Culture and Fertility: The Case of the Philippines 9789814377485

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FOREWORD It is generally recognized that ethnic diversity is characteristic of Southeast Asian countries. However, very little is known about the relationships between this diversity and other social and behavioural dimensions. In most countries in the region, such relationships have yet to be fully explored, partly because of the sensitivity of the issue and partly because of the dearth of essential data on ethnic behaviour and differentials.

In the case of population behaviour, although several aspects, such as fertility, mortality and a variety of attitudinal dimensions, have been measured successfully in most Southeast Asian countries, they are normally presented as national aggregates, and are often only broken down by rural-urban residence, education, income, household size and ethnic group. Thus, while there is some information available on the relationship between ethnic identity and fertility, tqe relationship has not been systematically examined in most of the Southeast Asian countries. The lack of this kind of basic data on ethnic differentials in population behaviour in Southeast Asia has definite implications for national population policies and programmes. These policies and programmes are usually implemented or launched on a national level with very little consideration for the ethnic diversity of the country, and are therefore often perceived, on an ethnic group or community level, as being ethnically based, unacceptable or even biased. Perceptions ·like these certainly have a direct effect on the manner in which such policies and programmes are implemented and received. With conditions as the foregoing in mind, and in view of the importance of, and the lack of information on, the relationship between dimensions of ethnic identity and population, the Institute in 19 75 got together with a group of interested research scholars from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand and began an investigation of such relationships and their implications for population policies and progress. Entitled "Culture and Fertility in Southeast Asia", this investigation consisted of two separate but linked activities, divided into Phase I and Phase II of the project, with the former focused largely on the analysis of secondary data and the latter on material generated by planned fieldwork and the administration of a questionnaire. The work that follows forms part of the "country monographs" growing out of Phase I of the project. These monographs, like the project itself, have

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been made possible through the co-operation and support of a number of individuals and organizations, particularly the International Development Research Centre (IDRC}, Ottawa, the various country team leaders and their colleagues, and the two co-ordinators of Phase I, Dr. Rodolfo Bulatao and Dr. Ong Jin Hui. To all of them we say, thank you. We are also particularly grateful to Dr. Ong Jin Hui who, in addition to general co-ordinative responsibilities, helped to edit the manuscripts on which the country monographs are based. Whilst thanking all contributors to, and partiCipants m, the project, and wishing the monographs all the best, we hope it is clearly understood that the responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Instit11te or its supporters. 5 September 1980

Kemial S. Sandhu Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

PREFACE

This volume is part of a series of monographs on culture and fertility m Southeast Asia. They arose out of a regional research project, "Culture and Fertility in Southeast Asia", initiated by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and involving researchers from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The first phase of the Culture and Fertility project concentrated on demographic variables and issues in relation to ethnic and other cultural variables. Each monograph, focusing on a particular country, is developed essentially on the following lines. First, the historical background and the development of the present social structure are detailed. Following this, the patterns of interaction among the various ethnic groups are considered, with particular attention paid to the identification of variables which may influence fertility patterns of the various groups. Against this backdrop, the population policies and family planning programmes are explained. The demographic structure and its changes in tandem with these policies and programmes are then analysed. In order to determine the impact of key variables on fertility patterns, a secondary analysis of available data was carried out, utilizing multiple classification analysis. There are differences in the substance of the individual country monographs, largely on account of the nature and availability of materials and documentation. All the same, there has been quite an adequate coverage of the areas deemed important in all the volumes. Indeed, the chapters on national population policies and family planning and the ones on demographic structure are almost complete in detail; in addition, they are comparable with· one another. On the other hand, the chapters based on secondary analysis have problems of comparability because secondary data were used. Since these data sets were not originally designed to answer to the project's research model, there were difficulties in comparing variable definitions and operationalization. Even more problematic was the fact that some variables were not available in the data sets. Furthermore, the data sets were not comparable in population coverage and time-frame (the target year was 1970). For all these reasons, this chapter in each of the monographs should not be treated as anything more than a preview or pretest of the research model. Seen in this perspective, it not only provides a useful means of identifying relevant explanatory variables but also shows that variations do indeed exist in a number of areas between ethnic groups and between countries.

IV

Variations and shortcomings of the type above notwithstanding, the five monographs on the whole do provide a useful background to the identification of relevant ethnic variables. Moreover, the lack of comparability of data is currently being corrected in the second phase of the project. A standardized core questionnaire with additional peripheral and specific queries has been designed, based on the findings of the country studies of Phase I. Ultimately, it is expected that the analysis of data collected in Phase II will culminate m an in-depth examination of the relationship between ethnicity and fertility. 1 September 1980

Ong Jin Hui Editor, Country Monographs Culture and Fertility in Southeast Asia, Phase I

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.

Percentage Distribution of the Philippines by Broad Age Groups: 1903, 1918, 1939, 1948, 1960, 1970 and 1972

37

Percentage Distribution of Population by Marital Status, Sex and Year

38

Major Geographical Regions of the Philippines Land Area, Population, Density, May 1970

40

Total Overall and Marital Fertility Rates for the Philippines and Its Major Regions: 1960 and 1963-68

42

5

Variables in the Analysis

47

6

Multiple Classification Analysis of Fertility-related Measures, Philippines, 1973

48

F-ratios in Multiple Classification Analysis of Fertility-related Measures, Philippines, 19 7 3

50

Betas in Multiple Classification Analysis of Children Ever Born by Ethnicity, One Other Factor, and Covariates, Philippines, 19 7 3

50

Deviations from the Mean in Multiple Classification Analysis of Fertility-related Measures, Philippines, 19 7 3

52

Multiple Classification Analysis of Children Ever Born, by Ethnic Group, Philippines, 1973

54

Adjusted Deviations in Multiple Classification Analysis of Children Ever Born, by Ethnic Group, Philippines, 1973

55

2

3

4

7

8

9

10

11

IV

Table No. 12

13

Multiple Classification Analysis of Desired Family Size, by Ethnic Group, Philippines, 19 7 3

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Adjusted Deviations in Multiple Classification Analysis of Desired Family Size, by Ethnic Group, Philippines, 1973

57

CONTENTS

FOREWORD PREFACE

iii

LIST OF TABLES

v

1:

CULTURAL DIVERSITY

1

II:

INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR

18

III:

POPULATION POLICIES:

30

IV:

DEMOGRAPHIC AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

36

V:

CULTURAL DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY

45

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PAST AND PRESENT

59

I:

CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Introduction

Ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism in Southeast Asia make the regwn a fertile ground for generating and testing hypotheses about the relationship between ethnic identity and various social and behavioural processes. The understanding of such linkages will bear direct practical implications, particularly when such behaviours are governed directly or indirectly by institutional policies applied on a nationwide scale. This has hardly been done, either on a crossnational or cross-cultural basis. Greater recognition of the salient role of ethnic identity in developed as well as developing political and social systems is gradually increasing. An active search for the independent effects of ethnic identity, the limitations of earlier treatments of the ethnic variable, and a strong quest for a more dynamic theory of ethnicity are some underlying issues in recent literaturc. 1 The inclusion of the clement of ethnic variations in theories of modernization and development has also been articulated. The monograph is concerned with gammg an insight into the relationship between ethnic identity and population behaviour in the Philippines. Establishing the linkage between ethnic diversity and fertility differentials will have definite implicati,ons for population policies and programmes. This interest grows from the general recognition that such policies and programmes have often been planned and implemented on a national scale, with little consideration for ethnic diversity. While the relationship between ethnicity and fertility will not be directly studied or measured in this manuscript, inferences and hypotheses will be drawn from an integration of available literature on the various ethnic groups in the Philippines on the one hand and a review of relevant population data from existing surveys on the other. Chapter I is divided into two parts. The first part is mainly a brief comprehensive overview of trends and concepts in ethnicity research followed ~----------

1 George de Vos and Lola Pomanncci-Ross, eds., Ethnic Identity (Palo Alto: Mayfield, 1975); Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity, Theory and Experience (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975); Richard A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research (New York: Random House, 1970); and Sami Zubaida, ed., Race and Radicalism (London: Tavistock, 1970).

2

by a glimpse into the literature on the relationship between etlmicity and fertility. The inclusion of a general review of literature on ethnicity was prompted by (a) the observation that empirical research on Philippine ethnic attitudes has drawn heavily from this body of literature, and (h) the desire to further clarify that the study of ethnicity as a potent determinant of behaviour has been preoccupied with the same types of behaviour (for example, ethnic relations) and that it can be expanded to include other unexplored spheres of application (for example, population behaviour). This last point is then discussed in a review of studies where ethnicity status has been examined in relation to fertility behaviour. While such studies are limited and the analysis of Philippine population behaviour is as yet unexplored, the review reveals the significance of pursuing this type of research. The second part of Chapter I presents a general description of the ethnic situation in the Philippines. This is intended primarily to provide an overview of ethnic diversity in the Philippines based on an integration of demographic, geographical, anthropological and historical data. Groups are not equally described in detail, since information and data on every group vary in quantity, quality and availability. On this basis, certain groups have been preselected for convenience in analysis in subsequent chapters.

The Nature of Ethnicity:

A Review

Defining an Ethnic Group A basic difficulty encountered in comparative studies of ethnic groups one of definition. An ethnic group has been most frequently defined as a collection of people distinguishable from other groups by having in common one or more of certain characteristics, namely, religion, racial origin, national ongm, language and cultural traditions. 2

IS

This definition remams the most commonly used research definition. Several conceptual problems have been advanced, however, and these have led

2 Melvin M. Tumin, "Ethnic Group," in J. Gould and W.L. Kolb, eds., A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 243-244; and Raoul Naroll, "On Ethnic Unit Classification," Current Anthropology 5 (1964): 283-312.

3

to extensive discussions on the meamngs and functions of ethnic groups.

On

the whole, the problems which have been raised do not suggest any definite revisions of meaning; they arc critiques of various interpretations which have been attached to this traditional definition. In general, this traditional definition has guided ethnographic work which has been criticized as being too static, simplistically descriptive and nothing more than a taxonomy of trait inventories particular to each group. Some Philippine ethnographic research may be considered to be of this sort. A critical stance is generally taken against the assumption that ethnic groups are mutually exclusive units developing in isolation from one another; rather, ethnic boundaries are maintained not by differences per se but by the social significance given to these differences. Social contact between groups maintains the boundaries. Similarly, Patterson emphasizes that what is critical about an ethnic group is not the particular set of symbolic features distinguishing groups but the social uses of these features. 3 In actual research, Campbell and LeVine have proposed the use of questions on "own group identity" as a relatively unbiased approach to discovering the levels of most salient group identification.4 Thus it appears that critiques of definition are actually an expose of problems encountered in locating ingroup-outgroup boundaries. Moreover, one major focus of this critical assessment is the prevailing practice among researchers of using a common feature of differences in separating groups that are to be compared, whether or not this applies equally to the groups. For instance, a comparison between Thai ethnic groups and Pilipino ethnic groups should not perhaps be based on linguistic differences alone; while both may be differentiated according to linguistic differences, Thai ethnic groups are more meaningfully bound by descent rather than language. 5 Indeed, group differences vary qualitatively and widely within each society, between societies and at different historical periods. 6

3 Orlando Patterson, "Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Framework and Caribbean Case Study." In N. Glazer and D. Moynihan, eds., Ethnicity: Theory and Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 197 5). 4 Donald T. Campbell and Robert A. LeVine, "A Proposal for Cooperative Cross·cultural Research on Ethnocentrism." Journal of Conflict Resolution 5 (1961): 82-108. 5 Charles F. Keyes, "Toward a New Formulation of the Concept of Ethnic Group," Ethnicity 3 (1976): 202-213. 6 Pierre van den Berghe, Race and Ethnicity: Basic Books, 1970); Zubaida, op.cit.

Essays in Comparative Sociology (New York:

4

Related Concepts The emergence of ethnic groups as a category of social grouping m the social sciences was attended by the rise of a constellation of related concepts in the literature, the most notable of which are ethnic attitudes, stereotyping, ethnocentrism and prejudice. Studied independently or jointly, the relationships among these concepts are immediately clear. Two assumptions implicitly or explicitly underlie the usage of these concepts. First, there is always some consciousness among members of the ethnic group about his sense of belonging to the group. Group consciousness is assumed to be basic to ethnocentrism, ethnic identity, prejudice or even stereotyping. Secondly, it is apparent that the study of ethnicity is frequently not conceived neutrally: usage of the concepts is charged with social concern for real or potential sources of group conflicts. The prevalence of an applied approach has been noted by many writers and must indeed have been the important source impetus for sustenance of active research in the field. 7

Ethnic identity refers to the identification of a person with an ethnic group. Basic group identity is composed of primordial affinities and attachments and it is as distinct from all other multiple and secondary identities people acquire because unlike others, its elements are what make up a group.8 Ethnic identity thus comprises many dimensions which may be grouped into two basic categories: ( 1) structural dimensions, generally referring to identification characteristics arising from the social structure of one's group, for example, language and kinship; and (2) attitudinal dimensions, referring to beliefs and practices held by the group, like those pertaining to interethnic perceptions and religion. There is no body of literature written directly about f1e explicit measurement of ethnic identity. In practice, however, self-reports either used singly or in combination with secondary data are made use of in assessing the structural dimensions of ethnic identity, while traditional survey methods of attitude measurement are used in the measurement of its attitudinal dimensions. A group's sense of ethnic identity or belonging presupposes the group's ethnic attitudes towards other groups. This has often been referred to as

7 George E. Simpson and .John M. Yinger, Racial and Cultural Minorities (New York: and Row, 1972). 8 Harold R. Isaac, Idols of the Tribe: Harper and Row, 1975).

Harper

Group Identity and Political Change (New York:

5

intergroup attitude, often discussed m terms of cognitive, affective and cognate clements. 9 When cognitive beliefs about an ethnic group become simplified, generalized, rigidified and insufficiently based in fact, they are labelled stereotypes~ 0 According to Katz and Braly, cognitive beliefs become fixed impressions which conform very little to facts they represent. 11 The conceptual work of Lippman and the methodology described by Katz and Braly have served as models for most of the subsequent theories and empirical work on the cognitive component of ethnic attitudes. This is also found to be true in Philippine studies on ethnic attitudes. Katz and Braly's paradigm consists of a trait selection task attributed to different ethnic groups. Therefore, operationally, cognitive beliefs about an ethnic group usually consist of a description of particular patterns of traits commonly assigned to the group. The patterns of trait assignment are usually fairly consistent over time. The evaluation of interethnic attitudes has invited the greatest degree of social concern. The concepts of ethnocentrism, prejudice and discrimination are evaluative labels signifying pejorative and potentially destructive consequences of group identity, thereby calling for vigilant attention and remedial solution. The term ethnocentrism was initially used to refer to a dichotomized "we-group" and "others-group" outlook that ethnic groups basically maintain. This classic definition of ethnocentrism may be best described as a syndrome involving a polarized sentiment of loyalty, integration and positive self-regard towards ingroup members in contrast to derogatory stereotype and hostility towards outgroup members. It is reflected in LeVine and Campbell's more recent formulation of ethnocentrism as "covering both the ingroup-outgroup polarization of hostility and the self-centred scaling of all values in terms of group folkways." In other words, one's own group is viewed as the centre of everything and all other groups are scaled and rated with reference to it.

9

M.B. Smith, "The Personal Setting of Public Opinions: A Study of Attitudes Toward Russia," Public Opinion Quarterly 11 (1947): 507-523; and B.M. Kramer, "Dimensions of Prejudice," Journal of Psychology 27 (1949): 389-451.

10

Walter Lippman, Public Opinion (New York:

11

D. Katz and K.W. Braly, "Racial Stereotypes of 100 College Students," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 28 (1933): 280-290.

Harcourt, Brace, 1922).

6

LeVine and Campbell, inferring from selected social science theories on inteq.,rroup relations, provide a large body of propositions h ypothcsized to be predictive of variations in ethnocentrism both within and between social groups. 12 Realistic group conflict theories, for instance, propose that group conflicts are rational or realistic outcomes when groups have incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources. 13 External conditions, for example, geographic distance between groups, are recognized as producing variations in ethnocentrism. 14 Social anthropological theories of conflict, on the other hand, assert that most individuals are members of more than one group and that the ordering of loyalties to these groups has significant implications for the solidarity of the entire ethnic group.

Prejudice and discrimination are perhaps the most stigmatized of the evaluative manifestations of interethnic attitudes, partly owing to the volume of research that has been devoted to these phenomena. Prejudice has been used in different senses by different authors. Three major defining criteria have been suggested: ( 1) violation of a norm of rationality, occurring in the form of prejudgement, overgeneralization, stereotyped thinking and rigidity in modifying opinions in the face of new evidences or on account of individual differences; (2) violation of the norm of justice when ethnic groups are treated in an unequal manner such as in discrimination; (3) deviation from the norm of "human heartedness" which signifies lack of humane acceptance of others expressed in rejection, indifference and hostility. Aside from subscribing to the idea that prejudice occurs w!1en one or more of the above norms are violated, other authors have preferred to think

12

Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Attitudes and Group Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1972).

Theories of Conflict, Ethnic

13

Leslie A. White, The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1949) and "The Concept of Evolution in Cultural Anthropology," in Evolution and Anthropology: A Centennial Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Anthropological Society of Washington, 1959); Lewis A. Coser and B. Rosenberg , eds., Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings (New York: Macmillan, 1957); and Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962).

14

H. Zimmer, Philosophies of India (New York: Pantheon Bollinges, 1951); and L.F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (London: Stevens, 1960).

7

of prejudice in terms of degrees and kinds. For example, Williams distinguishes between prejudices based on functional differences in the social order or real differences in value and those emphasizing stereotypes centred on symbolic elements that are of no functional significance such as skin colour. 15 Williams conceives of prejudices as a blanket term covering a wide variety of concrete forms which may be mild or intense, for example, prejudice against groups with which one has no contact in contrast to prejudice with contact groups, or prejudice based on social conformity as against prejudice anchored in deep aggressive hostility. A unified theory explaining the origin of prejudice is still lacking in spite of the voluminous literature on the subject.

Previous Studies on Ethnicity and Fertility Population research in the West, particularly in the U.S. has concentrated on differences in fertility behaviour among ethnic groups. 16 In general, data from these studies show that different patterns of fertility behaviour are exhibited by different ethnic groups, for example, American blacks display higher fertility than American whites, while Catholics in Northern Ireland have higher fertility than those in the Republic. Data in this series of studies have been interpreted in the context of majority-minority status as well as social, demographic and economic characteristics. Two arguments have been contrasted as competing explanations of differential fertility between majority and minority groups. The "assimilationist" perspective claims that the fertility of the majority population and that of the minority become similar as social, demographic and economic characteristics of these populations become similar. Also known as the "characteristics hypothesis", it has construed the higher fertility of blacks in America as having arisen from

15

Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (New York: Research Council, 1947).

16

Clyde Verrwn Kiser, et al., Trends and Variations in Fertility in the U.S. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Charles F. Westoff, et al., Family Growth in Metropolitan America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961}; Robert E. Kennedy, Jr., "Minority Group Status and Fertility: The Irish," American Sociological Review 38 (1973}: 85-96; and Robert E. Roberts and Eun Sui Lee, "Minority Group Status and Fertility Revisited," American Journal of Sociology 80 (1974): 503-523.

Social Science

8

characteristics of social class, education and mobility that are associated with minority status. 17 The"minority group status" hypothesis is an alternative explanation that has been proposed on the basis of empirical data which did not support the assimilation hypothesis. It was shown that, when social demographic characteristics are controlled, fertility differentials are not eliminated. The relative efficiency of these two hypotheses was tested by Sly, with results supporting both explanations, that is, (a) minority-group status exercises an independent effect on fertility, and (b) minority group status and certain structural factors interact to affect fertility. 1 8 The inconsistency in results borne by Sly's study has been reexamined in a later study with the general conclusion that ethnicity has effects on fertility independent of other dimensions. 19 In their paper, Roberts and Lee took note that data used in previous studes were cumulative fertility data and no attention was given to the confounding effects of generational differences, for example, the fertility of younger minority women more closely reflects the dominant group pattern than older minority women. Lack of statistical control on age at first marriage, as well as employment status, was also suggested as weaknesses in Sly's paper. On more basic grounds, it was likewise noticed that none of the earlier papers specified definitions or measures used in locating minority groups. Defining minority groups and specifying ethnic conditions resulting in differential fertility are relevant issues. Kennedy defines a minority group as "any distinct group comprising less than 50% of a total population ... 20 Numerical share of total population is a convenient index, though quite remote from more popular sociological definitions. In the latter case, minority

17

M.G. Smith, "Social and Cultural Pluralism," in Vera Rubin, ed., Social and Cultural Pluralism in the Caribbean. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 83, Set. 5 (1960); and Ralph Thomlinson, Population Dynamics (New York: Random House, 1965).

18

David F. Sly, "Minority-group Status and Fertility: An Extension of Goldscheider and Uhlenberg," American Journal of Sociology 76 (1970): 443-459.

19

Roberts and Lee, op.cit.

20

Kennedy, op.cit., p. 35.

9

group has been defined as a coherent subculture whose members interact with one another and distinguish themselves from the rest of the population. 21 In ethnicity studies, minority groups have been used synonymously with racial groups or religious groups. The empirical evidence on majority-minority differences in fertility patterns among American ethnic groups provides a strong enough basis for launching deeper analyses of this phenomenon. Social psychological factors have yet to be examined to determine how fertility is influenced by ct~nicity. If ethnic status does exert independent effects on its members, then the perceptions, beliefs and behaviour of group members should reflect this. 22 Specific conditions under which minority group status can exert an independent effect have not been fully explored. Using Irish data, Kennedy asserts that minority group fertility will be higher when two sets of conditions exist: "( 1) the group members believe they can increase their political influence by increasing their share of the total population; and (2) the group's members believe their chances for individual upward mobility are much less than enjoyed by the rest of the population. "2 3 Comparative studies of fertility-related aspects of ethnicity would g1ve important clues towards the understanding of the nature of the relationship between ethnicity and fertility. Until the present time, no empirical study has been made on this in the Philippines.

Ethnic Diversity m the Philippines A cursory look at a complete listing of ethnic groups in the Philippines would give one the impression of there being great cultural diversity in the country. Ethnologically, however, Filipinos may be considered more homogeneous than diverse. With the exception of a small number of Negritos, who still dwell 21

William Petersen, The Politics of Population (London:

V. Gollancz, 1964).

22

James T. Fawcett, Psychology and Population (New York: 1970); and Roberts and Lee, op.cit.

23

Kennedy, op.cit. , p. 86.

The Population Council,

10

m the forest and remote mountains, and the "Mestizo" group, an admixture of Chinese, Europeans (mainly Spanish) and Americans, the majority of the indigenous people arc racially homogeneous. Filipinos are generally of southern Mongoloid stock, characterized by brown skin, straight black hair, slender build and sparse body hair. 24 Language is perhaps the single and most simple basis for classifying Filipinos into ethnic groups. Philippine languages, numbering over seventy-five distinct dialects, belong to the Malaya-Polynesian family of the Austronesian phylum of languages. 25 Heterogeneity of tongues is not the rule, however, since about 90% of the Filipinos belong to only eight similar ethnolinguistic groups and the nationwide use of a national language, Pilipino, has greatly increased in recent years. While language has become the most useful index in identifying maJor ethnic groups in the Philippines, religion serves as an additional criterion, particularly in distinguishing minority groups. To a lesser extent, the attributes of race are likewise relevant, as in the case of the Chinese in the Philippines, a small but powerful minority. Of the total 36,684,486 Filipinos in 1970 distributed across the three major islands of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, about 90% are Christians, 4.3% are Muslims and less than 4% non-Christian ethnic minorities, or pagan groups. The Chinese, numbering about 80,421 in 1970, are numerically a small group but they constitute an important segment of the population. 26 Of the above groups, the Christians constitute the dominant group, not only politically but in other ways.

24

R. Bennet Bean, "Types of Negritos in the Philippine Islands," American Anthropologist 12, No. 2 (1910): 220-236; Alfred l.;ouis Kroeber, Peoples of the Philippines, 2nd ed. (New York: Anthropological Handbook Fund, 1943); and Jerome B. Bailen, "Studies in Physical Anthropology in the Philippines," in Mario D. Zamora, ed., Studies in Philippine Anthropology (Quezon City, 1967), pp. 150-161.

25

Douglas Chretien, "A Classification of Twenty-one Philippine Languages," Philippine journal of Science 91 (1963): 485-506; and Robert B. Fox et al., "A Preliminary Glottochronology for Northern Luzon," Asian Studies (University of the Philippines) 3, No. 1 (1965): 103-113.

26

Jacques Amyot, The Chinese Community of Manila: A Study of Adaptation of Chinese Familism to the Philippine Environment, Philippine Studies Program, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago (Chicago, 1960); Ira Hubert Reynolds, "Chinese Acculturation in llocos: Economic, Political, Religious," Ph.D. dissertation, Hartford Seminary, 1964; and Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life 1850-1898 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965).

11

Major Christian Groups The eight major Christian groups distinguished by dialect and ranked according to size are: Cebuano, Tagalog, Ilokano, Ilongo, Bikolano, Samareno, Pampangan, Pangasinanse. 2 7 "Bisayan" (Visayas) is a generic term for Cebuanos, Panayans and Samarans. Exposure to common, ecological, cultural and historical influences -- wet-rice agriculture, coastal trade during the pre-Spanish period, the all-encompassing governmental and ecclesiastical systems, literacy, the rise of urban centres, money, commerce, anti-Spanish movements during the post-Spanish era -- has resulted in considerable cultural levelling among the major Christian groups. Most of the Christian-Filipinos live in the coastal lowlands and valleys, north-western Luzon {Hokan region), the Cagayan Valley (north-central Luzon) and the alluvial Central Luzon Plain, the largest continuous Philippine lowland. The Ilokanos, Tagalogs, Pangasinanse and Pampangans are the major groups congregating in the thickly populated Central Luzon Plain, while most of the population in Metropolitan Manila are Tagalogs. The Bikolanos occupy the Bikol peninsula in the southeastern part of Luzon, the Catanduanes Island and northeastern Masbate Island. In the Visayas, the Samarans live in the Samar and eastern Leyte, while the Cebuanos predominate in Cebu, Bohol, Siquijor, eastern Negros and western and most of southern Leyte. The Panayans occupy Panay and western Negros. Most of the Christian-Filipinos in Mindanao, the second largest island in the country, are Visayan immigrants, mainly Cebuanos and Boholanos. Cebuan, Panayan, Samaran, Hokan, Tagalog, Bikolano, Pampangan and Pangasinan are the most widely claimed mother tongues. There are only slightly more Filipinos who speak more Pilipino (the national language, derived from Tagalog) than English, which is very widely spoken. Many Spanish words and phrases have become a part of the Philippine language and "pidgin" languages like Chabakano, a mixture of Spanish and Subanun-Cebuan, and Caviteno, a Spanish-Tagalog blending, have developed. The use of the Spanish language itself, however, has never been as widespread. The rural Filipino, especially if he is of the elite, is apt to reside in a poblacion (large village, or small or middle-sized town) or, even more likely,

27

Fred Eggan et al., Area Handbook on the Philippines. Relations Area Files Press, 1956).

4 Vols (New Haven:

Human

12

m a barrio. Buildings in most poblacions, especially those influenced by the Spaniards, are arranged in a semigrid system with the plaza at the centre. The church, public schools, market place and the municipal building, where local government officials hold office, are usually located either near or directly opposite the perimeter of the rectangular plaza complex. Land utilization, terrain and proximity to roads, rivers and cities are the main factors that determine the spatial characteristics of the barrio. Compact settlements generally are found in regions of intensive agriculture like Central Luzon Plain, whereas in areas characterized by dry upland farming like Cebu, houses are likely to be scattered among the fields. Thirty-two percent of the total Philippine population {in 1970) reside in urban areas and 68% in rural areas. Of the 21% Filipinos (7 ,555,4 70) who live in cities, over 1,000,000 live in Metro Manila, the centre of politics, business, finance and commerce, industry, education, press and communication, transportation, medicine, arts, fashion, fads and recreation. Other large cities like Cebu, Iloilo and Davao arc regional trade centres. Provincial cities like Dumaguete, Tacloban and Baguio have fewer Europeans and Americans in their populations and generally have closer socioeconomic ties with their hinterlands. Westernized Filipinos, many of whom are educated abroad and speak English fluently (sometimes Spanish too), reside mainly in large cities. 28 Aside from the above groups, there are twelve mmor Christian groups. The majority of these -- the lbanag, the Sambal, the Gaddang, the Isnay, the lvatan, and the Aklan -- are found on the island of Luzon. Then there are the Hantik in Panay; the Banton in Tab las Island and Banton; the Isamal (the only minor Christian group of Mindanao) on Samal Island in Davao Gulf; and the Kalamian, Kuyonon and Agutaynon of Calamianos Islands north of Palawan and on several islands in the Sulu Sea between Palawan and the Visayan Islands. Because of their being located in geographically isolated areas on relatively small islands or on narrow strips along coasts detached from the rest of the islands by mountain ranges, these minor Christian groups, on the whole, have not felt the impact of Western and other foreign influences as much as they have the incursions of the larger cultural-linguistic groups, especially the Ilokano, Cebuano

28

l'rank Le Bar, ed., Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia. Human Relations Area Files Press, 1975).

Vol. 2 (New Haven:

13

and Tagalog, who today constitute the dominant population in areas traditionally held by them. Although they still use their mother tongues at home, these minor groups are continuously experiencing much social and cultural assimilation. They share with major Christian groups a large portion of the Spanish-Filipino lowland culture. In physical appearances, these minor Christian groups are mainly either "Indonesian" or "Malayan" in type. Exceptions are the Ibanags, the tallest and one of the darkest in the Philippines, the Ivatans who are said to resemble the Ainu of Japan and the Isamal who seem to be more akin to the tall Caucasoid type. Linguistically, these mmor Christian groups (except for the Ibanag and Akian) are unique; yet they are related in some way to the neighbouring larger groups -- the Isinay with Iloko and Pangasinan; and the Kalamian, Kuyonon and Agutaynon with the Bisayan languages and the Palawan Tagbanuwa. However, the English sounds of "F", "V" and "Z" are peculiar only to the Ibanags, whereas among the Aklan, certain sounds which are never or seldom used in the other Philippine dialects are common.

Minority

Gro~

Muslims -- The "Moros", a term initially applied indiscriminately to most people of the Philippines by the Spaniards, now refers only to Filipinos who have been converted to Islam from Borneo and Malaya before the Spanish Conquest. 29 The Moros, however, prefer to be called Moslem Filipinos. They form the largest non-Christian group in the Philippines but they are far from being a homogeneous group as their members include ten people from ethnolinguistic groups (Eggan leaves out the Ilanon and lists only nine) -- the Maranao, the Maguindanao, the Ilanon, and the Sangir in western and southern Mindanao; the Tausog, the Samal, the Yakans and Badjaws in the islands of the Sulu Archipelago and the coast of Zamboanga; the J ama Mapun in Cagayan and the Sulu islands; and the Melebuganon (Melebugnan) on Balabac Island and the

29

Le Bar, op.cit.

14

adjacent coast of Palawan. of them are

Ma~uindanao,

They totalled 1,584,963 in 1970 and about 98% Maranao, Tausog and Samal.

History and the stage of Islamization arc the basis of the hierarchy that seems to exist among the Moro groups. Because of their early conversion, their affinity in the past to the once powerful Sulu Sultanate and their highly developed political organization, the Tausog feel they rank first. They think the Ilanon, Maranao and Maguindanao uncouth (alipulu) and keep themselves aloof from the Samals. The Maranao in turn feel superior to the Maguindanao. The Samals are said to be the lowest of the major groups but the Yakans and the Bajao rank even lower. It is said the latter groups never had an independent political status and some Moros do not consider them as real Moslems. The taboo on the eating of pork is widespread, but the Yakan and the Bajao in particular are relatively more lax in observing this. On the whole, it may be said that dominant groups indulge in the most orthodox religious practices while the more isolated ones still adhere to pagan beliefs and practices. Other taboos (besides the eating of pork that would set the Moros apart from their Christian neighbours are the drinking of alcoholic beverages (though this is not so for the Moros of Cotabato, according to Chester L. Hunt) 30 and ballroom dancing. The distinctive Moro dress differs from group to group, although all men who have gone on a pilgrimage to Mecca arc distinguished from those who have not by a white turban. Must of the languages spoken by these Moro groups belong to Conklin's Central Philippine language groups and have close affinity with the major Christian languages, especially the Tagalog and Sugbuhanon. The Maranao and the Maguindanao understand each other's languages. Under the "datu system", the political organization of the Moros, all persons in a district consider themselves allied to a local datu or sultan, who in turn owes allegiance to a territorial sultan. Members of the aristocratic families, whose claim to authority is based on the Koran, have the monopoly of leadership; but actual power depends on individual charisma and the number of followers. 31 There was a time when it was possible for one who is not from the nobility to acquire the necessary wealth and power through piracy 30

Chester L. Hunt, "Ethnic Stratification and Integration in Cotabato," Philippine Sociological Review 5 (1957): 13-38.

31

Le Bar, op.cit.

15

but since the American era, power through intermarriage involved powerful sultanates, characteristic that has set it

it has become more difficult to do so. Consolidating among aristocratic families, especially when this resulted in a fairly cohesive Moro society, a off from the pagan groups.

Suspicions and often enmity continue to exist between Muslims and Christians. This traditional alienation of the Moros has its roots in a long history of conflict, fear and distrust, augmented by land disputes between them and the Christian settlers. In more recent times, the many government sponsored resettlement schemes and economic development programmes have served to widen the rift. The Moros had successfully opposed the attempts of the Spaniards to impose upon them the Christian religion and the government and culture of Spain. What some historians refer to as the "Moro wars" were actually countless Spanish expeditions to Moro lands and frequent Moro raids in Spanish strongholds in the Philippines that lasted for about 300 years. Today, there is a growing feeling of solidarity on the part of the Moros with the rest of the Moslem world. More Moros are making the pilgrimage to Mecca and a number of them are getting invited to attend international Muslim conferences.

Non-Christian Minority Groups Considerable ethnic diversity exists among the survtvmg pagan mountain and forest peoples of the Philippines. The Indonesian types and Malay blends, with Indonesian and Mongoloid elements predominating, are common.33 There are thirty-seven major groups ranging from about 100,000 to a few hundred in size, and a number of subgroups dispersed throughout the archipelago; however, must are concentrated in the geographically marginal areas of the upland regions of Luzon, the interior of Mindanao and Palawan and the mountain regions of Mindoro and Negros. These non-Christian groups include:

32

Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: Press, 1973), pp. 107-168.

33

Joseph Ralston Hayden, "What Next for the Moro ?" Foreign Affairs 6 (1928):

644.

University of the Philippines 633-

16

(a)

The Luzon groups -- conveniently grouped under four regional headings (1)

The North Luzon groups -- the Kalinga, the Tinggian, the Apayao and the Pagan Gaddang.

(2)

Central Luzon groups -- the Ifugaos, the Bontoks and the Lepantos (Sagoda).

(3)

The Southern Luzon groups -- the Ibaloi and the Kankanai.

(4) The southeastern groups -- the Ilongot.

(b)

The Mindoro groups

(1)

The northern groups -- the Iraya, the Alangan, the Tadyawan, the Tagaydan and

(2) The southern groups -- the Batangan, the Hanunoo, the Bukid, the Batognon and the Bangon.

(c)

(d)

The hill tribesmen, chiefly on Panay and Negros and generally referred to as bukidnon (1)

The Sulods of Panay

(2)

The Magahots of southeastern Negros

The Mindanao groups (1)

The Subanons in the interior uplands of Zamboanga

(2)

The Bukidnons -- the mountain dwellers of the province of Bukidnon.

(3)

The tribesmen of the southwestern highlands of Mindanao -- the cave dwelling Tasadays, the Tirurays, the Tagubili (Taboli, T'boli) and the Cotabato (Tudag).

(4)

The hill tribesmen of the central Mindanao highlands -- the Bagobos, a tribe which encompasses four distinct but interrelated groups: the Manuvu, the Matigsalug, the Attaw and the Tagabawa.

( 5)

The Davao Gulf tribesmen -- the Mandaya, the Agusan Manobo, the coastal Bagobo, the Bilaan, the Tagakaolo, the Kulamian and the Ata.

17

(e)

The Palawan Pagan groups ( 1) The Tagbanuwa in central and northern Palawan.

(f)

(2)

The Batak scattered in areas north of Puerto Princessa m northeastern Palawan.

(3)

The Palawan in southern Palawan and the Konoy m the interior of southern Palawan.

(4)

The Kalamian people originally occupying Caron Island and coastal settlements on Busuanga Island and adjacent smaller islands.

(5)

The Agutaymo on Agutaya Island of the Cuyo group, the Kuyono on Cuyo Island and the Kagayano on Cagayan Island who presently show no traces of their aboriginal culture.

The Negritos and Dumagat

All the pagan groups speak languages belonging to the Philippine branch of the Malaya-Polynesian family.

The Luzon Pagan Groups. The pagan population of the interior hills and mountains of Luzon (including the Negritos) number less than 350,000 or some 3. 7% of Luzon's 1948 population of slightly over 9 million. The rice-terracing pagans, among whom are the well-known Ifugaos and Bontoks, live on a mountain mass centring on the Cordellera Central with peaks reaching 9,000 feet. To the north, east, and south of this mountain mass -- on the foothills -- live the semipermanent dry-rice cultivators: the Apayao, the Gaddang, the Ilongots and the remaining Negrito and Negroid groups. All peoples of the Philippines are assumed to have originated from the Asian mainland and most of the mountain languages and cultures developed from a common base. Cultural differences among the modern mountain tribes -- most notable of which are the general distinctions between a northeastern group of dry-rice cultivators (Apayao, Mt. Tinggian, Northern Kalinga and Pagan Gaddang) and a southwestern zone of terraced wet-rice agriculturists (Ifugao, Bontok, Kankanai, Ibaloi) and the relatively much more complex social and religious institutions of the latter which Keesing attributed to local adaptation to favourable

18

ecological factors -- appear to be a relatively late development. 34 For Eggan the local development of village complexity with associated residence and wealth patterns is a response to population increase and stability resulting from field cropping. 3 5

II:

INTERGROUP BEHAVIOUR

An ethnographic profile of every ethnic group which makes up a society will provide little information on the ethnic situation in that society. Differences in language, culture, religion and other attributes have become important indices of diversity as these are reflected in interethnic relations among the groups. It might be implicitly assumed that ethnicity has nothing to do with the differences per se but with the social meaning given to these differences by both ingroup and outgroup members of a society. The earliest published studies on racial and ethnic relationships in the Philippines were concerned mostly with social distance towards nationality groups, often using the Bogardus social distance scale. 3 6 This scale was to become a model on which social distance measures were developed later. Interest in ethnic stereotypes and images brought forth a greater amount of research in the 1950s, still using the Bogardus scale and, later the Katz and Braly adjective checklist method; research in the 1960s and 1970s saw the inclusion of the semantic differential technique attitude questionnaires and open-ended inquiries in

34

Felix M. Keesing, "The Isneg: Shifting Cultivators of the Nothern Philippines," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 18, No. 1 (1962): 1-19.

35

Fred Eggan, "Some Aspects of Culture Change in the Northern Philippines," American Anthropologist 43, No. 1 (1941): 11-18, "Some Social Institutions in the Mountain Province and Their Significance for Historical and Comparative Studies," Journal of East Asiatic Studies 3, No. 3 ( 1954): 329-335, and '"Cuhural Drift and Social Change," Current Anthropology 4 (1963): 329-335.

36

Emory S. Bogardus, "Measuring Social Distance," Journal of Applied Sociology 9 (1925): 299-308.

19

interethnic analysis. 3 7 By this period, exclusive concern over nationality groups had given way to concern over those ethnic groups which were in local residence in the country. Despite diverse measures yielding highly consensual results on ethnic attitudes and images, only a few studies aimed to test specific hypotheses or inquired into causalities involved in ethnic relations, conflicts or antagonisms. The most notable attempt in scope and purpose is perhaps the study by Bulatao which was later followed up in a large·scale survey by the Filipinas Foundation. 38 The relating of data to theoretical frameworks has been kept to a minimum, except in some studies. On the whole, historical, cultural and structural analysis of the nature of ethnic relationships is still far from complete. Although the Philippine population is ethnically diverse, by virtue of foreign contacts and influences since Spanish·American colonization, researchers of ethnic relations have had their eye on ethnic antagonisms, discrimination and conflicts. The Muslim situation is a case in point; a relevant issue has been posed as regards the implicit assumption that antagonisms do and must exist. The question is to what extent the research provides the respondent a first occasion to create an image of ethnic groups which would otherwise never surface to his conscious level. It has been strongly argued that prejudice as defined and behaviourally exhibited in the West does not have a corresponding reality in everyday Philippine interpersonal relationships. Weightman, viewing Philippine society as particularistic and personalistic in its kin-orientedness, presents a rather sweeping and careless description of the ethnic orientation of the Filipino: 39 This is not necessarily the case in the Philippines where discrimination and anti-location against the "alien", the stranger, and taong-labas find overt expressions in folklore, law and society. Thus, anti-locution, cultural antagonism and ethnic stereotyping are far more overt in the Philippines than in the United States.40 37

Katz and Braly, op.cit.; C.E. Osgood and G.J. Suci and P.H. Taanenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

38

Rodolfo A. Bulatao, Ethnic Attitudes in Five Philippine Cities (Quezon City: Research Laboratory, University of the Philippines, 19 7 3).

39

George H. Weightman, "A Study of Prejudice in a Personalistic Society: An Analysis of An Attitude Su,rvey of College Students," Asian Studies (University of the Philippines) 2 (1964): 87-101.

40

Ibid., p. 90.

Social

20

A search for trends in prevalent intergroup relations among ethnic groups m the Philippines reveals a lack of exact behavioural indices of contact between groups. The resulting picture is inevitably one of generalizations drawn from fragmented data on images, perceptions and attitudes. Hunt advances an interesting point in his own search for Philippine social distance data. Group relationships in the Philippines are less characterized by segregation than they are in the United States, and it seemed more realistic to measure the degree of acceptance of a giVen relationship than to offer only the acceptance-rejection alternatives. 41 Ethnic social distance patterns and attitudinal degrees of accepting other groups have yet to be thoroughly reviewed and analysed in the context of history. Historical literature on intergroup relations is particularly rich in the case of the Muslims and the Chinese.42 As to what information intergroup literature can offer in the current research on fertility, the following examples of information were considered useful. First, social distance studies offer data on marriage and intermarriage preferences among ethnic groups. These preferences can be checked with actual intermarriage patterns which in turn may yield consequences that are fertility-related, for example, intermarriage leading to migration or intermarriage resulting in the adoption of norms in the spouse's group or region. Second, stereotype studies should reveal traits consensually ascribed to different groups and these traits may be examined in terms of fertility-relatedness, or ethnic differentials in fertility may obtain useful explanations from a validation of these images. For example, high fertility among Bikolanos may be related to their stereotyped traditional image; or the Ilokano's frugality may be an explanation of their relatively lower fertility. Third, some of these studies include religion and religious preferences as determinants in patterns of social relationship. This can be examined in terms of religious values and practices facilitating or hindering child productivity. Ethnic values and norms related to the family, marriage and children will also be assessed and presented in greater detail in the next chapter.

41

Chester L. Hunt, "Social Distance in the Philippines," Sociology and Social Research 40

(1956): 42

253-260.

Majul, op.cit.; Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, eds., The Muslim Filipinos (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974); and Amyot, op.cit.

21

Social Distance Studies Historically, social distance towards foreign nationals was the predominant concern in earlier Philippine social psychological research on ethnic relations. Data collected by Macaraig between 1931-32 comprised what is considered to be the first social distance study in the Philippines. 43 With a sample of 2,386 teachers and students from Manila, Iloilo and Zamboanga, Macaraig used a modified Bogardus social distance instrument to gauge the sample's differential preference for thirteen national groups, namely: Filipinos, Spanish, Spanish Mestizos, Italian, Japanese, Hindus, Frenchmen, Japanese, American Mestizos, Englishmen, Chinese and Chinese Mestizos. The results revealed the most positive preference for Filipinos, Americans and Spanish Mestizos. Chinese and Japanese were least preferred, that is, they were the most frequently chosen for exclusion from the country. Subsequent studies on social distance patterns towards nationality groups generally reveal consistently high preferences for Caucasians relative to coloured races. 44 The prominence of Americans, by virtue of their white colour and Filipino emulation of their values and standards, is notable. 45 While American influences have been prevalent, these have had more to do with material aspects of culture (dressing, entertainment) than with values and norms. American family norms, such as preferences for a small family size, have not surfaced as part of the colonial experience. Moreover, in the context of American antiimperialist movements that rose in recent years, the image and preference of one's group might have changed. Greater ethnocentrism and lower regard for the white man were noted. The social distance pattern is particularly clearcut in the case of the Chinese. They are resident foreign nationals who have become distinct and successful in business -- something which native Filipinos do not approve of. Social distance literature, as well as historical accounts, of Sino relations in the Philippines provides strong evidence that, despite years of residence and 43

Allen L. Tan, "A Survey of Studies on Anti-Sinoism m the Philippines," Asian Studies 6, No. 2 (1968): 198-207.

44

A.S. Kanwar, "A Study of Social Distance between Some Filipinos and Sixteen Other Ethnic Groups," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of the Philippines, 1956; and Joel V. Berreman, "Philippine Attitudes Toward Racial and National Minorities," Research Studies of the State College of Washington 25 (1957): 186-194.

45

Hunt (1956), op.cit.; and Weightman, op.cit.

22

naturalization, the Chinese have not been fully assimilated into Philippine society. Data on social distance reveal the limited social acceptance accorded the Chinese, usually as business partners or as compadres (baptismal or wedding sponsors), is mostly on grounds that the Chinese concerned is gifted with business acumen and is wealthy. As marital partners, the Chinese are ranked the lowest even though Filipinos are seen as relatively tolerant of mixed marriages. 46 Despite the expressed aversion, however, intermarriages between Filipinos and Chinese have occurred and this accounts for 10% Chinese blood ancestry of many Filipinos. 4 7 A look at census and vital statistics data reveals that intermarriages between Filipinos and Chinese are indeed more frequent than popularly thought. Between 1960 and 1969, 805 marriages between Chinese males and Filipinas were recorded whereas 583 were contracted between Filipino males and Chinese brides. These figures, when combined, even exceeded the number of recorded marriages contracted between Chinese couples totalling 890 for 1960-69. Hunt had noted that the discrepancy between expressed attitudes towards Chinese intermarriages and actual intermarriages provides an occasion for studying the relationship between attitude and overt behaviour. 4 8 Several recent studies provide indications of improvement and variations m attitudes towards the Chinese, though the bulk of the data still emphasizes that the strains and antagonisms have not disappeared. It has been reported that social distance towards the Chinese is less than that which is observed towards the Muslim or the Japanese. It was also reported that a more positive regard for lower class Chinese exists whereas middle class Chinese are less accepted for they arc perceived to be business competitors. In comparing the Chinese in the city and the Chinese in the rural setting, Amyot points to the greater degree of interaction, acceptance and intermarriage occurring in the rural setting. 4 9 It was reported that 64% of the Chinese from rural areas and 39% of those in Manila have one or more Filipino friends. Only one-third of his sample did not have any Filipino relatives, ninong or ninang. while 53.7% claimed having Filipino relatives.

46

Hunt (1956), op.cit.

47

Otley H. Beyer, "Christian Population of the Philippines in 1942 ," in Marcelo Tangco, Christian Peoples of the Philippines, 1951.

48

Hunt (1956), op.cit.

49

Amyot, op.cit.

23

Bulatao suggested that city of residence rather than cthnicit y affects prejudice toward the Chinese and Muslims, for example, Manila residents were found to be more prejudiced than other city respondents. 50 Similarly, greater antagonisms and more negative images were suffered by the Chinese in the northern areas whereas in the south they are better accepted, particularly in Mindanao. It will be noted that the majority of the research on anti-Sinoism in the Philippines were concerned with Filipino attitudes towards the Chinese and little has been said regarding Chinese reaction to this. Mutual images held by the Chinese and the Filipinos have been compared. While positive regard for one's own group was equally exhibited by the Chinese and the Filipino, the Filipino rating of the Chinese was better than the rating the Chinese gave to the Filipino. Repressive measures launched against the Chinese have led them to drift away

from Philippine society and to limit interaction to that among themselves; they are further united through collective institutions and organizations and through a closed, complete and self-sufficient Chinese community in the Philippines.51 Though there is general truth to describing Chinese identity as strong and loyal, assimilation and changes have taken place. There is not a single Chinese group or organization which is accepted by all Philippine Chinese and there is no single political ideology which is followed by all. The Chinese as an ethnic group differ among themselves in status, religion, values and traditionalism. The retention of strict "Chineseness" provides insights into the extent to which the Chinese have been assimilated. Adoption of the majority group's values is best illustrated in the area of religion. In one survey it was reported that 78% of the respondents were Christians though only 40% of their fathers and 55% of their mothers were. Christian Chinese, particularly the Catholics who are in the majority, have shown the greatest changes. In the area of language, Chinese Hokkien and Mandarin are now hardly used for reading and writing but are confined to verbal transactions. Most Chinese have a comparatively functional knowledge of both English and Pilipino.

50

Bulatao, op.cit.

51

Antonio S. Tan, The Chinese in the Philippines, 1898-1935: A Study of Their National Awakening (Quezon City: Garcia Publishing Co., 1972); and Amyot, op.cit.

24

The most recent study on anti-Sinoism should throw some light on how ethnic attitudes have changed. The attitudes of Filipinos (native-born Filipinos), Filipino-Chinese (naturalized Filipinos) and Chinese-Chinese (Chinese by blood and citizenship) were compared. An attitude questionnaire based on a rather thorough review of ethnic issues relevant to anti-Sinoism was used. The results revealed that while all respondents agreed that the Chinese should be assimilated into Philippine society, Filipinos disagreed that they should be accommodated in Philippine schools. The political allegiance of the Chinese in the Philippines was questioned by the Filipino respondents; moreover, both the Filipino-Chinese and the Chinese nationals did not fully accept the idea that they ought to pay allegiance only to the Philippine Government. For them, Chinese culture and tradition must be sustained though they express willingness to accommodate Philippine norms. Filipinization, to some, is best demonstrated through the acquisition of Philippine citizenship. Thus, it appears that the Chinese arc both rejected and accepted, envied and defended, admired and insulted. 52 The solidity of ethnicity for the Chinese remains and is suggested by data showing that only 15.6% of the 33% of Chinese who are naturalized Filipinos identified themselves as Filipino. Repressive measures launched to control the Chinese during the Spanish, American and postindependence periods have been thought to be one explanation of anti-Sinoism. 53 The measures were instrumental not only in curbing Chinese economic success but in impressing negative attitudes in the minds of Filipinos. Legal measures enacted against the Chinese are of two types: those which aimed to limit their business involvement in the country and immigration measures meant to limit their number. These measures became psychological obstacles for Chinese assimilation into the society. 54 Explaining the case of the Filipino, Weightman argues that personalism, kin-orientedness and the absence of any egalitarian ideology are factors implicated in the Filipino attitude towards the Chinese.55 Thus, antipathy towards the 52

Tan (1972), op.cit.

53

Margaret Wyant Horsley, "Sangley: The Formation of Anti-Chinese Feeling in the Philippines - A Cultural Study of Stereotypes of Prejudice," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1950; and Tan {1972), op.cit.

54

Amyot, op.cit.

55

Weightman, op.cit.

25

Chinese (or any other ethnic group) embodies elements of antipathy towards the "non-kin". Weightman, however, presents no evidence to verify that personalism is the explanation.

Among Philippine Ethnic Groups Considered one of the most extensive studies on Philippine ethnic attitudes, the research of Bulatao tapped a number of attitudinal indices such as ethnic social distance ratings, open-ended questions, semantic differential scales, and an attitude questionnaire on ethnic issues. 56 The study focused on ethnic groups distinguished by three factors: dialect variations, among the major Philippine ethnic groups; nationality, in the case of the Chinese; and religion, distinguishing the Muslim Filipino from major ethnic groups who are Christian. In general, the results showed that Christian groups make distinctions among themselves but discriminations are sharper and more emotionally charged for the Chinese and the Muslim. Muslims are accused of not contributing to national development while the Chinese clannishness is seen negatively. Social distance data among major ethnic groups tended to be similar regardless of the relationship under consideration. Implicitly, the Tagalog is equally disposed to befriending an Ilokano as to marrying one. On the whole, the research has been consistent in its findings that, first and foremost, members of an ethnic group would prefer to associate with people from their mvn group. The conclusion that the Filipino is ethnocentric is based on this ingroup loyalty verified empirically through social distance preferences. In no case has it been reported that first preference was given to an outgroup. A national ethnic attitude survey covering all regions m the Philippines was launched by Filipinas Foundation. The Tagalogs were ranked as the most likeable, followed by the Cebuanos and the llokanos. With the exception of the Muslims who chose the Cebuanos as the second most likeable group, all others chose the Tagalog. It is quite interesting that 48% of the 3,500 respondents replied "none" when asked about the least likeable group, preceded

56

Bulatao, op.cit.

26

by 31% choosing the Muslims. Likeability was associated with positively valued traits such as goodness, kindness, loyalty, friendliness, whilst boastfulness, conceit and hotheadedness constituted the basis for "non-likeability". The bottom positions were occupied by the Warays and Pampangos, in addition to the Muslims. That there are hardly any signs that make discrimination discernible among maJor ethnic groups may be partly due to points of contact which bind the groups such as Catholicism, parallel customs and traditions and, to a significant degree, the use of English and Pilipino as common languages, supplanting their own dialects. Moreover, the breakdown of the distinctiveness of ethnic lines may also be brought about by intermarriages, which seem to occur freely, and migratory movements, which facilitate ethnic intermixing. The Tagalog, generally thought to be the most prominent and most urbanized Filipino group, is the most popular choice in social distance preferences. 57 The greater acceptability of the Tagalog may be linked to the recognition of the prominence of the group, whose members often reside nearest to Manila, the Philippine's recognized centre for cultural, economic and political life. Moreover, aspirations of seeking economic opportunities in the metropolis accentuate the popularity of its residents who are considered more literate, more modem and richer in culture. The Tagalog dialect, which became the basis of Pilipino, the national language, has acquired the greatest prestige among the vernaculars and is currently considered the lingua franca. Marital preferences indicated by social distance analyses point to the greater frequency of a Tagalog being chosen either as a husband or wife among the ethnic groups, except among the Muslims and the Warays, who both chose the Cebuano. Where preferences are transformed into actualities, this provides fertilityrelevant predictions that norms and practices of Tagalogs may well be the future trend. As Gilandas and Conaco suggest, sexual practices and attitudes may be following the "growing tip" phenomenon, that is, urban Manila women, increasingly becoming liberal with sexual expression, birth control and the like, are the potential heralders of social change in the country. 58 Marital preferences of

57

Bartlett H. Stoodley, "Some Aspects of Tagalog Family Structure," American Anthropologist 59, No. 2 (1957): 236-249.

58

Alex Gilandas et al., "Sex and the Single Filipina: Science Information 6 (April-June 1978).

A Holistic Approach," PSSC Social

27

Tagalogs, however, are quite ethnocentric. Tagalogs and Ilokanos mutually express preference for each other though the preference of the Tagalog is for the Ilokano as husband rather than as wife. The dominant influence of Catholicism is likewise reflected in the social distance surveys. Bulatao's five city samples appeared to support the Philippines' pride in its Catholicism. Hunt found that the high status which members of the dominant religious and regional group accord themselves is, to a great degree, shared by the rest of the population. He suggests that this supports the hypothesis that "minority groups are influenced by the folkways of the majority group even to the extent of accepting the status ratings which the majority groups apply to themselves. " 59 Sharper discriminations are exhibited when Christian groups and nonChristian groups rate one another. In Hunt's study, the Negritos, Igorots and Muslims received less favourable ratings than all other groups. Negative Muslim ratings have been documented in most social distance studies and these have received considerable attention in historical and political discussions. MuslimChristian conflict, of current controversy in the political management of the country, is probably the most clear-cut and concrete case of ethnic antagonism among Filipinos. Grounded on political, historical and religious bases, the separation not only manifests itself in behavioural intentions but in actual open conflicts as well. Bulatao considers the Muslim and Chinese problems partial evidence in support of the "two scapegoat theory" of Bettelheim and Janowitz, that is, some of one's hostilities, arising out of a sense of inferiority and envy, are directed towards a high status minority (the Chinese) while other hostilities, arising from feelings of superiority, are directed towards a low status minority group (the Muslims). 60 The integration of the Muslim with the mainstream Philippine society has become a subject of numerous analyses~l Separated mainly by religion, tradition and historical scars brought about by low regard for them, the Muslims have

59

Hunt (1956), op.cit., p. 256.

60

Bulatao, op.cit.; and Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, Dynamics of Prejudice (New York: Harper, 1950).

61

Majul, op.cit.; and Gowing, op.cit.

28

bravely emerged in current Philippine politics as a powerful group. Thus far, the Muslims have been allowed to follow their own laws and tradition, notably on polygamy which is illegal in the country at large. An examination of attitudes towards intermarriage between Muslims and Christians revealed that only 25% of the unmarried Muslim respondents rejected the idea. Male and female responses differed, with more of the Muslim males preferring mixed marriage than Muslim females. Eighty percent of married Muslims consented to the idea of their son marrying a Christian whereas greater resistance was exhibited for a daughter's marriage to someone outside the religion. The case is similar to the Chinese receptivity to a Chinese male marrying a Filipina rather than to a Chinese female marrying a Filipino. Reasons for this have not been documented, but it might be hypothesized that preservation of ethnic identity or kin identity, for that matter, is more likely when a son marries an outgroup member than when a daughter marries into an outgroup. It is still traditionally believed that it is the wife who is subjected to accommodating and assimilating the husband's values rather than v1ce versa. Social distance patterns towards other non-Christian minority groups bear a resemblance to the majority groups' attitudes towards the Muslims but they are less critical and rejective when analysed separately. Only more familiar mountain province tribes (for example, the Igorot) and the Negritos have been included m social distance studies; however, isolated non-Christian groups, separated by religion, absence of westernization, physical isolation, and indigenous practices, have interacted minimally with major Christian groups. Feelings of superiority over the cultural minorities are often gleaned from the meagre data available. It is interesting to note that the majority of Bulatao's 1, 705 respondents did not regard the Muslims and Chinese as important problems. Only a low priority was assigned to ethnic problems. This is contrary to Weightman's claim that ethnic antagonism is highly pronounced among Philippine groups. 62 Out of 3,500 interviews, only 40.7% considered the Philippines as having problems with minority groups; 35.4% said yes and 23.9% were uncertain. Bulatao observes that "ethnic problems have so far not impressed themselves on national consciousness, though the Muslim problem may just be starting to do so. Talk about national unity may therefore have more the character of

62

Weightman, op.cit.

exhortations not to make waves rather than expressmg any senous interest m the problems of national minorities."63

Interethnic Perceptions and Images Social distance and ethnic attitudes are founded on how one group perceives the other. Group perceptions, while expected to vary according to time and context, have tended towards stability through the operation of ethnic stereotyping. Stereotype stability is quite characteristic of interethnic images held by Philippine ethnic groups. The stereotypes are interesting per se despite limited efforts made to verify or validate the content of these generalizations. How the stereotype persists through time and how stereotyped images directly affect social interaction are still unanswered questions.

The Bikolanos. The Bikolanos are particularly interesting because of their intermediate position between the Tagalogs and the Visayans of Samar and Leyte. Their relationships seem closer to the Visayans of Panay and Western Negros. The Bikol region is considered rather rich and fertile and this has been thought to have made the Bikolanos rather complacent. In temperament, they are The Bikolanos have been perceived as gay and fond of social gatherings. cool-tempered and peaceful, humble and generous, friendly and warm, and extravagant though poor. 64 Just as the Bikolano is stereotyped as lighthearted and peaceful, the Bikol region is perceived to be a place where living is not difficult, and perhaps this has led to accusations that the Bikolano is lacking in ambition. Naturally quiet and peaceful, the Bikolanos have also been perceived to be religious. It is popularly believed that male Bikolanos make up a great proportion of the population's priests. Other stereotyped characteristics of the Bikolanos include patience and self-control. 63

Bulatao, op.cit.

64

Ibid.

30

Happy family life is said to be peculiar to the Bikolanos. Having large families is not something to be regretted. The Bikolano man is a good husband, although he is prone to spending freely and gambling. The Bikolano has also been described as "salawahan" or indecisive. Studies on the Bikolanos as an ethnic group are quite limited, compared to the greater attention given to other ethnic groups. Ethnographic data on the Bikolanos are difficult to find, save for occasional case studies in particular towns or communities. 65 Thus very little empirical sources can be used to relate the above stereotypes to other dimensions.

III:

POPULATION POLICIES:

PAST AND PRESENT

To the extent that most of the world's nations treat population growth as a major problem, a wide range of solutions has been offered in the form of policies and programmes designed to control it. In East and Southeast Asia, about 86% of the population belong to countries with population programmes or countries receiving some support for a programme. 6 6 To date, population policy in the Philippines has been mainly oriented towards a clinic-centred approach. 6 7 As in most developing nations, population programmes, while varied in approaches and organization, have, to a large extent, been concerned mainly with family planning and birth control methods.

65

Frank Lynch, "Ang mga asuwang: A Bicol Belief," Philippine Social Science and Humanities Review 14 (1949): 401-427.

66

Mercedes B. Concepcion, "Population Control in Southeast Asia," The Month (November 1973): 381-386.

67

William F. Stinner, "Levels, Trends and Differentials in Philippine Nuptiality, Fertility and Family Size Ideals and Preferences: An Integrated Summary of Research Conducted Under USAID Contract," University of the Philippines Population Institute, 1975. Mimeographed.

31

Population Control:

Historical Notes

In the Philippines, interest in population control may be traced to the pre-Spanish period, as evidenced by provisions in the Code of Sumakwel, which explicitly specified control of the number of children according to one's capacity to support and raise one's offspring. However, with the introduction of Catholicism by Spain in 1521, and the stabilization of Catholicism as tllc dominant religion of the Philippine population, Catholic preaching about marriage and procreation -- "increase and multiply" -- influenced the population policy and birth control was viewed to be contrary to the duties and obligations of marital life. Historically, family planning activities were not undertaken in an organized manner until the period 1939-48 when Presbyterian and Congregational ministers and non-Catholic lay leaders started lecturing about birth control in small congregations. These efforts were later consolidated when the National Council of Churches in the Philippines established a counselling clinic, the Family Relations Center. However, family planning and birth control managed to reach only a limited number of clients. What is currently an active population movement in both government and private organizations in the Philippines had its beginnings in the 1960s. The establishment of a Population Institute at the University of the Philippines in 1964 saw the beginning of specialized training in demography, active analyses of population characteristics and trends, and the initiation of research which became significant for planning purposes.

By the late 1960s, the Philippine Government had begun to exhibit senous concern over the rapid population growth in the country. Its commitment to the problem of population control was manifested in the 196 7 signing by the Philippines' President of the United Nations Human Rights Declaration on Population, which stressed the recognition of population control as an element in long-range national planning. A year later, this commitment was seen in the creation of the Project Office for Maternal and Child Health in the country's Department of Health, pursuant to an agreement between the National Economic Council and the U.S. Agency for International Development. This office, which was expected to use mainly foreign funds was initially assigned overall responsibility for drawing up a population planning programme.

32

The basic policies which constituted the official show of national concern over population growth were first promulgated in 1969. 68 During this year, a Population Commission (POPCOM) was created; thus the adverse effects of population expansion on the economic and social development of the country were publicly recognized. The task of undertaking and disseminating research on population was assigned to POPCOM. In 1970, legislation had been proposed to make family planning an official policy in the Marcos Administration, with the following major tasks articulated: first, education to impress on the people the need to control the country's population; secondly, the dissemination of knowledge on birth control; and thirdly, the provision of facilities, especially in rural areas of the Philippines. By this time, the integration of family planning in all medical schools was initiated. The open advocacy of family planning was heard and discussed in public forums, lectures and meetings led by private organizations concerned about the issue. The Family Planning Association of the Philippines and the Planned Parenthood Movement of the Philippines are examples of the active groups which spurred on the population campaign in this period. In contrast, antipopulation control circles developed among religious groups, notably the Catholics. Since the creation of POPCOM, the Philippine Government has taken full interest in sustaining a family planning programme on a permanent basis. In 1970, the composition of POPCOM was expanded to include national Department Secretaries and heads of private and religious agencies. In 1971, the first national budget appropriation for its operation was drawn and approved by the Congress of the Philippines. By 19 72, President Marcos, through decrees and letters of instruction, had enjoined and directed all heads of schools, government offices, mass media, civic, voluntary and religious organizations and even business enterprises, to promote the concept of family welfare, family planning and responsible parenthood. POPCOM, in achieving the objectives of the population directives, assumed the role of central co-ordinator, policymaker, planner and funding agency of the government in population matters. Though it did not directly implement projects, POPCOM had a network of about forty different government and private agencies for the implementation of policies. As of 1973, POPCOM had reported the establishment of 2,400 family planning clinics in the country and had registered 1,637,158 acceptors. About two-thirds of these clinics are in rural health units while others are located in agricultural centres, clinics and hospitals. 68

Philippine Laws and Resolutions 6, Joint Resolution Number 2.

33

In 1973, another major institution was established to serve population control goals. The Population Center Foundation {PCF) is a private institution, organized with the expressed purpose of increasing the involvement of the private sector in population control, thus supporting and complementing the national programme. In its projects, the PCF has shown interest in considering alternative modes of control by which population goals can be integrated with fields such as nutrition, human settlement, environment and social welfare. One useful project launched by the PCF is the creation of the Population Data Information Service (PDIS), a centralized clearing house for population data.

Regional Population Research and Implications for Policy As observed by Stinner, the orientation m population planning and research m the Philippines has largely been focused on the clinic-centred approach. In the substantive underpinning of policy, research has been directed towards the assessment of the functioning of the clinics, for example, acceptance rates, continuation rates, follow-ups, and so forth. Stinner viewed such research as having been largely evaluative in nature and "specifically so in terms of one policy option, thereby mitigating to a very large extent the utilization of research in a formulative fashion, that is, as a foundation for the development of more comprehensive and integrated schemes. "69 Moreover, the more pragmatic aspects of evaluating policy have led researchers to focus on national levels and trends to provide baseline parameters in assessing the success of family planning programmes. That this tended to gloss over and conceal existing divergencies among the various subgroups in the population has recently been articulated and substantiated in a growing body of research concerned with interprovincial and regional comparisons of trends. For instance, as Smith reported recently, while the percentage of single women and the mean age at marriage indicate a steady national trend over the 1903-60 period, provincial trends in the timing of marriage have pursued a more varied course. 7 0 Within the 69

Stinner, op.cit.

70

Peter C. Smith, "Fertility and Nuptiality: The Local-area Mosaic," in Wilhelm Flieger and Peter C. Smith, eds., A Demographic Path to Modernity (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1975), pp. 201-233.

34

Philippines, moreover, the highest fertility rates in the 1960 census and the 1968 National Demographic Survey (NDS) analyses have been found to be in the Bikol region and the frontier areas of the Cagayan Valley and Mindanao. On the other hand, the lowest levels have been found in Metropolitan Manila and in the Ilokos regwn. The hypothesis that ethnic differentials in fertility exist has been suggested by these recent research studies. Although the relationship between fertility and ethnicity has not been directly explained, the ethnic differences borne by regional comparisons should have implications for policymaking. Hauser has emphasized the advantage to be gained from tailoring population programmes to the varying marital and fertility situations in the regions. 71 The formulation of regional policies rather than national policies may be suggested on the basis of regional fertility differences or, for that matter, regional outcomes of family planning efforts. Research relating ethnic diversity and fertility could help launch a new phase of policymaking in the Philippines, characterized by the formulation of programmes based on a broader framework that will not only cover estimates of baseline fertility parameters, but also relate fertility motivations to their respective social and cultural settings. 7 2 Thus, ethnic differentials provide clues to potential target populations and possibly, future clinic locations. Interprovincial enumeration of available clinics, as well as survey data on registered birth control users, would provide this basic information. More importantly, however, exploitation of ethnicity as a determinant in future analyses would provide a wider base for setting up policy alternatives. For instance, information on the nature of ethnic relations among groups in a population would indirectly provide clues as to the acceptability of policies espoused and formulated by certain dominant groups. In the Philippines, it has often been observed that the Tagalogs' framework (in Central Luzon and particularly in Metropolitan Manila) guides the national policies of the land. To some extent, this has invited objections from other ethnic groups and, predictably, the workability and acceptability of the national policy have suffered. This can be seen in the area of language planning for the Philippines. The various ethnic groups' perception and response to national policy cannot be overlooked.

71

Philip M. Hauser, Implications of Findings of Fertility Studies in the Philippines for Policy and Future Research (Honolulu: East-West Population Institute, 1973).

72

Stinner, op.cit.

35

Moreover, where different needs and weaknesses are identified, different solutions are called for. In Metropolitan Manila, for example, policy requirements should stress modes of reducing fertility rather than encouragement of delays in marriage since age at marriage is rising and moderate to high fertility levels are observed. Policy considerations for the region with highest reported fertility (Bikol), on the other hand, should stress both. Similarly, less efforts are called for in the Ilokos region where delayed marriages have led to low fertility levels and where the highest incidence of nonmarriage is found. The cases of the Muslims and the Chinese are interesting to analyse in the context of the supposed ethnicity-fertility question. The Chinese, a marginal but powerful minority in the country, have been subjected to explicit legislations designed to limit their number. The Chinese reaction to this restriction is as yet unknown. The Muslims, on the other hand, have had a history of conflict with the dominant groups (the Filipino Christians), and their current responsiveness to the national government and its programmes is generally far from optimal. The Muslim response to the national population policies and programmes is likewise unknown. In the Philippines as a whole, it has been noted that declines in fertility are attributable to changing patterns in nuptiality rather than to actual reductions in marital fertility. Interprovincial differences have borne out this finding and explicit policies can be suggested on such a basis. Smith puts forth the possibility of formally setting up policies to influence age at marriage. 73 The University of the Philippines Law Center has made this recommendation in the proposed revision of the penal code, focused on population and the law. It was noted that, under existing laws, the minimum legal age required for marriage is fourteen years for the female and sixteen years for the male. Raising the age of consent for both parties would indirectly affect population growth. Finally, improved population planning can come in the form of inducing greater women participation in the labour force. By generating wage and salary improvements for women and designing programmes which raise their status, the authors concerned may expect to delay marriage of women.

73

Smith (1975), op.cit.

36

IV:

DEMOGRAPHIC AND CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

The relationship between ethnicity and fertility behaviour cannot be said to have been directly studied in the Philippine setting. None the less, while most of the population research and policy concerns in the Philippines, have focused on national trends, several studies undertaken at regional and provincial levels have shown ethnic differentials in population behaviour. Similarly, data on the structural and sociocultural characteristics of the different ethnic groups also offer information on ethnic orientations that bear upon population behaviour. This chapter will start with a general description of the population situation in the country: its size and rate of growth, distribution and density, age, sex and marital distribution, fertility and mortality rates as well as migration and urbanization. This initial section relies heavily on census data, notably the 1970 census on which much secondary research has already been done. Ethnic and regional differentials in population behaviour will then be discussed. The latter section will be based on a number of studies which are mostly secondary analyses of the 1968 National Demographic Survey. The chapter also will include a discussion of sociocultural factors presumably related to fertility, focusing on the ethnic level whenever it is possible, and on the national level, when data on the former are lacking.

An Overview of the Philippine Population Situation According to the 1970 census, the Philippines had a total population of 36,684,486, unevenly distributed over a total land area of 300,000 square kilometres. This yields an average density of 122.3 persons per square kilometre. In 1974, the population was placed at 41,457,000, making the Philippines the seventh largest country in Asia, with a people-to-land ratio of 140 per square kilometre. The increase in population between 1960 and 1970 is estimated to be 35.4%, with an annual growth rate of 3.01 %. Eleven islands of the total 7,100 islands in the Philippines constitute 92.3% of the total land area. Arranged in terms of population size, the following ordering of the islands was recorded in the 1970 census: Luzon, Mindanao, Samar, Negros, Palawan, Panay, Mindoro, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol and Masbate. The population is unevenly distributed with

37

one out of seven Filipinos residing in Central Luzon, a territory accounting for only 8% of the total land area. Southern Mindanao, which accounts for 21% of the land area, contains 13% of the population. Out of the total population, 31.8% are concentrated in the urban areas while 68.2% live in rural areas.7 4 A slight domination of females over males characterizes the sex ratio in Philippine population to date. In 1970, 50.3% of the populace were female, while 49.7% were male. The age structure of the 1970 census data reveals that 45.7% are under 14 years of age, 51.4% belong to the productive or working ages (15 to 64 years) and only 2.9% are above 65 years old (see Table 1).

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of the Philippines by Broad Age Groups: 1903, 1918, 1939, 1948, 1960, 1970 and 1972

Age (Years)

1903

1918

1939

1948

1960

1970

1972*

Percent

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

0-4 5-15 15 35 65 and over

15.1 24.4 34.4 22.9 3.2

16.9 27.2 33.2 20.3 2.4

16.3 26.7 33.9 19.6 3.5

15.5 28.6 33.5 19.2 3.2

16.9 28.8 32.4 19.2 2.7

16.6 26.5 33.3 20.1 3.5

17.6 28.4 32.6 18.7 2.7

Median (years)

20.2

18.5

18.3

17.7

17.1

17.9

16.3

Source:

Bureau of Census and Statistics.

* Based on 1 january 1972 Base Population -- Survey undertaken jointly by the Bureau of Census and Statistics and the Commission on Population.

The median age of the population was 20.2 in 1903, 17.1 years in 1960, 17.9 in 1970 and 16.3 years in 1972. Concepcion has aptly described the age distribution in the Philippines as being broad at the base and tapering rapidly upward.75 With a young population, only half of which is of working

74

Tito A. Mijares, "Population Trends and Statistics," The Ambassador 3, No. 4 (1973): 14-41.

75

Mercedes B. Concepcion, "The Population of the Philippines," in University of the Philippines Population Institute, First Conference on Population, 1965 (Quezon City, 1966).

38

age, it has been predicted that the birth rate will remam at high levels. narrowing of the base can be achieved only by fertility decline.

The

It has been projected that the female population will continue to outnumber the male population (see Table 2). Out of the 13.4 million females in 1960, Concepcion reported that 5.8 million were in their childbearing age, that is, 15-41 years. 76 Accordingly, in the age bracket of 14 years to 44 years, three out of four women were already married. The median age at marriage was estimated to be 19.8 years. In 1972, 46.9% of the males and 46.5% of the females were already married. For the Philippines as a whole, the crude birth rate is placed as ranging between 42 and 45 per thousand, which means a total fertility rate exceeding 6 children per woman and childbearing extending into the later years of the productive period. According to Stinner, these trends in the fertility performance of women of 30 years and above are in sharp contrast to those of women in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea, who exhibit lower age-specific fertility. 77

Table 2: Percentage Distribution of Population by Marital Status, Sex and Year

Sex

Total

Single

%

Married

Distribution Widowed

Others

Male 1972* 1960 1948 1939 1918 1903

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

51.5 48.0 48.0 45.1 60.7 58.6

46.0 49.0 47.0 50.7 35.6 36.6

2.0 2.7 3.7 4.1 3.7 4.8

0.5 0.3 1.3 0.1

Female 1972* 1960 1948 1939 1918 1903

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

47.5 43.7 42.8 39.0 57.0 54.1

46.3 49.3 46.7 51.5 35.8 36.4

5.5 6.4 8.4 9.3 7.2 9.5

0.7 0.6 2.1 0.2

* Based on 1 January 1972 Base Population -- Survey undertaken jointly by the Bureau of Census and Statistics and Commission on Population.

76

Concepcion (1966), op.cit.

77

Stinner, op.cit.

39

Improved health programmes and resources have largely contributed to the decline of death rates and mortality, estimated to be 11 per thousand. The decline in deaths interacting with an increase in births constitute a general picture of a growing Philippine population. The volume of internal migration in the Philippines is difficult to measure. Kim estimated that between 1960 and 1970, 22 provinces gained population while 33 provinces lost population through migration. 78 The fast growth of urban population has been assumed to be mostly attributable to migration. Pascual found that urban attraction is greater for women, except in the case of those who migrated to Southwestern Mindanao and Sulu where the migrants were equally divided between males and females. 79 Females, on the whole, have been found to migrate somewhat more frequently than males. Males are more attracted to rural areas, except in Central Luzon where the reverse is true. Between 1960 and 19 70, interprovincial migrants numbered more than 1.01 million males and 1.08 million females. The majority of migrants were aged 15-19 years, 20-24 years and 25.29 years. The three age groups constituted 45.44% of total migrants. Pascual noted that the migrants on the whole were better educated than the population at places of destination, except in Manila, Central Luzon, Bikol and Eastern Visayas, where the migrants were of a lower educational background.

Ethnic and Regional Differentials Research analysing fertility differentials in the Philippines has been done in terms of national indices and, to a lesser extent, regional differentials. Most of the research has been addressed to the identification of variables which are correlates of marital fertility, notably socioeconomic factors such as education, income, urban-rural residence and migration. More recent research has focused on 78

Kim Yun, "Net Internal Migration in the Philippines, 1960-1970," journal of Philippine Statistics 23, No. 2 (1972): 9-27.

79

Elvira M. Pascual, "Internal Migration in the Philippines," in University of the Philippines Population Institute, First Conference on Population, 1965 (Quezon City, 1966), pp. 315-353.

40

timing of marriage, childbearing patterns, ethnicity differentials and other sociocultural dimensions. The systematic examination of regional differentials in marrtage and childbearing is a recent development, mainly because data have not been available. Provincial-level parity data were first available in the 1939 census and were analysed by Taeuber for provincial differentials. 80 More attention, nevertheless, has been focused on national demographic parameters. Smith provides two reasons for this. First, the data are more adequate for national-level analyses than on subnational units due to the small sizes of samples or failure to tabulate subnational data. Secondly, the national analyses have been motivated by the need to evaluate family planning programmes on a nationwide basis. Table 3 presents a summary of 1970 census data on Philippine population size and density according to its regions.

Table 3: Major Geographical Regions of the Philippines Land Area, Population, Density, May 1970*

Population

Land Area Region/Province Sq.Km.

I

% of Total Land Area

Number

Density

%of Total Population

Persons Per Sq.Km.

542.3

0.2

3,803,182

10.4

7,013

II llokos and Mountain Provinces 25,765.7

8.6

1,833,154

5.0

71

III Cagayan Valley and Batanes

26,837.7

8.9

1,462,723

4.0

55

IV Central Luzon

23,646.0

7.9

5,100,095

13.9

216

v

45,614.9

15.2

4,354,983

11.9

95

17,632.5

5.9

2,966,881

8.1

168

21,579.1

7.2

3,785,408

10.3

175

Metropolitan Manila

Southern Luzon and Islands

VI Bikol VB Western Visayas

*

80

Based on the 1970 Census

Irene B. Taeuber, "The Bases of Population Problems: 26, No. 2 (1960): 97-114.

The Philippines," Population Index

41

Marriage Patterns Smith notes that marital patterns vary considerably across Philippine regwns and provinces with respect to timing and universality. 8 1 Similarly, interprovincial levels of fertility are existent, arising partly from trends in the timing of marriage. In 1960, more than 40% of Filipino females aged 20-24 were still single and 7.3% of those who were 45-54 years had never married at all. The singulate mean age at marriage in 1960 was 22.3. Age at marriage IS considered an important determinant of fertility levels. An examination of Philippine marriage data for 1960 and 1968 reveals a clear trend towards younger ages at marriage. The proportion of wives aged 45-54 increased from 39% in 1960 to 43% in 1968. Census data in 1970 reveal that nearly three-fifths or 59.3% of the 7,551,740 ever married women were married by the age of 20 and 87.9% by the age of 25. It is interesting to note that over one-third (34. 7%) of the total ever married women were married between 18-20 years of age. Delay in marriage rather than decrease in marital fertility is responsible for overall fertility decline observed in the first half of the 1960-70 decade. Smith looked into the percentage of single women as an index in the timing of marriages. 8 2 More than 40% of Filipino females aged 20-24 in 1960 were still single and 7.3% of those who are 45-54 years have never married at all. The trend towards younger age at marriage is more evident in rural women than in urban women. Data in Pascual's analysis indicate that age at marriage and fertility have an inverse relationship. Data in 1968 seem to bear this out: women who married before 18 years have higher birth percentages than those who married at 18 or 19, about 38% more births than those in the 25-29 age groups, and 55% more births than those marrying at 30 or later. Thus declines in fertility among younger Filipino women have not in fact been due to reductions in marital fertility but to incidence of delayed marriages. In fact, Stinner calls attention to actual increase in marital fertility among younger women in the mid 1960s. 83 The trend towards delayed marriages should therefore bring about

81

Peter C. Smith, "Philippine Regional