Conflicting Identities: Travails of Regionalism in Asia 9780367354763, 9780429331718

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CONFLICTING IDENTITIES

Edited by Rabindra Sen, Anindya Jyoti Majumdar and Bhagaban Behera

CONFLICTING IDENTITIES TRAVAILS OF REGIONALISM IN ASIA Edited by Rabindra Sen, Anindya Jyoti Majumdar and Bhagaban Behera

an informa business

ISBN 978-0-367-35476-3

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CONFLICTING IDENTITIES In the era of globalization, regionalism aims at a practical compromise between global governance and national aspirations. Attempts have been made by states, in varying degrees, to advance cooperation towards mutual benefit in different parts of the world. However, the very process of regional cooperation in a defined geographical area adopts unique ways and special characters to accommodate the particularities of the region and does not lead to similar consequences when compared with the processes in motion in other areas. This volume is the culmination of the brainstorming exercise of a National Seminar on ‘Asian Regionalism in the Twenty First Century’ at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata. The task is to fulfil two main objectives: to join the debate on the efficacy of regionalism today and make a meaningful contribution to an understanding of the subject; and also to suggest ways of tiding over the problems faced by the countries in various regions or subregions of the Asian continent in their attempts to advance towards the goal of regional cooperation and integration. The essays in this book are envisioned to benefit not only a wide community of scholars involved in teaching and research in general and the students of international relations in particular but would also be of interest to any avid reader who intends to explore the patterns of contemporary world politics. Former Professor and ex-Coordinator of the Centre of Advanced Study Programme in the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Rabindra Sen is the author of China and ASEAN: Diplomacy during the Cold War and After and co-editor of South East Asia: Security in the Coming Millennium. Anindya Jyoti Majumdar is Professor in the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata. Bhagaban Behera teaches in the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata. He is the author of Central Asia-China Relations Since 1991 (2006).

Conflicting Identities TRAVAILS OF REGIONALISM IN ASIA

Edited by

RABINDRA SEN ANINDYA JYOTI MAJUMDAR BHAGABAN BEHERA

MANOHAR 2019

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Rabindra Sen, Anindya Jyoti Majumdar and Bhagaban Behera; individual chapters, the contributors; and Manohar Publishers & Distributors The right of Rabindra Sen, Anindya Jyoti Majumdar and Bhagaban Behera to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Print edition not for sale in South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan or Bhutan) British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-0-367-35476-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-33171-8 (ebk) Typeset in Adobe Garamond Pro 11/13 by Manohar, New Delhi 110 002

Contents

Introduction rabindra sen, anindya jyoti majumdar and bhagaban behera

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1. Regionalism and Security: Bridges over Fault-lines anindya jyoti majumdar

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2. Regionalism in Asia-Pacific: Role of APT and EAS g.v.c. naidu

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3. Eurasian Regional Security: The Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization bijaya kumar das

47

4. Genesis and Evolution of Regionalism in Europe and South Asia: A Comparative Analysis purusottam bhattacharya

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5. South Asian Regionalism in the Light of Evolving Neo-regionalism in Asia shantanu chakrabarti

93

6. SAARC in India’s Foreign Policy Calculus partha pratim basu

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7. Rethinking Regionalism in South Asia a. subramanyam raju

129

8. ASEAN in the New Global Order: The Effective-Ineffective Dichotomy tridib chakraborti

143

9. (Re)evaluating Regionalism in West Asia sanjukta banerji bhattacharya

183

10. Regionalism in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors bhagaban behera

215

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CONTENTS

11. Asian Regionalism and Sub-Regionalism: The Context of Indo-Thai Cooperation and Connectivity lipi ghosh

237

List of Contributors

263

Index

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Introduction RABINDRA SEN ANINDYA JYOTI MAJUMDAR BHAGABAN BEHERA

discussion and debates on regionalism and regionalization from a terminological and theoretical point of view and in its functional manifestations through regional and sub-regional groupings in different parts of the world have long formed a key aspect of the discourse in International Relations. Asia being the focal point of global attention, especially in recent times, it is hardly surprising that the debate on the problems and prospects of regionalism in the world’s largest continent has attracted the attention of all and has become more and more intense. Ideas of regionalism play a constructive role in providing visions of a regional community as it should ideally be as well as the guiding principles for putting the blueprint into practice. The fundamental questions relate to the structural bases of the organizations or groupings deemed necessary and also their modes of operation. In an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world, regionalism is necessary for ‘internationalizing’ Asia, corresponding to its growing importance in the world economy. Even then, however, heterogeneity, lack of unity, and nationalism all have undermined efforts at regional cooperation in Asia. Thus the idea of ‘One Asia’ even today is more a dream than a reality. The present volume is the culmination of the brainstorming exercise of a National Seminar on ‘Asian Regionalism in the Twenty-First Century’ organized under the UGC Centre of Advanced Study Programme of the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University. The seminar was intended to fulfil two main objectives – to join the debate and make a meaningful contribution to an understanding of the subject; and also to suggest ways of tiding over the problems faced by the countries in various regions or sub-regions

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of the Asian continent in their attempts to advance towards the goal of regional cooperation and integration. The volume collects eleven articles on various dimensions of regionalism and the process of its evolution in different regions. In his paper dealing with regionalism and security, Anindya Jyoti Majumdar explores into the motivations of regionalism from different angles with the belief that the process of regionalism in different regions do not have a common line of advancement. He views regionalism as a strategy that smoothens up the sharp edges of conflicting states in a region especially when attempts are made on part of states to understand security in multilateral terms without compromising the national interest. Security regions are made and unmade depending on the convenience and exigencies of time and space, and the particular international order prevailing at a time leading to geopolitical image-engineering. Majumdar maintains that a simple explanation in terms of coordination of policies to achieve the goals of security from intra-regional conflicts and external threats might not be adequate to understand the complexities of regional security. In fact, security management requires a constant process of region construction that is temporary and fragile. Creation of regional agencies does not lead to regionalism per se. Referring to the various regional organizations, Majumdar concludes that while bridges are sought to be built by the actors in a region, very often threats from invisible fault-lines remain. In his paper G.V.C. Naidu first explains the concept of regionalism, and then pays attention to the genesis and growth of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific with special reference to the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) initiatives. Naidu points to the unprecedented interest in regionalism in the Asia Pacific region and other parts of the world and the resultant proliferation of a variety of multilateral mechanisms for promoting regional cooperation. This, Naidu argues, is attributable mainly to the metamorphosis in the concept of regionalism itself and more importantly the emergence and growth of Regional Trading Arrangements (RTAs) as major drivers of global trade. Many of these initiatives are increasingly viewed both as instruments designed to promote economic cooperation and to address political-security issues and even as attempts to build regional

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communities. Naidu points out that while ‘old regionalism’ was primarily understood in the narrow terms of either economic or security cooperation, ‘new regionalism’ has acquired a larger and more expansive interpretation of regional cooperation. In Naidu’s opinion, the EAS symbolizes the rise of Asia as the third and probably most important global pillar, providing the political impetus and commitment to an ongoing process. Despite scepticism about the EAS, it can potentially emerge as a game changer in many ways, including promotion of regionalism. As the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia is likely to be volatile in coming years, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is seen as a major player in providing regional security and stability in the broader Eurasian perspective. The organization has assumed enormous significance not only due to its membership of super powers, Russia and China, but also due to its geographical significance as it spreads over regions of the world. Bijaya Kumar Das analyses its influential role since its inception in 2001 with increasing number of countries aspiring for its membership. An emerging trend that can be deciphered in the domain of the SCO in recent years is the widening of the set of activities into the areas of trade and commerce, development of transport linkages and people to people contact. The organization as a platform to explore mechanisms to deal with security threat, trade potential and mutual advantage has been increasingly gaining momentum. The broadening of the membership will help in furtherance of the collective spirit of the organization, and make it one of the most powerful regional entities for providing peace, security, stability in the broader Eurasia region. Given an ‘expanded’ SCO and its control over large part of the world’s oil and gas reserves, growing economic power, and nuclear arsenal, experts in this area agree with the fact that SCO’s political, military and economic clout is on the rise, not only within the Eurasian space, but also as an international actor to be taken seriously. Purusottam Bhattacharya compares and assesses the evolution of regionalism in South Asia in the light of the widely recognized success of regionalism in Europe in the form of the European Union. In his three-part exposition, Bhattacharya traces the origin and progress of the ideas of regionalism and its institutional manifestations in Europe

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and the impetus and motivations that led the European states towards supranational arrangements. Despite challenges in the form of debtcrisis, terrorism or inflow of refugees and the difficulties in formulating common security and foreign policy response, the Union however remains the inspiring model for regional cooperation. In the same fashion, Bhattacharya explores the origin and development of regionalism in South Asia – where the story does not appear to be so encouraging – pointing out the constraints and hesitations innate in the process. However, even a failed SAARC serves some purpose and Bhattacharya concludes that while valuable insights can be obtained by SAARC from the EU experiences there is the need for the South Asian organization to develop its own model in accordance with its realities and compulsions. Shantanu Chakrabarti begins his chapter with two sets of conceptual distinctions: between regionalism and neo-regionalism on one hand, and regionalism and regionalization on the other. His chapter focuses on analysing the growth and progress of South Asian regionalization process in the context of the spread of neo-regionalism as a global phenomenon affecting the process of regional connectivity in Asia. Regionalization of Asia since the 1980s, he argues, has been marked by deepening of Intra-Asian levels of trade, so much so that they appeared, before the global recession of 2007-8, to be decoupling from the global economy and form an autonomous zone of economic dynamism. But while SAARC, the South Asian regional organization completed nearly 30 years of its existence, its objectives of enhancing regional cooperation to reduce intra-regional disparities and evolve a more cooperative development agenda remained far from accomplished. He warns that the bane of South Asian regionalization process was that it was overburdened with the function of promoting a confidencebuilding exercise in addition to facilitating regional economic cooperation which makes the challenges tougher. Partha Pratim Basu argues that the procedural and political constraints that from the very beginning afflicted SAARC appeared so insurmountable that a section of India’s foreign policy elites and political analysts felt that India should dump the organization altogether and engage with more robust organizations such as ASEAN,

INTRODUCTION

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an advocacy he seeks to assess. He begins by briefly tracing the evolution of India’s SAARC policy and contends that its early lukewarm attitude towards the organization gave way in the 1990s in the context of the end of the Cold War and the onset of economic globalization. This brought about a more intense cultivation of the neighbourhood not only from the economic standpoint, e.g. stepping up trade flow in the region, but also for political reasons, i.e. in view of its great power aspirations. In this backdrop, the efficacy of SAARC has been evaluated in terms of its contributions (or lack thereof ) towards transforming the security scenario of and facilitating economic cooperation in the region, keeping in view India’s foreign policy objectives. However, the author concludes that despite these findings, SAARC should not be abandoned by India at least for three reasons: regional meetings at various levels provided valuable occasions for informal contacts among heads of states away from the media glare with ‘safety valve’ implications; a degree of coalescence of interests visible among SAARC members around developmental concerns; and the global recession (of 2008-9) and its aftermath creating fresh possibilities for revitalization of the agenda of economic integration in South Asia. A. Subramanyam Raju in his paper contends that South Asia remains a region without regionalism since geographical continuity, its greatest asset from the standpoint of region-formation, has not yet been fully harnessed. Still South Asia is increasingly perceived as an important region by the rest of the world, a perception further reinforced by convergence of interests among SAARC members for regional cooperation, three of which – connectivity promotion, energy cooperation and combating climate change – have been highlighted by the author. First, he stresses the importance of improving infrastructural facilities, building soft borders, widening access to technology, developing maritime, air and road connectivity among others. All this, he argues, will contribute towards enhancing trade volumes and help the region to progress towards greater integration. In sum, it is imperative for the states of South Asia to come together to fight the non-traditional security threats which they cannot tackle individually and hence the author concludes with the suggestion of

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amendment of the SAARC Charter so as to allow discussion of bilateral problems in the regional forum which constitutes the most formidable roadblock to fashioning this vital unity. ASEAN’s impressive track record during more than four and a half decades of its existence is clearly evident from a perusal of its successes and achievements discussed in detail by Tridib Chakraborti. The author points out that in spite of the numerous problems and challenges, both internal and external, confronting the ASEAN, the regional organization has not only survived, but has developed into a principal force internationally and thereby established itself as a model of regional unity worth emulating. After highlighting ASEAN’s achievements, Chakraborti delves into the detail of the major challenges faced by the ASEAN. Although ASEAN has come a long way to strengthen its financial systems, vulnerabilities remain. But, as emphasized by Chakraborti, in most of the cases, realizing that the issues call for collective responses by the members, the ASEAN members have tried to collectively address the problems. Chakraborti concludes his study saying that the continuous stream of internal crises should be seen in a positive light for these can make ASEAN more experienced and refined. Sanjukta Bhattacharya points out that there is a drive towards regionalization in both the developed and developing world to face the new economic and political challenges of the present century. Analysing regionalism in West Asia from a historical, regional and geopolitical perspective, Bhattacharya, however, argues that the region appears to be moving in reverse gear, with growing incapacity and disequilibrium of existing regional organizations, which are among the oldest among modern regional organizations. According to her, there is also no attempt in the region at any kind of new regionalism or regionalization. As Bhagaban Behera argues, regional integration remains a hot topic of research on Central Asia, although the actual progress of regional integration remains at a very low level. Since 1990s there has been a proliferation of regional and sub-regional groupings in the Central Asia region. These newly-independent states are confronting complex threats including international terrorism, religious extremism, illegal drug trafficking, transnational criminal activity, border disputes

INTRODUCTION

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and disagreements over the management and use of water and energy resources. Security threats in Central Asia are transnational as well as national and the security of the region is both interdependent and interconnected. The incursions launched by militants into Kyrgyzstan (in 1999 and 2000) and Uzbekistan (in 2000) provoked a series of mutual recriminations among these states and sharply exposed their inability to devise a regional response to the crisis. Further, the relocation of Central Asia from the periphery to the centre of the United States’ zone of strategic interest since 2001 served to deepen extant fault-lines within the region. The basing of US troops in the region has served to entrench previously existing patterns of regional cooperation. This paper focuses on the issues behind the emergence of regional organizations and how far they have succeeded in fulfilling the aspirations of the states and to analyse the synthetic motivations behind the participation of great powers in various regional arrangements in the region. Lipi Ghosh in her paper emphasizes the importance of IndiaThailand relations in the context of sub-regional cooperation. She points out that the intensity of India-Thailand relations is an important phenomenon, especially in the context of India-ASEAN relations. The paper is broadly divided into two sections. In the first section, Ghosh points out that during the last few decades after the end of the Cold War, India’s Look East and Thailand’s Look West policies have led to closer bilateral ties and cooperation in all areas under regional and sub-regional cooperation frameworks. Ghosh highlights in detail the salience of connectivity. Evaluating the progress made so far towards achieving the goal of greater connectivity between India and Thailand, Ghosh points out the constraints and lacunae to emphasize that there is still a lot to be accomplished in the different fields of connectivity. Ghosh, however, points out that Indo-Thai cooperation is not free from hazards. She refers to challenges like rising disparity between two countries, inadequate or lack of parity in infrastructure, and the capacity constraints. The author nonetheless concludes the discussion on an optimistic note hoping that both India and Thailand will take steps to make improvements in the different areas of connectivity to deepen Indo-Thai cooperation, which in turn would lead to greater cooperation between India and ASEAN.

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Notwithstanding the focus on Asia, there is also a general treatment of the theoretical aspects and nuances of regionalism. One of the questions quite relevantly raised is whether regionalism should be plucked out of its economic moorings to also establish the importance of its politico-strategic dimensions. In addressing regionalism in Asia, the emphasis in this volume has been on not simply making estimates of progress made by the regional organizations in Asia in realizing the objectives that had brought them into being, but bringing under focus the problems that explain the yawning gap between what we hope for and the actual realities we are faced with. We would like to record our profound gratitude to all the contributors. Needless to say the authors alone are responsible for their views expressed in the articles. Special thanks are due to Professor Purusottam Bhattacharya, Professor Sumita Sen and Professor Shibashis Chatterjee, for giving us the necessary help and encouragement. This volume is a modest attempt at understanding the increasingly important but at the same time a complex issue, and we would deem our efforts rewarding if the volume is provocative enough to generate pertinent questions relating to the debate on Asian Regionalism.

CHAPTER 1

Regionalism and Security: Bridges Over Fault-lines ANINDYA JYOTI MAJUMDAR

like many other concepts in international relations, regionalism too can be understood from different angles and accordingly, the inferences, assumptions and subsequently the conclusive observations too would change. Regionalism is typically understood as a scale of significant coordination of policies of states within a definite geographical area for certain mutual benefits. It is a process through which states in close proximity within a geographical region form a framework of collective strength with the predominant purposes of ensuring security and promotion of economic interests. States are the primary units of international relations; hence, bilateral or multilateral options of coordination of policies are exercised to achieve goals when unilateral measures appear as inadequate. Within the framework of international cooperation towards a better world, regionalism aims to bring together the component states under one umbrella towards creating a better region in terms of development and security priorities. The supporters of regionalism argue that regional arrangements are natural outgrowth of international cooperation as global organizations are too big, diffused and ambitious and therefore largely ineffective to cater to the practical needs of the local issues of a region. Thus, regionalism operates between two extremes: the separateness of sovereign states on the one hand and the possibility of subordination to a centralized world government. Mutual benefit on the basis of the principle of functional cooperation is the leading motivation of regionalism. States are strictly autonomous in nature and too sensitive to yield decision-making to some other authority that might influence the fate of the state interests. On the

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other hand, mutual convenience pushes them to create mechanisms for coordinating their activities in order to protect better the same state interests. As a result a supranational structure comes into being to which the member state agrees to submit. No wonder, such supranational structures are marked with undercurrents of nationalism because the right compromise and a correct balance between state sovereignty and the jurisdiction of the higher authority is to be maintained at every step. The legitimacy of the regional organization depends on the scale of benefits accrued from the activities of the organization for its members. Very broadly, three types of regional organizations exist: viz. regional defence organizations, regional economic organizations and regional multi-functional organizations. There are primarily three ways through which regionalism might contribute to security: (1) as a spillover of functional cooperation, (2) as an instrument of collective self-defence, and (3) as a process through which a region negotiates with extra-regional environment. In general terms, the Functionalists argue that technological and economic development lead to the growth of specialized organizations that tend to cross national borders. States are almost forced to cooperate generating a political dynamic that activates the forces of integration. One can apply a supranational approach thereby focusing on politics above the level of states, or one can apply an intergovermentalist approach and thereby focusing on the politics between and within states. In the first case, regionalism can be understood as an integrative process occurring at the supranational level within a certain geographical area. In the second case, regionalism means development of institutionalized cooperation among states and other actors on the basis of regional contiguity. Either way, regionalism is viewed as a product of functionalism which prescribes network of agencies on sectors such as economic, technical, scientific, social and cultural having a spillover effect on issues political as close functional relations require intense political coordination. In fact, it is argued that change in attitude would result from cross-cutting ties and integrate the interests of nation states. In all such cases, we have a common underlying assumption in varying degrees, that apart from all kinds of non-political benefits, regionalism would produce greater stability in relations among neighbouring states having a significant

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impact on security considerations. In a way, regionalism paves the path for broad-based security. Security and peace emerge as a byproduct of regional cooperation or integration. A course of gradual advancement is generally suggested: functional cooperation leads to formation of a security community where intra-community wars are absent, such a community can strive for greater economic assimilation, and finally, political integration. The process however is not automatic or inevitable, the more one integrates, the more one loses the ability to shield itself from others and the troubles caused by the common policy of the organization or the failures to tackle issues of common concern leading to lop-sided impact upon the members, pave way for resurgent nationalism. There is another line that would essentially focus on security on the basis of collective self-defence and following the spirit of Article 51 of the UN Charter would establish the so-called ‘regional security arrangements’ and view this as a form of regionalism. These ‘regional collective defence systems are designed to deter a potential common threat to the region’s peace, one typically identified in advance’.1 In other words, this means formation of regional alliances to coordinate national security policies. Regional security by means of defence ties and alliances with major powers is oriented towards ‘having an organization that is structured to present a common military and diplomatic front against an outside factor. By maintaining the balance and distribution of power, security is thus assured’.2 This has been a feature of the Cold War period and has led the scholars to argue that ‘although the primary motive of several regional organizations after the Second World War was to achieve security guarantee for their members, after the Cold War in an altered international milieu such organizations have mainly focused on economic development of the region through meaningful cooperation among member states’.3 The essential motivation remains the same, viz., to build a framework of collective strength in close proximity with partner states. ‘The emphasis has shifted from pure and simple self-defence to what may be called conscious self-promotion.’4 In other words, the military-strategic interests initially gave birth to regional agencies but the focus shifted to economic growth, trade blocs came into existence and gradually, regional agencies aspired to

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become truly multi-functional. Regionalism today, as goes the observation, is more than mere territorial grouping of states for some limited purpose. In the process, however, the very idea of region is blurred and in its multi-functional ventures, security is neglected. A point that is repeatedly emphasized defines regionalism as a shared initiative where the identities of individual actors are faithfully retained. It does not mean homogenization and disappearance of the nation state or differences among them. Rather, regionalism is a strategy that smoothens up the sharp edges of conflicting states in a region. This may indicate attempts on part of states to understand security in multilateral terms without compromising the national interest. There is yet another way to ensure security through regionalism as exemplified by the ASEAN Regional Forum (or the ARF) that does not fall in any of these categories. Though regional in name, in fact, it goes beyond the region and seeks to negotiate with the external forces and the political environment in which the region is located. Here, a core tries to reach out to the outlying bounds and seeks to manage, nurture and construct possible forces of peace and stability rather than control, contest or resist the forces of possible threats. In this, it actually provides the third line of approach to regional security: securing the region by becoming extra-regional. How viable this line could be – is a matter of debate. To understand the emergence of distinct mechanisms in particular regions, scholars have also used the constructivist approach with its focus on ideational factors, including norms and ideas. Norms and principles might form the basis of formal mechanisms of conflict management5 derived from shared knowledge and state practices. In short, it means that the process of regionalism in different regions might not have a common line of advancement. CONSTRUCTION OF SECURITY REGIONS

In the contemporary world, regionalism – especially, in the era of globalization – finds a place of prominence. Some would criticize regionalism as an impediment for the growth of universalism and global government as regional organizations take issues out of the

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jurisdiction of the global organizations and emerge as alternative agencies. Regionalism can be regarded as standing somewhere between international anarchy and world government. The United Nations Charter recognizes the existence of regional agencies but imposes the pre-condition that such agencies and their activities should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN (Article 52) and in the event of conflict between the obligations of the members of the UN and their obligations under any other international agreement, the obligations under the UN shall prevail. It is understood that regional agencies are best suited to manage and resolve local disputes and the Charter of the UN has provided for a flexible framework in which the regional agencies and the UN can function in a harmonious pattern with the regional agencies being complimentary to the UN system of collective security. However, the post-Cold War new regionalism is the dynamic relationship between developments in different parts of the world. It is a response ‘in kind’ to match the efforts of economic integration elsewhere – a kind of domino effect – countries in a region seek to respond to the developments in other regions.6 But not all organizations are the same in terms of abilities or purposes: the degree of integration differs and not all regional organizations are similar in nature or origin. Any good text on regionalism would point out certain common conditions for the success of regional institutions that include not only geographical proximity but also a plethora of other conditions like similar political systems, supportive political opinion and leadership, cultural homogeneity, similar historical experience, compatible forms of governments and economic systems, perception of a common threat and also similar levels of military preparedness of the members. However, very often, the security threat emanates from the region itself; a bigger power’s relations with its smaller neighbours may induce the smaller states either to band together against the big power, or to bring an external power in the region to establish balance or to have direct bilateral interactions with the big power. In each of these cases, regionalism suffers. A region can be viewed as a container of diversities but it may often remain a very unstable container of explosive elements. In the post-Cold War period, small and medium powers look for

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more strategic autonomy in dealing with the local issues that have been either neglected or blown out of proportion during the Cold War period by the superpowers. However, not all local issues could be solved locally as the local organizations might not have necessary competence. Interference by the external power is sometimes essential, sometimes troublesome depending on the nature of the issue and the extent and manner of such interference. In general, as the understanding goes, during the Cold War period, regional security organizations were formed whereas in the post-Cold War period – in the era of globalization – regional economic organizations are being formed that in a roundabout way might ensure security. However, in context of security in its conventional sense, regionalism might not result in common advantage for all the states in a particular region. Security is not always attainable in multilateral terms and the ideal of cooperative security is difficult to achieve in an environment of mutual distrust. Moreover, alliance formation is not necessarily an expression of regionalism as it is generally made out to be. Locations are products of geography but regions are products of human perception. There are no distinct geopolitical regions apart from those that exist in the imagination of man. Construction of a security region that heavily depends on the principle of geographical contiguity is more often a matter of impulse of time than any specific criterion. Therefore, the rule of geographical proximity that constitutes a region may suddenly end at a man-made point, where a new region begins. Often these are post facto constructions that depend on the convenience of academic analysis or tactical/strategic considerations. These divisions among regions are essentially geo-political. South Asia can be accepted as a viable region for economic and other (mainly non-political) cooperation among the states, but if one considers the possibility of a nuclear weapons free zone here, it becomes important to include at least some parts of China, a nuclear weapons state that borders the South Asian region. Without China’s participation a lopsided arrangement would come in place. Naturally, one then talks of either ‘Southern Asia’ including some parts of China or of a ‘Strategic Triangle’ incorporating China, India and Pakistan. Indeed, construction of a region can very well be a part of motivated campaigning to justify

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certain policies or push forward particular goals. The tags attached to such regions bear a specific connotation and the imprint of the prevailing world order. Specific identities are imposed or acquired thereby. Therefore, in the same fashion, regions are made and unmade; the names of such regions bear a specific connotation and the prevailing world order. The terms like the Middle East, the Gulf, and the West Asian region attribute different identities to almost the same actors expanding or contracting a particular region based on the exigencies of situation or renewed focus on a particular stretch of land or sea at a particular point of time by the dominant powers of a particular epoch. A region can expand or contract depending on the exigencies of the situation and macro-regions (like the Indo-Pacific) or microregions (like the Af-Pak region) – all are constructed for security purposes with specific objectives in view. These are tailor-made regions, focusing on security requirements of a particular time. Regions are fragile as these regions are made or unmade over time. The European Union (EU) had been expanding for some time. Brexit proves that it may shrink as well. Moreover, for security considerations, a region is hardly insular, as actors external to the region must also be taken into calculations. A paradox has been observed in the sense that ‘with the loss of Cold War constraints, regions now have greater autonomy – while at the same time, levels of interpenetration and globalization indicate diminished possibilities of regional insulation’.7 Even though the region is somewhat geographically defined, the issues of security are not easy to handle. The EU can be cited as the epitome of regional integration with institutional structures transcending national borders. The EU has a council of ministers, drawn from cabinet ministers of member states, a European Commission to implement and oversee policies as implemented by the so-called ‘Eurocrats’, i.e. European bureaucracy, a European parliament, representatives directly elected by citizens of memberstates, and a Court of Justice. A common currency is used over a large part. EU plans to develop a European Rapid Action Force and intends to pursue common foreign and security policy. However, the issues of security, in its traditional sense are still major hurdles where national perspectives of major states may appear as the most dominant factors.

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While consensus may emerge in dealing with issues of immediate concerns within the region, fault-lines appear when member-states’ loyalty is demanded by extra-regional developments. The Old EuropeNew Europe division with regard to invasion of Iraq by the coalition of the willing is a case in point. Even within the region, regional sentiments may run well with success and stability, hardships may generate nationalist feelings. As it was pointed out long back, ‘The political will to allocate more resources to defence budgets is conspicuously absent and without such will Europe is unlikely to have a Common Foreign and Security Policy’.8 The applicability of the term region is a misfit where the maximum distance between the capitals of participating countries tends to interlink geographically distinct entities. These organizations are called macro-regional and these are mainly defence organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the smaller closeknit organizations – micro-regional entities – are purely economic in nature, like the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the like. It is to be noted however that organizations with the agenda of promotion of economic interests are no longer confined in geographical settings. For example, the club of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) cares little for geographical boundaries, rather finds cohesion of attributes and interests as a compelling factor for coming together in pursuit of global clout. Likewise, in terms of macro-region, the ARF stands supreme as it combines multiple security complexes. While the ASEAN has been exceedingly successful as an economic trade bloc, ethno-nationalist movements with trans-border ties and internal political instability have disturbed ASEAN’s security structure. However, the absence of regional wars coupled with economic benefits of cooperation has given ASEAN its identity which is better than the small power status of the individual members. ARF was essentially a response of the ASEAN-members to the post-Cold War shifts in security paradigm in the early 1990s as the possibility of a less pro-active role of the United States in the region and the rise of China to a scale of dominance appeared increasingly real. In order to apply the same ASEAN-style dialogue and consensus-building to an even wider zone

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that spreads much beyond Southeast Asia, while sustaining the Southeast Asian region at its core, the ARF sought to provide a platform for avoiding conflict through consultation and dialogue. In this, the ASEAN states rejected the idea of establishing a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) on the lines of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and sought to expand the ASEAN framework of Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) for political and security dialogue with nonASEAN countries in the region. Its members therefore include all actors who might have a direct impact upon the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The ASEAN remains the repository of all ARF documents and provides the necessary support to sustain ARF activities. ARF is thus an extension of ASEAN and not a separate security establishment. Is regional security possible, especially when the region inflates itself into a nebulous entity? Security, understood in multilateral terms, is often quite difficult to achieve as the elements of diversity increase. Regionalism is best served within a defined and relatively smaller perimeter where intensity of cohesion among the members depends on the identification of common external threats. The ASEAN members attach much credence to the 1976 Treaty objectives that include inter alia respect for independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of member-states; peaceful settlement of disputes; noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; and the right to live without external interference. If an ASEAN Regional Community is formed thereby, the ARF, with members from beyond Southeast Asia, is then hardly an effective and meaningful operational support. MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Any response to a conflict, especially in an era of uncertainties, would follow different patterns of conflict-prevention, conflict management, conflict reduction and finally, conflict resolution. For the ARF, a comprehensive security approach (including non-traditional security issues) is the preferred option, arranged on the basis of political and security cooperation, confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and constructive engagement towards promoting stability

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in the region. Apparently a platform for creating suitable environment for mediation and conciliation especially among the major actors, the ARF is a unique arrangement aimed at responding to possible conflicts without resorting to force through peace-making and peacebuilding. But during all these years, promotion of confidence-building remains the priority; it is yet to embark on the stage of preventive diplomacy, sometimes claimed as overlapping with the former. The ARF integrates the Southeast Asian region into the big canvas and merges multiple security complexes into one. It is however a tall task when a formless perceived region is sought to be stabilized by a formless institution that seeks to quell the challenges of uncertainties with tools of unpredictable variety. It is a novel attempt but the efficacy of the ARF-approach and the relevance of such an institution in enhancing regional security are debatable as the general understanding of the non-ASEAN members is that the nucleus of ARF is ASEAN and therefore the ASEAN countries should not involve themselves in other security complexes. In terms of multilateralism, there is already a competition from the East Asia Summit framework – yet another forum for strategic dialogue and cooperation. Indeed, there can hardly be a distinct security region though a security community is notionally possible. The geographical area inhabited by the security community may be termed as a security region. The region exists as long as the community exists and expands or shrinks following the changes in the formation of that community transcending geographical regions. Expansion of NATO after the end of the Cold War explains this phenomenon. There are no fixed geographical regions that by itself can contribute to regional security through mere proximity and common borders. A multi-functional agency like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has utterly failed to generate a sense of security in South Asia. Within a certain geographical area, alliance cohesion depends on the intensity of external threat and as the threat dissipates, the regional cohesion too either vanishes or gets distorted. The best example is NATO which has been branded as a regional security organization. With the end of Cold War and the demise of the Soviet threat and subsequent expansion of the NATO, the very idea of the erstwhile

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region has changed which gives the impression that alliance formation is a process distinct from regionalism and would depend on the perceived nature of threat in a system by a group of balancing actors rather than on a regional initiative/considerations. NATO perhaps is a better option for the Western nations now, than the United Nations, for maintaining international peace and security in a manner suitable to their preferences.9 While attempts are often made to pass alliances as regional organizations, but not all security alliances are regional in a true sense. While an alliance like ANZUS has also been branded as a regional security organization, the power that binds the treaty members is the United States, which comes in only as the region expands to the extent of extra-regional limits. Other alliance organizations like the SEATO or CENTO were formed as instruments of the US containment policy against the then Soviet Union. With members from Europe and Asia, hardly these two alliances were regional in nature. It is equally incomprehensible as to how the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with members from Africa, Asia and Europe could be regional organizations and how the region is constituted in such cases. These are essentially pressure groups with common area(s) of concern where geographical contiguity is immaterial. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, regional blocs tend to move beyond the region. NATO advocates out of area operations; the ARF shows the way of ‘peaceful’ out of area operations. Less focus on institutionalism – an ASEAN feature – is another form of establishing a ‘coalition of the willing’ (not for military measures but essentially pacific) though the group may be made of uneasy coalition partners. China’s growing assertiveness has brought together states from different corners to institute a common platform. The quad of the US, Japan, Australia and India in the Indo-Pacific presupposes a trans-regional venture where international politics enters into a post-regionalism phase. Security considerations vary among states and contrary to the usual understanding that coordination of policies among the constituting members of a region would result in absolute gains for all in terms of security; often regionalism is an anti-hegemonic strategy to control and restrain states that are relatively powerful within a regional set

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up. SAARC may be viewed as one such arrangement where regionalism is an instrument to negotiate with the big power in South Asia by the smaller neighbours collectively. A regional approach to security issues is generated by different motivations in the behavioural patterns of the states; a simple explanation in terms of coordination of policies to achieve the goals of security from intra-regional conflicts and external threats might not be adequate to understand the complexities of regional security. Regionalism on the basis of security considerations is perhaps best reflected in the campaigns for constituting nuclear weapons free zones that has a direct bearing upon the survival of states within a particular geographical area because of activities of extra-regional actors. Here too, security depends not only on the intention of the participating states to abjure nuclear ambitions but more on the security guarantee provided by the de jure nuclear weapons states against nuclear attack or blackmail to the members of such zones. However, there is a limit to establish nuclear weapons free zones as Latin America and the Caribbean, South Pacific Region, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Africa have already been declared (along with the Antarctic region, outer space and seabed) nuclear weapons free zones. Areas that have been left out like Europe (the United Kingdom and France), North America (the United States), East Asia (China and possibly, North Korea), South Asia (India and Pakistan) and the Middle East (Israel and possibly, Iran) have nuclear weapons states. Guided regionalism can provide platforms for greater bilateral/ multilateral interactions among states that seek to establish channels for building cooperation in response to an evolving but uncertain security environment. Bereft of security cooperation as a primary focus, such agencies look for other ways of cooperation to establish and nurture bonds of cooperation. As such, these agencies, like the Mekong-Ganga cooperation initiative involving India, Thailand and the states of Indo-China region, lack the impetus of regionalism and remain platforms for diplomatic communication through limited functional collaboration. In the post-Cold War era, absence of superpower domination gives prominence to local and regional security issues. Apparently, this signifies a greater degree of security autonomy enjoyed by regions

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since the end of the Cold War and a role of regions in constituting new forms of identity. However, without sanguinity in terms of a region – a regional identity remains elusive in Asia. Under the security studies now, different geographical regions of the world are characterized with particular dynamics unique to the region; various regional security complexes are outlined; and regional security itself becomes a point of discussion; but what is to be seen that in most cases, local/regional initiatives are absent paving way for external interference in these areas and simultaneously redesigning the regions marked by close links with external actors. Most of these assign a role to the United States or prescribes how the US should shape its policies towards these regions and ‘peaceful rise of China’ has added other dimensions to the security scenarios. BRIDGES OVER THE FAULTLINES

Within the regions, it seems that the bridges of economic gains are frequently made but security fault-lines run deep within regions. Diversity in security structure and levels of military development lead these states to concentrate on economic cooperation with emphasis on trade and investment thereby building bridges, but foreign policy cooperation is limited to participation in multilateral trade negotiations where security fault-lines run deep. The OAU (before turning into AU in 2002) catered to political tasks of decolonization, anti-apartheid and protection from civil wars, trying to promote peace and stability. AU now focuses more on economic issues but its ‘Peace and Security Council’ has the objective to ‘promote peace, security and stability in the continent’. Regionalism (in a geographical sense) for security is a matter of convenient region construction and in essence, an exercise in geopolitical image-engineering. As a result, it might prove to be temporary and fragile. All such arrangements conceal a struggle between conflicting forces of nationalism and supra-nationalism and as nature of security threat changes over time, adjustments become necessary at frequent intervals. Overlapping membership has its disadvantage. Competition among the organizations with not-so-similar objectives prevents formation

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of any common policy on security considerations. As a result, EU defence policies might come under severe strain if NATO policies aim at out of area operations. Here too, for integration purposes, EU suffices as region, but when security is concerned, the region expands to include the non-European NATO members. And therefore, it appears that security cannot really be a relevant impetus for regionalism. Differences run deep and bridges are sought to be made over faultlines. While the bridges are visible and give an impression of safety, threats from the invisible fault-lines remain. Regional organizations see their security interests vitally affected by armed conflicts within countries in their area or adjacent to it. The problem is, regions are integrated into a global scheme and viewed as theatres by global powers. In such a case, one is reminded of the observation made by Michael Leifer that ‘…the prerequisite for a successful ARF may well be the prior existence of a stable balance of power’.10 The observation, albeit made in the context of the ASEAN, can be applied generally in the context of regionalism and security. The world is marked by the presence of unhappy families of states and – paraphrasing Leo Tolstoy – each unhappy in its own way. Each group is trying to find solutions in its own way. Regionalism has been a handy tool some of the times. However, as the present trends indicate, if the changing situation so demands, states may become trans-regional in the post-regionalism phase of international relations in search of security. NOTES 1. Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkoph, World Politics: Trends and Transformation, Belmont: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2004, p. 595. 2. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p. 28. 3. Aneek Chatterjee, International Relations Today, Delhi: Pearson, 2010, p. 166. 4. Radharaman Chakraborty, ‘Globalization and New Regionalism’, in Anindyo J. Majumdar and Shibashis Chatterjee (eds.), Understanding Global Politics: Issues and Trends, New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2004, p. 167. 5. Callabero-Anthony, n. 2, p. 42. 6. Thomas Christiansen, ‘European Integration and Regional Cooperation’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 594.

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7. Ian Clark, ‘Globalization and the Post-Cold War Order’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 734. 8. Purusottam Bhattacharya, ‘Globalization and New Regionalism: The EU Experience’, in Anindyo J. Majumdar and Shibashis Chatterjee (eds.), Understanding Global Politics: Issues and Trends, New Delhi: Lancer’s Books, 2004, p. 185. 9. See Anindyo J. Majumdar, ‘The Evolution of NATO’, World Focus, New Delhi, no. 231, March 1999, pp. 15-17. 10 . Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model for Regional Security, Adelphi Paper 302, OUP/IISS, 1996, pp. 57-8.

CHAPTER 2

Regionalism in Asia-Pacific: Role of APT and EAS G. V. C. N A I D U

INTRODUCTION

the asia-pacific region is witnessing an unprecedented interest in regionalism and as a result there is proliferation of a variety of multilateral mechanisms to promote regional cooperation both in the security and economic fields. This can be attributed principally to two reasons. First, the concept of regionalism itself is witnessing a metamorphosis. Traditionally it was viewed in a narrow perspective of economic cooperation confined to a distinct geographic region. Since regional cooperation was most successful in West Europe, thanks in part to various institutional frameworks from its earliest avatar the 1950 European Coal and Steel Community to the present European Union, the tendency in other parts of the world has been to emulate the European example to the extent possible and to reap the benefits of cooperation at the regional level. Second, and more importantly, at a time when the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is teetering, regional trading arrangements (RTA) are not merely rapidly multiplying but are emerging as major drivers of global trade as well. The RTAs (both bilateral and multilateral free trading agreements) are increasingly seen as principal promoters of trade, investment, liberalization and the attendant aspects of economic cooperation. The fact that nearly two-thirds of the RTAs have come into existence in the past decade alone is a testimony to their key role and growing significance in world trade. Insofar as the East Asian region1 is concerned, more than a hundred RTA/FTAs have been entered into already and innumerable more are

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being negotiated. Except North Korea, every country in the region – from India to South Korea and from Australia to Myanmar – has signed more than one. These, in fact, are not simply attempts to promote trade, but are far more wide-reaching and hence are called comprehensive framework agreements. As a result, these have become very attractive for the countries in the region. The most prominent are those led by ASEAN with China, India, Japan, South Korea, etc., besides numerous bilateral ones (the most recent being the ChinaSouth Korea free trade agreement that became operational in December 2015). The newly agreed upon Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), involving the ten ASEAN nations, China, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand (ASEAN+10), which began talks in earnest by launching the first round of talks in May 2013, will be a mega RTA if talks conclude within the ambitious target of the end of 2017 (which appears unlikely). If realized, it would usher in one of the world’s largest free trading regions encompassing the entire East Asian region consisting of nearly half of the global population and some of the most dynamic and largest economies of the world. A pan-East Asian FTA will have considerable implications not only for the region but for the rest of the world as well. It will catapult the region into a commanding position in global economic affairs. Despite some scepticism, which is not entirely warranted especially in view of China’s dominant position in manufacturing, all see major advantages in the creation of a mammoth market. The first test of whether such a mega market can be achieved would be the successful realization of the ASEAN Economic Community, which has been launched in 2015, which seems to be proceeding apace although the EU style of integration in many ways is an unlikely proposition, given the region’s complex security environment, persistent historical vestiges, uneven economic development and so on. Not to be left out of the East Asian action, the US has pushed for a very ambitious Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade arrangement, which includes select countries on both sides of the Pacific,2 and was intended to go beyond WTO targets in what is dubbed as twenty-first century trade agreement by bringing under its ambit a variety of issues from labour standards to environmental issues and from drastic

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reductions in barriers for trade to government procurements. Many other countries that were not members showed a lot of interest in joining the TPP; even Chinese seemed to be debating whether or not to join. After hard and intense negotiations held in utmost secrecy spread over seven years, a deal was worked out and signed in February 2016. The US, which spearheaded the TPP claimed that the agreement aimed to ‘promote economic growth; support the creation and retention of jobs; enhance innovation, productivity and competitiveness; raise living standards; reduce poverty in the signatories’ countries; and promote transparency, good governance, and enhanced labor and environmental protections’.3 However, President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the TPP came like a bolt from the blue. Since the US had been the biggest backer and being the largest and most powerful economy in the world, its withdrawal left the TPP rudderless. While the TPP was being negotiated, RCEP came under pressure to match up to TPP’s standards, if not more. Although attempts are on to revive the TPP minus the US, most agree that it will not be the same and if at all something is worked it, it would be a watered down version. Consequently, the focus has reverted back to the RCEP, the original mega, region-wide FTA, while simultaneously talks on several others deals are also going on. One can also discern two broad trends in this context: one, the RTAs, besides promoting trade, are becoming stepping stones for greater economic cooperation and even integration among the participating countries, and two, the RTAs, in contrast to the past, are constituting a link between the developing and developed countries. Whether one likes it or not, the name of the global economic game now is regionalism and regional multilateralism. Indeed, many of these initiatives are increasingly looked at in a broader perspective both as instruments to promote economic cooperation and to address political-security issues and even as attempts to build regional communities. Although regionalism and regional multilateralism is relatively a post-Cold War phenomenon, many countries see them as the best means to promote regional cooperation in a region otherwise extremely complex with enormous diversity bedevilled with innumerable security and political problems such as East Asia. True, the Association of

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Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, is an exception. ASEAN was born out of Cold War political compulsions, yet it should be credited for fashioning a unique approach that included in its agenda the politico-security issues along with economic. For long ASEAN’s focus had remained on Southeast Asia for obvious reasons, however the rise of China in particular and rapidly growing interface with Northeast Asia and with India to a lesser extent compelled it to look beyond its geographical ambit. This set in motion a new dynamic by way of creating frameworks covering larger Asia-Pacific. Notwithstanding the fact that the earliest in this category to come into being was the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) formed in 1989, for a variety of reasons it failed to live up to its huge (and unrealistic) expectations as an instrument not just for regional cooperation but for a more ambitious goal of integration too. Open regionalism and voluntary initiatives to lower restrictions on trade and investments turned out to be APEC’s undoing. The 1997-8 financial crisis that badly hit several countries in East Asia necessitated an urgent need to find ways to ensure non-recurrence of such economic catastrophes. This once again set off another round of creating new regional multilateral institutions – since APEC was useless in dealing with the crisis – resulting in first the launch of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and later the East Asia Summit (EAS) in the domain of economics. Both of these have emerged as nascent but serious attempts to promote regionalism although their roles still remain low key and much of economic vibrancy and rapidly expanding intra-regional economic bonds seem to be primarily market propelled. In the following, the paper tries first to explain what constitutes regionalism, then looks at the genesis and growth of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, probe in detail the APT and EAS initiatives, and finally end with some broad inferences. REGIONALISM

In order to understand regionalism in a perspective, one needs to keep in mind the basic fact that regions are primarily subjective creations and are imaginary, which could be either socially or politically constructed, or as the present trends suggest economic considerations

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play are beginning to play a pivotal role. The geographic proximity along with certain shared common traits was considered prerequisites in order for regional multilateral institutions to be created and for regionalism to succeed. However, it was not the case always (for instance, at the time of its formation ASEAN considered offering membership to Sri Lanka, which neither geographically belonged to Southeast Asia nor shared any commonality with the region). However, now that criterion hardly matters anyway. The launch of the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), which plans to bring countries from such vast and diverse regions such as the US, Chile and Peru in the American continent to Vietnam, Malaysia and Japan in Asia along with others is a good example of how the new regionalism is undergoing a metamorphosis. Thus, regionalism as a phenomenon basically confined to a geographically contiguous region is fallacious in the age of highlydeveloped communication and transport links and in the wake of inexorable globalization. Thus, the process of delineation and construction of spatial regions is a dynamic one and can undergo changes so long as they are underpinned by certain common traits and objectives. It could be a network of political and defence bonds, geographical proximity, economic interdependence or shared political attitudes and behaviour, or even cultural and social homogeneity.4 While there are widely varied viewpoints about what regionalism is, the ‘tendency of a region and its constituents to preserve and expand the benefits of regional interactions by developing institutions and mechanisms of various kinds that set, monitor and enforce the standards of interaction’5 broadly captures its meaning and contours. Of course, it has undergone a remarkable change in both its meaning and scope ever since it came into prominence in Western Europe after the Second World War with the creation of security-related regional organizations, such as NATO, and economic cooperation attempts in the 1950s and afterwards. The main objectives of these organizations (and many others that came into being afterwards) were either trade or security. However, conceptually the regionalism idea began to undergo a radical change with ASEAN, inter alia, gaining prominence, which gradually broadened its scope considerably. It certainly was not due to conscious efforts and a well-thought plan, but circumstances

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impelled the Association to chart a unique course. Created ostensibly for economic reasons, ASEAN was, however, as noted a product of the Cold War and for a long time economic cooperation remained its biggest shortcoming for a variety of reasons, even while it gained considerable diplomatic clout and hence looked beyond economics. Starting from the launch of APEC in 1989 and soon aided by the end of the Cold War, the Asia-Pacific/East Asian region saw a proliferation of regional multilateral mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for security purposes, the APT, the EAS and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC – an inter-sub-regional mechanism with membership drawn from South and Southeast Asia), etc. All these professed an assortment of ambitious objectives to be achieved in both the economic and politico-security spheres. Moreover, most of them are no longer seen as instruments merely for economic cooperation but having a larger goal of regional integration and eventually help create regional communities. This is what is known as the ‘new regionalism’. It marks ‘openness, outward looking, economic orientation, linkage with nationalism, transnationalism’.6 In other words, in contrast to ‘old regionalism’, which was primarily understood in the narrow terms of either economic or security cooperation, the new regionalism, which arose in an increasingly multipolar context and is induced from within a specific region rather than imposed from without, has acquired a larger and more expansive interpretation of regional cooperation. As a result, regionalism is acquiring a broader definition and hence becoming complex. It is now as much political and security-driven as it is economic. The concept of regionalism consequently is increasingly seen as a multi-dimensional approach to promote regional cooperation. It is clear that the idea of regionalism, apart from fundamental shifts in conceptual terms, is also beginning to play a vital role in the promotion of regional cooperation economically and politically as well as in addressing and alleviating certain security concerns. Indeed, if one takes a closer look at the way regional organizations are evolving across the world and especially in the Asia-Pacific, they are constantly expanding their agenda to include a wide range of activities. Nonetheless, in order for regionalism to succeed, a sense of identity,

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belongingness, and certain shared interests and common goals are essential, which will not be possible unless strongly backed by political will. The other concept, ‘Open Regionalism’, has been adopted as the guiding principle by APEC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Two of its main components are trade facilitation and nondiscrimination vis-à-vis outsiders or non-member states. As a result, regionalism as a concept is increasingly seen as a multi-dimensional approach to promote regional cooperation. REGIONALISM IN ASIAPACIFIC

The way regionalism is understood now is primarily a post-Cold War phenomenon in the Asia-Pacific. It began in 1989 when the Japanese came up with the idea of creating a regional multilateral framework in Asia against the backdrop of West Europe creating a common market and the American attempt for a North American free trade zone. Tokyo, being the second largest economy then and heavily dependent on the above markets, was concerned that its exports to these markets might face protective barriers. Hence, it sought to consolidate its position in Asia by creating an Asian version of RTA. Then Prime Minister Bob Hawke of Australia convened the first APEC Ministerial Meeting comprising most countries of the Pacific Rim in Canberra to take advantage of buoyant economic conditions which could be appropriately channelized to promote growth as well as for greater cooperation. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia, in part driven by the same set of reasons as Japan and partly prompted by political motivations, came up in 1990 with the idea of East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG). However, unlike APEC, Mahathir’s EAEG comprised only the Northeast and Southeast Asian regions. He was spurred first by the emergence of East Asia as an economically dynamic region; second, China’s emergence offering huge economic opportunities; and finally, Japan’s key economic role by way of investments, technology transfers, and the creation of regional production networks. By then it was pretty clear that Japan had played a key role in the economic rise of East Asia.7 For two reasons, among others, Mahathir’s proposal – despite Mahathir reformulating the

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‘Grouping’ to a more benign East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) – failed to generate much enthusiasm although the Japanese private sector welcomed it. First, fearing the creation of a ‘yen-bloc’ and possibly restricted access to a large and expanding market as Asia, Washington not only opposed it vehemently but even pressured Japan and South Korea not to join it. China notably too was wary of Japan’s likely lead role if EAEG were to materialize but was then not strong enough to state its reservations openly. Second, a few Southeast Asian countries too were concerned that the proposed grouping might lead to an economic standoff with the West on whose markets they were critically dependent for their exports. Yet, no question that the above initiatives, in fact, were also the beginnings of looking at promoting regionalism with a long-term goal of greater economic integration prompted by several encouraging signs that brightened the prospects in the region. Aside from huge foreign exchange reserves that these countries had been accumulating, there were marked shifts in consumption patterns with the steady rise in purchasing power and as a result markets within the region began to witness rapid expansion. The political expediency driven by post-Cold War uncertainties – most prominently the rise of new power centres and their growing assertiveness and drastic military builddown by the US – played a key part in revisiting the role of regionalism and regional multilateral institutions once again. It was premised on the belief that economic interdependence would ameliorate political tensions, if any, and webs of overlapping regional institutions would enhance confidence and transparency. Furthermore, ASEAN had its own vested interest to remain at the centre of much of regional activity. That was the reason why, despite considerable initial reticence, ASEAN quickly jumped on the bandwagon of regional multilateralism, for that was the best way it could continue to be able to play a key role in regional affairs. Thus, despite a lack of history of operating under regional multilateral institutions, regionalism began to gain momentum. When left with no choice, notwithstanding initial reservations, China saw an opportunity to engage the rest of the region to advance its interests through these mechanisms (which subsequently proved to be very successful). Desperately looking for ways to enhance its politico-

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security role in East Asia, Japan too saw an opening to do that through multilateralism. The US, however, had reservations about security multilateralism fearing that it might undermine its strategy of forward deployment and bilateral alliances. Hence, it wanted regional cooperation to fructify under the APEC banner wherein it was a dominant member rather than what Mahathir had advocated. On the other hand, India hardly figured in the discourse on East Asian multilateralism early on, for it was economically inconsequential and politically marginal notwithstanding the market reforms and the launch of the Look East policy in the early 1990s. Prolonged and sustained economic vibrancy led not merely by the rise of China but virtually the entire region resulted in a noticeable shift in terms of rapidly growing stakes within the region than without. For instance, China’s emergence as the largest trading partner for most countries (prominently Japan and South Korea, America’s closest and major trading partners for nearly five decades) and expanding markets offering more investment opportunities for capital surplus countries such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc., are testimony. The 1992 ASEAN’s FTA proposal was one of the first, which was followed by a flurry of such proposals both at the bilateral as well as multilateral levels later on. The sea change in trading patterns is too apparent to be ignored: intra-East Asian trade increased to 54 per cent by 2010 from 35 per cent in 1980. It certainly was more than intra-North American trade and only slightly less than the EU. Similarly, intra-regional FDI flows were even starker – increasing to 80 per cent in 2005 from around 16 in 1991. According to the Asian Development Bank, ‘Asia continues to be the world’s top destination for foreign direct investment, attracting $527 billion in 2015, up 9 per cent over 2014. Global foreign direct investment (FDI) increased to a record $1.8 trillion in 2015, with nearly 30 per cent going to the region. Outward FDI from Asia and the Pacific declined to $418 billion, down 9.4 per cent from 2014. Intraregional FDI (from and to Asia and the Pacific) has increased over time (about 52.6 per cent of total FDI inflows to the region in 2015). East Asia received 60 per cent of total intraregional inflows in 2015, with Southeast Asia attracting 24 per cent. FDI in Asia is driven predominantly by export-oriented multinationals investing in

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manufacturing.’8 It meant a perceptible decrease in dependency on extra-regional markets by the East Asian countries. Although a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, to an extent the process was also driven by political considerations. Against the above backdrop, two major attempts towards regionalism are briefly discussed below. ASEAN PLUS THREE APT

APT was conceived as a response to the European Union’s proposal for a dialogue with Asia. The APT mechanism was created for the sake of convenience and in order for the East Asian countries to arrive at a common stance to deal with the EU at the initiative of ASEAN which asked Japan, China and South Korea to participate. The end result was the launch of Asia-Europe Meeting or ASEM in 1996. However, before the second ASEM summit scheduled for 1998 took place, Southeast Asia was hit by the financial crisis in 1997, which snowballed into a major economic, political and social crisis affecting most parts of Southeast Asia. Since in a way the 1994 devaluation of Chinese currency contributed to the crisis and fears that further devaluation would further cripple the economies, and since Japan had the capability to bail out badly battered economies, it became imperative to closely work with these countries to find ways to withstand the crisis. By then it had become obvious that despite its grandiose plans, APEC had failed to make notable strides in economic cooperation and in any case it was utterly helpless to deal with the crisis. Thus, an urgent need to create a mechanism to tackle future likely crises was strongly felt. That is when the utility of the APT as a mechanism to face any financial/economic crises was discovered. The APT process was institutionalized in 1999 when the leaders issued a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation at their Third APT Summit in Manila. Even though the chief intent was to ensure that financial crises do not recur, they also expressed their resolve in ‘further strengthening and deepening East Asia cooperation at various levels and in various areas, particularly in economic, social, political, and other issues of common concern’. For the first time, thus, one can see signs of East Asian regionalism taking concrete shape. During the Second APT Summit in Hanoi in 1998, Korea’s

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President Kim Dae-jung proposed the establishment of an East Asia Vision Group of eminent persons to present a mid- to long-term vision for regional cooperation. In the process, two ideas came up, viz., (1) development of institutional links between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and (2) the setting up of a working group to study the merits of an East Asian free trade and investment area. To study the report of the Vision Group, entitled Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity, an East Asia Study Group (EASG) was established consisting of the ASEAN Secretary General and senior officials of the APT member states in 2001. One of the recommendations of the EASG was the establishment of an EAS. Besides a set of recommendations for greater cooperation, the Study Group mooted the East Asian ‘community’ idea for the first time.9 A notable proposal under the APT has been the Chiang Mai Initiative taken in 2000. Its primary objective was to pool foreign exchange reserves to face the 1997-type financial crises. Under this the member states could dip into these reserves to tide over a foreign exchange problem. This would also ensure that crisis is nipped in the bud so that it does not spread to other countries. By 2010 nearly US $120 billion had been pledged by the member states of APT. This is the most visible and significant contribution of the APT so far. Apart from representing the first tangible sign of regionalism in East Asia, the APT helped ASEAN to retrieve its status and prestige which were badly battered by the 1997 crisis with the reaffirmation that ASEAN would remain the driving force to achieve the long-term goal of an East Asian community. At the same time, the APT also recognized mutually reinforcing and complementary roles of the APT process and other regional fora such as the proposed EAS and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to promote East Asian community building. In 2010 a decision to establish the East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) II was taken. Over the years cooperation under the APT has broadened and deepened with a wide array of issues covering political-security, finance and economic and social and cultural under its rubric such as food and energy security, financial cooperation, trade facilitation, disaster management, people-to-people contacts, narrowing the development gap, rural development and poverty alleviation, human trafficking,

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labour movement, communicable diseases, environment and sustainable development, and transnational crime, including counterterrorism. There are some 65 mechanisms (1 summit, 17 ministerial, 23 Senior Officials, 1 Directors-General, 17 technical level meetings and 6 other track meetings) coordinating APT cooperation. An EAVG II was established in 2010 to ‘stock-take, review and identify the future direction of APT cooperation’.10 EAST ASIAN SUMMIT

The two important reports – one by the EAVG, set up as a Track II group in 1999, and the 2000 EASG – created the basis for providing a framework for cooperation in East Asia. The EASG report, besides providing a long list of short-, medium- and long-term measures to be undertaken, also recommended the ‘evolution of the annual summit meetings of APT into the EAS’. Interestingly, the Report stated: ‘The EASG has come to the conclusion that, as a long-term desirable objective of the ASEAN+3, EAS will serve to strengthen East Asian cooperation.’ Further, the EASG asserted that the ‘ASEAN+3 framework remains the only credible and realistic vehicle to advance the form and substance of regional cooperation in East Asia.’ And, it stressed that ‘the EAS should be part of an evolutionary and stepby-step process’.11 The question is why the EASG recommended an EAS at a time when the APT was still evolving and yet to take substantial decisions. A political explanation rather than an economic logic may be in order here. By the early 2000s two major developments were conspicuous. One, Japan and a few ASEAN countries were beginning to be seriously concerned about China’s inexorable rise both as an economic as well as military power along with growing assertiveness. Two, less prominent but significant was the rapidly increasing bonhomie between Japan and India. This came out quite glaringly when Japan and China clashed over the question of inclusion of India in the proposed first summit meeting of the EAS. Eventually the Japanese view prevailed with the ASEAN heavyweights such as Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore supporting the decision to extend the invitation to India to be one of the founding members of the EAS. It was no doubt done

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with two motives: to balance China, and to underscore India’s role in regional security and its potential to add to the overall East Asian weight. Probably in order to allay any concern Washington might have harboured that EAS was an attempt to keep it out from regional cooperation, Australia and New Zealand too were included. Malaysia, which had all along been in the forefront since the late 1980s in promoting the idea of building an East Asia identity and forge stronger links within the region, offered to host the inaugural meet of the EAS in late 2005 with 16 countries (ASEAN plus three plus three) participating. The import of the EAS lies in the fact that it symbolizes the rise of Asia as the third and probably most important global pillar. It is a different question to what extent it has achieved the goals it set for itself given the region’s extreme complexity. The EAS, nonetheless, provides the political impetus and commitment to a process that is already on, i.e. the East Asian countries are interacting economically with each other more than with other regions like never before. This is happening devoid of an overarching, regionwide organization guiding it but almost entirely driven by market conditions. Theoretically, strong political support through an institutionalized structure will boost this process and may even result in regional integration. Such integration will address two issues. One, greater interdependence will act as a big incentive for countries to become militarily less aggressive, and two, many of the existing security problems will not flare up into conflicts because of certain common, critical stakes. The 2005 EAS Declaration was too general and wide-ranging encompassing political and security cooperation, infrastructure development, financial issues, poverty eradication, fight against epidemics, etc. Surprisingly, only a passing reference was made to economic integration. A few things nonetheless became clearer after the first summit. One, the EAS would be an annual affair; two, it would be firmly under ASEAN’s control, which certainly dashed Chinese hopes of hosting the subsequent meeting; three, the simultaneous continuation of the APT process and underscoring its role as the principal driver of regional economic cooperation made Indians and Japanese unhappy who probably had hoped that the EAS would replace the APT; and finally ASEAN’s assertion that EAS would

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remain open and outward looking with the Association as ‘driving force’ thus keeping the door open for the US. By the time the first EAS meeting was held, it was quite clear that ASEAN was trying to balance interests of various major powers but at the same time ensuring that its own role and importance were in no way undermined. The EAS, which otherwise hardly had any achievements to its credit, unexpectedly came under a lot of focus when the US expressed interest to join in 2010. American decision, of course, has to do with its reassessment of robust involvement in East Asian affairs, especially through active participation in regional multilateralism. Russia, which had been an observer since 2005, always sought to participate as a full-fledged member. With the inclusion of the US and Russia, the EAS now comprises 18 countries – ASEAN Plus Eight. Perhaps today the EAS has become politically more significant than its tangible contribution to economic cooperation. Yet, certain question marks remain: what happens to many other existing mechanisms purportedly to deal with economic and security issues and what is EAS’ relationship with these going to be? In their characteristic style, ASEAN scholars argue that the EAS will complement, not supplant, APEC, A+3, the ARF, etc., and that it is another spoke in the wheel to build confidence and to construct institutions. Probably the biggest challenge is going to be ASEAN’s ability to manage inter-great power relations, which are the key element of East Asian regional economic and security architecture. If current signs are any indication, they may signal the emergence of the EAS as a major platform for political issues. CONCLUSION

Regionalism in Asia Pacific is relatively a post-Cold War phenomenon and hence it is no way near the EU in its accomplishments. It is also fraught with many problems despite phenomenal shifts in economic relations. At a time when the Asia Pacific is witness to profound shifts in regional order, especially in the wake of rise of new power centres and the region rapidly moving towards multipolarity, ASEAN is trying to balance interests of various major powers without undermining its own role and importance. Invariably there will be tensions among

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countries as to what role the APT and EAS would have to play depending on which one advances the interests of which country. Whereas China wants the APT to be the principal driver of regional cooperation where it would be a predominant player, Japan, India, the US and some ASEAN countries want the EAS to play a key role in regional affairs. Discomfiture at the prospect of a China-dominated regionalism is palpable. In any case, much of the current economic cooperation that is taking place is mostly market-propelled and partly because of a large number of free trade and regional trade agreements. Despite scepticism about the EAS in terms of what EAS can do more than the others such as APEC, ASEAN Dialogue Partnerships, ASEAN Summit Meetings with partners, APT summits, etc., it can potentially emerge as a game changer in many ways, including in the promotion of regionalism. With the US and India, the EAS can emerge as a key mechanism to check China’s growing assertive attitude in the region but also provide the much needed political and economic latitude for many countries. In any case, it would be interesting to see what role the APT and EAS will play in promoting regionalism in the Asia Pacific. NOTES 1. Asia-Pacific and East Asia have been used interchangeably for convenience. 2. Twelve countries had joined the TPP – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United States and Vietnam. 3. Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, USTR, 4 October 2015, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/ october/summary-trans-pacific-partnership. 4. J.A. Camilleri, Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order, vol. 1, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2003, pp. 2-5. 5. Ibid., p. 12. 6. See for details F. Liu, ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Regionalism’, in F.-K. Liu and P. Regnier (eds.), Regionalism in East Asia: Paradigm Shifting, London: Rutledge-Curzon, 2003. 7. A good indicator of Japanese growing role was that nearly three-fourths of its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) was headed to East Asia in the early 1990s.

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8. See Asian Economic Integration Report 2016, Special Theme: ‘What Drives Foreign Direct Investment in Asia and the Pacific?’, https://www.adb.org/ sites/default/files/publication/214136/aeir-2016.pdf 9. http://www.aseansec.org/13202.htm 10. http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm 11. See the Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, http://www.mofa. go.jp/%5Cregion/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/report.pdf

CHAPTER 3

Eurasian Regional Security: The Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization B I J AY A K U M A R D A S

INTRODUCTION

the drive towards Eurasian security received a shot in arm with the emergence of the Shanghai Five. The process began in 1989 with negotiations on confidence building measures on the Soviet-Chinese border to settle their border problems. These negotiations were later transformed into talks on confidence building measures and reduction of armed forces between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on the one hand and China on the other, following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. Commencing in 1989 at the bilateral level between the USSR and the People’s Republic of China, the talks acquired in 1993 the character of multilateral dialogue between Russia, China and the three bordering Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On 26 April 1996, the presidents of the five bordering states met in Shanghai to sign the package of 14 agreements on border issues, confidence building measures and reduction of armed forces deployed in the border regions.1 In July 2000, the Shanghai Five, renamed the Shanghai Forum after Uzbekistan joined as an observer at the Dushanbe Summit, evolved into a Eurasian regional organization to cope with challenges of political normalization in the Central Asian region. The Dushanbe Declaration emphasized increased cooperation against the ‘three evils’ of separatism, terrorism and religious fundamentalism and the creation of an anti-terrorism unit.2 It was decided to widen interstate

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cooperation in diplomatic, commercial, military and technological fields for reinforcing regional security and stability. The Shanghai Five reflected the commonality of the national interests of China, Russia and the states of Central Asia. China’s commitment to the Shanghai Five arose out of its desire to counter the challenges of Islamic secessionism in the Xinjiang region. The Russian initiative was motivated by the domestic political environment and the threat to its security due to breakdown of law and order in the northern and southern Caucasian region, having wider repercussions in the Central Asian scenario. As the principal successor state, Russia claims the responsibility for the containment of intra-regional conflict in the former Soviet space where it had vital security and economic interest. The Shanghai Five agreement on confidence building measures in 1996 helped reduce tensions and initiate demilitarization along the borders of the member states. After significant success in the demilitarization initiative, the Shanghai Five shifted its attention to the elimination of religious militancy in the region. The Shanghai Five mechanism was upgraded as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 with Uzbekistan joining the group at the meeting of the heads of state and government held in Shanghai. The leaders committed themselves to cooperate in combating trafficking in drugs and arms, fighting terrorism and religious extremism, and resolving disputes over trans-border resources such as water, energy and transport infrastructure.3 The foreign ministers of the SCO, at their meeting held in Beijing in January 2002, adopted a document for fostering cooperation in maintaining regional security and stability and combating threats from terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. It was announced that peace and stability must be ensured through the motto ‘security through cooperation’. IMPORTANCE OF EURASIA IN THE CONTEXT OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION

The entire trans Caucasian-Central Asian region is generally referred to as ‘Central Asia’ or ‘Central Eurasia’, the latter including Turkey as well as China’s Xinjiang region. The region has been defined by several writers in terms of its landscape, mountains, rivers and the people inhabiting it. Others have described it in terms of its location

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and proximity to the states existing around and its importance in world politics. Sir Halford Mackinder propounded his famous Heartland Theory establishing the importance of Eurasia in world politics. His dictum runs ‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, Who rules the Heartland commands the world island and Who rules world island commands the world’.4 The significance of Eurasia came to be asserted for the first time in his geopolitical theory. Nicholas Spykman, the noted American geo-politician, agreeing to Mackinder’s theory, formulated his contentions as ‘Who controls Rimland, rules Eurasia, Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world’.5 Kenneth Weisbrode has defined Eurasia as a region ‘stretching from the Bosphorus in the West to the borders of the Chinese province of Xinjiang, and from the Kazakh Steppe in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south’.6 These definitions clearly explain what made the USSR one of the two superpowers. Its geopolitical, geo-strategic location, rich energy resources and mineral reserves permitted it to grow into a powerful state. Eurasia thus became, as Brzezinski highlighted, the chessboard for future fights among great powers when the Soviet Union lost its hegemonic power in this region.7 The region, commonly termed ‘Central Asia’ in recent literature, covers an area of 4 million sq. km bordered by the Caspian Sea in the West, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan to the South, China in the East, and the Russian and Siberian steppes to the north. Geographically, the SCO covers an area of 30 million sq. km or about three-fifths of Eurasia with a population of 1.51 billion, about a quarter of the world’s total population. The SCO’s present members and observers account for some 2.7 billion people out of the total world population of 6.4 billion.8 If Pakistan, Iran, India, and Mongolia joined the organization as full members, the demography and geography of Eurasia, would have been portrayed as the largest political, economic and military alliance, what some Western commentators call a ‘NATO’ of the East. SCO AND PROMOTION OF EURASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY

The main spirit behind the SCO is the growing realization among the Eurasian powers that regional security cannot be ensured through

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overseas security arrangements located far from the territory. The spirit behind the SCO can be defined as five ‘Cs’ – confidence, communication, cooperation, coexistence and common interest.9 The main outcome of the Second SCO Summit in St. Petersburg, 2002 was the document entitled ‘the Shanghai convention on fighting terrorism, separatism and religion extremism’, and the SCO members signed an agreement on Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS).10 This is a significant agreement because it called for a clear-cut legal framework as well as practical interactions in the struggle against terrorism, separatism, and extremism. In May 2003 SCO Summit in Moscow approved the establishment of the SCO Secretariat in Beijing and transfer of the RATS from Bishkek to Tashkent. The SCO also conducted its first joint exercise during 7-12 August 2003. The SCO held a follow-up economic cooperation and integration ministerial meeting. On that occasion, the prime ministers of the SCO member states settled on a budget for the organization’s secretariat and the RATS in Tashkent. The June 2004 meeting in Tashkent further concretized the SCO’s framework, and Mongolia was also admitted as an SCO observer in the course of the summit. Russia also put forth an initiative to create an SCO-Afghanistan contact group, both to revive the Afghan economy and to maintain security and stability in the region. In relation to this, the SCO members signed an agreement outlining cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking while Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the importance of the SCO in creating anti-drug security belts around Afghanistan.11 An important outcome of the 2005 SCO Summit held in Astana in Kazakhstan was a call to the US to set a firm deadline for the withdrawal of US and NATO armed forces present in the SCO member countries as part of the US-led antiterrorist coalition. This clearly demonstrated that Russia, China and the Central Asian Republics together wanted to be in charge of regional security within the framework of the SCO.12 At the SCO Summit in Shanghai on 15 June 2006, ten agreements were signed including those on the procedure of organizing and holding joint anti-terrorism actions in the territories of SCO member Republics, identifying and severing infiltrating channels of people engaged in terrorism, separatism and extremism in the territories of SCO member

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Republics, the SCO Business Council, and an action plan of SCO Inter-bank Association member banks on supporting regional economic cooperation.13 Furthermore, a Declaration adopted at the summit strongly emphasized the security dimension. It stated, ‘What specific means to be adopted to safeguard security of the region is the right and responsibility of countries in the region. The SCO will make a constructive contribution to the establishment of new global security architecture.’14 China and Russia are collaborating in the SCO to realize their respective security and economic interests. For China and Russia, attacking the ‘three evil forces’, uniting against terrorism and defending national security are the most substantial points of strategic convergence under the SCO framework. The member countries of the SCO are all facing different levels of the terrorist threat, such as China’s Xinjiang ‘East Turkestan’ terrorist forces, Russia’s Chechen terrorist forces, and in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, the Islamic Renewal Party, Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, and other terrorist extremist forces. The ‘three forces’ are directly threatening unity, territorial integrity and ethnic harmony in the countries concerned, and influencing their social stability and economic development. The Bishkek Declaration (2007) of the heads of the member states of the SCO emphasized the need for collective effort to counter the new challenges and threats. Expressing concern over the threat of narcotics coming from Afghanistan and its negative effect on Central Asia, the heads of state called for strengthening of cooperation within the framework of the organization, along with international efforts on the creation of antinarcotics belts around Afghanistan. SCO members held the biggest military exercise in Xinjiang region of China and Chebarkul region of Russia under the name of a peace mission.15 The Dushanbe Declaration on 28 October 2008, underlined the importance of developing dialogue among the SCO member states over the issues of effective and rational use of water and energy resources with due regard for the interests of the parties. Also underlined was the need to increase the activities of the SCO-Afghanistan group to discuss issues of joint action against terrorism, illegal circulation of narcotics and organized crime. The joint declaration of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Islamic Republic of

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Afghanistan on 27 March 2009 focused on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime. It called for combined efforts of all states and organizations concerned aimed at creating ‘the anti-drug and financial security’ belt in this region.16 The meeting of the Council of Heads of state of the SCO, held on 10-11 June 2010 at Tashkent, called for strict observance of the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as on peaceful use of nuclear energy and considered the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in Central Asia as an important element in ensuring regional peace and security. The signing of the protocol to the treaty establishing the nuclear weapons free zone in Central Asia by the nuclear powers will be an effective step in this direction. In 2012, SCO Summit held on 6-7 June 2012, in China emphasized the bigger role of SCO after NATO’s withdrawal of forces following the war on Afghanistan. Similarly, in the Bishkek Summit held on 13 September 2013 SCO called for joint actions to deal with security threats. The President of Kyrgyzstan stated that activities of terrorists and extremists groups are still in the rise in Afghanistan and called on the SCO members to continuously support Kabul, in its effort to fight against terrorist forces. In the Dushanbe SCO Summit held in 12 September 2014 emphasis has given on regional and economic cooperation along with the suggestion of Russian President’s initiative on creating a centre to deal with security threats and challenges faced by the member states. In the SCO’s Ufa Summit held in 2015 in Russia, a future plan of cooperation amid growing economic and security challenges in this region sought to be addressed with inclusion of India and Pakistan as full-fledged members in helping counter-terrorism and extremism. Entry of India and Pakistan into SCO in 2017 is a positive step for their domestic security and will extend the anti-terrorism network as well. The 2016 SCO Summit in Tashkent provided broader framework for both economic and security cooperation as it emphasized the need to develop a regional anti-terrorist structure meant for combating terrorism and extremism. Similarly, President Putin’s proposal of linking the Eurasian Union with the Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt will be immensely beneficial in integrating economic cooperation. The 2017 SCO Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan was remarkable in many respects. The acceptance of India and Pakistan to SCO makes SCO the largest and most populous international

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regional cooperation organization. With the involvement of Pakistan and its strategic position on the New Silk Road, the summit was thought to have a positive effect on further development in this regard. One of the major tasks of the SCO in this summit was to combat terrorism through the active participation of new members more specifically India and Pakistan. India is expected to have a bigger say in pressing for a concerted action in dealing with terrorism as well as issues relating to security and defence in the region. INTERESTS OF CHINA AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA

The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union presented both challenges and opportunities to Beijing: challenges included a new geopolitical situation on its border whereas opportunities included a possibility of the revival of the ‘Silk Route’. China’s security and economic policies in the Central Asian Republics rest upon countering terrorism, religious extremism and Uyghur independence, bilateral and regional economic cooperation, military cooperation, and neutralizing the influence of major powers inimical to China and Central Asia’s multilateral security arrangement.17 China has taken major steps and initiatives to secure its core geographical and geoeconomic interests. These include border dispute resolution, reduction of military force in the border regions, and good neighbourliness with friendship and cooperation agreements. China’s interests in Central Asia have widened from stability at the border to encompass energy security, geopolitics and combating extremist, terrorist as well as separatist forces. Commenting on these concepts, Lieutenant General A. Klimenko said: Amid the ongoing globalization it is just as important to have a certain exclusive zone of influence or in Chinese terminology living space, which can be used for economic, scientific and technological development as well as ensuring the country’s security and stability.18

The eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is another factor which has influenced Beijing’s policy initiatives in Central Asia. This enlargement is aimed at promoting

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democracy, human rights and civil society in the former Soviet political space. A series of colour revolutions – Georgia in 2003, the orange revolution in Ukraine 2004, and the tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 created uneasiness for Beijing.19 These developments increased China’s concern about Uyghur restlessness getting externally exploited. The Chinese involvement was strengthened after Uzbek scholars termed the Andijan event a direct interference by the US in the internal affair of Uzbekistan. The interest perceptions and policies of Russia as former ruler of Central Asia, has great importance in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s policy towards Central Asia has passed through different phases. The first phase began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and lasted till 1992. Moscow evacuated Central Asia voluntarily as a result of Western-oriented policies and considered Central Asia as an unnecessary burden. The second phase began in 1992 and lasted until 1999. Significant developments in Central Asia, namely, the Tajik civil war made Moscow pay attention to the region. However, the decline of Russian influence in this region paved the way for other actors namely, US, China, Iran, etc., to penetrate the region. The third phase of Russian policy began in 2000. Moscow began to take some initiatives to come back again to the region. President Putin established more pro-active and cooperative engagement with the Central Asian counterparts. The 9/11 incident in 2001 and the American policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan were interpreted as a new opportunity for cooperation with the United States. Russia wanted to be a strategic partner of United States in the war on terror in expectation of recognition of Russian influence over the region. However, American policy towards Central Asia and Afghanistan caused a great disappointment, as United States preferred alliances with the individual Central Asian states and conducted operations in Afghanistan with its NATO partners ignoring the existence of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the SCO. With this disappointment, the last phase of Moscow’s policy started in 2003. Determined to regain its influence in the context of active involvement of US in Central Asia, Russia strengthened its relations with the Central Asian

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states. Moscow became more active in the energy field, and took part in joint military exercises under SCO and CSTO umbrellas. Russia has multiple interests in Central Asia. The region is crucial for Moscow because it constitutes the southern border of Russia and acts as a buffer against the conflict-ridden countries/regions to its south such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East. This region also acts as a bridge for Moscow to be influential in the context of great power competition. Since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has been afraid of increased Islamic radicalism which may also influence Muslims inside Russia and can cause an internal strife. After the terrorist attacks in Dagestan and Chechnya, Moscow included the issue of radical Islam in the ‘2000 Security Concept’.20 In 1994, Foreign Intelligence Service Report indicated that radical Islamism is a major threat and Russia must be ready to contain it.21 Increasing Western influence led by US has been considered another important threat for Moscow. Initially Moscow welcomed the US presence for a united fight against terrorism. However, things did not go the way Russia predicted. The US gave greater weight to cooperation with the Central Asian states than Russia during the Afghanistan operation and installed military bases in the region. This created a great discomfort for Moscow as it perceived that entry of the US would undermine Russian interests in this region. The main security architecture for Russia to deal with both the problems of radical Islam and American intervention is the CSTO, which was established on the basis of the Collective Security Agreement in 1992 at Tashkent. Besides, Russia wanted to enhance its bilateral security relations with Central Asia on the issue of radical Islamism and drug and arms trafficking. As for Russia’s economic interests in Central Asia, energy occupies a significant place. Russia has monopoly over the transportation routes of Central Asian energy resource. The Central Asian states remain dependent on Russia in order to sell their oil and gas to world market. Moscow has multi-dimensional interest in the energy issue in Central Asia: first, gaining control over the exploitation of oil and gas along with the transportation routes; second, regaining its former dominant role over the region’s energy markets; and third, controlling hydroelectric power production in this region.

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It can be safely said that every single state in the region is important for Russia for different reasons. For example, Uzbekistan’s geographical position acts as a shield against spillover to the north of radical Islamist element in Afghanistan. Similarly, Kazakhstan is significant for Russia as it is the southern gate to Central Asia. It acts as a buffer against threats from radical Islam and drug and arms trafficking. Kazakhstan sits on the crossroads of China, Europe and Russian Siberia. Thus, its geographical location makes it crucial for Moscow both in terms of economy and security. Tajikistan is also a strategic dam against radical Islamist forces in Afghanistan and therefore the closest security partner of Russia. Being in the heart of Central Asia, Kazakhstan attracts both Russia and the US. The closure of the US military base in Manas airport is a strategic gain for Russia to exert its influence in this region. Turkmenistan is crucial for Russia especially because of its vast natural gas resource. Russia has the infrastructural base and the technical knowhow for transportation of Turkmeni gas to the world market, and does not want Turkmenistan be a competitor in world’s natural gas market. Therefore, Russia managed to prevent Ashgabat from joining the BTC pipeline (America) through construction of a pipeline under the Caspian Sea. Thus, both China and Russia have similar multidimensional interests in Central Asia and think that the realization of their common interests can be materialized through a common regional framework, i.e. through the SCO. RUSSIA AND CHINA: COOPERATION AND COMPETITION WITHIN SCO

The fact that the SCO during the 15 June 2001 summit forcefully underlined its right to regulate affairs in Central Asia signifies the single common ground where interests of Moscow and Beijing can converge. These two regional hegemonic states, which have defined terrorism, separatism and extremism as major threats to internal, regional and global stability, have politically subscribed to a realpolitik world-view with a strong economic emphasis. Through the SCO, both nations know that they can raise their bargaining power vis-à-vis the US and Europe, as well as all the regional states, including the post-Soviet independent states, by acting in concert. While swings and uncertainties characterized the Sino-Soviet relationship in the

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Cold War era, Sino-Russian relationship has steadily stabilized in the new century. Today, their respective interests have tended to converge more and more. But it is also an accepted fact that the Bear and the Dragon nurture conflicting aims and interests regarding the region. It is not to be forgotten that the SCO is basically a Chinese project. The decision to locate SCO’s headquarters in Beijing and to appoint a Chinese Secretary-General reflects an unchallenged Chinese influence. China and Russia have reached a settlement of their 4,300-km shared border and trade has increased sixfold during Putin’s term as president. Both powers support non-interference in domestic policy and seek internal stability. Beijing needs energy, arms, and raw materials in pursuit of its industrialization. Moscow is in dire need of foreign investments to maintain internal and regional energy infrastructure and explore new energy discoveries, which can be funded by China. While sharing economic benefits, they have vested interests in using the Central Asian states as buffers and in containing insurgency, separatism, radicalism, and opposition. While the interests of China and Russia seem to converge on a number of issues related or unrelated to US policies, there are areas of inevitable tension and conflict between the two powers. Russian policy makers realize that China will become a steadily stronger neighbour, and will want to address those ‘red line’ territorial issues, going far back to the times of Tsarist Russia. It is more a clash of long-term interests and competition for greater domination and slicing off greater portion of the Central Asian pie. China is set to establish its hegemony in the region, while Russia has to struggle hard to maintain its strategic standing on par with China. Among so many serious sources of tension, one obviously is the ongoing large immigration of Chinese into the Russian Far-East and untapped resource-rich Siberia, which is a threat not only for the Russian Federation, but also a threat to densely populated Kazakhstan. Both are also competing for their share of overland continental trade from East Asia to Europe, either via the Trans-Siberian railway or on the second Euro-Asia land bridge running via Xinjiang and Central Asia, as well as matters regarding pipeline routes and energy management. At the macro level, given its high economic growth, Chinese

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economic power will be increasingly visible. At the backdrop of China’s growing trade relations with Central Asia, Europe, and the US, Russia will trail well behind, losing its economic position and attraction. Moreover, Beijing’s increased partnership engagement with New Delhi, Islamabad, and Tehran will directly undermine Russia’s clout and spheres of influence. Russia’s principal advantage over China is energy; but as China makes inroads into Central Asia through bilateral agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and acquisitions of assets, Moscow’s ability will be eroded. With power-relations reversed, China will be the dominant power. The Chinese share many anxieties and important goals with Russia as far as membership of the SCO and the Central Asian region are concerned. At the general level, they have found co-habitation with Moscow beneficial, as they are able to benefit from Russian initiatives in various areas and redirect resources to other priorities. As a matter of fact, because of its ability to mobilize and hence to rely on Chinese support, Russia’s once cooperative attitude toward the US changed into one of deterrence. The strategic partnership between the two would undermine the US involvement in the region. Similar to Moscow, Beijing is concerned about the spread of threatening ideologies such as Western democracy and Islamic fundamentalism. Likewise, the growing presence of the US in the region and the Far East has aroused fears of encirclement and containment for Beijing, driving it to protect its western flank from intrusion from foreign powers. But unlike Moscow, Beijing so far has avoided directly challenging the US military presence in Central Asia, while recognizing the advantages of having the United States as partner vis-à-vis the fight against terrorism and for promoting stability – sine qua non to develop the Central Asian oil and gas resources. In the construction of the SCO, undisturbed by the fact that Russia has successfully improved its strategic position in the region, Chinese leaders have engaged Russia in Central Asia and have undoubtedly favoured a preeminent security role for Moscow – as a hedge against the growth of Islamic radicalism and US presence. For Beijing, the most important goal is to reach out to energy resources therein, and to secure markets for its goods, and outlets for its investment. China’s growing energy needs – presently the world’s

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second-largest oil consumer – represent the principal driving force for increased interest and involvement in Central Asia. In order to secure diverse sources of energy and the risks and vulnerabilities of the supplies of oil from the Persian Gulf, China is pushing for the development of alternative land-based oil and gas pipelines that would secure the flow of Central Asian gas and oil supplies eastward toward China. The Chinese west-east pipeline projects are going hand in hand with active operations of Chinese oil and gas companies, which are busy in launching joint ventures or direct acquisitions in energy projects in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. They continue to acquire energy assets and buy up other strategic natural resources and industries, as and when these become available, and with so much surplus capital they possess. In the long run, however, such a development would no doubt undermine the Russian hegemony of directing and operating the westward flow of energy resources. Beijing seeks to get tacit approval or non-interference in its struggle against ethnic separatism in the Turkic Uyghur autonomous region of Xinjiang province. As for Moscow, it has allied with Beijing in order to restore some of its influence over its ‘near- abroad’ and reassert its regional hegemony. While trying to keep away the US and its NATO allies from the region, the SCO can facilitate Chinese intrusion. The regimes of the Central Asian states want support for their survival against opposition movements, economic development assistance, and increased trade and investment. Chinese investment and finance for infrastructure and development in and across Central Asia will potentially contribute to prosperity, under the watchful eyes of Moscow. Growing regional prosperity will mean peace, an environment less amenable for outside intervention. As argued by Chung, Beijing has three reasons for wanting to minimize US hegemony in the region. First, China fears that, with an American ally in their midst, Central Asian states will pay less heed to Chinese political demands than before. Second, China worries that efforts to augment its economic influence in Central Asia will be compromised by US support for American petroleum companies in winning concessions from regional governments at China’s expense. Third, with military bases close to China’s western borders, Washington has the option of helping Beijing flush out Xinjiang terrorists operating

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in Central Asia, or putting direct military pressure on China if it perceives a threat from that country. In that respect, the US military presence retarded progress in institutionalizing the SCO, and kept surging Chinese influence in Central Asia under check. China’s short term concerns were initially focused on border delineation issues, and minimizing direct and indirect involvement by the Central Asian states in China’s own ethnic minority issues. Over time, as a result of deepening security cooperation, largely through the evolving SCO, there has been a growing Chinese focus on economic agenda, most particularly in the area of energy in the region. INTERESTS OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES IN SCO

As mentioned above, the interests of the Central Asian states in joining the SCO are manifold and can be identified as follows: nation building and independence; non-interference and sovereignty; national security; protection of borders from internal and external threats; good neighbourly relations; control over and effective utilization of natural resources; enhanced trade and commercial dealings; access to world commodity and capital markets; and establishment of national and regional infrastructure for transport and communications. The Central Asian states are interested in the SCO’s practical undertakings for regional security and development such as confidence-building, antiterrorism activity, fighting drug trafficking and securing borders, trade and economic cooperation, investment projects, rehabilitation of transportation networks and exploitation of transit potential. Irrespective of being member or non-member of the SCO, the Central Asian nations are exposed to the potential danger of falling into the orbit of Chinese or Russian domination in spite of their ‘balancing’ efforts. PROBLEM AREAS OF SCO

Despite its graduation to a full-fledged institution, the SCO remains hampered by dominance of national interest over multinational cooperation and sacrifice by its members. Even more revealing is the

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inescapable fact that despite the rhetoric, the fundamental strategic goals of the organization for countering terrorism, securing borders, and bolstering regional stability has been compromised with the active and positive cooperation of the US in this context. The SCO is also seriously outpaced by the scale and scope of US engagement in the region and cannot hope to match the organizational capacity and role of NATO in Central Asia. But the SCO remains increasingly assertive in its confrontational stand on the future of the US military presence in the region and with the recent eviction of US troops from Uzbekistan continues to be dominated by the Chinese and Russian tactics of using the SCO to pressure the US and garner special leverage. Thus it is the Chinese, Russian, and of course, American national interest in Central Asia rather than any multilateral initiative like the SCO, that will determine security and stability in this region. The main threats to the SCO will flow from the nature of China-Russia relations: on the one hand, strategic convergence between Beijing and Moscow would lead to the establishment of a bilateral diktat of these powers in Central Asia, and on the other, there lies the danger of a sharpening of Sino-Russian competition in the region. It is important to note that cooperation among its members and observers is essentially based upon a negative strategic objective: to counter US/Western interest. The Central Asian states do not have much in common. Hence, eventually a spilt in this organization is not inconceivable. From the Western point of view, the SCO has failed as a security provider and only added to a long line of abortive attempts to reorganize Central Asia under Russian leadership. However, to say that the SCO has played no role in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia is also wide off the mark. The joint preparation for the war on terrorism and religious extremism has certainly contributed to the development of an atmosphere necessary to ensure success in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The SCO has not just contributed to the creation of an atmosphere for launching a successful struggle against terrorism in Central Asia, it has also made a tangible contribution to this struggle by conducting Sino-Kyrgyz anti-terror exercises and joint military manoeuvres in Kazakhstan in August 2002 with the participation of five members (except Uzbekistan).

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NATO AND SCO AS SECURITY ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARISON

As a security pact, it is questioned by many whether the SCO possesses the characteristics of either the Warsaw Pact or NATO, or can pose as a fully-developed counterpart to the latter. Most experts subscribe to the view that the SCO can be conceived, at this stage, neither as a ‘new Warsaw Pact’ nor a mutual defence pact exemplified by NATO. The Warsaw Pact members in the past shared the same ideological (socialist) values, a unified market under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the same weapon and defence systems, and an integrated command and control mechanism. The pact permitted the positioning of Soviet troops and bases across the territories of its members, and joint military exercises. Under a single hegemonic power, the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was able to mobilize force, flex muscle, and conduct military operations at will. Such capacities do not yet exist within the SCO. Given the SCO members’ cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, different levels of economic structure and development, divergent political aspirations, many unresolved regional challenges, it is much too early to see if the SCO can mobilize itself to project a unified stand in the form of a security alliance comparable to either the Warsaw Pact or NATO. As Plater-Zyberk points out, organizing the SCO as a viable military bloc would require: political commitment; long-term planning and coordination; and a long-term, prohibitively expensive and well coordinated rearmament programme.22 Unlike the old Warsaw Pact, within such a loose institutional setup as exists in the SCO, there is a shared but not necessarily selfreinforcing exercise of power by the two regional heavyweights, China and Russia. The SCO’s organizational effectiveness is also likely to be hampered by internal frictions, tensions, and even competition between its member states over many challenging issues, such as minorities, border security, energy, pipelines, and water resources in the region. On the other hand, those Central Asian states that are full members of the club are too sensitive in asserting their national identity, sovereignty, and independence, with simmering fear and suspicion concerning Russia and China. It needs to be noted that all the five Central Asian nations have links with outside powers, being

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also participants of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. On the other hand, Kyrgyzstan’s recent decision to close the Manas Airbase, the only US base in Central Asia and a vital transit point for NATO and US operations, signals a serious turn of events. At this point and also for the near future, many scholars think that the SCO is far from being either a replica of NATO or a ‘counterweight’ to NATO, as it lacks the mechanism, institutional depth, organizational effectiveness, mutual trust, and common ideals. Unlike NATO, there are no declared commitments and mutual defence pledges. Given its structural evolution and working experience, the case of NATO cannot be easily emulated by the SCO or other such organizations. ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCO

The SCO, however, has the potential to play an independent role in safeguarding stability and security in this region. Deeper cooperation in combating terrorism, separatism, extremism, and drug trafficking is a priority for the SCO. The SCO will make a constructive contribution to the establishment of a new international security architecture of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and mutual respect. What specific means and mechanisms should be adopted to safeguard the security of the region is the right and responsibility of the countries in the region. Among important indications of the SCO’s growing recognition and participation in international stage, one can mention the eagerness displayed by some neighbouring countries to join the organization, several current studies about the SCO published by the American and European institutions as well as others in the post-2002 period, and the observer status in the UN General Assembly granted in December 2004. An increasing number of countries and international organizations have proposed to establish contact and cooperation with the SCO. The SCO now maintains regular contacts with various UN bodies such as UNDP. During 2005-7, the SCO proceeded to sign MoUs with other active institutions in the Eurasian space, namely the OSCE, CIS, and OCST. The Dialogue of Cooperation in Asia, the Economic Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Cooperation should also be mentioned. While the shared objective is to fight against extremism and

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terrorism, the overall strategic aim of the alliance for Beijing and Moscow is somewhat geared to curbing the growing influence of the US in Central Asia by way of establishing a joint sphere of influence at the backyard as well as across the continent. Evidently, while resetting its priorities, the idea of counterbalancing the presence of the US and hence that of NATO in Central Asia has become one of the organization’s central objectives. Some commentators point out that a stronger SCO, particularly one with a military component and Iran as a full member, might serve as a check to US interests and ambitions in the region, while some others argue that the SCO lacks the power and economic strength to counterbalance the US. It cannot be denied that the SCO has achieved considerable headway. It has progressed faster in getting the Central Asians to work together on real issues in a non-zero-sum equation. It needs to be noted that the Central Asian members’ participation in the SCO has by no means precluded their cooperation with NATO. Most experts agree that the SCO’s influence in the region is on the rise. In conjunction with NATO, the SCO will surely contribute to the overall security and stability of the region as a whole. It serves as a forum to minimize the possibility of direct confrontations in the post-Cold War environment. Given the confidence-building mechanism that has been established, the SCO should be able to avert conflicts between the overlapping interests and influences of the two giants in Central Asia. The SCO’s stance declares to the international community that there is no ‘vacuum’ in Central Asia’s strategic space that needs to be filled by security organizations from outside the region. The largescale military exercises code-named ‘Peace Mission 2007’, held in Chelyabinsk in Russia’s Volga-Ural military district and in Urumqi, capital of Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region, displayed the organization’s solidarity and joint capability. The proposed formal link between the CSTO and the SCO, which means the CSTO plus China, forms the construction of new security architecture in this important part of the world. For both Russian and Chinese policy makers, the SCO was and is a way to maintain the strategic SinoRussian dominance over the wider Central Asian region, while engaging in friendly relations with their Central Asian neighbours.

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CONCLUSION

Given an ‘expanded’ SCO and its control of a large part of the world’s oil and gas reserves, growing economic power, and nuclear arsenal, most of the experts agree that the SCO’s political, military, and economic clout is on the rise, not only within the Eurasian space, but also as an international actor. A stronger SCO, particularly one with a military (nuclear arsenal) component and Iran as a full member, will then become the third leg of the multi-polar world order. Notably for Beijing, as for other members as well, an aggressive SCO would, however, run counter to the members’ vital interests – benefits of cooperation with the West – if attempts proceed to transform the SCO into an anti-Western or anti-US/NATO bloc. The SCO should, however, be a conscious stakeholder contributing to stability, peace and prosperity in Eurasia. The SCO stands poised to become quite influential in Central Asian politics. Its clout will rise and diminish in line with Chinese interest in the project. China has so far proved willing to pour substantial diplomatic and economic resources into this long term project. With the Central Asian republics badly in need of economic and political support, their loyalties will follow money. In this equation, Russia lacks the financial resources and the manpower as well as the diplomatic sophistication to lead the organization. As a regional security organization, SCO is one of the clearest examples of ‘New Regionalism’ which is based on the interests of the members, mutual benefit and openness to participation of other actors. It is designed not only to serve the political and security interests of the member countries, but also to look after various economic and sociocultural problems. Besides, problems associated with environmental degradation and the issues of terrorism and drug trafficking have been adequately addressed. The success of SCO since its inception has been highly recognized and appreciated keeping in mind the political and security environment and various challenges of nation building in Central Asia and the threats coming from within the region and beyond. There is no doubt about the fact that the competition between China and Russia in controlling the mechanisms and functioning of SCO for their respective interests led to a kind of China-Russia centric organisation discarding interests of other

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member states. However, in the longer run SCO is dedicated to provide security, both traditional and non-traditional, and stability and integrity in fighting with different challenges and problems. It has served as a checkmate to NATOs expansion to the region by projecting its objectives and interest manifestations. NOTES 1. Sun Zhuangzhi, ‘New and Old Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Sino-Central Asian Relations’, The Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 4, Summer 2004, p. 60. 2. Ibid. 3. ‘Shanghai Summit Issues Press Communiqué’, Xinhua News Service, 15 June 2001. 4. Brian Blout, ‘The Imperial Vision of Halford Mackinder’, The Geographical Journal, vol. 170, no. 4, December 2004. 5. Kenneth Weisbrode, Central Eurasia: Prize or Quicksand? – Contending Views of Instability in Karabakh, Ferghana and Afghanistan, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 11. 6. Ibid., p. 12. 7. Devendra Kaushik, ‘New Geopolitics of Hydrocarbon Resource: A Eurasian Perspective’, in K. Warikoo (ed.), Central Asia and South Asia: Energy Cooperation and Transport Linkages, New Delhi: Pentagon Press, p. 9. 8. World Population Data sheet on www.prb.org. 9. La Zhongwei, ‘SCO Under New Situation’, Contemporary International Relations, vol. 12, no. 6, June 2002, p. 23. 10. Ramkant Dwivedi, ‘China’s Central Asia Policy in Recent Times’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 4, 2006, p. 151. 11. Chien-Peng Chung, ‘China and the Institutionalization of Shanghai Cooperation Organization’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 53, no. 5, September-October 2006, p. 9. 12. Ibid., p. 10. 13. G. Chufnin, ‘The SCO: Changing Priorities’, International Affairs, vol. 53, no. 1, 2007, p. 60. 14. Marcel de Haas (ed.), The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Towards a Full Grown Security Alliances?, The Hague: Netherland Institute of International Relations, November 2007, p. 17. 15. Graham E. Fuller and Frederick Starr, The Xinjiang Problem, Washington: Central Asia – Caucasus Institute, 2003, p. 9. 16. Ibid.

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17. Sujit Dutta, ‘China’s Emerging Ties with Central Asia’, in Nirmala Joshi (ed.), Central Asia – The Great Game Replayed: An Indian Perspective, Delhi: New Century Publications, 2003, p. 157. 18. Lt. Gen. A.K. Klimenko, ‘The Evaluation of China’s Military Policy and Military Doctrine’, Military Thought, vol. 14, no. 2, 2005, p. 50. 19. Lena Johnson, ‘Russia and Central Asia’, in Roy Allison and Lena Johnson (eds.), Central Asian Security: The New International Context, London: Institute of International Affairs, 2001, p. 100. 20. Ibid. 21. Dmitri Trerin, ‘A Farewell to Great Game: Prospects for Russian-American Security Cooperation in Central Asia’, European Security, 12, 2004, p. 23. 22. Suat ÖKSÜZ, ‘An Emerging Powerhouse in Eurasian Geopolitics: The Shanghai Six+’, Ege Akademik Bakış/Ege Academic Review 9(2), 2009, pp. 713-34.

CHAPTER 4

Genesis and Evolution of Regionalism in Europe and South Asia: A Comparative Analysis P U R U S OT TA M B H AT TA C H A RY A

INTRODUCTION

the second world war had raised serious misgivings, especially in Europe, about the ability of the nation state to ensure the wellbeing, peace and security of the individual citizens and others who lived within its jurisdiction. A major consequence of this realization was the emergence of regionalism, which came to be one of the dominant dynamics of the international political system since the late 1940s. The roots of this regionalism were the perception by the national policy-makers that there were common interests shared by states located in a particular region and that these interests could be ‘most efficiently and effectively promoted by close and continuing co-operation within a regional framework’.1 The nature of these interests was varied; as a result the regional organizations which were formed were also varied in terms of their prime objectives. For instance, the perceived need in Western Europe for greater security led to the birth of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); and the desire to foster economic development led to the founding of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) (which later became the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development or OECD). A prime objective for the establishment of the ASEAN was to exert greater diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the socalled threat from Communist China and the Arab League arose out of a commitment to a common Arab heritage. The regional model took a concrete and, it may be argued, a

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successful shape in Western Europe – in spite of its current difficulties – which was sought to be replicated with varying degrees of success in different parts of the world. A host of regional organizations sprang up in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America during the 1960s, 1970s and even as late as the 1980s. While it was recognized that the European model was not necessarily suitable to the other regions of the world due to divergences in their respective geographical, historical, cultural and developmental experiences in nation-building, the idea of maximizing advantages in economic, especially trade matters, as well as other spheres not overtly political took firm roots during this period. While taking note of the substantially varied characters of regional formations in different parts of the world, regionalism as a concept and strategy essentially indicates the desire of the governments and peoples of two or more states to establish voluntary associations by pooling together resources (material and non-material) for the creation of common functional and institutional arrangements. Regionalism can also be described as a process with shared fundamental values and norms. The state actors forming a regional organization participate in a growing network of economic, cultural, scientific, diplomatic, political and military interactions.2 It may be noted here that the problem of region and regionalism attracted a great deal of attention in academic circles in the 1960s and 1970s which generated a very lively debate though no definitive conclusions could be reached. A lot of theorizations have been attempted though a common thread which can bind together all the regional experiments in different parts of the world over the years has been hard to find due to the varied nature of the regions and regional experiments. It is in this context that this paper attempts a comparative analysis of the regional experiments in Europe and South Asia. After the relatively dormant period of the 1970s regionalism experienced resurgence in 1980s and 1990s in Western Europe, Latin America, North America and Asia. In the global South regionalism received a fillip due to the end of the Cold War, globalization and a keen desire to provide a stimulus to investment, employment and growth because of an increasingly competitive international economic environment. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the

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regional experiences in Europe which began in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Second World War. The second part focuses on the efforts at building a regional formation in South Asia which started only in the 1980s. The third part summarizes the discussion and attempts to arrive at a conclusion. REGIONAL EXPERIENCES IN EUROPE

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the victorious Allied powers, which included several European states, envisaged the preservation of international peace and security to be the responsibility of a world body which took shape in the creation of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter permitted regional arrangements in Article 51, Chapter VII (Articles 52-4), and Article 103 on the condition that they were to have a secondary role only. Charter obligations were to prevail over regional ones in the event of conflict. However, a number of factors contributed to a retreat from the universalism envisaged by the UN founders. Some of the more important ones were the superpowers’ global antagonism, the cumbersome nature of the UN’s own central structure, and ‘its apparent inability to promote meaningful solutions at the global level for essentially local and regional problems’.3 The West European states particularly lost faith in the UN for protecting their security or fostering their economic and political interests. The region therefore witnessed the emergence of the greatest degree of regional cooperation based on a ‘core area’ of mutual interest subsequently. Our discussion of European regionalism has to begin by addressing the conundrum of ‘what is Europe’ which confronts students of European affairs at all levels. Geographically Europe is only a promontory of Asia, bounded by the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. There has been a considerable degree of debates among geographers regarding the dividing line between the land masses of Asia and Europe. Without going into the details of this debate, especially whether Russia (more importantly Asiatic Russia) should be included in any discussion on Europe we would confine ourselves to an understanding of an Europe that is restricted to the landmass from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains as preferred

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by the former French President Charles de Gaulle. Most commentators have traditionally been inclined to mean Western Europe only while referring to Europe omitting the erstwhile Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe though prior to the Second World War these countries had close cultural, diplomatic and economic ties with France, the United Kingdom and Germany. The ‘core Europe’ has included the original six founding member states of the European Economic Community (EEC), i.e. France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Subsequently other western and northern European states joined the EEC as the organization expanded and finally the EC/EU assumed its present shape of 28 member states with the entry of the erstwhile Soviet bloc countries of eastern and central Europe as well as some of the Balkan states (which emerged out of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia) and Cyprus and Malta. Overall the term ‘Europe’ is largely a vague geographical expression whose dividing lines are largely arbitrary. We have to bear in mind that for the purpose of this paper we are only referring to ‘political’ Europe which does not always coincide with the differing Europes of cultural and historical heritage, economic and political ties.4 In order to understand the impulse for regional cooperation that emerged in the wake of the Second World War it is necessary to explore briefly the evolution of the ‘European Idea’ in the sense of a united Europe which has exerted a great appeal. This has been a dream which was sought to be fulfilled either by conquest or hegemony or by the voluntary action of Europe’s constituent units. ‘Europe unite’ has been a powerful slogan whether voiced by such different men as the Emperor Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire, the Duc de Sully, Aristide Briand, Winston Churchill and Jean Monnet. Prior to the twentieth century there were two kinds of approaches to European unity; schemes for hegemony such as those of Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire in the sixteenth century and Napoleon Bonaparte at the turn of the eighteenth century; and plans for peace within Europe and defence against the Ottoman Empire in the East outlined in the Duc de Sully’s ‘Grand Design’ in the seventeenth century and the Abbe de Saint-Pierre’s ‘Memoir to make a perpetual peace in Europe’

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at the beginning of the eighteenth century. The recent history of European unity movement has drawn on these plans for peace.5 European civilization is nearly 4000 years old. The cradle of this civilization was the Graeco-Roman cultures where Greece was the provider of philosophy, science and literature; Rome provided law and institutions. The first experience of unity dates back to the times of the Roman Empire when large parts of the continent came under the authority of imperial Rome. During the era of Papal authority the concept of Christendom exerted a lot of influence over much of Europe. Later, as mentioned earlier, conquerors like Charlemagne in the ninth century, Napoleon in the early nineteenth century and finally Hitler in the twentieth century made attempts at unity by military force with disastrous consequences. In order to understand the quest for integration it is necessary to comprehend the position of the sovereign state in Europe. A number of sovereign states, essentially a European invention, became well established by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which ended the thirty years war. It ‘paved the way for a system of states to replace a hierarchical system under the leadership of the Pope and the Habsburg family that linked the Holy Roman and Spanish Empires’.6 Between the seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries warfare had become a common form of relationship among the European states occasionally punctuated by diplomacy. Other peaceful methods to unite or reunite Christendom have already been referred to. By the end of the nineteenth century nationalism had turned into a significant force with political consequences, the most notable being the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. The First World War – also known as ‘the Great War’ – brought about far-reaching changes in the organization of the European polity. The longstanding continental empires of Imperial Germany, AustriaHungary, Czarist Russia and the Ottoman rulers were destroyed and a number of new nation states such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Czechoslovakia were created. A notable attempt to break through the nationalism and distrust of inter-war European relations was a proposal by the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand for the creation of a confederated Europe.

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However, the Briand Memorandum was received with a great deal of scepticism and was relegated to a ‘study group on European Union’ at the League of Nations. It is noteworthy however that an alternative way forward for Europe had been identified which was to blossom into the European Union of today. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, which had turned out to be a veritable graveyard for European powers such as Germany, France and Italy, thinking Europeans were convinced that the only solution to the age-old rivalry that had bedevilled Europe was to forge unity through a consensus that took into account the prevailing post-war realities. It was not only a question of political and economic reconstruction of a shattered Europe; nor even recovery of the lost great power status of some of the continent’s erstwhile major powers. More fundamentally it was an issue of whether the peoples of Europe were capable of drawing the necessary lessons from the ravages of the two world wars and display their readiness to reconcile the nationalistic rivalries that had brought so much misfortune. The first significant impetus the European idea received was from a speech by Winston Churchill, the war-time prime minister of Britain, at Zurich, Switzerland, in September 1946 when he spoke of the need to create ‘a kind of United States of Europe’ based on Franco-German reconciliation. This speech made the ground propitious for a unity movement to be born in Western Europe which, over the next decade, facilitated the creation of a number of organizations committed to advancing the cause of a united Europe. The principal difficulty in this regard arose on the question of the inter-governmentalism vs. supra-nationalism debate. The intergovernmentalists were led by British who were not prepared to embrace any kind of sacrifice of national sovereignty to facilitate cooperation among the west European states. There were however other states, especially France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy, who were of the view that a more radical method of cooperation was the real answer to Europe’s problems. It was felt that mere creation of forums for cooperation among governments in critical fields such as trade and industry, business competition, energy, transport and the like would not be enough. What was needed was the creation of

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an institution which would be able to adopt common policies in some of the areas earlier agreed upon among the participating states and which the member states would be duty bound to implement within their respective jurisdictions. This idea found its most fruitful manifestation in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. The basic idea of the plan for the ECSC was to find a solution to the German problem. Historically the Franco-German conflict was at the root of the problems of modern Europe and in the reconciliation of this rivalry lay the key to a peaceful, united and prosperous Europe. The ECSC provided an opportunity for such reconciliation besides binding a potentially powerful and resurgent Germany within the confines of a supranational framework. Thus under the ‘Schuman Plan’ (so named after the French foreign minister who had taken the initiative), which was announced in May 1950, France and Germany were both to place the control of their coal and steel production under a single High Authority; other countries were also welcome to adhere to the scheme if they wished. Consequently Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy also joined the venture while Britain refused to participate in it on the plea that the plan was too supranational and was contrary to British national interests. The establishment of the ECSC was an important milestone in the evolution of the European unity movement. It marked the critical transition from inter-governmentalism to supranationalism, which proved to be the much needed breakthrough in the search for a radical brand of institutions necessary for dealing with the kind of problems Europe faced in the post-Second World War era. Despite serious reservations on the part of Britain, the leading power of Europe at the time, and numerous other impediments, the momentum towards the creation of an economic organization (since an overt political structure was still unacceptable to the states concerned) along supranational lines continued to gather pace in the years that followed. The idea of a European Common Market had been in circulation for quite sometime. The success of the ECSC experiment provided fresh encouragement for new efforts in this direction and the initiative taken by the Benelux governments (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) succeeded in producing a report in the spring of 1956

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which provided the basis for the treaties establishing the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM). These treaties were signed in Rome on 25 March 1957 and ratified by the six in the following months. The Communities came into formal existence on 1 January 1958. The EEC pledged to ‘establish the foundations of an ever closer union among the European Peoples’. The enterprise involved the creation of 3 communities – the EEC, the EURATOM and the ECSC which had existed since 1952. The institutions of the three organizations were merged by a treaty on 8 April, which came into force on 1 July 1967. This treaty achieved a single executive for the ECSC, the EEC and EURATOM comprising the Council and the Commission based in Brussels. Thereafter the first enlargement of the Communities took place in January 1973 to incorporate Britain, Ireland and Denmark and the three organizations came to be known as a single entity – the European Community (EC). Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Rome spelt out the purposes, meanings and broad aims of the EEC, which was designed to embrace all areas of economic and social endeavour within a ‘Community’ concept. Its purpose was not simply to promote economic self-interest of the member states but also to commit them to a commonality of interest. The treaty also sought to establish a Common Market and progressively approximate the economic policies of member states, promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated pace of raising the standard of living and closer relations between the states belonging to it.7 The member states creating the Community gave an undertaking to participate in common institutions, to establish a customs union (which meant an arrangement whereby the participating states agreed to abolish duties and other trade restrictions among themselves) and to adopt common commercial policies towards third countries as well as common policies in the spheres of agriculture, transport and business competition. They also agreed to a framework for free movement of persons, services, goods and capital, procedures for co-ordination of economic and social policies and measures regarding approximation of laws. Undertaking was also given for participation

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by member states in a wide range of Community financial institutions as well as an association of overseas countries and territories having special links with member states. The Rome Treaty formula for European regional cooperation was significantly more far-reaching than what was provided in the constitutions of other European organizations (with the exception of the ECSC) created in the aftermath of the Second World War. The range of mechanism provided for in the EEC treaty permitted the organization’s common institutions to have dramatic and substantial involvement in policy making. As explained earlier the establishment of the EC was an effort to move beyond the traditional method of inter-governmental cooperation. This was reflected in the creation of the Community institutions which enjoy a great deal of autonomy and play a critical role in the decision-making process and the general functioning of the EC (renamed European Union on 1 November 1993). Its institutional structure and policy-making process is one of the distinguishing features of the European Union. The Union has four principal institutions – the Council of the European Union, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice; in addition, there is an Economic and Social Committee and a Court of Auditors. Policy formulation in the Union is a product of intensive dialogue between the Commission and the Council; the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee exercise primary consultative roles in this process. The Court of Justice has jurisdiction on the overall process and the Court of Auditors scrutinizes the Union’s budget. It should be noted that policy making is a two-way process – interaction between the various institutions themselves and their relationship to the member states. What has been presented above clearly points to the unique nature of the European Union. The matter is however not free from controversy. Some lawyers have argued that the Union is not endowed with explicit supranational powers. It is not essentially different from other international organizations though there exists a more intense level of cooperative activity by the member states. Others argue that the EU does possess a unique character whose most noteworthy feature is a significant shift of sovereignty from national to Union levels. An

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intermediate conception of the organization is that it is ‘a body created to perform certain functions, which are of common interest to a group of states, and which has, for this purpose, been endowed with its own responsibility and a sufficient amount of sovereignty without being invested with the fullness of powers characterising a state’.8 The European Court of Justice itself declared that the Treaty of Rome created ‘a new legal order’ independent of the member states and whose acts have direct legal effect on them.9 Generally precedence has to be given to Union law over national law leading to the conclusion that EU membership emphatically impinges on the sovereignty of the member states in a more immediate and extensive fashion than in the case with other national treaty commitments. The formulation of the common policies and their implementation has been an interesting test case of transfer of sovereign authority in the concerned areas from the member states to the Union institutions. Certain member states such as France in the early period and later Britain fought hard to protect and preserve their national sovereignty in the issue areas as much as possible. Reconciliation of conflicting national interests has occasionally led to serious crises in the functioning of the Union. And the EU has not only survived but also expanded its area of activity. One of the notable successes of the Union has been its steady enlargement over the past five and a half decades. The founding fathers had made it clear that though the Union was beginning its journey with only six member states it would be their earnest endeavour to bring together other countries of western, northern, central and eventually eastern Europe within the fold as well. Keeping this objective in mind the Union has undergone seven enlargements to date which has brought almost the whole continent of Europe within the ambit of the EU. The Union also undertook the ambitious objective of formulating a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1991 as it wanted to project a common international identity. However, integration in the fields of foreign affairs and security policy has been much slower and did not reach the kind of depth desired. It has been argued that such integration has not happened ‘because no foreign affairs and security policy objective has arisen that was of such urgency that the

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EU member states, unable to find a commonly agreed intergovernmental solution, would be open to persuasion by advocates of an integrationist solution’.10 The movement for European unity is nearly seven decades old now. The face of Europe has changed beyond recognition during this period. The Europe of today is a political and economic powerhouse enjoying a decisive say in the management of international affairs. The EU, the principal vehicle of the integration movement, is also a much transformed entity. Not only has its membership increased from the original six to the present twenty-eight – the number is poised to go up in the near future – but its areas of activity have also expanded considerably. The Union launched its own common currency – the Euro – which is the second most important currency in the world today. However, the Union hit a rough patch in 2008 when the world economic recession sent an already depressed EU economy into a tailspin. As a result some of the weaker members of the Eurozone like Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy were plunged into a sovereign debt crisis, which required substantial financial bailout packages, particularly for Greece as also for Spain, Portugal and Ireland. Of late Europe has become a victim of international terrorism with attacks on Spain in 2004 and 2017, Britain in 2005 and 2017, France in 2015 and 2016 and Belgium in 2016. Apart from these major attacks there have been sporadic attacks throughout the continent over the past decade and a half. Another grave challenge Europe faces today is the migrant crisis. Europe has been an attractive destination for migrants for centuries and it has absorbed them with varying degrees of success though the continent never faced any catastrophic crisis as a result of migration. However, the recent waves of desperate migrants from Africa, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq have been of a nature the like of which the continent has not seen since the end of the Second World War. Millions of migrants descended on Europe in the hope of a better future as they flee civil war, failed economies and persecution. At the time of writing the EU is desperately struggling to find a common response as the crisis has divided the Union like never before. The latest crisis to hit the EU was the decision of the United

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Kingdom which joined the EU in 1973 after an agonizing appraisal of its role in a Europe that had begun to chart out a new course in the aftermath of the Second World War to leave the Union. It voted in a national referendum, held on 23 June 2016, to leave the European Union. The referendum verdict was a narrow 52-48 per cent victory of those favouring a Brexit (British exit from the EU). Consequently the EU finds itself in another crisis as no country has ever left it since its formation. The reactions from the UK’s EU partners ranged from disappointment, dismay to outright anger. Hastily convened meetings took place in Brussels, Berlin, Paris and other European capitals to take stock of the fall-out of the UK’s decision. European Council President Donald Tusk appealed for calm and unity among the EU’s 27 other member states, saying that the vote is historic but does not call for a ‘hysterical reaction’; German Chancellor Angela Merkel has ‘regretted’ the UK’s decision. However the divorce will not happen overnight as the tangled knots of EU membership will take at least two years to be unravelled. The German government has called for the UK to be given time for negotiating a smooth and rancour-free withdrawal. Till then the UK continues to be a member. Negotiations for the UK’s disengagement started on 19 June 2017 and till date four rounds of talks have been held though the progress has been slow and riddled with polemics on both sides. However, EU leaders are worried about a ‘contagion’ effect as some leaders of Far Right parties in France, the Netherlands and elsewhere in the bloc have called for referendums of their own a la UK. Nevertheless it does not seem likely that the EU will collapse following the British desertion. Long term EU watchers are familiar with the inherent resilience of the organization which has withstood many a crises in the past though they acknowledge the unprecedented gravity of the current set of challenges, including Brexit, the Union faces. The British case cannot be compared with the other EU member states as Britain has always been ‘an awkward partner’ with a turbulent history of membership over the past 43 years.11 Therefore drawing hasty conclusions about an imminent collapse of the EU is amateurish and a superficial exercise. An educated guess is that the EU will survive but calls for its reform will now no longer be confined to London but will spread far and wide within the bloc.

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It would therefore be premature to conclude that European regionalism is facing its ultimate denouement as it grapples with the fourfold challenges of the sovereign debt crisis, terrorism, the migrants issue and finally the UK’s decision to leave the EU. In the past it has demonstrated its ability to accommodate divergent interests of its member states which increased in numbers, as we noted, from 6 to 28. The Union is sufficiently resilient. The successes of European regionalism are well established which are still being sought to be emulated in other parts of the world. Whether the EU will survive in its present form is another question as there is already a consensus about the need for reform. However, the path it has charted in the past seven decades is well recognized and both the positive and the negative dimensions of the European experiment will provide important lessons for other parts of the world. REGIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA

Compared to other areas of the world, the emergence of the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia is a somewhat belated development. Regional groupings such as the European Union, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as similar entities in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America had assumed concrete institutional shape by the time Zia-ur-Rehman, the then President of Bangladesh, mooted the idea for a similar venture in South Asia in 1980. Besides other factors which contributed to the belated entry of regionalism in South Asia, the moot question that arises whether South Asia can be classified as a region. As mentioned in the introductory part of this paper, regionalism is fostered due to certain commonalities in a region such as geographic contiguity, ethnic and cultural ties, common historical experiences, shared perception among the cooperative units about themselves and the world and the expected benefits from such cooperation, political, economic and even strategic. The concept of South Asia as a region is comparatively of recent vintage. Earlier South Asia, which is essentially the former British ruled Indian subcontinent, used to be conceptualized as a part of Southeast Asia mainly due to its geographical link with that region.

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Scholars, Americans in particular, termed the whole region of today’s South and Southeast Asia as Southern Asia.12 Ceylon (today’s Sri Lanka) and Burma (today’s Myanmar) were also annexed by the British, and Nepal and Bhutan were British protectorates though nominally independent. Though the British were eager to include it in their domain, Afghanistan never became a part of the British Empire. So South Asia today is a region comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives. ‘This imagined territoriality of the present South Asia is highly influenced by the perceptions of the British colonial rulers. On the basis of the perception of the Western scholars, the identity of South Asia within specific geographical boundaries has been reconstructed.’ Burma and Afghanistan have been excluded from this South Asian territoriality – due to the former’s proximity to Southeast Asia and the latter’s inclusion by US policy-makers as a part of Central Asia or South-west Asia, a conceptualization which was further strengthened by the developments that took place after the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979.13 Defined in this light South Asia can be viewed as a region with a homogeneity in historical, social and cultural traditions. It is however a region which is basically Indo-centric as India is central to it both geographically and culturally. India shares common land borders with Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh and maritime borders with Sri Lanka and Maldives. It is in a dominant position not only in terms of population, but also in terms of natural resources, technological know-how, and economic and military strength. This Indo-centric nature of South Asia introduced a fault-line (to use the phrase of Samuel Huntington, the author of the famous ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis) which, with hindsight, can be said to have hobbled the progress of South Asian regionalism. The severe asymmetries that prevail between India and its South Asian neighbours and the bilateral difficulties experienced by New Delhi with almost all the South Asian states excepting Bhutan and Maldives made it wary of advancing any suggestions for a regional framework as it was conscious of the fact that its own size and economic and industrial development could

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prove to be obstacles in the development of regional cooperation in South Asia.14 It was therefore in the fitness of things that the task of initiating regional cooperation fell to one of the smaller and relatively weaker states in South Asia – Bangladesh – whose President Zia-ur-Rehman suggested in 1980 that it was possible to organize cooperation within an institutional framework for the common good of the people of the region. It was suggested that the possible areas of cooperation could be economic, technical, scientific, educational, social and cultural. It was further suggested that in order to make regional cooperation meaningful, the venture had to be mutually beneficial to all countries concerned, irrespective of their existing economic disparities.15 Despite its reservations and a cautious response to the Bangladeshi initiative – in view of the troubled history of the region since independence, especially the turbulent Indo-Pakistani relationship – India was not willing to stand in the way and frustrate the venture which would have been damaging for New Delhi’s image in the region. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was finally set up in December 1985 following a series of ministerial parleys among the seven would be members of the Association namely India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives between 1981 and 1985. A Charter of the Association incorporating the objectives, principles, institutions and general provisions running into 10 articles had already been agreed upon and was adopted at the Dhaka summit of the heads of states and governments in December 1985. As it appears in the Charter, the Association is essentially inter-governmental in nature and has an institutional mechanism comprising a Council of Ministers, Standing Committees, Technical Committees, Action Committees and Financial Arrangements. Special care was taken to ensure prohibition in the raising of bilateral issues of a politico-security nature at meetings of the SAARC as such a practice was likely to vitiate the environment for enhancing economic cooperation and trade relations which was meant to be the basic objective of the organization.16 Considering the geo-political realities in the region the success of

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the states concerned in establishing an association for regional cooperation was indeed a notable achievement. The institutionalization of the movement progressed considerably during the first two decades with a steady increase in the range of activities by the SAARC. A Secretariat, based in Kathmandu, has been playing an important role in coordinating activities launched under the Association. Regional institutions like the Agriculture Centre (Dhaka 1995), the Tuberculosis Centre (Kathmandu 1992), the SAARC Documentation Centre (New Delhi 1994), and the Meteorological Centre (Dhaka 1995) came up in the first decade. However, apart from cooperation in the relatively uncontested issues it had been realized by the SAARC countries that unless the organization could take up the core issues of economic and trade ties a meaningful breakthrough in regionalism in South Asia could not be achieved. A groundbreaking agreement seeking to liberalize intraregional trade within a stipulated period was reached at the seventh summit of SAARC leaders at Dhaka in April 1993. The South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) called for a reduction of trade barriers among the SAARC member states. The step by step liberalization of trade in the region outlined by SAPTA envisaged periodic rounds of trade negotiations for exchange of trade concessions on tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff measures. A new milestone was reached at the 9th summit at Male in July 1998 in further promoting regional trade with the decision to form a South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in the SAARC region by 2001. SAFTA was finally born in 2004 and came into force in 2006 which was quick with ratifications coming from all the SAARC member countries. Though the SAFTA’s progress has not been as rapid as had been hoped for it allowed the member states to take a regional view of trade linkages rather than view them from a national perspective. According to one expert the ‘. . . initial figures of intra-SAARC trade under SAFTA have been encouraging. By the end of 2009 total trade under SAFTA certificates of origin was about $687 million, and by 2010 it crossed $1400 million, which is modest but significant for initial years.’17

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If South Asian trade potential – an Asian Development Bank (ADB) study done in 2008 places the potential of trade under SAFTA at $85.1 billion – has to be realized in a meaningful way SAARC has a long way to go. The principal problem is that large volume of trade in the region is informal which is also indicative of potential trade under SAFTA. An optimistic view of why SAFTA is not proceeding as fast as it should have is ‘the fact that intra-SAARC trade volumes are far lower compared to that in other regions which is not a critique of SAFTA. It rather reflects on structural problems of industry and infrastructure in our region’.18 However, the fact remains that the smaller members of SAARC are somewhat uncomfortable with India’s regional economic clout. There is a fear in some of these countries that if free trade is permitted in the region their markets will be inundated with Indian goods and services which will spell the doom of their own nascent industries. The point to note here is that in spite of such fears countries like Sri Lanka have signed bilateral free trade agreements with India and other countries like Bangladesh are increasingly taking a more flexible view of prospects for free trade in the region. The only exception is Pakistan which is steadfastly standing in the way of the full implementation of SAFTA for reasons, one suspects, not wholly economic and commercial and rather more political and strategic. As of now the SAARC has a long list of key issues of focus on its agenda; these are – Poverty Alleviation and development activities; SAARC Development Fund; Trade, Economy and Finance; Transport and intra-regional connectivity; Narcotics, Drugs, Terrorism and legal matters; Environment, Forestry and Prevention of Natural Disasters: Agriculture and Rural Development; Energy; Social Development: including health, education, women and children, etc. It was hoped from the very beginning that progress in these relatively noncontroversial areas will generate sufficient confidence among member states which will facilitate movement onto other core areas like trade and commerce, removal of tariff barriers, customs union and eventually a common currency and an economic union. Observers of South Asian regionalism are divided in their assessment of the successes, failures and prospects of SAARC as a regional

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organization. Sheel Kant Sharma, former Secretary General of SAARC, reflects an optimistic view of the organization’s future while conceding that we are still far away from the cherished goal of regional economic integration. SAARC and regionalism in South Asia require the intensity of article of faith and an optimistic, problem-solving predisposition. SAARC can transcend the straightjacket of ‘process’ and can bring forth instrumentalities of cooperation (like SAFTA, SDF, South Asian Food Bank etc.) to forge stronger bonds of cooperation.19

A more pessimistic position is taken by another expert. To quote her, Regional cooperation in the South Asian region lacks the commitment and dedication that is required to make it a success. Some countries have agreed to cooperate because they do not want to be spoilers while there are others who genuinely believe that this is the way forward.20

It is worthwhile to quote what the former Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani said in his speech at the 16th SAARC summit in 2010, Only when we refuse to be held hostage to history, only when we sincerely and assiduously work to build trust, resolve disputes, bridge perceptions and see merit in an enlightened collective self-interest, will we be able to unleash our latent potential.21

In September 2016 SAARC suffered a setback when the 19th summit of the Association that was scheduled to take place in Islamabad on 15-16 November was cancelled. The cancellation came in the wake of India’s decision to boycott the summit for Pakistan’s involvement in the terrorist attack at an army camp in the Uri town of Kashmir in September 2016 in which 19 Indian soldiers died. Relations between India and Pakistan had taken a turn for the worse following the audacious attack by a Pakistan-backed terrorist organization on the Pathankot Air Force base in January 2016. India had, since then, been demanding that Pakistan take action against these terrorist organizations who were carrying out repeated attacks against Indian security forces and civilians, especially in Jammu &

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Kashmir though Islamabad largely ignored these complaints. The Uri attack proved to be the last straw that resulted in the cancellation of the Islamabad SAARC summit raising a huge question mark over the very future of SAARC. It is as yet uncertain what the next course of action for the Association is likely to be and what will be its ultimate fate. The concluding note of this section (which was written long before the current impasse enveloped SAARC) can be summed up in the words of the expert noted above. It is a tall order to expect regional cooperation between countries who do not see eye to eye even in bilateral matters. Each country joined SAARC to forward its interests or to avoid getting sidelined, particularly within the Indo-centric region. Pursuing national interests is desirable but to pursue it under the cloak of regionalism is a recipe designed for the failure of SAARC. A regional identity is essential for the success of SAARC. If the countries try to undermine regional interests for their narrow political advantage then members can resign themselves to this forum becoming a mere talking shop. . . . However the time to write the epitaph of SAARC has not yet come. In spite of all the misgivings, and non-implementation of various agreements and conventions, SAARC provides greater regional visibility to smaller countries and provides them with the opportunity and responsibility to contribute to the region in a meaningful way. For them even a failed SAARC is more attractive as a platform than being restricted to bilateralism in an India-dominated region.22 CONCLUSION

The question that has been frequently raised in the context of a comparative analysis of the European and South Asian regionalism is whether the former can be a model for the latter. There is no doubt that the European Union has provided inspiration to many regional groupings around the world which have looked upon the European model as an example to follow. So far as the EU and SAARC are concerned there are differences of opinion. While some say that the EU being structurally a more equitable arrangement is ethically as well as strategically more appropriate for South Asia, the other view is that in spite of many similarities between the two regions in terms

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of their diversity of languages, regions, nationalities and cultural heterogeneity as well as size there is hardly anything in common between South Asian and European historical experiences in the past three centuries. Hence the European experience of regional cooperation is not relevant to South Asia. South Asia can at best have some insights from the European experiences in supra-nationalism; however given the considerable differences in demographic and economic weight it would be hard for South Asia to construct a customs union or a common market.23 The EU is conscious of the complexities of South Asia as a region and the difficulties in building economic and political cooperation given the high geopolitical asymmetries prevailing in the area. However, the EU can still help the South Asian integration process through its own experience in dealing with diversity and crisis prevention. The European Commission has commented extensively on this issue. It offered its opinion way back in 1995 that while it is not worthwhile for SAARC to follow the costly institutional infrastructure of the EU it may be useful to study which EU practices can be adapted in regard to the formulation of proposals of common benefit to the region, principles on the basis of which the competence of the regional bodies may be extended and how economic integration and political consultation could proceed side by side each reinforcing the other.24 Considering the potential for EU-SAARC cooperation the substantive collaborative effort is rather meagre to say the least.The reasons for such a deficiency are not far to seek. First, the internal divisions within SAARC have played a significant role in preventing much effective cooperation with the EU. One is primarily referring here to the India-Pakistan adversarial relationship which has considerably blunted the pace of regional cooperation in South Asia and prevented, as already noted, the ‘core’ areas of economic cooperation from occupying centre stage. Second, the weakness of the SAARC Secretariat also acts as a roadblock since it is empowered to discharge only administrative functions and lacks professional expertise. Unlike the EC which was created by the Treaty of Rome the SAARC Secretariat did not figure in the SAARC Charter and was only created in 1987 by an agreement of the member states. It lacks

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the power to take initiatives and the SAARC member states have not empowered it to take decisions. It also lacks monitoring capabilities to assess the degree of progress in various areas. In contrast the EC enjoys extensive powers in EU’s decision-making and implementation of decisions agreed upon. Third, there is also mutual lack of understanding of each other’s procedures on the part of the EU and the SAARC. Complex as they are the EU procedures are not properly understood within the SAARC. Likewise the EU too is mostly in the dark concerning the methods and procedures adopted in the SAARC. A proper partnership requires adequate understanding of each other’s organizational methods and procedures. There is a genuine absence of appreciation in South Asia of the degree of supra-nationalism that has been achieved in Europe in the past 60 years. Fourth, financial constraints within the SAARC have also acted as a roadblock from implementing regional projects. Financial limitations of the member states as also lack of mutual trust come in the way of genuine regional projects from taking shape in South Asia. Better co-ordination and resource generation is a prerequisite for successful implementation of programme activities and project ideas identified by various SAARC bodies. The EU has a much better record of decision-making and its subsequent implementation in this regard. It follows therefore that while valuable insights can be obtained by SAARC from the EU experiences there is the need for the South Asian organization to develop its own model in accord with its own realities and compulsions. That has been the case with other regional groupings such as the ASEAN, GCC, MERCOSUR, etc. There is a consensus in the scholarly circles that as a regional organization SAARC has not been able to live up to the expectations it generated at the time of its inception in 1985. Some of the reasons have already been discussed in this paper as well as in the existing literature on South Asian regionalism. Commentators have dealt with the crucial role of India in vitalizing SAARC and making it relevant for South Asian development. India needs to act proactively which was evident in the approach of the National Democratic Alliance government led by Narendra Modi since 2014. However, as will be noted later, Modi’s gestures were not reciprocated by Pakistan which makes clear that India cannot unilaterally bring about a pattern of

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behaviour conducive to the promotion of regionalism in South Asia without cooperation from its neighbours. There is often some talk in some circles, even reflected in SAARC summits, of the need to introduce a common currency in South Asia. This is at best an impractical suggestion ignorant of the current realities. A common currency presupposes a considerable degree of economic integration among the participating states which have already gone through the process of forging a free trade area, a customs union and finally an economic union. There has to be a considerable degree of convergences in the economic, commercial, monetary and fiscal policies in the participating states before a common currency can be launched. The South Asian states have not even been able to launch a free trade area which, as already noted, is mired in all kinds of political and technical bottlenecks. As things stand even the European Union is finding it difficult to sustain their common currency – the Euro – in the face of the sovereign debt crisis in which Europe is trapped at the moment. Some doomsday analysts are even predicting that the Euro may collapse though the EU common currency is showing greater resilience than had been anticipated. South Asia may therefore need to tread cautiously and any talk of a common currency may be a long way off. So in conclusion it may be observed that the Europe of today is a Europe which is at peace with itself as it has been able to overcome centuries of conflict, division and great power rivalry which tore it apart in the past. While a dream of a United States of Europe has not materialized it certainly presents to the world the image of a united continent which can act in unison on many of the burning issues that confront today’s Europe and the world. That is not to suggest that the fourfold crises the EU faces today – the sovereign debt problem, terrorism, the migrants issue and Brexit – will necessarily be overcome successfully anytime soon as the very nature of these issues do not lend themselves to straightforward resolutions. The knowledgeable experts are optimistic about the resilience and sound structural dynamics of the EU which will perhaps enable it to negotiate the perilous waters that lie ahead. So far as South Asian regionalism is concerned in the words of a former Secretary General of the SAARC Secretariat,

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. . . the success of SAARC institutional arrangements will rest on identification and pursuit of the core projects which could yield tangible results. These projects can be easily identified in the area of trade facilitation, removal of barriers, improvement of regional transport, removal of transit restrictions, opening up of port facilities and promotion of trade in energy in a comprehensive way, comprising regional grids for electricity, hydropower and gas pipelines. . . . South Asian regionalism is in need of tangible success stories of a magnitude which is proportionate to its larger population.25

Clearly SAARC needs to identify and agree upon projects, as suggested above, which are doable in the light of the regional realities rather than pursue ideals which may have been successful in other regions but may be unrealistic in South Asia. However, as noted above, the success and the very future of SAARC seems to be hanging in the balance in view of the developments in 2016 as India and Pakistan, the two most important member states, struggle to find common ground which has been vitiated by the conflicting narratives of national security in the two states. While optimists would argue that similar situations – involving India and Pakistan – had arisen several times in the past and the Association had been able to overcome them the current impasse seems to be of a more serious nature and a significant breakthrough is imperative if any progress for South Asian regionalism is to be achieved in the near future. NOTES 1. Kenneth J. Twitchett (ed.), European Cooperation Today, London: Europa, 1980, p. xv. 2. Arie M. Kacowicz, ‘Regionalization, Globalization and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent or Over-lapping?’, Alternatives, vol. 24, 1999, pp. 527-56. 3. Twitchett, op. cit., p. 2. 4. Ibid., pp. 5-6. 5. Ibid., p. 13. 6. K.J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicits and International Order, 16481989, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 26. 7. ‘The Treaty of Rome’, cited in Twitchett, op. cit., p. 48. 8. Twitchett., op. cit., p. 48. 9. Ibid. 10. Juan Diez Medrano, ‘The European Union: Economic Giant, Political

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11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

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Dwarf ’, in T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds.), International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 174. Stephen George, ‘An Awkward Partner’: Britain and the European Community, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Anasuya Basu Ray Choudhury, SAARC at Crossroads: Fate of Regional Cooperation in South Asia, New Delhi: Samskriti, 2006, p. 46. Ibid., p. 48. Purusottam Bhattacharya, ‘Regional Co-operation in South Asia and India’s Role: A Critique’, in Sanjukta Bhattacharya (ed.), India at the End of 20th Century, New Delhi: Lancers’ Books, 2001, pp. 233-4. Ibid., p. 234. Charter of the SAARC, Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat, 1985. Sheel Kant Sharma, ‘South Asian Regionalism: Prospects and Challenges’, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, vol. 6, no. 3, July-September 2011, p. 310. Ibid. Ibid., p. 314. Smruti S. Pattanayak, ‘SAARC at Treaty Five: An Incredible Idea Still in its Infancy’, Strategic Analysis, vol. 34, no. 5, September 2010, p. 676. Speech by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yusuf Raja Gilani, at http:// www.sixteenth SAARC Summit.bt/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/Pakistan. pdf Pattanayak, op. cit. Jacob Rusel, ‘The European Union: A Model for Regional Cooperation in South Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly, 7 December 1996, p. 3173. Kant K. Bhargava, Heiuz Bongartz and Farooq Sobhan, Shaping South Asia’s Future, New Delhi: Vikas, 1995, p. 55. Sharma, op. cit., p. 314.

CHAPTER 5

South Asian Regionalism in the Light of Evolving Neo-regionalism in Asia S H A N TA N U C H A K R A B A RT I

INTRODUCTION

regionalism, particularly its economic variant, though not new, has become a significant aspect of global interactions in the post-Cold War period. As of 20 June 2017, 445 notifications of Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) had been received by the GATT/ WTO. Of these, 279 were in force. Many scholars, however, prefer using the term ‘regionalization’ instead of ‘regionalism’ as the former involves a greater degree of intentionality and multilevel approaches while the latter indicates a state led approach at formal and institutional levels. Regionalism, it has been argued, refers to the political process in which states drive cooperative initiatives. Regionalization, by contrast, refers to processes of economic integration which, while they may be influenced by state policies, are essentially the uncoordinated consequence of private sector activities.1 ‘Regionalization’, in this context, it has been argued, should be understood as a two-way, or multi-way, process in which complex constellations of variables at regional, global, national, local, and even personal/individual levels can combine to produce outcomes at any given time.2 The process of regionalization has become particularly prominent since the late 1980s and has been termed as ‘neo-regionalism’, which advocates a more pluralistic, ‘bottom-up’ approach in contrast to the ‘old regionalism experiments’. Neo-regionalism gives greater attention to local specificities and dynamics and prefers to analyse the ‘constructive’ process of regions as opposed to traditional views of

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regions as essentially fixed or semi-fixed geographical spaces only. Raimo Vayrynen, for instance, defines a region as: A spatial concept which is defined by a combination of geographical proximity, density of interactions, shared institutional frameworks, and common cultural identities. . . . Regions are not so much measureable, building blocs of the international order as spatially defined cultural, economic and political constructions whose nature and functions are transformed over time.3

In contrast to traditional state-led regionalism, neo-regionalism, at least theoretically, envisages the region as an instrument for democracy and bottom-up participation, development planning and decision-making generating global political and economic networks. The region develops as a functional aspect of borderless, urban and high-tech society. ‘Regionalization’, seems to be a more appropriate descriptive term for the current process of regional interactions. Neo-regionalism, as a process, has affected Asia in a significant way with major processes of regional interactions and integration being experienced, particularly in Southeast and East Asia. The progress of South Asian regionalization, in contrast, has been tardy. It is common to adopt a critical view of the slow and intermittent progress of regionalization in South Asia, especially if compared to the progress in Southeast and East Asia. One must, however, remember that neoregionalism is a dynamic process much dependent upon local specificities. It is also important to remember that neo-regionalism does cover not only economic interactions but also greater political commitment and interaction at official levels as well as the proliferation of civil society networking and people to people contacts at various societal levels. Thus, the South Asian process of regionalization would continue to be subject to its regional moorings as it cannot simply pick and choose any successful model trying to implement it in its own area (as is often suggested by several analysts). Such experimentations are sure to fail if the local regional dynamics are not taken into account. This essay makes an attempt to analyse the growth and progress of South Asian regionalization process in the context of the spread of neo-regionalism as a global phenomenon affecting the process of regional connectivity in Asia.

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DEFINING NEOREGIONALISM

Neo-regionalism has been defined to be very diverse in its nature and multidimensional, comprising a range of models/structures/processes of region-building rather than the single norm expected of, and advocated for, first wave regionalism by neo-functionalists. Second, it can involve partnerships between states in the ‘North’ and ‘South’, whereas previous regionalisms presupposed only North-North or South-South cooperation. According to one analyst, the ‘new’ regionalism differs from the ‘old’ regionalism in the following respects: 1. Whereas the old regionalism was formed in a bipolar Cold War context, the new is taking shape in a more multipolar world order. 2. Whereas the old regionalism was created from outside and ‘from above’ (i.e. by the superpowers), the new is a more spontaneous process from within and ‘from below’ (in the sense that the constituent states themselves are main actors). 3. Whereas the old regionalism was specific with regard to objectives, the new is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process.4 It has, however, been also argued that the stated differences between ‘new’ and ‘old’ regionalisms as politico-economic projects are exaggerated and overstated, and only two (the North-South element of some new regionalist projects such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Association (NAFTA), and the relative lack of emphasis on issues of identity and legitimacy in the ‘old’ regionalist projects and scholarship) stand up to scrutiny.5 Overall, however, neo-regionalism accepts that regions are essentially constructed through multilevel interactions and takes into account the societal process involved in the regionalization process. FEATURES OF ASIAN NEOREGIONALISM

The process of regionalization in Asia has been slower and different from the process in Europe and the Western world and has generally picked up since the late 1980s and particularly in the post-Cold War period. According to Michael Haas, for instance, the process of Asian

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way to cooperation, in contrast to the more ‘integrationist’ model pursued in Western Europe, was ‘communitarian’ in nature focusing more on less controversial issues and an incremental approach.6 A significant aspect of the Asian growth story has been the enhancement in the scale and penetration of interactions at regional level. As one scholar notes: Economic cooperation and regionalism have become very visible policy instruments in Asian countries, where they have been used to sustain these countries’ growth momentum. At present, almost every country in the region is part of some bilateral or regional trade arrangement. This has led to the proliferation of various free trade agreements (FTA), regional trade agreements (RTA), preferential trade agreements (PTA), and comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPA) within and outside Asia in recent years. The growing economic regionalism/cooperation among Asian countries has been encouraged by various factors, such as increasing regionalism in Europe and North America; the perceived success of economic integration in other regions, especially in the European Union (EU); … recognition of the need to further strengthen economic ties; and the slow progress of multilateral negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Furthermore, the 1997/98 financial crisis underscored Asian interdependence and shared interests and provided the impetus for major intergovernmental engagements and initiatives striving for Asian regionalism.7

Another significant aspect of Asian neo-regionalism has been the enhancement in intra-Asian trade levels, particularly in the context of China’s rising dominance. This led to the popularity of the decoupling thesis in certain circles. Decoupling thesis essentially refers to the phenomenon of a weakening of the impact of demand and supply shocks emanating from the advanced countries on the economic performance of East Asian economies or their growth, which has become more independent from cyclical developments of the global economy.8 For some time the decoupling thesis had been gaining currency in Asian policy circles as rapidly rising levels of intra-regional trade over the past decade seemed to suggest that Asian economies were decoupling from the global economy to form an autonomous zone of economic dynamism which was essentially China-centric. This argument essentially rested on two premises – first, that the declining share of exports to the US and other Western markets

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indicated that the region was increasingly self-reliant as a source of demand; and second, that China’s rapidly growing consumer demand would serve as the primary engine of growth and cushion against a US slowdown or global recession. The 2007-8 economic recession and the global economic slowdown, however, dispelled this as largely being myth as the contagion spread out to Asia, raising several questions over the notion of Asian autonomy. Growing levels of intra-regional Asian trade have been driven primarily by production networks engaged in cross-border trade in parts and components, in an increasingly fragmented regional chain of production consisting mostly of intermediate goods destined for assembly in China and exported outside the region. The global economic crisis also gave rise to the G20 that, while elevating the symbolic weight of Asian economies in global governance, has also created institutional competition for regional frameworks. This fragmentation amongst the Asian 6 (A6) can be seen both in participation, which has been largely unilateral, uncoordinated and driven by national interest/status anxiety, and on the issue of the evolving architecture of global governance, where there appears to be little agreement on the legitimacy, effectiveness and future of the G20.9 Thus, Asian neo-regionalism while making significant progress in regions like Southeast Asia or East Asia, still have not created enough opportunity for Asian economies to attain autonomy which continue to be linked to the global economic tide and ebbs. THE PROGRESS OF REGIONALIZATION IN SOUTH ASIA

South Asian region could be characterized as one with a long history of coherent political, economic and administrative unity. South Asia also constitutes a coherent environmental region with a conjoint ecological cycle and common and shared rivers, oceans, and mountain chains. The region enjoys an extremely rich common historical heritage and legacy, as well as, cultural and socio-economic commonalities. Moreover, like other regions in global space, the conceptualization of South Asia as a region has tended to evolve over time and has not remained static and frozen. New geopolitical and geo-economic

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developments along with greater communication facilities and an increasingly assertive diaspora, all have contributed in substantially altering the conception of South Asia as a region. The South Asian region could be also characterized as a ‘security complex’ constituting a subsystem of the global community of states that for reasons related to historical, geo-strategic and socio-cultural linkages have an interlinked security architecture. This has resulted in regional rivalry and tension expressed through steady rise in military expenditure and defence spending, including the overt nuclearization of the regional rivals, India and Pakistan. The South Asian region is also an ‘Indo-centric’ region because of the strategic location of India straddling the region, her geographical size and extent, her vast population and her superiority in terms of military, economic and soft power. But this has not resulted in unambiguous acceptance of her ‘hegemony’ on the part of the South Asian countries. In fact, projection and exercising of Indian hegemony in the region has been a complex and evolving affair, not uniform in character and often contested. India’s South Asian neighbours have continuously sought to deny or negate this pre-eminence by seeking to limit India’s regional hegemony. All these have had negative consequences in growth of cooperative regionalism in South Asia symbolized by the tardy growth of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Sporadic attempts towards generating greater Asian interactions were attempted initially as a part of decolonization process and generating greater South-South cooperation. An Asian Relations Conference, for instance, was held in New Delhi in March 1947 mainly under Jawaharlal Nehru’s initiative. The Bandung Conference of 1995 also involved such efforts as a part of creating greater AfroAsian solidarity. After the 1955 Bandung conference, the issue of South Asian regional cooperation was informally discussed at various fora, from time to time. In 1961, for instance, a conference of Asian Economic Planners organized by the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was held in New Delhi which led to the setting up of an Asian Institute of Economic Development and a Regional Advisory Group on Economic Development and Planning

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in Asia. But discussions on furthering regional economic cooperation could not yield any positive result as India and her neighbours like Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and Pakistan remained lukewarm to the idea.10 The idea of creating a regional organization in South Asia was once again revived during late 1970s primarily through the efforts of the then Bangladesh president Zia ur Rehman. Bangladesh was also the first to provide rationale for such cooperation by preparing the Bangladesh Working Paper (BWP) often called the ‘Bible of SAARC’. The BWP, giving instances of regional states being members of transregional fora like the ESCAP, NAM and the Commonwealth stated that South Asia constituting one-fifth of humanity must cooperate in order to alter the uneven level of development in the region. Since its establishment in 1985, the SAARC has completed thirty two years of its existence managing to give itself an institutional base in the process. But little achievement has been made in the original objective of enhancing regional cooperation to reduce the disparities and ensuring a more cooperative developmental agenda (see Table 1). The cooperative ventures within the region also get hampered by the dominant state centric paradigm within the region which includes TABLE 1: SOUTH ASIA: SELECTED HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Rank

73 105 131 132 139 144 147 169

Country

Sri Lanka Maldives India Bhutan Bangladesh Nepal Pakistan Afghanistan

Selected human development indicators Life Expectancy at birth (years) (2015)

Expected years of schooling

Gross National Income (GNI per capita) (2011 PPP $)

75 77 68.3 69.9 72 70 66.4 60.7

14 12.7 11.7 12.5 10.2 12.2 8.1 10.1

10,789 10,383 5,663 7,081 3,341 2,337 5,031 1,871

Source: Data compiled from the UNDP Human Development Report 2016, http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf, (accessed: 16 December 2017).

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S H A N TA N U C H A K R A B A RT I TABLE 2: MILITARY EXPENDITURE BY COUNTRY AS PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 201016

Country Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

2010

2011

2012

2013

2104

2015

2016

1.9 1.3 – 2.7 1.5 3.1 2.7

1.8 1.4 – 2.7 1.5 3.1 2.7

1.2 1.3 – 2.5 1.4 3.3 2.2

1.1 1.3 – 2.5 1.4 3.3 2.2

1.3 1.3 – 2.5 1.6 3.3 2.4

1.0 1.4 – 2.4 1.5 3.4 2.5

1.0 1.3 – 2.5 1.4 3.4 2.4

Source: The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) websitehttps://www.sipri.org/sites/default/ files/Milex-share-of-GDP.pdf(accessed: 27 December 2017).

robust military build up as a part of the nation building exercise among the constituent countries. Table 2 provides details on the steady and constant level of military expenditure in the region. SAARC, as an organization, thus, is yet to make any substantial impact in elevating the level of economic integration in the region. In spite of the introduction of trade liberalization schemes like the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) in 1995 and South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2004, the level of intra-regional trade continues to remain low, hovering between 4 and 6 per cent only. This is in spite of the fact, that during the first three years of their independence, intra-regional trade among India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, as a percentage of their total trade, was in the double digits. The percentage of intra-regional trade, however, began to go down particularly as regional tensions as in the case of India and Pakistan, political tensions virtually closed official international trade between them. With intra-regional trade at less than 5 per cent of total trade, South Asia is the least integrated region in the world, dwarfed by East Asia’s 35 per cent Southeast Asia’s 25 per cent and Europe’s 60 per cent. It also remains one of the world’s least connected regions with it being 20 per cent cheaper for the South Asian giant India to trade with Brazil than its neighbour Pakistan.12 Tardiness in enhancing regional economic connectivity has affected South Asia’s overall global economic profile. The tables below (Tables 3 & 4) indicate how the participation of South Asian economies in

TABLE 3: SAARC SHARE OF WORLD TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 201516

Country

Merchandise Trade (Share in world’s total exports) (%)

Merchandise Trade (Share in world’s total imports) (%)

Commercial Services Trade (Share in world’s total exports) (%)

Commercial Services Trade (Share in world’s total imports)(%)

0.00 0.22 0.00 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.06

0.06 0.26 0.01 2.21 0.01 0.06 0.29 0.12

0.01 0.04 0.00 3.35 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.15

0.02 0.17 0.00 2.83 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.13

Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Source: Data compiled from World Bank website, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/ WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=AF%2cBD%2cIN% 2cMV%2cNP%2cPK%2cLK%2cBT (accessed: 24 December 2017).

TABLE 4: FDI FLOWS IN SOUTH ASIA 2017

(in millions of dollars) FDI Inflows 2014 World Asia South Asia Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

2015

FDI Outflows 2016

2014

2015

2016

13,23,863 17,74,001 17,46,423 12,53,159 15,94,317 14,52,463 4,60,136 5,23,641 4,42,665 4,12,333 3,38,683 3,63,058 41,417 50,848 53,735 12,020 7,817 5,553 37 163 100 – 1 -1 1,551 2,235 2,333 44 46 41 17 7 -12 – – – 34,582 44,064 44,486 11,783 7,572 5,120 333 308 448 – – – 30 52 106 – – – 1,867 1,289 2,006 122 25 52 894 680 898 67 54 237

Source: Data compiled from Annex table I.1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2011-16 in UNCTAD World Investment Report 2017: Invest and the Digital Economy, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2017), pp. 222-5.

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global merchandise and service trade has remained low and relatively constant. Though the regional economies share similar developmental challenges, India’s economy is disproportionately larger than its neighbours’. Currently, India accounts for about 80 per cent of the region’s GDP, Pakistan accounts for about 10 per cent, Bangladesh 6 per cent, Sri Lanka 2 per cent, and the rest less than 2 per cent. Thus, one could easily comment that one of the major causes of poor intra-regional trade in South Asia is because of India’s low key economic involvement in the region.13 India, in fact, prefers to have bilateral trade agreements with her South Asian neighbours and already enjoys free trade agreements with South Asian neighbours like Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. Initiatives to bolster South Asian economic integration, thus, continue to remain mostly confined to policy brief/papers and expert committee recommendations rather than getting translated into action. Though there are signs that intra-regional FDI in South Asia is now on the increase, as some of India’s major corporations are expanding their regional investments, taking advantage of a relatively good business environment in some of the countries of the region, the percentage is still very low as has been estimated to be around less than 4 per cent of the total FDI inflows, received by the South Asian countries.14 RECENT TRENDS IN SOUTH ASIAN REGIONALIZATION PROCESS

An internationalization of the region as a result of greater involvement of extra-regional powers has been taking place. While this has mostly happened in terms of bilateral engagements, the trend has had some impact at multilateral level also. The SAARC, for instance, currently has nine external observers: Australia, China, European Union (EU), Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea (South Korea), Mauritius, Myanmar, and the USA. The SAARC, in recent years, has also sought to diversify its operations by establishing linkages (bilateral and multilateral basis) with external countries or organizations particularly located in Southeast Asia and East Asia.

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South Asia, however, still remains the least integrated region in the world, where integration is measured by intra-regional trade in goods, capital, and ideas. Intra-regional trade as a share of total trade is the lowest for South Asia. There is little cross-border investment within South Asia. The flow of ideas, crudely measured by the cross-border movement of people, or the number of telephone calls, or the purchase of technology and royalty payments, are all low for South Asia. In South Asia, for instance, only 7 per cent of international telephone calls are regional, compared to 71 per cent for East Asia.15 The dream of converting the SAFTA into a duty free area by 2016 for all member countries, thus, still remains a distant dream. It has been argued that the growth of intra-regional trade has remained subdued due to considerations other than economic issues like regional strategic rivalry and tension. Inadequate physical infrastructure hampers their global competitiveness even in those sectors where they have revealed comparative advantages along with high level of protectionism also hamper attempts towards greater economic integration.16 The rationale for any protectionism in a preferential or free trade agreement is to provide protection to sectors considered unfit for competition (infant industry argument, socio-economic arguments to protect small-scale producers, agricultural products for food security reasons). According to SAFTA regulations, member countries, for instance, are required to review the list for reduction every four years or earlier, as established by the SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC) but there is no formal or binding commitment.17 It has been observed that often, during the process of stakeholder consultation, sectors with strong domestic lobbies seeking protection get included in the list. Sensitive lists, particularly in the case of India, have come to be dominated largely by such sectors.18 India’s granting of duty-free access to goods from five SAARC countries in November 2011 is expected to strengthen intra-regional links and there was a framework agreement to reduce customs duties of all traded goods to zero by 2016.19 But such deadlines tend to get extended indefinitely. But one should also be careful that the regional arrangements are truly trade creating, making its members better off, and do not end in trade diversification, which is a negative development. The trade related dispute settlement mechanism process in all the

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South Asian countries is also much longer than in Southeast and East Asian regions. Infrastructure development and energy production remain vital drivers in any significant enhancement of regional cooperation. Proper transportation facility has typically been seen as one of the major determinants of economic integration process. It enhances international and regional connectivity through the free flow of goods and factors across borders, allowing countries to benefit from a better relocation of resources. The SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport Study, which was endorsed by the member countries during 14th SAARC Summit in New Delhi in 2007, gives a comprehensive assessment of the inadequate nature of regional infrastructure. At present, infrastructure investment in terms of GDP in South Asia varies from less than 1 per cent (Nepal) to 4.8 per cent (India). Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka come in between. In order to sustain 8 per cent GDP growth in South Asia, there would an increased demand for infrastructure services that in turn would require investment amounting to about 10-12 per cent of GDP during the period 2008 to 2012.20 Regional connectivity also continues to suffer from inefficient and underdeveloped border zone warehouse and other facilities. South Asia is also yet to have a proper regional transit arrangement, although partial transit exists for land-locked countries like Afghanistan, TABLE 5: INDIA’S TRADE WITH SAARC COUNTRIES 201617

(in $ million) Country

Afghanistan Bangladesh Bhutan Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Export From India

Import to India

Total Volume of Bilateral Trade

India’s Total Trade

Percentage share

506.34 6820.11 509.28 197.79 5,453.59 1,821.87 3,913.15

292.90 701.68 307.82 9.17 445.13 454.49 602.20

799.24 7521.79 817.10 206.97 5,898.72 2,276.36 4,515.35

660207.28 660207.28 660207.28 660207.28 660207.28 660207.28 660207.28

0.12 1.14 0.12 0.03 0.89 0.34 0.68

Source: Export Import Data Bank, Ministry of Commerce, Government of India website http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp (accessed on 31 December 2017).

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Bhutan and Nepal. Poor quality of regional transport and improper monitoring system adds to the woes which reduce the level of regional connectivity. Most SAARC countries are also not signatories to major international conventions related to transit (see Table 6). The SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services has been signed in April 2010. While countries like Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, have ratified the agreement, other SAARC members like Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal and the Maldives, have been dragging their feet.21 If the process of regionalization is a comprehensive one, it needs to be a more people-centred process. Given the level of income disparity and inadequate development in the region, the importance of making SAARC more development oriented can hardly be overstressed. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been adopted by all the countries of South Asia. There is also a regional commitment and monitoring of the MDGs by the SAARC countries. At the 13th SAARC Summit held in Bangladesh in 2005, the Heads of State or Government endorsed the SAARC Development Goals (SDGs), which are based on the MDGs and localized for the region. In order to properly implement the goals, certain long overdue concrete steps must be taken up on an urgent basis. The SAARC Food Security Reserve which was renamed as the SAARC Food Bank in 2007, for instance, needs to be activated. With nearly 40 per cent of the world’s poor and 35 per cent of the world’s malnourished residing in the region, its importance can hardly be overstressed. Similarly, the SAARC Development Fund (SDF) should be more vigorously utilized. Given the global spread of the South Asian diaspora, the regional organization must also initiate some concrete programme for the diaspora people, particularly the vulnerable sections. It has been estimated, for instance, that the South Asian region receives annually US$ 39.4 billion remittances from its workers overseas. A coordinating mechanism is required particularly as majority of these migrants go to Gulf countries where the vulnerable and poor sections often get subjected to major harassment or exploitation. A major SAARC initiative taken up during the 1990s was to create a subregional cooperative group consisting of India (eastern and north-eastern states), Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal within SAARC.

Yes No No

No

No

Yes

No

Bangladesh

No

Afghanistan

No

No

No

No

Bhutan

No

No

Yes

Yes

India

No

No

No

No

Maldives

No

No

No

No

Nepal

No

No

Yes

Yes

Pakistan

No

No

No

Yes

Sri Lanka

Source: Prabir De, Regional Cooperation for Regional Infrastructure Development: Challenges and Policy Options for South Asia, RIS Discussion Paper No. 160, RIS, New Delhi (December 2009), p. 46.

Convention on Road Traffic (1968) Convention on Road Signs and Signals (1968) Customs Convention on Temporary Importation of Commercial Road Vehicles (1956) Customs Convention on Containers (1972)

Convention

TABLE 6: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

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In contrast to its initial apathy to joining SAARC, India was enthusiastic to move forward with the idea of a subregional scheme within the organization’s structure.22 While much has been written on this at the policy planning level, there is a need for more focus here as the group has the potential of initiating significant development works in undeveloped zones covered within the geographical space envisaged by the group. It has also been suggested that regional integration in South Asia will get a boost if it is undertaken as part of a broader pan-Asian cooperation. This will lend it greater dynamism and minimize the fears of smaller member countries towards regional cooperation in South Asia.23 In recent years, within Asia, India’s major economic initiatives are mainly directed through the ‘Look East Policy’ (now renamed as Act East Policy) which seeks to expand India’s links with the countries located in Southeast Asia and East Asia along with her burgeoning influence in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean zones. Joint economic initiatives involving South Asian countries like the South Asian sub-regional grouping, the Kunming Initiative, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Cooperation, the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORARC) along with the subregional group within SARRC, are mostly attempts to create extra-regional economic linkages between South Asia and Southeast Asia and East Asian countries rather than enhancing regional cooperation within South Asia specifically. CONCLUSION

It has been argued that the process of economic integration in South Asia will remain mired unless there is a change in focus on the part of the South Asian states away from traditional security concerns to human security in these countries.24 While certain steps towards generating a more comprehensive and holistic cooperative agenda have been taken, it must be remembered that regionalization in South Asia cannot escape its ‘South Asia’ centric nature and political process. The irony is that any South Asian initiative would require India’s greater involvement, but it continues to generate fears about encirclement and domination by the regional hegemon. Much of this

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is, however, not correct. Recent empirical analysis, for instance, has proven that India’s economic growth is not unilateral and that India’s growth related spillovers are transmitted regionally through a combination of direct and indirect channels and have had a positive impact on South Asian growth. But the impact is still limited if compared against similar regional experiments because of limited regional economic connectivity.25 The problem is that the South Asian regionalization process needs to fulfil the twin functions of being a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) exercise and a facilitator of regional economic cooperation at the same time, which is a difficult task. The SAARC, over the years, has clearly proven itself to be incapable of performing both the tasks at the same time. The fact that it has managed to survive over thirtytwo years is itself is a major regional achievement. Changing regional dynamics in terms of greater opening up of the region from within and without as displayed by developments like greater civil society level interactions, increasing influence of the regional emigrant communities over policy making and extra-regional strategic intrusions (particularly the US and China) also generate new and evolving challenges for the regionalization process. The future of South Asian regionalization would, thus, depend upon a set of interconnected variables, all of which are not entirely economic in nature. NOTES 1. Mark Beeson, ‘Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 6, 2005, p. 971. 2. Alex Warleigh-Lack, ‘Towards a Conceptual Framework for Regionalisation: Bridging “New Regionalism” and “Integration Theory”’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 13, no. 5, December 2006, p. 759. 3. Raimo Vayrynen, ‘Post Hegemonic and Post Socialist Regionalism: A Comparison for East Asia and Central Europe’, Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies Working Paper, August 1997, Source: Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAONET), http:// www.ciaonet.org/wps/ var01/index.html (accessed on 24 August 2001). 4. Bjorn Hettne, ‘The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace’, in Bjorn Hettne and Andras Inotai (eds.), The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security, Helsinki: UNU/ WIDER, 1994, p. 2.

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5. Alex Warleigh-Lack, op. cit., p. 767. 6. Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace, New York: Praeger, 1989. 7. Durgesh K. Rai, ‘Asian Economic Integration and Cooperation: Challenges and Ways Forward for Pan-Asian Regionalism’, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Paper 152/2010, November 2010, pp. 6-7. 8. Yung Chul Park, ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Decoupling of East Asia – Myth or Reality?’, Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) Working Paper No. 281, ADBI, June 2011, p. 3. 9. Hugo Dobson, ‘The G20: Engine of Asian Regionalism?’, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Paper 179/2011, November 2011, p. 19. 10. Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 81. 11. Human Development in South Asia 2015, the Economy and the People, Lahore: Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, 2015, p. 13. 12. ‘The Potential of Intra-regional Trade for South Asia’, Infographic, The World Bank, 24 May 2016. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/ 05/24/the-potential-of-intra-regional-trade-for-south-asia (accessed on 20 December 2017). 13. Ding Ding and Iyabo Masha (eds.), ‘India’s Growth Spillovers to South Asia’, IMF Working Paper 12/56, International Monetary Fund, February 2012, pp. 7-8. 14. Ibid. p. 9. 15. Sadiq Ahmed and Ejaz Ghani, ‘South Asia’s Growth and Regional Integration: An Overview’, in Sadiq Ahmed and Ejaz Ghani (eds.), South Asia’s Growth and Regional Integration, New Delhi: World Bank and Macmillan, 2007, p. 4. 16. Rajeev Jain and J.B. Singh, ‘Trade Pattern in SAARC Countries: Emerging Trends and Issues’, Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, vol. 30, no. 3, Winter 2009, p. 111. 17. Nisha Taneja, Saon Ray, Neetika Kaushal and Devjit Roy Chowdhury, ‘Enhancing Intra-SAARC Trade: Pruning India’s Sensitive List Under SAFTA’, Working Paper No. 255, New Delhi: ICRIER, April 2011, p. 2. 18. Ibid. 19. Ding Ding and Iyabo Masha (eds.), op. cit., p. 8. 20. Prabir De, ‘Regional Cooperation for Regional Infrastructure Development: Challenges and Policy Options for South Asia’, RIS Discussion Paper No. 160, New Delhi: RIS, December 2009, p. 9. 21. Nazmul Ahsan, ‘SAARC Trade in Services Deal in Limbo due to Fear Factor’, The Financial Express, 3 October 2011, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd. com/ more. php? news_ id=151553 (accessed on 16 October 2011). 22. Md Nuruzzaman, ‘SAARC and Subregional Co-operation: Domestic Politics

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and Foreign Policies in South Asia’, Contemporary South Asia, vol. 8, no. 3, 1999, p. 318. 23. Ramesh Chandra and Rajeev Kumar, ‘South Asian Integration Prospects and Lessons from East Asia’, Working Paper No. 202, New Delhi: ICRIER, January 2008, p. 19. 24. Muchkund Dubey, ‘SAARC and South Asian Economic Integration’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 42, no. 14, 7-13 April 2007, p. 1240. 25. Ding Ding and Iyabo Masha (eds.), op. cit., pp. 19-20.

CHAPTER 6

SAARC in India’s Foreign Policy Calculus PA RT H A P R AT I M B A S U

INTRODUCTION

regionalism as a feature of the international system involves development of institutionalized cooperation among states and other actors covering a varied mix of economic, social, political and security concerns on the basis of regional contiguity. In some instances such as the European Union (EU) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), this process has ended up in the construction of an integrated regional space subject to some distinct common rules of behaviour. Regionalization might refer to intensification of social and economic interaction, either through state-led integration schemes intended to increase such interaction or measures to ensure stability where there is market-led integration. But regional organizations can also foster ‘security communities’ (transitional communities in which peoples have dependable expectations of peaceful change) by promoting cooperation, establishing norms of behaviour, and serving as sites of socialization and learning. Two ‘waves’ of regionalism are usually identified with the early 1990s as the rough cut-off point: while the earlier experiments were primarily state-directed which emerged after Second World War in the context of post-colonial restructuring, economic protectionism or regional security concerns; the later developments represented market-driven ‘new’ or ‘open’ regionalism which coincided with the end of the Cold War and onset of the latest phase of globalization. Regionalist experiences in the continents of America, Europe, Asia and Africa, however, have followed different patterns reflecting divergent political and cultural contexts.1

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The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) which expanded in 2007 to induct Afghanistan as its eighth constituent in addition to the founding members India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives, was formed as a regional multilateral initiative in 1985. Its aim was to accelerate the process of economic and social development in the member states through collaborative action in certain specified areas of cooperation. But from the very outset, the organization was hamstrung by several procedural and political constraints which spawned a sense of disillusionment among many SAARC-watchers. Politically speaking, it had to bear the brunt of the ever volatile Indo-Pak ties and strains of mistrust and misgivings that characterized India’s relations with other smaller neighbours as well. In this backdrop, the insistence in the SAARC Charter on respecting the principles of sovereign equality, political independence and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs coupled with the rule of decision-making through consensus has seriously maimed the organization. So much so that a section of Indian foreign policy elites as well as political analysts seem convinced that India should bypass SAARC and pursue its growth trajectory in partnership with more cohesive and robust regional organizations such as ASEAN. This article makes an attempt to assess this position under four heads: the first section looks at the changing facets of India’s engagement with SAARC especially in the wake of the second wave of regionalism in the 1990s; the second and third sections examine SAARC’s performance in the areas of security and economy in the light of the notions of ‘security community’ and ‘new regionalism’; and the final section concludes with some observations on the relevance of SAARC in India’s foreign policy calculations. EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S SAARC POLICY

During the early years of SAARC, India’s disposition towards the organization was at best lukewarm. On one hand, New Delhi firmly maintained that all problems and disputes between various countries of South Asia had to be sorted out bilaterally. There was no question of the involvement of any third party whether it was a superpower,

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a state of the region or any collective entity. And this pronouncement stood irrespective of the fact that it sounded largely incompatible with the principle of multilateralism New Delhi propagated internationally. However, its lack of enthusiasm for the new organization was also rooted in the perception that the SAARC was a mechanism devised by its neighbours to isolate it politically within South Asia. It may be noted that threat perceptions of the members of the region diverged widely: for India, prevention of intervention by extra-regional powers – more precisely the US – was the major concern while for the rest, especially Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh, India constituted a bigger threat. Thus New Delhi’s reading that the organization was at least partly designed to deflect India’s weight could hardly be dismissed altogether.2 The 1990s, however, ushered in two epoch-making developments, viz., the end of the Cold War and acceleration of the pace of economic globalization which in turn entailed two momentous changes in the course of Indian foreign policy. First, New Delhi’s relations with the Western powers including the USA improved perceptibly which by and large warded off New Delhi’s earlier apprehensions regarding external intervention in South Asia. Second, economics rather than politics seemed to emerge as the major driving force in the ‘new world order’ which was affirmed by the formation of the World Trade Organization, the stillborn component of the so-called Bretton Woods system set up in the 1940s. In the wake of these transformations a marked shift occurred in New Delhi’s appraisal of SAARC. The imperatives of engagement with SAARC from the standpoint of Indian foreign policy elites, observed C. Raja Mohan, were economic as well as political.3 In the wake of globalization, most of the states of South Asia were found to undertake market-oriented economic reforms which imparted new meaning and significance to the notion of regional economic cooperation. Perhaps with the exception of Pakistan all the countries of the region seemed keen on moving in the direction of a regional free market, and it also dawned on them that such an arrangement could not exclude India. New Delhi too, in the backdrop of the proliferation of other regional economic blocs, began to appreciate the urgency of stepping up trade flows within the region. However, these economic considerations

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overlapped with the logic of India’s growing aspirations to achieve major – global and not simply regional – power status. It was convinced that to attain this objective, the ambience of perpetual tension and mistrust with the neighbours had to give way to a framework of positive cooperation in the region. It also called for neutralizing Pakistan’s proclivity to exploit the problems India had with its smaller neighbours to its own advantage. In other words, one prerequisite of India’s emergence as a power to reckon with was to foster a ‘patient, sensitive and sophisticated policy of engaging neighbours, removing obstacles to cooperation and gaining trust incrementally’. Its response took the form of the ‘Gujral Doctrine’,4 i.e. the bold and imaginative departure made from India’s longstanding neighbourhood policy by I.K. Gujral, first foreign minister and then prime minister under the short-lived United Front government (1996-7). This fresh policy initiative rested on the assumption that in order to transform the regional dynamics and expedite cultivation of common interests with its South Asian neighbours, New Delhi should eschew the principle of reciprocity and show greater generosity towards the smaller states. It seemed to realize that the emphasis it had previously laid on symmetry and reciprocity in resolving bilateral disputes with its neighbours inescapably restricted the elbow room for the smaller neighbours both domestically and internationally which in turn came in the way of the pursuit of mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation. In other words, the essence of the policy was ‘giving more for less’ which was mandated by India’s self-interest and considerations of realpolitik. SAARC AND THE SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY SCENARIO

This brings us, in this and the following section, to an evaluation of SAARC’s functioning and performance, undertaken with a view to grasping how far the same could contribute towards furthering India’s foreign policy goals. This assessment will be made in terms of two areas of cooperation often taken to explain the rationale and dynamics of regional organizations: fostering of security and intensification of economic exchanges. Although security does not officially figure in SAARC charter as an area of cooperation, from the very outset its

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potential for enhancing security in the region – at regional, extraregional as well as intra-state levels – has been debated by scholars and practitioners alike. The SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism was signed as early as in 1987 and came into effect in 1988 following ratification by the member states. This was followed up by the signing of the Additional Protocol on Terrorism with a view to address the issue of terrorist financing structure in 2005 though it sparked off a heated debate on the definition of terrorism. Pran Chopra, the Indian political commentator, pleaded for a ‘SAARC route to security’ decades earlier and offered three concrete proposals: a region-wide ‘no-bases-no-war’ agreement, regional collective security and a verifiable regional nuclear ban in South Asia.5 Similarly, the Sri Lankan scholar Amal Jayawardane proposed in a conference held in 2009 that SAARC should develop its own security mechanism building on the experiences of other regional organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which would enhance its operational capability to effectively tackle terrorism.6 Yet these expectations failed to materialize7 largely because the states of South Asia failed to evolve a ‘security community’.8 The functioning of a regional organization is often predicated on the formation of a ‘security community’ which is said to exist when a group of states share a broad agreement as to resolving mutual differences short of resort to force, threat of force or use of violence. In this sense a security community draws upon the notion of cooperative security where the actors define security with – rather than against – others. A study of the more successful regional groupings such as EU or ASEAN revealed that the urge to form a security community was generated by the perception of a shared external threat (e.g. Soviet and/or Chinese communism). But no such threat of a common extraregional ‘enemy’ existed in South Asia that could bring the countries together on a common security-oriented platform. Instead South Asia was marked by an enormous power asymmetry between India and its regional neighbours. India was perceived by the smaller states of the region – with the exception of Pakistan perhaps – as the principal intra-regional menace which made the major inter-state disputes in

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the subcontinent predominantly India-centric. The seemingly endless inventory of problems between India and Pakistan – Kashmir, terrorism, (nuclear) arms race, water disputes, identity-related questions (e.g. communal riots and treatment of minorities) to name a few – were relatively well-known. But Indo-Bangladesh relations too were marked by anxieties over river water sharing, land boundary disputes, illegal immigration, fundamentalism, cross-border terrorism9; the ethnic question vitiated India’s equations with Sri Lanka10 while irritants in Indo-Nepal ties covered both ethnic and political matters.11 While some progress was made over time towards abatement of some of these disputes, the structural threat perceptions of India’s neighbours did not change much. The second obstacle to the formation of a security community stemmed from the clash of the security perspectives held by India and Pakistan – one status quoist and the other revisionist. In other words, while New Delhi upheld the geo-strategic unity of the subcontinent, Islamabad stressed extra-regional – US, Chinese or West Asian – involvement to counterbalance the strategic advantages enjoyed by India.12 In relation to this fundamental divide in the subcontinent, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh stood neutral at best: if they did not overtly support Pakistan nor did they join hands with India either. While this mindset could be largely attributed to mistrust of India’s perceived hegemonic ambitions, sub-national issues and internal security considerations – as mentioned above – also came in the way of normalization of bilateral relations with India. On the part of India, third, emphasis on bilateralism still remains strong which has thwarted the installation of a multilateral conflictresolution mechanism comparable with, for example, that of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It is primarily because of New Delhi’s inflexible posture that contentious bilateral issues have been left out of SAARC’s purview which has substantially restricted its scope as a regional organization. It posed a peculiar dilemma before SAARC members: while it is well-known that the organization virtually stands hostage to Indo-Pak rivalry, any suggestion that the regional grouping could have some role in settling disputes between the two countries was firmly ruled out by India.13 As a result, any arrangement that could transcend the competitive

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security dynamics and erect a cooperative framework in its place to facilitate peaceful modes of conflict resolution at thresholds far below from direct mobilization seemed almost an impossibility in the South Asian context. No wonder the high hopes harboured by scholars such as Chopra as to fashioning a collective security system, no-war treaty or regional nuclear ban agreement following the establishment of SAARC remained unfulfilled. In practice it was found that even on such a vital contemporary challenge as terrorism, consensus and cooperation was found difficult to achieve within the SAARC framework.14 SAARC AS FACILITATOR OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

The ‘new regionalism’ which largely accounts for proliferation of regional groupings in the current phase of globalization has also fuelled fresh expectations of SAARC evolving into a vibrant regional organization. The notion of new regionalism rests on the assumption that economic cooperation induced by the logic of free trade within a region leads to a ‘thick web of interdependence’ among the partner countries.15 As most of the South Asian states embraced economic reforms and opened up their economies since the 1990s, the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was launched in 1995 which was upgraded to South Asian Free Trade Area in 2006. India as the key player of the region was exhorted by many to undertake a leading role in raising the level of trading ties and allied economic exchanges among the South Asian countries.16 New Delhi’s potential gains from this exercise, it was pointed out, included infusion of greater trust among neighbours with commensurate strategic dividends, facilitation of economic integration of its geographical fringes such as the north-eastern region and consolidation of energy security among others. Critics, however, maintained that the basic flaw in the ‘new regionalism’ thesis was the belief that the economic calculations would operate independent of security and political considerations. Indeed, India-Pakistan relationship offers an excellent case study of the interplay of economic and political factors in international relations.

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In the first year after Partition, 56 per cent of Pakistan’s exports went to India and one-third of its imports came from there. But by the turn of the new century, India-Pakistan trade – together with most other legitimate movements across the border – became negligible as bilateral relations between the neighbours turned from bad to worse through the decades. This only confirmed that when it comes to an intense clash of political and economic forces, the former usually override the latter. In this connection, it may be recalled that the process of economic integration among West European states was launched in the 1950s in the hope of preventing future wars in the continent, but the project was ultimately successful because war between France and Germany – the arch rivals – had already become highly unlikely. But the Indian subcontinent presented a different picture where if the Pakistanis made movement on the Kashmir issue a precondition for implementing SAFTA norms, New Delhi called on Islamabad to curb terrorism before any comprehensive dialogue could begin on the longstanding bilateral disputes. Under the circumstances, the logic of ‘new regionalism’ with the accessories of liberalization, open communications and a host of functional cooperation hardly had much prospect of operating in South Asia.17 Empirical studies on the future of regional integration in South Asia, on the other hand, have thrown up mixed conclusions which in any case added to the concerns regarding the fate of SAPTA/ SAFTA. Thus some argued18 that most of the prerequisites for the emergence of a successful trading arrangement remained plainly absent in the region. These preconditions included: high pre-arrangement tariffs; a high level of trade in the region before the arrangement; the existence of complementary rather than competitive trade; and differences in the economic structures of the countries concerned. Of these, it was pointed out, only the first was met in the case of South Asia thanks to the protectionist policies followed by most of the states of the region since attaining independence from British colonial rule. These measures in effect encouraged both trade diversion from South Asia and duplication of commodities (such as jute and rubber) across the region which had an adverse impact on the volume of intra-regional trade. Thus, while some scholars correctly detected a significant rise in intra-regional trade in the new millennium, this

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increase had been recorded in terms of a very narrow base.19 Further, the bulk of intra-SAARC trade remained heavily skewed in favour of bilateral trade between India and other member countries. While India and Pakistan traded essentially with the developed countries, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka imported a substantial proportion from South Asia – especially India – but these ironically constituted a tiny fraction of India’s exports. This brings us to another set of studies which identified potential benefits from preferential trade liberalization in South Asia but even these held that smaller countries were likely to gain more than the larger countries, and that India’s gains were estimated to be much higher under unilateral liberalization than under preferential liberalization.20 In other words, we are again transported to the grossly asymmetric situation prevalent in the region where the larger party – in this case India – lacked the incentive to dismantle the tariff structure all at once because the structural asymmetry made multilateral arrangements more favourable to the smaller states. The latter in their turn lacked the capacity to reciprocate the former in terms of positive benefit and negative penalty and remained wary of engagement out of fear of being swamped by the more powerful actor. Under the circumstances, India’s response has taken two different forms. On one hand, it chose to enter into bilateral free trade agreements with individual member countries of SAARC which appeared far more liberal and substantial in freeing intra-regional trade. Such agreements were concluded with Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka and one with Bangladesh too was on the cards.21 Indeed, the trend has also seemed to be catching on with the other SAARC members with Sri Lanka sealing a similar agreement with Pakistan in 2010 and contemplating one with Bangladesh as well. On the other hand, a ‘logic of transcendence’ appears to have come into force which prompted India along with some other member states to redefine South Asian economic space, reach out to adjacent economic zones and thereby escape inter-state conflicts that afflicted SAARC. The logic of globalization and the expansion of the Indian economy have driven India to forge closer ties with the dynamic economies of the Southeast Asian and the Asia Pacific regions through its Look-East (renamed ‘Act East’ under PM Modi) initiative. Thus

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India signed a free trade agreement with ASEAN in goods in 2011 and followed it up with an FTA in services and investments in 2012 with a view to strengthening economic engagement with this region. Similar market opening pacts were also either implemented or under active consideration with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Again, some SAARC members either coming together at subregional level or in conjunction with neighbouring states outside SAARC sought to proceed with economic cooperation at a more rapid pace than seemed feasible under SAARC’s rules of unanimity. Thus the BIMSTEC/Bay of Bengal Initiative emerged as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia and was slated to become a ‘growth quadrangle’ typical of East Asia to foster economic consolidation by avoiding Indo-Pak conflict rhetoric. The Asian Development Bank and private sector enterprises have floated the idea of another South Asian Growth Quadrangle embracing Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and 11 contiguous eastern and north-eastern states of India. The Kunming Initiative connecting provinces of Southwest China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and north-eastern India in cooperative network remains yet another case in point. DOES INDIA THEN NEED SAARC?

Thus we are propelled to this all important final question and for some, the answer is firmly in the negative. One perceptive scholar summed up the issue thus: India’s aspired power projection goes beyond South Asia, and it clearly wants liberation from the South Asian quagmire to play a more assertive role in Asian, if not global, affairs. Indian security thinking is clearly dominated by a status-quo vision of unifying the South Asian subcontinent strategically as a precondition to expand its influence elsewhere. . . . South Asia as an economic space is too claustrophobic for a growing Indian economy and the logic of scale, more than anything else, demands rapid integration of India with Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific with or without the existing South Asian states. . . . The structural difference between the Indian economy and those of its neighbouring states of South Asia is a strong impediment to establish a free trade regime in South Asia that would be truly remunerative and economically attractive for all the states of the region. India clearly

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prefers bilateral economic deals with its South Asian neighbours rather than genuine economic multilateralism for obvious reasons.22

However, while appreciating the punch of this argument, it would not be out of place to recall what S.D. Muni observed some two decades back: ‘The various regional meetings at different levels have provided valuable occasions for informal contacts where bilateral issues have been thrashed out’.23 The functioning of SAARC has facilitated regular meetings of ministers, officials as well as heads of state which offered these decision-makers a convenient cover to engage in productive deliberations. While bilateral exchanges remained hostage to the continuous flux of day-to-day relations, SAARC’s umbrella has allowed leaders to meet in the name of discharging their regional commitments. Again, bilateral dialogues took place in full public – especially media – glare but meetings on the sidelines of SAARC provided opportunities to address tricky bilateral issues in a relaxed and informal ambience. These gatherings bred familiarity among leaders and officials which, to go by the testimony of those who deal with organization, have often contributed to defuse regional tensions. Indeed, as Bajpai noted, the very fact that virtually all mandated SAARC meetings have been held in the past itself testifies to the utility of the organization.24 Therefore, however frustrated the Indian foreign policy elites might have become as to the usefulness of SAARC, they hardly afford to miss its efficacy as a regional ‘safety valve’. After all, the bigger picture concerning India’s global ambitions cannot altogether overshadow its regional predicament especially keeping in mind the repeated reminders issued by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that India cannot change its neighbours at will.25 Moving beyond the security angle, we would also do well to remember that the uniqueness of SAARC largely consisted in the fact that it was founded with an accent on socio-economic development. South Asia constituted one of the poorest regions of the world and the scenario was made all the murkier by problems of overpopulation and gender discrimination, illiteracy and malnutrition, hunger and disease, drug menace and environmental degradation. In a sense, it was the growing realization of the urgency of collectively addressing these developmental needs – rather than pressing political

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compulsions – that brought the member countries together on the SAARC platform. No doubt the internal political disagreements that perpetually plagued the organization seriously came in the way of effectively fulfilling these objectives. Yet SAARC’s achievements in these ‘low politics’ areas have remained far from negligible: r the South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation has been entrusted with developing strategies and policies for alleviating the impact of structural adjustment and opening up of the South Asian economies; r the SAARC Decade Plan of Action was adopted to promote the welfare of girl child as well as priority concerns in areas of health and nutrition, education and literacy, marriage and motherhood; r the Committee on Environment identified measures for environment management including establishment of a relief and assistance mechanism for natural disasters and regional cooperation on development of modern disaster warning systems; r the Initiative on Health and Population Activities treated disease as a major security threat and called for control and eradication of major diseases in the region such as malaria, leprosy, tuberculosis, diarrhoea, rabies, AIDS and iodine deficiency disorder; r the SAARC Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances has spawned a coordinated regional strategy for law enforcement, prevention, treatment and rehabilitation for combating drug trafficking and drug abuse; r a SAARC Development Fund launched in 2010 was to serve as a regional funding mechanism modelled after the International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank and sponsor various social, economic and infrastructure projects of the region; r the South Asian University, first proposed by the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to provide world class facilities and professional faculty to students and researchers from SAARC member countries, started functioning in 2010; r a ‘Charter of Democracy’ was also adopted to promote regional cooperation aimed at strengthening good governance.26 The list can be further enlarged with the inclusion of initiatives such as Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians, SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, SAARC Fellowship and

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Scholarship Schemes, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies, South Asia Women’s Centre, SAARC Youth Volunteer Programme, SAARC Audio-visual Exchange Programme, SAARC Scheme for Promotion of Organized Tourism, SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme, South Asia Olympic Council, South Asian Festivals among others.27 Since SAARC functioned in these areas in a low key way, the risk of political disagreements acting as spoilers also remained relatively low. Yet the salience of these initiatives in the South Asian socio-economic context could hardly be overstated and it would be unfortunate if New Delhi loses interest in this genre of SAARC activities. It would be pertinent to recall in this connection former Prime Minister I.K.Gujral’s observation made in his inaugural address of the SAARC 2015 Conference held in New Delhi in February 2007 that he had ‘the increasing feeling that the unofficial SAARC’ – whereby he referred to the unprecedented rise in interaction and networking among various institutions, agencies and civil society organizations – ‘is going to be the driving force behind the official SAARC process’ in future.28 Finally, scholars like S.D. Muni have argued that the global recession that set in around 2008 (from which Europe and the United States are yet to wholly recuperate) could be viewed as a potential spur for revitalization of economic integration within SAARC. On one hand, the South Asian economies, thanks to their less than complete integration with the global market, remained relatively immune from the worst impact of the economic slowdown. On the other hand, the concomitant decline in the share of the United States and European Union in South Asia’s export markets was likely to provide an impetus to intra-regional trade and commerce29 though the actual progress on the ground was yet to be confirmed. IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION

The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, immediately after taking charge in the summer of 2014 announced his ‘neighbourhood first policy’ and plans to forge robust economic cooperation and enhance intra-South Asian trade by removing bottlenecks as well as to focus on boosting up regional connectivity networks to facilitate stronger economic partnership. Yet the 18th SAARC summit, the first attended by Modi, held in

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Kathmandu in late 2014 ended in a damp squib as, of the three connectivity agreements (on road, rail and energy) that topped the summit agenda, only the last one could be finalized because Pakistan was reportedly yet to complete its ‘internal processes’ to endorse them.30 Islamabad’s intransigence became palpable again when in the following year it raised objections to the SAARC satellite project proposed by Prime Minister Modi (aimed at providing support in areas of telemedicine, weather forecasting and communication) on the ground that the satellite which would be operated by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) might allow New Delhi to secure key data on Pakistan’s sensitive infrastructure and thereby undermine its security.31 In 2016, bilateral relations between Pakistan and India touched a new low – first over the terrorist attack at Pathankot air base32 and then renewed ferment in the State of Jammu & Kashmir following the death of a Hizbul Mujahideen commander – further bedimming the prospects of the SAARC’s revival if any.33 The fat was finally in the fire when India expressed its inability to attend the 19th SAARC summit to be hosted by Pakistan in November 2016 in the aftermath of allegedly Pakistan-backed attack on its army camp in Uri (resulting in the death of 19 soldiers) in September 2016 with Bangladesh and Afghanistan seconding the boycott call which led to the cancellation of the meeting.34 Meanwhile yet another irritant to India’s contemporary engagement with SAARC cropped up in the form of Pakistan’s plea (along with several SAARC members) for elevation of China’s position within the organization – from observer to either a full member or a dialogue partner.35 Indeed, Pakistan, apparently in an effort to tide over its isolation in the subcontinent in the aftermath of the aborted 19th SAARC summit, floated the idea of a greater South Asian economic alliance which would include China, Iran and Central Asian Republics.36 While New Delhi had no qualms about bilateral economic engagement with Beijing, it was not really prepared to accept Chinese presence in its regional backyard. Indeed, upgradation of China’s status in the organization could very well have rekindled in the minds of the policy makers of the South Block the apprehensions of the 1980s, i.e. the possibility of SAARC shaping up as an anti-Indian entity.

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Under the circumstances, the whole question of the efficacy of India continuing as a SAARC member is very likely to be reopened, indeed with an added punch from Britain’s exit from the European Union (not to speak of the conservative pronouncements emanating from the Trump administration in USA). We have of course pointed out above that India secured limited gains by remaining a member of the organization which provided a forum for informal consultations on controversial bilateral issues on the sidelines of the summit meetings; and had also undertaken a series of healthy initiatives in ‘low politics’ areas in which the nations of South Asia have shared interests irrespective of all political divisions and animosities. However, as far as promoting a joint security architecture was concerned, SAARC turned out to be a non-starter, and the scenario is hardly likely to change in the foreseeable future (unless an unprecedented catastrophe perpetrated by an ISIS-like monstrosity forces New Delhi and Islamabad into a tight embrace). Meanwhile, on the economic front, New Delhi seems determined to intensify its bonding with other South Asian states by deepening its footprints within sub-regional ventures that bypassed Pakistan. To quote a commentator, ‘India has breathed new energy into BIMSTEC, by involving almost all South Asian nations in it, with the conspicuous absence of Pakistan, making it virtually a ‘SAARC-minus-one’ organization. In addition, the BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) sub-grouping is making physical connectivity, along with rail and power-sharing systems, ‘into a new model of cooperation’.37 The launch of the South Asia Satellite in 2017 which, the Indian prime minister said during his video address to the leaders of six SAARC countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka (Pakistan being conspicuous by its absence), would open up new horizons of engagement and greatly benefit the progress of the South Asian region38 also pointed in the same direction. NOTES 1. See Edward Best and Thomas Christiansen, ‘Regionalism in International Affairs’, in John Baylis et al. (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 4th edn.

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2. C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Penguin, 2003, p. 242. 3. Ibid., p. 243. 4. Ibid., p. 241. 5. See Kanti Bajpai, ‘Security and SAARC’, in Eric Gonsalves and Nancy Jetly (eds.), The Dynamics of South Asia: Regional Cooperation and SAARC, New Delhi: Sage, 1999, p. 76. 6. Remarks by Professor Amal Jayawardane, RCSS SAARC as a Regional Mechanism to Counter Terrorism, http://globalcenter.org/wp-content/ uploads/2009/10/8_October_2009_Jayawardane.pdf 7. See for example the sombre conclusions reached by Arndt Michael while evaluating the role of SAARC ‘in the regional security architecture in South Asia’ – ‘Sovereignty vs. Security: The Role of SAARC in the Regional Security Architecture in South Asia’, Harvard Asia Quarterly, vol. XV, no. 2 Summer 2013, 8. See Shibashis Chatterjee, ‘Space and Regional Cooperation: The SAARC Story’ in Navnita Chadha Behera (ed.), Envisioning a New South Asia, New Delhi: Shipra, 2009, p. 28. 9. India-Bangladesh relations seemed to have touched their lowest ebb between 2001 and 2006 when the charge of cross-border terrorism engineered by Jamaat-e-Islami, then a partner in the BNP-led coalition government of Bangladesh, was repeatedly lodged by New Delhi, and Dhaka never tired of complaining about discrimination in the field of bilateral trade. The situation seemed to improve considerably after the Awami League government under Sheikh Hasina assumed power in Bangladesh in 2008 and obliged India by reining in the militants and New Delhi reciprocated by extending substantial economic concessions and assistance. However, agreement was yet to be reached on sharing of Teesta waters, consturction of the Tipaimukh Dam in north-east India and implementation of the Land Boundary Agreement involving the exchange of ‘enclaves’. 10. As to Indo-Sri Lankan ties, the Tamil question remained a major complicating factor: while New Delhi no longer contemplated any direct intervention as it did in the 1980s, it insisted on a negotiated settlement between the national government and the Tamils of the island’s northern and eastern regions. As the Rajapakse administration seemed bent on a military solution to the Tamil issue, India voted against Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council in 2012 to ensure that the Tamil people get justice and live a life of dignity. On the other hand, after the Tamil militant outfit LTTE was vanquished some three years ago, Lanka grew closer to China and Pakistan which had offered it military support during the war, which quite expectedly was not palatable for India. 11. Nepal’s disaffection towards India had several layers and stages: in the earlier

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13.

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15. 16.

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18. 19. 20. 21.

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decades, the questions of border demarcation and the trade and transit rights of a landlocked country constituted the major bilateral problem areas. Since the 1980s (and particularly after the Maoists emerged as a force to reckon with in Nepalese politics), the issue of India’s interest in tapping the hydroelectricity potential of the Nepalese rivers (which, it was alleged, was largely responsible for annual floods), among others, constituted the basis of the charge of a hegemonic India out to colonize its smaller South Asian neighbours. These contradictory mindsets found their latest expression in January 2013 when Islamabad’s demand for an investigation by the United Nations into the alleged killing and mutilation of Indian soldiers by their Pakistani counterparts was downright rejected by New Delhi. See ‘Pak Army Brutality May Force India to Rethink Peace Process’, Times of India, 10 January 2013. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema made a strong case for amending the SAARC Charter to the effect of subjecting bilateral disputes to collective discussions. See Cheema, ‘SAARC Needs Revamping’, in Gonzalves and Jetly. At the time of the signing of the Additional Protocol meant to strengthen the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, lack of consensus among members regarding definition of terrorists came into the open. They were also divided on the issue of extradition of a person as some felt that extradition could be sought on purpose for punishing someone for his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political views. Chatterjee, n. 8, p. 35. See Mahendra P. Lama, ‘Economic Reforms and Integration in South Asia: Role of India in SAARC’, in R.R. Sharma (ed.), India and Emerging Asia, New Delhi: Sage, 2005, pp. 140-1. Edelgard Mahant, ‘The Political Economy of South Asia’, in Anjum Siddiqui (ed.), India and South Asia: Economic Developments in the Age of Globalization, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2007, pp. 42-3. See Dushni Weerakoon, ‘Regional Economic Cooperation Under SAARC: Possibilities and Constraints’, in Siddiqui, p. 237. Mahant, n. 17. See Weerakoon, n. 18. ‘Bangladesh-India FTA Likely this Year’, Business Line, 4 March 2011. However, voices sceptical of the likely benefits of such agreements were not rare altogether. See ‘Doubt Over Benefits of FTA with India’, http://www. thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=244613. Chatterjee, n. 8, p. 44. S.D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia, New Delhi: National Publishing House, 33, quoted in Bajpai, n. 5, p. 83. Bajpai, n. 5, p. 86. See also Jayawardane, n. 6.

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26. For details, see Arabinda Acharya, ‘Promoting Human Security in South Asia through Multilateral Cooperation’, in Dipankar Banerjee (ed.), SAARC in the Twenty-First Century: Towards a Cooperative Future, Colombo: RCSS and New Delhi: India Research Press, 2002; and Gautam Kumar Basu, ‘Tension Areas in the Processes of Regional Integration in South Asia’, in Anuradha Bose (ed.), SAARC: A Quest for Unity: Problems and Prospects, Kolkata: Minerva, 2011. 27. See Irum Shaheen, ‘South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: Its Role, Hurdles and Prospects’, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science, September-October 2013, www.Iosrjournals.org 28. Quoted in Zahid Shahab Ahmed and Stuti Bhatnagar, ‘Interstate Conflicts and Regionalism in South Asia: Prospects and Challenges’, Perceptions, Spring-Summer 2008, p. 12. 29. See ‘SAARC: The Changing Dimensions’, in Bose (ed.), SAARC, n. 26. 30. S.D. Muni, ‘A Disappointing SAARC Summit, 28 November 2014’, Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/11/disappointingsaarc-summit-2014112885157300755.html 31. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, ‘Pakistan Raises Security Issues to Oppose SAARC Satellite Project’, Economic Times, 26 June 2015. 32. See M.K. Narayanan, ‘The Road from Pathankot’, Hindu, 22 January 2016. 33. Huffington Post, ‘Who is Burhan Wani and Why is Kashmir Mourning Him’, 13 September 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.in/burhan-wani/ who-was-burhan-wani-and-why-is-kashmir-mourning-him/ 34. ‘SAARC Summit Collapses as India and Two Other Members Pull Out’, Hindustan Times, 29 September 2016. 35. See note 30. 36. ‘Greater South Asia with China, Iran: Isolated Pakistan seeks bigger SAARC to Counter India’s Influence’, India Today, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/ story/south-asian-economic-alliance-saarc-china-iran-pakistan-india/ 1/785071.html. 37. Indrani Bagchi, ‘Question Mark Over SAARC Summit Again’, Times of India, 23 September 2017. 38. Ibid.; Surendra Singh, ‘PM Narendra Modi’s Space Diplomacy Turns Satellite Launch into Mini SAARC Summit’, Times of India, 6 May 2017.

CHAPTER 7

Rethinking Regionalism in South Asia A. SUBRAMANYAM RAJU

INTRODUCTION

south asia represents one-fourth of world population with low gross domestic product, low per capita and low literacy rate coupled with high birth and death rates. In 2005, the South Asian region was home to 33 per cent of the world’s poor1 and contained the largest number of the world’s hungry, about 350 million people.2 The region is afflicted by a number of problems – social, political and economic. Disputes, mutual distrust, misunderstanding and suspicion still prevail in the region. No common external threat was perceived by the region. It is clearly evident that absence of collective identity and lack of sense of belonging still exist in the region. South Asia has been a region without regionalism.3 Obstacles to cooperation in the region include: suspicion and trust deficiency between India and its neighbours; rivalry between India and Pakistan; and inability to demarcate the porous borders. Conflicts and disputes have pushed the region backward. However, it is to be noted that intra-state conflicts have increased compared to inter-state conflicts. There are hardly any pair of states in South Asia, which are not affected by trans-border spilling of ethno-nationalist, communal and militant activity. Though geographical continuity remains the greatest asset for SAARC, this potential is not harnessed because boundaries have been seen as the manifestation of national identity in the region. Yet, South Asia is seen as an important region in the world and it is gaining global identity. The SAARC has enlarged its membership from seven to eight (Afghanistan joined in 2007 as the eighth member) and nine external and major states joined as observers.4 South Asia

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is one of the fastest growing economic regions in the world (6 per cent growth per year). Most of the countries in the world (particularly the West) see the region as a nuclear flash point. Also some non-state actors’ activities emerge from the region, which was seen as a security concern. Though there was no significant development towards regional cooperation, the SAARC is the only platform where the member states can debate and discuss various issues related to the region. South Asia is trying to integrate itself with Asia, which is expected to play a vital role in the global arena. And it may be said that there is a convergence of interests among the countries in the region for regional cooperation. Most of the countries in South Asia are geographically closer to India and unlike the latter no country in the region has geographical proximity with more than two countries. India has border problems with many of its neighbours. Also its territory, population, military and economic development make the region Indo-centric. Population and land mass of India are three times greater than that of all the other South Asian countries combined. The SAARC was established in 1985 and its aim was/is to accelerate economic cooperation in South Asia. It was agreed by the members that there shall be a meeting once in a year. The SAARC has completed thirty years, but only eighteen summits were held. The nineteenth summit was cancelled, which was supposed to be held at the end of 2016 in Islamabad. Due to political instability in the host country or strained bilateral relations of some countries, the summits had to be postponed. There were sixteen areas of cooperation among the member states. The SAARC Charter emphasizes that no bilateral issues should be discussed at the regional forum and all decisions should be taken unanimously. India and Pakistan initially were reluctant to join the SAARC. They had apprehensions. India’s apprehension was that all its neighbours would work against it, and Pakistan had reservations that India would work against it by using the SAARC as a platform. The strained relations between India and Pakistan had impact on the SAARC. On one hand, the member states are interested in regional cooperation, and on the other, they are looking at different directions and not

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looking at each other as part of South Asia. It seems to be like this: eight crews sitting in different directions in a ship and trying to steer the ship, which results in either no movement of the ship or though the ship moves but not forward. However, in the previous SAARC summits (2005-14), promoting connectivity, energy cooperation, and sustainable environment (climate change) were identified as areas to be focused by the South Asian countries to eradicate poverty in the region. The paper focuses on the first three areas, which would contribute to eradicating/ minimizing poverty in South Asia and construct a new South Asia, which would be free from conflicts. Further, the paper focuses on various stimulators for rethinking regionalism in South Asia. CONNECTIVITY IN SOUTH ASIA

Improving infrastructure facility, making soft borders, access to technology, connecting maritime, air and roadways and unrestricted trade are some of the issues to be focused by South Asian countries to move towards integration in the region. Connectivity will not only facilitate contacts within the region, but also with the rest of the world. It is to be noted that South Asia’s GDP was about 25 per cent of the global total in 1700.5 It was due to the trading links that had existed in the region. It is to be noted that trade among the South Asian countries is currently only 5 per cent and one of the reasons for less trade among them is insufficient trade facility measures. A number of constraints in South Asia in terms of trade facilitation have been identified by the World Bank (2007) and some of them are: lengthy customs and port clearance times; poor transport and communications; the fact that trucks of one country are not allowed across the border to deliver cargo; regulatory constraints introduced at the gateways and border crossings; and costly domestic transport owing to the distance between the production area and the major ports.6 There is now a convergence of interests among the countries in the region to work towards restoration of unrestricted direct trade and shipping links. Connectivity plays a significant role in combating poverty. One

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element of poverty is the lack of information/communication. Thanks to transformation of communications by penetrating new technology, many poor people are being benefited. For instance, taxi drivers, farmers, and fisherfolk are benefited by using mobile phones and mobile banking, which is considered to be a silent revolution. If people are connected, they are more productive. People are not dependent on aid but on connectivity and market. Bangladeshi economy has gone up by 2 per cent because of mobile phones. This exceeds the money given to Bangladesh through aid.7According to the World Bank, ‘If countries in South Asia continue growing at a 7 per cent rate, the incidence of poverty would be reduced from 50 per cent to 20 per cent.’8 South Asia inherited an integrated transport system from the British, but this was fractured not only by the partition but by its political aftermath. It needs to be integrated again in order to bring the countries closer. Due to lack of integration of the transport system in South Asia, the logistic costs are very high and ranges between 13 and 14 per cent of GDP compared to 8 per cent in the US.9 Linking land locked/linked Nepal, Bhutan and the north-east of India would lead to economic development and could work towards poverty reduction. In 2006, regional trade was $10.4 billion, i.e. 5 per cent of total trade. If transport network is improved, trade may rise up to $40 billion (i.e. 20 per cent of trade). The twelfth summit, held in Islamabad in 2004, called for strengthening transport, transit and communication links across South Asia. For instance, while a container from New Delhi takes more than a month to reach Dhaka through the maritime route via Bangladesh and Singapore/Colombo to Chittagong port and then by rail to Dhaka, it can reach within five days with direct rail connectivity between New Delhi and Dhaka. Similarly between Dhaka and Islamabad, it would take 7,162 km by sea instead of just 2,300 km through overland across India. New Delhi and Tehran were jointly planning to develop a transport corridor between India-Iran-Afghanistan, but Pakistan did not agree to the proposal. India can have access to Central Asia through the Iranian port of Chabahar and through Afghanistan. Shipment of Assam tea to the West requires a travel of 1,400 km to reach Kolkata port, passing

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through the Chicken’s Neck corridor. There is no agreement for India to use the traditional route through Chittagong port which would be shorter by 60 per cent. The southern border of the Tripura state is only 75 km from Chittagong port, but goods from Agartala are required to travel 1,645 km to reach Kolkata port through the Chicken’s Neck. If transport cooperation were there, goods would have travelled only around 400 km across Bangladesh to reach Kolkata. One of the tools for improving trade/cooperation among the countries in the region is energy cooperation and in the following section, an attempt is made to discuss how energy cooperation would address the energy requirements of the region. At the 2014 summit in Kathmandu, the member states realized and agreed on three regional agreements for connectivity and integration-motor vehicles, rail and energy cooperation. Somehow the motor vehicle agreement did not materialize due to opposition from Pakistan. However, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) came together and signed the Motor Vehicles Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic on 15 June 2015. The Indian prime minister while launching the satellite in Bangalore, dedicated it to South Asia, which was seen as a gesture towards sharing communication among the countries in the region. ENERGY COOPERATION

In 2001, the South Asia Regional Initiative on Energy (SARI/Energy) was first initiated. Energy cooperation as a cornerstone of the SAARC Summit was preceded in December 2003 by the second meeting of the SAARC Technical Committee on Energy, which issued a 20-Point Dhaka Declaration10 endorsing many of the regional projects that were previously developed under SARI/Energy, including a regional power grid among India, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan, and an agenda for involving energy information exchange, micro-hydro, energy efficiency projects, and policy replication initiatives. The objective of SARI/Energy was to provide technical assistance and support for cross-border projects that would integrate the energy networks among neighbouring countries in South Asia. By doing so, a regional strategy and regulatory framework can be developed and

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implemented to enhance energy security, flexibility, and quality of supply and to promote bilateral and energy trade. Energy infrastructure in South Asia has to be developed to address the existing imbalance between the location of energy resources and demand centres in the region. In July 2004, the thirtieth session of a SAARC standing committee maintained that there should be a greater cooperation in the energy sector, which would strengthen and deepen regional cooperation. The SAARC endorsed the concept of an ‘Energy Ring’ of interconnected energy systems in the region. The member states realized the importance of setting up a Regional Power Grid, which would ensure quality power supply in the region. South Asia can promote South Asian Development Triangle11 comprising north-eastern parts of India, Bangladesh and Nepal; Southern grid connecting South India with Sri Lanka; and Western grid, especially Punjab (India) connecting with Pakistan’s Punjab. It also can have growth quadrangle cooperation among Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and north-eastern parts of India. Since energy is one of the determinants in the new millennium, the South Asian states should take initiatives in sharing energy resources. New Delhi’s relationship with Islamabad is very important because any gas pipeline to India from the Middle East/Central Asia would require Pakistan’s involvement and partnership. Countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal that have access to natural gas and hydropower will increase security of supply, economic efficiency, and environmental benefits in the region through pipeline and power interconnections. South Asian countries mostly are dependent on imported energy resources. If all countries are interconnected then they would be able to import their required energy resources from other regions, particularly from Middle East and Central Asia.12 Through cooperation the South Asian countries can have multiple benefits. For instance, hydropower potential in India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan and gas resources in Bangladesh and coal in India are in abundance. This can not only improve their efficiency but also can minimize oil imports, reducing dependency on foreign currency.

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Cross-border pipelines for oil and gas are needed in South Asia primarily because only limited reserves are located close to traditional markets in the region and many gas markets have been constrained by regulatory and institutional factors. New gas reserves are being found, but remote fields are often not efficiently exploited for lack of transport infrastructure and proximity of markets. Moreover, crossborder oil and gas pipelines have a history of vulnerability to disruption and of generating conflict due to a variety of reasons such as involvement of different parties with their own interests; absence of a regional regime that can be used to police and regulate activities and contracts; and differences regarding sharing of profit and rent among the parties. For cross-border pipelines to succeed, there must be clearly defined and accepted rules for resolving issues and problems with projects driven by commercial and not by political considerations. Thirty per cent of demands can be met by themselves if they have energy cooperation. It is to be noted that there is a link between energy consumption and climate change. In the following section, an attempt is made to discuss how climate change will impact the livelihood of people and what initiatives by the South Asian countries are necessary to address the problem. CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOUTH ASIA

Climate change poses different challenges. It has a major influence on sea level change. It is estimated that the rate of global sea level rise was between 0.1 and 0.2 metres (about 3.9 to 7.9 inches) during the twentieth century and this rate of sea level rise was ten times that of the previous 3,000 years. Since the end of the ice age, transfers of mass from ice sheets to the oceans have raised sea level by 120 metres. Due to the impact of climate change, it is expected that the sea level will go up. As a result people, who live in coastal areas/low-lying areas, will have to suffer. It is estimated that by 2050, about 250 million people may leave their places due to intensifying monsoon flooding, desertification and reduced food production. Most of the developing countries, which are dependent on coastal fishery and agriculture, are likely to be affected. If a one-metre sea level rise were

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to take place, it would displace seven million people in India.13 In the future many more may be displaced. Further, intrusion of seawater into ground water and changes in temperature can reduce agricultural and fishing incomes. A rise in sea level would result in the gradual submergence of the coastal states and cities. Tens of millions of people in Asia may have to be resettled, and massive expenditures to be incurred to protect the coastal cities from sea level rise, which may range from about 20-70 cm (about 8 inches to 2 ft) by the end of this century. Largescale migration from coastal zones is expected due to submergence of coastlines as a result of rise in sea levels. This will create a large number of environmental refugees especially from low-lying regions in poor countries. Climate change could represent an additional stress on ecological and socioeconomic systems that are already facing tremendous pressure. Its impacts include sea level rise, changes in the monsoon, increased severe storms and flooding and drought. Sea level rise will damage aquaculture industries and fish productivity, and cause higher risks of increased frequency and intensity of coastal surges and cyclones. It is expected that there will be a large-scale migration from coastal zones due to rise of sea level, which will lead to submergence of coastlines. This will create a large number of environmental refugees who are living in low-lying areas. People, who are depending on coastal areas for fishery and agriculture, will be adversely affected. For instance, 35 per cent of the land in Bangladesh would be submerged by a onemetre rise. It will be difficult for Bangladesh to take protective measures, and as a result tens of millions of people will be displaced in Bangladesh and many of them could spill over into India. Evacuation is not easily implemented, because of the reluctance of governments to order mandatory evacuations and unwillingness of residents to leave their unprotected property.14 Mumbai is the tenth largest city in the world and the economic capital of India with twelve million inhabitants. The cost to Mumbai of a one-metre sea level rise has been estimated to be $71 billion, indicative of the huge economic cost of climate change faced by Asia’s coastal city.15 Similarly

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Maldives, according the reports, will completely be submerged by 2100 or uninhabited due to the loss of fresh water. Sri Lanka will have a similar problem. Floods along the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers in 2007 affected about 13 million people in Bangladesh and economic cost was over one billion US dollars and in Pakistan, in 2010 floods, 20 million people were affected and economic cost was around 10 billion US dollars.16 Even the land locked/linked countries (Afghanistan, Bhutan and Nepal) will have problems due to droughts and shortage of rainfall. Due to climate change, India’s GDP may decrease by 2 per cent and other South Asian countries may suffer even more. With changes in temperature, precipitation and humidity, main sectors such as agriculture and rural development are likely to be severely affected. Impacts are already being seen in heat waves, cyclones, floods, salinization of the coastline and their effects on agriculture, fisheries and health. The ocean has the largest heat capacity of any single component of the climate system and over the past 40 years, it has been the dominant source of changes in global heat content. Global ocean heat content, according to the IPCC, has increased since the late 1950s.17 Besides causing a sea level rise, ocean heat content may cause changes in the occurrence of extreme events such as cyclones. South Asian countries have to join together in a collaborative effort to bring about a strategic shift, across the globe, from production and consumption patterns based on carbon-based fossil fuels to those based on renewable energy and non-carbon fuels, because it is a question of life and death for every human being in the world. Every country must prioritize areas such as energy efficiency in lighting, transport, power generation, and reduce the energy-intensity of industrial production. It is the responsibility of every country to limit emissions of GHGs through initiatives such as improving efficiency of the energy and industrial production capacity, as well as energy development, both conventional and renewable, for improving environmental quality and limiting human health hazards from air pollution.

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STIMULATORS

It is to be noted that in the history of human kind no single problem was solved through conflicts. Conflicts in South Asia must be seen as a stimulator for regional cooperation. For instance, war between India and Pakistan did not prove that neither of them gained out of three wars between them. Further, poverty is one of the foremost concerns for the entire region. Unless there is understanding and cooperation among the countries, it would be difficult to work to eradicate poverty in the region. The region is affected by many nontraditional security threats,18 which have transnational dimension and no individual country would be able to tackle them. Hence this can also be treated as a stimulator for cooperation in the region. Further, impact of globalization and dependence would make countries focus on regional grouping. Now it becomes challenging for every country to focus on development and hence cooperation among the countries in the region is required. India is emerging as a major economic power and the reports predict that it would emerge as third largest economy in the world by 2030. If this is going to be the reality, then the neighbours would certainly benefit by associating with the former through economic cooperation. As far as environmental security is concerned, relevance of national security becomes insignificant. For instance, with regard to tsunami, earthquake, cyclones, etc., relevance of national security of a country becomes obsolete. In other words, the countries must shift from an exclusive to inclusive model of security.19 It is hoped that the civil society in South Asia, which is gaining momentum in recent times, would work for cooperation among the countries. The SAARC Charter was drafted in 1985 and Article X has two provisions: all decisions to be taken unanimously and no bilateral issues to be discussed in any regional forum/summit. After three decades of SAARC’s existence, bilateral border problems between India and Pakistan are yet to be solved. It is to be noted that the SAARC is the only platform where the differences could be sorted out. In the age of globalization and inter-dependence, both the above provisions seem to be irrelevant. The strained relations between India and Pakistan limit regional cooperation. Hence bilateral issues should

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be discussed at the regional forum not for precipitating the problem but for resolving it amicably. CONCLUSION

Greater people to people contact, improving infrastructure facility, making soft borders, access to technology, connecting maritime,20 air and roadways and unrestricted trade are some of the issues to be focused by the South Asian countries. Unless these requirements are met, it would be difficult to improve regional cooperation in the region. Regional cooperation could minimize the costs of research and improve efficiency. South Asian countries must focus on connecting the region, promoting regional energy trade, and addressing climate change, etc., through regional cooperation. Bureaucrats should be allowed to take up initiatives rather than being dominated by politics in the activities of SAARC. In the EU, it is a practice to take up projects with consent of the majority of the member states. Any country, which does not want to be party to any agreement, can opt out. For instance, the UK refused to agree to Euro as a currency. Similarly, Greece opposed a common constitution for Europe. Despite the opposition from its members, the EU adopted a resolution to have common currency and common constitution. Similarly, majority members’ decisions should be allowed within the SAARC to turn South Asia into a prosperous region. Priorities of SAARC need to be changed as the emphasis should be on human development21 and the member states must shift their focus from security of the borders to regional cooperation. SAARC should have institutional mechanism to make it an effective body rather than acting as a consultative body. There is a need for cultural connectivity in South Asia so that mistrust, suspicions and paranoia would be reduced. South Asia is a not a poor region but people of the region are poor due to policies of the South Asian countries. Through mutual cooperation, the South Asian states can work on areas such as eradication of poverty, effective governance, improving trade, sharing water, food, health and energy security, etc. The member states need to realize that they have to work collectively to address these problems, which are having transnational dimensions.

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NOTES 1. See https://www.worldvision.org.hk/en/learn/poverty-in-asia. 2. See www.fao.org/hunger/en/, p. 3. 3. See Shibashis Chatterjee and Sulagna Maitra, ‘Space and Regional Cooperation: The SAARC Story’, in T. Nirmala Devi and Adluri Subramanyam Raju (eds.), Envisioning a New South Asia, New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2009, pp. 25-46 and C.K. Lal, ‘Imagining South Asian an Unipolar World’, in Adluri Subramanyam Raju (ed.), Reconstructing South Asia: An Agenda, New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2007, pp. 263-72. 4. Australia, China, European Union, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar and the US. For more details see, P.V. Rao, ‘Expansion of SAARC: Political and Economic Implications’, South Asian Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, January-June 2008, pp. 17-33. 5. See I.P. Khosla, ‘South Asia: Connecting to a Globalized World’, in Devi and Raju (eds.), Envisioning a New South Asia, no. 3, p. 7. 6. Jeevika Weerahewa, Impact of Trade Facilitation Measures and Regional Trade Agreements on Food and Agricultural Trade in South Asia, Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, Working Paper Series, No. 69, June 2009, p. 5, see http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp6909.pdf. 7. Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, New York: Public Affairs Book, 2008, p. 26. 8. Ibid., p. 25. 9. Hasanuzzaman and Zeeshaan Rahman, ‘Bangladesh and Regional Connectivity: Best Practices from Global Experiences’, Occasional Paper, Centre for Policy Dialogue, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2010, p. 9, see http://www. cpd.org.bd/pub_attach/OP89.pdf. 10. Regional Energy and Trade Laws in South Asia, vol. 1, prepared by Nexant, September 2004, p. 71, www.sari-energy.org. 11. ASEAN states have Growth Triangle like Southern Growth Triangle – Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, Northern Growth Triangle – Sumatra, Malaysia and Thailand and East Asian Growth Area – Philippines, Indonesian Islands, Malaysia and Brunei. 12. For further details see A. Subramanyam Raju, ‘India’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities’, in Mohanan B. Pillai and L. Premashekhara (eds.), Foreign Policy of India: Continuity and Change, New Delhi: New Century, 2010, pp. 35-46. 13. Asian Development Bank, 1995, cited in Jyoti K. Parikh and Kirit Parikh, Climate Change: India’s Perceptions, Positions, Policies and Possibilities, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2002, p. 7. 14. Roland J. Fuchs, Cities at Risk: Asia Coastal Cities in an Age of Climate

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15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

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Change, Asia Pacific Issue, East-West Center (Honolulu), no. 96, July 2010, p. 8. TERI (Tara Energy Research Institute), ‘The Economic Impact of a One Metre Sea Level Rise on the Indian Coastline: Method and Case Studies’, report submitted to the Ford Foundation, 2006, cited in ibid., p. 4. See n. 2. For details see http://philhart.com/content/intergovernmental-panel-climatechange-ipcc. See V.R. Raghavan, ‘Non-Traditional Threats to South Asian Security’, in Raju (ed.), n. 3, pp. 129-35. B.S. Raghavan, ‘Security Doctrine: Lessons from History’, Business Line, 21 March 2011, p. 8. For more details about maritime cooperation in South Asia, see A. Subramanyam Raju, ‘Maritime Cooperation in South Asia’, in Raju (ed.), n. 3, pp. 151-73; A. Subramanyam Raju, ‘Maritime Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan’, Pakistan Journal of International Relations, Karachi (Pakistan), vol. 1, no. 1, January-June 2009, pp. 111-35; Adluri Subramanyam Raju and Keethaponcalan, Maritime Cooperation between India and Sri Lanka, New Delhi: Manohar, 2006. See Adluri Subramanyam Raju, ‘Human Security in South Asia: Some Observations’, in Devi and Raju (eds.), n. 3, pp. 122-32.

CHAPTER 8

ASEAN in the New Global Order: The Effective-Ineffective Dichotomy TRIDIB CHAKRABORTI

in the chronicle of Southeast Asian history, security threats stalk from local, regional and global stimuli and their impact on the socioeconomic structure of these countries is not a current inclination. After prolonged years of conflict and turmoil faced by these countries, some regional states, through the method of experiment and fault, finally glumly agreed to establish the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok. During its existence for more than forty-six years, this regional organization has increased its dynamism of membership from five in 1967 to ten in the present time. However, in this long period of its endurance, the countries of Southeast Asia have faced number of internal and regional problems like – the genocidal acts of the Pol Pot regime during 1975-8; Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia; East Timor crisis; Myanmar’s military repression; transnational problems such as the forest fires in Indonesia; low intensity conflicts and terrorism; the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and Global meltdown in 2008; South China Sea dispute, etc. – which caused relentless tensions in the Southeast Asian region. The intensity of these crises led critical annotations on governmental policy from political leaders in the neighbouring countries and heaved a big question mark on ASEAN’s realistic successful mechanism of the principle of regionalism, based on its precepts of non-interference and non-confrontation. These regional issues ultimately led Thailand’s foreign minister, Surin Pitsuan to challenge ASEAN’s central principle of non-intervention and called for a change at the ASEAN’s foreign ministers meeting held in 1998. He demanded that the ASEAN members be permitted to openly discuss each other’s domestic affairs,

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in cases the issues had a trans-border impact. In place of a strict adherence to non-interference as an ASEAN norm, Surin Pitsuan proposed the idea of ‘flexible engagement’, by which he meant that the ASEAN members required more ‘openness’ in dealing with one another, and should not desist from propounding on each other’s domestic policies, which may have regional connotations. His proposal, unfortunately, received only the support of the Philippines, and was firmly rejected by the rest of the ASEAN members, which advocated ‘constructive interventions’ in certain regional issues, as and when essential. Against such a backdrop, the issues like forest fires and transboundary environmental pollution, terrorism after 11 September 2001, South China Sea embroglio, Asian financial crisis of 1997, etc., were examples where ASEAN took a number of initiatives and tried to resolve these outstanding problems based entirely on dialogue, consultation, cooperation, engagement and mutual interaction. In doing so, it has handled these problems proficiently and thereby reduced tension, in order to promote perpetual peace, ever-lasting amity and cooperation in the region by applying the regional consensus principle of ‘mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations’ (Article 2 of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation), without misaligning from the principle of non-intervention. The majority of ASEAN members felt that these principles are intrinsic in the very scenery of the organization and have not only contributed to ASEAN’s success in the past, but also will continue to do so in future. Therefore, discarding them would not make ASEAN stronger. After more than four and a half decades of its genesis, ASEAN has not only survived, but also has developed into a principal force internationally and thereby established itself as an exemplary model of regional unity, commendable of emulation. Through its policy of trial and triumph, on the one hand, ASEAN has come to play an extremely constructive and prominent role by developing a sense of regional identity and managed to avoid public confrontation, in order to make ASEAN more viable as a successful regional organization, on the other. Also, it has evolved as a podium of collaboration, support and cooperation among the members, making it a basic forum for cooperation. As against this

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backdrop, the main purpose of this article is to highlight ASEAN’s achievements and weaknesses over these forty-six years of its existence. REGIONALISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN’S EMERGENCE

The narration of Southeast Asia is a storyline of mêlée and mistiness. Since the end of the Second World War, this region was overwhelmed by Cold War politics, which largely hindered the countries of this region to function independently and in an intensive loom for the attainment of their holistic success. Each country of this region got burdened in a quandary of its own, encountering and stressed with multitude of influences – productive or toxic – both from within and without. After decades of nation-building, in spite of diverse histories, political and social systems, religious beliefs, and cultural backgrounds, each of the countries of Southeast Asia could retrospect and introspect with pride at the manifold achievements. Many of these countries also countenanced severe setbacks and disappointments. While some of them were incensed with prolonged armed resistances, political cataclysms, blood-spattered military coups and separatist struggles, which followed as usual corollaries of ethnic conflicts, poverty and under-development, domination of ruling party on the minority community, religious dominance (mainly gradient of Islamic fundamentalism), historical legacy, opium and drug-related menace, human trafficking, etc., the others enjoyed unprecedented economic augmentation, development, wealth and affluence. Despite this surfeit of sweet and sour historical memories, the countries of Southeast Asia endeavoured to maintain peace and sustained security through their indigenous regional organization like the ASEAN, which was established in 1967 at Bangkok, at the initiative of the five original member countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. While Brunei Darussalam joined the Association on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar became members on 23 July 1997 and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. The Bangkok Declaration united the ASEAN member countries in a joint effort to promote economic cooperation and welfare of the people in the region. This Declaration clearly set out

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the guidelines for ASEAN’s activities and defined the aims of the organization. The members of this association came together with three cardinal objectives in mind: to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the region through cooperative programmes; to safeguard the political and economic stability of the region against big power rivalry; and to serve as a forum for the resolution of intra-regional divergences. It also represented the collective will of the nations to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation through mutual efforts and sacrifices, in order to secure their peoples’ peace, freedom and regional growth and prosperity. With the enlargement of membership, ASEAN currently has faced more thorny challenges. To offset these new challenges, the ASEAN leaders planned and endorsed the ASEAN Charter in 2007. Besides, over the years, this regional organization expanded its wings of membership outside its circuit, by introducing various forms of Dialogue Partners (e.g. Sectoral, Full and Summit level). For instance, Australia became a Dialogue Partner in 1974, New Zealand in 1975; Japan, US and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1977; the European Union in 1980; Canada in 1981, Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1991; India in 1995; and China and Russia in 1996, etc. Furthermore, it has developed three major offshoots with its dialogue partners and they are – the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + 1 process1 and finally, the East Asia Summit in 2005 at Kuala Lumpur. The entire region of Southeast Asia has a population of more than 600 million, a total area of 4.5 million sq. km, a combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of more than US $ 1.9 trillion and an average per capita income near that of China. Over the last decade, the countries have averaged a growth rate of more than 5 per cent per year. If Southeast Asia were one country, it would be the world’s ninth largest economy. It would also be the most trade-dependent, with a trade-to-GDP ratio in excess of 150 per cent, and one of the world’s consistently good performers. This region stretches across three times zones and incorporates a key part of Asia’s continental landmass and several archipelagos. Economically, it belongs to the developing world, but some of its member-countries have joined the world’s top 20 most competitive economies. ASEAN belongs to the

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wider East Asian region which is approaching economic parity with the North American region and the European Union. While the combined GDP of East Asian countries was only 4 per cent of world GNP in 1960, it was 25 per cent in 1992 and 33 per cent in 2010.2 Besides this, its economic importance, wealth of natural resources and marine territories are believed to hold immense global strategic significance. The region also forms the bridge between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, straddling some of the busiest sea-lanes in the world. The oil tankers and freighters that pass daily through these sea-lanes buttress Japan’s status as an industrial power. The ASEAN countries form a group of distinct heterogeneous communities that greatly differ in their political, social and economic structures, cultural ethos and ruling elite philosophies.3 The formation of ASEAN through the Bangkok Declaration accorded high priority to cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields, of which economic cooperation was considered to be the most important, other and where external threats remained a regular motivating force behind its formation. In fact, the member-states shared the belief that the greatest security threat facing them was foreign-backed communist insurgency. To avoid these tensions, the ASEAN countries, time and again, have promoted regional peace and stability, largely through the pursuit of socio-economic goals. Based on this outlook, the ASEAN, after fortysix years of performance, has, on the one hand, modified some of its organizational structures as and when necessary, and achieved the inclusion of all the Southeast Asian countries within its fold, a goal that it had set for itself at birth, on the other. ASEAN: A PRAGMATIC APPRAISAL

Over the last forty-six years, ASEAN as a regional organization has evolved its knack to prove its stamina and display its potential as a successful regional organization in the Asia-Pacific, comparable to the performance of other regional organizations, except European Union (EU) in the present Global Order. During this long period, it had faced a number of economic, political, security and other nontraditional challenges, emanated from within and sometimes with the provocation of extra-regional powers, and it more or less, has

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skilfully tackled these issues based on regional consensus and propelled the organization to move forward. What appeared to be the most important to the ASEAN members was that many of their internal problems, which have regional and transnational dimensions, occasionally caused serious tensions and divided the countries of Southeast Asia. However, in most of the cases, by realizing the depth of the problem, the ASEAN members clearly understood that the issues were no longer an individual undertaking of the affected countries, and mostly demand a cooperative and concerted response by the members. This resulted in that the ASEAN members have always tried to work together to address these problems and mobilized their own regional resources to thwart the crises. In the last forty-six years, the success rate of ASEAN appears to be quite conspicuous and is as follows: First, ASEAN has played a very prominent premeditated and responsible role in Southeast Asia and beyond insofar as the geopolitical architecture is concerned. Over the years, this regional organization helped put an end to separation and confrontation among Southeast Asian countries, created a new relationship on the basis of friendship, mutual understanding and trust, comprehensive and close cooperation, and thereby contributed to maintaining regional peace and security. The sudden fall of former Soviet Union and introduction of globalization and liberalization placed the countries of Southeast Asia in a solemn quandary, since globalization drastically altered the geopolitical and economic landscape all over the world and made the different parts of the globe more and more interdependent. The ASEAN members, within a short span of time, adjusted their systems quite efficiently by performing their proficient role, in keeping with the then necessary circumstances. Besides this, it has created a scaffold and solid foundation for stronger regional links, actively supporting member-countries in the socio-economic development process of regionalization and modernization. As a result, its role and standing in the international arena have improved, graduating this association as an important political and economic entity, not only in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region, but also in regional policies of countries and major centres in the world. The second achievement of ASEAN is maintaining tranquillity in

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the strategic sea lanes and attempting to make them less tension prone, compared to other water areas of the globe. It is a fact that some of the world’s most important sea lanes pass through Southeast Asia. Fifty per cent of world trade and one-third of international oil supply pass through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, like the rest of ASEAN, respect international law. They cooperate with one another, and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), in keeping the Straits safe for international navigation and archipelagic sea lanes secure and clean. Recently, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have agreed to establish a cooperative mechanism, open to user states and other stakeholders, to promote and maintain navigational safety in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, and to protect their marine environment from pollution by ships. This is the first instance in which Article 43 of the Law of the Sea Treaty has been implemented. However, in recent times, some tensions have evolved with reference to the South China Sea and the growing naval strength of China and movements of naval ships of United States, India, Japan, etc., to counter Chinese presence and outreach in the water lanes of this region. Third, over the years, ASEAN’s progression in response to external threats remained a regular rousing force boosting its development. During most of its first decade of existence, ASEAN accomplished relatively little success. Tensions between member-states threatened the organization’s operation, but the withdrawal of American and British forces from the region, entry of China and Russia to play larger roles in Southeast Asia, and the political impact of the Vietnam War compelled the ASEAN states to be united. In November 1971, ASEAN committed Southeast Asia to becoming a ‘Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality’ (ZOPFAN). ZOPFAN began as an independent Malaysian effort to get the great powers to agree to the ‘neutralization’ of Southeast Asia. For strategic reasons, most other ASEAN states ultimately agreed to this concept for the welfare of the region. After the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 and the simultaneous emergence of unified communist Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, political uncertainty was re-generated in the region. This resulted in that, at the first meeting of the ASEAN Heads of State in Bali in 1976, two important documents came out very prominently –

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the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treat of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia. At the Bali Summit, the ASEAN foreign ministers established the ASEAN Secretariat in order to enhance coordination and implementation of policies, projects and activities of the various ASEAN bodies. Besides this, the Declaration of Bali addressed the economic dimension of security by identifying four areas of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation. The TAC, which remains a prime accomplishment of this Summit, encouraged military cooperation between the ASEAN states, albeit on a non-ASEAN basis. The TAC was a code of conduct for Southeast Asia and obliged its signatories to mend disputes peacefully, by prohibiting the use of force. It was open to accession by non-ASEAN states also. In fact, today, the TAC has grown to become one of the most powerful means of ASEAN’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Presently, its signatories comprise all the Southeast Asian countries as well as China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, United States, Russia and Australia. Besides this, over the years, through experience, the ASEAN has modified some of its former processes with the growing magnitude of its regional and extra-regional social, cultural and political activities in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and even in the present years.4 The fourth accomplishment of ASEAN is that over the years, this organization has evolved into a paradigm of multiculturalism and reduction of ethnic unrest that has existed in the domain of each country. Southeast Asia is a microcosm of the world. It is home to many ethnic and tribal groups, languages, cultures, and all the world’s great religions. One of ASEAN’s most impressive achievements is the success of its multiculturalism, ability to forge unity in diversity and reduction of ethnic tensions to a great extent in the turf of the respective affected countries. Over the years, this region and regional constituents have faced severe ethnic problems. The severity of these ethnic unrests came into stark prominence especially after the end of the Cold War, though the roots of these tribulations were inherited much earlier. In fact, the internal security problems in the sociopolitical structure of Southeast Asia are not recent phenomena and have originated principally due to ethnic/race conflicts, poverty and under-development, domination of ruling party on the minority

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community, religion (mainly rise of Islamic fundamentalism), historical legacy, opium and drug related matters, etc. The display of these internal security tensions has often led to outbursts of insurgency followed by terrorism and low intensity conflicts. In Southeast Asia, low intensity wars and insurgencies, terrorist activities and social unrest are used by all sides – by freedom fighters, by dissidents, by guerrillas, by nationalists, by political activists of left or right, by ethnic and religious groups, by mafia-style criminal gangs, by drugtrafficking organizations, and by authoritarian governments or military rulers. These social unrests – be it in guerrilla form, terrorism and/ or low intensity war – often vary from one country to another in the region and the presence of these significant internal security challenges is indicative of the lack of legitimacy of the nation state in Southeast Asia. In particular, the sternness of the separatist challenges in Indonesia and the Philippines indicate their basic fragility – would they become balkanized and degenerate into failed states? More importantly, there is an interactive element in the internal rebellions: for instance the problems in East Timor (presently resolved with the help of UN peacekeeping operations), Irian Jaya and Aceh, Southern Philippines, Cambodia (between Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese/ Tongkingese), Myanmar, Malaysia (PAS), Southern Thai Muslims (i.e. Pattani United Liberation Organization), etc., often create distrust, dissection and anxiety among neighbouring countries of Southeast Asia, resulting in sharp conflicts of opinions and interests, thereby raising barriers to the realization of a regional security community and a united front against low intensity conflicts and terrorism that have cropped up time and again. The emergence of various rebel groups clearly presented the continuing ‘weakness’ of the post-colonial structure of Southeast Asia, which itself is a product of the arbitrary imposition of colonial borders that failed to take into account the region’s enormous ethno-religious diversity.5 What appeared to be the most striking point is that the ASEAN members skilfully handled many of their internal problems, which have regional and transnational dimensions and occasionally caused serious tensions and divided the countries of Southeast Asia. However, in most of the cases, realizing the depth of the problem, the ASEAN members have realized that the problems are no longer an individual undertaking

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of the affected countries, and under such circumstances, they have mostly demanded a coordinated and concerted response by the members. As a result, the ASEAN members always tried to work in unison in addressing these serious issues and mobilized their regional resources to prevent the crises. Their overall outlook is entirely based on dialogue, consultation, cooperation, engagement and mutual interaction, favouring engagement to become more ‘flexible’, and interaction ‘enhanced’. Both engagement and interaction are therefore maintained. It has also tried to strike a balance between what is desirable and what is possible, between the ideal and the practical, between desired ends and available means and between international involvement and national sovereignty. It has also adopted a variety of institutionalized apparatus, like the ASEAN-EU Meetings, the ASEAN-US Meetings, the ASEAN plus three Meetings, the InterSectional Meeting on Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime and so on, where different avowals and joint communiqués were approved to combat terrorism internationally as well as address challenges emanating from the internal ethnic strains faced by each member. Thus, the ASEAN members continue to tackle various internal threats from within by avoiding public confrontation, and thereby have created a congenial milieu much better than in the past and proven the ASEAN’s ability to function more effectively in the emerging global politics. In a world which is often troubled by conflicts and misunderstandings involving ethnicity, tribalism, languages, cultures and religions, ASEAN is an unsullied example of thriving multiculturalism. Fifth, in order to accelerate the mobility of this regional organization, on 20 November 2007, at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore, a Charter has been initiated by ASEAN members, which serves as a firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by providing legal status and institutional framework for ASEAN. Through this Charter, an attempt has been made to reshape the ASEAN by following the precepts like: (i) transforming ASEAN from a loose association into a rules-based organization which will compel members to take agreements and commitments seriously, with a procedure for monitoring compliance and a system of dispute settlement;

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(ii) establishing an ASEAN human rights body; (iii) promoting ASEAN’s economic, political and socio-cultural integration; (iv) committing to certain principles such as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, good governance and constitutional government; (v) empowering the ASEAN Secretary-General and the ASEAN Secretariat; (vi) creating new ASEAN institutions, while streamlining ASEAN’s structure and decision-making processes, and (vii) making ASEAN more cohesive, efficient and effective, as well as people-oriented.6 Besides this, the Charter also codifies ASEAN norms, rules and values; sets clear targets for ASEAN; and presents accountability and compliance. This Charter offers transparent rules for ASEAN to function and predictabilities for the outside world and institutionalizes the working processes of ASEAN to enable its officials to make decisions more effectively. Its main strategic thrusts are – formalizing and strengthening ASEAN as an institution, and establishing formal mechanisms to monitor compliance and settle disputes. This Charter also placed all ASEAN Member Countries on an equal footing, thus dispelling the paradigm of older and newer ASEAN member countries.7 On 1 January 2009, the Charter was adopted, ratified, and entered into force by providing the legal and institutional framework for ASEAN to be a more rules-based organization, providing that ‘disputes that concern the interpretation or application of ASEAN economic agreements shall be settled in accordance with the ASEAN Protocol on Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism’,8 which approved an enhanced dispute settlement procedure including three stages: advisory, consultative, and adjudicatory. As of February 2009, no disputes had been raised for adjudication.9 However, it has been felt by some scholars that the ASEAN Charter is hybrid in nature with hard-law complexion with soft-law effect and so far, has failed to live up to the expectations of the most developed countries because those members overvalued their capability to execute their ideas for the region in the light of one of ASEAN’s most central tenets. They argue that the ASEAN Charter is both strengthened and constrained

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by the ASEAN Way. They further argue that ASEAN develop only those devices with which all member-states are content, and it quarantines differences, so that members may focus their energies on reciprocally pleasing pledges. Nevertheless, in spite of these criticisms, the ASEAN Charter has become a legally binding agreement among the 10 ASEAN member-states and this is no doubt, a bold initiative and a major achievement of ASEAN in the new global order. It is still early to predict as to whether the Charter will catalyze the attainment of ASEAN’s ‘One Vision, One Identity, One Community’ by the year 2015. The ratification of the Charter is a major step towards the realization of ASEAN ‘as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability and progress, bonded in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies’. While the journey ahead is long and challenging, is the Charter’s fate too realist or too little idealist? Is the ASEAN glass half-full or half-empty as a consequence? Whatever its flaws, the Charter provides a roadmap to the future. Whether the compass of the subtly modified ‘ASEAN Way’ can take ASEAN to its destination will depend on it recalibrating its norms, values and purpose to remain nimble, relevant, and effective in an increasingly uncertain world.10 The sixth achievement of ASEAN in its political and security domain was the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993. This idea provided an occasion to institute new multilateral institutions since bilateral alliances were no longer sufficient. In fact, the ARF was the culmination of a process that began with non-ASEAN actors who argued that the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region needed a security organization. ASEAN registered its propriety role in the ARF, insisting on the right to set the agenda and adapting the ‘ASEAN Way’ of interaction (i.e. consensus building) to the proceedings of the ARF. The formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, together with other ASEAN forums on defence, law and transnational crime, has promoted closer dialogue among defence and law authorities/ agencies, encouraged better understanding of security challenges affecting ASEAN (and its dialogue partners) and enhanced ability of relevant agencies to deal with them through information-sharing and intelligence exchange in multifarious areas such as non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber terrorism, missile defence,

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maritime security, natural disasters (such as earthquake and tsunami) and pandemics (such as Avian Influenza and HIV) in a more useful and judicious way through well-coordinated disaster management and emergency response mechanisms. Summarily then, with the help of the ARF, ASEAN, over the years, has reduced many tensions, which took place, not only among the members, but also vis-à-vis others, who were part and parcel of the ASEAN processes.11 Unfortunately, since July 2010, with reference to the South China Sea issue, some temporary differences have evolved between Cambodia and the Philippines in the ARF platform. In spite of this minor irritant, the overall performance of ARF, as a security forum has barred many severe tensions from becoming open conflicts in the region. The seventh success of ASEAN remains the expansion of its wings towards external organizations and groups of countries to acquire support for high priority objectives in recognition that the organization requires the cooperation and assistance of external actors to achieve its aims. The first group of countries, on which ASEAN focused its external relations, consisted of ASEAN’s major trading partners. Thus, ASEAN established Dialogue relations with Australia in 1974, New Zealand in 1975, Japan, US and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 1977, the European Union in 1980, Canada in 1981, Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1991, India in 1995, and China and Russia in 1996. Besides this, it has developed three major offshoots with its dialogue partners and they are – the ARF, ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + 1 process. With the rise of India and growing connectivity among India, Australia and New Zealand, and Northeast and Southeast Asia, it was logical for ASEAN, in 2005, to launch the East Asia Summit (EAS) comprising ASEAN and six other members like – China, Japan, ROK, Australia, India and New Zealand. Apart from its economic logic, the EAS has great strategic significance as Asia’s peace depends on China, Japan and India’s ability to live at peace with one another. ASEAN, neutral and acceptable to all, has played the vital role of convener, facilitator and architect of the evolving regional architecture. Thus, with the expansion of its configuration, ASEAN is performing quite effectively in this competitive global economic order. The eighth achievement of ASEAN is its plan to propel this regional

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organization into a community. After over four decades as an association for regional cooperation, ASEAN is poised to move towards greater regional integration, with a motive as a formal international organization with the capacity to make decisions binding and enforceable upon all ASEAN member states. However, ASEAN is still facing the pangs of integration relating to developmental gaps between developed and under-developed members, in particular Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. While acknowledging the need to narrow the developmental gap among member countries, in 2003, the ASEAN members, through the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), announced the establishment of the ASEAN Community by the year 2020. The idea of this ASEAN Community rests on three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation. Each pillar will take the form of its own community: The ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC) demonstrates that ASEAN has gained more confidence in addressing political and security matters. In the Action Plan of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), four core elements include: building a community of caring societies to manage the social impact of economic integration; enhancing environmental sustainability and sound environmental governance; preserving and promoting ASEAN’s cultural heritage and living traditions; fostering dialogue among civilizations, cultures and religions and promoting ASEAN’s standing in the international community.12 Besides this, countries in the region are ensured of living in peace with one another; and the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is the end goal of ASEAN economic integration. The AEC will be a single market and production base with free flow of goods, services, investment, capital and movement of skilled labour by 2020. The integrated economy should be stronger than separate individual member’s economy, making it possible to compete with emerging economies like China and India. At the 11th ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in December 2005, it was agreed to put forward the goal of realizing an AEC by 2015. The establishment of AEC is spearheading ASEAN’s regional integration.13 It is believed by the leaders of ASEAN that the Bali Concord II appears to map out a different course for regional cooperation, namely deeper integration

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under regionalism. The ASEAN leaders are also conscious that failure to integrate the assorted markets of ASEAN will denote the group loses investment and economic opportunities to regional competitors such as China and India. The fact remains that in spite of many hurdles, presently the ASEAN is trying to reach the commitment that it initiated through the Declaration of ASEAN Bali Concord II in 2003. The ninth achievement of ASEAN has been to keep Southeast Asia more or less peaceful. This is akin to what the European Union (EU) has achieved after a long period, i.e. consolidating peace in entire western Europe. ASEAN was created in 1967, at the height of the Cold War power game and the Vietnam War. Today, Southeast Asia is at peace with itself and with the world, but this does not mean that the region is totally free from problems. Over the years, ASEAN has failed to resolve many of its outstanding regional issues amicably. There are cases, where its response has remained quite feeble. In the stretch of more than forty-five years of its existence, this regional organization has experienced a host of hazards and rows like transmigration and influx of refugees; drugs, human trafficking and transnational crimes; East Timor crisis; Myanmar’s military repression; low intensity conflicts and terrorism; Muslim separatist movements in southern Thailand and the Philippines; Thailand’s devaluation of the Baht; Cambodia’s coup in 1997; sacking of Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim in the 1990s; the financial crises of 1997 and 2008; the ill effects of globalization and Asian Values syndrome; rising Islamic fundamentalism; the protests by the monks in Myanmar in recent times; the Singapore-Malaysia differences over water supply and its pricing; the Singapore-Indonesia problems over an extradition treaty, export of sand for Singapore’s reclamation project and the dumping of hazardous waste;14 the insurgency problem and demand for a separate Islamic state in southern Thailand; the Thai statement in 2003 that Cambodia’s famous Angkor Wat temple belonged to Thailand, etc., which demonstrate that intra and interstate problems posed severe threats not only for the survival of this regional organization, but also to the prospect of a holistic regional order. The ASEAN members, through their long drawn experiences, on many occasions, have, unfortunately, failed to resolve some of these complex

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issues, thus exposing the limitations and challenges intrinsic in the principles of non-intervention and informal disputes settlements. However, on the overall bilateral spats, concerted efforts to contain them have been evident quite regularly. Despite this limitation, there are issues like the South China Sea dispute among some members of ASEAN and China which have conflicting historical claims, and where the ASEAN countries clearly bonded to successfully initiate the non-binding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea, adopted in 2002. Through this regional initiative of ASEAN, it at least encouraged all the conflicting parties not to resort to the use of force and ignored China’s preference to deal with this issue bilaterally, on the basis of its principle of non-intervention. Unfortunately, in the July 2010 ARF meeting, some differences evolved between Cambodia and the Philippines with reference to the publication of the communiqué on South China Sea. But these differences had been well tackled and amicably resolved by the ASEAN members. Similarly, with reference to the issues like forest fire, i.e. haze and trans-boundary environmental pollution caused in Indonesia; the scourge of terrorism after 11 September 2001; the natural calamities like ‘tsunami’ and earthquakes; the genocide of the Pol Pot regime during 1975-8 and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia; island disputes, territorial claims and subterranean tensions among the Southeast Asian countries, even in the case of Myanmar, etc., the ASEAN members have taken a number of initiatives and endeavoured to resolve them amicably, solely based on dialogue, consultation, cooperation, engagement and mutual interaction. These regional tribulations have been tackled by ASEAN, based on regional consensus, without breaking away from the principle of non-intervention. The majority members have felt that, since the principle of non-intervention is inherent in the very nature of the organization, having contributed to ASEAN’s success in the past, it would continue to do so in future, thus discarding the proposition that it would not make ASEAN any stronger. Its consensus model has always served this Association and its members splendidly. Therefore, through its policy of trial and triumph, anchored on the mindset of regional cohesion, ASEAN has come to play a very constructive and prominent role in developing a sense of regional identity in Southeast Asia and has been successful

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in reducing tensions for the maintenance of regional peace and stability, in spite of political differences among the member countries.15 Tenth, the ‘we feeling’ mindset that has been generated in the Southeast Asian region remains a major achievement of ASEAN. Over the years, ASEAN has flourished due to a number of integrative factors. The political spirit of the countries of Southeast Asia to come together in spite of differences in size, level of development and security sensitivity has been substantial. The moves in this organization towards realizing the common goal of enlarging regional markets for intra-regional as well as inter-regional trade reflected a conscious choice by the leadership. These countries, in order to improve the economic conditions and thereby reduce the gap between the old and the new entrants of ASEAN, undertook a programme known as the Initiative of ASEAN Integration (IAI). This regional initiative has been the most critical hurdle faced by ASEAN in recent times. It has been felt by the developed ASEAN members that their less-developed counterparts, due to their past historical legacies, deficiencies in resources and knowledge while attempting to catch up with the rest of the grouping, particularly in areas of more sophisticated cooperation like free-trade agreements or prevention of infectious diseases, sometimes feel isolated. Some members have had very little experience with multilateral cooperation after long years of colonial rule. And some have even employed ASEAN as a shield against external pressure, in order to prolong their brutal regimes. Thus, IAI is an important plan to promote the regional cause, because until and unless the economic condition of these countries is improved, the region cannot prosper. For the implementation of the IAI, Vietnam joined other ASEAN members in issuing the Hanoi Declaration on Narrowing Development Gap at the AMM-34 held in Hanoi in 2001. With Vietnam as the Chair of the IAI task force, the implementation of IAI has seen some results. IAI currently has 134 projects of which, over 92 per cent have received a total committed aid of US $48 million for developing infrastructure, human resources, information technology, tourism, poverty reduction and improvement of living standards. In June 2007, Vietnam hosted the Second IAI Development Cooperation Forum to work out a cooperation strategy to implement the IAI in the 2008-15 periods. Vietnam introduced an important

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initiative on socio-economic development through the Sub-Mekong Development and Cooperation Programme for poor areas along the East-West Corridor. This initiative has been, no doubt, a clear paradigm of ASEAN’s outlook of regional cohesion, based on pragmatic understanding, which happens to be a unique feature for the countries of Southeast Asia.16 Eleventh, the countries of Southeast Asia have observed the fastest growing economies in the world over the past two decades. Established in 1967, with the Bangkok Declaration, the ASEAN’s initial goals were mainly political in nature and sought to promote peace in what was at that time a volatile region. During this time, it did not attempt any major economic cooperation initiative until the new international political environment emerged at the end of the 1980s. Its first key programme was establishing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, which originally only covered trade in manufactured goods to be liberalized over a 15-year period. However, ASEAN eventually expanded the scope and shortened the implementation period of AFTA so that it was technically in full effect at the beginning of 2004 for the original ASEAN countries and Brunei Darussalam (ASEAN-6),17 although there are transitional periods for products on the temporary exclusion lists, including some agricultural and food products and automobiles. After two years, ASEAN decided to hasten the time frame of AFTA from 15 to 10 years. In addition to tariff reductions and the elimination of non-tariff barriers, trade facilitation measures are also being undertaken, such as, adoption of an ASEAN Agreement on Customs, the implementation of Green Lane System for CEPT products to expedite customs clearance, adoption of ASEAN common customs form, elimination of customs surcharges and harmonization of standards, customs nomenclature and valuation.18 The decision to create an FTA was regarded as a qualitative leap in the history of ASEAN economic cooperation, which resulted in intra-ASEAN trade to increase very rapidly19 and by the mid-1990s, ASEAN slowly but steadily, emerged as a truly regional economic organization. During the years 1993-5, the intra-ASEAN exports increased from US $42.77 billion to 68.83 billion. This represents an average growth rate of 30.46 per cent per annum, strikingly higher than the average 20 per cent growth of total ASEAN exports. The share of intra-ASEAN

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exports to total exports increased to 22 per cent in 1995 and day-today, the figure increased very rapidly. Furthermore, to expedite economic integration effort of ASEAN, 12 priority sectors have been identified for fast-track integration by 2013. These include agro-based products, air travel, automotive products, e-ASEAN, electronics, fisheries, health care, logistics, rubber-based products, textiles and apparels, tourism, and wood-based products. Nine of these sectors account for over 50 per cent of total trade in goods. One of the important tasks that ASEAN has undertaken in the era of globalization is to move towards closer economic integration with greater intra-ASEAN economic linkages and free flow of people, goods and services. With the expansion of ASEAN, there is also a greater need to ensure balanced development between old and new member countries. To achieve these goals, they initiated working together in supporting and facilitating regional initiatives in various sectors. As a result, at the 30th Anniversary of ASEAN, the members adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020, at the Second ASEAN Informal Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1997, and set out a broad vision of ASEAN for the year 2020, as a community, which would be ‘outward looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies. Vision 2020 also seeks ‘to create a stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN Economic Region in which there is a free flow of goods, services and investments, a freer flow of capital, equitable economic development and reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities’. Besides this, at the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003, the ASEAN leaders resolved that an ASEAN Community shall be established, and at the 12th ASEAN Summit in January 2007, the members affirmed their strong commitment to accelerate the establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015 and signed the Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015. The idea of this ASEAN Community is based on three main pillars, namely, the ASEAN Political-Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Each pillar has its own blueprint, and, together with the Initiative of ASEAN Integration (IAI) Strategic Framework, a programme that aims to narrow the development gap

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between members, and IAI Work Plan Phase II (2009-15), from the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009-15).20 Among these three pillars, the action plan for the implementation of the AEC was published in the form of the ‘ASEAN Blueprint’ in November 2007. As part of the AEC process, ASEAN developed the Charter, which was ratified by each ASEAN member state and came into effect in December 2008, and the AEC has specifically targeted the following four prime goals and they are: (i) A single market and production base, characterized by a free flow of goods, services, investment and skilled labour, as well as a freer flow of capital; (ii) A competitive economic region characterized by sound competition policy, consumer protection, intellectual property rights protection, infrastructure development, sectoral competition in energy and mining, rationalized taxation and e-commerce; (iii) Equitable economic development, characterized by small and medium enterprise development and enhancement of initiatives geared to help the least-developed ASEAN member states; (iv) Towards integration into the global economy, with ASEAN centrality and participation in global supply networks. In a nutshell, the primary goal of economic integration in ASEAN, as articulated by its leaders, is to reduce transaction costs associated with economic interchange and to make the region more attractive to multinational corporations wishing to take advantage of its diversity and openness in rationalizing production networks. In this sense, it is both determining and determined by the new wave of outwardoriented regionalism in Asia.21 The upward economic strength of ASEAN following its number of programmes and activities strengthened its economic base with the engagement of some of the prime dynamic world economies, starting from the AFTA-Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),

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the China-ASEAN FTA, etc. The effective outcome of these initiatives resulted in that intra-ASEAN trade increased consistently over the years from US $44.2 billion in 1993 to US $73.4 billion, before the financial and economic crisis struck in mid-1997. Between 2001 and 2008, these trade figures augmented from US $164 billion to US $481 billion, which accounts for 25 per cent of its total global trade.22 Furthermore, in the last few years, ASEAN has emerged as a more economically prominent and attractive market not only to the United States, but also for China, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, some European countries, etc. Alas, this upward mobility of ASEAN’s economy, received a severe jolt following the 1997 East Asian Financial crisis and 2008 worldwide global meltdown. In both these crises, the entire economic dynamics of the Southeast Asian region was affected quite severely, and its spillover effect was felt on society, domestic security and regional order, which immediately realized the imperative of being closely linked to each other than was previously perceived. Hence, each ASEAN member branded these crises as crises of the entire region, thus implying the crucial need for regional strategies and action. It was also felt by them that an economically integrated ASEAN would create a large market, which would enhance the competitiveness of ASEAN’s exports and lower production costs through economies of scale. A cohesive ASEAN would also increase its international bargaining power and help to facilitate negotiations for greater market access for its products and services to export markets. Furthermore, an integrated ASEAN would enlarge the region’s economic and financial clout, as individually, the countries are dwarfed by the size of the international capital market. As a result of this regional thinking, the ASEAN members, with reference to the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, within a short span of time, finally trounced this acute financial problem, where in Singapore played a very positive role. However, the 2008 financial crisis was broader, deeper and more complex than the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8. While the Asian financial crisis arose from structural weaknesses in financial and monetary systems at home, the latter came from financial and economic meltdowns in the advanced countries, especially the United States. The US sub-prime mortgage collapse shattered confidence in

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major global financial institutions and instruments, massive deleveraging, crashing equity prices, froze credit markets, reversed credit and investment flows to Asia, wounded Asian stock prices and exchange rates and interrupted a decade of record economic expansion and social progress in developing Asia. This global financial crisis has resulted in a solemn drop in the region’s exports, thereby posing a threat to Southeast Asia’s main engine of growth and its impact has been felt through a spiky decline in world demand for the region’s exports. The scale of that decline in exports has led in turn to a marked dip in the growth rates of GDP in these countries – a drop that in some cases resulted in negative growth rates in 2009 and beyond. For example, in 2009, exports of some of these Southeast Asian countries fell (25 per cent in Indonesia, 13 per cent in Malaysia, 18 per cent in Thailand, and 32 per cent in Vietnam). Also, the growth rate of this region had fallen to 4.3 per cent in 2008, compared with 6.4 per cent in 2007.23 Besides this, the ASEAN region is also experiencing a significant drop in foreign direct investment, which has deprived it of both finances and new technology. This is a grave problem for countries that rely on external borrowing to help fund their budget deficits, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and the ASEAN member countries in the Greater Mekong Sub-region.24 It is a hard reality that the ASEAN members in the 1997 financial crisis were affected more internally than the 2008 global economic crisis. However, in the latter economic meltdown, while comparing the former one, the ASEAN members suffered less than many developed economies of the Western world. The 2008 financial crisis had a negative spillover effect in each economy of Southeast Asia, but it varied from one to another within the region. Nevertheless, the overall growth impetus of the region remained quite robust, underpinned by the strength of domestic demand and thanks to large-scale investments in infrastructure and buoyant private consumption. Currently, slowly but steadily, this region is overcoming this crisis, where the expanding and intensifying intra-ASEAN and intra-Asian trade is acting as a buffer to any decline in ASEAN exports to the outside world and also providing assistance to weak partners, mainly the VCLM countries through the series of regional and bilateral swap arrangements. It is estimated that the rapidly growing size of consumer expenditure

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in ASEAN projected over the next 20 years will result in a major transformation of the pattern of global multinational corporations, as United States and European multinationals dramatically renovate their corporate strategies towards the Asia-Pacific region. In such a scenario, the ASEAN will account for a higher share of total annual investment into Asia-Pacific, as well as having a growing share of multinational corporation workforces and a greater voice in global top management for most multinationals. The rapid rate of growth in Asian consumer markets will also bear the rise of ASEAN multinationals in different industry segments, and become increasingly important for global multinationals, as ASEAN middle-class income increases rapidly, driving demand for a wide gamut of market segments ranging from fast-moving consumer goods to luxury goods, etc.25 Summarily then, it can be contended that over the years the ASEAN, through its regional efforts has surfaced as an emerging economic power bloc in the global turf. Finally, the principle of non-intervention remains the principal vehicle of ASEAN’s success in its entirety. This principle, based on Article 2 of TAC, adopted at ASEAN’s First Heads of Government Summit in 1976, has been a major subject of contention in ASEAN affairs. On the one hand, the strict observance of this principle has helped to promote a stable environment of peace conducive to development. On the other, complete disregard of this fundamental code has resulted in internal tensions. However, in the changed international and regional contexts, strict adherence to the principle has tended to divide the ASEAN states. The founding members of the ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, had accepted non-interference in each other’s affairs as a cardinal principle and characteristic of ASEAN amity. This norm was intended to apply not only to interferences by extra-regional powers, including the major powers such as US, Soviet Union, China and others, but also by Southeast Asian countries in the affairs of their own neighbours. The main aim of the TAC was to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their people, which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship. It stresses the salience of ‘mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all

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nations’ and highlights ‘the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion’. Most prominently, it enshrines the principle of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of one another’. What appeared to be the most important to the ASEAN members was that many of their internal problems, which have regional and trans-national dimensions, occasionally caused serious tensions and divided the countries of Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, in most of the cases, realizing the depth of the problem, the ASEAN members have clearly comprehended that the issues call for coordinated and concerted responses by the members. As a result, the ASEAN members, in spite of occasional differences, have endeavoured to work together to address the problems and mobilize their regional resources to prevent the crises, based on dialogue, consultation, cooperation, engagement and mutual interaction, in consonance with their preference for more ‘flexible’ engagement and ‘enhanced’ interaction. Thus, the ASEAN members continue to tackle various regional crises by consensus, known as ‘the ASEAN Way’, and have attempted to avoid public confrontation, without evading the principle of non-intervention. Based on the long and rich experiences as a regional organization, ASEAN has not only survived but has also developed into an important force internationally, being held up as an exemplar of regional unity and consolidation.26 EMERGING PITFALLS OF ASEAN

ASEAN has proved its stamina and ability to function as an independent regional entity in this competitive global order. During this long drawn half century journey, however, it cannot be claimed honestly by the members of this regional organization that it has resolved all its internal and regional problems amicably. The major challenges presently faced by the ASEAN members are as follows: First, the economic development of the Southeast Asian region, in spite of its prosperity, is still unbalanced and some countries lag behind in socio-economic development. Thus the overall competitiveness of the Southeast Asian region needs to be enhanced. Serious execution of its programmes in all fields of cooperation (economic, political-security and socio-cultural) is essential for its credibility. The former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Ong Keng Yong

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in an inaugural speech, at the V Forum Asia 2007, held in Barcelona, on 12 November 2007, while highlighting some challenges of ASEAN’s economic performance, expressed deep concern as to how the large inflows of capital in ASEAN could be effectively managed in order to minimize distortions of its domestic markets. He then suggested some options to tackle this problem and they are: (i) greater flexibility in exchange rate system (to allow authorities more room to manage fluctuations in money supply arising from higher inflows), (ii) prudent fiscal policy (to prevent interest rates from rising that will lead to further currency appreciation), (iii) continued liberalization of capital outflows (to encourage more direct and portfolio investments overseas), and (iv) strong financial sector supervision (to further develop and stabilize domestic financial markets). The success of Europe and other advanced countries in dealing with large surges in capital flows can be a good model for ASEAN economies to emulate.27 He further said that the financial turbulence that broke out in July 2007 also highlights the need for ASEAN economies to continue its financial and corporate sector reforms and minimize the heightened volatility and widening of risks that can undermine the region’s financial systems. Although ASEAN has come a long way to strengthen its financial systems, vulnerabilities remain. Thus, the challenge for ASEAN is to uphold the foundation for a ‘brawny upswing through reforms that sponsor healthy banking and corporate balance sheets and accommodative financial conditions’. Finally, he suggested that the region continues to amalgamate itself into the global economy, and policies that promote greater trade and financial liberalization need to be vigorously pursued. As trade interdependence in ASEAN appears to be intensifying, policy makers to face the daunting tasks of striking a balance between domestic and external objectives without compromising their comparative advantage and expanded presence in world trade…. Be in ASEAN, now will allow you to effectively and productively enjoy the benefits of a growing and integrating region.28

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It is a fact that in the context of emerging global order where competition for trade and investment opportunities is likely to become more intensified and where successful economic recital is seen to be the most important source of internal legitimacy and international influence, in order to endure itself and prosper, the ASEAN must persevere to be a region of high economic growth and must work to be an increasingly dynamic epicentre of economic activities. Continued achievement also requires that the ASEAN countries individually and collectively increase their technological capabilities to grind and help sustain their competitive edge into the next century. Hence, for the process of the development of free market mechanism to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the region, the late entrants of ASEAN should be given special attention for the development of sound financial and banking system including necessary domestic fiscal, monetary and savings instrument, promotion of domestic private entrepreneurship, and encouragement of ‘responsible’ direct investment more from the developed economies of ASEAN countries.29 Otherwise, the diversity in economic development models results in asymmetric roles among ASEAN economies, which would make it harder for institutionalizing the integration of ASEAN. If not, the development gaps could generate asymmetry in macro-economic collaboration due to uncoordinated exchange rate policy and incompatible financial markets, which would further result in regional economic instability or even crisis among members. Second, the issue of human rights is a sensitive one in ASEAN’s day-to-day functioning. Realizing the importance of this issue, in 1993, following the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, it finally agreed to prepare an appropriate regional mechanism on human rights. After a highly controversial process, ASEAN member countries agreed upon the terms for the human rights body stipulated in the Charter, to be known as the Asian Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), in July 2009. The AICHR formally became effective after the ASEAN Summit held in October 200930 and where Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand wanted this body to have an enforcement capacity, while Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia did not. Thus, in a nutshell, ASEAN’s present position on human rights can be abridged as follows:

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(1) The equality, inter-relatedness and indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights; (2) The promotion of human rights must take into account the specific cultural, social, economic and political circumstances, and in the context of development and international cooperation; (3) The rejection of the politicization of human rights, including its use as a precedent for economic cooperation and development assistance; (4) The promotion and protection of human rights must respect the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states; (5) The balance of individual rights and community rights.31 In spite of this outlook of ASEAN, recently on 18 November 2012, at its 21st ASEAN Summit, held in Phnom Penh, the member-states signed a Declaration titled, ‘Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration’, which principally aims at guarding and supporting the human rights of citizens in ASEAN member states. This declaration binds countries of the regional bloc not only to follow the protection and promotion of human rights, but also to maintain the highest human rights standards expressed in various instruments and declarations of the international community. Unfortunately, 64 ASEAN civil society organizations rejected this declaration, as they consider it as a flawed document.32 Besides this, the issue of Myanmar also remains a susceptible point of normal functioning of ASEAN. Over the years, Myanmar’s abysmal human rights record and its continuous detention of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi created a shoddier image all over the world. It is not clear whether the present changes towards a more open system and establishment of civilian government in Myanmar have given the ASEAN a better image and whatever happens in Myanmar due to ASEAN’s policy of ‘flexible engagement’ or due to domestic problems, remains a big question. However, it can be said that the ASEAN has at least reminded Myanmar’s military government that total seclusion from the international community would benefit neither it nor the ASEAN. Besides this, the Western countries have time and again criticized ASEAN for being too ‘soft’ in its approach to promoting human rights and democracy by the junta-led military government

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of Myanmar. Despite global fury at the military crack-down on peaceful protesters in Yangon, ASEAN rejected proposals for economic sanctions. This caused huge concern as the European Union, a potential trade partner, refused to conduct free trade negotiations at a regional level. Nevertheless, the present ASEAN approach towards Myanmar, through its policy of continuous engagement, mediation and persuasion may lead it to soften its outlook towards ASEAN and create an improved image to the outside world. The third weak point is that there is no clear mechanism for civil society to take part in ASEAN. It is often criticized for asserting on the one hand that democratic principles guide them, while on the other, allowing human rights violations to occur in Myanmar, and socialism to rule in Vietnam and Laos. ASEAN was set up long after the UN was founded, yet it is more outdated than the UN in many aspects. ASEAN therefore should look to the UN or European Union models which let non-government organizations register as consultative counsel. That is no surprise as many ASEAN members do not encourage people’s participation.33 So, in order to make the ASEAN more effective in its entirety in various spheres, civil societies, NGOs, politicians, parliaments, entrepreneurs, media and others must be involved more and more in its holistic developmental progression. Fourth, before it reaches the ASEAN Community in 2015, in order to maximize mutual benefits for member countries, the ASEAN needs to fix its weaknesses. In this context, Bantarto Bandoro, a senior researcher from the Indonesian Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) said: ‘The ASEAN Community 2015 is a platform that should be materialized whether each country likes it or not. However, it is not an easy process towards the community. Countries must assure that they have strong infrastructures.’ He further added that, ‘one of the most important pillars towards the community is the economic community aside of politic-security and social ones and for that the economic community must be strengthened as it would provide the biggest contribution’. Finally, he said that ‘this bloc is still far away from the establishment of single currency’. ASEAN single currency would be meaningless if there is no stability in each country’s economy.34 Fifth, the Charter is not the sole guideline for ASEAN in the long

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run, but just until 2015. It still adheres to the non-interference policy as it remains unclear as to how this will actually change. In order to make it an effective vehicle, there is an urgent need to launch more rules and institutions. The role of the Charter will be critical to move ASEAN ahead because it requires principles, ideas and objectives, rules and institutions as prerequisites for its future. Thus, deepening of integration is significant for ASEAN because it would let ASEAN cooperation to become a living reality for the people and the international community. Presently, the major challenge of ASEAN is its faltering toward greater institutionalization, toward an additional legalized way of doing things and resolving problems, and toward a greater promise to implement conformity. Although initially it was hoped that the new Charter would be able to tackle these defects, the flaws in it have once again disturbed those who wish a more progressive and capable ASEAN. However, it is a fact that the Charter is not meant to make revolutionary changes to ASEAN. Instead, the Charter will have to catalyze change and inspire reforms if ASEAN is to maintain its geopolitical stature and relevance in the present juncture. Sixth, the development gaps still exist among the late ASEAN members (VCLM countries)35 namely, in the areas of income, infrastructure, integration and institution. The present situation of development gaps reflects dramatic imbalances in integration capacity of ASEAN members, which thwarts ASEAN from reaching deeper and wider economic integration and restricts it to a sluggish and sometimes hopeless process. If it is not reduced, then ASEAN may face a lowering of its regional and global position. The slow integration process of ASEAN might shove the developed ASEAN members (ASEAN-6) towards centrifugal leaning, or seeking bilateral affiliation with external partners. The least developed countries would then become more annoyed and ASEAN runs the risk of losing its hitherto unity and solidarity. 36 However, it is a fact that ASEAN as a regional organization has taken serious efforts in narrowing the Development Gap between the more developed and less developed counterparts through the IAI Programme. This internal economic constraint among members could be tackled if ASEAN creates a fund of at least half a billion US dollars initiated by its better endowed members. This fund will also help

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ASEAN attract third parties to participate more fully in their efforts.37 Therefore, the digital gaps are the core determinants in shaping possible outcomes of the current integration and community-building process of ASEAN. Seventh, the greatest challenge facing ASEAN stems from within. Numerous cases of severe internal stresses and strains have been evident. Trans-migration and influx of refugees, drug trafficking and transnational crimes, Myanmar’s military repression, the issue of terrorism, Muslim separatist movement in southern Thailand, Cambodia’s coup d’etat, sacking of Malaysian deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim in the 1990s, South China Sea dispute, water dispute between Singapore and Malaysia, etc., have generated severe regional tensions. In recent times, these internal differences have re-surfaced on a number of occasions. For instance, the ASEAN was unable to hold its 14th Summit on 13-17 December 2008 as scheduled because of political turmoil in Thailand. The postponement of the Summit dealt a serious blow to the birth of a ‘new’ ASEAN marked by the launch of the ASEAN Charter. The situation worsened further with the emergence of signs of distrust among member states when they openly questioned the readiness and ability of Thailand to host the Summit. This event put the regional group’s age-old policy of noninterference in the domestic travails of a member state under question and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of ASEAN as a regional organization. This incident also exhibited the manner in which a non-democratic state could use this as an example of how democracy in a member state can negatively affect ASEAN as a whole.38 Another example that can be cited in this context is that the ASEAN members have been unable to solve the dispute along the Thai-Cambodian border, revealing the limitations of the ASEAN way. Finally, the differences on issuing a Joint Communiqué at the annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in Phnom Penh in July 2012 could be another example of ASEAN’s low point. At the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the foreign ministers failed to reach an agreement on how ASEAN’s views on the activities of claimant states in the South China Sea should be reflected in the Joint Communiqué. While a gray coating can be found in the diplomatic leadership taken by Indonesia to secure a common ASEAN position on the issue, the

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events at the 45th AMM tarnished ASEAN’s image and gave rise to commentaries on whether ASEAN’s influence and reach as a collective body had waned. Here, individual national interests came into more prominence than the regional interest, for which, the concept of ASEAN’s community-building had been overshadowed. This event in turn undermined ASEAN’s credibility and unity, which have been the central basis of ASEAN’s regional cohesion. In spite of these differences among the members on a number of issues, ASEAN is still functioning normally. Eighth, in this competitive global order, economic competition from emerging economies, such as China, India, Japan, the United States, some European countries, Bangladesh, Australia, South Korea, etc., and their growing economic penetration in the ASEAN market remain a major concern to these countries. It has been felt by them that too much economic infiltration of their products might affect their internal economic structure. Besides this, the growing Chinese influence as a regional power in the Southeast Asian region and involvement of some extra-regional powers to contain the former’s regional influence is a major subject matter of contention in the present context. So, the ten Southeast Asian countries have to work harder together to face the competition from these economic players and thereby display greater political will to reinforce their economies on the basis of a regional mindset. Ninth, another budding challenge that ASEAN might face in the coming years is the emergence of other regional and sub-regional organizations in the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. Besides ASEAN, presently, there are other regional masts, namely: the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) with China, Japan and South Korea and the East Asian Summit (EAS). Since ASEAN as a group has been dynamically drawn in all these regional mechanisms, how the ASEAN will respond to increasing power rivalry, especially with the rise of China and India as regional powers and re-entry of some extra-regional powers, remains a major subject matter of political discourse of international relations. Another serious challenge that ASEAN needs to deal with in the coming days is building of a new regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific. For the last few years, among

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Track-Two communities, designing and shaping a new East Asian organization as an overarching body for strategic dialogues and security cooperation has been methodically conversed. But today’s application of tackling methodology may be obsolete tomorrow. So, ASEAN should be well set to deal with unexpected and unprecedented future problems and new challenges. Tenth, the current challenge relates to ASEAN itself. The Association has set itself an ambitious target in the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) protocols, which has been initiated from January 2016. This is ASEAN’s most striving endeavour yet to create a ‘seamless Southeast Asian economy’, extending beyond merchandise trade to services trade, investment, labour movements, and harmonization of standards. There is no doubt that the AEC is a significant step forward: the exemptions (from free trade) will have to be made explicit, and some skilled labour movement will be freed up. But implementation is likely to be very hard, especially in services and labour sectors. Actually, in 2003, the members of ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) idea with an aspiration of broadening economic cooperation measures including lower trade and investment barriers; harmonized rules and regulations; and ways to place the region in the global value chain of production. The sole aim is to create a ‘single market and production base’ and generate more welfare gains than those facilitated through tariff liberalization under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) of the 1990s. Having congregated the expectations set by the Cebu Summit in 2007 of building an ASEAN Community by 2015, ASEAN is now well-poised to embark on a new phase of not just community-building, but also community-strengthening and consolidating. Having seen 2015 come and go, it now look forward to the new milestone year of 2025 with the new agenda document ‘ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together’. The sole strategic objective of the AEC is to help its members pursue their national interests. By becoming economically cohesive, the ten ASEAN economies can work together against economic and financial vulnerability, and also become a bigger market space (of over 600 million people) to foreign investors. This in turn would help boost the participation of the ASEAN economies in the global production network process. An economically cohesive region would also

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strengthen the member states’ bargaining power at the WTO as well as in the respective FTAs with external partners, and in other strategic matters. The financial cooperation mechanism under the ASEAN+3 framework is expected to increase the Asian voice in, and for, global financial management. The AEC outcome should not be seen solely in terms of its ability to achieve a single market. Rather, the AEC should be viewed as a strategic project that will attract more investments, help member countries plug into global supply chains, and strengthen their bargaining power in international economic and financial matters. This AEC initiative can also be viewed as a defensive act taken in response to the regional trading arrangements (RTA) under the European Union and the US’s success with NAFTA. Moreover, there had been dissatisfaction with the slow progress of the liberalization process under the WTO as well as the limited success of the APEC process. Therefore, implementation of the AEC would certainly strengthen ASEAN’s position in the bigger economic space of Asia. However, this initiative of ASEAN can be termed one of the biggest challenges since its inception as a regional organization. Finally, maintaining the group’s unity on the principles of equality, consensus, and non-intervention, which it has achieved over the years, has emerged as a serious theme of academic exercise on this regional organization. The ‘we feeling’ mindset that has been developed by ASEAN over the years through its principle of non-intervention might lose its dynamics if the ASEAN members are unable to function jointly. Under such circumstances, ASEAN’s birth dream and rationale behind its formation, and whatever it has achieved would be jeopardized. CONCLUSION

It can be said unhesitatingly that ASEAN has accomplished over the last five decades much to be proud of as a widely recognized economic organization in the international community for an example of enlightened regionalism. In the political and security spheres, ASEAN has transformed itself from a small regional organization into a major voice for peace, justice and moderation in the Asia-Pacific and world affairs. ASEAN has maintained peace and stability among its member-

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countries, despite territorial disputes and other contentious issues among them. Today, it is the only regional organization in Asia that provides a political forum where Asian countries and the other world powers can address and negotiate problems on common security, political issues and military concerns. During its long voyage, it can be contended that the benefits of ASEAN as a regional framework and institution are wide-ranging. From its declared objectives of socio-economic and cultural cooperation, as embodied in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, ASEAN has, in fact, grown effectively through the more sensitive approach of political and geo-political cooperation in the last forty-six years. During these years, ASEAN’s success has been multifarious and as follows: First, ASEAN’s major achievement has been the maintenance of regional peace and stability for more than four decades. Resolving the Cambodian conflict via peaceful negotiation was an immense ASEAN triumph. Second, it has helped to create useful consultative mechanisms such as APEC and ARF. Third, it has helped to balance the interests of Great Powers in Southeast Asia by engaging them in various dialogues and programmes such as ASEAN’s Zone of Peace and Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. However, since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN’s avowed objectives from 1967 have bound this regional organization further, either through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) or a common approach to regional investments and intensified cooperation in socio-cultural fields, with a number of dialogue partners helping to build a matrix of trade and development across the region. Also, in the social field, ASEAN’s realization was illustrated vividly by its support extended to Indonesia, following the tsunami that hit Aceh and other parts of the region in 2004. Furthermore, the ASEAN Vision 2020, which was unveiled in December 1997 in Kuala Lumpur, might act as the guiding thrust for ASEAN, and could transform its current achievement of regional political stabilization into an even greater socio-economic and cultural consolidation, in order to emerge as a credible regional player in the Asia-Pacific in the next phase of its development. What appears to be most important to the ASEAN members is that many of their internal problems, which have regional and transnational dimensions, have occasionally led to tensions and divided

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the countries of Southeast Asia. However, in most of the cases, the ASEAN members have realized that the problems demanded a coordinated and concerted response by the members. This resulted in that the ASEAN members always tried to work in a concerted manner to address their problems and mobilized its regional resources to prevent the crises. The overall perception of ASEAN members is entirely based on dialogue, consultation, cooperation, engagement and mutual interaction. It prefers more ‘flexible’ engagement and ‘enhanced’ interaction. So, it continues to tackle various regional crises and threats from within and outside by following the principle of regional consensus, known as ‘the ASEAN Way’, and thereby attempts to avoid public confrontations, without breaking away from the principle of non-intervention. However, the efficacy of ASEAN processes and mechanisms, and the underlying principles have been brought to question many times. There are a number of issues like, Hun Sen seizing power in 1997, the inclusion of Myanmar within ASEAN in 1997, the financial crises of 1997 and 2008, the vulnerability of its export-oriented economy, weak intra-regional trade, human rights violation, the politics of authoritarianism, the massive protests and riots culminating in the fall of Indonesian President Suharto in 1998, sacking of Malaysian deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim by Mahathir bin Mohammed in 1998, the differences among the ASEAN members on the South China Sea issue in July 2012 at the ARF meeting, etc., which have sometimes put a several question mark over the integrity of this regional organization. Furthermore, implementation of the AEC would remain a major challenge of ASEAN, because the key to its success and longevity has been solely based on the performance of the individual countries, combined with an economic strategy characterized based on ‘outward-looking regional integration’. The ASEAN through its AEC documents of 2025, trying to continue its long drawn path of regional integration and try to provide an insight as to the regional organization’s priorities, focus and goals and which remains more deep rooted attention and fervour. In spite of occasional hurdles, it can be argued that ASEAN’s experience of nearly half a century has made this regional organization more pragmatic in the emerging global politics. It must be highlighted at this juncture that

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ASEAN is not an association that is spaced out from the sum of its member-states. It is an organization of sovereign states that make decisions on the basis of their national interests. It also remains a political and economic force because it is the only regional organization in this current global order, which gives the countries of Southeast Asia a collective voice and enable them in dealing with extra-regional powers. In other words, the consensus principles of ASEAN nevertheless remain a significant achievement in itself. Through its quiet diplomacy in the last five decades, ASEAN has managed to play a more active role in its policy formulations. In many ways, the political and economic stability observed in ASEAN countries clearly exhibits the testament to the fact that its success story is an extraordinary one and its record during the 50 years of its existence illustrates that with the right model, a regional organization can indeed be successful. To end my paper, I shall quote Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Security Council, who had said in 2000: ‘Today, ASEAN is not only a well-functioning, indispensable reality in the region. It is a real force to be reckoned with far beyond the region. It is also a trusted partner of the United Nations in the field of development.’ To sum up, it can be said that ideology has never been a problem to ASEAN. It has not allowed theoretical political differences to interfere in its efforts to cooperate for the common good. ASEAN’s leaders have never felt tired of seeking consensus, and have always worked hard for it. Today, it is the only regional organization in Asia that provides a political forum where Asian countries and the world powers can discuss and consider problems about common security, political issues and military concerns. Moreover, the continuous stream of internal crises can make ASEAN more experienced and refined, because its historical experience of origin and development could prompt the establishment of its image as an enlightened regional organization in the Asia-Pacific architecture in the present point in time. NOTES 1. For details see Tridib Chakraborti, ‘ASEAN: An Overview’, Journal of Political and Socio-Economic Research, Tripura: Department of Political Science, Tripura University, vol. 1, no. 1, January-June 2008, p. 97.

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2. ‘Economic Achievement’, see http://www.aseansec.org/11832.htm (accessed on 12 April 2015). 3. Chakraborti, n. 1, p. 73. 4. Tridib Chakraborti, ‘SAARC and ASEAN in the Emerging Global Order: A Pragmatist Comparative Analysis’, in Anuradha Bose (Das) (ed.), SAARC – A Quest for Unity: Problems and Prospects, Kolkata: Minerva Associates, 2011, pp. 85-6. 5. Clive Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996, p. 192; for details analysis see also Tridib Chakraborti, ‘Terrorism and the ASEAN States: A Classification and Prescriptive Analysis’, in Omprakash Mishra and Sucheta Ghosh (eds.), Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict in the South Asian Region, New Delhi: Manak, 2003, pp. 316-56. 6. ‘ASEAN at 40’, Tommy Koh, IPS-South-South Executive Brief, vol. 1, no. 1, January 2008, p. 3, http://www.ipsnews.net/south-south/SSTV1.6.pdf (accessed on 12 March 2013). 7. Speech delivered by Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of ASEAN at the Dr. Handa Diplomatic Lecture Series, University of Cambodia, 14 December 2007, for details see www.aseansec.org/21254.htm (accessed on 23 March 2015). 8. ASEAN Charter, Article-24, see http://www.asean.org/21069.pdf (accessed on 21 June 2015). 9. The ASEAN Secretariat, ‘Fact Sheet: ASEAN Dispute Settlement System’, 24 February 2009. 10. Cited by Eugene K.B. Tan, ‘The ASEAN Charter as “Legs to Go Places”: Ideational Norms and Pragmatic Legalism in Community Building in Southeast Asia’, Singapore: Singapore Year Book of International Law, 2010, p. 198, for details see law.nus.edu.sg/sybil/downloads/articles/.../SYBIL2008-171.pdf (accessed on 25 April 2015). 11. Chakraborti, n. 4, p. 92. 12. ‘ASEAN: 40 Years of Development and Co-operation’, Nhan Dan, 8 August 2007 http://english.vietnamnet.vn/politics/2007/08/727337/ (accessed on 16 April 2015). 13. For details see Cielito F. Habito, Fernando T. Aldaba and Ofelia M. Templo, ‘An Assessment Study on the Progress of ASEAN Regional Integration: The HaNoi Plan of Action Toward ASEAN Vision 2020’, Regional Economic Policy Support Facility (REPSF) Project No. 03/006b, 2004, pp. 2-4. 14. The Jakarta Post, 2 March 2005. 15. Chakraborti, n. 4, pp. 100-1. 16. Ibid., pp. 107-9. 17. The original ASEAN members, when it was established in 1967 were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined in 1984, as a sixth member of this regional organization.

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18. Chakraborti, n. 4, pp. 88-9. 19. Ibid., p. 89. 20. See http://www.ASEAN.org/64.htm (accessed on 22 October 2012), cited in Tridib Chakraborti, n. 4, pp. 90-1. 21. Hiro Lee and Michael G. Plummer, ‘Assessing the Impact of the ASEAN Economic Community’, OSIPP Discussion Paper: DP-2011-E-002, 23 March 2011, pp. 2-3. 22. For details see www.ASEANsec.org/10342.htm (accessed on 22 May 2015). 23. ‘The Global Economic Crisis Challenges for Developing Asia and ADB’s Response’, Asian Development Bank (ADB), April 2009, www.adb.org/ Documents/.../Economic-Crisis/default.asp (accessed on 24 April 2015). 24. ‘Global Financial Crisis and its Social Impact in the Countries in ASEAN’, www.icsw.org/.../2009-12-Global-Financial-Crisis-and-its-Social-Imp (accessed on 24 April 2015). 25. http://www.cfoinnovation.com/content/aseans-rise-next-economicsuperpower (accessed on 22 March 2015). 26. Chakraborti, n. 1, pp. 94-6. 27. Inaugural Speech delivered by Ong Keng Yong, Secretary-General of ASEAN at the at the V Forum Asia 2007 at Barcelona, 12 November 2007, for details see http://www.aseansec.org/21145.htm (accessed on 25 April 2015). 28. Ibid. 29. See http://ikdasar.tripod.com/sa_2000/sea/cambodia/cambodia3.htm (accessed on 28 March 2015). 30. ‘ASEAN to Launch Human Rights Body’, Al Jazeera English, 20 July 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asiapacific/2009/07/20097204241 679480.html (accessed on 28 April 2015). 31. For details see also A.J. Langlois, The Politics of Justice and Human Rights: Southeast Asia and Universalist Theory, Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 2001 32. ‘Asian HR Stalwarts Criticize Flawed ASEAN HR Declaration’, The Manila Times, 25 November 2012, see http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/ special-report/36034-asian-hr-stalwarts-criticize-flawed-ASEAN-hrdeclaration (accessed on 28 May 2015). 33. For details see The Bangkok Post, 15 December 2008, p. 11. http://www. thaiworld.org/enn/include/print.php?text=816&category_id=5&print=true (accessed on 28 March 2015). 34. Cundoko Aprilianto, ‘ASEAN Needs to Fix Weaknesses Towards Bloc Community’, 25 October 2010, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/ world/2010-10/25/c_13574703.htm (accessed on 28 April 2015) 35. The VCLM countries meant Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. 36. Bui Truong Giang, ‘Development Gaps in ASEAN as Crucial Non-traditional Security Issue: A 4-I Approach’, Center for International Security and

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Strategic Studies (CISS), Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), see www.rsis-ntsasia.org/resources/publications/.../buitruonggiang.doc (accessed on 29 January 2015). 37. See http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=641 (accessed on 21 February 2015). 38. Pranamita Baruah, ‘New Challenges Confront ASEAN’, 4 May 2009, IDSA Comment, seehttp://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/NewChallenges ConfrontASEAN_PBaruah_040509 (accessed on 25 April 2016).

CHAPTER 9

(Re)evaluating Regionalism in West Asia S A N J U K TA B A N E R J I B H AT TA C H A RY A

there is a growing body of literature centred on the idea that regional institutions, and more specifically, regional organizations, are becoming important actors in international politics. Many analysts further feel that regionalism and regionalization can contribute not only to economic growth and stability but also political liberalization and even democracy. Observers have noted that regional entities in both Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have had a positive effect. However, West Asia is perhaps one of the exceptions that prove the rule: it is not a region that can be easily associated with regionalism although regional institutions here go back to among the earliest ones to appear in contemporary world politics. The basic puzzle is that despite geographical proximity, a relatively high degree of social, cultural and religious homogeneity as well as political, military and economic interaction, there has been historically a low level of institutional regional cooperation. In the current context too, the lack of influence of regional institutions is very strongly evident in the events that have shaken the region, particularly since 1991. Institutional shortcomings, domestic constraints and rivalries and international interventions are some of the more obvious barriers to regional political cooperation, particularly on issues centred on conflict and conflict resolution. Interestingly, regional institutions that are more functional and focus on economic matters have achieved a degree of success that has eluded the political ones. This raises some important issues regarding why regionalism has not worked so far in West Asia. Apart from the reasons mentioned earlier, answers must be sought in history, the character of governments

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and governance, ethnic national identities, etc. The present paper will examine the causes for the relative failure of regionalism in West Asia in the light of all these factors and attempt a prognosis of the future of regionalism or even regionalization in the context of contemporary political changes. DEFINING REGIONALISM

First however, an attempt will be made to define regionalism theoretically, which may indicate gaps in the framework of regionalism in West Asia. Regionalism is not the same as regionalization. The major components defining a region, from which regionalism is derived, are geographical contiguity, interaction and a perception of belonging to a distinctive community with a largely shared identity.1 Some common characteristics can also be identified: (1) a certain amount or degree of social and cultural homogeneity; (2) similar political attitudes or external behaviour toward third parties; (3) common political institutions, as an expression of political interdependence; (4) a certain degree of economic interdependence; and (5) common behavioural criteria, such as the identification of norms pertaining to conflict management and resolution.2 Joseph Nye focuses on the geographical aspect of regionalism when he defines international regions as ‘a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence’, and (international) regionalism as ‘the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions’.3 This definition was never fully accepted, one reason being the difficulty of defining spatial regions as well as the failure of ‘groupings on the basis of regions’ to achieve any proper degree of regionalism particularly in the Third World during the Cold War years. Other analysts like Ernst B. Haas emphasized on the need to distinguish between regional cooperation, regional system, regional organization and regional integration and regionalism.4 Barry Buzan gives a more restricted definition when he speaks of a regional security community or a

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regional security complex, which implies states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a given geographic area.5 This could include great power concert, collective security, pluralistic security communities or integration through institutionalization and shared norms.6 To go by these definitions, one can speak of regionalism as the proneness of governments and/or people of two or more states to form voluntary organizations and pool together resources, economic, military and other, to create functional and institutional associations. These associations can go beyond state actors to include regional institutions and societal organizations that share or accept similar norms and thus create networks of economic, diplomatic, cultural, scientific, political and military interactions. Regionalization, on the other hand, is seen as a dynamic process of formation of regional geopolitical units, organized for political cooperation among a particular group of states, and/or as regional communities such as pluralistic security communities.7 It denotes the process by which patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarities, and convergence within a cross-national geographical space occurs. Regionalism as an ideology, which may be in contrast to nationalism or neo-nationalism, differs from the process of regionalization, which implies the empirical process of functional cooperation. According to the New Regionalism approach, regionalization is the expression of increased commercial and human transactions in a defined geographical region. Regionalism refers to an intentional political process, typically led by governments with similar goals and values in pursuit of the overall development within a region. Regionalization, however, is simply the natural tendency to form regions, or the process of forming regions due to similarities between states in a given geographical space. Both find expression largely in the economic and security domains, including convergent motivations toward both political/security and economic forms of integration. Following the end of the Cold War and because of shifts in the global balance of military and economic power as well as the uneven effects of globalization, there is a growing tendency towards regionalism worldwide, particularly of the economic kind. This is being called ‘new regionalism’.8 However, new regionalism

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dates back to the 1980s and is connected to the structural transformation of global economics and politics. ‘Old regionalism’, on the other hand, dates back to the 1950s and continues parallel with new regionalism till today in differing forms, though it stagnated in the 1970s. Both have to be seen in the historical context. Old regional organizations were more inward looking and aimed more at collective regional security or regional economic development vis-à-vis nonregional actors and perhaps, this can be explained in the context of self-preservation during the Cold War and the issues of (non-)growth and (non-)development in the post-colonial, post-world war years. New regionalism in contrast, is related to (1) the erosion of bipolarity and a move towards multipolarity in the twenty-first century, (2) the relative decline of American power and its subsequent tolerance of regionalism, particularly the kind that fosters its economic and security interests, (3) the growth of ‘globalization’ and interdependence that follows from it, and (4) the changing attitudes towards neo-liberal economic development and political systems in the developing and postcommunist worlds.9 Regionalism today is extroverted rather than introverted and reflects the relationship between globalization and regionalization. It involves state as well as non-state actors and is the result of the dynamics of global, regional, national and local forces, the importance of each force varying due to factors like space, time, region and/or any other dynamic, depending on the given significance of any of these at any specific interface. Björn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum have tried to theorize the revival of ‘regionness’ in what they call the New Regionalism Theory, which they have tried to build around the core concept of ‘regionness’, indicating the multidimensional results of the process of regionalization of a particular geographic area.10 The concept of ‘regionness’, according to them, include regional space, regional complex, regional community and region-state, which are important to understand the construction and consolidation of regions. They note that new regionalism cannot

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be about emerging regions only but should focus on the world in transformation and the emergence of multi-level patterns of governance, although the world order approach should not prevent a concentrated study of a region either empirically or normatively, which is also necessary to understand the global order. The authors explore metatheoretical postulates and then examine each of the five concepts of regionness as marked out by them to arrive at the conclusion that the concept of regionness is heuristic; it constitutes a natural history of regionalization, which makes it easy to pin-point the specificities of real world regionalization.… In the era of globalization, new large structures beyond the state are obviously preferable to regression into micro-polities… the region-based territorial order ‘regional multilateralism’ seems to possess a stability and equality that a completely globalized order, assuming that this is at all a possibility, would lack.11

What is of significance from the point of view of this paper is that while the authors mention a number of regional organizations in Africa, Europe, Southeast Asia and the Americas as examples in the course of their analysis and to prove their point, nowhere is there any mention of West Asia or regionalism or regionalization in the Middle East. In fact, Paul Aarts of the University of Amsterdam, analysing this peculiarity as early as 1999, noted that while each regional project has its own distinctive features, and although the Middle East or the Arab world no doubt forms a region in the geographical sense, So far, however, neither political nor economic regional arrangements have materialized. This seems to exemplify the Middle East as the eternal ‘exceptional’ case, being out of step with history and immune to the trends affecting other parts of the world. Great ambitions towards regional unity coexist with constant conflicts, there is a conspicuous lack of democratic tradition and a ‘regional civil society’ is at best a sleeping potentiality. The Middle East is the region of ‘realist thinking’ par excellence. Collective political structures have mostly taken the form of ‘regional hegemonism’ (or ‘hegemonic regionalism’), while economic integration has hardly moved beyond the stage of rhetoric.12

This observation was made in 1999; the fallout of the Gulf war (1991), the Iraq war (2003), the 2011 Arab uprisings, the change in the

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balance of equations between republican powers and monarchies and the rise and spread of revivalist Islamic extremism have further queered the pitch for the kind of regionalism and regionalization that has been mentioned earlier, to take root in the near future in the West Asian region. HISTORICALLY SPEAKING

The Middle East, however, is a prime area, historically speaking, for regionalism and regionalization to take root. The Arab empire, the largest empire in history, spread from Spain to Sind in what is modernday Pakistan by the early eighth century and went beyond in later years through modern Turkmenistan to the border areas of China. Islamization and to an extent, Arabization, went hand in hand with the Arab conquests. Arabization was more complete in what is today known as the Arab world with the Arabic language becoming the lingua franca of a large part of the Middle East with only some minor dialectical differences. The Arab culture was hybrid as was the Arab empire, borrowing and internalizing what was then considered the ‘best practices’ of existing cultures that they conquered. To this was added the unity of Islam, all Muslims forming the ummah, the Islamic community, a kind of brotherhood of faith. And during the Caliphate period, the Rashidun (ad 632-61), the Umayyad (ad 661-750) and the Abbasid (ad 750-1258), the Arab empire, theoretically, was under the overarching, though symbolic rule of the caliphs. Although sultanates developed, the Friday prayers began with the name of the caliph and investitures were sought by new sultans from the reigning caliph. After the assassination of the last Abbasid caliph by Hulagu, Ghengiz Khan’s grandson, a new caliphate emerged in Egypt. When the Ottoman Sultanate took over the remaining lands of the Arab empire in the sixteenth century (the process had begun much earlier), Selim I appropriated the title of the caliph and the Turkish sultan remained the caliph of the ‘Islamic’ world, again theoretically (because many rival rulers claimed spiritual headships over their own realms; for instance, the Mughal emperor claimed to be the Imam of the Mughal empire and rejected the spiritual overlordship of the rival Turkish sultan), till the constitutional abolition of the caliphate by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, the first president of the Turkish republic

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in March 1924. Although there had been some parallel caliphates during the rule of the Abbasids like the Umayyad caliphate of Cordova, these had not seriously challenged the mainstream caliphate. The reason for giving this historical sketch is to prove the point that the Arab world had been largely, though loosely, united, first under the Arab empire and then under the Ottomans, with a small gap in between, from the seventh to the twentieth centuries. In the Arab world, even though regions like Egypt and Arabia were largely autonomous by the eighteenth/nineteenth century, they continued to formally remain under the Turkish Sultanate. As such, this area was historically as well as geographically a region, perhaps more than many other ‘regions’ of the world. When Arab nationalism began with the Nahda, it spread from the Levant to Egypt and was not concentrated in any particular region or religion, some of the pioneers being Coptic or Syrian Christian Arabs. Further, the Arabs evidently treated the Turkish Sultanate as part of their heritage; this is apparent from the fact that when the Young Turk movement began for reform of old ruling structures and for more constitutionalism and inclusiveness in administration, interestingly, the Arabs wanted to be a part of the movement, and decided on a separate strategy only because the Young Turks insisted on their movement being centred on a Turkish ethnic identity and rejected the Arabs. During First World War, one of the secret treaties that the British negotiated was with King Hussein, the leader of the Hejaz, for support against the Ottoman empire which was part of the Axis powers, in return for a post-war Arab state that would presumably include the major part of the Arab world, that is, Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian region at the least – the whole of Arab West Asia. The British obviously had no intention of honouring their promises even though Arab irregulars led by T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) were instrumental in driving Axis forces out of a large part of the Levant. The break-up of the Ottoman empire resulted in the creation of a number of new Arab states – Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and later, Saudi Arabia. The British retained Palestine, which had been clandestinely promised as a ‘homeland’ to Zionists under the Balfour Declaration during the war, in another of Britain’s secret understandings, the difference being that this time the promise was honoured. The outcome was the creation of the Jewish state of Israel in a predominantly Arab and Muslim

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region and the non-emergence of Palestine as an Arab state till date even over a part of the area that was claimed as Palestine by the Arab inhabitants of the region.13 It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the consequences of the creation of Israel, but it should be noted here that opposition to Israel was one of the very few causes over which the Arab world remained united and, in fact, was one of the motivating factors behind the formation of the first regional organization of the Arabs, the Arab League, which remained divided over most other issues. Given the long history of staying largely within a single empire (with various degrees of autonomy) for almost thirteen centuries, it is not surprising that the two defining features of the region, when new Arab states emerged in the twentieth century, were pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. One would expect that these features provided a prime background for regionalism and regionalization. In the short run, it did provide the impetus for states trying to come together in loose federal unions, a trans-territorial political party that had the intention of bringing Syria and Iraq together under a common socialistic objective, and the formation of the Arab League which was actually promoted by the British to prevent federations and combinations among Arab states. In the long run, however, a variety of factors prevented the urge towards unity that had been noticed earlier, and with time, as vested interests grew, affinity was replaced by discord as Arab leaders vied for power and supremacy in the region. What happened was that Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism became anchors for rival leaders to build their own power bases. While President Nasser of Egypt espoused Arab nationalism and Arab socialism which became equated with what is now known as Nasserism in his bid for regional leadership, Saudi Arabia, in its own endeavour for leadership, promoted pan-Islamism, which became institutionalized in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a multinational organization of Islamic/Muslim countries. ARAB LEAGUE AND ITS TRAVAILS

In the beginning, however, there was a sense of ‘regionalism’, so much so, that the purpose of Arab unity seemed to be the formation of one

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large Arab state, the thought of which must have been nightmarish to former imperial powers who had held on to their colonial possessions on the basis of the policy of ‘divide and rule’, particularly because the Middle East’s importance as being the largest repository of fossil fuel became self-evident after the invention of aeroplanes, automobiles and mobile fighting machines that became so necessary in the power politics of the twentieth century. Faced with German advance into Arab lands under British influence (mandate, etc.) during Second World War, Anthony Eden, a member of the executive committee of the Political Warfare Executive, noted in 1941 that …many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy.… It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, yes, and the political ties, too, should be strengthened. His Majesty’s Government, for their part, will give their full support to any scheme that commands general support.14

This was obviously an attempt to appease Arab sentiment already incensed by the introduction of Jewish people into their midst, at a time when German forces were making major advances. In 1943, in response to Eden’s repetition of his earlier statement, Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Sa’id, who was a staunch British ally, came up with a document called the ‘Blue Book’ where he outlined a two-step plan for Arab unity, the first step being a federation of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine, with autonomy for the Jews, and having Jerusalem as an international city that would be under the still unformed United Nations. The second step would be a federation of this entity with Iraq to form an ‘Arab League’ with a rotating presidency and a council that represented each unit. In March 1944, Emir Abdullah of Jordan announced a different plan for a ‘general Arab federation’, demanding that he should be made the ruler of ‘Greater Syria’ which would comprise a union of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. He argued that this new state would serve as a counterbalance to Iraq and Egypt and would prove a solution to the Palestine problem. These ideas were opposed by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.15 The rivalries of the future were already evident before the formation of any kind of regional entity. However, this churning of ideas led to the Preparatory Meeting of

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the General Arab Conference in Alexandria, Egypt, in September 1944, where the leaders agreed to form a loose confederation of independent states. In essence, the Alexandria Protocol that came out of this meeting was an agreement to set up the Arab League. It is interesting that within days of the signing of this document, several heads of government who had signed it were removed. Mustafa alNahas Pasha of Egypt was denounced as a traitor and relieved as prime minister; the prime ministers of Syria and Lebanon were similarly dismissed; in Lebanon, the protocol was denounced as an attack on Lebanese sovereignty. Despite such objections, the League of Arab States took shape over the next few months taking into consideration the opposition to the Alexandria Protocol. The League finally came into being in March 1945. The British were interested in this kind of a union because it would divert attention from ideas of a stronger confederation apart from the fact that they could use all the goodwill they could generate during the war from the Arab world. An idea was also mooted that if Palestine, over which the British held the mandate, became part of a larger Arab unit, Arab fears of Zionist expansionism would correspondingly diminish, which may ultimately help in solving the budding Palestine problem.16 The early Arab idea of an Arab League, as is clear from Nuri Pasha’s ideas was a much more closely integrated and centralized union. It was only after the leadership and initiative passed to Egypt following Egypt’s decision to identify with the Arab movement that Nahas Pasha’s conception of a loose federation became institutionalized. It needs to be pointed out here that despite centuries of being connected through single empires, there was no unity of thought regarding a regional institution from the very beginning. Nuri Pasha’s vision of a centralized union did not appear plausible in a region that included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria, because each considered itself a heavyweight player. There were too many rival dynasties, too many local political differences as well as wide variances in social structures and standards of political maturity for a close union even though all these had predominantly Arabic speaking populations, were ethnically the same and shared, more or less, the same tenets of Islam. The rulers of the newly-created states had already carved out niches for themselves, developed power bases and separate state

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interests. These became less and less easy to compromise as time went on. The Arab League was loosely structured, perhaps deliberately so, the mandate being to ‘draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate collaboration, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty’, keeping provisions open for the expansion of the League as more and more Arab countries became independent. The special appendix regarding Palestine is particularly noteworthy. This provided that until Palestine, whose existence and de jure national independence as an Arab country was affirmed, had a government of its own to represent it in the League Council, the Council would itself select an Arab from Palestine to represent it in its proceedings.17 This was perhaps the self-defining foremost motive for its creation, the promotion of Jewish immigration into their land being anathema to all Arab states. And, in fact, the first Arab-Israeli war was fought under the banner of the Arab League and its (unacknowledged but definitive) defeat was perhaps the first cause of its disunity that snowballed in the coming years. Arab people who had believed in the propaganda of ‘seven states and 40 million people’ pitted against the nascent Israeli state had another of their ‘awakenings’ that shook the foundations of existing regimes and almost led to the end of the Arab League itself. King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in July 1951 and the monarchy was overthrown in Egypt in 1952 as was the Lebanese president who had been in power since 1943. Only in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the existing regimes survived at least for the time being, but the shape of regional politics began to change with the emergence of strong republics existing side by side with monarchies. Soon, there was the emergence of strong leaders in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and later Libya, none of which were monarchies and their rivalry for power was camouflaged in ideologies like Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. Against this was pitted pan-Islamism, which was the counter used by Saudi Arabia in its bid for leadership of the region. Given the strong rivalry for power, the Arab League could rarely function as a regional organization should. The only area where there was apparent unity was on the issue of Palestine. The Arab League responded to military challenges from Israel by sending military forces from willing member countries to fight Israel in 1956 (the Suez crisis,

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in which the British and the French were also involved), 1967 and 1973, but following the withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli equation after the signing of the Camp David Treaty (1979) and the (temporary) expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and other Arab institutions that had developed around it, the League was further weakened (partly because Egypt possessed the largest and best armed army among Arab countries) and the only issue on which they (largely) appeared to cooperate in the immediate post-1979 period, was the condemnation of Egypt. It is interesting that there was mainly verbal and little military support for Lebanon when Israel invaded Palestinian camps in southern Lebanon in 1982 and occupied the region. Later, during the Iran-Iraq war, there was little support for Iraq from the Arab League even though individual Arab countries loaned it money, the subject of further discord in the post-Iran-Iraq war years; instead, the war years provided the opportunity for Saudi Arabia to emerge as the leader of the oil-rich Gulf region, mostly monarchic in polity, as the driving force of a new, more economically and politically cohesive regional institution, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). According to a Western analyst, the League’s political failure is the consequence of the organization’s shaky foundations. It was established in 1945 to embody the spirit of pan-Arabism. However, the organizational setup required the League to operate at the mercy of states that rejected pan-Arabism in all but rhetoric. This is illustrated by the League’s mandate, which was restricted to safeguarding independence and sovereignty, and its majority decisions were made binding only for those states that accepted them.18 In 2009, Marco Pinfari of the American University in Cairo, in a study, found that the Arab League mediated 12 out of 20 minor regional conflicts and in that timeframe, it was involved in only seven of 36 major interstate wars. Also, the League intervened in only five of 22 major civil wars. Most notably, the organization failed to come up with a unified response to the 1990 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the ensuing Gulf war, and the 2003 Iraq war. More recently, the League voted to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, but its attempts to broker a cease-fire in Syria failed to have any impact. In short, regular summits have mostly made headlines not because they led to collective action but because they led to collective inaction.19

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In fact, the Arab League’s impotence as a regional organization and its inability to deal with the problems plaguing the Middle East became even more evident from the 1990s. Till then, it had at least held strictly to the letter of its charter which promoted respect for the existing systems of government and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, as well as the resolution of all disputes between member states by peaceful means. Despite strong disagreements and ambivalent attitudes of members on key issues, the League had retained its importance as the main exponent of Arab interests in the international arena over the years. But the Arab world’s growing political disunity and the personal ambitions of individual Arab leaders, many of whom had come to power through coups and had retained their authoritarian rules for extraordinary lengths of time through suppression of dissent, became apparent during the Gulf war and the 2003 Iraq war. The Arab League split on the issue of the invasion of Kuwait by another League member, something unprecedented, and many gave actual support to the pseudo-coalition led by the United States (US), including Saudi Arabia, which allowed ‘infidel’ troops to operate against a fellow Muslim and Arab state from its soil. The 2003 Iraq war proved even more devastating to regional unity because this was a war that was not provoked by any Iraqi challenge to the Arab world and did not have the mandate of the United Nations (UN); the League was unable to come up with any reaction or a pan-Arab position vis-à-vis the US occupation of Iraq. More recently, its position during the Libyan war is even more telling about the failure of not only regionalism but also pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, pillars on which Arab regionalism had been expected to grow. For the first time in its history, the organization imposed an isolation regime on an Arab country and asked the international community to intervene. It accused Libyan leaders of carrying out reprisals against armed demonstrators, even though it had accepted such actions in other Arab countries. In placing Libya at the mercy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which intervened militarily in a manner not sanctioned by the UN, the Arab League abandoned its primary role by rejecting all options for peaceful resolution of the conflict, not even offering to serve as a mediator, although it did not actively take part in the military

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operations with only the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar sending aircraft to patrol Libyan airspace. But what is noteworthy is the issue of which countries actually supported the League’s resolution regarding the no-fly zone over Libya which allowed the NATO to intervene. As a result of the Iraq war of 2003 and the Arab uprisings of 2011, the heavyweight leaders of authoritarian republics were no longer there to call the shots. An indication of what was to happen was clear from the fact that it was the GCC that first called for a no-fly zone over Libya and requested the Arab League to take action pursuant to this objective. By this time, it was the Arab monarchies that had gained the upper hand in the Arab League since the Arab republics were under pressure. Qatar held the rotating presidency; only eleven of the 22 members of the League were present at the meeting and of the eleven, a majority of the states were also members of the GCC, suggesting that the League’s endorsement was a GCC move imposed on the League. Libya was suspended from the League as was Syria in November 2011, the first such expulsions after Egypt’s expulsion in 1979, but then it had been a case of the League perceiving Egypt as a traitor because it had abandoned an Arab cause. Libya’s suspension can be explained by Muammar Gaddafi’s increasing general disconnect with the Arab world and his espousal of the newly-framed African Union which he promoted over the Arab League based on his premise that Libya was an African country, but Syria’s expulsion can be explained more in terms of regional geopolitics and power games. In the Syrian case, the shifts in political power from the earlier republican heavyweights to the Gulf monarchies were very clear. Syria had been a bastion of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. Following the suspension, the Arab League, now led by traditional rivals of Arab socialism for whom its last stronghold was Syria after the fall in importance of Egypt and Iraq, imposed economic sanctions on Syria despite Article VIII of the Charter which states that ‘each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government’. Further, according to Article XVIII, ‘the Council of the League may consider any state which fails to fulfil its obligations under the charter as separated from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of the states, not counting the state concerned’. In the case of Syria, Lebanon and Yemen’s ‘no’ votes did

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not count, leading to accusations of violation of the Charter, which, legally speaking, it was. But it was now the GCC members who held the upper hand in the Arab League and they called the shots. The issue of Syria needs to be highlighted because Arab League actions again demonstrated the lack of unity among member states. After its suspension from the League, the Syrian government agreed to allow foreign observers from the Arab League to monitor Syria’s progress in removing troops from protest areas, free political prisoners, and negotiate with dissidents. The mission, which arrived in Syria on 26 December 2011, was in accordance with an Arab League peace plan designed to resolve the Syrian crisis. Within a month Saudi Arabia withdrew from the mission followed by the smaller Persian Gulf states and on 28 January 2012, the Arab League suspended the mission. In any case, Syria had questioned the credibility of the mission which was led by Sudanese Gen. Mohamed Ahmed Mustafa al-Dabi, who held a key position in Omar al-Bashir’s government in Sudan, where the president himself was charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Interestingly, only five of the 22 League members participated in this mission and four of them were Gulf monarchies: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Qatar. Egypt had its own interests in overseeing the removal of the Syrian leader, and Sudan wanted legitimacy after its own human rights problems in Darfur. Following this attempt at mediation, the Arab League appeared to lose control over any effort at mediation and requested help from the international community. The Arab League’s Syria policy is seen as a shift away from its traditional stance of Arab unity to one of a policy directed by the interests of Gulf sheikhdoms and monarchies which tilt towards the West. Here the lack of Arab solidarity and dissensions within the Arab League can be explained not only in terms of state rivalry and the quest for power but also the other equations among states that have not been mentioned so far. Regionalism involving Arab states must also take into account the powerful non-Arab states in the region that have their own agendas and interests in the region: Turkey and Iran, and indirectly, Israel. Turkey which neighbours Syria and had good relations with both the Bashar al Assad regime and the opposition (because of its Western connections particularly as a member of the

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NATO), had initially hoped to use its good offices with both sides in the Syrian civil war to bring about gradual democratization, but when this failed, it imposed sanctions against Syria. The Arab League sanctions bolstered the Turkish position apart from giving an opening for international intervention. So far as Iran is concerned, Syria had a strategic alliance with Iran and its regional proxies as a part of its bid for one-upmanship in the region’s competition for power. Bashar al Assad strengthened his ties with the Hezbollah, an extremist antiIsraeli Shi’a group, in an attempt to gain a more influential position vis-à-vis Israel which occupied part of its land, the Golan Heights. However, this strategy meant leaning more towards Iran than the Gulf monarchies which were Sunni and political rivals of Iran, and this was more than they wished to tolerate. The Syrian regime’s role in the Shi’a alliance served as the driving force for the Arab League’s policy under the leadership of the Gulf countries. The end of Ba’ath rule in Syria, it was assumed, would strike a serious blow to the Iranled Shi’a bloc. This would both weaken the Hezbollah in Lebanon and undo thirty years of Iranian influence over Syria and isolate Iran in the politics of the Middle East. Therefore, Saudi Arabia – which continues to pursue a sect-oriented regional leadership race with Iran – regards developments in Syria as an opportunity to boosts its own influence in the Middle East.20 If the Assad regime, which had gained considerable power in the region since Hezbollah’s 2006 ‘victory’ over Israel, collapsed, new opportunities for power would be created for Saudi Arabia and strengthen its hands as a patron of Hamas in the competition with Israel. In the new emerging equations, it is also possible to see the role of Qatar which is closely allied not only to Saudi Arabia but also to the West, particularly to the US, and has influence worldwide through its Al Jazeera television network. Qatar, as the leader of the Arab League in this crucial time, in coordination with Saudi Arabia, not only oversaw the NATO intervention in Libya but also designed the League’s response to the Syrian crisis. This has been possible because of Egypt’s present inability to wield any kind of influence over the Arab League. In fact, in the absence of Syria and the impotence of Iraq, Egypt’s inability to exert influence has led to the increasingly active role of the Gulf monarchies in the

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League’s decision-making processes. The present state of disunity and the precedence of the Gulf monarchies has not only eroded whatever little Arab unity that had existed earlier, but has opened the door for foreign intervention, something that the League had been against from its inception and even more foreboding, the spread of Islamic militancy of a kind not known before, which tried to carve out a geographical space for itself in the region on the basis of the promotion of a twisted form of Islamic ideology and history. REGIONAL RESPONSE TO THE ISIS

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS (also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – ISIL – or simply Islamic State, that is, ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah, or Daesh which is the acronym derived from its Arabic name, ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyahfī ‘l-‘Irāqwa-sh-Shām) was the biggest challenge to the state system till the early 2017. The main cities of Mosul and Raqqa, which had been controlled for years by the Islamic State in Iraq, eventually fell to Kurdish and Iraqi forces respectively, but only because these were backed by US-led coalition troops. The ISIS believes in a Salafist, Wahhabi form of extremist Islam that believes in theocracy and recently almost became a kind of proto-state occupying large parts of Iraq and Syria. It wishes to set up a ‘caliphate’ and demands the allegiance of Muslims worldwide to the caliphate. Outside Iraq and Syria, where thanks to Russian and American military help including massive bombing of target areas it is less of a threat than earlier, it still controls territory in the Sinai and in Libya. It is not within the scope of this paper to describe the war on ISIS, but what is pertinent here is an analysis of what has been the regional response to the ISIS, its violence and the flight of refugees. Interestingly, instead of a shared cohesive response, country responses have varied according to regime perception of threat not only from the ISIS but also other potential rivals – something that has plagued the Middle East since the formation of the Arab League if not earlier – and this explains the scattered, incoherent and disparate responses to the ISIS, even as the organization expanded its territorial control in 2014 and into the next year, before losing some ground in the later months of

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2015. According to an analyst, the ISIS emerged at a moment in regional international relations that has been described as a new Middle East Cold War.21 The earlier version of what has been called the ‘Cold War’ has already been described; it was associated with Egyptian political ascendancy under President Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s and coalesced mainly around two struggles – one between nominally leftist military-backed republics and conservative hereditary monarchies, and a second among the radical republics themselves, often taking on Nasserist vs Baathist dimensions. In the current version, however, there is no coalition of radical republics and no political figures of the stature of Nasser. On the other hand, added to the issue of the ascendancy of the hereditary monarchies, there is a pronounced sectarian dimension to regional power politics, with Saudi Arabia and Iran using regional identity to polarize support for themselves and counter their opponents. And also unlike the earlier era, this time there are multiple jihadi movements, from al-Qaeda to ISIS, challenging regimes, states and borders, marketing their struggle for material power as ideological and existential movements. The confusion of regional responses makes sense only when viewed from the perspective of regional power rivalries, which has been styled the new Middle East ‘Cold War’. For Iran, the territorial conquests of ISIS took place in largely Sunni Arab or Kurdish parts of Syria and Iraq, but in all cases they interfered in Iran’s sphere of influence because of its support of the Hezbollah. While the situations in Syria and Iraq were dramatically different, Iran put forces on the ground in both countries to counter the ISIS. Saudi Arabia, in contrast, did not send its own troops into combat and had no equivalent ally to Hezbollah to back in its stead. It did, however, support various Syrian rebel factions, funnel arms and money into the conflict, and continue to cast Iran – not ISIS – as its main regional opponent. In the aftermath of the Iranian nuclear deal (between Iran and six major powers, including the US, in 2015) and the Russian airstrikes that commenced in September 2015, that orientation intensified. Saudi Arabia remains the wealthiest Arab state, but the largest Arab army belongs to Egypt. However, Egypt is no longer the regional power it once was, and its focus remains decidedly internal rather than regional. So far as Turkey is concerned, its policy was complicated by its Kurdish issue. After

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suffering an electoral setback of their own in the summer, Turkish officials began reassessing their approach to the entire ISIS question. When ISIS began bombing Turkish border towns, the policy seemed to shift, with Turkey becoming more explicitly against the ISIS. Turkey’s response, however, only underscored the differing priorities of regional regimes, since Erdoğan’s government spoke in terms of combating the ISIS while directing most Turkish military attacks at Kurdish forces and especially at the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK. As such, there has been no concerted regional response to the ISIS, leaving it mainly to external powers to contain what emerged as a regional problem. However, when ISIS bombed mosques in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, or slaughtered tourists on the beaches of Tunisia, regional regimes were compelled to confront ISIS as a serious threat. But the new question that came up was which ISIS since multiple branches of the group had popped up. The other question was, to what extent did ISIS have a following within a particular country’s borders? Tunisia, for example, has often been said to supply more ISIS recruits than any other Arab country. It was Jordan, a smaller player in the emerging power equation but faced with the prospect of the spread of ISIS into its territory where anti-Israeli sentiment among its large Palestinian population could supply ready recruits, that tried to rally regional support against what it called the ISIS central, that is, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and the Arab League in its meeting in March 2015 agreed to form a pan-Arab military coalition in principle with about 40,000 troops drawn from Egypt, the GCC countries, Jordan and Morocco.22 However, the regimes lacked in military cooperation, and even worse, differed on their perceptions regarding what is meant by extremism and militancy. Regimes individually decried groups and states varying from the Muslim Brothers to al-Qaeda to ISIS to Iran. Regime opponents and critics in some of these same states pointed to the authoritarian brutality of many of the regimes themselves as the main security threat to the peoples of the region, and one that enabled violent challengers like ISIS to emerge in the first place.23 The Arab League had actually signed a mutual defense treaty shortly after its formation, whose primary target was the newly-established state of Israel but it had proved impotent then. Now, after over 65

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years, even when Saudi Arabia managed to assemble a military coalition of Arab states with the target of eliminating the ISIS, it was deployed to Yemen, and not against the ISIS, because each regime was focused on different domestic and external concerns, and had different bogeys to fight. When Libya made a plea to the League for military assistance against the ISIS in Libya, it responded with a statement that ‘there is an urgent need to swiftly put into place an Arab strategy that includes military assistance to Libya in confronting’ the Islamic State, but did not pledge any immediate assistance.24 Here too, neighbouring Egypt had conducted one round of airstrikes unilaterally and wanted further military action, but other Arab countries were not so forthcoming. In fact, the dissensions within the League became clearer at a meeting of the League member states’ foreign ministers early in 2016, where the closing document accused Tehran of ‘provocative acts’. Lebanon’s foreign minister objected: ‘We protest the statement due to its mentioning of the Lebanese Hezbollah organization and accusations of terrorist activity. It [Hezbollah] is represented in the country’s parliament and government, and thus we demanded removal of the expression for Lebanon’s position to be identical with the common decision’ – and Iraq and Lebanon abstained from voting.25 SO, ANY HOPE FOR REGIONALISM OR REGIONALIZATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

It appeared at one point of time that the Arab League’s chief success lay in non-political fields like culture and communication. While political matters were constantly beset with disputes among member states, there was more hope of unity on economic issues. The Economic Council of the Arab League was set up under the terms of the Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950; it was subsequently renamed as the Economic and Social Council of the Arab League (ESC). In 1957, it set up the Council of Arab Economic Unity and in February 1997, it adopted the Agreement to Facilitate and Develop Trade Among Arab Countries (1981) in pursuit of the goal of a Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). The ESC continues to administer the GAFTA and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, and also supervises the Council of Arab Economic

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Unity and other subsidiary institutions. In 2007, resolution 365 proposed a summit to address exclusively the economic and social development issues facing the Arab world, and following this, a couple of Arab Economic and Social Development summits were held. In the first summit (2009), a resolution called for adopting necessary measures to establish an Arab customs union as of 2010 which would become fully operational by 2015, and to ultimately establish an Arab common market. Apart from this, much earlier in 1959, the Arab League held the first Arab petroleum congress and in 1964 established the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO). However, the economic successes of the League have been negligible as political issues have taken prime place in its agenda. Moreover, the Middle East, despite a common perception that it is oil-rich, is highly diverse economically, and in fact, can be divided between the resourcerich and resource-poor countries, with the latter earning a major percentage of their foreign exchange earnings from remittances sent by workers who regularly migrate from poor countries like Yemen, Jordan and Egypt to the Gulf region for work. The pattern of disparity in income and GDPs among states does not make for a workable free trade area. Interestingly, apart from Libya, the oil-rich countries are the ones that escaped the churning of the 2011 Arab rebellions, were able to control actual (Bahrain) and potential dissent, and are now, at least for the time being, the decision-makers of the Arab League. Under the circumstances, the promise of an Arab free-trade zone never materialized. Less than 10 per cent of the Arab world’s trade is between Arab states. Politically, Israel, its first rallying cry, no longer offers much glue. Some Arab states, in fact, make it easier for Israelis to enter than Palestinians, with the profit motive undercutting the ideology of Arab nationalism. According to Khairallah Khairallah, a veteran Arab opinion-writer from Lebanon, the Arab League is obsolete: ‘It was built to respond to the 1940s and we’re now in the 21st century. The idea of Arab nationalism is dead.’26 In fact, even the binding force of the Arab world – the language and culture – also seems to be under attack. After six decades of Arabization programmes, the former French colonies in North Africa are abandoning the effort. Morocco is reintroducing French as the language of tuition for science

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and mathematics. Algeria has declared Tamazight, the indigenous Berber tongue, an official language, and may consider rendering it in a Latin script. The former British colonies in the Middle East appear to be doing much the same with English. A survey by ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, a Dubai-based PR company, last year noted that young Arabs in the Gulf use English more frequently than Arabic.27 Micro-regionalization projects too, in the long run, have degenerated. The Palestinian Liberation Organization, though it cannot be called a regional organization, was an umbrella group for various fedayeen associations fighting for the liberation of Palestine. Following its long impotence in setting up a state of Palestine, and the death of its charismatic leader, Yasser Arafat, and the emergence of rival Islamic groups that have strong ideological bonds, it is no longer a force to reckon with. Similarly, the attempt at merging states and experimentations with forming unions like the United Arab Republic (UAR) also failed primarily because of the ambitions of individual leaders and the resulting incompatibility of federalisms. The Ba’athists too once contemplated the merger of states based on the idea of Arab socialism, but the project never took off because of the erosion of multilateral ideology due to resurgent nationalism. Here, it may be noted that the regional idea harked back to the idea of an Arab state, an idea that was mooted during the First World War. With the growth of national interests and leaders’ stakes in the leadership of their own states, the idea of a pan-Arab state became increasingly obsolete as individual state-centred nationalisms took root. In the entire region, multilateral organizations appear to have worked when they focused on only one burning issue, or when there was general compatibility regarding the political nature of state systems and the focus was on the economic well-being of the member states and smaller states were amenable to the leadership of the economic giant of the micro-region. In the first instance, the one successful organization was the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and in the latter case, the general economic success of the GCC has to be noted. The OAPEC had been formed in 1968 in the wake of the half-hearted response of Arab countries to the call for an oil embargo during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a

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multinational oil cartel of which the Arab oil exporting states were members (many of them founding members), did not have the exclusively regional political and economic issues of the Arab world in mind and had not responded as expected to the call for an oil embargo in 1967; the OAPEC had therefore been created to serve the Arab petroleum exporting countries’ interests. The success of the OAPEC was evident following the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Arab countries decided to use oil as a weapon against states that had supported Israel during the war, and demanded that OAPEC and Persian Gulf OPEC members like Iran should cut oil production by 5 per cent every month until Israel completely evacuated the territories it had occupied during the 1967 war. Further, to take punitive measures against Israel’s supporters, oil importing countries were placed in three categories: hostile, friendly and neutral. Oil supply at pre-1973 levels was to be maintained only to friendly countries, with neutral countries getting lesser supply and hostile ones none. The effect was immediate: Japan and the European Economic Community (EEC) issued formal statements calling Israeli occupation of Arab territories illegal, and Britain and France moved quickly to enter into individual deals with Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia to exchange crude oil for arms or capital goods. The proposed production cut-back and embargo on oil shipments had another effect: it drove oil prices up beyond expectation. OPEC states met in December 1973, and increased the posted price of oil to $11.65 per barrel. OPEC prices increased actually to $34 by October 1981 from only around $3 in early 1973. All this resulted in a complete change in geopolitics with oil importing countries, particularly the US, experiencing a prolonged slump, while the Middle Eastern oil exporting countries accumulated wealth, with large current account surpluses, a part of which was spent on purchasing armaments. The importance of oil and keeping control over sources of oil supply also became even more evident to the US.28 What is significant is that this organization, at least temporarily, was able to coordinate action with devastating effect for the geopolitics and geoeconomics, and indirectly, for the future of the Middle East. However, in the face of regional rivalries and in the wake of the Camp David Accord, which was seen as defection of Egypt from the Arab

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camp, and also because of the impact of the high price of oil on the non-oil producing countries of the Arab world, the focus of the OAPEC shifted from using oil as a weapon. The OAPEC continues to exist even today;29 it is now regarded as a regional, specialized intergovernmental organization focusing on organizing cooperation in oil development, collective projects, and regional integration. However, it no longer has the importance or sense of unity and purpose that it once had, and is one of among other overlapping oil-focused organizations in the region. The Gulf Cooperation Council is perhaps the most important regional, or rather, sub-regional organization in the Middle East today. Originally created in 1981 as a result of Iran and Iraq being engaged in war with each other for the better part of the 1980s, thereby giving space to Saudi Arabia to establish its leadership over the smaller Gulf countries, a position that the three Gulf giants had been vying for over a long time, it is now more than an organization with a focus on oil-trade; it is a regional common market with a defence planning council as well. In fact, the defence part goes back to the Iran-Iraq war, since there was fear of the war (and Iran’s Shi’a forces) spilling over to the Gulf region. This took on a more intense role in the context of the post-war Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, a GCC member. Although a proposed deterrent force did not materialize and Kuwait secured military commitments from the US and Britain following the Gulf War, a resolution was taken during the Kuwait summit of 1997 which aimed at linking GCC member states with a military communication network for early warning. The defence part of the GCC became active in 2011 when internal protests escalated. The Peninsula Shield Force, which was part of the mutual agreement signed on 10 October 1982 among GCC countries, was activated to ensure the integrity of Bahrain’s territorial borders. Interestingly, however, with increasing revenues and foreign power backers, even the GCC which was more cohesive than any other Arab regional organization, has been seeing divisions based on rivalry for power and influence in which media wars play an important role. Qatar and Saudi Arabia, once close allies, have seen some very public differences, highlighted by the two media houses, Al Jazeera, owned by Qatar, and Al Arabiya, based in the UAE, but funded by Saudi

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Arabia. On 5 March 2014 Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, accusing it of interfering in their internal affairs and jeopardizing regional security. In a joint statement, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain said that the removals followed Doha’s failure to commit to a security agreement signed in 2013 in Riyadh. But the issue goes further than that: the two media houses back different groups in Egypt and Syria, reflecting the politics of their backer-countries.30 What are perhaps even more significant are US-Qatar military ties: today, Qatar is the location of the US Central Command’s Forward Headquarters and the Combined Air Operations Centre. In 2014, the United States sold $11 billion worth of arms to Qatar, including AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and Patriot and Javelin defence systems, making the country a power to contend with so far as Saudi Arabia is concerned. In the economic field, the GCC had shown a great deal of unity and integration, but given intra-regional tensions, the recent fall in oil prices and the consequent decline in GCC revenues may have a disintegrating effect. After clocking more than $1 trillion annually in export revenues during the period 2012-14, GCC economies experienced a 23 per cent fall in export revenues in 2015, mainly driven by Saudi Arabia, which accounted for close to half the estimated $250 billion loss. Matters came to a head in mid-2017 when several members of the GCC, including the heavyweights, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, cut off diplomatic relations with Qatar on 5 June asking all Qataris to leave their respective countries within 14 days and banning their own citizens from residing in or travelling to Qatar. They also closed their airspace to Qatari aircraft forcing Qatar Airways to fly over Iran. Other countries like Egypt, Yemen, Maldives, etc., also cut off relations with Qatar. While there are underlying reasons, some of which have been mentioned earlier, the ostensible reasons shown was that Qatar was funding terrorists, and a second (hidden) insinuation was of good Iran-Qatar relations, Shi’a Iran being Sunni Saudi Arabia’s biggest rival in the region, but with whom Qatar shares the world’s largest gas field. Qatar admits to have aided groups which many extra-regional and non-Muslim states claim to be terror organizations, for instance, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hamas, but denies that it has funded groups like the Al Qaeda or ISIS. In fact, most

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Muslim and Islamic states in the region have funded and otherwise aided the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hamas. The real reason for isolating Qatar is evident in the 13-point list of demands served on Qatar by its neighbours on 22 June: curb diplomatic ties with Iran; shut down Al Jazeera and other Qatar founded news media; close a Turkish military base and halt joint military cooperation inside Qatar; sever all ties to ‘terrorist organizations’ and hand over ‘terrorist figures’ and so on. Qatar claimed that this was an invasion on its sovereignty and refused to comply, after which the neighbours only insisted that it should agree to six principles like combating terrorism, denying safe havens to terrorists, stopping incitement to hatred and violence, non-interference in the affairs of other states, etc. It may be mentioned that two of the six-member GCC refrained from cutting off relations with Qatar: Kuwait and Oman. The Qatar crisis is far from over as could be seen from a GCC summit held in early December 2017 in Kuwait. Apart from the Kuwaiti head of state, the only other ruler present was Qatar’s Sheikh Tamin bin Hamad Al Thani; all other GCC countries sent senior or junior officials. To add to the insult, UAE set up a committee to bolster military, economic, trade and cultural ties with Saudi Arabia, on the eve of the meeting. If Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, the three other countries of the GCC join (it is expected that they will be invited), it will clearly isolate Qatar further and therefore this committee may be the beginning of another grouping. While Kuwait’s Sheikh Sabah called for a revision of the GCC Charter to include a dispute resolution mechanism, nothing has come of it so far. Meanwhile, Qatar has been seeking allies elsewhere in this period, signing new military, economic, commercial, media and other agreements with countries like USA, Russia, Turkey, UK, France, Germany and Italy31 – finding succor outside the Arab world and internationally, rather than regionally. However, as noted earlier, in the current context, the GCC members (minus Qatar) appear to be the decision-makers in the Arab League, and were responsible for the foreign intervention in Libya and the impotence of regional actors in the Syria case. In the absence of the big players of the region – Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, in the near future, riven as they are by war and acute instability – the GCC will continue

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to play the defining role (whatever there is of it), positive or negative, in the region. But, as noted, even the GCC has major cracks and is another case in point to illustrate that regionalism or regionalization has not taken root in the Middle East/West Asia despite talk of a single market and a customs union. CONCLUSION

The paradox about West Asia and the Middle East as a whole is that while countries in the region have numerous shared political, economic, environmental, and security issues, the region still remains one of the least integrated in the world. In fact, in large parts of the post-Cold War world, both developing and developed, there have been a plethora of new regional organizations of different types – economic, security, etc. – as well as attempts at regionalization to meet the new challenges of globalization and shifting balances of power in geopolitics. The continent of Africa, for instance, troubled by coups, civil wars, wars of independence, superpower politics and extreme poverty for much of the Cold War years, not only reconstituted the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was largely impotent in dealing with Africa’s variegated problems because of the limitations of its Charter, into the African Union (AU), which has a new Charter and aims to be like the European Union (EU) but with Africa’s special needs in mind, and apart from other programmes aimed at development, is deeply immersed in projects to improve human rights standards in the continent and promote democracy and democratization. Since Africa is a large continent with many independent states, several regional economic communities have emerged in Africa to push for regional free trade as well as regional peace and stability, for instance the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Many of these are overlapping, the common aim being growth and stability. Here, states with disparate polities and economies are coming together for the common good, sidelining differences and highlighting common interests. There are cross-continental attempts at regionalization as well like the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum or

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the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) forum of emerging countries. These vary in their degree of success and achievements, but the fact remains that countries and organizations are attempting focused institutionalization to meet the challenges of the future. On the other hand, West Asia is a case of reversal of regionalism and regionalization, with a regress in the cohesiveness and a marked disintegration evident in existing regional organizations. There have been no new regionalization initiatives and no attempt at building cross-national economic or security organizations to meet the challenges facing West Asia in the post-Cold War period. Unlike in the Africa of the current century, differences are highlighted and common interests are still being sidelined. In trying to find answers for why has regionalism failed to take off in West Asia, one must look at (1) continuing regional disorder, (2) the lack of any strong state or states that can act as an anchor/ anchors of stability, (3) persisting rivalries for power, which are now spilling over to the GCC as well, (4) (perhaps) over-extension of power by the earlier big republican powers – Egypt, Iraq and Syria – which has ultimately worked against them, so far as Arab unity is concerned, (5) the exclusion of Turkey, Iran and Israel in any schemes of regionalism and regionalization, (6) the failure of the Arab League to address the economic, political or security concerns of the region and its peoples, (7) competition between states that use ideologies as fronts in their desire for power in the regional power competition, thus pitting countries with different ideologies against them, (8) a lack of focus on the economics of new regionalism, (9) disparate and nonintegrated macroeconomic policies and a disproportionate dependence on foreign (i.e. extra-regional) markets for exports, such as oil, (10) the hesitancy of regional leaders to surrender power, even in part, over the national economy to a larger, regional, economic community,

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(11) too much rivalry for power and a lack of any sense of working for the common good, and (12) sectarianism, religious differences that lead to generational conflicts, religious extremism that is exploited by leaders to suit their objectives, etc. To this may be added (1) the lack of democratization, and (2) the lack of a civil society. However, these are Western concepts that need not necessarily hamper regionalism, especially since we find China as a member of a number of new regional organizations. In fact, China is often a driver of ‘new’ regionalism projects and countries that become members of such organizations do not necessarily endorse China’s politics or political orientation. The Arab world’s failure at regionalism must be seen in the Arab historical, cultural and political context. These are just a few random thoughts that attempt to summarize the analysis given above as to why, even when faced by the challenges of ISIS that threaten people and states alike, the regional institutions have not been able to mount a regional response. At the same time, it may be said that no other region has been beset by such serious challenges in the post-Cold War period. Can they overcome these difficulties and work together for peace and development? That, of course, is a million dollar question given the current state of disunity, instability and war in the region, and the continuing rivalries for power and leadership of the region. Added to this is the entry of external players who had always been trying to protect their own interests through political and military support of regional players. The intervention of the foreign players does not also appear to be from a completely altruistic point of view: each foreign player has its own interest in shaping the region to serve its own interests, and they find easy support among the feuding leaderships of West Asia. However, there is more potential for the success of sub-regional organizations that have common goals particularly in managing the oil wealth of their region, shared security concerns, common economic programmes and refrain from the leadership competition that has plagued the region for so long. This may be a difficult task in the long run, given the multiple points of intra-state dissension and dissent. In sum, therefore, although it is desirable that strong regional

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organizations emerge in the region that can provide a direction towards peace and counter destabilizing forces, both indigenous and foreign, it is more likely that regional alignments will continue to be fractious – going against the tendency in most other parts of the world where there is a drive towards ‘new’ regionalism. NOTES 1. Howard W. Wriggins (ed.), Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, p. 4. See also, Bruce Russet, International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967. 2. Arie M. Kacowicz, Regionalization, Globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent, or Overlapping?, The Helen Kellog Institute for International Studies, Working Paper, No. 262, December 1998, available at https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/262.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2016). 3 . Joseph S. Nye, International Regionalism, Boston: Little, Brown, Co., p. vii. 4 . Ernst B. Haas, ‘The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing’, International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, Regional Integration: Theory and Research (Autumn 1970), pp. 607-46. 5 . Barry Buzan, ‘Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective’, in Brian L. Job (ed.), The Insecurity Dilemma, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991, 167-89. 6 . Patrick M. Morgan, ‘Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders’, in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (eds.), Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, pp. 20-42. 7 . Van R. Whiting, ‘The Dynamics of Regionalization: Road Map to an Open Future?’, in Peter H. Smith (ed.), The Challenge of Integration: Europe and the Americas, Miami, FL: North-South Center, 1993, pp. 17-49. 8. Björn Hettne, ‘Beyond the “New” Regionalism’, New Political Economy, vol. 10, Issue 4, 2005, Special Issue: Key Debates in New Political Economy, pp. 543-71. 9. Zoleka V. Ndayi, ‘“Theorising the Rise of Regionness” by Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum’, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, vol. 33, Issue 1, 2006, pp. 113-24. 10. Björn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum, ‘Theorising the Rise of Regionness’, in Shaun Breslin, New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy, vol. 10 of Warwick Studies on Globalization, Psychology Press, 2002, p. 33 ff.

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11. Ibid., p. 48. 12. Paul Aarts, ‘The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 5, 1999, pp. 911-25. 13. For details see Eugene Rogan, The Arabs: A History, New York: Basic Books, 2011; Philip Khouri Hitti, History of the Arabs, 10th edn., Basingstoke, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 14. Quoted in Bernard Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East, Hachette, London, 2013, Chap. 17. 15. Cris E. Toffolo, The Arab League, New York: Infobase Publishing, 2008, p. 33. 16. Michael J. Cohen, The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, pp. 93 ff. 17. League of Arab States, Charter of Arab League, 22 March 1945, available athttp://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html (accessed on 28 May 2016). 18. Michael Bröning, ‘The End of the Arab League?: What the Organization Can Learn from the African Union’, Foreign Affairs, 30 March 2014, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2014-03-30/endarab-league (accessed on 23 May 2016). 19. Cited in ibid. 20. See also Müjge Küçükkeleş, ‘Arab League’s Syrian Policy’, Policy Brief No. 56, SETA, Ankara, Turkey: Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, April 2012, available at www.setav.org (accessed on 24 May 2016). 21. Curtis Ryan, ‘Regional Responses to the Rise of ISIS’, Middle East Research and Information Project, available at http://www.merip.org/mer/mer276/ regional-responses-rise-isis (accessed on 25 May 2016). 22 . Patrick Goodenough, ‘With Eye on Iran and ISIS, Arab Leaders Agree to Set Up Joint Military Force’, CNS News, 30 March 2015, available at http:// www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/eye-iran-and-isis-arableaders-agree-set-joint-military-force (accessed on 25 May 2016). 23. Ryan, n. 20. 24. Tamer El-Ghobashy, ‘Arab League Supports Libya’s Plea for Help in Fighting Islamic State’, The Wall Street Journal, 18 August 2015. 25. ‘Arab League Statement Not Supported by Lebanon, Iraq’, Al Alam, 11 January 2016, available at http://en.alalam.ir/news/1777951 accessed on 25 May 2016). 26. Quoted in Timekeeper, ‘What is the Point of the Arab League?: The Sad Decline of a Once-bold Organization’, The Economist, 29 April 2016. 27 . Ibid. 28. Frank A. Verrastro and Guy Carruso, ‘The Arab Oil Embargo: 40 Years

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Later’, Commentary, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 16 October 2013, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/arab-oilembargo% E2%80%9440-years-later (accessed on 27 May 2016). 29 . See the OAPEC website for details on current programmes, at http://www. oapecorg.org/Home (accessed on 27 May 2016). 30. ‘Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]’, Global Security.Org, available at http:// www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm (accessed on 27 May 2016). 31. Faisal Abdulhameed Al-Mudahka, ‘The Second Independence of Qatar’, Gulf Times, 31 December 2017, available at http://www.gulf-times.com/ story/576595/The-second-independence-of-Qatar (accessed on 3 January 2017).

CHAPTER 10

Regionalism in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors BHAGABAN BEHERA

INTRODUCTION

following the ussr’s collapse in 1991, there was an expectation that the newly-independent states would form a coherent economic and security complex because the five states, namely, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, were geographically proximate and shared a common material culture, social structure, common Turkic and Muslim background, cultural valuesystem and historical memory. The states were also bound by both the Soviet legacy and the need to find a way of collectively managing the region’s trans-boundary natural resources.1 The independent states have a wide range of endogenous problems which negatively influence and hinder their economic and social development, intra-regional cooperation and their full affirmation in the international geopolitical scenario. The slow implementation of economic, social, and political reforms, poverty, the lack of regional cooperation in the economic, and energy sector, the threats represented by the Islamic terrorism, the drug and weapon trafficking, a strong presidential political model, the failure to solve endogenous problems – such as the shared borders and minorities’ rights – characterize the post-Soviet Central Asia.2 Since independence, Central Asian states have experienced a geopolitical competition involving the external actors in the region, defined as a modern version of the nineteenth-century great game.3 The competition was triggered by the concern of a power vacuum after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequences that unsolved political, economical and social problems could provoke

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beyond the regional boundaries, as well as by the strategic relevance of the region determined by its geographical centrality and its closeness to Russia and China and above all by the opportunity to exploit the huge Central Asian and Caspian oil and gas reserves, in order to secure the control of the energy export routes.4 However, USSR’s collapse made it possible for each state to exercise as much sovereignty as they desired, often leading to a situation where over-excessive exercise of sovereignty of one regional state damaged the interests of others. Border delimitation and water issues are the leading causes of tension among these states. According to Bohr, ‘for integration to succeed in Central Asia, it is important for these states to accept that the individual sovereignty of each state should be voluntarily limited and transmuted into a regional sovereignty, under which all problematic issues … would become a subject for collective regional decision making’.5 While such a decision-making process shows some signs of emerging, collective actions that deliver on promises and implement collective decisions seem to be lacking. In the long-term, regional jurisdiction over such issues would enforce and protect the individual sovereignty of each state from imbalances, one-sided decisions, and the various problems that these states encounter. Initially, the idea of creating a community or union of Central Asian states was promoted with the idea that integration for these regional states, with their weak economies, shared security concerns and common challenges, is economically and politically more beneficial than to deal with these issues individually.6 The shared history, culture, economy and more importantly the imperial legacy facilitates the growth of regionalism in post-Soviet Central Asia space. The above background characteristics facilitate the growth of regional organizations in the region. However, the huge economic, political and social costs of disintegration quickly dampened post-independence euphoria and dispelled any illusions that economic and political sovereignty would guarantee speedy growth and improvement in the standard of living. New integration initiatives emerged in the region in 1992 and went through several phases.7 The effects of globalization on these new states have proved to be a greater force than efforts to develop regional cooperation in the post-Soviet space. The regional bodies that have emerged in the post-Soviet space are formal rather than real.

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GROWTH OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA

In global politics, regionalism indicates effective forms of mutual international cooperation under preferential conditions. In other words, regionalism aims at maximizing development, security, sovereignty, prestige, international role, needs and interests.8 Regional integration is based on many different conditions, such as geographical proximity, economic complementarity, similarity of political systems, cultural and ideological correspondence that facilitates the negotiation process, and social structure. Four factors are necessary for successful integration process, namely politicization, redistribution, reduction of alternatives, and externalization.9 The regional integration process in post-Soviet Central Asia takes into considerations several factors namely, specific historical, cultural, religious, geo-strategic, geopolitical, and geo-economic conditions. Within the regionalization processes, the economic and political spheres are interrelated. Countries, as the participants of regional integration, are political units. Regionalism is subordinate to superior goals of the state foreign policy.10 Central Asian states participate in various regional and supraregional structures. Most of them are created by the Russian Federation and intraregional integration is rather weak. As independent entities in the international arena since 1991, Central Asian states have signed various intra-regional and inter-regional agreements in order to promote and protect their national and regional interests. The subsequent sections have analysed how far these regional organizations have succeeded in fulfilling the aspirations of these states and the challenges they have faced in the promotion of regionalization in this volatile region. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Former Soviet republics founded the CIS on 21 December 1991. Representatives of the CIS member states meet regularly to discuss economic, military, political and social issues of common interest. More than 2,000 agreements on several issues of intra-CIS relations have been signed since its inception.11 However, most of these agreements exist only on paper. The CIS has proved unable to move

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its decision-making procedures to the supranational level. The success of the CIS integration has been weakened by national fears of losing the autonomy in decision-making and by concerns about distributional imbalances.12 Failure of the CIS project is determined by political, economic, population, and territorial dominance of Russia. Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO)

Partly to address their common problems and partly to prevent their further marginalization in the new post-Soviet order, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan established the Central Asian Union (CAU) in 1994 with the aim of forming a ‘common economic area’ for the free circulation of capital, goods and labour and establishing common policies on credit, prices, taxes, customs and hard currency. Tajikistan formally joined the CAU in 1998, but Turkmenistan consistently declined invitations to join. In 1998 the CAU was renamed the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU), and in 2001 it was rechristened once again as the CACO. Trade among the four states of the CACO has not exceeded 7.8 per cent of their total foreign trade turnover (down from 15.6 per cent in 1994).13 CACO and its predecessor organizations have failed to develop an effective structure for the coordination of regional economic, trade or security policies. Protectionism has come to dominate the economic relations of the Central Asian countries, reducing already low levels of intraregional trade. CACO failed in harmonizing customs, taxation or anti-dumping policies. An interstate system of payments has not been created, no mechanism for the resolution of disputes exists, and no efficient mode of compensation from gainers to losers has been formulated. The CACO’s joint peacekeeping battalion Centrasbat, formed under the aegis of the United Nations in 1996, was not deployed during the incursions by armed militants in 1999 and 2000 into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.14 Further; plans to establish regional water and energy consortia have not been fulfilled, despite featuring prominently on the organization’s agenda since 1997. While the downstream countries, namely, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan want more water for their growing populations, the upstream countries, namely, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan want more water for their electricity generation and farming.

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Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC)

With CACO’s failure in promoting regional cooperation, Central Asian leaders stepped up the process of joining and forming other regional structures, most of which included external actors. In 1995, Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus signed an agreement on the formation of a CIS customs union, which was subsequently joined by Kyrgyzstan in 1996 and Tajikistan in 1999, and refashioned in October 2000 into the EURASEC and Uzbekistan joined in 200615 but it suspended its participation in 2008. In 2002 Moldova and Ukraine were granted observer status at the EURASEC, and in 2003 the same status was granted to Armenia. It should be noted that EURASEC with its Eurasian Development Bank is one of the most effective regional organization in the post-Soviet area, not only due to its focus on institutions and formal cooperation, but also on financial and economic sectorial projects.16 The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)

The Eurasian Economic Union, created in 2015 by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Armenia, claims to be the first successful post-Soviet initiative to overcome trade barriers and promote integration in a fragmented, under-developed region. The EEU is an economic, technocratic project that offers some benefits to members, particularly in easing cross-border trade and facilitating labour migration, but also poses economic risks by raising external tariffs and potentially orienting economies away from global markets. So far it has had little economic success, though access to Russia’s labour market has been an important motivator and, on balance, a positive outcome for struggling post-Soviet economies. Beset by trade disputes, sanctions regimes and a regional economic crisis, trade inside the EEU fell by 26 per cent in 2015.17 Like the Customs Union before it, the Eurasian Economic Union was built with one goal in mind: to cement Russia’s hold over the states in its periphery. With the promise of investment and protection, the Kremlin has done just that, bringing fellow bloc members Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan firmly under its influence. But the EEU has not reached the global status Moscow hoped it would.

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Rather than rivalling its biggest competitor, the European Union, the Russia-led organization has limped along, struggling to overcome the problems Russia’s deteriorating economy has created for it. Though Europe’s fragmentation could give the bloc a temporary boost, the persistent weakness of the EEU’s most important member will continue to hold the organization back, stuck in the shadows of its Western adversary.18 According to the World Bank analysis, the main beneficiary of the union will be Russia. Critics of the Eurasian integration model notice that it will deepen the political dependence of the member states on Russia and limit their actual sovereignty. Moreover, such a union does not have to provide regional stabilization for Russia’s involvement in conflicts between the former Soviet republics.19 However, despite its present weaknesses, it will grow strength to strength in coming years. Many states from outside the region are showing interest in the Union. India was one of them and India’s membership will greatly help the members of the Union and India. CIS Collective Security Treaty (CIS CST)

Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992 and Uzbekistan joined later. But Uzbekistan did not renew its membership when it was due in 1999.20 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan re-joined the CST, while Turkmenistan continued to remain outside the grouping. Uzbekistan adopted a pro-Western orientation and in 1999 Uzbekistan joined GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) a regional grouping formed in 1997 that opted to remain outside the Russiandominated EURASEC and the CIS CST.21 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

CSTO was signed in 2002, just a year after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, by the pro-CST members and Uzbekistan, nick named the chameleon, joined the organization in 2006. The CSTO is the main military alliance in the CIS space.The treaty allows Russia’s involvement in the defence of all Central Asian states except the neutral Turkmenistan.22 The CSTO’s aim was the military-technical

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cooperation including deliveries of weapons and military equipment at reduced prices and the deployment of Collective Rapid Reaction Forces in the region to combat terrorism. It called for the creation of a coalition force in the Central Asian region and joint military systems primarily of air defence, command, control, communications, information, and intelligence system and this allowed Russia to establish new regional military bases in various parts of the Central Asian states. President Vladimir Putin has indicated that the directions he will take during his current term in office are post-Soviet reintegration and strengthening of Russia’s great power status via the UN Security Council.23 Despite the common heritages, similar cultural values, economy and politics, Central Asia lacks regionalization in policies because of both the weaknesses in state capacity and will as well as the growing involvement of external actors in the region’s internal affairs. Currently in the realm of multilateral security cooperation, the West-led Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), Russia-China co-led SCO, and the Russia-led CSTO are deeply involved in the region’s stability in one way or another. Besides multilateral security cooperation, external powers namely China, USA, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan are involved in various economic projects in the region at bilateral level. According to the Article 2 of the Treaty of the CSTO, memberstates maintain their security on collective basis: In case a threat to security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several member-states or a threat to international peace and security, the CSTO member-states will immediately put into action the mechanism of joined consultations with the aim to coordinate their positions and take measures to eliminate the threat that has emerged.24

CSTO has become a powerful military and political organization of Central Asian states and it is strengthening the political authority of member-states and their positions on the international stage, providing stability and security on the international and regional levels. According to CSTO documents, ‘Engagement and cooperation with the CSTO is an issue of importance to Afghanistan as, from the perspective of the CSTO member-states, the stability of Central Asian

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is directly linked to the stability of Afghanistan’. Therefore on the CSTO platform, Russia has offered her shoulder to Afghanistan for stability in the country.25 While being the founder of CSTO, Russia had proposed multilateral cooperation of CSTO with NATO on the Afghanistan issue but unfortunately NATO rejected CSTO cooperation, as it has adopted aggressive behaviour against Russia and its allies in the region.But it’s not clear how Moscow intends the group to work. After NATO’s refusal, CSTO adopted alternate ways to seek stability in Afghanistan by taking precautionary measures to prevent the penetration of ISIS’ militancy from Afghanistan to CSTO member states. For this purpose Russia is interested to install CSTO military along Afghan borders, especially on Tajikistan’s adjacent border with Afghanistan. While the recent CSTO exercises focused on conventional military threats, Moscow has shown little stomach for military action outside its own borders.26 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

The SCO, an intergovernmental mutual security organization, was formed in 2001 and at present consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 2017 full membership has been extended to two South Asian neighbours – India and Pakistan increasing from six to eight members at present. Its agenda covers cooperation in a whole range of economic, political and security fields, with emphasis on enhancing Central Asian security by combating terrorism and other threats to the region and fostering regional trade, investment and economic development. The aim of the organization is ‘to strengthen mutual trust, friendship and goodneighbourliness between the member-states; to encourage effective cooperation between them in the political, trade and economic, scientific and technical, cultural, educational, energy, transport, environmental and other spheres; and to undertake joint efforts for the maintenance of peace, security and stability in the region.’27 The Declaration obliged member-states to ensure the implementation of the Shanghai Convention on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism, including the establishment of a regional anti-terrorist structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization … and

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draw ‘appropriate multilateral documents’ on ‘cooperation in curbing illicit trafficking in arms and narcotic drugs, illegal migration and other types of criminal activity.28 Taking into account the conclusion of the active military phase of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, the member states of the SCO consider it essential for the appropriate participants in the antiterrorist coalition to decide on the final time frames for the temporary use of the infrastructure objects and the maintenance of military contingents on the territory of SCO member states.29

SCO provides the Central Asian states, a collective platform to effectively deal with issues of common concern and the multitude of problems can only be solved through mutually beneficial regional cooperation. In a relatively short period of time, SCO has succeeded in creating basic structural and legal foundations for regional cooperation, enhancing security and defence ties, especially to counterterrorism, strengthening economic, trade, communication and transportation links, harmonizing ties between the member-states and enhancing the organization’s international image and standing.30 At the 12th Summit of the SCO held in Beijing on 6-7 June 2012, member states approved a strategic plan for medium term development over the next decade.31 From the Central Asian perspective, the future of the SCO is far from being determined. On economic issues, the SCO is not certain to succeed in becoming a real multilateral mechanism to govern trade and investment dynamics, which are ultimately bilateral. Political and military achievements are also far from reality. In SCO summit of 2016, Russian President Valdimir Putin said that all the SCO member states and the CIS countries in this integration process will pave the way for developing a broad Eurasian partnership.32 New financial institutions, such as the BRICS New Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Eurasian Bank, will help ensure successful implementation of multilateral economic projects within the SCO framework.33 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO’s PfP has launched its activities in the region to maintain peace and security in this vulnerable region. In 1994, all the Central

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Asian states except Tajikistan signed the PfP Framework Document and finally Tajikistan signed in 2002. Two recent developments have increased NATO’s interests in Central Asia: First, since the alliance has already offered full membership to most eastern European countries, Central Asia has become the major focus of the PfP programme. Second, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan has resulted in the alliance’s regional military presence. The US and other NATO member troops have been stationed in various parts of the Central Asian countries.34 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

OSCE, a product of East-West consensus during the Cold War, was involved in security and cooperation in the region in a more comprehensive term than the other three. Since their independence, five Central Asian states became member states of the OSCE, and during the 1990s, the OSCE established its field offices in all these states, which reveals that the Asian dimension already became a part of OSCE strategy for security and stability in the 1990s. Given the lack of regionalization of their own among the states of Central Asia, multiple regional security frameworks stretched to the region from outside in ensuring security of the region from various threats. In principle, OSCE and SCO promote cooperative security, a joint attempt to prevent war by building trust and CBMs, whereas each of NATO and CSTO is a collective defence organization, formalized by a treaty among participant states that are committed to defend a member state if it is attacked by another state outside the organization. CONSTRAINTS ON REGIONALISM

Since their independence, Central Asian republics do not consider each other as main political and economic partners. For instance, sociological survey in Kazakhstan shows that neighbouring regional countries are not among priority economic partners.35 Some of the regional constraints that prevent cooperation in the region are discussed below:

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Sovereignty Issue

One of the hurdles of effective cooperation and integration is the issue of the sovereignty of each member state. The collapse of the USSR made it possible for each state to exercise as much sovereignty as they desired, often leading to a situation where over-excessive exercise of sovereignty of one regional state damaged the interests of others, e.g., border delimitation and water issues. For integration to succeed in Central Asia, it is important for these states to accept that the individual sovereignty of each state should be voluntarily limited and transmuted into regional sovereignty, under which all problematic issues (e.g., inter-state water consumption) would become subjects for collective regional decision making.36 Economic Issues Economic Incompatibility

There is a perceived lack of economic compatibility among the economies of Central Asian states participating in the integration process. The leaders of these states perceive their regional counterparts as competitors rather than partners in the international market. In many cases, these states prioritize their ties with non-regional countries as more important for developing their economies than the expansion of economic and trade ties within the region. Accordingly, frontiers are being fortified to protect individual markets from neighbouring states. The outcome of such policy is a lose-lose situation for all. As Boris Rumer noted, ‘the Central Asian states lack objective preconditions for regional unity in so far as they have neither a shared interest in a single market, as in the European Union, nor large investment resources from one of the member states, as in the North American Free Trade Agreement’.37 Homogeneous Products

Central Asian states rely heavily on trade in raw materials, such as gas and oil, with non-regional states. While this brings much-needed revenues and short-term impetus for their economies, it does not resolve the tasks of developing regionally-based processing industries,

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promoting trade in processed goods, facilitating the movement of labour and products across borders, or the task of enhancing the competitiveness of these states in the international market. In Central Asia, intraregional trade intensity is relatively low and external trade dependence is high. All five countries export primarily a limited range of commodities with substantial overlap among them. For example, Kyrgyzstan exports mainly gold and electricity; Tajikistan electricity, cotton and aluminium; Turkmenistan cotton and natural gas; Uzbekistan cotton and gold; and Kazakhstan mainly oil and metal products. The countries’ economies are more competing than complementary, with the exception of certain specific resource complementarities (i.e. oil and coal in Kazakhstan, natural gas and cotton in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and hydropower resources in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan).38 Different Economic Models

Economic models of these states differ significantly from one another. For instance, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are adopting liberal reforms; Uzbekistan, and to a lesser extent Turkmenistan, continue governmentled economic reforms. Tajikistan is still recovering from the shock of civil war and heavily relies on assistance from Russia and other international donors. Protectionist trade policies have exacerbated an already heavy dependence on commodities as the main exports, making the region vulnerable to commodity price shocks. As one economist has pointed out, the Central Asian presidents have acquired ‘monopolistic control over key imports and enterprises, a lucrative perk quite at variance with the notion of regional free trade and transparent capital movement’.39 Conflicting trade policies and nontariff barriers have inhibited the interaction of private business groups and individual traders in trans-boundary regions, stifling their potential contribution to the creation of autonomous interstate linkages necessary for the construction of informal regionalism. UZBEK HEGEMONY

Neo-realists assert that regional groupings form in response to external challenges, and the Central Asian region truly fit into the theory.40

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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan perceive Uzbekistan’s preponderance and heavy handed behaviour as their greatest external threat, and it is this challenge in particular that has shaped the ways in which they approach the regionalization process. Since 1991, Uzbekistan has consolidated its position as the regional hegemon in the region. Following the September 11 attacks, however, the consolidation of Uzbekistan’s unequivocal status as the United States’ strategic partner in Central Asia, coupled with Uzbek efforts to modernize its armed forces, has resulted in tipping the strategic balance in the country’s favour. Kazakhstan is affirming itself as a leader nation in the region, because of its political stability, the partial adoption of structural reforms and the wealth deriving from its oil and gas energy reserves. TRADITIONAL RIVALRY

Traditional rivalry and mistrust existing among Central Asian republics is the most important factor which continues after more than two decades of independence to hinder a real regional cooperation. This attitude is particularly evident in trans-boundary relations, because the mutual suspicion and hostility has delayed and prevented any form of economic and energy cooperation, and also undermined the achievement of regional stability and security.41 NATIONBUILDING

The major constraint on the regionalization process is the heavy emphasis on nation-building as a means of reshaping cultural and political life. All of the Central Asian states can be characterized as nationalizing regimes, aspiring to become the states of and for particular core nations.42 Central Asian leaders have geared their efforts towards revising national histories, upgrading national languages and creating new iconographies rather than directing them towards the reabsorption of their newly-independent polities into regional organizations which requires the pooling of sovereignty and the formation of supranational structures.

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INTERNAL REGIME TYPE

Internal politics has placed serious constraints on regional projects. Regionalization in Central Asia is a state-centric process, representing the temporal interests of small groups of authoritarian ruling elites, whose hold on power depends on their control of hypertrophied security services. Internal regime type is particularly an important constraint on regional cooperation in Central Asia, given that regional dynamics are defined by interactions between highly personalist regimes and even individual leaders, rather than between states or societies. Rulers have been unwilling to create mechanisms to make agreements binding, with the result that most agreements either experience complications in their implementation or are simply breached. LACK OF CIVIL SOCIETY COOPERATION

Neo-functionalists hold that regional integration deepens and ultimately becomes self-sustaining through interest groups, pressure groups, public opinion and elite socialization.43 The personalist regimes of Central Asia have impeded the emergence of the more diversified type of regionalization that would be created by interactions between NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), private traders, migrant labourers, and other types of independent social and business networks. This so called ‘soft’ regionalism relies on the existence of a diversity of independent civil society organizations and transnational sub- state networks which have not been allowed to flourish in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) suggested ‘regional institution building’ requires the participation of both governmental and nongovernmental entities as central components. However, Uzbekistan refused to join, claiming that the programme infringed state sovereignty. The Uzbek government also refused to allow the aid agencies such as the Aga Khan Foundation and Agenced’Aide à la Cooperation Technique et au Development (ACTED) to engage in cross-valley developmental work.44

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NEGATIVE SUBREGIONAL DYNAMICS

The cooperation networks formed among Islamist groups in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya and Xinjiang provide a prominent example of ‘negative sub-regional dynamics’. Since the late 1990s, radical Islamists have managed to stage insurgencies and perpetrate acts of violence against the authorities in Central Asia, Xinjiang and the north Caucasus.45 The need to stop the armed transboundary incursions of terrorists and extremists has pushed the Central Asian political leaderships to adopt rigid measures which also affect the border trade and fuel political mistrust among the states. PRESENCE OF EXTERNAL POWERS

Exogenous factors have affected negatively on the Central Asian regionalization process. The roles played by external powers have been constraints on regionalization in Central Asia. Notably, the US has preferred bilateral relationships with emphasis on Uzbekistan at the expense of regional cooperation. In reaction, since 11 September, three Central Asian states, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have sought to balance the strategic partnership that Uzbekistan has formed with the US by revitalizing their regional alliances with Russia as well as by strengthening their own bilateral relations with the US. The arrival of US military forces in Central Asia provided the Central Asian states with an unprecedented opportunity to maximize strategic benefits and to establish a multiplelevel security system. China has also shown keen interest in the region for her energy and security interests. Different multilateral security frameworks currently prevailing in Central Asia are related to US, Russian, Chinese, and EU involvements in the region.46 The US concept of a ‘Greater Central Asia’ and the EU strategy for a new partnership with Central Asia both reflect the will of these two important external geopolitical players to support a regional approach in order to help central Asian republics handle and solve their common problems and promote regional stability and security in the area. This approach appears fully functional at the strategic goals achieved by the US in the area, focusing on strengthening of

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security and stability in the region by means of military and economic cooperation of the Central Asian republics in the framework of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN).47 One of the most important factors which correctly prevent regional cooperation in Central Asia is the opposition of clashing geopolitical interests and strategic aims of the involved external geopolitical players, mainly Russia, US, EU, China, and in lesser extent Turkey, Iran, South Korea, India. These external influences have marked a division between Central Asian states, because most geopolitical attentions and economic investments are focused on the possibility of exploiting hydrocarbon energy reserves and on security issues linked to the stabilization of Afghanistan and the NDN implementation.48 CONCLUSION

Regional cooperation in Central Asia in general has very weak institutional framework and in the formative stage. Although all are non-democratic and semi-democratic, the Central Asian states have different strategic interests and have taken different paths of development. They hold conflicting views on the handling of security threats. In fact, to judge by the growing list of disputes and tensions among the Central Asian states, it would appear that the greatest threat to the region’s security and stability comes not from Afghanistan, Russia or Islamist groups, but from within the region itself. Prospects of economic and political cooperation in Central Asia, speed and scale of these processes will depend on the readiness of nations to work together in the contract regional projects, to carry out the proper reforms and introduce the forms and methods of economic regulation adopted in the world practice, as well as on the political will of the governments of the member states. Promoting economic development in Central Asia, a critical step towards genuine long-term stability, is a key challenge for regional governments and the international community. Strengthening regional cooperation is one of the most powerful ways to foster development and would enable the states of Central Asia to better meet the daunting individual and collective challenges they face.49 Various regions of Central Asia are experiencing extreme poverty

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and underdevelopment and lack the infrastructure to achieve sustainable economic advancement. Progress will require a considerable commitment from local and international actors to overcome the range of factors that stand in the way of further economic cooperation and which act as a brake on development. Enhanced coordination between the varieties of actors working in the region will strengthen these commitments. Unless the states in the region come to a common platform, the development of a pan-Central Asian regional identity will remain a chimera and regionalization in the narrowly defined Central Asian region is unlikely to move forward. Clear objectives and integration policies are crucial for any regional integration process to succeed. Bruxelles recognizes that ‘a regional approach is suitable for tackling common regional challenges such as organized crime, human, drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism and non-proliferation issues, intercultural dialogue, energy, environmental pollution, water management, migration as well as border management and transport infrastructure’.50 For the success of integration process, regional integration should not be treated as purpose, rather it should be treated as a mechanism. Regionalism should adopt a bottom up integration process where goods, services, labour and capital will move freely instead of topdown approach. One of the major hurdles for successful integration process is the corrupt and patriarchal nature of these countries’ leadership. For example, Turkmenistan remains a isolated republic because it is the most undemocratic country in the region. For the successful development of regionalism, it is necessary that countries of the region should liberalize their domestic politics. Differences arising from pattern of hostilities, namely, ethnic divisions, border issues, water issues among the member countries should be resolved first for the smooth growth of regionalism. In many ways, the five Central Asian countries do form more of a region than just a collection of countries. To exploit the advantages of a agglomeration, national commitments for greater regional cooperation will be critical. The defining objective should be one of regional initiatives with national ownership. Central Asian governments and their people at large need to appreciate that the payoffs from embracing open regionalism for them are huge, as it would greatly empower them to fully exploit the

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advantages of their unique location amidst some of the most dynamic economies in the world.51 Additionally, successful economic and security cooperation in Central Asia requires the involvement of Russia and China – the two dominant powers in the region. NOTES 1. Martin C. Spechler, ‘Regional Cooperation in Central Asia’, Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 49, no. 6, November/December 2002, pp. 42-7. 2. Fabio Indeo, ‘The Concept of a “Greater Central Asia”: Perspectives of a Regional Approach’, CASI Working Paper, Central Asian Studies Institute, presented at the First Annual CASI Conference in October 2011 (accessed on 10 January 2017), available at: https://auca.kg/uploads/CASI/Working_ Papers/WP_Indeo.pdf. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Annette Bohr, ‘Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order’, International Affairs, vol. 80, no. 3, 2004, pp. 485-502. 6. European Community, ‘Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia’, for the period 2007-13 (accessed on 15 July 2015), available at: http:// eeas.europa.eu/central_asia/rsp/07_13_en.pdf . 7. Alexander Libman and Evgeny Vinokurov, ‘Is it Really Different?: Patterns of Regionalization in the Post-Soviet Central Asia’, 2010 (accessed on 9 July 2015), available at: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21062/. 8. Agnieszka Konopelko, ‘Bases and Mechanisms of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Central Asia’, International Business and Global Economy, no. 33, 2014, p. 215. 9. J.S. Nye, ‘Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model’, International Organization, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970. 10. Konopelko, op. cit., p. 218. 11. Mirzokhid Rakhimov, ‘Historical Transformations and Regionalism in Central Eurasia’, The 2nd International Conference of the HK Russia, Eurasia Research Project, Hanyang University, Korea, pp. 125-44 (accessed on 25 June 2015), available at: http://www.eurasiahub.org/data/ftproot/20 10%EA%B5%AD%EC%A0%9C%ED%95%99%EC%88%A0/ Mirzokhid.pdf. 12. F.S. Hansen, ‘Integration in post-Soviet Space’, International Area Studies Review, 19 June 2013 (last accessed on 12 January 2018), available at: http:// journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2233865913490938. 13. Natalia Ushakova, ‘Central Asian Cooperation: Toward Transformation’, Central Asia and the Caucasus, vol. 21, no. 3, 2003, p. 122.

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14. Stuart Horsman, ‘Water in Central Asia: Regional Cooperation or Conflict?’, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds.), Central Asian Security, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001, pp. 69-94. 15. ‘Kazakh President Differs with Uzbek Head over Eurasian Economic Community’, BBC Monitoring, Inside Central Asia, 4 June 2001, in Annette Bohr, 2004, pp. 485-502. 16. A. Libman, Commonwealth of Independent States and Eurasian Economic Community: First International Democracy Report, Centre for Studies on Federalism, 2011 (accessed on 12 January 2018), available at: http://www. internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/460_CIS-libman.pdf. 17 . ‘The Eurasian Economic Union: Power, Politics and Trade’, Europe and Central Asia Report, no. 240, 20 July 2016 (accessed on 12 December 2016), available at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/240-the-eurasianeconomic-union-power-politics-and-trade.pdf. 18. ‘Why the Eurasian Union Will Never Be the EU’, Startfor, 17 September 2016 (accessed on 10 January 2017), available at: https://www.stratfor.com/ sample/analysis/why-eurasian-union-will-never-be-eu 19. Konopelko, op. cit., p. 220. 20. Annette Bohr, ‘Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Mission Impossible?’, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 14, no. 3, 2003, p. 256. 21. Roy Allison, ‘Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia’, in Annette Bohr, 2004, op. cit., p. 488. 22. Shirin Akiner, ‘Regional Cooperation in Central Asia’, in Patrick Hardouin, Reiner Weichhardt and Peter Sutcliffe (eds.), Economic Developments and Reforms in Cooperation Partner Countries: The Interrelationship between Regional Economic Cooperation, Security and Stability, Brussels: NATO Economics Directorate, 2001, pp. 187-208. 23. Sebastien Peyrouse, ‘Central Asia’s Long-Term Questions Remain Unanswered After the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit’, Foreign Policy and Civil Society Program, July 2012, pp.1-3 (accessed on 10 July 2015), available at: www.gmfus.org/wp.../1342192327Peyrouse_Sha nghaiSummit_Jul12. pdf. 24. Tayyab Baloch, ‘NATO Challenges SCO and CSTO in Afghanistan’, Katehon, 14 June 2016 (accessed on 10 December 2016), available at: http:// katehon.com/article/nato-challenges-sco-and-csto-afghanistan. 25. Ibid. 26. Ramtanu Maitra, ‘Regional Implications: If and When the U.S. Withdraws from Afghanistan’, Aakrosh, 30 April 2012 (accessed on 15 July 2016), availableat: http://aakrosh.sasfor.com/aakrosh/regional-implications-if-andwhenthe-us-withdraws-from-afghanistan. 27. Askhat Safiullin, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia’, Central European Journal of International and

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28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43.

44.

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Security Studies, vol. 4, Issue 2, 2010 (accessed on 5 July 2015), available at: http://cejiss.org/issue/2010-volume-4-issue-2/safiullin. Ibid. Ishtiaq Ahmad, ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization: China, Russia, and Regionalism in Central Asia’, Social Sciences Research Council, Dubai School of Government, University of Dubai, UAE, paper presented at Conference on ‘Inter-Asian Connections’, 21-3 February 2008 (accessed on 12 December 2016), available at: www.ishtiaqahmad.com/downloads/SCO_Dubai_ Feb_08.pdf. Peyrouse, op. cit., July 2012, pp. 1-3. Ibid. ‘16th Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit Highlights Russian, Chinese Leadership’, 2016, Larouche, June 2016 (accessed on 10 November 2016), available at: https://larouchepac.com/20160626/16th-shanghaicooperation-organization-summit-highlights-russian-chinese-leadership. Ibid. ‘NATO and Central Asia: The Two Elephants that Never Meet’, EUCAM Watch, no. 11, February 2012, pp. 2-7 (accessed on 15 December 2015), available at: http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/ Newsletters/EUCAMWatch-11.pdf. Rakhimov, op. cit. Timur Dadabaev, ‘Central Asian Regional Integration: Between Reality and Myth’, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Bi-Weekly Briefing, vol. 9, no. 9, 2 May 2007, pp. 6-8 (accessed on 20 December 2016), available at: hawk. ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/.../Analyst_vol+9+no+9.pdf. Boris Rumer (ed.), Central Asia and the New Global Economy, London: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, p. 10. Bohr, 2004, op. cit. Martin Spechler, ‘Regional Cooperation in Central Asia’, Problems of PostCommunism, vol. 49, no. 6, November/December 2002, p. 46. Michael Schulz, Fredrik Söderbaum and Joachim Öjendal, ‘A Framework for Understanding Regionalization’, in Michael Schulz, Fredrik Soderbaum and Joachim Öjendal (eds.), Regionalization in a Globalizing World: A Comparative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes, London and New York: Zed, 2001, pp. 1-17. Indeo, op. cit. Bohr, 2004, op. cit. Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective’, in Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 59. Senator Sam Nunn, Barnett R. Rubin and Nancy Lubin (eds.), Calming

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45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

50.

51.

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the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, New York: Century Foundation Press, 1999, p. 21. Annette Bohr, Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998. Eunsook Chung, ‘Multiple Regional Security Frameworks for Central Asia’ (accessed on 12 November 2016), available at: http://www.sejong.org/ Pub_st/PUB_ST_DATA/kst005-09.pdf. Indeo, op. cit. Ibid. ‘Promoting Regional Cooperation and Development in Central Asia’, March 2009 (accessed on 11 July 2014), available at: www.carnegieendowment. org/.../promoting-regional-cooperation-and-development-in-centralasia/1s1a. Council of the European Union, ‘The European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, European Communities’, October 2007, p. 11, in Fabio Indeo, op. cit. Rajat M. Nag, Johannes F. Linn and Harinder Singh (eds.), Central Asia 2050: Unleashing the Region’s Potential, New Delhi: Sage, 2017.

CHAPTER 11

Asian Regionalism and Sub-Regionalism: The Context of Indo-Thai Cooperation and Connectivity LIPI GHOSH

INTRODUCTION

regionalism is a relatively new aspect of Asia’s rise. As Asia grows and prospers, its economies are increasingly vital to each other – and to the world. As markets interconnect the region, Asian governments need to work together more closely to sustain economic development, grasp common opportunities, and manage shared risks and problems. Asian regionalism was given new impetus by the vulnerabilities exposed by the financial crisis of 1997/8; it is dynamic, flexible, and outward looking; and it does not imply a fortress Asia, but creates a network of bridges. As such, emerging Asian regionalism is good for individual economies, good for the region, and good for the world. Regional and sub-regional cooperation is a major factor which helps to boost India-Thailand relations. During the past few decades in the post-Cold War period, India’s Look East and Thailand’s Look West policies have led to closer relations and cooperation between Thailand and India in all areas under regional and sub-regional cooperation frameworks, namely, ASEAN-India, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC). ASEANINDIA COOPERATION

India became sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992. In 1996 this was upgraded to full dialogue partnership. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong opined, ‘Asia has become a new focus for

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the great game of international relations and here ASEAN can play a constructive role providing a platform for the interaction of all the external players within Asia’.1 According to H.E. Krit Kraichitti, Ambassador of Thailand to India, ‘Thailand attaches importance to greater connectivity between ASEAN and India both in terms of transportation network and networking among our people. For the security front Thailand reaffirms our commitment to strengthen cooperation under ASEAN India joint declaration on cooperation to combat terrorism.’2 Over the years ASEAN-India functional cooperation has been expanded to include human resource development, science and technology, people to people contacts, small and medium enterprises, information and communication technology, energy, agriculture and initiative for ASEAN integration. Tourism also has an integral part in this ASEAN-India functional cooperation. As early as 30 November 2004, the Third ASEAN-India Summit in Vientiane, Laos, set out the roadmap for ASEAN-India engagement. India is actively contributing to the implementation of Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) work plan. The Fourteenth ASEAN Transport Ministers (ATM) meeting on 6 November 2008 in Makati, Philippines adopted the ASEAN-India Aviation Cooperation Framework to lay the foundation for closer aviation cooperation between ASEAN and India.3 ASEAN and India marked the 20th anniversary of their dialogue relations in 2012 with a Commemorative Summit held in India. A number of Commemorative activities have been planned to signify the expanding and deepening of the dialogue partnership. Prime Minister Narendra Modi had attended the 13th ASEANIndia Summit and the 10th East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on 21-2 November 2015. Dato Sri Mohd. Najib Bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak, prime minister of Malaysia chaired both the Summits, which were attended by heads of state/government of other ASEAN and East Asia Summit Participating Countries respectively. At the 13th ASEAN-India Summit, prime minister and ASEAN leaders reviewed ASEAN-India cooperation and discussed its future directions. At the 10th East Asia Summit, the Leaders took a stock of the achievements of the EAS over the last decade and deliberated on its future, with a view to strengthening it and making it more

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effective. The leaders also discussed matters of regional and international concern including terrorism, irregular migration, etc.4 BIMSTEC

Another framework that brings Thailand and India together is BIMSTEC or the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Economic Cooperation which was established in 1997. The members are Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bhutan and Nepal. The objective of the grouping is to serve as a bridge between Southeast Asia and South Asia. BIMSTEC focuses on trade and investment, technology, transport and communication, energy, tourism and fisheries. This BIST-EC was the forerunner of BIMSTEC. It was decided that BIST-EC would be action oriented which would yield tangible economic benefits for member countries. Participation of the private sector would be an important element in the initiative and implementation of projects. BIST-EC would essentially be an open subregional grouping without Myanmar. It was expected that Myanmar in due course would become a full member of BIST-EC. On BISTEC, Pitak Intrawityanunt, deputy minister of foreign affairs (1996-7) observed that economic development is not a matter of chance it is a matter of choice. With BIST-EC we have chosen to bring our countries closer together in a common endeavor to take charge of our own destinies. We are living in an age of economic globalization where the key characteristics may be described by words such as borderless commerce, interdependence and competitiveness. In such a context the key to survival is through collaboration, utilization of synergies, economies of scale, rationalization and competitiveness.5

It is now clear that India will not wait ad infinitum for SAARC to make progress and become an effective institution. As Narendra Modi, the present Indian prime minister said during the Kathmandu Summit: ‘The bonds will grow through SAARC or outside it, among us all or some of us.’ In this context, the BIMSTEC (consisting of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Thailand, and Sri Lanka) will be a viable option for India to forge an effective regional group to promote broader economic integration.6

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BIMSTEC was formed in 1997, and in 2014 its secretariat was established in Dhaka. It has identified 14 priority areas of cooperation – including trade and investment, transport and communication, energy, tourism, and fisheries – and each member country has been given the responsibility of leading at least one of these priority areas. India is leading transport and communication, counter-terrorism and transnational crime, and environment and natural disaster management. The most important driver should be the BIMSTEC Free Trade Area. While a Framework Agreement has been signed, it has yet to come into force. Member countries should not only conclude their negotiations on trade regarding goods but they should also quickly expand their scope to services and investments as it has been envisaged in the Framework Agreement. Physical, institutional, and people-topeople connectivity should be the cornerstones of this cooperation. The question is should India put more political and economic weight into BIMSTEC than SAARC, and the answer is yes. As compared to 5 per cent as in the case of SAARC, intra-BIMSTEC trade as a percentage of their total trade is close to 7 per cent. In 2007, India’s total exports to BIMSTEC countries was $7.8 billion and in 2013 it increased to $19 billion, while during this period its imports from this group increased from $5.7 billion to $8.3 billion. Thus, India’s positive trade balance with the BIMSTEC group of countries is growing, with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka among its top 25 export destinations.7 This intra-regional trade is expected to grow at a faster rate as evident from a report titled ‘BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistic Study’ conducted by the Asian Development Bank. In this context, India needs to focus on three key areas. First, India needs to put more political capital into sorting out its bilateral issues with other BIMSTEC countries, particularly with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. This is an imperative for converting India’s ‘Look East’ policy to ‘Act East’. It is important to note that Bangladesh also has a ‘Look East’ policy, while Thailand has a ‘Look West’ policy. Myanmar is increasingly realizing its potential as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia, and Sri Lanka is keen to play a more proactive role in and around the Bay of Bengal. Bhutan and Nepal, two land locked countries in this group, are looking forward to bettering their

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connectivity to diversify their trade base. Second, India should be more proactive in concluding negotiations on goods in the BIMSTEC Free Trade Area and should quickly start negotiations for a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement on goods, services, trade facilitation, investment, competition, public procurement, and other areas of trade-related cooperation. A quick conclusion of a goods-only FTA is possible because India is already implementing an FTA with Sri Lanka, an ‘Early Harvest’ (goods-only) trade agreement with Thailand, and has offered duty-free access to the least developed countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal. Such offers can be extended to Myanmar, which is another LDC in the group. A comprehensive economic cooperation agreement among the BIMSTEC group of countries will help many of these least developed countries graduate out of their LDC status. Third, while negotiating a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement, the BIMSTEC group of countries should see how they can have positive spill-over effects on their priority areas of cooperation. For instance, there should be special efforts to see how a regional solar grid can be established. Given their geographic locations and climatic conditions, a regional solar grid is possible and it could be an important component of regional energy security.8 Considering this zone of possible cooperation, India and other BIMSTEC countries should strive to improve physical connectivity through trade facilitation infrastructure and measures as well as institutional connectivity through the convergence of rules, regulations, policies, and procedures for cross-border trade and investment. Together they could facilitate better people-to-people connectivity. Therefore, in view of changing geo-political developments in Asia and the Pacific, it is time for Indian leadership to understand the importance of the Bay of Bengal and the role that regional economic integration among the BIMSTEC group of countries can play in furthering strategic and security objectives with eastern and south eastern neighbours. MEKONG GANGA COOPERATION

Thailand and India also cooperate in Mekong Ganga Cooperation. The MGC brings together Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand

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and Vietnam. Both the Mekong and the Ganga are civilizational rivers and the MGC initiative is indicative of shared cultural linkages among the member countries. The focus of MGC is on promotion of tourism, cultural and educational cooperation. The MGC initiative is a compliment of the different initiatives in India towards Southeast Asia. The MGC is the only regional project which does not directly involve a preferential trade agreement. It is an economic cooperation agreement between certain ASEAN member states and India with an aim to increase trade and investments in the region. The initiative concerns India, Myanmar and the Indo-Chinese countries. Its first objectives are the promotion of tourism, transport, culture and education which are important fields of cooperation for the promotion of people to people contact. It is noteworthy the Greater Mekong Subregional (GMS) programme had encouraged interests of many external states and non-state stakeholders. The first six ASEAN countries had taken priorities to develop induction of CMLV countries (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam) in GMC and this indeed has transformed the character and agenda of ASEAN and thus gave prominence to GMS in the ASEAN talks. In conjunction with the development of CMLV and GMS, India became interested in this strategic place. It was in 2007 that the Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGCI) was launched as part of India’s Look East policy. In a way the GMS countries also see India as a source of assurance particularly in balancing China. Thailand’s role in all these changes had been crucial. Starting before the end of the Cold War, Thailand favoured a change in mainland Southeast Asia with its so called ‘Turning the Battle field into the Market place’ policy in late 1980s. Thailand was an active player in the GMS initiatives from its beginning and wanted to encourage other GMS countries and regions to adjust to these economic transformations. Among the GMS countries, Thailand was the first to take lead toward a comprehensive economic and security partnership with India.9 It is interesting at this juncture to study Mekong Ganga tourism as one of the most important areas of cooperation. In the tourism field, the MGC decided to conduct strategic studies for joint

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marketing, launch the Mekong-Ganga Tourism Investment Guide, facilitate the travel of people in the region, expand multi-modal communication and transportation links to enhance travel and tourism and promote cultural-religious package tours.10 Buddhist circuit tourism has been a flagship project under BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga. During the past few years since Thai airways started its daily flights from Bangkok to Bodhgaya, we can see substantial increase in the number of Buddhist pilgrims coming from Thailand and Asia. The number of tourists coming to visit archaeological and religious sites as well as ancient monuments in India, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand also increased with the expansion and improvement of air linkages between Thailand and India and improvement of road conditions linking various Buddhist circuit sites and cities in India. It is important to note that within this framework of ASEAN, BIMSTEC and GMC, the most important phenomenon is India’s Look East and Thailand’s Look West policies. Immediately in the post-Cold War politico-economic architectural structure in Asia the important policy of Thailand was to look to the West. Thai government looked to the West as it felt that its geographical location compelled it to look to South Asia. So it was as early as mid-1990s that Thai government enunciated a Look West policy. The necessity of enhancing economic interaction with neighbours to the immediate west of Thailand was discerned in 1989 when the then Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan was the first prime minister to visit India. In fact, the conceptual idea for closer economic arrangement with neighbours of immediate West was pursued by the Chuan Leekpai administration when responsibility for coordinating economic policies rested with the then Deputy Prime Minister Supachai Panichpakdi. However, in the beginning, political and economic reforms which have begun to show tangible results in South Asia had not taken firm root. The essential enabling environment was absent. The enabling environment became available later on. First and foremost, sustained economic reforms have enabled the countries of South Asia to grow more in line with their true economic potentials. There was a realization on the part of these countries that linking their economies to

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Southeast Asia would better ensure their growth. Likewise Thailand saw the same necessities and potentials for an economic relationships with countries of South Asia. Pitak Intrawityanunt observes the Look West policy arises out of Thailand’s own necessity to link itself with areas of potential growth in the world economy… for sustaining and increasing Thailand’s economic competitiveness in a globalised world economy sub-regional economic cooperation is a necessity. The Look West policy has a three pronged approach of increasing trade, investment and harnessing the mutual benefits to be derived from sub-regional natural resource endowments.11

The latest development in India-MDC is that India and Cambodia on 16 September 2015 signed two MoUs on Tourism and MekongGanga Cooperation Initiative. The MoUs were signed in the presence of Indian Vice-President Hamid Ansari and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen at the Peace Palace in Phnom Penh. On the one hand, the tourism MoU is aimed at boosting tourist movement between the two countries and on the other, the MoU on MekongGanga relates to five ‘quick impact projects’ undertaken by India and these are: r 50,000 US dollars grant to Cambodia for the upgradation of an Entrepreneurship Development Centre in existence since 2004. r Two projects in health care, especially to do with malaria. r One project on agriculture. r One on women’s empowerment.12 INDOTHAI CONNECTIVITIES

With such political parameters existing between India and ASEAN, Thailand as a centre of international tourism in Southeast Asia is prepared to work closely with India in promoting tourism with each other on bilateral and regional basis and here crops up the issue of connectivity. Air Connectivity

We can identify four types of connectivities between India and Thailand as discussed below. One important idea that arose from

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discussions as early as creation of BIST-EC was creating a BIST-EC airline. This was thought to reinforce Thailand’s infrastructure in the air. The BIST-EC airline was to be jointly owned by member countries and to be operated under franchise by the private sectors. It would serve to link various sub-regional towns and cities such as Hat Yai, Phuket, Kandy, Chennai, Kolkata, Bodhgaya, Chittagong, Mandalay, Chiang Rai and Phitsanulok. It is interesting to note that India has open sky aviation policy and it was thought as early as 1997 that this could aid the development of Phuket island as a centre of tourist activities. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan said that there are government plans for aviation network in the Andaman Sea and a link with India’s Nicobar Islands. It was hoped that this kind of air connectivity would bring mutual benefits to both the countries through trade and tourism. In 1997, Indian Prime Minister I.K Gujral announced an open sky policy during a visit to Nepal in June.13 Thus Thailand’s Look West policy was in line with India’s Look East policy as both aimed at strengthening and exploiting economic potential. In recent times, the Thai Ambassador to India Krit Kraichiti observes that – Thai and Indian airlines can bring tourists from Thailand and Asia to visit Buddhist sites in India and bring tourists from India to Thailand and other countries in East and Southeast Asia. Tourists can stay at hotels jointly operated by Thai and Indian businesses and avail of two packages that our travel agents jointly arrange. Together we can promote Incredible India and Amazing Thailand.14

Air connectivity between India and Thailand is growing with nearly 140 flights per week, reflecting a rapidly growing passenger traffic between the two countries. Bangkok is connected by air to 9 Indian destinations.15 Over 900,000 Indian tourists are likely to visit Thailand every year due to increased air connectivity, liberalized visa norms and development of new destinations such as Chiang Mai in the north, senior officials have said. ‘Nearly 800,000 Indian tourists visited Thailand in 2010. We expect 15-20 per cent increase this year’, Chattan Kunjara Na Ayudhya, director, Tourism Authority of Thailand, told IANS. He said at least three airlines, including IndiGo, Bangkok Airways and Philippine Airlines, would start new flights between India and Thailand.

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In 2011, 791,185 Indian tourists visited Thailand, of which 60 per cent flew for leisure while 40 per cent for business purposes. Ayudhya, who heads Tourism Authority of Thailand’s India operation, said the proportion of first-time visitors has been increasing during the last few years because of a high jump in disposable income of young Indians. ‘Right now the proportion is 60:40. In a couple of years we expect over half the tourists from India will be first-time visitors.’ However, the number of Thai visitors to India is not that impressive. Nearly 60,000 Thai visited India in 2011, of which 80 per cent were Buddhist pilgrims. ‘The main reason behind India witnessing less number of Thai tourists is high cost package – visa fees, air fares and overall transportation and staying cost is quite high here,’ Governor of Tourism Authority of Thailand Suraphon Svetasreni, who was on a visit to India, said. Svetasreni urged the Indian government to liberalize visa norms, saying it would help develop tourism industry in the backward Indian states like Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. He said, Thailand on the other hand, offered free visa on arrival, economical hotel tariffs and better connectivity to attract more Indian tourists. Svetasreni said he was keen to work with tourism authorities in India to ensure flight connectivity, lower air fares and cheaper hotels to make India and Thailand among the most preferred destinations. Bangkok and Pattaya are the most popular tourist destinations in Thailand attracting over 60 per cent of the total visitors. Nearly 30 per cent overseas tourists go to Phuket and only 10 per cent to other destinations. Thailand is now focusing on development of new destinations like Chiang Mai. Thailand was positioning Chiang Mai as an adventure tourist destination where people can enjoy river rafting, trekking and four-wheel drive safaris in a natural wonderland.16 Kolkata is ideally placed as a transit hub for travelers flying from Bhubaneshwar, Guwahati, Patna and Ranchi into Bangkok as it offers easy and timely connectivity. Rail Connectivity

There is currently no rail link between India and Thailand. To initiate such a link, it is necessary to introduce a railway linkage between India and Myanmar first. At present there is no link between India

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and Myanmar. A link through Tamu is proposed under the TransAsian Railway network, with both India and Myanmar having constructed or in the process of constructing lines that narrow the gap between their respective national networks. China (PRC) is also actively promoting a line between Kunming and Myanmar. This could connect with the Myanmar India link, thus providing a potential route between India and PRC that could generate additional tonnage in support of a BIMSTEC rail corridor. There is no rail link between Bangladesh and Myanmar. Bangladesh is promoting this as an alternative route for the Trans-Asian Railway. This would ultimately provide the shortest rail route between South and Southeast Asia, but it is likely to prove to be expensive, and thus is probably a more long-term option than the proposed Trans Asia Railway link through the north-east states of India. Myanmar and Thailand are not connected. A potential rail route through the Three Pagoda’s Pass was the subject of a Korean-assisted feasibility study in 2007. This routing alignment corresponds with the designated route of the Trans-Asian Railways connection. Unfortunately, this study indicated that this link would have a low rate of return, due to the high cost of construction through difficult terrain and the lack of adequate traffic demand to support the development. Myanmar has a rail link to Dawei, and an alternative route, though longer, could be via Ban Bong Tee. However, initial indications are that this could be even more expensive. It is evident that significant improvements need to be undertaken in national networks before addressing the issue of international connectivity. Thailand and Myanmar have both indicated low priority for such rail connections. On the other hand, India has minimal priority in its investment programme for international rail links, and is engaged in regauging the rail network in the north-east, and Bangladesh Railways Development Plan 2007-13 does not include connectivity with Myanmar. This clearly indicates that rail connectivity is not considered as a priority, but represents a potential longer term goal17 (see Map 1). Road Connectivity

It is said that a country’s prosperity may be judged by its roads. Indeed, this always has been true. One can say that transportation has always

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Source: www.mapofworld.com (assorted relevant routes by cartographer) MAP 1: NEW DELHIBANGKOK RAIL LINK ROUTE

played an important role in the process of economic development of all nations. It was within this framework of thought that the Asian Highway (AH) project came into existence. The project, also known as the Great Asian Highway, is a cooperative project among countries in Asia and Europe and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, to improve the highway systems in Asia. It is one of the three pillars of Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development (ALTID) project, endorsed by the ESCAP at its forty-eighth session in 1992, comprising Asian Highway, TransAsian Railway (TAR) and facilitation of land transport projects. The aim of the AH is to promote and contribute towards the expansion of national and international trade and tourism, to stimulate economic development to facilitate pilgrimage to holy places and to open up new vistas for the regions where people are living in isolation. The AH project has been drawn up to connect the capitals and

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important sea ports of the countries in West, South and Southeast Asia. So this international highway system has been planned out to link up countries in between Iran and Malaysia. So eventually the AH network will serve an area of about 7 million sq. km with a population of more than 700 million. It comprises 83 routes which total 57,000 km, of which 34,000 km forms the international priority routes.18 It may be noted here that the physical construction of the highway is not the only feature of the AH projects. There are efforts to promote the international movement of people and exchange of goods. Therefore concurrently with the filling up of missing links and upgrading of substandard portions, there is publicity campaign to demonstrate the potentials of AH. The advanced highway network would provide for greater trade and social interactions between Asian countries, including personal contacts, project capitalizations, connections of major container terminals with transportation points, and promotion of tourism via the new roadways.19 However, rights groups in Southeast Asia monitoring the NorthSouth Corridor segment were concerned with the remote area’s rapid development resulting in significant increases to exposure of HIV/ AIDS, human trafficking and the possible exploitation of the surrounding forests and wildlife resources.20 Sanjoy Hazarika of the Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research however positively commented: ‘The [2003] agreement between Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand needs to be considered by India as an international link for trade, while retaining the presently designated AH route through Tamabil, Bangladesh, and Imphal, India.’ He also stated: ‘Given its extensive geographical coverage and the recent move to integrate it with other means of transportation, the Asian Highway project requires collective effort and close collaboration among the Asian countries.’21 Several motor trips over the AH have been undertaken. The first trip was taken by a seven-men broadcasting team of Radio Corporation of Japan and the Australian Broadcasting Commission which made a ten-week trip from Bazargan in Iran to Dhaka in Bangladesh.22 Another trip was made by William Tanzer, who started his journey in London and ended in Kolkata. To reiterate, the AH system is not

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a network of super highways, but it is joining of existing national roads to form the international links. AH is really the symbol of Asian unity, progress and partnership. Such being the background of AH, India and Thailand are cooperating closely on improving regional connectivity through initiatives such as India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, Asian Highway Network (under UNESCAP) and BTILS under BIMSTEC framework. The Trilateral Highway project is an ambitious undertaking which was initially launched under the vestiges of the MGC and later incorporated into the transport sector of BIMSTEC. But it has not yet fructified. What are the bottlenecks in terms of financial, security and regional concerns? How will this affect India’s Look East Policy (LEP)? What is needed to get this crucial project executed? With the aim to begin the project in early 2004, the construction of the 1,360 km highway at a cost of US $700 million was distributed in three phases so as to connect Moreh (India), Mae Sot (Thailand) through Bagan in Myanmar. The inherent logic of the road was to fulfil the ambition of creating a ‘link’ between north-east India and Southeast Asia (see Map 2). The project however faces many problems. Financial problems remain a contentious issue. India and Thailand have upgraded some of the link roads, but due to financial scarcity in Myanmar, much work remains incomplete. Tensions have also flared due to Myanmar’s demand for India and Thailand taking up the responsibility of bearing the costs of road construction in its territory. Additionally, there are also many security concerns in the region. A well documented aspect of India-Myanmar border is that it is plagued by numerous problems such as illegal trade, drug trafficking and insurgencies. Recent news updates elicited the demand for Indian forces to seal the border, in particular the stretch aligning Manipur, as outfits belonging to United Liberation Front of Manipur (ULFM) and United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) were regularly using the Friendship Road along the border to transport weapons through the national highway 39. Additionally, China has a de-facto control over Kachin state bordering the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as its territory and the commencement of the Trilateral Highway could flood the state with Chinese goods and illegal weapons hampering

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Source: www.mapofworld.com (assorted relevant routes by cartographer) MAP 2: MAP OF INDIAMYANMARTHAILAND TRILATERAL HIGHWAY

the security interests of India. These concerns have always been present but the prospects of accruing long-term benefits from the highway are also substantial for India especially strategically, by gaining a foothold in its eastern flank. Therefore the enthusiasm for the highway still prevails. For India, however, the realization of the Trilateral Highway will bring a greater share of problems along with the benefits. The trilateral project raises concern on its final destination as well, i.e. the MyanmarThailand border where the ethnic insurgent camps still exist. Myanmar, in the past has accused Thailand of harbouring groups like the Karen National Union and the Chin National Liberation Front. The crossborder infrastructure has also been impeded due to Thailand’s concern with the influx of illegal immigrants and the narcotics business.23 In view of all these practical constraints on development of the Trilateral Highway, a deeper element of regionalism has to be taken

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into consideration as well. The quicker integration of Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) has cast a shadow over other regional organizations like BIMSTEC and MGC. While cross border connectivity has grown at a super rate between GMS countries, it has effectively drowned the scope of projects like the Trilateral Highway as the Mekong region countries are being increasingly sucked into the economic vortex of China. Currently, GMS countries are concentrating on upgradation and construction of new highways under the Asian Highway Project and already US $2.7 billion have been invested to this effect. The East West Corridor, the North-South Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor are the three major projects being implemented. The upgradation of these highways and ratification of Cross Border Transport Agreement (CBTA) have since quadrupled the intra-GMS trade. It is not a surprise that the Trilateral Highway initiative, already crippled with political and financial problems, has lost its charm.24 The completion of the Trilateral Highway will forge greater connectivity between India and Southeast Asia and the positives will outweigh the negatives in every sense. Connectivity will bring its share of problems but will certainly open up avenues for cooperation with the neighbouring states and provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cross-border problems which hitherto have remained unresolved. Additionally, the Trilateral Highway will connect India to the Asian Highway Network and trade between India and ASEAN will receive a further boost which is already predicted to touch US $100 billion in the next five years and also boost trade potential of India, Myanmar and Thailand that is largely carried out through sea routes at present, adding to the substantial cost. Moreover, India’s north-east region will be repositioned as a regional trading hub. It is evident that the Trilateral Highway is crucial for the realization of the LEP and its failure might shake the very foundations of this quest upon which India has embarked. BTILS initiative is also very important to be noted. The Regional Technical Workshop of BIMSTEC Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) under the BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study (BTILS) was held on 18-19 September 2007 in Bangkok, Thailand, preceded by the Sub-regional Consultation Meeting between

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Thailand and Myanmar on 17 September 2007. The secretaries and senior officials from the respective transport/foreign affairs ministries of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, the Chairperson and representatives of the BIMSTEC Working Group (BWG), members of the Technical Assistance (TA) Team from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), BTILS Consultant Team members, and representatives from the BIMSTEC Centre attended the meeting. The meeting was held to discuss the findings and conclusions of the BTILS draft Interim Report, to solicit preliminary comments on the draft BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Policies and Strategies, and to deliberate on the draft Logistics Action Plan. TAC members agreed to hold the second TAC Meeting on 27-8 November 2007 in Bangkok, Thailand. The key objectives of the BTILS were as follows: r identification of the transport infrastructure and logistics bottlenecks in the BIMSTEC r region and their root causes; r identification of existing policies, strategies and development plans by various parties to address these physical and non-physical barriers; r development of proposals for relevant and practical policies and strategies to eliminate or mitigate these identified constraints; r identification of the roles that various organizations should or could have in promoting; r and implementing changes to the regional transport and logistics environment; and r development of a proposed action plan for the phased introduction of enhanced logistics in response to the changing transport environment within BIMSTEC and in the global logistics marketplace.25 The proposed policy framework and strategies are intended for the guidance of BIMSTEC and its member countries by providing a broad spectrum of transport and logistics policy and strategy recommendations on collective regional issues affecting travel and trade within the BIMSTEC region. A major component of BTILS is the development of policies and strategies for correcting the

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weaknesses and eliminating the threats identified in the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis contained within the Interim Report. Therefore, the main objective of these policy framework and strategies is primarily to help formulate BIMSTEC policy and strategy in relation to specific transport and logistics issues, which are constraining trade or raising transport costs in the various parts of the region. It is not the intention to develop an overall transport policy or strategy for either BIMSTEC or the region as a whole or to propose national policies or strategies, other than in the specific interests of BIMSTEC and its goals of enhanced regional connectivity and development of intra-regional trade.26 This simplified framework was initially circulated in advance of the BTILS Regional Technical Workshop held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 18-19 September 2007 as the basis for discussion. At that workshop, detailed explanations were provided on each issue and the logic of the proposed policy framework and strategies, in the form of presentations and supporting paperwork. The workshop was not designed to approve the proposed policy framework and strategies, as that was the main function of the later second TAC meeting held on 29-30 November 2007 in Bangkok, Thailand. The workshop provided an opportunity for the TAC members to contribute to the formulation and development process by assisting the Consultant Team and the ADB Implementation Team in delivering practical and effective solutions to the transport and logistics problems of the BIMSTEC region. The second TAC meeting revisited the proposed policy framework and strategies, agreed on some further amendments and approved their submission as part of the BTILS Final Report to the BIMSTEC Working Group in January 2008.27 Sea Connectivity

The Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) is a state corporation of Thailand, responsible for the regulation and governance of the ports of Thailand, primarily the ports of Laem Chabang and Bangkok, the country’s two largest ports. PAT operates Thai ports in conjunction with public companies including Hutchison Ports Thailand and PSA International. The Port Authority is located in Bangkok. The PAT

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was founded by the Port Authority of Thailand Act 1951, as an autonomous government agency under the jurisdiction of the ministry of transportation and communications. In 1961, construction was begun on the port of Laem Chabang, due to overcrowding at the river port of Bangkok, and by 1997 Laem Chabang had become the country’s busiest seaport. In 2000, the Port Authority of Thailand was converted from a government agency to a state corporation by amendment to the Port Authority of Thailand Act 1951. Ports under the governance of PAT include those of Bangkok, Laem Chabang, Chieng Saen, Chieng Khong, Ranong, Songkhla, Satun as well as the Bangkok Coastal and Barge Domestic Terminal. Bangkok port is the feeder port and logistics centre in the heart of Thailand. The port of Bangkok area is located on the left side of the Chao Phraya River in Khlong Toei District occupying over 900 acres (3.6 sq. km), with jurisdiction of 66 km of riverfront. This port has played a vital role in developing the country’s economy as an international trading gateway. It has continuously developed new services to help boost competitiveness of Thai exports in the global market, reduce cost and facilitate exporters, particularly those belong to the small and medium enterprises.28 Laem Chabang is a main port with world class facilities and services. Laem Chabang is located in eastern Thailand, on the Gulf of Thailand, and it occupies 2,572 acres (10.41 km2). This port is Thailand’s main international deep sea port, located in the Tungsukhla, Sriracha and the Banglamoong districts of Chonburi province with an area of 2,536 acres. PAT is developing Laem Chabang port to be recognized as a world class port making it the gateway to the Mekong sub-region as well as one of Asia’s major hub ports.29 Chiang-Saen and Chiang Khong are ports which can be treated as gateway to GMS countries: China, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar. Chiang Saen is located on the Mekong River across from Laos in Chiang Rai Province in the very north of Thailand. Its role as a trade connection with Myanmar, Laos and the southern provinces of China is expanding and new facilities are being planned 10 km away at the Mae Nam Kok estuary of the Mekong River. It constitutes an area of approximately 3.6 acres. The front of the port is adjacent to the Mekong River and the back of the ports links the Chiang Saen

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and Chiang Khong districts to support tourism, trade, and investment. Chiang Khong port is located in Chiang Khong district of Chiang Rai province. Its objective is to serve the upper Mekong sub-region as part of the Quadrangle Economic Cooperation Project that will help facilitate trade among Thailand, China, Laos and Myanmar. The Ranong port is gateway to the southern west coast to accommodate trade expansion in South Asia. Ranong is located on the Kra Buri River of the Kra Peninsula, across from Myanmar and near the Indian Ocean coast. Approved in 2003 as a PAT port, expansion is planned to serve the West Indian Ocean and Andaman Sea areas. The Ranong port is positioned to encourage shipping along the Andaman coast line particularly to facilitate trade among South Asian ports like Colombo, Chennai, Kolkata and Chittagong. Strategically located on the Andaman port, Ranong port serves as a trading centre between Thailand and the West allowing shippers to avoid the Malacca strait that helps to save much time and shipping expenses. Apart from South Asia, the port maintains trade with Africa and Europe. The port currently plays an important role as a supply base for natural gas and oil exploration and production projects in the Bay of Bengal30 (see Map 3). So the above-noted account shows that the Port Authority of Thailand is aggressively developing and expanding its port business country wide to accommodate growing international trade as well as enhance the potential of Thai exporters to compete in the global market. Songkhla Port is gateway to the southern east coast. Satun is the future port in southern west coast to connect east-west trade route. The port authority of Thailand has a vision to provide a world class port service and to be gateway for the greater Mekong sub-region as well as in new Hub Port of Asia. The objective of these ports is to ensure that port business and other related activities are connected to the country’s infrastructure, to accommodate the expansion of waterway transportation and to help promote international trade and the country’s economic growth. The BIMSTEC region is interconnected by both main line deep sea container and feeder ships distributing containers throughout the Bay of Bengal from hub ports. Laem Chabang in Thailand is gaining importance in the Gulf of Thailand with main line calls and having

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Source: www.mapofworld.com (assorted relevant routes by cartographer) MAP 3: INDIATHAILAND MARITIME LINKAGE: BAY OF BENGAL SECTOR

excess capacity in the short term. The restriction of 1 million TEU placed on Bangkok Port should result in some of the existing feeder services currently serving Bangkok being switched to Laem Chabang. It has potential as a hub, but this is more in relation to Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) than the BIMSTEC countries. It was agreed at the inception meeting not to examine the ports in the Gulf of Thailand. Laem Chabang is the premier container port and the growth restrictions imposed on Bangkok Port at 1 million TEU will make Laem Chabang even more dominant. The latest extension to the port means that adequate capacity is available for expansion. Performance levels are comparable to Singapore and Hong Kong. Road connectivity has been an issue, but is now being addressed by the construction of additional highway linkages. The report focuses more on the Andaman Sea ports and their

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potential in the context of intra-BIMSTEC trade. At Phuket Port, utilization is declining due to dwindling cargo traffic, being only 28 per cent of its potential, and the berth utilization down to only 20 per cent in 2006. The main reason for this adverse position is the lack of supporting industrial clusters in the hinterland and that the port is over 800 km from the mainland areas of demand near Bangkok, with connectivity being both difficult and expensive. The potential to develop this facility as a container port, servicing the Bay of Bengal, is extremely low. It is unlikely any container shipping line would be interested in calling and in future, the primary role of Phuket will be restricted to that of a passenger port. Therefore, a specialized passenger facility may be required. Ranong suffers from the same problems as Phuket as it is also located far from the centres of demand. It also suffers from a lack of rail connectivity with the nearest railhead 110 km away at Chumpohn. It is considered that Ranong’s future role is likely to be in the development of the offshore energy sector. This is demonstrated by the state-owned petroleum company’s presence and its interest in the port operations. The potential as a general cargo or container port appears limited. A key issue from the Thai perspective is whether to develop the connectivity or focus more on Dawei port or an alternative deep water port in Myanmar that is closer to Bangkok. CONCLUSION

Thus Indo-Thai cooperation strengthens inter-regional cooperation. Definitely this cooperation is not free from hazards. The identified challenges are: rising disparity between two countries, inadequate or lack of parity in infrastructure, the capacity constraints and finally lack of real regional cooperation. However, in spite of these constraints, in the age of Asian century, while China is coming up as a giant power, it is important to develop more and more intense relations between India and Southeast Asia. In the context of completion of twenty years of India-ASEAN relations, the intensity of IndiaThailand relations is an important phenomenon. We hope that both India and Thailand will keep up developing their connectivities from multiple angles and in this will gradually tighten up not only Indo-

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Thai sub-regional cooperation but will definitely strengthen IndiaASEAN cooperation to a great extent. We need to remember that India and Thailand are today celebrating 70 years of establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations which were formalized soon after India achieved Independence in 1947. Over the last several years, relations with Thailand have shown considerable growth in diverse fields over the last several years. Immense untapped potential still exists which remains to be harnessed. With the arrival of the Narendra Modi government, it was felt that fresh energy and vision was needed to be imparted to ties with the region. Thus was launched the Act East Policy in November 2014 with the avowed intent to enhance the intensity and expand the scope and domain of regional partnership. Greater emphasis is sought to be provided to strategic cooperation including fight against terrorism, radicalization and terror financing, defence cooperation, promoting infrastructure and connectivity. Several fresh initiatives have been mooted and earlier projects sought to be put on fast track. Positive green shoots are already visible.PM Modi discussed bilateral issues of mutual interest with Thai PM General Prayuth Chan-o-cha on the sidelines of ASEAN Summit in Myanmar in November 2014. On 10 November 2016, PM Modi visited Bangkok to pay tribute to King Bhumibol Adulyadej who passed away after a long and eventful reign of seventy years in October 2016. Vice-President Hamid Ansari visited Thailand in February 2016, and PM Prayuth toured India in June 2016. A comprehensive and detailed roadmap for future activities and directions was agreed to during the visit. Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn visited India in November 2016 to receive the first World Sanskrit Award. In June 2015, the Minister of External Affairs, Sushma Swaraj, visited Bangkok to co-chair the 7th Meeting of India-Thailand Joint Commission, and to attend the 16th World Sanskrit Conference. This vibrant exchange of visits underscores the importance both countries attach to bilateral partnership. So, finally to conclude one must say from the Legend of Rama to the Wisdom of Buddha our (India and Thailand) ties are founded on a shared cultural heritage and for present and future generations to come the regional and sub-regional ties can not only maintain the heritage but give it a more prominent shape.

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NOTES 1. ASEAN day lecture 7 August 2007 as quoted in Ambassador I.P. Khosla, ‘India and Southeast Asia: Common Perspectives on a Post Cold War World Order’, Chief Guest Address at the seminar on ‘India-Southeast Asia Strategic Convergence in the 21st Century’, 26-8 March 2008, Centre for SAARC Studies Andhra University, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, India, March 2008, pp. 16-17. 2. Special address by Krit Kraichitti, Ambassador of Thailand to India for the 5th Northeast Business Summit at Hyatt Regency, Kolkata on 8-9 January 2010. 3. ASEAN-India Dialogue Relations, ASEAN Secretariat, March 2010, pp. 1-3. 4. http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases (accessed on 15 May 2016). 5. Suthiphand Chirathivat and Chayodom Sabhasri, ‘India Mekong Cooperation Thailand’s Perspective’, unpublished paper presented in international conference on Mekong-India Cooperation: Linking Markets, Fostering Trade, organized by RIS New Delhi in collaboration with Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, Calcutta University, Kolkata, 23 June 2011, pp. 1-2. 6. Bipul Chatterjee and Surendar Singh, ‘Time to Energize BIMSTEC’, The Diplomat, 7 January 2015 vide http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/time-toenergize-bimstec/ (accessed on 15 May 2016). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Sayantani Sen Mazumdar, ‘Mekong-Ganga Cooperation: A Brief Overview’, vide www.globalindiafoundation.org/mkng-%20cooperation, p. 4. 10. Pitak Intrawityanunt, ‘Looking West at BIST-EC: A Bridge Not to Far’, Saranom, 10 February be 2551 (ad 2008). 11. Pitak Intrawityanunt, op. cit., p. 4. 12. http://www.jagranjosh.com/current-affairs/india-cambodia-signed-twomous-on-tourism-mekong-ganga (accessed on 16 May 2016). 13. Rita Patiyasevi, ‘Aviation Pact to aid Phuket’, The Nation, Bangkok, 31 July 1997 in Khwam Samphan Rawang prathet Thai kap India Nai prachuban lae Thangkhwam Muh nai Anakhot, Bangkok, 2540, p. 283. 14. Remarks by H.E. Krit Kraichitti, Ambassador of Thailand to Republic of India at Look East Summit 2010 Conference at Hotel Hyatt Regency Kolkata, 27 March 2010, p. 7. 15. meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=50044530 (accessed on 18 August 2011). 16. Economic Times, New Delhi, 11 February 2011 vide www.evisaasia.com/ (accessed on 18 August 2011). 17. Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic

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18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

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Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study (BTILS), Final Report, Asian Development Bank, January, 2008, p. 51. Priya Osthananda, ‘The Asian Highway’, Thai Journal of Development Administration, January 1970, p. 117. Rahul Kamat, ‘The Great Asian Highway’, Project Monitor website, 31 January 2005, retrieved 5 May 2009. Brian McCartan, ‘Roadblocks on the Great Asian Highway’, Asia Times website, 23 January 2008, retrieved 5 May 2009. Rahul Kamat, ‘The Great Asian Highway’, Project Monitor website, 31 January 2005, Retrieved 5 May 2009. Osthananda, op. cit., p. 123. Tanvi Pate, ‘India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway’, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Southeast Asia – Articles, 6 May 2010, p. 1. Ibid. Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study (BTILS), Final Report, Asian Development Bank, January 2008, p. vii. Ibid., pp. vi, viii. Ibid. Bangkok Port: Export Services at Bangkok Port, Handbook, Bangkok, September 2007, p. 1. Port Authority of Thailand, Handbook, Port Authority, Bangkok, September 2007. Ranong Port, Port Authority, Bangkok, September 2006.

Contributors

PARTHA PRATIM BASU is Professor of International Relations and Director, School of Media Communication and Culture, Jadavpur University, Kolkata. He received his PhD from University of Calcutta. Professor Basu is the author of Press and Foreign Policy in India (2003). Among his recent publications is a co-edited volume titled Democracy and Democratization in South Asia (2011). He was, till very recently, the editor of the Jadavpur Journal of International Relations (Sage). BHAGABAN BEHERA teaches in the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata. He earned his PhD degree from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is the author of Central Asia-China Relations Since 1991 (2006). He has brought out various research papers and reports on traditional and non-traditional issues in Central Asia. PURUSOTTAM BHATTACHARYA is former Professor of International Relations and former Director of School of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Jadavpur University. He is an alumnus of Presidency College, Kolkata, London School of Economics and Political Science, London and Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is the author, editor and co-editor of ten books and has also contributed a large number of research papers in edited volumes and national and international journals. SANJUKTA BANERJI BHATTACHARYA is former Professor of International Relations and former Coordinator, Centre for Refugee Studies, Jadavpur University. She received her PhD degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University. She has received the Fulbright Fellowship twice, once for pursuing post-doctoral research and the second time as a visiting scholar. She has published and co-authored several books and contributed to many research journals and multi-authored volumes.

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

SHANTANU CHAKRABARTI teaches in the Department of History, University of Calcutta. He also holds the honorary position of the Convener, Academic Committee, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Calcutta. He was formerly a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. He is the author of Cooperation in South Asia: The Indian Perspective (2008) and Privatisation of Security in the Post-Cold War Period: An Overview of Its Nature and Implications (2009). He has edited and co-edited volumes on Conflict Resolution,Securitization,Globalizati on and Nation-Building. TRIDIB CHAKRABORTI is the Professor and Dean, School of Social Sciences, ADAMAS University, Kolkata, and former Professor of International Relations at Jadavpur University. He is the author of India and Kampuchea: A Phase in Their Relations – 1978-81 (1985). He has co-edited books and contributed many articles to edited volumes and journals of national and international repute. He has presented papers in national and international conferences and also taught as a visiting professor at Dublin, Ireland. BIJAYA KUMAR DAS teaches in the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University. He obtained his PhD degree from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He is at present Coordinator, Human Rights PG Diploma Course of the Department. The areas of his research interest are foreign policy, security and domestic issues of Central Asia, Russia and Greater Eurasia. LIPI GHOSH is Professor and Director of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Calcutta. She is also Head, Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies. She specializes in specifically Myanmar and Thai studies. She has authored two books titled Burma: Myth of French Intrigue (1994) and Prostitution in Thailand: Myth and Reality (2002). Books edited by her include The Eastern Indian Ocean: Historical Links and Contemporary Convergences (2011) and Connectivity and Beyond: Indo Thai Relations Through Ages (2009).

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

265

ANINDYA JYOTI MAJUMDAR is Professor of International Relations and former Director, School of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Jadavpur University. He received his PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, USA, under the Fulbright-Nehru Academic and Professional Excellence Fellowship Programme. He has authored a book Lethal Games (2004) and edited/co-edited a few others. He is at present the coordinator of the Centre for Advanced Study Programme in the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University. G.V.C. NAIDU is Professor in the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His visiting appointments/fellowships include the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Daito Bunka University, Japan, East-West Center, Honolulu, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Gakushuin University, Tokyo, National Chengchi University, Taipei, etc. He has authored The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia (2000), and co-edited Changing Security Dynamic in Eastern Asia (2005) and India-Japan: Partnership for Peace and Security in Asia (2006). A. SUBRAMANYAM RAJU is Professor in the Centre for South Asian Studies, Pondicherry University. He is an Associate Editor of Indian Ocean Region (London: Routledge) and South Asian Studies (Pondicherry University). He was Salzburg Seminar Fellow (2006) and the recipient of the Mahbub-Ul-Haq Award (1998) and Kodikara Award (2003) from the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, and Scholar of Peace Award (2002) from WISCOMP, New Delhi. He has published ten books including edited volumes. Former Professor and ex-Coordinator of the Centre of Advanced Study Programme in the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, RABINDRA SEN is the author of China and ASEAN: Diplomacy during the Cold War and After (2002) and coeditor of South East Asia: Security in the Coming Millennium (2000) and Power, Commerce and Influence: India’s Look East Experience (2009). Professor Sen has also contributed articles to journals, edited books, periodicals and newspapers.

Index

African Union 209 Agenced’Aide à la Cooperation Technique et au Development 228 Annan, Kofi 178 ANZUS 25 Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 202-3 Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO) 203 ASEAN Economic Community 156 ASEAN-India cooperation 237-9 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 8, 34, 40-2 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 18, 23, 25, 28, 115; integrates Southeast Asian region 24 ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 156 Asia-Europe Meeting 40 Asian Development Bank 85 Asian Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights 168 Asian Land Transport Infrastructure Development project 248 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 22, 34, 36, 37 Asia-Pacific region 31-45; ASEAN Plus Three 40-2; East Asian Summit 42-4; regionalism in 34-40; regional trading arrangements 32-3; Trans-Pacific Partnership 32-3 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 12, 13, 22-4, 25, 28, 111, 116, 143-78; achievements of 148-61; and economic strength of 162-3; ASEAN-EU meetings 152; Bangkok Declaration 145-6; born

out of Cold War 33-4; Charter 152-4; Charter in 2007 146; Concord II (Bali Concord II) 156-7; East Asian Financial crisis 163-4; Economic Community 156, 161-2, 174-5; efficacy of processes and mechanisms 177; emergence of 145-7; emerging pitfalls of 166-75; FTA proposal (1992) 39; goal of economic integration in 162; Hanoi Declaration on Narrowing Development Gap 159-60; identity 22; important tasks of 161-2; overview 143-5; position on human rights 168-9; pragmatic appraisal 147-66; principle of nonintervention 165-6; promoting trade 32; Regional Community 23; Regional Forum 154-5; regionalism and 35-6; response to external threats 149-50; role in Southeast Asia 148; 13th Summit in Singapore 152-3; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 150; 1976 Treaty objectives 23 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) 125, 133 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Cooperation 107 Bangladesh Working Paper 99 Basu, Partha Pratim 10-11 Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) 36, 107, 125, 239-41, 250, 252-4, 256-7 Bhattacharya, Purusottam 9-10, 14

268

INDEX

Bhattacharya, Sanjukta 12 BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study (BTILS) 252-4 Bishkek Declaration (2007) 51 Bonaparte, Napoleon 72 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 22, 210 Briand, Aristide 73-4 Briand Memorandum 74 Buzan, Barry 184 Camp David Treaty (1979) 194 Central Asian Cooperation Organization 218 Central Asia regionalism 215-32; Central Asian Cooperation Organization 218; CIS Collective Security Treaty 220; civil society cooperation, lack of 228-9; Collective Security Treaty Organization 220-2; Commonwealth of Independent States 217-18; constraints on regionalism 224-6; different economic models 226; economic incompatibility 225; Eurasian Economic Community 219; Eurasian Economic Union 219-20; growth of regional organizations 217-24; homogeneous products 225-6; internal regime type 228; nation-building 227; North Atlantic Treaty Organization 223-4; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 224; overview 215-16; presence of external powers 229-30; Shanghai Cooperation Organization 222-3; sovereignty issue 225; traditional rivalry 227; Uzbek hegemony 226-7 Chakrabarti, Shantanu 10 Chakraborti, Tridib 12

Chatterjee, Shibashis 14 Chiang Mai Initiative 41 China: collaboration in SCO 51; cooperation and competition within SCO 56-60; interests in Central Asia 53-6; Shanghai Five and 48 Chinese Silk Road Economic Belt 52 Chopra, Pran 115 Churchill, Winston 74 CIS Collective Security Treaty 220 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 54-5, 64, 220-2 Common Foreign and Security Policy 78-9 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 209 Commonwealth of Independent States 217-18 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements 96 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia 23 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 23 Confidence Building Measure 108 Council of Arab Economic Unity 202-3 Cross Border Transport Agreement 252 de Gaulle, Charles 72 Dushanbe Declaration 47-8 Dushanbe Summit 47 East Asia Economic Caucus 38 East Asia Economic Grouping 37-8 East Asian Summit (EAS) 42-5; Declaration of 2005 43-4; EASG recommendation for 42-3 East Asia Study Group (EASG) 41, 42 East Asia Summit 8 East Asia Vision Group (EAVG) 41, 42

INDEX

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 98 Economic Community of West African States 209 Eurasian Economic Community 219 Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 219-20 Eurasian regional security 47-66; achievements of SCO 63-5; cooperation and competition within SCO 56-60; Eurasia in context of great power competition 48-9; interests of Central Asian countries in SCO 60; interests of China and Russia in Central Asia 53-6; NATO and SCO as security organizations 62-3; overview 47-8; problem areas of SCO 60-1; SCO and promotion of 49-53 Europe, regionalism in 71-81; Briand Memorandum 74; Common Foreign and Security Policy 78-9; crisis in 79-80; EEC 76; establishment of EC 77; European Atomic Energy Agency 76; European Coal and Steel Community 75, 76; European Common Market 75-6; European Economic Community 72; European Union 77-81; First World War and 73-4; formulation of common policies 78; movement for European unity 79; overview 69-71; Treaty of Rome 76-7 European Atomic Energy Agency 76 European Coal and Steel Community 75 European Economic Community (EEC) 72, 205 European Rapid Action Force 21 European Union (EU) 9, 10, 21, 77-81, 111, 209 EU-SAARC cooperation 88-90

269

Foreign trading arrangements 32-3 Ghosh, Lipi 13 Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) 202-3 Greater Mekong Subregional (GMS) programme 242 Gujral, I.K. 114, 123 ‘Gujral Doctrine’ 114 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 194, 196-7, 204, 206-9 Haas, Michael 95-6 Hamas 208 Hawke, Bob 37 Hazarika, Sanjoy 249 Hettne, Björn 186 Huntington, Samuel 82 Ibrahim, Anwar 157 India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum 209 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 37 Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) 107 Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) 124 Indonesian Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) 170 Indo-Thai connectivities 244-58; air connectivity 244-6; rail connectivity 246-7; road connectivity 247-54; sea connectivity 254-8 International Criminal Court (ICC) 197 International Maritime Organization (IMO) 149 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), regional response to 199-202

270

INDEX

Khairallah, Khairallah 203 Klimenko, A. 53

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 25, 204-5

Leifer, Michael 28 Look East Policy 39

Panichpakdi, Supachai 243 Port Authority of Thailand 254-5 Port Authority of Thailand Act 1951, 255 Post-Ministerial Conference 23 Putin, Vladimir 50

Mackinder, Sir Halford 49 Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) 241-4 Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGCI) 26, 242, 244 Modi, Narendra 89, 123-4 Mohamad, Mahathir 37-8 Muni, S.D. 123 Muslim Brotherhood 208 Naidu, G.V.C. 8-9 Neo-regionalism 93-107; Asian, features of 95-7; definition of 95; overview 93-4; progress of regionalization in South Asia 97-102 North American Free Trade Association 22 North Atlantic Free Trade Association 95 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 22, 24-5, 28, 64, 69, 223-4; Afghanistan and 54; eastward expansion of 53-4; expansion after Cold War 24; vs. SCO 62-3 Northern Distribution Network 230 Nye, Joseph, 184 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 69 Organization for European Economic Cooperation 69 Organization of African Unity 209 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 204-5 Organization of Islamic Conference 25

Raju, A. Subramanyam 11 Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure 50 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 32, 33 Regionalism: and broad-based security 17; conflicting states and 18; contribution to security, ways of 16; in Europe 71-81; guided 26; mutual benefit and 15-16; post-Cold War period 19-20; in South Asia 81-7 regional security 15-28; arrangements 17; ASEAN Regional Forum and 18; bridges over fault-lines 27-8; broad-based security 17; Eurasian 47-66. See also Eurasian Regional Security; management of 23-7; security regions, construction of 18-23 Regional Trading Arrangements (RTA) 8, 32-3, 93, 96 Russia: collaboration in SCO 51; cooperation and competition within SCO 56-60; interest perceptions and policies of 54; interests in Central Asia 53-6; Shanghai Five and 48 SAARC Development Fund 105 SAFTA Ministerial Council 103 security regions, construction of 18-23 Sen, Sumita 14 Shanghai Cooperation Organization

INDEX

(SCO) 9, 48, 115, 222-3; agreement on Regional AntiTerrorism Structure 50; Bishkek Declaration (2007) 51; Bishkek Summit, 2013 52; Business Council 51; cooperation and competition within 56-60; Dushanbe Summit 2014 52; Inter-bank Association 51; interests of Central Asian countries in 60; and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 51-2; problem areas of 60-1; and promotion of Eurasian regional security 49-53; Summit, 2003 50; Summit, 2012 52; Tashkent Summit, 2016 52; Ufa Summit, 2015 52; vs. NATO 62-3 Shanghai Five 47, 48 Shanghai Forum 47 Sharma, Sheel Kant 86 Singh, Manmohan 121 Soderbaum, Fredrik 186 South African Development Community 209 South Asia: climate change and 135-7; connectivity in 131-3; energy cooperation 133-5; FDI flows in 101; intra-regional FDI in 102; progress of regionalization in 97-102; recent trends in regionalization process 102-7; regionalism in 81-7; rethinking regionalism in 129-39; SAARC as facilitator of economic cooperation in 117-20; selected human development indicators 99; stimulators 138-9 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 10-12, 24, 25, 83-7, 98, 111-25, 129-31; achievements 122; Agreement on Trade in Services 105; Charter 88;

271

Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 122; Decade Plan of Action 122; Development Fund 105, 122; Development Goals 105; Documentation Centre 84; establishment of 83; evolution of India’s policy 112-17; expansion of 2007 112; as facilitator of economic cooperation in South Asia 117-20; Food Security Reserve 105; granting of duty-free access to goods 103-4; India’s boycott of Islamabad summit 86-7; India’s need for 120-3; India’s trade 104; Preferential Trading Arrangement 100; Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism 115; Regional Multimodal Transport Study 104; Secretariat 88; share of world trade in goods and services 101; smaller members of 85; South Asian Free Trade Agreement and 84-5, 100; South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement and 84; South Asian regionalism and 85-6; and South Asian security scenario 114-17; subregional cooperative group 106-7 South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) 84-5, 100, 118 South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) 84, 100, 118 South Asia Regional Initiative on Energy 133 South Asia regionalism 81-7; ASEAN 81. See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations; geo-political realities in 83-4; Indo-centric region 82; initiating regional cooperation 83; and neo-regionalism in Asia 93-107; overview 69-71; SAARC

272

INDEX

83-7; South Asian Free Trade Agreement 84-5; South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement 84 Spykman, Nicholas 49 Tanzer, William 249 Tolstoy, Leo 28 Trans-Pacific Partnership 32, 35 United Liberation Front of Asom 250 United Liberation Front of Manipur 250 United Nations Development Programme 146 Weisbrode, Kenneth 49 West Asia regionalism 183-212; ALECSO 203; Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 202-3; Arab League and its travails

190-9; Camp David Treaty (1979) 194; Council of Arab Economic Unity 202-3; defining regionalism 184-8; Greater Arab Free Trade Area 202-3; Gulf Cooperation Council 194, 196-7, 204, 206-9; historical perspective of 188-90; Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 204-5; Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 204-5; overview of 183-4; regionalization in Middle East 202-9; regional response to ISIS 199-202 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 31, 96 Zia-ur-Rehman 83 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality 149