereignty belonged to the Ottoman Sultan. In addition, the Greek refusal, dictated by the regional diplomatic environment at the time, underlined a theme that was to recur in the future: the clashing priorities between Greek leadership in Athens and the aspirations of Cypriots. In 1915, Athens was not prepared to get involved in a war in the Balkan region that might jeopardize her gains in the Balkan wars of 1912-13. This passing opportunity for Enosis slipped by, never to return. Even after November 1914, when Turkey’s entrance in the First World War against Britain nullified the Cyprus Convention, British policy remained static, since strategic imperatives regarding Cyprus remained the same. The initial

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plans for the use of Cyprus as a military base were rendered irrelevant in 1882, once Britain began its occupation of Egypt and its strategic harbour of Alexandria. Despite these changes in the strategic utility of Cyprus, the British remained unwilling to hand over the island to a foreign power – that Cyprus was adjacent to the new British Empire, and to the quasi-empire conquered in the Middle East during the last phases of the Great War of 1914-1918, only bolstered this reluctance. This was particularly true after the war, when aviation became an important strategic consideration, since the island was well-suited to such facilities.29 The course of the 1920’s saw the consolidation of Enosis as an actual movement instead of a vague aspiration in Greek Cypriot consciousness. This new impetus was shaped by the continuing disappointments the Greek Cypriot leadership experienced in its efforts to make its demands heard. The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 made no mention of the national question of Cyprus; the Greek Prime Minister instead focused on Hellenic aspirations in Asia Minor, Macedonia and Thrace.30 Venizelos kept the Cypriot Enosists’ delegation in Paris at a distance, encouraging them instead to go to London and come to a direct understanding with the British. In light of these omissions and outright rejections, the Greek Cypriots realized that in their demands for Enosis with Greece, they were on their own – and a sense of ‘Cyprus alone’ became a crucial component of the psychology of the Enosis movement. Under such circumstances it was only natural that the Church should increasingly come to the foreground as the ‘champion’ of Enosis, and that the movement should assume more organizational complexity. A National Council was formed in 1921 and soon thereafter launched an effective boycott of the legislature by Greek Cypriots. The Enosis aspirations of Greek Cypriots were checked by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, after which Cyprus became a British colony. The treaty divided the ranks of Greek Cypriot politicians between those who were committed to ‘Enosis and only Enosis’, and the moderates who sought ‘autonomy’ within the British Empire along the lines of that recently acquired by Malta.31 Nevertheless, it was Britain’s failure to formulate an ‘offer’ likely to encourage the moderates which ensured the continuing dominance of the hardcore Enosis wing. The events in Cyprus of October 1931,32 which included open rebellion against the Colonial Government, were a turning point in the history of the Enosis movement, as this was first time the demand for Enosis led to public disturbances. Other reasons for these demonstrations included the impact of the worldwide financial crisis of the late 1920s on the Cyprus economy, as well as the Government’s unwillingness to vest the island’s public education with

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BRITAIN AND CYPRUS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1878-1939 13 Greek Cypriots. The fundamental motive for these events was the national aspiration for Enosis. The suppression of the October 1931 uprising and the subsequent punitive measures taken by the British were a major setback for the agitation of Enosis. In response, the movement assumed an ‘underground’ form, waiting for appropriate circumstances to re-emerge. Such circumstances were created at the beginning of the following decade, when Greece entered the Second World War. 1.3 The Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus One of the key actors with a traditional leading part on the island’s domestic political stage was the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Cyprus; this remained profoundly true during the Second World War.33 The leading hierarchical position in Church was the Archbishop, who under the old Ottoman millet system, was the civil and religious leader of his community. The Archbishop’s role as the protector of the nation (Ethnarch) had been shaped by the various occupations the island suffered over many centuries. On matters of taxation and in many other areas, Greeks of all classes had looked to the Ethnarch as their mouthpiece and interlocutor, both with the local Ottoman administration and with ultimately the Sultan in Constantinople. It was therefore expected that the most eminent persons to welcome the British authorities to the island in 1878 were the representatives of the Church. For the Church itself, the transition from Ottoman domination to British rule posed potential difficulties. Under Ottoman rule, the Church was the recipient of preferential treatment by the Porte since Ottoman authority tolerated any other religion as long as its practitioners obeyed them.34 It was Ottoman policy to recognize the authority and the rights of the Orthodox Church, and the Berat, a document announced after the election of each Archbishop, bestowed upon the Archbishop various privileges. The most important of these privileges was the collection of taxes from the island’s Orthodox flock, which was vested in the hands of the Archbishop, who also enjoyed complete freedom in his ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The Archbishop had the right to be an ex officio member of the Central Council (Medjliss Idare), whilst his subordinate Bishops sat on the District Medjliss Idare. Despite the real inferiority of the Greek Christian majority under Turkish rule, and the problems the Church had in representing its flock within the framework of the millet, it is nonetheless clear that the Church enjoyed a degree of prestige in its rule. The Turks hanged Archibishop Kyprianos on 9 July 1821, along with many other members of the island’s Greek Christian intelligentsia and clergy, alleging that they intended to join the revolution then sweeping other Greek lands in the Empire. Following these tragic events, the Church in

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general – and the office of the Archbishop in particular – accrued an iconic significance in the collective Greek Cypriot consciousness. It came as a shock after 1878 when the new colonial government did not fully recognize the involvement of the Church in civil affairs. The Archbishop was no longer considered to be the unique representative of the Christian population, and his responsibilities were essentially restricted to spiritual matters. The British stripped him of his right to collect taxes, although he retained a leading role within the community. In the following years the Church, assisted by greater freedom of civil life under the new dispensation, naturally consolidated its place as the second power on the island after the British administration. The Archbishop was invariably the head of all Enosis delegations sent to the Colonial Office in London up until 1931. The Church also retained control over education, which ultimately resulted in strained Government-Church relations during 1920s, as the British sought, to impose their own desiderata in this crucial sphere. Tensions came to a head during the extensive disturbances of October 1931, for which the British, somewhat conveniently, held the Church principally responsible. Two leading Bishops, of Kitium and Kyrenia, were exiled from Cyprus, though allowed to travel freely otherwise; Archbishop Cyril III, though strongly admonished by Governor Sir Ronald Storrs, remained in place. On his death in 1933, however, the absence of the two exiled Bishops became an obstacle to the canonical election, according to the charter of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.35 Authority as Locum Tenens was subsequently vested in Bishop Leontios of Paphos. Bishop Leontios had been abroad at the time of the 1931 disturbances. He had been allowed to return, though not without considerable discussion on the British side. The Commissioner of Paphos telegraphed the Secretariat in Nicosia that Leontios ‘should not be allowed to return owing to his antiGovernment politics’. Soon afterwards he sent a lengthy report to the Colonial Secretary: “The Bishop has proved himself to be a great firebrand…he is most antiEnglish in his views and has during this year visited all the villages making speeches to the effect that the Village Authorities and others must lose no occasion to insult all British officials, especially the Governor, the Commissioner and the Local Commandant (of Police). In his speeches he has said that the British Government has no right to be in Cyprus, and is only robbing the people by remaining here”.36 After Sir Edward Stubbs replaced Governor Storrs, Leontios was eventually allowed onto the island. The British administration was by no means displeased by the hiatus in full archiepiscopal power within the Church, as the administration

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BRITAIN AND CYPRUS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1878-1939 15 believed weakening the Church would also weaken the Enosis movement. The canonical complexity surrounding the election of a new Archbishop – including not only the Ecumenical Patriarch but other Patriarchates in the region – further complicated the situation. However, Leontios, as Acting Archbishop or Locum Tenens, soon emerged as a strong and energetic leader well-equipped to make life difficult for the British. That the archiepiscopal throne remained vacant as late as in September 1939 was a crucial aspect of the political situation in Cyprus at the end of the 1930s. 1.4 Trade Unions and the Left One of the reasons the period of the Second World War is so significant in modern Cypriot history is that a new force emerged which stood parallel to the established and traditional power of the Church. This force, the Cypriot labour movement, was a new political expression devoted to the betterment of working conditions. The labour movement was initially launched and supported by the Trade Unions and ultimately led to the formation of A.K.E.L. (Progressive Party of Working People) in 1941. The fundamental significance of this new actor and its relevance to the future of Cyprus, was that the labour movement was the first real challenge to the monopoly of the Church within Greek Cypriot society. The initial appearance of any form of labour association in Cyprus can be traced to the second half of the 1880s, when organisations of tradesmen formed voluntary groups under various names such as αδελφότητες (brotherhoods), σύνδεσμοι αποταμιεύσεως (saving societies) and even συντεχνίαι (guilds). Yet such bodies often disintegrated rapidly – the Limassol shoe-maker guild is the only organisation that seems to have survived for long.37 Limassol, the chief commercial centre in Cyprus, was usually the ‘receiving point’ for new ideas on the island; this was certainly the case when an incipient communism evolved, including discussion of events in Russia during 1917-18. At this time socialistic ‘clubs’ and newspapers such as Πυρσός (Pirsos – Torch) made their first appearance.38 As in many parts of the world, the aftermath of the Great War of 1914-18 brought many economic difficulties to Cyprus. Many peasants left their villages during this period – they were absorbed into the larger towns, or they found employment in the island’s foreign-owned mining industry, principally copper. This massive relocation of peasants to urban areas helped create the island’s first proper working class.39 Consequently the first fully-fledged ‘Trade Unions’ appeared in Limassol around 1920, principally in the building trades.40 These were quite primitive organizations, often nothing more than vehicles for the interests of their founders.41 By 1924, however, more mature labour unions emerged such as the ‘Union of Tailor Workers’. In response to the nascent

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Cyprus labour movement, the British administration exiled certain labour ‘agitators’.42 In 1926 the Communist Party of Cyprus (K.K.K.) was officially founded.43 In its official newspaper, the party declared its dedication to the improvement of the economic and social conditions of the proletariat and the forging of brotherly links with workers and peasants in other countries.44 On the national question, the party proposed a radical solution – the independence of Cyprus within a Balkan Soviet Federation.45 This did little to equip the communists to challenge the well established and essentially conservative Enosis movement, and many Greek Cypriots saw the K.K.K. position as an anti-national stance. The events of October 1931 were a first test for the communist party. While the rest of the island declared disobedience to the colonial government and demanded Union with Greece, Cypriot communists took an entirely different attitude. When the rebellion broke out, the K.K.K. denounced it as an expression of the desires of the Church and the bourgeois class and therefore deleterious to workers. However, as the rebellion evolved, some K.K.K. leaders realized the dangers of remaining aloof from what appeared to be a mass movement and they tried to cooperate with the Archbishop in the formation of an anti-imperialistic front. During the October events the world communist organization, Comintern, criticized the K.K.K., alleging that “the uprising was a genuine national liberation movement, in which two camps had opposed each other. On one hand there was the camp of the people, along with simple communists, under the leadership of nationalists and the Church. On the other, there was the camp of imperialists having as an ally the leadership of the Communist Party”.46 The party’s Central Committee issued a communiqué on the 23rd of October, in which it stated that differing aims with respect to the national issue did not preclude common action against imperialism.47 By that time, however, the revolt was already fizzling out. The subsequent repression enforced in Cyprus by the colonial authorities was severe. For the first time, and as an immediate punishment, the British resorted to exile on an extensive scale. This included not only the Bishops but also leading communists. The government amended the Criminal Code in 1933. The Communist Party of Cyprus was formally proscribed, and many communists were imprisoned, in some instances for up to four years.48 Although the party was severely weakened, it nonetheless survived ‘underground’, assisted by the organizational skills of Ploutis Servas. A leading communist figure, and later the first General Secretary of A.K.E.L., Servas had been excluded from the island under the 1931 Defence Regulations. He went to Moscow and then to Athens where he was active in the Communist Party of Greece until the Metaxas regime exiled him. The Cyprus authorities allowed Servas back into

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BRITAIN AND CYPRUS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1878-1939 17 the country in 1935 after he agreed to sign a document declaring he would abstain from any political activity.49 Servas nonetheless succeeded in reorganizing the party with the help of his brother; they concentrated their efforts, however, in the trade union field proper, developing a nucleus for the revival of a communist entity once conditions allowed.50 The Servas brothers were abetted by the relatively moderate attitude of the British towards trade union activism in their empire from the mid-1930s, since it was seen as a counter-weight to more dangerous political developments, and by worsening labour relations on the island, which provided fertile soil for propaganda and recruitment. According to the Annual Report for the social and economic progress of the people of Cyprus for 1939, there were twentytwo strikes on the island that year.51 By this time the British administration was concerned about the possible political implications of the mobilization of the Left, including further public protest and disturbances. 1.5 Palmer’s Rule (1933-1939) The colonial authorities, as represented by Governors Storrs and Stubbs, reacted to the events of October 1931 by introducing a series of strict measures that impinged on the daily life of Cypriots. A form of martial law was imposed through a Defence Order in Council, and subsequent legislation included the prohibition of the Greek flag, the prohibition of five or more persons congregating without permission from the District Commissioner, the prohibition of the ringing of church bells except for regular services, and censorship of the press.52 The Legislative Council was abolished and all powers were vested in the Governor who exercised authority with the help of an Executive Council consisting of himself, four official nominated members (the Colonial Secretary, the Commissioner of Nicosia, the Attorney General and the Treasurer) and three non official members nominated by the Governor. In 1933, an Advisory Council was formed to create ‘a channel through which the Government might audit the community on questions of legislation and other matters affecting the relations between the Government and the people’53 but there was no real representative organ on the island. In addition, the Governor suspended all municipal elections and appointed all councillors himself. By 1933, when the new Governor, Sir Richmond Palmer, took office, the new status quo was characterized by the officials themselves as one of ‘benevolent autocracy’. Not surprisingly, many Greek Cypriots did not see this autocracy as particularly benevolent. Indeed, in Greek Cypriot historiography, the name of Governor Palmer has been identified with the most autocratic period of the British occupation, the ‘Palmerokratia’ (Παλμεροκρατία). All real local power lay in the hands of the Governor, who ruled via Orders in Councils. An ironic consequence

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of British repression after 1931, however, was that whilst the Church itself was the focus of some of these restraints, and for various reasons remained unable to resolve the question of filling the vacant Archbishop’s throne, its status as the authentic ‘voice’ of Greek Cypriot aspirations was only reinforced. Beginning in 1937, tensions between the British administration and the Church increased. Growing Greek Cypriot support for Bishop Chrysanthos of Trapezounta – Apokrisarios (representative) of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Athens and a suitable candidate for the vacant Archpiscopal throne – was countered by the Cyprus Government, which feared that, like Leontios, Chrysanthos would advocate Enosis. Palmer quickly introduced two laws in 1937 mandating that the new Archbishop had to be a British subject (Bishop Chrysanthos was Greek), and that the election of an unqualified candidate could be vetoed by the Government. In 1938, the Locum Tenens was confined by Government prohibition within the limits of Paphos municipality following further ‘political’ activity on his part. On Holy Monday, 3 April, the Cyprus Police searched the Archbishopric premises in Nicosia looking for ‘seditious’ documents and even firearms.54 Although no guns were found, the archives of the 1931 National Organization were seized, and the Government confined the Bishop to Paphos until May 1940. However, even in the Colonial Office itself there was a degree of embarrassment over the apparent prosecution of an ancient Christian Church by a British colonial authority, especially the raid on the archiepiscopal palace, which the authority officially described as ‘an unfortunate accident’.55 The Left also suffered during the ‘Palmerokratia’, and the Cyprus Communist Party was decimated. The censorship reinforced by legislation in 1936, to control the import of foreign newspapers, specifically targeted radical influences. By the end of the 1930s, the various blockages and repressions instituted by the colonial government underpinned a taut political atmosphere in Cyprus. This explains the edgy and resistant texture which came to characterize the Enosis movement which, though forced underground , never ceased to be a defining ideal for most Greek Cypriots. 1.6 Cyprus on the Eve of the Second World War Beginning in the mid-1930s, there was a metropolitan reaction against the repressiveness of colonial practice in many British territories. In tandem with this reaction, events had unfolded throughout the British Empire, such as the riots in the West Indies in 1937, that fueled rising international tensions. These incidents cost Britain much of its credibility and made London wary of confrontation throughout the colonies. The more Britain projected herself as a liberal world power in an age of fascist dictators, the more an association with

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BRITAIN AND CYPRUS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1878-1939 19 colonial autocracy – and colonial poverty – was potentially embarrassing. Because Cyprus had become subject to a particularly ‘tight’ form of autocratic rule, and because it was a ‘European’ colony, an unusual and highly sensitive phenomenon, Britain risked much embarrassment as a result of any false steps it made in Cyprus. This explains the forceful debate in the British press following the publication of articles in The Daily Telegraph and The Morning Post on 28 and 29 December 1938 criticizing the blanket censorship of the press in Cyprus. The author of these articles wrote: “…The people complain that the present system makes it impossible for anyone to express his opinions freely…The press is under rigid control, and no reason is given when administrative action is taken against a paper…”. The article applied the same criticism to constitutional representation as well: “They (the people) strongly maintain that the Advisory Council, which sits in private, does not fulfill the object for which it was created, to serve as a channel for the expression of the views of the people. Its eight nominees do not include representatives of vitally important activities such as agriculture and finance, and nominees showing any independence of mind are dropped. Moreover, measures intimately concerning the people, they affirm, are prepared without consulting even those whom the Government nominated as representatives of the people. An instance quoted is the Rural Debts Bill just published which affects 80 per cent of the population, but has never been discussed in the Council”.56 The presence in London of a well established Cypriot community – including an active intelligentsia which energetically submitted articles and letters to metropolitan newspapers, helped to foment such discussion.57 Any sign of debate in Britain about ‘repression’ in Cyprus encouraged Greek Cypriots to take more risks in offending what was called the ‘Palmerist Dictatorship’. The Greek Cypriot press extensively reproduced publications from the British press in its call for the improvement of the existing environment. The major Greek Cypriot newspaper Ελευθερία (Eleftheria – Freedom), published translations of articles critical of the island’s colonial administration.58 In one of its editorials, Ελευθερία asserted that the existing regime on the island could only prove damaging to the Empire’s affairs, since its violation of democracy and liberty could easily prove fertile ground for enemy propaganda.59 Pushed onto the defensive, the Cyprus Government – under great pressure particularly from Whitehall – agreed to a substantial relaxation of press censorship in early February 1939. This sense that the local colonial autocracy, which had successfully exploited the opportunity presented by the disturbances of 1931, was now running out of steam and subject to new pressures for reform,

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was part and parcel of the distinctive atmosphere on the island as war approached in Europe. Governor Palmer and his administration, however, were determined to severely limit any reform. Palmer explained to his superiors that, whilst lifting censorship might win some plaudits, it was bound to cause more problems than it solved. Indeed, it was axiomatic to the British Colonial Government inside Cyprus – and was always to remain so – that the moment a repressive apparatus was dismantled, an Enosis movement would emerge with all of its previous vigor and insistence.60 There was certainly proof of this as the modification of censorship was immediately followed by a fresh agitation to restore constitutional liberties in Cyprus, with newspaper articles calling for such action followed by a deluge of petitions from towns and villages.61 The petitions clarified that Cypriots were loyal to Britain but that the form of the authoritarian administration clashed with claims of British ‘liberalism’.62 By June 1939 there were 73 such petitions circulating in the six main towns, and 67 in village areas.63 These petitions were always a characteristic of public politics in Greek Cyprus, testimony not only to a high rate of literacy amongst this most distinctive ‘colonial’ population, but also to complex institutional links which made such mobilization feasible. While a renewed Enosis enthusiasm took hold, increased labour militancy provided fresh opportunities for communist agitators, and the Cyprus government was clearly facing more difficulties than it had since October 1931. So far as proponents of Enosis were concerned, the administration’s basic argument remained the same: that it did not represent the real views of the people. Evidence for this could usually be provided to the Colonial Office, as when the Governor was assured by the Mukhtar, on a visit to the village of Assia in Famagusta District in March 1939, that the villagers were entirely happy with the Government’s policy – though in this case a counter-petition was quickly set afoot to rebut any such assertion.64 In another instance, a member of the Municipal Council of Nicosia personally promoted the petitions in various villages throughout the island and his appointment to the Council was immediately revoked.65 Such political turbulence was inspired by the prospect of Palmer’s departure from the island. Indeed, such ‘changes of the guard’ in British colonial Cyprus always created a febrile public atmosphere rife with expectations about what a new regime might offer. The same expectations had accompanied Sir Garnet Wolseley’s arrival in Cyprus in 1878.66 On 5 July 1939 the Secretary of State for Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, made a statement in Parliament regarding the future of Cyprus. MacDonald defended the past actions of the British administration, but he outlined a prospective restoration of the representative principle in the governance of the

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BRITAIN AND CYPRUS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1878-1939 21 Colony. MacDonald emphasized, however, that this would be achieved primarily through ‘a gradual increase of responsibility in local government’ rather than through the restoration of a fully fledged colonial legislature.67 MacDonald also advised that it would be for a new Governor to evaluate things himself before any radical new initiative could be set in motion. In this manner the Secretary of State sought to dampen any excessive enthusiasm prior to the arrival in Cyprus of Sir William Battershill, Palmer’s successor, on 10 August 1939. The London Times reported his arrival in Larnaca as follows: “…The announcement of his appointment a few months ago was greeted with genuine approval by all parties, and on landing at Larnaca he was given an enthusiastic reception…The local press and interested bodies … have freely expressed their hopes of the numerous political and other reforms which they confidently expect the new Governor will put into effect immediately”.68 Inevitably, Battershill swiftly found himself in receipt of 27 new petitions calling for renewed constitutional freedom.69 “The people here seem to have a fantastic faith in me but I fear they will soon be disillusioned”, he wrote in a private letter to his mother in August 1939, “The newspapers continue to say what a fine fellow I am…they feel sure I shall give self government to the Cypriots…When they know what I am going to recommend – I have not made my mind yet but it certainly won’t be self government or anything like it – then they will be furious…”.70 Disillusionment, dashed expectations and mutual suspicion had long been embedded in Anglo-Hellenic relationships, and this was especially prevalent in British Colonial Cyprus after 1878. As Governor Battershill’s writings prove, such a pattern had a profound effect on the island’s affairs by the end of the 1930s. This inherently fragile and divisive situation was soon subject to the ensuing pressures of a wartime polity.

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2 THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS

2.1 The ‘Change of Guard’ in Cyprus On the eve of the War, Cypriots expected a lot from the Colonial Government. Any change in the colonial hierarchy of the island habitually raised hopes for improvement in local affairs. In particular, the departure of Sir Richmond Palmer from the island and the arrival of a Governor with a more liberal reputation triggered anticipations of constitutional reform. The new Governor, William Battershill, was familiar to Cypriots since he had previously served in the island as Colonial Secretary from 1934 to 1937 and had built a sympathetic reputation. On his departure from London, Battershill received a petition from the Cypriot Brotherhood of London; the delegation that handed him the petition included Glafkos Klerides, later so prominent in the Greek political arena. The petition expressed trust in the new Governor and the wish that the gap that existed between the Government and the people of Cyprus would soon be diminished. Desire for a solution of the archiepiscopal problem, always so important to the Cypriot populace, was also expressed in this petition.1 Simultaneously, events concerning Greece, not least an increasing closeness between Greece and Britain, had heightened Cypriot expectation. The dictatorial regime of General Ioannis Metaxas, established 4 August 1936, broadly maintained a traditional pro-British policy in Athens. However, as in the rest of southeastern Europe, German infiltration of the Greek economy rapidly increased during the second half of the 1930s -though this was not reflected in increased German political influence.2 In fact, General Metaxas had initiated in 1938 the proposition of a formal treaty between Greece and Britain, though Britain initially avoided such a commitment for a variety of reasons, one of which was Britain’s inability to produce the military equipment such an agreement presupposed. British industry at that time was already at

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full pelt trying to churn out defence goods to meet the demands of other partners, particularly those in her Empire-Commonwealth.3 Furthermore, there were broader naval considerations to be taken into account, as the British Government had recently reaffirmed a critical commitment to Australia in case a crisis erupted in the Pacific area. Nevertheless, Metaxas, despite recognizing the impossibility of Britain taking all Balkan partners under its wing, remained determined to keep Greece in the British sphere of influence.4 Indeed, in April 1939, when the Italian occupation of Albania indicated further regional upsets ahead, Britain and France unilaterally offered a guarantee of territorial integrity to Greece, provided Greece resisted aggression.5 When Britain declared war on Germany on 3 September, following the latter’s attack on Poland, Metaxas expressed his wish to see the Anglo-French alliance triumph.6 The cooperation and friendship between Greece and Britain as a new panEuropean crisis took shape directly affected public opinion in Cyprus, as it convinced Cypriots that local political reform was likely to receive a boost. In reality, Greek Cypriots’ expectations were, as always, likely to be disappointed, since British intentions towards representative reform on the island remained very restricted, as evidenced by Malcolm MacDonald’s statement of 5 July 1939. Nevertheless, such hopes and demands were necessarily at first put ‘on hold’, since the absolute priority lay in an Allied victory over a fascist opponent. In this struggle, Cypriots were to make a notable contribution; one that was to be a factor in political developments on the island. 2.2 The Onset of War As in most parts of the world, acute disturbance in Cyprus could not be avoided with the eruption of the War, and its outbreak had a significant impact in the daily life of most Cypriots. The Colonial Government had to make provisions for the safety and welfare of the population, and its most immediate problem was the control of profiteering and the financial uncertainty it created. Unavoidable increases in the prices of goods were stemmed by Orders of the Governor.7 However, a predictable atmosphere of panic caused many Cypriots to withdraw their savings from banks. Such was the financial turbulence that authorities were forced to call for a four day closure of the banks in early September, by which time new legislation prohibiting business, unless under license, came into effect.8 In the face of this economic instability, the Bank of Cyprus and three other banks came close to suspending all payments.9 Other Government measures followed, including the establishment of consultative organs to advise officials on issues of economic management.10 Significantly, whilst the local press welcomed the formation of these offices, they expressed the hope that participants in this process would be selected from

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 25 a broader background and, by implication, not just from the ‘magic circle’ of Cypriots hitherto approved by Government House and embraced by the Colonial bureaucracy.11 Additional measures taken by the Colonial government included the censorship of telegrams and the excavation of trenches for use in the event of an air raid.12 The Colonial Government of Cyprus had been under much pressure and subject to much criticism for some time, not only from the island’s press but also from the papers in metropolitan Britain, yet a significant modification of the political mood set in after the War began. This shift in mood was reflected in an article published in Ελευθερία (Freedom) by Ioannis C. Klerides, an up-andcoming Nicosia lawyer who had participated in the 1937 delegation to London to request more liberal reforms. Klerides explained he had been about to write a series of critical commentaries on political life in Cyprus, but he went on to state that under current circumstances he now felt such demands should be temporarily put aside. “Our duty”, Klerides said, “is to leave both the Government of Cyprus and the Colonial Office undistracted so as to successfully confront the present critical situation…It has to be repeated, as we have previously declared to the Secretary of State for Colonies, that the fact that we are Greeks does not make us any less interested in the fate of the British Empire than any other British citizen”.13 Such a declaration, coming from a member of a highly influential professional family in Greek Cypriot society, led to a flow of similar statements in the local press asserting that now was not the time to agitate on constitutional matters.14 Against this background, the rising crescendo of anti-Government opinion in Cypriot newspapers abruptly stopped and most editorials declared loyalty to the British war effort. The Governor himself, both surprised and impressed by the Cypriots’ reaction to the War, exclaimed that “the Cypriot is a volatile subject. His allegiances, when inspired by deep feeling, are generously given”.15 Still, an inherent suspicion and nervousness in the mentality of British colonial officialdom in Cyprus displayed itself in an assessment of the motives that drove both the vernacular press and the Greek Cypriots in general to reverse their previous attitude. A Colonial Office official expressed his disbelief that this state of affairs could last very long, while the Governor himself conveyed to London his contention that the reason Cypriots demonstrated such loyalty towards Great Britain was that they believed they would be granted greater constitutional liberties by the end of the war.16 Nevertheless, Cypriot willingness to remain at Britain’s side received due recognition in certain important quarters. King George VI himself expressed his appreciation for the loyalty shown by the Cypriot population.17 In addition, the Greek Cypriot press regularly republished articles from foreign newspapers that commented on the surprising goodwill of Cypriots towards Britain.

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Meeting a few days after the onset of hostilities in Europe, the colony’s Advisory Council, which included a number of prominent Cypriots, recommended the creation of a military corps of five hundred Cypriots that would participate in the war with the British Army. In his speech, Governor Battershill expressed his belief that Cypriots would generously contribute to the proposed scheme. “I am convinced about the outcome but before we succeed an outrageous struggle lies ahead of us”, he stated. “Cyprus, not less than Great Britain and the Empire, has to play her own part in the present war…I am convinced that the people of Cyprus are willing and prepared to share the sufferings, the disasters and the trials which will come until we accomplish the final victory”.18 Cypriots responded to the call, and by the middle of October the first batch of the Cypriot Section of the Royal Army Service Corps left Larnaca for Egypt, receiving an enthusiastic farewell on their departure. A series of articles, published in Ελευθερία by a journalist who accompanied a draft of Cypriot volunteers to Egypt, described the enthusiasm of those involved.19 A Greek newspaper in Alexandria remarked that this enthusiasm did not dissipate once the Cypriot recruits arrived in Egypt itself.20 Soon afterwards, the extension of the recruiting scheme to the enlistment of Cypriots as muleteers in Pack Transport Companies of the Royal Army Service Corps was announced and met with similar enthusiasm.21 The Times commented on the loyalty of Cypriots: “The people of the island whether Greeks or Turks, have shown enthusiastic loyalty. Two volunteer transport units are already serving overseas. Before February 18, when the King approved the formation of a Cyprus Regiment consisting of combatant troops, pioneers and transport, 6000 men had volunteered for service. The number of volunteers is understood to have been nearly doubled since.”22 Although Cyprus had played a role in World War I, not least in the largescale provision of pack animals for British armies in the Middle East, the extensive participation of Cypriots in the British armed forces both on land and in the air after September 1939 had no precedent. The Cypriot response to the present call to arms could not be without effect, both as to how the British now regarded their Cypriot subjects and as to what Cypriots themselves expected to be their due reward should the Allies eventually prevail. 2.3 The Return of the 1931 Deportees: The Case of Theofanis Theodotou The Cyprus Government could hardly watch these events unfold without making some concessions to the people of Cyprus and striking a sympathetic note, particularly since much was expected from the new colonial Governor who had seemingly brought an ‘air of change’ to Cyprus. One of the initiatives Battershill now took was to permit Theofanis Theodotou, a former member of the Legislative Council and one of the 1931 deportees, to return to the island.

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 27 The question of the return of the 1931 exiles had long preoccupied Greek Cypriots. In 1937, the King of Greece, George II, had discreetly discussed with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden the possibility of their return as a means of reducing tensions on the island.23 The official British position had been that it would be re-examined after the end of Sir Richmond Palmer’s governorship.24 In early December, however, Battershill announced that Theodotou would be allowed to return to the island, provided he did not participate in local politics.25 Public opinion in response to this news was positive, but Greek Cypriots soon began speculating as to whether or not the other exiles would be allowed to return. An editorial in Φωνή της Κύπρου (Voice of Cyprus) commented that ‘the Colonial Office and the Government of Cyprus must be sure that Cypriots will appreciate and will greet with much gratitude such a decision so that a common effort might be made for successfully encountering the present crucial situation and for the country’s progress in general’.26 It was clear to most Greek Cypriots that the Government’s initiative in the case of the exile of Theodotou represented a first step in turning the page on 1931. Theofanis Theodotou returned to Cyprus on 31 December 1939. It was immediately surmised in Ελευθερία that Theodotou and the Locum Tenens would meet to discuss the still burning issue of the archiepiscopal vacancy, thus immediately violating the conditions of Theodotou’s return to the island, but Theodotou was quick to deny any such involvement on his part in public questions.27 Nevertheless, this modest change of ‘atmosphere’ led very quickly to the circulation of petitions for the return of Bishop Makarios from his own prolonged deportation. Such village petitions, including those from Palechori in the Pitsilia area and Angastina in the Famagusta district, linked the Makarios issue to that of the vacant archiepiscopacy. This, indeed, demonstrates that not even the outbreak of war and a concomitant display of Cypriot ‘loyalty’ to Britain, for whatever reason, obscured the centrality of the 1931 experience in the Cypriot consciousness. The Government attributed this renewed pressure not to the Locum Tenens, Leontios, but to local newspaper editors.28 In fact, there was no immediate prospect of the other 1931 exiles, ecclesiastical or communist, being allowed back into Cyprus, despite the wishes of the Greek Cypriot community.29 As Battershill stated privately, the decision over Theodotou had merely been intended as an experiment. Local reaction to Theodotou’s return, and to his subsequent activities, were to provide a measure for the Government to assess whether further liberalizing measures might be risked. Bishop Makarios II, eventually destined to be Archbishop, was not to return to Cyprus until after the War was over.

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2.4 Church Attitudes after the Onset of European Hostilities The cold and edgy relationship between colonial authorities and the Church did not improve with the departure of Governor Palmer from the island as relations between Battershill and the Locum Tenens certainly started out on the wrong foot. Bishop Leontios was not invited to the welcoming ceremony for the new Governor, a snub which did nothing to promote reconciliation between the two institutions. Instead of Bishop Leontios, clerics of lower standing, such as the Archimandrite of Kitium, were called to take part in the celebrations. The absence of Leontios at the inauguration of Battershill received extensive publicity in the Greek Cypriot press which, given the lifting of censorship, was able to criticize the Government of Cyprus more freely than it had been under Palmer. George Vassiliades, a well known lawyer and political figure, wrote a letter to the Colonial Secretary and the Police Commissioner asking that Leontios be included in the ceremonial inauguration of the new Governor.30 When this did not happen,31 Vassiliades was ‘exposed’ to the criticism of more radical Greek Cypriot opinion, a classic case of the embarrassment often suffered by Greek Cypriot ‘moderates’ in the island’s political life. The first formal contact between Battershill and Leontios was a telegram Leontios sent to Battershill in which he raised, among other issues, the sensitive matters of national aspirations and education. The message, which mixed a flattering welcome with barbed political criticism, began by protesting ‘against our national persecution by the propagandist and absolutist Cyprus Government’, before extending the warm welcome of Cypriots, as pro-British Greeks, to the representative of ‘philhellenic Britain’. From his place of confinement, Leontios greeted Battershill’s arrival ‘in our beautiful Greek island’ but observed that Cypriots, especially the youth, looked forward to the ‘recognition, restoration and fulfillment of their national aspirations’.32 Leontios was clearly bent on asserting the traditional role of the Church leader as a mediator between the people and the government, something the colonial authority was not willing to concede. Governor Battershill anticipated that sooner or later the government should challenge the Church’s claim to Ethnarchy and wean it from its attachment to Enosis.33 Meanwhile, those in government circles had been heartened to learn that Ioannis Klerides had urged Leontios to put aside immediate demands for Enosis until more limited reforms had been granted.34 Indeed, the revival of moderate Greek Cypriot opinion as war loomed boosted British hopes that a wedge might be driven between a younger group of reformists, centered around Klerides, and traditional radicals. It was even mooted in the Colonial Office that consideration should be given to the prospect of granting Cypriots a degree of local representation, in order to give greater scope to those who shared Klerides’s views and put Enosis ‘radicals’ on the defensive.35

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 29 Leontios’s basic tactic, at the outbreak of war, lay in an enigmatic caution likely to irritate those in residence in Government House. One example of his approach was the arrangement of prayers for the victory of Britain and her allies in Orthodox churches throughout the island; that Leontios did not issue a statement to the Orthodox people of Cyprus upon the onset of the war was interpreted by the authorities as evidence of his pro-German feelings or, as Battershill reported, that he was waiting to see how the war evolved. In support of his position, the Governor reported that when Leontios was asked by Church colleagues whether prayers should be said for the Allies, he replied that he was not sure, since a German victory in the European conflict was probable. Some priests, however, initiated services calling for the victory of Britain and her allies, often with the help of Church committees in various villages.36 The pro-German sentiment of the Locum Tenens was not something that could be proved, but evidence does suggest that many within the Church opposed Leontios’s equivocal approach to the start of the War particularly at the end of October when Leontios openly criticized any ‘pro-Allied prayers’. Given that in other Cypriot quarters the Allied war effort had met with positive opinion and cooperation, it is not surprising that the Government’s suspicions focused on the Locum Tenens himself. Criticism towards Leontios in some cases came also from amongst certain Greek Cypriots.37 This situation was compounded by appeals from the British Red Cross, which were launched in October 1939. The Governor’s pleas for aid met with widespread support from all classes, and a daily column appeared in newspapers listing the names of donors and the sums they had donated. By early November donations to the Red Cross had reached the sum of £4500.38 The issue of Cypriot support for the British Red Cross also revealed fissures within the Church hierarchy. Whilst Leontios sought to use his authority to halt donations, various Church Committees, in villages such as Rizokarpaso and Akanthou, responded to the call for help. Leontios warned these committees not to flout his authority. By December, however, the Greek Consul in Cyprus, Eleftherios Mavrokefalos, circulated an appeal for a Greek Red Cross Fund separate from its British counterpart. Although the Cyprus Government looked suspiciously on this initiative as a means of keeping Enosis feelings alive,39 the appeal was received with extensive enthusiasm from Cypriots who donated generously, and £1000 was quickly gathered. Leontios himself promised to donate the sum of £25040 - his pledge was mentioned in the Athenian newspaper Εστία (Hestia).41 Leontios drafted an encyclical calling for generous contributions to this new Red Cross fund but the Greek Consul objected to this encyclical, however, as it feared colonial intervention.42 Nevertheless, the Greek Red Cross gave an

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opportunity to individual churches and monasteries to demonstrate their true loyalty to Greece without being accused of betraying the war effort. For example, a contribution of £20 made by the Phaneromeni Church of Nicosia to the British Red Cross was accompanied by a donation of £100 to the Greek Red Cross. In this way, some Greek Cypriots maintained a balance between the various loyalties which, either out of tactical necessity or firm conviction, they continued to honour. Still under local confinement in Paphos, the Locum Tenens had to circumscribe his activities. One way to do so was through the use of close clerical allies as ‘proxies’, especially Kyprianos Kyriakides, later Bishop of Kyrenia. Kyriakides delivered sermons throughout the island in which he criticized the Colonial Government and discussed national aspirations. On one occasion, in the Phaneromeni church of Nicosia, he advised his congregation to beware of the propaganda disseminated by all the major belligerents in the current war, since each was ‘trying to get rich by selling munitions’.43 In early November, he delivered an oration in the Ayia Trias church of Yialousa, in which he declared flatly that “the King of England should not be prayed for in the Orthodox churches because he is not an Orthodox believer”. His repeated assertion that the Church only desired the union of Cyprus with Greece also attracted attention.44 Naturally the Colonial Government closely followed these sermons, which they considered openly seditious, and there was a considerable amount of discussion, both within the Colonial Government of Cyprus and in the Colonial Office, as to whether or not Kyriakides should be prosecuted. Although Battershill was tempted to use Emergency regulations against Kyriakides, the Cyprus Attorney General, Lancelot Blood, advised Battershill that not only was there no sustainable legal ground for prosecution, but that recourse to Emergency legislation would only jeopardize wider public cooperation and sympathetic public opinion. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, was especially opposed to any legal action taken ‘against political agitators, who may be obnoxious to Colonial Governors but against whom there is no evidence of enemy association’.45 Thus Kyriakides remained free to continue his activities on Leontios’s behalf, which caused much of the enmity between the Colonial administration and much of the Orthodox Church hierarchy to fester. Behind much of this mutual uneasiness lay the intractable issue of the vacant archiepiscopal throne, which was tied to the much desired repeal of the repressive Church laws enacted during the ‘Palmocracy’ of the 1930s and a prerequisite for better Church-Government relations. In late November 1939 Christodoulos Galatopoulos, a former member of the Legislative Council and a major political figure of Paphos, sent a letter to the local press commenting on

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 31 a potential thaw in Government-Church relations and offering to act an intermediary between the two parties.46 The letter intensified rumours that the Colonial Government was prepared to repeal the hated laws instituted by Palmer, provided Leontios would not be a candidate in any future archiepiscopal election. The press – and local opinion in general – favoured the settlement of this thorny problem. Leontios’s ecclesiastical opponents, however, feared that once such a repeal was in effect, Leontios would exploit his considerable prestige to insist on putting himself forward as Archbishop and Ethnarch. Such internal divisions were heightened by expectations that the Government would eventually feel bound to permit a fresh set of municipal elections after a long interval. The gradual revival of ‘normal’ political life, or the anticipation of such a revival, intensified immanent Cypriot rivalries, and suspicions at various levels began to overlap in critical ways. Although Leontios expressed his willingness to meet with the Governor in the early part of 1940, and at one point offered a personal donation of £50 to the British Red Cross, Battershill and his senior colleagues continued to hold the Locum Tenens very much at arm’s length. Colonial officials believed that by such gambits Leontios was trying to prove to Greek Cypriots that any failure to come to a settlement was not his fault.47 Two factors stirred the wariness in Government House. The first arose in the wake of feelers Leontios put out towards the Turkish Cypriot community following a serious earthquake in Turkey in December 1939. After the earthquake, Leontios sent his sympathies to the Turkish consul in Nicosia and gave his blessing to the collections of relief funds to be sent to the Turkish mainland. In Cyprus there was nothing more calculated to arouse the anxieties of the local colonial administration than any sign of Turkish and Greek representative figures working together for common purposes48 - such a phenomenon had been one of the reasons the British had been so pleased to suspend the constitution in 1931. The second factor aggrieving Government House was the growing likelihood of Greek belligerency after Greece’s persistent rival, Italy, entered the War on Germany’s side in June 1940. The Colonial Government feared that Greek participation in the war would inevitably raise the prospect of a wave of pro-Hellenic – and by extension, pro-Enosis – feelings in Cyprus. Should Greece take up arms against Italy, Greek-Cypriot volunteers were likely to flock to the Greek Army, not the British.49 Indeed, the fear of the repercussions a surge of pro-Hellenic feelings might have on the island led the Governor to hasty actions. Such was the case with the annual Pan-Cyprian Games, in which Greek athletes were invited to take part.50 Battershill initially pleaded with the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Michael Palairet, to withhold visas from the Greek athletes, but he was unsuccessful. When Battershill finally agreed to their participation in the games, he was widely

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applauded by the Greek Cypriot community. In the end the Greek athletes did not arrive,51 but the opening ceremonies were a jubilant expression of Hellenic solidarity,52 and the crowd enthusiastically applauded Leontios and the Greek consul. Neither the Governor nor the Commissioner of Nicosia attended.53 Once the period of his confinement finally ended in May 1940, Leontios returned to Nicosia, although he was careful to moderate some of his statements. He responded positively to a government call later that month for services in all Orthodox Churches for the Empire and the Allies,54 and he declared his willingness to meet with Battershill.55 Nevertheless, the Colonial Government remained wary of him. Just prior to the dramatic entry of Greece into hostilities on 28 October 1940, Leontios proceeded to a move for which he was severely criticized even by his supporters. Subsequent to solicitations from the Trade Unions that the Church ought to assist in alleviating the distress of the unemployed,56 Leontios invited representatives of the Nicosia Unions to the Archbishopric. During the meeting, the Bishop showed great interest in the welfare of working men.57 He agreed with the request for the provision of emergency food supplies to the unemployed, which the Mayor of Nicosia, Themistocles Dervis, opposed.58 Nevertheless, the negative stance the Trade Unions took towards the various funds that were organized for the Greek cause a few weeks later set them against the majority of Greek-Cypriots, particularly those on the conservative Right. Ultimately, however, Greece’s entry into the war in Europe was to profoundly influence the stance adopted by the Church and by Cypriots in general. 2.5 New Shifts in Press Opinion and Government Policy Greek Cypriots naturally followed news of the war at large with great interest and apprehension. After a few months of coverage of ongoing hostilities, however, the local press returned its attention to events within Cyprus, especially to such matters as the archiepiscopal vacancy, the prospect of municipal elections, unemployment, education and rural debt. According to an editorial in Ελευθερία “…the year 1940 finds Cyprus in a state of political truce; it does not however find her indifferent towards other matters that may influence the island’s internal life”.5 The relaxation of censorship made for a more open discussion of political issues, an impulse intensified by the possible re-introduction of municipal elections. As Ανεξάρτητος (Anexartitos - Independent) hinted, Cypriots’ willingness to moderate their political demands did not prevent them from seeking the return of electoral politics, albeit within a limited sphere.60 Such elections had not been held since 1931, having been ruled out of order in 1935, whilst in 1938 a law was passed extending the mandate of the existing nominated councils to 1940. Governor Palmer had actually favoured

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 33 permanently excising the elective element from the Municipal Corporations Law; as one official commented, the municipalities did not teach the Cypriots ‘the art of managing their own affairs’.61 Nevertheless, such a suggestion had been unacceptable to the Secretary of State Ormsby-Gore, in London, on the grounds it would attract unfavourable attention in the Westminster Parliament. The situation after September 1939, and above all the generally cooperative attitude of most Cypriots towards the British war effort, had some impact. At a time when Britain was soliciting the help of Cypriots in its overall war effort, any further restriction of representative mechanisms, even at the municipal level, was likely to strike a very jarring note. Even Battershill could see some advantage in the reintroduction of municipal elections, since this might bring Greek Cypriot moderates more to the fore.62 On 22nd March, a date chosen in part to distract attention from the usual celebrations attending Greek Independence Day on the 25th, the Colonial Government announced that municipal elections would take place at some point in 1941. However, the course of military events – most significantly the eventual surrender of Crete after heroic resistance to the Axis in late May 1941 – ultimately forced the postponement of these elections until March 1943. Nevertheless, from the moment the Government announced its decision in principle to revive ‘popular’ politics in Cyprus, the impetus already noted for contending parties to stake out their future positions was bound to gather apace. Following the restoration of freedom of the press, its management became increasingly important to the colonial authorities. The Cyprus Government was often displeased with the gloss the London periodicals added to their reportage of Cypriot contributions to the war, since these contributions were linked to suggestions, made frequently, that some appropriate ‘political’ reward would be granted in due time. For example, The Times reported that the first colonial service personnel under British colours to reach France in January 1940 had in fact been Cypriot. Soon thereafter, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain addressed Parliament: “The Colonial Empire still continues to bring valuable reinforcement of many kinds to our war effort”, Chamberlain stated. “Hon. Members will know that the first Colonial contingent has now arrived in France in the form of a transport unit from Cyprus. It is representative of all those Colonial military forces which are ready to defend their own lands and liberties against the common enemy.”63 The resulting plaudits were inevitably reproduced in Cypriot newspapers.64 The colonial authorities in Cyprus, however, worried that an excessively rosy view of things elsewhere might counteract the extreme caution they often urged on the Colonial Office, and the Governor therefore shortly conveyed the cold douche to a Whitehall colleague informing him that the island was “…riddled with politics at the

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moment and is likely to remain so for all time so far as I can see. The so called political truce is a farce”.65 In order to ensure what they regarded as more balanced and informed press coverage, the administration and the British Council established a new Englishlanguage newspaper, the Cyprus Post. The British Council also collaborated with the Ministry of Information to bring a Cypriot press delegation to Britain, an excursion that would include a visit to France. Although the main right wing nationalist editors refused to join the delegation, six other editors (four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots) traveled to Britain, where they had meetings at such institutions as the Trades Union Congress and the Colonial Office.66 Their presence in Britain attracted a good deal of press attention, almost all of it appreciative of Cyprus’ part in the war. According to The Times, “this [the number of Cypriot volunteers] is a remarkable record for a population of at most 350,000 souls, inhabiting an island so poor, and for so long a period neglected, as to be known as the Cinderella Colony. It is to be hoped that the British Government and the Colonial Office will not forget it when the war has ended.”67 Back in Cyprus, local newspapers regularly hinted at postwar advances.68 The growing maturity of the Cyprus press, combined with greater ‘politicization’ at home as conditions evolved, would have a significant effect on Cypriot public opinion throughout the remainder of the war. 2.6 Consolidation of the Labour Movement after September 1939 As workers worldwide endured trying times, from the late 1920s onward, so did the labour movement in Cyprus. When the first official law concerning Trade Unions was enacted, in 1931, the response was disappointing, and as of 1932 there was only one Trade Union registered, with no new registrations in 1933 and 1934.69 ‘Infant’ industrialization during the following years, however, spurred the rapid foundation of 46 Trade Unions by the end of 1939, nurturing a nascent yet vigorous labour movement. British colonial practice was not against emergent labour representation in the island – on the contrary, it favoured such growth. Especially during wartime, the British believed Trade Unions should be encouraged to improve economic efficiency. In 1940 the administration appointed an official Labour Adviser to handle increasingly contested labour matters.70 The post was created to ensure the evolution of labour arrangements in the Colonial Government’s own image; local British officialdom was also eager to avoid the takeover of the Trade Unions by communist agitators, whereby the latter could come back ‘above ground’. This issue became increasingly important to the British as time went on. The Communist Party of Cyprus (K.K.K.) was proscribed after the disturbances of 1931 but managed to survive by operating underground. The

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 35 outbreak of the war in Europe and the peculiarity of the political conditions on the island at the time created more opportunities for interference in local affairs, especially through the Trade Unions. Government determination to repress this interference underlay its decision not to grant permission to representatives of all Cyprus Trade Unions to meet in Nicosia on 6 August 1939. This move was criticized not only by union organizers but also by the conservative newspaper, Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ (New Cypriot Guardian), which remarked that the only conceivable reason for the administration’s decision lay in ‘the autarchic spirit that is characteristic of the governing system of the last years’.71 The Governor may have been especially keen to keep such a meeting away from the capital of the island, since Nicosia was the bastion of both the nationalist bourgeoisie and the conservative Church. Permission was finally granted for the meeting to take place in Famagusta, a major commercial city, the alternative to Nicosia, Limassol, having also been rejected as a ‘radical heartland’. The absence of any superior organ for the coordination of the actions of disparate Trade Unions severely curtailed any possibility of bringing pressure to bear directly on the Government. The 6th of August marked the first attempt by the Trade Unions to create a Pan-Cyprian Conference. As a result of the conference, the Trade Unions presented their requests to the authorities in the form of petitions calling for the improvement of working conditions, labour legislation and social insurance, but the conference itself failed to establish any working machinery on a Pan-Cyprian basis, a goal that would not be realized until 1941. The outbreak of the Second World War nonetheless brought intense economic dislocation to Cyprus, and it was this dislocation that helped the Trade Unions’ realize the need for collective action, which necessarily involved strikes. The Government saw such strikes as the result of communist influence, but the growth of a restless labour movement was also clearly due to increasing unemployment. Former markets now in Axis countries were closed to Cyprus, while the restriction of certain materials hurt contractors – many were forced to shut their operations, while shipping shortages contributed to the deleterious effect the war had on the island’s economy. Size of production in Cyprus was also a problem: according to one official analysis, ‘…small quantities located away from the main shipping routes do not conduce to the most economical employment of a limited tonnage’.72 On the first day of the war, employees of the Public Works Department went on strike and only returned to work when the government gave them a twenty-four hours deadline before dismissal.73 In the mining industry, where most wage-workers were employed, problems also speedily arose. Prior to the beginning of the war, there were about 8000 mining jobs on the island, but half of these employees were let go.74 The Cyprus

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Mines Corporation ceased operations at Skouriotissa and Mavrovouni in response to the closure of the German market while the abrupt halt to commercial mining operations at Kalavasos devastated the Cyprus working class.75 The situation clearly necessitated some degree of relief, and the Colonial Government immediately organized schemes towards that aim. As the unemployment rate rose in the following months, more organized relief works were provided. Village works were organized, while in Nicosia a special road work relief was instituted by the local Commissioner after 1 February 1940 – by this date about five hundred applications for work had been received.76 The Trade Unions were naturally drawn towards collective representation in the face of widespread unemployment, and they uniformly supported permissive labour legislation, occurred in three of the main towns on the island, Larnaca, Limassol and Nicosia.77 Failure often led to ‘incidents’ involving hard-pressed labour, such as those in the Morfou area, where a large group of unemployed men gathered outside the office of the District Inspector shouting that they were starving and needed work.78 Labour unrest was particularly intense during February and March of 1940, when strikes occurred in many public departments, the strike in the Public Works Department the most notable. These strikes, which caused unrest in all the major towns on the island, concluded with the arrest of around 40 workers.79 The Trade Unions reacted to these arrests by sending telegrams of protest to the Governor and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.80 These telegrams ultimately reached the House of Commons, where the nature of the strikes and the reaction of the Government of Cyprus were called into question.81 The unrest peaked on the 8th of March when 1500 workers from Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol and Nicosia went on a fresh twenty-four hour strike. Despite protestations from the Trade Unions, the colonial administration insisted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the Trade Unions were not really integrated into local society.82 The Governor himself alleged that what appeared to start as a spontaneous movement of labour discontent, spurred by rising unemployment, deviated from its original intention and was being exploited by the communists, which ultimately embarrassed the Government. The Governor insisted that in the current circumstances this had the inevitable effect of exposing the Government to enemy propaganda.83 As war took hold in Europe, the Government’s anxiety about Trade Union activities became increasingly linked to the island’s communist faction and the degree to which it was influenced by ‘fellow travellers’ outside the island. Some evidence for such fears was provided by contacts with London-based Cypriot ‘leftists’ such as Evdoros Ioannides (who later took the nom de plume Doros Alastos) a member of the ‘Cypriot Branch of the Communist Party of Great

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 37 Britain’ and the ‘Committee for Cyprus Autonomy’, who composed regular protestations to the Colonial Office. Government hostility towards the Trade Unions was also aroused by the Trade Unions’ opposition to the recruitment of Cypriots by the British army. Signs of this opposition emerged after the initial announcement of the formation of groups of Cypriot volunteers. In Larnaca, beginning in November 1939, there were reports of communists persuading other Cypriots not to join the Royal Army Service Corps, on the grounds that Russia would win the war anyway.84 Different slogans were reportedly used for towns and villages. Trade Unions in the towns argued that Russia, with the help of Germany, would be the ultimate victor, and that labour would then reap its reward. In the villages, the appeal to Enosis sentiments was expressed explicitly with the slogan, ‘Why be killed for England, when you belong to Greece?’.85 In both approaches, the idea of the war as a capitalist venture and as a means of continuing the dictatorial administration of Cyprus overlapped. As a result of their efforts, only a comparatively small group of Trade Union members enlisted in the Army. In Nicosia, for example, where the majority of the unemployed were members of Trade Unions, only 23 out of 1000 unemployed people enlisted during April 1940.86 As an indication of the Government’s acute concern, during March 1940 the police searched the premises of leading labour-leftist agitators Minos Perdios, Ploutis Servas and Demetris Stephanides.87 The police found documents which resulted in the prosecution of Perdios, whose guilty plea led to a lenient punishment.88 Although Trade Union activity lessened somewhat after these events, according to Governor Battershill, they inspired the communist party to strengthen its apparatus, and Ploutis Servas certainly toured Cyprus subsequent to the trial of Minos Perdios with this aim in mind. His growing importance in Cyprus politics was demonstrated by his father’s funeral, which was paid for by the Limassol Trade Unions and attended by 500 workers.89 Early April 1940 saw a fresh crisis in Government-Trade Union relations as a result of the transfer of the organization of the relief works from the Commissioner of Nicosia to the Public Works Department, which increased the number of daily working hours from eight to nine. The Trade Unions saw this transfer as a tactic to force workers to join the British Army, and on 12 April 600 workers marched in protest to the Commissioner’s Office. Various arrests and prosecutions followed.90 In the end most of the affected Trade Unionists accepted the new terms of the Public Works Department. However, the incident indicated that Servas’s increasingly organized activities were paying off, and as long as municipal elections in 1941 remained a prospect, the implications here were political as well as economic. By mid-1940 the colonial administration, perhaps with some

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cause, had become extremely nervous as rather disparate Trade Union responses to the inevitable dislocation caused by the war evolved into a movement that threatened to disrupt the normal pattern of Cypriot affairs. The capacity for confrontation was bound to be enlarged once the Greek Cypriot Right witnessed the growing strength of a labour movement opposed to both the Colonial Government and to the traditional power structure in Cyprus. 2.7 The Cypriot Intelligentsia in London The Cypriot community of London vigorously sought to improve the welfare of their compatriots back in Cyprus. Although there was not a large scale immigration of Cypriots to England until after the Second World War,91 there was a substantial Cypriot community in London, most of its members drawn from the poorer strata of Cypriot society and often subject to difficult living conditions in Great Britain.92 Nevertheless, a group of Cypriot intellectuals in London contributed to British press coverage of matters concerning Cyprus, thereby exerting pressure on the British Government. This group of Cypriots was represented by the ‘Committee for Cyprus Autonomy’, formed in 1937.93 The Committee’s main purpose was to serve the Cypriot people by influencing British public opinion with regard to conditions on the island. The Committee advocated that Cyprus should enjoy full autonomy in which all Cypriot institutions and the internal administration of the island would be under local control. This model of autonomy was conceived within the sphere of the British Empire. Evdoros Ioannides served as the Secretary of the Committee, while Ezekias Papaioannou, a future General Secretary of A.K.E.L,94 served as Treasurer. Evanthis Nicolaides, a leading figure in the Communist Party of Cyprus, also played a prominent role. Nicolaides was in Greece during the 1931 disturbances and was refused entry to the island thereafter. His application to return to Cyprus in 1939, which coincided with that of Theofanis Theodotou, was rejected, and he left Greece and went to London.95 Social policy was central to the Committee’s program, which promoted absolute freedom for workers and villagers’ organizations and Government protection for the unemployed and for those who had no landed property. The Committee was always quick to react to situations arising in Cyprus, especially those concerning the Trade Union movement. During the general strikes of March 1940, the Committee prepared and delivered a memorandum to the Colonial Office regarding the unjust treatment of Cypriot workers by the Colonial Government in light of increasing unemployment on the island. The memorandum explained the seriousness of the prevailing conditions in Cyprus and pleaded with the Colonial Office to intervene on economic issues.96

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 39 The views of the Committee were expressed through two papers that circulated in London. Βήμα (Vema-Platform), edited by Nicolaides, was a fortnightly political and social newspaper that promoted the pursuit of freedom and self-government for Cyprus. Κυπριακά Νέα (Kipriaka Nea-Cypriot News) endorsed the same policy and it was consequently not allowed to enter Cyprus under Governor’s Order in Council of 11 January 1939, at a time when the issue of press censorship in Cyprus started to get extensive publicity. The works of Κυπριακά Νέα and the activities of the Committee in London were often discussed within British circles in Cyprus. Governor Battershill told his superiors in the Colonial Office that Κυπριακά Νέα was stridently communist. According to Battershill, this was demonstrated by the paper’s editorials, which were of a seditious nature. Editorial statements asserting that ‘…the existence of the English Empire costs every year as many victims as the last European war in the four years of its duration’97 naturally roused the fury of the colonial authorities in Cyprus and those in Britain. In response to the prospect of compulsory conscription of Cypriots residing in England, the Committee sought to provoke public sentiment in favor of a refusal to fight. According to the Committee, Cyprus itself was under a dictatorship, and as such it would be inconsistent to ask Cypriots to fight in the name of self-determination and freedom of nations when they themselves were deprived of such rights.98 The Committee circulated a petition along these lines amongst London Cypriots, and ‘Ομάς Νέων’, the Band of Youth, was formed on 13 January 1940 to protest the compulsory conscription of Cypriots residing in Britain.99 Βήμα and Κυπριακά Νέα naturally served as the interlocutors of this opposition. An editorial in Κυπριακά Νέα wrote: “Why then - we Cypriots refuse to go into the ranks of the army? We do not refuse to serve only for the simple reason that by doing so we serve British Imperialism…Our refusal does not spring out of patriotism or cowardice. It is a political weapon which we use and shall use widely to arouse and bring to the forefront the Cyprus question.”100 It was not long before British authorities began to worry about the possible repercussions such propaganda might cause not only within the Cypriot community in London but also amongst Cypriot troops fighting in France. There was also some concern as to the effect these papers might have if they somehow managed to reach Cyprus, since their editorials were also preoccupied with labour issues on the island. Both newspapers were prohibited in Cyprus, as expected, while in Britain New Defence Regulations were enacted on 29 May 1940 in an effort to prevent the dissemination of ‘harmful publications’. As a result, both periodicals were subject to limited editorial freedom with regard to the conduct of the war and to cramped circulation.

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However, after a brief interruption both papers reappeared at full strength and, along with the work of the Committee, contributed to a large degree to exposing the conditions suffered by Cypriot workers to the British public. In May 1940 the Committee for Cyprus Autonomy published a pamphlet entitled ‘Cyprus and the War,’101 proof that the Cypriot intelligentsia in London was playing an important role in promoting its concerns in the imperial metropolis. This was something of a special case, since very few British colonies possessed a sophisticated metropolitan lobby of this sort – yet another example of the idiosyncrasy of a ‘European’ colony. 2.8 Greece’s Entry into the European War Italian aggression against Greece during summer 1940 presaged more serious events. Italy had occupied Albania in spring 1939, and in June 1940 entered the European war on the side of Germany. The leader of the fascist Italian administration, Benito Mussolini, was determined to make territorial gains in the Balkan Peninsula at the expense of Greece and Yugoslavia. Italian intentions towards Greece were made clear on 15 August, one of the most important religious days in the Orthodox calendar, when the Italians torpedoed the Greek cruiser, ‘΄Ελλη’ (Elli), off the island of Tenos. For her part, at the time of Italy’s entry into the War, Greece retained its ambiguous policy of neutrality while simultaneously maintaining an orientation towards Britain.102 After the attack on the ΄Ελλη, an alarmed Greek government attributed the torpedoing to a submarine of ‘unknown nationality’,103 although there were no doubts as to who was responsible, in order to avoid giving the Axis powers any pretext to attack. Nevertheless, Italian activity on the Albanian front, combined with an Italian press campaign against Greece, left little hope for a mutual understanding.104 Greece was determined to defend her soil and not to give in to any Italian aggression, and the story that follows the Italian invasion of Greece is central to Greek political memory. At 3:00 AM on 28 October, the Italian Ambassador in Athens, Emmanuelle Grazzi, went to the presidential house to see General Ioannis Metaxas. By mistake, the guard thought Grazzi was the French consul, and he informed Metaxas as such. When Metaxas opened the door to his quarters, in his nightgown, he was face to face with the Italian consul, rather than his French counterpart, who had come to deliver a humiliating ultimatum.105 Grazzi demanded that Italian troops be permitted transit over Greek soil, and he gave the Greek president three hours to reply. The authoritarian Metaxas immediately rejected the demand. “Alors, c’est la guerre”, he replied to Grazzi, thereby announcing Greece’s entry into the European war. Since then, the 28th of October has been celebrated in Greece as ‘ΌXΙ’ (Ohi-No) Day. 106

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THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR AND COLONIAL POLITICS IN CYPRUS 41 The promising start of Battershill’s governorship was suddenly interrupted and overshadowed by events in Europe. The eruption of hostilities was a considerable shock to all branches of Cypriot society, but the general response had been to stand by the side of the Allied war effort, and a more sympathetic attitude toward Britain was noticeable in the attitude of local politicians. At the same time, the need for the Cyprus Government to adopt a somewhat more ‘liberal’ stance, as demanded by the natural logic of the war situation, meant that the labour movement had a long-awaited opportunity to entrench its position more firmly. The entry of Greece into the war presented additional challenges to the Cyprus Government. Overall, the overlap of Greek and British interests brought about by the war created a new dynamic in the internal politics of the island, though not necessarily in ways likely to solve the ‘national question’. The Church, as the principal institution of Greek Cypriot life, was to be profoundly caught up in this flux.

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3 THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT OCTOBER 1940 - MAY 1941

3.1 Cyprus and the Entry of Greece in the European War The deterioration of Greco-Italian relations after 15 August posed serious problems for the Foreign Office, which feared a potential Italian assault upon Cyprus. Italian intelligence was aware of the poor defence conditions on the island, and that an invasion of Cyprus from Italian bases in the Dodecanese was feasible.1 Fearing the possible loss of Cyprus to Italy, as well as its repercussions in the Near East and Middle East, the Colonial Government adopted tighter defence regulations on the island2, including the formation of the ‘Cyprus Volunteer Force’ on 14 June.3 The events of August in Greece roused intense indignation in Cyprus, where anti-Italian sentiment was traditionally strong.4 After receiving the news of the torpedoed ΄Ελλη, a central committee was organized to collect funds for the Greek Navy.5 On 22 September, enemy aircraft attacked Cyprus in the island’s first-ever air raid.6 Nevertheless, as hostilities between Italy and Greece escalated, Cyprus was eventually excluded from an invasion by Italian armed forces. The 28th of October marked the onset of the Greco-Italian war – it was also a key date with regard to the progress of internal political life in Cyprus. The significance of the 28th of October in Cypriot politics lies within the following parameters: Firstly, it marked the revival of Enosis with all its old vigour; secondly, it resulted in the abandonment of some of the illiberal laws the post1931 regime had established. Cypriots traditionally identified themselves with the struggles of the Hellenic state, in which volunteers from the island, as in 1912, had played a part. Inevitably, therefore, the Greco-Italian war had a significant impact on Cypriots, who also took some satisfaction from the

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overlap of British and Greek interests.7 Upon hearing of Metaxas’s response to Grazzi, Cypriots held demonstrations in all of the major towns on the island; according to the Governor, “the spirit of excitement reached the bounds of hysteria”.8 The press featured pictures of King George II, which the British would have considered a most seditious act even a few days earlier,pointing out the need for a concentration on Greece’s war effort.9 Ελευθερία stressed the common Anglo-Greek interests in Europe and highlighted King George VI’s message to his Greek counterpart. “Your struggle is our struggle,” George stated. “We are now fighting against the common enemy…”10 The Greek consulate was now situated at the centre of popular attention. Naturally, the Acting Archbishop was the central figure in the pro-Hellenic demonstrations in the island, as the boycott against the Government had ended, and the crowds gathered to hear him in Larnaca were the largest the town had seen in many years. That same day the Locum Tenens visited Limassol where, amidst performances of the Greek national anthem, he told the crowd, “the world is worth nothing without Britain and Greece,”11 – a statement that remained memorable for Greek Cypriots. The contribution of Cypriots to the Greek war effort in relation to the island’s wealth was indeed remarkable.12 By the middle of 1941, the amount raised for the Greek War Fund had reached the sum of £100.000.13 Battershill confessed in a letter to his mother that “…people are pawning their wedding rings to give money to the Greek War Fund. I’m afraid any British war charity will fare ill here at the moment when all the local inhabitants are giving to the Greek funds.”14 Indeed the matching donations to the British R.A.F. Spitfire Fund had only reached £5000.15 Nonetheless, the Governor himself admitted that the atmosphere was wholly spontaneous, with no interference from Enosist agitators, despite an expectation that the latter would eventually seek to exploit the situation.16 Cypriot contributions to the various funds established for Greece were, according to Battershill, proof of Cypriots’ desire to be looked upon as ‘…Greek speaking, Greek thinking and Greek feeling individuals…’17 Cypriots now tacitly ignored much of the repressive legislation of the 1930s, and the large crowds gathering in public, the performance of the Greek national anthem, the public gathering of large crowds and, most significantly, the Greek and Turkish flags flying alongside the Union Jack were testimony to this. The prominent display of Turkish flags was in itself suggestive, given the Turkish Cypriot minority’s belief in its need to assert its presence and demonstrate its loyalty to Britain when it appeared that, depending on Greece’s future successes, the colonial authorities would treat their Turkish subjects less favourably than they would treat the island’s Greek Cypriot majority. The issue of flags preoccupied the British administration. Given the

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THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 45 circumstances surrounding Greece’s entry into the war, the British understood that any effort to halt the now widespread display of the Greek flag throughout Cyprus was doomed to fail. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot community was vital to British interests on the island, and Britain had to consider its concerns. The current diplomatic position of Turkey itself, whose role was of some importance to British war interests, meant it was imperative not to cause any grievance to the Turkish community by prohibiting the exhibition of the Turkish flag. Eventually, the Colonial Government amended the flag law so that the flags of all Allied countries, such as Greece, as well as those of countries connected to Britain with a formal treaty, such as Turkey, could thenceforth fly without restriction on the island. Thus the British resolved the wartime flags dilemma.18 The months subsequent to Greece’s entry into hostilities proved Cypriot support for ‘Hellenism in danger’ was no passing phenomenon. Financial contributions to the Greek cause continued with the same zeal but, more significantly, there was also a massive movement for Cypriot recruitment to the Greek army. Local press kept its focus exclusively on Greek events, leaving internal issues aside for the moment. Cypriots followed the fate of Hellenism, celebrating its successes, admiring the heroic achievements of Greek soldiers and anticipating the final outcome of the struggle, with Greece victorious.19 In January 1941, Metaxas issued a statement to the effect that Greece ‘cannot abandon those who belong to our race to foreign hands’.20 This resonated quite strongly with Greek Cypriots, and when Metaxas died suddenly in late January, Greek Cypriots mourned his passing as a national tragedy.21 The resurgence and consolidation of Enosis sentiment on the island was underlined by the publication of an article in January 1941 by Compton Mackenzie in Reynolds News in which he highlighted the idea of a Greater Greece in the future. 22 Mackenzie advocated that Britain, in any settlement, should give Cyprus and the Dodecanese to Greece, in addition to permitting Greece to share in the control of the Suez Canal. Mackenzie also suggested that the Greeks should be invited to take responsibility for the postwar Libya, hitherto an Italian possession. British officialdom considered Mackenzie’s article highly unwise, as it aroused unnecessary speculation about the future of the island amongst Cypriots in both communities. At the same time, the article caused nervousness inside the Greek Government, which feared the repercussions in Greece itself at a time when close relations in Britain were considered as vital as ever.23 Naturally, Mackenzie’s editorial made its greatest impression in Cyprus, where its suggestions for the future of Cyprus and Greece were warmly received. That the article itself did not reach the island did not stop the local press from publishing a summary of the article and commenting on it.24 According to one newspaper, should the Allies follow Mackenzie’s prescription Cyprus and the Dodecanese would

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‘naturally re-enter the organism to which they have never ceased to belong’, an assertion which was typical of press support for Mackenzie’s ideas.25 Leontios also made use of Mackenzie’s article, referring to it during the celebration of the anniversary of the Greek Independence on 25 March. Greek Cypriots were now, in practice, free to demonstrate and fly the Greek flag, and the celebrations for the 1941 anniversary had a special character, with more emphasis than ever on the Hellenic descent of Greek Cypriots.26 Leontios told one crowd, “the victory of the Allies is certain and the cession of Cyprus to the Great Greece which will be accomplished when victory finally crowns the efforts of the allied arms is even now an accomplished fact”.27 Greek Cypriots went so far as to criticize the colonial administration for not declaring the day a public holiday. Enosis had evidently survived the intense persecution to which it had been subjected beginning in 1931, and the movement now reemerged as strong as ever, with the Orthodox Church of Cyprus continuing to encourage its comeback. Beginning with Greece’s entry into the war, Greek Cypriots expressed their belief that Cyprus was destined to be part of postwar Greece at every opportunity, to the growing dismay of both the colonial administration and the island’s Turkish Cypriot minority. 3.2 The Reaction of the Turkish Cypriot Community It was natural that Turkish Cypriots felt a certain anxiety as the war evolved. It was impossible for Turkish Cypriots to be indifferent to the atmosphere of fanatic patriotism created by their Greek Cypriot counterparts and to the rumour that Cyprus would become part of Greece after the war. When Greece entered the war, Turkish Cypriots expressed their loyalty to Great Britain, not least by the simultaneous display of both Turkish and British flags during public demonstrations, which included those celebrating Greece’s entry into the war and those in support of the Allied cause. A competition between the two main communities as to which was the most ‘loyal’ to the Colonial authorities soon became evident. For his part, the Governor made sure to assuage Turkish Cypriot feelings immediately by praising the community’s loyalty at the Bairam festivities on 1 November 1940.28 Turkish Cypriots were alarmed at these fresh events, and in response they began to develop their own political consciousness. To counteract the collection of funds for the Greek army by Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots made contributions to funds for the welfare of the Turkish army.29 Soon enough, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community requested permission for the display of the Turkish flag on mosques, which the Colonial Government granted. Additionally, following Greece’s entrance into the Allied

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THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 47 camp, Greek subjects on the island were exempted from the restrictions imposed on the movement of alien residents on the island; Turkish Cypriot leaders also requested the same exemption for Turkish nationals.30 While the Turkish Cypriot community gained these concessions from the Colonial Government, its leadership still sought to maintain a constructive relationship with the Greek Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriots still followed a strong instinct for coexistence with their Greek neighbours: Turkish Cypriot leaders congratulated the Greek consul in Nicosia on the successes of his country,31 and services were held in the island’s mosques in support of the Greek and British war effort. These services included the collection of money for relief in Greece.32 In the towns of Cyprus, however, things were quite different. The determination of Turkish Cypriots to show where their political sympathies lay found expression during the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Sukru Saracoglou, who visited Nicosia with Anthony Eden on 19 March 1941. Predictably, the visit received extensive publicity in the local press.33 This rare event provided Turkish Cypriots with the chance to demonstrate their own ‘national’ feelings, and during Eden and Saracoglou’s visit rumours circulated on the island that Cyprus would return to Turkish hands. The event was applauded with equal ardor by Greek Cypriots, who sought to demonstrate their enthusiasm for the Allied war effort in Eden’s presence. The excitement was such that the Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Soz, advised its readers to forego the island’s 25th of March – a date that marked the anniversary of the Greek Independence Day – in order to avoid any incidents.34 The beginning of the Second World War, most significantly Greece’s entry into the war and the subsequent response of Greek Cypriot society, in addition to Turkish Cypriot concerns regarding the impact of the war on the island’s destiny, accelerated the emergence of a political consciousness in the Turkish Cypriot community. The evolution of Turkish Cypriot nationalism is beyond the scope of this book.35 However, the wartime period was clearly critical to this nascent political consciousness, which continued to evolve even after hostilities had subsided. 3.3 The Movement for Cypriot Volunteering in the Greek Army The prospect of a patriotic Greek Cypriot movement for enrollment in the Greek Army, instead of in the British forces of the Cyprus Regiment, brought a degree of unsettlement to Government House. Indeed, one of the immediate repercussions, in Cyprus, of Greece’s entry into the war was the torrent of applications which the Greek Consul in Nicosia received from Cypriots seeking to enroll in the Royal Hellenic Forces.36 The Acting Archbishop played a prominent part in this movement, which he took under his guidance and

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leadership. This movement constituted a real worry for colonial officialdom, and the regulation of these applications required the colonial administration to exert pressure on the Greek Government. The Cypriot exiles in Athens also followed the situation closely.37 Upon the onset of this phenomenon, in late October, the Greek Consul, Eleftherios Mavrokefalos, refrained from taking any action until instructions on the subject came from Athens. The Locum Tenens, however, sought to encourage enlistment in the Royal Hellenic Forces. As early as August 1940, Leontios, seeing that a Greco-Italian war was inevitable, sought the advice of the Greek Consul as to how best to supervise the volunteering process.38 In November, Leontios toured the island organizing collections for Greece, and there were press reports, based on leaked information, that in due time the Church intended to assist Cypriots who wished to depart for Greece39 - one local right wing paper published letters from some of its readers advocating that Leontios should be the first to go.40 In each of the major towns, committees comprised entirely of veterans of the Balkan wars were organized41 In December 1940, Leontios requested an urgent interview with the Governor on the subject of volunteers. His intention was to inform the Governor of the desire of Greek Cypriots to depart for Greece at once, and to request the relevant travel facilities.42 The Colonial authorities were predictably opposed to such a prospect. First and foremost, Greek Cypriot preference for the Greek Army, rather than for the British forces – even though volunteers for the latter were paid – would be considerably embarrassing for the British. Secondly, the Cyprus Regiment itself was in need of many more able-bodied Cypriots and could not afford any such deflection of recruits. The problem facing the British was that the enlistment of Greek Cypriots in the Royal Hellenic Forces was legal, since Greece was allied with Britain, so the colonial authority’s initial measures to stem the tide of Greek Cypriot volunteers for the Greek army were largely administrative. At the time travel from Cyprus to Greece went through Egypt, due to the absence of direct communication with Athens, which meant that Cypriots wishing to travel to Greece were forced to apply for Egyptian visas, which meant significant delay. In an effort to gain some time to consult Whitehall, Battershill agreed to Leontios’s request for an interview but for a later date, pleading other, more immediate obligations.43 At the same time, Battershill reassured his superiors in London that he doubted there was a genuine desire among young Cypriots to join the Greek Army, especially given the personal dangers.44 Battershill was determined to clarify for Leontios that Cyprus was a British Colony with its own Regiment, with some of its units currently serving in Greece, and this prohibited Battershill granting exit permits to the island’s British subjects so they could serve in another country’s army.

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THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 49 Leontios, however, was impatient, and on receiving the Governor’s response to his request for an interview he issued an announcement calling all eligible men to present themselves as volunteers at the Archbishopric, thus making the Church responsible for the organization of these volunteers and himself the Ethnarch of Greek Cypriots.45 The widespread response to the Locum Tenens’s call proved British estimates of potential enlistment in the Greek Army had been understated.46 The Foreign Office sought to approach the Greek Government discreetly, through the British Ambassador to Athens, Sir Michael Palairet, to determine if the Greeks were willing to consent to an announcement by Battershill that Cypriot volunteers for the Greek military were not be desirable at the moment.47 Palairet believed it would be difficult for any Greek Government to approve such a statement, and he himself was reluctant to press the Greeks to do so.48 A few days later, after speaking with General Metaxas, Palairet informed his superiors that the Greek Prime Minister himself had received numerous applications from Cypriots and had proposed the acceptance of a limited number of recruits from Cyprus. Palairet wanted to accommodate the Greek Government, which clearly wished to satisfy London’s request but also wished to honour the Greeks of Cyprus who so willingly offered themselves to the Greek military.49 This alternative was not implemented, however, and the attention of both Greece and Britain was diverted from the issue, albeit temporarily, by the sudden death of General Metaxas. The Governor of Cyprus, however, was anxious for instructions from London, since the great number of volunteers registered at the Archbishopric in the first days after the announcement – around twelve hundred men for the Greek military and two hundred women for the Greek Red Cross – created a tense atmosphere in Nicosia, especially since the number of volunteers for the Cyprus Regiment had dwindled proportionately.50 Battershill also feared that Cypriot volunteers who fought for Greece would return from the war full of heightened Hellenic feeling, and so inflame Enosis sentiment in postwar Cyprus. Ultimately, it was the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Lloyd,51 who decided the fate of the Cypriot volunteers. “Quite clearly the Greek Government should be asked to say that they do not approve of the Locum Tenens’s step and that all Cypriots who wish to serve the Allied cause should join the British Army and the Cypriot section of it,” Lloyd wrote. “The F.O. should so be told. We must make the Greeks do this.”52 The Foreign Office concurred with Lloyd’s opinion. A few days later the British Ambassador in Athens received a telegram to the effect that the Greek Government should respond to any offer from Cypriot volunteers to aid the Greek cause by informing them that such aid would be much more effective if

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rendered to the British Cyprus Regiment, and that the Greek Consul in Nicosia should be urged to communicate to Leontios that his recent activities were illadvised.53 In early February, Greece instructed its representatives in Nicosia to inform Leontios accordingly, and to ask that he abandon his efforts.54 Leontios made another request to meet with the Governor on the subject, but Battershill deliberately ignored it.55 Subsequent to these events, Leontios discreetly halted the volunteer movement in Cyprus. However, this did not prevent several Greek Cypriots traveling to Greece at their own expense to participate in the Greek war effort, nor did it impede Greek Cypriots from contributing to the various funds in support of the Greek cause, and the Acting Archbishop himself continued to exhort Cypriots to assist the Greek cause to the best of their ability. 3.4 Church and State after 28 October 1940: In Search of Reconciliation The Italian invasion of Greece had two immediate effects on relations between the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Colonial Government. The first was the end of the boycott of the Orthodox Church on the British authorities. The second, as evidenced by the Cypriot volunteer movement, was the Locum Tenens’s demand that he be considered by the colonial authority as the Ethnarch of his Greek Cypriot flock. This dynamic meant that even in the fresh circumstances brought about in Cyprus by the war, any efforts for honest reconciliation between these two institutions were bound to be fruitless. The Acting Archbishop was quick to react to news of events in Greece. On 29 October he spoke in Larnaca surrounded by Greek, British and Turkish flags. “Past misunderstandings must be forgotten,” he exclaimed to an ecstatic crowd. “Long live - the King of England, the British nation, our allies Turkey and Greece.”56 He made similar speeches in Limassol and in Paphos, giving assurances that the Church and the Government were united during such a crucial time.57 In Paphos he led cheers for the British and the Greek Kings, and for the Turkish President.58 Upon his return to Nicosia, Leontios signed the Governor’s visitors’ book and requested an interview – this was the first time since he took over his duties as the Locum Tenens of the vacant throne in 1933 that Leontios requested an audience with the Governor. The next day, 31 October, he received the Governor’s Aide-de-Camp and the Commissioner of Nicosia in the Archbishopric.59 Before departing for Famagusta, the next stop on his tour of the island, the Bishop sent Battershill a telegram expressing his appreciation for ‘this courtesy’.60 Leontios and Battershill finally met on 14 November 1940.61 This was a purely formal meeting, but its importance was critical, as it was the first time the leaders of the Church and the State in Cyprus had met since 1933.

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THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 51 In addition to speeches throughout the island, Leontios also organized services in the Orthodox Churches in honour of the Allied cause.62 The Governor was invited to take part in the celebration at Phaneromeni Church in Nicosia, which was conducted by Leontios, but the Commissioner of Nicosia attended in the Governor’s place.63 The Church led the collection of funds for the Greek war effort. Under the Bishop’s guidance, committees were formed in all major towns to coordinate fundraising, and Leontios personally appealed to Cypriots for general contributions. Leontios issued further encyclicals calling upon churches to donate at least one-fourth of their annual revenue before Christmas64 while continuing to advance the cause of Cypriot volunteers. Meanwhile, Bishop Makarios of Kyrenia and the rest of the exiles in Athens followed events in Cyprus65 and acted as mediators between the Acting Archbishop and the Greek government. Government House regarded Leontios’s actions as highly ambiguous. Battershill believed Leontios’s efforts were dictated by his desire to take advantage of the situation and consolidate his position as the Ethnarch of Greek Cypriots.66 Leontios’s persistent efforts to aid Greece, especially through Cypriot volunteerism, posed potential difficulties for the colonial authority in Cyprus and for the British Government, and the Bishop’s efforts to combine fervent support for the defeat of the Axis powers with the expectation of Enosis irritated Battershill. During his sermons, Leontios repeatedly told worshippers, “the moment is near when we, the Greeks of Cyprus, will be liberated and united with our Mother Greece.”67 In his messages to the Greek Prime Minister and the King of Greece on the occasion of the New Year of 1941, Leontios underlined the desire of the Greeks of Cyprus for Enosis; He also sent similar telegrams to the Governor and to King George VI on the same occasion, which the Colonial Office read with suspicion.68 Inevitably, the occasion of that year’s celebration of Greek Independence on 25 March was more intense than ever. Leontios made a speech in which he once again aligned the fate of Cyprus with that of Greece, tempting Battershill to impose Emergency regulations against him.69 The Colonial Office’s increasing impatience and indignation were emphatically summed up in one official’s minute, when he flatly wrote that he wished “it were possible to devise some means of getting rid of this turbulent priest.”70 Against this background, when everything in Cyprus was overshadowed by events in Greece, the problematic issue of the archiepiscopal vacancy remained. Given the complexity of the problem, the British considered approaching the Greek Government and the Phanar in Constantinople to participate in an effort to end the deadlock.71 Winston Churchill himself felt that the time was favourable to reach a solution, and he urged his officials to do everything possible to end a problem which had gone on too long.72 However, events in

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Greece during spring 1941 put a halt to any possible resolution of the vacancy. Greece was overrun by the German military in April and May of 1941. The Germans occupied Athens, and in the confusion created by the occupation, contact with the exiled Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios II, was lost.73 Makarios was still alive in Athens, but he was now in enemy territory, which prevented him from participating in Synodical affairs via correspondence as he had previously done. Under these circumstances, Leontios founded the ‘Popular Advisory Committee of the Church of Cyprus’, an advisory body under his leadership that assumed full administrative responsibility for the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.74 The majority of Cypriots saw this maneuver, which no one expected, as rather clumsy, and most newspapers criticized the move.75 Only Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλακας, a loyal supporter of the Bishop’s policies, stood in favour of it.76 Despite forces in support of wartime unity, the Orthodox Church and the Government of Cyprus did not manage to reach a mutual understanding and find a path to cooperation. Leontios continued to stress his Ethnarchic role even more than he had prior to the war, and he increasingly clashed with British colonial officialdom, whose attitude toward him was still frozen by the events of the 1930s. It was also during this period that the Church itself faced internal conflicts, as Leontios’s popularity waned after public condemnation of the Popular Advisory Committee of the Church of Cyprus. Meanwhile, the labour movement continued to increase its power and its stature on the island, further complicating the internal politics of Cyprus as the war continued across Europe and the Pacific. 3.5 The Labour Movement and the Foundation of A.K.E.L Beginning in the late 1930s, the Colonial Government was concerned about the rising power of the labour movement and its influence on Greek Cypriot society. The British were convinced that the Trade Unions were led by communist agitators and were devoted to political rather than industrial purposes, and the Secretary of State himself was worried about the possible sway the Trade Unions might gain on the island. Thus, in addition to the post of Labour Adviser, the Colonial Government considered further measures to diminish the influence of external political elements on workers. One of these measures was the suggestion that a prominent Trade Unionist from Great Britain should visit the island, with the purpose of explaining to workers how Trade Unions functioned in the UK under demanding wartime conditions. The colonial authority hoped that Cypriot labourers would see that the British Trade Unions were prepared to surrender some of their privileges for the sake of victory, and that the Cypriot Trade Unions might do the same. Battershill, however, opposed the idea, believing that the attitude of

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THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 53 the Cypriot workforce toward the war had changed since the Italian declaration of war against Greece, and that it would now be more cooperative. Under these circumstances, the intrusion of an outside ‘expert’, which was something the local colonial bureaucracy had always resisted, was considered unnecessary.77 The Trade Unions followed a somewhat pacific path when it came to war, and their members refrained from enlistment in the Cyprus Regiment. However, the Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 created an important testing ground for the island’s labour movement, and the Trade Unions were called to respond to a challenge that would be critical for their future in Cyprus. Battershill’s hope that the Trade Unions would adopt a fresh attitude to the war once Greece entered hostilities was dashed. Indeed, the Trade Unions, whilst sympathizing with Greece’s war effort, did not fully identify with the general upheaval affecting their compatriots, and their reticence created tensions within and around them. In early November the Locum Tenens invited representatives from clubs, the press, Trade Unions and other Greek Cypriot institutions to a meeting, in order to coordinate the collection of contributions for the Hellenic war effort.78 The Trade Unions declared their hatred for fascism and wholly condemned the Italian invasion of Greece.79 Yet, despite the presence of their representative at the meeting, the Trade Unions were adamant that they were unable to contribute to the Greek war fund due to a scarcity of funds, and that they could not take a leading part in the collections, since all their members were full-time workers.80 This position would ultimately draw negative criticism of the Trade Unions from the press and the public. It soon became apparent that there was no solidarity amongst Trade Union members themselves on the matter. Upon hearing the announcement that the Trade Unions were not able to contribute to the Greek war cause, ninety members of the Private Employees Trade Unions sent a letter to Leontios expressing their willingness to donate funds to the war effort and reaffirming their patriotic Hellenic feelings.81 The leaders of the Private Employees Union denied there was a large number of dissidents within the union, but that individual members were free to contribute to war funds if they so wished.82 Still, one of the immediate effects of the Unions’ decision was the creation of division within their own ranks, with moderates prepared to pledge their loyalty to the national cause on the one hand and hard-core members who insisted on maintaining an anti-war position on the other, making any coherent Trade Union policy impossible. Further solicitations from Leontios to the Trade Unions of Limassol for a donation of one shilling from each member83 were again rejected on the grounds that ‘this is contrary to our Unions’ statutes as it would define the Unions as political organizations’.84 In addition to their internal problems, the

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Trade Unions were also forced to confront negative public opinion. At a time when Cyprus was mobilized for the Greek cause, any refusal to take part was criticized as ‘anti-national’ and even vilified. Local newspapers became the forums for such views, mostly the right wing Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ and the labour Ανεξάρτητος. In response to criticism in the press of the Limassol Trade Unions, the Larnaca Unions clarified that they supported the victims of Italian fascism, but that they did not want to mix war politics with labour affairs.85 In Limassol, the ‘Limassol Committee for War Funds in Favour of the Greek Cause’ pleaded with workers to contribute to the general effort, as did most Greek Cypriots.86 To these pleas the Limassol Unions again listed rules and regulations that prohibited them from contributing to the collections.87 Nevertheless, perhaps in an effort to vindicate their position, the Trade Unions decided to host theatrical performances in all the major towns, with all profits to be donated to the civilian victims of the Italian bombing of Greece. In Nicosia, however, the Trade Union met with opposition from the committee responsible for the organization of the collections, which was led by the Church. The committee informed the Union, in response to its petition to the Locum Tenens, that no theatrical shows were acceptable for raising funds unless it was declared that the profits would be donated in favour of the Greek national cause itself.88 The unions met with a similar reaction in Larnaca, where the local ‘national’ committee refused to permit any performances unless it was clearly stated that the occasion would be under the aegis of the committee responsible for the national collections.89 There were cases to the contrary, however, particularly in Famagusta, where a play was performed and supported by the public.90 Ανεξάρτητος took the lead in supporting the Unions’ policy and criticized anyone who opposed them, including the Locum Tenens.91 Well-known local figures participated in the debate - including George Vassiliades, who defended the position of the Trade Unions. 92 This augmented the intensity of the debate and introduced a flavour of confrontation into the discussion that would feature prominently in the future municipal elections. An apparent antithesis soon arose between the Church and the Right, on the one hand, and the labour movement on the other. Against the background of the first visible confrontation within Greek Cypriot society, labour unrest continued to surge during this period. Labourers engaged in the relief works in Famagusta marched in protest to the office of the District Commissioner, resulting in the arrest of around eleven persons.93 In April, another incident took place, in Larnaca, where a hundred and forty workers were dismissed on account of a shortage of jobs in the building construction sector; the dismissals were followed by public protests, which

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THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 55 resulted in numerous arrests, although those arrested were later released after paying their fines.94 In May, 300 Public Works Department workers went on strike over wages. The strike continued until the end of the month, when the workers reached a compromise with the Government.95 The most important political evolution of this period was undoubtedly the foundation of A.K.E.L. (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζομένου Λαού - Progressive Party of Working People). A.K.E.L. was destined to play a vital role in Cypriot politics in the future, but this was hard to predict at the party’s outset. On 14 April 1941, George Vassiliades convened a meeting of thirty-two people in Skarinou – many of them communists, the rest from a wide ideological spectrum – to discuss the formation of a new political party.96 It is significant that many attendees were members of the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie, including Lefkios Zinon, Fidias Kyriakides, Saveras Saveriades and Zinon Rossides. Kyriakides presided over the meeting but stated at the beginning that he would not participate in the organization for personal reasons.97 The participants agreed on the formation of a Central Committee and on the formation of local committees in the major towns. The new party asserted its democratic and anti-fascist character, and presented a coherent program of social and labour policy. However, contrary to press speculation,98 the Central Committee decided that A.K.E.L. would not participate in the forthcoming municipal elections.99 It is interesting that at this point A.K.E.L. didn’t clarify its position with regard to the national question of the island.100 Indeed, it would be some months later when the party officially declared its political orientation towards Enosis. Parallel to A.K.E.L, K.K.K. survived underground for a few more years before its final dissolution. The simultaneous existence of both parties, a fresh leftist entity including ‘moderate’ elements and an older formation retaining its radical ideological character, was bound to create some confusion. Considering how critical A.K.E.L was to become in the political life of Cyprus, it is quite remarkable that its emergence passed almost unnoticed in the local press, but the middle of April 1941 also saw the final defeat of the Greek and British armies on the mainland. Most Cyprus newspapers mentioned the foundation of A.K.E.L., but only Ανεξάρτητος presented the party’s statutes and principles in detail. Three weeks later, on 9 May, A.K.E.L. announced it would call its first Pan-Cyprian Conference for October 1941. By that time, it would be clear that the young party’s growing power would be impossible to ignore. 3.6 The Question of the Greek Government’s Move to Cyprus Towards the end of 1940, as Greece, bolstered by Cypriot volunteers, continued to prevail against Italy, the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Michael Palairet,

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tentatively suggested to his colleagues that London might promise the postwar cession of Cyprus to Greece in exchange for a permanent base.101 Palairet’s suggestion was in part inspired by an article published in a Greek newspaper, Εστία (Hestia), which referred in detail to the stirring contribution of Cypriots to the Greek war effort. The Ambassador’s suggestion initiated a debate within Whitehall about postwar Cyprus. Edward Warner, counsellor on Middle Eastern affairs at the Foreign Office, favoured this suggestion, although he had originally preferred the acquisition of a valuable base at Suda Bay in Crete, instead of keeping an island with a population regarded as ‘hostile’ towards colonial rule.102 Other officials, such as Pierson Dixon and Philip Nichols, were concerned that both Turkey and the Turkish minority on the island might respond to this decision by demanding the cession of the island to Turkey.103 The recognition of the strategic importance of Cyprus to the Empire was fundamental to these officials, and the postwar retention of Cyprus by Britain assumed the colony’s further development as a military bastion. It was decided that Professor Arnold Toynbee104 at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London would prepare a memorandum regarding the postwar alternatives for Cyprus, one that would take into consideration all interested key players and factors. The continuing flux of events in Greece and the Balkans, however, profoundly influenced Britain’s considerations. By the end of 1940, Hitler had planned the ‘Barbarossa’ invasion against Russia, a massive offensive that required Germany to safeguard its control over the Balkans. To this end, the Germans forced Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to join the Tripartite Pact of Berlin, Rome and Tokyo.105 The subsequent overturning of the pro-Nazi government in Yugoslavia was the trigger for a long feared German onslaught. On 6 April 1941, the German army attacked Greece and Yugoslavia simultaneously, defeating and occupying both nations. The Greek premier, Alexandros Korizis, committed suicide on 18 April 1941, and the legitimate Government of Greece had to consider where outside the occupied mainland it might establish a base of operations. Crete was clearly preferable, as it was part of Greece itself, but the island was vulnerable to air raids, so King George II asked Palairet if the British Government would consider the temporary concession of a small part of Cyprus where the Greek Government could reestablish itself. This was not the first time Cyprus had figured in the considerations of the Greek Government. A few months earlier, Korizis had raised the subject of a future cession of Cyprus to Greece with Anthony Eden during one of the British Foreign Secretary’s secret visits to Athens. “As the Greek people will be required to offer the greatest of sacrifices, they will need, in order to maintain the excellence of their morale, an immediate

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THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 57 satisfaction of their demands,” Korizis told Eden. “I cannot tell you how impressive, in these hours of crisis, would a British gesture be whereby Cyprus would be ceded to Greece. I am simply putting forth a thought which will require further study and am not demanding an answer.”106 The British Minister replied that this was an important issue but was beyond his jurisdiction and that this precluded him from immediately addressing it. Near the end of March, Korizis spoke with Eden again, this time more urgently, and requested at least a part of Cyprus in which the exiled Government of Greece could exercise its legitimate authority. This second request also met with British hesitancy.107 On 11 April King George II again requested permission from the British for the establishment of an interim Greek capital in Cyprus.108 At first, British officials considered sequestering the Greek Government in Cyprus in a manner similar to arrangements made with other Allied governments then enjoying temporary refuge in London. However, and especially after receiving urgent warnings from Battershill,109 the British decided it would be impossible to cede a part of Cyprus, even a village, to the Greeks. Battershill was stridently opposed, explaining to his superiors in London that Cyprus lacked any air defence, and that its heretofore immunity from invasion would be endangered should the Greek Government establish itself in exile in Cyprus. Battershill also emphasized that ceding any portion of Cyprus to the Greek Government would provide an insurmountable boost to the Enosis movement. The Governor was adamant that no matter what guarantees were made as to the temporary character of the cession, Cypriots would look upon George II and his entourage as their own, which would antagonize both the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey itself.110 On 12 April 1941 the British Foreign Minister outlined the difficulties surrounding the implementation of the King George’s request to his Greek counterpart, Charalambos Simopoulos. The Greek Minister did not hide his disappointment and once again stressed the need for the Greek Government to continue to exercise its sovereignty, preferably from Cyprus.111 The British ultimately decided it would be best for the Greek Government-in-exile to rule from Crete, and defence measures were organized on the island,112 with the subject of Cyprus postponed until a later date.113 This date arrived suddenly at the end of May 1941, when Crete surrendered after fierce resistance to German forces. By this time, Toynbee, on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, had submitted his memorandum regarding the strategic and political value of Cyprus.114 Toynbee’s paper discussed all possible solutions to the question of Cyprus, listing the advantages and disadvantages of each solution, but clearly supported the cession of Cyprus to Greece. Toynbee remarked in the paper that it was ‘contrary to the traditions and in general to the interests of the British Empire to maintain in political

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subjection a people whose social and cultural level justifies the claims to selfdetermination’.115 However, given the prospect of Cyprus uniting with Greece, the reactions of Turkish Cypriots and the strategic considerations of Turkey would have to be taken into account. E. Warner in the Foreign Office continued to support this prospect, as he had earlier that year when Palairet first suggested ceding Cyprus to Greece.116 Warner’s colleague, R. Bowker, agreed that the cession of Cyprus to Greece would be most profitable for Britain, but that it should not be immediate.117 On the other hand, other members of the Foreign Office, including the Under Secretary of State, Orme Sargent, maintained the position that the question of Cyprus should be put off until the end of the war.118 As always, the future of Cyprus had the capacity to divide British officialdom. In its meeting of 2 June 1941, the War Cabinet concluded that the Foreign Secretary should not initiate discussions about Cyprus with the Greek Government, but instead, if asked, should declare that Cyprus would be included in postwar peace settlement discussions.119 Anthony Eden anticipated this eventuality in a memorandum of his own, and advocated that the cession of Cyprus to Greece did not contravene imperial interests. He also speculated that Germany might occupy Cyprus, ultimately handing it over to the quisling government of Athens, in which case the British might as well act first. According to Eden, if the Germans did offer Cyprus to any such Greek Government, the best tactic would be to ensure that the Greek Government-in-exile refused to recognize such an illegitimate Enosis. The lawful Greek Government could then state publicly that it had agreed with His Majesty’s Government to discuss the issue of Cypriot cession to Greece after the war.120 For his part, the Colonial Secretary merely emphasized certain points regarding the defence of the island.121 The Prime Minister himself made the final decision. Winston Churchill declared to his staff that it would be much better to leave all territorial settlements until after the war ended. He was strongly against relinquishing any British territory before the end of the war. He concluded his remarks by referring to a consideration that had long been a stumbling point for the British whenever the issue of union between Greece and Cyprus came up for discussion: “I have followed very closely all that has happened in Cyprus since I visited the island in 1907. I suppose you are aware there is a substantial Moslem population in Cyprus, who have (sic) been very loyal to us, and who would much resent being handed over to the Greeks”.122 Churchill’s intervention clinched the critical decision on the fate of Cyprus during the crucial hour of Greece’s surrender to the Axis. Meanwhile, in Cyprus, Greek Cypriots held steadfast to their hope for Union with Greece. They were to be profoundly shocked at the end of 1941 when a formal announcement was made that the question of the future of their island had been set aside.

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THE REVIVAL OF ENOSIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRIOT LEFT 59 3.7 Effects of the German Occupation of Greece in Cyprus The German occupation of Greece naturally had repercussions in Cyprus. The people of Cyprus had closely followed the military events of the previous months and universally condemned the German onslaught.123 Many Cypriots were grief-stricken at the news of the occupation of Athens, but they continued to hope for a final Greek redemption. Although previous victories by the Greek Army at the Albanian front had inspired the hope that Cyprus would be amongst Greek gains in the postwar settlement, any such hope was now dimmed. In early 1941, political activity on the island expanded at the prospect of the restoration of municipal elections later that year – an announcement in January confirming these elections would indeed take place increased anticipation on the local political scene.124 A proposition in Ελευθερία that all candidates be listed on one ‘national’ slate representing all classes raised objections from other papers, but also gave rise to fruitful debate.125 However, the Cyprus Government announced in May that the elections would be postponed sine die126 because of the crisis in Greece and the danger now facing the island, and the press and the public supported the delay. Indeed, the postponement of the elections was advocated earlier that year by Πάφος, which stressed that the occupation of Greece required the complete and undistracted attention of all Cypriots.127 Following the German conquest and occupation of Crete in the final days of May 1941, the people of Cyprus were gripped by a profound fear that their island would be the Nazis’ next target. As early as 2 May, the Colonial Government announced the gradual relocation of people from the major towns to the countryside, in order to minimize potential losses in an air raid, an event that heightened the anxiety of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.128 After Crete fell to the Germans, Australian reinforcements arrived in Cyprus, and the Cyprus Volunteer Force was mobilized.129 Amongst the guidance provided to the public, Cypriots were told to ‘stay where you are’ in the case of any invasion, and this exhortation emphasized the need for people to move as little as possible in such a crucial event.130 On 15 May, the island experienced another air raid, which resulted in the death of one person.131 The Governor consulted his superiors regarding the evacuation of foreign subjects from the island, mainly Poles, Jews and Britons, which heightened concern that a German attack on Cyprus was imminent.132 However, after the Allies occupied Syria and Germany began its disastrous invasion of Russia, on 22 June 1941, the possibility that the Germans might attack Cyprus swiftly faded. The entry of Greece into the Second World War had profound effects on Cypriot political life, particularly as it sparked a rebirth of the Enosis movement,

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nursed to increased strength by Leontios, which was bound to pose potential difficulties for the colonial administration. Greece’s entry into the war also resulted in a partial disengagement from the post-1931 regime, which in turn encouraged new political developments within Cyprus, especially the foundation of A.K.E.L. By May 1941, Cyprus was ripe for the remaking of its politics.

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4 THE BEGINNING OF THE REMAKING OF CYPRIOT POLITICS: MAY 1941-MARCH 1942

4.1 Greek Resistance During the Axis Occupation The surrender of Greece to the Axis powers followed the events of May 1941 and the eventual fall of Crete to the Nazis, and the country was henceforth divided into Bulgarian, German and Italian zones of occupation. In Athens, the Axis established the quisling government of General Tsolakoglou, while the exiled, legitimate Government of King George II travelled between Egypt, London and South Africa. Nevertheless, the occupation did nothing to hasten the end of the Greek resistance. On 31 May, the Nazi flag flying at the Parthenon was found lowered and torn apart,1 tangible proof that the resistance would continue its battle against the Axis throughout the occupation. The Communist Party of Greece (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας - K.K.E.) led the struggle against the occupying powers. Before the occupation of Greece and during and inter war years, K.K.E. had not been a major political force, never managing to gain more than 9% in elections.2 Nevertheless, the strong anti-monarchist sentiment prevailing in occupied Greece enabled K.K.E. to dynamically reinvent itself and gain considerable influence in Greek political affairs.3 The party was thrown into confusion by the Italian invasion of Greece, as was the Cypriot labour movement. Up until the invasion, the communists had viewed the hostilities as a clash between imperialist powers, with Greece itself within the fist of a dictatorship. However, once the leader of K.K.E., Nicos Zachariades, who was imprisoned in Corfu, exhorted his comrades to support the Metaxas regime and the Greek national struggle against the Italians, the party altered its view of the European war, and of Greece’s participation therein.4 The discussion of the reasons that prompted Zachariades – who later

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adopted a different stance towards the war – in this direction is beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, its importance remains clear. On the 21st of June the Germans attacked Russia, forcing the latter to enter the war on the side of the Allies. This date was significant for K.K.E. – and for Cyprus’s A.K.E.L. – as the party’s policy was completely transformed by Germany’s progress across the Eastern Front, which now emphasized the absolute priority of the defence of the Russian motherland. Members of the Greek Resistance established the National Liberation Front (Εθνικόν Απελευθερωτικό Μέτωπο - Ε.Α.Μ.) in September 1941 for the efficient coordination of the struggle against the occupation, and to permit the people of Greece, once liberated, to decide for themselves the constitutional future of their country. The military section of E.A.M., the Greek People’s Liberation Army (Ελληνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός - E.L.A.S.), was as important as the organization’s political arm, and both sections constituted the largest resistance force during the occupation. Undoubtedly, the experience the communists gained while operating underground, particularly during their persecution by the Metaxas regime, was a great asset to their guerilla organization, and figures such as Ares Velouchiotes (the pseudonym of Athanasios Klaras) would identify themselves with the resistance for many years after the war. By the time Greece was liberated, in October 1944, E.A.M. members numbered half a million, whereas the E.L.A.S. military force numbered 60,000.5 E.A.M and E.L.A.S were not the only functional resistance organizations opposing the Axis occupation of Greece. Resistence organizations with no affiliation to K.K.E. included the National Republican Greek League (Εθνικός Δημοκρατικός Ελληνικός Σύνδεσμος - E.D.E.S.), and later on the National and Social Liberation (Εθνική και Κοινωνική Απελευθέρωση - E.K.K.A.). Remarkably, none of these groups had any communication with the Greek Government-in-exile, which, divorced from mainland Greece, devoted itself to post-war territorial settlements, taking no part whatsoever in the organization and evolution of the resistance struggle in Greece.6 By 1942, Britain had also become involved in Greek affairs to a greater extent than ever, and the British Special Operation Executives (S.O.E.), which participated in wartime resistance in Europe, expanded its infiltration into Greece. The role of the resistance organizations in Greece was vital to all efforts against the Axis. A brief partnership between E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S., with participation from S.O.E., achieved spectacular results, as demonstrated by the famous Gorgopotamos operation of 1942. Unfortunately, this was the only coordinated effort between E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S., and by 1943 the Greek resistance forces had turned against each other,7 eventually drawing themselves and the rest of Greece into a catastrophic civil war that would delay the

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country’s postwar reconstruction until 1949. The consequences of this internecine battle would affect both Greece and Cyprus as well for many years to come. 4.2 Military and Administrative Changes in Cyprus after Greece’s Surrender to the Axis Powers The British decision not to evacuate Cyprus followed the arrival of the 50th British Division in July 1941, although Churchill and Eden doubted about the necessity for such a fighting force being garrisoned on the island after the occupation of Syria8 - later that year Indian troops replaced the Division. The British undertook considerable military works in Cyprus, including the extension of the landing grounds at Nicosia and Larnaca. These projects absorbed a large number of labourers and helped to relieve unemployment – in Paphos alone almost 2500 men were fully occupied in the construction of an aerodrome,9 and by July 1941 around 20000 people were engaged in the construction of various military works for the defence of the island.10 The immediate danger of air attacks against Cyprus was averted by the Allied occupation of Syria. Winston Churchill’s statement that the occupation of Syria safeguarded Cyprus11 reassured the island’s population. Nevertheless, this did not save Cyprus from random air attacks, which were particularly intense and resulted in several deaths during the summer of 1941,12 and attacks on Famagusta and Limassol during the middle of August are still wellremembered on the island.13 Nonetheless, by September 1941 it was evident that the defence of the island had significantly improved.14 The fortification of Cyprus was accompanied by a fresh ‘change of guard’. After two years in Cyprus, Sir William Battershill was promoted to new duties at the Colonial Office in London. The sudden news of his departure left Greek Cypriots with the taste of unfulfilled expectations. As Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλακας noted, Battershill’s promising appointment in 1939 had been interrupted by the eruption of the European War. Battershill had endeavoured to reintroduce municipal elections, which suggested a move away from the immobility that had been endemic to the local political scene.15 For his part, in his last speech to the Advisory Council, Battershill pointed out that legislation such as the Rural Debt Law had helped improve social conditions on the island. He also admitted that much more could have been done in Cyprus had the war not intervened.16 The new Governor, Sir Charles Woolley,17 arrived in Cyprus on 25 November 1941. He would remain on the island until the end of the war. In accordance with a suggestion by the Acting Governor J.V. Shaw regarding safety reasons,18 Woolley held his inauguration in a modest indoor celebration at the Governor’s House.19

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The arrival of Woolley coincided with a new wave of Enosis enthusiasm on the island caused by a statement made by Greek Prime Minister E. Tsouderos in which he pictured Cyprus as part of a Greater Greece. As so often before, a new Governor arrived just when Greek Cypriot expectations were in a heightened state. In addition to Woolley’s arrival and Tsouderos’s remarks, both the first Municipal elections since 1931, finally held in 1943, and the introduction of a new ten-year development programme, gave at least some credence to these hopes. However, whether these events would be enough to reinforce the Government’s position in relation to Cypriot public opinion was another matter. 4.3 A.K.E.L. and the Foundation of the Pan Cyprian Trade Union Committee (P.S.E.) Little was heard from A.K.E.L. after its foundation in April 1941, as its birth was overshadowed by the German invasion of Greece. However, Germany’s invasion of Russia on 21 June 1941 and the consequent Anglo-Soviet alliance enabled A.K.E.L. to make more of an impact on local politics. The enlargement of the war forced the Cyprus labour movement to become more engaged with the war and its effect on Greece and Cyprus. In tandem with the Trade Unions, A.K.E.L. became the spearhead of ‘anti-fascism’ in the island. After the German attack on Russia, the Trade Unions issued a statement condemning fascism and declaring their solidarity with the Soviet Union.20 A.K.E.L. was also quick to react to the news by sending a telegram to the Governor congratulating him on the Anglo-Soviet Alliance.21 The party then promoted the foundation of ‘anti-fascist’ committees in all the major towns on the island22 with the loyal support of Ανεξάρτητος, which acted as its mouthpiece. One of the party’s radical initiatives was to call on workers to support the struggle against the Axis by working voluntarily for one day a week at defence works throughout the island.23 The appeal met with a considerable response, and by early November 6000 people had volunteered.24 The success of this initiative and the publicity it generated demonstrated the growing strength of A.K.E.L. In combination with its ‘anti-fascist’ policies, A.K.E.L. also expanded its influence in the countryside by arranging lectures25 and founding cultural clubs in many villages.26 A significant organization was clearly in the making. By autumn, membership in A.K.E.L. had reached 1300.27 On the 5th of October A.K.E.L. convened its first Pan Cyprian conference, in Limassol, in order to discuss the party’s beliefs and principles, especially its anti-fascist policy.28 Preparatory district meetings had already been held in the island’s major towns.29 The Conference saw the election of the party’s Central Committee, in which Ploutis Servas was elected as its first General Secretary. According to an article published after the conference in the Limassol

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newspaper Παρατηρητής (Observer) what made A.K.E.L. so significant was that it comprised individuals new to the political arena.30 An even more significant date for A.K.E.L. was 16 November 1941, when the Second Pan-Cyprian Trade Union Conference was held on the premises of the religious club Αγάπη (Agapi - Love) in Nicosia.31 This was the second effort the Unions made to coordinate their operations after their first attempt, in 1939, had failed. This second conference succeeded in organizing the Unions under one leading organ, the Pan-Cyprian Trade Union Committee (Παγκύπρια Συντεχνιακή Επιτροπή - P.S.E.). The foundation of P.S.E. was an important step towards effective cooperation between the Cyprus Trade Unions, as henceforth P.S.E. played a crucial role in popular initiatives regarding labour issues. The Central Committee of P.S.E. contained 17 members, including well-known leftist figures such as Andreas Phantis and Andreas Ziartides. According to the charter of P.S.E., all District Trade Union Committees had to abide by the decisions of the Committee. A speech on behalf of A.K.E.L. was read at the Nicosia conference, and a number of telegrams were sent to the party’s British counterparts32 and to the Russian and American consuls in London.33 The conference also addressed the continued rise in the cost of living in Cyprus, which continued to create tremendous hardship for the people of Cyprus. That A.K.E.L. and the Cyprus labour movement in general now took a greater interest in military events did not stop them from pressing their demands, and labour strikes continued as before. Nicosia print-workers went on strike during the first days of June 1941, resulting in the cessation of the publication of newspapers for a week. Eventually, desperate to carry the exciting news of the Allied occupation of Syria, their employers ceded to the strikers’ demands.34 The railway strike, also held during the first days of June, was a more serious affair, since it delayed the delivery of supplies necessary for defence works at a critical time.35 Through Defence Regulations, the railway had been declared an essential service, so when the strike leaders refused to return to work they were prosecuted at the District Court.36 Only when the organizers called off the strike did the Government grant some of their demands.37 The prosecution of the Railway strike leaders intimidated their counterparts in smaller unions, but the latter could still look to P.S.E. for help. In January 1942, after a strike at a button factory in Larnaca ended with favourable terms for the strikers, P.S.E. criticized the Cyprus Post,38 which had called on the Government to repress the action.39 At first, A.K.E.L. maintained a discreet level of activity, until the Soviet Union entered the war, pushing the party further into the open, particularly in the villages, and A.K.E.L soon posed a serious challenge to the Colonial Government. Meanwhile, the overall strategic picture of the war lent the party a degree of ideological legitimacy and political protection.

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4.4 British Reaction to A.K.E.L.’s Growing Influence The Colonial Government did not initially regard the foundation of A.K.E.L. with a great deal of concern. Subsequent events, however, forced colonial officialdom to re-examine the party’s significance. The Government had always been suspicious of the labour movement, which it considered a tool of communist agitators. Once A.K.E.L. increased its activities, especially after Russia’s entry in the war, the Government of Cyprus began to follow its activities more closely. Acting Governor Shaw argued that prior to announcing their sincere desire that Russia prevail against Germany, the Trade Unions had been confused and hesitant about the war. According to Shaw, this hesitancy “contrasted strikingly with the spontaneous enthusiasm of most Greek Cypriots which had been displayed on the outbreak of hostilities between Greece and Italy.”40 British officials were quick to note A.K.E.L.’s enthusiasm for the ‘antifascist’ struggle, and the party’s rapid organization and operations, including the creation of ‘anti-fascist’ committees, the organization of celebrations and lectures, and the arrangement of demonstrations and collections, made an impression on them. The influence of A.K.E.L. in the villages was also noted by the Colonial Office which swiftly advised that the party’s actions should be monitored.41 Although the British, both in Nicosia and in London, had no doubt about the Cyprus labour movement’s sincere desire to aid the Soviet Union, they also suspected the movement had an ulterior motive, which was to gain much greater leverage over the colonial regime in Cyprus.42 Despite their suspicion, the colonial authorities took some conciliatory steps towards the labour movement, which included permitting the establishment of a Labour Commissioner.43 The Cyprus Government also enacted fresh labour legislation, which was welcomed by the working people of Cyprus. In September 1941, the Government announced three important labour bills.44 These were the ‘Trades Unions and Trade Disputes Law’, the ‘Minimum Wage Law’ and the ‘Trades Dispute-Conciliation, Arbitration and Enquiry Law’.45 A.K.E.L. prepared a memorandum on these bills46 which the party presented to the Colonial Secretary before they were officially enacted in November.47 While interviews granted to Union Representatives by the Colonial Secretary pleased many in the labour movement, and even though some individuals serving prison sentences for the July railway strike were duly released,48 labour Government relations remained tense throughout the war. From the start, the British were fully aware of the underlying link between A.K.E.L. and the Cypriot labour organizations. The colonial authority was anxious about the party’s increased activity, even more so by the end of 1941, when A.K.E.L. positioned itself firmly in favour of Enosis. In early 1942, A.K.E.L. presented the Governor with a memorandum of proposals touching

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on virtually all aspects of Cypriot society.49 It was clear to Governor Woolley and his colleagues that a new ‘power in the land’ had arrived. 4.5 The Vision of Emmanouil Tsouderos: the 15th November 1941 Declaration and its Implications Determined to do nothing which might prejudice its continued hold on Cyprus as part of its colonial empire, the British Government denied the request of the Greek King George II to move his government to Cyprus after the fall of Crete. In London, on 15 November 1941, when Greek Prime Minister Emmanouil Tsouderos addressed the fate of Greek-majority territories not yet politically united with the Kingdom of Greece, an irritated Whitehall issued a counter-statement that no change in the status of Cyprus was negotiable, and that the island’s fate would only be discussed after the end of the war. Tsouderos considered Cyprus to be high on the agenda of Greece’s future territorial claims, and he had prepared a memorandum for King George II in early July 1941 in which he summarized these claims, and placing Cyprus third after North Epirus and the Dodecanese.50 The Greek press paid prominent attention to any statements the Greek Premier made following the arrival of his regime in London in September 1941,51 particularly those concerning their country’s political future.52 The Premier’s reply to a message from the Locum Tenens, Leontios, wherein he expressed the hope that it would not be long before they could meet together on the soil of the common ‘mother Greece’, received tremendous publicity.53 It was only natural, then, that any of the Prime Minister’s speeches referring specifically to the future of Cyprus aroused a new wave of enthusiasm for Greece and pro-Enosis sentiment on the island. On 15 November 1941, Tsouderos delivered a speech at a dinner hosted by the Greek community of London. “Greece…dressed in white and with the nimbus of martyrdom round her head, she is not alone; she is followed by her beloved united daughters,” Tsouderos said. “Look! There is the woman of Macedonia, the woman of Crete, the woman of Cyprus, the woman of Peloponese, the woman of Dodecanese, the woman of Yanina, the woman of North Epirus… adorned with laurels they follow their mother, going forward towards victory that will unite them again in peace”.54 Such statements were bound to arouse the ire of Whitehall, and the attendance at the dinner by members of the Foreign Office made things all the more sensitive.55 The Prime Minister’s speech was characterized as ‘highly indiscreet’ and prejudicing Tsouderos’s ‘lack of political judgment.’56 Eden met with

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Tsouderos soon after the speech. He conveyed his disappointment and dissatisfaction to the Prime Minister and informed him that his incendiary remarks had created a sort of ‘revolution’ in Cyprus.57 Eden also told Tsouderos that London would issue a second statement confirming that any discussion of the future of Cyprus was entirely premature, then asked Tsouderos to use more careful and non-committal language when discussing the matter. In his defence, Tsouderos explained that his diction had been employed for purely allegorical purposes, that under no circumstances had he wished to raise the question of Cyprus, and that he himself was content to leave the matter until after the end of the war.58 He did explain to Eden, though, that the Atlantic Charter, as drafted by Churchill and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, contained provisions regarding freedom and self-determination and had inevitably encouraged Greek aspirations in this direction.59 This naturally would not be the last time that pronouncements by the Greek Premier were met with the disapproval of the Foreign Office.60 Of course Tsouderos’s words echoed across Cyprus.61 His speech of 15 November resulted in an intense resurgence of Enosis fervor in Cyprus, as exemplified by numerous editorials and by the stream of telegrams addressed to the Greek Premier.62 A statement in the Cyprus Post – recently founded on the island by the British Council – of the ‘just claims of Greek Cypriots in their demands for Enosis’ 63 almost led to the dismissal of the paper’s editor, W.J. Makin. The Colonial Office was furious that Makin, ‘despite being permitted a large measure of discretion in regard to editorial comment …had abused this license’.64 The Cyprus Post article received extensive publicity in the Cypriot press, which greatly disturbed the Colonial Authority.65 Since its founding, the Cyprus Post had been critical of Enosis,66 something which hadn’t helped increase its appeal amongst Cypriot readers – with Makin’s editorial, the paper sought, successfully, to make up some of this lost ground, irritating its own bankers in the process. This incident was neither the first example, nor the last, of the many dilemmas facing those charged with handling public relations for the ruling colonial power. The revival of Enosis sentiment on the island also disturbed the Turkish Cypriot minority. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Soz, remarked that the Greek Premier’s 15 November remarks had ‘produced great sorrow and anxiety in Turkish circles of Cyprus and the British Government’s denial in this respect is awaited with great impatience’67 – the paper’s accompanying attack on Enosis itself was rebutted in a number of Greek Cypriot editorials.68 Munir Bey, a longstanding member of the Executive Council, emphatically reasserted the Turkish Cypriot desire to remain under British rule in a telegram to the Colonial Office.69 He dispatched a similar telegram to the British Prime Minister.70

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There was little prospect of the British failing to heed Turkish Cypriot concerns. According to Tsouderos, Eden had warned him that whilst he might discuss the issue of Cyprus after the war, he could not neglect the wishes of the Turkish Cypriot minority.71 Before long the Cyprus Government would try to set the anxieties of the Turkish Cypriots entirely at rest. The Tsouderos episode was also significant in that it provided a convenient opportunity for A.K.E.L. to adjust its own position and adopt an unequivocally pro-Enosis policy. Following the 15 November dinner in London, the party announced that Tsouderos’s words had only been a proper expression of the terms of the Atlantic Charter,72 and that the incorporation of Cyprus into the Greek state would improve conditions for the working people of Cyprus. A.K.E.L. declared it would ‘put itself in the service for the national restoration in Cyprus’.73 This was a warning sign for the colonial authority, and for the traditional power of the Church and the Right. To meet this new challenge posed by A.K.E.L., on 2 December the Colonial Government of Cyprus issued its own statement. The statement referred to the anticipatory speculation Tsouderos had aroused on 15 November and declared that “the Governor is authorized to say that no negotiations have been or are in progress between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Greece regarding the postwar status of Cyprus. The question of transferring Cyprus from Great Britain to Greece after the war is not, therefore, under consideration”.74 In response, Ελευθερία commented that no one in Cyprus supposed that Enosis was a claim that would be discussed during the war. The paper went on to reaffirm that Cypriots continued to support an Allied victory, which might eventually allow for discussions of Enosis.75 The reverberations of Tsouderos’s 15 November address should not be underestimated. This was the first time the Greek Government had sought to gently raise the issue of Enosis and it elicited the determination of the British not to allow this genie to escape its bottle. It also prompted London to renew its emphasis on the desires of the Turkish Cypriots, which would be an important factor in the island’s future politics. A.K.E.L.’s decision, in the wake of Tsouderos’s speech, to rally behind the attempt to force Enosis into AngloGreek wartime diplomacy was of crucial importance, since it was ultimately the Left’s drive to take leadership of the Cypriot Enosis movement which would transform the island’s politics. This became clearer a few months later in the context of the celebration of Greek Independence Day, 25 March, which was always a date of symbolic importance in Cypriot life. 4.6 British – Church Relations Remain Deadlocked The occupation of Greece dealt Cypriot expectation of Enosis a powerful blow.

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As a consequence, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Locum Tenens, Leontios, initially kept a low profile with regard to Enosis. It was not long, however, before Leontios renewed his drive for Hellenic solidarity. His first effort was to once again collect money for the Greek Fund, an endeavour that had stalled after the invasion of Greece, and he presided over a meeting in October 1941 to resuscitate this appeal.76 Leontios selected the symbolic date of 28 October 1941, the first anniversary of Metaxas’s famous ‘No’ to Mussolini, on which to resume collections.77 The Acting Archbishop was careful not to use any language which caused undue offence in British eyes. This may be explained by the arrival of a new Governor. In contrast with the arrival of Governor Battershill, this time the colonial authority invited Leontios to the welcoming ceremony for Sir Charles Woolley which augured better relations between the Church and the Colonial Government.78 When Enosis sentiments in the island received yet another boost after 15 November, Leontios sent a congratulatory telegram to Tsouderos in which he confirmed that Greek Cypriots ‘anticipated the liberation and restoration of Greece and the union of all Greeks under their motherland’.79 After the Cyprus Government attempted to deflate Greek Cypriot enthusiasm with its statement of 2 December, Leontios wrote to Governor Woolley, assuring the Governor that Greek Cypriots held fast to their faith in Britain and to the certainty that “according to the liberal British tradition she will deliver justice to the Greek Cypriot people by freeing and transferring the Greek island of Cyprus to her motherland Greece.” Once the European War evolved into a global conflict, with the entry of the United States and Japan into hostilities in December 1941, Leontios sent another letter to Woolley, reiterating that the struggle of Britain and her allies had the complete support of Greek Cypriots.80 The first meeting between Governor Woolley and Bishop Leontios took place in late January 1942 at the latter’s request. At this first meeting, Woolley and Leontios exclusively discussed the still vacant archiepiscopal throne, and Leontios told Woolley that he wished to submit new suggestions as to how the vacancy might be filled. He forwarded these suggestions to Woolley shortly after the meeting, but there was nothing new in this document other than Leontios’s assertion that he would do anything in his power to end the deadlock. The press supported the prospect of a solution to the archiepiscopal vacancy,81 but Woolley was skeptical about Leontios’s motives and his willingness to cooperate. Woolley believed that Leontios hoped to take advantage of the inability of the exiled Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios II, to press his own claims, since he was trapped in occupied Athens, and that the Locum Tenens would try to come to an agreement with the Government that facilitated his own speedy elevation.

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Leontios’s motives were open to speculation. It was entirely natural that he wanted to bring to an end a problem that had troubled the Orthodox Church of Cyprus for almost a decade, and he had declared that he did not intend to participate in any forthcoming ecclesiastical elections. However, from the outset of the relationship, any such assertions foundered on Woolley’s conviction that the Locum Tenens was insincere. After the occupation of Greece, the Church of Cyprus took under its aegis the Greek refugees who had fled the mainland.82 The refugees were permitted to remain for a limited time only, until their movement to other countries became feasible. At first, the Greeks were kept in quarantine camps, and the press was prohibited from publishing news about their arrival. In early 1942, the colonial authority finally allowed the press to report on both the Greek refugees and the local committees established under Church leadership to oversee their accommodation on the island. The Church created committees for the relief of the escapees83 - with members drawn from local clubs and organizations – in Nicosia and Famagusta at first, then in other towns, and Leontios called on everyone to contribute generously to the collections.84 The Church also implemented and promoted a scheme for the adoption of Greek children by Cypriot families, who would be responsible for these children until the end of the war.85 The committee for collections, led by the Church, also accepted an offer from A.K.E.L. of both money and participation in district collection committees.86 The response to the appeal was positive and widespread, although Ελευθερία criticized the Church in an article about the appeal, alleging that the Church should have taken such steps earlier.87 In Limassol, gatherings were organized at which food for the refugees was provided to the accompaniment of patriotic poems and speeches.88 Paphos also welcomed these unfortunate Greeks and promised them every help possible.89 When the International Red Cross made arrangements for 9000 Greek children to be resettled in Turkey, Greek Cypriots urged the Church to secure the delivery of these young refugees to the island,90 as public opinion held that the people of Cyprus should be vested with this responsibility. Greek refugees eligible for recruitment often left the island to enlist in the Free Greek Forces under British command in the Middle East, which revived discussions about the Cypriot volunteering movement. The Mayor of Nicosia, Themistocles Dervis, echoing the spirit of Cypriots who had previously volunteered in the Balkan wars and in World War I, asked the Governor if these veterans might be allowed to form a ‘Sacred Legion’ to fight alongside these Greek forces.91 The British rejected Dervis’s request on the grounds that the most appropriate wartime participation for Cypriots was service in the Cyprus Regiment.92 The Locum Tenens adopted a more discreet approach to his goal of Enosis

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after the fall of Greece. While the Union of Cyprus with Greece was one of his foremost goals, the Acting Archbishop refrained from giving sermons likely to engender the Government’s disapproval. The Governor, however, had no illusions that Leontios had undergone any radical transformation. An incident later recalled by Percy Arnold, the editor of the Cyprus Post, underlines the dissonance between Woolley and Leontios. A newcomer to the island, Arnold had arranged a meeting with the Locum Tenens. When the meeting concluded, Arnold mentioned that he would shortly see the Governor as well – Leontios immediately pleaded that Arnold should deliver a personal message of support to the Governor on his behalf. The message Leontios asked Arnold to convey to the Governor stressed that whilst as Acting Archbishop he earnestly looked forward to the repeal of the Church laws of 1937, he nonetheless pledged that neither he nor his Church would do anything to embarrass the Government, and that the Church wholeheartedly supported the Allied war effort. When Arnold duly delivered this message a few days later, the Governor merely raised an eyebrow and remarked, ‘He said that, did he?’93 This sums up, in passing fashion, the icy relations between the Church and the Government of Cyprus. Not even the common danger of the war, and the warmth this common danger created, could melt it. 4.7 25 March 1942: Early Tension between the Greek Cypriot Left and Right The anniversary of Greek Independence, celebrated on 25 March 1942, proved to be a watershed in relations between the Left and Right in Cyprus. The division between the two, although it took a symbolic form, nonetheless had a powerful effect on Cyprus politics. In essence, A.K.E.L. announced it would put its full weight behind the celebration of the day, whereas the Church and its allies stuck to their position that under present conditions the event should be allowed to pass with little fanfare. These divergent positions were fully communicated by the respective press organs. Since the Church traditionally took responsibility for these ‘national’ celebrations, its position on this occasion was rather striking. Indeed, disagreements within Church circles as to how the day ought to be honoured were mirrored in the Archbishopric’s successive announcements on the matter. As early as the 12th of February, the Church of Cyprus had announced that due to the occupation of Greece, Independence Day would not be celebrated as it had been in previous years – instead, liturgies would be held for the final Allied victory, for the resurrection of Greece, and for Enosis.94 However, the Locum Tenens issued an elucidation a few days later, in which he stated that public celebrations should not be affected by the Archbishopric’s previous announcement.95 This triggered some discord between the Church and the Right, and

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the right wing Nicosia clubs issued their own separate announcement declaring they would not participate in 25th March festivities in any way.96 Having just declared itself in favour of Enosis, the day provided A.K.E.L. with an excellent opportunity for demonstrating its new position. In this regard, A.K.E.L.’s Central Committee and the working clubs of Nicosia were unanimous.97 While Leontios himself favoured the usual celebration in principle, he was necessarily aware that ‘various circles’ on the Right were strongly opposed to such celebration on the grounds that the current suffering of Greece was no occasion to celebrate.98 The Archimandrite of Kyrenia, a See endorsing intransigent Enosists, attacked A.K.E.L.’s policy, alleging that a party which had ‘endorsed people of other nations and other religions’ – one that was anti-national, in other words – had no right to be involved in Greek Independence celebrations in the first place.99 The Archimandrite’s stance deeply offended the Left.100 Despite all the criticism, A.K.E.L. organized multiple events for the day. In Limassol, the A.K.E.L. District Committee decided that, in addition to the Greek flag, the flags of Britain, China, Russia and the United States, as Allied countries, should also be displayed.101 The Commission of Limassol granted the District Committee permission to organize a march,102 as did the Commission of Nicosia,103 provided no more than 500 persons participated.104 An appeal by A.K.E.L. to Γ.Σ.Π. (Γυμναστικός Σύλλογος Παγκύπρια - Pan Cyprian Gymnastic Club) to make use of the club’s stadium on this occasion, however was rejected, as Γ.Σ.Π.was aligned with the Right.105 Eventually, the 25th of March passed much more quietly than had been expected, and each side celebrated the national day as it believed best, given the circumstances. The usual telegrams were sent to the Greek Prime Minister and Greek King in London.106 Doxologies were held in the Orthodox churches. The Locum Tenens conducted the main liturgy in Phaneromeni Church, in which he prayed for the resurrection of the Greek nation. Some clubs chose to cover their Greek flags in black.107 The Trade Unions celebrated the day at their premises, marched in the streets, and held evening celebrations in which the Greek and other Allied flags were prominently displayed.108 The celebrations of 25 March 1942 resulted in a profound division between the Cypriot Right and Left, confounding the sober advice of Πάφος that all Cypriots should remain united until victory in the war was achieved.109 The 25th of March served as the first testing ground for a new configuration of conflicting political forces on the island. A.K.E.L. was clear and consistent in its attempt to assume the leadership of the Enosis movement and took this position with confidence. The Right was caught unprepared to face this new challenge, and was immediately fraught with internal disagreements as to how

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to best handle the growing strength of A.K.E.L. On one thing, however, all factions on the Right were in complete accord – the refusal to yield the traditional leadership of Cypriot politics to a newly-arrived ‘communist’ party. This position precluded the possibility of any cooperation between the Left and the Right, despite initiatives made by Leontios to keep the Cypriot political world united under Church leadership.

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5 CYPRIOT POLITICS ON THE EVE OF THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS OF 1943

5.1 The Visit of Eminent Persons in Cyprus, the Press and Enosis Politics By 1942 Enosis had returned to the foreground of Cypriot politics, as evidenced by celebrations in honour of the 25th of March that year. There were a number of high profile visits to Cyprus that year, and in early 1943 Winston Churchill himself made an official visit to the island. A.K.E.L. managed to stay in the spotlight during this period by adopting an especially critical stance towards the Colonial Government. The Right initially countered A.K.E.L.’s growing influence by founding P.E.K., a farmers union. Created to represent the more conservative elements of rural society, P.E.K. ultimately assumed a significant social and political role in the island’s affairs. However, disunity continued to plague the Right, particularly within the Church, where the hard-line ‘Circle of Kyrenia’ austerely questioned the effectiveness of Leontios’s policies. Thus the announcement that municipal elections were to be held, finally, in March 1943, created a particularly feverish atmosphere within the island’s political scene. It was a regular trait of Cypriot public affairs that visits to the island by wellknown personalities were cause for enthusiastic political demonstrations, and it was axiomatic that such occasions provided an opportunity for expressions of Enosis. During the war, however, such demonstrations were accompanied by declarations of support for the Allied effort, as was the case when the Duke of Gloucester paid a brief visit to the island in May 1942. Ελευθερία reported that a crowd of more than 10 000 people enthusiastically gathered inside the ‘old’ city of Nicosia to welcome the Duke, cheering for both Greece and Britain. In his speech, the Duke thanked Cypriots for their cordial welcome, and for their valuable contribution to the Allied cause.1 According to the right wing Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ, the crowd waved both Greek and British flags, symbolizing the common struggle of the two countries. The article explained, however, that

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the Greek flag also symbolized that Cyprus was Greek, and that its hopes for unification with Greece ‘depend completely on traditional British liberalism’.2 Pericles Argyropoulos was a Greek Government officer sent to liaise with the colonial authorities regarding the welfare of the refugees from Greece, and his visit to Cyprus was also an event which aroused much local discussion. Not surprisingly, upon his arrival in mid-July 1942, various clubs and organizations rushed to welcome him to the island, each expressing hope for the eventual fulfillment of Enosis. Typical of these overtures was the telegram sent by the Nicosia club Τραστ, which concluded with the wish that Cyprus would ‘find its natural position with the consanguineous Greek state’.3 Argyropoulos was careful to limit his public statements to an appreciation of Cypriot generosity to the refugees, and to an exhortation to all citizens to assist the war effort against the Axis.4 During his stay he toured the island and met with both the British Governor and the Locum Tenens.5 In an interview with Ελευθερία, Argyropoulos stated his intention to deliver a report with observations and proposals for the most effective care of the refugees.6 His report, addressed to the British and Greek governments, approved the current administrative arrangements for the handling of refugee matters whilst calling for larger camps capable of providing better facilities.7 Later that year, the Greek Government handed the responsibility for the Greek refugees in Cyprus to the Greek General Chr. Gkion.8 The scrupulous discretion exhibited by Argyropoulos was carried a step further when Prince Peter of Greece visited Cyprus in October 1942, as his visit was unaccompanied from any official statement from either the British or Greek governments. For some pro-Enosis organs in Cyprus, this implied attempt to suppress natural Hellenic feelings went too far, and criticism ensued.9 Some compensation could sometimes be afforded by pro-Enosis statements appearing in Britain itself, since, given their provenance, these statements were less susceptible to allegations of ‘sedition’. An example of such compensation included a Compton Mackenzie article in the London-based newspaper, Ελλάδα (Ellada - Greece), wherein Mackenzie argued that even the addition of Cyprus and the Dodecanese to Greece would be an insufficient reward for her wartime sacrifices. Mackenzie’s article was naturally republished on the front pages of the Cypriot newspapers.10 Throughout 1942, however, Enosis advocates continued to experiment with ways of keeping their long term goal in the foreground without breaking the implicit bargains which underlay their island’s wartime relationships. 5.2 The Debate on the Issue of Compulsory Military Service in Cyprus An issue that occupied both the Government of Cyprus and local opinion in mid-1942, partly due to its delicate nature, was the prospect of compulsory

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military service on the island. This was not the first time the matter had come under consideration – as early as 1941, after the fall of Crete, Governor Battershill had considered the option of a draft.11 After Charles Woolley assumed his duties in Cyprus, the possibility of conscription returned to the spotlight. The Colonial Office had informed Woolley that the British Military Command in the Middle East, then under Claude Auchinleck, urgently needed extra manpower – the United Kingdom was at full stretch, and Australia was reluctant to provide troops to the region as she had done during the First World War and during the disastrous British campaign in Greece. Whilst some of the resulting shortfall might be filled by African manpower, the Colonial Office began to investigate if conscription might be possible in Cyprus.12 The Colonial Office’s initiative coincided with the preliminary examination that Woolley himself was making of the matter. At the time the Cyprus Regiment was suffering badly from a lack of sufficient recruits – according to an official report, from May 1941 to March 1942, only 514 people had registered for the unit and, during the first three months of 1942, only 11 of them were recruited.13 Local circumstances and wartime conditions in Greece were the primary reasons for the sparsity of volunteers for the Cyprus Regiment. The clear preference of Cypriots for well-paid civilian jobs at local military works was scarcely surprising, as few were willing to risk life if they could provide for their families from the safety of Cyprus. The Cyprus Regiment suffered a significant number of casualties, especially during the Crete operations of May 1941. Of the 8400 Cypriots who had enlisted in the Cyprus Regiment, 3540 were reported as either dead, prisoners of war or missing.14 This number understandably made many Cypriots reluctant to enlist. The Governor consulted the Advisory Council, which supported the imposition of conscription in one form or other, especially if linked to a formal announcement promising the restoration of political liberties on the island.15 This tack was attractive to the Governor, whose thoughts were beginning to turn in this direction, and an official communiqué was duly made to the press stating that the Government was considering conscription.16 However, following the Colonial Government’s announcement, an editorial in the Cyprus Post advocating the conscription of Cypriots17 turned the tide of public opinion against the government. The paper, whose connection with the British Council was well-known, based its support for conscription on the grounds that in recent months recruitment for the Cyprus Regiment had been inadequate. The editorial declared that the Allied war effort needed more men, that Cyprus was in a position to contribute more troops, and that the imposition of such a measure would be enthusiastically welcomed by Cypriots. The Cyprus Post, however, had miscalculated the prevailing mood among Cypriots, and the

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article was generally attributed to the Government itself by the rest of the island’s press and by the public. In a response to the article three days later, a Cyprus Post reader called Cypriots ‘lazy and cowards,’18 which predictably inflamed the Greek Cypriot press. An article in Πάφος mentioned that earlier that year the Cyprus Post itself had stated that “in terms of recruitment, Cyprus does not come last in the colonial war effort; in fact it probably comes first.”19 Most Cypriot newspapers declaimed that the contribution of Cyprus to the war effort so far was significant. Ελευθερία wrote that Cypriots’ lack of military experience had not prejudiced the performance of the Cyprus Regiment,20 whilst Ανεξάρτητος argued that more military recruitment would only accelerate the economic disorganization of the island.21 The clinching argument against conscription, however, was that enlistment was a decision that Cypriots had to make for themselves. The absence of a representative body capable of mediating between the people of Cyprus and the Colonial Government on such an issue was crucial. The Limassol-based Χρόνος (Chronos - Time) pointed out that Cypriots had so far voluntarily provided their services to the Allied cause, but compulsory participation in the Cyprus Regiment could only be decided by the people through a representative body.22 This intense antagonism between the Cyprus Post and the vernacular press foretold the course of events. It was essential that both A.K.E.L. and the Locum Tenens, Leontios, should address memorandums to the Governor on such an important issue. The Central Committee of A.K.E.L. informed Woolley that a just reward for the present Cypriot contribution to the war would be the repeal of the repressive laws of 1931. According to the Central Committee, Cypriots felt the principles of the Atlantic Charter were not being applied to them, despite their contributions to the Allied war effort. The people of Cyprus did not even have a representative popular body – the Advisory Council could in no sense be regarded in this light.23 To remedy this situation, the memorandum proposed, as a necessary first step, that the Colonial Government issue an official declaration that the principles of the Atlantic Charter would be applied to Cyprus after the war. According to the principle of self-determination, this meant that Cyprus would finally be able to unite with Greece. A second prerequisite for compulsory service was a restored Cypriot legislature whose elected members would have responsibility for all financial matters in the Colony. The A.K.E.L. memorandum even went so far as to insist that any compulsory recruits should be trained by officers of the Greek Army, instead of by their British counterparts.24 The Acting Archbishop likewise stressed that Cypriots had willingly contributed to the Allied war effort to a degree beyond the size of the island’s

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population. Leontios alleged that the imposition of compulsory service was ‘strictly unconstitutional,’ since Cypriots were deprived of any mechanism for agreeing to such a measure, which was essential where the lives of citizens were concerned. Leontios outlined his own proposal, in which he offered to recommend conscription to his flock, and even join the Army himself, on condition that an official declaration would be issued promising that Cyprus would be immediately ceded to Greece after the war. Echoing the A.K.E.L. position that Greek Cypriot soldiers should be trained by Greek officers, Leontios asserted that if Greek Cypriots had to fight outside Cyprus they should be incorporated into the Greek Forces in the Middle East.25 The Locum Tenens had consulted Pericles Argyropoulos on the matter while the latter was still in Cyprus on refugee work. Leontios asked Argyropoulos to review the memorandum to Governor Woolley and confirm that the government of Greece agreed with his proposal. Leontios was willing to change his policy if the Greek Government felt this was not the best method for the achievement of Enosis, and he told Argyropoulos that he would even quit his duties if Greece believed another bishop might best fulfill the national aspirations of Greek Cypriots. Unwilling to stoke further Anglo-Greek friction, Argyropoulos predictably ducked such leading questions, and he told Leontios that his last suggestion in particular (that Leontios was willing to quit his duties) was out of question, since it would surely upset local affairs and he promised to communicate Leontios’s proposal to the Greek authorities.26 Naturally, both memorandums were published and discussed in the local press, which was for the most part in complete agreement with A.K.E.L. and with Leontios,27 as were the Trade Unions.28 The discussions that followed the publication of the memorandums consistently emphasized the right of Cypriots to decide on this crucial matter for themselves.29 This position was not without opposition, however, since most Cypriots believed it was necessary to support the war effort in every way possible.30 Inevitably, after these events it became apparent to the British authorities that the majority of Greek Cypriots would oppose the implementation of a compulsory military scheme. Governor Woolley replied to Leontios, informing the Locum Tenens that he did not feel there were grounds for further discussion on conscription on the bases he had put forth in his memorandum.31 Woolley informed the Colonial Office that Cypriot reaction to a possible conscription scheme had been unexpectedly negative. He was careful to remind his superiors of Cypriot contributions to the war effort, pointing out that almost 20,000 people had applied to the Cyprus Regiment, one fifth of the island’s population.32 On receiving Woolley’s report, the Colonial Office expressed surprise at how warmly both A.K.E.L and the Ethnarch had put forward their respective

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views.33 At no point throughout the remainder of the war was compulsory conscription again debated. At the same time, it served both the Colonial Government and Greek Cypriots to maximize contributions to the Cyprus Volunteer Force, whatever differences there were between them with regard to other areas of public life on the island. 5.3 Opposition from the Press and the Circle of Kyrenia to the Locum Tenens Leontios came under increasing pressure during the second half of 1942, and his prestige was not what it was. With compulsory enlistment set aside, and the Cyprus Government instead trying to make the most of voluntary arrangements for recruitment34 many Greek Cypriots believed the acting Ethnarch had, since the fall of Crete, put too many obstacles in the way of the war effort. Ελευθερία now took this position and wondered about who “out of the group of the leaders and the clubs of the island helped the Governmental propaganda for the volunteering recruiting of the Cyprus Force? Whoever paid a visit to see these soldiers in their camps? Who approached these men, over their Easter leave? Was it perhaps the Church who rushed to welcome, to congratulate and to help these men fulfill their religious duties…?”35 In response, Leontios announced he would visit Cyprus Volunteer Force camps, where he would meet the volunteers and conduct doxologies. Indeed, throughout late November and December, he toured the Cyprus Volunteer Force camps and the Cyprus Regiment camps, where he met with the Cypriot volunteers.36 The local papers approved of this slight modulation in the pattern of his activities.37 Nor was Leontios free from criticism by the Church’s inner circles. Supporters of the exiled Bishop Makarios of Kyrenia, led by the Secretary of the Kyrenia See, Polikarpos Ioannides, often disagreed with how Leontios managed Church affairs, particularly the Church’s relationship with the British authorities. In a personal letter to the Locum Tenens, Ioannides strongly opposed the position Leontios had taken on compulsory conscription and urged him to revise it.38 Ioannides stated in his letter that both he and the Bishop of Kyrenia felt strongly that the achievement of the national aspiration required an impeccable contribution to the war against Germany and full cooperation with the Cyprus Government. Ioannides took particular umbrage with Leontios’s attempt to guide Greek Cypriots into the Greek Army rather than the Cyprus Regiment, as the latter was central to the Anglo-Greek relationship under present conditions, and significant service in this unit by Cypriots would ultimately serve to buttress the postwar demand for Enosis. Ioannides’s critique of Leontios was aired in a series of republished articles in Ελευθερία, in which he also attacked Leontios for ‘insufficient vigour’ in supporting various appeals for financial support for the Allied war effort.39 He urged all Greek Cypriots who

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“still believe in the ideals of democracy and justice and the four freedoms that President Roosevelt spoke of…to organize themselves as soon as possible so as to contribute to the Allied effort and to the defence of Cyprus.” By the end of 1942, it was clear that the war had provided a new testing ground for the existing fissures within the Church of Cyprus. Meanwhile, in local British circles, a desire emerged to narrow the gap between the Government and the Church, most practically by breaking the deadlock over the archiepiscopal vacancy. In particular, Governor Woolley suggested to the Colonial Office the possibility of the repeal of the restrictive 1937 Church laws, on the grounds that they only contributed to the recurring vigour of the Enosis movement. Furthermore, the 1937 Church laws helped preserve the gap between the Colonial Government and Cypriots, which played into the hands not only of the Church but, perhaps even more dangerously, of the Cypriot Left.40 The Governor even went on to suggest a repeal of the ban on the 1931 exiles and the return of Makarios, the Bishop of Kyrenia. Woolley’s ideas were not well received back in London. There had long been a fear at Whitehall that the abolition of these various laws might create highly unstable and unpredictable conditions, and the risks of doing so during the war were far too great.41 Thus the Government-Church deadlock continued – perhaps another ‘lost opportunity’ of Cypriot colonial policies. The real challenge to the Church, however, rather than its stalemate with London, was to arrive in 1943 with the success of A.K.E.L. in the municipal elections. 5.4 The Cypriot Left Prior to the Municipal Elections of 1943 As the 1943 municipal elections approached, A.K.E.L. made itself a dangerous opponent for the Right. One of the party’s main tactics was to bombard the colonial authorities with appeals on local issues. One of these concerned the central issue of education and inevitably caused quite a stir. The British insisted on separating schools according to religious criteria, rather than national, and they faced fierce opposition from Greek Cypriots. A.K.E.L., in this instance speaking for the majority of Greek Cypriots, criticized the Government’s insistence on using the term ‘Christian Orthodox’ instead of ‘Greek’, despite Cypriot cooperation with the Government since the onset of the war.42 For Greek Cypriots, this distinction was vital.43 The press, in support of A.K.E.L., observed that the use of the term ‘Christian Orthodox’ had no effect in diminishing the consciousness of being Greek.44 A second open letter from A.K.E.L. to the Governor alleged that proposals and suggestions made by various representatives of local interests were never replied to by Colonial officialdom.45 By publicly criticising the Colonial Government on a range of matters, A.K.E.L. increased its appeal across various sections of Cypriot society.

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A.K.E.L. also maintained and strengthened its close ties with the Trade Unions, often bolstering the latter’s demands. The deterioration of the economy during wartime and the increasing cost of living remained issues that preoccupied the Cyprus labour movement, and both A.K.E.L. and P.S.E. appealed to both the British Trade Union Congress and to Colonial officials in London for help.46 Strikes, mostly as a means of achieving higher wages, continued. A strike at the Limassol button factory47 in late June 1942 led to the prosecution of a group of workers,48 but the strike concluded in favour of the strikers,49 who received strong support from P.S.E.50 In October, representatives of P.S.E. met with the Cyprus Colonial Secretary to discuss important issues, including the cost of living and rates of pay – the discussion also covered more strictly political matters, including the liberalization of current laws and municipal elections.51 In December 1942 a second and more serious strike involving 8000 workers took place in Nicosia’s Government and military works. Despite a Governmental initiative to create a committee responsible for proposing measures for the reduction and stabilization of the cost of living, a decision not to grant wage increases52 resulted in a protracted strike. In response to rumours that an islandwide strike would be held in support of the demands of the Nicosia strikers, the Colonial Government issued an official warning that such a demonstration would be illegal, and that those who participated in such an action would be liable for penalties.53 The leaders of the Trade Unions, surprised by such Governmental determination, called off the strike.54 Eight striking workers had been sentenced to prison terms of 18 months,55 however, prompting P.S.E. to immediately contact the Trades Union Congress in London.56 Tension between the colonial authority and A.K.E.L. grew worse when the British refused to grant permission to the party to host celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, on 7 November, in Nicosia and Famagusta.57 Protests to the Colonial Office58 and the Trades Unions Congress59 eventually reached the Westminster Parliament. British MP, D. N. Pritt, asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, if Stanley was aware of the colonial authority’s decision to forbid celebrations of the anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union, an Allied country, and if “the Secretary of State had the intention of restoring some of the democratic rights of the people of Cyprus who are fighting and suffering heavy casualties in the cause of the United Nations.”60 According to Stanley, apart from arrangements for municipal elections, which were finally announced in October 1942, no other changes were planned with regard to legislation on the island, which seemed to indicate to Greek Cypriots and other interested parties that Britain’s postwar intentions for the island were deliberately vague.

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Pritt was well-known in Cyprus for his interest in the island’s affairs, and he often served as the voice of the Cypriot intelligentsia in London. A.K.E.L.’s relationship with London’s Greek Cypriot community, particularly with the ‘Committee for Cyprus Autonomy,’ provided the party with leverage and a source of vitality unavailable to the Cypriot Right. The Committee itself often addressed memorandums to Colonial officials in London, reinforcing demands that had been made on the island.61 In June 1942, the Committee organized an event with the participation of British MPs demanding the re-establishment of political life in Cyprus,62 and news of the meeting gained wide coverage in both the right and the left wing Greek Cypriot press.63 A.K.E.L. sent a telegram of congratulations to D. N. Pritt,64 who was naturally one of the British participants, and the party’s overture was followed by similar telegrams to Pritt from various clubs of the island.65 It was around this time that A.K.E.L.’s Central Committee contacted the Acting Archbishop to request his support in helping to reestablish political life in Cyprus.66 Leontios promised the party help in ameliorating both the political and economic situation in Cyprus.67 A.K.E.L. and the ‘Committee for Cyprus Autonomy’ were soon bound together organically, and one of the committee members, Ezekias Papaioannou, ultimately served as the General Secretary of A.K.E.L. from 1949 until 1989. Predictably, this relationship served to inflame the suspicions of the Cyprus Government, which seized the personal documents of A.K.E.L. General Secretary Ploutis Servas.68 The documents consisted largely of A.K.E.L. Central Committee meeting minutes and material relating to Cypriot political protests, but they nonetheless fueled the colonial authority’s growing suspicion of the party.69 The Governor was convinced that A.K.E.L. would not engage in an open clash with the Colonial Government until the war came to an end, but that the organized Left would, in the years following the war, present the most significant challenge to the existing regime. This assumption of ‘danger to the Left’ was of vital significance in the development and implementation of British policy in Cyprus even into the early 1950s. Subsequent to the seizure of Servas’s papers, Woolley considered deporting the General Secretary, whom Battershill had described as ‘a thorn in the flesh,’70 but he drew back at the last moment, given the publicity surrounding the Colonial Authority’s refusal to permit public celebrations on 7 November.71 Perhaps this ‘noise’ was the reason the Government of Cyprus finally decided not only to permit celebrations for the Red Army Day held on 21 February 1943 in all districts, but also to officially lead these celebrations.72 With British permission, the police forces and members of the Public Services participated in the festivities. As the 1943 municipal elections approached, the significance

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of A.K.E.L. in Cypriot political life continued to evolve, upsetting the Cypriot Right as much as it did a nervous colonial machine. 5.5 The Foundation of the Pan Cyprian Farmers’ Union (P.E.K.) The expanding influence of A.K.E.L. in the rural areas of the island through the activities of the cultural clubs predictably resulted in friction between the party and more conservative rural interests, particularly since these cultural clubs concerned themselves with the working conditions for farm labourers.73 Governor Woolley reported that the farmers were much “incensed at the high wages that they had to pay for casual labour during harvest” and had therefore decided to form a common front.74 Efforts toward the creation of a rural smallholders’ organization began during the first months of 1942. In late March, at the village of Prastio in Famagusta District, representatives from nine villages formed a committee to carry out the preparatory procedures for the foundation of a Pan-Cyprian Farmers’ Organization. The main goals of the organization were the ‘settlement of the various rural problems and to defend and pursue the rural interests in cooperation with the Government’.75 The founding conference was set for the end of May at the club Ρέα (Rea) in the village of Athienou. The emergence of such a conservative agrarian organization necessarily alarmed A.K.E.L. Newspapers, by this time more than ever a forum for emergent Cypriot politics, featured the usual exchange of opinions via the columns of Ανεξάρτητος, Ελευθερία and Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλακας. A.K.E.L.’s central rural committee denounced76 the forthcoming meeting in Athienou and called on its supporters to boycott a movement the party described as both deeply divisive and reactionary in its social basis.77 In reply, Ρέα accused A.K.E.L. and its cultural clubs of being frightened by the prospect of a farmers’ organization not under the party’s direct control,78 whilst Παρατηρητής commented sourly on A.K.E.L.’s apparent hostility towards the mobilization of ‘up to three quarter of the total population of the island’.79 Πάφος took a more moderate and calm approach to the conflagration by advising all interested parties, both the rural and the working cadres of the island, to stay united and to cooperate, for their own benefit and for the island’s general prosperity.80 The Pan Cyprian Farmers’ Union (Παναγροτική ΄Ενωση Κύπρου - P.E.K.) was duly formed in the village of Athienou on 31 May 194281 and was thenceforth the bastion of conservative rural elements on the island. According to the Governor, the union’s leading personalities, Treasurer Hadjinicolas and Secretary Hadjiharos, were of ‘good standing in their respective village communities’.82 Ultimately less comforting to colonial authorities was P.E.K.’s support for Enosis and the union’s aim to ameliorate social conditions in the

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countryside. In the words of Ελευθερία, the emergence and growth of P.E.K. was significant because it represented ‘the awakening of the rural world’83 in colonial Cyprus. This was to have considerable ramifications, both for the colony’s political regime and for internal Cypriot politics. 5.6 The Road to the Municipal Elections of 1943 The onset of the war in September 1939 interrupted the drive for constitutional reforms on the island. Later, in 1941, an announcement regarding the conduct of Municipal elections was cancelled due to the German invasion of Greece and the prospect of a German invasion of Cyprus. Nevertheless, the argument for the restoration of the political rights of Cypriots always managed to return to the spotlight one way or another, especially after the British were forced to acknowledge Cypriot contributions to the Allied war effort. Such an occasion arose in January 1942 during a Parliamentary debate, when the question was raised whether this notable contribution would lead to a restoration of constitutional life on the island.84 The answer, that Britain was currently preoccupied with matters arising from the war itself, did not provide a great deal of clarification. The Governor, meanwhile, was himself considering the restoration of some measure of Cypriot political life. In September 1942, Woolley asked his superiors if they would be prepared to consider an announcement that London ‘intended to take early steps, on the cessation of the hostilities, to effect substantial constitutional changes in Cyprus, to secure the people a more representative system of Government and a larger share in the management of their own affairs’.85 Woolley’s proposal included the re-introduction of the Legislative Council, which he alleged would strengthen the Government’s position and secure a greater contribution by Cypriots to the war effort, now that conscription had failed. Woolley also pointed out to Whitehall that politically-minded Cypriots had requested the application of the Atlantic Charter principles on the island, claiming that they were entitled to the same treatment as all other subjects of the British Empire. Battershill, however, now in the Colonial Office, was strongly opposed86 to any such announcement, as he believed that it would prompt Cypriots to devote their energy to effecting these constitutional changes, rather than to the war. Furthermore, according to Battershill, such an announcement would also provoke Greek interest in Cyprus, which Turkey would of course find disconcerting. Nevertheless, Battershill supported granting limited representation to Cypriots in their internal affairs, including the conduct of elections in the municipalities. In the end, the entire issue of Cypriot affairs was postponed for discussion until February 1943, when the Secretary of State summoned Governor Woolley to London to discuss the way ahead.

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In late October 1942, the Colonial Government finally made a public announcement regarding Municipal elections, which were slated for March.87 Rumours of the elections began when the Mayor of Nicosia, Themosticles Dervis, called the island’s mayors and all of its councillors to a meeting to discuss the issue of food supplies.88 Leaving aside the food supplies issue, Dervis declared to the attendees that the Colonial Government should grant Cypriots the political rights to which they were entitled, which meant in the least the conduct of local and municipal elections and the reintroduction of the Legislative Council.89 Once the matter was raised, the Turkish Cypriot representatives immediately withdrew. The establishment of Cypriot political rights once again became the focus of more general public discussions. The appointment of new members to the Advisory Council90 came as a surprise to most Cypriots, as they had expected, in light of new developments, that the body would not be retained.91 These appointments served to intensify public discussion about Cypriot political rights. A.K.E.L. was quick to exploit the speculative mood, and the party’s participation in this public discussion added an increasingly political dimension to its existing focus on such material grievances as the continuing increase in food prices.92 A.K.E.L.’s drive to extend its organizational reach throughout the island reached a new peak with the second Pan Cyprian Conference on 30 January 1943 in Famagusta.93 While British colonial authorities might have hoped to draw off accumulated discontent by permitting municipal elections, if only because to continue denying the people of Cyprus any form of representation was simply unsustainable, it was all too likely that a new electoral dynamic would reinforce the fresh momentum – and also the novel divisions – of the island’s political life. 5.7 Winston Churchill’s Visit to Cyprus Undoubtedly the most important visitor to Cyprus during wartime was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The Prime Minister arrived suddenly in Cyprus on 31 January 1943, fresh from meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Inonu in Turkey. Up until Churchill’s meeting with Inonu, the British were prepared to accept Turkish neutrality in the war. However, crucial developments such as the battle of El Alamein and the Stalingrad resistance foretold an Allied victory, and the Allies – Britain in particular – were ready to pressure Turkey to enter the war. The exertion of this pressure was the primary purpose of Churchill’s visit to Turkey, but Turkey refused to enter the conflict on the side of the Allies until February 1945. Churchill left Adana for Cyprus, where he spent only one day. Despite the

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brevity of his visit, he had arranged to meet with the island’s most important representatives, both Greek and Turkish. In a speech at Government House, the British Premier did not forget to refer to his first visit to the island in 1907, nor did he forget to point out to the island’s representatives that almost three decades later Cyprus had become quite prosperous. Churchill reminded his audience that he had formerly served as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he advised the people of Cyprus to save their money for the difficult times ahead and as a means to curb the inevitable inflation that higher wages on the island would certainly generate. On political matters, Churchill was careful to satisfy both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He emphasized that relations between Turkey and Britain were ‘of a most friendly character,’ then praised Greece’s heroic resistance, declaring that it would not be long before Greece found her place amongst the victorious countries of the United Nations. Churchill also acknowledged the contribution of Cyprus itself to the war effort, assuring the assemblage that the British people admired the Cypriot effort. He concluded with the following words: “believe me, after this war is over, the name of Cyprus will be included in the list of those who have deserved well, not only of the British Commonwealth of Nations, not only of the United Peoples now in arms, but as I firmly believe, of future generations of mankind’.94 During his short stay Churchill also managed to inspect the troops of the 4th Hussars, congratulating these soldiers for their heroic efforts. Cypriots welcomed the Prime Minister’s visit, and both Cypriot and British papers carried accounts of how enthusiastically Churchill had been received.95 Local clubs also addressed telegrams to the British Prime Minister.96 The Locum Tenens, who was among the guests at Government House, sent Churchill a telegram in which he openly referred to Enosis.97 While expressing his wishes for a speedy Allied victory, Leontios also wrote Churchill that he hoped the end of the war would bring the Enosis of Cyprus with Greece, ultimately satisfying the national aspirations of Cypriots which, as Leontios reminded him, the British Premier himself had acknowledged in 1907. The Locum Tenens quoted Churchill’s 1907 assertion that “it is only natural that the Cypriot people, who are of Greek descent, should regard their incorporation with what may be called their mother country as an ideal to be earnestly, devoutly, and fervently cherished. Such a feeling is an example of the patriotic devotion which so nobly characterizes the Greek nation…”98 Churchill’s visit renewed the hope of Greek Cypriots for the possibility of Enosis once the war concluded. However, in his 1907 speech Churchill had also referred to the Turkish Cypriots, whose wishes he said he could not neglect. In reality, not much had changed between these two visits.

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Especially during wartime, the importance Britain attached to Turkey was a vital factor in the preservation of the interests of the Turkish Cypriot minority on the island. While in Cyprus, Churchill sent a telegram to his Deputy Prime Minister regarding the potentially crucial role of Turkey in the war. In his telegram, Churchill stressed that the impending entry of Turkey into the war, which the Allies were most anxious to support, would constitute ‘the highest security for Turkey in the postwar world …by her taking her place as a victorious belligerent and ally at the side of Great Britain, the United States and Russia’.99 In the future the Turkish factor would prove to be a perplexing component of the ‘Cyprus Question’. During the war, however, Greek Cypriots were at a critical stage in the transformation of their own politics. The Cypriot Left, on the eve of the long awaited municipal elections, appeared ready to challenge the Right’s traditional influence on the island, and speculation about the repercussions a powerful Cypriot Left might have were of great concern to the colonial authority. In the opposite camp, the Right, undoubtedly still the most influential political player in the island, struggled with its own problems. The March 1943 municipal elections, the first testing ground for the island’s political powers, would demonstrate how much Cypriot political reality had been altered by the war.

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6 THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS OF 1943

6.1 The Conduct of the Elections The municipal elections of 21 March 1943 were the first since the disturbances of 1931 and signaled a return, albeit limited, to a pattern of political life in Cyprus. The institutions and political parties that emerged in Cyprus during the war were rather fragile and tentative in nature. ‘Clientelism’ as a phenomenon persisted in both Cyprus and throughout the Greek world, and it is within this context that Cypriot political parties and their significant actors evolved during the war. The official announcement of the municipal elections was made in October 1942. As March 1943 approached, and with victorious Allied operations in North Africa rendering an enemy attack impossible, political ferment prevailed on the island. The provisions of the Municipal Corporations Law stated that the elected municipal councils were to be appointed for a three-year period, whilst only men above the age of twenty-one resident in the municipality for the previous twelve months were eligible to vote. A most important provision, however, was that for the first time the labour class also had the right to participate.1 Fifteen municipalities in the island were entitled to participate in the elections, which included a total of 97 000 persons.2 In the island’s major towns, the ideological antagonism between the Right and the Left was evident once each camp presented its own separate list of candidates. In Nicosia, a traditionally conservative town, Mayor Themistocles Dervis, who had held the post since 1929, led the ‘National Combination’,3 which included prominent conservative political figures such as George Poulias and Zenon Sozos. It has been alleged that in Greek political history the Right exploited ‘national’ issues to deflect socio-economic questions.4 In the case of the 1943 elections in Cyprus, however, this did not fully apply. Indeed, the Right wing candidates, not surprisingly, based their political program on the

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question of the national aspirations. However, as the labour class was entitled to vote for the first time ever, the outcome of the elections was all the more unpredictable. Thus the Right presented a labour welfare programme as part of its platform, which promised to reduce both taxation on ordinary workers and the cost of living.5 The Right also sought the complete repeal of the illiberal laws of 1931, whilst another of its goals was the political independence of the municipalities from Governmental influence. A.K.E.L. and the Trade Unions put up joint candidates in Nicosia. Since Nicosia was the bastion of the conservative Right, the Left needed to come up with a popular leader. The solution was found in Ioannis Klerides, a captain in the Cyprus Volunteer Force and well-respected by most Greek Cypriots, who was presented as the leader of the ‘Popular Front’ of Nicosia.6 The candidates nominated by the Left claimed to have mostly the same aims as their counterparts on the Right. Nevertheless, the ‘Popular Front’ also based its political programme on a rhetorical denunciation of those Cypriots who had cooperated with the Colonial regime since 1931, thereby astutely pointing at Dervis and his colleagues.7 The Left also accused Dervis of having once sent a petition pleading for the continuance of Palmer’s service to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.8 In Limassol, a town with radical and even communist associations, things were somewhat different, and it was clear from the beginning that the Left had a good chance of conquering the municipality. Ploutis Servas, the leader of the Left in Limassol, used his oratorical skills to win over the crowds, stressing again in his speeches that the national goal of Cypriot communists was Enosis.9 Indeed, Servas, and the Left in general, made sure they repeatedly pointed out their commitment to this national demand. Servas insisted that there was no such thing as a ‘Cypriot Nation’ and that Cypriots were simply Greeks waiting to join the rest of the Greek state: “…Are we, nevertheless, a ‘Cypriot nation’? Can such a thing exist?...We have not our own Cypriot language but merely a Cypriot dialect and everybody knows that we speak Greek…We Cypriots also have a common religion with the Greeks…we also share the same historical traditions…There is no other civilization in Cyprus than the Greek one…and there is no doubt that for Cyprus national restoration would mean union with Greece.”10 Opposite Servas and his ‘United Front of Workers and Working People’ (Ενιαίο Μέτωπο Εργατών και Εργαζομένου Λαού - Ε.Μ.Ε.Κ.Ε.Λ.) stood the candidates of the Right behind Dr. Christianos Rossides, a popular political figure in Limassol who had served as a volunteer in the Balkan wars of 191213. Following his service in the Balkans, Rossides was a municipal councillor and later served as deputy mayor of Limassol for a number of years, with 1931

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his last in office. Dr. Rossides described his party’s policy as endorsing a ‘democratic and socialist ideology within a general framework of the traditional ideals of religion and of fatherland.’11 As the election drew closer, the feverish anticipation increased, particularly in Nicosia and Limassol. In Famagusta, indications were auspicious for the Left, since its candidate, Adam Adamantos, was a well-known and respected teacher in the town. The candidates on the Right in Famagusta, who according to the town’s Commissioner only presented themselves at the last moment,12 declared in their speeches that the communists were atheists and therefore not Greeks. In Larnaca the principal players were D. N. Demetriou, representing the Right, and K. Shakallis, representing the Left, while in Paphos a triangular contest took place between two nationalist groups and one on the Left. The mayor of Paphos, N. Nicolaides, sought reappointment, while a former mayor, Chr. Galatopoulos, and V. Vassiliou, the A.K.E.L. candidate, opposed him.13 Galatopoulos, despite being a traditional politician, refused to represent the Right and instead formed his own party, Παγκύπρια Ελληνική Σοσιαλιστική Πρωτοπορία (Pan Cyprian Greek Socialist Vanguard - P.E.S.P.) with its own newspaper, Νέα Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις (New Political Review).14 Back in Nicosia, at the core of the contest, the dispute between the two leading candidates, Dervis and Klerides, grew so bitter that some leading figures tried to reach a compromise whereby each side excluded a number of candidates, especially those who had cooperated with the British after 1931. The Locum Tenens also intervened, trying to take the edge off the conflict through a meeting with both sides. The representatives of the ‘Popular Front’ were more willing to work with Leontios than with the lay politicians of the Right, but Dervis refused to participate in the meeting, let alone step down from his candidature, which thwarted the Acting Archbishop’s efforts at mediation.15 The Church refrained from supporting any of the candidates. However, the Right criticized Leontios when he refused to give his blessing to a conservative Limassol candidate who denounced the ‘enemies of the Church’. When Leontios told the people of Cyprus that the Church would not take part in election politics, he received a flurry of telegrams complaining that this ‘treatment’ favoured the Left.16 The profound political and ideological tensions beneath the surface of Cypriot life almost boiled over when a Left wing demonstration in Dali, during which the Greek flag was allegedly treated disrespectfully, roused local members of the Right to such indignation that violence was only narrowly averted by police intervention.17 Ελευθερία warned of such explosive friction in numerous columns, but amid the electoral ‘noise’ calls for moderation went largely unheard. 18 The day of the elections19 brought with it an excitement Cyprus had not

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experienced in many years, and the front pages of the Greek Cypriot newspapers, imploring citizens to vote for their favourite candidates, reflected the mood.20 A massive ninety per cent of the electorate participated in the elections,21 which passed quietly and without incident, in part due to an official prohibition of the sale of liquor, in combination with the Government’s tight police arrangements.22 The results of the elections revealed a new state of political affairs in Cyprus. The Right triumphed in Nicosia, where Dervis was returned to the mayoralty – no candidate from the Left whatsoever was elected in the capital. One of the elected Turkish Cypriot councillors of Nicosia was Fazil Kutchuk, the young editor of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper, Halkin Sesi (Voice of the People), and later an important representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. In Larnaca, D. N. Demetriou comfortably secured his position as mayor, while in Paphos (Ktima) Ch. Galatopoulos and the candidates attached to him won, seemingly against the odds.23 To the dismay of the nationalist press, the Labour Front took possession of Limassol and Famagusta.24 Ploutis Servas emerged as the new mayor of Limassol, where the Right managed to secure only one council seat, while Adam Adamantos took the mayoralty in Famagusta. In the smaller municipalities, the influence of the Pan Cyprian Farmers’ Union (P.E.K.) was obvious, especially in Lefkoniko. In Kyrenia, a combination of candidates from the Right won outright, while the Right also won decisive victories in Poli tis Chrysohous, Kithrea and Morfou. Both parties managed to elect a number of candidates in Morfou, though the majority were conservatives. The municipal elections of March 1943 marked the first open confrontation between the two opposing ideological camps of Cyprus, and the results confirmed the influence of the Right as the traditional power in Cyprus. At the same time, that the Left won two of the island’s major towns proved A.K.E.L. now had the ability to sway large numbers of Cypriots and posed a serious threat to the Right. As soon as the elections were over, the Court approved an appeal against faulty ballots in Limassol. The repeat of the elections in that municipality, in October of 1943, proved the indisputable power of the Left in the island’s largest port. Above all, perhaps, the failure of Leontios to achieve a compromise between the two camps in the capital of Nicosia indicated that in the future, too, the Right would cling to its customary dominance of Cypriot political life, rendering improbable any easy cooperation with the Left in shaping the future direction of the island. 6.2 Discussions on the Future of Cyprus It was axiomatic in Cypriot thought that any visit made by the Colonial

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Governor to London was connected with the imminent alteration of the island’s regime. Such was the case when Governor Woolley travelled to London in February 1943 after an invitation by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley. This was the first time Woolley had visited London since assuming his duties as Governor of Cyprus - on account of the war, he had come to Cyprus directly from Nigeria, where he had served as Colonial Secretary. Although the official announcement of the Governor’s trip stressed that Woolley and Stanley would mainly discuss problems of an economic nature,25 it was only natural that Woolley’s visit to London inspired speculation that the two men would discuss the future of Cyprus,26 especially since Woolley left for London immediately after the British Prime Minister himself had been to Cyprus. The Governor and the Commissioner of Nicosia attended the London meetings, as did a number of other colonial office officials, including the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who participated at some sessions. The conclusions reached at these meetings were revealing of the way both the Colonial Office and the Governor regarded the situation in Cyprus. The relevant memorandum,27 drafted as a synopsis of the discussion, emphasized that the island was dominated by two political forces, conservative Enosis and radical communism, both hostile to the British colonial regime. While conditions in Greece forced Enosists to remain essentially passive, communists were regarded as actively working against the Government. The emergence of A.K.E.L. occupied a great part of the discussions and Governor Woolley urged that his Government needed a clear cut policy towards the party. Woolley was certain that while A.K.E.L. had declared its pro-allied and anti-Nazi position, its ultimate goal was to bring Cypriots into open rebellion against the Government once the war ended. Despite Woolley’s insistence, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stressed that unless the party broke the law, no action whatsoever could be taken against it.28 Both the Governor and Colonial Office officials agreed that Greek Cypriots felt no loyalty whatsoever to Britain. For the British, the Enosists and the communists, despite the differences between them, were equally devoted to the continual harassment of the British regime in Cyprus. While the Turkish Cypriot community remained dependably loyal to the Crown, there was an obvious tendency amongst Turkish Cypriots to look to Turkey, rather than to Great Britain, as a bulwark against the Enosists.29 The Cyprus Government interpreted loyalty as consistent docility towards British control, both in war and peace, and anything less was considered seditious. The Greek Cypriots were willing to honour this concept of loyalty, but only within the limited context of the war, as they believed that successful cooperation with the British during the war was necessary to achieve Enosis. Once the tide of war turned in

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favour of the Anglo-American alliance, the need to demonstrate loyalty in these terms became more imperative. This demonstration of loyalty to Britain in the service of Enosis crystallized in June 1943, when A.K.E.L. called upon its members to enroll in the Allied forces. Regarding the reverberating matter of constitutional reform on the island, Governor Woolley stressed that the situation prevailing in Cyprus, whose contribution to the war effort had been considerable, was at the very least embarrassing.30 That Cypriots were fighting for democracy abroad while deprived of it at home made the Colonial Government of Cyprus an easy target for accusations of oppression and poor governance – the absence of even a representative ‘voice’ to express public opinion made things even worse. Woolley realized it would be difficult to proceed with the reestablishment of any sort of representative body during wartime. He therefore proposed issuing an official statement that the Government intended to present Cypriots with a new constitution – one that provided for a Legislature with a strong elected element – immediately after the war. As usual, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was reluctant to take such a step, and the Colonial Office once more put forward that the disturbances of 1931 were proof that Cypriots were not ready for genuinely democratic government. The Secretary of State conceded, however, that granting permission for the conduct of municipal elections on the island had been a positive step forward. Although the elections would be held in a restricted field, they would provide Cypriots with the opportunity to exercise a degree of self government and if the municipal councils operated successfully, the rural areas would also benefit. Stanley wanted to see a gradual process evolve on the island, beginning with a local sphere of authority and, at least prospectively, spreading to larger spheres. The constitutional situation in Cyprus was inextricably tied to the future of the island. Woolley had insisted in previous proposals on an official statement that Britain had no intention of handing Cyprus to Greece after the war. The Secretary of State resisted Woolley, telling the Governor that such an issue would only arise after the end of the war. According to Stanley, there was no point in riling Greek Cypriots by emphasizing what should have been clear enough to them already. He believed leaving the whole matter aside for a future Peace Conference was far more prudent. Such were the ways in which colonial officials viewed the British position in Cyprus. Enosis was not to be discussed, and internal constitutional reform remained a tentative proposition. Greek Cypriots were naturally unaware of Whitehall’s position. While constitutional reform was indeed desirable, what the Greeks of Cyprus really wanted was Union with Greece, and a debate on Cyprus in the House of Lords on 31 March 1943 triggered a new surge of Enosis sentiment. The discussion started

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with Lord Farringdon’s brief overview of the island’s situation. “Although it is true that the majority of the population in Cyprus speaks Greek, Cyprus was not… part of the Greek world,” Farringdon told the assembled Lords. “The Cypriots can have no feelings of loyalty to the Greek Royal House…There is in addition the consideration that of the population of this island roughly two thirds only are Greek and one third Turkish. This minority would find itself, in a union with Greece, a very small minority indeed, whereas in Cyprus, by itself it is a very influential section of the population. For these reasons I hope very much that the present movement which exists in favour of an autonomous Cyprus – a self governing Colony within the British Empire – will receive the encouragement it deserves, and which I feel will be for the greatest advantage both of Cyprus and of the British Empire.”31 For his part, the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, the Duke of Devonshire, left aside the issue of Enosis and talked of the gradual representative form being established in the island as a result of the municipal elections. The Duke of Devonshire blamed Gladstone for introducing a full-fledged representative constitution back in 1882 at a time when Cypriots, Devonshire believed, were not ready for such advances, and this statement belied that municipal elections in Cyprus were the first step in a more ambitious scheme of constitutional development. Devonshire told the House of Lords: “It was perhaps very easy to follow, almost blindly, democratic theories of government in those days, but it is a fact that Mr. Gladstone in 1882 endowed the island of Cyprus with democratic institutions on western lines for which there was no kind of foundation or preparation, and then took singularly little interest in the island. My noble friend Lord Mersey – I shall refer to his speeches later – referred in some measure to the history of the island, and his historical reference, which I shall not recapitulate, is of interest because it does bring out the fact that in the whole of the immensely long known history of the island it never has had self governing, or anything like self governing institutions. There was in fact no foundation on which self governing institutions could be built…The local elections have already taken place, either last week or the week before, and democratic municipal government in the towns is already in existence. If that promises well, my right honourable friend proposes to extend the system to the rural districts and on that foundation – the solid foundation of the beginnings of local self government – it is his hope that he will be able to build permanent local self governing institutions. He is not going to be unduly hasty about it, because we know the disastrous effects of the breakdown of the institutions of this kind.”32 Such forthrightness was bound to elicit intense reactions back in Cyprus. News of the discussions arrived in the island immediately33 via a BBC

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transmission,34 prompting an immediate and widespread response in clubs, in the newly elected municipal councils, and in the press. Cypriots were offended by doubts about their ethnic origin and about the authenticity of their feelings towards Greece,35 and that they had been described as unprepared for the establishment of democratic measures. Above all, the absence of a reference to Enosis in the House of Lords, and instead to a gradual reintroduction of constitutional life on the island, caused dismay and indignation. Greek Cypriots unanimously condemned what they heard from the House of Lords. A stream of telegrams, in protest, made its way to the British Government, and the island soon found itself in the throes of an Enosis fever unseen since Greece’s entry into the war.36 The telegrams to Britain took umbrage at the aspersions the House of Lords had cast on Cypriot political abilities and declared that the sole political purpose of the Greek Cypriot community was Union with Greece immediately following the war.37 Some elements of the right wing press particularly accused the Committee for Cyprus Autonomy in London for giving Whitehall the misleading impression – without any authorization from the island’s political bodies – that Greek Cypriot aspirations would be satisfied by self-government within the island.38 Greek Cypriot discontent and renewed calls for Enosis were of course disturbing to the Turkish Cypriot community – it was a recurring phenomenon that any intensification of Enosis feelings on the island caused acute unsettlement amongst Turkish Cypriots. Munir Bey, the Turkish delegate of Evkaf39 and a member of the Executive Council quickly mounted a protest on behalf of Turkish Cypriots, reasserting, via telegram, that the island’s Turkish minority desired the continued British status quo on the island.40 Other members of the Turkish Cypriot community sent similar telegrams.41 Meanwhile, the more conservative faction of Turkish Cypriot society chose to emphatically express its opposition to Enosis. The result of this effort, after two Evkaf meetings in April, was the formation of the ‘Association for the Protection of the Cyprus Turkish minority’ (K.A.T.A.K.), the first actual institutional Turkish Cypriot reaction to the reinvigoration of Enosis sentiment. Upon their election, the chairman and deputy chairman of K.AT.A.K, both members of the Advisory Council, called the Commissioner of Nicosia to assure him of the lawful character of the organization and its commitment to the friendly cooperation between Turkish Cypriots and the British colonial authorities. The organisation summed up its objective as the formation of a united front against any suggestion of Enosis or any other solution, including self government, which altered the existing order prevailing on the island.42 One of the founders of K.A.T.A.K was Fazil Kutchuk,43 whose newspaper, Halkin Sesi, was the first to be suspended during the war.44 The suspension followed a series of strong editorials regarding

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the evacuation of the Moslem Lyceé from Nicosia and the use of its premises for military purposes. The editorials accused the Colonial Government of an antiTurkish policy, and in January 1943 the paper was suppressed for three months. A number of Turkish Cypriot associations were founded in the wake of K.A.T.A.K., including the Association of Turkish Cypriot Farmers, in May,45 and the ‘Syndicate for Nicosia Turkish Labourers’ (L.T.A.B.). The L.T.A.B. formally complained to the Commissioner of Labour that it was difficult for Turkish Cypriots to obtain work, and demanded equal treatment with Greek Cypriots.46 A few days later, Soz published an open letter to the Commissioner of Labour proposing a sixteen-point employment scheme for adoption by all Government employers.47 All the while, the Turkish Cypriots continued collecting donations for the Turkish Air Force continued, and in May 1943 there were minor incidents between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot miners.48 These events were testimony not only to the development of a Turkish Cypriot consciousness and the community’s reaction to the national aspirations of its Greek counterpart, but also confirmed the British belief that the Turks of Cyprus had indeed started looking toward Turkey, not toward Great Britain, for their future protection. 6.3 The Effect of the Elections on the Cypriot Right A.K.E.L.’s victories in Limassol and Famagusta confirmed the influence the party now wielded. This success, however, exacerbated the estrangement between the Left and the Right, and a second intervention by the Locum Tenens, this time to restore tranquility at a local level, with the formation of a National Council, proved unsuccessful. The elections also demonstrated that the Right needed to improve its organization if it wished to counter the advancing popularity of A.K.E.L. The background for these events was the imposition of new Government taxes.49 These taxes were a significant expense, not only for the peasant majority but also for the middle classes, many of whom were aligned with the Cypriot Right, and their levy made the need for a new political apparatus all the more intense. Preparations for this new political apparatus commenced right after the elections, and the conservative politicians of the island, led by Themistocles Dervis, sought to further consolidate their party. Nevertheless, internal differences within the Right thwarted the adoption of a common policy. A meeting of assorted Nicosia right wing clubs and organizations at the Archbishopric ended in failure, and Dervis decided to proceed on his own.50 In May he called on all citizens of the Nicosia District to support the ‘national’ party he claimed to represent.51 Preparations for the establishment of this

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national party continued throughout the month, with every town electing 25 representatives to attend a founding meeting. Eventually, on 6 June 1943, these representatives met at the Pan Cyprian Gymnasium of Nicosia, a locale traditionally connected with the Enosis movement, to form the Κυπριακό Εθνικό Κόμμα (Cypriot National Party - K.E.K.). The nascent party’s key aims were three: the unification and coordination of the national forces of Cyprus in order to bring about the achievement of the island’s incorporation into the Greek state; the preservation and strengthening of Orthodox Christian ideals; and the fortification of the Cypriot economy, in order to ensure the island’s prosperity.52 At this initial meeting, the party also elected a temporary General Council and smaller district committees. In July, K.E.K. elected its regular members and a General Secretary, Savvas Christis.53 That fall, Dervis took over as General Secretary. Although K.E.K. declared its intention to cooperate with the rest of the island’s ‘national forces,’ it was evident from the beginning that A.K.E.L. was not considered one of these forces, despite the party’s pro-Enosis policy. Dervis made two initial policy declarations. He announced that all repressive laws should be repealed, and that Cypriots “have the obligation to take over an intensive struggle against the internal enemy, A.K.E.L., and all other autonomists.”54 Such statements belied any prospects for harmony between A.K.E.L. and K.E.K. In addition to its battle against A.K.E.L., K.E.K. soon found itself under Government suspicion, and authorization for further meetings at the district level was refused by the colonial authority on the grounds that the party’s charter included seditious provisions.55 Leontios’s moderation in relation to Cypriot political conflict often aroused criticism from hardcore elements, and his attempt to create a National Council after the municipal elections, in order to unite rival factions came under attack from the Right. Leontios often accepted and in some cases even eulogized A.K.E.L. policy, which drew the ire of conservative politicians such as Dervis and the even more hard -line ‘Kyrenia circle’. Such conservative politicians were particularly irritated when, at a meeting with the newly-elected municipal council of Famagusta, Leontios praised the council’s national activities.56 Soon thereafter, a visit to the Archbishopric by a delegation from the cultural clubs of Morfou, attached to the Left, added to the tension.57 Even Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ, usually Leontios’s most loyal supporter in the press, disapproved of his attitude towards A.K.E.L. In a series of assertive articles, the paper urged Leontios to abandon his policy toward A.K.E.L. and to abandon any effort toward the foundation of a National Council that might endorse the Cypriot Left.58 In actuality, Leontios wanted to invite members of A.K.E.L., K.E.K. and P.E.K., along with delegates from the press, the fourteen newly elected mayors

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of the island, and a number of other prominent political figures to a forum in order to discuss the formation of a National Council.59 This effort, however, was doomed to failure. The Left was eager to participate in such a body, and was already calling other parties to contribute to its foundation.60 K.E.K. was willing to take part in the National Council, but only provided that all other participants were eligible as ‘national forces’.61 That the party’s definition of a ‘national force’ did not include A.K.E.L. made the entire project rather difficult to implement. A year later, Leontios would again try to bring together the disparate factions within the Cypriot political sphere on the eve of a visit by the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, in August 1944. But by then the internal Cypriot schism had deepened even further and was, in fact, beyond repair. As always in Cyprus, any ideological confrontation in politics was bound to arise elsewhere. Parallel to the growing gap between the two political parties, the atmosphere surrounding the Trade Unions was one of confrontation. After the elections in 1943, a number of workers who were ideologically closer το the Right decided to depart from the Trade Unions and form their own clubs. By October 1943, in Limassol, the bastion of Cypriot communism, two ‘New’ Trade Unions were extant, the ‘New Trade Union of Private Employees’ and the ‘New Trade Union of Woodworkers of Limassol’.62 It was the beginning of a wider secession of workers seeking more conservative leadership that led to the founding of the Confederation of Cyprus’ Workers (Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Κύπρου-S.E.K.) in October 1944. 6.4 A.K.E.L.’s Recruiting Campaign A.K.E.L. victories in the municipalities afforded the party a certain degree of confidence. A surprise development subsequent to the elections, however, did even more to increase the party’s influence on Cypriot society. Russia’s entry into the war in June 1941 altered the official policy of the labour movement and that of the nascent A.K.E.L. towards the conflict. A.K.E.L. stepped away from its original condemnation of the war as a ‘clash between imperialist powers’ and became an advocate for the defeat of fascism, although the party did not initiate any volunteer movement in support of the Allied cause. Then, on 16 June 1943, A.K.E.L.’s Central Committee called on all of the party’s members to enroll in the Cyprus Regiment. The reason behind the Central Committee’s call to arms was “the enforcement of the struggle for the freedom of Greece … and the securing of the national, political and social future of the island.”63 The members of the Central Committee even offered to enlist themselves. Eleven of its seventeen members eventually did so,64 while party leader Ploutis Servas, Famagusta mayor Adam

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Adamantos, and four other Central Committee members remained in Cyprus to continue their work. The response throughout A.K.E.L. was enthusiastic, as 700 members immediately volunteered to join the Cyprus Regiment.65 Such a mass enrollment in the British forces had not been experienced since the invasion of Greece in 1941, and the streets of Limassol were festive on the day the first volunteers marched through their hometown on their way to training camp.66 The leadership of A.K.E.L. delivered speeches to mark the occasion. Servas, in his speech, stressed the importance of contributing to the Allied war effort and called on all other parties to follow the example of A.K.E.L.67 The factors behind A.K.E.L.’s decision to actively support the war against the Axis was inspired by both regional and internal developments, including the dissolution in May 1943 of the Communist International, Comintern, the body responsible for the worldwide coordination of communist parties. The dissolution of the Comintern aroused great interest amongst Cypriots. According to Governor Woolley, many Cypriots believed one of the reasons the colonial authority tolerated A.K.E.L. was to win some favour with Stalin.68 Now, many believed, this tolerance would evaporate,69 and the right wing press welcomed the news of the dissolution as a critical political event.70 In any case, in its final announcement the Comintern urged its followers to intensify their efforts to strengthen the Allied cause against fascism.71 This appeal inspired A.K.E.L. to call upon its members to enlist, among other reasons. Right wing conservative groups expressed their disbelief at the sincerity of A.K.E.L.’s devotion to Enosis. The leadership of A.K.E.L., therefore, needed to prove that the party’s national credentials were unimpeachable. In June 1943 the Colonial Government refused to grant Servas permission to deliver a speech on the national question, and the party seized this decisive moment in order to develop a more forward Enosis policy.72 In addition to Right wing criticism of A.K.E.L. and the Government’s censorship of Servas, the establishment of the National Party, which claimed unchallenged leadership in Enosis politics, forced the communists to endorse a more radical approach to the national aspirations of Greek Cypriots. In an interview with the Cyprus Post, Central Committee member Prodromos Papavassiliou, at 24 the youngest councillor in Cyprus and one of the eleven members of the Central Committee who had enlisted, sought to provide an explanation for the party’s decision to call its members to enlist. Papavassiliou told the Cyprus Post that it was urgent that the people of Cyprus help liberate Greece and the other enslaved nations of Europe,73 and that every member of A.K.E.L. now believed the war was a struggle ‘against fascism’. However, Papavassiliou’s explanation might be connected to the prevalent belief in Cyprus during the summer of 1943 that the tide of the war had turned in favour of the Allies. Perhaps this was the decisive factor that prompted

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A.K.E.L. to urge its members to enlist, and the party took advantage of an opportune moment to maximize Cypriot claims to political rewards once the war concluded. The leftist press offered strong support to the A.K.E.L. recruiting campaign. Besides Ανεξάρτητος, the party’s mouthpiece, Κυπριακός Τύπος, Πάφος and Χρόνος all applauded the initiative, and an article in Χρόνος hinted at the contrast, in the context of the war, between the Left’s contributions and the Right’s inertia.74 In the face of such criticism, the Right remained inflexible, although K.E.K. would soon become aware of the pressing need for the kind of party organisation A.K.E.L. had demonstrated. Leontios, as always sympathetic towards the Left, congratulated A.K.E.L. on its bold move and visited the soldiers in their camps.75 The party’s ‘historic decision’, as it was summed up in British accounts,76 fueled the schism between A.K.E.L. and K.E.K. and set the terms for their future rivalry. The A.K.E.L. volunteer movement was also important because it brought a cadre of soldiers with leftist ideas to the Cyprus Regiment. The impact of these leftist troops would become evident upon the end of the war in 1945, particularly in the context of demobilization. 6.5 The Cost of Living Agitation In addition to the problems it faced as A.K.E.L. grew in size and influence, by 1943 the Colonial Government had to contend with a labour problem brought about by the continued rise in the cost of living in Cyprus. The situation climaxed in March 1944 with the largest strike ever held on the island. Following the labour unrest of December 1942, the colonial authority oversaw the formation of a ‘Cost of Living Committee’ comprising members of the Government, the Right, P.E.K. and P.S.E.77 The committee was charged with the task of coming up with solutions to the rising cost of living on the island.78 However, disagreements amongst committee members resulted in the delivery of two conflicting reports, one prepared by the Right and Government representatives, the other prepared by members of P.S.E. and P.E.K.79 The cost of living issue was also discussed during Governor Woolley’s visit to London in February and March of 1943. Woolley drew the attention of the Colonial Office to the low standard of living on the island, the absence of a large wealthy class from which to extract taxes, the wartime injection of cash driving up prices, and the dearth of industrial employment.80 The Colonial Office proposed a few measures to stabilize the cost of living in Cyprus, including the elaboration of various taxes and a savings scheme.81 The Governor proposed that a lottery might be popular with Cypriots, and that siphoning money from consumers’ pockets would check inflation and enable a loan for military purposes. Indeed, in May 1943 Governor Woolley sanctioned a ‘war

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loan’ from Cyprus to Britain in the form of a lottery.82 A.K.E.L. and P.S.E. both lodged protests regarding the cost of living on the island – the result of these protests was a discussion of the issue in the House of Commons, where it was suggested that inflation in Cyprus was actually higher than officially reported.83 Meanwhile, during the spring and summer of 1943, tension was rising in Cyprus after the Trade Unions declared that the measures taken to stabilize the cost of living were ineffective. P.S.E. issued a communiqué in mid-August criticising the Government’s continued refusal to grant wage increases despite rising inflation. Following this communiqué, approximately 5000 workers attended a meeting of the District Trade Union Committees in Nicosia.84 There were separate meetings of trade unionists in all districts, with attendees approving P.S.E.’s suggestion of a one-day strike on 27 August.85 Cyprus’s Acting Colonial Secretary, H. G. Richards, immediately advised the General Secretary of P.S.E. that such a move would devastate military works and other ‘essential services’,86 and that any such strike would be illegal. P.S.E. eventually chose to call off strikes by workers in essential services, but some work stoppages still ensued on the 27th in a number of towns.87 Despite anti-inflationary efforts, including the introduction of a rationing scheme for clothing at subsidized prices, the cost of living in Cyprus continued to rise, fomenting Trade Union militancy, and P.S.E. and the Shopkeepers’ Association agreed to hold another one-day strike on 25 October.88 It was again agreed that any workers in ‘essential services’ would limit any break in work to fifteen minutes. On the eve of the strike, the leadership of the Trade Unions held meetings. After the meeting in Nicosia, a procession of 2000 persons to the centre of the capital resulted in the arrest of eight Trade Union leaders, including the General Secretary of P.S.E., A. Ziartides, while a similar procession in Limassol resulted in the arrest and prosecution of Servas and two of his councillors. These arrests were followed by the usual protests sent via telegram to the British authorities back in London.89 This unrest was the essential background to the widespread strike action of 1 March 1944. Even after the strikes and arrests of 1943, the Colonial Government once more failed to develop any meaningful dialogue with the labour movement. However, before the end of the war, a number of events took place that helped bring about significant improvements in the living conditions of Cypriot workers. 6.6 Developments in Greece: March – August 1943 In March 1943, the legitimate Greek Government-in-exile decided to relocate from London to Cairo in order to be closer to the mainland, where it anticipated an Allied victory.90 A crisis was taking place within the Greek Forces

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of the Middle East, however, stemming from tension between the Forces’ conservative and communist officer cadres. The conflict ultimately brought about the resignation of Panayiotis Canellopoulos, a rising politician and the Vice President and Minister of Defence of the Greek Government since May 1942. Of course both communist and conservative resistance forces fought against the Germans in Greece. After the Gorgopotamos operation in November 1942,91 which was a unique instance of cooperation amongst Greek resistance forces, internal strife intensified, and a British political and military presence, via the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.), soon became entrenched in mainland Greece, in order to support the resistance.92 Within a month, however, by December 1942, the first random clashes between the communist E.L.A.S. (Ελληνικός Λαϊκός Απελευθερωτικός Στρατός - Greek People’s Liberation Army) and the right wing E.D.E.S. (Εθνικός Δημοκρατικός Ελληνικός Σύνδεσμος - Greek Democratic National Army) had already occurred. For their part, the British generally favoured the E.D.E.S. forces led by General Zervas. The need to trick the German command into expecting an imminent Allied landing in Greece presupposed the cooperation of all Greek resistance forces, particularly E.L.A.S., which posssed the largest forces.93 The British therefore grew more favourable toward E.L.A.S., while its leadership, in anticipation that an Allied victory was near, sought on its own part to be more conciliatory towards both E.D.E.S. and the British.94 At Britain’s behest, E.A.M-E.L.A.S participated in the ‘National Bands’ agreement of July 1943, wherein it was forced to halt any clashes with other military resistance groups. However, the agreement favoured a communist presence in the Joint General Headquarters, giving E.L.A.S. responsibility for the coordination of resistance activities in occupied Greece, in cooperation with British military authorities in the Middle East. Despite the auspicious ‘National Bands’ agreement, a crisis soon erupted. In August 1943 a delegation of guerillas - four from E.A.M., one from E.D.E.S. and one from E.K.K.A. – accompanied by Lt. Colonel E.C.W. Myers travelled to Cairo to meet the Greek King and the rest of the Government-in-exile. Originally conceived as a unique opportunity for rapprochement, the visit only served to demonstrate the deep differences between the resistance and the Greek government. Far removed from the reality in Greece, King George and his government could not comprehend the mentality of the resistance forces, which were unwilling to allow the King to return to Athens after the war without a plebiscite. The plebiscite was the first and most essential demand made by the guerilla delegation. The delegation’s second demand was that the administration of the Greek ministries of Internal Affairs, Justice, and Military Affairs would be

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assumed by members of the resistance. The delegation’s demands were highly disturbing to both the Greek government and to the British. Even if King George was willing to consider a plebiscite as the key condition for his return to Athens, to permit communists to assume such key government positions was unacceptable, both to him and to British authorities. The British tried to force the delegation to return to Greece, without Lt. Colonel Myers.95 The breakdown of negotiations in Cairo soon resulted in the rise of a distinct anti-British feeling in mainland Greece. The prevailing belief that Britain was determined to force the monarchy on the country, regardless of public feeling, only made a bitter and protracted conflict between Left and Right all the more likely. 6.7 The Repeat of the Election in the Municipality of Limassol - October 1943 The conduct of the municipal elections of March 1943 was not completed until the following October. Christianos Rossides, the candidate from the Right, challenged the election results in the Court of Appeal.96 His appeal, founded on faulty ballot boxes, was ultimately successful.97 Rossides’s was the only successful appeal, as similar appeals in Famagusta and Paphos were rejected. A new election in Limassol, set for 3 October 1943, presented an opportunity for the Left to prove its victory in the city had not been a random event, while the Right, in its new guise as K.E.K., saw the new election as its chance to staunch the gradual loss of its political dominance in the island. The new election would be the first open political confrontation between A.K.E.L. and K.E.K. The two parties maintained the same list of leading candidates, Servas for A.K.E.L. and Rossides for K.E.K., which made a slight change to the rest of its combination’s candidates. Beginning in the middle of September, excitement gripped Limassol as both parties tried to sway voters.98 The Allied invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943, followed by the official announcement of Mussolini’s resignation on 25 July 1943, afforded A.K.E.L. an opportunity to highlight its pro-Allied and anti-fascist stance with even greater emphasis. While maintaining its March programme, the party also made much of the success of its recruiting scheme.99 The national K.E.K. response was to step up to its condemnation of E.M.E.K.E.L. and of the Left in general, which it accused of ‘desiring the union of Cyprus with Greece only so they can spread their communist beliefs’. 100 A few days before the election, the colonial authority aggrieved the leadership of K.E.K. when it intervened after a speech by one of the party’s candidates, Costas Eleftheriades. The police and the District Commissioner accused Eleftheriades of making seditious references to Enosis, and they warned

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him not to participate in a planned rally to take place the following day. In protest, the other K.E.K. candidates refused to speak, and they asked the crowd to disperse quietly.101 K.E.K. representatives in Limassol also sent a telegram of protest to the Governor, in which they expressed their indignation at the ‘improper intervention of the Commissioner who exercised the illiberal law of 1932 against the freedom of speech and thought of the people…’102 Even A.K.E.L. felt bound to support K.E.K. with regard to the government’s treatment of Eleftheriades.103 Faced with the joint protest of these two usually estranged parties,104 the District Commissioner reversed his decision, and Eleftheriades was permitted to campaign.105 The incident illustrated the difficulty the Colonial Government faced when it attempted to exercise its former autocratic authority, especially when confronted by the combined forces of the Cypriot Left and Right. This partnership, however, was possible only when the Left and the Right needed to join together against the British. The election of 3 October 1943 sealed the complete influence of the Left in Limassol. To its dismay, K.E.K. failed to elect even a single one of its candidates to the Limassol municipal council.106 The victory was duly celebrated by the supporters of E.M.E.K.E.L.107 The municipal elections of 1943 were a defining moment in Cypriot politics, as they memorialized the first political confrontation between the traditional powers of the Right and the emergent Left. The election results proved the Right still held a leadership position in the island’s politics, but A.K.E.L.’s decisive repeat victory in Limassol demonstrated the young party had the heft to deeply affect the future of Cyprus. A.K.E.L.’s success in Limassol naturally exacerbated the growing estrangement between the two parties. Beyond the municipal elections of 1943, the critical situation in Greece throughout late 1943 and 1944 would further divide the Greek Cypriot community.

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7 THE EFFECTS OF THE GREEK CRISIS ON CYPRIOT POLITICS: FROM THE ONSET OF CIVIL WAR TO THE LEBANON CONFERENCE: OCTOBER 1943 – MAY 1944

7.1 The Aftermath of the Municipal Elections Inevitably, the Greek civil war (1945-1949) impacted Greek Cypriot political affairs. The first traces of the bitter resentment between the Greek Cypriot Right and Left during the late 1940s were clearly visible prior to the end of the war. The period of October 1943 to May 1944, from the onset of the first ‘round’ of the civil war until the Lebanon Conference, is particularly critical with regard to the influence of Greek affairs on Cypriot politics, especially during the winter and early spring of 1944. In addition to the burgeoning enmity between the Cypriot Right and Left, this period also saw fresh developments in the ecclesiastical question as, for the first time, the Locum Tenens had to cope with pressure from both the colonial authorities and from elements within the Archbishopric in Nicosia. Additionally, the Colonial Government of Cyprus continued to tussle with labour, an ongoing battle that was only worsened by continued inflation. As this period drew to a close, the hostility between the Cypriot Right and Left, which had blossomed prior to the municipal elections, reached an alarming tenor. Following the required re-run in Limassol, A.K.E.L. was confirmed as the town’s dominant political power. Servas once again assumed his duties as mayor, and the party, strengthened by his victory, sought to press its advantage. One of the first steps A.K.E.L. took to this end was to promote the extension of the elective principle to rural areas. Indeed, the subject was instigated by both A.K.E.L. and its mouthpiece, Ανεξάρτητος,1 while the Trade Unions added the

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extension to their list of demands.2 The system of appointed Mukhtars, some of whom took little real interest in their duties, had long been resented in the Cypriot countryside, and A.K.E.L. tapped into this pool of resentment by campaigning for the restoration of elections for rural representatives.3 In a speech at the farewell reception held on the occasion of John Shaw’s promotion to Chief Secretary in Palestine, Famagusta mayor Adam Adamantos addressed the issue. “The Council of Famagusta regrets to see the delay in the extension of the right for the election of rural representatives,” Adamantos said. “We cannot hide our disappointment, for while all the petitions on the subject were being submitted to the Governor, he immediately proceeded to the appointment of new Mukhtars. This surely shows contempt”.4 Right wing politicians refrained from associating themselves with this campaign. The island’s more traditional politicians persisted in their argument that Enosis was the most immediate and pressing demand facing the Cypriot people, and they were instinctively hostile towards anything which fell short of this goal or distracted from it.5 Despite their differences over rural elections, neither the Left nor the Right supported the approach of the British, for whom the municipal elections had been from the outset merely a starting point for any distinct programme.6 A considerable number of A.K.E.L. followers had enrolled in the Cyprus Regiment. These recruits provided active assistance to the party, which enabled A.K.E.L. to exert its influence far more broadly in Cypriot society.7 The British authorities were quick to grasp the meaning of these developments.8 A.K.E.L. members serving at home energetically supported the strikes that took place on the island, including the strike held by the Government and War Department employees.9 Governor Woolley was alarmed, and he informed his superiors in London that a proportion of Cypriot troops were likely to be ‘an embarrassment in times of local disturbances rather than the reverse’10. A.K.E.L. undertook a scheme to assist the families of Cypriot soldiers who were fighting abroad.11 The party circulated petitions amongst the dependents of these soldiers and organized a meeting at the Limassol Trade Unions for 250 women, all of them relatives of Cypriot troops. The meeting resulted in the organization of a deputation which presented the dependents’ request for economic assistance to the District Commissioner.12 A.K.E.L. also continued to tighten its bond with labour. After the prosecution of some of its members during the cost of living protest in October 1943, A.K.E.L. strengthened its ties with the Cypriot intelligentsia in London, so that the latter might serve as an interlocutor on the party’s behalf with British MPs. This effort brought about the discussion of Cyprus in the British Parliament. On several occasions, Labour MP George Mathers submitted

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questions to the Secretary of State regarding not only the burning issue of the Cypriot economy but also the legislation under which prosecutions were made.13 In early 1943 the Committee for Cyprus Autonomy renamed itself the Committee for Cyprus Affairs. This change was an interesting development, as by this time the Committee was squarely in the A.K.E.L. camp and formally represented the party in Britain. It was therefore only natural that the Committee would henceforth have to identify its national goals with those of A.K.E.L. and the party’s pursuit of Enosis, rather than stressing self-government for Cyprus within the sphere of the British Empire. The Committee was often the butt of criticism in Cyprus, especially from the Right, which attacked the Committee after Lord Farringdon’s speech in Parliament in March 1943. Nevertheless, the Committee for Cyprus Affairs energetically continued to inform the British public about the situation in Cyprus. On 31 October 1943, 250 delegates attended a conference of Cypriots in London organized by the Committee for Cyprus Affairs. A resolution published after the conference outlined the problems faced by the people of Cyprus while under British rule and for the first time officially demanded Enosis. According to the resolution, the accomplishment of Enosis would not result in discrimination against the Cypriot Turkish minority, since equal political rights would be recognized once Cyprus was united with Greece.14 The declaration helped to stave off some of the invective voiced by the Right back in Cyprus. Ανεξάρτητος published both the resolution and news from the Conference.15 Throughout 1943, A.K.E.L. continued to operate successfully at various levels, particularly after the impetus provided by the party’s victories in the municipal elections while the Right sought to replicate the party’s success in the Cypriot political arena. However, after the failure of the meeting in Cairo between the Greek Government-in-exile and the leaders of the Greek resistance in the summer of 1943, armed conflict erupted between opposing resistance factions, and this internecine struggle would come to bear heavily on Cypriot politics. 7.2 Relations of Cypriot Right and Left during the ‘First Round’ of the Greek Civil War The first ‘round’, as it is usually called, of the Greek civil war began in October 1943 and ended in February 1944 with the Plaka Agreement. The struggle between the Cypriot Right and Left was largely unaffected by the first round of the Greek civil war, partly because they were preoccupied with the results of the municipal elections and also because of their distance from the mainland, which meant both sides did not realize the seriousness of the conflict and were caught off guard as the civil war increased in scope and scale.

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The guerilla delegation that travelled to Cairo in August 1943 returned to Greece empty-handed, and tensions immediately increased between the right wing cadre of E.D.E.S. and the communist military branch of E.L.A.S. In September Italy surrendered, and the prospect of an imminent liberation inspired all the Greek resistance movements to expand recruitment. The British replaced Colonel Myers with the more stringently anti-communist Colonel Woodhouse, which convinced the Greek Left that London would soon openly support King George II and effect his return to Athens. The leadership of E.L.A.S., taking also into account information of the role of Zervas16 and with the prospect of the departure of the German forces from Greece, decided on an attack against E.D.E.S. On 10 October 1943, E.L.A.S. launched an open attack against E.D.E.S. which resulted in 1150 dead and 1500 missing persons.17 Once again, the Greeks, at war with an external enemy, turned against each other. Yet, the leaders of E.A.M. miscalculated the early departure of the Wehrmacht. Rather than abandoning Greece, the Germans interfered in the Greek strife by calling all ‘national guerilla forces’ to join the common cause ‘against Bolshevism’.18 The Greek Government blamed E.A.M. solely for the strife and forced the communists to participate in negotiations in December 1943. The outcome of these negotiations, in which delegates of E.L.A.S., E.D.E.S. and E.K.K.A. participated, was the Plaka Agreement of February 1944.19 The Agreement ended the first round of the civil war by sealing a tense and unstable cessation of hostilities, with all parties agreeing, reluctantly, to cooperate in the formation of a unified provisional government.20 The first round of the Greek civil war did not push the Cypriot Right and Left further away from each other, particularly since news from Greece about the conflict did not even reach Cyprus until two weeks after it had begun.21 The press generally refrained from editorializing about developments in Greece and restrained itself from favouring one party or another, although Ανεξάρτητος exhibited a slight tendency to publish articles about E.L.A.S,22 but this local ‘neutrality’ began to change during the first months of 1944. It was also widely believed that the severity of the divisions between the Greek guerilla factions and news of bloodshed were German propaganda.23 During the final months of 1943, the Cypriot press mainly concerned itself with military operations in the Mediterranean, particularly those on the Dodecanese islands of Leros and Kos, although the papers did pay some attention to the emerging constitutional issues in Greece and the terms on which King George II might be permitted to return to Athens.24 Even given these wider preoccupations, however, the acute tension between K.E.K. and A.K.E.L. took center stage in Cypriot press. On 10 January 1944,

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the nationalist Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ published an article alleging that A.K.E.L. was taking advantage of social and educational problems for purely political purposes.25 On 11 January 1944, the assistant editor of the paper, Vias Markides, and his wife were assaulted after leaving a cinema.26 Markides was severely beaten, and it was generally believed A.K.E.L. was responsible. The attack, the first instance of physical violence between the two parties, was a watershed in island politics. There were other, less violent confrontations throughout Cyprus. According to a report prepared by Governor Woolley, a resident of the village of Ypsonas, Limassol district, was warned his house would be blown up if he let his shop to the local A.K.E.L. club, while Nicosia residents opposed to A.K.E.L. boycotted a dance organized by the Nicosia Journalists’ Trade Union.27 At the Limassol button factory, the right wing Trade Unions refused to participate in a strike organized by the left. The deadlock meant the factory could continue producing buttons, but unknown assailants threw dynamite at the houses of button factory senior managers.28 The rivalry also played out in Ελευθερία and Ανεξάρτητος, whose columns served as the battleground between the editor of Ελευθερία, D. Th. Stavrinidis, and Ploutis Servas. The antagonism even spread to Pafos, where the A.K.E.L. friendly newspaper, Πάφος, and Νέα Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις, the nationalist newspaper edited by Christodoulos Galatopoulos, tore at each other in bitter editorials. As the pitch of the conflict increased, the Colonial Government appointed special constables to keep the situation under control.29 The Locum Tenens personally intervened, pleading for the end to a dangerous rivalry.30 It was the upcoming anniversary of Greek Independence on 25 March 1944, however, that brought the conflagration to a temporary halt. The events that usually united Greek Cypriots were those which pertained to Enosis. Such was the case when Labour MP J. Parker voiced his support in Parliament for Enosis,31 a move which the Greek Cypriot community unanimously applauded.32 The Turkish Cypriot community reacted swiftly. K.A.T.A.K. had declared its main objective to be the rejection of Enosis33 and immediately issued a rebuttal to Parker’s statements.34 Turkish Cypriots in Pafos, in tandem with the British, criticized the mayor for flying the Greek flag alone above the Pafos municipal building, although numerous Greek Cypriot politicians lent the mayor their support.35 Finally, in April 1944, Fazil Kutchuk left K.A.T.A.K. and founded the Turkish Cypriot National Party (K.T.M.B.P.), which meant that the Turkish Cypriot community would respond with more vigour to political developments in the Greek Cypriot community. Ideological and party divisions in Cyprus were taking shape well before parallel fractures on the Greek mainland had their significant impact on the Cypriot political scene.

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7.3 The Cost of Living Question: The Strike of 1 March 1944 One of the prominent events in the history of the Greek Cypriot Left and a critical moment in wartime Government-labour relations was the cost of living strike. The strike, which took place from 1 March 1944 until 23 March 1944, involved a total of 1800 employees. In January 1944 the Government announced a six piaster wage increase. This did little to alleviate the living conditions of the Cypriot working class, however, and in early February the Trade Unions began to prepare for a rapid and extensive strike. The central committee of P.S.E announced that the labour movement was no longer prepared to wait for the Government to fulfill its promises. P.S.E. also criticized the colonial authority for its ‘anti-popular policy which preferred to secure the interests of the few rich people’36 and called on labour to join in a new demand for the reduction and stabilization of the cost of living. Organisers planned for the strike to start in the vital Government and War Departments, where the workforce was already in a militant mood on account of frozen wages. 37 On 1 March, 1300 employees of the Army and Public Works Department in Nicosia and Famagusta went on strike, followed the next day by 500 of their colleagues in Larnaca.38 The leftist press (Ανεξάρτητος, Κυπριακός Τύπος, Χρόνος) naturally supported the strike, as did most of the general public.39 A.K.E.L. was now at the forefront of the labour struggle in Cyprus. The party issued a statement which denounced the Colonial Government’s treatment of Cypriot workers: “…it is both disappointing and surprising that the Government did not show any willingness to understand the just demands of the workers for partial adjustment of their wages to the cost of living…A.K.E.L. stands by the side of the workers’ just struggle”.40 The Locum Tenens immediately responded to P.S.E.’s call for moral support and gave his blessing to the strike.41 The strike attracted publicity throughout Cyprus, which forced the National Party of Themistocles Dervis to line up behind the strikers. The central committee of K.E.K. issued an announcement stating that although it was necessary to continue all military works, the strikers had evidently exhausted any other possibility of reaching an agreement with the Government. If, the communiqué continued, the Government had properly planned to control wartime inflation, the strike could have been avoided.42 The conservative farmers’ union, P.E.K., also supported the strike. The union’s General Secretary, H. Hadjiharos, defended the struggle of the military works employees and assured them and the public that P.E.K. would stand by the strikers, without any reservations, until they were granted their lawful demands.43 The Right Trade Unions also declared their support for the strike.44 A meeting in Nicosia between P.S.E. and the Colonial Secretary, Hugh Foot,45 was unsuccessful.46 A few days afterward, the colonial authority issued

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a statement expressing concern that the strike would have deleterious effects on the island’s military preparedness and, taking a conciliatory step, promised a review of wages in relation to the cost of living.47 In response, the Trade Unions decided to intensify their action and called for a one day general strike on the 13th of March, wherein 4000 War Department employees joined those workers already on strike throughout Cyprus.48 The leaders of P.S.E. attended one more meeting with Foot, who gave further assurances that the colonial authority would seriously examine the cost of living issue provided the strikers returned to work.49 Pending a settlement, the Government announced that police would disperse any unauthorized assemblies, which they did in Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol and Nicosia.50 A new turn in the strike came when the Government decided to continue work on military schemes with the help of the Cyprus Volunteer Force Reserve Company.51 K.E.K. was the only political organ to change its position during the strike, calling for a ‘temporary suspension’ after Foot promised the Government would examine the cost of living issue if the strikers returned to work.52 That same day, the leaders of P.S.E. met with Foot for the third time, and Foot assured them there would be no discrimination against workers if the strike were called off, and that the Government was proceeding with the formation of a committee to investigate the cost of living issue as soon as the strike came to a halt.53 P.S.E. duly terminated the strike, and work resumed on the 24th of March. The termination of the strike was predicated on a ten-week truce, a grace period during which the colonial authority was expected to significantly improve the general economic conditions on the island. After terminating the strike, the General Secretary of P.S.E., Andreas Ziartides, announced that the strike had been a political victory, and he emphasized the role of A.K.E.L. in its success, thereby underlining its political motivations.54 The Colonial Government was well aware of the political gains A.K.E.L. had made in supporting the strike,55 as the strike demonstrated the power of the labour movement and the pressure it could now exert on the Government. A fund raised for the strikers was a success, and both the Cyprus Post and Halkin Sesi supported the strikers.56 While it was significant that K.E.K. accepted the Government’s offer during the strike and supported its calls for an end to it, the most important result of the strike was the colonial authority’s fear of A.K.E.L.’s increasing influence and its concern that the party could stage a leftist uprising. 7.4 The Impasse of the Archiepiscopal Question: the Locum Tenens, the Colonial Authorities and the Nicosia Archbishopric It was during this period that Acting Archbishop Leontios faced increased

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suspicion and hostility from colonial officials in London and in Nicosia from within the Archbishopric. While this was not the first time the Locum Tenens had encountered opposition, it was the first time the head of the Colonial Office had publicly laid the blame for the archiepiscopal vacancy entirely upon Leontios. It was around this time that a group of senior clerics moved against him, calling upon the Patriarch of Alexandria for help. An ecclesiastical crisis ensued, and Leontios was forced to take refuge in the isolated monastery of Stavrovouni. The 1937 ecclesiastical laws and the exile of the Bishop of Kyrenia to Athens – which precluded the constitution of a proper canonical synod – were the two main obstructions to the canonical election of a new Archbishop. Woolley had previously tried to gain London’s consent to repeal the ecclesiastical laws, but his request was refused. During a February 1943 visit to London, however, Woolley’s superiors in the Colonial Office asked him to consider if any ‘substantial’ political advantage was to be secured if those laws were now dispensed with. The Governor’s subsequent report explained that while there was no political advantage to be gained, he nevertheless supported a partial repeal that would scrap the Government’s veto and the exclusion of any nonCypriot candidate. Moderate Cypriots would appreciate the gesture, which would also encourage the Ecumenical Patriarch, the Alexandria Patriarch and the Archbishop of Thyatira (who was responsible for the Greek Orthodox Church in Britain), to press Leontios to adopt a more flexible approach to the election of a new Archbishop.57 During a September 1943 meeting with the Secretary of the State and other Colonial Office officials, the Chief Secretary, John Valentine Shaw, supported Woolley’s report, but the Colonial Office was unenthusiastic. One official argued that any such gesture would be an expression of weakness and would encourage the Enosists, but the Chief Secretary countered that such anxieties were exaggerated.58 He stood by Governor Woolley’s proposals, insisting that although there could be no cast-iron guarantees, such an act of goodwill would assuage some of the resentment Greek Cypriots had harboured since the Palmerist autocracy.59 Despite his efforts, however, the Chief Secretary was unable to persuade the Colonial Office.60 Beginning in February 1942, the Colonial Government had flatly ignored all entreaties and representations from Leontios. The Acting Archbishop had repeatedly expressed his own disinterest in the vacant archiepiscopal throne and had personally appealed for the return of the exiled Bishop Makarios II, but these appeals had gone unanswered. In November 1943, however, on the tenth anniversary of the archiepiscopal vacancy, Leontios addressed a long memorandum to the colonial authorities which he also simultaneously provided to the local press. Leontios demanded the repeal of the 1937 church

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laws and the return Bishop Makarios II and all the other exiles.61 The Locum Tenens hoped to facilitate the formation of a canonical synod, which would in turn arrange an election. For the first time, Leontios stated his desire that this election should take place after the liberation of Greece, and that he would not participate in this election as a candidate. The Greek Cypriot press and a number of local organisations supported the Acting Archbishop’s demands. Shortly after the newspapers published Leontios’s memorandum, all of the island’s political parties, local village clubs and Orthodox institutions sent telegrams to the Governor declaring their full support for Leontios.62 Leontios then increased the pressure on Woolley by announcing that the Church was in ‘a state of deep mourning because of the continuance of the illiberal church laws’.63 The Locum Tenens also announced that the Church impasse was due to the Colonial Government’s obstructionist position.64 The press generally supported Leontios, which contravened the colonial authority’s contention that Leontios was an isolated figure. A.K.E.L. circulated petitions in support of Leontios’s demands and sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in which the party complained that the Government was invariably ignoring representations not only from the Church but from all of the island’s political organisations.65 The Pan Cyprian Organization of Religious Orthodox Institutions (Παγκύπρια Οργάνωσις Θρησκευτικών Ορθόδοξων Ιδρυμάτων - Π.Ο.Θ.Ο.Ι.), under the leadership of the future Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos Kyriakides, addressed telegrams to the British Prime Minister, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and to four British newspapers.66 The Π.Ο.Θ.Ο.Ι. demanded the repeal of the 1937 ecclesiastical laws and the return of the 1931 exiles, also reminding the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for the Colonies that the desire of Greek Cypriots for Union with Greece remained fervent.67 In addition to these telegrams, the Π.Ο.Θ.Ο.Ι. addressed a message to the Archbishop of Canterbury asking him to intervene. When the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem visited Cyprus, in January 1944, a delegation representing the organization called on the Bishop, who promised to support a rapid resolution of the archiepiscopal vacancy and the 1931 exiles. Although Cypriot public opinion was firmly behind the Locum Tenens, two events led to a crisis involving the Colonial Office and some local clerics. The first occurred when Emry Evans, the representative of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, gave a statement at Westminster in which he threw complete responsibility for the continued archiepiscopal vacancy on Leontios. When asked about the ecclesiastical situation on the island, Evans replied that the Orthodox Church had the freedom to proceed with the election of its new Archbishop at any time. This initiative, Evans continued, was vested with the

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Locum Tenens, who had refused to proceed with the election unless the colonial authority repealed the Church laws, which was impossible.68 London’s rigid position came as a blow to Greek Cypriots.69 That the question had been raised in Parliament as a result of the efforts of the Committee for Cyprus Affairs incurred the criticism of the right wing newspapers in Cyprus. Ελευθερία argued the discussion of the issue was inopportune,70 and that it gave British officials an opportunity to obstruct an ecclesiastical resolution.71 Naturally, the Locum Tenens quickly protested to London.72 Leontios argued that culpability for the archiepiscopal vacancy lay with the British authorities, who had been stalling since 1937. Leontios also accused the Colonial regime of bringing the Church, and with it the entire educational system, under its direct control, which he described as a poor reward after the Greek Cypriot contribution to the Allied war effort. 73 Leontios then gave a rare interview to the Cyprus Post, in which he was highly critical of the Government. Once a new Archbishop was properly installed, Leontios declared, the Government and the Church could negotiate for the establishment of ‘a lawful channel for defining the relations between them and not to enact laws for the election of Bishops which are fundamentally inconsistent with Canon Law and consequently unacceptable to the Church’.74 Following the interview, Leontios once more received striking support from clubs and local organisations.75 It was also at this time that Leontios faced a challenge from within the Church. A group of higher clerics of the Archbishopric,76 led by Archimandrite Hippolytos, appealed to the Patriarch of Alexandria. The clerics told the Patriarch they feared Leontios planned to proceed with a non-canonical election in order to effect his own elevation,77 although it was more likely their appeal was related to a separate dispute regarding ecclesiastical salaries. The appeal to the Patriarch outraged Leontios, who declared he would never have expected such a move by his fellow clerics.78 The Locum Tenens stormed out of Nicosia and established himself at Stavrovouni monastery,79 where he reaffirmed his intention to abstain from the candidature for the archiepiscopal throne.80 The colonial authorities kept a close eye on this ecclesiastical discord, obtaining information from Hippolytos and his cohorts via the Government censor.81 The local press severely criticized the clerics82 for their divisive maneuver, which contravened the interests of the Church, and political leaders from the Right and the Left even visited Leontios at Stavrovouni to offer him their support. Ελευθερία, meanwhile, called for conciliation.83 The mayors of Limassol and Famagusta emphasized that the current crisis demonstrated the need for a National Council 84 - a call A.K.E.L. would repeat on the occasion of the visit of the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies to the island. In the

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end, in the face of such acute pressure, the discontented ecclesiastics apologized to Leontios,85 and the Locum Tenens returned to the Archbishop’s Palace in Nicosia.86 Nevertheless, the impasse remained unresolved. The colonial authorities were unwilling to repeal the hated 1937 ecclesiastical laws, while Leontios was unwavering in his contention that no election could take place if these laws remained in force. Public opinion was strongly in favour of Leontios throughout these trials. This support, expressed at both political and social levels, helped thwart the attempts of the colonial authority to weaken Leontios by casting doubt on his legitimacy as a spokesman for the Greek Cypriot community. 7.5 The Mutinies in the Greek Forces in the Middle East and the Lebanon Conference After the Plaka Agreement, E.A.M. sought to form a ‘Mountain Government’. In mid-March 1944, E.A.M. surprised the rest of the Greek political world by announcing the formation of the Political Committee for National Liberation (Πολιτική Επιτροπή Εθνικής Απελευθέρωσης - P.E.E.A.) under the leadership of the Alexandros Svolos, a well known, non-communist academic.87 Following the E.A.M. announcement, Prime Minister Tsouderos invited Greek politicians from the occupied mainland, including E.A.M. representatives, to the Middle East, in the hope of building a broad-based, unified national government.88 At the time of Tsouderos’s invitation, Greek political opinion was in favour of the King’s return to Greece only after a plebiscite. The King was opposed to this requirement, which resulted in a stalemate between the Greek Government-inexile and resistance forces. A crisis then ensued within the Greek forces in the Middle East which profoundly altered Greek politics. The establishment of the P.E.E.A. stirred excitement among the left wing organizations within the Greek forces in the Middle East, the Α.S.Ο. (Απελευθερωτική Στρατιωτική Οργάνωσις - Liberating Military Organization) and the A.Ο.Ν. (Αντιφασιστική Οργάνωση Ναυτικού – Anti-Fascist Navy Organization).89 Within two weeks, these communist organizations provoked mutinies within the Greek forces stationed in Egypt, demanding that P.E.E.A. should form the basis of a national unity Government. The British Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-exile, Reginald Leeper, sent a telegram to the Foreign Office. “What is happening here among the Greeks is nothing less than a revolution,” he wrote.90 Tsouderos submitted his resignation,91 but King George refused to accept it until he returned to Cairo from London – this caused even greater turmoil, as the mutinies were already in progress. When King George finally arrived in Cairo, on 10 April 1944, he handed the Premiership to Sophocles Venizelos.

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The British took an aggressive stance toward the mutinies, even threatening to sink the Greek warships in Alexandria harbour.92 Greek Navy Commissioner P. Voulgaris managed to bring the mutineers under control, and on 24 April 1944 the First Greek Brigade, surrounded by British forces, surrendered.93 George Papandreou, who had arrived in Cairo in mid-April, replaced Venizelos once the mutineers surrendered. Papandreou was a strong anti-communist figure who was familiar with the realities on the ground in mainland Greece, and the British welcomed his presence. He became Prime Minister on the 26th of April94 and immediately presented his political programme, which included the formation of a ‘Government of National Unity’, the reorganization of the army, the discipline of the mutineers and the welfare of the people still under occupation in mainland Greece. The immediate result of Papandreou’s appointment was the dissolution of the two Greek Brigades, the purge of all leftist elements from the Army and the detention of approximately 9000 troops. There had been plans for the First Greek Brigade to march into Rome as the first Allied force to enter Italy, but these were eventually cancelled. The mutinies convinced the Greek bourgeoisie that the Left possessed enough strength to take over the country. Alarmed, the Greek middle and upper classes realized they had to rally against the Left. The mutinies also made it evident that the British had taken a central part in Greek affairs. The Lebanon Conference in May 1944 was a critical development, since it involved the entire spectrum of Greek political life. Both P.E.E.A. and E.A.M. had denounced the mutinies, but their representatives, along with those of K.K.E., were outnumbered by the rest of the conference participants. It was around this time that members of E.L.A.S. 95 had murdered the General Psaros, the leader of E.K.K.A., which weakened the communists. Papandreou attacked the E.A.M. representatives at the conference, accusing them of planning to take power by force after the war. The E.A.M. representatives had no contact with the ‘Mountain’ during the Conference. They were put on the defensive and finally forced to sign the agreement of 20 May 1944. The provisions of the 20 May 1944 agreement were based on the political programme Papandreou had outlined on his appointment. The agreement authorized a national unity government, but the five ministries given to E.A.M. were relatively unimportant. The mutinies were condemned, and the guerilla factions were placed under the command of a national unity government. The agreement also reasserted the right of the Greek population to choose its government and the system of that government. This dramatic development in Greek affairs of course came to bear on Cypriot public opinion, and for the first time the rival orientations in Greek mainland politics began to shape Cypriot politics. News of the mutinies in Egypt astonished Greek Cypriots,

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although Cypriot coverage of the mutinies and related events had been delayed on account of communications difficulties.96 In addition to the events in Egypt, the ominous issue of Macedonia also preoccupied Cypriot politicians. Specifically, Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ reported that Greek communists were assisting the Bulgarians in their plans to create an autonomous Macedonia97 and categorically stated that ‘such intentions on the part of the Greek communists were well known’.98 The National Party also took an official position on both Macedonia and the Greek mutinies. The party lodged a formal protest against the Greek communists with the exiled Government in Cairo, which was then under the short-lived leadership of Venizelos.99 The party also issued another, more peremptory communiqué calling on all Cypriots to condemn the communist role in recent events.100 For its part, A.K.E.L. used its third Pan-Cyprian Conference,101 in Larnaca, to announce its position on these recent developments. Information about the Cairo mutinies had just reached Cyprus, and the party expressed its sorrow that the “voice of genuine free Greeks for the participation and representation from guerillas from the enslaved mainland was drowned in blood.”102 The party then sent telegrams of support to E.A.M. and E.L.A.S.103 A few days later, A.K.E.L. announced its official position. The party’s political committee rejected the accusations made by K.E.K. and by some sections of the Cypriot right wing press regarding the role of Greek communists in Macedonia. According to A.K.E.L, the members of the Greek Communist Party and of E.A.M. were as ‘national’ in their ideals and sentiments as all other Greeks.104 The watchful colonial authority paid close attention to the growing acrimony between the Cypriot Right and Left, now partially fueled by ongoing battles between the Right and Left in Greece. Woolley particularly singled out A.K.E.L.’s policy in one of his political reports. The Governor expressed his disbelief that A.K.E.L. had only recently established contact with the Greek communists but observed, nevertheless, that these two factions were now clearly in contact with each. According to Woolley, it remained to be seen if A.K.E.L. would grow more aggressive as a result of this alliance, but he was quite certain that any criticism of British intervention in Greece would now find a ready echo in Cyprus. The Governor also feared, under the influence of the bolder E.A.M., that A.K.E.L. might become more strident and openly oppose the Colonial Government. Although the internal struggles in Greece were still at a formative stage, Woolley believed the volatile situation in Greece and the contact between A.K.E.L. and E.A.M. might boost the Enosis movement. Greek Cypriot nationalists were now forced to confront the increasing influence of E.A.M. in Greek affairs and even admit to the possibility of a communist government taking power in Greece after the war. Woolley

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believed such a prospect might prompt the nationalists to distance themselves from the demand for Enosis whilst pushing A.K.E.L. more firmly towards it.105 Nevertheless, Greek Cypriots unanimously hailed the Lebanon conference106 as the best hope for a lasting reconciliation between the key political forces in Greece. All of the Greek Cypriot political parties and clubs sent congratulatory telegrams to George Papandreou, as did the Church. These hopes for a settlement between rival Greek political factions were commensurate with the hope for a comparable rapprochement. Unfortunately, the fragile agreement reached in Libanon linking the Left, the Right and the British would soon unravel.

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8 THE EFFORTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS: AUGUST-DECEMBER 1944

8.1 Prelude to Sir Cosmo Parkinson’s Visit to Cyprus The impending finale of World War II galvanized the Enosis movement in Cyprus and inspired hope within the Greek Cypriot community that the island would soon see its national restoration with Greece. One of the most significant events of this period was the visit of the Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, during August and September of 1944. Parkinson arrived on the island at about the time when an Allied victory in the war seemed but a few months away. The Greek Cypriot community and the colonial authority clearly differed as to the direction a postwar Cyprus would take, and Parkinson’s visit, which was part of a wider Colonial Office scheme to keep in touch with the colonies and their wartime issues and problems, emphasized these differences. Ελευθερία announced Parkinson’s three-week sojourn to the island on the 21st of July.1 Governor Woolley was eager to disassociate Parkinson’s stay from any specific intentions for Cyprus, and he proposed that the visit should be explicitly connected with similar visits to other colonies.2 However, the reality of the war concluding in favour of the Allies raised Greek Cypriot hopes that the visit to Cyprus of such a senior official was connected with a review of colonial policy on the island.3 The Undersecretary of State’s visit posed a fresh challenge to Greek Cypriot politicians, as they needed to organize a joint welcome for Parkinson. Prior to Parkinson’s arrival, new efforts had been initiated for the creation of a National Council, which had become necessary due to two factors. The first of these was the outcome of the Lebanon Conference, which included the formation of a national unity government,

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and the second was the imminent end of the war. In June 1944, both A.K.E.L. and K.E.K. exchanged correspondence with Leontios regarding the possibility of cross-party coordination. Leontios insisted that a National Council should comprise all political parties, including A.K.E.L., but the National Party was extremely hesitant. K.E.K. had further strained its relations with the Locum Tenens when the latter refused to renounce the political activities of E.A.M., whose Mountain leadership was still refusing to participate in the Papandreou government, and also to condemn appeals organized by A.K.E.L. in Cyprus in support of the communist soldiers on the mainland.4 Parkinson’s arrival in Cyprus, however, made the need for at least a temporary harmony amongst the island’s political parties more imperative than before, and Leontios, at the head of Church, invited all parties to prepare a joint memorandum demanding immediate Enosis after the war.5 A.K.E.L., eager to participate, instantly accepted.6 A.K.E.L.’s involvement, however, remained an obstacle for the Right. The National Party’s mouthpiece, Πυρσός (Torch)7, which had just been founded, questioned the sincerity of A.K.E.L.’s dedication to Enosis.8 The next day, 10 August 1944, the Bishopric of Kyrenia announced its intention to fight communism.9 K.E.K. and P.E.K. eventually refused the invitation to participate in a unified welcome for Parkinson and instead conveyed their own separate messages to the Undersecretary. In the following months, Greek Cypriot politicians endeavoured to emulate the Greek example and reach an agreement of their own. On the occasion of Parkinson’s visit to Cyprus, however, they remained as divided as ever. 8.2 Sir Cosmo Parkinson’s Sojourn in Cyprus: August-September 1944 Sir Cosmo Parkinson arrived on the island on 11 August 1944 and immediately received a flood of telegrams welcoming him and requesting the satisfaction of just one demand – Enosis.10 The Governor expected that Greek Cypriots would seize the opportunity to petition for satisfaction of their national aspirations, especially in light of an approaching peace. For Woolley, it was essential that such hopes be deflated, but this had to be achieved without sparking a new crisis. To this end, the Governor arranged accommodation for Parkinson in Troodos instead of in Nicosia, where the bulk of Enosis demonstrations were to take place.11 Woolley also obtained approval from the Colonial Office that Parkinson should answer any questions about the postwar future of Cyprus by responding that London had not authorized him to comment on Enosis.12 The colonial authority had recently implemented the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which it hoped would serve as cushion against criticism that the British had not done enough to build postwar prosperity in Cyprus, and the

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THE EFFORTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS 131 Governor was anxious to make the projects financed by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act the focus of the Undersecretary’s official visit. After failing to align themselves under the aegis of the Acting Archbishop, the Greek Cypriot political parties acted independently in welcoming Sir Cosmo. A.K.E.L. and K.E.K., along with local clubs and organizations, issued separate announcements demanding Enosis.13 The press also warmly advocated the cause, and the colonial authority instructed the censor to warn editors they should adopt a more moderate attitude and refrain from publishing appeals for Enosis.14 After landing in Cyprus, Parkinson stated he would be happy to meet with Cypriot political delegations.15 A.K.E.L. and delegates from the Turkish Cypriot community had already requested interviews, while K.E.K. and P.E.K. asked to meet with the Undersecretary of State within a few days of his arrival. Parkinson spent much of his time visiting agricultural schemes, irrigation works and forestation areas.16 He avoided the towns where political effervescence prevailed. The colonial administration had long feared that A.K.E.L. would ultimately spearhead a violent outburst on the island. On receipt of information that demonstrations had been planned during Parkinson’s visit, the administration issued a communiqué on 16 August prohibiting such assemblies,17 and both Dervis and Servas were personally warned not to arrange demonstrations. Dervis promised that his party would observe the law, while Servas assured the colonial authorities that a meeting planned for that evening would not be followed by a procession.18 The same night, however, after an A.K.E.L. meeting, Servas and the rest of the party’s leadership participated in a demonstration, replete with Greek flags and Enosis banners, in the streets of Nicosia. The police promptly arrested Servas and sixteen other participants, all of whom appeared in court the next day.19 The editor of the Cyprus Post, Percy Arnold, published a vivid description of the hearing: “…An hour before their appearance, crowds came to demonstrate on behalf of their leaders, thronging all passages and corridors leading to the court, and the police were kept busy trying to keep a way clear. At the opening of the court people rushed in in such a disorderly fashion that the presiding judge, an Englishman, President Cox, ordered the doors to be closed, but shouts against the Illiberal Laws and for Enosis, persisted, so that His Honour was obliged to vacate the bench for several minutes. Ploutis Servas offered to produce order by appealing to the crowd to disperse, but the police were somewhat disinclined to let a man under arrest take command of the situation. When His Honour returned to the bench the disturbance continued and so he adjourned the hearing till 9.30 the following morning and ordered that the arrested persons should remain in custody”.20

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Cosmo Parkinson finally met with representatives from the Greek press and the Turkish press in Nicosia on 21 August. He told the press that the objective of his visit was to have ‘personal contact’ with the Colonial Government and with the unofficial community, and that he was pleased with the development projects he had seen. He also mentioned that the villagers he had spoken to appreciated the efforts the Government was making on their behalf. He made some comments on agricultural development, forestry and irrigation and, in a gesture of politeness, he concluded with some Greek words. Parkinson finished and announced he would welcome questions. The assembled journalists completely ignored Parkinson’s speech and immediately raised the issue of Enosis. Pavlides, the experienced editor of the right wing Φωνή της Κύπρου, on behalf of the Greek Cypriot press, expressed the collective hope that as the war approached its end the contribution of Cyprus would be recognized and the national aspirations of Greek Cypriots would be satisfied. Parkinson replied that this amounted to separation from the British Empire and that he had no authority whatsoever to discuss it.21 Other editors nonetheless pressed the same theme, but to no avail. All of them spoke in Greek, even though most of them had a good command of English. Percy Arnold of the Cyprus Post writes in his memoirs: “I thought it truly remarkable to see Cypriots, who in politics ranged from the extreme Left to extreme Right and who disagreed publicly almost daily, hold together on one theme. I do not think they had planned this united action – some were hardly on speaking terms with one another; the unity of their statements was the result of instinct and some experience in advocating the cause”.22 Fazil Kutchuk, speaking in Turkish and on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, expressed the community’s strong opposition to Enosis. Parkinson told the room that he was surprised that nobody wanted to speak about administrative or economic concerns – or it seemed, to address him in English. The journalists in attendance told Parkinson that every other issue would be resolved upon the satisfaction of Cyprus’s national restoration.23 Following the press conference, A.K.E.L. announced that the 28th of August would be celebrated as a day for Greek Cypriots to express their national feelings.24 The colonial authority had long suspected that A.K.E.L. hoped to bring about a violent outburst similar to that of October 1931, and the party’s announcement in advance of the 28th of August made the colonial authority extremely nervous. Governor Woolley and his Executive Council, afraid of A.K.E.L.’s ability to mobilize Greek Cypriots, immediately considered firm action against the party. One of their more radical ideas was the proscription of the party, but this was abandoned, as it would be hard to justify while the war continued (indeed, it

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THE EFFORTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS 133 was not until ten years later that the colonial authority actually proscribed A.K.E.L.).25 Woolley and the Council also considered the more ‘moderate’ option of deporting leading communists. This strategy was not new and had in fact been rejected by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in the past, but Woolley once again suggested it to the Colonial Office.26 A more viable option was the closure of premises, including those of the Trade Unions, in accordance with Defence Regulations.27 It was not until May 1945, however, that the colonial authority would close Trade Union premises and proscribe the Pan Cyprian Trade Union Committee (P.S.E.). As the 28th of August drew near, the Government became increasingly anxious, despite Servas’s assurance that the demonstrations would be peaceful. The colonial authority banned the Trade Union newspaper, Ανόρθωσις (Anorthosis), for publishing details on the processions,28 the first time the authority had banned the publication of a newspaper since it had halted the publication of Halkin Sesi in 1943. The Cyprus Government brought police reinforcements to Nicosia from villages and posted Indian troops in the main roads of Nicosia.29 Cypriot troops were excluded from this security detail, as their participation in various demonstrations and strikes convinced the government that these troops would be unreliable if called upon.30 An official government statement advised that the demonstrations planned for the 28th would be tantamount to open ‘defiance of the government,’ and that participants would face serious consequences. The colonial authority also implemented new Defence Regulations prohibiting road transport beyond municipal limits,31 in the hope that this restriction would keep villagers from driving to Nicosia on the 28th of August. All in all, the Colonial Government was preparing for a repeat of the 1931 uprising which, according to then governor Storrs, had been fueled by villagers descending on Nicosia.32 Parkinson told Servas he would not grant him an interview if the Nicosia demonstrations took place as planned.33 A few days before the 28th of August, K.E.K. issued a manifesto decrying A.K.E.L.’s tactics and emphasizing the necessity for Anglo-Greek friendship as a component of any postwar settlement.34 A few days after the 28th, the party expelled all of its members who had taken part in the day’s events.35 The approach of each of the major political parties to Enosis was the fundamental difference between them. K.E.K. believed in British liberal policy and imagined Enosis within a framework of Anglo-Greek friendship, and that any actions that alienated the local government, particularly those resulting in open violence, would damage the gains Cypriots had achieved thus far with their contributions to the Allied war effort. A.K.E.L., on the other hand, went out of its way to forcefully demand the satisfaction of Enosis, although the party’s

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position was that open confrontation with the government was highly undesirable. Servas eventually cancelled the 28th August demonstration to avoid any trouble,36 and limited the day’s events to the Trade Union premises in each town. Parkinson avoided the major towns on the 28th of August. He spent the day at the village of Lapethos, arriving that evening at the Army Headquarters at Boghaz, near Famagusta. On the following day he visited Famagusta, where Mayor Adamantos broached the subject of Enosis. The Undersecretary told Adamantos, as he had also emphasized to waiting journalists, that he had no authority whatsoever to discuss it. The proposed meeting between A.K.E.L, P.S.E. and Cosmo Parkinson never took place – the party’s Central Committee refused to meet the Under Secretary unless the ban on Ανόρθωσις was lifted, which was hardly likely. Parkinson did meet with delegates from the National Party, who gave him a memorandum on Enosis which emphasized Britain’s philhellene and liberal tradition.37 The Undersecretary also met with delegates from the Turkish Cypriot community who, naturally, declared their objection to Enosis. On 2 September, Sir Cosmo Parkinson left Cyprus for his next destination, Gibraltar. In accordance with the wishes of the Colonial Government, Parkinson had mostly avoided the major towns on the island for most of his three week visit. The Undersecretary had travelled throughout Cyprus, bypassing radical Limassol, and had inspected all of the island’s development works, in order to prepare a report to the Colonial Office. Although Parkinson had refused to address Enosis, Greek Cypriots made their interests and their postwar expectations clear to the Undersecretary during his visit. It was also clear to the Greek Cypriot community that the colonial authority was determined to maintain control of the island. While the two major parties had adopted disparate approaches to the national struggle, it was evident, as the war petered out in the Eastern Mediterranean theatre, that the yearning of all Greek Cypriots for Enosis had become quite acute. The Greeks of Cyprus, however, were also vulnerable to that ‘disappointment’ that was endemic to modern Hellenic experience. 8.3 The Liberation of Greece: October 1944 The autumn of 1944 finally saw the liberation of Greece, which had a direct effect on Cypriot politics. The first months of 1944 had been critical for Greek politics. The Lebanon Conference was a significant political defeat for E.A.M., but the Greek Left remained the dominant military power in most of occupied Greece. The agreement which concluded the Lebanon Conference was unsatisfactory to most Greek communists. They felt their representatives had gone beyond their instructions and failed the party, and in protest they refused

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THE EFFORTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS 135 to nominate ministers38 to the new national unity government. After protracted negotiations, the Greek Left finally consented to participate in the new government, but only if Papandreou resigned from the premiership. Papandreou offered to resign,39 but Churchill firmly opposed his resignation.40 Eventually, on 2 September, six delegates from E.A.M. assumed ministerial duties under the same terms they had rejected a few months earlier. There was now an urgent need to secure the orderly liberation of Greece as the Germans withdrew. This could only be achieved by the presupposed cooperation between the Allied forces and the Greek resistance. In August, at the behest of the British, Papandreou had moved the seat of his government from Cairo to the Italian city of Caserta. The premier invited guerilla representatives, including Zervas of E.D.E.S. and Saraphis of E.L.A.S., to travel to General Headquarters in Caserta to meet with General Henry Wilson, British Commander in Chief Middle East, and Harold Macmillan, the British Resident Minister in the Mediterranean. The result of this meeting was the Caserta Agreement, by which all guerilla forces came under the authority of the national unity government and under the operational command of General Sir Ronald Scobie, the General Officer and commander of British forces in Greece. Many Greek communists saw the Caserta Agreement as the surrender of E.L.A.S. to the British, while the Right criticized Papandreou for admitting communists to the national unity government. The provisions of the Caserta agreement41 planted bitter seeds that would blossom once the Greek Government-in-exile returned to Athens on 18 October 1944. The events that followed the Caserta Agreement demonstrated the degree to which British influence had permeated Greek affairs. Greece’s strategic position in the Mediterranean had made the country traditionally indispensable to British interests, and a pro-British Greek government was critical to London’s postwar policy in the wider region. Churchill, especially, was determined to maintain a friendly and, above all, non-communist government in Greece. The eve of the liberation of Greece found the Great Powers preoccupied with the country’s future. As early as May 1944, Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States had begun discussing postwar Greece. Churchill was bent on sending British forces to Athens immediately following the German withdrawal, so as to prevent a communist seizure of power. Churchill insisted on negotiating an Anglo-Russian understanding on the Balkans, especially with regard to Romania and Greece. President Roosevelt gave the Prime Minister his hesitant approval,42 which left the matter to be resolved solely between Britain and the Soviet Union. The British had long been worried about a Soviet advance in central and southeastern Europe.43 Churchill and Stalin addressed the Balkans at a conference in Moscow on 9-11

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October. The United States sent Averell Harriman to the conference as its lastminute representative, but he did not participate in the first crucial meetings. The outcome of the 9-11 Moscow meeting, the ‘Percentage Agreement’, came to symbolize the cynicism of the Great Powers’ wartime alliance.44 The agreement provided that Eastern Europe and the Balkan Peninsula would be divided into ‘spheres of influence’, regions over which the Soviet Union and Britain would have significant political influence. The Soviet Union would be preponderant in Romania (90 per cent) and Bulgaria (75 per cent) while Britain would dominate Greece (90 per cent). Both countries would have equal percentages of influence in Yugoslavia and Hungary.45 While Churchill and Stalin were dividing up the Balkans, the moment of liberation arrived in Greece. In early October 1944, the first British seaborne troops freed the city of Patra.46 Following the departure of the Germans, hostilities between E.L.A.S. and the Security Battalions erupted in the Peloponese and in Macedonia.47 There were a number of deaths and severe casualties,48 but these were only a taste of the impending civil conflict. Nevertheless, the inauguration of the national unity government in Athens on 18 October 1944 was met with euphoria. General Scobie, Harold Macmillan and Reginald Leeper accompanied the Government back to Athens – Scobie and Papandreou rode together in a car through streets crowded with ecstatic Greeks to the Acropolis, where the swastika was formally lowered and the Greek flag raised once more.49 After the ceremony the Greek Prime Minister addressed the crowd, comprised mainly of E.A.M. supporters, in Syntagma Square. Papandreou told the crowd that better days would come to Greece, and he promised elections. He emphasized his government’s belief “in rule by the People (Λαοκρατία)…which means the right to live and the right to vote…”.50 Tremendous disappointment and immense suffering, however, were to unfold in the country’s immediate future. 8.4 The Impact of the Liberation of Greece on Cypriot Politics: October November 1944 The political divisions in mainland Greece had a powerful impact on the Greek Cypriot community. After the Lebanon Agreement, many Greek Cypriots on the Left were sympathetic to the communists’ refusal to join the Papandreou government while conservative politicians criticized the communist position and urged reconciliation. Leontios personally pleaded for the reconciliation of the various mainland resistance factions with the Bishop of Kozani, Ioakim, an active participant in the resistance – paradoxically, perhaps – on behalf of E.L.A.S.51 The vernacular Greek Cypriot press, depending on its political orientation, took either the side of the Papandreou government or the side of

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THE EFFORTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS 137 E.A.M-E.L.A.S. and P.E.E.A.52 From the beginning the Cypriot Left naturally supported its counterparts on the mainland, and the A.K.E.L. Central Committee declared that Papandreou’s speech at the Lebanon Conference had been unnecessarily harsh towards E.A.M.-E.L.A.S.53 One of the most significant characteristics of the psychological disposition of Greek Cypriots was their traditional identification with the national centre, and they unanimously hailed the participation of mainland communists in the Papandreou government as a harbinger of better times. Indeed, once a national unity government, with the participation of the Left, had been achieved, a commensurate sense of unity overtook Greek Cypriot politics. The prospect of the imminent liberation of Greece reinforced this feeling of Greek Cypriot unity, and discussions were held in the hope of establishing a unified body to collect new funds for Greece. It fell to the Locum Tenens, as the Ethnarch, to bring about the harmonious cooperation of the island’s political parties. It was a difficult task, particularly since Leontios had been unable to arrange such cross-party cooperation on the occasion of Sir Cosmo Parkinson’s visit to Cyprus. On this occasion, however, the situation in Greece was the critical factor, and it inspired Greek Cypriots to arrive at a fragile and temporary understanding. A.K.E.L., the press and public opinion were all in support of a cross-party effort to collect funds for Greece. A.K.E.L. had continually sought a greater political role within Cypriot society and the acceptance of its legitimacy by the island’s other political organisations. It was for these reasons that the party had repeatedly declared its support for the formation of a National Council and, given the favourable circumstances in Greece, A.K.E.L. leapt at the chance to propose the formation of a united Greek Cypriot political platform that would spearhead the collection of funds for Greece, in anticipation of its imminent liberation.54 The right wing press also strongly promoted the initiative and urged Leontios to act accordingly.55 Leontios had no choice but to try once more to bring all the Greek Cypriot parties under a single umbrella, despite the difficulties such a task presupposed.56 He called on representatives from all of the clubs, newspapers, political parties and organisations on the island, including the Women’s National Organization, to attend a meeting to decide how best to organise the collections scheme. The National Party declared its intention to cooperate with all parties for a positive outcome, which was an encouraging development.57 The meeting, at the Archbishopric, under the leadership of Leontios, resulted in the formation of a Pan-Cyprian Committee to conduct the appeal. Phaneromeni Church initiated the collection of funds with a donation of £3000.58 By early November, donations to the appeal had exceeded £50,000 pounds.59 The successful implementation of this appeal was a first step. The National Party soon suggested that circumstances in Greece also required the formation

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of a National Council.60 The Locum Tenens, encouraged by these developments, addressed the first meeting of the Committee, imploring the participants to disregard their political differences and form a common political body in order to achieve Enosis.61 It was the first time during the war that the prospect of joint political action seemed feasible. The possibility of this Greek Cypriot united front put the Colonial Government under increased pressure. The Acting Governor immediately informed London that the formation of a Pan-Cyprian Committee was a unique occurrence, while Foot reported to his superiors that A.K.E.L. was driving this agenda in order to exploit Leontios for its own purposes.62 The Acting Governor and his colleagues were still alarmed at the prospect of a repeat of the events of 1931. They were especially concerned that if such events were to occur, the military experience many Greek Cypriots had gained in the Cyprus Regiment would make it rather difficult to suppress such an uprising.63 Throughout the island, the Greek Cypriot community celebrated the liberation of Athens. The celebrations were similar to those that had taken place on Greece’s entry into the war – there were demonstrations, doxologies and processions, many of them to the accompaniment of the Greek national anthem (Ὕμνος εἰς τὴν Ἐλευθερίαν – Hymn to Freedom), and the Greek flag was raised all over the island.64 Greek Cypriots were willing to overlook Papandreou’s failure to mention Cyprus in his inaugural speech at Syntagma Square. The Prime Minister’s omission made sense, since the new national unity government was heavily dependent on British help.65 The colonial authority was considerably shaken after a broadcast mistakenly reported that Papandreou had mentioned Cyprus in his speech.66 The liberation of Greece made the need for united Greek Cypriot political action still more imperative, and telegrams demanding Enosis poured in from every corner of the island. This flurry of nationalist activity included a fresh agitation for the return of Bishop Makarios and the rest of the deportees, much to the Colonial Government’s embarrassment.67 A.K.E.L. and K.E.K. agreed to leave aside their political differences and to cooperate, under the leadership of Leontios, until Enosis was accomplished.68 Representatives from all four parties met at the Archbishopric under the presidency of the Acting Archbishop and agreed on the need for ‘coordinated action for the settlement of the Enosis question’.69 Negotiations continued throughout October and November.70 It was a difficult task, since the differences between the parties and the bitterness each had toward the others were deeply rooted and a considerable impediment to immediate progress. A.K.E.L. presented a significant obstacle to the development of a unified Greek Cypriot Enosis policy, as the Central Committee was hesitant to agree

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THE EFFORTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS 139 to a truce that might hinder the party’s pursuit of its social and political aims. K.E.K., meanwhile, wanted to ensure that Enosis would be pursued without encouraging British or Russian influence in Greek affairs. The farmers’ union, P.E.K., demanded that the Locum Tenens clarify his stance with regard to communism and to A.K.E.L. The Acting Archbishop’s response riled the island’s more conservative elements: “I am convinced that A.K.E.L. desires Union with Greece and that in the case of a struggle it will be at its lead,” Leontios said. “It works fanatically on the question of our national restoration and wants Enosis as much as everybody else. Being the Locum Tenens and the Ethnarch, I am very glad because A.K.E.L., a party for which there were doubts as to whether it would support Enosis, is in the lead of the Enosis struggle…”71 The Mayors of Nicosia and Paphos were up in arms, but Servas assured them that A.K.E.L. did not claim to lead the push for Enosis, and his assurance calmed many of the troubled spirits on the Right.72 Nevertheless, the Right continued with a press campaign that undermined Leontios’s position. In the end, the parties reached a fragile agreement on 24 November 1944.73 The agreement was proof that an inter-party agreement was possible in Cyprus. However, the circumstances in Greece that had inspired such cooperation would ultimately destroy it. 8.5 Colonial Reaction to Cypriot Developments and the Designs of a Post War Policy The colonial authority anticipated that the most difficult period in the near future would be the interval between an armistice and a final declaration regarding the future of Cyprus. Given this assessment of the political situation in Cyprus, the liberation of Greece had given a troublesome boost to the island’s Enosists. The agreement amongst the Greek Cypriot political parties, however fragile it was, demonstrated their determination for effective action – the Acting Governor himself pronounced it a ‘remarkable achievement,’ compared to previous attempts. Foot was especially worried that this united effort to achieve Enosis might receive significant publicity in both Greece and Britain, and that this publicity would embarrass both the colonial authority and Whitehall.74 The manner in which A.K.E.L. had organized its members was rather impressive and the colonial authority still feared A.K.E.L. would seek an open confrontation with the Cyprus Government. According to Foot, party members had declared that A.K.E.L.’s ultimate purpose was to overthrow the Colonial Government.75 Governor Woolley also suspected A.K.E.L. would establish a communications nucleus in Greece, similar to the Committee for Cyprus Affairs in London, and would seek closer cooperation with E.A.M. once Greece had

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been liberated.76 Woolley believed the only means to thwart A.K.E.L. lay in the social and economic sphere, and he had already urged his superiors in London that British policy in postwar Cyprus should be ‘generous and constructive’.77 To this end, the Governor championed the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund,78 which mainly addressed issues pertaining to agriculture and health. It was in this context that the colonial authority developed plans for a Development Commission, as Woolley believed such a programme might indicate to Cypriots, especially the peasantry, the advantages a small colony might derive from membership in the British Commonwealth. The works financed by the Welfare Fund were expected to absorb a significant number of unemployed labourers and in 1945 the Governor announced £150,000 for public works spending. Woolley was also determined to initiate postwar programs for the welfare of Turkish Cypriots, in order to consolidate their political support for the Colonial Government.79 From early October 1944 until late January 1945, the Governor paid another visit to London to discuss, among other matters, future policy in Cyprus. The Governor explained to the Colonial Office that the situation in Cyprus was perilously similar to 1931, perhaps even worse, and he had already increased the police force on the island from 820 men to 1000. According to Woolley, as of his arrival in London the Colonial Government faced opposition from the Church, from conservative political circles, and from the Left. Woolley also requested that the Colonial Office replace the Indian units in the garrison with more reliable British formations.80 Assuming London had no plans to change the status of Cyprus after the war, Woolley advised the Colonial Office to immediately issue a forceful statement to this effect in order to deflate Greek Cypriot expectations of Enosis. The Governor averred that such expectations were high, and that the longer they went unchallenged increased the likelihood that an uprising on the island would be severe.81 In response to a remark that no ‘Cyprus Question’ existed and thus there was no need for any such declaration, Woolley emphasized that for Greek Cypriots Enosis was an open issue and one they expected would be settled – in consultation with the Greek Government – once the war ended. The Governor explained that he understood there were a number of officials in the Foreign Office who favoured ceding Cyprus to Greece, and that it would be difficult for him and his administration to pursue a clear and effective policy if they were not informed as to the position London would take in postwar Cyprus.82 For Stanley, Churchill’s statement at Mansion House on 8 November 194283 applied to Cyprus as it did to any other colony. Stanley nevertheless appeared willing to give Woolley an official written statement that ‘his function as Governor of Cyprus was to govern the Colony on the assumption that it would remain a

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THE EFFORTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS 141 part of the British Empire’.84 Developments on the Greek mainland, however, forced the British government to turn its focus toward other priorities. Subsequent discussions between Woolley and the Colonial Office addressed possible measures to prevent an outbreak of some kind on the island, including the deportation of ‘agitators’ and the closure of Trade Union premises which had been used for ‘seditious’ purposes. Woolley wanted tighter censorship of letters and telegrams coming into Cyprus. The Governor had been unsettled by broadcasts delivered on the occasion of the liberation of Athens by two prominent politicians, Nicolaos K. Lanitis and Alexis Kyrou. During these broadcasts, both politicians eulogized the contribution of Greek Cypriots to the war and the bonds of fraternity between Cypriots and Greeks. The Cypriot press printed transcripts of these broadcasts, which caused considerable excitement throughout the island.85 Lanitis had been forbidden to return to Cyprus on account of his involvement in the events of October 1931. That he was the first speaker to address a message to Cypriots on Greek Radio was considered rather unsettling in various quarters. The Secretary of State was reluctant to take any of the precautions Woolley proposed. Stanley knew it would be difficult to justify them to Parliament, and that their execution would rankle the British public. Past experience had demonstrated that the exertion of such repression in the colonies, especially in the case of Cyprus, posed problems at many levels and often required the British Government to defend itself against criticism at home and abroad. Stanley pressed Woolley to wait until it was absolutely necessary to take these precautions, and that until then their implementation would be unwise. He then instructed the Governor to prepare legislation which would authorize these measures if, and only if, there was no alternative. By the time Woolley returned to Nicosia in late January 1945, the situation had changed once again. Meanwhile, the only real ‘concession’ the Colonial Office had granted him was an economic development plan for the island, which the Governor felt was not much to go on if he were to avert the potential disaster which had come to preoccupy his administration. 8.6 The Events of December 1944 (Δεκεμβριανά): The physical confrontation between combined Greek and British units and the forces of E.L.A.S. in Athens in December 1944, better known by the Greek term Δεκεμβριανά (Dekemvriana), were a turning point in the history of modern Greece. The reasons for this outbreak of violence were the mutual suspicion and entrenched political competition between the traditional Greek political world, supported by the British, and the leadership of E.A.M. The return of the legitimate Greek government to Athens was an occasion

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celebrated in mainland Greece and around the world.86 Once the government had been reestablished, the pursuit of Nazi collaborators commenced, and the leaders of the puppet government, Tsolakoglou and Rallis, were jailed. At the same time, however, grave problems were simmering, as E.A.M. forces still dominated most of the country. Postwar Greece also faced famine, a scarcity of all supplies and inflation severe enough to unhinge the economy entirely.87 The Germans had burned down entire villages, while in the cities they had destroyed numerous buildings and entirely disrupted communications. It was the paradox of postwar Greece that just when her citizens needed to heal their wartime wounds, the nation’s internal divisions became more acute, as exemplified by the disarmament of the resistance groups. Of particular significance was the fate of the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion. Scobie and Papandreou regarded both units as an inseparable part of the country’s future armed forces, but E.L.A.S. wanted both disbanded.88 Intensive talks between Papandreou and Siantos, on behalf of E.L.A.S., did little to resolve the issue. On 2 December 1944 E.A.M. ministers resigned from the government, and the following day an E.A.M. procession through the centre of Athens was broken up, resulting in a considerable number of fatalities. American Ambassador MacVeagh, who watched the events from the balcony of his office, later recalled: “ I…heard bombs go off near the officers’ club on Regillis Street, and near Constitution Square, and these I believe were thrown by the instigators of the riots and not by the police, but I cannot be sure. The crowd was not supposed to be armed, and I saw no arms in their hands….The most remarkable thing I noted was the extreme youthfulness of the crowds, both male and female.”89 In Britain, The Times was extremely critical of the bloody and confused outcome of the E.A.M. demonstration.90 That the British did not intervene gave E.A.M. a false impression that they would remain neutral, and E.A.M. proceeded to take over a significant number of police stations. The British, however, had in fact been preparing for an open confrontation with E.A.M.E.L.A.S. Churchill was frank in his communication with Eden. “In my opinion, since we have paid the Soviet Union the price of having a freedom of action in Greece, we must not hesitate to use British forces to support the Greek royal government under Papandreou,” Churchill wrote. “This of course means that the British forces will intervene to forbid the execution of unlawful actions.”91 Finally, on 6 December, and again on 7 December, General Scobie demanded that E.A.M. evacuate the Athens-Piraeus conurbation they had occupied. Scobie had gathered a significant number of troops, including eight British battalions of infantry, four Greek battalions and a squadron of tanks, but the communities refused to obey Scobie, which resulted in hostilities. Shortly after the battle began, the National Guard battalions and other nationalist organi-

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THE EFFORTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF GREEK CYPRIOT POLITICS 143 zations, including ‘X’ (Khi), under Colonel George Grivas, arrived to reinforce the British. By the end of December, 22 National Guard battalions were added to the combined British-nationalist forces, and the communists were forced to retreat from Athens in early January. As a result of this temporary defeat, several hundred leftist guerillas were arrested or simply taken prisoner. One political outcome of postwar turbulence in Greece was the emergence of Archbishop Damaskinos92 as the new Regent. The selection of Damaskinos as Regent had initially been suggested to the Greek Government under Tsouderos in late October 1943.93 Damaskinos had been proposed as a man who enjoyed a national respect which transcended politics. In December 1944, however, King George and Churchill were both opposed to his appointment. It was at this time that General Wilson and Harold Macmillan, arrived in Athens. Wilson and Macmillan wanted an Archbishop who might satisfy both democrats (Venizelists) and royalists. They urged Churchill to take action immediately, and on Christmas Day 1944 Churchill and Anthony Eden arrived on Athens. In the following days, Churchill overcame his initial reluctance and came around to the election of Damaskinos. The Archbishop declared his intense ‘hatred for Communists in the country’, which presumably impressed the British Premier. By their second meeting, Churchill was sure the Greek Archbishop was ‘the outstanding figure in the Greek turmoil’.94 Meetings with E.A.M delegates,95 however, were fruitless, and the party’s inflexible policy forbade it from reaching a compromise with the government and with the other political parties. Consequently, on 30 December 1944, King George, after much pleading by Churchill, announced that Damaskinos would indeed be the new Regent. The King also promised not to return to Greece until elections took place. On 3 January 1945, the new government of Greece took power, without communist participation, under the Premiership of Nicolaos Plastiras. In an ironic postscript, the colonial authority in Cyprus realized that the Greek premier was on the list of the persons who were forbidden entry to Cyprus. In order to prevent his entry into Cyprus, Plastiras’s name had been added to the list during the rule of Governor Palmer, in 1936, and which was still valid in 1945.96 The events of December 1944 sealed the failure of the national unity government in Greece. The Left had lost its gamble and failed to conquer any significant political power, while Britain had once more infiltrated Greek affairs. Greece was now on the cusp of a protracted and savage Civil War. These events had a profound effect on Cypriot politics. The war ended as political and ideological division in Cyprus, now acutely refracted through a parallel and far more dramatic confrontation in Greece, was becoming deeper and more acrimonious. Indeed, the waning days of the global conflict saw the first major incident political violence in Cyprus.

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9.1 Greek Cypriot Politics after the December Events in Greece On 24 November 1944, Cypriot politicians had finally agreed on the necessity of setting aside partisan politics in the pursuit of Enosis, but any potential agreement was doomed to fail in the wake of the Δεκεμβριανά. The violent clashes between the Left and the Right in Greece astonished the Greek Cypriot community, which reacted radically to British intervention in Greek affairs. The Cypriot Right immediately vested blame for the unrest in Athens with E.A.M., and on 4 December, the National Party announced that it would not cooperate with A.K.E.L., given the latter’s solidarity with the mainland communists.1 At the same time, the Bishopric of Kyrenia issued a circular in which it labeled communism the enemy of the Church.2 On 6 December, A.K.E.L. issued a statement that the party stood by E.A.M.3 Although the announcement further polarized the Cypriot Right and Left, A.K.E.L. was still prepared to participate in the coalition. The agreement, however, appeared to be doomed as each party took an opposing view of British intervention in Greece and a new, intense bitterness took hold between the Cypriot Right and Left. British intervention in Greece demonstrated London’s decisiveness and its determination to pursue its interests in the eastern Mediterranean. To Greek Cypriots, however, the intervention was also a display of power. The National Party applauded the British for having ‘protected the majority of the Greek people’,4 while the Left denounced the intervention. In Nicosia and Famagusta, a ‘Committee for National Action’ distributed leaflets condemning ‘British imperialism’, the ‘unpopular fascist government in Greece’ and the ‘local traitors who applaud

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English imperialism’.5 The Locum Tenens refrained from participating in the debate and while the Bishopric of Kyrenia had condemned communism, Leontios kept aloof. His previous support for A.K.E.L. had alienated much of the Right, which now criticized his neutrality.6 The Acting Archbishop pressed on with the formation of a ‘Bureau of Ethnarchy’. The Bureau comprised eminent lawyers and other professional figures of the island, organized under Leontios’s leadership.7 The Bureau claimed to be ‘above all parties and organizations…but also waiting for the cooperation and solidarity of all Greek Cypriots’.8 By creating and leading such an organisation at a critical time in local politics, Leontios reaffirmed his Ethnarchic role. The Colonial Government of Cyprus was relieved to see the collapse of any possibility for cooperation amongst the Greek Cypriot political parties. The Acting Governor noted that had the coalition been successful the Enosis movement would have received a new impetus and would have put the Government under heightened pressure. “It was fortunate that when party agreement was on the point of being reached the A.K.E.L. plan was completely upset and the possibility of a coalition indefinitely postponed by the E.A.M. revolt in Greece,” Foot wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.9 Foot also noted a division of opinion within A.K.E.L. with regard to future policy as some party members expected the party to challenge government authority with strikes and demonstrations while hostilities continued in Greece. Indeed, the hard line members of the party were pressing for such action, which they believed E.A.M. sympathizers in Britain and elsewhere would support. The leadership of A.K.E.L., on the other hand, opted for a more moderate policy, as the Central Committee quickly realized that there were no grounds for open action against British intervention in Greece. At the time Servas was in London, accompanying the Trade Unions’ General Secretary, Andreas Ziartides, to the World Trade Union Conference, and his absence reinforced the Central Committee’s decision to take a more restrained approach to the situation. The wisdom of this decision was soon confirmed, as events in Greece increasingly turned public opinion in Cyprus against E.A.M., which could potentially turn public opinion against A.K.E.L. K.E.K. and the Right approved of the British policy in Greece. This encouraged the Colonial Government, which now believed there was little danger of a cross-party campaign for Enosis. Foot felt the situation in Greece proved to Greek Cypriots that ongoing British rule of the island was better than Enosis. After all, without the British, Cyprus could find itself in a chaos similar to that ravaging the mainland. As the war approached its end, therefore, the need to convince Cypriots of the advantages of British rule became even

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more imperative. On his return to Cyprus from London, Woolley’s first statement outlined the Colonial Office’s development plans for the island.10 In 1946, the announcement of a ten year development plan would make British intentions on this front even clearer.11 This colonial priority indicated a tendency of the Cyprus Government to willingly slip back into conditions prevailing in the 1930s when the rationale of developing Cyprus was so much in the foreground. In retrospect, the political agreement reached amongst the Greek Cypriot political parties at the end of 1944 may be added to the list of ‘lost opportunities’, beginning in 1931, in Greek Cypriot historiography. The question remained, nevertheless, as to whether or not internal and destabilizing factors had now become entrenched as a permanent trait in Cypriot political culture. Had Greek Cypriot efforts for unity simply mirrored events in Greece, or did they possess a dynamic of their own capable of surviving the Δεκεμβριανά? There was a real danger that the Greek Cypriot community might henceforth splinter, ideologically and factionally, into various pieces, which would prejudice the attainment of that ‘national aim’ to which all Greek Cypriots subscribed. This significant dilemma would be tested as the war came to an end. 9.2 The Demobilization of Cypriot Troops and the Question of the Return of the 1931 Exiles In early 1945, two major issues involving repatriation preoccupied the Government of Cyprus. The first was the return and demobilization of Cypriot soldiers serving abroad, which included a great many members of A.K.E.L., while the second was the increasing demand for the return of the conservative politicians the British had exiled in 1931. The Government’s approach to these issues writ large its tendencies at this critical stage. The problem the returning Cypriot soldiers presented was significant for the colonial authorities. It was estimated that around ten thousand soldiers would be homeward bound after the end of the war in Europe. This phenomenon was not unique to Cyprus, as military returnees were a problem in virtually all British colonies, not least in Africa.12 In Cyprus, the repatriation of soldiers promised even more troublesome consequences and political turmoil than it did in other British colonies. A great many Cypriot soldiers had been politically active prior to their recruitment, and they would return fundamentally changed by their contact with foreigners and by their overseas experiences. The issue of repatriating Cypriot soldiers loomed exceptionally large after the invasion of Normandy, as the plan for demobilization was fraught with two major problems. Polemidia Transit Camp, in Limassol District, could only host two thousand soldiers at full capacity per month, which would stretch the

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discharge process over half a year. The other problem was how to absorb these soldiers back into civilian life on the island without creating a new unemployment crisis. There were no records regarding the employment of each soldier prior to enlistment, which further complicated the situation. Hurried research on the provenance of each recruit showed that only 20 per cent of the volunteers came from the major towns and their suburban areas, while the rest had come from the poorest areas and villages on the island – the District of Paphos had provided a disproportionately large number of recruits.13 Given these numbers, it was now vital that economic conditions in the poorest villages were redressed, in order to enable the effective reception of returnees. The colonial authority was desperate to steer the returning soldiers from the major towns away from political agitation. In February 1945, Woolley decided this could be accomplished within the larger framework of maintaining full employment on the island, which could be achieved through the large scale development plans envisioned by the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. For Woolley, the question of demobilization was strongly tied to development works, and he believed the employment provided by these works was the key to the orderly discharge of the volunteers. To this end, he also suggested that the soldiers’ villages should be given priority in the implementation of irrigation works and agricultural plans, and that returning volunteers should have preference in their pursuit of Government employment. A.K.E.L. was closely connected to the demobilization issue. Many A.K.E.L. members had volunteered in 1943, which gave the party a marked influence on those Cypriots serving overseas. The party had also played a significant role in helping the families of these Cypriot soldiers with their grievances. Woolley noted the influence of A.K.E.L. members abroad during a visit with Cypriot troops in Italy on his way home from London.14 In early 1945 a group of veterans formed the Union of Cypriot Ex-servicemen (΄Ενωσις Κυπρίων Αποστράτων – Ε.Κ.Α) under the aegis of A.K.E.L. – this nascent organization was closely connected to the Enosis movement. The Governor worried the homecoming of a significant number of soldiers who espoused the party’s ideology would invigorate A.K.E.L. These soldiers had fought for freedom and democracy. They would naturally return to Cyprus hostile to any form of colonial rule, which would make A.K.E.L. all the more capable of creating disorder in the island. “I cannot too strongly emphasize this new factor in the situation,”15 Woolley urged his superiors in the Colonial Office. During E.K.A.’s first Pan Cyprian Conference, the participants sent a memorandum to the colonial authority demanding Enosis after the war and addressing other issues such as employment and welfare.16 In his reply, the Governor said he would happily consider all of the demands delineated in the

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memorandum provided the request for Enosis was removed.17 The representatives of E.K.A, indignant, sent a protest by telegram to the Colonial Office in London. In the months that followed the problem of demobilization would evolve into a daunting problem for the Cyprus Government. The second question pertaining to repatriation was the ‘return’ of the politicians the Government had deported in 1931. During the war the Greek Cypriot community had sought the return of the deportees, especially that of Bishop Makarios II, on numerous occasions. Early 1945 brought the improvement of conditions in Greece with the Varkiza agreement, the restoration of postal communication with the Greek mainland, and the return to the island of hundreds of repatriated Cypriots, all of which gave a fresh boost to Greek Cypriot demands for the return of all the exiles. The right wing press was the first to initiate a fresh agitation, while most of the exiles living in Greece, including the Bishop of Kyrenia, appealed on their own behalf. In a communiqué to Governor Woolley, Bishop Makarios wrote: “the special circumstances which have been created in Cyprus move me to believe that they render absolutely necessary the return of a Bishop among his flock, since this Bishop is imbued with confidence that the Anglo-Hellenic interests coincide and must continue to coincide for the future.”18 During Woolley’s visit to London, Woolley and Stanley had agreed that there were no immediate grounds for the return of the deportees, but this new round of requests forced the colonial administration to revise its position, and Woolley made considered and forceful arguments to counter Colonial Office reluctance.19 The situation in Cyprus had changed drastically in the wake of the war, and the colonial authority believed the Church’s influence had seriously diminished. Woolley believed it would be a grave error to examine the return of the deportees in the context of the events of 1931, rather than under current conditions. While the Church had been the instigator of the 1931 riots, it now faced the troubling absence of an effective ecclesiastical policy and dissension within its ranks. Woolley believed both factors had significantly reduced the Church’s influence on the Greek Cypriot community, and that A.K.E.L. was now the island’s primary political driver. According to Woolley A.K.E.L. now took the lead in the island’s political life, and the Locum Tenens himself was considered ‘little more than a puppet in the hands of politicians.’ A.K.E.L. had achieved a major breakthrough in Cypriot political life, in both the towns and in the country, and it was expected that the party successes in the municipal elections of 1943 would continue in the following year. Nevertheless, the events in Greece and the party’s open support for E.A.M. were a temporary setback for A.K.E.L, and Woolley believed his government should exploit the party’s weaknesses. To this end, the Governor proposed a

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labour policy designed to resolve the economic grievances on which A.K.E.L. thrived. He also wanted to press on with large scale rural development schemes and to adopt a more liberal policy with regard to constitutional affairs on the island, in order to encourage the spirit of cooperation P.E.K. had previously demonstrated. Lastly, Woolley urged the Colonial Office to adopt a generous policy with regard to both the exiles and the repeal of the Church laws. The Governor was convinced there was no better time than the present to adopt this policy, which he believed would restore relations between the Government and the bulk of the population, and that failure by the Colonial Office to take action would only deepen the divide between the Colonial Government and the Greek Cypriot community, and that political agitation on the island would become more acute. Woolley had also considered it would soon be necessary, perhaps even immediately, to make it clear to the Greek Cypriot community that Britain had no plans to cede Cyprus to Greece, and the Governor expected he would have to take some new and perhaps even repressive measures to stifle Enosis agitation. Given the conditions in postwar Cyprus, the return to the island of any persons connected to the Enosis movement would not be feasible. If they had already been allowed to do so, however, Woolley felt the gesture might moderate Greek Cypriot reaction once the Colonial Office announced that Enosis would not be accomplished. The return of the exiles might also act as a diversion from other pressing political issues, but Woolley believed that if the exiles remained overseas it could only benefit the Enosis movement. A final and rather interesting argument was that the Government should take all necessary steps to strengthen the position of the Church and that of the island’s conservative politicians, in order to counter the increasingly dangerous influence of A.K.E.L. With a strong Church and a resurgent Right, conservative politicians and farmers would be less likely to participate in open violence against the Government. The Colonial Office had considered the Church the main instigator of the 1931 uprising and the primary force behind the Enosis movement up until the first years of the war. However, as the war was coming to its end, the colonial authority feared the power of A.K.E.L. to such an extent that it now saw the Church as a potential ally. The Colonial Office delayed in espousing Woolley’s proposals, however, and it was not until the following year, 1946, that both the Church laws were repealed and the exiles were permitted to return to Cyprus. By this time the struggles within Greek Cypriot politics had entered a new phase. As the spring of 1945 approached, both the colonial authority and the Greek Cypriot community anticipated a reinvigoration of the Enosis movement and further unrest. On 22 March 1945 the Greek Consul, Kountouriotis, sent a message to his superiors in the Greek Foreign Office as to how to best revive

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Enosis in light of the repatriation of four hundred Cypriots from Athens. The message, intercepted by the British Foreign Office, made the colonial authority rather anxious.20 The demobilization of Cypriot volunteers would become a source of further frication and alienation between A.K.E.L. and the Cyprus Government. The eventual decision of the Cyprus Government to keep Cyprus Regiment soldiers in uniform to serve in other parts of the Empire would bring severe discord to the island, which ultimately resulted in the death of a Greek Cypriot sergeant in Famagusta. The soldiers would continue to protest for demobilization not only in Cyprus but also abroad as the mutiny of Cypriot serving in Beirut in October 1945 was to indicate most clearly. 9.3 The Debate on the Future of Cyprus It was clear by the first months of 1945 that the end of the war was approaching. In February, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, “The Big Three,” had convened in Yalta, where they had agreed to a number of significant postwar resolutions, including the demilitarization of Germany and the foundation of the United Nations. In Cyprus, the press reported that the United States favoured ceding the island to Greece, fueling speculation about a postwar settlement. Indeed, in early January The New York Times reported that the American government favoured the readjustment of the borders of Greece, including the cession of Cyprus to Greece, ‘provided that Greece can obtain British agreement – apparently a matter of some difficulty’.21 American opinion was rather critical of British intervention in Greece, and the US government was suspicious of Britain’s intentions.22 In this context, the USA had a tendency to look favourably upon a cession of Cyprus to Greece. The American Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, stated in a press conference that the reporter who had written the The New York Times article ‘apparently saw some departmental study paper that was private and not final’.23 However tentative US policy may have been it represents the first involvement of American policy-makers in Cypriot affairs, which would become increasingly prominent in the postwar era. In Cyprus, news of the American position on Cyprus satisfied much of the Greek Cypriot community, and many Greek Cypriots sent telegrams of gratitude to the United States.24 Disappointment, however, arrived on the island later that month when the future of Cyprus was discussed in the British Parliament. In view of the publicity that the Cyprus questions had recently received, Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee was asked whether “he (the Prime Minister) was aware of the views officially expressed by the United States Secretary of State as to the possible future status of Cyprus in relation to Greece; and if he will give an assurance that Cyprus will continue to form part

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of the British Empire and that there is no question of it being ceded to Greece or any other country.”25 Attlee answered that Britain’s position towards her Empire remained as it had been summarized by Churchill in his Mansion House statement of 1942 – in other words, Britain had no intention of dismantling its colonial rule overseas.26 Attlee’s response was fully intended to undermine the expectations of the Greek Cypriot community, which once more sent a flurry of telegrams of protest to London. The Locum Tenens sent a telegram to Churchill declaring that Greek Cypriots waited for ‘nothing short of Enosis’.27 For Governor Woolley it was essential that London should completely deflate these expectations, and he renewed his request for a definite statement of British sovereignty in Cyprus. The ensuing correspondence between Nicosia and London exemplified the differing views taken by the various departments in Whitehall. As they had in 1941, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office entertained sharply divergent strategies. In the spring of 1944 the Foreign Office prepared two new memorandums. The first was written solely for use as background on various questions concerning the island, but Battershill, now in the Colonial Office, criticized the memorandum because in his opinion it seemed ‘to be coloured by a predisposition on the part of the authors (whose sources of information do not of course include the Colonial Office records) to the view that either the cession is inevitable, or that the case for it is overwhelmingly strong’.28 The second memorandum addressed Greek claims to Cyprus.29 This memorandum, prepared by the Foreign Office Research Department, was again in favour of ceding Cyprus to Greece. According to this report, the island was ‘colonised by Greeks from the Peloponese and elsewhere as early as the 14th century B.C. and since that time Cyprus has shared the general fortunes of the Greek-speaking world’. The memorandum analyzed Greece’s historical claims to the island, including the Greek argument that the majority of the population was Greek by language, race, religion and tradition, and argued that Greece had fought twice on behalf of the Allies and therefore ‘deserves well of them’. On the subject of Cyprus itself, the memorandum argued that the majority of Greek Cypriots were sincere in their demands for Enosis, and that the segment of the community that most desired union with Greece comprised the educated and the politically conscious, an urban class that included journalists, priests and teachers and that while a portion of the rural population appeared to be apathetic, it was by no means hostile to the idea. The British had been quite generous in 1864 when they ceded the Ionian islands to Greece, and Greek Cypriots were hopeful that London might repeat such a gesture. The memorandum also made it plain that neither the aftermath of 1931, nor the Duke of Devonshire’s 31 March 1943 remark that Cypriots were incapable

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of exercising full self-government, had helped make British rule more popular in Cyprus. In closing, the memorandum asserted that Greek Cypriots believed Enosis would be a fitting recompense for their services in the present war. The Colonial Office and the Foreign Office also discussed the Turkish Cypriot community and whether or not its presence was truly an obstacle to settlement. For the Foreign Office, the Turkish Cypriot minority was not an insuperable problem. The Turks of Cyprus lived in peace with the Greek Cypriots, but it was believed they preferred British rule to Greek. The migration of Turkish Cypriots to Turkey or to some other part of the British Empire was also suggested. Greece had been hospitable to the many thousands of Muslims living in her territories, including Thessaly, Western Thrace and part of Macedonia, which meant there was little reason to assume Turkish Cypriots would be mistreated or discriminated against should Cyprus be ceded to Greece – if Britain decided on cession, she would be in a strong position to impose conditions, including the right of inspection by an international authority. All in all, throughout 1944 and 1945, the Foreign Office was favourably disposed towards Hellenic aspirations. These studies did little to impress or sway Governor Woolley, who wrote to Battershill that he thought “the papers were a little disappointing. As you say, the writers seem to be predisposed in favour of the view that cession is inevitable or at least that the case for it is overwhelmingly strong; they also seem to be out of touch with many of the realities of the present situation…”.30 Acheson, in the Colonial Office, concurred with Woolley’s opinion.31 Up until the end of 1944 and partly due to the circumstances in Greece, the Colonial Secretary was hesitant about Woolley’s insistence that London issue a definitive statement regarding the future of Cyprus, but the turmoil which gripped Greece in early 1945 convinced Stanley that the Colonial Office should take a more explicit stance. In March, Stanley informed the Foreign Office that he did not think Attlee’s comments in Parliament did much to set back the drive for Enosis in Cyprus, and that Britain should issue a more emphatic statement that would reinforce the notion that Britain had no intention of retreating from the island. The Secretary of State reiterated Woolley’s argument that the Cyprus Government needed Greek Cypriot cooperation in order to execute its development plans and thus counteract the Enosis movement, and that this required that Britain make its plan to retain the island clear to the people of Cyprus. Stanley sought Eden’s concurrence regarding such a statement – he also asked Eden if London should approach the Greek government in order to secure its promise that Enosis would not be part of any postwar settlement.32 Eden, however, did not feel the issue could be resolved with a single statement. He reminded Stanley that it had been decided in 1941 that all

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territorial settlements would be discussed after the war, and that approval for such a statement had to first be requested from the War Cabinet.33 The insistence on War Cabinet approval of any statement regarding territorial settlements was a fundamental element of Eden and Churchill’s policy regarding Greece. Both Eden and Churchil were adamant that no decisions bearing on Greece should be made prior to a Peace Conference – their mutual position stemmed from uncertainties regarding the Dodecanese and the role of Turkey after the war. Thus, in a meeting in late May 1945 at the Colonial Office, Stanley told his staff that for the moment he would not pursue a definitive declaration on the future of Cyprus.34 Informal discussions regarding Cyprus continued throughout 1945 in London. The formation of the new Labour Government, in July 1945, brought fresh hopes to Greek Cypriots for the satisfaction of their national aspiration. However, official British circles were devoted to keeping hold of the island. The Commanders-in-Chief Committee argued that the island should be further developed as a naval base,35 while the more liberally inclined Fabian Colonial Bureau36 also favoured British retention of Cyprus.37 The final entry of Turkey into the war, in February 1945, was another obstacle to the fulfillment of Enosis, as Turkey’s views on the ultimate disposition of Cyprus were now more likely to be taken into account by the Great Powers. The final phases of the war seemed to reinforce Britain’s vital interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East. Greek Cypriots continued to press for the end of colonial rule and for national restoration, but Whitehall continued to disappoint them. This disappointment would become part and parcel of their ongoing relationship with Britain. 9.4 25 March 1945: the Lefkonico Incident The 1945 celebration in Cyprus of Greek independence was especially important for a number of reasons. It was the first anniversary of Greek independence to be celebrated after the liberation of Greece and the day provided Greek Cypriots with an opportunity, now that the war was coming to an end, to fully express their desire for Enosis. Finally, and most importantly, by this juncture the antagonism between the Cypriot Right and Left was at an unusually high pitch, and a celebration in Lefkonico, a large village on the Mesaoria plain, resulted in the deaths of three persons and demonstrated the volatility now endemic to Greek Cypriot politics. The tragic events in Lefkonico also underlined the psychological distance between the Greek Cypriot community and the Colonial Government and demonstrated how difficult it was for the colonial authority to impose its wishes on the local press. Each party had begun preparing early on for the celebration of Greek

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independence. A.K.E.L. suggested common celebrations, but the other political parties ignored its request.38 A.K.E.L. also suggested that schoolchildren participate in the celebrations, but Themistocles Dervis condemned the idea.39 The Locum Tenens called upon everyone to celebrate the day in a spirit of cooperation. District commissioners, on behalf of the Cyprus Government, authorized processions and public speeches, but also instructed the police to use force if violence erupted.40 In Lefkonico, organisers agreed that after the church service, a local schoolmaster would give a speech in the churchyard, so the occasion would have no political character. After the speech was over, however, an A.K.E.L. member stood up to address the crowd. Arguments and some pushing and shoving ensued, followed by the angry departure of most of the right wing attendees, who gathered at P.E.K. local headquarters. The rest of the crowd, around 200 AKELists, quickly reformed and marched to their club in the village. Their route took them across the small bridge opposite the P.E.K. building. The police intervened before a physical confrontation erupted and a Greek Cypriot police sergeant, Patsalides, ordered the members of A.K.E.L. to disperse. The AKELists refused, and Patsalides ordered his two officers, a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot, to fire on the crowd. A twelve year-old boy and a young man in his twenties were killed instantly, and several people were wounded, one of whom died a short while later. The news from Lefkonico quickly spread throughout the island, as did word that the police had intervened in a similar procession in Pafos, although no injuries or deaths had been reported there.41 The colonial authority quickly issued a communiqué describing the events in Lefkonico as “a violent dispute between two opposite parties…in which an illegal procession was formed...and the Police intervened to prevent a more serious clash between the parties. The demonstrators were repeatedly called upon to disperse…when they refused to do so the Police opened fire. Five rounds were fired…”.42 The colonial authority then issued an order to all editors to refrain from publishing news or commentary on the confrontation in Lefkonico until the Government opened an official enquiry into the incident. The Cypriot press had generally refrained from open criticism of the Cyprus Government during the war. However, given the impending end of the war and anticipation on the island at a fever pitch, such forbearance was waning. In protest of the Government’s directive, all of the island’s editors, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, suspended publication on 28 March 1945.43 Of special significance was the reaction of the Cyprus Post, which criticized the official announcement regarding the incident at Lefkonico – Percy Arnold later wrote of his disappointment over the way the Government had misrepresented the Lefkonico march and the shooting deaths that followed

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it. The municipality of Lefkonico also issued a statement, signed by both right wing and left wing villagers, decrying the unnecessary killing of people who had participated in a peaceful demonstration with no intention of disrupting public order.44 Even this tragic event, however, was not enough to unite the island’s political parties, although A.K.E.L., P.E.K. and P.E.S.P. issued a common announcement condemning the events. The National Party, however, argued that it could not cooperate with A.K.E.L.45 and issued its own separate pronouncement. The Cyprus Government appointed a Commission of Enquiry.46 The commission held daily hearings for more than a month but was ultimately split in its conclusions.47 The majority believed there were no prior indications that violence would break out in the village, and that Patsalides had erred in judgment when he ordered his officers to fire on unarmed civilians. Governor Woolley had pressed the Colonial Office to direct the Commission to report only the established facts and not its opinions to the Attorney General, but Woolley’s superiors in London rejected his request.48 The Colonial Office strongly opposed giving any indication whatsoever that the Cyprus Government was interfering in the work of the Commission,49 as such interference might make the situation a greater embarrassment for the British than it already was.50 After Lefkonico, the Colonial Office was forced to confront serious criticism in Parliament. Arthur Creech Jones had asked “whether any action has been taken in respect of the Police who were responsible for this outrage; and will he also say why the news of this event was banned in Cyprus and was not allowed to leave the country, and why when a Press did appear from the Government it was a garbled statement and not in accordance with the facts.”51 The Colonial Office claimed it could not give Jones a sufficient answer, as the Commission had not finalised its report. In the end, the Attorney General decided the Commission’s report was unsatisfactory because it was not unanimous, and because it focused on the role of the police during the incident, rather than assigning blame for the incident itself. Woolley believed Patsalides and his officers had acted in good faith, and that the permission to carry and use weapons had been appropriate, as the colonial authority believed that A.K.E.L. intended to set a major disturbance in motion. The Governor saw the tragedy at Lefkonico not as an isolated incident but as the first expression of a general uneasiness throughout Cyprus and as such it provided extra evidence that the Government should proceed to the closure of all Trade Union premises. No action was ever taken against Patsalides and, despite public insistence, the Enquiry Committee’s report never saw the light of day. The incident at Lefkonico is extremely important because it encapsulates

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the attitudes of the key players in wartime Cyprus. Lefkonico was the climax of the conflict between the Right and the Left. Afterwards, further minor confrontations between the opposite parties took place in other villages of Cyprus as well. The colonial authority’s reaction to the incident was an expression of its own inherent nervousness, which replicated itself in lack of transparency and autocratic tendency. The Greek Cypriot community found this kind of regime intolerable, as was perfectly demonstrated by the press and the local parties. Perhaps most importantly, the event showed Britain’s determination to use every means possible to quell any sort of outbreak on the island. Cypriot expectations for Enosis continued to rise, however, but the British were unprepared to make any alterations to their postwar plans for the colony. 9.5 The End of the Second World War in Europe On 9 May 1945, Churchill officially declared the end of the war in Europe.52 Greek Cypriots celebrated the news with tremendous enthusiasm. Governor Woolley gave an address following the announcement in which he acknowledged the importance of the island’s contribution to the Allied war effort. Woolley told the people of Cyprus that they had “every right to feel proud for their role in the Allied victory. They fought in France, the Western Desert, Greece, Crete and Italy. During the last five and half years there was not a single moment during which Cypriots didn’t actively contribute to this struggle.”53 The end of the war, however, presented profound challenges to the Cyprus Government. The period between an armistice and a definitive declaration regarding the future of Cyprus had occupied Woolley’s government for some time. After the Lefkonico shootings, the Governor had additional evidence to present to the Colonial Office that further measures should be adopted to counter any fresh agitation on the island. Soon after Woolley’s request, the theft of a number of weapons from the C.V.F. armoury in Nicosia provided the Government with the pretext it needed to act more freely. There were indications that members of the Cyprus Volunteer Force had assisted in the theft, and this turned suspicions toward A.K.E.L. The police eventually discovered the stolen weapons in the village of Zodia, in the yard of an A.K.E.L. member, allegedly the cousin of Ploutis Servas.54 The colonial authorities, however, did not believe A.K.E.L. leadership had authorized the theft, and that it had been undertaken independently by the extremist wing of the party. Six members of the Cyprus Volunteer Force were prosecuted,55 and two of these men were eventually sentenced to seven years of imprisonment.56 According to the Colonial Office, the munitions theft was an “incident of considerable importance indicating a new factor in the situation of Cyprus…It is to be feared that under the leadership of A.K.E.L. Cyprus politics may be

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entering an altogether tougher and more dangerous phase, as a result of which for the first time there is a risk of violence in the Palestinian sense.”57 Indeed, at that time in Palestine, the anti-British strife created by groups such as Irgun and Stern had brought profound anxiety in London.58 The British feared a violent outburst of a similar nature in Cyprus, given its proximity to Palestine and the considerable number of Jewish refugees on the island, whose presence concerned officials in both London and Nicosia.59 Indeed, some members of Woolley’s administration still remembered Governor Palmer’s insistence, in 1938, that the Zionists considered Cyprus as part of the ‘Land of Israel’.60 Given these significant concerns, the colonial authority calculated that ‘firm action at the outset may effectively kill any taste for violence that they [the Cypriots] may be acquiring’.61 Woolley saw the situation on the island as ‘extremely difficult’.62 A few months earlier, in a private meeting with his Commissioners, he had referred to A.K.E.L. as ‘our little own E.A.M. but fortunately without its E.L.A.S.’63 As Woolley had predicted and feared, A.K.E.L. had become, indisputably, the biggest threat to the colonial regime. Two days after the end of the war and with the support of the Colonial Office, the colonial authority began its persecution of the Left in earnest. The Governor ordered the search of all A.K.E.L. and Trade Union premises on the island, which turned up documents considered to be seditious.64 The Cyprus Government fined the editor of the Trade Union newspaper, Ανόρθωσις, for publishing illegal articles, and over the next few months the leaders of P.S.E. were tried on various charges, including conspiracy to overthrow the status quo.65 Finally, in early 1946, the colonial authority declared the Trade Union organ an illegal organization. This series of repressive events inaugurated a period of acute tension between the Cyprus Government and the Cypriot Left which, on broader examination, fed into the profound polarization of Cypriot politics thereafter. The cessation of the hostilities in Europe in May 1945 did not bring political stability to Cyprus. In actuality, the end of the war signaled the beginning of a more turbulent era in modern Cypriot history, one shaped by the effect of the war on the island’s political organisations. The formation and growth of A.K.E.L. was doubtless the exceptional political event in wartime Cyprus. The communist party of Cyprus survived its persecution and proscription, in 1933, and under the capable leadership of Ploutis Servas A.K.E.L. had managed to return to the Cypriot political arena, where it thrived. The party took advantage of British leniency towards the infant Trade Union movement and emerged as a platform for more moderate leftist elements. A.K.E.L. was able to consolidate its influence in a short span of time, and by the end of the war the party was strong enough to assume a leading role in Cypriot politics. Indeed,

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A.K.E.L. would eventually lead the Enosis movement until 1949, when the defeat of E.A.M.-E.L.A.S. in mainland Greece dealt the party a severe blow. Despite its rapid growth and political successes, in early 1945 the party faced many problems and challenges. A.K.E.L.’s coexistence with K.K.K. satisfied the more hardcore members of the Cypriot Left, but this arrangement also caused significant turmoil within the party, and the final dissolution of the K.K.K., in 1944, was generally regarded as a wise move.66 Later that year, Ploutis Servas himself created a number of problems for A.K.E.L. when he refused to obey the Central Committee’s order to leave Limassol for Nicosia, where the party had established its headquarters. Servas chose to remain as mayor of Limassol rather than serve as General Secretary of A.K.E.L., and he resigned from the party in July. This was a remarkable turn by the man responsible for the survival and reemergence of the Cypriot Left. The emergence of A.K.E.L. and its growing influence caught both the Cypriot Right and British leadership off guard. The Right failed to grasp the significance of the new milieu on the island and could not effectively counter A.K.E.L.’s growing popularity for a number of reasons. First, the Right lacked a comparable organizational apparatus, and it was not until after the municipal elections of 1943 that the island’s traditional politicians were convinced of the need to create an institutional structure as an essential part of their political struggle. Even after the 1943 elections, however, the party suffered from a deficit of organizational skills, and it was largely the influential figure of Themistocles Dervis who wielded the party’s power. The National Party also failed to grasp the advantages of collaborating with A.K.E.L. and chose to pursue a strident anti-communist policy, rather than forming a coalition with the Left that might have resulted in the application of significant pressure on colonial rule, especially with regard to the national issue. The National Party was unwilling to entertain any form of solidarity, not only with A.K.E.L. but with the acting Ethnarch, Leontios, which alienated the Greek Cypriot community and created an opportunity for A.K.E.L. to increase its influence throughout the island. When the colonial authority finally permitted the conduct of the archiepiscopal elections, in June 1947, Leontios went on to become the new Archbishop, thanks in part to the support of A.K.E.L. The sudden death of the Archbishop later that summer, however, opened the way for the election of the more conservative Bishop Makarios of Kyrenia who had been permitted to return to the island in 1946. The end of the war found the Cypriot Right and Left extremely divided. Nevertheless, both parties agreed the satisfaction of Enosis would be sufficient recompense for Cypriot contributions to the Allied cause. The British, however, had no intention of bestowing such a reward on the colony. Governor Woolley

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continued to press the Colonial Office to issue a statement announcing and clarifying Britain’s intention to retain Cyprus.67 Shortly after peace was achieved in Europe, a British journalist and writer well aware of the realities in Cyprus, Percy Arnold, wrote about the island’s postwar dilemma: ‘Britain on her part should not be afraid of the plain truth; either hearing it or telling it. Britain, being a little more honest than in the past, should tell the Cypriots just this: We know that a vast number of Cypriots want Union with Greece, we know that these Cypriots would like Britain to clear out. You Cypriots, for your part, should understand that, in the world as it is today, we have not the slightest intention of clearing out. … We respect your aspiration; but you must understand our needs. In the future things may be different and the world may be more sane and more peaceful; many things may then become possible. Today you ask for Union with Greece; today, as things are, it is necessary for us as a world power to remain in Cyprus. …In this present phase of world affairs can we work together, Britain as the friend of Hellenism and Cypriots as the friends of Britain? …The English have responsibilities and the Cypriots have grievances, and both know how to be intransigent; but the Englishman can be, and all who have lived in Cyprus know that the Cypriot is, often generous. Now is an occasion for the exercise of that quality and a welcome moment of fresh air in the Middle East’.68 Disappointment and mistrust, however, were to be the main elements of Anglo-Hellenic relations in Cyprus in the near future. Britain’s withdrawal from India and Palestine would elevate Cyprus’s strategic importance as the last – and therefore indispensable – British base in the Middle East, which further complicated the situation on the island. During the 1950s crisis would erupt in Cyprus, as it would in so many other British colonies, and the national movement would lead a new struggle for freedom and for union with Greece. Cyprus was not, however, destined to be as fortunate as some other geographic fragments of the Hellenic world. In 1959 the London-Zurich agreements sealed the independence of the Republic of Cyprus, thereafter excluding any possibility of Enosis. The infant republic struggled thereafter to find its place within the international community, but many factors, both internal and external, only guaranteed that more troubles unfolded on the island. Indeed, in 1974 catastrophe came to the island in the form of a Turkish invasion. Turkey continues to occupy the northern 37 per cent of the island, and numerous attempts to achieve a just solution to the occupation have all failed. However, fresh political developments have taken place on the island, and in 2008, for the first time ever, the Republic of Cyprus elected an A.K.E.L. candidate, Demetris Christofias, to the presidency. It remains to be seen what the future holds for the island.

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CONCLUSIONS

This book has focused on the examination of the political changes in Cyprus during the Second World War. The onset of the War triggered far reaching changes not only on an international level but also within Cyprus. The island, prior to the onset of the hostilities was in the middle of a political agitation for the granting of political liberties. An unanimous Greek Cypriot political truce was however declared upon the news of war placing the Allied victory as the islanders’ priority. The colonial regime was taken aback by the overwhelming Cypriot contribution to the war effort which in itself spread hopes among Greek Cypriots for a post war ‘reward’. The Greek entry into the war in 1940 was a turning point with direct repercussions on Cyprus. For one thing it resulted in the re-emergence of the Enosis movement with all its old vigour. The question of Enosis became highly problematical for the colonial regime, both in Nicosia and in London, during the war. Significantly, this book has demonstrated the degree to which London itself was divided as to the future policy to be pursued in the island. On one hand, Greece’s heroic resistance had resulted in a sympathetic attitude within the Foreign Office towards the union of Cyprus with the mainland. The Colonial Office, however, as well as the Governors in Nicosia, strongly opposed that eventuality. British insistence in deflating the Greek Cypriot expectations for the fulfillment of the national demands is demonstrated time and again. The announcement of the development plans on the island was part of this anxiety in making clear that Cyprus was to remain part of the British Empire after the war. The war also brought to the foreground even more acutely the presence of the Turkish Cypriot minority and their own intense opposition for Enosis. For their part, the British, as exemplified by Churchill’s decisive intervention during a debate within officials in late 1941 as well as by his speech while in Nicosia later on in 1943, seriously took under consideration the role of this minority. Significantly, however, it was during these years that a tendency within the

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Turkish Cypriot community itself to start looking to Turkey for protection instead of to Great Britain first began to come seriously to the fore. Additionally, the war encouraged the multiplication of political parties in the Cypriot political arena. Undoubtedly, the critical event was the foundation of A.K.E.L. The party initially put forward a more moderate platform which even contained some bourgeois elements. Its capable leadership, its impressive organization and its members’ solidarity – a legacy from K.K.K.’s experience during the 1930s – accompanied a groundbreaking program of social and economic reform and in a short space of time won over a significant part of Greek Cypriot public opinion. The municipal elections of 1943 mirrored the degree to which the party had penetrated into Greek Cypriot society. A.K.E.L.’s success provoked the suspicion of both the colonial regime and the local Right. Both actors doubted A.K.E.L.’s sincerity on Enosis. For the local Government dedication to the Enosis cause was sine qua non for the existence of any political norm in the island. The past failure of the K.K.K. to attract interest to its doctrine of an independent Cyprus within a model of a Balkan-Soviet federation had shown that the ideal of Enosis was deeply rooted in Greek Cypriot consciousness. Anything less than that was simply unacceptable. Furthermore, for the British, the attitude of the Trade Union movement – with its refusal to donate to the war effort even after Greece’s entrance – and the subsequent criticism this stance had received from local Greek Cypriot opinion was almost certainly the driving force behind A.K.E.L.’s adoption of the Enosis dogma in late 1941. For the colonial authority, however, the predominant question that was posed after A.K.E.L.’s volunteering movement in June 1943, especially emphasized during Cosmo Parkinson’s visit and the crucial events of Greece in late 1944, was whether A.K.E.L. would resort to open violence. At the same time, the Cyprus Government refused to seize the opportunity for a closer cooperation with the Right to reverse A.K.E.L.’s popularity. For the Government, the Cypriot Right was as unacceptable as a partner as the Left. In contrast, any prospect of cooperation between Greek Cypriots themselves significantly alarmed the British authorities. British relief at the failure of a common understanding between the Cypriot Left and Right during the latter part of 1944 strongly exemplified that anxiety. The local Right was equally hostile towards A.K.E.L. but was ill-equipped to respond to the challenge that the latter’s influence on the island posed. The traditional politicians saw A.K.E.L.’s participation in the national demands as threatening to their own monopoly and therefore wholly unacceptable. Indeed, the bitter antagonism towards A.K.E.L. started even from the earliest stages of its foundation with the first incident that threatened violence between the two

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parts being identified as early as March 1942. Three years later, in 1945, the ideological polarization, assisted by events in Greek mainland, was conclusively demonstrated in the village of Lefkonico. One of the fundamental arguments of this book is that the traces of the antagonism between the Cypriot Left and Right of the later 1940s are to be found during the war. We have also evoked the different perceptions that the Cypriot Left and the Right held respectively of the achievement of Enosis in a post war milieu. Ironic though it might seem in the light of later developments the Right at this time was adamant that such an outcome should be explored within the frame of Anglo-Hellenic friendship. Especially after the British intervention in Greece in December 1944, the Right became even more attached to this rationale. The local Left, on the other hand, supported the adoption of more decisive and unilateral measures. Here, too, the external factor was crucial. As developments in Greece unfolded with the increasing criticism against E.A.M. in Cyprus, A.K.E.L. refrained from pursuing a radical policy. The central figure between our main three actors – the colonial authority, the Left and the Right – and the point of intersection between the pressures that this triangulation underpinned was certainly the Acting Archbishop Leontios. His personality and his role as the most prestigious representative of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus is clearly fascinating and important in its right, but – in the light of later Cypriot events – is evocative in its pre-echo of the role played by Archbishop Makarios III after 1950. Leontios retained the traditional equivocation verging on hostility towards the British regime and consistently sought to promote the Enosis cause with every opportunity given. Nevertheless, Leontios was not unanimously approved as a leader by clerics and traditional politicians. In contrast, his ‘moderate’ attitude towards A.K.E.L. divided the Right itself. Many politicians, mainly the supporters of the exiled Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios, disagreed with his tactics not only in terms of his policy towards the British but more intensely towards his acceptance of A.K.E.L. As Governor Woolley noted, these dissensions within Church ranks had resulted in seriously diminishing its influence within Greek Cypriots. In the later 1940s the Church would have to fight hard to reverse this decline. Another major argument of this book is that this division within the Right itself was one of the main factors that forbade this party from restricting A.K.E.L.’s growing influence on the island. It was this division, uncertainty and lack of coherent policy that A.K.E.L. took to its advantage. In between these events the continuing gridlock over the archiepiscopal problem – mainly because of the 1937 Church laws – and the continuing exile of the 1931 politicians added to the entrenched mistrust between the Government and Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, London’s inflexibility in

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restoring some kind of constitutional life in the island would make these relations even more tense. Woolley’s remark to the Colonial Office was characteristic when he said that ‘His Majesty’s Government were engaged in a war against autocratic forms of government but at the same time were maintaining a completely undemocratic government in Cyprus…’.1 As a result, post war relations between the local Government and Greek Cypriots certainly started on the wrong foot with the search at the Trade Union premises and the decision to declare their leading organ, P.S.E., illegal. In late 1945 Woolley still impressed on his superiors in the Colonial Office the extent of A.K.E.L.’s influence and of its close relations with the communists of Greece and Palestine.2 Recent scholarship3 has highlighted how the bitter struggles over the future of Cyprus during the 1950s emerged from the inter-related deadlocks of 1947-8 between Left and Right, Greek Cypriots and British, and (in however nascent a form) between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This book, however, has shown how the increasingly constraining, and even ominous, themes of the later 1940s can be traced in the formative period of 1939-45.

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1 2

Introduction All primary sources are cited in the National Archives of the United Kingdom unless stated otherwise Cyprus Situation: Note of the Discussion at the Colonial Office, 21 November 1944, CO 67/323/3. Martin Shipway, Decolonization and its Impact: a Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), p.63.

Chapter One The first time was a brief conquest of the island by Richard the Lionheart in 1191 while he was traveling to the Holy Land to take part in the Third Crusade (11891192). 2 The Cyprus Convention (more formally known as the ‘Convention of Defensive Alliance’) was signed on the 4th of June 1878, the result of secret talks between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. According to the Convention, Britain agreed that if Russia kept Batum, Kars or Ardanah when peace was made, she would defend the Sultan’s Asiatic possessions against any future Russian attack. For the full text of the Cyprus Convention see The Times, 9 July 1878. 3 F. R. Bridge, Roger Bullen, The Great Powers and the European State System 18151914 (London: Longman, 1980), pp. 118-119. 4 The term ‘Eastern Question’ relates to the diplomatic problem that was posed from the decay of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent territorial settlement of its possessions. 5 Mathew S Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (London: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 208-209. 6 Dwight E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 36. 7 Ibid, p.73. 8 Robert Holland, Diana Markides, The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 164-165. 9 Lee, Cyprus Convention, pp. 68, 77-78. 10 Ibid, p. 72. 11 Ibid, p. 77. 12 Anderson, The Eastern Question, p. 209. 1

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13 In his letter dated 5th of May 1878 to Queen Victoria he wrote the following, emphasizing the importance of the ceding of Cyprus “…If Cyprus be conceded to your Majesty by the Porte, and England, at the same time, enters into a defensive alliance with Turkey, guaranteeing Asiatic Turkey from Russian invasion, the power of England in the Mediterranean will be absolutely increased in that region, and your Majesty’s Indian Empire immensely strengthened. Cyprus is the key of Western Asia. Such an arrangement would also greatly strengthen Turkey in Europe and altogether she would be a stronger barrier against Russia than she was before the war…” Cited in William Flavelle Monneypenny, George Earl Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1929), vol. 2, p. 1163. 14 Holland and Markides, The British and the Hellenes, p.164. 15 Anderson, The Eastern Question, p.209; Harold Temperley, “Disraeli and Cyprus”, English Historical Review, 182, (1931), p. 276. 16 Christopher Howard, Splendid Isolation (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 81-82. 17 Ibid, pp. 81-82. “Two years ago… any man would have been thought insane who would have proposed what which has been now done; and when the bill comes in for payment, and the English people understand what they bound themselves to, I am not at all sure that two years hence we may not find that public opinion on these questions is pretty much what it would have been two years ago”; John Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), p. 9. 18 The Times, 22 July 1878. 19 Anne Cavendish (ed) Cyprus 1878: The Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley (Nicosia: Cyprus Popular Bank Cultural Centre, 1991), p. 5. 20 Temperley, “Disraeli and Cyprus”, p. 279. 21 Filios Zannetos, Ιστορία της νήσου Κύπρου (History of the island of Cyprus), 3 vols, (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1997), vol. 3, pp. 42-45. See also The Times, 7 August 1878 for a description of the enthusiastic atmosphere of the crowd gathered in Larnaca to welcome Sir Garnet Wolseley. 22 Holland and Markides, The British and the Hellenes, pp. 165-166. 23 Andros Pavlides (ed.) Μεγάλη Κυπριακή Εγκυκλοπαίδεια (Great Cypriot Encyclopedia.), 15 vols., (Nicosia: Filokipros, 1984-1991), vol. 1, p. 53.; George F. Hill, A History of Cyprus, 4 vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), vol. 4, p. 297; Sofronios Michaelides, Ιστορία της κατά Κίτιον Εκκλησίας (History of the Church of Kitio) (Larnaca: Holy Metropolis of Kitio, 1992), p. 273. 24 Costas P. Kyrris, History of Cyprus (Nicosia: Nicocles, 1985), p. 302. 25 Ibid, p. 302. 26 For an account on the Archiepiscopal issue and its impact on the ecclesiastical and political life of the island see Achilleas Lympourides, Το Πολύκροτο Αρχιεπισκοπικό Ζήτημα της Κύπρου και η Δεκαετής Περιπετειώδης Πορεία του 1900-1910 (The sensational archiepiscopal question of Cyprus and its ten year adventurous course), (Nicosia: Fakos, 1997); Nicos Christodoulou, Το Αρχιεπισκοπικό Ζήτημα της Κύπρου κατά τα ΄Ετη 1900-1910 (The archiepiscopal question of Cyprus during the years 1900-1910), (Nicosia: Centre of Studies of the Holy Monastery of Kykkos, 1999). 27 For a study of Greek Cypriot contribution to the Balkan Wars see: Petros Papapolyviou, Η Κύπρος και οι Βαλκανικοί Πόλεμοι-Συμβολή στην Ιστορία του Κυπριακού Εθελοντισμού (Cyprus and the Balkan Wars - contribution to the History

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of the Cypriot volunteering movement), (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1997). 28 Paul W. Wallace, Andreas G. Orphanides (Eds.), Sources for the History of Cyprus, Enosis and the British: British Official Documents 1878-1950, 12 vols., (New York: Greece and Cyprus Research Centre, 2004), vol. 11, pp. 67-72. 29 Memorandum by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1941, PREM 3/113. 30 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, The Cyprus Question, 1878-1960: The Constitutional Aspect (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002), p. 33. 31 Holland and Markides, The British and the Hellenes, p. 183. 32 For a full account of the October events in Cyprus see G. S. Georghallides, Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: the Causes of 1931 Crisis (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985). For an account of newspapers extracts on how the British and Greek press saw the events see Lambeth Palace Library, A.J. Douglas Papers, vol. 48, pp. 78-103. 33 Under the term of ‘autocephalous’ we mean the autonomy of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus as it was recognized during the Third Ecumenical Synod which was held in Effesos in 431 A.D. and was ratified by Emperor Zeno in 488 A.D. Andros Pavlides (ed.) Μεγάλη Κυπριακή Εγκυκλοπαίδεια (Great Cypriot Encyclopedia) 15 vols., (Filokipros: Nicosia, 1984-1991), vol .3, p. 7. For further reading on the history of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus the reader may consult Benedict Englezakis, Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus, 4th-20th centuries (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995); John Hackett, A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus (New York: Burt Franklin, 1972). 34 Panayiotis K. Persianis, Church and State in Cyprus Education - the Contribution of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus to Cyprus Education During the British Administration (1878-1960) (Nicosia: Violaris, 1978), p. 7. 35 Andreas Tillyrides, Cyprus 1931-1947: “The Outcome of the Uprising and the Long Vacancy of the Archiepiscopal Throne”, Εκκλησία και Θεολογία (Church and Theology), vol. III (London: Thyateira House, 1982), p.446. 36 G. S. Georghallides, “Church and State in Cyprus: October 1931 to November 1931: “A Systematic Humiliation of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus?” ”, Epetiris Kentrou Epistimonikon Erevnon, 19 (1992), pp. 370-371. 37 Rolandos Katsiaounis, Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1996), pp. 166-169. 38 Ploutis Servas, Κυπριακό: Ευθύνες, (The Cyprus Issue: Responsibilities), 4vols., (Athens: Grammi, 1985), vol. 1., p. 115. Servas, who was one of the protagonists of the Communist movement in Cyprus and the first ever General Secretary of AKEL, identifies the names of Aimilios Hourmouzios, Leonidas Strigkos and Christodoulos Christodoulides as the first agitators of the movement. In addition, the History of P.E.O. (Pan Cyprian Labour Federation) states that the newspaper ‘Πυρσός’ (PirsosTorch) had as its aim the struggle for the workers and the working class to be organized in order for the foundation of a socialistic society to be achieved. However, by 1925 ‘Pirsos’ was replaced by ‘Νέος ΄Ανθρωπος’ (Neos Anthropos – New Man), the official newspaper of the Cyprus Communist Party. See Pagkipria Ergatiki Omospondia, Ιστορία Π.Σ.Ε-Π.Ε.Ο. 1941-1991, (History of P.S.E.- P.E.O. 1941-1991), (Nicosia:1991), p. 15.; Thomas Adams, A.K.E.L. the Communist Party of Cyprus (Stanford Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), pp. 11-13. 39 Rolandos Katsiaounis, “Society and Politics During British Rule in Cyprus”, in Cyprus: from Ottoman Province to European State: a Conference of the Cyprus

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II Research Centre, Nicosia, and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1993), p.12. Andreas Phantis places the first steps of Trade Unionism in Cyprus as early as 18981901 with the foundation of the ‘Cypriot Teaching Association’ and the ‘District Teaching Association’. He regards these as the unions that opened the way for further developments. However, he admits that the first efforts for a more organized form of Trade Unionism were made later on in the 1920s. Andreas Phantis, Το Κυπριακό Συνδικαλιστικό Κίνημα στα Χρόνια της Αγγλοκρατίας 18781960 (The Cypriot syndicalist movement during the English occupation (18781960), 2 vols., (Nicosia: Kyriakides, 2005), vol. 1, p 52. The newspaper ‘Νέος ΄Ανθρωπος ’ wrote in 1925 that the failure of those Trade Unions was based on the fact that the purpose of those that took over the responsibility for their creation was solely to obtain votes from the workers. As soon as this happened, the Trade Union would split. History of P.S.E.- P.E.O., p. 13. One of the exiles was the founder of the communist movement in the island Dr. Nicolas Yiavopoulos. The Party actually was in operation since 1922 under the name of Cyprus Labour Party. Its founder was P. Fasouliotis. He later drifted away from the party due to disagreements with other members regarding the party’s policy. In any case, the official year of its foundation is generally accepted as 1926. Costas Sophocleous, Πάλη για την Ελευθερία (Struggle for liberty), (Nicosia: 2003), pp. 84-85; Yiannis Lefkis, Οι Ρίζες (The Roots), (Limassol: 1984), pp. 69-82. Cyprus Government, Communism in Cyprus (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp.3-4. Many years later, the Political Bureau of A.K.E.L. pointed out that this option was a mistake: Contemporary Social History Archives, “Θέσεις πάνω στο Εθνικό Θέμα: Μία συζήτηση σύμφωνα με την απόφαση του Π.Γ.” (Points on the National Issue: A Discussion According to the Decision of the Political Bureau), 7 June 1951, Box 371, File 20/21/22. Servas, Ευθύνες (Responsibilities), pp. 117-118; Yiorghos Leventis, The Struggle for Self-determination in the 1940s, Prelude to Deeper Crisis (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002), pp. 61-62. Leventis, ibid, p. 62. Communism in Cyprus, p. 5. Ibid, p. 6. Leventis, The Struggle for Self-determination, p. 65. Annual Report for the social and economic progress of the people of Cyprus, 1939, p. 43, CO 67/308/3. Doros Alastos, Cyprus in History: a Survey of 5000 years (London: Zeno, 1955), pp.356-357. An outline of the Present Constitutional Conditions in Cyprus and the Position of the Cypriot British Subjects Thereunder, p. 131, July 1937, CO 67/279/6. Eleftheria (Ελευθερία - Freedom) “Διενηργήθη χθες εις αρχιεπισκοπήν αιφνιδιαστική έρευνα υπό της αστυνομίας” (The Police held yesterday a sudden search at the Archbishopric), 4 April 1939. J.B. Williams’s minute on 24 May 1939, CO 67/297/6; The day chosen for the search was also seen as most unfortunate by the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Anglican Church. See Lambeth Palace Library, Cosmo Lang Papers, vol. 28, Philip

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Usher to the Rev. A. C. Don, Lambeth Palace. 22 May 1939, pp. 309-313. 56 Daily Telegraph and the Morning Post “The truth about political grievances in Cyprus”, 28 December 1938. 57 See Eleftheria “Τέσσαρες επιστολαί Κυπρίων εις τον ‘Ημ. Τηλέγραφον’ Λονδίνου και εις τον ‘Μαγχεστ. Φύλακα” (Four letters of Cypriots to London’s ‘Daily Telegraph’ and the ‘Manchester Guardian’), 11 January 1939. 58 See for example Eleftheria “Πώς σχολιάζει ο ‘Ημερήσιος Τηλέγραφος’ τα περί Κύπρου άρθρα του Μέρτον” (‘Daily Telegraph’ comments on Merton’s articles), 5 January 1939 and “Τα άρθρα του κ. Μέρτον του ‘Ημ. Τηλέγραφου” (The articles of Mr. Merton in ‘Daily Telegraph’), 6 January 1939. 59 Eleftheria “Η Κύπρος εις τας στήλας των αγγλικών εφημερίδων: ο περί τύπου νόμος εν Κύπρω” (Cyprus in the columns of the British press: the press law in Cyprus), 17 January 1939. 60 Indicative of this stance is a dispatch that Governor Palmer sent to Sir Cosmo Parkinson in which he urged: “In this generation, Enosis, if given rope, must at no distant date lead to disorder as in 1931. Enosis is not (Palmer’s underlining) dead.”, CO 67/301/3, 12 January 1939. 61 See Eleftheria “Μια αίτησις προς την Α.Ε. τον Κυβερνήτην” (A petition to H.M. the Governor), 7 May 1939; For the petitions themselves see Cyprus’ State Archives: Secretariat Archives (SA): SA1/738/39/1. 62 Minute of 12 October 1939, CO 67/293/10. 63 The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st April to the 30th June, 1939, p.154, CO 67/299/2. 64 The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st April to the 30th June, 1939, pp. 70-72, CO 67/295/4. 65 Eleftheria “Ο Κυβερνήτης ηκύρωσε το διορισμό του κ. Τσαγγαρίδου ως δημοτικού συμβούλου” (The Governor cancelled the appointment of Mr. Tsangarides as a Municipal Councillor), 24 May 1939. 66 The news of the appointment of William Battershill as the new Governor of the island received wide publication in the Press. He was characterized as an able and sympathetic official character who during his previous service in the island was well acquainted with the problems of the people of Cyprus. Weekly Police Intelligence Report (n.6) p. 94, CO 67/295/4. 67 Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Cyprus, 5 July 1939, CO 67/300/2; George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: the Middle East 1945-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954). 68 The Times “British policy in Cyprus: New Governor arrives”, 11 August 1939. 69 Battershill to MacDonald, 1 September 1939, CO 67/293/10. 70 Rhodes House Library, Private Papers of Sir William Battershill, MSS Brit. Emp. S 467, Box 4, file 3, 11 August 1939 and 18 August 1939. 1 2

Chapter Two Panayiotis Papadimitris, Ιστορική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Κύπρου 1878-1978 (Historic Encyclopedia of Cyprus 1878-1978), 16 vols. (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1997), vol. 6, pp. 371-372; Eleftheria “Ευοίωνον διάγγελμαν” (Auspicious message), 6 August 1939. Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 120.

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II For British economy mobilization see John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: the Historical Debate, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 43-45. Telegram from Sir S. Waterlow, 17 January 1939, FO 371/23776, R 539/539/19. Clogg, Concise History of Greece, p. 120; John S. Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 113. M. Palairet to Viscount Halifax: Political Review of the Year 1939, 9 January 1940, FO 371/24914, R 441/441/19. Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st July to the 30th September, 1939, p. 112, CO 67/299/2. Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st July to the 30th September, 1939, p. 112, CO 67/299/2. Battershill to MacDonald, 25 September 1939; FO 371/23776, Battershill to MacDonald, 6 September 1939, CO 67/299/2. Eleftheria “Ιδρύθησαν τοπικά συμβούλια δια να συμβουλεύσουν την Κυβέρνησιν” (Local councils were founded to advise the Government), 24 September 1939. Eleftheria “Τοπική πείρα” (The local experience), 26 September 1939. Panayiotis Papadimitris, Ιστορική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια της Κύπρου 1878-1978 (Historic Encyclopedia of Cyprus 1878-1978) 16 vols. (Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1997), vol. 7, p.8. Eleftheria “Να αφήσωμεν Κυβέρνησιν και υπουργείον απερίσπαστα εν όσω εξακολουθεί η κρίσις” (We must leave the Government and the Ministry undistracted while the crisis continues), 30 August 1939. See for example some indicative articles: Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ (Neos Kipriakos Filax-New Cypriot Guardian) “΄Ολοι μας παρά το πλευρόν της Αυτοκρατορίας” (All of us by the side of the Empire), 2 September 1939; Πάφος (Pafos) “Η Κύπρος και η διεθνής κρίσις” (Cyprus and the international crisis), 7 September 1939; Φωνή της Κύπρου (Foni tis Kiprou-Voice of Cyprus) “Το καθήκον μας” (Our duty), 30 September 1939. Battershill to MacDonald, 11 September 1939, CO 67/299/2. Battershill to MacDonald, 25 September 1939, CO 67/299/2. Eleftheria “Η νομιμοφροσύνη των Κυπρίων και η εκτίμησις του βασιλέως” (The loyalty of Cypriots and the appreciation of the King), 21 September 1939. Eleftheria “Η χθεσινή ομιλία του Κυβερνήτου ενώπιον του Συμβουλευτικού Σώματος” (Governor’s speech to the Advisory Council which was addressed yesterday), 5 September 1939. See generally the articles of Tefkros Anthias in Eleftheria, 24 to 31 January 1940. There was a significant Cypriot element in the longstanding and influential Greek community in Alexandria. See also: Eleftheria “Οι Κύπριοι και ο Αγγλικός στρατός” (Cypriots and the British Army), 11 October 1939. Battershill to MacDonald, 30 November 1939, CO 67/299/2. The Times, “The Cypriots’ war record”, 15 April 1940. Eden to Waterlow, 6 December 1937, CO 67/273/10. G. Creasy to O.C. Harvey, 16 December 1937, CO 67/273/10. Battershill to MacDonald, 9 October 1939, CO 67/294/8; For Theodotou’s undertaking see Cyprus’s State Archives, T. Theodotou to the Under Secretary of State, 9 November 1939, SA1/1508/1939. Foni tis Kiprou “Ευχάριστος εκ Λονδίνου πληροφορία περί την εις την πατρίδα επανόδου του κ. Θεοφάνη Θεοδότου” (Pleasant news from London concerning the return of Mr. Theofanis Theodotou), 9 December 1939.

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27 Eleftheria “Η επάνοδος εις Κύπρον του πολιτικού εξόριστου κ. Θ. Θεοδότου” (The return to Cyprus of the political deportee Mr. T. Theodotou), 1 January 1940; Battershill to MacDonald, 11 January 1940, CO 67/308/9. 28 Battershill to MacDonald, 29 December 1939, CO 67/308/9. 29 Ανεξάρτητος (Anexartitos-Independent) “Αιτήσεις προς τον Κυβερνήτην δια την λύσιν του αρχιεπισκοπικού και την επάνοδον του Μητροπολίτου Κυρηνείας” (Petitions sent to the Governor for the solution of the archiepiscopal issue and the return of the Bishop of Kyrenia), 10 November 1939; Foni tis Kiprou “Νέα έκκλησις προς την Α.Ε. τον Κυβερνήτην υπέρ της επανόδου των εξορίστων”(New appeal to H.E. the Governor in favour of the return of the deportees), 18 October 1939; Pafos “Η επάνοδος των εξορίστων” (The return of the deportees), 16 November 1939, “Η επάνοδος των πολιτικών εξορίστων ας αποτελέσει το πρώτο δείγμα της νέας πολιτικής έναντι της Κύπρου”(Let the return of the political deportees be the first sign for a new policy in Cyprus), 2 May 1940. 30 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, G.S. Vassiliades to the Colonial Secretary, 21 July 1939, Book IE (15), p. 147. 31 Eleftheria “Η απάντησις της Κυβερνήσεως εις την εισήγησιν όπως παραστή ο Τοποτηρητής εις την ορκωμοσίαν” (Government’s answer to the suggestion that the Locum Tenens should attend the oath-taking), 8 August 1939. 32 Eleftheria “Τηλεγράφημα του τοποτηρητή προς την Α.Ε. τον νέον Κυβερνήτην” (Telegram of the Locum Tenens to H.E. the new Governor), 11 August 1939. 33 Battershill to MacDonald, 18 August 1939, CO 67/304/12. 34 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Ιωάννης Κληρίδης προς Τοποτηρητήν Λεόντιον (Ioannis Klerides to Locum Tenens Leontios), 17 July 1939, Book IE (15), p. 146. 35 Costley-White minute, 30 September 1939, CO 67/304/12. 36 Battershill to MacDonald, 6 October 1939, CO 67/299/2. 37 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Ιωάννης Κληρίδης προς Χριστόδουλο Γαλατόπουλο (Ioannis Klerides to Christodoulos Galatopoulos), 5 December 1939, Book ΙΕ (15), p.164. 38 Battershill wrote to his mother that this sum was “amazing for such a small and poor country such as this. I did not believe it to be possible”. Rhodes House Library, Private Papers of Sir W. Battershill, MSS Brit Emp. S46, Box 4, file 3, Battershill to his mother, 15 November 1939. 39 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 December 1939, CO 323/1671/5. 40 Appeal on behalf of the Greek Red Cross, 1 March 1940, CO 323/1808/49. 41 Battershill to MacDonald, 24 January 1940, CO 67/308/9. 42 Battershill to MacDonald, 15 December 1939, CO 67/299/2. 43 Battershill to MacDonald, 2 November 1939, CO 67/299/2. 44 Battershill to MacDonald, 29 December 1939, CO 67/308/9. 45 Official minute, 15 January 1940, CO 67/304/12. 46 Anexartitos “Δια να επιτευχθή η λύσις του αρχιεπισκοπικού” (For the solution of the archiepiscopal issue), “Γύρω από το αρχιεπισκοπικό” (Regarding the archiepiscopal issue), 1 December 1939; Eleftheria “Τι επιστέλλει ένας φίλος του Σεβ. Μητροπολίτου Πάφου δια το αρχιεπισκοπικό ζήτημα και την υποψηφιότητά του” (What does a friend of his Reverence the Bishop of Paphos delivers for the archiepiscopal issue and his candidature), 30 November 1939.

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II Battershill to MacDonald, 11 January 1940, CO 67/308/9. Battershill to MacDonald, 15 March 1940, FO 371/24912, R 5567. Battershill to Lord Lloyd, 8 July 1940, CO 67/308/10. Anexartitos “Η κάθοδος εις Κύπρον Ελλήνων αθλητών” (The descent of Greek athletes in Cyprus), 29 March 1940. Eleftheria “Εματαιώθη η κάθοδος εις Κύπρον αθλητών εξ Ελλάδος και Αιγύπτου” (The arrival of the Greek and Egyptian athletes to Cyprus has been cancelled), 24 April 1940. Anexartitos “Οι ΚΘ’ Παγκύπριοι αγώνες” (The 29th Pan-Cyprian Games), 1 May 1940. Battershill to Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 27 May 1940, CO 67/306/6. Locum Tenens of the Archiepiscopal Throne of Cyprus to the Governor of Cyprus, 24 May 1940, CO 67/309/15. Battershill to Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 27 May 1940, CO 67/307/9. Anexartitos “Υπόμνημα της επιτροπής ανέργων προς τον Σεβ. Τοποτηρητήν” (Memorandum of the committee of unemployed towards His Reverence the Locum Tenens), 4 September 1939. Anexartitos “Η χθεσινή συνέντευξις της επιτροπείας των συντεχνιών μετά της Α.Σ. του Τοποτηρητού του αρχιεπισκοπικού θρόνου” (Yesterday’s interview of the deputation of the Trade Unions with H.R. the Locum Tenens), 14 September 1940. Anexartitos “Απάντησις του Δημάρχου Λευκωσίας εις το υπόμνημα της Συντεχνίας των Κτιστών” (The answer of the Nicosia Mayor to the memorandum of the Builders’ Union), 12 April 1940; Eleftheria “Τι εδήλωσεν ο Δήμαρχος Λευκωσίας εις επισκεφθέντας αυτόν 200 ανέργους” (The statement of the Mayor of Nicosia towards the 200 unemployed persons who visited him), 7 April 1940. Eleftheria “Τα εκτός πολιτικής ζητήματα” (Issues beyond the sphere of politics), 3 January 1940. Anexartitos “Ο λαός να αναδεικνύει τους δημοτικούς, κοινοτικούς και εκπαιδευτικούς του άρχοντας” (People should choose their municipal, communal and educational masters), 17 December 1939. R. W. Barlow minute, 24 February 1940, CO 67/306/15. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 February 1940, CO 67/306/15. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, vol.356, 16 January 1940, column 43. Eleftheria “Μια δίκαια αναγνώρισις” (A just recognition) 16 January 1940, “Η Κύπρος ανευφημήθη χθες εις την Βουλήν των Κοινοτήτων κατόπιν μνείας του κ. Τσάμπερλαιν” (Cyprus was applauded yesterday in the Parliament after a reference made by Mr. Chamberlain), 17 January 1940. A. Acheson ‘The situation in Cyprus’, 7 March 1940, CO 67/308/9. Modern Records Centre, Memorandum on Cyprus for the Attention of the T.U.C. of Great Britain, 15 April 1940, T.U.C. file ref. MSS.292/949.61/1; Memorandum on Cyprus, 15 April 1940, CO 67/309/8. The Times, “The Cypriots’ war record”, 15 April 1940. Eleftheria “Η νομιμοφροσύνη της Σιντερέλλας” (The loyalty of Cinderella), 27 April 1940. Aristodemos Avraamides, “A Brief History of Labour Relations in Cyprus”, in John Slocum, The Development of Labour Relations in Cyprus (Nicosia: Public

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Information Office, 1972), p. 10. 70 For colonial considerations on the post of the Labour Advisor see generally CO 67/303/5. 71 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Γιατί απηγορεύθη η διάσκεψη των εργατών” (Why was the workers’ conference prohibited), 2 August 1939. 72 Official Minute, p.40, CO 67/308/11. 73 Extract from the Annual Report from the Commissioner of Nicosia, 30 March 1940, CO 67/308/9. 74 Official Minute, p.39, CO 67/308/11. 75 Battershill to MacDonald, 25 September 1939, CO 67/299/2. 76 Battershill to MacDonald, 8 February 1940, CO 67/308/9. 77 Battershill to MacDonald, 8 February 1940, CO 67/308/9. 78 Battershill to MacDonald, 22 February 1940, CO 67/308/9. 79 Battershill to MacDonald, 8 March 1940, CO 67/308/9; Anexartitos “Συγκέντρωσις εργατών των ανακουφιστικών έργων προ του δικαστηρίου” (Relief works workers’ gathering in front of the court), 29 February 1940. 80 Telegram of Trade Unions Nicosia to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 February 1940; Telegram of Trade Unions Limassol to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 March 1940; Telegram from the Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 March 1940, CO 67/308/11; Anexartitos “Τηλεγραφήματα των συντεχνιών Λευκωσίας προς τον Υπουργόν των Αποικιών, την Α.Ε. τον Κυβερνήτην, και αγγλικάς εφημερίδας” (Telegrams of the Nicosia Unions towards the Secretary of State for the Colonies, H.E. the Governor and British newspapers), 1 March 1940. 81 Battershill to MacDonald, 13 March 1940, CO 67/308/11. 82 Telegram of Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 March 1940, CO 67/308/11. 83 Battershill to MacDonald, 8 March 1940, CO 67/308/9. 84 Battershill to MacDonald, 14 November 1939, CO 67/299/2. 85 Battershill to MacDonald, 18 June 1940, CO 67/308/9. 86 Battershill to MacDonald, 17 May 1940 CO 67/308/9. 87 Anexartitos, “ Κατ’ οίκων έρευναι εν Λεμεσώ” (House searchings in Limassol), 9 March 1940. 88 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Καταδίκη δια κατοχήν στασιαστικού εγγράφου” (Conviction for holding seditious paper), 28 March 1940. 89 Battershill to MacDonald, 5 April 1940, CO 67/308/9. 90 Anexartitos “Η χθεσινή δίκη των ανέργων Λευκωσίας” (Yesterday’s trial of Nicosia’s unemployed persons), 18 April 1940. 91 The Ethnic Community Oral History Project, Ξένοι: Ελληνοκύπριοι στο Λονδίνο (Foreigners: Greek Cypriots in London), (London:1990), p. 2. 92 Ezekias Papaioannou, Ενθυμήσεις από τη Ζωή μου (Remembrances from my life), (Nicosia: Pirsos: 1988), pp.33-35. For a history of the Cypriot community of London see also Ierotheos Kykkotis, Εξ Ανατολών: Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Παροικίας της Μ. Βρετανίας (From the East: history of the Cypriot community in Great Britain), (London: 1968). 93 Doros Alastos, Cyprus: Past and …Future (London: Committee for Cyprus Affairs, 1944), p. 60 94 Cyprus Autonomy, 27 December 1939, CO 67/307/1.

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II Regarding Nicolaides’s application to return to Cyprus see generally CO 67/304/11. Memorandum on Cyprus, 17 March 1940, CO 67/308/11. Battershill to MacDonald, 19 January 1940, CO 67/307/1. T. S. Bell to R. W. Barlow, 13 February 1940, CO 67/307/1. T. S. Bell to R. Burns, 19 January 1940, CO 67/307/2. Cyprus News, April 1940, CO 67/307/1. “Η Κύπρος και ο πόλεμος” (Cyprus and the war), May 1940, pp. 74-92, CO 67/306/17. The ‘Case for Cyprus’ publication also indicated the Committee’s concern for Cypriot affairs: Doros Alastos, The Case for Cyprus (London: Committee for Cyprus Autonomy, without date). John S. Koliopoulos, Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 132; I.C.B. Dear (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 399. Koliopoulos, Greece and British Connection, p.138. Cypher: M. Palairet, 3 September 1940 and 1 October 1940, FO 371/24910, R 6914/118/19. For the Italian ultimatum see Royal Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Greek White Book: Diplomatic Documents relating to Italy’s Aggression Against Greece (London: Hitchinson & Co., 1942), p.117. Panayiotis Vatikiotis, Popular Autocracy in Greece 1936-1941: A Political Biography of General Ioannis Metaxas (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 177; Christos Christides, Ιωάννης Μεταξάς: το Προσωπικό του Ημερολόγιο (Ioannis Metaxas: His personal diary), vols. 8, (Athens: Govosti, 1993) vol. 8, pp. 746-747. Chapter Three Philip Nichols to Major General R. H. Dewing, 15 August 1940, FO 371/24912, R 7046/G. Anexartitos “Οι νέοι κανονισμοί αμύνης” (New defence regulations), 5 June 1940; Eleftheria “Εδημοσιεύθησαν χθες οι νέοι κανονισμοί” (The new defence regulations were published yesterday), 4 June 1940. Anexartitos “Συγκροτείται Κυπριακή Εθελοντική Δύναμις δι’ υπηρεσίαν εν Κύπρω” (Formation of Cyprus Volunteer Force for service in Cyprus), 15 June 1940. Anexartitos “Ο Ελληνικός λαός έτοιμος δια πάσην θυσίαν” (The Greek people ready for every sacrifice needed), 20 August 1940, Eleftheria “Η καταβύθισις της ΄Ελλης” (Elli’s sinking), 17 August 1940; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο τορπιλλισμός της ΄Ελλης” (Elli’s torpedoing), 17 August 1940. Cypher telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 6 September 1940, CO 67/308/10. Eleftheria “Η Κύπρος εδέχθη χθες την πρώτην αεροπορικήν επίθεσιν υπό βομβαρδιστικών αεροπλάνων” (Cyprus experienced yesterday her first air attack by bombers), 23 September 1940. Cypher telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 30 October 1940, CO 926/1/10; Eleftheria “Πώς ήκουσεν ο κυπριακός λαός την είδησιν περί κηρύξεως του πολέμου εναντίον της Ελλάδος (How did Cypriots react to the news of war declaration against Greece), 29 October 1940. Cypher telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 1 November 1940, CO 67/308/10. Eleftheria “Ο Θεός βοηθός” (With the help of God), 29 October 1940; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Κυπριακός λαός έτοιμος να συμμετάσχη εις τον αγώναν υπέρ της Ελληνικής ανεξαρτησίας” (Cypriots are ready to contribute to the struggle for Greek

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independence), 29 October 1940; Pafos “Νυν υπέρ πάντων αγών” (Now, the struggle comes above all), 7 November 1940. Eleftheria, “Στιγμαί προς συνεννόησιν” (Moments for agreement), 30 November 1940; see also a relevant article from Neos Kipriakos Filax “Αυθόρμηται εκδηλώσεις της κυπριακής ψυχής” (Spontaneous expressions of the Cypriot soul), 30 October 1940. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Από της πρωίας της χθες οι οφθαλμοί μας ατενίζουν ελευθέρως την κυανόλευκον” (Since yesterday morning our eyes may freely gaze at the Greek flag), 30 October 1940. The Athenian press commented that the contribution of Cypriots to the Greek war effort constituted an example for Hellenism as a whole: Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Αθηναϊκός τύπος δια τας εθνικάς εκδηλώσεις της Κύπρου” (The Athenian press for the national expressions of Cyprus), 30 December 1940. Political situation in Cyprus, April 1941, p. 58, CO 67/314/10. Rhodes House Library, Private Papers of Sir W. Battershill, MSS Brit. Emp. s467 Box.4, file III, Battershill to Mrs. Battershill, 18 November 1940. George Kelling, Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus 1939-1955 (New York: Greenwood, 1990), p.24. Cypher telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 30 October 1940, CO 67/308/10. Governor Battershill to Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 31 August 1940 CO 967/54 A. These words were first used by Sir Ronald Storrs (Governor of Cyprus 1926-1932). Storrs wrote, ‘No sensible person will deny that the Cypriot is Greek-speaking, Greek-thinking, Greek-feeling, Greek, just as much as the French Canadian is French-speaking, French-thinking, French-feeling and French.’ Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: I. Nicholson & Watson, 1937), p. 550. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ανεστάλη επισήμως ο νόμος περί των σημαιών” (Official suspension of the flag law), 13 February 1941. Anexartitos “Παγκόσμιος θαυμασμός δια τον ηρωισμόν του ελληνικού στρατού” (Global admiration for the heroism of the Hellenic army), 31 October 1940. Governor of Cyprus to Lord Moyne, 8 March 1941, CO 67/314/10. Anexartitos “Ο Ιωάννης Μεταξάς εκηδεύθη χθες εν μέσω εκδηλώσεων βαθέος πένθους - Επιμνημόσυνοι δεήσεις σε όλες τις κυπριακές πόλεις” (Ioannis Metaxas was buried in an atmosphere of heavy mourning - memorial services in all Cypriot towns), 1 February 1941; Eleftheria “Το πένθος εν Λευκωσία εκ του θανάτου του Μεταξά” (Nicosia’s mourning of Metaxas’s death) 30 January 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Κλίνομεν ευλαβώς το γόνυ προ της σεπτής σορού του μεγάλου ανδρός” (We kneel with devoutness in front of the venerable body of the great man) 30 January 1941; Pafos “Ο θάνατος του Μεταξά” (Metaxas’s death), 30 January 1941. Reynolds News “A 2000 year old war we must finish”, 12 January 1941. Mackenzie was a Scottish novelist and co-founder of the Scottish National Party. He wrote a total of 113 published titles including essays, criticism, history, biography, travel writing and even books for children. Philip Nichols to Sir Michael Palairet, 16 January 1941, FO 371/29856, R 466/466/19. Neos Kipriakos Filax “΄Αγγλος αρθρογράφος συνιστών την δημιουργίαν ισχυράς Ελλάδος. Εισηγείται να δηλωθή ότι θα εκχωρηθούν εις την Ελλάδα η Κύπρος και η Δωδεκάνησος” (British columnist recommends the creation of a Greater Greece. He suggests to be declared that Cyprus and the Dodecanese will be ceded to Greece), 5 February 1941.

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25 Battershill’s Memorandum on Greater Greece, 24 March 1941, CO 67/315/19; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Κύπρος και Δωδεκάνησος - η νέα Μεγάλη Ελλάς” (Cyprus and the Dodecanese - the new Greater Greece), 26 February 1941. 26 Eleftheria “Ο χθεσινός κατ’ άπασαν Κύπρον εορτασμός” (Yesterday’s celebrations throughout Cyprus), 26 March 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο χθεσινός μεγαλειώδης εορτασμός της εθνικής παλιγγενεσίας εις ολόκληρον την Κύπρον” (Yesterday’s grand celebrations for the national regeneration throughout Cyprus), 26 March 1941. 27 Acting Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Report for March, 15 September 1941, CO 67/314/10. 28 Reuter telegram, 2 November 1940, CO 67/308/10; Anexartitos “Ομιλία της Α. Εξοχότητος εις το ΕΒΚΑΦ” (His Excellency speech at EVKAF), 2 November 1940. 29 Battershill to Lord Lloyd, 8 March 1941, CO 67/314/10. 30 Battershill to Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 25 January 1941, CO 67/314/10. 31 Eleftheria “Η συμπάθεια των Τούρκων της Κύπρου προς την Ελλάδα” (The feelings of sympathy of Turkish Cypriots towards Greece), 11 December 1940; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Συγχαρητήρια Τουρκικής κοινότητας Λευκωσίας προς την Ελλάδα” (Congratulations of the Turkish community of Nicosia to Greece), 11 December 1940. 32 Eleftheria “Και οι Τούρκοι υπέρ του ελληνικού αγώνος” (The Turks, too, are in favour of the Greek cause) 7 November 1940, “Εισφορά τουρκικού χωριού υπέρ του Ελληνικού αγώνος” (Contribution of a Turkish village to the Greek struggle), 21 December 1940; Pafos “Η Τουρκική κοινότης μετέχει του ελληνικού αγώνος” (The Turkish community contributes to the Greek struggle), 14 November 1940. 33 Anexartitos “Οι κ.κ. ΄Ηντεν και Σαράτζογλου συναντήθησαν εις Κύπρον” (Messrs Eden and Saracoglou met in Cyprus), 20 March 1941; Eleftheria “Ο κ. ΄Ηντεν και ο κ. Σαράτζογλου συνηντήθησαν εν Λευκωσία και διεσκέφθησαν επί της διεθνούς καταστάσεως. Πλήρης ταυτότης αντιλήψεων μεταξύ Βρετανικής και Τουρκικής Κυβερνήσεως” (Mr. Eden and Mr. Saracoglou met in Nicosia and discussed the international situation. Complete agreement of opinions between the British and the Turkish Government), 20 March 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η ιστορική συνάντησις εν Κύπρω των υπ. Εξωτερικών Αγγλίας και Τουρκίας κ.κ. ΄Ηντεν και Σαράτζογλου” (The historic meeting in Cyprus of the Foreign Ministers of Britain and Turkey, Messrs Eden and Saracoglou), 20 March 1941; Foni tis Kiprou “Επίσημοι επισκέπται της Κύπρου” ( The official visitors of Cyprus), 22 March 1941. 34 Acting Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Report for March, 15 September 1941, CO 67/314/10. 35 For a study on both Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalism see Rebecca Bryant, Imagining the Modern: the Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004). Also significant are the works of: Michael Attalides, Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2003), Paschalis Kitromilides, “From coexistence to confrontation: the dynamics of ethnic conflict in Cyprus” in Michael Attalides (ed.) Cyprus Reviewed: the Results of a Seminar on the Cyprus Problem held in June 3-6 1976. (Nicosia: the Jus Cypri Association, 1977), Peter Loizos, “The progress of Greek nationalism in Cyprus 1878-1970” in John Davis (ed.) Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Mair (London: the Athlone Press, 1974). For the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism see James McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919-1939: the Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey and Turkish Cypriot Community. (New York: Garland, 1987).

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36 Cypher telegram from the Governor of Cyprus, 30 October 1940, CO 67/308/10. 37 Theofanis Tsangarides, Το Ημερολόγιο ενός Εξόριστου (Diary of an Exiled), (Athens: 1948), pp. 75-6. 38 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Τοποτηρητής του Αρχιεπισκοπικού Θρόνου Κύπρου προς τον Πρόξενον της Ελλάδος εν Κύπρω, (The Locum Tenens of the Archiepiscopal Throne of Cyprus to the Consul of Greece in Cyprus), 29 August 1940, Book IH (18), p. 46. 39 Eleftheria “Η Αρχιεπισκοπή μελετά το ζήτημα της κατατάξεως εθελοντών εις τον ελληνικόν στρατόν” (The Archbishopric examines the issue of volunteers in the Greek army), 1 November 1940; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Τοποτηρητής και Κυβερνήτης αντήλλαξαν επίσκεψιν - η Εκκλησία δια την κατάταξιν εθελοντών” (The Locum Tenens and the Governor exchanged visits - the Church on the classification of the volunteers), 1 November 1940. 40 Neos Kipriakos Filax, “Η Εκκλησία και οι Κύπριοι εθελονταί εις τον ελληνικόν στρατόν” (The Church and the Cypriot volunteers in the Greek army), 8 November 1940. 41 Battershill to Lord Lloyd, 7 January 1941, CO 67/314/10. 42 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Τοποτηρητής του Αρχιεπισκοπικού Θρόνου Κύπρου προς την Αυτού Εξοχότητα τον Κυβερνήτην της Κύπρου (The Locum Tenens of the Archiepiscopal See of Cyprus to His Excellency the Governor of Cyprus), 10 December 1940, Book ΙΗ (18), p. 51. 43 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Colonial Secretary to the Locum Tenens of the Archiepiscopal See, 16 December 1940, Book ΙΗ (18), p. 57. 44 Telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 11 December 1940, FO 371/24912, R 8974/150/19. 45 Anexartitos “Εκκλησία της Κύπρου - γνωστοποίηση” (Church of Cyprus - announcement), 20 December 1940; Eleftheria “Απεφασίσθη η εγγραφή Κυπρίων εθελοντών δια τον ελληνικόν στρατόν” (The enrollment of Cypriot volunteers in the Greek army has been decided), 12 December 1940; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η Αρχιεπισκοπή δέχεται εγγραφάς των εθελοντών” (The Archbishopric invites registrations of volunteers), 12 December 1940. 46 Eleftheria “Αθρόα η εγγραφή των εθελοντών” (Enrolment of volunteers in great numbers), 17 December 1940. 47 Cypher Telegram to Sir Michael Palairet, 17 December 1940, CO 67/308/10. 48 Cypher Sir Michael Palairet, 19 December 1940, CO 67/308/10. 49 Cypher: Sir Michael Palairet, 3 January 1941, CO 67/308/10. 50 Cypher telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 9 January 1941, CO 67/308/10. 51 George Lloyd (1879-1941) was a member of the Conservative party strongly associated with its ‘hard-core’ right wing. He had served as a High Commissioner in Egypt in the 1920s but was forced by the Secretary of State Arthur Henderson to resign. In the 1930s, alongside Winston Churchill, he stood against the National Government and was one of the most prominent opponents of the granting of Indian home rule. When Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940, he appointed Lloyd as the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, but Lord Lloyd died a few months later. See generally John Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline of the British Empire (Weidenfeld and Nicholson: London, 1987). 52 Secretary of State for the Colonies note, 13 January 1941, p. 20, CO 67/308/10. 53 Cypher telegram from Foreign Office to Sir Michael Palairet, 19 January 1941,

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CO 67/314/10. 54 Cypher telegram, Sir Michael Palairet, 14 February 1941, CO 67/314/10. 55 Cypher Telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 1 March 1941, FO 371/29846, R 1863/198/19. 56 Cypher telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 30 October 1940, CO 67/308/10; Anexartitos “Ενθουσιώδεις εκδηλώσεις του Κυπριακού λαού υπέρ του αγώνος της Ελλάδος και των συμμάχων αυτής” (Enthusiastic manifestations of Cypriot people for the cause of Greece and her Allies), 30 October 1940; Eleftheria “Ο Τοποτηρητής εν Λάρνακι - Ενθουσιώδεις Ελληνο-Τουρκικαί εκδηλώσεις” (The Locum Tenens in Larnaca - Enthusiastic Greco-Turkish demonstrations), 30 October 1940. 57 Cypher telegram from Governor of Cyprus, 1 November 1940, CO 67/308/10. 58 Pafos “Ο χθεσινός παλλαϊκός εθνικός συναγερμός” (Yesterday’s universal national rally), 31 October 1940. 59 Anexartitos “Συνέντευξις της Α.Σ. του Τοποτηρητού μετά του Διοικητού Λευκωσίας και του Υπασπιστού του Κυβερνήτου” (Interview of H.R. the Locum Tenens with the Commissioner of Nicosia and the Governor’s Aid-de-Camp), 1 November 1940; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Τοποτηρητής και Κυβερνήτης αντήλλαξαν επίσκεψιν” (The Locum Tenens and the Governor exchanged visits), 1 November 1940. 60 Battershill to Lord Lloyd, 26 November 1940, CO 67/314/10. 61 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η Α.Σ. ο Τοποτηρητής επεσκέφθη χθες τον Κυβερνήτην” (His Reverence the Locum Tenens visited the Governor yesterday), 15 November 1940. 62 Anexartitos “Εγκύκλιος του Τοποτηρητού δια δεήσεις υπέρ του Ελληνικού αγώνος” (Circular of the Locum Tenens for services for the Greek cause), 2 November 1940; Eleftheria “Εγκύκλιος του Τοποτηρητού περί δεήσεων υπέρ του αγώνος” (Circular of the Locum Tenens for services for the struggle), 2 November 1940. 63 Battershill to Lord Lloyd, 7 January 1941, CO 67/314/10. This minor but telling incident had an echo in an earlier passage in Anglo-Hellenic relations. In 1863, in Corfu, just as the Union of the Ionians with the rest of the mainland approached, the Lord High Commissioner Sir Henry Storks preferred to send in his place, to the service conducted by the Archbishop of the island, two of his key lieutenants so as to avoid his own dignity being compromised by an occasion bound to be triggered by Enosis enthusiasm. As always, Anglo-Hellenism had a tendency to repetition. See Holland and Markides, The British and the Hellenes, p.69. 64 Απόστολος Βαρνάβας (Apostle Barnabas), 14, (Nicosia: December 1940), pp. 418419; Anexartitos “ Η Α.Σ. ο Τοποτηρητής καλεί τας εκκλησίας δι’ εισφοράς υπέρ του ελληνικού αγώνος” (H.R. the Locum Tenens calls the churches to donate in favour of the Greek cause), 12 December 1940. 65 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Κυρηνείας Μακάριος, Νικόλαος Λανίτης, Θεοφάνης Τσαγκαρίδης, Θεόδωρος Κολοκασίδης, Σάββας Λοϊζίδης προς τον Πάφου Λεόντιον Τοποτηρητήν (Makarios of Kyrenia, Nicolaos Lanitis, Theofanis Tsangarides, Theodoros Colokassides, Savvas Loizides to the Bishop of Pafos, the Locum Tenens Leontios), Book IH’ (18), 30 November 1940, p. 48a. 66 Battershill to Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 26 November 1940, CO 67/314/10. 67 Battershill to Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 25 January 1941, CO 67/314/10. 68 See CO 67/313/11, especially the official minutes. 69 Battershill to Lord Moyne, 26 March 1941, CO 67/313/10. 70 Acheson minute, 29 April 1941, CO 67/313/10. The phrase employed here was

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highly resonant in British history, since it was the same injunction by King Henry II which led so controversially to the assassination of Archbishop Becket in 1170. A.B. Acheson to the Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 21 February, CO 67/313/8. The Phanar was the headquarters of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church. Foreign Office to Colonial Office, 5 March 1941, CO 67/313/8. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ουδεμία είδησις ελήφθη περί του Μητροπολίτου Κηρηνείας” (No news was received from the Bishop of Kyrenia), 18 May 1941. Eleftheria “Μία ανεξήγητος απόφασις του Τοποτηρητού” (An inexplicable decision of the Locum Tenens), 24 May 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Λαϊκή Συμβουλευτική Επιτροπή της Εκκλησίας της Κύπρου” (Popular Advisor Committee of the Church of Cyprus), 22 May 1941; See also Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book ΙΕ (15) pp. 186-192 for the members constituting this body. Eleftheria “Αντικανονική και αδικαιολόγητος η υπό μόνο του Τοποτηρητού διοίκησις της Κυπριακής Εκκλησίας” (Anti-canonical and inexcusable administrative leadership of the Church of Cyprus by the Locum Tenens), 29 May 1941; Pafos “Η δημιουργηθείσα εν Κύπρω νέα εκκλησιαστική κατάστασις” (The new ecclesiastical situation in Cyprus), 22 May 1941; “Απόλυτον σεβασμόν προς τις τάξεις του καταστατικού” (Total respect towards the statutes {of the Orthodox Church}), 29 May 1941. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Τοποτηρητής ας κυβερνήσει την Εκκλησίαν” (Let the Locum Tenens administer the Church), 20 May 1941. Battershill to Shuckburgh, 28 November 1940, CO 67/314/10. Anexartitos “Επιτροπή εράνων υπέρ του Ελληνικού αγώνος” (Collection committee for the Greek cause), 6 November 1940; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Καταρτίσθη η μεγάλη επιτροπή εράνων εν Λευκωσία” (The establishment of the collection committee in Nicosia), 6 November 1940. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ανακοινωθέν των συντεχνιών Κύπρου επί της εισβολής εις Ελλάδα” (Announcement of Cyprus’s Trade Unions concerning the invasion on Greece), 8 November 1940. Anexartitos “Αι συντεχνίαι Λευκωσίας καταδικάζουν την Ιταλικήν φασιστικήν επίθεσιν κατά της Ελλάδος” (The Nicosia Trade Unions condemn the Italian fascist invasion against Greece), 6 November 1940; Eleftheria “Αι συντεχνίαι καταδικάζουν την επίθεσιν” (The Trade Unions condemn the attack), 6 November 1940. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Οι ιδιωτικοί υπάλληλοι και η συντεχνία των” (The private employees and their Union), 9 November 1940. Anexartitos “Ανακοινωθέν του συνδέσμου Ιδιωτικών Υπαλλήλων Λευκωσίας” (Announcement of the Nicosia Private Employees Union), 15 November 1940. A shilling was equivalent to the 1/20 of a pound. Eleftheria “Αι συντεχνίαι Λεμεσού και ο εθνικός Ελληνικός αγών” (Limassol Trade Unions and the national Greek cause), 14 November 1940. Anexartitos “Αι συντεχνίαι Λάρνακος δια την Ιταλικήν επιδρομήν κατά της Ελλάδος” (The Larnaca Trade Unions comment on the Italian invasion against Greece), 7 November 1940. Neos Kipriakos Filax “΄Εκκληση προς τους εργάτες” (A plea towards the workers), 14 November 1940. Anexartitos “Αι συντεχνίαι Λεμεσού δια την φασιστικήν επίθεσιν κατά της Ελλάδος”

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II (The Limassol Unions comment on the fascist attack against Greece), 8 November 1940. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Αι συντεχνίαι Λευκωσίας και ο εθνικός αγών” (Nicosia’s Unions and the national struggle), 14 December 1940. Anexartitos “Περίεργος πατριωτισμός” (Obscure patriotism), 1 December 1940, “Διατί εναυάγησεν η παράστασις των Συντεχνιών Λάρνακος υπέρ των θυμάτων των ελληνικών πόλεων” (Why was the Larnaca Unions’ theatrical show in favour of the victims of the Greek cities dashed), 8 December 1940. Anexartitos “Ποιοι είναι οι πραγματικοί πατριώται;” (Who are the true patriots?), 29 November 1940. Anexartitos “Κάτω ο φασισμός” (Down with fascism), 12 December 1940, “Πατριωτισμός και…πατριωτισμός” (Different kinds of patriotism), 15 December 1940. Anexartitos “Αποδοκιμάζεται η στάσις έναντι των συντεχνιών” (Criticism on the attitude against the Trade Unions), 12 January 1941. Anexartitos “Διαμαρτυρία συντεχνιών δια τις συλλήψεις εργατών” (Trade Unions’ protest for the arrest of workers), 9 November 1940, “Διαμαρτυρία συντεχνιών Λεμεσού δια την καταδίκην ανέργων Βαρωσίων” (Protest of the Limassol Trade Unions for the conviction of the Famagusta unemployed persons), 10 November 1940. Anexartitos “Αι λεπτομέρειαι της συγκεντώσεως και της δίκης των ανέργων εργατών Λάρνακος” 26 April 1941 (Details of the gathering and trial of the Larnaca unemployed workers); Eleftheria “166 εργάται προ του Δικαστηρίου Λάρνακος επί παράνομω συγκεντρώσει”, (166 workers appeared at the Larnaca court for their illegal gathering), 25 April 1941. Anexartitos “Απήργησαν χθες 300 εργάται εξ εργασιών του τμήματος Δημοσίων ΄Εργων” (300 workers of the Public Works Department went yesterday on strike), 18 May 1941, “Ελύθη η απεργία των εργατών του τμήματος Δημοσίων ΄Εργων” (The strike of the workers of the Public Works Department came to an end), 30 May 1941. Minos Perdios, Δοκίμιο Ιστορίας Κ.Κ.Κ.-Α.Κ.Ε.Λ (Essay of history of K.K.K.A.K.E.L), 3 vols. (Nicosia: A.K.E.L. Central Committee, 1968), vol. 2, p. 12. Ploutis Servas, Ευθύνες (Responsibilities), vol. 1, p. 120. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Δημιουργείται ‘Κόμμα Κυπριακόν’;” (Is a ‘Cypriot Party’ under formation?), 18 February 1941. Anexartitos “Η χθεσινή σύσκεψις δια την ίδρυσιν πολιτικού κόμματος” (Yesterday’s meeting for the formation of political party), 15 April 1941. Contemporary Social History Archives, Μία Σύντομη ΄Εκθεση πάνω στην Κυπριακή Κατάσταση και το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. (A brief report on the Cypriot situation and A.K.E.L.), November 1948, Box 370, File 20/21/14. Michael Palairet to Philip Nichols, 19 December 1940, FO 371/29846, R 397/198/19. Edward Warner minute, 21 January 1941, FO 371/29846, R 397/198/19. Suggestively, the desirability of a British naval base at Suda had a history which even preceded the acquisition of Cyprus by Great Britain in 1878. See Holland and Markides, The British and the Hellenes, p.89. Pierson Dixon minute, 31 January 1941, FO 371/29846, R 397/198/19; Philip Nichols minute 13 March 1941, FO 371/29846, R 397/198/19. Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) was a controversial figure in Anglo-Hellenic relations. He was appointed to the Koraes Chair of Modern Greek and Byzantine History, Language and Literature at King’s College, University of London in 1918.

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109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122

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Soon after his appointment, Toynbee secured academic leave to visit Asia Minor. There he witnessed the 1922 Greco-Turkish fighting and reported back to Manchester Guardian in a manner that was obviously in favour of the Turks. This caused the reaction of the Committee that funded the Koraes Chair and led to Toynbee’s resignation. See the detailed study on this subject by Richard Clogg, Politics and the Academy: Arnold Toynbee and the Koraes Chair (London: Frank Cass, 1986). See also Clogg, Anglo-Greek Attitudes: Studies in History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, Oxford, 2000). Constantinos Svolopoulos, Η Ελλάδα στο Β’ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, 1940-1944 (Greece in Second World War 1940-1944), (Athens: Archio Radiofonou, 2000), p. 12. Constantinos Svolopoulos, “Anglo-Hellenic Talks on Cyprus During the Axis Campaign Against Greece”, Balkan Studies, 23, (1982), p. 200. Ibid, p. 201. From Athens to Foreign Office, 11 April 1941, CO 323/1864/7; See also the details of the meeting of King George II with American Ambassador in Athens Lincoln MacVeagh on the subject a few days later. MacVeagh writes: “ He said (the King) Korizis proposed to ask for the whole island, but that he himself demurred, as he felt the British might well hesitate over an action which might create a difficult precedent..” John Iatrides (Ed), Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 338. George Kelling supports that Battershill’s warnings were not taken under consideration at all but that the final decision of not letting the Greeks coming to Cyprus was based on purely military purposes. Kelling, British Policy, pp. 26-32. Officer administrating the Government of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 April 1941, CO 323/1864/7. Eden to M. Palairet, 14 April 1941, FO 371/29840, R 3991/96/19; Linardatos Spiros, Ο Πόλεμος του 1940-41 και η Μάχη της Κρήτης (The 1940-41 War and the Battle of Crete), (Athens: Proskinio, 1995), pp. 157-8. Cypher Telegram from K.Q. R.A.F. M.E., 14 April 1941, CO 323/1864/7. War Cabinet meeting of 14 April 1941, CAB 65/22. Memorandum by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp.176-181, FO 371/29846, R 5841/198/19. Memorandum by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 179, FO 371/29846, R 5841/198/19. E. Warner minute, 25 April 1941, FO 371/29846, R 4179/198/19. R. Bowker minute, 27 April 1941, FO 371/29846, R 4179/198/19. P. Dixon minute 30 April 1941, P. Nichols minute 6 May 1941; O. Sargent minute 20 May 1941, FO 371/29846, R 4179/198/19. Extract from War Cabinet conclusions, 2 June 1941, CO 67/316/13. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 31 May 1941, FO 371/29846, R 5841/198/19. Extract from a meeting of the War Cabinet, 2 June 1941, CO 67/316/13. Prime Minister’s personal minute, 2 June 1941, FO 371/29846, R 5841/198/19; Prime Minister’s personal minute, 2 June 1941, CAB 120/499. In 1907 Churchill – then Under Secretary of State for the Colonies – visited Cyprus. In his address to the Greek elected members who welcomed him to the island he referred to their demand for Enosis. Despite recognizing the justice of their claims he also emphasized that Union of Cyprus with Greece would contradict the wishes of the

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II Turkish Cypriot minority – in fact he deliberately exaggerated the numbers of the Muslim minority. Churchill said: ‘It (the Enosis question) involves not only an absolute change in the Government of the island, but also the abrogation of the Treaty with Turkey. It involves further the setting aside of the views of nearly onethird of the population, and the creation of what would probably be a permanent and dangerous antagonism between the two sections of the community…On the other hand the opinion held by the Moslem population of the island, that the British occupation of Cyprus should not lead to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and that the mission of Great Britain in the Levant should not be to impair the sovereignty of the Sultan, is one which His Majesty’s Government are equally bound to regard with respect’. G. S. Georghallides, Churchill’s 1907 Visit to Cyprus: A Political Analysis (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1970) p. 211. Anexartitos “Η Ελλάς παρέταξε γίγαντας εναντίον των Γερμανών. Η αυτοθυσία των Ελλήνων υπερέβη κάθε όριο” (Greece proposed her giants against the Germans. The Greeks’ sacrifice exceeded every limit), 9 April 1941. Eleftheria “Αι δημοτικαί εκλογαί θα προκηρυχθούν συντόμως” (The municipal elections will take place shortly), 22 January 1941. Eleftheria “Ενιαίος συνδυασμός υποψηφίων που να αντιπροσωπεύει όλες τις τάξεις” (United slate of candidates that shall represent all classes”, 6 February 1941; Anexartitos “Η Ελευθερία και δημοτικές εκλογές” (Eleftheria and the municipal elections), 15 February 1941. Ελευθερία “Αναβάλλονται επ’αόριστον αι δημοτικαί εκλογαί” (Indefinite postponement of the municipal elections), 27 May 1941. Pafos “Ζητήματα: Αι δημαρχειακαί εκλογαί, μία αναγκαία εξήγησις, η έκκλησις του Τοποτηρητού” (Issues: the municipal elections, a necessary explanation, the Locum Tenens’s appeal), 13 February 1941 Anexartitos “Διάγγελμα της Α.Ε. του Κυβερνήτου προς τον Kυπριακόν λαόν” (Message of H.E. the Governor towards Cypriots), 2 May 1941; Eleftheria “Εν όψει του κινδύνου” (In view of the danger), 2 May 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η Α.Ε. ο Κυβερνήτης δια διαγγέλματος συμβουλεύει την απομάκρυνσιν του πληθυσμού εκ των πόλεων της νήσου” (Announcement of H.E. the Governor advises the removal of the population from the towns), 2 May 1941. Kelling, British Policy, p. 32. Eleftheria “Ενώ αντιμετωπίζομεν σοβαρώτερους κινδύνους” (While we confront more serious dangers), 22 May 1941. Eleftheria “Η χθεσινή εχθρική εναέριος επιδρομή κατά περιοχών της Κύπρου - Εις νεκρός και τρεις τραυματίαι και ελάχισται υλικαί ζημιαί” (Yesterday’s enemy air raid against territories of Cyprus - One dead, three casualties and few damages), 16 May 1941. Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 May 1941, PREM 3/113. Chapter Four Manolis Glezos and Antonis Santos were the young boys who succeeded in this very risky operation. They were members of the K.K.E. (Communist Party of Greece) and their actions during the resistance and throughout the difficult years in Greece following the war are well known. For a report of this event in the Greek Cypriot press see: Anexartitos “Ο Ελληνικός λαός εκδηλώνει παντοιοτρόπως την αντίδρασή του κατά του κατακτητού” (The Greek people express in every way possible their opposition against the conqueror), 1 June 1941; Eleftheria “Οι

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5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19

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΄Ελληνες κατεβίβασαν από την ακρόπολιν την γερμανικήν πολεμικήν σημαίαν” (The Greeks took down the German flag from the Acropolis), 1 June 1941. Richard Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 139. C.M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece: A Short History (London: Faber & Faber, 1991), p. 243. For Zachariades’s letter and the impact of the Greco-Italian war on K.K.E.’s war policy see: Demetris Kousoulas, Κ.Κ.Ε.: Τα Πρώτα Τριάντα Χρόνια 1918- 1949 (Κ.Κ.Ε.: the first thirty years: 1918-1949) (Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1987), pp. 173-178; Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Φωτιά και Τσεκούρι (By axe and fire), (Athens: Estia, 1990), pp. 93-97; Hagen Fleischer, Στέμμα και Σβάστικα: Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης 1941-1944 (Crown and Swastika: Greece of occupation and resistance 1941-44), 2 vols., (Athens: Papazisis, 1988-1995), vol. 1, pp. 130-131. Richard Clogg, Greece 1940-49: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War: A Documentary History (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 9. Clogg, Modern Greece, p. 141. David H. Close (ed.), The Greek Civil War 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization (London: Routledge, 1993). See the introduction. Defence Committee, Extract from the 51st meeting, 17 July 1941, CAB 121/538. Political Report for August 1941, CO 67/314/10. Political Report for July 1941, CO 67/314/10. Eleftheria “Η ασφάλεια της Κύπρου ηδραιώθη, εδήλωσεν ο πρωθυπουργός κ. Τσέρτσιλλ” (The security of Cyprus has been established, the Prime Minister Mr. Churchill declared), 10 September 1941. Eleftheria “Εχθρικόν αεροπλάνον εβομβάρδισεν χθες το αεροδρόμιο Λευκωσίας” (Enemy plane bombarded yesterday the Nicosia airport), 16 June 1941; Anexartitos “Η Αμμόχωστος εβομβαρδίσθη τρεις φοράς και η Λευκωσία μίαν” (Famagusta was bombed three times and Nicosia one), 5 July 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Νέος βομβαρδισμός της Αμμοχώστου - εφονεύθησαν εν όλω εννέα” (New air attack against Famagusta - nine persons were killed in total), 22 August 1941. Interview with Andreas Loris, former judge of the Supreme Court of Cyprus, who experienced the attacks conducted during the summer of 1941. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η Κύπρος έχει μεταβληθεί εις ένα πραγματικώς απόρθητον φρούριον” (Cyprus has been transformed into an impregnable bastion), 24 September 1941. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Επί τη αναχώρηση εκ Κύπρου του Σερ Ουίλλιαμ Μπάττερσιηλλ” (On the departure from Cyprus of Sir William Battershill), 13 August 1941. Anexartitos “Αποχαιρετιστήριος ομιλία της Α.Ε. του Κυβερνήτου προς τα μέλη του Συμβουλευτικού Σώματος” (Farewell speech of H.E. the Governor towards the members of the Advisory Council), 22 August 1941. For a record on Charles Campbell Woolley’s career see CO 850/188/2. Rhodes House Library, Charles Campbell Woolley Private Papers, J. V. Shaw to C. C. Woolley, 21 September 1941, MSS Brit. Emp. S 276, Box 5. Anexartitos “Αφίχθη χθες ο νέος Κυβερνήτης της νήσου” (The new Governor of the island arrived yesterday), 26 November 1941; Cyprus Post “Cyprus greets its new Governor”, 26 November 1941; Eleftheria “Ο νέος κυβερνήτης αφίκετο χθες αναλαβών τη διακυβέρνηση της νήσου” (The new Governor arrived yesterday

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assuming his duties in the island), 26 November 1941. 20 Anexartitos “Αι συντεχνίαι Κύπρου και ο αντιφασιστικός αγών” (The Trade Unions of Cyprus and the anti-fascist struggle), 28 June 1941. 21 Anexartitos “Τηλεγράφημα Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς τον Κυβερνήτην” (Telegram of A.K.E.L. to the Governor), 17 July 1941. 22 Anexartitos “Οργάνωσις αντι-φασιστικού μετώπου εν Λευκωσία” (Organization of anti-fascist front in Nicosia), 29 August 1941. 23 Anexartitos “΄Εκκλησις του Α.Κ.ΕΛ. προς τον εργαζόμενον λαόν. Μίας ημέρας εργασίαν δια την άμυναν της Κύπρου” (An appeal from A.K.E.L. to the working people. A day of work for the defence of Cyprus), 30 August 1941; “Η έκκλησις του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (A.K.E.L.’s appeal), 24 September 1941. 24 Political Report for November 1941, CO 67/314/10; Anexartitos “Δια την άμυνάν μας” (For our defence), 11 November 1941. 25 Anexartitos “Διαλέξεις Α.Κ.Ε.Λ” (Lectures of A.K.E.L.), 14 and 27 December 1941. 26 For the role and the impact of the cultural clubs see Christos Petas, Το κίνημα των μορφωτικών συλλόγων 1939-1945 (The movement of the cultural clubs 1939-1945), (Nicosia: 1992). 27 Anexartitos “Το συνέδριον του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ” (A.K.E.L.’s conference), 5 October 1941. 28 See the articles in Anexartitos from 5 to 8 October under the title “Το συνέδριον του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (A.K.E.L.’s conference). 29 Anexartitos “Αι επαρχιακαί συνδιασκέψεις του Ανορθωτικού Κόμματος” (The District Conferences of the Progressive Party), 30 September 1941, “Επαρχιακή συνδιάσκεψις του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ Λάρνακος” (District Conference of Larnaca’s A.K.E.L), 5 October 1941. 30 Paratiritis (Παρατηρητής – Observer) “΄Ενα Κυπριακόν Κόμμαν Αρχών” (A Cypriot political party), 16 October 1941. 31 Anexartitos “Η Δευτέρα Παγκύπριος εργατική συνδιάσκεψις” (The second PanCyprian Labour Conference), 18 November 1941. 32 Modern Records Centre, Xinaris to Trades Union Congress London, 16 November 1941, T.U.C. file ref. MSS.292/949.61. 33 Ιστορία Π.Σ.Ε-Π.Ε.Ο 1941-1944 (History of P.S.E.-P.E.O 1941-1944), p. 67. 34 Political Report for June 1941, CO 67/314/10. 35 Political Report for July 1941, CO 67/314/10. 36 Political Report for July 1941, CO 67/314/10. 37 Anexartitos “Ελύθη η απεργία των εργατών σιδηροδρόμου” (The strike of the railway workers’ has stopped), 25 June 1941. 38 Anexartitos “Η απεργία των εργατών κομβίων της Λάρνακας: ανακοινωθέν της Παγκυπρίου Εργατικής Επιτροπής” (The strike of Larnaca’s button factory workers: announcement of the Pan-Cyprian Working Committee), 6 January 1942. 39 Cyprus Post “Button strike continues”, 22 December 1941. 40 Political Report for July 1941, CO 67/314/10. 41 Acheson to Woolley, 27 February 1942, CO 67/314/10. 42 Political Report for August 1941, CO 67/314/10. 43 Ibid. 44 Anexartitos “Νομοσχέδια περί συντεχνιών κατώτερου ορίου ημερομισθίων και διευθετήσεως εργατικών διενέξεων” (Trade Union laws for lowest daily wages and the settlement of working disputes)19 September 1941; Eleftheria “Τρία εργατικά νομοσχέδια - αι κυριώτεραι αυτών διατάξεις” (Three labour laws: their main

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54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

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provisions), 19 September 1941; Foni tis Kiprou “Τα εργατικά νομοσχέδια: περίληψις των κυριοτέρων διατάξεων των” (The labour laws: summary of their main provisions), 20 September 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Εδημοσιεύτηκαν χθες τα τρία εργατικά νομοσχέδια” (The three labour laws were published yesterday), 19 September 1941; Pafos “Τα τρία εργατικά νομοσχέδια” (The three labour laws), 25 September 1941. For the laws see also C. A. Ashiotis, Labour Conditions in Cyprus During the War Years 1939-1945 (Nicosia: Cyprus P.G.O., 1945). Anexartitos “Υπόμνημα του ΑΚΕΛ επί των εργατικών νομοσχεδίων” (A.K.E.L.’s memorandum on the labour bills), 1 November 1941. Anexartitos “Τα εργατικά νομοσχέδια εθεσπίσθησαν εις νόμους” 21 November 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Εδημοσιεύθησαν χθες οι τρεις εργατικοί νόμοι” (The three labour laws were announced yesterday), 1941. Political Report for December 1941, CO 67/314/10. Ploutis Servas to the Governor of Cyprus, 25 February 1942, CO 67/314/14. Emmanouil Tsouderos, Ιστορικό Αρχείο 1941-44 (Historical Archive 1941-44), vols. 5, (Athens: Fitrakis, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 102-110. Eleftheria “Ο Βασιλεύς της Ελλάδος και ο κ. Τσουδερός εις Λονδίνον” (The King of Greece and Mr. Tsouderos in London), 23 September 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Βασιλεύς και ο διάδοχος των Ελλήνων έφθασαν εις Αγγλίαν” (The King and the successor of Greeks arrived in Britain), 23 September 1941; Pafos “Ο Βασιλεύς των Ελλήνων εις Λονδίνον” (The King of Greeks in London), 25 September 1941. Anexartitos “Ομιλία κ. Τσουδερού περί του πολιτειακού μέλλοντος της Ελλάδος” (Mr. Tsouderos’s speech for the state future of Greece), 9 October 1941; Eleftheria “Ο Βασιλεύς των Ελλήνων και ο πρωθυπουργός κ. Εμμανουήλ Τσουδερός προς τον Ελληνικόν λαόν: η Ελλάς θα απελευθερωθή και η ενότης όλων των ελληνικών εδαφών θ’αποκατασταθή” (The King of Greeks and the Prime Minister Mr. Emmanouil Tsouderos to the Greek people: Greece will be liberated and the unity of all the Greek territories will be restored), 29 October 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο κ. Τσουδερός ομιλεί δια το μέλλον της Ελλάδας” (Mr. Tsouderos speaks about the future of Greece), 9 October 1941, “Εμπνευσμένη ομιλία του πρωθυπουργού της Ελλάδος” (Inspiring speech of the Prime Minister of Greece), 10 November 1941. Acheson to Howard, 24 November 1941, FO 371/29846, R 10171/198/19; Anexartitos “Ο Πρωθυπουργός της Ελλάδος εύχεται προς την Α.Σ. τον μητροπολίτην Πάφου την εθνικήν ανάστασιν όλων των Ελλήνων” (The Greek Prime Minister wishes to H.R. the Bishop of Pafos the national resurrection of all Greeks), 11 October 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο κ. Τσουδερός ομιλεί δια την πανελλήνιον ΄Ενωσιν” (Mr. Tsouderos speaks about Pan-Hellenic Union), 11 October 1941. Speech by the Greek Prime Minister, 15 November 1941, FO 371/ 29846, R 10112/198/19. Walter to Eden, 24 November 1941, CO 67/311/11. E. Warner official minute, 23 November 1941, FO 371/29846, R 10171/198/19. Tsouderos, Ιστορικό Αρχείο (Historical Archive), vol. 1, pp. 171, 368. Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor of Cyprus, 29 November 1941, CO 67/ 311/11. Eden to Walter, 3 December 1941, CO 67/311/11. Minute by E. Warner, 29 December 1941, FO 371/33165, R 92/92/19. Anexartitos “Ο Πρωθυπουργός της Ελλάδος κος Τσουδερός ομιλεί περί Ενώσεως της Κύπρου μετά της μητρός Κύπρου” (The Prime Minister of Greece Mr. Tsouderos

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II speaks of Enosis of Cyprus with Greece), 16 November 1941; Eleftheria “ ‘Οραματίζομαι την Ελλάδα περιλαμβάνουσαν και την Κύπρον’, εδήλωσεν ο Πρωθυπουργός κ. Τσουδερός” (‘I visualize Greece including Cyprus’, the Prime Minister Mr. Tsouderos declared), 16 November 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Κύπριοι: φωνάξτε με όλην την δύναμιν των πνευμόνων σας: ζήτω η Ελλάς, ζήτω η Αγγλία” (Cypriots: shout with all your strength: long live Greece, long live Britain), 16 November 1941. Anexartitos “Η Πανελλήνιος ΄Ενωσις” (Pan-Hellenic Union), 18 November 1941; Kipriakos Tipos, “Η Ελληνική Κύπρος” (The Greek Cyprus), 17 November 1941; Paratiritis “ Και τη ζωή μας για την Ελλάδα” (We shall even give our life for Greece), 27 November 1941; Eleftheria “Τηλεγραφήματα προς τον κ. Τσουδερόν δια τας προσφάτους δηλώσεις του” (Telegrams to Mr. Tsouderos for his recent declaration), 23 November 1941; Pafos “Τηλεγραφήματα προς τον κ.Τσουδερόν” (Telegrams to Mr. Tsouderos), 27 November 1941. Cyprus Post “The future of Cyprus”, 18 November 1941. Robertson to Parkinson, 3 December 1941, CO 67/316/22. Anexartitos “Η δήλωσις του ΄Ελληνος πρωθυπουργού κ. Τσουδερού” (The declaration of the Prime Minister Mr. Tsouderos), 19 November 1941; Eleftheria “Αι δηλώσεις του κ. Τσουδερού δια την Κύπρον και εν άρθρον της εδώ αγγλικής εφημερίδος” (The statement of Mr. Tsouderos regarding Cyprus and an article of the island’s British newspaper), 19 November 1941; Kipriakos Tipos “ Το ‘Cyprus Post’ δια τας δηλώσεις του κ. Τσουδερού επί της Ενώσεως” (The Cyprus Post for the statement of Mr. Tsouderos for Enosis), 18 November 1941; Foni tis Kiprou “ Η βαρυσήμαντος περί Κύπρου αναγγελία του ΄Ελληνος πρωθυπουργού και αι παρατηρήσεις της ‘Cyprus Post’ (The important statement of the Greek Prime Minister regarding Cyprus and the observations of ‘Cyprus Post), 22 November 1941. For Greek Cypriot protests addressed to the Colonial Office for the policy of Cyprus Post see generally CO 875/5/26. Officer administering the Government of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 November 1941, CO 67/311/11. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Δια την ‘Σοζ’ ” (Regarding Soz), 25 November 1941. Officer administering the Government of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 November 1941, CO 67/311/11. Delegate of Muslems of Cyprus to the British Prime Minister, 23 November 1941, CO 67/311/11. Tsouderos, Ιστορικό Αρχείο (Historical Archive), vol.1, p. 171. Ploutis Servas, Το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. και τα Προβλήματα του Τόπου: Διάλεξη (A.K.E.L. and the Local Problems: a Lecture) (Limassol: 1942) pp. 21-25. Anexartitos “Το Ανορθωτικόν κόμμα δια την εθνικήν αποκατάστασην της Κύπρου υπό τη στέγην της μητρός πατρίδος” (The Progressive party for the national restoration of Cyprus with the mother land), 20 November 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Διακήρυξη της Κ.Ε. του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ” (Declaration of A.K.E.L.’s central committee), 20 November 1941. Battershill to Percival, 8 December 1941, CO 67/311/11; Anexartitos “Επίσημος δήλωσις επί του ζητήματος της Ενώσεως” (Official statement regarding the issue of Enosis), 2 December 1941; Eleftheria “Κυβερνητική ανακοίνωσις δια την δήλωσιν του πρωθυπουργού της Ελλάδος κ. Τσουδερού περί Κύπρον” (Governmental announcement for the declaration of the Prime Minister of Greece Mr. Tsouderos for Cyprus),

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78 79 80

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84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

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2 December 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Επίσημος ανακοίνωσις δια το ζήτημα της Ενώσεως” (Official announcement for the issue of Enosis), 2 December 1941. Eleftheria “Η υπόθεσίς μας” (Our case), 3 December 1941. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Νέα εξόρμησις της Κύπρου δια την ενίσχυσιν του εθνικού ημών αγώνος” (New Cyprus campaign for the boost of our national struggle), 1 October 1941. Απόστολος Βαρνάβας, (Apostle Barnabas), 6-12, (Nicosia: 1941), pp. 155-157; Eleftheria “΄Εναρξις Κυπριακών εράνων υπέρ ιερού ελληνικού αγώνος” (Commencement of Cypriot collection for the sacred Greek struggle), 28 October 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Εγκύκλιος του σεβασμιώτατου Τοποτηρητού περί συνεχίσεως των εθνικών εράνων” (Circular of H.R. the Locum Tenens for the continuance of the national collections) 16 October 1941. Political Report for November 1941, CO 67/314/10. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Εθνάρχης ομιλεί” (The Ethnarch speaks), 22 November 1941. Anexartitos “Ακράδαντος η πίστις εις την εθνικήν αποκατάστασιν” (Firm belief to the national restoration), 24 December 1941; Eleftheria “Επιστολή του Τοποτηρητού προς την Α.Ε. τον Κυβερνήτην δια την ΄Ενωσιν της Κύπρου” (A letter from the Locum Tenens to H.E. the Governor for Enosis), 24 December 1941; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Κυπριακός λαός διαδηλοί και πάλιν δια του Εθνάρχου του τον πόθον του δια την ΄Ενωσιν” (The Cypriot people declare once again through their Ethnarch their desire for Enosis), 24 December 1941. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Εξοχώτατε, ακούσατέ μας” (Your Excellency, listen to us), 1 February 1942. For a personal account on the arrival of these unfortunate Greeks in Cyprus see Constantinos Karayiannis, ΄Οταν οι Μνήμες ΄Ερχονται (When memories occur), (Nicosia: 1989), pp. 39-43. Anexartitos “΄Εκκλησις της Αντιφασιστικής Επιτροπής Αμμοχώστου δι’ εράνους υπέρ Ελλήνων προσφύγων” (An appeal of the Anti-fascist Committee of Nicosia for collections for the Greek refugees), 14 January 1942, “Αντιφασιστική Επιτροπεία Λευκωσίας” (Anti-fascist Committee of Nicosia), 15 January 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ιδρύθη Παν-Λευκωσιάτικη Αντιφασιστική Επιτροπή” (Foundation of Antifascist Committee of Nicosia), 13 January 1942. Neos Kipriakos Filax “΄Εκκλησις” (Appeal), 17 January 1942. Eleftheria “Αυτή είναι η Κύπρος και αυτά είναι τα αισθήματα του λαού της” (This is Cyprus and these are the feelings of its people), 28 January 1942. Anexartitos “Συνεδρία Κεντρικής Επιτροπείας Εθν. Εράνων: ανακοινωθέν” (Meeting of the Central Committee for National Collections: announcement), 4 March 1942. Eleftheria “Κάλλιο αργά” (Better late than never) 12 January 1942, “Επί το ιερόν έργον” (Get down to the noble work), 14 January 1942. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ζωηραί εκδηλώσεις εν Λεμεσώ υπέρ των αδελφών προσφύγων” (Enthusiastic demonstrations in Limassol for our brothers the refugees). Pafos “Μύρο το κύμα” (Holy wave), “Η Πάφος και οι πρόσφυγες” (Pafos and the refugees), 22 January 1942. Political Report for February 1942, CO 67/314/12; Eleftheria “Να έλθουν εδώ” (Let them come here), 22 February 1942, “Εθνική αλληλεγγύη” (National solidarity), 27 February 1942. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 February 1942, CO 67/314/11.

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92 Howard to Acheson, 11 March 1942, CO 67/314/11; Eleftheria “Αρνητική η απάντησις της Κυβερνήσεως δια τους εθελοντάς” (Negative Governmental answer for the volunteers), 12 April 1942. 93 Percy Arnold, Cyprus Challenge: a Colonial Island and its Aspirations (London: The Hogarth Press, 1956), pp. 37-8, 43; Also quoted in Holland and Markides, The British and the Hellenes, p. 216. 94 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ελληνική Εκκλησία Κύπρου: εορτασμός της 25ης Μαρτίου” (Greek Church of Cyprus: celebration of the 25th March), 14 February 1942; Foni tis Kiprou “Εορτασμός της 25ης Μαρτίου” (Celebration of the 25th March), 14 February 1942. 95 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο εορτασμός της 25ης Μαρτίου” (The celebrations of the 25th March), 26 February 1942. 96 Eleftheria “Η εθνική επέτειος” (The national anniversary), 16 March 1942. 97 Anexartitos “Θα εορτάσωμεν ούτως ή άλλως” (We shall celebrate one way or another), 17 March 1942. 98 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book IE (15), Κεντρική Επιτροπή Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς τον Τοποτηρητή Λεόντιο (A.K.E.L. Central Committee to the Locum Tenens Leontios), 21 February 1942 ; Anexartitos “Να η αλήθεια!” (Here is the truth!), 19 March 1942. 99 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η εθνική μας εορτή και οι κομματικοί σκοποί” (Our national day and party aims), 18 March 1942. 100 Anexartitos “Αληθώς, ουδείς φθόνος” (Truly, no envy), 21 March 1942. 101 Anexartitos “Ο εορτασμός της 25ης Μαρτίου” (The celebrations for 25th March), 13 March 1942. 102 Anexartitos “Επετράπη εις Λεμεσόν παρέλασις δια την 25ην Μαρτίου” (The conduct of a march for the 25th March was permitted in Limassol), 21 March 1942. 103 Anexartitos “Δεν παρεχωρήθη εις το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. άδεια συγκεντρώσεως και παρελάσεως” (A.K.E.L. was not granted a permission for gathering and marching), 20 March 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Μία άρνησις προς το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (A refusal towards A.K.E.L), 20 March 1942. 104 Anexartitos “Επετράπη να γίνουν παρελάσεις εις όλας τας πόλεις επί τη επέτειω της εθνικής παλιγγενεσίας” (The permission for the holding of marches was allowed in all towns for the anniversary of the national resurrection), 22 March 1942. 105 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η εθνική μας εορτή” (Our national day), 20 March 1942; Eleftheria “Περί τον εορτασμόν της 25ης Μαρτίου” (Regarding the 25th March celebration), 20 March 1942. 106 Anexartitos “Η Α.Σ. προς τον Βασιλέαν και τον κ. Τσουδερόν” (H.R. the Locum Tenens to the King and Mr. Tsouderos), 25 March 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Eθνάρχης προς τον Bασιλέαν τον Ελλήνων και τον κ. Τσουδερόν” (The Ethnarch to the King of Greeks and Mr. Tsouderos), 25 March 1942. 107 Eleftheria “Το Γ.Σ.Ο. και ο εορτασμός της εθνικής επετείου εν Λεμεσώ” (The Gymnastic Club Olympia and the celebration of the national day in Limassol), 22 March 1942. 108 Anexartitos “Ο εορτασμός της επετείου της εθνικής παλλιγενεσίας εν Κύπρω” (The celebration of the anniversary of the national resurrection in Cyprus), 26 March 1942. 109 Pafos “Την επαύριον του εορτασμού” (The day following celebrations), 26 March 1942.

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Chapter Five Chronos (Time) “Ο Δουξ του Γκλώστερ εις Κύπρον” (The Duke of Gloucester in Cyprus), 30 May 1942; Eleftheria “Ο Δουξ του Γκλώστερ μετά τριήμερον επίσκεψιν εν Κύπρω ανεχώρησε χθες” (The Duke of Gloucester departed yesterday, after a three day visit in Cyprus), 25 May 1942. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η άφιξις εις Κύπρον του Δουκός του Γλώστερ” (The arrival of the Duke of Gloucester in Cyprus), 25 May 1942. Anexartitos “Κυπριακά σωματεία προς τον κ. Αργυρόπουλον” (Cyprus clubs to Mr. Argyropoulos), 16 July 1942; Eleftheria “Ο κ. Αργυρόπουλος επεσκέφθη τους προσφυγικούς καταυλισμούς” (Mr. Argyropoulos visited the refugee camps), 16 July 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο κ. Αργυρόπουλος επεσκέφθη χθες καταυλισμούς” (Mr. Argyropoulos visited yesterday the refugee camps), 16 July 1942. Anexartitos “O κ. Αργυρόπουλος προς το Τραστ” (Mr. Argyropoulos to the club of Trast), 22 July 1942; Eleftheria “Μία χαρακτηριστική επιστολή του ΄Ελληνος υπουργού κ. Αργυρόπουλου” (A characteristic letter of the Greek Minister Mr. Argyropoulos), 22 July 1942. Eleftheria “Περιοδεία του κ. Αργυρόπουλου - πρόγευμα παρά τω Κυβερνήτη” (Touring of Mr. Argyropoulos - breakfast with the Governor), 17 July 1942, “Ο κ. Αργυρόπουλος παρά τω Τοποτηρητή” (Mr. Argyropoulos visits the Locum Tenens), 18 July 1942. Eleftheria “Ο κ. Περικλής Αργυρόπουλος και το ελληνικό προσφυγικό πρόβλημα” (Mr. Pericles Argyropoulos and the Greek refugee problem), 20 July 1942. Political Report for July 1942, CO 67/314/12. Panayiotis Machlouzarides, Κύπρος 1940-1960: Ημερολόγιο των Εξελίξεων (Cyprus 1940-60: Diary of Developments), (Nicosia: 1985), p. 49. Eleftheria “Μία επίσκεψις” (A visit), 24 October 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “΄Ελλην πρίγκηψ ως οπτασία” (Greek Prince like a vision), 24 October 1942. Eleftheria “Δεν αρκούν η παράδοσις της Κύπρου, της Δωδεκανήσου και της Λιβύης δια να ικανοποιηθεί πλήρως η Ελλάς” (The handing to Greece of Cyprus, the Dodecanese and Libya are not enough), 5 July 1942. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 May 1941, CO 67/316/7. Secretary for the State of the Colonies to the Governor of Cyprus, 19 April 1942, CO 67/327/8. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 April 1942, CO 67/327/8. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 April 1942, CO 67/327/8. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 June 1942, CO 67/327/8. Anexartitos “Το Συμβουλευτικό Συμβούλιον συνεζήτησε μέτρα προς αύξησιν της συμβολής μας εις έμψυχον υλικόν στην πολεμικήν προσπάθειαν” (The Advisory Council discussed measures to increase our contribution in manpower to the war effort), 27 May 1942; Eleftheria “Η Κυβέρνηση μελετά μέτρα προς αύξησιν της συμβολής της Κύπρου εις ανθρώπινον υλικόν” (The Government examines measures to increase the contribution of Cyprus in manpower), 27 May 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ενώπιον του Συμβουλευτικού σώματος ετέθη χθες το θέμα της αυξήσεως της συμμετοχής της Κύπρου δια εμψύχου υλικού εις την πολεμικήν προσπάθειαν” (The

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II issue of the increase of the contribution of Cyprus in manpower in the war effort was placed for consideration at the Advisory Council), 27 May 1942. Cyprus Post “Conscription for Cyprus”, 24 May 1942. Cyprus Post “Conscription for Cyprus”, 27 May 1942. Pafos “ Στρατολογία εν Κύπρω” (Conscription in Cyprus), 28 May 1942. Eleftheria “Κυπριακή συμβολή” (Cypriot contribution), 28 May 1942. Anexartitos “Η φωνή του λαού” (People’s voice), 29 May 1942. Chronos “Θα στρατολογηθούν οι Κύπριοι;” (Will Cypriots be conscripted?), 30 May 1942, “Η κοινή γνώμη και η στρατολογία” (Public opinion and conscription), 6 June 1942. For this argument see also Neos Kipriakos Filax “Το συμβουλευτικόν δεν είναι ‘κυπριακόν σώμαν’” (The Advisory Council is not a ‘Cypriot body’), 5 June 1942. Ploutis Servas to the Governor of Cyprus, 30 May 1942, CO 67/327/8. The Locum Tenens to the Governor of Cyprus, 30 May 1942, CO 67/327/8. Leontios had the support of his Popular Council including members such as D.N. Demetriou and Phidias Kyriakides. Vias Markides, Achilleas Emilianides, Zenon Rossides and Christodoulos Galatopoulos also gave their consent on the memorandum: See Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book IH (18), p. 95. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book ΙΗ (18), secret, Επίσκοπος Πάφου προς Περικλή Αργυρόπουλον, (Bishop of Pafos to Pericles Argyropoulos), 20 July 1942. Anexartitos “Στρατολογία υπό την προυπόθεσιν της εξασφαλίσεως της Ενώσεως της Κύπρου μετά της μητρός Ελλάδος - στρατιωτική εξάσκησις υπό Ελλήνων αξιωματικών - υπομνήματα της Α.Σ. του Τοποτηρητού και του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς την Α.Ε. τον Κυβερνήτην” (Conscription on the grounds of the granting of Enosis of Cyprus with motherland Greece - military training from Greek officers -memorandums of his H.R. the Locum Tenens and A.K.E.L. to H.E. the Governor), 31 May 1942; Eleftheria “Ο Πανιερώτ. Τοποτηρητής προς την Α.Ε. τον Κυβερνήτην δια την υποχρεωτική στρατολογία” (H.R. the Locum Tenens to H.E. the Governor for the compulsory military service), 31 May 1942; Foni tis Kiprou “Το υπόμνημα του σεβ. Τοποτηρητού προς την αυτού εξοχότητα τον Κυβερνήτην επί της στρατολογίας” (The memorandum of H.R. the Locum Tenens to H.E. the Governor on conscription), 6 June 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Υπόμνημα του σεβασμιώτατου Τοποτηρητού και εθνάρχου προς τον Κυβερνήτην επί του ζητήματος της στρατολογίας” (Memorandum of H.R. the Locum Tenens and Ethnarch to the Governor for the conscription issue), “Yπόμνημα Α.Κ.Ε.Λ προς την Α.Ε. επί της υποχρεωτικής στρατολογίας” (Memorandum of A.K.E.L. to H.E. for the compulsory military service), 31 May 1942. Anexartitos “Αι συντεχνίαι δια την στρατολογίαν” (The Trade Unions for conscription), 2 June 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Υπόμνημα των συντεχνιών επί της στρατολογίας” (Trade Union statement for conscription), 2 June 1942. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Εθνάρχης ωμίλησε” (The Ethnarch has spoken), 1 June 1942. Paratiritis “Η Κυπριακή συμβολή στον συμμαχικό αγώνα” (The Cypriot contribution to the allied cause), 11 June 1942. Anexartitos “Η Α.Ε. προς τον Τοποτηρητήν” (H.E. towards the Locum Tenens), 7 June 1942; Eleftheria “Το ζήτημα της υποχρεωτικής στρατολογίας και η απάντησις του Κυβερνήτου εις την επιστολήν του Τοποτηρητού” (The issue of compulsory

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35 36

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39 40 41 42

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service and the answer of the Governor to the memorandum of the Locum Tenens), 7 June 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Απάντησις του Κυβερνήτου εις το υπόμνημα του Τοποτηρητού” (The Governor’s answer to the memorandum of the Locum Tenens), 7 June 1942. Governor Woolley to R. G. Casey, 7 September 1942, CO 67/327/8. Official Minute, 22 June 1942, CO 67/327/8. Chronos “Υπέρ της Ελευθερίας” (For Freedom), 12 September 1942; “Πολεμική προσπάθεια και μεταπολεμικός κόσμος” (The war effort and the post war world), 19 September 1942; Eleftheria “Δηλώσεις του Απ. Γραμματέως προς συντεχνιακούς αντιπροσώπους” (The Colonial Secretary’s statement to the representatives of the Trade Unions), 21 October 1942; “Κυπριακή Εθελοντική Δύναμις” (Cyprus Volunteer Force), 18 October 1942. Eleftheria “Ας προσέξωμεν” (Let us be careful), 18 November 1942. Eleftheria “Ο Τοποτηρητής εις στρατόπεδον της Κυπρ. Εθελοντικής Δυνάμεως” (The Locum Tenens at a camp of the Cyprus Volunteer Force), 23 November 1942, “Ο Τοποτηρητής κ. Λέοντιος εις στρατόπεδον του Κυπριακου Συντάγματος” (The Locum Tenens Mr. Leontios in a Cyprus Regiment camp), 5 December 1942. Eleftheria “Ευοίωνος στροφή” (Auspicious turn), 22 November 1942, Pafos “Η ένοπλος εξυπηρέτηση του αγώνος” (The armed service of the struggle), 26 November 1942. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbushop Leontios, Book IH (18) Πολύκαρπος Ιωαννίδης προς Πανιερώτατον Μητροπολίτη Πάφου και Τοποτηρητή του Αρχιεπισκοπικού θρόνου Κύπρου κ.κ. Λεοντίω, (Polikarpos Ioannides to the Bishop of Pafos and Locum Tenens Leontios), 3 June 1942. See also Ioannides’s letters to the Central Committee of Cyprus for the Pan-Hellenic Struggle: Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book IZ (17), Πολύκαρπος Ιωαννίδης προς την Κεντρικήν Επιτροπείαν Κύπρου επί του Πανελληνίου Αγώνος, (Polikarpos Ioannides to the Central Committee of Cyprus for the Pan Hellenic Struggle), April (date not readable) and 9 October 1942. Eleftheria “Καιρός να αφυπνισθώμεν” (It is time to wake up), 28 January 1943. See generally the publication of Ioannides’s articles in Eleftheria under the same title from 19 to 28 January 1943. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 April 1942, CO 67/313/9. Draft dispatch on Cyprus, September 1942, CO 67/317/11. Anexartitos “Το ζήτημα της διδασκαλίας της Ελληνικής Ιστορίας: ανακοινωθέν γραμματείας Κ.Ε. Α.Κ.Ε.Λ” (The issue of the teaching of Greek History: announcement of A.K.E.L.’s Central Committee), 29 May 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η διδασκαλία της Ελληνικής Ιστορίας εις τα σχολεία της νήσου” (The teaching of Greek History in the island’s schools), 29 May 1942. See also, Neos Kipriakos Filax “Αναλυτικό υπόμνημα προς την Α.Ε. περί της παιδείας της Κύπρου” (Detailed memorandum to H.E. concerning education in Cyprus), 14 June 1942. See the following memorandum: The Pan Cyprian Schoolteachers’ Union to Governor Woolley, 16 July 1942, CO 67/311/20. Eleftheria “Η ουσία πρωτίστως” (The substance comes first), 19 September 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Εθνική φιλοτιμία” (National dignity), 20 September 1942. Political Report for July 1942, CO 67/314/12; Anexartitos “Ανοικτή επιστολή προς την Α.Ε. τον Κυβερνήτη” (Open letter to H.E. the Governor), 12 July 1942. Trade Union Committee to Central Trade Union Committee London, 13

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December 1942, CO 67/314/15; General Secretary of A.K.E.L. to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 December 1942. Anexartitos “Ανακοινωθέν της απεργιακής επιτροπής εργοστασίου κομβίων Λεμεσού” (Announcement of the strike committee of the Button factory at Limassol), 4 July 1942; Eleftheria “Απεργία” (Strike), 28 June 1942. Anexartitos “Καταδίκαι απεργών κομβίων Λεμεσού” (Prosecutions of strikers of Limassol’s button factory), 7 July 1942. For records on the trial see: CO 67/317/9, pp. 58-100. Political Report for August 1942, CO 67/314/12. Cyprus’ State Archives, Extract from Political Situation and Intelligence Report, 5 September 1942, p. 35, SA1/641/1942; Anexartitos “Η απεργία των εργατών κομβίων - το καθήκον όλων των εργαζομένων” (The strike of the button factory - the duty of all working men), 12 August 1942. Anexartitos “Η συνέντευξις της Π.Σ.Ε. μετά του Αποικιακού Γραμματέως” (Interview of P.S.E. with the Colonial Secretary), 18 October 1942; Eleftheria “Συνέντευξις μετά του Αποικιακού Γραμματέως” (Interview with the Colonial Secretary), 18 October 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η συνέντευξις της Π. Συντεχνιακής Επιτροπής με τον Απ. Γραμματέα” (The interview of Pan Cyprian Trade Union Committee with the Colonial Secretary), 20 October 1942. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 December 1942, CO 67/315/7. Anexartitos, “Απαγορεύεται η κήρυξις παγκυπρίου πανεργατικής απεργίας” (The declaration of a pan Cyprian labour strike is forbidden), 18 December 1942; “Κυβερνητική προειδοποίησις επί του ενδεχομένου παναπεργίας” (Governmental warning over the prospect of a pan Cyprian strike), 18 December 1942. Eleftheria “Λύση της απεργίας εργατών αμυντικών έργων” (End of the strike of the defence work labourers), 21 December 1942. Eleftheria “Αι χθεσιναί καταδίκαι εις φυλάκισιν 8 εργατών των αμυντικών έργων” (Yesterday’s sentences for imprisonment for 8 workers of the defence works), 20 December 1942. Modern Records Centre, A. Phantis to the Trade Union Congress London, 4 January 1943, T.U.C. file ref. MSS.292/949.61/1 Anexartitos “Η 7η Νοεμβρίου-ανακοινωθέν της επαρχιακής επιτροπής Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. Λευκωσίας” (The 7th November- announcement of A.K.E.L.’s District Committee of Nicosia), 8 November 1942. Ziartides to the Ministry for Colonies, 16 November 1942, CO 67/314/15. Modern Records Centre, Ziartides to the Trade Unions London, 18 November 1942, T.U.C. file ref. MSS.292/949.61/1. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, volume 385, 25 November 1942, columns 742-743; Anexartitos “Αι επερωτήσεις εν τη Βουλή δια τα Κυπριακά ζητήματα” ( The Parliamentary questions for the Cypriot affairs), 29 November 1942; Eleftheria “Επερωτήσεις εν τη Βουλή δια τα δικαιώματα του Κυπριακού λαού” (Questions in Parliament for the rights of Cypriot people), 28 November 1942. Committee for Cyprus Autonomy to the Colonial Secretary, 25 April 1942, CO 67/314/16. Cyprus Resolution, 31 May 1942, CO 67/312/5. Anexartitos “Ψήφισμα των Κυπρίων Λονδίνου προς τη Βρεττ. Κυβέρνησιν δια την

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Κύπρον” (Resolution of the Cypriots of London towards the British Government for Cyprus), 14 June 1942, “Τα Κυπριακά δίκαια” (The Cypriot rights), 17 June 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ψήφισμα Κυπρίων Λονδίνου περί αυτοδιαθέσεως της νήσου” (Resolution of the Cypriots of London for the island’s self determination), 14 June 1942, “Το μέλλον της Κύπρου” (The future of Cyprus), 16 June 1942. Anexartitos “Τηλεγράφημα Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς το βουλευτή κ. Πριττ” (Telegram of A.K.E.L. to Mr. Pritt, M.P.), 16 June 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προ τον βουλευτήν Πριττ” (A.K.E.L. to Pritt, M.P), 16 June 1942. Anexartitos “Μηνύματα σωματείων Λεμεσού προς τον βουλευτήν κ. Πριττ” (Messages of Limassol clubs to Mr. Pritt, M.P.) 17 June 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Τα σωματεία Λεμεσού προς τον βουλευτήν κον Πριττ” (The Limassol clubs to the deputy Mr. Pritt), 17 June 1942. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book IE (15), Γενικός Γραμματέας Α.Κ.Ε.Λ προς Τοποτηρητήν Λεόντιον (A.K.E.L.’s General Secretary to the Locum Tenens Leontios), 16 June 1942. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book IE (15), Τοποτηρητής Λεόντιος προς Γενικόν Γραμματέαν Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. (The Locum Tenens to the General Secretary of A.K.E.L.), 18 June 1942. Anexartitos “Αστυνομική έρευνα επί του Γ. Γραμματέα του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (Police search on A.K.E.L.’s General Secretary), 12 November 1942. Analysis of Documents Seized from Ploutis Servas, General Secretary of A.K.E.L., on the 11th November 1942, CO 67/314/15. Minute of Dennis William Battershill, 2 April 1942, CO 67/314/12. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 December 1942, CO 67/314/15. Eleftheria “Πώς θα εορτασθή εν Κύπρω η επέτειος του Ρωσσικού Στρατού” (How will the anniversary of the Red Army Day be celebrated in Cyprus), 20 February 1943. Rolandos Katsiaounis, Η Διασκεπτική 1946-1948: με Ανασκόπηση της Περιόδου 1878-1945 (The Consultative Assembly 1946-1948: with an overview of the period 1878-1945), (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000), pp. 73-4. Political Report for May 1942, CO 67/314/12. Eleftheria “Ιδρύεται Παγκύπριος Οργάνωσις Γεωργών” (Founding of Pan-Cyprian Farmers’ Organization), 1 April 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Προκαταρκτική σύσκεψις δια την ίδρυσιν της Παγκ. Οργανώσεως Γεωργών” (Preparatory meeting for the foundation of the Pan Cyprian Farmers’ Organization), 1 April 1942. Minos Perdios, author of the History of A.K.E.L. – K.K.K. later admitted that the party was wrong in attacking the foundation of P.E.K. Instead, Perdios pointed out, A.K.E.L. should have promoted the unity of the rural world. Δοκίμιο Ιστορίας Κ.Κ.Κ.-Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. (An Essay on the History of K.K.K.-A.K.E.L.), 3vols, (Nicosia: A.K.E.L. Central Committee, 1968), vol.2, pp. 29-32. Anexartitos, “Το συνέδριον Αθηαίνου: αποκηρύττεται υπό του Μόρφου, την μεγαλυτέραν κωμόπολιν της νήσου” (The conference in Athienou: it is denounced by Morfou, the biggest village of the island), 26 May 1942. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Το Παγκύπριον Γεωργικόν Συνέδριον και η στάσις του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (The Pan Cyprian Farmers’ Conference and A.K.E.L.’s attitude), 22 May 1942. Paratiritis “Πώς έπρεπε το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. ένα κόμμα αρχών να συμπεριφερθή” (How A.K.E.L., a party of principles, ought to have acted) 28 May 1942. Pafos “Εργάται και γεωργοί ενωθήτε” (Workers and farmers unite), 11 June 1942.

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81 Anexartitos “Το γεωργικόν συνέδριον: οι πραγματικοί σκοποί της ένωσης” (The rural conference: the real aims of the union), 2 June 1942; Chronos “Ανακοινωθέν Παναγρ. Συνεδρίου Αθηαίνου” (Announcement of the Rural Conference of Athienou), 6 June 1942; Eleftheria “Το ψήφισμα του εν Αθηαίνου Παγκυπρίου Αγροτικού Συνεδρίου” (The resolution of the Pan Cyprian Rural Conference in Athienou), 1 June 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Το χθεσινόν Παγκύπριον γεωργικόν συνέδριον” (Yesterday’s Pan Cyprian Rural Conference), 1 June 1942; Pafos “Ανακοινωθέν Παναγροτικού Συνεδρίου Αθηαίνου” (Announcement of the Rural Conference of Athienou), 4 June 1942. 82 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 June 1943, CO 67/317/9. 83 Eleftheria “Η αγροτική αφύπνισις” (The rural awakening), 31 May 1942. 84 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, volume 377, 21 January 1942, columns 345-346; Parliamentary Question, 21 January 1942, FO 371/33185, R 492/492/19. 85 Governor of Cyprus to George Gater, 7 September 1942, CO 67/317/11. 86 Memorandum by William Dennis Battershill, 20 November 1942, CO 67/317/11. 87 Eleftheria “Απεφασίσθη οριστικώς η διεξαγωγή δημοτικών εκλογών” (The definite conduct of the Municipal Elections has been decided”, 21 October 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η Κυβέρνηση απεφάσισε τη διενέργεια εκλογών” (The Government has decided the conduct of elections), 21 October 1942; Pafos “Η κυβέρνησις απεφάσισε τη διενέργεια εκλογών” (The Government has decided the conduct of elections), 22 October 1942. 88 Eleftheria “Το σημερινόν δημαρχειακόν συνέδριον” (Today’s conference of Mayors), 4 October 1942. 89 Eleftheria “Ποιαι εισηγήσεις υπεβλήθησαν κατά το χθεσινόν συνέδριον των δημάρχων” (Suggestions that were proposed during yesterday’s conference of Mayors), 5 October 1942; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η χθεσινή σύσκεψις των δημοτικών συμβουλίων της Κύπρου επί των επισιτιστικών προβλημάτων” (Yesterday’s conference of the Municipal councils of Cyprus on food supplying problems), 5 October 1942 90 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 January 1943, CO 67/314/22. 91 Political Report for January 1943, CO 67/314/12. 92 Anexartitos “Υπόμνημα δια το επισιτιστικόν και τας δημοτικάς εκλογάς” (Petition for food supplying and for the municipal elections), 14 October 1942. 93 Anexartitos “Το Β’ Παγκύπριον Συνέδριον του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (A.K.E.L.’s second Pan Cyprian Conference), 26 January 1943. 94 For British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s speech see Governor Woolley to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 February 1943, CO 67/318/2. 95 Chronos “Ο κ. Τσέρτσιλλ εις Κύπρον” (Mr. Churchill in Cyprus), 6 February 1943; Cyprus Post “Mr. Churchill visits Cyprus”, 2 February 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο κ. Τσέρτσιλλ επεσκέφθη την Κύπρον μετά του Αρχηγού του επιτελείου και του Υφυπουργού Εξωτερικών” (Mr. Churchill visited Cyprus accompanied by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office) 2 February 1943; Paratiritis “Ο ΄Αγγλος πρωθυπουργός Ουίνστων Τσέρτσιλλ εις Κύπρον” (The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in Cyprus), 4 February 1943; The Times “Cyprus’s great welcome to the Prime Minister”, 3 February 1943. 96 Anexartitos “Τηλεγραφήματα προς τον κ. Τσέρτσιλλ” (Telegrams to Mr. Churchill),

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2 February 1943. 97 Foni tis Kiprou “Τηλεγράφημα του Σεβ. Τοποτηρητού προς τον εξοχώτατον κ. Τσέρτσιλλ” (Telegram of H.R. the Locum Tenens to H.E. Mr. Churchill), 6 February 1943. 98 G. S. Georghallides, Churchill’s 1907 visit to Cyprus: A political Analysis (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1970), p. 211; C. W. J. Orr, Cyprus under British Rule, (London: Zeno), 1972, p. 163; Foni tis Kiprou “Τηλεγράφημα του Σεβ. Τοποτηρητού προς τον εξοχώτατον κ. Τσέρτσιλλ” (Telegram of H.R. the Locum Tenens to H.E. Mr. Churchill”, 6 February 1943. 99 Prime Minister to Deputy Minister, 1 February 1943, FO 954/22A. 1 2 3 4 5

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Chapter Six Eleftheria “Ο νέος περί Δήμων νόμος: καθολική ψηφοφορία δι’ εκλογήν των νέων δημοτικών συμβουλίων” (The new Municipal Law: universal voting for the election of the new municipal councils), 28 November 1942. Governor Woolley to Oliver Stanley, 17 May 1943, CO 67/311/32. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Καταρτίζεται ο υπό κον Δέρβην Εθνικός Συνδυασμός” (The ‘National Combination’ is established under Mr. Dervis), 28 February 1943. John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, Greece: the Modern Sequel: from 1831 to the Present (New York: New York University Press, 2002). Eleftheria “Το πρόγραμμα του Εθνικού Συνδυασμού Λευκωσίας” (The programme of Nicosia’s National Combination), 6 March 1943; Foni tis Kiprou “Ποιον το πρόγραμμα του υπό τον κον Δέρβην Εθνικού Συνδυασμού” (The programme of Mr. Dervis’ National Combination), 13 March 1943. Anexartitos “Εσχηματίσθη ‘Εθνικολαϊκός’ συνδυασμός εν Λευκωσία” (A ‘nationalpopular’ combination has been established in Nicosia), 6 March 1943. Anexartitos “Το πρόγραμμα του Λαϊκού Συνδυασμού εις τας δημοτικάς εκλογάς Λευκωσίας” (The programme of the Popular Combination in the Nicosia municipal elections), 13 March 1943. Anexartitos “Διατί έχομεν επιτακτικόν καθήκον να ψηφίσωμεν τον λαϊκόν συνδυασμόν” (Why we have a bounden duty to vote for the Popular Front), 20 March 1943; During his visit at the Colonial Office in 1938, Dervis had also pleaded for the maintenance of the constitutional position of the island. See Note of talk with Dr. Themistocles Dervis by J. B. Williams, 19 October 1938, CO 67/292/13. Anexartitos “Ομιλία του κ. Πλουτή Σέρβα, αρχηγού του Ε.Μ.Ε.Κ.Ε.Λ. Λεμεσού” (Speech by Mr. Ploutis Servas, leader of the E.M.E.K.E.L.), 17 March 1943. Anexartitos “Ομιλία του κ. Πλουτή Σέρβα, αρχηγού του Ε.Μ.Ε.Κ.Ε.Λ” (Speech of Mr. Ploutis Servas, leader of the E.M.E.K.E.L.), 18 March 1943. Eleftheria “Ο Εθνικός Λαϊκός συνδυασμός Λεμεσού” (The National-Popular combination of Limassol), 6 March 1943. Cyprus’ State Archives, Commissioner of Famagusta to the Colonial Secretary of Cyprus, 31 March 1931, p. 140, SA1/807/1942/1. Eleftheria “Προεκλογική δημοτική κίνηση” (Pre-election municipal movement), 9 March 1943. Political Report for January 1944, CO 67/323/2. Eleftheria “Η χθεσινή προσπάθεια προς συμβιβασμό των δύο παρατάξεων” (Yesterday’s effort for the compromise of the two parties), 17 March 1943; Archbishopric of

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II Cyprus , Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book IE (15), Τσαγγαρίδης προς Τοποτηρητήν Λεόντιον, (Tsangarides to Locum Tenens Leontios), date is not readable, p. 224. Anexartitos “Ο ενθουσιασμός δια το ΕΜΕΚΕΛ εις Λεμεσόν και Αμμόχωστον” (Enthusiasm for the Popular Front in Limassol and Famagusta), 19 March 1943; See also the telegrams in the Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book IE (15), pp. 220-228. Eleftheria “Πρωτοφανή αίσχη” (Unprecedented shame), 19 March 1943. Eleftheria “Δημοτικαί εκλογαί” (Municipal elections), 19 March 1943. The voting procedure took the following form: On the day of the election, people entitled to the right to vote confirmed their presence to the electoral centers. There was a separate ballot box for every candidate with his name displayed on it. Ballot boxes were made of wood and painted vertically, half white and half black. The candidate or his representative stood behind the box and announced the full name of the candidate to each voter. The voters would pass in front of every ballot box, receive a card, and by inserting their hand through a hole in the box, they threw it inside into either the ‘black’ (negative) or the ‘white’ (positive) compartment. Candidates with the most ‘white’ votes were subsequently elected councilors. Cyprus’s State Archives, Ballot boxes, Attorney’s General minute, 9 September 1943, SA1/808/1925. Anexartitos “Σύσσωμος ο λαός της Λευκωσίας προσέρχεται εις τας κάλπας με μίαν απόφασιν: να ψηφίσει λαϊκόν συνδυασμόν” (As one, the people of Nicosia are coming to the ballot boxes with one decision: to vote for the Popular Front), 21 March 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Εμπρός Λευκωσιάτες” (Come on, Nicosia citizens), 21 March 1943. Governor Woolley to Oliver Stanley, 17 May 1943, CO 67/311/32. Cyprus’s State Archives, pp. 6-8, SA1/807/1942/1; Eleftheria “Απαγορεύονται οινοπνευματώδη κατά την ημέρα των εκλογών” (The use of alcohol is prohibited on the day of the elections), 19 March 1943. Cyprus’s State Archives, Commissioner of Pafos to the Colonial Secretary, 24 March 1943, SA1/807/1942/1. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Θλιβερά αποτελέσματα εις Λεμεσόν” (Sad results in Limassol), 22 March 1943; “Εκλογικόν ατύχημα εις Λεμεσόν και Βαρώσια” (Electoral accident in Limassol and Famagusta), 24 March 1943. Anexartitos “Ο Κυβερνήτης εις Λονδίνον” (The Governor in London), 10 February 1943; Eleftheria “Η Α.Ε. ο Κυβερνήτης αφίκετο εις Λονδίνον” (H.E. the Governor arrived in London), 10 February 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η Α.Ε. ο Κυβερνήτης εις Λονδίνον” (H.E. the Governor in London), 10 February 1943. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Κυβερνήτης εις Λονδίνον” (The Governor in London), 11 February 1943. Cyprus - Policy, without date and author, CO 67/317/14. Note of discussion, 23 February 1943, CO 67/318/3; Cyprus-Policy, pp.39-46, CO 67/317/14. Cyprus-Policy, pp. 39-46, CO 67/317/14. Ibid. House of Lords, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 126, second volume of session 1942-43, 31 March 1943, columns 1024-5. The Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, Vol. 126, House of Lords, second volume

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of session 1942-3, 31 March 1943, columns 1033-35. 33 Anexartitos “Δηλώσεις του υφυπουργού αποικιών επί της πολιτικής καταστάσεως εν Κύπρω” (Statements of the Under Secretary of State on the political situation in Cyprus), 1 April 1943; Eleftheria “Η Κύπρος απησχόλησε χθες την Βουλήν των Λόρδων” (Cyprus occupied the interest of the House of Lords”, 1 April 1943; Neos Kirpiakos Filax “Η Κύπρος επανέρχεται εις δημοκρατικόν σύστημαν” (Cyprus returns to a democratic system of government), 1 April 1943. 34 Cyprus’s State Archives, Debate in the House of Lords on 31 March 1931: an account broadcast by the B.B.C. in the Cyprus transmission on 4th April, 1943, pp. 14-17, SA1/677/1937. 35 Eleftheria “Η εν τη Βουλή των Λόρδων συζήτησις περί Κύπρου και μία ανυπόστατος δήλωσις” (The discussion on Cyprus in the House of Parliament and a groundless statement), 7 April 1943. 36 For the telegrams see the whole files of CO 67/317/12 and CO 67/317/13. 37 Eleftheria “Αποκλειστικός πόθος του Κυπριακού λαού η ΄Ενωσις” (Enosis is the exclusive aspiration of the Cypriot people), 3 April 1943; Foni tis Kiprou “Ελευθερίαν, όχι ελευθερίας” (Freedom, not liberties), 10 April 1943. 38 Eleftheria “Παρεξήγησις” (A misunderstanding), 2 April 1943. 39 Evkaf is the religious institute of the Turkish-Cypriot community. 40 Governor Woolley to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 April 1943, CO 67/317/12. 41 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Διαμαρτυρία των Τούρκων δημοτικών συμβούλων της Λευκωσίας δια το τηλεγράφημα των Ελλήνων συμβούλων” (Protest of the Turkish municipal councilors of Nicosia for the telegram of the Greek councilors), 6 April 1943. 42 Political Report for April 1943, CO 67/314/12. 43 Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais: the Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus, (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1982), p.54. 44 See minute of 22 February 1943, CO 67/318/6, for further reasons of the paper’s suppression. 45 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Σύνδεσμος Τούρκων γεωργών” (Association of Turkish farmers), 5 May 1943. 46 Cyprus’s State Archives, L.T.A.B. to the Commissioner of Labour, 8 August 1943, SA1/658/1943/1. 47 Cyprus’s State Archives, M. Niazi, of the Nicosia Turkish Carpenters’ Union to the Commissioner of Labour, 12 August 1943, SA1/658/1943/1. 48 Political Report for May 1943, CO 67/314/12. 49 Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. 4, pp. 461-2. 50 Anexartitos “Η χθεσινή σύσκεψις εν τω αρχιεπισκοπικώ μέγαρω” (Yesterday’s meeting at the Archbishopric), 22 April 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Προς ίδρυσιν εθνικού κόμματος” (Towards the foundation of a national party), 22 April 1943; Political Report for April 1943, CO 67/314/12. 51 Eleftheria “Προς σύμπηξιν εθνικής παρατάξεως” (Towards the formation of a national party), 9 May 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Διάγγελμα προς τον ελληνικόν λαόν της πρωτευούσης” (Message towards the Greek people of the capital), 9 May 1943. 52 Eleftheria “Απεφασίσθη η ίδρυσις κυπριακού εθνικού κόμματος”(The foundation of a national party has been decided), 7 June 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ιδρύθη χθες εν Λευκωσία το Κυπριακόν Εθνικόν Κόμμα” (The Cypriot National Party was yesterday founded in Nicosia), 7 June 1943.

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53 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Τα συμβούλια του Κυπριακού εθνικού κόμματος κατηρτίσθησαν εις σώμαν” (The committees of the Cypriot National Party were organized in a body), 19 July 1943. 54 Eleftheria “Η ψεσινή εν Λευκωσία συνέλευσις δια την συγκρότησιν παγκυπρίου κόμματος” (Last night’s meeting for the foundation of a pan Cyprian party), 5 June 1943. 55 Political Report for June 1943, CO 67/314/12. 56 Anexartitos “Συνάντησις του δημ. Συμβουλίου Αμμοχ. μετά του Σ. Τοποτηρητού” (Meeting of the municipal council of Famagusta with H.R. the Locum Tenens), 18 April 1943. 57 Anexartitos “Αι προσπάθειαι του Τοποτηρητού δια την διατήρησιν της ενότητος του Ελληνικού Κυπριακού Λαού” (The efforts of the Locum Tenens for the preservation of the unity of the Greek Cypriot people), 21 April 1943. 58 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Με αίμα διαυγές” (With clear blood), 22 May 1943. See also the editorials of the same newspaper of 17 and 18 May, 1 and 5 June 1943. 59 Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book IE (15), The Locum Tenens to all the editors of the newspapers, 30 May 1943, p. 234; Foni tis Kiprou “Σύσκεψις του Σεβ. Τοποτηρητού μετά των τέως βουλευτών” (Meeting of H.R. the Locum Tenens with the former deputies), 22 May 1943. 60 Anexartitos “Το εθνικό μας ζήτημα - ο Τοποτηρητής έχει τον λόγον - διακήρυξις της Κ.Ε. Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (Our national issue - The Locum Tenens has the word - declaration of A.K.E.L.’s Central Committee), 14 May 1943. 61 Eleftheria “Απεφασίσθη η ίδρυσις Κυπριακού Εθνικού Κόμματος” (The establishment of the Cypriot National Party was decided), 7 June 1943. 62 Eleftheria “Νέαι επαγγελματικαί ενώσεις εν Λεμεσώ” (New working unions in Limassol), 15 October 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Προκήρυξη των ιδρυτών του Νέου Συνδέσμου Ιδιωτικών υπαλλήλων Λεμεσού” (Declaration of the founders of the New Union of Private Employees of Limassol), 18 October 1943, “Θα αναγνωρισθούν αι ‘Νέαι Συντεχνίαι’ Λεμεσού” (The ‘New Unions’ of Limassol will be recognized), 23 October 1943. 63 Anexartitos “Το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. δι ενεργοτέραν πολεμικήν προσπάθειαν” (A.K.E.L. for a more active war effort), 17 June 1943; Chronos “Το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. και η πολεμική προσπάθεια” (A.K.E.L. and the war effort), 26 June 1943; Cyprus Post “A.K.E.L. to call on members to join armed forces - Historic committee meeting”, 17 June 1943; Foni tis Kiprou “Απόφασις του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. υπέρ στρατιωτικής υπηρεσίας” (A.K.E.L.’s decision in favour of military service), 19 June 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ανακοινωθέν του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (A.K.E.L.’s announcement); Pafos “Μία αξιέπαινος απόφασις” (A praiseworthy decision), 24 June 1943. 64 These were: Costas Partasides, Andreas Fantis, Marcos Marcoullis, Minos Perdios, Georghios Lernis, Christos Savvides, Prodromos Papavasiliou, Georghios Leventis, Costas Shakallis, Vasos Vassiliou and Christos Katsiaounis. 65 Political Report for June 1943, CO 67/314/12. 66 Anexartitos “Εν μέσω απερίγραπτου ενθουσιασμού ανεχώρησαν οι εθελονταί μας δια το στρατόπεδον εκγυμνάσεων των” (Through indescribable enthusiasm our volunteers set off for their training camp), 29 June 1943. 67 Ibid. 68 Relating this assumption to the general war context, it is true that while Hitler was advancing toward Moscow, Stalin urged Churchill and Roosevelt to help by

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launching a big attack in the Western mainland in order to draw off German forces from the East. However, the British were reluctant to comply with this request and instead kept fighting in North Africa and the Mediterranean, neither of which offered much help to Russia. This British insistence on refusing to reinforce the Western Front often brought relations with Russia to the point of crisis. For this reason, the British were willing to favour Russia at other, smaller points, if they could, and restrained themselves from crushing the presence of communism in their colonies, as in the case of Cyprus. Political Report for May 1943, CO 67/314/12. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Επί τη καταργήσει της Γ’ Διεθνούς” (On the abolishment of the Third International), 27 May 1943. Anexartitos “Η Τρίτη Διεθνής διελύθη”, (The Third International has been dissolved), 23 May 1943; Eleftheria “Η Μόσχα διέλυσε την Κομιντέρν ως πεπαλαιωμένον οργανισμόν” (Moscow dissolved Comintern as an out-of-date organization), 23 May 1943. Political report for June 1943, CO 67/314/12; Governor Woolley to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 May 1943, CO 67/319/4. Cyprus Post “A.K.E.L.’s decision explained”, 19 June 1943. Chronos “Αίμα και χρήμα” (Blood and money), 10 July 1943. Anexartitos “Η Α.Σ. ο Τοποτηρητής επεσκέφθη χθες και ηυλόγησε τους γενναίους εθελοντάς μας” (H.R. the Locum Tenens visited and blessed our brave volunteers yesterday), 30 June 1943. Political Report for June 1943, CO 67/314/12. The participants were: The Treasurer J. F. Wilson as the president of the committee, Mr. J.A.C. Cruikshank as its General Secretary, the Director of the Land Registry Office R. A. Godwin Austin, Themistocles Dervis, D.N. Demetriou, P. Kithreotis and Dervis Osman Ahmet. From the part of P.S.E. and P.E.K. the participants were A. Phantis, C. Partasides and M. Hadjinicolas. Cited in Pagkipria Ergatiki Omospondia, Αγώνες για τον τιμάριθμο 1940-44 (Struggles for the cost of living 1940-44), (P.E.O.: 1984), p. 15. Anexartitos “Η επιτροπή τιμαρίθμου επεράτωσε χθες τις εργασίας της” (The cost of living committee yesterday ended its works), 23 January 1943; Eleftheria “Η επιτροπή τιμαρίθμου ενέκρινε χθες διαφόρους εισηγήσεις” (The cost of living committee yesterday approved various suggestions), 22 January 1943. Pagkipria Ergatiki Omospondia, Αγώνες για τον Τιμάριθμο 1940-44 (Struggles for the cost of living), pp. 15-73. Note of discussion, 23 March 1943, CO 67/316/12. The savings scheme concerned the question of what would happen to the profits of the peasantry, since the majority of them had now paid off their debts thanks to the provisions of the debt settlement legislation. See the relevant articles in Eleftheria of 7 and 8 May 1943 on the announcement and details on the lottery loan and of 13 August on details for the first draw. See also: Cyprus-Lottery Loan as proposed by Governor Woolley on 11 February 1943, CO 67/318/3. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, fifth series, vol. 387, 3 March 1943, columns 536-538; Stanley to C. Woolley, 9 April 1943, CO 67/316/12. Political Report for August 1943, CO 67/314/12. Anexartitos “Αι πανεργατικαί συνελεύσεις δια τον τιμάριθμο” (The labour meetings

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II for the cost of living), 24 August 1943; Cyprus Post “Trade Unions to call one day general strike on Friday”, 24 August 1943; Eleftheria “Αι συντεχνίαι απεφάσισαν χθες παναπεργίαν δια την Παρασκευήν” (The Trade Unions decided to call for a general labour strike on Friday), 23 August 1943. Anexartitos “Η επιστολή του αποικιακού γραμματέως όσο αφορά την 24ωρον απεργίαν” (The Colonial Secretary’s letter regarding the 24 hour strike), 26 August 1943; Cyprus Post “General Strike - Acting Colonial Secretary’s warning”, 26 August 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Αι απόψεις της Κυβερνήσεως επί της μελετώμενης απεργίας” (The Governmental view regarding the strike which is under study), 26 August 1943. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 August 1943, CO 67/315/8; Anexartitos “Η χθεσινή πανεργατική απεργία” (Yesterday’s general labour strike), 28 August 1943; Cyprus Post “Quiet general strike”, 28 August 1943; Eleftheria “Η χθεσινή συντεχνιακή απεργία” (Yesterday’s Trade Unions’ strike), 28 August 1943. Anexartitos “Η 24ωρος απεργία διαμαρτυρίας δια το ζήτημα του τιμαρίθμου” (The 24 hour strike for the cost of living issue), 19 October 1943; Eleftheria “Συντεχνιακή παναπεργία την προσεχή Δευτέρα προς μείωσιν τιμαρίθμου” (Trade Union general strike next Monday for the reduction of the cost of living), 18 October 1943. Secretary of Nicosia’s Smallshopkeepers’ Union to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 October, Secretary of the Limassol Trade Unions to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 October 1943, CO 67/315/8. Eleftheria “Η εις την Μ. Ανατολήν άφιξις του Βασιλέως και του κ. Τσουδερού” (The arrival of the King and Mr. Tsouderos in the Middle East), 21 March 1943. For the importance of the Gorgopotamos operation see Michalis Miridakis, Η Επιχείρηση του Γοργοπόταμου και το Ε.Α.Μ.-Ε.Λ.Α.Σ (The Gorgopotamos operation and E.A.M.-E.L.A.S.) (Athens: 1983), pp. 39-44. Richard Clogg, Greece 1940-44: Occupation, Resistance, Civil war: a Documentary History (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p.10. Clogg, A Short History of Modern Greece, pp. 144-5; Woodhouse, Modern Greece: a Short History, p.249; Ιστορία Ελληνικού ΄Εθνους (History of the Greek Nation), 16 vols., (Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 2000), vol. 16, p. 26. Petros Roussos, Η Μεγάλη Πενταετία 1940-45 (The great five years 1940-45), (Athens: 1982), 329-335. C. M. Woodhouse, Something Ventured (London: Granada, 1982), pp. 67-8. Woodhouse pointed out that the visit of the resistance delegation to Cairo was ‘handled with disastrous clumsiness’. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Αγωγή κατά του κύρους των δημοτικών εκλογών” (Legal action against the authority of the municipal elections), 8 April 1943. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ηκυρώθησαν αι δημοτικαί εκλογαί της Λεμεσού” (The municipal elections of Limassol have been canceled), 5 August 1943. Anexartitos “Ογκώδεις προεκλογικαί συγκεντρώσεις ΕΜΕΚΕΛ Λεμεσού” (Mass preelection rally of EMEKEL Limassol), 19 September 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Οι Λεμεσιανοί αποθέωσαν χθες τον εθνικόν συνδυασμόν” (The citizens of Limassol glorified yesterday the national combination), 20 September 1943. Anexartitos “Με επικεφαλής τους στρατιώτας της η Λεμεσός θα ψηφίσει το Ε.Μ.Ε.Κ.Ε.Λ” (With her soldiers at its head, Limassol will vote for E.M.E.K.E.L), 3 October 1943.

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100 Eleftheria “Οι χθεσιναί παλλαϊκαί συγκεντρώσεις του εθνικού συνδυασμού” (Yesterday’s widespread rallies of the national combination), 1 October 1943. 101 Eleftheria “Ματαίωσις, λόγω περιορισμών, προεκλογικών ομιλιών εν Λεμεσώ” (Cancellation, due to restrictions, of the pre-election speeches in Limassol), 24 September 1943. 102 Eleftheria “Διαμαρτυρία του Εθνικού Κόμματος προς τον Κυβερνήτην” (Protest of the National Party towards the Governor), 25 September 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Τηλεγραφική διαμαρτυρία” (Protestation by telegram), 25 September 1943. 103 Anexartitos “Η αστυνομία προσήψε κατηγορίας εναντίον οπαδών των αντιπάλων συνδυασμών” (The police pressed charges against supporters of the opposite combination), 24 September 1943. Ploutis Servas protested that the Commissioner’s decision was against the provisions of the Atlantic Charter and of the cause for which the war was fought. The Trade Unions also addressed a telegram to Governor Woolley along the same lines. 104 Anexartitos “Οι αντίπαλοι συνδυασμοί διέλυσαν ψες τις συγκεντώσεις των” (The opposite slates dispersed their crowds last night), 25 September 1943. 105 Eleftheria “΄Ηρθη η απαγορευτική διάταξις για τον κ. Κ. Ελευθεριάδην” (The forbidding order for Mr. C. Eleftheriades has been removed), 26 September 1943. 106 Eleftheria “Τα αποτελέσματα της δημοτικής εκλογής εις την Λεμεσόν” (The results of the Limassol municipal election), 4 October 1943. 107 Anexartitos “Ο χθεσινός πανηγυρικός εορτασμός των επινίκειων των δημοτικών εκλογών” (Yesterday’s festive celebration of the winning results of the municipal elections), 5 October 1943. 1 2

3

4 5 6 7

8

Chapter Seven Anexartitos “Εκλογή χωριτικών αρχών” (Election of rural representatives), 25 November 1943. Anexartitos “Η Β’ Επαρχιακή Συνδιάσκεψις των Συντεχνιών Λεμεσού” (The Second District Conference of Limassol Trade Unions), 30 November 1943. The demand was also incorporated into the list of demands of A.K.E.L.: Anexartitos “Η Γ’ Επαρχιακή συνδιάσκεψις του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. Αμμοχώστου” (The third District Conference of A.K.E.L. Famagusta), 23 December 1943. See some indicative articles in Anexartitos: “Η ύπαιθρος ζητεί εκλογάς χωριτικών αρχών” (Rural areas ask for election of their representatives), 16 December 1943, “Δια την εκλογή χωριτικών αρχών” (For the election of rural representatives), 28 December 1943, “Πολιτικαί ελευθερίαι” (Political liberties), 29 December 1943. Anexartitos “Οι πόθοι του Κυπριακού λαού” (The desires of the Cypriot people), 19 December 1943. Memorandum by the Cyprus Secretariat, May 1943, CO 67/319/4. Cyprus policy, p. 17, CO 67/317/14. The newspaper Anexartitos also served for that purpose. Often it published letters sent from the volunteers serving in the Middle East declaring their dedication to the fight for the freedom of Greece. See some indicative articles: “Γράμματα από τους στρατιώτας μας” (Letters from our soldiers) 17 November 1943; “Νεοσύλλεκτοι της Ελληνικής Βασιλικής Αεροπορίας προς το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (Recruits of the Greek Royal Air Force to A.K.E.L.), 30 November 1943, “Μήνυμα από τους μαχητάς μας” (Message from our fighters), 23 January 1944. Political Report for February 1944, CO 67/323/2.

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9 Political Report for March 1944, CO 67/323/2. 10 Political Report for March 1944, CO 67/323/2. 11 Anexartitos “Αι οικογένειαι εθελοντών Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (The families of A.K.E.L.’s volunteers), 25 December 1943. 12 Political Report for February 1944, CO 67/323/2. 13 Political Report for November 1943, CO 67/323/2; House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, vol. 392, 13 October 1943, columns 869-871; House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, vol. 393, 3 November 1943, columns 648-651. 14 Cyprus Resolution, 1 November 1943 CO 67/314/17: it is also pointed out here for the first time that the Committee for Cyprus Affairs now represents A.K.E.L. in Britain. 15 Anexartitos “Οι εν Αγγλία Κύπριοι και οι εθνικοί μας πόθοι” (Cypriots of Britain and our national claims), 4 November 1943, “Η συνδιάσκεψις των εν Αγγλία Κυπρίων” (The conference of the Cypriots in London), 4 November 1943. 16 Indeed, the leader of E.D.E.S., in an unknown - even to his fellow fighters document and after consultation with Woodhouse stated his support for King George despite his anti-monarchist feelings. According to Fleischer, ‘he sacrificed his extreme anti-monarchist principles for the purpose of taking the leadership of all the anti-EAM parties’. The existence of this document became known much later. Ιστορία Ελληνικού ΄Εθνους (History of the Greek Nation), vol. 16, p. 25 17 Ibid, p. 35; For a discussion on the first round of the Greek Civil war see Ole S. Smith “The ‘first round’ - civil war during occupation” in David H. Close (ed.), The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950 (London and New York: Routlegde, 1993). 18 Ιστορία Ελληνικού ΄Εθνους (History of the Greek Nation), vol. 16, p. 36. 19 For the records of the Plaka agreements see Γενικά Αρχεία Κράτους Ελλάδος (General State Archives of Greece), Small Collections, K.51, File 15, Dispatch 5, ‘Σημείωμα επί των διαπραγματεύσεων Ε.Δ.Ε.Σ.-Ε.Κ.Κ.Α.-Ε.Α.Μ./Ε.Λ.Α.Σ. (Note on the negotiations between E.D.E.S.-E.K.K.A.-E.A.M./E.L.A.S.). 20 Cyprus Post “Greek Guerillas agreement”, 17 March 1944. 21 Indeed, the first references in the Greek Cypriot press on the developments in Greece are traced in early November 1943 already two weeks after the initial physical confrontation between the powers of E.L.A.S. and E.D.E.S. had begun. See Anexartitos “Η κατάστασις εν Ελλάδι” (The situation in Greece), 3 November 1943; Cyprus Post “Greek fights Greek”, 4 November 1943; Eleftheria “΄Εργον των Γερμανών η αδελφοκτόνος σύγκρουσις των εθνικών Ελληνικών ομάδων” (The fratricidal conflict between the Greek national bands is a German job), 1 November 1943, Foni tis Kiprou “Επεισόδια ελληνικών αντάρτικων ομάδων” (Clashes between Greek guerilla groups), 6 November 1943. 22 Anexartitos “Ο Ελληνικός Απελευθρωτικός Στρατός” (The Greek Liberation Army), 18 November 1943 23 Anexartitos “Η κατάστασις εν Ελλάδι” (The situation in Greece), 3 November 1943; Eleftheria “΄Εργον των Γερμανών η αδελφοκτόνος σύγκρουσις των εθνικών Ελληνικών ομάδων” (The fratricidal conflict between the Greek national bands is a German job), 1 November 1943; Kipriakos Tipos “Μεγάλα τμήματα της Ελλάδος απηλευθερώθησαν υπό των ανταρτών” (Great parts of Greece have been liberated by the guerillas), 3 November 1943. 24 Anexartitos “Ο Βασιλεύς των Ελλήνων θα εξετάση το ζήτημα της επανόδου του εις

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Ελλάδα” (The King of Greece will examine the question of his return to Greece), 12 December 1943, “Της επανόδου του Γεωργίου Β’ θα προηγηθεί δημοψήφισμα” (A plebiscite will determine the return of King George II), 14 December 1943; Eleftheria “Το ζήτημα της επανόδου του βασιλέως των Ελλήνων” (The question of the return of the King of Greece), 12 December 1943; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο βασιλεύς των Ελλήνων θα μελετήσει το ζήτημα της επανόδου του εν Ελλάδα” (The King of Greeks will examine the question of his return to Greece),12 December 1943, “Δηλώσεις του κ. Τσουδερού δια την βασιλείαν εις Ελλάδαν” (Statements of Mr. Tsouderos for monarchy in Greece”, 16 December; Kipriakos Tipos “Ελληνικά προβλήματα” (Greek problems), 13 November 1943. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ενώ το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. ενεδρεύει” (While A.K.E.L. is lurking), 10 January 1944. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Δολοφονική απόπειρα εναντίον του υποδιευθυντού του ‘Ν.Κ.Φ.’ κ. Βία Ι. Μαρκίδη” (Murderous attempt against Neos Kipriakos Filakas’s Assistant Editor, Mr. Vias I. Markides), 11 January 1944, “Περί την άνανδρον απόπειραν εναντίον του κ. Βία Ι. Μαρκίδη” (Regarding the cowardly attempt against Mr. Vias I. Markides), 12 January 1944; Kipriakos Tipos “΄Αγνωστοι τραυμάτισαν ψες τον κ. Βίαν Ι Μαρκίδην” (Unknown persons hurt last night Mr. Vias I. Markides), 11 January 1944. Political Report for February 1944, CO 67/323/2. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the colonies, 1 April 1944, CO 67/327/10. Political Report for April 1944, CO 67/323/2. Pafos “Τηλεγραφική έκκλησις του Σεβ. Τοποτηρητού του αρχιεπισκοπικού θρόνου” (Telegraphic appeal of H.R. the Locum Tenens of the Archiepiscopal See), 30 March 1944. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth series, vol. 400, 25 May 1944, columns 1027-1028; Eleftheria “Συνηγορία εν τη Βουλή υπέρ των Ελληνικών εθνικών διεκδικήσεων” (Support in the Parliament in favour of the Greek national demands), 27 May 1944. Anexartitos “Το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς τον ΄Αγγλον εργατικόν βουλευτήν κ. Πάρκερ” (A.K.E.L. to the English labour M.P. Mr. Parker), 28 May 1944; Eleftheria “Το Εθνικόν Κόμμα προς τον κ. Πάρκερ” (The National Party to Mr. Parker), 28 May 1944. Kipriakos Tipos “Ενώ ημείς αλληλοτρωγόμεθα - πώς σκέπτονται οι συμπατριώται μας Τούρκοι” (While we fight between us - how do our Turkish compatriots think), 10 March 1944, “Οι Τούρκοι εναντίον της Ενώσεως και της αυτοδιοικήσεως” (The Turks are against Enosis and self government), 8 May 1944. Kipriakos Tipos “Οι Τούρκοι και οι επερωτήσεις του κ. Πάρκερ” (The Turks and the questions of Mr. Parker), 2 June 1944. Kipriakos Tipos “Μυωπικόν άρθρον τουρκικής εφημερίδος” (Short sighted article of Turkish newspaper), 3 May 1944. Pagkipria Ergatiki Omospondia (P.E.O.), Αγώνες για τον τιμάριθμο 1940-44 (Struggles for the cost of living), p. 130. Anexartitos “Δε θα δοθεί αύξησις εις τους εργάτας κυβερνητικών έργων” (There will not be a rise in the wages of the Government employees), 27 February 1944. Political report for March 1944, CO 67/323/2; Anexartitos “Η απεργία των εργατών των κυβερνητικών έργων” (The strike of employees in the Public Department), 2 March 1944.

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39 Anexartitos “Η εξέλιξις της απεργίας εις κυβερνητικά έργα” (The development of the strike at the public works), 8 March 1944. 40 Anexartitos “Η απεργία εις τα κυβερνητικά έργα” (The strike at the Government works), 3 March 1944. 41 Anexartitos “Η Α.Σ. ο Τοποτηρητής και ο αγών των εργατών κυβερνητικών έργων” (H.R. the Locum Tenens and the struggle of the employees of the Public works), 1 March 1944; Cyprus Post “Locum Tenens gives his blessings to Trade Union Committee” 1 March 1944; Eleftheria “Αλληλογραφία Συντεχνιών - Τοποτηρητού” (Correspondence between the Trade Unions and the Locum Tenens), 1 March 1944; Kipriakos Tipos “Η Α.Σ. ο Τοποτηρητής και ο αγών των εργατών κυβερν. έργων” (H. R. the Locum Tenens and the struggle of the workers of the Public works), 1 March 1944; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Τα εργατικά αιτήματα και ο Τοποτηρητής” (The Locum Tenens and the labour demands), 1 March 1944. 42 Eleftheria “Η απεργία και το Εθνικό Κόμμα” (The strike and the National Party), 6 March 1944; Cyprus Post “Dr. Dervis and National Party support strikers”, 7 March 1944. 43 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η απεργία” (The strike), 8 March 1944; Eleftheria “Απεφασίσθη 24ωρος απεργία” (A twenty four hour strike has been decided), 8 March 1944. 44 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η απεργία” (The strike) 8 March 1944. 45 Hugh Foot served as Colonial Secretary in Cyprus until 1945. After the war he served in Jamaica (Colonial Secretary 1945-7 and Governor 1951-7) and Nigeria (Chief Secretary 1947-50). He returned to Cyprus to assume duties as the last colonial Governor from 1957 up until the island’s independence in 1960. 46 Anexartitos “Συνεχίζεται η απεργία εις τα κυβερνητικά έργα” (The strike at the public works continues), 7 March 1944; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ο Αποικιακός Γραμματέας απέρριψε τα αιτήματα των απεργών” (The Colonial Secretary rejected the demands of the strikers), 7 March 1944. 47 Anexartitos “Επίσημος ανακοίνωσις επί της απεργίας στρατιωτικών έργων” (Official announcement on the strike in military works), 12 March 1944; Cyprus Post “Military personnel for essential works-Government warning to strikers”, 12 March 1944; Eleftheria “Επίσημον ανακοινωθέν” (Official announcement), 12 March 1944; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η Κυβέρνησις έναντι της απεργίας” (The Government in relation to the strike), 12 March 1944. 48 The local press also participated in the strike. On Monday 13 March, no newspapers were published. Due to the strike the railway also did not operate. Anexartitos “Η χθεσινή πανεργατική απεργία διαμαρτυρίας” (Yesterday’s pan-labour protestation strike), 14 March 1944; Cyprus Post “Orderly General Strike - leaders urge strike to go on”, 14 March 1944; Eleftheria “Παναπεργία και ψηφίσματα” (General strike and resolutions), 14 March 1944. 49 Anexartitos “Η χθεσινή συνάντησις της Π.Σ.Ε. μετά του Απ. Γραμματέως” (Yesterday meeting of P.S.E. with the Colonial Secretary), 18 March 1944; Cyprus Post “Strike: talks fail to produce settlement-Colonial Secretary’s statement”, 18 March 1944; Eleftheria “Η χθεσινή συνεύντευξις μετά τον αποικιακόν Γραμματέαν” (Yesterday’s interview with the colonial secretary), 18 March 1944. 50 Political Report for March 1944, CO 67/323/2; Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 March 1944, CO 67/327/10; Eleftheria “Αι χθεσιναί εργατικαί συγκεντρώσεις και διαδηλώσεις” (Yesterday’s labour gatherings and demonstrations), 20 March 1944.

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51 Cyprus Post “New turn in Government workers’ strike-more military used to replace strikers”, 21 March 1944; Eleftheria “Από της χθες ήρχισεν η αντικατάστασις των απεργών” (The replacement of the strikers started yesterday), 21 March 1944. 52 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 March 1944, CO 67/327/10; Eleftheria “Το εθνικό κόμμα και η απεργία” (The National Party and the strike), 21 March 1944. 53 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 March 1944, CO 67/327/10; Anexartitos “Η Π.Σ.Ε. συνηντήθη και πάλιν χθες μετά του έντ. Αποικιακού Γραμματέως” (P.S.E. had yet another meeting with the Hon. Colonial Secretary). 54 In the announcement Ziartides stated that the strike had led to a partial - yet important - political victory of Cypriots. Anexartitos “Κηρύσσεται από σήμερον ανακωχή εις την απεργίαν Κυβερνητικών έργων” (A truce is declared at the strike at the Government works as from today), 24 March 1944. 55 Political Report for March 1944, CO 67/323/2. 56 Anexartitos “Προκήρυξις του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (A.K.E.L.’s proclamation), 16 March 1944; Cyprus Post “Seventeen days”, 17 March 1944; For the role of the editor of Cyprus Post, Percy Arnold, in the strike see Percy Arnold, Cyprus Challenge, (London: the Hogarth Press, 1956), pp. 91-102. 57 Governor Woolley to Oliver Stanley, 10 June 1943, CO 67/313/9. 58 Discussion with Mr. Shaw, Colonial Secretary of Cyprus, 1 September 1943, CO 67/318/14. 59 Discussion with Mr. Shaw, Colonial Secretary of Cyprus, 30 August 1943, CO 67/318/14. 60 Discussion with Mr. Shaw, Colonial Secretary of Cyprus, 30 August 1943, CO 67/318/14. 61 Anexartitos “Επιστολή του Σ. Τοποτηρητού κ. Λεοντίου προς την Α.Ε. τον Κυβερνήτην Κύπρου” (Letter of H.R. the Locum Tenens Mr. Leontios to H.E. the Governor of Cyprus), 20 November 1943; Chronos “Δια τη λύσιν του αρχιεπισκοπικού” (Regarding the solution of the archiepiscopal problem), 20 November 1943; Cyprus Post “Locum Tenens renounces personal interest in Archiepiscopal throne”, 20 November 1943; Eleftheria “Ο Πανιερώτατος Τοποτηρητής ανακινεί το αρχιεπισκοπικό ζήτημα” (H.R. the Locum Tenens brings up the archiepiscopal question), 20 November 1943. 62 For a number of these telegrams see CO 67/313/9, pp. 46-55. 63 Eleftheria “Ο Πανιερώτατος Τοποτηρητής εκήρυξε βαρύτατο εκκλησιαστικό πένθος λόγω των αρχιεπισκοπικών νόμων” (H.R. the Locum Tenens declared the Church in a state of deep mourning due to the archiepiscopal laws), 4 December 1943. 64 Foni tis Kiprou “Ελληνική Ορθόδοξος εκκλησία της Κύπρου - εγκύκλιος” (The Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus - memorandum), 4 December 1943. 65 Anexartitos “Τηλεγράφημα του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς τον υπουργό των αποικιών” (A.K.E.L.’s telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies), 5 December 1943. 66 Those were: Manchester Guardian, The Times, Spectator and Church Times. 67 Anexartitos “Η Π.Ο.Θ.Ο.Ι. ζητεί πλήρη ελευθερία της Εκκλησίας μας” (P.O.R.O.I. demands the complete freedom of our Church), 15 December 1943. 68 House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, fifth series, vol. 397, 16 February 1944, columns 161-2; Anexartitos “Επερωτήσεις εν τη Βουλή δια το αρχιεπισκοπικόν” (Questions in Parliament for the archiepiscopal issue), 17 February 1944; Lambeth

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CYPRUS IN WORLD WAR II Palace Library, William Temple Papers, vol. 27, Extract from Official Report, 16 February 1944, p.275; Eleftheria “Απογοητευτικαί δηλώσεις του υπουργού δια το αρχιεπισκοπικόν” (Disappointing decisions of the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the archiepiscopal question), 17 February 1944, “Τι ακριβώς ελέχθη εις την βουλήν των κοινοτήτων δια το αρχιεπισκοπικόν” (What was exactly said at the House of Parliament for the archiepiscopal question), 21 February 1944. Eleftheria “Απροσδόκηται δηλώσεις” (Unexpected statements), 18 February 1944; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Υπουργός και αρχιεπισκοπικόν” (The Secretary of State for the Colonies and the archiepiscopal question), 18 February 1944, “Υπουργός, Βρετανία και Κύπρος” (The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Britain and Cyprus), 24 February 1944. Eleftheria “Απροσδόκηται δηλώσεις” (Unexpected statements), 18 February 1944. The correspondence exchanged between the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley and the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple, is revealing as to the extent to which the Colonial Office was hesitant to take any steps towards the solution of the problem during the war: “This question of the Cyprus Archbishopric is unfortunately full of politics. It forms one aspect of what is, without exception, the most difficult political issue in Cyprus – namely the movement for Union with Greece (Enosis). Both matters will have to be dealt with in due course, but you will readily understand that at this stage in the war I am most reluctant to take any step which might encourage public discussion, whether in this country or in Cyprus, of those highly controversial political matters”, Lambeth Palace Library, William Temple Papers, vol. 27, The Secretary of State for the Colonies Oliver Stanley to the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury William Temple, 16 March 1944, p. 275. Locum Tenens to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 February 1944, CO 67/321/6. Anexartitos “Τηλεγράφημα του Τοποτηρητού προς τον Υπουργόν Αποικιών” (Telegram of the Locum Tenens to the Secretary of State for the Colonies), 22 February 1944; Cyprus Post “Locum Tenens replies to the Secretary of State”, 19 February 1944; Eleftheria “΄Εγγραφον Τοποτηρητού προς τον υπουργόν δια το αρχιεπισκοπικόν” (The Locum Tenens’ document to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the archiepiscopal question), 22 February 1944; Kipriakos Tipos “Ο Τοποτηρητής επί των δηλώσεων του υπουργού δια το αρχιεπισκοπικόν” (The Locum Tenens on the statements of the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the archiepiscopal question), 21 February 1994; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Διαμαρτυρία του Τοποτηρητού προς τον Υπουργό των αποικιών” (The Locum Tenens’s protest to the Secretary of State for the Colonies), 22 February 1944. Cyprus Post “Locum Tenens replies to the Secretary of State”, 19 February 1944. Neos Kipriakos Filax “Το Εθνικόν Κόμμα και το αρχιεπισκοπικό” (The National Party and the archiepiscopal question), 19 February 1944, “Δια το αρχιεπισκοπικόν” (Regarding the archiepiscopal question), 21 February 1944; For a number of telegrams addressed to the Colonial authorities in London see: pp.101-2, 107-116, CO 67/321/6; Secretary of the Trast Club to the Prime Minister, 29 February 1944, FO 371/43752, R 3307/3307/19. The clerics were: Archimandrite Hippolytos, the Exarch of the Archbishopric Ieronymos; Parthenios Kirmitsis, Kyprianos Kyriakides, Iacovos Pavlou and deacon Dorotheos: p. 85, CO 67/321/6.

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77 Eleftheria “Τι έγραψαν προς τους Πατριάρχας οι κληρικοί της αρχιεπισκοπής” (What did the clerics of the Archbishop wrote to the Patriarchs), 11 May 1944; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Δια το αρχιεπισκοπικόν εζητήθη η παρέμβασις των πατριαρχών;” (Was the intervention of the Patriarchs asked for the archiepiscopal question?), 4 May 1944, “Η Ιερά Σύνοδος Αλεξάνδρειας έγραψεν προν τον Οικουμενικόν Πατριάρχην δια το αρχιεπισκοπικόν” (The Holy Synod of Alexandria wrote to the Ecumenical Patriarch for the archiepiscopal question), 9 May 1944; Foni tis Kiprou “Απειθαρχία κληρικών” (Indiscipline of clerics), 13 May 1944. 78 Foni tis Kiprou “Το τηλεγράφημα του Τοποτηρητού” (The telegram of the Locum Tenens), 13 May 1944 79 Foni tis Kiprou “Εγκατάστασις του Σεβ. Τοποτηρητού εις Μετόχιον Σταυροβουνίου” (His H.R. the Locum Tenens has settled at the Stavrovouni monastery), 20 May 1944. 80 Anexartitos “Ανακοινωθέν - το αρχιεπισκοπικόν μας ζήτημα - ανακοινωθέν του Σ. Τοποτηρητού” (Announcement: our archiepiscopal question - announcement of H.R. the Locum Tenens), 20 May 1944; Kipriakos Tipos “Ο ΄Αγιος Πάφου ομιλεί προς τον Κυπριακόν Τύπο” (The Saint of Pafos speaks to Kipriakos Tipos), 19 May 1944. 81 Archimandrite Hippolytos to the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, 19 March 1944, CO 67/321/6. 82 Foni tis Kiprou “Φωνή κλήρου και λαού” (The voice of the clericals and of the people), 20 May 1944, Kipriakos Tipos “Εν γρηγόρση” (Vigilance), 16 May 1944. 83 Eleftheria “Επιβεβλημένη πρωτοβουλία” (A necessary initiative), 24 May 1944. 84 Anexartitos “Οι δήμαρχοι Λεμεσού και Αμμοχώστου παρά τω Τοποτηρητή” (The Mayors of Limassol and Famagusta by the side of the Locum Tenens), 25 May 1944. 85 Eleftheria “Αξιέπαινος συνδιαλλαγή” (Praiseworthy settlement), 30 May 1944. 86 Eleftheria “΄Αφιξις του Π. Τοποτηρητού εις την αρχιεπισκοπήν του” (Arrival of H.R. the Locum Tenens to his archbishopric), 1 June 1944. 87 For the official announcement on P.E.E.A.’s foundation see Emmanouil Tsouderos, Ελληνικές Ανωμαλίες στη Μέση Ανατολή (Greek Abnormalities in the Middle East), (Athens: Aetos, 1945) pp. 116-7. 88 Evangelos Spyropoulos, The Greek Military (1909-1941) and the Greek Mutinies in the Middle East(1941-44), (Boulder; New York: East European Monographs, 1993), pp. 326-7. 89 Vasilis Nefeloudis, Η Εθνική Αντίσταση στη Μέση Ανατολή (The Greek Resistance in the Middle East), vols. 2 (Athens: Themelio, 1981), vol. 2, pp. 22-26. 90 Leeper to Foreign Office, 7 April 1944, p. 310, PREM 3/211/1. 91 Eleftheria “Παρητήθη χθες ο κ. Τσουδερός” (Mr. Tsouderos resigned yesterday), 4 April 1944. 92 General Paget to the Prime Minister, 8 April 1944, PREM 3/211/11; Mutiny 1 Greek Brigade, 26 April 1944, WO 201/1769. 93 Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, 24 April 1944, PREM 3/211/12. 94 Leeper to Foreign Office, 26 April 1944, PREM 3/211/13. 95 Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, Φωτιά και Τσεκούρι (By axe and fire), (Athens: Estia, 1990), pp. 131-2. 96 Anexartitos “Τα γεγονότα επί των τριών ελληνικών πολεμικών” (The events regarding the three Greek warships), 25 April 1944; Eleftheria “Θλιβερά ανταρσία εις τρία ελληνικά πολεμικά” (Sad mutinies in three Greek warships), 24 April 1944; Kipriakos Tipos “Ελληνική πολιτική κρίσις” (Greek political crisis), 15 April 1944; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Εμφύλιος σπαραγμός μεταξύ των μελών του ελληνικού ναυτικού”

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(Civil strife within members of the Greek navy), 24 April 1944. 97 Neos Kipriakos Filax “΄Ελληνες κομμουνισταί θέλουν αυτονόμησιν της Μακεδονίας” (Greek communists want an autonomous Macedonia), 24 April 1944. 98 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Αδελφικόν αίμα” (Brotherly blood), 25 April 1944. 99 Secretary General of the Cyprus National Party to H. E. President of the Greek Government Sophocles Venizelos, 26 April 1944, CO 67/323/2; Neos Kipriakos Filax “Η Κύπρος καταδικάζει τους υπέρ αυτονομίας της Μακεδονίας - Αξιοί άμεσον τερματισμόν των διενέξεων” (Cyprus condemns those who are in favour of an autonomous Macedonia - demands the immediate ending of the conflicts), 27 April 1944. 100 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Διάγγελμα Κ.Ε.Κ. προς Κυπριακόν λαόν” (K.E.K.’s announcement to Cypriot people), 9 May 1944. 101 It is noteworthy that Ezekias Papaioannou attended the works of the conference representing the A.K.E.L. branch of London. He was elected at the party’s central committee. 102 Anexartitos “΄Εληξαν αι εργασίαι του Γ’ Παγκυπρίου Συνεδρίου του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (The works of the Third Pan Cyprian A.K.E.L. conference have reached their end), 25 April 1944. 103 Anexartitos “Μήνυμα του Γ’ Συνεδρίου του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς τους ΄Ελληνας αντάρτας” (Message of the Third Conference of A.K.E.L. towards the Greek guerillas), 27 April 1944. 104 Anexartitos “Ανακοινωθέν του πολιτικού γραφείου του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (Announcement of the political committee of A.K.E.L.), 30 April 1944. 105 Political Situation, 18 May, p.18, CO 67/323/2. 106 For the records of the Lebanon Conference see General State Archives of Greece, Small Collections, G.S.A. K51, File 4 Dispatch A, pp. 1-18. 1 2 3 4 5 6

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8 9

Chapter Eight Eleftheria “Αντιπρόσωπος του Υπουργείου Αποικιών στην Κύπρον” (Representative of the Colonial Office in Cyprus), 21 July 1944. Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 June 1944, CO 67/329/10. Eleftheria “Ευπρόσδεκτος επίσκεψις” (Welcome visit), 22 July 1944. Archbishopric of Cyprus, Private Papers of Archbishop Leontios, Book ΙΕ (15), See the exchange of telegrams between the National Party and Leontios on that matter, pp. 249-259. Cyprus Post “Joint proposals for Sir Cosmo - Locum Tenens takes the lead”, 10 August 1944. Anexartitos “Αι προσπάθειαι του Τοποτηρητού δι υποβολήν κοινού υπομνήματος προς τον κ. Πάρκινσον - ανακοινωθέν του Πολιτικού Γραφείου του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (The Locum Tenens’s efforts for submission of a joint memorandum to Mr. Parkinson), 11 August 1944. This newspaper was established in July 1944 and was edited by the prominent lawyer and conservative figure Zenon Sozos. Simultaneously, the left Trade Unions also published their own paper entitled Ανόρθωσις (Anorthosis) edited by the Nicosia Trade Unions’ General Secretary, Stelios Iacovides. Pirsos “Πολιτικόν καμουφλάρισμα” (Political camouflage), 9 August 1944. Eleftheria “Αποκατάστασις της αλήθειας” (Restoration of the truth), 10 August 1944.

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10 Anexartitos “Ο Σερ Κόσμο Πάρκινσον έφθασε χθες εις Κύπρον” (Sir Cosmo Parkinson arrived yesterday in Cyprus), 12 August 1944. 11 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 13 July 1944, CO 67/329/10. 12 Draft telegram to the Governor of Cyprus, 14 August 1944, CO 67/323/3. 13 Anexartitos “Η επίσκεψη του αντιπροσώπου του υπουργού αποικιών στην Κύπρο” (The visit of the representative of the Secretary of State for the Colonies in Cyprus), 29 July 1944; Pirsos “Διάγγελμα Κυπριακού Εθνικού Κόμματος” (Announcement of Cypriot National Party), 5 August 1944. 14 Arnold, Cyprus Challenge, p. 132. 15 Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 August 1944, CO 67/323/3. 16 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 August 1944, CO 67/323/3. 17 Eleftheria “Επίσημον ανακοινωθέν” (Official communiqué), 17 August 1944. 18 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 19 August 1944, CO 67/323/3. 19 Anexartitos “Οι συλληφθέντες δια την παρέλασιν προσήχθησαν προ του δικαστηρίου” (The arrested for the demonstration were prosecuted in court), 19 August 1944. 20 Arnold, Cyprus Challenge, p. 134. 21 Eleftheria “Η χθεσινή σύσκεψις των δημοσιογράφων μετά του αντιπροσώπου του υπουργού και η αξίωσις της Ενώσεως με την Ελλάδα” (Yesterday’s meeting of the journalists with the representative of the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the demand of Enosis with Greece), 21 August 1944. 22 Arnold, Cyprus Challenge, pp. 139-40. 23 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Οι ΄Ελληνες δημοσιογράφοι εξέφρασαν χθες προφορικώς προς τον Σερ Κ.. Πάρκινσον τον μοναδικόν πόθον του λαού μας” (The Greek journalists expressed orally yesterday to Sir C. Parkinson the only desire of our people), 22 August 1944. 24 Ανόρθωσις, “Προκήρυξις της Κ.Ε. Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς τον Κυπριακόν λαόν”, 23 August 1944. 25 The Proscription of the Reform Party of the Working People, 14 December 1955, CO 926/2084. 26 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 27 August 1944, CO 67/323/3. 27 Ibid. 28 Anorthosis, “Προκήρυξις Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. προς τον Κυπριακόν λαόν” (A.K.E.L.’s proclamation to Cypriot people), 23 August 1944. 29 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Αι επιδόσεις ψηφισμάτων υπό οργανώσεων και του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (The submission of resolutions by organizations and A.K.E.L.), 29 August 1944. 30 Governor of Cyprus to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 August 1944, CO 67/323/3. 31 Arnold, Cyprus Challenge, p. 149. 32 Storrs’ report on the ‘Disturbances in Cyprus in October 1931’, CO 67/243/1. 33 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Απάντησις του Σερ Κόσμο Πάρκινσον προς τον κ. Σέρβαν” (The answer of Sir Cosmo Parkinson to Mr. Servas), 27 August 1944. 34 Pirsos “Η Κομμούνα τορπιλλίζει” (Communists torpedo), 25 August 1944. 35 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Διαγραφή αξιωματούχων του Κ. Εθνικού Κόμματος της επαρχίας Λάρνακος” (Expulsion of members of the National Party of Larnaca

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District), 30 August 1944. 36 Eleftheria “Αι χθεσιναί συγκεντώσεις” (Yesterday’s gatherings), 29 August 1944. 37 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Συνέντευξις του Εθνικού Κόμματος μετά του Σερ Κόσμο” (Interview of the National Party with Sir Cosmo), 23 August 1944. 38 C. M. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece: 1941-49 (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), pp. 86-87. 39 Warner to Eden, 4 August 1944, PREM 3/212/1. 40 Churchill to Eden, 6 August 1944, PREM 3/312/1. 41 Other provisions included that the Security Battalions were regarded as enemy forces. See Macmillan to Eden, 26 September 1944, PREM 3/212/14. 42 Campbell to Eden, 27 July 1944, PREM 3/66/7. 43 David Close (ed.), The Greek Civil War, p. 72. 44 Winston Churchill very vividly described the scene: “…The moment was apt for business, so I said, ‘Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions and agents there. Don’t let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety percent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?’ While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper… [gives the names of the countries and the percentages]…I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more than it takes to set down…After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, ‘Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper’. ‘No, you keep it’, said Stalin.” Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War-Triumph and Tragedy, 6vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), vol.6, pp. 226-8. 45 For the background of the agreement see Stephen Xydis, Greece and the Great powers 1944-1947 (Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1963), pp. 54-59. 46 The Times “Return to Greece”, 6 October 1944. 47 Garrisons of Greek units that collaborated with the Germans during the occupation. 48 David Close, The Greek Civil War, pp.78-79. 49 The Times “Mr. Papandreou in Athens”, 19 October 1944. 50 Georgios Papandreou, Η Aπελευθέρωσις της Ελλάδος (The Liberation of Greece), (Nicosia:Ekdosis Diethnous Vivliopoliou kai Praktoriou Tipou, 1945), p. 137. 51 Telegram sent from Acting Archbishop Leontios to Bishop of Kozani, no date, p. 448, CO 67/323/3; Eleftheria “Πατριωτικόν τηλεγράφημαν Τοποτηρητού προς Κοζάνης” (Patriotic telegram of Locum Tenens to the Bishop of Kozani), 15 July 1944. 52 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ανθελληνική η στάσις του Ε.Α.Μ.” (Anti-Hellenic attitude of E.A.M.), 14 June 1944. 53 Anexartitos “Συμπληρωματικαί θέσεις της Κ. Επιτροπής του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (Supplementary points from A.K.E.L.’s Central Committee), 9 June 1944. 54 Anexartitos “΄Ερανος για την Ελλάδα” (A fund for Greece), 13 September 1944. 55 See the editorials in Neos Kipriakos Filax on 13, 14, 16 and 17 September 1944. 56 Eleftheria “Εθνικοί έρανοι” (National funds), 17 September 1944. 57 Eleftheria “Προς διενέργεια νέων εράνων” (Towards the conduct of new funds), 21 September 1944. 58 Pirsos “Η χθεσινή παγκύπριος συνέλευσις δια τους εθνικούς εράνους” (Yesterday’s pan

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Cyprian assembly for the national funds), 26 September 1944. 59 Acting Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 11 November 1944, CO 67/323/3. 60 Eleftheria “Τάσσονται υπέρ του Εθνικού Συμβουλίου” (Supporting the foundation of a National Council), 26 September 1944. 61 Anexartitos “Η χθεσινή συνεδρία της Κ.Ε. των εθνικών εράνων” (Yesterday’s meeting of the Central Committee for the national funds), 1 October 1944. 62 Acting Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 October 1944, CO 67/323/3. 63 Acting Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 October 1944, CO 67/323/3. 64 Acting Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 October 1944, CO 67/323/3. 65 Rolandos Katsiaounis, “Οι Ελληνοβρετανικές σχέσεις, ο Αντιβασιλέας Δαμασκηνός και η Κύπρος, Οκτώβριος 1944 - Σεπτέμβριος 1945” (Greco-British relations, Regent Damaskinos and Cyprus, October 1944-September 1945), Epetiris Kentrou Epistimonikon Erevnon, 19, (1992), pp. 456-7. 66 Foreign Office to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 October 1944, CO 67/323/3. 67 Foreign Office to the Ambassador in Greece, 27 October 1944, FO 286/1154. 68 Eleftheria “Το ζήτημα της κομματικής εκεχειρίας-ανακοινωθέν Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (The question of the political truce-A.K.E.L.’s announcement), 9 October 1944, “Το Κ.Ε.Κ. και η κομματική εκεχειρία” (K.E.K. and the political truce), 10 October 1944. 69 Eleftheria “Δια κομματικήν εκεχειρίαν” (For the political truce), 12 October 1944. 70 Eleftheria “Η προς εθνικήν συνεργασίαν προχθεσινή σύσκεψις των κυπριακών κομμάτων” (The meeting for national cooperation between the Cypriot parties that was held two days ago), 20 October 1944. 71 Anexartitos “Αι προσπάθειαι προς πραγματοποίησιν της εθνικής ενότητος ευοδούνται” (The efforts for the realization of the national unity have happy results), 16 November 1944. 72 Acting Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 November 1944, CO 67/323/3. 73 Neos Kipriakos Filax “Ευτυχής τροπή του ζητήματος της ενότητος” (Happy outcome of the question of unity), 25 November 1944. 74 Acting Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 14 October 1944, CO 67/323/3. 75 Acting Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 October 1944, CO 67/323/3. 76 A. Fantis to A. Ziartides, 27 October 1944, CO 67/323/3. 77 Governor Woolley to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 May 1944, CO 67/323/2. 78 The Fund was first introduced in 1929, but it was with the Act of 1940 that significant financial help was provided to the Colonies for development and welfare works. Hill points out that during 1940-43, Cyprus was benefited with the amount of one million and seventy thousand pounds, which were devoted for development purposes. Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol.4, pp. 482-4. 79 Note of a meeting in the Secretary of State’s room on the 21 December 1944, CO 67/323/6.

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80 At that time troops in Cyprus consisted of two Indian Battalions which were fully mobilized. There were also two thousand fighter pilots serving in R.A.F. School in the island. 81 Cyprus Situation: Note of the Discussion at the Colonial Office, 21 November 1944, CO 67/323/3. Woolley’s insistence is significant since it provides the origin for the logic behind the infamous ‘never’ statement by Hopkinson in 1954. 82 Note of a Meeting in the Secretary of State’s room on the 21 December 1944, CO 67/323/6. 83 Winston Churchill had then stated: ‘I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire’. 84 Note of a meeting in the Secretary of State’s room on the 21 December 1944, CO 67/323/6. 85 Eleftheria “Η ψεσινή προς την Κύπρον ομιλία του κ. Λανίτου” (Last night’s speech of Mr. Lanitis’ to Cyprus), 13 November 1944. 86 The traditionally large Greek community in Egypt duly celebrated the news. The Times “Liberation of Athens”, 14 October 1944. 87 It is estimated that a million Greeks died of famine during the occupation. The Times “Grim plight of Greece”, 9 October 1944; Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece (New Haven and London: 2001), pp. 32-72. 88 G. M. Alexander, The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece 1944-47, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), pp. 64-76. 89 John Iatrides, Ambassador MacVeagh reports: Greece, 1933-1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 654. 90 The Times “Crowd fired on in Athens”, 4 December 1944. 91 Churchill to Eden, 7 November 1944, PREM 3/212/14. 92 Damaskinos was elected Bishop of Athens in 1938, but the Metaxas regime intervened. Metaxas overruled the decision of the Holy Synod and appointed the Bishop of Trabizond Chrysanthos as the new Archbishop. The Bishop was well known in Cyprus, as he had been considered a potential candidate for the island’s own archiepiscopal elections in 1937, and for whom a portion of the ecclesiastical laws of 1937 had been enacted. The Colonial Authority in Cyprus had in fact used the Metaxas intervention in Greek ecclesiastical affairs to justify its own policy with regard to church affairs in Cyprus. When the Germans occupied Greece, Chrysanthos was dethroned because he refused to swear in the puppet government of General Tsolakoglou. He was then replaced by Damaskinos, who demonstrated a humanitarian attitude throughout those difficult years. Damaskinos had opposed the persecution of the Greek Jewish community, and when he was threatened with execution he allegedly replied: “The religious leaders of this country are not shot; they are hung instead. I ask you, General, to please respect this tradition”. For Damaskinos’s resistance activities during the occupation see generally: Ilias Venezis, Αρχιεπίσκοπος Δαμασκηνός: οι Χρόνοι της Δουλείας (Archbishop Damaskinos: the Years of Slavery), (Athens: Estia, 1981). 93 Ilias Venezis, Αρχιεπίσκοπος Δαμασκηνός: οι Χρόνοι της Δουλείας (Archbishop Damaskinos: the Years of Slavery), (Athens: Estia, 1981), pp. 283-286. 94 Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6, pp. 313-316. 95 The Times “Mr. Churchill meets the rival leaders”, 27 December 1944. 96 Foot to S.E.V. Luke, 15 February 1945, CO 67/324/4.

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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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Chapter Nine Eleftheria “Τα ελληνικά γεγονότα και τα εδώ κόμματα” (Greek developments and local [Cypriot] parties), 4 December 1944. Eleftheria “Χριστιανισμός και κομμουνισμός” (Christianity and Communism), 5 December 1944. Anexartitos “Η ελληνική πολιτική κρίση: ανακοίνωση της Κ.Ε. του Α.Κ.Ε.Λ.” (The Greek political crisis: announcement of A.K.E.L.’s Central Committee), 6 December 1944. Acropolis “Το Κ.Ε.Κ. επί της εν Ελλάδι καταστάσεως” (K.E.K. on the Greek situation), 4 January 1945. Leaflets distributed in Nicosia and Famagusta in December 1944, pp. 210-15, CO 67/323/5. Pirsos “Το καθήκον του Εθνάρχου μας” (The duty of our Ethnarch), 2 January 1945. The members of the Bureau were: Stavros Stavrinakis, Georgios Makrides, Ioannis Klerides and Achilleas Emilianides. Reserving members were: Kyrillos Pavlides and Nicolaos Iacovides. Apostle Barnabas, Season 3, Vol. 6, 3 January 1945, p. 17. Acting Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 January 1945, CO 67/327/16. Eleftheria “Επανήλθεν ο Κυβερνήτης-μεγάλα σχέδια αναπτύξεως” (The Governor has returned-great development plans), 28 January 1945. For the plan see CO 67/328/11 and CO 67/328/12. Ashley Jackson discusses the dimensions of this problem in Africa, mainly in Botswana. See Ashley Jackson, Botswana 1939-1945: an African Country at War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) pp.217-258. See also David Killingray, “Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen and Politics in the Gold Coast 1939-50” in Journal of Modern African Studies, 21, (1983:3). Memorandum on Demobilization and Settlement of Ex-soldiers in Cyprus on the Termination of War in Europe, no date, pp. 69-81, CO 67/328/5. Political report for February 1945, CO 67/323/4. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 March 1945, CO 67/324/4. Resolution of the 1st meeting of Ex-servicemen, 28 January 1945, CO 67/323/5. Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10 April 1945, CO 67/323/5. Makarios of Kyrenia to the Governor of Cyprus, 6 February 1945, CO 67/324/4. Governor Woolley to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31 March 1945, CO 67/324/4. Greek Consul Nicosia to the Foreign Ministry Athens, 22 March 1945, CO 968/125/7. ‘New York Times’ report on United States policy concerning the cession of Cyprus to Greece, 3 January, pp. 5-6, FO 371/48360, R 708/708/19. Indeed, Churchill’s order that Athens should be treated ‘like a conquered city’ had been leaked through an American press source. ‘New York Times’ report on United States policy concerning the cession of Cyprus to Greece, From Foreign Office to Washington, 4 January 1945, p.9, FO 371/48360, R 708/708/19. These were initially held by the censor but were eventually allowed to be sent.

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25 Parliamentary Debates, Fifth series, vol. 407, 17 January 1945, columns 157-8. 26 Parliamentary Debates, Fifth series, vol. 407, 17 January 1945, columns 157-8. 27 Eleftheria “Ο Παν. Τοποτηρητής προς τον Τσέρτσιλ δια το μέλλον της Κύπρου” (The Rev. Locum Tenens to Churchill for the future of Cyprus), 5 February 1945. 28 Battershill to Governor Woolley, 18 April 1944, CO 67/329/6. 29 The Greek Claim to Cyprus, Research Department of Foreign Office, March 1944, CO 67/319/5. 30 Woolley to Battershill, 8 July 1944, CO 67/319/5. 31 Minute by A. Acheson, 10 August 1944, CO 67/319/5. 32 S. E. V. Luke to the Under Secretary of State for the Foreign Office, 12 March 1945, CO 67/327/16. 33 Williams to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, 9 April 1945, CO 67/327/16. 34 Note of a Discussion with the Secretary of State on the 22nd May 1945, CO 67/327/16. 35 An Appreciation of the Military Implications of the Palestine Problem on Imperial Strategy, 2 May 1944, CO 67/319/5. 36 The Bureau functioned as a separate organization for the Fabian Society. It acted as a clearing house for information on colonial affairs and became a pressure group acting on behalf of colonial people. The Bureau was renamed the Commonwealth Bureau in 1958. In 1964 it was amalgamated with the International Bureau and a few years later absorbed back into the Society. 37 Fabian Colonial Bureau, Strategic Colonies and their Future: the Problems of Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus (London: Fabian Society, 1945), pp. 35-6. 38 Anexartitos “Δια τον εορτασμόν της Εθνικής επετείου” (For the celebration of the national anniversary), 10 March 1945. 39 Eleftheria “Η 25η Μαρτίου και οι μαθηταί” (25th of March and the pupils), 20 March 1945. 40 H. Foot to the Commissioners and the Commissioner of Police, 18 March 1945, CO 67/324/2. 41 Anexartitos “Η Ελληνική Κύπρος επανηγύρισε εν έξαλλω ενθουσιασμώ την εθνική επέτειο” (The Greek Cyprus enthusiastically celebrated the national anniversary), 27 March 1945. 42 Cyprus Post “Lefkonico shooting incident’, 27 March 1945. 43 Cyprus Post “Why there were no newspapers yesterday”, 29 March 1945. 44 Anexartitos “Γύρω από τα αιματηρά γεγονότα του Λευκονοίκου” (Regarding the bloody events of Lefkonico), 29 March 1945. 45 Anexartitos “Κοινόν ανακοινωθέν των 3 κομμάτων” (Common announcement of the three parties), 29 March 1945. 46 The Enquiry Committee was composed by R. A. Goodwin Austin as the Chairman, M. C. Melissa and M. Zekia as members. 47 Lefkonico Commission of Enquiry, 19 June 1945, CO 67/324/1. The third member of the Enquiry, M. Zekia, concluded that Patsalides’s actions were reasonably necessary in order to disperse the procession. 48 Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 May 1945, CO 67/324/1. 49 Secretary of State to the Governor of Cyprus, 7 May 1945, CO 67/324/1. 50 Minute by Mr. Duncan, 3 May 1945, CO 67/324/1.

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51 Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, volume 410, 18 April 1945, columns 192-194. 52 The Times “End of German war proclaimed”, 9 May 1945. 53 Eleftheria “Ο Κυβερνήτης προς τον Κυπριακό λαό” (The Governor’s address to Cypriots), 9 May 1945. 54 From Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 May 1945, CO 67/324/5. 55 Eleftheria “Ανευρέθησαν θαμμένα εις Ζώδιαν τα κλαπέντα όπλα” (The stolen weapons were found buried in Zodia village), 20 April 1945. 56 From Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 14 June 1945, CO 67/324/5. 57 Minute of 25 April 1945, CO 67/324/5. 58 In one of Stern’s operations in November 1944, the British Minister in the Middle East, Lord Moyne, was killed. See I. C. B. Dear, The Oxford Companion to the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), s.v. “Irgun”, “Stern Gang”. 59 For the history of the Jewish refugees in Cyprus see Stavros Panteli, Place of Refugee: the History of the Jews in Cyprus (London: Elliott & Thompson, 2003). 60 Stavros Panteli, The History of Modern Cyprus (Herts: Topline, 2005) p. 137. 61 Minute of 25 April 1945, CO 67/324/5. 62 Governor Woolley to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 May 1945, CO 67/323/6. 63 Rhodes House Library, Private Papers of Charles Campbell Woolley, MSS Brit. Emp. S 276, Box 5, 7 February 1945. 64 From Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 May 1945, CO 67/323/5. 65 Prosecution of Members of Pan Cyprian Trade Union Committee, 24 October 1945, CO 67/323/5. 66 Minos Perdios, Δοκίμιο Ιστορίας Κ.Κ.Κ.-Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. (Essay of History of K.K.K.A.K.E.L.), vol. 2, pp. 54-56. 67 Note of a Meeting Held in the Secretary of State’s Room at 11 a.m. on the 23rd November, 1945, CO 67/321/7. 68 Percy Arnold, “The Cyprus Dilemma” in Contemporary Review, 170, (1946) pp. 78-81. 1 2 3

Conclusions Cyprus-Policy Memorandum, CO 67/317/14. Note of a Meeting Held in the Secretary of State’s Room at 11 a.m. on the 23rd November 1945, CO 67/330/11. Rolandos Katsiaounis, Η Διασκεπτική 1946-1948: με ανασκόπηση της περιόδου 1878-1945 (The Consultative Assembly 1946-1948: with an overview of the period 1878-1945), (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000); Yiorghos Leventis, The Struggle for Self-determination in the 1940s, Prelude to Deeper Crisis (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002).

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Unpublished Sources: Official Records: (i) The National Archives of the United Kingdom: The following record classes were used: Cabinet Office: CAB 65: War Cabinet Minutes: CAB 65/22. CAB 120: Minister of Defense Secretariat: CAB 120/499. Colonial Office: CO 67: Original Correspondence, Cyprus: CO 67/292/13, CO 67/293/10, CO 67/295/4, CO 67/ 273/10, CO 67/279/6, CO67/294/8, CO67/299/2, CO 67/300/2, CO 67/301/3, CO 67/303/5, CO67/304/11, CO 67/304/12, CO 67/306/6, CO 67/306/15, CO 67/306/17, CO 67/307/1, CO 67/307/2, CO 67/307/9, CO 67/308/3, CO 67/308/9, CO 67/308/10, CO 67/308/11, CO 67/309/15, CO 67/310/14, CO 67/311/11, CO 67/311/32, CO 67/312/5, CO 67/313/8, CO 67/313/9, CO 67/313/10, CO67/313/11, CO 67/314/10, CO 67/314/11, CO 67/314/12, CO 67/314/14, CO 67/314/15, CO 67/314/16, CO 67/314/17, CO 67/314/22, CO 67/315/8, CO 67/315/19, CO 67/316/7, CO 67/316/12, CO 67/316/13, CO 67/316/22, CO 67/317/9, CO 67/317/11, CO 67/317/12, CO 67/317/13, CO 67/317/14, CO 67/318/3, CO 67/318/6, CO 67/318/14, CO 67/319/5, CO 67/321/6, CO 67/321/7, CO 67/323/2, CO 67/323/3, CO 67/323/4, CO 67/323/5, CO 67/323/6, CO 67/324/1, CO 67/324/2, CO 67/324/4, CO 67/324/5, CO

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67/327/8, CO 67/327/10, CO 67/327/16, CO 67/328/5, CO 67/328/11, CO 67/328/12, CO 67/329/6, CO 67/329/10, CO 67/330/11, CO 67/243/1. CO 323: Original Correspondence, Colonies: CO 323/1671/5, CO 323/1808/49, CO 323/1864/7. CO 875: Public Relations Department: CO 875/5/26. CO 926: Mediterranean Department: CO 926/1/10, CO 926/2084. CO 967: Private Office Papers: CO 967/54 A. CO 968: Records of Defence Department: CO 968/125/7. Foreign Office: FO 371: General Correspondence 1906-1966: FO 371/23776, FO371/24910, FO 371/24912, FO 371/24914, FO 371/29840, FO 371/29846, FO 371/29856, FO 371/33165, FO 371/33185, FO 371/43752, FO 371/48360. FO 286: Records of Embassies: FO 286/1154. FO 954: Private Papers of Sir Anthony Eden: FO 954/22A. Prime Minister’s Office: PREM 3: Operational Correspondence and Papers: PREM 3/113, PREM 3/211/11, PREM 3/211/12, PREM 3/211/13, PREM 3/212/1, PREM 3/212/14, PREM 3/66/7. (ii) Contemporary Social History Archives, Athens (Αρχεία Σύγχρονης Κοινωνικής Ιστορίας, Αθήνα): Κ. 371 Φ.20/21/14, Κ.371 Φ.20/21/22.

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(iii) Cyprus’ State Archives, Nicosia (Κρατικά Αρχεία Κύπρου, Λευκωσία): Secretariat Archives: (SA1): SA1/739/39/1, SA1/1508/1939, SA1/641/1942, SA1/807/1942/1, SA1/808/1925, SA1/677/1937, SA1/658/1943/1. (iv) General State Archives, Athens (Γενικά Αρχεία Κράτους, Αθήνα): Small Collections, G.S.A. K51. (v) Modern Records Centre, Warwick University: T.U.C. MSS. 292/949.61/1. Unofficial Records: (i) Private Papers: Cyprus’ Archbishopric, Nicosia (Ιερά Αρχιεπισκοπή Κύπρου, Λευκωσία): Archbishop Leontios’s Private Papers. Lambeth Palace Library, London: Papers of Cosmo Lang. Papers of William Temple. Papers of A. J. Douglas. Rhodes House Library, Oxford Papers of Sir William Dennis Battershill. Papers of Sir Charles Campbell Woolley. Papers of Sir John Valentine Shaw. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis: Rappas, Alexis. The Elusive Polity: Social Engineering and the Reinvention of Politics in Colonial Cyprus, 1931 – 1941. Florence: European University Institute, 2008. Interviews: Andreas Loris, Former Judge of Cyprus Supreme Court.

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i Parliamentary Debates: Hansard, House of Commons (Vols. 356, 377, 385, 387, 392, 393, 397, 400, 407). Hansard, House of Lords (Vol. 126). ii Cyprus Government Communism in Cyprus, Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1955. iii Cyprus Archbishopric Απόστολος Βαρνάβας journal. iv Newspapers: Great Britain: Daily Telegraph and the Morning Post. Reynolds News. The Times. Cyprus: Ακρόπολις (Acropolis). Ανεξάρτητος (Anexartitos). Ανόρθωσις (Anorthosi). Cyprus Post. Ελευθερία (Eleftheria). Κυπριακός Τύπος (Kipriakos Tipos). Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλακας (Neos Kipriakos Filakas). Παναγροτική (Panagrotiki). Παρατηρητής (Paratiritis). Πάφος (Pafos). Πυρσός (Pirsos). Φωνή της Κύπρου (Foni tis Kiprou). Χρόνος (Chronos). v. Books and Articles: Adams, Thomas. A.K.E.L. the Communist Party of Cyprus. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977. Alastos Doros. Cyprus in History: a Survey of 5000 years. London: Zeno, 1976. ___________. Cyprus: Past and …Future. London: Committee for Cyprus Affairs, 1944.

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Alastos, Doros The Case for Cyprus. London: Committee for Cyprus Autonomy, no publishing date. Alexander, G. M. The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine, British Policy in Greece 1944-47. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. Anderson, S Mathew. The Eastern Question 1774-1923. London: Macmillan, 1966. Arnold, Percy. Cyprus Challenge: A Colonial Island and its Aspirations. London: Hogarth Press, 1956. ___________. “The Cyprus Dilemma.” Contemporary Review, 170 (1946): 78-81. Attalides, Michael. Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics. Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2003. ___________. “Τα Κόμματα στην Κύπρο, 1878-1955” (The political parties in Cyprus 1878-1955). In Κυπριακά, 1878-1955 (Cypriot issues, 1878-1955). Nicosia: Municipality of Nicosia, 1986. Avraamides, Aristodemos. “A Brief History of Labour Relations in Cyprus.” In The Development of Labour Relations in Cyprus, edited by John Slocum. Nicosia: Public Information Office, 1972. Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos. Φωτιά και Τσεκούρι (By axe and fire). Athens: Estia, 1990. Bridge, F. R. and Bullen Roger. The Great Powers and the European State System 1815-1914. London: Longman, 1980. Bryant, Rebecca. Imagining the Modern: the Cultures of Nationalism. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004. Cavendish, Anne (ed). Cyprus 1878: The Journal of Sir Garnet Wolseley. Nicosia: Cyprus Popular Bank Culture Centre, 1991. Charmley, John. Lord Loyd and the Decline of the British Empire. Weidenfeld and Nicholson: London, 1987. Christides, Chistos. Ιωάννης Μεταξάς: το Προσωπικό του Ημερολόγιο (Ioannis Metaxas: his personal diary). Vol 8. Athens: Govosti, 1993. Christodoulou, Nicos. Το Αρχιεπισκοπικό Ζήτημα της Κύπρου κατά τα ΄Ετη 1900-1910 (The archiepiscopal question of Cyprus during the years 19001910). Nicosia: Centre of Studies of the Holy Monastery of Kykkos, 1999.

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Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War –Triumph and Tragedy. Vol. 6. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953 Clogg, Richard. Greece 1940-49: Occupation, Resistance, Civil War: a Documentary History. New York: Palgrave, 2002. ___________. Anglo-Greek Attitudes: Studies in History. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000. ___________. A Concise History of Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. ___________. A Short History of Modern Greece. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. ___________. Politics and the Academy: Arnold Toynbee and the Koraes Chair London: Frank Cass, 1986. Close, David H. (ed.) The Greek Civil War 1943-1950: Studies of Polarization. London: Routledge, 1993. Darwin, John. The End of the British Empire: the Historical Debate. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Dear, Ian C. B. The Oxford Companion to the World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Ekdotiki Athinon, Ιστορία Ελληνικού ΄Εθνους (History of the Greek Nation). Vol 16. Athens: Ekdotiki Athinon, 2000. Englezakis, Venediktos. Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus, 4th -20th Centuries. Altershot: Variorum, 1997. Faustmann Hubert and Peristianis Nicos (eds). Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post – Colonialism 1878-2006. Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2006. Fabian Colonial Bureau. Strategic Colonies and their Future: the Problems of Hong Kong, Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus. London: Fabian Society, 1945. Fleischer, Hagen. Στέμμα και Σβάστικα: Η Ελλάδα της Κατοχής και της Αντίστασης 1941-1944 (Crown and swastika: Greece of occupation and resistance 1941-44). Vol.1. Athens: Papazisis, 1988-1995. Georghallides, G. S. “Church and State in Cyprus: October 1931 to November 1931: “A systematic humiliation of the autocephalous church of Cyprus?””. Epetiris Kentrou Epistimonikon Erevnon, 19 (1992): 361-448. ___________. Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: the Causes of

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1931 Crisis. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985. ___________. Churchill’s 1907 visit to Cyprus: A Political Analysis. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1970. Hackett, John. A History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. New York: Burt Franklin, 1972. Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis. The Cyprus Question, 1878-1960: The Constitutional Aspect. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002. Hill, George F. A History of Cyprus. vol.4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Holland, Robert and Markides Diana. The British and the Hellenes: Struggles for Mastery in the Eastern Mediterranean 1850-1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Holland, Robert. The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 19001970. London: Fontana Press, 1991. ___________. European Decolonization: 1918 – 1981: An Introductory Survey. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985. Howard, Christopher. Splendid Isolation. London; New York: Macmillan, 1967. Iatrides, John. Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. Ioannou, Fifis. ΄Ετσι άρχισε το Κυπριακό (This is how the Cyprus Question began). Athens: Filistor, 2005. Jackson, Ashley. Botswana 1939-1945: an African Colony at War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999. Karayiannis, Constantinos. ΄Οταν οι Μνήμες ΄Ερχονται (When memories occur). Nicosia: 1989. Katsiaounis, Rolandos. “Cyprus 1931-1959: The Politics of the Anti-colonial Movement”. Epetiris Kentrou Epistimonikon Erevnon, 33 (2007): 441-469. ___________. Η Διασκεπτική 1946-1948: με Ανασκόπηση της Περιόδου 18781945 (The Consultative Assembly 1946-1948: with a survey of the period 1878-1945). Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 2000. ___________. Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century. Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1996.

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Katsiaounis, Rolandos. ‘Society and Politics during British Rule in Cyprus’, in Cyprus: From Ottoman Province to European State: a Conference of the Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London. London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1993. ___________. “Οι Ελληνοβρετανικές σχέσεις, ο Αντιβασιλέας Δαμασκηνός και η Κύπρος, Οκτώβριος 1944 – Σεπτέμβριος 1945” (Greek-British relations, the Regent Damaskinos and Cyprus, October 1944 – September 1945). Epetiris Kentrou Epistimonikon Erevnon, 19 (1992): 449-514. Kelling, George. Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus 1939-1955. New York: Greenwood, 1990. Ker-Lindsay, James. Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-64. Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2004. Killingray, David. “Soldiers, Ex-Servicemen and Politics in the Gold Coast 1939-50”. Journal of Modern African Studies, 21 (1983): 523-534 Kirk, George. Survey of International Affairs: the Middle East, 1945-1950. London: Oxford University Press, 1954 Kitromilides, Paschalis. “From Coexistence to Confrontation: the Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus.” In Cyprus Reviewed: the Results on a Seminar of the Cyprus Problem held on 3-6 June 1976 edited by Michael Attalides. Nicosia: the Jus Cypri Association, 1977 Koliopoulos, John. Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977. ___________ and Veremis, Thanos. Greece: the Modern Sequel: from 1831 to the Present. New York: New York University Press, 2002. Kousoulas, Demetris. Κ.Κ.Ε.: Τα Πρώτα Τριάντα Χρόνια 1918- 1949 (Κ.Κ.Ε.: The first thirty years: 1918-1949). Athens: Elliniki Evroekdotiki, 1987. Kykkotis, Ierotheos. Εξ Ανατολών: Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Παροικίας της Μ. Βρετανίας (From the East: history of the Cypriot community in Great Britain). London: 1968. Kyrris, Costas P. History of Cyprus. Nicosia: Nicocles, 1985. Lee, Dwight E. Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention policy of 1878. Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1934. Lefkis Yiannis. Οι ρίζες (The roots). Limassol, 1984. Leventis, Yiorghos. The Struggle for Self-determination in the 1940s, Prelude to

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Deeper Crisis. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002. Linardatos, Spiros. Ο Πόλεμος του 1940-41 και η Μάχη της Κρήτης (The 194041 war and the battle of Crete). Athens: Proskinio, 1995. Loizos, Peter. “The Progress of Greek Nationalism 1878-1970”. In Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Mair, edited by John Davis. London: Athlone Press, 1974. Louis, William Roger. The British Empire in the Middle East 1945 – 1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Lympourides, Achilleas. Το Πολύκροτο Αρχιεπισκοπικό ζήτημα της Κύπρου και η Δεκαετής Περιπετειώδης Πορεία του 1900-1910 (The sensational archiepiscopal question of Cyprus and its ten year adventurous course). Nicosia: Fakos, 1997. Machlouzarides, Panayiotis. Κύπρος 1940-1960: Ημερολόγιο Εξελίξεων (Cyprus 1940- 1960: Diary of Developments). Nicosia: 1985 Macmillan, Harold. War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean January 1943 – May 1945. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984. Mazower, Mark. Inside Hitler’s Greece. New Haven and London: 2001. McHenry, James. The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus 1919-1939. New York: Garland, 1987. Michaelides, Sofronios. Ιστορία της κατά Κίτιον Εκκλησίας (History of the Church of Kitio).Larnaca, Holy Metropolis of Kitio, 1992. Miridakis, Michalis. Η Επιχείρηση του Γοργοποτάμου και το Ε.Α.Μ. – Ε.Λ.Α.Σ. (The Gorgopotamos operation and E.A.M. – E.L.A.S.), Athens: 1983. Monneypenny, William Flavelle and Buckle, George Earl. The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. Vol. 2. London: John Murray, 1929. Nefeloudis, Vasilis. Η Εθνική Αντίσταση στη Μέση Ανατολή (The Greek resistance in the Middle East) Vol. 2. Athens: Themelio, 1981. Oberling, Pierre. The Road to Bellapais: the Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus. Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1982. Orr, C.W.J. Cyprus under British Rule. London: Zeno, 1972. Panteli, Stavros. The History of Modern Cyprus. Herts: Topline, 2005. ___________ Place of Refugee: The History of the Jews in Cyprus. London: Elliott & Thompson, 2003.

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Papadimitris, Panayiotis. Ιστορική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Κύπρου 1878-1978 (Historical encyclopedia of Cyprus 1978-1978). Vols. 6-7. Nicosia: Epifaniou, 1997. Papadopoulos, Theodoros. Η Διοργάνωσις του Εθνικού Κινήματος 1901-1931 (The organization of the national movement 1901-1931). Nicosia:Theopress, 2009. Papaioannou, Ezekias. Ενθυμήσεις από τη Ζωή μου (Remembrances from my life). Nicosia: Pyrsos, 1988. Papandreou, Georgios. Η Aπελευθέρωσις της Ελλάδος (The liberation of Greece). Nicosia: Ekdosis Diethnous Vivliopoliou kai Praktoriou Tipou, 1945. Papapolyviou Petros. Η Κύπρος και οι Βαλκανικοί πόλεμοι – Συμβολή στην Ιστορία του Κυπριακού Εθελοντισμού. (Cyprus and the Balkan wars – contribution to the history of the Cypriot volunteering movement). Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1997. Pavlides Antros (ed.) Μεγάλη Κυπριακή Εγκυκλοπαίδεια (Great Cypriot encyclopedia.). Vols. 1 and 3. Nicosia: Filokipros, 1984-1991. Pagkipria Ergatiki Omospondia (P.E.O.). Ιστορία Π. Σ.Ε. - Π.Ε.Ο. (History of P.S.E. - P.E.O.). Nicosia: P.E.O., 1991. ___________. Αγώνες για τον Τιμάριθμο 1940-44 (Struggles for the cost of living 1940-44). Nicosia: P.E.O.:1984. Perdios, Minos. Δοκίμιο της Ιστορίας Κ.Κ.Κ.-Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. (Essay of history of K.K.K.-AKEL). Vol. 2. Nicosia: A.K.E.L. Central Committee, 1968. Persianis, Panayiotis K. Church and State in Cyprus Education - the Contribution of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus to Cyprus Education during the British Administration (1878-1960). Nicosia: Violaris, 1978. Petas, Christos. Το Κίνημα των Μορφωτικών Συλλόγων 1939-1945 (The movement of the cultural clubs 1939-1945). Nicosia: 1992. Phantis, Andreas. Το Κυπριακό Συνδικαλιστικό Κίνημα στα Χρόνια της Αγγλοκρατίας 1878-1960 (The Cypriot Syndicalist movement in the years of the English occupation 1878-1960). Vol. 1. Nicosia: Kyriakides, 2005. Reddaway, John. Burdened with Cyprus. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986. Roussos, Petros. Η Μεγάλη Πενταετία 1940-45 (The great five years 1940-45). Athens: 1982. Royal Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Greek White Book: Diplomatic Documents Relating to Italy’s Aggression against Greece. London: Hitchinson & Co., 1942.

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Segev, Tom. One Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate. New York: Henry Holt, 2001. Servas, Ploutis. Κυπριακό: Ευθύνες (The Cyprus issue: responsibilities). Vol.1. Athens: Grammi, 1985. Servas, Ploutis. Το Α.Κ.Ε.Λ. και τα Προβλήματα του Τόπου: Διάλεξη (A.K.E.L. and the local problems: a lecture) Limassol, 1942. Shipway, Martin. Decolonization and its Impact: a Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008. Sophocleous, Costas. Πάλη για την Ελευθερία (Struggle for liberty). (Nicosia: 2003). Spyropoulos, Evangelos. The Greek Military (1909-1941) and the Greek Mutinies in the Middle East (1941-44). Boulder; New York: East European Monographs, 1933. Storrs, Ronald. Orientations. London: I. Nicholson & Watson, 1937. Svolopoulos, Constantinos. Η Ελλάδα στο Β’ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο 1940-1944 (Greece in the Second World War). Αθήνα: Αρχείο Ραδιοφώνου, 2000 ___________. “Anglo-Hellenic talks on Cyprus during the Axis Campaign against Greece”. Balkan Studies, 23 (1982): 199-217. Temperley, Harold. “Disraeli and Cyprus”. English Historical Review, 182 (1931): 274-279 The Ethnic community Oral History project. Ξένοι: Ελληνοκύπριοι στο Λονδίνο (Strangers: Greek Cypriots in London). London: 1990. Tillyrides, Andreas. Cyprus 1931-1947: “The outcome of the uprising and the long vacancy of the archiepiscopal throne”, Εκκλησία και Θεολογία (Church and Theology). Vol. III. London, Thyateira House: 1982. Tsangarides, Theofanis. Το Ημερολόγιο ενός Εξόριστου 1931-1946 (Diary of an exiled). Athens: 1948. Tsouderos, Emmanouil. Ιστορικό Αρχείο 1941-44 (Historical archive 1941-44). Vol.1, Fitrakis. 1990. ___________. Ελληνικές Ανωμαλίες στη Μέση Ανατολή (Greek abnormalities in the Middle East). Athens: Aetos, 1945. Varnava, Andrekos. British Imperialism in Cyprus 1878-1915: The inconsequential possession. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009.

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Vatikiotis, Panayiotis. Popular Autocracy in Greece 1936-1941: A Political Biography of General Ioannis Metaxas. London: Portland; Or: Frank Cass, 1998. Venezis, Ilias. Αρχιεπίσκοπος Δαμασκηνός: οι Χρόνοι της Δουλείας (Archbishop Damaskinos: the years of slavery). Athens: Estia, 1981. Wallace, Paul W. and Orphanides, Andreas G. (Eds). Sources for the History of Cyprus, Enosis and the British: British Official Documents 1878-1950. New York: Greece and Cyprus Research Centre, 2004. Woodhouse, C. M. The Struggle for Greece: 1941-49. London: Hurst & Company, 2002. ___________. Modern Greece: A Short History. London: Faber & Faber, 1991. ___________. Something Ventured. London: Granada, 1982. Xydis, Stephen. Greece and the Great Powers 1944-47. Thessaloniki: Institute of Balkan Studies, 1963. Zannetos, Filios. Ιστορία της Νήσου Κύπρου (History of the island of Cyprus). Vol.2. Nicosia: Epiphaniou, 1997. Zavou, Soula. Τα Πολιτικά Κόμματα της Κύπρου στον 20ο Αιώνα (The political parties of Cyprus in the 20th century). Athens: Kastaniotis, 2002.

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INDEX

A.O.N. (Anti-fascist Navy Organization) 123 A.S.O. (Liberating Military Organization) 123 Abdul Hamid, Sultan 8, 9 Adamantos, Adam 97, 98, 106, 114,134 Adana 90 Adolf, Hitler 56 Advisory Council 17, 19, 26, 65, 81, 82, 90, 102 Agapi Club 67 Akanthou 29 Albania 24, 40, 59 Alexandretta 8 Alexandria 12, 26, 120, 122, 124 Anexartitos (Ανεξάρτητος) 32, 54, 55, 66, 82, 88, 107, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118 Angastina 27 Anorthosis (Ανόρθωσις) 133, 134, 158 Argyropoulos, Pericles 80, 83 Arnold, Percy 3, 74, 131, 132, 155, 160 Asia Minor 8, 9, 10, 12 Assia 20 Association of Turkish Cypriot Farmers 103 Athienou 88 Atlantic Charter 70, 71, 82, 89 Attlee, Clement 151, 152, 153 Auchinleck, Sir Claude 81 Australia 24, 59, 81

Balkans 7, 56, 96, 135 136 Bank of Cyprus 24 Barbarossa operation 56 Berat 13 Boghaz 134 British Council 34, 70, 81 Bulgaria 11, 56, 63, 125, 136 Bureau of Ethnarchy 146 Cairo 5, 108, 109, 110, 115, 116, 123, 124, 125, 135 Canellopoulos, Panayiotis 109 Caserta 135 Chamberlain, Arthur Neville 33 China 75 Chronos (Χρόνος) 82, 107, 118 Chrysanthos, Bishop of Trabizond 18 Church laws (1937) 18, 74, 85, 30, 85, 121, 122, 150 Churchill, Sir Winston 51, 58, 65, 70, 79, 90-92, 135-136, 140-143, 151-152, 154, 157, 163 Comintern 16, 106 Committee for Cyprus Autonomy (Renamed into Committee for Cyprus Affairs in 1943) 37, 38, 40, 87, 102, 115, 122, 139 Constantinople 7, 8, 13, 51 Corfu 63 Cost of Living Committee 107 Cost of living, question of 67, 86, 96,

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107-109, 114, 118-119 Cultural Clubs 66, 88, 104 Cypriot Branch of the Communist Party of Great Britain 36 Cypriot Brotherhood, London 25 Cyprus Convention (1878) 7, 9, 11 Cyprus Mines Corporation 35-36 Cyprus Post 3, 34, 67, 70, 74, 81-82, 106, 119, 122, 131, 132, 155 Cyprus Regiment 26, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 73, 81-83, 84, 105-107, 114, 138, 151 Cyprus Volunteer Force 43, 59, 84, 96, 119, 157 Cyril III, Archbishop of Cyprus 14 Damaskinos, Archbishop of Athens 143 December, 1944 (Δεκεμβριανά) 5, 141143, 145, 147 Derby, Lord 9 Dervis, Themistocles 32, 73, 90, 95, 96, 97, 98, 103, 104, 118, 131, 155, 159 Disraeli, Benjamin 8, 9 Dixon, John Pierson 56 Dodecanese 69, 80, 116, 154 Devonshire, Duke of 101, 152 E.A.M. (National Liberation Front) 5, 64, 109, 116, 123-125, 130, 134-136, 137, 139, 141-142, 145, 146, 149, 158, 159, 165 E.D.E.S. (National Republican Greek League) 64, 109, 116, 135 E.K.A. (Union of Cypriot ExServicemen) 148 E.K.K.A. (National and Social Liberation) 64, 109, 116, 124 E.L.A.S. (Greek People’s Liberation Army) 64, 109, 116, 124, 125, 135, 136, 137, 141, 142, 158, 159 E.M.E.K.E.L. (United Front of Workers and Working People) 96, 110, 111 E.O.K.A. (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) 2 Eastern Anatolia 7

Eastern Front 64 Eastern Question 7, 8, 9 Ecumenical Patriarchate 18, 120 Eden, Sir Anthony 27, 47, 56-58, 65, 6971, 142-143, 153-154 Egypt 12, 26, 48, 63, 123-125 El Alamein 90 Eleftheria (Ελευθερία) 19, 25, 26, 27, 32, 44, 59, 71, 73, 79, 80, 82, 84, 88, 89, 97, 117, 122 Eleftheriades, Costas 110-111 Ellada (Ελλάδα) 80 Elli (΄Ελλη) 40, 43 Ethnarch 13, 28, 31, 49, 50, 51, 83, 84, 137, 139, 159 Evkaf 102 Executive Council 17, 70, 102, 132 Fabian Colonial Bureau 154 Famagusta 20, 27, 35, 36, 50, 54, 65, 73, 86, 88, 90, 97, 98, 103, 104, 105, 110, 114, 118, 119, 122, 134, 145, 151 Flags: Greek 17, 45, 46, 75, 80, 97, 117, 131, 136, 138 Turkish 44, 45, 46, 50 British 46, 79 Nazi 63 Foni tis Kiprou (Φωνή της Κύπρου) 27, 132 Foot, Sir Hugh 118, 119, 138, 139, 146 France 24, 33, 34, 39, 157 Funds: Greek War Fund 44, 53, British R.A.F. Fund 44 Galatopoulos, Christodoulos 30, 97, 98, 117 George II, King of Greece 27, 44, 56-57, 63, 69, 109, 110, 116, 123, 143 George VI, King of the United Kingdom 25, 44, 51 Germany 11, 24, 31, 37, 40, 56, 58, 59, 64, 66, 68, 84, 151

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INDEX Gladstone, William Ewert 9, 101 Gloucester, Duke of 79 Gorgopotamos Operation 64, 109 Government House, Nicosia 25, 29, 31, 47, 51, 91 Grazzi, Emanuelle 40, 44 Greater Greece, idea of 45, 66 Greek Government-in-exile 57, 58, 64, 108, 109, 115, 123, 135 Grivas, Colonel George 143 Hadjiharos, Charidemos 88, 118 Halkin Sesi 98, 102, 119, 133 Harriman, Averell 136 Hay, Lord John 9, 10 Hestia (Εστία) 41, 56 Home, Colonel Robert 7 House of Commons 9, 36, 108 Hungary 136 India 9, 65, 133, 140, 160 Inonu, Ismet 97 Ioannides, Evdoros (Alastos Doros) 36, 38 Ioannides, Polikarpos 84 Ionian Islands 9, 10, 152 Irgun 158 Italy 31, 40, 43, 55, 68, 116, 124, 148, 157 Japan 72 Jews 59, 158 Jones, Creech Arthur 156 K.A.T.A.K. (Association for the Protection of the Turkish Cypriot Minority) 102, 103, 117 K.E.K. (Cypriot National Party) 104, 105, 107, 110, 111, 116, 118, 119, 125, 130, 133, 138, 138, 146 K.K.E (Communist Party of Greece) 4, 63, 64, 124 K.K.K. (Communist Party of Cyprus) 16, 34, 55, 159, 164 K.T.M.B.P. (Turkish Cypriot National

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Party) 117 Kalavasos 36 Kipriaka Nea (Κυπριακά Νέα) 39 Kithrea 98 Klerides, Glafkos 23 Klerides, Ioannis 25, 28, 96, 97 Korizis, Alexander 56, 57 Kos 116 Kountouriotis, Andreas 150 Kutchuk, Fazil 98, 102, 117, 132 Kyprianos, Archbishop of Cyprus 13 Kyprianos, Bishop of Kitium 10 Kyrenia 30, 51, 52, 72, 75, 79, 84, 85, 98, 104, 120, 121, 130, 145, 146, 149, 159, 165 Kyriakides, Fidias 56 Kyriakides, Kyprianos 30, 121 Kyrou, Alexis 141 L.T.A.B. (Syndicate for Nicosia Turkish Labourers) 103 Labour Movement 15-16, 34-38, 41, 5255, 63, 66, 67, 68, 86, 105, 108, 118, 119 Lanitis, Nicolaos 141 Lapethos 134 Larnaca 9, 10, 21, 26, 36, 37, 44, 50, 54, 65, 67, 97, 98, 118, 119, 125 Lausanne, Treaty of (1923) 10, 12 Layard, Sir Austen 8 Lebanon Conference (1944) 113, 123, 124, 126, 129, 134, 136, 137 Leeper, Sir Reginald 123, 136 Lefkonico, incident (1945) 154-157 Legislative Council 11, 17, 26, 30, 89, 90 Leros 116 Limassol 15, 35, 36, 37, 44, 50, 53, 54, 65, 66, 73, 75, 82, 86, 96, 97, 98, 103, 105, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117, 119, 122, 134, 147, 159 Lloyd, Lord George 46 Loyalty (towards Britain): Greek Cypriot 20, 25, 26, 27 Turkish Cypriot 44, 46, 58

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MacDonald, John Malcolm 20, 21, 24, 30 Macedonia 12, 69, 125, 136, 153 Mackenzie, Sir Compton 45, 46, 80 Macmillan, Harold 135,136, 143 Malta 12 Markides, Vias 117 Mathers, George 114 Mavrokefalos, Eleftherios 29, 48 Mavrovouni 36 McVeagh, Lincoln 142 Medjliss Idare 13 Mesaoria 154 Metaxas, Ioannis 16, 23, 24, 40, 44, 45, 49, 63, 64, 72 Middle East 5, 12, 26, 43, 73, 81, 83, 109, 123, 135, 154, 160 Millet system 13 Minimum Wage Law 68 Mirianthefs, Makarios Bishop of Kyrenia 27, 51, 52, 72, 84, 85, 120, 121, 138, 149, 159, 165 Mohammerah 8 Morfou 36, 98, 104 Moscow 16, 135, 136 Muleteers 26 Municipal Corporations Law 33, 95 Municipal Elections, (1943) 89-90, 9599, 110-111 Mussolini, Benito 40, 72, 110 Mutinies, Greek Forces of the Middle East (1944), 123-124 Myers, Edmund Charles Wolf 109, 110, 116 National Bands, Agreement of (1943) 109 National Combination, Municipal Elections (1943) 95 Nea Politiki Epitheorisis (Νέα Πολιτική Επιθεώρησις) 97, 117 Neos Kipriakos Filax (Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ) 35, 54, 79, 104, 125 Never Statement (1954) 2 Nichols, Philip 56

Nicolaides, Evanthis 38, 39 Nicolaides, Nicolaos 97 North Epirus 69 October, 1931 (Οκτωβριανά) 1, 12-13, 17, 132, 141 Ormsby-Gore, William 33 Orthodox Church of Cyprus 13-15, 46, 50-52, 72-73, 165 Ottoman Empire 7, 9, 11 P.E.E.A. (Political Committee for National Liberation) 123, 124, 137 P.E.K. (Pan Cyprian Farmers’ Union) 79, 88-89, 98, 104, 107, 118, 130, 131, 139, 150, 155, 156 P.E.S.P. (Pan Cyprian Greek Socialist Vanguard) 97, 156 P.O.R.O.I. (Pan Cyprian Organization of Religious Orthodox Institutions) 121 P.S.E. (Pan Cyprian Trade Union Committee) 66-67, 86, 107, 108, 118, 119, 133, 134, 158, 166 Pafos (Πάφος) 59, 75, 82, 88, 107, 117 Palairet, Sir Michael 31, 49, 55, 56, 58 Palechori 27 Palestine 114, 158, 160, 166 Palmer, Sir Herbert Richmond 17-18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 31, 32, 96, 120, 143, 158 Pan Cyprian Gymnastic Club (Γυμναστικός Σύλλογος Παγκύπρια) 75 Pan-Cyprian Games 31-32 Papaioannou, Ezekias 38, 87 Papandreou, George 124, 126, 130, 135, 136, 137, 138, 142 Papavassiliou, Prodromos 106 Paratiritis (Παρατηρητής) 67, 88 Paris, Peace Conference (1919) 12 Parkinson, Sir Cosmo 105, 129-134, 137, 164 Patra 136 Peloponese 69, 136, 152 Percentage, Agreement of (1944) 136

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INDEX Perdios, Minos 37 Persian Gulf 7, 8 Peter, Prince 80 Phanar 51 Phaneromeni Church, Nicosia 30, 51, 75, 137 Phantis, Andreas 67 Plaka, Agreement of (1944) 115, 116, 123 Plastiras, Nicolaos 143 Poland 24 Poles, evacuation from Cyprus 59 Poli tis Chrysochous 98 Popular Front, Municipal Elections (1943) 96, 97 Poulias, George 95 Prastio 88 Pritt, Dennis Nowell 86, 87 Private Employees Union 53 Psaros, Demetrios 124 Public Works Department 35, 36, 37, 55, 118 Rallis, Ioannis 142 Rea Club 88 Red Cross: Greek 29, 30, 49 British 29, 30, 31 Refugees: Greek 73, 80 Jews 158 Relief Works 36, 37, 54 Reynolds News 45 Rizokarpaso 29 Roosevelt, Franklin 70, 85, 13, 151 Rossides, Christianos 96, 97, 110 Rossides, Zinon 55 Royal Army Service Corps 26, 37 Royal Hellenic Forces 47, 48 Rural Debt Law 65 Rural Debts Bill 19 Russia 37, 56, 59, 64, 66, 67, 68, 75, 86, 92, 105, 135, 139

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S.E.K. (Confederation of Cyprus Workers) 105 S.O.E. (Special Operations Executive) 64, 109 Sacred Legion 73 Saracoglu, Mehmet Sukru 47 Sargent, Sir Orme 58 Saveriades, Saveras 55 Savvas, Christis 104 Scobie, Ronald 135, 136, 142 Security Battalions 136 Serbia 11 Shaw, John Valentine 3, 65, 68, 114, 120 Simopoulos, Charalambos 57 Skouriotissa 36 Sofronios III, Archbishop of Cyprus 10 South Africa 63 Soz 47, 70, 103 Sozos, Zenon 95 Stalin, Joseph 106, 135, 136, 151 Stalingrad 90 Stanley, Oliver 86, 99, 100, 140, 141, 149, 153, 154 Stephanides, Demetris 37 Stern 158 Stettinius, Edward 151 Storrs, Sir Ronald 2, 14, 17, 133 Straits, the Dardanelles 7, 8 Stubbs, Sir Edward 14, 17 Suda Bay, Crete 56 Suez Canal 8, 45 Svolos, Alexandros 123 Syria 59, 65, 67 Tenos 40 The New York Times 151 The Times 26, 33, 34, 142 Theodotou, Theofanis 26-27, 38 Thrace 12, 153 Toynbee, Arnold 56, 57 Trades Dispute-Conciliation, Arbitration and Enquiry Law (1941) 68 Trades Union Congress 34, 86 Trades Unions and Trade Disputes Law

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(1941) 68 Treaty of Paris (1856) 7 Tripartite Pact 56 Tsolakoglou, George 63, 142 Tsouderos, Emmanouil 66, 69-71, 72, 123, 143 Turkey 8, 11, 31, 45, 50, 56, 57, 58, 73, 89, 90, 91, 92, 99, 103, 153, 154, 160, 164 Varkiza, Agreement of (1945) 149 Vassiliades, George 28, 54, 55 Velouchiotes, Aris (Athanasios Klaras) 63 Vema (Βήμα) 39 Venizelos, Eleftherios, 12 Venizelos, Sophocles 123, 124, 125 Victoria, Queen 8 Voulgaris, Petros 124 War: Russo-Turkish (1877) 7 Greco-Turkish (1897) 10 Balkan (1912-13) 10, 11 First World War (1914-1918) 11 Greco-Italian (1940) 40-41 Warner, Edward 56, 58 Wehrmacht 116 West Indies 18 Whitehall 7, 19, 33, 48, 56, 69, 85, 89, 100, 102, 139, 152, 154 Wilson, Henry 135, 143 Wolseley, Sir Garnet 9, 10, 20 Woodhouse, Christopher Montague 116

Yalta, Conference (1945) 151 Yialousa 30 Ypsonas 117 Yugoslavia 40, 56, 136 Zachariades, Nicos 63 Zaimis, Alexander 11 Zervas, Napoleon 109, 116, 135 Ziartides, Andreas 67, 108, 119, 146 Zinon, Lefkios 55 Zodia 157

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1. Native girls working at the asbestos mines, 1912.

2. Workers at the asbestos mines, 1912.

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3. A view of Limassol city, circa 1930.

4. View of Government House, Nicosia, after its destruction during the October 1931 disturbances.

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5. Winston Churchill’s visit at Government House, Nicosia, 1 February 1943. In foreground ( from left to right) Bishop Leontios, the Mufti, Winston Churchill and Governor Sir Charles Woolley.

6. A group of A.K.E.L. volunteers, 1943.

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7. A.K.E.L. volunteers parade in the streets of Limassol under the supervision of Ploutis Servas. June 1943.

8. The first Cypriot company to depart abroad.

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9. A group of Cyprus Regiment soldiers in Italy during the war.

10. The British Foreign Minister Sir Anthony Eden inspects men of the Cyprus Regiment in the Middle East.

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11. Cypriot volunteers arriving at Piraeus Port, Athens, December 1940.

12. A group of Cypriot women, volunteers of the Auxiliary Territorial Service (A.T.S.), serving in North Africa, reading news of war developments.

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13. Celebrations for the Red Army Day, Nicosia, 21 February 1943. The Acting Governor John Shaw is heading the celebrations. The occasion gained a special meaning as it was honoured by colonial officials, the Locum Tenens, municipal councilors, Munir Bay on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, the Greek Consul Eleftherios Mavrokefalos, members of the Trade Unions and an enthusiastic crowd cheering for the Allied cause.

14. Celebrations for the Red Army Day, Nicosia, 21 February 1943. A closer view of the guests attending the event. Prayers for the Allies were also said by clergymen of the Anglican, the Maronite and the Armenian Churches.

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15. A scene from the Chrysorogiatissa Monastery, prior to the conduct of the Archiepiscopal elections of June 1947. (Seated from Right to Left): the Locum Tenens Leontios, the Bishop of Derkon, Ioakim, and the Abbot of the Monastery, Cyril.