Croatia and the European Union: Changes and Development (Southeast European Studies) [1 ed.] 9781472431851, 9781472431868, 9781472431875, 1472431855

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Croatia and the European Union

Southeast European Studies Series Editor: Florian Bieber, Centre for Southeast European Studies, University of Graz, Austria

The Balkans are a region of Europe widely associated over the past decades with violence and war. Beyond this violence, the region has experienced rapid change in recent times, including democratization and economic and social transformation. New scholarship is emerging which seeks to move away from the focus on violence alone to an understanding of the region in a broader context drawing on new empirical research. The Southeast European Studies Series seeks to provide a forum for this new scholarship. Publishing cutting-edge, original research and contributing to a more profound understanding of Southeastern Europe while focusing on contemporary perspectives the series aims to explain the past and seeks to examine how it shapes the present. Focusing on original empirical research and innovative theoretical perspectives on the region, the series includes original monographs and edited collections. It is interdisciplinary in scope, publishing high-level research in political science, history, anthropology, sociology, law and economics and accessible to readers interested in Southeast Europe and beyond. Forthcoming titles in the series Social Inequalities and Discontent in Yugoslavia Edited by Rory Archer, Igor Duda and Paul Stubbs Negotiating Social Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina Edited by Stef Jansen, Čarna Brković and Vanja Čelebičić Civic and Uncivic Values in Montenegro The Challenges of Democratic and Value Transformation in a Society in Flux Edited by Kenneth Morrison and Kristen Ringdal Romania and the Quest for European Identity Philo-Germanism without Germans Cristian Cercel

Croatia and the European Union Changes and Development

Edited by Pero Maldini and Davor Pauković University of Dubrovnik, Croatia

© Pero Maldini and Davor Pauković 2015 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Pero Maldini and Davor Pauković have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Wey Court East 110 Cherry Street Union Road Suite 3-1 Farnham Burlington, VT 05401-3818 Surrey, GU9 7PT USA England www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows: Croatia and the European Union : changes and development / [edited by] by Pero Maldini and Davor Paukovic. pages cm. -- (Southeast European studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4724-3185-1 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-1-4724-3186-8 (ebook) -- ISBN 9781-4724-3187-5 (epub) 1. European Union--Croatia. 2. Democratization--Croatia. 3. Croatia--Politics and government--1990- I. Maldini, Pero, editor. HC240.25.C87C86 2015 341.242’2094972--dc23 2015011060

ISBN 9781472431851 (hbk) ISBN 9781472431868 (ebk – PDF) ISBN 9781472431875 (ebk – ePUB)

Printed in the United Kingdom by Henry Ling Limited, at the Dorset Press, Dorchester, DT1 1HD

Contents List of Figures and Tables   Notes on Contributors  

vii ix



Introduction   Pero Maldini and Davor Pauković

1

Croatian Accession to the European Union: EU Democratization Potential and Issues of Democratic Consolidation   Pero Maldini

11

Democratic Deficits, Delayed Democratization and Prolonged EU Accession   Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos

33

2 3 4 5 6 7

The Discourse on Europe: From the Return to Europe and the Escape from the Balkans to the European Union as a Solution of All National Problems   Davor Pauković

1

53

Croatia between the “Return” to Europe and the “Remaining” in the Balkans   Nebojša Blanuša

69

Public Support for European Integration in Croatia: Utilitarian, Identity-based, Institutionally Driven or All of the Above?   Ivan Landripet

93

Remembering War the European Way: Croatia’s Commemorative Culture on the Eve of EU Membership   Vjeran Pavlaković

117

Contextual and Institutional Characteristics of Croatian Accession to the European Union   Nataša Beširević

139

Croatia and the European Union

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8 9

Transformation of the Croatian Party System in the Process of EU Accession   Višeslav Raos

159

Transformation of the Croatian Security and Defense System in the Euro-Atlantic Context   Marijana Musladin

177

Index  

195

List of Figures and Tables Figures 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.1 5.2

Perception of the priority of Croatia’s integration in the EU 1990–2012   Types of Euroskepticism in Croatia 2006–2013   Diffuse support for the EU in Croatia   Specific support for the EU in Croatia   Perception of socioeconomic conditions in the EU   Perception of functioning of EU institutions   Diffuse and specific support for democracy   Expression of “core” EU values in Croatia   Knowledge about the EU in Croatia   Hypothetical model of popular Eurodispositions in Croatia   Structural model of popular Eurodispositions in Croatia: Results of SEM  

71 78 81 82 82 83 84 85 87 102 107

Tables 4.1 4.2 4.3

Croatian conspiracy theories about Yugoslav and Western threats from 1990 to 2012   Perception of importance to join the EU and support of democracy   Correlation of factual knowledge about the EU and support for the EU  

75 85 87

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Notes on Contributors Nataša Beširević, PhD, graduated at the Faculty of Political Science University of Zagreb. As a chevening scholar of the UK government she obtained an MA degree at the University of Sussex in Contemporary European Studies in 2004. She finished PhD studies on the EU at the Faculty of Political Science and defended the PhD thesis in 2012 on EU–Western Balkans relations. As a post-doctorate scholar of the US government she obtained a post-doctoral fellowship at UC Berkeley, in the Department of Political Science, EU Centre of Excellence. From 2002 until 2007 she worked at the Ministry of European Integration/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, finished diplomatic studies and since 2007 has worked as a research assistant/assistant professor on several EU-related courses. She has published several scientific papers on the EU, the Western Balkans, European Community enlargement, Europeanization, democratization, and nationalism. Beširević is Sussex University alumni consul and consultant on the EU projects in the Western Balkans. Nebojša Blanuša, PhD, is Assistant Professor of Political Psychology at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, head of the scientific project Public, Elites, Media and Communication Strategy of Croatian Accession to the European Union, and collaborator at the international scientific projects of European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) Action ISO806: The True European Voter and FP7 project Social Performance, Cultural Trauma and Reestablishing Solid Sovereignties (SPECTRESS). His main research interests concern political psychoanalysis, nationalism, conspiratorial thinking, cultural trauma, political cynicism, political behavior, historical and political cleavages, Euroskepticism, social science research methods, etc. He is author of the book Conspiracy Theories and Croatian Political Reality 1980–2007 (Plejada, 2011, in Croatian), and a member of several domestic and international journal editorial boards. He teaches courses in social and political psychology, politics and art in south-east Europe, and the political unconscious. Ivan Landripet, PhD, is a lecturer and researcher at the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb. His main research interests are divided between the sociology of European integrations, particularly popular Euroskepticism, and the sociology of sexuality. Alongside 12 nationally-funded research projects, he has collaborated on a Framework Programme 6 project focused on social and cultural underpinnings of corruption in south-east Europe and a Phare program project on

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Euroskepticism in Croatia. His thesis, as well as a monograph that he edited and co-authored, examined popular support for European integration in Croatia. He is editor in chief of Sociological Review, the official journal of the Croatian Sociological Association. Pero Maldini, PhD, is Associate Professor at Department of Mass Communication at the University of Dubrovnik (former Head of Department), current Head of Interdisciplinary Doctoral Study of Communication Science at the University of Osijek, and Head of Department for Intercultural Communication at Edward Bernays College of Communication Management in Zagreb. He teaches several courses in political science at undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral studies at the three universities. His research interests are comparative politics, democratization, democratic transition, political culture, and Croatian politics. He has published two books and one edited volume, and a number of papers and book chapters in the field of comparative politics, democratic theory, political culture, media and politics, political education, and presented his works at more than 20 international conferences. He has received several international grants for research training abroad in the USA, the Netherlands, Hungary, and Slovakia. He is a member of the Executive Board of the Croatian Political Science Association and a member of three journal editorial boards. Marijana Musladin, PhD, is Assistant Professor in the Department of Mass Communication at the University of Dubrovnik. She received her PhD in International Relations and National Security in 2011 from the University of Zagreb. She teaches International Relations and European Integration at BA level, and National and International Security at MA level. She has published several scientific papers about national and international security, EU security policy, EU Mediterranean policy, European neighborhood policy, and EU Eastern partnership, and presented papers at several international conferences. She is a member of the Atlantic Council of Croatia and the Croatian Political Science Association. Davor Pauković, PhD, is Assistant Professor in the Department of Mass Communication at University of Dubrovnik. He received his PhD in contemporary history in 2010 from the University of Zagreb. He teaches courses in contemporary Croatian and world history. He has published four edited books and a dozen articles about political transition in Croatia, dealing with the past, dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbs in Croatia, and Serbo-Croatian relations. He has presented papers at numerous international conferences and participated in several national and international scientific projects. His research interests are political transition, memory culture, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, dealing with the past, Europeanization and globalization, and Serbo-Croatian relations. He is Editor in Chief of Contemporary Issues, the international journal for social

Notes on Contributors

xi

sciences and humanities, and Associate Researcher at the Political Science Research Centre, Zagreb. Vjeran Pavlaković, PhD, is Assistant Professor in the Department of Cultural Studies at the University of Rijeka, Croatia. He received his PhD in History in 2005 from the University of Washington, and has published articles on the politics of memory, Second World War commemorations in the former Yugoslavia, the impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on domestic politics, and Yugoslavs in the Spanish Civil War. Recent publications include “Twilight of the Revolutionaries: Naši Španci and the End of Yugoslavia” in Europe-Asia Studies (September 2010), “Croatia, the ICTY, and General Gotovina as a Political Symbol,” Europe-Asia Studies (December 2010), and “Symbols and the Culture of Memory in Republika Srpska Krajina” in Nationalities Papers (March 2013). He is also a co-editor of the book Confronting the Past: European Experiences (Political Science Research Centre, 2012) and is a lead researcher of the project Symbolic Strategies of Nation Building in the Western Balkans. Višeslav Raos has a PhD in Comparative Politics, and is Senior Teaching and Research Assistant at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. He studied Political Science at the University of Vienna, graduating in 2008. The same year he became a research assistant at the Political Science Research Centre in Zagreb. In 2014, he defended his doctoral thesis at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb. His thesis, published as a monograph in the same year, focused on the electoral success of regionalist parties in Croatia and Italy. His research interests and publications include political parties and elections, confrontation with the past in the post-Yugoslav area, the role of territory in politics, and the transformation of politics by European integration and new technologies.

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Introduction Pero Maldini and Davor Pauković

Contextual and Conceptual Framework The collapse of communism two and a half decades ago marked the end of the Cold War and the bipolar division of the world, the momentum of globalization and the information revolution—political, economic, and technological processes that would fundamentally change the world. At the same time, it was the beginning of a period that would be marked by democratization of the post‑communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe and the European integration process (Schwartzman, 1998; Tilly, 1999; Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Fukuyama, 1989; Grugel, 2002). The fall of the communist regime marked a historic victory of liberal democracy and its values over authoritarian socialism (communism) which failed to achieve socioeconomic prosperity and political and individual freedom, resulting in its collapse from inside. Freedom, equality, civil and political rights, the rule of law, pluralism, individualism and tolerance—as the core values​​ of democracy—were the spiritus movens of anti-communist, pro-democratic political forces in these societies at turn of the 1990s. They set the establishment of a democratic political order as their primary and main political goal. Although political elites were key actors in the transition process, the democratization of most post-communist societies of Central and Eastern Europe was characterized by specific forms of transformation, different than those in Southern European and Latin American countries in the 1970s. They are, inter alia, particularly characterized by the radical break from the previous authoritarian regime, pro-democratic movements, and participation of large social groups in the process of regime change, as well as a pronounced influence of exogenous factors (notably the European Union) on the process of democratization.1 1 Unlike most “southern” transitions—in which the process of regime change was primarily pacted, i.e. evolutionary—in most post-communist transitions (particularly those most successful) it was revolutionary, marked by a radical break from the old regime. Transformation of most of these societies was characterized by movements from below, i.e. by mass social mobilization. The dominant (political and social) dynamic was a confrontation, not compromise and negotiation between the old elite and the new social movements. It had a significant impact on the subsequent course of democratic consolidation, as did the impact of external factors, i.e. international actors, particularly

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Croatia and the European Union

To the citizens of these societies, in turn, democracy has meant political and individual freedom, economic prosperity, civil rights, and opportunities for social and individual progress. The same expectations and hopes have marked the Croatian accession process, primarily through the discourse of political elites. Developed countries of the European West represented those achievements, so joining the European democratic club was one of the main goals of European post-communist countries’ social and political transformation. Democratization and joining the European Union took place in parallel, as complementary and intertwined processes. Full membership in the European Union, in turn, meant the end of the transition process and a confirmation of democratic consolidation of these societies. On the other hand, European integration was led from its inception (the European Coal and Steel Community, and later the European Community) by the need to preserve European economic and cultural sovereignty. It was particularly pronounced during the post-Cold War period, when economic and political reasons became more important than those of security, and later in the attempts by the EU to resist the increasing global pressures. That period is marked by the establishment of the European Union and its main political and economic objectives—strengthening its economic and political position in the new global environment. That goal assumed the inclusion of new member states, especially the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, through their democratization and Europeanization, the building of institutions, common standards, and mechanisms of political decision-making in the EU. In that context, EU enlargement policy was designed primarily as an instrument of democratization of post-communist societies. Namely, the process of EU enlargement—from the pressure to conform with the EU’s pre‑membership conditions to the accession negotiations in which the aspirant member adopts the acquis communautaire—has led to the emergence of a unique model of “democracy promotion through integration.” This model was developed during the 1990s in preparation for enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, by formalizing the criteria for being able to start accession negotiations.2 the European Union, when it comes to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Beyme, 1996; Offe, 1997; Bunce, 2003, 2006; Diamond, 1999; Maldini, 2008; Merkel, 1999; Munck and Leff, 1997; McFaul, 2002; Terry, 1993; Welsh, 1994). 2 The European Council has set formal criteria defining the level of democracy that is expected of the candidate countries for EU membership. The Copenhagen criteria of 1993 include the political criteria (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, and ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union), the economic criteria (existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU), and the legal criteria (laws fully aligned with the body of European law, i.e. adoption and implementation of the EU’s entire acquis communautaire). Besides these three, each acceding country also has to meet the fourth, administrative criteria (the so-called Madrid criteria of 1995), which mandate

Introduction

3

It included primarily political conditions that require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities (Balfour and Stratulat, 2011, pp. 6–7). Despite being led primarily by economic and security interests, the EU is subtle and deliberate. The support for democratization processes is thus consensual, i.e. with the consent of the new member states to the “game rules” set by the EU, which entails their actual implementation in their own societies. Thus the influence is not necessarily perceived as pressure, but as guidance and help to own efforts in the democratization of society (Whitehead, 1996). The accomplishments on the way are “rewarded” with adequate assistance and institutional ties (CARDS/PHARE, TACIS and MEDA programs,3 among others), technical and financial assistance, institutional ties ranging from trade to cooperation agreements to full membership and inclusion in the EU market and participation in EU decision-making. The processes of democratization and EU accession flowed differently in different countries. They were affected by different historical, political, cultural, economic and social features of the individual societies. However, the Central and Eastern European countries completed their accession process in 2004, or 2007 respectively, within the fifth enlargement round. Croatia was absent from that circle, and the accession process lasted until 2013. The reasons for this substantial delay are manifold. Besides characteristic authoritarian political and sociocultural heritage, they are primarily specific conditions of democratic transition—in particular, the burdensome process of gaining independence and building a nation-state, marked by a war, as well as its post-conflict legacy and controversies over many political issues. It pushed democratization into the background and greatly influenced the structuring of the transition political elites, the choice of transformational strategies, the action of political authorities, the mode of constitution of the nation-state, and the formation and functioning of the institutions of the political system. In addition, the sociocultural and political provenance of political elites (especially political authorities during that period), and their not always consistent commitment to the values of democracy and inconsistent political will to implement them significantly determined the dynamics and democratic achievements of the transition process (Kasapović, 1996; Zakošek, 2002; Županov, 2002; Karajić, 2000). the adaptation and strengthening of administrative structures with the goal of creating an effective state administration to implement acquis and secure the conditions for a gradual and harmonious integration (European Council, 1993, 1995). 3 PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies), CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability), TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States), and MEDA (MEsures D’Accompagnement) are EU financial instruments to provide financial and technical assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Western Balkans in their preparations for joining the European Union, and to countries in southern Mediterranean within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

4

Croatia and the European Union

Despite the slow process of democratic transition and the democratic deficits that have marked this period (especially during the first decade), joining the European Union was a key component of this process from the very beginning. The dominant pro-European orientation of both political authorities and citizens, and a broad political consensus regarding the Croatian accession to the European Union, were an essential prerequisite for the realization of the accession process, but not sufficient. Specifically, the EU required the achievement of concrete democratic standards, which, due to reasons already mentioned, were not realized as quickly as desired. This in turn has delayed the accession for several years. On the other hand, the extended accession period did not accelerate democratization as much as it strengthened Euroskepticism and suspicion towards the EU. Thence stems the ambivalent attitude toward the Croatian accession, and the advantages and disadvantages of EU membership. A certain paradox is visible: during the period when Croatia did not have the necessary democratic standards, commitment to EU accession was relatively high. Conversely, in parallel with achieving the necessary standards, skepticism towards membership had grown, and was the highest just before entering the membership. Croatian popular commitment towards joining the European Union, expressed at the very beginning of Croatian democratic transition, had significantly declined during the two decades of the changing dynamics of the EU–Croatia relationship, giving way to relatively widespread Euroskepticism at the doorstep of its full membership. A long period of reforms and harmonization of legal, political, and administrative prerequisites with EU legislation that Croatia had passed, and criteria it had to meet—significantly higher than those set in negotiations with previously associated countries—stems, on the one hand, from the increased suspicion of EU countries about further enlargement, mainly due to poor experiences with prematurely accepted and unprepared countries (particularly Romania and Bulgaria). On the other hand, it stems from the recent economic crisis, particularly the Eurozone crisis and the serious problems of the southern countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal), whose economies have to be generously supported by other EU member states in order to survive. In Croatia, the strong initial support for EU accession has significantly declined with time, while distrust has increased. One of the reasons for that are certain inconsistencies in EU policy: the lack of expected support during the war of independence, and the different criteria for the accession process before and after the post-communist countries joined. Another reason was a significantly prolonged accession process, as well as the problems in the functioning of the EU caused by the recent economic crisis. All this was accompanied by a fear of loss of identity, resulting in a failure to realize national (economic and political) interests within the EU. At the same time, the Croatian accession to the EU shows that despite serious problems in its functioning the EU still has its meaning and significance, and that membership is desirable. Thus, Croatia could serve as

Introduction

5

an example of successful democratic transition fostered and significantly aided by EU policies, especially to the countries of the region. Although reduced and burdened by skepticism, it seems that the support for the EU in Croatia stems from a sense of long-desired political, economic, and military security that EU membership would provide, and also serves as a confirmation of the inherent sociocultural belonging to Europe. Structure and Analytical Framework Today, when Croatia is finally a member of the EU, there are a variety of issues that have to be considered in the context of what Croatian accession to EU means to Croatia, i.e. what changes it caused and how it contributed to its development. The importance of this topic, therefore, is twofold. First—unlike economic and political studies which regularly analyze the development of society and the state through economic progress—this book seeks to analyze the impact of the accession process on the development of the political system, state institutions and democratic standards, as well as its impact on the sociocultural changes in society, especially those relating to identity (both national and European), the relationship to the past, to EU membership, and the perception of the EU among Croatian citizens. Therefore, it is about factors which are prerequisites of democratic and economic development in the context of the EU environment. The book also, directly or indirectly, evaluates the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU accession policy and its instruments. In this regard, it attempts to discuss various aspects of this impact, which is, however, neither unambiguous nor linear. Topics presented in this book include analysis of some of the most important political, social and cultural processes and changes that have occurred in Croatian society during the accession process to the EU. The book does not intend to cover all aspects of that process; rather it is focused on those which had the most discernible impact on political and social changes in Croatia throughout the duration of the process. It is primarily about issues of democratic transition (the state-building process and establishment and functioning of democratic institutions in very specific conditions dominantly marked by war), then about cultural aspects related to issues of identity (cultural, national, political), memory culture and attitudes towards (political) history, about public support for European integration, and finally about the transformation of party and defense systems—all under the impact of the EU accession process. Different authors and somewhat different approaches covering each topic are interconnected by a common subject: the impact of the process of EU accession and the changes it caused or encouraged. The discussed aspects in turn have substantially marked the traversed period, but they strongly affect the present moment of contemporary Croatian society as well. The structure of this edited volume follows this framework, and the content is divided into nine chapters.

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Croatia and the European Union

Content and Main Findings The first two chapters deal mainly with issues of democratization, but from different viewpoints and methodological approaches. The opening chapter examines the reach of the European model of democratization through integration and how and to what extent the process of accession to the EU has contributed to the democratization of Croatian society. It analyzes and compares the prerequisites for full membership in the EU and the prerequisites of a consolidated (substantive) democracy. The discussion is of whether the accession means the completion of the democratization process, i.e. whether the process of the EU enlargement is merely a formal normative-institutional (political, economic, legal, and administrative) compliance of new members, or whether it also possesses a significant qualitative (modernization) dimension, especially regarding the consolidation of democracy, i.e. the development of substantive democracy. Besides the political-institutional preconditions, it necessarily requires these socio-structural and sociocultural elements. The relative underdevelopment of these preconditions—combined with insufficient institutional capacity and the lack of government’s appropriate strategies—are dysfunctional in relation both to the democratic and economic development and the active position of Croatia in the new European framework, and consequently on its proportionally smaller benefit from joining the EU. Chapter 2 seeks to expand the discussion, emphasizing that war has intensified the problems arising from parallel political, economic, and state transformation. The simultaneity of these processes caused democratic deficits that hindered full democratic consolidation. It analyzes the outcomes of democratic transition in terms of the criteria of consolidated democracy as proposed by W. Merkel (Merkel, 2005). It confirms Merkel’s transformation theory and his notion that statebuilding and unresolved border issues represent important causes of democratic deficits, as well as relations with the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) and with Slovenia that show how post-conflict issues affected democratic consolidation and EU integration. It shows how deficiencies in the partial regimes of civil rights and horizontal accountability slowed down Croatia’s path to EU membership. While specific democratic deficits inherited from the war-affected transition period slowed down EU accession, at the same time the process of Europeanization, at least partially, enabled an overcoming of democratic deficits and opened the path towards full democratic consolidation. Chapters 3 and 4 analyze discourse about Europe, the EU and European integration. Chapter 3 clearly shows that Europe (and the EU) has played a major role in Croatian political discourse since the late 1980s. During the initial phase of democratic transition, the newly formed political parties and civil society institutions stressed the need for a “return to Europe.” During the 1990s, the ruling Croatian Democratic Union stressed that Croatia had “finally established full statehood” and escaped from the Balkans. Since 2000, the goal of achieving EU membership as a solution to all problems started to slowly replace the solution of the “national question” that was believed to resolve all state problems. The lack

Introduction

7

of critical discourse about the EU, especially before 2009, was furthered by the consensus of parliamentary parties on EU membership, which agreed upon a so-called “Alliance for Europe” that meant the avoidance of partisan conflict over issues related to EU accession. While Chapter 3 deals with change in the political discourse, Chapter 4 tries to connect political discourse with public opinion. Strong identification with the “return to Europe” discourse from the early 1990s has declined during the last two decades due to the negative impact of war, authoritarian rule in the 1990s, problematic EU politics towards Western Balkans and the dysfunctional way in which Croatians have coped with the past and the present. Another temporal factor has been Croatia’s prolonged accession to the EU. These processes have created latent antagonism towards the EU and consequently turned positive identification with the EU into a dystopian sentiment. Shaped by historical legacy and the recent development of the Euro crisis, this sentiment, expressed in Euroskeptic and Europhobic attitudes, has acquired the special form of perceiving the EU as a new Yugoslavia. This is an implicit adoption of the subjective position of the “colonized” that could function as a fuel for reproduction of Western stereotypes of Croatia as a part of Europe’s “inner other.” Emphasizing significance of public support for the project of European integration, Chapter 5 examines the background of popular Euroskepticism in Croatia. The author presents broader theoretical perspectives on Euroskepticism and discusses conceptual and analytical shortcomings associated with their application. In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive framework of popular support for European integration, a structural model of Croatian citizens’ attitudes towards the EU was synthesized. In addition to encompassing a range of economic, political, social, symbolic, and institutionally driven motives as predictors of Euroskepticism, the model accounted for mediated relationships between Euroskepticism and its predictors. Results indicated that public support for European integration among Croatian citizens was substantially influenced by various concrete utilitarian assessments of outcomes of the country’s EU membership and by evaluation of the EU’s institutional efficacy. Whether in favor of European integration or not, Croatian citizens seem to be relying strongly on emotional anchors and their national and supranational identifications when reasoning about the EU. Sharply contested narratives of the Second World War, further radicalized by the wars accompanying Yugoslavia’s dissolution in the 1990s, profoundly shaped Croatia’s political culture, public space, and understanding of the recent past. Ideological divisions and issues of ethno-national identity were intimately tied to the deconstruction of the official communist historiography and new, nationalist interpretations of the Second World War which were often played out in political speeches and commemorative events. Chapter 6 examines how EU accession has affected war remembrance and the commemorative culture in Croatia, and how European paradigms of remembering the Second World War have been interwoven into the state-building narratives already present since 1990. Croatian elites sought to reaffirm antifascist values and symbols which had been denigrated

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Croatia and the European Union

during the first decade of independence, and by directly associating the EU project with Croatia’s own contribution to the anti-Axis alliance nearly forgotten commemorations were once again revived and imbued with new meanings. In explaining the influence and limits of the European integration process in Croatia, Chapter 7 explores connections between implementation of the EU enlargement policy and its instrument of political conditionality with contextualization of the Croatian political system as the main element of conditionality efficiency. As substantial research findings and papers on these issues are still under-developed this chapter tries to fulfill the theoretical and research gaps of scientific studies in the area of the influence and the limits of EU political conditionality in Croatia. It connects three main variables of the contextualization of the EU political conditionality in Croatia: fundamental issues of statehood, primarily through the nation-states’ forming; the nature of previous regimes which led to the creation of a particular political and legal culture, and finally the notion of weak states as the main obstacle for the efficiency of the EU conditionality in the pre-accession period. The aim of Chapter 8 is to depict and analyze the transformation of the Croatian party system during the long and complicated road towards EU membership. Methodologically, it operates within the concept of Europeanization of the party system, which is understood as a process of response and adaptation of political parties to European integration and EU governance. The Europeanization of party systems occurs on organizational, ideological, and policy levels. The chapter places the Croatian case into a broader context of Europeanization of party systems of European countries, especially regarding the different modes of Europeanization experienced by old and new EU member states. The conclusion of the chapter shows that despite its distinct war experience, Croatia has followed a pattern of party system Europeanization that is similar to other post-communist EU member states. This type of party system Europeanization includes the emergence of a pro-accession consensus, which has a moderating effect on party politics and draws main parties towards the center of the political spectrum, while non-mainstream policies become marginalized. Chapter 9 deals with the transformation of the Croatian security and defense system. Accession to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stressed Croatian affiliation to the exclusive EuroAtlantic security area. Within the framework of the EU acquis which Croatia had to accept for the successful closing of Chapter 31 (Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy), the reform of the Croatian security system was very important. In this regard, Croatia has achieved a great deal in terms of transformation and modernization of the armed forces, the adoption of standards and the development of a new military culture on a joint basis. To sum up, this book tries to offer an insight into certain processes and issues that have marked the Croatian integration path, its impact on the political and social sphere, and the repercussions of this process in the region. Analysis of the Croatian route to the EU and its impact on democratization and modernization serves also

Introduction

9

as a study from which one can derive comprehensions about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the EU’s enlargement policy. The intention of this book is to present all of this through nine different but mutually interrelated chapters. Its value is not only in the review of the road travelled, but also in the analysis of the current situation, as well as in providing comprehensive perspectives of Croatia in the European Union. The joining of Croatia, especially at a delicate moment for European integrations, marked by crises, is in this sense very instructive. References Balfour, R. and Stratulat, C., 2011. The Democratic Transformation of the Balkans. EPC Issue Paper, No. 66. Brussels: European Policy Centre. Beyme, K. von, 1996. Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe. Basingstoke, Macmillan Press; New York: St. Martin’s Press. Bunce, V., 2003. Rethinking recent democratization: lessons from the postcommunist experience. World Politics, 55 (2), 167–92. ——— 2006. East European democratization: global patterns and postcommunist dynamics. Orbis, 50 (4), 601–20. Diamond, L., 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. European Council, 1993. European Council in Copenhagen: Presidency Conclusions June 21–22. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ copenhagen/default_en.htm, accessed October 10, 2013. ——— 1995. European Council in Madrid: Presidency Conclusions, December 15–16. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1_en.htm, accessed October 12, 2013. Fukuyama, F., 1989. The end of history? The National Interest, (16), 3–18. Grugel, J., 2002. Democratization: A Critical Introduction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Huntington, S.P., 1991. The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press. Karajić, N., 2000. Politička modernizacija—Prilozi sociologiji hrvatskoga društva. Zagreb: Hrvatsko sociološko društvo i Zavod za sociologiju Filozofskog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. Kasapović, M., 1996. Demokratska tranzicija i političke institucije u Hrvatskoj. Politička misao, 33 (2–3), 84–99. Linz, J. and Stepan, A., 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Maldini, P., 2008. Demokracija i demokratizacija. Dubrovnik: Sveučilište u Dubrovniku. McFaul, M., 2002. The fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: noncooperative transitions in the postcommunist world. World Politics, 54 (2), 212–44.

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Merkel, W., 1999. Teorije transformacije: demokratska konsolidacija postautoritarnih društava. Politička misao, 36 (3), 121–50. ——— 2005. Embedded and defective democracies. Democratization, 11 (5), 33–58. Munck, G.L. and Leff, C.S., 1997. Modes of transition and democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in comparative perspective. Comparative Politics, 29 (3), 343–62. Offe, C., 1997. Cultural aspects of consolidation: a note on the peculiarities of postcommunist transformations. East European Constitutional Review, 6 (4), 64–8. Schwartzman, K.C., 1998. Globalization and democracy. Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1), 159–81. Terry, M.S., 1993. Thinking about post-communist transitions: how different are they? Slavic Review, 52 (2), 333–7. Tilly, C., 1999. Processes and mechanisms of democratization. Sociological Theory, 18 (1), 1–16. Welsh, H.A., 1994. Political transition processes in Central and Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics, 26 (4), 379–94. Whitehead, L., 1996. Three international dimensions of democratization. In Whitehead, L. (ed.) The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–25. Zakošek, N. 2002. Politički sustav Hrvatske. Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti. Županov, J. 2002. Od komunističkog pakla do divljeg kapitalizma. Odabrane rasprave i eseji (1995–2001). Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada.

Chapter 1

Croatian Accession to the European Union: EU Democratization Potential and Issues of Democratic Consolidation Pero Maldini

Introduction Since the establishment of an independent Croatian state, the policy of accession to the EU is one of the few having general political consensus among most of the political parties—particularly the leading ones which mainly articulated it—in spite of their differences and rivalry. At the same time, the citizens’ mostly pro-European orientation during that period had its ups and downs, depending on the articulation of pro-European policy in Croatia, and on the perception of the EU based on the activities of its institutions, especially those concerning Croatia. With the accession of Croatia to the EU, a major political and social goal was accomplished. However, it remains questionable how (and how much) the accession process has influenced the consolidation of democracy and social development in Croatia. The problem of the noticeable cleavage between formal and substantive democracy is a serious one; it questions the democratization potential of the EU enlargement policy, and consequently the very meaning of joining the European Union. In this context, however, the question arises as to whether the fulfillment of the specified requirements for full membership in the EU also means the completion of the process of democratic transition, i.e. the realization of a consolidated (substantive) democracy, or is it merely a formal normative-institutional compliance with the European acquis communautaire as a standardized set of requirements. In other words, does the accession to the EU have a significant democratizing dimension (a part of the already implied normative-institutionalism), especially in relation to the development of socio-structural and sociocultural prerequisites of the substantive democracy in post-transitional societies, such as a vibrant civil society, civic culture, political participation, and a developed public sphere—factors which, in developed democracies, allow a citizen’s voice and participation, and function as mechanisms for limiting and controlling the political power? This chapter attempts to analyze this complex problem from three viewpoints. The first refers to the crisis of democracy in post-transitional societies of the EU, which is primarily a consequence of the incomplete democratic (socio‑structural

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and sociocultural) consolidation of those societies. The second refers to the crisis of democracy in the old, well-established democracies; mostly a consequence of globalization and the implementation of the neoliberal doctrine on political processes (post-democracy). The third viewpoint refers to democratic deficits in the functioning of the EU itself, manifested both in the insufficient representativeness and the insufficient abilities of democratic control over the operation of the EU political institutions, the non-transparent process of making political decisions, and consequently their insufficient legitimacy. On one hand, those problems undermine the credibility and attractiveness of the EU, and bring into question its democratizing potential. On the other hand, the exemplar of Croatia joining the EU, despite many problems on the way and in the midst of a serious crisis of EU functionality, indicates that the desirability of membership in the Union is still present, as is the perspective of democracy, welfare, and security which it can provide to its member states. Still, the question remains as to whether the EU enlargement policy is motivated primarily by the impetus of democratization, or the economic and political interests of its most developed members. The accession of all new member states, including Croatia, was preceded by the process of accepting and implementing the acquis, i.e. the process of adapting the national institutionalnormative and economic market structure to the one in the EU, while the problems of socio-structural and sociocultural adaptation (which follow neither linearly nor necessarily the process of formal adaptation) were left as secondary. Hence, the main focus of this chapter is an examination of the reaches of the European model of democratization through integration using the example of the accession of post-communist countries to the EU, Croatia in particular. Special attention is paid to the level of democratic consolidation, as well as to aspects of democracy in the EU. The starting point for this analysis is the distinction between a formal and substantive democracy, and with a particular reason. The level of democracy is manifested primarily in the scope of realization of fundamental democratic values, particularly civil rights and liberties, political participation, and the possibility of effective control over the political authorities (the government’s responsibility and dependence on the voters) (Dahl, 1971; Diamond, 1999; Merkel, 2004; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Since these characteristics of modern democracy in particular are threatened, one can speak of its crisis (Crouch, 2004; Stoker, 2006; Wolin, 2008). Within the EU framework, it manifests itself as a crisis of political representation, of legitimacy, and a crisis of functioning—both at the level of nation-state and level of EU institutions (Habermas, 2011, 2012; Cipek, 2007). From the viewpoint of democratization of Croatian society, this chapter attempts to show the constraints of the EU enlargement policy and its limited democratic potential. Although Croatia meets all criteria for a formal democracy, it seems that it does not possess sufficient capacities (both as a state and society) to achieve substantive democracy, and to be able to cope with the challenges brought on by the new, European framework. It is even more pronounced at

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present (2015), with the recent socioeconomic crisis bringing into question the democratic legitimacy of the EU system, and with democratic deficits visible even in its oldest member states. Democratic Deficits and their Origins The ambiguity of the term “democracy” stems primarily from different understandings of the extent to which the idea of democracy has been realized (Parry and Moran, 1994, p. 3; Dahl, 1971, pp. 2–4; Maldini, 2008, pp. 30–35). At the inception of the modern liberal democracy Tocqueville pointed out its two original meanings: first, democracy as a political order defined by rule of the people through institutions and procedure, and second, democracy as a society characterized by equality and civil rights, wide political participation, and autonomous action by citizens in order to bridge hierarchical mediation when regulating relations in a society (Tocqueville, 2001). The second meaning implies a societal prerequisite of democracy and suggests that it cannot be reduced to its formal, institutional aspect. A formal “electoralist” approach to democracy (postulated by transitional theory, optimistically predicting development of democracy on that basis) is therefore not suited for a qualitative analysis of democracy. The problems of democratic transition of postauthoritarian societies have specifically pointed out the danger of making this reduction and the importance of actual democratic content.1 Substantive democracy, however, is marked by general consensus, wide political participation, responsibility of the government, civil rights compliance, tolerance, and pluralism. It assumes a democratic process which has to continuously reproduce; regulating power relations in a way that maximizes the possibilities of individuals by enabling them to participate in discussions and influencing decisions. On that basis, formal democracy is distinct from substantive democracy. That distinction separates the institutional and procedural aspects from their implementation and the way they are practiced in actual social conditions (Schumpeter, 1976, p. 260; Dahl, 1971, p. 4; Diamond, 1996, 1 Implicit belief in the determinant importance of elections has almost led to equating democratic multiparty elections and the establishment of a normativeinstitutional democratic structure with democracy itself (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 65; Karl and Schmitter, 1991; Huntington, 1991, p. 7; Linz and Stepan, 1996a, pp. 3–15; Jackman and Miller, 2005; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Whitehead, 2002, pp. 36–57). There were great expectations that elections and the institutions of the democratic system would significantly affect democratization and participation. However, elections simply provided many post-authoritarian but still non-democratic regimes with democratic legitimacy. Most of them stayed in the “gray zone” as non-consolidated or incomplete democracies (Diamond, 1999, p. 22; O’Donell, 1996, p. 34), i.e. non-liberal, limited, defective democracies (Zakaria, 2007, pp. 89–118; Zakaria, 1997, pp. 42–3; Merkel, 2004) or “democraduras” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 41).

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pp. 21–4; Maldini, 2008, pp. 30–35; Kaldor and Vejvoda, 1997, pp. 62–3). There are multiple reasons for using this distinction: on one side, despite a large number of newly established democracies, a growing gap between electoral (formal) and liberal (substantive) democracy is evident, especially in posttransitional societies, or as Zakaria put: “Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not” (Zakaria, 2007, pp. 17–18). The consolidation and development of democracy in post-communist societies have shown themselves to be complex and prolonged, independent of their relatively fast political transformation and normativeinstitutional constitution of democracy. It turned out that “building a house is not the same as establishing a home” (Brzezinski, 1989, p. 2), i.e. the realization of democracy takes a lot more than just establishing institutions, and that it is a complex and comprehensive process of social transformation, like “rebuilding the ship at sea” (Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998). Democratic deficits of post-communist societies therefore stem mainly from the gap between formal democracy and substantive democracy. Deep changes brought on by the transition have marked a strong discontinuity in the political and socioeconomic development of post-communist societies. In the conditions of a new and changed political structure, the inertia of sociocultural patterns and a pronounced influence of authoritarian political legacy have marked a continuity of old social values and the patterns of their respective political culture. That discrepancy between the political structure and the patterns of the dominant political culture is one of the main factors of the hampered democratization of post-communist societies (Beyme, 1996; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). A consolidated democracy, therefore, means much more than a formal, political democracy. Along with the necessary normative-institutional structure, it includes a political-representative dimension (representativeness and legitimacy of the democratic government), socio-structural (developed and vital civil society), sociocultural (civil political culture and political support for the democratic order) and behavioral dimensions (political participation and action in accordance with fundamental values of democracy) upon which legitimacy and stability of the democratic regime can be built (Linz and Stepan, 1996a, 1996b; Merkel, 2004; Diamond, 1999).2 It could be argued therefore 2 Linz and Stepan speak of five interactive arenas as the characteristics of consolidated democracy. Assuming the existence of the state (as a basic precondition of democratic order), they are: an autonomous and vibrant civil society, a free, competitive and inclusive political society, the rule of law that guarantees the freedom and independence of social organization, rationally organized and legitimate state apparatus in the function of democratic government and institutionalized economic society (market economy) (cf. Linz and Stepan, 1996a, pp. 5–15). Merkel, in turn, speaks of five partial regimes that have to support each other in order to provide consolidated and stable democracy. They are: the electoral regime, the regime of political rights of participation, the civil rights regime, the division of power and horizontal accountability regime and the effective power to govern regime (Merkel 2004, pp. 36–43). See more on this in Chapter 2 of this volume by Pauković and Raos.

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that consolidation of democracy in post-communist societies presents a sociostructural modernization as much as a democratic re-socialization of society (Maldini, 2008). On the other hand, democratic deficits of developed democracies are a consequence of domination of the neoliberal concept, i.e. the implementation of principles of economic (market) rationality on political discourse on issues of the political community, on political decision-making, and on functioning of state. Moreover, one could speak of post-democracy as a crisis of (neo)liberal democracy (Stoker, 2006, pp. 32–67, 68–85, 87–92; Crouch, 2004, pp. 1–52, 78–103; Wolin, 2008). Consequently, democracy in its classic sense (contestation about the public good) is transformed into a formal, representative political order which is putting aside the public good and the political deliberation of the community (Brown, 2005, pp. 40, 42). These problems also affect the post-communist societies, and with their inherent problems further hamper their democratic consolidation. Postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe joining the EU is definitely an indicator of success of the democratization process, but is not necessarily a confirmation of consolidation of their democracies. On the other hand, there exists a series of indicators pointing to the fact that democratization of those countries and their integration in the common EU framework was led primarily by the political and economic interests of developed European states. The democratization of those countries seems to be realized just up to the point of their political and administrative compatibility with the developed part of the EU. From a political standpoint, it is primarily a matter of meeting the criteria of a formal democracy. The democratizing potential of EU accession policy therefore needs to be re-examined, as well as the level of democracy inside the EU itself, with an emphasis on the activity of its political institutions and the legitimacy of its political regime. EU Enlargement Policy and Democratization: Its Reach and Limitations The EU enlargement policy is undoubtedly the most important and perhaps the most successful instrument of democratization ever. By creating a specific political community, unprecedented in modern political history—by uniting nation-states into a politically and economically unified space—the EU strongly promotes democracy as a basis for political relations inside and outside its borders. That, in turn, forms its policy towards new member-states, which is based primarily on a partner-like relationship, instead of a hegemonic one. The process of the EU’s enlargement is not imposing EU interests upon the weak (at least not directly, and least of all forcefully), but is a gradual, voluntary, and democratic process with the explicit consent of the acceding states. Thus, European democratization through integration represents a unique model. Unlike some other models, which prefer a bottom-up approach, this model is based on

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a top-down approach which demands reforms led by governments through the process of adopting laws and work on their enforcement.3 In the formal sense, the basis of the EU enlargement policy was set by the European Council two decades ago, by the Copenhagen (political, economic, and legal) and Madrid (administrative) criteria, which define the level of democracy expected from candidate states (European Council, 1993, 1995). The meeting of these criteria was set as a prerequisite for their accession to the EU. Full membership and all its benefits represent a reward for meeting the criteria, with mechanisms to oversee and control the process provided. The goal was to equalize candidate countries according to uniform standards (formalized criteria) in order to enable them to access joining accession negotiations and to lessen the risks of possible political and economic instability of the new member-states, which might burden other EU countries (Balfour and Stratulat, 2011, pp. 6–7; Grabbe, 2006, pp. 10–11). The main goal, however, is certainly democratization and Europeanization of candidate states. The two processes overlap, since Europeanization essentially means influence of the EU on other (non-member) states, which primarily assumes support for democratization processes. Europeanization—spanning from acceptance of European values to implementation of normative and institutional arrangements of the EU—is possible only in a stable and functioning democratic framework (Dolenec, 2008, pp. 25, 35). Europeanization means the process of joining the EU and also the much wider process of the “return to Europe” after the transition from authoritarian rule. It actually implies “EU-ization,” which means the meeting of accession requirements and the adoption of EU norms, policies, and institutional models that were strongly connected to the wider processes of modernization and post-communist transition. It also means a significant impact to domestic political structures and public policy change (Grabbe, 2006, p. 5). The main instrument of the EU enlargement policy is the political (or democratic) conditionality. It manifests itself in the insistence on certain democratic standards as prerequisites for membership: the EU sets them as indispensable conditions to be met by the acceding states in order to attain full membership. Political (democratic) conditionality became especially prominent in the fifth round of EU enlargement, i.e. in the process of accession of postcommunist countries of Central and Central-Eastern Europe. In that process, those countries have undergone a specific process of external incentives model 3 For example, it contrasts starkly to the US approach in the degree of its formality. US democratization focuses less on government-to-government and legislation assistance and more on the non-state components (civil society, party building, etc.). While this approach is limited through its numerous passing stages until finances reach the final recipient, it is highly effective in working on bottom-up reform, capacity-building, and supporting public demands for change. It is considerably weaker in reforming national law and the incentives are pale in comparison to EU membership. Both the EU and the US use both approaches, but their strengths lie in different areas (Grossman, 2006, p. 6).

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of governance which includes massive policy transfer under which the candidate states have to transpose the full acquis communautaire (Pridham, 2002, pp. 954–9; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, pp. 670–71; Grabbe, 2006, pp. 86–8). Political conditionality, acting on the principle of “carrot and stick,” is twofold. Positive conditionality includes the expected benefits, often in terms of delivery of economic and administrative assistance, and finally admission to the EU, in return for the fulfillment of required conditions—political, economic, and social reforms needed to meet the criteria. Negative conditionality includes a penalty in case a specific commitment has not been met (e.g. delaying the negotiations, and/or sanctions such as reducing, suspending or withdrawing a reward until the state complies with the criteria set by the EU). The influence to change the status quo is usually based on a strategy to provide incentives for the targeted actors to succeed in meeting the conditions. Thus the relationship between positive and negative conditionality is usually asymmetric since it aims to help a country to accept the required conditions, which can only succeed in situations in which the expected benefits are greater than the cost of political change. Its effectiveness thus varies with the credibility of EU conditionality and the domestic costs of reforms implementation, but also with the subjective perception of the EU’s relationship toward their country, both among the citizens and political elites (which is noticeable in the case of Croatia). The problems of insufficient preparedness for EU membership which were shown with some countries from the fifth round of enlargement, mainly Romania and Bulgaria (problems related to the rule of law, corruption, and a weak judiciary), have indicated a need for adequate measures even after the attainment of full membership (monitoring, benchmarking, and a safeguard clause as negative conditionality policy tools to maintain pressure even after the accession), and have significantly tightened accession criteria for the new candidates. Croatia, as the next candidate, had substantially longer and more extensive negotiations, because the criteria set for Croatia during the negotiations were more demanding than for any prior country. Those criteria are now also set for all future candidates for EU membership. They will be in the spotlight in the forthcoming process of enlargement to the Western Balkan countries, where political conditionality will be especially apparent. On one hand, those countries are geographically surrounded by EU member-states, and the need to join the EU is quite understandable. On the other hand, they are non-consolidated democracies with serious democratic deficits (e.g. Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania), some even with an incomplete nationstate building process and inter-ethnic tensions (e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo) (cf. Balfour and Stratulat, 2011; Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004; Grabbe, 2006; Anastasakis, 2008). Consistent use of political conditionality in the process of their accession will therefore be of key importance, even more so than before (especially in balancing the positive and the negative conditionality). Yet political conditionality also generates reaction, polarization and a sense of injustice in most Western Balkan countries, especially when it touches upon nationally sensitive matters and unresolved post-conflict issues (Anastasakis, 2008,

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p. 375). In that context, criteria set by the EU are (re)interpreted in accordance with dominant political discourse(s), thus losing their real meaning. In turn, this weakens both their willingness and capacity to implement the acquis, and thus to attain a higher level of democracy. Considering the specificities and the diversity of that area, the EU will have to make special efforts in using political conditionality in order to succeed in consolidating democracy in those countries, and making them ready for full membership in the EU. However, after the accession of Croatia as the 28th member-state, a certain “enlargement fatigue” is noticeable in the EU, not only because of the problems seen after the obviously premature accession of Romania and Bulgaria, but because of the EU’s internal problems, which directly impact enlargement policy, and actually its deceleration. Problems such as failure of the Constitutional Treaty, with ratifying the Lisbon Treaty and implementing some of its institutional innovations; with immigrants (particularly emphasized by the recent socioeconomic crisis as well as rise of anti-immigrant radicalism and populism among the right-wing political parties, and the rise of Euroskepticism among EU citizens). This situation suggests that the enlargement process will be postponed for some time, and that the EU will be dealing mostly with the functioning of its own institutions. Although the EU model of democratization through integration has been shown to be successful, it definitely has its limits. They stem primarily from the inner structure of post-transitional societies and the political actors within them. It means that even with international institutions encouraging the governments in transitional societies to be more open and democratic, the democratization process will not be accelerated unless there are sufficiently strong pro-democratic pressures from the inside (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, pp. 30–31). In that context, the domestic barriers that limit the effectiveness of European pressures for change in the reinforcement of democratization should be seen in connection with the preferences of domestic actors, especially elites, as well as with institutional constraints—interpreted narrowly or broadly to include legacies, underlying norms and existing collective identities. To ascertain how and when these become real obstacles for democratic consolidation, it is necessary to understand how external conditionalities and/or socialization change the structure of domestic opportunities and help to determine what kinds of actors become empowered by democracy promotion. For this purpose a three-point analysis—which focuses on governance (state and individual governments), political parties as intermediary actors, and civil society—can be useful. It may be supposed that European integration, given its intrinsically elitist character, will have an impact on these three levels in descending order of effectiveness, and that insufficient capacity of state institutions could seriously affect the implementation of the political conditions.4 The second 4 Institutional capacity is considered as a tool of policy implementation, through which the capacity of bureaucratic intermediaries to carry out requisite actions and to cooperate in the implementation of policy is enhanced, thereby facilitating implementation (May, 2003). Although this concept has a crucial place within EU enlargement policies, the

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problem stems from the limited effect of the promotion of democracy on the broad party structures, since it is limited to contacts with party leaders. The third problem is manifested in the fact that civil society is indeed far away from Brussels, although the EU’s position here is usefully focused. Here, the bottom-up approach of direct help for the development of the civil sector seems far more effective (Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004, pp. 106–7). This limit of the EU’s influence on the democratization process stresses the importance of endogenous factors—different and specific for each society—as key determinants of democratic consolidation. The limited effect of the EU on the democratization process stems also from the EU’s own structure, as well as from problems in the functioning of its institutions, which brings into question the credibility of the EU democratizing policy. Without going into a broader analysis of this very important aspect of functioning of democracy in the EU, only the most obvious deficits marking the functioning of EU institutions will be noted here. National parliaments do not have any authority in the affairs of the EU, while the function of the European Parliament is not yet sufficiently developed. The European Parliament, although a political and representative institution par excellence (the only institution where the members are elected directly), is depoliticized (there is no majority and opposition as is common in the national parliaments) and formalized (political questions are often reduced to technical ones) (Cipek, 2007). The majority of important decisions are thus left to the executive branch, which in turn is not completely autonomous, considering the influence of various non-political actors on the Commission’s decisions. The pronounced influence of committees (a phenomenon known as “commitology”) and agencies as non-political actors in the creation and making of decisions of the executive authority in the EU displays a significant deviation from the political towards the administrative-legal practice in the Commission’s activity (Đerđa, 2007, pp. 1197, 1209). Additionally, the impact of many expert groups and lobbyist networks on the decision-making process is considerable. Although European Commission has no particular operationalization or definition of it, i.e. there are no specific threshold criteria defined (Dimitrova, 2002). Nevertheless, from summarized different definitions it has used, it can be defined as administrative structures and systems, human resources and management skills necessary for the adoption and implementation of the acquis communautaire. Insufficient institutional capacity is, in the case of Croatia, seen in low judicial capacity, i.e. the inability of the judicial system to resolve legal cases in a timely manner, resulting in a large number of unresolved cases, as well as susceptibility towards political influence. That in turn brings into question the rule of law, i.e. the principle of equality and legal security. In addition, the public administration is slow and inefficient in the implementation of laws and regulations, slow in conducting reforms, and its institutions are politicized and insufficiently competent (Marčetić, 2007, pp. 61, 108; Koprić, 2010, p. 671). As a consequence, the functioning of the economy and the market is impaired, and social development inhibited. It also reduces the transparency of the political decision-making process and the citizens’ impact on it: the underdeveloped structure of the civil society, which cannot match the political government as an autonomous and strong control mechanism, further contributes to this.

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they contribute to the effectiveness of decision-making, they have no democratic legitimacy, and are not subject to democratic control. In institutional terms it means the growth of the bureaucratic machinery and their growing influence on political decisions. In political terms it highlights a serious democratic deficit, mainly due to minimization or exclusion of classic political actors (representativeness, political competition) and the general public (transparency, participation) from the decision-making process, whose legitimacy is therefore questionable.5 Democracy promotion and the enlargement process are in many respects marked by insistence on bureaucratic procedures and formal demands (speed, efficiency, and expertise) in the process of accepting the acquis. They have constrained democratic politics in the applicant countries and limited their EU accession to a narrow sphere of elites and experts (Raik, 2004). Their influence on the general public is therefore relatively weak, partly because it was mediated (and often reinterpreted) by national governments (political elites), and did not reach them directly. In such conditions, when the citizens are not sufficiently informed, or when the dominant sociocultural matrix does not sufficiently support the values promoted by the EU, political conditionality—aimed mostly towards the removal of institutional shortcomings (the functioning of the administration, judiciary, and laws)—can be perceived as imposition, because citizens do not perceive the EU institutions as their own. Since enlargement policies put executives before legislatures, lack of deliberation over new legislation may widen the already existing gap between political (both domestic and EU) elites and the citizens, particularly if new regulations reduce the citizens’ already existing benefits. Based on all of the aforesaid, it is possible to argue that the process of democratic consolidation in those countries, including Croatia, has been left incomplete even after their accession. This point once more emphasizes the crucial role of domestic conditions and commitment to reforms for the success of EU policies of democracy promotion. EU Accession Impact on Croatia’s Course to Democracy Pro-European Orientation and Democratization Croatian pro-European orientation and the accession of Croatia to the EU are inseparable from the process of gaining state independence and the process of democratization. Pro-European orientation, although displayed with different 5 This is not simply about a formal problem of political procedure, but a democratic deficit felt by many EU citizens in real life. There are more and more indicators which confirm that EU citizens have become aware of how much EU regulations and directives are affecting their daily lives, and that they consider these decisions to have been taken by supranational officials in a remote, secretive, unintelligible, and unaccountable fashion (Schmitter, 2007, pp. 34–5).

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intensities in different periods (from latent to manifest) is a constant of Croatian culture and identity. Moreover, that orientation, given their rootedness and prevalence, has become a strong motivator for political activity. Connecting national identity with the European one was a characteristic differentia specifica, pointed out whenever Croatian culture and national individuality was to be accentuated, especially in the opposition towards the imposed political and cultural unitarism within the Yugoslavian state, which the Croats often perceived as a framework of political and national limitation on their freedom. It is therefore understandable that Croatia, in addition to the realization of national and state independence, expressed political will to join the EU. In these conditions, the accession to the EU had the symbolic meaning of leaving “the Balkans” and the “return” of Croatia to the cultural and civilizational circle where it has always belonged, and from which it was separated during the decades-long authoritarian rule (Zambelli, 2010, see also chapters 3 and 4 in this volume). However, the actual meaning of accession, manifested in the expected political, socioeconomic, and security perspectives provided by the EU framework, was even more important. In the political sense, there were great expectations of the EU (at the time the European Community, the EC) providing support to Croatia in the process of realization of national and state independence and development of democracy, and admitting Croatia to the EU relatively quickly. In addition, there was a widespread belief that joining the EU, as a club of economically most developed countries, would mean fast exit from the crisis, social and economic development, and a higher socioeconomic standard, almost like the one in the developed EU countries. In the terms of security, in specific conditions of growing danger for the newly acquired independence and freedom, EU membership (including NATO membership) meant a safe haven and complete recognition of a new state. Although these expectations were neither realistic nor based on facts, they had an extremely motivational and moving power; thus the process of gaining national and state independence and the establishment of democracy was from the very beginning closely connected with pro-European orientation, of political elites and citizens alike. The international recognition of Croatian statehood (in January 1992) caused a great wave of enthusiasm and optimism, and a substantial increase in sympathy for the EC. However, when in later years great expectations were left unfulfilled, the disappointment which ensued was equally great and widespread. Partly, it was caused by unrealistic expectations, but even more the cause of the disappointment lay in the inconsistent and often confused policy of the international community (particularly the EU) towards the events in Croatia, especially during the key period of establishing independence and wartime. The Specific Conditions of Croatian Transition Compared to many other post-communist societies, Croatia had more advantages at the beginning of the transition, which offered the chance for an easier and

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quicker democratic transformation.6 However, in the democratic transition those initial benefits were not exploited. On the contrary, the adverse conditions that have marked this process largely blotted them out. This is primarily because of parallel processes of exit both from authoritarian rule and the Yugoslavian federation, the establishment of state independence and the war, all of which have hampered the process of democratization, and consequently the process of joining the EU. National identity and state-territorial integrity as key features of a political community are a basic prerequisite for the process of democratic transition (Rustow, 1970, pp. 346, 352–6; Linz and Stepan, 1996a, pp. 16–37). However, in the case of Croatia, it was precisely this prerequisite that was brought into question. The dissolution of the communist regime and its ideology as a cohesive factor of the Yugoslavian multinational federation marked the dissolution of that federation, from which Croatia separated and gained independence. Simultaneously, war aggression towards Croatia and other members of the former state followed as a reaction to this separation and independence. The force and scope of the aggression forced Croatia into a defensive war for preservation of her newly acquired independence and freedom from occupation. The aggression meant a partial occupation of Croatian territory, which significantly violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Croatian state. Its normative-institutional order could not be established on its entire territory despite the international recognition and clearly defined borders. Such conditions lasted until the liberation of occupied territories by the military operations Flash and Storm in 1995, and until the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danube Region in 1998 when all Croatian territories were finally reintegrated into the Croatian legal and political system. The length of the war, its vast material destruction and the suffering of numerous citizens had substantially slowed down, and in some cases even completely impeded democratization processes. During a period of several years, Croatian society and its functioning was directed mainly towards defense, and later towards recovery from the war (care for a large number of refugees, the rebuilding of destroyed buildings and infrastructure). Direct and indirect danger for a large number of Croatian citizens, insecurity, uncertainty, and economic deprivation as a result of crippled economic productivity and 6 The greater level of economic development, compared to both neighboring republics in the federation (only Slovenia was more developed) and most of other postcommunist societies in Central and especially Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the local type of communism, socialist self-managing and social ownership, although authoritarian in nature, was not totalitarian, and enabled far more liberal social relations, social mobility, and a higher personal and social standard for citizens, compared to the so-called real-socialism; a stiff, dogmatic, and closed communist regime under the patronage of the USSR, which was present in the societies of Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, the relatively open borders and free movement (including a large number of Croatian emigrants as well as foreign tourists) have enabled direct contacts, economic and especially cultural relations with the West, which to some extent could compensate for the lack of democratic experience.

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increased unemployment had conditioned a social atmosphere that did not favor transitional processes, democratization in particular. The need to preserve the newly created state and its independence, and the need to attain security and stability, were set above all others as a primary interest. At the same time, despite the wide international recognition of Croatian statehood, at the time the international community did not contribute significantly to stopping the war in Croatia and creating adequate conditions for democratization. One of the most important determinants influencing the process of democratization, and especially the organization and functioning of the Croatian political system, is undoubtedly the model of regime change. Unlike most communist societies in Central Europe, dominated by capitulation or confrontation models, marked by strong anti-communist protests, pro-democratic movements, and democratic elites in the opposition pressuring the old authoritarian government into demission, the regime change in Croatia also had the characteristics of a compromise (conducted) model and the secession (ethnic) model.7 The reforms that started the democratic transition were initiated by the communist government. However, they were not put in motion due to softliners’ power in the political government structure (they were in the minority), nor the strengthening of democratic opposition and the pressure by a democratic anticommunist movement or anti-regime protests (there were none in Croatia), but due to pressure by authoritarian political forces from the immediate political surroundings, and the influence of the political changes in the Central European countries. On taking power the main opposition party, whose leaders were mainly former communist dissidents, kept the elements of the majority voting system which suited them and had secured their majority during the 1990s, and continued to set the institutional structure of the political system, not respecting the political opposition and designing the system primarily according to their own interests. Such implementation of democratic transition “from above,” as well as their political provenance, had a negative long-term influence on the

7 With regard to relations between the old and the new political elites, and their influence on the transitional changes in post-communist societies, the basic models of action and the types of regime change are: (a) the capitulation model—the capitulation of old political elites in spite of a weak opposition (Czechoslovakia, the GDR) and the dominant impact of the new (pro-democratic) political elite; (b) the confrontation or pact model—negotiations with a strong opposition after a period of major conflict (Poland), negotiations between the government and rival elites (Hungary), shared influence between the old and the new political elite; (c) the compromise or conducted model—the fall of totalitarian government in spite of weak opposition and a repressive regime, with government apparatus well-preserved on the lower levels (Romania, Bulgaria), and dominant influence of members of the old though formally reformed political elite; (d) the secession or ethnic model—national independence through secession from multinational states, ethnification of political space (republics of USSR and Yugoslavia) (Kasapović, 1996, pp. 30–36; Kasapović, 1997, p. 8).

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development of political pluralism, government–opposition relations, and the democratization of the political system in general. The government of the period did not act with the aim of democratizing the political system, but instead took care of the process of building and strengthening the nation-state and national integration which, in a state of war, became primary. However, domination of national over democratic elements in the process of constitution of the Croatian state as a democratic political community influenced the ideologization and suppression of many other political and civil interests, and impeded the democratic articulation of general political will. In addition, the actions of the ruling party, which long kept the character of a political movement, substantially influenced the authoritarian style of government, primarily the instrumentalization of the state and populist political mobilization, which reduced the pluralist political space and impeded democratization. The institutional structure and the activity of the government were under the exclusive control of the dominant party and its president, which shaped them mainly to suit their needs rather than to democratic standards. In these adverse conditions, the concentration of political power, the inability of democratic control of the government, an increase in intolerance, the exclusion or neutralization of the political opposition, political conducting of economic processes (especially economically inefficient and socially unjust processes of privatization of public companies, and the rise of corruption) continued. This authoritarian regression finally resulted in serious democratic deficits and the inability to democratize the political system. The citizens’ dissatisfaction due to the consequences of such politics and social state was increasing, and government was losing its legitimacy. Near the end of the first decade of Croatian transition, the political opposition won the parliamentary elections of 2000, after which the nearly dead democratization process came back to life. Accession Process and Democratization The renewed democratization process re-accentuated pro-European orientation, not only on a declarative level, but also in actual moves of the government to join the EU. Simultaneously, the EU supported those changes and, after a period of restraint due to dissatisfaction with the level of democracy in Croatia during the 1990s, opened up processes which led to Croatia’s accession. It was the start of the period of gradual rebuilding of mutual trust between the EU and Croatia. Since then, all subsequent governments have continued to carry out the reform policy with the goal of accession, although with different intensity and success in different periods. Although Croatia had established relations with the EU in 1992 when most member-states recognized Croatia as an independent state, the intensification of those relations starts with the negotiations about the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2000 which Croatia had signed by the end of 2001, and which entered into force in early 2005 after its ratification by the parliaments of EU member‑states.

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In the meantime, in early 2003, Croatia filed a request for membership in the EU, and in 2004 received a positive opinion from the Commission. In the same year the Council of the European Union adopted the European partnership for Croatia, by which Croatia gained the status of a candidate state, and the right to use the pre-accession funds of the EU (ISPA, PHARE, and SAPARD programs8). In 2005 negotiations began, in several phases and with varying dynamics, encompassing 35 chapters which Croatia gradually closed until mid-2011 when the negotiations were finished. In 2009 Croatia became a member of NATO and in late 2011 signed the Accession Treaty: after which a referendum about the accession was held in Croatia in 2012. After the ratification of the Treaty by the national parliaments of the EU member-states, Croatia became a full EU member-state on July 1, 2013. During that period, the main challenges for Croatia were judiciary reform, the return of refugees, the respect of minority rights, the fight against corruption, and public administration reform. Despite subsequent changes of government, Croatia is experiencing an improvement in human rights protection and advancement in the democratic standards performance, which was particularly fostered once the EU offered candidate status. The EU’s policy of Stabilization and Association has contributed to the progress achieved and in bringing the country closer to EU membership. However, that development was neither linear nor increscent; it was conditioned by structural constraints at the political, economic and social levels, while its dynamics were highly dependent on political will and commitment of political factors, whether government or opposition. Extremely long accession negotiations (six years) and their dynamics significantly influenced the citizens’ attitude towards the EU. The initial enthusiasm gradually waned, and attitudes to the EU became more realistic and critical. Euroskepticism increased significantly, and is still present. Despite the government’s pro-European campaign, the results of the Croatian accession referendum were among the lowest compared to previous acceding countries. Among multiple factors contributing to this the most pronounced ones were the relatively weak awareness of citizens about the functioning of the EU and its institutions due to the Croatian government’s inadequate strategy of informing the people, but also due to the educational and informational deficits of a considerable number of Croatian citizens and consequently their prejudices and lack of interest, bad perceptions of the activity of EU institutions due to their indecision and lack of support during the Homeland War, controversies regarding the judicial processes of the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) in The Hague, fear of becoming part of new Balkan integrations due to the inconsistency of EU policy in solving the postwar situation in former 8 ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession), PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies), SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development) are the European Union pre‑accession instruments to assist the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their preparations for joining the EU.

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Yugoslavia, and fear of loss of sovereignty and foreign takeover of the domestic economy, the selling out of real estate, destruction of agriculture, and suppression of domestic products by foreign ones. In addition, the lack of trust in the national political institutions contributed to the lack of trust in those of the EU (Štulhofer, 2006; Grubiša, 2012; Skoko, 2007). The mistrust towards EU institutions was also increased by the constant postponing of Croatia’s accession term, as well as additional, significantly higher criteria that Croatia had to meet. The problems of functioning of the EU institutions in the conditions of recent socioeconomic crisis (the Eurozone crisis in particular) also had an effect on the increase of Euroskepticism. However, despite all this, the advantages of joining the EU, which most citizens see in the guarantee of political stability, strengthening of the rule of law, decrease in corruption, and the possibilities of better education, prevailed, which is why the Croatian accession referendum was, in the end, successful. Adjusted referendum law has further contributed to this success, despite the small turnout of voters, as well as the aforementioned consensus among all relevant political elites regarding Croatian accession (primarily for the sake of the legitimacy potential of pro-European policy).9 In this context, it is necessary to note that the general consensus of political actors regarding the accession policy was often used for domestic policy purposes. The accession policy served as an additional source of legitimacy for the government, especially when the implementation of certain public policies needed to be additionally strengthened by “European” arguments, i.e. to present them as necessary due to the accession process. On the other hand, the opposition criticized policies and the activity of the government precisely with the point of discrepancy between their activity and EU demands in the process of accession. Both sides often used EU criteria as a substitute for their flawed political activity, lack of vision and adequate political action. The key problem in that relationship lies in the fact that at the beginning of the accession negotiations and after them Croatian politics had not clearly defined the national interests (political, economic, and social), i.e. the key development goals and the strategies for their achievement. Indeed, development strategies for certain segments of state and economy were made not as a part of a generally accepted development policy but rather partially. Additionally the implementation was incomplete during the mandates of individual administrations, i.e. without continuity, since they were not established upon a general consensus but upon party (coalition) programs. In that situation, Croatian accession to the EU became the main political goal, instead of being the main instrument for the achievement of development goals and national interests. That, in turn, resulted in a passive and often uncritical acceptance of EU demands and, for the most part, a purely formal meeting of the requirements in the process of implementation of EU criteria. At the same time, the 9 Generally, one could argue that public support for the EU and European integration in Croatia was indicated to be resting upon a set of interlinked utilitarian, identity-based, and institutionally driven factors (see Chapter 6 in this volume).

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institutions failed to develop sufficient capacity (human, technical, organizational) in order to adequately respond to all demands of the system that is expected from a full EU member-state. Insufficient institutional capacity, in turn, is a significant impediment in the process of structural modernization, hinders functioning of the system, and presents an obstacle for a more active and purposeful usage of the EU’s development resources, which means that Croatia, in all likelihood, will not be able to realize the expected benefit from joining the EU. The process of Croatian accession to the European Union has shown its limited effect on the democratization process, different from that in countries from previous rounds of enlargement. First, democratic conditionality as a key instrument of the enlargement policy has had ambivalent results in Croatia. While on one hand it accelerated the processes of system adaptation through the implementation of acquis, on the other hand, due to the raised criteria and the constant postponing of Croatia’s accession term, it caused a substantial rise in Euroskepticism, citizens’ indifference regarding the EU, and even a slowdown of democratization in the 2006–2010 period. The impact of EU democratizing through the accession process is clearly visible in governance and polity that followed liberal democratic principles, i.e. in the level of change in the normative-institutional (laws, institutions) and the political sphere (government, political parties), but substantially less in the development of society, particularly its structural elements essential for substantive democracy, civil society, the public, and the media. An additional problem is still the very slow reform of the judiciary which, in spite of normative compliance with the acquis, achieved after a lengthy negotiation period, is not sufficiently autonomous (especially regarding political influence), nor sufficiently capacitated, which reflects on the functioning of the rule of law. It proved that it is the endogenous factors which, in spite of the strong influence of the EU as an exogenous factor, define the dynamics and the effects of democratization. Democratization of institutions and legislations, although an indispensable prerequisite, are not enough to change political, social, administrative, and judiciary practices. Conclusion Previous analysis has shown that democratic deficits are present in both the old established democracies and in those post-transition, as well as in the functioning of the EU institutions to the extent that one can talk about the crisis of democracy. Although manifested in an increasingly similar manner, it has different causes, and therefore also different consequences. While democratic deficits of post-communist societies stem mainly from the issues of insufficient consolidation of democracy (underdeveloped structural requirements, and the discrepancy between political culture and political structure), the crisis of democracy in developed democracies post-democracy is a consequence of domination of the neoliberal concept in the political discourse and decision-making process. In that context, there is doubt

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about the possibilities and the reach of the European model of democratization through integration, with political conditionality as its main instrument. The attractiveness of EU membership, and of the perspective it opens up, have strongly influenced pro-democratic political, economic, and social changes in candidate states. EU membership was shown to be a catalyst on institutional and normative levels and a motivator on a subjective level of democratic changes. Political conditionality was shown to be an extremely useful instrument in the preparation of candidate states for future EU membership, because during the accession process they completely harmonized their legislature and institutional-political structure with the EU through the acceptance of the acquis. It is precisely the efficiency of its use that has shown the advantages of European top-down model of democratization through integration, as demonstrated by the number of new member-states which, through many reforms in the process of accession, have secured and strengthened democracy. Nevertheless, in spite of the full normative-institutional harmonization, the consolidation of democracy remains incomplete, especially in terms of socio-structural adaptation (the development of horizontal networks of civil society and public sphere) and sociocultural re-socialization (the development of civic culture, political participation and voice), because the realization of that process is carried out primarily at the level of the EU-national government relations, i.e. the political elites, without a significant or direct impact on the wider social structures. In the context of post-communist countries where democratic consolidation, besides political and normative-institutional prerequisites, presumes social modernization, i.e. processes of socio-structural adaptation and sociocultural resocialization, the accession process has influenced them unequally. This asymmetry, proportionally to its prominence in specific countries, creates a lower institutional capacity and relatively greater democratic deficits. Croatia is in many ways an example of a state/society with that asymmetric relationship (or cleavage) between the formal and substantive democracy (Zakaria, 1997; Merkel, 2004; Maldini, 2008). It results both in democratic deficits and in an insufficient institutional capacity which hampers the functioning of the state, e.g. administration of justice in ensuring the rule of law, reform of the state, fostering the economy and the functioning of the political system, as well as poor usage of EU development resources and an inability to solve problems caused by the recent socioeconomic crisis, amongst other things. The origins of that situation lie in the specific conditions of the Croatian transition to democracy: the characteristic model of transition, a difficult process of exit from the Yugoslavian federation, the establishment of a sovereign nation-state, and the war for preservation of independence. These primarily endogenous factors have substantially influenced the perennial standstill of the process of democratization. On the other hand, exogenous factors, primarily the influence of the international community, the EU in particular, have had a twofold role. First, their hesitation and inconsistent policies failed to help stabilize the state, while their later active support for the renewed democratization processes was constructive and led to the process of Croatia’s

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accession to the EU. This process confirmed that external pro-democratic influence can speed up democratization, but only if there are sufficient internal resources. However, despite objective problems, the Croatian government failed to use its position and time during the accession negotiations to clearly define national interests and shape adequate development strategies which would strengthen the institutional capacity of the state and modernize Croatian society, primarily to stimulate development of civil society and strengthen the economy. That relative underdevelopment of structural factors, along with patterns of a political culture burdened with authoritarian legacy, was an obstacle to development of substantive democracy, and still is, despite noticeable progress achieved during the accession process. Croatian society is therefore significantly more vulnerable to external political and economic influences, especially in the conditions of the recent socioeconomic crisis. Insufficient institutional capacity, in turn, is dysfunctional with regard to the active position of Croatia in the new political and economic environment, and consequently to its relatively lesser benefit from joining the EU. In this regard, Croatia is in imminent need of serious work to clearly articulate the national interest(s) and form clear, feasible, and long-term development strategies, which include the development of structural factors (the economy, civil society, infrastructure), modernization of the system, and the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the state. Only then is it possible to realize significant socioeconomic development and overcome existing democratic deficits. EU membership should serve to significantly speed up and facilitate those processes, because the government, now in the EU framework, shares responsibility with the EU administration as a larger, more powerful authority which strengthens their role in the implementation of certain policies. References Anastasakis, O., 2008. The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more pragmatic approach. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 8 (4), 365–77. Balfour, R. and Stratulat, C., 2011. The Democratic Transformation of the Balkans. EPC Issue Paper, No. 66, Brussels: European Policy Centre. Beyme, K. von, 1996. Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan, and London: St. Martin’s Press. Brown, W., 2005. Neo-liberalism and the end of liberal democracy. In Brown, W. (ed.) Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 37–59. Brzezinski, Z., 1989. Toward a common European home. Problems of Communism, 38 (6), 1–10. Cipek, T., 2007. Institucionalni dizajn i demokratski deficit Europske unije. Društvena istraživanja, 16 (4–5), 851–65. Crouch, C., 2004. Post-democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

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Dahl, R., 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press. Diamond, L., 1996. Is the third wave over? Journal of Democracy, 7 (3), 20–37. ——— 1999. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Dimitrova, A., 2002. Enlargement, institution-building and the EU’s administrative capacity requirement. West European Politics 25 (4), 171–90. Dimitrova, A. and Pridham, G., 2004. International actors and democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: the integration model and its limits. Democratisation, 11 (5), 91–112. Dolenec, D., 2008. Europeanization as a democratising force in postcommunist Europe: Croatia in comparative perspective. Politička misao, 45 (5), 23–46. Đerđa, D., 2007. Institucionalni ustroj izvršne i upravne vlasti u Europskoj uniji. Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 28 (2), 1185–218. Elster, J., Offe, C. and Preuss, U., 1998. Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. European Council, 1993. European Council in Copenhagen: Presidency Conclusions June 21–22. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/ default_en.htm, accessed October 10, 2013. ——— 1995. European Council in Madrid: Presidency Conclusions, December 15–16. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad1_en.htm, accessed October 12, 2013. Grabbe, H., 2006. The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Grossman, J., 2006. EU Membership as a tool for democratization. Paper presented at the Conference on Democracy Promotion and International Cooperation. Denver (CO): Center for Civic Education. Available at: http://partners.civiced. org/paw/tools/people_download.php?group=event&id=199, accessed October 15, 2013. Grubiša, D., 2012. Hrvatski referendum za Europsku uniju: anatomija zakašnjelog (ne)uspjeha. Politička misao, 49 (2), 45–72. Habermas, J., 2011. Europe’s post-democratic era. The Guardian, November 11. ——— 2012. The Crisis of the European Union. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press. Huntington, S.P., 1991. The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press. Inglehart, R. and Welzel, C., 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. The Human Development Sequence. New York: Cambridge University Press. Jackman, R.W. and Miller, R.A., 2005. Before Norms: Institutions and Civic Culture. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. Kaldor, M. and Vejvoda, I., 1997. Democratization in Central and East European countries. International Affairs, 73 (1), 59–82. Karl, T.L. and Schmitter, P.C., 1991. What Democracy Is … And Is Not, Journal of Democracy, 2 (3), 75–88.

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Kasapović, M., 1996. Demokratska tranzicija i političke stranke. Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti. ——— 1997. Parlamentarizam i prezidencijalizam u Istočnoj Europi, Politička misao, 34 (1), 5–20. Koprić, I., 2010. Stanje lokalne samouprave u Hrvatskoj. Hrvatska javna uprava, 10 (3), 665–81. Linz, J. and Stepan, A., 1996a. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. ——— 1996b. Toward consolidated democracy. Journal of Democracy, 7 (2), 14–33. Maldini, P., 2008. Demokracija i demokratizacija. Dubrovnik: Sveučilište u Dubrovniku. Marčetić, G., 2007. Upravljanje ljudskim potencijalima u javnoj upravi. Zagreb: Društveno veleučilište u Zagrebu. May, P.J., 2003. Policy design and implementation. In G.B. Peters and J. Pierre (eds) Handbook of Public Administration. London: Sage Publications, 223–33. Merkel, W., 2004. Embedded and defective democracies. Democratization, 11 (5), 33–58. O’Donnell, G., 1996. Illusions about consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7 (2), 34–51. O’Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P., 1986. Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusion about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Parry, G. and Moran, M., 1994. Introduction: problems of democracy and democratization. In G. Parry and M. Moran (eds) Democracy and Democratization. London and New York: Routledge, 1–17. Pridham, G., 2002. EU enlargement and consolidating democracy in postcommunist states—formality and reality. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (5), 953–73. Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F., 1997. Modernization: theories and facts. World Politics, 49 (2), 155–83. Raik, K., 2004. EU accession of Central and Eastern European countries: democracy and integration as conflicting logics. East European Politics and Societies, 18 (4), 567–94. Rustow, D.A., 1970. Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model, Comparative Politics, 2 (3), 337–63. Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U., 2004. Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (4), 661–79. Schmitter, P., 2007. A European democracy: why and how? In P. Maldini and D. Vidović (eds) Transition in Central and Eastern European Countries: Experiences and Future Perspectives. Zagreb: Centar za politološka istraživanja, 17–36.

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Schumpeter, J., 1976. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: Allen and Unwin. Skoko, B., 2007. Percepcija EU u hrvatskoj javnosti. Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva, 3 (1), 349–68. Stoker, G., 2006. Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Štulhofer, A., 2006. Euroskepticizam u Hrvatskoj: s onu stranu racionalnosti? In K. Ott (ed.) Pridruživanje Hrvatske Europskoj uniji—Izazovi sudjelovanja, IV. Zagreb: Institut za javne financije and Zaklada Friedrich Ebert, 135–54. Tocqueville, A. de, 2001. Democracy in America. New York: Penguin Putnam Inc. Whitehead, L., 2002. Democratization. Theory and Experience. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Wolin, S., 2008. Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zakaria, F., 1997. The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign Affairs, 76 (6), 22–43. ——— 2007. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Zambelli, N., 2010. Između Balkana i Zapada: problem hrvatskog identiteta nakon Tuđmana i diskurzivna rekonstrukcija regije. Politička misao, 47 (1), 55–76.

Chapter 2

Democratic Deficits, Delayed Democratization and Prolonged EU Accession Davor Pauković and Višeslav Raos

Introduction The accession of Croatia to the European Union represents the sixth round of EU enlargement1 and is the first EU enlargement to include a single country since Greece joined the European Union in 1981. The final phase of Croatian accession negotiations coincided with a major economic crisis in the EU2 and a general atmosphere of enlargement fatigue. The aim of this chapter is to examine specific problems that influenced Croatia’s road to EU membership and have slowed down the negotiations process. These peculiar difficulties set Croatia somewhat apart from other ex-communist countries that became EU members in 2004 and 2007. The analysis of obstacles met by Croatia on its way to EU membership builds on Wolfgang Merkel’s concept of embedded and defective democracies (see Merkel, 2004). This chapter seeks to test Merkel’s ideas about factors that lead to democratic deficiencies, which, in turn, account for slower democratic consolidation and impeded EU accession. The research framework of this chapter places emphasis on key accession negotiation documents as primary empirical sources that detect structural problems pertaining to the delayed democratic consolidation in Croatia. In addition, the chapter aims to show how the process of EU accession influenced democratic consolidation in Croatia. The highlighting of democratic consolidation as a prerequisite for successful EU accession is not a result of chance, but builds upon a body of literature (e.g. Lavenex and 1 (1) Northern Enlargement in 1973 (United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark), (2) Greek Enlargement in 1981, (3) Iberian Enlargement in 1986, (4) Neutral Enlargement (Austria, Sweden and Finland) and (5) the Eastern Enlargement in 2004 (Malta, Cyprus, the Baltics, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland) and 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania). 2 In the European Union, the global 2007–2008 economic recession, which started with the bursting of the subprime mortgage bubble in the United States, spilled over into the sovereign debt crisis (especially in Spain and Greece) which ultimately gave rise to the Eurozone crisis.

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Schimmelfennig, 2011; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2010; Jano, 2009; Alexander, 2008; Zielonka, 2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004) that draws a clear parallel between Europeanization and democratization. In this context, Europeanization means a steady increase in the importance and influence of EU institutions, regulations and policy recommendations, while democratization stands for steady development of democratic institutions and procedures, as well as an increase in democratic value orientations among party members and the electorate.3 Embedded and Defective Democracies In his theory of transformation of political systems, Wolfgang Merkel (2011, p. 18) introduced the concept of embedded democracy; a democracy based on the rule of law and embedded both inwardly and outwardly, so that it can withstand internal and external shocks and challenges, such as wars or major economic downturns. This specific concept of democracy is a result of his critique of Robert Dahl’s model of polyarchy (Dahl, 1971), which, when put into practice (e.g. by the Freedom House index of democracy) detects only typical, minimal, electoral democracies and does not point to deficiencies which account for differences among democratic regimes (Merkel, 2004, p. 34, 2011, p. 17). According to this concept, an embedded democracy consists of five partial regimes—the electoral regime, the regime of political rights of participation, the civil rights regime, the division of power and horizontal accountability regime and the effective power to govern regime (Merkel, 2004, p. 36). These partial regimes support each other and provide long-term stabilization and resilience of democratic political systems. In contrast, deficiency in one of these partial regimes disrupts the logic of democratic governance and the rule of law and leads to non-consolidated, defective democracy. Depending on which partial regime functions improperly, there are four possible types of defective democracies—exclusive, domain, illiberal, and delegative (Merkel, 2004, pp. 49–50). Thus, an exclusive democracy occurs when the electoral regime is seriously deficient, i.e. a substantial part of the electorate was denied full voting rights (e.g. in the United States before the Civil Rights Movement). A domain democracy represents a type of defective democracy in which a social actor without electoral legitimacy obstructs the functioning of the legal authorities and acts as a parallel source of political authority. Domain democracies are typical in Latin America due to the problematic role of army and paramilitary forces in that region. An illiberal democracy suffers from a disruption in the division of power because the judiciary cannot effectively 3 However, some authors (e.g. Noutcheva, 2009) argue that the case of the Western Balkans region shows that the European Union and its policy of conditionality has achieved only limited success in promoting substantial reforms geared towards democratic consolidation.

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oversee the legislative and executive branches of government. Finally, an overly assertive executive government branch that acts independently of the legislative and judicial branches and seeks to manipulate them characterizes a delegative democracy. This type of defective democracy is often associated with a presidential or a semi-presidential political system. Merkel also lists 10 sources of deficiencies of partial regimes that cause defective democracies: a modernization path, level of modernization, economic trends, social capital, civil society, stateand nation-building, type of authoritarian predecessor regime, mode of transition, political institutions and international and regional context (2004, pp. 53–4). We offer a brief explanation of each of Merkel’s sources of democratic defects. A path of modernization that follows a trail of semi-modernization (partial modernization with limited success at harnessing new technologies and organization practices), accompanied by great disparities in ownership has a high possibility of producing democratic defects. In addition, a very low level of modernization serves as an impediment to successful democratization. Economic downturns tend to offer a breeding ground to authoritarian tendencies and thus thwart democratization. Further, a high level of social capital and a developed web of civil society organizations build societal trust and modes of cross-class and cross-generational cooperation which enhance democratization, while the lack thereof accounts for poor democratic performance. Societies that have to deal with state- and nation-building, especially those faced with unresolved border issues and problems with the integration of minorities, can expect a lower success in establishing and maintaining a functioning democratic regime. The more severe the type of the authoritarian predecessor regime, the more difficult will it be to democratize the country successfully. In addition, the more inclusive the mode of transition, that is the better the members of the old political elite and the democratic opposition cooperate in the transition process, the more successful the outcome of the democratization will be. Political institutions that are subject to informal rules and modes of operation, such as patronage, corruption and cronyism, will prevent successful democratization. Finally, an international and regional (neighboring countries) environment of a given country can affect the success rate of the democratization process—countries surrounded by other struggling defective democracies also have a high possibility of turning into a defective democracy. While one might find in the Croatian case at least some traces of most of the enumerated factors which cause democratic defects, in this chapter we have decided to emphasize only two of the 10 factors, namely the nature of political institutions and the processes of nation- and state-building. We shall highlight political institutions that are prone to corruption and cronyism as a factor of democratic deficiency because of their close connection to the problems pertaining to the functioning of civil rights and the division of power and horizontal accountability partial regimes. The processes of nation- and statebuilding as factors leading to the development of a post-communist defective democracy are not necessarily confined to the Croatian case (for a comparison with Slovakia, see Fisher, 2006). Yet the concurrence of these processes with

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a war makes this factor especially important for the assessment of the roots of the lagging behind of Croatia in terms of democratic consolidation. Finally, Merkel (2011, p. 27) specifically underlines unresolved issues of statehood (e.g. border issues) and nationality as particularly strong factors that can cause the establishment of a defective, instead of a consolidated, embedded democracy. Deficiencies of the Partial Regimes: The Croatian Case Former Yugoslavia had a mixed model of state-led and market-influenced economy and achieved a much higher level of economic development and national wealth than most socialist countries in Europe (Vasilevski, 2007, pp. 22–4; Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007, p. 230). Yet democratic consolidation, the establishment of the rule of law and of a functioning market economy in Croatia proved to be an arduous endeavor. Although the transition from autocracy to democracy was a fast and smooth one (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 294; Čular, 2000, p. 33), democratic consolidation in Croatia was postponed (according to his four-level concept of democratic consolidation, Merkel concluded that in 2009 Croatia was a consolidated democracy) (2011, pp. 412–13). This led to systemic and structural problems of both the state and the economy that impeded further reform and the progress necessary for successful EU accession. The coinciding of several historic turning points makes Croatia a very specific case (Zakošek and Čular, 2004; Merkel, 2006, p. 8). As already mentioned, Croatia is the only post-communist EU member state which has experience of a recent war fought on its own territory.4 However, the general fast consolidation in much of post-communist Europe came as a surprise for theorists of democratic transition due to the concurrent processes of political (democratization, often accompanied by state-building) and social and economic transformation (the introduction of capitalism). Concerning the early democratic period in Croatia (the early 1990s), one can talk about an overlapping of two types of defective democracies—an illiberal and a delegative democracy. According to Merkel, a delegative democracy arises when both the legislative and the judiciary have limited control over the executive, which is often led by a charismatic president whose actions do not respect constitutional norms and hamper the independence of the judiciary and the equality of citizens before the law (2004, p. 50). The semi-presidential system5 under President Franjo Tuđman (1990–1999) fits very well into the concept of delegative democracy, while the lack of horizontal accountability and mutual control of government branches and 4 On specific conditions of democratic transition in times of war and state building, see Chapter 1 of this volume. 5 On the challenges to democratic consolidation faced by Central and Eastern European countries with semi-presidential systems of government, see also Sedelius and Mashtaler (2013).

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political institutions shows that Croatia also had traits of an illiberal democracy. The next two paragraphs will give specific examples of these deficiencies in the functioning of the rule of law—the inefficient judiciary and a problematic process of privatization that did not respect equality before the law and business transparency. These two outcomes of deficiencies of the rule of law were also the main problems in Croatia’s EU negotiations. Subsequent paragraphs will show how some of the factors causing deficient democracy—corrupt political institutions and the burdensome processes of state- and nation-building—affected Croatia’s path towards consolidated democracy and EU membership. The four main issues discussed in this chapter—privatization, the judiciary, relations with the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the border dispute with Slovenia—represented the main difficulties in the process of EU accession, but also served as obstacles in democratic consolidation. The last two issues clearly reflected problems of post-conflict state- and nation-building, while the first two issues (privatization and functioning of the judiciary) mirrored the problem of political institutions riddled with corruption and crony capitalism. The Judicial System: Weak Capacities and Political Dependence Before the 1989/1990 democratic transition, the judicial system was under strict control of the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH). Similar to other communist countries, all court work was subject to political diktat, rendering the concept of division of powers an empty phrase. Legal disputes were subject to a de facto parallel authority system: the authority of the SKH that sought to solve civil disputes by political means and the formal legal authority of the judiciary that sought to adhere to provisions of the legal system (Uzelac, 2001, p. 5). A new Constitution, adopted in December 1990, laid the foundations for the development of a democratic legal system and the establishment of judicial autonomy. However, the period of democratic consolidation was prolonged by war conditions (often used as a pretext for the political manipulation of the courts) which brought new legal issues (the legal consequences of the war), the repercussions of which continue to the present. New constitutional provisions about the appointment and mandate of judges were not transparent and were vaguely defined. This led to the professional erosion of legal practice. During the early 1990s, about one-fifth to one-sixth of the total number of judges left the judicial system (Uzelac, 2001, p. 13). This situation ensued partially from initial transition problems, while also greatly reflecting the wish of the new government to marginalize the old communist cadres in the judicial system. Croatia never achieved legal and political conditions for lustration. Instead, practices of both elite continuity and political revanchism prevailed (on lustration in Croatia, see e.g. Dvořáková and Milardović, 2007). Appointments of judges and state attorneys that catered to party interests and daily politics were and largely are a dominant feature of the judicial system and a major obstacle to

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further reform. Article 75 of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (signed in 2000, ratified in 2005) stated that “the Parties will attach particular importance to the consolidation of the rule of law” and that they would put a strong focus on “the independence of the judiciary, the improvement of its effectiveness and the training of the legal professions” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2005). Regarding the independence of judges and public attorneys, one cannot overlook the fact that despite various anti-corruption campaigns and action plans, corruption remains one of the key problems. According to data obtained from public opinion polls in the last couple of years, a vast majority of citizens viewed the judiciary as the most corrupt part of society (Transparency International, 2007, p. 195). An analysis of annual progress reports on Croatia’s accession, issued by the European Commission, reveals that the reform of the judicial system has proved to be a major and enduring obstacle to EU membership. The 2005–2007 progress reports continuously emphasized the structural weaknesses of the judiciary, while noting only limited progress (European Commission, 2005, 2006, 2007). The 2008 Progress Report marks a decisive step forward for Croatia’s efforts at improving its judicial system. However, the reports judged the reforms as very slow due to weak administrative capacities (European Commission, 2008, p. 8). Despite some positive impulses, mostly resulting from the government’s response to harsh criticism from Brussels and the methods of conditionality (see more in Rodin, 2001; Mäki, 2008), the backlog of old cases remains a huge problem. Old cases, which often remain unprocessed due to time limitation (see more in Uzelac, 2004), are one of the most enduring issues affecting the proper functioning of the courts and the dispensation of justice. In 2009, the annual report noted a major breakthrough in the tackling of the case backlog, and spoke of “good progress” on “reducing the number of old civil and criminal cases” (European Commission, 2009, p. 9). The progress reports in 2010 and 2011 placed most emphasis on Chapter 23, Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, and the raising of efficiency and impartiality of the judiciary, as well as on the fight against corruption and discrimination (European Commission, 2010, p. 47, 2011, pp. 45–52). Together with Chapter 8, Competition Policy, Chapter 23 took the longest to open (June 30, 2010) and to close (June 30, 2011). Troubles with the judiciary were one of the main reasons the European Commission introduced additional monitoring screening and reporting in the pre‑accession period, in order to make the Croatian government fully comply with the acquis communautaire and all the stipulations agreed upon during the negotiations process. The first monitoring report, released in October 2012, also detected problems regarding the efficiency and independence of the judiciary (European Commission, 2012, pp. 7–8). A politically motivated judiciary indicates problems with the division of powers and a lack of horizontal accountability (the fourth partial regime of embedded democracy), while rampant corruption clashes with the third partial regime of civic rights that should guarantee the equality of all citizens before the law. Deficiencies in the functioning of these two partial regimes reveal a deeply disturbed logic of functioning of formal political institutions. Judicial institutions

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which do not adhere to the rule of law and which do not treat all citizens equally disrupt democratic processes and standards and thus prevent full democratic consolidation and the establishment of an embedded democracy. The Privatization Process: Economic Inefficiency and Corruption At the beginning of the transition process, Slovenia and Croatia were the most prepared for privatization due to existing elements and practices of market orientation and economic reform (Veselica and Vojnić, 2000, p. 831). When discussing the economic dimension of democratic consolidation, Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 11) point out that there “cannot be a non-wartime consolidated democracy in a command economy.” In other words, a wartime situation would permit postponement of the privatization process and the establishment of what these authors call “economic society” or “economic arena of democracy.” Therefore, in times of a defensive war (and, in this case, state-building), largescale privatization is not an economic policy of choice. Privatization started in 1991 and followed the policies of the last Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković, who started introducing elements of free market economy, but was also envisaged as a tool of Croatian national liberation, state-building, and reversal of Yugoslav economic relations which were perceived as unjust and inefficient (Grdešić, 1999, p. 113). Moreover, early privatization enabled the new political elite to gain material sources of power. First President Franjo Tuđman saw swift privatization as a means of Westernizing and Europeanizing Croatia and clearing the path for full independence and international recognition. In the initial phase (1990–1993), employees and managers of enterprises in social ownership could buy out shares in the companies they worked in.6 Most of the small shareholders had little or no knowledge of capitalist economy and eventually sold off most of their shares to manager cadres in order to gain quick cash in the turmoil of war. The managerial elite included both old communist technocrats and new elites that consisted of individuals who had close ties to the new government, either through party membership or through informal networks of kinship and regional or local origin. The distribution of wealth and power and the allocation of key posts and functions according to patrimonial, paternalistic, and clientelistic patterns turned Croatia’s transitional economy into crony capitalism (Frydman, Murphy, and Rapaczynski, 1998). The state agency for ownership transformation, the Croatian Privatization Fund (CPF), acted in terms of political discretion and was prone to direct manipulation. This included preferential interest rates given by banks due to political dictates, as well as the usage of capital assets of the company being bought as a mortgage for loans needed to pay for the 6 See more on various forms of privatization in Croatia and other post-communist countries in Kalogjera (1993, pp. 65–70). For a comparison of Central and Eastern European paths to privatization see Kiss (1993).

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shares of the same company.7 Such an economic transition, characterized by the so‑called “tycoon privatization” (Vojnić, 2003, p. 165), resulted in a series of business decisions which led to massive layoffs, decline of production rates and the transformation of production plants into retail warehouses, benefitting only the short-term investment interests of the new managers and shareholders, but causing social insecurity, massive unemployment and eventually, recession.8 Although the privatization process was intended to make use of citizens’ savings and to encourage entrepreneurship in Croatia, in effect it only involved a handful of well-connected managers and upcoming politicians (Nusinović and Teodorović, 2002, p. 321). The capital drain from newly privatized companies resulted in numerous liquidations of otherwise prospective businesses. However, the system partially stabilized in the latter privatization phases, which included initial public offers, as well as voucher privatization for the beneficiaries of state funds reserved for war veterans and war widows (Gregurek, 2001, pp. 160–62). With the government change in 2000 and a rapid opening towards EU markets, foreign investors (mainly from Germany, Austria, and Italy) bought many unsuccessfully privatized banks and enterprises. In 2001, a process of revision of the privatization process started, spanning the office terms of both Ivica Račan and Ivo Sanader. The State Audit Office evaluated 1,006 cases of privatization and detected unlawful activities and procedures in almost all of the companies (931) put under financial and judicial review (Grubiša, 2005, p. 69). However, due to both time limitations and the political connections of the managers involved in these cases, the courts processed none or almost none of these wrongdoings. The 2005–2009 progress reports (European Commission, 2005, p. 35) objected that further privatization was progressing too slowly, partially due to a “large number of lawsuits against the Croatian Privatization Fund.” From the Commission’s point of view, the slowing down of the privatization process in Croatia was a sign of bad preparation for the EU common market as well as national protectivism and government control. However, the government was not and still is not ready to let go of companies that either generate revenue needed for the already stretched national budget or generate great losses but employ a great number of citizens who represent the core electorate, vital for the political survival of party elites. The reports also pointed to internal corruption schemes in the Fund, as well as unsuccessful and slow selling of the state asset portfolio due to weak institutional mechanisms and bad price setting (European Commission, 2007, p. 20). Among the enterprises covered in this portfolio, the shipyard industry was a particular stumbling block. Despite having a long tradition and a good international reputation, the industry was highly indebted (huge bank loans are covered by 7 On corrupt privatization schemes in Croatia during the early 1990s, see also Ramet (2011). 8 The word tycoon, originally denoting a landowner in medieval Japan, describes the nouveau riche transition capitalists with strong ties to new political elites in South Eastern Europe. It is similar to the concept of an oligarch in the post-Soviet societies.

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state guarantees which poses a significant risk for the national budget) and was in need of restructuring and fresh investment capital. Tenders for the privatization of shipyards failed mainly due to strict conditions set both by the government and by labor unions; so that investors were not prepared to clear the debts and pledge themselves to continued shipbuilding. The completion of requirements for opening and closing of Chapter 8, Competition Policy, depended directly on the shipyards issue. Both the final progress report of 2011 and the monitoring report of 2012 placed huge emphasis on the successful resolution of problems pertaining to the shipyard industry (European Commission, 2011, pp. 31–2, 2012, pp. 6–7). The structural problems of privatization in Croatia reveal issues with the partial regime of civic rights. Two key aspects of civic rights as a partial regime supporting embedded democracy are violated here—equality before the law and the protection of property. Thus, the problems of privatization underline the issue of malfunctioning political institutions, that is, institutions regulating fair access to the market and protecting the equality of all business stakeholders. The Burden of History Transition in Croatia fits into a larger pattern of simultaneous transformation in Eastern Europe. It featured all three aspects of transformation. This simultaneous transformation included a political, economic, and state transformation (Merkel, 2011, p. 307). In addition, the war interfered with the institutionalization and consolidation of democracy (see more in Zakošek, 2008).9 The new political order had significant democratic deficits due to the conditions in which the transition to democracy took place.10 These conditions were further intensified by institutional arrangements (the majority election system at the first democratic election and the semi-presidential system introduced in 1992), as well as political culture, which in socialist Yugoslavia was characterized by the presence of extreme authoritarianism (Šiber, 1992, pp. 106–7). During the 1990s, the government was preoccupied with war issues and the process of state-building, which greatly reduced the strength of the opposition parties and contributed to the authoritarian characteristics of the system. In that period, one could not always draw a clear line between the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the state apparatus and a national movement. Government actions were often justified by the protection of Croatian national interests, sovereignty and statehood, while top government officials perceived any criticism as opposition to Croatian independence and liberty. The considerable emphasis on nation-building proved detrimental to successful democratization and modernization (Ágh, 1999, p. 277). For most of the decade, the discourse on national sovereignty held a dominant place. In a context shaped by highlighting 9 On specific challenges to democratization in a post-conflict setting, see Jarstad and Sisk (2008). 10 See also Chapter 1.

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of the “finally established” Croatian sovereignty and statehood, one could not talk about a transfer of sovereignty to EU institutions. In fact, there was a pronounced resistance to some new international associations, notably those connected to the former Yugoslav republics and the Balkans.11 Democratic deficit and a strong presence of issues of nationhood and statehood led to Croatia’s isolation regarding EU integration in the late 1990s. Nationalism and isolationism as the results of state sovereignty forged in war limited any serious debate or efforts towards EU integration. The strategy of the EU, which included a regional approach to “the Western Balkans” and insisted on regional cooperation, contributed to this. The Croatian political elite understood such concepts as an attempt to create some sort of a new Yugoslav association (Jović, 2006). In addition, regional relations (cross-border cooperation among post-Yugoslav countries), practically cut off by the war, could not be significantly re-established in late 1990s, only a few years after the end of armed conflict. The government change in 2000 initiated the long-delayed democratic consolidation and the opening of the process of European integration. Shortly before that, in mid-1999, the EU Council of Ministers adopted the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) as a long-term strategy for developing relations between the EU and the countries of South Eastern Europe. This included the development of economic relations with the EU, regional cooperation and ultimately the prospect of EU membership. The SAP called for the conclusion of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with each country involved in the process. Negotiations about the EU and the Croatian SAA began during the Zagreb Summit in November 2000. The SAA was signed in October 2001 and entered into force on February 1, 2005. The process of convergence with the EU continued in the next period, with a few interruptions. The slowing down of the process of Croatian accession was associated with several problems derived from the historical legacy of state-building and problems of postponed democratic consolidation. The emphasis on Croatian sovereignty and statehood during the 1990s clearly shows that nation- and statebuilding are prerequisites for democracy and that wartime and unresolved issues with irredentism and ethnic minorities impede democratic consolidation (Merkel, 2011, pp. 310–11). Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia One of the causes of international isolation in the late 1990s was insufficient cooperation with the ICTY. Specifically, at the time of the establishment of the ICTY on May 25, 1993 (United Nations Security Council, 1993) and in subsequent 11 The amendment of the Croatian Constitution 1997 inserted a paragraph that reads: “It is prohibited to initiate any procedure for the association of the Republic of Croatia into alliances with other states if such association leads, or might lead, to a renewal of a South Slav state community or to any Balkan state form of any kind” (Croatian parliament, 1990).

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years, the Croatian political elite believed that this court would primarily punish “the aggressor” (Serbia) and confirm Croatia’s status as victim of Greater Serbian policy. Tuđman and his associates believed that the Tribunal would not deal with “individual” violations of international law committed in a defensive war. The ICTY did not meet these expectations and caused dissatisfaction that was reflected in the Resolution on Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague adopted by the Croatian parliament (1999). The Resolution required decisive and effective punishment of crimes committed during the aggression and war in Croatia. It particularly warned of the ICTY proceedings related to the indictments against Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The wording of the Resolution stated that the Tribunal had become a place to carry out precisely defined political goals. The content of this document showed that the officials in Zagreb held a view that the indictments against Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croatian war leaders were excessive and leading to imbalance and instability of the Dayton Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. An especially important part of the Resolution condemned the politicization of the ICTY through excessive statements of the Office of the Prosecutor regarding the 1995 operations Flash and Storm. The Resolution declared the legitimacy of these “anti-terrorist” actions within the internationally recognized Croatian borders, and defined possible individual criminal acts committed in these actions as a matter reserved solely for the Croatian judiciary. Because of this paragraph, the ICTY and the Office of the Prosecutor demanded international pressure on Croatia regarding cooperation and responsibility in the cases of operations Flash and Storm. While many Croatian citizens saw the prosecution of war crimes as an external attempt to undermine the country’s sovereignty and challenge the established national identity and official historic narratives, EU representatives maintained that full compliance with the ICTY would serve as a proof of attainment of democratic standards (Freyburg and Richter, 2010, p. 271; see also Zambelli, 2010). Sufficient cooperation with The Hague Tribunal would thus signal Croatia’s readiness for the process of EU membership negotiations. In 2000, the new government changed the official stance towards the ICTY and sought to establish cooperation that would, with the punishment of individual crimes, end Croatia’s international isolation and enable EU and NATO integration. Thus, in April 2000 the Croatian parliament adopted the Declaration on Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague. The Declaration stated that the ICTY had the right to institute proceedings to determine responsibility for crimes committed during and immediately after the war. It actually meant that Croatia recognized the ICTY’s jurisdiction over operations Flash and Storm, which the previous government had challenged (see also Peskin, 2008; Pavlaković, 2008). This change of attitude towards the ICTY enabled the acceleration of the accession process. However, it did not remove the question of relations with the ICTY and war-related issues from the daily agenda. In September 2002, the Croatian government received the indictment against the retired general Janko Bobetko, the former Croatian Armed Forces Chief of Staff, for crimes committed

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in the operation Medak Pocket in 1993. This indictment rocked the political scene in Croatia and caused problems for the government. Fierce opposition to the indictment came from the ranks of the former HDZ government, which said Bobetko was a symbol of the Homeland War and that one “must not allow the creation of an impression that Croatia was created through crime” (Vjesnik, 2002). The government decided not to extradite Bobetko to the ICTY because it claimed that parts of the indictments were unconstitutional and subsequently sought to challenge the legitimacy of ICTY legal actions. This caused further international pressure. For example, the United Kingdom suspended the ratification process of the SAP, while there were also speculations about the introduction of sanctions. Bobetko’s health ultimately facilitated the Croatian government’s position, as he became unfit for trial and died in April 2003. Following the death of Bobetko, the attention and interest of the public shifted to the indictment against General Ante Gotovina. He had been in hiding since the ICTY had made his indictment public in 2001, but the issue did not become the dominant obstacle to full cooperation with the Tribunal until early 2003. Although there had been considerable speculation that Gotovina was hiding in Croatia with support from right-wing factions in the Croatian government, his arrest occurred on the Canary Islands in December 2005. According to the opinion of the Office of the Prosecutor, Croatia had not undertaken sufficient efforts to locate and extradite Gotovina. Because of the negative report about Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY, the EU postponed the start of accession negotiations with Croatia in March 2005 (Vjesnik, 2005). Indictments against Croatian generals opened the question of the relation of the international community towards the war in Croatia. Wide sections of the Croatian public believed that any part of the indictment against Gotovina that spoke of “planned ethnic cleansing” of the Serbs from the so-called “Krajina”12 during and immediately after operation Storm in 1995 represented an attempt to criminalize the Croatian Homeland War. Thus, Gotovina became a symbol of what numerous Croatians perceived as unjust treatment by The Hague Tribunal (see also Pavlaković, 2010). Many Croatian citizens also held that such an indictment would equally blame all the belligerents and impose the idea that the foundations of the Croatian state rested upon “a joint criminal enterprise.” According to the survey conducted by the agency Puls, only 7 percent of respondents thought General Gotovina was responsible for the delay in negotiations with the EU and 27 percent blamed the Croatian government for failing to prove that it fully cooperated with the ICTY. The largest number of respondents, 43 percent, felt the European Commission and the ICTY were responsible for the delay in negotiations. The majority of the public, but also the 12 “Krajina” literally means borderland. The name hails back to the times of Ottoman Wars and refers to the military border the Habsburg Empire had established in parts of Croatia along the border to Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to protect its lands from Ottoman invasion. In August 1990, Serb rebels proclaimed a self-governing entity called “Republic of Serbian Krajina” in areas around the Croatian–Bosnian border.

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country’s political leadership, thought that the European Union treated Croatia unjustly and too strictly. At the time of the blockade of the accession process, there was a decline of public support for Croatian EU membership (see also Pavlaković, 2008). After the delay of the start of negotiations in March 2005 Prime Minister Ivo Sanader said that public support for accession would rise by 10–15 percent once Croatia was “fairly treated from our perspective” (BBCCroatian.com, 2005).13 After the transfer of Gotovina to The Hague, the ICTY ceased to be the main topic regarding Croatia’s EU accession. Instead, Chapter 23, Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, received most attention. Additionally, the question of missing artillery logbooks as key evidence in Gotovina’s trial at the ICTY created another minor yet persistent obstacle to the accession process. A public opinion poll conducted in the fall of 2011 produced some interesting data.14 In their answers to questions concerning the ICTY, the majority of respondents claimed the ICTY was negative for national interests, as well as for the country’s sovereignty.15 Yet there is a significant discrepancy in the respondents’ view of the statement: “Cooperation with the ICTY should be supported because it strengthens Croatia’s integration into Europe.”16 The responses to this statement show a large number of those that agree with it, as well as a large number of undecided respondents. This demonstrates that a large number of respondents viewed EU integration as a national interest due to which cooperation with the ICTY was necessary, although the previous responses showed a negative view of the ICTY. The responses to these questions also show support for the perception of the Croatian Homeland War as an exclusively defensive and just war which was being questioned by the ICTY through the levelling of guilt, but they also depict EU accession as a first-level national interest which justifies cooperation with the ICTY. 13 For a detailed account of the rapprochement towards The Hague Tribunal under Prime Minister Sanader, see Lamont (2010). 14 This stratified survey (conducted by IPSOS, an international agency for market, media, and public opinion research, on a sample of 1,500 participants) was part of the Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in West-Balkan States: Intents and Results (2011–2013) project. The project was conducted at the University of Oslo, Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages, in partnership with the University of Rijeka and the Political Science Research Centre in Zagreb. See details and opinion poll results at http://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/nation-w-balkan/index.html. 15 Cooperation with the ICTY is negative for Croatia’s national interests: fully disagree 8 percent; mostly disagree 14.2 percent; both agree and disagree 19.4 percent; mostly agree 26.1 percent; fully agree 25.6 percent; don’t know/refuse to answer 6.8 percent; Cooperation with the ICTY infringes on Croatia’s sovereignty: fully disagree 8.9 percent; mostly disagree 16 percent; both agree and disagree 19.5 percent; mostly agree 23.9 percent; fully agree 22.7 percent; don’t know/refuse to answer 9 percent. 16 Fully disagree 17.7 percent; mostly disagree 15.8 percent; both agree and disagree 27.3 percent; mostly agree 23.6 percent; fully agree 8.2 percent; don’t know/refuse to answer 7.6 percent.

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The troublesome relation of Croatia with the ICTY has highlighted how unresolved statehood and nationhood issues can affect democratic consolidation and cause democratic defects. In addition, the problems with acceptance of ICTY indictments revealed issues with the full acceptance of rule of law and thus pointed to the poor functioning of the third partial regime, i.e. the civic rights regime. The Border Dispute with Slovenia Another problem resulting from the legacy of Yugoslavia’s break-up in 1991 that significantly influenced the process of EU accession, as well as the public discourse on European integration, was the unresolved land and sea border dispute with Slovenia. Regarding this issue and EU accession, the first problem occurred with the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone (ZERP). On October 3, 2003, Croatia declared its ZERP in the Adriatic Sea (Croatian parliament, 2003). Initially, the ZERP should have not applied to EU member states. However, in late 2006 a new decision stipulated that ZERP application would extend to member states beginning in 2008. The entering into force of this decision in early 2008 provoked pressure from the EU, primarily from Slovenia, for its abandonment. Slovenia claimed that Croatia, by introducing the ZERP, prejudged the sea border and therefore could not accept such a decision. The EU asked Croatia to resolve the issue with Slovenia, essentially pressuring Croatia to withdraw the application of the ZERP on EU member states in order to prevent “serious delays in the accession process,” in the words of Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn in early March 2008 in Zagreb (Poslovni dnevnik, 2008; Vjesnik 2008a). A few days later, the Croatian government abandoned the application of the ZERP on the grounds of a situation of clashing of two national interests—ZERP and EU accession (Croatian parliament 2008). Further, Prime Minister Sanader expressed the attitude that EU membership was an absolute priority, and thus the temporary withdrawal of the ZERP vis-à-vis EU member states was justified (Vjesnik, 2008b). Unresolved border issues between Slovenia and Croatia slowed the negotiation process again in December 2008, when Slovenia directly blocked the opening of those negotiation chapters that it deemed problematic due to Croatia’s alleged prejudging of the sea and land borders in its negotiation positions. Slovenia’s official argument was that Croatia was directly prejudging the border in the negotiating papers it had sent to the European Commission (B92.net, 2008). On the other hand, the Croatian public and political elite considered this a Slovenian attempt to blackmail Croatia and seek territorial concessions from Croatia in exchange for EU membership (B92.net, 2008). Croatia had asked for a settling of the border dispute before an international court and the separation of bilateral issues from the accession process, while Slovenia was looking for a solution of border issues before Croatian accession. Slovenia insisted that the resolution of the dispute should conform not solely to international law, but also pay respect to the “principles of justice and equity.” The Commission became involved in resolving the issue, which resulted in an arbitration proposal by the Enlargement

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Commissioner Olli Rehn in May 2009. Nevertheless, these talks ended on June 15 as Slovenia proposed changes to Rehn’s final draft. Finally, following Sanader’s sudden resignation in July 2009, in September 2009 the Slovenian Prime Minister Borut Pahor and Croatian Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor reached an agreement on the unblocking of the accession negotiations and the continuation of negotiations on arbitration. Croatia issued a statement to the Presidency of the EU that no document in the negotiation process could prejudge the border between Slovenia and Croatia and that no document or unilateral step after June 25, 1991 could have legal effect on the solution of the border dispute (Jutarnji list, 2009). The Slovenian blockade of the negotiations had a negative effect on the perception of the EU by the Croatian public, and membership support fell steadily for eight consecutive months. After the agreement on unblocking the negotiations this decline stopped, so that new surveys published by “Promocija plus” on their website in October 2009 showed membership support over 50 percent. Bilateral problems with Slovenia (which also extended into the period of ratification of the Croatian accession treaty due to issues pertaining to the case of “Ljubljanska banka” bank) have shown how democratic consolidation and overcoming of statehood issues (borders, sovereignty, and succession after state collapse) are essentially connected. We can see in this a confirmation of the notion that the problem of nation- and state-building as part of simultaneous transformation is the most difficult to deal with (Merkel, 2011, p. 311). Conclusion The specific traits of Croatia’s road to EU membership are a result of a range of factors: in the main they arise from the context of political and economic transition from communism, the break-up of Yugoslavia, war and the troublesome process of building a new sovereign state. The concurrence of all these events makes the Croatian case specific, but also accounts as a key source of democratic deficits. Such circumstances have produced numerous structural problems, such as the legally and morally questionable process of privatization and the weak functioning of the judiciary. Croatia’s case confirms state-building and unresolved border and/or minority issues as causes of democratic deficits, as stipulated by Merkel (2011, p. 27, p. 308, pp. 310–11). Also, deficiencies in the functioning of the third (civil rights) and fourth (horizontal accountability) partial regimes have undermined the proper functioning of a market economy in Croatia as well as full establishment of the rule of law. Problems regarding transparent privatization and market regulation, as well as the independence and efficiency of the judiciary became key issues that impeded progress in EU integration. The process of EU accession played a major, probably even a pivotal (at least considering the dynamic of the process) role in (partially) overcoming democratic deficits. In this sense, the Europeanization of the Croatian political system at the same time represented a consolidation of the democratic regime. Further, the question of cooperation with the ICTY, as well as

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border problems with Slovenia, point to an important process regarding sovereignty and EU integration. Statehood and full sovereignty won by war and EU accession, which implies giving up on a portion of one’s own sovereignty, both happened in a very short period. These two primary goals of Croatian politics in the last two decades often came into conflict, and are best illustrated by the issues of cooperation with the ICTY and the border disputes with Slovenia. Numerous public opinion polls conducted in the last decade pointed to this problem. In addition, they showed that the Croatian public was not sure what goals should be a national priority. If we bear all these factors in mind, it becomes clear that the long and difficult way towards EU membership was a result of very specific historic legacies and conditions of democratic transition. Croatia’s EU accession could not have looked much different from what it turned out to be due to a specific course of transition that was marked by war, state break-up, state-building, and the political and economic departure from communism. While other post-communist EU member states such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia experienced most of these processes, the Croatian case also included a war that further enhanced the negative impact of state break-up and new state-building on democratic consolidation that subsequently slowed down the process of EU integration. References Ágh, A., 1999. Processes of democratization in the East Central European and Balkan States: sovereignty-related conflicts in the context of Europeanization. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 32 (3), 263–79. Alexander, M., 2008. Democratization and hybrid regimes: comparative evidence from southeast Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 22 (4), 928–54. B92.net, 2008. Slovenia “blackmailing” Croatia. December 3, 2008. BBCCroatian.com, 2005. Većina građana nije razočarana odlukom EU (The majority of citizens are not disappointed by the EU decision). March 17, 2005. Bideleux, R. and Jeffries, I. 2007. The Balkans: A Post-communist History. London: Routledge. Croatian parliament, 1990. Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Available at http://www.sabor.hr/fgs.axd?id=17074, accessed November 25, 2013. ——— 1999. Rezolucija o suradnji s Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom u Haagu (Resolution on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague). Available at http://hidra.srce.hr/arhiva/263/18315/www.nn.hr/clanci/ sluzbeno/1999/0500.htm, accessed February 20, 2014. ——— 2000. Deklaracija o suradnji s Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom u Den Haagu (Declaration on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague). Available at http://hidra.srce.hr/arhiva/263/18315/www.nn.hr/ clanci/sluzbeno/2000/0957.htm, accessed February 20, 2014. ——— 2003. Odluka o proširenju jurisdikcije Republike Hrvatske na Jadranskom moru (Decision on the extension of the jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia

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in the Adriatic Sea). Available at http://hidra.srce.hr/arhiva/263/18315/www. nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2003/2250.htm, accessed February 20, 2014. ——— 2008. Odluka o izmjeni Odluke o proširenju jurisdikcije Republike Hrvatske na Jadranskom moru (Decision on the amendment of the decision on the extension of the jurisdiction of the Republic of Croatia in the Adriatic Sea). Available at http://hidra.srce.hr/arhiva/263/33321/www.nn.hr/clanci/ sluzbeno/2008/0998.htm, accessed February 20, 2014. Čular, G., 2000. Political development in Croatia 1990–2000: fast transition— postponed consolidation. Croatian Political Science Review, 37 (5), 30–46. Dahl, R., 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dvořáková, V. and Milardović, A. (eds), 2007. Lustration and Consolidation of Democracy and the Rule of Law in Central and Eastern Europe. Zagreb: Political Science Research Centre. European Commission, 2005. Croatia 2005 Progress Report. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec _1424_final_progress_report_hr_en.pdf, accessed February 25, 2014. ——— 2006. Croatia 2006 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa. eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2006/nov/hr_sec_1385_en.pdf, accessed February 25, 2014. ——— 2007. Croatia 2007 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/croatia_progress_reports_en.pdf, accessed February 25, 2014. ——— 2008. Croatia 2008 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa. eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/keydocuments/reports_nov_2008/croatia_ progress_report_en.pdf, accessed February 25, 2014. ——— 2009. Croatia 2009 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa. eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/hr_rapport_2009_en.pdf, accessed February 25, 2014. ——— 2010. Croatia 2010 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/hr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, accessed February 25, 2014. ——— 2011. Croatia 2011 Progress Report. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/hr_rapport_2011_en.pdf, accessed February 25, 2014. ——— 2012. Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/hr_rapport_2012 _en.pdf, accessed February 25, 2014. Fisher, S., 2006. Political Change in Post-communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Freyburg, T. and S. Richter, 2010. National identity matters: the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the western Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (2), 263–81.

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Frydman, R., Murphy, K., and Rapaczynski, A., 1998. Capitalism with a Comrade’s Face. Budapest: Central European University Press. Grdešić, I., 1999. The politics of privatization in Croatia: transition in times of war. In M. Simai (ed.) The Democratic Process and the Market: Challenges of the Transition. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 110–26. Gregurek, M., 2001. Stupanj i učinci privatizacije u Hrvatskoj (The level and effects of privatization in Croatia). Ekonomski pregled, 52 (1–2), 155–88. Grubiša, D., 2005. Political corruption in transitional Croatia: the peculiarities of a model. Croatian Political Science Review, 42 (5), 55–74. Jano, D., 2009. The whys and when enlarging EU to the western Balkans. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 2 (1), 61–77. Jarstad, A.K. and Sisk, T.D. (eds), 2008. From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jović, D., 2006. Croatia and the European Union: a long delayed journey. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 8 (1), 85–103. Jutarnji list, 2009. Slovenski parlament prejudicira granica (The Slovenian parliament is prejudging the border). February 19, 2009. Kalogjera, D., 1993. Privatizacija u stabilizaciji i razvoju hrvatskog gospodarstva (Privatization in the stabilization and development of the Croatian economy). Društvena istraživanja, 2 (1), 51–86. Kiss, Y., 1993. Paradoksi privatizacije u Istočnoj i Srednjoj Europi (Privatization paradoxes in East and Central Europe). Društvena istraživanja, 2 (1), 3–30. Lamont, C.K., 2010. Defiance or strategic compliance? The post-Tuđman Croatian Democratic Union and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Europe-Asia Studies, 62 (10), 1683–705. Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. 2011. EU democracy promotion in the neighbourhood: from leverage to governance? Democratization, 18 (4), 885–909. Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A.C., 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Mäki, J.-M., 2008. EU enlargement politics: explaining the development of political conditionality of “Full Cooperation with the ICTY” towards western Balkans. Croatian Political Science Review, 45 (5), 47–80. Merkel, W., 2004. Embedded and defective democracies. Democratization, 11 (5), 33–58. ——— 2006. Nasuprot svakoj teoriji: brza konsolidacija demokracije u srednjoistočnoj Europi (Against any theory: rapid consolidation of democracy in central and Eastern Europe). Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva, 3 (1), 7–24. ——— 2011. Transformacija političkih sustava: uvod u teoriju i empirijsko istraživanje transformacije (Transformation of political systems: an introduction to theory and empirical research of transformation). Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science.

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Noutcheva, G., 2009. Fake, partial and imposed compliance: the limits of the EU’s normative power in the Western Balkans. Journal of European Public Policy, 16 (7), 1065–84. Nusinović, M. and Teodorović, I., 2002. The privatization process in Croatia. In A.E. Young, I. Teodorović, and P. Koveos (eds) Economies in Transition: Conception, Status and Prospects. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 317–36. Official Journal of the European Union, 2005. Stabilization and Association Agreement. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?textfield2=26&y ear=2005&Submit=Search&serie=L, accessed March 30, 2014. Pavlaković, V., 2008. Better the grave than a slave: Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In S.P. Ramet (ed.) Croatia since Independence: War, Politics, Society, Foreign Relations. Munich, Oldenbourg, 447–78. ——— 2010. Croatia, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and General Gotovina as a political symbol. Europe-Asia Studies, 62 (10), 1707–40. Peskin, V., 2008. International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Poslovni dnevnik, 2008. Ako se ZERP brzo ne riješi, doći će do zastoja u hrvatskim pregovorima (If we do not find a quick solution to ZERP, there will be a delay in Croatia’s negotiations). March 7, 2008. Ramet, S.P., 2011. Croatia and Serbia since 1991: an assessment of their similarities and differences. East European Politics, 27 (2), 263–90. Rodin, S., 2001. Requirements of EU membership and legal reform in Croatia. Croatian Political Science Review, 38 (5), 87–105. Schimmelfennig, F. and Scholtz, H., 2010. Legacies and leverage: EU political conditionality and democracy promotion in historical perspective. EuropeAsia Studies, 62 (3), 443–60. Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U., 2004. Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (4), 661–79. ——— (eds), 2005. The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sedelius, T. and Mashtaler, O., 2013. Two decades of semi-presidentialism: issues of intra-executive conflict in Central and Eastern Europe 1991–2011. East European Politics, 29 (2), 109–34. Šiber, I., 1992. Politička kultura i tranzicija (Political culture and transition). Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science. Transparency International, 2007. Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. United Nations Security Council, 1993. Resolution 827. Available at http://www. unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f21b1c.html, accessed March 30, 2014.

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Uzelac, A., 2001. Hrvatsko pravosuđe u devedesetima: od državne nezavisnosti do institucionalne krize (Croatian judiciary in the nineties: from independence to institutional crisis). Politička misao, 38 (2), 3–41. ——— 2004. The rule of law and the judicial system: court delays as a barrier to accession. In K. Ott (ed.) Croatian Accession to the European Union: Institutional Challenges. Zagreb, Institute for Public Finance, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 105–30. Vachudova, M.A., 2005. Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vasilevski, S., 2007. Diverging Paths, Diverging Outcomes: A Comparative Analysis of Post-Communist Transition in the Successor States of Yugoslavia. Toronto: York University, YCISS Post-Communist Studies Programme Research Paper Series. Veselica, V. and Vojnić, D., 2000. Europske zemlje u tranziciji na pragu XXI. stoljeća: gdje je Hrvatska—Quo Vadis Croatia (European Countries in transition on the eve of the 21st century: Quo Vadis Croatia). Ekonomski pregled, 51 (9–10), 829–66. Vjesnik, 2002. Stigla haaška optužnica za generala Bobetka (An indictment from The Hague has arrived for General Bobetko). September 20, 2002. ——— 2005. Pregovori odgođeni (Negotiations delayed). March 17, 2005. ——— 2008a. Rješenje ZERP-a ključno za nastavak pregovora s EU-om (A solution to ZERP is key to renewed EU negotiations). March 7, 2008. ——— 2008b. Čelnici stranaka danas o rješenju za ZERP (Party leaders will discuss solutions to ZERP today). March 11, 2008. Vojnić, D., 2003. European integration process: where is Croatia? Ekonomski pregled, 54 (1–2), 157–72. Zakošek, N., 2008. Democratization, state-building and war: the cases of Serbia and Croatia. Democratization, 15 (3), 588–610. Zakošek, N. and Čular, G., 2004. Croatia. In S. Berglund, J. Ekman, and F.H. Aarebrot (eds) The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 451–92. Zambelli, N., 2010. A journey westward: a poststructuralist analysis of Croatia’s identity and the problem of cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Europe-Asia Studies, 62 (10), 1661–82. Zielonka, J., 2007. The quality of democracy after joining the European Union. East European Politics and Societies, 21 (1), 162–80.

Chapter 3

The Discourse on Europe: From the Return to Europe and the Escape from the Balkans to the European Union as a Solution of All National Problems Davor Pauković

Introduction Since the beginning of the liberalization and democratization process in the late 1980s, the concept of Europe has played a major role in Croatian political discourse. The meaning of this concept changed depending on the context in which it was employed. In this chapter the concept of Europe has a twofold meaning. First, as a civilizational community of equal and sovereign nations during the early 1990s, and second, after 2000, as a synonym for the European Union and the accession process. The political discourse depicted and analyzed in this chapter is divided into three main periods, i.e. discourse phases. The first period (1989–1992) encompasses the time of the break-up of communism and the creation of a sovereign state in late 1980s and early 1990s. During the initial phase of democratic transition, the newly formed political parties and civil society institutions stressed the need for changes which would allow the re-inclusion of Croatia in the “civilization achievements of developed Europe.” After the liberation from communist single-mindedness that had led society into a universal crisis, the dominant motif became the “return to Europe.” The second period (1992–2000) includes much of the 1990s, especially the second half of that decade. During the 1990s, the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) stressed that Croatia had “finally established full statehood” and achieved the “detachment from the Balkans.” The party pointed out that Croatia did not belong to the Balkans on a “cultural and civilization level.” This period was marked by emphasis on hard-won full national and state sovereignty. Regarding Europe, i.e. the EU, one can say that during the 1990s a discourse on the “escape from the Balkans” dominated, which also meant a lack of confidence in the process of European integration, because the ruling elite interpreted the insistence on regional cooperation as an attempt to create a new Yugoslavia (see also Paić, 2006). The third period (2000–2013) began with the change of government in 2000 and represents a fundamental shift from a political discourse with an emphasis

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on full state sovereignty towards a discourse of necessity of European and Atlantic integration, foremost aspects of EU accession.1 European integration was promoted as a top priority national goal. With the return of the reformed HDZ to power in late 2003, the pro-European discourse did not change, but was further strengthened under the leadership of the new party leader Ivo Sanader, who declared EU membership as his main goal. The lack of critical discourse about the EU was furthered by the consensus of parliamentary parties on EU membership, which agreed upon a so-called “Alliance for Europe” that meant the avoidance of partisan conflict over issues related to EU accession. Since 2000, the goal of achieving EU membership as a solution to all problems slowly began to replace the solution of the “national question” that was believed to resolve all state problems. However, in recent years (2009–2013) more space in political discourse is given to topics related to necessary reforms associated with the accession process. The main reason for this change can be found in the current economic crisis that hardly affected some EU members. The third period can therefore be divided in two subperiods, the second of which contains a softening of EU dogmatism and a more objective approach to reforms needed for Croatia to achieve full membership. Research Framework In this chapter, an analysis of the political discourse in Croatia from 1990 to EU accession in 2013 is given. The political discourse taken into account is limited to examples derived from public addresses, including interviews and speeches made by leading political actors in the given period: the President, the Prime Minister and the leaders of main parliamentary parties. For an assessment of the first period, program documents and individual texts of party bulletins are analyzed, because they were often the only means of examining opinions for the newly established anti-communist opposition. The second period is almost exclusively limited to Tuđman, who in his speeches and public addresses shaped the political discourse of the dominant HDZ during the 1990s. The main emphasis is the analysis of the societal context which produced a specific political discourse. Therefore, this endeavor follows the steps of critical discourse analysis, which examines a particular ideological outlook and underlying power relations and hierarchies conveyed by a piece of text or speech (Fairclough, 1995, p. 32). Political discourse is, therefore, a specific linguistic form of political action which will be examined here through the public address of key actors mentioned above (Van Dijk, 1997, pp. 12–20). It is well grounded in the theory that political discourse can preserve values and identities, support dominant historic narratives and suppress alternatives, shape collective senses of belonging and 1 Similar changes can be observed in other post-communist countries. For Polish example see Krzyzanowski (2009).

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justify and incite collective action. Also, the strategic use of political language includes coercion, legitimization and delegitimization, as well as representation and misrepresentation (Gee, 1999, pp. 20–22; Chilton, 2004, pp. 45–6). The assessment of the specific aspects of the political discourse will try to justify the division in the three distinct periods under discussion and provide the background context which produced and reproduced a given type of political discourse. The First Period: Back to Europe (1989–1992) From 1989 to 1992 when the breakdown of the communist system took place, liberalization and initiation of political transition in Croatia differs in certain aspects from concurrent processes in other countries of communist Europe. Along with similar transformation processes which have left their mark on the whole Eastern Bloc (see Pridham and Lewis, 1996; Roland, 2000; Zielonka, 2001; Gill, 2002; Klingemann et al., 2006; Paić, 2006; Møller, 2009), Croatia has also taken part in the vertigo of the break-up of federal Yugoslavia during wartime. Political transition in Croatia occurred simultaneously with the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the building of nation-states. In addition, the transition and consolidation of democracy were hampered by the war (see more in Zakošek, 2008). The struggle for statehood and sovereignty has marked the process of political transition as well as the prevailing political discourse, including the discourse on Europe. The dominant political goal of establishing an independent and sovereign state, i.e. an abandonment of the Yugoslav federation, has left its imprint on the perception of Europe and European integration. In this period, the discourse on Europe had two meanings. First, it concerned a return to Europe as a community of civilized peoples which respects democratic rights and general humanist norms towards which Croatia (Yugoslavia) was expected to strive. Second, this meant the concrete act of accession into the European Community. Regarding this second meaning, the discourse did not involve any dealing with the functioning and real content of the European Community. The approach of European Community membership was understood as a confirmation of a process of societal transformation towards European standards, but also as an endorsement of the sovereign status of Croatia as a new European state, while inclusion in the new community neglected the fact that accession also meant a certain degree of shared sovereignty. During 1989, at a time when opposition forces were forming in Croatia and contesting the government’s reluctance to accept them as legitimate political actors, the invoking of Europe and the European Community served to apply pressure on the government to allow political activities beyond communist institutional confines. Specifically, until the fall of 1989, the prevailing viewpoint among Croatian communists was that socialist democracy was to be developed through the concept of so-called non-partisan pluralism, which meant that the opposition was to act through the Socialist Alliance and should not question the

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basic principles of the political and societal regime.2 Marking the tercentennial anniversary of the French Revolution, the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance (HSLS), the first truly oppositional party in Croatia, organized, together with the Society for Yugoslav–European Cooperation, a round table in Zagreb which culminated in the adoption of the Zagreb Statement (July 14, 1989), a document that included a number of points demanding reforms which in their content meant a transformation of the communist system into a democratic and free trade society. The Statement’s conclusion indicated that the demanded reforms at the same time represented prerequisites for European Community membership (Bilten HSLS, 1989). In October of 1989, in Slovenia opposition initiatives, mostly from Croatia and Slovenia, gathered and issued the Otočec ob Krki Statement, which, among other things, demanded the recognition of opposition forces and implementation of reforms geared towards democratization. The last item of the Statement demanded “a swift undertaking of all necessary measures and actions which are required for the accession of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the European Community” (Glasilo HSLS, 1989). In early 1989 it is the leitmotif of Europeanization through the adoption of political pluralism, as opposed to Milošević’s orchestrated “anti-bureaucratic revolution,” that can be followed in the political discourse of the opposition. This began with interviews and statements of the ever-more publicly present leaders of, at that time still unrecognized, opposition initiatives (for example Lerotić, 1989, pp. 11–13) and was later expanded during the 1990 election campaign through programmatic documents of newly formed and registered opposition political parties. The Elections, Forming of the New Political Regime and the Statehood Struggle At the time of the first multiparty elections in spring 1990, the views of various political actors regarding the “return to Europe” varied significantly. For example, the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance (HSLS), one of the major parties during the initial democratic transition, stressed the rights of the individual as the highest value through which society would “organically return to Europe.” In addition, in its program documents before the 1990 election, the party demanded that Yugoslavia immediately submit a request for membership in the then European Community (EC). According to the HSLS, by remaining outside of a united Europe, Croatia would be “doomed to poverty and long-term backwardness in all respects” (Đurić et al., 1990, pp. 211, 215). Moreover, EC membership, as mentioned before, was also expected to facilitate the resolution of Yugoslavia’s inter-ethnic problems. 2 The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) was a mass organization comprising almost all adult inhabitants, which served the purpose of mobilizing citizens and channeling their social and political activities along communist lines.

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Some political actors in Yugoslavia believed that the country could become a member of the European Community in 1992 and thus put an end to the state crisis. Most political actors saw “Europe” and the European Community as a possible solution to the Yugoslav crisis. Regarding this, it is interesting to note the thoughts of the first president of HSLS, Slavko Goldstein, who, in an interview given immediately after the first election, said that the Eastern enlargement of the European Community was especially important for Yugoslavia. He pointed out that in the new Europe, which was taking shape, borders would lose their significance, so that it would be irrelevant whether Yugoslavia would join the community as a single entity or a loose confederation of individual states. Goldstein concluded that the clashes between Yugoslav republics and nations could only find a successful solution inside Europe (Babić, 1990, p. 13). In the context of a deepening of the Yugoslav crisis and the worsening of inter-ethnic relations during the summer of 1990, HSLS publicly appealed to European institutions, including the European Parliament, to serve as a negotiations mediator between democratically elected representatives of Yugoslav republics in order to establish their new relations “in the spirit of European principles of democracy” (Vjesnik, 1990, p. 2). After the adoption of the multiparty system, the reformed communists (SKHSDP)3 tried to emphasize their reformist course to prove that their acceptance of full democratization was not a result of various pressures, but of their genuine political reorientation. This ideological change included an abandonment of Marxism and building a new identity on the foundations of the European Left. This policy shift was followed by an electoral slogan: “The European Left is our premier political interlocutor.” The joining of the European Community was highlighted with a special chapter in the party’s election program, with an accent placed on active participation in the process of European integration (Naše teme, 1990, pp. 622–47). The discourse on Europe employed by HDZ, the party that won the first multiparty elections in Croatia and during its decade-long rule led the republic towards war victory and state sovereignty, but also towards certain autocratic regime characteristics, had several dimensions. In the election campaign before the first multiparty election, HDZ advocated the inclusion of Croatia (and Yugoslavia) in the European Community in its program documents (Đurić et al., 1990, pp. 62, 69–70). Given that democratic transition in Croatia was marked by the national question and the question of statehood on the basis of which HDZ won the elections, “Europe” was more emphasized in the context of membership of Croatia and the Croatian people (as “one of the oldest European nations”) in “Western civilization” and the “community of European nations.” This was also an expression of the will to legitimize the Croatian right to self-determination and an independent state. In his speech at the constitutive session of the first multiparty 3 After its reformation, the League of Communists of Croatia (SKH) added the acronym SDP (Party of Democratic Change). In 1992, the party was renamed to Social Democratic Party of Croatia, retaining the same acronym.

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Sabor4 on May 30, 1990, Tuđman declared Europeanization of Croatia, i.e. a return to the European cultural tradition and inclusion in the European Community, as immediate goals of the new government. He also stated that the process of integration into the European Community should enable Croatia to secure its sovereignty and swift progress (Tuđman, 1990). The discourse on the return to Europe, that is to say the escape from the Balkans, was very common in Tuđman’s public rhetoric. For example, he concluded his speech at the HDZ General Committee in mid-June of 1990 with an advocacy of implementation of a series of reforms which would aide Croatia in leaving the “long imposed Balkanism” return to “the spiritual and cultural environs where it belongs,” which is Europe (Glasnik HDZ, 1990, p. 10). The party discourse on Europe is dominated by this component of the return to a community of sovereign European nations. The return to Europe was meant to fulfill the function of the long-desired recognition of national sovereignty and the right to an independent state. The discourse of escape from the Balkans, which had already emerged in this period, was later amplified with a fear of new Balkans economic and political associations and marked the entire decade. After electoral victory, the main goal was establishment of full Croatian sovereignty, i.e. the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis either through a confederal reorganization or break-up. The discourse on European integration was thus used in an affirmative stance towards the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. On May 30, 1990, Tuđman defended the confederal solution for Yugoslavia by referring to the historic creation of the European Community (Tuđman, 1990, pp. 16–20). Further, the official confederacy proposal, issued by Slovenia and Croatia in October 1990, pointed out in its preamble that the confederal solution also bore a role in “instigating processes of integration among all contemporary European nations and states” (Predsjedništvo Republike Hrvatske, September 12, 1990, p. 7). The deterioration of the Yugoslav crisis and the subsequent war were the final episode of this period which brought about a gradual change of the discourse on Europe and the European Community. In Croatia, the dominant emphasis in domestic policy was, naturally, on military defense of sovereignty, while foreign policy concentrated on international recognition. In this context, Europe as the European Community was viewed as an external actor which should play a major role in stopping the war. Tuđman’s speeches in this period, including those given prior to the independence referendum in May 1991, the public appeal to citizens at the outbreak of total war in October 1991 and when joining the United Nations in May 1992, no longer contained references to European Community accession.5 The emphasis was now on Croatia’s right to sovereignty and statehood. In this period there was an idealization of Europe and the European Community. This idealization included the process of European integration, European democracy, European civilizational achievements and, above all, European 4 The Croatian parliament. 5 A collection of Tuđman’s most important speeches from 1989 to 1999 is available online at http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-govori-index.htm.

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influence and capabilities in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. The idealization ceased with the outbreak of open armed conflict and an ever-growing dissatisfaction of the Croatian political leadership because of the perceived lack of willingness of Europe to stop the war in Croatia. Despite this, a certain level of idealist approach has remained an integral part of the discourse about Europe to the present day. The Second Period: The Struggle for National Sovereignty and Mistrust Towards Europe (1992–2000) The international recognition and affirmation of Croatia in the first half of 1992, the signing of a ceasefire and the arrival of United Nations peacekeeping forces created for a moment an impression of a beginning of the end of the turbulent period of the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, soon war broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the attempts at finding a political solution in Croatia did not yield any results, while the lack of determination on behalf of the international community and no clear vision on the solution to the Yugoslav crisis pushed the Croatian leadership towards an ever-stronger shift of political discourse on international actors. A gradual rise of mistrust towards the international community, especially towards Europe, marked the whole of the 1990s. Tuđman’s disappointment with the lack of understanding of international actors for Croatia’s actions was apparent in many speeches and interviews given in the ensuing period. The second level of declining relations with the international community concerned Tuđman’s domestic policies. Explicitly, there were increasingly frequent critiques of the authoritarian features of the new regime, especially regarding the government’s relations towards the opposition party and the media. Tuđman rejected these criticisms by claiming that they were a consequence of “neo-communist” and “Yugoslav unionist” propaganda. After the military operation Maslenica in January 1993, in which the Croatian Army regained control over a section of territory in northern Dalmatia, the international community’s reaction was intensely negative and included threats of sanctions. In an interview given to the German newspaper Der Spiegel immediately after the operation, Tuđman expressed his bafflement at Germany’s lack of understanding for the Croatian military operation and, amongst other things, said “we were at war, we had no friends in Europe, yet we still created a modern Croatia” (dr. Franjo Tuđman—službene stranice, 1993). In almost all of his most significant interviews, Tuđman stressed the Croatian historic right to statehood by quoting at length episodes of national history which expressed sovereign decisions.6 A fear of “enemies of Croatian sovereignty” marked the government’s political discourse during the 1990s. This fear was not solely about international actors, but was also extended in domestic affairs. Thus, critique of the government’s policy was often qualified as opposition to Croatian 6 All of these events are listed in the Preamble (Historical Foundations) of the first Croatian Constitution, adopted in December 1990.

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independence and sovereignty, i.e. a critique of HDZ was equated to an opposition to Croatia. During the entire decade, HDZ maintained the characteristics of a national movement, whereby distinctions between state and party structures were often blurred (Kasapović, 1996, p. 171; Pauković, 2012, pp. 207–8). After the War (1995–2000) Distrust towards the international community continued after the war. In a speech marking the first anniversary of the military operation Storm in August 1996, Tuđman stated that EU and NATO representatives had asked Croatia to join a “Balkans confederation” or a “union of Southeastern Europe,” yet the “firm stance” of Croatia’s government at least temporarily pushed back such threats (Spomen stranica predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana, 1996a). The delay in the process of Croatian integration into European and Atlantic associations was interpreted as a sign of reluctance on the part of some international actors to support an independent Croatian state. Tuđman explicitly voiced such views upon the admission of Croatia into the Council of Europe in November 1996. On this occasion, he stressed the “fear” of any Balkan integration as a precondition for European integration. Tuđman warned that “the imposition of unsustainable regional frameworks” could, “in the near future, lead to new tragic events.” He added that if a regional association were to be insisted upon, then Croatia should join with the Adriatic-Danubian countries, where Croatia had close connections and a sense of belonging, rather than the Balkan countries (Spomen stranica predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana, 1996b). Tuđman held his most prominent speech on plans on new Balkans associations and alleged cooperation of the opposition parties with international enemies of Croatia independence in November 1996 at Zagreb Airport, having returned from medical treatment in the United States where he was diagnosed with gastric cancer: We will not let those remnants of the Yugo-Communist system, nor those of the Yugo-Serbian one, onto the state of affairs which we have found in Croatia at the moment of establishment of Croatian freedom and democracy. We will not let them bring all that into question. We will not allow this to these Yugo-Communist remnants, nor to those political amateurs, headless scatterbrains, who don’t see what we are really dealing with today in Croatia and in the world with all sorts of regional plans […] We will not let those who tie themselves even to the black devil against Croatian freedom and independence, not only to the black, but also to green and yellow devils […] We will not let those who tie themselves to all opponents of Croatian independence, not only tie themselves to them, but they also offer themselves to them, not only do they offer themselves but they sell themselves for thirty pieces of silver, as they themselves boast that they’re receiving donations from all sorts of world centers of power, ranging in their connections from fundamentalist extremists to various false preachers and pseudo-democratic deceivers which preach to us great ideas of human rights and media freedoms. (wikisource.org)

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Due to the fears of a new Balkan integration, the 1997 constitutional amendments featured a clause on the prohibition of any Balkan state associations (see also Spomen stranica predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana, 1997). Tuđman deemed criticism of his government, which came both from the opposition parties and the international community, as an attempt to overthrow the HDZ and destabilize Croatia, which would, among other things, mean a creation of a docile Croatia, eligible for inclusion in new Balkan and Yugoslav associations (Spomen stranica predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana, 1998). On the tenth anniversary of the founding of HDZ Tuđman said in his speech before the party General Committee that Croatia accepted (European) integration, yet it accepted such integration in which we would stay an independent homeland, such integration in which we will implement our own thought as well, our own contribution, in which we will not be anybody’s pawn and nobody’s anonymous for execution of any kind. (Spomen stranica predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana, 1999)

He pointed out that there were various policies and interests in the European Union and that Croatia paid most attention to developing relations with the United States, but also with the EU and its individual member states. In this speech he also warned of the danger of Balkan integrations which he deemed contrary to Croatian national interests (Spomen stranica predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana, 1999). During the 1990s a discourse on the “escape from the Balkans” dominated, which also meant a lack of confidence in the process of European integration, because the ruling elite interpreted the insistence on regional cooperation as an attempt to create a new Yugoslavia (see also Paić, 2006). The end of the 1990s was marked by an ever-growing opposition critique of HDZ and its policies. The critique of democratic deficits of the regime, voiced by the opposition, started receiving stronger support in the international community which openly backed government change, i.e. a consolidation of democratic arenas and an opening towards integration processes. Opposition parties began to collaborate closely to achieve common victory in the next parliamentary election. The most important aspect was the cooperation of HSLS and SDP, while public attention was drawn to the successful meeting of HSLS president Dražen Budiša and leader of the reformed communists (SDP) Ivica Račan and their signing of a coalition agreement (savjest.com, 2009). Soon, a coalition of six opposition parties was formed which demanded early elections. The Third Period: European Integration as a Main Political Goal (2000–2013) The victory of the allied opposition in 2000 after the decade-long rule of HDZ represented a turning point in Croatian politics. This government change hastened the process of consolidation of democratic arenas in domestic policy, while in

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foreign policy it meant the beginning of the exit from isolationism and the start of the process of European and Atlantic integration. Shortly before this, in mid-1999, the EU Council of Ministers adopted the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) as a long-term strategy for developing of relations between the EU and the countries of south-eastern Europe. This included the development of economic relations with the EU, regional cooperation and ultimately the prospect of EU membership. The SAP called for the conclusion of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with each country involved in the process. Negotiations on the EU and the Croatian SAA began during the Zagreb Summit in November 2000. Finally, the SAA was signed in October 2001 and entered into force on February 1, 2005. The process of convergence with the EU continued in the next period, with a few interruptions. After the conclusion of the negotiations process, which was halted on several occasions, Croatia became a full EU member on July 1, 2013. The 2000 election meant a change in the discourse on European integration, which henceforth was promoted as a top priority national goal (see also index.hr, 2003). We can notionally accept the viewpoint expressed by Sharon Fisher on the defeat of the tentatively called “nationalists” and the victory of the “Europeans,” not only in elections but also in public discourse (Fisher, 2006, pp. 149–69). This also meant a change in policy towards the ICTY and the adoption of the principle of regional cooperation which the EU had insisted upon as part of the SAP. Since then, a certain dogmatism about EU membership as the top national priority has developed, an achievement that would presumably lead to the resolution of major state issues. It seems that since 2000, the goal of achieving EU membership as a solution to all problems started to slowly replace the solution of the “national question” that was believed to resolve all state problems. With the return of the reformed HDZ to power in late 2003, the pro-European discourse did not change, but was further strengthened under the leadership of the new party leader and Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, who declared EU membership as his main goal. The lack of critical discourse about the EU was furthered by the consensus of parliamentary parties on EU membership, which agreed upon a so-called “Alliance for Europe” that meant the avoidance of partisan conflict over issues related to EU accession. In 2005, the Croatian parliament established a National Committee for Monitoring of Accession Negotiations as an expression of this consensus. The pro-accession argument often used by the political elite was reduced to emphasizing that “no country so far has asked to leave the Union” or that “everyone who entered lived better than before accession.” This argument is coupled with the underdeveloped public discourse in Croatia about the main problems and issues facing the EU itself (see also Rodin, 2007, pp. 3–15). In this period, the numerous statements of the Croatian political leadership on the EU were dominated by general remarks on the necessity and positive impact of integration. On Europe Day, in May 2007, President Stjepan Mesić stated: “The European Union is a millennium endeavor to which there is not alternative for us, because, in order to develop, we have to integrate with those more developed than us” (dnevnik.hr, 2007). At a lecture given in 2008 in Essen, Germany, Prime

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Minister Ivo Sanader, among other things, pointed out that “Croatia historically belonged to Europe” and added that “Croatia would profit from the European Union, just as well as the European Union will profit from Croatia” (danas.hr, 2008). The importance of EU accession was often compared to the attainment of independence, making it the second most important national strategic goal. In this regard Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor said in her 2010 Christmas address: EU accession is a strategic goal which we have set 20 years ago when we embarked on the fulfillment of the Croatian people’s thousand-year-old dream of its own sovereign, democratic, independent and European state […] I am convinced that next year, when on 25 June we will celebrate the 20th anniversary of the historic decision of the Croatian Parliament on the independence of the Republic of Croatia, we will also be able to say that after having established and defended our state we have also fulfilled the goal of the state’s homecoming—back to Europe, the political, economic and civilizational circle where Croatia has always belonged. (Poslovni dnevnik, 2010)

In accordance with such an approach, much more discussion was dedicated to the date of Croatia’s EU accession and not to the necessary reforms needed for Croatia’s equal participation in the EU common market. The low visibility of European issues and debates around specific structural problems is largely derived from the specific problems that Croatia faced, which are predominantly derived from its historical legacy. The result was that the topics which provoked most attention were those that expressed a conflict of the national and the supranational sphere of governance. This is connected to the cooperation with the ICTY and the border conflicts with Slovenia. However, it should be noted that in recent years (2009–2013) more public and media space is given to topics related to necessary reforms associated with the accession process. The reasons for this change can be found in the resolution (or calming down) of issues stemming from Croatia’s historic legacy, as well as in the current economic crisis. For example, in 2010, we could observe an overemphasizing of the possible positive impact of the EU cohesion funds on Croatia’s economy. After the 2008 financial and economic crisis the statements on the positive impact of Croatia’s EU accession became somewhat more cautious, yet there was no substantial change in the generally positive political discourse on Europe. Thus the new Prime Minister Zoran Milanović (SDP) stated in his report to the Sabor on the accession progress in January 2012: The situation is not marvelous, yet the EU is still the most ordered, sociologically, ecologically, economically and regulation-wise most demanding community which the human race has built in all times and places. It has the highest standards of human rights protection, tolerance of diversity, investment, incentives, harmonization and prevention of inequalities […] We are entering into something that we know to be good, which is right here before our eyes,

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yet which undergoes change, a fact which we should always bear in mind. There the successful and the less successful ones, it is up to us to get the best out of us, out of EU, to enter the Union and to let the Union enter Croatia, in order to make Croatia more stable, stronger and more independent. (NATO.hr, 2012)

Despite the ever more pronounced crisis in Croatia and in several EU member states, the country did not experience a rise in a noteworthy Euroskeptic political discourse. While one could see a rising frequency of Eurorealist remarks on the economic unpreparedness for accession (e.g. low capacity for participation in the Common Market), a certain degree of dogmatism and idealism regarding EU membership has remained present in the political discourse until accession in 2013. Conclusion The three periods of political discourse on Europe analyzed in this chapter have seen different levels of intensity and presence in the given time frame. In the initial period of political transition and state-building the discourse on Europe is marginal and mostly serves the purpose of tangible political actions or interests. Thus “European values” of pluralism and respect of civilizational achievements were employed in the context of the struggle against dogmatic anti-reformist forces in Yugoslavia, while the right to statehood was legitimized through the appeal to Croatia’s belonging to the European community of nations and to European culture. The advocacy of Croatia’s participation in European integration processes was justified not only as a means of economic and societal progress, but also as a way towards a possible solution to the Yugoslav crisis. In this initial phase, the discourse on Europe was attractive and acceptable to everybody and all political actors used it in an affirmative manner because Europe was synonymous with progressiveness and the goal to be reached, either as a civilizational and democratic achievement or as a concrete process of European integration through the European Community. However, the outbreak of total war, the perception of Europe’s (European Community) incapability in stopping the conflict and the realization that the European actors were divided over solutions to the Yugoslav crisis led to a long period of resignation towards European integration. The first half of the 1990s was marked by wartime and the growing dissatisfaction of the Croatian leadership with the international community. This dissatisfaction related to the insufficient results of the United Nations peacekeeping missions and the lack of understanding of Croatian military operations. In the second half of the 1990s the main reason for the often negative discourse employed by the Croatian government towards international actors, especially the EU, was a result of increasingly frequent criticism of the undemocratic characteristics of HDZ rule. However, the main reason for a negative discourse on the EU, i.e. European integration, stemmed from Tuđman’s belief that Croatia

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was being pushed into a new Balkans association. His viewpoint that the world in general and Europe in particular were full of enemies of Croatian independence led the state towards a certain level of isolationism. The political discourse of the ruling party used every opportunity to emphasize the main goal, full state sovereignty and independence, won through war. This emphasis is best seen in the speeches and interviews given by the first Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman. His fears of a forging of new Yugoslav associations in world centers of power were further exacerbated by the European Commission strategy of regional cooperation as a prerequisite of progress towards EU membership. The second factor which prevented approaching the EU in the second half of the 1990s was the ever louder critiques of the quality of democracy in Croatia, voiced by international actors. Tuđman vehemently dismissed all criticism, because he understood it to be part of the plan to bring down the HDZ government and place the opposition parties in power. The growing political and social discontent in Croatia resulted in government change in 2000. This was the first government change in the new sovereign state, yet Tuđman failed to live to see it, as he died in December 1999. The third phase of political discourse development, which began with the victory of the united opposition at the 2000 election, was marked by democratic consolidation and a movement towards processes of European integration. The discourse on national sovereignty was relatively abruptly exchanged for a discourse on European integration. EU accession became the main national strategic goal: it was declared that there was no alternative: therefore accession could not be subject to any critique in the political mainstream. In this context, a consensus of parliamentary parties was achieved, which meant avoidance of partisan competition over EU affairs. Partisan discord could mostly be seen over the issue of which party, i.e. the ruling administration, contributed most to EU accession. A pronounced idealism towards Croatia’s EU membership precluded any noticeable debate on the substantial issues which would face the country upon accession, while the discourse on the issues faced by the EU itself was completely marginal. Since accession, this last issue has become even more pronounced, yet it is related to the general, Europe-wide criticism of the democratic deficit of the EU, i.e. the issue of a project conceived by political elites and with which the people of Europe have not identified in a satisfactory manner. Croatian political elite deals with the issues pertaining to the functioning of the EU and the democratic deficits of EU institutions are largely in line with political elites in other member states. Two key processes have left their mark on Croatia since the establishment of statehood in the early 1990s and have had a crucial influence on the political discourse and political legitimation. The first pertains to the building, defense and affirmation of the state and was marked by emphasis on national sovereignty, myths and symbols. Together with the democratic elections, statehood won and confirmed by war represented a foundation of legitimacy of the political system during the 1990s. Thus, the motif of preservation of the hard-won national sovereignty dominated the political discourse. International affirmation was sought through an “escape from the Balkans” and inclusion in international

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associations, i.e. recognition of Croatia as a Central European and Mediterranean country which belongs to the West. The second process, which began after the 2000 change of government, pertains to the process of inclusion in European and Atlantic integrations, i.e. the EU and NATO. This process had its foundation in a new political discourse which differed from that of the 1990s in several key aspects. Foremost, accession to the supranational EU includes a partial transfer of sovereignty on common EU institutions which is in direct opposition to one of the key discursive elements of the political narrative of the 1990s—the safeguarding of full national sovereignty. The most visible problem arises from the fact that a very short timespan has passed between a war-like exit from one state association and the process of joining another supranational organization. Yet the most important issues were those stemming from the historic legacy which reproduced the contradictions of the 1990s discourse and current policies which created and necessitated a different discourse. This was most apparent in the cases of border disputes with Slovenia and relations with the Hague Tribunal. These cases demanded tangible political decisions through which the political elite was forced to express its stance regarding the existing contradiction of the two discourses. The gravity of decisions connected with the problems mentioned are witness to the fact that there were still conflicting discursive elements to which the political elite had no clear answers. Although the last 10 years were dominated by a discourse on European integrations which managed to justify political and economic concessions as part of achieving a first-priority national goal (EU membership), the 1990s discourse still remains strong (Pauković, 2013, pp. 106–7). References Chilton, P., 2004. Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice. London and New York: Routledge. Đurić, D., Munjin, B. and Španović, S., 1990. Stranke u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: NIRO Radničke novine. Fairclough, N., 1995. Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. London and New York: Longman. Fisher, S., 2006. Political Change in Post-communist Slovakia and Croatia: From Nationalist to Europeanist. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Gee, J.P., 1999. An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method, 2nd edn. London and New York: Routledge. Gill, G., 2002. Democracy and Post-communism: Political Change in the Postcommunist World. London and New York: Routledge. Kasapović, M., 1996. Demokratska tranzicija i političke stranke: razvoj političkih stranaka i stranačkih sustava u Istočnoj Europi. Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science. Klingemann, H.-D., Fuchs, D. and Zielonka, J. (eds), 2006. Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge.

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Krzyżanowski, M., 2009. On the “Europeanisation” of identity constructions in Polish political discourse after 1989. In A. Galasinska and M. Krzyżanowski (eds) Discourse and Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 95–113. Møller, J., 2009. Post-communist Regime Change: A Comparative Study. London and New York: Routledge. Naše teme, 1990. Za miran, sretan život u suverenoj i demokratskoj Hrvatskoj (SDP election program). Naše teme, 3–4, 622–47. Paić, H., 2006. Kroatien: Europa- und Balkanvorstellungen in Kroatien. In V. Džihić, S. Nadjivan, H. Paić and S. Stachowitsch (eds) Europa—verflucht begehrt: Europavorstellungen in Bosnien-Herzegowina, Kroatien und Serbien. Vienna: Braumüller, 95–156. Pauković, D., 2012. The role of history in legitimizing politics in transition in Croatia. In D. Pauković, V. Pavlaković and V. Raos (eds) Confronting the Past: European Experiences. Zagreb: Political Science Research Centre, 183–219. ——— 2013. Nacionalna izgradnja u Hrvatskoj: suverenitet između nacionalnog i nadnacionalnog. In D. Gavrilović (ed.) Croatian-Serbian Relations: Minority Rights-fight Against Discrimination. Novi Sad: Centar za istoriju, demokratiju i pomirenje, 97–107. Pridham, G. and Lewis, P.G. (eds), 1996. Stabilising Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge. Rodin, S., 2007. Divergencija javnog diskursa u Hrvatskoj i Europskoj uniji—uzroci i posljedice.Politička misao, 44 (2), 3–15. Roland, G., 2000. Transition and Politics: Politics, Markets, and Firms. London and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Van Dijk, T.A., 1997. What is political discourse analysis? Belgian Journal of Linguistics, 11 (1), 11–52. Zakošek, N., 2008. Democratization, state-building and war: the cases of Serbia and Croatia. Democratization, 15 (3), 588–610. Zielonka, J. (ed.), 2001. Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe: Volume 1: Institutional Engineering. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Media Sources Babić, J., 1990. Opozicija je spremna. Danas, May 8, 12–14. Bilten HSLS, 1989. 200. Obljetnica francuske revolucije. August 23, 3–4. danas.hr, 2008. Sanader: EU će profitirati od Hrvatske. Available at http://danas. net.hr/hrvatska/sanader-eu-ce-profitirati-od-hrvatske, accessed November 1, 2013. dnevnik.hr, 2007. Mesić: EU je milenijski pothvat, NATO kišobran sigurnosti. May 5, 2007. Available at http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/mesic-eu-je-milenijskipothvat-nato-kisobran-sigurnosti.html, accessed November 3, 2013.

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Glasilo HSLS, 1989. Izjava iz Otočeca. Glasilo HSLS, October 31, 8. Glasnik HDZ, 1990. Glavni naglasci iz govora dr. Franje Tuđmana. Glasnik HDZ, June 28, 9–10. index.hr, 2003. Račan predao zahtjev za članstvo u EU. Available at http://www. index.hr/vijesti/clanak/racan-predao-zahtjev-za-clanstvo-u-eu/120155.aspx, accessed November 1, 2013. Lerotić, Z., 1989. Evropeizam kao ideologija. Danas, January 24, 11–13. NATO.hr, 2012. Milanović: EU donosi dobro. Available at http://www.nato.hr/ milanovic-eu-donosi-dobro, accessed November 3, 2013. Poslovni dnevnik, 2010. U 2011.afirmirat ćemo pravnu državu, izaći iz recesije i završiti pregovore s EU, December 25, 2010. Available at http://www.poslovni. hr/vijesti/kosor-u-2011-afirmirat-cemo-pravnu-drzavu-izaci-iz-recesije-i-zavr siti-pregovore-s-eu-167557#, accessed November 1, 2013. Predsjedništvo Republike Hrvatske, 1990. Nacrt ugovora o jugoslavenskoj konfederaciji. Večernji list, October 12, 7–8. savjest.com, 2009. Nikada nisam bio nacionalist. Available at http://intervjui.sav jest.com/intervju.php?s_vjest_id=22&nikada-nisam-bio-nacionalist, accessed November 2, 2013. Spomen stranica predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana, 1996a. Govor u prigodi prve obljetnice Oluje. Available at http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-14. htm, accessed November 1, 2013. ——— 1996b. Govor u prigodi primanja Republike Hrvatske u članstvo Vijeća Europe. Available at http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-15.htm, accessed November 1, 2013. ——— 1997. Poslanica Predsjednika Republike Hrvatskom državnom saboru. Available at http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-18.htm, accessed November 4, 2013. ——— 1998. Govor na Središnjem odboru Hrvatske demokratske zajednice. Available at http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-20.htm, accessed November 4, 2013. ——— 1999. Govor na Glavnom odboru u povodu desete obljetnice HDZ-a. Available at http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-22.htm, accessed November 7, 2013. Tuđman, F., 1990. Pristupna riječ predsjednika dr. Franje Tuđmana. Glasnik HDZ, June 11, 16–20. ——— službene stranice, 1993. Oslobađamo vlastitu zemlju. Available at http:// www.tudjman.hr/intervju-dat-der-spiegelu-3-veljae-1993, accessed November 8, 2013. Vjesnik, 1990. Mirovni posrednici. Vjesnik, September 11, 2. wikisource.org. Govor Franje Tuđmana u Zračnoj luci Zagreb 23. studenog 1996. Available at http://hr.wikisource.org/wiki/Govor_Franje_Tu%C4%91mana_u_ Zra%C4%8Dnoj_luci_Zagreb_23._studenog_1996, accessed November 5, 2013.

Chapter 4

Croatia between the “Return” to Europe and the “Remaining” in the Balkans Nebojša Blanuša

Introduction As part of the independence movement in post-socialist Central and East European countries, the “return to Europe” discourse has been especially prominent and multifunctional in legitimizing national sovereignty and transitional politics in various ways and degrees. In Croatia it has also been the source for positive identification with democratic order and its values, as well as against the “spectre” of Yugoslavia. However, during the last two decades this identification has declined due to the negative impact of war, authoritarian rule in the 1990s, problematic elements of EU politics towards the Western Balkans and dysfunctional Croatian coping with the past and the present. Another temporal factor has been Croatia’s prolonged accession to the EU. These processes have created latent antagonism towards the EU and consequently turned positive identification with Europe into a dystopian sentiment. Shaped by historical legacy and the recent development of the Euro crisis, this sentiment, expressed in Eurosceptic and Europhobic attitudes, has acquired the particular form of perceiving the EU as a new Yugoslavia. On the other side, similarities between current Euro crisis and dissolutive processes in former Yugoslavia could not be ignored, especially from the perspective of those shaped by such trauma. So, the current crisis and post-political processes in the EU could have an extra negative impact in slowing down processes of further democratization and political consolidation of Croatia and capitalization of its economic opportunities. The purpose of this chapter is to trace these dynamics of Croatian political discourse and to show how they are evidenced in public opinion.1 First we discuss 1 All public opinion data are obtained and calculated from two sources. One is the longitudinal national election study conducted by the Faculty of Political Science (FPZ), University of Zagreb from 1990 to 2012. This study consists of six waves, following parliamentary elections in Croatia in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007, and 2012. Another source is the longitudinal study of the Delegation of the European Commission (DEC) in Croatia and the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs from 2000 to 2013. This study consists of 14 waves, each in every year, usually conducted in July or September. We use this opportunity to express our great thanks to these institutions for

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general functions of these “returning” and “remaining” political syntagmas. Through these lenses I will present dynamics of the last two decades of Croatian Europeanization. I will combine discourse analysis with large national survey results with to give a flavor of political meaning-making to general public perceptions and moods. In the quest for general recognition and national identity building in the early 1990s, the “return to Europe” was a prominent discourse among Croatian political elites and citizens. Such identification with Europe has been functional in two senses. In the first place, it has been established in the binary opposition against symbolic “remaining in the Balkans,” in the fiery dynamics relevant for understanding domestic and foreign politics in recent Croatian history. The second function of Europe was primarily identification with its democratic order and values, often only declarative, as well as with painstaking process of Europeanization of Croatian politics and public opinion. Dynamics of Binary Opposition As the opposite of the return to Europe, the discourse of remaining in the Balkans carries the meaning of historical void and lost time in the “life of the Nation,” imbued with suffering and living in an unnatural state with other nations, mostly (re)considered as barbaric and primitive. In the creation of self-projected national identity under conditions of severe war threat in 1991, the arch-enemy was, of course, the imaginary Serb, described as the “5 Bs” monster with political characteristics of “Balkanism, Barbarism, Byzantinism, Bolshevism and Balvanism” (Buden, 2000, p. 56). The development of war and territory occupation, as well as the absence of expected European military intervention, brought further identification with the role of martyrs, and paradoxically with the side of Europe in mentioned binary opposition. The role of the martyr was depicted in such a way as to imply that Croats are supposed to be better Europeans than Western Europeans, as expressed in in an October 1991 newspaper editorial: For almost three hundred years of an uninterrupted war of defense, Croatia has acquired the honest title antemurale christianitatis—the outer battlements of Western European Christian culture. But this title has cost us dearly […] Entire generations, one after another, have been sacrificed in defense of the whole European civilization. During these three centuries, when at that time the largest non-Christian power in the world has been destroying, devastating and conquering Croatia, the Western part of the Christian world has slept soundly behind its battlements and developed in every respect […] At the end of the allowing us to use and analyze the data. Responsibility for analysis and interpretation of data lies solely with the author of this chapter.

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20th century […] Croatia is once again defending Europe from this danger from the East. The Croats defend their homes and their system of values which have been built by Western democracy […] No one wants to intervene actively and that is a betrayal of what they owe to Croatia. (Buden, 2000, p. 59)

This was one point where identification with the actual rather than the not ideal Europe started to dissolve into mistrust, dislike and a perception of the hypocrisy of the European Community. Such changes are also observable in public opinion surveys. In that sense, perceived priority of Croatia’s integration in the EU decreased, especially from 1990 to 1992 (see Figure 4.1). Even in the following decade of more open international politics and the process of Europeanization, this issue never became as prominent as at the beginning of the 1990s. In May 1992 the award-winning journalist of the year, Danko Plevnik, wrote about the colonizing dangers of the European Community (EC) in the context of then recent Croatian international recognition. 60% 50% 40% 30% 20%

10% 0%

1990

Figure 4.1

1992

1995

2000

2003

2007

Perception of the priority of Croatia’s integration in the EU 1990–2012

2012

Note: These results are obtained from surveys conducted at the FPZ, on nationally representative samples. In a multiple-answer question, out of the 12 answers offered, the respondents were free to choose only three political goals estimated as the most important. After the survey in 2000 this question has been posed in a different way, methodologically incomparable to previous surveys. For that reason those results are presented separately in Figure 4.1. In surveys of 2003, 2007, and 2012 the question was to estimate to what degree respondent think the new government should focus on various political goals on a four-point scale (none, a bit, to a certain degree, a lot). Figure 4.1 presents the percentages of respondents who considered Croatia’s integration in the EU as a goal worth a lot of effort. Even in this more informative and non-coercive methodology this issues never again appeared so hot.

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Croatia and the European Union Croatia is facing the challenge of joining Europe. What kind of Europe? To the EC-Europe, EFTA-Europe, Mittel-Europe […] Which limb of Europe does Croatia wish to enter? There is no dispute here, in the EC-Europe. Yet, there are not only advantages, but also traps […] Embarking on the EC-Europe because of making more secure our state sovereignty is stupid since national sovereignty of economic premature babies and infants is visual deception in the new Europe […] EC-Europeanization is legal occupation of small states by the big ones, of small companies by the bigger ones, and ‘leasing’ of the cheapest working class […] What is declarative and doctrinarian, and what is deep interest of EC-Europeans? […] they were not concerned about the southEuropean ‘brothers’ during the war attacks […] One thing is obviously clear: whole European political history is against unification of Europe. The war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is a symptom of that fact. Instead of political humanism EC-Europe offered to its own ‘hearth’ repulsive charitable humanitarianism: ‘Stay there you lousy fellows.’ (Plevnik, 1992, p. 37)

Such ideas about the threat of Europe will become common features of Croatian hard Euroskepticism many years after these words were written. Hence, this binary opposition Europe vs. the Balkans has been functional for the last 20 years. During the 1990s this was the general framework of President Tuđjman’s isolationist politics, highly imbued with his misunderstandings of the EC and EU politics. To understand the ideological content of this binary opposition, his reactions towards different international initiatives for regional cooperation were especially informative. In 1991 he refused Croatian membership in the Visegrad group (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland), and in 1992 membership in Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), associations whose purpose was to prepare post-socialist countries for accession to the EU. According to him Croatia was much more developed than other countries and so should be the first to enter the EU, almost automatically (cf. Grubiša, Beširević, and Špehar, 2012, p. 2). This idea of Croatian superiority over other post-socialist states was not only based on nationalistic discourse that invented historical glory of antemurale christianitatis, but also on Croatia’s high economic status in former Yugoslavia and the implicit general stereotype of Yugoslavia’s exceptional position, expressed in soft socialism with Western products and an important role in the international politics.2 This stereotype, as one of the rare positive identifications with Balkans, is still present in Croatia, although the reasons for it disappeared long ago. The fiercest reactions of President Tuđjman against regional initiatives began in 1996. His rabid speech against the “Regional Approach” of EU politics 2 I owe this idea to Zoran Kurelić from his presentation “No carrot and no stick” at the conference Crisis of Politics and the Political, held at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb from May 30 to June 1, 2013. For counter-stereotypes and envy of Eastern Europeans towards Yugoslavia see Woodward (1993, p. 20).

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towards the Western Balkans in November 1996 was the culmination of this discourse. It reveals a rich imaginarium of inner and outer enemies whose main task was supposed to be to put Croatia back into the Balkan state. This was his notorious theory “Of Black, Yellow, and Green Devils”: We shall not allow to either the remains of the Yugo-Communist or the YugoSerbian system the situation we found in Croatia at the time of establishing of Croatian freedom and democracy. We shall not allow them to put it all into question. We shall not allow to these Yugo-Communist remains, or to those political dilettantes, headless muddle-heads who don’t see what is really going on today in Croatia and in the world with all sorts of regional plans […] We shall not allow to those who align themselves even with the black devil against Croatian freedom and independence, not only with the black, but also with green and yellow devils […] We shall not allow to those who align themselves with all adversaries of Croatian independence, not only align, but offer themselves, not only offer, but sell themselves for the Judas silver […] and they align themselves with all from fundamentalist extremists, to all sorts of false prophets, pseudo-democratic bluffers, who preach us today great ideas about human rights and freedom of media. (Ujakfranjo, 2008)

This interpretation is a distilled expression and central narrative of Croatian contemporary nationalism. The imaginarium it offers has been reproduced constantly and it is still present in the ideological spectrum of the right.3 President Tuđjman and senior state officials of the time reacted similarly to other ideas of regional integration, such as the Pan-Balkanian Confederation (Berković, 1996, p. 78), Euroslavia (Caracciolo, 1996, p. 48), and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) (Butković, 1997, pp. 2–4). The concrete consequence of these politics was the addition of a new paragraph in the Constitution that prohibits initiation of any process of restoration of a Yugoslav or Balkans state union (then 135 § 2, today 142 § 2). The last initiative, SECI, as well as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (initiated after NATO intervention in FR Yugoslavia in 1999) also produced huge public debates. After the USA proposed SECI “it was nearly impossible to turn on a television or radio or to open a newspaper in Croatia without learning of the imminent danger of a world conspiracy to force Croatia ‘back onto the Balkans’” (Lindstrom, 2003, p. 319). Until the 1999 this paranoid discourse was expressed in the theory of global conspiracy against Croatia, with Western “Great Powers” as the main threats to the Croatian independence and sovereignty (see especially Alaburić, 1998, p. 69; Matić, 1998, p. 3; Prosperov Novak, 1998, p. 16; Letica, 1999, p. 9). 3 Curiously, on the date of Croatia’s accession to the EU, neo-fascist singer Marko Perkovic Thompson organized a concert in Split as an alternative to official celebration of Croatia’s entry into the EU, starting it with the same speech.

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After the Death of President Tuđjman Discourse of the specter of Balkans did not cease after the death of President Tuđjman and the electoral success of a coalition of social-democrats and liberals in 2000. Although the 1990s was characterized by pro-European politics in Croatia, the specter continued to haunt its political reality. It reappeared in HDZ’s “proclamation to Croatian people at home and abroad” after President Mesić’s retirement of seven army generals who signed an open letter against the false presentation of the Homeland War. The proclamation was formulated as an accusation that the new government had enabled “deliberate erosion of the power and sovereignty of the Croatian state, with the ultimate goal to introduce Croatia into a Balkan association, in which it would soon lose its independence” (Croatian TV Archive, 2000). The new government had been proclaimed by the future prime minister Ivo Sanader as the “anti-Croatian communist regime” which “is trying to spill the glass of citizens bitterness over the brim of a civil war, lead to further rifts and a possible armed conflict within the Croatian people, and if this happens—Croatia will be no more!” (Croatian TV Archive, 2000). The Catholic Church in Croatia has also participated as an active supporter reiterating similar theories of the “great conspiracy of international community” (Butković, 2001, p. 7). Its Manichean rhetoric on the fight between Good and Evil continues today, usually accompanied with critique of social-democrats and governments led by them in Croatia (see e.g. Miklenić, 2014). At the start of the twenty-first century similar but less dramatic discourse was expressed and directed mostly against the EU as the “mastermind” of sinister plans for Balkan reintegration in various forms: against the supposed EU and Croatian government’s secret project of Balkanian customs and monetary union (Letica, 2001, p. 39); against economic reintegration of the Balkans (Lušić, 2003, p. 29); against a Balkan energy community (Đurić, 2004, pp. 12–15); trade integration of the region (Lovrić, 2006, p. 14.); the South-East Union as trade-off decision before EU integration (Sabalić, 2006, p. 98); a free trade Balkanian Union (Dorić, 2010); as well as against Tim Judah’s recent signifier “Yugosphere” (Judah, 2009, 2011; Sabalić, 2009). These ideas about the workings of different political protagonists “pushing” Croatia on the Balkans, usually dressed in some form of Yugoslav association, as well as endangering Croatian sovereignty, were not only part of high politics or media discourse. As we can observe from FPZ surveys from 2007 and 2012, on the level of public opinion they were and still are accepted by substantial numbers of Croatian citizens (Table 4.1). Interpretations of the hostility of the international community, expressed in the adversity to the independence of Croatia and punishment for the destruction of Yugoslavia through the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), were even in 2012 accepted by about half of Croatian citizens. It would be interesting to test this thinking now, after the acquittal of Croatian generals Gotovina and Markač, but also after the final decision in the ICTY case of Prlić and others, since in both cases President Tuđjman was named the leader of a joint criminal enterprise.

Croatia between the “Return” to Europe and the “Remaining” in the Balkans

Table 4.1

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Croatian conspiracy theories about Yugoslav and Western threats from 1990 to 2012 2007 (%)

In the course of aggression against Croatia, some great powers deliberately undermined its independence in order to preserve Yugoslavia. The International Court in the Hague was founded with the intention of punishing those responsible for the disintegration of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, abolishing distinctions between the aggressor and the victims and concealing the real role of great powers in this conflict. The so-called human rights activists who are recruited from yugonostalgic groups and collaborators of foreign secret services are the most dangerous enemies of Croatia. Since the mid-1990s, the parties which were then in opposition have been deliberately destabilizing the country and endangering its independence. The European Union is a conspiracy of big business the aim of which is to destroy national states. Far from the public eye, and contrary to the desire of its citizens, Croatia is attempting to join a new Balkan federation through regional integrations.

2012 (%)

Disagree

Not decided

Agree

Disagree

Not decided

Agree

7

18

75

6

40

54

17

27

56

12

41

47

39

31

30

26

49

25

50

31

19

30

48

22

46

28

26

29

42

29

59

26

15

33

45

22

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Other tendencies are also interesting. Between 2007 and 2012, perception of the EU as dangerous for national states increased. This can be interpreted as part of an already developed anti-Western sentiment, as well as growing Euroskepticism in the context of the Euro crisis. But the most bizarre is the growing tendency to think that Croatia will be pushed into a new Balkan federation, even though these results were obtained after the EU accession referendum, which was approved by a majority of voters. What is also interesting in 2012 survey results is a sort of escape into indecisiveness. This could be due to the introduction of younger generations in the sample, generations unaware or without direct experience of these controversial events, as well as a repression of the turbulent period of war and transition. Nevertheless, controversies are still present, haunting Croatian political reality. Previous research (Blanuša, 2009) shows that these conspiratorial interpretations are a part of the same type of political thinking about the “inner and outer enemies” of Croatia. They are highly significant predictors for electoral behavior in Croatia as well as deeply related to nationalistic and conservative ideological orientations, authoritarian potentials with inclination to the siege mentality and negative political attitudes towards democracy, the EU, etc. Moreover, ancestors (grandfathers and great-grandfathers) of people who believe in these conspiracy theories were more frequently members of military troops of the Independent State of Croatia, a quisling formation installed by Axis powers during the Second World War. They have more difficulty than other groups in coping with the recent past and refuse to accept or acknowledge Croatian crimes in the Homeland War (Blanuša, 2009). During the period from 1991 to today the described political discourse has created an ideological space in which identification with Europe has declined. Such discourse has been facilitated through several factors. First were the material, political, and socio-psychological war devastation. As a consequence, war language in Croatian political discourse is still present. Another factor is Tuđjman’s authoritarian rule in the 1990s that has also stimulated Balkanist stereotypes of Western leaders and journalists, who used them for criticizing and disciplining purposes against his pseudo-democratic regime. Balkanism has been a common discursive tool deployed by the West to explain and justify Croatia’s enormous fall in international standing, from being a promising emerging democracy and war victim to an international outcast (cf. Razsa and Lindstrom, 2004, p. 633). That has further stimulated Tuđjman’s anti-Western attitude. Through such dynamics a vicious circle of mutual distrust has been formed, reiterated, and vehemently expressed in the agonizing relationship with the Hague Tribunal. Although the mistrust has been slowly diminishing for the last 14 years, internalized stereotypes could easily be re-enacted in some new political dispute between Croatia and the EU. I will risk the hypothesis that, along with Croatian political leaders’ inconsistency, proverbial imprudence, unwillingness to change, which includes the problem of “simulating” democracy, as well as dysfunctional coping with the past, one reason for the prolonged process of accession can be seen in previously developed stereotypes and mutual mistrust. Also, the process

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of informing citizens about the EU, possible positive and negative effects, threats and opportunities for different segments of the population in the whole period was passive, rudimentary and completely inadequate. Moreover, the government campaign for the EU accession referendum was propagandistic, based on similar principles to agitprop communist campaign during the Second World War for entering Yugoslavia (Krajina, 2013, p. 118). Hiding the results of Croatian negotiations with the EU was perceived as further irritating behavior by the public. Also, the public constantly perceived Croatia as the subordinated partner in these negotiations (Blanuša, 2011a, p. 18). All these processes have created latent antagonism towards the EU among Croatian citizens and has consequently turned positive identification with Europe into a dystopian sentiment, expressed in Euroskepticism, development of which we can analyze in Croatian public opinion surveys.4 The most appropriate indicators here are citizens’ fearful and hopeful expectations about the consequences of Croatian membership in the EU. According to our previous results (Blanuša, 2011a) these expectations are empirically grouped in a way that could be in a theoretical sense easily adapted into Sørensen’s (2008) typology of Euroskepticism. There are four types of Euroskepticism: economic-utilitarian, sovereignty-based, democratic, and social. The first one considers expected money-based benefits and costs from cooperation, the second resists supranational institutions. The third is concerned with democratic deficit of the EU institutions and the fourth worries about the national welfare and community customs and criticizes the neoliberal politics of the EU. In our research they were expressed in the Croatian context as: (1) worsening of economic conditions and the position of Croatia in the EU market, (2) a feeling of political and cultural endangerment by the EU, (3) endangerment of the rule of law in the EU, effectiveness of public institutions and corruption, and (4) endangerment of self-sustained existence and societal customs of the Nation (cf. Blanuša, 2011a, p. 25). Since the last item also includes negative economic effects on social life, in this chapter we call it socioeconomic Euroskepticism. This is the most commonly expressed type of Euroskepticism in Croatia, and much more present than sovereignty-based Euroskepticism. Additionally, due to bad economic conditions and fragile democratic institutions, dominant are optimistic expectation in Croatia that these aspects will be improved in the EU, here expressed as a very slight economic-utilitarian and democratic Euroskepticism (Figure 4.2, overleaf). The results are expressed as an average level of acceptance of statements comprising each type of Euroskepticism composite scale. Socioeconomic type is comprised of statements that after integration people will need to give up on their traditional customs of private production for their own needs (e.g. food and (non-)alcoholic beverages), Croatian agriculture will be destroyed as well as manufacture, prices will increase significantly, foreign workers will “steal” the jobs of domestic people and social differences will become larger. 4 This phenomenon has been researched in DEC surveys from 2006 to 2013 on the nationally representative sample of citizens more than 15 years old.

Croatia and the European Union

78 70 60

socio-economic

50 40 30

sovereignty-based economic-utilitarian

20

democratic

10 0

2006

Figure 4.2

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Types of Euroskepticism in Croatia 2006–2013

The sovereignty-based type is comprised of statements that Croatia will lose its sovereignty, national and cultural identity, that Croatian language will be even more marginalized, etc. The economic-utilitarian type is constructed from the set of negative expectations of Croatian influence on international economic events and trends, the domestic unemployment rate and export possibilities for Croatian companies. Finally, the democratic Euroskepticism expects negative trends after integration in areas such as the rule of law, corruption, politicians’ behavior and effectiveness of public institutions. Not only because of its dominance, but also because of its content, special attention should be given to the socioeconomic Euroskepticism. It seems to be a well-developed organismic imaginarium, with the nation as a sublime object of enjoyment, experienced as endangered by external rules, foreigners, products and industries. The common denominator of dangers is international capital. Such an imaginarium has been recognized by Salecl (1994, p. 24) as the “post-socialist moral majority” discourse, based on organic national ideology simultaneously stressing that “we must not surrender to soulless capitalism” (1994, p. 24) or neoliberalism, which tries to colonize us. Such rigid crisis-type thinking, more appropriate for a war situation, has been nurtured in Croatia in the last 20 years. Moreover, it is in accordance with antimarket/authoritarian tendencies (Kitchelt, 1992, p. 20), which were highly present as a part of main cleavage on the level of the party system, especially during the 1990s. All of the previously mentioned factors influenced its development, expressed here in Europhobic form. Another interesting point is that this type of thinking is equally distributed among all social stratums and ideological groups, while sovereignty-based Euroskepticism is more characterized by objective “accession losers”: small farmers and fishermen, the less educated and poorer citizens of Croatia (Blanuša, 2011b, p. 8).

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Along with and against these processes of forming a negative stance towards the EU, which are serious obstacles for further EU integration, in the period from 1991 to today Croatia has been through significant processes of Europeanization of its politics and society. The question is what kind of achievements and potentials for Europeanization—conceived as a counter-process to the previously explained tendencies—has been built through the last 20 years in Croatia? Europeanization of Croatian Public Opinion Some authors call a part of the previous process a “retrospective Europeanization” (Grubiša et al., 2012, p. 31), which is basically identification with cultural and political European heritage. It has had a positive effect for most of the post-socialist European countries as a step towards the inclusion of the EU system of governance into national institutions, political processes, as well as values, attitudes and behaviors of political elites and citizens. But in Croatia it lasted too long (Grubiša et al., 2012, p. 31). At the level of political elites, it turned into the narcissistic “overidentification” with Europe, probably one from medieval times5 and consequently, through the before-mentioned processes, into a strong public lack of identification with the actual EU. However, this is just one aspect of Europeanization. According to Radaelli (2000, p. 5), the concept of Europeanization refers to processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things” and shared beliefs, cognitive maps and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic political discourse, identities, political structures and public policies. In this part of the chapter we concentrate on the Europeanization of political discourse, cognitive maps and values, mostly in public opinion. Public opinion—in this case national—has an important role and influence on the legitimacy of the EU (Radaelli, 2000, p. 5), especially after the end of the “permissive consensus era”6 of relationship between citizens and elites (cf. Hooghe and Marks, 2005, p. 425). Public opinion may support or constrain other dimensions of Europeanization, during and after accession. The strength of the commitment to the new political union, as well as compatibilities with its values, norms, attitudes and knowledge, are of significant importance. 5 We should not forget that in 1992 the EC offered to Croatia legal redress to help it in harmonization with the EC legal system. President Tuđjman refused such help with the answer: Regnum regno non praescribit leges [One nation does not prescribe laws to another] (Grubiša et al., 2012, p. 2). The wider dimension of such identification is expressed in the already mentioned social representation of Croatia as antemurale christianitatis. 6 According to this interpretation European integration was dominated by elites until 1991, when an ill-informed and disinterested public allowed political elites a free hand in setting EU policy (Carruba, 2001, p. 141).

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The question is what kind of dynamics of Europeanization of Croatian public opinion is observable in the following aspects: • Diffuse and specific support for the EU • Core values of the EU • Knowledge about the EU? Diffuse and Specific Support for the EU Based on Easton’s (1965) conceptualization of political system support and its refinement by Niedermayer and Sinnott (1999) we use two measures as indicators of general or diffuse support: general feeling toward the EU and EU accession referendum voting intention. As indicators of specific support, we use the general perception of advantages for ordinary citizens of member states, of personal and societal advantages for Croatia if it joins the EU, and specific perceptions of socioeconomic conditions and functioning of EU institutions. According to available data, the results are presented in figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. Generally speaking, Figure 4.3 shows how strong and idealistic were identification with and inclination towards the EU at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, despite Croatian Democratic Union government conflicts with the EU during the 1990s. This public mood was part of a general enthusiasm raised through parliamentary election results in 2000 and the bold pro-democratic redirection of Croatian politics after a decade of the isolationistic politics of President Tuđjman and informal sanctions by the international community, in particular because of his politics towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dynamics in the period since 2000 may be perceived as a reflection of struggle with the EU’s demands and conditions for membership. This was partly expressed as coming to terms with indictments for the war crimes from the 1990s, where the main catalyst was Croatia’s relationship to the Hague tribunal. The high criteria of the EU, an unresolved past, prolonged EU negotiations, imbued by several political crises (e.g. the affair with the Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone in 2008 and border disputes with Slovenia in 2009), created widespread discontent and demobilized Croatian support for the EU. Popular interpretations were that the EU wanted to “push” Croatia back to the Balkans.7 In 2010 this perception began to diminish, although even after the EU referendum more than 20 percent of citizens believed the Balkan–Union conspiracy is still in play (see Table 4.1). 7 According to public opinion results, Blanuša (2011a, p. 20) claims that in the period from 2006 to 2010 this was a dominant perception among citizens, along with perceptions that the EU is partly responsible for violation of Homeland War dignity, that it tries to balance the role of Croatia and Serbia in the Homeland War, as well as placing great demands on Croatia and no demands on Serbia. These perceptions were highly correlated with Croatian Euroskepticism.

2000

Figure 4.3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Diffuse support for the EU in Croatia

2001

2007

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2011

2012

2013

Negative feeling about the EU

EU referendum: voting AGAINST

Positive feeling about the EU

EU referendum: voting FOR

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82

Another interesting point is that from the beginning of accession negotiations the general feeling about the EU remains constantly lower than the referendum voting intention. But what makes this intention increase? Which additional factors, perhaps hopes and fears, “push” Croatian citizens to this inclination? This question is even more important in the light of relatively low specific support for the EU (Figure 4.4), particularly because the expectation of personal benefits is consistently the lowest one. It seems that people expect more of a spillover effect of the general improvement of conditions with EU membership.

80 70 60 50 more advantages for Croatia in the EU

40

no data 2000–2005

30

more advantages for the EU citizens more personal advantages if Croatia joins the EU

20 10 0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Figure 4.4

2013

Specific support for the EU in Croatia

70 65 60

EU is losing economic race with the USA and Japan

55 50

Differences in the standard of living among member states are getting smaller

45 40

EU membership had a positive effect on the increase of the standard of living in new member states

35 30 25 20

2006

Figure 4.5

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Perception of socioeconomic conditions in the EU

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83

70 65 60

EU is losing economic race with the USA and Japan

55 50

Differences in the standard of living among member states are getting smaller

45 40

EU membership had a positive effect on the increase of the standard of living in new member states

35 30 25 20

2006

Figure 4.6

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Perception of functioning of EU institutions

Although the whole period may be perceived as “demystification” of the relationship to Europe, these results indicate an actual belief in the EU as panacea. However, Croatian citizens are far from a naive perception of the EU (see figures 4.5 and 4.6). While most of these indicators show a decline up to 2010, as well as more positive perceptions in 2011 due to the governmental pro-EU referendum campaign, the next two items are in constant increase: (1) The socioeconomic one expresses fear that the EU is losing the economic race on the global market, not only from the USA and Japan. In 2013, 62.8 percent citizens also believe that BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) are serious threat to the European economy; (2) for the majority of Croatian citizens, the EU is becoming an increasingly bureaucratic organization. Taken together with questionable confidence in memberstates’ equality and possibility of citizens’ influence, this is a clear indication of recognition of a well-known problem in the EU: democratic deficit. Decline of expectations about increase in living standard and levelling such differences among member states, especially in 2012 and 2013, are clear signs of perception of the Euro-crisis,8 as well as of general apathy. Similar and moderately correlated ideas with these ones are a decline of belief in the efficiency of EU institutions, and in belief that their officials are hired because of their expertise and abilities.9 It is clear that suspiciousness towards EU functioning is growing in the time of crisis. 8 Correlations of these two statements with perception that “The Euro is currently in a big crisis and its future is uncertain” are in 2012 r = 0.341, r = –0.201, and in 2013 r = –0.352, r = –0.150. 9 Pearson correlations between these four variables are significant and vary in the interval from 0.298 to 0.448.

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Values Values are elements of the political philosophy of a community. Written at the beginning of the Treaty of Lisbon, EU core values are: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights. “These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, nondiscrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail” (Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, 2008, p. 5). As such, they are normative forces and all member countries should respect them. Furthermore, they are general criteria and frames for judging human action. For these reasons, this aspect of the Europeanization of public opinion should (optimistically) have a deep impact on the political behavior of member states and their citizens. Using available data we have tested whether Croatian citizens have increased their commitment to EU core values in the process of accession. Since we live in an overdetermined world, we can hardly speak of a causal and simple relationship, especially where the process of democratization of post-socialist states has been overlapping with Europeanization. Also, the values of these two processes are the same. However, involvement in EU accession makes these two processes converge. Our next data analysis is indicative of a first response to the question of whether the issue of EU integration touches deeply held democratic values (see Figure 4.7). Loyalty to democratic order seems to have relatively stable and for most of the time has had dominant support among Croatian citizens from 199510 until today.

80 70 60

diffuse support for democracy (democracy is always a better solution than strong leaders)

50 40

(satisfaction with democracy in Croatia)

30 20 10

0

1995

Figure 4.7

2000

2003

2007

2012

Diffuse and specific support for democracy

Note: These are the results of FPZ election studies.

10 Questions of diffuse and specific democracy were not included before 1995.

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Very high specific support in 1995 is a consequence of political euphoria and identification with the government, produced by military victory and the recapture of a large part of occupied territories from Serbian rebels. However, the level of satisfaction with democratic performance follows the line of the fall of the regime at the end of the 1990s, described as a defective democracy (Merkel, 1999) or even an authoritarian regime (Kasapović, 2001, p. 17), the subsequent democratic turn at the elections in 2000 and further painstaking Europeanization. Indication of painful Europeanization is significant, but there is a small correlation of both types of support for a democratic regime with perception of the importance of joining the EU from 2000 onward. Such correlation did not exist prior to this (Table 4.2). Table 4.2 also shows that after the enthusiastic start of Europeanization in 2000, the relationship between democratic and EU integration support has been declining. These results are in accordance with the general picture of Croatian Europeanization. Table 4.2

Perception of importance to join the EU and support of democracy

Diffuse support for democracy Specific support for democracy

1995

2000

2003

2007

2012

0.030 –0.039

0.226* 0.255*

0.171* 0.144*

0.102* 0.166*

0.094* 0.107*

Note: *p < 0.01.

100 importance of improving the position of youth

90

importance of ensuring social justice and security to all importance of ensuring human rights and liberties

80

importance of improving the position of women

70 60 importance of harmonious life between Croats and ethnic minorities

50 40 30

importance of punishing war crimes and cooperation with Hague court

20

importance of ensuring gay and other sexual minorities’ rights

10 0 2003

Figure 4.8

2007

2012

Expression of “core” EU values in Croatia

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Other values related to the same process have been researched since 2003 in the form of perception of importance of their implementation (Figure 4.8). Highly-esteemed goals (fighting crime and corruption, ensuring social justice and security, human rights and liberties etc.) reflect the main problems of postsocialist societies, inherited from a previous historical period or produced on their way to the Western model. A growing importance in concern for women and youths, as a promising trend in terms of equality, human dignity and concern for younger generations, is easily endangered in time of crisis. On the other hand, the three least supported goals deal with problems of relationship with openness to others, inclusiveness, respect and tolerant coexistence. Furthermore, it is these values that are correlated in the highest degree with the perception of importance of joining the EU.11 Especially worrying is a decrease in importance of punishing war crimes. This result was partly a reflection of convicting first-instance verdicts of Croatian generals Gotovina and Markač in April 2011. However, after their acquittal in November 2012 a different phenomenon appeared in the public discourse. By generalizing this verdict to the whole state—which has never been indicted by Hague—and presenting the verdict as evidence of “Croatia’s innocence,”12 the problem of evading dealing with war crimes committed by the Croatian side reappeared. Obstructing the process of working through the trauma and preventing mourning for the victims of the other side has had a negative impact on the normalization of coexistence and has prolonged the antagonism and culture of intolerance to next generations. To ensure conditions for long-term peaceful cooperation, as a preferable model of relationships and a fundamental value of the EU, specters of the past should be dismantled, not repressed. Knowledge The last question about Europeanization considers another important source for cognitive mobilization—skilled participation (Inglehart, 1977)—as well as more extensive and sophisticated citizen involvement in EU politics. Knowledge plays an important role in legitimizing political community, regime, and particular policies. More sophisticated citizens have a better chance of functioning successfully in the new context, to be a corrective factor of the system and consequently more supportive of the dominant values, expectations, and institutions of a political community (cf. Karp, Banducci, and Bowler, 2003, p. 272). Delegation of the European Commission (DEC) survey results suggest that knowledge of the EU stagnated up to 2010, that is, during the phase of turmoil and larger unpredictability of the accession process. After the final steps of negotiations, accession campaign, and joining the EU, these results increased constantly (see Figure 4.9). 11 These correlations vary from 0.168 to 0.329. 12 A popular daily newspaper heading after acquittal. See for example Ivkošić (2012) and Butković (2012).

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60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Figure 4.9

Knowledge about the EU in Croatia

Table 4.3

Correlation of factual knowledge about the EU and support for the EU

2013

Note: The line represents an average percentage of correctly answered questions on factual knowledge about the EU. These questions were asking recognition knowledge on objective facts about the EU, e.g. number of member states, procedures, budget, EU financial programs, roles of main institutions, names of high officials, status of Croatian negotiations etc. The number of questions varied from 20 to 27 per survey.

2006 General feeling about the EU Perception of (dis)advantages for citizens in the EU

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

0.159* 0.265* 0.250* 0.169* 0.175* 0.205* 0.193* 0.234* 0.197* 0.226* 0.220* 0.195* 0.179* 0.188* 0.188* 0.235*

Note: * p < 0.01.

Although citizens are still answering less than 50 percent of questions on average correctly, this trend is promising for their further involvement and dealing with the EU, especially in the sense that with a higher level of such knowledge evaluation of EU functioning becomes less the mere function of national politics evaluation (ibid.). We can only hope—especially in the near future, and because of the significance of first experiences—that higher political knowledge, along with greater awareness of democratic deficit and various costs and frustrations in dealing with the EU will not produce popular demobilization in this sphere

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of political behavior. Some recent researches show empirical support for the idea that more self-assessed and more objective knowledge of the EU decreases ambivalence in EU support, and this effect is even stronger for highly educated people (Stoeckel, 2011). According to Croatian results (Table 4.3), knowledge is not high but is still positively correlated with diffuse and specific support of the EU. These correlations follow the general trend of relationships between Croatia and EU in the period from 2006 to 2013. Conclusion All results presented here indicate a huge transformation of Croatian political discourse and public opinion in the period from 1991 to today. The romantic picture of the EU started to change in the first years of the last decade into a more realistic and heavily burdened relationship with the EU. In such a constellation, the process of Europeanization of public opinion has slowed down. To be clear, developed latent antagonism towards the EU has been produced in confrontations with many appropriate and reasonable and some whimsical but huge obstacles, such as the Slovenian negotiations blockade. Although in the past two decades Croatian citizens have turned their positive identification with the Europe into a dystopian sentiment, loaded with Eurosceptic and Europhobic attitudes, they have also voted for accession. This decision has probably been influenced by the discontent with domestic political, economic, and social “accomplishments.” Hopes about improving the rule of law, international political and economic status, and reduction of corrupt behavior of politicians through membership of the EU are decisive here (Blanuša, 2011a, p. 33). There is another disturbing tendency influencing Croatian Europeanization, shaped primarily by the memory of the historic legacy from the twentieth century and the more recent development of the Euro crisis. In the last few years the right ideological spectrum has used the slogan “EU is YU.” They believe that joining the EU will repeat an old political mistake as Croatia did when entering the former Yugoslavia: Croatia in the EU would be even more marginalized than it used to be in Yugoslavia. The pro-accession government campaign during the second part of 2011 saw this idea as a serious threat for referendum success and used TV spots to campaign against it. This idea is a transposition of existing Eurosceptic and Europhobic attitudes to the past, by equating the EU, as a multinational community, with the former Yugoslavia. Basically, this is an implicit adoption of the subjective position of the “colonized” and “provincial” which can produce learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) and a failure to respond adequately to opportunities in the new union. This mentality could also function as a fuel for reproduction of Western stereotypes of Croatia as a part of Europe’s “inner other,” a crystallization of old stereotypes that would be ominous for future relationship of Croatia and the EU. On the other side, similarities between the current Euro crisis and dissolutive processes in former Yugoslavia cannot be overlooked, especially from the

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perspective of those shaped by such trauma (Krastev, 2009; Mencinger, 2011; Bianchini, 2013). It is not simply a matter of reinforcing ideologically shaped perceptions but a real threat that is structurally similar to the Yugoslav case. Here it is appropriate to quote Charles Lane: Once upon a time in Europe, there was a confederation. It stretched from the Alps to the Adriatic and straddled the ancient line between Western Christendom and Byzantium. The confederation promised an eternal end to the wars that had historically bedeviled its component peoples. It built goodwill and interdependence through a common currency and free movement of labor and capital […] the confederation offered a ‘third way’ between the callousness of American-style capitalism and the inefficiency of central planning […] I wouldn’t overstate the analogy between Yugoslavia and today’s troubled European Union […] But I wouldn’t understate the analogy, either. Like the European Union, Yugoslavia was constantly trying bureaucratic fixes for deep-rooted rivalries—between Albanians and Serbs, Serbs and Croatians. Leadership shuffles, duplicative institutions and constitutional rewrites papered over but never eliminated them, even though almost all Yugoslav nationalities spoke the same language. (Lane, 2012)

The current crisis and post-political processes in the EU could have potentially disastrous effects, with the additional negative impact in slowing down Croatia’s further democratization and capitalization of its economic and political opportunities. As scholars we can only write, talk and hope that this will not happen. References Alaburić, V., 1998. Zašto, zapravo, smatram da ne treba sudski goniti autora žestokog antisemitskog pamfleta u “Hrvatskom slovu”? Globus, September 25, 69. Berković, Z., 1996. Zašto dr. Tuđman misli da međunarodna zajednica želi Hrvatsku ugurati u Euroslaviju, Balkanoslaviju, Istroslaviju ili Dalmatoslaviju? Globus, March 22, 78. Bianchini, S., 2013. Ako se EU raspadne, raspast će se krvavo kao Jugoslavija. Slobodna Dalmacija, August 31. Available at http://www.slobodnadalmacija. hr/Spektar/tabid/94/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/220076/Default.aspx, accessed October 19, 2013. Blanuša, N., 2009. The structure of conspiratorial beliefs in Croatia. Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva, VI, 113–43. ——— 2011a. Euroskepticizam u Hrvatskoj. In I. Šiber (ed.) Hrvatska i Europa—strahovi i nade. Zagreb: Biblioteka Politička misao, 11–46. ——— 2011b. Euroskeptizismus und das referendum über den eu-beitritt Kroatiens: Zu wenig Kommunikation, zu viele Sorgen. Blickpunkt Kroatien, 14/15, 8.

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Available at http://www.fes.hr/E-books/pdf/Blickpunkt/Blickpunkt_14_15.pdf, accessed September 8, 2013. Butković, D., 1997. Zagreb pred američkim ultimatumom: postaje li Beograd prijestolnica Jugositočne europske unije u koju moraju ući i Hrvatska i Slovenija? Globus, January 10, 2–4. ——— 2001. Jesu li biskupi zaista navijestili rat protiv ulaska Hrvatske u EU i za njezinu potpunu izolaciju? Globus, July 27, 6–8. ——— 2012. Rat je napokon završen: Hrvatska je nevina! Globus, November 16. Available at http://www.jutarnji.hr/rat-je-napokon-zavrsen--hrvatska-jenevina/1066870/, accessed October 15, 2013. Buden, B., 2000. “Europe is a whore.” In N. Skopljanac Brunner, S. Gredelj, A. Hodžić, and B. Krištofić (eds) Media and War. Zagreb: Centre for Transition and Civil Society Research; Belgrade: Agency Argument, 53–62. Carracciolo, L., 1996. Predsjednik Tuđman griješi kad misli da mi želimo obnovu Jugoslavije. Globus, August 9, 48. Carrubba, C.J., 2001. The electoral connection in European Union politics. The Journal of Politics, 63 (1), 141–58. Croatian TV Archive, 2000. Proglas hrvatskom narodu u domovini i svijetu i hrvatskim građanima. September 30. Available at http://www.hrt.hr/ arhiv/2000/09/30/, accessed September 8, 2013. Dorić, P., 2010. EU u tajnosti priprema Balkansku uniju. Slobodna Dalmacija, July 31. Available at http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Svijet/tabid/67/articleType/ ArticleView/articleId/111298/Default.aspx, accessed February 24, 2013. Đurić, D., 2004. Zastupnici u strahu od Balkana. Nacional, September 14, 12–15. Easton, D., 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley. Foreign and Commonwealth Office London, 2008. Consolidated Texts of the EU Treaties as Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. Available at http://www. official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm73/7310/7310.pdf, accessed October 11, 2013. Grubiša, D., Beširević, N., and Špehar, H. (eds), 2012. Politički sustav Europske Unije i europeizacija hrvatske politike. Zagreb: Biblioteka Politička misao. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., 2005. Calculation, community and cues. European Union Politics, 6 (4), 419–33. Inglehart, R., 1977. Long-term trends in mass support for European unification. Government and Opposition, 12, 150–77. Ivkošić, M., 2012. Nevinost Tuđmanove Hrvatske. Večernji list, November 16. Available at http://www.vecernji.hr/kolumne/nevinost-tudmanove-hrvatskekolumna-476339, accessed October 8, 2013. Judah, T., 2009. Entering the Yugosphere. The Economist, August 20. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/14258861, accessed October 8, 2013. ——— 2011. Let’s hear it for the Yugosphere. The Economist, June 23. Available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/06/ former-yugoslavia, accessed February 25, 2013.

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Karp, J.A., Banducci, S.A., and Bowler, S., 2003. To know it is to love it? Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union. Comparative Political Studies, 36 (3), 271–92. Kasapović, M. (ed.), 2001. Hrvatska politika 1990–2000. Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti. Kitchelt, H., 1992. The formation of party systems in East Central Europe. Politics and Society, 20 (1), 7–50. Krajina, Z., 2013. EU nije YU—EU je fora: analiza predreferendumskih televizijskih spotova Vlade RH za ulazak Hrvatske u EU. Politička misao, 50 (2), 98–123. Krastev, I., 2009. The challenge of Europe. Dangerous analogies. CIDOB International Yearbook, 32–5. Lane, C., 2012. Yugoslavia’s lessons for Europe’s disunion. The Washington Post, May 29. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/yugoslaviaslessons-for-europes-disunion/2012/05/28/gJQA2YmTxU_story.html, accessed October 20, 2013. Letica, S., 1999. Po etnopsihoanalizi dr. Franje Tuđmana u Sarajevu, predsjednik Slobodan Milošević nije kriv za agresiju na Hrvatsku i BiH. Globus, August 6, 9. ——— 2001. Šestorka se mora hitno ograditi od skandalozne negave da priprema plan o balkanskoj carinskoj i monetarnoj uniji. Globus, May 16, 39. Lindstrom, N., 2003. Between Europe and the Balkans: mapping Slovenia and Croatia’s “return to Europe” in the 1990s. Dialectical Anthropology, 27, 313–29. Lovrić, J., 2006. Epidemija balkanofobije. Globus, February 3, 14. Lušić, B., 2003. Jugonostalgičar iz Skandinavije. Globus, July 9, 29. Matić, M., 1998. Sionisti. Hrvatsko slovo, September 11, 3. Mencinger, J., 2011. Eurozone debt crisis. Globalpost. Available at http://www. globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/110613/euro-zone-debt-crisisyugoslavia, accessed May 30, 2013. Merkel, W., 1999. Deffective Democracies. Estudios/Working Paper, 132, 1–24. Available at http://www.march.es/ceacs/publicaciones/working/archivos/1999_ 132.pdf, accessed October 16, 2013. Miklenić, I., 2014. Hoće li Europska unija pomoći? Glas Koncila, June 20. Available at http://www.glas-koncila.hr/index.php?option=com_php&Itemid= 41&news_ID=24920. Niedermayer, O. and Sinnott, R., 1998. Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance. New York: Oxford University Press. Plevnik, D., 1992. Evropsko južno voće. Danas, May 26, 37. Prosperov Novak, S., 1998. Hrvatsko slovo je fašistoidni list pokrenut na Tuđmanovo inzistiranje. Nacional, September 23, 16. Radaelli, C., 2000. Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change. European Integration Online Paper, 4 (8). Available at http://eiop. or.at/eiop/texte/2000–008.htm, accessed October 16, 2013.

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Razsa, M. and Lindstrom, N., 2004. Balkan is beautiful: Balkanism in the political discourse of Tudman’s Croatia. East European Politics and Societies, 628–50. Sabalić, I., 2006. Račan ušoku: europski socijalisti guraju Hrvatsku u balkansku uniju. Globus, March 22, 98. ——— 2009. Rađanje Jugosfere iz pepela Jugoslavije. Globus, September 4. Available at http://globus.jutarnji.hr/hrvatska/radanje-jugosfere-iz-pepelajugoslavije, accessed October 8, 2013. Salecl, R., 1994. The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and Feminism after the Fall of Socialism. London and New York: Routledge. Seligman, M.E.P., 1975. Helplessness: On Depression, Development, and Death. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman. Sørensen, C., 2008. Love me, Love me not … a Typology of Public Euroscepticism. SEI Working Paper No 101. Brighton: University of Sussex. Available at https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-workingpaper-no-101.pdf&site=266, accessed October 12, 2013. Stoeckel, F., 2011. Unpacking Cognitive Mobilization: The Effect of Information on EU Support and Attitude Ambiguity. Paper prepared for the European Union Studies Association Conference Boston, March 3–5. EUSA Papers Archive. Available at http://www.euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/8c_stoeckel.pdf, accessed October 16, 2013. Ujakfranjo, 2008. Dr. Franjo Tuđman—zračna luka 1996. Video online. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AqbJOVlEzng, accessed October 8, 2013. Woodward, S., 1993. Balkan Tragedy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Chapter 5

Public Support for European Integration in Croatia: Utilitarian, Identity-based, Institutionally Driven or All of the Above? Ivan Landripet

Introduction The bulk of empirical studies that examined attitudes towards the European Union (EU) and European integration have targeted political elites and partybased support. However, growing rates of Euroskepticism among EU citizens and a widening gap between elite and popular attitudes—recorded since the mid-1990s—brought about an agenda shift both in theorizing and researching Euroskepticism (Boomgaarden et al., 2011).1 As EU citizens are gaining more means of channeling their views on the EU and Eurointegrations (e.g., national referenda on EU-related issues, growing legislative powers of the European Parliament), their preferences are becoming increasingly hard to ignore. More than ever, stability of the European political system thus depends on popular support (Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2008; Fligstein et al., 2012) in spite of the democratic deficit that still taints the EU’s political institutions. The background and the extent of discontent with European integration vary from one member state to another (Brinegar and Jolly, 2005; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008; Arató and Kaniok, 2009) and from one European geopolitical region to another (Llamazares and Gramacho, 2007; Guerra, 2008). Nonetheless, the core universal reasons underlying diminished popular support for the EU in the “old” member states were largely ascribed to the adverse effects of two 1 The term Euroskepticism has become a byword for the opposition to a wide range of European integration policies and to the EU as an institution. It is often used indiscriminately to describe views of political elites, civil society, and the general public, as well as to address an entire range of neutral to extremely negative attitudes and sentiments. As demonstrated in a number of studies (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Sørensen, 2008; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008; Arató and Kaniok, 2009), its use should be limited to specific segments within typologies of EU/Eurointegration attitudes (for more on variations in EU opposition terminology see Chapter 4). To avoid ambiguity when summing-up a broader range of general, diffuse, attitudes towards the EU and European integration, in this chapter a more neutral term—Eurodisposition—is employed.

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fundamental Eurointegration processes, the EU’s widening and deepening (e.g., McLaren, 2006; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008; Hartleb, 2011). On the one hand, recent enlargements encompassed a number of economically underdeveloped and institutionally under-reformed countries from the former Eastern Bloc. On the other hand, the EU has been gaining greater political powers at the expense of member states, thus influencing the everyday lives of the EU citizens ever more directly. At the same time, the EU is becoming increasingly complex and increasingly incomprehensible to an average citizen. A plunge in the popular EU support was also witnessed in the “new” member states, typically a short while after the onset of the negotiation process. However, the opposition to European integrations in the post-socialist states was sparked by a substantially different set of universal reasons. Simply put, “the EU looked different from the inside than from the outside” (Rulikova, 2004, p. 29). Expectations from EU membership were largely idealistic in that citizens envisioned a rapid achievement of high economic and democratic standards following a swift admission to the EU (Neumayer, 2009). The accession process was also perceived as a safeguard against setbacks in implementation of transitional reforms. Although that expectation proved to be a fairly realistic one (Haughton, 2011), the pace and the outcomes of economic transition and democratic consolidation may have been equated among the public with the accession process itself and projected on to the prospects of the future in the EU (Tverdova and Anderson, 2004). Disillusionment with the EU was thus traced to individual and collective hardships that resulted from transition, particularly to reductions in economic and social rights and erosion in social services (Tucker et al., 2002). Additional notable culprits were identified in fears over loss of sovereignty shortly after it was regained from previous supranational associations (Rulikova, 2004; Guerra, 2008; Hartleb, 2011), in pronounced nationalistic sentiments instigated by political mobilization against the communist regimes, and in resistance to some normative ideals of the EU such as the free market model (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006). Although Croatia initiated and completed the EU accession process well after other new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe, it shared much of its universals (Roter and Bojinović, 2005). Unlike Croatian political elites, which remain predominantly EU-optimistic and Europhilic (cf. Chapter 8), Eurodispositions of the Croatian public shifted from an overwhelming support for the EU and Eurointegrations to a state of polarization. Notable decline in EU support in Croatia even preceded the start of the negotiation process.2 The foremost among the country-specific circumstances surrounding the rise of popular opposition to Eurointegrations in Croatia is attributed to the legacy of the 1991–1995 Croatian War of Independence (e.g., Blanuša and Šiber, 2007; Skoko, 2007). First, the war mobilized nationalistic sentiment on a larger scale compared to most post-socialist countries. Second, prosecution of war 2 The dynamics of popular EU-related attitudes in Croatia were elaborated in Chapter 4.

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crimes committed by the Croatian side and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia were high on the EU’s agenda when evaluating political criteria for membership. The accession was thus perceived as a threat to accomplishments that many Croatian citizens fought and died for. Third, economic transition conducted under wartime circumstances exacerbated political corruption, which ranked Croatia among countries of endemic corruption (Grubiša, 2010). Supplemental accession criteria that the EU consequently assigned to Croatia, more rigorous supervision of reform implementation, and setbacks in the accession brought about by bilateral issues such as the border dispute with Slovenia, resulted in a lasting and demanding negotiation process often interpreted as overly strict and even unfair. In addition, many fears were voiced pertaining to the economic sphere, most notably to the capacity of the Croatian economy to cope with market forces within the EU. With the onset of the Eurozone crisis it has also become clear that Croatia might become the first post-socialist member state that will fail to gain tangible economic benefits from the membership, at least in the short term (Tišma et al., 2012).3 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive conceptual and empirical account of the foundations of popular Eurodispositions in Croatia. Considering the aforementioned, it is reasonable to assume that public support for or opposition to the EU and Eurointegrations in Croatia is grounded in prospects of strictly utilitarian gains or losses from the membership, as well as in anticipation of threats or affirmations to national identity and culture. The support—or the lack thereof—could also be an artifact of elite cueing (i.e. citizens’ use of elite cues in political decision-making) or resorting to institutional proxies, both potential consequences of insufficient experience with and knowledge of the EU. Those assumptions form the basic propositions of the three broader theoretical perspectives on Eurodispositions—utilitarian, symbolic, and institutional—that have been successfully applied in the majority of studies on popular support for European integration in the existing and the acceding member states. Most of the research, however, was conceptually limited to a single theoretical perspective or analytically oriented to examination of unmediated links between the Eurodispositions and its predictors. To deepen the understanding of the background of popular Eurodispositions in Croatia, in this study the relationship between popular Eurodispositions and measures stemming from the three major theoretical approaches was conceptualized as a structural model. Thus, a more elaborate and a more balanced framework of public support is proposed that accounted for possible interdependence of economic, symbolic, and institutionally-driven motives behind popular EU-related attitudes. In the conceptual part of the chapter, the conventional approach to understanding public support for the EU is briefly presented, followed by its 3 For a more detailed account of the Croatian accession process and the unfavorable context that surrounded it, see chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7 of this volume.

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critique. Taking into account the need for revisions in examination of popular Eurodispositions that were voiced in the recent literature, a structural model of Croatian citizens’ attitudes towards the EU is then synthesized from the existing theoretical and empirical insights. Results of the model’s empirical testing constitute the central part of the analytical section, which also contains essential information on research methodology and measures that were applied in gathering data. The chapter concludes with a discussion on ramifications of the nature of popular Eurodispositions detected in this study for Croatian citizens’ present and future perception of and support for European integration. A Brief Outline of Conceptual Models in Research of Popular Eurodisposition Fundamental Frameworks Forged primarily as an economic community, the EU and its precursors have been drawing their legitimacy mainly from macroeconomic accomplishments such as the common market and labor mobility. It therefore comes as no surprise that utilitarian frameworks were the first to gain prominence in Eurodispositional studies (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). In a nutshell, the EU is conceived as an interest-oriented institution that entails deep and farreaching distributive effects on societies and citizens of the member states. Objectivistic variety of utilitarian approaches focus on the socioeconomic status and market position of the citizens, proposing that individuals with higher levels of economic, social, and cultural capital would benefit from liberalizing markets and other socioeconomic outcomes of Eurointegration, and vice versa (e.g., Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Tucker et al., 2002). Subjectivistic approaches focus on perceptions, assuming that the public form their Eurodispositions—both general and specific—primarily on the grounds of observed or expected economic gains and losses (e.g., Gabel, 1998; Brinegar and Jolly, 2005). With the deepening of European integration and accession of post-socialist countries, strictly economic concerns were extended to utilitarian evaluation of such Eurointegration effects as political stability, democratization of national political arenas, quality of life, and social security (e.g., Tverdova and Anderson, 2004; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007; Wagner, 2008). In criticism of utilitarian approaches, it was argued that on the one hand, citizens’ ability to understand current or prospective effects of European integrations is overrated (Hooghe and Marks, 2005; McLaren, 2006). On the other hand, group loyalties compared to utilitarian calculation may be stronger and certainly more primeval forces behind mobilization of support for or opposition to political objects and processes related to European integration. Thus, as the EU’s domains expand from strictly economic to political and even symbolic, identitybased approaches gained significant ground in Eurodispositional research. These perspectives propose that the EU—as a political system that gradually establishes

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its preeminence over traditional political communities—carries profound effects on citizens’ identities that originate from nation-centered group allegiances (e.g., Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2007). The basic assumption is that European integration may instigate negative sentiments towards the EU if European integration is perceived as detrimental to norms, collective values, traditions, and sovereignty of nation states, irrespective of citizens’ socioeconomic status or utilitarian evaluation of the EU. AntiEuropean attitudes and perception of symbolic threats may in particular be fostered by sociocultural values such as traditionalism, ethnocentrism, and exclusive (ethnic) national identity. In contrast, values such as post-materialism, inclusive (civic) national identity, and European identity may predispose citizens to embrace Eurointegrations, even if they were “dispassionately” judged as unfavorable (e.g., Inglehart, 1971; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005; Harris, 2011). More recently, utilitarian and symbolic perspectives were supplemented with a heterogeneous perspective sometimes referred to as the institutional approach (cf. McLaren, 2007; Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2008). An umbrella term, it aggregates frameworks that, plausibly, fill the gap between the conceptual opposites of “rational” utilitarian and “irrational” symbolic approaches. In essence, “arational” approaches assume that EU citizens are often faced with EU-related decision-making under circumstances of limited rationality, usually due to low cognitive mobilization, i.e. lacking knowledge of the supranational context and, consequently, lacking abilities to comprehend it (Inglehart, 1970). To compensate, citizens may—intentionally or not—resort to national-level institutional actors for guidance or project onto the EU their experiences with national-level institutions, as well as their assessment of current relations between their country and the EU. The former is typically associated with party cueing (citizens’ use of political party cues in political decision-making), particularly where national elites are divided over the EU and European integration (Ray, 2003). The latter—the transfer of impressions of familiar to unfamiliar political entities—is understood as the use of proxy mechanisms in evaluation of the EU and Eurointegrations (e.g., Anderson, 1998; Abts et al., 2009; Kumlin, 2009). In either case, cognitive shortcuts and heuristics used in the process serve as an aid in cognition and help citizens to seemingly transform “from hopeless incompetents to reasonably capable participants in democratic politics” (Wagner, 2008, p. 9). New Direction in Research of Popular Eurodisposition and its Shortcomings Fundamental frameworks demonstrated their viability in research across virtually all periods and national contexts, including Croatian. This is true even for utilitarian approaches (Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007), which have been the subject of most criticism and revisions. However, separate application of the three frameworks tends to underestimate the complexity of human motivation (Hooghe and Marks, 2005, 2007). The “single-approach” studies have even

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inadvertently demonstrated the need for more comprehensive conceptualization of sources of popular attitudes towards the EU. In a Croatian utilitarianoriented study (Bagić and Šalinović, 2006), reasoning behind the assessment of costs and benefits from the future EU membership was deemed impulsive and emotional rather than strictly rational because diffuse expectations from the membership were considerably more predictive of membership support than specific utilitarian expectations from the membership outcomes. An identityoriented study found that pride related to tangible national accomplishments in arts, science, governance, and social welfare was a stronger predictor of the EU support than pride in historical and mythological dimensions of the nation (Lamza Posavec et al., 2006). Sekulić and Šporer (2008) reported that European identity in Croatia was related to professional and educational status—both objectivistic utilitarian measures—which were also found predictive of EU support in another, institutionally oriented study (Babarović et al., 2011). More extensive studies pointed to empirical contribution of measures derived from all three fundamental approaches (Čulig et al., 2007; Blanuša, 2011), as could be expected. Therefore, it became evident that a more complete picture of support for the EU can only be provided by a more complete set of factors that determine it (Abts et al., 2009; Boomgaarden et al., 2011). A number of authors have taken the issue of conceptualization in popular Eurodisposition research still further. They argued that “interest- and identitybased explanations capture different sides of the same coin” (de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007, p. 307), and that interest- and identity-driven behaviors make “a false dichotomy” (Cram, 2012, p. 74). Moreover, it was pointed out that “the utilitarian approach and the identity perspective tap into the same causal mechanism underlying the attitudes of European publics to integration,” and “fit into one single explanatory framework of support for European integration” (de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007, p. 308). But how precisely does feeling like one has benefited from the EU impact attitudes to EU institutions? […] What is the connection between perceptions of EU institutions and worries about the loss of national identity? […] Does exclusive national identity predispose Europeans against feeling that they have benefited from European integration? (McLaren, 2007, p. 238)

While as yet no major overarching theory was proposed to address these challenges, several conceptual contributions were made, such as the model of political (or double) allegiance (de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007).4 But even 4 The model attempts to reconcile interest and identity at the level of interaction between national and supranational institutions. It is presumed that citizens would offer their allegiance to national governments if the national institutions provided in return safety, social stability, well-being, and socio-psychological security (including the sense

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such valid conceptual attempts were not evaluated within analytical frameworks that allow closer and more explicit empirical inspection of interactions between Eurodispositional determinants and, ultimately, examination of mechanisms behind popular support for European integration. In other words, appropriate analytical examination of structural relationships between Eurodispositional predictors is largely missing. This may be among the main reasons why “more work on disentangling the various causal linkages [in the background of popular Eurodispositions] is required” (McLaren, 2007, p. 249). Towards an Integrated Model of Popular Eurodispositions in Croatia Internationally, only a few comprehensive empirical studies have thus far placed conceptual focus on structural relations between Eurodispositional determinants while relying on statistical techniques suited for an explicit examination of mediating effects (Christin and Trechsel, 2002; Hooghe et al., 2007; Wagner, 2008; Lubbers and Jaspers, 2011). Guided by conceptual and analytical procedures applied in those and similar studies, in this section a hypothetical structural model of support for European integration in Croatia is devised. More specifically, a synthesis of existing conceptual foundations and empirical findings is provided in an attempt to integrate basic elements of fundamental theoretical frameworks into a single explanatory model of Croatian citizen’s Eurodispositions. Formulation of hypotheses was adjusted to known distinctive attributes of post-socialist context in general and to the Croatian context specifically—a warranted practice in the absence of broader theoretical approaches befitting transitional settings (Wagner, 2008). The initial set of hypotheses is derived from the basic premise of fundamental perspectives, that of a direct link between Eurodispositions and principal utilitarian, symbolic, and institutional factors presumed to constitute the background of support for European integration. Interest-wise, the assessment of economic effects of EU membership is supplemented with assessments of social and political outcomes of the membership to address Croatia’s post-transitional condition. Potential economic and political consequences are divided into benefits and costs (realistic threats). Identity-wise, the role of collective identities (European and national) is supplemented with evaluation of symbolic threats. Concerns over loss of national sovereignty and cultural identity may be of particular importance in Croatia due to the legacy of the war. National identity is divided into exclusive and inclusive, but neither is hypothesized to be directly linked to popular Eurodispositions in Croatia on the grounds of the political elites polarization premise. It is well documented that exclusive national identity tended to be mobilized in opposition to the EU and inclusive national identity in support of the EU in national settings deeply of belonging). Allegiance towards the EU is then conditioned upon the EU’s ability to enable national elites in this effort.

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divided over European integration (e.g., Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005, 2007). As broad consensus in favor of Eurointegrations prevails among the elites in Croatia, it is reasonable to assume that national identity does not directly influence popular support for the EU. Institution-wise, the assessment of the EU’s capacity to facilitate social and political processes in member states is addressed. H1: The stronger the Croatian citizens’ perception of economic and political gains from EU membership, the stronger their support for the EU and European integration. H2: The stronger the citizens’ perception of utilitarian threats from EU membership, the stronger their opposition to the EU and European integration. H3: Perception of symbolic threats of EU membership diminishes citizens’ support for the EU and European integration. H4: The stronger the citizens’ sense of European identity, the stronger their support for the EU and European integration. H5: Trust in the EU’s institutional efficiency increases the citizens’ support for the EU and European integration. Although not expected to directly affect public support for the EU and European integration in countries such as Croatia, national identity may nonetheless have a strong mediated influence. According to the cultural threat model and its evaluations (McLaren, 2002, 2006, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005; Wagner, 2008), the exclusive form of national identity amplifies the perception of symbolic threats from EU membership while the inclusive form diminishes it. As for the impact of national identity on European identity, the sense of exclusive national identity was generally found not to be predictive of the sense of European identity (Deflem and Pampel, 1996; Duchesne and Frognier, 2008; Fligstein et al., 2012). This was confirmed in a Croatian study (Kamenov et al., 2006), where it was suggested that the theory of nested identities best explained non-conflict coexistence of different-level identities (e.g. subnational, national, and supranational). On the other hand, the sense of inclusive national identity may provide fertile ground for supranational identifications in general and European identity specifically (Duchesne and Frognier, 2008; Harris, 2011; Fligstein et al., 2012). Finally, European identity—like inclusive national identity—was indicated to diminish the perception of symbolic threats from EU membership (Weßels, 2007). H6: The stronger the citizens’ sense of exclusive national identity, the stronger their perception of the symbolic threats of EU membership. H7: The stronger the citizens’ sense of inclusive national identity, the weaker their perception of the symbolic threats of EU membership. H8: The stronger the citizens’ sense of inclusive national identity, the stronger their sense of European identity. H9: The stronger the citizens’ sense of European identity, the weaker their perception of the symbolic threats of EU membership.

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In extension of the political elites polarization premise, it was argued (and usually confirmed) that national identity does not affect assessment of the utilitarian outcomes of EU membership where national elites do not polarize public opinion over the Eurointegration issues (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2007). However, it has been demonstrated that citizens rely more directly on another set of emotive anchors when evaluating utilitarian costs and benefits from the membership—the sense of symbolic threats on the one hand, and European identification on the other (McLaren, 2006, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2007; Boomgaarden and Freiere, 2009). This sort of an “emotional mobilization” may be particularly pronounced in the acceding countries, where citizens are only able to assume what the distributional effects of EU membership will be (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2006; Wagner, 2008). H10: The stronger the citizens’ perception of symbolic threats of EU membership, the stronger their perception of realistic threats of EU membership. H11: The stronger the citizens’ perception of symbolic threats of EU membership, the weaker their perception of economic and political gains from EU membership. H12: The sense of European identity diminishes the citizens’ perception of realistic threats of EU membership. H13: The sense of European identity increases the citizens’ perception of economic and political gains from EU membership. Combined with premises of institutional trust and political efficiency, cognitive mobilization theory suggests that lack of knowledge of and personal experience with complex institutions such as the EU generate distrust of the EU— particularly when European identification is weak (Weßels, 2007)—and activate transfer of national-level institutional trust to institutional trust in the EU. This transfer, or the use of a proxy mechanism, may be an almost automatic reaction to the context of limited rationality (Anderson, 1998), or a more cognizant assumption that national political elites ultimately decide on EU legislation and administer most of the EU policy implementation (McLaren, 2007; Abts et al., 2009). Either way, public trust in the EU is presumed to reflect public trust in national institutions. H14: The sense of European identity increases the citizens’ trust in the EU. H15: The stronger the citizens’ trust in national institutions, the stronger their trust in the EU. Finally, it was argued (and empirically substantiated) that trust in the EU’s institutional efficiency has a positive impact on public assessment of economic and political effects of the EU membership (the model of political allegiance) (de Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007; Cram, 2012). H16: The stronger the citizens’ trust in EU’s institutional efficiency, the stronger their perception of economic and political gains from EU membership.

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Trust in the EU institutions

)

H15 (+

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Trust in Croatian institutions

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Inclusive national identity

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European identity

Figure 5.1

Hypothetical model of popular Eurodispositions in Croatia

A graphical representation of the overall hypothetical model is laid out in Figure 5.1.5 In summary, it is hypothesized that public support for the EU and Eurointegrations in Croatia is directly influenced by perceptions of utilitarian costs and benefits, fears of symbolic threats, European identity, and trust in the EU. In contrast, the impact of trust in national institutions and both forms of national identity are expected to be fully mediated. Trust in the EU’s institutions is presumed to mediate trust in national institutions, while symbolic threats of EU membership are presumed to mediate exclusive and inclusive national identity (in the case of the later, European identity is expected to be an additional mediator). Apart from the direct effect, European identity is hypothesized to influence popular Eurodispositions by affecting trust in the EU, as well as expectations from utilitarian and identity-based outcomes of EU membership. Examination of the Background of Popular Support for European Integration in Croatia Data and Analytical Strategy The data used to test the proposed model were collected within a research project funded by the Delegation of the EU to Croatia from the Phare program. 5 A comparable, but more extensive version of this model was proposed and tested in Landripet (2012).

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The survey was carried out on a national probability sample of 1,005 Croatian citizens aged 18 or above in May 2007. The multistage sample was stratified by age, gender, county, and education. A total of 65 trained interviewers conducted structured face-to-face interviews in participants’ households. The overall response rate was 61.6 percent, with women and citizens from large cities having refused participation somewhat more often. All participants provided informed consent, and no incentives were paid for participation. All study procedures were approved by the Ethical Review Board of the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Zagreb. The questionnaire was pretested in 2006 among 228 university students in the capital of Zagreb. In the measurement part of model evaluation, internal consistency and principal component analyses were carried out to assess reliability and explore dimensionality of composite indicators. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to test individual measurement models, local measurement models (utilitarian, symbolic, and institutional), and the global measurement model that combined all composite measures. At all CFA stages, several aspects of construct validity were assessed (cf. Hair et al., 2010, pp. 679–81).6 In the structural part of model evaluation, structural equation modeling (SEM) was applied to test structural relationships between the constructs as specified by the proposed hypothetical model. SEM was chosen over the much more common multiple linear regression for two notable analytical advantages (e.g., Kline, 2005; Hair et al., 2010). First, SEM is suited for testing complex models in a simultaneous analysis of entire systems of interdependent variables (i.e., modeling of multiple mediational relationships). Second, it combines CFA (which focuses on the structure of constructs) with path analysis (which focuses on the structure of relationships between the constructs), thus accounting for metric properties of constructs and their interrelations within a single procedure. Parameters were calculated with maximum likelihood estimation. In all measurement and structural analyses congeneric modeling was observed. To reduce model complexity, hierarchical factor analysis (HFA) was employed with two multidimensional measures and item parceling (e.g. Sass and Smith, 2006) with a few unidimensional measures that consisted of six or more items. Missing data were replaced using regression imputation (most items contained < 1 percent missing values, with the maximum amounting to 1.7 percent). Participants’ replies to all questionnaire items used in analyses were anchored 6 Acceptable convergent validity was defined as factor loadings > 0.5, > 50 percent of variance explained, and Cronbach’s alpha > 0.6. Indicators of discriminant validity were twofold. First, construct variance was expected to be larger than variance shared by any two constructs included in the model. Second, model fit indexes were expected to indicate acceptable fit of a congeneric model. That is, a model with no crossloadings established between manifest variables loaded by different constructs, or between residual variance associated with manifest variables within or between constructs. Nomological validity was indicated if correlations between constructs (or their absence) met conceptual expectations.

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on 5-point Likert-type response formats (e.g., from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”). In all analyses probability value < 0.05 was set as a threshold for statistical significance. All procedures were performed with IBM SPSS Statistics 21.0 and IBM SPSS Amos 21.0 packages. Measures and Measurement Models Popular Eurodispositions Popular Eurodispositions—general public support for the EU and European integration in Croatia—was the outcome variable. It was measured by four single-item indicators that tapped into diffuse affective, instrumental, supportive, and integrational facets of the citizens’ attitudes.7 Item intercorrelations ranged from r = 0.66 to r = 0.8, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.91, and the underlying construct was one-dimensional, with factor loadings 0.87–0.93. The construct accounted for 80.6 percent of variance. Model fit indexes in CFA demonstrated good or acceptable model fit (χ2 = 18.3, df = 2, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.08, TLI = 0.98, CFI = 0.98).8 Measures from the utilitarian sphere Measures from the utilitarian sphere included assessments of specific economic and political benefits and costs that may result from Croatia’s EU membership. The measure of projected gains consisted of eight single-item indicators that addressed topics such as increased exports, foreign investments, labor mobility, financial support, democratic standards, and institutional efficiency. Items were combined into four unidimensional parcels that exhibited sound metric properties (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83, factor loadings 0.78–0.85, 66.7 percent variance explained, model fit: χ2 = 3.4, df = 2, p = 0.18, AGFI = 0.99, RMSEA = 0.03, 7 In answer to “What feeling do you personally attach to the European Union?,” 23 percent of participants indicated extremely or predominantly negative feelings, 37 percent extremely or predominantly positive, and 40 percent neutral. When asked “Is membership in the European Union likely to earn Croatia gains or loses?,” 28 percent responded with much of somewhat more loses than gains, 39 percent indicated much or somewhat more gains, and one third expected equally gains and losses. When asked “What is your position on Croatia’s accession to the European Union,” 27 percent were somewhat or entirely against it, 43 percent were in favor, and 30 percent were undecided. Finally, in answer to “Should Croatia’s accession to the EU be accelerated or decelerated,” 40 percent voiced putting a stop to accession or its deceleration, 25 percent voiced acceleration, and 35 percent though the accession should proceed at the current rate. 8 Chi-square test is sensitive to sample size. In the case of large samples (N > 200), it tends to indicate rejection of the model even when differences between predicted and observed covariances are slight (Kline, 2005, p. 136). Therefore, values for the following additional model fit indexes are consistently supplied: AGFI (Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index), RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of Approximation), TLI (Tucker Lewis Index), and CFI (Comparative Fit Index).

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TLI ≈ 1, CFI ≈ 1). The measure of projected realistic threats of EU membership consisted of four items addressing loss of ownership over businesses and attractive real estate to foreigners, mass immigration of foreign labor, and mass brain drain. It demonstrated excellent discriminant validity as indicated by model fit (χ2 = 0.04, df = 2, p = 0.98, AGFI ≈ 1, RMSEA ≈ 0, TLI ≈ 1, CFI ≈ 1), but barely acceptable convergent validity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.63, factors loadings 0.63–0.74, 47.8 percent variance explained). It was used in further analyses as the local (utilitarian) model had acceptable model fit (χ2 = 95.9, df = 19, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.96, RMSEA = 0.06, TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.96), and good nomological validity (the correlation between realistic threats and economic and political gains was r = –0.3). Measures from the symbolic sphere Measures from the symbolic sphere included collective identities and evaluation of symbolic threats of EU membership. Measured by three items, symbolic threats taped into fears of loss of cultural identity (“Croatian language will be in jeopardy,” “Croatian customs will vanish”) and national sovereignty. The construct had fairly good metrics (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74, factor loadings 0.78–0.84, 65.5 percent variance explained). European identity was a three-item construct measured by attachment to Europe, preference of Europe as a stateless and borderless whole, and notion of united Europe as the means of achieving well-being of the Europeans. The construct had acceptable metrics (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7, factors loadings 0.77–0.81, 62.2 percent variance explained). Exclusive national identity was measured by six items reflecting affinities towards intra-ethnic marriages as a strong norm, living in a country populated with just one ethnicity, keeping distance from other nations, and Croats being privileged over other citizens. Items were combined into three unidimensional parcels that indicated sound metric properties (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83, factor loadings 0.85–0.89, 75 percent variance explained). Inclusive national identity was measured by four items that addressed support for preservation of ethnic minorities’ culture and customs, and open expression of diversities. The measure demonstrated acceptable discriminant validity as indicated by model fit (χ2 = 14.6, df = 2, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.08, TLI = 0.9, CFI = 0.96), but barely acceptable or even poor convergent validity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.59, factor loadings 0.57–0.73, 45.5 percent variance explained). It was used in further analyses as the local (symbolic) measurement model indicated good model fit (χ2 = 140.5, df = 59, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.97, RMSEA = 0.04, TLI = 0.96, CFI = 0.97) and nomological validity (all intercorrelations between the four constructs were of expected direction as hypothesized by the proposed model, while the association between European and exclusive national identity was not statistically significant). Measures from the institutional sphere Measures from institutional sphere included trust in national and EU institutions. Trust in the EU was measured by a multidimensional scale consisting of 21 items that assessed the EU’s capacity to facilitate social, economic, and political processes in member states. The first factor aggregated 10 items that addressed

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broad civil and social issues (e.g. consumer protection, gender equality, public health, citizens’ democratic inclusion; items were combined into five parcels). The second factor aggregated eight items that addressed varied security-related issues (e.g. combating terrorism, human trafficking, illegal immigration, corruption and organized crime; items were combined into four parcels). The third factor aggregated three items that addressed economic issues (economic growth, unemployment, and citizens’ standard of living). As the factor intercorrelations were moderately high (0.4–0.45), HFA was performed. The three first-order factors constituted a single unforced second-order factor. Model fit of the entire construct was acceptable (χ2 = 330.2, df = 51, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.07, TLI = 0.94, CFI = 0.96), as were the metrics of the construct in which first-order factors were treated as manifest variables (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76, factor loadings 0.78–0.85, 67.3 percent variance explained). Trust in national institutions was measured by a multidimensional scale consisting of 11 items that evaluated efficiency of Croatian institutions in implementing modernization reforms. The three factors reflected assessments of reaching political, economic, and institutional standards (e.g. reforms in agricultural, judiciary, production, and higher education sectors, minority and human rights protection, reduction of external debt, market liberalization). As the factor intercorrelations were moderately high (0.4–0.46), HFA was performed. The three first-order factors constituted a single unforced second-order factor. Model fit of the entire construct was acceptable (χ2 = 176.5, df = 31, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.06, TLI = 0.95, CFI = 0.96), as were the metrics of the construct in which first-order factors were treated as manifest variables (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.7, factor loadings 0.78–0.81, 62.5 percent variance explained). The local (institutional) model displayed a borderline but acceptable model fit (χ2 = 82.9, df = 8, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.08, TLI = 0.9, CFI = 0.95), and good nomological validity (the correlation between trust in the EU and national institutions was r = 0.21). Global measurement model Finally, the global measurement model signaled acceptable overall fit (χ2 = 1,144.5, df = 398, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.04, TLI = 0.92, CFI = 0.93). As for the nomological validity, the associations between the constructs hypothesized by the proposed model were statistically significant and of the expected direction. Albeit weak, two additional associations not hypothesized in the case of Croatia were indicated—a positive link between popular Eurodispositions and inclusive national identity, and a positive link between realistic threats and exclusive national identity. Results: Evaluation of the Hypothetical Structural Model Tested with SEM in the form proposed in Figure 5.1, structural model was of borderline fit by most criteria (χ2 = 1,365.5, df = 418, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.9, RMSEA = 0.05, TLI = 0.91, CFI = 0.92). In an attempt to improve it, but also to explore the potential addition of the two structural relationships indicated by

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the global measurement model, the model was subjected to minor respecification. Modification indexes indicated the largest improvement in fit for the inclusion of correlational link between exclusive and inclusive national identity. As both measures were exogenous variables that expectedly shared a moderately strong negative correlation, there were no theoretical or analytical reasons against the introduction of covariance link. Other adjustments indicated by modification indexes were not performed—even if theoretically sensible—as they would have individually provided only a marginal decrease in the model chi-square statistic and compromised the principle of congeneric modeling. Lastly, structural links between popular Eurodispositions and inclusive national identity, and between realistic threats and exclusive national identity, were iteratively included. Although statistically significant within the global measurement model, in none of the iterations were those links statistically significant within the structural model. Therefore, neither of the two relationships was eventually introduced to the model. The slightly revised, final version of the structural model is presented in Figure 5.2.9 It demonstrated somewhat improved fit compared to the initial model (χ2 = 1,268.2, df = 417, p < 0.01, AGFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.04, TLI = 0.92, CFI = 0.93).

0.29

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Figure 5.2

POPULAR EURODISPOSITIONS

European identity

Structural model of popular Eurodispositions in Croatia: Results of SEM

9 For transparency, the measurement segment of the structural model—containing manifest variables associated with constructs and error terms—was not displayed. All reported coefficients were statistically significant at p < 0.01.

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Most model fit indexes still indicated a merely acceptable fit and a number of hypothesized links were weak. Nevertheless, all the structural relationships were confirmed even though the initial model was subjected only to minor, non-structural, respecification and remained congeneric. From the inferential point of view, it may therefore be cautiously proposed that the revised model is compatible with the data and can be considered provisionally confirmed, or rather, not-disconfirmed. Overall, the model accounted for a fairly sizable 57 percent of the variance in the Eurodispositions of Croatian citizens. Public support for the EU and European integration was directly affected by most fundamental utilitarian, symbolic, and institutional factors. On the one hand, the more the citizens trusted the EU, identified as Europeans, and assessed EU membership as politically and economically beneficial for the country, the more supportive of the Eurointegrations they were. On the other hand, fears of threats to collective interests that might result from EU membership, both economic and cultural, increased the opposition to Croatia’s Eurointegration. Considering the size of effects, utilitarian and institutional factors affected Eurodispositions to a larger degree than symbolic, which was particularly the case with trust in the EU institutions and anticipation of realistic threats. Identity-based determinants carried less weight, if any. By focusing on direct effects it could thus be assumed that the more rational motives bore a greater contribution to formation of popular support of or opposition to Eurointegrations in Croatia than the more irrational motives. However, the patterns and strength of mediated effects indicated by the model provide an empirical account for a different understanding of the background of the citizens’ Eurodispositions. Trust in the institutional efficiency of the EU—the single strongest direct predictor—was considerably more grounded in the citizens’ sense of European identity than the assessment of the interaction between national and EU-level institutions. Moreover, the tendency to attribute losses in concrete economic resources to EU membership was rather strongly influenced by fears of symbolic threats and—indirectly—by exclusive national identity. At the same time, the evaluation of political and economic gains from the membership rested more upon the combination of the sense of European identity and symbolic threats than upon trust in the EU’s efficiency. Put differently, identity-based factors reflected marginally on the citizens’ general attitudes towards the EU and European integrations, but nonetheless made a considerable impact on the popular Eurodispositions by (partially) conditioning its more direct predictors. The citizens with pronounced European identity may be compelled to somewhat idealize the EU’s ability to facilitate political, economic, and social processes in the member states, and to have overrated expectations from economic and political outcomes of the membership (and vice versa). At the same time, they are less concerned about realistic and symbolic threats of the membership than the citizens who do not share their supranational identification. In addition to enabling European identity, the sense of inclusive national identity also contributes to a decreased sense of symbolic threats from EU membership. Conversely, the citizens with pronounced ethno-nationalistic sentiments may tend

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to evaluate EU membership primarily as a danger to Croatian sovereignty, cultural distinctiveness, and, indirectly, to Croatia’s economic interests. In sum, there is convincing empirical evidence in support of a conclusion that EU-related evaluations among Croatian citizens are—to a considerable extent—identity-driven outlooks disguised as calculations of tangible costs and benefits from EU membership and as objective assessments of the EU’s efficiency. Neither the pseudo-rational reasoning behind the EU support, nor the absence of immediate effects of identity-based sentiments was surprising, however. The model of cultural threats and the premise of value-based anchoring of utilitarian expectations from the EU proved useful conceptual tools within a national context marked by lacking experience with EU membership, legacy of post-communist transition, and certain national particularities. In Croatia, most notable among those particularities are the absence of polarization of the political sphere over EU-related issues, pro-EU party cueing coming from all prominent political options from the right and the left, and systematic bonding of the accession to the EU as Croatia’s final break with the Balkans and the country’s twentieth-century past (cf. chapters 3 and 4). This combination seems to have suppressed mobilization of national identity in opposition to Eurointegrations in spite of a massive surge in Croatian nationalism that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent war, and in spite of the discourse centered on equating the pursuit of EU membership with repeating the historical mistake of joining the former Yugoslavia. Limitations Before proceeding to conclusions, several major study limitations need to be noted and briefly addressed. Within the chosen conceptual and analytical approach, impact of sociodemographic factors is typically assessed by testing for structural invariance across groups. More precisely, it is estimated whether the parameters of direct and mediated links within the model differ when applied to different age, income, profession, or education groups. Given the complexity of the tested model, such moderating effects could not be analyzed as the sample size was insufficient to allow further partition into subgroups. This limits the empirical insights, even though considerable sociodemographic effects were not expected. Most studies carried out in Croatia reported absence of a pronounced sociodemographic profile of popular Euroskepticism (Štulhofer, 2006; Sekulić and Šporer, 2008; Babarović et al., 2011), as well as marginal effects of basic sociodemographics on fundamental predictors of popular Eurodispositions (Čulig et al., 2007; Blanuša, 2011). As the data used in this study were not collected recently, the findings may not accurately reflect current attitudes of the Croatian public. However, the analyses focused on examination of deeper processes underlying popular Eurodispositions. Compared to general support for the EU, specific EU-related attitudes are arguably less affected by situational factors and more resistant to temporal change (e.g., Rulikova, 2004; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). An analysis of Eurobarometer reports revealed that public perception of trust in the

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EU and effects of EU membership on national economy or economic and political stability in Croatia were mostly stable over several years or more (Landripet, 2012, pp. 60–61). In addition, it is noteworthy that neither the negotiation process nor the EU’s internal affairs were the subject of extensive media coverage in the period when the research was conducted (Čulig et al., 2007, p. 43). It is thus reasonable to assume that the recorded public opinion on the EU-related topics was not overly biased and transitory due to the political context. Finally, any causality implying language used with results of testing the proposed structural model should be understood as provisional rather than empirically established. SEM facilitates testing of elaborated dependency relationships in non-experimental and cross-sectional research designs, but requires practitioners to draw on sound theoretical frameworks in formulating causal hypotheses. The usefulness of the proposed model therefore depends on how compelling its conceptual rationale is found, as the data cannot ascertain the direction of the proposed associations. Conclusion Public support for the EU and European integration in Croatia was indicated to be resting upon a set of interlinked utilitarian, identity-based, and institutionally driven factors. On the one hand, it is directly and substantially influenced by assessments of political and economic outcomes of the country’s EU membership and evaluation of the EU’s capacity to foster attainment of socially desirable goals within member states. On the other hand, the citizens’ calculations and evaluations concerning the EU-related issues were to a considerable degree “informed” by identity- and value-based factors. Whether in favor of Eurointegrations or not, Croatian citizens tend to rely on cognitive shortcuts and emotional anchors when reasoning about the EU and various outcomes of the EU membership. It is likely that such a constellation in the background of popular Eurodispositions in Croatia stems from the country’s transitional past, prolonged non-membership status, a national context characterized by a steady consensual support for Eurointegrations among the elites, and the subsequent absence of polarizing influences on the public opinion. With no major frictions between Croatian elites over the EU and Eurointegrations in sight, the ultimate question is whether the eventual completion of democratic consolidation and accumulation of first-hand experience with EU membership is likely to shift priorities behind the popular attitudes from positive and negative sentiments to knowledge- and experience-based evaluation. Reports on other post-communist member states suggest that this may not be the case. In general, no substantial changes in motives behind popular support for the EU and Eurointegrations were indicated years into the membership, with the citizens remaining fairly ill-informed about the EU’s institutions and authorities (Guerra, 2008; Wagner, 2008; Loveless, 2010). However, this may not be a sign of slow

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convergence of experiences and attitudes among the public in the “old” and the “new” member states, but instead a symptom of structural challenges facing EU citizens as a whole. By gaining jurisdiction over a number of political, economic, and social processes traditionally attached to nation states, the EU has become a hybrid, multilayered political entity, an unparalleled and ever-changing quasistate that already possesses some essential attributes of conventional federal and confederate states (Pelinka, 2011). For the EU citizens, this entails an almost continuous effort to make sense of new developments that are hard to comprehend and even harder to predict, whether brought about by the EU-level institutional changes or the EU’s interaction with the member states. In assessing the “moving target” of the EU, the citizens are required to weigh up often ambivalent individual and collective effects of European integration and to reconcile potentially conflicting regional, national, and supranational identifications evoked in the process. The absence of accessible Europe-level media coverage devoid of national biases and domestic priorities in the EU-related news representations only adds to the problem (Ross, 2008). Therefore, should the EU continue on the path of external and particularly internal integration—however gradual—it is improbable that EU citizens at large will be relying less on their identities in attempts to unravel the enigma of European integration (Fligstein et al., 2012). As for symbolic factors of particular relevance in the case of Croatia, the results indicated that supranational identification with Europe was the only identity-based factor to directly influence public attitudes towards the EU, and the predictor with the strongest mediated impact on popular Eurodispositions. European identity bolstered institutional trust in the EU and perception of utilitarian benefits from the EU membership, and curtailed the levels of perceived utilitarian and symbolic threats. At least in part, that could have been instigated by the widespread political and media discourse on joining the EU epitomized by the metaphor of “return to the European family” (Šarić, 2005). If so, how may European identity reflect on the future public support for the EU now that Croatia has finally “returned home”? Is it likely that its enabling influence will gradually deflate as the goal it might have been closely associated with was achieved? Could this contribute to a rise to prominence of other identity-based factors, possibly the ethno-nationalistic sentiments? This remains to be seen and certainly to be studied. There is little doubt, however, that Europeanism should not be expected to drive future support for European integration if tied to conceptions of a mutual European past and historical Croatian bond to Europe. The citizens should instead be enabled to form their attitudes towards the European integration based on a balanced perspective on Croatia’s present position in the EU and a foreseeable role it is to play in the Union of tomorrow. This task may remain a challenge for the domestic “identity entrepreneurs,” as both the national media representations of the EU and the political communication strategies tend to be one-sided, superficial, and non‑analytical (Popović et al., 2011; Grubiša, 2012). On the broader scale, the EU is facing the challenge of high salience of national

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identities (Fligstein et al., 2012), while the supranational identity—an essential facilitator of further Eurointegrations (Harris, 2011)—is at best present in the form of an implicit identification with the EU rather than a sense of belonging and solidarity with other citizens of the EU as a political collective. So far, the effects of the socializing efforts of the EU’s institutions in establishing an explicit EU identity have been weak. Much more work is required in transforming the implicit attachment into a conscious and passionate identification with the EU as a meaningful presence (Cram, 2012)—for its “old” and “new” citizens alike. References Abts, K., Heerwegh, D., and Swyngedouw, M., 2009. Sources of Euroscepticism: utilitarian interest, social distrust, national identity and institutional distrust. World Political Science Review, 5 (1), 1–24. Anderson, C., 1998. When in doubt, use proxies: attitudes toward domestic politics and support for European integration. Comparative Political Studies, 31 (5), 569–601. Arató, K. and Kaniok, P. (eds), 2009. Euroscepticism and European Integration. Zagreb: Political Science Research Centre. Babarović, T., Ćilić Burušić, L., and Burušić, J., 2011. Who are the supporters of Croatian membership in the European Union and NATO? Predictive value of personal and national well-being. Social Indicators Research, 102 (1), 71–80. Bagić, D. and Šalinović, A., 2006. Cost-benefit analysis as a determinant of popular support for Croatian accession to the European Union. In K. Ott (ed.) Croatia’s Accession to the EU: The Challenges of Participation (in Croatian). Zagreb: Institut za javne financije, 155–80. Blanuša, N., 2011. Euroscepticism in Croatia among youth and adults. In D. Bagić (ed.) Does School Educate Good Citizens? (in Croatian). Zagreb: Gong and FPZ, 106–26. Blanuša, N. and Šiber, I., 2007. The youth and Europe: fears and hopes (in Croatian). Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva, 3 (1), 119–41. Boomgaarden, H. and Freiere, A., 2009. Religion and Euroscepticism: direct, indirect or no effects? West European Politics, 32 (6), 1240–65. Boomgaarden, H., Schuck, A., Elenbaas, M., and de Vreese, C., 2011. Mapping EU attitudes: conceptual and empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU support. European Union Politics, 12 (2), 241–66. Brinegar, A. and Jolly, S., 2005. Location, location, location: national contextual factors and public support for European integration. European Union Politics, 6 (2), 155–80. Carey, S., 2002. Undivided loyalties: is national identity an obstacle to European integration? European Union Politics, 3 (4), 387–413. Christin, T. and Trechsel, A., 2002. Joining the EU? Explaining public opinion in Switzerland. European Union Politics, 3 (4), 415–43.

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Cram, L., 2012. Does the EU need a navel? Implicit and explicit identification with the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50 (1), 71–86. Čulig, B., Kufrin, K., and Landripet, I., 2007. EU + ?–: Popular Attitudes Towards Croatia’s Accession to the European Union (in Croatian). Zagreb: FF Press. de Vries, C. and van Kersbergen, K., 2007. Interests, identity and political allegiance in the European Union. Acta Politica, 42 (2–3), 307–28. Deflem, M. and Pampel, F., 1996. The myth of postnational identity: popular support for European unification. Social Forces, 75 (1), 119–43. Duchesne, S. and Frognier, A., 2008. National and European identifications: a dual relationship. Comparative European Politics, 6 (2), 143–68. Eichenberg, R. and Dalton, R., 2007. Post-Maastricht blues: the transformation of citizen support for European integration, 1973–2004. Acta Politica, 42 (2–3), 128–52. Fligstein, N., Polyakova, A., and Sandholtz, W., 2012. European integration, nationalism and European identity. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50 (S1), 106–22. Gabel, M., 1998. Economic integration and mass politics: market liberalization and public attitudes in the European Union. American Journal of Political Science, 42 (3), 936–53. Gabel, M. and Palmer, H., 1995. Understanding variation in public support for European integration. European Journal of Political Research, 27 (1), 3–19. Grubiša, D., 2010. Anti-corruption policy in Croatia: benchmark for EU accession. Politička misao, 47 (5), 69–95. ——— 2012. Croatian referendum for the European Union: anatomy of a belated (lack of) success (in Croatian). Politička misao, 49 (2), 45–72. Guerra, S., (2008) Domestic Proxies and the European Factor Before and After Accession: Polish Attitudes Towards EU Integration in a Comparative Perspective. Brighton: University of Sussex. Hair, J., Black, W., Babin, B., and Anderson, R., 2010. Multivariate Data Analysis, 7th edn. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Harris, E., 2011. Nation-state and the European Union: lost in a battle for identity. Politička misao, 48 (2), 91–109. Hartleb, F., 2011. A Thorn in the Side of European Elites: The New Euroscepticism. Brussels: Centre for European Studies. Haughton, T., 2011. Half full but also half empty: conditionality, compliance and the quality of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Political Studies Review, 9 (3), pp. 323–33. Hooghe, L., Huo, J., and Marks, G., 2007. Does occupation shape attitudes on Europe? Benchmarking validity and parsimony. Acta Politica, 42 (2–3), 329–51. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., 2004. Does identity or economic rationality drive public opinion on European integration? Political Science and Politics, 37 (3), pp. 415–20. ——— 2005. Calculation, community and cues: public opinion on European integration. European Union Politics, 6 (4), 419–43.

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——— 2007. Sources of Euroscepticism. Acta Politica, 42 (2–3), 119–27. Inglehart, R., 1970. Cognitive mobilization and European identity. Comparative Politics, 3 (1), 45–70. ——— 1971. Changing value priorities and European integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 10 (1), 1–36. Kamenov, Ž., Jelić, M., Huić, A., et al., 2006. National and European identity and attitudes toward the European integrations in Zagreb and Novi Sad (in Croatian). Društvena istraživanja, 15 (4–5), 867–90. Kline, R., 2005. Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling, 2nd edn. New York: The Guilford Press. Kopecký, P. and Mudde, C., 2002. The two sides of Euroscepticism party positions on European integration in East Central Europe. European Union Politics, 3 (3), 297–326. Kumlin, S., 2009. Blaming Europe? Exploring the variable impact of national public service dissatisfaction on EU trust. Journal of European Social Policy, 19 (5), 408–20. Lamza Posavec, V., Ferić, I., and Richtar, S., 2006. National pride and openness to European integrations (in Croatian). Društvena istraživanja, 15 (1–2), 141–53. Landripet, I., 2012. Structural Relationship among the Determinants of Croatian Citizens’ Opinions Towards Croatia’s Membership in the EU (in Croatian). Zagreb: Sveučilište u Zagrebu. Llamazares, I. and Gramacho, W., 2007. Eurosceptics among Euroenthusiasts: an analysis of southern European public opinions. Acta Politica, 42 (2–3), 211–32. Loveless, M., 2010. Agreeing in principle: utilitarianism and economic values as support for the EU in Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies, 48 (4), 1083–106. Loveless, M. and Rohrschneider, R., 2008. Public perceptions of the EU as a system of governance. Living Reviews in European Governance, 3 (5), 1–35. Lubbers, M. and Jaspers, E., 2011. A longitudinal study of euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 versus 1990. European Union Politics, 12 (1), 21–40. McLaren, L., 2002. Public support for the EU: cost/benefit analysis or perceived cultural threat? The Journal of Politics, 64 (2), 551–66. ——— 2006. Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration. London: Palgrave. ——— 2007. Explaining mass-level Euroscepticism: identity, interests, and institutional distrust. Acta Politica, 42 (2–3), 233–51. Neumayer, L., 2009. Euroscepticism as a political label in Central Europe: what has changed with the accession? In K. Arató and P. Kaniok (eds) Euroscepticism and European Integration. Zagreb: Political Science Research Centre, 179–95. Pelinka, A., 2011. The European Union as an alternative to the nation-state. International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, 24 (1–2), 21–30. Popović, G., Grmuša, T., and Prpić, H., 2011. Reporting the EU in the Croatian daily newspapers: the completion of the Croatian accession negotiations. Informatologia, 44 (4), 309–22.

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Ray, L., 2003. When parties matter: the conditional influence of party positions on voter opinions about European integration. Journal of Politics, 65 (4), 978–94. Rohrschneider, R. and Whitefield, S., 2006. Political parties, public opinion and European integration in post-communist countries. European Union Politics, 7 (1). 141–60. Ross, G., 2008. What do “Europeans” think? Analyses of the European Union’s current crisis by European elites. Journal of Common Market Studies, 46 (2), 389–412. Roter, P. and Bojinović, A., 2005. Croatia and the European Union: a troubled relationship. Mediterranean Politics, 10 (3), 447–54. Rulikova, M., 2004. The influence of pre-accession status on Euroscepticism in EU candidate countries. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 5 (1), 29–60. Šarić, Lj., 2005. Metaphorical models in EU discourse in the Croatian media. Jezikoslovlje, 6 (2), 145–70. Sass, D. and Smith, P., 2006. The effects of parceling unidimensional scales on structural parameter estimates in SEM. Structural Equation Modeling, 13 (4), 566–86. Sekulić, D. and Šporer, Ž., 2008. European and Croatian identity: cognitive mobilization or latent conflict. Sociologija i prostor, 46 (1), 3–22. Skoko, B., 2007. The perception of the European Union among the Croatian public (in Croatian). Anali Hrvatskog politološkog društva, 3 (1), 349–68. Sørensen, C., 2008. Love me, Love me Not … a Typology of Public Euroscepticism. EPERN Working Paper No19 and SEI Working Paper No101. Brighton, Sussex: European Institute. Štulhofer, A., 2006. Euroscepticism in Croatia: beyond rationality? In K. Ott (ed.) Croatia’s Accession to the EU: the Challenges of Participation (in Croatian). Zagreb: Institut za javne financije, 135–54. Szczerbiak, A. and Taggart, P. (eds), 2008. Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism: Volumes 1 & 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tišma, S., Samardžija, V. and Jurlin, K. (eds), 2012. Croatia and the EU (in Croatian). Zagreb: Institut za međunarodne odnose i Delegacija Europske unije u Republici Hrvatskoj. Tucker, J., Pacek, A., and Berinsky, A., 2002. Transitional winners and losers: attitudes toward EU membership in post-communist countries. American Journal of Political Science, 46 (3), 557–71. Tverdova, Y. and Anderson, C., 2004. Choosing the West? Referendum choices on EU membership in east-central Europe. Electoral Studies, 23, 185–208. Wagner, B., 2008. Determinants of support for the European Union in Central and Eastern Europe: the role of attitudes towards the nation state. Paper prepared for the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics in Riga, Latvia. Weßels, B., 2007. Discontent and European identity: three types of Euroscepticism. Acta Politica, 42, 287–306.

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Chapter 6

Remembering War the European Way: Croatia’s Commemorative Culture on the Eve of EU Membership 1

Vjeran Pavlaković

Croatia’s path to membership in the European Union was a long and difficult one, with political criteria significantly overshadowing economic ones. The EU was most demanding when it came to the legacy of Croatia’s War of Independence (Domovinski rat, or the Homeland War 1991–95), particularly regarding cooperation with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), refugee returns, minority rights, and reform of the judiciary. Moreover, there was a demand for Croatia to confront the even darker legacies of the Second World War that had been awakened in the 1990s; the pro-fascist Ustaša movement had been rehabilitated after the fall of communism and incorporated into the new statebuilding narratives.2 As part of first president Franjo Tuđman’s policy of national reconciliation, the black-shirted fascist collaborators of the Poglavnik (“leader”) Ante Pavelić were recast as patriots while the members of the multi-ethnic Partisan resistance movement, led by Josip Broz Tito and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, were labeled as anti-Croat killers serving the interests of Greater Serbian politicians in Belgrade. Even after the crises of the 1990s, Croatia was locked in a seemingly perpetual struggle over interpretations of the Second World War, especially since various memory agents consciously blurred traumas from 70 years ago with the more recent war accompanying Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The promise of EU membership seemed to offer a way out of the country’s internal “red and black” divisions over the past (i.e., left- and right-wing 1 The research for this chapter was part of the project “Framing the Nation and Collective Identity in Croatia: Political Rituals and the Cultural Memory of 20th century Traumas” funded by the Croatian Science Foundation (HRZZ). 2 The Ustaša (plural: Ustaše) movement, after the Croatian word for “insurgent,” was formed in the early 1930s by Ante Pavelić, a member of the Croatian Party of Rights who had fled into exile after the assassination of several Croatian deputies in the Yugoslav Assembly in 1928. This radical Croatian separatist movement was dedicated to the violent destruction of the Yugoslav state, was alternatively supported and suppressed by Mussolini’s Italy, and eventually came to power in April 1941 on the heels of the Axis destruction of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

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interpretations of the Second World War) and the beacon for a brighter, more prosperous future. The road to the EU opened after Tuđman’s death in 1999 and the election of Ivica Račan’s leftist coalition government in 2000. Even though Croatian elites often perceived the demands of the European Commission to be unfair or illegitimate, Jelena Subotić argues that they profoundly believed themselves to be European and were thus willing to fulfill the rigorous criteria in order to complete the Europeanization process (Subotić, 2011: 311). This was even the case regarding issues such as handing over suspected war criminals or documents demanded by the ICTY when public opinion had turned against EU accession. All post-2000 administrations argued that only by addressing the war crimes committed by the Croatian side and reining in rampant nationalism could Croatia “return to Europe” and Western civilization where it had always belonged. This discourse of European values was not only useful for justifying cooperation on war crimes issues and insisting on social, political, and economic compromises with the EU, but also for dealing with the more symbolic legacies of the Second World War which continued to shape everyday politics. This chapter examines how the EU accession process affected war remembrance and the commemorative culture in Croatia, and how European paradigms of remembering the Second World War have been interwoven into the state-building narratives already present since 1990. From 2000 to 2013, Croatian elites sought to reaffirm antifascist values and symbols which had been denigrated during the first decade of independence by resurgent nationalists. By directly associating the EU project with Croatia’s own contribution to the anti-Axis alliance, former presidents Stipe Mesić (2000–2010) and Ivo Josipović (2010–2015) actively pushed for the revival of nearly forgotten Partisan commemorations which were imbued with new meanings. Dates which had been used to glorify the motto of brotherhood and unity during socialist Yugoslavia were reinterpreted as representing not only the antifascist resistance but authentic state-building efforts and visions of European unity as Croatia came closer to full EU membership. The paradigm of Holocaust remembrance, embodied by the establishment of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research3 in 1998, likewise influenced Croatia’s commemorative practices, especially after the country joined it in 2005 (Radonić, 2010). Politicians at commemorations of the War of Independence changed the content of their speeches in order to reflect steps the government took to address war criminals on the victorious side: perpetrators were named, Serb victims acknowledged, and declarations issued that asserted the war was a defensive one which ultimately preserved European values in Croatia. The focus of this chapter will be on antifascist commemorations in the years immediately prior to EU accession, although I draw upon earlier research which traced Croatia’s commemorative culture since 1990. The work of scholars such as David I. Kertzer (1988), Titus Ensink and Christoph Sauer (2003), and 3 In 2013, the Task Force changed its name to the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

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Jan Assmann (2005) on political rituals, commemorative speeches, and cultural memory serve as a guide for tracing how Croatian elites have framed the past. Published transcripts of speeches, a wide variety of print and electronic media sources, and fieldwork conducted since 2006 form the core of my research material. The main official holiday commemorating the Second World War is June 22 (Antifascist Struggle Day), which Tuđman established in 1991 as a replacement for the controversial Uprising Day (July 27). Although sparsely attended (the date falls at the beginning of the summer tourist season and is separated by only a few days from Statehood Day, June 25), Croatian presidents and prime ministers have used this commemoration to reassert Croatia’s antifascist roots since 2000. I have chosen this commemoration as the primary focus because of the high-level delegations attending the ceremony over the last decade and the fact that the issues of statehood and European integration were regularly emphasized in the speeches given by the participating politicians. Several other memorial days will be mentioned, and while EU discourse has also permeated the speeches at these events, because of space limitations they will not be described in as much detail as the June 22 commemorative events. Commemorations at the former Jasenovac camp (the weekend closest to April 22) and Bleiburg Field in southern Austria (the weekend closest to May 15) most dramatically symbolize the divided narratives over the Second World War. The Jasenovac memorial center and annual commemoration represent Croatia’s (often problematic) Europeanization of Holocaust memory. Bleiburg, which many consider to be a manifestation which unapologetically glorifies the Ustaša movement, can be seen as a form of remembrance that has remained outside of EU influence, even though paradoxically it takes place in a country which has been an EU member since 1995. Although Antifascist Struggle Day is a national holiday with the central site of memory near the city of Sisak, local communities observe the holiday in other parts of the country. The most passionate commemorations are held in the Rijeka littoral region (Primorje) and Istria, parts of Croatia which are particularly proud of their antifascist heritage. While over 3,000 monuments and other forms of memory markers have been destroyed in Croatia since 1991 (out of a total of about 6,000 erected during socialist Yugoslavia), few were damaged in these regions which were far from the front lines of the War of Independence (Hrženjak, 2002). However, even this apparent continuity with the Partisan narrative has been modified to reflect Croatia’s entry into the EU. The recently enacted Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes (August 23), based upon European Parliamentary declarations and resolutions condemning both Stalinism and Nazism, actually resulted in a contradictory trend for commemorative politics. Rather than truly commemorate all victims, as the name implies, the right wing in Croatia has used this memorial day to draw parallels between the ruling Social Democrat Party (SDP) and communist repression against suspected collaborators and class enemies since 1944. Finally, EU discourse has characterized the celebrations of the Victory and Homeland

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Thanksgiving Day and Day of Homeland Defenders (August 5) held in Knin. The date marks the entry of the Croatian Army into Knin during Operation Storm in 1995, a lightning-quick victory marred by crimes against civilians, looting, and widespread destruction. While in previous years the observation of this event was subject to nationalist euphoria, counter commemorations, and occasionally somber reflections on the accompanying human rights violations, more recently the anniversary of Operation Storm (the legacies of which had in fact delayed Croatia’s accession) was used by politicians to describe a process of European integration as opposed to exclusively national self-determination. The Second World War in Croatia and Memory Politics Although the Second World War radically transformed and affected all of the republics of the former Yugoslavia, the traumas and deep divisions of that conflict can particularly be felt in contemporary Croatia due to the complex relationship between state-building narratives, legacies of both right- and left-wing extremist ideologies, and inter-ethnic violence perpetrated on a massive scale. The War of Independence in the 1990s reawakened many of the unresolved issues from the past, which had been suppressed for decades as part of the socialist regime’s efforts to maintain its monopoly over the historical narrative. The ideology of “brotherhood and unity” was coined to emphasize the unified struggle of all of Yugoslavia’s peoples against the foreign occupiers and domestic collaborators rather than focus on the internecine slaughter of civilians and revenge killings. The cultural memory politics of socialist Yugoslavia (with some regional differences) reflected this interpretation of the past in commemorative practices, monument construction, official historiographies, educational systems, and a broad range of cultural production until the system began unraveling in the 1980s following Tito’s death. The Second World War on the territory of former Yugoslavia was not a clear-cut struggle between foreign occupiers and a revolutionary guerrilla movement, but a multisided civil war characterized by the systematic persecution of rival ethnic and religious groups for over four bloody years (Hoare, 2006; Pavlowitch, 2008; Ramet, 2007; Tomasevich, 2001). The spiral of violence was particularly brutal in the Independent State of Croatia (NDH—Nezavisna Država Hrvatska), which included not only most of today’s Croatia (yet notably lacking the Istrian Peninsula and most of the territory on the Adriatic coast) but also present day Bosnia-Herzegovina. Members of the Ustaša terrorist movement established the NDH on April 10, 1941, just a few days after the Axis invasion and destruction of royal Yugoslavia. Ante Pavelić, who returned from exile in Italy, quickly established a harsh dictatorship that passed racial laws against Serbs, Jews, and Roma; built a system of concentration camps (the most notorious one being the Jasenovac complex); and violently repressed any opposition to his regime. While many Croats initially welcomed the NDH as salvation from the Serb-dominated interwar Yugoslav state, the totalitarian methods of the Ustaša regime quickly revolted the majority of the

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population. Serbs, who comprised nearly 30 percent of the NDH’s inhabitants, were the main targets of the Ustaša’s genocidal politics. They swelled the ranks of the growing Partisan resistance movement, organized by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia under Tito’s skillful command. Other Serbs joined the Četniks, who fought for the restoration of royal Yugoslavia but engaged in numerous atrocities against Croat and Muslim civilians and eventually fully collaborated with the pro‑Axis forces. The various factions and shifting alliances unsurprisingly resulted in “near-anarchy and an ideal situation for revolutionary war” (Pavlowitch, 2008, p. 273), from which the Partisans eventually emerged victorious. The Ustaše stayed loyal to Hitler until the end, and while much of the leadership, including Pavelić, were able to escape to the West after May 1945, tens of thousands of others associated (or allegedly associated) with the regime suffered in postwar communist massacres, death marches, or other types of persecution, symbolically commemorated as the Bleiburg massacre and the Way of the Cross (Grahek Ravančić, 2009). Croats in particular were saddled with the guilt of the Ustaša crimes, even though by the end of the war hundreds of thousands of ethnic Croats had fought in the Partisan ranks. The legitimacy of the postwar socialist regime was based upon the official narratives of the Partisan struggle, referred to in the historiography as the People’s Liberation Struggle (NOB—Narodnooslobodilčka borba). Although by the 1960s Yugoslavia was far more liberal in many aspects than its neighbors in the Soviet bloc, challenging the state’s interpretation of the past, especially the numbers of victims, was a taboo topic that could result in prison sentences. Renata Jambrešić-Kirin, writing on the socialist-era politics of memory related to the Second World War, concludes that “the Yugoslav animators of cultural memory” were important in “affirming the political order, the ideology of brotherhood and unity, and the legitimacy of the ruling party, while repressing the problem of interethnic conflicts” (2006, p. 166). In addition to the introduction of new rituals, commemorations, and burial ceremonies, the socially constructed memory of the Second World War involved monuments and memorials, history books, films, the cooption of the artistic community and youth organizations, and the complete ideological conformity of the educational system. After multiparty elections in 1990 and the rapid disintegration of communist ideology in Yugoslavia as well as Eastern Europe, the monopoly over the past crumbled along with the former political system. A proliferation of debates about the Second World War in Croatia contributed to the deterioration of Serb-Croat relations and the slide towards a new cycle of war. Slobodan Milošević, Serbia’s president and architect of Yugoslavia’s bloody dissolution, used his propaganda apparatus to spread fear among Croatia’s Serbs of a renewed Ustaša threat. At the same time, Tuđman (himself a former Partisan officer) and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ—Hrvatski demokratski savez) tolerated the rehabilitation of the Ustaše in an attempt to bridge the red–black ideological divide among Croats. Despite the shameful policies during its brief existence and its inglorious end, the NDH remains romanticized in certain circles because of the predominance of the state-forming ideology (državotvornost) and ideas of “state right” among nationalists. In their

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interpretation, the Ustaša supposedly established the first independent state since the loss of national sovereignty in 1102, ignoring the fact that the NDH was divided and controlled by both Italy and Germany. The consequence of this alleged “thousand year dream for an independent state” (Tuđman’s oft-used phrase) meant that for many Croatian nationalists it was more important to have a state (even a fascist one) than a democratic political system. Thus, even a criminal regime such as that established by the Ustaše would have legitimacy in certain circles. Fetishization of the state led to the whitewashing of Ustaša crimes by the post-1945 émigré community, a trend that entered mainstream Croatian political culture after 1990. Nevertheless, the Croatian Constitution (adopted in December 1990 and amended most recently in 2010) cites the Partisan movement and ZAVNOH (State Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia, the governing body of the Croatian Partisans) as part of the continuity of Croatian statehood.4 The establishment of statehood (whether the NDH, the Socialist Republic of Croatia within a federal Yugoslavia, or independent Croatia in 1991) remains at the heart of war remembrance in Croatia, and it is one of the predominant discursive motifs in all commemorative speeches. Therefore the inclusion of EU discourse in war commemorations represented an important shift for how the political elite tried to shape the historical narrative; no longer was national sovereignty the only theme, rather the move towards another multinational union was interwoven into the already fluid war narratives of the twentieth century. Commemorations, along with other political rituals such as rallies, parades, anniversaries, and other mass gatherings, are symbolic public activities that elites use to construct a grand narrative of a nation-state’s history. “Politics is expressed through symbolism,” asserts anthropologist David I. Kertzer, suggesting that even people in modern societies are influenced more by symbolic forms than rational calculations (1988, p. 2). In Ritual, Politics, and Power he cites the prevalence of political rituals, replete with emotional, historical, and national symbols, in every political system regardless of whether it is a democracy with free market capitalism or an authoritarian regime with a state-run economy. Kertzer adds that “ritual is an integral part of politics in modern industrial societies; it is hard to imagine how any political system could do without it” (1988, p. 3). Additionally, the commemorative speech plays a key role in political rituals, and as Titus Ensink and Cristoph Sauer have shown in their discourse analysis of the Warsaw Uprising commemoration, “without a speech, a commemoration cannot come to pass” (2003, p. 29). Since commemorations and anniversaries are cyclical events that take place every year, they can be analyzed systematically over time. In analyzing how the relationships between cultural memory and national identity in Croatia changed from the war years in the 1990s to the present day, it is necessary to define the three levels in which memory functions. The first level is individual memory, or the remembering of events actually experienced by individuals. Since people who experienced the Second World War are still 4 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, an online version is available at http:// www.zakon.hr/z/94/Ustav-Republike-Hrvatske.

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living, their oral histories contribute to the communicative memory and discourse of those events, although it can be expected that the death of this generation will change the way the war is remembered (Assmann, 2005, p. 59). The second level is collective memory, a term coined by sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. He argued that group memory was socially constructed through interaction with others and reflected the dominant discourses of society (Halbwachs, 1992). Institutional memory, the way ruling elites as well as their opponents construct historical narratives, represents the final level of memory and is the most relevant framework for analyzing the post-socialist transition in Croatia. Commemorations, textbooks, the names given to public spaces, and monuments are a few elements of institutionalized memory which states and regimes use to present their interpretation of the past in order to justify the present political order. As mentioned above, the most dramatic shifts in the cultural memory of the Second World War took place after 1990, when Croatian state-building narratives replaced Yugoslav brotherhood and unity. Although cultural memory research has only been applied to the case of the former Yugoslavia relatively recently, a number of studies have been published in the region (Cipek, 2011; Karačić et al., 2012; Kuljić, 2006; Pavlaković, 2009). Yet the shift towards an EU narrative represents another layer in the way the past is reconfigured to reflect contemporary political goals. Croatia is not unique in the fact that the memory of the Second World War has shaped contemporary politics. Memory politics profoundly shaped the postwar landscape in Western Europe, and after the fall of the Berlin Wall former communist countries in Eastern Europe thoroughly revised their interpretations of the war and subsequent Soviet occupation (Lebow, 2006; Müller, 2002). But Croatia and the other former Yugoslav republics experienced a new conflict in the 1990s in which the collective remembrance of the Second World War played an explicit role. One of the consequences of this reanimation of the ghosts of the past is the blurring of the past and the present, in which interpretations of the Second World War are inextricably influenced by the narrative of the Croatian War of Independence. The decision by post-2000 political elites in Croatia to frame the Second World War within the broader European antifascist narrative rather than focusing primarily on the state-building aspects can be seen as part of an identity convergence strategy for justifying difficult compromises and measures as part of the EU accession process. Subotić, building upon the work by Randy Stoecker, defines identity convergence as “a dynamic process by which political actors strategically emphasize shared norms and values and disregard or omit contradictory ones in pursuit of particular political goal [sic]” (Subotić, 2011, p. 313). Pro-EU Croatian elites thus emphasized the shared antifascist values that represent the foundation of the European Union while at the same time delegitimizing NDH apologists who argued that the Ustaša regime represented the true continuity of Croatian statehood. Furthermore, the communist ideology of the Partisans and the postwar excesses of the Titoist regime were ignored in order to better situate the resistance movement into the broader European narrative based on democracy and market capitalism. As will be shown in the case studies below, the identity convergence strategy adopted

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by Croatian elites can be traced in commemorative rituals in “which domestic political actors nurture, reinforce, and promote a particular version of state identity that best serves their competitive electoral goals” (Subotić, 2011, p. 313). Antifascist Struggle Day under Tuđman and Mesić (1991–2009) In socialist Yugoslavia, the regime’s monopoly over historical narratives meant that the holidays which were celebrated were connected to key moments from the People’s Liberation Struggle or international worker holidays (such as May Day), while religious holidays were ignored and had to be celebrated in private (Hoepken, 1999, p. 196; Rihtman-Auguštin, 2000, p. 116). Franjo Tuđman and the HDZ-dominated parliament that came to power in 1990 not only oversaw the ideological transformation of Croatia’s streets and monuments but also reshuffled the calendar and collection of national holidays. How to officially remember the beginning of the antifascist uprising within the emerging nationalist historical narrative in Croatia illustrates this debate over the recent past. Although July 27 had been celebrated as Croatia’s Uprising Day during socialist Yugoslavia, Tuđman designated a new date, June 22, as the more nationally-appropriate memorial day. Yugoslav communists had been planning for an armed uprising since the Axis occupation in April 1941, but it was the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22 that served as the spark for the formation of the first Partisan unit in Croatia, in a forest near the industrial town of Sisak (Anić, 2005, pp. 20–21). Led by Vladimir Janjić-Capo and Marijan Cvetković, this unit of mostly Croats sabotaged the important railway nearby, representing the first act of armed resistance in Croatia (Goldstein, 2008, p. 279). Other acts of resistance spread across Croatia, especially in Zagreb, where the communists had many members and sympathizers. But it was in the predominantly Serb region of Lika along the Croatian–Bosnian border that the massive armed uprising took place in the summer of 1941. On July 27, Serb villagers in Srb and in Drvar (Bosnia-Herzegovina) organized a popular revolt, nominally under the command of a local Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) cell, attacking all symbols of the NDH regime and ambushing the Ustaša forces sent to restore order. Although the uprising in Srb was commemorated as a Partisan and communist rebellion, in reality the situation was considerably more complicated. The communists were relatively few in number, while a significant number of the rebels fell under the influence of Četniks who committed atrocities against Croat and Muslim civilians in reprisal attacks that destroyed the towns of Boričevac and Kulen Vakuf in August and September of that year. Drago Roksandić’s study on Uprising Day anniversaries in Croatia after 1945 vividly illustrates how commemorating (or not commemorating) certain dates played a central role in constructing the narrative of 1941 during socialist Yugoslavia. In his analysis of the official party newspaper in Croatia, Vjesnik, Roksandić shows how changing Serb–Croat relations as well as Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union determined whether the Sisak Partisans would be recognized

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or “silenced” by exclusive coverage of the more “autochthonous” uprising on July 27 (Roksandić, 1995). The decision by the Tuđman administration in 1991 to shift the official antifascist holiday to June 22 (renamed Antifascist Struggle Day—Dan antifašističke borbe) was motivated as much by politics as by the desire to properly acknowledge the Sisak Partisans. A Zagreb newspaper article declared that the change of dates “was not only paying off the debt to historical truth, but was a significant liberation of Croatia from the spiritual, cultural, and political oppression that it tolerated for more than seventy years” (Večernji list, 1991). An uprising by Serb peasants against the NDH was no longer an appropriate lieux de memoire in a Croatia reasserting its historic state-building narrative. In the 1990s, the June 22 commemorations passed practically unnoticed, with only brief wreath-laying ceremonies conducted at the Altar of the Homeland (a fabricated memory-site constructed in a medieval fortress in the hills above Zagreb), the monument to People’s Heroes in Mirogoj Cemetery, and the monument to fallen antifascists in Zagreb’s Dotršćina Park. Tuđman never attended the official ceremonies but rather sent members of parliament, while local antifascist veteran organizations arranged additional commemorations at various sites of memory across the country (Novi list, 1996, p. 3). Only after 2000 did Croatian administrations begin sending high-level delegations to various antifascist commemorations. In 2006 Stjepan Mesić became the first Croatian president to attend the Antifascist Struggle Day ceremony held in the Brezovica forest near Sisak. The connection between the Partisan movement in the 1940s and the independent state forged in the War of Independence in the 1990s became a dominant theme in the speeches given at the June 22 commemoration, challenging right-wing interpretations of the NDH’s statehood. Vladimir Šeks, one of the HDZ’s most senior deputies, personally illustrated the shift in Croatia’s attitudes towards the Partisan legacy in his speech on June 22, 2005, when he stated that ZAVNOH [the State Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Croatia] established the foundations of Croatian state sovereignty within the Yugoslav state and reintegrated Croatian regions that the servants of the occupiers had handed over to the Nazi-fascists. In the national and democratic sense Croatian antifascism is immeasurable. It is founded on the Partisan struggle during the Second World War and in the Homeland War, and is turned towards the future. (Vjesnik, 2005)

The highest officials in the country thus began to publicly express support for the antifascism that had been vilified in the 1990s, culminating in the Croatian parliament’s passing of the Declaration of Antifascism in April 2005.5 5 The text of the declaration can be found at www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=7273. Croatian antifascist organizations have criticized the government in the years since the enactment of the Declaration, alleging that at the local level not enough was done to promote antifascism, sanction the use of Ustaša and other fascist symbols, or provide sufficient benefits to the dwindling numbers of Partisan veterans.

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Former president Mesić’s speech in 2006 in Brezovica not only exemplified the trend of restoring antifascism and the Partisan struggle in the national narrative; it also explicitly mentioned the antifascist struggle as the predecessor to European integration. In a direct challenge to the revisionist historiography of the 1990s, which had associated the Croatian national struggle within the NDH, Mesić emphasized that Croats had fought on the proper side, had contributed significantly to the global antifascist cause, and had been led by Tito, himself a Croat. Mesić added that “the future of Croatia is in Europe, a united Europe, built upon the foundation of antifascism, democracy, tolerance, respect, and the protection of human and minority rights.”6 The following year in Topusko, Mesić declared that “in contrast to the Quisling NDH, at the 3rd ZAVNOH assembly [May 8–9, 1944] the Partisan movement restored the idea of the Croatian state” (Novi list, 2007, p. 9). Croatia’s shift towards remembering the European way could be clearly seen in the fresh attention paid to the Jasenovac memorial center. A year after joining the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research, the Croatian government renovated the Jasenovac “Flower” monument (by architect Bogdan Bogdanović) and financed a new permanent exhibition with assistance from the US Holocaust Museum. Although Mesić was the first Croatian president to attend the commemorations every April, it is then-Prime Minister Ivo Sanader’s speech that is worth noting: We must speak about a Europe without divisions precisely at Jasenovac. Because Jasenovac is a tragic measure of the depth of divisions which, in the context of the old conflicted Europe, were carved deeply into the tissue of Croatian society. Few countries in Europe felt and suffered so much from the consequences of European divisions and conflicts between ideologies and peoples. In the War of Independence we overcame those divisions, we strengthened our antifascist foundations while simultaneously condemning communist totalitarianism, and we raised the paradigm of a newly united and reconciled Croatia that is our pledge in the new Europe. That new Europe brings values that are also part of our inheritance, such as dialogue, tolerance, peace, and democracy. Modern Croatia will be built precisely upon those values.7

A contemporary approach in commemorating and memorializing the Holocaust is part of the European paradigm of remembrance focusing on victims, and Croatia, like other post-socialist countries desiring membership, has made an effort to adopt EU standards. Despite many improvements in the museum’s approach to the Ustaša regime’s genocidal policies at camps such as Jasenovac, the exhibition remains problematic (Radonić, 2010). Even Mesić criticized the 6 The text of Stjepan Mesić’s speech was published in Glas antifašista (2006, p. 5). 7 Speech of former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, November 27, 2006, at Jasenovac, transcript in the possession of the author.

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minimalistic and rather avant-garde design, stating that “it did not adequately present the brutality of the killings, even though it was good that the victims were individualized. Perhaps I am subjective, but this was a concentration camp of horror and the most terrible kinds of death” (Novi list, 2006, p. 3). In 2008, Mesić admitted that the EU was in the midst of a serious economic crisis, but he believed that both the Europeanization of Croatia and the values of antifascism were worthy enough to continue upon the path charted by the country’s political elites. In his speech at Brezovica he reflected on both the manipulation of the past and the European future: Today’s Croatia is on the path towards a unified Europe, regardless of the difficulties that appear occasionally on our side, and regardless of the troubles currently facing the European Union. A united Europe, with its values, standards, and criteria, is our future. And we are joining that Europe in the first place because of ourselves and our future. That European future of ours must be cleansed of historical delusions, political deviations which drag us back into the past, and desires to change history and historical truths after the fact. The European future is built upon the foundations laid down in the now-distant days of the Second World War, upon the ideas of antifascism and freedom. And—the future is built upon the truth about the past!8

This speech is interesting because it reveals how the commemorative space provided Mesić the opportunity to address very contemporary issues. On the one hand, for the domestic audience he underlined that the goal of European integration was still desirable and really the only option on the table; Croats were and always had been European. On the other hand, the message to the EU was that Croatia shared European values even though it was still troubled by the legacies of the war in the 1990s, bouts of nationalism, and an ambiguous stance on the Ustaša regime. Mesić, although one of the most outspoken politicians on the issue of war crimes committed by Croatian forces during the War of Independence, often compared the positive antifascist aspects of the Partisan movement with those of the war in the 1990s. At the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Split from Italian occupiers, he noted that “with the victories in the People’s Liberation Struggle and the War of Independence we completed the architecture of our space,” alluding to the territorial borders of the Croatian state (Novi list, 2008). He added that Croatian antifascism contributed to the Allied victory, but also that victory in 1995 enabled the EU to expand into this region of the former Yugoslavia. These and similar statements can also be read as having both domestic and international meanings. For the Croatian public, equating the Partisans with the heroic images from the more recent war of the 1990s served to restore dignity to the veterans of the Second World War who had been maligned during the first decade of 8 Transcript of Stjepan Mesić’s speech in Brezovica on June 22, 2008, in possession of the author.

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independence. The message for the EU was that the Croatian Army should be considered to be an integral part of Croatia’s antifascist tradition, having fought against Milošević’s dictatorship and helping to bring an end to the war in 1995. Mesić’s speech in Brezovica in 2009, his last as president, was also one of his most militant. In part he was responding to the speech of parliamentary deputy Andrija Hebrang (HDZ), given at Bleiburg Field on May 16, which had included sharp attacks against communists who were still in politics and political parties that allegedly continued to deny communist crimes.9 Hebrang referred to Tito as a war criminal with blood on his hands, which prompted considerable applause from the crowd. The Bleiburg commemoration had taken place the day before local elections, and in addition to several hundred individuals with Ustaša symbols, uniforms, and flags, members of right-wing parties were handing out campaign flyers despite rules of campaign silence. Although there was no direct mention of the Social Democrats, the HDZ’s campaign in the previous month labeled its main opponent as a party of unreformed communists that wanted to remove religious education from schools. Additionally, the Croatian Bishops’ Conference issued a statement for Croatian citizens not to vote for parties that denied Partisan crimes committed during and after the Second World War. Mesić used the Antifascist Struggle Day commemoration to lash out against revisionists, defend Tito, and once again reject the NDH as an expression of Croatian statehood: Our state is young. It emerged from the War of Independence, which was a struggle for freedom and independence. Today’s Croatia has absolutely nothing to do with the entity which tarnished the Croatian name during the Second World War and is responsible for unparalleled crimes against Serbs, Jews, Roma, Croatian antifascists, and anybody else it suspected could think differently. The so-called Independent State of Croatia was not an expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people, nor is today’s Republic of Croatia in any way its continuation, nor its rebirth. The NDH was not independent, not Croatian, and it was not a state!10

Reflecting upon European commemorative practices, Mesić said he envied the manner in which Germany, the United Kingdom, and France gave respect to the Allied victory, suggesting that in Croatia he sometimes felt isolated in his defense of antifascism. This speech was clearly directed at his domestic political opponents, and at the end he vowed that his “final battle, his final war” would be to continue to fight for the truth about the Second World War (Jutarnji list, 2009; Novi list, 2009). 9 Speech by Andrija Hebrang, Bleiburg, Austria, May 16, 2009. Transcript in possession of the author. 10 Speech by Stjepan Mesić’s in Brezovica on June 22, 2009. Transcript in possession of the author.

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Antifascism on Europe’s Doorstep (2010–2013) Mesić’s successor, Ivo Josipović, took a more reconciliatory position towards “the other side:” those who had lost family members due to post-war communist repression. In an effort to depoliticize debates on the Second World War, on June 20, 2010, Josipović visited the mass grave of Partisan victims at Tezno (Slovenia) with a delegation of politicians and members of antifascist organizations. However, he continued to emphasize that rehabilitation of fascism and glorification of the NDH would not be tolerated (Vjesnik, 2010).11 He also laid a wreath at Bleiburg, which he visited without the members of antifascist or Serb organizations of his delegation, becoming the first Croatian president to visit the controversial site of memory. There he issued a rather idealistic declaration about memory politics in Croatia: With this act, I believe that as far as Croatian politics is concerned the Second World War has ended. We have closed one chapter of Croatian history, so we can focus on the future and leave any unresolved questions for the historians. (Večernji list, 2010)

Unfortunately, Croatia remains bitterly divided over the Second World War, even after joining an EU allegedly focused on the future. Despite symbolically reaching out to the right wing, Josipović remained adamant that antifascism was the foundation of the Croatian state. At Brezovica on June 22, 2010, Josipović declared that “the War of Independence is the natural continuation of the People’s Liberation Struggle, which created the foundation of Croatian statehood” (Novi list, 2010). Former Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor (HDZ) also made a comparison between the two conflicts in the twentieth century, but was more explicit regarding Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic integration: Due to the victory against fascism and the victory in the War of Independence, today we are building Croatia as an independent, democratic state for all of its citizens. That is how we became a member of NATO, the most efficient alliance of Western democracies, and soon we will become a member of the EU, which will complete the process of state-building and return us among Western nations where we always belonged. (Vjesnik, 2010)

Neven Mimica, formerly the deputy speaker of the Croatian parliament and currently a member of the European Parliament, noted that the EU was a barrier to Nazism and fascism, and that Croatian antifascism was based on European values.12 However, just like Josipović’s premature claim that the Second World 11 While Bleiburg is the main symbolic place of memory for the defeated Ustaša forces, Tezno is the location of a former antitank trench where the bodies of captured NDH soldiers were buried. 12 Field notes taken at Brezovica, June 22, 2010.

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War was over, events since Croatia’s entry into the EU (incidents of hate speech, mobilization against minorities, and the chanting of Ustaša slogans at international soccer matches) show that the EU is not a cure-all for Croatia’s problems with extreme nationalism. The display of extreme nationalism was in evidence in 2011, when members of the Croatian Pure Party of Rights (HČSP—Hrvatska čista stranka prava) organized a demonstration in Brezovica against the official commemoration. This marginal right-wing party is known for its use of Ustaša symbols, threats against homosexuals and antifascist organizations, and the staging of countercommemorations in Srb, Vodoteč, and Kumrovec in 2010 (Večernji list, 2010). Josipović’s efforts at reconciling divided Croats did not bear much fruit, especially because this would also represent the HDZ’s last moments paying homage to antifascism; after losing parliamentary elections in December 2011 to a center-left coalition, the HDZ turned to the right and began mobilizing supporters around symbolic issues from the past. However, on June 22, 2011, former foreign minister Gordan Jandroković (HDZ) claimed that “the antifascist struggle formed the base of EU integration.”13 During the HDZ’s last two mandates (2004–2008, and 2008–2011), party members had regularly attended Partisan commemorations where they affirmed (perhaps not as enthusiastically as Mesić) Croatia’s antifascist traditions and European values. The election of Tomislav Karamarko as president of the HDZ in 2012 resulted in a deliberate return to the more overt nationalist rhetoric of the 1990s.14 As Croatia’s entry into the EU drew closer, and the debate over whether or not Croatia should even join heated up, Croatian elites increased the rhetoric of the EU future as the only viable one. At Brezovica in 2012, clearly responding to fears that Croatian identity and sovereignty would be assimilated in the EU, Josipović insisted that “Europe will recognize us for our antifascism, which is a part of our national identity” (Glas Istre, 2012). By celebrating the antifascist past, Croatian identity would be preserved and not erased, as the right wing claimed in its anti-EU campaigns. He repeated his argument that “what the antifascists were in the 1940s, our Homeland Defenders (branitelji, the term for veterans of the 1990s war) were in the 1990s” (Večernji list, 2012). The center-left coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) did not make any significant changes to the commemorative practices other than cutting off state funding for the Bleiburg commemoration, provoking the right wing on symbolic issues from the very beginning of the administration’s mandate. SDP officials generally followed a formula similar to that of their predecessors—emphasizing the common antifascist values of Croatia and the EU, the preservation of statehood in the Partisan struggle, and equating Croatian Partisans with the veterans of 13 Live broadcast on Croatian radio television (HRT1), June 22, 2011. 14 Former Croatian minister of the interior and Partisan veteran Josip Boljkovac referred to Karamarko, who, incidentally, also served as minister of the interior as “an extremist and an Ustaša” (Novi list, 2012, p. 4).

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the 1990s. One noticeable difference, however, was that Prime Minister Zoran Milanović specifically mentioned Serbs in his speech on Antifascist Struggle Day in 2012. Although he did not use the phrase of “brotherhood and unity” from the socialist era, he did state that “brotherhood between Serbs and Croats saved Croatia during the Second World War” (Glas Istre, 2012). One of the reactions to the revisionism of the 1990s was precisely to restore antifascism in the state-building narrative, but by emphasizing Croats in the Partisan movement the Serb contribution was marginalized. Since the right wing had labeled the Partisans a mere fig leaf for Greater Serbian control of Croatia, both Mesić and Josipović used the rhetoric that the antifascist resistance fought for Croatian national interests and not a centralized Yugoslavia. According to a 2011 survey of 1,500 adults in Croatia, only 40.4 percent of respondents believed that the Partisans had fought for national interests, while 40 percent thought that statehood continuity had been preserved through ZAVNOH and the Partisan struggle (as stated in the Constitution) (IPSOS Strategic Marketing, 2011). This seems to indicate that despite the new commemorative discourse, collective memory of the Second World War remains divided. For Serbs in Croatia, meanwhile, antifascism and the Partisan movement are key components of their identity. The ZAVNOH resolutions enshrined Serbs as a constituent nation in Croatia due to their contribution to the Partisan cause and great number of victims who suffered during the war. The Constitution of 1990 eliminated Serbs as a constituent nation in Croatia and some antifascist commemorations, such as the July 27 uprising in Srb, were labeled as Četnik holidays by nationalists. For many years certain antifascist anniversaries were attended only by Croatian Serb organizations, although since 2000 that has gradually changed.15 Whereas the Croatian political elite has emphasized state-building and European values, as discussed above, Serb participants in commemorative events focus on Serb–Croat cooperation in the antifascist struggle. For example, at the Srb commemoration in 2009, the president of the Serbian National Council (SNV), Milorad Pupovac, insisted that we are gathered here so that the trust of people in each other is created and strengthened in Lika. We must spread the trust between Croats by Serbs […] Croatia needs more justice and more accountability, and the load must be shared by all. Srb was not just a place of the uprising, but a place where there existed a belief in a more just society. (Novosti, 2009)

In 2012, the SNV delegates demonstratively walked away during the middle of the ZAVNOH commemoration in Topusko after Serbs were not mentioned in the 15 According to interviews conducted by historian Filip Škiljan among Croatian Serbs, many of them still consider the legacy of the antifascist movement as an important component of contemporary Serbian identity, along with language, the Cyrillic script, and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Škiljan, 2014, pp. 129–32).

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official part of the program. The SNV’s vice president told reporters that “the complete omission of Serbs in the program of the celebration was particularly hard on us. This is not the first time that the contribution of Serbs to the victory over fascism was ignored” (Novosti, 2012). Pupovac issued similar criticism in a parliamentary debate over military cemeteries and destroyed monuments in eastern Croatia in January 2013, when he asked his fellow representatives whether “antifascism in that part of the country belonged only to Serbs” (Novosti (Kronika), 2013). In insisting on the “Croatian-ness” and “European-ness” of the Second World War in Croatia, the political elite’s narrative of the antifascist resistance drifted away from the factors which made it unique and worth celebrating. The main audience of the commemorative manifestations in any case was not the decimated Serb population nurturing antifascism, but Croats who considered the NDH a legitimate state or the international monitors of Croatia’s readiness for EU integration. All of the speakers at the commemoration in June 2013—President Josipović, speaker of the parliament Josip Leko, Labor Minister Mirando Mrsić, and honorary president of the Association of Antifascist Fighters Stjepan Mesić—focused on the imminent entry into the EU. While Josipović concluded that “without antifascism Europe is not Europe, and Croatia is not Croatia,” Mrsić described how “in ten days Croatia is returning to its European home which is founded upon antifascism” (Novi list, 2013). The rhetoric was considerably less inflammatory, as if the war against fascist rehabilitation was soon to be over following Croatia’s long-awaited entry into the EU. However, looking back over the commemorations in the last decade, the proclamations by Croatia’s political leadership in Brezovica seem rather hollow and issued without truly carrying out the promises behind the rhetoric. It is true that on the symbolic level the Croatian elite underwent a sea change after 2000 in its stance on the legacy of antifascism and efforts to implement European regulations, values, and discourse. Yet the statements in front of a few hundred dedicated antifascists and local politicians could hardly have an impact, or reflect upon, the myriad of socioeconomic problems and serious ideological divisions roiling Croatian society with or without EU membership. Commemorations in Vukovar,16 Čavoglave,17 16 The fall of Vukovar in 1991 is commemorated every year on November 18 as Vukovar Remembrance Day, with the central event being a column of remembrance from the city hospital to the memorial cemetery. In 2013, after months of tension over the use of Cyrillic script (perceived by many veterans to be a symbol of Serbian aggression) on municipal signs, the official government delegation was snubbed and prevented from joining the column of remembrance. 17 Since 2005 Čavoglave, a village in the Dalmatian hinterland near Sinj, has been the site of unofficial War of Independence celebrations on August 5. Although the official commemoration takes place in Knin, controversial musician Marko Perković Thompson has organized increasingly larger celebrations in his home town that attract those with a harder right-wing position on the recent past.

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Bleiburg,18 and even Kumrovec19 indicate that mass political rituals “from below” draw more authentic, passionate, and radical crowds where EU discourse is nowhere to be heard. Conclusion This chapter sought to trace how EU discourse shaped the speeches given by Croatian government officials at the Antifascist Struggle Day commemorations. Based on which topics were given the greatest emphasis during the political rituals in Brezovica every June 22, it is apparent that the post-Tuđman elites were directing their messages at two main audiences: domestic and international. Primarily they sought to restore the antifascist movement in the state-building narrative. The collapse of socialist Yugoslavia and the war in the 1990s with all of its Second World War symbolism had completely delegitimized the Partisan movement in the eyes of many Croats, along with the rehabilitation of the Ustaša by nationalists during the wartime hysteria. Much of the criticism leveled at the Partisans and the subsequent regime had little to do with socialism, but instead focused on the Partisans’ being Yugoslav, Greater Serbian, and, paradoxically, Četnik. Both Croatian presidents after Tuđman, Mesić, and Josipović were in center-left parties before being elected, so it is not surprising that they would position themselves as antifascists once in office. The rhetoric of the Croatian state-building project was cut and pasted into speeches at antifascist commemorations, while comparisons between the Partisan struggle and the War of Independence became unavoidable. Future research into the commemorative speeches will seek to more systematically trace particular words and combinations of words which appear in these speeches, but even in this overview the discursive patterns are easily visible. Furthermore, the identity convergence process identified by Jelena Subotić was used by Croatian elites in order to justify the need to commemorate events such as Antifascist Struggle Day. According to this interpretation, the elites were telling the electorate that it had to commemorate the Partisans because the antifascist movement was European, and Croatia’s only viable future was in an EU founded upon antifascism. The path towards EU membership directly 18 While the Croatian government delegations in Bleiburg were never at the highest level, since 2012 state funding has been cut off and taken over by opposition parties and the Catholic Church. The commemoration draws thousands of individuals from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Croatian diaspora in Western Europe. 19 Although Tito’s birthplace was hardly visited in the 1990s, it has once again become a pilgrimage site for thousands of visitors from all over the former Yugoslavia. Unlike the references to European antifascism issued by government officials, the participants in Kumrovec unabashedly celebrate Yugoslav socialism and perpetuate Tito’s cult of personality.

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affected the behavior of certain political parties, such as the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), which had unabashedly displayed Ustaša symbols and glorified the NDH in the 1990s. Realizing that in order to participate in any future governing coalition his party would need to be acceptable for the EU, former HSP President Anto Đapić announced in February 2001 that the HSP was definitively distancing itself from Ustaša symbols which it had used to mobilize Croats during the war. Đapić told 1,200 gathered HSP members We want to remove all barriers which obstruct the HSP’s transformation from a wartime party into a modern European right-wing party, as well as to attract those voters who were reluctant to give their votes to our party because the [Ustaša] symbols bothered them. (Vjesnik, 2001)

Most political parties welcomed the HSP’s decision to move away from the Ustaša legacy, especially those on the left who concluded the shift was “in the interest of Croatia” (Novi list, 2003, p. 8). Others on the right, such as members of the HČSP, refused to renounce connections with the Ustaše, arguing that “the NDH was the true desire of the Croatian people for a free and independent Croatian state” (Novi list, 2003, p. 8). Croatia certainly had, and continues to have, serious problems with those who glorify the NDH and all of the extreme right-wing ideology it represents, but it appears that the commemorative posturing had little impact without a more systematic approach to dealing with the dark past in other spheres of Croatian society, from sports to the educational system. The other target audience included the members of the European Commission and other bodies monitoring Croatia’s progress towards the EU. Croatia’s flirting with fascism in the 1990s and sometimes ambiguous stance on crimes committed by Croatian forces in the War of Independence meant that European officials and diplomatic corps were closely monitoring every symbolic act regarding the darker episodes of Croatia’s past. Croatia’s leaders received accolades from those monitoring the country’s progress since the war years, but human rights groups repeatedly emphasized that at the local level and more generally in society attitudes towards the Second World War hardly matched the statements issued in Brezovica and other commemorations. A mere glance at the Ustaša graffiti in most Croatian cities or the behavior of football fans (and the symbols they use) reveals that the most extreme nationalism is still celebrated openly by significant segments of the population. However, the use of EU discourse in the commemorative events did send the message that the Croatian political elite, at least until 2012, had a consensus about both the EU project and antifascism. After Croatia’s successful entry into the EU on July 1, 2013, this consensus, and the stance on antifascism more generally, seems to have withered away. Judging by the recent spate of events (right-wing mobilization against homosexuals, fascist salutes at international sporting events, a proposed mobilization against the use of Cyrillic by the Serb minority, and hate speech against minorities), Croatia has “returned to the 1990s” rather than moved forward into the bright EU

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future.20 Efraim Zuroff, the director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, argued that the growth of “neo-fascist nostalgia in Croatia […] is also the responsibility of the European Union, because events like these are simply unimaginable in an EU country” (Politika, 2013). It is possible that the mainstream political consensus on antifascism was a tactic by the right wing which is now once again showing its true colors without fear that it could endanger the European integration process. The HDZ, under Karamarko’s leadership, has called for embracing the policies of Tuđman, accused the SDP government of being “communists,” actively attended commemorations of Partisan victims while ignoring those remembering fascist victims, and has tacitly supported a number of discriminatory initiatives against minorities, a radical shift from the more moderate positions of his predecessors Sanader and Kosor. Another explanation could be that Croatia is actually mirroring the growth of the radical right in other EU countries, such as Hungary or France, where the consequences of the global recession have proved to be fertile ground for renewed nationalism and xenophobia. For a decade EU accession was used as the argument to restore dignity to Croatian antifascism, but it remains to be seen whether a European Croatia will continue to nurture its antifascist past or slip back into virulent nationalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century. References Anić, Nikola, 2005. Narodnooslobodilačka vojska Hrvatske, 1941–1945. Zagreb: Savez antifašističkih boraca i antifašista Republike Hrvatske. Assmann, Jan, 2005. Kulturno pamćenje, trans. by Vlahidin Preljavić. Zenica: Vrijeme. Cipek, Tihomir (ed.), 2011. Kultura sjećanja 1991. Zagreb: Disput. Ensink, Titus and Sauer, Cristoph, 2003. A discourse analytic approach to the commemorative speeches about the Warsaw uprising. In T. Ensink (ed.) The Art of Commemoration: Fifty Years after the Warsaw Uprising. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 19–40. Glas antifašista, 2006. September 5, 2006, 5. Glas Istre, 2012. June 23, 2012, 4–5. Goldstein, Ivo, 2008. Hrvatska 1918–2008. Zagreb: EPH. Grahek Ravančić, Martina, 2009. Bleiburg i križni put 1945. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za Povijest. Halbwachs, Maurice, 1992. On Collective Memory, trans. by Lewis A. Coser. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 20 This was ironically symbolized in November 2013 by the reprinting of Arkzin, an antiwar newspaper from the 1990s. While the texts were over a decade old they still seemed relevant, and the cover featured a Croatian football player from the national team, Joe Šimunić, giving the fascist salute and shouting “Ready of the Homeland,” the Ustaša version of Sieg Heil.

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Hoare, Marko Attila, 2006. Genocide and Resistance in Hitler’s Bosnia: The Partisans and the Chetniks, 1941–1943. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hoepken, Wolfgang, 1999. War, memory, and education in a fragmented society: the case of Yugoslavia. East European Politics and Societies, 13 (1), 190–227. Hrženjak, Juraj (ed.), 2002. Rušenje antifašističkih spomenika u Hrvatskoj 1990–2000. Zagreb: Savez antifaštičkih boraca Hrvatske. IPSOS Strategic Marketing, 2011. Strategies of Symbolic Nation-building in West Balkan States, online database at www.ffri.hr/cultstud/index.php/istrazivanje/ projekti/118-symbolic-strategies. Jambrešić-Kirin, Renata, 2006. Politička sjećanja na Drugi svjetski rat u doba medijske reprodukcije socijalističke kulture. In Lada Čale Feldman and Ines Prica (eds) Devijacije i promašaji: Etnografija domaćeg socijalizma. Zagreb: Institut za etnologiju i folkloristiku, 149–78. Jutarnji list, 2009. June 23, 2009, 2–3. Karačić, Darko, Banjeglav, Tamara, and Govedarica, Nataša, 2012. Re:vizija prošlosti: Politike sjećanja u Bosni i Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj i Srbiji od 1990. godine. Sarajevo: Freidrich Ebert Stiftung. Kertzer, David I., 1988. Ritual, Politics, and Power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kuljić, Todor, 2006. Kultura sećanja. Belgrade: Čigoja štampa. Lebow, Richard Ned, 2006. The memory of politics in postwar Europe. In R.N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner and C. Fogu (eds) The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1–39. Müller, Jan-Werner (ed.), 2002. Memory and Power in Post-war Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Novi list, 1996. June 23, 1996, 3. ——— 2006. November 28, 2006, 3. ——— 2007. May 10, 2007, 9. ——— 2008. October 12, 2008, 4. ——— 2009. June 23, 2009, 3. ——— 2009. July 31, 2009, 2. ——— 2010. June 23, 2010, 3. ——— 2012. May 17, 2012, 4. ——— 2012. May 18, 2012, 16. ——— 2013. June 23, 2013, 6. Novosti (Kronika), 2013. January 4, 2013, 2. Pavlaković, Vjeran, 2009. Crvene zvezde, crne košulje: simboli komemoracije i sukobljenje istorije Drugog svetskog rata u Hrvatskoj. In G. Đerić (ed.) Pamćenje i nostalgija: Neki prostori, oblici, lica i naličja. Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 43–81. Pavlowitch, Stevan K., 2008. Hitler’s New Disorder: The Second World War in Yugoslavia. London: Hurst & Company. Politika, 2013. December 3, 2013. Zurof: Nostalgija za fašizmom u Hrvatskoj. Available at http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/tema-dana/Zurof-Nostalgija-zafasizmom-u-Hrvatskoj.lt.html, accessed December 7, 2013.

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Radonić, Ljiljana, 2010. Univerzalizacija holokausta na primjeru hrvatske politike prošlosti i spomen-područja Jasenovac. Suvremene teme, 3 (1), 53–62. Ramet, Sabrina P. (ed.), 2007. The Independent State of Croatia, 1941–45. London: Routledge. Rihtman-Auguštin, Dunja, 2000. Ulice moga grada. Belgrade: XX. vek. Roksandić, Drago, 1995. Shifting references: celebrations of uprisings in Croatia, 1945–1991. East European Politics and Society, 9 (2), 256–71. Škiljan, Filip, 2014. Identitet Srba u Hrvatskoj. Politička misao, 51 (2), 111–34. Subotić, Jelena, 2011. Europe is a state of mind: identity and Europeanization in the Balkans. International Studies Quarterly, 55, 309–30. Tomasevich, Jozo, 2001. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Večernji list, 1991. April 27, 1991, 12. ——— 2010a. June 21, 2010, 6. ——— 2010b. July 28, 2010, 4. ——— 2012. June 22, 2012, Ono što su antifašisti bili 40ih, to su naši branitelji bili 90-ih. Available online at http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/ono-sto-su-antifasistibili-40-ih-to-su-nasi-branitelji-bili-90-ih-423133, accessed June 30, 2012. Vjesnik, 2001. February 25, 2001, 3. ——— 2005. June 23, 2005, 5. ——— 2010a. June 21, 2010, 2. ——— 2010b. June 23, 2010, 2–3.

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Chapter 7

Contextual and Institutional Characteristics of Croatian Accession to the European Union Nataša Beširević

Introduction From the perspective of bargaining power of the EU and its applicant states, political conditionality is the most important source of change in candidate countries. That policy instrument presents pressure from the EU’s side to the candidate state to fulfil particular international obligations. Enlargement policy of the EU towards Central, East and South-east Europe’s states was in most cases described as political conditionality, and it is closely tied to democratization of post-Communist countries, having a positive political effect to the consolidation of their political systems. However, the efficiency of EU political conditionality does not necessarily depend on the implementation of this instrument, but primarily on the internal context of the state to which it relates. Contextualization is at the center of policy implementation, because implementation is always related to the specific policy as an answer to a specific problem in society. It is the political context that conditions the degree to which implementation of the EU Enlargement policy will be successful in solving particular problems. In researching the impact of contextualization on political conditionality, the most important variables are political institutions and political culture, and these depend on the nature of the previous regime, fundamental issues of “statehood,” and important international influences. Therefore, in explaining the influence and limits of the European integration process in Croatia, this chapter will explore the connection between implementation of the EU Enlargement policy and its instrument of political conditionality with contextualization of the Croatian political system as the main element of conditionality efficiency. As substantial research findings and papers on these issues are still under-developed this chapter will try to fulfil the theoretical and research gap of scientific studies in the area of the influence and limits of EU political conditionality in Croatia. This chapter will connect three main variables of the contextualization of EU political conditionality in Croatia: fundamental issues of statehood, primarily through the nation-states forming; the nature of previous regimes which led to the creations of a particular political and

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legal culture, and finally the notion of weak states as the main obstacle for the efficiency of EU conditionality in the pre-accession period. Although it entered the EU on July 1, 2013, the Nations in Transit (NIT) Report 20131 Croatia has shown that by number of democracy scores2 it still hands on democratic development closer to post-Yugoslav states than new member states’ counterparts. According to NIT democratic development scores, Croatia is closer to Serbia than Slovenia even after the 10-year-long accession process with the EU (the official application for EU membership was made on February 21, 2003 and full accession achieved in 2013), while Serbia began the negotiation process in January 2014.3 Such democratic development vividly illustrates how national challenges in the Croatian political arena still influence the positive impact of EU membership. Moreover, despite noteworthy institutional reforms pushed by the EU, Croatia is still considered a semi-consolidated democracy and this shows that the democratization and consolidation efforts of the EU’s democracy promotion are clearly limited. Since the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis in July 1991,4 the European Community/Union used diplomatic, humanitarian, military, developmental, and trade strategies in the region of former Yugoslavia in order to fulfil, broadly speaking, the fundamental security–foreign policy goals of the Union: freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the rule of law. Since 2000 the Enlargement policy is the prime mover in realizing those goals in the region of the Western Balkans.5 The break-up of the former Yugoslavia has left behind a highly fragmented region that is a complex 1 A detailed report is available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ NIT2013_Tables_FINAL.pdf. 2 The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for electoral process; civil society; independent media; national democratic governance; local democratic governance; judicial framework; and independence and corruption. 3 Status in October 2014. 4 On July 7, 1991, whilst supportive of their respective rights to national selfdetermination, the European Community pressured Slovenia and Croatia to place a threemonth moratorium on their independence with the Brijuni Agreement (Woodward, 1995, p. 200). 5 Region in this context encompasses the states of the Stabilisation and Accession Process (SAP) launched at the European Council in Santa Maria da Feiri. Since the 2000 Zagreb Summit they are also called the Western Balkans states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo under the UN Declaration no. 1244, Macedonia, and Serbia). That political term included those states of south-east Europe that did not have any institutional relations with the EU before 2000. The political descriptor south-east Europe encompasses Bulgaria and Romania, but these states signed the Stabilisation and Accession Agreement as the first formal step towards membership of the EU in 1993. In the opinion of the author, Croatia is separated from the Western Balkans grouping on entering the EU on July 1, 2013 when the accession process, with its procedures and phases under the SAP umbrella, common for all states in the region, officially ended for Croatia.

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ethnic, politic, and economic jigsaw, but as the EU leaders and EU institutions broadly acknowledged in official reports, regulations, and papers,6 all countries in the region had gone through the same European accession structure. The European Union is inclined to group each major region that is approaching EU membership into sub-regions that have their own logic, common historical, political, economic, and security characteristics. The EU considered the Western Balkans as the sub-region with the common problems of: weakness in the rule of law and democratic institutions, corruption, the threat of resurgence of extremist nationalism, poverty, and social exclusion. Therefore, Croatian case studies in the limits of the conditionality efficiency can be indicative for all other aspiring states in the region taking the same European Integration path. Theoretical Frame of the Conditionality The context of the Croatian accession case can be observed through the topdown Europeanization concept of neo-institutionalism and through the study of implementation that placed internal context and political culture to the fore (Börzel and Risse, 2000; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Jacoby, 2004; Kelley, 2004; Vachudova, 2005; Schimmelfenning 2005; Zürn and Checkel, 2005). From rational choice models of asymmetrical bargaining power of the EU and its applicant states, political conditionality is the most important source of change in candidate countries. That instrument, present on the international stage since the end of the Second World War, is broadly defined as international pressure which includes certain institutional preferences, that is, fulfilling particular international obligations (Borislavova Spendzharova, 2003, p. 145; Malová and Rybář, 2003, p. 99). The policy of the EU towards the states of Central, East and South-east Europe was in most cases described as “political conditionality” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 661). Use of the instrument of conditionality in the 1990s and early 2000s correlates with the increased interest of studies in the process of democratic consolidation, in which context it is relevant to mention authors such as Pridham (1995, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2005); Smith (1997); Grabbe (1999, 2001, 2002, 2006); Zielonka and Pravda (2001); Mattli and Plumper (2002); Vachudova (2001, 2005); Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel (2003, 2006); and Sedelmeier (2005), as well as Noutcheva and Bechev (2008). In most of the relevant literature political conditionality is tied to democratization of post-Communist countries, having a positive political effect on the consolidation of their political systems. This chapter argues that the effectiveness of EU political conditionality does not necessarily depend on the implementation of conditionality, but 6 More information is available at DG Enlargement web page: http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement/news_corner/key-documents/.

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primarily on the internal context of the state to which it relates. To approach this thesis, the chapter will follow Hix’s (2005) structure of the EU political system, which applied Easton’s (1965) and Almond’s (1966) assumptions of connection between the system and its environment (political context). In researching the implementation of particular policy, EU Enlargement policy in this case, the context in which implementation happens and which influences the implementation is of huge significance. As argued by Hill and Hupe (2002), contextualization is of great importance for implementation, since implementation is always related to the specific policy as an answer to a specific problem in society. It is the political context that conditions the degree to which the policy implementation will be successful in solving particular problems. An ever-increasing number of studies on implementation of the EU policies (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998) emphasize that the most important variables are political institutions and political culture (Knill and Lenschow, 1998). According to Hill and Hupe (2002, p. 22), development of democracy and the rule of law affect the implementation. If the political outcome is democratization, then the fundamental context consists of the nature of the previous regime and fundamental issues of “statehood,” besides the important international influences. Linz and Stepan (1996) advance a similar argument and believe that the studies which see democratization as the outcome of certain policies comparing a small number of countries, are focused on the nature of the previous regime, fundamental issues of statehood and important international influences. As indicated by Caramani and Wagemann (2005), the political influence of the political culture in the process of European integration has become a fundamental element of analysis of formation, consolidation and implementation of the supranational system, for political culture affects peoples’ requirements of particular features of the political system and the political elite. The political culture of Croatia at the beginning of European integration process (i.e. as formed by the Zagreb summit in 2000) through the accession period is marked by a strong post-Communist cultural heritage (political centralization and particracy), a strong policy of nationalism which is directly associated with traditionalism, mystification, and abuses of historical memory, a process of re-traditionalization,7 persistence of religious attitudes and traditional forms of society and family, a strong influence of majority religion, identity based on a strong emphasis on belonging to a particular group or community, population perception through the threat of Another (Serbs, homosexuals, etc.), distrust towards political elites, 7 This is a natural psychological response to the value vacuum created after the fall of Communism, in a society already disposed to traditionalism. Individuals and whole societal groups turn to the past and to the revival of particular traditional values. Re-traditionalisation is most obviously revealed in the expression of ethnic and religious identity and has the function of establishing the continuity of values, as a reaction to the frustration and sense of insecurity created by the breakdown of a previous ideological system, as Vasović (1998) argues.

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parties and institutions, lack of a tradition of the rule of law, governance and administrative–constitutional culture, the lack of a regulatory framework and a clear distinction between the ruling party and the state, the increase of organized crime and connection of state leadership with criminal organizations or activities. All those elements belong to the Western Balkans’ context and are similar in all countries in the region, although Croatia pushed ahead with political, economic and administrative reforms compared to other countries. Other states are finding it more difficult to make headway against the twin obstacles of inter-ethnic obstruction and a shattered political and economic landscape. Scientific studies on EU political conditionality in Croatia mainly aimed at researching the historical conditions of development of identity and nationalism, evaluation of breakdown and conflict in the former Yugoslavia primarily through the legal and military–security prism, development of particular regional initiatives and opening of the European perspective, with emphasis on the democratization, polity transitions and consolidation, as well as the Europeanization of particular policies. Substantial research findings that explain the context of the democratization process in Croatia through contextual elements of statehood, political culture and weak state and their connection with implementation of the EU Enlargement policy have yet to emerge: this chapter will try to fill that theoretical and practical gap. Geographical and Social-economic Determinants For EU political actors, the Western Balkans, which until July 1, 2013 included Croatia, was a joint geopolitical term for the group of the post-Communist countries in South-east Europe, whose common characteristics are critical weaknesses in the rule of law and democratic institutions, administrative weakness, questionable standards of political behavior, endemic corruption, the threat of resurgence of extreme forms of nationalism, as well as poverty and social exclusion, weak civil society, and lack of critical and vibrant media.8 The roots of these twenty-first-century issues are partly determined by geographic characteristics of this part of Europe. Difficult communication within mountain chains, and the non-existence of rivers with navigable waterways, which prevented railway construction and road maintenance “made the trade within the area more expensive and made the process of political connecting more complex,” as Mazower points out (2003, p. 25). This made it difficult for Ottoman and Habsburg rulers to collect taxes and improve exports and the economy, which consequently made effective governance more expensive. It is the lack of well-preserved roads and non-developed bureaucracy, as Mazower (2003, p. 44) argues, that led to the non-existence of real industrialization in towns and weak development of market-oriented agriculture. Shepherd economy, 8 As indicated in several reports from the Commission beginning with the Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe First Annual Report 2002.

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peasantry, low industrialization, and low agrarian employment prevailed until the early twentieth century. In the Balkans the urbanization and emergence of town population, consumption, industry, and services similar to those that existed in the Western Europe appeared in the second half of the twentieth century, but until the 1950s the village was the main political, administrative, financial, and military unit of living in the Balkans. The goals of the Communist authorities were universal industrialization, public works, and mechanization of agriculture, and directing these traditional agrarian societies towards modernization in order to ensure employability of the population. Centrally run investment in the heavy industries was the cornerstone of the Communist economic policy, and the foundations of modernization were rapid electrification, machine production, and expanding the road and railway system. “During only one generation agricultural rural societies jumped into the modern town life” Mazower (2003, pp. 142–3). Cities spread with great speed; between 1960 and 1991 the Croatian capital Zagreb doubled its size. Institutions of the modern social state were established—schools, universities, hospitals, and agricultural corporations—and illiteracy and rural isolation disappeared. However, the nature of central economic planning was in conflict with the market law of supply and demand, private entrepreneurship was only partially allowed, and a lack of management experience prevented the market competition of state companies. Heavy industry required significant worker employability which was protected by social rights, but that made it uncompetitive when compared to overseas capitalist actors. Communist authorities took loans from the Western banks, debts could be repaid only with significant budget cuts, and the economic crisis provoked a crisis of the federal political system; conflicts regarding the usage of resources at the republic level emerged. Long-lasting economic crisis weakened the federal leadership and the systems started collapsing. This chapter will describe the transitional system of economic development, but will deal briefly with the economic-social trends that preceded it. Fundamental Issues of Statehood: Establishing Nation-states, the Rule of Law and Democracy According to Schultz (1997), geographic regions do not exist for themselves, they are created. Kocka (2000) reaches a similar conclusion when discussing the historical space; neither is clearly determined only by nature, geography or historical events, but are emerging under the influence of changeable political interests, strategies and ideologies. As Mazower (2003) argues, twentieth-century scientists tried to understand why the Balkan states and societies remained poor and unstable and why they did not transform as they should. Religious schism, rural rootedness, and ethnic differences are cited as reasons for lagging behind European history. However, there were almost no ethnic conflicts and the religious coexistence under the Ottoman Empire (from the fourteenth until

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the early twentieth century) was more accepted than in the Catholic part of the Balkans (mostly Croatia). However, the lack of ethnic conflict was not a sign of ethnic tolerance, but rather an indication of the non-existence of the idea of nationality. Religious rather than ethnic unity was emphasized. Orthodox Christianity was dominant (because the patriarch was loyal to Constantinople, unlike the Pope), while Croats followed Latin rituals and Catholicism. Although a small literate elite primarily arising from the church aegis in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were not particularly national, with time they became the bearers of modern nationalism emphasizing the national history and legacy, a change which took some time to reach the illiterate rural population. Since the peasants were those whose uprising created new nation-states, they remained closely connected with their church, and religion became the main political factor of national identity. In the Balkans, as opposed to Western Europe, there was no place for anti-Church secular activity. The Austrian–Hungarian monarchy was constituted as a state of those two peoples in 1867, determining the national development of the peoples under its auspices.9 The emergence of nation-states is therefore a relatively modern historical process. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, from the French Revolution to the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the political map of the modern Balkans is created. During that time Serbs and Croats within larger territorial units inherited a certain level of sovereignty and independence (Croats through the institution of parliament, and Serbs through the Peć Patriarchy, established in 1557 with the consent of sultan Suleiman the Magnificent). At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the great powers together with other Balkan states (Bulgaria, Montenegro, Romania) gave Serbia independence, after which the Serbian prince (Knjaz) was declared king. Bosnia and Herzegovina was allocated to Austria–Hungary, which will annex it in 1908. Due to nationalism, newly established states started shaping the ethnic homogeneity of their markedly heterogeneously ethnic territories. Establishment of the first Yugoslavia (1918) was the aberration here. Still the new state had to deal with a multitude of problems which influenced the coexistence of different ethnicities (Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, and other smaller groups) within the boundaries of a community (Banac, 1984; Ramet, 1992). Important characteristics of the Balkan model of nation-building (which appeared in the period after 1850) were a systematic subordination of citizen rights to the principle of nationality/nationalism. Membership of the state was considered as a natural consequence of a membership of the nation, and implied the participation/belonging to the dominant ethnic or religious community. Since it is this “Balkan nationality” and not citizenship that offers the foundation for membership of the particular nation, concern for the minority implies 9 Croatian national revival, therefore, takes place in the period between 1835 and 1848, and with the Croatian–Hungarian Settlement, Croatia was guaranteed certain rights which other non-Hungarian nations did not have.

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irredentism. The characteristics of national feeling of the peoples in South-east Europe is therefore collectively and not individuality the sense of citizenship. Nationalism legitimizes the past and also identity through the group as entity which has the “natural right” to a particular territory. As Mazower argues (2003, p. 136), Balkan parliamentary systems were corrupt and autocratic systems which kept the power in the hands of judiciary, military officers, and the town elite. In reality, it was difficult to politically mobilize peasants who were still mostly illiterate, sluggish, and disinclined to travel. Democratic institutions in the Balkans between the First and Second World Wars were extremely weak; in Kraljevina SHS (Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenians) King Aleksandar dissolved the parliament and from 1929 ruled the new community of Yugoslavia by a personal dictatorship. The authoritarian rule of kings and appointed ministers obliterated the weak democratic tradition. In this rather specific condition the Balkans met the Nazi occupation which stirred up ethnic civil war and erased the pre-war political and town elite. The consequence of the war, genocide, and ethnic cleansing increased ethnic homogeneity in all Balkan states. Federalism and party apparatus were the centripetal forces with which the Communists tried to solve the problem of nationality. In a multinational state such as the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the national issue was a silent dimension of potential quarrels with politicians and intellectuals prone to nationalist ideology. However, the balanced constitution and political institutions within the Federation created a particular equilibrium of national issue in which there was no mention of tailoring the borders and protection of minorities, although in the foundations of the common state the two largest peoples, Croats and Serbs, found different interests. As a quarter of the Serb population lived outside the borders of the mother state, the centralized Yugoslav state provided guarantees for their security. For Croats and their historical process of living under Habsburg rule, a decentralized state and weak federation meant the control of their own fate. After the death of Josip Broz Tito, weakened federal leadership facing the economic crisis failed to resist nationalist currents, especially the rise of Serbian nationalism in the mid-1980s, which renewed the issue of borders and territorial expansionism that had disappeared in Tito’s Yugoslavia and post-war Europe. As in other Communist countries in the late 1980s, Yugoslav Communist leaders wished to remain in power. Some of them reprogrammed themselves as reformed Communists and hoped to integrate into the European-style social democracy (Communist Union of Croatia—Party of Democratic Changes). Others chose new principles of legitimacy for the post-Communist regimes (in the case of Croatia, the Croatian Democratic Community: the largest party of Christian democratic orientation). According to Caratan (1993) peoples of Eastern Europe in the postCommunist period simply continued development that was hindered in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in multinational states in which they participated more or less voluntarily. Therefore, realization of nation-states

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in the region of former Yugoslavia was not a return to the past, but a historical necessity; making possible the completion of the process of nation-building and realization of the right of the nation to self-determination. Separation of federal units and their independence is the last step in the creation of nation-states in the region of the Western Balkans, where ethnic nationalism remained strong and the citizenship legacy more fragile than elsewhere. Ideology and Political-legal Culture Development of the Balkans, Croatia included, should be measured by the very instruments which Europe used to develop itself: modern nationalism which brought mass politics, civic and industrial life, new state structures, and the spread of literacy and technology. As argued by certain analysts (Akos, 1997; Diamond and Platnner, 1991; Eley and Suny, 1996; Gilliland, 1996; Judt 1994) the post-Communist era on one hand continues with the policy of emphasizing ethnic identity, interests and national rights, and on the other hand uses liberal institutional arrangements close to the economic system and political ideology of Western Europe, constantly balancing between the two political agendas, which will be presented in this chapter as a contextual–ideological framework. Nationalism Because nationalism is an ideology which supports the development of political movements, the rise of subjective national identification is taken as a result of different social processes: economic, political, and ideological. It was often argued that two types of nationalism dominate different parts of Europe. Smith (1991), in his classical division of civic and ethnic national identities and nationalisms, argues that the former is a product of Western Europe and the latter mostly a product of the East. The civic concept includes a precisely defined territory, community of laws and institutions, united political will, equal rights for all members of the nation and a minimum of common values, traditions and sentiments which connect people. The ethnic model is characterized by a sentiment of common ancestry where the people are one nation. Emphasis on ethnic nationalism in Croatia is related not only to the historical creation of nations, but is also of great importance in the post-Communist era (Lovell, 1999). The ethnic type of national identity is in sharp contradiction to the model of national identity of Western Europe and the USA, which emphasizes the importance of civil rights and the territorial nature of the state. Nationalism in Croatia mostly emphasizes the cultural heritage of the population and its ethnic continuity (Stavrianos, 1994; Jelavich and Jelavich, 1977; Jelavich, 1983), and this development is a result of historical processes of nation-building in the region in the last 150 years. Nationalism is also a part of populism, which is denoted both as an ideology and political form and strategy, built on the values of nationalism, which serve

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it as instruments for seizing power. Milardović (1996, p. 15) argues that the common characteristics of populism are people, leader, anti-individualism, antiintellectualism (as a protest against the stratum which would like to shape the society by knowledge, while populism relies on leaders, affective and traditional actions of people/the mass) and anti-modernism (a lack of trust in the modernization of society, which causes frustration). To achieve a better understanding of Croatian nationalism it is perhaps necessary to see it as part of the political culture of a region whose main ingredient is populism. National-populist culture was widened and preserved primarily, but not exclusively, with the help of three key institutions: state, military, and church. In such a context, populism helped homogenize whole nations and encourage the sense of unity and of uniting “equal” citizens against the common (more or less real) enemies. In this regard, it would be almost impossible to draw a demarcation line between populism and nationalism. Liberalism Economic and political liberalism are included in the analysis of contextual ideological conditions: after 1989 this implies individual rights and property ownership, equality before the law, an independent judiciary, religious tolerance, equal participation of citizens in political and social life, freedom of media, protection of minorities and opposition to the tyranny of majority, separating the public from the private sphere and encouraging civil society. Liberal and civic nationalism, as a hybrid of these two doctrines, becomes part of modern political history of transitional Eastern, Central and south-east Europe. As Massey, Hodson, and Sekulic (2003) argue, the structural conditions required for the emergence of liberal/civic nationalism are an openness of dominant cultural forms (primarily education and acquisition of wealth) which will allow success in society even for the lower social classes, and present the foundation of modernization. Liberal nationalism in the Western Balkans appears in 1970s and 1980s, particularly after the death of Josip Broz Tito, when political instability offers the opportunity for the emergence of new political interests within socialist Yugoslavia, where leaders of the republics push for the specific combination of liberalism and ethnic nationalism. Reformers within the Communist party (especially in Croatia and Slovenia) initiate the ideas of market economy, privatization, and political pluralism. As Vujadinović (2005, p. 45) argues, Important joint experience of the former Yugoslavia during 1970s and 1980s is related to the modernisation processes, under the influence of the West, in economy, culture, family, education. This experience of modernisation represented a counter-balance to traditionalism, patriarchalism, [and a] dominant collectivist ideology first of communism and then nationalism (that is, ethnic nationalism), which marked the process of abolishment of the joint state. But the counter-balance was insufficiently articulated and without the strong social foothold.

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Transition changes meant a dramatic decrease of quality of life for millions of people who were collateral victims of national economies’ collapse. In such circumstances there is an increase of social connectedness of powerful political leaders and ethnically homogenous followers; ethnic nationalism is accepted by “the losers in the war or the disappointed in the peace,” particularly those at the lower levels of participation in the capitalistic entrepreneurial environment. Gellner (1983) argues that those citizens who are not included in the mainstream of societal modernization and who are directly hit by economic liberalization, unemployed and with lower levels of education, the religious, elderly and rural population, will be more prone to ethnic nationalism, with the inclusion of those of the population that directly participated in or were affected by war events. The most important choice Croatian political leaders and their voters face since 1990 is the alternative between following the liberal agenda and forcing the national path (Taras, 1993). Political Culture and the Notion of “Weak State” in the Western Balkans Generally speaking, political culture can be considered as a set of values, standpoints and beliefs of a particular political system. Almond and Verba (1963) argue that the development of stable and efficient democratic rule depends on the people’s orientation towards democratic process. Putnam (1993) argues that political culture is a channel by which the past influences the present, but it can be successfully reshaped by social-economic modernization (a higher level of education, urbanization, and secularization). Of course, there is no linear pattern of connecting social-economic modernization and democratization of political culture, but the research showed a high level of correspondence between these phenomena. The political culture of Croatia implies elements of paternalism, religion oriented at conservatism and autocratic tendencies, and nationalism which often degenerated in the political pathology of intolerance. Political culture formed within the Communist systems encompasses general characteristics: authoritarianism (a subject relationship towards authority and a paternalistic relationship between individuals and the state), the domination of collectivity and populism, a low level of social and political criticism, a high level of distrust towards democratic institutions of the system, predominant identification with your local community (primary affiliation) which causes distrust towards the “aliens,” especially other and different, as Vasović (1997, p. 151) argues. Apathy, intolerance towards political non-sympathizers, distrust towards political institutions, lack of independence of citizens accustomed to the state taking care of everything and lack of preparedness for a market economy are socialization effects of a Communist system where all decisions were passed by the Communist Party. The political culture is a causal factor of transition towards democracy and the stability of a democratic system, once it is established (Schmitter and Karl, 1994). Balkan societies reflect their political immaturity, social and ethnic fragmentation, and economic backwardness, as argued by Galić (2000). An underdeveloped

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political culture of civil culture as a fundamental precondition for developing democracy undermines common standards of pluralism, tolerance and human capability of democratic ruling, because the Communist elite substituted civil society with socialist ethics under party supervision. According to Linz and Stepan (1996) and Holms (1996) what characterizes the post-Communist cultural legacy is the influence of totalitarianism (techniques of isolation, censure, and limitation), strong politics of nationalism, the contradiction between democratization and market competition, distrust towards the political elites, institutions, and actors (primarily parties), lack of tradition of the rule of law, governance and an administrative-constitutional culture, lack of regulatory framework and clear differences between ruling party and state, increase of rates of criminality, and the joining of state leadership with criminal organizations. “Therefore in conditions of economic decline democracy will not be able to take deeper roots, so [the] final product of today’s trend could be adoption of half-authoritarian patterns combined with nationalistic and populist policies” as Galić (2000, p. 201) argues. Ethno-nationalism is part of Balkan political culture which is in direct correlation with traditionalism and abuse of historical memory. This also relates to Croatia, which historically belonged to multinational empires that were ruled in an autocratic manner with a period of fragile democracy, on which the legacy of communism was built. The limiting factors of democratic transformation in Croatia, which is the outcome of the EU policy of enlargement, both in its institutional–legal and civic–political aspects (affirmation of a democratic political culture of tolerance, non-violence, respecting autonomy and differences, that is, a non‑segregationist relationship towards others in terms of race, nation, gender, sexual minorities, etc.) are multiple. Limitations imply, according to Vujadinović (2001, pp. 337–47), the legacy of a devastated and corrupted state, slow reform of political institutions and harmonization with European legislation, non-autonomous judiciary and a preponderance of the executive branch over parliament. Democratic deficit is visible in the political style of all political actors, primarily reflected in the lack of political responsibility of both the ruling and opposition parties when it comes to the social community and interests of the state, as well as a lack of self-awareness about the importance of politically correct behavior. Political parties’ organization is non-democratic, reflected in centralistic management and the domination of the leadership principle. The authoritarian syndrome as a historically and culturally conditioned basis of the Western Balkans, which stays stable despite all social and political overthrows and changes in combination with the legacy of bureaucratized state and cult of a leader, creates the political culture of today’s Croatian oligarchical established political parties, the populist support of citizens, and intolerance towards different opinions and affiliations. Populism, nationalism and some degree of authoritarianism are strengthened by weak economic development. Parts of old elites directly profited from limited economic reforms, primarily through the process of privatization, which limited market competition and

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development of an entrepreneurial climate which could strengthen the process of democratization and expedite economic growth. Once profitable state companies were privatized, with the governing structure close to the ruling elite (De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb, 1996; European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 1997; Herdandez-Cata, 1999; Fischer and Sahay, 2000; Havrylyshyn and Nsouli, 2001; Gungor and Yamak, 2002; Bitzenis, 2009). Criminal links (robberies, murders, trafficking in human beings, prostitution, and money laundering) between the corrupted political elite and organized crime was present in every state of the Western Balkans, including Croatia. The phenomenon of poor institutional development, legal confusion and rooted corruption create the structure of a so-called “weak state,” where political leaders and elites are incapable of developing and following economic reforms and modernization. According to Buzan (2008) the key difference between weak and strong states, and great and small powers, is the fact that the former differentiate them according to the level of social-political cohesion, while the latter relate to the military and economic force in comparison with other states. Weak state does not automatically imply a dysfunctional state: the key characteristic of that phenomenon is lack of capacity and lack of political will to satisfy normative functions of the statehood. The primary source of the weak state in Croatia is a lack of legitimacy, which does not mean lack of bodies of authority within the state, but describes the relationship between the state and its citizens on the most general bases. As Merkel (2011) reasons, the long-term weaker effects of partial social-political systems, such as the economy, or social or internal security, do not allow for the creation of potential for legitimacy, or dissolve its existing reserves, which is very dangerous especially where such potential was never particularly high. The issue of legitimacy is an important point in the implementation studies of the EU policies, because, as Hill and Hupe (2002) emphasize, without citizens’ trust in the institutions and policy networks,10 implementation of EU policy will be a fiasco. Although it is not possible to reach a more detailed analysis of factors of successful implementation due to the limited scope and space of this chapter, it is worth mentioning that Croatia had several favorable internal conditions compared to other Western Balkans states that led to full accession before all other states. Primarily, in 2000 Croatia had full control over its borders, had settled questions over territory and legitimacy11 and enjoyed good neighborhood 10 According to Petek (2008, p. 56), analysis of the policy networks can be most easily defined through two basic elements. The first one is identifying the policy actors, state and non-state, or formal and informal, the second is determining the type of their structured interaction, as a stable pattern of relationship through time—both for the purpose of description and analysis of the policy process. 11 The Erdut Agreement reached on November 12, 1995 between the authorities of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities of self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina, meant that the eastern region of Croatia was peacefully returned to Croatia.

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relations with all Western Balkans states. Croatia is an ethnically homogeneous country that enables no major veto on ethnic lines where national minorities’ issues did not prevail. At the beginning of the accession process Croatia did not have ethnic tensions, crises and division or sovereignty issues. In December 2002 the Croatian parliament adopted a resolution supported by all political parties defining Croatia’s accession to the EU as a strategic national goal that helped enormously in organizing the negotiation structure. From 2000 onwards regardless of which political party was on power, the impetus to internal reforms caused by the EU conditionality request was consistent and all leading parties showed unconditioned commitment to the EU accession, although it did include some of major national interest (proceedings against Croatian citizens considered war heroes before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, disputes over Croatian–Slovenian borders, the issue of shipyards’ privatization etc.) and reforms’ costs were politically and economically high for successive governments. Anti-EU opposition in Croatia was very weak and although it was present, especially during the pre-referendum period, it was led by a marginalized and inconsistent political party (the Croatian Party of Rights, a political party holding a single seat in the Croatian parliament). It is also noteworthy that Croatia was marked as a functioning market economy leading in economic conditions in the region by all indicators. These are some of several internal conditions that influenced implementation of the EU Enlargement policy. For future research on conditions of (un)successful implementation of the EU Enlargement policy it would be worthwhile to explore internal conditions in a more detailed manner, comparing them with case studies of other candidate countries in the region. Conclusion This chapter followed an analytical model of the political system on the connection between the system and its environment (political context). Exploring the contextualization of implementation is extremely important, as political context determines the extent to which implementation of policies will be successful in solving certain problems. The relationship between theory and practice in the implementation of a particular policy is in the specification of context. This chapter followed the assumption that if the political outcome of implementation is democratization, as is the case with the EU Enlargement policy, then the major context of international influence (the EU in particular) on certain states is framed and limited by the nature of the previous regime and fundamental issues of statehood in the particular country. These elements strongly influence the conditionality element of the European integration process, underpinned by the same political framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process from 1999. Despite clear differences amongst countries, and in the Croatian case especially in favorable internal conditions when the

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accession period began (non-existence of ethnic tensions or division, clear sovereignty issues, a settled institutional–constitutional frame), all states in the region share a similar political culture which is a fundamental element of analysis of formation, consolidation and implementation of any EU policy. The institutional and cultural context of the political system of Croatia was connected to the Western Balkans due to a common history heritage, consolidation challenges and democratic indicators closer to post-Yugoslav countries and Albania than other post-Communist states. Due to additional conditions in the region that differ from those of Croatia, including secessionist movements, unsettled borders and ethnic tensions, ongoing enlargement will be even more challenging both for the EU and the regional elites and population. References Akos, R.T., 1997. The Great Surprise of the Small Transformation. The Demise of Communism and the Rise of the Private Sector in Hungary. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Almond, G.A., 1966. Comparative Politics. Boston, MA: Little Brown. Almond, G. and Verba, S., 1963. The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Banac, I., 1984. The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics. New York: Cornell University Press. Bitzenis, A., 2009. Balkans. Foreign Direct Investment and EU Accession. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing. Borislavova Spendzharova, A., 2003. Bringing Europe in? The impact of EU conditionality on Bulgarian and Romanian politics. Southeast European Politics, 4 (2–3), 141–56. Buzan, B., 2008. People, States, and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. New York: Columbia University Press. Börzel, T.A. and Risse, T., 2000. When Europeanization Hits Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change. RSC Working Paper, 56 (2000). Firenza: European University Institute. Caramani, D. and Wagemann, C., 2005. A transnational political culture? The Alpine region and its relationship to European integration. German Politics, 4 (1), 74–94. Caratan, B., 1993. Raspad komunističkih federacija. Politička misao, 1 (93), 119–32. De Melo, M., Denizer, C., and Gelb, A.. 1996. Patterns of transition from plan to market. World Bank Economic Review, 10 (3), 397–424. Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.F., 1991. Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Easton, D., 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley. Eley, G. and Suny, R. (eds), 1996. Becoming National. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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——— 2005. Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vasović, M., 1997. Vaspitanje za demokratiju—problem transfera. In Z. Avramović (ed.) Demokratija, vaspitanje, ličnost. Beograd: Institut za pedagoška istraživanja, 150–62. ——— 1998. Politička socijalizacija i promene političke kulture. In M. Podunavac (ed.) Fragmenti političke kulture. Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka-Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnjenje, 80–114. Vujadinović, D., 2001. Prepreke i perspektive razvoja civilnog društva u SRJ. In I. Spasić and M. Subotić (eds) Revolucija i poredak. o dinamici promena u Srbiji. Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 333–47. ——— 2005. The concept of civil society in the contemporary context. In S. Mihajlović (ed.) Between Authoritarianism and Democracy. Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia—Civil Society and Political Culture. Beograd: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 33–53. Woodward, S.L., 1995. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War. Virginia: Brookings Institution Press. Zielonka, J. and Pravda, A. (eds), 2001. Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zürn, M. and Checkel, J.T., 2005. Getting socialized to build bridges: constructivism and rationalism, Europe and the nation-state. International Organization, 59 (4), 1045–79.

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Chapter 8

Transformation of the Croatian Party System in the Process of EU Accession Višeslav Raos

Introduction In the course of the long and arduous process of EU accession, which began with the Zagreb Summit in 2000, Croatian political parties have undergone major transformations.1 These changes included alterations of their values, program points, and modes of political communication. While EU membership has been a nominal priority for all major Croatian political parties since the first multiparty election in 1990, until the beginning of the negotiations process in 2005 the parties did not place much emphasis on European affairs. The aim of this chapter is to examine the Europeanization of the Croatian party system. First, the concept of Europeanization of political parties and party systems and the differences between party system Europeanization in Western and Eastern Europe is discussed. Then, an analysis of the early moments of the Europeanization of Croatian parties during the 1990s is given. Further, the profound transformation of the Croatian party system after the beginning of the process of European integration in 2000 and especially since the start of the accession negotiations in 2005 is examined. Finally, the development of the party system after accession in 2013 and the European Parliament by-election, which elected first Croatian Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), is examined. Europeanization of National Party Systems Broadly speaking, Europeanization denotes responses by political, economic and societal actors to the multifaceted processes of European integration (Ladrech, 2002, p. 389). These responses denote changes of behavioral patterns and adaptations to innovations pushed forward by EU institutions. Also, Europeanization can be defined as the influence exerted by the European Union on non-member states through policy convergence and the processes of EU enlargement (Dolenec, 2008, p. 35). This chapter deals specifically with the Europeanization of political 1 This was the first EU summit held outside of an EU member state. It initiated European integration for ex-Yugoslav countries and Albania.

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parties and the party system in Croatia. Political parties can be seen as primary political actors that convey EU policy change and implement them on a national systemic level. In European post-communist countries, the processes of European integration have gone hand-in-hand with the processes of democratization and democratic consolidation. Democratization of post-communist Europe cannot be separated from the processes of European integration and thus Europeanization (Dolenec, 2008, p. 24). In other words, attainment of democratic standards was a prerequisite for advancement in EU accession, while at the same time the European Union, mostly through modes of political conditionality, made an impact on further democratization in emerging democracies of Central and South-eastern Europe. A correlation between democratization and Europeanization can especially be seen in the accession processes of post-conflict countries of South-eastern Europe (Vujović and Komar, 2008). In order to depict a specific combination of democratization, Europeanization, and state-building Keil (2013, p. 344) suggests the term “EU Member State-building” which implies transformative processes initiated by the European Commission in order to make post-conflict post-communist states in South-eastern Europe capable of joining the European Union. Paradoxically, while the EU promotes democracy and fosters democratization in candidate and new member states, at the same time the process of Europeanization of party politics leads towards a democratic deficit as an ever greater share of decisions is made at the supranational level where top party officials engage in consensus politics without the democratic approval of their party base and their voters on the domestic level. The democratic deficit paradox is actually manifold. In the case of Central and Southeastern Europe Europeanization of political parties implies democratization, while the whole of the EU can be regarded as a club of liberal democratic countries which have all attained high standards of civic and minority rights and rule of law. Yet with further European integration and development of common European institutions, the democratic deficit becomes more evident. The alienation of EU politicians from their domestic counterparts is especially evident in the qualified majority voting used in the Council of the European Union and is represented by a decreased importance of national parliaments and the creation of the so-called “executive bias” (Carter and Poguntke, 2010, p. 299). In other words, the consensus reached through EU institutions may force European representatives of political parties to greatly diverge from policy lines set by their respective political parties on the domestic level. On the European level, policy convergence reflects itself upon the national party systems which become more European in the sense that political parties tend to follow a development path which draws them closer to their ideological counterparts in other member states. Party system Europeanization is more than just policy convergence, rather it denotes a complex process of incorporation of the EU organizational and policy dimension in the workings of political parties on the domestic level (Ladrech, 2002, p. 392). Although the EU creates new grounds for party competition, the increased amount of supranational policy-making and governance actually narrows the maneuvering playing field for individual political parties and forces them to reach consensus on a wide range of topics.

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The dynamics of the response of a party system to EU impulses can be observed on three levels—institutionalization of the party system, European socialization of party elites through participation in the European party federations, and the attitudes towards EU integration expressed by voters (Fink-Hafner, 2008, p. 167). Also, as Ladrech put it (2002, p. 396), Europeanization of party systems can be analyzed on five levels: (1) party program, (2) organization, (3) patterns of party competition, (4) relations of the party with the national executive, and (5) relations outside the national party system. Programmatic change refers to increased mention of the EU in party manifestos and programmatic papers—it does not necessarily imply a pro-EU stance, i.e. an acceptance of further European integration. During the 1990s, Croatian political parties almost univocally vaguely accepted EU membership as a long-term goal, yet hardly any of them actually developed their own policy on Europe or accomplished much in furthering the European cause. Considering organizational change, we must bear in mind that this dimension of Europeanization of political parties usually only occurs after some time has passed since EU accession, so that this dimension can only marginally be analyzed in the Croatian case. In other words, amendments to internal party structure can occur as a result of participation in the workings of the European Parliament, but prior to that such change will be limited to maintaining a party office for foreign relations. Once such an office takes a more specific European character, we can speak of Europeanization of the party organization. Also, change in party organization occurs as power becomes increasingly accumulated in two groups which often overlap—the party elite and those party members who specialize in EU affairs (Carter, Luther, and Poguntke, 2007, p. 9). Further, MEPs are increasingly given voting rights at party congresses and are coopted into party executive bodies (Ladrech, 2007, p. 197). When talking about altered patterns of party competition, we should consider the emerging of a specific EU-related cleavage in the political party spectrum which leads to a division of the party system into two or more camps, regarding their view of the extent and scope of European integration and EU enlargement. Relations of the party with the national executive may become strained as national party leaders become more involved in EU affairs. In old EU member states, especially the more populous ones, one can observe a growing alienation of party leaders serving as EU officials from their domestic support base. More specifically, MEPs increasingly adopt positions independent from their respective national political parties, which shows that they do not function as agents of principals on the national party level (Mühlböck, 2012). In addition, analysis of the 2004 and 2007 European Parliament elections has shown that in all member states there is an increased disparity between opinions held by political parties and their voters, with the parties being consistently more pro-European (supporting deeper integration) than their voters (Mattila and Raunio, 2012). This dimension still cannot be observed in the case of Croatia, the newest EU member state, because Croatian MEPs are newcomers and have not had enough time to become fully immersed in politics at the EU level. Finally, relations outside of the national party system develop as political parties embrace a more active role

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in European party federations which influence domestic policies and call for policy coordination and convergence. Organizational change is directly linked with changes in relations outside of the national party system, as party offices for international cooperation increasingly become points of coordination with the respective European party federation. Party System Europeanization in Old and New Member States We can observe a convergence and homogenization of voting patterns in Europe in the last four decades which implies advancement of national party systems towards a Europeanized party system which shares common European features. These common features include the continuous presence of a socialist (Social Democrat and or Labor) party, as well as high prevalence (over 50 percent) of votes for liberal, conservative, green, and extreme right parties (Caramani, 2001, pp. 808–9). Since the first free election in 1990, the Croatian party system has seen an uninterrupted electoral and parliamentary presence of the main European party families—socialists, liberals, and conservatives, which testifies to the fact that its main features correspond to the main features of the European party system. However, one has to take into account that the main Social Democrat Party (SDP) evolved from a post-communist towards a social liberal (Blairite New Labor) party, while the main Conservative Party (HDZ) transformed from a Nationalist Conservative Party into a Christian Democratic Conservative Party. Also, while other EU member states have witnessed a steady rise in the vote for green and extreme right parties (Caramani, 2001, p. 809), the Croatian party system has followed a different path—green parties have yet to achieve electoral significance, while extreme right (but also extreme left) parties have since the beginning of the EU negotiations process seen a constant drop in voter support. Vachudova (2008, p. 862) claims that the national party systems of all EU candidate states follow a similar pattern of transformation which includes a significant programmatic moderation of main political parties working towards accession and a creation of the pro/anti-EU cleavage just before accession, but is also concluded with a phase of partial reversion to more nationalistic policies once the accession process is completed. The Chapel Hill dataset on party competition in post-communist EU member states shows that parties to the right on the economic dimension (i.e. pro-market) and that have a gal (green, alternative, libertarian), as opposed to tan (traditional, authoritarian, nationalist) stance on the cultural dimension tend to give strong support to European integration, while in the old member states the EU receives most approval from economically left and culturally gal parties, while economically right parties have a higher tendency towards Euroskepticism (Vachudova, 2008, p. 862). An analysis of party manifestos in 15 European countries (including some non-EU members such as Switzerland and Iceland but excluding all post-communist member states) conducted by Pennings (2006) has shown a steady increase of mentions of the

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importance of Europe and the European Union for various policy areas, which is a sign of the growing awareness of European political parties of the need to take into account the European dimension when shaping policy documents. However, in his research of national party systems Mair (2000) arrived at the conclusion that the European Union has had only limited impact on the format and mechanism of party systems in member states. He linked this to the fact that there is no European party system because there is no party competition at European level (Mair, 2000, p. 39). Nevertheless, one must bear in mind that Mair’s research was conducted prior to the Eastern Enlargements of 2004, 2007, and 2013 and before the signing of the Treaties of Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007). Since these two treaties we can observe a deepening of European integration which has resulted in more policy areas being shaped at EU level, which translates into more coordination and convergence of policies of national parties from the same European party federation. Also, the Europeanization of national party systems is much stronger in the case of the enlargement of EU in Central and South-eastern Europe due to the synchronous processes of Europeanization and democratic consolidation. Party systems in Central European EU member states all show a large consensus on EU membership, while Euroskeptic parties tend to exist on the fringes of the party spectrum (Lewis, 2005, pp. 194–5). The fluidity of the new party systems in post-communist Europe has enabled a much stronger impact of the European Union on party competition. Central European parties increasingly adopt programs which adhere to standards of their respective European party federations, while some of them even changed party logos and names in order to better signify their compatibility with one of the big Western European party ideologies (Socialist, Christian Democrat, and Liberal) (Lewis, 2008, p. 159). While for now the EU has had only a modest impact on West European national party systems, in Central and South-eastern Europe the European Union has been a major promoter of democracy and has greatly contributed to the Europeanization of party systems through political conditionality employed during the negotiations process (Ladrech, 2008, p. 149). Therefore, while a certain level of Europeanization can be observed in all national party systems of EU member states, it is particularly the new democracies of Central and South-eastern Europe that show the greatest amount of change of their party systems as a result of the processes of European integration. The Croatian Party System and EU Affairs in the 1990s Although the first free multiparty election in 1990 was dominated by the statehood issue, i.e. the question of whether Croatia should become an independent state or form a confederation with some (or all) republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, many citizens placed considerable emphasis on EU integration as a means of ending the Yugoslav crisis and a possibility of economic prosperity. In a poll conducted (Grdešić, Kasapović, Šiber, and Zakošek, 1991, pp. 195–6) at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb prior to the election, 54.41 percent

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of the respondents claimed that their preferred party had the best solutions for “association and cooperation with Europe,” while 72.61 percent stated that the key value that their preferred party possessed was a “pro-European orientation.” In its first party program, the so-called “Basic Program Draft” adopted in February 1989, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) voiced its support for the inclusion of Croatia and Yugoslavia in the European Community (EC). Further, this program draft stated that the party did not wish the EC to develop into a single European state or an association under hegemony of an individual member state and also dismissed the idea of the transformation of Yugoslavia into a centralized unitary state prior to EC accession (Milardović, 1997, p. 33). This shows that the early HDZ wished European integration which would lead towards a “Europe of nations” and not the “United States of Europe.” Also, this document highlights its opposition to the concept of democratization of socialist Yugoslavia through the dismantling of its federalist constitutional architecture. The same line of argument was later used by President Franjo Tuđman (1990–1999) in his opposition to Croatia’s membership in the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the South-east European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and the South-east European Cooperation Process (SEECP) because he saw these regional economic and security initiatives either as a second-class version of the EU and a sort of a “waiting room for EU accession” (in the case of CEFTA), or as an attempt to recreate a southern Slavic (Yugoslav) or Balkan (South-east European) state association which would serve as an alternative to full membership or serve as a prerequisite for full accession. Thus, the Euroskeptic position of HDZ in the 1990s was not just based on a fear of loss of national sovereignty, but was specifically linked to a strong aversion towards multilateral initiatives which included close cooperation of former Yugoslav republics. In its first program declaration in June 1989, HDZ repeated its wish for Croatia’s integration in the EC, but also specifically mentioned furthering the European cause through the AlpsAdriatic Working Community, as well as inclusion of Croatia in the Association of European Regions (AER) (Milardović, 1997, p. 38).2 Further, in a public declaration demanding free multiparty elections, civil rights and the introduction of a free market economy, HDZ also prompted the last Communist government to take steps towards inclusion of Croatia in the EC (Milardović, 1997, p. 39).3 This shows that before coming to power, HDZ recognized the role cross-border cooperation played in the process of European integration, yet the party maintained a selective approach to such cooperation—while association with the southeastern neighbors was shunned, collaboration with the north‑western neighbors 2 The Alps-Adriatic Working Community is a cross-border initiative founded in 1978. It originally included Austrian, German, and Italian regions, but later also encompassed Slovenia and Croatia. During the 1980s, it enabled cooperation across the Iron Curtain. 3 This declaration was made in November 1989, just a month before the League of Communists of Croatia passed a decision to allow a free multiparty election in the spring of 1990.

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was welcomed. In a 1993 foreign policy section of its party program, HDZ again named membership in the European Community as a goal of national interest and recognized the need and possibility for various modes of cooperation with all neighboring countries, but strongly emphasized a rejection of such association that which would lead to a supranational community which would endanger Croatian sovereignty (Milardović, 1997, p. 47). This rejection of supranationality was actually a rejection of the very idea of the contemporary European Union, as envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, we can see that the EU policy of HDZ during the 1990s rested upon three elements. The first included the view of Croatia as an intrinsically European country and viewed the European Union as a “Europe of sovereign nations” and a “community of common cultural heritage.” The second was based on a rejection of any multilateral association which bore similarities to the Yugoslav federation. Finally, the third element was rooted in an absolutist understanding of state sovereignty and a rejection of a higher authority over state sovereignty. The party’s position was closely linked with Tuđman’s personal worldview—he was an admirer of Charles de Gaulle’s tradition of a strong sovereign state, and also a believer in a Europe based on a common Western culture which he regarded as opposed to the Orthodox culture of Eastern and South-eastern Europe. Although there are no records that he had read his work, Tuđman subscribed to ideas developed by Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal work Clash of Civilizations and quoted him when discussing the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Jović, 2009, p. 43). In its 1990s party program, the progressive liberal Croatian People’s Party (HNS) specifically linked EU accession with the protection of civil and human rights through the European Courts of Justice, but also acknowledged that European integration presupposes partial suspension of national sovereignty as means of inclusion in the new, post-Cold War international order (Milardović, 1997, p. 56). This party recognized the transformation of the European Union from an economic union into a union of shared democratic values and a platform for supranational governance. HNS adopted an EU policy which largely corresponded with political trends in EU member states. The conservative liberal Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), a major opposition party during the 1990s, stated in its program principles in 1989 that it valued Croatia’s belonging to European culture and thus supported a pro-European orientation of Yugoslavia (Milardović, 1997, p. 90).4 In its 1990 draft program HSLS devoted an entire section to European affairs. Titled “A Future in Europe,” it saw European integration as a chance for the introduction of democracy and a free market economy in Yugoslavia and a means of overcoming ethnic strife, especially in Kosovo (Milardović, 1997, 4 Early programs of all Croatian parties, even the pro-independence HDZ, include references to Yugoslavia because they were adopted before the eventual break-up of the federal state and operated in a situation where the final dissolution was not yet deemed possible. HSLS was initially divided in two factions—one national liberal and the other social liberal.

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p. 92). This document also acknowledged the fact that an integrated Europe leads to a withering away of state borders which should enable the Yugoslav republics to peacefully resolve its issue, either through new modes of cooperation or through dissolution of the federation. In other words, HSLS viewed European Community membership as a prerequisite for a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis. In its program guidelines, developed after Croatia’s independence in 1991, the party started mentioning European integration as a means of ensuring the rule of law and protection of civil and human rights and also wrote of the “Europeanization of state institutions” (Milardović, 1997, pp. 95–6). Here it can be seen that both major liberal parties recognized the specific European discourse on civil rights and the rule of law. One can thus point out that the Europeanization of Croatian political parties already started in the 1990s with the liberal parties, yet the whole party system experienced structural Europeanization after 2000 and especially after 2003 and the return to power of a rebranded, Europeanized HDZ under Prime Minister Ivo Sanader (2003–2009). In its 1990 program the reformed Communists, renamed League of Communists of Croatia—Party of Democratic Change (SKH-SDP) declared itself an integral part of the modern European left and gave strong support for European integration, both through accession to the European Community, as well as participation in the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) and cross-border cooperation with Italy, Austria, and Hungary (Milardović, 1997, p. 191). After its merger with the minor Social Democratic Party in 1994 and its final transformation into the present Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP), the party began to speak of the European social model, i.e. a social democratic welfare state of the Scandinavian type, coupled with a mixed economy (Milardović, 1997, p. 222). In this program there was more emphasis on social policy than on European policy. The EU is nowhere directly mentioned. However, the SDP was the first party to describe cooperation with ideologically similar parties in other European states as a policy goal. The discussion on Croatian political parties and the processes of European integration during the 1990s is not complete without a look at the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS). Despite being a regionalist party which only plays a minor role in the whole party system, IDS has played a very important, even decisive role in the early stages of Europeanization of the Croatian party system. Contrary to Tuđman’s strong centralism, derived out of fear of secession and dissolution of the nascent Croatian state along the Yugoslav scenario, the IDS developed a strong pro-European stance because it recognized that regionalism and decentralization had become an ever growing aspect of the processes of European integration (Ashbrook, 2008, p. 130). The Istrian regionalists tried to appeal to sympathy in EU member states with their rejection of a centralized Croatian state and wanted to present themselves as genuine Europeans. The party tried to join the Assembly of European Regions (AER) independently of Croatian official policy, but the idea ultimately failed and this membership was only achieved after the initiation of the process of Croatia’s EU integration in 2000. The pro-EU position of IDS was also based on a policy emphasis on

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minority language rights and cross-border cooperation, as the regionalist party wanted to portray itself as more adapted to values of a united Europe. The IDS was indeed the first Croatian party that recognized the importance of these issues and tried to implement them through regional and local government in Istria. However, the party actually opened these topics too early and could not impose them on the whole party system. However, after 2000, partial decentralization was achieved as part of pro-European reforms and endeavors at complying with EU standards. We can see that a regionalist party embraced European integration because it recognized that the new trends in the EU pushed forward values which were highly compatible with their regionalist agenda for Istria. Furthermore, the Istrian regionalists tried to differentiate themselves from other Croatian political parties precisely through their direct and uncompromising pro-EU stance. They did not succeed in Europeanizing the Croatian party system, but they did contribute to its gradual change towards values and policies dominant in the EU, such as minority language rights, regionalization, and cross-border cooperation. During the war years (1991–1995) Croatian political parties paid little attention to European affairs and the creation of the European Union (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty). The issues most commonly mentioned by political parties at the 1992 parliamentary election revolved around topics of Croatia, war, statehood and democracy, while almost no party, except the HSLS, mentioned Europe, albeit only sporadically (this idiom ranked 8 out of 10 in the HSLS electoral campaign) (Lalić, 1995, pp. 230–33). Yet for almost all mainstream political parties in Croatia, the adjective “European” was and still is almost synonymous with the terms “modern,” “democratic,” “advanced,” “progressive,” and “wealthy.” Despite the peculiar condition of an incomplete democratic consolidation5 halted by war and intensive state-building, the Croatian party system has proved to be very stable, with the same political parties dominating the party landscape in 2013 as those that have shaped the initial party system after the first multiparty election (Zakošek, 2008, p. 600). According to Merkel’s (2011, p. 402) four-level typology of democratic consolidation, in terms of representative consolidation, which includes both the party system and interest associations (trade unions and employers’ associations), Croatia ranked fourth (after Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovenia) among all European post-communist countries. Therefore, the profound transformation after 2000 towards European values did not change the main protagonists of the party scene, but rather amended their policies and changed the patterns of party competition by introducing the EU issue. Europeanization of the Croatian Party System since 2000 Even in the early phases of EU accession (after the Zagreb Summit in 2000 and especially since the beginning of the negotiations in 2005) one can observe a 5 On postponed democratic consolidation in Croatia see Čular (2000).

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transformation on the party system level. This change manifested itself in the form of greater readiness for cross-partisan collaboration and coordination regarding European issues. In the 2003 election campaign the issue of Croatia’s EU accession ranked third in an overall ranking of topics dealt with in TV advertising done by political parties (Lalić and Kunac, 2010, p. 47). This marked the increased importance of the EU in the discourse of Croatian political parties. By proclaiming an “Alliance for Europe” in 2005, major Croatian parties, including the ruling center-right government led by HDZ and Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, as well as Social Democrats led by previous Prime Minister Ivica Račan and HNS leader Vesna Pusić, decided to bypass party competition on all policy issues pertaining to Croatia’s EU accession. In practice, this meant that both the government and most opposition Members of the Croatian Sabor (MoS) supported acts which were passed in order to align Croatian laws with the acquis communautaire. Further, this meant that in 2005, at the onset of the accession negotiations, one of the key opposition leaders (Vesna Pusić) was placed at the head of the National Committee for Monitoring of Accession Negotiations to make sure that the “European cause” was above partisan strife. However, on numerous occasions, one or both major parties threatened to quit the suprapartisan committee. Democratization (and thus Europeanization) of post-communist Central and Eastern European countries is largely driven by the development of political party competition, i.e. a party system with clear alternatives and possibilities for alternation in power (Grzymała Busse, 2007, p. 1, cited in Dolenec, 2008, p. 29). After the initial transition election of 1990 when HDZ formed the first post-communist government, the first alternation in power in a democratic setting occurred with the critical 2000 election when a center-left coalition, led by the reformed Communist turned social democrat party (SDP), came to power. This alternation triggered change and competition, as now both leading parties (HDZ and SDP) were presented with an incentive to adopt policy innovation in order to achieve re-election. The transformation of the Croatian party system into a competitive pluralist party system which revolves around two major parties (HDZ and SDP) and several minor parties after the turn of the century coincided with the beginning of the process of European integration. Thus, we can see parallel processes of democratization (or rather democratic consolidation), Europeanization of the party system and Europeanization of the whole political system. The initiation of the EU accession process transformed the party system in such a fashion that the subsequent alternation in power (the 2003 election and the return of HDZ to power) did not represent a change in EU policy, because of a clear path dependency. The new HDZ with its pro-European electoral program and a Christian Democratic outlook provided a “lock-in effect” which confirmed and fixed the course of Europeanization and democratic consolidation of the whole political system which started in 2000 (Dolenec, 2008, p. 40). The political party system in Croatia has undergone three distinct phases in the first decade of democratic governance (1990–2000). As Čular (2001, pp. 130, 141) points out, in the first phase (1990–1992) a bipolar system emerged which

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included a pro-independence and a pro-confederation camp and was followed by a party system predominated by HDZ (1992–1995)6 which was transformed in the second half of the 1990s (1995–2000) into a confrontational party system, with the governing HDZ competing with a broad, heterogeneous opposition block. From 2003 on, the party system began developing towards moderate pluralism. The decreased polarization was a direct result of the impact of the EU accession process. The cross-party project of Croatia’s EU membership had a strong moderating impact on the whole party system, as the two main parties drew closer to the center, while both the extreme left and the extreme right lost electoral importance. As basically all parliamentary parties adopted a pro-EU position, their party programs became more moderate and less distinct. Even though the main parties SDP and HDZ clashed over specific themes (the border dispute with Slovenia, cooperation with the ICTY), the both eventually followed the same pro-EU policy, including on divisive issues pertaining to the society’s confrontation with the past and overcoming of the war legacy. The nature of Euroskepticism in Croatia is somewhat peculiar as it is marked by a strong difference in attitudes between the political elite and the general populace. While almost all parliamentary political parties gave their open support for EU membership, the polling results in the years preceding the 2012 accession referendum showed a steady decline of public support for Croatia’s accession to the European Union (Štulhofer, 2006, p. 141). The rise of Euroskepticism in the Croatian public was not primarily rooted in a rejection of European integration, but was more the result of a growing distrust towards both national and European political institutions and political leaders. Croatian Euroskeptics developed a perception of alienation of the Croatian political party leaders from their voters and supporters and also felt that the process of accession negotiations was lacking in transparency. Furthermore, the case of Croatia’s accession was especially demanding due to specific war-related issues which need to be solved and which created specific conditions that the Croatian side had to meet before advancing with the negotiations process. Although Euroskepticism had seen a steady intensification due to accession fatigue, numerous preconditions during the negotiations process and the decreased appeal of the European Union due to the crisis of the Eurozone, the core of the Croatian electorate has maintained support for EU membership through gravitation towards the two main political parties—HDZ and SDP. Rather than differing in their programmatic view of EU membership and practical EU policy, SDP and HDZ started competing for the role of the “more European party” and tried to position themselves as “the actor” most responsible for the eventually successful process of Croatia’s EU accession. By stressing their commitment to EU obligations and modernization reforms pushed forward by the European Commission, SDP, and HDZ both started catering to the same 6 On the electoral predominance of the HDZ in the 1990s and frequent electoral reform see Kasapović (2000).

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electorate—the young, urban, well-educated professionals. This new social class was actually shaped by the negotiations process, as this large-scale transformation of public administration, the judiciary and diplomatic service necessitated individuals with advanced degrees in EU politics, law, administration and business economics. Thus, a transformation of tertiary education, largely supported by the Delegation of the European Commission in Zagreb, nurtured a new generation of young professionals who became an important factor in winning elections, but also served as a recruiting ground for new party members. As both major parties commenced recruiting members and attracting voters from the same body of voters, this started drawing them both to the center and made them moderate their political programs. While other parties on the center-left (HNS, IDS) had already adopted a pro-EU stance, on the center-right the agrarian Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) had to jump on the bandwagon led by the pro-European policy proclaimed by HDZ in order to maintain coalition potential. The Croatian party system has become so dominated by the pro-EU stance that Euroskeptic parties are regarded as pariahs and their position is perceived as almost anti-systemic. This is consistent with Taggart’s research (cited in Mair, 2000, p. 34) which concluded that Euroskeptic positions are most often adopted by parties to the far left or the far right of the party spectrum that are thus already in a position of an outsider. The Europeanization of Croatian political parties was greatly aided by activities of German political party foundations. The liberal Friedrich Naumann Foundation, linked with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), began its work in Croatia in 1991. It maintained cooperation with the progressive liberal Croatian People’s Party (HNS) and the conservative liberal Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS), as well as the social liberal and regionalist Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS). The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, close to German Social Democrats (SPD), opened its Zagreb office in 1996 and paved the way for the emergence of the SDP as the strongest opposition party at the end of the 1990s. The Hanns Seidel Foundation, linked with the Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) started working in Croatia in 1997 and promoted German–Croatian trade cooperation, but also supported cultural and political initiatives with a Christian Democratic background. In 2001, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, close to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), started its work in Croatia and strongly influenced the transformation of HDZ into a Christian Democratic party. The Heinrich Böll Foundation, connected to the Alliance ’90/The Greens started operating in Zagreb in 1999. Although this party foundation has financed numerous socially and politically visible projects in Croatia and neighboring countries, it has not succeeded in helping the fragmented environmentalist scene to organize in a single political force capable of winning parliamentary seats. One may say that major German political parties have started to serve as role models for Croatian political parties—the SDP takes after the German SPD and the HDZ was refashioned according to the CDU/CSU template. In 2002, HDZ became an associated party of the European People’s Party (EPP), while this status changed to full membership with Croatia’s signing of the accession treaty on December 9, 2011. The same year HSS also became an associate member

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of the EPP. HSLS was the first Croatian party to become an associate member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) in 1994.7 In 2001 HNS became a full member of ALDE, while Vesna Pusić became vice-president of the European Liberals in 2006. The Istrian regionalists became full members in 2006. Thus we can see that the two biggest European parties waited for Croatia’s EU accession in order to admit Croatian parties as full members, while the European Liberals supported their fellow parties in a much stronger way years before the country joined the EU. This significant support is particularly evident in the fact that Vesna Pusić was the only member of the ALDE executive who did not hail from an EU member state. The SDP became an associate party of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in 2004, while full membership was granted after the accession treaty was signed. The European socialization of Croatian party elites was not limited to the parties themselves, but also included party youth organizations (Fink-Hafner, 2008, p. 176). The young generation of party leaders are especially active in the adoption and promotion of values and standards of their respective European party federations. At the 2011 parliamentary election the accession treaty was already signed, so that the electoral programs of both the Kukuriku coalition (SDP, HNS, IDS, and HSU)8 and HDZ did not place much emphasis on EU affairs, but rather focused on the economic crisis and social issues such as the retirement system and labor market regulation (Nikić Čakar, 2011, pp. 11, 14). In his analysis of electoral programs of SDP and HDZ in 2003, 2007, and 2011, using the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)9 methodology Nikić Čakar (2011, p. 15) concluded that the SDP followed policies which were consistent with its social democratic identity, while since its return to power in 2003 HDZ had started strongly moving to the center, and under Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor (2009–2011) even adopted moderately left positions. This finding is consistent with the notion that the Europeanization of the whole party system was intensified after 2003 and the moderation and Europeanization of HDZ under the leadership of Sanader. At the Croatian EU membership referendum, held on January 22, 2012, all parliamentary parties save for the Croatian Party of Rights–Dr Ante Starčević (HSP-AS), a nationalist conservative party with only 1 (out of 151) MoS and 1 MEP (out of 12), expressed their support for accession.10 However, the low turnout (43.51 percent) and the relatively large number of citizens which voted no to the EU (33.13 percent) showcased that the elites of the mainstream political parties which give the defining tone to the party system did not succeed in 7 This European party was at the time known as the European Liberal, Democrat, and Reform Party (ELDR). 8 The Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU) is one of several one-issue parties in Croatia which focus on the rights of the retired population. 9 The CMP is a long-term international research project which developed a database of mapped policy preferences of political parties in 50 countries for all elections since 1945. 10 This party was created as a splinter group from the original HSP. The additional name it bears refers to the founder of its nineteenth-century predecessor Party of Rights.

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effectively bringing the European cause closer to the electorate. A large number of referendum absentees also confirmed a state of alienation of party elites from the general populace and the perception of EU accession as an elite program on which ordinary citizens have limited influence. The European Parliament (EP) by-election in April 2013 which elected the first 12 Croatian MEPs has shown three things. First, it has once again confirmed the already mentioned alienation of Croatian voters from the EU project pursued party elites. Although European Parliament elections are characterized by low voter turnout in all member states, the 20.74 percent of Croatian citizens who cast their votes at this election marked a true low point. Second, the election campaign was marked by national issues and not EU-related topics. This is consistent with an EUwide trend of turning EP elections into mid-term national elections which serve as an opportunity to show support or criticism of the current government. Third, this election marked an end to the cross-partisan consensus which was developed around the goal of the nation’s EU accession. Since accession there has been a slow yet steady movement towards a bipolar polarized party system as the two main party blocs—the center-left Kukuriku coalition and the center-right coalition of HDZ, HSS, and HSP-AS—start drifting away along a new ethical cleavage. The drifting of agendas of the two major parties and their coalition partners is particularly evident on the following issues: assisted reproductive technology, sexual education in schools, LGBT legal rights, dealing with the Communist past, and dealing with the war legacy and the relations of the state with the Catholic Church. Thus, after the pro-EU agenda became so entrenched in the programs of almost all Croatian parties and has promoted economic and social modernization, the party system shows the need for new ways of policy differentiation. This new policy differentiation includes a range of postmodern bioethics issues which characterize party competition in old EU democracies, but it also includes specific Croatian issues in confronting the past. The pro-EU consensus, as well as the crossparty consensus during the war years, has prevented and postponed dealing with issues concerning the Communist past. While other post-communist EU member states have to a larger or smaller extent dealt with their past through the opening up of archives of the Communist intelligence services and the implementation of lustration and transitional justice, the Croatian party system has failed to address this issue so that it reemerged after EU accession. Finally, moving away from state and EU-related issues towards postmodern political questions is indeed a sign and confirmation of a Europeanized party system in Croatia. Conclusion This chapter has attempted to show how the Croatian party system was initially only marginally influenced by the European Union, but after the opening of the process of European integration in 2000 it saw a rapid transformation including a strong moderation of party programs which has resulted in a shift of party

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competition from state and war-related issues towards European issues. The EU cleavage did not run through the party system, but rather started dividing the party elites from the general populace. The organization change in the party system can be seen in the fact that party offices for international cooperation are increasingly used for policy coordination with fellow parties in European party federations. The elected MEPs are not automatically included in the highest party bodies (party national executives), but represent a mix of established politicians and newcomers for whom the EU serves as an alternative dimension for a party career. Due to a short experience of EU membership, one still cannot draw conclusions about the impact of party system Europeanization on the relations between the party and the national executive, but due to the general alienation of the Croatian party elites from the ordinary voters and the perception of the growing democratic deficit both on a national and European level, we can expect an increased divergence of party leaders participating in EU-level policy-making from party members on the domestic front. Further, the relations of Croatian parties beyond the national party system show a strong involvement and integration into European party federations which push forward the standardization of party programs and viewpoints along common policy lines. Finally, albeit a special case due to its war legacy and an absence of a strong Euroskeptic party, it can be concluded that Croatia has followed a pattern of party system Europeanization that is rather similar to that of other post-communist EU member states. This pattern is characterized by the creation of a pro-accession consensus, which moderates party policies and draws the main parties towards the center, while the extreme positions are marginalized. References Ashbrook, J., 2008. Buying and Selling the Istrian Goat: Istrian Regionalism, Croatian Nationalism and EU Enlargement. Brussels: Peter Lang. Caramani, D., 2001. The Europeanization of electoral politics: an analysis of converging voting distributions in 30 European party systems, 1970–2008. Party Politics, 18 (6), 803–23. Carter, E. and Poguntke, T., 2010. How European integration changes national parties: evidence from a 15-country study. West European Politics, 33 (2), 297–324. ——— Luther, K.R. and Poguntke, T., 2007. European integration and internal party dynamics. In T. Poguntke, N. Aylott, E. Carter, R. Ladrech, and K.R. Luther (eds) The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation. London, New York: Routledge, 1–25. Čular, G., 2000. Political development in Croatia 1990–2000: fast transition— postponed consolidation. Politička misao, 37 (5), 30–46. ——— 2001. Vrste stranačke kompeticije i razvoj stranačkog sustava. In M. Kasapović (ed.) Hrvatska politika 1990.–2000.: izbori, stranke i parlament u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science, 123–46.

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Dolenec, D., 2008. Europeanization as a democratising force in post-communist Europe: Croatia in comparative perspective. Politička misao, 45 (5), 23–46. Fink-Hafner, D., 2008. Europeanization and party system mechanics: comparing Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online, 10 (2), 167–81. Grdešić, I., Kasapović, M., Šiber, I., and Zakošek, N., 1991. Hrvatska u izborima ‘90. Zagreb: Naprijed. Grzymała Busse, A., 2007. Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jović, D., 2009. Yugoslavia: A State that Withered Away. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press. Kasapović, M., 2000. Electoral politics in Croatia 1990–2000. Politička misao, 37 (5), 3–20. Keil, S., 2013. Europeanization, state-building and democratization in the Western Balkans. Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 41 (3), 343–53. Ladrech, R., 2002. Europeanization and political parties: towards a framework for analysis. Party Politics, 8 (4), 389–403. ——— 2007. Europeanization and national party organization: limited but appropriate adaptation? In T. Poguntke, N. Aylott, E. Carter, et al. (eds) The Europeanization of National Political Parties: Power and Organizational Adaptation. London and New York: Routledge, 195–212. ——— 2008. Europeanization and the variable influence of the EU: national parties and party systems in Western and Eastern Europe. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online, 10 (2), 139–50. Lalić, D., 1995. Pohod na glasače: analiza sadržaja poruka predizbornih kampanja stranaka. In S. Vrcan, D. Lalić, Z. Pokrovac, et al. (eds) Pohod na glasače: izbori u Hrvatskoj 1990.–1993. Split: Puls, 203–80. Lalić, D. and Kunac, S., 2010. Izborne kampanje u Hrvatskoj: dvije studije o tri izborna nadmetanja. Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science. Lewis, P.G., 2005. EU enlargement and party systems in Central Europe. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 21 (2), 171–99. ——— 2008. Changes in the party politics of the new EU member states in Central Europe: patterns of Europeanization and democratization. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online, 10 (2), 151–65. Mair, P., 2000. The limited impact of Europe on national party systems. West European Politics, 23 (4), 27–51. Mattila, M. and Raunio, T., 2012. Drifting further apart: national parties and their electorates on the EU dimension. West European Politics, 35 (3), 589–606. Merkel, W., 2011. Transformacija političkih sustava: uvod u teoriju i empirijsko istraživanje transformacije. Zagreb: Faculty of Political Science. Milardović, A. (ed.) 1997. Političke stranke u Republici Hrvatskoj: politologija stranaka: programi političkih stranaka. Osijek, Zagreb, Split: Pan liber.

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Mühlböck, M., 2012. National versus European: party control over members of the European parliament. West European Politics, 35 (3), 607–31. Nikić Čakar, D., 2011. Kukuriku versus HDZ: analiza izbornih programa. Političke analize, 2 (8), 10–15. Pennings, P., 2006. An empirical analysis of the Europeanization of national party manifestos, 1960–2003. European Union Politics, 7 (2), 257–70. Štulhofer, A., 2006. Euroscepticism in Croatia: on the far side of rationality? In K. Ott (ed.) Croatian Accession to the European Union: The Challenges of Participation, Vol. 4. Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 141–60. Vachudova, M.A., 2008. Tempered by the EU? Political parties and party systems before and after accession. Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (6), 861–79. Vujović, Z. and Komar, O., 2008. Impact of the Europeanization process on the transformation of the party system of Montenegro. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online, 10 (2), 223–41. Zakošek, N., 2008. Democratization, state-building and war: the cases of Serbia and Croatia. Democratization, 15 (3), 588–610.

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Chapter 9

Transformation of the Croatian Security and Defense System in the Euro-Atlantic Context Marijana Musladin

Introduction The entry of Croatia into NATO and the European Union symbolically ended the process of transition during which Croatia has been transformed into country of multiparty democracy and market economy. In addition to the social, economic and legal adjustments, transformation of the Croatian security and defense system is an essential part of the transition process as a whole. Within the framework of the EU acquis which Croatia had to accept for the successful closing of Chapter 31, the reform of the Croatian security system was very important. In this regard, Croatia has achieved a great deal in terms of transformation and modernization of the armed forces, the adoption of standards and the development of a new military culture on a joint basis. In transforming national security orientations and doctrine, military structures, and patterns of civil–military relations to conform to the expectations of the Euro-Atlantic security institutions Croatia has been successful in building a professional, modern force that contributes to collective security in the region and it has made considerable progress in transforming civil–military relations to conform to the needs and expectations of a democratic society. Accession to the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also emphasized Croatian affiliation to the exclusive Euro-Atlantic security area. Challenges and processes facing Croatian national security in the Euro-Atlantic context are great, but also encouraging, because they provide for long-term stability and peace. The aim of this chapter is to show the Croatian path towards the European Union in the context of European security and defense policy, and the course and results of reforms in the field of security and defense. Since the process of preparing for membership in the European Union took place in parallel with preparations for NATO membership, transformation of the Croatian security and defense system was observed in the Euro-Atlantic context. The first part of this chapter refers to the geopolitical position of Croatia in the context of the Western Balkans region and the importance of that region for the European Union, particularly for the Union’s foreign and security policy. In the second part there is analysis of the transformation of Croatian security and defense systems in accordance with European security policy and NATO. My objective

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is also to point out the place of Croatia in the Euro-Atlantic security system. Participation in international peace support operations is an important instrument of foreign and security policy of the Republic of Croatia in contributing to international security and stability. In that sense, this chapter also provides an analysis of Croatian participation in the Euro-Atlantic security institutions and their missions in the field. From this analysis it is apparent that Croatia is committed to national security policy and the functioning of the armed forces within the framework of a new security paradigm that emphasizes cooperation and action at the international level. The countries of the Euro-Atlantic region also have an objective interest for joint counteraction to so-called new challenges to security. The transition process calls for new patterns in security systems’ behavior. Security systems of European states are faced with emerging new threats (climate change, piracy, threats to energy security, cyber security, etc.). Croatia is now an integral part of that security environment. Based on the above, the last part of this chapter focuses on contemporary challenges for Croatian security in the Euro-Atlantic context. Geopolitical Position of the Republic of Croatia in the Context of the Western Balkans In the past, international relations were often defined by geographical factors: natural resources, geographic location, access to the sea—emphasizing the importance of geographic factors in the position of the country in the international community—and this is also present in European and American international relations theory (Ratzel, 1903; Mackinder, 1943; Spykman, 1944; Mahan, 1960). According to Kurečić (2001) geopolitical position is one of the most important geopolitical categories and geographical position of Croatia is significant because it occupies a unique position in a contact area between the central Danubian basin and the central Mediterranean. Internally, its geographically unique position, connecting the Danube Valley with the Adriatic, or rather central Europe with the Mediterranean, creates a regional variance in which individual parts are dependent on one another. Externally, this unique position gives Croatia convenient openings for participating in European markets (Kurečić, 2001, p. 1). Geopolitical position was always significantly responsible for Croatia’s position in the international community. The factors that determine Croatia’s geopolitical position are geographical factors, global geopolitical structures, the political situation in Croatia’s neighborhood, and the political situation in Croatia (Kurečić, 2001, p. 1). An important determinant for Croatia’s position, in the past as well as in the present, is its contact with differing cultural, political and economic, or more concisely, civilizational spheres. These spheres have throughout history interacted and also conflicted on the territory of Croatia (Pavić, 1976). According to Klemenčić, on the basis of historical events three cultural-civilizational spheres of influence can be recognized. From the west and south Croatia was subject to the influence of the

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European Mediterranean. This is an expressly Catholic civilizational sphere, with a primarily Latin ethnic character, which reached Croatia through Italy. The Central European civilizational sphere is to the north of Croatia. It is also primarily Catholic, but there is also a Protestant and Jewish presence, and it influenced Croatia through contacts with Germanic peoples (Germans, Austrians) as well as Hungarians. The third cultural-civilizational sphere is the Balkans. It is characterized by Eastern Orthodoxy, but also by Islam, brought to Europe by the Turks. The ethnic character of this sphere where it has contact with Croatia is Serbian. However, these differing influences did not destroy the integrity of Croatia (Klemenčić, 1993). The Croatian state has contact with many major European zones in the physical-geographic and historic-cultural as well as ethnic sense. Situated between the Western European countries Austria, Slovenia, Italy, and the Eastern European countries Hungary, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia plays an important geopolitical and traffic role in Europe. Geopolitically, Croatia’s position has proved sensitive and the existence of the Croatian state and people have been threatened frequently. As a result, numerous territorial changes have taken place, as well as Croatia’s membership in various state and political unions. The advantages of its position, its multilayered cultural heritage and the wealth that comes from regional interaction will enable Croatia to take a position as an independent and sovereign state. In contemporary international relations in a number of EU documents, Croatia and other countries of former Yugoslavia, with Albania but not Slovenia, is classified in the so-called Western Balkan region, regardless of the apparent diversity in social development and its belonging to the Mediterranean and Middle Europe throughout its history. Generally however there is no universal agreement on the Balkan region’s components. Some define the region in cultural and historical terms and others geographically, though there are even different interpretations among historians and geographers. According to Britannica, the Balkans are also called the Balkan Peninsula, eastern-most of Europe’s three great southern peninsulas, usually characterized as comprising Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova (britannica.com, 2013). Petrovic Piroćanac (2004) says that the Balkans are perceived as a place on the edge of Europe, which is territory within Europe but is not part of contemporary European space and time. As before, this regionalization is not the result of a socio-geographical principle, but rather international interests and circumstances arising in the European Union after 1991. Despite its widespread use in international relations, the term Western Balkans still cannot be found in any political science dictionary (Topalović, 2000, p. 145). This is an entirely new concept that attempts to describe the strategy of the European Union with regard to the region of the former Yugoslavia, with the exception of Slovenia, and the addition of Albania, which are then promoted as a geographical determinant of the same spatial scale (Milardović, 2000, p. 37). The political concept of the Western Balkans develops intensively in 1997 when the General Council of the European Union adopts a policy of a regional

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approach to the Western Balkans. The concept was introduced in EU institutions when the Council of Ministers of the EU established a special regional committee for the Council of Ministers of the Western Balkans (Council for the Western Balkans) (Slukan Altić, 2011, p. 410). Based on the above, we can conclude that the term Western Balkans is the primary geographical indication because it is an extremely diverse area in terms of culture, politics, history, and national and religious affairs, any generalizations on this basis would be wrong. However, with regard to the frequency of using the term Western Balkans in documents of the European Union, the same term is used in the context of EuroAtlantic security. In this sense, the notion of the Western Balkans in this chapter will apply to those countries that have participated in the EU Stabilization and Association Process (SAP),1 while the wider Balkan region or South-eastern Europe describes Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, and Turkey. Transformation of the Croatian Security and Defense System in Accordance with European Security Policy and NATO Seeking to play a more active role in global affairs, the EU has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The main objective is to formulate and implement a common policy in dealing with foreign policy and security issues. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a major element of the CFSP and is the domain of EU policy covering defense and military aspects. According to Chapter 31 of the EU acquis, which is relevant to our analysis, the CFSP and the CSDP are based on legal acts, including legally binding international agreements, and on political documents. The acquis consists of political declarations, joint actions, common positions and agreements. Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue in the framework of the CFSP, to align with EU statements, to take part in EU actions and to apply agreed restrictive measures. However, for successful closing of Chapter 31, reform of the Croatian security system was very important and cannot be separated from the process of preparing for membership in NATO. Without going into the chronology of Croatian negotiations with the EU in Chapter 31, it should be noted that the last Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s state of preparedness for EU membership was written in 2012. As regards the CFSP, during the reporting period, Croatia aligned itself, when invited, with all 70 of the relevant Council decisions and EU declarations, a 100 percent alignment. Croatia has fulfilled the commitments and requirements arising from the accession negotiations in the field of foreign, security, and defense policy (europa.eu, 2012). 1 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia.

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Below is an analysis of the transformation of the Croatian security and defense system which led to successful closure of Chapter 31 of the EU acquis and Croatian participation in European security and defense policy. The origins and development of Croatia and its armed forces was a parallel process that has its source in a war situation. International relations of the Croatian Armed Forces cannot be viewed outside of the role of the Croatian state in the international community. During the entire time of its independence, Croatia’s defense system and armed forces have played a central role in ensuring national independence and the liberation of its occupied territory, or acted as a key factor in reforms and meeting the conditions for membership in NATO and the European Union. In this sense it is possible to identify four stages of international relations: the Homeland War and the creation of the Croatian state and the Croatian army, post-war isolation and various forms of conflict with the international community, the period of expansion of international cooperation and the Croatian Armed Forces after 2000; and full integration of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia in the international community (Bilandžić, 2009). On the other hand, the performance measures used to track and assess the readiness of an aspirant nation to affiliate with the Atlantic Alliance and ESDP include the following four criteria (Edmunds, 2006): 1. substitution of a national security and defense strategy based upon territorial-based threats, with a collective security defense strategy; 2. modernization, professionalization, and specialization of the armed forces—a model of military professionalization that equates “modern” armed forces with smaller, highly skilled, flexible force structures and the abandonment of large, land-based conscript military forces; 3. according to the emergence of a number of “new” security challenges, such as terrorism, drug smuggling and illegal migration, that have refocused military roles on internal security issues, full acceptance of, and democratic participation in, the collective security decision-making process of the Alliance and ESDP. 4. continuing salience of a wider domestic social and political role for armed forces. Greenwood argued that this means establishment of democratic civil–military relations to include a clear division of authority between the head of state and the head of government; peacetime governmental or executive direction of the general staffs and commanders through the Ministry of Defense; legislative oversight of the defense and security organizations to include the budget; and popular perception that there is civilian and democratic control of the armed forces (Greenwood, 2005). These four principles are the essential components of the North Atlantic and ESDP security frameworks; they form the bases with which to assess the success of democratic transformation in the role, purpose, mission and behavior of the armed forces in Croatia. Development of the Croatian Armed Forces began during the

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Homeland War, which largely determined the key objectives and national interests of the Republic of Croatia. Without entering into the course of the war, we can say that Croatian Armed Forces were created in extremely adverse conditions of overwhelming military force and aggression. After the war there was a period of adjustment to peacetime conditions, which required the transformation of the entire defense system. The transformation process was characterized by reconstructing and reducing the number and size of the armed forces. The initiative to modernize and restructure the Croatian military in 2000 originated with the Račan government, not with the armed services or general staff. From the newly-elected government’s perspective, the modernization, professionalization, and restructuring of the Croatian Armed Forces became the mechanisms through which the civilian leadership was able to reassert control over the military and carry out its cherished vision to pursue European and North Atlantic integration. To accomplish the modernization and restructuring program, the government of Croatia adopted a long-term and detailed planning program to reduce the overall size of the armed forces; resettle redundant military personnel into the civilian economy; reconfigure the disposition of forces, their armaments, and their mission; reinvigorate professional military education in conformity with NATO and ESDP doctrine and practice; reallocate and reduce the military budget to focus on modernization; and integrate Croatian military units into NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) operations and exercises. Under the modernization and restructuring program, the transformation of the ministries of defense and armed forces themselves resulted in the reduction of the armed forces’ end strength from more than 200,000 members during the Homeland war to the current 17,420 members, of which 15,615 are active military personnel and 1,805 state employees (osrh.hr, 2013). The current structure of the Croatian Armed Forces has been in place since 2006. It consists of the General Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces with military representative offices and General Staff units, three services—the Croatian Army, Croatian Air Force and Air Defense and Croatian Navy—the Croatian Defense College Petar Zrinski and Support Command. It is evident that the Croatian Armed Forces have conducted a remarkable transformation in the last 15 years. The government has also made considerable investments in the recruitment, retention, promotion, education, and training of military personnel with the goal of creating a highly professional military force (Bellamy and Edmunds, 2005), and it abolished conscription in 2008 to reinforce the professionalization of the armed services. The next significant step was taken with the adoption of a number of important strategic documents—national security strategy, defense strategy, and military strategy. These documents created an institutional framework in which Croatia identified threats and challenges to its security environment, determining strategic objectives and necessary resources. Specifically in 2002 the Croatian parliament adopted a series of policies that explicitly defined the national security and military strategy of the Republic. The fundamental document was the National Security Strategy of Croatia (2002) which defined the principle threats, goals,

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objectives, and strategy for the Republic’s national security (Hrvatski Sabor, 2002). Amongst other points, the National Security Strategy stressed Croatia’s overriding interest in joining the EU and NATO, and it expressed Croatia’s full acceptance and support for the values of collective security (Hrvatski Sabor, 2002). The document mirrors the threats and concerns of other NATO nations, but also stresses the positive potential contribution of Croatia’s membership and participation in collective security to security in South-eastern Europe. Consistently since 2002, official Croatian documents reiterated and strengthened the state’s commitment to collective security articulated 2002 in the National Security Strategy. Specifically, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 2005 represents a significant step towards the practical realization of Croatia’s National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy. In this regard, the Strategic Defence Review is a public document providing direction for developing the defense system and the Croatian Armed Forces, ensuring that in the future they continue to protect the vital interests of the Republic of Croatia and its citizens. This Review addresses the most fundamental issues regarding the development of Croatia’s defense (morh.hr, 2005). Croatia’s annual reports on defense planning to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) repeatedly reinforced the commitment and importance of collective security. These and related documents underscore that accession to the NATO alliance is the primary national security goal for Croatia (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2008). The extent to which Croatia followed up on and internalized its written commitments to collective security is open to interpretation, but its formal adherence to the principle is clear. It could be argued that Croatia, as was the case in other formerly socialist states, suffers from poorly developed military and defense planning capabilities, and that the planning documents are essentially military staff exercises in which the civilian authorities have little direct involvement (Nelson, 2004). In this sense, Edmunds wrote that before 2000, many of the personnel had strong ties to the ruling party of the Tuđman regime (i.e. HDZ). Much of the military command had also been politicized under the Tuđman regime, and the politically powerful veterans organizations were accustomed to playing major roles in defense and national security decision-making (Edmunds, 2007). Nevertheless, despite reservations regarding initial motivations, there is common agreement that Croatia has consistently contributed to regional security structures and missions for both NATO and the ESDP (Pietz and Remillard, 2006). Overall, Croatia has made a strong commitment to accepting NATO’s collective security values, and it has made good on that commitment over time. This will be discussed further in the text below. Croatian National Security in the Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture The concept of national security is considered in its broadest sense and concerns State security, which means security of persons, institutions, properties, and

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national territory. However, in the twenty-first century, with the emergence of so‑called soft security challenges it would be nearly fatal to equate national security with the security of the state. Richard H. Ullman noted that the definition of national security only (or even primarily) in military terms conveys the wrong idea about reality. First, it causes the government to concentrate on military threats and ignores other and perhaps even more harmful dangers. Further, it contributes to the militarization of international relations so that in the long term it can only strengthen global uncertainty (Ullman, 1983, p. 135). With the end of the Cold War, it became clear in all parts of the world that civil wars, expulsion, despotism, poverty, and hunger were much more of a direct threat to the individual security of people than wars between countries. For the purposes of this chapter we define national security as a condition which ensures the freedom of the state and society, territorial integrity and sovereignty, political and social stability, the rule of law, environmental conditions, and human (personal) security. National security and national interests are closely linked. According to Tatalović (1999, p. 43) national interests are the values and objectives directed towards the development of the national community, while national security is an activity organized with the aim of protecting these interests and being the instrument for their realization. This is why in defining national security one should take into account the awareness of the non-existence of the threats to national interests or the existence of the means sufficient to eliminate all the potential threats. Accession to the European Union and NATO has been one of the key national interests of the Republic of Croatia. From the very beginning of gaining international sovereignty Croatian politicians, at the time inexperienced in foreign policy, treated the two accession processes (accession to the EU and accession to the NATO) in a pair; hence they coined the inadequate phrase “Euro-Atlantic integration,” which was later colloquially accepted in everyday discussions on this topic. Accession to the European Union and NATO also stressed Croatian affiliation to the exclusive Euro-Atlantic security area. At present the EuroAtlantic region has a high level of involvement in international security affairs. The concentration of various institutions for international interaction on security matters in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole is the highest in the world. The construction of international and collective security institutions in Europe has the longest history, and has its origins in decisions of the 1815 Congress of Vienna (Karaganov and Bordachev, 2009). The main regional structures related to collective security include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CE), the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Added to the number of European multilateral institutions should be those bodies that have sprung up on the territory of the former Soviet Union—the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In the system of multilateral cooperation in Europe a role is played by the United Nations (UN) and numerous structures aimed at the development of sub-regional cooperation.

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Croatia is a member of all relevant international security institutions and started to participate in peace support operations in September 1999.2 For the last 13 years members of the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) have participated in more than 20 international missions and operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO, and the EU. In the beginning peacekeeping operations were performed mainly by members of the Croatian Armed Forces but, according to an integrated approach supported by the international community that brings together the military, civilian, and development components of crisis management, the operation gradually included members of the civilian police, diplomats, and representatives of other ministries. Croatia is a founding member of the Adriatic Charter and has been heavily involved in regional exercises with both the ESDP and NATO. NATO–Croatia relations date back to 1994, when senior Croatian diplomats publicly declared Croatia’s interest in joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP).3 Relations continued to expand, and Croatia joined the PfP and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in May 2000. Since 2002 Croatia’s cooperation with NATO has taken place within the framework of the Membership Action Plan (MAP).4 In the MAP framework, Croatia set out its reform plans and timelines in its Annual National Programme (ANP). Key areas included political, military and securitysector reforms. Important priorities were efforts to meet democratic standards, support for reducing corruption and fighting organized crime, judicial reform, improving public administration, promoting good neighborly relations, and ensuring sufficient levels of public support for joining NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012c). Finally, in April 2008, Croatia was invited to start accession talks to become a member of the Alliance. The accession protocols were signed on July 9, 2008, and Croatia officially became a NATO member on April 1, 2009. Croatia is very important country in NATO because for geostrategic and security reasons. Two other parties of the Adriatic Charter, i.e. Albania and Macedonia, will constitute a so-called security triangle with Croatia for maintaining stability in the still insecure region of South-east Europe, where many issues remain unresolved.5 Because of Croatia’s specific position on the left coast of the Adriatic Sea, as well as on the so-called “Balkan Route” of 2 Only four years after the end of the Homeland War, in 1999, the Republic of Croatia first sent its armed forces to a UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNMOSIL). From that time, the Republic of Croatia has made significant progress in the quality and quantity of its contributions to establishing peace in conflict areas. 3 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a program of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. The purpose of the Partnership for Peace is to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Euro-Atlantic partners and NATO, as well as among partner countries (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012a.). 4 The Membership Action Plan (MAP) mechanism is the stage in the procedure for nations wishing to join where their formal applications are reviewed by the current members (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012b). 5 For example the constitutional position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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smuggling various non-conventional threats from the East towards the West, Croatia plays an active role in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Since its first major peace-support operation in the Balkans in the early 1990s, the tempo and diversity of NATO operations have increased.6 Croatia started to participate in the NATO missions and operations in February 2003, first in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by sending a military police platoon comprising 50 members. It was the largest and the most demanding peace support operation in which Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) members have been participating (osrh.hr, 2013). Members of the Croatian Armed Forces share their knowledge and experience with the Afghan National Army and National Police, thus helping its members to develop operational capabilities for planning and carrying out their tasks, and they also work as staff members in ISAF regional commands. In December 2010 the Croatian parliament decided to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan (ISAF) and in 2011 and 2012 sent up to 350 members of the Croatian Armed Forces, with the possibility of rotation. Regular rotations are carried out every six months. The 22nd contingent of the Croatian Armed Forces departed for the ISAF mission in August 2013. The contingent comprises 154 Croatian and 22 Montenegrin troops, as a continuation of the partnership between the two countries within the A-5 initiative.7 The 22nd contingent also includes 56 Croatian troops who are already in Afghanistan. By participating in this mission over the past 10 years, Croatian troops have contributed, together with the allies, to changing the living conditions of the Afghan population. In 2008 Croatian parliament issued the Decision to deploy up to 20 CAF members and two Croatian Air Force and Air Defense helicopters to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) Peace Support Operation in Kosovo. The first Croatian contingent was deployed to participate in the KFOR Operation in 2009. Main tasks of the Croatian contingent are transportation of KFOR personnel, VIPs and cargo transportation. The contingent is under the direct command of KFOR Commander. The 12th Croatian contingent comprising 21 CAF members and two Mi-171 Sh helicopters is currently deployed to the KFOR Operation in Kosovo. Since its establishment in 1999, the operation in Kosovo has expanded to include minority protection and national heritage protection, but its primary goal of maintaining a safe and secure environment for the whole population has remained the focus of this operation (osrh.hr, 2013). Apart from these two operations, the Croatian parliament in May 2011 adopted a decision on the participation of members of the CAF in peacekeeping operations NATO “Unified protector.” In the peacekeeping operation in 2011 and 2012 two members of the Croatian Armed Forces were sent, with the possibility of rotation. 6 A list of the complete NATO operations and missions is available at http://www. nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_ 52060.htm (accessed September 25, 2013). 7 A-5—country signatories to the US–Adriatic Charter: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Croatia.

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Currently, NATO and Croatia actively cooperate in a range of areas, with a particular emphasis on defense and security sector reform, as well as support for wider democratic and institutional reform. According to the results of surveys from 2008, the participation of armed forces in international military missions enjoys the support of a relative majority of Croatian citizens when it comes to missions within the institutional frameworks of the UN and NATO. On the other hand, there is no support for participation in allied coalitions outside the UN and/or NATO. There is also substantial public support for participation in non-combat humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, while it is divided over participation in peace-making operations. Previous participation of armed forces in international missions is evaluated as a success by the majority of citizens (Matika, 2009, p. 355). After all the twists and turns of its internal development, the EU is gradually becoming a more a visible actor in the international arena. The significance of the EU as an element of Euro-Atlantic security depends on the extent and effectiveness of the ESDP, and the willingness of participants to invest political capital and resources in this initiative. The role of the EU’s foreign and security policy is to preserve peace, strengthen international security and promote international cooperation, and the EU has sent peacekeeping missions to several of the world’s trouble spots. Over the last decade, the EU has launched 23 civilian missions and military operations on three continents and has a leading role in the Balkans, where it is funding assistance projects in seven countries to help them build stable societies. As a candidate for membership in the European Union, the Republic of Croatia has been involved in the security activities of the EU. For the first time, Croatia was included in one of the CSDP mission with representatives of the police in the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan in 2002. This was followed by the participation of representatives of the armed forces in Operation European Union Force (EUFOR) in Chad and the Central African Republic (a team and two staff officers) from October 2008 until March 2009. Starting from November 2008 Croatian police and judicial representatives were involved in the composition of the civilian mission of establishing the rule of law in Kosovo—European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). As a response to increasingly aggressive pirate attacks on merchant vessels in the Gulf of Aden, the European Union launched a military operation in 2008 in order to deter and prevent piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. Operation Atalanta, also known as European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU-NAVFOR-ATALANTA), contributes to the protection of World Food Program vessels and AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) vessels delivering food aid, the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. Croatia has been participating in Operation ATALANTA since 2009. One staff officer has been currently assigned to the Allied Maritime Component Command Northwood in the UK (mvep.hr, 2013). Croatia is also continuously providing logistical support for the European Union Force operation named ALTHEA in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina (the use of seaports and airports, etc.) (osrh.hr, 2013).

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In the future, as a member of the EU, Croatia is planning to increase its contribution to common security and defense, taking into account national interests and foreign policy priorities, in particular the stability of the region and the European neighborhood in accordance with their capabilities. In the Euro-Atlantic space there are numerous organizations for the development of sub‑regional cooperation. Traditional military aspects of security rarely appear in their sphere of operation (except for cooperation among South-eastern European countries on implementing agreed measures on arms limitation and reduction, and the application of confidence-building measures). But if we apply a broader interpretation of security, it is important not to underestimate the role of sub‑regional organizations. Their very existence is a consolidating and stabilizing factor in the international political landscape of the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, when we discuss Euro-Atlantic security, all three parts of the Euro-Atlantic space—the United States, Europe, and Russia—must be taken into account. They all have their own policy with regard to the outside world and security problems. Based on the above, the formation of Euro-Atlantic security architecture is a broad and multifaceted project affecting various aspects of the situation in the region and beyond. Croatia recognizes its place and role in the international community and seeks to be an active participant of international processes with other partners and stakeholders in the international community. This deployment of Croatia’s Armed Forces is clearly defined in 2005 with the adoption, previously mentioned, of the Strategic Defence Review. Analysis of the missions and tasks of the armed forces indicates that three of the four missions and tasks have an international dimension, which clearly confirms the earlier international orientation of Croatia. This aspect makes clear that Croatia committed to national security policy and the functioning of the armed forces within the framework of a new security paradigm that emphasizes cooperation and action at the international level (Tatalović, Grizold, and Cvrtila, 2008, p. 99). Significantly, Croatia has taken a leading role in participating in collective security operations, and has made the commitment and implemented a fundamental transformation in the restructuring, professionalization, and modernization of its armed forces. Since the creation of the state and its armed forces, after post-war isolation, expansion of international cooperation and integration into the international community and its security, defense, and military structures, the Republic of Croatia and its armed forces have gone from being the recipients and beneficiaries of international aid to suppliers and providers of security services around the world, the “exporter of security” (Mikac, 2009). Contemporary Threats of the Croatian National Security in the Twenty‑first Century The word “threat” has multiple meanings. The English term threat refers to a communication of a disagreeable alternative to an individual or group by one in

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authority or who pretends to be (Koschnik, 1992, p. 210). According to the US Department of Homeland Security, a threat is natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment and/or property (dhs.gov, 2008). For the purposes of this chapter, the focus is on security threats, especially on threats to national security. In the broadest sense a security threat is any incident or confrontation that jeopardizes security. Security threats are understood as events that can seriously or even radically undermine the existence of a socio-political entity or prejudice its vital interests. The national security environment can be jeopardized by internal and external threats. Generally, different countries have a variety of internal threats to national security, and they are usually related to political instability, economic and financial crisis, corruption, minority problems etc. External threats to national security mainly relate to international terrorism, cyber-crime, or cyber security threats, organized crime (fraud, drugs, money laundering, piracy, human trafficking, smuggling), human-made disasters, floods, earthquakes and ethnic conflicts, land, chieftaincy, and religious disputes. For many countries the significance of various new challenges is not the same; moreover, it may change over time. With respect to some problems, an increased level of hypersensitivity is characteristic of most countries in the EuroAtlantic region. One example is the issue of energy security. Some challenges may also affect individual countries or groups of countries to a greater extent than others.8 Yet, all the new challenges are fundamentally transnational. For this reason, there is broad recognition of the need for the most energetic mobilization of resources for international cooperation, whether by using the organizational base of existing multilateral institutions, by converting some of their mechanisms, or by creating new institutions. The countries of the Euro-Atlantic region have an objective interest for joint counteraction to so-called new challenges to security. A generally accepted list (Baranovsky, 2010; Erwin, Magnuson, Parsons, and Tadjdeh 2012; mi5.gov.uk., 2013) of new challenges does not exist, but the following almost certainly belong to it: drug trafficking; terrorism; threats to biosecurity; epidemics and pandemics; emergencies and disasters; environmental challenges; climate change; illegal migration; transnational crime; maritime piracy; corruption; financial and economic manipulation; failures in resource supply (especially energy), etc. Although the Republic of Croatia is not faced with a direct threat at this time, there are certain processes within its surroundings which pose security risks and may have the potential to grow into direct threats towards its security and stability. According to the current Strategy for Croatia’s national security, the most relevant possible threats to the security and stability are: 8 The war on terror in the United States, for example, has at times taken on exaggerated forms, which is understandable in light of the shock from the September 11, 2001 attack. In Europe the problem of terrorism has traditionally been more acute for the United Kingdom, Spain, and France.

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• crises in its neighboring areas, especially those located in the Southern Mediterranean/Northern Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus; • geopolitical position within an area of intersections that link the area of Europe with new energy sources in the area of Asia (the Caucasus, Central Asia);9 • because the Republic of Croatia is surrounded by a large number of countries in transition (in the area of South-east Europe), their internal problems and troubles pose security risks for the entire region; • intensifying international threats in the region and further: some of the most significant securities risks are the problems of arms and illegal drugs trafficking, illegal immigration and human trafficking, especially of women and children. The Republic of Croatia is especially sensitive to this form of threat towards its security since it is located within an area of trafficking routes from Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe towards Western Europe; • along with the mentioned risks, the results of a five-year war are still present in the Republic of Croatia. A particular danger stems from leftover mines and explosive devices which endanger human life and economic development10 (Hrvatski Sabor, 2002). Considering when the Strategy for the Republic of Croatia’s National Security was adopted (2002), and the fact that in the meantime Croatia became a member of NATO and the EU, some of the security risks mentioned in this strategy no longer have that kind of security importance as it had before the Croatian accession to Euro-Atlantic integration. In any case, they should be listed as a security threat—troubles within the economic system, corruption, a negative population growth, a decrease in the participation of the active working population and a high unemployment rate; problems with the functioning of the judicial system and the slowness of conducting legal procedures; a population decline; border issues which resulted in the fall of the former Yugoslavia, etc. (Hrvatski Sabor, 2002). Security challenges, in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration processes, require from Croatia as a member of the EU and NATO the development of overall national power, or the development of military capabilities interoperable to allied forces for the conduct of multinational operations in the modern global war as a process characterized by the dynamism of a large number of new battlefields, and a large spectrum of various military operations with different operational goals. In that context, modernization and equipment are important components of military capabilities. Although important, the numeric size of the future force 9 This area contains traffic routes which connect central Europe with the Mediterranean and south-east Europe. The development of wider regional crises can result from possible conflicts of interest regarding control over transition routes, access to new resources or gaining influence within areas which are sources of such resources. This also includes conflicts of interest between countries which possess such resources and countries en route to their access. 10 Across Croatian territory around 74,000 mines are scattered. From 1991 to date mines have been detonated by 1,975 people of whom 509 died (politikaplus.com, 2013).

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becomes is less important than a measure of personal capabilities. In line with the transformation of goals force structure, new military technologies, and the level of knowledge and skills of future armed forces are far more important. Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to show the Croatian path towards membership of the European Union in the context of European security and defense policy, and the course and results of reforms in the field of security and defense. Research has shown that Croatia has achieved a great deal in terms of transformation and modernization of the armed forces, the adoption of standards and the development of a new military culture on a joint basis. Success in transforming national security orientations and doctrine, military structures, and patterns of civil–military relations to conform to the expectations of the Euro-Atlantic security institutions Croatia has helped to build a professional, modern force that contributes to collective security in the region and has made considerable progress in transforming civil–military relations to conform to the needs and expectations of a democratic society. Although the Croatian transition process completed with the accession to full membership of NATO and the EU, the Croatian security environment should also be considered when it comes to national security. The position of the Croatia in a region that does not have a full stability (South-eastern Europe), and the experience of the Homeland War emphasize the importance of viewing Croatian national security in the Euro-Atlantic context. The Western Balkans is still a region in transition, where economic development is underway and in which cooperation is increasingly seen as an obvious choice. The countries of the region are today much more closely connected through various cooperation schemes than they were years ago. But there are still acute social problems such as unemployment, poor infrastructure, drug and human trafficking and other forms of organized crime. Many analysts and officials believe that one of the processes that will contribute to overcome those problems is unconditional integration of all Balkans countries into Euro-Atlantic structures (EU and NATO). The regional cooperation in the Western Balkans is needed as a crucial ingredient of stability and good political relations and to help overcome nationalism and intolerance, promoting mutual understanding and political dialogue in the region. Joining neighboring countries in the EuroAtlantic structures will increase the level of security and stability in Croatia. The National Security Strategy is a fundamental conceptual document of any state that defines national security policy and the ways of its implementation, and the first Strategy for the Republic of Croatia’s National Security was adopted in 2002. From then to now, foreign policy and the security position of Croatian are greatly changed and it is necessary to devise a new strategy to take account of the political and social changes that have occurred, especially in the immediate neighborhood. However, in developing a new strategy it is necessary to use a comprehensive approach to national security.

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In the past decade, the Republic of Croatia has made an impressive transformation, from the former recipient of peacekeeping forces to an active participant in securing peace, to becoming a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council and a NATO and EU member. In this new role, the Republic of Croatia is showing its political will and readiness to contribute to global peace and stability, creating mechanisms to respond effectively to the current demands for the preservation of peace, as well as taking opportunities for further development of partnerships in promoting world peace and security. The geopolitical position of Croatia, its turbulent history and global processes confirm the inevitability and logic of Croatian aspirations and consistent commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration and fostering transatlantic ties. Based on the preceding analysis, we can conclude that Croatian membership of the European Union and Euro-Atlantic security associations is the best way to exercise and protect Croatian national interests. When it comes to action by the global geopolitical structures and geostrategic players, Croatia also needs to take three geopolitical initiatives—the European (the EU, Council of Europe, and OSCE), the Euro-Atlantic (US, NATO) and the global (UN, Russia, China). With coordinated action by all actors of international relations that operate in the international community, Croatia should be better adapted to the new challenges brought by the globalization process, the new world order and new national security threats of a global character. References Baranovsky, V., 2010. The Euro-Atlantic Region: Security Challenges and Opportunities for a Joint Response. Report to the Meeting of the Commission on Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative, Munich. Available at http://www.imemo. ru/ru/publ/2010/10049.pdf, accessed October 2, 2013. Bellamy, A.J. and Edmunds, T., 2005. Civil–military relations in Croatia: politicisation and politics of reform. European Security, 14 (1), 71–93. Bilandžić, M., 2009. Hrvatska vojska u međunarodnim odnosima. Polemos, 11 (2), 11–27. britannica.com, 2013. Balkans. Available at http://www.britannica.com/EB checked/topic/50325/Balkans, accessed November 7, 2013. dhs.gov, 2008. Asset, Value, Threat/Hazard, Vurnelability, and Risk. Available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/prevent/rms/426/fema426_ch1.pdf, accessed November 7, 2013. Edmunds, T., 2006. What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe. International Affairs, 82 (6), 1059–75. ——— 2007. Security Sector Reform in Transforming Societies: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Erwin, S.I., Magnuson, S., Parsons, D., and Tadjdeh, Y., 2012. Top Five Threats to National Security in the Coming Decade. Available at http://www.nationaldefense

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magazine.org/archive/2012/November/Pages/TopFiveThreatstoNationalSecurity intheComingDecade.aspx, accessed September 18, 2013. Europa.eu, 2012. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Main Findings of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership. Available at http:// ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/hr_rapport_2012_ en.pdf, accessed May 30, 2014. Greenwood, D., 2005. Bases of assessment. In D. Greenwood (ed.) The Western Balkan Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership—Harmonie Paper 18. Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies, 11–20. Hrvatski Sabor, 2002. Strategy for the Republic of Croatia’s National Strategy, adopted March 19. Narodne novine 33/02, Zagreb. Karaganov, S. and Bordachev, T., 2009. Towards a New Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture. Report of the Russian Experts for the Valdai Discussion Club Conference, London. Available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/ Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng= en&ord866=grp2&id=121540, accessed October 2, 2013. Klemenčić, M., 1993. Croatia—past and present location, position, territory, borders, regions. Acta Geographica Croatica, 28 (1), 23–38. Koschnick, W.J., 1992. Standard Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Paris: Saur. Kurečić, P., 2001. Geopolitika i suvremeni geopolitički položaj Hrvatske. Međunarodne studije, 1 (4), 115–27. Mackinder, J.H., 1943. Democratic Ideals and Reality. London: Constable Publishers. Mahan, A.T., 1960. Pomorska Strategija. Beograd: Vojno izdavački zavod. Matika, D., 2009. Participation of the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia in international military missions—attitudes of the Croatian public and officers of the Croatian armed forces. Društvena istraživanja, 18 (3), 355–69. Mikac, R., 2009. Iskustva u obrazovanju i pripremi za mirovne misije: primjer Afganistana. In S. Tatalović (ed.) Obrambeno i sigurnosno obrazovanje u 21. Stoljeću. Zagreb: Centar za sigurnosne studije Fakulteta političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu i Politička kultura, 89–109. Milardović, A., 2000. Zapadni Balkan: pojam, ideje i dokumenti o rekonstrukciji Balkana u procesu globalizacije. Osijek, Zagreb, Split: Pan liber. morh.hr, 2005. Strategic Defence Review. Zagreb: Ministry of Defence. mi5.gov.uk, 2013. What are the Biggest Current Threats to National Security? Available at https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/faqs-about-mi5/what-are-the -biggest-current-threats-to-national-security.html, accessed November 7, 2013. mvep.hr, 2013. Republic of Croatia and the Council of Europe. Available at http://www.mvep.hr/en/foreign-politics/multilateral-relationsold/council-ofeurope-%28ce%29/relations-between-croatia-and-the-council-of-europe-/, accessed September 11, 2013. Nelson, D.N., 2004. Civilians, the military and defence planning in south east Europe: an analysis of the Stability Pact Self-Assessment Studies. In E. Cole, T. Donais, and P.H. Fluri (eds), Defence and Security Sector Governance and

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Index

accession to EU accession process 2–4, 7–8, 26 Croatia 5, 11, 18–29 post-communist countries 12, 16, 18 requirements (criteria) 16, 17 acquis communautaire 2, 3, 8, 11, 12, 17–20, 27–8, 38, 177, 180, 181 Ágh, A. 41 Akos, R.T. 147 Alaburić, V. 73 Alexander, M. 34 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 171 Almond, G. 142, 149 Alps-Adriatic Working Community 164 ALTHEA 187 AMISOM 187 Anastasakis, O. 17, 29 antemurale christianitatis 70, 72, 79 Antifascist Struggle Day 119, 120–25, 127–33 Ashbrook, J. 166 Assembly of European Regions 166 Association of European Regions 164 Balkan/s, the 53, 58, 61, 65, 109 Balkan-Union 80 federation 75, 76 remaining in 69, 70 Balfour, R. 9, 16, 17, 29 Banac, I. 145 Banducci, S. 86 Baranovsky, V. 189, 192 Bechev, D. 141 Bellamy, A.J. 182, 192 Berković, Z. 73 Beširević, N. 72 Beyme, K. von 9, 14, 29 Bianchini, S. 89 Bideleux, R. 36 Bilandžić, M. 181, 192

Bitzenis, A. 151 Blanuša, N. 76, 77, 78, 80, 88 Bleiburg 119, 121, 128–9, 130, 133 Bobetko, J. 43–4 Bordachev, T. 184, 193 border dispute 37, 46–8 Borislavova Spendzharova, A. 141 Börzel, T.A. 141 Bosnia-Herzegovina 120, 124, 133 Bowler, S. 86 Brown, W. 15, 29 Brzezinski, Z. 14, 29 Buden, B. 70, 71 Budiša, D. 61 Bunce, V. 2, 9 Butković, D. 73, 74 Buzan, B. 151 CAF, see Croatian Armed Forces Caracciolo, L. 73 Caramani, D. 142, 162 Caratan, B. 146 CARDS 3 Carruba, C. 79 Carter, E. 160–61 Catholic Church 133 Checkel, J.T. 141 Chilton, P. 55 Cipek, T. 12, 19, 29 civil rights 2, 6, 12–14 civil society 6, 11, 14, 16, 18–19, 27–9 cleavage 161–2, 172–3 commemorations 118, 121–8, 130–35 Common Foreign and Security Policy 180 communism 53–4 Comparative Manifesto Project 171 conspiracy theories 75, 76 Constitution of 1990 122, 131 coping with the past 76 corruption 35, 37–40

196

Croatia and the European Union

Council of Europe 184, 192 Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 188 Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) 41, 44, 54, 58, 60, 64, 121, 124–5, 128, 130, 135, 162, 164–6, 168–9, 183 Croatian Homeland War 35–7, 39–45, 47–8 Croatian parliament 43, 62, 125, 145, 152, 182, 186 Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU) 171 Croatian Party of Rights 134 Croatian Party of Rights–Dr Ante Starčević (HSP-AS) 171–2 Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) 170, 172 Croatian People’s Party (HNS) 165, 168, 170–71 Croatian Privatization Fund 39–40 Croatian Pure Party of Rights 130, 134 Croatian security and defense system 177, 183 Croatian Serbs 120–21, 128, 131–2, 134 Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) 61, 165–7, 170–71 Croatian War of Independence 94–5, 99, 109, 117, 119, 123, 125, 127–9, 132–4 Crouch, C. 12, 15, 29 cultural memory 118, 120–23 Cvrtila, V. 188, 194 Četniks 121, 124, 131, 133 Čular, G. 36, 167–8 Dahl, R. 12, 13, 30, 34 Day of Remembrance for Victims of all Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes 119 De Melo, M. 151 Declaration of Antifascism 125 democracy consolidated 6, 11–15, 17–20, 27–8 crisis of democracy 11–13, 15, 27 defective 33–6 democratic deficits 4, 6, 12, 13–15, 17, 19, 24–9 embedded 33–4, 36, 38–9, 41 formal 12–15 post-democracy 12, 15, 27

prerequisites for 5, 6, 11 substantive 6, 11–14, 27–9 democratic consolidation 33–4, 36–9, 41–2, 46, 55, 160, 163, 167 democratic deficit 41–2, 47, 61, 160, 173 democratic transition of Croatian society 21–2, 24, 28 of post-communist societies 1, 13, 16 of post-transitional societies 11, 14, 18 process 1–2, 3–6, 11, 14, 23 democratization Croatian society 6, 12, 53, 57, 142–3, 149 EU democratization potential 11–12, 15 EU model of democratization 6, 11–12, 15–16, 18, 28 post-communist societies 1, 3–4, 14–15, process 1, 3, 6, 8, 16, 18–28, 34–6, 41, 160, 164, 168 Denizer, C. 151 development democratic 6, 13–14, 19, 21, 28–9 economic 5, 6, 21 social 5, 11, 19, 27 strategies 26, 29 Diamond, L. 1, 2, 9, 12, 13, 14, 30, 147 Dimitrova, A. 17, 19, 30 Dolenec, D. 16, 30, 159–60, 168 Dorić, P. 74 Dvořáková, V. 37 Đapić, A. 134 Đerđa, D. 19, 30 Đurić, D. 74 Easton, D. 80, 142 Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone (ZERP) 46 Edmunds, T. 181–3, 192 elections 56, 61 Eley, G. 147 Elster, J. 14, 30 Engert, S. 141 enlargement policy 140–50 Ensink, T. 122 Erwin, S.I. 189, 192

Index ESDP, see European Security and Defence Policy EU, see European Union EU Stabilization and Association Process 180 EUFOR 187 EULEX 187 EUPOL 187 Euro crisis 69, 76, 83, 88 Euro-Atlantic region 178, 184, 188, 189 security 177, 178, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192 Eurodisposition 93–6, 98–9, 102, 104, 106–11 Europe Central and Eastern 1–3, 15, 22, 25, 160, 163, 168 return to 6–7, 16, 21 South-eastern 160, 163, 165 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 151 European Commission 38, 40–41, 44, 46–7, 118, 134, 141, 160, 169–70 European Community 58, 64, 164–6 European identity 97–102, 105, 107–8, 111 European integration 57–8, 60–61, 159–69, 172 identity-based support for 93, 95–6, 98–9, 105, 108 institutionally-driven support for 93, 95, 97–9, 105–6, 108 political parties-based support for 93, 97, 109 public support for 93–4, 98–101, 104–6, 108–11 threats of 95, 97, 99–102, 105–9, 111 utilitarian support for 93, 95–9, 104, 108 European Parliament, Member of 159, 161, 171 European People’s Party 170–71 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 187 European Union (EU) accession 33–4, 37–8, 42–8, 54, 65, 159–62, 164–72 citizens of 93–4, 96–7, 101, 111–12

197

democratic deficit of 93 discontent with 93–4, 97 enlargement policy 2, 8–9, 11–12, 15–18, 27 process 2–4, 17–18, 20, 33, 46, 159, 161, 163 institutions 34, 42, 65, 159–60, 169 joining to 2–4, 6, 9, 11–12, 15–16, 21–2, 25, 27, 29 member states 64, 93–4, 108, 111, 159–66, 171–2 membership 2–8, 11–12, 16–18, 21, 25, 28–9, 33–9, 42–3, 45–8, 54–5, 64, 140, 159, 161, 163–71 referendum 169, 171–2 negotiations 1–2, 4, 16–17, 23–7, 29, 94–5, 110 political conditionality 8, 16–18, 20, 27–8 support 80–82, 87 diffuse 80–82 specific 80–82 trust in 100–102, 105–6, 108–9, 111 Europeanization 2, 6, 8, 16, 34, 47, 56, 58, 70–72, 79–80, 84–6, 88 party system 159–63, 166–8, 171 europhobic attitudes 69, 78, 88 Euroskepticism 4, 7, 18, 25, 27, 69, 77, 88, 93, 109, 162–4, 169–70 democratic 77–8 economic-utalitarian 77–8 socio-economic 77–8 sovereignty-based 77–8 Fairclough, N. 54 Fink-Hafner, D. 161, 171 Fisher, S. 35, 62, 151 France 128, 135 Freyburg, T. 43 Friedrich Ebert Foundation 170 Friedrich Naumann Foundation 170 Frydman, R. 39 Fukuyama, F. 1, 9 Galić, B. 149–50 Gee, J.P. 55 Gelb, A. 151 Gellner, E. 149

198

Croatia and the European Union

Germany 62, 122–3, 128 Gilliland, M.K. 147 Goldstein, S. 57 Gotovina, A. 44–5, 74, 86 Grabbe, H. 16, 17, 30, 141 Grdešić, I. 39, 163 Greenwood, D. 181, 193 Gregurek, M. 40 Grizold, A. 188, 194 Grossman, J. 16, 30 Grubiša, D. 26, 30, 40, 72, 79 Grugel, J. 1, 9 GrzymałaBusse, A. 168 Gungor, B. 151 Habermas, J. 12, 30 Hague Tribunal, The, see International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia Halbwachs, M. 123 Hanns Seidel Foundation 170 Havrylyshyn, O. 151 HDZ, see Croatian Democratic Union Hebrang, A. 128 Heinrich Böll Foundation 170 Herdandez-Cata, E. 151 Hill, M. 151 Hix, S. 142 HNS, see Croatian People’s Party Hodson, R. 148 Holmes, S. 150 Holocaust 118–19, 126 Homeland War 74, 76, 80 Hooghe, L. 79 HSLS, see Croatian Social Liberal Party HSP-AS, see Croatian Party of Rights–Dr Ante Starčević HSS, see Croatian Peasant Party HSU, see Croatian Party of Pensioners Hungary 135 Huntington, S.P. 1, 9, 13, 30, 165 Hupe, P. 142, 151 ICTY, see International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia ideological divisions 117–18, 120–21, 126, 129, 131 IDS, see Istrian Democratic Assembly

Independent State of Croatia (NDH) 120–25, 126, 128–9, 132, 134 Inglehart, R. 12, 14, 18, 30, 86 inner and outer enemies 73, 76 institutional capacity 6, 16, 18–19, 27–9 Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre‑Accession (ISPA) 25 International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY, The Hague Tribunal) 6, 25, 37, 42–8, 62, 74, 117–18 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 186 ISP, see Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS) 166–7, 170–71 Italy 122 Jackman, R.W. 13, 30 Jacoby, W. 141 Jambrešić-Kirin, R. 121 Jandroković, G. 130 Jano, D. 34 Jarstad, A.K. 41 Jeffries, I. 36 Jelavich, B. 147 Jelavich, C. 147 Josipović, I. 118, 129–33 Jović, D. 42, 165 Judah, T. 74 judiciary 34, 36–8, 43, 45, 47 Judt, T. 147 Kaldor, M. 14, 30 Kalogjera, D. 39 Karaganov, S. 184, 193 Karajić, N. 3, 9 Karamarko, T. 130, 135 Karl, T.L. 13, 30, 149 Karp, J. 86 Kasapović, M. 3, 9, 23, 31, 60, 85, 163, 169 Kelley, J. 141 Kertzer, D.I. 122 KFO, see Kosovo Force Kiss, Y. 39 Kitchelt, H. 78

Index Klemenčić, M. 179, 193 Knill, C. 142 Knobel, H. 141 knowledge 79–80, 86–8 Kocka, J. 144 Komar, O. 160 Konrad Adenauer Foundation 170 Koprić, I. 19, 31 Koschnick, W.J. 189, 193 Kosor, J. 47, 63, 129, 135, 171 Kosovo Force (KFOR) 186 Krajina, Z. 77 Krastev, I. 89 Kukuriku coalition 171–2 Kunac, S. 168 Kurečić, P. 178, 193 Ladrech, R. 159–61, 163 Lalić, D. 167–8 Lamont, C.K. 45 Lampinen, R. 142 Lane, C. 89 Lavenex, S. 33 League of Communists of Croatia (SKH) 37, 57 Leff, C.S. 2, 10 Leko, J. 132 Lenschow, A. 142 Lerotić, Z. 56 Letica, S. 73, 74 Lewis, P.G. 163 liberalism 148–50 liberalization 53 Limongi, F. 13, 31 Lindstrom, N. 73 Linz, J.J. 1, 9, 13, 14, 22, 31, 36, 39, 142, 150 Lovell, D.W. 147 Lovrić, J. 74 Lušić, B. 74 Luther, K.R. 161 McFaul, M. 2, 9 Mackinder, J.H. 178, 193 Magnuson, S. 189, 192 Mahan, A.T. 178, 193 Mair, P. 163, 170 Mäki, J.M. 38

199

Maldini, P. 2, 9, 13, 15, 28, 31 Malová, D. 141 Marčetić, G. 19, 31 Markač, M. 74, 86 Marković, A. 39 Marks, G. 79 Mashtaler, O. 36 Massey, G. 148 Matić, M. 73 Matika, D. 187, 193 Mattila, M. 161 Mattli, W. 141 May, P.J. 18, 31 Mazower, M. 143–4, 146, 155 MEDA 3 Member of the Croatian Sabor 168, 171 Membership Action Plan 185 Mencinger, J. 89 Merkel, W. 2, 6, 10, 12–14, 28, 31, 33–6, 41–2, 47, 85, 151, 155, 167 Mesić, S. 62, 74, 118, 125–33 Mikac, R. 188, 193 Milanović, Z. 63, 131 Milardović, A. 37, 164–6, 148, 179, 193 Miller, R.A. 13, 30 Milošević, S. 56, 121, 128 Mimica, N. 129 modernization 6, 8, 15–16, 27–9, 35, 41 monuments 119, 123–4, 132 Moran, M. 13, 31 Mrsić, M. 132 Mühlböck, M. 161 Munck, G.L. 2, 10 Murphy, K. 39 national identity 95, 97–102, 105–9, 112, 122, 130–31, 133 national security 184, 189, 192 National Security Strategy of Croatia 182–3, 190–91 nationalism 94, 108–9, 145–8, 150 nation-building 35, 37, 41, 45 NATO 8, 21, 25, 129, 177, 181–7, 190–92 NDH, see Independent State of Croatia Nelson, D.N. 183, 193 Niedermayer, O. 80 NikićČakar, D. 171 Noutcheva, G. 34, 141

200

Croatia and the European Union

Nsouli, S.M. 151 Nusinović, M. 40 O’Donnell, G. 13, 31 Offe, C. 2, 10, 14, 30 Operation Storm 120 Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe (OSCE) 183–4, 192 Pahor, B. 47 Paić, H. 53, 55, 61 Parry, G. 13, 31 Parsons, D. 189, 192 Partisan movement 117, 121–8, 130–31, 133 Partnership for Peace 182, 185 party competition 160–63, 167–8 elite 161, 169, 172–3 organization 161, 173 program 159, 161, 164–6, 168, 172 system 159–63, 166–9 Party of European Socialists 171 Pauković, D. 60, 66 Pavelić, A. 117, 120–21 Pavić, R. 178, 194, Pavlaković, V. 43–5 Pennings, P. 162 perception 70–71, 76, 80, 82–3, 85–7, 89 Peskin, V. 43 Petek, A. 151, 155 PHARE 9, 25 Pietz, T. 183, 194 PiroćanacPetrović, Z. 179, 194 Plevnik, D. 71 Plumper, T. 141 Poguntke, T. 160–61 policy convergence 159–60 policy-making 160, 173 political culture 7, 14, 27, 29, 142–3, 149–51 political discourse 53–4, 59, 64–6 political elites 1–3, 7, 17–18, 20–21, 23, 26, 28, 65, 93–5, 97, 99–101, 110 political institutions 35–8, 41 polyarchy 34

post-communist societies/countries 1–2, 4, 8, 12, 14–16, 21–3, 27–8, 160, 163, 167 post-socialist transition 94–6, 99, 109, 110 Pravda, A. 141 Preuss, U. 14, 30 Pridham, G. 17, 19, 30, 31, 141 privatization 37, 39–41, 47 Prlić, J. 74 Prosperov, N.S. 73 Przeworski, A. 13, 31 Pupovac, M. 131–2 Pusić, V. 168, 171 Putnam, R. 149, 156 Račan, I. 40, 61, 118, 168 Radaelli, C. 79 Raik, K. 20, 31 Ramet, S.P. 40, 145 Rapaczynski, A. 39 Ratzel, F. 178, 194 Raunio, T. 161 Razsa, M. 76 Rehn, O. 46–7 Remillard, M. 183, 194 return to Europe 53, 55, 58, 69–70 Richter, S. 43 Risse, T. 141, 153 Rodin, S. 38, 62 Roksandić, D. 124 Rustow, D.A. 22, 31 Rybář, M. 141 SAA, see Stabilization and Association Agreement Sabalić, I. 74 Sahay, R. 151 Salecl, R. 78 Sanader, I. 40, 45–7, 62–3, 74, 126, 135, 166, 168, 171 SAPARD 25 Sauer, C. 122 Schimmelfennig, F. 17, 31, 34, 141 Schmitter, P.C. 13, 20, 30, 31, 149 Scholtz, H. 34 Schultz, H.D. 149 Schumpeter, J. 13, 32 Schwartzman, K.C. 1, 10

Index SDP, see Social Democrat Party Second World War (People’s Liberation Struggle) 117–24, 127–9, 131–2, 134 Sedelius, T. 36 Sedelmeier, U. 17, 31, 34, 141 Sekulić, D. 148 Seligman, M. 88 Serbian National Council 131–2 Serbian Orthodox Church 131 SFRY, see Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia simulating democracy 76 Sinnott, R. 80 Sisak (Brezovica) 124–5, 127–30, 132–4 Sisk, T.D. 41 SKH, see League of Communists of Croatia Skoko, B. 26, 32 Slovenia 95, 129 SlukanAltić, M. 180, 194 Smith, A. 147 Smith, K. 141 Social Democrat Party (SDP) 61, 119, 130, 135, 166, 168–71 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 121–2, 124, 133 South-east European Cooperative Initiative 164 South-east European Cooperation Process 164 sovereignty 59, 66, 164–5 Soviet Union 124 Sørensen, C. 77 Split 127 Spykman, J.N. 178, 194 Srb 124, 130–31 Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 42, 62, 140 state-building 35–6, 39, 41–2, 47–8 statehood 121–3, 125–6, 128–31, 133, 144–7, 151 Statehood Day 119 Stavrianos, L.S. 147 Stepan, A. 1, 9, 13, 14, 22, 31, 36, 39, 142, 150 Stoeckel, F. 88 Stoker, G. 12, 15, 32 Strategic Defence Review 183, 188

201

Stratulat, C. 3, 9, 16, 17, 29 Subotić, J. 118, 123, 133 Suny, R. 147 Šeks, V. 125 Šiber, I. 41, 163 Škiljan, F. 131 Špehar, H. 72 Štulhofer, A. 26, 32, 169 TACIS 3 Tadjdeh, Y. 189, 192 Taras, R. 149 Tatalović, S. 184, 188, 194 Teodorović, I. 40 Terry, M.S. 2, 10 Tezno 129 Thompson, Perković M. 132 Tilly, C. 1, 10 Tito, J.B. 117, 120–21, 126, 128, 133 Tocqueville, A. de 13, 32 Topalović, D. 179, 194 Topusko 126, 131 transformation 34, 36, 39–41, 47 transition 35–7, 39–41, 47–8, 53–4 Tuđman, F. 36, 39, 43, 58–61, 64–5, 117–18, 121–2, 124–5, 133, 135, 164–6 Ullman, H.R. 184, 194 UN, see United Nations UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 185 United Kingdom 128 United Nations (UN) 64, 184–5, 187, 192 United States 61 Uprising Day 119, 124, 131 Ustaša movement 117, 120–22, 125–30, 133–4 Uusikylä, P. 142 Uzelac, A. 37–8 Vachudova, M.A. 34, 141, 162 values 69–71, 79–80, 84–6 Van Dijk, T.A. 54 Vasilevski, S. 36 Vasović, M. 142, 149 Vejvoda, I. 14, 30 Verba, S. 149 Veselica, V. 39

202

Croatia and the European Union

veterans (branitelji) 130, 132 Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day 119–20, 132 Vojnić, D. 39 Vujadinović, D. 148, 150 Vujović, Z. 160 Vukovar 132 Wagemann, C. 142 war crimes 118, 124, 127–8 war in Croatia 60 weak states 143, 149–52 Welsh, H.A. 2, 10 Welzel, C. 12, 14, 18, 30 Western Balkans 143–6, 150–51, 177, 179, 191 Whitehead, L. 3, 10, 13, 32 Wolin, S. 12, 15, 32 Woodward, S.L. 140

Yamak, R. 151 Yugoslavia 36–7, 39, 41–2, 46–7, 55–7, 59, 64, 69, 72–5, 77, 88–9, 109, 140, 159, 163–6 Zagreb 124–5 Summit 42, 62, 159, 167 Zakaria, F. 13, 14, 28, 32 Zakošek, N. 3, 10, 36, 41, 55, 163, 167 Zambelli, N. 21, 32, 43 ZAVNOH 125–31 ZERP, see Ecological and Fisheries Protection Zone Zielonka, J. 34, 141 Zuroff, E. 135 Zürn, M. 141 Županov, J. 3, 10