Crossroad Discourses Between Christianity And Culture 9042028637, 9789042028630

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Crossroad Discourses between Christianity and Culture

CURRENTS OF ENCOUNTER STUDIES ON THE CONTACT BETWEEN CHRISTIANITY AND OTHER RELIGIONS, BELIEFS, AND CULTURES VOL. 38

GENERAL EDITORS Jerald D. Gort Henry Jansen Lourens Minnema Hendrik M. Vroom Anton Wessels Advisory Board Leonard Fernando (Delhi) James Haire (Canberra) James W. Heisig (Nagoya) Mechteld M. Jansen (Amsterdam) Kang Phee Seng (Hong Kong) Oddbjørn Leirvik (Oslo) Francis Anekwe Oborji (Rome) Jayakiran Sebastian (Philadelphia, PA) Nelly van Doorn-Harder (Valparaiso) Ulrich Winkler (Salzburg)

Crossroad Discourses between Christianity and Culture

Edited by Jerald D. Gort, Henry Jansen, and Wessel Stoker

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2010

Festschrift in honor of Hendrik M. Vroom on the occasion of his 65th birthday This publication has been made possible by generous grants from: the Van Coeverden Adriani Stichting, the section Encounter of Traditions of the Faculty of Theology, VU University Amsterdam, the Faculty of Theology, VU University Amsterdam, the Mission Department of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands (Kerk in Actie), and the General Secretariat of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands and by the unfailing support and enthusiasm of the publisher, Editions Rodopi, for this and other volumes in this series.  Cover Image: Blaues Pferd I by Franz Marc. The editors are grateful to the Städtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus, Munich for permission to use this painting. Cover design: Pier Post The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of  “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for  documents - Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-2863-0 E-Book ISBN: 978-90-420-2864-7 ©Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2010 Printed in the Netherlands

TableofContents PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix IntroductoryEssay:TheologyofCulture,Secularity,andPlurality WESSELSTOKER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 PARTI:CHRISTIANITYINTERACTINGWITHWESTERNAND CONTEMPORARYCULTURE 1.ModernCulture:General TheBackgroundandNatureoftheDeepChangesintheReligious RealitiesinModernEuropeANDRÉDROOGERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 TheConceptofCultureinAbrahamKuyper,HermanBavinck, andKarlBarthCORNELISVANDERKOOI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.FaithandReason TheRoleofFaithinScienceandinReligion KEITHWARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 ChristianFaithandReason:AHermeneuticalApproach EDWINKOSTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 3.Worldviews AmorMundiina(Post)LiberalEra:TheRelevanceofanArendtian ThemeforChristianSelfUnderstandingToday RONALDA.KUIPERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Equality,Difference,andJustice TONVANPROOIJEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 BusinessEthicsandIntrinsicMotivationinaPluralistWorld CONNIEAARSBERGEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 4.SocietyandPolitics RenewalofCivilization:TowardJusticeandPeace HENKE.S.WOLDRING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Populism:ABlessinginDisguiseforDemocracy? GOVERTJ.BUIJS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Poverty,Oppression,andChristianFaith JERALDD.GORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 ThePublicRoleofChurchesinPresentDemocraticSouthAfrica ETIENNEDEVILLIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

5.Esthetics ImaginationandArtintheChristianFaith:OnImagination andArtintheChurchDESIREEBERENDSEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Language,Literature,andTranscendence:TheContribution ofF.R.LeavisHENRYJANSEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 ReadinessandTiming:TheEarlyModernVirtuesofHamlet’s ProvidentialChristianityLOURENSMINNEMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 PARTII:CHRISTIANITYINTERACTINGWITHWORLDRELIGIONSAND TRADITIONS 1.AfricanTraditions IndigenousSpiritualityandSustainableDevelopment:ACritical AppraisalofAfricanRenaissanceRhetoric FRANSWIJSEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 AfricanPhilosophy,Contextualisation,Multiculturalism W.L.VANDERMERWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 2.Hinduism Untouchables,Christians,andHindus:HowtheSacredWorld OrderisPreservedandRenouncedVICTORVANBIJLERT . . . . 319 ContemporaryChristianHinduRelationsinBritainandthe NetherlandsJANPETERSCHOUTEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 3.Judaism Superseded,Obstructive,orCrucial?ChristianViewsofJudaism anditsSacredTextsALBERDINAHOUTMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 RecentDevelopmentsinChristianJewishDialogue SIMONSCHOON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375 4.Buddhism SympathyandEmpathy:TheCompassionateBodhisattva andtheLoveofChristJOHND’ARCYMAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 ChristianandBuddhistSpiritualities:TheirDifferencesand ComplementaritiesCHRISTAANBEEK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 5.Islam PresentDayEuropeandIslaminEncounter:EmergingEuropean IslamanditsDialoguePartnersGÉSPEELMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431 TheCouncilofChurchesintheNetherlandsanditsEncounter withIslamALLEG.HOEKEMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449

6.EncounterwithChinaandwithNewReligiosities ProximityandDistanceChinaandtheChristianWest:AnEssay inInterculturalPhilosophySANDERGRIFFIOEN . . . . . . . . . . . . 471 ChristianViewsoftheNewReligiositiesoftheWesternWorld REENDERKRANENBORG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487 PARTIII:CHRISTIANITYINTERACTINGWITHITSELF 1.WorldCouncilofChurches RecentEcclesiologicalDevelopmentsintheWorldCouncilof Churches:ContinuityorDiscontinuity? CONRADJ.WETHMAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 505 ConversionintheEcumenicalDebate:GreatJoyor GreatDiscomfort?JANVANBUTSELAAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 525 2.WorldAllianceofReformedChurches ConfessioandTraditio:AReformedApproachinDialogue withtheLutheranTraditionMICHAELWEINRICH . . . . . . . . . . 545 ChristianityandCulture:WARCattheMillennium GEORGENEWLANDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 3.TheWiderEcumenism InterculturalTheologyastheIntegrationofEcumenismand Missiology:TheExampleofCurrentLatinAmerican ChristologyMARTIENE.BRINKMAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579 GodHasNoFavourites:EcumenismandInterreligiousDialogue. TheUnityofGod’sCreationANTONHOUTEPEN . . . . . . . . . . . 599 INDEXOFSUBJECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 619 INDEXOFNAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631 CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 639

Preface ThepaintingonthecoverofthisvolumeisFranzMarc’sBlaues Pferd I (Blue Horse I 1911), which brings together the book’s most important themes. The horse represents nobility and pri marily spirituality, whereas in Christian iconography blue is thecolorusedforheavenandtranscendence.Redreferstoag gressivenesshere.Thehorseisstandingwithhisheadbowedto theleft,asifitisreflectingonhowevilintheworldandinreli gioncanbeovercome. LiketheBlueHorse,Christianityiscalledtoreflectiveen counter with its cultural environment, including itself. The in teraction between Christianity and culture involves the ques tionoffaithandreasonandtakesplaceatthelevelsofpolitics, society and esthetics, but it also includes encounter with other religions, spiritualities, ideologies and worldviews, as well as engagementintheformofinternalecumenicalencounter.Allof these matters are addressed in the following pages, beginning withanintroductoryessayconsistingofananalyticalsynthesis ofthesalientpositionsandviewscontainedinthevariouswrit ingsthatmakeupthiscompendium. This book of thematic essays is intended for use as a sourceortextbookinuniversity,collegeandtheologicalsemin arycoursesdealingwiththeproblemsandpossibilitiesofinter and intracultural communication, contextual interpretation, in terreligiousdialogue,andecumenicalthemes,debatesanddis cussions. We are pleased to dedicate this collection to Hendrik M. Vroom tomarktheoccasionofhisfarewellasProfessorofPhilosophy of Religion at the Faculty of Theology, VU University Amster dam, and to honor his long scholarly service in the pursuit of knowledge,learningandunderstanding. JeraldD.Gort HenryJansen WesselStoker

IntroductoryEssay TheologyofCulture,Secularity,andPlurality  WesselStoker CrossroadDiscoursesbetweenChristianityandCultureexploresthe place of the Christian faith in contemporary (post)modern cul ture and looks at its dialogue with secular culture, the world religions,andnewformsofreligiosity,andattheinternaldia logue between different Christian confessions. Contemporary Westerncultureissecularandpluralisticwithrespecttoworld views, and a tendency toward globalization can also be noted. WhatdotheseculturalchangesentailfortheChristianfaith?In this introductory article I will make some comments from the perspectivesoftheologyandphilosophyofculture,thusoutlin ingaframeworkforthecontributionsinCrossroadDiscourses.I will do that by means of three key terms: theology of culture, secularity,andplurality. TheologyofCulture:AWorldviewAPriori An important concept in Abraham Kuyper, the father of the NeoCalvinist movement in the Netherlands, is the idea of the “spheresovereignty”insocietalareaslikeeducation,art,church, etc.,asCornelisVanderKooi1shows.Kuyperthusacknowledges theseparationofchurchandstate:wherevertheseparationbe tweenchurchandstateexists,thechurchnolongerenjoysany prideofplace,andallreligionsaretobetreatedequallybythe government. Kuyper’s idea of “sphere sovereignty” in society canserveasaframeworkfortheinteractionofChristianitywith secularcultureandotherreligions.Forthisdialogue,theideaof “spheresovereignty”entails,namely,thatallpartiesareequal. This is a necessary condition for dialogue without compulsion orpressurebyoneofthedialoguepartners.Itisnot,however,a 1 Thenamesinitalicsrefertocontributorstothisvolume.Cf.the tableofcontents.

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sufficientcondition,foronecouldaskwhychurchandpolitics, faith and science should have something to say to each other. Aretherepointsofcontactforsuchadiscussion? Karl Barth does not provide us with such a point of con tact. Van der Kooi points out that the early Barth severed the connection between Christian faith and Western culture, albeit BarthdidnottherebysignifythattheChristianhadnorespon sibilitytowardsociety.Tothecontrary,Barthsroleinthestrug gleoftheGermanchurchesshowsimpressivelyhowChristian theologyunmaskedtheideologyofNazism.PaulTillich,Barth’s ally against liberal theology, held that the early Barth lacked a theology of culture (Tillich 1987: 91116). He did not find this gulfbetweenfaithandcultureacceptableanddevelopedathe ologyofculturehimselfinwhichhedemonstratedhowreligion isthesoulofculture(Tillich1990:6985).IsTillichsconceptof religionapointofcontactforthecurrentdialogueoffaithwith culture? Tillich views religion as an indication for absolute mean ing, for the unconditional that is present in society via values likethemeaningoflife,thegood,thejust,thetrue,thebeauti ful,andpersonallifeinlove.Theindividualthushasanunder standingoftheunconditional;areligiousaprioriispartofbeing human. By referring to this unconditional in different areas of culture,Tillichisabletorelatereligion(astheexperienceofthe unconditional) to culture. Religion is the substance of culture, andcultureistheformofreligion(Tillich1967:84).Tillichthus providesapointofcontactforadialoguebetweentheologyand culture.Christiantheologiansexplaintheultimatemeaningthat peopleexperienceastheunconditional,astheGodoftheBible: “God is the concrete, symbolic, religious expression of the un conditional.Ofcourse,onlyreligiouslymindedpeoplewillcall suchanunconditionaltheirGod”(Richard2007:210). With his broad concept of religion (religion as orientation towardtheunconditional)Tillichwantstodemonstratethatre ligion is not a separate area in culture but a dimension of all areasofhumanlife.Isharehisintentionbutdisagreewithhow heelaboratedonit.Iwillmaketworemarksregardingthiswith aviewtoaculturaltheologicalframeworkforthecontributions inCrossroadDiscourses.

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In his theology of culture Tillich makes use of the meta physicalviewofmeaning.Anexperienceofmeaninginvokesa chainofincreasinglylargercontextsuntilonefinallyarrivesat absolute meaning as the end and final justification for experi encing meaning. The “unconditional” is derived from a meta physics in which a value like the existential meaning of life is based on a final ground in an unconditional meaning (Stoker 1996:7090).Thatisakindoffoundationalismthatiscriticized today by philosophical thinkers as divergent as Heidegger, Plantinga,andDerrida.Mynextpointisverymuchinlinewith thiscritique.Thisviewofmeaningasachainofmeaningwith absolutemeaningastheenddoesnotdoenoughjusticetonon religiouspeople.Tillichleaveshardlyanyroominasecularcul ture for an experience of meaning that for certain people does notrefertothesourceofultimatemeaning,God. Iwill indicate a hermeneutics offinitude as an alternative forfoundationalismbelow.HereIwillnowprovideanalterna tive to Tillich’s concept of religion in order to find common ground for dialogue between the Christian faith and secular cultureaswefindinthefirstpartofthisvolume. Everypersonhasalifeorientation,hastobeahumanbe ing.Lifeisamatterofunderstanding(verstehen)people,things, and situations. It is not the unconditional that is part of being humanbuttheappropriationofalifeorientation.Icallthatan existentialofbeinghuman:apropertythateachpersonshould realize. I thus point on the one hand to the structure of being humanandontheothertothewayinwhichthisexistentialis givenworldviewform,asafragmentedworldview,asasecular worldviewsuchashumanism,asanorganizedreligion,orasa form of new spirituality outside of religious traditions (Stoker 2004:11518).Thisdoesjusticetosecularity,andadialoguebe tweenChristianityandsecularculturecanbecarriedout. In short, a worldview a priori or life orientation is part of beinghumanandcanserveascommongroundinthedialogue withculture:everypersonhas,inonewayoranother,alifeor ientationandviewscertainnormsandvaluesasimportant.Art and the church, the church and politics have something to say tooneanother.

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The contributions in this volume can be read on the basis of thesetwoideasofthetheologyofculture.ThefirstisKuyper’s (andTillich’s)acknowledgementofasecularcultureandofthe separationofchurchandstate.Acultureledbythechurch,as occurredinpremodernsociety,istoberejected.EtiennedeVilliers showsthatsuchapremodernsocietywasmoreorlesspresentin South Africa before apartheid. Victor van Bijlert explores ten sions in India with respect to religion and the secular state in connectionwiththeDalits.Hinduismholdstoareligious,hier archical world order in which the Untouchables are rejected and their opportunities strongly limited. That clashes with the secularstatethatIndiaisandis,moreover,atoddswithhuman rights.Itisnecessary,therefore,accordingtoVanBijlert,tode fendthedemocratic,secularconstitutionofIndia. The different spheres of society have independence from thechurchandstateandthusthechurchshouldnotinterferein them.HenkE.S.Woldringshowshowthestateneedstopromote social cohesion but also to respect the independent spheres of society.Thus,Woldringwritesthatitisthepoliticaltaskofthe state “to help each person conquer his ‘freedom of expansion andautonomy’progressivelyinapositivemanner”(cf.below: 137).Oneofthephenomenaofamulticulturalsocietytoattract interestisthepopulismthatweusuallyconnectwithextreme rightpoliticalparties.GovertJ.Buijsclarifiesthetermpopulism and shows that it has more nuances than is usually acknowl edged. Second, because the development of a life orientation is part of being human, there can be a fruitful dialogue on the question of how a life orientation can best acquire content throughcertainvaluesinthepublicsphereorinacertainpolit ical or worldview conviction. Some contributors see the basic givens in culture as “points of contact” for the dialogue be tweenreligionandculture.RonaldA.Kuipersdemonstratesthat Hannah Arendt’s amor mundi can also be used in public theo logy.TonvanProoijenshowsthat“equality”inthepublicsphere canbeenrichedbythebiblicalconceptofjustice.KeithWardde monstrates that there is overlapping and difference between “faith” in natural science and the Christian faith. Desiree Be rendsen searches for the connection between art and religion andclarifieswhatthemesinartcanmeanforreligion,whereas

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HenryJansenexploreswhatkindoflanguagecanbethebearer ofspiritualvalues.Jansenwantstogobeyondthewellknown discussiononthesimilaritybetweenreligiouslanguageandpo eticlanguage.Heinvestigatesthespiritualvaluesthatcanliein the language of each written work and may or may not evoke transcendenceofsorts. The secular givens cited aboveamor mundi, equality, faith,themesinart,andlanguageasapossiblebearerofspirit ual transcendenceare important for the Christian faith be cause they can be related in one way or another to that faith, and sometimes, conversely, biblical concepts can fructify secu larideassothatthereisaninterchangebetweencultureandthe Christianfaith.Thatissomewhatdifferent,LourensMinnemaar gues, in Shakespeare’s Hamlet. He claims that early modern virtueslikeHamlet’s“readiness”and“timing”makehimcapa ble of combining Christian views of providence with secular viewsoffate. Common ground can be sought in interreligious dialogue aswell.JohnD’ArcyMaydoesthatindialoguewithBuddhism. HepointstodifferenceandoverlappingbetweentheBuddhist notion of compassion and the Christian notion of love and maintainsthat,viaaphenomenologyofsympathyandempath y,hehasfoundacommongroundforaglobalethics. Onecouldaskwhatkindofconceptofcultureispresupposed inthisvolume.Arewetalkinghereabouthighculture,aboutthe dialogue with art and science? And is the concern in interre ligious dialogue only that of an intellectual dialogue between academically trained experts? That is not the case in this vol ume.CrossroadDiscoursesviewsculturemorebroadlythansim ply high culture: culture is not only a matter of the mind but also of the body. From the point of view of biblical anthropo logy, the human being is, after all, a unity of body, spirit and heart.Biblicalpeace,shalom,isamatterthatconcernsthewhole person. Culture can be viewed as “any conversion of raw na tureintoahabitableworldthroughtheexerciseofhumanlabor and attention” (Cobb 2005: 41; quoted in Chun 2008: 168). The concern here is thus to give shape to material existence. Anton Houtepen and George Newlands show that the churches are also occupied with social problems, including religious violence. JeraldD.GortsuppliesaChristianviewoftheissueofpoverty.

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Martien Brinkman also pays attention to popular culture when helooksattheinfluenceofpopularreligiosityontheimageof JesusinLatinAmerica. Theologyofcultureclarifiestheintertwinementofreligionand culture.Everybodyneedsaworldvieworientation,andthatisal sowhyreligionisimportantforaculturethathasbecomesecu lar.Aphilosophyofcultureapproachcanindicatefurtherwhat secularitymeansfortheplaceoftheChristianfaith. Secularity:TheImmanentFrame AndréDroogersshowstheconsequencesofthemodernizationof Western society for religion. Modern culture is characterized primarily by secularization/secularity, plurality and globaliza tion. Here I will discuss secularization/secularity and globaliza tion. In the next section I will explore plurality further in con nectionwithinterreligiousdialogue. Droogerspointsoutthatthetermsecularization(viewedas a social process) refers primarily to dechurchification and is less connected to the idea that religion will eventually disap pear.Religionisnotdisappearingbutisshiftingmorefromin stitutional religion to spirituality that thrives outside religious institutions.CharlesTaylorhasexploredthedepthsofsecular ityinhisASecularAge,andwhathehastosayaboutitclarifies thebackgroundofdifferentcontributionsinthisvolume. Taylordistinguishesthreemeaningsofthetermsecularity (viewed as the result of a process of secularization) (Taylor 2007:24,1215).Secularity1referstothedisappearanceofreli gionfromthepublicsphere,i.e.social,economic,andpolitical life. Connie Aarsbergen explores a problem in connection with thesecularizedpublicspacewhenitconcernsethicallyrespons iblebusinesspractices.Ontheonehand,moralityisoftencon nected with religion, but how is a company to make choices hereifreligionhasdisappearedfromthepublicsphere? Secularity 2 concerns the decrease (in a quantitative sense) ofbeliefsorreligiouspractices.Thequestionthenishowtradi tionalchurchescanrespondtothis.Unfortunately,manyinthe churchdonotcommentonthisformofsecularization,andthus ananswerhasnotbeenforthcoming.Onecanpointout,forex ample,thatthereisnowmoreopennessintheProtestantChurch

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intheNetherlandsforthePentecostalmovement,whichcarries a strong attraction for many, and in some cases also for so calledmodernspiritualityandapproachestofaithlikethepros perity gospel. Interest in esotericism has also grown. Reender Kranenborg discusses the changed position of the church with respecttoesotericism.OrthodoxChristianitydidnotrespondto esotericismforalongtime,butinterestinthatmovementisin creasing—within the church as well. In a challenge to the church, Kranenborg asks if we can speak here of a new con textualtheology. Secularity3ariseswhenoursecularizederaisinvestigated with a view to the question of the cultural conditions under which people believe now in comparison to earlier periods. This meaning concerns understanding the conditions of mod erncultureonthebasisofwhichpeoplemakeordonotmakea choiceforareligionorforasecularworldview.Letuslookatthis forminmoredetail. Taylorsketchesthedevelopmentfromanenchantedtoan unenchanted world. In the premodern period the human self wasporousandcameintocontactwithspiritanddemons.The human being lived in an enchanted world. Slowly, the “buf feredself”arose,ahumanselfthatdelimiteditselffromevilin fluences from outside (Taylor 2007: 3742). In Christianity the accentbegantoliemoreontheinternalsideofthehumanbeing andonselfdisciplinethroughspiritualexercises. In the Middle Ages the social order was a matter of (Pla tonic) “forms” that were anchored in reality as “essences.” In the naturallaw thinking of Hugo de Groot (15831645) and John Locke (16321704) the social order was seen as a human construction(Taylor2007:12530).Thisdidnotingeneraldeny anyreferencetoGod,butovertimenaturallawwasexplained inanimmanentwayandtheconceptofamoralorderwithout Godarose. With respect to time, a distinction was made in the pre modern era between sacred and profane time. Violence within society was channeled through carnivals, allowing a time of “misrule” and a time of restoration of order. That distinction disappearedwhentheconnectionbetweenreligionandtheso cialorderbecamelooser.Timebecamepurelyseculartime,ho mogenous,emptytime(Taylor2007:5459,129).

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Becauseofthechangedviewofthehumanself,oftheso cialorder,andoftime,sincetheendoftheeighteenthcentury there have been secular worldviews existing alongside organ izedreligion.Religionisnolongerselfevidentincontemporary Westernsocietybutweliveinasecularera.Itwouldbewrong toarguethatsecularitymeansthatthesecularworldviewisthe onlyoptionandthatreligions,becauseofdevelopmentsinthe modernperiod,arepassé.Peopledidargue,afterall,thatsecul arization entailed the disappearance of religion. Taylor shows thatthisviewtacitlypresupposesthata“secularage”assumes that there is only one option: the secular one. That is incorrect and,todemonstratethat,hearguesthatasecularagedoesnot meanthatthereisonlyoneoption,thesecular,butthatwe,sec ular or religious, share an immanent framework. It is the con text within which we make the choice to believe or not. The changedhumanself,thechangedsocialorder,andtimeassec ulartimegaverisetoanimmanentframeinsociety.Taylorde scribesitasfollows: Sothebufferedidentityofthedisciplinedindividualmoves inaconstructedsocialspace,whereinstrumentalrationality is a key value, and time is pervasively secular. All of this makes up what I call the “immanent frame.” (Taylor 2007: 542;cf.also566)

Whatisnowcalledtheimmanentframewasoriginallythe“na tural”orderincontrasttothe“supernaturalorder.”TheRefor mation also distinguishedtheorder ofgrace from the orderof nature, but this order of nature has now become the immanent framethroughwhichwestampourtimeassecular.Theimma nentframeisthecontextinwhichwechooseanddevelopour belief,andthatcanbeachoiceforasecularorreligiousworld view. This immanent frame is merely the context for believing inareligioussenseornot,andthatissomethingdifferentfrom choosingaworldviewwithrespecttosubstance. Itcomesdowntothequestionifthisimmanentframeisto beconsideredclosedoropentoreligioustranscendence.Athe istsconsidertheimmanentframeclosedanddevelopaworld viewchoiceforaclosedworldstructure.Itisassumedthatsci encehasdemonstratedthatGoddoesnotexist,oritisclaimed, via a reductionistic theory of religion, that the function of reli gion has been taken over by something else (e.g. science), or

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that values can be authorized by the autonomous self. As we saw, the immanent frame is also the starting point for the be liever, but in this case it is interpreted as being open to trans cendence. In addition to the immanent frame of contemporary sec ular culture, I would also like to point to the changed view of rationality as well, which has consequences for the way in which people account for faith. The view of rationality has changed in the twentieth century. From the Enlightenment up untilhalfwaythroughthetwentiethcentury,thetimeinwhich logicalpositivismwasprevalent,aconceptofuniversalreason wasendorsedanditwasbelievedthatanabsolutefoundationfor knowledgeexisted.ButwehavebeendrivenfromthatGarden of Eden of sharing God’s point of view. We have no absolute knowledge, and that includes religion. The strong view of ra tionalityhasgivenwaytoaweakerview.Doesthisthenentail relativismintheareaofworldviews?No,thefalsedilemmaof allornothingshouldbeavoided.Peoplearefiniteandthatmeans that their claims to knowledge are not absolute but limited. Manyquestionsinlifeappeartobeamatterofprobability. Someofthecontributionsinthisvolumecanbeplacedagainst thisbackgroundofepistemologyandphilosophyofculture. SanderGriffioenlooksatthechangedviewofrationalityin connection with religion. In his contribution on China and the Christian West he points out that, for Matteo Ricci (15521610) and Leibniz (16461714) natural theology was still the common ground for the relationship between Christianity and Confu cianism. Such a natural theology that arrives at God through sharedreasonhasnowbecomeimpossible.Theorderofnature has become, as we saw, an immanent frame, and the cultural differencesarenowbeingemphasizedmore.Griffioenindicates new ways to present the Christian faith in a nonWestern cul ture. Edwin Koster considers the immanent frame open to reli gious transcendence but no longer speaks of a rational justifica tionforfaith.Heonlywantstoshowthecredibilityofreligious practices. One can ask if globalization, the process whereby the world is experienced as one global village, does not impose a tightpatternonthevariousculturesthroughouttheworld.W.L. van der Merwe explores this and argues that globalization pro

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duces not cultural homogeneity but multiculturalism. In a de scriptive sense, the term entails that there are cultural differ ences and that we should not level them. Multiculturalism shouldnotbeunderstoodasculturesexistingalongsideonean otherbutasaconditionforculturaldifferences.Houtepengives an example of multiculturalism and demonstrates that in the West multiculturalism has influenced the rise of a wider ecu menismofthethreeAbrahamiticreligionsJudaism,Christian ity,andIslam.Buttherecanalsobeadifferentresponsetoglo balization, as Frans Wijsen shows in discussing a reactionary African response to globalization. Does the immanent frame thatismoreorlessselfevidentintheWestalsoobtainforAfri ca? Some political leaders in Africa deny that and want to re turn to a time before the immanent frame, arguing for native spiritualityandthusforanAfricanRenaissance. Theologyofcultureshowshowreligionandculturecanbein tertwined.Philosophyofculturedemonstratesthatreligioncan be a sound option also within the immanent frame. But how canadialoguebecarriedoninasocietyinwhichtherearemany religionsandworldviews?Thatisacomplicatedquestion.Iwill limitmyselftodiscussingthephilosophicalbackgroundthatis determinativeforreligiousdialogueinapluralisticsociety:the shiftfromafoundationalistepistemologytoa“hermeneuticsof finitude”anda“hermeneuticsofsuspicion.” PluralityandHermeneuticalReason Religiousdialogueoccursinapluralisticculturewithaplural ityofreligionsandsecularworldviews.Wewillnowsaysome thingmoreaboutpluralityinculture. At the end of the eighteenth century people slowly began todiscoverthehistoricityofallculturesandthusculturaldiffer ences.Newlandsshows,amongotherthings,howtheWorldAlli anceofReformedChurchestakestheissuesofculturalcontextand the problem of inculturation into consideration, and Brinkman givesanexampleofthatbymeansoftheimageofJesusinLatin America.Heshows,asstatedabove, thattheimageofJesusis stampedbythecultureofLatinAmerica. Pluralityincultureintheareaofreligionandworldviewis afact,buthowshouldthatbevaluated?Iwouldliketopointto the changed view of rationality in support of a positive valua

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tion. Absolute knowledge is no longer an option, and that is alsotruewithrespecttoreligiousdialogue.Thedifferencesbe tween the religions can no longer be bridged by rational truth aswasattemptedintheeighteenthcenturythroughthenotion of natural religion. Natural religion was thought to lie at the foundationofrevealedreligionslikeJudaism,Christianity,and Islam.ThatnaturalreligionconsistedofarationalfaithinGod, morality,andimmortality.Thedifferencesbetweenallthereli gions arose, it was held, through what revelations added to them.Acommonunifiedbasiswasthusimposedonreligions, dictated by a reason that every human being was thought to share and was independent of historical circumstances. It was notonlythediscoveryofthehistoricityofculturesthatplaced this concept of reason in question. In philosophy itselfHei deggerplayedadecisiveroleherefoundationalistepistemolo gy that was related to the general concept of reason was crit icizedandreplacedbyabroader,hermeneuticalconceptofrea sonandthusbyahermeneuticsoffinitude. Foundationalistepistemologyheldthatthebasisforstate mentswasselfevidentinitselfandnotsubjecttocorrection,as is the case in statements like “no circle is square” or “my foot hurts.”Butmostofourstatementsofknowledgeconcernmat ters that are more comprehensive and have an aspect of inter pretation.Moreover,ourknowledgedoeshavealimit,asKant demonstrated. Since Kant, we understand that our knowledge isfiniteandweemphasizethedialogicalstructureofourknow ing. The dilemma of absolute knowledge or relativism is not onlytoberejectedingeneralbutalsowithrespecttoreligion.It isnot,aswestatedabove,aquestionofeverythingornothing. Thehumanbeingisfiniteandthereforehisknowledgeandin sightisalsolimitedintheareaofreligion.Thequestionofreli gioustruthcannotbedecideddefinitively.Atpresentreligious dialogueisnotconductedonthebasisofauniversalreasonthat yieldsuniversalreligioustruths.Thatwholeapproachhasbeen unmaskedasfiction.Rather,itoccursonthebasisofhermeneu ticalreasonandahermeneuticsoffinitude. We arereferredto theinterpretationofholybooks,butwedonothavealeaseon truth over against other holy bookswhich does not, for that matter, prevent one from holding to the truth of one’s beliefs. Whatthephilosophercallsahermeneuticsoffinitudethetheo

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logian calls the creatureliness of the human being, the human beingasafinite,limitedbeing,createdbyGod. Asidefromahermeneuticsoffinitude,wearealsoreferred toa“hermeneuticsofsuspicion.”Ashumanbeings,wearenot mastersofourselvesandareoften,consciouslyorunconscious ly, driven by selfinterest. Texts and people can openly or co vertly maintain situations of injustice. What philosophy calls a hermeneuticsofsuspiciontheologycallssin,whichisalsopre sentinhumanknowledge.(Westphal2001:177f.).Paulspeaksof people who “suppress the truth by their wickedness” (Romans 1:18).Areligionshouldthereforebecriticalofitselfanditsown tradition. One remark should still be made here. Conducting a dia logue is not only a matter for theological experts who discuss the cognitive insights of religion with one another. There are otherkindsofdialogue.Whatwasstatedabovecanleadtothe impression that, anthropologically speaking, the human being is only mind. That would be incorrect, for the human being is alsobody,asIstatedabove.Religionisnotonlyamatterofthe humanmindandheartbutalsooneofthehumanbody.Ifone looks at icons in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, one sees that evangelists, apostles, and saints are often depicted with eyes wideandelongatedfingersasasignthatthepersonportrayed isaspiritualhumanbeing.ThemuchreadDutchnovel,Knielen opeenbedviolen(KneelingonaBedofViolets)byJanSiebelink, isaboutagroupofradicalProtestantswithastrongsenseofsin andadeepfaithinGod.Thatfaithisalsovisibleintheirbodies. Themaincharacterinthenovel,HansSievez,whohimselfbe longstothisgroup,andhiswifeMargjearephysicallyrepelled by these people because of their deformities and strong body odour.Theirdescriptionsleadonetobelievethatthemembers of this sectarian group are freaks. That religion is also often a matterofthebodyisalsopresentinthisvolume. InhercontributionChristaAnbeekdiscussesthedialoguewith Buddhism in different forms of dialogue. Apart from the dia logue of experts in religion, of which May provides a nice ex ample,shealsodiscussespracticalspiritualdialogueinwhichthe bodyplaysarole.Onecanthinkhereof,forexample,sittingfor alongtimeinmeditationandbreathingexercises.

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An example of the abovementioned hermeneutics of sus picion emerges in the dialogue with Judaism (Houtman and Schoon). Alberdina Houtman sketches primarily the traditional approach of the church to the Jews and Simon Schoon shows that,afterAuschwitz,somechurchesrevisedtheirearlierviews abouttheJews. Thisvolumeisalsoatreasuretroveofinformationonhow dialoguewithotherreligionsisnowbeingconducted.JanPeter Schouten writes about the history of dialogue with Hindus in theNetherlands.AlleG.Hoekemadoesthesameforthedialogue with Islam, whereas Gé Speelman discusses dialogue from the perspectiveofMuslims. If, in discussing Conrad Wethmar and Jan van Butselaar, I refertoaparallelwithepistemology,Idonottouchtheheartof their contributions. Nevertheless, the following observation is interesting because we see the extent to which church and theology are in step with culture. Wethmar shows in his dis cussion of the ecumenical debate on the church that this ini tiallyoccurredinanatmosphereoftheoutdatedviewofreason asuniversalthatwasthoughttobeuniversallyvalid.Itisnow recognizedthataviewofchurchshouldbelessmonolithic,and thereismoreroomforthepluralityofviewsofthechurch.The current view of the church as a pilgrim people acknowledges that the church is still on the way, thus making it difficult, it seems to me, for a church to make an absolute claim on truth. Here we see a similar shift in the view of the church as that which occurred in epistemology as described above. I will re markthatsuchashiftmustbefirstofalljustifiedtheologically by an appeal to the eschatological character of the truth of the Christianfaith.Christianity,afterall,doesliveoutoftheprom iseofthecomingofGod’skingdom. InhiscontributionVanButselaarshowsthatconversionto acertainreligionisoftenviewedwithscepticisminEurope,in contrasttohowitisviewedinAfrica.Canoneofthecausesof thisbethedominanceofa(post)modernclimateinEurope?Hav ing an organized worldview, let alone being converted to one, isoneareainwhichChristianfaithdeviatesfrom(post)modern culture. Are Christians not ultimately “strangers and pilgrims onearth”(Hebrews11:13)?

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In addition to Wethmar and Van Butselaar, Michael Wein rich also gives an example of ecumenical dialogue. He shows thesmallbutsignificantdifferencesbetweentwoProtestanttra ditions, the Lutheran and the Reformed, with respect to con fessionandtradition.HearguesthattheLutheranviewstillre flects a medieval view of the church as the Body of Christ, of the ideal of a universally visible body of the church, whereas the Reformed tradition reflects more a modern striving for an ecumenical commitment of different churches, each aiming for thecatholicityofauniversalchurch. The distinction between interreligious dialogue and ecu menismamongchurcheshasbecomelessclear.Thetheological disciplineofecumenicsisincreasinglybeingdirectedtothein teractions between church traditions in a global Christianity, and missiology is focusing more on the theology of nonWest ernchurches,accordingtoBrinkman.Interreligiousdialoguehas becomeanintegralpartofecumenicsandmissiology.Forother reasonsaswell,thedistinctionbetweeninterreligiousdialogue andecumenismhasbecomelessclear.HereIremindthereader that Houtepen discusses a wider ecumenism beyond the boun daries of the church: the Abrahamitic ecumenism of Judaism, Christianity,andIslam.Gortarguesthatthepracticalapproach to poverty will be successful only in collaboration with other worldreligions,whichalsopromotesecumenism. Crossroad Discourses gives the reader a splendid impression of Christian faith in contemporary culture, both with respect to secular culture and other religions. It shows how changes in culture,suchassecularity,plurality,andmulticulturalisminflu ence ecumenics and interreligious dialogue. The cultural posi tionofthechurchandthereligiousattitudeofchurchmembers isthuschanging. Bibliography Cobb, K. (2005). The Blackwell Guide to Theology and Popular Culture. Oxford:Blackwell. Chun,YoungHo.(2008).“ATheologyofCulture:PaulTillich’sEarly ConceptionandItsSignificanceToday.”In:C.Danzetal.(eds).Reli gion – Kultur – Gesellschaft.  TillichStudien. Berlin: LIT. Pp. 155 70.

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Stoker, W. (2006). Is Faith Rational? A HermeneuticalPhenomenological AccountingforFaith.Transl.HenryJansen.Louvain:Peeters. (1996).IstheQuestforMeaningtheQuestforGod?TheReligiousAs criptionofMeaninginRelationtotheSecularAscriptionofMeaning. Transl.HenryandLucyJansen.Amsterdam:Rodopi.  (1994).ZingevingenPluraleSamenleving.Bolsward:HetWitte Boekhuis. Taylor,C.(2007).ASecularAge.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Tillich, P. (1990). “Über die Idee einer Kultur.” In: P. Tillich. Main Works2.Ed.M.Palmer.Berlin:DeGruyter.Pp.6985. (1987).“KritischesundPositivesParadox:EineAuseinandersetz ungmitKarlBarthundFriedrichGogarten.”In:P.Tillich.Main Works4.Ed.J.Clayton.Berlin:DeGruyter.Pp.91116. (1967).“ReligionundKultur.”In:P.Tillich.GesammelteWerkeIX. Ed.R.Albrecht.Stuttgart:EvangelischesVerlagswerk.Pp.8293. Richard, J. (2007). Review in: C. Danz et al. (eds). Internationales Jahr buchfürdieTillichForschung.Münster:LIT.Pp.20910. Westphal,Merold.(2001).OvercomingOntotheology:TowardaPostmod ernChristianFaith.NewYork:FordhamUniversityPress.

PartI

ChristianityInteracting withWestern andContemporaryCulture

TheBackgroundandNature oftheDeepChanges intheReligiousRealities inModernEurope AndréDroogers

Abstract BeginningwithWesternEurope,theworldhaschangedinthelasttwocen turiesinawayunprecedentedinhumanhistory.Wemustviewnotonlythe secularization process but also religious resurgence and pluralism against thisbackground.Modernizationisthebasiccauseofadramatictransforma tion in many areas of life, including religion. It encompasses and nourishes other processes such as urbanization, migration, individualization and the media revolution, all of which have consequences for the religious situation. Inthisarticle,themapandgeologyofthecurrentreligiouslandscapeinmod ernEuropeareexplored.Theperspectiveisthatofsocialscienceor,morespe cifically,theculturalanthropologyofreligion.Itissuggestedthatcurrentbe lievers have to find their way through a series of repertoires that provide modelsorschemasfortheirmeaningfulplaceinmoderncultureandsociety. Therangeofviewsandoptionsissketchedbriefly.Theuniqueandambigu ousnatureofoureraisreflectedinpresentsignificationprocessesandtheir outcome.

Modernization1andtheEraofDrasticChanges Whatarethebackgroundandnatureofthedeepchangesinthe religiousrealitiesinmodernEurope?Findingananswertothis questionleadstotheimpossibletaskofsummarizingtwocen turies of complex changes, something that can only be done

1

InthiscontextIpreferthetermmodernizationtomodernity,be cause I wish to emphasize the process more than the result. Besides, modernizationisusedtodescribetheprocessthatiscommontoallcon texts,whereasmodernitymanifestsitselfinadiversityofforms.Inthis essaymytopiciswhatiscommonratherthanthediversity. 19

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throughsweepingstatementsandwithanutterlackofnuance. Moreover,beforebeingabletotalkabout religiouschange,one mustaddressthemoregeneralchangesinEuropeansocietythat accompanied such dramatic changes in the field of religion. Thiswidensthescopeevenmore.YetIseenootherwayofap proaching the question under discussion. Being an anthropo logistItendtostudyreligionasaculturalandsocialphenom enon.Religionisanchoredinsocialandculturalcontexts,andit changes with them. It is influenced by these contexts but also seeks to influence them in turn. I will begin therefore by sum marizingthechangesinthesocialandculturalsetting.Inasec ondstep,Iwillturntothechangesinthefieldofreligion. Looking at what happened in Europe from the social and cultural context, the main factor of change is modernization. Modernization can be defined as the process by which the re sults of science and technology are applied to and integrated into society. This process has triggered an incisive transforma tion of European cultures and societies. It also brought im mensechangestotherestoftheworld.Inthe lasttwocentur ies,humanityhastakenaturnthatisunprecedentedinhistory. NinianSmart(1992:315–52)hasaptlycalledthis“theexplosion ofEurope.”Wenowliveinaworldthatisbothuprootedand feverishlyseekingtomaintainitsidentity.The2.3millionyears ofpremodernhumanhistorysincehomohabiliswasalsosubject tochange,butthatwasnothingcomparedtowhatmoderniza tionhasproducedingreatturmoil.Evenifweplacethebegin nings of humanity with homo sapiens sapiens, about a thousand centuries ago, what happened in these last two centuries has beenveryradical.Muchthatwasconsiderednormalfor99.8% of humanhistorywasundoneinthelast0.2%ofthathistory. Comparinghumanity’shistorysofartothelengthofaday,the recentmodernizationphaseisequivalenttothelastthreemin utes of the twentyfour hour period. In a minimum span of time,amaximumamountofchangewasbroughtabout. As a consequence, we are faced with problems that are similartothoseofthesorcerer’sapprentice.Actsonwhichwe havesupposedlyreflecteddeeplyhavehadunforeseenandun intendedconsequences.Whatmodernizationanditsaccompan ying processes have brought about might suggest that society and culture are manipulatable and makable, but, in fact, those

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processes have created a situation that is difficult to control. Consequently,thefourmainproblemsfacingglobalsocietyto dayare:(1)povertyandillness,(2)the(lackof)controlofvio lence,(3)theecologicalcrisis,and(4)multiculturalunderstand ingor“howtolivetogetherdespitedifferences.”Someofthese problemsconcernreligion—andevenmoresosince9/11. Modernization, as the application in society of the results of science and technology, is most visible in the industrializa tionprocess.Urbanizationisanobviousandrelatedconsequence of this process. Urbanization entails migration and thereby changesinthetraditionalsocialstructures.Themajorityofthe population now lives in urban areas, whereas formerly it was locatedinruralareas. Modernization occurred during the time when the world wasbeingdiscovered.Europewasthebasisforthisexpansion of influence, which took the form of colonialism and colonial powers.TheEuropeanwayoflifewasexportedtovastareasin the rest of the world. Reducing or exterminating the original population, as happened in the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, Europeans occupied entire continents. European na tionsdividedtheworldamongthemselvesandestablishedcol onies.TheWestputtheResttotheserviceofitseconomic,po litical and also religious interests. This led to migrations from theEuropeanmetropolistothecoloniesbutwasalsothecause ofothermigrationflows.Slaverywasanearlyformofinvolun tarymigration,dislocatingmanypeople,especiallyfromAfrica, to the New World. After decolonization, the movement of mi grationwasreversedinthattherewasnowmassivemigration from the former colonies to the countries of the former colon izers.Lateron,otherformsofmigrationoccurred,suchaslabor migration from the Mediterranean countries to western and northern Europe. And, of course, there is the immigration of asylum seekers, initially coming for political reasons but now alsoforeconomicreasons,especiallyfromsubSaharanAfrica. Themostrecentexpressionofmodernizationistheprocess ofglobalization.Globalizationcanbedefinedastheprocessby whichtheworldisexperiencedasoneplace.Sincethemodern izationoftransport,asaresultofscientificandtechnologicalin ventions, worldwide travel has been facilitated, allowing peo ple to transcend their own region and to become acquainted

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with other cultural and social contexts. Part of modernization wasthedevelopmentofsteamandmotorshipsand,lateron,of air transport, accelerating the rhythm of mobility and migra tion. The radius of action has increased exponentially. World wide business relations are one manifestation of this change. Nations waging war on the other side of the world is another. Masstourismisalsofacilitatedbythisdevelopment.Simultane ously,therehasbeenachangeinscale,erodingtheroleofna tions, which are said to be losing ground, reinforcing both su pranationalunitiessuchastheexpandingEuropeanUnionand regionalpoliticalidentitymovements. In terms of communication, it is not just travel that has been revolutionized and has thus contributed to globalization. Modernization also led to the media revolution (Meyer and Moors 2006). This other application of science and technology to society has contributed immensely to the globalization pro cess. After radio, the telephone and television, the worldwide webisthelatestadditiontothetechnologythatfacilitatescom munication.Peoplehavevariouspossibilitiesforcontactingone another. In addition, information from beyond the traditional socialandculturalboundarieshasbecomeavailable,including knowledgeaboutotherreligions.Globalizationalsomeansthat theformerboundariesbetweencultures,societies,religionsand nationshavebeenperforated.Theerosionoftheseunitshelped supranationalandtransnationallinkscomeintoexistence. While people meet on the level of largescale units, there is si multaneouslyareactionthatleadspeoplebacktosmallerunits, witharegionalorlocalidentity. The individualization process is another general conse quenceofmodernization.Urbanizationandmigrationhavedis turbedtraditionalsocialstructures.Whensociallifeinavillage iscomparedtowhatisnowcommoninurbansettings,thedif ferences are obvious, even though urban neighborhoods may show villagelike characteristics. In the traditional setting, kin shiprelationshipsformtheprimalsocialrelationships,withse veralgenerationslivingtogetherinextendedfamilies.Thefam ilies that live together in the village cooperate in multiple set tings for a number of purposes, including religious activities. Thereisastrongsenseofsocialcontrol,facilitatedbytheface tofacerelationshipsbetweenpeople.Thewayoflifeinthevil

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lageshowsarelativedegreeoforderandcontinuity,although regularlyalteredbyeventsinthewidercontextandbyinternal processes.Moreover,reproduction,evenoftraditionalcultures, isoftenreproduction,renewedproduction.Atthesametimecon tinuityisgenerallyguaranteed.Theestablishedorderisusually theonlyonethatisknown. In comparison, moving into town represents a rupture in kinshiprelationships,eventhoughkinareusuallythefirstper sonsintheurbansettingtowhomthemigrantturns.Buturban livingconditionsmakethetwogenerationfamilythebasicunit, ratherthantheextendedfamily.Moreover,urbanrelationsare notcharacterizedbysharedfunctionswithalimitednumberof persons. Rather, different relationships and networks are re quiredforeachfunction.Socialcontroldiminishesaccordingly. Inaddition,theurbancontextoffersmanyalternativelifestyles thatcompetewiththevillagewayoflife,eventhoughtheseal ternativesarenotnecessarilyavailabletoall,aswhencultural, ethnic,classorreligiousdifferencesputupbarriers.Moreover, dependingontheneighborhood,newsocialstructuresmayde velop.Urbanreligiousgroupsmayoffernewformsofartificial kinshipbetweenbrothersandsisters. The liberty to choose between alternatives is undeniably greater in town than in the rural village. To this it must be added that, in the capitalist system, the individual is the basic unit in terms of labor and production as well as consumption. Especially in the field of consumption, commodities have be cometheprimaryassetfortheconstructionofindividualiden tity.Advertisingagenciesdictatelifestyleswhilegivingthecon sumertheideathatheisanoriginal.Oneiswhatonechooses. Theauthenticityrequiredfromtheconsumerreflectsandrein forces the individuality that is dominant in the urban context. Paradoxically,theobligationtobeanauthenticanduniqueindi vidualisasocialobligation,supportedbymassproduction. Infact,thisindividualizationfoundanearlyexpressionin a religious context, namely the Reformation, when a personal decision of faith became important. The theology of salvation musthavestimulatedaswellasreflectedtheideathattheindi vidualisimportant.Religionisnotjustareflectionofprocesses in society but influences these same processes as well and can be oneoftheagents.Thisperspectiveappearstohavebecome

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more influential since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Religiouspluralismisoneofindividualization’sconsequences. Insum,thelasttwocenturiesshowaradicalturningaway frommuchthatwascommonandnormalsincehumanmemory until 1800. Modernization transformed society and culture by introducing science and technology. This caused other pro cesses, such as industrialization, urbanization, migration, glo balization and individualization, facilitated by revolutionary developmentsintheareasoftransport,mediaandcommunica tion.Modernizationalsoledtoanumber of problemsthatsci ence,technologyorpoliticshavenotbeenabletosolvesofar. ModernizationandtheStudyofReligion What are the religious consequences of modernization? Basic ally,therearethosechangesthathavetodowithreligiousplur alism,asaconsequenceofincreasedmobilityandaccessiblecom munication. In addition, there are secularizing changes, presum ably linked to modernization and, more particularly, to indi vidualization.Thesewillbediscussedinthenextsections.ButI willbeginbydiscussingaconsequenceforacademia:religions wereturnedintoanobjectforstudy. Without European expansion, (inter)religious studies would not be the field that it is now. Increased mobility and communication have led to an expanding knowledge of other religions, just as they have stimulated contact between repre sentativesofreligions.Thisknowledgeandexperiencebecame availableinamoreintensivemannerthroughcolonialcontacts withandbetweentheworldreligions,andtoalesserdegreetri bal religions. Just as cultural anthropology became founded in thiswayasadiscipline,studentsofreligionstartedtheirwork, operating from a new discipline. Scholars began mapping the wideningworld,surprisedbywhattheywerediscovering.Reli gionwasoneofthenewfields. Itwasnotonlyanthropologyandthestudyofreligionthat were influenced, to say the least, by the European expansion. The much older discipline of theology also felt the consequen ces.AlthoughthemissiontopreachtheChristianmessageisas old as that message, the European expansion gave new wings to the propagation of the Gospel. The universal claim of the ChristianfaithmatchedtheworldwidepresenceofEuropeans.

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PostReformation European Christian pluralism was exported. OntheEuropeanside,thisledtothefoundationofmanymis sion societies. Missiology developed as a supporting subdisci pline.Onthereceivingside,theadoptionoftheChristianfaith ledeventuallytoquestionsofinculturationandadaptationthat are still with us in intercultural theology. Moreover, the en counter with other religions raised the question of a Christian theologicalappraisaloftheexistenceofthesereligions.Thedia loguebetweenrepresentativesofreligionsbecameanissuefor interreligiousstudies.Thewholefieldisaconsequenceofmod ernizationandEuropeanexpansion. ModernizationandReligiousPluralism Let us now turn to the changes that modernization brought to European religion, starting with religious pluralism. The find ingsofearlyresearchersweremetwithinterestamongtheEur opean elite. This was especially the case with Hinduism and Buddhism.Thoughnotadoptedfully,thesereligionsnourished initiativesbyaminorityofEuropeanstodevelopandadhereto suchmovementsastheosophy. Atalaterstage,especiallyafterdecolonization,immigrants from the former colonies came to the countries of their exco lonizers.Theirmotivationsforimmigrationvariedfromeduca tional to economic, political or even religious interests. Mi grantsbroughttheirreligions,establishingtheirowncommuni tiesandopeningtheirownmeetingplaces.Theyimportedcler gyfromabroad.Thusalltheworldreligions,includingthenon Europeanvariations,cametoberepresented. Still later, immigrants from southern European and nor thern African countries came to western and northern Europe as cheap labor. This strengthened the presence of Islam in Eu rope. It also contributed to religious pluralism in Europe. Though originally labeled guest workers or migrant workers, theirfamiliessoonjoinedthem.Intheprocessthatstartedwith immigration, their form of Islam often changed from the pop ularruraltothemoreofficialurbanMediterraneanforms.Some of their children are developing a form of Islam that is hardly culturallyrooted,calledpureIslam,usingtheglobalworldwide web as platform and claiming supracultural validity. In both

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generationsIslamaccompaniedtheneedforaclear identityin thenewcontext. As suggested above, the most recent immigration, that of asylum seekers, also reinforced religious pluralism. Com ing from a variety of countries, with different religious backgrounds, what they have in common is that they felt co ercedtoleavetheircountry,sometimesforreligiousreasons. Nexttoimmigration,individualizationmustbementioned asacauseofreligiouspluralism.Itispartandparcelofthepre sent social structure. Social control has diminished. Individual choicesareencouragedandconsideredpositive,asasignofau thenticity. If the media revolution and globalization are added tothis,includingtheavailabilityofavarietyofeasilyaccessible religious repertoires from all over the world, then religious pluralismisapredictableoutcome.Sinceelementsfromdiffer ent religious sources can easily be combined in an unlimited varietyofsyncretisticforms,religiouspluralismhasreachedan unprecedentedlevel. Religiouslifereflectsthesocialobligationemanatingfrom consumerlife,tobeanauthentic,originalandautonomousin dividual through the choices made in buying particular pro ducts. The experience or kick that the product should bring is mirroredinthedramaticexperiencethataworldview,alsoand especially in its idiosyncratic forms, is required to yield. Even thosewhocontinuefaithfullywithintheinstitutionalizedorcon gregationalformsofreligionhavebeguntoshowthesesame characteristics. Instead of blind loyalty, they tend to adopt an attitudeofselectiveaffinity,comingandgoingastheyplease, lookingforsatisfyingexperiences,andusingtheirinstitutionas a service institute. In the emphasis on authenticity and exper ience, modernization’s focus on the human subject becomes visibleinreligion. When new forms of religion or worldviews, such as New Age,emergefromthisindividualizedclimate,thedegreeofin stitutionalizationislow.Thiscorrespondswiththeindividual’s searchforselfrealization.Thewholenessthatislackinginsoci ety and its institutions is sought within the self. People may identifywithe.g.NewAge,buttheirparticipationisoftencon ditionedandlimitedtoshorttermobligations,suchastraining weekendsorcourses.NewAgeisperfectlyadaptedtothepro

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cessofindividualization:itdoesnotimposeitself.Moreover,it favors the self, just as advertising does. Especially those forms thatofferastrikingexperienceoftheselfgaininpopularity.In evitably,thisindividualizedbehaviorofreligiousconsumerson theworldviewmarkethascontributedtoreligiouspluralismas well. Theselfand,therefore,individualidentityhavebecomean important issue in the field of religion. This development has ledtotheproposalbyPaulHeelasandLindaWoodhead(2005: 1–11) to use a special term for this inwardly directed world view.Theyproposetocallthisspirituality,whereastheconcept ofreligionmusthenceforthbereservedforaworldviewthatis directed toward the divine outside the person. Heelas and Woodheadpredictthatthedivinewithinwillgraduallyreplace thedivinewithout.Itissaidhumorously:Iusedtobeanatheist untilIdiscoveredmySelfwasGod.2But,fromtheperspective of a substantial definition of religion, emphasizing the central roleofthesacredastranscendingthebeliever,theturntoward theSelf—oftenwrittenwithacapital—maybeviewedasathe ismindisguise.Oneofthecharacteristicsthatcomewiththedi vinewithinisthatitisnotsubjecttothesamescientificcritique asthedivinelocatedsomewhereoutsidetheindividualis.That might make spirituality a better product for the worldview market. Moreover,iftheideaisconsideredplausiblethattheimage people have of the divine is closely linked to the form the in stitutions take, that image may change when the institution loses its hold on the person. At first sight, this may not make muchsense,butifwefollowÉmileDurkheim’sleadthat“Reli gious representations are collective representations which ex press collective realities” (Durkheim 1976: 10), the divine and the institution can be shown to share a number of character istics: both outlive the individual, both are never fully under stoodorcontrolled,bothleadalifeoftheirown,bothhaveau thorityovertheperson,bothdemandsacrifices,bothusesanc tions,positiveaswellasnegative,andbotharesocialproducts. The power of the sacred and the power of the institution rein 2

PaulHeelasshowedusacardwiththistextwhenhegavealec tureattheVUUniversity.

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force each other. So if the power of the institution is eroded, andtheindividualobtainsmuchmorefreedom,thismusthave consequencesfortheviewsonthepowerofthedivine.Accord ingly, the image of the divine may change. The inward move mentofthedivine,beinglocatedintheself,seemstobeoneof theformsthatsuchachangeistaking.Oneelementinthisde velopmentisthatthedivinelosesitspersonalcharacterandbe comesananonymousforceorenergy.Theinwardmigrationof thedivineisaccompaniedbyafreereformulationofthesacred. It is probable that a less personal God will not use sanctions againstaperson. Despite these differences, the divine within may share someofthecharacteristicsthatmadethedivineoutsidetheself resemblethesocialinstitutions.Theselfmaybetheinternalre flection of the institutions. It may serve as a conscience with moral authority, commenting on the person’s behavior, gener atingfeelingsofguilt.Itmaymoreoverbethoughtofasasoul thatoutlivestheindividual.Theselfisneverfullyunderstood, alsobecauseitleadsalifeofitsown. The inward trend has consequences for the secularization debate,soletusnowturntothattheme. ModernizationandSecularization Whenviewingmodernizationasthemotorthatbroughtim mense changes to the European religious situation, we should include the secularization process in this overview. The secu larizationthesispredictedtheendofreligionasaconsequence of modernization. We must pay attention to this thesis, even though, as we saw, its most convinced versions have now be cometheexception,whereastheywerepreviouslytherule,not onlywithregardtoEuropebutpredictingitsfulfillmentinthe restoftheworldaswell.Modernizationwassupposedtocause secularization,becauseifsciencewasappliedinsociety,itcould notbecombinedwithreligiousknowledge. Characteristically, religion has been defined in contrast withempiricalscience,aswhenreligionissaidtobe“allex plicitandimplicitnotionsandideas,acceptedastrue,whichre latetoarealitywhichcannotbeverifiedempirically”(VanBaal and Van Beek 1985: 3). The expectation was that religion, be

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cause of its nonempirical nature, would not survive the mod ernizationprocess,noteveninitsrationaltheologicalform. That is the most vulgar and homogeneous form of the se cularization thesis. There are more sophisticated forms that drawattentiontodifferentiatedandmorenuancedconsequen ces of modernization (cf. Casanova 1994: 211). The term has a longhistory.Theoldestmeaningofsecularizationreferstothe monk who left the convent to become a priest in the world. Lateron,italsoreferredtotheconfiscationofreligiousproper ty,suchasconvents,bysecularauthorities.Butinthewakeof modernization, secularization has been defined as the loss of the influence that religion used to have in the way society is organized.Similarly,theconceptofsecularizationhasalsobeen employed to say that religion was exiled to its own sector. A comparableemphasisisgivenwhenitreferstothebanishment of religion to the private sphere. Saying that in the seculariz ationprocessreligiousinstitutionsloseinfluenceandmembers isalsoawayofstatingthis.Dechurchificationisthusaformof secularization. Unfortunately, the term is not always used in a precisewayandthemeaningisoftenleftimplicit. Atpresent,mostofthosewhodefendedthesecularization thesisasapredictionofthedisappearanceofreligionfromthe European scene admit that this is not what has happened, let alonethattherestoftheworldwastofollowtheEuropeanex ample (Berger 1999, 2002). Although there are still a few de fenders of the disappearance thesis (e.g. Bruce 2001a, 2001b; Voas and Bruce 2007; see also Timothy Jenkins 1999), the con notationofsecularizationisnowmuchclosertothedechurch ification version or the privatization reading of the concept. Grace Davie (1994) gave us the apt phrase “believing without belonging”tocharacterizethereligiouspositionofasignificant part of the European population (see also Davie 2000, 2001, 2002). In fact, people leaving the institutional religion did not lose their religious conviction or sensibility as a majority and overnight. The percentage of convinced atheists remains rela tivelysmall.Rather,itmeantthatthenationalchurchesinpar ticular had not understood the challenge of the changed situ ation. In the past, statistically speaking, the majority of people used to identify themselves with the church. Currently, many peoplearestillwillingtocallthemselvesreligious,orspiritual,

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but most of them do not identify with the traditional religious institutions,eventhoughtheymayseearoleforthechurchesas moralspokesmenandanationalconscience.Theconsequences of the new situation do not seem always to have been assimi latedfullybytheleadershipofmainlinechurches. Spirituality has become a popular concept, seeming to be politicallymorecorrectthanreligion,whichhasbecomeacon cept that is now more and more associated with conservative Christianity and Islam. In spirituality, the transcendental per spectiveofaworldviewremained.Admittedly,thereisthemi gration of the divine from without to within. But even so, the neatdistinctionthatHeelasandWoodhead(2005:5–6)suggest ed is not always reflected in reality. In my view, the false pre supposition is that people are as consistent in their worldview as theologians would be. In practice, worldview is a very con textual phenomenon, with people positioning themselves ac cording to the conditions they find themselves in, day by day, step by step. It depends on the situation as to whether the frameofreferenceisreligiousorspiritual,tosticktotheterms as Heelas and Woodhead define them. Consequently, one shouldqualifytheresultsofsurveys.Itmaymakeadifference whether the interviewer calls in the morning or in the after noon. Especially in times of crisis, old repertoires, including their experiential, ritual and narrative sides, are remembered andreactivated. Withregardtomodernityandsecularization,onescenario muststillbementioned.Thedemandsthatespeciallyindividu alizationputsonthepersoncanbesoheavythatitbecomesvir tuallyimpossibletoliveuptothem.Traditionalmoralorienta tionshaveoftenbecomesubjecttodiscussion,leadingtouncer taintywithregardtotherightmoralposture.Thepressuretobe anauthentic,autonomousandemancipatedselfmaybecomeso intense that frustration and deception follow. The ultimate com mand is to remain faithful to oneself and to feel at home, but thisisoftendifficulttorealize.Anutterlyindividualizedsociety is, moreover, impossible, a contradiction in itself. Society may demand individualization, but it does not offer the conditions forrealizingit.Furthermore,institutionshavenotdisappeared, and emancipation from institutional pressure is therefore not withoutproblems.

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In addition, people may have difficulty in playing all the roles that the different contexts prescribe. They may have pro blemsmanagingthedifferentidentitiesthatcomewiththesedi verse roles. In searching for an authentic dramatic consumer’s experience,theymaybedisappointedorgrowtiredanddisillu sioned. In the religious or spiritual field people discover that thedivineselfthatiswithinisasunknownandasnonempir icalasthetraditionaldivinewithoutwas.Theselfcannotserve as the Archimedean point. Popularized psychology from self helpbooksandglossiesdoesnotsolvetheproblem,nordoexpen sive therapists. This identity crisis is especially visible among young people, but it is present in the consumer society in general.Identityhasbecomeatherapeuticconcept.Ifoneadds that science may explain how things work but not why they affectmeandnotsomebodyelse,theconsequencemaybethat individualization not only stimulates secularization, as sug gestedabove,butmayalsoleadtosacralization—justasitmay boostpsychotherapy.Indealingwiththesecontrarytendencies, people may return to old religious repertoires and old values andexperiencesinordertofindtheirwaytoanacceptableand plausibleidentity.Thismaymeanareturntoinstitutionalreli gion, as is observable in the growth of Evangelical and Pente costal groups, but it may also take less organized forms. The market and the media appear to adapt to these trends. Reli gioussupplyfollowsdemand. Add to this the four unsolved problems in the world I mentioned before, that society does not resolve and that sur passindividualpowers:povertyandillness,violence,environ ment, living with differences. Although global organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace help to com pensate feelings of guilt and failure, the problems do not lose their relevance. In the wellknown view of the German socio logistUlrichBeck(1992),weliveinarisksociety.IntheEuro peancontextthisalsomeansthatsomepeoplehavetopaythe priceforthewealthofthebettersituated.Thislowerclasswill appealtoreligionasoneofthewaystosurviveinmodernEu ropean society. Migrants are overrepresented in this category. Inallcases,religionmayresurgeincompensationofuncertain ty and risk. The current European and global situation adds newreasonsforreligion’sroleasaproblemsolver—arolethat

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isalreadygivenwiththegeneralhumanconditionanditsbasic theodicyproblemssuchasevilandsuffering,inevitabledeath, andmoralfailure. Thus one particular form that a reaction against secular ization and individualization may take is the reinforcement of religionasasafehavenamidwidespreadlossofidentity.Even though fundamentalists make free use of the communication devices that modernization has brought to humanity, funda mentalism is, of course, a reaction against modernization and theerosionofidentity.Itisbasedonanawarenessofthenega tive side of modernization processes, especially in the moral sense.Ingeneral,orthodoxymaybestrengthenedwhenthein stitutionisunderthreat.Theologymaybesubservienttosucha goal, justifying this position by producing the complementary ecclesiology. Whateverthevicissitudesofthereligiousinstitutions,from a point of view of the religious experience, an important ele mentinthefoundationofanyreligion,theweakenedpowerof theinstitutionmaybeablessingindisguise.Thepowerofthe institution has the tendency to imprison the religious experi enceinfixedcodes.Popularreligioncanbeunderstoodasare actionagainstthismonopolization.Powerpervertsthecreativ ityofthereligiousinnovators.Itisquiteobviousthatreligious leadersactastheydobecausetheycareaboutthecoremessage. Buttheoriginalexperiencewithwhichitallbeganmayalsobe petrifiedbythiscare.Inthatrespect,secularization,inthesense of continuation of religiosity outside the institution, may be a way of salvaging what religion is all about. Secularization as dechurchification may be a curse for the church or any other institution,butablessingforreligion.Therealcurseforthein stitutionstemsfromitsviewonpower. Theimagethatthusemerges,todifferentdegreesindiffer entcountries,isthatofavarietyofpositions.Iseefourcategor ies: 1. Asmallminorityprofessestobeatheist,correspondingto themostradicaldefinitionofsecularization. 2. Thenthereisamuchlargercategoryofpeoplewhomain tain some form of religiosity, which they themselves per hapscallspirituality.Thesepeoplenolongeridentifywith theinstitutionalChristianreligion.Theycorrespondtothe

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4.

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definition of secularization as dechurchification. In this categorythemigrationofthedivinefromwithouttowith inmaybeoccurring.Thismayinpracticebenotverydif ferentfromtheatheistsinthefirstcategory,inthatthesa credoutsideandabovethepersonisdenied.Thesepeople also make free use of the various worldview repertoires that have increasingly become available. Their practice is verycreativeandinnovative.Thedifficultytheyencounter in obeying the modern commandment to be authentic au tonomous individuals may stimulate their creativity and intuition. Thenthereistheminorityofpeoplewhostillidentifywith theinstitutionalChristianreligion,yetmayverywellhave assimilatedsomeofthechangesthathavetakenplaceout side the institutions, especially New Age. An interesting developmentisthegrowthofCharismatic,Pentecostaland Evangelical groups, reflecting individualization in their em phasis on personal experience but preserving an institu tional and orthodox framework, especially when success ful. Migrant churches, many of them Pentecostal, can also beincludedinthisthirdcategory.Theyareinterestingbe cause they not only offer en ethnic home to migrants but alsooftentransformthemselvesinreversedmissionorgan izations for the rechurchification of Europe. In addition, moreorthodoxgroupsmaintaintraditionagainstallerod ingforces,fleeingfromthoseforcestoasplendidisolation. Finally, the representatives of religions other than Chris tianity must be included. Some of them are recent immi grants,butmanyrepresentthesecondorthirdgeneration —their grandparents having moved to Europe. Islam is prominent, of course, but Hinduism and Buddhism are also represented in significant numbers. For demographic reasons, the number of people in this category may in creasemorethanthatofthoseintheothercategories,with theexceptionofthemigrantchurches.

Conclusion Europe has for some time been labeled the most secularized partoftheworld,servingasamodelandpredictionforfuture developments in the rest of the world. After the reformulation

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of the secularization thesis, Europe is still an exceptional case, even though secularization is taking other forms than the sim ple demise of religion. What has been eroded is institutional religion.Ithasalsolostmuchofitsinfluenceinsociety.Butoth erwisereligion,religiosityandspiritualityareverymuchpres ent,albeitinstronglypluralistforms,inasyncretisticmixand free use of repertoires from all over the world, including the Europeancollectivememory(HervieuLéger2000),eventhoughit isonlyvaguelyremembered. Pluralism has been established as the European religious identity. It is the new way of making sense of life and reality. Whether this European religious pluralism will become the modelandexamplefortherestoftheworld,nowthatthesecu larization scenario has not materialized in its most drastic forms,remainstobeseen.Individualizationshouldthenspread totherestoftheworld.AsPhilipJenkins(2002)hassuggested, thenewChristianitywillbelocatedinthesouthernhemisphere and will be conservative in nature. Within Islam, conservative tendencies are strong as well. So Europe may well remain unique in its current pluralism. The thesis that Heelas and Woodhead (2005) developed, suggesting the migration of the divinefromaboveandoutsidethepersontowithinandbased intheperson,maywellpredicttheformthatsecularization—or somewouldsayatheism—willtakeinthecomingdecades. These developments in the European situation—if consid ered plausible—should be translated into issues for further re search. Scholars from both intercultural theology and interreli giousstudies,theprimaryreadershipofthisvolume,willhave to take these developments into consideration when formulat ingtheirresearchagenda. Bibliography Beck,Ulrich.(1992).RiskSociety:TowardsaNewModernity.Londonet al.:SAGE. Berger, Peter L. (2002). “Secularization and DeSecularization.” In: LindaWoodheadetal.(eds).ReligionsintheModernWorld:Tradi tionsandTransformations.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.Pp. 291–98. (1999).“TheDesecularizationoftheWorld:AGlobalOverview.” In: Peter L. Berger et al. (eds). The Desecularization of the World:

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Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Pp.1–18. Bruce, Steve. (2001a). God is Dead: Secularization in the West. Oxford andMalden:Blackwell. (2001b).“TheCuriousCaseoftheUnnecessaryRecantation:Ber ger and Secularization.” In: Linda Woodhead et al. (eds). Peter Berger and the Study of Religion. London and New York: Rout ledge.Pp.87–100. Casanova, José. (1994). Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago/ London:TheUniversityofChicagoPress. Davie,Grace.(2002).Europe:TheExceptionalCase,ParametersofFaithin theModernWorld.London:Darton,LongmanandTodd. (2001).“ThePersistenceofInstitutionalReligioninModernEur ope.”In:LindaWoodheadetal.(eds).PeterBergerandtheStudyof Religion.LondonandNewYork:Routledge.Pp.101–11. (2000).ReligioninModernEurope:AMemoryMutates.Oxford:Ox fordUniversityPress.(1994).ReligioninBritainsince1945: Believ ingwithoutBelonging.Oxford:Blackwell. Durkheim, Émile. (1976). The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. London:GeorgeAllen&Unwin. Heelas, Paul, and Linda Woodhead. (2005). The Spiritual Revolution: WhyReligionisGivingWaytoSpirituality.Maldenetal.:Blackwell. HervieuLéger, Danièle. (2000). Religion as a Chain of Memory. Cam bridge:PolityPress. Jenkins, Philip. (2002). The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity.Oxfordetal.:OxfordUniversityPress. Jenkins,Timothy.(1999).“TwoSociologicalApproachestoReligionin Modern Britain.” In: Timothy Jenkins. Religion in Everyday Life: AnEthnographicApproach.NewYorkandOxford:Berghahn.Pp. 2339. Meyer, Birgit, and Annelies Moors (eds). (2006). Religion, Media, and thePublicSphere.BloomingtonandIndianapolis:IndianaUniver sityPress. Smart,Ninian.(1992).TheWorld’sReligions:OldTraditionsandModern Transformations.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. VanBaal,J.,andW.E.A.vanBeek.(1985).SymbolsforCommunication: AnIntroductiontotheAnthropologicalStudyofReligion.Assen:Van Gorcum.

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Voas, David, and Steve Bruce. (2007). “The Spiritual Revolution: An otherFalseDawnfortheSacred.”In:KieranFlanaganandPeter C. Jupp (eds). A Sociology of Spirituality. Aldershot: Ashgate. Pp. 4361.

Author’sNote: I would like to express my gratitude to Anton van Harskamp for his inspiring comments on an earlier version of this paper. This essay was originally presented as a paper for the ESITIS conference in Birmingham, 1113 April 2007. It was originally published in Studies in Interreligious Dialogue 17 (2007): 17184 and is republished here with the kind permission of Peeters PublishersandBooksellers,Leuven,Belgium.

TheConceptofCulture inAbrahamKuyper, HermanBavinck,andKarlBarth CornelisvanderKooi

Abstract The neoCalvinist approach to culture in the theology of A. Kuyper and H. Bavinck reflects the attempt to engage positively with modern Western cul ture.Moderndevelopmentsandachievementsarejustifiedtheologicallythrough the concept of common grace or the catholicity of the church and Christianity. TheseedoftheGospelhasnourishedandinfluencedconcernforpeople,and developments in science and human culture. The Gospel changes culture whereveritgoes.KarlBarth breakswiththisEurocentricview.Inhistheo logyallhumancultureisdeeplyrelativized,butthatdoesnotmeanthaten gagementwithcultureismeaningless.InJesusChristGodhasrevealedwhat it means to be human. Notwithstanding important differences, the neoCal vinistictheologyofKuyperandBavinckandBarth’stheologyoftheWordof fer a theological context for a positive and hopeful engagement with culture andsociety.

Introduction TheauthorofthelettertoHebrewsremindshisreadersofthe cloudofwitnesseswhohaveprecededthecontemporarycom munity of believers and never received the things promised “but“onlysawandwelcomedthemfromadistance.”Hethen adds: “And they admitted that they were aliens and strangers onearth”(Hebrews11:13).ItisnotwithoutreasonthatIrecall these words with regard to the problem that will be discussed in this contribution, namely the shape of a theological view of culture.Howcanhumanbeingsinthecontemporaryworldbe oriented to the Gospel while at the same time participating in the world? What vision or which theological concept sustains their connection with God and his Kingdom and preserves themfromanuncriticalaccommodationtothisworld?

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In this contribution I will discuss the answers that were givenbyAbrahamKuyper(18371920),HermanBavinck(1854 1921), and Karl Barth (18861968). The first two are included amongthefoundersandrepresentativesoftheCalvinistrevival movement in the last decades of the nineteenth century and wanted to bring Reformed theology back into relation with modern times. In Kuyper’s words, he wanted to rouse Re formedtheologyfromtheslumberintowhich,heargued,ithad sunkmanydecadespreviously(Kuyper1908:VI).KarlBarthis wellknown for his reconstruction of the Reformed theological legacy along Christological lines in the twentieth century, and particularlyforhiscritiqueofmodern“Christianity”asaneasy accommodationoftheChristianfaithtomodernculture.Butall threetheologians,eachinhisownway,gaveananswertothe question raised in the first half of the nineteenth century by FriedrichSchleiermacher(Schleiermacher1968:146):“Mustthe knot of history unravel in such a way that Christianity goes withbarbarismandsciencewithunbelief?”Schleiermacherhas been regarded as the father of liberal theology because of  his decisivedenialofthisdilemma.TheChristianfaithandmodern culturearenotnaturalenemies.Rather,theChristianreligionis essentiallytheexpressionoftheheartofhumanityandshould thereforenotbeplacedinoppositiontomodernculture.Mod ern culture, in its pursuit of happiness for human beings and thehumanizationofsociety,canfindtheanswerstoitsdeepest longingsintheChristianreligion. KuyperandBavinckarenotoftenviewedasSchleiermach er’s heirs, but one could argue that there is a positive relation between Schleiermacher’s willingness to construct a positive relationbetweentheChristianfaithandmoderncultureandthe theologicalviewsofKuyperandBavinck.Itmust,however,al so be stated that Karl Barth responded in his own way to the challengeissuedbySchleiermacher.Inhisfamoussecondcom mentaryonPaul’sLettertotheRomans,theRömerbrief2(1922), there is a impressive emphasis on the difference between God andhumanculture.ButitshouldnotbeoverlookedthatBarth alsoarguedthattherewasapositiverelationbetweenchurchand state, between “Christengemeinde und Burgergemeinde,” be tween faith and culture. In all three theologians it is clear that

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theirtheologyhadanexplicitpubliceffectandthatpartsoftheir theologycanbecalledpublictheology. Itisimpossibletogivearesponsible,allencompassingpic tureoftheirtheologiesinrelationtoourtopic,however.Inthe nextsectionsIwillrestrictmyselftosometypicalaspectsofthe thoughtofthesethreetheologians.Itmustbestatedinadvance that their thought was not a monolithic whole, as is often as sumed.Kuyper,BavinckandBartheachshowimportantdevel opments and changes in their dealing with culture. (Augustijn andVree1998;Vree2006).LivingReformedtheologyisalwaysre spondingtoitshistoricalcontextandisthereforeneverstatic.I willtouchuponthesehistoricalchangesonlyinpassing,andI can discuss only some of the most influential and essential ele mentsoftheirtheologyregardingculture.Iwillgiveabriefout lineofKuyper’sideaofspheresovereignty but willfocuspar ticularlyonhisdoctrineofcommongrace.Iwillsubsequentlydis cuss some relevant treatises by Bavinck on the catholicity of Christianity and the church. In the third place, I will look at Barth’scriticalapproachtoculture.Finally,wewillclosewitha shortevaluation. AbrahamKuyper WhataremainelementsofKuyper’stheologyofculture?Inthe firstplace,wehavetomentionheretheconceptofspheresov ereignty.Wewilldiscussitbriefly,becausethisconcepthasnot onlyproventobeimportantasatoolfordefendingsocialplur alismoveragainstthedominanceofthestate,butitalsofunc tionedasabulwarkofreligiouspluralism.Inthesecondplace,I willdiscussthedoctrineofcommongrace:theviewthatGod’s grace is not only concerned with the salvation of individuals, i.e. “special grace” but also extends to culture. The world in whichweliveiscreatedbyGod,andGod’spurposeisnotlim itedtothesalvationofsinnersbutalsoincludesthesalvationof his creation and the possibility of his indwelling culture. Kuy per developed this view later in his career in his doctrine of commongrace.Thisconceptnotonlyallowedhimtomakethe active participation of Christians in the modern world possible butelevatedthisparticipationintoanissueofobediencetoGod.

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SphereSovereignty Theconceptofspheresovereigntyimplies,firstofall,aviewof creationandthedifferentiationofculturallife.Ascreator,God distinguishedbetweenvariousrealmsordomainsoflife.Fam ily, state, labor, education, science and art must be disting uishedasdifferentdomainsthatareautonomousintheirown field. Their autonomy, however, is only valid horizontally, be cause God must be recognized as sovereign, and God’s sover eigntymustbeacknowledgedinthevariousrealmsordomains of life. All forms of earthly power and every sphere of life is thereforeboundtoGod’ssovereignty.Thisconceptwasaweapon in Kuyper’s hands against the almighty power of the modern state over all domains of life. In fact, it was a concept that he gratefullyreceivedfromthehandsofliberalism.Thepowerof the state should be restricted and be bound by a constitution; civicsocietyshouldtakeasmuchresponsibilityaspossiblefor itsownaffairs. Second,thistheoryofspheresovereigntywasusedtoad vocate the legitimacy of the plurality of worldviews and reli gions. From a cultural perspective, it provided Kuyper with a theoryfordealingwiththereligiouspluralityofDutchsociety. Politically,itwasusedtoargueforavarietyoffaithbasedor ganizationsandinstitutionsinsociety.Thefoundationofexpli citly orthodox Christian schools, newspapers, and hospitals could be defended in this way. This organization according to worldviewandreligiousorientationisstillvisibleinDutchso ciety.Itisstillamodelofdemocraticpoliticsforsocietieswitha religiouslydiversecitizenry(Wolterstorff1999:190205). CommonGrace OneoftheotherinnovativeelementsofKuyper’stheologywas hisconceptofcommongrace.Thisdoctrinewasintendedtore conciletwoobservationsthat,onthebasisoftheReformedcon fessions,seemtoconflictwitheachother.Ontheonehand,itis stated explicitly in the confessions that humans suffer from totaldepravity,corruptiototalis.Inaddition,intheteachingsre gardingsalvationthechurchisdescribedasthecommunityof believers who are said to have been sanctified by Christ and haveputonthenewman.Basedonthesetwoaffirmations,one wouldexpect,theoretically,thatthechurchwoulddisplaychar acteristics of the kingdom of God in all ways, whereas pure

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wickednessandcorruptionwoulddominatetheworld.Butthis expectationdoesnotappeartobefulfilled.Kuypersummarizes theproblemwithperspicuity:“Theworldexceedsmyexpecta tions, while the church disappoints.” Apparently for Kuyper, thisisalsoaninsightgainedfromexperience.Whyisitthatlife intheworldsoexceedstheexpectationstowhichoneisledon thebasisoftraditionaldoctrine? Inanefforttoexplainhowtheworldcanbebetterthanex pected,Kuypersoughtforaconceptthatexpresslygrantsathe ologicalroletotheexistenceofdevelopmentandculture:com mongrace.HepickeduponasuggestionmadebyCalvin,who firstarguesforcorruptiototalisinthechapteronfreedomofthe willinhisInstitutesoftheChristianReligionandthenarguesthat whatever we encounter in the world as good and admirable mustbeassumedtobesurvivingsparksmaintainedbydivine indulgence.Iproposetotouchonlyinpassingonthequestion ofthedegreetowhichKuyperiscorrectinhisappealtoCalvin here,contentingmyselfwiththeobservationthatKuyperhim selfclaimsonlythatheisdevelopingsomethingthatismerely presentinseminalforminCalvin.Thelegitimacyoftheappeal isentirelydependentontheviewthatonehasofChristiandoc trine.AccordingtoKuyper,doctrineisaunity,orevenasystem of God’s thought, that, once comprehended by human con sciousness through revelation, can be developed further. That means that it is defensible to say that the fundamental princi plesofthatwhichcametobecalledCalvinismarenotyetfully unfolded in Calvin’s own writings and that apparent conflicts areonlyamatterofalesserorgreaterdegreeofadvancesinde velopment. It should be clear, however, that Calvin’s focus in speakingaboutgeneralgraceisdifferentfromKuyper’s.While this general grace receives no further attention in Calvin and the focus remains on humanity’s total dependence on God’s grace,Kuyperturnshisattentiontothethemeofcommongrace as such. In Calvin’s view, this world is still only a temporary dwellingplace.ThelightsofGod’sgoodnessandpaternallove still shine, but the emphasis lies on the shortness and provi sionalcharacterofthislife.InKuyper—andalsoinHermanBa vinck—earthly life, culture, development, science and techno logyhaveundisputedlybecomemuchmoreimportantandare givenmuchmoreattention.

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The thought of Kuyper and Bavinck is deeply marked by modern culture and theories of progress in numerous fields. Their view of history fits entirely into the accepted patterns of the years prior to the First World War. In developing his doc trineofcommongrace,KuyperhasEuropeanAmericansociety inthebackofhismind.Heappearstobeadevotedadherentof theviewofthewestwarddevelopmentofculture.Underthein fluence of the Gospel, Western society is the center of civiliza tion.Therearelowercultures,butthroughtheirpenetrationby Westernculturalinfluencestheywillbechangedandelevated. Thushewriteswithconviction:“ThetriumphofChristianEu ropeisanabsolute”(Kuyper1903:243). TheFunctionsofCommonGrace What functions does common grace have? At the very least, therearethreefunctionsthatcanbepointedout.Thefirstfunc tion stated by Kuyper is related to sin and is directed against thecontinuingspreadoftheeffectofsinintheworkofcreation. In this sense, common grace is conceived as a purely negative instrumentfor haltingthedisintegratingeffectsofsin(Kuyper 1903:5764).Kuypergivesvariousexamplesofhowitworksin thiswayasabrake. Thisbrakingeffectisnotitssolefunction,however.Com mongracealsoservestofacilitatethedevelopmentandfulfill mentofspecialgraceonearth.ItcouldbearguedthatinKuy per the notion of Providence is further qualified as common grace.Throughitsworking,specialgraceisgrantedafoothold inthedevelopmentofhistoryandculture,justasthedovethat Noah released after the Flood sought a place to rest. Common gracethusservestomaketheactualizationofspecialgracepos sible. Kuyper’s view of the state offers a good example of how thisconceptworks(Kuyper1904:120).Thestatearisesfromthe gracethatGodgrantedaftertheFloodtoarrestsinanditsef fects. Common grace and the institutions in it are included among the provisoria. The church too is brought into being by divineProvidenceinordertofulfillGod’scounselwithregard tothehumanrace,butitisexplicitlyrootedinspecialgrace. Wehavereachedanimportantpointhere,andIwillreturn toitlater.Fornow,sufficeittosaythat,basedonthestoryof Noah, Kuyper takes the view that God, in his special grace, is

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not concerned with saving all people but with saving the hu man race (Kuyper 1903: 107). In order to clarify the nature of this salvation, Kuyper reaches, as he so often does, for images fromnature.Atreecanlosebranchesandbepruned,butitstill continues to exist as a tree. God goes about the deliverance of thehumanraceinthesameway.Itshouldbeclearthatthisar gumentation fits extremely well with thinking that arises from double predestination. Not all people are elected, but in the electGodsavesthehumanrace. ABroadTheoryofCulture We do only partial justice to Kuyper’s view of common grace, however, if we stop here. It is even the case perhaps that the coreoftheconceptliesinthethirdorlastaspect:Kuyperdevel opsthetheoryofcommongraceintothefoundationforabroad theory of culture. Common grace has its deepest  basis and meaning in the honor of God, in His sovereign will. For that matter,thefunctionsdiscussedabovecanalsobesituatedasbe ingentirelyinkeepingwiththehonorofGod.Infact,thehonor ofGodwouldbeinjuredifSatanhadbeenable,throughhisin tervention, to bring the process of creation to a halt. With re gardtospecialgrace,itisforGod’shonorthatwearesavedfor eternity;now,itislikewiseamatterofGod’shonorforallthe potentialthatliesconcealedinlifetocometoitsfullestdevelop ment(Kuyper1903:622;1902:214,254262).Asbackgroundfor his argument, Kuyper created a perspective in which science, development and learning are not to be seen primarily as ex pressions of a culture hostile to God but principally as the ef fectsoftheunfoldingofGod’sthought.Whileitisindeedalso true that in the field of science Kuyper spoke of two kinds of science,hisconceptoffersthepossibilityofhailingmedicalsci enceandadvancingtechnologyasgiftsofGod.Kuyperiscom pletelyrepresentativeofatimeinwhichsciencewasregarded asaguidetothefutureandinwhich,indeed,scientiststookon priestly characteristics. It was not necessary to reject the work ofasurgeon,architectorengineerwhopersonallyhadnocon nection whatever with Christian faith simply for that reason. All knowledge and development served to enhance the honor of God. Just as every flower that blooms ultimately blooms to thehonorofGod,soitiswithexpandingculture.Theconcept functionsasameansofempowermentforpeopletoengagein

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culture. The famous words uttered by Kuyper in his opening addressattheVUUniversityin1880canberecalledhere: Oh, no single piece of our mental world is to be hermet icallysealedofffromtherest,andthereisnotasquareinch in the whole domain of our human existence over which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: “Mine!” (Kuyper1998:488)

HermanBavinck Kuypercanberegardedasthefounderandcreativearchitectof the neoCalvinist revival, but the name of Herman Bavinck (18541921)mustbeaddedimmediately.Seventeenyearsyounger than Kuyper, Bavinck regarded himself Kuyper’s student and indeed,inmanyrespectshewas.InhisviewofcultureBavinck followedinKuyper’sfootsteps,criticallyandperhapswithmore modesty,butheshowsnohesitationwithrespecttoKuyper’s basic positive view of the relationship between the Christian faith and modern culture. His most wellknown piece of work is,ofcourse,his1888rectorialaddress“Decatholiciteitvanhet Christendom en de kerk” (The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church) (Bavinck 2008a: 2163). Another example is the article“DenavolgingvanChristusenhetmoderneleven”(The Imitation of Christ and Modern Life). There is a time span of thirtyyearsbetweenbotharticles,atimeinwhichtheneoCal vinistmovementhaditsheydayandblossomedasanspiritual and social renewal movement. These works reflect the way in whichBavinckwasimpressedbymodernity.Hemakesitvery clearthatthetimesinwhichhelivedwerecompletelydifferent from earlier periods. In his experience, the modern world has completelychangedincomparisonwitholder generationsand contemporaryChristiantheologyshouldbeawareofthis. Bavinck was definitely impressed by modern develop mentsinculture,science,educationalandmedicalpossibilities, but at the same time one also perceives a strong and deter minedattempttoviewthenewculturalsituationasachallenge givenbyGod.Theworldassuchisnothostile;theworldand cultureexistinrelationtoGodtheCreator.Therefore,Bavinck condemns any pietistic retreat from the world and endorses a positiveattitudetothevariouspartsofmodernculture.Incon nection with the parables of Jesus in Matthew 13, he uses the

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imagesofapearlandyeast.TheGospelisnotonlyapearl,for whichthemerchantsoldallthathehadsohecouldbuyit.But itshouldalsobeayeastthatinfluencesandworksallthrough thedough.Thismeansthattherearepositiverelationshipsbe tweenthefruitsofmoderncultureandscienceandthemessage of the Gospel. The values that are intrinsic in the Gospel have deeply influenced Western societies. The concern for the indi vidual person, for the wellbeing of ordinary people, for the sick,thepoor—inshort,thepursuitofthehumanizationofhu manlife—cannotbeseparatedfromtheimpactoftheGospelin thelonghistoryofWesternculture. ItisalsosignificantthatthispositiveviewoftheChristian faithasyeastismaintainedbyBavinckinhislaterworkaswell. In “De navolging van Christus en het moderne leven” (1918) (Bavinck 2008b: 25794) he writes about the Great War and seemstobeshockedbythecrueltiesofmodernwarfare.Modern ity, consolidation shows its dark side. Science, which should provide humanity with progress and increase in happiness, is usedinwarfaretokillanddestroy. Whatisatstakeheretheologically?Isthereanymajorde velopmentinattitudeandconvictionregardingtherelationbe tweentheChristianfaithandmodernculture?In1888Bavinck took it for granted that there was a strong relation and de pendency between the Christian faith and modern culture. Christian faith has had a strong positive influence on the pro gress of science and humanities. One can easily recognize the generally accepted idea of a bond between culture and the Christianfaithasitwasdefendedatthebeginningofthenine teenthcenturybySchleiermacher. In1918Bavinckshowshimselftobeshockedbythecruel tiesoftheGreatWar,butthatshockdidnotmeanthathebroke withtheimageofyeast,withthetheologicalconvictionthatthe Christianfaithshouldandcanhaveadeeppositiveinfluencein society and the lives of people. The positive relation between the Christian faith and modern culture is maintained. In Ba vinck’sthoughtwestillfindthenotionthatthereisadeepand inherent relation between God’s revelation and Western cul ture. Karl Barth will give short shrift to this relation and with thatendtheEurocentrismthatdominatedWesterntheologyfor solong.

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KarlBarth The difference we encounter in Karl Barth is remarkable and great.Barthstartedasanadherentofliberaltheologyinthetra ditionofSchleiermacherandWilhelmHerrmann.TheChristian faithandmodernitywithitsstressonfreedomandprogressin humanity are closely interrelated. Theologically, this means thattheSpiritofGodissomehowimmanentinthelifeandcul ture of the Christian tradition. On this point Barth becomes uneasywithhisformerteachersanddistanceshimselffromthe idea of the immanence of the Spirit of God in culture and the image of progress. In 1915 Barth delivered an address called Kriegszeit und Gottesreich (Wartime and the Kingdom of God). Theaddressitselfhasnotsurvived,butwedohaveashortre portbytheBaselscholarPaulWernle.InalettertoMartinRade, Barth’s teacher and tutor during his student period in Ger many,WernlewrotedownthemainthesesbywhichBarthde finedthecurrentsituation. 1. The world remains the world, ruled by the devil; all at tempts in all different ways to improve it and help it are worthlessandunsuccessful;2.GodisGod;thekingdomof God must come, then everything will be different; 3. What wemustdoisbelieveinJesusChristandwaitfortheKing domofGod.(Kantzenbach1977:406)

Of course, it might be that this report is  strongly biased be cause Wernle was obviously quite irritated and annoyed by thesestatements.Bethatasitmay,wehaveenoughreasontore gardthesestatementsascorrect.TheyfitverywellwithBarth’s otherwritings.AlreadyinthefirsteditionofDerRömerbrief,his 1919 commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Romans and, more radically,eventhesecondeditionofthisworkhemakesasharp distinctionbetweenhumancultureandGod’srevelation.Inthe 1922editionofthiscommentary(Römerbrief2)hefoundaway todistinguishbetweenGodandhumankind,God’smovement toward the world and the world itself, that makes it clear that Barth cut the bond connecting the Christian faith to European orWesternculture.ItisonlypossibletospeakofGod’srelation betweenHimandthehumanbeing,betweeneternityandtime, betweentherisenChristandusintermsofnonidentity.

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Theconsequencesforthisviewandthetheologicalconcept of culture are tremendous. At first glance, it appears to be de vastating for the usual distinction between lower and higher civilizations. The highest peaks of Western culture cannot be identifiedwithsomekindofrealizeddivinereality.God’sSpirit doesnotdwellinhumansociety,buttouchesthisreality,asthe tangenttouchesthecircleatone,infinitesimalpoint.Thisreal ity,thisculture,isnotfullofGodbutemptyofhisfullness.The Spirit is not the supporter of great personalities and high cul ture,rathertheSpiritisatroublemakeranddisturbsthosewho thinkthattheyaretheluckypossessorsoftherichesofculture, thebeatipossidentes. This new concept of a relation between God and culture does not mean that, in Barth’s view, the Christian faith and Christiansarenotcalledtohavearesponsibleattitudetowards theirsociety.Hisaddress“DerChristinderGesellschaft”(The Christian in Society), given at the annual meeting of the Reli gious Socialists in Tambach, Germany, makes clear that Jesus Christisnotabsentfromtheworld.Rather,heistheengine,the agitator of all kind of movements. People are searching for a better world and, somehow, this pursuit of happiness is the hidden ground and soil of the revolutionary present time. In Römerbrief 2 Barth makes it explicit that this sharp distinction between God and humankind renders it impossible to oppose the church to the world, renewal movements to the conserva tive groups in society, Paul to Saul. The sovereignty of God’s dealing with the world, in judgement and grace, has to make people aware that they remain deeply dependent on God’s grace, God’s acceptance and “Yes.” The dividing line between thosewhoareontherightsideandthoseonthewrongsideis never fixed but always subject to God’s divine activity. That knowledge has to make those who want to be fighters for a goodcausedeeplyhumbleandtimeandagainbringthemback toGodastheonewhodecides,judgesandrestores. Barth’s Römerbrief 2 is a document of a new relation be tween faith and culture. There is no direct relation between European or Western culture and God. The achievements of Western culture, its science, its technical achievements, its civ ilization can perhaps be praised, but in the light of God’s re

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velationtheyshouldbecriticizedagainandagain.Humanityis nottheexclusivepossessionofChristianculture. ButallthisdidnotleadBarthtoakindofpoliticalandcul turaldefeatismorindifferentism.Notatall.TheChristianwho has heard God’s voice and promises is aroused and has to an swerthecallofGod.HowwerespondtoGod’sgraceinJesus Christdoesnotleadtoindifferencetowardtheworld.Through out his whole life Barth delivered an abundance of public ad dresses and lectures by which he became a theologian with a loud public voice and impact. The prophetic function of his theology became strongest, most likely in the 1930s with the BarmenDeclaration.Andhelaterdeliveredlectureslike“Recht fertigung und Recht” (Justification and Justice), “Christenge meindeundBürgergemeinde”(ChristianCommunityandCivil Community)and“EvangeliumundGesetz”(GospelandLaw). InalltheselecturesandaddressesitisclearthatBarthdoesnot wanttoleavetheworldandhistorytothedevil.Hedefendsa positionaccordingtowhichthechurchknowsaboutthesalva tion that God achieved once and for all in Christ. Humankind may live without God, but God does not want to live without human beings! That is the core of the Gospel and decisive for what humans beings are theologically (Barth 1975: 534) At the centerofGod’srevelationisJesusChristasthepersoninwhom Godrevealshimselftosayhis“Yes”toallhisfellowhumanbe ings.Itmeansthatthechurchknowsaboutsalvation,aboutan eternal purpose of God, about a divine righteousness and re conciliation,thatcannotbeidentifiedwithourhumanideasof rightousnessandhumanity.InJesusChristGodrevealstheface ofhisdivinelove,of hisdivinehumanity.AccordingtoBarth, humanity is not something that we can discover by ourselves. WhatitistobetrulyhumanisrevealedbyGodhimselfinJesus Christ.Thus,humanityis,inthefirstplace,apredicateofGod, notofus.InJesusChrist,inhislife,inhisacts,theworldhasto learnwhatitistobehuman,open,loving,togiveone’slifefor others. In the life of Jesus of Nazareth we are taught not to strivetobeGodbuttobehuman,obedient,responsivewithin theboundariesofcreation. Thishasalsoabearingonatheologicalviewofculture:it means,infact,thatthehistoryofJesusChristrevealsthemys tery of our world. Our culture and world may look as if they

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arevoidofGodandhope,imprisonedwithintheboundariesof birthanddeath,but,infact,inthelightofthehistoryofJesus Christ, human culture lives under the promise of the presence andcomingofGod.HumaneffortswillnotbringaboutGod’s Kingdom,butourworkhastobedoneinprayerforthecoming ofhisKingdom. Evaluation It is interesting to see the differences between Kuyper and Ba vinckontheonehandandBarthontheother.Thefirstcritical pointtobementionedhereisthecontentofthewordgrace.In Kuyper’sconceptofcommongracegracemustbedistinguished from saving grace. Common grace is the expression of God’s longsuffering,hispatience,and,lessso,hissteadfastness.Does this not entail the danger of compartmentalizing the various kindsofGod’sacts?Thequestioncanandmustbeaskedhereif Kuyper and Bavinck’s neoCalvinist concept does not suffer fromtoosharpadivisionbetweenthevariousdoctrinesoreven aseparationbetweentheworkofcreation,redemptionandful fillment. They use the traditional distinction between the eter nal Son as involved in the work of creation and the incarnate Soninvolvedintheworkofredemption.Thesameistruewhen welookattheworkoftheSpirit.KuyperseestheSpiritatwork incommongrace(Bacote2005:11216),butwhatiftheSpiritof life becomes separated from the Spirit of renewal? One could askiftheTrinitariandistinctionsinKuyper’sandBavinck’stheo logydonoteventuallytendtobecomeseparationsintheworkof God. ThedifferencebetweenBarth’sapproachandtheneoCal vinistic concept of common grace is clear. According to Barth, graceisalwayssavinggraceandisaddressedtoallpeople.Grace and acceptance in communion with Christ is the promise and hiddensecretforallJesusChrist’sfellowhumanbeings.Inneo Calvinistictheologythereisakindofdualitybetweencommon graceandspecialgrace.ThereisadualitybetweentheEternal SonandtheIncarnateSon,betweentheSpirit,whocreatesand sustainstheworld,andtheSpiritwhobringsusintocommun ion with Jesus Christ. Barth attempts to overcome the tensions in these dualities when he makes the eternal decision of the election of Jesus Christ the center of his doctrine of God. This

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has a bearing on human life and culture: Human beings are called to respond to this divine “yes” once spoken in Jesus Christ.TheSpiritofJesusChristwillteachthem. ThedifferencesbetweenKuyper,BavinckandBarthshould not, however, make us blind to what they have in common: Both theologies provide Reformed theology with parameters according to which life and culture are not empty, not void of the promise of God. They offer believers as “aliens and stran gers” a theological and spiritual framework in which ordinary life, politics, building a society, a family, raising children and dailyworkarenotsenselessenterprisesbutpromisingchallen gesandthingstowhichhumanbeingsarecalled. Bibliography Augustijn,C.,andJ.Vree.(1998).AbrahamKuyper:Vastenveranderlijk. Deontwikkelingvanzijndenken.Zoetermeer:Meinema. Bacote, E.V. (2005). The Spirit in Public Theology: Appropriating the Le gacyofAbrahamKuyper.GrandRapids:BakerAcademic. Barth,K.(1998).RechtfertigungundRecht;ChristengemeindeundBürger gemeinde;EvangeliumundGesetz.Zurich:TheologischerVerlag. (1975). Die Kirchliche Dogmatik VI/: Die Lehre von der Versöhnung. 3rded.Zurich:TheologischerVerlag. Barth, K. (1977). “Der Christ in der Gesellschaft (1919).” In: J. Molt mann. Anfänge der dialektischen Theologie, Teil I. Munich: Kaiser Verlag.Pp.337. Bavinck,H.(2008a).“DecatholiciteitvanhetChristendomendekerk.” (1888). Gereformeerde katholiciteit (18881918). Barneveld: Neder landsDagblad.Pp.2163. (2008b). “De navolging van Christus en het moderne leven.” (1918). Gereformeerde katholiciteit (18881918). Barneveld: Neder landsDagblad.Pp. 25794. (19061911). Gereformeerde Dogmatiek. Kampen: Kok. English Translation:(20032008)ReformedDogmatics.GrandRapids:Baker Academic. Kantzenbach,F.W.(1977).“ZwischenLeonhardRagazundKarlBarth: DieBeurteilungdes1.WeltkriegesindenBriefendesBaslerThe ologenPaulWernleanMartin Rade.”ZeitschriftfürSchweizerische Kirchengeschichte71:393417.

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Kuyper A. (1998). “Sphere Sovereignty.” In: Abraham Kuyper: A Cen tennial Reader. Ed. James D. Bratt. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Pp. 46390. (1908). Encyclopaedie der Heilige Godgeleerdheid. Vol. I. 2nd ed. Kampen: Kok. (19031904). Gemeene Gratie. Vol. IIIII. Amsterdam/Pretoria: Hö vekerenWormser. (1902).GemeeneGratie.Vol.I.Leiden:Donner. Ridderbos, S.J. (1947). De theologische cultuurbeschouwing van Abraham Kuyper.Kampen:Kok. Schleiermacher, F.D.E, (1968). “Zweites Sendschreiben to dr. Herrn Lücke.” In: Schleiermacher Auswahl.  Hamburg: Siebenstern. Pp. 14075. VreeJ.(2006).Kuyperindekiem:DeprecalvinistischeperiodevanAbraham Kuyper18481874.Hilversum:Verloren. Wolterstorff, N. (1999). “Abraham Kuyper’s Model of a Democratic Polity for Societies with a Religiously Diverse Citizenry.” In: C. vanderKooiandJandeBruijn(eds).KuyperReconsidered:Aspects ofhisLifeandWork.Amsterdam:VUUitgeverij.Pp.190205.

TheRoleofFaith inScienceandinReligion KeithWard

Abstract The natural sciences are often said to rely only on observation and exper iment,notonauthority.Butthereisaproperappealtofaithandauthorityin science—theauthorityoftheoreticalinsight,observationalexpertiseandabil ity to produce fruitful practical consequences. Religions have an analogous formoffaith.Thereistheauthorityoftheoreticalinsight,usingadifferentform of explanation—intentional explanation in terms of mental causation and purpose. There are confirming expert observations (revelations and experi encesofGod),andtherearefruitfulconsequencesforpersonallife.Theseare much more contentious than in science, but that arises from the nature of personalknowledgeasselfinvolving,rootedinhistoricaltraditionandessen tiallyevaluative.Wemaythussaythattherearetwosortsoffaith.Scientific faithisintheintelligibilityofphysicalnatureandthereliabilityofscientific expertise.Religiousfaithisintheultimategoodnessofrealityandinthereli abilityofatraditionofprophets,saintsandsages.Religiousfaithinvolvesper sonalcommitmentanddevotioninawaythatscientificfaithdoesnot.Never theless,itcanbesaidthatbothformsoffaitharerationalandarenecessary presuppositionsofobtainingappropriateknowledgeofrealityinitsfullness.

FaithandFacts ThemottooftheRoyalSocietyofLondonfortheImprovement of Natural Knowledge, the oldest and most prestigious aca demyofthesciencesinBritain,foundedin1660,is“Nulliusin Verba,”“onthewordsofnoone,”or“nothinginwords.”Thatis tosay,nobeliefistobeacceptedinthenaturalsciencesjustbe causeitiswritteninabookorgivenbyrevelation. ThismottoreflectsthesituationinseventeenthcenturyEu rope, after a great primarily scientific conflict between accep tance of the authority of Aristotle, as expressed in his extant writings,andthenewobservationsofGalileo,whichpostulated

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averydifferentviewofthenatureoftheuniverse.TheRenais sancewasatimewhenthelearningofthegreatclassicalartists andphilosopherswasrecoveredandenthusiasticallyembraced byscholarsandartists.Thiswasatimeofrenewalandcreative activity.Butofcoursetheclassicalphilosophershadtheirlimi tations, and while immense intellectual edifices could be built upon their works, it turned out that the classical philosophers were just plainly wrong about many facts. Some of those im pressiveintellectualedificeswereaccordinglybuiltonsand. ItwaslargelytheauthorityofAristotle’sbooks,nottheBi ble or Christianity, that the Royal Society rejected. What mat tered was what was involved in the “new science,” and what Galileo and Roger Bacon represented—careful, repeatable and publicly checkable observations, controlled experiment and precisemeasurement.Theseweretobethemethodsofscience, andnophilosophicalorreligiousauthoritywastobeallowedto contradictthem. Over three hundred years have passed, and the general distinctionstillholdsbetweentheresultsofcarefullyrecorded and controlled observations and statements of a purely philo sophicalnature,orstatementsbasedonsomeancienttextoral leged revelation, not based on such evidence. Some modern writers have interpreted that distinction as one between “sci ence”and“faith,”anditistruethatwhereAristotleortheBible makesastatementaboutobservablemattersoffactthatcanbe independently checked by observation and experiment, such observations can in principle show the authoritative text to be mistaken.Therecouldthenbeaconflictbetweenacceptanceof ascientificallyestablishedviewandbeliefinthetotalinerrancy ofanyreligioustextliketheBible. The fact that Aristotle was wrong about many matters of fact—like the nature of the stars or the principle of inertia— doesnotmeanthathewasnotagreatphilosopher.Sothefact thattheBibleismistakenaboutsomefactsdoesnotmeanthatit isnotaworkofgreatspiritualinsight.ItdoesmeanthattheBi ble is not inerrant in every respect. But anyone who has read thedifferingGospelaccountsoftheresurrectionknowsthatin anycase. ThereareformsofChristianfaiththatassertthetotaliner rancyoftheBible,butthatisnotastandardChristianview.A

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more sophisticated view of biblical inspiration (one taken, for example, by the Second Vatican Council statement on biblical inspiration, Dei Verbum, 18 November, 1965, chapter three) is that the Bible is inerrant in all those things that God “for the sakeofoursalvationwishedtoseeconfidedtothesacredscrip tures.” There is some room for discussion about just what truthsareimportantforsalvation,buttheyalmostcertainlydo notincludesuchmattersaswhethertheearthgoesaroundthe sunorifhumansevolvedfromoneremotecommonancestorof allotherorganiclifeforms. Are there nevertheless some factual matters that are im plied by statements of faith? Some people do not think so—in England,RichardBraithwaiteandDonCupittcometomindas writerswhothinkreligiousstatementshavenofactualcontent. In the USA, Stephen J. Gould’s proposal that religion and sci encearetwo“nonoverlappingmagisteria”amountstothe samething.Religiousstatementsmayexisttoevokeorsustain an“agapistic”wayoflife,orfeelingsofvarioussorts,especially feelings of mystic unity with all things. But they do not state anyfacts,sotheycannotconflictwithscience. MostChristians,however,wouldholdthattheexistenceof Goddoesmakeadifferencetowhatsortoffactsthereareinthe universe.IfJesusistheMessiah,thenGodchosehimtohavea specialroleinearth’shistory,andempoweredhimtofulfilthat role.IfJesussavespeoplefromsin,thenattheleastthatentails some change in human behaviour that is brought about by a spiritual influence channelled through Jesus. If there is eternal life with God, then humans can live again after the death of theirbodies.Theseclaimsallentailsomeformofdivinecausal ity,thebringingaboutofsomestatesofaffairsbyanonphys icalbeing. Ifthereissuchcausality,shoulditbedetectiblebyscientif icmethodsofobservationandexperiment?Atfirstsightthean swerseemstobeyes,atleastinprinciple.IfJesuswasamanof amazing insight, close knowledge of God, healing power and moralpreeminence,thosearefactsthatobservationshouldre veal. If believers claim to be inspired by the Spirit of God, we should be able to see some improvement in their moral and psychologicalattributes.

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Butmattersarenotsoclear.Manyreligiousleadersatthe timetookJesustobeadangerousfanatic,evenablasphemer,so thefactsatissuearenotstraightforward.Judgmentsabouthu manpersonsarenotablyhardtomakewithanycertainty,and people can differ widely in their assessments of others. A per sonwhoseemscourteous,kindandconciliatorytooneobserver mayseemtobestuffy,complaisantandcowardlytoanother. Further, it is often impossible to be quite sure what the barefactsare.Thingshappenquickly,areobservedinattentive ly,arerarelyrepeatableandquicklybecomeinfusedwithfalseor inaccuratememories,sothatevenwhatactuallyhappenedcannot beestablishedbeyondreasonabledoubt.Historicalorbiograph ical facts usually fail the scientific tests of precise and con trolled,measurableandrepeatableobservation.Therearefacts, but they cannot be established with certainty, and they are of tensubjecttoverydifferentinterpretationsandevaluations. TheresurrectionofJesusfromdeathisagoodexampleof this.Eitherhedidliveandappearafterphysicaldeathorhedid not.Butallwehavearethereportsofsomewhosaytheysaw him,andwecannotbecertainthattheiraccountsarereliable,or that they are trustworthy enough to be generally accepted. They certainly fail as scientific claims, for the conditions of observa tionwerenotrigorouslycontrolled.Yettheyarefactualclaims. Areallydeterminedscientistcouldsaythatweshouldnot accept any factual claims that are not established by properly scientificmethodsofcontrolledobservation.Butthatwouldvir tuallyeliminatehistoryandbiography,andmostbeliefsfound ed on everyday commonsense experience. Even the decisions of law courts, which aim to establish facts beyond reasonable doubt,donotliveuptostrictlyscientificinsistenceonchecka bleorfalsifiableobservation.AstheeighteenthcenturyEnglish philosopher Joseph Butler said, “Probability is the guide of life.”Weoftenhavetodecidewhomtotrustorbelieveandact onfactualclaimsthatarelessthantheoreticallycertain.Wealso havetoactonourownjudgmentsofcharacterandcompetence, evenwhenthosejudgmentsarenotwidelyshared.  TheRoleofFaithintheSciences Couldthisbecalledanelementof“faith”?Iffaithisrelianceon theauthorityofsomeonewhomwefeelwehavegoodreasonto

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trustasbeinginabetterpositionthanwearetoknowthefacts, then faith is necessary to human life. Most of us have faith in science—we trust that scientific claims are made honestly by competent scientists in their field, which we probably do not fully understand. There have been famous cases in which dis honestclaimshavebeenmade—theclaimbyaKoreanscientist tohaveclonedahumanbeingisarecentexample.Andhonest and competent scientists can be wrong—as Einstein (perhaps) wasabouttherebeinghiddenvariablesunderlyingtheIndeter minacy principle. But on the whole the scientific community hassystemsofpeerreviewwhich,whilenotinfallible,achievea consensus of informed opinion on most scientific matters. The restofuswouldbewelladvisedtotrusttheconsensus.Wecan notworkouteverythingforourselves,especiallyifourgraspof mathematicsisnottoostrong. Thisiscertainlynotblindfaith,anditisultimatelybacked up by observations and experiments. But it is nevertheless the acceptance on authority of beliefs that we could not ascertain for ourselves. In most developed sciences, ordinary observa tions that anyone could make are not enough. This brings out an element of modern science that is perhaps even more im portantthanobservation—theformationofatheoryintermsof precisely quantifiable laws governing the interactions of either observed or postulated entities. As the founders of the Royal Societysaid,theywishedtopursue“physicomathematicalex perimental learning.” Experiments are important. But equally important is the development of mathematical techniques whichwillenabletheinteractionsoffundamentalphysicalpar ticlestobedescribedwithprecision.Thoselawscanbegeneral isedtoapplytorelevantlysimilarentities,andthengiveriseto predictions that can be tested. The tests, however, are some times so complex that a very sophisticated grasp of theory mightbeneededtosaywhethertheyconfirmthehypothesisor not. Only a mathematical physicist of some competence could deviseanexperimenttotestwhethertheHiggsBosonexistsor couldtellwhetheritsexistencehadbeenconfirmedornot. Only people with a high degree of competence can really confirm the theories for themselves. The rest of us have to ac cept this on two main grounds—peergroup acceptance of the reputationofthephysicistsconcerned,andthefactthattheories

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“work”inproducingpracticaleffectslikenuclearexplosionsor transistors. Scientificobservationisveryunlikeordinarypublicobserva tion.Itrequireshighlyspecialisedandcontrolledconditionsof observation, devised by highly creative theorists and carried out by highly trained observers. It often requires great mathe matical ability, skills of theory formation and genuinely new ways of thinking about the physical world. So in at least the moretheoreticalsciences,observationshavetheroleofsuggest ing highly complex theories and ways of confirming them by furtherhighlycontrolledobservations.Itisnotamatterofcom monsense“lookingandseeing.”Itismoreamatterofdevising very complex explanatory models, partly on grounds of their eleganceandfruitfulness. All this is certainly not a matter of just accepting what some ancient authority says, without testing it. And it is not a matterofreceivingarevelationfromGod.Yetitisimportantto stressthatthereisaplaceforauthorityinmodernscience,and thatitisfalsejusttotelleveryonetoworkthingsoutforthem selves. That authority has three main bases—acceptance of an explanatory framework (the “laws of nature”); reliance on the workofhighlytrainedobserversworkinginstrictlycontrolled conditions;andthefactthatthetheoriesandobservationsgive rise to correct predictions. So the Royal Society motto might wellberendered:“Notinwordsalone,”withouttheoryformu lationthathassomefruitfulpracticalconsequencesandthatis confirmedbyrigorousandexpertobservation.Faith—trust—in science is justified because science produces theories that have beenconfirmedbyexpertobservation,thathavefruitfulconse quences, and that provide general principles that explain why things happen as they do (because fundamental physical enti tiesfollowgenerallaws). ReligiousExplanations Isthereanyparallelinreligion?Therearesomecleardisanalo gies. Religious believers are not concerned to produce general laws that explain why things happen. They do not provide prin ciplesthatcanbeusedtoimprovethephysicalworld.Andthey donothavelaboratoriesinwhichclosecontrolledobservations canbemade.

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Therearenogenerallawsproducedbyrevelationthattell ushowthingswork.Ifabelieversays,“Goddidit,”thatalmost prevents us from giving a law in accordance with which God didit,sincethewaysofGodaremysterious.Thisshouldnot,I think,beregardedasafailuretoexplain,evenlessasablockto seeking a scientific explanation. It is best seen as pointing to a differentformofexplanationfromascientificexplanationthat providesgenerallawsofphysicalinteraction. Suppose that a rock falls from a high cliff onto someone’s head.Ascientificexplanationwillmentionthefriabilityofrocks, the law of gravity, and the relative hardness of rocks and hu man heads. In a sense, that is a complete physical explanation of what happened. It mentions all the physical states and gen eral laws involved, and maybe suggests that, given all these, suchaneventwasmoreorlessboundtohappensoonerorlat er. ButnowsupposeIsay,“Johndidit.Hepushedtherockin order to kill his enemy.” Does this explain anything? It does, butitisadifferentsortofexplanation.Itsaysthatapersonin tendedtheeventtohappenandbroughtitaboutforareason.It isnotthattheeventwasboundtohappenanyway.Nowwesee thatsomeonemadeithappen,whentheyneednothavedone. Intentionalactioninordertoachieveagoalhasenteredthepic ture.Thatmakesanexplanatorydifference.Itdoesnotconflict withthescientificexplanationinanyway.Butitaddssomething —there was a mental cause and a goal. Saying “John did it” doesnotblockattemptsatscientificexplanation.Nordoesitfail togiveascientificexplanation,sinceitisnottryingtogiveone. Itexplainsinadifferentway. Sotosayofacertainevent“Goddidit”doesnotcompete withorblockanyscientificexplanation.Itaddsthatwhathap pened did so in order to achieve a goal envisaged by a con sciousandimmaterialbeing,God,andthatGodcausedittohap pen, very possibly in accordance with all existent laws of na ture.ButGoddoesnotactbecauseheiscausedtodosobyany setofgenerallaws.Sowhenonesays,“Goddidit,”oneisnot citing any such law, one that might possibly produce predic tionsandbeusedbyhumansinfuturetobringaboutwhatthey want.

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We can say general things about God, such as that God willingeneralaimatgoodnessoratjustice.Butwecannotsay whatspecificallyGodwoulddo,andwecertainlycannotcalcu late a precise probability that he might do a specific thing. To saythataspiritualbeingofacertainnaturecausessomethings to happen tells you something very significant about why things happen.Ittellsus“thatforthesakeofwhich”theyhappen,and it tells us that some mind envisaged and intended to realise such a goal. But it tells us no laws in accordance with which things(otherthingsbeingequal)necessarilyhappen.Infact,it more or less explicitly denies any such necessity, since God might always have done otherwise. Religious explanations in termsofGodproducenogenerallaws.Theyassertthatthereare purposesandintentionalcauses.Sciencecannomoredeny(or assert)thatthanitcandenyorassertthatJohnthrewtherockat someone, intending to kill him. Science reports events. It does not report intentional actions. That is not a failure of science, andintentionalexplanationisnot a failuretobeproper scien tificexplanation.Scientificandintentionalexplanationscom plement one another, and both can properly be called explan atoryindifferentways. Furthermore,intentionalactsofGodcannotbeobservedin laboratory conditions, precisely because they are personal and freeactions,andGodhasthepowertofrustrateanyattemptto predict divine actions in detail. We might think it improper to experiment upon some human subject in a laboratory in ways that limit their freedom and responsibility. But in the case of God,suchathingisnotjustimproper.Itisinprincipleimpossi ble,sinceGod’sfreedomcannotbelimited.Itisjustnotpossi bletocarryoutexperimentsonGod.Becausereligiousexplan ationisaformofintentionalexplanation,itcannotproducethe sortsoflawsorexpertobservationsthatthenaturalsciencesdo. AnalogiesBetweenScientificandReligiousExplanation Those aresomeofthedisanalogiesbetweenscientificandreli giousfaith.However,therearealsoanalogiesbetweenreligious explanation and scientific explanation. Both have a basic and distinctive form of intelligible explanation. The basic explana toryschemeofthenaturalsciences,paradigmaticallyexpressed in1687bythepublicationofIsaacNewton’sPrincipiaMathemat

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ica, is that all natural (purely physical) complex states are caused by universal laws of the interaction of the elementary particlesofwhichtheyarecomposed.Inasimilarway,thereis abasicexplanatoryschemeforpersonalandreligiousphenom ena, which is that personal agents envisage goals which they canfreelybringabout.Inthecaseoftheism,thebasicpostulate is that there is a cosmic consciousness which envisages goals thattheuniverseasawholeisintendedtorealise.Believersin Godthinkthatthewholephysicalcosmosisdependentupona more fundamental purely spiritual (nonmaterial and conscious) reality. The natural sciences will by definition (since “natural” meansphysicalandlocatableinspacetime)notbeconcernedto investigate such a spiritual reality. But that is a selfimposed limitofnaturalscience,notadisproofofGod. IfthereissuchaGod,thenitbecomeshighlyprobablethat it would communicate its goals in some way to finite agents whoseresponsibilityitmaybetohelpinrealisingthosegoals. Itwillalsobelikelythatitwillhelpthosewhoseektoachieve the divine goals and hinder those who do not. One would ex pecttheretobesomeformofrevelationofdivinepurpose,and someexperienceofdivinehelp(grace)orhindrance(judgment) inhumanlives.So,asthesciencesrelyonexpertobservers,reli gionsrelyonprophets,sagesandsaintsasauthoritieswhoex periencethespiritualmoreintenselyandreliablythanmostof us. Insofar as they are taken to have greater affinity with and moreintenseexperienceofGodtheymightbeexpectedtohave greater insight into the nature and purposes of God. Their ob servationsdonottakeplaceintheimpersonalcontextoflabora tories, but in the intensely personal context of meditation and prayer,ofprivilegedpersonalrelationshipwithasupremeSpir it. Revelation can be reasonably seen as a form of personal communicationthatishighlyprobableifthereisindeedaGod, eventhoughthenaturalsciences,preciselybecausetheyarena tural, will specifically exclude revealed truth from considera tion. Justasthenaturalsciencesareconfirmedbytechnological progress,soreligiousbeliefsareconfirmedbypersonalexperi encesofliberationfromegoism,despairandanxietyintoalife ofjoy,purpose,valueandmeaningandasenseofunionwitha reality of supreme understanding, compassion and bliss. Thus

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inboththenaturalsciencesandinreligiousbelief,thereisafund amental postulate of a basic explanatory scheme, there is con firming expert observation or experience, and there are fruitful consequences,intheonecaseinphysicalimprovementsandin theotherinmental,moralorspiritualimprovementsinperson allife. TheSelfInvolvingNatureofReligiousFaith One great difference remains and seems insuperable. The na tural sciences provide a cumulative, confirmed and agreed body of knowledge that few competent observers would seriously dispute. Religion is not like that. The existence of God is dis puted; different alleged revelations from God contradict each other; and religious belief sometimes seems to cause as much socialandpsychologicalharmasitdoesgood. Thereasonforthisdifferenceispreciselythatreligiousbe lief is not a matter of dispassionate and impersonal examina tion. It involves highly emotional evaluations of and commit ments to ways of feeling and acting. Religious belief is selfin volving in a way that scientific belief is not. Some people find Godtobetheultimatetyrant;othersseeGodasultimatemean ing and goodness. Some will use beliefs about God to evoke fear,ortojustifyactsofappallingcruelty;otherswillfindthat God’s love drives away fear and demands universal compas sion. Just as ethical and political beliefs are hugely diverse and largelyreflectone’sownpersonalcharacterandperspectiveas wellasthegeneralvaluesandtraditionsthathavebeenlearned from one’s own culture, so there is a diversity in religious be liefs and attitudes that cannot be removed. If human life is a battle between good and evil, one cannot expect that belief in Godwillbewhollyonthegoodside,whileatheismwillbeas sociated with evil. Both will be ambiguous, yet personal deci sions and commitments have to be made. In this area of what have been called fundamental human options, the cool objec tivityofscientificexplanationisnotpossible.AsSørenKierke gaardputit,passionatecommitmentshavetobemadeincon ditions of objective uncertainty. Part of faith is to be true to thosecommitments,oncemade,becausetheyrepresentthebest

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thatweknowandcando,givenourinevitablypartialandim perfectperspectives. Inbiographicalandhistoricalmatters,wemostlytrustthe recollectionsofthosewhosawandexperiencedvariousevents, andofcoursewemusttrustthereliabilityofourownmemories too. We tend to trust those whose general moral evaluations matchourown,ratherthanthoseofverydifferentpoliticalopin ions.Wecantellgoodhistoriansfrombad—again,peerreview has an important part to play. But even good historians disa gree strongly about many events, their causes and consequen ces.Ourownevaluativeperspectiveisthusonefactorininflu encingustotrustsomesourcesratherthanothers. In adopting basic moral, philosophical and religious posi tions,welookfortrustworthiness,competenceandreliabilityin others and for a set of evaluative opinions that are not too far removedfromourown.Ifwehavedoneourbesttosortthose things out, then it is reasonable to place our trust in some au thorities,eveninhighlydisputedmatters.Manyreligiousasser tions are based on testimonies to highly unusual experiences, eitherinsubjectiveexperience(suchasdreamsorvisions)orin publicly observable events (such as miracles). It is not unrea sonabletoplacetrustinsuchaccounts,ifoneacceptsasaliving possibilitythatcertainpeople—prophets—areinspiredbyGod tosayorwrite,toexperienceordothethingstheydo. Godisnotadirectlyobservablecause,soitcannotbecon clusivelyestablishedbyobservationthatGodinspiresprophets. Yet God could be postulated as the cause which best explains thewritingsandinsightsoftheprophets,whichseemtosome, butnotallpeople,tohaveanextraordinarilyperceptivequality. So observation is relevant. The writings must be true, original and morally challenging. They must communicate a truth that isnotnormallyaccessibletohumanminds,butwhichgivesreal insight into the place and purpose of human life in the uni verse. But such observations are shot through with personal evaluationswhichitisimpossibletodiscountentirely. This marks one clear difference between scientific judg mentsandreligiousjudgments.Theybothrelyonexpertabili ties,butinverydifferentways,correspondingtothedifference betweendispassionateenquiryandselfinvolvingpersonalrela tionships.Theexpertabilitythatispropertoscienceiscompe

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tenceinmathematics,intheoryformationandinexperimental observation. The corresponding expert ability that is proper to religionsisexceptionalaccesstothemindofGod,theabilityto developacoherentschemeforunderstandingthebeingofGod andGod’srelationtothehumanworldanddiscernmentofthe divinepresenceinhistoryandpersonallife. Therecertainlyarepeoplewidelyacceptedasreligiousau thorities, like Mohammed, Caitanya, Jesus or the Buddha. The trouble is that they seem to disagree with one another. Exper tise is no guarantee of truth. This is an area in which Hendrik Vroomhasmadeveryimportantcontributions.IthinkIamin agreementwithhiminsayingthatthedisagreementsaretobe understoodinlargepartasduetodifferentculturalandphilo sophicaltrajectoriesofthoughtdevelopedovermanycenturies. Yet in the great religious traditions there is a common agree mentthatthespiritualisdistinctfromandmoreimportantthan thematerial.Thegoalofareligiouslifeistoescapetheselfish attachments associated with the material world and achieve a consciousandpositiverelationtoadeeperspiritualreality. In the greatest writers in these traditions, there is also a common thought that we can speak only haltingly and ob scurelyaboutthenatureofthespiritualandofourultimate goal with regard to it. So there is much room for reverent ag nosticism(theapophaticway)ratherthanbombastic assertive ness. Finally,interpretationsofthespiritualandtheultimatehu man goal are developed intellectually in the light of culturally diversekeyideasthatcauseputativedivinerevelationstobere ceivedandunderstoodinratherdifferentways. Noneofuscanavoidsupposingsomeviewsonthesemat terstobemoreadequatethanothers,andwemustcommitour selvestowhatwehonestlybelievetobethemostadequateac count, both intellectually and morally. It is because religious faith,likeallmoral,aesthetic,politicalandpersonalelementsof humanlife,isselfinvolvingthatinreligiousmatterswecannot insist on the dispassionate objectivity of scientific method. Of courseweshouldseektobeasfairandobjectiveaswecan,but noneofuscanavoidtheadoptionofapersonalstancewhichis boundtobeinsomerespectscontroversialordisputed.

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CommitmenttotheSupremacyofGoodness Thereisanotherimportantelementofreligiousfaiththatenters intotheequationandisabsentinthenaturalsciences.Faithin Godinvolvesnotonlythedispositiontoassenttosomematters asgenuinelyrevealedbyGod,butalsoapersonalcommitment oflovingdevotiontoGod.To“havefaith”inanotherpersonis often to commit oneself in loving relation to her, even when othersrejectorcriticiseher.Onemighthavefaithinone’swife or husband even when others accuse them of wrongdoing, if one believes they are honest and unjustly attacked. Faith goes beyond the strict evidence, because one has a relationship of trustwiththemthatismeantpreciselytoendurethroughhard shipanddifficulty. SofaithinGod’sgoodnessinvolvesabasicbeliefthatGod isgood,plusanelementoftrustthat God remainsgood,even when times are hard and God’s goodness does not seem very apparent. This sort of faith is not totally unlike the faith some scientists may have that their basic insights are correct, even when others oppose them. But personal loyalty requires that faithisnotjustinthecorrectnessofatheory.Itisinthereliabil ityandsteadfastnessofapersonuponwhichwemaystakeour whole lives. Is that unreasonable? It may be, if the person is caught out in some huge fraud, or turns out to be a total liar. Butiftheevidenceforsuchathingisunclear,itmaybemorally preferabletotrustinthem,asawayofbuildinguppositiveper sonalrelationships–oneofthegreatestvaluesinlife. FaithinGodisnotinanotherfiniteperson.Itistrustinthe objectivityandsupremacyofgoodness.Inamorallyambiguous world,thatmaybethebestbetwecanmake.Isittotallyunlike trustintherationality,intelligibility,eleganceandbeautyofthe deeplawsandstructuresofnature?Isuspectthatthis“scientif ic faith” is a form of faith in goodness, though it tends to dis connectthatgoodnessfromanythoughtofrelationshiptoacon scious,mentalorpersonalreality.Itisbeautywithoutanycos micmindthateverappreciatesandvaluesit,intelligibilitywithout any cosmic mind that understands it, and rationality without any cosmic mind that could formulate and act on intelligently formedlogicalprinciples. Wecan,dimlyandinpart,appreciateandunderstandthe cosmos.Thefactis,though,thatitsbeautyandintelligibilityex

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istedlongbeforewedid,asfeaturesofthebasicstructureofthe cosmos. Beauty and intelligibility are only potential or hypo theticalvalues,unlesstheyareappreciatedandunderstood.To givethemrealobjective,extrahuman,existence,itisnaturalto postulate a cosmic mind in which those values have real ex istence,andwhichthecosmosexiststorealiseinmanydiverse finiteforms.Ifwedopostulatesuchacosmicmind,thenitbe comes possible that we humans could have a more personal andconsciousrelationshiptoit,desiringandlovingitforitself aswellasinitsmanifestationsinthephysicalworld. Scienceandfaitharenotcompletelydifferent.Thereissci entific faith, in the intelligibility of the cosmos and in the gen eraltrustworthinessofthescientificcommunity.Thereisscien tificunderstanding,whichtriestouncoverthespecificlawsand constantswhichgovernthephysicalbehaviourofentities. Thereisalsoreligiousfaith,intheultimatecharacterofthe cosmosasamanifestationorexpressionofaconsciousrealityof supreme goodness and in the general trustworthiness of pro phetsorsageswhodisclosethisultimatecharacterintheirlives and teachings. And there is religious understanding, which seekstoseethewholecosmosasexistingforthesakeofdistinc tivevalueswhichitalonecaninstantiateandwhichitisahu manresponsibilitytoimplement. TwoSortsofFaith Thereisadeepdifference,however,betweenatheisticandan atheisticviewoftheuniverse.Auniversewithoutanypurpose orgoalislikelytobeverydifferentfromauniversewherethe goalisthatintelligentlifeformsshouldemergeandfindfulfil ment in the knowledge and love of God. For the latter, there would be an authentic way to live, a way aimed at knowing andlovingGodmorefully.Religiousbeliefsetsoutthewayto suchinnerfulfilmentandpeaceinfaceofthecrueltiesofasin ful world. For the former, such a way of life would be a re gression to an infantile illusion, and therefore the real, hidden intentofreligiousdogmamightbeseenasawaytocreatefear and submission among the masses, over whom the deluders (thepriestsandtheircronies)canexercisetherealdrivingforce of much human behaviour, the will to power. The difference seemsabsolute.Itsuggeststhatthedifferencebetweenreligious

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belief and unbelief is not primarily a theoretical difference about whether physical naturalism is a correct philosophical view.Itisadifferenceaboutthedeepestspringsofmotivation and action in the human heart. Rational arguments are impor tant and attempt to show the consistency, coherence and ade quacyofphilosophicalviews.Butsuchviewsarebasedonthe adoption of basic attitudes, evaluations and commitments madeataprerationallevel,wheredeeppracticaldifferences areincapableofrationalresolution. UnderstoodinapositiveChristiansense,“faith”isacom mittedresponsetotheGodwhoisencounteredinandthrough thepersonofJesus,asitismediatedtousbyaChristiancom munity,achurch.Thiscommittedresponsetoapersonalreality isdifferentfromanythingtobefoundinthesciences—thougha scientist may have an analogous commitment to truth and to theintelligibilityandbeautyofthecosmos.Yetthescientistwill alsobecommittedtotakinganimpartialandobjectiveattitude totheobjectsofstudy.ThatisimpossibleforpersonsofChris tianfaith,exceptinsofarastheyareundertakingpurelyintellec tualresearchintotheologicaltopics. Faithisthusnotpurelyintellectualassentthatgoesbeyond theavailableevidence.Itisapracticalcommitmentofthe wholepersonalityinresponsetoadiscernmentofapersonalre ality at the heart of the experienced cosmos. Such matters of evaluation, commitment and purpose belong to personal knowl edge,andthenaturalsciencesarenotconcernedwiththatarea. TheRoyalSocietyisrightinrejectingrevelationaspartofour “natural” knowledge of the cosmos. Revelation is part of our personal knowledge of the cosmos, and we can look for the general analysis of such knowledge in morality, the arts, in philosophyandreligion. Christianfaithisbasedontrustthatthephysicalor“natur al”realmofspacetimeisanappearanceofadeeperor“super natural” reality. Scientific faith makes a commitment to the beauty and intelligibility of the natural. It does not entail that thereisnothingelsetorealitythanthematerialandisinprin cipleagnosticabouttheexistenceofaspiritualdimensionorof God. Yet scientific faith can reasonably be seen as pointing to the object of religious faith, trust in a conscious and compas sionatemindthatgivesbeautyandintelligibilitytothecosmos

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butrevealsthatourultimatenatureanddestinyliesbeyond,in consciousrelationtoonesupremeSpiritofbeautyandtruth. Thereisfaithinbothscienceandreligion.Theyareanalo gous modes of human thought. But they are different in their methodsandintheirobjects.Ifthereissuchathingaspersonal knowledge, as irreducibly intentional explanation and as a spiritual,nonphysical,reality,thenitwillbepossibletospeak ofreligiousfaith,notassomethingirrationalandunevidenced but as making possible a form of rational understanding that complementsscientificunderstandinganddisclosessomething distinctive,importantandtrueaboutwhatthefactsreallyare.

ChristianFaithandReason AHermeneuticalApproach EdwinKoster

Abstract CanChristianpracticesbeconsidered“reasonable”?Thiscontributionraises thisquestionwithrespecttothereligiouspracticeofblackchurchesinAmer ica during the early 1960s and that of the contemporary Roman Catholic ChurchinEurope.TheessayfirstexplorestheviewsofDanielDennettand RichardSwinburnewhounderstand“reasonability”as“rationallyjustified.” Itwillbeshownthattheyapproachthecomplexphenomenonofreligionasa variantofscientificortheoreticalthinking.Theclaimofthischapteristhat thequestionofthemeaningofreligiouspracticehastoprecedeanyepistemo logical research. This essay then argues, inspired by the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein,thatitisbettertousetheconceptof“credibility”ratherthan “rationaljustification”regardingthequestionofthereasonabilityofreligious traditions.

ReligiousPracticeandReasonableness In The American Future: A History Simon Schama tells the im pressive story of Fannie Lou Hamer: “… a big black woman fromtheDelta,preacher’sdaughter,eyeswidewithresolution, brow furrowed with passion; a gospel pair of lungs on her, sweating in her print dress on the Atlantic City boardwalk” (Schama 2008: 130). Fannie Lou Hamer was a deeply religious cotton picker from Ruleville, Mississippi. After working in the fieldsformorethan35years,shevisitedachurchserviceinher hometownin1962whereacivilrightsactivistlinkedtheGospel tothemeslikesocialjusticeandfreedom.Hereyesweresuddenly opened, and from that moment on she dedicated her life—as the “most unstoppably vocal champion” (Schama 2008: 137)— tothestruggleagainstthe(political)oppressionofblackAmeri cans.Thisstruggleinvolveddailydeaththreatsagainstherand her family. She was imprisoned, beaten savagely, bullets were 69

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firedthroughthewindowsofherhouse.Butherfaithwasun quenchable: “Fannie Lou reckoned this was what Christians wentthroughfortheLord’scause”(Schama2008:134).Thelife ofFannieLouHamerisastoryinwhichthelinebetweenreli gion andpoliticsiscrossedallthetime.Asarepresentativeof theblackcommunityofMississippiontheDemocraticConven tionFloor,forinstance,shewasaskedwhyshehadcome.She didnotanswersimplythatshewantedtoberegisteredtovote but said “… don’t you know? The Kingdom of Jesus; that’s whatIwant”(Schama2008:138). Reflecting on the history of the black church in America, Schama writes that it was the struggle against slavery and ra cismthatmadeBarackObama’snominationandelectionpossi ble. In connection with racism, he claims that the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s—in which Hamer played such an im pressiverole—wouldnothavehappenedatallwithouttheblack church communities. Leaders of this movement, such as the BaptistministerMartinLutherKingJr.,weremembersofthese communities.Theirspeecheswereinspiredbythepulpits,their protestsongsbyGospelmusicandtheiraversiontosegregation was based on the Bible (Schama 2008: 129ff.). In short, their politicalactivitiesseemedtobeinspiredbytheconvictionthat the pursuit of social justice and freedom is a way to express God’sloveforhispeople.Or,tosayitdifferently,iftheexpres sion“Godislove”ismeaningful,thenAmericansocietyhasto change radically: from suppression to acceptance of the black community. The black church in 1960s America in general and the life ofFannieLouHamerinparticularareexamplesofreligiousprac ticesthatconsistofmanydifferentelements.Thesamecouldbe saidofthepracticesofotherChristiantraditions.IntheRoman CatholicChurchforinstance,Christianpracticeappearstocon sist of an invariant pattern of metaphors and fixed phrases, a strict logic of symbols and rituals, a hierarchical system in whicheveryclergymanhashisownposition,vestments,obliga tionsandrights.Membersofaparishparticipateinthecelebra tionoftheEucharist,visittheelderly,communicatewiththelo calcouncilaboutcommoninterestsandprojects,organizetrips toTaizéandLourdes,andtakepartinvariousactivitieswithin or outside the community. In his wonderful book, The Catholic

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Imagination,AndrewGreeleyarguesthat“Catholicsliveinanen chantedworld,aworldofstatuesandholywater,stainedglass and votive candles, saints and religious medals, rosary beads andholypictures”(Greeley2000:1).Bylivinginsuchaworld CatholicsemphasizethepresenceofGodandstressthenearness ofGodtohiscreation. These practices make it clear that religion is a complex phe nomenonthat includesseveralaspects.ForFannieLouHamer andtheblackchurch,religionandpoliticsarecompletelyinter twined, whereas the example of the Roman Catholic Church showsthatreligionisamultidimensionalwebofliturgical,so cialandmanagerialactivities,amongotherthings. In this essay I will discuss the question if these practices arereasonable.“Reasonableness”willbeunderstoodfirst—asis usually the case—in the sense of “rationally justifiable.” Is it possibletogivegoodreasonstoparticipateinareligioustradi tion,reasonsthatcanbesustainedbyargumentsanddefended againstcritics?Isthereligiousattitude,likethatofFannieLou HameroranaverageCatholicbeliever,rationalinthatsenseor —to use a term referring to scientific practice—even testable? The question if religious convictions and experiences can be labeled“rationallyjustified”istreatedinthenexttwosections withreferencemainlytotheworkofDanielDennettandRich ard Swinburne. In the last section it is proposed that “reason ableness”beunderstoodas“credibility.”Inspiredbythework of (among others) Ludwig Wittgenstein, I will argue that the useofthisconceptismoreappropriatewhendiscussingtheprob lemofthereasonabilityofreligioustraditions. RationalJustificationandChristianBelief:BreakingtheSpell? Giving a rational justification goes together with the intention of giving a rational account of an act or a claim and thus pro vidinginsightintothegroundsthatsupportthepracticeorcon victioninquestion.Arationaljustificationthusmakesitpossi ble to assess the validity of practices and convictions. Can, for example, political positions and actions of the black church— often expressed in religious terms—be assessed rationally and can arguments be cited that demonstrate the validity of this practice?AndcanthewholeoftheRomanCatholicpracticeof

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faithbeassessedasvalid?Iwilllimitmyselftothesequestions inthisandthefollowingsection. Inthecaseofreligiouspracticethequestionofrationaljusti fication is most often posed explicitly in connection with reli giousconvictionsandexperiences,whichareusuallyviewedasat temptstoexpresssomethingthatiscognitivelymeaningfuland nottheexpressionofemotions,orameansofgroundingethical guidelines.Andalthoughitisoftenrecognizedthatareligious practiceisaphenomenonwith,amongotherthings,social,psy chological, economic and political dimensions, in the response tothequestionofrationalityallemphasisusuallyliesonclaims thatwouldbemadewithrespecttoGod. Fromsuchaperspective,thequestionoftherationalityof thereligiousattitudeofFannieLou,forexample,isnotdirected to the rational justification of her political activities but is fo cusedonthequestionifthestatement“Godislove”canbejust ifiedrationally.Thisquestionistobeanswerednegatively,ac cordingtosomeonelikeAnthonyFlewwhoexaminedthisfaith statement in the wellknown debate on theology and falsifica tioninthe1950s.Heshowsthattheexperienceofhopelesssuf feringdrivesChristianstoqualifythestatement“Godislove.” God’s love operates differently, or, as is sometimes asserted, God’s love is incomprehensible to people. According to Flew, thismeansthatthestatement“Godislove”isuntenable,for,in Flews words, it dies the death of “a thousand qualifications.” Afterall,notestcanbeconceivedinwhichthestatementabout Godslovecanbefalsified:ineachcaseofanegativeresultthe believer maintains, after all, that the meaning of the statement “God is love” has been wrongly understood. As a result, ac cording to Flew, this statement cannot be rationally justified (Flew 1966: 9699). Flew thus views religious convictions such as“Godislove”astestablehypothesesthat,likescientificstate ments,shouldbesupportedbygroundsthatarefalsifiable. ThequestionoftherationalityofCatholicpracticecanalso be reduced, from this perspective, to the question if grounds canbegiventosupporttheclaimthatGodispresentinnature (“creation”).Thus,forinstance,RichardDawkins—perhapsthe bestknownatheistatthebeginningofthetwentyfirstcentury —with his book The God Delusion (2006) argues that God did notcreatetheworld.Dawkinsdoesthisbyshowingthatthelife

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sciences provide good grounds that make the hypothesis that God is the creator of the world superfluous. Just like Flew, he thuspresupposesthattheexistenceofGodisascientificques tionandthatonlyscientificallytestedgroundsareadmissible. In a recent book, Breaking the Spell, Daniel Dennett also startswiththepresuppositionthatareligiouspracticemustbe considered a collection of knowledge statements that have to meetcriteriathatarecurrentlyemployedinscience.But,inter estingly,Dennetseesreligionfirstasacomplexsetofphenom ena. In contrast to Flew and Dawkins, Dennett does not auto matically reduce religious practices to statements about a su pernatural reality. Second, by making use of several scientific disciplines, he can evaluate (at least in principle) the different aspectsofareligioustradition. Because religion has elicited the best and worst in human character and in our societies—from selflessness to fanaticism andfromthestruggleforsocialjusticetoreligiouslyinspiredwars —Dennettarguesthatitisnecessarytounderstandthisphenom enon. He wants to study religion scientifically, as an entirely natural phenomenon. In the beginning of his book he defines religions tentatively as “social systems whose participants avowbeliefinasupernaturalagentoragentswhoseapprovalis tobesought”(Dennett2006:9).Inreflectingonthescopeofre ligious practices Dennett admits that the scope of religion is quitebroad.“Itaffectsnotjustoursocial,political,andeconomic conflicts,buttheverymeaningswefindinourlives”(Dennett 2006: 15). And he views this influence positively: religion “makespowerfulandtalentedpeoplemorehumbleandpatient,it makesaveragepeopleriseabovethemselves,itprovidessturdy support for many people who desperately need help staying awayfromdrinkordrugsorcrime”(Dennett2006:55). MorethanFlewandDawkins,Dennettthusseemstoview religionasamultidimensionalphenomenon.Thisnaturalphe nomenoncanandmustbeinvestigatedscientifically.Thatreli gionisanaturalphenomenonmeansthat“religionisnaturalas opposedtosupernatural,thatitisahumanphenomenoncom posed of events, organisms, objects, structures, patterns, and the like that all obey the laws of physics or biology, and hence do not involve miracles” (Dennett 2006: 25). However, to under standreligionasanaturalphenomenondoesnotautomatically

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implythatitisnottruethatGodexists.AccordingtoDennett, God can be the loving creator of us all or the father of Jesus Christ, and yet religion itself, as a complex set of phenomena, canbetotallynatural(Dennett2006:25). In spite of his broad view of religion, in the final analysis Dennettfocusesonthesupernaturaldimensionasthecorephe nomenon of religion: “gods who are effective agents in real time”(Dennett2006:11).Theclaimsmadebytheadherentsofa religious tradition about this supernatural dimension must be investigatedscientifically.1Bydoingthis,thespellofreligion— in which, according to Dennett, American society is caught— canbebroken.Atleastthatiswhat Dennettasserts.Heattrib utes the fact that experts in the area of religious studies have not yet succeeded in scientifically investigating this socalled supernaturaldimensiontotheirhiddenassumptionsandpreju dices: [Scholarsinreligion]eitherwanttodefendtheirfavoritere ligionfromitscriticsorwanttodemonstratetheirrational ityandfutilityofreligion,andthistendstoinfecttheirmeth odswithbias.Suchdistortionisnotinevitable.Scientists… take a variety of triedandtrue steps to prevent their bias frompollutingtheirevidencegathering:doubleblindexperi ments, peer review, statistical tests, and many other stand ardconstraintsofgoodscientificmethod.(Dennett2006:32)

Ifthismethodisappliedfromaneutralperspectivetothephe nomenonofreligion,Dennettthinks,itcaneasilybeshownthat religiousconvictionsareuntenableandcanberefuted.2

1

Accordingtotheblurb,BreakingtheSpellis“thedaringandcontro versialexception”withrespecttothescientificstudyofreligion.Inhis bookDennettsuggestssometimesthatnoscientificinvestigationofreli gionhasoccurredatallyet(Dennett2006:e.g.18,20,31).Nevertheless, heappearstobecompletelyinformedaboutthestatusofcontemporary researchinreligiousstudies.Healsoacknowledgesthediversityofdis ciplinesinthisfieldofstudy(Dennett2006:23f.).However,itisdoubtful ifheunderstandsthecognitivescienceofreligion,forinstance(Geertz 2008). 2

ForacriticismofthispositionseeKoster2009a:4350.

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That religion will prove to be outdated in the light of sci enceissoobviousforDennettthatheissurprisedthatreligion has still not disappeared centuries after the emergence of the modernsciences.Hisexplanationforthatrevolvesaroundwhat hecalls“beliefinbelief”:religionplayssuchanimportantrole forpeoplethatitisnotsubjectedtocriticalquestioning,letalone seriousscientificresearchintothetenabilityofreligion(Dennett 2006:20046).Inaddition,arefutationofChristianitycouldlead tothebreakdownofthemoralsystem.Thus,thereistoomuch at stake, and people understand this: they consciously do not ask any questions about contradictions within their faith—ac cordingtoDennett(Dennet2006:20810). ThequestionisifDennett’sanalysisisadequate.Howcan intelligent people seem to be prepared to allow, without any further ado—in Dennett’s view—blatant and fundamental in consistenciestoexistalongsideoneanother?Dotheyreallydo that because they are afraid that our moral system will other wisebeputatriskandthussocialcohesion,whichwasachieved withdifficultysometimes,willbelost?Andis,furthermore,his panacea, i.e. that the scientific investigation of religion will re movedangerslikefundamentalisticintoleranceandreligiously justifiedviolence,notan illusion?Ishisviewoftherangeand impactofscientificresearchnotsimplynaive? Dennett’s book is interesting because his analyses invoke questions like these, even though he does not ask those ques tions himself. His work offers openings in which tensions be tween different ways of looking at reality are made tangible. ThatisanoptionthatDennettdoesnotdiscuss,i.e.thatareli gious view of the world—on the level of bedrock assumptions —isintensionwitha(natural)scientificview.Dennettresolves thistensionbyfinallyapproachingthecomplexphenomenonof religionasavariantofscientificthinking.Thatappearspatently obvious from the passages in which he writes about the in comprehensibilityofGod.Heviewstheacknowledgementofa mysteryattheheartoffaithconvictionsasaconsciousattempt to make them immune to criticism and thus to remove them fromscientificformsoftesting(Dennett2006:16465,21621). Thepostulationofinvisible,undetectableeffectsthat(unlike atomsandgerms)aresystematicallyimmunetoconfirmation

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CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE or disconfirmation is so common in religions that such ef fectsaresometimestakenasdefinitive.(Dennett2006:164) ThefundamentalincomprehensibilityofGodisinsistedup on as a central tenet of faith, and the propositions in ques tionarethemselvesdeclaredtobesystematicallyelusiveto everybody.(Dennett2006:220)

The possible tension between scientific language and religious language,betweenthesearchforfactsandthesearchformean ingisthuscompletelyignoredbyDennett.Thiscouldbedueto Dennett’snegativevaluationofthephenomenonofreligion.It isconceivablethatsomeonewhodoesnotseetranscendenceas adeliberateattemptatimmunizationbutasafundamentalchar acteristicofChristianity willcometoadifferentvaluationand not,perhaps,smoothoutthetensionbetweenreligionandsci ence.InthenextsectionIwillexplorethisquestionbymeansof theworkofaprominentChristianapologist. RationalJustificationandChristianBelief: TheEvidentialValueofReligiousExperience? The question of the rationality of religion is thus usually fo cusedonthatoftherationalityoffaithconvictions.Inmostcases, theseconvictionsarepartofreligiouspracticesand,inthatsense, thisfocusislegitimate.Fromthepointofviewoftheepistemol ogyofreligionthisfocusisunderstandable:epistemologydoes researchthenatureofknowledge,andconvictionsdoclaimtocon tain knowledge about reality. That is why it is a matter of course to inquire into the grounds for faith convictions and to investigate whether faith convictions arise in a reliable way or not. Theonewhohasgonefurthesthereinthedefenseofthera tionality of the Christian faith is undoubtedly Richard Swin burne.Thisretiredprofessorofthe“PhilosophyoftheChristian Religion”atOxfordisoneofthemostwellknowndefendersof theclaimthatreligiousconvictionscanbejustifiedepistemolo gically.HepresupposesthattheexistenceofGodmustbeseen as a hypothesis that—just as in the natural sciences—can be madecredibleviainductivemethodsofargumentation.Using, amongotherthings,Bayes’probabilityformula,Swinburnede monstrates,forexample,thattheprobabilitythat“Godbecame

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incarnateinJesusChristwhorosefromthedead”isveryhigh given all the evidence that we have and the already present backgroundknowledge—is,namely,“somethinglike0.97”(Swin burne2003:214). TogiveaproperideaofSwinburne’swayofarguing,Iwill discusshissocalled“PrincipleofCredulity.”Amongotherthings, Swinburneusesthisconcept—whichcomesfromThomasReid —todefendtheevidentialvalueofreligiousexperiences.He de finesreligiousexperienceasanexperience“whichseemstothe subjecttobeanawarenessorperceptionofGod,orsomeother supernatural reality” (Swinburne 1981: 182). Swinburne sub sequently enumerates five different types of religious experi ence, of which I will give only the first two. The first is an ex perienceofGodoranothersupernaturalrealityinaneveryday nonreligiousobject.Someonelooks,forexample,atthestarsin thenightskyand(suddenly)seesthemashavingbeenmadeby God. The second is an experience of completely unusual phe nomena.Asanexample,Swinburnepointstotheappearanceof Jesus—consideredtobe dead—tohisdisciples,asdescribedin the gospel of Luke. Swinburne describes the appearance as a “publicevent.”Thedisciplessawamanwhoboreastrongre semblance to Jesus and, when they saw this, had the religious experience of having encountered the risen Christ (Swinburne 1981:18385). According to Swinburne, the “Principle of Credulity” ob tainsforsuchreligiousexperiences:“Isuggestthatitisaprinci pleofrationalitythat(intheabsenceofspecialconsiderations), ifitseems(epistemically)toasubjectthatanobjectxispresent, thenprobablyxispresent”(Swinburne1981:186).Hethusclaims that establishing what something seems to be is good grounds for stating what something actually is. He then argues that the application of this principle—which has common sense on its side—is admissible in all areas, thus also religious experience. Butthelatterisfarfromobvious.Ifwegobacktotheexamplebe longing to the second type of religious experience that Swin burneenumerates—thatoftheidentificationofamanstronglyre sembling Jesus as the risen Christ—it then becomes clear that thisisaninterpretationthatcouldalsobeaprojectionofthebe liever. How often has Mary appeared? According to Swin

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burne’s criterium, she has perhaps appeared even more often thantheRomanCatholicChurchacknowledges. ButSwinburnemustbegivensomecreditonthispoint,for hedoesstatethattherecanbe“specialconsiderations”thathin der such identifications. What considerations does he have in mind?Swinburnedifferentiatesbetweenfourdifferentcircum stances whereby the Principle of Credulity does not hold: the unreliability of the perceiver, the perception of an object that proved to be incorrect under comparable circumstances, the possibilityofmakingitverycrediblethatxcouldnotbepresent or was not the cause of the experience in question (Swinburne 1981: 19092). Swinburne then attempts to demonstrate that noneofthecircumstancesapplyinthecaseofreligiousexperi ence. Swinburne is too brief when discussing the first three cir cumstances or else puts the onus of proof on his (imaginary) atheistic dialogue partner (cf. Koster 2005: 40810). Here I will deal only with the way in which Swinburne attempts to dis provethefourthpossibleobjectiontothePrincipleofCredulity, namelythattherealityvalueofareligiousexperienceisatstake if it can be shown that the religious experience has another cause than God. But in the case of God that is, according to Swin burne,impossible: For there are two possible ways in which God might have causedmyexperiences—byinterveningintheoperationof naturallaws,orbybringingabouttheoperationofthelaws asaresultofwhichIhavetheexperience.(Swinburne1981: 194)

Accordingtothisview,Godisthusalwaystobeenteredasthe causalfactorbehindit.Thisclaimcanbedefended“logically.” The price that is to be paid for this logical reasoning is that Swinburnemakeshisviewimmunetocriticism.Empiricalproof, afterall,addsnothinginthecaseofestablishingthecauseofare ligiousexperience.ForthatreasonSwinburne’spositionisplaus ibleonlytothosewhosharehisstartingpoints(cf.Koster2005: 40511). Swinburne thus gives a rational account of the Christian faith.Heisconcernedwiththeprobabilityofbarefactsoffaith, separatefromthepracticeinwhichthesefaithconvictionsfunc tion.Hepresentshisargumentinanaloofway,asifhisreason

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ingstandsentirelyonitsownandleadseveryonewhofollows therulesoflogictothesameresults.Butthatdoesnotproveto bethecase.AcertaincommitmenttotheChristianfaithispre supposed. A leap of faith is necessary to be able to subscribe to Swinburne’sargument.Thisappearstobeclearestatthepoint thathisreasoningassumesatautologicalcharacter. With Swinburne, the tension between the language of the believer and that of the theoretically thinking epistemologist has beenresolved.Althoughhe,asanapologist,doesnot,likeDen nett, view something like transcendence negatively, his ap proachdoesleadtoanargumentinwhichfaithstatementsare considered“highlyprobable”andwherebythedecisiontopar ticipateinareligiouspracticeisjustifiedthroughlogicalreason ing. Another recent thinker who also sees transcendence as a fundamentalconceptwithinChristianity,PaulMoser,connects theelusivenessofGodwiththeattempttoformulateanobjec tive rational reconstruction of the Christian faith (Moser 2008; cf. Koster 2009b). The commitment that such thinkers presup poseisnotvisiblyconnectedwithdeepfeelingsofdependence. And it is precisely these feelings and experiences that seem to informthereligiouspracticeoftheblackchurchandCatholics: the commitment of Fannie Lou Hamer comes from the experi enceofbeingtoucheddeepwithinhersoulandtheinspiration that has led to the variegated imagination of Catholics origin atesinalivedfeelingofwonder.Ithereforeconcludethatpar ticipationinthereligiouspracticeoftheblackchurchandofthe Catholics cannot be justified by a rational proof like Swin burne’s. CredibilityofReligiousPractices In the previous two sections we saw that people like Dennett andSwinburnereducereligiouspracticetoacollectionofstate ments on the supernatural, the rationality of which can (Swin burne) or cannot (Dennett) be demonstrated. They treat reli giousstatementsliketestablehypotheses.ThequestionifChris tianfaith isreasonableisthustransformedintothequestionif Christianconvictionscanberationallyorevenscientificallyjust ified.Butthisdoesnotdoanyjusticetothereligiouspracticeof thebeliever(cf.Wittgenstein1966andVroom1989:30120).By focusingonthe(im)possibilityofarationaljustificationofreli

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gious convictions and experiences (separated from their con texts),thequestionofthemeaningofreligiouspracticesinwhich suchconvictionsandexperiencesfunctionisignored.Thatques tionmustfirstbeposed,foritcanthenbeclarifiedifprofound argumentationslikeSwinburnesaremeaningfulandifresearch asproposedbyDennettshouldbecarriedout. Tounderstandreligiouspracticeonecannotignoretherea sonsandgroundsthatpeoplehavetoparticipateintheseprac tices.Thecharacterandthefunctionofsuchpractices,theirpre suppositionsandconditionsofpossibilitycanbederivedthrough acarefulanalysisoftheparticipants’actions,attitudes,andmo tives.Thequestionofthereasonabilityofareligiouspracticeis thus approached by distilling the meaning of the practice, de scribingthecharacterandfunction,andmakingthepresupposi tions and conditions of possibility visible. “Reasonableness” is thusunderstoodintermsof“credibility.”Icangiveonlyarough indicationofthequestionofthecredibilityofChristianfaithin this section, relying partly on my own experiences and intui tions,andonlyforthepracticesdescribedinthefirstsection. If we look now at the two examples with which I began this essay, we should note that religious practices are complex phenomenathatcannotbereducedtoacollectionofstatements about a supernatural reality or attitudes of absolute obedience andsubjectiontoasetofoutdated—fromacontemporaryper spective—or even backward commandments. Fannie Lou Ha mer’s strong desire for a just society seems to be borne by the love of God, as emerges from the stories about Jesus. That de sire results in a courageous attitude and becoming actively in volved. The practice of Roman Catholic Christians is based on theconvictionthatGodispresentin“creation”andthatthispres encebreaksthroughintheliturgy,amongotherthings.Theen chanted imagination—which is continually reinforced through developmentsbothinthechurch(asintheliturgyandthesacra ments) and outside it (in the area of, for example, art, music, andarchitecture)—makesthisfaithpossible(Greeley2000:e.g. 1621, 18388). The religious experience of the members of the blackchurchisaninspiringstimulustogiveformtoonesown world, whereas the religious practice of the Catholic Church invokesaimaginativeworldthatgivesalloflifeitscolourand form.

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Whoever has dismantled the presupposition that the rea sonableness of a religious practice is based on rational argu ments and has gotten on to the track of the meaning of these practicescanposethequestionofwhatexactlythedecisivefac tor is that constitutes the credibility and appeal of religious prac tices. The struggle for a just society that Fannie Lou Hamer is conducting, her desire for a world that is in accord with the “Kingdom of Jesus” is—my argument goes—not a question of knowledge,ofgivingarationaljustification.Itisremainingfaithful in proclamation to an essential event (Otten 2009; cf. Badiou 2003). What she has read in the Gospel and heard during that decisivemeetingwithacivilrightsactiviststampedherlife.To thatstoryandthateventsheremainsfaithful.Shecannotjustify that faithfulness theoretically: her attitude and her actions are basedonanonnegotiablecommitment.Whatbelongstosucha commitment is not rational argumentation but a witness that must be proclaimed and can have a contagious effect. That emergesnicelyinthestorySchamatellsaboutthebustriptoIn dianolathatFannie Lou andotherstaketodemandtheirright to vote (Schama 2008: 21315). They meet with adversity—to state it mildly. At the moment that everyone is almost desper ate,FannieLouwitnessestoherhope: But then, from somewhere in the back of the bus, a sound started; a voice, pure and low, just easing out into the air; FannieLou’svoice.“Thislittlelightofmine,”itsang, I’mgonnaletitshine Thislittlelightofmine I’mgonnaletitshine And the voices joined in. They were sovereign; invincible. They had the Lord with them. They would overcome. (Schama2008:215)

Herfaithprovesitselfnotviaascientificinsightthatisdemon strated through experiment, which has survived the journey past the different correction mechanisms such as peer review andreplication(Koster2009a:4547)andmustthusbeaccepted astheresultofalogicalinference.Herfaithstartswiththecon viction that there is a story to which she must remain faithful, aneventthroughwhichsheissetinmotionandcansetothers in motion. The most subjective and most unusual can be uni

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versal(cf.Koster2010).InthewordsoftheDutchessayistWil liamJanOtten, Precisely through remaining faithful to the understanding that it is not a fact, not a provable theory, not a law of na ture—preciselythroughthat,andonlythencanthetruthbe activeineveryone,alwaysandeverywhere.(Otten2009:75)

Thereasonthatsheholdsontoherreligiouspractice thushas to do with faithfulness to an event that cannot be theoretically grounded but can be refuted or confirmed (“empirical fit”; cf. Koster2005:40003). In the second example, the practice of Roman Catholic Christians,wefindthedecisivefactorbyaskinghowtheCath olics succeed in temporarily turning off the skepticism that in evitably accompanies the enchanted imagination. How can a Catholic bear the tension between the view based on science and that based on religious experience? For she knows about explanationsviathe(natural)sciencesbutneverthelesspartici pates in the rituals of the church. She knows that the effect of baptismorthemysteryoftransubstantiationcannotbejustified rationally in terms of natural science but recognizes that these sacramentshavetheirownvalueandfunctionwithinreligious practice.ThereligiouspracticeoftheCatholic,asappearsfrom my analysis of the work of Dennet and Swinburne, does not haveanyscientificrationalitybutdoeshave—becauseoftheen chantedimagination—akindofcredibility.Thiscredibilitydoes nothaveanythingtodowiththeattempttoofferacomprehen sive and consistent theoretical explanation. It is not based on “ordinary grounds” (Wittgenstein 1966: 5358). It does have to dowiththeattempttomarkandindicatecrucialmomentsina human life (such as birth, becoming an adult, marriage, sick ness,loneliness,lossofmeaninganddeath).Becauseoftherit ualsthatareperformedinthecommunionofbelievers,Catho licsexpresstheirdesiretodealwiththeexistentialquestionsof lifeinagenuineway.Theirreligiouspracticedoesnotgiveany answerstosuchquestionsbutare“appropriateresponses”that make it possible to endure and celebrate life. These responses donotrequireanydeepscientificresearchbutanattitudethat fitsinthebroadercontextoftheirlives(DeDijn2006:5056,62; cf.DeDijn1996).

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Thecredibilityofthesetworeligiouspracticescannotthus beestablishedbyatheoreticalorempiricaldemonstration.Nev ertheless,thatdoesnotmeanthattheunderstandingortheex perienceisexcluded.Abelieverthinksdifferently,organizeshis life in a particular way, has “different pictures” (Wittgenstein 1966:55).Byreflectingonthemeaningofthesepractices,estab lishingtheirfunctionandpresuppositions,andmakingthecon ditionsforpossibilityexplicit,thequestionofcredibilitycanbe approached and be framed as an “internal or different logic.” This logic places the unique in the foreground, proceeds from the enchanted imagination and revolves around the existential questions of life. If these conclusions can lead to a “general theoryofreligion”andhowthereasonablenessofreligionisre latedtoformsofscientificrationalitymustemergefromcontin uingresearch. Bibliography Badiou,A.(2003).SaintPaul:TheFoundationofUniversalism.Stanford: StanfordUniversityPress. Dawkins,R.(2006).TheGodDelusion.London:BantamPress. DeDijn,H.(2006).Religieinde21steeeuw:Kleinehandleidingvoorvoor entegenstanders.Kapellen:Pelckmans. (1996).“BroadEthicsandBroadReligion.”In:M.M.Olivetti(ed.). Philosophiedelareligionétiqueetontology.Milan:Cedam.Pp.527 42. Dennett, D.C. (2006). Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenom enon.London:PenguinBooks. Flew, A.G.N. (1966). “Theology and Falsification.” In: A.G.N. Flew and A.C. MacIntyre (eds.). New Essays in Philosophical Theology. London:SCMPress.Pp.9699,10708. Geertz,A.W.(2008).“HowNottoDotheCognitiveScienceofReligion Today.”MethodandTheoryintheStudyofReligion20:721. Greeley,A. (2000).TheCatholicImagination.Berkeleyetal.:University ofCaliforniaPress. Koster, E. (2010). “’Show, Don’t Tell’: The (Ir)rationality of Religious Stories.”Forthcoming. (2009a). “Taking Religion Seriously? Wentzel van Huyssteen on RationalityinScienceandTheology.”ArsDisputandi9:3150. (2009b).ReviewofPaulK.Moser.TheElusiveGod:ReorientingRe ligiousEpistemology.Bijdragen70/3:37778.

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(2005). In betovering gevangen? Over verhaal en rationaliteit, religie enirrationaliteit.Budel:Damon. Moser, P.K. (2008). The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Otten,W.J.(2009).“Dezedriewoorden.”Trouw(30May):7377. Schama,S.(2008).TheAmericanFuture:AHistory.London:TheBodley Head. Swinburne, R. (2003). The Resurrection of God Incarnate. Oxford: Clar endonPress. (1981). “The Evidential Value of Religious Experience.” In: A.R. Peacocke(ed.),TheSciencesandTheologyintheTwentiethCentury. Stocksfieldetal.:OrielPress.Pp.18296. Vroom,H.M.(1989).ReligionsandtheTruth:PhilosophicalReflectionsand Perspectives.GrandRapids/Amsterdam:Eerdmans/Rodopi. Wittgenstein,L.(1966).“LecturesonReligiousBelief.”In:L.Wittgen stein.LecturesandConversationsonAesthetics,PsychologyandReli giousBelief.Ed.C.Barrett.Oxford: BasilBlackwell.Pp.5372.

AmorMundiina(Post)LiberalEra TheRelevanceofanArendtianTheme forChristianSelfUnderstandingToday RonaldA.Kuipers

Onlythroughasympatheticandcriticalexchangeofviewsofwhatis really and legitimately desirable can peace, coherence, and solidarity bemaintainedinoursocieties.Roomforindividualstolivetheirspe cificwaysoflifeandtheneedforacommonresponsibilityforonean othershouldbebroughtintobalanceverycarefully—andthatcannot bedonebyneglectingworldviewtraditions. (Vroom1997:341)

Abstract Privatization,theliberalpoliticalstrategyforhandlingreligiousdifferences, has been criticized for hegemonically privileging a secularist worldview and forrefusingtoprovidefullpublicscopetothepluralityofreligioustraditions thatexistincontemporarydemocraticsocieties.Fortheseandotherreasons, itisimportanttoexplorealternativestoprivatizationthatdonottherebyne glecttheimportanceofmaintainingcitizensolidarityinthesesocieties.This essayexploresthepotentialthatamormundi,afundamentalthemeofHan nahArendt’spoliticalphilosophy,hasforaddressingthisvexingissue.Indo ingso,italsoaskswhetherArendt’sthematizationofthehumanpositionbe tween past and future, amidst the demise of tradition, holds any lessons for contemporaryChristians.Whatwoulditmeanfortoday’sChristiantolovea world that has, for both good and ill, become what it is, from out of a past that remains to be discovered, in its full plurality and natal potentiality? CanChristianfaith,attheendoftheday,dowithoutamormundi?

LovingourShrunken,EnlargedWorld The world human beings share is becoming both smaller and bigger, and for the same reason. The reason (or perhaps rea sons)Iamreferringtoisthatmotleycollectionofsocial,polit ical, economic, and technological developments that today go 85

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underthelabels“globalization”and“globalism”(seeScheuer man2002).1Sofar,wehavetendedtoseethesedevelopments asprimarilyworldshrinking.Afterall,thefactthatinamatter ofmerehours,providedIhavesufficienteconomicmeans,Ican hoponanairplaneinTorontoandflytoAmsterdam,Kyoto,or Sao Paulo, does seem to make the world smaller. So too does the fact that, simply by picking up a telephone receiver or typingafewcharactersintoanetworkedcomputer,Icancom municate instantly with people at all points of the globe. I can invest in mutual funds whose managers trade in abstract, hy brideconomicproductsIcannotevenbegintounderstand,the accumulatedtradeofwhichcansparkglobaltrendsthatarea ble to enrich or immiserate entire national economies. We live inaworldwhereindeeditisnothardtoimaginehowthepro verbialflapofabutterfly’swingsononesidecanbringabouta hurricaneontheother. Observations such as these are commonplace today. They makeiteasytoseehowourworldhasbecomesmaller.Yethow oftenhavewepausedtoconsidertheirenlargingeffects?How have these developments made our world—yours, mine, hers, his—bigger? It is important to ask this kind of question, becausethissideofglobalizationalsopresentsformidablechal lenges to the worldwide effort to achieve, and in some fortun atecasesmaintain,“peace,coherence,andsolidarityinourso cieties.” Paradoxically put, I want to say that precisely in get ting smaller, our world has gotten bigger. That is to say, be cause the world has gotten smaller, global humanity has been confronted with the facts of pluralism and difference to a de greethatisperhapshistoricallyunprecedented.Theworldhas gotten bigger because the exotic stranger whom we once thought we could safely ignore now lives next door, so to speak.Thisfactaloneexertsnewpressuresonwhatevercitizen

1

Notingthattheword“globalization”isoftenusedasanumbrella termfordistinctsocial,political,andeconomictrends,Scheuermangoes ontoexplainthat“mostcontemporarysocialtheoristsendorsetheview thatglobalizationreferstofundamentalchangesinthespatialandtem poralcontoursofsocialexistence,accordingtowhichthesignificanceof spaceorterritoryundergoesshiftsinthefaceofanolessdramaticaccel erationinthetemporalstructureofcrucialformsofhumanactivity.”

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solidarityoursocietieshavebeenabletoachieve;itboththreat ens that coherence and increases the urgency of developing new,moreinclusiveformsofit(seetheessaysinTaylor1994). Given this state of affairs, Hendrik Vroom is surely right (intheepigraphcitedabove)tosuggestthattheliberalstrategy forhandlingdifference,aformofprivatizationthatneglectsthe publicsalienceofapluralityofworldviewtraditions(religious and otherwise), will do little to contribute to the sympathetic andcriticaldialogueweneedinordertoachievethehealthyform of social solidarity our pluralistic societies require. Yet to take these worldview traditions seriously in both their particularity and plurality also implies a willingness to risk courting social fragmentation.  In cultivating a public space in which these traditionsandtheindividualsthatbelongtothemmayactand appear,thereisnoguaranteethatthesesamesocialactorswill continue the work of preserving a space that makes room for this very plurality and particularity in the first place. Yet, as I willargue,thisisariskwemustbewillingtoundertake,iffor nootherreasonthanthatneglectingthepublicsalienceofthese differencesisinherentlyunjust. Ontheothersideofthecoin,increasinglevelsofinnerso cietal pluralism the world over present both individuals and communities with opportunities for relating to and engaging withnearbystrangersthatalsohavethepotentialtoenlargeand enrichthementalityof“established”communities.Accordingto the social theorist Iain Chambers, many of us may choose to refuse the consequences of these globalizing processes, in which case “racism, xenophobia and virulent nationalism are always readytoprovidethelanguagesofcomprehension….”Butour destiny,heinsists,“isclearlyelsewhere”(Chambers1994:109).2 While there can be no question that this relatively new social reality disturbs previously settled notions of cultural identity, includingthehistories,traditions,and languagesthatinform them, this situation, as Chambers insists, is not only one of crisis,butalsoopportunity.

2

SeeHuntington1998foracontrastingpointofviewaccordingto whichtheemergenceofsuchpluralismcombinedwithotherglobalizing pressuresdestineshumankindforviolentconflict.

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 In my home country of Canada, for example,suchhistor icalfactorsasitsconstitutionbytwofoundingnations,English and French (to the exclusion of the First Nations that already inhabited its vast expanse), has over time eventually led to a concerted effort at the federal political level to nurture a fluid ratherthanfixedsenseofnationalidentityandcitizenship,one that could help strike a difficult balance between citizen soli darity, on the one hand, and the mutual recognition of impor tantlinguisticandculturaldifferences,ontheother.Thiseffort cametoaheadinthelatterhalfofthetwentiethcenturywhen in the early 1970s the Liberal government of Pierre Elliot Tru deau adopted an official policy of multiculturalism in order to recognizeCanada’sinternaldiversityand,insodoing,tomove beyondthepredominanceofCanada’sBritishcolonialheritage. Aprocessthatgrewoutofthisnation’seffortstorecognizethe distinct cultures of two founding nations eventually expanded into an effort to come to terms, first, with expanded European immigration,thenwiththewoefulhistoricaltreatmentofCan ada’s First Nations, and finally today with the influx of immi grants from all parts of the globe. The results of this official policyofmulticulturalismhavebeenmixed.The“challengesof recognition”(asIamtempted,followingCharlesTaylor,tocall them)itseekstomeetareongoingsocialandpoliticalconcerns inthiscountry,andthemanysocialjusticeissuestheyraiseare farfrombeingsettledtothesatisfactionofall,especiallythose who find themselves on the outside looking in. These chal lengescontinuetoexertpressureonafragile,becausepurpose lyfluid,senseofnationalidentity.Forthisreason,theeffortto strikeadifficultbalancebetweencitizensolidarityandmutual recognitionofculturaldifferencesremainsaperpetualresponsi bilityforthepeopleofthiscountry.3 This everincreasing internal diversity presents Canada withchallengesformaintainingpeaceandsolidaritywithinits borders that, while somewhat unique to it, are not unlike the challenges many other Western, not to mention nonWestern, countries face (see Kymlicka 2007). Recent dramatic events in the Netherlands have been well documented in the English 3

ForanexampleofsuchongoingworkintheprovinceofQuebec seeBouchardandTaylor2008.

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speakingworld(seeBuruma2007).But,asIhavealreadysug gested,thissituationisnotsimplyoronlyacrisis;itisalsoan opportunity.Again,Chambersgivesusagoodsenseofthisop portunity when he suggests that the disruption to an estab lished sense of identity that is caused when those previously consideredperipheralandmarginalemergeatthe“center”al so bears within itself new possibilities that we might come to findwelcome.Withtherapidlydiversifyingurbanlandscapein mind, he suggests that the modern metropolitan figure is no longerthecolonialmaster,butratherthemigrant: [S]heandhearetheactiveformulatorsofmetropolitanaes theticsandlifestyles,reinventingthelanguagesandappro priating the streets of the master. This presence disturbs a previous order. Such an interruption enlarges the potential as the urban script is rewritten and an earlier social order andculturalauthorityisnowturnedinsideoutanddispersed. All is revealed in the dexterity of moulding the languages ofmodernityandcultivatingthecityaccordingtodifferent rhythms,makingitmovetoadiversebeat.(Chambers1994: 23)

Chambers here notes how, at a minimum, traditionally inher itedscriptsareundergoingprocessesofsignificantrevision.Yet they are not simply being thrown out. As K. Anthony Appiah suggests, the new postcolonial forms of identity that are emergingbothmakeuseofavailableculturalscriptsandyetdo soinawaythatdesiresnottobe“tootightlyscripted”(Appiah 1994:163). To some degree, both Appiah and Chambers recognize that none of us weaves our identity out of whole cloth. In Chambers’words:“Noneofuscansimplychooseanotherlang uage,asthoughwecouldcompletelyabandonourprevioushis tory and freely opt for another one.” Instead, he notes, “What wehaveinherited—asculture,ashistory,aslanguage,astradi tion, as a sense of identity—is not destroyed but taken apart, openeduptoquestioning,rewritingandrerouting”(Chambers 1994: 24). Chambers here highlights one particularly salient wayinwhichthehumancondition“betweenpastandfuture” emerges for many people today. The question is not whether

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wewilltakeupaparticularculturalinheritance,butratherhow wemightcometodoso. The zone we now inhabit is open, full of gaps: an excess thatisirreducibletoasinglecentre,origin,orpointofview. In these intervals, and the punctuation of our lives, other stories,languagesandidentitiescanalsobeheard,encoun tered,andexperienced.(Chambers1994:24)

Chambershereattemptstoportraythecontemporarycontextof pluralism and diversity in such a way as to encourage us to make these potentially unsettling facts welcome. He wants his readertoseetheopportunityforpersonalgrowthandidentity formationinthesenovelfactsofcontemporaryexistence,asop posedtothethreatsorriskstheymayalsocarrywiththem. InthisessayIwanttoexplorewhateffectoreffectssuchan enlarged world might conceivably have on a Christian’s sense of their religious identity. Is it possible for today’s Christian to find such an enlarged world a welcome one? Or, in order to preserve their religious identity, must they refuse this world and rely on a more traditional and exclusive (not to mention exclusionary) “language of comprehension”? What would it meanforChristianstolovesuchaworld?Cantheydosowhile maintaining a filial connection to the traditions they cherish andhopetopassalongtofuturegenerations? Iproposetoexplorethesequestionsbywayofexamining Hannah Arendt’s affirmation of the plural public world, that arenaofactioninwhichpeopletogetherandintheirdiversity maychoosetocareforandbuildacommonhome,onefitforall to live in, and in which nobody is considered superfluous.4 I understandthisaffirmationtobeArendt’sparticularamormun di,herloveoftheworld.DoesArendt’samormundiholdales son for Christian selfunderstanding today? Does her work in this area suggest a hope and a possibility that may resonate withChristiansastheyliveouttheirfaith,“crosspressured”as they often are between loyalty to their religious tradition, on

4

Onthemodernproblemofconsideringpeoplesuperfluous,see Arendt1968a:459.

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theonehand,andthecrisesthatArendtclaimsourmodernage hasvisitedupontraditionassuchontheother?5 Inordertoanswerquestionslikethese,Iwillfirstexplore thewayArendtthematizesmodernhumanity’srelationshipto the past. I do so especially because Arendt’s thoughts on this score help us understand the various features of the modern crisesofmeaningandidentitythatflowfromwhatsheseesas the failure of tradition in the twentieth century, a failure that includes religious tradition. We will see that Arendt makes an important distinction between tradition and the past, one that she thinks lets us maintain a crucial memorial passage to the past.MaintainingsuchapassageiscrucialforArendtbecause, firstofall,memorygivesthoughtrootsthatkeepitfrombeing blownaboutbydestructivesocietaltrends;secondly,thepastis never simply past; and finally, the past harbors forgotten pos sibilitiesthatdominanttraditionshaveoftenservedtoobscure, possibilitiesthatmayhelpusthroughourpresentcrises.Inthe end,Arendt’sconcerntofindawaytoallowthepasttospeakto thecrisesofthepresentexhibitsanimportantfacetofheramor mundi.  These explorations of the past, in fact, return us to the worldofthepresentmorereadytotakeuptheresponsibilities thatconfrontusthere,because,asweshallsee,forArendtthe forceofthepastconsistsintheverypresenceofbeginningsthat itbestows(YoungBruehl1982:496).6 TheworldArendtasksustoloveisaworldthatiswhatit has become, for both good and ill. We must face its darkness squarely, making a place for those unwelcome facts that have comehometoroost,justaswedoforthosethatwefindmore comely.Whatisperhapsmostshockingtothesensitivereader of Arendt is that, throughout her profound explorations into

5

Onthematterof“crosspressure”seeTaylor2007:ch.16.Onthe crisisoftraditioninthemodernperiodseeArendt2006:ch.1,“Tradition andtheModernAge.” 6 ThisishowYoungBruehlsummarizesArendt’sunderstanding of the force of the past, in contradistinction to Heidegger’s notion of “throwness.” See YoungBruehl 1982: 496: “Heidegger presented the ‘throwness’ofmantowarddeath,hisheadlongrushintothefuturethat comes toward him, but he did not present the force of the past, the presenceofbeginnings.”

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the darkness and evil at work in the unprecedented atrocities thathumanbeingshavecommittedoverthecoursethetwenti ethcentury,shedoesnotultimatelygiveintopessimismorcyn icism but maintains a hope for transformation and the mir aculousbirthofnewpossibility(seeArendt1958:247).7Whatis more,shediscoversthiscapacityinandthroughherverymin ingforthetreasuresofthepast.Istherenot,then,alessonfor today’s Christian in the hope expressed in Arendt’s amor mundi? TheForceofthePast:ThePresenceofBeginnings Beforeturningtothislessoninthefinalsectionofthisessay,I willfirstexploreArendt’sparticularunderstandingoftheway thatmodernWesternsocietiesaresituatedwithrespecttotheir past.Shearguesthatpeopleinthesesocietiesnowliveinatime ofcrisis,oneofwhosemainfeaturesisthetotalbreakdownof thetraditionsofreligion,morality,andpoliticsthatoncefirmly connectedthesepeopletotheirpast,anduponwhosecultural, pedagogical, semantic, and spiritual resources they could rely for the appropriate formation of individual conscience and social solidarity. For Arendt, the terrible reigns of totalitarian governmentsinthetwentiethcenturyhaveputpaidtotheidea that modern Western persons retain any kind of strong connectiontothesetraditionsastheyexistedattheirmostvital moments. In the case of Nazi Germany, Arendt offers the followinganalysis: It was as though morality, at the very moment of its total collapsewithinanoldandhighlycivilizednation,stoodre vealedintheoriginalmeaningoftheword,asasetofmores, ofcustomsandmanners,whichcouldbeexchangedforan othersetwithnomoretroublethanitwouldtaketochange thetablemannersofawholepeople.(Arendt2003a:43)

7  See BowenMoore 1989: 19: “The attitude of amor mundi views both the world and one’s natality from the perspective of faith and hope.”InemphasizingthismorehopefulsideofArendt’swork,Irealize Iamdeflectingattentionawayfromamorepessimistic,elitiststrainin herthought.Foranexcellentexplorationofthetensionbetweenthese twomomentsseeCanovan1978.

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ForArendt,thepoliticalatrocitiesofthetwentiethcenturyfully exposed the breakdown of Western moral tradition, a break down that, as Nietzsche’s criticisms of nineteenthcentury Eu ropean bourgeois hypocrisy emphasize, occurred well before these catastrophic events took place. Yet for her, the unpre cedented and incomprehensible rise of totalitarian domination inthetwentiethcenturyhasuppedtheante;ithas“brokenthe continuityofOccidentalhistory”withacertainunprecedented finality.Theriseoftotalitariandominationhasseveredourcon nectiontotraditionbyintroducing“crimes”thatarenotsuscep tible to judgment according to traditional moral standards or legal frameworks. “The break in our tradition,” she therefore solemnly proclaims, “is now an accomplished fact” (Arendt 2006:26). It is important to understand the precise way in which Arendt considers this breakdown of tradition to be a crisis for us.Withthelossoftradition,shesays, wehavelostthethreadwhichsafelyguidedusthroughthe vastrealmsofthepast….[I]tcannotbedeniedthatwithout asecurelyanchoredtradition—andthelossofthissecurity occurredseveralhundredyearsago—thewholedimension ofthepasthasalsobeenendangered.(Arendt2006:94)

But why is this endangerment a problem? Pace many of her critics, Arendt does not simply wish to glorify the past.8 Yet while she is no conservative defender of tradition per se, she doesworrythatthebreakdownoftraditionhasthepotentialto severuscompletelyfromourpast. Weareindangerofforgetting,andsuchanoblivion—quite apart from the contents themselves that could be lost— would mean that, humanly speaking, we would deprive ourselves of one dimension, the dimension of depth in hu manexistence.(Arendt2006:94)

8 CarefulreadersofArendt,suchasDanaVilla,agreeonthispoint, eventhough,forexample,Arendt’spoliticalphilosophyisoftencriti cizedforharboringanelitist,antimodernnostalgiafortheGreekpolis. Forarefutationofthiscriticism,andanalternativeunderstandingofthe wayArendtseekstominethepast,seeVilla2007,esp.985.IthankChris Allersforbringingthisarticletomyattention.

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As we shall see, Arendt thinks that it is vitally important for humanexistencethatweretain,anddonotlose,thisdimension ofdepth. The importance of this depth dimension surfaces in her late essay, “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy,” in which she closely links the activities of remembering and thinking. Rememberingandthinkingareconnectedbecauseourabilityto remember depends upon our ability to think through our ex periencesbywayofaninnerdialogue:“Noonecanremember whathehasnotthoughtthroughintalkingaboutitwithhim self” (Arendt 2003b: 94). We are now in a position to see why Arendtunderstandstheoblivionofforgettingtobesodanger ous,andwhyshethinksthemaintenanceofmemoryissoim portant. The person who refuses to remember, she claims, is “readytodoanything,”inmuchthesamewaythatthecourage of one who immediately forgets the experience of pain may quicklyslideintorecklessness(Arendt2003b:94).Takingsuffi cient account of the early phase of Arendt’s intellectual trajec tory (as Dana Villa councils her readers to do), we quickly see the role that memory plays in her attempt to understand and diagnose the supremely destructive political phenomena asso ciatedwiththeemergenceoftotalitarianismintheheartofciv ilized Europe (see Villa 2007: 983). Simply put, memory as a kind of thinking provides a depth dimension that can counter theriseandspreadofsuchterribleevil: Iamcertainthatthegreatestevilsweknowofarenotdue to him who has to face himself again and whose curse is thathecannotforget.Thegreatestevildoers arethosewho don’t remember because they have never given thought to thematter,and,withoutremembrance,nothingcanholdthem back. For human beings, thinking of past matters means moving in the dimension of depth, striking roots and thus stabilizingthemselves,soasnottobesweptawaybywhat evermayoccur—theZeitgeistorHistoryorsimpletempta tion.Thegreatestevilisnotradical,ithasnoroots,andbe cause it has no roots it has no limitations, it can go to un thinkableextremesandsweepoverthewholeworld.(Arendt 2003b:95)

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The breakdown of tradition in the heart of European civiliza tion is a crisis, according to Arendt, because this breakdown threatenstosevermembersofthiscivilizationfromadepthdi mension that would provide them with the capacity to resist evil and prevent catastrophe in those rare historical moments “whenthechipsaredown”(SeeArendt2003c:189). I say “threatens” in the preceding sentence because tradi tionandmemoryarenotexactlythesame.Sowhilethelossof tradition may indeed threaten memory, it does not completely abolishitspossibility.YetArendtisrighttoseethatanybreak intraditionweakensmemory,forthereisbothacollectiveand transgenerational facet to tradition that strengthens the indi vidual capacity for memory. Tradition at its best is able to house or archive historical testimony that would be long for gottenbyindividualrememberers.Traditioncanthusbeseen, statically, as a storehouse of communal memory that is be queathed from one generation to the next, or, more dynamic ally,astheactivedonationandreceptionofhistoricaltreasures thatarereinterpretedandworkeduponbythegenerationthat receivesthem,justasthegenerationthatbequeathsthemonce had to do when they engaged in the work of reception. Tradi tion in either sense stands for a communal and intergenera tional work of remembering and interpreting that transcends theabilityofanyoneindividualinthatcommunitytoremem berorinterpretonhisown(seeRicoeur2004:129). This qualification aside, it remains the case that Arendt wantstofacethiscrisisoftradition(andhencememory)squarely. In doing so, however, she does not think it will do simply to mount a conservative rearguard effort to recapture “the tradi tion”(whateverthatis)inallitsformerglory.Thisfacetofher thought emerges clearly in the essay “What is Authority?” where she explores “the decline of the Roman trinity of reli gion, tradition, and authority” (Arendt 2006: 140). For Arendt, authority is something that has vanished from the modern worldbutinitsabsencestillstandsforaformoflegitimatepo liticalorderthat,whilenecessarilyhierarchical,could,withre course to neither compelling force nor rational persuasion, providethepermanenceanddurabilityhumansneedtobuilda publicworldfitforhumanhabitation.ForArendt,“thelossof authority is merely the final, though decisive, phase of a de

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velopment which for centuries undermined primarily religion and tradition” (Arendt 2006: 93). While its demise surely re presents a loss, Arendt does not simply think we must bend our political efforts to turning back the clock, to reestablishing thislostformofpoliticalauthoritysomehow.Sheeschewsthis attempt primarily because of the lack of success with which suchattemptshavemetsofar. Authority as we once knew it, which grew out of the Romanexperienceoffoundationandwasunderstoodinthe light of Greek political philosophy, has nowhere been re established, either through revolutions or through the even lesspromisingmeansofrestoration,andleastofallthrough the conservative moods and trends which occasionally sweeppublicopinion.(Arendt2006:141)

Arendt’srefusaltogotheconservativeroute,hereaselsewhere, pushes the question concerning her insistence on the impor tance of maintaining memorial continuity with the past to a deeperlevel.Ifsheisnotrecommendingsomeformofconser vativeretrievalofalostpast,whatdoesshethinksheisupto indirectingherreader’sattentionthere? Arendt alludes to an answer to the latter question in the followingtwophrases:1)“traditionandpastarenotthesame”; and2)(aphrasesheborrowsfromWilliamFaulkner)“thepast isneverdead,it’snotevenpast.” I would liketoexploreeach phrase in turn. The sentence in which the first phrase occurs runsasfollows:“…theundeniablelossoftraditioninthemod ern world does not at all entail a loss of the past, for tradition and past are not the same” (Arendt 2006: 93). The distinction Arendtheremakesbetweentraditionandpastisimportant,be causeitprovidesheraroutetoengageinanexplorationofthe past without appealing to the nowbroken thread of tradition. In fact, conservative nostalgia for tradition might even hinder thisrenewedexplorationofthepast.Inalmostthesamebreath as she describes the breakdown of tradition as a kind of crisis shealsospiesinitanopportunity,for,shenotes,thethreadof tradition wasalsothechainfetteringeachsuccessivegenerationtoa predeterminedaspectofthepast.Itcouldbethatonlynow will the past open up to us with unexpected freshness and

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tellusthingsnoonehasyethadearstohear.(Arendt2006: 94)

Bereft of tradition, but not of the past, memory, and not just humanbirth,bearswitnesstothepossibilityofthenatal. Arendt’sdistinctionbetweentraditionandpastistakenup again in the first volume of The Life of the Mind, which phe nomenologically analyzes our thinking capacity. There Arendt describes her approach to the past in rather deconstructive terms: I have clearly joined the ranks of those who for some time now have been attempting to dismantle metaphysics, and philosophywithall itscategories,aswehaveknownthem from their beginning in Greece until today. (Arendt 1971a: 212)

Whatmakesthisapproachdeconstructive,asopposedtomere lydestructive,isArendt’sconcomitantrecognitionthattheloss ofreligion,authority,andtradition“doesnotdestroythepast” and that “the dismantling process itself is not destructive” (Arendt 1971a: 212). For Arendt, we have not lost the past as such but rather “the continuity of the past as it seemed to be handed down from generation to generation” (Arendt 1971a: 212).Whatremainsafterthedemiseofthishistoricalcontinuity are “fragments” of the past that have crystallized over time, andthattheverycontinuityoftraditionmayevenhavekeptfrom view.AlludingtoseverallinesfromShakespeare’sTheTempest, she describes these fragments as the “pearls,” the “rich and strange” that she counsels her readers not to destroy in the same stroke that they would pretend to dismantle tradition (Arendt1971a:212). TheShakespeareanmetaphorsofpearlsandcoralalsosur face in her essay on Walter Benjamin in Men in Dark Times. There she affirms a poetical form of thinking that delves into the depths of the past “like a pearl diver who descends to the bottomofthesea….”Thispearldiverdoesnotdelveinto the pastinorder“toresuscitateitthewayitwasandtocontribute totherenewalofextinctages.”Hermissionisnot“toexcavate the bottom and bring it to light” but instead “to pry loose the richandthestrange,thepearlsandthecoralinthedepthsand to carry them to the surface …” (Arendt 1968b: 205). For

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Arendt,thisformofthinkingisguidedbyaconvictionthat,al though everything is doomed to decay with the passage of time,thepastisnotconsignedtooblivion.Forher,“theprocess of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization ….” Even (and perhaps especially) in a time of broken tradition, fragmentsofthepast survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that remain immunetotheelements,asthoughtheywaitedonlyforthe pearldiverwhoonedaywillcomedowntothemandbring them up to the world of the living … as something “rich and strange”, and perhaps even as everlasting Urphäno mene.”(Arendt1968b:206;seealsoVilla2007:98586)

So we see how, for Arendt, the breakdown of tradition doesnotcutoffallapproachestothepast.Anotherreasonshe thinksthisisthecaseisbecausesheagreeswithFaulknerthat “the past is never dead, it’s not even past” (the second of the phrases I mentioned above). For her, “the world we live in at any moment is the world of the past; it consists of the monu mentsandtherelicsofwhathasbeendonebymenforbetteror worse ...” (Arendt 2003d: 270). One might add that these monumentsandrelicsincludethoserichandstrangecrystalliz ations that both the passage of time and tradition itself might haveforgotten.Theseremainpresentintheirabsenceevenif,as forgotten,theyarenotableto“tellusthingsnoonehasyethad earstohear.”YetArendthasfaiththatthesepearlsarethereto be discovered by the alert historical diver. All the same, the worldweliveiniscomposedofwhathasbeendone,apastthat in this sense is never past. Our world, then, is also indelibly marked by the incomprehensible and unprecedented rise of totalitarian domination, and it will not pay us to try to forget thisdarkfacteither.AsArendtcounsels:“Whenthefactscome hometoroost,letustryatleasttomakethemwelcome.Letus trynottoescapeintosomeutopias—images,theories,orsheer follies” (Arendt 2003d: 275). But how are we to make unwel comefactswelcome?Arendttellsusthatitisafunctionofthe past“tohauntuswhoarepresentandwishtoliveintheworld asitreallyis,thatis,hasbecomewhatitisnow”(Arendt2003d: 270). That is, we can make unwelcome facts welcome, we can find a place or home for them, when we refuse evasion and

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insteadchoosetolivein“theworldasitreallyis.”ForArendt, such nonevasion means facing the responsibility of under standingourworldasoneinwhichthecontinuityoftradition hasbeendecisivelybroken,andalsoasoneinwhichunprece dented and incomprehensible “crimes,” committed on an un imaginablescale,havebecomepossible.9 Yettofacethisdarknessisnottogiveintofate,asthough humankindweredestinedallalongforsuchadarkend,andas thoughwehavewithinourselvesnocapacitytohopeandreach forsomethingdifferent.Arendt’sformulaforgreatnessinahu man being is not amor fati, but amor mundi.10 This is a love for theworldthatsquarelyfaces,butdoesnotnecessarilyacceptas inevitable, what the world has become. For example, in reflec ting on the loss of worldly permanence and reliability that ac companiesthelossofpoliticalauthority(onecornerofthereli giontraditionauthority triangle), Arendt nevertheless insists thatthisloss“doesnotentail,atleastnotnecessarily,thelossof the human capacity for building, preserving, and caring for a 9 IamhereremindedofPrimoLevi’sappealtohisreaderatthebe ginningofIfthisisaMantoconsidertheextentofthesufferingandde humanization that humans visited upon their fellows in Auschwitz: “Meditatethatthiscameabout….”IreadArendt’sattempttowelcome unwelcomefactsasanacceptanceoftheresponsibilityimpliedinLevi’s appeal.SeeLevi1987:17. 10

SeeNietzsche1967:258:“Myformulaforgreatnessinahuman beingisamorfati:thatonewantsnothingtobedifferent,notforward,not backward,notinalleternity.Notmerelybearwhatisnecessary,stillless conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is ne cessary—butloveit.”ForallofNietzsche’sinfluenceuponherthought, IsuggestthatArendt’samormundi,intimatelylinkedasitistohercon ceptualization of human natality, marks a significant departure from Nietzsche.Whileitisonethingtoacceptstoicallyeverythingthat“fate” hasvisitedupononeself,onceoneembraceshumanpluralitytheway Arendthas,thisgesturecannotbeextendedtoacceptanceofwhat“fate” hasvisiteduponeveryoneelse.Theonlysensiblemoralresponsetothe Holocaustistosay“thisoughtnevertohavehappened.”Thatsaid,there isasimilaritybetweenNietzsche’samorfatiandArendt’samormundi,in sofarasbothattitudesrejectmendaciousevasionandinsteadseektoac cepttheworldforwhatithasbecome.YetIstillsubmitthatawilling nesstofacedarknesssquarelyisnotthesameaswantingnothingtobe different.

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world that can survive us and remain a place fit to live in for those who come after us” (Arendt 2006: 95). In embracing the worldthathasbecomewhatitis,wesimultaneouslyacceptthe responsibilityforitscare,ataskthatincludesthepoliticaleffort to cultivate a space in which a plurality of actors can appear, andalsothemoregeneraltaskofpreservingaculturalcarapace that will be a fit home for future generations. Here is finally where,accordingtoArendt,wefeeltheforceofthepast,inthe continuousbestowalofbeginnings,theeverpresentpossibility of natal creatures to begin again, to initiate. This is one of the lessonsofthepearldiver. AmorMundiandHumanNatality: ALessonforGlobalChristianity? In the previous section, we saw that for Arendt tradition and thepastarenotthesame,andthepastisneverpast.Withthese two gestures she signals the passage that she thinks remains open between the crises of modernity, and a past that would help people retain a dimension of depth in the present that could serve as a rudder to guide them through such stormy seas.HerdebttoHeideggerhereisnotinsignificant,especially when it comes to her way or manner of thinking (see Arendt 1971b:5152).AccordingtoBowenMoore,Arendtlearnedfrom Heidegger “the kind of passion called forth by thinking anew whathadbeenhandeddowninthought”(BowenMoore1989: 7). For Arendt, Heidegger’s way of thinking allowed “the cul tural treasures of the past, believed to be dead” to speak once again, yet now with a freshness that allowed them to propose “things altogether different from the familiar, wornout trivi alities they had been presumed to say” (Arendt 1971b: 51). Arendt’s thematization of natality represents one salient in stance of this kind of intellectual retrieval. In thematizing this centralconcept,itisnotastretchtoimagineArendtthinkingof herselfasapearldiver,uncoveringanUrphänomenethatmight give people the courage to assume the arduous tasks of con fronting darkness and finding the willingness to start again. The past’s force, for her, resides precisely in this continual presenceofnewbeginnings,inthefactofnatality. When introducing the theme of natality, Arendt’s wont is to refer to a famous passage from Augustine’s The City of God.

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AttheendofTheOriginsofTotalitarianism,shequotestheLatin of this phrase as Initium ut esset homo creatus est and translates this as “that a beginning be made man was created.”11 I think that Arendt’s frequent references to Augustine in this context are noteworthy, because they show her to be working in this Heideggerian mode of retrieval—an attempt to save an im portant historical insight from the fate of becoming little more than a wornout triviality. As she retrieves this pearl, Arendt describes“thefactofnatality”as“thebirthofnewmenandthe newbeginning,theactiontheyarecapableofbyvirtueofbeing born” (Arendt 1958: 247). As Patricia BowenMoore explains, Arendt’s insistence on the importance of natality marks an af firmation of, indeed a love for, a world of human plurality: “Natality’s full experience breaks out into a world of human plurality where men, not Man, inhabit the earth” (Bowen Moore 1989: 18). BowenMoore goes on to describe a twofold promiseinherentinhumannatality: … it is a promise to the child on behalf of the community of othersthattheworldwillbepreservedasaplaceofappear anceforthechild’suniquecapacitytobegin;itisapromise to the world on behalf of the child that successive genera tionswillbegranteditandthatbeginningswillbemadefor thesakeoftheworld.(BowenMoore1989:1819)

BowenMoore connects this twofold promise to the theme of love:theloveoftheworldforthechildandtheloveofthechild fortheworld: [T]he promise inherent in natality is rooted in that exper ienceoflovewhichtakesintoaccounttheworldofhuman experience.Natality’sfullexpressionofthistypeoflove—a love open to the world and its promises—is amor mundi: lovefortheworld.(BowenMoore1989:19)

Isubmitthatthislovethatisbothopentoandaffirmingof the world holds a lesson for the diverse expressions of global Christianity we find today. Somewhat ironically, the attention,

11

SeeArendt1968a:479.SeeBillings2004:13233,n.19forexcellent homeworkontheinaccuracyofArendt’scitationoftheoriginalLatin, andthedifferentwaysshetranslatesthisphrasethroughoutherwork.

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theamor,thatArendtgivestotheworldcanremindChristians todayofoneoftheirownculturaltreasures.Thatis,inspiteof hercritiqueofChristianspiritualityasaforcethatservesmain lytoalienatehumansfromtheworld,Arendt’samormundican remind Christians that this story of alienation is not the only one that can be told about their religion. As James Bernauer astutelysuggests, Arendt’s commitment to a love of the world actually mir rorstheBiblicalfaithofacreativeGodwhoestablishedand found his creation to be good and who, in the New Testa ment,“solovedtheworldthathegavehisonlySon.”(Ber nauer1987:17)

In arguing that contemporary Christianity can (re)learn something vital from an engagement with Arendt’s “philo sophy of natality,” I do not mean to suggest that Christianity holds no further lessons for augmenting Arendt’s philosophy. Clearly it does. Such learning would continue a process that Arendt herself inaugurated, one that can be seen throughout herworkfromherdoctoraldissertationonAugustinerighton through to her very last writings. So I do not mean to suggest that future traffic between Arendtian political philosophy and Christian thought will be oneway in the opposite direction.12 As Bernauer indicates, this dialogue marks a twoway traffic 12

Whilethescopeofthisessaydoesnotallowmetoexploread ditionalwaysthatrecenttheologicalreflectionmightpushArendt’scon ceptofnatality,IdirectthereadertoanexcellentessaybyDavidBillings thatcomparesArendt’s“new”withJürgenMoltmann’snovum.SeeBil lings2004,especially13940:“Novum(thenewassociatedwithadvent) isthehistoricalmanifestationofsomethingnot‘againsttheoverwhelm ingoddsofstatisticallaws’[asitisforArendt]butabsolutelyimpossible apartfromthecomingofGod.Moltmann’sunderstandingoftheescha ton(aredeemedworldwithouttransienceordeath)hasnoanaloguein Arendt’sthought.ThenewforMoltmannisgroundedinGod’scoming; forArendtitisgroundedinanaspectofthehumancondition….Nev ertheless,thisdifferencedoesnoteliminatethefactthatwithinhuman historythenewofnatalityandnovumlookquitesimilar.Thissideofthe eschaton,nohistoricalevent(nomatterhowsurprisingorevenmirac ulousinArendt’ssense)isobviouslyorindisputablytheworkofGodra therthanofhumanagentsactingintheirworld.”Ithankmycolleague NikAnsellforbringingthisarticletomyattention.

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fromwhichbothsideshavebenefitedandmaycontinuetodo so: “If religious experience provided Arendt with some of her philosophy’s major categories, her thought offers religion apathtowardarenewedworldliness,anopportunitytoshape a presence in the full light of the public life” (Bernauer 1987: 20). It remains the case, then, that Arendt’s amor mundi may serve as a stark reminder to Christians of a cultural treasure theyareindangerofforgetting,especiallyonceweconsiderthe influence currently enjoyed by trendy apocalyptic interpreta tions of Christianity that, in an attempt to hasten Christ’s secondcoming,absolutelyrevelin,andactivelyseektoencour age, the future destruction of the world (see Gorenberg 2002; Rossing 2004). Christians need to remember that in the New Testamenttheincarnationitselfisunderstoodasadivineactof amor mundi. I would go even further and say that Christian hopeandexpectationforacomingfutureofjusticeandpeace, ifitistoavoidaculpablepassivityandcomplacency,cannotdo withoutamormundi.Inmakingthispoint,Icannotimproveon DavidBillingsclaimthat,althoughChristianhopeissustained by a larger eschatological context that is mostly absent in Arendt’sthought,Arendtteachesusthatthishope“mustwork itself out in striving for justice and identifying with the poor andoppressedhereandnow”(Billings2004:136). Arendt’s amor mundi, her longing for a world that has room for everybody, also serves to remind us that we are all, finally,migrants(hopefully)onourwaytothisworld—onthe way,andperhapscalled(althoughIsuspectshewouldnotuse thatlanguage),toafuturethatisnotyetrealbutthatwehave reasontohopemightbeborn.Thishoperequiresanamormun di, an affirmation of the idea that, while we have yet to arrive on that distant shore, we must love the world we find now so thatwemay joinintheeffort—somemorereligiouslyinclined folkmightsaythe“pull”—towardthisworld’s(be)coming.In terestingly, this affirmation of the world amid deep uncertain ty, this confidence in a future that perhaps by our own lights we have no right to expect, puts global humanity right where Friedrich Nietzsche (arguably) thought we always were—as migrantsontheway: ThehiddenYesinyouisstrongerthanallNo’sandMaybes that afflict you and your age like a disease; and when you

104 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE have to embark on the sea, you emigrants, you, too, are compelledtothisby—afaith!(Nietzsche1974:340)

Bibliography Appiah, K. Anthony. (1994). “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multi cultural Societies and Social Reproduction.” In: Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress.Pp.14963. Arendt, Hannah. (2006). Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought. Introduction by Jerome Kohn. New York: Pen guin. (2003a).“PersonalResponsibilityunderDictatorship.”In:Jerome Kohn (ed.). Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schoken Books. (2003b). “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy.” In: Jerome Kohn (ed.). Responsibility and Judgment. New York: Schoken Books. (2003c). “Thinking and Moral Considerations.” In: Jerome Kohn (ed.).ResponsibilityandJudgment.NewYork:SchokenBooks. (1971a).TheLifeof the Mind,VolumeI:Thinking.NewYork:Har court. (1971b).“MartinHeideggeratEighty.”NewYorkReviewofBooks (21October). (1968a).TheOriginsofTotalitarianism.NewYork:Harcourt. (1968b). “Walter Benjamin: 18921940.” In: Men in Dark Times. SanDiego:Harcourt. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bernauer, James W., S.J. (1987). “The Faith of Hannah Arendt: Amor MundianditsCritiqueAssimilationofReligiousExperience.”In: James W. Bernauer, S.J. (ed.). Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Pub lishers. Billings,David.(2004).“NatalityorAdvent:HannahArendtandJür gen Moltmann on Hope and Politics.” In: Miroslav Wolf and William Katerberg (eds). The Future of Hope: Christian Tradition amidModernityandPostmodernity.GrandRapids:Eerdmans. Bouchard, Gérard, and Charles Taylor. (2008). Building the Future: A Time for Reconciliation—Report for the Province of Québec Consul tation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural

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Differences. http://www.accommodements.qc.ca/documentation/ rapports/rapportfinalintegralen.pdf. BowenMoore, Patricia. (1989). Hannah Arendt’s Philosophy of Natality. London:MacMillan. Buruma, Iain. (2007). Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam, and theLimitsofTolerance.NewYork:Penguin. Canovan, Margaret. (1978). “The Contradictions of Hannah Arendts PoliticalThought.”PoliticalTheory6:526. Chambers, Iain. (1994). Migrancy, Culture, Identity. New York: Rout ledge. Gorenberg, Gershom. (2002). The End of Days: Fundamentalism and the StrugglefortheTempleMount.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Huntington,SamuelP.(1998).TheClashofCivilizationsandtheRemak ingofWorldOrder.NewYork:SimonandSchuster. Kymlicka, Will. (2007). Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New InternationalPoliticsofDiversity.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Levi, Primo. (1987). If this is a Man and The Truce. London: Abacus Books. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. (1995). “On the Utility and Liability of History for Life.” In: Unfashionable Observations. Stanford: Stan fordUniversityPress.  (1974).“Wewhoarehomeless.”In:TheGayScience.Transl.Wal terKaufmann.NewYork:RandomHouse. (1967). On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Ed. Walter Kaufmann.Toronto:RandomHouse. Ricoeur, Paul. (2004). Memory, History, Forgetting. Transl. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Rossing,BarbaraR.(2004).TheRaptureExposed:TheMessageofHopein theBookofRevelation.Boulder:WestviewPress. Scheurman, William E. (2002). “Globalization.” In Stanford Encyclope dia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/en tries/globalization.Accessed3March,2009. Taylor,Charles.(2007).ASecularAge.Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press.  (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition.Ed. AmyGutmann.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. Villa, Dana. (2007). “Arendt, Heidegger, and the Tradition.” Social Research74:9831002.

106 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Vroom, Hendrik M. (1997). “The Function of Religion in Culture: A Hiatus in the Liberal Pragmatic View of Culture and Religion.” In:C.D.HardwickandD.A.Crosby(eds).Pragmatism,NeoPrag matism,andReligion:ConversationswithRichardRorty.NewYork: PeterLang.Pp.33753. YoungBruehl,Elisabeth. (1982).HannahArendt:ForLoveoftheWorld. 2ndedition.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.

Equality,Difference,andJustice

1

TonvanProoijen

Abstract Howcanwesustainidealsofequalityandjustice in a globalizingworldchar acterized by insecurity and plurality? This contribution seeks to answer this questionbyproblematizing the (political)useoftheterm“equality”andby lookingatthedilemmasresultingfromitinthelightofabiblicalperspective on justice. Equality appears to be an elastic and, even more, a comparative concept. The question is always what our (implicit) point of comparison is. Weallacceptmanydifferences.Butwhendodifferencesbecomeinequalities? Our conception of equality is mainly a perception of equal rights, of equal sauce for both goose and gander. But who we are is apparently not determ ined by our equality but in and by our differences. The biblical notion of righteousness(tzedakah)andtheportrayalofhumankindas“God’simage” offeraperspectiveinwhichwecandojusticetodifferenceswithoutlegitimiz ingorpromotinginequalities.Thefocalpointisnottheequalityofnakedhu manbeingswhoareequalatanabstractlevelbutanequalappealtoallofus inourconcreteandthereforeverydifferentlivingconditions.

Introduction One of the things that is going to distinguish the twentyfirst centuryfromthetwentieth,HenkVroompointsoutinhisbook Plaatsbepaling, is the final loss of the modern belief that the

1

InthisarticleIwillusesomerevisedfragmentsfromMan,Where areYou,astudyonconceptsofhumanitythatIwroteincollaboration withHenkVroomandothers.Itwasdesignedtorethinkfundamental politicalvaluesfromaChristianandChristianDemocraticpointofview. TheDutchoriginalwaspublishedin2006undertheauspicesoftheRe searchInstitutefortheCDA(theChristianDemocraticPartyintheNe therlands).Later,aslightlyreworkedEnglishtranslationwaspublished bythe CentreforEuropeanStudies(VanProoijen,Klink,andVanAsselt 2008).ItookthelibertyofquotingfreelyfromthisEnglishversionand adaptingsomepassages,especiallyfromchapter5.

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worldcanbemadebetterthroughtechnologicaldevelopments andgovernmentpolitics(Vroom2006:22).Ourglobalizingworld hasbecometoocomplexandmultifacetedforustobelievethat realitycanbemanipulatedinthiswayanymore.Wehavebeen confronted,forinstance,withtheuncontrollabilityofourworld economyandtheapparentvulnerabilityofourpoliticalandso cialinstitutions.Evenmore,thereisagrowingawarenessofthe radicalandirreduciblepluralityofworldviewsand,thus,ofper spectives on what a better future must look like. Confronted with the unmanageability and unpredictability of our social, po litical,economicalandecologicalrealityand,accordingly,with our own fragility, Vroom stresses, we have to face again the fundamentalquestionsaboutthemeaningoflife—notonlyour ownlifebutalsolifeassuch:Whyareweonearth?Toagreat extent,suchquestionsconcernourconceptofhumanity. InthiscontributionIwillfocusononeofthemajorfeatures of the modern paradigm just mentioned, namely the basic no tion of the equality of all human beings as human beings. This basic value is closely related to our notion of justice (“what’s sauceforthegooseissauceforthegander”).Whatdoesoure thosofequalitymeaninaworldofdifferencesandgrowingin equality? Is the language of universal rights sufficient? How canwe,inourchangingworldcharacterizedbyinsecurityand plurality, sustain ideals of equality and justice? In what way canreligiousconceptsbehelpful?Toanswerthesequestionsin averypreliminaryway,Iwilltrytoproblematizethe(political) use of the term “equality” and look at the resulting dilemmas fromabiblicalperspectiveonjustice. EqualityasaBromide In the political debate the expression “equality” has great rhe toricalpower.Justaswedonotexpectananswertoa“rhetor icalquestion,”soalsoanappealtoourequality—whateverthat termmaymean—doesnotneedanyfurtherexplanation.Orso politicalopponentsaresupposedtobelieve.Droppingtheterm “equality”atsomepointinapoliticaldebateisatriedandtest edwaytodisqualifyotheropinions.Whoacceptsbeingaccused ofpromotinginequality,underminingsolidarityorcontributing todiscrimination?

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Ofcourse,thequestionofequalitybecomespoliticallyur gent only if solutions need to be found to change conditions that cause inequality. Concrete choices are then required and many, often conflicting, interests enter into the picture. How broadlyornarrowlyarewetointerpretequalityindebateson cutting down state subsidies? With what other values does it cohere?Insuchdebatesgeneralappealstoequalitycouldoften becomeapoliticalbromide,meantonlytostressone’sownob vious right. As a core value of modern democratic societies, equality—which we all somehow consider to be selfevident andwhich,asacommonfoundation,shouldenablecommuni cation—then becomes more of a “conversation stopper.” If we wanttogobeyondthis,thenweshouldreflectonourinterpre tationandfoundationofequality. EqualityandHumanDignity Thebasicvalueoftheequalityofallpeopleisanachievement withalongandpainfulhistory.Ifonestudiesthebackground of the American Declaration of Independence (“all men are createdequal”)andtheFrenchDeclarationoftheRightsofMan andoftheCitizen(“Menarebornandremainfreeandequalin rights”), the emotional tension behind these declarations is readilyapparent.Neveragainwewillsubmittotheyokeofsup pressionandpatronizationbythenobilityorthechurch.Never again will anyone be privileged over another because of her birthandancestry.Equalitybelongstoourhumandignity. The timespecific element and historical development of ourperceptionofequalitybecomesclearifwecomparemodern WesternerswithpeopleintheMiddleAges.Forthelatter,dig nityhadtodomainlywithhonourthatwastobepaidandthe duty related to one’s dignity. Dignity referred in particular to thestatusofdignitaries.Thefoundationofthehonourthatwas paid to a person lay in social stratification and the essentially relatedsocialinequalitybasedonposition,property,statusand birth (Taylor 1991: 45f. and Rohde 1997: 7f.). One person re ceivedmorehonourthananother,notbecauseofactualmerits butbecauseofsocialpositionandancestry. An example of this can be found in Shakespeare’s King Lear.KingLear,whoabdicateshisthroneinfavourofhisdaugh ters,feelsthathishonourhasbeenwrongedbecausehistwoel

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dest daughters reduced the last remnant of his royal status— hisretinueofknights.Totreathimapartfromhisclass(merely as“ahumanbeing”),asoneofmany,istotreathimunworthily (Ignatieff1990:2553). The medieval culture in which Lear lived (and the later early modern period of Shakespeare) consisted of ranks and classes, an order largely legitimized by the church. Everyone wasequalbeforeGod,butGodhadalsogiveneachhumanbe inghisorherownplaceinthesocialorder.Thereisagreatdif ferencebetweenmodernWesternersontheonehandandLear andhiscontemporariesontheother.Ofcourse,westillendorse theconceptofhonourbasedoninequality.Adecorationwould becomecompletelymeaninglessifeverycitizenwouldreceivea decoration in the mail tomorrow. Give credit where credit is due.Butifourdignityisatstake,inmostcaseswewillinsiston beingtreatedashumanandpointoutthefundamentalrightsto whichwe,ashumanbeings,areentitled:freedom,qualityoflife, righttoshelter,etc. So, in the past few centuries, a generalization of dignity has taken place (Rohde 1997: 7). Dignity no longer converges with honour, to which only dignitaries are entitled, but with equal acknowledgement of each individual as a human being. The honour of the classbound individual has become “democra tized” into the universal (because “essential”) dignity of human kind. More than that, dignity has not only become demo cratized,butgeneralizationitselfhasbecomepartofourdefini tionofdignity.Thus,typesofequalacknowledgementbecame essential for our modern democratic society: equal acknowl edgementwithregardtogender,sexualdisposition,andworld view. EqualityasanElasticTerm As human beings, we are all equal. Who would disagree? Concrete implementations of this basic notion widely differ, however.Apparently,equalityis,asVroom(1995:17)onceput it,anelasticterm.Viewsvaryfromaveryminimalistfreedomof choicetotheabsoluteequalityidealof“equalresults”(Buikhuis en,DeJager,andManenschijn1989:5879).Thenarrowestidea istheliberalidealofequalityastheequalrightofallpeopleto freedom of choice. Equality means being free from everything

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that hinders one in one’s free development as a human being. The broadest possible concept of equality is equality as equal result. The starting point of each individual differs, but in the endeverythingneedstobedividedequally.Equalityistheob jectiveitself.Thequestionis,ofcourse,whichformofgovern ment and which powerful government apparatus could ac complishthis(onecanthinkhereofthedisastrouspoliticalex perimentsofthetwentiethcentury). Inbetweenwefindthemostcommonview,thatof“equal opportunities.”Butmanyvarietiesexisthereaswell.Whatop portunities are involved and what differences—what blocking ofopportunities—areunfairandshouldbecompensated?Such discussionsconcernabroadornarrowinterpretationofequal ity as equal opportunities. Is it only about the “external” ele ments (for instance, the financial situation of parents that pre ventstheirchildrenfromgoingtouniversity)oralsoaboutthe “internalelements’”?Shouldwe,forinstance,alsocompensate suchpersonalelementsastalentandphysicalcondition?Inoth erwords,whatdifferencesdowenormativelyconsidertobeunequal? What barriers have to be removed because they are precondi tionsthatshouldnotmakeadifference?Weallbelievethatitis undesirableifonlyintelligentpeoplewithagreatdealofmon ey can afford a good education for their children. Such ine quality should somehow be compensated. But to what extent? A minimal view is that at least in principle everybody should have the same access to all education. The idea that children with a social disadvantage or physical shortcomings should somehowbecompensatedgoesabitfurther.Dyslecticsdeserve extraattention,justasforeigninfantswithalanguagedeficien cy do. The view that all children together should attend the sameschoolgoesevenfurther.Thecrucialquestionregardinga smallerorbroaderinterpretationofequalityiswhatdifferences wefindunfairbecausetheyareundeserved.Itisunfairifadys lectic child has fewer opportunities than a child without read ingdifficulties.Heisnottoblame.Butdoesthisnotapplytoall differences between children, differences in family situations, physicalconditions,character,IQ,EQ,etc.?Whereisthelineto bedrawn?

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EqualityandOurPointofComparison We do not view every difference as a problem. Difference meansvariationinsteadofboringuniformityandispartoflife. Ourrealityistypifiedmuchmorebydifferencethanbyequal ity.Weoftengladlyacceptdifference,aslongasitdoesnotbe come inequality. But what is the point at which it changes? Whendodifferencesbecome“inequalities”?Andwhendothey become ”injustices”? As an isolated value, “equality” is not enoughtodeterminethis.Equalityisnotanisolatedideal;itis a comparative concept. “I am pregnant” could be an isolated statement; “I am equal” could not (Vroom 1995: 17). In itself, equalityisanemptyterm.Whatisthecontextinwhichequality israised?Towhatisitcomparedandfromwhatperspective? Differences could be determined empirically; inequality supposes a point of comparison, a benchmark, a (moral) norm (Buikhuisen, De Jager, and Manenschijn 1989: 17). As soon as we define certain characteristics as normative, then differences become inequalities. What point of comparison do we use for humanbeings?Equality,aswesaid,hasbecomepartofourde finition of being human. In premodern societies it was hardly viewedasproblematicthatsomeonebelongingtoahighsocial classhadmorestatusandwaspaidmorehonourthansomeone from a lower class. The modern generalization of human dig nity has impressed upon us the basic idea that we all have equal rights because we are all human beings. In our welfare state the moral relation between youth and senior citizens, be tween employed and unemployed, between healthy and sick peoplehasbeendeterminedbyafinemeshedsysteminwhich basicneedssuchasfood,shelter,clothing,warmthandmedical carearebeingtransformedintoclaimsonthecollective.Weare nolongerdependentonthecharityofouremployer,ourparish or the charitable initiatives of ladies from the highest social circlesforthefulfilmentoftheseneeds.Rather,thefulfilmentof theseneedsisourperfectright.Butcouldsuchageneralandab stractprincipleofequalityreally dojusticetothedignityofin dividualhumanbeings? EqualityandDifference Tosharpenthisproblemofequality,difference,andjustice,Mi chael Ignatieff refers to King Lear (Ignatieff 1990: 2553). Lear

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wonderedifhewouldstillmeananythingifallhisroyal“hon ours”—his retinue of knights, among other things—would be taken away from him. Disappointed in the love of his daugh ters,hewandersallalone,likeabeggar,outsidethetown.This was not the romantic countryside but (as in biblical parables) the wilderness outside the civilized world, where beggars and exiles lived. Ignatieff points out that for Shakespeare this no man’s land is the world in which pity, social obligations and habitsnolongerdeterminehumaninteraction.Itistheworldof the “natural,” naked human being, without “retinue” and thereforewithoutanydignityandrespect.Here—andonlyhere —equality rules, but it is an equality of contempt that no hu manbeingcanbear.Dependentonthecharityofothersforhis basicnecessitiesoflife,Learfindsthatintheendahumanlifeis as cheap as that of an animal. He can only hope that being hu man would be reason enough for a claim on the abundance of others.AsIgnatieffconcludes,theonlyequalityistheclaimthat everyhumanbeingisentitledtobasicnecessitiesoflife.Inthis thekingdoesnotdifferfromthebeggar(orfromanimals). AccordingtoIgnatieff’sinterpretation,Lear’snotionofdigni ty is not based on what people need (food, shelter, education —everythingthatwenowadayshavesetdowninconstitutional rights)butonwhatpeopleowetootherpeople.InLear’scase, thismeansthatafatherdeservestherespectofhisdaughters,a king a retinue. In Shakespeare’s perception, human dignity is basedondifference:onstatus,title,etc.Forhim,thedimensions in which people are equal—being naked, suffering, mortality —were definitely not intrinsic elements of human dignity. In fact,totreatpeopleequallyistodenythemtherespecttheyde serve.Totreatahumanbeingonthebasisofhisgeneralhuman needsmeanstoreducehimtothepitifulequalityofhisnatural being.ThiscontemptuousequalitytypifiestheattitudeofLear’s two eldest daughters: their father will receive no more or less thananarbitraryanonymousbeggar.Inthiswaytheydishonour Lear,takingawayhisdignity. According to Ignatieff, the crux of King Lear is that in the real, concrete life of human beings no difference can be made between the generally human and specifically individual. Lear notonlyneedsclothes,abedandfood,butheneedstheclothes, bedandfoodtowhichheisentitledonthebasisofhisrank,his

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merits,hishistory.Histwoeldestdaughterswillprovideonly thatwhichheclaimsasapoor,nakedanimalanddenyhimthat towhichheisentitledasafatherandaking.Ignatieffcontinues thelinetoourtimeandreferstooneofthemostharrowingex amplesinourhistory:theconcentrationcampsinwhichpeople werestrippedoftheir“retinue”:clothes,suitcases,rings,glass es, hair, clothing—in short of everything that made them who theywere.Theywerereducedtoequalunitiesofthenakedhu manbeing.Thatsituationleavesonlyoneclaim—Lear’sclaim: becausetheyarehumantheydeservetolive.But,saysIgnatieff withLear,intheendthatistheweakestclaimthatpeoplecan have on one another, a claim on anybody at random and thereforeonnoone. Thisistheparadox.Tobringjusticetotheworld,evenina noman’sland,theconceptofthefundamentalequalityofallhu man beings has been developed. However, we recognize our mutualhumanityespeciallyinourdifferences,inourindividu ality,inourhistory.Ouridentitydoesnotlieinouruniversality but in our particularity. We derive our dignity especially from our difference from others, from what makes us special. Our concept of equality is mainly a perception of equal rights, of equal sauce for both goose and gander. But who we are is not determinedbyourequalitybutinandbyourdifferences.Sowhat weneedisaperspective,avisionofajustsocietythatdoesjus tice to differences without legitimizing or promoting inequali ties. RightsandRighteousness In politicaltheological debates, Psalm 72 is usually referred to asacentralbiblicalimageofajustsocietyandfairgovernment. Itgivesexpressiontoavisionofpeaceandjustice,ofshalom:in ajustsociety,thepoorandvulnerablewillflourishandblossom likethegrainthatswaysonthehillsides.This“royalpsalm”is a prayer for a righteous king. “Endow the king with your jus tice,OGod,/Andtheroyalsonwithyourrighteousness./He will judge your people in righteousness, / your afflicted ones with justice.”2 A righteous king defends the divine right and

2

TheBibletextsherearetakenfromtheNewInternationalVersion.

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doesjusticetotheweak,offerssalvationtothepoorandliber ates those who are weak and have no one to help them. This psalm uses two different Hebrew words for “justice”: mishpat andtzedakah.“Endowthekingwithwithyourjustice[mishpat] OGod,/Andtheroyalsonwithyourrighteousness(tzedakah)./ He will judge your people in righteousness [tsedek], / your af flictedoneswithjustice[mishpat].”Iwillnottakeupthedebate aboutthedifferentinterpretationsofthesetermsand/ordiffer entmeaningstheymayhaveinother(biblical)texts(althougha thoroughexegesismaybeusefulinthepoliticaltheologicalde bateinwhichthemeaningofPsalm72anditsinterpretationof tzedakah are often taken for granted). Here I will follow Jona thanSackswhoarguesinhisbookTheDignityofDifferencethat mishpatmoreorlessmeansthemaintenanceoflaw,theimpar tialexecutionoflaws,andthuspunishingtheguiltyandprotec ting the innocent (Sacks 2003: 113). Tzedakah, Sacks writes, is a much broader concept. In a certain way it has to do with the “implementation”ofmishpat.Itisnotsomuchaproceduralasa substantial concept, signifying  social justice and salvation bringingrighteousness. The concept of tzedakah not only involves the strict right eousness of “rules are rules” but also charity. This seems to be contradictory.Anactofcharitycannotberighteous(onegives someonesomethingtowhichheisnotentitled)andarighteous actcouldnotbedescribedasanactofcharity(onegivessome onesomethinghedeserves).Thefactthattzedakahstillcontains both elements, Sacks points out, can be understood from the biblical portrayal of man. Human beings are representatives of God on earth (Sacks 2003: 114). This does not make us the owners of the earth. The earth is God’s creation and therefore hisproperty.WehumanbeingsmanagetheearthforGod.We are God’s stewards. If it would be a matter of absolute pro perty, then there would be a difference between righteousness (what the other must give) and charity (what the others could giveoutofsympathy,pityorforwhateverotherreason).There foretheformerislegallyenforceable,thelatteramoralobliga tion at most. However, because we are not the owners of our property but “only” stewards, we are bound to the conditions Godsetforthisstewardship.Oneofthem—probablythemost important one—is that we share with people in need. What

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wouldhavebeencharityinotherlegalsystemsisastrictlegal demand in Jewish law. Charity can be humiliating for the re ceiver.Itmakespeopledependentandcanstrengthenthenega tive spiral instead of breaking it. In tzedakah what we would view as an act of charity is not a violation of our dignity as a person,notanunderminingofourselfrespect.Sacksstatesthat thegreatestactoftzedakahistheactthatenablesindividualsto becomeselfsupportingandtocontinuewithoutthathelp(Sacks 2003:120).Headdsaremarkableobservation:Jewishlawstates thatapersonwhodependsonreceivingtzedakahgiftsshouldal sobeabletogivetzedakahgiftshimself.Inotherwords,peopleare entitledtosufficientmeanssothattheyinturncanalsogiveto others.Thisdemand,Sacksargues,isaconcreteexpressionofa very basic insight in human life. Giving is an essential part of humandignity. BeingCreatedinGod’sImage We are living in a changing world characterized by insecurity andplurality.Howcanwesomehowsustainidealsofequality andjustice?InPsalm72itisthekingwhoiscalledtoaccount for the realization of tzedakah. Apparently, a just king is not blindfolded, like our symbol of justice, but biased in favour of theweak.Thisimageofjusticeassumesacertainpoliticalreli giousframework.God’sjusticeisthepointofreferenceforev erybody. Within this context prophets can call the king to ac countbyreferringtoGod’sjustice.Buthowcouldthisbiblical concept of justice be transferred to our situation, in some way oranother? Ithasbeenclaimedongoodgroundsthatthenotionofthe equalityofallpeoplehasitsrootsinthefirstchaptersoftheBi ble. Here, human beings are portrayed as “God’s image”: “So God created man in his own image, / in the image of God he createdhim;/maleandfemalehecreatedthem”(Genesis1:27). Biblicalscholars(suchasvonRad[1942:7])defendedtheview that a perception of representation lies behind Genesis 1 that hadbeenwidespreadthroughouttheentireancientEast.Egyp tianandAssyrianrulerswereseenasrepresentativesofGodon earthandthusasliving“imagesofGod”(Tutankhamenmeans literally:livingimageofAmon).Inturn,suchkingscreatedim ages of themselves to represent their power. In this way they

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couldbepresentinthemostremoteprovinces.3Inthecreation storyinGenesis1itisnotthekingbuteveryhumanbeing,as theimageofGod,whoisGod’srepresentative.Thestoryofcre ation thus opposes the dictatorial Eastern ruler and says that the equality of human beings lies in the creation of Adam, the humanbeing,byGod.This“democratization”ofthe“imageof God” notion must be seen in a context of insecurity, plurality, and reorientation. The first chapters of Genesis are a portrayal ofhumankindasanarrative.Thiswasbornoutofacrosspol linationofseveraltraditionsatthetimeoftheBabylonianexile (Waaijman 1991). The old social and religious structures that haddeterminedtheidentityoftheJewishpeoplelosttheirva lidity on the shores of the rivers of Babylon. As stated above, theprayerforarighteouskingofPsalm72shouldbereadina contextofreligiousandsocialunity,inwhichthekingcouldbe called to account for his responsibility to execute God’s right eousness. The divine justification of the social relations and rightswasunderminedinpluralisticBabylon,whichwasruled by an authority that did not accept the same divine authority. Oneofthemostimportantdevelopmentsinthe(religious)iden tity of the Jewish people in exile lies precisely in the “demo cratization”oftheoldideaofroyalty.Whatwasonceonlyat tributedtotheking,theroyalresponsibilityofrightandright eousness,nowbecomessomethingattributedtoallpeople.The principleofequalityinGenesis1isnotaformalequalitybefore thelawbutanequalityintheroyalappealmadetoeverysingle individual. The people are no longer situated as praying around the king who, as the arbitrating authority between the divineandtheearthly,wassupposedtobringpeaceandjustice, buteveryhumanbeingiscalledtoaccount.Thisapplieseventothe mostvulnerable. ConcludingRemarksandQuestions Weliveinanunmanageableandunpredictableworldinwhich we are once more confronted with our own vulnerability. The problemswearefacing,problemsofvastinequalityandinjus

3

ForadiscussionofthisinterpretationofGenesis1seeMiddleton 2005:10422andWestermann1974:21113.

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ticeforinstance,confrontuswithfundamentalquestionsabout themeaningoflife.Religioustraditionsmaynotofferclearcut answerstothesocialandpoliticalproblemsourworldisfacing, buttheirbasicinsightsinhumanlifecanservetogiveorienta tion. The reorientation on ancient traditions during the social, politicalandreligiouscrisisoftheBabylonianexileandthecon sequential“democratization”oftheroyaldutytomaintaintze dakah may offer a perspective for our problem of equality, dif ferenceandjustice.Thisisnottheequalityofnakedhumanbe ingswhoareequalatsomeabstract,nonempirical,metaphys icallevel.Thepointofcomparisonistheappealofroyalrespon sibility to all of us to employ the diversity of our talents in our concreteandthereforeverydifferentlivingconditions. Ifthisnotionofeveryone’sroyalresponsibilityistakento be the starting point for further politicaltheological reflection, many critical questions still have to be discussed. By way of conclusionIwillmentiontwoofthem.First,doesthisnotionof “democratization” of royal responsibility eventually not legiti mize a “privatization” of justice, shifting attention from state responsibilityforguaranteeingthebasicnecessitiesoflifeinall circumstances to the duties and responsibilities of individual citizens, whatever their private conditions are?  Is that not at odds with the message of Psalm 72? This psalm declares that onlywhenthekingactsrighteouslyandtakescareoftheneedy will the people live in justice and peace and the land prosper and be fertile. Everyone who wants to refer to biblical notions of justice cannot make light of the serious implications this claim has for governmental responsibilities. But what are the concreteimplications? Second,istheimageofhumanbeingsjustindicatednottoo “activist” an image? It concerns “taking responsibility” and “giving”. But what about people who are seemingly not capa bleofplayingsuchanactiveroleinsociety?Mydisabledneigh bour, for instance—what about her “royal responsibility” and her “being image of God”?4 Justice, we said, is not about the

4

 J.S. Reinders (e.g. 2000: 74ff. has sharply criticized theological viewsthatrelatethenotionof“beingGod’simage”ratherexclusivelyto humancapacities).

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equal right to receive, but about the equal right to give. But whatismeantby“giving”?Isitaquestionofeveryhumanbe ingnotonlyalwayshavingtherightbutalsotheabilitytogive? Inotherwords,doesitmeanthateveryperson,whateverhisor hermentalorphysicalconditionmaybe,hasalwayssomething tooffer,loveandattentionforinstance?Fortunatelyandrightly so, my disabled neighbour is entitled to an allowance, and is visitedtwiceadaybyanursewhoispaidbyusall.Butsheis reallygivenherdueonlywhenitisacknowledgedthatshe,asa human being, also has something to give, beyond that which shereceives—howcanwe,inourincreasinglyfragmentedsoci ety,maintainthesocialframeworkstodoso? Bibliography Buikhuisen, W., E.M. de Jager and G. Manenschijn. (1989). Gelijkheid voorallen:Isdatrechtvaardig?Rotterdam:NederlandsGesprekCen trum. Ignatieff,M.(1990).TheNeedsofStrangers.London:HogarthPress. Middleton,J.R.(2005).TheLiberatingImage:TheImagoDeiinGenesis1. Eugene:Wipf&StockPublishers. Reinders,J.S.(2000).“MentalRetardationandtheQuestforMeaning: PhilosophicalRemarkson‘TheMeaningofLife’inModernSoci ety.”In:JoopStolk(ed.).MeaningfulCare:AMultidisciplinaryAp proach to the Meaning of Care for People with Mental Retardation. Dordrecht:KluwerAcademicPublishers.Pp.6584. Rohde, C.C. (1997). Het vertoog van waardigheid: Een cultuursociolo gische studie naar het dierbare en verhevene in de westerse samenle ving.Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress. Sacks, J. (2003). The Dignity of Difference: Or How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations.London:Continuum. Taylor, C. (1991).The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard Uni versityPress. VanProoijen,T.,A.Klink,andE.J.vanAsselt(2008).Man,WhereAre You? An Exploration of the Christian Democratic Portrayal of Man kind.Brussels:CentreforEuropeanStudies. Von Rad, G. (1942). Der alte und der neue Mensch: Aufsätze zur theolo gischenAnthropologie.Munich:Lempp. Vroom, H. (2006). Plaatsbepaling: Christelijk geloof in een seculiere en pluralecultuur.Zoetermeer:Meinema.

120 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE (1995). “Brede en smalle gelijkheid: Gelijkheid – levensbeschou wing–pluralecultuur.”In:R.KranenborgandW.Stoker(eds). Religiesen(on)gelijkheidineenpluralesamenleving.Leuven:Garant. Pp.1736. Waaijman,K.(1991).DemensalsbeeldvanGod.Nijmegen:TitusBrands maInstituut. Westermann, C. (1974). Genesis. Vol. 1: Genesis 111. NeukirchenVluyn: NeukirchenerVerlag.

BusinessEthicsandIntrinsicMotivation inaPluralistWorld ConnieAarsbergen Abstract Thiscontributionwillexplorethemoralandphilosophicalproblemscorpora tions meet when, in a pluralist world, they want to stimulate intrinsic mo tivationformoralbehaviourintheiremployees.Theaftermathofthefinancial crisisespeciallyshowsthatextrinsicmotivationaloneisnotenough.Toface the many complex moral challenges in business, employees also need to be internally inspired to do the good. But most methods for moral training do nottranscendthelevelofsanctionsandrewards.Themainreasonforthisre strictionisthatcorporationsalsowanttomeettherequirementsofafreesoci ety.Thesourceofintrinsicmotivationoriginatesfromoneofthemany(reli gious or secular) worldviews. In a pluralist organisation such ideals cannot be imposed on employees with different ideas. The leading question in this contributionwillbeifitispossibletoincludeintrinsicmotivationinmoral training while respecting the requirements of a free and pluralist society. I willexaminecontemporarystrategiesforintegritymanagementsuchascom pliance, corporate governance, religious and spiritual ways, valueoriented approachesandcompetencemanagement.Iwillconcludebygivingsomesug gestionsforchangingmoralattitudesinanintrinsicway.

Introduction Inpremodernandmoderntimesmoraleducationwasthetask of parents and neighbours who were firmly embedded in reli gioustraditionsthemselves.Inthepresentpostmodernperiod, however,especiallyincountriessuchastheNetherlandswhere half the population is secularised and individualised, it is no longer selfevident that moral traditions are shared or passed on to the next generation. Basic rules for social and moral be haviouraretaughtinfamiliesandatschool,ofcourse,butthis isusuallynotsufficienttoequipprofessionalstomeetthecom plicated moral challenges and dilemmas they face at work. Sometimes, even the most basic rules of politeness and social behaviour are not taught at home. Schools and institutions for 121

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(higher)educationtrytofillthisgap,andcompaniesthatarecom mittedtoCorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR)alsotraintheir staffinmoralskills. Thus,moraleducationisincreasinglybecominganewre sponsibility for corporations. The reasons for this need not be idealistic: bad moral behaviour on the part of employees can cost the business a great deal of money. Supervision is expen sive and leads to needless bureaucracy. Customers who are treatedrudelyarelostforeverandbadbehaviourcausesstress ontheworkfloor.Goodreputationsinbusinessareveryexpen sivetobuildupbutveryeasytodestroy.Inthepresentfinan cial crisis we are witnessing many cases of bankruptcy due to greedandinternalcorruption. Theinvolvementofbusinessesinmoraltrainingcouldalso be inspired positively by a conscious and voluntary commit ment to CSR. There are a growing number of (international) companies that want to act responsibly towards their employ ees and stakeholders. They issue business codes in which they promise to comply with the international guidelines for multi nationalsasexpressedbytheOrganisationforEconomicCoop erationandDevelopment(OECD)and/ortheUniversalDeclara tionofHumanRights(UDHR).Briberyandchildlabouraresim plyoutofthequestionforthem.Thesecorporationsconstitute the starting point of this essay: a positive choice has already beenmadeonacorporatelevel,andtherealchallengeishowto ensure thatemployees(andsuppliers)willactuallycomplywith thecodeofconduct. ExtrinsicandIntrinsicMotivationandPluralism To ensure internal compliance with the code of conduct, the easiest way is to work with sanctions and rewards. Such mea suresassumeextrinsicmotivationonthepartoftheemployees. Extrinsic motivation refers to the situation where the source that stimulates moral behaviour is thought to exist outside the moral actor. Employees will act according to the desired rules andstandardsoutoffearofpunishmentoroutofdesirefor(fi nancial or social) reward. As I will show in this contribution, extrinsic motivation alone does not provide enough of a foun dation for resisting the many temptations in business. Mana gersandemployeesalsoneedtobeintrinsicallymotivated,i.e.

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tobeinspiredfromwithinthemselvestoactinamorallyaccep tableway.Themoralactorisinspiredbyidealsandmoralval ues that have been internally embraced and will also be pur suedwhennobodyiswatching. Thus,moderncorporationscannotdowithoutmoraltrain ing that is aimed at intrinsic motivation to do the moral good. The argument here assumes that the moral actor needs some kindofworldviewforsuchintrinsicmotivation.Thiscouldbe eitherapoliticalidealorareligiousvisionoftheidealsociety. Thequestionifthismotivationissecular(humanist)orreligiousis irrelevant:somekindofidealviewofsocietyisneeded.More over,thisidealforsocietyshouldbeattractiveenoughtostim ulate moral actors to transcend their egocentric positions and includetheinterestsofothersintheirdecisions,especiallyindi lemmaswhereprivateandpublicinterestsconflict. The problem in today’s pluralist and liberal society, how ever,isthatitisnolongerpossibletoimposeoneworldviewon otherswhohavedifferentworldviews.Theidealsofagoodlife thatarepursuedaredifferent,varyingfromahedonistlifefull ofpleasuretoareligiouslifeaspreparationforJudgementDay. To avoid conflict among citizens, the political solution so far has been to respect a separation of the private and public do mains.Inthepublicdomain,governmentsremainasneutralas possiblewithregardtoreligionsorworldviewsthatareheldin theprivatedomain.Moderncorporationsadoptthissolutionas well.Today’sCEOsregardtheircorporationsaspartofthepub licdomainandinreligiousmatterstheyadoptthesamepolicy asthestate.Theyseektorespecttheprivatereligionorworld viewoftheiremployeesaslongasthatreligiondoesnothavea detrimentaleffectontheefficiencyoftheworkthatneedstobe performed. These CEOs realise that in this globalised world theyhaveoutgrownthestatusofsmallfamilybusinesseswhere theycouldfindtheiremployeesintheirownreligiousgroupto ensureacommonmoralhorizon. Beingawareoftherequiredneutralityinapluralistworld, corporationsactiveinmoraleducationhavedifficultieswithin trinsicmotivationasatopicandconcentrateonanintegrityman agementthatisbasedsolelyonextrinsicmotivation.Themoral problems in today’s business and financial world, however, show that this is not enough. Are there possibilities for moral

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educationthattranscendextrinsicmotivationandcanstillmeet therequirementsofafree,liberal,nonpaternalisticandplural istsociety? ComplianceandCorporateGovernance Compliance is one of the key words in today’s integrity man agement.Inacomplianceorientedapproach,emphasisisputon internal control and supervision to ensure that the rules and regulationsarebeingobeyed.Forinstance,acceptingorpaying bribes is strictly forbidden in most reputable corporations. In mostcodesofconduct,dismissalismentionedastheappropri atesanctionforcombattingthisworldwideevil. In a compliance strategy, the management is expected to givetheright example.Asusedtobetrueofvicars,managers also live “in glass houses.” The financial crisis and the Enron scandal have shown that a wheeling and dealing management isseenasalicencebylowermanagementandemployeestooutdo their bosses in bad moral behaviour. A bit of teasing by the management could lead to a culture in which mobbing is re garded as normal. The guards also need to be guarded—the policy of corporate governance is closely connected with com pliance.Everyoneistobecheckedandmonitoredfromthetop down.1 Canthestrategiesofcomplianceandcorporategovernance meetthepluralistdemandtorespectdiversity?Especiallyinin ternationalbusiness,corporationsencounterdeviatingcustoms and moral standards. As a rule of thumb, a decent company triestorespectandincorporatelocalcultureasmuchaspossi ble. For instance, important religious holidays are respected, eventhoughitisnotalwaysthemostefficientthingtodofrom the business’ point of view. In intercultural training pro

1

Inrecentbusinessscandalsoneofthereasonswhyboardsof(non executive)directorsfailedintheirsupervisoryroleisthattheywerepart ofthesameoldboys’networkasthemanagement.Theywerenotwilling (norable)tosupervisetheiroldfriendsfromcollege.Sincethefinancial crisistherehasbeenapubliccallformoreknowledgeandmorediversity (morewomenandrepresentativesofNGOs)inthesupervisoryboards, notonlytobreakwithapermissiveculturebutalsotobreakoutofthe tunnelvisionofthewhitemalebusinessculture.

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grammes young business people are taught how to approach local people in a respectful way and not to offend them need lessly,suchasbyshowingthesoleoftheshoetoaMuslim. Respectfordiversity,however,doesnotmeanthatalllocal moral standards are acceptable. The rule of thumb2 for decent corporationsisthattheyshouldrespectlocalcultureaslongas itdoesnotconflictwiththeUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights (or other guidelines such as those issued by the OECD). Espe cially in the field of equal treatment, these guidelines can give rise to the necessary intercultural problems. Discrimination a gainstspecificminorities(suchaslowcastedalits),homosexuals andwomenisoftendeeplyembeddedculturally.Corporations that have committed themselves previously to the UDHR or other initiatives, and have announced this accordingly in their codesofconduct,cannotgivein.Theymayorganisecourseson the work floor that explain their policy and seek to reduce re sistance,but,intheend,inacomplianceorientedstrategy,em ployees with persisting deviating cultural views will simply havetocomplyaswell.3 The conclusion that could be drawn here is that compli ancebased strategies impose Western morality on other cul tures.TheUDHRisofWesternoriginandenforcingitshowsa lackofrespecttootherviewsofthegood.Butisthistrue? We have seen above that decent companies are usually quite respectful with regard to local culture. There is a great dealofmoralconsensusintheworldconcerningfightingbasic evils such as lying, stealing or the exploitation of workers. All over the world ordinary workers detest corruption and wel

2

Expressedin,forinstance,Jeurissen2008,especiallych.11.

3

Thispolicybecomesmoredifficulttoimplementwhenthereare seriousviolationsofhumanrightsinthehostcountry,suchasNorth Korea,orwhenlegislationisnotconsistentwiththeUDHR,asinSaudi Arabia.InsomeMuslimcountries,womenarebarredfrommanagement positions;nonMuslimworkersanddhimmisarelessprotectedbylaw andtradeunionsforsalarynegotiationsareofficiallyforbidden.Yet,for decentcompanies,therearewaystooperateonthemarginsofwhatis legallypossible,suchasallowingworkers’councilstodiscusslabour conditionsandtreatingallworkersequally.Whenitbecomesimpossible toactdecently,theonlyoptioniswithdrawfromsuchcountries.

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comethebetterlabourconditionsandopportunitiesfordemo cratic participation that accompany compliance with interna tional business principles. If this means that a lowcaste man ageristobeacceptedasone’sboss,thenthatpriceispaidquickly. In practice, only dictators and crooked managers seem to em phasise the Western origin of the rules and regulations that accompanyrespectfortheDeclarationofHumanRights.Theirre ferencetoculturaldifferencesoftenservesonlyasanexcuseto continuetheirviciouspractices.Thereisevenconsensusworld wide that child labour should be banned, even in India and China.Itisalsorecognisedthatthesevicesaresometimeshard to combat in practice because of greed, hunger and persistent premodernculturalhabits. A compliancebased strategy can thus meet the require mentsofapluralistworld.Thequestion,however,isifsuchan approachissufficientintoday’scomplexworld.Theansweris negative. Most of today’s processes have become so com plicatedthatspecialistsandexpertsneedtobehired.Thesepro fessionals(forinstance,inthefieldofICTorinternationallaw) are more knowledgeable in their specific field than those who hire them are. Like any other, these professionals know where the opportunities are for making money. “Knowledge is pow er” is an old saying, and that power can be abused. But (gen eral)managersneedtotrusttheseprofessionalssincetheirlack ofspecialistknowledgepreventsthemfromexercisinganycon troloverthem. The compliance strategy also fails because in today’s in creased complexity, too many rules and regulations make the operationneedlesslybureaucraticandinefficient.Forasmooth operation, managers and professionals need a certain discre tionalareainwhichtheycanmakechoicesthatarebestsuited tothecomplexsituationinwhichtheyfindthemselves:theyre quire freedom. Unfortunately, another old saying is applicable here:“Opportunitymakesthethief.” Thus,extrinsicmotivation—whichisassumedinacompli anceoriented strategy—is not enough. There are many situa tionsinwhichacompliancebasedstrategy,combinedwithcor porate governance, fails. This means that professionals and managersalsoneedtobeintrinsicallymotivatedtoactproper ly.Howcanthisbedoneinapluralistworld?

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ReligiousandSpiritualWaystoStimulateIntrinsicMotivation Especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, when New Age was quite popular, management gurus were hired to stimulate in trinsic moral motivation. “Transformation” was the key word at that time, which did not mean “change” in the ordinary sense.Thesemanagementtrainerssoughtarealspiritualchange thatwasintendedtoaffecttheinternalnorms,valuesandatti tudes of a person. In their courses and training sessions, they referred to spiritual forces that could be found either deep within those taking the course or outside in the spiritual uni verse. Some of these training programmes were often medi tationsessionsforlisteningtothevoicesoftheinnerselforus ing tarot cards or other such cards to see what the angels or otherspiritshadtosay. At the height of their glory, transformation management wasevenorganisedundertheauspicesoftheConfederationof NetherlandsIndustryandEmployers(VNONCW).Inthe1990s such management courses became less popular, even though they still exist as a niche in the market of corporate training. Themainreasonforthisdeclineinpopularityistheinfluenceof a new generation of managers who are more “down to earth” andhavelessaffinitywiththeflowerpoweridealsofthebaby boomers. In a pluralist world, however, resorting to spiritual man agement gurus has a very important drawback. It does not showrespectforemployeeswhoareorthodoxMuslims,Jewsor Christians,forwhomdealingwithspiritualforcesisstrictlyfor bidden. Secularised rationalists will also have difficulties with meditationsessions,tarotandangelcardssincethereisnoem piricalproofforthetruthofthemessagesthataresent.Employ ees could, of course, refuse to participate in these courses, but they also want to be loyal to their company and remain team players.Amorepracticalreasonisthattheyhavetomeettheir mortgagepayments. The same pluralist drawback applies to today’s Christian initiatives,especiallyintheUnitedStateswherereligiousbusi nessleadersinspiretheiremployeeswithChristianvaluesthat have to do with taking care of one’s neighbour. In traditional areas where the populace more or less share one religion, the religious inspiration of the boss of a small or mediumsized

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company may not cause any problems. In today’s globalised and pluralist world, however, with Catholics, Protestants of various denominations, Muslims, Hindus, secularists and ad herents of many other worldviews employed in one company, imposingacorporatereligionisnolongeranoption. Thus, respect for pluralism leaves management with a problem.Acompliancestrategythatisbasedonlyonextrinsic motivation is not enough. Traditionally, religious faith has helpedmanypeopletobecomeintrinsicallymotivatedtoactin a morally appropriate way toward others and to move from egocentrism to care for one another. But respect for pluralism requiresthatacompanycannotsingleoutonereligionandim poseitontheiremployees.Whatotheroptionsarethereforcor porate management to transcend a complianceoriented stra tegy? TheValueOrientedApproach Arecentalternativetothecomplianceorientedapproachisthe valueorientedone.Thisstrategystimulatesemployeestoiden tifywithacorporatevaluesystemthatincludesvaluessuchas “integrity,”“trustworthiness,”“respect,”“consumercare,”“safe ty,”“creativity,”etc.Themainadvantageofthevalueoriented approachisthatitoffersasolutionfortheproblemthat,inour complex world, not every situation can be controlled by rules and regulations. Instead of rules, professionals and managers aregivenidealsandvaluesthatshouldbestrivenforandreal ised. The optimistic assumption is that when employees are trusted they will also show that they are worthy of such trust. Most people feel honoured when they are given responsibility andfeelmorallyashamedwhentheydisappointtheirsuperiors anddonotmeetthecorporategoalsandvaluesthatareset. Anotheradvantageofthisstrategyisthattherearealways people with anarchist sympathies who appear to be allergic to rulesandregulations.Acompliancestrategyactuallystimulates their creativity to break the rules, whereas a valueorientated strategy stimulates them to act in accordance with corporate values. Doesthisapproachentailanyproblemswithregardtooth er views in a pluralist world? Again, this should not be exag gerated.Althoughwearedealingwithacommon“worldview”

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that is not neutral, corporate values such as “integrity” or “re spect” have been abstracted from their original ideological sources.Beingformulatedinageneralway,theyserveassour ces of inspiration for the morally good behaviour of the em ployees regardless of their personal faith or ideology. Most of thesevaluesarealsopresentintheworldreligionsandcanalso be embraced from a secular and rational point of view. Since these values improve life in general, they can be grasped, as JohnRawlswouldsay,bypublicreason(Rawls1993). With the valueoriented approach an important step for wardhasbeenmadeinoursearch.Respectforculturaldivers ity and pluralism need not be in conflict with defining a cor poratevaluesystemthatshouldinspirepeopletodotheirbest, be less selfish and act in a decent way. It is, in fact, the same “strategy”BarackObamausesinhisspeeches.Healsorefersto a kind of “civil religion” derived and abstracted from various sources and distilled into a common belief system, including the necessary virtues that should inspire all Americans, what ever their background, to combat the evils that now threaten theAmericanDream. Theproblemstillremainsthatavalueorientedstrategyis quite risky. It is based on the optimistic view that employees canbetrustedtodisplaymoralresponsibility,eventhoughthey may not want to or be able to do so. This view assumes, per haps,toooptimisticaviewofhumannature.Notallpeopleare abletotakeonmoralresponsibilityandactfromamoralpoint of view. Not all people will embrace the corporate value sys tem. Will they be able to resist greed when confronted with tempting situations? If the interests of the corporation (or the general interest) in certain business deals conflicts with their ownpersonalinterests,willtheymaketherightchoices?Mana gersandprofessionalsstillneed,inmyview,tobeintrinsically motivated, especially in situations where there is no super vision. CompetenceManagement:MoralCompetence Competencemanagementisoneofthelatestmanagementtools tobeseenasawaytostimulateintegrity.Intoday’shumanre sourcesmanagement(HRM),manytraditionaljobdescriptions arenowtranslatedintolistsofcompetencesthataprofessional

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should possess. In this way corporations hope to be able to meetthechallengesoftheconstantlychangingworldinwhich knowledge and skills have low tenability. Jobs do not remain thesame,socorporationsarebecomingmoredependentonthe competence of the individual employees to adapt to new situ ations. Acompetenceconsistsofalistofknowledge,skillsandat titudes. Each job consists of a collection of competences, some ofwhicharespecifictothefunctionwhereasothersareshared with other (similar) jobs within the company, and still others arerequiredforallemployeeswithinacompany(forinstance, clientfriendliness).Moralcompetenceisoneofthem. Theknowledgecomponentusuallydoesnotoffermuchof aprobleminmanagementcourses.Contentcanbeconveyedin variousstimulatingways.Whentheintegritystrategyisvalue orientated, the competence is usually phrased in core values thatthecorporationsareseeking,suchasmutualrespect,trust worthiness,reliability,careforcustomersandstakeholdersand safety. In a complianceoriented approach emphasis is put on thedosanddon’tsaslaiddowninthecodeofconduct.Inboth the compliance and valueoriented strategies it is important that employees understand cognitively why certain values are soughtandwhycertainrulesarenecessary.Ifrulesarenotra tionalandcannotbeunderstood,theywillberesisted. Unfortunately, this world does not consist only of saints. Wrongdoersknowperfectlywellthattheiractsarecondemned by society; otherwise they would not make such an effort to conceal them. Thus, knowledge of the reasons behind certain values or measures is necessary but not sufficient to stimulate people to act in a moral way. To stimulate integrity, more is needed. Thesecondcomponentofmoralcompetenceconsistsofthe skill to deal with the moral problems and dilemmas in profes sionalsituations.Thisismoredifficulttoteach,butitisnotim possible. Employees should be trained, for instance, in how to addressrudeclientswhileretainingtheirselfrespect.Also,ex pensivegiftsneedtoberejectedwithoutoffendingthegivertoo much. On a higher level, managers may be confronted with commercial decisions that immediately affect the interests of other stakeholders, such as the local community and environ

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mental organisations. A manager with sufficient skill will be abletomakeasystematicstakeholders’analysisinwhichtheir interests are also taken into account and negative effects are diminished as much as possible. In most decent corporations thereareethicscommitteesthatcanhelpemployeeswhenthey areconfrontedwithdifficultdilemmasandlacktheknowledge andskilltodealwiththem. Thus, skills can also be taught in moral training sessions. Therealproblemisthatemployeesshouldalsobewillingtoact inamorallydecentway.Themoralattitudeisthethirdpartof moralcompetence.Mostmanagementtrainersagreethatthisis themostimportantandmostdifficultparttoinfluencewithre specttoaperson’scompetence. If the moral attitude of a manager or professional is well developed, he or she can resist tempting situations where the interestofthecorporation(orthegeneralinterest)conflictswith his or her personal interests (for instance, when a bribe is re fused). The problem with moral behaviour is that it is usually beneficialforthegroupasawholebutoftenentailsapersonal sacrificefortheindividual.Intheabsenceofsupervisionorso cialcontrolitisdifficulttoresistsuchtemptation.Aprofession al therefore needs to be intrinsically motivated, which means thatthevaluesandrulesofthecorporation(orsociety)arein ternalised. Honesty is a value that is pursued as an end itself andnotasameansfor(egocentricorenlightened)selfinterest. Aclearconscienceisthenmoreimportantthanafullwallet. Thus, we still face the problem of intrinsic motivation. Competencemanagementfrequentlyusestheicebergmetaphor to refer to the attitude component. Knowledge and skills are visibleandcanbecheckedrelativelyeasily.Butunderthesur face lies the inner motivation of a person—the values and normsthatdrivehimorher.Theydetermineaperson’sbehav iour to a large extent. It is commonly agreed that this is very difficulttoapproach,butisitimpossible? SomeSuggestionsforChangingMoralAttitudes Inapluralistsocietywithdifferentviewsofthegood,thepeace keepingstrategyhassofarbeentoremainasneutralaspossible inthepublicdomain.Forcorporations,thisalsoentailsareluc tancetoimposeaspecificreligionorworldviewontheirwork

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ers. From Obama’s reference to values and virtues in a “civil religion” and today’s valueoriented approaches in integrity management,wehavelearnedthatthepublicdomainneednot remain empty in the moral sense. It is possible to abstract a number of values from various ideological sources that can be embracedcommonlyandvoluntarily,withoutviolatingrespect forpluralismandbecomingtoopaternalistic. Oneofthemainproblemsinthepostmodernworldisthat thevarioussourcesofmoralinspirationareconveyedless.Some times, even basic moral notions are not present. Repair work needstobedoneincombinationwithteachingbasicknowledge about the various views of the good—something that can be done without giving precedence to any one. Building aware nessshouldthereforebethefirstaiminmoraltrainingsessions thatseektostimulateintrinsicmotivation. A useful tool for making trainees aware of the difference betweenextrinsicandintrinsicmotivationandthemoralsteps thatcanbetakeninlifeisLawrenceKohlberg’stheoryofmoral development. Kohlberg distinguishes between the preconven tional stage (which is the selfish position in which people ask only: What’s in it for me?), the conventional stage (in which people accept the moral standards and conventions of their group or society), and the postconventional stage (in which peoplebasicallyaccepttheirmoralconventionsbutarealsocrit icalofthemiftheyconflictwithhumanrightsorchallengethe socialcontract).Althoughthereisacademicdebateaboutthese moral stages, they have proven to be quite useful for policy makersinpractice,especiallyinroadsafetymanagement. Adult trainees have usually left the selfish preconven tional stage. The motivation to do that need not be intrinsic— they may simply not want to become social outcasts or may wanttoseekapprovalfromtheirpeers.Intheabsenceof(social or real) control, the risk of falling back into preconventional behaviour is relatively high. The following case helps trainees torecognisethestageofmoralbehaviourtheyareatandtosee thatthereareotherwaystoresolvemoralconflicts. CaseoftheInternetBargain: AninefficientInternetcompanyhasforgottentosendabill foranexpensivecomputerthathasbeendeliveredathome. Theclientissentareceiptstatingthattheinvoicehasbeen

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paid. The question for the trainees is if they would inform theInternetcompanyofthefactthattheyhavemadeamis take.(Cohen2007)

In this specific case there is no social control and the people workingattheInternetcompanyarealsoanonymous,sothere islittleornoriskofbeingcaughtorbeingsociallycondemned. When roleplaying this case, there is usually always an— extrinsicallymotivated—groupthatdecidesnottowarntheIn ternet company. Their justification is that the company should not be that stupid and therefore deserves its loss of income. There is usually also a intrinsically motivated group that de cidestocalltheInternetcompany,evenifitmeanspayingthe bill.TheyreferspontaneouslytotheGoldenRuleandthetype ofsocietytheydonotwanttolivein.Theyrefertofeelingsof guilt and a bad conscience which is either religiously or secu larly motivated. The first group often listens in amazement to these intrinsic motives of the second group. They never guess that it would also be possible to think differently about re solvingthisdilemmabetweenpersonalinterestandgeneralin terest. Thenextstepcouldbeadiscussionwiththetraineesabout thekindofworldinwhichtheylive.Fortunately,mostrational humanbeingswanttoliveinadecentsocietyandworkinade cent company. Human life would otherwise be brutish, nasty andshort,sosanehumanbeingsusuallyacceptcommonrules thatneedtobeobeyed. Fromanegocentricperspective,however,itisstillrational to be parasitical on the good behaviour of others and act sel fishly. Here trainees should perhaps take cognizance of Kant’s categorical imperative: Is it possible to universalise orgeneral ise the moral behaviour about to be committed? If not, one is probablyclaimingthatoneisanexceptionforone’sself.Also,it isimportanttodiscusstheGoldenRule:Dountoothersasyou wouldhavethemdountoyou.ThisRuleshouldbemadeprac ticalandconcrete:Isitdesirabletohavesomebodysayingnasty things about us? If not, why do we gossip about others? How wouldwefeelasparentsifourchildrenwereforcedtodropout ofschoolandtoworkinafactory? To stimulate trainees to take a moral point of view, John Rawls’“veilofignorance”(Rawls1975)ishelpfulaswell.Vari

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ouscasescouldbeactedoutinwhichtraineeshavetonegotiate about how they are going to distribute scarce resources. The challenge is that, behind the veil of ignorance, participants do notknowanythingabouttheirbackground,sotheycanberich, but also be poor, disabled, black, gay or female. Will they still discriminateorenrichthemselves? Discussionsaboutpersonalidealsforsocietycouldalsobe accompanied by the question of how much responsibility we shouldassumeforothers,notonlyinapoliticalsensebutalso in a business sense. Do companies have a moral duty to make surethattheirproductsandservicesareusedresponsibly?For many young trainees in the neoliberal climate, “personal re sponsibility”hasbecomesuchaninternalisedkeywordthatof tenlittleempathyisleftforthosewhomakemistakes.Having been brought up in a rich and safe environment, the thought does not cross their minds that bad things can also happen to responsiblepeople. Theabovesuggestionsdonotpretendtobecomplete.But, in my experience, they have helped trainees take the moral point of view, become aware of their stage of moral develop mentandtoreflectonidealsforthetypeofsocietytheywantto liveinandthepersontheywanttobe.Thesteptobeingtruly intrinsicallymotivatedissomethingthat,intheend,cannotbe enforced.Itisaninnerdecisionthatonlythepersoncanmake for him or herself. This could be inspired either by his or her religion or by a secular idea of selfrespect. It could be an ex plicit decision made in light of the type of person somebody wants to be or a choice that will gradually be made over the years by becoming an adult who assumes responsibility for one’sfamilyandenvironment. Conclusion Letmeconcludebystatingthatintoday’scompetencemanage mentitispossibletogivemoraltrainingsessionsthathavein trinsic motivation as a goal that does not conflict with the de mandsofapluralistsociety.Althoughthemoralattitudeisgen erally regarded as an iceberg that is difficult to approach, it is possibletogobelowthesurfaceandtomaketraineesawareof thevarioustypesofmotivationthatdrivesthem.Foratrainer, it will probably be difficult to check objectively if the intrinsic

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motivation is present and note it in some report. But if it re mains absent and employees prove unable to resist the many temptationsatwork,itwillbeestablishedempiricallyandwith serious negative effects for many, as the financial crisis has shown. Intheaftermathofthefinancialcrisis,Ihopethatinthecor porate reflections on the moral lessons that should be learned measureswillgobeyondcomplianceandcorporategovernance toincludeintrinsicmotivationaswell. Bibliography Cohen,Martin.(2007).101MoralDilemmas.London:Routledge. Jeurissen,Ronald.(2008).Ethics&Business.Assen:VanGorcum. Rawls,John.(1993).PoliticalLiberalism.Ithaca:ColumbiaUniversityPress. (1971).ATheoryofJustice.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

RenewalofCivilization TowardJusticeandPeace HenkE.S.Woldring Abstract Thecentralquestionofthisessayreadsasfollows:Howcanthepoliticaltask ofcivilizationandculture,intendedtorenewsociety,promotesocialcohesion throughjusticeandpromotepeacewithoutculturalrelativism?Socialcohe sion is a critical concept because of its conditions and characteristics as a process of development. I will first discuss how the political task of civiliza tionandculturecanpromotesocialcohesioninrelationtojustice.Second,I will discuss how the political task of civilization and culture can overcome cultural relativism and can promote peace as well. I will conclude by an sweringthecentralquestionofthisessay.

Introduction The neoThomist philosopher Jacques Maritain considers cul turetobeadynamiccontextofhumanlifethatprovideshuman beingswithfundamentalmaterialneeds.Itisalsocharacterized by a moral development of speculative and practical activities thatmakescultureaproperlyhumandevelopment.Heargues that to speak of culture is to speak of the common good of human beings (Maritain 1971: 8283). Since he also holds that the task of the state is to promote the common good, he calls thispoliticaltaskofthestate“ataskofcivilizationandculture” that is meant to help each person conquer his “freedom of ex pansion and autonomy” progressively in a positive manner. This freedom and autonomy can be achieved only within the political society as a civilized community (Maritain 1986: 125 26). This task of civilization and culture is to renew the com munityinattainingsocialcohesion,whichistheresultofrela tionships of justice (Maritain 1986: 121, 12930). Since the free domandautonomyofhumanbeingsmaydifferfromonecul turetoanotherand,asaconsequence,socialcohesionmayexist

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in varying degrees, the question arises if moral values and normsofdifferentculturesshouldbetakenasrelative.Ifwere jectsuchculturalrelativism,ifweholdthattheoneculturemay be morally superior to the other, or if we believe that re presentativesoftheoneculturemaycriticizetheinternalaffairs ofanother,thenpeacebetweenhumanbeings,communitiesor states may be endangered. The central question of this paper reads therefore as follows: How can the political task of civil ization and culture, intended to renew society, promote social cohesion through justice and promote peace without cultural relativism?Iwillfirstdiscusshowthepoliticaltaskofciviliza tionandculturecanpromotesocialcohesioninrelationtojus tice.Second,Iwilldiscusshowthepoliticaltaskofcivilization andculturecanovercomeculturalrelativismandcanpromote peaceaswell.Iwillconcludebyansweringthecentralquestion ofthispaper. SocialCohesionasaCriticalConcept ManycitizensofWesterncountriesfearfortheirchildren’sfu tureaswellasfortheirown.Theyfeartheconsequencesofthe globalization of production and distribution which results in oppositeeconomicdevelopmentsbetweenrichandpoorcoun tries. They fear the relationship of ideological polarization be tweenWesterncountriesandArabandAsiancountriesand,as aconsequence,theriskofinternationalmilitaryconfrontations. Theyfearfortheircountry’sfuture,moreover,asincomepolar izationincreases,sincetherearepersistentlyhighlevelsofun employment and widespread social exclusion. Although they accept responsibility to a certain extent, they lay some of the blame on their governments for insufficiently protecting them against these political, economic and social threats. There is a wellgrounded fear that failure to respond to these problems will push more citizens into the arms of radical populists and religioussectarianswhopropagateapoliticsofintoleranceand exclusion.DecliningsocialcohesioninWesternsocietiesisdue inparttosuchreactionsbyitscitizensandthepoliticalfailure to respond to these reactions appropriately. The decline of so cialcohesionassumesthatcertainconditionsandprocessesthat characterize a wellfunctioning society are no longer satisfied. This complaint about declining social cohesion, however, does

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notgiveanyindicationwhatsocialcohesionis.YetJaneJenson arguesthatmanyassociate“theconceptofsocialcohesionwith enthusiasm, finding in it a way of discussing the interconnec tionsamongeconomicrestructuring,socialchangeandpolitical action” (Jenson 1998: 3). However, discussions on these items donotyieldanyclarityontheconceptofcohesion.JudithMax well’sdefinitionismoreprecise: Socialcohesioninvolvesbuildingsharedvaluesandcom munities of interpretation, reducing disparities in wealth and income, and generally enabling people to have a sense that they are engaged in a common enterprise, facing sharedchallenges,andthattheyaremembersofthesame community.(Maxwell1996:13)

Inthisdefinitionsocialcohesionrefersneithertoconditionsnorto concretegoalsofasocialcommunity.Rather,itinvolvescharac teristicsofsocialcohesionasanongoingprocessofdeveloping acommunity:asenseofcommitment(“sharedvaluesandcom munities of interpretation”), an idea of justice (“reducing dis parities in wealth and income”), and the capacity to manage conflicts(“engagedinacommonenterprise,facingsharedchal lenges”). Jenson distinguishes various “dimensions” of or, more ade quately,conditionsforsocialcohesionthatcanbesummarized asfollows(Jenson1998:1517).  1. Because of its characteristics of sharedvaluesandthe senseofcommitment,thefeelingofbelongingisclearlyacondi tion for social cohesion. Feelings of isolation from the com munityareassociatedwithathreattosocialcohesion. 2. Since social cohesion is related to social and economic institutions,wecanask:Whohasaccesstoandaneffectiveop portunity for full participation, especially in labour markets, and who are marginalized? This question refers to the condi tions of participation and inclusion. Practices that result in non involvementandexclusionareassociatedwiththreatstosocial cohesion. Economic exclusion, for instance, for more than a temporaryperiodofunemployment,leavespeoplesociallyiso lated, undermines their human dignity, and leads to social ex clusion. Participation and inclusion may promote full citizen

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ship and democracy in political, social and economic institu tions. 3. Because social, economic and political conflicts may be unavoidable in achieving a new social order, we have to ac knowledge examples of the most important conflicts: over de finitions of national identity, the relation between religion and the modern state, the capacity of society to adapt to other cul tures,thecapacityofsubculturestoadapttothedominantcul ture of society, the applicability of Western notions of human rights everywhere, the public and legal status of issues of per sonalmorality,andtheroleofcivilsocietyoveragainstthein stitutionsofthestate(seeBerger1998:xvi).Inamodernsociety that is characterized by a plurality of worldviews, social com munities, political institutions and cultural minorities, it is im possible to have a uniformed system of moral values and normsinallfieldsofsociety.Althoughallcitizens,socialcom munities and cultural minorities should obey the laws of the constitutional state, we have to acknowledge that there are groupsthatpromoteandaggravatesocialandpoliticalconflicts and seek polarization. An important condition for promoting socialcohesionistonurturethosesocialcommunitiesthatcon tributetopracticesofrecognitionandtoleranceofpluralityrather than undermine these practices through rejection and in tolerance.Inshort,anyproblemforsocialcohesionariseswhen therecognitionofthatpluralityorrejectionofitoccursinways thatreducefeelingsofbelonging,discourageparticipationand inclusion,andunderminerecognitionandtolerance. Theconditionsaddressedalertustothefactthatsocialco hesionisnotjustaboutsocietyatlargeornationalidentitybut aboutlocalcommunitiesandothersocialcommunitiesaswell. Sincewearediscussingsocialcohesioningeneral,thequestion arises if these various forms of social cohesion could threaten the social cohesion of society at large. Moreover, if there are variousformsofsocialcohesionwithinsociety,isthesocialco hesionofanationalsocietynecessary?Ifso,thenaresharedpo litical values (a common commitment to the existence of a country and, in particular, to democracy, for instance) suffi cient? These questions concentrate on social cohesion as a de pendentvariable.However,ifwetakesocialcohesionasanex

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planatory variable, the question arises as to what its possible consequences or intended results (for instance, a decline in criminality, improvement of economic welfare, public health care and public school education) are. Social cohesion appears to be an ambiguous concept when employed by those seeking toaccomplishavarietyofthings(Jenson1998:37). Anothertroublingquestionisthatsocialcohesionmaybea threat to social cohesion as such (Jenson 1998: 3536). If social communitiesareveryexclusiveandonlyinwardlooking,they maysufferfromtoomuchsocialcohesionthatmighthaveneg ative consequences for citizens’ loyalties to other communities and their loyalty to society at large. It is necessary to be sen sitivetothecapacitytobeopentoalegitimatepluralityofso cialcommunities. In short, we may say that social cohesion is a critical con cept: first, because of its conditions (the feeling of belonging, participationandinclusion,recognitionandtoleranceofplural ity), and, second, because of its characteristics as a process of development (a sense of commitment, an idea of justice, and the capacity for managing conflicts). We have to investigate Maritain’squestionofhowthepoliticaltaskofcivilizationand culturecanpromotesocialcohesioninrelationshiptojusticein relationtotheseconditionsandcharacteristics. SocialCohesionandJustice ToclarifyhisviewofsocialcohesionasacriticalconceptMar itain discusses social cohesion in relation to its conditions: the multitude of social communities and the task of the state to promote the common good and social integration. He argues that society consists of a multitude of social communities that shouldachieveautonomy.Inthiscontextautonomymeansthat everysocialcommunitygovernsitselfandcarriesoutdutiesac cording to its own rights, freedoms and responsibilities. He does not describe the social plurality of society as a fact only butadvocatesthispluralityasagoodthatcontributestothevi tality of society (Maritain 1951: 1213). This advocacy of social plurality means that he wishes to justify and strengthen social communities in which concrete human freedoms are incar nated.Moreover,hearguesthattheultimatemeaningofsocial communities is “affective and moral, having reference to the

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dignityoftheperson,adignityofwhichthepeoplethemselves have become conscious, not of course as possessing or truly meritingthatdignitybutatleastasbeingcalledtoit”(Maritain 1973: 201). From this claim of the dignity of human beings he defends a personalist theory of social communities. However, howcansuchapluralistsocietybepreventedfromfallingapart andleadingtoaprocessofdisintegration? To answer this question, Maritain argues that social com munities can degenerate if they are oppressive toward their own participants, toward other communities or if they are too exclusive. First, Maritain argues that an important reason for many social communities to be oppressive toward their own participants is the failure of modern democracies to achieve realdemocracyor,asMaritainputsit,“thefactthatthisrealiza tioninevitablydemandedaccomplishmentinthesocialaswell asinthepoliticalorder,andthatthisdemandwasnotcomplied with”(Maritain1986:19).Aprocessofdemocratizationofsocial communitiesshouldcomplementademocraticstate.Thissocial democracy is not only a manner of organizing communities, but it should serve first and foremost as a moral design to en ablecitizenstolivewithdignity,freedomandresponsibility. Second,ifassociationstranscendtheirrightsandfreedoms byoppressingothersocialassociations,Maritaincontendsthat theywillthreatenthevitalityofsociety.Industriescanimpose requirements that threaten the interests of families, groups of employees and consumers. They can misuse their autonomy andbecomemoreorlessoppressive(Maritain1951:1925).The important idea about associational plurality is not simply that societiesaresociallydifferentiated.Rather,itisthemeaningof this differentiation that matters: associational plurality decen tralizes power and promotes citizens’ freedoms and a way of lifeinaccordancewiththeirhumandignity. Third, Maritain criticizes social communities that are very exclusiveandonlylookinward.Thesesocialcommunitiesmay sufferfromtoomuchmoralcohesionthatmighthavenegative consequences for citizens’ loyalties to other communities and theirloyaltytosocietyatlarge.Maritainarguesthatsocialcom munitiesshouldpromotethecommitmentoftheirmembersto participateinsocietyatlarge(Maritain1986:10305).

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Maritain argues that the state has the particular task of maintaining laws, promoting public order and acting in the publicinterest.Heacknowledgesthatthestateisnotagoalin itselfbutanagencyentitledtousepowerandcoerciontoserve theinterestsofcitizens(Maritain1951:12,20).Inshort,thestate hasthepoliticaltaskofpromotingthecommongood.Hecalls thispoliticaltask“ataskofcivilizationandculture”thattends to help each person in a positive manner to conquer his “free dom of expansion and autonomy” progressively within a po litical society that “must be strong and must defend itself ef fectively against disintegration” (Maritain 1986: 12526). Since Maritain does not view freedom and autonomy as absolute standards, and since he discusses the “task of civilization and culture”asaprocessforconqueringfreedomandautonomypro gressively,heacknowledgesthatsocietiesachievedifferentde greesoffreedomofexpansionandautonomy.Topreventsuch a society from falling apart he adds that the political task of civilizationandcultureisconditionedbytheideaofasocialin tegration that can be achieved only through a legal organiza tionofsocietybythegovernment(Maritain1986:128). Maritain is very clear that society needs social integration throughtheorganizationofthestatetoimprovethestructures of human life. Individual human beings will perhaps not be comemorallybetterasaresultofthisorganizationbutatleast theirstateoflifeandthestructuresofhumanlifeingeneralwill improve (Maritain 1986: 115, 127). In this context we have to acknowledge that social integration always presupposes re spectfortheautonomyofsocialcommunitiesandculturalmi norities. Moreover, we have to distinguish between economic integration (labour and lodging), cultural integration (school education and language), sociostructural integration (partici pation in labour, lodging and school organizations) and polit icalintegration(participationwithinademocraticstateandso ciety according to its rules). Legally organized social integra tion,however,hasmoralimplicationsbecauseitcannotsurvive without the moral support of citizens. Otherwise, this organ izedsocialintegrationwouldonlybecomecoerciveand,conse quently,oppressive. To clarify social cohesion as a critical concept somewhat more,Maritaindiscussesthecharacteristicsoftheprocessofthe

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development of social cohesion. He argues that, based on this organizedsocialintegration,a“civilizedcommunity”mayarise by virtue of the progress of moral consciousness, relationships of social justice, civic friendship and other internalized moral values (Maritain 1986: 121, 12930). Because of these moral values,suchacivilizedcommunityischaracterizedbyasocial cohesion or (better) a sociomoral cohesion. The legally organ ized social integration precedes the sociomoral cohesion of a civilizedcommunityand,atthesametime,tendstostrengthen thiscohesion.Moreover,thedegreeofsociomoralcohesionde pendsonthemeasureofsocialintegration. Maritainarguesthatthestatehasthetaskofpromotingthe common good or the political task of civilization and culture, whichhasatwofoldmeaning:ithastoconqueraperson’sfree domandautonomyprogressivelyandithastopromotealegal social integration. The balance between both tasks can be achievedbyasociomoralcohesionthatischaracterizedbyre lationshipsofjusticeandotherinternalizedmoralvalues.Inhis view, the idea of sociomoral cohesion is not an independent variable, because it is part of the common good, which is the normativecharacteristicorgeneralgoalofthestateandwhich socialjusticeshouldpromote(Maritain1951:14,20).Thegener al goal of the state should not be confused with the concrete goalsofgovernmentpolicy,suchasadeclineincriminalityora reorganizationofpublichealthcare.However,theeffectsofthe government’s policy on these issues should be judged by the idea of social justice in order to evaluate if they contribute to thecommongood;socialjusticeisnotthesameasthecommon good,butitis“essentialtothecommongood”(Maritain1986: 96). Maritain enumerates three characteristics of social justice: 1) the intrinsic morality or integrity of life, perfection of the goodandrighteoushumanlifeofthemultitude;2)thepropor tional or harmonious distribution of goods among persons, fit aidfortheirdevelopment,andorder,unityandauthorityinso ciety; 3) splendour as the “chief value, the highest possible at tainment (that is, the highest compatible with the good of the whole)ofpersonstotheirlivesaspersonsandtotheirfreedom of expansion or autonomy” (Maritain 1986: 9495; see Schall 1998:145).

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Now we are in a position to answer the first question posedintheintroduction:Howcanthepoliticaltaskofciviliza tion and culture promote social cohesion in relation to justice? This political task of promoting the sociomoral cohesion of societycanbeachievedinandthroughademocraticstatethat should promote the common good through legally organized social integration. On the basis of this social integration a civ ilizedcommunitymayarisebyvirtueofsocialjusticeandother moralvalues.Suchacivilizedcommunityischaracterizedbya degreeofsociomoralcohesion. CulturalRelativismversusCulturalUniversals Regarding different degrees of social integration and different interpretations of and practices of justice and other moral val ues, we may observe varying degrees of the sociomoral cohe sionofcommunities.Thisobservationincludesapluralityofcul tures that tends to encourage appreciation for cultural relativ ism. This appreciation restrains group prejudices, teaches hu mility and underpins the idea of mutual respect. At the same time, cultural relativism has generated widespread doubt re gardingtheobjectiveworthofmoralstandards.Butculturalre lativism implies a curious paradox: on the one hand, it holds thateverycultureisuniqueandincommensurablewithothers andthatoutsiderscannotevaluateapeople’sbeliefsandprac tices;ontheotherhand,itholdstheobjectivemoralvaluethat allpeopleneedanddeserverespectdespitetheirdiversehabits and customs. To clarify this paradox, Philip Selznick argues that cultural relativism is a doctrine of appreciative tolerance basedona“postulateofhumanity.”Thispostulateincludesthe principleofselfdetermination:allpeoplesseektheirownwel fare and, in so doing, create their own ways of life that make sensetothem;theydevisetheirownmoralstandards,customs and habits in which we discern implicit criteria of their social wellbeing. The paradox of cultural relativism becomes clear whentheseclaimsofselfdeterminationarestressedsofarthat they undermine the principle of respect for others and, at the extreme,rejectthisrespect.However,doesthefactofthediver sity of cultural selfdetermination settle any question of moral justificationanddoesitrefutetheideathatsomewaysofliving may be better than others? Selznick argues that the “implicit

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criteria of social wellbeing ... are not necessarily the same as criteria of moral wellbeing” (Selznick 1992: 99). Does this dis tinctionbetweencriteriaofsocialandmoralwellbeingpresup pose that there are or should be moral standards that go be yondthecriteriaofsocialwellbeing,and,ifso,dothesemoral standardshaveuniversalvalue? To answer this question I first need to investigate the fol lowing transcendentalphilosophical question: What necessary conditionsarepresupposedthatmakeitpossibleforhumanbe ingstoformculturesthat,inMaritain’swords,enablethemto expand “the properly human life, including ... moral develop ment...whichisproperlyworthyofbeingcalledahumande velopment”(Maritain1973:95)?Ifculturalanthropologistsand philosophersposethisquestion,theyoftenbegindiscussingthe problem of cultural universals, including moral universals, obtainedinductivelyonthebasisofempiricalresearch.Toclar ify that the debate on these universals does not answer that transcendentalphilosophical question, I have to discuss the problemofuniversalsfirst. Inrelationtothediversityof culturalcontextswehaveto distinguish between specific rules and practices and universal cultural values or universal moral values. These cultural and moral universals exist for good reasons, and they can be ac counted for, according to Selznick, in three main ways (see Selznick1992:9798).First,thereisnodoubtthathumannature doesnotdeterminespecificrulesandpractices,butitdoespro videthepsychologicalfoundationsformoralexperience:allhu manbeingsarealikeinbeingsubjecttoconditioning,inhaving asimilarrangeofemotions,inneedingsecurity,respectandthe capacity to care for others. Since human nature does provide the psychological foundation of moral experience, it generates some moral principles, such as preserving human life, valuing affection and companionship and looking after the wellbeing ofcloserelatives. Second, social life has functional necessities that must be metifgroupsaretosurviveandflourish:leadership,commun ication, specialization, symbolic affirmation of group identity, maintaining order and protecting property. These necessities generate moral values (and matching obligations): the subor

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dination of individual inclination to the perceived welfare of thegroup,prohibitingmurderandtheft,andmutualhelp. Third, all peoples have invented independently similar practices and ideas within limited possibilities. They have foundwaystoselectspouses,extendhospitality,showrespon sibility, demonstrate courage, be honest, and propitiate the gods.Butinpracticethesewaysarenotinfinitelyvarious.They mustadapttotherecoursesavailableandtotheproblemsand constraints of everyday life. All peoples face similar problems andsolvetheseproblemsintheirownway,buttheydosowithin theframeworkoflimitedalternatives. Those moral values (based on the psychological founda tionofmoralexperience,functionalnecessitiesofagroup,and practices and ideas within limited alternatives) are not acci dentaldevelopmentsbut,accordingtoSelznick,areuniversally recognized.Althoughtherearevariousspecificrulesandprac tices of property, the wellbeing of relatives and hospitality, thesedifferencescannotbeusedasevidenceofradicaldiscon tinuity in human culture. Selznick argues that “the universals show that human societies are everywhere much the same in their appreciation of basic morality” (Selznick 1992: 96). This ideaofabasicmoralitymeansthatinandthroughtheconcrete ness of social participation, much of what we call distinctively humanorhumanworthemerges,whichmayunderminerather thansupportculturalparticularity(Selznick1992:103).Selznick argues that it is true that every cultural context has unique rules and practices, but it is just as true that cultural contexts showsimilaritiesfromwhichwecandrawgeneralconclusions regardingtheformsandlimitsofsociallife. Hearguesthatthiscombinationofuniquenessandsimilar itiesmeansthatamoderateformofculturalrelativismisindis pensable. This moderate form of relativism is something other than a radical relativism that holds that particular circumstan cesmustbetheultimatejudgeofwhatisgoodanddoesnotad mitanyideaofobjectivity.However,theideaofanyobjectivity reflectsourunderstandingofthevarietyandcomplexityofcir cumstances, and the capacity of social learning to find alter nativewaysofmeetingsimilarchallenges.Selznickargues:“... what is morally good in the circumstances is objectively good, thatis,itdoesinfactsolveproblems,providesatisfaction,en

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hancecompetence”(Selznick1992:114).Headdsthatamod erateformofculturalrelativismbasedonthisunderstandingof pluralityofculturalcontextsimpliesanappealtothebeginning of cultural and philosophical inquiry, not its end, and it may promotecommunicationandcommunity. Selznick advocates a moderate form of cultural relativism throughtheideaoftheobjectivityofculturaluniversals,which show themselves in particular practices. Knowledge of these universalshavebeenobtainedinductivelyfromthesepractices, i.e. by discovering people’s capacity for social learning to find alternativewaystomeetsimilarchallenges,tosolveproblems, provide satisfaction and enhance competence. However, the crucial question is: Do those inductively obtained universals provideevidenceofuniversality?Whattheoneconsiderstobe cultural and moral universals the other may judge to be phe nomena of particular cultures. This critic may argue that so called universals have no ultimate status because they belong tothecultureimpregnatedleveloftheembodimentofthebasic anthropological structure rather than to that structure itself. Selznick’s search for cultural universals that are obtained inductively from various cultures does not answer the prior transcendentalphilosophical question: What necessary condi tionsarepresupposedthatmakeitpossibleforpeoplestoform culturesthatenablethemtoobtainamoraldevelopmentthatis properlyworthyofbeingcalledahumandevelopment? CulturalPluralityinSearchofTruthandPeace Maritain considers culture to be a dynamic context of human life that provides human beings with fundamental material needsandthat,aboveall,ischaracterizedbyamoraldevelop ment that is a genuine human development. He considers cul turetobethecommongoodofhumanbeingsandaddsthatin thesenseofhisdefinitionofculture“thereisnoculturethatis not humanist.” He continues: to “denounce a spiritual devia tionofculturedoesnotmeantocondemnthisculture(Maritain 1971:8283).Inthiscontextwehavetobeawarethat Maritain holdsimplicitlythatitishardlypossibletojudgeacultureasa whole. Since he views culture as the expansion of human life, includingthematerialdevelopmentthatisnecessaryandsuffi

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cient to enable us to lead an upright life, its moral, economic andtechnicaldevelopmentmaydiverge. Maritain does not judge cultural plurality uncritically. Thereisaprogressivemovementofsocietiesastheyevolvein history. Maritain argues that this movement depends on “the doublelawofthedegradationandrevitalizationoftheenergy of history, or of the mass of human activity upon which the movement of history depends” (Maritain 1986: 113). This means thatwhereasthewearandtearoftimeandmentalpassivityde grade the moral energy of human beings, the creative forces thatarecharacteristicofthespiritofhumandignityandliberty constantly revitalize the quality of this energy. Society ad vances due to the vitalization of moral energy springing from thisspiritandliberty.Thismeansthatculturalprogresswillnot takeplacebyitselfbutthroughtheascentofconsciousnessthat is linked to a superior level of organization, i.e. a civilized community.Thiscommunitycannotbeachievedthroughcom pulsion but only through the progress of moral consciousness and relationships of justice and brotherhood (Maritain 1986: 11415,118,121). As I discussed above, the state has the task of civilization andculturethattendstoconqueraperson’s“freedomofexpan sion and autonomy” progressively and to promote social in tegration. Politicians should promote the progress of moral consciousnessandtherelationshipsofjusticeandbrotherhood that may be achieved in different cultural contexts in different ways.Thisprogresscanbeachievedonlybygreatpoliticalvi gilancestimulatedbyaprocessofeducationtorevitalizemoral andspiritualresourcesofculture(Maritain1986:26,4142,64). Before Maritain evaluates a cultural context, he looks at it initsownright.Hewantstodojusticetootherculturesand,in particular,tohumanbeingswhobelongtothesecultures—and thisiscrucialinwhatIcallhistranscendentalphilosophicalin vestigation—becausehehastorespect“inthemhumannature andhumandignityandthoseveryresourcesandlivingsprings oftheintellectandofconscience”(Maritain1965:24).Basedon this respect he acknowledges the necessity of a real and genu inetolerancethatoccurs only when a man is firmly and absolutely convinced of a truth,orofwhatheholdstobeatruth,andwhenheatthe

150 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE sametimerecognizestherightofthosewhodenythistruth toexist,andtocontradicthim,andtospeaktheirownmind, notbecausetheyarefreefrom truthbutbecausetheyseek truth in their own way, and because he respects in them humannatureandhumandignity.(Maritain1965:24)

Moreover,thisacknowledgementofhumannature,dignity,tol erance and other “essential foundations” of culture arise from the “philosophical duty” to understand one another’s point of viewinagenuineandfairmanner(Maritain1965:29). To answer the transcendentalphilosophical question, Maritain searches for the necessary conditions that make cul turepossibleandenablehumanbeingstoobtainamoraldevel opmentthatisproperlyworthyofbeingcalledahumandevel opment. These conditions are moral universals that ought to count:humandignity,responsibility,justice,toleranceandhu manfellowshipwhichmeritrespectanduniversalacknowledge ment simultaneously. Moreover, there are two characteristics thatpromotetheprocessofacknowledgementoftheseuniver sals: the growth of moral consciousness and the philosophical duty to understand one another’s point of view in a genuine andfairmanner. Since Maritain holds that these moral conditions are evi dence of universality and that they merit general respect, his viewofpluralistculturalcontextsdoesnotimplyaculturalre lativism.Fromhistranscendentalphilosophicalapproachheis searchingformoralconditionsthatmakeculturepossibleand, as such, for common moral values that human beings share whobelongtodifferentculturesandthatmakeanintercultural communication possible. On the basis of his search for moral universalshecriticizesdeficienciesofassociations,alackofde velopment in the moral attitude of human beings, cultural de generation and oppressive minorities. Although Maritain em ploysthelawofdegenerationandprogresstobeabletoevalu atemorallydifferentcultures,tojudgecertaincultures(orparts ofit)inamodestmannerasmorallysuperiortoothercultures, and even to criticize these cultures, his transcendentalphilo sophical approach is intended to promote intercultural com municationand,asaconsequence,peaceaswell. Unlike Selznick, Maritain does not consider intercultural communication to be a possible result of inductively obtained

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and,assuch,moreorlessgenerallyaccepteduniversals.Onthe contrary, he acknowledges the possibility of communication— notwithstanding cultural differences—based on moral univer sals as necessary conditions, and promoted by the philosoph icomoraldutytounderstandoneanother’sideasandpractices. Consequently, Maritain distinguishes two interpretations of universals: a) what is accepted factually in general and b) whatoughttocount.Thefirstinterpretationofuniversalsisthe result of induction, which is often applied to what many cul tures have in common and is accepted more or less generally, despite their differences. The second interpretation refers to a transcendentalphilosophical approach that inquires into the necessary conditions that make culture and intercultural com munication possible. This interpretation of universals does not refer to what is accepted generally but to what ought to count or what merits agreement. To answer the second question posedintheintroduction—Howcanthepoliticaltaskofciviliz ation and culture overcome cultural relativism and promote peace as well?—I conclude that on the basis of his transcen dentalphilosophical approach Maritain discusses moral uni versalsthatmeritagreementinordertoovercomearadicalcul tural relativism, to promote intercultural communication and, asaconsequence,peaceaswell. Conclusions Wenowhavetoanswerthecentralquestionposedintheintro duction: How can the political task of civilization and culture, intendedtorenewsociety,promotesocialcohesionthroughjus tice and promote peace without cultural relativism? I have al ready discussed Maritain’s argument that the political task of civilization and culture is to promote the common good, in cluding both a person’s freedom of expansion and autonomy, andsocialintegrationthatprecedesandtendstostrengthenthe sociomoral cohesion of society. I concluded that the political taskofcivilizationandculturetopromotesociomoralcohesion of society may be achieved in and through a democratic state, whichshouldpromotethecommongoodthroughsocialjustice asitsessentialtask. Next, I discussed Maritain’s transcendentalphilosophical approach for discovering necessary conditions that make cul

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ture possible and underlie intercultural communication. I con cluded that certain universal moral values ought to count: hu man dignity, responsibility, justice, tolerance and human fel lowship. Maritain seeks to overcome a radical cultural relativ ismonthebasisofthesemoraluniversals. Maritain would acknowledge, however, that moral uni versals have an abstract character. They do not eliminate cul turaldifferencesbutaremostdirectlyrevealedinandmostfully nourishedbyparticularculturalcontexts.Nonetheless,moraluni versals have a normative character because we are confronted withquestionsofjusticeandinjustice,goodandevil.Itiscru cial how we respond to these questions within limited cir cumstancesandpossibilitiesofmaterialdevelopment.Sincewe are discussing moral universals, which are nourished by and revealed in various cultural contexts and their different ma terial developments, we have to acknowledge that a moderate form of relativism is unavoidable. But, unlike Selznick, this moderateculturalrelativismisnottheresultofuniversals,that are obtained inductively and are more or less accepted gener ally, but is conditioned by moral universals. Conditioned by these universals, people form various cultures in which they undergomoraldevelopment.Ifweareabletorelatethesecon ditionsofuniversalstovariableculturalcircumstances,includ ingtheirdifferentmaterialdevelopments,thenwemayescape botharadicalculturalrelativismandanarrogantsuperiorityof agivenculture.Thisescapeenablesustocontributetointercul turalcommunicationand,asaconsequence,topeaceaswell. Although Maritain’s transcendentalphilosophical ap proach clarifies which moral universals ought to be acknowl edged,heisawarethatthisacknowledgementaloneshouldnot be identified with renewal of cultures. This acknowledgement may contribute to a new phase in culture that may become a fertile ground for revitalizing the moral universals in practice. Such a new phase in culture will be a relative maximum of achievementofjusticeandpeace;itisrelativetoagivenhistor ical and cultural climate and it appeals to that acknowledge mentofmoraluniversals(Maritain1973:128).

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Bibliography Berger,Peter(ed.).(1998).TheLimitsofSocialCohesion:ConflictandMe diation in Pluralist Societies. A Report of Bertelsmann Foundation to theClubofRome.Boulder:Westview. Jenson,Jane.(1998).MappingSocialCohesion:TheStateofCanadianRe search.Ottawa:CanadianPolicyResearchNetworks. Maritain, Jacques. (1986). Christianity and Democracy & The Rights of ManandNaturalLaw.SanFrancisco:IgnatiusPress.  (1973). Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems ofa NewChristendom.NotreDame:UniversityofNotreDamePress. (1971).FreedomintheModernWorld.NewYork:GordianPress. (1965). On the Use of Philosophy: Three Essays. New York: Athen eum. (1951).ManandtheState.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress. Maxwell, Judith. (1996). Social Dimensions of Economic Growth. Eric JohnHansonMemorialLectureSeries.Vol.VIII.Edmonton:Uni versityofAlberta. Schall,JamesV.(1998).JacquesMaritain:ThePhilosopherinSociety.Lan hametal.: RowmanandLittlefield. Selznick,Philip.(1992).TheMoralCommonwealth:SocialTheoryandthe Promise of Community. Berkeley et al.: University of California Press.

Populism ABlessinginDisguiseforDemocracy? GovertJ.Buijs

Abstract Populism is a notoriously difficult term to define—almost synonymous, it seems, with democracy as far as content is concerned. This essay disting uishes between a political and a critical use of the term, and then presents someclassicalvoicesonformsof“populism”thatconstitutethreatstodemo cracy.Christianitymadetheproblemofdemocracymuchmoreurgentthanit wasintheclassicalperiod.SincetheriseofChristianityintheWestonehas tobeademocrat.Thislackofotheroptionsobligesustobeextremelycareful. Weneedtoknowwhenpopulismisathreattodemocracy,whenitishealthy, andwhenitisneither.Anattemptismadebydistinguishingbetweenthree typesofpoliticalrepresentationthatcorrespondtothreepossibleformsofun derrepresentation.Newsociopoliticalmovementscanemergeasaresponseto underrepresentation.Onlyonespecificformofaresponsetounderrepresen tationcanbeconsideredtobe“populist”inaformthatismoreorlessdan geroustodemocracy.

DemosandPopulus:DifficultiesinDefinition What difference does language make? Is Greek inherently bet terthanLatin?Theword“populism”seemstosuggestthatitis. Anessayonpopulismcannotavoidnavigatingtheparadoxical taskofdefiningtheconcept,whichisthatthetermisusuallyre garded as a negative, pejorative term while its key element is exactlythesameasthekeyelementofawordthatweusually esteem highly. “Democracy” is the term that is generally met with great favour. It is derived from the Greek demos (people) andkratein(togovern),andthereforeitsliteralmeaningis“gov ernment by the people.” The key term here is “people.” But “people” is the literal English rendering of the Latin populus, which is nothing else than the equivalent of the Greek demos, people. So when the demos govern, it seems to be good, but whenthepopulushavecontrol,itallbecomesquestionable.How 155

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is this possible? Is “populism” useful as a term in a critical theoryofpolitics?Is“governmentofthepeople,bythepeople andforthepeople”—AbrahamLincoln’sfamousdictum—anot quiteaccuratedefinitionof“populism”?Whyissomeonecalled apopulist,anyway?WhyisChavezcalledapopulist,andOba manot?WhyisBerlusconidubbedapopulist,andMandelanot? Do not all elected leaders and elected parties in a democracy claimtogivevoicetotheconcernsofthepeople?Canwe,there fore,reallydistinguishbetweenpopulismanddemocracy? Andyet,istherenotsomethinggoingon,especiallyinEu ropeancountries,thatwecannotignorebecauseitreallyisdif ferent from “business as usual,” politically speaking? Is there not something new about the FPÖ of the now deceased Jörg HaiderinAustria,andtheFrontNationalofJeanMarielePen in France, the Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) (later renamed the Vlaams Belang [Flemish Interest]) of Filip de Winter in Bel gium,theFortuynmovementandmorerecentlythePVV(Party for Freedom) of Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, something thatweshouldcall“populist”?Whatisthesecretoftheirrise? Populismisoftenreferredtointheliteratureasaparticular styleofpoliticsthatcashesinonadistinctionbetweenthe“cor rupt”eliteandthepure,“commonpeople,”oftenthroughchar ismaticleadership.1InthisessayIwillfirstdistinguishbetween the political and the critical uses of the term. I will then con tinue with the critical use by listening to what some classical authors had to say about the phenomenon. Christianity has madetheproblemofdemocracymuchmoreurgentthanitwas in the classical period: after the advent of Christianity in the West one has to be a democrat; it is no longer optional. This lackofotheroptionsobligesustobeextremelycareful:weneed to know when populism is a threat to democracy, when it is healthy,andwhenitisneither.Iwillattempttooutlineacon

1 See,forexample,AlbertazziandMcDonnel(2008),whodescribe populism as “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous peopleagainstasetofelitesanddangerous‘others’whoaretogetherde pictedasdepriving(orattemptingtodeprive)thesovereignpeopleof theirrights,values,prosperity,identityandvoice.”

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ceptual instrument that may help in this respect, utilizing the conceptsofrepresentationandunderrepresentation. PopulisminthePoliticalArena Thequestionofdefinitionmayappeartobesplittinghairs,but itisquiteserious.“Populism”canbeusedinatleasttwodiffer ent contexts, with two different meanings as a consequence. Thefirstcontextisthepoliticalarena.Hereitusuallyfunctions asapoliticalinstrumentforanaprioridismissalofnewconten dersinademocraticorderor,evenmorestraightforwardly,asa meanstodiscreditapoliticianonehappensnottolike. The first political use is to dismiss new democratic con tenders.Duetovarious circumstances,itispossiblethatevery now and then there is a relatively widespread feeling that the existing representatives no longer represent (large portions of) the people. Contemporary democracy has taken care of that problem by distinguishing between the governing party and the official opposition (in the United Kingdom the term “Her Majesty’sopposition”isevenused).Theoppositionisthus re gardedasanintrinsicpartofthedemocraticsystem(whichisa major difference from the classical ideas of democracy). It is intendedtocatchmostofthedissentingvoicesandbringthem togetherinaplatformthatisabletotakeoverthegovernment ina“friendlyrevolution”afteranelection. However,itisconceivablethattheofficialoppositionisnot abletofillthatrole.Itmaybedividedandweak;itmaysuffer fromtheverysameflawsasthepartyorpartiesingovernment. It is conceivable, simply hypothetically, that members of both thegovernmentandtheoppositionareexposedinthepressas having claimed certain expenses that were not directly related to their jobs as members of Parliament or congressional repre sentatives.Insuchahypotheticalcase—whichdoesoccurevery nowandthen—anotherpartymaycomeintobeing,stirringup public outrage and promising a radical cleanup. Such a third party, the outsider, may easily be called “populist” by the es tablishedparties.However,insuchsituationsitisalwaysgood torememberthatademocraticsystemisanopensystem,amarket in which everyone is allowed to compete for votes. “Third” parties, which are opposed to and position themselves outside both the government and the opposition, are fully allowed to

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enter the field—even though neither the governing parties nor the opposition may like it. The “third” party may even chal lengethepoliticalsystemby,forexample,questioningthejus tice of the district system (in the UK) or the functioning of an equal representation system. This does not constitute a consti tutionalproblem,inspiteofwhatisoftenallegedbypoliticians. Thus,oneshouldbewaryofthe“political”useoftheterm:itis usuallynothingmorethananattempttodisqualifyapriorinew competitorsinsteadoftakingtheirchallengetoheart. Thesecondformofpoliticaluseofthe“pword”istouseit asasimplepejorativetermforapoliticianonedoesnotlike.It isatermusedbythe“established”politicianstodenouncethe newcontenders.However,theuseoftheterminthiswaymay blind the established politician to his own failures. One does nothavetotakeacertainanalysisseriouslyifonecanclaimthat the one doing the analyzing is a “populist,” let alone that one has to enter into a real debate with a socalled populist poli ticianorpopulistparty. In conclusion, the political use of the term “populism” is usuallynotmuchmorethanadiagnosisandacurethataggra vates the disease it is intended to heal. In easily accusing one another of populism, politicians prepare the ground for true populistmovements.Butbythetimesuchmovementsarriveon the scene, as a diagnostic tool populism may have become blunted.So,withoutanydeeperanalyticalunderstanding,poli ticiansshouldrefrainfromusingtheterm. PopulismasanAnalyticalTerm:AncientVoices Asecondcontextinwhichpopulismmaybeusedisincritical political science, epistemè politikè in the classical sense. Such a scienceinquireshowpoliticalorderispossibleandwhatthecir cumstancesandcausesofpoliticalhealthandofpoliticaldecay are.Classicalpoliticalscienceoftenmakesdistinctionsbetween various types of political order, such as monarchy, aristocracy anddemocracy.However,morethanmerelygivingaflatcata logueoftypes,criticalinquiryproceedstowardsananalysisof thetypeofhumanbeingthatisbothpresupposedbyandrein forcedbyacertainpoliticalorder.Thedynamicsbetweenacer tainpoliticalorderandthepeoplewhoinhabitthisordercanei therdestroytheorderormakeitsustainable.Itseemsthatclas

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sicalpoliticalscientistswerealreadyacutelyawareofwhatinre centdiscussionhascometobeknownastheBöckenfördetheor em. Böckenförde, a member of the German Supreme Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht),oncestatedthatthefree,secularstate livesonpremisesitcannotitselfguarantee.2Toputthisdiffer entlyandmore generally:apoliticalstructurealwaysdepends onapoliticalculturethatitcannotitselfproduce. In this context populism refers to changes in the political culture, in the makeup of people’s minds, in the makeup of what Charles Taylor has called the moral horizon of a culture (Taylor 1989), the set of widely shared intuitions about good andbad,aboutwhatisworthwhileandwhatisnot.Asocalled populistpartymayeitherembodythischangeitselformaybea criticalforcethattriestoforceanalreadydegeneratedpolitical orderbacktowarditsoriginalimpulse.Itmayevenbebothat thesametime. Inthissecondcontext,therearequiteafewanalysesavail able that may sharpen our insight into certain problems of a democratic political order that may give rise to something we cancallpopulism.Sincepoliticalscienceinthissensewasfound edbytheGreeks,itmaybegoodtolistentotheirancientvoices first. That democracy has inherent dangers and can never be considered to be stable is an insight that was very common a mongancientthinkers.Itledquiteafewofthemtorejectdemo cracyasweknowitaltogether.Plato’sreputationespeciallyhas sufferedseverelyfromhissupposed“antidemocratic”views,since being antidemocratic has become the cardinal sin of modern politics.3 However, the classical empirical analyses can be dis missedcheaplyandhastilyonlyatourownperil.Whenreading Plato,forexample,onecaneasilyignorehimfornotsharingour dogmaticpreferencefordemocracy.However,weshouldtryto look beyond our own dogmatic position, which would lead us toward such an easy dismissal—we think, as a rule, that those who are not in favour of democracy must be evil—so that we 2

 “Derfreiheitliche,säkularisierteStaatlebtvonVoraussetzungen, dieerselbstnichtgarantierenkann”(Böckenförde1976:60). 3

AkeyroleinthisrespectwasplayedbyKarlPopper(1945).Cf. Koolschijn(1996)intheNetherlands.

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cantrulyappreciatetheremarkablyacuteempiricalanalysesof theclassics.OneofPlato’sempiricalfindingsis,forexample,his insightthatthereisaninherentconnectionbetweendemocracy and tyranny (The Republic, 562a), a view that has remarkable similarities to, for example, that of one of the most thoughtful defenders of democracy today, Claude Lefort, who suggests that there is a deep connection between democracy and totali tarianism(Lefort1986:especiallypartIII,237319). ForPlato,democracyassuchisanunstableformofgovern mentthatcontainsandevennurturesthegermsofthediseases thateventuallydestroyit.InthisrespectitisforPlatonotatall exceptional, for every form of government is in the end some howselfdestructive.Whyisthisso?InPlato’sanalysis,itisthe aspectthatisgivencentrestageinacertainpoliticalorderthat —when unchecked—will do this. In an oligarchy the central element is wealth: the rich have power, but, because once rich, one constantly wants to have more, the economic gap between therichandthepoorbecomessowidethatthesystemcollapses. (This is a clear prefiguration of Marx’s Verelendungstheorie: one class constantly diminishing in size accumulates all the wealth but is then unable to retain its power because it is increasingly outnumbered by the poor.) The poor now take over, distribute thewealthequally,andestablisharegimeofliberty.However, whenlibertyismadethecentralelementofapoliticalorderand becomes unrestrained, it breeds anarchy. Every distinction be tween teacher and pupil, or even between the laws and those whoaresupposedtoobeythem,doesnotaccordwellwiththe idea of liberty. Unrestrained liberty may even affect animals, likehorsesandasses,thatare“wonttoholdontheirwaywith the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside” (563c). Unrestrained freedom,thehallmarkofdemocracyaccordingtoPlato,creates a situation in which everybody bumps into everybody else without restraint. All virtues of temperance and selfrestraint are ridiculed: if one can get it now, he should pursue it. New virtuesareenthroned,oldervirtuesarechangedwithrespectto content: [thepeople]proceedtoleadhomefromexileinsolenceand anarchyandprodigalityandshamelessness,resplendentina greatattendantchoirandcrownedwithgarlands,andincel

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ebrationoftheirpraisestheyeuphemisticallydenominateinso lence “good breeding”, license “liberty”, prodigality “mag nificence”,andshamelessness“manlyspirit”.(560e)

This situation of anarchy cries out for new leadership, the ty rant, who promises to set matters right (The Republic, 562d 563d). However,thetypeofpersonwhoproducesthis“order” and is produced by it is the person who is unable to fulfil the firstrequisiteofmorality,whoisunabletodistinguishbetween thehigherandthelowerinthesoul,betweenwhatisworthless and what is worthwhile, which desires are good and honour ableandwhicharebase(560b561d).Forthetyrant,everydesire isofequalworthtoanyother,andtheyallhavetobesatisfied simultaneously.Sothetyrant,whorisestopoweronthetideof democracy, in theendpursuesonlyhisown interests,thusbe comingverymuchliketheoligarchs,whosedethronementwas the reason behind the rise of democracy in the first place. We havecomefullcircle. SimilarobservationscanbefoundinAristotle,althoughhe isabitmorepositiveaboutthesustainabilityofapoliteiathatal soincludesdemocraticelements.Forhimaswell,however,“de mocracy” in and by itself is not a valid option but a degenera tionofthebestconstitution.InPoliticshefirmlysubjectsdemo craciestotheruleoflaw.Inademocracyinwhichthelawisnot supreme demagogues prevail (1292a1037). It becomes a des potism of the people in which there are no limits to what “the people”—actually led by demagogues—want. However, in the longrun,thedemagoguestendtooverrulethepeopletofurther their personal interests and overthrow democracy all together. Or they alienate so many people that they in fact evoke their ownopposition(1304b201305a7). Another, and certainly one of the most acute, observer in thisrespectisundoubtedlyPolybius,theGreekslavewho,after havingbeendeportedtoRome,becameoneofthegreatesthis toriansofhisage.HisHistories(Historiai)describestheamazing spectacle of the rise of one city, Rome, to world dominance in less than 53 years. After book V Polybius suddenly interrupts the flow of the story and deals with various political constitu tionsthatarepossible,inordertofindanexplanationfortheex traordinarysuccessofRome.DidRomedevelopthebestpossi bleconstitution?InhisanalysesPolybiusclaimstogivealucid

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summaryofthepoliticalknowledgeofhistime(referringtoPla to and others)—and lucid it is. Most writers before him dis tinguished between three possible constitutions: kingship, aris tocracyanddemocracy.Polybiusemphaticallyincludesthede generated counterpart of each of these: monarchy/dictatorship, oligarchy and ochlocracy (mob rule). For our purposes it is es pecially the transition from democracy to ochlocracy that is of interest(Historiai,BookVI,9).Democracyarisesfromthefearof the royal abuse of power. The people take the responsibility of poweronthemselves.Theyknowtheraisond’êtreofthedemo craticconstitution;Theyknowandrememberthedarkpossibil itieswithinthehumansoul,thelustforpowerandtheabuseof power.Butgradually,fromgenerationtogeneration,peopleget used to democracy; it becomes a matter of course. The equal rights and freedom for everyone, including freedom of speech, isnotconsideredasimportantasitoncewas,democracyisnow seenasboring,asanimpedimenttothefullrealizationofone’s individualambitions.Democracystartstobeseenbysomeasa platformforthefulfilmentofthoseambitions,andtheystartto manipulatecitizensbygiftsandthedistributionofwealth.The peoplegraduallybecomeusedtolivingattheexpenseofothers. Assoonasthemeanstomakethispossibledryuportheysim plygrowimpatient,theypickaleaderfromoutsidethesystem whopromisestogivethemeverythingtheywantthroughredis tribution. A violent clash occurs, in which the newly elected leader,initiallybackedbythepeople,overrulestheexistingin stitutionsinthenameofasuperiorjusticeandthengraduallyor violently suspends the laws and overthrows the existing po litical order. A new, “democratic,” dictator is born. Therefore, forPolybiusonecanspeakofdemocracy(asdistinguishedfrom ochlocracy)onlyifcertain“cultural”preconditionsarefulfilled: It is not enough to constitute a democracy that the whole crowdofcitizensshouldhavetherighttodowhateverthey wish or propose (as is the case in an ochlocracy, GJB). But where reverence to the gods, succour of parents, respect to elders,obediencetolaws,aretraditionalandhabitual,insuch communities,ifthewillofthemajorityprevail,wemayspeak oftheformofgovernmentasademocracy.(BookVI,4)

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What conclusion can be drawn from listening to these ancient voices?Thefirstisthat,accordingtotheancients,ahealthyde mocracy presupposes a healthy type of human being. The key element here is something like “selfcontrol” or “selfgovern ment.” Only human beings who can govern themselves can be entrustedwithgovernanceinapoliticalorder.When“thepeo ple”govern,thisrequirementholdsforallofthem.Afullblown “consumersociety”maynotsitwellwithdemocracy. Asecondelementisthatofmemory:ahealthydemocratic orderisinstitutedasaresponsetoanearlierpoliticalorderthat wasrepressiveandabusive.Ahealthydemocraticorderischar acterizedbythevividawarenessthatrepressionandtheabuse of power is a human potentiality that can always be realized. When this dark side of human nature is forgotten, one of the motivating and legitimizing pillars of a democratic order col lapses. The memory of oppression keeps a healthy scepticism about“greatleaders”and“saviours”alive. A third element in a healthy order therefore is the educa tion of the younger generation. The transition from one gener ationtoanotheriscrucialinanypoliticalorder,butespeciallyso inademocracy.Storieshavetobetold,storiesofformeroppres sionandsubsequentliberation,storiesaboutthelustforpower as a destructive force within one’s own soul and stories about howtohandlethisforce,existentiallyandinstitutionally.Sothe storiesthataretoldinthe“publicsphere”arecrucialforthesur vival of a democratic order. (This is the reason for Plato’s con tentionthatnotallstoriesshouldbetold). Finally,preciselybecauseofthislatterrequirement,thede cayofdemocracyisalmostinevitable,accordingtotheclassical philosophers. Experiences can be passed on by telling stories butnotbystoriesaboutstories.Astoryaboutone’sownexperi encehasapersuasivepowerthatismissingfromasecondhand storyofsomeonewhodidnothavethatsameexperience.4The memory of a political community is always a fading memory thatcannotsustainitselfovermorethantwogenerations.More over,thereisthe“wheelofhumanaffairs”that,inPolybius’ac

4

Thepassingonofwisdomfromonegenerationtoanotheractually isacentralorganizingthemeinPlato’sRepublic.SeeVoegelin1957:46 134.

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count,istheunavoidablecycleofriseanddecay.Intheclassical experience,“populism”or“ochlocracy”isunavoidable(untilit, inturn,runsitscourseaswell). TheBackgroundofWorldHistory Itmaybeworthwhiletosketchbrieflyadeeperandlargerback groundthatgivestheproblemofdemocracyanevengreaterur gencyformodernWesternersthanitdidintheclassicalperiod. For we, lately born, live in the aftermath of what can be called the“agapeicrevolution,”theimpactoftheJudeoChristianwit ness to God’s love embracing all human beings indiscrimin ately.5“ForGodsolovedthekosmos...thatwhoeverbelievesin [JesusChrist]...willlivehaveeternallife,”John’sgospeltellsus. Buttherootsofthisintuitiongobackfurther,i.e.tothenotion ofallhumanbeingsashavingbeencreatedintheimageofGod (Vroom2009:86;Middleton2005;Rist1982;Berman2008).Indi vidually,peopleareofequaleternalworth.Inalongandoften rough incubation process the West has tried to gauge the stag gering implications of this revolution, has tried vehemently, even violently, to reject it, has tried to ignore it. But, neverthe less,ithasnotbeenabletosuppressit.Frommedievalfarmers protestinginLondonin1381andshouting,“Wearehumanbe ings,createdintheimageofChrist,butwearetreatedlikethe savagebeasts!”6tothetwentiethcenturyarticulationofuniver sal human rights, the West has “suffered” from the collective consciencethatwasinculcatedinitsculture,muchtothechag rin of, for example, Nietzsche. The most eyecatching implica tion of the agapeic revolution has been the transition from the homohierarchicustothehomoaequalisasthe”standard”ofbeing human.7

5

ForamoreextensiveaccountofwhatIcalltheagapeicrevolution seeBuijs2008a:1850and2008b:2143. 6

WiththisrallyingcryEnglishfarmers,accordingtothechronicler JeanFroissart(13371405),rebelledin1381againstheavytaxationand serfdom.SeeLeGoff2003:376. 7

ThetermsareborrowedfromLouisDumont’sHomoHierarchicus (Dumont1967).Later,in1977,DumontsimultaneouslypublishedFrench andEnglisheditionsofthemoderncounterpartof“equalhumanbeing”

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Oneofthosewhoattemptedtoanalyzethistransitionand its political implications was the French nobleman Alexis de Tocqueville, who travelled extensively throughout the United Statesintheearlynineteenthcenturyand,onthebasisofthese travels, wrote his La démocratie en Amérique, which was to be comeaclassicinmodernsociologyandpoliticalscience.8ForDe Tocqueville,worldhistorywasindeedonthemove:itwasmov ingfromahierarchicalordertowardademocraticorder.Inre gardtothismovement,heevendaredtospeakofa“providen tial” dynamics. From his writings it is quite clear that he, born andraisedinFrencharistocraticcirclesthatlongedforareturn to the Ancien Régime, did not particularly like this movement. Butonehastoberealistic,anditisbettertounderstandreality than to play games with it. So he travelled to America to see what a truly democratic order would look like. To understand Europe’s future, he studied America’s present and America’s past. In this way, he hoped that Europe’s future could not be guided,althoughitcouldnotbestopped. Ifthis“worldhistoricalsketch”iscorrect,thentheclassical analyses of democracy receive even greater urgency. Although democracymayhaveexistednowandthenforshortperiodsin antiquity,itwasatthattimejustoneoptionamongothersand onethatwasnotinanywayprescribedbythedominantmoral horizon. The classical moral horizon did not actually support democracy—whichmaywellbetherealcauseofitsephemeral occurrence. In antiquity people were usually seen as basically unequal (Rist 1982; Berman 2008). Henceforth democracy was notsomuchamatterofprincipleasacleverandpragmaticway ofpreventingdominancebythefewortheone.IntheWestthis particularpoliticalsettlementgraduallyacquiredamuchhigher status as the only political constitution that does justice to the

butwithentirelydifferenttitles.TheFrencheditionkeptthetitleHomo aequalis,whereastheEnglisheditionwascalledFromMandevilletoMarx: TheGenesisandTriumphofEconomicIdeology.OnthisseeBeteille1987. 8

SeeDeTocqueville(1835/1840,2vols.);theEnglishtranslationDe mocracyinAmericaistheonethatismostregularlyquoted.See,forex ample,vol.1,“Author’sIntroduction”forthe“irresistiblerevolution”in “Christian countries” pointing in the direction of growing individual equality,fromhierarchytodemocracy.

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equaldignityofhumanbeings.9Otheralternativesarenolonger morallyconceivable.Theancientscouldchoose,butwe,modern Westernpeople,havetobedemocrats—sowewouldratherbe cautious with respect to democracy. We have to be more cun ningthanthewheelofhumanaffairs. ThreeLayersofaPoliticalOrder Howarewetounderstandpopulismthen?Istheunderstanding oftheancientssufficientforwhatwearefacingtoday?Forthe ancients,populismwasasignofdecay.Canitalsobetheoppo site?Canitbethatdemocracyhasalreadygraduallychangedinto anoligarchyofelites,andthatpeople’smovementstrytoreverse this?Inthislatterinterpretation,populistmovementsareasign ofhealth.Theytruly“represent”thepeople,whereastheestab lishedeliterepresentonlythemselvesandtheirowninterests. Inordertotacklethisproblem,itishelpfultomakeacouple of distinctions regarding that key term of any political order: “representation.”Governmentsaresupposedtobe“representa tive.”Democraticgovernmentsaresupposedto“represent”the people.Thekeyclaimofpopulistmovementsisthattheytruly do“represent”thepeople.Sowhatdoes“representation”mean? Eric Voegelin distinguishes between three types of repre sentation (Voegelin 1952: 2975). The first is called “elemental” and refers to the basic procedures that account for representa tion: a parliament, elections, a government based on the out comeofelections,accordingtofairrules,aconstitution,thewill ingnessforfairandopendebate. A second type of representation is called “existential”: in thecourseofhistorypeoplesomehowcometogethertobringa political order into existence. Whatever the “elemental” rules maybe,thecountryitself,ortheempireitself,comesintoand/or remainsinexistence.Thereisalwayssomeonewho“represents” thisentity,guaranteeingtheexistenceofthepoliticalentityand enabling it to act in history. There is no doubt that even dic tators act as representatives of their country and their people, 9

ForaninterpretationofdemocracyalongtheselinesseeFuku yama 1992. However, the specific problem of the universality of this underlyingnotionofequaldignityisansweredhereprematurelyinthe affirmative.

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even when they are not duly elected. So the second type of re presentationbringsintoplaythehistoricaldimensionofapolit icalentity’scomingintoexistenceandthepossibilityofitsceas ing to exist. In “normal” times, this dimension remains quite hidden,itispresupposed.Butwhentheexistenceofapolitical entity is at stake, the issue becomes topical. When there is a widespreadfeelingthatexistenceisthreatened,andthe“repre sentatives”intheelemental,constitutionalsensedonotseemto beabletohandlethissituation,thereisampleroomfortheemer genceofarepresentativewhomaynotberepresentativeinthe constitutionalsense(Voegelin1952:49). Thethirdtypeiscalled“transcendent”representation.Not onlyisthepoliticalofficebearerarepresentativeofthepeople, healsopresentshimselfasrepresentativeofahighertruththat is no longer experienced as the product of the particular com munity he represents in the first and second sense. The office bearer “represents” the spiritual and cultural goals and stand ardsthatthepeoplewanttoembodyinthefuture:justice,peace intheworld,rights.Theofficebearermediateshighertruthsto thepeople—truthsthatarechallengesandatthesametimelim its to the political order. In ancient times this third dimension wasalwaysintermsofthe“divine”:thekingoremperoristhe sonofGodorischosenbyGod,hehasa“heavenlymandate,” etc. PopulismasaResponsetoUnderrepresentation Voegelin’s distinction provides us with a challenging tool for analyzing various aspects of populism. The phenomenon of populism is best approached by the term ”underrepresentation.” There can be underrepresentation at an elemental level: certain groups do not find themselves represented in the existing par ties,sotheyformanewpartyandparticipateinelections.They maywinacertainamountofvotes;thatisnotaproblem.Ifthey claimtorepresent“thepeople,”thatisalsonotaproblem.They havetoproveitintheelections.Iftheyuseothertechniquesof involving this new constituency, for example by relying much moreonthemediathanonactivemembership,thistoodoesnot constitutetoomuchofaproblem.Eveniftheirrhetoricisanti elitistandantipolitics,aslongastheelementalproceduresare obeyed, there is no problem. Italy’s Berlusconi may belong to

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thistype(andtheafterWWIIpartypoliticsinItalydidnothave toomuchreasontoboastanyway).Althoughhecertainlystretches therules(forexample,regardinganindependentpressandor ganizing his own legal immunity), he does not seem to pose a genuine danger to either Italy’s political system as a whole or “transcendent” principles.  So, in the case of underrepresenta tion at the elemental level, the label “populism” should be a voided. However, underrepresentation may also manifest itself at the second level. A large segment of the people may have the feelingthatthecurrentrepresentativesareonlyconcernedwith procedures while at the same time putting the existence of the political community at risk either by “selling out” to another political entity (e.g., a European Union) or to another type of entity altogether (e.g., large corporations and ”captains of in dustry”) or to other cultural groups (e.g., Islam). Second level populismmaystillremainwithintheformalboundariesoffirst level representation and yet create such great tensions that it maygraduallyunderminesupportfortheelementalrepresenta tion. The democratic procedures are not taken seriously any more.Thecountryisindanger,sooneshouldnotbedistracted bylegaltechnicalitiesbutact.Talkcanemergeandbepromoted about the supposed weakness of elemental representation. The political questions now concern the “to be or not to be” of the politicalentity.Politiciansoperatingattheelementallevelmay notevenunderstandtheseissuesandmaybebewilderedbythe processofsettinganewagenda.Ofteninthesecasesthereisan intergenerational problem at play: a new generation for which theolderorderhasbecomeopaqueandnowwantstoredefine thenatureofthepoliticalcommunity,wantstoredefinewhois inandwhoisout. The difficulty, of course, is that the movement that raises thesequestionsmayberight.Perhapsthepoliticalcommunityis in danger indeed. However, the elemental type of representa tion asks for a fair and open debate on these issues. Populism occurs when a movement withdraws from elemental represen tation—itbecomesfullyantiestablishment—andstarttoappeal tothe“purewe,”tothegroupthattrulyrepresentsthecountry whileatthesametimelargelyrefusingtoparticipateontheele mentallevel.The“purewe”isidentifiedasanendangeredspe cies,andthepromotionoffearbecomestheprimaryvehiclefor

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political involvement. At the same time, there is no considera tion of the third element of representation, transcendent repre sentation.Higherprinciplesofjusticearenotconsideredorare suspended, alongside the elemental rules and procedures, be causethereisnowanemergencysituationthatcallsforaction, regardlessofhigherprinciples.Itwouldbepreferableifwecould agree on preserving the term “populism” as a critical term for thisparticularresponsetothistypeofunderrepresentation. Thethirdtypeofpotentialunderrepresentationoccurswhen “transcendent” viewpoints are experienced as having no place in a political order. In such a case movements can be built aroundthehighprinciplethatissupposedtobelacking.There is a call for justice, for peace, for acknowledging basic human rights. Movements that are built around these themes—for ex ample, as in Martin Luther King’s Civil Rights Movement— may display the outward features of a populist movement but arebasicallydifferent.Thisisnottosaythatthistypeofpolitical movement is without dangers. When the elemental representa tionisnottakenseriously,thisresponsetounderrepresentation mayeasilyslipintoafullideologicalmovement.Thisisthedog maticfundamentalismoffiatiustitia,pereatmundus(letjusticebe done,eveniftheworldisdestroyed). Adistinctioncanthusbemadebetweennewsocialandpo litical movements that are, in principle, a longterm (since not alwaysashortterm)blessingforademocraticorderandpopu lismthatisarealthreattodemocracybecauseittendstodeny anddespiseboththebasicproceduralinstitutionsofdemocracy aswellasthemoralhorizonthatformsthe“transcendent”back groundofademocraticorder. Ifwecombinetheaboveanalysiswithsomeoftheclassicalin sights,wearriveatthefollowingpicture.Populism,asthedirect appeal to the people over against the democratic procedures and over against the political establishment, may occur espe ciallyinthetransitionfromonegenerationtoanother.Itmaybe boosted by the emergence of a type of individual who is very much concerned with his own comfort and wellbeing, which arenowsomehowexperiencedasthreatened.Itmaybeboosted aswellbyagenerationof“establishedpoliticians”whoareop erating and thinking only at the first level of representation, thus ignoring the other two levels. Politics then becomes a

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purelypragmaticand/orproceduralmatter—untilaprotestmove mentarises. Anotherkeyelementthatplaysaroleinthepossibleriseof populismisthekindofstoriesthataretoldinthepublicsphere about the deeper reasons for having democracy in the first place. If the intellectual and popular stories about democracy portrayitonlyasapragmaticagreement,withoutmoralsignifi cance,supportfordemocracymaydwindleovertime(asseems tohavehappenedinWeimar).Andifthemediahighlightonly negativeaspectsofademocraticorder—itssupposedinefficien cy,tardiness,etc.—itmaycontributetoanatmosphereinwhich more and more people start to dream longingly about a sup posedlymuchbetterpoliticalorderthatmostprobablydoesnot exist.So,forahealthydemocracycriticalmediaarecritical,but overcriticalmediacanbelethal.Itiseasytodenounceanactual goodinthenameofanonexistingandimpossiblebest. So, only a democratic order in which the representatives operate on all three levels of representation, the elemental (re spectforprocedures,willingnesstodebate),theexistential(pre servingoftheculturalandhistoricalidentityofthepoliticalor der)andthetranscendent(respectforhigherprinciplesofjust ice), will have the strength to survive. Of course, there may be tensions between the three levels: for example, is the cultural and historical identity a good enough embodiment of transcend ent principles? If not, then the identity has to be amended: for example, rights have to be granted to newer groups of people whowerepreviouslynotconsideredtobeinneedofrepresen tation. Underrepresentation breeds protest, but a critical political science distinguishes between protest and protest: one form of protestcanrightlyappealtothebasicmoralhorizonofthede mocratic order and in that way contribute to a renewal and deepening of a democratic order; another form tries to under mine the legitimacy of that democratic order as well as of its moralhorizonandinthatwaycontributetoitsdecay.Onlythen weshouldspeakof“populism”. Postscript Theaboveanalysiscorrespondswithandsupplementstheanal ysis of one of the most important interpreters of populism to

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day,MargaretCanovan.In1981shepublishedavolumeonpop ulism and expanded her analysis in a more recent article. Fol lowingMichaelOakeshott,shedistinguishesbetweentwofaces (and phases) of democracy: a “sceptical” face and a “redemp tive” face. For Canovan, these two faces belong together.10 The oneneedstheother.Sometimestherearemomentsinwhichthe ideals and the existence of a certain political community are newlydebatedandsettled.Sometimesitis“businessasusual,” andalltheemphasisisjustonwhatcanbepracticallyrealized. Populist movements may play a key role in the “redemptive” moments. It could be argued that democratic institutions (like routin izedreligiousinstitutionsinWeber’sanalysis)needanocca sionalupsurgeoffaithasameansofrenewal.Incaseswhere radical populist mobilization against a partitocrazi leads to the formation of new parties or to a reform of the institu tional structure, democracy may indeed be regarded as a selfcorrectingsysteminwhichbothaspectsplaytheirpart. (Canovan1999:14)

The supplement to this viewpoint that I have provided in this essay,makinguseofVoegelin’sdistinctions,is,firstofall,that there are several types of “populism,” some of which may in deedfunctioninthewayCanovansuggestsasrenewalandre vitalization.Buttherearealsoothertypesthatmayembodythe worstfearsoftheancients:thedestructionofapoliticalorderby making it ripe for tyranny. The question if this is still a possi bilityliesinourownhands. Bibliography Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell. (2008). TwentyFirst Cen tury Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy. New YorkandLondon:PalgraveMacmillan. Arditi,Benjamín.(2004).“PopulismasaSpectreofDemocracy:ARe sponsetoCanovan.”PoliticalStudies52:13543. Aristotle. (1984). The Complete Works of Aristotle. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. RevisedOxfordTranslation.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress. 10

SeeCanovan1981and1999.Foranothersupplementarycriticism ofCanovanseeArditi2004.

172 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Berman, Joshua A. (2008). Created Equal: How the Bible Broke with An cientPoliticalThought.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Beteille, André. (1987). “On Individualism and Equality: Discussion withLouisDumont.”CurrentAnthropology28:66977. Böckenförde,ErnstWolfgang.(1976).Staat–Gesellschaft–Freiheit:Stu dienzurStaatstheorieundzumVerfassungsrecht.FrankfurtamMain: Suhrkamp. Buijs, Govert J. (2008a). “Agapè and the Origins of Civil Society.” In: HenkGeertsemaetal.(eds.).PhilosophyPuttoWork:Contemporary Issues in Art, Society, Politics, Science and Religion. Amsterdam ChristianStudies.Vol.1.Amsterdam:VrijeUniversiteit. (2008b).“TegenwindvanGeest.”In:ErikBorgmanetal.Dewerk ingvandeHeiligeGeestindeEuropesecultuurentraditie.Kampen: Kok. Canovan,Margaret.(1999). “Trust the People! Populism andtheTwo FacesofDemocracy.”Political Studies47:216. (1981).Populism.NewYork:HarcourtBraceJovanovich. De Tocqueville, Alexis. (1990). Democracy in America. English transla tionofDeladémocratieenAmérique(1835/1840,vols.12)byHen ryReeve;rev.FrancisBowen.NewYork:VintageBooks. Dumont,Louis.(1980).HomoHierarchicus:TheCasteSystemandItsIm plications. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Originally pub lishedinFrenchbyGallimard(Paris),1967. (1977). From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Eco nomic Ideology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Originally publishedasHomoaequalisbyGallimard(Paris). Fukuyama, Francis. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York:FreePress. Koolschijn, Gerard. (1996). Plato: De strijd tegen het democratische beest. Amsterdam:Ooievaar. Lefort,Claude.(1986).ThePoliticalFormsofModernSociety:Bureaucracy, Democracy,Totalitarianism.Cambridge:MITPress. le Goff,  Jacques. (2003). De cultuur van middeleeuws Europa. Amster dam:MaartenMuntinga.OriginallypublishedasLacivilisationde lOccidentmédiéval.Paris:Arthaud,1964). Middleton,J.Richard.(2005).TheLiberatingImage:TheImagoDeiinGe nesis1.Eugene:Wipf&Stock. Plato.(1961).TheCollectedDialogues(includingtheLetters).Ed.byEdith HamiltonandHuntingtonCairns.Princeton:PrincetonUniversi tyPress.

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Polybius. (1989). The Histories of Polybius. Transl. Evelyn S. Shuck burgh.London:Macmillan&Co.http://www.questia.com/. Popper,Karl.(1945).TheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies.Vol.1.TheSpellof Plato.London:Routledge&KeganPaul. Rist,JohnM.(1982).HumanValue:AStudyinAncientPhilosophicalEth ics.Leiden:E.J.Brill. Taylor, Charles. (1989). Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Voegelin,Eric. (1957). Plato and Aristotle: Order & History. Vol.III.Ba tonRouge:LouisianaStateUniversityPress. (1952).TheNewScienceofPolitics.Chicago:UniversityofChicago Press. Vroom, H.M. (2009). “Gespreide verantwoordelijkheid.” In: J.P. Bal kenende et.al. Christendemocraten over de kredietcrisis. The Hague: CDA.

Poverty,Oppression,andChristianFaith JeraldD.Gort  Attachmenttotownsanddesertisbad. Eachmomentfliesswiftlylikethewind; Sothisgreed,avariceandfalsehopesarebad. MuhammadSa’idSarmad(15901660)

 Abstract This essay is concerned with the question of the sources of oppressive eco nomicpoverty.Itbeginswithadescriptionandanalysisofthepresentsitua tion of poverty, which is growing rather than decreasing throughout the worldtoday,anddistinguishesbetweentheultimateandproximatecausesof thiscondition.TheessaythenlooksattheChristianresponsestopovertyin past and present, pointing to the early influence of Greek dualism on the churchs attitude toward physical poverty and its attempts to defuse texts that challenged social, political and economic arrangements. Finally, the es saydiscussesthemakeupofanappropriateChristianresponsetoit,pointing tothenecessaryingredientsofanalysis,introspectionandconversion.Italso points to the necessity of rereading Gods Word and rediscovering there God’s preferentialoptionforthepoor,andthatChristiansarecalledtoemulatethis. HereChristiansaretoengageindialogicalcooperationwithotherreligionsto combatpovertyinawiderecumenism. 

Introduction  Throughoutknownhumanhistoryeverycommunalentityhas experiencedlongerorshorterlivedcrestsofrelativemoralup rightnessandpoliticaleconomicdecencyinterchangedwithex tensive sloughs characterized by the relentless pursuit and ac cumulationofmaterialwealthbythehighandmighty—kings, aristocrats,landlords,magistrates,politicalleaders,clerics,bank ers, merchants. During these periods of moral degradation the powerfulfewsawtotheinstitutionalizationofexploitativestruc tures,laws,customs,andmoresinordertoensurethemainten anceoftheirpositionsofprivilege,whichinevitablyledtotheim 175

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poverishment of the masses. That was true in the past and is equally true in recent history and the present. If through time therehasbeenanychangeinthispatternitwillonlyhavebeen oneincomparativedegree,notinsubstance. Poverty,Injustice,andOppression:DescriptionandAnalysis  Onecandistinguishatleastthreekindsofpoverty.Thereiswhat can be termed moralspiritual poverty, which is caused by per sonal wrongdoing and ensuing feelings of guilt and remorse. Thenthereiswhatcouldbecalledpsychoculturalpoverty,which laysholdofmillionsofthewelloff,who,thoughhavingmore thanenoughmaterially,aredeeplytroubledbyfeelingsofmean inglessnessandpurposelessness.Andfinally,thereismaterialso ciologicalpoverty,causedbypolitical,social,andculturaloppres sion.Theholyscripturesofvariousreligions,includingthoseof Judaism,Christianity,andIslam,alsomakeadistinctionbetween thepoorinspiritandthemateriallypoor.1 It is with the latter category of the poor and involuntary povertythatthisessayisconcerned.2Whenreflectingoninjustice andpovertyinthissenseitisessentialtokeepinmindthatthey areveryrealconditionsandthereforemayneverbespokenofin theabstract.Theyarealwaysperpetratedbyrealpeopleagainst real people.3 This is certainly true in Scripture. As Elsa Tamez

1

IntheBiblethepoorarenotalwaystheeconomicallypoor;the righteousrichandeventherighteousrulercanbecalledpoorwhen theireffortstodogoodarefrustratedbytheforcesofinjustice;inthis senseevenGodcouldbereckonedamongthepoor.Theterms“poverty” and“poor”arealsoappliedtotheprivileged,rich,andpowerful;wewill returntothislater. 2

Theconcernis,thus,neitherwithvoluntary(monastic)poverty northatcausedbyidleness. 3

Naturaldisasterscausepoverty,too,ofcourse:theAsiantsunami in2004leftmassivedeath,destruction,anddestitutioninitswake;the 2005hurricaneKatrinadidthesame.Butsuchdisastersareoftengreatly aggravated,asinNewOrleans,byculpableneglectofhumanresponsi bility.

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rightlyargues,whentheBiblespeaksofoppression,4itslanguage “isalwaysveryconcrete.”In“biblicaltheology‘oppression’refers toarealexperiencethatisdirectlyrelatedtoagentsofoppres sion.”The“oppressed”and“poor”“sufferexploitation…dis criminationanddegradation”(Tamez1982:3).  Instances Theevilsofinducedpovertyandinjustice5areendemicthrough outourpresentworld,inthoseplacesandareaswhereitiscon spicuousandwellknown,ofcourse,butalsowhereitissaidto be“hidden”or“unseen.”Wearelivinginaworldinwhichthe oppressionandmarginalizationofpeopleareactuallyonthein creaseratherthanbeingeradicatedoratleastgreatlyameliorated asmanyhadoptimisticallyexpectedduringthedecadesofdecol onization, growing Western prosperity, and massive develop mentaidprogramsfollowingWWII.Thereisnowaworldwide politicaleconomicphenomenonandstructureinplacethathas beentermed“globalapartheid”andisdefinedas“aninternation alsystemofminorityrulewhoseattributesincludedifferentialac cesstobasichumanrights,wealth,andpower”(Bond2004:4). The rich are getting richer, the poor poorer. According to currentestimatesthereareatleast75millionchildrenworldwide whoaretotallybereftofeducation.Vastnumbersofpeoplelive belowWorldBankpovertylevels,oftenonlessthanonedollar perday.Inmanypartsoftheworld,thedegreeofpovertyand 4

IntheBible“oppression”hasawidevarietyofmeanings.Tamez pointsoutthatthereare“nineHebrewrootssignifying‘oppression’”in theOldTestament,whichareusedincombinationwithalargenumber ofotherterms:despoliation,violence,injustice,etc.(Tamez1982:5). 5 Theuseof“injustice”and“justice”inScriptureisverycomplex. AsH.Jansenhasshown,justiceintheBiblehassalvific,forensicanddis tributiveconnotations.WhenitisusedofGoditisassociatedwithsalvif icfaithfulnesstohiscreationandretributiontowardthosewhoviolate theirrelationshipwithGodandtheirfellows;inrespectofhumansitre ferstofaithfulnesstoGodandtootherpeople,toobedienceandright eousness, observance of the precepts of God’s law, daily just, ethical dealingsinallareasoflife.Intheend,statesJansenrightly,theprimary categoryofjusticeisitsethical,distributiveaspect,notitsforensicretrib utiveside.Itsprincipalaimisrightsocialorder:shalom (cf. Jansen 1990: 143- 55). 

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oppression, including horrific sexual violence against women, girls,andevenbabies,isalmostbeyondcomprehension.Around 30%ofthepopulationofAfricasuffersfromabjectpovertyand hunger.Around50%oftheworld’spopulationlives“inmake shifthomesinsquattersettlementsandwork[s]inshadowecono mies” (Albright and de Soto 2007: 42).6 In 2008 more than 39.6 millionAmericanslivedbelowthepovertylevel,morethan45.7 millionwerewithouthealthcareinsurance,andin200931.1mil lionwereunemployed(cf.Serwer2009:24).TheeconomistSte phenRoachpointsoutthatAmericanconsumers,whomakeup “onlyabout4.5%oftheworld’spopulation,” spentabout$10trillionin2008.Bycontrast,althoughChina andIndiacollectivelyaccountfornearly40%oftheworld’s population,theircombinedconsumptionwasonlyabout$2.5 trillionin2008.(citedinTimeMagazine:October12,2009,42)

Europeansocietiesarebecomingeverlessegalitarianandcaring. Politicalconservatismandeconomiclaissezfaireareeverywhere ontherise.Clearly,humandistressintheformofinjustice,pov erty,7andoppressioncontinueunabatedintherealityandexperi enceofthisworld.8Whatcanbesaidaboutthesourcesofthese conditions? UltimateCause IntheChristianviewtherootcauseofoppressionleadingtopov ertyiswhattheBiblecallssinorrebellionagainstthewillofGod forhumankind.Asnarratedintheprimevalbiblicalstoriesofcre ation, the Almighty made heaven and earth from chaotic no thingnessand,asthelovingFather,formedhumanchildrenafter hisimageandinhislikeness,maleandfemale,placingthemto recreateandrecreateharmoniouslyinparadiseatthecenterof creation.Buttheybecamedissatisfiedwiththisstateofwellbeing 6

FormerU.S.SecretaryofStateMadeleineAlbrightandHernando deSotoarecochairsoftheU.N.affiliatedCommissiononLegalEmpow ermentofthePoor.(undp.org/legalempowerment). 7 ForasurveyofecumenicalperspectivesonpovertyseeDickinson 1991:80610. 8

DuetorapiddevelopmentinChina,India,andBrazilthepercen tageofthepoorrelativetothetotalworldpopulationmaybedecreasing butinabsolutetermstheirnumbersareontheincrease.

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andwholeness.Theyallowedthemselvestobetemptedtodesire somethingmore.Themomenttheysuccumbedtothistemptation and in this way said farewell to innocence, they forfeited their tenancyintheparadiseofpeaceandlovetheLordintendedfor them. Theybecamevulnerable:afraidofGodand,withgoodrea son,ofeachother.ThoughretainingGod’simage,humans,through theirmutinyagainsttheDivinepurpose,losttheirlikenesstoGod. RetentionoftheimageofGodcoupledwith(willful)lossofbeha viorallikenesstoGodeffectsastateofselfalienation,anintense innerconfusionanddissonanceinhumans,wherebytheycome tobeatseriousoddswiththemselves.Ontheonehand,people knowandrecognizethetruthandthegoodanchoredinandem anatingfromGod’s“eternalpoweranddivinenature”—plainly evident“sincethecreationoftheworld”andclearlyseen”from what has been made”—but nevertheless persistently suppress thistruthbytheirwickedbehaviorandinsodoingexchangeit foralie(Romans1:1825).9 The Apostle Paul attests poignantly to this moral schizo phreniainRomans7,whereheconfessestohisowninteriorbaf flementandselfestrangement: IdonotunderstandwhatIdo.ForwhatIwanttodoIdonot do….Ihavethedesiretodowhatisgood,butIcannotcarry itout.For…theevilIdonotwanttodo—thisIkeepondo ing….WhenIwanttodogood,evilisrighttherewithme. (vv.1525)10

 ProximateCauses Itisthisprimallawlessnessofthehumansoulthatengendersand drivesoppressionintheformofthetwinevilsofinjusticeandin ducedpoverty.AsWesselStokertrenchantlyobservesinhisin troductoryessaytothisvolume,becausehumans“arenotmas tersof[them]selvesandareoften,consciouslyorunconsciously, 9

AllscripturalquotationsinthisessayaretakenfromTheNewIn ternationalVersionStudyBible. 10

 Paul does not mean that there is no goodness or potential for goodnessinhumanbeingsandtheworld,nordoeshemeanthatpeople arenotmorallyaccountablefortheiractions.Whatheispointingtoisthe greatpowersinhasoverpeopleandthedeleteriouseffectsithasonhu manlife.

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drivenbyselfinterest....[P]eoplecanopenlyorcovertly”bring aboutorbeinstrumentalinthecontinuationof“situationsofin justice” (Stoker 2010: 1112). Elsa Tamez states that such situa tionsoccuragainstthebackgroundofa“fetishizedstructurewith adeadlylogicofitsown”which“leadstothedenialofallthe basicrights”ofmarginalizedpeople,“thelogicwhichleadsthe richtoaugmenttheirpossessionsatwhatevercost”(Tamez1982: 3). Peoplefallpreytimeandagaintotheseeminglyinescapable temptationtoheedthesirencallofnarcissisticselfgratification andtopursuetheirownegocentric,evenegomaniacal,objectives atthecostlyexpenseofothers.Sometimespeople,ledbygreedor coldbloodedambition,evendegeneratetothepointwherethey fallsquarelyintothecategoryofthosetowhomtheLatinadage homohominilupusapplies:wolveswhoruthlesslypreyuponand intheprocessoftendestroytheirfellowhumanbeings.11Thebe settinghumanvicesofavariceandrawselfinterestbreedcallous orcasualindifferencetotheplightofthosewhoarebeingabused andimpoverishedforone’sowngain.Thisbasenessgivesriseto andinturnisaidedandabettedbyahostofexploitativesitua tionsandstructuressuchasracism,corruption,andbadgover nance. Paralleltoandcausallytiedtotheintensificationofworld poverty has been the spread of Western predatory capitalism, whichplayedamassiveroleintheworldgirdlingeconomiccrisis thatdefinedmuchofthelatterhalfofthepreviousdecadeand continues into the present one. Years of unrestrained capitalist policiesandpractice—intheU.S.andtoalesserorgreaterdegree inothercountriesaswell—haveledtonowhereandworsefor vastpopulacesthroughouttheworld,particularlyinthesouthern butalsointhenorthernhemisphere.Thisbearsclearwitnessto themoralbankruptcyofmoderncapitalism.Despitethisabject failure,however,thesystemofgreedandselfishnesscontinuesto existandeventothrive.

11

However,theultimatepurposeofoppressors,Tamezobserves, “isnottokillorimpoverishtheoppressed,”forthatwouldobviouslyde privethemofvictimstoexploit.Theprincipleaimofoppressorsistoin creasetheirwealthandpower,andanyensuing“impoverishmentand deathoftheoppressed”isofsecondaryimportance(1982:41).

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InarecentarticleintheNewYorkTimes,reviewedbyHenry Giroux,theAmericanNoblePrizewinningeconomistPaulKrug manexaminedtheabidingvirilityoftheunfetteredmarketideo logyfoundedona“toxiccombinationofmoney,power,greed andrawselfinterest,”particularlyasithasmanifesteditselfin theU.S.sincethe70s.AsreportedbyGiroux,Krugmanexpressed hisamazement  thatafteralmostthreedecadesthepoliticalsceneisstillunder theswayofwhathecallsthe“zombiedoctrineofReaganism” —the notion that any action by government is bad, except whenitbenefitscorporationsandtherich.(Giroux2009)

Itisclear,Girouxadds,thatzombieReaganismhas producedenormoussufferingforthosewhoneverbenefited fromtheexcessesofthesecondGildedAge,especiallywor kers,thepoor,disadvantagedminorities,andeventuallylarge segmentsofthemiddleclass.(Giroux2009)

Analysisofthecomplicatedtechnicaldetailsinvolvedintherela tionshipbetweenlaissezfairecapitalismandpoverty12mustof course be left to the relevant experts. Our concern is with the questionofthehistoricalandappropriateChristianresponseto (world)povertyandthepoor. ChristianResponsestoPovertyinPastandPresent  EarlyonthechurchfellundertheswayofdualisticGreekphilo sophy,wherebyrealitywasdividedupintotwospheres:thein feriordomainofmatter,body,nature;andthesuperiorrealmof reason,soul,thesupernatural.Anditiswiththelatterspherethat thetheologyandspiritualityofthechurchhasbeenlargelypreoc cupied,inmanyinstancesrightupuntilmoderntimes.Thisoth erworldlydispositioninformedtheentirelifeofthechurchand bore large consequences for its general outlook. Human insti tutionsandsecularhistorywerenotaconcernofthechurch,they were simply there, requiring only to be explained and then left 12

Infairness,itisnotonlyWesterneconomiclaissezfairethaten gendersworldpovertyandinjustice.Chinesestatecapitalismisdoingso, too,onalargescaleinpartsofthesouthernhemisphere,whereChinese stateenterprisesoftenexploitlocalworkerswithoutjustcompensation tofeedChina’svoraciousappetiteforrawmaterials.

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alone.Theearthlysideofreality,itwasheld,isruledbynatural law and therefore takes care of itself. This appeal to a “ready made‘naturallaw’”wasthemechanismbywhichitbecamepos sibleforthechurchtoignorethe“historicityofman’sexistence” (Schillebeeckx1967:48).Asexpressedbythe1985SouthAfrican KairosDocument:13  Socialandpoliticalmatterswereseenasworldlyaffairsthat havenothingtodowiththespiritualconcernsoftheChurch…. Publicaffairsandsocialproblemswerethoughttobebeyond thesphereofspirituality.(citedinMabuza2009:18)

 Alongsideitstheologyofnaturallawtherewasasociological factorthatalsohadahugeimpactonthewaytheBiblewasin terpreted.AfteritsConstantinianestablishmentthechurchquick ly began to identify with and position itself on the side of the privilegedandtherich.Itcametothinkofpowerandwealthas itsGodgivenperquisites.Throughbyfarmostofitshistorycas tles, palaces, and lofty positions were more descriptive of the church’slifethanwerehumilityandlowliness.Infact,thelowly moreoftenthannotremainedfigurativelyandliterallyatthegate orwayinthebackofthechurch.AsO.Noordmansironicallyre markedinhissplendidtheologicalmeditationonLuke18and16, entitledSinnerandBeggar,“EverySundaythechurchwasfullof sinners,butonenoticedfewbeggars;they…wereusuallyfound onthestreet”(Noordmans1946:9). Givenitssocietalpositionandmodeofthinking,itissmall wonderthatinitsexegesisthechurchturnedtotheuseofvarious meansofdefusingscripturalcontentthatposedathreattothe poise of existing social, economic, and political arrangements. Mostoftentheyweredenaturedbymeansofallegorization.Any biblicalpassageshavingclearimplicationsofasocialnaturewere transformedintoextravagantallegories.TheoppressedofLuke 4:18 were those who were downtrodden by guilt, the captives thosewhowereimprisonedbysin,thepoorthosewhowerespir ituallydestitute.Otherbiblicalconceptssuchashunger,thirst, lowliness,nakedness,suppression,andreferencestodeliverance 13

TheKairosDocument—ChallengetotheChurch:ATheologicalCom mentonthePoliticalCrisisinSouthAfricaprovidedananalysisofapart heidandabiblicaltheologicalinterpretationofthehistoricalroleofthe churchwithinanditsvocationwithrespecttothatcontext.

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fromsuchconditionsweresimilarlynottakenatfacevaluebut “sothoroughlyspiritualizedthattheynolongermeantwhatthey plainly said.” In this way the Good News of the gospel “was madeformanyintononews”(Gort1978:86). Manykeyscripturaltermsweregivenanexclusively“per sonalistic”orsymbolicalmeaningandthusseverelytruncated. Gospelwascastlargelyintermsofcomfortforindividualhuman souls.Itwasthoughttobeprimarilyapplicabletopeople’sinner spiritualneeds.Salvationwasconsideredtobesomethingpurely personalanditsprimaryorientationwasheaven:liberationwas privatizedandtranscendentalized.Neithergospelnorsalvation, thus, was thought to have any kind of direct bearing on the politicaloreconomicorganizationofsociety.Andtheconception of Christian ministry was understood accordingly. Its principal aimwastheconversionandredemption,thecureandcareofin dividualsouls.Itdidnotincludeeffortsonbehalfofthematerial liberationofthepoorandoppressedinthehereandnow.14 Inlikemannerthechurch,ledbyitsnaturaltheologyanda misconstrued conception of predestination and divine provi dence,interpretedthetermpoorandpovertyinanallbutexclu sivelyfigurativeway.AsNoordmansputit,thechurchemployed naturaltheology“asashieldthrownupagainstthesharparrows ofthegospel”(Noordmans1946:9).Forlongcenturiesthechurch opinedthatGodhimselfhaddividedhumanityintolordsand vassals.Somepeoplewerepredestinedtowealth,otherstopov erty.“Allgiveneconomicconditionsandclassdistinctionswere consideredtobedivinelyordainedandthereforeinviolableand immutable”(Gort1978:85).Thisconvictionisaptlysummedup bythe19thcenturyquatrain: Therichmaninhiscastle, Thepoormanathisgate; Godmadethemhighandlowly, Andorderedtheirestate.

14

Thisisnottosaythepoorhavenotbeensuccoredbythechurch. Ithasalwaysprovidedmoneyandgoodstomeettheimmediateneeds ofpeople;butthiskindofgiving,whilealwaysimportant,wasnote nough,foritsgoalwasonlytemporaryalleviationoftheeffectsofpover tyandnottheliberationofthepoorfrompovertyitself.

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AppropriateChristianResponse:WholePersonObedience ChristiansandtheChristianchurchneedtokeepthemselvesin formedaboutthehardrealitiesofgrowingworldpovertyandop pression,reflectontheirdirectorindirectinvolvementinthecon tinuationofinjustice,reorientthemselvestothewilloftheLord theyarecalledtoserve,andtheninobediencetoHiswillbecome whistleblowersandadvocatesoragentsofchange.TrueChris tianobedienceisorshouldbeapassionatematteroftheheart— “Aboveallelse,guardyourheart,foritisthewellspringoflife” (Proverbs4:23)—andthusinvolvesthewholeperson,mind,soul, andbody. AnalysisandIntrospection Firstofall,anhonestdiagnosisneedstobemadeofwhatisactu allygoingonlocallyandgloballyintermsoftheperpetuationof oldformsofoppressionandthecreationofnewones,alongwith anexaminationoftherolethechurchisplayinginthatprocess.In conducting this analysis those who confess Christ need to ac knowledgethatgraveinjusticehasbeenperpetratedinthename oforwiththeexplicitapprovalofChristianityandthatthechurch hasfrequentlyassociateditselfwithforcesandsystemsinimicalto humanwellbeing,suchasslaveryandcolonialismandinmore recenttimesthepovertyandinjusticeproducingideologyand practiceofunfetteredcapitalism.Becauseofitsgravemoraldefi cienciesandrecentmalfunctionmanypeoplehavedevelopeda profounddistrustofthissystem.Yet,sadly,largenumbersofpar ticularlyNorthAtlanticChristiansandchurchespersistingiving unquestioningallegiancetoit,15eventhoughitshouldbeplain thatwhatitrepresentsisantitheticaltotheteachingsofChristian ity. Along with others in the Western world numerous Chris tianshavefallenpreytothedemonicforcesofmaterialism,con sumerism,andgreed.Today,asinthepast,manychurchesseem tobeunwillingtorecognizesocialinjusticeforwhatitis.Despite abundantmediacoverage,manyhaveeithernointerestinorre 15

Cf.,forexample,the“ConservativeBibleProject”onConservape dia,thewebsitefoundedin2006byAmericanneoconservativeAndrew Schlafly,whichcallsfora“cleansing”ofthebiblicaltextfrom“liberal ism,”arestorationofthe“conservativenature/bias”oftheBible,anda newappreciationofthe“freemarketcharacter”of,e.g.,Jesus’parables.

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fusetopayheedtowhatisreallygoingonintheworld,aworld inwhich,forexample,80%ofitstotalproductionisdistributed amongjust14%ofitspopulation.Thisbegsanimportantques tion:BywhatlogiccanWesterncountriesbecalled“rich”when billionsofpeopleintheworldexistinconditionsofabjectpover ty?WhatsensedoesitmaketospeakoftheU.S.asthe“richest” nationintheworldwhen40millionofitsownpeoplelivebelow thepovertylevel,deprivedofsuchbasichumanneedsasade quatefood,education,andhealthcare? WhatallChristiansneedtokeepfixedintheirmindisthat nooneistrulyfreeuntilallarefreefrompovertyandinjustice. AccordingtothetraditionalAfricanphilosophyandspirituality ofUbuntu“ahumanbeingisahumanbeingthroughotherhu manbeings”(Mabuza2010:181)or:Iambecauseweare.Bishop DesmondTutuspokeofthemorallawbywhich“wearebound togetherinwhattheBiblecalls‘thebundleoflife.’Ourhumanity iscaughtupinthatofallothers”(citedinMabuza2010:184).This interconnectedness of humankind could hardly be more strik ingly expressed than in the famous words of the seventeenth centuryclergymanpoetJohnDonne(15721631):  No man is an island, entire of itself …. Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and thereforeneversendtoknowforwhomthebelltolls;ittolls forthee(MeditationXVII).

Beforeitcanhopetobeacrediblepartytothesearchforjusticein theworld,Christianitymustalsoconcedethepresentcloseasso ciation of numerous Christians and churches with exploitative structuresandthuscomplicitywithvictimizers. Conversion16andReorientation Christiansandchurchesalliedwithexploitativeforcesandsys temsinthepresentworldneedtoundergometanoia,aradicalre visionofmindandconduct.Theymustengageina“realignment of norms [and] values“ (Mabuza 2010: 181) and turn back to God’s ways and concerns. Christians linked to such systems shouldrecallSocrates’sagaciouscaveat:“Ofthesetwo,doingand sufferingwrong,wedeclaredoingwrongtobethegreaterevil, 16

 See Jan van Butselaar’s essay on this subject elsewhere in the presentvolume.

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andsufferingtobethelesser”(Gorgias:509c).Theyneedtoheed thechargeoftheOldTestamentpatriarchJacobtohishousehold andallwhowerewithhim:“Getridoftheforeigngodsyouhave withyou,andpurifyyourselvesandchangeyourclothes.Then come,letusgouptoBethel,whereIwillbuildanaltartoGod” (Genesis35:2). Interpreted for Christians involved in systems that bring aboutinjusticethesewordsmean:discardthepanoplyoffalse assumptions,alienthinking,selfservingconductyouarewearing inthevainhopeofprotectingyourselfandexchangethisarmor foranewsetofclothessothatyouwillbepresentabletoGodand suitableforservicetoHimwhohatestheidolatryofinjusticeand callsforittobegottenridof.AsvoicedbytheKairosDocument: “Oppressionissinanditcannotbecompromisedwith,itmustbe doneawaywith”(citedinMabuza2010:21). In the deepest sense this summons to conversion actually constitutesanofferofdeliverancefrom“poverty,”notthekind sufferedbytheoppressed,notthepovertyofthesinnedagainst butthatofthesinner.“Dominationanddependencearecutofthe samecloth….Exploitationenslavesthoseonitsreceivingendbut alsothoseonitsgivingend”(Gort178:102).Poverty,thus,isnot acategorythatappliesonlytothosewithouteconomic,social,po litical,andlegalpowerbutalsotothosewhopossesssuchpower tothedetrimentofthepoorandoppressed.“Povertyisaremin deroftheheartlessnessintheworldandbythesametokenacall totherichandpowerfultoreturntotheirhumanity”(Pobee1987: 67). RereadingGod’sWord Christiansneedtorecognizeorreacquaintthemselveswithand internalizethebiblicalvisionoftheKingdomofGodthatpro misesfullandnotpartialliberationtotheworld.Itisunmistak ablyclearthatthisvisionconcernsnotonlythespiritualneeds butthetotalexistenceofwholepeople,includingtheirsociolo gicalcircumstances.Ithastodowiththeentiretyofhumanwell being and thus also with questions of poverty and political economic justice. Although scripturally “poverty” does not al waysrefertotheeconomicallydestitute,itispatentthatinthe Bible“thepoor”areoverwhelmingly“thehelpless,theindigent, the hungry, the oppressed, the needy, the humiliated” (Tamez 1982:79).

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Itisclear,too,fromScripturethatthesepoorarethespecial appleofGod’seye,somuchsothatitisnecessarytospeakof God’spreferentialoptionforthepoor.AccordingtotheBible,op pressionoftheweakis“oneofthemostiniquitouswaysimagin ableofinsultingcreation”(Gort1978:106).InIsaiahabuseofthe poorbyGod’sownpeopleisdescribedasdisgustingtohissight, anoffensetohisnostrils.Godsaystothem:unlessyoupursue justice and defend the cause of the weak, your religion means nothingtome;Iwillnotlistentoyourprayers,forIcannotstand theconcurrenceofsolemnassemblyandiniquity(cf.Isaiah1:11 17,58:16).TheprophetAmosalsomakesitplainthatGodde spisesandwillnotacceptobservancewithoutobedience:“Butlet justicerollonlikeariver,”hesays,“righteousnesslikeanever endingstream”(Amos5:2123).Justasitisimpossibleforany thingtoflourishwithoutabundantwater,sohumankindcannot thriveintheabsenceofrighteousnessandjustice. It is clear that “liberation of the oppressed is God’s own cause”(Tamez1982:4).Godtakesthesideofthepoor,willnever forsakethemintheirsearchforreliefandjustice:  Hewilldelivertheneedywhocryout, Theafflictedwhohavenoonetohelp. Hewilltakepityontheweakandtheneedy Andsavetheneedyfromdeath. Hewillrescuethemfromoppressionandviolence, Forpreciousistheirbloodtohissight. (Psalm72:1214;seealsoIsaiah41:17)

ThisgoodnewsofGod’sconcernandpromiseiscenteredinthe gospelofChrist,whoappliedtheopeningwordsofIsaiah61to hisownpersonandwork: TheSpiritoftheLordisonme,becausehehasanointedmeto preachgoodnewstothepoor.Hehassentmetoproclaim freedomfortheprisonersandrecoveryofsightfortheblind, toreleasetheoppressed,toproclaimtheyearoftheLord’sfa vor.(Luke4:18,19;cf.Matthew11:46andLuke7:22)

TheNewTestamentgospelsplainlyshowthatJesusChrist shareshisheavenlyFather’spreferentialoptionforthepoor.The wholeofthelifeofJesuswasdirectedtowardandconcernedwith thepoor.“TheSonofMancametoseekandtosavewhatwas lost”(Luke19:10);hestoodattheirsideandaccompaniedthem.

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Duringhisearthlyministry,hewhoformsthecenterofGod’slib eratinglovewasalwaystobefoundattheperiphery,inthemar gins of human life outside the gate, along with the poor, the voicelessandpowerless,andtherebybecametheonetrueand perfecticonofGod.  Vocation IntheirlivesandworkChristiansarebeholdenfirstandforemost totheLordtowhomtheybelong.ItisinChrist,theadvocateof thedefenseless,thatthechurchisgrounded.Heisthesourceof itspower,i.e.itsfaith,hope,andlove.AsJürgenMoltmannput itsomeyearsago:  TheLordshipofChrististhechurch’ssoleandhenceallem bracing,determiningfactor….Itcanneitherbesharednorre stricted.ThatiswhyChristianity’sobediencetothisliberating lordshipisallembracingandundivided.(1989:5)

 Thismeansthatallhumanrules,laws,actions,behavior,condi tions,andsystemsaresubjecttocriticaltestingonthetouchstone ofthegospel.Christianobediencecannotbelimitedbytheclaim ofanymasterotherthanChrist.Itisonlywherethechurchlistens tohisvoicealonethatit“arrivesatitstruthandbecomesfreeand aliberatingpowerintheworld”(Moltmann1989:5) IfChristianslistenattentivelytothevoiceoftheirLord,they will hear him calling them to follow his example. The “aston ishing”thing,accordingtoMatthew25,isthatwhenChristiansor otherstakeupapositionofsolidarityatthesideofthepoorand oppressed,theydoso—whetherawareofitornot—inthecom panyofChrist,forheisthere:“Itellyouthetruth,whateveryou didforoneoftheleastofthese…,youdidforme”(v.40).Byde monstratingsolidaritywiththepoor,peoplepaytributetoGod: “whoever is kind to the needy honors God” (Proverbs 14:31). What is even more, “He who is kind to the poor lends to the Lord”(Proverbs19:17).Godregardshelpingthedisadvantagedas agifttohimself,foritisthroughthissolidaritythatthepoorare enabledtofeelthewarmbeatofGod’slovingheart.Godneeds peoplewithhearttotakehisplacehereonearth:tohelphimhelp people,andtohelphimeasehisneed,hispain,hishunger.God whoidentifieswiththepoorhasnoothereyesandears,noother handsandfeetthanthoseofhisearthlyservants.

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ThechurchencountersChristinthepresenceofthepoor:if itreallylooksitwillseehisfaceintheirfaces.Correspondingly, when Christians show themselves to be on the side of the op pressedtheyreassumethelikenessofGod,becomeiconsofthe presentiarealisChristi,17takeonanewfaceinwhichthepoorper ceive the visage of Christ the liberator. And this is the way it shouldbe.Thereshouldalwaysbeabondofinstantcommunica tionbetweenthechurchandthepoor.Whattheyseeinonean other’sfacesshouldtriggerreciprocalloveatfirstsight.Itisin solidarity18withthepoorthatthechurchandChristiansbecome truefriendsoftheGodwhodrawstheoppressedtotheforeand, with his arm around them, says: Les amis de mes amis sont mes amis.19 Action:Words,Prayer,Praxis MorethansixtyyearsagothefamedeconomistJohnMaynard Keynes,argued,accordingtoRobertSkidelsky,thatthechallenge ofeconomics20wastofindawayofensuringthatpeopleevery wherewouldbeabletolivetheirlives“wisely,agreeably,and well.” In the Keynesian view, the economy was nothing more thanameansofachievingthatgoal,andwefallmiserablyshort whenweseeeconomicgrowthasanythingotherthan“awayto achievethe‘goodlife’”forall(citedinLeonard2009). ChristianscoulddoworsethantoadoptKeynes’sethicaland moralvisionofeconomicsaspartoftheinformingethosoftheir responsetoworldpovertyandoppression.Itisclear,basedon thepromisesandimperativesofthebiblicalwitnessandChris tians’professionoffaithintheabsoluteauthorityofChrist,that Christiansshouldbendtheireffortsinwhateversmallorlarge waytheycantothepromotionofgoodlifeforalleconomicsand thetransformationofanyhostisbonicommunis,21anyeconomicor politicalsystemthatengendershumaninjusticeandpoverty.Itis 17

TherealoractualpresenceofChrist.

18

 Solidarity may defined as having a sense of responsibility re garding,identificationwith,andactiononbehalfofanother. 19

Thefriendsofmyfriendsaremyfriends.

20

Forviewsoneconomicissuesintheecumenicaldebateseede SantaAna1991:31320. 21

Enemyofthecommongood.

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notanoptionforChristianstoignoreoppression,toaverttheir facesfromthepoor.Theyarecalledtobecomecatalystsofchange inaworldinwhichthingsarenotthewaytheyaresupposedto be. “Donotmerelylistentotheword,”theapostleJameswrote, “dowhatitsays”(James1:22).Todaythat“doing”shouldcer tainlyinvolvecallinginsistentattentiontothegrowinggapbe tweentherichandthepoor;takingastrongstanceagainstthe hugelylopsideddistributionofwealthamongnationsandpeo ple;andcritiquingthefreeforallcapitalismthathasbeensweep ingacrosstheworld,alongwiththegreed,corruption,andnaked selfinterestitbreeds.Inthisvein,the1980InternationalMission aryConferenceinMelbournestatedthatChrist’spreferentialop tionforthemarginalizedmustoccupyacentralplaceinChristian spiritualityandthatthepromotionofliberativejusticeamongthe poor is a crucial facet of the apostolic calling of the Christian church. Wordsandstatementsagainstoppressionandtheinjusticeof destitution,particularlyifspokenwithacommonvoicebychurch esandChristians,cancarryweightandevenprovetobeapow erfulforcefortherenewalandtransformationofsociety.Oralre presentationsareimportantbuttheyalsorequiretobeaugmen ted by action, the use of transformative tools. This holds for prayertoo.ForChristians,prayerisinitselfanappropriateand necessaryresponsetoinjustice,but,likewordsraisedagainstin justiceorinterjectedintopoliticaldebate,prayerneedstobecom plementedbyactiveendeavor.22 Biblicaljusticerequiresthatallexistingsocialandeconomic configurationsbehelduptoongoingcriticism.Iftheyfallshort, Christiansandthechurcharecalledtopressuregovernmentsto changethem,todowhatisrightandservejustice.23Thestruc tures of society, too, are subject to conversion. Of course the churchitselfcannotbringaboutthissortoftransformation.As theKairosDocumentcorrectlypointsout,changingthesekindsof 22

Therearemanyinstancesofeffectiveactionprayer,suchasthe 1985“DayofPrayerfortheEndofUnjustRule”organizedbytheSouth AfricanCouncilofChurches. 23

Itmustbestressedthatitisnotpoliticizedreligiosity—thefunda mentalismfoundinalltheworldreligionstoday—thatisneeded,butpo liticallyengagedreligion.

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structures“isfundamentallyamatterofpolitics.Itrequiresapo litical strategy based upon a clear social or political analysis” (citedinMabuza2009:17).Nevertheless,theChurchhasanim portantroletoplayhere.Ithasthetask,intheviewoftheKairos Document,ofmeasuringsuchpoliticalstrategiesandtheirana lyticalunderpinningsagainsttheyardstickofthepromisesand requirementsofthegospel. Advantagedpeopleinthesocalledrichandemergingcoun trieshavetobeactivelymadeawareofthesignificantpartthey maybeplayinginthecreationorcontinuationofpoverty.The churchshouldurgeindustrialistsandcorporationstopracticeso cialentrepreneurshipaccordingtotheQuakerconceptof“doing wellbydoinggood”andaidthemintheirsearchforethicallyde centbusinessstandardsandcodesofpractice.24Financiers,bank ers,andbusinessleaderswhodemonstratefealtytooldidolsin newguise—materialism,greed,rampantconsumerism—mustbe challengedvigorouslyandpersistently.Politiciansandgovern mentsneedtobecontinuallyremindedoftheirfundamentalre sponsibilitiesandheldaccountabletothepeople. Pursuanttothis,usecanbemadeofsocialmediaforumslike Facebook,Twitter,andotherstobecomeengagedinpoliticalac tionatthelocalandworldlevelandtogloballyairthepressing problemsandneedsofthepoor:unfairpricingpolicies,health care, education, food and water security, property rights, ade quatehousing,andsoforth.Thesesocialnetworkingforumscon stituteapotentiallypowerfulmeanstomarshalwidespread,in ternationalpublicopinionbehindeffortstotransformstructures ofoppressionandsituationsofpoverty;tochallengecorruption infested and bribedriven economies; to promote rule of law, transparency,andgoodgovernancethroughouttheworld. WiderEcumenism:HermeneuticsofExpectation Moreover,intheinterestofassuringgreatersuccessforactionon behalfoftheoppressed,Christiansshouldengageindialogical cooperationwithotherreligionsandreligiousbelieverstoforma unitedfrontagainsttheevilsthatcausethepovertyandinjustice

24

SeetheessayonbusinessethicsbyConnieAarsbergeninthisvol

ume.

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foundthroughoutourglobalizedworld.25Theyneeddothatcon fidently but also in humility, shedding any vestige of the su perciliousdisdainthathassooftentypifiedChristianity’sattitude towardotherreligions,thekindofarroganceexpressedinaverse fromMatthewArnold’s“EmpedoclesonEtna”: Butwe—assomerudeguest Wouldchange,where’reheroam, Themannersthereprofess’d Tothosehebringsfromhome— Wemarknottheworld’scourse, butwouldhaveittakeours. (ActI,SceneII,230;Arnold1985:31)

Theotherreligionsshouldalsobeapproachedinaspiritofexpec tantopennessinthefullrealizationthatwehumansarefinitebe ingsandhencelimitedinourabilitytoseeanythingwhollyor perfectly.26AsEmpedoclesputsit: Theoutspreadworldtospan AcordtheGodsfirstslung, Andthenthesoulofman There,likeamirror,hung…. Hitherandthitherspins Thewindborne,mirroringsoul, Athousandglimpseswins, Andneverseesawhole…. (ActI,SceneII,80,85;Arnold1985:27)

Althoughthereareundeniabledifferencesamongthereligionsof theworld,“therearealsomattersandconcerns,suchasinjustice and poverty, which … in increasing measure are becoming of highsaliencetoallofthemalike”(Gort2002:131).Despitethe

25

OnthismatterseealsotheessaybyAntonHoutepeninthisvol

ume. 26

InthisconnectionseeWesselStoker’sdiscussionoftheneedfor ahermeneuticsoffinitudeandofahermeneuticsofsuspiciononpp.10 12inhisintroductoryessaytothisvolume.

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viewsofthesocalled“new”atheiststothecontrary,27dignity, freedom,justice,respect,andsolidarityarefundamentalvalues stimulatedbyandchanneledthroughreligionsandworldviews. ButmutualityofconcernisnottheonlyreasonChristians shouldengageinwiderinterreligiousecumenism.Therearealso pragmaticgroundsforjointinterreligiousaction.Itisclearthat Christianityoranyotherreligionalonecandoonlysomuchto confrontandcombatthenewdemonicpowersthatgiveriseto worldpovertyandoppression.Broadinterreligioussolidarityon behalfofandwiththevictimsofinjusticewouldwithoutdoubt beamuchmoreeffectivewayofengenderingconditionsfavora ble to the relief and structural betterment of the poor and op pressed.Itisthroughsuchjointactionthatwiderecumenismbe comeswiderliberativeecumenism, Thoughitisfirstofallconcernedwiththelifesituationsof themarginalized,sustainedwiderecumenismofthiskindmaybe expectedtoyieldanaddedbenefit:namely,thediscoverybyits participantsofimbricationsatthelevelsofbelief,spirituality,and religiousexperience.Multireligious“liberativepraxishasaspe cialcapacityforbringingareasofinterreligiousoverlaptolight” (Gort1992:103).Andthisdisclosure,inturn,wouldlikelymove thereligionsandtheiradherentstoengageinevengreaterjoint effortonbehalfofthepoorandoppressed. Bibliography Albright, Madeleine and Hernando de Soto. (2007). “Giving the Poor TheirRights:HowLegalEmpowermentcanHelpBreaktheCycle ofDespair.”TimeMagazine(July16). Ana, Julio de Santa. (1991). “Economics.” In: N. Lossky, José Míguez Bonino,etal.(eds.).DictionaryoftheEcumenicalMovement.Geneva: WCCPublications/GrandRapids:EerdmansPublishingCompany. Pp.31320. Armstrong, Karen. (2009). “Think Again: God.” Foreign Policy. http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/19/god_0?(October19). 27 RichardDawkins,SamHarris,andChristopherHitchensclaim thatreligiousbeliefis“notonlyretrogradebutevil”andthatreligion “createsdivisions,strife,andwarfare,”thatit“imprisonswomenand brainwasheschildren,”thatits“doctrinesareprimitive,unscientific,and irrational,essentiallythepreserveoftheunsophisticatedandgullible,” thatGodisthesourceofallhumancruelty(Armstrong2009).

194 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Arnold, Matthew. (1985). Arnold: Poems. Selected by Kenneth Allott. Harmondsworth:PenguinBooks. Bond,Patrick.(2004).TalkLeft,WalkRight.Scottsville,SA:Universityof KwaZuluNatalPress. Dickinson,R.D.N.(1991).“Poverty.”In:N.Lossky,JoséMíguezBonino, etal.(eds.).DictionaryoftheEcumenicalMovement.Geneva/Grand Rapids: WCC Publications/Eerdmans Publishing Company. Pp. 80610. Gerson,Michael.(2009).“Mugabe’sFearlessOpposition.”Washington Post(November25). (2009).“U.N.OfficialAssailsCongoOperation.”WashingtonPost (October15). Giroux,HenryA.(2009).“ThePowellMemoandtheTeachingMachines ofRightWingExtremists.”http://www.truthout.org/100109A?n. Gort,JeraldD.(2002).“Religion,ConflictandReconciliation:Ecumen icalInitiativesAmidstHumanBrokennessandCommunityDivi sion.” In: J.D. Gort, H. Jansen, and H.M. Vroom (eds). Religion, ConflictandReconciliation:MultifaithIdealsandRealities.Amsterdam/ NewYork:Rodopi.Pp.11733. (1992). “Liberative Ecumenism: Gateway to the Sharing of Reli giousExperienceToday.”In:J.D.GortandH.M.Vroom(eds.).On SharingReligiousExperience:PossibilitiesofInterfaithMutuality.Am sterdam/Grand Rapids: Editions Rodopi/Eerdmans Publishing Company.Pp.88105.  (1978).“GospelforthePoor.”In:J.D.Gort,H.J.Westmaas(eds.). Zendingopwegnaardetoekomst.Kampen:Uitgeversmaatschappij J.H.Kok.Pp.80109. Jansen,Henry.(1989).TheRighteousness(SDQ)ofGodandHumanityinthe Psalter.UnpublishedTh.M.Thesis.CalvinTheologicalSeminary, GrandRapids. Leonard, Andrew. (2009). “John Maynard Keynes: Don’t Call It a Comeback.”ReviewofRobertSkidelsky,Keynes:ReturnoftheMas ter(NewYork:PerseusBooksGroup,2009).http://www.salon.com/ books/feature/2009/09/24/keynes/index.html. Mabuza,WesleyMadonda.(2010).KairosRevisited:InvestigatingtheRele vanceoftheKairosDocumentforChurchStateRelationswithinaDemo craticSouthAfrica.UnpublishedPh.D.Thesis.FacultyofTheology, UniversityofPretoria. Moltmann,Jürgen.(1989).TheChurchinthePoweroftheSpirit:AContri butiontoMessianicEcclesiology.London:SCMPress.

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Pobee,JohnS.(1987).WhoArethePoor?TheBeatitudesasaCalltoCom munity.Geneva:WCCPublications. Noordmans,O.(1946).Zondaarenbedelaar.Amsterdam:HollandUitge versmaatschappij. Sarmad,MuhammadSa’id.(1954).RubaiyatISarmad.Editedandtrans latedbyFazlM.Asiri.Santiniketan,11. Schillebeeckx,Edward.(1967).VaticanII:TheRealAchievement.London: Sheed&Ward. Serwer,A.(2009).“TheDecadefromHell.”Time(December7):2328. Stoker,Wessel.(2010).“IntroductoryEssay:TheologyofCulture,Secu larity,andPlurality.”In:J.D.Gort,H.Jansen,andW.Stoker(eds). CrossroadDiscoursesbetweenChristianityandCulture.Amsterdam: Rodopi.Pp.115. Tamez,Elsa.(1982).BibleoftheOppressed.Maryknoll:OrbisBooks.

ThePublicRoleofChurches inPresentDemocraticSouthAfrica EtiennedeVilliers

Abstract Thisessayprovidesasketchofthepublicrolechurchesplayinpresentdemo cratic South Africa. The strong effect the transition to a democratic dispen sation has had on the public role of churches and the dominant trans formationapproachonwhichthepublicroleofmanyofthemwasbasedinthe apartheid era is discussed first. An attempt is then made to determine the opportunitychurcheshavetoplayapublicroleinthepresentSouthAfrica. Theopportunitystilltheretoplayaconstructivepublicroleis,however,not optimallyutilisedbyallchurches.Someofthereasonsforthisarediscussed. In conclusion, a number of challenges the South African churches face re gardingtheirpublicroleinpresentSouthAfricaareindicated.

Introduction Like so many things in present South Africa the public role of churchescanbeadequatelyunderstoodonlyifaccountistaken of the quite recent transition from an nondemocratic political dispensation based on apartheid to a new democratic political dispensation.Oneofthereasonsisthattheopportunitychurch eshaveforplayingapublicrolehaschangedasaresultofthe politicaltransitionandtheconstitutionalandpoliticalmeasures thatwereintroducedtorectifythediscriminatoryandautocrat ic features of the apartheid dispensation. Just as important is thatthedemiseoftheapartheiddispensationandtheintroduc tionof ademocraticdispensationbroughtaboutincisivechan gesintheperceptionchurcheshaveoftheirpublicroleandin theirmotivationtoplaysucharole. InthiscontributionIwillfirstlookbrieflyatthepublicrole churchesplayedinthepreviouspoliticaldispensation.Theloss, sincetheintroductionofthedemocraticperiod,ofthelegitima cy of the transformation approach that had been dominant in the apartheid dispensation in churches influenced by the Re

197

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formed tradition—if not in all mainline churches—will be dis cussedinthesecondsection.Inthethirdsectiontheopportun ityforchurchestoplayapublicroleinthepresentdemocratic dispensationwillbedetermined.Fourth,wewillattempttoex plain why some churches do not make optimal use of the op portunity they have for playing a public role. In the last part some of the challenges the churches in South Africa face with regardtotheirpublicrolewillbebrieflyindicated. ThePublicRoleofChurchesduringtheApartheidEra There was a vast difference between the public role played by the socalled Afrikaans churches on the one hand and the so calledEnglishchurchesandchurchesliketheDutchReformed Mission Church and the Dutch Reformed Church in Africa on theotherintheapartheidera.TheAfrikaanschurcheshadare lationshipofclosecooperationwithandprivilegedaccesstothe Nationalist government.1 They legitimated the apartheid and security policies of the Nationalist government, while the gov ernment in turn allowed the Afrikaans churches to exert a stronginfluenceontheformulationofitspolicies,especiallyre garding education, welfare and public morality.2 This brought about,amongotherthings,theprivilegedpositionofChristian religiousinstructioninschools,thetransformationoftheschool curriculum to give it a Christiannational flavour, higher gov ernment subsidies for church welfare activities exclusively di

1

J.Durandtracestherootsofthiscloserelationshipbacktothein fluenceoftheReformedpietismprevalentintheNetherlandsatthetime JanvanRiebeeckfoundedaDutchsettlementattheCape(Durand2002: 3239). 2

Thisclosecooperationisrevealinglyillustratedbythefollowing remarkmadebythechurchofficialresponsiblefortheDiaconalServices oftheDutchReformedChurchinareportin1991:“The…executive officer of the General Commission for Diaconal Services serves in a varietyoftaskgroupsthatpreparelegislation,whilethecommentaryof the GCDS with regard to legislation and possible alterations is continuallyasked,givenandconsidered.Thereisthereforenotension between the welfare legislation (16 laws) and Scripture and its norms”—translatedfromAfrikaans(AgendaGSCMeetingMarch1991: Addendum6).

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rectedatwhitepeopleandtheintroductionofconservativele gislation regulating public morality (inter alia censorship laws prohibiting pornography and blasphemy, and legislation pro hibitinggambling).TheAfrikaanschurchesalsohadprivileged access to the stateowned radio and television (cf. De Villiers 2001b:52). Tosomeextent,theothermainlinechurchesalsobenefited fromthepoliciesoneducation,welfareandpublicmoralityne gotiatedbetweentheNationalistgovernmentandtheAfrikaans churches,andtheaccessChristiandenominationshadtostate ownedmassmedia.Itallowedthemaprivilegedpublicrolein comparison to other religious denominations. The significant public role they played, however was primarily to oppose stronglytheapartheidandsecuritypoliciesofthegovernment. Theirpublicroleinopposingthesepoliciesgrewinsignificance astheytookonavicariousleadershiproleintheliberationstruggle when most of the leaders of liberation movements such as the ANC and the PAC were either imprisoned by the government orforcedtogointoexile. Inspiteofthesedifferencestherewasonesignificanttheo logical resemblance between all the mainline churches influ enced by the Reformed tradition: all of them based the public role they played on what can be called the transformation ap proach (for a discussion of the transformation approach of the Reformed tradition cf. Niebuhr 1951: 190229). Both the Afri kaans churches and other mainline churches in the Reformed fold were convinced that they had God’s calling to transform societyinthelightoftheGospelofChrist. ThethreeAfrikaansReformedchurchestooktheirpointof departure in the theocratic ideal expressed in, among other things,Article36oftheConfessioBelgica.Accordingtothistheo cratic ideal, the state is an institution of God that has to serve him by protecting the true Christian religion against false reli gion, by listening to the voice of the church and by striving to serve Christian values in its policies and actions.3 The govern

3

 The theocratic ideal as part of the faith tradition of the Dutch ReformedChurchandthenegativeimpactthetransitiontothenewcon stitutional dispensation had on this ideal is discussed in a report on “Church and State in the Present Constitutional Dispensation” in the

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ment shared the conviction that South Africa was a Christian countryandalsogaveexpressiontoitinthe1983constitution4 andinitspolicies. Reformed churches and theologians who opposed apart heidandwereinvolvedinthestruggleagainsttheapartheidre gime were just as convinced that the Bible condemned apart heidandthattheywerecalledbyGodtostruggleforanewand liberated South Africa. An example is ABRECSA (Alliance of BlackReformedChristiansinSouthernAfrica),foundedin1981 (cf. Boesak 1984: ixx). Their opposition to apartheid prepared thewayfortheDeclarationonRacismthattheGeneralCouncil oftheWorldAllianceofReformedChurchesadoptedinOttawa in August 1982 and in which Dr. Allan Boesak, chairperson of ABRECSA,playedaprominentpart.Itdeclared“thatapartheid isasinandthatthemoralandtheologicaljustificationforitisa travestyofthegospel,abetrayaloftheReformedtradition,and aheresy.” TheLossofLegitimacyoftheTransformationApproach WiththedawnofthenewpoliticaldispensationinSouthAfrica in1994everythingchanged.Withinashorttimeitbecameap parent that the conviction that Christians have a calling to transform society in accordance with the Gospel has almost completely lost the selfevident nature it had for Reformed Christiansinthepreviouspoliticaldispensation.Inmyopinion therearetwomajorfactorscontributingtothisdevelopment. Thefirstisthedismantlingofthecredibilitystructuresun dergirdingthetransformationapproachinthepreviouspolitic aldispensation.InthecaseoftheAfrikaansReformedchurches this took place in a rather dramatic and even traumatic way. The old constitution that gave political legitimacy to their ef fortstoensurethatChristianvalueswererecognisedingovern mentpolicieswasabolished.Thelossofpoliticalpowerbythe

ProceedingsoftheGeneralSynodoftheDutchReformedChurch,Octo ber1998:8387. 4

Oneofthenationalobjectivessetoutintheconstitutionwas“to maintainChristianvaluesandcivilisednormsandtorecogniseandpro tectfreedomofworship”(Lubbe2002:64).

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National Party meant that these churches lost the sympathetic ear of politicians sharing the same theocratic vision. They also losttheirpositionofprivilegedaccesstothestateownedradio and television. All of this amounted to a severe loss of social statusandpublicinfluence. As happened in Germany after unification, South African churches, church leaders and theologians who actively sup ported the liberation struggle found that appreciation for the role they played in the apartheid era did not translate in the NewSouthAfricaintoprivilegedpublicrolesbutratherintoa severe loss of public influence. Their loss of public influence waspartlyandironicallytheresultofthesuccessofthelibera tion struggle. In the New South Africa it was no longer neces saryforchurchesandchurchleaderstofillthepoliticalvacuum thatwasleftbythebanningofliberationorganisationsandthe imprisonment of their leaders and to play a vicarious political leadershiprole.TheleadersoftheANCandthePACwhowere released from prison and returned from exile after 1990 took overthepoliticalleadershiproleandexpectedthechurchesnot tointerferewithpolitics. The second was the introduction and entrenchment of so cialstructuresandprocessesinfluencedbymodernisation.The onefactorthat,morethananyotherperhaps,contributedtothe loss of legitimacy of the transformation approach of the Re formedtraditionsincethedawnofthenew politicaldispensa tionwastheintroductionofanewliberalconstitution.Thisnewlib eral constitution, for the first time in South African history, clearly insists on the separation of religion and state. This makesitdifficult—ifnotimpossible—forthegovernmenttoim plementthedistinctiveviewsofaparticularreligiousgroup,let alone the distinctive views of a particular religious denomina tion within that religious group. In the present political dis pensation the state is seen as a purely human institution that has to obey the will of the majority, must not favour any par ticularreligion,hastopromoteasetofcommonhumanvalues expressedinthebillofrights,andhastoensurereligiousfree dom for all religious institutions (cf. De Villiers 2001b: 5152). Apparently,theviewthatsocietyshouldbetransformedinac cordance with the Christian Gospel is discredited by the new liberalconstitutionaspoliticallyillegitimate.

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TheOpportunityforPlayingaPublicRole Thelossoflegitimacybythetransformationapproachdoesnot meanthatthechurcheshavenoopportunitytoplayaconstruc tivepublicroleinpresentdemocraticSouthAfrica.Inanassess ment of the opportunity the churches have to play such a role thefollowinghastobetakenintoaccount. TheNeed One way of assessing the opportunity for churches to play a publicroleistodeterminetheneedthatexistsintheSouthAfri cansocietyforchurchestoplaysucharole.Itisnosecretthat South African society is plagued by a number of very serious problems. At SACLA (South African Christian Leadership Assembly)2003inPretoriarepresentativesofagreatnumberof South African churches identified seven socalled “giants” amongtheseproblemstowhichchurchesshouldurgentlypay attention: crime, poverty, unemployment, racism, gender and sexual discrimination, the deterioration of family life and HIV/AIDS.Tothisanumberofotherseriousproblemscaneasi ly be added: violence, ethnic conflict, poor service delivery, public unrest, xenophobia and the deprivation of the environ ment. Itistruethatthegovernmenthastheprimeresponsibility to solve these problems. This does not mean that there is no need for help from other quarters. The South African govern ment just does not have the capacity to handle all the dimen sions of these problems in an effective way.  Besides, it is glo ballyacknowledgedtodaythatthecontributionofNGOs—and thatincludesreligiousdenominations—incombatingtheprob lems of society is indispensable (cf. Hubig 1995: 10607; Heid brink 2003: 187256). Combating poverty and injustice, caring forthesick,reconcilingpeoplewhoareestrangedfromonean other, contributing to moral formation and building healthy marriageandfamilyrelationshipshavealwaysbeenpartofthe core activities of churches. They have built up a certain exper tiseinhandlingthesemattersandhavedeveloped—eachinits own way—an infrastructure of services. The South African churchesarenoexceptioninthisrespect.

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TheConstitutionalandPoliticalScope It cannot be denied that to some extent the opportunity for churches to influence government policies in the present de mocratic dispensation is more restricted. This is a result of the dismantlingofcredibilitystructuresundergirdingthetransfor mationapproachalreadymentioned.Itisalsotheresultofthe separationofreligionandstaterequiredbythepresentconsti tution. No religious denomination is allowed to have a privi legedrelationshipwiththegovernment,andthegovernmentis notallowedtobaseitslegislationonthespecificbeliefsofone particularreligion. However,onehastotakeaccountofthefactthatthesame constitutionthatseparatesreligionandstatealsorecogniseshu man rights such as freedom of religion, freedom of conscience and freedom of speech. All church denominations and their members have the right to express their opinion in the public sphere freely by means of their own communication channels and the mass media. There are no legal restrictions on them, andthereforealsonoexcuseforthemnottoexercisetheirpro pheticcallingtocriticisemorallyunacceptablegovernmentpol icies publicly or make constructive policy proposals based on theirownexpertise(cf.Coertzen2008:34567).Thereare,how ever, other restraints on the churches in exercising their pro pheticcallinginthisregard.TheAfrikaanschurchesstillhavea legitimacy problem on account of their support of apartheid, butthisisevenmoresobecauseofthefactthattheyarestillre presentingalmostexclusivelywhiteChristians(foradiscussion ofthelegitimacyproblemoftheDutchReformedChurchcf.De Villiers 2008a: 741). In my opinion, they have little chance of having the government take their criticism of or proposals for policyseriouslyiftheyremainalmostexclusivelywhite. ItmustalsobesaidthatthepresentANCgovernmenthas not exactly exhibited openness in responding to criticism by churchesorecumenicalorganisationsespeciallyduringthelast fewyears.Ithasoftenrespondedinaratherirritatedmannerto criticism by church representatives on, for example, its HIV/ AIDS policies and lack of service delivery. A recent example wastheaccusationoftreasonandhatredofMr.JacobZumadi rected by the ANC against Archbishop Desmond Tutu when thelatterdaredtoquestionpubliclyZuma’ssuitabilityasapresi

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dentialcandidate,onaccountofmorallydubiousbehaviourin thepast,amongotherthings. Ofspecialimportanceisthattheseparationofreligionand staterequiredbytheconstitutioniswhatonecandescribeasa “soft” one.5 Section 15 of the Bill of Rights in the constitution doesnotimplyneutralitytowardsreligionsbutimpartiality.It makes allowance for religious observances in state institutions and some cooperation between the government and religious denominations on an equitable basis. One may therefore con clude that the constitution does create a certain legal space for religious denominations to play a public role. What this legal spaceexactlycomprisesis,ofcourse,opentointerpretation.O verthefirsttenyearsofthenewdemocraticdispensationfierce public debates were waged on the implications of the consti tutionforgovernmentpoliciesonespeciallyreligiouseducation in public schools and government sponsoring of welfare pro grammesandinstitutionsrunbyreligiousdenominations. In the case of religious education in public schools, the debatewasonwhethertheexistingpracticeofsinglefaithreli giousinstructionandobservancesduringofficialschoolassem blies should be allowed to continue—be it in a more impartial way—orifacompletelynewanddifferentapproachshouldbe introduced. Most churches argued for the retention of single faithreligiousinstructionandobservancesandquotedthepol icyofconfessionalreligiousinstructioninpublicschoolsinGer manyasademocraticallyacceptablemodel.Intheend,thegov ernment in its Policy on Religion and Education, promulgated in 2003,decidedtoworkfrom the premise that the public school has an educational re sponsibilityforteachingandlearningaboutreligionandre ligions,andforpromotingthese,butitshoulddosoinways thataredifferentfromthereligiousinstruction,andreligious nurture provided by the home, family, and religious com munity.(Section1)

5

Cf.theremarkmadebythethenMinisterofEducationProfessor Kader Asmal in his foreword to the National Policy on Religion and Educationpromulgatedin2003:“Wedonothaveastatereligion.Butour country is not a secular state where there is a very strict separation betweenreligionandthestate”(DepartmentofEducation2003:2).

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Unlikeasinglefaithapproachtoreligiouseducation,which provides religious instruction in one religion, and unlike a multiplesinglefaithapproach,whichprovidesparallelpro grammesinreligiousinstructionforanapprovedsetofreli gions, a multitradition approach to the study of Religion Education does not promote any particular religion. It is a programme for studying about religion, in all its forms, as animportantdimensionofhumanexperienceandasignifi cantsubjectfieldintheschoolcurriculum.(Section23)

This does not exclude the possibility of occasionally utilising guestfacilitatorsfromvariousreligions(Section34).Represen tativesofreligiousorganisationsareeveninvitedtocontribute voluntarilytothedevelopmentanddistributionofsuitablema terialsforuseinReligionEducation(Section47).Thepolicyalso acknowledgestherightofcitizens,attheirownexpense,toes tablish independent schools, including religious schools, as longastheyavoidracialdiscriminationandmaintainstandards requiredbythestate,includingthecurriculumstandardswith respecttoReligionEducation(Section16).Governingbodiesof publicschoolsareallowedtomaketheirfacilitiesavailable for religiousobservances,inthecontextoffreeandvoluntaryasso ciation, and provided that facilities are made available on an equitable basis. However, wherever “a religious observance is organised, as an official part of the school day, it must accom modateandreflectthemultireligiousnatureofthecountryin anappropriatemanner”(Section61). Inthecaseofsocialwelfareservicesthedebatewasonthe extenttowhichreligiousserviceprovidersshouldstillbefund edbythegovernment,andespeciallyonhowtheskewedgov ernment funding in the previous political dispensation that strongly discriminated against black people should be correc ted.Oneoftheresultsofthediscriminatoryfundinginthepre vious political dispensation was that the Afrikaans churches could provide extensive welfare services to white people in need,becausetheywereheavilysubsidisedbythegovernment. For example, in the case of the Dutch Reformed Church, be tween75and80%ofitsspendingbudgetforsocialwelfareser viceswasfundedbythegovernment.

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Thegovernmentdecidedtocontinuefundingreligiousser viceprovidersbutonlyiftheymeettherequirementssetoutby theDepartmentofSocialDevelopmentinitsPolicyonFinancial Awards to Service Providers of 2007. The objectives of the policy are,amongotherthings,toprovideatooltofacilitatethetrans formationofsocialwelfareservicedelivery;developthecapac ity of emerging and previously disadvantaged organisations thatdonothavetheresources;createanenablingenvironment for new service providers previously excluded from govern ment funding; and provide a basis for the redistribution of re sources in a more equitable manner (Section 3.3). The Depart ment of Social Development regrets that it has only limited fi nancial resources to support social welfare services. The main reasonisthateffortstoimprovethesafetynetforthepoorhave resulted in the Department spending an average of 90% of its budgetonsocialgrants,leavingonly10%ofthebudgettopro vide a wide range of services rendered either by NGOs or the government.Thishasmadecertainpolicyshiftsregardinggov ernmentfundingofsocialwelfareservicesnecessarytoensure thatservicesgototheneediest(Section5.3).Asaresult,thepol icyspecifiesthataserviceproviderwillbeeligibleonlyforafi nancial award by the Department of Social Development if it meets certain requirements. A service provider must, among otherthings,provideservicesorintendtoprovideservicesfor the people in line with the Department’s priorities and objec tives,promoteequitabledistributionofserviceswhiletakingin toaccounthistoricalimbalancesincludingrace,genderandthe urban/ruraldivide,promoteinclusivenessandrepresentivityin themanagementandorganisationofservices,includingthees tablishmentofmanagementcommitteesthatbroadlyreflectthe communitiesthattheyserve,andsupportandcommititselfto share resources and transfer skills to emerging organisations (Section10.4). Thenetresultofthisfundingpolicyofthegovernmentfor socialwelfareservicesprovidedbychurcheshasbeentwofold. First of all, these social welfare services, especially those pro vided by Afrikaans churches, have emerged in a process of drastic transformation in order to meet the requirements for governmentfunding.Secondly,thefactthatgovernmentfund ingforsocialwelfareserviceshasnotsubstantiallyincreasedin

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realterms,butnowhastobespreadoverafargreaternumber of service providers, has as a result that church social welfare services that could previously count on government subsidies fundingasubstantialpartoftheirspendingbudgetsnowhave to accept the fact that a much smaller percentage of their ex pensesarefundedbythegovernment.Inthecaseofthesocial welfare services of the Dutch Reformed Church, government fundingnowcoversmoreorless30%oftheirexpenses. Newforumsfornegotiationonpolicybetweenthegovern mentandreligiousdenominationshavealsobeenintroducedin themeantime. Althoughthegovernmentwasunwillingonac countofthe“soft”separationofreligionandstaterequiredby theconstitutiontocreateanegotiationforumforChristiande nominationsonly,itinstitutedinterreligiousnegotiationforums such as the National Religious Association for Social Develop mentandtheNationalReligiousLeaders’Forum.Suchforums can function well only if the different religious denominations negotiate with one another on the desired policies and reach consensus before they negotiate with the government. Unfor tunately this has not happened often. The result was that the balanceofpowerinthesenegotiationforumswasforthemost part in favour of the government. The government could use the meetings of these forums to promote its own policies and gainsupportforthemwithoutmuchresistancefromthedivid edrepresentativesofthereligiousdenominations. TheOpportunityChurchMembersHave Itisimportantthatinourdefinitionof“church”wenotinclude only the local congregation, the church denomination and the ecumenical organisation. Dirkie Smit (1996: 11929) has rightly pointedoutthatthereareothermanifestationsofthechurchas well.ThechurchmemberwholivesoutherChristianbeliefsin other life spheres or who founds or supports an organisation providing humanitarian aid is also a manifestation of the church.ItisespeciallyinthisrespectthatSouthAfricanchurch eshavemuchtooffer. Unfortunately, the misunderstanding exists among many South African church members, especially in the Afrikaans churches, that political power is indispensable in solving soci etalproblems.Whatisnottakenintoaccountisthatinaneraof globalisation economic power and the power of expertise are

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justasimportant.6Althoughitmaybetruethatthechurchde nominationstowhichtheybelongdonothavesuchastrongin fluence on government policies anymore, many church mem bersareownersofbusinesses,fillseniormanagementpositions inbigcompanies,arewealthyonaccountofinheritanceorsuc cessfulinvestments,orareexpertsintheirfield.Bymakingcre ative use of their economic power and expertise they can do muchtocontributetotheeconomicempowermentofandtrans ferofskillstopreviouslydisadvantagedpeople. OptimalUseoftheOpportunitytoPlayaPublicRole? Many examples can be quoted of church denominations, con gregations and church members playing a constructive public roleinpresentdemocraticSouthAfrica.Theyactivelyrespond totheseriousproblemsintheSouthAfricansocietybysetting upprogrammesthatcontributetothealleviationoftheseprob lems. Some of them do not shy away from criticising insuffic ientgovernmentpolicies,corruptionbycivilservantsandpoli ticians and poor service delivery by government departments andmunicipalities. Itcannotbedenied,however,thattherearesomeworrying tendencies that prohibit some church denominations and their congregationsandmemberstomakeoptimaluseoftheoppor tunitytheyhaveinthepresentdemocraticSouthAfricatoplay a constructive public role. I want to mention two of these ten dencies. ThefirstisthetendencyofmanymembersoftheAfrikaans churchestobeunwillingtomakeanyconstructivecontribution to the alleviation of societal problems on account of the ex tremelynegativeviewtheyhaveofwhatishappeninginsoci ety (cf. De Villiers 2008b: 37580). Many of them have the de featist, even apocalyptic, view that South African society is in evitablyheadingforcollapse.Thisviewcanbeexplainedpartly bythetraumaticexperiencesofviolentcrimetowhichsomeof them have been exposed. However, the “spectacles” they put

6

Fortherelativisingeffectofeconomicandculturalglobalisation onthepoliticalpowerofgovernmentscf.DeVilliers2001;Stigliz2002: 5388;Tomlinson1999.

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onwhentheylookatthetransformationpoliciesofthegovern ment such as land reform and affirmative action—in other words, the presuppositions and attitudes in the light of which they interpret such policies and their implementation—also contribute to this negative view. I have already alluded to the deepseated conviction among Afrikaners that if they do not havepoliticalcontrolofthecountrytheywillinevitablybesup pressed by the majority of black people.7 They experience the transformation policies of the government as an affirmation of thisconviction.Asaresult,theyexperiencethemselvesashelp less victims. Another deepseated prejudice that still prevails amongmanymembersoftheAfrikaanschurchesisracialpreju dice.Asaresult,theyexperiencetheincreaseofcrimeinSouth Africaandthelackofgovernmentalservicedeliveryasjustone moreproofoftheinherentincompetenceofblackpeople.Look ingatthepresentSouthAfricansocietythroughthespectacles of these deepseated prejudices has the inevitable result that manymembersoftheAfrikaanschurches havestrongfeelings ofbeingseriouslythreatenedbywhatishappeninginsociety. These negative views and feelings of many church mem bersoftheAfrikaanschurchescannotbutalsohaveaneffecton their expectations of the church and on church life itself. Church members tend to view the Afrikaans churches as the last safe haven they have as white Afrikaners in this society. Theydonotwanttheministersoftheircongregationstopreach abouttheresponsibilitytheyhavetohelpsolvetheseriouswid er problems of society. Another effect is that a shift is taking place in many congregations of the Afrikaans churches away fromtheoutwarddirectedspiritualityoftheirReformedtradi tiontoaninnerdirectedspirituality.8Theemphasisinthemin

7

Cf.forexamplethepronouncementsoftheVoortrekkerCoenraad Scheepersalreadyin1852:“[Whites]andblackscannotlivetogether,un lesstheblackmanisinstateofsubjectiontothewhite”(quotedbyGilio mee2003:181)andofHendrikVerwoerdin1948inwhichhereferredto SouthAfricaas“awhiteman’scountrywherehemustremainthemas ter”(quotedbyGiliomee2003:279). 8

Cf.thefollowingconclusiondrawnbyM.J.S.MasangoandH.J.C. Pieterse:“Privatizedfaithandspiritualityarethehallmarkofthechurch. RecentresearchintheNed.Geref.Kerkshowsthisfaceofthechurch

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istryofmanycongregationstendstobeincreasinglyoncatering to the personal and emotional needs of the members them selvesandonsecuringthefuturesurvivalofcongregations.In otherwords,thepriestlyaspectofministry(thecomfortingand healingofthemembers)receivesalmostalltheemphasis,while thekinglyaspect(theencouragingandtrainingofmembersto liveaholylifeinalllifespheres)andthepropheticaspect(con tributingbymeansofcriticalinvolvementtotherenewalofso ciety)areforthemostpartneglected. ThesecondtendencyIwanttopointoutisthetendencyof therulingANCparty,ontheonehand,torespondrathernega tively to criticism by church representatives and, on the other hand,tocurryfavourwithcertainchurchdenominations.Espe cially during the last election the presidential candidate of the ANC, Jacob Zuma, did not only use Christian religious lang uageinspeechestoconvinceChristiansofhissympathyforthe Christianreligionbutalsopersuadedcertainchurchdenomina tions to provide a forum for him to promote the ANC. This close relationship between the ruling party and certain church denominationscontravenesthespiritoftheconstitution,which doesnotallowprivilegedrelationshipsbetweencertainchurch denominationsandthegovernment/rulingparty.Italsounder mines the prophetic responsibility of such church denomina tions,becauseofthefearthatcriticismofthegovernmentcould causethemtolosetheirprivilegedposition.Itisevenmoreso when the government clearly shows that it does not tolerate criticismbyrepresentativesofchurches. There is reason to be wary of any attempt by the govern menttoestablishcloseandprivilegedrelationshipswithpartic ularchurches.ThelegacyofsuchcloserelationshipsinsubSa veryclearly”(MasangoandPieterse2008:128).TheyquoteW.J.Schoe manwhoconductedempiricalresearchamongmembersoftheDutch ReformedChurch:“Religionisaprivatematterand‘my’personalre lationshipwithGodisoftheutmostimportance.…Thecommunityis notinthesightofthecongregations.…Itseemsthatworshippersinthe DRCcongregationsarelivingintheirownprivateworldandarelacking involvementwitheachotherandespeciallythewidercommunitythat theyaresupposedtoserve.DRCcongregationsareinneedofamore missionalapproachfocussingonservingthecommunity,beingachurch fortheother”(Schoeman2007:910).

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haran African countries has mostly been very negative. The closerelationshipbetweentheNationalistgovernmentandthe Afrikaanschurchesinthepreviouspoliticaldispensationserves as an obvious example. John de Gruchy states the following about such close relationships in other subSaharan African countries: Relatively small ruling elites of political, church, and business leaders, often belonging to one dominant ethnic group,formedinformalcoalitionswhichsought“toexercise hegemonic control over the society,” preferring to perpet uate their own privileged status after independence rather thantosharepowerwithothergroups.Thisoftenledtothe cooptionofthechurchesasuncriticalservantsofthestate, giving legitimacy to policies which were morally suspect, sociallydisastrous,andcounterproductivetoChristianwit ness.(DeGruchy1995:170)

ChallengesRegardingthePublicRoleofChurches inPresentSouthAfrica In conclusion, I would like to indicate a number of challenges churchesfaceregardingtheirpublicroleinpresentSouthAfri ca.Theywouldbeabletomakeoptimaluseoftheopportunity theystillhavetoplayaconstructiveroleonlyiftheydealwith thesechallengeseffectively. i)Anadequatepublictheologyneedstobedevelopedthat would give direction to South African churches regarding the constructive public role they ought to play in present demo cratic South Africa. Such a public theology should assist Re formed churches in particular to transform the theocratic and exclusivist transformation approach on which their public role wasbasedinthepreviouspoliticaldispensationintoamorein clusiveonethatwouldenablethemtocontributetotherenewal ofsocietywithoutstrivingtoChristianiseallspheresofsociety (cf.DeVilliers2005:52526). ii) Such a public theology should be undergirded by the cultivation of a spirituality that would, on the one hand, be healing and help church members to overcome their irrational fears and racial prejudices but, on the other, would also be transformationalandempoweringbycreatingempathyforthe poorandthemarginalisedandastrongsenseofresponsibility

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tocontributeconstructivelytothealleviationoftheproblemsof society. iii)Churcheshavetoaccepttherealitythatthescopethey have in the present democratic South Africa to influence gov ernment directly is limited. They should, however, learn to makemoreeffectiveuseoftheinterreligiousforumscreatedfor negotiation with the government. This would require, among otherthings,moreintenseinteraction,negotiationandcoopera tionwithnonChristianreligiousdenominations. iv) Church denominations have to take into account that, althoughthescopetheyasinstitutionshaveforplayingapublic role has become more limited, the same is not necessarily true of their members. Church members still have the potential to play a significant public role. Church denominations are chal lengedtoinspireandequiptheirmemberstorealisethispoten tial. v)Anumberofchurchesalsohavetoaccepttherealitythat the funding they receive for their social welfare programmes and institutions will never again be as high as in the previous political dispensation. They face the challenge of transforming their social welfare services in accordance with the require ments of the Department to ensure optimal funding by the government.Notonlythey,butallchurchesinvolvedinsocial welfare have to develop creative new ways of fundraising to payforthegreatestpartoftheirexpenses. vi) Churches have to overcome their disappointment and unhappinessaboutthefactthatthegovernmentwasunwilling to retain singlefaith religious education in public school and learntomakeeffectiveuseoftheopportunitiesthepresentgov ernment policy on religion and education still present to them to contribute to religion education and participate in religious observancesintheschoolenvironment. vii) Churches, on the one hand, have to devise ways of constructively cooperating with government departments and municipalities without being coopted by them. On the other hand, they should not relinquish their role of prophetic criti cism against unacceptable government policies and corrupt practices of politicians and civil servant. One of the challenges they face in this regard is to find the most effective and com municablewaysofcriticising.

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Bibliography Agenda of the Meeting of the General Synodical Commission of the DutchReformedChurch,March1991:Addendum6. Boesak,A.(1984).BlackandReformed:Apartheid,LiberationandtheCal vinistTradition.Johannesburg:SkotavillePublishers. Coertzen,P.(2008).“FreedomofReligion:ThenandNow16522008.” VerbumetEcclesia29:34567. DeGruchy,J.W.(1995).ChristianityandDemocracy:ATheologyforaJust WorldOrder.CapeTown/Johannesburg:DavidPhilip. DepartmentofEducation.(2003).NationalPolicyonReligionandEduca tion. Department of Social Development. (2007). Policy on Financial Awards toServiceProviders. DeVilliers,D.E.(2008a).“TheInterdependenceofPublicWitnessand InstitutionalUnityintheDutchReformedFamilyofChurches.” VerbumetEcclesia29:72843. (2008b).“KandieNGKerknog‘nkonstruktiewerolindieSuid Afrikaansesamelewingspeel?”VerbumetEcclesia29:36886. (2005). “The Vocation of the Reformed Ethicist in the Present SouthAfricanSociety.”Scriptura89:52135. (2001a). “Die kerk en ekonomiese globalisering.” Verbum et Ec clesia22:46577. (2001b). “The Influence of the DRC on Public Policy during the late1980’sand1990’s.”Scriptura76:5161. Durand,J.(2002).Ontluisterdewêreld:DieAfrikanerensykerkin‘nver anderendewêreld.Wellington:LuxVerbi. Giliomee, H. (2003). The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Cape Town: Tafelberg. Heidbrink, L. (2003). Kritik der Verantwortung: Zu den Grenzen verant wortlichenHandelnsinkomplexenKontexten.Weilerswist:Velbrück Wissenschaft. Hubig,C.(1995).“VerantwortungundHochtechnologie.”In:K.Bay ertz (ed.). Verantwortung: Prinzip oder Problem? Darmstadt: Wis senschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft.Pp.98139. Lubbe, G. (2002). “ReligioPolitical Changes in South Africa.” In: D. Kritzinger (ed.). No Quick Fixes: Challenges to Mission in a Chan gingSouthAfrica.Pretoria:IMER.Pp.6169. Masango, M.J.S., and H.J.C. Pieterse (2008). “Liturgy on the Edge of Community.”PracticalTheologyinSouthAfrica23:12539. Niebuhr,H.R.(1951).ChristandCulture.NewYork:Harper&Row.

214 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE ProceedingsoftheGeneralSynodoftheDutchReformedChurch.Oc tober1998:8387. Schoeman, W.J. (2007). “The Congregational Life Survey in a South African Church: Strengths and Weaknesses.” (Unpublished pa per). Smit,D.J.(1996).“Oordiekerkasuniekesamelewingsverband.”Tyd skrifvirGeesteswetenskappe36:11929. Stiglitz, J. (2002). Globalization and its Discontents. London et al.: Pen guinBooks. Tomlinson, J. (1999). Globalization and Culture. Chicago: Chicago Uni versityPress.

ImaginationandArt intheChristianFaith OnImaginationandArtintheChurch DesireeBerendsen

Abstract Thisessaylooksatthesubjectofimaginationandshowsthatimaginationis notsimplyaRomanticcategory.Imaginationisnottheexclusivedomainof artistsbutisalsopartofourfacultyofknowing.Thisobtainsentirelywith respecttoreligiousimagination.ThatiswhyitisverygoodthatProtestant churchesareonceagainpayingattentiontoart.Thisessaywillfirstexplore theepistemologicalaspectoftheimagination,wherebyMarkJohnson’sinter pretation of Immanual Kant’s thinking on imagination will figure strongly. GerardusvanderLeeuwandPaulMoyaertwillthenbeinvokedtoshowhow religionandimaginationcohere.Lastly,theessaywilldescribeaspecificcase, i.e.thepolicyoftheexhibitcommitteeoftheDomChurchinUtrecht.

Introduction There is a programme on Dutch radio in which a wellknown Dutch individual writes a letter to God. During the Christmas vacationof2007itwasStefBos’turn(BosisaDutchsingerand songwriter).1 In this letter Bos makes the connection between thecreativeworkofartistsandthatofGodandtheroleofthe imaginationthataccompaniesthatcreativeworkquiteclear.He beginshisletterasfollows: DearGod, Letmebeginatthebeginning. ThemostbeautifulcreationstoryistheAborigines’. Itopenswith: …AndonthefirstdayhumanscreatedGod.

1 “DeOchtenden’,”EvangelischeOmroep,radio1(04012007,9:00 10:00a.m).Seehttp://www.ochtenden.nl/afleveringen/januari2007/

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Bosthensaysthathewasbaptized“inyourname”andthathe sawGodtwice.Thefirsttimewasinhisfather,whomadehim self small “for you and for me.” The second time he saw God wasintheeyesofhismothershortlybeforeshedied.“Isawa softlightofsurrenderandrest.” Thesentence“Whatdoesitmatter...ifyouareourimagin ationorifyoutrulyexistaslongasitdoessomethinggoodfor someone”recursregularly.Afterhestatesthathehopes,atthe endoflife,tobeabletosay,incompletesurrenderandrest,“I don’tknow,”comesthisparagraph: But in my imagination you have emerged unscathed from thebattle.…Thechildinmestillspeaksintothevoidona regularbasisbeforegoingtosleep.WheneverImakemusic andtranscendmyselfIsuspectyouofhavingahandinthat. Itdoesn’tmatterifyouactuallydoexist;imaginationissuf ficient.

Imaginationissufficient.Whatdoesitmatterif“youareafig mentofourimaginationorifyouactuallydoexist”?Formany (orthodox) believers it does matter. For them, it makes a great differenceifGodexistsorifwesupposesomethingtobepres entinstoriesandritualsthatdoesnot“really”existoutsideof them. According to me, in his letter to God Bos touches on a number of essential points concerning the relation between faithandimagination. HebeginswiththecreationmythoftheAborigines.“And onthefirstdayhumanbeingscreatedGod.”Suchagodcreated byhumanbeingsisnotafantasyoranartefact.Itis—fromthe moment it is created—the god of these people. Although the peoplecreatedit,itexistsseparatelyfromthem.Andbecauseit existsseparatelyfromthem,itcansaysomethingtothem;they canhavearelationshipwithit—justasapoemexistsseparately from the poet as soon as it has been composed or a painting expressesmorethanthelinesonthecanvas. Bos then connects faith with surrender. He mentions two momentsinwhichhehasseenGod:onceinhisfatherandonce inhismother.HeseesGodinthesurrenderpresentinthepray erofhisfatherandthesurrenderandrestofhisdyingmother. Hedoesnotseethattowhichhisfatherandmothersurrender. Heseesthatitdoesthemgoodandthereforeitisgood.“What does it matter if … you are a figment of our imagination or if

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youactuallydoexist”?Thecriterionisthus:Doesithaveaposi tiveeffect?AGodwhocausestheshadowofhelland damna tion,ashewasinthevillagewhereBoscamefrom,cannotbea goodGod. In the paragraph after he wrote what he saw in his dying mother, he talks about the rational side of faith. It is clear that this is not the most important aspect for him. Faith has to do with the reasons of the heart. Those kinds of reasons require surrender. If you already exist, you are incomprehensible to ouroverratedintelligence.”Heattemptstosurrender,ashesaw hisfatherandmotherdo,andhecandothatinmusic:“When ever I make music and transcend myself I suspect you of hav ingahandinthat.”Bosconnectsselftranscendencewithmove mentsfromthesubjecttosomethingoutsidethatsubject,move mentsthatarepossibleonlybecausethesubjectletsgoofitself. Inmyview,thismovementrequiresnotonlysurrenderbutalso imagination. ImaginationandEpistemology Theconnectionbetweenreligionandimaginationisnotimme diately apparent. Imagination is often associated with fantasy (cf.Phillips1991;Johnson1987:141).2Itisarguedthatifreligion and imagination are associated, with imagination viewed as fantasy,thenreligionwouldbeakindoffairytalethatdoesnot havemuchtodowithreality(Green2000:103;Feurbach1973). Religion,then,mustbeseenasprojection—whichisanegative qualificationinthisrespect. Inthisarticleimaginationisviewedasthehumancapacity toconceiveofsomething.Peopleusethiscapacityinperceiving andnamingthingsaswellasinallcreativeactivity.Therefore,I will argue that it is basic to religion as well (cf. Moyaert 2007: 1922).Religioustraditionsappealtopeople’simaginationand stem from people’s imagination. In this respect religion is like poetry.Justasinpoetry,itisnotpossibleinreligiontoestablish 2

Johnson1987:141:“Asurveyofsomeofthemostinfluentialdis cussionsofimaginationintheWesterntraditionrevealstwoquitedif ferentapproachestothesubject—onethatassociatesitwithart,fantasy andcreativity,andanotherthattreatsitasafacultythatconnectsper ceptionwithreason.”

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the objective truth of, for example, the existence of God. What canbeestablishediswhatisheldtobetrueinatradition,that is: the value of credal truths. Religion is a game (Barnard and Postma 2007: 414; Huizinga 1938: 35  46): a serious and heal inggameopentothefuture.Itisagameinwhichpeople’san xieties,hopes,anddesirescanbeputintoaframeworksothat theycancopewiththem. In modern times—in any case since Descartes—imagina tionhasbeenviewedwithsuspicion.InthissenseDescartes’ra tionalismisveryPlatonic.SinceNewtonandtheriseofthesci ences, the ideal of science has become “clear and distinct” knowledge. Western philosophy, especially epistemology, has adoptedthisideal,inwhichunderstandingissuperiortoimag ination, because imagination is seen mainly as fantasy. Con ceptualtruthisvaluedmorethanimaginativetruth.Moreover, imagined truth is ”just” imagination and therefore not “really true”(Descartes1993:ch4;Plato1921:section1,chapter4,book VII). In this line of thought, when religion arises from imag ination,itisevidentthatreligionwillloseitsimportance. Overagainstthistendency,theEnlightenmentphilosopher ImmanuelKantdoesgrantimaginationanimportantroleinhis philosophy. According to Kant, imagination has a connecting functionintheprocessofknowing.Inordertobeabletoknow something,reasonandexperienceneedtobeconnected.People cannot have knowledge without the categories of reason and sensual perception or experience. In a famous sentence, sum marizing his transcendental philosophy, he stated: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant 1929: 95). Kant was searching for the conditions that make knowledge possible. How is it possible for human beingstodistinguish,name,summarize,andunderstand?How doestheabilitytoknowwork?Kantdescribeshisanswerinhis CritiqueofPureReason,wherehetriestoovercometheantagon ism between empiricism and rationalism. According to Kant, not all knowledge can be gained solely through reason, as the rationaliststhought,noristhemindatabularasa,ablankslate thatreceivesimpressionsfromtheexternalworld,astheempir icists held. The human mind contains socalled categories,: the twelvecategoriesofreasonthatsortouttheinformationcoming from outside. Knowledge arises only through combining im

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pressions from outside with the categories of understanding. Impressions without concepts are blind, which means that im pressions that have not yet been categorized do not fall under the category of knowledge. And the same goes for the under standing:thoughtswithout(empirical)contentareempty. In line with Mark Johnson’s interpretation of Kant (John son1987:13966),Idistinguishfouraspectsofimagination:the reproductive, the productive, the schematic and the creative. Johnsonholdsthatthesefouraspectsareanattempttocombine thetwomainapproachesofimaginationinWesternphilosoph y:theromantic,creativeoneandtherationalone.Thefirstthree areepistemological;thelastcanbetermedromantic.Reproduc tiveimaginationconnectsperceptionandreason.Itisthefaculty of achieving a synthesis between mental representations and generalrepresentations.Allkindsofknowledgeinvolvejudge ments in which mental representations are unified and ar ranged under more general representations. This regards the empiricalpartofgainingknowledge.Aconcreteexampleofre productiveimaginationismemory,i.e.whenempiricaldataare rememberedlater. Itistheproductiveimaginationthatisatworkwhenasitua tionisbeinginterpreted.Theimaginationenablespeopletoap plycategoriestothemultitudeofempiricalperceptions—thatis the reproductive aspect. The productive function of imagina tionguaranteestheunityofmyknowledge.Idonotexperience a series of states of consciousness, but there is a structure that unifies my successive states of consciousness and turns them into my conscious states. Kant calls this synthesizing activity “productive,”becauseitgeneratesastructurethatanysetofre presentationsmustfitiftheyaretobeexperiencedasobjectsin asharedworld(Johnson1987:15051).Herewehavethemore rational function of imagination. So, according to Kant,  objec tive,public,sharedexperiencesdoexist,becausehumanconsci ousness has an objective structure. Without the reproductive andproductiveaspectsofimaginationnoknowledgewouldbe possibleatall(Jonkers2002:§2;Warnock1976:2634;Kearney 1988). The schematizing function of imagination is the concrete mediation between sensations and thought. This explains how abstract mental structures can connect up with the contents of

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sense perceptions (Johnson 1987: 152). The schematizing ac tivityoftheimaginationmediatesbetweenimagesorobjectsof sensation on the one hand and abstract concepts on the other. Thefourthfunctionoftheimaginationisthecreativeone,which playsacentralroleinart,literatureandscience.Inthehistory of philosophy imagination is seen as either romantic (creative) or as rational. For Kant, imagination receives its synthesizing capacity through distinguishing between the four aspects and tryingtorelatethefirstthreeandthecreativefunction(Johnson 1987:157). Thus,imaginationincludesanepistemologicalandacrea tive aspect. The first three (reproductive, productive and sche matizing) are epistemological, the last one creative. These as pects,however,aremorecloselyconnectedthanisoftenthought inphilosophyofreligion.Initsproductivenaturetheepistemo logical aspect also has a creative element. Moreover, in both cases feeling plays a central role. In the romantic tradition, where imagination is connected with art and creativity, imag inationisdefinedasreasonwithfeeling.Imagination,initscre ative aspect, helps one see ordinary objects as significant in a new way. The interpretative function of imagination, which is itsnormalfunction,maybeheightenedsothatwhatispresent toustakesonanewmeaning.Thispowerisidenticalwiththe power of representation, of forming images of things, in order to think about them in their absence (Warnock 1976: 10203). Scientific data have different meanings in different paradigms. Or,touseanexamplefromeverydaylife,whenoneisbittenby a dog while jogging, that dog changes in one’s  mind from a goodnatured dog into a mean wolf. The epistemological as pects of imagination are at work in art as well. The reproduc tive, productive and schematizing aspects of imagination are neededincreatingandinwatchingandinterpretingart.Mean ing is created by both the creating artist and the interpreting viewer. A good example of how this works is described by Mieke Boon and Peter Henk Steenhuis in an essay on viewing Rembrandt’sTheJewishBride(BoonandSteenhuis2009:6974). TheyexplainKant’sphilosophyofperceptionindescribingthe waytheyseethepainting. Imagination, as I argue in this article, is crucial to the hu manascriptionofmeaningandreasoningbecausewhathuman

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beingsacknowledgetobemeaningfulandthewaytheyreason about it depends on the structures of imagination that consti tutes our experience. Up till now I hope I have thus far made clearthathumanbeingscannotfunctionwithouttheirimagina tion. People imagine the world in which they live, the things they see, the culture they codesign and the religious tradition inwhichtheylive.Thecapacityforimaginationdevelopsgrad ually from childhood on. In the first years of a human being’s life,heorsheslowlydiscoversthattheoutsideworlddoesnot correspondwithoneself.Imaginationisanecessarytoolforget tingintocontactwiththisoutsideworld.3Boththecreativeand the interpreting aspects of imagination are needed. A child en countersallkindsofculturalobjects:language,art,culture,and religious symbols—all different products of the imagination. Humanbeingsmustlearntoexpressthemselvesbyusingthese kinds of imagination. Every human has to learn to shape and framewhatlifebrings.Oncepeoplehavelearnedtousetheirim aginationthisway,theycan,forexample,useculturalobjectscre ativelytoexpressgriefandtocopewithloss. ImaginationandCreationinReligionandArt Ialreadystatedabovethatreligioustraditionsappealtohuman imaginationandevenemergefromimagination.Thisdoesnot meanthatthereligioustraditionsaresimplyfigmentsofhuman imagination,forallourknowingisconnectedwithimagination, asIhaveshownwithreferencetoKantandJohnson.Inthissec tionIwilldiscusstherelationbetweenreligionandimagination

3 InspiredbythepsychologyofDonaldW.Winnicott,severalpsy chologistsofreligionviewreligioninthecontextofimagination(cf.Zock 1997:3148;JongsmaTieleman1996).Theseinterestingviews,generally based on psychoanalytical theories, are closely related to what I am arguinginthisarticlefromtheangleofphilosophyofreligion.Accord ingtoDickTieleman,however,imaginationisonlyaheuristisicinstru ment,awaytogivemeaningtotheChristiantraditionagain(Tieleman 2000).WithZockandJongsmaTieleman,Iamconvincedthatthefunc tionofimaginationismuchmorefundamental.Notonlydoesimagin ation sort out reality, but reality is knowable only through using the imagination.Imaginationisnotopposedto“concretefacts”butshapes theobservationanddescriptionoffacts.

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from the perspective of theology via the relationship between artandreligion.Myguidesinthisareaarethehistorianofreli gion Gerardus van der Leeuw and the philosopher Paul Moy aert. Aconceptthatplaysanimportantroleinbothreligionand artiscreation.ForVanderLeeuw,thecreativeworkoftheart ist is possible as recreation or giving form to reality. Because GodhasrevealedhimselfinChristintheformofahumanbe ing,itispossibleforhumanbeingstoexpressthemselvesinim ages.ThemovethatVanderLeeuwmakesisfromincarnation asredemptionorrecreationbacktocreationandforwardtoes chatology. The centre of a theology of the arts, for Van der Leeuw,mustbetheImage:thefactthatGodimagined.“Allart isimaginativeart.Butthesocalled“expressive”isthisinavery specialsense.Itisdominatedentirelybytheshape,theform.… Theformisthecentralprincipleofbothartandtheology”(Van der Leeuw 1955: 363). To form is to shape, and to create is to ascribemeaning.ThatiswhyVanderLeeuwcallsimagininga sacredact: We recall then that no reality can exist without existing as image,thatcreationandimageareverycloselyrelated.And werecallthatwebelievewecanseetheformofcreationre peated in the “creations.” God created, i.e. he formed …. (VanderLeeuw1955;364)

AlthoughVanderLeeuwdoesnotwanttoreduceeitherartor religiontotheother,hedoesseethattheycannotbeseparated from each other. “Religion seeks art repeatedly because it can notlivewithoutformandshape.Artalwaysstrivesforreligion as the broader and deeper current in which its waters can be emptied”(VanderLeeuw1955:209).Artisnotreligiousartifit hasareligioussubjectbutifitsintentionisreligious.Thecrea tionofanartistcannotbecomparedwiththecreationbyGod, for it is only a “faint reflection” of that (Van der Leeuw 1955: 370). That artists recreate reality certainly does not mean that theycopyorreproducereality.Tothecontrary,“Imaginationis representation and in that reproduction of power” (Van der Leeuw1955:177).Inanimagetheessenceofwhatisdepictedis presented,evenifthereisnoexternalsimilarityatallwithwhat

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isdepicted.Itis arealityalongsidecontinuingreality.Theim age stops the flow of life. The image is not a depiction or imi tation of nature but “reproduces the essence of what is depic ted; it personifies and represents a power (Barnard 2004: 67). Images can function as substitute representations of reality. Flowingandcontinuingrealitycanbeinfluencedbytheimage thathasanindependentexistence.Moyaertdescribesthatnice ly when he explains that it is not appropriate if someone else kisses the photo of someone beloved by me, or when he de monstratesthatthephotoofsomeonebelovedbymealsolimits thespacethispersonoccupies.Griefforalovedonewhoisno longer there can be omnipresent. By putting a photo some where, that loss is given a certain place whereby it no longer needstodeterminealloflife(Moyaert2007:152). Moyaert uses a term from phenomenology to refer to this process: he calls it the “incarnation of meaning.” The incarna tion of meaning is the phenomenon by which a sign shares in thepoweroftherealityrepresentedinthesign(Moyaert2007: 82).VanderLeeuwmentionstheexampleofthedollthatisde stroyed instead of the unfaithful lover. Icons too are examples of “complete images.” Christ himself is visible in an icon of Christ,justasthebreadandwinearetransformedintothebody and blood of Christ in the Eucharist the moment the priest in theRomanCatholictraditionspeaksthewordsofdedication.In thatsenseaniconissacramentalintheEasterntradition.Moy aertandVanderLeeuwshowthatimagesingeneralcanhave thatsacramentalsignificance.Ifthatissodependsontheinten tion of the artist, but primarily on the attitude of the viewer withrespecttotheimageinquestion.HereKantsepistemology returns. Together with the impression that the image evokes, theperceptionoftheviewerdetermineswhatisseen. Inthissense,imagesdonotexistforthemselvesbuthavea function.Theirfunctionistoinfluencereality. Imaginingisasacredactbecausetheyintendasecondreal itynexttothefirst,whichisconnectedessentiallywiththe first but is nonetheless a different one. And precisely that qualityofbeingan“other”makesimaginingareligiousact. (VanderLeeuw1955:176)

Peopletrytomouldcontinuingrealitytotheirwillinallkinds ofways.Bothartandreligionareattemptstorecreaterealityas

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given. “The possibility of life is explored and ‘empowered’ in cultusandculture”(Barnard2004:64).Thisobtainsnotonlyfor primitiveartandiconsbutalsoformodernart: … each true work of art points beyond its borders. Each trueworkofartisreligiousinthissense.Eachtrueworkof artbearstheseedofitsownelevationwithinitself.…Each true work of art is experienced as an incarnation of that whichisbeyondanddifferent”(VanderLeeuw1955:372)

Inthiswayartcanbeasymbolinwhichtworealitiescometo gether, that of the image and that of the imaged. The symbol canbreakopenthecloseddomaininwhichwelive.Thatiswhy “[t]hesymbolisnotdecoration,isnotsuperfluous.Thesymbol ismoftheliturgybreaksaclosedworldviewopentoGodand makesGodpresent”(Barnard2004:86).Withoutliturgy,with outcultusandthuswithoutimagination,thatbreakingopenis impossible. Art, even modern art, can help in that breaking openofreality. TheExhibitPolicyattheDomChurch4 The exhibit committee has existed since the opening of the re storedDomChurchinUtrecht,theNetherlandsin1986andex hibitshavebeenheld.Therehasalsobeendiscussionsincethe openingonwhat,how,andwhy.Documentsonandconnected withtheopeningoftheDomChurchdiscussexhibitsonsocial themes,ontherestoration,onthearchitecture.Suchexhibitsare heldinthechurchandarealsoownedbytheDomChurch.At thesametime,therearealsodiscussionsonmodernartshows. InanissueofthemagazineKerkvoogdijfrom1970Rev.vander Werf,thefirstministeroftheCityPastorateoftheDomChurch remarks:“Worksofartareintendedtoteachthevisitorstosee what they do not yet see.” Regnerus Steensma, professor of churcharchitectureandchurchuse,haswrittenagreatdealon the church and (modern) art. In 1990 he wrote a series of ar ticles in the periodical of the Reformed Church in Utrecht on,

4

Thissectionistakenfromthepolicydocumentsoftheexhibitcom mitteethatI,aschairpersonofthiscommittee,wroteinthesummerof 2008.

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among other things, experiences with temporary exhibits in churches. Oneshouldbeawarethatacertainprocessissetinmotion when works of art are placed in a church that claim to be morethandecorationsoftheareaandwanttogobeyonda mere illustration of biblical history. Then churchgoers can get the impression that there has been an invasion of the spaceandritualswithwhichtheyarefamiliar.Theworkof artcanbeexperiencedasaFremdkörper,foritdemandsex plicitattentionastowhatthisisactuallyintendedforwith respect to what is done is on the altar or on the pulpit.… Morethanoncetheworkofarttouchesasorespotand,in general,thatisnotpleasant.…Theworkofartcanquestion establishedtruthsandviewsandthatmakespeopleuncer tain.Inprinciple,aworkofartcandothesameinamuse umorgallery,butthatdoesnotbyalongshothavetohave suchastrongeffect:itisaneutralenvironment.…

In other publications Steensma points out that the relation betweenchurchandmodernartalwaysconcernsanencounter between two autonomous partners (cf. e.g. Steensma 1987). Church and art are two separate parties that every now and then enter into conversation with each other (de Wal 2002: 24 40).IntheDomChurchtheycanmeet.Neitherartnorchurchis apartnerthatissoautonomousthatithasnothingtosaytothe other. They are independent parties that converse with each otherassoonasartexhibitsinchurchcomeup. What then does the autonomous party to say to the church? What does the church want art to say to it? What do they want to have said to them? It can be that the churches wanttolistentowhatishappeningoutsidethechurchviacon temporaryart.Itcanbethattheywanttolearnviaartistswhat questions, difficulties, fears and joys people have outside the churchwalls.Ontheotherhand,exhibitscanbeacallingcard forchurchesif,forexample,thequestionsart(ists)evoke(s)are recognized. Hans Kronenburg, a former minister of the City PastorateoftheDomChurch,wroteinanoldHandreiking(aid) that,throughworkingintheDomChurchhehasgainedmore ofaneyefortheimageofBabelandJerusalem.

226 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Arthistorianshave,afterall,madeitcleartousthataGoth iccathedralremindsusofthecityofGodintheRevelation ofJohn,whereitisnottheemperorandthoseinpowerwho determine the service but the Lamb and his disciples, the victims of violence, and the martyrs. To keep that vision alive—everything that could be done and experienced in thechurchintheMiddleAgeswasputinservicetothat:the liturgy,themusic,thearts,thedistributionofbreadamong thepoor,theburialofthedead.

Hewritesthathefindsitachallengetomakesomethingofthat visionvisibleintheDomChurchandtokeepitalive(Kronen burg1995). Thesequestionsandremarksarestillrelevantin2009.Why doestheDomChurchhaveanexhibitcommitteethatwantsto holdexhibitsinthechurch?Firstofall,itdoesnotwanttohold exhibits all the time nor is it necessary to do so. The church is notamuseumandisattractiveenoughonitsown.Ifthereare exhibits then they must be good and have something to say. ThestartingpointforexhibitsintheDomChurchcanbesocie tal, religious, social and of current interest. Exhibitions can in terpret or comment on (aspects of) the Christian tradition or theycanexpressthefeelingsofthetimeinamoregeneralway. Assuch,artcanhaveapropheticfunction.Itisnotbecauseex hibits must show something beautiful but that what it evokes matters. The exhibited work must display a vision that can be shared.Thatvisiondoesnothavetobesharedbythemembers ofthecommittee,thechurchcouncilorthecongregation,butit mustbeauthentic. The exhibit committee sets up exhibits based on its own vision. Here reactions from others are not of primary im portance. Opposition is not bad; caution yields “middle of the road” exhibits and such do not have any place in the Dom Church.Theexhibitsmustmakeonethink—eithertheviewers oremployeesoftheOpenDomorthechurchgoers. TheDomChurchisanopenchurch,notamuseum.Itisa livingbuildingwithalonghistorythatisvisibleinandonthe structureitself.Animportantfunctionofthisbuildingisthatis itisahavenintheheartofthecity.Peoplecanmeetoneanoth er and their Creator. As a Protestant church, the church build ing is simply a place where church services can be celebrated.

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ButasaGothiccathedralthechurchbreathesthesphereoflight and space. It is not sacramental, but it can be called so. The architecture gives it a air that invites one to repentance and tranquility. Exhibits can be a means to contribute to what the church has to say in a contemporary way, or it can provide insight into or commentary on current trends and develop ments.Asalivingchurch,theDomChurchwantstoengagethe arts. Artists are sometimes partners in this, sometimes mirrors andsometimessoundingboards.Thus,wedonotaskiftheart isChristianornot.Wesimplyaskifithassomethingtosayto us.5 Ifanexhibitionhassomethingtosaytothecongregation,it wouldbeniceifitwouldhaveabroaderfunctionthansimplya beautification of the church. The exhibit committee takes the churchyearintoaccountinitschoices.Elementsoftheexhibits cansometimesplayaroleperhapsinthedifferentcelebrations intheDomChurch. TwoExamplesofExhibitionsintheDomChurchinUtrecht Inthefallof2008theexhibit“LastigePortretten”(Troublesome Portraits) could be seen in the Dom Church. Twelve lifesize portraits of (ex)homeless people stared penetratingly at the viewers when they entered the church. Twelve contemporary apostles who, one by one, asked the visitor: Why do you see me now but not when I’m standing outside with the Straat krant? In this case the artist was the prophet who constantly asked the congregation if they did see the other if he or she werenotpresentedlifesizedinthechurch. The intention of the artist and the Dom Church as the organisationhostingtheexhibitwastoexposealargepublicto the homeless in a way that broke through the stereotype. In connection with this exhibit the artist published a book, in co operation with the Catharijnehuis, a walkin centre in Utrecht, containing prints of the paintings, the life stories of those por trayedandvariousarticlesontheproblemofhomelessness.

5

 Here I agree with Wessel Stoker’s proposal to see the relation betweenartandreligionascorrelation.Cf.Stoker2006.

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The twelve portraits each tell their own story. “It can happen to anyone …,” one of the subjects said. That indicates that the line between sleeping in a bed and sleeping under a bridgeissometimesverythin.Manybiographiesintheaccom panyingbookformthelivingevidenceofthis.

   Theexhibitionopenedon5September2008.TheactorPe ter Faber, who had been homeless himself for a period in his youth, performed the opening. An alderman of the city of U trecht offered the subjects a copy of the book and one of them toldherlifestory.The“LastigePortretten”werepaintedbythe graphicdesignerandportraitpainterWimdeHaas.Theexhibit was an initiative by De Haas in cooperation with the Dagop vangUtrechtFoundation,theCatherijnehuisandtheCityPas torateoftheDomChurch. ThisexhibitcametotheDomChurchattheinitiativeofthe artist. He was already in contact with the Catherijnehuis and tookupcontactwiththechurch,whichwasenthusiasticabout this exhibit. The idea of hanging the portraits on the pillars in the choir aisle was the artist’s and he hung them himself. He tookcareoftheopening.FortheDomChurch,thisexhibitwas agreatsuccessinaverysimpleway.Itisalwaysdifficulttoes timate how many people will come to see an exhibition, be causetheDomChurchisalwaysopen.Butitcanbestatedthat there were a great many more visitors in that period in 2008 thantherewereinthesameperiodin2007.Theguestbookfor theexhibitcontainsmanyfavourablecomments. As a whole, the “Lastige Portretten” exhibit illustrates the position of Van der Leeuw and Moyaert. The portraits are not reproductionsofthefacesofthesepeoplebutrepresentthere

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alityofhomelessness.Theygiveformtothetaskofthechurch to care for and provide shelter for the widow, orphan, and stranger.6Inthissensethe“LastigePortretten”(itisnotforno thing that they number twelve) can be seen as modern icons. The reality of life on the street breaks through. The people whomvisitorstothechurchnormallydonotseearepresent— not only their portraits but they themselves. They themselves arethereandlookatthevisitor.Theythereforemakeanurgent appeal to the visitor. Some Cubans who visited the church during this exhibit thought that the portraits of the homeless wereportraitsofsaints.Thatwasnotsuchastrangeconclusion, giventheperspectiveofthepaintingsandhowtheywerehung. In 2009 during Lent up until Easter the Dom Church hostedanexhibitofcontemporaryartonsufferingandEaster, an exhibit that was of a very different nature than that of the “LastigePortretten.”Thisexhibitwasputtogetherbytheexhib itcommitteeitself.Onememberofthecommitteeisacquainted withmanycontemporaryartiststhroughherworkasanarthis torianandjournalist.Sheapproachedthemwiththequestionif theywouldliketoparticipateinagroupexhibitonthethemeof suffering, dying and resurrection around Easter in the Dom Church. Almost all the artists approached responded immedi atelyinapositiveway.Aprojectplanwassetup,asubsidyap pliedfor,andtheexhibitionwasrealised. The title of the exhibition was: “Verloochening en Belofte, HedendaagsekunstrondlijdenenPasen”(DenialandPromise: Contemporary Art on Suffering and Easter). The artists who participated were: Jac Bisschops, Jes van der Bijl, Paul van DongenandMarcMulders,GijsFrieling,GeorgeMeertens,Jan peter Muilwijk and Lefteris Olympios. These eight contemp oraryartistsprovidedworksthathadtodowiththethemesof theStationsoftheCrossandEaster.7Toagreatextent,theseare artworksthatwerecreatedspeciallyforthisoccasion,whichled

6 Foragoodanalysisofhowartcandothissee,inadditiontoVan derLeeuwandMoyaert,Ricoeuraswell(1995:14466). 7

Fortheworksofartinthisexhibitionsee:http://www.trouw.nl/ nieuws/religiefilosofie/article2063177.ece/Eigenzinnige_kruisweg staties.html.

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toaquitevariedexhibition,bothinstyleandvisuallanguageas wellasintechniqueandchoiceofsubject. The artists often no longer illustrate the Bible story but re flect in their own style, based on their own vision, true to theirownthemeandonthebasisofabroadandoftencur rent religious involvement on the spirit of Easter (de Wal 2009).

It is autonomous art in the sense that the artists themselves chose the theme and its implementation without any instruc tionsfromthechurchoranyothergroup. TheexhibitopenedonSundayafternoon,1Marchandwas opened by an art historian and the Dom cantor. A small cata logueoftheexhibitwasprinted(DeJong2009). Comparedwith“LastigePortretten,”thisexhibitwasmore controversial.The“LastigePortretten”weremoreaccessiblebe cause they were figurative paintings and formed more of a unity.Theunityof“VerloocheningenBelofte”hadtobesought bytheviewerherselftoagreatextent.Thevisuallanguagewas quite varied, which had an alienating effect for some visitors. Withrespecttopublicity,thisexhibitwas,justlike“LastigePor tretten,” a great success. Each week, for seven weeks, a work of art from this exhibition was included in the City Pastorate’s own digital Lenten calendar. Among other things, the daily Trouw reported on this exhibit. In addition, the artworks ap peared weekly on the website www.trouw.nl with a short ex planation. The text “In the Protestant Dom Church in Utrecht the Stations of the Cross are given an entirely contemporary significance. Eight artists imagine Jesus’ path of suffering in a personalwayfortheexhibition’VerloocheningenBelofte’”was placedabovetheworkofartthatwastobediscussed,byway ofintroduction.Justaswiththe“LastigePortretten,”realitycan bebrokenthroughviatheseworksofart.Theviewermustin deed put more effort into it here, because the image are less obvious.Whichrealitybreaksthroughhere? ConcludingRemarks InthisarticleIhaveshownthatartandchurchstillhavesome thingtosaytoeachotherin2009.Inbothreligionandinartim aginationplaysanimportantrole.Notonlyinthecreativepro

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cessofcreationbutalsoinviewingart,injudgingworksofart andinthegenesisofreligiousknowledge.Theepistemological andcreativeaspectsofthepowerofimaginationmeetinthere ligious life and in the experience of art. That is why it is good that art and the church attempt to stay in conversation with each other and to confront each other with each others final questions.IntheDomChurchexhibitscouldplayagreaterrole in the liturgy. Then, perhaps something of the reality that breaksthroughintheimageswouldbecomevisibletochurch goers. Bibliography Barnard, M. (2004). De dans kan niet sterven: Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890–1950)herlezen.Zoetermeer:Meinema. and E. Postma. (2007). “Het ludieke en het rituele: Johan Huiz inga’sHomoLudensherlezen.”TheologischDebat4:414. Boon, M., and P.H. Steenhuis. (2009). Filosofie van het Kijken: Kunst in anderperspectief.Rotterdam:Lemniscaat. Descartes,R.(1993).DiscourseontheMethodofRightlyConductingOnes ReasonandofSeekingTruthintheSciences.(http://www.gutenberg. org/ebooks/59). Feuerbach, L. (1973). Das Wesen des Christentum. Ludwig Feuerbach Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 5.  Ed. Werner Schuffenhauer. Berlin: AkademieVerlag. Green, G. (2000). Theology, Hermeneutics and Imagination: The Crisis of InterpretationattheEndofModernity.Cambridge:CambridgeUni versityPress. DeJong,L.(2009).VerloocheningenBelofte:Hedendaagsekunstrondlijden en Pasen: Jac Bisschops, Jes van der Bijl, Paul van Dongen & Marc Mulders, Gijs Frieling, George Meertens, Janpeter Muilwijk, Lefteris Olympios.ProduceerdbyStichtingDocete;printedbyDenBlijde Haan,Nijeveen. DeHaas,W.,A.Hacquebord,A.,andR.Mol.(2008).LastigePortretten: Dakloosheidinbeeld.Rhenen:DeHaasGrafischOntwerp. De Wal, J. (2009). Lecture at the opening of “Verloochening en Be lofte.”TheDomChurch,Utrecht(1March).Unpublished. (2002). Kunst zonder kerk: Nederlandse beeldende kunst en religie, 19451990.Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress. Huizinga, J. (1997). Homo Ludens: Proeve ener bepaling van het spelele mentdercultuur.Amsterdam:Pandora.

232 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason. Chicago/London: The University of Chi cagoPress. JongsmaTieleman, P.E. (1996). Godsdienst als speelruimte voor verbeel ding:Eengodsdienstpsychologischestudie.Kampen:Kok. Jonkers, P. (2002). “Illusory Imagination versus Nihilistic Reason: A HistoricalPhilosophicalCaseStudyoftheRoleofImaginationin Religion.”www.arsdisputandi.org2. Kant, I. (1929). Critique of Pure Reason. Transl. Norman Kemp Smith, Houndmills:PalgraveMacmillan. Kearney, R. (1988). The Wake of Imagination: Toward a Postmodern Cul ture.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress. Kronenburg,H.(1995)Handreiking:KerkbladvanhetCitypastoraatDom kerk(September). Moyaert, P. (2007). Iconen en beeldverering: Godsdienst als symbolische praktijk.Amsterdam:UitgeverijSUN. Phillips,D.Z.(1991,2006).FromFantasytoFaith:Morality,Religionand TwentiethCenturyLiterature.London:SCMPress. Plato. (1921). The Republic. Plato in Twelve Volumes. Vol. 12. Transl. HaroldN.Fowler.Cambridge/London:HarvardUniversityPress/ WilliamHeinemannLtd. Ricoeur,P.(1995).“TheBibleandtheImagination.”In:FiguringtheSa cred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination. Transl. David Pellauer. Ed.MarkI.Wallace.Minneapolis:FortressPress.Pp.14466. Steensma,R.(1990).HervormdUtrecht.Vol.46(20July). (1987).Indespiegelvanhetbeeld:Kerkenmodernekunst.Baarn:Ten Have. Stoker,W.(2006).God,Meesterindekunsten:Eenherwegingvandetheo logischeesthethiek.InauguralLecture.VUUniversityAmsterdam. Tieleman, D. (2000). Leven met verbeelding: Betekenisverandering van ge loofengodsdienstineenpostmodernecultuur.Kampen:Kok. Van der Leeuw, G. (1955). Wegen en Grenzen: Een studie over de ver houding van religie en kunst. 3rd reprint. Revised by E.L. Smelik. Amsterdam:H.J.Paris. Warnock, M. (1976). Imagination. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress. Zock, H. (1997). “Religie als transitioneel fenomeen: Het belang van Winnicott voor de godsdienstpsychologie.” Nederlands Theolo gischTijdschrift51:3148.

Language,Literature,andTranscendence TheContributionofF.R.Leavis HenryJansen

Abstract Thisessaybeginsbyrelatingcurrentinterestintranscendencetothediscussion onthesimilaritiesbetweenreligiouslanguageandpoeticlanguage.Itthenasks ifthediscussionneednotgofurther,i.e.intoanexplorationofthespiritual valuescontainedinthelanguageofanywrittenwork.Thefirstsectioncompares thelanguageoftwo“confessional”documentstodrawattentiontothedifferent waysbothreligioustextsworkintermsoflanguageininvokingasenseoftrans cendence.ItthenexploresthepossiblecontributionbyF.R.Leavis,atwentieth centuryliterarycritic,toresolvingtheproblemsthiscomparisonraises,explor inghisviewoflanguageandreligioninthenextsectionandanalyzingtwocen tralthemesinhisthought:thetechnologicoBenthamiteapproachanddisso ciationofsensibilityinthetwosubsequentsections.Theessaythenlooksatthe applicationoftheseconcernstothethemeoftranscendence.

Introduction Thenotionoftranscendenceisagaingaininginterestinacademic circles.1Forscholarsworkingintheologicalaestheticsoranycom binationofaestheticsandreligiousstudies/interests,thisdevel opmentissignificant.Thisdiscussionbearsonanotherdiscussion that has been going on for some time: the similarities between religiouslanguageandthelanguageofliterature,similaritiesthat havelongbeenrecognizedintheologyandphilosophyofreligion. TheviewofScriptureandreligiouslanguagethatdevelopedand gainedimmensegroundduringthelatterpartofthetwentiethcen turyisthatofScriptureasart,asliteratureofthehighestcalibre. That,combinedwiththeideathatpoetryorliteraturehasaspe cialpurchaseonreligiouslanguage,ortheevenstrongerclaimin

1

Cf.forinstance,Schwartz2004;Steiner1989;Stoker2008and2009; Taylor1992. 233

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the postRomantic period that art is a substitute for religion, bringsthequestionoftranscendenceinartandtheologyhome. Whatistherelationbetweenpoetry/literatureandlanguageand transcendence?Doespoetryprovideuswithakindofpseudo religionorevenasubstituteforreligion? Thesequestionshavebeenansweredinvariousways.But howisonetoviewthisrelation,especiallygiventhecurrentthink ing among many theologians about the nature of religious language?Manyargueorseemtoargueforaspecialqualityfor religious language, contrasting it with the language of science. Whereasthelatterisobjectiveandfactual,religiouslanguageis evocative,metaphorical,akintothelanguageofpoetry.Religious language’spurchaseontranscendenceisaffordedbythefactthat itisevocativeinnature.Severalquestionsarisehere.Thefirstis ifthisisinfacttrue.Isthe“poetic”natureofreligiouslanguage enoughtoevokethetranscendent?Moreimportantly,perhaps, onecouldaskifthecurrent—andinmyviewcorrect—opposition between religious and scientific language goes far enough. Is therenotamorefundamentaldistinctionthatneedstobedrawn, i.e.thatbetweenlanguagethatpromotes“spiritualvalues”and language that does not? This is, in effect, the question of tran scendencewithrespecttolanguage. Iwouldliketoexplorethesequestionsbylookingatthework and thought of F.R. Leavis (18951978), a highly original and controversialliterarycriticatCambridgeUniversityforseveral decadesfromthe1920suntilthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcen tury.2Leavisarousedgreatoppositionbutalsoacertainfollowing duringhisyearsofactivitybybeing,forinstance,anearlycham pionofT.S.EliotandD.H.Lawrence.Butmuchmoresignificant for our purposes was his view of English literature and its “religious”quality.Leavisdidnottakethestandardviewofliter atureorpoeticlanguageas“religious”ortranscendentassuch. Butinhisviewitdidhaveatranscendentquality,andthatisthe qualitythatwewanttoexploreinthiscontribution.Leavishad andstillhasanimportantcontributiontomaketothisissueand currenttheologicaldiscussioncanbenefitfromhisreflections.

2

Despitehavingdiedin1978,Leavisstillremainsaforceinliterary criticism.HisworkshaverecentlybeenrepublishedbyIvanR.Dee,Inc., Publisher(ElephantPaperbacks)inChicago.

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Wewillfirstexplorethequestionofreligiouslanguagein moredetail.WewillthenexplorewhatLeavismayhavetocon tributetoaresolutionoftheproblembylookingatvariousas pectsofhisapproach.Followingthat,wewilllookmoreclosely atLeavis’understandingoflanguageandhow,inhisview,lang uageconveysasenseoftranscendence. TwoExamplesofReligiousLanguage Iwillnowlookattwoexamplesofreligiouslanguage.Thesetwo examplesaredrawnfromtheconfessionalandsemiconfessional documentsoftheChristianReformedChurchofNorthAmerica. Iwillbeengagingincritiqueoftheseconddocument,butthis critiqueisinnowayintendedtobenortobeusedasacriticalre flectiononanydoctrinalpositionsthatareexpressedinthedocu ment or the theology espoused by the Christian Reformed Church.3Itisintendedtopointtocertainfactorsintheauthors’ abilitytoexpressthemselvesinasuitablyconvincingwaytheolo gically.Giventhecommonunderstandingofwhatreligiouslang uageis,overagainstthelanguageofscience,wewouldexpect bothexamplestobesimilarlyevocative—and,toacertainextent, theyare.Butisthatenoughtodescribethem,orarethereareoth ercriteriathatweneedtotakeintoquestion? ThefirstexampleistakenfromTheHeidelbergCatechism. Letuslookatthefirstquestionandanswer.Thefirstquestion asks:“Whatisyouronlycomfortinlifeandindeath?”Thean swerreads: ThatIamnotmyown,butbelong—bodyandsoul,inlifeand indeath—tomyfaithfulSaviorJesusChrist.Hehasfullypaid forallmysinswithhispreciousblood,andhassetmefree fromthetyrannyofthedevil.Healsowatchesovermeinsuch awaythatnotahaircanfallfrommyheadwithoutthewillof myFatherinheaven,infactallthingsmustworktogetherfor

3 Theyareexamplesofpublicdocumentsofreligiouslanguagein EnglishthatIknowbest.Thefirstexample—fromTheHeidelbergCate chism—has confessional status, of course, for many churches in the Reformedtradition.Ishouldaddthatthisismyownattemptatsuch analysis.Foramuchmoreextended,insightfulandthoroughcompar isonofvariousinstancesof“religiouslanguage”seeRobinson1975.

236 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE my salvation. Because I belong to him, Christ, by his Holy Spirit,assuresmeofeternallifeandmakesmewholeheartedly willingandreadyfromnowontoliveforhim.4

Itisapparentthatthisanswerismakingastatement.Butitgoes beyondsimplythat,assumingthecharacterofaconfessionbe causeofitsobviousevocativequality—itevokesthetranscendent (thusplacingitamongexamplesofpoeticlanguage)throughits languageandstyle.Theevocativenatureofthisconfessioniscon veyednotonlybythepersonallanguage(“I,”“own”)—forwhich thisconfessioniswellknown—butalsobythewayinwhichitis composed,despiteitsbeingatranslation.5The“bodyandsoul,in lifeandindeath,“whichissetoffbydashesandconstructedina neatparallelism,interruptsthesentenceandaddssubstanceand emphasistothe“belong.”Theinterjectionhadtooccurhere:it followsnaturallyfrom“belong”becausethebelievermuststress this. It is not a cold, calculated answer but an answer of faith, whichiswhyitalsoreadsnaturally.Thereaderhastheimpres sionthatthetranslator/writerofthispassagewasnotconcerned withbeingpoetic,withbeingevocativebutsolelyconcernedwith expressingthetruthashesawit.Thereaderthusgetsthesense that this was the deepfelt belief of the person who trans lated/wrotethistext.Theechoingofbiblicallanguageaddstothis evocativequality.Onegetstheimpressionofthe“truthfulness”of these expressions because that was how the authors believed it—inthosetermsandwiththatpassion.Itisthroughthatlang uagethattheyweretaughttoexperience,tofeeltheirfaith.The “tyrannyofthedevil,”forinstance,wasexperiencedas“tyranny,” i.e. as bondage to sin, and such an expression came naturally becauseoftheexperienceatthetimeofreligiousandpoliticalty 4

ThistranslationistakenfromthePsalterHymnal,publishedbythe ChristianReformedChurch(GrandRapids)in1987. 5

Thefactthatoneisworkingwithatranslationcouldbeahamper ingfactorinitself,since,notonlyinadditiontotheregularproblems concerningtranslations,hereonecouldalsoaskifthequalityofthereli gious/poetic language is sufficiently reflected in the translation. But translationsofTheHeidelbergCatechismhavebeeninexistenceforsev eralcenturies.Therecomesapointinreligiousdocumentswherethe translations,liketheKingJamesVersion,beginstolivea“poetic”orlit erarylifeoftheirown.

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rantsatthattime.Itisbecauseofthis“truthfulness,”Ibelieve,that this confession still carries force, even if people in the con temporaryperiodmaydisagreewithsomeorallofitstheology. Mysecondexampleisdrawnfromadocumentapprovedby theChristianReformedSynodin1986as“acontemporarytesti mony,”entitled“OurWorldBelongstoGod”(alsopublishedin thePsalterHymnal).Thefirstarticleofthepreamblereads: AsfollowersofJesusChrist, livinginthisworld— whichsomeseektocontrol, butwhichothersviewwithdespair— wedeclarewithjoyandtrust: OurworldbelongstoGod!

Thispassagecontainsthesamepersonallanguageandthelang uageofbelongingfoundinTheHeidelbergCatechism.Itisreplete withreligiouslanguageandonewouldexpectittobeevocativein thesamewaythatthefirstanswerofTheHeidelbergCatechism isevocative.Butthepassage,bothreligiousandostensiblypoetic and intended to be a rousing introduction to not only the pre amble but to the document as a whole, falls flat. This happens becausethepieceasawholeseemstobeengagedmoreinanexer ciseofstatingapositionthanconfessing. Acertaindistancefromtheworldbecomesimmediatelyap parent:“AsfollowersofJesusChrist,/livinginthisworld.”One wantstoask:WhereelsewouldthefollowersofJesusChristbe living?(Iftheyarelivinginheaventheconfessionisunnecessary.) Onesuspectsthatabridgewasneededfortheclause“whichsome seek…despair“setoffbydashes.Butthisclauseitselfraisessev eralquestions.Why,forinstance,thedashes?Thepointexpressed hereseemstobecentraltothedocumentasawholebuthereit seems to be given secondary status. It does not seem to add emphasistoanythinginthisfirstarticle.Ifitaddsemphasisatall, itseemstodosobywayofcontrasttowhat“we”do(declarewith joyandtrust).Butthesethreeattitudes(despairandcontrolover against joy and trust) are not stated as parallel views. Further more,thestructureseemstoleadtosomethingofaholierthan thouattitude:somewanttocontroltheworldandothersviewit withdespair,but“we”....Inotherwords,“we”havetherightatti tude.Wouldnotacontemporarytestimonywanttoconfessthat

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“we”areincludedamongthosewhowanttocontroltheworld andalsoamongthosewhodespair?Whydopeopledespair?Why dotheywantcontrol?Arethesenotimpulsespresentineachone ofus?Allofuswantcontrol;allofusdespair,yetmanyofusstill declarethatourworldbelongstoGod. This sense of separation, of distance, continues. Article 3 reads: Butrebelcriessoundthroughtheworld: some,crushedbyfailure orhardenedbypain, giveuponlifeandhopeandGod; others,shaken, butstillhopingforhumantriumph, workfeverishlytorealizetheirdreams. AsbelieversinGod wejointhisstruggleofthespirits, testingourtimesbytheSpirit’ssureWord.

 Hereagainadistinctionismadebetweensome,othersand“us,” “believersinGod.”Whatexactlyis“thisstruggleofthespirits,” andhowdoesitqualifyorclarifythepredicates”workfeverishly torealizetheirdreams”or“giveuponlifeandhopeandGod.” Thetextsuggeststhereisaconnectionbutdoesnotadequately definewhatthisconnectionis.Further,whatisthefunctionhere of“testingourtimesbytheSpirit’ssureWord”?Hereagainthear ticlefailstorecognizeandarticulatethecontradictionspresentin and the lived experience of every individual. As “believers in God,”wetoogiveuponlifeandhopeandworkfeverishlytoreal izeourdreams.Moreover,whythemovefrom“followersofJesus Christ”to“believersinGod”?Doesthelatterrefer to orimply somethingmoregeneral,applicableto“all”believers? Oneofthemajorreasonsforthefailureofthistestimonyto capturetheimaginationisthatitreliestoomuchonclichés.Asa resultthelanguagebecomesvagueandflat.Wedonotknowwhat to do with terms like “dreams” or how to understand them. Anothermajorreasonisthat,althoughthetextincludesfootnotes tobiblicaltexts,ititselfdoesnotcontainbiblicallanguage.This wasprobablyadeliberatechoicebythewriters,inordertocon nectwiththoseoutsidetheChristianfaith.Bethatasitmay,the useofvaguelanguagedoesnothelpmatters.

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Whatthisbriefcomparisondemonstratesisthatitisnote noughsimplytocomparereligious/poeticlanguagetoscientific languagetounderstandtheconnectionoftranscendencetoreli giouslanguage.Somereligiouslanguage,despiteitsbeingclearly religious,doesnotevokemuchoftranscendencebutfallsflaton theear.Thequestionarises:Dowenotneedmorethanadistinc tionbetweenscientificandreligious/poeticlanguageinorderto arriveatanotionofhowlanguagecangiveasenseofthetran scendent?WewillnowlookatthethinkingofF.R.Leavisonthis issue.WewillfirstexploreLeavis’owndealingwiththeterm“re ligion”anditsroleinliteraturebeforeturningtoabroaderdis cussionofhisconcerns. LeavisonReligionandLanguage:EliotandBunyan T.S.EliotisprobablytheforemostChristianpoetofthetwentieth century,althoughhedidnotbeginhisadultliterarycareerasa Christian.ItwaslaterinhislifethathebecameaChristianand begantoreflectthisinhiscreativeworkasapoetinpoemssuch asFourQuartetsandplayslikeTheCocktailParty.HisChristian worksareoftenreadasliteraryexplorationsofChristianfaith.In TheOxfordCompaniontoEnglishLiterature,forinstance,weread thatFourQuartets“succeededincommunicatinginmodernidiom thefundamentalsofChristianfaithandexperience”(Drabble1985: 364),withoutfurthereludicatingwhatthisclaimisintendedto mean. But that is precisely the point: How do the collection of poemsknownastheFourQuartetscommunicatethesefundamen tals?Dotheyexpresstheminadiscursivewayorina“poetic” way? Does reading these poems add to our experience of the Christianfaithinanyway,ourexperienceofthetranscendent?Do theyconveythesefundamentalsinawaythattranscendenceis evoked? Moreover, expressed in the way the Oxford Companion putsit,thesepoemssoundpedanticandworksforwhichthepo etryassuchhassecondarystatus.Onecanthereforelegitimately ask:Onwhatleveldothepoemsfunctionasreligiouspoetryand whatistheirgeneralfunctionasreligiouspoetry? LeavismayhaveagreedwiththeOxfordCompanionthatFour Quartets communicated “in modern idiom the fundamentals of Christianfaithandexperience.”Indeed,hedidhaveahighregard forEliotasagreatpoetanddidarguethatthesepoemswereim

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portant(Leavis1979c).6Thus,hisviewofFourQuartetsisinone sensepositive.ButhewouldnothavecalledFourQuartetssuccess fulinthesamewaythattheOxfordCompaniondid.Infact,itis questionableifhewould,intheend,havecalledthem“success ful.”Hefeltthattheywerefailureswithrespecttotheirabilityto portrayasenseofthetranscendent. His problem with Eliot on this score is that whereas Eliot wantstoevokethe“reallyreal,”“[t]heultimatereallyrealthatEli otseeksinFourQuartetsiseternalreality,andthathecandolittle, directly,tocharacterize”(Leavis1998a:175).Referringtothefol lowinglinesfrom“BurntNorton,”“Exceptforthepoint,thestill point,/Therewouldbenodance,andthereisonlythedance,” Leavis goes on to argue that these lines and the poem cannot evoketheideaofthetranscendentthattheyaremeantto: The“stillpoint”exceptforwhichtherewouldbenodanceis notnowjust“thestillpoint”oftheopeningphraseofthepara graph.That,thoughastrikingparadox,issimplyforthecos micscopeofthesuggestion,theevokedobservablefactofthe everydayphysicalworld.(Leavis1998a:17576)

ForLeavis,theimageryfailstoevokeanythingtranscendent;the onlythingitevokesistheeverydayphysicalworldtowhichit refers. Theissue,forLeavis,isthatintheendFourQuartetsbecomes nothingmorethansimplysayingandstatingwhatEliottakesto bethetruth.Thisiswhythepoemsfailtoconvince.Accordingto Leavis,whenEliotfailsasapoet,hefailsbecauseheturnstostat ingsomethinginsteadofpresentingit: Eliot’smodeofimpartinghissense[in“LittleGidding”]that the pentecostal theme is for him of central importance is in essenceoneofmerestatement—statementsoinsistentasfairly tobecalledemphaticassertion.(Leavis1998a:252)

Eliot’slanguagechangesinsuchacase,Leavisargues,fromthe languageofpoetrytoastatementofhowthingsare.Apparently, hecannotsayinpoetrywhathewantstosay.This,Leavisasserts, isnotaquestionofEliot’sabilityasapoetbutofhisattitudeto wardtheworldandhisconsequent(in)abilitytoexpresswhathe

6

Wewilldiscussthisbelow.

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wantstoexpress.Onthefirstpoint,LeavisarguesthatEliot’s“fear oflifeandcontempt(whichincludesselfcontempt)forhumanity” (Leavis1998a:205)isoperativehere.Eliothasretreatedfromlife and,asaresult,hisconceptionofothernessisstrippedofevery humanattributeandthusbecomesanonentity: Infact,aconceptionofpurenonhumanothernesscanhardly beaconception;itcanbenomorethantheghostofone—a merepostulate.ThespaceclearedfortheOtherbytheelimin ationofallthat“humankind”canrecognizeaslife,valueand significanceisavacuum;nothingislefttoqualifyit.(Leavis 1998a:245)

AccordingtoLeavis,Eliot’sattempttoconvey“otherness”endsin a vacuum because there is nothing to tie it to life. The second aspectinvolvedhere,i.e.Eliot’sinabilitytoexpresswhathewants toexpress,istiedtothefirst.Becauseofhisfearoflife,thetrans cendenteludeshismeansofexpression.Heneedslifetoexpress transcendence,andthat,inLeavis’view,hedoesnothave.7Eliot failsinconveyingasenseofthetranscendentbecauseofhis“fear oflife.“ ButLeavisdoesfindagoodexpressionofthetranscendentin someonewhomonewouldexpecttofindthesame“fearoflife”: JohnBunyan,theseventeenthcenturyPuritanwriterofThePil grim’s Progress. Given most popular views of Puritanism, this wouldnotbethelogicalplacetolook.Nonetheless,thisiswhere Leavistakesus.RespondingtoapossibleobjectionthatBunyanis concernedwitheternalliferatherthanlifeonearth,hewrites: thesenseoftheeternalconveyedbyThePilgrim’sProgressand coming from the whole man (“trust the tale”, as Lawrence said,notthewriter)isnomerematterofalifegoingonandon foreverthatstartsafterdeath.Itisasenseofadimensionfelt intheearthlylife—inwhatforusislife,makingthissome thingthattranscendsthetimesuccession,transienceandevan escenceandgivessignificance.(Leavis1967:47)

7

Cf.Leavis1979a:144:“Eliot’spoetryhasn’tarichhumanexperi encebehindit.Itreveals,rather,arestriction;itcomes,indeed,outofa decidedpoverty.”

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Thispassageprovidescluesastowhy,inLeavis’eyes,Bunyan succeededandEliotdidnot.Centraltothispassageisthenotion oflife.IfEliotwasfullofselfcontemptandhatredoflife,itispre ciselylifethatonefindsinBunyan.First,Bunyanwritesfroma closeobservationoflife,“itstruthanddepth,”reflected,forexam ple,inhisrenderingofconversations(Leavis1967:4143).Second, the enjoyment of this life was part of the Puritan ethos. The Puritansparticipatedreadilyinthehumaneartsandgracesand “Theplaceofmusic,dancing,andthesocialpleasuresofthetable intheSecondPart,whereawholepartymaketheirpilgrimage together,isespeciallysignificant”(Leavis1967:3839).ItisBun yan’sattitudetowardlifethatallowshisworktoexudeasenseof thetranscendent,forthissenseoflifeisnotsimplyrestrictedto thisworld.Leavisfindsthatsomethinghasbeenlostbythetime of Daniel Defoe, the author of Robinson Crusoe and Bunyan’s Dissentingsuccessor.WhatismissinginDefoeisthesenseofthe spiritualandthislendsacertainintensitytoBunyan’swork: forBunyanbottomlesssloughsanddreadfulabyssesmenace thepilgrim,mountainsseemsabouttofallonhim,andnotto beapilgrimistobecertainlyandeternallydamned.Butthe hazardsandmenacesarethenegativeaccompanimentsofsome thingpositivethatisnotthereinDefoe’sworld:theconcern, intenseandprofound,forwhat,talkingloosely,aswehaveto talk(fornoprecisionispossible),wespeakofasthe“meaning oflife”.Suchaconcern,feltasthequestion“Whatfor—what ultimatelyfor?”isimplicitlyaskedinallthegreatestart,from whichweget,notwhatwearelikelytocallan“answer”,but thecommunicationofafeltsignificance;somethingthatcon firmsoursenseoflifeasmorethanamerelinearsuccessionof days,amatteroftimeasmeasuredbytheclock—“tomorrow andtomorrowandtomorrow”....(Leavis1967:46)

ForLeavis,then,thequalitythatBunyanaddsisasenseoftrans cendence,afeltsignificancetolifethatgoesbeyondwhatisempir icallyseenandfelt.8Andthissenseoftranscendenceislinkedto

8

ThequestionifLeavisiscorrectinhisassessmentsofcertainwrit ers will inevitably arise. No doubt, many will disagree with him, as manyhaveanddidthroughouthiscareer.Bethatasitmay,Leavis’sig nificancestillstands,sincewhathehastosayaboutlanguageanditsuse

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thefactthatBunyanwrites“fromthewholeman,”i.e.bothhis mindandemotionsareinvolvedinwhatandhowhewrites.Bun yanisintimatelyinvolvedinwhatheiswritingandwritesthat withcareandthought. Thiswriting“fromthewholeman”iscrucialtoLeavis’think ing, constituting the basis of his thoughts on literature and its functionintheworldtoday.Itisalsocrucialtoanycontribution we might see him making to the theological question of trans cendenceandhowthatisexpressedinliterature.Thefundamental problemLeavisseesinmodern,contemporarysocietyislocated inwhatheoftencallsthe“technologicoBenthamiteage”andin thedissociationofsensibility.Thesetwoarefurthermanifestations ofCartesiandualism:theseparationbetweenmindandbody,fact andvalue,objectiveandsubjective.Wewillfirstlookatthe“tech nologicoBenthamiteage.” TheTechnologicoBenthamiteAge LeavisseesthistechnologicoBenthamiteorutilitarianapproach tolifemanifestedinvariousfacetsofsociety.Eventhemodern university, which sees itself primarily as a place for producing graduates, educated people or reduces education to something purelyquantifiable,doesnotescapethisapproach.This“technolo gicoBenthamiteage”alsofiguresinhisappreciationforthework ofCharlesDickens(cf.Leavis1972a),D.H.LawrenceandT.S.Eliot (Leavis 1979a). He sees Eliot in Four Quartets as recoiling from “meaninglessness;thelossofsignificance,ofsatisfyingendsand ofanyadequateconcernforthem,orofthepowerofadequate concern, in the elaboration of the machinery—meaninglessness andunreality”(Leavis1979c:123).Thesearethesamethemeshe seesinDickensandLawrence. Thegreatwork,thegenuinelycreativework,ofliteratureis opposedtothattechnologicoBenthamiteemphasis,whichLeavis considerstobefatalforspiritualvalues.Creativeliteratureand thelanguageusedinsuchworksemphasizespiritualvalues.By spiritualvaluesLeavismeansvaluesthathavetodowithlife.Life is,byfar,thecentraltermforLeavis.Butitisnotonethatiseasy todefine.Itis“something”that“is‘there’onlyintheindividual”

stillstands.

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(Leavis1972b:17),bywhichhemeansthatitisonlyinthecon cretethatonecantalkaboutlife;onecannevertalkaboutlifein theabstract.BecauseofLeavis’emphasison“life”asexistingsole lyintheindividual,onecanalsoseeadoorbeingopenedhereto contextualandembodiedknowledge,eventhoughLeaviswasnot aware of these movements. He did find a kindred spirt in the chemistphilosopherMichaelPolanyiandhisPersonalKnowledge, andclearlyhisthinkingwaspushingthedooropentotheconcept ofthecontextualityofknowledge.ButforLeavis,theconceptof “life”remainsimpossibletodefineinafinalway(Leavis1998c: 14).Ithastodowithvitality,witharobustnessintheworkoflit eraturethatpitsitagainstthestultifyingdeadnessoftechnology, ofutilitarianism.Itis,ashestatesintheessayreferredtoabove, thenecessaryword(Leavis1972b).InthelaterLeavis,RogerPoole argues,themeaningoruseofthetermbecomesmoreprecise.Ac cordingtohim,theliteraryworkisviewedasakindofcircuit: Thesubtletyofthenewapproachisthis:Eliot,Lawrence, Dickens,Black,whenpondered,willprovideacritiqueofthe endsofthesocietytheylivedin,managingtosetupakindof oscillation of possibilities in the words themselves between whatwasthecase,whatshouldhavebeenthecase,orwhat mighthavebeenmadethecase,hadhumanresponsibilityin tervened.Thesewritersdealexplicitlywiththequalityoflife astheyexperiencedit.Theyaretobestudiedintenselyandin depthbecauseoftheircontributiontothetheologicaldebate. Buttheirwritinghasitselfgot“life”—becausetheenergy fedroundtheteleologicalcircuitconceptualizesforus.Their writing poses for us, in significant groupings, in significant structures,waysofinterpreting(ofacceptingorrefusing)the endsinevidenceinthesocietyinwhichtheliteraryworkwas written.Suchanovelorpoemisathoughtact,offeredinsig nificantverbalform.(Poole1974:69)

Whatthisamountsto,intheend,isamoralvisionofliter ature:writers,novelists,poetsandcriticshavearesponsibilityto life,tothevaluesoflife.ThisiswhatLeavisseesCharlesDickens, forinstance,doinginhisnovels,pittingcharacterslikeSissyJupe, achildraisedinacircus,againstcharacterslikeGradgrind,orthe

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circusagainsttheindustrialtowninHardTimes.9Thisiswhathe seesWilliamBlakedoinginhisoppositiontoUrizen,thepersoni ficationinBlake’sworkofconventionalreasonandlaw.Itisalso whyEliot’sFourQuartetsmatters:“thecurrentflowingthrough thepassage...givingittheeffectofawrestlingwithexperience thatengagesthewholebeingandonwhichissuesofthegreatest emotionalandspiritualmomentarefelttodepend”(Leavis1979c: 127).Or,ashewriteslaterinthesameessay: WhatImeanisthatonecan’treaditandtakeitinasapoem inadetachedintellectualway.Intakingthe“communication” ofthe“idea”...onegoesthroughadifferentprocessfromthe mastering of a logical disquisition; the whole being is in volved,andoneiscompelled,inthetaking,toachieveanew realization of the nature of experience. And that realization isn’t,andcouldn’tbe,amerematterofinterestintheory.Itin volvesone’sbasicattitudesandone’shabitsofthoughtand valuation.ThatiswhatImeantbysayingthatnoonecould take the communication of “Burnt Norton” and not know, withdecisiveforce,thatthespiritualPhilistinismoftheworld weliveinismenacinglyantihuman,orinertlyaccept“arising standardofliving”asanadequateaccountofhumanendsand needs.(Leavis1979c:129)

Leavisseesthefunctionofgreatcreativeliteratureasessentially moral,althoughnotinanykindofsimplisticsenseasmoralistic. Dickens’HardTimesandLittleDorrit,aswellashismanyother works,aremoralcondemnationsofVictoriansociety. Butthemoralsenseofliterature,ofpoetry,goesevenfurther. TwophrasesthatreturnwithregularityinLeavis’workareacom ment made by William Blake and echoed later, according to Leavis,byacharacterinanovelbyD.H.Lawrence.Thestatement by Blake from Letter 59 concerns his paintings and designs: “ThoughIcallthemmine,Iknowtheyarenotmine”(Blake1906). InD.H.Lawrence’sTheRainbowTomBrangwensays,whenwatch ing by the fold during lambing season under a night sky: “He

9

Cf.alsomydiscussionofHardTimesinJansen2004.Inthisnovel SissyJupeisthefigurewhostandsforlifeoveragainstthedeadening effectsoftheIndustrialRevolutionandits(lackof)morality,ofwhich Gradgrindistherepresentative.

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knewhedidnotbelongtohimself”(Lawrence1977:40).10This moralsenseiswhatLeaviscalls“disinterestedness,”thewriter’s orartist’ssensethatheisnotwritingorproducingartforhimself. Theartistorwriteriscalledtowriteforhissociety.Heorsheis calledtoamoraltaskofthisnature.Inthefaceofthedeadening, stultifyingtechnologicoBenthamiteageliteraturehasaspiritual andmoraltask.IfthetechnologicoBenthamismreducesthehu man being to something quantifiable, great literature protests againstthatandpresentsanewvision. Jeremy Tambling wrote recently that the ultimate critique againstLeavis would be that he fought a battle he could win too easily againstEnglishintellectualmediocrityandCambridgeparo chialism,andneverperceivedthatthereweremoreinteresting challengestohisownposition.Whilethedebatesaboutcul turethatheinthetwentiethcenturydidmuchtoinitiatein Britain,andthathavegeneratedBritishculturalstudies,have gonebeyondhisconcernwiththeliteraryandpoeticusesof language,hisworkthere,whileremainingdefinitiveinsome instances,isalsoendstopped.(Tambling2006:60)

SuchacriticismmissesthepointwithrespecttoLeavis’import ancenotonlyforliterarystudiesbutalsoforotherfieldsofstudy aswell.In1993MarthaC.NussbaumandAmartyaSenattempted totakethespiritualsideofhumanexistenceintoaccountindis cussingthe“qualityoflife”—whichisoftenmeasuredinquantifi ableterms(GNP,lifeexpectancy,etc.)—byinsistingontheplace ofimaginationandwonderinhumanlife,buttheydidsowithout fully defining what that would mean and as if there is no dif ferencebetweencertaintypesofimagining.11Thereareprofound differencesinwaysofimaginingandtheproductsofimagination. Thesecaninvolve“spiritual”values.Topreventfallingintothe trapofdecidingthesemattersinaquantifiableway,westillneed languagethatpointsustrulybeyondthequantifiableandtothat whichistrulyworthwhileinlife. 10

TomBrangweninTheRainbowisafarmerandcouldbesaidto represent“nature,”tiedtohissoilandcommunity.Heisgovernedby hisinstinctsratherthanhisintellect. 11

Cf.NussbaumandSen1993,andJansen2004.

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DissociationofSensibility Thesecondaspectwithrespecttotranscendenceconnectedwith CartesiandualismandtheCartesianemphasisinphilosophyon clearanddistinctconceptsisthenotionof“dissociationofsensi bility.” This notion originated with T.S. Eliot, who argued that aftertheseventeenthcenturysomethingoccurredintheEnglish mind,asaresultofwhichthoughtandfeelingseparated.12Within thisdevelopmentlanguagebecamemorerefinedandfeelingbe came cruder. Leavis agrees in essence with this view (Leavis 1979b: 7223) and applies it very fruitfully in a comparison of Shakespeare’sAntonyandCleopatraandJohnDryden’slaterAllfor LoveintheRestorationperiod(Leavis1998b:14454).Heviews theformerasclearlysuperior,arguingthat“Itisanimmediately feltsuperiorityinthelifeoftheverse—superiorityinconcreteness, varietyandsensitiveness—thatleavesuswith‘eloquence’instead of‘life’astherightwordforDryden’sverse”(Leavis1998b:144 45).ThedifferenceisthatShakespeare’suseoflanguageismuch moreimmediateandseems,inLeavis’words,tomakeandenact language(Leavis1998b:147),whereasDryden’sverseis“merely sayingandrelating.”Thethoughtisremovedfromthemeansof expression. What Dryden says in his verse, can be restated in anotherway,canberestatedinprose.Thepoetryfunctions,for Dryden, not as an essential means of saying something but as ornamentation. Leavis argues similarly in connection with JonathanSwift,theeighteenthcenturysatirist,inasectioncalled “Prose”in“JudgmentandAnalysis”: 12

Cf.Eliot1975:64:“Thedifference[betweenHerbertandTenny son]isnotasimpledifferencebetweenpoets.Itissomethingwhichhad happenedtothemindofEnglandbetweenthetimeofDonneorLord HerbertofCherburyandthetimeofTennysonandBrowning.Tennyson and Browning are poets, and they think; but they do not feel their thoughtasimmediatelyastheodourofarose.... Wemayexpressthedifferencebythefollowingtheory:Thepoets oftheseventeenthcentury,thesuccessorsofthedramatistsofthesix teenth,possessedamechanismofsensibilitywhichcoulddevourany kindofexperience.Theyaresimple,artificial,difficult,orfantasticas theirpredecessorswere....Intheseventeenthcenturyadissociationof sensibilitysetin,fromwhichwehaveneverrecovered;andthisdissoci ation, as is natural, was aggravated by the influence of the two most powerfulpoetsofthecentury,MiltonandDryden.“

248 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Swift’simagery,...strikesusasthethoughtitself;itseemsto assailusintheconcretewithoutmediation.Sointenseishis reactiontolifethatwedon’tthinkofitasstatable;insteadof descriptionwehavethis,theproductofdestructivecreativity, inwhichwehave,nottalkingabout,buthandingoverorpre senting.Thereisaninsistenceofmentalactivity,manifesting itself in The Tale of a Tub in the inexhaustible resource with whichhetakesthereaderbysurpriseandcatcheshimonthe wrongfoot.(Leavis1998b:138)

Inthispoeticlanguage—andthesamecouldbesaid,inLeavis’ view, of “prose”writers like Dickens and Lawrence—form and contentaretrulyunitedinthelanguageitself.Itisnotfirstamat terofthinkingofwhatneedstobesaidandthenfindingthebest (mosteloquent)waytosayit.No,rather,inthistypeofwriting theformemergesnaturallyfromthecontent.Itisthecontentthat determines the form. Whatever is said is said in that form and cannotbesaidinanyotherway.Anditisthereforetrueinthe sensethatwefeelitstruth.Thisisnotmerelyamatterof“em piricalfit,”whichagainsuggestsdistanceandabstraction,buta felttruthfulnessaboutwhatisbeingsaid.Thisishowitis. Toreturntoourtworeligiousexamplesfromthebeginning ofthisessay,onecansaythattheexamplefromTheHeidelberg Catechismisafeltthought.Whateverissaidthereisnotamatter ofanalysisalonebutofemotionaswell.Whateverelseitdoes,it callsonetoconfession.Thatisitspoweraswrittenlanguageand thatiswhyitisconvincingandcallsforassentorrejection.The secondexample,fromthecontemporarytestimony,createsdis tancebetweenusandit,betweenthethoughtthatisexpressedand howitisexpressed.Aswritten,itdoesnotinviteourassentbut ouranalysis.Weareinvited—nottoconfessbuttothink. Whatdoestheaboveanalysishavetodowithtranscendence, withtheabilityofreligiouslanguagetoevoketranscendence?We will now apply the above insights to the question of religious language. Poetic/ReligiousLanguageandTranscendence Theconnectiontoreligionintheaboveisveryimportant,evenfor Leaviswhowasandremainedanagnosticallhislife:themoral and/orreligiousqualityofgreatliteratureisthatwhichleadsus

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“todiscoverwhatatbottomwereallybelieve.Whatfor—whatul timatelyfor?Whatdomenliveby?—thequestionsworkandtell atwhatIcanonlycallareligiousdepthofthoughtandfeeling” (Leavis1972c:56).13ForLeavis,thequestionoftranscendencein poeticandreligiouslanguageismorethanaquestionofitsbeing evocativebuthastodowithitsspiritualqualitiesaswell,withthe affirmationoflifethatispresentinanypieceofwriting.There appeartobethreefacetstothistranscendenceandallthreeare intrinsicallyrelated. Thefirstfacetofthistranscendenceissimplythesituationin whichthewriterfindshimorherself.Leavisarguesinvarious placesthatthecreativewriterdrawsonthelanguagethatprecedes himorherandchangesit(Leavis1998a:213).Hecontends,forin stance,thatShakespearecouldnothavebeenwhathewashadthe Englishlanguagenotdevelopedasithadbeforehiminitsspecific creativeway(Leavis1998e:52),althoughhealsocontendsinthe samesentencethattheconditionsthatmadeShakespearepossible have disappeared. A language, Leavis states, is not simply a meansforexpressionbut“embodiesvalues,constatations,distinc tions,promptings,recognitionsofpotentiality”(Leavis1998e:49). Assuch,thewriterispartofacommunity,acollaborativecom munityinwhichheparticipates. Butthiscommunityoflanguagealsoextendstothosewho readtheworkofliterature.Theworkofliteratureconstitutesa placewherepeoplecanmeetinameaningbecauselanguagepro videsacentralcoreformeeting(Leavis1998e:58).Thewriterand thecriticsandthecommunitymeetinwhatLeaviscallsthe“third realm”(e.g.Leavis1998e:62),whichisneithertheprivatenorthe publicworldbuttheworldoftheliterarywork:itisthatthatisa meetingplaceformindstoreflectandrespond.Anycritic,i.e.any seriousstudentoflanguageandliterature,alsoparticipatesinthat

13

Cf.alsoLeavis1967:46(citedabove,p.242).Becauseofhisem phasisinsuchpassages,somescholarshaveseenareligioussidetoLea vis.BilanseessomeaffinitywithPaulTillich’sdelimitationofGodasthe groundofallbeing,whichhefeelscomesclosetoLeavis’senseoftrans cendence(Bilan1979:30001).BellseesphilosophicalaffinitieswithHei degger’snotionofBeing.Itshouldbeclear,however,thatLeavisnever explicitlydiscussedthisandremainedanagnosticthroughouthislife (Joyce2005:1).

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communitywhensubjectingaworkofliteraturetoengagedanal ysis,askingtheprofoundlyspiritualquestionsthatliteratureisto present. Withthislattercommentwehavealreadybroachedthesec ondfacetorleveloftranscendence:thatofthemoralresponsibility ofthewriter.Aswesawabove,thewriteriscalledtopresenta newvision.Thisvisionisessentiallyatranscendentvision.Here thetranscendentreferstothedisinterestednessorimpersonaliza tion(e.g.Leavis1998a:185)ofthewriterorartist,hisrisingabove himself,hissensethat“ThoughIcallthemmine,Iknowtheyare notmine.”14Thewriterwritesoutofanisusor“deepinnerneed” promptedbyanahnung(Leavis1972b:25).Throughhis/herdisin terestednessthewriterisconcernedtoservethespiritualvalues oflifethatgofarbeyondanyutilitarianconcerns.Thehumanper sonandhumansocietyiscalledtoataskandresponsibilitythatgo beyond what technologicoBenthamite society can conceive or offer. Thissecondfacetisimmediatelyrelatedtoanddependenton thethirdlevelorfacet.Ifthewriteriscalledtoresponsibility,itis becausetherearespiritualvalues,thereislife.Itisbecausethere ismoretolifethan“technologicoBenthamite”values,whichLea visalsoequateswith“spiritualPhilistinism.”Thewriteristoserve humanityandtheworldthroughservingandpromotingthisaf firmation of life, thus counteracting the deadening effect of the “technologicoBenthamite”age.Writersandeducationalinstitu tionsand,byimplication,allpeoplearecalledtoaffirmthis.Nisus andahnungarealsorelatedtothisleveloftranscendence.Itisthe need for transcendence, the sense of it that drives writers. The transcendentrealitytowhichLeavisrefersneednotbeseenasa vertical transcendence (i.e. God) but is essentially a horizontal transcendence.Thewritersensesthatthereismoretothisworld thanthatwhichisempiricallyquantifiable.Itisherethatthesense oftranscendencelies.

14

Cf.alsohisdiscussionofthecharacterDanielDoyceinDickens’ LittleDorrit(Leavis1972a).

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Conclusion We have argued in this contribution that the discussion on the similaritiesbetweenreligiouslanguageandpoeticlanguagedoes notgofarenoughinconnectionwiththeissueoflanguageand transcendence.Amorefundamentaldistinctionneedstobedrawn betweenlanguagethatpromotes“spiritualvalues”andlanguage thatdoesnot.Wethentestedthisdistinctioninrelationtotwo religiousdocumentsandsawthat,indeed,therewasadifference inthequalityofthelanguage,eventhoughbothdocumentscould besaidtobe“poetic”innatureandstyle. TheworkofF.R.Leavis,theliteraryissuesandjudgementsto whichhesummonshisreadersandreadersofliteratureandother workstomake,showsthattheconnectionbetweenreligiouslang uageandliterarylanguageisnotassimpleorstraightforwardas itoftenmadeouttobe.Utilizinghisinsightsintolanguagewith respecttothetechnologicoBenthamiteage—anillnessthatstill plaguesusinvariousways—anddissociationofsensibility,theo logians and philosophers of religion can devote themselves to lookingatthe“spiritualvalues”thatanywrittenworkincludesin itswriting.WhatLeavis’workshowsisthatsuchasearchgoesbe yondlookingatthesurfacestructureofthelanguageandlooking deeptodiscoverhowtexts—religiousorotherwise—canconvey suchspiritualvalues. Bibliography Bilan,R.P.(1979).TheLiteraryCriticismofF.R.Leavis.London/NewYork/ Melbourne/Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Blake,William(1906).TheLettersofWilliamBlake.http://www.archive. org/stream/letterswilliamb00tathgoog/letterswilliamb00tathgoog _djvu.txt.AccessedJune2009. Drabble,Margaret(ed.).(1985).TheOxfordCompaniontoEnglishLitera ture.5thed.Oxfordetal.:OxfordUniversityPress.P.364. Lawrence,D.H.(1977).TheRainbow.Reprint.Harmondsworth:Penguin. Eliot,T.S.“TheMetaphysicalPoets.”In:T.S.Eliot.SelectedProseof T.S.Eliot.Ed.andIntroducedbyFrankKermode.London/Boston: FaberandFaber.Pp.5967. Jansen, Henry. (2004). “The Quality of Life: Comic Vision in Charles DickensandIrisMurdoch.”In:M.SarotandW.Stoker(eds).Reli

252 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE gionandtheGoodLife.StudiesinTheologyandReligion(STAR)10. Assen:RoyalvanGorcum.Pp.95112. Joyce,Chris.“MeetinginMeaning:PhilosophyandTheoryintheWork of F.R. Leavis.” Modern Age 48. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_m0354/is_3_47/ai_n15927269/. Leavis,F.R.(1998a).“FourQuartets.”In:F.R.Leavis.TheLivingPrinciple: “English”asaDisciplineofThought.WithanIntroductionbyPaul Dean.ElephantPaperbacks.Chicago:IvanR.Dee,Inc.,Publisher. Pp.155264. (1998b).“JudgmentandAnalysis.”In:F.R.Leavis.TheLivingPrinci ple:“English”asaDisciplineofThought.WithanIntroductionbyPaul Dean.ElephantPaperbacks.Chicago:IvanR.Dee,Inc.,Publisher. Pp.71154.  (1998c).“Preface.”In:F.R.Leavis.TheLivingPrinciple:“English”as aDisciplineofThought.WithanIntroductionbyPaulDean.Elephant Paperbacks.Chicago:IvanR.Dee,Inc.,Publisher.Pp.918. (1998d).“Thought,LanguageandObjectivity.”In:F.R.Leavis.The LivingPrinciple:“English”asaDisciplineofThought.WithanIntro ductionbyPaulDean.ElephantPaperbacks.Chicago:IvanR.Dee, Inc.,Publisher.Pp.1970. (1979a).“TheNecessaryOpposite,Lawrence:Illustration—TheOp posedCriticsonHamlet.”EnglishLiteratureinOurTimeandtheUni versity:TheClarkLectures1967.Cambridgeetal.:CambridgeUniver sityPress.Pp.13557. (1979b).“ThePresentandthePast:Eliot’sDemonstration.”In:F.R. Leavis.EnglishLiteratureinOurTimeandtheUniversity:TheClark Lectures1967.Cambridgeetal.:CambridgeUniversityPress.Pp.63 82. (1979c).“Why‘FourQuartets’MattersinaTechnologicoBentham iteAge.”In:F.R.Leavis.EnglishLiteratureinOurTimeandtheUni versity:TheClarkLectures1967.Cambridgeetal.:CambridgeUni versityPress.Pp.10933. (1972a).“DickensandBlack:LittleDorrit.”In:F.R.andQ.D.Leavis, DickenstheNovelist.Harmondsworth:PenguinBooks.Pp.282359. (1972b).“Introductory:‘Life’isaNecessaryWord.”In:F.R.Leavis. NorShallMySword:DiscoursesonPluralism,CompassionandSocial Hope.London:Chatto&Windus.Pp.937. (1972c).“TwoCultures:TheSignificanceofLord Snow.”In:F.R. Leavis.NorShallMySword:DiscoursesonPluralism,Compassionand SocialHope.London:Chatto&Windus.Pp.3974.

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(1967).“ThePilgrim’sProgress.”In:F.R.Leavis,AnnaKareninaand OtherEssays.London:Chatto&Windus.Pp.3348. Nussbaum,MarthaC.,andAmartyaSen.(1993).“Introduction.”In:Mar thaC.NussbaumandAmartyaSen(eds).TheQualityofLife.WIDER Studies in Development Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Pp.16. Poole,Roger.“TheAffirmationisofLife:TheLaterCriticismofF.R.Lea vis.”NewUniversitiesQuarterly29:6090. Robinson,Ian.(1975).“ReligiousEnglish.”TheSurvivalofEnglish:Essays inCriticismofLanguage.Reprint.Cambridgeetal.:CambridgeUni versityPress.Pp.2266. Schwartz,R.(ed.).(2004).Transcendence:Philosophy,Literature,andTheolo gyApproachtheBeyond.London:Routledge. Steiner,George.(1989).RealPresences.Chicago/London:ChicagoUniver sityPress/FaberandFaberLtd. Stoker,W.(2009).“TheRothkoChapelPaintingsandtheUrgencyofthe TranscendentExperience.”InternationalJournalforPhilosophyofReli gion64:89102. (2008). “God in de (post)moderne cultuur: George Steiner over transcendentieinkunstencultuur.”VerbumetEcclesia29:47591. Tambling,Jeremy.(2006).“Afterthe‘CambridgeSchool’:F.R.Leavis(18 951978),Scrutiny(19321952)andLiteraryStudiesinBritain.”In: JulianWolfreys(ed.).ModernBritishandIrishCriticismandTheory: ACriticalGuide.Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress.Pp.5660. Taylor,M.C.(1992).Disfiguring:Art,ArchitectureandReligion.Chicago: TheUniversityofChicagoPress.

ReadinessandTiming TheEarlyModernVirtues ofHamlet’sProvidentialChristianity LourensMinnema

Abstract This contribution focuses on Hamlet’s belief in providence and on the early modernkindofChristianityitrepresents.Thekeyquestioniswhetherthefig ureofHamletembodiesaliterarytransformationofapiousChristianintoa secular Renaissance subject or the transformation of a secular Renaissance subject into a pious Christian. It will be argued that Hamlet’s “readiness” and “timing” are early modern virtues whose discovery allows Hamlet to combineChristianideasonprovidencewithsecularideasonfortunewithout blending them into a new synthesis. The combination of Christian and sec ularelementsinHamlet’s thinking remainstoounstableandtoomuchofa struggleforthat.“Readiness”and“timing”areearlymodernvirtuestypical ofatransitionalageofclashingvaluesthatneedmoretimetocrystallizeout thanisavailableunderthepressureofearlymodernlife

Introduction Around1600WilliamShakespearerecreatedtheliteraryfigure of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark. Does Hamlet embody the liter ary transformation of a pious Christian into a secular Renais sance subject or is it the other way around? On the one hand, Hamlet’sviewofhumannaturedrawsonChristianity.Hamlet isimpressedbyhumankind’sambiguoushumannature:“inac tionlikeanangel,inapprehensionlikeagod”butdusttoo,that is to say, both lofty soul and downtoearth matter (Hamlet II.ii.30207).Ontheotherhand,HamletisinfluencedbytheRe naissanceviewofhumannature.ThomasMcAlindonpointsto this Renaissance conception of human nature and the way it differsfromtheChristianconceptionwhenhestressesthatthe issueisnotabouta(vertical)battlebetweentheangelicandbes tial dimensions of human nature but concerns the (horizontal) overflowing of boundaries (McAlindon 1996: 1819). Added to 255

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thisambiguityareHamlet’sideasonprovidenceandfortune.Is Hamletconvinced,eitheratthebeginningortheendoftheplay, ofadivinelyordainedoutcome,theworkingofwhathe,inline with Calvin, terms “special providence” (V.ii.192)? But let us startwiththephenomenonoflove. HumanNatureandTime Onthefaceofit,thephenomenonofloveisconnectedwithhu man nature but not with time. In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, how ever,loveislinkedtoboth.AsMcAlindonpresentsit,inShake spearean tragedy, it is not workings of fate that confront the heroes but those of nature and the latter’s intrinsic forces of chaos. These forces do not just occur in the outside world but alsowithinhumannature.Theycanhaveaconstraininginflu enceaswell.IflovedrivesHamlettotheextremepointwhere opposites are confused, it also seems to inhibit him there, pre venting him from becoming another Pyrrhus or Laertes in the questforrevenge. McAlindonconsiderslovethecrucialaffectinHamlet’sbe havioural pattern. If this claim is justified, the way love is si multaneously credited and discredited as love by Claudius (in hisefforttourgeLaertestoaction)isallthemoreinteresting: NotthatIthinkyoudidnotloveyourfather, ButthatIknowloveisbegunbytime, AndthatIsee,inpassagesofproof, Timequalifiesthesparkandfireofit. Thereliveswithintheveryflameoflove Akindofwickorsnuffthatwillabateit, Andnothingisatalikegoodnessstill; Forgoodness,growingtoapleurisy, Diesinhisowntoomuch. (IV.vii.10917)

Loveiscreditedasarealphenomenonbutis,atthesametime, discredited as temporal (caused by time) and unbalanced (ex cessofoneGalenichumour).AnthonyGashcomments: What [Claudius’ language] claims to observe is a law in mentalorpsychologicaleventswhichfollowsthesamecau sal logic as physical processes. Starting with an example fromchemistry(thecandleflame)itendswiththebiological

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languageof“plurisy”,anexcessofonehumour,inthiscase blood, causing sickness. But this apparently scientific lang uageisalsointernallyindialoguewiththelanguageofreli gion (love) and ethics (goodness). In describing love and goodness as it does, this way of talking assumes that they arecausedratherthancausing,objectsofknowledgerather than the causes and conditions of knowing. It is easily for gotten that it was an ancestor of this approach against which Socrates and Plato had reacted and which spurred Plato to enunciate the alternative model of knowledge whichwenowcallphilosophy,asdistinctfromnaturalsci ence.... In Claudius’ speech it is precisely this mysterious claimwhichisignoredorrejected,whenloveisportrayedas beingsubjecttothesamelawsofgrowthanddecayasany temporal phenomenon. That Shakespeare thought of Clau dius’ naturalism as in dialogue with the PlatonicChristian traditionisindicatedbytheformulationofhisearlyandless sophisticated Machiavel, Richard III, who mocks “this word ‘love’ which greybeards call divine” (3 Henry VI, V.vi.81). Andinoneofhissonnets,Shakespearetakesthesideofthe greybeards by setting his love beyond the cause and effect sequenceswhichdetermineandexplainsomuchhumanbe haviour, representing it as sui generis rather than caused or motivated.(Gash:1920)

McAlindonandGashpointout,infact,thatHamletdoesnotgo along with Claudius’ appeal to “reason” in the sense of a “re cognition of necessity or fate as identical to natural order, as opposedtochaos.”RightfromthebeginningHamletrefusesto join in Claudius’ manipulative use (for political purposes) of “reason”asa“recognitionofuniversallawsofnature”: ’Tissweetandcommendableinyournature,Hamlet, Togivethesemourningdutiestoyourfather. Butyoumustknowyourfatherlostafather; Thatfatherlost,losthis;andthesurvivorbound Infilialobligationforsometerm Todoobsequioussorrow.Buttopersever Inobstinatecondolementisacourse Ofimpiousstubbornness.’Tisunmanlygrief. Itshowsawillmostincorrecttoheaven,

258 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Aheartunfortified,amindimpatient, Anunderstandingsimpleandunschooled. Forwhatweknowmustbe,andisascommon Asanythemostvulgarthingtosense, Whyshouldweinourpeevishopposition Takeittoheart?Fie,’tisafaulttoheaven, Afaultagainstthedead,afaulttonature, Toreasonmostabsurd,whosecommontheme Isdeathoffathers,andwhostillhathcried, Fromthefirstcorsetillhethatdiedtoday, “Thismustbeso”.Weprayyouthrowtoearth Thisunprevailingwoe,andthinkofus Asofafather. (I.ii.87108)

The one emotion that dominates the play, grief, is simultane ously credited and discredited as grief by Claudius, whose re cognitionofnecessityisastrategyforeliminatingthetragicex perience of chaos and a recognition of tragic fate. In Claudius’ perception,lifemustgoon.InHamlet’sperception,thereisthe entire inner world of sincere feelings that cannot be neglected even though it cannot be seen or shown in the outer world of thecourt.Hamletdoesnotdescribethisinnerworldbutrefers toitinindirecttermsas“thatwithinwhich[sur]passesshow” (I.ii.85). Instead of appropriating Claudius’ transparent neces sity of the natural order or, for that matter, an obscure Greek necessityoffate,Hamletseemstoappropriatetheobscurecha os of human freedom. Hamlet’s incidental reference to the Christian idea of providence comes across as one among the manyreligiousandsecularideasthatwereclashingandasfar lessimportantthanthesecularizedRenaissanceideaoffortune. HumanNatureandFortune Renaissancethinkingonfortuneopposedreasontopassion.Ac cordingtoBertO.States,thePassion’sSlaveSpeechaddressed toHoratiodirectlyfollowingtheadvicetotheplayers(III.ii.66 97)playsHoratiooffagainstHamlet’soldschoolfriendsRosen crantz and Guildenstern, who are repeatedly linked to fortuna and fortunehunting, whereas Horatio is linked to virtù (talen tedwill)(States1992:188).

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In Hamlet’s Passion’s Slave Speech, fortuna and virtù ap pearas“bloodandjudgement”(passionandreason): Andblestarethose Whosebloodandjudgementaresowellcommeddled ThattheyarenotapipeforFortune’sfinger Tosoundwhatstopsheplease.Givemethatman Thatisnotpassion’sslave,andIwillwearhim Inmyheart’score,ay,inmyheartofheart, AsIdothee. (III.ii.78b84a)

Thespeechisareturn,inthindisguise,oftheveryadviceHam let has been giving the players, States argues. That is, it trans latesthetheoryofactingintohumanconduct.Horatioistothe perfectactorasRosencrantzandGuildensternaretotheambi tious clowns who pad their roles to steal laughs (States 1992: 188). But the virtue of which Hamlet speaks here—the happy marriage of passion and reason—is the very virtue Hamlet manifestlylacks. Fortuna and virtù are key concepts in high Renaissance thinking,includingthepoliticalthinkingofpeoplesuchasNic colò Machiavelli (cf. Machiavelli 1982: 13033 [chapter 25]). Lauro Martines explains why. The question of the relation be tweenvirtùandfortunehadbeendiscussedinthefifteenthcen tury,butvirtùcouldbeseenthenasthevictor,especiallyindis cussions set among the dominant social groups. After the out break of the Italian Wars, the topos invaded political reflection aswellasliteratureandmoralthought: The dynamic aspect in Machiavelli’s vision of politics is in theshiftingoppositionandunionbetweenvirtùandfortuna andintheconflictbetweentheStateandtheantisocialbeast inman.Virtùistalentedwillpoweringreatpoliticalaffairs, thestuffofleadershipandsuccess.Itmaybelongtoindivid uals as to collectivities. Fortuna is the sum of forces lying beyondvirtù—forceshostile,neutral,orhelpful,butalways changing.Initschanges,fortunamayincludeoratanymo mentexcludetheantisocialvices,butvirtùcanneverreally includethebeastinman,forwhentheprinceelectstopar takeofthebeastinordertoaccomplishapoliticalend,the choiceisarationalone,madetoservetheendsofthestate.

260 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE If in The Prince Machiavelli emphasizes relations between virtù and fortuna, in The Discourses, looking to the political healthofcollectivities,hegivesmoreemphasistorelations betweenvirtùandpoliticalcorruption(virtùgonedecadent). Infact,thesecontrapuntalpairingswereaformulationofthe overwhelmingquestionforItaliansociety:couldtheruling classesrule?Howmuchrealcontrolhadtheyoverpolitical processes,overevents,overtheenvironment,overthepen insula’sforthcomingdestinies?(Martines2002:31115)

Themainantithesesintheidealizedsolutionsofsixteenthcen turyItalianthinkers,Martineswrites,arethese:reasonpassions; virtùfortuna;manbeast;elitesmultitudes;richpoor;State ambition (individual egotism); civil society  anarchic nature; lawviolence;orderdisorder. Renaissancethinkingaboutfortuneisquitedifferentfrom medievalthinkingaboutfortune.Whilethenotionoffortuneis connectedwiththenotionoftragedyinbothcases,therespec tive notions of tragedy are different. George Steiner points to Chaucer’s medieval definition of “tragedy” as “a narrative re counting the life of some ancient or eminent personage who sufferedadeclineoffortunetowardadisastrousend”(Steiner 1982:1112).1HeputsChaucer’smedievaldefinitionoftragedy asadeclineoffortunewithrespecttoitsbeingthedecisiveplot patterninperspective: Chaucer’s definition derives its force from contemporary awarenessofsuddenreversalsofpoliticalanddynasticfor tune....Buttheriseandfallofhimthatstoodinhighdegree was the incarnation of the tragic sense for a much deeper reason: it made explicit the universal drama of the fall of man....Itisinagardenalsothatthesymmetryofdivinein tentplacestheactoffortunatereversal.AtGethsemanethe arrow changes its course, and the morality play of history alters from tragedy to commedia.... Of this great parable of

1

Chaucer’sPrologueoftheMonk’sTalecontainsthefamousmedieval definition of tragedy: “Tragedie is to seyn a certeyn storie, / As olde bookesmakenusmemorie,/Ofhymthatstoodingreetprosperitee,/ And is yfallen out of heigh degree, / Into myserie, and endeth wrecchedly.”

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God’s design, the recital of the tragic destinies of illustrious menareaglossandareminder.(Steiner1982:1213)

RaymondWilliams,too,hassomeveryhelpfulinsightsintothe crucial changes from one culture to another (Williams 2001: 19ff.).InGreektragedytheactionwasatoncepublicandmeta physical.Itconcernedrulingfamiliesbelongingtoalegendary pastandall—theaction,familiesandpast—mediatedbetween godsandmen.InSenecantragedythereisastressonthenobil ityofsufferingandenduringmisfortune,whichprovidedaba sis for the later transfer of interest to the suffering individual away from types. In medieval Christian ideas about tragedy, theemphasisisonthefalloffamousmenwhobeginin“pros perity” and end in “adversity.”2 This reveals, first, a shift of meaning from change in fortune to a fall, reminiscent of the Fall.Thatistosay,itisexpressiveofaChristiannotionoffor tuneastheagentofprovidence.Second,itrevealsashiftfrom Aristotle’s “happiness and misery” to “prosperity and adver sity.”Thatistosay,theChristiannotionoffortuneincreasingly refers to thisworldly success as opposed to striving for the worldbeyond.Itbecomesasintotrustinfortuneinthesense of seeking worldly success instead of seeking God. Fortune is put outside any general and common human destiny. The worldlywheeloffortuneisasinfuloptioninwhichoneshould notbecomeinvolvedinthefirstplace.Adualismbetweenthis worldly and otherworldly striving tends to coincide with a split between fortune and providence. Under the pressure of the alienation of feudal society, Williams argues, the emphasis onageneralconditionbecamesoattachedtoasingleparticular case—the fall of princes—that the general reference to tragedy becamenegativeandlimitedtoprinces,nolongeratoncepub lic and metaphysical but social (rank as an isolated condition) as opposed to metaphysical. Fortune became a secularized no tion, and the actionoriented Aristotelian “change of fortune” becamethepersonorientedindividualisticnotionof“changein thehero’sfortunes.”

2

Williams,[1966]2001:21,quotesLydgate:“Itbegynnethinpros perite/Andendetheverinadversite/Anditalsodoththeconquesttrete /Ofrichekyngesandoflordysgrete.”

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ProvidenceandthePlay’sClosure WhatisHamlet’simpressionoftheChristianconceptofdivine intention and divine intervention? In Shakespearean tragedy supernaturalpowers(witches,ghosts,providence,fate)operate in complete consistency with the dynamics of nature, McAlin donobserves(McAlindon1996:2).ApartfromClaudius’efforts to escape divine punishment by trying to repent through prayer,divineintentionsareconsideredbyonecharacteronly, Hamlet, and only to the extent that “heaven” or “providence’ canrestoreorder,forceHamlettokillsomeoneandpunishhim for doing so (III.iv.17577). Hamlet has a sense of providential involvement in human affairs. In Hamlet’s mind, providence, revengeandtimingareintertwinedbecausetheyareallrelated tothenecessityandtherealityofamoraluniverse,accordingto HarryKeyishian.Westernreligiousculture“furnishesthemeta physicalunderpinningforShakespeare’saccountoftheurgeto revengebecausetheJudeoChristiantraditionholdstheconvic tion that evil will be punished eventually” (Keyishian 2003: 5 6). Further on, Keyishian reiterates his own point that divine providence has always played a consoling role but in Shake speare’stimestartstobequestionedevenbyChristianbelievers (Keyishian 2003: 11). What about Shakespeare’s Hamlet or its heroHamlet?WhathappensafterHamlet’sdepartureforEng land,Keyishianargues,reflectsasortofEuripideanmanipula tion(Keyishian2003:63).FrombeingaMachiavellianstrategist, HamletturnsintoaChristianfatalist,or,rather,theplaywright hasHamletmoveinactVfromaMachiavellianworldorderto aprovidentialone(Keyishian2003:57and54).Thisistheplay wright’smethodofrescuingHamletfromhisdilemma.Thetri alsandconstraints,thedilemmasanderrorsoftheheroarethe means by which Shakespeare invites his audience to identify withhisarticulateandattractiveprotagonist.Theyalsotendto exonerate the compromised hero largely for his excesses, be cause the hero suffers more from the evil world around him than the world suffers from his immorally contaminated vio lence.TheAristoteliantragicflawisnotascribedtothecharac teroftheherobuttothecriminalworldaroundhim(Keyishian 2003:6364). ThestrikingthinginKeyishian’sargumentisitsavoidance ofassumingoutrightaChristianworldviewasHamlet’sultimate

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frame of reference. The issue at stake is, of course, to what ex tentShakespeareingeneralandHamletinparticularcanbein terpretedasexpressiveofaChristianworldview.Theonlysub stantial evidence for that in this play might be Hamlet’s refer ence to providence. Keyishian prefers “Euripidean manipula tion”and“providentialworldorder”to“Christianfatalism”for tworeasons.Firstofall,thereistheshiftinworldviewfroma religiousfocusoninscrutablepowersdestroyingtheindividual to a secular focus on social powers destroying the individual. But there is also an artistic reason: the playwright has to pro videasatisfyingclosureandasympathetichero.Thatistosay, themaintragiccharactershavetodie,andtheyhavetobesuffi cientlymoraltomaketheaudiencesufferfromtheirdeathsand immoralities and to “constitute the audience as a forgiving com munity”(notetheChristianvocabulary!).3 Inadditiontothesereasons,however,thereisoneotherar tistic reason that is related to the provision of a satisfying clo sure and has been highlighted by Steiner: Christianity has an antitragic vision of the world (Steiner 1982: 324; cf. 33141ff.). The Christian view allows only partial or episodic tragedy. Within its essential optimism there are moments of despair. Cruel setbacks can occur during the ascent toward grace. Yet, being a threshold to the eternal, the death of a Christian hero can be an occasion for sorrow but not for tragedy. There has beennospecificallyChristianmodeoftragicdramaevenatthe height of the Christian faith. From an artistic point of view, to provide a Christian closure to a tragedy would mean turning the tragedy (“ultimate tragedy”) into melodrama (“near tra gedy”)orpartialtragedy(“waste”).

3

AccordingtoKeyishian(2003:64),toconstitutetheaudienceasa forgivingcommunitywillingtoidentifywiththecauseofaprotagonist whohasnotonlyriskedbutalsosufferedcontaminationinthepursuit of righteous goals, the playwright removes from the protagonist the burdenofinitiatingactiononbehalfofjustice:arestabilizedHamlet, satisfiedthat,althoughhehasnotalwaysdonetherightthing,hehas alwayspursuedajustcause,isallowedtotranscendcontaminationby resigninghimselftodeathandwaitingforeviltoundoitself. 

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Steinernonethelesssticksfirmlytohispostulatethattheo logicalassumptionsandvaluesareinherenttotragedyandthe tragic.TheGreekdeities,theghostinHamlet manifesttheintrusionofmortalmenandwomenintoaspi der’swebofnonhuman,superhumanagentsandvoyeuris ticwatcherswhoseexactlegitimacyandpowersmaybein question,butwhoseappallingproximitytofallenmankindis palpable.(Steiner2004:5)

Also,thesecularclosureofShakespeareanplaysisnotentirely closedtotranscendence,Steinercontends: RepeatedlyinShakespeare,whetheronstageorbyclearin ferenceandinvocation,thefifthactbordersonredemption, onarecuperativedawnafterthetragicnight.Scotlandwill blossomafterMacbeth’sdeath,Cassio’srégimewillbenefit Cyprus,FortinbraslookstobeasounderrulerthanHamlet wouldhavebeen.(Steiner2004:7)4

The ambivalence that can be felt in Keyishian’s and Steiner’s positions regarding the religious or secular character of the worldviewunderlyingtheplayillustratestheunstablecombin ationofChristianandsecularelementsbothinHamlet’sthoughts andelsewhereintheplay.Thiscombinationremainstoomuch ofastrugglefortheelementstobeblendedintoanewsynthe sis. The play as a whole, in my understanding, represents a clash of worldviews, tragic and nontragic alike. This clashing ofworldviewswastypicaloftheRenaissance,aneraofcompet ingandcontestedrepresentations,asStephenGreenblattputsit (Greenblatt 2001). As to the hero of the play, a secular tragic worldview, if any, seems to dominate Hamlet’s basic mood. Hamlet’s response to death in the graveyard scene, Peter B. Murrayargues,showsnogrieforcompassionuntilhispersonal relationship with Yorick begins to bring death closer to him. His view of life as a base pursuit of worldly goods that death shows to be futile is also found in Christian thinking, but the

4

Seealsop.12:“Ihavepointedtothepoliticalupbeatwhichcon cludesMacbeth,Othello,Hamlet.EveninLear,thefinaleisenigmatically ambiguous.OneneednotimposeaChristianglosstodetectthehintsof redemptionorrepair.”

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Christianresponseistorenounceworldlygoodsforthesakeof thesoul.NowhereinthisscenedoesHamletexpressanyhope oranyconcernforthehumansoul.Hisonlyregretseemstobe thatdeathendsalldistinctionsofsocialclass.Hamlet’spercep tion that death brings human greatness to “base uses” moves him to a deep sense of loss that he counters not with faith or prayerbutwithirony(V.i.209212)(Murray1996:260).Hamlet ispresentedasabelievingChristian,notasapiousChristian. ReadinessandTiming David Bevington points out that the philosophical debate on “faithindivineprovidence”versus“scepticismregardingpro vidence” already takes place in Hamlet itself. Shakespeare stages thedebatebyhavingHamletdisagreewithHorationotjuston the issue of the ghost’s insistence that Horatio and Marcellus sweartokeeptheirvowsofsilenceandHamlet’sproclamation that“therearemorethingsinheavenandearth,Horatio/Than aredreamtofinyourphilosophy”(I.v.1667).Healsohashim disagreewithHoratioontheissueoftheextenttowhichprovi dence shapes the story of revenge soon coming to its close. Hamletisscepticalofmanythingsbuteventuallyheremainsa Christian who believes in “a divinity that shapes our ends” (V.ii.10) and in “special providence” (V.ii. 214). “Let be” (V.ii. 218),hecounselsHoratio.This“readiness”soundsclosetoHo ratio’sstoicattitudebut,Bevingtonargues,thereisagreatdif ference between Hamlet’s Christian stoicism, which places all events in the hands of providence, and Horatio’s Roman sto icism,whichseeschanceinsteadofprovidenceatworkinhis tory.BevingtonobservestheironythatwhereasHamletseeshis storyservingheaven’spurposeofpunishingthosewhodeserve punishment, Horatio—who is asked by Hamlet himself to tell Hamlet’s story—interprets Hamlet’s story very differently, i.e. as“accidentaljudgements,”“casualslaughters”and“mistaken purposes” (V.ii.3758), that is to say, in profoundly sceptical, secular and ironic terms. Bevington concludes that “Shake speare,withhischaracteristicdelightindebate,offersusadual explanation in which the alternatives are mutually incompati ble” (Bevington 2008: 15154). What Bevington calls Hamlet’s and Horatio’s “stoicism” strikes me as a shared attitude that seizes opportunities. This is different from modern risktaking

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adventurers and calculators of probability whose lost (early modern)senseoftimingasamatterofmoralresponsibilityhas beenreplacedwithanewlyacquired(modern)senseofoppor tunism. According to McAlindon, one very important feature of Shakespeareantragedyistheroleoftime(McAlindon1996:13 18).Timeisthemeasuredmovementofthematerialworldand discloses a cyclical pattern of binary and quadruple opposites: dayandnight,springandautumn,summerandwinter.Inthe Renaissancethehumanbeingisconceivedasatemporalmicro cosm,thepartsofthebodybeingconnectedwiththeheavenly bodies. Like any powerful ruler, Time can seem both terrible and reassuring. It signifies change, decay, and death but also, beingcyclical,orderandconstancy.InRenaissanceculture,time is associated with justice whereas injustice is associated with haste.Timelinessisabehaviouralideal,heldtobeaprerequis ite for all action that is effective, socially proper, and just. In Shakespearean tragedy, the deeds that generate the tragic ac tionareuntimelyormistimedinthesensethattheyaredilatory or(muchmoreoften)eitherrashorcunninglyswift. If Claudius’ speed initially establishes him as a source of chaos, thereafter it shows him as an efficient counterpoint to Hamlet’s wavering between delay and fatal rashness (McAlin don:1996:12025).ForHamlet,everythingtakesonthedimen sion of time, and time is out of joint. For him, his inability to reshapeitbecomesaproblemofwhentoact.Heistroubledby memory,whichkeepsconsciousnessintime,andisaprerequis itefortruthtoone’sselfandtoothers—forresolutionandcon stancy.Thechiefeffectofhissenseofprovidentialinvolvement ineventsisthathealtershisattitudetotime.Itisnotforhimto create or even to identify the opportune moment for action: it willcometohim,and“thereadinessisall”(V.ii.215).Thehero, workingatlastinconjunctionwithtimeand,beyondthat,with time’s order of justice, puts an end to the confusion that his mightyoppositehascreatedordoessoinpart. Bevington’sandKeyishian’stopicof“scepticismregarding providence” and McAlindon’s topic of “readiness in conjunc tion with time’s order of justice” should not go unnoticed. In my opinion, these topics can be understood even better if

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viewedwithinthebroaderhistoricalcontextofanearlymodern increaseinsubjectivityandreflectiveness. FromEarlyModernTragedytoPostmodernComedy: FromProvidencetoChance? The premodern worldview presumes a given world order that humankind(asacollective)isexpectedtojoin.Thehumanbe ingispartandparcelofthewhole.Heexpectstofindhisgoal inlife,nottoinventit.Thehumanbeingisdestinedtofitinto the order of time and the world. Time is not normally out of joint,andifitis,itwillreturntonormalagain.Theworldorder isinorder;itconstitutesamoralorder.Humanbeingshaveto beinconjunctionwithtime’sorder.Iftheyfailtojointheexist ing world order, they fail their destiny, they are out of place, marginal, led astray by the greater gods or taken away by the larger passions. The human being’s subjective influence and inputarelimitedandarenotthemainpartofwhatishappen inganyway.Thisisthestuffofancienttragedy.Theancienttra gichero’sguiltismorepassivethanactive,moreaformofsuf feringendurancethanofconsciousacting—ifsetoffagainstthe moderntragichero’sguilt.5 Themodernworldviewpresumesaworldorderwhichpeo ple (as individuals cooperating according to a social contract) areexpectedtoconstruct.Onthesurface,thereisnodifference between medieval aristocrats displaying decorum and Renais sance aristocrats cultivating decorum. But, in my understand ing,thereisadifferenceinviewsofhumannatureandaction. TheRenaissancearistocratscombinetheiraristocraticstylewith an aesthetic interest in methods of writing tragedy. That is to say, whereas medieval aristocrats displayed decorum in order toconfirmtheirstatus,Renaissancearistocratshadaninterestin form because, to them, form demonstrates one’s capacity to shape reality, to impose one’s style, to leave one’s mark. The selfshapingProteuswasoneoftheirfavouriteGreekgods.Re naissance aristocrats had an aesthetic interest in methods of writingtragedyforitseffectsontheaudience.Also,humanbe

5

HegelandKierkegaardintroducedsimilarwaysofdistinguishing betweenancientandmoderntragedy.Cf.VandenBerghe2005and2008.

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ings have to be ready to seize accidental opportunities as time passes. Time becomes a matter of timing, of turning time to one’sfavour.Themoderntragichero’sguiltismoreselfmade thanpassive,moreaformofconsciousactingthanofsuffering endurance,moretheresultofpersonalresponsibilitythanofin evitable fate, more his own product than his predetermined destiny,lessdrivenbythegreatergodsandthelargerpassions thanbyhisowncharacterandchoices,lessfittingintoagiven moralorderthanprojectinghisownutopia.Subjectivityandre flectivenessarethestuffofmoderntragedy.Themodernhuman being does not suffer from divine necessities but from coinci dental accidents, contingencies, and the collateral damage of jointventures.That,JohanTaelsnotes,isthestuffofcomedy.6Is moderntragedy,then,closertoacomicworldview?Taels’an swertothisquestionalsoshedslightontheearlymodernrela tionshipbetweenscepticism,providenceandtiming. Schiller,HegelandKierkegaard,heargues,arerepresenta tivesofadecisiveshiftinfavourofthemodernworldview.The interestingthingisthatthishistoricalshiftleadsHegeltoprefer comedytotragedy,whereasitleadsKierkegaardtoprefertra gedytocomedy.Whattheyhaveincommon,Taelsexplains,is their modern awareness of reflectiveness. The early modern strugglebetweenpassionandreasonculminatedintheEnlight enmentvictoryofreasonoverpassion,andintheearlyRoman ticidealizationofpassionlessdetachment.InHegelianthought, passionless detachment takes the form of abstract reflective ness, of a full consciousness finally floating freely above the struggling history that nature produced on its way to full fledgedselfconsciousness.Inshort,ittakestheformofapan optic comic worldview. Hegelian aesthetics declares that com edyisthehighestartisticgenre,becauseitsspeculativeachieve mentindevelopingareflectivepointofviewenablestheSpirit to reach higher grounds than the ethical battlefields of history andtragedy.Panoramiccomedyrepresentsthesuperiorunder standingofdetachedreflectivenessandmetaphysicallaughter.

6

WhereasforHeering,1961:20916,Hegelmarksthebeginningof the spread of a pantragic worldview, for Johan Taels he marks the beginningofthespreadofapanopticcomicworldview.Cf.Taels2005 andTaels2008.

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Kierkegaard could not appreciate the Hegelian concept of metaphysical laughter. He prefers tragedy to comedy because hisreflexivenessdoesnotliberatehimfromhistory’sstruggles. Onthecontrary,itplungeshimevenmoreintoitsfailures—or rather,intoitscontradictions.TaelspointsoutthatKierkegaard translates Aristotle’s “failure” or “error” (hamarteima) as “con tradiction,” thus (in line with Lessing) broadening the moral scope of the “tragic” and the “comic” to an existential scope thatisnotnecessarilymoralorreligious.Whatthe“tragic”and the“comic”shareiscontradiction.Whatseparatesthemispain orlackofit.Abstractreflectivenessleadstopainlessdetachment butconcretereflectivenessleadstopassionatesuffering,andour concrete existence leaves us no choice but to acknowledge in ourmindsandheartsthatthereisnomentalorspeculativeway out of our responsibility and guilt by cultivating a comic con sciousness of absolute freedom. The more Kierkegaard reflects on his concrete existence, his reason serving his passion, the more his “thoughts are bloody”—to quote Hamlet—and pain ful. However,Taelssuggests,the(post)modernworldviewtends tobecomic,nottragic,preciselybecauseofitsincreasedreflec tiveness. This modern reflectiveness is, in turn, intensified by theomnipresentpowersofmassmediacoveringhistoryfroma bird’seye view, exercising the power of panoptic knowledge, flexiblefocus,andrapidshiftsofattention,thusenhancingthe detached attitude typical of postmodern comedy and scepti cism. But postmodern comedy and scepticism are different from early modern comedy and scepticism, Taels points out. Early modern comedy and scepticism are deeply moral and social. Earlymodernscepticismconcernsestablishedauthorities,tradi tionalcustoms,thepast,butitdoesnotyetfullydoubtthemor al and social order of the world. Early modern human beings weresensitivetotheappealtotheirsubjectivedetermination,a conscious readiness to shape their destiny actively, to become more selfreliant for lack of traditional authorities and out of individualistic ambition. Despite their metaphysical and polit ical doubts, they still strove to be in conjunction with time’s moral order. But the timing and the readiness are now up to themselves; they have to make up their own mind. In this re

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spect, and in postmodern retrospect, Hamlet presents a tragi comicworldview.Hamletmakesuphismindnotjustaboutthe existence of ghosts and the truth of the ghost’s word but also abouthistimingandhisreadinesstobeaninstrumentofdivine punishmentandprovidentialplanning.Hamleteventuallysuc ceedsinjoiningtime’smoralorderbyactivelyshapinghisdes tiny.Buttheexcessivekillingthatgoeswithitisasmuchabout destroying destinies as it is about shaping them—a tragic out come that only fuels Horatio’s neoStoic scepticism regarding divineprovidence.Horatio’slastwordis“chance.” Conclusion Hamlet’s readiness and timing are Renaissance virtues whose discoveryallowshimtoembraceChristianideasonprovidence as an early modern way of coping with secular ideas on for tune. Hamlet embodies the literary transformation of a believ ingChristianintoasecularRenaissancesubjectandthetransfor mation of a secular Renaissance subject into a pious Christian. Thatistosay,Hamletembodiesbothofthemsimultaneouslybut without blending the Christian and the secular elements into a newsynthesis. Bibliography Bevington,David.(2008).Shakespeare’sIdeas:MoreThingsinHeavenand Earth.Malden/Oxford:WileyBlackwell. Gash, Anthony. “The Dialogic Self in Hamlet.” Unpublished Manu script. Greenblatt, Stephen. (2001). Shakespearean Negotiations: The Circulation ofSocialEnergyinRenaissanceEngland.Oxford:Clarendon. Heering, H.J. (1961). Tragiek: Van Aeschylus tot Sartre. ’sGravenhage: L.J.C.Boucher. Keyishian, Harry. (2003). The Shapes of Revenge: Victimization, Ven geance, and Vindictiveness in Shakespeare. New York: Humanity Books. Machiavelli, Niccolò. (1982). The Prince. Translated with an introduc tionbyGeorgeBull.Harmondsworth:PenguinBooks.Originally publishedin1513. Martines, Lauro. (2002). Power and Imagination: CityStates in Renais sanceItaly.London:Pimlico.

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McAlindon, Thomas. (1996). Shakespeare’s Tragic Cosmos. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Murray, Peter B. (1996). “Hamlet.” Shakespeare Criticism Yearbook 37: 24168. Shakespeare,William.(2002).TheTragedyofHamlet,PrinceofDenmark. Ed.T.J.B.Spencer,withanintroductionbyAnneBarton.London: PenguinBooks. States, Bert O. (1992). Hamlet and the Concept of Character. Baltimore/ London:TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress. Steiner, George. (2004). “‘Tragedy’, Reconsidered.” New Literary His tory35:115. (1982).TheDeathofTragedy.5thed.London:FaberandFaber. Taels,Johan.(2008).“LaughingMatters:TheUnstoppableRiseofthe ComicPerspective.”In:ArthurCoolsetal.(eds).TheLocusofTra gedy.Leiden/Boston:E.J.Brill.Pp.299318. (2005).“Hetkomischelotvanhettragischeinde(post)moderne media.” In: Paul Vanden Berghe, William Lemmens and Johan Taels(eds).Tragisch:Overtragedieenethiekinde21eeeuw.Budel: Damon.Pp.165184 Vanden Berghe, Paul. (2008). “The Tragic is Always the Tragic: Kier kegaard and Lacan on a Modern Antigone.” In: Arthur Cools et al.(eds).TheLocusofTragedy.Leiden/Boston:E.J.Brill.Pp.18195. (2005).“Hettragischeblijfttochaltijdhettragische?Kierkegaard enLacanovereenmoderneAntigone.”In:PaulVandenBerghe, WillemLemmensandJohanTaels(eds).Tragisch:Overtragedieen ethiekinde21eeeuw.Budel:Damon.Pp.11935. Williams,Raymond(2001).ModernTragedy.Peterborough:Broadview PressEncoreEditions.

PartII

ChristianityInteracting withWorldReligions andTraditions

IndigenousSpirituality andSustainableDevelopment ACriticalAppraisalofAfricanRenaissanceRhetoric1 FransWijsen

Abstract Several political and religious leaders in Africa hold that, in the context of neoliberal globalization, the development of modern African society should bebasedonthecommunityspiritoftraditionalAfrica.Afrocentristsarecon vincedthatthereisabrightfutureforAfricaifAfricansreturntothepathsof theirancestors,andtheyconsequentlyargueforanAfricanRenaissance.Us ingadiscourseanalyticalapproach,thiscontributionasksifthepathsofthe ancestors are still present in this era of globalization, and if they promote peaceandprosperityasadvocatesofAfricanRenaissanceclaim.Whatdothe answerstothesequestionssignifyfortherelationbetweenAfrican—indige nousandmodern—scientificmodelsofdevelopment?

Introduction “TheancestorsofAfricaareangry.Forthosewhobelieveinthe poweroftheancestors,theproofoftheirangerisallaroundus. Forthosewhodonotbelieveinancestors,theproofoftheiran ger is given another name.” By quoting these words by Ali Mazrui, the Tanzanian theologian Laurenti Magesa (2002: 13) begins his argumentforanAfricanRenaissanceinresponseto Africa’s marginalized position in the presentday globalized world. Magesa clearly states his diagnosis of the situation in AfricabyagaincitingMazrui:“Thingsarenotworkingin[and for] Africa.” There is poverty, disease and insecurity. And the

1

ThisessayelaboratesonapaperIpresentedataninternational conferenceonreligionanddevelopmenton14and15June2007atthe VU University, Amsterdam. I am grateful to Luuk Knippenberg, Jan PlatvoetandLaurentiMagesafortheircriticalcommentsonearlierdrafts ofthispaper. 275

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therapy he prescribes is also clear. Magesa urges the govern mentsandallthecitizensofAfrica“tosustainandaccomplish thehopeofindependenceusingthecontinent’sownphilosoph icalvisioninthecontextofpresentdayrealities”(2002:27). MagesaisnottheonlyadvocateofanAfricanRenaissance —it seems to be fashionable among African intellectuals and leaders.PoliticianssuchasformerSouthAfrica’spresidentTha bo Mbeki (2001) and former Kenyan vicepresident Moody A wori(2005)usetheexpressiontorefernottoAfrica’spastbutto itsfuture.Theologians,however,tendtointerpretthisnotionin revivalistways.SimeonEbohsays:“Thewaytosocialharmony andpeacefulcoexistenceliesingoingbacktoourAfricanpast and emulating the rich treasures and precious strands of our cultural heritage. Our lawmaking and lawenforcing must re flect our past—African communalism” (Eboh 2004: 219).2 The samepositionistakenbyBénézetBujowhoisinspiredbyJomo Kenyatta’snotionofharambeeandsaysthat“itismostdesirable thatAfricansshouldgobacktotheirowntraditions”(Bujo1998: 167).OliverOnwubiko(2001:36)writes:“Itisthewealthofthe communityandinthecommunity,Africansbelieve,thatmakes the individual rich and not the wealth of the individuals that makesthecommunityrich.”Onwubiko(2001:8285)arguesfor usingJuliusNyerere’snotionofujamaainnationandcommun itybuilding. Having conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Tanzania since 1984 onwards, I feel privileged to have experienced at leastthetailendofujamaasocialism.Itwasafascinatingendea vourthathashadatremendousimpactonthesenseofnational unityandsocialstabilityrightuptothepresent(Othman2000). Butitwasnotasuccessintermsofeconomicdevelopment(Ma ghimbi1992,1995a,1995b;Shivji2008;StögerEising2000;Schweig man 2001). In general, the production of food and cash crops

2 TherearetwomainorientationsintheAfricanRenaissancerhet oric.Oneispoliticalandadministrative:itpresentstheAfricanRenais sanceasaforwardlookingconcept.Theotherisculturalandphilosoph ical:initAfricanRenaissancereferstotheindigenousvaluesofthepast thatshouldserveasthefoundationofpresentAfricansociety(cf.Boele vanHensbroek2001:3).

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dropped dramatically,3 and the exploitation of natural resources (land,water,wood)acceleratedduetoastringentcampaignto formvillages.4IamthereforesomewhatsuspiciouswhenIhear African theologians say that the best and only way to pros perity and peace in Africa is to delink from the world system andgobacktothepathsoftheancestors.5 Ifthepastwassoprosperousandpeaceful,What—tobor rowthetitleofabookbyVanderVeen(2004)WentWrongwith Africa? Three questions can be asked about going back to the pathsoftheancestors.First,ifthecommunalistpathsexistedat all in precolonial Africa, do they still exist in our presentday globalized world? Second, if they still exist, do they promote developmentinthesenseofpeaceandprosperityasadvocates ofAfricanRenaissancehold?Andthird,whatisthesignificance of the answers to these two questions for the relation between African (indigenous) and modern (scientific) models of devel opment? InthiscontributionIwillreviewsomeoftheassumptions underlyingtherevivalistorientationintheAfricanRenaissance rhetoric. They are: (1) Africa’s future lies in going back to the past,thatis,Africandevelopmentshouldbebasedontraditional models;and(2)AfricahastosolveitsproblemsinAfricanways, i.e. by using indigenous models and by delinking from the world system. My review is based on my own ethnographic

3

Factorsinthedecreasewerebadclimaticconditions,warwithU gandaandhighoilprices,aswellasineffectiveagriculturalpolicies(Hy den1983:200;Maghimbi1992:121). 4

Peoplewereforcedtoliveinvillages,whereastheywereusedto livingscatteredacrossthecountryandusingthescarcenaturalresour ces.Thisresultedin,amongotherthings,deforestationanddesertifica tion(WijsenandTanner2002:12327). 5

Thetherapyofdelinkingisnotnew.Undertheinspirationofsuch lecturersasWalterRodney(1972),LatinAmericandependenciatheories tookrootintheUniversityofDaresSalaamcampus.”Imperialismwas seenasenemynumberoneandcallswereputforthtodisengagefrom theimperialistandtheworldcapitalistsystem,”saysShivji(1990:53). And,hecontinues,“Thesolutionthuslayinaradicalorevenarevolu tionary disengagement (delinking) from imperialism, and in serious selfreliance.”

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fieldwork in Sukumaland in northwest Tanzania and on com parisonswithcasestudiesinotherpartsofAfrica.6 Iwilllookatthedebateonreligionanddevelopmentfrom the perspective of critical discourse analysis. Unlike radical poststructuralistdiscourseanalystswhoclaimthatthereisno thing beyond discourse, or, at least, that scholars do not have accesstorealityoutsidediscourse,Iassumethatitispossibleto replace an inadequate representation of reality by a better one through dialogical research and critique. At a minimum, it should be an aim of any scientific investigation to know more aboutrealityandtoproducerepresentationsofrealitythatare as good as possible (Phillips and Jørgensen 2004: 18285). Ac cordingtoFairclough(1992:9,60)discourseanalysisisaform ofideologycritique.Italsoimpliesintervention. Thiscontributionhasfivesections.First,Iwillexplorethe resurgenceofreligioninthepublicdomaininAfrica.Second,I will describe African alternatives to neoliberal globalization. Third,Iwillelaborateonthestruggleaboutdefinitionsofdevel opment.Andfourth,IwillgiveacriticalappraisaloftheAfri can alternatives to the neoliberal model of development. The fifth section will provide reflection and the future prospect. I willclosewithadiscussionandconclusion. TheResurgenceofReligioninthePublicDomain Variousscholarsofinternationalrelationsanddevelopmentis sues have written about the worldwide resurgence of religion (Thomas 2005; Fox and Sandler 2006; Klein Goldewijk 2007). For present purposes I am interested not so much in whether the claim is true or not but in how the resurgence of religion manifestsitselfinAfricaandhowitcanbeexplained.Withre spect to the phenomenon itself, we can observe that the dom inantresponsetotheeconomicandpoliticalcrisesinAfricahas

6

InmystudieswithRalphTannerIinvestigatediftheassumption thatreligion“isapositivefactorindevelopmentandpeace”holdstrue (WijsenandTanner2000:150).Tannerwasacolonialadministratorand governmentanthropologistinTanzaniainthe1940sand1950s.During the1960shewasalectureratMakerereUniversity,Kampala,Uganda. IcametoTanzaniain1984.Togetherwehavemorethanfiftyyearsofex perienceandfieldworkinEastAfrica.

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been communication with the spirit world (Ellis and Ter Haar 2004;TerHaarandEllis2006).7Whetherornotthisresponseis called“religious”dependsonthedefinitionofreligionused.8 Toexplainthisphenomenonwemustseetheresurgenceof religion against its historical background. During decoloniz ationmostcountriesinAfricahadhighexpectations(Maghimbi 1995a: 42, 1995b). Slave trade, imperialism and colonialism were overandAfricalookedforwardtoabrightfuture.Butthelinks with the former colonial powers remained, and little by little mostAfricancountriesbecameinvolvedinColdWartensions. They received a great deal of development aid for ideological reasons,andAfricandictatorswerekeptinplace. AfterthefalloftheBerlinWallon9November1989thesit uationchanged.ThegovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesofAmer ica and Russia no longer had political interests in Africa. The gap left by the superpowers was to some extent filled by the IslamicArab bloc.9 Whereas there had once been a “scramble forAfrica,”albeitmotivatedpurelybyselfinterest,inthepost ColdWareranobodyseemedinterestedinthecontinent. ThepsychologicalandspiritualcrisisinAfricais,however, muchdeeperthantheeconomicandpoliticalcrisis.Afterinde pendence, the leaders of the liberated African states, such as KwameNkrumah,KennethKaunda,JomoKenyattaandJulius Nyerere, produced nationalistideological philosophies that were secular. But these “grand narratives” no longer worked in the

7

Idefinereligionasapracticethathumanactorsperceiveascom municationwithspiritualbeingswhomtheybelievetoexistandaffect theirlives(Platvoet1982:2430).InthisneoTyloriandefinitionthecon ceptofcommunicationiscrucial. 8

Inthisessaytheintentionofthehumanactorisusedtodifferenti atevariousmodesofcommunicationwiththespiritworld,usuallydis tinguishedasreligionversusmagic.Itisbettertoseethetwoasacontin uumofreligiouscommunicationthatrangesfromotherorientedvenera tiontoselforientedmanipulation(Platvoet1982:26). 9

ItwasprobablynocoincidencethattheIslaminAfricaconference tookplaceattheendofNovember1989.Itculminatedinthesocalled AbujaDeclarationof28November1989,whichsoughttopromotesoli darityamongMuslimsinAfricainordertofostertheirdevelopmentand education.SeeAlkalietal.1993.

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postcolonial era and nationstates disintegrated. Of course, var iousAfricanscholarswonderifweareinfactlivinginapost colonialeraandarguethatcolonizationhasbeenexchangedfor globalization. They analyze globalization from the perspective of the world systems theory, which views Africans as victims ratherthanasagents.AsIwillshowlateringreaterdetail,this typeofanalysisispartoftheproblem.Ithasaonedimensional focus on macroeconomic processes and tends to ignore the complexities of local and cultural forms of oppression (Wijsen 1999:131). Hereitwillsufficetosaythatpeoplegaveprioritytoiden tities other than their national identities in the postCold War era.Theylookedforneworientationsandseemedtofindthese inthesecurityofIslamwithitsstrictrules,aswellasinChris tian sects and neotraditional movements. During the ujamaa era religion was an issue in Tanzania, but it was kept outside thepublicdomain.10Sincethemid1980sreligionhasbecomea public issue that, mixed with political interests, threatens na tional unity. People are increasingly elevating religious identi tiesabovenationalorevenethnicidentities(Wijsen2003).One maythinkhere,forexample,ofIslamismandthecasemadefor shari’abyCivicUnitedFrontmembersinTanzania,ofnewChris tianmovementssuchasPentecostalorCharismaticchurchesin Kenya, or the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments in northern Ugan da.Thisessayfocusesonneotraditionalmovementssuchasmun giki(Kagwanja2003)andkemeticism(Odak1979)inKenya,and sungusungu in Tanzania (Bukurura 1994). But, as I hope to show, Islamic, Christian or neotraditional movements that do wellinAfricaintermsofgrowthhavethesameroots. Thetheoryofaresurgenceofreligion,however,iscontest ed.Isitreallyaresurgenceofreligionoraresurgenceofsome thing else, such as magic (Nwankwo 2004: 32) or spirituality

10

 There was a debate on religion and development in Tanzania (Westerlund1980;VanBergen1981)butmainlyamongEuropeans.Reli gionwasnotanissueattheUniversityofDaresSalaam.Atpresent,this universityisplanningtoestablishadepartmentofreligiousstudies.

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(Heelas and Woodhead 2005)?11 And if there is such a resur gence,whataboutongoingsecularization,alsoinAfrica(Meto go1997;ShorterandOnyancha1997;PlatvoetandVanRinsum 2003)?TheunderstandingofreligioninAfricaiscomplex,since theconceptisWesternthroughandthrough.Thelatterpresup posesthedivisionoflabourinsocietyandtheseparationof—or atleastacleardistinctionbetween—sacredandprofanedomains of life. Where this distinction is blurred, as happens in Mbiti (1969:1)whenheclaimsthatinAfrica“religionpermeatesinto allthedepartmentsoflifesofullythatitisnoteasyorpossible alwaystoisolateit,”talkaboutreligionbecomesvague. Thisbringsustothecomplexissueofthenatureofreligion and African religion in particular. Early anthropologists ob served pragmatic utilitarianism and sheer materialism in Afri canreligion(EvansPritchard1937).Theseattitudespossiblyex plain why prosperity churches are so popular in Africa nowa days(Nwankwo2004:32).AsIwillshowingreaterdetail,ev erydayAfricanreligion(incontrasttotheconstructsofAfrican philosophersandtheologians)is“magical,”asaremostlivedor popularreligionsintheworld.12  SurvivalandRevivalofIndigenousSpiritualities IreferredabovetothefalloftheBerlinWallandtheconsequent widespreadbeliefthatneoliberalismisauniversalsystem.One reactiontoneoliberalglobalizationinAfricaistodelinkfrom the world system and to search for alternatives in indigenous spiritualities (Odozor 1997). This trend is found in various fields of study. I will briefly mention five of them. Each field would requireadetailedtreatiseofitsown. Inresponsetoenvironmentaldestructionasaresultofagri cultural applications of Western science and technology, Afri

11

AsIexplainedintheintroduction,Idonotdefinemagicorspir itualityas“somethingelse”butasmodesofreligion.AsIwillshowlater, theyseemtobeontheselforientedendofthecontinuum. 12

Theterm“magic”hasanegativeconnotationintheologicalcir cles,whereitisregardedastheoppositeofreligion.Asexplainedabove, Iuse“magic”asadescriptivetermtodifferentiatevariousmodesofreli giouspractice(WijsenandTanner2000:151).

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cans revert to indigenous knowledge in agriculture and envir onmental care (Wangiri 1999: 82). The conviction underlying these attempts is that the ground in which the ancestors are buried is holy and should not be exploited. In African tradi tionalspiritualitythespiritworldandthenaturalworldarein terconnected. Therefore, whoever harms the natural world harms the spiritual world. It is thus said that the African atti tudetonatureisrelational,notinstrumental(Daneel1998). Criticizing the neoliberal market economy, African schol arsofbusinessandmanagementadvocateAfrica’scommunity spirit.Inreactiontowhatisperceivedas“typicalWestern”in dividualismandmaterialism,decisionmakinginorganizations andcompaniesistobebasedonAfrica’s“palavermodel”and focusedonsocialcapital,notonlyonmaterialgains.Thespirits oftheancestorsshouldbeusedassocialcapitalinthemanage mentoforganizationsandstates,saysMbigi(2000).Inasubsis tenceeconomypeopleworkinordertoliveandnottheotherway round (Hyden 1983). It is an “economy of enough” in which “smallisbeautiful.” ManypeopleinAfricaresorttotraditionalhealing(Chep kwony 2006). One of the consequences of globalization is that thegapbetweentherichandpoorwidens.Manypeoplecannot affordtobuyWesternmedicinethereforeandthusresorttoin digenous healers for two reasons: they find their rituals more compatiblewiththeirownworldview,andhealersareavailable ingreaternumbers.InUganda,forexample,theratiobetween (Westerntrained)medicaldoctorsandpatientsis1:20,000,where as the ratio between indigenous healers and patients is 1:100 (Khamalwa2006:88). Customary law and peacekeeping are being reinstated in many parts of Africa. In Tanzania the sungusungu vigilantist movement developed (Masanja 1992; Bukurura 1994), as did the gacaca people’s tribunals in Rwanda and the gadagada sys teminEthiopia.ManyAfricansholdthatWesternlawfailedto bring justice and peace to Africa (Mutua 2003; Van Notten 2006).Hencetheypromotetraditionalreconciliationritualsand conflict resolution, as happened in South Africa (where tradi tionalritualsweremixedwithChristiansideas)andisnowbe ingproposedinnorthernUganda.

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Traditional ways of governance and decision making are usedasalternativestoWesterntypedemocracyinvariouspartsof Africa (Assefa 1996; Gounden, Pillary and Mbugua 2007). The multipartysystemisnotreallydemocratic,itissaid,sinceitis basedoncompromiseratherthanconsensus(Bujo1998).Chiefs arebeingreinstatedinUgandaandtosomeextentinTanzania, and in Ethiopia nationbuilding is based on a federal system runonethniclines(Abbink1997;Hamer2007). Thisisnottheplaceforadetailedexplanationofwhythe concept of spirituality has become so popular in the West (Heelas and Woodhead 2005) and in the “TwoThirds World” (AbrahamandMbuyBeya1994;Olupona2000)andwhetherit is a mode of religion or an alternative to religion. The point is thatthealternativestoneoliberalglobalizationmentionedabove arebasedonAfrica’scommunalism(Eboh2004:219),andfrom an African perspective the community includes the spirits of theancestors.Thus,communalismisspiritual(Mbigi2000). TheStruggleabouttheDefinitionofDevelopment Fromadiscourseanalyticalperspectivetheaimofresearchisto explorethestrugglebywhichdefinitionsofpolyphonicreality become so natural that they are taken for granted (Fairclough 1992:60).Ineverydayspeech“development”referstothepro cessbywhichthepotentialofathingorpersonachievesmatur ity or fulfilment. As such, the notion of “development” has a connectionwithateleological,inparticularChristian,philosophy oflife(TerHaarandEllis2006:354).Onecanspeakaboutagri cultural, social, economic, national or international, psycholo gicalorspiritualdevelopment. The term often refers in development studies to the dis course that started in eighteenth and nineteenthcentury Eu ropeaboutbringingabetterqualityoflifetothelessadvanced areasoftheworld.13And,ofcourse,“betterquality”referredto what Western Europeans and North Americans considered “normal”:economicgrowthandmodernizationthrougheduca 13

ThesedevelopmentswerenotEuropeaninthesensethatthey startedwithgoingbacktoEuropeantraditions.Theystartedwithrevolu tionssuchastheFrenchRevolutionandtheIndustrialRevolutionwhich wereexperiencedatfirstasbeingagainstthetradition.

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tion and health care, science and technology. Policy makers (bothnativeandforeign)whoadvocateaWesterntypedevelop ment refer therefore to the eradication of poverty and hunger, achievinguniversalprimaryeducation,promotinggenderequal ity,reducingchildlabourandmortality,combatingHIV/AIDS, ensuringenvironmentalsustainability.14 Somedevelopmentscholarspreferdefinitions“fromwith in,”inapeople’sownterms,i.e.endogenousdevelopmentbased on local knowledge systems (Millar et al. 2006; Du Toit 2007). Development, then, is the process in which people use their ownresourcestoachievewhattheyconsidertobeamoresatis factory life (Theuri 2002: 193).15 The people in the Tanzanian villagewhereIlivedandworkedusedtosay:theaimofdevel opment is a good life, manifested in the fertility of the land, cows and wives, health and wealth in the family, wellbeing and happiness, vitality, life force and spiritual power (Wijsen andTanner2000). According to others, development should be sustainable. The term “sustainability” stems from German studies on for estryandreferstologginginsuchawaythattheforestcanre storeitself.Thetermwasintroducedtodevelopmentdiscourse bytheWorldConservationStrategy(Allen1980)andhascome into general usage since the socalled Brundtland Commission Report(Brundtland1988).Thequalificationofsustainabilitycom prises the notion of intragenerational and intergenerational solidarity. In other words, our development should not be a chievedatthecostofothers,whethertheylivenoworareyetto beborn.Thismeansthatthepresentgenerationmustnotsatis fy its own needs to the extent that it depletes the natural re sourcesofitsdescendants.

14

PolicymakerswhoadvocateWesterntypedevelopmentarenot onlyWesternersinthegeographicalsenseoftheword;manyAfrican governmentsareaswell.Thedevelopmentmodeloftheujamaaregime wasnotessentiallydifferentfromthatofthecolonialrulers(Maghimbi 1995a,1995b;WijsenandTanner2002). 15

AsWorldBankstudiesshow,whatisconsideredtobeamoresat isfactorylifemayvarywithinoneandthesamecountry(NarayanParker 1997).

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With respect to intragenerational solidarity, however, it has been observed that conflicts in Africa are often related to ethnicity (Pierli, Presbitero, and Muko 1999: 4145) and motiv ated by religious beliefs; since most—if not all—African reli gions are ethnic religions it would even be difficult to disting uishethnicandreligiousconflicts.Severalethnicgroupsbelieve that they are the only “proper” people and that other ethnic groups are not people.16 The superiority complex is usually backed up by a myth that people in the West would call reli gious.TheMaasaihavealegendthatallcattlearegiventothem by God and therefore cattle raiding is legitimate (Getui 1999a: 13).TheTutsihegemonyovertheHutuwasjustifiedbyamyth tellingthemthattheirdominancewasordainedby God(Skin nader2002:4950). As far as intergenerational solidarity is concerned, indig enous religions seem to be overly anachronistic (Wiredu 1980: 12). The mistake of traditionalism is that “what we ought to be” is defined in terms of “what we used to be,” says Kwasi Wiredu (1992: 60). He summarizes the “three evils” of African culture as anachronism, authoritarianism and supernaturalism (Wiredu1980:1).Supernaturalismisnotthebeliefintheexist ence of supernatural beings but the belief that our wellbeing depends only on these beings (Wiredu 1980: 5), an attitude foundinsomeoftheprosperitychurchestoday,ascanbeseen in their denial of the causal relation between HIV and AIDS. Closely connected and more important than this attitude is an intuitive, unanalytic and unscientific mode of thinking (Wire du1980:11). IndigenousSpirituality:BlessingorCurse? Thus, at first glance it seems that indigenous knowledge and thedemandsofsustainabledevelopment,insiders’andoutsid ers’ views, or local and global concerns are incompatible. Eth 16 ThisisnottosaythatAfricanpeoplesaremoreethnocentricthan otherpeoples.Ethnocentrismishumanandplaysitspartonothercon tinentsaswell.ButinmanyAfricancountriestheexperienceofnational unityisnotstrongenoughtosuppressethnocentricsentiments.Inthe fieldofnationalunityNyereredidagreatjob,aswestatedintheintro duction.

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nocentrismandanachronisminAfricanspiritualitiesseemcon straints on intergenerational and intragenerational solidarity. LetusnowtakeacloserlookattheAfricanalternativestoneo liberal globalization that we mentioned before by citing exam plesfromourstudiesinSukumalandandfromcasestudiesin otherpartsofAfrica. Ofcourse,weshouldnotgeneralize.Africaisahugecon tinentwithalonghistory.Insomesocietiesthecommunitarian attitudeseemsveryweak,asisthecasewiththeIkinUganda; inothersocietiesitisverystrong,asseemstobethecasewith the Nyakyusa of Tanzania. In some places the belief in a Su premeBeingand/orspiritualbeingsseemsomnipresent,where asinotherplacesthisbeliefseemsalmostabsent(Horton1975). Moreover,theseattitudesandbeliefsmayvarywithtime.Thus, attitudes towards other people (intragenerational solidarity) and the natural environment (intergenerational solidarity) are nothomogeneousinAfrica. Undoubtedly,therearemanyplacesinAfricathatarebe lieved to be sacred, but the Sukuma of northwest Tanzania do not have such a belief, neglecting even their own ancestors’ houses(WijsenandTanner2000:6263).Sukumalandwassparsely populatedandfarmerssimplymovedfromonefieldtoanother (Wijsen and Tanner 2000: 6970; Brandström 1991). However, with evergrowing populations, there is a danger of overgraz ing and desertification. The campaign to form villages under the ujamaa regime is a case in point (StögerEising 2000; Schweig man2001).Tanzaniahadapopulationof16millionin1975;by 2000itwas35million.Thepopulationisexpectedtobe60mil lionin2025and88millionin2050.Agriculturebasedonindige nousknowledgewillnotbeabletofeedAfrica’sescalatingpop ulations(Getui1999b),whichwillmoreoverincreasinglylivein townsandnotinruralareaswherefoodproductiontakesplace. Mwanza, the capital city of Sukumaland, had a population of approximately 40,000 in the 1950s and over a million now, in spiteofthemanyAIDSvictims.Oldattitudestonaturewillnot solveglobalenvironmentalproblems(Taringa2003:212;Ndun gu2005:6668). Africa’s community spirit did a lot to maintain solidarity. But in Sukumaland solidarity extended mainly to one’s own

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clan.17 There were no communal rituals except in times of dis tress, severe drought or cattle raids (Wijsen and Tanner 2000: 7475).ThustheSukumaarewillingtoinvestinwatersupplies orotherdevelopmentprojectsonlyifthereisanimmediatere turnforthefamily(WijsenandTanner2000:68;Drangert1993: 33).Segeja(1998:14)notesthatshikome(whichhedefinesasre verential dialogue) deals mostly with family affairs. “Minimal effort is made to reflect on issues in a broader context,” and “[a]lthough nonSukuma may be invited to participate in shi kome, their views would not be taken very seriously.” It is doubtfulwhetherfamilysolidarityworksonalargerscale.This is also the lesson of ujamaa (StögerEising 2000; Schweigman 2001). The communitarian spirit within the clan causes lack of creativity and initiative, as well as fear of jealousy and witch craft.Theresultisnotonlyhostilitytowardsoutsidersbutalso pressurewithinthegroup. Undoubtedly, Sukuma traditional healers do a good job. They are bonesetters, herbalists, and psychotherapists. But if Sukumahealersclaimthatalldiseasesarepersonal,causedby witchesandancestors,orwilledbyGod,andthattheirpatients thereforedonotneedtogothehospitalbecausemodernmed icine based on science and technology cannot cure them, they arenotpromotingthehealthoftheirpatients(WijsenandTan ner 2000: 48). It can be observed that traditional healers have significant results in treating the symptoms of HIV/AIDS, and for that reason should be given a place in the health care sys tem,buttheycannotcurethedisease,assomeofthemclaim.18

17

TheVictoriaFederationofCooperativeUnionsinSukumaland seemstobeanexceptiontothisrule.Atthetimeitwasthelargestco operativeorganizationinAfrica,operatinginoppositiontotheAsian cottontradersintheregion(WijsenandTanner2002:128).Thismoreor lessconfirmsourobservationthattherewaslittlecommunalsolidarity exceptintimesofdistress(WijsenandTanner2002:74). 18 ThisisnottosaythatallSukumahealersmakethisclaim.There arealsoAfricanpresidents(e.g.YahyaJammehofGambia)whosaythat theycancuresixoutoftenAIDSvictimsbymeansofherbalteaand Koran texts. Even South African president Thabo Mbeki questioned openlyifAIDSwascausedbyHIV.Butinhiscasethebackgroundisnot religious(Mbekiseemsagnostic;inanyeventheisnotreligiouslyactive

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Customarylawandtraditionalpeacekeepinghavethead vantage that they are smallscale and have immediate effect. The sungusungu in Sukumaland were successful in bringing peacebutusedmeansthatareunacceptablebyWesternstand ards.FewSukumawouldconsideritwrongtokillasuspected witchoracattlethiefcaughtintheactortostealfromastran gerorthegovernment(WijsenandTanner2000:96).Thegacaca tribunalsarenotpopularamongeithertheHutu,whofearthat thetrialswillbeunfair,ortheTutsi,whofearreprisals.Accord ing to traditional leaders, Joseph Kony should be granted am nestyafteratraditionalreconciliationritual,butmostordinary people want justice to be done (Allen 2006). The peace agree ment in Kenya after the postelection violence in 2007 was not basedontheAfricanpalavermodel(Bujo1998:3637)butonin ternational pressure. And several scholars question if the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa will be effective inthelongrun(Meiring2002). Traditional governance and decisionmaking are a com munal affair based on consensus. Yet, the Sukuma chiefs were notpopular,andyouthsandwomenhadnosayinthedecision making of the elders (Wijsen and Tanner 2002: 7578). In 2004, of54memberstatesoftheAfricanUnion,18hadcivilwarsrag ing in their territories and four of the five largest refugee populationsintheworldwereAfrican.Whyisitthattherebels in Darfur distrust their own leaders in the African Union and seek intervention by the United Nations? The Mungiki move mentinKenyaisalsoaprotestagainstthepoweroftheelders (Kagwanja 2003; Frederiksen 2007), and various womenled spiritmovementsareprotestsagainstmaledominance(Wijsen andTanner2000:117;Waliggo2002:16).Ethnicitycancontrib utetotheselfesteemofoppressedpeoples.Butitisdifficultto build a nation on ethnicity as is shown by the ethnicitybased federalsystemofEthiopia.Itleadstoatotalitarianstate,based ontheoldageprincipleofdivideandrule.

inpublic)butpolitical:Africansdieofpoverty,notofAIDS.

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NotOnlyaSolutionbutalsoPartoftheProblem We referred above to Van der Veen’s study, What Went Wrong with Africa (2004). There are many more studies written in an Afropessimisticmood,suchasDavidSigner’sDieÖkonomieder Hexerei (2004), Landes’ study, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998)andRobertCalderesi’sstudy,TheTroublewithAfrica(2006). Indeed, there is no lack of studies that attribute the misery in AfricatoAfricansthemselves.Thisisunfair,sincethesestudies tendtounderestimateinternationaloppression.But,ontheoth er hand, to say that in precolonial Africa food was abundant andconflictunknown—as,amongothers,Nangoli(1986:1821) andMuriuki(2001:13540)doisunrealistic.19 TheAfrocentricclaimthatallevilscomefromEuropeand all solutions from Africa is a stereotype, as is the Eurocentric claimthatAfrica’smiseryisdueonlytoitsprescientificignor anceorwitchcraftbeliefs,whichmustbeeradicatedbymodern izationandscientificdevelopment.Thisisjusttoexchangeone ethnocentrism(Eurocentrism)foranother(Afrocentrism).Froma discourseanalyticalperspectiveonemustbesuspiciousofone sided approaches that fix multifacetted development issues to simplecausesandsolutions.ThisappliesalsotoIslamism(“we are the best of all people”) and Pentecostalism (“we are the saved”),whichbyandlargehavethesameroots. Whetheronesolutionisbetterthananother,suchasNyer ere’s ujamaa socialism or Mwinyi’s ruksa liberalization,20 needs tobedecidedinadebateondevelopmentdefinitionsandpoli cies. In contrast to the theoretical universalism with which I startedinthefirstsection,namelytheassumptionthatafterthe 19 Apartfromnaturaldisasterssuchasrinderpestandtsetseflies, therewasintranationaloppression.Mirambo,chiefofUgowe,extended hispowerthroughoutmostofNyamweziland(insomestudies,Sukuma landisconsideredpartofNyamweziland)andwasinvolvedinslave trade.HecollaboratedwithTippuTib,anAfroArabslavetraderwho wasofNyamwezidescenthimself. 20

Nyerere’ssuccessor,AliHassanMwinyi,whowaspresidentfrom 1985till1995,abandonedtheujamaastatecontrolledeconomyandpro motedafreemarketeconomy.MwinyiwasnicknamedMr.Ruksa.He mentionedruhusaagreatdeal,theSwahiliwordforpermission,which heasaZanzibaripronouncedasruksa.

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falloftheBerlinWallneoliberalismisacceptedbyallnations, thisbattleistobefoughtaccordingtotheprinciplesofconcrete universalism.Thisimpliesthatavalueorpracticedevelopedby thepeopleofonecultureisembracedbypeopleofanothercul ture through a process of conversation and collaboration and finally reaches a universal status because it is accepted by all (Tarimo2004:2829). Thestruggleaboutdefinitionsofdevelopmentwillalways be controversial, since it is based not only on rational argu mentsandperceivedfactsbutalsoonpowergames,ideologies andconvictions.Thisisshownby,amongotherthings,thede bate on The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the for mulation of alternative declarations, e.g. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. However, this struggle is no longer only,andnotevenprimarily,betweenEuropeansorNorthAmer icans and Africans but between Africans themselves and be tweenEuropeansandNorthAmericansthemselves.21 Magesa’s “hope of independence,” with which I started, mayhaveworkedduringthedecolonizationperiod,whenAfri cans had to regain confidence in themselves after being de pendentonEuropeansforacenturyorlonger.22Butinaworld characterized by interdependence the “hope of independence” and going back to “the continent’s own philosophical vision” alone becomes dysfunctional.23 According to the critics of uja

21

SincethiscontributionelaboratesonapaperthatIpresentedin 2007Iwillmakeanabstractionofdebatesonneoliberalismsincethefi nancialcrisisthatoccurredin2008,theelectionoftheUSpresidentBar ackObama,newsocialistexperimentsinsomeLatinAmericannations, andthedebateaboutDambisaMoyo’srecentstudy,DeadAid(Penguin 2009). 22

ThedurationandintensityofEuropeancolonialisminAfricais subjecttoseriousdebate.InSukumalanditdidnotlastlongandwasnot veryintense(WijsenandTanner2002)andthisappliestomanyother partsofAfricaaswell(EllisandTerHaar2004:143). 23

Asstatedabove,inmyviewtheoldstyleanalysisofcentreperi pheryrelations(Rodney1972),whichisstillverypopularinAfrica,is partoftheproblem(Wijsen1999).Ofcourse,theinterdependenceofcul turesandeconomiesisatheoreticalassumption,justastheworldsystem theoryanditsnotionofdependencewere.Butitwouldbeasdifficultto

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maa,delinkingfromtheworldsystemisnotgoingtohelpAfri ca, just as the “disengagement” discourse in the 1970s did not helpit(Maghimbi1992,1995a,1995b;Shivji1990,2008). There is, I suspect, a “Paradise Lost”mentality at work in thediscourseontheAfricanRenaissance.Consideringthemas siveinternalmigrationsinAfricaandintercontinentaltradebe tween Africa and Asia or the Arab world for two millennia or more, Africa has never been a continent of stable, closed com munities.Localisnotopposedtoglobal;rather,localislargelya productofglobal.JustaswhatisperceivedasAfricancultureis toalargeextentan“inventionoftradition”(Ranger1983,1993), the notion of the African society as a closed community where peoplearealwaysprosperousandpeacefulistoalargeextenta romanticconstruct,an“inventionoflocality”(Robertson1995:35). DiscussionandConclusion My answer to the question if Africa’s communalist traditions stillexistinourglobalworld,iftheyeverexistedatall,is,onthe onehand,thattheyarebeingpropagatedasalternativestoneo liberaldevelopment.Thustheyappeartoexist.Butontheother handitremainstobeseeniftheyaretobeinterpretedasreviv als or inventions. The Sukuma people of Northwest Tanzania neverhadthistradition(WijsenandTanner2002),andthisap plies to various other Tanzanian and African peoples as well. Nyerere’s idea that socialism and democracy were already at home in Africa was too simplistic. Perhaps it was the case in some parts, but they were not general societal patterns (Ma ghimbi1992). Myanswertothesecondquestionofthispaper,i.e.ifthe paths of the ancestors promote development, depends on how development is defined, and, as we have seen, this is the out comeofstruggle.Ifdevelopmentisdefined“fromwithin,”ina people’sownterms,theanswertothisquestionmaybeinthe affirmative.Thepathsoftheancestorsmaybringpeaceandpros perity to one’s own clan. But, if development is defined in

theorizeaboutpresentdayAfricawithouttakingtheinfluenceofthe ChineseintoaccountasitistotheorizeaboutAfricainthepastwithout recognizingtheinfluenceoftheArabs.

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terms of sustainability, i.e. guided by intra and intergenera tionalsolidarity,thisisquestionable.Inthelightofsustainabil ity,indigenousspiritualityinSukumalandsuffersfromserious constraints both in terms of ethnocentrism (lack of generosity) and anachronism (lack of futurity). And this applies to other partsofAfricaaswell(Wiredu1980;Gyekye1997). InthiscontributionIreviewedtwoassumptionsinthere vivalistAfricanRenaissancerhetoric:(1)thefutureofAfricalies in going back to the past, i.e. African development should be basedontraditionalmodels,and(2)Africahastosolveitsown problemsinAfricanwaysbygoingbacktoindigenousmodels anddelinkingfromtheworldsystem.OnempiricalgroundsI tend to agree with Gyekye that the ideology of Africa’s com munity spirit (referred to as ubuntu, harambee, or ujamaa) is basedontwomistakes.TheideaofAfrica’scommunityspiritis both“overstated”(Gyekye1997:37)and“misinterpreted”(Gy ekye 1997: 148). Advocates of these ideas confuse ethical ideas with economic systems. Gyekye (1997: 239) bluntly says, “One aspect of the African postcolonial experience where the reviv alist position would do more harm than good is the aspect of development.” Accordingtosomescholars,traditionalindigenousknowl edgeonjustice,medicine,andagriculture,forexample,islarge ly compatible with and even offers better conditions for the possibility of sustainable development. Of course, this would varyinvariousfieldsofstudyandgeographicalterritories,but in Sukumaland this is not the case. There was and is ex ploitativefarmingandlittleornosolidarityoutsideone’sown group. This is not a moral assessment. Given their climatic conditions, as subsistence farmers, the Sukuma simply do not have the possibility to invest in activities if there is no imme diatereturn;andthisappliestomany,ifnotmost,subsistence farmers(Hyden1983). Thusmyanswertothethirdquestion,whattheoutcomeof our discussion signifies for the relation between traditional African and modernEuropean models of development is that theyhavetheirowncontextuallogic.Aswasclearfromthean alysis of Tanzania socialism, the two models seem to address different issues and to operate on different levels. Ujamaa may havebeeneffectiveinaddressingfamilyissuesonthelocallev

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el,butitappearedtobeadisasterwhenappliedtotheeconomy ofanation(Maghimbi1992;Shivji2008). Traditionalreconciliationritualsmayhavebeeneffectivein restoring peace in the village, but their effectiveness may be limited when applied to interethnic or international conflicts. Traditionalmedicineisveryeffectiveinhealingpsychosomatic diseases but so farithasnotbeenabletoofferatreatmentfor the AIDS pandemic, notwithstanding the claim of some tradi tional healers and African politicians to the contrary. And it is yettobeseenifindigenousagriculturecanfeedtheevergrow ingpopulationsofAfrica. Comingbacktothedistinctionbetweenreligionandspirit uality,Iamnotsureiftalkaboutspiritualityisjustanotherfad or a breakthrough in religious studies. When I hear Lovemore Mbigi(2000)say,“InAfricanspiritreligion,thespiritrepresents ourultimaterealself,”itresemblesthetypeofspiritualitythat Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead (2005) describe when they speakaboutthe“subjectiveturn”to“Godwithin.”Itisinthis subjectivitythatoldandnewcosmicspiritualitiesmeet.Ihypo thesizethatmodesofreligionthatareontheselforientedend ofthecontinuum(e.gmagic,andspiritualityintheabovemen tioned sense) are not very supportive of sustainable develop ment.WhetherornotthereisaconnectionbetweenChristianity anddevelopment,aswassuggestedabove,andwhetherornot Christianity does better in terms of sustainability, is subject to furtherresearch.Ihastentoaddthatselforientedmodesofreli gion are not confined to African religion but are found in all religioustraditions. Last but not least, critical discourse analysts do not per ceiveitastheirprimarytasktotestifrepresentationsofrealityare true or false (Phillips and Jørgensen 2004). This type of testing would go far beyond their competence. According to radical poststructuralistdiscourseanalysts,itwouldevenbeimpossi bletoproveifstatementsarerightorwrongsincewehaveno accesstorealityoutsideourrepresentationofreality.Thisisnot my position. What critical discourse analysts can do is to analyze the debate on the definitions of reality, to show dom inant and peripheral voices in the debate, and to criticize ide ological positions that fix complex problems to single causes and readymade solutions. In the field of development issues

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300 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Wiredu, K. (1992). “Problems in Africa’s SelfDefinition in the Con temporary World.” In: K. Gyekye and K. Wiredu (eds). Person and Community. Ghanaian Philosophical Studies 1. Washington: TheCouncilforResearchinValuesandPhilosophy.Pp.5970. (1980). Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

AfricanPhilosophy,Contextualisation, Multiculturalism W.L.vanderMerwe

Abstract AfricanPhilosophyisrelatedtotheneedfortheselfreflectivecontextualisa tionofphilosophyinamulticulturalsociety.AfricanPhilosophy,understood as a family name for all the diverse articulations of philosophy from within andfortheculturalcontextsofAfrica,issignificantinthisregardasitexem plifiesinaparadigmaticwaythehistoricalandculturalcontingencyorcon textual particularity of philosophy. It is argued that a similar, though more complicatedselfreflectivecontextualisationofphilosophyiswhatiscalledfor inpresentdaysocieties.Byanalysingthelogicofmodernityitisarguedthat modernisation and the increasing globalisation of modern culture does not meanincreasingculturalhomogeneity,buttheextensionofculturaldifferen ces and multiculturalism to a common feature of societies. In conclusion a few preliminary remarks are made about the impact of multiculturalism on philosophyandhowphilosophymaycontributetowardstheselfunderstand ingandwellbeingofmulticulturalsocieties.

Introduction1 Philosophy has always been contextual but not always selfre flectively aware of its own contextuality. This is no longer the case,atleastnotwithinwhatisbroadlycalled“WesternPhilo sophy.”Anawarenessofitsowncontextualityisnowcommon place, due to a number of twentiethcentury developments from withinthetraditionitself.Tonameafew:the“linguisticturn” (thelaterWittgenstein’sexplorationofthepluriformityoflang uagegamesandformsoflife),the“hermeneuticturn”(Heideg

1

This article is a revised version of “African Philosophy and the ContextualizationofPhilosophyinaMulticulturalSociety,”AfricAvenir Foundation;http://www.africavenir.org/fulltext/fulltext03.html.  301

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ger’s disclosure of the historicity of Being), the “critical turn” (Critical Theory’s unmasking of the entanglement of philosophy and power relations), the “structuralist turn” (the early Fou cault’s genealogy of the discourses of knowledge/power), the “pragmatistturn”(Rorty’sdebunkingoftheuniversalisticpreten tions of philosophy as such), and—last but not least—the “de construtivist turn” (Derrida’s devastating driving home of the consequencesofalltheformerforanyattempttoabstract“text” from“context”).Thus,thedecenteringawarenessoftheunde niable and insurmountable relation between thought and cul tureeruptedinthetwentiethcenturyattheverycentreofWest ernphilosophy.Theaftershockofthiseruptioniscalled“post modernism.”Therubbleitleftbehindiscalled“eurocentrism,” the fertile soil posited by it is called “postcolonialism.” The newcropsproutingfromthissoil,iscalled“multiculturalism.” This is how it should be, because the encounter of philosophy withmulticulturalismisboththechallengeandtheimperative towardsitsownselfreflectivecontextualistion. Perhaps the tradition of Western Philosophy is ironically the most susceptible to meet this challenge, because of its self relativising impulse. But, the need for contextualisation is not onlyaboutreflectiononthediversitiesofcontextandtheappli cation of methods and approaches to the diversity of contexts. The need is for appropriation of these contexts. One example of suchapostcolonialdiversityofcontexts,ofextremerelevance to European (and particularly Continental philosophy) are the traditions of African thought and wisdom. But, by and large, toolittleattempthasbeenmadeovertheyearsbyleadingana lyticalorContinentalphilosopherstoengageinconstructivedi aloguewithformsofAfricanthoughtandwisdom.2 InthiscontributionIthereforewanttorelateAfricanphilo sophytotheneedforaselfreflectivecontextualisationofphilo sophy in multicultural societies. To highlight the contribution anengagementwihAfricanphilosophycouldmake,Iwillfirst give an assessment of the significance of the development of and debate about the “identity” of “African Philosophy.” My first aim is to show how a proper engagement with “African Philosophy”, too often neglected until recently, could contrib 2

AnotableexceptionistheworkofHeinzKimmerle.

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utetoaselfreflectivecontextualisationofapostcolonialphilo sophyinthemulticulturalcontextsofEurope(orthe“North”). But, to achieve this goal, my second aim is to show that the questforadistinctiveAfricanphilosophyissurpassedbythemul ticultural contexts of presentday societies in Africa and else where. Subsequently, the meaning of multiculturalism will be explainedbeforeIventure,inconclusion,somepreliminaryre marks on the philosophical appropriation of multiculturalism, whichIthusconsidertobeoneofthemajorchallengesofphilo sophyinourglobalisedworld. ContextualisationandAfricanPhilosophy Anintensifyingandincreasinglycomplicateddebatedeveloped in the second half of the twentieth century amongst African philosophers,theirEuropeancounterpartsandanthropologists withaspecialinterestinindigenousAfricancultures,“systems of thought,” and oral traditions of wisdom, with regard to the identity and even the possibility of an “African Philosophy.”3 In recent years the debate has subsided somewhat—and rightly so, for reasons that will become clear shortly. Taking stock of thehistoricaldevelopmentandalltheissuesatstakeinthede bate cannot be done extensively here, but the following obser vationsmaysufficeforourpurpose. Thecontroversialityofthenotionofan“AfricanPhilosophy” fromanEuropeanaswellasanAfricanperspectiveis,especial ly now in hindsight, not surprising or unwarranted, given the presumed historical origin of the concept, activity, and disci plineof“philosophy”inancientGreeceanditscrucialfounda

3

Therearemanyintroductionstoandsurveysofthehistoricalde velopmentofandcurrentpositionsinthisdebate,butWright(1984)and Floistad(1987)canbetakenasauthoritative.Wrightalsoprovidesanex tensivebibliography,asdoesNeugebaurinNaglDocekalandWimmer (1992).TheAfricanPhilosophyReaderbyRouxandCoetzee(1998)and,as tworeadersdobyEmmanuelChukudiEze(ed.),AfricanPhilosophy:An Anthology (1998) and Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader (2008)provideexcellentcompilationsofseminaltextsfromandabout themesandperspectivesinAfricanthought.Myownknowledgeandin terpretationofthisdebatereliestoaconsiderableextentonthecritical expositionbyMasolo(1994).

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tionalfunctioninthe(intellectual)historiesandculturesofEu rope.4Thisintegrallinkbetween“philosophy”andEuropewas reinforced during the Enlightenment, the development of the “newsciences”sincetheeighteenthcentury,andtheEuropean belief in—what Stephen Toulmin (1990) aptly named a “Cos mopolis”—anallencompassingvisionofasocietyasrationally orderedastheNewtonianviewofnatureintermsofwhichhu man nature and society could and should be understood and structured according to exact rational categories. This vision and its philosophical legitimation accompanied the colonising ofotherpartsoftheworld,likeAfrica,inthewakeofthesup posedsuperiorityanduniversalityofEuropeanmodernity.Ac cordingly,thequestionfromtheoutsetinthedebateaboutAfri canPhilosophywasifthedescriptionof“philosophy”assuch,is not irrevocably eurocentric and imperialistic. Thus, whilst seekingtoestablishitsownidentity—atleastinitially—thede bateaboutAfricanphilosophyironicallycontributedtotheex posure of some of the universalist claims of Western philo sophyasmasqueradingformsofeurocentricparticularism. Three developments in the recent history of Western dis courses on Africa and the African responses to it need to be mentionedinthisregard.First,theethnographicalstudiespub lishedsincethelate1940s,whichattemptedtoarticulatetheim plied worldviews, moral values, and conceptual systems em beddedintheculturalcodesandcustomsofindigenousAfrican peoples.Thedebateabouttheirviability,whichtookadecisive turnduringthe1960swiththepublicationofPeterWinch’sar ticle“UnderstandingaPrimitiveSociety”(1964),isnotprimar ilyimportantwithregardtotheidentityofAfricanphilosophy. Its importance may instead be located in the shift it brought about to the questioning of the formerly uncritically assumed neutrality of the conceptual schemes and categories of anthro

4

LocatingthehistoricaloriginofphilosophyinancientGreeceisof coursecontestedbysomeAfricanphilosophersandscholars.See,forex ample,Diop’s(1974)reconstructionofthecrucialroleofAfricainthe genesisofcivilization,followedonandstrengthenedbyOlela1980and 1984,andculminatinginMartinBernal’scontroversialBlackAthena:The AfroasiaticRootsofClassicalCivilization(1987).Seealsoforreferenceson thecontroversy,criticisms,anddefensesfootnote8inBlok1996.

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pologyandphilosophy,andthusthequestioningoftheclaims of“objectivity”and“universality”of(Western)rationalityand themethodologiesofthesciences(Masolo1994:12446). Second,thecontributionsofAfricanintellectualswhowent abroad for a professional training in Continental philosophical trends but returned to Africa and began to articulate in various ways,bytheapplicationandadaptationofthesetrendswithin the context of African experience, what one could call Philo sophiesforAfrica,forexamplePanafricanism,BlackConscious ness, African Socialism, and the conceptualisation of “negri tude” (and its different interpretations) in the writings of Ce saire, Senghor, and Fanon (Clifford 1988: 177). In a dialectical way,theirexistentialandsocialanalysesutilisedtheconceptual schemes and integral ideas of Continental philosophies for a critique on the universalistic claims and supposed superiority ofWesternphilosophy,science,andculture. Third,followingmainlyonthepoliticalliberationandde colonization of Africa, were the contributions of European trained African philosophers like Crahay (1965), Okere (1983), andmorerecentlyMudimbe(1988and1994)—inspiredmainly byhermeneutical,structuralist,andpoststructuralistapproach es—whobegantoanalysethestrategiesanddiscursivepower/ knowledgeformationsintermsofwhich“Africa”wasmargin alisedastheinferior“Other”ofEuropeancultureinthephilo sophicalandscientificdiscourse(s)ofmodernity.Thisapproach made it possible to deconstruct certain ethnophilosophical ac countsofAfricanthoughtinasfarastheyaremerelyconstructs of Western power/knowledge discursive practises and opened thepossibilityofanauthenticreappropriationofAfricantradi tionsofwisdominanAfricandiscourseonandofphilosophy. The important work done presently on the documentation of Africansagacityandtherecordingandfurtherdevelopmentof “SagePhilosophy”servesasprimaryexampleinthisregard. Consequently, what one encounters in scanning through themajordevelopmentswithinthedebateaboutAfricanPhilo sophy is a rich tapestry of diverse and disparate forms and modes of philosophising and indeed a variety of philosophies oftenengagedincritiqueofoneanother.Discerningsomepat tern in the tapestry may be useful—as for example in the late Odera Oruka’s distinction between four varieties of African

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philosophy:ethnophilosophy,professionalphilosophywithlit tleornoreferencetoethnographicdata,Africa’smodernpolit ical and ideological thought, which focuses on the production of a postcolonial discourse, and African philosophic sagacity.5 But the fact remains that there simply is not an African philo sophyreducibletoasingularidentity,anormativemethod,ora shared set of premisses. And still there is African Philosophy— but then only in the Wittgensteinian sense of referring to a rangeoffamilyresemblancespertainingtoallthearticulations ofphilosophyofAfricaandforAfrica.Thewholehistoricaland polemicaldiscourseabouttheidentityofAfricanphilosophyis thusinitselfexamplaryoftheheterogeneoustraditionsofphil osophical reflection, the universal “conversation of humankind,” particulartothecontextualquestionsofwhatiscommonlycalled “Africa.” But what is commonly called “Africa” is a supreme exampleofanamewithoutreference. ThesignificanceofAfricanPhilosophyshouldthusnotbe soughtinadistinctidentityonparwith,parallelto,orasanal ternativetoasupposeddistinctidentityof“WesternPhilosoph y.”Aspostmoderncritiquesfromwithin“WesternPhilosophy” have shown, philosophy may have been primarily associated with the histories and cultures of Europe until the twentieth century, but is in fact also a family name for various and ex tremelydivergentattemptstocometogripswiththedemands oflifeinspecifichistoricandculturalcircumstances.Fromthis perspective, “philosophy” is not an allencompassing, unified, universal,metanarrativeoftheultimatemeaningofhumanex istence—in spite of its pretensions to the contrary in the writ ingsofsomeclassical,medieval,orespeciallymodernistEuro pean philosophers. In many respects African philosophy pic tures synchronically what has been the case diachronically throughthehistoryofsocalled“WesternPhilosophy.” TomymindthisistheprimesignificanceofAfricanphilo sophy. It exemplifies in a paradigmatic way the historical and culturalcontingency,thecontextualparticularity,ofphilosophy —the reciprocity between reflection and the prereflective con ditionsofthinkingthatconstituteourLebensweltorthe“formsof 5

Foranexcellentcriticalappraisalofthisconceptualschematisation ofOderaOruka,seeDeacon1996.

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life”ofoureverydayexistence.6Thisreciprocity,duetowhich anyclaimtouniversalityinphilosophycanonlybetheuniver salisationofaparticularity,belongstotheforgetfulnessofWest ernmetaphysics.PerhapsthisispartoftheforgetfulnessofBe ing of which the tradition of Western philosophy has suffered for so long, according to Nietzsche and Heidegger? In African philosophythesilenceofthisforgetfulnesshasbeenbrokenin theconsciousattempttomakethisreciprocityexplicitinthein evitablediversityofdiscoursesparticulartothecultural,histor ical,andsocialconditionsofan“Africa”ofwhichnobodyknows whatthenamesignifies.Thiswasdonebyseekingtoarticulate and reappropriate the conceptions of meaning and value em bedded in the cultural practices and languages within the im mediate contexts of African societies, by forging conceptual toolsmoreappropriatetotheinterpretation,critique,andtrans formationofAfrica’sowncultures,andbyutilisingvariousdis courses of Western philosophy and traditions of indigenous thoughtasvehiclesforthetheoreticalarticulationofthe“iden tities” of African peoples or to contest alienating “identities” imposeduponthem. InthiswayAfricanphilosophysucceededinmakingphilo sophy a heterogeneous family of philosophical discourses par ticular to Africa, and in doing so it set an example of what a selfreflective contextualisation of philosophy may look like, whatitmaybeabletoachieveandwhereitmaymeetitslimi tations.Suchaselfreflectivecontextualisation—onlyinamuch morecomplicatedway—iswhatiscalledforinthechallengeof multiculturalismtophilosophy,i.e.in the needforphilosophy to come to terms with its own selfreflective contextualisation within the increasingly multicultural contexts of contemporary societies. TheMeaningofMulticulturalism Aprincipalcharacteristicofalmostallpresentdaysocietiesand oftheworldasa“globalvillage”isthedailycoexistence,inter 6

ForacomparisonoftheHusserliannotionofLebensweltandthe Wittgensteiniannotionof“formsoflife”andadiscussionofthedialectic ofreflection(language)andtheprereflectiveconditionsofthinking(ex perience)seeVanderMerwe(1993;1996).

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action,andcommunicationofpeopleofvariouscreedsandcul tures. Today, ordinary people’s encounter with difference, i.e. with worldviews and cultural or religious value systems, beliefs,andpracticesdifferent from their own,is unprecedent ed and unavoidable. “Multiculturalism” is generally used as a descriptionofthisdistinctiveculturalconditionoflatemodern orpostmodernsocieties.Thetermitselfwasinitiallyintroduced in the 1970s in Australia and Canada to refer to special policy arrangements aimed at protecting the distinctness of indige nousculturalgroupsandimprovingtheirequalparticipationin civil and political life. However, its denotation rapidly shifted, first towards cultural diversity as a factual characteristic of societies,and,second,tosocialandpoliticalmovements(espe cially in academia) and intellectual discourses that strive to promote the value of cultural differences or claim public re cognition for specific cultural differences. Thus, “multicultur alism” not only refers to cultural diversity as a factual char acteristic,butalsoasadesiredgoal,aswellastodifferentforms of public policy with regard to both, and to a number of  nor mativetheoreticalstancesorresponseswithregardtoallthree ofthesereferences.Notbeingattentivetothisvarietyofmean ings,canbemisleadingandhascausedalotofconfusioninde batesaboutmulticulturalism. Accordingly,whatmulticulturalismrefersto,orshouldre ferto,isinitselfasourceofdisputeinphilosophyandthehu man sciences.7 In political philosophy it may mean the claim thatapoliticalsocietyshouldrecognisetheequalstandingofall stable and viable communities belonging to it (Raz 1994: 69) withallthedifficultquestionspertainingtothegrantingofcul turespecific rights and the protection of minorities (Kymlicka 1995). With regard to education and science it may mean the demand to revise methodologies and syllabuses in order to makethemmorerepresentativeoftheculturalgoods,histories,

7 Goldberg(1994:42941)providesanextensivebibliographyoflit eratureonmulticulturalismandausefulselectionofarticlesforthepur poseofanintroductiontotheissues.Foraproperintroductiontothe currentphilosophicalreflection,seeGutman(1994)withcontributions bymajorphilosopherslikeCharlesTaylor,JürgenHabermas,Michael Walzer,andK.AnthonyAppiah.

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achievements, and values of other than Western cultures with all the questions pertaining to the epistemic status of scientific practisesandcanonisation(Bak1993).However,whenusedin a more general normative sense multiculturalism may express quite diverse ideals and imperatives. On the one hand, it may refertotheadvocationofafusionofdifferentculturesintoone syncretistic, cosmopolitan worldculture through intercultural understandingandcrossculturalassimilation.Ontheotherhand, itmayrefertotheadvocationofanappreciationforculturaldif ferencesandthepositiveaffirmationofdiversityasanecessary conditionofhumanexistenceassuch.8 Toavoidbeingsidetrackedbythisdispute,Iwillusemul ticulturalism in a fairly neutral, encompassing and descriptive sense to refer to the presence of distinct cultural differences withinasocietyandtoemphasisethatsuchdifferencesarenot trivialbutrealandshouldberecognisedassuch.Multicultural isminthissensereferstotheparadoxicalnatureofthepresent, globalising latemodern or “postmodern” culture. On the one hand,therecanbenodoubtthatthecultural“formsoflife”of modernitythatdevelopedoutoftheEuropeanEnligtenment— forexample,democracy,marketeconomy,science,andtechno logy—have expanded and will continue to expand globally. Theresultofthisglobalisationofmodernityisthetransforma tion and equalisation of the everyday existence—the Lebens welt—of all peoples of all cultures.9 But, perhaps contrary to whatmighthavebeenexpected,thisglobalisationofmodernity is accompanied by a heightened awareness of and attachment

8

 The opposites referred to here is in the first case approaches, mainlyinspiredbyHabermas,suchas“communicativeethics”or“delib erative democracy,” and in the second case approaches inspired by FrenchphilosopherslikeDerridaandLyotard. 9

ThisisforcefullyandconvincinglyarguedbyDupré(1993)who concludes(p.249):“Itsinnovativepowermademodernity,whichbegan asalocalWesternphenomenon,auniversalprojectcapableofforcingits theoreticalandpracticalprinciplesonallbutthemostisolatedciviliza tions.”However,althoughthisistrue,itisnotcorrecttostate—asDupré does—that“modern”hasbecomethepredicateofaunifiedworldcul ture.Modernityor“modernculture”isaccompaniedbyanincreasing awarenessofandattachmenttoculturaldifferences.

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toparticularculturesandculturespecificvalues.Theprocessof globalisationisnotaprocessofculturalhomogenisationbutof increasingfragmentationandpluralisation(Welsch1987). Thisparadoxicalcoincidenceofthedefactorealisationofa modernworldculture(ontheonehand)andasimultaneousdi versification of culture (on the other) may seem enigmatic but canbeexplainedintermsofthepeculiar“logicofmodernity.” Whatdoesthis“logic”entail?Modernitydevelopedoutofthe Enlightenment on the basis of ideas and values that were un derstoodtobeuniversal.Forexample:thefreedomoftheindi vidual to act autonomously and the authority of reason over traditional sources of meaning and morality like cultural con ventions,religion,orcollectivehistory.Thehistoricalevolution ofdemocracy,thearticulationofbasichumanrights,thedevel opmentofscienceandtechnology,andtheconcomitanttechno logisationofthehumanlifeworldandtheexpansionofthecap italist economy can be traced back at least to these two ideas: theprimacyoftheautonomousindividualabovetheparticular culturalcommunity,andtheprimacyofasupposedly“univer sal”humanreasonaboveculturespecificcodesandbeliefs.The logicofmodernitythuspresupposedadetachmentoforeman cipation from a particular cultural community or collectively sharedhorizonofsignificance.Forthisreasonmodernitycould expandtransculturallyanddevelopintoaglobalworldculture. Butforthisverysamereason—andthisistheresolutionofthe paradox—itcannotprovidepeoplewithanattachmenttothose specificmeaningsandvaluesforwhichtheyaredependenton culturalformsoflife. Thus,asaglobalworldculture,modernitydoesnoterad icateculturaldifferencesbutcreatesanexistentialvacuumthat canbecoveredonlybyafallingbackontospecificformsofcol lective identity and cultural attachment. The expansion of the cultural “forms of life” of modernity is therefore not a process oftransculturalunification,buttheglobalextensionofthecon ditions that make it possible to affirm cultural differences and claim public recognition for and protection of culturespecific values.Accordingly,therevivalonaworldwidescaleofethnic ity, nationalisms, and other forms of cultural particularism, or the emergence of new ones, should not be understood as the lastconvulsionsofalmostbygonepremodernattitudesandten

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dencies,norasshortlivedcounterreactionstotheglobalisation of modernity. It is simply the vital supplement of modernity, the inevitable shadows of the universalised values of the En lightenment. Thisironiclogicofmodernity,intermsofwhichitrealises aradicalpluralisationofsocietyandcultureinthesamemove mentinwhichitachievesglobalexpansion,isalsowhat“post modernity” as a description of the distinctive cultural condi tionsofourpresentexistencerefersto(Welsch1987:5385).The distinctivedifferencesofthepastbetweentheculturalcontexts withinwhichWesternphilosophyasopposedtoAfricanphilo sophywerepractisedmayfadewiththeinevitablemodernisa tionofAfricansocietiesandtheglobalisationofmodernity.But the commonality of sharing increasingly the same postmodern societalcontextisnotthesharingofahomogeneousculturebut a common encounter with multiculturalism as a universal fea tureofpostmodernsocieties. What the impact of this encounter with multiculturalism will be on philosophy and to what extent philosophy may be abletocontributetowardstheselfunderstandingandwellbe ing of multicultural societies are complex and wideranging questions. It is beyond the scope of this contribution—and be yond my competence—to explore them in a satisfactory way. Neverthelessitisextremelyimportanttoputthesequestionson the agenda for collective reflection and philosophical debate and I hope the following preliminary remarks will serve this purpose. TheAppropriationofMulticulturalism Many contributions to the growing discourse on multicultur alismamounttoreflectionsaboutsocioculturaldiversityasifit isbutanotherproblemtobesolved,aproblemtowardswhich neutral ground can be assumed. However, this is not what a properphilosophicalencounterwithmulticulturalismdemands.It should be clear from the preceding explanation that multicul turalism does not confront us with a problem to be solved through reflection but rather with a postmodern condition of thinking that has to be appropriated in our reflection. It de mandsaphilosophicalreflectionfromwithinthecrisscrossing ofandbreachesbetweenthevariousparticularhistories,tradi

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tions,andmodesofthinkingintermingledinthemulticultural contextofpresentdaysocieties.Suchaselfreflectivemulticul tural contextualisation of philosophy entails, to my mind, at leastthefollowing. First, the realisation that there is no neutral ground, no “viewfromnowhere”inphilosophywithregardtoculturaldif ferences, because of the cultural contingency of every philo sophical viewpoint, and the histories and traditions of philo sophy—“Western” or “African”—as such. This realisation im pels one to enter into dialogue with the traditions of wisdom and thinking of other cultures—not so much in the hope that one will reach a transcultural, metaphilosophical consensus but as a way of acknowledging the particularity of one’s own viewpointanddiscoveringtheculturalcontingencyofone’sown philosophicalpresuppositionsandallegiances.10 Second, the realisation that the particularity and cultural contingencyofone’sownviewpoint,indeedone’sidentityasa person and a philosopher, is itself heterogeneous and much more “multicultural” than one would have thought. To quote Amy Gutman (1993: 183): “Not only societies, but people are multicultural”—meaning not “cosmopolitan” in the sense of sharingasimilarmixtureofculturesbutinthatone’sidentityis a continuous reweaving of various patterns of the cultures to which one is exposed. Thus, there need not be a contradiction betweenacknowledgingtheculturalcontingencyofone’s own philosophicalviewpointandtheselfreflectiveappropriationof multiculturalismasaconditionofthinking.Itissimplytheflip side of the coin. Every philosophical viewpoint is already in scribed or embedded in the multiculturality of our existence. With this I do not only mean the empirical fact that our exist enceisincreasinglymarkedbyadailyencounterwithcultural differences.Rather,asIhaveargued,thattheexperienceofcul tural diversity has become the postmodern condition of philo sophicalreflection.Butitcanbesoeitherwithanawarenessof the fact or without. Having an awareness of the fact is to take multiculturalismasastartingpoint;thinkingfromwithinitnot

10

Kimmerle’s(1991and1995)earlyexplorationsofinterculturaldia logueservesasahermeneuticalmodelinthisregard.

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onlyinafirstmodeofreflection,asisalwaysthecase,butalso inasecondmodeofselfreflectivity. Third, the realisation that the understanding of multicul turalism in terms of different cultures coexisting as it were a longsideoneanotherinonesocietyisamisconstrualofthemat teratstake;“abewitchmentofourintelligence”bythenoun“cul ture”—to paraphrase Wittgenstein (1988b: 109). It presupposes that cultures are monolithic, transparent, and neatly demar catedwholes,whereasthisisnotthecase.Obviously,itcannot be denied that there are different, distinctive cultures. But to conceptualise multiculturalism or the distinctive sociocultural diversityofpresentdaysocietiesinthiswayforcesoneintoac ceptance of an essentialist, substantive, and static understand ingofcultureandculturaldiversity. Thisiswherethedemandsofmulticulturalismeclipsevari ousformsofculturalrelativism, ethnocentrism,anduniversal ism that all presuppose such an essentialist understanding of culture.11 The minimalist claim common to cultural relativism andsophisticatedformsofethnocentrism,namelythatthereis noculturetranscendentArchimedeanpointfromwherediffer entculturescanbestudied,understoodandjudgedor,inRor ty’swords(1991:2),no“skyhookwithwhichtoescapefromthe ethnocentrism produced by acculturation,” need not presup pose such an understanding of culture. But cultural relativism normally involves more substantial claims that do presuppose such an understanding of culture: for example, the claim that different cultures are incommensurable or that crosscultural understanding and translation is not possible or that different culturesareofequalvalue.Universalistapproachestocultural diversity, however, also presuppose an essentialist conception ofculture—forexample,bypostulatingsomeuniversalcultural constants, a single core of “human culture,” present in all the different cultures, or only manifested differently in different cultures,orstilltobediscoveredandrealizedthroughthemer ging or forging of different cultures into one. Such a universal “human culture” is of course an abstraction without real con

11

Forashortoverviewofsomeformsofculturalrelativism,ethno centrism,anduniversalism,seeProcee(1991:1163).SeealsoVander Merwe2003:6280).

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tentoraregulativeideathatappealsonlytothosewhosharea particular, culturespecific teleological understanding of his tory. Fourth,asthedecisivealbeitsimplifiedconclusion,there alisation that multiculturalism should rather be understood or approachednotastheproblemof“differentcultures”coexist ingalongsideoneanotherbutratherastheconditionof“cultur al differences,” running across various cultures and being in herentinanydistinctculturebecauseoftheculturalheterogen eityofpresentdaysocieties.Suchculturaldifferencescanbeas realbetweenmembersofthesamecultureasbetweenmembers ofdifferentcultures(Caws,1994:375). Therelevanceofthisviewpointwithregardtomostmulti ethnic societies is that the congruence of “ethnicity” and “cul ture”neednotbeconsidered,ontheonehand,negativelyasan evil to be extinguished where and whenever possible. But nei ther should it be understood on the other hand as a conver gencethatcorrespondstosomeessential,homogenousidentity. Althoughethnicculturecannotbenegatedasarealsocialand culturalphenomenon,itshouldnotbeabsolutisedtheoretically. Moreandmorepeopleparticipateinandencountermorethan oneofthevarious,distinguishablediverseethnicandsociocul turalformsoflife prevalentintheirsociety.Interculturalcom municationandcrossculturalassimilationarepossibleanddo take place in their daily lives in spite of the embeddedness of theirexistenceindifferentethnicandsocioculturalformsoflife. Part of this intermingling of cultures is the reality of cultural differenceswithregardtocertainbeliefs,values,andpractices. And in cases of conflict, no culturetranscendent set of criteria can be applied to judge the conflicting positions or legitimate theobjectivevalidityofanyoneposition. Certainlythisimpelsphilosophers,educators,andintellec tuals in general to engage in intercultural dialogue and, on a moretheoreticallevel,toexplorethepossibilitiesofintercultur al philosophy. Through such a dialogue and discourse it may bepossibletodevelopwhatCharlesTaylor(1985)calls“alang uageofperspicuouscontrast,”apublicdiscoursethroughwhich the divergent communities could develop a mutual understand

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ing of their cultural differences and commonalities.12 In and through this process, it might become evident that certain as pectsoftheother’scultureareinadequateand/orthataspectsof one’s own are—in which case the understanding of the other mayleadtoatransformationofone’sown.13Withoutdoubt,one oftheimplicationsofmulticulturalismforphilosophers,educa tors,andintellectualsingeneralistobeorbecomesuchtrans versal crosscultural interpreters of the divergent experiences, values,andpracticesintheirsocieties(Bauman1987). Butthisviewalsoaccountsfortherealitythattherewillal ways be misunderstandings and conflicts that cannot be re solvedthroughdialogueanddeliberation,i.e.fortherealisation thata“mergingofhorizons”isnotalwayspossibleordesirable inthecaseofcertainculturaldifferencespeopleareattachedto. Howeverpromisingandofvitalimportancetheexplorationof interculturalphilosophymaybe,thesamewillholdtrueforit. In such extreme cases—whether of philosophical dissensus or societal conflict—one reaches those cultural differences which refertowhatpeoplevalueultimately,as,forexample,indiffer ences of religious belief. Such differences concern what people believetobeofultimatesignificance,“thegood.”And,asWitt genstein(1988a:§3e)observed,“Youcannotleadpeopletowhat is good, you can only lead them to some place or other. The good is outside the space of facts.” People’s beliefs about the goodarenotbeliefsthatpeopleholdbutratherbeliefsthathave themintheirhold.Consequently,therewillalwaysbeapoint, 12

SeealsotheexpositionoftheimportanceofTaylor’sproposalin VanNiekerk1993:3137. 13 Toexpect,though,asTaylor(1985:125)does,thatthiswillbe“a languageinwhichwecouldformulatetheirwayoflifeandoursasalter nativepossibilitiesinrelationtosomehumanconstantsatworkinboth” (myitalics)isagaintohopeforateleologicalresolutionofallculturaldif ferences.Asinthecaseofothersimilarproposalswithregardtothereso lutionofconflictcausedbymulticulturalism,forexample,Habermasian modelsofdeliberativeorcommunicativeethics,suchahopeisbasedon anoverestimationofrationalityandanunderestimitionoftheextentto whichsomeculturaldifferencesarenotofsuchanaturethatpeoplecan bepersuadedtoexchangethemorleavethembehind.Onthequestion whydefendingthispositionisnotanendorsementofrelativismseethe excellentstudybyNicholasRescher(1995).

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both in our intercultural philosophical endeavours and in our societallife,wherewewillstumbleupontheincommensurable —not because of a supposed mutual exclusion of our cultures ortheimpossibilityofinterculturalcommunicationandunder standing, but because our culturally embedded values defy evenourownunderstanding,justificationandexplanation. At this point even an intercultural philosophy encounters itslimitations,andtheonlywaytominimizepotentialconflict willbethepoliticalnegotiationofamodusvivendi.Butthecon tinuous negotiation of a modus vivendi in our societal life will notbepossibleifpeoplearetoldthattheirculturesareincom mensurable;onlyiftheyareremindedoftheirfinitudeintheir attachmenttoculturallycontingentvalues.Andinthisregarda selfreflectivecontextualisedphilosophy—ofwhichcontempor ary, postcolonialist African thought is a trail blazing example —canplayanimportantroleinmulticulturalsocieties. Bibliography: Bak,H.(ed.).(1993).MulticulturalismandtheCanonofAmericanCulture. Amsterdam:VUUniversityPress. Bauman,Z.(1987).LegislatorsandInterpreters.Cambridge:PolityPress. Bernal, M. (1987; 1990). Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. Vol. 1: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece, 17851985; Vol. 2: The Archeological and Documentary Evidence. New Bruns wick:RutgersUniversityPress. Blok, Josine H. (1996). “Proof and Persuasion in Black Athena: The CaseofK.O.Müller.”JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas57:70524. Caws, Peter. (1994). “Identity: Cultural, Transcultural, and Multicul tural.”In:D.T.Goldberg.(ed.).Multiculturalism:ACriticalReader. Oxford:BasilBlackwell. Clifford,J.(1988).ThePredicamentofCulture:TwentiethCenturyEthno graphy,LiteratureandArt.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Crahay, F. (1965). “Le Décollage conceptuel: conditions d’une philo sophiebantoue.”Diogène52::6184. Deacon,M.(1996).AfricanPhilosophy:FromDrumsandMaskstoRation ality?Johannessburg:RandAfrikaansUniversity. Diop,C.A.(1974).TheAfricanOriginofCivilization:MythorReality.Ed. andtransl.M.Cook.Westport:LawrenceHillandCompany. Dupre, L. (1993). Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of NatureandCulture.NewHaven/London:YaleUniversityPress.

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Eze, E.C. (2008). Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. Mal den:Blackwell. (1998).AfricanPhilosophy:AnAnthology.Malden:Blackwell. Floistadt,G.(ed.).(1987).ContemporaryPhilosophy:ANewSurvey.Vol. 5:AfricanPhilosophy.Dordrecht:MartinusNijhoff. Goldberg,D.T.(ed.).(1994).Multiculturalism:ACriticalReader.Oxford: BasilBlackwell. Gutman, A. (ed.). (1994). Multiculturalism. 2nd rev. edition. Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress. (1993). “The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics.” PhilosophyandPublicAffairs22:171206. Kimmerle, H. (1995). “Mazungumzo: Dialogen tussen Afrikaanse en Westersefilosofieën.”Amsterdam/Meppel:Boom. (1991). Philosophie in Afrika – Afrikanische Philosophie. Frankfurt: QumraninCampusVerlag. Kymlicka,W.(1995).MulticulturalCitizenship.Oxford:ClarendonPress. Masolo,D.A.(1994).AfricanPhilosophyinSearchofIdentity.Blooming ton:IndianaUniversityPress. Mudimbe, V.Y. (1994). The Idea of Africa. Bloomington: Indiana Uni versityPress. (1988). The Invention of Africa. Bloomingtom: Indiana University Press. NaglDocekal,H.,andF.M.Wimmer.(1992).PostkolonialesPhilosophieren: Afrika(miteinerBibliographiezusammengesteltvorChristianNeuge bauer).Vienna/Munich:R.OldenbourgVerlag. Okere,T.(1983).AfricanPhilosophy:AHistoricoHermeneuticalInvestiga tionoftheConditionsofitsPossibility.Lanham:UniversityPressof America. Olela,H.(1984).“TheAfricanFoundationsofGreekPhilosophy.”In: R.A.Wright(ed.)AfricanPhilosophy:AnIntroduction.Lanham:Uni versityPressofAmerica. (1980). An Introduction to the History of Philosophy: From Ancient AfricatoAncientGreece.Atlanta:SelectPublishingCompany. Procee, H. (1991). Over de grenzen van culturen. Meppel/Amsterdam: Boom. Raz, J. (1994). Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rescher, N. (1995). Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus. Ox ford:ClarendonPress.

318 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Rorty, R. (1991). Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge: Cam bridgeUniversityPress. Roux, A.P.J., and P.H. Coetzee. (1998). The African Philosophy Reader. London/NewYork:Routledge. Taylor, C. (1985). Philosophical Papers. Vol. 2. Philosophy and the Hu manSciences.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Toulmin,S.(1990).Cosmopolis:TheHiddenAgendaofModernity.Chica go:UniversityofChicagoPress. VanderMerwe,W.L.(2003).“Multiculturalism(s)?ACriticalApprais al.”ActaAcademica35:6280. (1996). “Language, Lifeworld and (Inter)subjectivity.” Analecta HusserlianaXLVIII:34966. (1993). “Wittgenstein and Husserl on the Constitution of Mean ing.” In: Klaus Puhl (ed.). Schriftenreihe der WittgensteinGesell schaft20/2:Knowledge,LanguageandMind.Vienna:VerlagHölder PichlerTempsky.Pp.27787. Van Niekerk, A.A. (1993). “Relativism versus Ethnocentrism.” South AfricanJournalofPhilosophy12:3137. Welsch,W.(1987).UnserepostmoderneModerne.Weinheim:VCHVer lagsgesellschaft. Winch,P.(1964).“UnderstandingaPrimitiveSociety.”AmericanPhil osophical Quarterly 1: 30724. Reprinted in B.R. Wilson (ed.). (1970).Rationality.NewYork:Harper&Row. Wittgenstein, L. (1988a). Culture and Value. Repr. and Transl. Peter Winch.Oxford:BasilBlackwell. (1988b). Philosophical Investigations. Transl. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford:BasilBlackwell. Wright, R.W. (ed.). (1984). African Philosophy: An Introduction. 3rd ed. Washington,D.C.:UniversityPressofAmerica.

Untouchables,Christians,andHindus HowtheSacredWorldOrder isPreservedandRenounced VictorvanBijlert

Abstract Hinduismisoftenregardedasatolerantandnonviolentreligion.Whenever thereisviolenceorinjusticeperpetratedbylargegroupsofHindus,thereisa tendencytoexplainthisasananomaly.ThelowestgroupsinHindusociety especially,thesocalledUntouchablesorDalitsand—evenmoreso—Dalitcon vertstoChristianity,oftenfaceHinduaggression.Inordertorevealthemo tivation for Hindu resentment, this essay analyses Hinduism in terms of a universallyinternalisedsocialmodel.ThismodelismorebasictoHinduism than any particular scripture or cult. It explains the fundamental Hindu viewoftheuniverseasahierarchicallystructuredsacredworldorderwithits complement, a nonhierarchical sphere of renunciation and numinous indi vidualism.Thisessayarguesthatifthismodelisproperlyunderstood,itex plains the subordinate role of Untouchables in Hindu society as well as the strategiesavailabletocopewithoppression.

HinduViolence Christmas2007intheKandhamaldistrictintheIndianstateof Orissawasnooccasionforjoy.Catholic,Pentecostalandother churchesweresetonfire.Hindumobsroamedthestreetsshouting “StopChristianity;killChristians.”Thetargetsofthisaggression wereDalitChristians.1Complaintstothepolicedidnotstopthe

1

 Dalits, Untouchables, Outcastes, Harijans (Mahatma Gandhi’s term)alldesignatethesamesocialgroupofthelowestofthelowestin Hindusociety(cf.MendelsohnandVicziany1998:25,Webster1999:11). NowadaysthetermDalitismostcommonlyaccepted,butUntouchable willalsobeusedinthisessay,sincethetermexplainsverywellthebasis oftheirlowstatus:highcasteHindusshouldnotbetouchedbythese lowestofthelowest.Dalitmeans“trampledupon.”Gandhieuphemis 319

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continuing Hindu belligerence. These riots were premeditated actsofviolenceresultinginhundredsofhousesdestroyed,doz ensofchurchinstitutionsburned down,andseveralcasualties (seeCommunalismCombat14/127[January2008:68]).Theywere organised by members of the Hindu “Nationalist” RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal.2 Although these attacks came as a nasty sur priseandmadetheheadlinesofworldnews,theydidnotsig nificantly worsen the already tarnished popular image of Hin du“nonviolence”and“tolerance.” That Hinduism is a nonviolent and tolerant religion is a notion still held in the Western world. This notion is based largelyonMahatmaGandhi’snonviolentstruggleagainstBrit ishcolonialruleinIndia.Thus,thephenomenonofviolentHin dumobsonarampageandakillingspreecontinuestoastonish Westernobserverssomewhat.Usually,itisexplainedasananom aly, as something alien to the normally peaceful character of Hinduism.3PerhapsthefactthatDalitChristianswereatthere ceivingendwasarealjoltbecauseHinduviolenceisusuallydi rected against Muslims. Also, the fact that the Christians tar geted belonged to the lowest rungs of the Hindu social ladder and that some of them were recent converts to Christianity

ticallylabelledthemHarijans(“peopleofGod”).Accordingtothe1991 censusofIndia,therewereatleasttwentymillionChristians,ofwhom halfwereUntouchables(Webster1999:89).The2001censuscitesaround twentyfourmillionChristiansforthewholeofIndia(source:http://cen susindia.gov.in). 2

RSSstandsforRashtriyaSwayamsewakSangh(“CommunityofNa tionalVolunteers”).Foundedin1925asaHindunationalistandHindu cultural“sect,”itsgoalhasalwaysbeento“purify”theHinduholyland IndiaofforeigninfluencessuchasIslamandChristianityandestablish IndiaasapurelyHindunation.Sincethe1960sithasspawnedmany daughterorganisations:theVHP,VishvaHinduParishad(”WorldHin duCouncil”),andtheBajrangDal(“PartyofHanuman”).Alltheseor ganisationssharetheoriginalgoaloftheRSSand,togetherwithitspo liticalwing,theBJP,BharatiyaJanataParty(“IndianPeople’sParty”),are collectivelyknownastheSanghParivar(“TheFamilyoftheSangh= RSS”).FordetailsseeJaffrelot1996:3344,196204,363ff. 3

FortheseWesternperceptionsofHinduismseePinch2006:514, 24348.

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madethesufferingallthemorepoignant.Thisviolencenoton lysignalsanalarmingbreakdownofthemodernsecularIndian state,italsoneedstobeexplainedagainstthebroaderbackdrop oftheHindusocioreligioussystemandthewaythissystemis capableofabsorbingforeigninfluencesandindividualandcol lective choices that radically challenge the Hindu “body poli tic.” DharmaasCosmicandSocialOrder Familiarity with monotheistic religions of the Book, the Abra hamicreligions,oftenrendersthecomplexreligiousphenomen on of Hinduism difficult to grasp. In the Abrahamic traditions GodisauniqueDeity,theCreatoroftheUniverseandthelaw giverforallhumankind.TheBibleandtheQur’anthuscontain, amongotherthings,universalmorallawsapplicabletoall.Hin duismdoesnothavesuchatranscendentalwrittencode.Itdoes nothavearevealedcodeofconductnorexplicittextualrevela tionsbytheCreatoroftheuniverse.Hinduism’scodeexistsnot asatextoftranscendentaloriginbutasanimmanentprinciple, the dharma, “bearer,” “carrier,” “supporter,” “arranger”—all thesemeaningsareintendedintheworditself.Dharmaisnever revealed in its totality in textual form. There are innumerable texts in Hinduism—beginning with the Vedas—that describe bits and pieces of dharma and are to a large extent bound by time, place and social status. The final, ultimate, complete and authoritativetextualrevelationofthedharmadoesnotandwill never exist, for dharma is the fundamental order of the cosmos and the order of Hindu society as a whole. Dharma both as cosmicsacredorderandasimmanentorderingprincipleofso cietyisthecanonofHinduism. Knowledge of this immanent canon of dharma is by no meansobligatoryforallHindus.Acquiringdetailedknowledge of dharma—including knowledge of it as embodied in sacred texts—isnotmeantforallHindusbutisthedomainoftwodis tinctgroups:theBrahminpriests,whoarehereditaryreligious specialists,andworldrenouncers(sannyasis,sadhus).TheBrah minspreserveandtransmitknowledgeofthedetailsofthesa cred world order; the renouncers perceive the world order di rectlyasitis.TheBrahminsguardthegroupmoralsoftheHin dusocialorder;therenouncersproclaimsoteriologiesbasically

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meant for those individuals that have detached themselves fromthehierarchicalorder. This double access to dharma is reflected in the social and cosmicorderthatisalso dharma.Dharmagovernstheexistence of individuals, social groups, the whole human world and the wholecosmoswithitsgodsanddemonsandothersemidivine beings. Dharma rules the world in two ways: first, as the sus tainingprinciplebehindthesacredhierarchicalorderofHindu society and, second, as the immanent transcendence from which allorderflows.4Thislatteraspectofdharmaisdirectlyaccessible in the numinous sphere of renunciation, which stands in a ne cessaryandcomplementaryoppositiontothesacredsocialhier archy. SacredHierarchy Traditionally,thesocialhierarchyofHinduismismanifestedin the system of four varnas, “colours” or “classes.” The earliest fulldescriptionofthissacredhierarchyisfoundinRigVeda,book 10, hymn 90. A single plurality, the cosmic spirit or Purusha with a thousand heads, a thousand eyes and a thousand feet (10.90.1) is being sacrificed by the gods (10.90.6) who also fa shionthecosmosandthesocialorderoutofthepartsofthePu rusha’sbody(10.90.814).“HismouthwastheBrahman,histwo armsweremadethewarrior,histwothighstheVaishya;from his two feet the Shudra was born” (10.90.12; Macdonnell 1917: 201). To appreciate this metaphor of the social hierarchy we must imagine the Purusha to stand erect on his two feet. The highest part of the cosmic/societal spirit is occupied by the

4

ThisfactexplainswhyHinduismdoesnothaveapersonalsupreme Godasalawgiver,asintheAbrahamictraditions,andwhyHinduscan easilyimagineratherabstracttranscendenceasavarietyofconflicting supremegodsorgoddesses.Therealsourceofreligiousauthorityand objectofHindudevotionisnotgodsorgoddessesbuttheunderlying principleofthecosmos,aprincipleinwhichonedoesnotevenhaveto believebutwhichonecanonlyaspiretoexperienceforoneself.

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Brahminpriests.5Thearmsaretheprincesorkings.Thefarmers, artisans and traders are collectively indicated by the word Va ishya,meaning“thosewholiveintheinhabitedareas,thevish.” Thelowestpartofthebody,thefeet,representthelowestrung on the social ladder. They are indicated by the collective term Shudra, “slave / lowly servant.” Later Brahminic texts not only preservedthisbasicmodelbutalsospecifiedthevariousduties incumbentonthesefourclassesorvarnas. WhenthePurushastandsupstraight,hetouchestheearth onlywithhisfeet,whilehisheadisfurthestremovedfromthe earth. This metaphor is important for several reasons. It sug geststhattheBrahminsrepresentthegods:inthenextverseof the hymn the gods are said to have emerged from different parts of the Purusha’s head (10.90.13). Furthermore, the feet/ shudrastouchtheimpuritiesofthesoilwhilethehead/Brahmin isfurthestremovedfromtheseimpurities.6Thefactthattheso cial hierarchy is symbolised by a single human body with its parts,implies thatthehierarchyisnaturalandunalterable,for thehandscannotperformthefunctionsoftheheadnorthefeet thefunctionsofthehead.Thus,challengingthehierarchywould be tantamount to mutilating the Purusha or even killing him. Lastly, since the goal of human life is to stay healthy, so the goalofthePurushaistostayhealthy.Hishealthispreservedby keeping it clean through Brahminic rituals. Since health in the humanbodyisfurtheredbyphysicalhygiene,soritualhygiene keepstheHindubodypolitichealthy.ItisthetaskoftheBrah min priests to see to this ritual social health. From the bodily hygienemetaphorofHindusocietyfollowstheultimatetaskof Brahmins:tokeeptheirritualpurityintact.Therealpurposeof allpurity,andmostofallofritualpurity,istowardofftheul timateimpurityofdeathitself.

5

Englishhastwospellings:BrahmanorBrahmin.Thelatteristhe moretraditionalBritishspelling,whereastheformerismorelinguistic allycorrect.InSanskritthewordispronouncedasbráhmana. 6

Tothisday,touchingsomeonewithone’sfeetisagrossinsultac cordingtoHindusocialetiquette.Conversely,ifonetouchesthefeetof asuperiorwithone’sheadoneshowsdeeprespectandhumility.

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ImpurityandPurity Deathinitsbiologicalmanifestationasthefinalendoflifeisthe greatestimpurityimaginabletotheHindureligiousconception. Brahmin ideology is therefore obsessed with excluding real deathineverypossibleway.Foronlythuscanthehealthofthe cosmic body politic be guaranteed. The health of—i.e. the ab sence of death from—the Purusha is symbolised by recurrent cyclical time. For in cyclical time everything reoccurs, there is nofinalendtothings,norealdeath.Cyclicaltimeinthecosmos is indicated by the fixed movements of the heavenly bodies suchasthesunandthemoon(whicharealsopartsofthehead ofthePurusha[10.90.13]).Theimportanceofregularpredictable cyclicaltimeisreflectedintheinterestHindustakeinastrology tofixthemostauspiciousmomentfortheperformanceofritu alsortheconclusionofmarriages.Strayirregularastronomical phenomenalikesolareclipses,lunareclipsesandcometsareal waysseenasgreatcosmicimpurities,andnofoodiscookedor eatenduringeclipses.Cyclicaltimeisalsothesecretbehindthe Hinduideaofreincarnation:physicalirredeemabledeathisde niedthroughthebelief(fromasocalpointofview!)thatthereis a soul that will be constantly reincarnated in new bodies. The cycles of reincarnation are believed to be without beginning, a perfect metaphor for the ritual health and the “notdying” of thePurusha.AdharmatextfromaroundthethirdcenturyBCE, theApastambaDharmasutra,hasthistosayaboutreincarnation: People of all classes enjoy supreme and boundless happi nesswhentheyfollowtheLaws(dharma)specifictothem…. [U]pon…returntoearth…byvirtueof…hismeritsheob tains a high birth.… So, going around like a wheel , he re mainshappyinbothworlds[i.e.thisworldandthehereaf ter] …. In like manner, others, when they fall from their castesasaresultoftheirsinfulacts,arebornasoutcastesin wombsthataretheaftermathoftheirsins.(2.2.27,transla tionOlivelle1999:4445;emphasismine)

This early text clearly indicates what purposes reincarnation serves. Keeping the impurity of real death away from the Pu rusha is not immediately obvious, but the reason why there is naturalsocioreligiousinequalityisevident.Peopleonthelow er social rungs owe their plight to themselves, for they had

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sinnedinformerlives.Theironlyhopeofmovingupthesocial ladder (in future births!) lies in their obedience to the higher castesandinfollowingapathofvirtue.Butthereisanothertra ditional way to escape the inequality of the social system: re nunciationoftheworld. WorldRenunciation Complete escape from the pressures and inequalities of the socialordercomesthroughworldrenunciation.Itisthesphere inwhichonereachestrueliberation,muktiormoksha;liberation from all social bonds, from cyclical time, from reincarnation andthusactuallyalsofromthesociologicalimpactofdeath.In the sphere of renunciation the renunciant merges, as it were, withthedharmaitselfandthusbecomeshimself(orherself,for renunciationhasnothingtodogender,purityorimpurity,caste orclass),asourceofexternaliseddharmaforothers.Thisispos siblebecausethesphereofrenunciationisanunpredictable,nu minous and thus potentially dangerous state of existence in which the distinctions between human and divine melt away. Often, this state is expressed in metaphors of unity with the sourceofbeing,orunitywiththesoulofall: Whenintheselfofadiscerningman, hisveryselfhasbecomeallbeings, Whatbewilderment,whatsorrowcantherebe, regardingthatselfofhimwhoseesthisoneness. (IshaUpanishad7,translationOlivelle1996:249)

WorldrenunciationisthespherefromwhichIndianspirituality andselfemancipationflow.Itisthespherefromwhichnewspir itual movements are born and brought to the social world of hierarchy,nottoabolishitbuttoexistnexttoit.Bothspheres, the sacred social hierarchy and world renunciation, have al waysreinforcedeachother.Brahminicpurityintheformofve getarianism,nonviolence,andteetotalismhasbeenadoptedby manyrenouncersinordertobecomesociallyacceptable,while renunciationhasprovidedtheBrahminicorderwithasafepas sagefrompressureandoppression,asafepassagethatdoesnot fundamentally endanger the continued existence of the order. World renunciation ideally addresses the solitary individual. But in order to bring the numinous character of renunciation

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underBrahminiccontrol,therenouncer—ifcharismaticenough —can establish a sect of followers. The sect is invariably a groupofrenouncersoraspiringrenouncerswholookuptothe founderastheirspiritualguide.7Thus,thesocialmodelofHin duismistwofold:thesphereofsacredhierarchyandthesphere of world renunciation, with sects as the link between these two.8 HighCasteHinduismandUntouchability WhatistheplaceofuntouchabilityandtheUntouchables/Dalits in this social model? The early Brahminic texts do not use the term “outcaste” as a permanent situation as happens nowa days. The early texts speak of patita “fallen [out of the social system]”duetoimpurebehaviourortheperformanceofsinful actions.9Beingoutcasteoruntouchableasapermanentandhe reditarysocialsituationisalaterdevelopment.Itmeansastate ofpermanent,irredeemableimpuritythatistransmittedtopos teritybybirthandfromwhichthereisnoescapewithinthehi erarchical system. In any case, every caste and class is hered itary,andonecannotexchangeone’scasteandclassforanoth er. Dumont regards the absolute opposition between the pure BrahminatthetopofthesacredorderandtheUntouchableat theverybottom,evenbelowtheShudra,astheveryessenceof Hinduism(Dumont1980:4355).Thisoppositionisbothstruc tural and functional, for the lowest position of the utterly im pureUntouchablecomplementsthehighestpositionoftheBrah min (Dumont 1980: 535). The most important factor in being Untouchableisthehereditarypollutionthroughuncleanmenial work such as “skinning animal carcasses, tanning leather … butchery of animals; fishing; removal of human waste; attend

7

Thereisnoexceptiontothisrule.AllIndianreligiousmovements, i.e.Buddhism,Jainism,Vaishnavism,Shaivism,Sikhism,Tantrism,etc., followthispattern.Theywerefoundedbycharismaticworldrenouncers/ gurus. 8

ThispresentationofthesociologyofHinduismowesmuchtothe greatFrenchindologist/sociologistLouisDumont,seeDumont1980:267 86,42539. 9

Forexample:theft,abortion,homicide,incest;seeOlivelle1999:32.

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ance at cremation grounds; washing clothes” (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 7). These jobs are unclean and impure because deadanimals,deadhumans,dirtandhumanexcrementarehan dled.Sincehandlingthesesubstancesnecessarilyentailstouch ingthem,theseuncleanjobsmeansthatoneisconstantlytouch ingdeathorobjectsthatcausediseases.Deathanddisease(lead ing to death) are the ultimate impurity, and thus the groups that“handle”deathhavetobekeptonthelowestouterfringes of the sacred hierarchy forever. Hence permanent social un touchability arises, for dirt and death have to be constantly re moved from society by someone, and that someone is the Un touchable. By keeping those that always touch death outside the social fold, the higher castes, as it were, remain pure from the ultimate polluting influence of death, while social distance topollutionpreservesthehealthofthesocialorder. Hierarchy does not only define the Brahminic social sys tem,italsoobtainsamongtheUntouchablesthemselves.Men delsohnandViczianyassertthat Untouchablesareorganisedinjatis[endogamouscommen salgroups]justasotherHindus….yetbecauseoftheirab sence from the varna scheme, the Untouchables are often depictedasbeing“outcastes”orwithoutcaste…asalower grouping to be distinguished from “caste Hindus.” (Men delsohnandVicziany1998:6)

Thecomprehensivegroupcalled“Untouchables”isthusfarfrom beinghomogeneous.Untouchablesvaryinfunctionwithinthe villagesocietyandtheirpollutionhandicapvariesfromregion to region. In some places, especially in South India, Untouch ablesfulfilanindispensableritualfunctioninappeasingwhim sical local gods (cf. Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 10). This function only reaffirms their inferior status because only those whoareasimpureasdeathcanapproachthelocalgodssafely. Inotherregions,Untouchablesaresimplyscavengers.Irrespec tiveofthelocalvariations,thefactremainsthatinIndiansoci ety Untouchables/Dalits are in every way considered to be ex tremelyinferiortoallothercastesduetoirredeemableinherent impurity. This impurity not only causes social backwardness butalsothediscriminationbyandthehatredofthehighercastes. Some examples of this hatred were given at the beginning of thisessay.

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WhataretheoptionsopentoUntouchables/Dalitsforcop ing with caste discrimination and utter backwardness? Basic ally,therearethreestrategies:first,submissiontothecastesys tem and meek acceptance of one’s role as the ultimate subal tern;two,utilisingformsofdissentavailablewithinHinduism itself;three,convertingtoanonIndianreligion. AcceptanceorOpposition? Acceptanceofone’slowstatusamountstonomorethanwhat the majority of the Dalits/Untouchables feel they are forced to do anyway. Especially in the late nineteenth century, after the BritishCrownassumedparamountcyinIndia(in1858),theUn touchables“hadnogeneralcritiqueofHindusociety,andwere concernedwithnothingmorethangainingacceptabilityforthem selveswithinthatsociety”(MendelsohnandVicziany1998:78). Compliance proved to be unprofitable. The colonial presence hadaprofoundimpactonUntouchables:likeallotherIndians, theyweredrawnintopanIndianmovementsofmodernisation and were gradually linked to the network of communications andfastoverlandtransportationthatwaslaiddownacrossthe subcontinent. Untouchables began to contemplate their own modes of social reform and opposition to their traditional low status. Opposition to highcaste oppression assumed religious shape,sincethesourceofoppressionwasalsoofadeeplyreli giousnature:highcasteHinduideologyandritualorthopraxis. Thereligiousnatureoftheoppressioncouldthusbefought withthesamereligioustradition.ThetraditionalHindustrate gyofreligiousoppositionwasandstillistooptout,eitherindi viduallyorcollectively.Individualoptingoutamountstoindi vidualworldrenunciation,andUntouchablessometimesadopted thistraditionalstrategy.Aswehavealreadyseen,thisisthetra ditional function of world renunciation: to ease social tensions andpressures. Individual world renunciation does not disturb the social hierarchy.Moredisturbingandpoliticallyandsociallyrelevant is collective world renunciation. There are many examples of this, showing that this fundamental Hindu institution is func tional in Indian society. Collective renunciation takes the form of a sect with a charismatic founder at the head. The founder acts as the spiritual guide and teacher of the followers. The e

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thos of liberation that is characteristic of renunciation can be broughttobearonHindusocietyasa whole through thesect. Untouchables have used this Hindu idiom as a strategy of so cialselfliberationwithgreateffect.Letuslookatsomeeffective instances of collective renunciation by Untouchables: Satnamis (FollowersoftheTrueName),Ramnamis(FollowersoftheName ofRam)andBuddhists. Satnamis The Satnami sect originated in Chattisgarh in Central India,10 aroundtheteachingsoftheUntouchablechamar(averyimpure casteofshoemakers),Ghasidas(around17701850).Around1820 Ghasidaslefthishometomeditateintheforestforsixmonths. Whenhereturnedfromtheforesthetoldhishouseholdthathe hadcommunicatedwiththeSatPurush(TrueSpirit).ThisTrue Spirit had instructed Ghasidas to proclaim to his fellow Un touchablesthatthey were to worshiponlytheTrue Name,Sat Nam.Theyshouldalsoabstainfromalcohol,eatingmeat,tobac co, and handling dead animals and leather (Bauman 2008: 43 44).Inotherwords,theyweretofollowalifestylecharacterised by Brahminic notions of ritual purity. When Ghasidas died in 1850, the number of his followers had risen to a quarter of a million. In the beginning of the twentieth century this number haddoubledagain(Bauman2008:45).Thesectwasfoundedin thetraditionalway:byapersonwhowasbothcharismaticand whousedtheHindureligiousidiomofrenunciation.Ghasidas ensured that the sect adopted many traits of world re nunciation, coupled with Brahminic notions of ritual purity: teetotalismandvegetarianism(Bauman2008:46).Thiscombin ation is the usual method by which sects adjust renunciation (withitsnuminousanomy)totheBrahminicworldorder(with itsdemandsofritualpurity).TheUntouchableSatnamisectex emplifies the traditional option of collective renunciation. The uppercaste Hindus in Chattisgarh did not view this Untouch able emulation of uppercaste Hindu behaviour very lightly. Or,inthewordsofBauman:

10

ChattisgarhusedtoformpartofthestateofMadhyaPradeshbut becameaseparatestateintheIndianUnionin2000.

330 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Orthodox Hindu society forbade dalits to appropriate the signsandsymbolsofthehighcastes.…Buttheprohibition seems to have made those symbols all the more desirable, suchthattheybecameanaturalinducementforthedalitsto adopt the customs and behaviour of the highest castes. (Bauman2008:545)

Wemayremarkthattheadoptionofhighcastebehaviourwas possible precisely because of the charismatic authority that ra diatesfromworldrenunciation.Nevertheless,evensomehigh caste Hindus regarded the Satnami sect as properly Hindu. In the twentieth century, a Maharashtrian Brahmin, Baba Ram chandra,cametoChattisgarhtohelptheSatnamisestablishare form movement for Satnami Untouchables. This movement “sought to rework the relationship of the community [of Sat namis]withareconstitutedHinduorderintheimageofupper castenationalists”(Dube1998:173). Ramnamis The second example of collective selfemancipatory world re nunciation by Untouchables also comes from Chattisgarh. The Ramnamisectformedaroundanothercharismaticandworldre nunciatory Untouchable chamar: Parasuram. Born in the mid nineteenthcentury,whenhewasinhismidthirtiesParasuram metawanderingrenunciantHindumonknamedRamdev,whom Parasuram invited to his home. The monk ordered Parasuram to chant the sacred name of Ram unceasingly. Ram is the sev enthincarnationoftheHinduGodVishnu,theDeitywhopre servestheworldandisaverypopularmanifestationofVishnu. HisculthasspreadintheHindispeakingareamainlythrough the Hindi epic Ramcharitmanas (“The Lake of the Deeds of Ram”),writtenbythepoetsaintTulsidas(15321623).Parasur amobeyedtheinstructionofthemonkRamdevand,asaresult, found the next morning that, after a night of chanting, his breast miraculouslydisplayedthenameofRamwritteninDevanagari script.Consequently,ParasurambeganteachinghisfellowUn touchables to chant the name of Ram and to listen to readings from the Hindi epic by Tulsidas.11 Since its inception Parasur am’ssecthasinducedthefollowerstotattoothenameofRam 11

FormoredetailsonParasuramseeLamb2002:61ff.

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all over their body, to chant the name of Ram, and to recite fromtheRamcharitmanas.Thesectlateralsoestablishedsome thinglikeanorderofrenunciantstoactasspiritualguidesfor the ordinary Ramnami followers. The features of the Ramnamis thatattractmostattentionnowadaysaretheirtattoosofthename ofRam,theirspecialcrownsmadeofpeacockfeathersandtheir yearly Bhajan Mela (“Fair of Religious Singing”), at which a speciallydecoratedpoleiserectedandthenameofRamissung uninterruptedly (Lamb 2002: 94112). Like the Satnamis, the Ramnami sect combines world renunciation with a Brahminic lifestyle of vegetarianism and teetotalism (Lamb 2002: 7274, 161).FortheRamnamis,membershipinthesectmeansemanci pationfromuppercasteHindusocietybyemulatingthelatter’s rulesforpurityinaworldrenunciatorysocialsetting. Buddhism ThethirdexampleofUntouchablesseekingworldrenunciation asawayofescapefromcasteoppressionisthe1956masscon versionbyUntouchablestoBuddhism.Thisconversionwasini tiated and led by the leader and spokesman of the Untouch ables, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (18911956).12 Like all other ancient andmodernspiritualmovementsinIndia,Buddhismwasfound ed by a charismatic world renouncer, the Shakya prince Sid dhartha,sometimeinthefourthcenturyBCE.Throughouthis whole active life Ambedkar struggled to raise the socioeco nomic status of his fellow Untouchables. After much soul searching,hechoseBuddhismasthereligionofhischoice,not only for himself but also for his fellow Untouchables. During the ceremony on 14 October 1956 in Nagpur in which several hundred thousand Untouchables participated, Ambedkar read out a list of specific oaths they would all take. These included teetotalism, nonviolence, and the rejection of Hindu symbols and casteism (Jaffrelot 2000: 13435). Thus, once more Brah minicpuritywaslinkedtorenunciationinasectarianform.In spiteoftherejectionofHindusymbolsanddeities,Ambedkar’s collectiveconversiontoBuddhismconstitutesamovesimilarto thatoftheSatnamisandtheRamnamis.Ambedkardidnotwant

12

FormoredetailsonAmbedkarseetheexcellentmonographby ChristopheJaffrelot(2000).

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to reject Indian religious idioms completely. He is quoted as stating:“BuddhismisapartandparcelofBhartiya[i.e.Indian] culture.Ihavetakencarethatmyconversionwillnotharmthe tradition of the culture and history of this land” (in Jaffrelot 2000: 137). That conversion to Buddhism gave Untouchables a strongsenseofdignityisborneoutbythefollowingstatement madebyanUntouchableduringthesamemassconversion:“I am not a Mahar,13 nor an Untouchable, nor even a Hindu. I have become a human being. I am now equal with highcaste Hindus.Iamequalwithall.Iamnotlowbornorinferiornow” (in Jaffrelot 2000: 138). It seems that collective world renuncia tion is one of the right idioms, one of the right strategies for combating the social ostracism that Untouchables—staying withinhighcasteHindusociety—havetosuffer. ConversiontoChristianity ThelastoptioninourschemeisconversiontononIndianreli gions.SinceitisnotknownifUntouchablesconvertedenmasse toIslaminthepastorinrecenttimes,thereisonlyChristianity at which we should look more closely.14 Untouchables have convertedtoChristianityinsignificantnumbers(seenoteone). In the late nineteenth century Christian missionaries regarded theUntouchablesasidealrecipientsoftheliberatingmessageof theGospel.ForUntouchables,conversiondidnotmeanresort ingtosomeformofworldrenunciation;rather,itmeantsocial and economic improvement, for the converts received educa tion and some financial assistance (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 789). Christianity brought tangible benefits that conver sion to sects like the Satnamis or Ramnamis did not bring. The flip side of Christianity was that others perceived converts as peoplewhohadabandonedtheirfamily,friendsandcommun ity(Bauman2008:99). There are other drawbacks as well. Various authors have observed that, since the independence of India in 1947, Un touchable converts to Christianity suffer three disadvantages.

13

Thisisalowcasteofgatekeepers,watchmen,messengersofdeath notices,sweepers,andremoversofcattlecarcasses,cf.Jaffrelot2000:26ff. 14

 For Untouchables and the absence of conversion to Islam see MendelsohnandVicziany1998:8788.

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First, they suffer from general discrimination. Second, the In dianGovernmentdoesnotrecognisetheDalitChristiansasop pressedlowcastes,andthereforetheyarenotentitledtospecial state benefits reserved for Dalits. Third, uppercaste Christians discriminate against the Dalit Christians (Massey 1995: 8184; Shiri1997:1314;Webster1999:90). Dalit Christians face huge challenges. Mainstream Indian ChristiantheologyoftenexpressesitselfwiththehelpofHindu philosophical notions. This tendency—meant to avoid alienat ingIndianChristiansandHindusfromeachother—ignoresthe fact that most Indian Christians do not belong to the upper castes (Webster 1999: 6162). Thus, Christian theology in India mustformulateatheologythataddressesthelivesandexperi encesofDalits.Todeveloptheirownversionofliberationtheo logy, Dalit theologians revert to Ambedkar for inspiration (Webster 1999: 6573). For Ambedkar liberation “was a condi tion of liberty, justice and fraternity which has been enshrined inthepreambletotheConstitutionofIndiaasanationalgoal” (Webster 1999: 113). Dalit theology proclaims new life in Jesus andthemessagethatGodidentifieswithDalitsintheirplight. Dalittheologymustargueforthetransformationoftheexternal circumstancesofDalitlivesandmustassistinthestrugglesfor improvement together with all other oppressed groups (Web ster1999:115). Conclusion What conclusions about (Dalit) Christian—Hindu relations can bedrawnfromtheforegoing?TheHinduhatredofdeviantreli giousbehaviour—notedatthebeginningofthisessay—cannot be explained as a rare and unusual departure from normally tolerantHinduism,fortheviolenceispersistentandhasalong history.NorcantheHinduhatredbeexplainedawayasaspor adic outburst of extreme Hindu chauvinism. A closer look at the targets of the violence and the reasons for it reveal the workingsofHinduismasareligioussystemoforderingtheso cialworld.TheoftmentionedHindutoleranceisatoleranceof theologicaldoctrineandspecificphilosophicalbeliefs.NoHin dutrulyobjectstoChristianityasadoctrineofpersonalsalva tion or a belief in the individual redemption offered by Jesus Christ.NordoHindushavemuchagainsttheideathatJesusis

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God.TherealobjectionofHindusagainstconversiontoChris tianityliesinthelatter’ssocialimpact.Untouchableswhovol untarilyconverttoanonIndianreligionnotonlyrejectpartof the “national” culture but also evince disregard for the sacred socialorderofHinduism,disregardforthesocioreligioushier archy. Private beliefs of the Untouchables do not interest Hin dus of whatever caste. Nor do they care if an individual Un touchable would be personally moved by the Christian mes sage. What is dangerous in the eyes of Hindus is the fact that collectiveconversiontoChristianitydisturbsthesacredHindu order that relegated the Untouchables to performing unclean tasks.WhatworsensthecaseforChristianityisthefactthatitis offoreignorigin(likeIslam,butunlikeBuddhismandtheRam nami and Satnami sects). Hinduism is not based on orthodoxy butonorthopraxis.Andthelatterisbeingfundamentallyques tionedandcompletelyunderminedbyconversiontoChristian ity,especiallyiftheconvertsbelongtothelowestofthelowest inHindusociety.Itisperhapsforthisveryreasonthatresent mentagainstconversiontoChristianity—startedjustafterIndi an independence—has led to special anticonversion laws in severalIndianstates.15Untouchablesaretheretodomenialdir ty jobs for extremely little or no payment. Upper castes resent disobedienceanddevianceamongtheUntouchables. For Christian Untouchables two things are of utmost im portance. From a religious point of view, it is pertinent to de velopaDalitliberationtheologyfurther.Fromasocialandpo litical point of view, it is absolutely necessary to defend the presentdemocraticsecularConstitutionofIndiaatallcosts.For it embodies the spirit of justice, liberty, equality, fraternity. Its charter of fundamental rights includes the abolishment of Un touchability, equality before the law, the freedom of religion, thefreedomofspeechandexpression,thefreedomtoassemble peaceably,therighttoeducationandprotectionagainstexploit

15

SuchlawsexistineightIndianstates,includingthestateofOrissa wheretheviolencetowhichwereferredatthebeginningofthisessay tookplace.FormoredetailsontheselawsandonthetreatmentofDalit ChristiansinIndiaingeneral,consultthewebsiteoftheAllIndiaChris tianCouncil:www.christiancouncil.in.

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ation.16 It is on the Indian Constitution, fully at work in all its might,thatthesocialliberationofUntouchablesrests. Bibliography Bauman,ChadM.(2008).ChristianIdentityandDalitReligioninHindu India,18681947.GrandRapids:EerdmansPublishingCompany. CommunalismCombat14/127(January2008):68. Dube, Saurabh. (1998). Untouchable Pasts: Religion, Identity, and Power among a Central Indian Community, 17801950. Albany: SUNY Press. Dumont,Louis.(1980).HomoHierarchicus:TheCasteSystemandItsIm plications.CompleteRevisedEnglishEdition.Transl.MarkSains bury, Louis Dumont, and Basia Gulati. Chicago: The University ofChicagoPress. Jaffrelot,Christophe.(2000).DrAmbedkarandUntouchability:Analysing andFightingCaste.London:HurstandCompany. (1996).TheHinduNationalistMovementandIndianPolitics:1925to the1990s.NewDelhi:VikingPenguinIndia. Lamb, Ramdas. (2002). Rapt in the Name: The Ramnamis, Ramnam, and UntouchableReligioninCentralIndia.Albany:SUNYPress. Macdonnell, A.A. (1917). A Vedic Reader for Students. Indian Reprint 1951.Madras:OxfordUniversityPress. Massey,James.(1995).DalitsinIndia:ReligionasaSourceofBondageor Liberation with Special Reference to Christians. New Delhi: Mano har. Mendelsohn, Oliver, and Marika Vicziany (1998). The Untouchables: Subordination, Poverty and the State in Modern India. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress. Olivelle, Patrick. (1999). Dharmasutras: The Law Codes of Apastamba, Gautama, Baudhayana and Vasishtha. Translated from the Original Sanskrit.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. (1996). Upanishads. Translated from the Original Sanskrit. Oxford/ NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress. Pinch, William R. (2006). Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires. Cam bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

16

Theserightsandfreedomsareembodiedinthefirstthirtytwo articlesoftheIndianConstitution.Thetextoftheconstitutionisavailable onlineat:http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29july08.pdf.

336 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Shiri,Godwin.(1997).ThePlightofChristianDalits:ASouthIndianCase Study.Bangalore:AsianTradingCorporation. Webster,JohnC.(1999).ReligionandDalitLiberation:AnExaminationof Perspectives.NewDelhi:Manohar.

ContemporaryChristianHinduRelations inBritainandtheNetherlands JanPeterSchouten

Abstract ThelargestHinducommunitiesinEuropearefoundinGreatBritainandthe Netherlands.Therehasbeenagreatdealofexperiencewithinterreligiousdia logue in both countries, which occurs on several levels. First of all, there is themultilateraldialogueonanationallevel,wherebyrepresentativesofreli gions meet on an equal footing. This form of dialogue has been widely de velopedprimarilyinGreatBritainThentherearethemanyinitiativesbythe churches for dialogue with Hindus. Here primarily fundamental theological questionsarise,evenleadingtoareconsiderationofone’sowntradition.Itis remarkable that in both countries it is often the same theological questions thatrequirefurtherreflection.Finally,therearenumerouslocalsituationsin which Hindus and Christians meet each other and share something of their religiousbackground.

HindusinEurope In the past half century small communities of Hindus have formedinmostWestEuropeancountries(Baumann1997).Hin duscametoEuropeasrefugeesandsettledindifferentplaces. TherefugeesconsistedprimarilyofTamilsfromSriLankaand GujaratisfromtheEastAfricanstates.Preciselyinthesecircles there was a strong need to build up their own religious com munity in the country to which they fled. In addition, Hindu citizens from India and also Hindus from the Caribbean area cametoEuropeforperiodsofshorterorlongerduration,some times permanently. But the number of Hindus in most coun triesisverysmall.Thus,theHindusinGermanyareestimated tonumberbetween76,000to86,000(Luchesi2004:118);thatis approximately0.1%ofatotalpopulationof82million. There are, however, two exceptions. In both Great Britain andtheNetherlandsthereareconsiderablylargerHinducom munities, although they still constitute a small minority of the population.Butinbothcountriesitisapercentageofthepop 337

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ulation that is seven to ten times larger than that in Germany. IntheUnitedKingdomthecensusof2001listedapopulationof 558,810 Hindus, about 1% of the general population (Weller 2004:456).IntheNetherlandsthecurrentnumberofHindusis estimated to be 109,000 (Schouten 2008: 264), i.e. 0.65 % of the population. It is not surprising that there are greater numbers of Hin dus in these two European countries. The British were the co lonial power for centuries in the Hindu heartland, i.e. current India and Pakistan. Already prior to their independence, Hin dus came regularly from the colonies to the colonial mother countryforstudyorwork.Inthe1950sand60stherewasacon stantstreamofimmigration,fromtheIndiansubcontinentand evenfromtheCaribbean,wheremanyIndianshadbeenliving sincethenineteenthcentury.Addedtothis,asoftheendofthe 1960s there were tens of thousands of Hindus from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, who saw themselves forced to leaveasaresultoftheAfricanizationpoliciesinthosecountries. Finally,inthe1980s,Tamilrefugeesalsoarrived inGreatBrit ain from Sri Lanka, settling there as in many other European countries. Moreover, there were a limited number of native peoplewhojoinedoneoftheorganizationsthatformedaround Hindugurus,suchastheHareKrishnaMovement. ThepresenceofHindusintheNetherlandsisalsolargelya result of colonialism. The greater majority of Hindus in this countryare,afterall,descendantsofthecontractlabourerswho were hired to work on Surinam plantations. As of 1873 the Dutch government conducted an active recruitment policy, in which inhabitants of then British India were contracted for la bourinthecolonyofSurinam.Manyplantationworkerssettled in Surinam after their contract had expired. After the colony gained independence in 1975, a considerable number of them and their descendants came to the Netherlands. In addition, small numbers of refugees from East Africa and Sri Lanka, as well as a small number of immigrants or temporary “expats” fromIndiaitself,alsocametotheNetherlands.Thenumberof HindusamongthenativepopulationoftheNetherlandsisvery limited,butjustasinEnglandthesesmallneoHindugroupsdo exercisegreatinfluence.Beingadherentsofmovementsgeared

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tomissionarywork,theyaremuchmoreinclinedtopropagate amessagethantheoriginalHindus. Given the special history of the British and Dutch Hindu communities,itwillproveinterestingtoinvestigatepreciselyhow therelationsbetweenChristiansandHindushavedevelopedin thesecountries. InterreligiousEncounteronaHighLevel Interreligious dialogue occurs on various levels. It can involve official representatives of religious groups who engage in dia logueonanequalfooting.Itcanalsoinvolvepeoplefromonere ligion, from the church for example, who seek contact with thoseofdifferentfaiths.Sometimestherearelocalinitiativesin which groups of different backgrounds who live in the same neighbourhoodseekencounteranddialogue.Andthereiscon tact, of course, between individual people from different reli gionswhomeetoneanotherinordinarysituations. Mostlikely,ourattentionregardinginterreligiousdialogue isdrawnfirsttothoseoccasionsinwhichcontactismadewith in a certain official framework. It speaks for itself that state ments made in the name of large national organizations carry extraweight.Overagainstthat,theroomtomovebecomesmore limitedinproportiontothedegreethatanorganizationhasthe characterofofficialrepresentation. GreatBritain In1987theInterFaithNetworkfortheUKwassetupinGreat Britain (Braybrooke 1994: 208; Inter Faith Network 2007). This network has in the meantime become the largest umbrella or ganization of religious persuasions in the United Kingdom. It thus brings together the national organizations of 29 different religious groups from the worlds of Christianity, Judaism, Is lam, Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, Zorostrianism and Baha’i. Therewerealso27nationaland96localinterreligioussocieties associatedwithit,aswellas12educationalandacademicbod ies.ThefounderwasBrianPearce,whohadgainedexperience in interreligious dialogue in the World Congress of Faiths. In thetwentyyearsthathewasdirectorthenetworkexpandedin toasignificantfactorinBritishsociety. TheInterFaithNetworkbroughtmanyleadersofreligious groups together on many occasions. This was important pri

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marily in situations in which tension between the different communitieswasthreatening.TheNetworkthusplayedame diatingroleinthecommotionthatarosein1988afterthepub lication of Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses (Bray brooke 1994: 208). For the government this Network was also thedialoguepartnerafter9/11.Thisorganizationattemptedin manydifferentwaystoincreasetheknowledgeofthereligious diversityinGreatBritain.Afewtimesadirectoryoflocalinter religious organizations was published and the famous manual ReligionsintheUK:AMultiFaithDirectorywasalsoworkedon. OfthemanybrochuresandpamphletsthattheInterFaith Networkpublished,itisprimarilyBuildingGoodRelationsfrom 1993 that is of fundamental importance (Inter Faith Network 1993). This pamphlet contains a “code of conduct” for the en counterwiththoseofotherfaiths.Thiscodeconsistsofanum berofrulesthataregroupedintothreesections.Firstisthere spectful attitude with regard to those of other faiths and their beliefs: “As members of the human family, we should show eachotherrespectandcourtesy.”Thenapleaforasinceredia logue is made: “When we talk about matters of faith with one another, we need to do so with sensitivity, honesty and straightforwardness.”Finally,thesensitivepointofthezealfor convertingisaddressed: Somepeoplewillalsowanttopersuadeotherstojointheir faith.Inamultifaithsocietywherethisispermitted,theat temptshouldalwaysbecharacterisedbyselfrestraintanda concernforother’sfreedomanddignity.

Thecodebreathesasympatheticatmosphereanditiscertainly significantthatallparticipatingorganizationshaveendorsedit. Nevertheless, the weakness of such an official dialogue is im mediatelyvisibleinit.Thestatementsaresogeneralthatitcan hardlybeexpectedthatonewouldnotagreewiththem.Thisis evenmorestrikinginthecasesinwhichthecurrentpoliticalsit uationgivesoccasionforastatement.Afterthebombattacksby Islamic fundamentalists in London in July 2005 the Inter Faith Networkissuedapamphletthatcalledforcalmandasenseof community,butthewords“Islam”and“Muslim”arenowhere used (Inter Faith Network 2005; cf. Inter Faith Network 2007: 26).

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Christians and Hindus learned, together with others, to conferontoleranceinapluriformsociety.Thatiscertainlywhat theNetworkgained.ForChristians,itmeantthattheoldmono poly positions had to be given up: those of other faiths were received on an equal footing in the centre of church power. Thusin1993thearchbishopofCanterburyrequestedtheInter Faith Network to organize a meeting with religious leaders in LambethPalace.Thatinitiativewasthenrepeatedannually.For Hindus, this official dialogue also had many greater conse quences.Hinduismwasconsideredinthisframeworktobeone oftheinstitutionalizedreligionsinthecountry.Itwasexpected that universally recognized leaders would come forward and thatpositionscouldbeformulatedthatwouldbesupportedby allHindusoratleastbythemajorityofthem.TheHinduismof these immigrants with such different backgrounds had until nowbeenadiffusephenomenon,wherebyethnicculturaltradi tionsandcastecustomsweremoreintheforegroundthantheir collectivefaith.Underthenewcircumstances,BritishHinduism gradually developed into a more clearly defined “faith com munity”(Knott2009). TheNetherlands Compared with the comprehensive British network, dialogue on this level has not occurred very much in the Netherlands. But a Dutch “Council of Religions” was already organized in 1979. This was an initiative by Rudolph Boeke who, like the founder of the Inter Faith Network, was active in the World CongressofFaiths.ThemajordifferencefromtheBritishorgan izationwasthatthemembersoftheDutchCouncilwerenotof ficial representatives of the religious communities. They were appointedaspersonnelbythethreeindividualsofthedirector ate of the Stichting Raad van Religies (Council of Religions Foundation).Memberswereplacedintooneofthreecategories. First,therewasaspokespersonfromeachreligiouscommunity (a Christian, a Jew, a Muslim, a Hindu, a Buddhist and some onefromthenewreligiousmovements).Thenanequalnumber of religious studies scholars were members of the council, one specialistforeachofthereligionscited.Finally,therewerecon tact persons in the council from other umbrella organizations (theCouncilofChurches,theInternationalAssociationforReli gious Freedom and the World Conference on Religion and

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Peace). The great number of members who worked at univer sitieswasstriking;thefunctionofchairwasalwaysoccupiedby aprofessor.1 ThemembersoftheCouncilofReligionsmetanumberof timesayear.Thecouncilofferedagoodopportunitytobecome acquainted and to have open discussions on topical themes. Thus, in the 1980s the rising Islamic fundamentalism was the topicofmanyadiscussion.Hereitappearedtobeaconsidera ble advantage that the members were not official representa tives of religious communities or organizations. The disadvan tage was, of course, that the meetings of the council had little directeffectoutsideofit.Thediscussionsdidhaveindirectin fluence—somememberswereconsultedbythegovernmenton topicalissues,suchasthesubsidizingofprayerareasforMus lims and Hindus.  But the Council of Religions also had long periodsofinactivity.Intheend,theheartshiftedtotheworkof local councils of religions that were gradually organized in mostofthelargecities. ForthecontactbetweenChristiansandHindustheworkof the Council of Religions did in any case mean that more at tention was paid in the church and university to the quickly growingHindupresenceinthecountry.Thefirstextensivein ventoryofHindugroupsintheNetherlandswascommissioned bytheCouncilofReligions(Schouten1982). InitiativesfromtheChurches Inadditiontotheseformsofmultilateraldialogue,whosepur pose is to have all the religious communities meet, there are many situations of bilateral dialogue. With respect to Hindus and Christians, primarily the initiatives by the Christian churchesareimportanthere.ThisobtainsforbothGreatBritain andtheNetherlands,andinbothcountriesitisparticularlythe church umbrella organizations, the Councils of Churches, that sawanimportanttaskinthis.Theattemptsbythechurchesat dialogue with Hindus are unique in that the churches were alwayscriticalabouttheirowntraditionaswell.Theencounter 1

Thechairpersonswere,successively,thesociologistofreligionPie terSmits,thehistorianofreligionJacquesWaardenburg,theparapsycho logistHenrivanPraagandthephilosopherofreligionHendrikVroom. Imyselfwassecretaryofthecouncilfrom1978to1999.

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withthoseofadifferentfaithdid,afterall,inevitablyencounter difficultquestions.Howcouldthereligioustraditionsofothers beappreciatedfromaChristianbackground?Whatspacedoes theChristianfaithofferforsharinginthespiritualityandcele brations of other religions? What is the relationship between dialogueandmissionarywork? GreatBritainDialogue InGreatBritaintheCouncilofChurches,nowcalled“Churches Together,”hashadanimpressivehistoryintheareaofinterre ligiousdialogue(Harris2007).2Alreadyin1978aspecialbody wassetupforinterreligiousdialogue,theCommitteeforRela tionswithPeopleofOtherFaiths(now:TheChurches’Interreli giousNetwork).ThefirstsecretarywastheMethodistminister Kenneth Cracknell. He has had a great influence on reflection onthemeaningofcontactwiththoseofotherfaiths.Cracknell wroteabookletin1981forthecouncilinwhichheformulated fourprinciplesfordialogue(BritishCouncilofChurches1981). Theseprincipleswere: Dialoguebeginswhenpeoplemeeteachother; Dialoguedependsonmutualtrustandmutualunderstand ing; Dialogue makes it possible to share in service to the com munity; Dialoguebecomesthemediumofauthenticwitness.

Thefirstprincipleemphasizesthevalueofpersonalencounter: according to this way of looking, dialogue is certainly not a comparisonofdoctrinesorholyscriptures.Onlyintheencoun terofpeoplefromdifferentreligionscananactualdialoguede velop.Thisrequiresacertainattitude,characterizedbymutual openness,asthesecondprincipleindicates.Thethirdprinciple connects interreligious dialogue with shared responsibility for society.Thepurposeisnotatheoreticaldiscussionbutacontri bution to the pluriform society in which religions have to live together. The fourth principle, finally, indicates that it is pre 2

 This organization was originally called the British Council of Churches.In1990thenamewaschangedwhentheRomanCatholics joinedandtheworkingareaexpandedtoincludetheRepublicofIreland. ItthenbecametheCouncilofChurchesforBritainandIreland.In1999 thenamewaschangedto:ChurchesTogetherinBritainandIreland.

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cisely in a dialogical encounter that both partners in the dia logue are given the opportunity to spread their faith. This fact nullifiesoppositionbetweenmissionizinganddialogue. CracknelllaterelaboratedonthefourprinciplesinInGood Faith(CouncilofChurchesforBritainandIreland1991),which continuestobeveryinfluentialtoday.Thisviewisdirected,of course,towardallsituationsofdialogue,butitwastheencoun terwithHindusthatCracknellfoundparticularlyinspiringfor thisview(Cracknell1996a,1996b).Heforgedaspecialconnec tion with the members of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness(ISKCON,usuallycalledtheHareKrishnaMove ment).Inthe1980sthismovementwaswatchedcloselyonthe politicallevel,withthesuspicionthatthiswasasectthatwould have a dangerous attraction for young people. In line with his ownprinciples,Cracknellstartedadialoguewithadherentsof the movement. He recognized in them the authentic faith of a centuriesoldHindutraditionandworkedhardtoprotectthem fromfalseaccusations. GreatBritainTheQuestionofGod The questions to which the encounter with Hindus gave rise can be seen in a 1986 publication by the Council of Churches (Hooker 1986). The title What is Idolatry? did not make it im mediately clear that it was about dialogue between Christians and Hindus. But that was the case. The author himself ex plained the title of his book by writing about “the question whichthetitleofthispaperimplicitlyraises:shouldChristians call Hindus idolators?” (Hooker 1986: 4950). The question re flectsthechangingreligiouslandscapeofGreatBritain.Hindus have been setting up temples in many places in England since the 1970s. This was being done in particular by immigrants from East Africa who had an important share in this (Knott 2009).Afteralltheywere“twicemigrants”andbroughtagreat deal of experience with them in building up a religious com munity life; they had done so in their African period as well. MostoftheseimmigrantswereGujaratisandasignificantnum berofthembelongedtotheSwaminarayanMovement(Pocock 1976;Dwyer2004).Preciselythiswellorganizedreformmove mentwasabletobringitsadherentstoachievingagreatdeal. Thepassionforenterpriseinthismovementculminatedinthe constructionofatempleentirelyinmarble,costingasmuchas

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twelve million pounds sterling. This temple in Neasden was finallydedicatedin1995. Roger Hooker was the right person to help Christian be lieversintheirorientationinthisnewsituation.Hehadworked forseveralyearsasamissionaryinIndiaand,afterhisreturn, had settled in Birmingham (Kings 2002: 4753), a city with a long history of interreligious activities (Conway 1995). Hooker taughtatoneoftheSellyOakcollegesandfulfilledmissionary dutiesamongHindusandSikhs.InhisbookHookdoesanex tensiveanalysisofimagesandthevenerationofimagesinboth the Christian and Hindu traditions. His purpose here was to break through the monolithic thinking apparent in two oppo site religions. Not all Christians think the same about images; nor do all Hindus. Whoever—on the basis of her Protestant Christianfaith—callsHindus“idolators”mustalsocallRoman Catholics and Easter Orthodox believers such. More important isthequestion:TowhomdoHindusdirectthemselvesintheir veneration?Hookdistinguishes threeanswers. Thefirst is that GodcanbeworshippedonlyviaChrist,whichmeansthatHin dus do not worship God. Diametrically opposed to that is the answer that presupposes a single divine reality and thus as sumesthatHindusworshipthesameGodintheirowncultur ally determined way. Hooker himself chooses for a via media that remains as much as possible in dialogue with the two ex tremes. This leads him to propose that the Bible teaches us to know the true God but that Hindus do not fall outside God’s graciousactivity. GreatBritainMixedMarriages Among thepublications by theBritishCouncilofChurchesis another striking one on mixed marriages (Lamb 1982). It is a pastoral book, in which it appears that there were mixed mar riagesofseveralkindsatthebeginningofthe1980s,including thosebetweenHindusandChristians.Theauthor,Christopher Lamb,wasanAnglicantheologianand,likeHooker,belonged to the “school” of Selly Oak Christian writers on interfaith themes(Conway1995:129).Hisbackgroundwouldhavemade him even more interested in this problem. The clergy of the ChurchofEnglandfoundthemselvesinadifficultpositionthat, according to British law, everyone, baptized or not, had the right to marry in their church (Church of England 1991: 1).

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Lambiscertainlyreservedwithrespecttointerfaithmarriages. Buthedoespleadforcarefulpastoralcounselingwherebysev eralremarkablecasesarecited.Hedoesnotseeamarriagebe tweenaChristianandaHinduasthemostproblematicbecause of the traditional tolerance of Hindus towards other religions. But resistance from the Christian side can be expected, and in Lamb’sviewwithgoodreason. GreatBritainParticipatinginEachOther’sFeasts A special form of interreligious dialogue is formed by the in volvement of the one religious community in the feasts of the other. It does not speak for itself that churches would partic ipate on an official level in the feasts of other religious com munities.Itrelativizestheoldadageextraecclesiamnullasalusir revocably.ThisisasensitiveissuepreciselywithrespecttoHin duism,withwhichChristiansdonothaveanysharedhistorical background.CongratulationstoJewishorIslamiccommunities can appeal to common basis more easily. But there are exam plesoftheofficialinvolvementofthechurchinHindufeasts. For some years the archbishop of Canterbury has been sendingaletterofcongratulationstoHindusontheoccasionof Divali,thefeastoflight.Thesymbolismoflightanddarkplays an important role in Christianity as well of course. This gives the opportunity to underscore the overlappings between the religions. Moreover, Divali is celebrated in late fall, when the advent season begins for the church. These elements are obvi ously in the foreground in the annual congratulations. Refer ence can, of course, easily be made to the efforts of both reli giouscommunitiestoallowthelighttotriumphoverdarkness and good over evil. Nonetheless, in the text of such messages onefeelsthatthequestionif“thelight”meansthesameinboth traditions cannot be answered so easily.  Thus the archbishop wrotein2008: Weseektoreflectonwhathasgonebeforeandtoreconnect withthelightwhichlieswithinusandwhichisattheheart ofallthatis.ChristiansknowthisastheLightofLightandcan appreciate and share in the ways in which at Diwali you cel ebrateyourawarenessoftheinnerlight.(Williams2008:1)

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TheNetherlandsDialogue A great number of initiatives have been developed in the Ne therlands as well by the Council of Churches in order to con ductadialoguewithHindus(Bakker2006).Thesuddeninflux oftensofthousandsofHindusfromSurinamaround1975was a particular challenge for the churches. Contact by the council withthenewcompatriotswasfirstsoughtinTheHague—after all,itwaspreciselyinthiscitythatthelargestHinducommun ityarose.Thelocalinitiativesweregraduallyliftedtoanational level, and in 1985 a Werkgroep Hindoeïsme (Hinduism Work ing Group) was set up under the auspices of the Council of Churches in the Netherlands. The group consisted of Protes tantsandRomanCatholicsontheonehandandSurinamHin dus from the traditional persuasion (Sanatan Dharm) and the reformmovementAryaSamajontheother.Althoughthenum ber of members has never been higher than ten, there was al waysgreatdiversity. In the quarter century of its existence the working group (nowtheContactgroepHindoesChristenen[ContactGroupfor HindusandChristians])hasissuedquiteanumberofpublica tions.SomewerediscussedinthecouncilitselforintheOffice for the Relationship with World Religions and received a more or less official character as a publication (Sectie Relatie Wereldgodsdiensten 1985; Werkgroep Hindoeïsme 1993; Schouten1995;Bakker1996).Otherbooks,resultingfromdis cussions in the working group were published by individuals (Van Dijk et al. 1999; Rambaran and Koeldiep 2004). These in clude a work written by two Hindu members of the working groupas,accordingtothesubtitle,a“contributionbyHindusto interreligious dialogue in the Netherlands” (Rambaran and Koeldiep2004).Fortherest,itisstrikingthatanumberoftop icsthatwerecentraltothedialoguebetweenHindusandChris tians in Great Britain have also attracted attention in the Ne therlands.Afewexampleswilldemonstratethis. TheNetherlandsTheQuestionofGod In 1996 Freek Bakker published a book called Hindoes en chris tenenhoezitdat?(HindusandChristiansWhataboutThem?) (Bakker1996).ThebookwaswrittenattherequestoftheCoun cilofChurchesintheNetherlands,butseveralobjectionsfrom conservativeswerevoicedintheplenarymeetingofthecouncil

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when the manuscript was presented. The book was published intheendbutwithaveryreservedforewordbythesecretaryof the council who described it as “not a final assessment but as partofreflection”(Bakker1996:8). TheleitmotivinBakker’sargumentisconstitutedbyhiscon victionthatknowledgeandexperienceofGodcanalsobefound outside the JudeoChristian tradition, and Bakker uses biblical groundstoarguethis.Hethusreferstotheepisodeinthepatri archalnarrativesinwhichAbrahamacknowledgestheCanaan iteMelchizedekasapriestoftheEverlastingGod(Genesis14). And he also points to the suprahistorical, cosmic aspect of the ChristfigurethatappearssometimesinthelettersofPaul(Co lossians1).Moreover,Bakkerusesargumentsbasedontheex perience of Hindus with Christ and the Christian faith. Here, forhim,itisprimarilymysticsandthinkersinmodernHindu ism who are important—in particular, Ramakrishna, Vivekan anda,DayanandaandGandhi.Bakkerthuscautiouslyposesthe question if the vision that Ramakrishna had of Christ can be viewedasamanifestationoftheLordinanotherreligion.And he writes with appreciation of Indians who apply the Hindu termsadgurutoJesus. Bakker sees possibilities for mutual enrichment in the en counter between Hindus and Christians. Christians could de velopmorerespectfornatureasaresultofthisencounterand could grant a more important place to ritual and mysticism. Hindus could learn something about the value of a faith com munityandtheequalityofall people.Itwouldalsobeimpor tantforthemtoseethespecificwayinwhichGodrevealshim self in the crucified Christ: descending into the dark and de spisedsideoflife. Bakker’smanuscriptevokedmuchdebateandresistancein theCouncilofChurches;membersoftheDutchReformedChurch especially voiced a number of objections. There was no open nessfordialogueintherightwingofthisCalvinisticdenomin ation. The objections by orthodox Calvinists were directed mainlyatthediscussionofChristology.Whattheymissedhere wastheunicityofChristandtheclassicalcharacterizationofthe workofredemption.Thisdiscussionwouldbecontinuedfora longtimeinthecouncil.Thediscussionswerecontinuedinthe Office for the Relationship with World Religions (later called:

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“InterreligiousEncounterConsultationGroup”).In2004abook waspresentedthathadbeenwritteninresponsetothisdiscus sion(Schouten2004).Nowaswellittookagreatdealtogetthe plenarymeetingofthecounciltopublishit. Nevertheless, Bakker’s discussion of Christology was cer tainlynotthemoststrikingthingabouthisbook.Referencesto VivekanandaandGandhi,aswellastodifferentChristiantheo logians in India, did not offer the insider anything new. And theargumentforusingthetitlesadguruforJesus—fromwhich many orthodox church leaders recoiled—was also not that re volutionary. Rather, his discussion of the question of God had somethingveryremarkableaboutit.Bakkerattemptedtobreak throughthegenerallyfeltoppositionbetweentheChristianand HinduconceptsofGod:itwaswidelyfeltthatHindushavean impersonal concept of God whereas for Christians a personal conception of God is central to their faith. Bakker approached thisinthesamewaysimilarthatHookerapproachedtheissue of images. In a short but deep section he shows how the con cept“person”haddevelopedinEuropeanhistory.Hethusrela tivizedthematterofChristiansspeakingaboutapersonalGod in one way. In contrast, he shows how different views of God exist alongside and are mixed with one another in Hinduism: thepersonalalsohasadefiniteplace.Inthiswayanapparently unbridgeablegulfwasneverthelessbridged. TheNetherlandsMixedMarriages There was also a major problem in the Netherlands in church circles as to how to approach the issue of mixed marriages. In 1995theCouncilofChurchesissuedareportthatwascompiled bytheWerkgroepHindoeïsme(Schouten1995).Thisreportwas specialbecauseitwaswrittenjointlybyChristiansandHindus. A Reformed minister, two Roman Catholic priests, a pandit from Sanatan Dharm and a pandit from Arya Samaj collabor ated on it. They were agreed on one point in advance: mixed marriages are a reality against which religious organizations should not protest as such. This is also expressed in the title: trouwendoenzetoch…(Theywillgetmarriedanyway...). The book begins with a sketch of four marriage celebra tionsofmixedcouples.UnlikeinGreatBritain,theactualmar riage in the Netherlands is always performed by the civil au thorities. But there are a number of possibilities for a religious

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ritualafterwards:inachurchservice,aHinduritual,anadap ted ceremony in a home or with two different gatherings, one HinduandoneChristian.Fromthechoicesmadeitisnotonly apparent how many questions confront the bridal couple with respect to their wedding. The differences in faith and cultural patterns behind those questions also become visible. The book argues that each person should study the religion of the other and become acquainted with it. It also offers an aid for mixed marriage ceremonies, complete with suggestions for readings fromtheholyscripturesofbothreligions. TheNetherlandsParticipatinginEachOther’sFeasts Since1998theCouncilofChurchesintheNetherlandshassent aletterofcongratulationsannuallytotheHinducommunities. This greeting is compiled by the Contactgroep HindoesChris tenen (formerly the Werkgroep Hindoeïsme). Unlike the mes sage from the archbishop of Canterbury (and, for that matter, that from the Vatican authorities), this letter is not sent on the occasion of the Divali feast but on that of Holi. This was a re quest by the Hindus in the contact group, and has to do with the special place the Holi feast had in their earlier homeland Surinam(Sukul1974:14). HoliistheHinduNewYear’sDayandoffersagoodoppor tunitytowishHindusaprosperousnewyear.Butitshouldbe statedthatmostHindusintheNetherlandshaveadaptedtothe Western calendar and have the new year’s feeling more on 1 January.Themostimportantritualofthisfeastistheburningof a large pile that symbolizes impurity and evil. The church’s congratulations refer to this regularly, for the struggle against evil is something that obviously binds both religions. Some times texts from the holy scriptures from both traditions are placedalongsideeachother,whichcansummonupagreatdeal ofmutualrecognition.Thus,theHoligreetingof2009refersto theBibletext:“Donotbeovercomebyevil,butovercomeevil withgood”(Romans12:21),whereasthefinalverseoftheRig vedawasquotedatthebeginning:“Oneandthesamebeyour resolve, and be your minds of one accord. / United be the thoughtsofallthatallmayhappilyagree”(RigVeda10.191.4) (RaadvanKerken,2009).

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LocalEncounters Cracknell’s thesis, “Dialogue begins when people meet each other”(BritishCouncilofChurches1981)suggeststhatthebest dialogueoccurswherepeoplefromdifferentbackgroundsmeet indailylife.Indeed,therearemanyinspiringexamplesoflocal situations where people become acquainted with each other’s background through working together or sharing interests. Suchadialoguehappensoutofchurchcongregationsanda roundHindutemples,atschools,incareinstitutionsorinneigh bourhoodorfriendshipcontacts. Itshouldbenotedthattheneedforadialogueisprimarily aChristianphenomenon.InHinducommunitiespeopleretreat much more quickly to their own property and have less of a needtosharetheirownreligioustraditionwithothers.Oneof the reasons for this difference is, of course, that traditionally Hinduism has much less of a missionary consciousness than Christianity. Kim Knott observed already in her pioneering studyonHinducommunitiesinLeedsin1986,thattheHindus did not want to spread their faith because “They feel that the dharmaofthehostsocietyisChristianity”(Knott1986:232). In contrast, there are a number of reform movements and organizationsaroundspecificgurusthatdowishtobeheardin the new environment in which they find themselves. This ob tains primarily for the Hare Krishna Movement (ISKCON), whichinbothcountriesveryemphaticallytakestothestreetsto involveoutsidersintheirdevotion.Peopleinthismovemental so organize congresses whereby dialogue with Christians is sought (Cracknell 1996b).3 The fact that most adherents have their roots in the Western world and were raised in Christian families plays a role here of course. But there are also temples belonging to population groups that were originally Hindu where contact with Christians is maintained. It is striking that theseareprimarilytemplesofmovementsthatadvocatethere form of classical Hinduism. In Great Britain the large, very prominenttempleoftheSwaminarayanMovementinNeasden also regularly attracts visitors of Christian background. These visitorscanbequitehighlyplaced:inMarchof2009thePrince 3

Sharpestatesincorrectlythat“nodialogueofanyconsequencee merged”frommovementslikeISKCON(Sharpe1990:110).

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ofWalesandtheDuchessofCornwallvisitedthetempleonthe occasionoftheHolifeast.TheNeasdentemplehassetupaper manent exhibition on Hinduism for the innumerable Western visitors.IntheNetherlands,inordertobecomeacquaintedwith Hinduism,churchgroupsvisitprimarilytheSriRamtempleon MijtenStreetinTheHagueandthenewSriRamtempleinWij chen.ThetempleinTheHagueisthecradleofthekarmavadic tradition;thisisthetraditionwithinSanatanDharmthatwants toappointnonBrahmansaspriestsaswell(Buikema2005:28). InthetempleinWijchenthepriest’sworkisalsoentrustedtoa nonBrahman(Nugteren2009).Itispreciselyinthesemorere formmindedcirclesthatthereismoreopennesstowardsbelie versfromothertraditions. There are many local church institutions where dialogue occurs.Manyparishesorcongregationsseekcontactwithlocal foreigncommunities,bothIslamicandHindu.Sometimesindi vidualHindusseekalocalChristiancentretobecomeacquain ted with the dominant religion of the country or out of a per sonalneedforinsight.TheJesuitMichaelBarnesgivesafineex ample of the latter (Barnes 2006). In the dialogue centre of his order in West London a young Hindu who was interested in theSpiritualExercisesofIgnatiusofLoyolacameby.Heexpec tedthatadeepstudyofthistextwouldprovideaneworienta tion in his religious experience. The father guided him on this spiritual path for three months. The Hindu made the frame work of Ignatius’ exercises his own but in that context used prayertextsthatheknewfromhisowntradition:theBhagavad Gita.TheJesuitconcludedthatitseemedpossible“tobuildupa relationship between persons of different faith traditions by working on the resonances or echoes which one language of faith may inspire in another” (Barnes 2006: 111). An interre ligiousdialoguewillnotoftenbeasintenseasthisone.Butthat the encounter between people of different faiths can mean an enrichmentofbothisclearfromthedialoguebetweenHindus and Christians, particularly in Great Britain and the Nether lands.

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Bibliography Bakker, F.L. (2006). “The HinduChristian Dialogue in Europe: The CaseoftheNetherlands.”DharmaDeepika10:2337. (1996).Hindoesenchristenen–hoezitdat?Gedachtenrondderelatie tussenhindoeïsmeenchristelijkgeloofinNederland.Kampen:Kok. Barnes,Michael.(2006).“WithGodintheWorld:ADialoguebetween the Bhagavad Gita and the Spiritual Exercises.” In: Catherine Cornille(ed.).SongDivine:ChristianCommentariesontheBhagavad Gita.Leuvenetal./GrandRapids:Peeters/W.B.Eerdmans.Pp.91 112. Barot,R.(1991).“Migration,ChangeandIndianReligionsinBritain.” In:W.A.R.ShadidandP.S.vanKoningsveld(eds).TheIntegration of Islam and Hinduism in Western Europe. Kampen: Kok Pharos PublishingHouse.Pp.188200. Baumann, Martin. (1998). “Sustaining ‘Little Indias’: The Hindu Dia sporasinEurope.”In:GerrieterHaar(ed.).StrangersandSojour ners: Religious Communities in the Diaspora. Leuven: Peeters. Pp. 95132. Braybrooke,Marcus.(1994).“InterfaithDevelopmentsinEurope.”In: SeanGill,GavinD’CostaandUrsulaKing(eds).ReligioninEur ope.Kampen:KokPharosPublishingHouse.Pp.20113. BritishCouncilofChurches.(1981).RelationswithPeopleofOtherFaiths: Guidelines on Dialogue in Britain. London: The British Council of Churches. Buikema,Jan.(2005).“Eenstemuitdepraktijk:Interviewmetpandit Attry Ramdhani.” In: Reender Kranenborg (ed.). Voorgangers in Nederland.Zoetermeer:Meinema.Pp.2836. ChurchofEngland. (1991).Guidelines fortheCelebrationofMixedFaith MarriagesinChurch.London:BoardofMission. Conway,Martin.(1995).“TogetherinBirmingham—Strengththrough Racial Diversity: Religious Plurality in an English City.” Studies inInterreligiousDialogue5:11740. CouncilofChurchesforBritainandIreland.(1991).InGoodFaith:The FourPrinciplesofInterfaithDialogue:ABriefGuidefortheChurches. London:CCBI. Cracknell, Kenneth. (1996a). “The Four Principles of Interfaith Dia logueandtheFutureofReligion.”ISKCONCommunicationsJour nal4.www.iskcon.com/icj/4_1/cracknell.htm1. (1996b). “The Nature of the Self: A VaisnavaChristian Confer ence.”StudiesinInterreligiousDialogue6:21320.

354 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Dwyer, Rachel. (2004). “The Swaminarayan Movement.” In: Knut A. JacobsenandP.PratapKumar(eds.).SouthAsiansintheDiaspora. Leiden/Boston:Brill.Pp.180199. Harris,ElisabethJ.(2007).HistoricalNotesontheCommitteeforRelations with People of Other Faiths (CRPOF) and the Churches’ Commission forInterFaithRelations(CCIFR)19772003.London:ChurchesTo getherinBritainandIreland. Hooker,Roger.(1986).WhatisIdolatry?London:TheBritishCouncilof Churches. InterFaithNetworkfortheUK.(2007).20Years:MilestonesontheJour neyTogetherTowardsGreaterInterFaithUnderstandingandCoopera tion.London:TheInterFaithNetworkfortheUK. (2005). Looking after One Another: The Safety and Security of our FaithCommunities.London:TheInterFaithNetworkfortheUK. (1993). Building Good Relations with People of Different Faiths and Beliefs.London:TheInterFaithNetworkfortheUK. Kings,Graham.(2002).ChristianityConnected:Hindus,Muslimsandthe World in the Letters of Max Warren and Roger Hooker. Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum. Klootwijk, Eeuwout. (1993). “Hindoes in Nederland: een aanzet tot theologischereflectie.”WereldenZending22:5364. Knott, Kim. (2009). “Becoming a ‘Faith Community’: British Hindus, IdentityandthePoliticsofRepresentation.”JournalofReligionin Europe2:85114. (1986).HinduisminLeeds:AStudyofReligiousPracticeintheIndian HinduCommunityandinHinduRelatedGroups.Leeds:University ofLeeds. Lamb,Christopher.(1982).MixedFaithMarriage:ACaseforCare.Lon don:TheBritishCouncilofChurches. Luchesi, Brigitte. (2004). “Tamil Hindu Places of Worship in Ger many.” In: Knut A. Jacobsen and P. Pratap Kumar (eds). South AsiansintheDiaspora.Leiden/Boston:Brill.Pp.11633. Nugteren, A. (2009). “Home is Where the Murtis Are: A Hindustani CommunityanditsTempleinWijchen,theNetherlands.”Journal ofReligioninEurope2.Forthcoming. Pocock,D.F.(1976).“PreservationoftheReligiousLife:HinduImmi grantsinEngland.”ContributionstoIndianSociology(NS)10:341 65. Raad van Kerken in Nederland (Council of Churches in the Nether lands).(2009).SubhHoli!!(Holigroet).Amersfoort:RaadvanKerk en.

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Rambaran, Hari, and Devi Koeldiep. (2004). Voetafdrukken uit de Ve dische wereld: Bijdrage van hindoes aan de interreligieuze dialoog in Nederland.Budel:Damon. Schouten, Jan Peter. (2008). “Hindoeïsme.” In: Meerten ter Borg et al. (eds). Handboek Religie in Nederland. Zoetermeer: Meinema. Pp. 25364. (ed.).(2004). Wie zeggendemensendatIkben?JezusChristusinde dialoog.Amersfoort:RaadvanKerkeninNederland. (ed.). (1995). ‘Trouwen doen ze toch…’: Over huwelijken tussen hin doesenchristenen.Kampen:Kok. (1982).“WegwijzerinhindoeïstischNederland.”Religieuzebeweg ingeninNederland4:3373. Sectie Relatie Wereldgodsdiensten (Office for the Relation to the World Religions)oftheCouncilofChurchesintheNetherlands.(1985). Handreiking voor ontmoeting tussen christenen en hindoes in Ne derland. Anders geloven, samen leven III. Voorburg/Amersfoort: Prot. Stichting tot Bevordering van het Bibliotheekwezen/ De Horstink. Sharpe,EricJ.(1990).“HinduChristianDialogueinEurope.”In:Har old Coward (ed.). HinduChristian Dialogue. Maryknoll: Orbis Books.Pp.10015. Sukul, J.P. Kaulesar. (1974). Enkele beschouwingen over het Holifeest. Utrecht:ShriSanatanDharmNederland. VanderBurg,C.J.G.(2004).“TheHinduDiasporaintheNetherlands: HalfwaybetweenLocalStructuresandGlobalIdeologies.”In:Knut A. Jacobsen and P. Pratap Kumar (eds). South Asians in the Dia spora.Leiden/Boston:Brill.Pp.97115. Van Dijk, A.M.G., et al. (eds). (1999). Hindoeïsme in Nederland: Achter gronden, geloofsbeleving en toekomstperspectieven van Surinaamse hindoesindeNederlandsesamenleving.Budel:Damon. Weller, Paul. (2004). “Hindus and Sikhs: Community Development andReligiousDiscriminationinEnglandandWales.”In:KnutA. JacobsenandP.PratapKumar(eds).SouthAsiansintheDiaspora. Leiden/Boston:Brill.Pp.45497. WerkgroepHindoeïsme.(1993).Geestelijkeverzorgingvanhindoesinde gezondheidszorg:Eenpeilingnaardevoorzieningenvoorhindoesineen aantal ziekenhuizen in enkele Nederlandse regio’s. Maarssenbroek: WerkgroepHindoeïsme. Williams,Rowan(2008).“Archbishop’sDiwalimessage2008.”www. archbishopofcanterbury.org/2013.

Superseded,Obstructive,orCrucial? ChristianViewsofJudaismanditsSacredTexts AlberdinaHoutman

Abstract ThroughoutthealmosttwothousandyearsofJewishChristiancoexistence, Christian views of Judaism and its sacred texts have generally been quite negative. There have also been notable exceptions, however, and especially since the second half of the last century, some positive developments can be noted.InthepresentessaywewillconsidersomemajorcurrentsofChristian thinkingonJudaismasithasdevelopedsincetheEarlyModernPeriod,with anemphasisonProtestantthought.Geographically,weconcentrateonWest ern Europe, the area where the great catastrophe of the Shoah took place, whichhadaconsiderableimpactonWesterntheologyaftertheSecondWorld War.

Introduction EmergingfromthelateMiddleAges,Europebeganundergoing extraordinarychangesinallaspectsoflife,notleastinreligious thinking.TheReformationwasstartingtotakeplace.Humanist thought and scholarly curiosity found their way into religion, marking a break in Christian thinking on world religions in generalandJudaisminparticular.Afterthedarkperiodofthe MiddleAges,whenJewishChristianrelationsweremarkedby crusades, public disputes, inquisition, and expulsions, the six teenthcentury Reformation movement initially brought some relieffortheJews.Oneofthereasonsforthiswasthattheuntil thendominantCatholicChurchnowhadanewenemytofight, namelytheProtestants.Thisshiftedsomeofthenegativeatten tion away from the Jews. Another reason was that, under the influence of the new Zeitgeist, an interest in Jewish religious works as vehicles of classical learning and ancient wisdom developed.Therehadalwaysbeenindividualsandsmallgroups who had studied Hebrew and rabbinic literature, but that was generally motivated by polemical or missionary reasons. Now 357

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therewasagenuinewishtolearnwithoutulteriormotivesvis àvis the Jewish community. This did not only change the ap preciation of Jewish knowledge but also led to scholarly con tacts between Christians and Jews. The Christians needed the Jewsinordertogainaccesstotheirworldoflearning,bothina material way, by buying and borrowing books and manu scripts, and in an intellectual way, as tutors who could teach them Hebrew and Aramaic and introduce them to the vast bodyofrabbinicliterature. TheSixteenthCentury TheleaderofthenewProtestantmovement,MartinLuther,had a markedly positive attitude towards the Jews in his early years,basedupon hisfirmexpectationthattheywouldjoinin the Reformation. He was convinced that the Jews’ rejection of Christ was due to the—in his eyes—false teachings and prac tices of the Catholic Church. In 1523 he wrote an interesting tractate entitled Daß Jesus Christus ein geborener Jude sei (“That JesusChristwasBornaJew”),inwhichhestressedthathatred againstJewswastheologicallyunfounded,since,afterall,Jesus himselfwasaJew.HehopedandexpectedthattheJews’antag onism towards Christianity would be softened by this more positive attitude towards them and that they would be con vinced of the messianship of Jesus through the new light that he shed on the Bible. However, when this did not happen, his sympathy turned into anger. In his work Von den Juden und ihrenLügen(“OntheJewsandTheirLies”)of1543,hegavethe infamous advice to the legal authorities that the synagogues and houses of the Jews should be razed, their books confisca ted, their safe travel restricted, their usury prohibited, their worshiprestricted,andthattheyshouldbesubjectedpersonal lytoexpulsion.Asthetitleofthisbookmakesclear,thiswork attackednotonlytheJewsbutalsotheirliterature:“Wedonot give a fig for their crazy glosses, which they have spun out of theirownheads”(Luther1971:196). Other reformers were less antagonistic and held a more positiveviewofJudaismanditsScriptures.Thecommentators at the exegetical schools of Strasbourg, Basel and Zurich used and appreciated the rabbinic sources, but in a restricted sense, namely, as far as “the rabbis” could help clarify the literal

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meaningofthetextanditshistoricalcontext.Inadditiontothe rabbinicalcommentaries,theinterestintheTargumim(Aramaic translationsoftheHebrewBible),andthekabbalah(Jewisheso terictradition)gainedinimportance.ThebasicunityoftheOld and the New Testaments, however, and therefore the main points of the Christological interpretation of the Hebrew Bible wereneverdoubted. AlthoughtheReformersingeneralhadamoretolerantview of Judaism than the Catholic Church before them, the change wasnotfundamental.Thebasicbelief,thatthechurchofChrist was the verus Israel (“true Israel”) that had superseded carnal Israel (“Israel according to the flesh”), i.e. the Jewish people, remained. Consequently, postbiblical Judaism was treated with suspicionandcontempt,includingtheoldchargethattherab bishadchangedthetextoftheBibleinseveralplacestothede trimentoftheChristianfaith. The CounterReformation, which began in 1545 when the CouncilofTrentwascalledinresponsetotheProtestant“rebel lion,”dealtharshlywithJewsaswellasProtestants.Thismove ment induced new antiJudaic sentiments when Pope Paul IV (15551559) stated that Jewish survival depended on their con vertingtoChristianity.Inadditiontotheoldreproaches,theJews werenowalsoblamedforhelpingtheProtestantmovementby teaching the Protestants Hebrew and by introducing them to their sacred scriptures. Whereas earlier popes had often de monstrated a charitable attitude towards the Jews of Italy and had even welcomed to Rome large numbers of refugees from thepersecutionscarriedoutinSpainatthetimeoftheInquisi tion, Pope Paul IV confined the Jews under his jurisdiction to ghettoes (Oberman 1994: 12730). Hebrew books were de stroyed in bonfires in Rome and elsewhere where papal influ ence was high. Pius V (15661572) expelled entire Jewish com munities from cities where Jews had lived continuously since antiquity,andheencouragedCatholicprinceselsewheretodo likewise (Johnson 1987: 24344). The temporary alleviation of thepersecutionoftheJewshadended. TheSeventeenthCentury Inthecourseoftheseventeenthcenturythenewlyacquiredin sight that Christians could benefit from the study of the He

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brewBibleandrabbinicliteraturestartedtodevelopintophilo JudaismwithinpartsoftheProtestantChurch.Throughthenor malization of ChristianJewish contacts appreciation grew for theJewishwayoflife,withitsgreatemphasisonlearning,and for Jewish ethics and social values. This brought about a wil lingnesstoreexaminethepropositionthatGodhadrejectedhis beloved people and had superseded them by the Christians. Many Christian readers of the Bible in the Reformation period cametoseethatithadnotbeenGod’spurposethatallthepro mises that God made to Abraham should be fulfilled in the church: a promise belongs to the party to whom it has been made and not to another party. In this light, the logical con clusionwasdrawnthattherewerestillpromisesGodhadmade toIsraelthatneededtobeperformed.Therefore,itseemedne cessarythatIsraelshouldreturntoZionsothattheprophecies concerningtheendoftimesmightbefulfilled. Strong eschatological expectations developed along with the Protestant movement. It is apparent that seventeenthcen turyEuropewascrisscrossedbynetworksofmillenarianChris tiansandJewswhowereconvincedthattheMessiaheitherhad already come or would do so shortly (Coudert 1994: 75). For some Protestant leaders, the Reformation itself indicated that thefinalactofworldhistorywouldsoonarrive.Andsincemil lenarian thinkers held the conversion of the Jews to be the crucial penultimate event before the commencement of the ThousandYearReignofChristonearth,thisbecameoneofthe mostserioustheologicalconcerns(VanderWall1988:73).There wasagreatfeelingofurgency,becauseitwasbelievedthatthe conversion of the Jews would have to take place in the very near future, even to the extent that specific dates were given (Van der Wall 1988: 77). Accordingly, plans were made to aid thisconversion.Themillenariansconsidereditnecessarytoun derstand Judaism more completely if they were to assist the JewsinseeingthetruthoftheGospel(Popkin1988:35).Tothis end, Jewish works were translated into Latin and vernacular languages.ThisdevelopmentwasespeciallystronginEngland andtheNetherlands.AnothertacticforreachingJewishhearts wasbywayofcharitysothattheJewswouldrecognizethelove ofJesusinthesecharitableworks(VanderWall1988:80).

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SomeradicalProtestantphiloJudaistscameupwithanew strategy for converting Jews. Rejecting Catholic tradition, they offered Jews the promise of a return to the apostolic past of early Jewish Christianity stripped of the more offensive doc trinesoftheincarnation,resurrection,andtheTrinity.Thepro blem,however,washowtofindoutexactlywhatapostolicJew ishChristianitywas.ThisrequireddelvingintotheJewishsour ces to discover what the customs and beliefs of early Jewish Christianswere.Theseinvestigationsprovidedtherationalefor ChristianswhoembracedJewishcustoms,suchastheSabbatar ians(Coudert1994:85). In England there was a growing interest in and apprecia tionofJudaismonthepartofthePuritans.Theyfocusedtheir attentionontheOldTestament,learnedHebrew,andevenbe gan to practice Jewish customs (Glaser 2008: 159; Popkin 1988: 25). In addition, on a political level the debate was influenced by the growing knowledge and appreciation of Judaism. Pres byterians,ErastiansandIndependentsfoughtovertheinterpre tationoftheancientJewishcommonwealthinanattempttoar ticulatetheirfavouritereligiousconstitution(Glaser2008:174). TheEighteenthCentury Asmightbeexpected,thedevelopmentsintheeighteenthcen tury were to a large degree influenced by the Enlightenment. Theperiodwascharacterizedbyadvancesinthinkingthatsteered theworldawayfromreligioninthedirectionofsecularism,hu manism, individualism, rationalism, and nationalism. At this timethehumanmind,rationalthought,andempiricalsciences tookcentrestage. ThenewrationalspiritalsogainedinfluenceoverChristian theology.Asanexample,wecanmentiontheresearchintothe historical Jesus as opposed to the Christ of faith. This research beganwithSamuelReimarus(16941768)inthemideighteenth century (Schweitzer 1984: 5668). To understand Jesus’ teach ings,scholarsstartedtostudyhisbackgroundandhisworldof thinking, especially eschatology. The insight that Jesus was a Jewishman,bornofaJewishmotherandwholivedaccording to the faith and the traditions of his fathers, generally influ encedthinkingaboutJewsandJudaisminapositiveway.

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Parts of the Jewish communities of Europe were affected bythespiritoftheageaswell,whichledtoagreaterinvolve ment of more and more Jews in the intellectual debates of the times. The Haskalah, the Jewish movement that supported the adoption of enlightenment values, strove for an expansion of Jewish rights within European society. Its followers advocated “coming out of the ghetto,” not just physically but also men tally and spiritually. The Haskalah introduced the distinction betweenJewishnationalityandreligion:onecouldbeanonbe lieveroradheretoanotherreligionandstillbeaJew.Gradually, when the process of emancipation and integration developed further,Jewsbecameanimportantpartofcivilsocietyandpar ticipatedintheintellectualdebatesofthetime.JewsandChris tianscouldnowmeetontheneutralgroundofreason. Born in the second half of the eighteenth century and ac tive well into the nineteenth century, the influential Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (17681834) embodied the transition from Rationalism to Romanticism (Crouter 2005). Schleiermacher participated in the avant garde movement of early German Romanticism in Berlin, which included Chris tiansaswellasJews.HehadmanyJewishfriendswithinhisin tellectual circle and was a protagonist of Jewish civil rights. In an early work (1799) on the subject of Jewish emancipation in Prussia,LettersontheOccasionofthePoliticalTheologicalTaskand theOpenLetterofJewishHouseholders(Schleiermacher2004),Schlei ermacher argued that Jews should receive full citizenship and civil rights, provided only that they compromise in their reli giousobservancestoapointenablingthemtomeettheirduties to the state, and that they give up politically threatening com mitmentssuchasthosetoacomingmessiahandtotheirstatus asaseparatenation.Thatthisadvocacyforthecivilandpolit ical rights of the Jews was not inspired by admiration for the Jewish religion but rather by his sociopolitical convictions be comesclearfromhisclassicbookOnReligion:SpeechestoItsCul tured Despisers (Schleiermacher 1994). In this book, which was firstpublishedin1799,Schleiermacheradvocatedreligion—in cluding Judaism—free of state interference. But, as it happens, in the same book he described the Jewish religion as outdated andoutworn,asthefollowingfragmentshows:

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OfoneformonlyIshouldspeak,forJudaism islongsince dead.Thosewhoyetwearitsliveryareonlysittinglamen ting beside the imperishable mummy, bewailing its depar tureanditssadlegacy.YetIcouldstillwishtosayaword onthistypeofreligion.Myreasonisnotthatitwasthefore runner of Christianity. I hate that kind of reference. Each re ligion has in itself its own eternal necessity, and its begin ning is original. But the beautiful childlike character of Ju daismcharmsme.(Schleiermacher1994:23839)

He then goes on to describe that “childish” character of Juda ism, where God is represented throughout as rewarding, pun ishing,anddiscipliningindividualsforparticularthings.Itwas, according to Schleiermacher, due to this limited point of view thatJudaismwasgrantedonlyashortlife.Itdiedand,sinceits sacred books were closed, the intercourse with God and his peoplewaslookeduponasended(Schleiermacher1994:240). TheNineteenthandEarlyTwentiethCenturies Inthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcentury,inreactiontoEnlight enment Rationalism, a new intellectual attitude known as Ro manticismbecamedominantinEurope.Inthisclimatereligion started to flourish again. The new emphasis on emotions and feelingshadaneffectonhowChristiansexperiencedtheirfaith, andgaverisetotheRéveilmovement.Thismovementfocused ontraditionalChristiandogmasbutalsowantedfaithtobean existential living reality. The eschatological expectations at the timewerestronglymillenarian,andthefollowersofthismove menthopedthatthepropheciesoftheOldTestamentwouldbe fulfilled in their own lifetime. These expectations included be lief in the return of the Jews to the Promised Land and their acceptance of Jesus as the Messiah. Accordingly, this led to an intensification of Protestant missionary activities to convert Jews(Eckardt2005:246).Asaresultoftheseactivities,anum berofdistinguishedJewsweredrawntoChristianity,especially in England. However, whereas formerly Jewish converts re nounced their original faith and customs and assimilated to generalChristianpractice,anewtrendwasnowdeveloping.In London, in 1865, the Hebrew Christian Alliance was established for Jews who had converted to Christianity. At its first confer encethefollowingstatementwasmade:

364 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Letusnotsacrificeouridentity.WhenweprofessChrist,we do not cease to be Jews; Paul, after his conversion, did not ceasetobeaJew;notonlySaulwas,butevenPaulremained, aHebrewoftheHebrews.Wecannotandwillnotforgetthe landofourfathers,anditisourdesiretocherishfeelingsof patriotism…. As Hebrews, as Christians, we feel tied toge ther;andasHebrewChristians,wedesiretobealliedmore closelytooneanother.(CohnSherbok2000:17)

This was the beginning of a new movement of Hebrew Chris tians,orMessianicJews,whodidnotgiveuptheirJewishiden tity in favour of the Christian one. Rather, they were proud to beandremainmembersofGod’soriginallychosenpeopleand, assuch,willinglyheldontopartsoftheJewishtradition. Anentirelynewwayofthinkingwasdevelopedatthebe ginningofthenineteenthcenturybytheAngloIrishevangelist John Nelson Darby (18001882). Darby tried to discover an in terpretiveframeworkforunderstandingtheoverallflowofthe Bible,harmonizingtheapparentcontradictionsbetweenthedif ferent parts of the Bible. He used the term “dispensations” to refertoaseriesofchronologicallysuccessiveperiodsinhistory thatemphasizespecificBiblicalcovenants(Wilkinson2008:98 104).DarbyandhisfollowersbelievedthatthenationofIsrael was distinct from the church, and that God would fulfil His promises to the nation of Israel. These promises included the promises of land, which in the future would result in a mil lennial kingdom in which Christ, upon His return, would rule the world from Jerusalem for a thousand years. Christian Dis pensationalists sometimes embraced (and still do) what some criticshavepejorativelycalledJudeophilia,rangingfromsupport ofthestateofIsraeltoobservingJewishholidaysandpracticing traditionallyJewishreligiousrituals. Inthemeantimeanotherdevelopmentwastakingplacein the Netherlands. Abraham Kuyper (18371920), the father of DutchneoCalvinismandaninfluentialstatesman,mobilizeda broad following of mostly lower middle class Protestants, and succeeded in giving them their own church, their own uni versity and their own political party. He was of great signifi cancethereforefortheemancipationofalargepartofthePro testant population in the Netherlands. In this struggle he saw the liberals in particular as his rivals. Since he associated the

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emancipatedinfluentialJewswiththeliberalparty,hedirected partofhispoliticalcampaignexplicitlyagainstthissectorofthe population.Inaseriesofarticlesmeantforthewiderpubliche wordedthisasfollows:“Itisgraduallybeginningtodawnthat, under the cloak of Liberalism, the Jews have indeed become lordandmasterinourpartoftheworld”(Kuyper1878:5).Al though these articles had primarily a political aim, they also played upon religious sentiments of the readers, as becomes clearinthefollowingfragment: Indeed,fromallwereadaboutIsraelintheHolyScriptures, itwasforetoldbeforehandwithnecessitywhatwenowac tually see concerning Israel. Especially a) that it cannot be eradicated;b)thatitwouldalwaysbeanationwithextraor dinaryintellectualpowers;andc)thatit,aslongasitrejec tedChrist,wouldalwaysbetheallyofpowersthatcontend withChristianity.(Kuyper1878:14)

InhistheologyKuyperopposedtheeschatologicalideasofthe RéveilthatforesawanimportantrolefortheJewsbecausethat diverted,inhiseyes,attentionfromthepresent.Inhisopinion, agenuinestrugglewastobewagedbyChristiansagainstJews because they rejected Jesus and in this way resisted the estab lishmentofGod’skingdomintheworld.Kuyper’sapproachto wardsJewswasexclusivelymissionary.Inhisview,theywere violatorsofGod’scovenantandshouldbecalledontojointhe Church.BecauseheregardedtheChristianChurchastheonly “truePeopleofGod,”therecouldbenoplacefortheJewsasa people,thatis,asanethnicgroup.Thatiswhyhewasopposed to the abovementioned attitude of Messianic Jews who had converted to Christianity and still wanted to stick to their old customs.Inhiswords: To choose for Israel of the flesh is to reject the Christ; who choosesforChrist,breaksawayfromtheIsraeloftheflesh. TheimplicationisthatanyJewwhoconverts,mustnotonly believe in Jesus as the Christ, but must also renounce his Jewish existence. He must do more than a Gentile convert. (Locus de Consummatione Saeculi, cited in Van Klinken 1999: 297)

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PostWarTheology ThecatastropheoftheSecondWorldWar,withtheattemptby the Nazis to annihilate the Jewish people completely, and the subsequent foundation of the state of Israel stirred up strong feelings within the church. People started to reconsider God’s relation to his chosen people and, with that, the relation be tweenChristianityandJudaism.DidthepeopleofIsraelbelong to the past, and had they been superseded by the church that considered itself “the true Israel,” as  had long been thought? Alternatively, was God’s covenant with his people still valid and should the church be considered merely as an additional partner in that covenant? Were not the foundation of the state ofIsraelanditsmiraculousvictoryoveritspowerfulenemiesin thesubsequentwarclearsignsthatGodhadnotabandonedhis people? Should not the immigration into Israel of Holocaust survivors, refugees from Arab countries, and other Jews from all over the world be seen as a clear fulfilment of biblical pro phecy? In any case, most religious Jews considered the foun dation of the state of Israel messianically as the beginning of theirredemption.InthetraditionalversionofthePrayerforthe State of Israel that was published by the Chief Rabbinate of Israelin1948thiswaswordedasfollows:“OurFatherwhoisin heaven,ProtectorandRedeemerofIsrael,blesstheStateofIs rael,thedawnofourdeliverance.”TheideathatthestateofIs rael was a sign of God’s active concern for his chosen people wasstrengthenedevenmoreafterthe1967SixDayWarandits miraculous outcome. Nowadays, with the advantage of hind sight,muchcanbesaid—andindeedissaid—againstthatpious conviction, but at the time it was experienced by Jewish and Christian believers as the fulfilment of the words of the Bible beforetheirveryeyes. Anotheraspectofpostwartheologywasagrowingaware nessofthedependenceofthechurchonJudaism,i.e.ashaving emerged from it (pace Schleiermacher). Combined with the de velopments described above concerning the state of Israel, in the 1960s and 1970s these insights led to a new theology con cerning the people and the faith of Israel. For the first time in thehistoryofthechurch,anindependentrolewasawardedto Judaism, allowing for the possibility that Jews had their own waytoGodwithouttheintercessionofJesus.AmongbothPro

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testantsandCatholics,ChristiansbecameinterestedinJudaism as”theirancestorinfaith”anddiscoveredthatmuchcouldbe learnedfromthisrichtradition.Inthe1970sapeculiarphenom enonappearedonthesceneintheDutchchurchesandsociety: Christians and Jews came together to study Talmud, Midrash, andmedievalandmodernJewishtraditionsinwhattheycalled leerhuizen (“[theological] study groups”), the Dutch equivalent oftheHebrewBethMidrash.ChristianssoughttheJewishroots of their faith, and—more surprisingly—Jewish teachers were willing to give lectures to Christian audiences (Schoon 2004: 204). The new developments also appeared in official church documents (cf. Schoon in this volume). In 1965 the Catholic Churchpublishedadeclarationontherelationofthechurchto nonChristian religions called Nostra Aetate (“Our Time”). This document also contained some noteworthy and revolutionary statementsconcerningtheJewishpeopleandfaith.Letuslook, forexample,at§4: 4. As the sacred synod searches into the mystery of the Church,itremembersthebondthatspirituallytiesthepeo pleoftheNewCovenanttoAbraham’sstock. ThustheChurchofChristacknowledgesthat,accordingto God’ssavingdesign,thebeginningsofherfaithandhere lectionarefoundalreadyamongthePatriarchs,Mosesand theprophets.SheprofessesthatallwhobelieveinChrist— Abraham’ssonsaccordingtofaith—areincludedinthesame Patriarch’scall,andlikewisethatthesalvationoftheChurchis mysteriously foreshadowed by the chosen people’s exodus from the land of bondage. The Church, therefore, cannot forgetthatshereceivedtherevelationoftheOldTestament through the people with whom God in His inexpressible mercyconcludedtheAncientCovenant.Norcansheforget that she draws sustenance from the root of that wellculti vatedolivetreeontowhichhavebeengraftedthewildshoots, the Gentiles. Indeed, the Church believes that by His cross Christ,OurPeace,reconciledJewsandGentiles,makingboth oneinHimself. The Church keeps ever in mind the words of the Apostle abouthiskinsmen:“theirsisthesonshipandthegloryand the covenants and the law and the worship and the prom

368 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE ises; theirs are the fathers and from them is the Christ ac cording to the flesh” (Rom. 9:45), the Son of the Virgin Mary.ShealsorecallsthattheApostles,theChurch’smain stayandpillars,aswellasmostoftheearlydiscipleswhopro claimedChrist’sGospeltotheworld,sprangfromtheJew ishpeople.

A few years later the Dutch Reformed Church in the Nether landsfollowedwiththemuchdiscussedstudydocumentIsrael: People,LandandState(GeneraleSynodeNHK1970),whichdealt specificallywiththeproblematicnotionofthepromiseofland andthestateofIsrael.Thedirectoccasionforthisstudydocu mentwasaresolutionbytheWorldCouncilofChurchesabout the situation in the Middle East following the SixDay War (Goodall1968:189;cf.alsotheHeraklianStatement).Thisreso lutionwasconsideredbysomeDutchtheologianstobebiased, pushingallproblemsuntoIsraelwithoutpointingouttherole oftheneighbouringcountriesinthesituationthathadarisen.In Israel:People,LandandState,theauthorsofthedocumentlooked forabiblicaltheologicalviewoftheJewishpeopleandthestate ofIsrael.TheyconcludedthatpresentdayJewswerethedirect descendants of the biblical people of Israel and, as such, the lawful heirs of the biblical promises concerning the land. The remigration of the Jews from all over the world to the newly foundedstateofIsraelwasaccordinglyseenasasignofGod’s faithfulnesstohischosenpeople.Intheviewoftheauthorsof thissynodicaldocument,thisdidnotnecessarilymeanthatthe last stage of world history had started nor that the Jews could nowrestassuredthattheyneveragaincouldbeexpelledfrom theland.Ideally,thestateofIsraelshouldserveasexampleofa justsocietybasedonGod’sTorah. InGermanythesocalledRhinelandDocumentof1980be came a major turning point in Europe with its assertion that Jews were permanently elected as God’s people, and that the church had been included in this covenant with God through Jesus(Eckardt2005:246). TheTwentyFirstCentury Thepresentcenturystartedoffwithanothernoteworthydocu ment,namelythereportChurchandIsraelpublishedin2001by theCommunityofProtestantChurchesinEurope,thesocalled

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Leuenberg Church Fellowship (Church and Israel 2001). This documentisimportantinmanyrespectsbutespeciallybecause it publicly and clearly rejects all forms of supersessionism. It doessointhefollowingwords: II.3.1…[Thechurch]seesIsraelasthepeoplewhichknows and honours God in the framework of the revelation to which its Holy Scriptures witness but without confessing Christ. Precisely on the basis of the revelation in Christ, it cannotbesaidthatIsraelshouldmerelybeseenasthepast historical context of the Christ event and as “outdated” now.Onthecontrary,Israelcontinuestobetheunchanging constitutive and far from outdated point of reference for God’s revelation in Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ. Faith knowsthatinGod’shistorywithhiscreation,fromthebe ginningtotheendoftime,thepeopleofIsraelcontinuesto haveitslastingplace.

Alsoremarkableisthepublicconfessionofguiltintheconclud ingparagraph: ThechurchesoftheLeuenbergFellowshiprecogniseandre grettheirshareofresponsibilityandguiltinrelationtothe peopleofIsraelinviewofthecenturiesoldhistoryofhostil itytotheJews.Thechurchesrecognisetheirfalseinterpreta tionsofbiblicalstatementsandtraditions;theyconfesstheir guilt before God and humanity and ask God for forgive ness. They hold fast to the hope that God’s Spirit will lead andaccompanythemonnewpaths.

Although this statement is quite recent and came from the CommunityofProtestantChurchesinEurope,itcannotbecon sideredtoexpressthegeneralfeelingtowardJewsnowadaysin Christian Europe. Throughout Western Europe, a growing un easiness can be noted towards the Jews and their religion, which is largely due to the land politics of nationalOrthodox settlersintheWestBank,orJudeaandSamariaastheypreferto callit.Attheotherendofthespectrum,thereistheveryactive movementofChristiansforIsrael,whichhasaworldwidenet work. We may also mention in this respect the International ChristianEmbassyinJerusalemthatwasfoundedin1980asan evangelical Christian response to the need to comfort Zion ac

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cordingtothescripturalcommandinIsaiah40:12:“Comfort, comfortmypeople.” Bothextremes,therejectionofIsraelasanoppressiveforce, andtheunconditionalsupportofChristianZionists,areconnec ted to the state of Israel. The meaning of the state is in any e ventmuchdiscussednowadaysinChristiancircles.Isitanor malstatelikeallotherstates,withgoodandbadpolicies,with successes and failures? Alternatively, should it be regarded as “God’sownmiracleinourtime”?Andshoulditthenbemea sured by the standards of justice that are laid down in the Bi ble?Verydifferentpositions,sometimesdiametricallyopposed, arepropounded.InevangelicalandorthodoxReformedcircles Old Testament prophecies are combined with current political events and in them the believers see God’s ancient promises fulfilledbeforetheireyes.Theyaskthechurchestosupportthe stateofIsraelandthepoliciesoftheIsraeligovernmentuncon ditionally,becausetheyareconvincedthatonlyinthiswaywill God’s plan, including the Second Coming of Jesus be realised. In the state of Israel they find their allies within the Orthodox and the ultranationalists, strange as this may seem. Quite of ten, evangelicals see Messianic Jews, who believe in Jesus, as the anticipation of what soon will happen to all Jews. At the otherendofthechurch’sreligiouspoliticalspectrum,theescha tologicalmodelisrejected.Theretheguidingtheologicalprinciple is that, as a “model” or “notion,””biblical Israel” stands for all the poor and oppressed in the world (see Schoon in this vol ume).Thoseofthelatterpersuasionaremoreinclinedtolisten to the voices of Palestinian Christians (e.g. Ateek 1989), who feel oppressed by the Israeli occupiers. They support the de mandthatIsraelleavealloccupiedPalestinianterritoryimme diately,andtheyadvocatetheestablishmentofanindependent Palestinianstate.ThesedifferencesinthestandpointsofChris tians,basedonopposingmodelsofthinking,seemtotallyirre concilable. SummaryandConclusions ThemultitudeofChristianviewsofJudaismanditssacredtexts makesclearthattheBibleisnotunambiguousonthissubject,to say the least. Throughout the centuries, but even within a cer tain period, opinions have varied greatly. According to some

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views,theroleoftheJewishpeopleinsacredhistoryisfinished. Due to their unbelief and disobedience God has given their share to the church. The church is seen as the true Israel to which all the biblical promises have been transferred. These views can be summarized as Replacement Theology. Another way of looking at the Jews as having been superseded by the churchwasexpressedbySchleiermacherwhoconsideredJuda ismtobeadeadreligion.OtherviewsconsidertheJews to be anobstructivefactorinsacredhistory.Theyareseenastheene mies of Christianity and should therefore be actively fought. Thisopinionwasexpressedby,amongothers,thelaterLuther andbyAbrahamKuyper.Stillotherviewsseeacrucialrolefor the Jews in the endtime scenario. These occur among seven teenthcentury Puritans and later in various evangelical move mentsuptothepresenttime. The Christian views of Judaism are diverse and multi faceted.Thisshortessaydidnotmentionallthedifferentviews, nordiditdofulljusticetotheonesitdidmention.Nonetheless, wehopeitprovidedthereaderwithanimpressionofthecom plexityofthesubjectandaffordedhimorheramodestguideto thevastlabyrinthofopinions. Bibliography Ateek,N.S.(1989).Justice,andOnlyJustice:APalestinianTheologyofLib eration.Maryknoll:OrbisBooks. “ChurchandIsrael:AContributionfromtheReformationChurchesin EuropetotheRelationshipbetweenChristiansandJews.”http:// www.jcrelations.net/en/?item=1009.(Accessed28092009). CohnSherbok,D.(2000).MessianicJudaism.London:Continuum. Coudert,A.P.(1994).“TheKabbalaDenudata:ConvertingJewsorSe ducingChristians.”In:R.H.PopkinandG.M.Weiner(eds).Jew ish Christians and Christian Jews: From the Renaissance to the Enlight enment.Dordrechtetal.:KluwerAcademicPublishers.Pp.7396. Crouter, R. (2005). Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism.Cambridge/NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress. Eckardt,A.L.(2005).“Judaism,ChristianPerspectiveson.”In:E.Kess ler and N. Wenborn (eds). A Dictionary of JewishChristian Rela tions.Cambridgeetal.:CambridgeUniversityPress.Pp.24446. Generale Synode NHK. (1970). Israël, volk, land en staat: Handreiking vooreentheologischebezinning.Zoetermeer:Boekencentrum.

372 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Glaser,E.(2008).“’AParallelMadewiththeJewishSanhedrin’:Toler ating Jews and Jewish Precedents in the Early Modern Church andState.”In:M.DimmockandA.Hadfield(eds).TheReligions of the Book: Christian Perceptions, 14001660. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Pp.15979. Goodall,N.(1968).TheUppsalaReport1968:OfficialReportofthe4thAs semblyoftheWorldCouncilofChurches,UppsalaJuly420,1968.Ge neva:WorldCouncilofChurches. Heraklian Statement. http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/docu ments/centralcommittee/heraklion1967/statementonthe middleeast.html.(Accessed28082009). Johnson, P. (1987). A History of the Jews. New York: Harper & Row Publishers. Kuyper,A.(1878).LiberalistenenJoden.Amsterdam:Kruyt. Luther,M.(1971).TheChristianinSocietyIV.Luther’sWorks.Vol.47. Ed.H.T.LehmannandF.Sherman.Philadelphia:FortressPress. (1919).VondenJudenundihrenLügen.In:MartinLuthersWerke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Weimar: H. Böhlaus Nachf. 53. Pp. 417552. (1900). Daß Jesus Christus ein geborener Jude sei. Martin Luthers Werke.KritischeGesamtausgabe.Weimar:H.BöhlausNachf.11. Pp.31436. Nostra Aetate. http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_ council/documents/vatii_decl_19651028_nostraaetate_en.html. (Accessed28082009). Oberman,H.A.(1994).TheImpactoftheReformation:Essays.GrandRa pids:W.B.EerdmansPublishers. Popkin, R.H. (1988). “Some Aspects of JewishChristian Theological InterchangesinHollandandEngland(16401700).”In:J.vanden BergandE.G.EvanderWall(eds).JewishChristianRelationsinthe SeventeenthCentury:StudiesandDocuments.Dordrechtetal.:Kluwer. Pp.332. Schleiermacher, F. (2004). “Letters on the Occasion of the Political Theological Task and the Open Letter of Jewish Householders.” In: David Friedländer, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Wilhelm Abraham Teller. A Debate on Jewish Emancipation and Christian TheologyinOldBerlin.EditedandtranslatedbyR.CrouterandJ. Klassen.Indianapolis:HackettPub.Pp.80112.

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(1994).OnReligion:SpeechestoItsCulturedDespisers.Transl.John Oman, with a foreword by Jack Forstman. Louisville: Westmin ster/JohnKnoxPress. Schoon, S. (2004). “Protestants and Jews: A LoveHate Relationship.” In: P.N. Holtrop, F. de Lange and R. Roukema (eds). Passion of Protestants.Kampen:Kok.Pp.188211. Schweitzer, A. (1984). Geschichte der LebenJesuForschung. 9th ed. Tü bingen:Mohr. VanderWall,E.G.E.(1988).“TheAmsterdamMillenarianPetrusSer rarius(16001669)andtheAngloDutchCircleofPhiloJudaists.” In:J.vandenBergandE.G.EvanderWal(eds).JewishChristian RelationsintheSeventeenthCentury:StudiesandDocuments.Dord rechtetal.:Kluwer.Pp.7394. Van Klinken, G.J. (1999). “Abraham Kuyper and the ‘Jewish Ques tion’.” In: C. van der Kooi and J. de Bruijn (eds). Kuyper Recon sidered:AspectsofhisLifeandWork.VUStudiesonProtestantHis tory3.Amsterdam:VUUitgeverij.Pp.29398. Wilkinson.P.R.(2008).ForZion’sSake:ChristianZionismandtheRoleof JohnNelsonDarby.Eugene:Wipf&Stock.

RecentDevelopments inChristianJewishDialogue SimonSchoon

Abstract TherelationshipbetweenChristiansandJewsisanemotionalandambivalent one,somethingofalove/haterelationship.Ontheonehand,Christiansfeela special attachment to the Jews as “the people of the old covenant.” On the otherhand,theyfeelresentment,becausethissameJewishpeopledidnotac ceptJesusasthepromisedMessiah.AftertheSecondWorldWarachangein thinking occurred in the main traditional churches, witnessed in many of ficialdocuments,causedbytheshockoftheShoahandbytheestablishment ofthestateofIsraelin1948.Allpastcurrentsandmodelsofthoughtarestill strong in the relationship between Christians and Jews: antiJudaism and philoJudaism, the mission to the Jews and Judaizing tendencies. Views on JewsandonJudaismtouchonallaspectsofChristiantheology.Thisarticle describes different models in Christian thinking about Jews and Judaism, mentions some urgent issues in the JewishChristian dialogue and outlines prospectsforthefutureofthisdialogue.

ANewParadigm? It must be recognized that more has changed for the better in JewishChristianrelationsinrecentdecadesthaninnearly2000 years. One can point to a stream of official church statements andalibraryoftheologicalstudiesasproofofthis.Evenso,the Christian willingness to change did not originate primarily in theological considerations. New scholarly studies yielding bib lical insights about the Jewish people have not been the most important instrument shaping the fundamental Christian revi sionofitsconceptionofJewsandJudaism.Historicalfactors— farmorethantheologicalones—havebeenbehindthechurch’s farreachingreconstructionofitsideasinthisvitalmatter.The shock waves caused by the Shoah and the great impression madebytheestablishmentofthestateofIsraelin1948arethe primary factors that set the change in Christian views on Jews andJudaisminmotion. 375

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However,onemusthonestlyask:Hassomuchreallychanged intheteachingandlifeofthechurchthatJewscanriskanopen dialoguewithChristians?Ormustwerecognizethattheamen ded conception of Jews and Judaism has reached hardly more than a small part of the Christian church? It is impossible to cometoanewtheologicalparadigmandarenewaloftherela tionshipbetweenJewsandChristiansaslongasChristiantheo logyseestheeventinthetwentiethcenturythatbearsthename “Auschwitz”assomethingthathasnorelevanceforitsthinking. FormostJews,everything,thewholeworld,changedafterthe Shoah.1 For some Christians nothing changed in the relation ship between them and the Jews: the same issues and ques tions,justasever,arestillonthetableforthemaftertheShoah, primarilythequestionoftheMessiahshipofJesusandthesal vationoftheJews.ForotherChristians,everythinghaschanged; nothing in church and theology remained the same after the Shoah. Has a new theological paradigm in the views of churches and Christians on Jews and Judaism arisen? Is Judaism really recognizedtheologicallyasalivingtraditionandistheongoing theologicalsignificanceoftheJewishpeopleinthepostbiblical period accepted in Christian thinking? Have the consequences oftheseconvictionsbeendrawnforthebasictenetsofourfaith anddoctrine?Thesequestionscannotbeansweredquicklyand mustremainopenforthepresent. Documents In the last half century a great deal of work has been done to amendthetheoryanddoctrineofthechurchonJewsandJuda ism. Various attempts have been made by churches in official documents to break with supersessionism and substitution (or replacement) theology and to develop a different perspective on the relationship between the church and Israel. In this re spect,thedeclarationNostraAetate(no.4)oftheSecondVatican Councilin1965mustbeseenasamilestone.Lookingbackfrom

1

TherearealsocriticialJewishvoiceswhowarnagainstabuseof thememoryoftheShoahandprotestitscentralroleincontemporary Jewishthinking.SeeespeciallyBurg2008:1325,6990.

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thetwentyfirstcentury,itisscarcelyimaginablehowthatfirst, careful statement foreshadowed a tectonic shift in the theo logical thought of the Roman Catholic Church towards Jews. Thedeclarationbegins: As this sacred Synod searches into the mystery of the church,itrecallsthespiritualbondlinkingthepeopleofthe new covenant with Abraham’s stock.... The church, there fore, cannot forget that she received the revelation of the Old Testament through the people with whom God in his inexpressible mercy deigned to establish the ancient cove nant.Norcansheforgetthatshedrawssustenancefromthe root of that good olive tree onto which have been grafted the wild olive branches of the Gentiles. (Quoted in: Fisher andKlenicki1990:27)

Inthe1980savirtualfloodofdeclarations,statementsandpas toral letters appeared from bishops, synods and other church assemblies. These pronouncements of varying significance and qualitysignalledremarkableshiftsintheChristianperspective on the Jewish people (Rendtorff and Henrix 1988; Henrix and Kraus 2001). Prior to 1980, the Netherlands Reformed Church was almost the only church in the world that addressed the subjectoftheJewsandtherelationshipbetweenthechurchand Israel as a serious matter of faith. In 1949 an annual Israel Sunday on the first Sunday of October, in the season of the JewishHighHolyDays,wasinstituted.In1959thesynodpub lishedthestudyIsraëlendekerk(IsraelandtheChurch),where by Israel’s enduring election and involvement in the covenant wasaffirmed.Furthermore,thestateofIsraelwasidentifiedas asignofGod’sfaithfulnesstowardshispeople,asignthat—in spite of all human betrayal and unbelief—the Jewish people hadbeengiven a newchancetogiveexpressiontoitselection inhistory. In Germany it was the 1980 decision of the synod of the Protestant Church of Rhineland that sparked an intense dis cussion. After that, other publications and declarations were published in Germany and elsewhere. The confessional state mentsof1980,afewofwhichIwillquote,wenttotherootof the issue, and represented an important theological change in theGermanchurches:

378 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE 1.Weconfesswithdismaythecoresponsibilityandguiltof GermanChristendomfortheHolocaust. 3. We confess Jesus Christ the Jew, who as the Messiah of Israel is the Saviour of the world and binds the peoples of theworldtothepeopleofGod. 4. We believe the permanent election of the Jewish people as the people of God and realize that through Jesus Christ the church is taken into the covenant of God with his peo ple. 6.WebelievethatintheirrespectivecallingJewsandChris tiansarewitnessesofGodbeforetheworldandbeforeeach other.Thereforeweareconvincedthatthechurchmaynot expressitswitnesstowardstheJewishpeopleasitdoesits mission to the peoples of the world. (Protestant Church in Rhineland1980)

A remarkable document was also published by the Presby terian Church in the United States, which completed six years of study in 1987 with a synodical declaration called A Theolog icalUnderstandingoftheRelationshipbetweenChristiansandJews. Itsmainstatementsareasfollows: 1.WeaffirmthatthelivingGodwhomChristiansworship is the same God who is worshipped and served by Jews. WebearwitnessthattheGodrevealedinJesus,aJew,tobe theTriuneLordofall,isthesameOnedisclosedinthelife andworshipofIsrael. 2. We affirm that the church, elected in Jesus Christ, has been engrafted into the people of God established by the covenantwithAbraham,IsaacandJacob.Therefore,Chris tianshavenotreplacedJews. 3. We affirm that the reign of God is attested both by the continuing existence of the Jewish people and by the church’sproclamationoftheGospelofJesusChrist.Hence, when speaking with Jews about matters of faith, we must always acknowledge that Jews are already in a covenantal relationshipwithGod.(Brockway1988:10520)

WorldwideChange For a long time the issue of JewishChristian dialogue was al most exclusively a transatlantic concern of Europeans and

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Americans. Christians from other parts of the world had little connection with what they saw as a mainly “Western hobby.” TheyunderstoodthatthisspecialEuropeanandAmericanfas cination sprang from Western Christians’ guilt feelings about thecenturieslongpersecutionofEuropeanJewsandfromtheir recognitionofChristiancoresponsibilityforthishistory.Inre cent years a change has been occurring in various places aroundtheworld.Aninstitutionaldialoguehasbeensetinmo tion by representatives of Judaism and the Eastern Orthodox Churches.AftertheIronCurtaincamedown,manyEastEuro peans rediscovered the rich Jewish heritage in their countries. New councils of Christians and Jews have been established here, encouraging churches to catch up with the times and to fight antiJudaism in theology and religious practice. Also, churchesintheMiddleEast,especiallythroughthediscussions in the Middle East Council of Churches, have become interes ted in JewishChristian dialogue on account of its obvious im plications for the political tensions between Israelis and Pales tinians. It is a significant development, with the result that manytheologiansfromThirdWorldcountrieshavemadetrips to Israel or have actually studied there for longer periods, therebydiscoveringthattheencounterwithlivingJudaismcan beimmenselyrewarding(Ucko1996). So the JewishChristian dialogue is slowly spreading, to a limitedextent,intovariouscontextsoftheworld.ThenorthAt lantic region, in which the memory of the Shoah plays a vital role,isnolongertheonlyonetotakeupJewishChristiandia logue.NorisWesterntheologytheonlyinstrumentformediat ingJewishChristiandialogueinotherecumenicalcontexts.The creation of separate bilateral dialogues between Jewish partners on the one hand and Christians in the Middle East, Latin America,AfricaorAsiaontheotherhasbeenfoundtobemore fruitful. Sometimes these discussions have become trilateral dialogueswithMuslimsasathirdparty,andmanytimesJew ishChristianencountershavebeenwidenedtobecomeamulti religiousdialoguewithadherentsofvariousreligions. The context of Latin American liberation theology must alsobementioned.HeretheantiJudaismofWesternChristen domisoftenadopteduncriticallyandanimageisformedofJe susasLiberatorinsharpcontrasttothe“legalisticPharisees”of

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histime.Theseserveastheprototypesoftheexploitersandop pressors of Latin America, past and present, in the church as wellasintherulingclass(Klenicki1988). In an intraChristian theological debate with Palestinian Christians, Western Christians may indeed explain what they, after centuries of antiJudaism—to their shame—have at last learned about Jews and Judaism. But it must also be expected thattheyremainacutelyawareoftheexceptionalcircumstances in which Palestinian Christians experience Israelis and which haveshapedtheirtheology(Ateek2008:1566,11529). Ambivalence There is still ambivalence at the beginning of the twentyfirst century concerning the relationship between Christians and Jews. The flames of passion frequently run high. Older church members are more affected by the Shoah, whereas younger people are more influenced by the ongoing IsraeliPalestinian conflict.Allpastcurrentsandmodelsofthoughtarestillstrong in this passionate relationship between Christians and Jews: antiJudaism and philoJudaism, the mission to the Jews and Judaizing tendencies. Attitudes towards the modern state of Israel vary greatly and are frequently defended by biblical ar guments.TheyrangefromsupportfortheGreaterIsraelMove ment to the conviction that the state of Israel is racist and shoulddisappearassoonaspossible.AppallingeventsinIsrael and the Palestinian Territories can suddenly change deepfelt loveintohatredorhatredintolove. In the Netherlands the two major Reformed denomina tionschangedtheirchurchordersin1991.Alreadyin1951the Netherlands Reformed Church (Hervormde Kerk) ceased speak ing of a “mission to the Jews” and formulated the task of the church as “dialogue with Israel.” Until 1991 the Reformed ChurchesintheNetherlands(GereformeerdeKerken)spokeofthe “task of the church to confess to the Jews, inside and outside Israel, that Jesus is the Christ.” The new church order of the Protestant Church in the Netherlands, after uniting in 2004, speaksaverydifferentlanguage.Thefirstarticleofthechurch order states that the Protestant Church in the Netherlands “is reachingouttothecomingoftheKingdomofGod,sharingin the expectation that is given to Israel.” And article I.7, on the

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relation between the church and the people of Israel, reads as follows: Thechurchiscalledtogiveshapetoitsindissolublebondwith the people of Israel. As a faith community that confesses ChristthechurchisseekingdialoguewithIsraelconcerning theunderstandingofHolyScripture,particularlyonthesub jectofthecomingoftheKingdomofGod.(ProtestantChurch intheNetherlands2003:910;emphasismine)

These and other developments could provide grounds for ex pecting that the ambivalent relationship has finally changed into a stable one of dialogue and reconciliation. But this rosy picture would be too naïve. There are still many remnants of theoldambivalenceinthelove/haterelationshipbetweenChris tiansandJews.TheChristianmissiontotheJewshasnotcom pletelydisappeared.Bytheturnofthetwentyfirstcenturythe defendersofmissiontotheJewsinthemainlinechurcheswere fightingarearguardactionagainstthemajorityopinionthatre gardsJudaismasalivingreligionandthereforewantstoabol ish all forms of mission to the Jews. But in large parts of the growing evangelical movement the mission to the Jews is still seenasahighpriority. A statement by the evangelical Lausanne Movement de clares that it deplores the discrimination and suffering that havebeendonetotheJewsinthenameofJesusChrist.Butat thesametimeitemphasizes: Ifthebygonehistoryisusedtomakethechurchkeepsilent in its witness to the Jewish People, we must protest; it would be an act of grave discrimination to withhold the GospelfromtheJewishPeople.(“LausanneLetter”1986)

From a Jewish point of view, this mission is a sign of the de finitely broken relationship with Christianity because it does not leave the Jews any room to choose their own destiny. The positionofJewishChristians,ChristianJews,MessianicJewsor Hebrew Christians is not easy. Jewish Christian groups often refertoandregardthemselvesasthehistoricalcontinuationof the“JudaeoChristians”ofthefirstcenturies.Theyalsolookat themselvesas“aneschatologicalsign”thatprovesthatthefinal phase of history has started and the “end times” are near. In evangelical circles “Messiah (Jesus) Confessing Jews” are held

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upasasignofthegreatharvestthatwillswiftlycome.Theyare treated as “twice elected” because they are both Jews and believers in Jesus as the Messiah. These Jewish Christians or Messianic Jews should not be used, however, for the triumph alismofChristiantruthnorasproofofthenearnessoftheend times.Rather,theyaretoberespectedasbrothersandsistersin theecumenicalChristiancommunitywhoremindusoftheori ginsofthechurchinthefirstcentury(Elgvin1993;CohnSher bok2000). DifferentViews Very different positions, sometimes diametrically opposed to one another, are propounded. The different Christian views and attitudes show both affinity with and estrangement with respecttoJews,JudaismandthestateofIsrael.Itmaybehelp ful to distinguish a number of models of the conceptions of JewsandJudaismChristianshold.Althoughthesemodelscan notalwaysbeseparatedfromoneanother,theycancertainlybe distinguished. The most important models are the following, indicatedbykeywords: Replacement Thismodelwasdominantinchurchhistory.Itassertsthatafter Jesus Christ the church has taken the place of the people of Israel.Israel’smissionwasonlytoproducetheMessiahandaf ter fulfilling that mission its task in salvation history was fin ished. In this model the new covenant replaces the old cove nant, baptism replaces circumcision, and the Gospel replaces the Law. The dispensation of “ancient Israel” is often seen as earthly and the dispensation of the church as spiritual. This model frequently leads to antiJudaism in sermons and reli giousteaching. Illustration Inthismodel,linkedtothefirst,theJewsareregardedasanil lustrationofanespeciallysinfulpeople.IsraelintheOldTesta ment is regarded as a typos that points to the fulfilment in the New Testament. As an obstinate people in the Old Testament and as an unbelieving people in the New Testament, the Jews show how disobedient all people are. Their behaviour is para

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digmatic and contagious. In Christian sermons from the very beginningtheJewsbecametheillustrationofthisparexcellence. Eschatology This model gives expression to the conviction that the escha tologicalandapocalyptictextsintheBiblearebeingfulfilledin ourlifetime.ManyevangelicalChristiansseetheunificationof Jerusalem in 1967 in particular as the beginning of the end times.TheyseetheeventsconcerningthereturnoftheJewsto the land of Israel as the setting of the stage for the second comingofJesusandhopetohastenhiscomingbyuncondition ally supporting the state of Israel. Old Testament prophecies are combined with current political events in the Middle East and seen as God’s ancient promises fulfilled in our time. Churches and governments are urged to support the state of IsraelandthepoliciesoftheIsraeligovernmentfully(Marsden 2008:175216). Israelas“Notion” SomeChristiansliketotreatthebiblicalconceptof“Israel”asa criticalnotionwithrespecttoboththepresentdaychurchand the modern Jewish people and state. For them, the direct self identificationoftheJewishpeopleandtheJewishstatewiththe term“Israel”isobjectionable.Intheirview,biblicalIsraelisnot a“nation”buta“notion”thatbecomesespeciallyvisibleinour time in the poor and oppressed in the world. In this view, the Jewsareoftenidealizedasawanderingpeoplethathastolive in exile. The Jews are seen as chosen as long as they are the sufferingpeople.ForthoseChristians,thePalestinianshavere placedtheJewstodayandmeritthetitle“Israel”or“Peopleof God”becauseoftheirsuffering. Experiment In this view the Jews are regarded as God’s particular chosen people and the state of Israel as a kind of “experimental gar den” whose inhabitants must perform exemplary justice. They are called upon to live up to the biblical commandments of peace and justice as an example for the whole world. Those ChristianstendtojudgethestateofIsraelbyhigherstandards thantheydoallotherpeoplesandstatesintheworld.

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ASignofGod’sFaithfulness In the second half of the twentieth century, confessional state ments from some Protestant churches, especially in Germany and the Netherlands, have called the return of the Jews to the landandstateofIsrael“asignofGod’sfaithfulnesstowardhis covenantpeople.”ThesedeclarationsstressthatGod’selection oftheJewishpeopleisirrevocable.Thesepositions—intheNe therlands as early as 1959, in Germany in 1980—have now come under strong criticism, especially because of emotions sur rounding the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. The aforementioned churchorderoftheProtestantChurchintheNetherlandsrefers to the indissoluble bond with the people of Israel (the Jewish people), not with the state of Israel. The confessional article in thechurchorderistheexpressionofatheologicalconvictionon thebasesoftheoriginsofthechurchwithinthepeopleofIsrael in the first centuries, their shared Scripture, and the shared ex pectation,firstgiventoIsrael,oftheKingdomofGod. DialogueAgenda Itisdifficulttowriteanythingontheprospectsforthefutureof therelationsbetweenthechurchandtheJewishpeople.Itcan notbeforeseenifthechangeintheologicalthinkingthatstarted because of the shock of the Shoah will be continued in the twentyfirst century when the living memories of that event will slowly fade and become part of history. Only the future willrevealifJudaismwillberespectedbychurchandtheology asalivingtradition. What items should be placed on the agenda of research and dialogue in the coming years? I would like to propose at leastfoururgentthemes:Thepartingoftheways,covenant(s), mission and the question of truth, and the state of Israel. The study of these themes could illustrate both the affinity and es trangement between Jews and Christians. Jews will approach the themes mainly from a historical angle, whereas Christians willadoptamoretheologicalapproach. ThePartingoftheWays StudiesbyJewishscholarsinparticularhavethrownnewlight on what is generally called “the Parting of the Ways between Christianity and Judaism” in the first century. This term is ra

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ther vague and confusing. The parting of the ways in the first centurywasbynomeanstotalanditisonlyinretrospectthat onecanspeakabout“Christianity”and“Judaism”inthisperi od. There were all kinds of overlapping movements that in cluded Jews and socalled “JudeoChristians.” Many different Judaisms existed in the first century, and there were various factionsintheJewish“Jesusmovement”andgroupsofGentiles whoadoptedthenewMessianicfaith.Avolumewaspublished in 2003 with the provocative title The Ways that Never Parted (Becker and Reed 2003). A great deal of interaction existed between Jews and “Christians” in the first centuries. Many groups were more or less “Jewish” and more or less “Chris tian,” very different from the ideal types of Rabbinic Judaism andOrthodoxorApostolicChristianitythatweredescribedby rabbisandthechurchfathersintheirwritingsfromthesecond century through to the fifth. Only in the early Middle Ages couldonespeakofadefinitepartingofthewaysbetweenJews and Christians and the establishment of a clear distinction betweentheJewishandChristiantraditions. It should be clear that the motherdaughter metaphor, used in the latter part of the twentieth century to describe the origin of Christianity as the “daughter” of the “mother” Juda ism,doesnotdojusticetothehistoricalrealityofthefirstcen turies.Thispopularmetaphorwasaprotestagainstthedomin ant,centuriesoldimageofthechurchas“mother”whohadde finitely replaced the disobedient Jewish people and was the legitimate heir of the Scriptures of Israel. The Jewish scholar Allan Segal has proposed an alternative metaphor. The “mo ther” Israel had two sons, twins, like Rebecca in the story in Genesis. The two sons were Rabbinic Judaism and Orthodox Christianity(Segal1986:14281).LikeJacobandEsau,Jewsand Christians struggled for the right to be the firstborn son. Al thoughthismetaphorseemstoresemblemorethehistoricalre ality of the first centuries, like every metaphor and image it is imprecise. The family metaphor suggests an organic develop ment in the origins of the two “religions,” which does not re flect the precise historical reality. Because metaphors influence andsometimesevencreatetherealitytowhichtheyrefer,they are not innocent. As symbols, they have an enormous impact onthehistoricalconsciousnessofagroupofpeopleandonthe

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experience of their identity. The challenge must be taken up anew in careful research and ongoing dialogue to study the complex parting of the ways between Jews and Christians in the first centuries, without inhibitions by prejudices, the urge forharmonyortheneedtostrengthenone’sownidentity. Covenant(s) MostexegetesholdtheviewthattheHebrewwordberithshould be translated not by “covenant” but by “obligation.”Berith ex presses the sovereign power of God who imposes his will on his vassal Israel: God promises in a solemn oath to fulfil his wordtohispeopleIsrael,whoareonlyrequired to be faithful and to obey. Early in its history, the church regarded the “old covenantofIsrael”asdefinitelyabrogated;thetextonthe“new covenant” in Jeremiah 31 was explained as pointing to ful filmentinChrist.Meanwhile,therewasagrowingemphasisin RabbinicJudaismonthemutualityofthecovenantrelationship between God and his people. The term covenant plays a less prominent role in Roman Catholicism and the Eastern Or thodoxtraditionthanitdoesinProtestantism.Itismuchdebat ed in the JewishChristian dialogue if the concept of covenant, either in its onecovenant version (more Protestant) or in its twocovenantversion(moreCatholic),canfunctionasabridge betweenthetwotraditions.Inthelastdecadesofthetwentieth century, numerous official ecclesiastical statements declared thatthecovenantofGodwithhispeoplewasneverabrogated. Covenanttheologyoftenassistedintherenewalofrelationsbe tween the church and the Jewish people. The famous declara tionNostraAetate(1965)ofVaticanIIfollowstheconceptofthe twocovenants: The Church, therefore, cannot forget that she received the revelation of the Old Testament through the People with whom God in his inexpressible mercy deigned to establish theancientcovenant.(KornandPawlikowski2005)

LiketheNetherlandsProtestantChurch,theGermanProtestant Church in Rhineland follows the one covenant perspective in its declaration of 1980 Towards a Renewal of the Relationship be tweenChristiansandJews.InseveralJewishpublicationsaswell, theconceptofcovenanthasbeenviewedinrecentdecadesasa centralconceptintheBibleandasausefulterminthedialogue

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withotherreligions(cf.Greenberg2000:49101).Moreinterest ing than the Christian dogmatic debate on the theories of the one covenant and the double covenant, the conclusion may be that “covenant” has proven to be a useful concept in the dia loguebetweenJewsandChristians(Schoon1998:22550). TheQuestionofTruth One of the most sensitive issues in the relation between Jews and Christian is the socalled Christian mission to the Jews. Onecannotimagineamorestrikingillustrationoftheestrange ment between Jews and Christians than the wellorganized Christian attempts to separate Jews from their people, convert themtotheChristianfaith,andmakethemmembersofaChris tianchurch.Jewsregardthisasdeeplyoffensiveandabsolutely reprehensible. But some Christians view it as their most important task to convince Jews of the truth that Jesus is the only way to God and the only means of salvation. For them, this question of truth is the most important issue on the table. In the eighteenth century the pioneers of the organizations for missiontotheJewswereundoubtedlyradicalfortheirtimein their love for the Jewish people and resistance to the ever presentChristianantiSemitisminchurchandtheology.Bythe turn of the twentyfirst century, however, the defenders of the mission to the Jews in the mainline churches were fighting a rearguard action against the majority opinion that regards Ju daism as a living religion and therefore wishes to abolish all formsofmissiontotheJews.Butinlargepartsofthegrowing evangelical movement, the mission to the Jews remains a high priority. TheStateofIsrael MuchdebatedamongChristiansisthesignificanceofthestate ofIsrael.Isitanormalstatelikeallotherstates,withgoodand bad policies, with successes and failures? Or should it be re gardedas“God’sownmiracleinourtime,”asmanyEvangel icals—the socalled “Christian Zionists”—tend to believe, an attitude abhorred by Palestinian Christians (Sizer 2005)? And shoulditbejudgedbytheologicalideasderivedfromtheBible or measured by the standards of international law? Christian attitudes towards the modern state of Israel vary greatly, and rangefromsupportfortheGreaterIsraelMovementtothecon

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victionthatthestateofIsraelisracistandshoulddisappearas soonaspossible.Deepfeltlovecanchangequicklyintohatred because of the appalling events in Israel and the Palestinian Territories and vice versa. PhiloSemitism and antiSemitism canalternatequickly(Schoon2006). Disentanglement Two authoritative voices on the Christian side of the dialogue scenecomefromGermantheologians:theProtestantNew Testament scholar Peter von der OstenSacken and the Roman Catholic systematic theologian Michael Welker. At a symposi um in 2003 on the occasion of the twentyfifth anniversary of the study program Studium in Israel for German theologians, theybothwarnedagainstthedangerofannexingJewsandJu daisminthecontextofdialogueandinterreligiousstudies.Von der OstenSacken, who wrote many pioneering studies in the field of ChristianJewish dialogue, points to the need of disen tanglingJudaismandChristianity,sothattheothercanremain other (Von der OstenSacken 2004). Michael Welker wants to abstainfrommodelsoftherelationshipbetweenChristiansand Jews that define the Jewish other only from a Christian per spective and in this way annex Judaism for the purpose of Christianidentity.Hehimselfdefendsthemodeloftwodiffer ent ways, one for Jews and one for Christians, that could be understood as complementary. Both perspectives—the Jewish and the Christian—should not be harmonized and brought to gether under one concept. Rather, the fact that they are differ ent can be made to bear fruit for the witness to God in our world(Welker2004). The great challenge lies in answering  the question if the church and theology are capable after Auschwitz of overcom ing the ambivalence that has often turned into hatred towards JewsandtheJewishpeople,andifChristians,intheirrelation shipwiththeJewishpeople,canlearntolivewiththedualityof kinship and distinction. Many scholars tend to overemphasize the“backtotheroots”concept.Thiscouldturnouttobeasu perficial slogan and runs the risk of serving fundamentalist goals.TheNewTestamentsituation,inallitsdiversity,cannot simply be revived and reintroduced. A history of almost 2000

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yearshasleftitsmarksonthepresentsituation.Hermeneutical choicesarethereforeunavoidable. These are only a few of the many pressing questions that arise. Therefore, the consequences of the new ChristianJewish encounterhavetobetakenseriouslybyallthesubdisciplinesof Christian theology (cf. Söding 2003). The internal debate be tween Christians from different confessional backgrounds on the impact of JewishChristian dialogue on church and theo logy is of great importance. Jewish questions directed towards the heart of Christian identity will always give Christians rea sonsforthoroughreflection.Perhapsthiscouldbeseenas“the Jewish mission” to the church and the Christians. I will just mention a few examples of questions that can stimulate and challengeintraChristianreflection:WhataretheChristological implicationsoftheJewishnessofJesus?Whatisthetheological significanceoftheelectionandcontinuingexistenceoftheJew ishpeople?And:HowdowereadtheScriptures,firstgivento the Jewish people, as our own Scriptures without again dis owning the first addressees of these books? (Van Buren 1988: 28130;Marquardt1988;1991). But the most important challenge for churches and Chris tians, perhaps, is to start a new practice in relation to Jews in generalandintheJewishChristiandialogueinparticularasit is lived, for example, in the Christian project Nes Ammim in Israel. This project was started in 1962 by some Dutch and Swiss Christians in order to turn a new page in the book of ChristianJewish relations (Schoon and Kremers 1978). At pre sent it also facilitates reconciliation activities for Jews and Pal estiniansandoffersthemaplacetomeettogether.Butthereis still a long way to go before Christians and Jews have devel oped an adult and fruitful relationship of dialogue and recip rocalrespect. ThereismuchlessinterestinJewishChristiandialogueon theJewishsidethanontheChristianside.Thereare,however, some hopeful newer developments. It is of fundamental signi ficancethatJewsandChristiansarenowmorelikelytoseeeach other as allies than as opponents or even enemies. This was clearly expressed in Dabru Emet: A Jewish Statement on Christians and Christianity, signed in September 2000 by more than 150

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rabbis and Jewish scholars in the United States, England, CanadaandIsrael: Jews and Christians, each in their own way, recognize the unredeemed state of the world as reflected in the persist ence of persecution, poverty, and human degradation and misery. Although justice and peace are finally God’s, our jointefforts,togetherwiththoseofotherfaithcommunities, willhelpbringthekingdomofGodforwhichwehopeand long. Separately and together, we must work to bring just iceandpeacetoourworld.Inthisenterpriseweareguided bythevisionsoftheprophetsofIsrael.(QuotedinFrymer Kensky2000:XX)

Conclusion It is difficult to make predictions about the future of the rela tions between the church and the Jewish people. It cannot be foreseen, for example, if the change in Christian theological thinkingthatstartedbecauseoftheshockoftheShoahwillcon tinue in the twentyfirst century when the living memories of theShoahwillslowlyfadeandbecomepartofhistory.Onlythe future can tell if church and theology after Auschwitz will be capable of overcoming the old ambivalence towards Jews and Judaism.ThequestioncannotyetbeansweredifChristianswill learntolivewiththedualityofkinshipanddistinctionintheir relationship to the Jewish people. They will have to find their waybetweentheScyllaofharmonizationandtheCharybdisof indifference. The twentyfirst century will show if Christians willrespectJudaismasalivingtraditionandwillrecognizethe theological significance of the existence of the Jewish people. Thiswouldentailarealparadigmshiftinchurchandtheology. What steps must be taken in the coming years to realize these goals?Afewpointscanbementionedbywayofconclusion. TheFruitfulnessofDifference ChristiansshouldrecognizethatthefactthatJudaismandChris tianityaredifferentisanenrichmentandnotathreat.Recogni tion of the fruitfulness of difference will create space for an open and authentic dialogue. Attempts at harmonization re ducetheroomforencounterandareanobstacletorealdialogue. Dialogue will fail if Judaism is studied only as a means to a

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Christianaimandisusedasa“solution”forChristianidentity problems. Reciprocity There has to be growth in reciprocity in the dialogue between JewsandChristiansifitistobeaviableoptionforthefuture. TheDabruEmetstatementmentionedaboveisasignofagrow ingJewishwillingnesstoengageinrealdialogue.Butreciproc ityindialoguecanbereachedonlyiftheasymmetryofthedia logueisaccepted.Christianstendtoemphasizethesymmetry, whereas Jews pay more attention to the asymmetry. But even when Christians accept the asymmetry wholeheartedly, they are unable theologically to abandon the relationship. A quota tion from the German theologian FriedrichWilhelm Marquardt clarifies this Christian position: “Even if Israel maintains the right to keep its distance, we still have the obligation of rela tionship” (Marquardt 1994: 164). Jews and Christians will al ways put efforts into a theology of the other, more explicitly into “a Christian theology of the Jewish people and Judaism” andintoa“Jewish‘theology’ofthechurchandChristianity.” InterreligiousDialogue Inthecomingyears,partoftheJewishChristiandialoguemust be devoted to and combined with the trilateral dialogue be tween Jews, Christians, and Muslims and, even more widely, with multilateral interreligious dialogue. The practice of these differentdialoguesneedsfurthertheoreticalworkwithrespect tobothatheologyoftheJewishChristiandialogueandatheo logiareligionum.Basedontheheartoftheirownidentity,Chris tians cannot give up the particularity of the JewishChristian dialogueandhaveitmergeintoagreater“universal”dialogue. Theimageofdifferentconcentriccirclescouldmakethisclear er. For Christians the inner circle is confined to the Jewish Christian dialogue because of the origins and the history of Christianity. The second, wider circle points to the dialogue between the three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, andIslam.Beyondthis,otherwidercirclesencompassthedia logueswithotherreligionsandworldviews.Theachievements of JewishChristian dialogue should stimulate the whole spec trumofinterreligiousdialogue. 

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DialogueoftheHeart In the JewishChristian encounter more room should be made —in addition to the dialogue of the head—for the dialogue of theheart.Manypeopleinourtimeareinsearchofameaning ful spirituality. Cheap harmonizations, like the Kabbalistic views adopted by Madonna, should be avoided. Study of the differencesandpointsofcontactofthemysticaltraditionsand, inparticular,acomparisonofthespiritualexperiencesinJuda ism and Christianity could open up a promising field of re search(VandenBergandSüss2006).Thequestionifitispossi ble to participate in intercommunal spiritual worship and ex perienceswithoutgivingupone’sloyaltytoone’sownreligion shouldbeanswered. TheOtherasMystery Without respect for the mystery of the other and for the other asmystery,everydialoguewillturnouttobeafailure.Thezeal toconverttheotherandtheurgeforharmonizationshouldbe changed into acceptance of the otherness of the other. The declared“indissolublebond”isnotafacteitherofthepastorof the present: it is a theological conviction that should inspire Christians to strive for its realization in practice. It could turn outtobeadangerousconvictionforJewsifChristianswantto transform Jews into their own image. To quote Emanuel Levinas: “The other is not reducible to myself” (Levinas 1969: 8595). Our lives are upset through the epiphany of the other. Theotherbringsconfusiontothe“I”becauseofhissubjectivity and appeals to my obligation for responsibility. The other appealstome,andIamcalledtoresponsibility.Jewshavethe moralrighttoexpectaChristianityindialoguethatwillnever againconstituteathreattothem. Bibliography Ateek,N.S.(2008).APalestinianChristianCryfor Reconciliation.Mary knoll:OrbisBooks. Becker.A.H.,andA.Y.Reed(eds).(2003).TheWaysthatNeverParted. TSAJ95.Tübingen:MohrSiebeck. Brockway,A.(1988).TheTheologyoftheChurchesandtheJewishPeople: StatementsbytheWorldCouncilofChurchesanditsMemberChurch es.Geneva:WCCPublications.

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Burg,A.(2008).TheHolocaustisOver:WeMustRisefromitsAshes.New York:PalgraveMacMillan. CohnSherbok,D.(2000).MessianicJudaism.London:Cassell. Elgvin,T.(ed.).(1994).IsraelandYeshua.Jerusalem:CaspariCenterfor BiblicalandJewishStudies. Fisher,E.J.,andL.Klenicki(eds).(1990).InOurTime:TheFloweringof JewishChristianDialogue.NewYork:PaulistPress. FrymerKensky, T. et al. (eds). (2000). Christianity in Jewish Terms. Boulder/Oxford:WestviewPress. Greenberg,I.(2000).FortheSakeofHeavenandEarth:TheNewEncoun terbetweenJudaismandChristianity.Philadelphia:JewishPublica tionSociety. Henrix, H., andW. Kraus(eds).(2001). DieKirchenunddasJudentum: Dokumente von 19862000. CDRom/Vol. II. Paderborn: Bonifa tius/Chr.Kaiser. Klenicki,L.(1988).“Jews,ChristiansandLiberationTheology:ASym posium.”ChristianJewishRelations21:360. Korn, E.B., and J.T. Pawlikowski (eds). (2005). Two Faiths, One Cove nant?JewishandChristianIdentityinthePresenceoftheOther.Lan ham:SheedandWard. “LausanneLetteronJewishEvangelism.”(1986).CurrentDialogue50: 3335. Levinas,E.(1969).Hetmenselijkgelaat.SelectedandIntroducedbyA. Peperzak.Baarn:Ambo. Marquardt,F.W.(1994).Wasdürfenwirhoffen,wennwirhoffendürften? EineEschatologie.Vol.2.Gütersloh:Chr.Kaiser. (1990, 1991). Das christliche Bekenntnis zu Jesus, dem Juden: Eine Christologie.Vol.12.Munich:Chr.Kaiser. Marsden, L. (2008). For God’s Sake: The Christian Right and US Foreign Policy.London/NewYork:ZedBooks. ProtestantChurchintheNetherlands,The.(2003).Kerkordeenordinan tiesvandeProtestantseKerkinNederlandinclusiefdeovergangsbepa lingen.Zoetermeer:Boekencentrum. Protestant Church in Rhineland, The. (1980). “Extract from: Zur Er neuerungdesVerhältnissesvonChristenundJuden.Handreichungder Evangelischen Kirche im Rheinland, Düsseldorf, 1980.” Transl. F. Littell, rev. by R. Rendtorff. Towards a Renewal of the Relationship between Christians and Jews. http://www.jcrelations.net/en/?id = 1005.

394 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Rendtorff, R., and H. Henrix (eds). (1988). Die Kirchen und das Juden tum: Dokumente von 1945 bis 1980. Paderborn/Munich: Boni fatius/Chr.Kaiser. Schoon, S. (2006). “Messiaanse koorts bij Joden en christenen.” In: G.C. den Hertog and S. Schoon (eds). Messianisme en eindtijdver wachtingbijjodenenchristenen.Kampen:Kok.Pp.17495. (1998).Onopgeefbaarverbonden:Opwegnaarvernieuwingindever houdingtussendekerkenhetvolkIsraël.Kampen:Kok. andH.Kremers(1978).NesAmmim:EinchristlichesExperimentin Israel.NeukirchenVluyn:Neukirchener. Siegel,A.F.(1986).Rebecca’sChildren:JudaismandChristianityintheRo manWorld.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Sizer, S. (2005). “The Theological Basis of Christian Zionism: On the RoadtoArmageddon.”In:N.Ateeketal.(eds).ChallengingChris tianZionism:Theology,PoliticsandtheIsraelPalestineConflict.Lon don:Melisende.Pp.5975. Söding,T.(2003).“‘...dieWurzelträgtdich’(Röm.11,18):Methodische undhermeneutischeKonsequenzendesjüdischchristlichenDia logesinderneutestamentlichenExegese.”In:P.Hünermannand T. Söding (eds). Methodische Erneuerung der Theologie: Konsequen zen der wiederentdeckten jüdischchristlichen Gemeinsamkeiten. Frei burg:Herder.Pp.3570. Ucko, H. (ed.). (1996). People of God, Peoples of God: A JewishChristian ConversationinAsia.Geneva:WCCPublications. Van Buren, P.M. (1988). A Theology of the JewishChristian Reality. Part 3.ChristinContext.SanFrancisco,Harper&Row. VandenBerg,A.,andR.Süss(eds).(2006).SpiritualiteitinJodendomen christendom.Heerenveen:ProtestantsePers. VonderOstenSacken,P.(2004).“‘DasGeheimnisdesanderen:’Ver such einer Orientierung im christlichjüdischen Verhältnis.” In: K.Krieneretal.(eds).LernenaufZukunfthin:Einsichtendeschrist lichjüdischen Gesprächs – 25 Jahre Studium in Israel. Neukirchen Vluyn:Neukirchener.Pp.723. Welker,M.(2004).“ZurZukunftdeschristlichjüdischenDialogs.”In: K.Krieneretal.(eds).LernenaufZukunfthin:Einsichtendeschrist lichjüdischen Gesprächs – 25 Jahre Studium in Israel. Neukirchen Vluyn:Neukirchener.Pp.3548.

SympathyandEmpathy TheCompassionateBodhisattva andtheLoveofChrist JohnD’ArcyMay Abstract Compassion is central to Buddhism, as love is to Christianity; but are they thesameorevencomparable?TheIndianandJewishcontextsoftheconcepts are reflected in their very different frames of reference in Buddhology and Christology.InChristianity,thereisanontologicalrelationshipbetweenlove ofneighbourandloveofGod,symbolisedintheredemptivesacrificeofChrist. The Buddhist paradigm of compassion is the Bodhisattva, the Great Being whopostponeshisownfinalliberationforthesakeofallsufferingbeings.Ma hayanaBuddhismdevelopedthisalreadytraditional“otherregarding”figure tocounteractwhatitsawasthe“selfregarding”idealoftheTheravada.Aphe nomenologyofsympathyandempathyisproposedasameansofestablishing commonground,particularlyinviewoftheexigenciesofa“globalethic.”

Introduction One of the many misconceptions which arose out of Europe’s initial encounter with Buddhism was the contrast between Christianity,asareligionoflove,mercyandactivecharity,and aBuddhismcharacterisedbypassivity,selfabsorptionandthe futile attempt at selfsalvation—if indeed it was regarded as a religion at all. Anyone who knows Buddhists, of course, is aware that they are at least as kind and outgoing as anyone else,andthisseemstohavebeentruefromtheverybeginning (Ananda, the Buddha’s “beloved disciple,” is said to have re ferredtotherecentlydeceasedBuddhaas“hewhowasso kind” [cited by Sangharakshita 1999: 21]). Even a cursory ac quaintancewithBuddhismmakesclearthatattheveryheartof itsteachingsiscompassion(karuna),themostimportantfruitof

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the acquisition of wisdom (prajña) and the centrepiece of the Buddhist value system. This becomes particularly clear when weencountertheGreatCompassion(mahakaruna)oftheGreat Being(mahasattva),theBodhisattvaorlivingbeingdestinedfor finalenlightenment(seeNakamura1987). Yet doubts remain. There are subtle but profound differ ences between this Buddhist spiritual and ethical conception anditspossibleChristiancounterparts.Benevolence(metta)and compassiondonotfigureatthepinnacleoftheBuddhistscale of spiritual attainments; they are rather the starting point, and theycanlooksuspiciouslylike meanstoanend,namelyone’s own spiritual perfection in the achievement of complete equa nimity (upekkha). They are certainly not the same as Christian mercyandlove.Thewholeframeofreferenceinwhichtheyap pear is different, and one has the impression that they are dif ferentlymotivatedaswell.InwhatfollowsIwouldthusliketo exploretherelationshipbetweentheboundlessloveatthecen treofChristianityandtheuniversalcompassionwhichcharac terises Buddhism, proceeding to develop a phenomenology of sympathyandempathyastheyappearinthetwoculturaland religiouscontexts. CompassionandLove Christ is the symbol of redemptive love, of suffering trans mutedintosacrificebybeingfreelyacceptedasthepriceforthe salvation of all humanity. The premise of this conception is fundamental, indeed “original” sinfulness, a human state of misery brought about by wilful moral evil which can only be outweighed by the boundless love in the heart of Christ. At times this was construed, for example by St Anselm, as Christ “paying the price” of the ultimate sacrifice to assuage God’s woundedhonour,whichonlyheastheDivineSoncoulddoon our behalf. Such a scenario is incomprehensible and even dis tressing to Buddhists, for whom the world and human nature simply are what they are and “bad karma” is part of the mix. Our fundamental problem is not sin but the ignorance (avijja) that conceals from us the condition of our existence, namely transitorinessorimpermanence(anicca)andtheinabilitytofind lasting fulfilment and satisfaction (dukkha, often translated as “suffering”) because we are wedded to the illusion of an indi

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vidual“self”(Sanskritatman,Paliatta)asthecentreofourexist ence. Even Christians, however, are starting to have their doubtsabouttheadequacyoftheaboveversionofredemption, preferring to place at the centre of their faith the original “good” creation and the “new” creation in Christ (see, for in stance,Mackey2006,whocharacterisesmuchtraditionalChris tian theology as being “sindriven”). There are other accounts of redemption, for example that of Duns Scotus, in which the Incarnationwouldhavebeenpartofthedivineplanevenifour first parents had not sinned. There is thus scope for exploring thecentralChristianbeliefindivineloveinconversationwith Buddhistswithoutbeinghemmedinbymedievalforensicorre tributiveconstructionsofredemption. IntheHebrewBible,Godisdescribedasshowing“mercy” or “compassion” (rahamim, connoting the “bowels” or “heart,” also the maternal womb or bosom, raham). God therefore par donsoffencesoutofmercifullove(hesed)andunfailingfidelity (‘emet).TheprototypicalcryofthePsalmististhusthepleafor mercyandforgiveness:“Havemercyonme,OGod,according tothysteadfastlove;accordingtothyabundantmercyblotout my transgressions” (Psalm 51:1). This Jewish heritage helps to explain,thoughitbynomeanspredetermines,theNewTesta mentportraitofGodas“Fatherofmercies”(2Corinthians1:3); Jesus’disciplesaretobemerciful“evenasyourFatherismer ciful” (Luke 6:36). Parables such as the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:3037)andtheProdigalSon(orperhapsmoreappropriately theProdigalFather,sinceheissogenerouswithhislove,Luke 15:1132) beautifully expand on this theme, and in the final judgementsceneitisthosewhohaveshownpracticalkindness, even unknowingly, who are admitted to Christ’s kingdom (Matthew25:3146). In Buddhism the corresponding symbol is not the life of Siddhartha Gautama, whom modern scholars refer to as the “earthly” or “historical” Buddha and who for later Buddhists wastheBuddhaofthepresentworldage(kalpa),oneamongin numerable others, but the figure of the Bodhisattva, the Great Being coursing towards full awakening or enlightenment (bo dhi),whichwillbringaboutfinalrelease(nirvana)fromthecycle of rebirth in conditioned existence (samsara). The Lotus Sutra containsvividportraitsofnumerousBodhisattvasintheluxur

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iant imagery of Indian mythology, such as the Bodhisattva “Never Despise,” who persists in proclaiming to all he meets “YouwillallbecomeBuddhas,”earninginsultsandridiculefor his pains (Chapter XX); or the Bodhisattva “Regarder of the CriesoftheWorld”(Avalokitesvara,ChapterXXV),theuniversal saviourofallindistress,whoisoftenportrayedwithaneyein each of his many hands, symbolising his alertness to suffering andhisreadinesstohelp.InJapaneseBuddhismheeventually assumesthefemaleformofKannon,shewhograntschildrento thechildless.OnthethresholdofBuddhahoodtheBodhisattva paradoxicallyachievesfinalliberation(nirvana)byvowingtore nounceitforthesakeofsavingallsentientbeingsfromtheirig noranceandsuffering.TheBodhisattva,thoughalreadyenlight enedandliberatedfromallpassions,issomovedbythesuffer ingintheworldthatheorshevowsnottoreaptherewardof ultimatepeaceuntilitcanalsobeattainedbyallbeings. TheearthlyBuddhaofthepresentworldagenevertheless entereddefinitivelyintonirvana(hisparinirvana,asdescribedat lengthintheMahaParinirvanaSutra).Sangharakshita(1999:88) is of the view that the Mahayanists needed to explain that the Buddha’s final release did not imply the selfishness of which theyaccusedtheirrivalsintheHinayanaor“lesservehicle.”This becomes the paradigm of the “worthy” or “perfected” one (ar hat, Pali arahant) in Theravada Buddhism, whereas the Maha yanaidealisembodiedinthealtruisticBodhisattva.Theprecise difference between a Bodhisattva—enlightened, yet one step short of definitive liberation—and the Buddha’s earthly exist enceasa“livingliberatedone”(jivanmukti)isnotentirelyclear, butnocontradictionisintended:theBuddhareachedenlighten mentonlyafterinnumerablerebirthsasaBodhisattva,manyof whicharerecountedintheJatakasor“birthstories.”ThisBodhi sattva career acquainted him with the full spectrum of animal andhumansufferingresultingfromignorance,whichgiveshis exerciseofcompassionwhatoneauthorhaswellcalleda“kar mic depth” that is not only universal but cosmic in scope (Strong2001:1619).ItwasonlyaftertheriseoftheMahayana with its criticism of the arhat as too narrow an ideal that the Bodhisattva became the predominant symbol of Buddhist per fection,thoughasymbolthatwasentirelytraditional.Thearhat,

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in short, was seen to lack compassion (karuna; see Nakamura 1987:266). As a model of selfless love, the Bodhisattva ideal only makes sense when interpreted in its Indian context. Its Chris tiancounterpartisjustasfirmlyrootedinaJewishcontext.The lawyer who prompts the parable of the Good Samaritan an swers his own question, “Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?,” by quoting Deuteronomy (6:5) and Leviticus (19:18):“YoushalllovetheLordyourGodwithallyourheart, andwithallyoursoul,andwithallyourstrength,andwithall your mind; and your neighbour as yourself” (Luke 10:2526). Love of neighbour and love of God are thus inseparable, and thisgivesChristiancompassionanontologicaldimension.Ina famous essay, Karl Rahner argued that the two loves form a unity, for human love can only come about as the explicit re alisationoftranscendentalconditionsofpossibility,whicheven if they are not conceptually grasped constitute the “horizon” within which love becomes a real possibility. Those in pos sessionofthenecessaryconceptsknowthistobe“God,”aGod whoislove.Thereissuchathingas“loveofGod,”andwemay loveourneighbour“forGod’ssake,”butwhattheNewTesta ment reveals is that God has loved us in order that we might love one another (John 13:34); this is our way of returning God’sloveforus(1John4:7,11).Anyactofgenuineloveisper formed,knowinglyornot,asanoutworkingofthedivinelove which gives human existence its fundamental orientation to wards selftranscendence (see Rahner 1965: 28081). The very structure of human knowing and willing corresponds to this caritas (what the New Testament calls agape), the love of total selfdispossession and selfemptying (kenosis), which is the di vine life itself, infused into the human soul by grace (Rahner 1965:28485,29091). This Christian scheme of things—though it is Catholic ra therthanProtestantinitsemphasisonthetransformativepow er of grace and human nature’s openness to receive it—has echoes in certain developments of contemporary philosophy. Heretheselfisnotanisolatedspiritualentity,asconceivedby Descartes, but is mediated to its own awareness as an embod iedselfbytherelationshiptotheother,asproposedbytheJew

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ish1philosopherEmmanuelLevinasinachallengetotraditional metaphysics (see Levinas 1979; 1981; 1990). Not “Being,” but the“Good”whichmakesBeinga“Gift”isprimary(seeMarion 1991;Davies2001:chapters5,6and7).Thisethicalratherthan ontological conception of the self may be situated somewhere betweenthesolipsismofDescartesandthenegativityofNietz sche, which in its radicality is reminiscent of the Buddhist teachingon“notself”(anatta):forNietzschethereisno“being” behind “doing” (see Davies 2001: 116, 118). The Christian con ceptofperson,embodiedasanindividualselfyetatleastsub liminallyawareofanhorizonoftranscendencewhichopensup inexhaustiblepossibilitiesofknowledgeandlove,ispredicated upon the relationship to the other, as conceived by the Jewish thinkerMartinBuberinhisphilosophyof“I”and“Thou.”The IThou relationship is the Grundwort or fundamental relation ship, such thatthe“I”ofIThouisradicallydifferentfromthe “I”ofIIt(Buber1995:1).Weshallreturntothisinsightbelow. In Mahayana Buddhism the “selfregarding” arhat is re placed by the “otherregarding” Bodhisattva as the ultimate ideal,thoughnotwithoutacertaincontinuitywiththeethicof living “for the sake of others” clearly present throughout the Theravada Pali Canon (Sangharakshita 1999: 910). Sangharak shita(1999:1112)evensuggeststhatitwastheemphasisonbe ingwiseandcompassionateratherthansayingwhatwascorrect teachingthatledtothesplitbetweenMahayanaandTheravada in the first place. Even within the first century after the Bud dha’s lifetime there are indications that the Bodhisattva ideal wasemergingtotranscendthesomewhatossifiedconceptionof thearhat,leadingtotheformationofthe“Bodhisattvavehicle” (bodhisattvayana) in opposition to the traditional vehicle of the “listeners” or “disciples” (sravakayana) (Sangharakshita 1999: 2526,29;Nakamura1987:26667). ThekeytothedistinctivenessofthedevelopedBodhisatt vaideal,however,istheconceptofbodhicitta,literallythe“en lightenedmind”ratherthanmerelythe“thoughtofenlighten ment,” “the manifestation, even the irruption, within us of 1

Levinashimselfdidnotwishtoberegardedasa“Jewishphilo sopher”ifthatmeantthathemadeJewishteachingsnormativeforhis thoughtbutratherasathoroughlyprofessionalphilosopherwhodrew onhisJewishheritage(seeAtterton,Calarco,Friedman2004:16).

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something transcendental,” comparable perhaps to the Holy SpiritinChristiantheology(Sangharakshita1999:3133).Thisis notsomethingmerelyindividual,pertainingtoaparticularper son;itis“supraindividualbutnotcollective,”therealisationof emptiness and compassion as absolutes (paramarthabodhicitta), thoughrefractedthroughconditionedexistenceastheindivid ualactsofcompassioninemptinesswhichtheenlightenedcan practise (samvrttibodhicitta). A Bodhisattva is one of whom bo dhicitta has taken complete possession; it is simply the undi luted manifestation of something we already are (Sangharak shita1999:3238).Itmaybepossibletosetthisinrelationwith Rahner’s conception of the “supernatural existential” which correspondstotheindwellingloveoftheTrinity. TheBodhisattvaisthusrevealedasapowerfulsymbolofa love that far transcends individual altruism. The enlightened mind and heart as the full expression of the will to enlighten mentparticipatesinarealitywhichmakescompassionnotonly conceivable but able to be realised in the Bodhisattva’s Great Vow(mahapranidhana)topractisealltheperfections(paramitas). We,however,canonlyapproachthistranscendentrealityphe nomenologically. How do Christian love and Buddhist com passion manifest themselves against the backgrounds of their respectivetranscendentalconditionsofpossibility? SympathyandEmpathy Johann Baptist Metz has proposed that compassion could be come the new global programme of Christianity in the age of religiousandculturalpluralism(Metz2000). Traditionalterms like Mitleid and Empathie, in Metz’ view, are not sufficiently “political” and “social” to address this task, while Buddhism has even less to offer (Metz 2000: 13). At the core of this new programme is the Gospel value of responsiveness to (Empfind lichkeitfür)thesufferingofothers,whichisthekeytoChristian ity’s universalism (Metz 2000: 11). Just as I once proposed the unspokenbutreal“consensusofthesuffering”(May1984:224 34)andAloysiusPierisspokeofthe“magisteriumofthepoor” (Pieris 2000: 208) as normative for religious authenticity, so Metzidentifiesan“authorityofthesuffering”rootedinaninar ticulatebutprofoundspiritualityor“mysticism”whichseesin thefacesofthepooracommandwhichhastobeobeyed(Metz

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2000: 1516), quoting Hans Jonas: “Sieh hin – und du weißt” (“Just look – and you will know”). What he does not seem to appreciate,however,isthatitispreciselythisthatholdsoutthe possibilityofsomerealequivalencebetweentheallembracing compassion(karuna)oftheBodhisattvaandthetotallyselfgiv inglove(agape)ofGodinChrist. TheBodhisattvaidealanditsrealisationinbodhicittaisnot justanafterthoughtoraglossonaninwardlookingprocessof mental purification. It is the mythical symbolisation of core Buddhistvalueswhich,asoneauthorputsit,have“tamedwild peoples”(Thurman1987:90)andhaveanimmediateandprac ticalbearingonnonviolentstrategiestoovercomeviolence,in cluding the “structural” violence of misguided “development” and authoritarian rule (see May 2003: chapter 4). Christians tend to miss this implication because they are easily alienated by the mythological scenarios spun by the Indian imagination in order to express the absoluteness and universality of the Buddhabody of absolute truth (Dharmakaya), the Buddhana ture of absolute emptiness (sunyata) in which the Bodhisattvas participate.Yetagenuinequestionremains:canthefullrealisa tion of the Buddhist ideal, so vividly imagined in the extrava gant symbolism of the Bodhisattvas, have anything to do with history, the forum in which human destinies are decided by actsofmoralchoiceconstrainedbymaterialconditions? Christianity, too, is shot through with mythological ele mentsinheritedfromitsoriginalJewish,HellenisticandMiddle Easterncontexts,andJesuscanperhapsbestbeunderstoodthe ologically as “symbol of God” (Haight 1999). Yet the central doctrine of Incarnation, especially when viewed in the light of itsJewishantecedentsratherthanitsdefinitiveGreekformula tions, establishes a rootedness in history and an acknowledge ment of the material world which are not so apparent in the Buddhist schema of the “three bodies” (trikaya). According to this,evenwhatcontemporaryChristianswouldcallthe“earth ly”or“historical”Buddhaonlyappearsina“manifestationbody” (nirmanakaya)whichisitselfsubordinatetothe“bodyofcom munal bliss” (sambhogakaya), the staple symbolic medium of theMahayanasutras. Though the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Masao Abe creativelyappropriatedtheconceptofkenosisasthemutualto

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tal selfemptying of the persons in the Trinitarian Godhead, making this the equivalent of a “dynamic sunyata” (see Ives 1995), the term originally applies to the person of Jesus, who “emptiedhimself”(heautonekenosen)and“tookontheformofa slave” (morphen doulou labon); although he was “in the form of God” (en morphe theou), he adopted the “likeness” (homoiomati) and“appearance”(schemati)ofaman(Philippians2:67),lang uage reminiscent of the Buddhist “manifestation body” (nirmanakaya).TheBuddhistsolutiontotheproblemoffinding anhistoricalequivalentoftranscendentlovewastoassumethat therearetwolevelsofthespiritualperfections(paramita)corre spondingtothetwolevelsoftruth(satya),oneabsolutelytran scendent (paramarthasatya, paramarthaparamita), the other rela tive and conditioned (samvrttisatya, samvrttiparamita). The same applies,aswehaveseen,totheEnlightenmentmind(bodhicitta) of the Bodhisattva and the eternal Buddhanature itself (Dhar makaya,Dharmadhatu).Inoneway,ofcourse,asanattemptto expresstheinexpressiblebysymbolicmeansthisisjustasspec ulative and mythological as the Christian doctrine of Incarna tion.Inbothcases, however,thesolutionisnottheoreticalbut existential:itisthepossessionofbodhicittathatallowstheBodhi sattvatorealisethatthe“empty”formsofphenomenalappear ance are the medium in which the Great Compassion works itself out, according to the principle enunciated by the Heart Sutra:“Here,OSariputra,formisemptinessandtheveryemp tiness is form; emptiness does not differ from form, nor does formdifferfromemptiness;whateverisform,thatisemptiness, whateverisemptiness,thatisform”(Conze1968:74).InChris tianityitisnolessparadoxicalthatgraceinfusesthedivinelove into the most mundane human existence. Yet for the Buddhist practitioner and the Christian believer the compassion of the BodhisattvaandthegraceofChristarenotmerelynotional,but real. ParticularlyintheMahayana,thiscomplementarityof“ex perience”and“theory”wouldseemtobetheoutworkingofthe EnlightenmentmindoftheBodhisattvainwhatBuddhistscall “theexchangeofselfandother”(seeThurman1987:7790).The whole splendour of bodhicitta at the heart of the Bodhisattva ideal is the will that all beings be saved from the suffering caused by ignorance through the enlightenment that brings

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final liberation from the bonds of desire. All beings are im agined as one’s “mother,” whose kindness, love and compas sion must be remembered and repaid. The Bodhisattva medi tates on the equality and sameness of oneself and all others now:everythingaboutothersis“I.”AsexpressedinThichNhat Hanh’s conception of “interbeing,” bodhicitta, far from being a flight into an emptiness somehow “beyond” this world of suf fering beings, implies identification with their sufferings, im plemented not only in the realisation of transcendence but in “political” practices of generous giving (dana), serving the needs ofbeings—includingwhatWesternershumancentredlycall“the environment”—and observing the highest standards of truth andintegrity(Hanh1987;Harris2008).Sucha“programme,”to borrow Metz’ term, envisages compassion as a fusion of affec tivity,cognition,volitionandontologyinbringingtheotherto the fore, a combination of the imaginative empathy needed to placeoneselfintheother’spositionandtheaffectivesympathy thatmakeshis,heroritssufferingone’sown.Interestingly,this corresponds to Davies’ characterisation of Christian compas sion(Davies2001:chapter11),inwhichhecharacteriseskenosis thus: … the mutual grounding of self and other, which is the foundationofconsciousness,canbeappropriatedastheim ageofthetriuneGodinus.Itisintheepiphanyoftheper sonal other to ourselves that we discover the trinitarian character of our consciousness, in which self and other en countereachotherthroughthemediationofathird,which is the mutually possessed life of consciousness itself. (Davies2001:251)

Compassion, in other words, involves a considerable effort of bothintellectandimagination. These concepts have perhaps nowhere been more thor oughly explored than in German phenomenology, building especiallyonMaxScheler’sanalysisoftherelationshipbetween moral values and feelings, in particular the Nachfühlen that al lows us to reproduce in our own sensibility what the other is experiencing, which provides the basis of Mitgefühl, empathy withtheobjectivelygraspedsufferingoftheother,andeventu ally of Einsfühlung, identifying oneself with the psychic reality oftheother(seeStegmüller1969:10610).Thepresuppositionof

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this act of empathy which makes sympathy possible is not a primary selfawareness; rather, Scheler anticipates Levinas in maintainingthattherealityoftheotherisgivenasimmediately evident to an inner perception which precedes selfawareness ofone’sownego;onethusperceivesone’sownself“asifIwere another”(“alsobicheinandererwäre”,Stegmüller1969:110). WithintheframeworkofHusserl’sphenomenologyEdithStein developed an even more differentiated analysis of empathy (Stein1989).She,likeLevinas,beginswiththe“look”perceived inthefaceoftheother,whichleadsthepersonofempathyfrom what is outwardly seen to the other’s inner disposition, from objective intentionality to a subjective “conprimordiality,” the realisationthattheother’sprimordialexperience,whilenotmy own primordiality, is equivalently primordial for him or her. Einfühlung(empathy),forStein,entailsthat“’I’become,asnear as ‘I’ can, one with the other by turning to the content of the eventasifIwasthesubject”(Palmisano2003:28;see2636).2 MartinBuber,stronglyinfluencedbythemystical“enthu siasm”oftheHasidimorHolyOnes,emphasisedtheprimacyof therelationtoaThouwhichcallsforthadeeperandmoreper sonal response than the relation to an It, “so that one can im agine quite concretely what another is feeling, thinking and knowing,”thoughthis“doesnotabolishthebasicdistancebe tweenoneselfandtheother”(Atterton,Calarco,Friedman2004: 3).Levinas,whosespiritualhomelayratherinTalmudicpiety and Rabbinical exegesis, though he was influenced by Buber, only gradually came to acknowledge the ethical character of Buber’s thinking and its capacity for radical transcendence in the presence of an “eternal Thou” (see Strasser 2004: 39, 44; Bernosconi2004:69,81).ForLevinas,theIThourelationshipis asymmetrical because of the moral “height” of the other over against the self in its “isolated subjectivity” (Atterton, Calarco, Friedman 2004: 6, 33). For him, the orientation to the other is dominatedbyseparateness,buttheasymmetryisovercomeby the presence of a “third” (le tiers), the infinity glimpsed in the face of the other and the awareness of multiple others, which opensthewaytoconceptsofjusticeandsociety.Buberalsode 2

IwouldliketothankmydoctoralstudentsFrJosephPalmisanoSJ andFrGeorgeZavershinskyforthelighttheyhaveshedformeonthe thoughtofEdithSteinandMartinBuber,respectively.

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veloped conceptions of the “Inborn Thou” and the “Eternal Thou”asthe“third”whichliftstheIThourelationshipbeyond itself. One of Buber’s foundational contributions to dialogical thought was to break through the “vision bias” inherited by HusserlfromhisteacherBrentano,whichtendedtoreducewil lingandfeelingtoknowing:therelationtotheotherisnotlim ited to the cognitive, but engages the affectivity of the whole personinitsembodiment,asexploredbyMerleauPonty.3Curi ously, Buber and Levinas accused each other of being Heideg gerian!TheGermanwordSorge,“care,”withitsderivativeFür sorge, “solicitude,” plays a central part in Heidegger’s existen tial ontology, where it is identified as an “existential” or deep structure of our “being in the world” (Dasein), equiprimordial withtheAngstassociatedwithbeing“thrown”intosuchanex istence (Geworfenheit) and at the same time “always ahead of itself”(sichvorwegsein).4“Theexpression‘care’meansanexis tential and basic ontological phenomenon” (Heidegger 1996: 183; see Stegmüller 1969: 16768). For Buber, Heidegger’s ab stract ontology lacks the critical distance from history made possible by genuine transcendence; for Levinas, Heidegger lacks thedimensionofethicalintersubjectivityandshareswithBuber the presupposition that being, not goodness, ultimately groundsthereal.Buber,however,sawthatdialoguewasabet ter starting point for personalist philosophy than Dasein’s care and solicitude for existence (see Cohen 2004). The term Sorge neverthelesshasconnotationsofboth“care”and“concern”ata deepexistentiallevelandgivesanaddeddimensiontothecon fluenceofempathy(Mitgefühl)andsympathy(Mitleid). Searchingtheologicallexicaandencyclopaediasforentries on Mitleid (the German term for “compassion”), the Tübingen moral theologian Dietmar Mieth found almost none. Such a simpleandbasicethicalattitudeascompassioisapparentlynot 3

SeeAndrewTallon,“AffectionandtheTranscendentalDialogical PersonalismofBuberandLevinas”(Atterton,Calarco,Friedman2004: 4964,5455).Levinaswasalsoreadingcontemporarypersonalistphilo sophersof“presence”suchasGabrielMarcel. 4 Daseinisthus“beingaheadofitselfinalreadybeinginaworld” (Heidegger1996:179),“Sichvorwegschonseinalsseinbei”(Stegmüller 1969:168,n.1).

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ratedashighlyasonemightassumeinChristiantheology.Yet, asMiethgoesontoargue,an“ethicofsympathy”(Sympathiee thik)isanindispensablecomplementtoKant’srationallyground edcategoricalimperative.AMitleidsethikcertainlyneedscontin ual rational reflection as a means of controlling emotional im pulses,butreasonalonedoesnotsufficeaseitherasourceora motiveforethicalaction(Mieth2000);indeed,inLevinas’view reason “is not only incapable of stopping the violence, but is showninimportantrespectstobeincomplicitywithviolence” (Atterton,Calarco,Friedman2004:21). Buddhism is by no means a stranger to such conceptions. TheDalaiLama,firmlyassertingtherealityofBodhisattvasin formed by the mind of Enlightenment, shows how their exist enceispremisedonthedistinctioninidentitybetweenconven tionalandultimatetruth,thecoincidenceofdependentarising (paticcasamuppada) and emptiness (sunyata); “Hence, the two truths are one entity” (Gyatso 1987: 220). He explains why, in theBuddhistconceptionofcompassion,thereallycrucialattain ment is not lovingkindness (metta) or even altruism (mudita) but the equanimity (upekkha) which makes no distinction be tweenthewellbeingofone’sdearestfriend,aneutralpersonor one’sworstenemy.Mindfulofthekindnessofotherbeings,one must“recognizeallbeingsasyourdearestfriend”inthe“exchange of self and other” (Gyatso 1987: 22224; emphasis in original). The fruit of wisdom as onepointedness of mind is the simple ethical injunction “Help, do not harm,” in other words, a re solvetoact(Gyatso1987:225226),echoingSchopenhauer’sdic tum“Harmnoone,helpall”(“Schadeniemandem,hilfallen,” cited by Mieth 2000: 23). This could signal a considerable con vergence, not just between Buddhist and Christian ethics but betweentheBuddhologyandChristologyfromwhichtheyde rive. The fundamental importance of this convergence is per hapsbestillustratedwhenwecontemplateaworldutterlyde void of the empathy that makes sympathy possible and pre paresthegroundforbothloveandcompassion.Thefascistand communistregimesofthetwentiethcentury wereexamplesof theattempttopurgesocietyofsuch“softhearted”virtues.Itis hard to decide whether the fanatical antiSemitism of Hitler’s ThirdReich,theutterlyarbitrarysuppressionofallopposition,

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whetherimaginedorreal,inStalin’sRussia,theunquestioning commitmentofanentirepeopletotheemperorcultinwartime Japan,ortheruthlesssacrificeoftensofmillionsoflivesinpur suitofmilitaryandeconomicpowerinMao’sChinaisthemost shocking example of the attempted elimination of compassion asaprincipleofpoliticalethics. Such an attitude was in a certain sense anticipated in the antimoral philosophy underlying the life and work of the no toriousMarquisdeSade,whopeopledhistreatisesandnovels withcharacterswhowerespurredontotheextremitiesoflust bytheirquestforthe“perfectcrime,”conditioningthemselves toloveevilastheydeliberatelysetaboutcreatinghellonearth. Others, almost at random, became the objects of their experi ments in selfgratification through sexual cruelty. It is a testi monytothefundamentalnecessityofthevaluesandvirtueswe have been discussing that this programme is ultimately self contradictory,tendingtoconsumeitsperpetratorsintheirown excesses,buttheMarquis’determinedefforttoimagineitinall itsperversityandevencarryitoutisevidenceofthefragilityof these virtues. Even the Nazis had shamefacedly concealed pangsofselfpitybecauseoftheemotionaltolltakenbytheac tualcarryingoutoftheirprogrammeofextermination,whereas deSade’saimwastoeradicateeventhese(seeStobbe2002:76 84).Whenonehasplumbedthedepthsofevilinthiswayand contemplatedtheconsequencesoftheeradicationofallfellow feeling,onebeginstoappreciatethattheBodhisattvaidealand theevangelicallovecommandment,farfrombeingabstractand idealistic,arethesymbolicexpressionsoftherationallyground edandpracticallyorientatedattitudeswhichmakesocialliving andhumanfulfilmentpossibleatall. Conclusion:TowardsaGlobalEthosofCompassion Clarification of these issues is a small contribution to estab lishingthepossibility,envisagedbyHansKüng(Küng1990),of the world’s religions actively cooperating to bring about a shared ethos or moral consensus, deriving from their various narrativeandphilosophicalframeworks,whichwouldcombine the best of their inherited values and ground what has since cometobecalleda“globalethic,”“theglobalisationofethics” or “ethical globalisation.” Even in theory, however, this is not

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so easy to imagine as Küng and the framers of the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic at the 1993 World’s Parliament of Reli gions in Chicago appear to have supposed (see Küng and Ku schel1993).Ineachcase,inanongoingprocessofcomparative ethicsandtheology,itneedstobeshowninpainstakingdetail just where the equivalences lie and how much weight is to be given to the obvious differences between the religious tradi tions.Thisisthetaskofwhatmightbecalleda“collaborative” interreligioustheology. In our case, and looking at our results from an explicitly Christianpointofview,itbehovesustoaskBuddhistswhether we have really understood how compassion coheres with the questfortheliberatingwisdomthatcomesfromenlightenment, which can easily appear to be ahistorical and apolitical—and evenamoralwhenwelearnthattheeliminationofalldualism, including that presupposed by the need to discriminate be tween good and evil actions, is the substance of the break throughtosatoriortheexperienceofliberation.Wehaveshown thatthisdoesnotdojusticetotheBodhisattvaidealofuniversal compassion, and in any case there are varieties of Buddhism, suchasthoseinitiatedbyShinranandNichireninJapan,which are“prophetic”incharacterandstandoutfromthebroadlines oftradition.ForChristians,theattempttounderstandBuddhist compassionthrows newlightontheconceptofagapeastheo verflowing divine love which cannot be earned and is presup posedbyallmanifestationsofhumanlove. Bibliography Atterton,Peter,MatthewCalarco,andMauriceFriedman(eds).(2004). Levinas and Buber: Dialogue and Difference. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UniversityPress. Bernosconi,Robert.(2004).“’FailureofCommunication’asaSurplus: DialogueandLackofDialoguebetweenBuberandLevinas.”In: Peter Atterton, Matthew Calarco and Maurice Friedman (eds). Levinas and Buber: Dialogue and Difference. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UniversityPress.Pp.6597. Buber, Martin. (1995). Ich und Du. Stuttgart: Reclam. Originally pub lished1923. Cohen, Richard A. (2004). “Buber and Levinas—and Heidegger.” In: Peter Atterton, Matthew Calarco and Maurice Friedman (eds).

410 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Levinas and Buber: Dialogue and Difference. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UniversityPress.Pp.23549. Conze,Edward(ed.).(1968).SelectedSayingsfromthePerfectionofWis dom.2nded.London:TheBuddhistSociety. Davies, Oliver. (2001). A Theology of Compassion: Metaphysics of Differ enceandtheRenewalofTradition.London:SCM. Gyatso,HHTensin,14thDalaiLama.(1987).“ThePracticesofBodhi sattvas.”In:DonaldS.Lopez,Jr.andStevenC.Rockefeller(eds). TheChristandtheBodhisattva.Delhi/Albany:SriSatguruPublica tions/StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Pp.21727. Haight,Roger.(1999).JesusSymbolofGod.MaryknollNY:OrbisBooks. Hanh,ThichNhat.(1987).Interbeing:CommentariesontheTiepHienPre cepts.Berkeley:ParallaxPress. Harris, Elizabeth. (2008). “Generosity in Christianity and Pali Bud dhism.”DharmaWorld35:1417. Ives,Christopher(ed.).(1995).DivineEmptinessandHistoricalFullness: A BuddhistJewishChristian Conversation with Masao Abe. Valley Forge:TrinityPressInternational. Küng,Hans.(1990).GlobalResponsibility:InSearchofaNewWorldEthic. London:SCM. and KarlJosef Kuschel. (1993). A Global Ethic: The Declaration of theWorld’sParliamentofReligions.London:SCM. Levinas, Emmanuel. (1990). Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. London:TheAthlonePress. (1981). Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. The Hague/Bos ton/London:MartinusNijhoff. (1979). Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. The Hague/ Boston/London:MartinusNijhoff. Mackey, James P. (2006). Christianity and Creation: The Essence of the ChristianFaithanditsFutureamongtheReligions.NewYork/Lon don:Continuum. Marion,JeanLuc.(1991).GodWithoutBeing:HorsTexte.Chicago/Lon don:UniversityofChicagoPress. May,JohnD’Arcy.(2003).TranscendenceandViolence:TheEncounterof Buddhist,ChristianandPrimalTraditions.NewYork/London:Con tinuum. (1984).Meaning,ConsensusandDialogueinBuddhistChristianCom munication: A Study in the Construction of Meaning. Berne: Peter Lang.

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Metz,JohannBaptist.(2000).“Compassion:ZueinemWeltprogramm des Christentums im Zeitalter des Pluralismus der Religionen und Kulturen.“ In: J.B. Metz et al. (eds). Compassion: Weltpro gramm des Christentums. Soziale Verantwortung lernen. Freiburg/ Basel/Vienna:Herder.Pp.918. Mieth,Dietmar.(2000).“Mitleid.”In:J.B.Metzetal.(eds).Compassion: WeltprogrammdesChristentums.SozialeVerantwortunglernen.Frei burg/Basel/Vienna:Herder.Pp.2125. Nakamura,Hajime.(1987).“BodhisattvaPath.”In:MirceaEliade(ed.). The Encyclopedia of Religion. Vol. 2. New York: Macmillan. Pp. 26469. Palmisano, Joseph. (2003). An Emptying That Gives: The Significance of the Givenness of Edith Stein for the Interreligious Dialogue. M.Phil. thesis,IrishSchoolofEcumenics,TrinityCollegeDublin. Pieris,Aloysius.(2000).“ChristBeyondDogma:DoingChristologyin the Context of the Religions and the Poor.” Louvain Studies 25: 187231. Rahner, Karl. (1965). “Über die Einheit von Nächsten und Gottes liebe.” In: Schriften zur Theologie. Vol. VI. Einsiedeln/Zurich/Co logne:BenzingerVerlag.Pp.27798. Sangharakshita.(1999).TheBodhisattvaIdeal:WisdomandCompassionin Buddhism.Birmingham:WindhorsePublications. Stegmüller, Wolfgang. (1969). Hauptströmungen der Gegenwärtsphiloso phie:EinekritischeEinführung.2ndrev.ed.Stuttgart:AlfredKröner Verlag. Stein,Edith.(1989).OntheProblemofEmpathy.Dordrecht:Kluwer. Stobbe,HeinzGünther.(2002).VomGeistderÜbertretungundVernicht ung: Der Ursprung der Gewalt im Denken des Marquis de Sade. Re gensburg:VerlagFerdinandPustet. Strasser, Stephan. (2004). “Buber and Levinas: Philosophical Reflec tionsonanOpposition.”In:PeterAtterton,MatthewCalarco,and Maurice Friedman (eds.). Levinas and Buber: Dialogue and Differ ence.Pittsburgh:DuquesneUniversityPress.Pp.3748. Strong, John S. (2001). The Buddha: A Short Biography. Oxford: One world. Thurman, Robert A.F. (1987). “The Buddhist Messiahs: The Magnifi centDeedsoftheBodhisattvas.”In:DonaldS.Lopez,Jr.andSte venC.Rockefeller(eds).TheChristandtheBodhisattva.Delhi/Al bany:SriSatguruPublications/StateUniversityofNewYorkPress. Pp.6597.

ChristianandBuddhistSpiritualities TheirDifferencesandComplementarities ChristaAnbeek

Abstract ThroughoutthecenturiesBuddhistChristiandialoguehasbeencharacterized bymanydifferentattitudes,suchasmutualinterest,enmity,feelingacom monchallenge.InthisessayfourapproachestoBuddhistChristiandialogue arediscussed,inwhichinterestintheotherisacommonattitude:thephilo sophicaltheological, the practicalspiritual, the narrativeexistential and the ecosophical.AsurveyofaBuddhistChristianinitiativeonthepracticalspir ituallevelisthenpresented.SeventeenDutchandBelgianmonksandnuns involved in the Monastic Interreligious Dialogue programme were inter viewed. The main focus of the survey was the question in what way this twentyfiveyearongoingexchangeprogrammehasinfluencedtheexperience of spirituality in the participating Christian communities. After going into somedetailsofthisresearch,theconclusionisdrawnthatthefourapproaches ofinterreligiousdialoguementionedabovecomplementandneedoneanother. Allshouldbeinvolvedinattainingthefinalgoalofinterreligiousdialogue:a morepeacefulandjustworld.

Introduction The dialogue between Buddhists and Christians already has a longhistory.Thefirstcontactsprobablydatebacktothesecond centuryAD.ClementofAlexandria(150215)writesinhisStro mateis about Buddhist monks who follow the precepts of the Buddha,whomthey,accordingtohim,raisedtodivinehonour on account of his extraordinary sanctity. The long history of contact between Buddhists and Christians is excellently de scribed in Michael von Brück and Whalen Lai’s volume Bud dhismus und Christentum: Geschichte, Konfrontation, Dialog (von Brück 2000). Reading this book makes one aware of the many different attitudes Buddhists and Christians have had toward each other throughout the different ages. Some contacts are char

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acterized by enmities, such as the destruction of the relic of Buddha’steethbythePortugueseinSriLankainthesixteenth century and the persecution of Christians in the seventeenth centuryinJapan.Othercontactsillustratefriendlyinterest,such as at the World Parliament of Religions in 1893 in Chicago. Some debates are inspired solely by apologetic preoccupations and are organized with the aim of proving the superiority of one’s ownreligion,otherrepresentativesofBuddhismandChristian ity feel a common challenge in, for example, presenting an al ternativetoamaterialisticworldview(Thelle1987:217). MyowninvolvementinBuddhistChristiandialoguestart edmorethanfifteenyearsago,whenIwaswritingmydisserta tion (Anbeek 1994). In my publications on BuddhistChristian dialogueIdistinguishfourapproachestothisdialoguethatcan bebroadenedtoapplytointerreligiousdialogueingeneral:the theologicalphilosophical, the practicalspiritual, the narrative existentialandtheecosophicalapproaches(Anbeek2003,2005, 2008). In this essay I will introduce these four paths briefly. ThenIwillfocusonthesecondapproachanddescribesomere sultsofresearchthatwasdoneinChristianmonasteriesinthe Netherlands and Belgium that were involved in BuddhistChris tianexchange.IntheconclusionIwillarguethatonepathisnot enoughforBuddhistChristiandialogue.Allfourpathsareneed edtoachievetwoimportantgoalsofinterreligiousdialogue:an authentic understanding of the other as other and making this worldamorepeacefulplace. FourApproachestoBuddhistChristianDialogue PhilosophicalTheological The philosophicaltheological approach to interreligious dia logue is directed toward important insights and dogmas from religioustraditionsandcomparingthemwithoneanother.The questionarisesiftheterm“God”fromtheChristiantraditionis comparable with the term sunyata from the Buddhistic tradi tion.Thelattermeansemptiness and isconsidered thehighest realitybycertainBuddhistgroups.Anotherexampleofsucha question is if the Christian term agape, “love,” is comparable withtheBuddhisttermkaruna,“compassion.”Thisformofin terreligious dialogue is often practised by religious specialists whoarewellversedintheirowntraditionsandthencontinue

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toacquireknowledgeofanotherreligion.Theystudyimportant booksoftheothertraditionandconferwithitsrepresentatives, usually at conferences. A great advantage for those who use thismethodisthathe/sheisforcedtoenterintothetraditionat depth.Animportanttestofthisisthatanyreflectionsmustbe recognizable to members of the other tradition, thus requiring indepthknowledge A disadvantage is the limitation of this intellectual ap proach.Eventhoughonemaybeknowledgeableaboutanother tradition,onemaystillnotknowwhatitmeanstoliveit.Bud dhism,oranyotherreligioustraditionforthatmatter,isnoton lyaboutinsightsbutmoreaboutalifebasedontheseinsights. Therefore,everytraditionhasspiritualexercisesanddirections forlifeitself. PracticalSpiritual Priortotheemergenceofanyofthemodelsthatnowexistfor interreligious dialogue, there were pioneers who went out on theirownandexploredpathswithoutanymodels.HugoEno miyaLasalle(18981990)wassuchapioneerintheareaofprac ticalspiritualBuddhistandChristiandialogue.Heworkedasa missionaryinJapanandparticipatedforthefirsttimeinaBud dhistmeditationweekin1943.Hismotivefordoingsowasto becomeacquaintedwiththerichnessofBuddhism.Hesoonno ticedthatmeditationhadaprofoundinfluenceonhisownspir ituality. Throughout his life he wrote prolifically on Buddhist andChristianspiritualityandsupervisednumerousmeditation courses. InspiredbypioneerslikeLasalleandothers,manypeople werewillingtoexplorethepathofmultispirituality.Oneofthe initiativesinthisareaisMonasticInterreligiousDialogue.This is an exchange programme for Buddhist and Christian monks andnunsthathasexistedsince1979.Participantsstayinthemon asteryoftheothertraditionforanumberofweeksandpartic ipate as much as possible in aspects of that tradition, such as religiousceremonies,dailychoresandprayersandmeditation. AnexchangeprogramwasalsostartedintheUnitedStates of America, offering in particular exchange with monks from Tibet.TheTrappistmonkThomasMerton,alearnedauthorof works on contemplative spirituality, and the Dalai Lama were

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involved in this exchange programme. These exchanges con tinueuptothepresentday. Agreatadvantageofthisapproach,comparedwiththein tellectualformofdialogue,isthatthewholebodyparticipates, leadingtoevengreaterdiscoveries.Manymonksandnunswho participated indicated that Buddhistic meditation led them to discoverhowimportantthebodyandbreathingareforexperi encing spirituality. A dimension opens up t hrough the body that goes beyond thinking and channels one into a deep still ness. In this state of stillness a reality described by the Desert Fathers can be observed. The heart of Buddhist and Christian spiritualityseemstoleadtothesamesource(Anbeek2003). A disadvantage of this path is that it often causes tension within Christian communities. Many Christians are not inter ested because their own tradition offers enough on which to baseandlivetheirlives.Othersconsideritriskytobecometoo intensivelyinvolved.Willoneloseone’sownfaith?Whatelseis needed besides Christ? Dealing with these questions is not al wayseasy.DiscoveringthedeepunitybetweenBuddhistsand Christiansmaythereforehaveaboomerangeffect.Howcanwe thencopewithdifferenceswithinourowncommunities? NarrativeExistential Inadditiontomyacademiccareer,Iworkedfornineyearsasa pastoral caregiver in a psychiatric institution. And although I was not contracted to study interreligious dialogue, my eyes wereopenedheretoaspecialformofdialoguethatcanbeap pliedtointerreligiousdialogue. I had to deal with people there from totally different reli giousbackgroundsandwasalsoconfrontedwithdiverseforms ofillness,educationallevels,socialbackgroundsandfamilyhis tories.Theyallsharedtheexperiencethatlifestagnatesattimes: unexpected problems can arise, which place life in a different perspective. I noticed how important it is for people to be able to talk about their livesnot only about current difficulties but also about their past, their work, their education, about what they consider to be important and valuable, about problems they had encountered and how they resolved them. And we also talked about their futures: what they would like to take up again,newventuresinwhichtheyhopedtoengage,despitethe

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fact that their lives had definitely changed. Group discussions showthatpeopleliketolistentooneanother’sstories.Itisin spiringtodiscoverthateachlifehistoryhashighsandlowsand then to observe how people move on despite difficulties. The sharingofjoyandsorrowcancreatebondsdespitedifferences inpersonalhistories. It struck me that when people are asked about important eventsintheirlivestheyseldomtalkabouttheirreligion.They talkabouttheirchildhood,asickmother,meetingtheidealpart ner even if it failed to work out, about their children, about workthatgavetheirlivesmeaning.Somementionreligiononly when asked about what support they find for in their lives. Whenthishappens,everyoneinthegroupreligiousornot understands what they mean. The reason is that they do not mention dogmas or practices that others might fail to under standbuttalkaboutthewayfaithhasdevelopedintheirlives, about the comfort it has given them, the doubts, the questions and sometimes resignation to the fact that faith and life itself remainincomprehensible. TheseinsightshaveledtoanawarenessthatInowreferto as narrativeexistential interreligious dialogue. Primary ques tionshereare:“Whoareyou?”“Whathaveyoubeenthrough?” “How have you coped with all that has crossed your path?” and finally, “What has been your source of strength?” The di verseanswerstothelastquestioncanbeunderstoodonlyinre lation to the answers to the previous questions. Insight into a person’s religious history and choices can be attained only by understanding his or her life story (Anbeek 2005; Kalsky et al. 2005). The narrativeexistential travel guide has the advantage that the many answers to the question “What has given you support?”isnotaweaknessbutastrength.Ahugediversityof creativityandinspirationofequalvalueisrevealed.Behindre ligious and spiritual differences is the shared adventure of be ing human, in which everyone is confronted sooner or later with joy and sorrow, health and illness, birth and deathto getherwiththechallengeofcopingstrategies(Vroom1989;An beek1994).Adisadvantageofthispathisthatitisaslowroute to knowledge. Many stories are needed to get some under standingofprecioushumanvalues.

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Ecosophical Ecosophystressesthediversityandrichnessofculturesandlife forms. In addition, it encourages people to open their eyes to thefactthatdespitethisdiversityweformoneglobalcommun ity that is extremely vulnerable. Dialogue from an ecosophical perspective seeks unity amidst diversity and finds this in our common responsibility for a viable global society that is based onrespectfornature,universalhumanrights,economicjustice andacultureofpeace. Important principles for building a justified, sustainable andpeacefulglobalsocietyarespecifiedinthedeclarationEarth Charter, in which thousands of organizations worldwide coop erated,togetherrepresentingmillionsofindividuals.Thedocu ment contains fifteen principles and is divided into four chap ters: 1. respect and care for all living forms; 2. ecological in tegrity; 3. social and economic justice; 4. democracy, nonvio lenceandpeace.EarthCharterhas,moreover,developedapro gramme concerning religion and sustainability, and hopes to collect and to strengthen various initiatives and the work of severalinstitutions.Manyindividualsandorganizationsreflect onthebasisofChristian,Buddhist,Confucian,Islamic,Hindu, Jewishorhumanistinspiration,andalsomakeajointpractical contribution to the maintenance of our earth. Their initiatives are collected by the Forum on Religion and Ecology in Harvard. Anadvantageofthisapproachisthatdifferentworldviewsare broughttogetherbyacommonchallengeinwhichweneedone another. ADetailedExampleofPracticalSpiritualDialogue AnexchangeprogrammebetweenJapaneseZenBuddhistmonks andnunsandEuropeanChristianmonksandnunshasexisted for more than twentyfive years already. In 1977 two expert meetingswereorganized,oneintheVSandoneinEurope.The focus of these meetings was what contribution the monastic communitycouldmaketointerreligiousdialogue.TheMonas tic Interreligious Dialogue (MID) committee was established in Europe,andmanyactivitiesandexchangeswereorganizedunder the auspices of this committee. On the initiative of the Dalai LamaandKakichiKadowakiSJin1979,agroupoffortyJapan ese Buddhist monks and nuns visited European monasteries (of

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theBenedictine,CistercianandTrappistorders).In1983seven teen European monks and nuns visited Japan. The third ex change took place in 1987 and the fourth in 1991. These ex changeprogrammesarestillgoingon,althoughthenumberof participantshasbecomesmaller.Thestructureofthemeetings has not changed: after a short introductory programme the visiting monks and nuns participate as fully as possible in the scheduleofthewelcomingcommunity. In2007,theDutchchapteroftheMIDwantedtoevaluate the exchange programme. They were interested in how the Bud dhistChristian contacts had influenced the spirituality of the communities and of the individual members in the commun ities of the Westmalle Verband, a network of the Flemish and DutchBenedictine,CistercianandTrappistorders. Inordertogainmoreinsightintothisquestionthirtyeight questionnairesweresenttothecommunitiesthatbelongtothe WestmalleVerband.Twentyweresentback.Outofthesetwen ty communities, nine were involved in the exchange pro grammes. Only two communities received guests from Japan; theothersalsosentsomeoftheirmemberstoJapan. There is almost no communal experience with Zen medi tationinthesetwentycommunities.Insomecommunitiesthere are only one or two individuals who practise Zen meditation, but in general there is no interest in or knowledge about Zen Buddhism, with the exception of four communities. The Saint Willibrords Abbey (Doetinchem) and Maria Toevlucht Abbey (Zundert) offer an extended Zen programme to guests of the abbey.TheSaintLiobaMonastery(Egmond)andtheOnzeLieve Vrouw van Koningsoord Abbey (BerkelEnschot) practise Zen meditationasacommunity. In the second phase of the research seventeen monks and nunswereinterviewed.EightofthemwerepractisingZenona regularbasis;sixhadpractisedZenforacertainperiodbutdid notcontinuewithitafterwards.Threeofthoseinterviewedhad noexperiencewithZenmeditationatall. Before exploring some of the results of the interviews, I wouldliketomentionalreadyonesignificantconclusionofthis survey:nogeneralconclusioncanbedrawnabouttheinfluence of Zen on the communities of the Westmalle Verband. Some thing like “Zen in the Westmalle communities” does not exist.

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Some of the nuns and monks practise Zen but all for different reasons.OthersdonotpracticeZen.Someareinterestedinthe Buddhist philosophical background, whereas others are not. Everybodywhowasinterviewedhashisorherownreasonsfor letting his or her own Christian spirituality be influenced by ZenBuddhismornot.However,therearesomeremarkablere sultsthatrevealedthemselves.Thesearementionedinthefol lowingandillustratedbysomequotesfromtheinterviews. AMysterywithoutWords SomeoftheintervieweesstressthatZenisaboutamysterythat is not expressible in words but nevertheless touches on the deeperbasisofbeinghuman.Thisconsciousnessofa“levelof spirituality and/or human existence not accessible through words” does increase the awareness of the relativity of the fa miliarreligioustradition,withitssocallednecessaryguidelines and specific pathways. “You have to find and go your own way. If you can develop your prayer in an intimate way, you canopenyourselftothemysteryofbeing.Thisprocessdoesnot havetobehugeorimpressive.Itisaninnerpath,whichisuni versal.” SomeonewhoserootswereintheCatholictradition,more specificallyinthemysticandcontemplativevariantofthattra dition,testifiedthatleavingone’sownhomewasasteptoward newdiscoveries.“Atacertainmomentthemoundofsnowbe gins to move. Then everything comes down, you cannot stop that.Theoriginalstructurerevealsitself,thenakedrock.Reality itself,whichisnotChristian,notBuddhistorwhatsoever.” ZenasaMethodofPersonalPrayer The Christian contemplative tradition as practised in the mon asteriesoftheWestmalleVerbanddoesnotgiveanyextensive indication of how to practise personal prayer. Some monks or nuns take refuge in Zen meditation to deal with this. Zen is seenasawaytowardcontemplativeprayer. WhenIenteredthemonasteryIwasintroducedtothedaily schedule.Aftervigils,betweenfiveandseveno’clockinthe morning,therewasindividualmeditationformorethanan hour. I did not know what to do with this time. In the be ginning I prayed the rosary, but I had the feeling that this wasnottherightthingformetodo.Iwasrestless,fidgeting

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allthetimeonmyseat,andwaslookingfora comfortable positionthatwouldalsobealert.Otherswerealreadyused to sitting on a bench or a cushion, which I followed. I dis covered how you can relax through concentrating on your breath.ThenIreadsomebooksbyThomasMerton,andso itgrew,butinatotallypersonalway.

One person tells how Zen brought the intensity for which he was searching. According to this monk, one cannot leave it to mercy: exercise is needed, and discipline and guidance so that the intended awareness will develop. Sometimes Zen leads to deepspiritualexperiences. Zen gave me the experience that everything is as it should be. I was in total harmony with myself. Zen also freed me from fear, so it gave me quite a lot. Once I had the exper ience that time no longer existed. At the beginning of the meditation the bell rang, and immediately after it rang againtoclosethemeditationsession.Asifnotimehadgone by.

Some mention Zen as a special exercise for individual prayer, but others find other exercises, such as praying the rosary, re citingmantras,paintingicons,contemplatingtheLord’sPrayer andevenlivinginahermitage.Thesemethodscanalsoleadto specialexperiences. In the monastery they never taught me how to pray. You hadtoworkthatoutbyyourself.Itsoundsstrange,butitis alsoagoodthing.Istartedprayingwiththebreviary,psalms, etc.Atacertainmomentitdidnotworkanymore,Iexper ienced a lot of resistance in myself. I could not pray any more.Thisinabilitytopraycausedadeeplongingforpray er,andthisisexactlywhatprayeris.Prayeriswhereyour heartleadsyou.Ifyouknowthis,youdonothavetoworry. You can become quiet and know that it all happens in si lence.Insilenceyoucanopenyourself.Insilenceallpossi bilitiesunitethemselvesandaredirectedtoGod.

One of the interviewees told how sitting in the choir and prayingtherosaryworkslikeabalmforthesoul.Sittinginsi lencebringsmanyfeelingsandthoughtstothesurfaceofone’s consciousness.“ThenIhaveaverypersonalmantra,whichre

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sonateswitheverybreath.Itis:SourceofLife,sourceoflove,be here,be.” NoteveryonewhostartsZenmeditationcontinueswithit. Sometimes it gives direction for a couple of years, after which theyreturntoChristianexercises.“InrecentyearsIhaveaban donedZen.IpraytheLordsPrayer,andthat’sit.Everymorn ing and every evening I contemplate the Lord’s Prayer. This prayer expresses a personal relationship with God, which is veryimportantforme.” Othersmentionpaintingiconsasawaytoexperiencefaith. Oneofthenunstellshowthisactivityhelpshertostayinrela tionshipwithChrist.Paintingisalsoawaytobecomequietand find concentration. ”If I am painting the face of Christ, some timesitfeelslikesomethingofHimbecomespresentinme.” Evenwithoutspecialmethodsspiritualexperiencesoccur. Theabbeywasclosetotheocean.Ihadneverlearnedhow to swim, although I was raised near the sea. I was always fearful of water, afraid of surrendering myself. One day I decidedtotrytoswim,andtomyownsurpriseIwasfloat ing.ThereIwas,inthewater,inthewarmthofthesun,un deracobaltbluesky.Godisgood,Ifelt.Myprayerbegan tostreamforth,andneverstoppedagainsince.Prayerisno thingelsethanthisopencontact.

TheBodyLinesofZen SomeoftheintervieweesstatethatZenopenedtheireyestothe importanceofthebodywhenitcomestothepracticeofspiritu ality.Onedoesnothaveabody,butoneisone’sbody.Thesi lent, upright meditation posture unlocks this healing aware ness.Also,theconcentrationonbreathinghelpsonearriveata newrelationtothebody.Thisview,i.e.thatmindandbodyare joined, is more Eastern than Western. Through the exchange programme, some of the Christian participants became aware ofthisdifferentapproach. The best thing I learned is the meditation posture. I was educatedasateacherinphysicaleducation,andyetInever feltthisbefore.Youaresittingstableandrelaxed.Thisposi tiongivesrest.ThethreedayretreatIexperienced,withsit ting in this position for more than eight hours a day, even

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strengthenedthisquietness.Itwasoneofmystrongestspir itualexperiences.

TheBuddhistPhilosophicalBackground SomeofthoseinvolvedinZenpracticearealsointerestedinthe philosophical and religious background of Zen. Some of them writeaboutZenBuddhism,whichattractsotherstoZen. IreadthebooksbyDumoulinSJ,aBuddhologist.Themore youread,themoreyouunderstand.IwrotereportsofZen meetings and also translated books and talks about Zen. Then people came to our abbey and asked to see the sister who wrote about Zen; they wanted to become acquainted withZenthemselves.Lassallegavemepermissiontoteach, butIfeltthatmorewasneeded.IwouldliketopresentZen asanacceptedmethodformeditationinourcommunity.So I asked our abbess permission to teach Zen in our abbey. WerefurnishedtheatticandaZenprogrammewasstarted. Only one sister of our community joined the meetings, all theotherswereguests.

Someone else tells how the study of Eastern texts helped to broadenhisunderstandingofhisowntradition. IwasreadinganarticleaboutTaoismandMeisterEckhart. ItwasaboutwuweiandGelassenheit,andIsawthesimilarity betweenthesetwoconcepts.Thisarticlealsomotivatedme tostartmeditation.Gelassenheitforexample,doesnotmean “doingnothing”but“lettingyourinnerselfgo.”Itisaway to relax in all kind of situations that cause stress (these situations also occur in a monastery, there can be the pressure of work, or a conflict with another person). Gelassenheithelpstocalmyourself,torenounce,toletgo.Or in religious terms: Gelassenheit creates openness to God. Meditationhelpsyoutoseehowyouremotionshinderyour relationtoGod.Thenyoucantrytogiveupthisblockade.

Others do not study Buddhist philosophy or doctrines inten tionally. They see Zen purely as a method to calm down and become silent. It does not even have to be called Zen, it is a technique that stands outside of a religious tradition. Eastern rituals,likebowingandsingingsutras,areseenassuperfluous fringes. “For me only the essence is important, just the sitting,

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without reference to Buddhism, but out of the experience of a Westerntradition,”oneoftheintervieweessaid. IthinkyoucandetatchZenfromtheBuddhistbackground. In this way you get something like a European Zen. It is a vaguething,butthatisnotaproblem.Themethodforbe ing silent comes from Hinduism. In the original Buddhism alltheologicalquestionswereputaside,sowhyshouldwe bother with it? The most important thing is to rediscover the God experience. I don’t like the expression “to practise Zen.”IamrealizingmoreandmorethatIdon’tlikethisla bel.Meditationisaregularpartofourdailyschedule:half an hour after compline. Everyone seeks her own place in the church, some close to the altar, others in a dark niche. Andaftervesperswealsomeditate,twentyminutes.Thisis howitalwayshasbeeninourtradition.

NoMutualInterestinZen Despitethefactthattheexchangeprogrammeshavebeengoing onformorethantwentyfiveyears,interestinZenisnotcom mon in the communities. At first there was even resistance in some communities. “We were brought up with the idea that other religions were from the devil. I myself was also suspi cious,Iwasafraidthatourowntraditionwoulddisappearinto thebackground,andthatasortofvagueChristianitywouldre main.” Interest in Zen in the long term is limited as well. One personreportedthattheinfluenceonthecommunitywasvery minorandthatthemeditationsessionswerevisitedmainlyby guests from outside the community. “Some familiarity with Zenhasgrownbecauseithasasmallplaceinourdailysched ule.” ZenasaPathtotheChristianFaith OneoftheintervieweesexperiencedZenasastepinhispathto themonasticlife. After this crisis I started praying and was reading books aboutmeditation;theTaoTeChingisstilloneofmyfavour ites.IalsoreadaboutCh’anandZenandstartedpractising Zen meditation. The Eastern wisdom brought me back to myownfaith.Icrossedovertomyowntraditionbutwith outleavingEasternwisdom.

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OthersalsoaffirmthatZencanbeofhelpinfindingthewayto Christian spirituality. Many people who are estranged from theirownfaithordonotbelieveatallhappentobeinspiredby Zenmeditation,comeintouchwithadeeperinspirationorre turntotheiroriginalsource.“Afewofourbrothersfoundtheir waytoourcommunitythroughZen.Thatisanimportantrea sontocontinueofferingourZenprogrammetoguests.” TensionandConflict:Individual ForsomethepracticeofZencausesstress.Whatshouldbegiv enpriority?Mostoftheinterviewees’emphasizekeepingChris tianspiritualityintheforeground. It is important to me to experience my spirituality within Christianboundaries.Iwanttoliveasawholepersonand alsotoparticipateinourcommunityasawholeperson.My interest in the Buddhist tradition does not take away my commitment to the Christian monastic tradition. In conse quence,IcannotspendallmytimereadingBuddhisttexts, becausethentherewouldbenotimeleftforreadingChris tiantexts.Ifeelmyselfobligedtomysisterstostayincon tactwiththeChristiantexts.HowelsecouldIcommunicate with them, who do not know anything about Buddhist texts?

A few feel called to teach Zen, but not outside the monastery. Teaching Zen is seen as one of the duties that is done for the community.Obediencetotheabbotorabbessisfirst.Therela tionshipwiththeZenteacherisoflessimportance.“Asamonk Igavemyselftothecommunity.Thefirstplaceisalreadytaken. Itisachallengetohavethetwogotogetherinharmony.Ihope it’spossible.”AlthoughtherewastensionbetweenZenandthe monastic call, at the same time Zen cannot be seen apart from the latter. “If I would leave the community, I would also give up teaching Zen, because without the community the heart of myZenpracticeismissing.” Others express the tension between the Buddhist and Christian world in a different way. For one person it is not so much the choice between Buddha and Christ as that between themonasticpracticeandZenmeditation.Hischoiceisclear.

426 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE I do not have a relationship with Buddha, I do have one withChrist.Prayingformemeansbeingrelated.IfImedi tate, Christ is there, as “inbeing.” Zen opened this up for me.TheChristianexperienceisveryintense,butInolonger feel the need for a certain Christian monastic practice. The questionifyoucanbringZentomonasticlifeissomething likethequestionifyoucanbringhighschooltouniversity.

TensionandConflict:IntheCommunities Zen causes tension not only for individuals but also for the communities. Many times the problems are seen as minor and neutralized. “Some sisters did not like it, sitting with crossed legs.Lateronwehadthosebenches.”Anattitudeoftoleranceis presented. In this community some people see pros and others cons. Thatisnotaproblem;wearenotobligedtohavethesame opinion. Nevertheless, questions were raised as a result of the offering of an intensive Zen programme to guests and theconsequencesthishadforourcommunity.

Although worries are masked and minimized by jokes like “if youdothesitting,wedoallthework,”arathersharpcriticism is growing, which was expressed by some of the interviewees. In some communities many guests are welcomed who come mainly for Zen meditation. As long as there is a balance be tweentheZenperiodsandtheattendanceoftheseguestsinthe churchthereisnoproblem.Itmakesadifferenceifguestscome solely for meditation and never come to church. One of the monks stated with irritation in his voice, “At such moments I think:Wearenotasupplycompany.” ThereissuspicionofsomeofthosewhoareteachingZen. ThisdistrusthasgrownsinceanumberofpioneersinZen,who are Zen teachers now, left their communities. This distorted situationisverypainful,forbothsides. IfIamhereinthecommunity,Ilivelikeahermit.Idonot go to the prayers in the church; only on special days like Easter or Christmas. But I do go to the refectory. I travel a lot to teach Zen in different places. I like that, but at the sametimeitispainful.Ilovemylifeofprayerandmycom munity.Thisdoubleloyaltyistearingmetopieces.

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Thetensionandconflictswereexpressedwithgreathesitation. Thecommunitiesexplicitlydonotwanttopresenttheirinternal pressure to the outside world. Of course, this does not take awaythedifficultieswithwhichsomecommunitiesaredealing. Conclusions The most remarkable conclusion that can be drawn from this survey has already been mentioned. Seventeen interviews about the influence of the BuddhistChristian exchange pro gramme on the spirituality of the participating Christian com munities yield seventeen different observations on what is go ingon.Thiscanbeinterpretedasasignoftolerancewithinthe communities. Everybody is allowed to have his or her own opinion and is free to make some individual choices when it comestothepracticeofspirituality. Anotherimpressivefactthatwasnotedbytheinterviewers wasthewillingnessoftheintervieweestotalkabouttheirown spirituality. The interviews were semistructured indepth en quiries, in which the interviewees were asked about their courseoflifeanddevelopmentofspirituality.Alltheinterview eesshowedawillingnesstotalkaboutthemselvesanddidnot hesitatetoexpressintimatedetails,likespecialexperiences,but alsodoubts,difficultiesandquestionsthatbroughttheirchoice forthecontemplativelifeinacommunityforthem. However,duringtheinterviewsIreceivedthe overallim pression that this open sharing was not common practice a mongthemembersofthedifferentcommunities.Theexchange of what is at the heart of the contemplative life, and dialogue aboutdifferencesinexperiencesandattitudes,didnotseemto happen often among the brothers and sisters of the commun itiesonthecontrary. When this intuition was expressed at a meeting of the board of the Dutchspeaking branch of the MID, it was af firmed. Monks and nuns live closely together without serious dialogueabouttheirindividualspiritualpaths.Ingeneral,they donotsharetheirexperiences,theirhopes,longingsandfears. Also, their mutual tension is not a subject of open discussion. Thissharingisnotstimulatedeither.Duringthemeetingofthe board, the present contemplatives expressed fear of sharing in this way. It seems frightening to open up one’s inner self to

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brothersorsisterswithwhomoneislivingbecauseonemakes oneselfvulnerable. Nonetheless, from the perspective of interreligious dia logue this step cannot be left out. One needs to be in contact withtheothertoseethebeautyoftheother.Differencesinspir itual values can open one’s eyes to treasures one would have seenononesown. The four approaches of interreligious dialogue need one an other.AsfarasIamconcerned,interreligiousdialogueisnotan endinitselfbutservesalargerpurpose.Thecoreandconcern of interreligious dialogue is to bring the different inspirations together and create, each on the basis of the encouragement found in one’s own tradition, a more peaceful and just world, not only for human beings but for all living creatures. To be abletoworkonthisweneedallfourapproaches. The elaborated example of practicalspiritual dialogue makesclearthatoneapproachtointerreligiousdialogueshould becomplementedbytheothers.InthiscasetheBuddhistChris tian exchange programme, which is an example of practical spiritual dialogue, could be broadened by narrativeexistential dialogue. This method of dialogue is not only relevant to peo plefromdifferentreligioustraditionsbutcanalsobeappliedto communicationamongoneanotherasbrothersandsistersfrom thesametradition.Itproceedswiththehelpofquestionssuch as:Whoareyou?Whatdidyougothroughinyourlife?What were the high points and low points? Where do you find sup port?Whatdoesyourfaithmeaninallthis? Notallthepathshavetobewalkedbyeverybody,butthe approaches need one another. We need to communicate about ourlives,aboutoursufferingandhope,andtotelloneanother whatfaithcontributestoourlives.Ifweunderstandsomething ofthesourceofpoweroftheother,weareprobablywillingto experience something of this richness, at least some of us will be. Undergoing the practice of the other will probably waken, at least in some of us, the intellectual curiosity in the philo sophical and/or theological backgrounds of the other. This in quiry will help us to understand the path of the other even more, although it may be different from our own. Differences can be seen as richness if we know how to transcend them by combiningforcestorealizeaunitedvisionofhope.

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Bibliography Anbeek,C.(2008).“BoeddhismeenChristendom:confrontatieendia loog.”In:J.FrishmanandS.Hellemans(eds).Hetchristendomen de wereldreligies: Dialoog en confrontaties. Utrechtse Studies 12. Utrecht:VanGruting.Pp.14665. (2005).“BuddhismandChristianity:CanWeLearnfromtheOth er?” Bijdragen: International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 66: 319. (1994). Denken over de dood: De boeddhist Nishitani en de christen Pannenbergvergeleken.Kampen:Kok. Earth Charter. www.earthcharter.org and www.earthcharterinaction.org/ religion. ForumonReligionandEcology.http://environment.harvard.edu/reli gion/main.html Kalsky, M. et al. (eds). (2005). Moderne devoties: Vrouwen over geloven. Amsterdam/Antwerpen:deProm. Mitchel, D.W., and J. Wiseman (eds). (2003). Transforming Suffering: ReflectionsonFindingPeaceinTroubledTimes.NewYork:Random House. (eds).(1997).TheGethsemaneEncounter:ADialogueontheSpiritual LifebyBuddhistandChristianMonastics.NewYork:Continuum. Thelle,N.R.(1997).BuddhismandChristianityinJapan:FromConflictto Dialogue.Honolulu:UniversityofHawaiiPress. Von Brück, M., and W. Lai. (1997). Buddhismus und Christentum: Ge schichte,Konfrontation,Dialog.Munich:C.H.BeckVerlag. Vroom,H.M.(1989).ReligionsandtheTruth:PhilosophicalReflectionsand Perspectives.Transl.J.W.Rebel.Amsterdam/GrandRapids:Rodo pi/Eerdmans.

PresentDayEuropeandIslam inEncounter EmergingEuropeanIslamanditsDialoguePartners GéSpeelman

Abstract AsnewgenerationsofEuropeanbornMuslimsaregrowingup,theMuslim communityischanging.Thewayreligionwasexperiencedbytheirparents, anIslamconnectedtovillagecommunities,isbeingreplacedbyamorepri vateIslaminthenextgeneration.InthisessayIwanttosketchthesechanges andlookattheirimplicationsforinterreligiousdialogue.Inparticular,Iwant to identify which Muslim groups are interested in interreligious dialogue, and why. I will highlight three trends in presentday European Islam: the salafi movement, which wants to go back to the sources, bypassing tradi tionalreligiousauthorities,theneoSufimovement,andthesearchforanIs lam compatible with European citizenship. After that, I will briefly explore differentdialogueinitiativesandthedifferentactorsengagedinthem.Iwill end with an evaluation of these initiatives. What are the possible directions dialoguecouldtake?

EuropeanditsIslam ThegreatinfluxofMuslimsintoEuropestartedadecadeafter the Second World War, when the growing industries of West ern Europe needed labourers. The young men from Pakistan, TurkeyorAlgeriawereperceivedprimarilyasmigrantsatthat time, strangers needing support and hospitality. When the gatesoflegallabourimmigrationgraduallybegantocloseafter theoilcrisis(1973),manymigrantsdecidedtohavetheirfami liescomeovertojointhem.Anewphasestarted,inwhichcul turalandreligiousidentitybecameimportant.Muslimmenfelt the need to open prayer areas where they could meet and whereaqualifiedimamwouldbeabletopassontheirreligious heritagetothenextgeneration.

431

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Duringthe1980s,asthesechildrengrewup,religiouspri orities found their way into the public sphere (Nielsen 2003: 355).ItbecameclearthattheywereinEuropetostayandthat theyhadaculturalandreligiousorientationthatwasinmany waysdifferentfromthatofthesocietiesinwhichtheylived. This was expressed in the different “affairs” seen across Europe,startingwiththeRushdieaffairinGreatBritain(1989) and the Foulard Affair in France (1989). These affairs, and the subsequentdebatesinthemediaamongintellectualsandpoliti cians,changedtheperceptionsthemajorityhadofthenewmi norities living in their midst. They were no longer primarily “Turkishguestworkers”or“Asianmigrants”;instead,theybe came”Muslims.”Thisdevelopmentcoincidedwithchangesin theselfperceptionsofpeopleswhohadbeenestablishedinEu ropeforalongerperiodoftime. AfterthecollapseoftheSovietsystem,inmanyEuropean countries the question of national identity, so central and cru cial,duringthenineteenthcenturyonceagainbecameanissue. Communal religious adherence became strong in Eastern Eu ropeagain,asintheCatholicCroatian,OrthodoxSerborMus limAlbaniancommunities. In1993,SamuelHuntingtonwroteaseminalarticle,stres singtheprimacyofculturalrootsintheclashofcivilisations.A newagendaaroseafterthefalloftheBerlinWall,andreligion becameafocusagainforEuropeanpolicymakers.Thepresence ofMuslimswasnolongerconnectedonlywithsocialandeco nomicquestions;itbecameapoliticalissue(Nielsen2003:357). TowardsaPrivateIslam Today,somestatesinWesternEuropehaveagrowingnumber of Muslim inhabitants. The estimated numbers are: for Ger many 4.4 million (4.9%), for Great Britain 1.62 million (2.7%), forFrance4.46.4million(710%),fortheNetherlands900,0001 million (5.56%).1 How does “Islam” look to them? How has

1

 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_by_country.Francedoesnot includeethnicorreligiousstatisticsinitscensusdata;forFrance,there fore,numbersarealwaysanestimate.

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their perception, their experience, the way they live changed theirreligion? Religion “back home” was both territorialised and com munal.Thevillagecommunitysharedsacredtimesoffestivals andsacredspaceslikethegravesofsaintsthatcouldbevisited. Womendidnotusuallyvisitthemosque,buttheywereactively involved in the cults of the saints. Through their migration Is lambecamedetachedfromboththecommunityandthesacred places.Thenewcommunitymigrantsaretryingtoestablishin theEuropeanspherehasonlyonefocus,themosque,towhich people from different villages come. They share the core of Is lamic practices, praying together and wishing one another a blessed Ramadan. But they do not share their daily lives with oneanother.Thenuclearfamilyhasbecomethemain“celebrat ingcommunity.” Another change has been the growing awareness among Muslims of the diversity and variety of Islam. There were dif ferencesamongthebelieversinPakistanorTurkey,butnotdif ferencesofsuchabewilderingvarietyastheymeetintheimmi grant situation. Obviously, “Islam” means something totally dif ferent to their Muslim neighbours, apart from the core rituals andconvictions. Sothereisaprocessofpluralisation,ofdeterritorialisation andofdeinstitutionalisationamongMuslims.OlivierRoy bringsthesetrendstogetherinhisanalysisoftheprocessofthe individualisation of Islam (Roy 2003: 7594). To both outsiders and European Muslims themselves, “Islam” becomes the core of a neoethnic identity. “The Muslim community” is sometimes used in the way the Ottoman millet functioned: as a minority definedbyitsreligion.InthedebatesaboutthefutureofIslam, wenolongerhearaboutPunjabiorKurdishvillagersbutabout “Muslims.“ Butwhatis“Islam”ifitisnotrootedintheculturalprac ticesofaparticulargroup?Aratherabstractcoreremains,part ly structured around the mosque and the shared core rituals, partlyaroundcertainethicalvalues,liketheimportanceofvir ginityofgirlsbeforemarriage,acertainstressonfamilyvalues, andcriticismsof“themoraldepravity”ofthecountryofsettle ment.“TheMuslimcommunity”becomesaratherabstractgroup ofpeoplesharinganucleusofbeliefsandpractices,notanex

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isting community of people related to one another (Roy 2003: 66). Islamisnolongersomethingobvious;ithasbecomeasub ject of reflection for its adherents. They have to find reasons why they pray, fast, or dress in a certain fashion because they have to explain these practices to outsiders, to their children andtothemselves.Theyarenolongerpartofawayoflife;they are options to choose from among many other options. This processofreflectionleadstoan“objectification”ofIslam.2 And so a new discourse about Islam comes into being a mongEuropeanMuslims.Theylearntodefendtheirfaithand to express it in simple, understandable terms. What “Islam” meanscanbesummarisedinafewsimplerulesandpractices. Whetheronewantstofollowtheserulesandpracticesbecomes increasingly a matter of a reasoned personal choice as well. WhatIslammeanstoanyMuslimlivinginEuropebecomeshis or her own affair, since there is less and less of a community controllingthebehaviourofitsmembers.Attemptsatsuchcon trolsdooccurofcourse.Muslimwomenandgirlscanbeunder very severe pressure to follow certain patterns of behaviour. Butthereareescaperoutes,waysofgivingshapetoone’sown life. And yet Dasetto warns us that individualised Islam does notmeaninstabilityorfragmentationregardingtheidentityof Muslims. The need for a shared discourse acceptable to Mus limsfrommanydifferentbackgroundsleadstoareformulation of the faith that reorganises them around a shared common coreandfindsnewcommittedcommunities(Dasetto2000:23). Also,individualisationdoesnotmeanthatIslamisnecessarily liberalised; many Muslims opt for an interpretation that gives themcontrolovertheirlives,andthatmaybeaverystringent, severe,“Calvinistic”interpretation. TheYoungerGeneration:“Puritans,”Mystics,Citizens ManyMuslimsoftheoldergenerationtrytorestoresomething of the “homeland atmosphere” in the mosques they have founded in the inner cities and suburbs of their new country.

2

ThetermwascoinedbyEickelmanandPiscatori1996:38.

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This type of nostalgic mosque, however, no longer appeals to their children. The involvement of Muslims in prayers at the mosquereflectsadownwardtrendifwecomparefirstandsec ond generation migrants. And yet younger Muslims indicate time and again that Islam is very important for their identity. Theygoonsubscribingto“Islamic”normsandvalues,eventhe approximately63%ofyoungMuslimswhoneverseeamosque from the inside, who can be said to be “believing without be longing”(cf.PhaletandterWal2006:29). Some younger people do feel, however, that they need to beapartoforganisedIslam.TheytrytoreformIslambytaking overthemosqueorganisationsfromtheirelders(Nielsen2001: 38),whichmayresultinastruggleforpowerinthemosqueor ganisations,bothbetweenoldandyoungandbetweenthoseof different ideological orientations (Jenkins 2007: 135). In this struggle younger visitors complain about the traditional, local forms of Islam the imam from their parent’s home villages preaches.TheylongfornewwaysofcreatingIslamicidentity. Salafis In the search for new orientations, the young choose different directions. One of these is an involvement in the debate about rules of behaviour. These rules used to be decided by muftis, Muslim scholars who could guide individual believers con fronted with new circumstances on how to regulate their be haviour in accordance with the Shari’ah. Can a member of the national football team refrain from fasting during Ramadan whenhehastoplayanimportantmatch?Canagirlwearnail polishduringRamadan?IsorgandonationpossibleforaMus lim?Howmuchalimonyshouldamanpayhisdivorcedwife? A Shari’ah council has been set up in the United Kingdom to issuefatwas3inresponsetoquestionsbythebelieversaboutev erydaylife.ThedifferencewithIslambackhomeisthatbeliev ers in Europe are free to do whatever they like with the an swers.Thefatwacannotbeenforced.Thatmeansagainthatthe natureofthefatwaischangingradically:itisbecomingpersonal advicetoanindividualbeliever(Roy2003:79).

3

AfatwaisareligiousopinionconcerningIslamiclawissuedbyan Islamicscholar,amufti.Fatwasusedtobelegallybinding.

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Such traditional authorities are losing control in another way as well. Not only in Europe, although there more than in Muslim countries, the localised, embedded normative Islam is making room for a media or sound bite Islam. Islamic norms andvaluescanbeconstructedandpassedonbylaypeoplewho consulttheQur’an,thehadithandUsulalFiqh(sourcesofIslam ic jurisprudence) themselves. All these resources are neatly placed on CDroms, all hyperlinked and crossreferenced. The computer expert Sa’d alFaqih says: “I am not an ‘alim … but with these tools, I can put together something very close to whattheywouldproducewhenaskedforafatwa”(Mandaville 2000:285). Thusthetraditionalmufti,whoneededalongandspecial isedtraining,isgraduallylosinghisauthority.Hisadvicehasto competewiththoseofselfappointed“experts”ontheinternet, wherebelievershotlypursueanddebateproperIslamicnorms. Moreover, many younger Muslims feel less attached to tradi tionalShari’ahlaw.Rather,theywanttogobacktothesources, theQur’anandtheSunna,withouthavingrecoursetotheinter veningcenturiesofIslamictradition(Waardenburg2000:59). It is in this “internet Islam” that we can locate the strong salafi (forebear) trends within European Islam. Salafis are Mus limswhorejectmostofthetraditionalbodyoffiqh(Islamicjur isprudence)whenitcomestorulesofbehaviour.Instead,they gobacktothepristineIslamoftheirforebears,thecommunity around Muhammed in Medina. They read the Qur’an and the Sunna for themselves and derive their own rules of behaviour directlyfromthosesources. ContrarytoolderformsofIslamism,liketheMuslimBro thers,4 most salafis have no clear political agenda. Rather, they seektoreformthepersonallivesofMuslimsthroughstrictad herence to a set of prescriptions. In no way can a believer swerve from the example of the Prophet and his Companions. They reject the division of the Muslim communities into dif

4

TheSocietyoftheMuslimBrotherswasfoundedbyHassanal BannainEgyptin1928.TheywantedtochangeEgyptintoatrulyIslamic society, originally especially through education. In the 1960s several branchesturnedviolent.Nowadays,thesocietyisactiveinmanyMuslim countries.

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ferent law schools. We should bear in mind that every law schoolisassociatedwithaparticularethniccommunity.Salafis are seeking a global Islam, in which cultural differences have been overcome (Roy 2003: 128). They prefer a more radical, clearcut,purified,rigorousIslam(DeKoning2007). Somebranchesofthesalafimovementhaveextendedtheir rejection of the values of modern secular society into activism, evenradicalism;theyareoftencalledjihadisalafis.Themajority, however,preferlifewithinasmallsectariancommunityoflike minded believers to involvement in society. Adherence to this typeof“bornagain”salafimovementoftengoeshandinhand withabreakwithone’sparentsandfamily.Forsuchbelievers, Islamisnolongerconnectedtoterritorialandgenerationalties; it has been delocalized. Their community may be an internet group or a small group meeting in a house. That makes them part of the privatised versions of Islam that abound in Europe today(Roy2003:144).Traditionalreligiousleaderseverywhere are having great problems confronting such young radicals (Lewis2009:279). NeoSufism But a “Puritan” Islam is not the only option. We can see the emergence of new forms of the traditional mystical Sufi bro therhoods hand in hand with this development. In many Is lamic cultures of the past and the present, these brotherhoods were rooted in local communities. One became a member, not asaresultofanindividualchoicebutratherasafamilytradi tion.Thismannerofbeingamystichasgivenwaytoanew,in dividualisticformofSufism. OneofthemostprominentbranchesofthisnewSufismin Europe is the Gülen movement. Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish scholarwhowaspartlyinspiredbytheteachingsofSaidNursi, aTurkishreformerofthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury,al thoughherejectedNursi’ssocialconservatismandnarrowna tionalism.BothNursiandGülenarerootedintheNaqshbandi Sufi brotherhood. Many European cities have groups of Gülen followerswhoareactiveineducationandininterreligiousdia logue. The form of Islam Gülen preaches, with a positive atti tudetowardsreligiouspluralismbutneverthelessastrongreli gious and moral identity, appeals especially to young Turkish professionals.InTurkey,thenewmiddleclassofbusinessmen

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from the provinces supports the movement. In Germany and theNetherlandsGülengroupsareveryactiveinsettingupde batinggroupsandorganisinginterreligiousdialogue.5Another field in which they operate is education. Many (interreligious) secondaryschoolshavebeensetupbytheGülenmovement.6 Not every Muslim actually joins a neoSufi group. Neo Sufismcouldbequalifiedaspartofalargertrendwherepeople from the new generation are being inspired by forms of Islam thatgiveclearcutrulesforbehaviourontheonehandbutpay close attention on the other to the personal motivations and emotions of the individual believer. Another indicator for this overallprocessisthepopularityofpreacherslikeAmrKhaled, whoissometimescalled“Islam’sBillyGraham.”7Hissermons, delivered in an emotional style, stress values that have to do withtheinnerlifeofthebeliever,suchasloveforhumankind, patience,endurance,resistingevilinone’spersonallife,spirit ual development. Amr Khaled is very popular among young women in Moroccan mosques in the Netherlands (De Koning 2007:25357).8 MuslimsasCitizens SomeMuslimintellectualsseeachallengeintheprivatisationof religiontodaytodevelopamoreliberalIslam,opentorational enquiry. In some of the emerging student societies (others are verymuchinfluencedbythesalafitrend),youngpeoplearetry ing to develop an Islamic identity that does justice to the fact thattheyarecitizensofthecountryinwhichtheygrewupand are totally committed to its democratic institutions and ideals. TheyoftenoptforareinterpretationofIslamicsourcesandhis tory that puts the potential for debate and renewal of Islam at thecentre(Speelman2008:196). PeoplelikeMohammedArkouninFrance,NasrAbuZayd intheNetherlands,orBassamTibiinGermany,whohavebeen activeininterreligiousdialogueformanyyears,pointtothepo

5

Seehttp://www.islamendialoog.nl.

6

Seehttp://www.cosmicus.nl.

7

Cf.DavidHardacker,TheIndependent(4January2006).

8

Seealsowww.amrkhaled.net.

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tentialforcriticalandliberalattitudeswithintheIslamictradi tion.In1992TibioutlinedhisideaofaEuroIslam. The concept of EuroIslam is intended to provide a liberal varietyofIslamacceptablebothtoMuslimmigrantsandto Europeansocieties,onethatmightaccommodateEuropean ideasofsecularityandindividualcitizenshipalongthelines ofmodernseculardemocracy.(Tibi2002:37)

Tibi recommends a moderate degree of what Ibn Khaldun calledasabiyya(awarenessofone’sroots)(Tibi2002:42). NasrAbuZaydismoreactiveinthefieldofQur’anicher meneutics.Heaimsataformofhermeneuticsthatmediatesbe tween the classical Islamic tradition and the modern world of freedom,equality,humanrights,democracyandglobalisation. Arkoun engages in a critical and rational analysis of Qur’anic texts. Another branch of the liberal reformist tree is the debate among young European Muslim women on gender issues. From2427October2008,thethirdcongressinBarcelonaonIs lamic feminism brought many European Muslim women to gether.9 Speakers like Asma Barlas, Amina Wadud, and Sitti MujdaMuliarepresenteddifferentcurrentswithinIslam.Nev ertheless, all stressed the need for a feminist reading of the Qur’an especially. Many feminists turn to the Qur’an itself as their primary source of religious knowledge and inspiration. They claim the right to read and interpret their Holy Book, sometimes bypassing centuries of traditional scholarship. In thistheyresemblethesalafis(Barlas2002). MuslimResponsestoIslaminEurope HowdoMuslimsrespondtothesetrends?Inthefirstplace,we can look at the leaders of existing mosque communities. Their strategy is to try to get control of their constituencies without losingtouchwithlargersociety.Oneofthewaysinwhichthey adapted to the growing awareness that they had to get a foot hold in Europe is the attempt to create interlocutors of the na tionalstateonbehalfofallMuslimsbyattemptingtouniteun

9

Seehttp://www.feminismeislamic.org.

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der one umbrella organisation representing the Muslim com munity. These attempts show the diversity in orientation a mong the Muslim citizens. In Germany, for instance, there are three large national bodies, basically with a Sunni orientation: the Zentralrat der Muslime (representing 20 smaller organisa tions), the DITIB (representing the largest Turkish mosque or ganisation, with ties to the Turkish Department for Religious Affairs),andtheIslamrat(basicallyrepresentingtheMilliGör üs,anIslamistTurkishorganisation,andsome25otherorganis ations).10YetthereisasizeableminorityofShi’iteAlewiteswho are usually not represented in these bodies (Pratt and Göbb 2007: 47).11 Also, different Nurculukrelated organisations are active,aswellastheorganisationoftheGülenmovementmen tionedabove. TheseleadersneedtocreatespaceforIslamwithintheEu ropeancontextandtorelatetorivalorganisations.Theyhaveto dealwithconstituenciesthataregrowingmoreandmoreplur alistic,whichisaskingagreatdealoftheimamsinlocalmosques. At the same time, the debate about the future of Islam is not passingunnoticedinthemosqueorganisations. OneofthefieldsofintraIslamicdebateisthefutureroleof Islamiclawandjurisprudence.Fromthepointofviewoforgan isedIslam,thisisavitaltopic,sinceIslamhasalwaysbeenor ganisedaroundliturgicalandethicalrulesofbehaviour.Which rulesaretoprevail,nowthattheageoldcustomsofthevillage areindecline?Whatmoralrulesaretobetaughttochildrenin Qur’anclasses? AscholarwhohasgreatinfluenceontheintraIslamicde bate is Yusuf alQaradawi (de Koning 2008: 253). He is clearly conservative in his adaptations of Islamic law to modern life and very popular among European Muslims. This popularity may be ascribed partly to his frequent appearances on tele vision,wherehegiveslegalrulingsoneverydayquestions.Al 10

 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamische_Organisationen_in_Deutsch

land. 11

Alawitesconstituteabout20to25%ofthepopulationofTurkey, including Kurdish groups. In Germany, however, this percentage is higherthanintheircountryoforigin;estimatesrangebetween400,000 and600,000(thelatterisbasedontheirownassessment).

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Qaradawi is controversial because of his Muslim Brotherhood backgroundandhispoliticalstandpoints. Some other European Muslim thinkers find more exciting andradicalwaystolinkthelegaltraditionsinIslamtoformsof Europeancitizenship.Theydonotwanttogiveupfiqh(Islamic jurisprudence)butdoseetheneedforathoroughrevision.This revisionispossiblebytheapplicationoftheageoldprincipleof maslaha(publicinterest).Aprominentrepresentativeofthisatti tude is Tarik Ramadan. He criticizes the attitudes of scholars like alQaradawi who do not seem to understand that one can no longer speak about Europe as an alien territory. Rather, in Ramadan’sconception,thesituationofMuslimsinEuropeisa modelforMuslimselsewhere.Islamisnowpartofaglobalcul tureandMuslimsareworldcitizens.Inlightofthisnewposi tion, they have to rethink the old ways of dealing with non Muslims.Beingequalcitizensinaglobalsystemasksforaposi tiveevaluationofreligiouspluralism(Ramadan2004:53). Churches,GovernmentsandMuslims:PresentDialogues What are the current subjects of dialogue in the European context?Idistinguishthreefieldsofdialogue.Thefirstistheso ciopoliticalfieldofdebate;questionsaboutthecompatibilityof religion with liberal or democratic values (human rights, non violence, gender equality, secularity, etc.), are emerging as the hottesttopicshere.Asecondfieldofdialogueistheareaofne gotiations between Muslims and government authorities (both nationalandlocal)aboutthepublicspacegiventoIslam,anda thirdisthegrassrootsdialogueonthelocallevel.Churchesare active in different ways in each of these dialogues. I will give some examples of the three forms of dialogue and the role of thechurchesineachofthem.12 PoliticalDialogue WithintheEuropeanUnionthepoliticalneedfordialoguehas led to a number of initiatives. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, EuroArabdiscussionsstartedtoputreligionontheagenda.In November 1995, at a meeting of the European Union and the

12

IwanttothankJanSlomp,towhomIowesomevaluableinsights onthissubject.

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coastal states of the Mediterranean, “interreligious dialogue” was one of the topics for international cooperation (Nielsen 2003: 358). Muslim states are increasingly active in taking dia logueinitiatives.IntheMiddleEast,forinstance,anewurban professional middle class, although identifying with Islam, is interested in the debate on human rights, democracy and reli giousandpoliticaldialogue(Nielssen2003:360). European Union authorities are actively searching for co operation with the European churches to help organise such a dialogue. The former President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, was instrumental in the foundation of the for um“ASoulforEurope”in1994.Heencouragedchurches,hu manistandIslamicorganisationstocometogetheranddiscuss different social and ethical topics. Churches have sought to be proactiveininitiatingsuchaEuropeandialogue.2008wasthe European year for intercultural dialogue. Together with COMECE(CommissioEpiscopatumCommunitatisEuropensis; the European bishops) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Conference of European Churches (CEC) organised four conferencesintheEuropeanParliamentbuildingon“Christian EuropeandIslaminEurope”:onthepossibilitiesandpitfallsof interculturaldialogue,thevisibilityofreligioninthepublicdo main, the viability of a European Islam, and relations of the EuropeanUnionwithMuslimcountriesandreligiousfreedom there(Islamochristiana34(2008):21016). ChurchesinEurope have an infrastructure that enables this type of international sociopoliticaldialogue.The“IslaminEurope”Committeewas founded in 1987 by the CEC and the Council of European Bi shops’ Conferences (CCEE) to help the European churches re flectonandgivethemsomepastoralinstructionsonthegrow ingpresenceofMuslimsinEurope.Theywereamongthefirst to reflect on the implications of Islamic law for Muslims in Europe.13 People active in the CECCCEE Committee are often churchofficialswhohavespecialisedinIslam.

13

Theirreport“IslamicLawanditsSignificancefortheSituation ofMuslimMinoritiesinEurope”appearedin1987(http://www.ccme.be).

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NegotiatingonSpaceforMuslims TherelationsbetweenMuslimsandlocalornationalauthorities varies according to the structure of the relationships between churchandstate.Traditionally,therewerethreemodelsforthe relationship between West European states and religious com munitiesintheearliertwentiethcentury: 1.Concordatsbetweenthestateandthe(Catholic)church: Portugal,Italy,Spain,Germany 2. Protestant state churches dominate, with more or less roomfornonconformistgroups:Finland,Denmark,Great Britain 3.Separationofchurchandstate:theNetherlands,France, Belgium,Ireland(Elzas2003:84). Localchurchescansometimesplayamediatingrole.Thisises peciallythecaseincountriesthathaveanopenstatechurchtra ditionliketheUnitedKingdom.PhilipLewisgivesaninterest ing description of the help local churches in Bradford (a city withalargeMuslimpopulation)givetoMuslimsandthelocal authorities to mobilise initiatives to bridge social capital. They have brought together potential Muslim and Christian com munityleadersinordertobuildsocialnetworks,sincetheynot edthatMuslimandnonMuslimcommunitiesareliving“paral lellives.”Oneoftheinitiativesconcernsanattempttofightrad icalisation among Muslim youth. Potential role models for youthsbetween13and16ofdifferentreligiousbackgroundsre ceive training in leadership skills, conflict resolution and reli gious literacy in an Intercultural Leadership School (ICLS). Imams learn about conflict resolution within Muslim families, andcivicnetworksarebeingbuilttopreventoutbreaksofvio lence(Lewis2009:273). DialoguebetweenReligiousCommunities Itisdifficulttochooseanexamplefromtheplethoraofmaterial onlocalgrassrootsdialoguebetweenMuslimandChristianin dividuals. An interesting topic here is the influence of tradi tional statechurch relationships in different countries on this formofdialogue.MalcolmBrownhascomparedtwolocaldia loguegroups,oneinnorthernFranceandanotherinGlasgow. He concludes that there are significant differences in the way dialogue is conducted due to different attitudes church people

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in France and the UK have towards the state and society at large. Dialogue is more theoretical, informal and multilateral in theUnitedKingdom,and,conversely,morepractical,form al and bilateral in France. By this, I mean that the formal dialogue which exists in the United Kingdom is more con cernedwiththesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenChris tianityandIslam,whileinFrancethereismoreofafocuson the common concerns and aspirations of Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, formal groups established for the purpose of MuslimChristian dialogue are particularly im portantinFrance,whereas,intheUnitedKingdom,thedia logue which takes place between neighbours, colleagues andfriendsismoresignificant.(Brown2002:7)

Oneoftheconclusionsafterastudyofexistingdialogueinitia tives is that, in the three forms of dialogue under discussion, churcheshavesofarbeenabletobethemoststructured,organ isedpartnerinthedialogueprocess.Theyhavehaddialogueon their agenda for a longer period than European governments, and they have a better infrastructure for dialogue than Mus lims. Both Catholic and Protestant churches have appointed of ficialsonthenationallevelwhoarefamiliarwithinterreligious dialogue.Muslimsdonothaveofficialsyetassuch.Therefore, churches often function as a liaison between governments and the Muslim communities. This is true for the dialogue on the level of the European Union but also for a more local level of dialogue,likethenegotiationsthattakeplacebetweenmosque organisations and national or local authorities about space in thepublicdomain. MuslimsasAgentsinDialogue The involvement of Muslims in dialogue efforts has so far oc curredmostlyontheindividuallevel.Wehaverecentlyseena moresustainedeffortbyMuslimorganisationstobeinvolved.I wanttohighlightthreeformsofMusliminvolvement. AspecialgroupofChristiansandMuslimsincooperation istheGroupeduRechercheIslamoChrétien(GRIC).TheGRIC hasbeenorganisingajointdialogueandstudyprojectofMus

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lims and Christians in France and North Africa for more than thirtyyears.Thegrouphastwocopresidents,aMuslimanda Christian. There are four local groups (in Rabat, Tunis, Paris andBrussels)thatmeetregularly.Theyhavepublishedmater ialontheBibleandtheQur’an,developingidentities,faithand justice,sinandethicalresponsibility.Theirlastvolumewason pluralismandlaicité(ArfaMensia2000:165/6)14 The Muslims most involved in this type of dialogue are those we classified under the heading “Muslims as Citizens.” MohammedArkoun,forinstance,hasbeenaparticipantinthe GRIC. A dialogue initiative launched by a more conservative groupofmosquerepresentativesistheIslamicCharterinGer many.Itwasinitiatedintheaftermathof9/11inFebruary2002 and tries to formulate a Muslim Identity within the German constitutionalframework,claimingthatIslamandtheGerman Constitutionor,morebroadly,theframeworkofhumanrights areperfectlycompatiblewithIslam.Ithasatwofoldtargetau dience: the majority society and other Muslims (Affolderbach 2006: 74). It is perhaps for this reason that it has met with a mixed reception in the German public debate. Sentences like: “ThereisnocontradictionbetweentherightsgrantedbyGodto the individual and the core substance of the Western declara tionofhumanrights”arousesuspicion:Whichrightsmightnot belong to “the core substance” (Troll 2003: 36270)?15 But how ever one may judge its contents, the Charter is a clear attempt byaconservativeMuslim bodytoopenupapublicdebateon thepossiblecontributionofIslamtolargersociety. Many of the NeoSufi groups, and especially the Gülen group, have paid great attention to interreligious dialogue, of teninvitingotherstodialoguemeetingsandconferences.Their effortsaredirectedtowardsdialogueonthegrassrootslevel.In theNetherlandsandGermanytheyhavesetupneighbourhood groupsandwomen’sgroups,talkingabouteducation,festivals and cooking (and putting the last subject into practice!). Their

14

Seealsohttp://www.gric.asso.fr/.

15

 For reactions by the Protestant Church to the Charter see http://www.kircheislam.de/.

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approach is inspired by their founder, Fethullah Gülen (Gülen 2007:3762) PossibleFutures InthisessayIhavetriedtoanalysethepossibilitiesforthefu turecontributionsbyMuslimstothefieldofEuropeaninterre ligious dialogue. If we look at the opening for dialogue in the Muslim community, we can see that there are three currents withinEuropeanIslamwherepeoplearetakinganactivepart: the representatives of umbrella organisations, involved in dis cussions with larger society on the public space for Islam, lib eral intellectuals bent on an Islam compatible with democracy and the more spiritual currents stressing inner harmony and loveforone’sneighbour.TherearealsoMuslimgroupsnotin terested in dialogue, and they should not be ignored. Interre ligiousdialogueinEuropeaswellaselsewhereistakingplace againstthebackgroundofpotentialinterethnic,intercommunal violence.InanacademicstudyAshutoshVarshneyaskedwhy three major cities in India exploded into HinduMuslim vio lenceintheaftermathoftheAyodhyaaffairwhereasthreeoth er cities with a comparable demographic profile did not. His conclusion was that, although sharing in everyday practices wasimportant,thecrucialvariablewasthepresenceorabsence ofacivilsocietyinwhichbusinesspeople,professionals,mem bers of cultural groups and political parties from the different background encountered one another regularly (Lewis 2009: 276). In many countries, churches are quite hesitant about en teringthepublicdebateorplayingaroleforthepublicwelfare. Quiteoften,itturnsoutthatthereisapositiveappreciationby the authorities or politicians if they do. Churches especially havehadlongexperienceinpeacebuildingandreconciliation, bothatthepersonalandcommunallevels. In addition to this dialogue of mediation and negotiation, theremustberoomforamutualcriticaldialogueofideas.The ologians need to be aware of the need for comparative theo logy, reflecting on both the common roots and the differences betweenourreligioustraditions;philosophersandpoliticalsci entists must engage in an intercultural exchange. Politicians need to reflect on secularism and plurality. Last but not least,

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everyday informal meetings are the basis of peacebuilding. Both churches and mosques, although they have a floating at tendance,canbethefocusformanypeopleinneighbourhoods. Bibliography Abu Zayd, Nasr. (2004). Rethinking the Quran: Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics.Utrecht:SWP. Affolderbach,Martin.(2006).“Die‘IslamischeCharta’–einMeilstein für den Islam in Deutschland?” In: Hermann Düringer et al. (eds). Christen und Muslime: Verantwortung zum Dialog. Darmstadt: WBG.Pp.7177. Arfa Mensia, M. (2000). “Une expérience privilégée de dialogue: le GRIC.” In: J. Waardenburg (ed.). MuslimChristian Perceptions of Dialogue Today: Experiences and Expectations. Louvain et al.: Pee ters.Pp.16182. Arkoun, Mohammed. (2006). Islam: To Reform or to Subvert. London: SaqiBooks. Barlas, Asma. (2002). Believing Women in Islam. Unreading Patriarchal InterpretationsoftheQuran.Austin:UniversityofTexasPress. Brown, Malcolm D. (2002). “An Ethnographic Reflection on Muslim Christian Dialogue in the North of France: The Context of Laic ite.”IslamandChristianMuslimRelations13:29. De Koning, Martijn. (2007). De “zuivere” islam. Amsterdam: Bert Bak ker. Dasetto, F. (2000). “Discours, sociétés et individus dans l’islam con temporain,1334.”In:FeliceDassetto(ed.).Parolesd’islam:Indivi dus, sociétés et discours dans l’islam européen contemporain. Paris: MaisonneuveetLarose. Eickelman, D., and R. Piscatori. (1996). Muslim Politics. Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress. Elsas, Christoph. (2003). “Europäischsäkularstaatliche Tradition als RahmenchristlichmuslimischerBegegnungen.”In:RalfGeissler andHolgerNollmann(eds).MuslimeundihrGlaubeinkirchlicher Perspektive.Schenefeld:EBVerlag.Pp.7590. Gülen, M. Fethullah. (2007). Verhandelingen, perspectieven, meningen. Rotterdam:StichtingIslamenDialoog. Jenkins,Philip.(2007).God’sContinent:Christianity,Islam,andEurope’s ReligiousCrisis.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Lewis, Philip. (2009). “For the Peace of the City: Bradford – A Case Study in Developing InterCommunity and Interreligious Rela

448 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE tions.”In:StephenR.Goodwin(ed.).WorldChristianityinMuslim Encounter.London/NewYork:Continuum.Pp.27386. Mandaville,Peter.(2000).“InformationTechnologyandtheChanging Boundaries of European Islam.” In: Felice Dassetto. Paroles d’Is lam: Individus, sociétés et discours dans l’islam européen contempor ain.Paris:MaisonneuveetLarose.Pp.28197. Nielsen, J. (2003). “Is There an Escape from the History of Christian Muslim Relations?” In: David Thomas and Clare Amos (eds). A Faithful Presence: Essays for Kenneth Cragg. London: Melisende. Pp.3145. (2001). “Flexibele identiteiten: moslims en de natiestaten van West Europa.” In: Dick Douwes (ed.). Naar een Europese Islam? Amsterdam:MetsenSchilt.Pp.2149. Phalet,Karen,andJessikaterWal(eds).(2006).“MosliminNederland: Diversiteit en verandering in religieuze betrokkenheid. Turken en Marokkanen in Nederland 19982002.” The Hague: SCP werk document106b.http://www.scp.nl. Pratt, Douglas, and Barbara Göbb. (2007). “Islam and ChristianMus limRelationsinGermany:RecentDevelopmentsandContinuing Issues.”IslamandChristianMuslimRelations18:4365. Ramadan, Tariq. (2004). Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Ox ford:OxfordUniversityPress. Roy, Olivier. (2003). De globalisering van de islam (L’islam mondialisé). Amsterdam: Van Gennep. Published in English as: Globalised Is lam.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2004. Speelman,Gé.(2008):“Deidentiteitvandemoslimstudent.”Begrip34: 18897. Tibi, Bassam. (2002): “Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between EuroIs lamandGhettoization.”In:NezarAlSayyadandManuelCastells (eds).MuslimEuropeorEuroIslam.Lanham:Lexington.Pp.2942. Troll, Christian. (2003). “Islamic Charter for Germany.” In: David ThomasandClareAmos(eds).AFaithfulPresence:EssaysforKen nethCragg.London:Melisende.Pp.36270. Varshney, Ashutosh. (2002). Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and MuslimsinIndia.NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress. Waardenburg,J.(2000).“NormativeIslaminEurope.”In:FeliceDas setto(ed.).Parolesd’islam:Individus,sociétésetdiscoursdansl’islam européencontemporain.Paris:MaisonneuveetLarose.Pp.4968.

TheCouncilofChurches intheNetherlands anditsEncounterwithIslam

1

AlleG.Hoekema

Abstract This essay describes the various ways in which the Council of Churches in the Netherlands and its respective sections and working groups interpreted IslamandmetwithMuslimsintheNetherlandsfromtheendofthe1970sup untilthepresent.Thisencountertookplacebyorganizingjointstudymeet ings,writingreportsandbookletsonaspectsofIslamandbyissuingpublic statementsinperiodsofseriouscrisis.Keywordsinthisencounterhavebeen “respect,” “tolerance” and “multicultural society.” Even in the last decade, whenseveralviolentactsofterrorismoccurredinternationallyandnationally andsignsofahardeningofpositionstowardsIslambecamevisibleinDutch society,thesekeywordsweremaintained.

Introduction The era of globalization had started when the Council of ChurchesintheNetherlands 2wasfoundedin1968.Thisac celerated the necessity of interreligious dialogue, which, from the beginning, had been mentioned as one of the priorities of the new council because, for instance, Protestant and Catholic missionarypioneerslikeD.C.Mulder,J.vanLin,P.G.M.Backx andJ.Slompclearlyrecognizeditsimportance.Attheoccasion ofthefortiethanniversaryofthiscouncilacommemorativevol umewaspublishedthatdescribesitshistoryanddevelopments 1 TheauthorisgratefultotheCouncilofChurchesintheNether landsforitspermissiontousearchivalmaterial,andtoitssecretary,Rev. KlaasvanderKamp,forhiscriticalcommentsonanearlierversionof thisarticle. 2

ThepresentCouncilofChurchesisthesuccessortoanEcumenical Councilthatwasfoundedin1948;theRomanCatholicChurchwasnot partofthisearlierbody. 449

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inanumberofarticles(Houtepenetal.2008)anditincludes,of course, a chapter on the council’s Office for Interreligious En counter(SpeelmanandSteenbrink2008:7691). Inthispresentarticlewewilllimit ourselvestoadescrip tionandanalysisoftherelationshipoftheCouncilofChurches with Muslims in the Netherlands and with the world of Islam ingeneral.Duringtheperioddescribedhere,severalofficesand working groups of the council dealt with aspects of Islam and thelifeofMuslimsintheNetherlands.Thiswasconfusingsome times.Theboundariesweintendtodrawarefacedwithyetan other complication. The discussion with Muslims and the re flections on Islam have often been embedded within broader discourses on interreligiousissues,ournewmultiformsociety, thelifeofmigrantsinoursociety(includingthepositionofmi grantchurches),andmattersconcerningsocial,culturalandpo litical integration. We will refer quite often to the work being done by the Office for Interreligious Encounter, which was formedin1979(andupuntil1984borethenameOfficeforthe Relationship with World Religions). An active Islam working groupfunctionedundertheauspicesofthisofficethatinitiated many contacts with Muslim organizations in the Netherlands. Therefore,wewillstartwithabriefdescriptionofthehistoryof thisparticularworkinggroup.Afterthat,wewilltrytoanalyse the activities and reports of the Council of Churches with re spect to the Islam in three fields (which coincide more or less withthreesuccessiveperiods)thatcanbespecified asfollows: becoming acquainted with (Muslim) migrants, theological re flection, and finally, responding to crisis situations and to the publicdebateonintegrationintheNetherlands. TheIslamWorkingGroupoftheCouncilofChurches In 1974, when some 200,000 Muslims from Morocco, Turkey, SurinamandothercountrieshadmigratedtotheNetherlands, the Netherlands Missionary Council organized an encounter between Muslims and Christians for the first time in the Ne therlands.Thisresultedinthefoundingofa“Contactcommissie moslims en christenen in Nederland” (Contact Committee for Muslims and Christians in the Netherlands); from the begin ning Muslims were part of that committee, which dealt with practical issues like suitable space to be used as mosques, Is

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lamic cemeteries, better educational opportunities for Muslim childrenandlegalpossibilitiesforritualslaughtering(cf.Coun cilofChurchesintheNetherlands1982:1112).Studymeetings wereorganizedin1976and1978. AftertheOfficefortheRelationshipwithWorldReligions started its work, the activities of this contact committee were taken over from 1980 onwards by the Islam Working Group withinthisoffice.3AlthoughneithertheProtestantnorthe Ca tholicmissionaryorganizationsformallyplayedaroleintheof ficeandtheworkinggroup,thestaffoftheseagenciesbecame stimulatingmembersoftheworkinggroupwhich,fromthebe ginning,hadsomeMuslimmembersaswell.Thefirststudyen counter that the new working group organized took place in 1981ontheoftenrecurringtheme“ToleranceandAcceptance.” D.BakkerandHamzaZaïdwerethekeynotespeakers. AlthoughtheIslamWorkingGroupcontinuedtofunction well,from1985onitseemedappropriateneverthelesstoforma differentkindofconsultativebodyinwhichChristianchurches and Muslim organizations would be represented on a parity basis. A letter signed by D.C. Mulder (chairman Council of Churches), H.A.M. Fiolet and W.R. van der Zee (secretaries), startswiththewords:“GoodcontactbetweenMuslimorganiz ationsandtheChristianchurchesisofgreatimportance.For,on the basis of their faith, together they bear a responsibility to wards our society and the wellbeing of the people.”4 A first meetingtookplaceinSeptember1986inwhichnolessthan38 points for consideration were listed, ranging from information on schools about Islam, promoting Muslim political influence, respondingtowrongimagesofIslaminthemediatobuilding respectandtoleranceandclarifyingtheissueofreligiousmulti formity. Nevertheless, in the end this consultative body was discontinued, partly because of disagreement among the Mus lims themselves—some organizations (like Ahmadiyyah and the socalled “AlMadjliesoel AlIslamie Fie Hollanda”) were 3

 See Jaarverslag 19791983 van de Werkgroep Islam van de Sektie Wereldgodsdiensten van de Raad van kerken. Archives of the Council of ChurchesinAmersfoort(henceACC),file“WerkgroepIslam.” 4

LetterstothememberchurchesandtoseveralMuslimorganiza tions,10April1985.ACC,file“ParitaireCommissieChristenenMos lims.”

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unacceptable to others—and partly because almost all Muslim representatives were lay administrators with other duties whereastheChristiansdelegateswhowereemployedfulltime as theologians. From the perspective of the Christian partners, theconfusingandoftenchangingpictureastothemanyMus lim and Islamic organizations from mainly Moroccan, Turkish and Surinam background made lasting contacts rather compli cated(VanHeelsum2004)untilnow. TheIslamworkinggrouphascontinueditsworkuptothe present, although, following a restructuring of the Council of Churchesin2001,asa“Contactgroupinbehalfofthepractice ofdialoguewithIslam.” BecomingAcquaintedwithEachOther OneofthemaintasksoftheIslamWorkingGroupwastoassist the increasing number of Muslims who migrated to this coun try in feeling accepted and welcome. In addition, migrants in general, and Christian migrants in particular—since they were often minorities—were also regarded within the Council of Churchesasguidesexperiencedindealingwithapluralistsoci ety.Thus,thiswasalsothevisionsetdowninOpelkaaraange wezen (Raad van Kerken 1984), a document by the Multiform SocietyWorkingGroup.5 Thisisthereasonforthepublicationofannualgreetingsto theMuslimcommunityattheoccasionofthefeastofRamadan. Thefirstoftheseletterswaspublishedandsentin1982;6from 1997ontheyhavebeensignedbythechairpersonofthecouncil itself. The letter sometimes contained a brief, cordial message based only on a text from the Bible or the Qur’an, whereas in other years they refer to conflicts or other, sometimes distres sing, issues that made it necessary to reassure the other side andconvincethemofthelastingbondbetweenChristiansand Muslims. The greetings sent in 1983, when Ramadan fasting wasextremelydifficultbecauseIdalFitrtookplaceinJune,ex 5 TheMultiformSocietyWorkingGroupwasformedin1980under theauspicesoftheOfficesforServices(socialwork). 6

TheVaticanhasbeensendingsuchgreetingssincethe1970sand FatherP.G.M.Backxstartedwiththisinitiativein1979intheNether landsonbehalfoftheRomanCatholicChurch.

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plicitly mentioned the example of the fast: “To us, Christians, yourfastingmeansacalltoausterity,sincewearesurrounded by a consumer society.” Muslim fasting was to become one of the issues that was regularly mentioned in brochures and treatisespublishedbythecouncil.Theletterwhichwassentin February1991,atthetimeofthefirstGulfWar,hadadifferent formatandmentionsmountingtensionsduringthepastyears, alsobetweenChristiansandMuslimsintheNetherlands.Mus lims felt threatened by those tensions and many Dutch people saw the Muslims as their enemies, according to the letter. Un derthesecircumstances, TheCouncilofChurcheswantstoinformyouthroughthis letter that, even during and after the present tensions, it wants to struggle with you against prejudices, discrimin ation and racism. The Council believes that such Muslim groupsthathavebeencommittedtoapeacefulandjustso cietyformanyyearsandwithwhichwehavegoodcontact, shouldbestrengthenedintheiraims.7

AninterestingcasebroughttotheIslamWorkingGroupin 1987 was the heated discussion in the daily newspaper Trouw onthepossibilityoflegalpermissionfortheazantoberungon towerbells,inadditiontotheChristiancalltoworship.ALaw on Public Manifestations passed by Parliament in April 1988 allowed this in article 10. However, as far as I know, no local government has yet given actual permission to mosques to do so.8 TheGulfWar,inadditiontotheRushdieaffair(seebelow) anddebatesinsocietyabouttheuseofthejilbab,ledtospecial meetingsbetweenrepresentativesofMuslimorganizationsand theCouncilofChurchesinOctoberandNovember1991.What could be done to remove the negative images and prejudices that existed in the Netherlands towards Muslims? The com ments in society regarding vigorous statements by the liberal politician Frits Bolkestein were used as an example. The meet 7 LettertotheboardsofMuslimorganizationsintheNetherlands, 1February1991;ACC,file“WerkgroepIslam19901994.” 8

SeeACC,file“ParitaireCommissieChristenMoslims”andwww. wetten.overheid.nl>WetOpenbareManifestaties>paragraafIV,artikel 10.

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ings discussed possible models for responding in such situa tions.Unfortunately,theprocedureforpreparinganofficialstate mentbythecouncilasawholeusuallytakestoomuchtimeand preparingajointresponsewithMuslimorganizationswascon sidered complicated as well. Longterm educational programs, meetings and conferences might be a better way. The struggle againstprejudicesshouldbeprimarilyataskforeachpartyon itsown.9Aswewillseebelow,inlateryearsthecouncilwasto publish public statements at several moments of national or internationaltensionorconflict. A second field of activity of the Working Group has been the organization of joint study conferences on a wide range of issues. After the abovementioned meeting in 1981 on “Toler anceandAcceptance,”anotherconferencefollowedin1983on “Muslim Students in Christian schools,” which was well pre pared through extensive documentation. Three themes were discussed: Koran instruction at Christian schools, the place of theirownlanguagesandculturesintheschoolcurriculumand dailyeducationalpracticewithspecificrules.10Twoyearslater members of the Working Group held a discussion with Mus limsofTurkishdescentaboutthepositionofChristianminori ties in Turkey.11 In April 1988 still another conference was or ganizedon“WorkingTogetherwithMuslimsforaSustainable Society.” Eighty people participated; unfortunately only eight wereMuslims,thusemphasizingthedifficultiesinmakingcon tact! An exchange of views between Christian pastors and imamsinJanuary1995wasproofofmorematurerelationships, even though the language barrier continued to be a handicap. Ideas about the theological education of imams at universities in the Netherlands started to circulate during these years, and 9

Briefreportofadiscussionon3October1991;,ACCfile“Werk groepIslam19901994.” 10

Jaarverslag19791983vandeWerkgroepIslam.Thesituationinpub licschoolswasnotanissuehereapparently. 11

ACC,file“WerkgroepIslam19841987.”Themeetingwasheldin the office of the Islamitische Stichting Nederland (Hollanda Diyanet Vakfi;IslamicFoundationintheNetherlands)inTheHague.Thisfound ationwasfoundedin1982.

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in the relatively quiet period 19951997 several meetings with the(Turkish)IslamitischeStichtingNederland(IslamicFounda tiontheNetherlands)tookplace.Alargeconferenceon“Islam andtheWest,”whichwastobeorganizedin2003bytheInsti tute for Multicultural Development FORUM together with the CouncilofChurches,unfortunatelynevertookplace.Thefinal decade of the twentieth century and the first years of the new century were marked too much by serious incidents to make conferencesonregularissuespossible. Allthesemeetingsandseveralsmalleronesaimedatbetter mutualunderstandingbetweenChristiansandMuslims.Look ingattheavailableresources,thiswasprobablyslightlyeasier with Muslims of Turkish and Surinamese background than withMoroccanMuslimsduringthefirstperiod. AlthoughnotspecificallyaimedatcontactbetweenChris tians and Muslims, we want to mention finally a large gather ingofrepresentativesofreligionsandotherworldviewsatthe occasion of the silver jubilee of the reign of Queen Beatrix in 200512 and a subsequent gathering in January 2007 where reli gious leaders signed a declaration of freedom and peace.13 In both meetings the recognition of the dignity of each human being and therefore of the equality of all people despite their differentwaysofthinkingwasemphasized.Thedeclarationun derscoresthefactthattheNetherlandsalwayshasbeenamelt ing pot of peoples and cultures, where people with different religions and worldviews have learned—although with ups anddowns—tolivetogetherwithmutualrespect.Nothingcan be concluded yet, of course, as to the lasting impact of such gatheringsanddeclarations. TheologicalReflection WhentheOfficefortheRelationshipwithWorldReligionswas inauguratedin1978,oneofitstasksbecame“Promotingreflec tion on the relationships between Christians and adherents of other religions, particularly with respect to the issue of dia

12

15December2005intheDomChurchinUtrecht.Themaintheme was“Invrijheidverbonden”(ConnectedinFreedom). 13

Seewww.raadvankerken.nl>actueel>2007>Januari.

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logue.”14Thus,theologicalreflectionwasimportantbothwithin theofficeandwithintheIslamWorkingGroup.Ingeneral,this reflection dealt with practical problems or issues rather than purelyacademicissuesand, sinceitwasmeanttoserveanin terested lay readership, most publications were in the form of brochuresorbriefreports. One of the earliest publications was the booklet Samen geloven,andersleven,publishedin1982.Oneofitsbriefchapters sketches how Muslims can practice their faith in the Nether lands. The attitude that native Dutch people should show to wardsMuslims(andviceversa)isrespect,akeywordthatrecurs timeandagainindiscussionsandpublicstatementsduringthe next decades. Christians can learn from their encounter with othersand,togetherwiththem,shoulddevotethemselvestoa just society. Six areas of concern are identified: education in a multiform society, room to build mosques, interreligious mar riage, pastoral care in prisons, pastoral care in hospitals and, finally, being good neighbours. Since the booklet is aimed at Christian readers, suggestions for five Bible studies have been added: on the covenant, Jesus and creation, the name of Jesus Christastheonlyname,thefearofGodandtheunknownGod. And, finally, three possible approaches for meeting each other aredescribed:thecalltorepent(sincetheGodoftheMuslimsis notthesameasthatofChristiansandJews),aninvitationtodi alogue (made possible because Allah is the same as God but Christians received a deeper sense of the love and wisdom of GodinChrist)and,beingpilgrimstogetheronthewaytoGods Kingdom(allreligionsarewaystoGod). In 1991 the report was revised and published in one vol umetogetherwithsectionsontheencounterswithHindusand Buddhists(Slomp1991).15TheparticipationofMuslimsinshap ing the text had become larger. A separate chapter, written by Hamza Zaïd, was added about “a Muslim vision on the en counterwithChristians”(Zaïd1991),inwhichtheauthorrefers to the Qur’an (the wellknown text of Sura 2:143) to prove the 14

Seeletterfromthecounciltoitsmemberchurches,Amersfoort22 May1978.ACC. 15

ThesectionontheencounterwithHindushadoriginallybeen publishedasvolumeIIIoftheseriesSamengeloven,andersleven.

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necessityfordialoguewithChristians.HamzaZaïdendswitha clearappealtobothMuslimsandChristians: To my brothers and sisters, who are Muslims, I say: don’t shun the dialogue, look out for contacts yourselves. Knock at the door and show our partners, that we respect them and even need them. To my brothers and sisters, who are Christians,Isay:seizetheopportunityandholdoutahand totheotherpeople,seethemasequalpartners.(Zaïd1991: 57)

Several of the themes in this report returned in later pub lications, such as, for instance, the report Over de houding van christenen jegens moslims which had been prepared in 198889 andwasfinallypublishedin1991asBiddentotdezelfdeGod(Van Cuilenburgetal.1991).Wefindthesamethreeapproachescon cerningthequestioniftheoneAllahoftheMuslimsisthesame as God, the father of Jesus. As in Wereldgodsdiensten in Neder land, published in the same year, the authors, all of whom be longedtoaTheologyTaskForcethathadbeeninauguratedby theOfficeforInterreligiousEncounterin1987,didnotmakea real choice. Two immediate causes led to the founding of this taskforce.Firstofall,ameetinghadtakenplacein1985inBali between members of the Indonesian Council of Churches and theCouncilofChurchesintheNetherlandsinwhichbothsides promisedtopayattentiontothetheologicalandpastoralques tionsthatChristiansfaceinamulticulturalsociety.Second,the invitationbyPopeJohnPaulIItohaveaWorldDayofPrayer forPeaceinAssisigaverisetothequestion,“Dowepraytothe same God?” The aim of Bidden tot dezelfde God? was to make clear to Christians that the presence of Muslims is a real chal lenge to them; all three choices have to do with the ultimate truth question. Therefore, after the final chapter of the book sketched a number of fundamental similarities and differences between both religions, the authors once again emphasize that thisreport is intended to advance a discussion within the Christian community in the Netherlands concerning these view points. This report wants to contribute towards continua tionorstartingofadialogueamongtheadherentsofthese viewpoints.(VanCuilenburg1991:57)

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ThesameobtainsforWereldgodsdiensteninNederland.Theafter word,writtenbyJanSlompassecretaryoftheOfficeforInter religiousEncounter,statesthattheofficeitselfrefusedtochoose between the options “call to repent”, “invitation to dialogue” and “being pilgrims together on the way to the Kingdom of God”(Slomp1991:211). Leaving these options open was probably the maximum that could be reached in an official publication by the council. An ecumenical theology of religions was never achieved, even thoughitwaswidelyfeltthatthesocalledAbrahamicreligions have much in common.16 Certainly no full consensus could be reached among its member churches about the abovemen tioned options. The members of the main Protestant churches were divided on this issue and a few years earlier, in 1986, in thepreparationphasefortheWorldDayofPrayerforPeace,it hadbecomeclearthat,forsimilarreasons,theRomanCatholic Bishops’ Conference in the Netherlands did not see any possi bility of praying together with people of other faiths. One can speak only of “the simultaneousness of the prayer and the com monality of the place where it is held,” even though there are differences between the prayers of Jews, Christians and Mus limsontheonehandandthoseofHindus,Buddhistsandoth ersontheother.However,eventhenpeoplecanbeenrichedby suchprayers,accordingtotheVatican,17inaccordancewiththe 16 Atranslationwasalsopublishedin1991ofadocumentbythe WorldCouncilofChurches,Oecumenischeoverwegingenoverrelatiestussen christenen en moslims. This was a draft for a text published in 1992 as IssuesinChristianMuslimRelations:EcumenicalConsiderations.Itsstatus wasmoreorlesssimilartothatofpublicationsbytheCouncilofChurch esintheNetherlands.TheCentralCommitteeoftheWCC(August1992) reviewedthedocument,statingthat:“Althoughthisisnotapolicydocu ment,itprovidescarefulanalysisandthoughtfulinsightforChristians interestedininterreligiousrelations.” 17

AletterbyH.A.vanMunsterOFM,secretarygeneraloftheBi shops’Conference,dated26September,1986,asareplytoadiscussion inarecentmeetingoftheCouncilofChurcheson10Septemberinwhich afundamentaldiscussiontookplaceastothepossibilitiesofcooperation betweenChristiansandotherbelievers.ACC,file“SectieRelatieWereld Religies19851987.”ThequotationisfromathoroughreportbyMgr.J. Meija, “Theological Reflection on the World Day of Prayer, Assisi 27.10.1986.”

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declaration Nostra Aetate (1965) which says that other religions reflectarayoftheDivineTruththatenlightensallpeople. The matter of common prayer was also dealt with in a morerecentbooklet,Samenvierenmetmensenvananderereligies (Raad van Kerken 2003). During these years several interreli giouscelebrationstookplace,organizedorcoorganizedbylo calorregionalcouncilsofchurches,mostlyonspecificoccasions suchasareligiousholiday,theDayagainstRacismorthecom memorationofadisaster,awar,etc.Thebookletwantstogive practical advice only concerning these interreligious celebra tions,againwithoutmakinganychoice.In2006,anotherpubli cation by the Council of Churches provided practical sugges tions as well: “Be well aware of the aim of such a meeting or celebration,andtakeintoaccountthedifferencesinvisionasto possibilities and limitations” (Raad van Kerken 2006b: 26). As with other issues, much depends here on the personal convic tionoftheparticipants. InIkbenchristen,mijnpartnerismoslim(1995)thepractical problems and possibilities of marriage between Muslims and Christianshadbeenexplored.Tenyearslater(2006)thattheme recurredinanopenandcriticalwayinthebookMijnpartneris moslim (Folbert 2006); however, although several members of theIslamContractGroupwereamongtheauthors,thisvolume wasnotpublishedunderthedirectauspicesofthecouncil. Finally,Christologicalquestionswerenotneglectedeither. Within the framework of a broad reflection on atonement and reconciliation (which was to be the theme of the kerkendag [church day] in 1998) a volume was published in which one chapterwasdedicatedtothechangingpositionofJesusChrist duetotheinterreligiousworldinwhichwenowlive.Thisvol umewastheresultofcollaborationbetweentheOfficeforInter religious Encounter and the Office for Theological Issues (Valkenburg1998).ThebookletWiezeggendemensendatikben? JezusChristusindedialoog(RaadvanKerken2004b)is,inaway, asequeltothisvolume,intendedprimarilyasamethodological aidforlocalchurchgroups:WhatisthemeaningofJesusChrist againstthebackgroundofourpluralisticsociety?Inbothbooks thepositionoftheIslamconstitutesonlyoneaspect.Atanaca demiclevel,therecentvolumeInhetspoorvanJezusenMoham med,bysixMuslimandsixChristianscholars,focusesonsimi

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larthemesfrominterreligiousandinterculturalperspectives (elBouayadi and Vroom 2008);18 however, the council was not directlyinvolvedhere. Someofthemostrecentpublicationsconstitute proofofa growing sensitivity in the churches and the council as to the public discussions on integration, tolerance and the role of the churchesinthepublicdomain(cf.VroomandWoldring2002). The strong will of the council to enter the realm of public de bate had become apparent already in the document Overtuigd tolerant (Raad van Kerken 2004a). Although Islam is hardly mentionedinthisdocument,thenecessityofinterreligiousand interculturalencounterwascertainlyoneofthereasonsfordis cussingthethemeoftolerancewithintheEthicalIssuesConsul tationGroup. Themostfundamentalandthoroughreportofthechurch es on the encounter with Muslims is probably the working documentOpelkaaraangelegd(RaadvanKerken2006a).19Inthe midstofheateddebatesinsocietyaboutthelimitationsofinte gration,thisdocumenttriestoformulateawellbalanceddefini tion of integration, building on the earlier vision and tradition of the council. Integration is thus defined as follows: “Integra tion is a joint effort for a peaceful or decent society based on equalcitizenship”(RaadvanKerken2006a:16).Thedocument isawareofthegrowingxenophobiaamongmanynativeDutch citizensaswellasthefearofIslamicterrorism.Nevertheless,it cannotbesaidthatthesocioculturalintegrationofnewcitizens has failed altogether. Dialogue continues to be necessary to a chieve a relaxation of tensions. At the same time, it should be possible to indicate points of contention openly, even if this sometimesleadstoconfrontation(RaadvanKerken2006a:21). Thedifferencefromseveralotherinterpretationsofintegration isthatthisdocumentemphasizesthefactseveraltimesthatitis atwowayprocesswithroomforculturaldiversity.Theideaof “twicethinking,”basedonSaintAugustine’snotionofadouble civitas,isinteresting:withinthecircleoftheChristiancommun 18 SeveralofthearticlesinthisworkwerepublishedinEnglishin StudiesinInterreligiousDialogue18(2008)1. 19

AreportoftheProjectgroepIntegratieoftheCouncilofChurches andSKIN;asummaryandadaptationappearedinthesameyearinthe RaadvanKerken2006b.

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ity(ortheMuslimcommunity)believerswillsearchforthebest theologicalandreligiousanswersregardingthenormsofChris tianacting(orMuslimacting)withintheworld.Yetwithinthe public realm of our broken society these norms and insights have to be defended without the possibility of referring to the authorityand(worldly)poweroftheChristian(orMuslim)tra dition.Itistobehopedthatthismodelof“twicethinking”can helpMuslimsinDutchor,moregenerally,Westernsocietybuild abridgebetweentheirtheocraticvisionsofan“Islamicsociety” on the one hand and a positive evaluation of a pluralist and eventually nonreligious democracy (Raad van Kerken 2006a: 4446). This working document can be seen as a good start, al though certainly not as a definite answer. Unfortunately, the documenttooeasilylabelscriticalessaysontheintegrationde batebyPaulScheffer(Scheffer2000;cf.RaadvanKerken2006a: 6)andothersas“onesided”withoutenteringintoarealdiscus sion of their concerns which many people in Dutch society shared. Also, the recommendations at the end of the working paper remain too general and lofty, omitting the questions of whereandinhowfarthechurchitselfneedstochangeandre pent(RaadvanKerken2006a:5253). PublicStatementsinTimesofTension Thedecadesuntilthebeginningofthetwentyfirstcenturyalso containedtensionsregardingthepresenceofMuslimsinDutch societyofcourse.However,lookingback,thecouncildoesnot seem to have emphasized these tensions; instead, it stressed harmony. Up until 2000 we find few public statements by the council involving Islam, and these are not directly concerned with the situation in the Netherlands. The most conspicuous casewasthefatwaagainstSalmanRushdieon14February1989, the sad result of his novel The Satanic Verses (1988). Here the fundamentalrightoffreedomofspeechcollidedwithvaluesof mutual respect, acceptance and tolerance that had so clearly been defended by the council in its relationship with Muslims andothers.AlocaldialoguegroupcomposedofChristiansand Muslimscondemnedthefatwabutheldthat“thecontent[ofthe book]isterriblyhurtful;itgivesevidenceofaverylowmental ity of the author. We advise everybody against reading the

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book ….”20 Together with other organizations, a Rushdie con ferencewasorganizedinNovember1989.Inthenextyearsecu menical discussions with Muslims were influenced negatively bytheRushdieaffairandthecreationofimagesandprejudices astheresultofit.AnIslamitischLandelijkComitee(IslamicNa tionalCommitee)wasevenfoundedbecauseofit,butnojoint public statement by Christians and Muslims was prepared, which apparently disappointed Imam Abdulwahid van Bom mel.21 The Ramadan greetings to the Muslim community of April1990refertothistensioninadiplomaticway: We understand that you have felt wounded, since, accord ingtoyou,boththeMessengerandtheBookseemedtobe discreditedbythenovelSatanicVerses,eventhoughyoudid notendorsethecalltohavetheauthorkilled.Wehopethat alltheoutrageregardingthisnovelhascausedmanypeople toreflectwhattheQur’anmeanstoyou.Thediscussionon these matters can be pursued in complete freedom in the Netherlandsandnobodyneedstofeelthreatened.Weinvite you to stand up for this freedom together with us and othersatanytimeandplacewheneveritisnecessary.

The tension is palpable in the response to these greetings by the neighbourhood council “Witte Vrouwen” of the local councilofchurchesinUtrecht.Thisgroupheldthatthetoneof theRamadangreetingswastooservileandhypocriticalregard ingfreedomofreligionwithinIslam.“Eventhoughallreligions have the same rights within Western democracies, this ab solutelydoesnotimplythat,toChristians,Islamisequal….”22 Wegettheimpressionthatsuchearlysignsofbasicunrestwere not clearly recognized by the national Council of Churches. A few years later the secretary of the council, Wim van der Zee, accepted aninvitationfromAdriaanvanDisandChrisKeule 20

LetterbythedialoguegroupMuslimsandChristiansinUtrecht, 20February1989.ACC,file“WerkrroepIslam19881989.” 21 SeetheminutesofthemeetingsoftheParitaireCommissieChris tenenMoslimson14Apriland13September,1989.ACC,file“Paritaire CommissieChristenenMoslims.” 22

LetterbythisNeighbourhoodCouncilon27August1990.ACC, file“WerkgroepIslam19901994.”

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mans to join a Committee of Recommendation of the Rushdie DefenseCommittee.23 Actually, this case formed an overture to several public areas of great tension in which Islam has been involved in the last decade. We will mention three of them: the attack on the TwinTowersinNewYorkandthePentagoninWashingtonon 11 September 2001, the controversial film Submission by the DutchmemberofParliamentAyaanHirsiAli(29August2004) and the subsequent brutal assassination of the director of this film,TheovanGogh,on2Novemberofthatyearand,finally, thefilmFitnabytheDutchMPGeertWilders(27March2008).24 TheCouncilofChurchesreactedpubliclyinallcases. On 15 September 2001, a few days after the attack on the TwinTowers,theCouncilofChurchesorganized,togetherwith others,anHourofReflectionandPrayerintheDomchurchin Utrecht which was broadcast on national TV. At the very last moment,aMuslim,ImamAbdullahHaselhoef,wasalsoasked tospeak.Althoughthepresenceofrepresentativesfromconser vativeProtestantchurchespreventedhimfromsayingaprayer, his sincere words impressed many people. The council also wrote a letter to the prime minister, Wim Kok, and within a month organized a discussion with Muslim leaders. The letter to the prime minister emphasized that the council agrees with thecondemnationofterrorism.However, actions need take place within the boundaries of the inter national legal order and according to the rules and proce duresofconstitutionalstates.…[T]hisisextremelyimpor tant,sincethissystemisoneofthepillarsoftheworldasan

23 LetterbytheRushdieDefenceCommitteeNederland,2February 1994.ACC,file“WerkgroepIslam19901994.” 24

Otherseriousconflictsthatcouldbementionedaretheattackson atraininMadrid(11March2004)andonthreeLondonMetrotrainsand abusin2005andtheinsultingcartoonsbyaDanishartistin2006.Inthe lattercasestheCouncilrespondedpublicly;inthecaseoftheattackin LondonthiswasdonethroughastatementtogetherwiththeContact orgaanMoslimsenOverheidandtheCentraalJoodsOverleg(seebe low).IntheNetherlandsthecontroversialattitudeoftheMoroccanimam Khalil elMoumni on homosexuality raised much debate in 2001 and 2002.

464 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE international community. In our opinion, the organizing of actionsofretaliationandwrathdoesnotbelongtothis.25

These words include an implicit deep concern about the plans of the United States’ government to invade Iraq (and eventu ally,Afghanistan). Also,theeffortstofounda“CouncilofReligions”werein tensified.Unfortunately,thislattereffortdidnotsucceedfully, although a Platform of Religions was formed after several years.26 When the Council of Churches devoted a regular ses sionayearafterthe9/11attackstolookingbackatthecomplex situation,mostmembersopinedthatthecouncilshouldcontin ue to do what it had done: intensify encounters with Muslims and interreligious dialogue. However, the oftrepeated ques tion, ”Why do they hate us in the West so much?” should not beneglectednorshouldthequestionaboutfreedomofreligion and religious martyrdom. On the other hand, voices that sup ported pending military actions against Iraq and a harder ap proachtoterrorismwerealsoheardinthismeeting.27 Even more than the terrible events of 2001, the sharp de batesabouttheshortfilmSubmissionandthesubsequentassas sination of Theo van Gogh in the autumn of 2004 made the churches aware of the fact that the multicultural society is no longer a “multicoloured feast.” Fear, concern, anger and feel ingsofpowerlessnessprevailed.Again,thecomplicateddilem mas between the fundamental freedom of speech and the equallyfundamentalrightofreligiousfreedomcametothesur face. In a letter to members of local councils of churches, the councilreferredtoPaul’sLettertotheRomans12:18andcalled 25

Lettertotheprimeminister,Amersfoort,21September2001.

26

OtherspeakersattheHourofReflectionandPrayerwereKath leenFerrier,BasPlaisierandBishopAdvanLuyn,amongothers.Forall informationonthe9/11attackseeACC,file“AanslagVS11/9/2001Iand II.”Thetimeconsumingdiscussionsaboutthelegalstatusofa“Council ofReligions”aninitiatingrole,canbereadinACC,file“RaadvanReli gies,”inboxSectieInterreligieuzeOntmoeting2001/2004. 27

Minutesofthe307thmeetingoftheCouncilofChurchesinthe Netherlands,September12,2002.Intheend,thepeaceorganizationsPax ChristiandInterkerkelijkVredesberaadsupportedmilitaryactionsinAf ghanistan.

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upon Christians to strengthen contacts with Muslim commun ities, since it is our task, “insofar as it depends on you, to live peaceably with all.” Similar voices could be heard in an Open Letter by the Roman Catholic Bishops and in a message to its membersbytheGeneralSynodoftheProtestantChurchinthe Netherlands.28Specialmentionshouldbemadehereofaniniti ative by the council and some churches to open a special tele phone line for everybody with questions, remarks or the need for pastoral help. The “listening line” functioned from 1619 November and some 230 people made use of it—Christians as wellasMuslimsandothers. The pending release of the film Fitna by the Member of Parliament Geert Wilders caused the council and a number of Muslim organizations to publish a declaration on 17 March 2008inwhichitissaid,amongotherthings,that Itisreprehensiblewhenthatwhichissacredinourreligions is ridiculed and our faith offended. We therefore strongly rejectallcontemptandslanderaimedattheQur’anandthe Prophet Muhammad. Just as we would not wish this with regard to the Bible and the Christian faith.… We declare thatreligionsneverhavethepurposeofcallingforviolence or the threat thereof. We strongly reject all violence that is perpetratedinthenameofGodorofareligion.…IntheNe therlands we have invited everyone in the country to help steadfastlyincreatingasocietyinwhichrespectandpeace fulrelationsareallimportant.

After the film appeared on the internet, a press release by the council underscored its view that religions ought to be ap proachedwithrespectandthatthecaricaturethatFitnasketch esofIslamhastoberejected.Thereshould,ofcourse,beroom

28

TheletterbytheCouncilofChurchesisdated10November2004; theOpenLetterbytheBishopswaspublishedinTrouw,aswellaselse where,on11November2004,andthekanselboodschap(pulpitmessage) ofthePKNwastobereadfromallpulpitsonSunday,21November 2004.SeeACC,file“MoordopTheovanGogh+nasleep.”

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to criticize religious customs—those of Christians as well as thoseofMuslims.29 Finally,ontwooccasionsMuslimorganizations,thecoun cilandJewishorganizationscollaboratedinissuingjointstate ments. This happened the first time after the attacks on three undergroundtrainsandabusinLondonon7July2005.30The statement called for the continuation of peaceful demonstra tions.ThesecondtimewasinDecember2008,aftertheattacks on the Gaza Strip by the Israeli army after Hamas had been launchingrocketsforalongperiodintoIsraelivillages.“Groups within religions that use violence obscure our effort for peace and justice. Our religions need to sound the call to be peace makers,”31thestatementissuedatthattimeread. ReadytoParticipateinthePublicDebate? The above review of three decades of intensive encounter be tweentheCouncilofChurchesandMuslimsintheNetherlands teaches us several things. It was never easy to establish repre sentative and longlasting instruments of contact. First of all, because so many committees and organizations are working alongsideeachotherontheMuslimsideandpartlybecausethe (theoretical or theological) aims of Christians often differ from thepractical,dailyneedsoftheMuslims.Moreover,withinthe council there are or were several offices and working groups dealing with different aspects of the encounter with Muslims: theologicalissues,practicalmatters,welfareaspectsandpublic or political issues. These groups did not always operate from the same perspective. Since the specific problems and challen gesthatthepresenceofIslaminoursocietyposeswillcontinue todemandagreatdealofattention,itmaybegoodtogiveaco 29

 Press release, 27 March 2008. Within the broader context of “ChurchesandIslam”thematterofthefilmwasdiscussedinameeting ofthecouncilon9April2008.ACC,file“Wilders/filmfitna.” 30

SeeACC,Box67(a),ContactgroepIslam2005/6.OntheJewish side,thestatementwassignedbytheCentraalJoodsOverleginwhich sevenJewishchurchesandagenciescooperate. 31

Seewww.raadvankerken.nl>actueel>2008>December>oproeptot saamhorigheid.ThistimethestatementwassignedonlybytheNeder landsVerbondvoorProgressiefJodendom.

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ordinatingandmonitoringtasktooneoftheconsultationgroups. Thisisalsorelatedtothethirdissue:thequestionsconcerning the relationship with Muslims have been embedded within a much broader discussion of the integration of all migrants, includingnewmigrantchurches.Thisovershadowsthespecific encounter with Islam. And, finally, especially during the last decade but also in earlier periods, devastating or at least un pleasant public incidents impeded a quiet growth of mutual trust. Usually,initspublicationsandpublicstatementsthecoun ciltookacautious,sympatheticpositionmarkedbykeywords like:tolerance,workingtogetherforadecentsocietyandespe ciallyrespect.Significantly,inallitspublicstatementsthecoun cilhastriedtodissociatetheword“terrorism”asmuchaspos sible from Muslims in general. This has weak aspects as well. Byadmittingthatallreligions,andinthisparticularcase,Islam, includeaspectsofviolenceintheirpractice,itwouldhavebeen easier to urge Christians (or “the West” in general) to repent andtocall“Christian”orWestern“terrorist”oraggressivebe haviourbyitspropernameaswell. As to the publications by the council and its offices and workinggroups,onegetstheimpressionthattheywereaiming mainly at interested church members rather than Muslims or society at large. Most publications try to explain to Christians whatIslamis;wefindhardlyanypublicationsinwhichaspects of Christianity are explained to Muslims.32 This may be partly duetothefactthatthecouncildeliberatelykeptanymissionary perspectiveatadistanceforalongtime(Hoekema2008).The picturemayshowmanymorenuancesonthelocallevel. Finally,thecouncilparticipatedinthepublicdebateonthe role of religion in our society by means of regular meetings with the government and with political parties rather than by publishingarticlesondiscussionpagesinnationalnewspapers. Thishasmostoftenbeenlefttoindividualtheologiansandoth ers.HenkVroom,incommentingonthetraditional“prophetic function” of the churches, asks if such public statements by a churchoraCouncilofChurchesareeffective: 32

Anexceptionarethesixteenbriefleafletsonallkindofaspectsof MuslimandChristianlifesuchasbaptism,circumcision,fasting,Mary, theTrinity,etc.,publishedbytheIslamWorkingGroupin2000.

468 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Abishoporapastorwhosayssomethingremarkablearous es [public] discussion, whereas a church that publishes an official statement incites arguments from its own constitu ency—aninternalpluralismthatneutralizesitsofficialposi tiontowardsthegovernment.(Vroom2002:99)

Clearly,aseriousdiscussionwithintheCouncilofChurcheson its strategy and means as to its public role will be useful. The comprehensivedocumentOpelkaaraangelegdcertainlycontains goodpossibilities,eventhough(orperhapsbecause)itsstatusis that of a working document only. Hopefully, the council will continuetoproduceandpublishdiscussionpapersofthiskind asitscontributionstothepublicdebate. Bibliography ElBouayadivandeWetering,Stella,andHenkVroom(eds).(2008).In hetspoorvanJezusenMohammed:OpzoeknaarGodenhoeteleven ….Zoetermeer/Kapellen:Meinema/Pelckmans. Folbert,Josien(ed.).(2006).Mijnpartnerismoslim.Kampen:Kok. Hoekema,Alle.(2008).“Duidelijkbetrokkenmaarmoeilijkintescha kelen.”In:AntonHoutepenetal.(eds).WaakvlamvandeGeest:40 jaarRaadvanKerkeninNederland.Zoetermeer:Meinema.Pp.189 201. Houtepen,Antonetal.(eds)(2008).WaakvlamvandeGeest:40jaarRaad vanKerkeninNederland.Zoetermeer:Meinema. Raad van Kerken in Nederland (Council of Churches in the Nether lands). (2006a). Op elkaar aangelegd: Integratie en de rol of religie. Eenvisievanuitkerken.Amersfoort. (2006b).Wijhorenbijelkaar:Kerken,geloofenintegratie.SeriesOec umenische Bezinning 31. Amersfoort: Projectgroep Integratie RaadvanKerken/SKIN. (2004a). Overtuigd tolerant: Een bijdrage aan de bezinning over tole rantie.SeriesOecumenischeBezinning26.Amersfoort. (2004b).Wiezeggendemensendatikben?JezusChristusindedialoog. SeriesOecumenischeBezinning27.Amersfoort. (2003). Samen vieren met mensen van andere religies. Series Oecu menischeBezinning25.Amersfoort. (1984).Opelkaaraangewezen.Amersfoort. (1982). Samen Geloven, Anders Leven: Handreiking voor ontmoeting tussenchristenenenmoslimsinNederland.PublishedbytheOffice

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for the Relationship with World Religions. Voorburg/Amersfoort: DeHorstink. Scheffer, Paul. (2000). “Het multiculturele drama.” NRC Handelsblad (January29). Speelman,Gé,andKarelSteenbrink.(2008).“’Jebentandersdaniken datiswaardevolengoed.’”In:AntonHoutepenetal.(eds).Waak vlam van de Geest: 40 jaar Raad van Kerken in Nederland. Zoeter meer:Meinema.Pp.7691. Slomp, Jan (ed.). (1991). Wereldgodsdiensten in Nederland: Christenen in gesprek met moslims, hindoes en boeddhisten. Amersfoort/Louvain/ Voorburg:DeHorstink/Publivorm. Valkenburg, Pim (ed.). (1998). Begaanbare wegen: Verzoening tussen de godsdiensten.Kampen:Kok. VanCuilenburg,Paulaetal.(1991).BiddentotdezelfdeGod?Ontmoeting christenenenmoslims.Driebergen:CentrumvoorEducatie. Van Heelsum, Anja et al. (2004). Moslim in Nederland. Islamitische or ganisatiesinNederland.TheHague:SociaalCultureelPlanbureau. Werkdocument 106; also published as the final part in Karen Phalet (ed.). Moslim in Nederland. The Hague: Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau,2004.) Vroom, Henk. (2002). “Religieus pluralisme en publiek domein.” In: HenkVroomandHenkWoldring(eds).Religiesinhetpubliekedo mein.Zoetermeer:Meinema.Pp.75102. and Henk Woldring (eds). (2002).  Religies in het publieke domein. Zoetermeer:Meinema. Zaïd, Hamza. “A Muslim Vision on the Encounter with Christians.” In:JanSlomp(ed.).WereldgodsdiensteninNederland:Christenenin gesprek met moslims, hindoes en boeddhisten. Amersfoort/Louvain/ Voorburg:DeHorstink/Publivorm.Pp.5357.

ProximityandDistance ChinaandtheChristianWest AnEssayinInterculturalPhilosophy SanderGriffioen

Abstract ThisessayfocusesontherelationbetweenChinaandtheWest.Forthemost part it concerns China as viewed through Western lenses, starting with the “natural theology” of Matteo Ricci and the Jesuit Mission, then turning to the“RitesControversy”oftheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturiesandend ing with contemporary issues. In the final section the emphasis shifts from the West to China. This contribution aims to go beyond the description of certainphasesintherelationbetweenWestandEast.Firstandforemost,it attempts to reconstruct this development in terms of “proximity” and “dis tance.”Itconsidersthegeniusofnaturaltheologytobeitssenseofproximity and the later development a fateful distancing. To regain proximity it sug geststhatinterculturalphilosophyheedtheexperienceofChristiancommun ities. To illustrate this point, it draws on Vroom’s discussion of symbols in Indianhymns,JohnWu’stranslationoftheBible,andacasestudyonChin esechurchesintheNetherlands.

Introduction Western philosophy has a welldeserved reputation for being selfcentered. There are, however, important exceptions to the rule. Sometimes, one even finds echoes of another tradition in placeswheretheculturalmyopiaisstrongest.Onecouldthink hereofJosephdeMaistre’s(17531821)diatribeagainstthepro clamation of universal human rights. He comments sarcastic allyontheconstitutionof1795that“man”doesnotexist.Inhis lifetimehehadseenFrenchpeople,Italians,andRussiansand, thanks to Montesquieu, he knew that there were Persians. He concluded,however,“Asregards‘man,’IdeclareIhavenever

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methim.”1Interestingly,DeMaistreindirectlypaystributetoa philosophical satire using another culture to drive home its message:DeMontesquieu‘sLettrespersanes(1721).Thusheun wittinglyshowedwhataformativefactorphilosophyhasbeen inreachingouttoothercultures. The use of “natural theology” in this essay is, of course, open to misunderstanding. I have neither the competence nor theintentiontoventureintothefieldoftheology.“Naturalthe ology”isusedhereonlyinahistoricalsensetocapturethees sence of the conviction by which both the Jesuits and Leibniz wereled,i.e.thatallcreaturesareequallyendowedwithreason andthat,bythelightofreason,iffreedfromthefettersofidol worship and superstition, they will naturally arrive at the in sight that there is one (highest) God, and that in him we live andmoveandhaveourbeing. Although borrowing here and there from missiology and related disciplines, intercultural philosophy is the genre to whichthisessaybelongs.Thismeansthat“naturaltheology”as well as Hegel’s lectures on Asia will be treated consistently as varietiesofinterculturalphilosophy.Similarly,Legge’sstruggle and Schmidt’s agnosticism will be diagnosed as the loss of a universalframeworkininterculturalphilosophy. TheRitesControversy ThefamousJesuitMissioninChinaservedforseveralcenturies astheprimesourceofknowledgeofthatpartoftheworld.The reports sent home by Matteo Ricci (15521610), his colleagues andsuccessorswereverymuchthelensthroughwhichEurope lookedatChina. Wewouldnowsaythatthislenswasprimarilyphilosoph ical, although the Jesuits preferred to speak of “natural theo logy.” However, it does not matter which designation is used since the Jesuits considered all relevant philosophy to be na turaltheology.ThisalsomarkedtheirapproachtotheChinese 1

DeMaistre1989:145:”Iln’yapointd’hommedanslemonde.J’ai vu,dansmavie,desFrançois,desItaliens,desRusses,etc.,jesaismême, grâcesàMontesquieu,qu’onpeutêtrePersan:maisquantal’homme,je déclarenel’avoirrencontrédemavie....”

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tradition. They singled out Confucian thought because it was assumedthatitshierarchicalsystemofthoughtledtothethres holdofanauthenticnaturaltheology.Ashasoftenbeenpoint ed out, the Confucian thinking they came to know was a neo Confucianism shaped especially by Zhu Xi (11301200). This system of thought was indeed hierarchically ordered. Its high estprinciple(taiji)seemedtolenditselftointerpretationasan equivalent (or at least an approximation) of what the West meantbySupremeBeing(VanderLeeuw2006:3436). OneEuropeanphilosopherwhowasinfluencedbytheJes uitaccountswasLeibniz(16461716),andhiswritingsonChi nastillformahighpointinthereceptionhistoryofChina.Like Montesquieu,whousedthePersiansforhiscommentaryonthe conditions in France, Leibnitz used China as a mirror for the Europeofhistime.However,itwasnotonlyasasocialandpo litical critic (and much less for purposes of satire) that this philosopher turned to the Far East. His was obviously also a genuineinterestinthisworldthatwasatoncemysteriousand familiar. Experts still praise the quality and fairness of his de scription in which he carefully balanced strong and weak points. He was impressed by their statecraft and also praised theirobservationalskills,buthethoughtthat,comparativelyspeak ing, they were less good at scientific systematization (Leibniz 1994:4647;VanderLeeuw2006:51). Leibnizalsorespondedtoanexternalfactor:acontroversy abouttheJesuitlegacythathadbeenragingforsometime.Ricci and others had gone far with respect to legitimizing Chinese culture. An important factor in this was the acceptance of the (neo)Confucianphilosophytheycametoknowasanauthentic form of “natural theology.”2 Although certainly considered to bedeficientinsomerespects,thistraditionneverthelessseemed eminentlysuitableasapreparationfortheGospel.Riccididnot demand more than that the Chinese worship of Heaven be complementedandsupersededbytheworshipofthe“Lordof Heaven”(tianzhu).

2

OneshouldrememberthiswasaConfucianismreshapedbyZhu Xi(11301200)andotherneoConfuciansofthatperiod.

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Initially, the Jesuits had Rome’s full support. But the cli matebegantochangeinthesecondhalfoftheseventeenthcen tury. This marked the beginning of the “Rites Controversy,” whichendedwithanofficialindictmentoftheJesuitapproach as too accommodating. This came at a time when the Jesuits hadcomeunderattackwithinEuropebyPascal(16231662)and hisJansenistfriends.ThereisevidencethatthisEuropeancon troversy contributed greatly to undermining the credibility of theRiccianapproachtoChina.3 The critics held to a different view of the cult of Heaven. The Jesuits, of course, had known all along that “Heaven” in Chinesethoughtdoesnotdenoteapersonandnotevenaspirit ual being but rather an impersonal realm.4 Nevertheless, they regarded piety towards Heaven as something on which they could build. Their opponents reached quite different conclu sions.Intheirview,theChineseworldviewwasmaterialist,ag nostic, and, in fact, closer to Spinoza‘s “atheism” than to the Christian faith. Leibniz joined the battle by refuting the anti Riccian objections raised by Malebranche and Longobardi— who was himself a Jesuit . But his defense could not turn the tide. PointofContact It is hard to find even one outright defense of the antiRiccian position in the literature. Most commentators treat the oppo nents as bigots, but, strangely enough, this does not seem to leadtoareturntotheRicciLeibnizposition.BothJesuitnatural theologyanditsLeibnizianEnlightenmentsuccessorendedup inhistory‘sdustbin. So the opponents’ victory was definitive. Should I, as a Calvinist,notrejoiceatthis?PerhapsbutIdonot.Whyisthat? It is true that I do agree more with the critics than with Ricci

3

Cook and Rosemont (Leibniz 1994: 5) state that the Sorbonne facultyhadturned“largelyJansenist”;seealsoBuckley1994:283. 4

TherearevestigesofaprehistoricalcultofaprimordialHighGod.

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and Leibniz. As I will explain later, it is indeed my conviction thattheirnaturaltheologywasinsensitivetoreligiousandcul tural differences. The problem, however, is that the opponents wereabletocomeupwitha“framework”ofasimilarcontext transcendingscope. The widely shared assumption in academia at present is that there is no internal point of contact between China and Christianity.“Shipsthatpassinthenight,”Iheardthedoyenof Dutchsinologists,ErikZürcher(19282008),declareataconfer enceonthissubject(2002).Becauseacademiccultureissomuch anheirtotheantiRiccianreaction,ithasbecomewellnighim possibletobefairtothemotivationofthoseearlymissionaries. ManywouldnowsaythattheirpresenceinChinahadadouble agenda: Yes, their zeal to understand and translate China was exemplary. No, their interest was not pure, for it always, to somedegree,servedanagendasetbytheChurch.Thesuspic ion that they were really there to make converts to a Western religion was tangible in the audience when I was lecturing on intercultural philosophy in the past years. You could tell from their faces that they thought it would have been better if the missionarieshadneverlefttheChristianWest. I would maintain, nevertheless, that the natural theology position was less Eurocentric than is generally thought and showed, in fact, quite a remarkable evenhandedness in assess ingculturaldiversity.Itsbasicassumptionwasthatreasonwas a creational gift and had been distributed by Providence irre spective of geographical boundaries. Similarly, it held that Di vine assistance is there for all humans for using (and if neces sary)redirectingthisgift,irrespectiveoftheirspecificcultures. Therefore, the China mission did not see itself, I believe, as a Western outpost among aliens. Rather, the prevailing attitude seems to have been that they did in China what they would have done in Europe also: lead others to a more complete un derstandingofsalvation. To show the strength of Ricci’s conception, let me quote twopassagesfromhisworkon TheTrueMeaningoftheLordof Heaven.ItshouldbenotedhoweasilyhemovesfromEuropeto Asia:

476 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Inancienttimes,inthestatesneighboringmyownhumble nation,therewerenotmerely threereligionsbuthundreds of thousands of heterodox schools of thought; because our scholarslaterclarifiedthetruthwiththeaidofcorrectrea soning and influenced people by good works, these states now all follow the religion of the Lord of Heaven. (Ricci 1985: 101)It is simply that because we feel pity for men’s mistakes we wish to lead them back to their original path andintotheholyChurchoftheLordofHeaven.Weareall brotherswhosharethesamefather.(Ricci1985:455)

Therecurrentuseof“return”and“[shared]origin”throughout this book illustrates my point. Far from viewing conversion to Christianity as grafting an Asian shoot on to a Western trunk, thesemissionarieshopedforareturntothesharedoriginofhu mankind. AGrowingDistance PascalandtheJansenistsconcurredwithRicci,ofcourse,onthe point that humankind had issued from one father. However, thisknowledgehadnowbecomearevealedtruthratherthana truthofreason.ForPascal,theconditionhumainewaslessamat terofsharedcreaturelinessthanoneofafallennatureandlost grandeur.“SeeninthelightoftheChristianrevelation,natureis suchthatshetestifieseverywhere,withinmanandwithout,to a lost God, and a corrupt, unredeemed nature” (Löwith 1985: 184). Viewed from this angle, nothing in Chinese thought can be expected to transcend unredeemed nature and recommend itselfasasteppingstonetoredemption. Judgedsuperficially,laterhistory—afterPascal’sinfluence had waned—seems to have led to a greater understanding of the East. During the heyday of the Enlightenment it became something of a trend to start with China when writing world history,ratherthanwithAdamandEveinParadise.Thecradle of civilization was sought in ancient China; and the biblical storyunfoldingfromthecreationoftwohumanssomewherein the Near East towards the history of the Jewish tribes now seemed unbearably particularistic. Nowhere was this shift car riedthroughmoreprovocativelythaninVoltaire’sEssaisurles

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mœursetl’espritdesnations(“EssayontheCustomsandEthosof theNations”)(1756).AsVoltairebluntlydeclared,Chinesehis tory was both much older and much more civilized than the biblicalhistoryoftheJewishpeople. Prima facie, it appears that China thus obtained an even higher status than it enjoyed even with Ricci and Leibniz. But weshouldnotehowasubtledislocationoccurssimultaneously. Whereastheformerengagedinanexerciseinsynchroniccom parativesand,tothatextent,placedChinaonanequalfooting withtheWest,inVoltaire’sschemeChinaisplacedwithinade velopmentscheme.Althoughitdoesholdprideofplaceassuch astheprimalstageinthehistoryofcivilization,itsrelevanceis reduced, indeed, to a first stage in a long process. Moreover, with ancient China having been idealized to make the biblical storyoftheHebrewpeoplelookinsignificant,itsfurtherdevel opmentcouldbeseenonlyasasteadydecline.Forallitsideal izationofChina,Voltaire’sworldhistorywasmoreEurocentric thanRicci’s. Hegel’s case is even more illuminating. Although he did notbecomeinteresteduntilthe1820s,thelastdecadeofhislife, China became a recurrent theme in his great lecture series on world history, religion, and the history of philosophy. These notesdeservetobetakenseriously,althoughthenetresultcer tainly does not measure up to Leibniz’ achievement.5 Hegel’s historical sense prevented idealizations such as Voltaire’s. He did not concern himself with constructing a protohistory; in stead,Chinanowfiguredwithinahistoricalsetting.Onitsini tiallevel,ChinesethoughtisstillpartandparcelofwhatHegel callsthelevelofstatereligion;thenTaoismappearsasastepto wards philosophy coming into its own. The next stage is reached in (Chinese) Buddhism. Confucius, who was praised abundantly by Ricci and Leibniz, is now relegated to the first level.Hegelconsideredhisthoughttobelargelycommonsensi ble, and dryly remarks that the Sage’s reputation would have

5

ThisthemeisoftenskippedinHegelstudies.Forarehabilitation seeGriffioen2008andmoreextensivelyGriffioen,“HegelonChina,” forthcoming.

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been better served if he had been left untranslated.6 China’s greatachievementcameonlywhenitdevelopedapurenotion ofbeingassubstanceunderBuddhism. One should note here the ”antiRiccian” thrust of Hegel’s lectures on China. I do not mean that Hegel subscribed to all the Jansenist arguments against natural theology. Rather, the convergenceliesintheconclusionthat,first,theBuddhistposi tionis“atheistic”,that,second,Chinahadnoresourcesforget tingbeyondthispointand,third,thatittook“theChristianre volution”—insteadofa“completion”—toovercomeAsianstag nation. Inthefirstplace,Buddhismistreatedasatheistic.Hegel’s accountrunspartlyparalleltohistreatmentofSpinoza,andit sometimesseemsasifheislessconcernedwiththeparticulars ofBuddhismthanwithoutlininghisownpositionintheathe ism controversy that had been ignited by Jacobi’s critique of Spinozistic influences in German idealism. considered to be a necessarystage.Inkeepingwiththis,thedevelopmentofacon ceptoftheOne(orNatureasinSpinoza)asthebeginningand endofallthatexistsispraisedasamajorachievement. In the second place, however, Hegel is keen to expose a seriousshortcoming.NeitherBuddhismnorSpinozasucceeded in conceiving of the absolute as subject, instead of as substance. Theydenotetheabsoluteasoriginanddestinyofallthatlives but,notasanfreelyacting,willing,thinkingSubject(=God).7 In the third place, Hegel is adamant in his view that the conception of the absolute as subject was possible only in the wake of Christian revelation. Why? Because, as Hegel points out, this principle historically presupposes the Christian doc trine of the preciousness of the human person in the eyes of

6

Hegel1994:371:“Cicero’sDeofficiisisbetter,perhaps,forus,that allofConfucius’works.Thecompetentjudgeswillassessthetransla tions.ForthesakeofConfucius’fameitwouldhavebeenbetternotto translatethem;theyarewhollyordinary,longwindedmorality”(Trans lationmine). 7

WhereasSpinozatreats“Nature”and“God”assynonyms(Deus sivenatura),Hegelreservestheterm“God”fortheabsoluteassubject.

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God.8Asiacouldnotandcannotgetbeyondtheprincipleofthe One as the allabsolving substance; it lacks the inner resources to conceive of free subjectivity. A move in the right direction wouldhavebecomewhatatpresentiscalleda“paradigmshift” rather than a mere completion as Ricci naively thought. Hegel wasconfidentthatthisrevolutioncouldonlyhavetakenplace within the Christian era. In his view, China’s worldhistorical mission ended with Buddhism: its mission fulfilled, it was left asanemptyshellonthebanksoftime. ChinaMission What kind of philosophy did the missionaries take along to China in Hegel’s century? The orthodox mission, it appears, had not overcome the destruction of natural theology. Although my exposition will be restricted to only a few illustrations, I trustitwillbeenoughtogainameasureofclarity. The towering figure of the Protestant China Mission was James Legge (181597), missionary, translator, and later Bri tain’sfirstprofessorofChinese(atOxford).Heisstillhonored forhistranslationsoftheChineseclassics.Hestruggledagreat dealwithhowtoarriveataChristianappraisal.Forallhissym pathyfortheChineseclassics,heremainedthestaunchScottish Nonconformist he was. Nevertheless, the missionary boards grew increasingly critical of him. One objection was his choice ofshangdifortheterm“God”since,strictlyspeaking,itmeans highestGod,ratherthantheonlyGod.AsasinologistatOxford, he arrived at conclusions that agreed even less with his ortho doxfaith,maintaining,forinstance,thatwhenitcametoapre paratioevangelica,theteachingsofConfuciusareonthelevelof theOldTestament(Girardot2002:224,302,323).Hispointwas

8 Manytextscouldbequoted;sufficeittoquotethisonefromthe Rechtsphilosophieof1821,par.185(Hegel1958:124):“Theprincipleofthe selfsubsistentinherentlyinfinitepersonalityoftheindividual,theprin cipleofsubjectivefreedom,isdenieditsrightinthepurelysubstantial formwhichPlatogavetomindinitsactuality[asitwasinAsia].This principledawnedinaninwardformintheChristianreligion….”

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that, in their own way, the Chinese had fulfilled “the whole dutyofman”(Ecclesiastes12:13). In a certain sense he approached Ricci‘s position, because he also held that Chinese (= Confucian) religion needed to be complementedratherthandestroyed.Thedifferencewasthathe had no philosophy to support his position (and no Leibniz to assist him). When his back was up against the wall he had no otherdefensethantoappealtotheninthcommandment,saying hecouldnotbeartopassfalsewitnessontheChinese(Girardot 2002:32324). Legge’s struggle could not prevent orthodox missionaries onthewholefromleaningsoheavilytowardsanegativeview of Chinese culture that it became difficult to find any point of contact. Without wanting to belittle the missionary project or questionthededicationofthemanymissionariesandtheirlove fortheChinesepeople,itmustbestatedthattheyhadtocover anenormousspiritualdistancetogettheirmessageacross,and oftentheydidnotsucceed.AsMaxWeberputit(Weber1922: 515),theChristianmissionariestriedinvaintocreateanaware nessofsin.Fitzgeraldechoesthisjudgment: Theantithesisofsalvationanddamnation,theprimemotive forChristianconductandorthodoxbelief,wasabsentinthe Chinese mind. The people could never really understand thatthiswasthemotiveofChristianmissionteaching.(Fitz gerald1964:,128)

These missionaries may seem to have been a rather un philosophical lot, yet I believe their concentration on human sinfulness is inexplicable apart from the earlier philosophical shipwreckofnaturaltheology. LostinSspace Thefirstmissionarieshadtotravelalmostayearbeforereach ingtheirpostintheFarEast.Yetamazinglyenough,theiratti tudewasalmostcasual.Theydidnotcomeasquartermastersof aEuropeanoutreachprogram.Theirattitude(asexemplifiedby Ricci) was to go where they were called, be it Europe or else where. I am aware, of course, that they were not particularly

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close to the common people. In fact, the Jesuits followed an elitist strategy that focused on scholars and literati. Legge was certainlyinclinedtoexpectmoreofthediffusionoftheGospel among the middle classes and the poor, but at the end of the daywhatmatteredtohimwastheindirecteffectonthehigher class.9 Yet it is astonishing how intimate both Ricci and Legge becamewithaworldthatinitiallywasentirelyforeign.10 It is true that Hegel’s philosophy does bring a universal framework, but, as we saw, its developmental character ascribesaplacetoChinaonlyintheearlystagesoftheMarchof theMind.Thegeographicaldistancehereturnsintoadiachron icdistance.Later,thetideturnedagainandtheHegelianyoke was broken. The hierarchical ranking was undone, cultures nowbecameplacedinapositionofequality.Thiswasakindof liberation,butitcameatthepriceoffragmentation:beingthus juxtaposed,everyculturebecame“anisland,entireofitself.”11 Whatsailsatpresentundertheflagofinterculturalphilo sophyisquitediverse,andIwouldnotdaretogiveanygeneral indicationofwhereitisheading.OnlyinanegativesensecanI saythatIdonotseesignsofphilosophyrecoveringitsoriginal ethos.Thisisdue,Ibelieve,tothelastingeffectsofthefragmen tation just mentioned, compounded by political motivations. What I mean is that the present stress on the radical “other

9 Characteristically,inapubliclectureontheprospectsofChristian missions,aftercommendingnewconvertsamongthepoorandthemid dleclassfortheirfaith(“Ihaveknownsomewhotookjoyfullythespoil ingoftheirgoods,andsomewhowerepreparedtodieanddiddie,ra therthandenytheirfaith”),hearrivedatthisassessment:“Andtheiref fecthasbeengreatonthehigherclassesofChinesesocietyandthemem bersofthegovernment,manyofwhoseprejudicesarepassingaway” (Legge1888:64). 10

ThisstruckmewhenreadingShusakuEndo’sSilence(1966),the grippingaccountofthepersecutionofmissionariesandconvertsinearly seventeenthcenturyJapan. 11

JohnDonne,MeditationXVII:”Nomanisanisland,entireofitself ...anyman’sdeathdiminishesme,becauseIaminvolvedinmankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”

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ness” of distant cultures is at least partly inspired by antiglo balizationconsiderations. I sense such a political motivation at work in Stephan Schmidt’s study on intercultural philosophy (Schmidt 2005). ThislearnedbookcompetentlytracesthedevelopmentofCon fucianthoughtbutfailstodowhatitclaims:toprovideanew foundation for intercultural philosophy. Instead of showing possibilitiesforarapprochement,itdoesitsbesttobroadenex istinggapsbyinsistingthatConfucianthought,theparagonof Chineseculture,hasnopointofcontactwithanythingfromthe West,claimingitrepresentsaformofradicalotherness(Schmidt 2005: 172, 232, 250). What creates distance, Schmidt thinks, is language. His intercultural hermeneutics wants to sensitize thoseinterestedinChinatoinsurmountableproblemsoftrans lation.Thisisnotonlytofrightenamateurssuchasmyselfbut alsoexpertsinthefield,claimingthatlinguisticinsensitivityis causingstagnationininterculturalphilosophy.12 RegainedProximity InsteadoffollowingSchmidt,interculturalphilosopherswould do well to heed processes of integration, carefully weighing what is serviceable to the leveling forces of globalization and whathasthepotentialofdisclosingnewpossibilities.Thefunc tioning of the Christian church worldwide may provide them with many instances of the latter kind. What Vroom wrote about symbols in Indian hymns can be used as an example here.Hisaccountofwhathappensinthemakingandsingingof Christianhymnishighlyrelevantforoursubject.Whathede scribes is a movement from the specifics of a context in which thehymnisborntoanattempttoexpresssomethingoftheuni versal human condition and then back to the lifeworld of the

12

Schmidt2005:232(cf.25154):“Thefarreachingnonconsidera tionofthetranslationproblemsisasadindicationofthemethodological statusquoofinterculturalphilosophy”(translationmine).

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worshipers.13Suchaprocessdoesintegrateacommunityintoa traditionbutdoessoinawaythathasnothingtodowithadi versitydestroyingglobalizationprocess. Vroomwouldagreethatintegrationintoatraditionishard to balance and would therefore be helped by an appropriate philosophy.Inthefirstplace,itentails(aswejustsaw)amove ment of transcending one‘s immediate context or even one’s culture. In the second place, it also ideally mobilizes inner re sources,disclosingitspotentialsintheverymovementoffree ing itself from the restrictions of a given context. Where an equilibriumisreached,analternativehasbeendevelopedboth visàvis the Riccians and the antiRiccians. Ricci’s approach wasonesidedtotheextentitabstractedfromallformsofcul turalembeddedness;hisnaturaltheologydidnotdevelopacul tural hermeneutics. The worship of the Lord of Heaven, al though it presupposed the Confucian cult, was, nevertheless, not conceived to disclose and develop Chinese potential. The antiRiccians were much more culturally aware but in a nega tive sense only since they doubted that Chinese culture could provideanypointofcontact. On the other hand, the disclosure of potential always im plies a transcending and leaving behind of certain elements. There is no perspective of a wholesale redemption of any cul ture. It may well be that Chinese Christians tend to think too easily about this. Hazenbosch and Griffioen found indications of such a tendency in their case study of Chinese churches in the Netherlands. Interestingly enough, no evidence was found ofasenseofradicalothernessseparatingtheChinesefromthe HebrewBible.Rather,theprevailingsenseappearstobeoneof proximity,awidelysharedassumptionthatbiblicalteachingre inforcescertainkeyvaluestheyhavegrownupwith,especially 13

Vroom2004:156:“Thesolutionforthetransmissionofthe‘tra dition’inapluralityofcontextsandsituationsistocitehumanexperi enceonamoregenerallevel:allpeoplemusteat,canfeellonely,under godifficulties,andneedafriend,helperandprotector.…Peopleare addressedonadeeperandmoregenerallyhumanlevel(food,lightin general,Jesusasfriend)andhave(oneassumes)developedtheabilityto applythegeneraltermstotheirownlives.”

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“filial piety,” a value that fulfills a cementing function in their culture. Church leaders show concern that Western churches may become lost in space, having succumbed so much to the spiritofindividualismastobealmostoutofreachoftheGos pel. Another assumption is that the Chinese language (be it Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkein or whatever else) is needed to keepthespiritofindividualismoutside.Thisexplainsthereluc tancetoallowDutchorEnglishlanguageworshipservices(Grif fioenandHazenbosch2008). Another illustration of how hard it is to find an equili brium is the work of John Wu (Wu Jingxiong, 18991986). Wu hasbeencalledthemostfamousconvertoftheinterbellumera. Hewasbothatoplegalscholarandarepresentativeoftheold literati class. During WW II he started to translate the psalms andtheNewTestament.Characteristically,hedrewonChinese resourcestogainproximitytotheHebrewBible.Histranslation ofthefirstletterofJohnespeciallyshowsthathedidnotshun usingkeyconceptsborrowedfromTaoismandneoConfucian ism(seeHaft2006,2008).HowmuchweightheputonChina’s internal resources becomes clear from his reminiscences in his autobiography. He relates that, in translating the psalms, he never felt as if he had been been transposed into a foreign world—quite the opposite. The descriptions of nature seemed quiteChinese14whereashefoundanevenstrongerresemblance betweenwhathecalledthe“spiritualcausality”affirmedbythe psalms and the Chinese idea of immanent justice. This line of Psalm9,forinstance,struckhimas“veryChinese”:“TheLord isknownbyhisjustice;thewickedareensnaredbytheworkof theirhands”(Wu:216). Personally,IdoubtiftheChineseideaofimmanentjustice, sometimessymbolizedas“thenetofHeaven”fromwhichnone canescape,canreallydojusticetotherichconnotationsofthe biblical sense of justice opening up towards love and forgive ness.

14

P.29oftheDutchtranslationBovenoostenWest;Ihavenotbeen abletoconsulttheoriginal.

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Only through trial and error it is possible to find out ex perientiallywhattheconvertneedstoabandonandwhatthere istobedisclosedandcarriedalongontheChristianpilgrimage. It is my conviction that only by taking this kind of experience seriously can the onslaught of the Rites Controversy be over comeandabeginningbemadewiththedevelopmentofatruly interculturalphilosophy. Bibliography Buckley,MichaelL.(1994).“TheSuppressionoftheChineseRites.”In: The Chinese Rites Controversy: Its History and Meaning. In: D.E. Mungello(ed.).MonumentaSericaVol.XXXIII,Nettetal:Steyler. DeMaistre, Joseph. (1989). Écrits sur la Révolution. Paris: Presses Uni versitairesdeFrance. Fitzgerald,C.P.(1964).TheBirthofCommunistChina.London:Pelican. Girardot, Norman J. (2002). The Victorian Translation of China: James Legge’s Oriental Pilgrimage. Berkeley: University of California Press. Griffioen,Sander.“HegelonChina,”In:avolumeonHegelandReli gion.Ed.T.J.M.Slootweg.Forthcoming. (2008).“China:dichtbij,verafenanders.”In:GerdRielandBart Raymaekers (eds). Taoïsme. Louvain: Louvain University Press. Pp.1129. andHenkHazenbosch.(2008).”Ethiekenmulticulturaliteit.”In: AnnetvanMelleandPetervanZilfhout(eds).WoordenenDaden: Eeninleidingindeethiek.Amsterdam:Boom/OpenUniversiteit. Haft, Lloyd. (2008). “De Dao als Logos in een Chinese vertaling van het Nieuwe Testament.” In:  Gerd Riel and Bart Raymaekers (eds).Taoïsm.Leuven:LeuvenUniversityPress.Pp.7391. (2006).“JohnC.H.WuendevleesgewordenDaovanJohannes.” In:SanderGriffioen.Eenweggaan,Budel:Damon,Pp.10513. Hegel, G.W.F. (1994). Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Part 1. Ed. P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke. Vol. 6. Hamburg: Mei ner. (1958). Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Transl. T.M. Knox. Oxford: Clarendon,1958, Legge, James. (1888). The Nestorian Monument of Hsian Fu. London: Truebner.

486 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (1994). Writings on China. Ed. Daniel J. CookandHenryRosemont.Chicago/LaSalle:OpenCourt. Löwith, Karl. (1985). Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis. Sämtliche Schriften 3. Stuttgart:Metzler. Ricci, Matteo. (1985). Tianzhu shiyi (1603). A ChineseEnglish Edition. Ed. Edward J. Malatesta, S.J. Taipei/Paris/Hong Kong: Institut Ricci. Schmidt, Stephan. (2005). Die Herausforderung des Fremden: Interkul turelle Hermeneutik und konfuzianisches Denken. Darmstadt: Wis senschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft. VanderLeeuw,Karel.(2006).Leibniz:OverdeNatuurlijkeTheologievan deChinezen.Budel:Damon. Vroom,Henk.(2004).“BhajansandtheirSymbols:ReligiousHermen eutics of ‘the Good Life’.” In: Marcel Sarot and Wessel Stoker (eds).ReligionandtheGoodLife.STAR.Assen:RoyalvanGorcum. Pp.15372. Weber,Max.(1922).GesammelteAufsätzezurReligionssoziologie.Vol.1. Tübingen:Mohr. Wu,John.(n.d.).Bovenoostenwest.Transl.DickOuwendijk.Utrecht: Fontein.

ChristianViews oftheNewReligiosities oftheWesternWorld ReenderKranenborg

Abstract Each religion must examine the situation of its time. Thus, Christian churchesintheWestshouldexaminethenewreligioussituationthatischar acterized by a new religiosity, or delineated as esotericism or (Neo)Gnosti cism. Is it possible to develop a specific Western contextual theology in this context? This essay first explores the area of the new spirituality. It then looksattheresponseof“Evangelicals”tothis(Neo)Gnosticism(oftencalled New Age). After that, it investigates the attitude and responses of the Pro testant Church in the Netherlands, which was intensely involved in a dia loguewithNewAgeandesotericismintheperiod19922001.Finally,“eso tericChristianity”isexploredandthequestionisposedifthisformcanagree inonewayoranotherwiththetheologyoftheProtestantChurchintheNe therlands. The question of how much one can speak of a new Western con textualtheologyisdiscussedinthefinalsection.

Introduction Thereligiouscontexthaschangeddramaticallyforthechurches intheNetherlandsinthelastfiftyyears.Afewpublicationswill illustratethispoint.In1958thefourtheditionofA.B.W.M. Kok’sVerleidendegeestenappeared.Thisbookdescribestwenty three small religious groups that were usually referred to in those times as sects. Waarheid en dwaling, by the same author, had appeared about 10 years previously, giving brief descrip tions of about fifteen Christian groups. In summary fashion bothbooksreportedthenontraditionalchurchgroupsexisting in the Netherlands at that time. The two largest Protestant de nominations, the Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk (Netherlands Reformed Church) and the Gereformeerde Kerken in Neder land (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands), and the Roman CatholicChurchconstitutedadominantmajority,withanaddi 487

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tional number of smaller, primarily Reformed, denominations. Beyond that, there was still a large percentage of people who belonged to another denomination or did not belong to any church.Thus,thereligiouscontextofChristiansintheNether landswasasfollows:aChristiancountry,withaChristiancul ture, with a large number of people with no church affiliation whononethelesswerestillstronglyinfluencedbytheChristian tradition in their thinking, standards and value patterns, with an additional few deviating groups. There was no reason to developanykindofWesterncontextualtheology. Thesituationhaschangedcompletelyin2010.Itisconsid erably more difficult to describe and great shifts have taken place. Two publications can serve to illustrate this. In 2008 the Handboek Christelijk Nederland (HCN) by E.G. Hoekstra and M. H.Ipenburgwaspublished.Thisbookgivesshortdescriptions of 648 different Christian congregations, churches and groups, includingthemajorchurchesintheNetherlandsbutprimarilya great many small Christian communities who together have a large following. In 2000 the same authors published the third reprintofWegwijsinreligieusenlevensbeschouwelijkNederland,an encyclopedia that had more than 600 columns with many en tries. Although this book also includes many of the Christian groups found in the HCN, such as mainstream churches, the largerpartoftheworkisfocusedonnonChristiangroups.Itis this form that is extensively discussed in Wegwijs: Islam, Hin duism, Buddhism, Judaism, esotericism, the new religiosity. The book does not offer a complete picture by far, as is ap parentfromthefollowing.In2007IpublishedmyNeohindoeïs tische bewegingen in Nederland in which I described seventy movementsthathavetheirrootsinHinduismandofwhichon lysomewereincludedinWegwijs.Inshort,thereligiousmapof theNetherlandshaschangedinthelastfiftyyears. What does the religious context of the Christian churches intheNetherlandslooklikeatpresent?1Weshouldstatefirstof all that the Christian churches are now becoming an increas inglysmallerminorityandthatitisexpectedthatinafewyears lessthanfivepercentofthepopulationwillbelongtothePro testant Church in the Netherlands (PKN). Further, the new 1

ForanuptodateoverviewseeTerBorgetal.2008.

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Christian religiosity is striking: many Evangelicals and many Pentecostals, primarily immigrants. Then there are the great worldreligions,whichconstituteaverylargeminoritywithal mostamillionMuslimsandallegedlyahundredthousandHin dus that, as with the previous category, are still growing. We mustthenpointoutthatagreatmanypeoplehavejoinedsome religiousgrouporother—somanythatwecansaythatmajor ity of the population is “nonchurch.” But being “nonchurch” does not imply that there is no interest in religiosity or spirit uality,forthesearequitepopular,sowecanstatethatthefact that someone is nonchurch does not at all mean that he is a religious or has no interest in such matters. To the contrary, a largemajoritysaytheyareinterestedinreligionorspirituality. ThisisthenewreligiouscontextofthechurchesintheNe therlands: we live in a country with, in addition to all those whodonotbelieveandconsiderthemselvestobeatheistorhu manist, with many who adhere to other (and new) religions andwithareligiositythatisusuallynotChristianbuthasadif ferent content. In this new religious context it is precisely this socalled“newreligiosity”thathasaveryimportantrole.Ifthe church wants to develop a contextual theology—and this is needed—then it must focus in particular on this nonchurch spirituality(asidefromthecontactwithMuslimsandHindus). InthiscontributionIwillexplorethequestionofwhatkindof Christianresponsestherearetothisnewreligiouscontextwith such a new religiosity. We will concentrate on the response of thePKN. TheNewReligiosity The term “new religiosity” is not sufficiently clear in itself, whichiswhyafurtherexplanationisneeded.“New”doesnot mean “new in the Netherlands.” That is why Islam, for in stance, is not included within this new religiosity. Nor does “new” refer to “new Christian religiosity,” which can refer to Evangelicals and Pentecostals. Rather, it concerns a religiosity thatisfoundoutsidetheChristianchurchesandcongregations, even though some members of the Christian churches do dis playthisnewreligiosityverymuch.Thisnewreligiosityhasa number of aspects—not in the sense of aspects of a certain or ganizationbutratherasseparateelementsofalargerphenom

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enon.Itconcernsareligiositythatischaracterizedbyinterestin angels,spiritsandsupernaturalbeings,withwhomcontactcan bemade(e.g.via“channeling”)andwiththerelationshipsthat canbemadewiththosewhohavepassedaway.Theconceptof NDE (near death experiences) is very appealing and viewed primarilyasprooffortheexistenceofahigherreality.Beliefin “thepowerofthemind”or“positivethinking,”i.e.thatonecan attainallonedesires(thebookTheSecretisagoodillustration ofthis),hasastrongfollowing.Thetermmagicisreadilyused, wherebywhatismeantisthatpeoplecanuseorunderstandin visiblepowersintheuniverse(onecanthinkhereofastrology). Peopleareverymuchinspiredbyalternativehealthcare,which includesnotonlyforcesofnaturebutalsospiritualenergy.And “naturereligion”alsoplaysarole,notonlybecauseoftheques tionofhowtodealwithnatureproperlybutalsobecauseofthe worshipofnature(asin(neo)paganismortheGaiahypothesis). Althoughitisimpossibletounifyalltheseaspectscompletely, we can at least say that all these aspects are concerned with findingthedivineenergywithinourselvesandthecosmos,and strivingtobecomeonewithitortobeabsorbedintoit.Thatis whyafewtermsareusedatpresentthatemphasizeandsum marizethisaspect:(neo)Gnosticism,esotericismandNewAge. Inanyevent,weseethatthesetermswereusedincreasinglyfor oneandthesamething,albeitthetermNewAgeisdisappear ingandtheterm(neo)Gnosticismisbeingusedmoreandmore. In any case, discovering one’s own divine core and becoming onewithitiscentraltoallofthis. If we inquire into the relation between the Christian faith andthenewreligiosity,theissueisthen:HowdoChristiansor Christian churches respond to this new Gnostic religiosity? In what follows three responses will be outlined: that found in Evangelicalcircles,thatofthemajorProtestantchurchesinthe Netherlands (later the PKN) and the response by “Esoteric Christianity.” TheResponsebytheEvangelicals Evangelical circles can respond quite fiercely to this new reli giosity. Indeed, they have been responding from the time that NewAgefirstarose,takinggreatinterestinit,eventhoughthis interest was guided by rejection. It was thus clearly stated im

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mediately that New Age did not accept traditional orthodox teachings and views, and it was pointed out that people be lieved many things not in the Bible that seemed Christian but wereverydifferentfromitwithrespecttocontent.Onecould, for instance, speak of Jesus Christ but never about him as the SonofGod.Rather,hewasviewedmoreasaGnosticteacher.It wasveryquicklyconcludedinEvangelicalcirclesthatitwasall theworkofSatan,forthedevil,itwasclaimed,canpretendto be an angel of light and thus deceive many. By following the ideasofNewAgeoneenteredthesphereofpowerofeviland was lost. Thus, they saw the power of the devil growing here. Gradually, the concept of occultism was used and applied in creasinglyandwascontinuallyfurtherelaborated.Inshort,the area of the occult is large and conceals many dangers. Almost all aspects of the new religiosity sketched in the section above canbeincludedwithinthisoccultism:alternativemedicine(in cludinghomeopathy),yoga(theideaofselfredemption),(neo) paganism (primarily modern witchcraft or wicca), everything thattendstowardmagic(includingastrology),etc.Thatcango quite far. Illustrative here is the reaction to the Harry Potter books:here,accordingtoEvangelicals,averydangeroustend ency can be seen there, for those books concern supernatural beingsandwizardryormagicispracticed.Insum,HarryPotter is not read in these circles, for it is much too dangerous: the books contain in essence demonic activities that emanate from Satan’sreachofpower.Therearestrictwarningsagainstallof this within Evangelical circles, in which an apocalyptic tone is often heard, for the occurrence of all these temptations of the devil is a sign that the end times have arrived. We must con clude that there is no dialogue here with Gnostic spirituality; everythingisliterallydamned;nothingcanbedonewithit;no thingcanbelearnedfromitanditneedstobecombated.2 Butwewouldbedistortingthefactsifwesawtheaboveas representativeforallEvangelicalgroups.Itisanextremereac tion,foundnonethelessinmanyChristiancircles,includingthe EvangelicalcirclesinthePKN.Butitisabsolutelynottheonly one;therearemoremoderateviews.Onerepresentativeofsuch 2

AmoreextensivediscussionoftheEvangelicalandotherChristian responsescanbefoundinKranenborg1994:795.

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from the very beginning in the Netherlands is J. Verkuyl, a member of one of the Protestant (Reformed) demoninations at thetimeintheNetherlandsbutwithanEvangelicalinclination (Verkuyl1989). This response does not want to speak of fear of the devil andoccultism,anditisopentoapproachingtheotherandnot turninghim/herintoahereticbeforehand.Rather,theposition hereisthatNewAgeisitselfaresponsetoalackinthechurch. Theclaimisthatif,forexample,peoplehadputmoreemphasis onexperience,itwouldhavecomesofar.Thispositionalsoin cludestheattitudethatonecanlearnsomethingfromNewAge spirituality—for,afterall,whatiswrongwithusingyogaexer cisesformeditation?SuchthingscanbeusefulforaChristian. AnotheraspectoftheencounterwithNewAgeisthat,asChris tians, people are focused anew on what the Christian faith is about, so that they can thus be clearer and more certain about theirownfaith.ItcanthusbeclearthatGodisalwaystheOther and that every person is a unique person, recognized by God (thus no Gnosticism or reincarnation) and it may also be clear thatGodistheCreator.Further,thatJesus,astheSonofGod, asGod,hascomeonearthtosavepeopleiscentral,withthere sultthatpeoplebecomeconsciousoftheirsinandmustrepent. Thus,thereismoretoit:one’sownChristianfaithcanbecome clearer, so that it can be expressly stated that New Age and Christianfaithcannotultimatelybejoined.Intheendtheyare verydifferentwaysandcompromiseisimpossible.Thisre sponse is considerably more positive than the Evangelical re sponseabove.Butifitactuallyentailsanencounterisnotclear. Thereis,inanycase,nothingofacontextualtheology. TheResponseoftheProtestantChurch(es)intheNetherlands TheabovementionedpublicationbyVerkuylappearedin1989. That this book could be published clearly indicates that there was obviously great interest at the end of 1980s in New Age spirituality.Verkuyl,giventhathewassosensitivetodevelop ments in spiritual areas, felt called to write on this and make clear that the church could not avoid such matters and at the same time had to show what its position with respect to New Agewas.

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Thechurchesheardthesignalandwenttowork.Thatfirst becameclearwiththeCouncilofChurchesintheNetherlands. Within this council the Office of Interreligious Encounter was formed, which even included a number of working groups, such as the New Religious Movements Working Group. In co operation with the organization for collaboration in pastoral care in the Netherlands Reformed Church and the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, supported by the abovemen tioned office, a study day was convened by the council on 13 March1992.Theydidnotintendtobeginwithstatingpositions ormakingjudgements;theirconcernwasprimarilytomakean inventoryofwhatkindofideaspeoplehadregardingthisarea in modern society and primarily in wide circles of the church. Theinterestinthisstudydaywasquitegreat—thetheme“New Age and Christian Faith” spoke to many. For that reason the presentations on this study day were gathered into a volume thatwaspublishedin1993andreprintedin1994(publishedas Kranenborg1993).Ashasalreadybeenstated,itdidnotintend toassessorcondemnNewAge.Variouspositionswereheard: adherents of New Age spoke, as did those who had questions aboutthismovement.Thecouncilheldouttheprospectofpub lication that would explore the pastoral side of the matter in particular.Thispublicationalsoappearedin1993asanedition ofPraktischeTheologie,calledDepastoraleuitdagingvanNewAge. Inanycase,itbecamecleartothechurchesintheNether lands that New Age could not be ignored. For that reason the synods of the three uniting churches decided to explore it in depth. They commissioned the “Council for the Affairs of Church and Theology of the Netherlands Reformed Church” and the “Delegates for Church and Theology of the Reformed ChurchesintheNetherlands”towriteapastoralaid,intended fordiscussioninthecongregationsonNewAgethinking.This aid was discussed by the synod of the uniting churches, ap provedandsenttothechurches.On29January1994approval was given and the booklet was published as De kerken hebben hungeheim:Tussenoudennieuw.Thisreportlookeddeeplyinto New Age. It was indicated that this was necessary because so many in the churches were occupied with the material and it was therefore outlined extensively what New Age was about. ThereweremanycitationsbyNewAgeauthors,sothatitcould

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beseenwhatwasessentialinthesecircles.Atthesametimeit could also be seen that the church had possibly not paid e noughattentiontocertainthingsandhadnoperspectiveonthe new spirituality that was being developed. They had been too busywithtraditionalmattersandformsoffaith,withoutknow ing what the concerns of the congregational members were. A confession of guilt was made, but it was also indicated that it couldhavebeenotherwise. Fourtopicswerethematizedinthebookletasessentialfor the encounter or contact with New Age thinking. These topics could lead to recognition but at the same time to alienation. These topics are: creation, God’s nearness, the community and onthewaytothefuture. Withrespecttothetopicofcreation,itisstatedclearlythat creationandCreatorareseparateandthatthecreationischar acterizedbybrokenness,aconsequenceofsin.Certainly,God’s creationisgood,butwehavetolivewithimperfectionandam biguity,whichisinherenttocreation.Herethecouncilisdistan cingitselffromtheGnostictendency(althoughtheterm“Gnos tic” is not used) towards holism and the idea that God and humanbeingsconvergeonthedeepestlevel.Inadditiontothis, it is stated clearly that we are abusing the creation terribly at present and that New Age, with its environmental awareness, isagoodexampletofollow. The topic of “God’s nearness” deals with the question of therelationshipbetweenGodandhumanbeings.Theideathat thehumanbeingatbottomisdivineandpartofauniversaldi vine energy, essentially a Gnostic idea, is rejected. Rather, the human being is seen as a creation willed by God, with whom Godentersintoarelationshipandwho,asahumanbeing,can buildarelationshipwithGod.Godcanbeveryneartoahuman beingthroughtheHolySpirit,suchthatonecanevensaythat God dwells in the person. But this intimacy is still a relational intimacyandthehumanbeingandGodcannotbeidentified. Thetopicof“Community”emphasizesthatapersondoes notliveforhimself,fortheChristianfaithisnotindividualistic, but lives within a community. People have a joint task in this world, in confession and in action to which the church must continue to dedicate itself. One can detect a strong individual

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ism in New Age, in which it concerns exclusively that one de velopsoneself,withoutseeingtheother. The fourth topic is “on the way to the future.” Here the issueisreincarnation.Itisstatedclearlythateachhumanlifeis uniqueandunrepeatable,andthateveryonealsohasapersonal relationship with God, in which a person is addressed as the other.Thepurposeoflifeisnottoliveonearthoncemorebut to be with Jesus Christ after death. The idea that people can perfectthemselvesthroughthecourseofmanylivesandreach the final goal of union with God does not fit within Christian thinking.Inthatwaytheunicityandpersonalaspectofhuman lifedisappearsfromview. In the discussion of this report at the synod, it appeared thatanimportantdetailhadbeenoverlooked:nothingwassaid about Jesus’ life and work. That we are reconciled in Jesus Christ and can live only on the basis of his grace was not dis cussedinthereport.Thismatterwasaddressedintheintroduc tiontothebrochure. Thisreportstronglyinfluencedthediscussionforthecom ing years, although it was thought that more could have been said.Inanycase,thechurchdecidednottoremovethematter fromtheagendabuttocontinueandaresearchprojectwasset up: Dialogue between the Church and New Age Thinking,” withastaffmemberwhowouldorganizeanationalconference on this matter and, in addition, would write a report on this material. In 1996 the staff member, Frederike de Jong, pub lishedherZeishetzelfopwiezewachtasapreparatoryworkfor theconference“TussenVisenWaterman”(BetweenPiscesand Aquarius)thatwasultimatelyheldon6and7March1998.Af terthisconferencedeJongpublishedEenonverwachtenieuwetijd inwhichaninventorywasmadeandthequestionsforthenear futurewerelisted. De Jong posits five topics on which she did not give her opinion or judgement but presented them as important topics for the church’s further discussion with the New Age move ment.ThefirsttopichastodowiththeconceptofGod.Shein dicatesthatwithinNewAgetheemphasisfallsonthedivineas animpersonalpower,whereasthechurchesspeakexplicitlyof

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a personal God with whom one can enter into a relationship.3 She then looks at the topic “experiences,” which includes ap paritions, passing on messages and healing gifts, a topic that was not explicitly addressed earlier. She rightly argued that such information should be discussed more within the church andinamoreopenway.Thethirdtopicisreincarnation.Here itappearsthattherearegreatdifferencesbetweentheviewsof thechurchandthoseofNewAge;theconnectionofreincarna tion with socalled “selfdevelopment” is particularly impor tant:intheend,ahumanbeinglivesonlybythegraceofGod. The next topic, “suffering,” is closely connected to the idea of reincarnation. Is suffering essentially a consequence of the deedscommittedinapreviouslifeandarepeoplethusrespon sible for suffering in the present life. Or must suffering and guiltbeseparated?Inthelattercase,apersonisthenresponsi bleforhowhedealswithsuffering,ratherthanbeingresponsi ble for the suffering itself. The last topic is Jesus Christ, which was not discussed in De kerken hebben hun geheim. New Age talksabout“theChristwithinone”orabouttheChristlightor the Christ spirit or that one must develop the Christ within oneself.ThereturnofChristshouldthenalsobeunderstoodin thesensethatoneisincreasinglyfilledwiththespiritofChrist in oneself. Considerably little is heard within New Age about the specific work of Jesus, i.e. his reconciling and forgiving work,justaslittleisheardabouttheideaofJesusasredeemer andliberatorfromsins.Areconnectionsstillpossiblehere? Matters continued to develop after de Jong’s book was published.Althoughshestatedinherforewordthatthefurther progress of the project was uncertain, the ecclesiastical bodies decidedinthesameyeartocontinue:thedialoguebetweenthe churchandNewAgethinkinghadtobecontinued.Therefore, itwasdecidedtoexploretheabovementionedtopicsthorough lyinanumberofregionalstudydays,namelyon3June2000in The Hague, 19 May 2001 in Groningen and on 3 November 2001 in Eindhoven. The three topics that had earlier been dis

3

 She does not wish to characterize New Age as Gnostic. In my view,thisisincorrect,evenifitiscorrectthatNewAgedoesdifferfrom classicalGnosticism.ButtheconceptofgodinNewAgeisnonetheless usuallysketchedasGnostic.

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cussedwerethemostimportant.OneconferencefocusedonJe susofNazareth,thesecondonthephenomenonof“chanelling” andvoicesfrombeyondandthethirdonreincarnation.4 After the third conference it remained quiet for good. It had become clear that this project would not be continued; a certain reluctance began to arise in connection with the topic. This could be seen already when the conference in The Hague wascalledoffbytheecclesiasticalbodiesbecauseitwasthought thatthereweretoofewspeakerswhocouldarticulatetheortho dox Protestant position. That the conference went ahead any way was because the clergy in The Hague organized it under theirownauspices. Itwasduetoseveralfactorsthatthematterwasultimately given up and that there would be no continuation. An impor tantreasonwasthattherewascontinuallylessinterestfromthe worldofNewAgetoengageindialoguewiththechurch.The advocates of this dialogue had either died or were concentrat ingmoreontheirownesoterictradition,whichtheynolonger calledNewAgethinkingbutreferredtoitratheras(neo)Gnos ticismorEsotericChristianity,thusdistancingthemselvesfrom thetraditionalchurchposition. Butamuchmoreimportantreasonforendingthiscontact layinthefactthatthereweremanyothermattersinthechurch esthatprovedtohavehigherpriority:peopleweresimplytoo busy with the church’s internal concerns. The radical merging ofthethreeunitingchurchesintothePKNwasloomingonthe horizon, the churches were busy writing a new church order andorganizinganewchurchstructurebymeansofregionaliza tion, so that there was no time to explore the new spirituality. Also,thefactthatthechurchwasgrowingsmallerledtoagreat deal of emphasis on survival and searching for new church models, while there were also signs of a “confessionalization” and “evangelicalization” of the church. In any case, there was notalkofacontextualtheology. Did the encounter with New Age yield any results? In a general sense it did: because of that encounter there is now more interest in experience and mysticism, less emphasis on 4

Thelecturesofthethreeconferenceswerecollectedandpublished; seeMakandSondorp2003.

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dogma and doctrine; there is openness towards phenomena thatcannotbeimmediatelyexplained.Butanactualnewtheo logyhasnotarisen.Theencounteryieldedverylittletheologic ally,andtherehasinessencebeennoprocessingofthenewre ligiosity—unlesswewanttolookatitfromtheotherside. EsotericChristianity TheHandboekreligieinNederlandpublishedin2008paysample attention to Christianity in its many forms. One of the forms thatreceivesseparatetreatment,inadditiontoProtestantismor the Eastern Orthodox churches, for example, is the socalled EsotericChristianity,bywhichtheauthor,JohnvanSchaik,in troducesanewbranchofChristianity.Itisnotthattheexpres sion was not used previously, but in general it was not talked about that way. In short, by this term Van Schaik means what waspreviouslycalled“esotericism.”Thisincludedsuchschools asclassicalGnosticism,Manichaeism,theCathars,Rosicrucians andFreemasons,theosophyandanthroposophy,NewAgethink ing.AlthoughVanSchaikrecognizesthatthesemovementscan be very different, he wants to characterize them as Christian. There are groups that have little connection with classical Chris tianitybuttherearealsogroupsthataresometimesveryclose to orthodox beliefs. In line with that he remarks that Rudolf Steiner, for example, the founder of anthroposophy and the Christian Community, sees Jesus as divine, that he speaks of Christs incarnation, his death on the cross and resurrection, and of his redemptive work. But all these quite divergent movements can, nevertheless, be included in one category characterized by, among other things, the emphasis on experi ence, interest in mysticism, where people are not so much monotheisticaspanentheistic,wherethereistalkofapparitions and contact with the other reality, and where transmutation (thechangeintoanothermatter)isessential.Thisbroadcurrent of Esoteric Christianity can also include the ecclesiastical theo logians of New Age thinking such as Karel Douven, Joanne KlinkandHansStolp. Byincludingallofthisunderthecommondenominatorof EsotericChristianity,VanSchaikhassetanimportantdevelop mentinmotion.Firstofall,hestatesbythisthatesotericismis not something Eastern in Western dress but has an authentic

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Christian origin. If it could be stated easily in the 1990s that NewAgewasaWesternizedformofHinduismorthatBlavat skyoftheTheosophicalSocietyhadbroughtEasternwisdomto the West, this can no longer be claimed if we follow Van Schaik’s definition. Second, he has thus made esoteric Chris tianityoneoftheimportantschoolswithintheChristiantradi tion.Thereare,forexample,RomanCatholicism,liberalismand there is Esoteric Christianity. And, as an orthodox Christian willneverthelessseeliberalism—withwhichhecompletelydis agrees—as a Christian movement, so he should also consider Esoteric Christianity—with which he probablyalso completely disagrees—as a legitimate form of Christianity. Thus, esoteri cism is, as it were, legitimized by Van Schaik as an authentic formofChristianity. Now a complication appears. For Esoteric Christianity is not only an independent movement. This form of Christianity also appears within the other currents and various Christians and theologians propagate this Esoteric Christianity enthusias tically within the Protestant churches. We could compare it withliberalism:itisanindependentmovementbutisprimarily presentwithinProtestantchurches,forexample.Onethusfinds thisEsotericChristianitywithinthePKN—atleastatheologian likeStolpisactiveinthePKNasaministerwithallrightsand privilegesbelongingtothatoffice. ThedialoguewithNewAgethinkingmaybeathingofthe past, but now that Esoteric Christianity is present within the church one may nevertheless ask if it should be explored and discussed.Ontheonehand,thisisdifficult.Whoeverlooksinto how, for example, liberalism is handled within the PKN (and washandledintheformerNetherlandsReformedChurch)can not come to any other conclusion than that people may be members of one church but can also live completely without anyrealcontact.ArethereanyorthodoxChristianswhoengage liberalism?Eventhestatementbyaliberalclergymanthatthere is no God will lead to great critique but not any kind of dia logue.WillitbeanydifferentwithEsotericChristianity?People aretoleratedwithinthePKNbuttheydonotcommunicatewith oneanother.Ontheotherhand,wemustobservethatthisEs oteric Christianity still speaks very much to many. That must bring the church to the point of taking up the dialogue again

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and thus again discussing the topics that played a role in the encounterofthechurchwithNewAgethinking.Orshouldwe saythatthisEsotericChristianityis,inessencetheexemplarof acontextualtheologyofthechurch,forittakesupnewtopicsin which connections are made to the dominant culture of our time?ButthatisafewstepstoofarforPKNtheology. Conclusion LookingbackonthewholeoftheencountersbetweenChristian churches and New Age thinking, I would like to make three remarks. First of all is the point that the church cannot do every thing: there are different views and considerations that the churches cannot accept and must therefore reject. That hap penedinthepastandthatisstillthecase.Itisnotthatthean athema sit needs to be pronounced constantly, but there are somethingsthatthechurchcannotaccept.Canthechurchcon tinue to hold on to her traditions with its doctrines here or is therethepossibilityofsettingsomeestablishedviewsasideand incorporatingentirelynewideasthatwerefirstrejectedasnon Christian?Thisdoesnotseemtometobethecase.Thechurch hasitslimits;ithasthosethingsitwillnotandcannotabandon, and matters to which it will not and cannot agree. We can continue to count on this. It is impossible for the church to be unfaithfultoitsownrootsandessentialviews. Second, this is not to say that nothing can change. Things can certainly be different in a formal sense. The church pro ceeds too often and too much on the basis of reason and pays toolittleattention tofeeling.Thechurchteachingandthepre sentationofittoooftenhappeninarationalisticway,whereas thatissomethingthatisincreasinglychanginginoursociety.In thenewspiritualityallaccentfallsonexperience.Onedoesnot speak about God; one feels him. That accounts for the interest in (also Christian) mysticism—a topic that did not arise in the discussionseither.Italsohastodowiththeoftenstillsodom inant(neo)BarthiantheologyinwhichGodexistsoutsideofall experience, and the concept of religion has become something odious,forreligionisconcerned,accordingtothisview,exclu sivelywithbeingrightandwantingtohaveexperiences.Ifthis form of theology would be given less room in church life and

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there would thus be more room for experience and becoming aware, there would be many who could find a connection to contemporaryspirituality. Third, expansion of the church’s intellectual legacy is al ways possible. In Buddhist cultures Jesus can be called bodhi sattvaandinIndiaitispossibleforChristianstospeakofJesus assatguru.Indoingso,theyarenotgivingupanythingoftheir ownchurchtraditionbutareenrichingitwithnewaspectsand expanding the image of Christ. Can this also not be the case withthenewspirituality?WithinGnosticismJesusiscalledthe teacherofwisdom.WhycanitnotbesaidofJesusthathegives peopleinsightandknowledge (gnosis),thatheshowspeoplea way, etc.? That does not make Jesus identical with a classical Gnosticteacherbutsomeaspectscanbeincludedthatwouldfit well with the concept of Jesus in the church. More examples couldbegivenofthis.Hereperhapssomethingofacontextual theologycanbefoundafterall. Bibliography Douven,K.(1988).Hetchristendomopwegnaarde21eeeuw.Soest:Self published. Hoekstra, E.G., and M.H. Ipenburg. (2008) Handboek christelijk Neder land.Kampen:Kok. (2000).WegwijsinreligieusenlevensbeschouwelijkNederland.Kam pen:Kok. DeJong,F.(1997).Zeishetzelfopwiezewacht.Kampen:Kok. (1998).Eenonverwachtenieuwetijd.Baarn:TenHave. Kok,A.B.W.M.(1959).Verleidendegeesten.Kampen:Kok. (1939).Waarheidendwaling.Amsterdam:Bakker. Kranenborg,R.(2002).NeohindoeïstischebewegingeninNederland.Kam pen:Kok. (1994).DeanderewegvanJezus.Baarn:TenHave. (1993).NewAge:Visiesvanuithetchristelijkgeloof.Amersfoort:De Horstink. (ed.).(1988).Reincarnatieenchristelijkgeloof.Kampen:Kok. M  ak,A.,andO.Sondorp.(eds).(2003)In‘shemelsnaam:Zoetermeer: Meinema. Synodesderkerken.(1994).Dekerkenhebbenhungeheim:Tussenouden nieuw.Leusden.

502 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Ter Borg, M. et al. (2008). Handboek religie in Nederland. Zoetermeer: Meinema. VandenHoogen,A.J.M.,andE.R.Jonker(eds).(1993).Depastoraleuit dagingvanNewAge.Zwolle:Waanders. Verkuyl,J.(1989).DeNewAgebeweging.Kampen:Kok.

PartIII

ChristianityInteracting withItself

RecentEcclesiologicalDevelopments intheWorldCouncilofChurches ContinuityorDiscontinuity? ConradJ.Wethmar

Abstract ForthefirsthalfcenturyofitsexistencetheWorldCouncilofChurcheswas unabletodevelopasystematicandcomprehensivestatementonecclesiology. Thereasonforthiswastheneutralityinecclesiologicalmattersthatthisor ganizationhadtomaintaininordernottoalienateitsmembersandpotential members whose main differences of conviction occurred mainly in their re spectiveviewsonwhatthechurchisorshouldbe.Thisofficialpolicyofneu tralitywasreflectedintheWCC’sTorontoStatementof1950.Afteraperiod of fifty years however it was no longer possible to make further progress on thewaytoorganicunitybetweenchurcheswithouttakingthemostdifficult andcontroversialecclesiologicalissuesheadon.Since1989 theWCCthere fore undertook a new ecclesiological initiative which in 1998 resulted in a documententitledTheNatureandPurposeoftheChurch.Onthebasis ofresponsestothisdocumentitwasamendedandreissuedduring2005with theslightlyalteredtitle“Thenatureandmissionofthechurch.”Itisstillnot afinaldocumentbutregardedasastageonthewaytoacommonstatement. Thisarticleinvestigatesthequestionwhetherthisnewinitativeconstitutesa continuation or a discontinuation with the implicit ecclesiological assump tionsthathadbeenpresentintheWCCsinceitsinception.

Introduction CurrentlytheWorldCouncilofChurches(WCC)canlookback onahistoryofmorethansixtyyears.Onewouldhaveexpected that an institution with such an extensive track record would longagoalreadyhavegainedclarityonthebasicissuespertain ing to its nature and purpose. It must, therefore, seem rather strange that at present it is still possible to refer to ecclesiolo gical developments in WCC circles as being recent. Such a no tion would presuppose that meaningful changes in the views

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regarding the nature of the church and consequently also re garding the selfunderstanding of the WCC have in the recent pastindeedtakenplace.Whetheroneshouldspeakofmeaning fulchangesinthisregardisexactlythequestionwhichIwould liketoinvestigateinthisessay. What is remarkable, however, is the fact that only after a history of fifty years has the WCC succeeded for the first time in publishing a document that contains a more or less com prehensiveandcoherentecclesiologicalstatement.Itwasissued in 1998 by the Faith and Order Commission with the title The NatureandPurposeoftheChurch:AStageontheWaytoaCommon Statement (NPC). Churches, commissions, institutes and indi viduals were requested to respond to this document. In the lightofthecommentsreceivedthedocumentwassubstantially amended and republished in 2005 with the slightly different titleTheNatureandMissionoftheChurch:AStageontheWaytoa CommonStatement(NMC).Inthisarticleanattemptistherefore madetodescribethebackgroundtoandrelevanceofthisdocu ment. Why was this document published so many years after theinceptionoftheWCC?Doesitreflectachangeintheviews regardingthenatureofthechurchintheWCCordoesitmani fest a continuation of ideas that all along had been present in theWCC?Doesitprovideananswertothecomplaintthat the WCCdoesnotsupplyproperinsightintothenatureandtaskof thechurchintheworld(Runia1990:256)?Initsattempttofind answers to these questions the present article will first give a briefanalysisoftheimplicitecclesiologicalviewsthatwerepre sentintheWCCfromtheverybeginningaswellasadescrip tion of the broader ecclesiological implications of the various notionsandidealsofchurchunityatwhichtheWCCwasaim ing.Thiswillthenprovidethebackdropforabriefanalysisand evaluation of the genesis, contents and relevance of the docu mentTheNatureandMissionoftheChurch. HistoricalBackground Itwouldbeimpossibletoobtainaproperunderstandingofand appreciationforthedocumentsNPCandNMCwithoutcalling to mind the origin of the ecumenical movement in the nine teenthcentury.Itwasthenthatchurchleadersbecameacutely awareofthefactthatthedivisionsbetweenthechurcheshada

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deleteriouseffectontheexecutionoftheircommonmissionary task in the world. The divisions between the churches were caused by at least three kinds of considerations, namely those related to matters of practical missionary strategy, the social role of the churches in society as well as those pertaining to matters of faith and church order. The history of how these three concerns were taken care of by the three organizational structures of the International Missionary Council (1921), the Life and Work Movement (1925) and the Faith and Order Movement (1927), respectively, has been documented exhaust ively and therefore does not have to be discussed here. What shouldbekeptinmind,however,isthattheconcernsandem phasesthathadbeenrepresentedbythethreemovementsmen tionedcontinuedtohavealastingeffectevenafterthesemove ments were incorporated into the WCC by the middle of the twentiethcentury. Afurtherimportantfactorthatcontributedtothedevelop mentoftheecumenicalmovementwastheincreasingcollabor ation of Christian scholars since the last decades of the nine teenth century. New scientific theories and the application of literary and historical criticism to the Scriptures posed chal lenges to some of the fundamental tenets of the Christian reli gion. In an attempt to meet these challenges in a responsible manner scholars were increasingly drawn together in interna tionalacademicorganizationsinwhichacademiceminencewas beginningtotranscenddenominationalinterests.Inthisprocess twoimportantfactswerediscovered:thatdoctrinaldifferences thathadbeenregardedasdistinguishingfeaturesbetweenchurch es were often present within a single church and that misun derstandingoftheother’spositionwasoftenthecauseofsome importanttheologicaldifferences.Thepossibilityofremovingat least some of the root causes of disagreement through dialogue begantoappear(Jay1978:81). It is worth noting that not only the relevance of dialogue butalsotheroleofacademictheologywerecontinuouslymain tainedintheecumenicalmovement.Thisisclearlyemphasized inthedocumentthatwearegoingtoanalyzeshortly.NMC97 stressestheimportanceoflisteningtoexpertopinionanddraw ingonappropriatesourcesofscholarshipaswaysofsustaining collegialityinthechurch.

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The ethos of dialogue was the approach that the WCC adopted from the outset in an attempt to solve the problem of division between the churches. This led in time to the estab lishment of a complex network of institutional structures and initiativesthatconstitutetheWCC.Itwas,however,especially theFaithandOrdersectionthat,eventuallyasacommissionof the WCC, was mandated with the responsibility of studying andreportingonthenatureandunityofthechurchaswellas ontheotherdoctrinalissuesthatwereinvolved(Bergjan1994: 45).ItisremarkablethatevenbeforeitbecamepartoftheWCC, theFaithandOrderMovementhadalreadyadoptedareportat itsfirstWorldConferencein1927thatestablishedapatternits laterdocumentsandstatementslikeNPCandNMCwouldfol low.Itgaveaconcisedefinitionofthechurchasthecommun ionofbelieversinChrist.Itthencontinuedbyconfirmingthat thechurchhasacommonfaithbasedonScriptureandcreedas wellasastructuredministrythatisdividedaccordingtothree types,namelyepiscopal,presbyteralandcongregational.Italso hasaministryofsacraments,whichconsistsmainlyofbaptism andtheEucharist.Toeachoftheseconvictionsthatthechurch es have in common the report adds explanations of where the differencesbetweenthechurcheslie(Haight2005:373). AstheFaithandOrderCommissioncontinuedtheological work along these lines in an attempt to assist churches in developingahigherdegreeofinstitutionalunityitbecameclear that it was exactly the often fundamentally different views of whatthechurchisthatnotonlypreventedcooperationbutalso the mutual acceptance of one another’s ecclesial nature. It also became abundantly clear that any institution that intended to playamediatingrolebetweenthedividedchurcheswouldonly be able to do so on a strictly impartial basis as far as ecclesio logical convictions were concerned. This was exactly the basic thrust of a document issued by the Central Committee of the WCCmeetinginTorontoin1950(Borovoj1988:505).Although thisdocument,whichbecameknownastheTorontoStatement, is not part of the WCC’s Constitution it has in the meantime reached nearcanonical stature and is regarded by some ecu menicalthinkersasthesinglemostcrucialtextforunderstand ingtheCouncil’secclesiologicalapproach(IngleGillis2007:33).

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TheoriginalintentionoftheTorontoStatementwastore pudiatethewidespreadsuspicionsthathadatthatstagearisen regarding the WCC. One such suspicion was that it was the WCC’s aim to become a superchurch. This is the reason why the statement at the outset categorically denies this claim. Should the WCC attempt to act for its member churches, the Statement says, it would cease to maintain the support of its membership(par.II/1).ThepurposeoftheWCCistobringthe churches into living contact with one another and to promote the study and discussion of the issues of church unity (par. II/2). Indenyingthechargeofstrivingtobeasuperchurch,Tor onto makes a further statement that proves to be of vital im portanceforthepurposesofthepresentarticle.Thisisthestate ment:“TheWorldCouncilcannotandshouldnotbebasedon any one particular conception of the church. It does not preju dice the ecclesiological problem” (par. II/2). The explanation that Toronto provides for this position is that the Council as such cannot possibly become the instrument of one confession or school without losing its raison d’être. There is room and spaceintheWorldCouncil,itsays,fortheecclesiologyofevery church that is ready to participate in the ecumenical conver sationandwhichadherestothebasisoftheCouncil(par.III/3). The Toronto Statement in particular also emphasizes the factthatmembershipintheWorldCouncildoesnotimplyac ceptanceorrejectionofthedoctrinethattheunityofthechurch consistsintheunityoftheinvisiblechurch.TheCouncil,itar gues, includes churches that believe that the church is essen tially invisible as well as those that hold that visible unity is essential. The whole point of the ecumenical conversation is preciselythatalltheseconceptionsenterintodynamicrelations withoneanother(par.III/5). This approach should not, however, be interpreted as a lackofconcernforthequestionoftruthinecclesiology.Toronto thereforeexplicitlystatesthatmembershipintheWCCdoesnot imply that a church should treat its own conception of the church as merely relative or that each church must regard the other member churches as churches in the true sense of the word(par.IV/3).

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The Toronto Statement, however, in addition to its first protectivesection,alsocontainedasecondsectioninwhichthe churches are encouraged to utilize the safe environment pro videdbythefirstsectiontoconsultandassistoneanother(par. IV/6and7).Toacertainextent,thissecondsectionoftheTor onto Statement can be regarded as an embodiment of the so called “as if” principle that has from time to time been propa gated in the ecumenical movement when churches were en couraged to cooperate as if they were one (Borovoj 1988: 511, 515). Theimplicationofallofthiswasthatastheyearswentby mutual understanding and relationships between churches de veloped that exceeded the expectations of the nineteen fifties. Nowonder,therefore,thatduringhislastyearsVisser‘tHooft repeatedly stressed that the Toronto Statement needs to be newlyanalyzedandupdated(VanderBent1986:93).Theques tion is how this can be done in a convincing manner. What is the ecclesiological relevance of the WCC today? Although the FaithandOrderCommissionhasincreasinglydrawnattention totheunityexperiencedintheecumenicalmovement,ithasnot beenabletospelloutwhatthenatureandpurposeofthatunity is. It is understandable, therefore, that since approximately 1987theneedtoundertakeacomprehensivestudyonecclesio logy has been mentioned repeatedly in Faith and Order min utes (Bergjan 1994: 71).  Before attending in detail to this new developmentintheecclesiologyoftheWCC,however,wefirst havetolooksystematicallyattheimplicitecclesiologicalassump tions that had been present in the WCC up to the end of the 1980s. These assumptions were usually related to the various idealsofchurchunitythatwereformulated. ImplicitEcclesiologicalAssumptions Itshouldbekeptinmindthattheecumenicalmovementandits subsequent embodiment in the WCC were originally of West ernandProtestantorigin(VanderBorght2000:239).Theinitial attemptstodiscussandcomparetheecclesiologiesofthediffer ent denominations in order to determine which one was the mostacceptablewereundertakenintermsofamodernistmod el of rationality. Especially in the Faith and Order context, the

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search for unity originally had a comparative and confronta tional character. This approach, however, was at root not a methodofdialoguebutoneofmonologue.Itcanbecharacter ized by the phrase “we will accept you as long as you are the same as us, but we will reject you at the points of difference” (Falconer2005:3).Thismethodwasemployedatthefirstthree worldconferencesofFaithandOrderinLausanne(1927),Edin burgh (1937) and Lund (1952). In Lund, however, it became clear that such a methodology was no longer appropriate. It couldattheutmostleadtoanuneasytruceandagrudgingac ceptance of one another but not to a real relationship. It was thereforedecidedthatanewmethodshouldbeemployed:not comparison and confrontation but an attempt to reach consen sus.Thecomparativemethodologyhadtobereplacedbyacon sensusmethodology. This new approach was not only a matter of strategy but had a theological basis: it was based on a Christological ap proach to ecclesiology. The Lund conference realized that “we cannotbuildthechurchbycleverlyfittingtogetherourdivided inheritances.Wecangrowtogethertowardsfullnessandunity inChristonlybybeingconformedtoHimwhoistheHeadof thebodyandLordofhispeople”(Falconer2005:4).Theimage ofthechurchasthebodyofChristgraduallystartedplayinga moreinfluentialrole,resultinginnotionslikeincorporationand participationbeingemphasized.Andthisagainledtothecon ceptofunitybeingclarifiedtomeanorganicunity—asbecame clear at the New Delhi assembly in 1961 (FlessemanVan Leer 1968:23).TheChristologicalfocusintheimplicitecclesiologyof the WCC was complemented by the 1968 Uppsala assembly’s emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit in effecting the catho licityofthechurch(FlessemanVanLeer1968:26). The Western notion of a unitary and universal rationality was replaced by the idea of the church as a pilgrim people in which the various groups learn from one another how to seek anddiscernthetruthtogether.Aclearexampleofthisnewap proachisprovidedbythediscussiononScriptureandtradition atthefourthWorldConferenceonFaithandOrderinMontreal in 1963, which was a forerunner of quite a number of subse quent studies on the interpretation of Scripture to be under takenintheWCCcontext.

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An important development in Montreal was the accep tance of the importance of diversity and plurality as ecclesio logicalphenomena.Asignificantcontributingfactor,inthisre gard,wasalecturedeliveredatthisconferencebytheGerman theologianErnstKäsemann.Incontradistinctiontotheunityof thebiblicalwitnesswhichleadingfiguresintheWCChadem phasizeduptothatpointintime,Käsemanndrewattentionto thefactthattheNewTestamentcontainsapluralityofecclesio logical models (Käsemann 1964: 266). The implication was, of course,thatchurcheswithdifferentecclesiologiescouldjustify their position by referring to the same New Testament. The debatestimulatedbyKäsemann’slectureledtotherecognition ofthefactthatthechurchunitythattheWCCwantedtofacil itatedidnotexcludealegitimatediversity.Theimportantques tion, however, was how one could reconcile this unity and di versity.Thisgaverisetothenotionofconciliaritybeingmooted as a process and a structure that could provide an answer to thisquestionasitiscapableofaccommodatingbothunityand diversity. The notion of conciliarity was, of course, not new. The WorldAssemblyinNewDelhihadin1961alreadydecidedthat theunitythattheWCCwantedtofacilitateshouldbediscussed intermsofthisnotion.Inordertodoso,aninvestigationhadto be undertaken into the nature and function of the councils of theancientchurch(Veenhof1981:170). A report in this regard was presented to the Faith and OrderconferenceinBristol(1967).Itwasfoundthatthecircum stancesinwhichtheancientchurchliveddifferedsubstantially from those that obtain at present. In the ancient church the conciliar process took place in terms of an existing fellowship betweenthechurches,whileinthesecondhalfofthetwentieth century the point of departure was one of plural ecclesiastical communities in confrontation with one another. Although an ecumenicalcouncilintheoriginalsenseofthewordistherefore notpossibleatpresent,conciliarityasanindispensabledimen sionofchurchlifewasstillpresentintheseparatedchurches.It washopedthattheWCCcouldfunctionasatoolinpreparation ofaneventualecumenicalcouncil.Inacertainsense,therefore, the ecumenical movement of the twentieth century could be

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seenasacontinuationoftheconciliardimensionthathadchar acterizedtheancientchurch. TheWorldAssemblyofUppsala(1968)acceptedthebasic ideasoftheBristolreport,withtheresultthattheWCCnowof ficiallyacceptedthevalidityofconciliarityforthefirsttimeas an attitude and a truly universal council as an aim (Veenhof 1971:171). AtaFaithandOrderconferenceinLouvain(1971)itsubse quently became clear that the requirements for a universal councilcannotasyetbecompliedwithsinceeucharisticfellow shipandfullconsensushavenotyetbeenreached.Oneshould therefore mainly emphasize counciliarity as a vital process in thelifeofthechurch.Byconciliarity,accordingtotheLouvain report,ismeant the coming together of Christians—locally, regionally or globally—for common prayer, counsel and decision, in the beliefthattheHolySpiritcanusesuchmeetingsforhisown purposeofreconciling,renewingandreformingthechurch byguidingittowardsthefullnessoftruthandlove.(Brink man1995:25)

The World Assembly in Nairobi (1975) ratified this change in emphasisinwhichthenotionofconciliaritycametofocusona qualityinchurchliferatherthanonaparticularevent.Concil iarity,inotherwords,constitutesacriterion:somuchcommon alityinfaith,witness,serviceandcelebrationshouldbedevel oped between the churches that together they are able to con veneacouncil.Conciliarityis,inthefirstplace,thereforenotan organizational issue but a matter of dynamic koinonia. It re presentsapneumatologicaldimensioninthelifeofthechurch: it refers to the Holy Spirit who brings koinonia between Christ and his body, the church, and subsequently also koinonia be tweenthemembersandstructuresofthechurch(Veenhof1981: 183). It therefore emphasizes the fact that the unity and catho licity of the church can be effected only through faith in the HolySpirit.Anadditionaladvantageofthenotionofconciliar ity is also that it adds a practical flavour to the ideal of unity preventingiffromremaininganabstractideal. In the continuing discussions in the WCC, however, the notion of conciliarity, in spite of all the positive characteristics associated with it, was gradually found to be slightly too re

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strictive. The result was that a related notion, namely that of koinonia,emergedasaframeworkwithinwhichecumenicalec clesiologicalworkcouldcontinue(Best2008:412).Thenotionof koinoniaorcommunionwasalsonotnewinecumenical circles but at this stage suddenly started to receive more emphasis (Bergjan1994:51). Whatisimportanttotakenoteofisthatwhereasecclesio logicalthinkingsinceLundtookaChristologicalturn,towhich was added a pneumatological emphasis in Uppsala, the intro ductionofthenotionsofconciliarityandkoinonialedtoatrini tarianorientation.In1975Nairobialreadyestablishedthattrue conciliarityisareflectionofthetriunebeingofGodinthelifeof thechurchwhileSantiagodeCompostela(1993)referredtokoi noniaas“groundedinTrinitarianlife,sharingthenatureofthe TriuneGodandreflectingit”(Bergjan1994:59). Thenotionofkoinoniahaslessstructuralcontentthatthan of conciliarity and proves to be a more flexible and versatile category.Itthereforeprovidedaconceptthathadthepotential of accommodating more aspects of ecclesiology than previous models that were mainly focused on dealing with issues of churchunity(Schwöbel1996:11). The sudden ascendancy of the notion of koinonia came as somewhat of a surprise in view of the fact that it plays a rela tively minor role in the New Testament where it often simply hasthegeneralmeaningofsharinggoods(DeWet2008:33).In only a few instances is it used in a theological sense in which casethebasicmeaningofthetermisparticipation.Itgivesex pressiontoarelationbetweenpersonsresultingfromtheirpar ticipation in the same reality (Van der Velde 1993: 130). Al thoughnotaprimaryecclesiologicalcategoryintheNewTesta ment,itdoesservethereasasynthesisconceptthatsucceedsin combiningthemeaningofseveralotherbasicimagesandmeta phors for the church like body and bride of Christ, people of GodandtempleoftheSpirit.Thewayinwhichthisisdoneis thatitpointstothebondsbetweenChristiansandalsobetween churches that are brought about by their common relationship tothetriuneGod.Koinoniawithoneanotherisentailedbytheir koinoniawithGodinChristthroughtheSpirit. Theprofundityofthisnotionthatconnotesthetranscend ent context and foundation of the church should not detract

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fromthefactthattheconceptofkoinoniaintheNewTestament alsoreferstothesharingofandparticipatinginmaterialthings, Paul’s collection for the believers in Jerusalem being a case in point. A further reason for the fruitfulness of the concept of koi nonia in ecumenical relations is that, as was the case with the notionofconciliarity,ithasthepotentialtocombineunitywith diversity. But koinonia also has the important capacity to deal with relationships in degrees as the Second Vatican Council alreadyascertainedwhenitstatedinUnitatisRedintegratiothat betweentheRomanCatholicChurchandothercommunions“a certainbutimperfectcommunionexists”(citedinVanderVel de 1993: 133). Such an acknowledgement opens the way for workingtowardsgreaterunitybetweendenominations. ANewEcclesiologicalInitiative Ourbriefanalysisofafewoftheassumptionspresupposedby the WCC’s discussions regarding unity in the church confirms thattherestrictionsimposedbythefirstsectionoftheToronto Statement did prevent the development of a comprehensive ecclesiology.Thesignificantdegreeofcooperationandmutual understanding that had been growing during a period of four decades of ecumenical endeavour, however, was clearly de monstrated by the presentation of and the reaction of the churches to the well known BEM document of 1982. Even the approach adopted in this document was revealing. It was the socalled convergence approach according to which one first identifieswhattheissuesareonwhichoneagreeswiththein tention of subsequently continuing work on the areas of disa greement(VanderBorght2000:226). Whatalsobecameapparentinthiscasewasthatcontinued growthinagreementonministryandthesacramentswouldbe possible only if the WCC phased out what IngleGilles (2007: 34) called its “agnosticism on ecclesiological matters.” If one wanted to move from convergence to consensus on the issues mentioned, the basic divergences in the field of ecclesiology could not be ignored any longer. The plenary commission on Faith and Order, meeting in Budapest in 1989, therefore de cidedthatamajorstudyonecclesiologyshouldbeundertaken (Best1990:219).

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A significant opportunity to start preparations to give ef fecttothisdecisionpresenteditselfwhentheCentralCommit tee of the WCC requested the Faith and Order Commission to prepareastatementon“TheUnityoftheChurchasKoinonia: Gift and Calling” for the Canberra World Assembly in 1991. Afteranumberofemendationsthisstatementwasacceptedby the Canberra Assembly. The Canberra Statement reflected an importantevolutioninthenotionofunitythatwasenvisioned (Gassmann and Radano 1993: 5). Whereas New Delhi (1961) emphasizedorganicunityandbothUppsala(1968)andNairobi (1975) the notion of conciliarity, Canberra preferred to locate theidealofunityinthebroadercontextofacommunioneccle siology. As has been indicated in the previous section, the no tion of koinonia provided a category in terms of which a more comprehensive ecclesiology than was feasible and possible in theWCCuptothispointintimecouldbedeveloped.Thisim mediately became apparent when the Canberra Statement em phasizedthat“thegoalofthesearchforfullcommunionisreal izedwhenallthechurchesareabletorecognizeinoneanother the one, holy, catholic and apostolic church in its fullness” (GassmannandRadano1993:7). The momentum of the discussion on ecclesiology was maintainedatthefifthWorldConferenceonFaithandOrderin Santiago de Compostela in 1993 where the major theme was again that of koinonia. A significant emphasis was the im portance of the holy Trinity for an understanding of koinonia: “GodwillsunityfortheChurch,forhumanityandforcreation because God is a koinonia of love, the unity of the Father, Son andHolySpirit”(BestandGassman1994:226).Itwastherefore recommendedthat ecclesiologyasaspecialthemeneedstobesetinthewider dogmaticcontextrepresentedbytheongoingstudyofFaith and Order on the ‘Apostolic Faith,’ while dogmatic reflec tioninturnmustalwaysbeintheserviceofthelivingreal ityoftheChurchand,inparticular,theextensionanddeep eningofkoinoniawithGodandGod’speopleastheinstru ments for the fulfillment of God’s purpose now and in the completedreignofGod.(BestandGassmann1994:251)

Against this background the Faith and Order Commission in 1994startedconcentratedworkonthelonganticipatedecclesio

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logicalstudy(Callam1998:98).Duringthefirstfouryearsthree differentattemptsweremadetofindanappropriateframework forthisproject(Falconer2005:5).Thefirstattemptwasfocused on churchdividing issues. This approach did not prove to be fruitful because, in spite of the significant degree of mutual understanding that had already developed in the commission, divergentecclesiologicaltraditionsstillmadethemselvesfelt.In asecondattemptitwasdecidedtousetheCanberraStatement as basic framework. On the basis of discussions at the plenary commissionmeetingheldinMoshiinTanzaniainAugust1996 itbecameclearthathoweverinspiringthisstatementwas,itdid not provide a sufficient theological outline on ecclesiology (Heim 1998: 111). Eventually, the commission decided that a BEM stylestatementonthechurchshouldbedrafted.Theintention wasthataconvergencetextshouldbeprovidedandthattheis suesonwhichdivergencescontinuestoexist,shouldbeclearly identified.Inthisprocesstheresultsofrelatedstudiesthathad been in progress, namely that on “Ecclesiology and Ethics” as wellasthaton“EpiscopeandEpiscopacy,”weretobetakenin toaccount(Falconer2005:7).Allthisworkledtothedocument The Nature and Purpose of the Church: A Stage on the Way to a CommonStatementbeingpublishedinNovember1998. Thisstudyhassixchapters.Thefirstdealswiththeorigin of the church in the triune God, while the second chapter fo cusesonthechurchasahistoricalrealityexposedtotheambig uitiesofallhumanhistory.Thethirdchapterdiscussesindepth thenotionofkoinonia,thecentralcategoryintermsofwhichall therelationshipsofthechurcharedescribed.Thefourthchap terattendstobasiccategoriesofecclesiasticallifeliketheapos tolic faith, the sacraments and various ministerial structures. Especially here mention is made of the fact that fundamental and basic work still needs to be done before common state ments between the various traditions can be made. The fifth and final chapter encourages various ecclesial institutions to studythetextandsendtheirreflectionstothecommission. Some fortyfive responses were received highlighting cer tainareaswhereitwasfeltthatcontinuingworkwasrequired. A number of these suggested that the relationship between churchandmissionshouldbegivenmoreprominence(Falcon er2005:10).TheFaithandOrderCommissionthenestablished

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a drafting group of nine to ten highprofile theologians repre senting various traditions to improve the 1998 document. A number of consultations were held and the responses of the FaithandOrderplenarycommissionmeetinginKualaLumpur in 2004 were also taken into account (Grdzelidze 2005: vii). By theendof2005asubstantiallyrevisedtextwiththetitleTheNa ture and Mission of the Church: A Stage on the Way to a Common Statementwaspublished. TheNatureandMissionoftheChurch AclosereadingofNMCrevealsthatitisindeedamoremature documentthanNPC.InsteadofNPC’sfivechaptersitonlyhas four.Thisreductionisbroughtaboutbymeansofamorecoher entarrangementofmaterial. Thefirstchapteremphasizesthatthenatureofthechurch isdeterminedbybeingacreationoftheWordandSpiritofthe triuneGod,Father,SonandHolySpirit.Thechurchisrelatedto eachofthese“Persons”inaparticularwaythatisportrayedin the New Testament by the images of people of God, body of Christ and the temple of the Holy Spirit. The reality to which theseimagesreferisexpressedandexplainedbythenotionof koinoniathatalsosucceeds,ashasbeenshownabove,incaptur ing the comprehensive relationship between God and the whole ofcreation(par.25). BeingthecreatureofGod’sWordandSpirit,thechurchis one, holy, catholic and apostolic. These essential attributes of the church are not obtained by empirical observation but flow from and illustrate the church’s dependence upon God. The church is one because God is one; the church is holy because Godisholy;thechurchiscatholicbecauseGodisthefullnessof life and the church is apostolic because the Word of God, sent bytheFather,createsandsustainsthechurch. Closely related to this idea is the notion of mission. Mis sionthusbelongstotheverybeingofthechurch.Thisisacen tral implication of affirming the apostolicity of the church, which is inseparable from the other three attributes of the church —unity,holinessandcatholicity(par.35).Allfourattributesre latebothtothenatureofGod’sownbeingandtothepractical demandsofauthenticmission.Ifanyofthemisimpairedinthe lifeofthechurch,thechurch’smissioniscompromised.Inthe

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poweroftheHolySpiritthechurchthereforetestifiestothedi vinemissioninwhichtheFathersenttheSontobetheSaviour of the world, bearing witness to the great deeds of God and invitingeveryonetorepentance,baptismandthefullerlifethat isenjoyedbythefollowersofJesus(par.37).Thisincludesthe diakoniaofcaringforthepoor,theneedyandthemarginalized aswellascaringfortheenvironment.Inallofthisthechurchis asignandinstrumentofGod’sintentionandplanfortheworld. The second chapter deals with the fact that the church is not only an eschatological but also a historical reality exposed toalltheambiguitiesofhumanhistory(par.48).Thisincludes change that allows for both positive development and growth aswellasforthenegativepossibilityofdeclineanddistortion. Italsoallowsforindividualandculturalconditioningthatcan contributetoarichnessofinsightsandexpressionsoffaith,but also to relativizing tendencies or to absolutizing particular views (par. 50). These developments have unfortunately often led to divisions among the churches that were due partly to sin and partly to a sincere attempt of Christians to be faithful to the truth (par. 53). NMC confirms the awareness that had been present in the ecumenical movement from the very beginning that such divisions impacts negatively on the mission of the church.Thisisamostseriousstateofaffairssincemission,ac cording to NMC, is essentially related to the very being of the churchaskoinoniawhichinturnhasthekoinoniaofallasitsul timategoal(par.57). A clear distinction should, however, be made between di vision and diversity. As has been shown above, since its 1963 Montreal meeting the Faith and Order Commission grappled withthephenomenonofdiversity.Atthatstagethepluralityof ecclesiologicalmodelsitselfwasemphasizedwhileitgradually became apparent that subsequently in different historical con texts, of both a synchronic and diachronic character, different ecclesiological emphases developed. NMC therefore confirms that here is a rich diversity of Christian life and witness born outofadiversityofhistoricalandculturalcontextsandthatthe communion of the church demands the constant interplay of cultural expressions of the Gospel. Authentic diversity in the lifeofcommunionmustnotbestifledandauthenticunitymust notbesurrendered.

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The answer to the question how these two dimensions, whichseemtobemutuallyexclusive,canbecombinedrequires a certain openness about the unity to which God calls the church. Only if the church moves step by step, under the guidanceoftheHolySpirit,willtheimageofvisibleunitybe come clearer. NMC 66 nevertheless repeats what the Canberra Statement formulated as the goal of the search for full com munion: fullcommunionisrealizedwhenallthechurchesareableto recognize in one another the one, holy, catholic and apos tolic church in all its fullness. This full communion will be expressed on the local and universal levels through concil iarformsoflifeandaction.(Canberra2.1)

InchaptersthreeandfourNMCdealswithstructuresofchurch order and the role of the church in society, especially with re ferencetotheestablishmentofmoralvalues. Conclusion Ithasbecomeclearthatoneofthemainreasonswhyittookthe WCC fifty years to develop a comprehensive statement on ec clesiology was that the member churches had divergent views on the nature and mission of the church. It is understandable thatinordertofacilitatecontactanddiscussionitwasinitially decided to avoid ecclesiological controversy as far as possible. Theecclesiologicalissuehadtobekeptinabeyance. This arrangement was reflected in the first section of the Toronto Statement of 1950. Within this framework the second sectionoftheTorontoStatementencouragedchurchesfromdif ferent traditions to assist and to learn from one another. This ledtoacooperationandmutualappreciationthatintimemade it impossible to ignore the ecclesiological significance of the WCC itself. NPC and NMC therefore reflect a discontinuity in thehistoryoftheWCCinthesensethatitforthefirsttimenow decided to take the most difficult and controversial ecclesio logical issues headon. It is especially noticeable therefore that NMC strongly emphasizes the necessity of the churches in the WCC context to develop a proper selfunderstanding. Such a selfunderstanding,itsays,isessentialforaproperresponseto itsvocationandisof“crucialimportance”(NMC,par.8).This

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study on the nature and mission of the church is therefore undertaken because of the “absolute centrality of ecclesiology to the ecumenical movement” (NMC, par. 2). One could per haps say that this position is more or less the reverse of what Toronto reflected in 1950. At that stage ecclesiology had to be avoidedforthesakeofcooperation.NMCnow,however,says “thatthetimeisright”forsuchanecclesiologystudy. Thischangeofpositionisprobablyrelatedtothefactthata strongerecclesialselfunderstandingdevelopedintheWCC.In gleGillis(2007:37)hasindicatedthatsuchaselfunderstanding was never totally absent from the WCC—not even in Toronto whereitwas,ashesays,broughtin“bythebackdoor”sinceit unobtrusively implicates all Christians in a larger mystical body.InNMCthisecclesialselfunderstandinghasgrowncon siderably even if it is not explicitly stated. NMC 62, for ex ample, says: “A pastoral ministry for the service of unity and theupholdingofdiversityisoneofthemanycharismsgivento the church. It helps to keep those with different gifts and per spectives mutually accountable to each other within the com munion.”Onecanimaginethatthesilentpresuppositionisthat thisministryisexercisedbytheecumenicalmovement.Thisis statedexplicitlyinparagraph98ofNMC: Theecumenicalmovementcanserveasastimulusandinvi tationtochurchleaderstoexplorethepossibilityofworking together in appropriate ways on behalf of their own com munitiesandasanexpressionoftheircareforallchurches, andincommonwitnessbeforesociety.

Thisstatementismadeinaparagraphthatdealswithcollegial ityasoneofthecharacteristicsofministry. The growing ecclesial awareness to which we have re ferredis,inturn,probablyrelatedtothefactthattherewasin deedapositivedevelopmentinthemannerinwhichthenature of the church has been conceived of in the WCC, especially in thelightoftheprominencethattheconceptofkoinoniahasre ceived. Runia’s fear of two decades ago that the nature and missionofthechurchwouldnotbeadequatelyportrayedinthe WCC is allayed by recent ecclesiological developments which reflect both continuity and discontinuity with the ecumenical past.

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Bibliography Bergjan,S.P.(1994).“EcclesiologyinFaithandOrderTexts.”TheEcu menicalReview46:4577. Best,T.F.(2008).“EcclesiologyandEcumenism.”In:G.Mannionand L.S.Mudge(ed),TheRoutledgeCompaniontotheChristianChurch. London:Routledge,pp.402420. (2004). Faith and Order at the Crossroads: The Plenary Commission MeetinginKualaLumpur.Geneva:WCC. (1990).(ed.).FaithandOrder19851989:TheCommissionMeetingat Budapest1989.Geneva:WCC. andG.Gassmann.(1994).OntheWaytoFullerKoinonia.Geneva: WCC Borovoj, V. (1988). “The Ecclesiastical Significance of the WCC: The LegacyandPromiseofToronto.”EcumenicalReview40:50418. Brinkman,M.E.(1995).ProgressinUnity?Louvain:Peeters. Callam, N. (1998). “The Church as Koinonia: An Ecclesiological Study.” In: A. Falconer. Faith and Order in Moshi. The 1996 Com missionMeeting.Geneva:WCC.Pp.97100. Deschner,T.,andG.Gassmann.(1990).Baptism,EucharistandMinistry 19821990:ReportontheProcessandResponses.Geneva:WCC. DeWet,B.W.(2008).“Koinonia(deelgenootskap).‘Ngemisinonsen twintigsteeeusekerkbegrip.”ActaTheologica28:3357. Falconer,A.(2005).“Introduction.”In:T.Grdzelidze(ed.).One,Holy, Catholic and Apostolic: Ecumenical Reflections on the Church. Ge neva:WCC. FlessemanVanLeer,E.(1969).“EkklesiologieindieWereldraad.”Ne derlandsTheologischTijdschrift24:1336. Gassmann,G.,andJ.A.Radano.(1993).TheUnityoftheChurchasKoi nonia: Ecumenical Perspectives on the 1991 Canberra Statement on Unity.Geneva:WCC. Grdzelidze, T. (2005). “Preface.” In: T. Grdzelidze (ed.). One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic: Ecumenical Reflections on the Church. Ge neva:WCC. Haight,R.(2005).ChristianCommunityinHistory.Volume2:Compara tiveEcclesiology.NewYork/London:Continuum. Heim, M. (1998). “Ecclesiology at the Crossroads” In: A. Falconer (ed.),FaithandOrderinMoshi.The1996CommissionMeeting.Ge neva:WCC.Pp.10509.

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Houtepen,A.(1993).“EenheidensolidariteitvanhetverdeeldeChris tendom.”InB.Hoedemakier,A.Houtepen,andT.Witvliet(eds). Oecumenealsleerproces.Utrecht/Leiden:IIMO. IngleGillis, W.C. (2007). The Trinity and Ecumenical Church Thought. Aldershot:Ashgate. Jay, E.G. (1978). The Church: Its Changing Image through Twenty Cen turies.Vol.2.London:SPCK. Käsemann, E. (1964). “Einheit und Vielfalt in der neutestamentlichen LehrevonderKirche.”In:E.Käsemann.ExegetischeVersucheund Besinnungen. Vol. 2. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. Pp. 26267. Runia,K.(1990).“DeecclesiologievandeWereldraad.”In:W.van‘t Spijkeretal.(eds).Dekerk.Wezen,wegenwerkvandekerknaarre formatorischeopvatting.Kampen:DeGrootGoudriaan.Pp.24656. Schwöbel, C. (1996). “Kirche als Communio.” In: W. Härle and R. Preul(eds.).MarburgerJahrbuchTheologieVIII.Pp.1146. VanderBent,A.(1986).VitalEcumenicalConcerns.Geneva:WCC. Van der Borght, E.A.J.G. (2000). Het ambt herdacht. Zoetermeer: Mei nema. VanderVelde,G.(1993).“KoinoniaEcclesiology—EcumenicalBreak through?”OneinChrist29:12642. Veenhof, J. (1981). “Pluraliteit en conciliariteit.” In: J.M. Vlijm (ed.). Geloofsmanieren.Studiesoverpluraliteitindekerk.Kampen:Kok. WorldCouncilofChurches.(2005).TheNatureandMissionoftheChurch: AStageontheWaytoaCommonStatement.Geneva:WCC. (1998).TheNatureandPurposeoftheChurch:AStageontheWaytoa CommonStatement.Geneva:WCC. (1950). Toronto Statement. Toronto, Ontario. (http://www.oikou mene.org/en/resources/documents/centralcommittee/toronto 1950/torontostatement.html).

ConversionintheEcumenicalDebate GreatJoyorGreatDiscomfort? JanvanButselaar

Abstract Christianconversionisexperienceddifferentlyindifferentcultures.InAfrica, itisareasonforgreatjoybutinEuropeandiscourseitoftenseemstobearea sonforgreatsadness.Butwhatisconversion?Thebiblicaltestimonyindicates a double function: repentance of sins committed and changing one’s life by followingJesusandlivingaccordingtothekingdomofGod.Intheecumenical movement,theissueofconversionhasbeenatthecenterofdiscussionforalong time,andnotonlyinmissionarycircles.Thesubjecthasrecentlybeendiscussed inconsultationsjointlyorganizedbytheWorldCouncilofChurches(WCC) andtheRomanCatholicChurch,andthetonehasoftenbeenoneofsadness. Thisessaydiscussesmanyquestionsconcerningconversion.Isitanunde niablehumanright,accordingtotheUnitedNations?Whatisthedifferencein approachbetweenreligiousstudiesandmissiology?DoesconversiontoChrist alwaysmeanachangeofone’sreligiouscommunity?Whetherconversionisa matterofgreatjoyorofgreatsadnessultimatelydependsonthepersoncon cerned:onlyheorshecantestifywhatconversionmeanttohimorher.

 Introduction Anumberofyearsago,duringavisittoEngland,mywifeandI wenttoalittlevillagecalledWinchelseainEastSussex.Wander ingthroughthevillage,wearrivedatthelocalchurchandthere foundamodestmonument:thefamousJohnWesleyhadpreached hislastsermonthere.Eventhetextofhissermonwasputonthe stone:“Repent,forthekingdomofheavenisathand”(Matthew 3:2).InGreek,thewordusedfor“repent”is,ofcourse,metanoeite, thecodewordforconversion.Itwascertainlynotthefirsttime thatIwasconfrontedwiththatwordanditwouldcertainlynot bethelast. DivergentExperiences AsamissionaryandtheologicallecturerinAfricaattheEcolede 525

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ThéologieinButare,Rwanda(19751981),Iwassurroundedbythe word.IwillalwaysrememberthetimeIwasinvitedtoassista localpastoratabaptismservicewheremorethan60personswere baptized into the body of Christ. That was done to their great joy—andtothesadnessofotherswhoalsolonged“tobeinthat number” but were not yet accepted by the church. Shortly af terwards, we decided to make an effort to recapture the oral sourcesofRwandesechurchhistory.Thechoiceofsubjectwasnot difficult:itwouldbeahistoryofconversion1—thatwassomething everybodywashappytotalkabout.Conversionwasnoproblem inAfrica—atleastnotforAfricans.Thefirstgeneralsecretaryof the All Africa Conference of Churches, the flamboyant canon BurgessCarr,respondedasfollowswhenaskedifaMuslimcould beinvolvedintheneworganization:“That’snoproblem,wewill converthimwithinayear….”Conversionwasamatterofgreat joy,almostasitwasintheearlydaysofthechurchwhenPaul andBarnabas,ontheirwaytothetensionfilledcouncilmeeting inJerusalem—tensionandchurchcouncilsoftenseemoftentogo handinhand!—werereportingtothebelieverstheyencountered abouttheconversionofsomanyGentiles.That,accordingtothe bookofActs,brought“greatjoy”(Acts15:3). The view of conversion as “great joy” changed drastically afterourreturnhomefromAfrica.InEurope,theword“conver sion”was,firstofall,hardlyheardinsideoroutsidethechurch andmission.Whenitdidpopup,itgaverisetodistrustonthe faces of the listeners and people reacted rather critically and sometimesevenaggressively.Missionsecretarieshadgreatprob lemsexplainingtotheirsecularizedEuropeanaudiencesthatcon versioninAfrica(andelsewhere)isgenuine—notthelateresult ofspiritualcolonialismorofdishonorablecoercionoroppression. OnemissionsecretaryImetwasevensoimpressedbythesecu laristcritiqueofconversionthathestartedtoaskAfricanchurch leaders if they really wanted any further growth in their churches—asiftheyhadachoice!Itwasalmostasifthemention ofconversionbroughtalltheharshWesterncritiqueofChristian mission,ashadbeenfashionablesincethe1960sonwards,tofull fruition.AniceexampleofthiswastheBBCtelevisionseriesThe Missionaries, broadcast in 1991 and shown on several Western 1

TheresultsofthisresearchwerereportedinVanButselaar1978; seealsoVanButselaar1981:11113.

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European networks. The image there was clear: mission was aboutconvertingpoorinnocentpeoplewhodidnotknowwhat theyweredoing;missionandconversionequaledthedestruction ofbeautifullocalculturesbydeclaringoldhabits“heathen”and forbidden.Thisimagewas,ofcourse,wellreceivedinEuropeat thattime—nobodywonderedwhythesubjectsthemselves,the newChristians,whowerenotaskedfortheiropinion,hadchosen tobecomefollowersofChrist.2Norwastheworkofsomescholars originatingfromthesouthernhemisphere,likethemissiologist LaminSanneh,takenintoaccount.Thesescholarsdiscoveredthat missionandmissionarieshadprotectedlocalculturesandhuman rightsperhapsatleastasmuchastheyhadcurtailedthem.That observationwouldbetoohardablowtothecommonWestern understandingofmissionandconversion(see,forinstance,San neh1982). Morerecently,whenagroupofKoreanChristianaidwork ersweretakenhostageinAfghanistan(2007),itbecameapparent thatlittlehaschangedsincethen.Thefirstreactionwasoneof horrorwhenitwasreported,especiallywhensomeoftheKoreans werekilledbytheTaliban.Butthensomereluctancetodefend themcreptin:Weretheyreallyonlyaidworkers?Orwerethey secretlyinthatMuslimcountrytoevangelize,toconvertaswell? AccordingtotheKoreans,theywerenottheretoevangelize,even thoughtheydidnothidethefacttheywereChristians.Butthe publicreactionintheWestwasclear:WasitalsonottheKoreans’ ownfaultthattheMuslimTalibanwereupset?Allatoncethe respect for human rights, which guarantees the freedom to propagateandtochangeone’sreligionseemedtobeforgotten. Strangely,theWesternsuspicionvisàvisconversion,thestrong MuslimrejectionofconversionfromIslam,andthepoliticalreal ityofAfghanistancametogethertoblamenotjustthehostage takers(whobecamehostagekillers)butalsothehostages.Inother words,oncethewordconversionpopsup,onecanforgetabout publicsympathyintheWesternmedia. TheAfricanexperienceisthatconversionisamatterofgreat joy;theEuropeanexperienceisthatconversioncannotberight—it isamatterofgreatconcern.ThatiswhatIencounteredintheecu menicalmovement,especiallyinthecirclesoftheWorldCouncil 2

ItwasbroadcastintheNetherlandsbytheChristianbroadcasting corporationNCRVasDeboodschappers;seeVanButselaar1991:12.

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of Churches (WCC). In order to understand the issues in the debatethereintheearly1980softhelastcentury,itisimportant tonotethedifferencebetweenproselytismandconversion.Pro selytism has to do with the action of churches and Christian missionstoconvincemembersofotherchurchestochangetheir church allegiance (see below, pp. 532, 536); evangelization is orientedtothosewhodonotknowChristorhisGospelandto callingthemtoconversion. Evangelizationhasbeenundersomesuspicionsincetheearly periodoftheWCC:Cantherebeagenuineconversionwhenmis sionariesareinvolved?Threereasonscanbeidentifiedwhythe WCCalwaysheld“conversion”atarm’slength.Thefirstwasthat in1948,whentheWCCwasformed,theInternationalMissionary Council (IMC) did not merge with the other two constitutive partnersoftheorganization,themovementsforFaithandOrder andforLifeandWork(Visser’tHooft1967:697724).Reflection on mission and missionary practice was thus done outside the bounds of the young WCC and could not shape that body.3 Another reason was that the first decades of the WCC were influenced by the decolonization process in the world. In that context,oneoftheaccusationsagainstmissionandmissionswas thattheyhadfunctionedasthe“spiritualarmofcolonialism,”as Marxisthistorianshadpreviouslyformulatedit(seeLoth1985).4 That made conversion an unpopular issue in ecumenical ga therings. AthirdreasonwastheinstallationbytheWCCofaWorking GrouponDialoguewithPeopleofLivingFaithsandIdeologiesin1971 (Selvanayagam2004).Itsfield,therelationbetweenChristianfaith and other faiths, had been on the agenda of the ecumenical movement for a long time, especially on that of the IMC. The debatesattheJerusalemconferencebythatbody(1928)areaclear testimonyofthis,aswerethediscussionsattheIMCTambaram conference(1938),wheretheDutchmissiologistHendrikKraemer played an important role (Kraemer 1938). But after the official installationoftheabovementionedWorkingGroup,thedifferent andsometimesopposingviewsintheecumenicalmovementon 3

TheIMCjoinedlater,attheWCCassemblyinNewDelhi,1961.

4

InthisworkLothisalreadymovingheretowardsamorebalanced viewofthehistoryofChristianmission.

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mission and conversion came to the fore in a more prominent way. I twice had the occasion to take an active part in that “debate,”oncewhenIrepresentedthemissiondepartmentofthe WCC5atthemeetingoftheWorkingGroupinSwanwickinthe United Kingdom in 1985 (see Van Butselaar 1985), and later duringaWCCmeetinginPotsdam(theGDR,1986). Asstatedabove,conversionwasnotapopularissueinthe ecumenical movement—as the evangelical organizations that aroseinthoseyearsunderstoodtoowell.Itwasthereforequite surprising that Emilio Castro, then director of missions at the WCC,wasabletopublishthatfundamentaldocumentMissionand Evangelism:AnEcumenicalAffirmation(WCCMissionSeriesNo.4 [1983])andlist“conversion”initasthefirstoftheecumenical convictions.Butthetambourdelabroussetoldmethatthiswasnot achievedwithoutafiercefightinGeneva. TheHeartoftheMatter Enoughaboutexperiences.Itistimetogettotheheartofthemat ter:Whatarewetalkingaboutwhenwespeakaboutconversion, studyconversion,orrejectconversion?Itispropertostartwith thebiblicalwitnessconcerningthisword.Kitteldevotesnoless than 34 pages to metanoéo and metánoia (Kittel 1977: 9751008). Thatalreadyshowsthecentralroleofthecalltoconversioninthe Christianmessage.KittelsaysaboutJesus:“Tocalltoconversion isthepurposeofHisSending”(Kittel1977:1001).Itisclearthat forJesus,asfortheprophetsintheOldTestament,conversion means repenting and returning to the law and love of God: “I havecometocallnottherighteous,butthesinnerstorepentance” (Luke5:32). Conversionispreparingoneselfforthecomingkingdomof God—asWesleypreachedinWinchelsea.ForPaul,thatfirstmis sionary, conversion was included in the call to faith in Jesus Christ.So,accordingtothebiblicaltestimony,beingaChristian meanstorepentandchangeeverydayofone’slife.Forthefirst hearersoftheGospel,itmeantareturntothealliancewithGod, tothewayoftheLord.Forthosewholivedoutsidetheknowl edgeoftheonetrueGod,italsomeantachangeofreligion.For all, it meant a break with the past. It is important to keep this 5

TheCommissionforWorldMissionandEvangelism(CWME).

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doublemeaningofconversioninmind:torepentandtochange (seealsoGittins1997:8789). In the early history of the church conversion meant indi vidualconversion;repentanceandchangeweretheactsoffaith ofoneperson.ThatchangedwhentheChristianfaithbecamethe official religion of the Roman empire, when the emperor Con stantine converted to Christianity. Then a model of collective conversion developed that was followed later elsewhere in Europe.KingClovisoftheFranks(466511)decidedtobecomea ChristianafterhisvictoryovertheAllemanniandbrought3000 of his compatriots with him into the church. It is this story perhapsthattriggeredtheWestEuropeanuneasinessconcerning conversion.Althoughtheideaofthecollectivewasneverabsent from European culture—sometimes in the form of a repulsive nationalism—therightsandthefreedomoftheindividualseem tohavetakenpriorityinthemodernperiodoveranycollective structure.Collectivedecisionsandbeliefsseemtoputpressureon theindividualtocomplywiththemajoritypointofview,andthat does not ring true. Probably, for Constantine and Clovis and others,thiswayofdealinginmattersoffaithwaslessproblem atic.ButinlaterEuropeanculturethathistoricalnotionwasoften lost.Storiesofpersonal,individualconversion,suchasthoseof Augustineand(later)ofLutherthereforemademoreofanim pression.Individualism,religiousexperienceandrationalexplan ationcametogetherthereinaprocessthatwasconvincingtothe onlookersintheirowntimeandlater. Whenthemodernmissionarymovementtookshapestarting inthelateeighteenthcenturyonwards,ithadtodealwiththis culturalstateofmind.Conversion,repentanceandchangehadto be individual first and foremost; that was the conviction in ProtestantmissionsfromnorthernEuropeandNorthAmerica.6 With these biblical and historical insights as baggage, the ecumenicalmovementhadtofinditswayintothetwentiethcen tury.Ascouldbeexpected,theIMCwasthefirsttotakeupthe challengetostudytheissueofconversion.Thethemeoftheirfirst conferencewastherefore:“TheEvangelizationoftheWorldinour 6

InCatholicmissionscollectiveconversions—sometimesderisively referredtoasfirehosebaptisms—wereconsideredlessproblematic.Or thodoxmissions,especiallyinAsia,werealsomoregearedtowardscol lectiveconversion.

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Generation” (Sawyerr 1978). In later years the conviction grew that it was not possible to depict all nonChristians simply as “heathens”oraspeopledeeplyinneedofChristianknowledge. Newquestionsarose.Howcouldtherole of otherreligionsbe appreciated?Howdoesthecalltoconversionrelatetopeopleof other faiths? As mentioned above, the second world mission conference(Jerusalem1928)struggledwiththatquestion.Inthe message of that conference conversion was translated more as repentance and (social) renewal than as a call to change one’s (religious)allegiance(Gort1978).AftertheSecondWorldWarthe discussions in the WCC went in the same direction (see Van Butselaar 2004). Especially after the creation of the Working Group on Dialogue, it was clear that the call to conversion in relationtopeopleofotherfaithswasnotsomuchabout“change” asitwasabout“repentance”andthushadthesamemeaningfor ChristiansandnonChristiansalike.Theonetimedirectorofthe WorkingGroup,WesleyAriarajah,formulatedthisinaconcise way: TheBible,byandlarge,talksaboutbelievers,notaboutcon verts.InJesus’ownministry,peopledidnothavetomove fromonecommunitytoanother,butfromaselfcenteredlife toaGodcenteredlife.Repentancehadtodowitharadicalre newal of relationship with God and one’s neighbors. Jesus preachedthatGod’skinglyrulehascomeintoourlivesand challengedpeopletoordertheirlivesaccordingtoitsvalues. HeshowsnoanxietytoconvertpeoplefromJudaismandto setuparivalcommunity.(Ariarajah1985:50)

This,ofcourse,couldleadtonothingelsethantoanaffirmation thatallreligionsareGodgiven,astheBaarstatementoftheWCC (1990)putit: ThisconvictionthatGodascreatorofallispresentandactive inthepluralityofreligionsmakesitinconceivabletousthat God’ssavingactivitycouldbeconfinedtoanyonecontinent, culturaltype,orgroupofpeople.Arefusaltotakeseriously the many and diverse religious testimonies to be found amongthenationsandpeoplesofthewholeworldamounts todisowningthebiblicaltestimonytoGodascreatorofall

532 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE thingsandfatherofhumankind….(quotedinAriarajah1999: 116)

That view strongly influenced the future development of ecumenicalthinking:itbecamemoreandmoreorientedtowards buildingthe“unityofareconciledhumanity”nolongerhindered byreligiousorideologicaldifferences(seeWCC1997).EvenAri arajahsensedthatsuchapositionwasmoreofafairytalethana matter of serious biblical theology when he asked: “Was Baar overly‘romantic’aboutreligioustraditionsanddiditignorethe waysinwhichreligionitselfcanbecomeamanifestationofrebel lionagainstGod?”(Ariarajah1999:117). Anotherexampleofreluctanceinspeakingofconversionas “change” came from quite a different side of the ecumenical movement:theOrthodoxchurches.7Theyhadsuffered,especially intheMiddleEast,underthe(unexpected)resultofProtestant andCatholicmissionworkinthosecountries.Missionariesthere hadoftenfailedtoreachtheMuslimcommunitywiththeGospel but had attracted Orthodox Christians to their denominations instead.Thatsoundedlike“sheepstealing,”likeproselytismand resultedintheWCCissuingmanydeclarationscondemningthis practice(WCC1997).AfterthefalloftheBerlinWall,newaccusa tionsofproselytismintheformerSovietcountriesarose.Forthe Orthodoxchurchesinthesecountriesconversionbecameabad word.Thiswasinaccordancewiththehistoricalpositionagainst evangelismbyOrthodoxChristiansintheMiddleEast.Theyhad beenlivingforcenturiesamidaMuslimmajorityandtheircon tinued existence had been possible only by adhering to Sippe denken(groupthinking),maintainingthereligiousstatusquoas much as possible. This entailed refraining from confronting Muslims with the Gospel and not protesting when a Christian becameaMuslim.Theythereforefeltthatcallingforconversion constitutedadirectthreattotheirpeacefulcoexistencewiththeir neighbors. Itisclearthatduringtheseyears,theMissionDepartmentof theWCCwasfightinganuphillbattletorealizesomesoundand unbiasedreflectiononthetheologyandpracticeofconversion.

7

TheyhadjoinedtheWCCenmasseattheNewDelhiassembly (1961).

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Theymanaged,buttheirvoicewasnotalwaysclearlyheardinthe ecumenicalchorus.8 ThePresentDebate Conversion—isitareasonforgreatjoyorforgreatunease?Both responsescanbefoundwhenconversionstoriesaretold.Even violent reactions to the process of conversion are sometimes reported. In the Christian tradition, conversion from Christ to othergodsor,asisoftenthecaseintheWesternworld,tonogod atallmaybedeplored,butitdoesnotusuallyleadtoexclusionor persecution.InthewidelyacceptedinterpretationofIslam,how ever, conversion to another faith community is punishable by death. In most cases this sanction is (luckily) not applied, but other,sometimesverynegativemeasuresdothreatenthewell beingoftheconvert.InHinduism,conversiontoChristianityis not very well understood either and often ends in a complete breakbetweentheconvertandhisorherfamily—ifnotworse,as recentkillingsofChristiansinIndiahaveshown.Thesedivergent attitudestoconversionhavemadeitmostimportanttostartan internationaldialoguebetweenpeopleofdifferentculturesand differentreligionsonthisissue. Inthesecularworld,thisdialoguestartedhalfacenturyago, whenthenewlyinstitutedUnitedNations(UN)waspreparinga declarationonhumanrights.SincetheaimoftheUNwastoban war,fosterpeaceandbringfreedomandwellbeingtoall,itwas importanttoformulateclearlywhatexactlytheresponsibilityof governmentswaswithrespecttotheircitizensandtheirfreedom. TheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)didnotappear withoutpriordiscussiononfundamentals.Article18especially, onthefreedomofreligionandthought,producedafiercedebate (seeEltayeb2000:especially102ff.).ManyMuslimcountrieshad difficultywiththeovertdeclarationthat“Everyonehastheright tofreedomofthought,conscienceandreligion;thisrightincludes

8

 At the general assembly of the WCC in Porto Allegre, Brazil (2006),therewasnomentionatalloftheWorldMissionConferenceheld inAthenstheyearbefore,wherePentecostalsexercisedgreatinfluence ontheprogram.

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freedom to change his religion or belief ….”9 In other words, everyone,regardlessofwhereheorshelivesandwhatheorshe believesisfreetoconvert.Thatitwasacceptedintheendwasdue in great part to the representative from Pakistan who rightly remarked that Islam was a missionary religion as well; if this clausewasnotincluded,thecalltobecomeaMuslimwouldthen becomeillegal. Inscribingsomethingintolawdoesnotmeanthatthereare nolongersinners—ashistoryhasshown.Thatalsoappliestothe UDHR. In many situations, in many countries, changing one’s religion is still a rather dangerous decision for the individual (Baltussen2005).10Howsensitivetheissueisalsobecomesclear inlateragreementsofMuslimandEuropeanprovenance.These attemptedtosoftenthefreedomofchangebycounterbalancingit withaprohibitionagainstcoercionortheuseofeconomicmeans tobringaboutconversion.Whenonereadstheseagreements,it isalmostasiftheydenythepossibilitythatconversioncanbea genuineandliberatinghumandevelopment. Thedebateonthejoyaboutanduneaseregardingreligious conversionwasgivenanewimpulserecentlyatthecommemora tionofthesixtiethanniversaryoftheUDHR.InthePeacePalace in The Hague, the Netherlands, a group of religious leaders signedadeclarationstipulatingthatreligionwasnotsomucha barriertotherealizationofhumanrightsastheirsourceandin spirationsincetimeimmemorial.Thatwasnew.Therehadbeen severalstudiesinthepastontherelationbetweenreligionand humanrights(Falconer1980),butneverhadreligiousleadersas suchexpressedthemselvesonthistopic.Thefreedomofreligion, therighttoconvert,hadsomethingtodowiththat.Inthisdeclar ationtherighttoconvertwasclearlyformulated,beitinasuc cinct way: “We consider the freedom to have, to retain and to adopt a religion or belief of one’s personal choice, without co ercionorinducement,tobeanundeniableright”(see“2008Faith inHumanRightsStatement”).Themeaningofthissentenceisno 9

SeeUnitedNations1950,GeneralAssemblyresolution217A(III) of10December1948. 10

TheIndianstateofKarnataka,whereviolentantiChristianat tackstookplace,recentlyevenplannedoninstitutingananticonversion law,cf.“ReligiousIntoleranceandDiscrimination,”Newsletter4/3/2009, pp.12.

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differentfromwhattheUDHRisaimingfor:thefullexerciseof religious freedom to everyone in the world. But the word “change”thatfiguredinearlierversionsofTheHaguedocument waswithdrawninordernottoarousedisturbingemotionswhere firmconvictionswereneeded.Itisimportanttonotethatallre ligiousleaderspresentatthePeacePalaceonthatoccasionagreed withthistext,includingtheShi’iteandtheSunniMuslims.Al thoughtheSunnirepresentativewaspreventedfromattending thesigningatthelastminute,theGrandMuftiofEgypt,Dr.Ali GomaaMohamedAbdelWahab,whenpresentedwiththeversion of the declaration that spoke overtly of the freedom to change one’sreligion,hadearlierdeclaredhisfullconsentandsupport forthedocument:thiswassomethingtowhichallMuslimscould and should agree.11 It seems that in international law, despite protestsandobjectionsfromseveralsides,thefreedomtochange one’s religion or to convert is recognized and considered to contributetothe“joy”ofhumanlife. Intheecumenicalmovementthedebateonconversioncon tinued,especiallyintheWorkingGroupoftheWCCanditssuc cessors.12 Many reports have been published of the encounters and consultations where this issue was addressed. In 2006 an interreligiousconsultationwascalledtodiscussconversionspeci fically.13Scholarsofdifferentreligionscametogetherandgave their views. On the Christian side, the WCC representative for interfaithdialogue,HansUcko,setthetone.Heshowedgreathes itationconcerningthisissue,quotinganearlierWCCconsultation that stated: “Conversion has become a threat and tension for religiousdiversityandharmony”(Ucko2008:6).Allthroughhis speechheseemedtobeappalledbytheideathatChristiansor Christianchurcheswouldfeelobligatedtocallpeopleofother 11

Duringapersonalinterview,Cairo,Egypt,23/9/2008.TheSunni representativesfromEgyptwereprohibitedbytheirgovernmentfrom attendingthesigningofthedocumentinTheHagueforpoliticalrea sons. 12

TheWCCisratherfondofrestructuringandtheWorkingGroup changesitsnamefromtimetotime. 13

MultifaithhearingonConversion,Lariano(Italy),1216/5/2006. ThisconsultationwasjointlyorganizedbythePontificalCouncilforIn terreligiousDialogue(PCID)andtheProgrammeforDialogueandCo operationoftheWCC.

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faiths to conversion to Jesus Christ. His arguments are clear: churchesandChristiansshouldfeelguiltyabouttheirpastmis sionarypractices,fromthecrusadesrightuptotheHolocaustof thetwentiethcentury.Furthermore,accordingtoUcko,thereis, theologically speaking, no obligation to convert; his strongest argumentforthatposition,however,isnotabiblicaltextbutthe factthat“TheordinarymanorwomaninthestreetinEuropeis likely to consider mission seeking the conversion of people of otherfaithsassomethingbigotic[sic],intolerantandaggressive” (Ucko2008:7).Hehadprobablyconductedhisinterviewsbefore MuslimsinEuropefilledthosestreets. Uckodoesnotonlyseeconversionnegativelybutalsoviews theconvertthatway,astheendofhisspeechinLarianoindicates: “Theconvertislookeduponwithsuspicionbythoses/heleftand thosehejoined.Thereareofcoursereasonsforthis”(Ucko2008: 17). It is clear: for this expert, conversion is a source of great dismayandhasnothingtodowithjoy.Thistonewaspickedup bymostoftheotherspeakersattheconsultation.Unease,regret, and anger about conversion is expressed repeatedly by repre sentatives from traditional religion, Judaism, and Hinduism.14 Thatwastobeexpected—theinvitationlistfortheconsultation seemstohavebeensomewhatlopsided.Whatwasremarkable, however,wastheinterventionbyaMuslimrepresentativeatthe conference, Rashied Omar. Omar did not start with the same morosereflectionsonconversionbutwiththestoryofaconvert inAfghanistanandhisattemptstoescapecapitalpunishmentfor hischangeoffaith.Thespeakerdidnotdenythenegativepractice ofsomecallstoconversionbuturgedtheMuslimcommunityto changeitsinterpretationofshari`ahonthispoint,inadditionto askingChristianstorefrainfromaggressiveevangelism: InordertostrengthentheMuslimcasetoreformtraditional laws on apostasy will require some Christian help. Their Christianinterlocutorsmightneedtolaborhardtocalmag gressiveChristianproselytizationefforts.(Omar2008:28)

14

TheOHM,theHindubroadcastingcompanyintheNetherlands, statedontelevisionthatChristiansare“outofdate”withtheircallto conversion (18/1/2009)—while at the same time showing how happy ChristianswhohadconvertedtoHinduismwere.

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ItseemsthatOmarunderstoodwhatconversionisabout:finding thewayoftruth.Hedidnotspeakaboutjoy—certainlynotatthis consultation—butdidurgehiscoreligioniststogobeyondhis toricalinterpretationsandsensitivitiesandtorecognizefullythe righttochangeone’sreligion. Thefinalreportoftheconsultationresumeswhatisquoted above.Ingeneral,conversionisseenashighlyundesirable,and freedomofreligion,freedomofconversion,althoughconfirmed, isstronglyconditioned:itshouldtakeintoaccountreligioussensi tivitiesandhistoricalmemories.Thereportwillhardlyhavein spired anyone to think anew about conversion as a joy and a causeforrejoicing. AsecondconsultationonthisprocesswasheldinToulouse, France(812/8/2007).Christiansfromdifferentbackgrounds,in cludingchurchesthatwerenotmembersoftheWCC,mettosee iftheycoulddevelopaChristiancodeofconductonconversion. Again,itwasHansUckowhoopenedthemeeting.Hisspeech clearlygaveamorebalancedviewofconversionthantheonein Lariano—but there were no Pentecostals and Evangelicals, stronglydedicatedtotheproclamationoftheGospelandthecall toconversion,sittinginfrontofhiminLarianoliketherewerein Toulouse. His deep aversion to conversion still came through, however,whenhecommentedontheordealoftheKoreanhos tagesinAfghanistan: Itisobviousthatitwasn’tonlytheconcernforthesocialand humanplightoftheAfghansthatbroughtthemtothecountry aswasfirstsaidaboutthisjourney.Thequestionoftranspar encyandhonestycannotbedissociatedfromourassessment ofwhatistakingplacerightnow.(Ucko2008:41)

Inotherwords,conversion,lackoftransparencyanddishonesty areallpartofthesamecomplex.TheCatholicrepresentativeat themeeting,FatherFioMascarenhasSJ,showedmorecourage whenhebroughtupthePostSynodalApostolicExhortationof PopeJohnPaulII“JesusChristtheSaviour,andHisMissionof LoveandServiceinAsia”(1999).Thepope insistedthatevan gelization is not an option but a command of the Lord, and thereforebothadutyandprivilege.Thisevangelizationhadto take place with loving respect and esteem for every listener, takingcarenevertoviolatethelistener’sfreedomofconscience.

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In short, conversion is, indeed, a matter of great joy, but one shouldtakecarethatitdoesnotbecomeacurse,acauseofgreat sadness,becauseofhowmessengerscommunicatetheGospel. ThePentecostalrepresentativeinToulouse,TonyRichie,con firmedthepriorityofevangelisminPentecostalism(seeRobeck 2006andAnderson2007).Heprotestedagainstusingtermslike “aggressiveevangelism”andpreferredtospeakof“energetic”or “enthusiastic” evangelism. That would account better for the spirit driving the messengers of the Gospel. He coined a new term,“dialogicalconversion”basedontheencounterbetweenPe terandCornelius(Acts10)whereboththe“missionary”andthe “convert”werechanged.Richiealsohaddiscoveredhowpejora tivetheconsultationinLarianohadspokenaboutconversion: TheLarianoReportcontainsexcessive,andthereforeoffen sive,antievangelismlanguage…butappropriatelyliftsup theimportanceof“selfcriticismandrepentance.”Itissome timesvaguetoafault….Thisambiguityisagreatconcern whereitcensuresexploitingvulnerablepeoplewithoutcare fullydefiningvulnerability….Evangelismthatisintentional lyunclearaboutitsintentionsisdishonest,anddishonestyis unethical. Yet it is unfair to ask Christians to conceal their faith.Thatwouldbedishonesttoo.(Richie2008:5152)

AnEvangelicalvoicefromMalaysia,whereIslamimposesitself insuchawaythatotherreligionsfeelextremelylimitedintheir freedom,wasalsoheardinToulouse.Itisclearthatthediscus sions in that consultation were less harmonious than they had beeninLariano.Butthen,thediversityofopinionswasmuchlar gerinToulousethanwasthecaseatthepreviousconsultation —inspiteofthereligiousdifferencesthere. NofinalstatementorreportofthemeetinginToulouseis foundintheissueofCurrentDialoguewheretheseconsultations arereported,norcanonebefoundontheWCCwebsite.Wasit notwrittenorwasitnotpossibletowriteone?Sincethen,the WCChasdonenomoreworkonthistopic.Inotherwords,“con version”stayswhereitwasintheecumenicaldebate:predom inantly a matter of dismay for the WCC and its interreligious friends;predominantlyamatterofjoyformanyotherChristians.

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Conclusions It is time for some conclusions or, rather—since such a short article cannot presume to provide enough basis for solid con clusions—pointstorememberwhenthedebateresumes. First of all, it is important to stress that conversion has a double meaning: repentance and change. It is therefore not di rectedsolelytowardsthoseoutsidethechurchbutisacalltoev eryone,ChristianandnonChristianalike,torepentandtochange in such a way that they begin to follow the way of the Lord. Further,nochurch,noChristiancan“achieve”conversion.Con versionistheworkoftheSpirit.Thisbiblicalinsightisratherlib eratingforallthosewhohavetoreflectandactonthistopic. Itshouldalsobenotedthat“conversion”isperceiveddiffer entlywithindifferentcontexts.InthecontextoftheChristianfaith communityitisunderstooddifferentlyfromhowitisunderstood inanacademiccontextlikethatofreligiousstudies.Inthefaith community,theconversionofsomeonetoChristisareasonfor joy—todenythatwouldbetodenytheliberatingpowerofthe Gospel.Missiologistswhoreflectonthemissionarycallingofthe churchshoulddenounceallbadpracticesbutshouldnotbeasked toignorethejoyofthosewhocometoChrist.Scholarsinreligious studies,ontheotherhand,starttheirresearchfromanother,more comparative,pointofview.Thatisnotaneutraloneeither:they toostartfromaspecificreligious,nonreligiousorevenantireli gious perspective. They can do their work on the basis of a staunchChristianconviction,asVroomhasshown(Vroom1996), butitcanalsobeotherwise.Inanyevent,itisnotalawofnature that religious scholars will arrive at negative conclusions for (Christian) conversion. Spindler has pointed to the research of secularscholarswhohaveshownthatnotonlycanconversionbe ofgreatpersonalbenefitbutitcanalsobreakupoldstructuresof societythatcounteractrenewalanddevelopment(Spindler1997). Itislamentablethatallthesefinebutfundamentaldifferencesin approacharenottakenintoaccountintheecumenicaldebate. Thereismore.Conversionseemstoimplyachangeofreli giouscommunity.Isthatorshouldthatalwaysbethecase?In manysituations,itisdangeroustobecomeaChristianovertly.I experiencedthatduringvisitstoMuslim,Hinduandcommunist countries.Peopleasked:CanIbeafollowerofJesusChristand continuetoliveinmyowncommunity?CanIbeagenuineChris

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tianwithoutbeingbaptized?Suchachangecouldnotonlycost memyfamily,myjoborevenmylife,italsocouldbecounterpro ductivetotheproclamationoftheGospel.Ihadnoeasyanswer tothatquestion.Butithappens.Peoplestayin(orreturnto)their faithcommunityasfollowersofJesusChrist.Agoodexampleof thatisGavrielGefen,aJewwho,althoughaconvertedChristian, ultimatelyreturnedtothesynagogueasafollowerofJesusChrist —andwasacceptedthere.Hewritesthatheisnottheonlyone (Gefen,2008).Sothecallforconversioniscertainlynotanaction to win the world for the church; it wants to win the world for Christ,forhisjusticeandpeaceforallhumankind. Isconversionamatterofgreatjoyoroneofgreatdismayor evensadness?Intheend,theanswerdoesnotdependonhowthe (inter)religious “Brahmins” feel about it, condemn it rightly or wronglyorabhorit.Intheend,itisthepersonconcerned,the personwhoisconverted,whohastheanswer.Secularjournalists haveaskedmeininterviewshowmanypeopleIhadconverted in my life. Quite honestly I could respond: nobody—I do not knowhowtodothat.Intheend,conversion—repentance,change —isamysterybetweenthemanorwomanlookingforlife,and forlifeinabundance,andGod.Itisthereforeratherstrangethat in all the ecumenical debates on conversion, no voice is heard from a convert or converts. When the ecumenical movement speaksaboutthepoorandthedowntrodden,thepoorandthe downtrodden are heard. When they speak about peace, the victimsofwararesittinginthefrontrow.Butonceconversionis ontheagenda,itseemsasifconvertsarecarefullypreventedfrom takingthefloorandexpressingwhattheyfeelorhavefelt—joyor sadness? Iwillthereforeendwithaconversionstoryofsomeoneto whomwealreadyreferredabove,LaminSanneh,whowasborn inGambiaandisnowamissiologistandhistorianatYaleUni versity. He was a Muslim who became a Christian. Jonathan Bonk15interviewedhim: WhatmadeyouinterestedinChristianity?

15

JonathanBonkisexecutivedirectoroftheOverseasMinistries StudyCenter(OMSC),NewHaven,USA,andpresidentoftheInterna tionalAssociationforMissionStudies(IAMS).

CONVERSIONINTHEECUMENICALDEBATE ReadingaboutJesusintheQur’anpiquedmycuriosity.Ihad noaccesstotheBibleortoachurchatthattime.SotheQur’an remainedtheauthoritativeandonlysourceofJesus,sonof Mary(therespectfulformtheQur’anuses). HowdifficultwasittoconvertfromIslamtoChristianity? OncethechoicewasmadeaboutthesignificanceofJesusin God’s work of salvation, it was not difficult to make the decisiontojointhechurch.GettingacceptedintheProtestant church,however,wasadifferentmatteraltogether,thanksto thechurch’ssuspicionandskepticism.Itisonlynow,atlong last, in the Catholic Church that I feel accepted uncondi tionally and unreservedly. It vindicates my view that faith countsforsomething,thoughitwasalongtimecoming. Followingyourconversion,whatdidyoumostmissaboutIslam? Iamnotsure“miss”istherightword,butIacquiredadeep appreciationforIslam,foritssenseofdivinetranscendence, formyownformationinitsmoralmilieu,forthehabitsof obedienceandfaithfulnessittranscribedinme,fortheideait inculcatedofthetruthandrealityGodinhumanaffairs.We shouldrememberthatwhileGodandJesusareswearwords intheWest,thatisnotsointheMuslimworld. Whatrole,ifany,didWesternmissionariesplayinyourconversion, eitherdirectlyorindirectly? Ineverwenttoamissionschoolandknewnomissionariesat allwhenIembarkedonmyenquiry….Somissionariesplayed littleroleinmyconversionexperience. DidyoufindthatChristianswelcomedyouwithopenarmsonceyou haddeclaredyourdesiretoconvert? Onthecontrary.Thechurchwassuspiciousanddistrustful. Couldyouelaboratejustalittlemoreonthatpoint? Unofficially,theMethodistchurchinquestionwelcomedmy decision to seek baptism, but officially they put off the de cisiontobaptizeme. TheyaskedmeinsteadtogototheCatholicChurch,which Ididforayear,butwiththesameresult,Ifound….Those weretheungarnishedfactsthatIasayoungconverthadto dealwith(ornottodealwith,ifIchose).IthappenedthatI was so profoundly affected by the message of Jesus, so in

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Is conversion a matter of great joy or one of great concern or sadness?Whateverreligiousorecumenicalleadersoracademic expertsmayfeelorarguetothecontrary,itisclearfromSanneh’s storythatthereisjoyforeachandeveryonewhofindstheway, thetruthandthelife. Bibliography “2008FaithinHumanRightsStatement.”(2009).StudiesinInterreligious Dialogue19:912. Anderson,A.(2007).SpreadingFires:TheMissionaryNatureofEarlyPente costalism,London:SCM. Ariarajah, W. (1999). Not Without My Neighbour: Issues in Interfaith Relations.RiskBookSeriesNo.85.Geneva:WCC. (1985).TheBibleandPeopleofOtherFaiths.RiskBookSeriesNo.26. Geneva:WCC. Baltussen.M.(2005).FreedomofReligionintheNewEurope.TheHague: Platform International Freedom of Religion and Belief/Justitia et Pax. Bonk, J.J. (2003). “The Defender of Good News: Questioning Lamin Sanneh.”ChristianityToday47:10. Briggs,J.etal.(2004).AHistoryoftheEcumenicalMovement.Vol.3:1968 2000.Geneva:WCC. Castro,E.(ed.).(1983).MissionandEvangelism:AnEcumenicalAffirmation. WCCMissionSeriesNo.4,Geneva:WCC. Eltayeb, M. (2000). “Legal Protection of the Right to Freedom of Thought,Conscience,andReligionorBeliefinMuslimCountries.” In:J.M.M.Naber(ed.),FreedomofReligion:APreciousHumanRight. ASurveyofAdvantagesandDrawbacks.Assen:VanGorcum&Comp. Pp.10018. Falconer,A.D.(1980).UnderstandingHumanRights:AnInterdisciplinary andInterfaithStudy,Dublin:IrishSchoolofEcumenics. Gefen,G.(2008).Recontextualization:RestoringtheBiblicalMessagetoa JewishIsraeliContext(unpublishedmanuscript).

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Gort,J.D.(1978).“Jerusalem1928:Mission,KingdomandChurch.”In ternationalReviewofMission67:27398. Kittel,G.(1977).TheologicalDictionaryoftheNewTestament.VolIV.Re print.GrandRapids:Eerdmans. Kraemer,H.(1938).TheChristianMessageinaNonChristianWorld.Lon don:EdinburghHousePress. Loth,H.(1985).ZwischenGottundKatun:DieBerlinerKonferenz1884/85 zurAufteilungAfrikasunddieKolonialismuskritikchristlicherMission er.Berlin:UnionVerlag. Mascarenhas, F., SJ. (2008). “Christian Witness in a Multireligious World.”CurrentDialogue50:4246. Müller,M.etal.(eds).(1997).DictionaryofMission:Theology,History,Per spective.Maryknoll:Orbis. Naber,J.M.M.(ed.).(2000).FreedomofReligion:APreciousHumanRight. ASurveyofAdvantagesandDrawbacks.Assen:VanGorcum&Comp. Omar,A.R.(2008).“Testimony.”CurrentDialogue50:2729. Richie,T.(2008).“AThreefoldCord:WeavingTogetherPentecostalEcu menism,Ethics,andEvangelisminChristianConversion.”Current Dialogue50:4754. Robeck,C.M.(2006).TheAzuzaStreetMissionandRevival:TheBirthofthe GlobalPentecostalMovement.Nashville:Nelson. Rouse,R.,andS.C.Neill.(eds).(1967).AHistoryoftheEcumenicalMove ment15171948.2nded.London:SPCK. Sanneh,L.(1982).WestAfricanChristianity:TheReligiousImpact.Mary knoll:Orbis. Sawyerr,H.(1978).“TheFirstWorldMissionConference:Edinburgh 1910.”InternationalReviewofMission67:255272. Spindler,M.R.(1997).“ConversionRevisited:PresentUnderstandingof aClassicMissionaryMotiveinMissiology.”Missiology25:293305. Ucko, H. (2008). “Towards an Ethical Code of Conduct for Religious Conversions.”CurrentDialogue50:619. United Nations.(1950).Yearbookofthe United Nations19481949.New York:UnitedNations. VanButselaar,G.J.(2004).“ConvergenceorDivergence?TheProtestant AttitudetoOtherReligions.”In:JeraldD.GortandAlleG.Hoe kema(eds).Mission:TheSoulofEcumenism.EssaysbyJanvanBut selaar.MissionSeriesNo.36.Zoetermeer:Boekencentrum.Pp.66 74. (1991). “Kan de NCRV ook liegen? De mythe van een neutrale boodschapper.”CentraalWeekblad(1/11):12.

544 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE (1985).“DialogueandWitness.”EcumenicalReview37:398405. (1981).“ChristianConversioninRwanda.”InternationalBulletinof MissionaryResearchV:11113.  (ed.).(1978).L’Espritetlesel:Recherchessurl’histoiredel’Egliseau Rwanda par un groupe de travail de l’Ecole de Théologie de Butare, Butare:ETB. Vroom, H.M. (1996). No Other Gods: Christian Belief in Dialogue with Buddhism,HinduismandIslam.Trans.LucyJansen.GrandRapids: Eerdmans. WorldCouncilofChurches.(1997).TowardsCommonWitness:ACallto AdoptResponsibleRelationshipsinMissionandtoRenounceProsely tism.ADocumentCommendedtotheChurchesbytheCentralCommittee oftheWorldCouncilofChurches,Geneva:WCC.

ConfessioandTraditio AReformedApproachinDialogue withtheLutheranTradition1 MichaelWeinrich

Abstract Thequestionbehindthereflectionshereisthatoftheparticularunderstand ingofauthority(Verbindlichkeit)intheReformedtraditionincomparison totheLutherantradition.Thereisabroadcommongroundbetweenthetwo traditionsregardingtheuniquenessoftheprincipleofScriptureastheunsur passable guideline for theological insights and ecclesiastical decisions. Con fessions and tradition are of secondary character and always need to be re visedanewinthecriticallightofScripture.Theyservethechurchastempor arily binding decisions in terms of human answers to God’s address to His peopleinthegospel.Beyondthissharedbasis,theReformedtraditionismore concerned with the provisional character of the church’s confessional writ ings.Thedifferencebetweenthecontemporaryactofconfessionandtheconfi dence in the wording of the confessions handed down indicates a different stressintheReformedandtheLutherantraditions.

Introduction I would first like to emphasise the farreaching consensus be tweentheLutheranandtheReformedapproachestotheircon fessional traditions, including the confessional writings. Com pared to the significance of Scripture, their importance is sec ondary—whichdoesnotmeanthattheyhavenoimportance.It should also be said that the sober realisation that they are his toricalincharactermeansthattheyhavetobereadinacontex tualised way regarding the circumstances of their emergence, andthereforetheyareopenforadjustmentinthepresenttime.

1

Thisisarevisedversionofapapergivenatthesecondmeetingof theLutheranReformedJointCommission(LWFandWARC)inWind hoek,Namibia,1117August2007. 545

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On the other hand, the remaining differences are still remark able, but with regard to fundamentals they do not differ very muchatall. The differences are rooted in different definitions of the central focus of theology. The central focus for Lutheran theo logy is the soteriological concentration to which all other as pectsoftheologyarerelated.Tosomeextent,onemaysaythat in Lutheran understanding theology is soteriology (centred on thedoctrineofjustification).TheChristologicalextranosgener atesitsimportancefromitsrelationtojustificationandreconcil iation. This is the wellknown articulus stantis et cadentis eccle siae.2 In the Reformed understanding justification is “the main hingeonwhichreligionturns”(cf.Calvin1960:3.11.1).Thisun derscoresitsunsurpassableimportancewithintheramblinged ificeoftheology,andatthesametimethewordingshowsthat justificationdoesnotstandforthewhole.Thehingemakesthe systemfunction,butitdoesnotrepresentthestructureanddes tiny of the whole (cf. Weinrich and Burgess 2009). In the Re formedunderstanding,theologyaimstoglorifyGodandprais ingGodisthepurposeofhumanlife.Tosayitmoreprovoca tively,thecentreoftheologyisthegloryofGodandnotthesal vation of human beings. Theology’s central perspective is not directedattruefaithorauthenticwitnessbutatGod’struth.It ismoreaboutGod’sjusticethanitisabouthumanjustification. The theological attention extends beyond God’s efficiency and relevance for human selfknowledge and his formative mean ing for a proper Christian existence. Rather, it is God himself who deserves our full commitment, and it is for this commit mentthatwearejustified. In my view, the switch leading to the difference between LutheransandReformedpeopleliesinaparticularperspective onGod’sdivinity:LutheranslookatthepointwhereGodmeets

2

ThisphrasewasfirstmentionedbyValentinErnstLöscherin1712; see Loofs 1917. In his exegesis of Ps 130:4 Martin Luther said, “The churchstands,ifthisarticlestands,andthechurchfalls,ifitfalls”(WA 40/III:352).

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humanbeings,andReformedpeoplerefertotherealityofGod who meets human beings in the way the Gospel informs us. Both sound very similar, but there is a peculiar difference— whichdoesnotdivideusbutleadstoagreatvarietyofdiffer ent aspects and accents spread throughout the whole range of theological subjects. One of these differences can be found in thedifferentwaysofdealingwiththeconfessionsofthechurch andtheirauthority. ConfessingChurch—TheChurch’sConfessions AsAndréBirmeléhasimpressivelyshowninhispaperforthe jointLutheranReformedCommissioninWindhoekin2007(cf. note1),confessionisanessentialpartofthebeingofthechurch (Birmelé2007;cf.alsoWirsching1980:487).Eitherthechurchis aconfessingchurchoritisnotachurch(Birmelé2007).3Atits verybeginningweencountertheconfessionofChristasthere surrected, who is the Lord (Philippians 2:11), and all the later confessions are reconfirmations and further drafts of this first confession.Initssubstanceeveryconfessionisanactualization of the connection to the resurrected and living Christ. In the particulartraditionoftheReformation,confessionsarethepub licproclamationoftheagreementofthechurch’steachingwith the witness of Scripture (cf. Faulenbach 2003: 1). They are, in principle, the secondary witness to the primary witness of Scripture(cf.Rügger1988:320f.). If we look more closely at the earliest Christian confes sions,wewillrealisethateventheyaresecondaryincharacter. TheyareresponsestotheselfrevelationoftherisenChrist,an swerstotheparticularaddressmadebytheResurrectedtothe mourning disciples. To be precise, in most cases the disciples werenotabletorecognisetheResurrectedjustbyseeinghim.It is not they who understand that he is resurrected but always Christ himself or an angel at any rate who solved the mystery oftheappearancebyexplainingoratleasthintingatanappro priate explanation. The disciples may have seen but they did notunderstand,andsotheyhadtobehelpedbyhavingJesus’

3

Achurchlackingaconfessionis“ipsofactoeinetoteKirche”(ipso factoadeadchurch);cf.Barth1935:7andWeinrich2003a.

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appearance explained to them. Then their eyes were opened; they recognised him and Jesus vanished (Luke 24:31). We do nothaveanexplanationforJesus’appearancenorisitselfevi dent—ithastobeexplainedtous.TherealityofthelivingChrist explainsitself,andthedisciplessimplyrespondwiththeircon fession.Inotherwords,thedisciplesdonotconfessbutareled toconfess.InthissensewecanfollowAlasdairHeronwhoem phasises: There is a great temptation for Christians, reformed and other,toimaginethatconfessionandtestimonymeans,first, lastandallthetime,theirconfession,theirtestimony,their witness before the world and God to the Gospel and the person of Jesus Christ, to set themselves in the role of the witnesswhoisfaithfulandtrue.Butthatdesignationisre served for another: the witness, testimony and confession onwhichChristianfaithandhopeandlovedependfromstart tofinisharenotoursbutthoseofJesusChrist,theone“faith fulandtruewitness”(Rev.3:14).(Heron1993:150)

This order is important for understanding the theology of theReformers.ItisalwaysGod’sactivitythatprecedeshuman activityandprovidestherealitytowhichtheconfessionmaybe the proper response. Confessions are in principle secondary— eventheearliestonesinchurchhistorywereso.Theyarenotan addressbutaresponsetobeingaddressed;theyarethehuman responsetotherecognitionofGod’sactivityregardingthecon ditionsofourselfrealisation.TheyaremadepossiblebyGod’s activity,butfinallytheyhavetobeexpressedbyhumanwords anddeeds. Confessions come from the human side with respect to their wording. Even if we imply the assistance of the Holy Spirit, they are still human responses. There are no reasons at all to overestimate the church’s confessions as durable safe guards of divine truth: they are inevitably infected by all the weaknessesthatarecharacteristicofhumanabilitiesandenter prises. They are also possibly inspired by the Holy Spirit, but thisisaconvictionthatneedstheSpirit’sconfirmationandcan notbestatedbythechurch—thechurchcanonlyhope.Confes sionsbearthetracesofhistoryandstrugglewiththerestrictions ofhumanlanguage.Thatiswhytheirauthorityalsohasarela tive character in the double sense of the meaning of the word:

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ontheonehand,theyrelatetoGod’sexplicitactivitytowardus and,inthissense,markthisinconceivablerelationintheword ingofaconfession.Ontheother,theyarederivedandnotabso lute,simplyrelativeinapejorativewayincomparisonwiththe divinetruth. There is also no reason to underestimate the possibility that the words of the church are true and its witness faithful. Ontheonehand,itisGod’sfaithfulnessthatenablesthechurch to be his witness and, on the other, the structured ministry of the church in the understanding of the Reformers provides a transparent and accessible procedure of decision making in which the congregation always has the opportunity to inter vene.BeyondalldifferencesbetweenLutheransandReformed regardingtheconcreterealisationofthestructuredministrywe sharetheimportantinsightofthehighlyvaluedcontrolbythe congregation.4 This is the pivotal point, and the differences re gardingtheconcreteshapeoftheministryarenotreallysignif icant. ThedifferencebetweentheLutheranandtheReformedas sessment of confession depends to a great deal on their differ ent confidence in the human capacity to create sentences that convey divine truth, at least approximately. The optimism re garding the closeness of human formulations to divine truth maybeabithigherintheLutherantraditionthaninthesobri ety of the Reformed tradition. This makes a difference beyond the farreaching consensus on this question. If taken seriously, in the Reformed understanding one could never claim that a confessioncanbearegulafidei;atbest,itcanonlybeasupport forthefaith’sattemptatitsownclaritybutnotasourceforthe certainty of faith. One may possibly distinguish the particular weightoftheoldchurch’screedsfromthelaterconfessionsand confessionalwritings,butthisdoesnotchangethegeneralper ception.5 (The particular reference to the old church’s creeds

4

Cf.thefurtherexplanationsinArnoldhainerKonferenz1985:44

63. 5

AsacomprehensiveaccountoftheReformedunderstandingof confessionscf.Vischer1982:11116andGuhrt1985:3849.

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maybetakenasanexplicitreferencetothechurch’scatholicity, whichshouldalsobeimpliedbyeverysingleconfession.) For further illustration, I will give an eloquent example fromtheearlytwentiethcenturythatdemonstratestheparticu lar Reformed approach to the problem. For the 12th General Council of World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) in 1925inCardiffKarlBarthwasaskedtogiveakeynoteaddress on the question “Is a common Statement of Faith (Creed or Confession)desirableorpracticablefortheReformedChurches oftheWorld?”6Itisworthmentioningthatacommitteehadal readybeenestablishedatthemeetingofthecouncilin1880to preparea“ConsensusoftheReformedConfessions”forthenext meeting,butthethinkinginthethreebranchesofthattime,the American, the British and the European churches, were so di vergent that the project was dropped.7 The notion came up againinthe1920s,andKarlBarthagreedtospeakonthisatthe councilinCardiff.Inhisscepticalpaperwefind,atleastinmy understanding, all the characteristic aspects of the Reformed understandingofconfessionandconfessions.8Thelongversion

6 Cf.theeditor’sintroductiontotheeditionoftheGermanversion inBarth1990:604. 7

Cf.AlexanderMartininhispaperfromtheCardiffmeeting,in: Fleming1926:108f. 8

 Three papers were given in Cardiff, outlining three different options.Asinthecommitteeestablishedin1880itwastheCanadian speaker, J.M. Shaw from Halifax (Canada), who was in favour of a commonReformedconfession,whiletheBritish,AlexanderMartinfrom Edinburgh and the European, Karl Barth, who were opposed. It is astonishingthatthereasons“pro”and“contra”inthefirsttwocasesare verysimilar.BecausetheReformedarealwaysreadytoimprovetheir confessions,theformulationofacommonstatementshouldnotentail anyrisk,expressinginitsveryshapethataconfession“isnomereassent totruth,butconsenttoawayoflife”(cf.J.M.ShawinFleming1926:117 28).Theargumentcanalsobeturnedinanotherdirection:since,ina Reformedunderstanding,confessionsdonotalwaysretaintheirvalue, the extraordinary effort at achieving a common statement should be avoided(cf.A.MartininFleming1926:10717).KarlBarthwastheonly

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of Barth’s paper includes the following comprehensive defin itionofaconfessioninitsfirstchapter: A Reformed Confession of Faith is a descriptive statement, spontaneouslyandpubliclyformulatedbyalocalrestricted Christiancommunity.Itmustbeastandard,validuntilre vised,whichdifferentiatesthisbodyfromotherbodies,and, asregardsthecommunity’sowndoctrineandpractice,indi catingatrendofthoughtalsocapableofbeingchanged.Itis adescriptionoftheinsighthithertobestowedupontheuni versalChristianChurchintotherevelation of GodinJesus Christ, according to the sole testimony of the Holy Scrip tures.(Barth:1925:100)

Rightfromthebeginningitwasnotaboutthepossibilityofre citingaconfession.Barthdescribesaconfessionasanecclesio logicalexistentialactinwhichthechurchactuallyconfessessome thingconcreteinitsparticularsituation.Onemay“believewith others,nomatterhowfaraway”(Fleming1926:133)buttheact of confession arises “on the ground of concrete reality” (Flem ing 1926: 134). As at the time of the Reformation, it has to be “an act, an effect, an activity, not only exhibiting a knowledge ofGodinHisrevelation,butalsoatthesametimedemonstrat ingarealearthlyassociationamongthem[wirklichermenschlich irdischerGemeinschaft]”(Fleming1926:134).9Realauthoritycan

onewhosoughtanappropriatetheologicalbasisforareasonablecon fessioninadeepersense(cf.Fleming1926:12843).ThecouncilinCardiff decided(again)toestablishasmallcommitteetoprepareaproposalfor thenextgeneralcouncilastohowtoproceed.Thecommittee’srecom mendationforthecouncilinBostonin1929saidthatthereshouldbeno furtherstepsregardingacommonstatementoffaith;cf.“JointReportof theEasternandWesternSectionsonaCommonStatementofFaith,”in Hamilton1929:387f. 9

 Fleming 1926: 141: “A Church which would today write a Confessionmusthavethecouragetoexpressherpresentinsightgained fromtheScripturesonthemodernproblemsoflifewhichoppressher memberstoday.…Today,forinstance,totakeoneexample,inthis matteroftheFascisticNationalism,whichsincethewarhasappearedin asimilarforminallcountries–doestheChurchsay‘yes’or‘no’tothis spirit?Doesshesay‘yes’or‘no’toAntiSemitism?”[1925!]Healsosaw thequestionofwaratstakeandaskedfor“anunconditionalandunmis

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begeneratedonlyinthe distressofaparticularsituation.And therefore confessions in a Reformed understanding are related toaparticulardateandtime(cf.Vischer1968:42).Beyondsuch concretechallengesthechurchmay“giveworldwidepraiseto certain things, which are proclaimed and listened to, but have neverhithertowonthebeliefofanyman”(Fleming1926:135). InhisassessmentofthemeaningofconfessionBarthisfocused exactlyonthequeryforauthorityandcommitment.Butbefore makinganyclaimstoauthorityhetriestoclarifythepossibility of authority in the reality of our world. It makes no sense for himtoclaimanauthoritythatremainsanillusion.Itisaspecial kindofpracticalrealismtocutofftheseselfaffirmingactivities, which require enormous effort and lead to nothing really important but only prevent the church from realising its true mission.10 It may be worth considering that even unions of churches in most cases do not come up with a new confession (Vischer 1968: 39).11 Authority and commitment arise in situa tionswherethechurchisrealisingthedistressitisin(cf.Barth 1931).Aslongasthechurchonlylooksforitsaffirmationwith out realising that it is not just one of the world’s possibilities butastrangerintheworlditwillcontinuetofailinitseffortsat authority(cf.Barth1930:16).12 There are things that you may and can do only when you must.TothiscategorybelongChristianConfessions of Faith. … Every other “Credo” is lazy incantation [fauler Zauber],

takable‘no’toplaceonthecandlestick.” 10

ThiswasthemainreasonwhyBarthhesitatedtojointhespecial kindofecumenism,whichlaterbecameembodiedintheWorldCouncil ofChurches;cf.BarthandVisser’tHooft2006. 11 TheRomanCatholicecumenicaltheologianPeterNeunereven emphasisesthatnochurchunionswereeverestablishedonthebasisof adoctrinalconsensus;cf.Neuner1996:61. 12

OnBarth’spositioninginthechurchstruggle(Kirchenkampf)cf. Weinrich2003b.

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andofthedevil,evenifitbetheApostles’Creed,wordby word.(Fleming1926:137)13

Andmoreonthelevelofpragmaticrealism,Barthsays: A Confession without serious theological preparation can neverbeanythingbutterriblywearisome,unoriginal,eclec ticandpurposeless.…Godpreserveusfromatheologically meaningless, perhaps designedly meaningless [wohl gar be deutungslosseinwollenden],Confession.(Fleming1926:138)

This is another decisive point. Barth saw the possibility thatachurch,especiallyinitsdealingwithitsconfessions,may fail to confess. As Eberhard Jüngel later underscored: “Where thefreedomofcreatingaconfessionismissed,theobligationto confessions is a mockery of the confession” (Jüngel 1968: 94) The church can be tempted to interpret the old confessions againandagainwithoutrealisingthecontemporaryneedfora confession.Itmaybe,asinthestruggleoftheearlyConfessing ChurchagainsttheinfluenceofNationalSocialismonthechurch, thatthereareonlyindividuals,likeBarthandBonhoeffer,ora particularcommittedgroupwithinthechurchwhoachievethe givenstatusconfessionis,butthechurchhasnochoicebuttotake up this challenge; otherwise its unity is threatened. A realised statusconfessionisurgestoadecision,andaconfessionimpliesa possibly clear decision in every case. In most cases the church will be too drowsy to recognise the contemporary temptations andchallenges,butitshouldbewillingtowakeup,ifsomeone orsomeofitsmembersspeakuptocallthechurch’sattention toastatusconfessionis(cf.Barth1952).Atleastthechurchhasto

13

ForBarth,itisimportantthatdogmaticinsightsimplyethicalde cisions.Thedogmaticconsistencyisproveninitsimplicitethicalclarity. Andthushecomplainsaboutthechurch’sethicalinconsistency:“Wesee inher[sc.theChurch]morevacillationandinconsistentinherethicthan inherdogmatic,sometimessilentwheresheshouldspeak,sometimes speakingwheresheshouldbesilent,alwaystwostepsbehindwithher deliberations,whiletheworldgoesonitswayregardless,defiant,and selfconfident.Sheisconfidentonlyinmatterswhereshehasnothingto fearforherself;sheisfullofthebestwilltoall,butcertainly,quitecer tainly,shehasnopropheticsentinelvoicesoundingoverthechaosof othervoices”(Fleming1926:141).

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initiateaprocessusconfessionisinwhichtheneededclarityincor respondencetowellreasonedbiblicalinsightshastobeworked out.Thechurchischallengedtoapublicconfessionthatintends tomakeadecisionbeforetheforumofthepublic.Inthiscase, confessionistheresultofaserioussearchforthewillofGodin aconcretesituation. Viewed soberly, we easily realise that just the fact of the necessity of a confession at the time of National Socialism shows that the church was going to become lost. It was the weakness of the church that made the confession necessary, andnotitsstrength.Thechurchwasnotwhatitshouldbeand sohadtobecalledbacktoitsauthenticfaith.Atnotimeisthe churchreallywhatitshouldbe,andsothechurchisalwaysina need of being called back to its original confession of its Lord. Thedifferenceisonlythatthismaybemoreurgentinoneperi odthaninanother,butthereisnoperiodinwhichitisentirely superfluous. Quiteanotherwayforthechurchtopositionitselfpublicly may be a qualified silence, especially in a situation in which particular social powers or interests expect support from the church(ArnoldhainerKonferenz1985:36f.).Thesilentrejection ofsuchanexpectationcanalsobeakindofconfession.14 When Barth speaks about status confessionis, he does not mean anything exceptionally extraordinary but the need for clearwordsbythechurchinamatterthataffectsthefaithofthe believers.15 The use of status confessionis in the sense Barth in tendsshowshowachurchexperiencesitsselfconsciousnessof being a confessing church. In most cases, the dramatization of using the words status confessionis is simply an indication of a church that wants to be untouched by the contemporary problems of the world. Since the church is itself a part of the world, it may not escape the world’s problems; rather the churchhastocontributeitspoliticalservicetoGod(“politischer Gottesdienst”) beyond and in addition to the celebration of its regularservices(cf.Barth1938:20316).Thisrelaxeduseofthe

14

ThiswasthedecidedrecommendationofBarth’sfamouswork TheologischeExistenzheute(1934);cf.Weinrich2003b. 15

Regardingstatusconfessionisalsocf.Guhrt1985:43f.

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status confessionis mirrors the Reformed understanding of the church’sconfessionsprecisely,atleastsinceBarmen.“Relaxed” doesnotatallmeanunserious.Confessionsarenottobeover estimated,butinthesituation whentheyareproclaimed,they speakwiththechurch’shighestattainableauthority(cf.1Peter 3:15: “Always be prepared to give an answer [Luther: Verant wortung] to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hopethatyouhave”). ThisshowsthatconfessioninaReformedunderstandingis linked closely to the first commandment. To say it once more briefly,itisaboutgivingtheglorytoGod(Heron1993:151).In sofar as there is no time at which the church does not need to askfortheappropriateunderstandingofGod’swill,toacertain extentonecansaythatthechurchisalwaysinthesituationof asking for the proper contemporary confession. For Barth, merely repeating insights or decisions from the past generally fallsunderthesuspicionofheresy(Barth1962:54).Atnotime can the church avoid giving its own answer to God’s address and that means that it cannot avoid finding its respective own confession—notinageneralsensebut“We,hereandnow,con fessthis”(Barth1925:103). AccordingtoBarth,theLutheranclaimtotheuniversalau thority of their confession (and later of their confessional writ ings) follows historically the medieval idea of a corpus Chris tianum, which already became obsolete in the areas where the Reformed communities emerged.16 The difference between the

16

BarthinFleming1926:130ff.:“Intheshadowofthisœcumenical authority[oftheChurchintheHolyRomanEmpire]Lutheranismfound arefuge,whenitlaiditsConfessionbeforetheEmperorandtheEmpire atAugsburg;andtherebyitbrokethebanofschisminidea,and,what wasmoreimportant,inpointoflaw.Itwasnotitsintrinsicmerit[ihrin nererWert],butthisquasiœcumenicalcharacter,itsqualityinpublicum scriptum,whichhasmadeitsAugsburgConfessionsodeartoLutheran ism—andmustalsomakeadherencetotheAugsburgConfessionde sirableincertaincircumstancesforthosewhoarenotLutherans.These circumstanceswerepresentinGermany,wheretheideaoftheCorpus Christianumhaspossessedanaltogetherexaggeratedpracticalimpor tancerightupthethreshold[Schwelle]ofmoderntimes,toamuchgreat erextentthaninSwitzerland,Holland,andtheFrenchandAngloScot tishWest.…Calvin—andtheReformedcommunityassuchingeneral

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Lutheran and the Reformed understanding refers to two mod els of ecumenicity arising for mainly historical reasons: on the onehand,theidealofoneuniversalvisiblebodyofthechurch, whichatthelatestbecameobviouslyanachronisticthroughthe historicalresultsoftheReformationand,ontheother,theidea ofanecumenicalcommitmentbydifferentchurches,eachstriv ing for the catholicity of the universal church (cf. Weinrich 2007). The Reformed understanding was not as much infected bytheConstantiniantiesofthelateMiddleAges,whichbegan to dissolve by the time of Reformation. In this sense one may takeBarth’shesitationregardinganauthoritative,agreedcom mon confession as a plea for an ecumenical attitude with low boundariesbutsubstantialreasoning. Ifwelookatthesehistoricalcircumstancesasanimportant reason for the different usage of our confessional writings, the differenceshouldlosemuchoftheemphasisthatstilloccasion allyemergesfromit.Thisshouldalsobeanaspectoftheabove mentionedhistoricizedunderstandingoftheconfession.Ithink that even the idea of ecumenism should be reassessed in light ofthisinsight. Every constitutional commitment to a commonly agreed uponconfessioncausesendlessandneedlessdiscussions,which donotmakethingsbetterbutjustmorecomplicated.Common lyagreedconfessionalwritingsmaytightentheidentityofsin gle churches, but they are not a promising road along which mutual acceptance and ecumenical commitment will be suc cessfully enhanced. The meaning of confessions will be funda mentallyoverratedasatoolforcreatingreliabilityandtherela tivity would be diminished to something that may finally be overlooked. The confessions tend to attract all importance to theircultivationandraiseunnecessaryobstaclestoanecumen icalcoexistenceatthebasisofthecatholicityofthechurch.The modestemphasisputonitsconfessionsintheReformedtradi tionhastobeunderstoodoffensivelyaspartofitsessentialecu menicalcommitment.Thefewerbarrierstherearetheeasierthe

—hasnotfurtherrelationsinprinciplewiththemedievalcorpusChris tianum;andthereforewheretherearenopracticalpoliticalcircumstances requiringtobemet,suchastheywereinGermany,hehasnointerestin anœcumenicalconfession,orientatedinthissensetowardsthepast.”

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needed unity is to achieve—this is an important point espe ciallyforJohnCalvin(Weinrich2008:4245). Confession,DoctrineandTradition To give a clear picture of the difference between confession, doctrine and tradition briefly is a delicate affair. A confession may be the initial stage for theological explanations and doc trinalconsideration,17andatthesametimeitmaybeakindof summaryinaprocessofdoctrinalclarification.18Doctrinemay beofdivineorigin,sinceChristhimselfisseenastheteacherof his church, and at the same time it can be a decision of the church or simply an individual theological model for sys tematisingthecontemporaryselfunderstandingoffaith.Andit isthesamewithrespecttotradition.Traditionmayfocusonthe biblicaloriginsandthecircumstancesoftheirgeneration,andat thesametimeitmaybeasampleofhistoricaltracesandusages that are characteristic for this or that church and its develop ment. In a wider sense, tradition is not simply a theological termbutincludesdifferentkindsofnontheologicalfactorslike cultural,sociological,psychologicalandevenpoliticalandeco nomical aspects. These nontheological factors are normally underestimated,andsotheydonotattracttheseriousattention in ecumenical debates as they should. On the one hand, they arealwaysmentioned;ontheother,theyarenotreallyinview. Often,theProtestantuseoftheword“tradition,”incontrastto theprincipleofScripture,alsoincludesapejorativeconnotation overagainsttheRomanCatholicunderstandingoftradition.But in the meantime we have learned that we are always dealing with tradition, otherwise we would have to reconsider every thinganew.19Inthisquestion,i.e.therelationbetweentheprin

17

Thestructureofmanydogmatictextbooksistakenfromthean cientchurch’screeds,especiallytheApostles’Creed. 18

Theancientchurch’screedsaretheconclusionofalongprocess ofargumentsonthenature(s)ofChristandaproperunderstandingof theTrinity.Formodernreasonsandattitudesofconfessionscf.Rügger 1988. 19

MichaelBeintker(2002:721)emphasisesthattheReformersstrug gledagainsttheprincipleoftraditionbutnotagainsttraditionassuch.

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ciple of Scripture and the esteem for tradition, the ecumenical movement made a great deal of progress, so that the contro versy lost much of its sharpness (cf. Körtner 2005: 4470). Fin ally, we always have to be aware of the unavoidable ambival ence of tradition. It may provide familiar space for commun icationandinteraction,but,ontheother,itcangetinthewayof changeandrenewalandmayholdachurchcaptiveandkeepit onthepathmostfamiliartoit.Thislastingambivalencehasto befacedwithaparticularcriticalawareness. The function and the meaning of all three terms depend basicallyontheparticularprevalentuse.Thereferencetothese termsbecamemuchmorerelaxedanddifferentiatedinthelast decades. Reasons for this change may be found in the current farreaching breaking away from traditions and the obvious loss of clear doctrinal distinctions and the expectation of con temporarytheologicalclarifications.Inaproperunderstanding doctrinesarenotobjectsoffaithbutsupportstoitsunderstand ing. Doctrines are agreements on what has to be said through faithabouttheGospel(cf.Sauter1988:126).Ifdoctrinesdonot serveasanaid,theyareuselessandsubjecttomisunderstand ing(cf.Ritschl2003).Usedproperly,doctrinesaimataconsen susfortheunderstandingoftruth(cf.Ritschl1990:614). Theconfessionalwritings,whichareagenuineoccurrence within the churches of the Reformation (Wirsching 1980: 488), canfitinallthreecategories.Theyareconfessions,theyprovide doctrines,andtheyarealsoaspecificpartofthetraditionofthe respective churches. Even if they claim the catholicity of the universalchurch(astheydo),theybelonginfacttotheconfes sionalcharacteristicsofparticularchurches.Also,theLutheran perspective of a world church is not able to overcome the re strictionthattheenvisagedworldchurchissimplyoneparticu lar church among others. Actually, the confessional writings havetobetakenasdoctrinalimpulsesforanongoingdoctrinal discussion(Lehrgespräch)asproposed,forexample,bytheCon cordofLeuenbergin1973andisstillpractisedbytheCommu nionofProtestantChurchesinEurope(CPCE)(cf.Ritschl1990: 614f.). To a certain extent, and this is what I want to emphasise, confessions,doctrinesandtraditionsarethesame.Theyallare notstaticcontainersoftruthbutusefulaidsforcommunication

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intherespectivecontemporarysearchforanappropriateman nerofconfessing,teachingandpassingonthetradition.Itisnot the church’s confessions, doctrines and traditions that are at stake but its possibly clearest confession to the public of its time.Ifweareunabletousethiscommunicativemeaningthat theyhave,theyarepossiblymoreobstaclestothechurches’life thantheyareitsfruitfulsupporters. GeorgeA.Lindbeckspokeofdoctrinesasthegrammarof faith(Lindbeck1984).Theyprovidesomerulesforcommunica tion,buttheydonotsubstitutethecommunication.Foralang uage it is important to know the grammar, but one cannot speakalanguagejustthroughknowingthegrammar.Itispos sibletospeakalanguagewithoutknowingthegrammar,butit isimpossibletospeakalanguagesimplyonthebasisofknow ingitsgrammar.Thegamehastobeplayedinalwayschanging situations,anditwillbeeasiertoplayitifonepaysattentionto some of the rules that have been handed down. But it always has to be played anew. Its authority depends on the authen ticity in which it responds to the respective present situation. Letmeconcludewithafinalremark.Thebiblicalwitnessis astrikingexampleofthispointedconclusion.Itdidnotsimply telltheGospelonce.Therewasaneedtotellitagaininanother way, and even a third and fourth time. And the different ver sionswereretainedasequallyimportant.Itisobviousthathow theGospelisproclaimedisverymuchrelatedtothesituationin whichitoccurs.Thebiblicalwitnessisnothingbeyondthedif ferentsituations;rather,itscatholicityisgroundedintheability to address even contrary situations (cf. Weinrich 2007). The richness of the biblical witness is the richness of the life envis aged. The great variety is not arbitrary but substantial. This is not only an appropriate model for understanding the church’s catholicitybutalsoforitsecumenicityanditsjointattemptsat communion. Bibliography Barth, Karl. (1990). Wünschbarkeit und Möglichkeit eines reformierten Glaubensbekenntnisses. In: Vorträge und kleinere Arbeiten 1922 1925. Gesamtausgabe Vol. 19. Ed. H. Finze. Zurich: Theolo gischerVerlagZürich.Pp.60442.

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“JointReportoftheEasternandWesternSectionsonaCommonState mentofFaith.”(1929).In:W.H.Hamilton(ed.).AllianceoftheRe formedChurchesholdingthePresbyterianSystem.TheThirteenthGen eral Council Boston, Massachusetts, 1929, Proceedings. Edinburgh: OfficeoftheWorldAllianceofReformedChurches.Pp.38788. Jüngel, Eberhard. (1968). “Bekennen und Bekenntnis.” In: Siegfried Herrmann und Oskar Söhngen (eds). Theologie in Geschichte und Kunst.FestschriftWalterElliger.Witten:LutherVerlag:94105. Körtner, Ulrich H.J. (2005). Wohin steuert die Ökumene? Vom Konsens zumDifferenzmodell.Göttingen:Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht. Lindbeck, George A. (1984). The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theo logyinaPostliberalAge.Philadelphia:WestminsterPress. Loofs, Friedrich. (1917). “Der articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae.” TheologischeStudienundKritiken90:323420. Luther, Martin. (1969) “Psalmos graduum.“ (1532/33). In: Martin Lu thers Werke (Weimarer Ausgabe). Vol. 40/III. Unrevised Ed. Graz:AkademischeDrucku.Verlagsanstalt.Pp.1475. Neuner,Peter.(1996).“VordemEndederKonsensökumene?ZurRe zeption der Studie über Lehrverwerfungen.” In: J. Brosseder (ed.).VonderVerwerfungzurVersöhnung:ZuraktuellenDiskussion um die Lehrverurteilungen des 16. Jahrhunderts. NeukirchenVluyn NeukirchenerVerlag.Pp.5179. Ritschl, Dietrich. (2003). Theorie und Konkretion in der Ökumenischen Theologie:KanneseineHermeneutikdesVertrauensinmittendifferier endersemiotischerSystemegeben?StudienzursystematischenThe ologieundEthik37.Münster:LitVerlag.  (1990). “Lehre.” In: Theologische Realenzyklopädie Vol. 20.Berlin/ NewYork:WalterdeGruyter1990.Pp.60821. Rügger, Heinz. (1988). “Neuere reformierte Bekenntnisse.” Theolo gischeZeitschrift44:31228. Sauter,Gerhard(1988).“VerbindlichkeitalsLehre?”GlaubeundLernen 3:12030. Vischer,Lukas.(1982).“BekenntnisundBekenneninderreformierten Kirche.”In:UnaSancta37:11116. (1968). “Neues Bekenntnis und neues Bekennen.“ In: Ökume nischeRundschau17:3551. Arnoldhainer Konferenz. (1985). Was gilt in die Kirche? Die Verant wortung für Verkündigung und verbindliche Lehre in der Evange lischenKirche:EinVotumdesTheologischenAusschussesderArnold

562 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE hainer Konferenz. NeukirchenVluyn: Neukirchener Verlag. Pp. 4463. Weinrich, Michael. (2008). “Viele Zweige, aber ein Baum: Johannes Calvin als Ökumeniker.” In: Kirchenamt der Evangelischen Kir che in Deutschland and the Reformierten Bund in Deutschland (ed.). Calvin: Das Magazin zum CalvinJahr 2009. Hannover: EKD andReformierterBund.Pp.4245.  (2007).“SomeAspectsofReformedCatholicity.”In:KatrinKus mierzetal.GrenzenerkundenzwischenKulturen,Kirchen,Religion en. Festschrift C. Lienemann. Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck. Pp. 20915.  (2003a).“ConfessingUnity.AReformedPerspectiveonEcumen ism.”ReformedWorld53:17080. (2003b).“KarlBarthsKampfgegendiereligiöseVersuchungdes Nationalsozialismus:VonderbescheidenenKompromißlosigkeit der Theologie.” In: Richard Faber and Gesine Palmer (eds). Der Protestantismus: Ideologie, Konfession oder Kultur? Würzburg: Kö nigshausen&Neumann.Pp.12545. and John Burgess (eds). (2009). What is Justification About? Re formed Contributions to an Ecumenical Theme. Grand Rapids/Cam bridge:Eerdmans. Wirsching,Johannes.(1980).“Bekenntnisschriften.”In:TheologischeRe alenzyklopädie. Vol. 5. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter. Pp. 487511.

ChristianityandCulture WARCattheMillennium GeorgeNewlands

Abstract The relationship between Christianity and culture can be traced in various ways, one of which is through the work of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches(WARC)inthemodernera.WARChastakenupvariousissuesin this period—issues of justice, the embodiment of dialogue. Following the introduction, this essay first traces WARC’s dealing with issues of justice, suchasapartheidandgenerosity.Thenextsectionexplorestheembodiment ofdialoguewithculture,whereasthefollowingsectionlooksattherelation shipbetweencultureandpower.Theessaythenturnstotheissueofthein terpretationoftheBibleinculture(s)and,finally,looksattheissueofChris tianityandhumanrights.

TraditionandCreativeInterruption The relationship between Christianity and contemporary cul turemaybeunderstoodindifferentways.Hereweseethisas essentially complementary. We can trace this reciprocity through the work of WARC in the modern era. Henk Vroom makes this very clear in his considered view on the nature of dialogue—an ideal stance for a participant in ecumenical en gagement: Dialogue does not involve an exchange of ideas while avoiding critical questions. Rather, dialogue concerns truthandincludesanalyses,questions,answers,objec tions, judgements. A critical dialogue consists of four things:(1)examinationofthatwhichothersactuallybe lieve; (2) articulation of one’s own belief; (3) readiness to learnfromoneanother:thisconcernsthoseaspectsofthecri tique that are true and continue to obtain; (4) open discus siononmutualcriticismwithrespecttotheconceptionsand practicesofbelief.(Vroom1996:5) 563

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In1982theWARCGeneralCouncilmetinOttawa,votedapart heid an articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae, and elected Allan BoesakasPresident.WARCwasconsciousofitsworldwidere sponsibilities. But it was also aware of the need to develop a distinctive identity and presence in Europe. The Europe Com mittee met in Vienna, Austria 1987, Lisbon, Portugal 1988, Fe ketic, Voyvodina, Yugoslavia 1990, Cambridge, England 1991, Uzgorod , CarpathoUkraine 1992, Athens, Greece 1993, Kosice, Slovakia 1994, Edinburgh, Scotland 1995, Geneva Switzerland1996,Prague,CzechRepublic1997.Inparallel,oth er regional committees met and exchanged ideas and repre sentatives,e.g.CANACandSAARC. At Seoul in 1989 the question, “Whom do you say that I am?” was pursued in great depth, with biblical study, theolo gical reflection and engagement with local churches, including Minjungcommunities.Itwasrecognisedthatthegoalsofmis sionandunitywenttogetheraspartofthesameGospelimper ative.ThegreatthemeofJPIC,comingoriginallyfromthe NorthAmericanchurches,wasdevelopedinanewtheologyof covenant.Therewasreflectiononanewproposalforacommon testimony of faith in the Reformed churches. Creation led, on theonehand,tothestudyofhumanrightsastherightsofna ture,and,ontheother,toanewurgencyinthesearchforjust ice, reflected in a WARC consultation in South Africa in 1993. WARC pursued a series of parallel dialogues with other churches,notablytheRomanCatholicandOrthodoxchurches, butalsoAdventistReformedandAfricanIndependentRe formed dialogue. It considered the challenge of new emerging ecclesiologies—e.g,inaConsultationinKampenin1993. CultureandJustice In 1995 the themes of Hope and Renewal in Times of Change was central to the Meeting of the European Area Council in Edinburgh. It is worth looking at these local meetings in their particularityandspecificity.TheChurchofScotlandhasalways beenmuchinvolvedinWARC,notablyinrecentyearsthrough the participation of Stuart Louden, Bill Shaw, Hugh Davidson and Calum Miller. Here Vroom spoke on the topic “Reformed IdentityisReformedInterpretationofChristianLife”(4849).

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In this dynamic process of the understanding and reinter pretationoftheGospelindifferenthistorical,socialandcul tural circumstances, the expressions of the Reformed heri tage will vary. I will give an important example of such a shift in recent history, the integration of equality between women and men in the understanding of Christian faith.... In this reinterpretation we have an example in the config urationofashiftinbasicinsights.Mostwomenandmenno longer perceive women as lower than males and as their helpers, nor do they think that such a societal ordering is evident.... Another insight has come into the foreground, equality.Nowthatinsighthasbecomecentralintheappro priationofscripture.

ThismeetingwasanimportantprecursoroftheGeneralCoun cilatDebrecenin1997.TheEuropeCommitteehadalreadybe comeacquaintedwiththeHungarianspeakingReformedcom munity through a meeting in northern Ukraine. Here was an opportunitytodeepenthesebondsandalsotoengageinatruly globalconversationonceagain.“BreaktheChainsofInjustice” was the challenging theme. Under the three central themes of Reformed Faith and the Search for Unity, Justice for all Crea tion,andPartnershipinGod’sMission,thecentralissuesfacing Christianlifeincontemporarysocietywereaddressed. ItwouldbeunwisetooverlookthefactthatDebrecenwas not without its tensions, some more constructive than others. There was some discussion on human sexuality, limited be cause it became rather heated, anticipating many of the geo graphicaldivisionswhichhaveaffectedtheAnglicancommun ioninrecentyears.Thislimitationamongothersledtotangible frustrationamongtheyouthdelegates,whofeltthatassurances of equal participation were not always delivered. (There had beenanimportantEuropeanYouthConsultationinBelecinthe Czech Republic in August 1996.) Here the official record (236) ofthePublicIssuesCommitteeReportrecordsdiplomatically: Duetolackoftime,theGeneralCouncilwasunabletodeal withthefollowingitems. Sexual orientation. Violence and discrimination are a mong the injustices committed in many of our societies endured by gay and lesbian people. Because of the deep differences of opinion surrounding this topic, consensus

566 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE among member churches will require a period of open dialogueandcarefulconsideration.

Although the majority of Reformed churches have yet to face this issue squarely, it should be mentioned that the Dutch churches have been among the most inclusive. Here was, and stillis,theelephantintheroom,oratleastalitmustest,ifnota caseofstatusconfessionis,forthechurches.IntheUKtheauthor wasgladtobeassociatedwiththefoundingofAffirmationScot land,asupportgroupforgayandlesbianChristians.Othertop icsleftoveratDebrecenincluded“comfortwomen,childpros titution and aboriginal children in Australia.” Again the tone andcultureofthemeetingisitselfsignificant.Itisgoodtonote that this last issue was finally constructively addressed by the Canadian and Australian churches in 2008 (Reformed Update, [June]). I return to cultural analysis of Debrecen. The 23rd General CouncilofWARCmetinDebrecen,Hungary,from819August 1997.Eachdaytherewasaperiodofworship,BibleStudy,then plenarysessionsofthecouncildealingwithadministrativemat ters. The reports were put together over the first week by sec tions and subsections of the conference meeting in committee. Therewerethreemainsubjectsofbusiness.IwastheRecorder forSectionI,ReformedFaithandtheSearchforUnity.Wepro duced a report including a series of recommendations for ac tion,addressedtothememberchurches.Theshapeofsections 2,JusticeforallCreation,and3,PartnershipinGod’sMission, weresimilar.TherewasalsoareportbyaPolicyCommittee,on a variety of issues including the conditional readmission to WARC of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa (ap proved), and a Public Issues Committee, with recommenda tionsonsubjectsfromhumanrightsinIndonesiatoinjusticein relation to gypsies in Hungary and Dalits in India. There was also a Message committee, which drew up a series of recom mendations which we finally signed, as the Declaration of De brecen—in which among millions of other things we pledged ourselvestoasimplelifestyle. The other main formal item was the election of a new World Executive Committee, which as at Seoul created lively and at times heated debate. The new Committee consists of a largercontingentfromtheSouth,reflectingashiftinthenum

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ber of delegates from northern countries. There was a reason able—but perhaps not large enough representation of women. Theothermaincategory,youth,wasnominallypresent,butin fact no one under 21 (29 before the next council) was elected. The youth were understandably unhappy that the actual re presentation failed to match the ringing affirmations of youth whichhadprecededtheelections.“Wearedisappointedbythe hollowwordsofourleaders.”Itwaspromisedthatfouryouth consultantswouldbenamed. TheCouncilendedwithapprovalofavastseriesofrecom mendations,coveringtheentireplanetarysystemitseemed,ap provedforactionorstudy,tobreakthechainsofinjustice.This hastobesetagainsttheperspectiveofamuchreducedbudget forthefuture.Tomatchaspirationstoresourceswillbeagreat challenge,astheysay,tothenewexecutive.Theissuesdebated often reflected the traditional liberal/conservative divides, the nations in the South sometimes reflecting cultural preferences originallytaughtbyandnowheavilyrevisedbytheNorth,no tablyonissuessuchastheordinationofwomenandsexualori entation. Breaking the chains of injustice could mean different thingsindifferentcultures.Allinall,thechancetolistenwith respect to many different voices, seeking to articulate the Gos pel within radically different cultures was a stimulating experi ence.Itwasalsoatimelyreminderofhoweasyitistogetcar riedawaywithourownrhetoric. Here we have more emphasis on confessionality. Beyond thiswehavemorestressonLifeandWorkissuesthanonFaith andOrderIssues.Theseareclearlyalwaysrelated,buttheem phasis varies in different cultures at different times. Reflecting further on the Debrecen theme, it seems to me that one useful way of thinking about justice and injustice as a particular Re formedconcernistofocusontheideaofgenerosity.Thisleads metoconcentrateonthecontributionofChristianfaithtopub lic issues, and especially to human rights. Generosity suggests goingbeyondtheboundsofwhatisstrictlyrequiredingiving. Generosityiswhatpeopleembodytowardsthestrangerintheir midst.Generosityincludesacceptance,friendship,hospitality— thegiftsofthespiritofChristlikeness. Generositybyexample.HowisfaithinJesusChrististobe expressedinReformeddiscipleship?ThecharacterofGodisthe

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characterofJesusChrist,whoiswiththosewhoareinprison, who are ill, who are mentally handicapped. How is the Re formedcommunityactivelytorespondtothosewhoareinpris on in Europe today? How is it to respond, for example, to the quality of health care, to matters of taxation and social struc tures?Howarewetorespondtotheissueofsexualorientation, divisiveatDebrecen,Lambethandelsewhere? Generositytakesplaceincommunity,andisdemonstrated instoriesofcommunity.WhenwelookattheBibleweseestor ies of the lack of generosity in community, in the treatment of Philistine neighbours, in the bitter tensions between Jews and Christians.Therearenarrativestooofgenerosity,incommunal hospitality, in the parables of Jesus, in the Sermon on the Mount. A generous community will always be an open com munity.Itwillbeopentocontinuingchange.Itwillbelievethat the human future is not simply the freezing of present struc turesastheyare.Itwillreflecttheoverflowofdivinegeneros ity.ForcreationitselfisGod’sfirstactofgenerosity,andrecon ciliation is the ultimate unconditional squandering of God’s loveforthenewcreation. One of the things of which theological professionals need to be constantly reminded is that actions speak louder than words,andthattheWordbywhichwearecalledtoliveisoften mosteffectiveasasilentword,awordofactivehospitality,en compassingpeoplewithgenerousfriendship.Inthatwaywel coming and friendly congregations can make hugely more ef fectivecontributionsthanwritersonthesubjectcanmake. EffectiveDialogueandEmbodiment Effective dialogue needs embodiment. In all these issues of “Life and Work” subjects the relation of theology to culture— local,ecclesial,political—constantlyarises.Ifwelookforamo mentatathirdrecentecumenicalandconfessionaloccasion,the progressoftheLambethConferenceoftheAnglicanCommun ioninLondoninJuly2008,weseethatverysimilardebatesto those at Debrecen took place on similar issues. Again there weredivisions,oftenbetweenNorthandSouth,oftenbetween moreconservativeandmoreliberalunderstandingsoftheBible. Thesedifferencesinvolvedtheology.Theyalsoinvolvedthecom ingintodisagreementofdifferentcultures.Behindmuchofthe

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debatelaydifferentattitudestothecriticalinterpretationofthe Bible. At this point we may  recall some comments made in the GospelandCulturesReportatDebrecen.TheGospelandCul tures Subsection derived the authority for its work from the statement of the 22nd General Council which said: “For us the gospelspeaksinmanytongues…thereisno‘flesh’thatisnot nourishedbyaculture.No‘word’canbeheardthatisnotthe languageofaculture.” The subsection developed several issues, of which these aretwo. CulturesBeforeChristianity:Werecommendthatthechurch es,bothlocallyandregionally,incorporatetheculturalval uesofeachregion.Forexample,suchculturalvaluesasex pressed in music, dance or movement, dress, colour, lang uage,andsymbolsmdistinctivetoeachculture,areimport ant for use in worship and other church practices. This re coveryofregionalcultureinthelifeofthechurchshouldbe doneinlightofacomprehensive,notnarrow,readingofthe Bible.Moreover,suchrecoveryshouldbedonewiththeun derstandingthatnotallculturalvaluesandpracticesareac ceptabletothespiritualityandethicalvaluesinspiredbythe gospel, retaining the integrity of both the culture and the gospel.



PluralismofCultures:WerecommendthatWARCworkwith the churches to help them: discern how the gospel is em bedded in each culture; identify the changing influence of the gospel or culture; study how the sacraments relate to culture including the aspect of human and ecological rela tionships;andscrutinizeculturesethicallyandspiritually.

CultureandthediversityofculturesareGodgivenbutnot everypartofcultureisgivenbyGod.Thereforewemustbegin the study of culture with respect for culture and people. The Gospelisembeddedineachcultureandalsocriticalofthatcul ture.Therearespiritualimpulseswithineachculture.Weseek to discern those impulses, recognizing that Christianity is not solelyconcernedwithspiritualorreligiousimpulses.Cultureis changing, which means that the interaction of Gospel and cultureisdynamic.Forinstance,thechurchshouldnotexclude from the means of grace people who live in a culture of po

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lygamy because that culture is changing, is able to be influ encedbythegospel.Studyisneededintohowthesacraments, baptismandcommunion,relatetoculture,includingtheaspect ofhumanandecologicalrelationships.Sometimes,cultural practices or questions reveal the gospel to the church, For ex ample,womenwithinandoutsidethechurchhaveaskedhow churchpracticesaretruetothespiritofChrist.Wemustsubject allculture,includingwesterncultures,toscrutiny. Thelastsentenceiscrucial:notallinculturationisauthen ticallyChristian.TheincarnationofGodinChristsetsaparticu lar paradigm for Christians throughout time and culture, cal lingeachofourcommunitiestoembodytheChristianwitness inwayswhicharespecifictoourowncontexts. CultureandPower GiventhatwehavesuchcomplexinteractionsbetweenGospel and culture within our own Reformed confession, it is even more important to pay attention to the relation between theo logyandcultureinecumenicaldialogue.Herethereisthepos sibility of further conflict, as different theological concepts are relatedtodifferentculturalenvironments.Someofthesediffer ences go through the confessional differences, so that we may share more common cultural assumptions with people of an otherdenominationthanwithourowndenomination.Onother issuestheconfessionalbondprovedtobemoresignificantthan the cultural bond. It becomes all the more important to devise strategiesforconstructiveconflictandcommonengagementwitheach other.Itmaybenecessarytocreatemulticulturaltheologicalap proachestoculturalvariety,astheoldculturaluniversalitiesof ubique, semper et ab omnibus disappear. At the same time, cul tural variety must be consonant with a common human enter prise as part of our understanding of God’s creation. Separa tismandexclusivenessarenotultimatevaluesinsuchavision, although they may have some penultimate justification. Social andpoliticalfactorsareinvolvedthroughout. Adoptionofnewecclesialinstrumentsmayhaveavariety ofperhapsunanticipatedeffects,whichmaybehelpfulinmov ing Christian community forward in the future. On the other hand,theymayhavetheeffectofinhibitingforwardlookingde velopment.ThecomingoftheOrthodoxChurchesintothe

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WCC was in many ways a great step forward. But in other waysitmayhavetendedtoactasabrakeonprogressivetheo logy and practice. The Councils and Synods of the Catholic Church take place almost without the witness and distinctive contributionofwomen.Itishardtoimagineenthusiasminthe Reformed tradition for such a development, and it is hard to think that decisions taken in an exclusively male environment are likely to produce ways forward into the future. Decisions basedonprecriticalapproachestotheinterpretationoftheBi ble, from whatever tradition, are unlikely to commend them selvesinallareasofthechurch. Thereisadifficultbutcrucialdimensionofecumenicaldia logue to be negotiated always between critical and precritical approaches to texts, traditions and institutions. We have to re cognisethatthecriticalperspectivesheldbyonedialoguepart ner may be seen rather as mere cultural conditioning by an other. Yet if we are not to have complete relativity, and there forenosignificantcommunication,itisnecessarytosearchfor commonground.Textsandtraditionshavepower,toliberateorto oppress. We noted precritical attitudes to scripture. What consti tutes precritical attitudes to tradition? It is striking that in the details of the Porvoo arrangements, though clergy in the Lu theranScandinavianChurchesordainedbybishopsaretobeaf forded reciprocal facilities in the Church of England, this does notapplytoasmallgroupofnonepiscopallyordainedclergy. Allclergyare“recognised,”butrecognitiondoesnotautomatic ally lead to interchangeability. If, as seems likely, this practice continues with the new AnglicanMethodist discussion, it is hardtoseePorvooasabreakthroughyetonthecrucialepisco pal/nonepiscopalfront.ItremainssignificantthattheMeissen agreement with the German Lutheran churches, though agree ing mutual recognition, did not provide for interchange of eu charisticministry. Once more, the nature of the relationship between interna tionalchurchbodiesandlocalchurchesbecomesanissue.Thereis need for local subsidiarity, to respect local circumstances. But how far may this go? The Dutch Reformed Church of South AfricawassuspendedfromWARCforpractisingandsupport ing apartheid. This was considered a matter of status confes

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sionis.Butwhoistodecidehowfarstatusconfessionis extends? AnOrthodoxorRomanCatholicsynodmightwell,onthebasis oftradition,consideragatheringwhichincludesordainedwo men,layclericalorepiscopal,tobeincapableofdecisionsbind ingonallChristianpeople.AconservativeEvangelicalgather ing, basing itself on the authority of scripture alone, might agree. The whole question of authority and democratisation in the churchariseshere.Thechurchmaynotbeademocracy.Butis somekindofdemocraticethosnecessaryforjusticetobemain tainedinthechurch?OristhisonlyaWesternpreoccupation? Are Western notions of justice and human rights negotiable, andifnot,howisdialoguetotakeplace?Thereisanexcellent chapter on these issues by John A. Coleman, “Not Democracy butDemocratisation”inADemocraticCatholicChurch(1992).For Coleman, the Catholic church may be seen as “a hierarchical communion instituted by the will of Christ and governed by normsofcollegiality,subsidiarity,andjusticeasparticipation” (Coleman 1992: 226). Better vehicles must constantly be found forpromotingthesecentralvalues.Headds“Absentdemocrat isation,churchessufferacrisisoflegitimation.” It becomes clear that there are no simple solutions to issues ofecumenicityandconfessionality.Itisnecessarytogoforward slowly,andtobuild trustandconfidencethroughworkingto gether.Wheredialoguepartnersactinwayswhichundermine trust,therearerealsetbacks.Thecentreremains the Gospelof Jesus Christ, the incarnation of the creative, responsive loving God.Buttheworkingoutofincarnationintoculturewillbein terpreteddifferentlyatdifferenttimes.ThisiswhenthePauline virtues of charity, patience, hope and longsuffering are much required.Butperhapsthatishowitoughttobe. CultureandText:SolitariaScriptura? Crucial to these decisions from a Reformed perspective but al so,aswasseenatLambeth2008,fromotherChristianperspec tives, is the role of the Bible. Here again dialogue at world level may assist dialogue at local level, and vice versa. Scripture has alwaysbeenatthecentreofChristianfaith,andwillalwaysbe there.Theauthorityofscriptureisdeeplyembeddedinthelife oftheChurchofScotland.Thisisextensivelyreflectedinallits

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constitutional documents. Without the scriptures we should know little of the character of God as selfgiving, creative, re sponsive love, shown in the events concerning Jesus Christ. Whatwehavetriedtodohereistoreflectontheinterpretation of scripture: how can church members be helped to reflect on thisancientanddiversecollectionofbooks,inwaysthatspeak totheirneedattheendoftwomillenniaofChristianfaith?The BibleplaysakeyroleintheconstructionofChristiandoctrine, and its role in helping to shape doctrinal decisions has always presentedthechurchwiththechallengeofhowtoreaditright ly.Wedonotexpectnowtoproduceadefinitivestatementfor alltime,butwehopethatthisstudymayhelptoinformdebate onourotherstudiesoverthenextfewyears,andalsocontrib utetotheuseoftheBibletodaywithinourchurch. Within the churches, the Bible has been interpreted and used in many ways at different times. Distinctive groups have had particular interpretations. In the life of communities, the Biblehashadconsequencesfortheuseofpower,authorityand influence.Itisimportanttolearntorespectdifference,tolisten tothestranger,notleastwhenthestrangerisGod.Thisisvital. We want to encourage the church to be ever more sensitive to thechallengesraisedbydiverseandsometimesunfamiliarvoi ces.Thescripturesshouldbeatleastasaccessibletopeoplein ourtimeasinformertimes.Aswestruggleinthenextcentury forlove,justiceandfullhumanity,wewanttoseetheBibleasa central resource. God who has brought redemption to human ity through Jesus Christ encourages us to fight against powers ofevilanddomination,andtostrivetoparticipateinthatliber ationwhichisbasedinfreedomofthechildrenofGod. Interpreting the Bible will not in itself solve all the prob lems facing us in the present. We  agree that we are called to lives of justice, mercy and humility. We believe that the life of Jesus Christ shows us the basic form of humanity. We believe thathisdeath,torturedonthecross,hasfundamentalimplica tionsforhumanrights.Webelievethatthroughhisresurrection thereisandtherewillbetransformationinthecosmos.Butwe havetobeabletotranslatethisintopractice,torealise,toactu alise it, to build freedom for transformation into all our struc tures. This is what the Gospel demands of us—not in theory, not some time in the dim and distant future, but right now.

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Through the living Spirit, the Bible becomes transformative. God’s good news is communicated throughout the world. The wordoflifeisbrokenforus;hereisthehealingpresenceofthe divinelove. Reexaminingecumenicityandconfessionality,itseemsto methatdiscernmentandwisdominreadingtheBiblemaybeat the centre of progress in an ecumenical development which is unequivocallybaseduponjustice,peaceandtheloveofGodin Jesus Christ. As such, it will be crucial also for the local dy namictensionbetweenecumenismandconfessionalitydemon stratedindocumentsoftheSCIFUtype.Itisclearthatmereor ganisational unity is not worth the huge effort which must be spenttoachieveit.Beyondthis,itisincreasinglytruethat“Life andWork”orientatedprojectsareofgreaterexistentialinterest to many Christians today, especially the younger generation, than“FaithandOrder”issues.InEuropetheyouthhasalready inlargemeasurevotedwithitsfeet.Wecannotexpecttochal lengethenextgenerationonthestrengthofwhatareperceived tobeboringanddisengageddoctrines.Onlyaunitywhichstreng thensjustice,peaceandtheloveofGodforallhumanitywilldeserve to catch the imagination of Christian people, and will have some chanceofbecominganecumenicalreality. This is a slow process. But the realisation of the COCU agreement in October 1998 demonstrated that with sufficient patienceandfaithunexpectedthingsbecomepossible. CultureandHumanRights Meanwhile the Alliance’s publications came to reflect an in creasing concentration on Human Rights in global discussion (cf.e.g.TheologyandHumanRightsI,ReformedWorld,48/2for July1998),ThereisagoodsurveyofWARC’shumanrightsin volvement up to 1989 by Jill Schaefer (www.warc.ch/dcw/rw 928/02.html).Theoriginalemphasisin1875wasontheprotec tion of weak and vulnerable churches. This was expanded by 1879 to “persons and groups suffering from social, economic andpoliticaloppression”andtocritiqueofsocialandeconomic structures producing inequity and suffering. 188081 brought attentiontopersecutedArmeniansandnativeAmericans,1884 mention of indigenous churches, 1888 workers’ rights and the needtobringpoliticalpressureonKingLeopoldonconditions

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in the Congo. Slavery, the plight of native Americans and of persecuted denominations in Eastern Europe were highlighted in the 1890s. The Alliance was critical of the First World War andhelda“JohnHusDay”ofreconciliationin1915.The1920s broughtcritiqueofwhitedominationinAfricaandattentionto Japanese atrocities against Koreans and in Europe attention to poverty and women’s rights. In 1933, with thegrowthofNaz ism, the Alliance protested against “every form of slavery, op pression, exploitation and spoliation” and at the same time at tackedthenotionof“aggressivewar.”Afterthewartherewas anunusualandcurioussilence.Condemnationofracismcame againatFrankfurtin1964.Thiswassoontofocusonthestrug gleagainstapartheidinReformedSouthAfrica,culminatingin thestatusconfessionisdeclarationatOttawain1982,andthesus pension of two of the Dutch Reformed Church denominations inSouthAfrica.Appropriately,ahandbookontorturewaspro duced at this time. In the later 1980s there were to be appeals and interventions on human rights’ violations in Guatemala, Chile,Taiwan,thePhilippines,SudanandEgypt. Since 1989 there have been further declarations and cam paigns on women’s rights inside and outside the churches, on sanctuary and asylum, on conflicts in the Balkans and in the MiddleEast,andthereiscontinuinginteractionthroughCCIA with UNHRC and other bodies. There have also been declara tionsonenvironmentalethicsandecologicalrights.Humanrights was increasingly a theme in the Europe Committee. (For this stimulus I was to be personally indebted in myChrist and Hu manRights,2006.) All of this tension, constructive and less so, led up to the firstGeneralCouncilofthenewmillennium,thefirstinAfrica, at Accra in Ghana in 2004. Again there was emphasis on mis sion, and on justice—above all and much more imperatively than before, on economic justice. The strategy benefitted from meetingsofaSouthSouthforuminBuenosAiresin2003anda SouthNorthforuminLondonin2004.Thedangersofglobalis ationtohumandignityandsustainabilityandthechallengeof feministthinkingnowcametotheforeinAfrica. Ecumenism was now to be reimagined, bringing in non traditional perspectives. Africa was to make its own contribu tion to Reformed worship. The legacies of colonialism and the

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dangers of neoliberalism were now to be addressed, along with the ambiguities of “Empire.” The voices of the voiceless werealsothevoicesoftheReformed. Accra was to initiate WARC’s Covenanting for Justice in theEconomyandtheEarthProject.TheAccraConfessionhigh lightedtheconnectionbetweenfaithandeconomics. SpeakingfromourReformedtraditionandhavingreadthe signs of the times, the General Council of WARC affirms that global economic justice is essential to the integrity of ourfaithinGodandourdiscipleshipasChristians.Webe lievethattheintegrityofourfaithisatstakeifweremainsi lentorrefusetoactinthefaceofthecurrentsystemofneo liberaleconomicglobalisationandthereforeweconfessbe foreGodandoneanother.(Para.16)

The main themes of Reformed faith were not to be subordin ated,however,toacurrentgeopolitical agenda.Thatwasmade clearinaremarkableSeptember2006issueofReformedWorld,in which leading theologians wrote profoundly of “the grace which shapes their lives”—I think especially of the words of NicholasWolterstorff: And there’s more to being human than being at that point in the cosmos where God’s goodness is meant to find its answeringratitude.Tobehumanisalsothis:tobeatthat pointinthecosmoswheretheyieldofGod’sloveissuffer ing.(Wolterstorff2006:263)

Questions of the nature of justice and of righteousness contin uedtothefore.Thisconcernwastobedeepenedfurtherinthe contextofthecelebrationofthe200thanniversaryoftheaboli tionoftheslavetradeonBritishshipsin2007.AsSetriNyomi, GeneralSecretary,putitmemorablyinhisLetterfromAccra: AttheElminaCastle,theDutchmerchants,soldiersandthe Governor lived on the upper level, while the slaves were held in captivity one level below. We entered a room used asachurch,withwordsfromPsalm132hangingabovethe door(“FortheLordhaschosenZion…”).Andweimagined Reformed Christians worshipping their God while directly below them, right under their feet, those being sold into slavery languished in the chains and horror of those dun

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geons. For more than two centuries in that place this went on.(Nyomi2008:6)

It should be said that the Netherlands had no monopoly on slavery. Britain benefited at least as much, if not considerably more! As WARC looked forward to celebrating the 500th anni versaryofthebirthofJohnCalvinin2009andlooksforwardto theformationoftheWorldCommunionofReformedChurches in 2010—getting used to the new acronym WCRC—it often findstheauthenticvoiceoftheReformedtraditionindifferent culturalcontexts. Inthefactorofbeinghuman,weareallhumantogether,no hierarchies,nopyramids,butaroundtable,theonlyimag erythatbefitstheAkansayingthatallhumanbeingsarethe childrenofGodandthebiblicalaffirmationthatallhuman beingsaremadeintheimageofGod.(Oduyoye2008:89)

AsVroomputitperceptively, Because people are vulnerable and there are contradictory lines running through the soul and many voices are heard inthecouncilroomofourinternalconversation,itmustbe an extraordinary merciful and loving God who has given everypersoninherentdignityandfindseverypersonas havingdignity.(Vroom2007:48)

Thisneedformutualunderstandingandforbearanceisrelevant toWARC,andindeedtoallaspectsofreligiontoday. The religious questions and the deep experiences around the meaning of life will not fade away. Religions pass on deepmotivationsandthereforetheycanhelpbutharmas well.Therefore,allreligionsneedreciprocalcritiqueand to learn to learn from the wisdom and perspectives of oneanother.(Vroom2006:353)

The vision of a listening, hospitable church is one which WARCcontinuestohonouranddevelopasitgoesforwardinto the future. Meeting in Princeton Theological Seminary in June 2007,headsofReformedtheologicalinstitutionsconcluded their strategy for wider international cooperation with this de claration:

578 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Weareresolvedthatthoughworkingtogether,listeningto one another and speaking out of different contexts, issues which are divisive elsewhere in the Christian world may forusbecomeplacesofmutualunderstandingandstrength.

Bibliography Coleman, John A. (1992). “Not Democracy but Democratisation.” In: E.C.BianchiandR.A.Reuther(eds).ADemocraticCatholicChurch. NewYork:Crossroad.Pp.1322. Newlands,G.(2006).ChristandHumanRights.Aldershot:Ashgate. Nyomi,S.(2008).“LifeinFullnessforAll?”ReformedWorld58(March): 6. Oduyoye, Mercy. (2008). “Talitha Qumi.” Reformed World 58 (March): 89. Vroom, H.M. (2007). “The Dignity of ‘I’ and ‘Me’.” In: Paul Middleton (ed.). The God of Love and Human Dignity. Edinburgh: T.&T. Clark. Pp.3550. (2006).“TheologyofReligions:Observations.”In:J.D.Gortetal.Re ligionsViewReligions.Amsterdam:Rodopi.Pp.33954.  (1996). No Other Gods. Transl. Lucy Jansen.  Grand Rapids:Eerd mans. Wolterstorff, N. (2006). “The Grace that Shaped my Life.” Reformed World56(September):263.

InterculturalTheologyastheIntegration ofEcumenismandMissiology TheExampleof CurrentLatinAmericanChristology MartienE.Brinkman Abstract This contribution will illustrate new developments in the field of intercul turaltheologyastheintegrationofecumenicsandmissiology,discussingthe changesinLatinAmericanChristology.Wewilldothatinfoursteps.First, we will show how acontextual the liberation theology of liberation of the 1970s and the 1980s was. Second, we will argue that the attention paid to LatinAmericanMariologycreatedawaytoChristologicalreflection.Third, wewillgivesomeAfroAmericanexamplesofsuchabreakthrough.Finally, wewillarticulatesomecriteriaforassessingthesenewimagesofJesus.The main question is if one can also speak of a “hidden Christ” in the current LatinAmericanreligiousmovementsasonecaninAfricaandAsia.Thean swerwillbebymeansoftheprincipleofthesocalleddoubletransformation. IfitisthecasethatnotonlyLatinAmericanmovementscolortheimagesof JesusbuttheJesusoftheNewTestamentscripturescancompleteorevencor rect these images, then one can truly speak of a double transformation in whichthecatholicityoftheChristianfaithcanbeexperienced.

Introduction Inrecentinterpretationsofecumenismandmissiologyacertain overlapcanoftenbenoticed:ecumenismcannolongerbelimit ed to dialogues on the controversies between the traditions of the Westernchurch,andmissiologycannolongerbelimitedtothe historyofWesternmission.Ecumenismisbecomingmoreand more concerned with all the interactions between the church traditionsinworldwideChristianity,andmissiologyisfocusing moreandmoreonthetheologyofnonWesternchurches(Hou tepen2003:2338).Eversincethediscoverythatthe“IndianJe sus”wasinconceivablewithoutinteractionwiththeHinducon 579

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text,the“JapaneseJesus”withouttheBuddhistcontext,andthe “LatinAmericanJesus”withouttheIndianandAfroAmerican religiouscontext,interreligiousdialogueformsanintegralpart of ecumenism and missiology as well, nowadays often called interculturaltheology. Wedefineinterculturaltheologyas“thatbranchoftheology that integrates what used to be called ecumenics and missio logythroughthedynamicthatcharacterizestherelationofthe Christian tradition to different cultures” (Brinkman 2009: 23; 2004:93104).Interculturaltheologyshowsthatinterreligiousdia logueisalsoaninternalChristiandialoguebecausethemajority ofChristiansworldwideliveasaminorityamongtheadherents ofoneoftheothergreatworldreligions(Hinduism,Buddhism or Islam), except in Latin America. This contribution points to thefactthateveninLatinAmericawecanspeakofaninternal Christian,interreligiousdialoguesincetheoriginal Indianreli gionsandtheAfroAmericanreligionsoftheblackLatinAmer icans were taken into consideration from the 1990s on. Latin America is often considered to be entirely Christian and is thereforenevermentionedasaplaceofinterreligiousdialogue. Thathasturnedouttobeamistake.Thiscontributionwillshow that a more nuanced approach to this continent is needed. SlowlybutsurelyWesternersarebecomingawareofthemulti religiouscharacterofLatinAmericawithitscenturiesoldIndi an and AfroAmerican religions with, for example, their own imagesofJesus. TheHiddenChrist Oneofthemostfiercelydebatedissuesincurrentmissiologyis theissueofthesocalled“hiddenChrist,”whichismoreorless a variation on the issue of the “hidden God.” The question if GodwasalreadypresentinAfricaandAsiabeforetheWestern missionaries arrived has been raised often in the last three de cades. Most contemporary Asian and African theologians are inclinedtoanswerthisquestionaffirmatively,pointingtoGod asthecreatorofthewholeworld,theuniversaloutreachofthe cosmicChristortheallpervasiveworkoftheHolySpirit.Does thisanswerimplythatthe“hidden”Godwaspresentnotonly ascreatorbutalsoasforgiverandreconciler?Thatwouldentail

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that there is a “hidden Christ” as well. The African theologian Bahemukaputsthequestionthisway: Africansbeliefsarecenteredaroundthedivine.Thisdivine could be in the form of the Supreme Being or divinity. Christ,theSonofGod,isonewiththeFather.IftheFather (Yahweh)revealedHimselftoAfricans,andtheyresponded infaith,whycouldthesameAfricansnotdiscoverChristin their“ActsofFaith”?(Bahemuka1989:9)

Those wellversed in interreligious dialogue will be familiar with the affirmative answers to such a question given by Indian theologians like Raimundo Panikkar and Stanley Samartha. In thefirstprintingofhisTheUnknownChristofHinduismin1964 PanikkaractuallystatedthatHinduismispotentialChristianity. Intheradicalrevisionofthisbookin1981,nowsuggestivelysub titled Towards an Ecumenical Christophany, he shifted to the po sitionthatChristisnotsomuchtheJesusofChristianityasheis the symbol of “theandric” human existence. In a “theandric” approach the connectedness of God (theos) and human beings (man=anèr)isunderscored.AsthemediatorbetweenGodand humans, Christ transcends Christianity and therefore the ad herentsofotherreligionsdonotneedtorefertohimnecessarily byanamederivedfromChristianity. Essentially, Panikkar says that the term “Christ” refers to anontological(=somethingnotconceivableapartfromhuman existence)mediatorwhoisamodelfortheconnectednessofthe relativeandabsoluteinallreligions.Inthisway,Panikkarcan speak of the “christic principle” that lies at the foundation of thewholeofreality.Eachlivingcreatureiscalledinhimandby himintoexistenceandexistsinandparticipatesintheSon;each livingcreatureisthusessentiallyaChristophany(Panikkar1981: 1920; 2526 and 192). Panikkar can state that Jesus is an epi phany(appearance)ofChristbutconsidersthattobeonlypar tially true. This Christ of the Christophany is not exhausted in Jesus.TherecanbeotherepiphaniesoftheChrist—suchas,for example,HinduavatarasorBuddhistbodhisattvas—butnosingle onesurpassestheepiphanythatJesusembodies. In contrast to Panikkar, Samartha does not want to speak of the “unknown Christ in Hinduism.” He feels that that does not do justice to the historical Jesus. Moreover, he considers it insultingforHindus to thinkoftheirreligionasakindofdis

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guised Christianity. He speaks rather of the “unbound Christ” who transcends the boundaries of Christianity. Just as Chris tianityisconnectedwithandboundtoChrist,soChristiscon nected with but not bound to Christianity (Samartha 1974: 10 and13942).Thisaccentontheunboundedcharacterandthere foreuniversalityofChristisarefrainthatwehearmanytimes inAsiantheology. With regard to the many examples of the “indigenous Christ” in Latin America we are confronted with precisely the samequestion: Is the Christ of the Andean people a “veiled Christ” who was already present in the preColumban religion of the people,sothattheworkofevangelizationisproperlytoas sist the Andean people to unveil their own proper face of Christ?”(Cook1983:279)

Cookconcludesthatthefailuretorecognizeeventhepossibility ofChristincarnatinghimselfbytransformingtheIndianculture from within led in the past to the massive rejection of every thing indigenous and the imposition of a foreign Christ (Cook 1983:279).Atpresent,however,thingsarechangingrapidlyin LatinAmericantheology. ChangesintheReligiousSituationinLatinAmerica First,thereisthespectaculargrowthofthePentecostalchurch es, which were always previously strongly opposed to libera tiontheologiansandallkindsofpopularreligionbutwhichare now increasingly prepared to share common concerns. An un impeachable witness like R. Shaull, the former spokesman of thesocalledtheologyofrevolutionofthelate 1960sandearly 1970s, was one of the first to show his “comrades” this trans formation(Shaull2001:7184).Theoftquotedadagethatliber ationtheologiansoptedforthepoorbutthepooroptedforthe Pentecostals has become famous. Apparently, this spirituality gave them more selfesteem than the rational analyses of the theologians of liberation (Troch 2004: 6466). Some, therefore, speakofthe“pentecostalization”ofthechurchesinLatinAmer ica. Second,traditionalpopularreligiosity(religionpopular)isbe ing increasingly acknowledged as an indispensable part of the

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context of Latin American Christianity. In the past, liberation theologians only rarely used the images, rites and symbols derived from their own cultural context. And when they used them,theyimmediatelyignitedafierce,ideologicalbattleabout their alienating and potentially manipulative character (Cook 1983:278).Therefore,Ribas’conclusionseemstobejustified: Liberation theology, generally speaking, did not pay much attention to popular religion…. Rather, it tried only to ra tionalize the struggle and liberation of the poor, as though liberation would happen through a sometimes rhetorical process. This would be in the fashion of European aca demia, rather than in the way many Latin Americans have theirsystemofbeliefconstructedandexpressed,thatisthe venerationoftheVirginandothersaints.Thereforepopular religion that articulates itself through the veneration of the Virgin and other saints would be forgotten, especially the visualrepresentationsthatmaintainasystemofbeliefsand institutions unchanged, unless these representations are al sothefocusofliberation.(Ribas2006:124)

Alreadyin1979,whenfacedwiththissituation,Galileaargued for a “cultural liberation” in which the “invention” of a thor oughlyandradicallyLatinAmericanapproachtodevelopment andliberationwouldgainprideofplace(Galilea1979:172;see also Scannone 1979: 21337). We are presumably standing on the brink of a farreaching shift in the appreciation of Latin America’s own indigenous spirituality, manifested in both the IndianandtheAfroAmericanreligions. Athird,andremarkable,changeinLatinAmericaistheemer genceoffemaletheologians.Theirvoiceswerehardlyheardin the theology of liberation, and when they did speak they did not articulate an approach of their own (Ritchie 1989: 8195; Nauta and Klein Goldewijk 1987: 1). Only a few of them criti cized their subordinate position (Nunes 1990/1991; Bidegain 1989: 28). These female theologians especially are calling for a reevaluationofindigenousspirituality(seebelow). Finally,weshouldmentiontheinternalchangeswithinlib eration theology itself, which arrived at a period of reorienta tion(Petrella2004and2008),ifnotatacrisis.The necessityof radical, political and social changes is arguably not a point of

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discussion, but the instruments of those kinds of changes are hotlydebated. LatinAmericawasthefirstcontinentinwhichthedomin anceofWestern,socalleduniversaltheologywascriticizedasa whole.Forthemoment,thelawofthehandicapofaheadstart couldapplytoLatinAmericanliberationtheology:aheadwith respect to the struggle against social justice but behind with respect to the integration of that struggle into Latin America’s own spirituality. Actually and paradoxically, the theology of liberationwasacontextual.1 But,asalreadyindicated,timesarerapidlychanging.This changeintheculturalclimateincludesthesubjectofourdiscus sion. We will concentrate specifically on the changes in Chris tology in four steps. First, we will show how acontextual the theologyofliberationactuallywas.Second,wewilldefendthe thesisthatthecurrentattentiongiventoLatinAmericanMario logycreatedabreakthroughinChristologicalreflectionaswell. Third, we shall give some Latin American AfroAmerican ex amples of that breakthrough. Finally, we will articulate some criteriaforassessingthesenewimagesofJesus. TheAcontextualCharacterofChristology inLatinAmericanLiberationTheology ItisobviousthatthedominantimageofJesusineverykindof theologyofliberationisthatofJesusasliberator.Asamatterof fact, that holds true for Latin America as well (Boff 1978, So brino1993andBonino(1984)2002).CharacteristicfortheChris tology of liberation is the return to the historical Jesus. It is its methodologicalstartingpoint(Sobrino1978:116).Thatimplies an immediate confrontation with Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdomofGod,hisownpraxis,thehistoricaldimensionofhis

1

Iamnotdrawingasharpcontrastbetweentheideaofcontextand thatofculture.Theideaofcontextisoftenassociatedwithsocialandpo liticalcircumstancesandthatofculturewithhighculture,theworldof art.Iwilluseabroadernotionofculture,definingitasacomprehensive system of meanings, norms and values by which people give form (meaning)totheirmaterialexistenceinacertaintimeandcontext.This definitionthereforealsoincludesthematerialaspectsofourearthlyex istence.

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cross and the eschatological character of his resurrection (Lois 1993:17386andCook1983:26775). Onthebasisofthishistoricalapproachonemighthaveex pectedadetailedsketchofthehistoricalandculturalcontextof Latin American people. Unfortunately, however, that was sel domthecase.Hence,in1976Moltmannaskedinanopenletter to the Latin American liberation theologians: “Where is Latin America in it all?” (Moltmann 1976: 5763; Van Prooijen 2004: 184203).InlinewithMoltmann’squestion,wegavethissection the somewhat provocative title “The Acontextual Character of ChristologyinLatinAmericanLiberationTheology.”Although thetheologyofliberationpreferstorefertothepoorasthe“sub jectoftheology”andevenasthe“sacramentofGod”or“sacra mentofJesus,”itisoftennotclearwhichconcretehistoricaland cultural circumstances the poor are found in and where these “subjects” can be encountered (Pixley and Boff 1989: 10922). Detailed analyses of their plight and references to their own symbolic world are often lacking. In the 1970s a kind of “uni versal”liberationtheologyhadactuallybeendeveloped.Itwas thought to be applicable everywhere in principle. Thus, large academicconferencesonthefutureofliberationtheologycould be simply held in any part of the world. But that time is now gone. Slowly but surely, Latin American liberation theology is processing the symbolic and religious world of the poor more explicitly,althoughsometimesstillreluctantly.Manyliberation theologians still regard popular religiosity with suspicion, as waryastheyare ofthesupposedly alienatingcharacterofthis religiositythatonlyconfirmsthestatusquo.Thus,forexample, Dussel warns against the ease with which favorite “shamans” can manipulate, governments can appease and church leaders can “tolerate” the adherents of these popular religions (Dussel 1986:8294). MariologyasaWayintoLatinAmericanChristology IncontrasttoLatinAmericanliberationChristology.LatinAmer ican Mariology had its own regional flavor from the outset. Popular religiosity in Latin America is, to a large extent, ex pressedthroughMariology.TheapparitionofMaryofGuada lupeespeciallyin1531tothepoorIndianJuanDiegoontheHill

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of Tepeyac, the place of pilgrimage to the goddess Tonantzin CihuacoatlnearMexicoCity,coloredthevenerationofMaryon theLatinAmericancontinent.AtthemountainwheretheIndi ansveneratedtheirqueenofheaven,themotherofthecreator andthemotherofthesaviorappearedinoneandthesameim age,namelythatoftheVirgin.Itisoneofthemostremarkable integrationsofthegreatindigenousdivinitiesintoChristianity. Gebara and Bingemer point out that, in this “theophany,” this poorIndianwassuddenlyabletoexperienceanimmensebeau ty,wasapproachedinhisownIndianlanguage,wascalled“my son”bytheVirginandwasfinallycommandedbythisheaven ly woman to ask the bishop to build a chapel for her. Poverty and the ability to experience beauty were not mutually exclu sive. His own Indian language was not, as was thought at the time,aninferiorlanguage.EvenapoorIndiancouldhaveanin timate relationship with Mary—she calls him “my son”—and thiswomansawtoitherselfthathermessageofcompassion,of protection for the weak, and comfort to the mourning would continue to be communicated in a private chapel. In this indi genouspopulartraditionitisthewomanMarywhosendshim onamission,whereasintheChristianscripturesitisJesuswho sendshisdisciplesontheirmission(GebaraandBingemer1989: 14454and1993:49293). The meaning is that the Virgin adopts the “natives” of Mexico maternally and, with them, the whole Latin American people.ShemakesGod’slifeincarnateinthevicissitudesofour fleetinghistory.So,thefemaleaspecthasbeenaddedtotheim age of the Christian God and the personal aspect to the image oftheGodoftheIndians.Herethe“soildemanding”motherof the Indians and the “heavengranting” father of the Christians come together in what Mary offers: the Son who mediates be tweenheavenandearth.ThisdevotiontoMaryclearstheway for a new, truly Latin American Christology (Elizondo 1983: 64). To a certain extent, the apparition of Our Lady of Apare cidacanbeconsideredanimportantadditiontotheapparition to Juan Diego. She was rescued from death by drowning but emerged from the water as a black woman and became the patron, the protector, of male and female slaves. When they ”met” her in the water of the river Paraiba, the fisherman Joo

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Alves and his two companions, who had not caught anything foralongtime,suddenlypulledinanenormoushauloffish— astorythatremindsusofthemiraculouscatchoffishinLuke 5:111. Our Lady of Aparecida became enormously popular, especially among the blacks in Brazil (Gebara and Bingemer 1989:15458and1993:49394). TheroleMaryfillsintheseapparitionsactuallycomesvery closetotheroleofJesusintheChristianscriptures.Apparently, it was easier initially for the Latin Americans to accept a wo manlikeMaryasthemediatorbetweenGodandhumanbeings thanamanlikeJesus.ItmightbethatthispreferenceforMary is closely connected with the chance to integrate the image of Marywiththatofpachamama,MotherEarth,acentralmotiffor theIncasespecially.Thisvenerationofthegoddessoftheearth, pachamama, is one of the strongest elements that has survived the destruction of the Inca religion. She is still worshipped in thepracticecalledpagoalatierra,payingtributetotheearthby pouringsomeofwhateveroneisdrinkingontheearthasanex pression of the experience of the sacredness of the land (Cook 1983:283).Thiskindofreligiositywasabletoexpressthemedi ating role of Mary more than the ideas derived from Western Mariology were. To a great extent, her veneration paved the wayforamoreindigenousvenerationofJesus,foracombina tionofmasculineandfemininedimensionsintheideaofChris tiansalvationandfortheconsolidationofthehumanityofthe Savior(Irrarrazaval2007:6768). Not only Indian religions, but AfroAmerican religions as wellareafertilebreedinggroundforanewenculturationofthe personofMary,thegoddessMotherandGoddessofLoveand Sensuality,closelyconnectedwithnewimagesofJesus. LatinAmerican,AfroAmericanImagesofJesus Like everywhere in the world, it is extremely difficult in Latin Americatoindicatewhatistrulyindigenousandwhatnot.All thecontinentsintheworldhave,throughoutthecenturies,ex perienced many waves of hostile or friendly invaders who mixed with those who were called the authentic inhabitants. Actually, the adjective “authentic” often refers only to those whoarrivedafewcenturiesearlier.Wecandistinguishatleast three main groups in Latin America: the Indians, the Afro

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Americans (former slaves) and the white, European immi grants.Eachofthesethreegroupshaditsownculturalreligios ityandcreateditsownenculturationsoftheGospel.TheEuro peans claimed their own enculturation that had occurred over centuriestobetheexclusivelyauthenticone,calledtheresultof this enculturation universal Christianity and accused other en culturationsofbeingsyncretistic.Thisdiscussioncontinuesinto thepresent. AtthistimeweareconfrontedwithmanyexamplesofIn dian and AfroAmerican enculturations of the Gospel as well. TheydonotclaimexclusivityastheEuropeanswereinclinedto do for their enculturation, but they do expect a respectful, al thoughnotuncriticalapproach.Inthiscontributionwewillfo cusononeofthemostwellknownexamplesoftheencultura tion of a Jesuslike mediator, namely what are called orixás in Latin America but were originally worshipped in Africa, es peciallyinNigeria,BeninandTogoasorishas.Itisparticularly withregardtothemthatweposethequestionstatedabove:Is therea“hidden”ChristinLatinAmerica? AfroAmerican religions contain four orders. First is the cosmic order, over which a single, intangible Supreme Being presides who sustains the world and provides the source of power for life. Later on, this Being was often replaced by the Christian Creator God. The second, natural order depends on the spirits or orishas (in Portugese: orixás) with whom individ uals establish a bond so that the cosmos, as a material entity, cansustainhumanlife.Inthethirdplace,thereisapoliticalor der,expressedinandbytheancestorstowhombelievershave recourse in order to secure social stability. Finally, there is an individualorder,whichisthelocusofthemythsandritesthat regulatelifefromthemomentofinitiationuntildeath.Thesere ligionsfavortrancelikestatesinordertoseekguidanceforthe community in its daily life and to aid in the recreation of the world from the terreiros or sites where the ancestors and the protectingsaintsasspirits(orixás)arepermanentlypresent.The orixás are spiritual forces that nurture the hope for freedom. Theydonotresideinametaphysicalworldbutliveintheriv ers,seas,waterfalls,treesandforests.Undertheirprotectionthe AfroBrazilian people retain their own unique identity and

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faith. These religions map out their own paths to salvation in thisway. Everyone has an orixá, a “patron” deity who maintains or restores the relationship with the Supreme Being, Olodumare. Theorixásaresaidto“mount”orpossesstheparticipantduring the rituals. The orixás mediate axe, a word used to refer to the lifeenergyinnatureandhumanbeings.Itistheultimatevalue that one can possess in life. Ethical applications are born from this value, and the axe is the grand sacrament of divine and cosmicenergy.JesusisoftenidentifiedwiththeorixáOxála(or Obatala),oftencalledthefatheroftheorixás,becausethereare many similarities between how Oxála and Jesus express their concernforthepeoplearoundthem.Eachcanberecognizedin the other. Oxála is also considered to be the creator of human beings, the one who sculpted them from clay, so that the Su preme Being could place the breath of life in them. Thus, the Supreme Being is not himself the creator. He only creates the orixás,thewaysinwhichhemakeshispowermanifest.Hence, as mediators of divine power, the orixás are sometimes called avatars, as in Hinduism. The supreme God breathes life into people but then afterwards removes himself and remains dis tantandindifferenttohumanproblems.Theorixásaretheones who govern the world and remain in contact with people (Lá zaro2007:114). Elegguaistheorixáwhoistheownerofthewaysandlife destinies of people. He can open and close horizons. He is the messengeroftheSupremeBeingandcanalsobeidentifiedwith Jesus.HisnegativesideiscalledEshu,whichistheincarnation of the bad things, the human problems and the tragic misfor tunes that come along in life. The Brazilians fear and respect him.TheElegguaEshupairisthemythicalexpressionofthein evitable relationship between the positive and the negative. In contrasttotheunambiguousimageofJesusinChristianitythe orixás are seen as persons who have their defects and their virtues.Theyaremanifestationsoftheambiguousandparadox ical character of existence. Good and evil are two inseparable aspects of existence, and both are combined in the divinities. Theybehavelikehumansandliveinintimaterelationshipwith them.Eachhasbeenendowedwithoneofthepowersofthesu premeGod(Lázaro2007:114and116).

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Yemanjá, the goddess of the river and the prehistoric mo therofalltheorixás,isthemotherofalllife.Sheisthearchetype ofthemotherwhoprotectsandgiveslife.InBrazilsheisiden tified with the Virgin Mary in her role as Our Lady (Gordon 1979:239).Storiestellofherloveaffairswithvariousorixásand speak about her tenacity and valor. Therefore, she is not only thegoddessMotherbutalsotheMotherofLoveandsensuality. Thefusionofthesetwoimagesbringsherclosetowomen’sreal lives(Lázaro2007:118). In this process of transformation the slaves managed to maintain their religious and cultural roots. The orixás found theirwayintodifferentBrazilianreligions.Oneofthemostwell knownisthecandomblé.Thecurrentcandomblédatesbacktothe areaaroundSalvadordeBahia,towherethousandsofYoruba slaves were transported since 1452. The name candomblé has beenusedfromthenineteenthcenturyonwards.Inrecentsur veys, about 2 million Brazilians (1.5 % of the total population) havedeclaredcandomblétobetheirreligion.However,inBrazil ian culture, religions are not seen as mutually exclusive, and thusmanypeopleofotherfaithsparticipateincandomblérituals regularlyoroccasionally. DoubleTransformation Itwasagreatmistakemadethroughoutthehistoryofmission in Latin America to believe that one can reach people without beingfamiliarwiththerealityoftheveryhumanmediationof theDivinethatexistsinpopularreligiosity.Peopleengagedin popular religiosity are seeking an experience of God closer to thesituationsoftheirdailylifethantheyhearinthemessageof the Western missionaries. They want God to accompany them ineachsituationoflife. Themediationofsaintsandorixásreflectaspiritofsubmis siontoaGodwhoisboththecreatorandtherecreatoroflife, and whose power is manifested in the natural world. At the sametime,thismediationreflectsareclaimingofthedignityof the human being. No matter how poor people are, no matter howmuchtheyneedfoodandclothingandotherdailynecessi ties of life, they preserve their dignity through daily customs and festive celebrations, through ethical values and aesthetic appreciation—allofwhichattesttothegraceofalifegivenby

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God.Spiritpossessionbringssymbolicandspiritualelementsto lifethatregulatethewholeoflife,transforminghumanbeings intolivingaltarsonwhichthepresenceofsupernaturalentities isinvoked. Many believers in Brazil are active simultaneously in the RomanCatholicChurchandinnewPentecostalmovementsor in the AfroBrazilian religions. Thus, there is a double loyalty (duplapertença),adoublebelonging(Troch2004:59;Yuasa1983: 73).ThemostcrucialquestionwithregardtotheindigenousIn dian and AfroAmerican enculturation is that posed by Cook, alreadyquotedabovebutnowslightlyrephrased: Is the Christ of the Andean or AfroAmerican people a “veiledChrist”whowasalreadypresentinthepreColum banorpreAfroAmericanreligionofthepeople,sothatthe workofevangelizationisproperlytoassisttheAndeanand AfroAmerican people to unveil their own proper face of Christ?”(cf.Cook1983:279;cf.p.582above)

Itseemsasifananswertothisquestionisalreadyactually giveninLatinAmerica.ThousandsofbelieversinLatinAmer icaandelsewhereintheworldacceptacombination,andeven anintegration,oflocalcosmicreligiositiesandtranslocalmeta cosmic soteriologies, not only as normal but as also inevitable andnecessary.Thisconfrontsuswithaseriousquestionforthe Christian faith: Is it possible for a person who belongs to one particular socioreligious group to feel at home and participate inanotherone?InthecaseofAfroBraziliancults,groupswho openly identify themselves as Christians invoke saints who have both Christian and African names. As stated, this phe nomenon is not limited to Latin America. Elsewhere as well, people can participate in official, approved liturgies of the Christian churches and at the same time invoke other powers —spiritsandancestors—forprotectionfromdanger,forhealing physical, mental, and social disorders, and for establishing fa vorable relations with the powers of nature and society. This phenomenon is often more the rule than the exception in the nonWesternworld. Such an actual and practical approach cannot, however, preventusfromamorethoroughgoingtheologicalreflectionon the question of the compatibility of the main characteristics of theJesusoftheNewTestamentwiththemaincharacteristicsof

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the orixás in the AfroAmerican religions. Every attempt to re formulatetheChristianfaithincategoriesandsymbolsofanew cultural context implies engagement with the religions that havetraditionallyshapedthatculture.Wenowcallthatprocess “enculturation.”Behindenculturationisanawarenessofthere lativityofallconceptualandphilosophicalarticulationsofaba sic or foundational experience, such as that of the nearness of GodinJesusintheNewTestament. Every enculturation process is always driven by the wish toenlargeandtoenrichatraditionbyitsreformulationinnew conceptualcategories.The“success”ofthisenterprise revolves always around the question of whether the heart orthe“essence”ofareligioncanbegraspedapartfromthe philosophical tradition in which it has emerged, as if one can reach back through that philosophical tradition to re trieve the experiences, insights, and worldviews first sys tematicallyexpressed.(Cornille2003:47)

Concretely,thatwouldleadtotheconvictionthattheimageof theorixácanbeseveredfromitsbackdropofAfricantraditional religions in the same way that Jesus can be conceived apart fromGreekcategories. It is obvious that that would be impossible if taken in an absolutesense.Wouldthatimply,asHoodasked(Hood1990), that “God must remain Greek?” In the early 1990s the North AmericanGreekOrthodoxbishopHarakasgave—notwithouta touch of humor—the following threefold answer to this ques tion:“Yes,No,Somehow.”“Yes.”thereissomethinglikeaher meneuticalprivilegeofafoundational,churchconstitutiveperi od.However,sincetheGospelhasbeentransmittedalloverthe world,newconceptsareneeded.Hence,theseconceptscanno longer be exclusively Greek. That is Harakas’ “No.” But these new concepts have to prove their viability in critical dialogue with former concepts articulated in the church throughout the ages.Someofthemwillbemoreadequatethanothers.Thatis why Harakas formulated his “Somehow” (Harakas 1991: 199). A fair test in which the benefits of old and new concepts are considered must be possible and belongs to the indispensable taskofeveryhermeneuticsoftradition. Iaminclinedtocallthisverificationprocedureaprocessof “double transformation” in which one reckons simultaneously

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withanadaptationoftheNewTestamentcategoriesaswellas new indigenous categories. This same procedure was already appliedintheNewTestamenttimesthemselves.Theonlyway inwhichtheNewTestamentauthorscouldtransmitthemean ingofJesuswastorefertoalreadyexisting(inotherreligions) religiousnames.Withoutexception,allthenamesusedtoindi catethemeaningofJesus(SonofGod,SonofMan,rabbi,lord, prophet, king, healer, exorcist, light of the world, etc.) had a (foreign)religiousbackground.Aprocessofdoubletransforma tion happened immediately. They had to show how Jesus in deed transformed existing religious names by his words and acts.But,atleastforuslivinginpostGreektimes,itisalsoclear that the application of these already existing religious names transformed Jesus in a GreekHellenist mold. This process of adoptionbyadaptationisaninevitableprocess,giventhetrans missionprocessinwhichareligionwithuniversal pretensions isalwaysinvolved(Brinkman2009:128).Itispreciselythrough theseattemptsatreformulatingonereligioustraditioninterms ofthecategoriesofanotherthatrealpossibilitiesfordeepening and enlarging one’s faith surface. The current Latin American religious reality seems to mirror this double transformation processinaremarkableway. Conclusions OneofthemostoutspokencharacteristicsofLatinAmericanin digenousimagesofJesusincomparisonwithAfricanandAsian imagesisthestrongemphasisontheinterconnectednessofhea ven and earth. “Earth” is not only a geographical, anthropolo gicalortheologicalcategorybutpreeminentlyaChristological, incarnationalcategoryaswell.LatinAmericanMariologyespe ciallydrawsourattentiontothesalvificmeaningoftheearth,of materialthingsandofhumanbodies.Allofthemareprepared toreceivethedivine.Jesusisthecreatorandrecreatorand,as such,theincarnationofGod.Thisfocusontheearthcolors,of course,theideasofsalvationaswell.Theyarederivedpredom inantlyfromwhathappenstopeopleonearth:fertility,health, solidarity, justice and compassion over against calamities, ill ness, lack of solidarity, injustice and egotism. Next to these moretraditionalIndianmotifs,inthefigureoftheorixátheAf roAmericanreligionssupportthenearnessandeventhebodily

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experience of divine presence, drawing us away from a sinful pastandopeningupafutureoffreedom(Guerra2003:25759). Atfirstglance,severalaspectsoftheNewTestamentimageof Jesus seem to be pushed into the background (the cross as vi carious death, for example), but the idea of selfsacrifice in or der to liberate others is not foreign to this spirituality. Also, morethanWesternspirituality,thisAfroAmericanspirituality isabletoaccountforwhatitmeanstobepossessedbythespirit ofJesusChristintheexperienceoftheliberatingforceofthese orixás.Wecan,ofcourse,askifthereisnottoomuchfocuson theseecstaticexperiences.Italwayscreatesakindofexperience elite and thus subsequently at least an informal hierarchy. It indicates that no religion is without any ambivalence and that noenculturationoftheGospelcanavoidthedialoguewiththe diachronic and synchronic catholicity of the church: the com munion throughout the centuries and with contemporaries. Hence, I would argue that there can be no responsible encul turationoftheGospelwithoutanyrelationtotheinternational, ecumenical movement that can considered to be the depot or (more dynamic) the clearing house of this multilayered ca tholicity. It is not that difficult, of course, to point to the necessary shiftsinaccentwithrespecttoWestern,AfricanorAsianChris tologies. Many African Christologies are inclined to start from theperspectiveofthehumanmediation(Jesusasancestor,heal er,exorcist,king,“chief,”brother,friend,etc.)andconsequently havedifficultyarticulatinghowthegreatestdivinity(“Supreme Being”)isconnectedwiththosehumanmediators.ManyAsian Christologies are often confronted with precisely the opposite problem. They have enough images (guru, avatar, boddhisattva, etc.) available for expressing the divine or enlightened ap proachtopeoplebutdisplaygreatdifficultyinexpressinghow suchapproachesalsotrulybearonthedepthsofhumanexist ence. On the other hand, Western Christologies—with their concentration on the formulations by ancient councils—have difficulty liberating Jesus from an historical isolation. They of ten lay such emphasis on the uniqueness of Jesus that there is nolongeranyroomforthe“Christinus.” From that, admittedly, too rough sketch, the mediation of theorixásjumpsoutasanunprecedentedintenseexperienceof

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whatitistobetrulyinspiredbyJesus.Asstatedabove,eachac centonintenseexperiencescreates,ofcourse,itsowndarkside, butthathasnoadverseeffectonhowthisformofreligiosityis able to provide both men and women with an emancipatory selfconsciousness—which European missions and liberation theology both failed to do. The historical Jesus himself must have done something similar for those who followed him. Hopefully,inthecomingdecadesdialogueinworldChristian ityonnewimagesofJesuswillbestartedfromtheperspective of the double transformation we discussed above. Despite the “hermeneutical privilege” that can, in my view, be granted to thewritersoftheNewTestamentandtheearlychurchfathers, we will still need to ask if the GreekHellenisticRoman tradi tionhasnotsometimesfunctionedasastraitjacketfromwhich Christianity is only now slowly but surely liberating itself. Withintheframeworkofthatdiscussion,theimageoftheorixá, alongwiththoseofancestor,guru,avataraandboddhisattva,can also be included, next to those of Jesus as Son of God, Son of Man,rabbi,anointed,theservantoftheLord,saviour,prophet, etc.  Bibliography AlthausReid, M. (1995). “Do Not Stop the Flow of My Blood: A Critical Christology of Hope amongst Latin American Women.” StudiesinWorldChristianity1:14359. Bahemuka,J.M.(1989).“TheHiddenChristinAfricanTraditionalRe ligion.”In:J.N.K.MugambiandL.Magesa(eds).JesusinAfrican Christianity: Experimentation and Diversity in African Christology. Nairobi:Initiatives.Pp.116. Bidegain,A.M.(1989).“WomenandtheTheologyofLiberation.”In:E. Tamez(ed.).ThroughHerEyes:Women’sTheologyfromLatinAmerica. Reprint.Maryknoll:Orbis.Pp.1536. Boff, L. (1978). Christ Liberator: A Critical Christology for Our Time. Maryknoll:Orbis. Bonino,J.M.(2002).FacesofJesus:LatinAmericanChristologies.Eugene: WipfandStock(1984). Brinkman, M.E. (2009). The NonWestern Jesus: Jesus as Bodhisattva, Avatara,Guru,Prophet,Ancestoror Healer? CrossCulturalTheo logies.London:Equinox.

596 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE (2004). “A Different Kind of Ecumenism.” In: F.L. Bakker (ed.). Rethinking Ecumenism: Strategies for the 21st Century. IIMO Re searchPublication63.Zoetermeer:Meinema.Pp.93104. (2003). The Tragedy of Human Freedom: The Failure and Promise of theChristianConceptofFreedominWesternCulture.CurrentsofEn counter20.Amsterdam/NewYork:Rodopi. Cook,M.L.(1983).“JesusfromtheOtherSideofHistory:Christology inLatinAmerica.”TheologicalStudies44:25887. Cornille, C. (2003). “Double Religious Belonging: Aspects and Ques tions.”BuddhistChristianStudies23:4349. Elizondo,V.(1997).Guadalupe:MotheroftheNewCreation.Maryknoll: Orbis.. (1983).“MaryandthePoor:AModelofEvangelizing.”Concilium 198:5965. Dussel, E. (1986). “Popular Religion as Oppression and Liberation: HypothesisonitsPastanditsPresentinLatinAmerica.”Concili um22:8294. Galilea,S.(1979).“LiberationTheologyandNewTasksFacingChris tians.”In:R.Gibellini(ed.).FrontiersofTheologyinLatinAmerica. Maryknoll:Orbis.Pp.16383. Gebara,I.(1993).“Mary.”In:I.EllacuriaandJ.Sobrino(eds).Mysteri um Libertationis: Fundamental Concepts of Liberation Theology. Mary knoll:Orbis.Pp.48295. and M.C.L. Bingemer (1989), Mary, Mother of God, Mother of the Poor.Maryknoll:Orbis. Gordon,J.U.(1979).“YorubaCosmologyandCultureinBrazil.”Jour nalofBlackStudies10:23144. Guerra,J.C.(2003).“TheDialoguebetweenChristianityandAfroCu banReligions.”Exchange32:25059. Harakas, S.S. (1991). “Must God Remain Greek?” The Ecumenical Re view43:19499. Hood, R. (1990). Must God Remain Greek? Afro Cultures and GodTalk. Minneapolis:FortressPress. Houtepen,A.(2003).“InterculturalTheology:APostmodernEcumen icalMission.”In:M.Frederiksetal.(eds).TowardsanIntercultural Theology.EssaysinHonourofJ.A.B.Jongeneel.IIMOResearchPub lication61.Zoetermeer:Meinema.Pp.2338. Irarrazaval,D.(2007).“LatinAmericanImagesofJesus.”JournalofRe formedTheology1:5071.

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Lázaro,C.L.A.(2007).“JesusandMaryDancewiththeOrishas:Theo logicalElementsinInterreligiousDialogue.”In:M.P.Aquinoand M.J. RosadoNunes (eds), Feminist Intercultural Theology: Latina ExplorationsforaJustWorld.Maryknoll:Orbis.Pp.10924. Lois,J.(1993).“ChristologyintheTheologyofLiberation.”In:J.Ella curia and J. Sobrino (eds). Mysterium Libertationis: Fundamental ConceptsofLiberationTheology.Maryknoll:Orbis.Pp.16893. Moltmann,J.(1976).“OnLatinAmericanTheology:AnOpenLetterto JoséMiguezBonino.”ChristianityandCrisis36:5763. Nauta, R., and B. Klein Goldewijk (1987). “Feminist Perspectives in LatinAmericanLiberationTheology.”Exchange16:16. (1987).“LatinAmericanWomenTheology.”Exchange16:732. Nunes,M.J.F.R.(1990/1991).“Women’sVoicesinLatinAmericanThe ology.”Concilium32:316. Panikkar, R. (1981). The Unknown Christ of Hinduism: Towards an Ecu menicalChristophany.Maryknoll:Orbis. Petrella,I.(2008).BeyondLiberationTheology:APolemic.London:SCM. (2004). The Future of Liberation Theology: An Argument and Mani festo.Aldershot:Ashgate. Pixley,J.,andC.Boff(1989).“ThePoor,SacramentofGod.”In:J.Pix leyandC.Boff(eds).TheBible,theChurchandthePoor.Tunbridge Wells:Burns&Oats.Pp.10922. Ribas, M. (2006). “Liberating Mary, Liberating the Poor.” In: M. Al thausReid(ed.),LiberationTheologyandSexuality.Aldershot:Ash gate.Pp.12335. Ritchie, N. (1989). “Women and Christology.” In: E. Tamez (ed.). ThroughHerEyes.Pp.8195. Samartha,S.J.(1974).TheHinduResponsetotheUnboundChrist.Interre ligiousDialogueSeries6.Madras:ChristianLiteratureSociety. Scannone,J.C.(1979).“Theology,PopularCulture,andDiscernment.” In: R. Gibellini (ed.). Frontiers of Theology in Latin America. Pp. 21339. Shaull, R. (2001). “From Academic Research to Spiritual Transform ation:ReflectionsonaStudyofPentecostalisminBrazil.”Pneuma 20:7184. Sobrino, J. (1993). Jesus the Liberator: A Historical Theological Reading of JesusofNazareth.TunbridgeWells:BurnsandOates. (1978). Christology at the Crossroads: A Latin American Approach. Maryknoll:Orbis. 

598 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Troch, L. (2004). “Ecclesiogenesis: The Patchwork of New Religious CommunitiesinBrazil.”Exchange33:5472. Van Prooijen, T. (2004). Limping but Blessed: Jürgen Moltmann’s Search for a Liberating Anthropology. Currents of Encounter 24. Amster dam/NewYork:Rodopi. Yuasa,K.(1983).“TheImageofChristinLatinAmericanIndianPopu larReligiosity.”In:V.SamuelandC.Sugden(eds).SharingJesus in the Two Thirds World. Bangalore: Partnership in MissionAsia. Pp.6185.

GodHasNoFavourites EcumenismandInterreligiousDialogue TheUnityofGod’sCreation AntonHoutepen

Abstract Thispaperlooksattheachievementsofecumenism inthesecondhalfofthe twentieth century, listing the many agreements that have been reached. It thenposesthequestionofthepromiseandchallengesofthisinrelationtoin terreligiousdialogue,pointingoutthatthemulticulturalsocietyisnowafact of life. The author then turns more specifically to Abrahamitic ecumenism, i.e.thatbetweentheJudaism,Christianity,andIslam.Inthethirdsectionhe discussespositivemarkersfor“unitivepluralism,”viathreeskandalainthat ecumenism: the challenge of common prayer, the skandalon of our Christo logical quarrels and, finally, the skandalon of violence in the history of all threereligions.Ineachoftheseareastheauthorspointstopossiblestrategies forresolution.

EcumenismattheCrossroads:ItsSuccessesandItsRecentCrisis When we speak about transformations of the churches in the second half of the twentieth century, ecumenism and interreli giousencounterseemtobetwoofthemoststrikingexamples. Ecumenism,“thegreatnewfactofourera”(Visser‘tHooft), has changed church life and social relations considerably. The increase in mixed marriages, the exchange of liturgical forms and organizational patterns of the churches (e.g forms of syn odality in the Roman Catholic Church, forms of episcopacy in variousReformationChurches),amultiplicityoftheologicaldi alogues,theosmosisofideasandscholarlycooperationbeyond confessional boundaries: all these have reshaped the idea of con fessional identity. Because of the ecumenical movement no church tradition has remained the same anymore. Christians

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havebecomeawareofa“legitimatediversity”bothwithinand amongchurches(Evans1997).1 Wearewitnessestothephenomenonof“partialidentifica tion”oreven“multipleloyalty”ofchurchmembers:manypeo ple are affiliated with different confessions during their lives; mostchurchmembersdonotfullyidentifythemselveswithall aspectsoftheirowntradition.Christiansmayadheretovarious spiritual movements and modalities within one and the same church or belong to common layers of spirituality across de nominationalboundaries. Important theological agreements on core questions of Christian confession were reached. Despite our divisions, we share“thefaithofthechurchthroughtheages”asaTreasurein EarthenVessels.2TheconvergencetextonBaptism,Eucharist,and Ministry(WCC[Lima]1982)documentedamajoragreementon the Christian sacraments and the structures of the church. The common explication of the Nicene Creed, presented to the churches in Confessing the One Faith (WCC [Budapest] 1989), laidthebasisforanecumenicalcatechesisonthefundamentals of the faith. The ecumenical movement has rediscovered the servantroleofthechurchinVaticanII’sconstitutionGaudiumet Spes and in the Faith and Order Study Church and World, re ceived in 1993 in Santiago de Compostella (WCC 1997), fol lowed by the studies on Ecclesiology and Ethics (19941997; cf. BestandRobra1997:291),receivedbytheHarareAssemblyin 1998.TheWorldCouncilofChurchesgaveastrongleadtothe common witness against racism, oppression, militarism, eco nomicinjustice,andecologicalexploitation.Overthepastthirty years a network of bilateral dialogues of the Christian World Communions has produced more than 1500 pages of interna tional theological agreements between different church tradi tions, especially on soteriology, ecclesiology, sacraments, and 1

Theexpression“legitimatediversity”wasfirstusedbyPopeJohn PaulIIinhisencyclicalUtunumsint§50(1995)and,incontrasttoillegit imatediversity,therichvarietyoftraditionsandhistoricalcontextswas seen as “integral to communion” by the World Council of Churches’ VIIthAssemblyinCanberra1991;cf.Kinnamon1999:173. 2

ThusthetitleofaWorldCouncilofChurches(WCC)Faithand OrderReport(1998)onhermeneuticalissues.

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the ministry (Meyer and Vischer 1984; Gros, Meyer, and Rush 2000).FarreachingagreementsonepiscopacybetweenLuther ansandAnglicansinGermany,theScandinaviancountries,the USA,andFrance(theMeissen,Reuilly,PorvooandELCAAgree mentsonEpiscopè19931999)3haverealizedanimportantecu menical “inner market” in Europe and the USA. The very im portantJointDeclarationontheDoctrineofJustification(1999)be tween the Lutheran Churches worldwide and the Roman Ca tholic Church marks a decisive step towards reconciliation. If suchadocumentwouldhavebeenpreparedbeforetheTriden tine Council, it would probably have prevented the split of Christianity in the West at the beginning of the sixteenth cen tury.LocalandregionalCouncilsofChurchesfosteredpastoral cooperationinmattersofcatechesis,diaconalservice,andpro phetic witness to society. So we may say that we Christians sharearealyetstillimperfectbutgrowingcommunionorkoino nia. These encouraging results of the ecumenical movement, however, were overshadowed and absorbed by two factors of regression.Thisoccurredfirstofallbecauseofthehesitationsof churchleaderstoaccepttheagreementsreachedbetweentheo logiansandtodrawtheconsequencesthereofforchurchlifeby amutualrecognitionofchurches,theirmembersandministers. And this occurred secondly because of the general societal cli mate of globalization, pluralism, secularization, and postmod ern thinking on differences and syncretism (French: bricolage). Ageneralcriticismofthe“hegemonyoftradition”hascometo thefore,especiallyincontextualtheologiesfromtheThirdWorld, andinfeministtheology(Pranger2003).Thistrend,althoughan understandable reaction to prevailing patriarchal and colonial domination, is inclined to deconstruct the very idea of a com mon Christian tradition, a shared faith, “confessed in all times and at all places and by everyone” (quod semper et ubique et ab omnibus creditum est: Vincent of Lérins). Why, then, should we attempttoreachaconsensusoftraditions,ifeverythingintra ditionisamatterofeverchangingculturalconstruction?Ifwe nolongerhaveanycriteriaforjudgingtheinsightsandformsof 3

Cf.TheMeissenCommonStatement,ThePorvooCommonStatement, CalledtoCommonMission.

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expressionofthesovereignotherpreciselyasother?Moreover, why should we foster formal dialogues between churches and confessionaltraditionswhenformalchurchadherenceseemstobe decreasing in favour of informal religion and “religious shop ping,”newreligiousmovements,andallkindsofindependentor “newly emergent” churches (cf Houtepen 1995)? According to therecenteditionofDavidBarrett’sWorldChristianEncylopedia (2002),nearlyhalfofallaffiliatedChristiansbelongtoinformal religious groups like Charismatic, Pentecostal or Evangelical communities,scarcelycommittedtoanyecumenicalendeavour or even opposing it. The crisis within the World Council of Churches,broughtintotheopenbythecriticismsoftheOrtho doxmemberchurchesontheapparentlossoftraditioninWest ern Christianity (cf. Houtepen 1998a), is only one sign of this ecumenicalaporia. KarlRahner(1983)oncelabelledthisglobalculturalsitua tiononeof“epistemologicaltolerance”:noneofusisableany more to cope with the whole historical richness of tradition. Konrad Raiser, at the WCC’s Assembly in Harare 1998 and in hisrecentbookForaCultureofLifespeaks,positively,ofanecu menicalspaceforthechurchestotransformacultureofglobal izationandviolenceintoacultureoflife(Raiser2002).Because cultures differ so much, intercultural communication between them becomes the special task of the ecumenical movement. RobertSchreiter(1997)wouldevencallthiscultureoflocaldi versitywithintheworldwidewebofglobalcommunicationand aglobalexchangeofmaterialandculturalgoodsANewCatho licity. Could the conclusion thus be: Let us be happy with our diversity and let us together hail ecumenism as “reconciled diversity,”goodrelations,andpeacefulcommunication? InterreligiousDialogue:ItsFailuresandItsHopes. Onefactorseemstobeeasilyoverlookedinthesepositiveeval uationsoftheincreasedflowofideasandproductsontheglo bal market: the lasting divisions among the world’s living faiths,responsible—asHuntingtonhascontended—formuchof theclashofcivilizationsthatheforesawin1991forthebeginning of the twentyfirst century (Huntington 1996). This was a vi sion—wemaynowsay afterthetragiceventsof11September 2001—withahighdegreeofaselffulfillingprophecy.Isittrue,

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thatChristianityandits“ecumenicalspace”or“catholicity”has thepotentialtotransformtheviolentaspectsofourglobalizing cultureandmulticulturalcohabitationintoa“cultureoflife.”I wouldarguethatsucharoleandresponsibilitywouldimplya muchmoreintensiveinterreligiousdialogueandarealisticpro grammetoimplementthebeautifulideasofVaticanIIexpressed in the declaration on the nonChristian religions Nostra Aetate, thedogmaticconstitutiononthechurchLumenGentiumandthe decree on the missionary activity of the church Ad Gentes. To quotejustonepassagefromthesetexts: TheCatholicChurchdoesnotrejectanythingofwhatistrue andholyinotherreligions.Withsincererespectsheconsid erscertainrulesofconductandcommandments,prescripts and doctrines which, however different in many regards fromwhatsheherselfteachesandfollows,notseldommir ror a ray of that “truth which enlightens all people.” She her self, however, proclaims and must do so incessantly the Christ, who is “the way, the truth and life” (John 14,6), in whom people may find the fullness of religious life and in whom God has reconciled everything to Himself. (Nostra Aetate§2)

HowcantheCatholicrespectforthetruthenlighteningallpeo ple, and the Christian message of God’s reconciliation with all of creation in Christ be brought together in concrete forms of conversation,cooperationandcommoncelebrationoftheunity ofcreationandthedignityofhumanlife? ParalleltointernalChristianconfessionaldialogue,interre ligious dialogue did bear fruits after World War II especially. Therewas,firstofall,thedialoguebetweenJudaismandChris tianityafterthetragedyoftheHolocaust,thenfromVaticanII onwards;thentherewasdialoguewithIslamandtheAsianre ligions and after the 1975 WCC Nairobi Assembly also with aboriginal or traditional religions in Africa, Australia, Latin America,andCanada.Threespecialsynodsofbishopsheldfor Africa,AsiaandthetwoAmericasunderthepontificateofJohn PaulIIhavepromotedthesedialogues,asdidJohnPaulIIhim selfduringhisfrequentvisitstoChristianchurchesonallconti

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nents.4 The Roman Catholic Secretariat for the Dialogue with NonChristians and for the Dialogue with NonBelievers, housedtogetherwiththeSecretariat(nowthePontificalCoun cil) for Promoting Christian Unity, has given a firm and open lead to this dialogue. This interreligious dialogue was both an exchangeonthelevelofideasandaconversationonthelevelof daily life on practical issues of tolerance, freedom of religion, humanrights,economicsolidarityandpeace.Theincreasedmi grationfromAsianandAfricancountriestoEuropehaschanged the religious habitat of people, most of all in urban centres. In many cities of Europe Turks, Moroccans, and Algerians form large minorities whose children dominate the schools, sports clubs, and other areas of city life. The prognosis of the Social CulturalPlanningOffice(2000)intheNetherlandsfortheyear 2020isthatMuslimswillmakeup7%ofthepopulationinthe country, the same percentage as Protestants and scarcely less thanRomanCatholics(10%).AlthoughChristiansandMuslims together will form only a minority of believers—about one quarter of the population—tensions between them will increase. Thesewillbecausedbyculturaldifferences,opposingviewson human rights, and on the rights of women, economic rivalry, general prejudice and international political suspicion, caused byterrorismandfundamentalistthreat.. A multicultural society, hailed by some politicians and firmly rejected by others, has become a matter of fact in daily life, where most of us configure our own lifestyles by borrow ing elements from foreign cultures: combining Japanese fish with Belgian beer and Italian pasta, playing Gregorian chants whilechattingwithanAfricanfriendorwhileteasinganIndian date.Theactualcoexistenceofdifferentreligiouscommunities inmostcitiesoftheworldmustbethestartingpoint,therefore, ofinterreligiousdialogueandconversationatthelocallevel. PositiveTheologicalMarkersofthe“UnitivePluralism”ofReligions The starting point for such a dialogue must be, of course, re spectforthediverseandlongstandingreligioustraditionsand culturesoftheotherlivingfaiths.Exclusivismandproselytism

4

ForasurveyofthesetextsseeHoutepen1998b.

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preclude every true dialogue and violate the human right of freedomofreligion.SinceVaticanIItheoldChristianadageex traecclesiamnullasaluswasabandonedoratleastradicallyrein terpreted(cf.Sullivan1992;Dupuis1997).Atheologiareligionum developedthatwasbasedonsuchgeneraltheologicalmarkers like “anonymous Christianity” (Rahner 1966; 1974; 1976), “the cosmicChrist”(Panikkar1981;1993),and“Christcenteredsyn cretism”(Thomas1969;1978;1979;1980),theunityofGodscre ation(Pannenberg1991:11987),a“universalWeltethos”(Küng 1990),orKonvivenz(Sundermeier1992;1996). Not unlike interconfessional dialogue, however, this field of interreligious dialogue also threatens to be absorbed and overshadowedbyageneralpleaforepistemologicalpluralism, the critique of institutionalized religion, and the shift of atten tioninbothculturalanthropologyandthegeneralstudyofreli gionstoreligionasaculturalconstructionofreality(cf.Geertz 1973; Pranger 2003). We therefore need a much more specific theology of religions than we have articulated thus far in ab stract terms of exclusivism, inclusivism, parallelism, or plural ism (Knitter 1985). We need a basic debate on anthropological and hermeneutical starting points, on historical prejudices and ontheimagesweformofenemies,asweneededthisatthebe ginningoftheecumenicalmovement.ThusthedeclarationDom inusJesusofSeptember2000,condemningbothexclusivismand pluralism,didnotreallydealwithsuchspecificaspectsofreal lifeconversationwithpeopleofotherfaiths,andespeciallynot with the problems of the socalled “Abrahamitic ecumenism” between Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Kuschel 1994). In her survey of the results of interreligious dialogue thus far, Jutta Sperber concludes that such a dialogue on the real neuralgic pointsthatdivideushasnotyettakenplace(Sperber2000:95). AbrahamiticEcumenism:ItsSkandalaandPerspectives Within “Abrahamitic Ecumenism”—to which I would like to limitmyreflectionsinthispaperbecauseitisthemostcommon contextoftheEuropeanChurches—conversationshouldcentre fist on the mutual neuralgic points or skandala of history, of whichIwillmentionthree:(1)therefusaltopraytogetherand to adore the same God, YHWHAbbaAllah; (2) the prejudices and misunderstandings with regard to Christian Christologies

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andinternalChristianquarrelsaboutit,especiallywithregard to the theologies of incarnation, the salvific meaning of Jesus’ crucifixionanddoceticinterpretationsofit,bothinearlyChris tianandingeneralMuslimthinking;and,perhapsthemostim portantthemeofall,(3)theuseandmisuseofpowerandvio lence in all three religions where they became dominant and managedtofostertheirbeliefsandlifestylesthroughthesanc tionsofpubliclaw(societaschristiana,sharia,thestateofIsrael). TheChallengeofCommonPrayer: TheUnityofCreationandthePraiseoftheCreator andFatherofallPeople Both the Jewish and Christian Sciptures as well as the Qur’an, althoughinseveralinstancesfavourabletoexclusivistideaslike election,predestination,forcedconversion,andholywar,testi fy to the final mercy of God who does not sanction human greedorprejudice,chosennessorexclusion.Becauseallarecre ated in the image and likeness of God, God has no favourites (Acts 10:34; Romans 2:11; Galatians 2:16; Colossians 3:25; 1 Peter1:17;Qur’an2:136).Godwantstobeadoredbyall:God has“puthiseyeintheheartsofmen”(Sirach17:8).Hehasen throned Adam as his prophet (rasul) and messenger (khalif). Godwants“ahouseofprayerforallnations”(Isaiah56:7;Mark 11:1518).ThecredibilityofAbrahamiticmonotheismdepends, indeed,onthewillofallbelieverstosubmit(=islam)totheone God,CreatorandFatherofallandtorespecttheprophetsand apostles who were his successive messengers in history. Until theendoftimeMoses,Jesus,andMohammedwillbeinsalvific and peaceful competition, even if in this terrestrial situation JewsoptfortheuniquepositionofMosesasgivingustheTor ah,ChristiansfortheuniquegiftofJesus,whogavehimselffor the life of all on the cross, and Muslims for God’s messenger Mohammed, who completed the revelations to and the cove nant with all true believers since Abraham or even since the prophetAdam(Steenbrink1998). At the same time, however, religious pluralism and inter action in an agnostic culture like ours should be aware of its precarious common responsibility for the adoration of the one CreatorandFatherofalllife.Wecannotaffordtoprayagainst one another. We should stop banishing the other followers of Abraham from our churches, mosques and synagogues or to

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force them into our own religious community: synagogue, church or umma. If they want to marry one another, there shouldbenohindrancetotheirlove.Weshouldnotbeafraidof sharing our economic and civil resources when people seek refugefrompersecutionorfrompoverty.Synagogues,church es,andmosqueshavesharedtheskylineofbeautifulEuropean citieslikeGranada,Serajevo,Mostar,andIstanbulforcenturies. Why, then, complain about a similar phenomenon that begins to mark the urban atmosphere of Antwerp, Brussels, Rotter dam,andAmsterdam?Inmanyofthesecitieswenowfindac tive councils of religions in addition to councils of churches, councils of mosques (fostering internal islamic ecumenism be tweene.g.Turks,Moroccans,Shi’ites,andSunnis),andcouncils of Jews. In many cases it was the Christian churches that took theinitiativeinthis,butitstimulatedaclimateoftrustamong thediversereligiouscommunities,whichdemandsfurtherforms ofspiritualsharing.Commonprayerwouldunderlinetheunity (tawhid)ofGodandtheobedience(islam)ofhiscreatures.Was it not Jesus himself who wanted the temple in Jerusalem to be “ahouseofprayerforallnations”?5AnddoesnottheQur’anit selfcriticizeourquarrelsaboutcommonprayer,saying: Do you quarrel with us about God, though he is our Lord and your Lord? (Qur’an 2:139; cf. 29:46)…. Wherever you are,Allahwillbringyoutogether(Qur’an2:147)….Itisno virtue, whether you direct your faces to the East or to the West. True virtue is in him, who believes in Allah, in the LastDay,intheangels,theBookandtheprophetsandwho shares out of love for God his possessions with his family, withorphans,withthepoor,thetravellers,thebeggarsand fortheredemptionofslaves.Hewhoisfaithfulinpraying andinpayingthetaxesforthereligiouscommunity(Qur’an

5

ThestoryofJesus’cleansingofthetemplehasacentralplacein boththesynopticgospelsandinJohn,whoputitattheverybeginning ofJesus’publiclife(John2:1316),referringtohis“zealforthehouseof God”(Psalm69:10)asthemaincause,likethatofthepsalmist,ofhis passionandrejection.ThesynopticsalludetoIsaiah56:17,whereitis saidthatpaganeunuchsandforeignerswillbeadmittedtothetemple forprayerandsacrifice.MarkespeciallystressesIsaiah56:7:“...formy housewillbecalledahouseofprayerforallnations.”

608 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE 2:177). Your God is One, there is no God except God, the Merciful,theOnefullofGrace.(Qur’an2:163)

ThiscommonAbrahamiticmonotheismisunderattackinaso ciety that hails “the return of the gods,” that uses the idea of God as a sheer metaphor for human passion or instrumental izes it in a magical way for the human economy of our fears anddesires.TheoneGod,worthytobeadoredbyJews,Chris tians, and Muslims alike, is the Creator and Bearer of an eco nomyofsalvationthattranscendsallhumanwilltocontrol,to calculate,andtoplan.OurScripturesrefertothisCreatorthrough manyimagesandmetaphors,suchastheWordofYHWH,the kingdom of heaven, the will of Allah. We may call this eco nomythepromisedland,thenewearthorparadise,butnoneof thesecaneverbeidentifiedwiththefinalpurposeofGodwho is “beyond any category,” hors categorie, and therefore unique, monos,theonlyOne,withoutanypeers,thepropertyofnoone. God does not have any prosopolèmpsia: God has no favourites. His covenant is a universal covenant, without exceptions and withoutanyprivileges.6ThisAbrahamiticmonotheïsmalsoex cludesanyformofmetaphysicaldualism:Godhasnopowerful enemieswithwhomHemustcompete.Heisnotonepoleina fieldofpolaritiesgoodandevil,lightanddarkness,thesacred and the profane, the public and the private, the spirit and the body,orweandtheother.GodistheoneCreatorofeverything that we experience as either good or bad, the familiar and the alien, the particular and the universal. The final judgment

6  Cf. Pannenberg 1991: 11987 (especially 12936). Pannenberg stressesthefactthatmonotheismlosesitscredibilitywhenitstartsto proclaimthattheoneGodofothermonotheismsisnottheonetrueGod ofourowncommunity.Theclaimthat“ourGod”istheoneanduni versal GodimpliesthatitcannotbeatribalorparticularGodofone groupexclusively.Christianitystartedpreciselywiththeclaimthatthe GodofIsrael,YHWH,isalsotheGodoftheGentiles.Withregardto Islamitcannotbeotherwise.EvenifJewish,Christian,orMuslimbelie verscannotfullyagreeontheirideas,concepts,andimagesofGod,they stillsharethecovenantalpromisesandblessingsofAbraham,expressing God’sownloveforallwhoconfessGodastheCreatoroftheUniverse, theGuide,theShepherd,andthemercifulJudgeofallbelievers.

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thereofisonlyHis.7ThisunityofGodcreatespeaceandequal ityinhumanity;itprovidesforequalchancesintheeconomyof salvation and for shared responsibilities. Any competition or strifeaboutGodisalientomonotheism. ASecondSkandalon:OurChristologicalQuarrels ThroughoutthecenturiesChristianshavereproachedbothJews and Muslims for not recognizing and honouring the figure of Jesus as God’s final envoy (cf. De Jonge 1998), denying him suchmessianicdignityasexpressedbythetitlesofSonofGod, SonofMan,ServantoftheLord,etc.BothJewsandMuslimsar gue, however, that we Christians ourselves are hopelessly di videdonthesignofIsa(Qur’an19:3637;21:93;23:53;43:6465): abouthisorigin,aboutthepolicyofGodheproclaimed,about the meaning of his death and resurrection, and about his final coming and judgment at the end of time. This division in our Christological and soteriological interpretation of the event of Jesus implies a deep confusion among us about Gods own be ingwithus. The early church dogma of the mystery of God’s threefold presence with us in creation, in the history of his WordandhisSpirit,andinthelifeanddeathofhisservantand messenger Jesus of Nazareth has been, for Muhammad and mostJews,thebigskandalonthroughoutthecenturies. Butdidwetakeourownaporiasinthisfieldseriously enough?Dowerealizehowmanyschismswehavecausedor atleasttoleratedindefendingoneortheotherofthehumanar ticulationsofthismysteryofGod’spresencewithus?Whycan wenottakeseriouslytheprotestsandquestionsofJudaismand IslamagainsttrinitarianandChristologicalmodelsthatseemto violate the absolute unity and sovereignty of God? Would not

7

WithinJudaismaswellasinChristianityandIslamdualisticideas havecreptinfromPersiansourcesandhavebeenretainedinreligious imageryoverthecenturies:Satan(shatan,iblis)andallkindsofdemons, angels,andspirits(djinn)populatethesymbolicuniverseofmonotheistic believers.IntheendtheyhavetosubmittotheoneGodwhocreates boththegoodandtheevilthings(Isaiah45:7),butmeanwhiletheseideas suggestakindofpermanentcompetitionbetweenGodandtheforcesof evil.Isaiah45isahymnofpraisetotheoneGod,unrivalled:“Iamthe Lordandthereisnoother,”verysimilartotheIslamicconfessionofthe onenessofAllahinQur’an2.

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the internal ecumenical Christian debate, e.g. on the economic Trinity or on the biblical parallellism of Jesus’ incarnation and resurrection, clarify historical Jewish and Muslim misunder standings,asifChristiansthinkaboutGod,JesusandtheHoly Spiritintermsofadivinefamily,andofGodgeneratingaSon throughthevirginMaryinsomemiraculousbutstillanthropo morphicprocreativeway?JewsandMuslimscouldlearnfrom suchadialoguethatChristiansdonotsimplyidentifyJesusand God, and so Christians would understand why the Qur’an stressesthefact so much thatJesushimself,aswellashismo therMary,glorifyGodinanunambiguousway,neverclaiming divinehonourforthemselves(Qur’an5:17;5:72;5:116;9:30)? Apparently, in formulating our Christologies and soterio logies we Christians have not succeeded in safeguarding the unityanduniquenessofGod,whichwasthecoreofJesus’own faith,norinmakingthisfaithcleartoJewsandMuslims.From recent exegetical and historical studies about the “Christolo gies” of the New Testament and the early church,8 we have learned that the early Christian communities could formulate their vision of the Christ event only within the framework of Jewishthinking.TheycouldbelieveinJesusonlyasGod’sfinal servant,prophet,andenvoywhoannouncedthecomingofthe Kingdom of God, who wanted to do the will of God and who identifiedhimselfthroughouthislifeanddeathwithamission giventohimbyGod,whomhecalledFather.Inhisdivinemis sionhewascontinuallyreplenishedbytheSpiritorruahofGod andfaithfullyservedGod’scause.HewasrelatedtoGodasthe heirandSon,preachingtheWordofGodanddoingtheworks of God in signs and miracles. In a highly theocentric way early ChristologyglorifiedtheoneGodandFatherofallcreationand derivedthemissionofChristoutsidethebordersofIsraelfrom hisunitywiththeoneCreatorofallhumankind.Thegospelof John especially proclaims the divine logos character of the per son and work of Jesus sent by God into the things of God and sendinghisdisciplesintotheworldofthenationsinthename ofGod,Father,andSpiritaswellasinhisownname,beingthe Son of God, representing the one God of all peoples from the 8

 E.g. Hahn 1969; Moule 1977; Schillebeeckx 1979; Dunn 1980; Vermes1983;Sanders1993;Schnackenburg1995.

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beginning of creation. He represents the invisible God and is theperfecticonofGod,butnowheredoeshereplaceGodoris simply identical with God: he praises and glorifies God, he praystoGodandsurrendershislifeandspirittoGod:heisin intimaterelationshipwithGod,butheisnota“secondGod”or a“substitute”forGod. AllofthismightbeclarifiedinaChristianJewishMuslim trilateraldialogue,comparingtheauthenticChristologicalstate mentsoftheQur’anand of thegospels.Itwouldthenbecome clearthattheKoranteachesarather“high”ChristologyofJesus asGod’senvoy(rasul)whoisovershadowedbytheWordand theSpiritofGod.Weshouldlearnagaintospelloutthemany images of divinehuman encounter—such as the adoption of the sons of God, the overshadowing of Mary, of Jesus, and of thedisciplesatPentecostbyGod’sSpirit—thataccompanythe idea of God’s Word and Wisdom sent to us in the person of Jesus, born of woman (Galatians 4:4) and raised by God from the dead. Much of this imagery is present in both the Qur’an and the New Testament and borrowed from the Jewish Scrip tures. The Qur’an, thus, does not at all minimize the signifi cance of Jesus in the creative and revelatory work of God nor dothegospelsforgetabouttheevergreaterrealityofGod,the oneandallencompassingmercifulFather.9 ThelaterChristianquarrelsaboutChristologyandsoterio logyrefermainlytothedivineoriginandthedoctrineofthein carnationofGodinJesusChrist,interpretedintermsofGreek ontology,whichwasalienbothtotheNewTestament10andto theQur’an.AcommonrereadingoftheScripturesofbothcom munitieswithregardtotheroleandthefigureofJesuswould beaprimarytaskofdialogue.Fortyyearsofexegeticalandhis torical reflection on the Christian interpretation of the Christ event that has tried to reconcile the New Testament Christolo 9

DeJonge1998:123:“JesustheSon,theexemplaryenvoy,incom pleteobediencetothewillofhisSender,inlovingunitywiththeFather, speaksandactsastheFather.Hence‘theFatherandIareone’(Jn10,30), and‘whoeverhasseenmehasseentheFather’(Jn14,9;cf12,45).Yetit isselfevidentthat‘theFatherisgreaterthanI’—theFathertowhomthe Sonreturnsatthecompletionofhismission(Jn14,31).” 10

SeethefindingsinDunn1980.

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gieswiththestrictmonotheismoftheJahwistictraditionofIs rael must still be communicated to both Jews and Muslims. Similarly,newerreadingsoftheQur’ananditsviewofthemis sionofJesusneedsreceptioninChristiantheologicalandcate cheticalteaching.11 OntheMuslimsideitisthedenialofthecrucifixionofJe sus that marks a skandalon for Christians. For Christians, the crucifixion of Jesus is one of the most certain facts of history and crucial for their view of the prophetic mission of Jesus, whereas Muslims see the crucifixion of a divine prophet as a finalfailureofhismission.Christianshaveinterpretedthepoor fateofJesus—hismodestbirth,theprotestsagainsthisteaching andhisshamefulexecutiononthecross—inaparadoxicalway, transforming his painful fate into victorious signs of God’s es chatological kingdom: a Christ triumphant in the end over in justice and death. In the nativity stories of Matthew and Luke Jesus’ cradle became the proleptic focus of adoration by both the Jewish underclasses—the shepherds—and of oriental wise men,andevenasourceoffearforRomangovernorslikeHer od.Jesus’crossandhisgravebecametheplaceofGod’svictory over death and decay, over human injustice and violence, a theophanyinviewofwhichtheRomanguardianstrembled. TheQur’anacceptsJesus’miraculousbirthandwonderful deeds but rejects his crucifixion and what happened at his grave:“They(theJews)didnotmanagetokillhim,theydidnot crucify him. They merely saw the appearance of it. No, God himself has raised him up to himself and God is mighty and wise”(Qur’an4:15759).AtrueprophetlikeJesus,whohimself isabletoraisethedead,cannotfallpronetodecay.SoIslamis inclinedtoglorifyJesusasamiraculousmanandadivinepro phet,raisedupbyGodtohisthronebutcannotseehimasthe suffering servant of God who offered himself to death on the cross for the sins of the world. It glorifies the results of the worksoftheprophetsandpreachesthetriumphofMuhammed as well as that of other prophets, among them first and fore most IsaJesus. We must confess that, on the Christian side as well, the triumphant Christ—Dominus Jesus—has frequently 11

Muchpreparatoryacademicworkhasbeendoneinthisfieldin thelastdecades.Cf.e.g.Goddard1996andLeirvik1999.

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been favoured over a more kenotic vision of Jesus as the ebed JHWH. This, perhaps, is our common skandalon. Neither Juda ismnorIslamthusfarhasreallyacceptedtheideaofasuffering Messiah. Christianity itself, though essentially based on the gospel of the crucified Jesus, has often succumbed to an ag gressivetheologyofthecross:inhocsignovinces.Theessenceof religionisatstakehere:isittofosterourowndesiresforpow er, prosperity, and success, or is religion primarily a cry from the depths of human misery, a protest against violence, and a supportofsolidaritywiththeweakandpowerlessinthename ofGodandtothegloryofGod? TheThirdSkandalon:AHistoryofViolence The third skandalon, related to the first and the second, is our common violent past of mutual excommunications, persecu tions, crusades, unholy alliances, colonial exploitation, geno cide, terrorism, and wars on terrorism: unholy violence, blas phemouslydefendedinthenameofGod.12 In the ecumenical movement and in Christian theology, andeveninpostmodernphilosophy,suchappealtoGodforthe support of our own power claims and acts of vengeance has been consistently rejected. We might speak of a general meta morphosis of the idea of God in the second half of the twentieth century. God’s energy and will are no longer expressed in terms of power, force, and domination but in terms of partici pation,relatedness,andcompassion.ThemysteryofGod’smerci ful gratuitousness and donation is expressed in a new kind of negative theology. The God of Abraham is not just better and more powerful than all other gods, powers, and forces in the universe,butHisdunamis andenergeiaareofadifferentorder, theorderofwhatpeoplelikeMargueriteYourcenarandGianni Vattimo have called “the weak forces.” God is neither an al mightykingnoradeisticfinetuneroftheuniverse.Godisno longer the natural ally of political or ecclesiastical rulers who claimtoactashisdirectviceregents.Godisnotthesolutionto ourphysicalormetaphysicalpuzzlesaboutlifeanddeath.God

12

SeethehistoricalanalysisinWatt1968.Formorerecentdevelop mentsseeDonohueandEsposito1982 andMortimer1982.Fortradi tionalIslamicpointsofviewonwarandviolenceseeKhadduri1979.

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is not a patriarch, granting men the right to behave like gods over against women. God cannot be claimed for one religion alone. Such a metamorphosis is the result of the critique of reli gionsincetheEnlightenment,ofacriticalrereadingoftheScrip turesandoftheecumenicalmovementitself(cf.Houtepen2002). Therewehaveheardthecryofthevictimsofpower:thepoor, the blacks, the oppressed, and the voices of women. There we havepleadedforjustice,peace,andtheintegrityofcreation,the abbreviationJPICnearlybecominganewtetragrammatonforthe GodofAbraham,Godofmercyandgrace,inwhomthereisno violence. Conclusion Ecumenism and interreligious dialogue have transformed the cultural position of the churches and the religious attitudes of theirmembersconsiderablyinthesecondhalfofthetwentieth century. An “ecumenical space” of tolerance, mutual respect, and intercultural exchange has indeed been created, fostering “acultureforlife”(Raiser). Within this space, however, conversation among Chris tiansandwithinandbetweentheadherentsofthethreeAbra hamitic religions especially should concentrate on the unity of God’screationasatheologicalbasisforhumandignityandhu manrightsandonthescandalsofourviolentpast:therefusal toadoreourGodYHWH,Elohim,Abba,Ruah,Allahastheone GodofAbraham;therefusaltoacceptasufferingandcrucified prophetasthefinalenvoyandmessiahofGod,andtheunholy allianceoffaithandpower,religion,andviolenceindefenseof particular and private interests, attitudes of conquest, and im perialisticideologies. GodisalivingGod,aGodoflife,mercyandgrace.Thisis thecorekerygmaofIslam,whichresemblesthecoremessageof theJewishScripturesandoftheGospelofJesus:thereisoneho lyGod,fromWhomandtoWhomeverythingexistsandwith outWhomnothingcanexist,Whohasnorivalsarrayedagainst Him, nor equals flanking Him. This God demands justice among all humans, who are created in equal dignity by God. All humans are tp live in grateful obedience to this one God Who will judge all people in the end of times and in the life

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hereafter without any prosopolèmpsia: then, too, God will have nofavourites(Platti1996:71). Bibliography Barrett, D. (2002). World Christian Encyclopaedia, 2nd ed. Vols. III. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress. Best,T.,andM.Robra(eds).(1997).EcclesiologyandEthics:Ecumenical Ethical Engagement, Moral Formation and the Nature of the Church. ReportsfromaStudyProcess.Geneva:WCC.Pp.291. CalledtoCommonMission:ALutheranProposalforRevisionoftheConcor datofAgreement.www.elca.org. DeJonge,M.(1998).God’sFinalEnvoy:EarlyChristologyandJesus’Own ViewofHisMission.GrandRapids/Cambridge:Eerdmans. Donohue, J., and J. Esposito (eds). (1982). Islam in Transition. New York/Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress. Dunn,J.(1980).ChristologyintheMaking:ANewTestamentInquiryinto theOriginsoftheDoctrineoftheIncarnation.London:SCM. Dupuis, J. (1997). Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism. Maryknoll:Orbis. Evans, G.R. (1997). The Church and the Churches. Cambridge: Cam bridgeUniversityPress. Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York:BasicBooks. Goddard, H. (1996). Muslim Perceptions of Christianity. London: Grey Seal. Gros,J.,H.Meyer,andW.Rusch(eds).(2000).GrowthinAgreementII: Reports and Agreed Statements of Ecumenical Conversations on a WorldLevel19821998.Geneva/GrandRapids:WCC/Eerdmans. Hahn,F.(1969).TheTitlesofJesusinChristology:TheirHistoryinEarly Christianity.Cambridge:Lutterworth. Houtepen,A.(2002).God:AnOpenQuestion.NewYork:Continuum. (1998a). “Evangelisation and Ecumenism: Contradiction and Challenge.”Religion,State&Society26:89100. (1998b). “From Freedom of Religion towards Really Free Reli gion:VoicesfromRomeandGeneva.”Exchange27:290310. (1995).“Hermeneutics,MissionandEcumenism:TheArtofUn derstandingaCommunicativeGod.”Exchange24:91110. Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of WorldOrder.NewYork:SimonandSchuster.

616 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Khadduri,Majid.(1979).WarandPeaceintheLawofIslam.NewYork: AMS.Originallypublishedin1941(Baltimore/London:JohnsHop kinsUniversityPress). Kinnamon,  M. (ed.). (1999). Signs of the Spirit: Official Report Seventh Assembly.Geneva/GrandRapids:WCC/Eerdmans. Knitter, P. (1985).  No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Atti tudesTowardtheWorldReligions.London:SCM. Küng,H.(1990).ProjektWeltethos.Munich/Zurich:Piper. Kuschel,K.J.(1994).StreitumAbraham.Munich:Piper. Leirvik,O.(1999).ImagesofJesusChristinIslam.Uppsala:SwedishIn stituteofMissionaryResearch. The Lutheran World Federation and the Roman Catholic Church. (2000).JointDeclarationontheDoctrineofJustification.GrandRap ids/Cambridge:Eerdmans. The Meissen Common Statement: On the Way to Visible Unity. (1992). CCU Occasional Papers 2. London: The Council for Christian Unity. Meyer, H., and L. Vischer (eds). (1984). Growth in Agreement: Reports andAgreedStatementsofEcumenicalConversationsonaWorldLevel. NewYork/Geneva:PaulistPress/WCC. Mortimer,E.(1982).FaithandPower.London:Faber&Faber. Moule, C. (1977). The Origin of Christology. Cambridge et al.: Cam bridgeUniversityPress. Panikkar, R. (1993).  The Unknown Christ of Hinduism. Maryknoll: Orbis. (1993).TheCosmotheandricExperience.Maryknoll:Orbis. Pannenberg, W. (1991). “The Reality of God and the Gods in the Ex perienceoftheReligions.”In:W.Pannenberg.SystematicTheolo gy.Vol.1.Transl.GeoffreyBromiley.GrandRapids:Eerdmans. Platti, E. (1996). Wat gelooft een goede moslim? Amsterdam/Averbode: Muntinga/AltioraAverbode. ThePorvooCommonStatement:TogetherinMissionandMinistry.(1993). London:ChurchHousePublishing. Pranger, J.H. (2003). Redeeming Tradition: Inculturation, Contextualiza tion, and Tradition in a Postcolonial Perspective. Dissertation Uni versityofGroningen. Rahner, K. (1976). “Observations on the Problem of the ‘Anonymous Christian’.”In:K.Rahner.TheologicalInvestigations.Vol.14.New York:Seabury.Pp.28094.

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618 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE (1969).TheAcknowledgedChristoftheIndianRenaissance.London: SCM. Vermes,Geza.(1983).JesusandtheWorldofJudaism.London:SCM. Watt, W. Montgomery. (1968). Islamic Political Thought. Islamic Sur veys6.Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress. World Council of Churches. (1998). A Treasure in Earthen Vessels: An InstrumentforanEcumenicalReflectiononHermeneutics.Faithand OrderPaperNo.182.Geneva:WCC.  (1991). Confessing the One Faith: An Ecumenical Explication ofthe Apostolic Faith as it is Confessed in the NiceneConstantinopolitan Creed(381).FaithandOrderPaperNo.153.Geneva:WCC.  (1990).ChurchandWorld:TheUnityoftheChurchandtheRenewal of Human Community. Faith and Order Paper No. 151. Geneva: WCC. (1982).Baptism,EucharistandMinistry.FaithandOrderPaperNo. 111.Geneva:WCC.

IndexofSubjects baptism . . . . . 82,382,467,508, 519,522,526,530,541,570, 600,618 BarmenDeclaration . . . . . . 48 blackchurches . . . . . . . . . . . 69 bodhicitta . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40004 Bodhisattva . . 39504,40711, 501,581,596 Brahmin . . 32127,32931,540 BritishCouncilofChurches . . . . . 34345,351,35354 Buddha . . . . . . . 64,395,39798, 400, 40203, 411, 41314, 42526 Buddhism . . . . . 12,25,33,326, 33132,334,39598,40001, 4011,41315,41920,423 24, 429, 47779, 488, 544, 580 Mahayana . . . . . 395,398, 400,402,403 Theravada . 395,398,400 businessethics . . . . . . 121,123, 125,127,129,131,133,135, 191

aboriginalchildren . . . . . . 566 Africa . . . . . . . . 4,10,13,21,25, 178,182,185,190,194,275 300, 30118, 52527, 543, 564,566,571,575,579,580 81,588,59195,60304 Africancommunalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276,295 AfricanRenaissance . . . . . . 10, 27577,29192,294,296 ahnung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 AIDS . . . . . . . . 20203,28488, 293,296,558 amorfati . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 ancestors . . . . . . . 275,277,282, 283,286,287,291,588,591 antiJudaism . . . . . . . . 359,375, 379,380,382, antiSemitism . . . . . . . 387,388, 407 apartheid . . . . . . . . 4,177,182, 197201,203,213,296,563 64,571,575 arhat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398,400 art . . . . . 1,35,40,80,215,217, 219,22027,22931,23334, 242,246,253,316,584 AugsburgConfession . . . . 555 authorityinscience . . . . . . . 53 authority . . . . 28,53,54,5658, 89,9597,99,117,144,189, 310,322,330,401,436,461, 545,54748,55152,55455, 55960,569,57273 autonomy . . . . . . . . 4,40,137, 14144,149,151

Canberra . . . . . . . . 51617,520, 522,600 candomblé . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 590 capitalism . . 180,181,184,190 freemarket . . . . . . . . 184 laissezfaire . . . . . . . . 181 Cartesiandualism . . . 243,247 caste . . . . . . . . 12526,172,319, 32435,341,448 catholicity . . . . . . 14,37,39,44, 511, 513, 518, 549, 55659, 562,579,59460203,617 619

620 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE channeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490 childprostitution . . . . . . . . 566 Chinamission . . . . . . 475,479 China . . . . . . . . 9,126,178,181, 408,47179,48186 Christianspirituality . . . . . . 102,190,415,416, 420,425 Christologies . . . 594,595,610 Christology . . . . . . 34849,395, 407,411,579,58486,595 97,61011,61517 church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim citizens . . . . . . . . . 88,112,118, 123, 138, 14043, 162, 205, 276,317,337,362,431,434, 43841,445,460,533 CivilRightsMovement . . . 70, 169 civilization . . . . . . . . 42,47,95, 105, 119,13739, 141, 143 45,147,149,151,153,304, 309,316,47677,602,615 classicalpoliticalphilosophy . . . . . 15559,16365,169 cohesion . . . . . . . . . . 4,75,137, 13845,151,153 comfortwomen . . . . . . . . . 566 commandment . . . . 33,80,280, 383,408,480,555,603 commongood . . . . . . 137,141, 14345,148,151,189 commongrace . . . . . 37,3943, 49 commonprayer . . . . . 459,513, 599,606,607 compassion . . . . . . 5,61,62,67, 252, 264, 39504, 40611, 414,586,593,613

competencemanagement . . . . . . 121,129,131,134 compliance . . . . 12122,12426, 128,130,135,328 ConcordofLeuenberg . . . 558 ConfessingChurch . . . . . . 547, 553,554 confession . . . . . . 1,13,40,204, 233, 23537, 248, 298, 369, 377,384,389,494,497,509, 545, 54760, 56668, 570, 572, 57476, 599600, 602 03,605,609 confessionalwritings . . . . 545, 549,555,556,558 confessions . . . . . . . . 1,40,545, 54758,600 consciousness . . . . . 41,61,144, 149,150,219,266,268,269, 305,344,351,385,404,420, 421,554,595 ConservativeBible Project . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 consumerism . . . . . . . 184,191 contextualization . . . . . 30103, 307,312 conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,13, 175183,185,186,190,295, 331,332,334,360,364,476, 52543,606 corporategovernance . . . . 121, 124,126,135 corpusChristianum . . . . . . . 555 CouncilofChurchesintheNe therlands . . . . . . 341,347, 355,44969 covenant . . . . . . . . 36468,375, 37778, 382, 384, 38687, 393,456,564,576,606,608 creation . . . . . . . . 3940,4243,

INDEXOFSUBJECTS 4849, 7172, 80102, 115, 117, 17779, 184, 187, 191, 21516, 22122, 231, 369, 379,397,410,456,462,475 76,494,516,518,531,564 66,568,570,588,596,599, 603,60506,60911,614 credibility . . . . . . . 9,69,71,79, 8083, 200, 203, 474, 606, 608 credo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552 creed . . . . . . 308,508,549,550, 552,557,600,618 creeds . . . . . . . . . 308,549,557 culturalminorities . . . 140,143 culturalplurality . . . . 148,149 culturalrelativism . . . . 13738, 145,14748,15052,313 culturalvalues . . . . . . 146,569 culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim cultures . . . . . . . . . 911,20,22, 23, 42, 88, 125, 138, 140, 145, 146, 14852, 252, 290, 303, 304, 30610, 31214, 316,418,437,454,455,472, 475,481,482,501,525,527, 533, 56770, 580, 596, 602, 604,615 Dalits . . . . . . . . . 4,125,31920, 32628, 330, 33336, 566, 599,600 death . . . . . . . . . . 32,49,55,56, 69,72,82,91,102,176,180, 185,187,235,236,241,258, 26366, 271, 32325, 327, 332,417,481,490,495,498, 533,573,586,588,594,609, 610,612,613 democracy . . . . . 140,142,153, 15572, 213, 283, 291, 296,

621

309,310,418,439,442,446, 461,572,578 democraticSouthAfrica . . . . . . 194,197,202,208, 211,212 dharma . . . . . . . 32122,32425, 335,351,353,40203,410 dialogueagenda . . . . . . . . 384 dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim interreligious . . . . 5,6,14, 36,337,339,343,346,347, 35254, 391, 411, 41318, 428,431,437,438,442,444 46,449,460,464,535,542, 580,581,596,597,599,602 05,614 difference . . . . 102,105,10719 dignity . . . . . . 109,110,11216, 119,139,142,149,150,152, 160,166,193,332,340,455, 575,577,578,590,603,609, 614 human . . . . 109,112,113, 116,139,142,149,150,152, 575,578,614 disciple . . . . . . . . . 77,226,368, 395,397,400,547,548,567, 576,586,610,611 Dispensationalists . . . . . . . 364 dissociationofsensibility . . . . . . 233,243,247,251 Divali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346,350 divinecausality . . . . . . . . . . 55 doctrine . . . 3942,49,145,181, 193,333,343,361,376,402, 403,423,478,498,500,509, 546, 551, 55659, 561, 573, 574,601,603,611,615,616 DomChurch . . . . 215,22431, 455,463

622 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE doublebelonging . . . . . . . 591 doubletransformation . . 579,590,592,593,595 Easter (“Verloochening en Be lofte”) . . . . . . . . . . . 22931 ecosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 ecumenicalmovement . . . . 19394,50607,510, 512, 519, 521, 525, 52730, 532, 535, 540, 54243, 557, 594,59902,605,61314 ecumenicalspace . . . . . 60203, 614 ecumenicity . . . . . . . . 555,559, 572,574 ecumenism . . . 10,14,175,191, 193,194,522,543,544,552, 556,561,574,575,579,580, 595,596,599,602,605,607, 61417 Abrahamitic . . . . 14,599, 605 wider . . . . 10,14,191,193 embodiment . . . . . . . . 148,170, 406,510,563,568 “EmpedoclesonEtna” . . . 192 encounter . . . . . . . . . . . . passim enculturation . . . 587,588,591, 592,594 epistemology . . . . . . . 911,13, 76,83,84,217,218,223 eschatology . . . . . . . . . . 13,103, 222,360,361,363,365,370, 383,393,519,585,612 esotericChristianity . . . . . 487, 490,497500 esotericism . . . . 7,48788,490, 49899 EternalSon . . . . . . . . . . . 49,49

Eucharist . . . . . . . . 70,223,508, 513,522,571,600,618 Eurocentrism . . . . . 37,45,302, 304,475,477 EuropeanMuslims . . . . . . 433, 434,440 Evangelical . . . . . . . 31,33,369, 370,371,381,383,387,408, 487,489,490,491,492,497, 529,537,538,572,602 evidentialvalue . . . . 76,77,84 exhibition . . . . . . . . 22630,352 experience . . . . . . . . . . . . passim extrinsicmotivation . . 12124, 126,128 FaithandOrder . . . . . . 50608, 51013, 51519, 522, 528, 567,574,600,618 faithaslovingdevotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 faithasrelianceonauthority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 fortune . . . . . . 25556,25861, 270,589 FourQuartets . . . . 23940,243, 245,252 generosity . . . . . . 292,410,563, 567,568 Gnosticism . . 64,472,487,490, 492,496,497,498,501,515 God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim gloryof . . . . . . . 546,613 kingdomof . . . . . . 40,46, 186,380,381,384,390,458, 525,529,584,610 Gospel . . . . . . . 6,24,37,42,45, 48, 54, 69, 70, 77, 81, 164, 183,187,188,191,194,199 201,332,360,368,378,381,

INDEXOFSUBJECTS 382,401,473,481,484,519, 528, 529, 532, 53740, 545, 547,548,558,559,564,565, 567,569,570,572,573,588, 592,594,607,610,611,613, 614,617 GreatBritain . . . . . . . . . 33740, 34247, 349, 35152, 432, 443 GreatWar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 greed . . . . . . . . . . 122,126,129, 175,180,181,184,190,191, 606 guestworkers . . . . . . . 25,432 harambee . . . . . . . . . . . 276,292 HareKrishnaMovement . . . . . . . . . . 338,344,351 Hegel’slecturesonChina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478 HeidelbergCatechism . . . . . . . . . . . . 23537,248 heresy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200,555 hermeneutics offinitude . . . . . 3,10,11, 192 ofsuspicion . . . . . . 1012, 192 hiddenChrist,the . . . . . . . 579, 580,581,595 hierarchy . . . . . . . . 165,32223, 32528,334,594 HIV/AIDS . . . . . . 202,284,287 HolySpirit . . . . . 236,401,494, 511, 513, 516, 51820, 548, 580,610 homeless(“LastigePortretten”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22731 humannature . . . . . . 129,146, 149,150,163,255,256,258, 267,304,396,399

623

imageofGod . . . . . 107,11618, 164,178,179,577 imagination . . . . . . . 71,79,83, 21532, 238, 246, 270, 402, 404,574 impurity . . . . . . . . . 32327,350 IndianRenaissance . . . . . . 618 indigenousspirituality . . . . . . 275,277,279,281, 283, 285, 287, 289, 29193, 295,297,299,583 individualization . . . 19,2224, 26,27,3034,43334 Indonesian Council of Churches . . . . . . . . . . 457 injustice . . . . . . 12,152,17681, 18486, 18993, 202, 266, 319,565,566,567 integration . . 14145,149,151, 353,362,450,460,461,467, 482,483,565,579,584,586, 591 intentionalexplanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,60,68 InterFaithNetwork fortheUK . . . . . 339,354 interculturalphilosophy . . . . 31416,47172,475, 481,482,485 intergenerationalchange . . . . . . . . . 91,9597,101, 121,431 interreligiousforums(SA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 internaldiversity . . . . . . . . . 88 intrinsicmotivation . . . . . . . 12123,125,127, 129,13135 irony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 Islam . . . . 10,11,13,14,25,26,

624 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE 30, 3334, 105, 168, 176, 279,280,289,294,320,332, 334,339,340,342,346,352, 353,391,418,43157,459 69,488,489,527,533,534, 538,541,544,580,599,603, 60609,61216,618 Israel . . . . . . . 359,360,36466, 36871, 37591, 393, 394, 466,542,606,608,610,612 Stateof . . . . . . . 364,366, 368,370,375,377,380,382 84,387,388,606 IsraeliPalestinianconflict . . . . . . . 370,371,37980, 38384,38789 justice . . . . . . . . 3,4,12,43,48, 60, 69, 70, 73, 79, 88, 103, 1009, 11119, 135, 13739, 141, 144, 145, 14952, 158, 162,165,167,169,170,176 81, 18487, 189, 190, 192, 93,202,263,266,282,288, 292,294,319,333,334,370, 371,383,385,390,405,409, 418,438,445,466,484,540, 546, 56367, 57276, 581, 584,593,600,612,614 social . . . . . . . . 69,70,73, 88,115,14445,151,584 justification . . . . . . . 3,9,48,69, 71,72,76,79,81,117,133, 145,200,316,546,562,570, 601,616 KairosDocument . . . . . 182,186, 190,191,194 kenosis . . . . . . . . . 399,402,404 KingLear . . . . . . . 109,112,113 Koreanhostages . . . . . . . . 537

language evocative . . . . . . . 23437,  240,248,249 poetic . . . . . . . 5,233,234, 236,239,248,251 religious . . . . . . 5,76,210, 23335,23739,24849,251 lawsofnature . . . . 58,59,257 legitimatediversity . . 512,600 liberationtheology . . . . . . 333, 334,379,393,579,583,584, 585,595,596,597 Lutheran . . . . . 13,54547,549, 555,558,560,571,601,615, 616 Mariology . . . . . . 579,584,585, 587,593 materialism . . . . . . . . 184,191, 281,282 marriage . . . . . . . . 82,202,259, 324,345,346,349,350,353, 354,433,456,459,599 MaryofGuadalupe . . . . . . 585 mercy . . . . . . . . . 367,377,386, 395,396,397,421,573,578, 606,614 MessianicJews . . . . . . 364,365, 370,381,382 Messiah(Jesus)ConfessingJews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381 MiddleEastCouncilof Churches . . . . . . . . . . 379 migrants . . . . . . . 25,31,33,88, 103,104,338,341,344,354, 431,432,433,435,439,448, 450,452,467,489,588 migration 19,21,22,24,26,28, 30,33,34,88,291,338,353, 366,368,431,433,604

INDEXOFSUBJECTS ministry . . . . . . . . 183,188,210, 508,515,521,522,531,549, 571,600,601,616,618 minorities . . . . . . 125,140,143, 150,181,308,432,442,452, 454,604 mission(s) . . . . . . 24,25,33,36, 66, 97, 104, 178, 190, 198, 210, 213, 284, 289, 29498, 328,332,339,34245,351 54,357,363,365,375,378, 38082, 384, 387, 389, 415, 423, 442, 44951, 453, 463, 464,467,471,472,475,476, 47981, 483, 493, 50508, 510, 51523, 52547, 552, 560, 56466, 575, 579, 580, 586,590,593,595,596,598, 601,603,61012,61517 missiontotheJews . . . . . . 375, 38081,387 missionary/ies . . . . . . 190,339, 343,345,351,357,363,365, 415, 44951, 467, 47980, 507, 525, 52830, 534, 536, 53839,54243,603,61617 missionizing . . . . . . . . . . . . 344 modern . . . . . . 30102,30406, 308,308,30912,316,318, modernity . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,30, 34,4446,89,100,104,231, 295, 301, 304, 305, 30911, 316,318 modernization . . . 6,1922,24 26,28,29,32,283,289 monotheism . . . . . . . . 606,608, 609,612 moralconsciousness . . . . . 144, 149,150 moraleducation . . . . . . . 12123

625

moralhorizon . . . . . . 123,159, 165,169,170 multiculturalsociety . . . 4,301, 449,457,464,599,604 multiculturalism . . . . 9,10,14, 88,104,105,301,302,303, 30709,31118 multipleloyalty . . . . . . . . . 600 Muslims . . . . . . . . 13,127,128, 279,320,342,354,379,391, 43146,44862,46467,489, 532,535,536,60406,608 10,612,617 mystics . . . . . . . . . . . . 348,434 natality . . . . . 92,9902,10405 NationalSocialism . . 553,554 naturallaw . . . . . . . 7,153,182 theologyof . . . . . . . . 182 naturaltheology . . . . . . 9,183, 47179,480,483 NesAmmim . . . . . . . . 389,394 Netherlands,the . . . . . 1,6,13, 88,107,121,127,156,159, 198,224,337,338,341,342, 347, 349, 350, 35255, 360, 364,368,377,380,381,384, 386,393,414,432,438,443, 445, 44958, 46166, 468, 471, 483, 48789, 490, 492, 493,499,527,534,536,577, 604 NewAge . . . . . . . . . 26,33,127, 168,432,487,490502 “new”atheists . . . . . . . . . . 193 newreligions . . . . . . . . . . . 489 newreligiosity . . . . 48791,498 nisus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 NostraAetate . . . . . . . . 367,372, 376,386,459,603

626 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE obedience . . . . . . . . . . . . 39,80, 162,177,184,187,188,325, 541,607,611,614 wholeperson . . . . . . 184 ochlocracy . . . . . . . . . . 162,164 oppression . . . . . . 69,163,280, 289,319,325,328,331,526, 574,575,596,600 “OurWorldBelongs toGod” . . . . . . . . . . . 237 partingoftheways . . . . 38486 passingonmessages . . . . . 496 Pentecostals/ism . . . . 6,31,33, 240,280,289,319,489,533, 537,538,542,543,582,591, 597,602 personalknowledge . . . . . . 53, 67,68 philoJudaism . . . . . . 360,361, 373,375,380 philoSemitism . . . . . . . . . . 388 philosophy . . . . . . . . 85,94,96, 181,218,253,257,301,305, 306,307,613 African . . . . . 185,30107, 309,311,313,31518 Greekdualistic . . . . . 181 pluralism . . . . . . 19,2427,34, 39,86,87,90,122,128,129, 132,252,294,317,401,410, 437,441,445,468,469,569, 599,601,60406,615 plurality . . . . . . . . . 1,6,10,13, 14,40,85,87,99101,107, 108, 116, 117, 14042, 145, 148,149,195,322,353,446, 483,512,519,531 politicalservice . . . . . . . . . 554 popularreligion . . . . . . 32,281, 582,583,585,596

populism . . . . . . . 4,15573,296 postwartheology . . . . . . . 366 poverty proximatecauses . . . 179 ultimatecause . . . . . . 178 injustice,andoppression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 postcolonialism . . . . . 280,292, 303,306,317,616 postmodern . . . . . . . . 104,121, 132,232,267,269,270,302, 306,308,309,311,312,318, 596,601,613 postmodernity . . . . . . 104,311 power . . . 21,27,28,31,32,40, 43,55,60,66,73,108,111, 116,126,127,142,143,160 63,17582,186,188,19094, 200, 207, 208, 211, 22024, 226,231,243,247,248,259, 26264, 266, 269, 270, 275, 279, 284, 28890, 295, 297, 299,302,305,309,335,338, 341,365,366,386,399,401, 408,428,435,461,464,490, 491,495,519,539,554,563, 570, 571, 573, 58891, 606, 608,61316 praxis liberative . . . . . . . . . . 193 prayer . . . 49,61,114,117,187, 189,190,216,262,265,342, 352, 366, 415, 42022, 426, 431, 435, 45759, 463, 464, 513,599,606,607 predestination . . . 43,183,606 preferentialoptionfor thepoor . . . 175,187,190 principleofcredulity . . 77,78

INDEXOFSUBJECTS ProtestantChurchintheNether lands . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,380,381, 384,393,465,487,488 Protestant churches in the Ne therlands . . . . . . . . . . 490 providence . . . . 5,42,183,255, 256, 258, 26163, 26568, 270,475 publicrolesofchurchesinSouth Africa,opportunitiesfor . . . . . . . . . . 202,208,211 publictheology . . . . . 4,39,50, 211 purity . . . 32327,329,331,350 qualityoflife . . . 110,244,246, 251,253,283 rationaljustification . . . . 9,69, 71,72,76,79,81 rationalism . . . . . 218,361,362, 363 Reaganism zombiedoctrineof . . 181 realism . . . . . . . . . . . . 552,553 reasonableness . . . . . 69,71,80, 81,83 Reformation . . . . . . . . 8,23,25, 35760, 371, 372, 547, 551, 556,558,559,599 Reformed . . . 10,13,38,39,40, 50, 198201, 203, 205, 207, 20911,213,214,224,235 37,348,349,368,370,377, 380,487,488,492,493,499, 54551,554,555,556,559 68,57072,57478,596 Reformers . . . . . . . . . . 358,359, 437,548,549,557 reincarnation . . . 324,325,492, 495,496,497 relativism . . . . . . . . . 9,11,137,

627

138,145,147,148,150,151, 152,313,315,318 religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim religiousidentity . . 34,90,431 religiouspractice . . . . . 6,9,69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 79, 8083, 281,354,379 Renaissance . . . . . . . . . 54,255, 25860,264,26667,27071 renunciation . . . . . . . . 319,322, 325,326,328,329,330,331, 332 repertoires . . . . . 19,26,30,31, 33,34 replacementtheology . . . . 371 representation . . . . . . . 27,116, 155,157,158,166,167,168, 169,170,190,219,220,222, 223,264,278,293,339,354, 567,583 resurrection . . . 54,56,84,229, 361,498,573,585,609,610 revelation . . . . . . . . . 11,41,45, 46,48,53,54,58,59,61,62, 64, 67, 105, 226, 321, 367, 369,377,386,476,478,547, 551,606 righteousness . . . . 48,107,114, 115,117,177,187,194,576 rights . . . . 4,69,70,81,10710, 11214, 117, 122, 125, 126, 132, 14042, 153, 156, 162, 164,167,169,170,177,180, 191,193,201,203,204,290, 297,298,308,310,334,335, 362,418,439,441,442,445, 462,471,499,527,530,533, 534,542,563,564,566,567, 57275,578,604,614 risenChrist,the . . 46,77,547

628 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE RomanCatholicChurch . . . . . . . . . 6971,78,377, 449,452,487,515,525,591, 599,601,616 sacrament . . . . . . . . 80,82,223, 227,508,515,517,569,570, 585,589,597,600 Salafis . . . . . . . . . . . . 43537,439 salvation . . . . 23,39,40,43,48, 55,115,183,236,333,367, 376,382,387,395,396,475, 480,541,546,587,589,593, 608,609,617 scepticism . . . . 13,163,265,70 scriptural . . . . . . 182,183,370 Scripturalinerrancy . . . . . . 54 Scripture . . . . . . . . 55,176,177, 187,198,233,319,343,350, 35859, 365, 369, 381, 384, 385,389,507,508,511,545, 547, 551, 557, 565, 57173, 579,586,587,608,611,614 scriptures . . . . . . . 55,176,343, 350,358,359,365,369,385, 389,507,551,573,579,586, 587,608,611,614 secularity . . . . . . . 1,3,68,14, 195,439,441 secularization . . . . . . . . 6,8,19, 2835,281,601 shikome . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287,298 Shoah . . . . . . 357,375,376,379, 380,384,390 sin . . . . . . 12,55,182,236,410 sinner . . . . . . . . . 182,186 sinnedagainst . . . . . 186 socialcohesion . . . . . . . . . 4,75, 13738,13941,14345,151, 153 socialdemocracy . . . . . . . . 142

socialintegration . . . . . . . . 141, 14345,149,151 socialjustice . . . . . . . 69,70,73, 88,115,144,145,151,584 socialnetworkingforums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 soteriology . . . . . 546,600,611 SouthAfricanCouncilof Churches . . . . . . . . . . 190 soul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,28,79, 16163, 179, 181, 18384, 192,235,236,255,265,324, 325,331,399,421,442,544, 577 spirituality . . . . . . . 3,6,10,27, 30,32,3436,102,181,182, 185,190,193,209,211,275, 277, 279, 28183, 285, 287, 289, 29195, 297, 299, 325, 343,392,401,413,415,416, 419,420,422,425,427,487, 489,491,492,494,497,500, 501,569,58284,594,600 statusconfessionis . . . . 553,554, 566,572,575 stoicism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . 161,228, 441,527,547,566,568,585 sustainability . . . 161,284,292, 293,418,575 Swaminarayanmovement . . . . . . . . . . 344,351,354 Tanzania . . . . . . . 275,276,278, 280,282,283,284,286,291, 292,29499,338,517 theologyofculture . . . . 14,6, 10,14,39,195 time . . . . . . . . 25668,298,321, 32425 tolerance . . . . . . . . . . . . 75,105,

INDEXOFSUBJECTS 138,140,141,145,149,150, 152,320,333,341,346,426, 427,449,451,454,460,461, 467,534,602,604,614 Toronto . . . . . 505,50810,515, 52023 tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim traditionalhealers . . . . . . . 287, 293,296 tradition . . . . . 3,13,14,35,62, 64,6971,85,87,9092,117, 118,121,217,221,276,283, 291, 293, 302, 303, 30507, 312,321,322,341,343,345, 346,350,352,361,367,369, 385,386,392,409,410,414, 428,441,446,500,517,518, 520,532,545,558,571,579, 60002,604,617 tragedy . . . . . . . . . 256,26064, 26669,271,298,595,603 transcendent,transcendence . . . . . . . 5,8,9,30,76,79, 146, 14852, 167,70, 183, 217, 218, 23337, 23943, 24751, 253, 264, 313, 314, 321,322,399,400,401,403 06,410,514,541 transcendental . . . . . . . 30,146, 14852, 183, 218, 321, 399, 401,406 transcultural . . . . 310,312,316 transformationalspirituality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Trinity . . . . . . 95,361,401,410, 411,467,516,523,557,610 ujamaa . . . . . . . . . 276,280,284, 286,287,289,292,296,298, 299 unitivepluralism . . . . 599,604

629

universalmoralvalues . . . 146, 152 universal . . . . . . . . 9,11,13,14, 24,61,62,83,108,110,114, 122, 125, 133, 145, 14648, 15052, 164, 166, 257, 260, 281,284,289,290,302,304 07, 30911, 313, 319, 321, 341,391,396,398,401,402, 409,418,420,471,472,481, 482,494,511,513,520,533, 551,555,556,558,570,580, 582,584,585,588,593,605, 608 Universal Declaration of Hu manRights . . . . 122,125, 290,533 Untouchable(s) . . . . 4,31921, 323,32535 urbanization . . . . 19,21,22,24 value(s) . . . . . . . . 25,8,31,45, 61,62,65,66,7678,82,84, 10709,112,121,123,127 32,13840,14447,150,152, 156,173,183,185,193,199 01,218,23334,241,24344, 246, 24951, 255, 264, 276, 290,300,304,30911,313 16,318,343,348,360,362, 396, 40102, 404, 408, 417, 428, 433, 43538, 441, 461, 48384,488,520,531,549 50,56970,572,584,58990 violence . . . . . . . . . . 5,7,21,31, 75,177,178,187,202,226, 260,262,288,296,319,320, 321,325,331,333,334,402, 407,410,418,441,443,446, 465,466,467,565,599,602, 606,612,613,614,617

630 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE virtue(s) . . . . . . . . . 5,101,129, 132,144,145,160,255,259, 270,324,325,407,408,572, 589,607 World Alliance of Reformed Churches(WARC) . . . . . . . . . . 545,550,560, 56367,569,571,57377 witness . . . 37,81,97,122,164, 180,189,211,213,343,369, 375,378,381,388,480,512, 513,519,521,529,543,544,

54649, 559, 570, 571, 582, 600,601 Working Group on Dialogue withPeopleofLivingFaiths andIdeologies . . . . . 528 WorldCouncilofChurches . . . . . . 368,372,392,458, 505,523,525,544,552,600, 602,617,618 worldviewapriori . . . . . . . 1,3 Zenmeditation . . . . 419,420, 422,42426

IndexofNames Barnard,M. 218,223,224,231 Barnes,Michael . . . . . 171,352, 353 Barot,R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 Barrett,D. . . . . . . . 84,602,615 Barth,K. . . 2,15,3739,4550, 500,547,55056,55961 Baumann,Martin. . . . 337,353 Beck,Ulirch . . . . . . . . . . 31,34 Berendsen,Desiree . . . . . . . . 4 Berger,PeterL. . . . . 29,34,35, 140,153 Bergjan,S.P. . . . . . . . . 508,510, 514,522 Berlusconi,S. . . . . . . . 156,167 Best,T.F. . . . . . . . 514,516,522 Bevington,D. . . . 265,266,270 Bidegain,A.M. . . . . . . 583,595 Bingemer,M.C.L. . . . . 58687, 596 Birmelé,A. . . . . . . . . . 547,560 Bisschops,Jac . . . . . . . 229,231 Blake,William . . . . . . 245,251 Blavatsky,H.P.D. . . . . . . . 499 Böckenförde,E.W. . . 159,172 Boeke,Rudolph. . . . . 341,354, 371,393,544 Boesak,Allan . . . 200,213,564 Boff,C. . . . . . . . . . . . . 585,597 Boff,L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584,595 Bolkestein,F. . . . . . . . . . . . 453 Bonhoeffer,Dietrich . . . . . 553 Bonino,J.M. . . . . . . . . 193,194, 584,595,597 Bonk,JonathanJ. . . . . 540,542 Boon,Mieke . . . . . . . . 220,231 Borovoj,V. . . . . . 508,510,522

Aarsbergen,Connie . . . . . . . 6 Abe,M. . . . . . . . . . . . . 402,410 AbuZayd,Nasr . . . . . 43839, 447 Affolderbach,Martin . . . . 445, 447 Albright,Madeleine . . . . . 178, 193 Ambedkar,B.R. . . . . . . . 33135 Anbeek,C. . . . . . . . 12,41314, 41617,429 Anselm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396 Appiah,K.Anthony . . . . . . 89, 104,308 Arendt,Hannah . . . . . . . . 4,85, 90106 ArfaMensia,M. . . . . . 445,447 Ariarajah,Wesley . 53132,542 Aristotle . . . . . 5354,161,171, 173,261,269 Arkoun,Mohammed . . . . 438, 439,445,447 Arnold,Matthew . . . . 192,194 Asmal,Kader . . . . . . . . . . . 204 Ateek,Naim . . . . . . . . 370,371, 380,392,394 Augustine . . . . 10002,460,530 AyaanHirsi,Ali . . . . . . . . 463 BabaRamchandra . . . . . . . 330 Backx,P.G.M. . . . . . . . 449,452 Bacon,Roger . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Bahemuka,J.M. . 297,581,595 Bakker,B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447 Bakker,D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451 Bakker,F.L. . . . 4749,353,595 Barlas,A. . . . . . . . . . . . 439,447 Barnabas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 526 631

632 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Braithwaite,Richard . . . . . . 55 Braybrooke,Marcus . . . . . 339, 340,353 Brinkman,M.E. . . . . . 5,10,14, 513,522 Brown,MalcolmD. . . . . . . 443, 444,447 Buber,Martin . . . 400,405,406, 40911 Buckley,MichaelL. . . 474,485 Buddha . . . . . . . . . 64,395,397, 398,400,402,403,411,413, 414,425,426 Buikema,Jan . . . . . . . 352,353 Buijs,GovertJ. . . . . 4,164,172 Burg,A. . . . . . . . . . . . . 376,393 Buruma,Iain . . . . . . . . 89,105 Butler,J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Caitanya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Callam,N. . . . . . . . . . 517,522 Calvin,John . . . . . 41,256,546, 555,556,560,562,577 Canovan,M. . 92,105,171,172 Carr,Burgess . . . . . . . . . . . 526 Castro,Emilio . . . . . . 529,542 Chambers,Iain . 87,89,90,105 Chaucer,G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 Chavez,Hugo . . . . . . . . . . 156 Clovis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 Cohen,Martin . . . . . . 133,135 CohnSherbock,Dan . . . . . 364, 371,382,393 Coleman,JohnA. . . . 572,578 Confucius . . . . . . . . . . . . 47779 Constantine . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 Conway,Martin . . . . 345,353 Cook,DanielJ. . . 324,474,486, Cook,M.L. . . . . . . . . . 582,583, 585,587,591,596 Cornelius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538

Cornille,C. . . . . . 353,592,596 Coudert,A. . . . . . 360,361,371 Cracknell,Kenneth . . . . . . 343, 344,351,353 Crouter,R. . . . . . 362,371,372 Cupitt,Don . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 DalaiLama . . . . . 407,410,415, 418 Defoe,Daniel . . . . . . . . . . . 242 Dasetto,F. . . . . . . . . . . 434,447 Dawkins,R. . . . 72,73,83,193 DeDijn,H. . . . . . . . . . . . 82,83 DeGruchy,John . . . . 211,213 DeHaas,Wim . . . . . . 228,231 DeJong,F. . . . . . . . 49596,501 DeJong,Liesbeth . . . 230,231 DeKoning,Martijn . . . . . . 437, 438,440,447 DeMaistre,Joseph . . . 47172, 485 DeToqueville,Alexis 165.172 DeVilliers,Etienne . . . . 4,199, 201,203,208,211,213 DeWet,B.W. . . . 468,514,522 DeWinter,Filip . . . . . . . . . 156 Dennett,Daniel . . . . . . . 69,71, 7376,79,80,83 Descartes,R. . . . . . . . . 218,231, 399,400 Deschner,T. . . . . . . . . . . . . 522 Dickens,C. . . . . . . 24345,248, 25052 Donne,John . . . . . 51,156,171, 185,247,322,335,481 Douven,K. . . . . . . . . . 498,501 Droogers,André . . . . . . . 6,19 Dryden,John . . . . . . . . . . . 247 DuchessofCornwall,the . 352 Dumoulin,Heinrich . . . . . 423 DunsScotus . . . . . . . . . . . . 397

INDEXOFNAMES Dupuis,J. . . . . . . . . . . 605,615 Durkheim,Émile . . . . . . 27,35 Dussel,E. . . . . . . . . . . 585,596 Dwyer,Rachel . . . . . . 344,354 Eckardt,A.L. . . . 363,368,371 Eickelman,D. . . . . . . . 434,447 Einstein,Albert . . . . . . . . . . 57 Eliot.T.S. . . . . . . . . 234,23945, 247,251,252 Elizondo,V. . . . . . . . . 586,596 Elsas,Christoph . . . . . . . . . 447 Endo,Shusako . . . . . . . . . . 481 Faber,Peter . . . . . . . . 228,251, 253,271,561,616 Falconer,A. . . . . . . . . 511,517, 522,534,542 Feuerbach,L. . . . . . . . . . . . 231 Fiolet,H.A.M. . . . . . . . . . . 451 Fitzgerald,C.P. . . . . . 480,485 FlessemanVanLeer,E.511,522 Flew,A. . . . . . . . . . . . 72,73,83 Fortuyn,Pim. . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Frieling,Gijs . . . . . . . . 229,231 Galilea,S. . . . . . . . . . . 583,596 Galileo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,54 Gandhi . . . . 319,320,348,349 Gash,Anthony . . 256,257,270 Gassmann,G. . . . . . . . 516,522 Gebara,I. . . . . . . 586,587,596 Geertz,C. . . . . . . . . . . 605,615 Gefen,Gavriel . . . . . . 540,542 Ghasidas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Girardot,NormanJ. . . . . . 479, 480,485 Giroux,HenryA. . . . . 181,194 Glaser,E. . . . . . . . . . . . 361,372 Göbb,Barbara . . . . . . 440,448 Gomaa,A.M.A.W. . . . . . . . 535 Goodall,Norman . . . 368,372

633

Gordon,J.U. . . . . . . . . 590,596 Gorenberg,G. . . . . . . 103,105 Gort,JeraldD. . . . . . 5,14,175, 183, 186, 187, 19295, 296, 531,543,544,578 Gould,StephenJ. . . . . . . . . . 55 Grdzelidze,T. . . . . . . 518,522 Greeley,Andrew . . . 71,80,83 Green,G. . . . . . . . . . . . 217,231 Greenblatt,Stephen . 264,270 Griffioen,S. 9,471,477,48385 Guerra,J.C. . . . . . . . . . 594,596 Haft,Lloyd . . . . . . . . . 484,485 Haider,Jörg . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Haight,R. . . 402,410,508,522 Hamer,FannieLou6972,7981 Harakas,S.S. . . . . . . . 592,596 Harris,ElisabethJ. . . . 343,354, 404,410 Haselhoef,Abdullah . . . . . 463 Hazenbosch,Henk . . . . 48385 Heering,H.J. . . . . . . . 268,270 Hegel,G.W.F. . . . . 26769,472, 47779,481,485 Heidegger,Martin. . . 3,11,91, 100,101,104,105,249,307, 406,409 Heim,Mark . . . . . . . . 517,522 Heron,A. . . . . . . 548,555,560 Hoekema,AlleG. . . . . 13,467, 468,544 Hoekstra,E.G. . . . . . . 488,501 Hooker,Roger344,345,349,354 Houtepen,Anton . . . . 5,9,14, 192,450,468,469,523,579, 596,599,602,604,604,615 Houtman,Alberdina . . . . . . 12 Huizinga,J. . . . . . . . . . 218,231 Huntington,SamuelP. . . . . 87, 105,432,602,615

634 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Husserl,Edmund . . . 307,318, 405,406 Ignatieff,M. . . 110,11214,119 IgnatiusofLoyola . . . . . . . 352 IngleGillis,W.C. . . . . 508,515, 521,523 Irarrazaval,D. . . . . . . . . . . 596 Jacobi,FriedrichH. . . . . . . 478 Jansen,Henry . . . . . 4,177,194, 195,245,246,251,296 Jay,E.G. . . . . . . . . . . . 507,523 Jenkins,Philip . . . . . . . . 34,35, 435,447 Jenson,Jane . . . . 139,141,153 JesusChrist . . . . . 5,10,13,37, 40,44,55,56,64,67,70,74, 77,8081,184,18790,222 23,230,237,333,345,348 49, 35861, 36370, 37578, 38183, 387, 389, 39597, 40203, 422, 426, 457, 483, 49192, 49598, 501, 508, 511,514,519,52526,528 29,531,533,53637,53941, 54748, 557, 56768, 570, 57274,57982,58489,591 96,603,60607,60918 Jeurissen,Ronald . . . . 125,135 JohnPaulII . 457,537,600,603 Johnson,Mark . . . . . . . . 21532 Johnson,Paul . . . . . . . 359,372 Jonkers,P. . . . . . . . . . . 219,232 Kadowaki,Kakichi . . . . . . 418 Kalsky,Manuela . . . . 417,429 Kant,Immanuel . . 11,133,215, 21821,223,232,407 Käsemann,Ernst . . . . 512,523 Kaunda,Kenneth . . . . . . . 279 Kearney,R. . . . . . . . . . 219,232

Kenyatta,Jomo . . . . . 276,279 Keyishian,Harry . . . . . 26264, 266,270 Keynes,J.M. . . . . . . . . 189,194 Kierkegaard,S. . . . . . . 62,267 69,271 Kimmerle,H. . . . 302,312,317 King,Jr.,MartinLuther. . . . 70, 169 Kings,Graham . . . . . . 345,354 Kittel,Gerhard . . . . . . 529,543 KleinGoldewijk,B. . . . . . . 278, 296,583,597 Klink,J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498 Klootwijk,Eeuwout . . . . . 354 Knitter,PaulF. . . . . . . 605,616 Knott,Kim . 341,344,351,354 Knox,T.M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485 KoeldiepDevi . . . . . . 347,355 Kohlberg,Lawrence . . . . . 132 Kok,AB.W.M. . . . . . . 487,501 Koster,Edwin . . . . . . 9,69,74, 7883 Kraemer,Hendrik . . . 528,543 Kranenborg,Reender . . . . . . 7, 119,353,487,491,493,501 Kronenburg,H. . 225,226,232 Kuipers,RonaldA. . . . . . . . . 4 Küng,H. . . . . . 40810,605,616 Kuyper,Abraham . . . . 1,4,37 44,4951,364,365,37173 Lai,Whalen . . . . . . . . 413,429 Lamb,C.. . . . . . . 345,346,354 Lasalle,HugoEnomiya. . . 415 Lawrence,D.H. . . . . . 234,241, 24346,248,251,252 Lázaro,C.L.A. . . 589,590,596 Lefort,Claude. . . . . . . 160,172 Legge,James. . . . . 472,47981, 485

INDEXOFNAMES Leibniz,G.W. . . . . . . 9,47275, 477,480,486 LePen,JeanMarie . . . . . . 156 Lessing,G.E. . . . . . . . . . 32,155, 169,269,285,295,297,608 Levinas,Emmanuel . . . . . 392, 393,400,40507,40911 Lewis,Philip . . . . . . . 437,443, 446,447,560 Lindbeck,GeorgeA. . 559,561 Lois,J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585,597 Longobardi,Nicola . . . . . . 474 Löwith,Karl . . . . . . . . 476,486 Luchesi,Brigitte . . . . . 337,354 Luther,Martin . . . . . . 358,371, 372,530,546,547,554,561 Mabuza,WesleyMandonda . . 182,185,186,191,194 Machiavelli,Niccolò . . . . 259, 262,270 Malatesta,EdwardJ.S.J. . 486 Malebranche,Nicholas . . . 474 Mandaville,Peter . . . 436,448 Mandela,Nelson . . . . . . . . 156 Maritain,Jacques . . . . 137,141 44,146,14853 Marquardt,F.W. 389,391,393 Martin,A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550 Martines,Lauro . 259,260,270 Marx,Karl. . . . . . 160,165,172 Mascarenhas,Fio . . . . 537,543 Maxwell,Judith . . . . . 139,153 May,JohnD’Arcy . . . . . . 5,12, 401,402 Mazrui,Ali . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 Mbeki,Thabo . . . 276,287,296 McAlindon,Thomas . . . . . 255 57,262,266,271 Meertens,George . . . 229,231 Meija,J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458

635

Merton,Thomas . . . . 415,421 Metz,JohannBaptist . . . . . 401, 404,410,411,486 Mieth,Dietmar . 406,407,411 Minnema,Lourens . . . . . . . . 5 Moltmann,Jürgen . . . . 50,102, 104,188,194,585,597,598 Montesquieu,CharlesLouisde Secondat . . . . . . . . 47173 Moyaert,Paul . . . 215,217,222, 223,228,229,232 Muhammad . . . . . . . . 465,609 Muhammad,Sa’idSarmad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175,195 Muilwijk,Janpeter . . . 229,231 Mulder,D.C. . . . . . . . 449,451 Mulders,M. . . . . . . . . 229,231 Mungello,D.E. . . . . . . . . . . 485 Murray,PeterB. 264,265,271 Nauta,R. . . . . . . . . . . . 583,597 Neuner,P. . . . . . . . . . . 552,561 Newlands,George . 5,10,578 Newton,Isaac . . . 60,218,304 Nielsen,J. . . 432,435,442,448 Nietzsche,F.W. . . . . . . . 93,99, 10305,164,307,400 Nkrumah,Kwame . . . . . . 279 Noordmans,O. . 182,183,195 Nugteren,A. . . . . . . . 352,354 Nunes,M.J.F.R. . . . . . 583,597 Nussbaum,Martha . . 246,253 Nyerere,Julius . . . . . . 276,279, 285,289,291,29698 Nyomi,S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 57678 Oakeshott,Michael . . . . . . 171 Obama,Barack . . . . . . . 70,129, 132,156,290 Oberman,Heiko 359,372,560 Oduyoye,Mercy . . . . 577,578

636 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Olympios,Lefteris . . . 229,231 Panikkar,R. 581,597,605,616 Pannenberg,W. . . . . . 429,605, 608,616 Parasuram . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 Pascal,Blaise . . . . . . . 474,476 Paul . . . . . . . . . . . 38,46,47,83, 179,348,464,526,529 PaulIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 Pearce,Brian . . . . . . . . . . . 339 Petrella,I. . . . . . . . . . . 583,597 Phalet,Karen . . . 435,448,469 Phillips,D.Z. . . . . . . . 217,232 Piscatori,R. . . . . . . . . . 434,447 PiusV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 Pixley,J. . . . . . . . . . . . 585,597 Plato . . . . 105,15960,16263, 17273,218,232,257,479 Pobee,JohnS. . . . . . . . 186,195 Pocock,D.F. . . . . . . . . 344,354 Polybius . . . . . . . . . 16163,173 Popkin,R. . . 360,361,371,372 Postma,E. . . . . . . . . . . 218,231 Pratt,Douglas . . . . . . 440,448 PrinceofWales,the . . . . . 352 Rahner,Karl . . . . 399,401,411, 602,605,616,617 Ram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32931 Ramadan,Tariq . . . . . 441,448 Rambaran,Hari . . . . . 347,355 Ramdev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 Rashied.A.Omar . . . . . . . 536 Rawls,John . . . . 129,133,135 Raymaekers,Bart . . . . . . . 485 Reimarus,Samuel . . . . . . . 361 Ribas,M. . . . . . . . . . . . 583,597 Ricci,Matteo 9,47181,483,486 Richie,Tonie . . . . . . . 538,543 Ricoeur,Paul . . . 105,229,232

Ritchie,N. . . . . . . . . . . 583,597 Robinson,Ian . . . 235,242,253 Rohde,C.C. . . . . 109,110,119 Rosemont,Henry . . . 474,486 Roy,Olivier . 43335,437,448 Runia,K. . . . . . . . 506,521,523 Rushdie,Salman . . . . 340,432, 453,46163 Sacks,J. . . . . . . . . 115,116,119 Sade,Marquisde . . . . 408,411 Samartha,Stanley 581,582,597 Sangharakshita . . . . . 395,398, 400,401,411 Sanneh,Lameh . . . . . 527,540, 542,543 Scannone,J.C. . . . . . . 583,597 Schall,JamesV. . . . . . 144,153 Schama,Simon . 69,70,81,84 Scheepers,Coenraad . . . . . 209 Scheffer,P. . . . . . . . . . 461,469 Scheler,Max . . . . . . . . 404,405 Schillebeeckx,Edward . . . 182, 195,610,617 Schiller,J.C.F.,von . . 268,268 Schleiermacher,F.D.E. . . . 38, 4546,51,36263,366,371, 372 Schmidt,S. . . . . . 472,482,486 Schnackenburg,R. . . . 610,617 Schoon,Simon . . . 12,367,370, 373,375,38789,394 Schouten,JanPeter . . . 13,337, 338,342,347,349,355 Schweitzer,Albert . . . . . . . 373 Schwöbel,Christoph . 514,523 Segal,A.F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 Selznick,Philip . . 14548,150, 152,153 Sen,Amartya. . . . . . . 246,253

INDEXOFNAMES Sharpe,EricJ. . . . . . . . 112,159, 351,355 Shaull,R. . . . . . . . . . . . 582,597 Shaw,J.M. . . . . . . . . . . 550,564 Shakespeare,William . . . 5,97, 109,110,113,247,249,256, 257,259,26266,270,271 Siddhartha . . . . . . . . . 331,397 Slomp,J. . . . . . . . 441,449,456, 458,469 Slootweg,Timo . . . . . . . . . 485 Smart,Ninian . . . . . . . . . 20,35 Smit,Dirkie . . . . . . . . 207,214 Smits,Pieter . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 Sobrino,J. . . . . . . 584,596,597 Socrates . . . . 185,185,257,257 Speelman,Gé . . . . 13,431,438, 448,450,469 Spencer,T.J.B. . . . . . . . . . . 271 Spindler,MarcR. . . . . 539,543 Spinoza,Baruch . . . . . 474,478 States,BertO. . . . 258,259,271 Steenhuis,PeterHenk . . . 220, 231 Steensma,Regnerus . . . . . 224, 225,232 Stein,Edith . . . . . . . . . 405,411 Steiner,George . . . . . 233,253, 260,261,263,264,271, Steiner,Rudolph . . . . . . . . 498 Stoker,Wessel . . . . . . . 1,3,14, 179,180,192,195,227,232, 233,251,253,486 Stolp,H. . . . . . . . . . . . 498,499 Sukul,J.P.Kaulesar . . 350,355 Swift,Jonathan . . . . . 247,248 Swinburne,Richard . . . 69,71, 7680,82,84 Taels,Johan . . . . 268,269,271 Tamez,Elsa . . . . 177,180,186,

637

187,195,595,597 Taylor,Charles . . . 68,14,87, 88, 91, 104, 105, 109, 119, 159,173,308,314,315,318 TerWal,Jessika . . . . . 435,448 Thelle,Norbert . . . . . 414,429 Thomas,M.M. . . . . . . 605,617 Tibi,Bassam . . . . 438,439,441, 448,591 Tieleman,Dick . . . . . . 221,232 Tillich,Paul . . . 24,1415,249 Troch,L. . . . . . . . 582,591,597 Troll,Christian . . . . . . 445,448 Tutu,BishopDesmond 185,203 Ucko,Hans . . . . . 379,394,535, 536,537,543 VanBaal,J. . . . . . . . . . . . 28,35 VanBeek,W.E.A. . . . . . 28,35 VanBijlert,Victor . . . . . . . . . 4 VanBommel,A. . . . . . . . . 462 VanButselaar,Jan . . . . 13,185, 526,527,529,531,543, VanderBent,A. . . . . 510,523 VandenBerg,A. . . . 392394, VandenBerghe,P. . . . 267,271 VanderBijl,Jes . 229,231,319 VandenBorght,E.A.J.G. . . . . . . . . . . 510,515,523 VanderBurg,C.J.G. . . . . . 355 VanderKamp,K. . . . . . . . 449 VanLeer,E. . . . . . . . . 511,522 VanderKooi,C. . . 1,2,51,373 VanderLeeuw,Gerardus . . . 215,22224,228,229, 231,232 VanderLeeuw,Karel . . . . 473, 486 VanderMerwe,W.L. . . . . 301, 307,313,318

638 CROSSROADDISCOURSESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE VanderVelde,G. . . . 514,515, 523 VanderWall,E.G.E. . 360,373 VanderWerf,J. . . . . . . . . . 224 VanderZee,W.R. . . . 451,462 VanDijk,A.M.G. . . . . . . . . 347, 355,486 VanDis,Adrian . . . . . . . . . 462 VanDongen,Paul . . . 229,231 VanGoghTheo . . . . . . . 46365 VanKlinken,G.J. . . . . 365,373 VanLin,J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449 VanMelle,Annet . . . . . . . 485 VanMunster,H.A. . . . . . . 458 VanPraag,Henri . . . . . . . . 342 VanProoijen,Ton . . . . . 4,119, 585,598 VanRiel,Gerd . . . . . . . 84,229, 231,406,485,540 VanSchaik,J. . . . . . . . 498,499 VanZilfhout,Peter . . . . . . 485 Varshney,Ashutosch . . . . 446, 448 Veenhof,Jan . . . . 512,513,523 Verkuyl,J. . . . . . . . . . . 492,502 Verwoerd,Hendrik . . . . . . 209 Visser‘tHooft,W.A. . 510,599 Voegelin,Eric . . . . . . . 163,166, 167,171,173 Voltaire,F.M.A.de . . . . 47677 VonBrück,M. . . . . . . 413,429 VonderOstenSacken,P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388,394 VonRad,G. . . . . . . . . 116,119 Vroom,HendrikM. . . . 64,79, 8485,87,105,10708,110, 112,119,164,173,194,296, 342,417,429,460,46769,

471, 48283, 486, 539, 544, 56364,57778 Waardenburg,J. . . . . 342,436, 447,448 Ward,Keith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Warnock,M. . . . . 219,220,232 Weber,Max. . . . . 171,480,486 Weinrich,M. . . . . 13,546,547, 552,554,556,559,561 Welker,M. . . . . . . . . . 388,394 Weller,Paul. . . . . . . . . 338,355 Wesley,J. . . . . . . . . . . 525,529 Westphal,M. . . . . . . . . . 12,15 Wethmar,ConradJ. . . . . . . 13 Wijsen,F. . . . 10,277,278,280, 281, 284, 28688, 290, 291, 294,299 Wilders,Geert . . . . . . 156,463, 465,466 Wilkinson,P.R. . . . . . 364,373 Williams,Raymond . . . . . 261, 271 Williams,Rowan . . . . 346,355 Winnicott,W. . . . . . . . 221,232 Woldring,HenkE.S. . . . . . . 4, 460,469 Wolterstorff,N. . . . . . . . 40,51, 576,578 Wu,Jingxiong(JohnC.H.) . . . . . . . . . . . 471,48486 Yuasa,K. . . . . . . . . . . . 591,598 Zaïd,Hamsa . . . . . . . . 451,456, 457,469 ZhuXi . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473,486 Zock,H. . . . . . . . . . . . 221,232 Zürcher,Eric . . . . . . . . . . . 475 Zuma,Jacob . . . . . . . . 203,210

Contributors ConnieAarsbergenisSeniorLecturerinBusinessEthicsatWindesheim UniversityofAppliedSciencesinZwolle,theNetherlands. ChristaAnbeekisAssistantProfessorofReligiousStudiesattheUni versityforHumanisticsinUtrechtandattheFacultyofCatholicTheo logy,UniversityofTilburg,theNetherlands DesireeBerendsen,aformerResearchFellowintheFacultyofTheology, attheVUUniversityAmsterdam,currentlyworksattheDomChurch inUtrecht,theNetherlands,asthestaffmemberinchargeofculturalac tivities.  MartienE.BrinkmanisProfessorofInterculturalTheologyintheFaculty ofTheologyattheVUUniversityAmsterdam. GovertJ.BuijsisAssociateProfessorofPoliticalandSocialPhilosophy intheFacultyofPhilosophyattheVUUniversityAmsterdam. EtiennedeVilliersisProfessorofChristianEthicsandDirectorofthe CenterforPublicTheologyintheFacultyofTheology,andofEngineer ingEthicsintheFacultyofHumanSciencesattheUniversityofPretoria, SouthAfrica. AndréDroogersisProfessorEmeritusofCulturalAnthropologyinthe FacultyofSocialSciences,andDirectoroftheHollenwegerCenterfor theInterdisciplinaryStudyofPentecostalandCharismaticMovements, attheVUUniversityAmsterdam. JeraldD.GortisAssociateProfessorEmeritusofMissiologyandTheo logyofReligionintheFacultyofTheology,attheVUUniversityAm sterdam,andiscofounderandcoeditoroftheacademicseriesCurrents ofEncounter. SanderGriffioenisProfessorEmeritusofPhilosophyintheFacultyof PhilosophyattheVUUniversityAmsterdamandisnowengagedinin terculturalstudies. AlleG.HoekemaisaMennoniteminister,presentlyteachingMissiology andContextualTheologyintheFacultyofTheologyattheVUUniver sityAmsterdam. 639

640 CROSSROADDIALOGUESBETWEENCHRISTIANITYANDCULTURE Anton Houtepen is Professor Emeritus of Theology in the Faculty of TheologyandDirectorEmeritusoftheInstituteforInterculturalTheo logyattheUtrechtUniversity,Utrecht,theNetherlands. AlberdinaHoutmanisProfessorofJewishStudiesandJewishChristian RelationsandlecturerinSemiticLanguagesattheProtestantTheological UniversityinKampen,theNetherlands. HenryJansen,aformerSeniorResearchandTeachingFellowintheFa cultyofTheologyattheVUUniversityAmsterdam,currentlyworksas afreelancetranslatorofacademicarticlesandbooks,andiscoeditorof theacademicseriesCurrentsofEncounter. Edwin Koster is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Faculty of PhilosophyattheVUUniversityAmsterdam. ReenderKranenborgisAssociateProfessorEmeritusofReligiousStud ies/NewReligiositiesintheFacultyofTheologyattheVUUniversity Amsterdam. RonaldA.KuipersisAssistantProfessorofthePhilosophyofReligion attheInstituteforChristianStudies,Toronto. JohnD’ArcyMayisaSeniorResearchFellowattheIrishSchoolofEcu menics,TrinityCollege,Dublin. LourensMinnemaisAssociateProfessoroftheComparativeStudyof ReligionsintheFacultyofTheologyattheVUUniversityAmsterdam, andiscoeditoroftheseriesCurrentsofEncounter. GeorgeNewlandsisProfessorEmeritusofDivinityattheUniversityof GlasgowandanHonoraryProfessorialResearchFellow;heisalsoanor dainedministeroftheChurchofScotlandandapriestintheChurchof England. JanPeterSchouten,anexpertonHinduism,isanordainedministerin theProtestantChurchintheNetherlands. SimonSchoonisProfessorEmeritusofJewishChristianRelationsatthe ProtestantTheologicalUniversity,Kampen,theNetherlands. GéSpeelmanisAssistantProfessorofReligiousStudies/Islamatthe ProtestantTheologicalUniversity,Kampen,theNetherlands.

CONTRIBUTORS

641

WesselStokerisProfessorofAestheticsintheFacultiesofPhilosophy, TheologyandArts,andteachesPhilosophyofReligionintheFacultyof TheologyattheVUUniversityAmsterdam. VictorvanBijlertcurrentlyteachesHinduismandBuddhismintheFa cultyofTheologyattheVUUniversityAmsterdam. JanvanButselaarwasGeneralSecretaryoftheNetherlandsMissionary CouncilanduntilrecentlyoftheInternationalAssociationforMission Studies(IAMS). CornelisvanderKooiisProfessorofWesternSystematicTheologyinthe FacultyofTheologyattheVUUniversityAmsterdam. W.L.vanderMerweisProfessorofPhilosophyofReligionintheFacul tiesofTheologyandPhilosophyattheVUUniversityAmsterdamand ProfessorExtraordinaryintheDepartmentofPhilosophyattheUniver sityofStellenbosch,SouthAfrica. TonvanProoijen,aformerResearchFellowintheFacultyofTheology attheVUUniversityAmsterdam,iscurrentlyastudentpastorinBreda, theNetherlands. ConradJ.WethmarisProfessorEmeritusofSystematicTheologyinthe FacultyofTheologyattheUniversityofPretoria,SouthAfrica. Keith Ward is a Fellow of the British Academy, a senior member of ChristChurch,Oxford,andformerlyRegiusProfessorofDivinityatthe UniversityofOxford. MichaelWeinrichisProfessorofSystematicTheologyintheProtestant TheologicalFacultyattheRuhrUniversity,Bochum,Germany. FransWijsenisProfessorofInterreligiousStudiesintheFacultyofRe ligiousStudies,ProfessorofMissionStudiesintheFacultyofTheology, andDirectoroftheInstituteofMissionStudiesatRadboudUniversity, Nijmegen,theNetherlands. HenkE.S.WoldringisProfessorEmeritusofPoliticalPhilosophyinthe FacultyofPhilosophyandEmeritusEndowedProfessorofWorldview andPoliticalPhilosophyintheFacultyofLawattheVUUniversityAm sterdam. He was also a Senator in the Dutch Parliament for several years.