Military History of the Philippines

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FOREWORD statesman Bismarck is quoted to

The German have said i "Fools say they learn from their experience;'I prefer to learn from other people's experience." It is from a study of the experience of our Filipino Ieaders in their conduct of military campaigns in our country in the past that our leaders of today and of tomorrow can derive useful lessons to guide them in planning and direOting present and future

campaigns.

More than we probably realize, the military history of our country is rich with accounts of Eilipino valor, heroism and ingenuiw, constituting a glorious legacy of which we and future generations are proud heirs. But more than this, they hglp illumine the path for our present and future leaders as they adIrlss themselves to the continuing task of providing for the security of our

country.

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is for these reasons that I have directed the inclusion of a of !!udy Philippine military history ln our ROTC training prog:ram. From the inculcation of knowledge of our military campaigns in the past, we hope not only to instill in our youth pride in our military heritage but also interest and concern in -the military problems that confront our country today. Its objeqtive analysis of the conduct of military campaifins maFqp ?-qtudrr of the risht approach to a seriou,q philippine mititaifl hist;iy-.-[ii and fruitful studv of-this--.book hi;' iilte;;sifid and highly informative accounts of the wars and batiles fought and his incisive comments on the good points demonstrated and errors committed in them, colonel Baclagon has set the pattern and basis for the inquisitive student to understand our conceflr for national seeurity or the reason for fighting insurgeney, sub. version and lawlessness.

R. C. ESPINO Genet'al, AFP Chief of Staff

PREFACE Ihfu book is the up-dated edition of PhiHppina Campui,gttu whic} published in 1963. Being the only book eontaining a eomprehenslve of lrttles fought in Philippine history fnom the Batfle of Mectan !ryu+ Besrerg to Yarg,, Philippinc campaigms was aeelaimed during the lgg2

wrl

Naffonal Bqok \yeek as-one of the trvelve outstanding Filipinlauthored booltt In the country. ftrowevero with the series of rnilitary eventc that hrvc teken plaee since the end of world I[rar II, it becomes necegsrry to- lnoorporate in the votume aeeounts of the anti-disgident carnpaign, of our pertcipation in the Korean War, of our involvementr, in thg Vietnrrn War, and of our csmpaigrr against subversion, rebelion sud l,rslmre;ra All these, added t" ttre chapters eontained' in fhil;,ffi'C-; polgiri, mrke up what I believe is thi most up-to-dete lfiili.ti,w ni$bw ol tlw Philippinas, the title which thip book now carries.

r first

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saw the need for a book on the military history of tlre Phllippinee when I. took up the etudy of military htstory as a cadet in -over the l'hilippine Miliiary Aeademyr After sa]i{rg ttre campaigrrs ; Napoleon, the American.civil \4far, and I[orld wan r begen aeking myself why there was no study made on the campaigns of our'ecrly Filipino leaders against the spanish and American iorces. one reason I could imagine was the belief that there was nothing much to be learued from those campaigns by way of rtrateey and tactics. This coutrd bc true because and this is the principal reason therre was'nobody who msde e fcirmal study of the campaigns in -the philippinea wiitr ttre vlew of producing a msterial which would not onty te interegting to Filipinos in general but also usefut to tnilitary students and r€rdem in tlte armed forces.

J

In the course of my study of the history of military

art, tr have a strong conviction that there is actually a lot to learn from the methods of war{are employed by the forces that fought in qur country. While we find the accounts of Alexander,s campaigns and thbso of Napoleon and Lee interesting and instructional to ali of ub, yet the rtrategy and tactics of those great military leaders wene applied under situation peculiar to their country, kind of peoplg and stato of clvilization. Theirs was the continental type of eampaigns iqvolving huge armies operating over extensive areas. rf we udre to profih at all by our study of military operations in history, we have to give more thought and consideration to the insular of campaign which eharactea lzed the campaigps in Philippine history. Because they were conducted under dtuatione peculiar to our country, we can derive from those cam. palgnr lessons which wilt be of help to us in solving our military developed

problems.

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drytrl ?orHns on trb bol rrr tn rfienb rgdg, rhm r rrr ldctrthd ilttr ttc Htrtoricd otvt{9i orbml uraHrupptne iruay.--rh; dcrrth od resGaleh rartpriarr in flris ldnd of beoridi wo*-ril dtnppotufing. rrowever, r was afforded r rptendid opportunrty tovct $ prduqvS

research when, aslisrGd L u," phiripptnc cru"ii lo!_rqry h werhington DC, r was given the facili{y to ovail of-ub;.; th" rc"ld of hldbrical matedars and documenb -aveilabre -y*li d-;[" t

pourygl Nationar Archives, us Army Historiear Divicion snd Ne, ttonal l[rr Cotlege. I $'ag able to dig up mone fagts-ana data whon I viaited the [braries of the US Uilitsr]' -Acad**y- US Navpl Academy. t[e Infautrv school at Fort Benning,-and the Cu'u-rra ;;d CoUeSp

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During my research work, I encountercd rgctenl dlfficulties. Ftrst was the lack of faetual accounts of the Ffiipiiro actions in the early re_ volts and in the wars against spain and the united ststes. It is unfortunate that almost ail of the historical materials b;"c on that part 9t.our history have been written by foreign authors. mL". was no Fi_ llpino historian at the time to recoid the events t"-pr."nt the Filiplno side of the conflict or batfle. our present"*a historicsl writcrs have to depend on deductions drawn from statements of forelgu chmniclera concerning the actions and possible thoughts of our early Fi'iipill*d";: Another difficulty was in gathering data concerning our participation in l{orld war IL_r courd not get-hord of any comf,at rriirory p.o Prl6d by any USAFFE or guerilla uait. Fortunately, due to the wer belng of recent occurence, I was able to acquire documents and hstimonies of Filipino participants to write * t"rro,rsh i"rv-i"iirut" story of our defense against the ilapaneie invasion, our resista-ncermovemeng and of the liberation campaign.

Ttrith the idea of_ reaping benefits frcm the rtoa, of philippine ormpaigns, r have endeavored to make an analysis oi esch In these analyses I cited the errors committed nv *oy or both "ampoign. of the opposing forces and also brought out the good poinu in their planr and tefions, especially if demonetrating an applicetion of a military ,Jncfdet These analyses are embodiea in 0re-comments wrri"r, iofloi .;;; chapter. Although this book i1 the product of almost three years of painataking researeh and work done under difficult circumstances, I muut admit that it is still far from being complete u".u""ie in detaits. In oriler to make it more reriable, I would like"nd to ask the readers, who rnay possess factdal knowledge of the actions I have narrated to communicate with me through the Adjutant General, GHe,henein, Cil; Gen. E. Aguinaldo and inform me of any constructive criticigm about this book. Such criticism will be tnken into account irr tho revision that I ghall undertako for the nuccetxling rNlitionn.

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Despite-,-howevel, its shortcomingu, I am proud to present tris book as mv humble contribution to our military liierature. 'l r6p" irrai uv 'providinr a source of study of campainn" t, tt" philipfines, this book will not only contribute to the prolessional knowledge'of all military but will also promote more interest in our military history. It i; TT m{ hope that in giving the accounts of the heroic actions of $9 the Filipino soldiery in the fast wars this book will make *" fr"r.ii "J future generations realize that they are the recipients oi a gitorious mi, litary heritage. I

r would like to'expness here my grateful acknowledgement of the invaluable assistance extended to me -by colonet primitivo c. Milsr\ cl1$ of Militarv gistory

of the Armed Force of the philippines, of the members of his staff, particularly Lt Cot primitivo Catalan and "nd M/sgt Bodolfo T. Tumanong, who went out of his way to ;;k;;";l; able the materiets that I needed for this book with;; their he[, Jvicg and encouragement the up-dating and writing of itris book would have been difficult or impossibla

ULDARICO S. BACLAGON Colonel AFP (Ret.)

INTRODUCTION The value of studying military hist6ry has long been recognized

in developed countries. As a matter of fact, an emphasis is given to it in totalitarian states. By and large, & course on History of Military Art is included in the curricula of the militarg n&val,

air force academies and in the service

schools of Western countries, wherein etudents study assiduously iu great detail the combat ac' tions participated in by their armed forces.

Under our New Societv, a study of Philippine Military History is integ:rat€d into the progr&m of instrustion for Citizen Army Training of secondary school students. It is felt that the Filipino youth must be oriented to most, if not all, of the major battles and campaigns waged by the Filipino soldier. The book, Milita,ry HistorU of the Philippines' written by Colonel Uldarico S, Baclago:r represents one of the selected good books clealing on the military history of our country. ^d distinguished soldier-scholar, Colonel lSaclagon is a veteran of various Philippine war campaigns and has written a number of boolrs which are now considered reference texts in our schools. comprehensive, objective, and analytical discussion of battles and campaigns is narrated through its pages thus making the book a4 effective vehicle of instrttction for Philippine military history. Significantly, Military Historg of the Phi,lippines aims to instill the F ilipino national spirit and a sense of pride and honor for the F ilipino soldier amollg our young Filipino rearlers - in this regard, the author has achievecl his obiective.

A

BIENVENIDO B. CASTRO .Brigod,ier General, AFP Di.rector' for Youth Affoirs

ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like_to express here my grateful acknowledgment of the invaluable help extended to me uv-tr,. t"rrr*"s'in the prep. aration of this book: / . Lieutenant .General Jesus Varoqe. then Ctrief of $taff. AFP, for encourasing *u Yffiff'

tJffildffi

Brigadier Generar firco G. Fajardo, former $uperintendent, Philipp;ns Military.Academy, fo" i]***ending me to to the IJnited states, thei.eby enarriii,g ;;t d;-*J*J'"#u"& so in foreien libraries; ' colonel Jaime- c- verasquez, former Military Attache, philippine {mbassr, IVashingtor'o.d., Jor arranging my visits to the various libraries in the United States; T.iaison Section, G-2, Department of the Army, USA, - Foreign for arrangiirg my visits to the variou" riuraiie.-in- tr," united

States;

The Library of congress, Nationar Library of the ph,ippines, JJ_nited states Military Academy, united staies N;vJ Acade.qy, National War College, US Infantry School, -ra 1fr.'t&mand and General staff college for allowing me to use their riur""y faeilities; .Colonel T. D. lgrppr, Head, Department of Military Art and Engineering, United Military Acaderny,-rri-riro*ing me to use the maps of the !Et"r USMA pamphlets on World Wr" ff ; The General Staff, GIIe, AFp, for giving me encouragement

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Cblonel Vivencio Dayo!, formcr Head, Acsdem,ic Group, phllencouras€nrcnt in -rirarrins L:;lnc,

iflf,H#JXfil,1ffi_uffip j;.

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colonel Isabero R. castr"o. former Gourse Dircstor of l{istory of . Military Art in pM4, Orlando F. Aquino f*;.ii;i;tli.=t;;k;nJ ; giving *e tis invaluable assistance ieading this book; To a lot of others, eopecially my friends in the Armed the Philippines and my feuow ieterans ot woirJ-w"; Forces 9j ii;; the resistance movement, without whose help, *nd *AvG agement the writing of this book would "r*rrh"r8'bee; iitticutt or .

impossible.

US.B. vltl

TILIIIRY

HI$TORY OF THE PIIIIIPPIIIES

TABTE

OF CONTENTS

COIITENTS

PAGE

Chapter

I

-

RESETANCE AGAINST SPANISH CON. QUEST

l-t5

Chapter

II

-

FILIPINOS IN THE ARMED 5ERVICE OF SPAIN

16-27

Chapter

III

THE PHII.IPPINE REVOLUTION

28-42

Chapter

lV V_

THE FITIPINO-AMERICAhI WAR

Chapter

VI

COLIAPSE

Chapter

-

Chapter Vll

Chapter Vlll Chapter Chapter

IX

X -

Chapter Xl Chapter Xll Chapfer Xlll chaprer xlv

AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF

THE

PHITIPPINES

OF

FII.IPINO RESISTANCE

AND GUERILTA WARFARE PRETUDE

TO JAPANESE INVASION

JAPANESE LANDING AND DRIVE TO" WARDS MANITA DEFENSE OF BATAAN

OF CORREGIDOR, VISAYAS, AI{D MINDANAO

DEFENSE

43-62 63-86 87-99 100 tt4

-

115

- 134 135 - 155 t56- t74

-

GUERILLA FORCES OF NORIH AND CENTRA| tUZOf{

-

THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT tN THE VISAYAS 195

-

THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT tN MINDANAO AND SUIU 215

-

THE LEYTE-Sp|,MAR CAMpAtcN

17s

234

-

194

-2ltl -?33

-

250

_

ONE

Chrptcr

XV

-

LUZON CAMPAIGN

Chrpter

xYt

-

tuzoN

Chapler

xvfi

;

VISAYAS

Chapter XVm

-

SAGA OF FERDINAND MARCOS

xrx

-

PEACE MISSION

Chapler Chapter

xx-

Chapter

xxt

Chapter XXll Chapter

Xxlll

CAMPATGN

_

PHASE

PHASE TWO

-

MINDANAO CAMPAIGN

IN

KOREA

INVOTVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR

251

270

-280

281

-295

296

308

309 326 -

-

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE ANTI.DISSIDENT CAMPAIGN 340

-

CAMPAIGNS

-

NATIONAL SECURITY

FOR

325 339

-

3tl9

350

-

355

356

-

362

SECURITY AND

TRANQUITITY

SOCIETY

*269

IN THE NEW

PICTORIAI ESSAY

363

APPENDICES

400

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Chapter

I

RESISTANCE AGAINST SPANISH CONQUEST

1.

The Battle of Mactan

nrl

rsToRrcAL BACKGROUND. Spanish historian, pisafetta, who accompanied Magellan

dury5.

in his epochal voyag:q recorded March 16, 1521 as the date of discovery of the Philippines by the Spaniards. Magellan first landed on Homonhon and Limasawa and on April 7 sailed for Cebu. By their -friendly manifestations, the Spag@rds quickly won the friendship of the natives in all the islands they had thus far visited.

However, in t?reir haste to impose control on all the natives, the Spaniards burned a village in a neighboring island where the native chief refused to submit to Spanish domination. This island was Mactan and its chlef was La_ pu-Lapu-soon to be the first Filipino to lead his followers in an organized resistance against the . Spaniards. Because of the deqs fiance of Lapu Lapu, Magellan decided to organize ancl personally Iead a punitive expedition to Mactan.

GENERAL SITUATION. Ma.

gellan had 270 men in his fleet of five small vessels, all of them armed with muskets and cross_ bows and wel.e protected with corselets and helmeLs. Of these 270 men, he brought 60 with him in his expedition to Mactan. Ac_ companying, said pigafetta, were "Thc (lhristian King (Rojah Hutrruhon of ()olrrr), thc princo, somc ol' thc chiof mcn, &nd ZO or B0

balanguais." All these men were loaded in three boats which sailed for Mactan on midnight of Friday, April 26. The waruiors of Lapu Lapu, on the other hand, numbered (again according to Pigafetta) arouncl 1,500 and were armed w-ith barnboo spears, arrows, and euflasses. Lapu Lapu Was evidenfly prepared to meet the Spaniards because, at the precise time Ma_ gellan landed with his men, all of Lapu Lapu's 1,500 men were on hand to meet the Spaniards. Furthermore. numerous pitholes were

reported by Pisafetta to have been fouud ou the beach obviously intended by the natives as traps or obstacl'es to the Spaniards' advance.

PIGAFETTA'S ACCOUNT OF

THE tsATTLE. The only available account of the action that took place on Mactan Island is Pigafetta's. He gave us this story:

"We reachecl Mactan three hours before dawn. The captain did not wish to fight them, but sent a message to the'natives by the Moro to the effect that if they would obey the King of Spain, recognize the Christian King (Rajah Humabon) as their sovereign, and pay us our tribute, he would be their friend; . but that if they wished otherwise, they should rvait to see holv our lances wounded. They replied that if we had l:rnees ihey had lances of bamboo rrrrrl sl rrkls h:rrdcnorl with fire. ('l'hcv ttsktttl

trs

) lt,rl l^ rrnan.-ril

to ettack them at oncq but to wait until morning so that in or_ der to induce us to go in search of them; for they haJAus il;; pitholes between the houses in o"der that we might fall into th;.

. "lVhen morning camq 4g of us leaped into the water up to "u" thigt * and waded throush *ut",

ror more than two crclssbow

fJislrt* before we could reach ttre the shore. The boats not ap proaeh nearer because "o,,ta of certain rocks in the water. When *u reached land, those men ma formed in three divisions to tfr" number of more than I,f0O pei_ slns. When they saw us, they cnarged upon us with exceeding loud cries, two divisior* o, o,ii flanks and the other on our front. When the captain saw thaf he _ Lormed us into two divisiorr,'unJ thus did rve begin to fisht. "The musketeers and crossbow_ men shot from a distance for ahout a half hour, btrt uret"ruiy shots only passed througir f:r tlq the shields which were made of thin wood and the arms (of the b_earers). The captain cried il 'Cease firing-! Cease firinsi thgr:

his order was not heeded. lut When

the natives saw that we were shooting our muskets to no purpose, crying out they determined to stand firm, but th"y ** doubled their shouts. When- our muskets were discharged, tfre nu_ tives would never stand still but Jeaped hither and thithe"; ;;;: jng themse,lves rvith tfrui"'rf,irfO*. They .shot so many arrov/s at us

&nd hurled so many bamlloo spe&rs (somc of th'cm tippcd with

iron) a{ thc cnphin gci,,,.,,t,

1,,]-

sirlos poirrtorl sltlicrr lrru.rkrrrr,tl firc, Hlolrr',q, rrrrrl rrrrrrl, Iturl,willr

lvo

scareely defend ourselves. Seeing captain-general sent some mon to burrt their houses in order to terrify them. Wfren ifr"V saw their houses burning, thei were roused to greater fury. Two our men were killed near-the -of houses while we burnerl ZoL;; bouses. So many of them down. upon us that they *frot "frrig"j The captain through the right lue *iih a poisoned arrow. "Ol1 that account, he ordered us -to retire slowly, but the men took to flight, except 6 or g of us u'ho rcmained with the captain. The natives shot only at ,rii;;; for thc latter were bare; una ?o Tury were the spears and stones

that, the

that they hurled at us, that we could offer no resistance, the mortars in the boats could not airl

us as they were too far away" So rve continued to retire for more than a good crossbow flight from the shore, always fightine ,p -; our knees in the water. The- natives continued to pursue us, and picking up the same spear 4 or 6 tirnes, hurled it at us again and again. Recognizing the captain, so t,urned upon him tlat they fan{ knocked his helmet off fris fread trvice, but he always stood firmly IrI(e a good knight, together witl

some others.

- "Thus did we fight for more than one hour, refusirrg to further. An Indian trurieA a ""ti"u famboo spear into the captain,s face, but the Iatter imna.p-.diately Uffed him with his lance, which he left in the Indian,s body. Then tryt;; !o laf hand on sword, tre cluta draw it out but half-way Uu.eur* he had lxren wonnrlett iri tto aim wilh lr lrrrrrrlroo jJlrcllt.. When tho nutive..r nrw l,htt, thoy ull hurlod

q

iltqltselveg upon hirn- One of thern wounded hlm on the left les with a large cutlass, whlch resembleg e scimitar, only being larger. That caused the captain to fail face' downward, when immediately they rushed upon him with iron and bamboo spears and with their cutlasses killed our mirror, our light, our connfort and our true guide. When they wounded him, he turned back many times to see whether we were all in the boots. Thereupon, beholding hirn deod, we, n'ounded, retreated as bsst we could to the boats, which werc already pulling off. "Tl.k Christian King would have#bided us, but the captain

charged him before we landed not to leave his balanguay; but to etay to see how we fought. When the King learned that the

&

esptain was dead, he wept. Had it not been for thst unfortunate captain, not a single one of us would have been saved in the boats, for while he was fighting the others retired to the boats." Pigafetta gave the results of the battle as foliows: h "Eight of, our men were killed with him (Mas:ellan) in that battle, and four Indians, who hatl become Christians and who had afterward eome to aid us, were killed by the mortars of the boats. Of the enemy, about lE were killed, while many were wounded.,, COMMENTS. White Magellan demonstrated extraordinari valor in this battle, his expedition wag doomett to failure at the very start. Thls was primarily due to lack of prepnrotory planning, to lncludc the gnthcring of informttlon eoncornlng the lnlnnd nntl Lha aonrl.llllla-

la- l-L-Lr^--^-

Provtded wlth the necessory Information reeprding the beaehes, h& would have directed the lauding to'be made at a point where his boats did not have to hang on the reefs at a great distance from the shore. Alsq equipped with more information about tlte natives and a better appreciation of their eapabilities, he would have avoided meeting Lapu Lapu,s supe-

rior force frontally. A landing at sorne other favorable point would

have enabled him t0 land his mortarg execute a msneuver

around Lapu Lapu's prepared position, and probably take the natives by surprise. Another error made by MageiIan was his failure or refusal to commit the force of Rajah Huma-

bon for, &s Pigafetta

claimed,

Rajah Humabon was willing and ready to assist the Spaniards. However, it eould be presumd that Magellan either did not have confidenee in the loyalty of the native force from Cebu or he simply wanted them to stand by and watch the Spaniards display their courage and skiil in combat. At any rate, had the Cebu force aided Magpllan, it would have afforded him a stronger force with which to fight Lapu Lapu and the results would have been different. It can be deduced fnom the accounts of Pigafetts thst the errors or omissions eommitted by Magellan eould be attributed to the latter's over-confidence in the invincibility of his arms and in his underestimation of the cap abilities of Lapu Lapu and his wgrriors. Lapu Lap-yr showed better Judgmont whon he dld not tnkc chan-

r '

force as te could ln order to have superiority over the Spaniards whose strength he probably knew. In this respecf he applied the principle of con-

at least numerlcal

centration of combat power in preparlng for his battle sgalnst

the Spaniards. He further elab.

orated his preparations by dig-

g:ing pitholes on the beach, hoping

to be able to entice the enemy to land at night and fall victims to his traps. When he finally en-

countered the enetrly he immediately saw in his numerical superiority an opportunity to execute a double. envelopment on the small enenly force. This he did by massing the bulk of his forces on the flanks and weakening his center. In so doing, Lapu Lgpu displayed tacticel skill and supe..

rior

leadership,.characterized by

the ability to make quick decisions. It should be noted, horvevor, that he evidenlly had'no plans of pursuit; cdherwise, he

eould have prepared boats with which 'he could overtake or cut off the retreat of the fleeing Spaniards snd thus complete their annihilation.

2.

Darlg Ftllplrw Reaolts

HISTOEICAL BACKGNOUND.

After the il-fated

voyag:e

of

Ma-

gellan, Spein sent to the philippines several expeditions all of which did not meet success until February, 16G6, when Miguel Lepez de Lcgazpi arrived ih Cebu wtth Andres de Urdaneta. The

Filipinos

at first

resist€d the

landlng of Legazpl at every place he went, but with the superiority of Spanloh arme, &dded by the tact of Logazpi und ths mlllterv

Ingenuity of Martin de Goiti, tlu Spaniards finally agsert€d their superioritv. Both Legazpi and hig gallant grandson, Juan de Sslcedo, proved to be men of tact and courage. They won the rrsiect and friendship of the Filipinos. But the Filipino chiefs could not reconcile themselves to becoming vassals of the King of Spain and, as a result, several attempts were made to eject the Spafish conquerors.

In the years that followed the death of Legazpi and Salcedo, the resentment and grievances of the Filipinos were further aggravatcd by the oppressive polieies of the Spanish colonial officials. Thus followed a series of revolts which were principally caused by the following:

1. The levying of tribute 2. The imposition of forced

3.

labor. The abuses and corruption of the Spanish officials.

4. The arrogance and

racial

discrimination ghowed by the haughty Spaniards. The first of these revolts was that led by Lakandula, the chief of Tondo, and Soliman, his nephew, against Legazpi in the )ear 1574.

BEVOLT OF I,AKANDT'LA AND SOLIMAN. In t6?0, Lwg.tpi sent his m&ster-of-camp, Martin de Goiti, to - the island of

Luzon. He landed.'rin Manila, then a Muslim settlement and found it "fortified with palm treee and stout arigues (wooden posfu) filled in with earth, and very many bronze eulverlns ond other oiocge cf lnr.oor. lvrra,, Ilalh Dol-

t"1

sh Soltmsn, chlef of the

gettle".

ment south of t}e Pasig, and Rajsh Lakandula, chief of the settlement on the north now ctlled Tondo, refused to yield to Goiti. "

On May L9, 1571, Goiti, with the assistance of 600 to 600 Visayans and a force of 110 Spanish soldiers, landed by force of arms and took the forts and artillery. Soon after that, he returned to Cebu. Legazpi came back with him to establish his (Lesazpi) headquarters in Manila. Legazpi made Manila the seat of his g:overnment and from there directed the prosecution of his pacification eamnpf,sn.

The Filipino chiefs, in

the

de Alcarero, elceld+neyor ol tho city of Santlslmo Nombre de Jo' sus (now Cebtr CitY), to Put e stop to lhe rebellion. In Cebu, Al' cgr&zo assembled his troopg, consisting of 50 Spaniards and 1,600 Filipinos and then proceeded to "ettack the enemy, who were entrenched in their fields."

The following is an account of the battle as narrated bY Medina: "During the battle, the rain was so heaw that theY could not use the arquebuses, so that the enemy was beginnlng to Prevail. Thereupon the shields of the Sugbu Indians were brought into service and the latter eided excellent' Iy, by guarding with them the powder-flasks and Powder-Pans of the arquebuses, 8o that they were lired with heaw loss (to the enemy)."

meantlme, remsind peaeeful but resentful of the usurp&tion of thelr powers by the Spaniards. In the year 1674, Lakandula and It is significant that the SPa' Sotlman made one more effort to reg&in their lost power and wit} niards won only because of the tlre aid of the neighboring settle- Filipino soldiers who, PerhaPs unments from Bulacan arrd Pam- knowingly, saved the YisaYan is-

Den88, attacked the Spanish garrison. The attempt failed due to the superiority of the Spanish te trms. Rqiah [iollrnan died durins

&

lands

for

SPain.

At that time'

there was evidence that the other Visayan natives were in sympa' thy with Tamblof,s cauge, and it fight snd thus ended the firgt wss only his defeat that deterred them from maklng similar uP' Fllipino revolt sgginst SPain. risings. TAMBLOT'S NEBELLION IN Father Murillo Velarde had hls BOHOL. In 1622, & men nemed famblot announced to the People own vergion of Alcsr&zo'B esmr8' of Bohol that "the tlme has come paign sgeinBt the Boholano following the when they would thiow off the i*f. He wrote oppression of the Castilians; for story: they were.agsured gf the aid of 'iOn l.Iew Year's dry, 1622, he thelr anceetors and diwatas or (Alcarazo) began the march to godr." Trmblot was able to gather the mountains, where the insur&bout 1,600 followers. gents were. For 6 days theY traOn learnlng of Tamblot's or- veled through rurged hills and grnlzatlon and lntontions, tho gov- doep rairines, crosnlng marshu of Cobu ordsred Don Juan whero the mud srmo to tltelr

.,'il T

knmr, or eyen to tlelr waiste, and sheddlng thelr blood on the ilrorne and briars. On the 6th day, the insurgents killed a friendly In-

dian... On the following

day,

more than 1,600 rebel Indians attacked our v&nguard which eonsisted of 16 Spaniards and 900

Indians; but when our muskets xrere fired so many fell dead that the rebels began to retreat to a

bamboo thicket. When we followed them, a heavy rain fell, which encouraged the rebels, for they said that our muskets were then useless. But lfeaven favored our c&use with a marvel, since althoush the pans of the muskeb locks were full of water, the soldiers declared that the powder never failed to catch fire nor did the matches go out. ,At this the rebels fled into the mountoins.,, After the Tamblot rebellion was broken up, some of the rebels surrendered but the others remained stubborn, and ..fortified themselves at the summit of a rugged and lofty hill, diffieult of access, and closed the road (to it) with brambles and thorns. They also filled the paths with very sharp stakes driven into the soil, and plaeed among: the branches of the trees many crossbows in order that thesg being discharged as our men passed them, might wound the soldiers; afld above they provided rn4nll stones to throw at the'spaniards, hurling them from the top of the hill.,, Six months later, the same Don Juan Alcarazo returned to dislodge those rebelg from their positlon wtth 40 Spanlards and many "fndians." "After cufferlng lroat hardnhlpn in maklng the

paths acceaslble, noorly

tll

hlr

men were hurt by the fime they reached the fort by the many stones which the enemy hurled down from the summit; but our soldiers courageously climbed the ascent,

firing their

musket$, &nd

killed many of the rebels, and put the rest to flight. firus the sedition was finally quelled. It was one of the most dangerous that had oceurred in the iBiands not only because oi-th" fact that the Boholanos were the most warlike and valiant but also because on

account of it the eonspiracy spread to many other tribes. Noble examples of fidelity in this

great disturbance are not laeking.,,

THE LEYTE REVOLT OF 1622. Almost simultaneous with

Tamblot's rebellion in Bohol, the natives of Carigara in the island of Leyte were incited into rebellion by Bancao, the ruling chief of Limasaw&, who in his younger day-s was awarded a royal decree of grirtitude by philip if tor fris hospitality to Lesazpi and the Spaniards who came to hie isIands. Father Melchor de yera went to Cebu to give barnlng of the impending revolt and, according to Velarde, .,immedlately Capt. Alcarazo equipped &n arrnada of forty veos6ls, in wtrich were embarked some Spania,rds

and mrny friendly Indians..--

They offered peece to the rc}/ta but the lattpr spurned it wtth oontempt. Our men, divided into three bodies, attaeled them; and when that which ilon Juan Alcarazo commanded came in right of the rebelq they fled to the hills.,,

cARAGA

REVOLTS, 1080.

Cnpt. Juan Bautlsta who was sent

by Gov. Don Juen Nlfio dc Tr.

l5

bora to .orr"nd the fort. and ple were able to hold the fort they E presidio of Carago, Mindanao, captured and as to how they were * 4m. manhandled the native chief of finally overcome. Available records indicate that the Spaniards were tr $hat district during a quarrel. To able to retake the fort sometime &venge the beating, the ralchief ffi lied his men and proceeded to kill later. ! ' the captain and twenty soldiers VISAYAN REVOLT, 1649'F 1650. This revolt, which start€d ,i and four Recollect missionaries. in the village of Palapag, Lesrte, , It was said that the Caragans

, I

\

&

was for a time a serious problem to Gov. Don Diego Fajardo because of its repercussion over the entire Visayan islands, including Mindanao. It was caused by the conscription of Yisayan laborers for ship-buildins work in the Cavite harbor. Martin Larios. This puuitive When the alcalde-mayor of Paforce mrbdued the rebels and re. lapag began to collect men to be storedfl,rder in Caraga. However, sent to Cavite, the inhabitants of according to Medina, "this upris- the villages immediately asseming gave us anxiety enough, as it bled in the house of Sumoroy and seemed to be the beginning of a began to organize their insurrection. Appointed chief was Don universal mutiny." CAGAyAN INSURRECTION, Juan Ponce, "a very influential 1639. T h i s insurrection was man but (according to the spanbrought about by the cruelty of ish priests) a bad Christian." Secthe alcalde-rnayor of ' Cagayan, ond leader was Don Pedro CoaDon Marcos Zapata, and the op- mug and the third was Sumoroy. pressive practices of the Spanish The insurgents incited the inhasoldiers. Enrag:ed by the punish- bitants of the neighboring villoges ment given by the alcalde-mayor of Catubig, Pambohon, Catarman, to one of their principal women, and Bonan. Soon after, the spirit the natives from several villagps of rebellion spread to Sorsoglon banded themselves together into a and the Camarines provinces and conspiracy and "entered the sen- to the northern part of Mindanao. On hearing of the insurrection, try-post at ten in the morning of March 6 with their arms, and killed the alcalde-mayor of Leyte beegn the sendinel and others who of- to colleet all the boets and men fered them some rssistance. They he could gather. Meanwhilg the went thenee to the fort, and insurgents "entrenched themselves breaking down the doors, or hav- on &n impregnable hill csiled the ing them opened by the spies in- 'table of Palapag'. .. They made side, attacked the garrison. Only trenches and strong stocksdeg, five soldiers ascaped, by hiding; with many sharp stakes and but later, the flre increaning, sn&res, and many stone boulders l,hese periqhed." 1 suspended, which, by being There wnr, howcver, llo rcporl, throwtt tri-lon the ntrongegt &rny, rc to how tonc the C[guysn pso- would cauno eruel injury."

were emboldened because of what ttuppened in Jotd where the Spaniards displayed laek of bravery in a fisht against the Joloans. As a eonsequence of this revolt, help was dispatchett from Cebu under Capt. Chaves and this force was reinforced by more soldiers under

I

Gov. Don Dlego Frjardo, rdalhlng th,l serlousness of the situation, held a council of war and assigned Ardres Lopez de Asaldegui to command the expedition which was composed of Spanish and na-

tive troops coming from llfanila i

and Pampanga, all loaded in lB oared vessels and 2 charnpans. Asaldegui beg:an aecumulating;

war supplies for the expedition

'

but before he eould eomplete his preparations, he was relieved by Capt. Gines de Rojas.

Rojas eontinued the preparations began by Asaldegui, Ioading the food supplies in the Z champans. The expedition was also reinforced by a fleet of 4 earacoas loaded rvith Spaniards and 44 Lutaog under the leadership of Francisco Ugbo, all of whom came from Zamboanga. The Zarnboanga force was under the over-all eommand of Capt. Juan Mufroz and the admiral was Juan de Ulloa. The foree of Roja,s was further strengthened by the amival from Cebu of Capt. Don Franeisco Sandoval and his men and Juan Fernandez de Leon who brought nren from Sulu, Caraga, and other provinces. These forees were assembled in Catbalogan and Rojas "divided thern into three divisions, two under the eommand of San_ doval and de Leon and the third in his own charge.,, Rojas' plan of operation was for Sairdoval to go to his encomienda at Catubig and thencg with all the men whom he could assemble, proceed to reduce the village of Palapag. Capt. de Leon was ordered to go with his men through Tubig, Sulat, Borongan and other villnges * first, howcvtr, to go l.o Guigrn trr gct ns

many men there es possible. Don Gines de Rojas chose the viltageo of Catarman and Babor, ylrere his encomienda was.

The story of the action that followed was told by Father Diaz: "All things were readlr to undertake the eonquest of the impregnable hill. Nothing worthy of note happened to Capt. Don Francisco de Sandoval, but ttre Indians of

Bacor

prepared

an

ambush

against .Iuan Fernandez de Leon in a very dangerous pass - but it was disclosed by a friendly In_ dian. Our men firing their muskets and arquebuses at that side, the Indians fled with great loss; and our men proceeded to the bar of the rivero where they fortified thernselves in a stout stockade. Sandoval did the same in Catubig, as did Don Silvestre de Rodas, whom Don Gines sent es a reenforcement to Sandoval.

". n . Don Gines fortified his post and ordered each captain to do the sarne with his, for he had resolved to blockade and capture the natives on the hill by hunger. The natives learned from their spies that Don Gines had but few rnen in his quarters as the rest had gone to get provisions; and having determined to use so favorable an opportunityr. many of them went at night, by the river, near the land. lfhen they thought that our men were very careless and sound asleep, they pulled some stakes oufr" of the fortifications of Don Gines and entered in a disorderly manner. But the sentinels hearing the noise sounded the alarm. I)on Gines, awaking, nr..iz.r,rl his sword rrrd llut:kler; and, lrccorn;rrrnirxl by those wtxr t:ould

follow him so hastllY, confronted the enemy and drove thdm to flight with great loss... Don Gines did not care to pursue them, fearing some ambush which would have been easy in that darkness."

B.

ln

of CaPtalns

Sandoval Leon.-The de and Juan Fernandez commenal

assault being planned in that form, Don Gines engaged the enemy with his men, with great valor to the sound of drurns and trumpets, and went up the hill witlt the soldiers of Don Gines did great difficulties and danger. For not approved of remaining on the the insurgents, cutting the rattans defensive and urged their com- by which the stones and verY mander to"attack. Don Gines then I a r gl e trunks of trees were "had the men ealled to arms and fastened and kept back, would arranged the attack. He formed 2 have been able bY rolling tlem divisions (for the attack) from down to do great damaS:e to our the whble army, and left the third men had not Divine Providence to guard the camP. The assault directed these missiles to Places was made in 2 parts - one bY the where they could do no damsge. open road, although it was better Our men went uP most of the hill defended by the opPonents, and with this obstinacy, and the ene' the"Ether by a precipitous Path my went out to meet them with which was passable forbhe birds so great valor that it seemed for it was a huge steep alone desperatiol; and the dam- so narrow at the Place rather rock, and aged inflicted upon them bY our the insurgents camp of the 'where arquebuses did not cool their ob was established that onlY a single stinaey, for they tried to throw man could enter an opening made themselves on our speors and by nature. . . The men climbed uP swords in their. anxietY to die by that path, using: feet and hands while killing others.. . The fight without their arms; for these Iast€d many hours, the enemY bervere carried by him who followed ing relieved, f,or they had many and afterwards given to him who brave and well-armed men on the was ahead; and so they did one hill. Don Gines seeing that the with another. fn addition to that, fury of the enemy was invincible the insurgents had posted a sen- (for they were fighting nrore like tinel there to advise them of any lions than men) and that his men new move, for which a few eom' could not proceed with the undering to his airi would be sufficient taking because they had no furto prevent many frorn effecting ther strength and were tired and an entrance. had many wounded, yielded for the time being and sounded the "Don Gines entrusted that dif- retreat. The enemy also retired, ficult undertaking to Capt. Silves- satisfied at the resistance that tre de Rodas. . . He gave him com- they had shown, although much mand of the Lutao soldiers, with to their cost. their commander Dotr F rancisco "Vory different was the Buccess Mncambo; for himself Don Gines of the brnve Silvestre de Rodas soltliers the of bnttnlion thc took his Lutnos in chtrgc of f)on with vrrttThe fronl.. itl whrl rtt.l.tclttll guurtl nnd ronrgunrd werc plucul I,'roncisco Uglrc ttttd I)ott l'rnncls-

o tlacambo, who on July 2, 1680, made the assault in the moct difficult point. Climbing up one bv one and without arm,, with the Iahor that was neeessary, at the middle of the ascent sn obstaele oeeumed that eould have blocked so great, an enterprise" That was a very heavy rain, whieh lasted a great part of the night, and which the men endured without the

slightest

shelter... The rain

eeased and, although they were soaking, they reaehed the entranee of the rock at an nDportune time, whe.n the sentinel, quite rrnsuspicious of sueh an assarrlt, was'absent... On that account, Silvestre de Rodas and some of the for+ most, who were the most vigorous, were enabled to enter. Confused and lacking in eounsel, I panie terror seized them (the natives) and foreed them into disorganized flight, so that Silvestre de Rodas and the Lutaos were allowed to become masters of the field. .. Don Gines ascended the hill with his whole army and destroyed the insurgent quarters by setting fire to them."

MALONG'S REBELLION IN PANGASINAN, 1660. The revolutionary movement in this provinee was began by Andres MaIong of Binalatongan who was "his Majesty's master-of-camp for

that tribe." fn no time

Malong

acquired many followers. After proclaiming himself King of pangasinan, he dispatched one pedro Gumapos, whorn he made a count, to the Ilocos and Cagayan regions wlth 3,000 men.'To pampanga he mnt another henchman, one Melchor do Vern, with I force of

C,000 merr. @

Illeanwhile, Gov. Manrique de Lara, learning of the rebel planr through the capture of Matong,s letter to Dnn Franclsco l[trafiago, the leader of an abortive revolt

in Pampanga, sent Gen. Fsteyhar to march by land to pangasinan with 400 infantry of various nationalities, ineluding Japaneoe, and a company of Creole Neglos, armed with "four pieces of artillery, whieh carried four libra

she!!s." Gov. de Lara also organized an amphlbious force eomposed of 1A Spaniards and B0 Pampnnros, loaded in 4 chanopans protecterl by a joanga, under Gen. Felipe de Usalde. This force was to land on Pangasinan through Lingayen Gulf. Gen. Esteybar began his campaign on December 22 and Gen. 6s flgatrde set out by sea on December 24. Concepcion's Hi*taria de ?iltpinas gave this account of Gen. de

llgalde's assault from the sea. first hndled in Bolinao which ,.he secured for the service of his Mnjeety,, and Gen. de Ugalde's force

then on January 6, 1G61, .,he came in sight of the bar at.Ling:ayen.,, "... Although he strove, at the

risk of his armada, to enter it against the severity'of the storm that opposed him, the weather prevailed and compelled him to make port two leguas to leeward of the bar at Sauli. He sent the joanga (whieh is an oared vessel) to make soundings at the bar, with orders to summon him .hy signals so that he,.frould approach\ with this opportunity near enough to reconnoiter the fortifications of the rebels. He discovered a large crowd of people, who made him no othcr rr'ply thtn thnt of bullets rrrrrl nrrown; ttnd he obllorvcrl tho

haste wtth which they were butldlng fortifications, working behind e shelter which they had made of gabions. The foresight of the general suspected that they had not closed the bar against him, and he again strove, although without &vail, to enter it on thd eighth of the month. Then, seeing that the weather was steadily becoming more favorable to the enemy, he proposed to assault the village by land. . . He commanded the infautry to disembark, without allowing them to take with them anything save their weapons. fie dispatched the armada under Capt. Don Diego de Lemas. . . to contend once more against the severity of the elements (for an entrance into the river) and if he could not overcome their hostility, to return to the harbor, and there await the result and new orders. He ordered the adjutant, Diego Sanchez de Almazan, to enter the river with the joanga at all risk, as its passage was so important for the security of the people against the enemy who were awaiting them on the other side; and told him that if the joanga should be wreeked they would find him and his troops at a post convenient for securing the people from invasion by the enemy.

"Ugqlde divided his soldiers lnto three bodies; one of these under the command of Capt. Mi-

B-

guel Rendon. The trat[alion (main body) was given to Capt. Cristobal Romero and the rearguard to Capt. Juan f)iaz Yanez. Captains Nicolas Rlaneo antl lxrrenzo Coronado wert: scnt. forward with some nrrlucbusitrs lo rtronnoitr.r thc fiekl. 'l'lx. grrrurrrl guvr: pultlir: ordgrl lo th.l mnrr rrf l.hn vnnouqrrl

to

shoot tho first soldier who should rrctreat from hie post Hc was awaited at the bar by the forcee of the insurgents, who sup. posed that he had iome in the champans which they saw endesvoring to occupy the bar. By this preeaution he took them by surprise, so little ready for it that, seeing themselves assailed and the drums sounding to call to arms behind them on the land, this second danger so terrified them that their defensive array was thrown into confusion; and their fear giving them no leisure for other plans; it sent them headlong and dispersed them in preeipitate

flight." Gen. Esteybar, on the other hand, was detained for some time in Arayat where hq collected Psm, pang:o troops levied for this campaign. On December 28 he received reports that Melchor de Vera and his 6,000 men were on their way to Arayat. Gen. Esteybar promptly gave the orders to march and reached Magalang by nightfall on the same day. At Magalang, Gen. Esteybar learned that the rebel army was in Macanilo that night. The general wanL ed to attack immediately but was prevailed upon by his leading officers to delay because of the exhausted condition of the troops. At this time, a cavalry captain, Don Luis de Aduna, volunteersl to go forward with some merr lo reconnoiter and determine thr. nl tuation of the rebels. 'Ihlr phrr was enthusiastically upyrrovrxl hy the general who assitrnorl fixrl soldiers under tho r.ornnllrul of Aduna.

Accortling .lirrrmv

I )r.r.

l.1p ('11s1r'o1x'lol, M

7

cbme to.meet the army, ignor&nt beceuse, at this timg Glen. Ugeldo end unauipecttns that he would and Gen. Esteybsr hsat joinea finil it so near and in the field; forces and together launched an and the nfght, the fatigue of his attack on Binalatongen. Malong men, and the present hostile atti- called for help from Melchor de tude of the people, rendered futile Vera but, for sorne unknown reathe activities of his spies. The son, the latter failed to come to troops of Don Luis de Aduna the succor of his besieged leader. marched in good order and, al- The attaek of the Spaniards led though he sent forward men to to the burning of Binalatongan explore the road, when daylight by the rebels and the subsequent came he found himself in the capture (by treachery of one of midst of the enemy, who were his own men) of Don Andres Mastretched out on a pleasant open long. Thus ended the colorful life field-nearly all of them lying on of a foreeful Filipino leader who, the ground, either from their na- with better knowledge of military tural sloth or overcame by sleep. strategy and tactics, would have The Pangasinans raised an alarm, been successful not only in defeatuttering a loud shout, a signal ing the Spanish forces but also in with which all these peoples begin maintaining, at least for the dutheir bettles, in order to arouse ration of his life, an independent their even courage and weaken the regime. enemy; but such was not the effect...." The rebels, said ConcepDAGOHOY'S REBETLION IN cion, fled in disorderly fashion BOHOL, 1774. After Tamblots but, strange as it seems, Don Luis revolt in 1621, Bohol went through de Aduna instead of taking the more than a eentury of comparapursuit, turned back to his own tive peace. Throughout this pecamp in a manner as if he was riod, however, the Spaniards made the one being pursued. no effort to reform their despotic The retreat of Aduna and his colonial rule. In L774, a man by men became the basis of Melehor the name of Dagohoy, enraged by de Vera's exirggerated report to the refusal of a Jesuit curate to Malong that he had defeated the bury his brother who died in the Spaniards and dispersed them in service of the church, took adpanic and terror. In the me&n- vantage of the occasion to arouse time, Malong was further encour- the long pent-up resentment of the aged in his csuse by the success Boholanos against the Spaniards of "Conde" Don Pedro Gumapos, and rallied 3,000 Boholanos to his campaign in Bauang. Inspired by side. these successes, Malong orgpnized After harrassing and inflicting another foree of 4,000 men under several defeats,,:'to the Snanish Don Jacinto Macasiag, a native of forces, Dagohoy triumphan[ly anBinalatongan, who was ordered to nouneed the independence of Bo. proceed to Cafayan to induce the hol. For 85 years thereafter, the people there to join the rebellion. Roholanos were able to maintain au This dispersion of forces later inrlepenrk,rll slultr..r hy rcpellinr{ all provrxl to bo dirustrous to Malong Sprrnislr rrilelrr;rlH to roconqucr thg

.

iulond. According to our histo- -attack. Quoting again our histo. rlrrn, Gregorio F. Zaide, the fol- rian Zaide, Cairo ,,attacked the lorving factcrs contribnted to Da- fighting Boholanos in their fortirohoy's success: ficd positions at Agl:onan, Catagdaan, Bangbang, Canangay, Ca"First, the fierce determination nloro, and Ganvan. His heaw lntl fighting proryess of the Boho_ pieces gave him a big artillery lnno patriots; "Second, the decadence of the Spanish regime as shown by the ltct that the Spaniards of the period rvere flo longer consummate flghters like the early conquistarlores.. . and;

"Third, the raging Moro wars rvhich sapped the strength of the Spaniards in the philippines and rligtracted the attention of the Spnnish authorities.,, During Dagohoy,s reign, the Spanish authorities, both political and ecclesiastical of,ficials, made overtures to pacify him but all of these failed. Even an expedition under Don pedro Lrchuga was beaten back by the rebel forces. After Dagohoy,s death, his subor_ dinate leaders carried on the ntruggle to preserve their hardcurned liberty" In

1827, Gen. Mariano Ricafort,

then

Governor-General of the Philippines, decided to put an end to the independence of Bohol by ;ending a force of 1,100 men un* der f)nn Jose Lazaro Cairo, the alcalde-mayor of Cebu. The expetlition of Cairo was divided into two di';isions: one under Cairo,s porsonal cornmand, with headrlualters :rt Batuanan, and the

ol,her division under pedro

birrlil, :r Filipirro who had

Ca-

his

hcudrlrrurir..rs lrl. Aglmrtn.

(i:iiro

.

&-

I'ir.st, lrltcrr.lrtctl to con_ virrr.r' l,lrr. r.r,lx,ls lo 1r11p1-,',,,1,1r lltrl. thln hrlvlrru lirlLvl ho lorrrr.l,vl lD,^

advantage over the defenders, who possessed only.a few cannons and a limited supply of muskets and porvder. Notwithstanding this inferiority in armaments, the embattled patriots fought stubbornly. They rvere forcecl to retreat be,,. fore the heavy bombartlment of S p a n i s h batteries, evacuating; stronghold after stronshold; but, in their retreat, they struek hard at their advancing foes."

After having driven the rebels from their positions in the mountains, Cairo was kept corrtinually busy chasing the rebel forces who carried on the fight in guerilla fashion by raids on Spanish garrisons and ambush on enemy patr:ols. In April 1928, Gov. Ricafort sent over Capt. Manuel Sanz to continue the campaign of Cairo who had returned to Cebu. The Boholanos resisted stubbornly and after months of bitter fighting, covering many villages and mountains, the defenders finally put up a stand at Boasa on Jan. 8, 1829. At Boasa, aceording to Zaide, "Lhe Boholanos massed themselves in the mountain . . . which they fortified with stone trenches of one league in circumference. lVithin the protection of these trenches were their cultivated fields of ba)ranas, camotes, corn, and rice; three springs of water, and therir lrrmy b:rrracks arrd houses."

"lr Mtry l!i:ll)," rk'. "(ltttrt,.

Srrrrz.

r'orrlirrrrr,rl Zrtikrtrlirrrr lrin crnr.k

bsttallonn arrd hoavy guns, &s(at Boasa). The brawny patriots resisted with ficrce courag:e. Twice the invadnaulted the stronghold

va Segovia. Because of this vic_ tory he came into virtual eontrol

of the Ilocos. He was at the heieht

of his power when he *r* a***ers rushed to the attack, and twice sinatetl on May 2g, 1968, by a they were repulsed. Capt. Sanz, Spanish mestizo, Miguel Vico_q. realizing the strength cf the de- His death, however, did put not fen