Cognition and Material Culture: The Archaeology of Symbolic Storage (Monograph Series) [1 ed.] 0951942069, 9780951942062

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The four episodes of ‘painting’ activity that produced the ‘spotted horses panel’ in Pech-Merle. (Adapted from Lorblanchet 1995, 212–13.)

M c DONALD INSTITUTE MONOGRAPHS

cognton and Materal culture: the Archaeology of Symbolc Storage Edted by coln Renfrew and chrs Scarre

Published by: McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research Unversty of cambrdge Downng Street cambrdge cB2 3ER (0)(1223) 339336

Dstrbuted by Oxbow Books United Kingdom: Oxbow Books, Park End Place, Oxford, OX1 1HN. Tel: (0)(1865) 241249; Fax: (0)(1865) 794449 USA: The Davd Brown Book company, P.O. Box 511, Oakvlle, cT 06779, USA. Tel: 860-945-9329; FAX: 860-945-9468

ISBN: 0-9519420-6-9 ISSN: 1363-1349

© 1998 McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research

All rghts reserved. No parts of ths publcaton may be reproduced, stored n a retreval system, or transmtted, n any form or by any means, electronc, mechancal, photocopyng, recordng or otherwse, wthout the pror permsson of the McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research.

Edted for the Insttute by chrs Scarre (Series Editor) and Dora A. Kemp (Assistant Series Editor).

Flm produced by Gary Reynolds Typesettng, 13 Sturton Street, cambrdge, cB1 2QG. Prnted and bound by Short Run Press, Bttern Rd, Sowton Industral Estate, Exeter, EX2 7LW.

cover llustraton: The so-called map of Bedolina, a prehistoric rock engraving from north Italy. (Copyright © 1998 by WARA, Centro Camuno di Studi Preistorici, 25044 Capo di Ponte, Italy.) v

Ths volume, and the conference from whch t derves, was nspred by Origins of the Modern Mind by Merlin Donald, publshed n 1991.

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Contents contrbutors Fgures Tables

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Preface cOLIN RENFREW & cHRIS ScARRE

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Chapter 1

Mnd and Matter: cogntve Archaeology and External Symbolc Storage cOLIN RENFREW

1

Chapter 2

Homnd Enculturaton and cogntve Evoluton MERLIN DONALD

7

Chapter 3

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems: an Evolutionary Perspective FRANcEScO D’ERRIcO

19

Chapter 4

Materal Artefacts, Symbolsm, Socologsts and Archaeologsts DAvID HALLE

51

Chapter 5

Mmess, Imagnaton and Role-play PAUL L. HARRIS

61

Chapter 6

Rock Art: Handmaden to Studes of cogntve Evoluton THOMAS A. DOWSON

67

Chapter 7

Dggng for Memes: the Role of Materal Objects n cultural Evoluton MARK LAKE

77

Chapter 8

Personal Experience and Belief: the Signiicance of External Symbolic Storage for the Emergence of Modern Human cognton E.J. LOWE

Chapter 9

The Supernatural Bengs of Prehstory and the External Storage of Relgous Ideas STEvEN MITHEN

89 97

Chapter 10 chnese Bural Patterns: Sources of Informaton on Thought and Belef JESSIcA RAWSON

107

Chapter 11 Socal Relatons and the Idea of Externalty MARILyN STRATHERN

135

Chapter 12 Some Problems wth the Noton of External Symbolc Storage, and the case of Neolthc Materal culture n Brtan JULIAN THOMAS

149

Chapter 13 Symbolc Behavour: the Orgn of a Spatal Perspectve EzRA B.W. zUBROW & PATRIcK T. DALy

157

Chapter 14 Mnd and Artefact: a Dalectcal Perspectve ROBERT A. HINDE

175

Chapter 15 Materal culture and cognton: concludng Thoughts MERLIN DONALD

181

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cONTRIBUTORS 1.

cOLIN RENFREW McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research, Downng Street, cambrdge cB2 3ER.

2.

cHRIS ScARRE McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research, Downng Street, cambrdge cB2 3ER.

3.

MERLIN DONALD Department of Psychology, Queen’s Unversty, Kngston, Ontaro, canada K7L 3N6.

4.

FRANcEScO D’ERRIcO chargé de Recherche au cNRS, UMR 5808 du cNRS, Insttut de Préhstore et de Géologe du Quaternare, Av. des Facultés, 334015 Talence, France.

5.

DAvID HALLE Socology Department, Unversty of calforna, Los Angeles, cA 90095-1551, USA.

6.

PAUL L. HARRIS Department of Expermental Psychology, Unversty of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3UD.

7.

THOMAS A. DOWSON Department of Archaeology, Unversty of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ.

8.

MARK LAKE Insttute of Archaeology, Unversty college London, 31–34 Gordon Square, London Wc1H 0Py.

9.

E.J. LOWE Department of Phlosophy, Unversty of Durham, 50 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HN.

10. STEvEN MITHEN Department of Archaeology, Unversty of Readng, Whteknghts, P.O. Box 218, Readng RG6 6AA. 11. JESSIcA RAWSON Merton college, Oxford OX1 4JD. 12. MARILyN STRATHERN Department of Socal Anthropology, Unversty of cambrdge, cambrdge cB2 3RF. 13. JULIAN THOMAS Department of Archaeology, Unversty of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ. 14. EzRA B.W. zUBROW Natonal center for Geographc Informaton Analyss, SUNy at Buffalo, Buffalo, Ny 14261-0023, USA. 15. PATRIcK T. DALy Department of Anthropology, SUNy at Buffalo, Buffalo, Ny 14261-0005, USA. 14. ROBERT A. HINDE St John’s college, Unversty of cambrdge, cambrdge cB2 1TP.

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Figures Provisional data base of Artiicial Memory Systems other than writing, used by different human groups around the world. The igures indicate types and not single systems. Possible associations between factors organizing an AMS code (see text). Portions of experimental single stroke lines engraved by lint points on antler, observed in transmitted light by means of resin replicas. 3.4. Study of a notch proile by image analysis. 3.5. Bone and stone objects from European Lower and Middle Palaeolithic sites described as bearing human-made sets of marks. 3.6. Examples of worked bones and personal ornaments from the Châtelperronian levels of the Grotte du Renne. 3.7. Notched rib from the Abri Blanchard (cat. no. D.38.23.1958) 3.8. Close-up view (top) of the notched area of rib D.38.23.1958 showing different types of post-depositional damage. 3.9. Notched rib from the Abri Blanchard (cat. no. D.38.23.1858) 3.10. Close-up view (top) of the notched area of the rib D.38.23.1858 showing two sets of notches. 3.11. Proiles of notches carved on the caudal edge of the Blanchard rib. 3.12. Top: notches engraved on the external aspect of the Blanchard rib; centre: notches engraved on the edge; bottom: close-up view of notches 5, 8 and 11. Scale = 1 mm. 3.13. Top: line rendition of the fragmentary reindeer metapodial from the Abri Labattut (cat. num. D.38.23.2072) indicating the four sets carved by different cutting edges; centre: variation in the spacing between notches; bottom: variation of the angles formed by the notch walls. 3.14. SEM micrograph of notches B12–14. 3.15. Notches carved on the crest of the Labattut metapodial: A: A13; B: B12–14; C: C4; D: D1. 3.16. Close-up view of notches A13 (left) and B14 (right) of the Labattut metapodial demonstrating morphological difference between the two notches produced by two different cutting edges. 3.17. Rhinoceros rib from Solutré. 3.18. Morphological differences between notches carved on the rib from Solutré suggesting use of different tools. 3.19. Schematic rendition of the notched side of the Solutré rib. Sets engraved by different tools are indicated. 3.20. Top left: distal end of the Solutré rib. Top right: detail of the surface showing an entanglement of striations and traces of impacts gradually increasing in number towards the point. Bottom: SEM micrograph of the rib point showing highly abraded appearance. 3.21. Top: face A of the engraved spatula from Laugerie Basse (cat. no. 38.189.1252); centre: close-up view of the same face; bottom: detail of the opposite face (B). 3.22. Schematic rendition of the spatula from Laugerie Basse indicating the different sets of marks engraved on this object. 3.23. Close-up view, from top to bottom, of sets D–H on face A of the spatula from Laugerie Basse. 3.24. Schematic rendition of the La Marche marks. 3.25. Schematic rendition of the broken pendant from Tossal de la Roca. 3.26. Frequency distribution of number of marks present in each set, on four of the objects studied. 6.1. A reproduction of the ceiling panel from Roufignac. 6.2. Below the outline of a mammoth, an eye and nostril were added to a natural feature on the wall of the cave (Bernifal) to give the impression of a human face. 6.3. The four episodes of ‘painting’ activity that produced the ‘spotted horses panel’ in Pech-Merle. 10.1. Archaeological sites in China. 10.2. Bronze ritual wine lask. Shang dynasty, c. 1200 BC. Height 29.8 cm. British Museum. 10.3. Drawing of a typical set of Shang dynasty ritual vessels from tomb 18 at Anyang, Henan province. 10.4. Drawings of the food tripods, ding, from the tomb of the royal consort Fu Hao, Shang dynasty, c. 1200 BC. 10.5a. Drawings of the sets of bronze ritual vessels and bells from tomb 7 at Baoji Zhuyuangou in Shaanxi province. 10.5b. Drawing of the tomb 7 from Baoji Zhuyuangou showing the main burial with a female interred to one side. 10.6. Drawings of ritual vessels and bells cast by one Wei Bo Xing, found in a hoard at Fufeng county in Shaanxi province. Late Western Zhou period, 9th century BC. 10.7. Drawings of a set of steel turning tools, by Melhuish Ltd c. 1913. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3.

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20 21 23 24 26 27 29 29 31 31 32 33

34 35 35 36 38 39 39

40 41 42 42 44 45 46 71 72 74 108 109 113 114 116 117 118 121

10.8. Drawing of a cast bronze igure of a standing man from Guanghan county in Sichuan province. 10.9. Drawing of a large bronze mask on an imaginary being from Guanghan county in Sichuan province. 10.10. Drawing of an imaginary bird crowned with antlers. 10.11. Drawing of the painting on one side of the inner cofin of the Marquis Yi of Zeng. 10.12a. Drawing of the tomb of Liu Sheng, d. 113 BC, at Mancheng in Hebei province. 10.12b. Drawing of the reconstructed jade suit of Liu Sheng from Mancheng. 10.13. Rubbing of the two sides of a halberd found at Baoshan in Jingmen county, Hubei province. 11.1. Plan of Mekeo village, Papua New Guinea. 11.2. Shells laid out down a ceremonial stand, streaming away from a house. 11.3. Carrying bags. A girl returns from the gardens with sweet potatoes in one netbag and vines and leaves in the other. 11.4. Tally made of bamboo slats, recording exchange transactions, worn here by someone decorated for an accompanying dance. 13.1. Palaeolithic engraving on mammoth bone; perhaps a representation of a settlement? 13.2. The famous Tepe Gawra landscape jar. 13.3. Detail of the map elements from the Tepe Gawra landscape jar. 13.4. Petroglyphic map from Bedolina, Valcomonica. 13.5. The famous Babylonian world map c. 600 BC. 13.6. Native American manuscript map of part of the Mississippi drainage. 13.7. Eskimo wood map from the coast of Greenland. 13.8. Marshall Island stick chart of the rebbelib type showing wave directions, currents, and islands. 13.9. Australian bark map from Arnhem Land.

122 123 124 125 126 127 130 136 139 140 142 162 162 162 163 163 168 170 170 170

tables 1.1 1.2. 4.1. 13.1. 13.2. 13.7. 13.8. 13.9.

Proposed successive stages or ‘layers’ in the evolution of primate/hominid culture. Properties of internal and external memory compared. Political afiliation of residents who have ‘primitive’ art, by their attitude to the art. A corpus of prehistoric, archaeological, and very early historic maps. A corpus of ethnographic maps from hunting, gathering, and ishing societies. Eskimo wood map from the coast of Greenland. Marshall Island stick chart of the rebbelib type showing wave directions, currents, and islands. Australian bark map from Arnhem Land.

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14 15 55 164 169 170 170 170

Preface The papers n ths volume represent the proceedngs

A key queston throughout these proceedngs was the mpact whch symbolc artefacts may have had n alterng patterns of human behavour. We could suggest that artefactual elements had a causatve role n cogntve changes, perhaps even changes n cogntve capactes. For llustraton, one could pont to the phenomenal feats of memory acheved by non-lterate socetes, contrastng sharply wth the lmted memory abltes of ndvduals relant upon wrtng and notaton. Ths s not n tself to suggest there s any physcal dfference n the mnds of the two groupngs, though that cannot be ruled out. What t does llustrate s the dramatc mpact whch the development of materal symbols may have upon the ways n whch modern humans thnk. In reachng such a concluson we must not of course overlook the mportance of collectvtes n mouldng human conscousness — the socal context of learnng, of symbols, and of communcaton s crucal to the outcome. The value and meanng of symbols s fundamentally a queston of socal context; the value of the varna gold s not so much a qualty nherent n the materal tself (even f the gold tself s rare and vsually attractve) but s a qualty socally ascrbed. The same s true of weghts and measures — these are essentally socal conventons. We must also bear n mnd that alongsde the measurement values themselves, the nstruments of weghng and measurng, and the assocated nomenclature, may well have had symbolc connotatons whch went far beyond the smple determnaton of quantty. Naturally enough n a conference of ths knd, the concept of external symbolc storage was subjected to crtcal apprasal and revew. Several partcpants expressed reservatons about the dea, many of them emphasizing the relexive quality of the relatonshp between humans and materal culture, and the socally-stuated nature of symbolc meanng. In usng the term ‘symbolc storage’ we should make clear that what we have n mnd s not a statc concept, but one whch refers to the nteracton between humans and artefacts n a general sense. It s not smply a queston of passve storage, of people creatng symbols whch convey a message to those who can read them; the symbols equally inluence the vewer by ther form and context, and the understandng of the symbol wll tself be remoulded and changed over the course of tme, as t gathers new

of a conference held at the McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research n cambrdge n September 1996 under the ttle ‘The Archaeology of External Symbolc Storage: the Dalectc between Artefact and cognton’. In brngng together a dverse group of speakers ncludng not only archaeologsts and anthropologsts but also psychologsts, a phlosopher, a socologst and an anmal behavourst, the am was to generate nterdscplnary dscusson about the nature of beng human as revealed n the record of materal culture. The emphass was on human cogntve expresson and ts development snce the so-called Human Revoluton at the begnnng of the Upper Palaeolthc. The Human Revoluton was the subject of an earler McDonald Insttute conference, the proceedngs of whch have been publshed n another volume n ths seres (Mellars & Gbson 1996). The cogntve aspects of the emergence of modern humans have receved consderable attenton, but much less consderaton has been gven to the changes whch have taken place snce the begnnng of the Upper Palaeolthc. One of the few authors to have addressed the subject n a systematc way s Merln Donald n hs recent book Origins of the Modern Mind (1991), and one of Donald’s key concepts s that of ‘external symbolc storage’: the development of devces outsde the body (hence ‘external’) devsed ether explctly or unconscously to hold and convey nformaton. Perhaps the most obvous example of such symbolc storage s wrtng, but the conference sought to concentrate prmarly on pre-lterate and non-lterate socetes, and on the uses of non-lterate symbols n lterate socetes. The symbols themselves vary wdely n scope, type, and meanng. At one end of the scale are non-lngustc symbols whch carry a clearly prescbed message, such as systems of weghts and measures. At the other end are symbols of status and wealth, or symbols markng out the everyday world, the dvson of space and actvty n domestc and non-domestc contexts. It s here that the concept offers such a powerful potental for archaeology, snce t can be appled n a wde range of archaeologcal contexts, and to very dfferent knds of socety. The concept can provde new nsght nto engraved artefacts of the Upper Palaeolthc, rtual bronze vessels from hstorcal chna, and twenteth-century art. x

assocatons or connotatons. The nterrelatonshp s essentially a luid one. The papers n ths volume survey the concept of symbolc storage across a wde framework of space and tme, begnnng wth the so-called ‘notatons’ of the Upper Palaeolithic, and the signiicance of Palaeolthc art, down to preferences n ‘ethnc’ art purchased by twenteth-century New yorkers. One central sesson of the conference focused on the use of symbolc storage n the form of art or rtual to nform or renforce belef. Another sesson consdered the more subtle ways n whch ordnary objects carry or facltate the carrage of nformaton, whether ntentionally or subconsciously. A inal section was devoted to the crucal role played by external symbolc storage n the transmsson of knowledge from one generaton to the next, and n partcular the mportance of mmess, or learnng by mtaton. The volume opens wth ntroductory chapters by coln Renfrew and Merln Donald. The papers then follow n roughly the order n whch they were gven at the conference, plus an addtonal paper by Robert Hnde. Snce the theme of the conference was nspred by Merln Donald’s work, and the term ‘external sym-

bolc storage’ s taken drectly from hs Origins of the Modern Mind, t seemed approprate to leave hm wth the inal word, in a closing chapter in which he reviews the concept n the lght of the conference dscusson. The concluson of the conference may gven n hs own words: that materal culture can ndeed create new cogntve opportuntes, changng how members of a socety thnk and represent realty, both ndvdually and collectvely. References Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Mellars, P. & K. Gbson (eds.), 1996. Modelling the Early Human Mind. (McDonald Insttute Monographs.) cambrdge: McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research.

Colin Renfrew & Chris Scarre McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research July 1998

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Mnd and Matter

Chapter 1 Mind and Matter: Cognitive Archaeology and external symbolic storage coln Renfrew While Orgns of the Human Mnd by Merlin Donald is recognized as the most coherent statement currently available on the development of human cognitive abilities, it is here criticized for laying insuficient emphasis upon the role of material culture in early human societies. In particular, a phase in cognitive development is proposed intermediate between that of linguistic or mythic culture, characteristic of Homo sapens, and the subsequent development of theoretic culture, usually utilizing writing, in urban societies. The missing phase or stage is one employing symbolic material culture, and is characteristic of early agrarian societies with permanent settlements, monuments and valuables. It is of particular relevance for prehistoric societies after the Palaeolithic period.

Merln Donald’s Origins of the Human Mind (1991)

most of us lve today is an artefact, albet a complex one. Merln Donald, who has other vald objectves, does not, I think, suficiently deal with this material realty of thngs. Indeed to llustrate what s lackng, t s approprate to set alongsde Origins of the Human Mind another interesting and inluential volume, edted by Arjun Appadura (1986), The Social Life of Things. For here we see the mportance of artefacts n the realm of human affars: ther role s symbolc as well as practcal. Wthout them socal lfe and ndeed ntellectual lfe could not have developed. So for me ths conference was, amongst other thngs, an opportunty to rectfy what I regard as an omsson n Donald’s perspectve, as well as to celebrate the overall valdty of hs approach. The focus of the present volume s delberately not the queston of the orgns of Homo sapiens sapiens and our accompanyng cogntve abltes: that has been the focus of a number of recent studes (notably Mellars & Gbson 1996; also Mthen 1996). Instead we are delberately focusng upon the more neglected ield of what happened in the ield of cognition after the momentous events whch led to the emergence of our own speces. I have myself a long-standng nterest n these matters: my Inaugural Lecture (Renfrew 1982) was

may be regarded as the most coherent statement whch we yet have concernng the development of human cogntve abltes, set n the broader framework of human evoluton, and takng adequate note of the nformaton to be ganed from the archaeologcal record. But Donald’s work s only a begnnng. And whle t offers numerous penetratng nsghts, for nstance nto the role of wrtng, and n partcular the role of alphabetc wrtng, t also (n my vew) has some blnd spots. In partcular, as I shall try to show, t may be regarded as mentalstc. That s perhaps not a strong reproach n a work devoted to the mnd. But there s mpled here a dchotomy between mnd and matter, whch s n part msleadng. I shall seek to show that much of the story of the development of human culture and cultures, and wth them of ‘mnd’ — for t s not altogether clear that the concept of ‘mnd’ does more than refer to speciic modes of behaviour (including thought) — s nseparable from human nteracton wth the materal world. In partcular much socal lfe, perhaps most socal lfe, s medated by human nteractons wth thngs. We lve n a world whch we have made: t s a world of artefacts, to the extent that t s almost true to say that the world n whch 1

coln Renfrew

enttled Towards an Archaeology of Mind, and set out to discuss some of the problems in this ield. For as I have argued elsewhere (Renfrew 1989; Renfrew & Bahn 1991, 431–4) t s possble to dscern a movement n recent archaeologcal thought towards what one may term cogntve-processual archaeology, whch aspres to deal wth some of these ssues n as scientiic and objective a manner as possible. This aspraton separates t somewhat from the ‘postprocessual’ or nterpretatve approach to the world of symbols and meanngs (e.g. Shanks & Hodder 1995), although n realty there s a far degree of overlap between the two ields. Bell (1994, 305), wrtng as a phlosopher of scence, has contrasted the empathetc method of the ‘post-processual’ or nterpretve approach wth the methodologcal ndvdualsm or ndvdualstc method whch he sees as characterstc of cogntve archaeology. I see cogntve archaeology as one of the most nterestng areas of archaeologcal research today (Renfrew et al. 1993; Renfrew & zubrow 1994).

Although Stonehenge s consdered n the treatment of early analogue models (Donald 1991, 338), sapent lfe and thought pror to the emergence of lteracy s only sketchly dealt wth:

the missing phase: symbolic material culture

Donald shows illuminatingly how it was the irst fully effectve phonetc system of wrtng utlzed by the Greeks whch allowed them to develop to the full ther theoretc atttude by externalzng the process of oral commentary: ‘They founded the process of externally encoded cogntve exchange and dscovery’ (Donald 1991, 343). For Donald, therefore, theoretc thought s to be assocated wth lteracy, and hence wth urban cvlzaton and state socety. In ts fully-developed demythologized and secularized form it is irst seen wth the Greeks n the seventh century Bc. But what of the long development of culture and socety n dfferent parts of the world between the hunter-gatherers of the Upper Palaeolthc on the one hand and the irst urban citizens of Sumer or of Mexco? The processes of development were slow and gradual, but many of the changes were profound. clearly many scholars today would not agree wth Donald’s vew of the rather rudmentary nature of the changes nvolved n the orgns of farmng. cauvn (1987) for nstance, has stressed the symbolc dmensons of the ncepton of farmng in Southwest Asia, and Hodder (1990) has explored cogntve aspects of early farmng n Europe. My central pont, however, s that wthout artefacts, materal goods, many forms of thought smply could not have developed. That s clearly true n the ield of religious belief, where the distinctions made between detes, for nstance, are n part dependent upon the possblty of representng them. But t s

The complex technologcal and socal developments that preceded wrtng mght suggest the exstence of some apparently analytc thought sklls that contaned germnal elements leadng to later theoretc development. However early nventons were pragmatc and generally not far removed from nature: for example, the domestcaton of anmals and plants would not have requred more than a recognton, transmtted over tme, that certan speces were desrable and domestcable for human use. complex constructonal products, such as brck structures and salng vessels, mght be seen as grand elaboratons on the ancent toolmakng sklls of humans. The social organisation of the irst towns and ctes presumably borrowed heavly from exstng famly and trbal structures. These pragmatc developments, mpressve as they were, lacked the essentially relective and representational nature of theory. (Donald 1991, 334–5)

In Origins of the Modern Mind, Donald (see also ths volume) sets out the followng very broad sequence of cogntve phases, separated by three major transtons: Epsodc culture, characterstc of prmate cognton (irst transition) Mmetc culture, characterstc of Homo erectus (second transton) Lngustc or mythc culture, characterstc of early Homo sapiens (thrd transton) Theoretc culture utlzng External Symbolc Storage Donald (1991, 275) notes that mythc culture extended to nclude all upper Palaeolthc, Mesolthc and Neolthc socetes. Whle notng the orgns of vsuographc nventon n the pctoral representaton of the Upper Palaeolthc cave pantngs hs attenton then shfts (Donald 1991, 285) drectly to early wrtng systems n Mesopotama, and the only systems of External Symbolc Storage to whch he gves careful consderaton are wrtng systems. 2

Mnd and Matter

true much more wdely than ths. One of the lessons n prehstorc archaeology over the past two decades has been the active role of material culture. For materal culture is not only relective of social relations and of cogntve categores: t s to a large extent consttutve of these also (Hodder 1986). Ths s clearly so n a purely descrptve sense: the concepts of house (with roof, walls, loor, windows) and furnture (chars, tables, carpets, lghts, cutlery) must clearly be consequent upon the pror exstence of such artefacts. But t s true also n an ascriptive sense, where values or qualtes are ascrbed. For just as the term ‘hot’ cannot have meanng wthout there beng objects whch may be so descrbed, so we cannot conceve of valuables wthout there beng objects or commodtes to whch value s ascrbed. John Searle n hs The Construction of Social Reality (1995, 119) has stressed that what he terms ‘nsttutonal facts’ (facts whch can exst only wthn human nsttutons) only exst by human agreement, and that in many cases they require oficial representatons, or n hs termnology ‘status ndcators’ because ‘the exstence of nsttutonal facts cannot n general be read off from the brute physcal facts of the stuaton’. Perhaps because he s a phlosopher, he thnks n terms of words, whether spoken or wrtten, as the usual form for such ndcators. But n realty many ndcators take the form of vsual symbols, that s to say artefacts. And some of the most mportant nsttutonal facts are emboded n artefacts and could not exst wthout them. As Searle (1995, 37) puts t: ‘Only bengs that have a language or some more or less language-lke system of representaton can create most, perhaps all nsttutonal facts, because the linguistic element appears to be partly constitutive of the fact.’ Whle ths s ndeed vald, we can go on to remark that n some cases the material element, and speciically the artefact, s also consttutve of the fact. Two examples wll llustrate ths ntegral relatonshp between concept, lngustc term and artefact. The irst is the whole ield of measurement, whch we may dscuss wth weght, by way of example. The term ‘weght’ s meanngless unless one has objects possessed of mass, and the noton of standardzaton arses naturally f one has a number of dentcal objects. In order to measure weght t s necessary to have some balancng devce and a reference object whch can serve as the unt of measure. In all of ths t s clear that the possblty of weghng has to arse from experence wth the artefacts of the real world (Renfrew 1982).

The second example relates to value. The noton of a valuable substance or commodty must surely be secondary to the pror exstence of objects or materials which are attractive or signiicant, so that ‘value’ can ndeed be ascrbed to them by consensus. value may, of course, be ascrbed rather arbtrarly to materals, but wthout the specal materals the concept tself would have lttle meanng (Renfrew 1986). There was a long perod n the long-term development of most socetes when such concepts as these could develop. In general, the rather sophstcated actvtes for whch wrtng was presumably devsed do themselves depend upon the exstence of a seres of concepts such as these: they are ndeed cogntve concepts. But n many cases they are not only mental or cogntve constructs: they are based upon nteracton wth the real world, and n general upon nteracton wth symbolc artefacts whch operate wthn the prevalng socal world. They are ndeed dependent upon language, for t s through language that ther ascrbed meanngs are agreed, made known and passed on. But these symbols have physcal exstence, and wthout ths exstence they could have no meanng, ndeed there would be no meanng. Ths leads me to suggest that there s n Donald’s evolutonary sequence a mssng phase, where the role of artefacts as symbols is increasingly signiicant. It arses from the Mythc or Lngustc culture of early Homo sapiens, and s absorbed nto and forms the foundaton for the Theoretc culture of the lterate ctzen. It s the phase of symbolc artefacts or materal symbols, of Symbolc Materal culture. the phase of symbolic material culture It s worth gong so far as to make ths suggeston more concrete by modfyng Donald’s basc sequence n order to nclude t. The sequence of transtons has now four rather than three major epsodes of change. The irst two transitions are still genetically based: the shft from early homnds to Homo erectus, and the shft from erectus to sapiens. But Donald telescopes events n squeezng subsequent hstory nto a sngle transton. To do so ultmately rsks favourng unduly the development of wrtng systems, undoubtedly one of the crucal mechansms of External Symbolc Storage, but hardly the earlest. External Symbolc Storage s one role, t has been suggested, of Palaeolthc cave art, used n effect as a teachng ad (Pfeffer 1982). Marshack (1972) makes a clam for what s n effect the storage of chronologcal nformaton n what he sees as the tme-structured 3

coln Renfrew

engravngs on bone of the Franco-cantabran Upper Palaeolthc. But t s not untl the ncepton of farmng that we see the wdespread development of permanent vllage settlements, and often the rse of consstent bural practces for the dsposal of the dead. The household and ts contents — as well as the tomb — offer a new range of opportuntes for materal culture to operate symbolcally.

smply be taken as surrogate representatves of our hunter-gatherer ancestors. The fourth transton, to theoretc culture, s generally assocated wth the development of wrtng, and reached some sort of a clmax wth the development of the alphabet and ts use by the classcal Greeks. In a general sense t s pertnent to ask whether ths s n general correlated wth the development of urbansm. It does not follow from such a generalzaton that one cannot have theoretc culture wthout ctes, nor that theoretc culture s a feature of all urban socetes. But t may not be napproprate to suggest some relatonshp or correlaton between what s here descrbes as the fourth transton and what Gordon chlde (1936) descrbed as the ‘urban revoluton’.

Revised system of cognitive phases Epsodc culture, characterstc of prmate cognton (irst transition) Mmetc culture, characterstc of Homo erectus (second transton)

the past/present paradox

Lngustc or mythc culture, characterstc of early Homo sapiens

As an asde, t s worth pontng out that there s somethng decdedly unsettlng about Donald’s evolutionary sequence, which at irst sight one imagines as a temporal sequence. But what of modern or recent non-lterate socetes? Are they not members, lke our lterate selves, of the most recent phase of Theoretc culture? Are modern hunter-gatherers stll n a phase of Mythc culture, and tradtonal non-urban farmng socetes n one of Symbolc Materal culture? As noted above, Donald (1991, 275) apples the term mythc culture to all upper Palaeolthc, Mesolthc and Neolthc socetes: but t s not clear how he could apply a temporal restrcton n order to avod applyng the term to all hunter-gatherer socetes or to all solated, egaltaran farmng socetes, ncludng those of the modern or recent world, n what we sometmes convenently thnk of as the ethnographc present. Ths would mply that the dstnctons n queston are not n realty chronologcal ones, but are dependent upon matters of cultural context. Does ths of necessty mply a re-awakenng of nterest n ‘la pensée sauvage’? It s self-evdent that one seeks to avod a return to gross generalzatons about ‘prmtve thought’ whch were so current a century ago, but unless clear and more subtle dstnctons are drawn there s an evdent rsk. As noted above, however, t s modern archaeologsts and ethnographers who perhaps too readly equate modern hunter-gather socetes wth those of our Upper Palaeolthc predecessors. Modern huntergatherer socetes are the product of forty centures of sapent evoluton, just as much as urban ones. They should not be regarded as lvng representatves of the Palaeolthc past.

(thrd transton) External Symbolc Storage employng symbolc materal culture, characterstc of early agraran socetes wth permanent settlements, monuments and valuables (fourth transton) Theoretc culture usng sophstcated nformaton retreval systems for External Symbolc Storage, usually n the form of wrtng, frequently n urban socetes. These phases are not of course smply sequental. We stll learn to rde a bcycle, or drve a car, or type as much by mmess, and by frequent repetton establshng motor sequences, as we do by reason or theory or other language-asssted modes of nstructon. Our own culture remans to a large extent ‘lngustc, or mythc’. Even so t may be a vald approxmaton to suggest that the thrd transton here may often be equated wth the transton to food producton, and thus the so-called ‘Neolthc revoluton’ of the Old World. It s at ths tme that so many symbolc categores of artefact are created and come nto ther own, whch are not preserved among Upper Palaeolthc hunter-gatherers. To say ths s not necessarly to mply that they are not n use among hunter-gatherer socetes today. It s too often assumed that modern hunter-gatherers may 4

Mnd and Matter

The same queston can be posed at a more ndvdual level. What of the non-lterate ndvdual wthn a modern urban culture, where the majorty of ctzens are lterate? Is ths person n some Mythc Phase, lackng the practce of theoretc thought? To pose the queston nvtes the response that more ‘prmtve’ modes of thought are stll wth us. Perhaps that s the rght answer, and Donald n hs book does ndeed explore the consequences of dfferent knds of educatonal experences, n partcular n the Mddle Ages. But there are some complex ssues to dsentangle here. Ths brngs us close to the ‘sapent paradox’ (Renfrew 1996), whereby we realze that, f bologcally modern humanknd made ts appearance n Europe nearly 40,000 years ago, possessing the same nnate genetc abltes as ourselves, then t s the ntervenng centures of learned behavour, and only that, whch separates them from us.

monuments whch characterze the Neolthc perod of Brtan. It should be borne n mnd, n the present context, that monuments are bult for remembrance. They are often memorals. It s the role of a memoral to serve the memory, often the collectve memory. Even n the modern lterate age, most memorals do ths most effectvely wthout relyng very heavly upon the wrtten word. Sometmes ndeed they are the means by whch memores are preserved whch would otherwse be lost. All of ths s very relevant to our central theme of ‘external symbolc storage’. It s true of course that a prehstorc monument cannot now tell ts story, wth chapter and verse of the orgnal myth or narratve or hstory, qute as effectvely as can an Egyptan or Assyran or Httte monumental nscrpton where the deeds of the ‘Great Kng’ are set out n cuneform or n heroglyphs. But t s probably true to say that even at the tme these hstorc monuments were erected there would have been few who could read the baleful sgns nscrbed upon them (and almost certanly not the great kngs themselves). And of course ther explct detaled message was completely lost along wth the understandng of the scrpts whch were used untl the great decpherments of the past two centures. So t would be a mstake to exaggerate the signiicance of the written component of the ‘external symbolc storage’. The story whch went wth these monuments would have been well known to ther contemporaries, just as the signiicance of Silbury Hll or the Dorset cursus n Wessex was n ther day. And even f the detals were not recalled, the general mport (.e. celebraton of the mghty vctores of the great kng) would have been obvous to all lvng wthn the culture n queston. But the language of the symbolc artefacts changes. Wth the passng of the Late Neolthc, fewer monuments were constructed. Specal artefacts, often of the new synthetc materal bronze, came nto promnence. Many of these are famlar from burals, especally from the early Bronze Age. But later, many objects of value were delberately offered up, sometmes n bogs or rvers. Ths practce, whch at irst sight today is dificult to understand, has been analyzed by Richard Bradley (1990) in The Passage of Arms, and agan we see that artefacts were beng used to fulil a very special function which could not have been acheved wthout them. In Brtan t s clear that there was a gradual development of what Searle would term ‘nsttutonal facts’ n the socetes of the day, alongsde what may have been the ‘brute facts’ of materal

symbolic material culture as external symbolic storage: the example of prehistoric Britain The Brtsh case s a good one to choose for the present purpose, precsely because we may rely upon what one mght term the ‘new Brtsh prehstory’ for qute a rch dscusson. What s needed, of course, s a separate and close examnaton of a number of ndependent trajectores of change: Southwest Asa, perhaps, and Mesoamerca, and chna. In each case one would wsh to see what may be sad about the orgns of the modern mnd n relaton to the archaeologcal record there. To what extent may one descrbe the culture of Mng chna as ‘theoretc’ n Donald’s sense? Or that of the Aztecs of Mexco and the Incas of Peru? No doubt few world cvlzatons would reach the degree of theoretc cerebraton dsplayed by the Greeks. But would not the chnese or the Maya rank wth the Sumerans? These are questons whch have to be asked, and some of the answers are no doubt already there for the attentve reader of The Cloud People (Flannery & Marcus 1983) or Science and Civilization in China (Needham 1954 ) The dscusson surroundng the Neolthc and Bronze Age perods of Brtsh prehstory has been partcularly rch n recent years, wth scholars such as Rchard Bradley, Julan Thomas, Nck Thorpe, John Barrett, coln Rchards and Davd clarke examnng closely the varous nterpretatons whch have been offered, whle the same may be sad of J.D. Hll and other authors for the Brtsh Iron Age. These authors, usng a varety of approaches, have wrestled wth the meanngs whch may be ascrbed to the major 5

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Flannery K.v. & J. Marcus (eds.), 1983. The Cloud People: Divergent Evolution of the Zapotec and Mixtec Civilizations. New york (Ny): Academc Press. Frankfort H., H.A. Frankfort, J.A. Wlson & T. Jacobsen, 1949. Before Philosophy: the Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man. Harmondsworth: Pengun Books. Hodder, I., 1986. Reading the Past. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Hodder, I., 1990. The Domestication of Europe. Oxford: Blackwell. Marshack, A., 1972. The Roots of Civilisation: the Cognitive Beginnings of Man’s First Art, Symbol and Notation. New york (Ny): McGraw-Hll. Mellars, P.A. & K. Gbson (eds.), 1996. Modelling the Early Human Mind. (McDonald Insttute Monographs.) cambrdge: McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research. Mthen, S., 1996. The Prehistory of the Mind. London: Thames & Hudson. Needham, J., 1954. Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 1. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Pfeffer, J., 1982. The Creative Explosion: an Inquiry into the Origins of Art and Religion. New york (Ny): Harper & Row. Renfrew, c., 1982. Towards an Archaeology of Mind. (Inaugural Lecture.) cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Renfrew, c., 1986. varna and the emergence of wealth n prehstorc Europe, n Appadura (ed.), 141–68. Renfrew, c., 1987. Problems n the modellng of soco-cultural systems. European Journal of Operational Research 30, 179–92. Renfrew, c., 1989. comments on ‘Archaeology nto the 1990s’. Norwegian Archaeological Review 22, 33–41. Renfrew, c., 1996. The sapent behavour paradox: how to test for potental?, n Mellars & Gbson (eds.), 11–14. Renfrew, c. & P. Bahn, 1991. Archaeology: Theories, Methods and Practice. 2nd edton. London: Thames & Hudson. Renfrew, c. & E.B.W. zubrow (eds.), 1994. The Ancient Mind: Elements of Cognitive Archaeology. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Renfrew, c., c.S. Peebles, I. Hodder, B. Bender, K.v. Flannery & J. Marcus, 1993. vewpont: What s cogntve archaeology? Cambridge Archaeological Journal 3(2), 247–70. Searle, J.R., 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. Harmondsworth: Allen Lane. Shanks, M. & I. Hodder, 1995. Processual, postprocessual and nterpretve archaeologes, n Interpreting Archaeology: Finding Meaning in the Past, eds. I. Hodder, M. Shanks, A. Alexandr, v. Buchl, J. carman, J. Last & G. Lucas. London: Routledge, 3–29. zvelebl, M. (ed.), 1986. Hunters in Transition: Mesolithic Societies of Temperate Eurasia and Their Transition to Farming. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press.

exstence. But whle some mght be nclned to relegate subsstence mode, for nstance, and settlement pattern to the realm of ‘brute facts’ (.e. those whch exst qute ndependently of language or any other nsttuton), t s now clear that the transton from hunter-gatherng to farmng n northwestern Europe was not an automatc one, brought about at once when the relevant domestcates became avalable. Subsstence mode was n large measure a matter of choce (zvelebl 1986) and strongly condtoned by the nature of socety and the socal organzaton. In human affars, brute facts rarely have absolute prmacy over nsttutonal facts. What s beleved and what s agreed, that s to say the perceved realty, s as powerful as what one mght today judge to be the real, physcal realty. Brtsh prehstory, most would now agree, s as much the story of developng concepts and belefs as t s of developng technologes and subsstence practces and of demography. These concepts and belefs were medated by and often emboded n the structures and artefacts of the day — that s what s meant by the actve role of materal culture. These artefacts are part of the story. It cannot be understood wthout symbolc materal culture. It may be, however, that n the broader context of study whch Donald has set up that we shall come to understand that symbolc materal culture rather better. Colin Renfrew McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research Downing Street Cambridge CB2 3ER References Appadura, A. (ed.), 1986. The Social Life of Things. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Bell, J.A., 1994. Reconstructing Prehistory: Scientiic Method in Archaeology. Phladelpha (PA): Temple Unversty Press. Bradley, R., 1990. The Passage of Arms. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. cauvn, J., 1987. L’apparton des premeres dvntes. La Recherche 194, 1472–80. chlde, v.G., 1936. Man Makes Himself. London: Watts. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Human Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press.

6

Homnd Enculturaton and cogntve Evoluton

Chapter 2 Hominid enculturation and Cognitive evolution Merln Donald

Hominid cultural stages may be classiied by applying strict cognitive criteria to existing chronological data. When several of these factors converge during a given time period, we have reason to propose a major cognitive-cultural ‘transition’ during that period. There are four proposed stages: ‘episodic’, ‘mimetic’, ‘mythic’ and ‘theoretic’. Each hominid transition introduced a new level of cognitive governance, and consolidated a permanent, semi-autonomous layer of hominid culture. Previous cognitive structures were always retained at each transition, and it is this which has yielded the rich, multi-layered cognitive-cultural structure of the modern mind. Human culture has become a major player in shaping cognition through its enormous epigenetic inluence, which gives it the power to exploit latent cognitive potential. Hominids have capitalized upon this evolutionary opportunity to an extraordinary degree with the invention of external symbolic technologies, which, along with all of material culture, now have a determining inluence on human cognition.

What s a truly ‘modern’ mnd? One mght argue

cogntve effects of enculturaton. There s a close relatonshp between cogntve skll, especally what mght be called latent ndvdual capacty, and the process of enculturaton. Indvduals do not leap nto modernty on ther own, but rather must make the transton through a process of ntense cultural embeddng. That embeddng process, especally f it occurs in early childhood and is suficiently allencompassng, mght lead to the successful enculturaton of the ndvdual nto a socety very dfferent from the one nto whch that person was born. But ths process nvolves much more than ‘programmng’ an ndvdual bran wth arbtrary cultural content. Members of a gven culture become part of a collectivity, deined not only by speciic languages and wrtng systems, but also by specalzed representatonal strateges and thought sklls. Ths consttutes the core of what s commonly known as ‘hgher’ cognton. The power of enculturaton to release latent capacty n ths realm s sometmes astonshng. The radcal effects of enculturaton are perhaps best demonstrated n prmates because the results

that humans haven’t changed very much snce the Old Stone Age. The cultural remnants of the Magdalenan perod, or even the Aurgnacan, feel fully modern n the sense that there s a cleverness there, a tendency toward nnovaton and symbolsm, that we nstantly recognze as smlar to our own. Strp away our accumulated technology and nsttutonal structure, and there but for the grace of hstorcal accdent, as we mght say, go ourselves. A corollary of ths belef s that wthn the past 40,000 years there has not been any signiicant evolution of human cognton. The strongest form of ths dea s that our modern cultural exploson has been drven by a mind that hasn’t changed signiicantly since our specaton. Perhaps the most compellng evdence of ths s the fact that many ndvduals have moved from the New Stone Age to post-industrial society in a sngle generaton. However, although the latter demonstraton s farly easy to make, t can lead to smplstc conclusions about the so-called constancy of human cognton, because t overlooks the potentally radcal 7

Merln Donald

are so clear and unconfounded by subjectve human cultural bases. consder the chmpanzees: n the wld these anmals do not show any lngustc capacty, and have very lmted use of tools. When irst raised in human households they were not able to acqure gestural capacty or other essental human cogntve sklls such as the sharng of attenton. yet raised in an artiicial culture designed by SavageRumbaugh and her colleagues (1993), pygmy chmpanzees have shown capactes that were formerly thought to be completely out of the reach of ther speces. They can learn to make Oldowan stone tools, and to modfy them and use them purposefully. They can understand sentences of naturally-spoken Englsh, ncludng reversble sentences n whch some grammatcal competence s necessary to grasp the meanng. They can acqure a large lexcon of vsual symbols — several hundred n some cases — and use them approprately. They can also use vsual symbols to communicate with other symbolically-competent chmpanzees to coordnate ther collectve actvty n solvng varous problems and challenges; n ths they are more effectve at socal coordnaton than their wild-reared conspeciics. In sum, after undergong ths radcal process of enculturaton pygmy chmpanzees do not act, thnk, or communcate lke the same speces. They do thngs they could never acheve n the wld, obvously wthout changes to ther genome. Ths rases an nterestng possblty: humans may also have fundamental characterstcs of mnd that would not be evident outside a very speciic cultural context. Savage-Rumbaugh’s chimps may be regarded as ‘overachevers’ n the sense that they dd not create the culture that revealed ther latent capactes. But then agan, nether dd most humans create the cultural envronments that mould ther cogntve destnes. Perhaps most ndvdual human bengs are also cogntve overachevers carred along by varous cleverly contrved cultural envronments (we wll worry about who dd the contrvng later). Hstorcally, certan strategc knds of cultural nnovaton might have released signiicant, and previously unseen, cogntve capactes. Ths s not to mnmze the role of genetc change n homnd cogntve evoluton; for radcal enculturaton to work, the potental to copy strategc elements of the target culture must be there, n the genes. Once agan, the prmate example s perhaps clearest: pygmy chmpanzees have the capacty to absorb certan elements of human culture, but they evdently have serous lmtatons as a speces that prevent them from beng able to copy all the crtcal

components of human culture, let alone nvent them. The speces has a zone of potental for cogntve growth, but t has to reman wthn that lmted zone. Early homnds descended from an ancestor that closely resembled the pygmy chmpanzee, and presumably shared most of ts ntellectual lmtatons, but they must have undergone major genetc change before they acqured the capacty not only to copy, but also to nvent essental elements of modern human culture. Both enculturaton and genetc change can be said to have shared a continuum of inluence on the evoluton of homnd cognton, the two factors nteractng n evoluton. Seen n ths way, human cogntve evoluton has never really stopped; but ts centre of gravty has shfted gradually from the genome to a cumulatve process of enculturaton. The precse tme course of homnd cogntve evoluton may never be known, but the perod durng whch the evolutonary momentum appears to have swtched most strongly toward culturally-driven cognitive change seems to be the Upper Palaeolithic. It may be dificult to establish whether the exploson of cave pantngs, amulets, sculptures, engravngs and notatonal artefacts that marked the Upper Palaeolithic was sustained throughout the entre perod, or perodcally dsappeared and reappeared, but there s lttle doubt that, over the long run, the process of representatonal nventon accelerated n that era. As the process became somewhat more secure, and as human populaton densty ncreased, t accelerated at an ever faster rate. There are, however, many unanswered cogntve questons about ths crtcal tme: How was spoken language evolvng? Was ts evoluton closely ted to other forms of symbolc nventon? What were people thinking about, and what types of thoughtprocesses domnated? Were ther prevalent belef systems essentally smlar to those of New Stone Age peoples, or were they dfferent n mportant ways? Human knowledge durng ths perod was presumably accumulatng, but how fast, and n what areas? Dd the transton from huntng and gatherng to agrculture, and from the latter to urban socety, impose suficiently traumatic selection pressures that further bologcal evoluton contnued to play a major role on the cogntve level, as we know t dd n the case of the mmune and dgestve systems? Or dd the nteracton between enculturaton and cognton eventually become ndependent of bologcal evoluton? The great value of archaeologcal reconstructon to cogntve scence s that t forces us to ask these questons. Any theory of human cogntve structure 8

Homnd Enculturaton and cogntve Evoluton

and functon has evolutonary mplcatons, whether or not they are made explct. It s mportant to make such assumptons explct; testng varous scenaros conceptually mght help us choose between varous theoretcally possble orders and herarches of emergence, and thus throw light on modern neuropsychologcal structure. conversely, we mght actually come up wth better hypotheses about cogntve evoluton tself. But ths won’t happen unless theores of orgn try to reconstruct underlyng cogntve change as well as what was happenng on the cultural surface.

nstance, a patent may lose the power of speech, whle retanng vsual recognton, or vice versa. Ths mples that the bran modules performng vsual functons are autonomous from those performng speech. There are a large number of smlar dssocatons n the clncal lterature. Mental modules seem to have emerged n a certan evolutonary order, and have a drect lnk to the emergence of specalzed bran structures. Ths dea was foreseen n MacLean’s (1973) evolutonary model of the human bran, whch postulated Reptlan, Palaeomammalan, and Neomammalan components. The Reptlan bran was conceved of as a cluster of component modules in the upper brainstem, mdbran and basal gangla. These regons are concerned mostly with basic drives, relexes, and reactions that irst appeared far back in evolutionary tme, wth the emergence of reptles. The blueprnt of the Reptlan bran has survved n all hgher vertebrates, and ts survval n humans s a vestge of our descent from reptles. MacLean’s second cluster, the Palaeomammalan bran, ncludes those areas of the lmbc system and cortex that support the most ancent mammalan nstncts and emotonal reactons; the blueprnt of these complex structures also survves n the human bran. Hs thrd cluster, the Neomammalan bran, was supermposed on the pre-existing Reptilian and Palaeomammalian acquisitons, and conssted mostly of the neocortex, whch became especally large n humans. Maclean made no effort to specify the subcomponents of our speciically ‘human’ ntellgence, or the stages that led to ts evoluton. Some recent theores, however, have tred to specfy how the unquely human features of bran and cognton evolved from the Mocene apes (Bckerton 1990; Bradshaw & Rogers 1993; calvn 1993; corballs 1991; Donald 1991; Dennett 1991; Gibson & Ingold 1993; Greenield 1991; Lieberman 1991; Pnker & Bloom 1990; Pnker 1994). Although many mental functons may be modular, conscousness tself does not appear to be modular, and appears to nvolve ntegraton across many subsystems. For ths reason, perhaps, the place of conscousness n any evolutonary scenaro s specal. Most of the basc operatons of the mnd and bran operate outsde of conscousness. In fact, the deining characteristics of cognitive modules — specalzed desgn, solaton from rrelevant nformaton, mandatory operaton — are the opposte of those that mark conscous thought, whch tends to be general-purpose, open to many kinds of informaton, and voluntary n operaton. In contrast, the operatons of bran modules are usually naccessble

Modularity and the notion of emergent cognitive architecture Archaeologcal researchers have developed varous theores of cogntve evoluton to help nterpret ther reconstructons of the homnd past. Ther efforts are enormously stmulatng to read, yet ths knd of cogntve theorzng has often stood n splendd solaton from modern cogntve research, and when t has tred to become connected to the cogntve manstream, t has tended to prefer very old deas. To take a few examples, n no partcular order, there are Wynn’s (1989) use of Pagetan notons about operatonal ntellgence and formal geometry to nterpret the cogntve mplcatons of stone tools; Davdson & Noble’s (1989) rather unque proposals, based loosely on the theores of vygotsky and Ryle, about the lnkage between depcton and language; and Whte’s (1989a,b) theores on the cultural meanng of the earlest human body ornamentaton, and the mpled cogntve shft that took place as human culture moved beyond bare subsstence. The theoretcal synthess recently proposed by Gamble (1994) also contans a number of deas that bear drectly on the orgn and specal nature of human cognton, but these are not drawn from modern cogntve scence or evolutonary psychology. In farness, ths may be due to a dfference n focus. Archaeology is time-oriented, and precise chronology s mportant, ndeed central to the dscplne. But evolutonary psychology has tradtonally been less concerned wth precse chronology than wth emergent structure. Mnd, despte ts apparent formlessness, has structure, just the way an organsm or a corporaton has structure. One term commonly used to descrbe ths structural arrangement s ‘modularty’; the mnd appears to be composed of many semi-autonomous modules or organs, each performng ts own specal functon. Bran modules can be damaged ndependently of one another: for 9

Merln Donald

their powers of large-scale integration and thus ncreased the capacty of ther central processor has some support from both gross neuroanatomy and artiicial intelligence research. First, there is important negatve evdence from neuroanatomy: the most obvous dstncton of homnd brans s ther relatve sze, rather than ther anatomcal structure; the rapd ncrease n homnd encephalzaton produced no dramatcally new structures n the human nervous system, and Passngham (1982) has stated that the modern human bran has exactly the proportons and structure that mght be predcted of a very large prmate bran by extrapolatng earler prmate expansons. Second, computers can be made to perform qualtatvely new cogntve operatons wth a merely quanttatve ncrease n capacty; thus a larger bran mght be expected to acqure novel operatonal capactes as t crossed a threshold of crtcal mass. Fnally, archaeologcal evdence of cultural progress generally follows evdence of bran expanson wth a consderable delay, rather than appearng at exactly the same tme. For example, Acheulan tools appeared several hundred thousand years after the expanson of the homnd bran n early Homo erectus. This suggests that there was a general-purpose brain expanson early n the hstory of ths speces, drven by something other than tool-making, that produced delayed effects on tool-making through gradual enculturaton, rather than through the acton of a specalzed homnd bran adaptaton for mproved tool-making. Hence even major new capacities, like speech, mght have emerged from a quanttatve expanson of exstng prmate ntegratve capactes, allowing for a suficiently long delay to allow a degree of cultural experimentation. Savage-Rumbaugh and her colleagues (1993), who have had such success in demonstrating the symbol-using capacities of enculturated pygmy chmpanzees, have recently expressed some support for ths possblty. The contrary vew s also credble: cogntve evoluton must have occurred at least partly at the modular level. Human cognton has some unque features that seem to demand such an explanaton. The prme example s language; as chomsky (1993) ponted out, human language has specal features that requre a specalzed bran module, and some recent evolutionary proposals have relected that vew (Bckerton 1990; Pnker 1994). In these proposals language must resde n a set of novel, unquely human bran capactes that are specalzed for generatng language. Although ths dea s stll controversal, at least one aspect of language s bound to have a modular explanaton: human vocal skll

to conscous ntrospecton (Fodor 1983). A good example of ther solaton from conscousness may be llustrated wth the example of human speech: speakers blthely produce sentences at output rates that are near the physologcal lmts of the system wthout any awareness of where the words or sentences are coming from. In a sense, speakers ind out what they have sad when everyone else does; just pror to speakng a word or sentence n a normal conversatonal context, there s no awareness of precsely what s about to be sad. Ths prncple of naccessblty apples equally to a varety of other mental operatons. Gven the exstence of many solated and essentally unconscous subsystems the unty of conscousness poses a major theoretcal puzzle, and t s not known how the products of dozens of semi-autonomous modules are integrated into one seamless stream of conscousness. One popular theory s that conscousness occurs somewhere else, outsde the modular herarchy. That hypothetcal place n the mnd, the locus of conscousness, has been called the ‘central processor’, where modular outputs supposedly come together n awareness. In ths common conceptualzaton of the mnd, the central processor can range freely over the specalzed outputs delvered by modules — sounds, objects, sghts, feelngs, places, words — comparng and unfyng these varous elements nto a sngle stream of personal experence. Thus the central processor s at the apogee of mental operatons, and the more rigidly-constrained ‘modules’ of the mind seem to be arranged n complex nested herarches that feed ther outputs nto the central processor. An analogy might be made to the role of the CEO’s ofice n a corporaton: t receves nputs from all sorts of lower-level organizational structures. Like the CEO’s ofice, the putative central processor must know as much as possble, and be relatvely unbounded; that is, remain open to a wide variety of inluences, rather than being narrowly dedicated to a speciic task. Its prmary functon s related to what some call ‘large-scale neural integration’ or the synthesis of knowledge across many dfferent neural subsystems. Ths prncple apples to many dfferent mammalan speces, snce all mammals share bascally smlar nervous systems. However, this speciic modular arrangement — the archtecture of mnd — appears to be qute unque n the human speces. In ths theoretcal context, homnd cogntve evoluton mght have nvolved a gradual expanson of the powers of the prmate central processor, or the evoluton of new specalzed modules, or both. The dea that humans mght have smply expanded 10

Homnd Enculturaton and cogntve Evoluton

consttutes a dramatc break wth our prmate hertage and seems to depend on several neural modules that are speciic to speech capacity (Lieberman 1984; 1991). Some other aspects of human hgher functon appear to demand specalzed adaptatons: left-hemisphere thinking skills, including aspects of sequental motor control, have propertes that seem to nvolve new computatonal prncples (corballs 1991; Greenield 1991) and thus imply new evolutionary modules. On the other hand, such an approach leaves the evolutonary theorst wth a dlemma; how do we establsh contnuty n what appears to be a dscontnuous adaptaton? There have been varous attempts to solve ths problem, by scaffoldng language on top of varous other, more fundamental alteratons n the apparatus of mnd. But the queston of conscous ntegraton remans unsolved, along wth the even more perplexng queston of the nature of the underlyng semantc system that supports, drves, and ultmately nvents languages. The machnery of language evdently gans free access to a varety of other cogntve subsystems; and ths feature suggests that, to some degree, language is also non-modular n desgn. Ths mples that eventually the problem of human cogntve evoluton must be addressed at the level of central processng capactes, whether or not the soluton takes a tradtonal or a radcally dfferent form. In the irst section of this paper I proposed the dea that both enculturaton and genetc change contrbuted to the cogntve capactes that are manfest n modern humans. In the second secton I introduced the notion of modularity and neuropsychologcal structure. By combnng these deas t becomes clear that the structural changes that characterze homnd cogntve evoluton must have been ntrcately nvolved wth homnd culture throughout the evolutonary process.

of envronmental renforcement, not of ntentonal representatons.) Knowledge acqured durng the lfetmes of ndvduals remans locked nsde each bran, ted to the experence of one ndvdual, and there s no way that ths knowledge can become publc, or serve as the bass for gradually buldng a shared representatonal culture. In humans there s a collectve component to cognton that cannot be contaned entrely wthn the ndvdual bran. It s the accumulated product of individually-acquired knowledge that has initially been expressed n a form comprehensble to other members of a socety, tested n the publc doman, iltered, and transmitted across generations. The gradual process of embeddng separate mnds n an evolvng culture, so that ndvduals ncreasngly fall under the sway of that culture, mght be called ‘emergent enculturaton’. Ths process s the reverse face of the evoluton of representatonal skll at the speces level. The byproduct of such a development s the publc representatonal doman; that s, a realm of expresson where knowledge and custom can be created through the nteracton of ndvdual mnds, and thenceforth shared by all members of the culture. The story of human cogntve evoluton revolves around ths radcal shft from the ‘solated mnds’ of other mammals, towards the ‘collectve’ mind that typiies humans living in symbol-using cultures. collectvty depends ultmately on ndvdual capacty; but ths s a recprocal relatonshp; enculturaton has become more and more mportant n settng the parameters of human capacty at the ndvdual level. Gallopng homnd enculturaton undoubtedly nteracted wth bran evoluton; t s self-evident that the ability of individuals to cope with a rapidly-evolving representational culture would have had mmedate, and at tmes drastc, itness implications. Thus the hominid brain and cognton evolved n symboss wth an emergng process of enculturaton. This symbiosis, speciic to humans, might be envsaged as a seres of changes progressng n parallel at two levels: ndvdual and cultural:

A conceptual basis for the cognitive classiication of hominid culture Cognition and culture are in many ways mirrormages, especally n the human case. cognton s traditionally identiied at the level of single indivduals — ths mght be termed the assumpton of the ‘solated mnd’ — and n other speces ths assumption seems largely justiied, since non-human speces do not have a capacty for ntentonal representaton, and are thus unable to transmt acqured knowledge across generatons. (They may transmt patterns of condtonng, but ths s merely a functon

c1 I1

c2 I2

c3 I3

c4 I4

(c = Successve cultural envronments) (I = Indvdual representatons) The culture establshes the envronment wthn whch ontogeness wll take place; and the developng 11

Merln Donald

ndvdual also contrbutes to the cultural envronment. The representatonal envronment changes to a degree durng a person’s lfetme and dramatcally across generatons. The level of ntellectual capacty vsble n behavour s thus a product of both factors, enculturaton and capacty. Nothng qute lke ths process takes place n other speces. There may be common patterns of learnng n other speces (even molluscs have ‘customs’ n ths sense) and there are parent–chld nteractons n most complex anmals, but these can be accounted for n terms of basc condtonng and learnng theory, and should not be confused wth the shared representatonal cultures of humans. Other speces start at bascally the same level wth each new generaton; not so humans. Semantc content and even the cultural algorthms that support certan knds of thnkng can accumulate, and the symbolc envronment can affect the way ndvdual brans deploy ther resources. Ths process of enculturaton must have started very slowly, presumably wth very gradual ncrements to a prmate knowledge-base, but has evidently accelerated in an exponental manner n the modern perod. The more rapd the change at the level of culture, the more crucal s the ndvdual’s capacty to ‘copy’ the current state of the representatonal culture, and also to contrbute to ts enrchment. Snce homnd enculturaton s a specal process that feeds back nto the capactes of ndvdual mnds, I have chosen to classfy homnd cogntve change n terms of the propertes of the representational culture. Hominid cultures are classiiable not only n terms of ther underlyng cogntve support systems, but also n terms of ther governng styles of representaton. Many dmensons have been used to develop systems for classfyng homnd cultures including diet, territory, tool-making, technology, food, knshp systems and shelter. These types of classiication typically do not address cognition directly, although they mght sngle out aspects of behavour that are directly inluenced by cognition. The cogntve dmenson s surely one of the most fundamental n settng the parameters of a culture; in fact, most other classiications of culture mplctly assume certan levels of cogntve development n the members of the culture. The cultural surface may be marked smultaneously by varous changes, lke the presence of better tools, dfferent dwellngs, complex socal organzaton, elaborate decoraton, and the presence of symbols; but the representatonal engne generatng the changes observable at the cultural surface les deeper, n the

cogntve system, as t s deployed both n the brans of ndvduals and n the representatonal systems shared by the collectvty. It s not mmedately obvous what cogntve dmensons are most mportant. Language appears to be the most salent dmenson; the emergence of language mght have encompassed all major cogntve evoluton n homnds. But one mght also sngle out, n the Behavourst/connectionist tradition, a generally-improved ‘learning’ capacty, or capacty for formng new assocatons (see Jerson 1973). Thus homnd cultures could also be classiied on the basis of their ‘associative’ or ‘lingustc’ capacty. Fetzer (1993) has suggested a thrd approach, based on Pierce’s classiication of symbolsystems, that lists ive levels of symbolizing capacity nto whch all cultures mght be placed. There are several other possble semotc and cogntve systems of classiication, but none seems to do justice to the collectve dmenson of cognton, or deal adequately wth the apparent qualtatve changes that marked the successon of homnd cultures, as they progressed from one stage to the next. In order to develop a useful cogntve classiication of culture we must keep four factors in mind. The irst might be called an individual factor: culture relects the cognitive capacities of the ndvduals makng up a collectvty. For nstance, socal complexty demands the ndvdual capacty to remember and servce many relatonshps, and to ‘read’ complex stuatonal cues (such as those used n tactcal decepton by monkeys). The second s a distributed factor which is, by deinition, larger than the ndvdual, and nvolves nteractons wth the socal and physcal envronment. The dstrbuted cogntve factor produces effects that are not easly predctable from the study of solated ndvduals — for nstance, languages, systems of wrtng, or human communcaton networks. The thrd factor, mposed by evolutonary theory, s a itness constraint. Major changes n homnd cognton and culture had to meet the same knds of constrants regardng reproducton, survval strategy, and so on, as any other aspect of evolutionary adaptation. The inal factor is a comprehensiveness constraint, whch precludes any proposal based on a narrow-band adaptation in some specal doman — for nstance a theory that focused on the human opposed thumb, erect posture, encephalization, or tool-making, in isolation. Any classiication that attempts to be more than a pragmatic one-dimensional label must take into account both ndvdual and dstrbuted cogntve factors, and itness constraints, and achieve an acceptable it to a range of chronologcal data on the nature and rate 12

Homnd Enculturaton and cogntve Evoluton

2. these representatons must be inherently public ways of modellng or expressng knowledge; 3. a novel, semi-autonomous layer of culture dependent on the irst two factors must be in evidence. My crteron for establshng major evolutonary ‘transtons’ n cognton (as opposed to mnor changes) was that all three of these crtera had to be met n any proposed perod of major change. Memory retreval s the frst requrement. Self-triggered retrieval from memory is sometimes called ‘explct’ memory, and n many ways t s the sgnature of human cognton. There are really only two possble routes to explct memory: ether an explctly accessble address system was mposed retroactively on pre-existing primate memory systems, or a whole new set of nherently accessble representations was created. The irst possibility seems hghly mprobable, gven the complex desgn of the nervous system, and therefore I have opted for the second possblty, that a new knd of representatonal process supported the evoluton of explct memory capacity. This process, by which knowledge can be recoded nto retrevable, or autocuable form, has been studed extensvely n modern human nfants, and s known as ‘representatonal redescrpton’ (Karmloff-Smith 1992). A new representational process with this fundamentally novel feature of self-retrievability mples a new storage strategy n the bran. Moreover, recoded knowledge, whether verbal or non-verbal, s drven by public representatonal systems; humans smply do not develop such representatons wthout some socal nvolvement. Publc systems are necessarly based on output (knowledge representatons that cannot be ‘expressed’ n outputs stay locked nsde the ndvdual bran), and therefore nvolve the production systems of the bran. The result of an expanded range of voluntary outputs s an ncrease n the varablty of behavour and thought, and ths s manfest n an exploson of publc culture. These prncples hold for each stage n human cogntve evoluton; thus, for each putatve stage or transton, we should look for a major change n each of these three parameters.

of anatomcal, behavoural, and cultural change. The prmate cogntve functons that underwent radcal change n homnds mght nclude: (1) the range of voluntary non-verbal expression; (2) iconic and metaphorc gesture; (3) mutual sharng and management of attention; (4) self-cued rehearsal; (5) reinement and imitation of skills; (6) generative (self-cued and innovative) imagery; (7) improved pedagogy, and other means of dffusng skll and knowledge; (8) greatly ncreased speed of communcaton; (9) ncreased memory storage; (10) a capacty for voluntary (explct) retreval from memory; (11) new forms of representaton (ncludng words and larger narratve structures); (12) autobographcal memory; (13) shared representatonal control of emotons and nstnctual reactons; (14) more complex overall structure (archtecture) of representaton and memory; and (15) the ntegraton of materal culture nto the process of explct knowledge representaton. The lst could be made longer. Astonshngly, these massve changes were apparently acheved wth about a 1 per cent change n DNA. Ths fact alone hnts at the specal nature of human cogntve evoluton; much larger genetc dstances between speces can exst wthout correspondngly massve cogntve dfferences, and usually behavour maps the physcal nhertance of a speces wth exquste precson. chmpanzees are genetcally much closer to humans than they are to most other prmates, and yet their cognitive proile is far closer to that of other prmates than t s to that of humans. Ths suggests that we need to nvoke somethng more than genetcally-entrenched changes in individual capacity in the case of homnd cognton. Cognitive fundamentals of the enculturation process The features specal to human culture and cognton are complex and nterrelated, and t appears unlkely that they evolved n parallel, each for a separate reason. There must be a smplcty to the underlyng cogntve processes that support the emergence of complex human cultural features; our tentatve lst of changng prmate functons must therefore be reducble to a much shorter lst of cogntve fundamentals, suficient to support the kinds of changes broadly encompassed wthn our structural model. In fact, ths shortlst need contan only three tems: 1. New, and consciously retrievable, knds of representatons must emerge at the top of the representatonal herarchy;

Major hominid transitions Using these criteria, I have re-interpreted the major anatomcal transtons n human evoluton n terms of cogntve/cultural changes. Table 1.1 summarzes some of the man features of the proposed model (Donald 1991; 1993a,b,c; 1994; 1996). Cultures are classiied by their dominant, or governing representatonal style. The startng pont s ape culture; and the representatonal style of apes can be called 13

Merln Donald

table 1.1. Proposed successive stages or ‘layers’ in the evolution of primate/hominid culture, using a cognitive criterion for classiication. Note that each stage persists into the next, and continues to occupy its cultural niche; thus fully-modern human societies incorporate aspects of all four stages of hominid culture. The upper Palaeolithic seems to be situated pretty clearly in the oral-mythic cultural tradition, but it set the stage for later expansions. stage

species/period

novel forms of representation

Manifest change

Cognitive governance

EPISODIC

primate

complex episodic event-perceptions

improved self-awareness and event-sensitivity

episodic and reactive; limited voluntary expressive morphology

MIMETIC (1st transton)

early hominids, peaking in Homo erectus; 4M–0.4 Mya

non-verbal action-modelling

revolution in skill, gesture (including vocal), non-verbal communcaton, shared attenton

mimetic; increased variability of custom, cultural ‘archetypes’

MYTHIC (2nd transton)

sapient humans, peaking in Homo sapiens sapiens; 0.5 Mya–present

linguistic modelling

high-speed phonology, oral language; oral socal record

lexical invention, narrative thought, mythc framework of governance

THEORETIC (3rd transition)

recent sapient cultures

extensive external symbolization, both verbal and non-verbal

formalisms, large-scale theoretic artefacts and massive external memory storage

institutionalized paradigmatic thought and invention

epsodc, because ts representatonal style s concrete and reactve, that s, bound to envronmental events. Apes are remarkably ntellgent and socally complex, yet they have a very lmted and stereotyped range of expressve outputs. Ths apples even to Savage-Rumbaugh et al.’s (1993) recent demonstratons wth bonobos; they can comprehend a surprsng amount of gesture and speech n an epsodc context, but they do not themselves nvent such representations or transcend speciic context. Thus apes have never nvented a publc representatonal arena that can be transmtted across generatons. Ther problem s prmarly one of output rather than comprehenson. Ths lmtaton must ntally have been overcome by means of an archac adaptaton that s a conceptual ‘mssng lnk’ between the epsodc cultures of apes and human prelterate oral cultures. Ths early change was a revoluton n motor skll that connected action to the remarkable social-perceptual sklls we nherted from apes. Early homnds, possbly Homo habilis, but certanly Homo erectus, must have had the ablty to rehearse and evaluate, and thus reine, their own actions. The implication of such a supramodal capacty to revew and rehearse action was that the entire skeleto-motor repertoire of homnds became voluntarly controllable under the supervson of conscous percepton, an ablty I call non-verbal action-modelling, or mimesis. This greatly ncreased the morphologcal varablty of explctly retrevable, conscous homnd acton. The result was, I beleve, the rapd emergence of the non-verbal background of human culture, a layer of ‘mmetc’ culture, that stll perssts n the form of numerous cultural varatons n expresson and custom (most of whch people are unaware of and cannot descrbe verbally), elementary craft and

tool use, pantomme, dance, athletc skll, and prosodc vocalzaton, ncludng group dsplays. The mmetc dmenson of human culture s stll supported by a prmarly analogue mode of representaton, similar in its imagery-driven operating principles to that descrbed by Pavo (1991), and t generated a varety of manufactured artefacts as well as dramatc changes n homnd lvng patterns. Mmetc culture supports lmted publc storage and transmsson of knowledge by non-verbal means — sharing of attenton and gaze, uses of custom and gesture, re-enactments, certain directed group behaviours, and so on. These gradually created a new class of non-verbal representations that could change and accumulate, albet very slowly, over generatons. Ths very slow-moving prototype of human culture was a successful adaptaton that could have endured on its own, without what we strictly deine as language, for well over a mllon years. A second homnd cogntve transton led from mimetic culture to speech and a fully-developed oral-mythic culture. This emerged over the past several hundred thousand years, culmnatng n the specaton of modern Homo sapiens. Oral culture s a specalzed adaptaton that complements, but does not replace the functons served by mmetc culture. I have labelled ths layer of culture ‘mythc’ because ts governng representatons consst of a shared narratve tradton — an oral, publc, standardzed verson of realty permeated by mythc archetypes and allegories, that can exert direct inluence over the form of human thought and conventon. The central structures of oral-mythic culture emerged as the homnd capacty for language became unversal. Its ntroducton nvolved a whole new class of representatons and correspondng storage meda n the bran. It also ntroduced a level of culture that 14

Homnd Enculturaton and cogntve Evoluton

still remains irmly at the centre of human social exstence. Language also ntroduced a much more powerful means of explct recall from memory than the imagery-driven retrieval enabled by mimetc representaton; lngustcally medated recall s by far the most salent form of explct memory retreval known to modern humans. In many ways, the essence of language les n ts power to address and organze knowledge, and make t accessble to further relection. These two changes set the stage for the later exploson of materal culture n modern humans. Thus there were, n the human evolutonary successon, two archac stages that gave humans ther dstnctve non-verbal ntellectual sklls, as well as ther verbal ntellectual capactes. The second transton also undoubtedly led to a further expansion of non-verbal capacities. In fact, oral-mythic culture encompassed all the mmetc capactes of humans; mmetc culture endured as its own semi-autonomous realm of ritual, custom and other non-verbal forms of expression. But typcally n such cultures, despte the strong presence of mmetc representatons, t s the oral realm that domnates. Ths complex culture, grafted onto an underlyng cogntve archtecture that remaned bascally prmate n structure, provded the cogntve nhertance of all humans who lved n the Upper Palaeolithic. The transition from preliterate to symbolicallyliterate societies began in the Upper Palaeolithic and has been marked by a long, and culturally cumulatve, hstory of vsuosymbolc nventon. It has also been marked by a radcal new development: the externalzaton of memory storage. External memory (as opposed to nternal, or ‘bologcal’ memory) nvolves completely new memory meda wth propertes that are fundamentally dfferent from those of bologcal memory. Table 1.2 llustrates some of these propertes. If we were speakng of computers, we would have no dificulty accepting that a system that could use the storage propertes lsted n the rght column of Table 1.2 (external memory) would have radcally dfferent capabltes from a system lmted to those n the left column (nternal or bologcal memory). Note that I am speakng of the cogntve capabltes of the whole socal system, as well as those of ndvduals embedded wthn the system. External symbolc technologes enabled humans to create qualtatvely new types of representatons, eventually yeldng powerful evocatve devces lke pantngs, sculptures, maps, mathematcal equatons, scientiic diagrams, novels, architectural schemes,

government economc reports, and so on. These elaborate devces serve an mportant cogntve engneerng functon: they set up states n the ndvdual mnd that cannot otherwse be attaned. Note that ths s not to say that ether symbolc nventon or external memory could trgger new nnate mental capacities. Rather, the new representatonal possbltes emerged from a developng symboss wth the external symbolc envronment, the bass for a partcularly radcal form of enculturaton. Ths symboss wth symbols supported the growth of a novel, semi-autonomous realm of human culture, based largely on an nsttutonalzed lterate élte. The algorthms that developed nto paradgmatc thought have been cultvated gradually over thousands of years of experience with symbolicallydrven cultures. Theoretc sklls nclude a wde range of thought-algorithms that are by no means innate, and are nconcevable outsde the context of a hghly symbol-dependent society. I call this third stage ‘theoretc’ culture, because where the superstructure of external symbolc control has become establshed to a suficiently high degree, it has become the governing mode of representation. Paradigmatic or logicoscientiic thought, a style of thinking quite different from the narratve thought sklls of oral culture, s not nnate to the human bran or even to the larger culture; rather t conssts of algorthms that evolved n a close teratve symboss wth external symbols. table 1.2. Properties of internal and external memory compared.

15

Internal Memory Record (engram)

external Memory Record (exogram)

ixed physiological media

virtually unlimited physical media

constraned format, dependng on type of record, and cannot be re-formatted

unconstraned format, and may be re-formatted

mpermanent and easly dstorted

may be made much more permanent

large but lmted capacty lmted sze of sngle entres (e.g. names, words, mages, narratves)

overall capacty unlmted sngle entres may be very large (e.g. novels, encyclopaedc reports; legal systems)

retreval paths constraned; man cues for recall are proxmty, smlarty, meanng

retreval paths unconstraned; any feature or attrbute of the tems can be used for recall

lmted perceptual access n audton, vrtually none n vson

unlmted perceptual access, especally n vson

organzaton s determned by the modalty and manner of ntal experence

spatal structure, temporal juxtaposton may be used as an organzatonal devce

the ‘workng’ area of memory s restrcted to a few nnate systems, lke speakng or subvocalizing to oneself, or visual magnaton

the ‘workng’ area of memory s an external dsplay whch can be organized in a rich 3-D spatial envronment

lteral retreval from nternal memory acheved wth weak actvaton of perceptual bran areas; precse and lteral recall s very rare, often msleadng

retreval from external memory produces full actvaton of perceptual bran areas; external actvaton of memory can actually appear to be clearer & more ntense than ‘realty’

Merln Donald

Like oral-mythic culture, this level of culture is dominated by a relatively small élite with highlydeveloped literacy-dependent cognitive skills, and ts prncpal nstruments of control — codfed laws, economic and bureaucratic management, relective scientiic and cultural institutions — are external to the ndvdual memory system. Ths type of representaton has gradually emerged as the governng level of representaton n modern socety. Theoretc culture s stll n the formatve stage, and even the most recent post-industrial human cultures must encompass all these collectve cogntve mechansms and cultural levels at once. Recent research on chld development supports ths noton; the cogntve enculturaton of modern chldren s hghly complex, as they are led through a tangled web of representatonal modes and complex nsttutonalized algorithms (Nelson 1996; Karmiloff-Smith 1992). In effect, we have become complex, multi-layered, hybrd mnds, carryng wthn ourselves, both as ndvduals and as socetes, the entre evolutonary hertage of the past few mllon years.

Dennett, D., 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston (MA): Lttle, Brown. Dennett, D. & M. Knsbourne, 1992. Tme and the observer: the where and when of conscousness and the bran. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15, 183–206. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard University Press. Donald, M., 1993a. Human cogntve evoluton: what we were, what we are becomng. Social Research 60, 143–70. Donald, M., 1993b. Précs of Origins of the Modern Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, 737–91. Donald, M., 1993c. An Evolutionary Perspective on Cognition and Literacy. Kingston: Queen’s University Mathematcs, Scence and Technology Educaton Group. Donald, M., 1994. Representaton: ontogeness and phylogenesis; a commentary on Karmiloff-Smith’s Beyond Modularity. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17, 714–15. Donald, M., 1996. The role of vocalization, memory retreval and external symbols n cogntve evoluton: a reply to addtonal commentares. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19, 155–64. Edelman, G.M. & L.H. Fnkel, 1984. Neuronal group selecton n the cerebral cortex, n Dynamic Aspects of Neocortical Function, eds. G.M. Edelman, E.W. Gall & W.M. Cowan. New York (NY): Wiley, 653–95. Falk, D., 1987. Homnd paleoneurology. Annual Review of Anthropology 16, 13–30. Fetzer, J., 1993. Revew of Merln Donald’s Origins of the Modern Mind. Philosophical Psychology 6, 339–41. Fodor, J., 1983. The Modularity of Mind. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Gamble, c., 1994. Timewalkers: the Prehistory of Global Colonization. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Gbson, K. & T. Ingold (eds.), 1993. Tools, Language and Cognition in Human Evolution. cambrdge: cambrdge University Press. Graf, P. & D. Schacter, 1985. Implct and explct memory for new assocatons n normal and amnesac subjects. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 11, 501–18. Greenield, P.M., 1991. Language, tools and the brain: the ontogeny and phylogeny of hierarchically-organized sequental behavor. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14, 531–95. Jerson, H., 1973. The Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence. New york (Ny): Academc Press. Karmiloff-Smith, A., 1992. Beyond Modularity: a Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Kimura, D., 1976. Neuromotor mechanisms in the evoluton of human communcaton, n Neurobiology of Social Communication in Primates, eds. H.D. Stekls & M.J. Ralegh. New york (Ny): Academc Press. Leberman, P., 1984. The Biology and Evolution of Language. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Leberman, P., 1991. Uniquely Human: the Evolution of Speech,

Merlin Donald Department of Psychology Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6 Canada References Bckerton, D., 1990. Language and Species. chcago (IL): University of Chicago Press. Bradshaw, J. & L. Rogers, 1993. The Evolution of Lateral Asymmetries: Language, Tool Use and Intellect. San Dego (cA): Academc Press. calvn, W.H., 1993. The untary hypothess: a common neural crcutry for novel manpulatons, language, plan-ahead, and throwing?, in Gibson & Ingold (eds.), 230–50. chase, P.G., 1993. Mddle Palaeolthc symbolsm: a revew of current evdence and nterpretatons. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 6, 263–98. chomsky, N., 1993. Language and Thought. Wakeield (RI): Moyer Bell. corballs, M.c., 1991. The Lopsided Ape: the Evolution of the Generative Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Damaso, A.R. & H. Damaso, 1994. cortcal systems for the retreval of concrete knowledge: the convergence zone framework, n Large-Scale Neuronal Theories of the Brain, eds. c. Hoch & J.L. Davs. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Davdson, I. & W. Noble, 1989. The archaeology of percepton. Current Anthropology 30, 125–55.

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Theory. New york (Ny): Harvester Wheatsheaf. Passngham, R.E., 1982. The Human Primate. New york (Ny): Freeman. Pnker, S., 1994. The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates Language. New york (Ny): Morrow. Pnker, S. & P. Bloom, 1990. Natural language and natural selecton. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13, 707–84. Premack, D., 1987. Gavagai. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Savage-Rumbaugh, E.S., J. Murphy, R.A. Sevcik, K.E. Braake, S.L. Wllams & D. Rumbaugh, 1993. Language Comprehension in Ape and Child. (Monographs of the Socety for Research n chld Development 233, v. 58.) Chicago (IL): University of Chicago Press. Whte, R., 1989a. Producton complexty and standarzaton n Early Aurgnacan bead and pendant manufacture: evolutonary mplcatons, n Mellars & Strnger (eds.), 366–90. Whte, R., 1989b. Toward a contextual understandng of the earlest body ornaments, n The Emergence of Modern Humans: Biocultural Adaptations in the Later Pleistocene, ed. E. Trnkhaus. cambrdge: cambrdge University Press, 211–31. Wynn, T., 1989. The Evolution of Spatial Competence. champaign-Urbana (IL): University of Illinois Press.

Thought and Selless Behavior. cambrdge (MA): Harvard University Press. McGrew, W.c., 1992. Chimpanzee Material Culture: Implications for Human Evolution. cambrdge: cambrdge University Press. McGrew, W.c. & L.F. Marchant, 1992. chmpanzees, tools, and termtes: hand preference or handedness? Current Anthropology 32, 114–19. MacLean, P.D., 1973. A Triune Concept of the Brain and Behavior. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. McNell, D., 1991. Hand and Mind: What Gestures Reveal about Thought. Chicago (IL): University of Chicago Press. Mellars, P., 1989. Technologcal changes across the Mddle–Upper Palaeolithic transition: economic, social and cogntve perspectves, n Mellars & Strnger (eds.), 338–65. Mellars, P. & c. Strnger (eds.), 1989. The Human Revolution: Behavioural and Biological Perspectives on the Origins of Modern Humans. Princeton (NJ): Princeton Universty Press. Nelson, K., 1996. Language in Cognitive Development: Emergence of the Mediated Mind. cambrdge: cambrdge University Press. Pavo, A., 1991. Images in Mind: the Evolution of a

17

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

Chapter 3 Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems: an Evolutionary Perspective

Francesco d’Errco Humans are the only species capable of creating means of recording, storing and transmitting information outside the physical body (artiicial memory systems or AMS). To investigate the possible origin of these devices in the Palaeolithic, a theoretical model has been developed through examination of the ethnographic record and from study of the rules which govern the use of AMS codes. Discussion of the applicability of the model to the archaeological material reveals that the technological analysis of marks derived from experimentally determined diagnostic criteria provides methods for identifying certain types of AMS, such as those based on accumulation of information through time. The analytical methods used in examining Palaeolithic marks, here summarized, are used to analyze several Palaeolithic marked objects. It is concluded that Anatomically Modern Humans used AMSs at least from the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic and that such systems played a major role in modifying human cognition.

Several models of the evolution of human cognition

increasing complexity of communication networks (Goonatilake 1991). In other models (Donald 1991; 1993; 1996), each new stage, mimetic, mythic, theoretical, is seen in terms of a differentiated organization and use of memory: on this basis external memory, with its use of external symbols, represents the ultimate stage in cognitive evolution. Whatever the model adopted, however, there always comes a time when theorists turn to archaeology in search of supporting evidence. Unfortunately their discussion of such evidence rarely takes into account the critical approach of modern archaeology. Equally, although some theorists’ models do offer helpful insights into the evolution of mental abilities, most are too loosely deined to serve as a valuable heuristic tool. Often the proposed generalizations seem little more than merely plausible interpretations of artefactual data and not the testable theories they should be (Bell 1994). In this respect, perhaps, we would do well to heed the advice of Mellars & Gibson (1996) when they point out the

have been developed in recent years in attempts to identify and deine the major stages involved and to characterize the mental processes at work (Byrne & Whiten 1988; Eccles 1989; Foley & Lee 1991; Aiello & Dunbar 1993; Gibson & Ingold 1993; Bradshaw & Rogers 1995; Mellars & Gibson 1996). The specialists concerned insist, in their models, on the primary role played by the emergence of symbolic forms of behaviour, and on the ensuing ability to preserve and use information stored away from the human body (Cherry 1980; Festinger 1983; Lindly & Clark 1990; Chase 1991; 1994; Goonatilake 1991; Davidson & Noble 1989; 1993; Donald 1991; Duff et al. 1992; Byers 1994; Knight et al. 1995; Mellars 1989; 1991; 1996; Mithen 1996; Thierry et al. 1996; see also Leroi-Gourhan 1964 and Goody 1977 for precursory statements). For some of these cognitive evolution models it is the interconnected genetic, cultural, and exosomatic information itself which evolves as a self-organizing mechanism, determining the ever19

Francesco d’Errco

20

keeping records of proverbs/songs

serving as hunting marks

serving as memory aids

transmitting messages

serving as calendars

keeping records of transactions

keeping records of cattle

keeping records of objects or beings

praying

miscellaneous

leather

shells

strings (wool, skin, vegetal) with knots

pebbles

incised ivory

incised wood or bamboo sticks

role of the archaeologist in developing methods of develop? How many of them will we be able to analysis to explore the overall signiicance of archaeoidentify among the archaeological material? All these logical material, thus paving the way for a solid data questions remain unanswered. Indeed the analytibase on which any theoretical superstructure might cal methods used by Marshack in studying objects be built. have never been clearly described nor validated by In the spirit of such an approach, I have chosen replicative experiments. Thus when he describes the to focus on a particular aspect of Donald’s ‘external way in which marks were produced on an object, or symbolic storage’ or Goonatilake’s ‘exosomatic inidentiies changes of tool, we do not know on what formation’, the moment at which humans were able basis he is making this claim. to produce artiicial memory systems (AMSs), i.e. In line with previous work (d’Errico 1991; physical devices speciically conceived to store and re1995a,b; d’Errico & Cacho 1994), I will show that the cover coded information. Although writing is, without study of ethnographic AMSs can provide interpretadoubt, the system which has most affected the develtive guidelines to be used for identifying archaeoopment of human societies, at least since the invention logical AMS. We need a technological analysis of of printing, it is likely that other types of AMS were Palaeolithic marked objects before we can discuss used both before and after the adoption of writing. their signiicance and their possible interpretation as The irst possible AMSs reported from UpAMSs. After addressing the controversial question of per Palaeolithic sites were interpreted as ‘marques the possible use of AMSs in the Lower and Middle de chasse’ or ‘systems of notation’ (Lartet & Cristy Palaeolithic, my theoretical and analytical tools will 1865–75). More than a century later, however, their be tested by studying several objects dating from difinterpretation remains controversial. ferent periods of the Upper Palaeolithic. The results In the last thirty years several authors, Marshack will provide the basis for a working hypothesis for in particular, have examined Upper Palaeolithic the evolutionary development of AMSs during the marked objects in an attempt to show that they served Upper Palaeolithic. as systems of notation (1964; 1970; 1972a,b,c; Raw material Function 1988; 1991a,c). Marshack has most often interpreted these objects as having notations based on lunar phases. Many criticisms have, however, been levelled at this work by authors such as White (1982), d’Errico (1989; 1992; 1995a; 1996a), Robinson (1992), and Elkins (1996, with comments). A major criticism is that Marshack has never proposed a testable theoretical framework and an explicit methodolAmericas 2 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 ogy. Although Marshack Europe 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 claims that he has idenAfrica 2 0 0 2 2 1 2 1 3 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 tiied systems of notaAsia 8 1 0 8 0 0 0 0 6 1 0 1 5 2 0 0 tion, he does not explain totals 16 1 2 13 3 1 3 4 13 4 1 4 8 2 1 2 what he means by this term. What exactly is ‘a system of notation’? Figure 3.1. Provisional data base of Artiicial Memory Systems other than writing, used How many types of by different human groups around the world. The igures indicate types and not single ‘notation’ can humans systems.

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

through time of information-bearing elements. Since notches cannot be distinguished by the naked eye, their morphology cannot play a role in the code, and nor does spatial distribution either. It is possible to carve a new notch in the space still free on the stick or between existing notches without changing the information being stored. Yet another example is the system of communication called Aroko, used by the Jebu of West Africa. This AMS consists of chains of shells carrying different messages according to the number of shells and their reciprocal position. The number and the spatial distribution of the elements are the two factors organizing the Aroko code; a different meaning is attributed to different sets of shells. As mentioned, the ethnographic evidence shows that each code can depend on one, two, three or even all of the four factors cited above. In all it is possible to deine up to ifteen basic codes. Several variants can be envisaged, however, depending on the hierarchical organization of these factors within the code. To give an example of hierarchical organization, let us consider the Inca AMS called ‘quipu’. A quipu consists of a number of cords, of different lengths and colours, suspended from a topband. The position and type of knot on each cord stand for objects and beings. The code employed here is one based on spatial distribution and element morphology. The spatial distribution is organized hierarchically in two steps (order of the cords and position of the knots). The morphology of the elements is also organized

Theoretical and analytical tools

My goal was to examine the ethnographic record in search of general principles that would make it possible to reduce information to a form that can be recovered by humans. The purpose of this study was not to establish a direct analogy between the ethnographic and the Palaeolithic record (Marshack 1974; 1985); the dangers of this approach have already been highlighted many times (Gould & Watson 1982; Wylie, 1985; 1988). To this end I created a provisional data base of 50 relatively simple AMSs, used all over the world for a variety of purposes in many different cultural and social contexts (Fig. 3.1). This sample includes rosaries, notched sticks, engraved slabs, strings with knots or shells, objects kept in nets and so on. The purpose of each device was studied, along with the material in which it was made, whether it would survive in the archaeological record, and whether it could be recognized as an artefact or identiied as an AMS. Particular attention was paid to the ways in which each system worked: the way in which the information was recorded, processed and then recovered. Examination of the ethnographic record revealed that up to four major factors can intervene in any AMS code: a) the morphology of elements, b) the spatial distribution of the elements, c) accumulation through time, and d) the number of elements (Fig. 3.2). If we take as as an example the Catholic rosary we ind that its code is based on the spatial distribution of the information-bearing elements and on the morphology of those elements: in this case beads, separated by chans of dfferent length (d’Errico 1995b). The order of the beads indicates the order of the prayers; the chain length and/or the bead dimensions indicate the type of prayer. Take a tally-stick and carve a notch on it every time something happens or an object has to be recorded, then its code is based on the accumulation Figure 3.2. Possible associations between factors organizing an AMS code (see text). 21

Francesco d’Errco

hierarchically (colour of the cords and type of knot). My model takes into account the way in which information is processed. In a rosary, information is processed only through tactile perception; in the quipu both tactually and visually. I also consider the eficiency of each system: the quantity and quality of stored information, the possibility of updating information, as well as the effort required to learn the code. The usefulness of this exploratory approach is that it classiies AMSs on the basis of the formal, and probably invariable, elements that play a rôle in elaborating any type of AMS code and not on features proper to each speciic AMS, such as its function or the meaning attributed to particular signs. The latter features are not normally preserved in the prehistoric record. Thus I use this model to ask questions about how these artefacts were used, not about what kind of information was stored and recovered, because only the former kind of question can be answered by archaeological analysis. Hence I am not interested in establishing a classiication of these devices, as was done in the past for writing systems (Saussure 1922; Gelb 1952; Pulgram 1976) but in developing an exploratory heuristic tool to be used in the interpretation of archaeological data. I draw attention here to the example of Harris who has developed a similar approach for the analysis of writing systems (1986; 1995). Several concepts deined by this author are pertinent here, such as the distinction he makes between tokens and emblems. The former are signs based on a one-to-one correlation between single items (notches on a tally stick, beads on an abacus, ticks or crosses on a list, etc.); the latter are signs based on a one-to-many correlation, by virtue of which the ‘many’ are regarded as forming a single class (potter’s marks, logos, national lags, etc.). Signs which function simultaneously as emblems and tokens are described as duplex signs. My analysis of modern AMSs suggests that it is the code and raw material type that will determine the likelihood or not of securely identifying archaeological AMSs. It will be hard, for example, to prove that strings linking shells, teeth or other pendants were used during the Upper Palaeolithic in a way similar to that described for the rosary, and not as pieces of body ornament bearing a different kind of meaning. The Upper Palaeolithic archaeological record, however, includes hundreds of marked bone objects. These objects constitute a more suitable basis for identifying possible AMSs. Repeated changes of tool, variations in marking techniques, in the arrangement of marks and in mark morphology can

provide clues to support an interpretation as an AMS. When marks are created by stone tools, for example, a change of tool will probably take place between each new stage of marking if the periods stages are relatively long. If we change between tool produces morphological differences visible to the naked eye, these different morphologies can be interpreted as the being result of the craftsman’s choice. If, however, changing a tool does not produce visible changes in the morphology of marks, then it is reasonable to consider such changes as epiphenomenonal owing to the accumulation of marks over time. Therefore criteria for identifying certain types of AMS, like those based on accumulation of information through time, depend on the technological analysis of marks. Palaeolithic marks include sequences of singlestroke lines (made by a single movement of a point), notches (produced by a single or repeated movement of a cutting edge), and microincisions (produced by the pressure, percussion or rotation of a point) carved on different types of material (bone, ivory, antler, stone). Microscopic analysis of experimental and archaeological marks, carried out in the last 15 years by optical and scanning electron microscope, both on the originals and on high quality resin replicas, have provided diagnostic criteria: 1) to identify the techniques used by prehistoric engravers; and 2) to establish whether morphological changes between marks are due to a change of tool, a change of marking technique, or to the breaking and resharpening of the point. Interesting results we have been obtained using computerized measuring methods for proile measurement and image analysis systems (d’Errico 1995b; 1996b). It has been shown, for example, that sets of notches produced by a single tool can be distinguished from sets produced by several tools, by comparing their proiles and by studying the variation of the angles formed by the notch walls (d’Errico 1991). Previous work has shown that, in single stroke lines, the width of the mark, its section, and the distances between internal grooves allow the identiication of marks made by the same tool, and that clear changes in these features often correspond to changes of tool. Density proiles of marks (Fig. 3.3), obtained by applying image analysis software to digitized images of the marks, have provided a new way for comparing the mark section and quantifying morphological differences between the marks (d’Errico 1995b). Similarily, plotting the dimensional values of experimental marks produced by pressure or by indirect percussion, often makes it possible to distinguish between groups of marks made by different tools. 22

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

Figure 3.3. Portions of experimental single stroke lines engraved by lint points on antler, observed in transmitted light by means of resin replicas. The point used to engrave two lines, A and B, was different from that used to engrave lines C and D. The density-proile plots of these four lines allow a visualization of morphological differences in the groove section. records a notch proile by using stylus arm connected to a drive unit. The computer compensates automatically for measuring errors resulting from the radius of the stylus tip and produces enlargements (up to 1000×) of selected portions of the proile. The software allows insertion of best-it lines and bestit circles into the proile, as well as the computation of geometrical elements (angles, radii, distances, etc.). The major drawback of this instrument, apart from its high price, lies in its dimensions and weight, both of which make it virtually impossible to transport to a museum or another laboratory. An additional problem is caused by the fact that the

All these methods have provided for each marking technique a range of morphological and statistical diagnostic criteria on the basis of which we can now recognize marks produced by the same tool, and distinguish changes of tool from other modiications such as resharpening, wear or changes in the hand motion. Analytical techniques Hitherto I have measured notch proiles using computerized measuring stations for proile measurement and representation. The measuring station 23

Francesco d’Errco

stylus enters into direct contact with the specimens. Even if the pressure on the object surface can be reduced to a few micrograms, the risk of damaging an original object with the sharp point of the stylus cannot be eliminated. Thus the study of Palaeolithic notches must be carried out on resin replicas of archaeological specimens. This, however, limits the analysis to well-preserved pieces that can be replicated without damaging the surface. The need to use resin replicas and the risk of

damaging the object with the stylus are obviated if one uses optical surface proilers (d’Errico 1996b). These instruments, based on the principle of the optical triangulation of laser light, allow a 2- and 3-dimensional reconstruction of very small surfaces without any contact with the object. Many morphological and metrical variables can thus be recorded. Their use, however, is still limited by their high price and excessive weight. A convenient alternative method, tested here,

Figure 3.4. Study of a notch proile by image analysis. Once the image has been digitized (A), the background is thresholded (B) using the density slice command and changed to white (C). The object outline is changed to black (D) using the same procedure. The density-proile tool generates a plot (E) from which the numerical coordinates are recovered and reduced to a polynomial equation (F). 24

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

consists of placing the object or its replica under a stereomicroscope equipped with both transmitted and relected light. The notch is positioned so that its proile is in the lens axis. The image is digitized using a CCD camera mounted on the microscope and connected to a desktop or portable computer equipped with a frame grabber card. By means of a sequence of image enhancement steps the curved line of the proile is transformed into numerical values (Fig. 3.4). The plot so produced can be used for visual comparison with plots of other notches. Quantiication of morphological differences between proiles can be obtained by measuring angles and by computing polynomial equations or conventional Fourier functions (Gero & Mazzullo 1984; Lestrel 1989). The use of the measuring station described above and of the image analysis system on the same experimental and archaeological sets of notches has provided comparable data.

satisied for markings such as those on objects from Bilzingsleben, La Ferrassie, Cueva Morin and Temnata. Unfortunately, none of these markings was submitted to a microscopic analysis in order to verify the possible anthropogenic origin of the marks, to ind evidence that they were produced deliberately and to reconstruct the marking procedure in a detailed and reliable way. In the absence of this data, it is dificult, if not impossible, to assess the signiicance of this material for the question in hand. The end of the Middle Palaeolithic, characterized in western Europe by technocomplexes such as the Uluzzian in Italy, and the Châtelperronian in France and Spain, shows a qualitative change in the archaeological record. At the Grotte du Renne (in the Arcy-sur-Cure cave complex of northern France), the Châtelperronian levels have yielded a varied collection of personal ornaments (Fig. 3.6) consisting of perforated or grooved teeth of different species, and pendants made of shell, ivory and bone (Leroi-Gourhan & Leroi-Gourhan 1965; Taborin 1990). Three small tubes, made of bird bones, show regularly spaced notches. Sets of notches were also produced on ribs, awls and bone points. Seven other Châtelperronian sites, apart from the Grotte du Renne, have yielded personal ornaments, consisting of perforated and sawn teeth and perforated shells of different species, as well as bone fragments with sets of incisions. Bone industry and perforated shells also occur at some contemporary Uluzzian sites of the Italian peninsula (Palma di Cesnola 1993). The recent identiication of a Neanderthal earbone in the Châtelperronian layers of Arcy (Hublin et al. 1996) seems to conirm, as already suggested by the Saint Césaire burial (Lévêque & Vandermeersch 1980) and by some human remains at other sites, that Neanderthals were authors of the Châtelperronian and Uluzzian assemblages. The presence of bone tools, personal ornaments and apparently ‘modern’ stone tools in Châtelperronian and Uluzzian contexts is variously interpreted: 1) as the result of an acculturation of inal Neanderthal populations by anatomically modern humans (Stringer & Gamble 1993; Bar-Yosef 1996; Mellars 1996; Hublin et al. 1996); 2) as proof of collecting by Neanderthals of objects abandoned by modern humans; or 3) as the result of post-depositional disturbances, i.e. the objects are considered as Aurignacian artefacts introduced into the Châtelperronian layers by post-depositional mixing (White 1992). A recent work, however, challenges these interpretations (d’Errico et al. 1998). A new assessment of the stratigraphic, chronological and archaeological

AMS use in the Lower and Middle Palaeolithic? Evidence for symbolic behaviour during the Lower and Middle Palaeolithic is limited and controversial (see for example Marshack 1991b; Simek 1992; Bednarik 1995; Bahn 1996; Chase & Dibble 1987; 1992; Davidson & Noble 1993; White 1992; Knight et al. 1995; Mellars 1996; Gibson & Mellars 1996). In a recent work, d’Errico & Villa (1997) have demonstrated that certain putative Lower and Middle Palaeolithic engravings on bones, such as Pech de l’Azé, Cueva Morin, and Stranska Skala, are in reality impressions of vascular grooves and that most of the putative ‘pendants’ of this period should be interpreted as bone fragments partially regurgitated by hyenas. This consequently reduces the already small number of Lower and Middle Palaeolithic objects considered by some authors as proof of non-utilitarian activities. The remaining objects (Fig. 3.5) come from 11 European sites (Bilzingsleben, La Ferrassie, Bacho Kiro, Suard, Marillac, Vaufrey, La Ferrassie, Ermitage, Morin, Beneito, Temnata). Only a few of these objects, however, display marks which could not be explained as the result of utilitarian activities. An even smaller sample show patterns which could be the expression of an AMS code. It should be clear that the recovery of information in AMSs based on serial markings requires patterns allowing a visual and/or tactile discrimination of the signs. This implies a certain degree of isomorphism of the signs and their arrangement in a way which would enable them to be ‘read’. If we judge from the representations of these objects, this condition is 25

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Figure 3.5. Bone and stone objects from European Lower and Middle Palaeolithic sites described as bearing humanmade sets of marks. 1–2: Bilzingsleben; 3–4: Suard; 5–7: Marillac; 8–9: Morin; 10: Vaufrey; 11: Beneito; 12: La Ferrassie; 13: Ermitage; 14: Temnata. 26

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Figure 3.6. Examples of worked bones and personal ornaments from the Châtelperronian levels of the Grotte du Renne. 1: Proximal end of a rib covered with ochre showing two sequences of regularly spaced notches; 2: hyena canine with grooved root; 3: epiphysis of a swan ulna sectioned by sawing; 4: long bone shaft fragment shaped by scraping; 5: bird bone diaphysis with regularly spaced notches; 6: reindeer metapodial with groove for suspension; 7: fragment of crinoid with natural perforation; 8: bone awl with groove at its base; 9: bone tube sectioned by transversal sawing; 10: wolf canine; 11: bovid incisor; 12–13: fox canines; 14: reindeer incisor; 15: byproduct of ivory ring manufacture; 16: ivory pins with traces of manufacture. (After Leroi-Gourhan & Leroi-Gourhan 1965, with modiications.)

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aspects of the Arcy record indicates that bone tools and personal ornaments discovered in the Châtelperronian levels of the Grotte du Renne do not originate from the overlying Aurignacian level but are, on the contrary, contemporary with the lithic assemblages and the man-made structures of the Châtelperronian levels. Reitting of worked bones and the presence of by-products of bone manufacture reveal that the body ornaments found at the site were made by the Châtelperronians and that they were neither the result of gathering of abandoned objects or trading with the Aurignacians. On the basis of a re-evaluation of the Châtelperronian and Uluzzian material culture, d’Errico et al. also argue that, contrary to general opinion, there is no evidence of adoption or absorption of Aurignacian bone and lithic technology by the late Neanderthals, but rather an independent invention of different ways of solving similar technological problems. This result is consistent with the patterns of chronological and geographical distribution of Aurignacian, Châtelperronian, Uluzzian and late Mousterian settlements suggesting that, with the exception of the Iberian peninsula, serious doubt exists regarding the putative prolonged contemporaneity of Neanderthal and anatomically modern human groups in Western Europe. In sum, the hypothesis whereby the Châtelperronian Neanderthals were acculturated by the Aurignacians becomes dificult to support. If the acculturation hypothesis is rejected, those working on the evolution of human cognitive abilities should look at the cultural achievements of the late Neanderthals in a new light. We should consider the profound implications of the manufacture and use of body ornaments by Neanderthals. Objects created for visual display on a human body necessarily imply a communication of some meaning (Leach 1976). A varied collection of objects such as those found at the Grotte du Renne — objects which were probably used by the same human group — suggests the elaboration of a code in which different categories of pendants convey complex messages by their presence, absence, association or position on the body. In many traditional societies, these codes provide information on the age, gender, social status and ethnic membership of the holder (Strathern & Strathern 1971; Faris 1972; Brain 1979; Hodder 1979; Morris & Preston-Whyte 1994; Strathern, this volume) and their use requires an intimate and often tacit knowledge of the cultural and social system (Hall 1973). We are therefore forced to admit that Châtelperronian Neanderthals elaborated, used and transmitted autonomous codes, as a relection of

possibly different social roles and an expression of a different cultural system. Symbolling, or ‘external symbolic storage’ (sensu Donald 1991), is a necessary prerequisite for developing such codes. The analysis of notched objects from Middle Palaeolithic contexts could even prove these Neanderthals had the ability to elaborate and use artiicial memory systems. Serially marked bones from Arcy and other late Middle Palaeolithic sites have not yet been submitted to a technical analysis. It is clear, however, that the varied collection of the Arcy body ornaments constitutes the best data set we have with which to study the emergence of these devices. This is but one example of the perils involved in looking at the evolution of human cognitive abilities in stadial terms, and in elaborating biologically based models for the evolution of human intelligence. So far, the debate about the origin of symbolic behaviour has been dominated by European evidence, undoubtedly a relection of a Eurocentric way of looking at the evolution of cognitive abilities. Models of a biologically-based intellectual superiority of anatomically modern humans (Byers 1994; Mithen 1996; Foley 1996), however, fail to explain why the irst North African and Near Eastern anatomically modern humans have left so little archaeological evidence of their modern cognitive abilities (see Marshack 1995 for a possible single exception). Contemporary South African moderns, in contrast, used large quantities of pigment, and produced serially notched objects and engraved ostrich eggshells, as demonstrated by early Middle Stone sites (MSA2b) such as Klasies River Mouth and Apollo 11 (Singer & Wymer 1982; Wendt 1974). Knight et al. (1995) have argued that the South African record implies a symbolic tradition extending back approximately 100 Kya. As with the late Middle Palaeolithic record, however, technological analysis of the MSA notched objects, demonstrating their possible use as AMSs, has not yet been carried out. Whatever the ultimate result of future research, the evidence from Arcy and from the Near East suggests that the reasons for the emergence of symbolling and the ensuing ability to produce AMSs would be more successfully researched outside the strict biological domain of species replacement, and far away from unilinear models of cognitive development (Gibson 1996). The best explanations are likely to come by focusing on the particular social, cultural and palaeoenvironmental contexts in which different types of AMSs were independently conceived and used. In the next section I will examine the record of one of these possible contexts, that of the European Upper Palaeolithic. 28

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spatula made from a rib from the Magdalenian layers of the Laugerie-Basse shelter, Dordogne (Peyrony & Maury 1914). With the exception of the Solutré rib, kept in the Musée de Solutré, the other specimens are stored in the Laboratoire de Préhistoire of the Musée de l’Homme. Discussion of these results will take into account already published analyses (d’Errico & Cacho 1994; d’Errico 1995b) and studies in progress.

The European Upper Palaeolithic record I present here the analysis of ive serially marked objects from France: two ribs from the Aurignacian layers of the Abri Blanchard, Dordogne (Didon 1911); a fragment of reindeer metapodial, probably Gravettian, from the Abri Labattut, Dordogne (Sonneville-Bordes 1960); a rhinoceros rib from the site of Solutré, Saône-et-Loire (Combier 1976); and a

Figure 3.7. Notched rib from the Abri Blanchard (cat. no. D.38.23.1958)

Figure 3.8. Close-up view (top) of the notched area of rib D.38.23.1958 showing different types of post-depositional damage. White lines indicate the area enlarged in the centre (right) and at the bottom (left). Scales = 1 mm. 29

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their spatial distribution. Other functions for these marks, however, can also be proposed; for instance, traces indicating the use of the object as a ‘retouchoir’ (a knapping tool to retouch lint blanks), are present near its broken end and between the notches of the irst set. In addition, the unbroken end reveals evidence of wear, probably produced by the use of the object as a punch for knapping blades by indirect percussion. Experimental reproduction of this knapping technique reveals that the craftman’s hand is generally positioned near the zone of the punch in contact with the core, to determine precisely the percussion point. This suggests that the two sets of marks had a functional purpose, that of helping the prehension of the object during its use.

Blanchard The irst rib from Blanchard (D.38.23.1958) was marked on both edges with two sequences of regularly spaced tiny incisions (Fig. 3.7). These can be estimated at 44 on one edge and 38 on the other, though the original number is dificult to establish because of post-depositional damage to the edges and fractures at both ends of the object. Experimental reproduction of these marks indicates that they were produced by a single passage of an unretouched cutting edge (Fig. 3.8). The state of preservation of the object does not allow the making of silicone replicas for SEM analysis of the marks. Moreover, the marking procedure and the dimension of the marks make the analysis of the proiles an ineffective technique to identify changes of tool. Optical examination of the incisions, however, suggests that all the marks on one side, and probably those on both sides were produced in one session by the same tool. These incisions are too tiny to be effective in helping the hafting or the prehension of the object during its use. They are hardly visible when you look at the object as a whole, but easy to distinguish if you focus on each individual incision. Since no morphological differences are visible between the marks, and they were probably carved in just one session, this object could represent an AMS with a code based exclusively on the spatial distribution of the elements. Since technological analysis is incomplete, however, we cannot exclude the possibility that the engraved pattern, though a form of external symbolic storage, could respond to other communication needs. The second rib (D.38.23.1858) shows two sets of notches, one carved on the external curved aspect of the rib, the other on its caudal edge (Figs. 3.9–3.10). A space, deliberately kept free of marks, was left in the irst set, between the irst two notches and the others. A single unretouched cutting edge was used to carve each set, as demonstrated by the morphology of notches and, for notches carved on the edge, by their proiles (Fig. 3.11). The regular, slightly oblique orientation of the notches on the edge of the rib suggests that all the marks were produced in just one session without interruption of the hand motion. The morphological difference between the irst three notches on the left and the others is due to the fact that the former were carved more supericially, and that they were probably made irst, as suggested by the gradual opening of the angle formed by the notch walls and by the rounded morphology of the bottom of the irst notches (Fig. 3.12). We could interpret this pattern as an AMS with a code based on the morphology of the elements and

Labattut The dorsal crest of the reindeer metapodial from Labattut was marked with at least 65 notches, certainly more before the fracture of the bone (Fig. 3.13). Morphological analysis of the notches indicates that they were produced by three, or possibly four different unretouched cutting edges (Figs. 3.14–3.16). The identiication of changes of tool is conirmed by quantitative analysis of the notch angles, which vary in coincidence with the changes of tool. The breakdown between the sets A–B is also marked by a slight change in the orientation of the marks. More importantly, this change is marked by a clear reduction in the spacing between marks, suggesting that the engraver moved the marks closer together when less space became available. Apparently he or she was not interested in producing a regular pattern, but rather in placing a certain number of marks on the bone. We note that: a) changes of tool were not due to the fact that the tool itself became too worn and needed replacement since the last notches of each set do not show breakage or particularly intensive wear; b) changes of tool were not due to the desire to produce a more complex pattern, since changes in notch morphology are not visible to the naked eye; c) there is no evidence that the notches had a utilitarian function, nor that the object was used as a personal ornament. If changes of tool are the result of lapses of time occurring between sets of marks, then we are dealing with an AMS having a code based exclusively on the accumulation of elements through time. We know that from 3 to 36 isomorphic elements bearing the same information were recorded in a single session. Recovery of information was probably carried 30

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

Figure 3.9. Notched rib from the Abri Blanchard (cat. no. D.38.23.1858)

Figure 3.10. Close-up view (top) of the notched area of the rib D.38.23.1858 showing two sets of notches. White lines indicate the area enlarged in the centre (left) and at the bottom (right). Scale = 1 mm. 31

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Figure 3.11. Proiles of notches carved on the caudal edge of the Blanchard rib. Notice the constant asymmetric morphology of the proiles suggesting the use of the same tool. Protuberances on the left side of notch 5, on the right sides of notches 6 and 8, and at bottom of notch 9 are due to microconcretions present inside these marks.

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Figure 3.12. Top: notches engraved on the external aspect of the Blanchard rib; centre: notches engraved on the edge; bottom: close-up view of notches 5, 8 and 11. Scale= 1 mm. 33

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Figure 3.13. Top: line rendition of the fragmentary reindeer metapodial from the Abri Labattut (cat. num. D.38.23.2072) indicating the four sets carved by different cutting edges; centre: variation in the spacing between notches; bottom: variation of the angles formed by the notch walls. 34

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

Figure 3.14. SEM micrograph of notches B12–14. Use of the same tool can be recognized by observing the general shape of the marks and, in particular, their lat bottom. Scale = 1 mm.

Figure 3.15. Notches carved on the crest of the Labattut metapodial: A: A13; B: B12–14; C: C4; D: D1. Scale = 1 mm. out by combining visual and tactual reception, but could also be obtained by tactile perception alone, for example by moving the inger-tip along the bone. If the notches were carved only on the anterior face of the metapodial, the chosen support did not allow the recording of more than 80 pieces of information.

of the rib is engraved with hundreds of thin singlestroke lines, close to each other and perpendicular to the main axis of the bone. A large number, if not all, were engraved in one session by a single point. These thin lines are crossed by a few more recent and wider long lines, made by another point. The convex face of the rib is engraved with a few groups of singlestroke lines, each made with a single point, crossed by several groups of irregular long lines. The most striking feature of this object results

Solutré Similar results were obtained by studying the rhinoceros rib from Solutré (Fig. 3.17). The concave face 35

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Figure 3.16. Close-up view of notches A13 (left) and B14 (right) of the Labattut metapodial demonstrating morphological difference between the two notches produced by two different cutting edges. Resin replicas photographed in transmitted light and printed as negative. Scale = 1 mm. from the 53 notches carved on one side of the piece. Microscopic analysis of the notches and study of their proiles (the latter using two different methods) indicate that the notches were produced by unretouched cutting edges, and that a dozen changes of cutting edge took place in the course of the accumulation of the marks (Figs. 3.18–3.19). If the change of cutting edge corresponds to lapses of time, we are once again faced with an artiicial memory system with a code based on the accumulation of elements through time.

Use of this object over a long period is suggested by the differential wear of the notch edges. Experimental notches and well-preserved archaeological notches generally show clean edges. At Solutré, on the contrary, the edges of the notches are heavily smoothed. The bone surface near the notches is very similar, at microscopic scale, to that reproduced experimentally by manipulating bone objects (Bromage 1984; d’Errico 1993), i.e. a highly homogeneous appearance with striations 1–2 µm wide. That these features are the result of technical 36

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

or post-depositional processes cannot be formally excluded. They are, however, quite different from those produced by experimentally polishing the bone surface with skins and furs or by mimicking several types of postdepositional process such as movement in the soil with water, sand, gravel, lint or bone fragments (Shipman & Rose 1988; d’Errico 1993). These processes produce much larger striations and, in some cases, different types of impact, absent at Solutré. Another element conirming a prolonged use of the object is the intensive wear of its point (Fig. 3.20). The wear consists of small impacts as well as a number of randomly oriented striations of different lengths, thereby suggesting a local, repeated abrasion compatible with that described on the active zone of digging-sticks (Oakley et al. 1977). Finally, some zones of the edge show traces of heavy scraping which has exposed the spongy bone. The wavy morphology of the scraped area suggests that, by comparison with experimental reproduction of the same feature, the scraping might have erased preexisting notches. All these are clues suggesting that changes of tool correspond to an accumulation over time. In the Solutré rib, between 1 and 10 isomorphic elements bearing the same information were recorded at each session. As with the Labattut metapodial, the marking technique and the space available limit the possible number of stored signs to around 100, or to around 200 if notches are carved on both sides of the rib. The dimension of the rhinoceros rib and the number of notches carved on its edge make it dificult to look at all of them or to count them only visually. Recovery of information was probably carried out by combining visual and tactile perception, or even by tactile perception alone.

single tool and it is possible that a change of tool took place between these three rows. Experimental reproduction of these marks indicates that the object was probably turned 180° between the two external rows, in order to facilitate the marking procedure. This can result in morphological variations which are dificult to distinguish from changes of tool. The eight sets of face B show a similar pattern. Sets J–L were probably engraved by the same tool. Changes of tool occurred between these two sets and set M, as well as between these and set N. Clear morphological dfferences and changes n the orentaton of the marks exist between the ive sets (D–H) engraved on face A. The question, however, is whether these differences are the consequence of repeated changes of tool, or the result of an intentional procedure. Experimental reproduction of these marks suggests that it is dificult to produce consecutively such pronounced morphological differences between sets only by changing tool. Furthermore, a closer analysis of the marks (Fig. 3.23) reveals that the same tool was used for tracing marks belonging to different sets. It is probable that these ive sets were produced in just one session and that the engraver deliberately enhanced the differences between sets, and tried to keep the morphology of marks within each set stable. It is hard to say what exactly the code-type of this AMS is because the rules seem to change in each part of the object. Sets A–C could be the expression of a code based on spatial distribution and, perhaps, on accumulation over time. Sets D–H, on the contrary, seem the expression of a code based on the morphology of the elements. Sets J–R, on the other face, could be the result of an accumulation over time. The repeated erasure of marks suggests that information was updated over time, but not necessarily that the code was based on accumulation over time, since in codes of this type updating is to be expected and there is no need to erase marks.

Laugerie Basse The spatula from Laugerie Basse probably bears an AMS of a different type (Figs. 3.21–3.22). This object was produced by extracting an elongated bone blade from a rib using the groove and splinter technique. The inal shape was given by carefully scraping and polishing the piece. The main, slightly concave, face (A) is engraved with three parallel rows of incisions to the left. To the right, one edge is marked with ive sets of notches. The other edge of the same face shows a set of 7–8 notches which were deliberately erased by scraping and are now barely visible because of the ink which covers this area. The other face shows eight sets of incisions, two of which have also been deliberately erased. Each of the parallel rows of incisions (A–C) on face A was engraved by a

La Marche My new study of the La Marche antler (1995b), a well-known object studied previously by Alexander Marshack, has provided a new interpretation of this piece (Fig. 3.24). According to Marshack (1972c; 1996), each set of marks was engraved by different points, showing an accumulation over time. On the basis of these putative changes of tool and on the counting of the incisions, the object was interpreted as a lunar calendar. I have shown that, for the large majority of the sets, the accumulation hypothesis cannot be retained: many morphological changes, interpreted 37

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Figure 3.17. Rhinoceros rib from Solutré. 38

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

Figure 3.18. Morphological differences between notches carved on the rib from Solutré suggesting use of different tools. Scale = 1 mm.

39 Figure 3.19. Schematic rendition of the notched side of the Solutré rib. Sets engraved by different tools are indicated.

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Figure 3.20. Top left: distal end of the Solutré rib. Top right: detail of the surface showing an entanglement of striations and traces of impacts gradually increasing in number towards the point. Bottom: SEM micrograph of the rib point showing highly abraded appearance. Scale = 1 mm.

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Figure 3.21. Top: face A of the engraved spatula from Laugerie Basse (cat. no. 38.189.1252); centre: close-up view of the same face; bottom: detail of the opposite face (B). The object was consolidated with a product which has now decayed, producing a microlaking of the surface. For this reason the technical analysis of the marks has been limited to the use of an optical microscope. Arrows indicate the position of sets of marks which have been deliberately erased. Scale = 1 cm. 41

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Figure 3.22. Schematic rendition of the spatula from Laugerie Basse indicating the different sets of marks engraved on this object.

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as being due to changes of tool, correspond to turning the antler upside down within groups of marks produced by the same point. I have also shown that the same point was used to engrave sets of marks on both faces. In two cases, two points were used alternately (set D and G, E and H). My analysis shows that the engraver, in effect, aimed to produce the largest number of morphological differences between the sets while using a small number of tools. In order to achieve this, he changed the orientation of the support, the technique used and the hand motion. Since accumulation through time does not seem to play any role, we must conclude that the La Marche antler code was based on the morphology of the elements and on their spatial distribution. The disposition of morphologically similar marks on several lines also suggests that one or both of these factors were probably hierarchically organized within the code, as we have observed in the quipu. Two horses are also engraved on the La Marche antler. Though they are dificult to assess, it becomes clear, by observing their spatial relationship to the markings, that these depictions played some role in the AMS code. This suggests that in the Upper Palaeolithic, as in modern times, systems of signs can integrate both iconic or symbolic elements.

different techniques and direction of movement offers an impression of disorder. Certain sets have incisions perpendicular to the axis of the object, while others are oblique. The length of the incisions, as well as their spacing, varies with each set. This object could, therefore, be an example of an AMS with a code based on spatial distribution of the elements and probably on their morphology. If the change of tool and of technique is taken as an index of lapses of time we might have a code based on all three factors: morphology, time, and distribution of the signs. Because of the small size of the marks and their dense spatial arrangement, recovery of information is only possible, in both the La Marche antler and in the Tossal de la Roca pendant, through visual perception. Conclusion Artiicial memory systems were developed and used in Europe at least from the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic, perhaps earlier in other parts of the world. It is premature to elaborate a reliable scenario for the evolution of these devices. Only a limited sample of objects has been analyzed reliably and few pieces have been studied exhaustively. More importantly, analytical and theoretical tools are not able, and probably never will be able, to provide clear-cut answers in all cases. The second of the serially marked ribs from Blanchard (D.38.23.1858) is an example of an object for which the interpretation as an AMS should probably be dismissed, given the presence of features indicating a possible functional use of the notches. For the irst rib from the same site (D.38.23.1958), its interpretation as an AMS represents just one of several possible explanations. The other pieces examined here (Labattut, Solutré, Laugerie Basse, La Marche, Tossal) should more reasonably be interpreted as AMSs, rather than objects used for other purposes. This is suggested by the recorded changes of tool. In other words, we will be able to identify relatively easily only those AMSs with codes based on accumulation over time, and those where the arrangement of the marks and/or morphological changes between marks are dificult to explain otherwise. It seems, however, that a number of Palaeolithic AMSs will be dificult to identify as such and that we will always have limited information, and a biased view, of their use and possible evolution. The ambiguity of the archaeological record stems probably from the particular polysemic approach that humans adopt when conveying meaning through material representations. If

Tossal de la Roca The last example I will present is a broken pendant from the late Palaeolithic levels of Tossal de la Roca, a rock-shelter near Alicante, Spain (d’Errico & Cacho 1994). On each side of this object we ind four sets of short incisions arranged in parallel rows. Microscopic and morphometric analysis of the marks shows that each set of incisions was made by a different tool and often by a different marking technique (8 or 9 changes in all). In one set (A4) it is even probable that two different points were used. Changes of tool cannot be due to the accidental fracture of the point at the end of each set, since experimental reproduction of these marks demonstrates that it would have been easy to engrave all the pattern with one or two tools. Use of the same point and the same technique would have given a greater homogeneity to the overall design. On the contrary, the use of several tools, Figure 3.23. (Left) Close-up view, from top to bottom, of sets D–H on face A of the spatula from Laugerie Basse. In spite of clear morphological differences between the groups of marks, the use of the same tool is recognizable. Notice the similarity between the mark D1 and marks of sets E and G (E1 and G1 in particular), and the similar shape of marks F1 and H1. Scale = 1 mm. 43

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Figure 3.24. Schematic rendition of the La Marche marks. Capital letters indicate groups of close marks carved by the same point (sets); small letters indicate sub-sets which correspond to a turning of the object between marks produced by the same point. Numbers in parentheses identify rows. Arrows indicate the turning of the object. Patterns near capital letters show sets carved by the same point. 44

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Figure 3.25. Schematic rendition of the broken pendant from Tossal de la Roca. Each pattern identiies a different point.

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decoration and notation, for instance, are not mutually exclusive possibilities in the engraver’s mind, how can we ourselves separate them when we analyze archaeological objects? In spite of these limitations, results presented here, and research, in progress suggest that codes based on the combination of two and possibly three factors (morphology, spatial distribution and accumulation over time) appear to be present from the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic. Changes in the organization of the codes and probably in the type of stored information took place during this twenty millennium time-span. Relative continuity, however, exists in the chosen raw material, in the marking techniques, and in the technical skills involved in shaping and marking the objects. These indings have important implications. By comparison with other types of AMS (e.g. writing, computers), we do know whether the techniques used to encode information, the choice of the support, its preparation, and its dimensions are semiologically neutral elements (Harris 1995). They condition the access to information,

determine the context in which the information exchange takes place, and often communicate as much as the recorded message itself. As Leroi-Gourhan (1964), Goody (1977; 1987), and Donald (1991), among others, have stressed, each technological innovation, allowing as it does for new forms of information storage and retrieval, determines the condition of knowledge and, ultimately, the functioning of human thought itself. No major qualitative changes can be seen from this point of view in the course of the European Upper Paleolithic. AMSs from this period are conceived of as itting into just one solid, long-lasting, transportable piece. The need for this is conirmed by the fact that they are in some cases carved on tools intended for use over a long period (Solutré, La Marche) and in other cases possibly worn as personal ornaments (Tossal de la Roca). AMSs that make no formal distinction between marks juxtaposed on a single alignment, or rely on the semiological technique of spatial grouping, seem to dominate. These are token-iterative systems, according to Harris’ classiication. Such systems use codes which are easy to learn. Emblems, however, are also used, as indicated by some signs on the La Marche antler, clearly intended to be different from the surrounding marks (e.g. set B and marks in set C). One can even wonder whether the apparent absence of emblems is to be attributed to the particular sample, mostly composed of serially abstract isomorphic signs. If Palaeolithic AMSs used depictional representations as emblems, we should address our attention to the hundreds of objects which, like La Marche, associate those re p re s e n t a t i o n s w i t h markings. A difference can be observed between the objects within the sample studied here. Unlike the Labattut metapodial and Figure 3.26. Frequency distribution of number of marks present in each set, on four of the Solutré rib, the markthe objects studied. ing procedure on the La 46

Palaeolithic Origins of Artiicial Memory Systems

Marche and Tossal de la Roca pieces allows a large number of signs to be stored on a reduced surface (Fig. 3.26). At La Marche, 237 marks form 18 isomorphic sets organized in 48 rows. At Tossal, 134 incisions arranged in 8 rows are itted into less than 2 cm2. At the end of the Upper Palaeolithic other objects, all around Europe, show technical know-how similar to that described at La Marche and at Tossal de la Roca (d’Errico & Cacho 1994). For instance, more than one thousand tiny incisions are itted onto one face of a Late Magdalenian (8 cm long) rib fragment from the Taï site (Marshack 1991a). Nine hundred incisions are engraved on a red deer metapodial found in the Los Azules burial; a comparable number of marks are carved on the Öküzini (Otte et al. 1995) and on La Ferrovia pebbles, as well as on the Zigeunerhöhle antler (Marshack 1992). Although the signiicance of some of these objects is still to be veriied, the increase in the number of marks and sets appearing at the end of the Upper Palaeolithic might signal an increase in the volume of stored information. This increase coincides with the use of marking techniques producing many marks on a reduced surface, and with a more systematic adoption of visual perception in the process of recovering information. Objects from La Marche and Laugerie Basse suggest that this is also the moment when complex codes based on the hierarchical organization of information, and the use of formally differentiated marks, are systematically adopted. These elements of continuity might imply that, during the European Upper Palaeolithic, the production and use of AMSs took place in similar social contexts. It is possible that only a few individuals were fully aware of the more complex codes, and that this competence was only one element of the role that these individuals played within Palaeolithic societies. Individuals specialized in storing memory among preliterate human groups, such as older members of the community, initiated individuals or ‘bards’, are the best candidates for being those who created, transmitted, and eventually modiied AMSs both in their artefactual reality and in the organization of their codes. This hypothesis is suggested by the relatively low number of these devices in the archaeological record, even at sites which have yielded thousands of well-preserved bone objects. If only a few individuals handled AMSs, could we reasonably expect a change in human cognitive abilities to result from the use of these devices? The answer is positive if we accept the notion that human cognition is socially distributed and that human actions are conditioned

by this ‘collective’ or ‘joint’ memory (Donald 1991; Hutchins 1995; Thierry et al. 1996). Even if used by only a few people, as was the case for writing before printing, there is no doubt that AMSs qualitatively enriched the collective memory of Palaeolithic societies, by changing the minds and the world of Palaeolithic people. Acknowledgements I owe a special debt of gratitude to Paola Villa for her critical reading of the manuscript and for her very helpful comments. Stimulating suggestions were also provided by Roy Harris, Merlin Donald and Chris Scarre. I thank Geneviève Lagardère and Marie Perpère, curators of the Musée de Solutré and of the Museé de l’Homme Upper Palaeolithic collections, for allowing me to study the objects presented in this paper. Jean Combier and Pierre Ayrolles have kindly assisted me during the study of the Solutré rib. The CNRS/Royal Society Exchange programme supported my 1996 stay in Cambridge, during which a irst draft of this paper was prepared. Francesco d’Errico Chargé de Recherche au CNRS UMR 5808 du CNRS Institut de Préhistoire et de Géologie du Quaternaire Av. des Facultés 33405 Talence France References Aiello, L. & R.I.M. Dunbar, 1993. Neocortex size, group size and the evolution of language. Current Anthropology 34, 184–93. Bahn, P., 1996. New developments in Pleistocene art. Evolutionary Anthropology 4, 204–15. Bar-Yosef, O., 1996. Modern humans, Neanderthals and the Middle/Upper Paleolithic transition in Western Asia, n The Lower and Middle Palaeolithic, eds. O. Bar-Yosef, L. Cavalli-Sforza, R. March & M. Piperno. Forlì: Abaco Edizioni, 175–90. Bednarik, R.G., 1995. Concept-mediated marking in the Lower Palaeolithic. Current Anthropology 36, 605–34. Bell, A.J., 1994. Interpretation and testability in theories about prehistoric thinking, in The Ancient Mind: Elements of Cognitive Archaeology, eds. C. Renfrew & E.W. Zubrow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 15–21. Bradshaw, J.L. & L.J. Rogers, 1995. The Evolution of Lateral Asymmetries, Language, Tool Use, and Intellect. London: Academic Press. Brain, R., 1979. The Decorated Body. London: Hutchinson.

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d’Errico, F., J. Zilhao, D. Bafier, M. Julien & J. Pelegrin, 1998. Neanderthal acculturation in Western Europe: a critical review of evidence and its interpretation. Current Anthropology 39, 1–24. Davidson, I. & W. Noble, 1989. The archaeology of perception: traces of depiction and language. Current Anthropology 30, 125–55. Davidson, I. & W. Noble, 1993. Tools and language in human evolution, in Gibson & Ingold (eds.), 363–88. Didon, L., 1911. L’abri Blanchard des Roches (commune de Sergeac), gisement aurignacien moyen. Périgueux: Ribes. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Donald, M., 1993. Précis of Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16, 737–91. Donald, M., 1996. The role of vocalization, memory retrieval and external symbols in cognitive evolution. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 19, 159–64. Duff, A.I., G.A. Clark & T.J. Chadderdon, 1992. Symbolism in the early Palaeolithic: a conceptual odyssey. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 2(2), 221–29. Eccles, J.C., 1989. Evolution of the Brain: Creation of the Self. London: Routledge. Elkins, J., 1996. On the impossibility of close reading: the case of Alexander Marshack. Current Anthropology 37(2), 185–226. Faris, J.C., 1972. Nuban Personal Art. London: Duckworth Press. Festinger, L., 1983. The Human Legacy. New York (NY): Columbia University Press. Foley, R.A., 1996. Measuring cognition in extinct hominids, in Mellars & Gibson (eds.), 57–65. Foley, R.A. & P.C. Lee, 1991. Ecology and energetics of encephalisation in hominid evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 334, 223–32. Gelb, I.J., 1952. A Study of Writing. Chicago (IL): University of Chicago Press. Gero, J. & J. Mazzullo, 1984. Analysis of artefact shape using Fourier series in closed form. Journal of Field Archeology 11, 315–22. Gibson, K.R., 1996. The biocultural human brain, seasonal migrations, and the emergence of the Upper Palaeolithic, in Mellars & Gibson (eds.), 1–8. Gibson, K.R. & T. Ingold (eds.), 1993. Tools, Language and Cognition in Human Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gibson, K.R. & P. Mellars, 1996. Introduction: approaches to modelling early human minds, in Mellars & Gibson (eds.), 1–8. Goody, J., 1977. The Domestication of the Savage Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goody, J., 1987. The Interface between the Written and the Oral. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goonatilake, S., 1991. The Evolution of Information: Lineages in Gene, Culture and Artefact. London: Pinter. Gould, R.A. & P.J. Watson, 1982. A dialogue on the meaning

Bromage, T.G., 1984. Interpretation of scanning electron microscopic images of abraded forming bone surfaces. American Journal of Physical Anthropology 64, 161–78. Byers, A.M., 1994. Symboling and the Middle–Upper Palaeolithic transition: a theoretical and methodological critique. Current Anthropology 35, 369–99. Byrne, R.W. & A. Whiten (eds.), 1988. Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chase, P.G., 1991. Symbols and Paleolithic artefacts: style, standardization, and the imposition of arbitrary form. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 10, 193–214. Chase, P.G., 1994. On symbols and the Palaeolithic. Current Anthropology 35(5), 627–29. Chase, P.G. & H.L. Dibble, 1987. Middle Paleolithic symbolism: a review of current evidence and interpretations. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 6, 263–96. Chase, P.G. & H.L. Dibble, 1992. Scientiic archaeology and the origins of symbolism: a reply to Bednarik. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 2(1), 43–51. Cherry, C., 1980. The communication explosion, in Symbol as Sense: New Approaches to the Analysis of Meaning, eds. M.L. Foster & S.H. Brandes. London: Academic Press, 249–67. Combier, J., 1976. Solutré, in Livret-guide de l’excursion A8, Bassin du Rhone. Nice: IX Congrès UISPP, 11–117. d’Errico, F., 1989. A reply to Alexander Marshack. Current Anthropology 30(4), 495–500. d’Errico, F., 1991. Microscopic and statistical criteria for the identiication of prehistoric systems of notation. Rock Art Research 8, 83–93. d’Errico, F., 1992. A reply to Alexander Marshack. Rock Art Research 9(1), 59–64. d’Errico, F., 1993. La vie sociale de l’art mobilier paléolithique. Manipulation, transport, suspension des objets en os, bois de cervidé, ivoire. Oxford Journal of Archaeology 12(2), 145–74. d’Errico, F., 1995a. L’art gravé azilien. De la technique à la signiication. (XXXIe supplément à Gallia Préhistoire.) Paris: CNRS. d’Errico, F., 1995b. A new model and its implications for the origins of writing: the La Marche antler revisited. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 5(2), 163–206. d’Errico, F., 1996a. Marshack’s approach: poor technology, biased sciences. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 6(1), 111–17. d’Errico, F., 1996b. Image analysis and 3-D optical surface proiling of Upper Palaeolithic mobiliary art. Microscopy and Analysis 39, 27–9. d’Errico, F. & C. Cacho, 1994. Notation versus decoration in the Upper Palaeolithic: a case-study from Tossal de la Roca, Alicante, Spain. Journal of Archaeological Science 21, 185–200. d’Errico, F. & P. Villa, 1997. Holes and grooves. The contribution of microscopy and taphonomy to the problem of art origins. Journal of Human Evolution 33, 1–31.

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Marshack, A., 1988. Paleolithic calendar, in Encyclopaedia of Human Evolution and Prehistory, eds. I. Tattersall, E. Delson & J. van Couvering. New York (NY): Garland, 419–20. Marshack, A., 1991a. The Taï plaque and calendrical notation in the Upper Palaeolithic. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 1(1), 25–61. Marshack, A., 1991b. A reply to Davidson on Mania & Mania. Rock Art Research 8, 47–58. Marshack, A., 1991c. The Roots of Civilisation. New York (NY): Moyer Bell. Marshack, A., 1992. L’evolution et la transformation du décor du debut de l’Aurignacien au Magdalénien inal, in L’art des objets au Paléolithique, tome 2: Les voies de la recherche, ed. J. Clottes. Paris: Ministère de la Culture, 139–58. Marshack, A., 1995. A middle Paleolithic symbolic composition from the Golan Heights: the earliest known depictive image. Current Anthropology 37(2), 356–65. Marshack, A., 1996. The La Marche antler revisited. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 6(1), 99–117. Mellars, P.A., 1989. Major issues in the emergence of modern humans. Current Anthropology 30, 349–85. Mellars, P.A. (ed.), 1990. The Emergence of Modern Humans: an Archaeological Perspective. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Mellars, P.A., 1991. Cognitive changes and the emergence of modern humans in Europe. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 1(1), 63–76. Mellars, P., 1996. The Neanderthal Legacy. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. Mellars, P.A. & K. Gibson, 1996. Modelling the Early Human Mind. (McDonald Institute Monographs). Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research. Mithen, S.J., 1996. The Prehistory of the Mind: a Search for the Origins of Art, Religion and Science. London: Thames & Hudson. Morris, J. & E. Preston-Whyte, 1994. Speaking with Beads: Zulu Arts from Southern Africa. London: Thames & Hudson. Noble, W. & I. Davidson, 1993. Tracing the emergence of modern human behaviour: methodological pitfalls and a theoretical path. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 12, 121–49. Oakley, K.P., P. Andrews, L.H. Keeley & D. Clark, 1977. A reappraisal of the Clacton spearpoint. Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 43, 13–30. Otte, M., I. Yalcinkaya, J. Leotard, M. Kartal, O. Bar-Yosef, J. Kozlowski, I. López Bayón & A. Marshack, 1995. The Epi-Palaeolithic of Öküzini cave (SW Anatolia) and its mobiliary art. Antiquity 69, 931–44. Palma di Cesnola, A., 1993. Il Paleolitico superiore in Italia. Firenze: Garlatti e Razzai. Peyrony, D. & J. Maury, 1914. Le gisement préhistorique de Laugerie-Basse. Revue Archéologique, 134–54. Pulgram, E., 1976. The typologies of writing-systems, in Writing Without Letters, ed. Haas. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1–28.

and use of analogy in ethnoarchaeological reasoning. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 1, 355–81. Hall, E.T., 1973. The Silent Language. New York (NY): Anchor Press. Harris, R., 1986. The Origin of Writing. London: Duckworth. Harris. R., 1995. Signs of Writing. London: Routledge. Hodder, I., 1979. Economic and social stress and material culture patterning. American Antiquity 44, 446–54. Hublin, J.-J., F. Spoor, M. Braun, F. Zonneveld & S. Condemi, 1996. A late Neanderthal associated with Upper Palaeolithic artefacts. Nature 381, 224–26. Hutchins, E., 1995. Cognition in the Wild. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. Knight, C., C. Power & I. Watts, 1995. The human symbolic revolution: a Darwinian account. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 5(1), 75–114. Lartet, E. & H. Christy, 1865–1875. Reliquae Aquitanicae, being Contributions to Archaeology and Palaeontology of Perigord and the Adjoining Provinces of Southern France. London: Williams & Norgate. Leach, E., 1976. Culture and Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leroi-Gourhan, A., 1964. Le Geste et la Parole. 2 vols. Paris: Albin Michel. Leroi-Gourhan, Arl. &. A. Leroi-Gourhan, 1965. Chronologie des grottes d’Arcy-sur-Cure. Gallia Préhistoire 7, 1–64. Lestrel, P.E., 1989. Method for analyzing complex two-dimension forms: elliptical Fourier functions. American Journal of Human Biology 1, 149–64. Lévêque, F. & B. Vandermeersch, 1980. Découverte de restes humains dans un niveau castelperronien à Saint-Césaire (Charent-Maritime). Comptes Rendus de l’Académie des Sciences de Paris 291, 187–9. Lindly, J. & G.A. Clark, 1990. Symbolism and modern human origins. Current Anthropology 31, 233–61. Marshack, A., 1964. Lunar notation on Upper Paleolithic remains. Science 184, 28–46. Marshack, A., 1970. Notation dans les gravures du Paléolithique supérieur. Nouvelles méthodes d’analyse. Bordeaux: Publications de l’Institut de Préhistoire de l’Université de Bordeaux. Marshack, A., 1972a. Cognitive aspects of Upper Paleolithic engraving. Current Anthropology 13(3–4), 445–77. Marshack, A., 1972b. The Roots of Civilisation. New York (NY): McGraw-Hill. Marshack, A., 1972c. Upper Paleolithic notation and symbol. Science 178, 817–28. Marshack, A., 1974. The Chamula calendar board: an internal and comparative analysis, in Mesoamerican Archaeology, ed. N. Hammond. Austin (TX): University of Texas Press, 255–70. Marshack, A., 1985. A lunar solar year calendar stick from North America. American Antiquity 50(1), 27–51. Marshack, A., 1987. L’évolution et la transformation du décor du début de l’Aurignacien au Magdalénien inal, in L’art des objets au Paléolithique: Les voies de la recherche. Foix-Le Mas d’Azil: Ministère de la Culture, 139–58.

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Chapter 4 Material Artefacts, symbolism, sociologists and Archaeologists Davd Halle The classic debate between ‘idealists’ and ‘materialists’ usually revolves around the most appropriate causal relation between material artefacts and cognition. This paper argues that the debate is, in practice, often empirically and conceptually arid since the most interesting questions usually, in fact, revolve around tracing the appropriate causal relations between two groups of symbols, with each group consisting of both material artefacts and their native-assigned meanings. The paper illustrates this point via a study of the causal relation between (a) the art (symbols composed of material artefacts and native-assigned meanings) displayed in the homes of various social classes in the New York region and (b) the homes and neighbourhoods (symbols composed of material artefacts and native-assigned meanings) in which the art is displayed. The paper also addresses other theoretical issues concerning the relation between material artefacts, symbols and cognition.

As a socologst who studes advanced ndustral

nterestng analyss of the Upper Palaeolthc cave art of Europe. Another dfference s that the socologst s reportng about everyday artefacts to people who nhabt the same, or a comparable, socety as that of the artefacts beng studed, and who are themselves lkely to possess smlar artefacts. Snce there s no pont n tellng people what they already know, a socologst s apt to seek dscoveres that go beyond common sense n surprsng ways. Thus the socologst s prone to seek symbolc meanngs and causal lnks that transcend what natves can easly dscern. At the same tme, natves may not only read the socologst’s theores regardng ther artefacts but also have an opportunty to dsagree wth the theores. In ths paper, I begn by sketchng some ssues and complextes entaled by the analyss of artefacts as symbols. I then llustrate these ponts by drawng on my research on art/artefacts as dsplayed n the modern home.

socetes, I could not hope to address the historical and archaeological questons rased by Donald’s analyss of ‘external symbolc storage’. However some of the theoretical ssues concernng the relaton between materal artefact, symbols, and cognton, are also faced by, and hotly contested among, those who study the modern world. The socologst addresses these ssues n a context that has some consequental dfferences from that of the archaeologst. Frst, all the data needed are, n prncple, collectble. Ths s especally true of cogntve data regardng the way the artefacts are vewed by the people who own, use, and resde near them. I wll refer to these people as ‘natves’ n ths paper. Thus the socologst mght be able to trace out, n a partcular emprcal context, a number of subtletes and complextes n the relaton between materal artefact, cognton, and symbolc meanng. The archaeologst can often only suggest these subtletes as possbltes, as n Dowson’s (ths volume) 51

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symbolism and its complexities I

But the artefacts whose meanng s dscovered by an outsder may be of great nterest too precsely because ther symbolc meanng was not htherto apparent to natves. For the reasons that I already mentoned, a socologst s especally nterested n such meanngs and symbols.

The symbolism or meaning of artefacts Renfrew (1994), followng Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (1925, 947), has defned a ‘symbol’ as somethng whch stands for, or represents, somethng else: ‘a vsble sgn of an dea or qualty or of another object’. It follows that the ‘symbolsm’ of artefacts s closely assocated wth the noton of ‘meanng’, for the lnk between the artefact/ symbol and what t ‘stands for or represents’ (or symbolzes) n most cases goes through the mnds of natves, outsde observers, or both. Only va ths lnk can the ‘symbol’ stand for or represent somethng else. Ths s why, after dscoverng what the ‘symbol’ refers to, we often then also talk about ts ‘meanng’.

Native-assigned symbolism/meaning, outsider-assigned symbolism/meaning, and the contestability of outsiderassigned symbolism/meaning An mportant complexty n the analyss of the symbolc meanng of artefacts results from the fact that the meanng(s) that natves assgn to them are not exhaustive of the range of meanngs the artefacts mght have. Perhaps natves assgn one meanng to an artefact, but an outsder who locates the artefact n a broader context may dscern an addtonal symbolsm/meanng of whch natves are partly, or even entrely, unaware. Donald’s concept of ‘external symbolc storage’ does ths, as does zubrow’s suggeston that a partcular ancent map s a ‘forerunner of our three-dmensonal relef maps’. Nor can the meanng that natves assgn to an artefact be taken as deinitive. Perhaps they give it one meanng, but an outsder mght determne that they are, at least n part, ncorrect. They mght, for example, beleve that a partcular artefact has positive connotatons not only for themselves but also for everyone else n the socety, whereas an outsder, wth access to addtonal data on how the artefact s seen, mght dscover that t s vewed negatively by some sectons of the populace. Thus, n analyzng the symbolsm/meanng of a materal artefact, reference to the meanng assgned to t by natves may be both ndspensable and non-deinitive. In this light, the most that an outsder/researcher who attrbutes certan knds of symbolc meanngs to artefacts can hope to acheve s nterpretatons whch can be compared wth one another for plausblty and tested (supported and even sometmes refuted) n the lght of new data. (See Lukes 1975 for an excellent dscusson of the ssues nvolved n allocatng symbolc meanng.) In ths paper, I wll sometmes, for convenence, desgnate the artefactual meanngs of whch natves are more or less aware as MN-NAT. I wll desgnate the artefactual meanngs that are added by an outsder as MN-OUT. In practse, there s also an nterestng mddle category of artefactual meanngs, for example those meanngs of whch natves are somewhat or mplctly aware but to whch an outsder can draw explct attenton. I wll sometmes refer to ths mddle category too.

The range of symbolic meanings If any artefact that has any meanng assgned to t, by a natve or by an outsder, s, n prncple, a symbol, it follows that the ield of potential and actual symbols s ggantc. Thus although I am not opposed to attempts to classfy symbols nto varous types, the categories that constitute such classiications are unlkely to offer more than some prelmnary deas. Typologes based on smple trchotomes such as Perce’s, or even more complex categorzatons, cannot be adequate by themselves, although they mght draw attenton to nterestng aspects of the problem of classfyng symbols. There s no substtute for the dificult work of uncovering the symbolism of partcular types of artefacts n partcular types of socal settng. Focusing on ‘interesting’ symbols/meanings Although any artefact that can plausbly be assocated wth any meanng can, n prncple, be called a ‘symbol’, n practce the researcher tends, qute approprately, to focus on artefacts whose meanng(s) are deemed to be of specal nterest. Indeed, when we apply the term ‘symbol’ to certan artefacts t s usually n order to ndcate that we have found such specally nterestng meanngs. What s deemed of ‘specal’ nterest wll, of course, vary by tme and by place, and wll also nevtably nvolve value judgements. Sometmes the symbols/artefacts that are deemed, because of ther meanng(s), to be of ‘specal’ nterest, are explctly recognzed as such by natves. The archaeologst or anthropologst wrtng for an audence that nhabts a very dfferent socety from the natves may, therefore, present materal that s well known to the latter. 52

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Causal relations between structures of symbols, versus causal relations between the ‘material’ and the ‘cognitive’1 Socologsts have been as fascnated as archaeologsts by the attempt to produce a general theory of what s the most approprate causal relation between materal artefacts and cognton. In both dscplnes, much of the debate over ths queston revolves around the merts of two polar postons, the ‘materalst’ versus the ‘dealst’ perspectve. For example, does a partcular materal artefact, or cluster of related artefacts, generate approprate cogntve representatons — the ‘materalst’ approach to causalty? Or, on the contrary, does cognton generate materal artefacts — the ‘dealst’ approach to causalty? These extreme postons — materalsm and dealsm — may make for dramatc ntellectual statements, but they often it the data less well than a mddle poston — ‘cogntve-materalsm’. Thus n many cases the typcal causal relaton between materal artefact and cogntve representatons s nteractve, both levels beng causally mportant wthout one beng causally prmary. For example, t would be hard, though not mpossble, to generate a particular artefact, such as a tool or a type of pantng such as a landscape, wthout some prior idea of that tool or landscape pantng. Lkewse t would be hard, though not mpossble, to have the idea of a partcular tool or of an abstract pantng wthout havng seen some prior examples of tools or landscape pantngs, n some form or other. If the ‘materalst’ versus ‘dealst’ debate often izzles out because the actual relation is interactive, analyss of the meanng of artefacts rases a perhaps equally nterestng queston. Is there an mportant causal relaton between two symbols (each consstng of materal artefacts and ther respectve natve-assgned meanngs). Lkewse, s there an mportant causal relaton between two groups of symbols (each group consstng of materal artefacts and ther natve-assgned meanngs2)? Having the conidence to answer in the afirmative often requires much data about the artefacts and about the natve-assgned meanngs. But a successful analyss along these lnes, entalng as t does the demonstraton of a causal relaton between two or more symbols/groups of symbols — here combinations of artefact and cognition including native-assigned meaning — sde-steps the ‘materalst’–‘dealst’ debate as to whether cognton causes materal artefacts or vice versa. It s just as revealng to debate whether one symbol or group of symbols causes another. In the followng secton, I wll llustrate these

ponts about the analyss of symbols n the context of my own work on art/artefacts as dsplayed n the modern home. the mode of dwelling in the sociology of twentieth-century art/aesthetics In understandng twenteth-century art, some of the most nterestng symbolc meanngs have been overlooked because we have gnored one of the central contexts wthn whch art should be understood, namely the modern house and the neghbourhood n whch t s located. The modern house and neghbourhood s a rch combnaton of symbols — materal artefacts and natve-assgned meanngs. Researchers nterested n placng twenteth-century art n a context have tended, nstead, to stress the mode of production (ether the mode of producton n socety generally or the producton of art tself) or the contexts of museums and galleres. But the majority of paintings in the last 150 years were irst purchased by ndvduals for dsplay n ther own homes. Usually t s only after many people have for some tme been purchasng the works of a particular artist, or a speciic artistic genre, to display n ther homes that the works begn to be dsplayed n museums and galleres. We need, therefore, not only to focus on the urban and above all suburban context of much modern lfe but also to enter the houses themselves, look at a range of trends n addton to suburbanzaton, and lnk the art and culture wthn to the socal lfe of the house and ts neghbourhood context. Ths approach can throw new lght on some of the man developments n twenteth-century Western art, such as the attracton of abstract art for ts audence; the declne of the proclvty for adults to want to commsson and dsplay panted portrats of themselves; or why ‘trbal’ artefacts came to be dsplayed, and przed, as art. In short, the house and neghbourhood — a complex combnaton of symbols composed of materal artefacts and natve-assgned meanngs — has an mportant mpact on the art dsplayed there, .e. on another complex combnaton of symbols composed of materal artefacts and natve-assgned meanngs. I developed my indings in a book entitled Inside Culture: Art and Class in the American Home (Halle 1993) whch s a study of the art found n the houses of a cross-secton of socal classes n the New york regon. The data are drawn from a sample of the houses of the upper and mddle class as well as the working class. Here I will sketch my indings with 53

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reference to just two genres — abstract art and ‘prmtve’ art. Both these genres are found prmarly n the homes of the well-to-do, rather than the workng class.

hstory museum dsplays n a few large ctes, lttle Afrcan art was to be seen n Amerca f t was not n prvate homes’ (vogel 1988, 4–5). What can be dscovered from analyzng ‘prmtve’ art n the context of the house? Among the New yorkers I ntervewed — both those who lved n Manhattan and those who lved n the suburbs — the largest category of ‘prmtve art’ dsplayed was from Afrca, and the Afrcan art they dsplayed conssted primarily of images of the person in the form of igures, heads or masks. Ths rases a central queston. Why do these whte, upper-mddle class Amercans, who usually lve n segregated neghbourhoods from whch Afrcan-Amercans born n the Unted States are typcally excluded (by economcs or prejudce or both) dsplay mages of Afrcans n ther homes n a place of honour? An mportant part of the answer came from dscoverng that dsplayng ‘prmtve art’ s hghly correlated with political party afiliation. Table 4.1 shows that, n terms of atttudes towards ‘prmtve’ art, there s a marked dfference between two types of resdents who dsplay ‘trbal’ art. One group places the art n a poston of honour and vews t as coequal to the best of Western art. Among such resdents, 66 per cent are regstered Democrats and 29 per cent are unregstered. Only 5 per cent (two households) are regstered Republcans. A second group, much smaller n number, vews the art ether wth derson or n Darwnan terms as the precursor of forms later perfected n the West. The reason why the respectful dsplay of mages of ‘prmtve’ persons, at least those from Afrca, the predomnant type, should be hghly correlated wth Democratc poltcs s not hard to dscern. The art of Afrcans s assocated n the Unted States wth the cultural tradton of Amercan blacks — AfrcanAmercans; to respect Afrcan art s to respect, one or two steps removed, Afrcan-Amercans. Further, to ntroduce an mage of a black nto a whte house and neghbourhood s to volate, albet symbolcally and prvately, the racal segregaton that pervades Amercan neghbourhoods. Almost everyone n the cty or suburbs knows f ther own and nearby neghbourhoods are ‘whte’, ‘black’, or (n unusual cases) racally mxed.4 To dsplay an mage of a black Afrcan n a place of honour n a modern Amercan house could scarcely be an nnocent or accdental act. Now, in the ield of modern American politics the Democratic party is irmly viewed as the party that s assocated wth Afrcan-Amercans. Indeed, of the varous groups — the South, the poor, blue-collar workers, catholcs and Jews, blacks — that once

‘Primitive’ and abstract art as artefact/symbols ‘Primitive’ art Only n the twenteth century dd Westerners begn to vew ‘trbal’ artefacts as art.3 Durng the prevous century, ethnographc museums often preserved these objects and presented them — Darwn style — as ndcators of the technologcal level reached by the socetes that produced them. Earler, they had been for the most part ether gnored or vewed wth horror as examples of pagan dol worshp (Goldwater 1986; Rubn 1984; Stockng 1985; Ames 1992). Untl recently, the standard explanaton as to why ‘trbal’ artefacts came to be dsplayed as ‘art’ n the West stressed the aesthetic acumen of certan artsts, drectors of cultural nsttutons, and crtcs, and the context of museums and galleres (Newton et al. 1975; Newton 1978). Ths explanaton became so standard that t has been referred to, roncally, as the ‘orgn story of modernsm’ (clfford 1988). Thus 1906–7 when a few vanguard igures — Picasso, Matsse, Apollnare, and others — ‘dscovered’ the aesthetc merts of Afrcan and Oceanc masks and igure sculptures, was a signiicant year for this vew. The conventonal explanaton further stresses how, later, the drectors of select galleres and art museums recognzed the aesthetc mert of ‘prmtve’ art. Examples n the Unted States, all located n New york, nclude the 1914 dsplay by the Alfred Steiglitz Gallery of African igures, the irst exhibiton anywhere of Afrcan sculpture as art; the 1935 Museum of Modern Art show ‘Afrcan Negro Art’, which stressed ‘primitive’ art’s inluence on modern pantng and sculptures; the 1957 openng of the Museum of Primitive Art in New York (the irst Amercan museum devoted to ‘prmtve’ art); and the agreement by the Metropoltan Museum of Art, n the late 1960s, to absorb the Museum of Prmtve Art and buld a specal wng to house t. yet there are good hstorcal reasons for assgnng a central place also to the analyss of ‘prmtve’ art n the context of the modern home. Long before the objects of trbal socetes found ther new places n major Western art museums, they had already made ther way nto prvate homes. As Susan vogel, the drector of the Museum (formerly center) for Afrcan Art n Manhattan, has wrtten, ‘Untl the 1970s, except for sporadc art exhbtons and natural 54

Materal Artefacts, Symbolsm, Socologsts and Archaeologsts

consttuted the famous electoral coalton that coalesced around Frankln Roosevelt and the Democratc party, nowadays only blacks reman as commtted Democratc party voters. It s, therefore, understandable that those who esteem ‘prmtve’, especally Afrcan, art should also be Democratc n ther poltcs. yet not all who dsplay ‘prmtve’ art vew t wth respect. A mnorty of resdents who dsplay ‘prmtve’ artefacts derde them or perceve them as nferor versons of forms later perfected n the West. Resdents of such households are ether Republcans or non-voters; none are Democrats (Table 5.1). consder ths n detal. Four of the households vewed ther artefacts wth derson. For example, a Manhasset woman had an Afrcan mask n her bathroom ‘. . . as a joke. Sometmes t scares people, and then we have a good laugh’. An East Sde woman who had a Polynesan face on her ktchen wall commented that t was ‘bzarre havng a cannbal n the ktchen!’ In addton to these households where ‘trbal’ persons are rdculed, three other households dsplay tems that, whle not ntended as derogatory, present ‘trbal’ socetes from an evolutonary perspectve as nferor versons of forms later mproved upon by Western socety. For example, a prest n Manhattan who drected the catholc mssonary effort abroad saw ‘prmtve’ artefacts as precursors of chrstanty. As he sad, ‘When I look at these I feel I’m at the pre-fath experence. Lke they do have a concept of an afterlfe. you can trace the development of the church from these knds of belefs.’ Hs collecton was arranged accordngly to record the progress toward chrstanty of the people he studed. The ‘trbal’ artefacts hung on the wall that led from the third loor to his fourth-loor apartment; his apartment above was full of the symbols of chrstanty — the entre layout a metaphor for the ascent of manknd from pagan to chrstan belefs. Thus ‘primitive’ igures can be symbols of the Rght (as well as of the Left), echong and perhaps updatng a long tradton (whch flourshed n Amerca from the 1890s to the 1950s, declnng wth the asserton by Afrcan-Amercans of a more aggressve dentty durng the cvl Rghts Movement) of usng materal objects — salt and pepper shakers, cooke jars, ashtrays, etc. — that depct black people n a degradng and stereotyped manner as subservent, powerless, and often wth grossly carcatured features (Dubn 1987). In the Unted States, Aunt Jemma s the best-known character depcted n such objects. Ths poltcal aspect of the dsplay of ‘trbal’

artefacts goes some way toward explanng both the domnance of Afrcan art and the domnance of mages of the person among the ‘trbal’ artefacts dsplayed n the houses sampled. Afrcan art s clearly an approprate symbol for the expresson of atttudes toward Amercan blacks (‘Afrcan-Amercans’), and igures and faces are clearly better at this than are pottery, jewellery, and fabrcs, whch non-experts mght not recognze as the art of black Afrcans. ‘Prmtve’ art, n ths context, s (at least partly) about atttudes toward blacks, as t was also, n mportant ways, n Europe n the early decades of this century — albeit with differences relecting the changed tme and place. clfford (1988), who recently crtczed conventonal explanatons for the attracton of ‘prmtve’ art n the West whch focus on the aesthetc taste of certan artsts and wrters n Pars n the 1900s, makes the European case clear. Pcasso, Apollnare, and the others ‘dscovered’ ‘prmtve’ art n the context of a perod of growng ‘negrophle’ n Pars and elsewhere n Europe. Ths ncluded the recognton of a varety of evocatve black igures — the jazzman, the boxer (Al Brown), and the ‘sauvage’ Josephne Baker. Enthusasm for Afrcan art was thus lnked to racal perceptons of blacks, who, n Europe, were przed for ther vtalty, rhythm, and erotc and magcal power. The dea that dsplayng Afrcan art s, at least n part, to do wth symbolzng the way resdents feel about Afrcan-Amercans s supported by observng that the vogue for dsplayng mages of ‘trbal’ Afrcans as art began among the Amercan upper-

table 4.1. Political afiliation of residents who have ‘primitive’ art, by their attitude to the art.

Political Afiliationa Democratc Republcan Unregstered total

Attitude to their ‘Primitive’ Art View it as Co-equal View it with Disrespect with Western artb or in Darwinian termsc (%) (%) 66 5 29 100 (n = 93)

0 60 40 100 (n = 15)

Note: ch square < p .01. The source for this data on political afiliation is respondents’ voter-registration records. Households wth ‘prmtve’ art where husband and wfe have each regstered for a dfferent poltcal party were excluded; however, such cases are rare (only three households). b Respondents who view ‘primitive’ art as co-equal with Western art are deined as those who both vew ther ‘prmtve’ artefacts as art and do not meet the crtera for a ‘disrespectful/Darwinian’ attitude as deined in note c. c Includes respondents who make derogatory comments about ther ‘prmtve’ artefacts, as well as respondents who, whle not makng explctly derogatory comments, vew the artefacts from an evolutonary (Darwnan) perspectve, as nferor versons of forms later perfected n the West. Note that f one spouse made a derogatory comment about the art, t s assumed here that the other spouse’s atttude s also derogatory. a

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mddle class on the East coast n the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the perod when Afrcan-Amercans from the South started to mgrate north n large numbers and to ill out urban ghettos in cities such as New York and Phladelpha. For poltcally lberal Northern whtes, dsplayng such artefacts would have been, and contnues to be, a gesture towards the ancestral culture of these now numerous black resdents of the regon. Ths ndcates the unduly monocausal character of the tradtonal vew that avant-garde whtes n New york n the 1920s and 1930s came to accept African artefacts as art because they were inluenced by the aesthetc tastes of the New york art élte, who were in turn inluenced by the Parisian artsts who ‘dscovered’ Afrcan art. Ths vew surely contans much truth, but to lnk the new whte taste for Afrcan art to the Harlem Renassance and to contemporary demographc movements of blacks nto the regon s just as plausble, and ndeed each perspectve enrches the other.

and reframed as ‘abstract art’. Some qualiications. This is an argument about the reasons why abstract art was attractve to the audence who purchased t. I am not suggestng that the artists who produced abstract art dd so prmarly n order to decorate plan whte walls. Nor do I want to argue that the vogue for whte walls was the only cause of the attracton of abstract art among twenteth-century audences. But I do suggest that t was a central cause, one whch has been overlooked.5 Conclusion: symbolism and its complexities II The precedng analyss llustrates the followng theoretcal ponts about the analyss of materal artefacts and symbols. Causal relations between structures of symbols, versus causal relations between the ‘material’ and the ‘cognitive’ Groups of symbols can plausbly have a causal relaton wth other groups of symbols. The symbols (here materal artefacts and natve-assgned meanngs) that consttute the modern house and neghbourhood have had an mportant causal mpact on the symbols (materal artefacts and natve-assgned meanngs) that consttute the dsplay of Afrcan art n the home and that consttute the dsplay of abstract art. To assert that the context of house and neghbourhood has an mportant causal mpact on the dsplay of art s not, therefore, to assert the prmacy of the ‘materalst’ over the ‘dealst’ perspectve. What s actually beng asserted, and what s often asserted (though not always explctly) n many socalled ‘materalst’ analyses of artefacts, s the causal mportance of one group of symbols composed of meanng and materal artefacts over another group of symbols composed of meanng and materal artefacts.

Abstract art Abstract art offers a second case study of some of the theoretcal ponts rased by the analyss of the symbolc meanng of materal artefacts. When I ntervewed well-to-do New yorkers who dsplayed abstract art n ther homes about the reasons why they lked abstract art, the largest group sad that t was the desgn or decoratve qualtes that attracted them to the works. Examples of comments are: ‘I lke ths pantng because of the vbrant colours.’ ‘We have a sedate room, and ths pantng explodes. It gves the room colour.’ ‘Ths pantng brghtens up the wall.’ Now f a central reason for the popularty of abstract art as dsplayed n the home s ts decoratve qualtes, then a key to understandng ts attracton for twenteth-century audences may le n the hstory of home decoraton. In the early twenteth century an attack on decoratve wallpaper, and a move to promote plan whte walls, was mounted by representatves of ‘modernsm’, the Internatonal Style. For example, Le corbuser proclamed n 1925 that ‘The tasks of our age — so strenuous, so full of danger, so vctorous — seem to demand that we thnk aganst a background of whte.’ The avantgarde’s successful promoton of plan, panted walls, especally whte walls, over ornamental wall paper, rased a problem. How to decorate whte walls? Abstract art, arguably, represented a soluton to ths problem. Now lnes, patterns, and desgns could return, not as despsed wallpaper but repackaged

Native-assigned symbolism/meaning, outsider-assigned symbolism/meaning and the uncontrolled process by which tastes in art/culture emerge Understandng the dsplay of Afrcan art, or of abstract art, n the context of the home and neghbourhood enables an outsder to add meanings (MN-OUT) that are not especally apparent to those who dsplay the artefacts. In the modern world, the (symbolic) meanings of art are unlkely to be neatly packaged and controlled and vsble to natves, or even to an especally ‘cultvated’ secton of natves. Those who purchase and enjoy art, ncludng the well-to-do and hghly educated, are often unaware of some 56

Materal Artefacts, Symbolsm, Socologsts and Archaeologsts

of the central reasons for ther aesthetc choces and of some of the most mportant (symbolc) meanngs of the artefacts as dsplayed n ther own homes. In my own research I dscovered that whle the upper-mddle class who dsplay art can usually talk at length about such topcs as the bography and personal crcumstances of the artst who produced the work, they can often say very lttle, have often thought very lttle, and are often unaware entrely, of some central features of ther choces n the aesthetc realm. For example, upper-mddle class New yorkers have rarely thought about the relaton between their decisions to display African igurines, faces or masks, on the one hand, and the partally or heavly racally segregated neghbourhoods n whch most of them lve, on the other hand. They have certanly never consdered ther decson to dsplay abstract art on ther walls n the context of the hstory of the declne of nneteenth-century decoratve wallpaper and the rse of the twenteth-century vogue for whte walls. These causes of, and motves for, ‘aesthetc’ choces are not usually repressed, n the Freudan sense of the term. They are smply not apparent to the people makng the choces, although they can be made apparent by research. Thus theores of the orgn and nature of aesthetc choces are lkely to be nadequate f they fal to acknowledge that people are often unaware of some of the man reasons for ther choces. Tastes n art often result from a complex and contnual nteracton between artsts, crtcs, and the purchasng audence. Ths process s less centred and beyond the ablty of any group fully to montor, let alone control, than s often thought. This inding undermines an extremely popular model for understandng the recepton of twentethcentury artefacts. Ths model s mpled by most versons of ‘cultural captal’ theory (assocated especally wth Bourdeu 1984) and by most versons of ‘Frankfurt’ and ‘neo-Frankfurt’ analyses of culture (assocated wth Horkhemer & Adorno 1972; Marcuse 1978; Baudrllard 1988).5 Accordng to ths model, artsts, crtcs and other cultural gatekeepers create artstc meaning and new aesthetc sensbltes, whch they then offer to the audence. The audence, f t s suficiently cultured, then accepts these meanings and sensbltes, more or less as they are passed along. Ths model, whch mples that artsts and crtcs are the drvng force of aesthetc and cultural hstory and have mastered the most mportant meanngs (symbolism) of the art/artefacts, is highly lattering to the artsts and crtcs, whch s one reason why the model s so popular n the art world and among those who wrte about these topcs. The truth s that artsts and

crtcs and other so-called cultural ‘gatekeepers’ are less n control of the meanng of these symbols, and more lkely themselves to be reactng to wder forces that medate not only ther tastes, but above all the tastes of the audence for art, than s often thought. The contestability of outsider-assigned symbolism/ meaning Some natves are lkely to contest these meanngs attrbuted by an outsder. There are, for example, natves who are, and wll reman, convnced that the prmary meanng of art s ‘aesthetc’. These people would contest an nterpretaton that suggested that mages of Afrcans dsplayed n the home often symbolze atttudes towards contemporary AfrcanAmercans. Much effort has been nvested by many art crtcs, art hstorans, and socal theorsts n support of the vew that those who chose abstract art have superor aesthetc sensbltes to those who chose representatve art. The clam that, on the contrary, many of those who dsplay abstract art may be dong lttle more than decoratng plan whte walls s not, therefore, lkely to be well receved n some quarters. (For example, a famous hstoran of modern art, on hearing my indings that disputed his image of the typcal audence for abstract art, referred angrly to the audence as ‘these specmens’.) In truth, the extent to whch the meanngs are apparent to natves who dsplay Afrcan artefacts wll vary. For some natves, the meanngs may fall nto the category that s mdway between MN-NAT and MN-OUT. They are meanngs of whch natves are somewhat or mplctly aware but to whch an outsder can draw explct attenton. Transitions from ‘symbol’ to ‘artefact with meanings’ Artefacts wth meanngs can be upgraded to mert desgnaton as ‘symbols’. Lkewse artefacts that are, at one tme, deemed to mert desgnaton as symbols may be downgraded to artefacts wth meanngs. Any artefact that can plausbly be assgned any meanngs can, n theory, be called a ‘symbol’, but n practce, as I suggested, the term ‘symbol’ s used to draw attenton to a class of artefacts whose meanngs are deemed of partcular nterest. It follows that f the determnaton, for a partcular artefact, as to what s of specal nterest changes, so may the decson as to whether the artefact should be desgnated a ‘symbol’. Thus t s only when we suggest that Afrcan igures may have more than aesthetic meaning for ther owners that t becomes useful to refer to these artefacts as ‘symbols’. 57

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Lkewse, t mght be approprate to cease referrng to a partcular artefact and ts meanngs as a ‘symbol’ f t turns out that artefact’s meanngs are less nterestng than was once thought. Abstract art has long been vewed as a symbol of the superor aesthetc sensbltes of those who dsplay the art. But f those who dsplay the art are often engaged n the mundane act of just ‘decoratng’ ther rooms and walls, then we may decde to cease desgnatng abstract art as a symbol of superor aesthetc sensblty. Instead, abstract art dsplayed n the home may not deserve more attenton than any other decoratve artefacts, such as wall mouldngs and specal lght ixtures. Thus artefacts wth meanngs that turn out to be nterestng can be upgraded to mert desgnaton as ‘symbols’. Lkewse artefacts that once merted desgnaton as symbols may be downgraded to artefacts wth meanngs.

yard, for they are unfettered by the requrement of legally ownng the lesure space depcted. Landscape depctons also, for many respondents, compensate for socety, for a long, nosy commute to work, for the bustle and pressure of the world of work and so on. Abstract art, for many resdents, decorates socety (a basc and perennal symbol). ‘Prmtve’ art, as found here n the homes of whte lberals n segregated resdental settngs, s a complex sgn. Among resdents who vew the art favourably t both gestures toward Afrcan-Amercan culture and resdents and, at the same tme, dstances from actual contemporary Afrcan-Amercans, va the very unlkelness of the Afrcans depcted n mage (a component of the symbolsm of Afrcan art that I had not space to develop n the dscusson above). Thus ‘prmtve’ art s also an example of an magnary achevement. It plays out a perceved socal and poltcal oblgaton to ntegrate non-whtes — Afrcan-Amercans, Latnos, and others — nto whte households and neghbourhoods. In ts ablty to represent the presence of these groups n the house, and therefore also n the neghbourhood, t depcts some of the dlemmas of segregaton for whte lberals. Fnally, art can convey symbolc meanng by ts absence, ndcatng that the mage t depcts s now seen by vewers as incompatible wth contemporary socal lfe. An example s the declne of depctons of the Last Supper n the ktchens and dnng rooms of the catholc workng class. Ths s related to the declne n workng-class households of the practce of several males, ncludng boarders, eatng together a meal that has doubtless been cooked by a female who s not mportant enough to be present. In these, and n other ways, can emerge a semotcs of art that s properly grounded n data. The nterpretatons so generated wll both take nto account the natves’ sense of the meanng/symbolsm of the art, whle not necessarly acceptng the latter at face value.

The range of symbolic meanings of art/artefacts The varety of nterestng meanngs that can legtmately be found n the symbols that consttute the art/artefacts dsplayed n the home s not well conceptualzed or captured by the smple noton that these artefacts/symbols ‘relect’ society. (The usefulness of the ‘relection’ metaphor is probably lmted to ts beng taken as statng a general clam that art needs to be understood n the context of varous structures n the socal realm, as well as n other contexts.) For the idea that art ‘relects’ society can be substtuted an emprcal account of the meanngs/ symbolsm of the art/artefacts. Does art, and do these artefacts n partcular, dealze socety, pseudo-dealze socety, compensate for t, consttute a metaphor for it, or even simply relect it? The empirical answer s that t s an emprcal queston, for art relates to socety n all of these ways, and more. To llustrate ths I wll draw examples not only from my indings concerning abstract and ‘primitive’ art, but also from my indings concerning landscape depctons, famly photographs and relgous conography. Famly photographs are complex symbols that, just n ther mode of dsplay alone, depct both the deal of famly closeness (n ther clustered mode of dsplay) and ts opposite, famly fraglty (n ther movable mode of dsplay). Landscape depctons pursue another pervasve modern deal. In ther portrayal of a contemporary nature as both calm and devod of other people, they sgnfy — n the materal context of houses featurng prvate backyards as a locus of lesure — the imaginary achievement of a prvate lesure on a scale far grander than the back-

David Halle Director of the UCLA LeRoy Neiman Center for the Study of American Society and Culture & Professor of Sociology Sociology Department University of California Los Angeles, CA 90095-1551 USA 58

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notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Baudrllard, J., 1988. The system of objects, n Baudrillard: Selected Writings, ed. Mark Poster. cambrdge: Polty Press, 10–28. Bourdeu, P., 1984. Distinction: a Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. clfford, J., 1988. The Predicament of Culture. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Dubn, S., 1987. Symbolc slavery: black representatons n popular culture. Social Problems 34, 122–39. Goldwater, R., 1986. Primitivism in Modern Art. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Halle, D., 1993. Inside Culture: Art and Class in the American Home. chcago (IL): Unversty of chcago Press. Horkhemer, M. & T. Adorno, 1972. The culture ndustry: enlghtenment as mass decepton, n Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. by John cummngs. New york (Ny): Herder & Herder, 120–68. Le corbuser, 1925. A coat of whtewash: the law of Rpoln, n The Decorative Art Of Today, by Le corbuser, trans. J.I. Dunnett. London: The Archtectural Press, 185–92. (Reprnted n 1987.) Lukes, S., 1975. Poltcal rtual and socal ntegraton. Sociology 9, 289–308. Marcause, H., 1978. The Aesthetic Dimension. Boston (MA): Beacon Press. Newton, D., 1978. Masterpieces of Primitive Art. New york (Ny): Alfred Knopf. Newton, D., J. Jones & S. vogel, 1975. The stuff that wasn’t n the Metropoltan: notes on collectng prmtve art, n The Chase, the Capture: Collecting at the Metropolitan, ed. Thomas Hovng. New york (Ny): The Metropoltan Museum of Art, 181–95. Renfrew, c., 1994. Towards a cogntve archaeology, n The Ancient Mind: Elements of Cognitive Archaeology, eds. c. Renfrew & E.B.W. zubrow. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 3–12. Rubn, W., 1984. Modernst prmtvsm: an ntroducton, n ‘Primitivism’ in 20th-Century Art: Afinity of the Tribal and Modern, vol. 1, ed. W. Rubn. New york (Ny): The Museum of Modern Art, 1–81. Searle, J.R., 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. Harmondsworth: Allen Lane. Searle, J.R., forthcomng. The Mystery of Consciousness. Stockng, G. (ed.), 1985. Objects and Others: Essays on Museums and Material Culture. Madson (WI): Unversty of Wsconsn. vogel, S., 1988. The Art of Collecting African Art. New york (Ny): The center for Afrcan Art.

The argument that follows has beneited from, though t does not duplcate, the excellent dscussons of the relaton between materal artefact and cogntve representatons n Renfrew (1994 and ths volume) and Searle (1995; forthcomng). For smplcty, I leave asde the queston of whether the symbolc meanngs uncovered by an outsder (MN-OUT) may also have a ‘causal’ mpact on another artefact/symbol. The bref answer s that they mght f they consttute the mddle category of artefactual meanngs that I referred to above (mddle between MN-NAT and MN-OUT), namely those meanngs of whch natves are somewhat or mplctly aware but to whch an outsder can draw explct attenton. The terms ‘trbal’ and ‘prmtve’ as appled to art are well known to be both unsatsfactory and yet hard to mprove upon. I use the terms here because I am referrng mostly to the audence for ‘trbal’ art n the West, and these are the terms that, for the most part, drove the nterest of twenteth-century audences n the artefacts. On resdental segregaton n modern Amerca see Massey & Denton, Residential Apartheid (cambrdge: Harvard Unversty Press, 1994). There are many nterestng studes of abstract art whch pont to varous aspects of the socal, economc, and poltcal context. My argument about the mportance of the house and neghbourhood s compatble wth acknowledgng these other aspects, and ndeed my argument should be vewed n that context. See, for example, Irvn Sandler, A Triumph of American Painting (New york: Praeger, 1970); Dore Ashton, A New York School (New york: vkng Press, 1973); Serge Gulbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art (chcago: Unversty of chcago Press, 1983); Dana crane, The Transformation of the Avant-Garde (chcago: Unversty of chcago Press, 1987); Stephen Polcar, Abstract Expressionism and the Modern Experience (New york: cambrdge Unversty Press, 199l); Sharon zukn, Loft Living (Baltmore: Johns Hopkns, 1982); charles Smpson, Soho: The Artist in the City (chcago: Unversty of chcago Press, 1981).

References Ames, M., 1992. Cannibal Tours and Glass Boxes: the Archaeology of Museums. vancouver: UBc Press.

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Mmess, Imagnaton and Role-play

Chapter 5 Mimesis, Imagination and Role-play Paul L. Harrs In the context of pretend play, young children of two- and three-years display a capacity for imaginative displacement from the here and now; an ability to bring real-world causal knowledge to bear on an imagined sequence of events; a sensitivity to the emotional implications of such events; and an ability to consider how the world appears when considered from another person’s perspective. The possible evolutionary implication of this cluster of abilities is explored with respect to planning and decision-making.

One of the most nterestng clams made by Mer-

irst, the child tends to re-enact his or her own actvtes — pretendng to sleep by lyng on the carpet wth eyes closed or drnkng from an empty cup wth accompanyng drnkng noses (Paget 1951). From around 18 months, chldren begn to re-enact not just usng ther own body — they also anmate dolls, turnng them nto actve agents who walk, or take a bath (Ncolch 1977). Between two and three years, ths role-play becomes ever more complex. Not only are characters made to nteract, they are endowed wth psychologcal states, ncludng sensatons, emotons and belefs (Wolf et al. 1984). Fnally, durng ths same perod chldren develop the capacty to enter nto jont pretence by decodng the pretend enactment of a play partner — to realze that n the context of a make-beleve epsode, pretend pourng from an empty vessel makes somethng wet, and wpng makes t dry agan (Harrs & Kavanaugh 1993; Harrs et al. 1994). In short, n the course of the thrd year small chldren become playwrghts who compose and act out solo or collaboratve dramas. I want to hghlght four features of such pretend play: the capacty for magnatve dsplacement from the here and now; the ablty to brng causal knowledge to bear on purely magnary transformatons; the way that self-generated magnary nputs drve the emotonal system; and the dsposton to vew and act on the world from a perspectve other than the perspectve of the self.

ln Donald (1991) s that a mmetc culture must have pre-dated the emergence of language n the course of human evoluton. He speculates, albet cautously, that the prelngustc chld can offer us a contemporary analogue of ths cultural mode. In this paper, I report recent indings on the normal course of mmetc development n young chldren. I also dscuss what we can learn from those cases of psychopathology where ths mmetc functon has been dsrupted. I argue that the developmental evdence does ndeed pont to an organzed mode — one that ncludes many of the features that Donald ascrbes to mmetc culture but one that also embraces varous developments n decson-makng and socal cognton. Mimetic development in young children Donald (1991, 168) argues that mmess s the ablty ‘to produce conscous, self-ntated, representatonal acts that are ntentonal but not lngustc’. It goes beyond mmcry and mtaton because t deploys them to a hgher end, namely that of ‘re-enactng and re-presentng an event or relatonshp’ (1991, 169) — ether for an audence or for the self. When does ths capacty appear n the course of chld development and does t emerge before or alongsde language? The most obvous ndex of mmetc capacty n young chldren s the ablty to engage n what developmental psychologsts typcally call symbolc play or pretence. Smple pretend gestures start to emerge between 12 and 18 months. At

Displacement from the here and now The possblty of dsplacement from the here and now has been taken as one of the desgn features of 61

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human language (Hockett 1958). Less attenton has been devoted to the cogntve machnery needed to support such dsplaced communcaton. Recent research on text processng ndcates that readers buld up a mental model of the scene or epsode beng descrbed, a model that s approprately updated as readers learn of further twsts n the plot (Bower & Morrow 1990). At present, we know very lttle about the way that ths modellng system develops n chldren. The research that I have descrbed on the emergence of pretence, however, suggests that t begns to emerge n a rudmentary form from 12 months onward. Makng ths pont more explct, t s reasonable to speculate that chldren’s pretend play must be underpnned by the cogntve ablty to go beyond the props and gestures that are used to represent a pretend epsode, and to magne the epsode n queston — whether t s one that they enact or one that they watch enacted by a play partner. It seems lkely that ths same magnatve process also comes to serve chldren’s comprehenson of language. When they hear an epsode descrbed that s not currently takng place, and whch they have never wtnessed, they can nevertheless deploy that capacty to map from the words that they hear to a mental model that they construct n ther magnaton. Alternatvely, when they have constructed a mental model, they can produce a verbal descrpton. In ths connecton, t s nterestng to notce that chldren’s own language gets rapdly lnked to ther pretend play. A priori, one mght have supposed that chldren would use ther speech to talk about current realty, and f not current realty, then about the actual past or the lkely future. Research shows, however, that two-year-olds use language to nvoke, and elaborate upon magned possbltes and not just realtes. For example, f they watch as one naughty toy anmal pretends to pour tea from a teapot over another anmal and are asked to descrbe what has happened, they descrbe not what they have actually seen (one anmal tltng an empty teapot above another to no effect) rather they descrbe what they magne to have taken place (‘He tpped tea over the other one — and now the other one s all wet’) (Harrs & Kavanaugh 1993, experments 6 and 7; Harrs et al. 1994). Smlarly, as they play, two- and three-year-olds often embellsh the epsode that they enact wth a verbal commentary (Fenson 1984; Wolf et al. 1984). In sum, developmental indings indicate that chldren have a capacty for magnatve dsplacement into a ictional, or make-believe episode. Between the ages of two and three years, they can map from such maged scenaros nto two dfferent meda.

On the one hand, they can represent such dsplaced epsodes va enactment, usng props, dolls, and ther own actng sklls. On the other hand, they can also represent such epsodes n words. In fact, n the context of pretend play, these two forms of mappng are often ntertwned. More generally, the developmental evdence does not ndcate two dstnct modes developng n sequence, wth the more lngustc mode buldng on the mmetc mode. Rather, the evdence ponts tentatvely to a gan n magnatve capacty that promotes — more or less concurrently — two dfferent representatonal sklls. Causal knowledge When we talk about chldren ’s magnaton or fantasy, t s temptng to assume that t s a whmscal world dominated by wish-fulilment, free association, and an absence of causal connectedness. Indeed, two of the major igures associated with theorizing about chldren’s play and magnaton — Paget and Freud — each tend toward ths vew, notwthstandng other major dfferences between them n ther theoretcal focus. My own research, however, has ncreasngly led me to a different view. A key inding to emerge s that when chldren magne a transformaton n ther magnaton, t s dscplned by known causal constrants. consder once agan the smple epsodes that we asked chldren to descrbe. They watched as one anmal ‘poured’ or ‘squeezed’ the contents of a contaner onto a vctm. We have found that when chldren are prompted by a pretend enactment of ths type they can work out the magnary causal outcome. For example, chldren realze that a contaner that s tlted or squeezed n the context of pretend play wll emt some of ts contents, that those contents wll be dsplaced onto an adjacent or lower surface, and that surface n ts turn wll end up, for the purpose of the pretend epsode, ‘wet’, ‘stcky’ or ‘drty’ dependng on the propertes of the dsplaced, magnary contents. In short, chldren apply ther causal knowledge of the world n calculatng magnary outcomes. Ths causal understandng can be ndexed usng a varety of measures. As noted earler, chldren can descrbe the outcome n words (Harrs & Kavanaugh 1993, experments 6 & 7); they can also, f asked, pont to a pcture of the vctm approprately transformed by the magned dsplacement (Kavanaugh & Harrs 1994; Harrs et al. n press); or they can respond wth an approprate pretend remedal gesture of ther own — ‘wpng’ or ‘dryng’ the surface that has been sulled (Harrs & Kavanaugh 1993, experment 5). 62

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Smlar results have emerged from a parallel set of studes on the early development of counterfactual thnkng. Our technque s to descrbe a causal outcome n the context of a short story — typcally an outcome that s untoward and undesrable. We then nvte chldren to say why this outcome occurred. We ind that even three-year-olds nvoke counterfactual possbltes n explanng such negatve outcomes (Harrs et al. 1996). For example, f the chld n the story s descrbed as dong a drawng wth a pen and endng up wth inky ingers, three- and four-year-olds who are asked to explan what happened often comment on a causal antecedent that was not n place — but whch, by mplcaton, would have blocked the actual, undesrable outcome. For example, they pont out that the story character ddn ’t use a pencl or — more magnatvely — should have worn gloves. Once agan therefore we see that young chldren’s magnatve conjectures are causally coherent: even wthn ther magnaton, they recognze the force of actual causal powers. All of ths evdence rases the ntrgung possblty that chldren’s ablty for magnatve dsplacement can be used n the context of thnkng through and weghng up possble causal sequences. Sometmes that causal knowledge may nvolve the understandng of lquds, solds and gravty, as n the examples dscussed above. Sometmes, t may nvolve the understandng of the belefs and desres that gude the behavour of other people. Indeed, sometmes t may nvolve a jont understandng of the physcal and psychologcal doman as chldren magne agents executng varous plans. In short, I am proposng a capacty for dsplacement from the here and now that is cognitively luid: it is informed by a varety of domans of causal knowledge (Harrs 1994a; Mthen 1995).

of age, some chldren nvent an magnary creature who can evoke the same feelngs of attachment and companonshp as a normal frend. chldren want a place reserved for the companon at the dnner table and burst nto tears f the companon s ‘left behnd’. Smlarly, havng magned a monster, robber or wtch, chldren may start to fear the very creature that they have nvented (Harrs et al. 1991). In more extreme cases, such magnary creatures may become a persstent source of anxety so that chldren have dificulty in falling asleep and repeatedly seek reassurance from caretakers (Jersld 1943). It seems plausble to conclude that the capacty for mmess s ntmately lnked to our emotonal system. Makng the same pont dfferently, the fact that a great deal of mimetic input is purely ictional does lttle to attenuate ts emotonal mpact. yet, n prncple, t would seem reasonable for the human bran to reserve ts emotonal reactons for states of the real world. What possble evolutonary gan could there be for creatures who are moved to tears by an magnary death, or frghtened of an magnary assalant? One possble explanaton s that emotonal reactions to iction are simply a slippage or inaccuracy n the apprasal system. In so far as mmetc dsplays reproduce many of the features of actual, real-lfe epsodes, there s a smple over-generalzaton of the emotonal reacton that would normally be elcted by a real stmulus to a mmetc or magned stmulus. On ths vew, there s no partcular reason to think of the emotional power of iction as revealng anythng except the emotonal power of real lfe. Ths argument, however, lacks psychologcal plausibility. In the irst place, even young children readily distinguish between ictional and real entities, so there is no inherent dificulty in marking the relevant dstncton even when the two domans share partcular features (Harrs et al. 1991; Wellman & Estes 1986). Second, there s ample evdence that our cogntve machnery can deploy that dstncton under other crcumstances. For example, when reasonng about counterfactual premses, young chldren and adults recognze that any nferences that mght be drawn from such premses do not amount to truths about the real world, however vald the deducton that has been made. Thus, n justfyng a concluson that follows from a counterfactual premse, chldren and adults refer back to the premse whch they are usng as a bass for ther concluson; they do not mply that the concluson has any emprcal valdty n tself (Das & Harrs 1990; Scrbner 1977). In other words, there s evdence that our cogntve equpment, even n chldhood, can

Imagination and emotion In descrbng the mmetc mode, Donald (1991) emphaszes the manfestatons that we see n contemporary culture, whether n a purely mmetc, non-verbal format as n pantomme and rtual dance — or n a more hybrd form nvolvng role enactment and language, as n theatre, opera and cnema. From a psychologcal pont of vew, t s ntrgung that such ictions have a powerful ability to drive our emotonal system. Indeed, we often classfy artstc works n terms of the emotonal mpact that they have: with regard to ilms, for example, we readily dstngush among thrllers, horror moves, weepes, comedes, and so forth. chldren’s pretend creatons have a smlar emotonal power. For example, around three or four years 63

Paul L. Harrs

make and sustan the dstncton between an actual state of affars and a hypothetcal or magnary state of affars so long as we are engaged n nferental thnkng. yet that same dstncton s frequently gnored n the context of emoton. Thus, we can ask what evolutonary gan there mght be n makng an epstemc dstncton between the actual and the magnary, whle at the same tme, gnorng that same dstncton at an emotonal level. I return to ths ssue below.

descrbed has major repercussons on chldren’s socal cognton, allowng them to adopt perspectves other than ther own current perspectve. Apparently, the mmetc mode s not just a capacty that permts magnatve enactment or re-enactment, t s lnked to an ncreased senstvty to varaton among people n ther psychologcal states and ensung acton. Planning and decision-making I have revewed four nterlnked features of the mmetc mode: the capacty for magnatve dsplacement from the here and now; the ablty to brng causal knowledge to bear on purely magnary transformatons; the way that self-generated magnary nputs drve the emotonal system; and the dsposton to vew the world from a perspectve other than the current perspectve of the self. What evolutonary pressures mght have selected for ths cluster of features? A plausble speculaton advanced by curre (1995) s that ths cluster promoted the ablty to plan and decde, especally n the context of rsk and gan. Suppose there s a choce between two routes to a water-source. One route s shorter but t ncludes a secton of open country; past experence has shown that attacks are more lkely n the open gven one’s vsblty to the enemy; the other route runs through the forest but t s longer. In plannng how to get to the water-source, a cluster of abltes would be helpful. Frst, t would be useful to engage n mental dsplacement — to magne the self takng each route. Second, t would be useful to magne the causal consequences of choosng each route — vsblty on the shorter route, and fatgue on the longer route. Thrd, t would be useful to shft to the perspectve of other agents — to magne what the enemy mght do, partcularly when the self s vsble. Fnally, n optng for one route over the other, t would be helpful to have some ndex of the rsks assocated wth each. To the extent that the causal mplcatons of each route can be magned, and to the extent that such magned scenaros drve the emotonal system — ncludng feelngs of fear — better decson-makng s lkely to ensue. In sum, the cluster of features that I have descrbed promote plannng because they mply the ablty to antcpate n the magnaton the causal consequences of varous hypothetcal actons, and to consder those from the perspectve of others as well as the self. They promote decson-makng because they offer the planner an overall ratng of each plan as ndexed by the vcarous emotonal state that a gven plan arouses when contemplated n the magnaton.

Shifts of perspective Much recent research on early cogntve development has examned the emergence of what has come to be known as a theory of mnd. In one of the now classc tests of ths ablty, chldren watch as a puppet deposts some chocolate n a box and leaves the stage. In the next scene, the chldren watch as a second puppet surrepttously removes the chocolate and puts t n another container. When the irst puppet returns, chldren are asked to predct where the puppet wll look for the chocolate. The developmental indings ndcate a sharp ncrease n the ablty to make ths predcton accurately between three and four years. Four-year-olds typcally recognze the fact that the returnng puppet wll have a more restrcted perspectve on the stuaton than ther own, and wll not take into account the transfer from the irst to the second box that they wtnessed. Hence, four-year-olds predict that the puppet will go to the now empty irst locaton even though they themselves would go mmedately to the second locaton. Three-year-olds, by contrast, frequently gnore ths dfference n perspectve and predct that the puppet wll go straghtaway to the second box. As yet, there s no consensus about the reasons for ths developmental change. Some clues are offered, however, by research on ndvdual dfferences. Although the shft n performance normally takes place between three and four years, chldren are more or less precocous wthn that age range. Three recent studes ndcate a correlate of precocous performance: chldren who engage n more pretend play are lkely to solve the perspectve task that I have descrbed, and varants upon t, at an earler age than chldren who are restrcted n ther pretend play (Astngton & Jenkns 1995; Taylor et al. 1993; youngblade & Dunn 1995). Moreover, the avalable evdence suggests that t s role-play n partcular, rather than pretend play n general, that s lnked to perspectve understandng (Harrs 1994b). These ntrgung fndngs suggest that the capacty for magnatve dsplacement that I have 64

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Lessons from psychopathology

pcture or analogue of an actual stuaton; t cannot, of tself, generate an actual stuaton. consstent wth ths proposal, Damaso and hs colleagues found that frontal patents, unlke normals, dd not show a skn conductance response when they were thnkng through n ther magnaton a potentally rsky course of acton. Not surprsngly, therefore, they made many more rsky decsons than normals (Bechara et al. 1994; 1996).

As I have descrbed t, the mmetc mode s a farly complex package of abltes. We can magne dsturbance to ts sub-components. For example, we can consder what mght happen to ndvduals who lacked the ablty for mental dsplacement. Alternatvely, we can consder ndvduals whose magnaton s ntact but who lack the standard connecton between the magnaton and the emotonal system. How would these ndvduals behave? If my argument s correct, we should expect a major departure from normal human functioning in each case. Speciically, we mght expect relatvely poor plannng n the former case, and relatvely poor decson-makng n the latter case. Two dstnct pathologes provde some support for these clams. Frst, consder the autstc syndrome. One of the earlest ndcatons that such chldren are abnormal s the absence of pretend play at around 18 months, suggestng that the capacty for mental dsplacement s damaged or delayed (Baron-cohen et al. 1992). Later on these chldren perform poorly (as compared wth normal and retarded controls) on tasks requrng a shft of mental perspectve, as descrbed earler (Baron-cohen 1995). Fnally, consstent wth the dea that the mmetc functon s lnked to plannng, autstc chldren perform poorly on standard laboratory tests of plannng, often known as executve functon tasks (e.g. the Tower of Hano) (Harrs 1993). More generally, the clncal pcture of autstc people suggests that they lve n a narrow temporal envelope lackng the aspratons and ambtons of normal people. Second, we may consder recent evdence regardng patents who have sustaned damage to the frontal lobe n adulthood. There s no obvous ndcaton that they lack ambton or aspraton. Rather the clncal pcture that they often present s that of beng excessvely, or at least recklessly, ambtous. Recent expermental work by Damaso and hs colleagues helps to pnpont the reason for ths. Normal people dsplay a marked skn conductance response not just to emotonally charged stuatons but to representatons of such stuatons, for example n the form of pctures. Frontal patents, on the other hand, show such reactons only to actual stmul and not to mere representatons such as pctures (Damaso et al. 1991). A plausible implication of this inding is that among frontal patents the magnaton does not drve the emotonal system, as t does among normals. After all, the magnaton can only excte the emotonal system by conjurng up a representaton — a mental

Conclusions I have argued that the mmetc mode nvolves a cluster of abltes — the ablty to pretend but also the ablty to work out causal transformatons, shft perspectves, and to feel emoton when contemplatng purely hypothetcal or magnary stuatons. Each of these features characterzes the pretend play of young chldren. What are the mplcatons of these developmental indings for the descent of humans, partcularly for human mmerson n culture and ts artefacts? I want to stress one mplcaton that mght otherwse go unnotced. Endurng cultural artefacts, such as wrtng, carvng and buldng, clearly extend our temporal horzon: they enable us to construct a publc record of the past, to look back at the past and to conceve of ts contnuaton nto the future. In ths way, the present s gradually embedded nto a temporal framework extendng backward and forward. certan cultural artefacts, however, offer a dfferent type of escape from the constrants of the present — a lateral dsplacement rather than a steppng backward or forward. In partcular, stores, symbolc props, and pantngs allow us to construct a publc record not just of what has actually happened but of magned possbltes. In the context of such representatons, we can embed an actual sequence of events nto a set of possbltes that exst n only our magnaton, but drve our emotons nevertheless. The evdence for an early mmetc mode suggests that chldren are rapdly attuned to ths pervasve aspect of the cultural medium. In the irst place, they can entertain the possible, the ictional, and even the counterfactual alongsde the actual. Moreover, especally n the context of pretence, the actual sequence of events, ncludng the gestures, props and artefacts that are used, s not nterpreted solely n relaton to ts objectve propertes. Instead, the actual s nterpreted, both cogntvely and emotonally, n terms of magned possbltes. Fnally, chldren’s ablty to engage n shared pretence — to agree on the meanng and causal mplcatons of ther gestures and props — means that the possbltes conjured 65

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developmental change and the famly envronment. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 35, 3–28. Harrs, P.L. & R.D. Kavanaugh, 1993. young chldren’s understandng of pretense. Society for Research in Child Development Monographs 231, 58, 1. Harrs, P.L., E. Brown, c. Marrott, S. Whttall & S. Harmer, 1991. Monsters, ghosts and wtches: testng the lmts of the fantasy–realty dstncton n young chldren. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 9, 105–23. Harrs, P.L., R.D. Kavanaugh & M. Meredth, 1994. young chldren’s comprehenson of pretend epsodes: the ntegraton of successve actons. Child Development 65, 16–30. Harrs, P.L., T. German & P. Mlls, 1996. chldren’s use of counterfactual thnkng n causal reasonng. Cognition 62, 233–59. Harrs, P.L., R.D. Kavanaugh & L. Dowson, n press. The depcton of magnary transformatons: early comprehenson of a symbolc functon. Cognitive Development. Hockett, c.F., 1958. A Course in Modern Linguistics. New york (Ny): MacMllan. Jersld, A.T., 1943. Studes of chldren’s fears, n Child Behavior and Development, eds. R.G. Barker, J.S. Kounn & H.F. Wrght. New york (Ny): McGraw-Hll. Kavanaugh, R.D. & P.L. Harrs, 1994. Imagnng the outcome of pretend transformatons: assessng the competence of normal chldren and chldren wth autsm. Developmental Psychology 30, 847–54. Mthen, S., 1995. Understandng mnd and culture: evolutonary psychology or socal anthropology? Anthropology Today 11, 3–7. Ncolch, L., 1977. Beyond sensormotor ntellgence: assessment of symbolc maturty through analyss of pretend play. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 23, 89–99. Paget, J., 1951. Play, Dreams and Imitation. London: Henemann. Scrbner, S., 1977. Modes of thnkng and ways of speakng: culture and logc reconsdered, n Thinking, eds. P.N. Johnson & P.c. Wason. New york (Ny): cambrdge Unversty Press, 483–500. Taylor, M., L.E. Gerow & S.M. carlson, 1993. The relaton between ndvdual dfferences n fantasy and theory of mnd, n J. Woolley (char), Pretense, magnaton and the chld ’s theory of mnd. Symposum presented at the bennal meetng of the Socety for Research n chld Development, New Orleans, March. Wellman, H.M. & D. Estes, 1986. Early understandng of mental enttes: a reexamnaton of chldhood realsm. Child Development 57, 910–23. Wolf, D.P., J. Rygh & J. Altshuler, 1984. Agency and experence: actons and states n play narratves, n Symbolic Play: the Development of Social Understanding, ed. I. Bretherton. Orlando (FL): Academc Press, 195–217. youngblade, L.M. & J. Dunn, 1995. Indvdual dfferences n young chldren’s pretend play wth mother and sblng: lnks to relatonshps and understandng of other people’s feelngs and belefs. Child Development 66, 1472–92.

up by one ndvdual are understood and elaborated on by others. In ths respect, mmess s not just an ndvdual achevement but a bass for creatng collectve representatons. Paul L. Harris Department of Experimental Psychology University of Oxford Oxford OX1 3UD References Astngton, J.W. & J.M. Jenkns, 1995. Theory of mnd development and socal understandng. Cognition and Emotion 9, 151–65. Baron-cohen, S., 1995. Mindblindness: an Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind. cambrdge (MA): Bradford MIT. Baron-cohen, S., J. Allen & c. Gllberg, 1992. can autsm be detected at 18 months? The needle, the haystack, and the cHAT. British Journal of Psychiatry 161, 839–43. Bechara, A., A.R. Damaso, H. Damaso & S. Anderson, 1994. Insenstvty to future consequences followng damage to human prefrontal cortex. Cognition 50, 7–12. Bechara, A., D. Tranel, H. Damaso & A.R. Damaso, 1996. Falure to respond autonomcally to antcpated future outcomes followng damage to prefrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex 6, 215–25. Bower, G.H. & D.G. Morrow, 1990. Mental models n narratve comprehenson. Science 247, 44–8. curre, G., 1995. Imagnaton and smulaton: aesthetcs meets cogntve scence, n Mental Simulation, eds. M. Daves & T. Stone. Oxford: Blackwell, 151–69. Damaso, A.R., D. Tranel & H. Damaso, 1991. Somatc markers and the gudance of behavor: theory and prelmnary testng, n Frontal Lobe Function and Dysfunction, eds. H.S. Levn, H.M. Esenberg & A.L. Benton. New york (Ny): Oxford Unversty Press, 217–29. Dias, M. & P.L. Harris, 1990. The inluence of the imaginaton on reasonng by young chldren. British Journal of Developmental Psychology 8, 305–18. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Fenson, L., 1984. Developmental trends for acton and speech n pretend play, n Symbolic Play: the Development of Social Understanding, ed. I. Bretherton. Orlando (FL): Academc Press, 249–70. Harrs, P.L., 1993. Pretendng and plannng, n Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism, eds. S. Baron-cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg & D. cohen. Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press, 228–46. Harrs, P.L., 1994a. Thnkng by chldren and scentsts: false analoges and neglected smlartes, n Mapping the Mind: Domain Speciicity in Cognition and Culture, eds. L.A. Hrschfeld & S.A. Gelman. New york: cambrdge Unversty Press, 294–315. Harrs, P.L., 1994b. The chld’s understandng of emoton:

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Rock Art: Handmaden to Studes of cogntve Evoluton

Chapter 6 Rock Art: Handmaiden to studies of Cognitive evolution Thomas A. Dowson Rock art, particularly European Palaeolithic cave art, is perceived in both popular and academic contexts as the origins of art. Consequently rock art becomes a handmaiden to evolutionary perspectives on human cognition. This position tends to promote naïve interpretations of the imagery, which are based on a number of empirical misrepresentations and certain logical problems. By addressing these issues, in essence theorizing the art, the interpretative potential of this imagery becomes more apparent. Palaeolithic images represented material and non-material resources that were actively negotiated in day-to-day social relations. They thus provide evidence for speciic social practices of real prehistoric people.

Merln Donald’s book Origins of the Modern Mind

But why?

proposes ‘three stages n the evoluton of culture and cognition’. These are, irst, the development of mimetic skills; second, lexical inventions; and inally, the externalization of memory. It is this inal stage that interests a rock art researcher such as myself. The externalization of memory, according to Donald, reles on a

That question is not as trivial as it might at irst seem. I argue that the idea that cave art represents the ‘earliest form of notation’ greatly limits the interpretation of rock art worldwide. In this paper I explore why it is that European Palaeolithic cave art is persistently referred to as the orgns of art, and/or the orgns of nformaton storage; and how t s that ths perception forces us to think about Palaeolithic art in certain ways — ways that draw on both a lawed methodology, and empirical misrepresentations of the art. In briely outlining an alternative interpretation, we are forced to think about early artistic traditions and human cognition in strikingly different ways.

visuosymbolic invention, which advanced through various well-documented stages, culminating in a variety of complex graphc and numercal conventons and writing systems. The second was external memory, which evolved to the point where external memory records, mediated by a ‘literate’ class, started to play a governing role. The third was the emergence of very large, externally nested cultural products called theories. (Donald 1993, 745)

Why?

Cave art was the irst of those ‘well-documented stages’ that provdes evdence for the orgns of the externalization of memory. Interesting and original as Donald’s ideas may be for those nterested n the evoluton of cognton, I take this opportunity to explore the place of rock art n our understandng of human cognton. Rock art, particularly European Palaeolithic cave art, has long been perceved as the orgns of nformaton storage.

In 1673 a Jesuit missionary made what is generally accepted to be the irst written account of images painted onto or engraved into a rock surface — images that we now call rock art. From the 1600s lterate traders and mssonares were travellng to remote and for them particularly hostile regions of the world. As educated explorers these people mantaned detailed journals of their journeys. And it was on one 67

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such journey that Father Jacques Marquette was drftng down the Msssspp Rver when he passed through an area of lmestone bluffs. On these surfaces he saw what he descrbed as an enormous and frghtening animal that he thought of as a great dragon-like cat wth deer antlers. So began the West’s strange fascnaton wth rock art. For centures thereafter countless travellers, missionaries and early colonists would come upon images on the rocks of landscapes they were reshaping in so many different ways. Many of them would write about these images. Today their words are a stark and often shockng remnder of the nsdous colonal processes ndgenous peoples around the world have had to endure. For Father Marquette the composte anmal wth the head of a cat, and a mask showng a human face wth antlers, would have provded powerful proof of the knds of demonc sprts he and hs European contemporares beleved ndgenous peoples worshpped. Some Europeans simply did not believe indigenous peoples could have executed such unequvocally beautiful and evocative imagery. In an account of travels durng 1797 and 1798 nto the southern African interior, then largely unexplored by Europeans, Sir John Barrow wrote: ‘The force and spirit of drawings, given to them by bold touches judiciously applied, and by the effect of light and shadow, could not be expected from savages’ (1801, 237). It is sadly ironic that rock art, in its early years of European discovery, merely served to reinforce Eurocentric attitudes of religious superiority and intolerance. But these attitudes were not only reserved for nonEuropeans. Just over two hundred years after the Jesuit’s startlng observaton on the Msssspp, a Spansh nobleman was excavatng n a cave called Altamra. He had just seen an exhibition in Paris of carved bone and antler from the Upper Palaeolithic. Don Marcelino de Sautuola was determined to ind similar examples of mobiliary art in the cave on his estate. While he was busy excavating, his daughter Maria wandered off nto other parts of the cave, and t was she who found pantngs of bson and other wld anmals on the celng of that cave. De Sautuola’s announcement of the ind in 1860 was greeted with extreme and vicious scepticism — the paintings were thought to be forgeres. At that tme t was mpossble for Europe to accept that primitive Palaeolithic people could have executed such magniicent paintings. Such an acceptance would certainly have challenged Europe’s cultural superiority. It was not long before rock art was being found

n other caves n France and Span; and these dscoveres challenged the vew that the pantngs n Altamra were forgeres. At a French ste called La Mouthe, for nstance, both rock pantngs and rock engravngs were found nsde a cave that had been sealed since Palaeolithic times. These depictions could not have been executed more recently. It was in the light of such evidence that the authenticity and the antiquity of this art soon came to be accepted. Refusal to accept rock art as the work of prehstoric hunter-gatherers is a position many writers the world over have adopted. Durng the decades after the images in Altamira came to light and after they became accepted as prehstorc, the most fancful ideas were penned to ensure European superiority. The dea of artsts from Outer Space, perhaps more ntellgent even than Europeans, has often been more palatable than that of so-called primitive artists. But even though such outrageous deas are no longer seriously entertained today, popular interest and the academic study of rock art is still used to bolster European superiority. A moments relection on the media attention that followed the recent ‘discovery’ of Chauvet and Cosquer caves in France reveals the power that Palaeolthc cave art possesses n capturng the magnation of a wide and popular audience. The indings from Chauvet Cave are particularly important as the radocarbon dates obtaned from certan mages suggest that this ‘style’ of Palaeolithic art is much older than initially thought (Clottes 1996). The inding has prompted a lurry of renewed popular interest in the origins of art. The media-hype raises two signiicant ponts. First, it is still generally believed that there was one pont n tme when one of our dstant, ndeed very distant, ancestors made a mark of some kind, and that that mark led to the variety of artistic traditions we have today. The idea that there were many, quite independent traditions of image-making around the globe thousands of years ago that have no bearing on contemporary artistic traditions is not one that produces sensatonal newspaper or magazne artcles. The second point, leading directly from the irst, is that the Palaeolithic cave art of Europe is still accepted as ‘the’ origin of art. The antiquity of cave art, ts geographc locaton n western Europe, and ts unquestioned aesthetic qualities make Palaeolithic cave art a seemingly obvious candidate for the begnnngs of the great artstc tradtons of the West. Ths echoes the once wdespread vew that Western 68

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history is often regarded as the history of humanity (Gellner 1964, 12). It is not surprising that the caves, particularly Lascaux, provde places to whch academcs, artsts and tourists alike make both intellectual and physical plgrmages. The tourst and educaton ndustres assocated wth these caves n France are well set up to promote a Francocentric history of art, with competition only from Spain and the Altamira cave. The book ‘From Lascaux to the Louvre’ wth a foreword by Francois Mitterrand completes a powerful natonalst message. These two related vews result from an old but persistent assumption that culturally modern Homo sapien sapiens developed n Europe and then colonzed the globe. More and more research, however, has revealed that biologically modern humans developed long before the earliest date for Palaeolithic cave art, and in places other than western Europe. It is not just a possibility but a certainty that all sorts of creatve tradtons developed around the world quite independently of, and in some cases even earlier than, those in Europe. But this certainty is overlooked. Contemporary, popular representations of Palaeolithic cave art still stand for the emergence of modern humans as we know them. Reproductons of mages from Lascaux and chauvet, that shout out from the covers of Time International and other popular journals, declare these as images made by people, not apes and monkeys. It becomes very dificult, then, to dvorce these mages from dscussons about the origins of image-making, symbolic behaviour and art; particularly for those wedded to evolutionary approaches to human cognton and culture.

vast panted and engraved panels are nothng more than a kind of manual on how to be a happy Palaeolithic hunter, and, in some cases, a dutiful Palaeolithic gatherer. Because cave art is seen as the starting point of a developmental progresson towards a complex range of representatonal devces, the message the images convey can only be simple and practical. The ‘primitive’ stereotype despite regular protestations never disappears; its merely becomes less explicit. In The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Human Evolution, for example, Strnger (1992, 249) wrtes: One of the most remarkable abilities of the CroMagnons was n the producton of engravngs and sculptures. These were part of a whole range of artstc expresson that appears after about 35,000 years in Europe, and which reached its heights on the panted walls and celngs of caves such as Lascaux and Altamra.

But is it so remarkable? The reason why some ind it remarkable that Cro-Magnons made art results from their thinking about Cro-Magnons in ways similar to those of Barrow and other early European colonists thinking about Bushman people of southern Afrca. As prmtve ancestors, ths remarkable art could not have been all that complex. Later n the volume, in a entry entitled ‘The hominid way of life’, Potts (1992, 329) writes, ‘the blossoming of symbolic expression portrayed on cave walls, in rockshelters and by carved igurines starting 30,000 years ago shows that novel modes of information transfer encouraged nnovaton’. The nterpretations that follow these sort of off-the-cuff remarks, at both popular and academic levels, are extremely limited and almost invariably centre on the images depicting observations of daily life (see, from the same encyclopedia, van der Merwe 1992, 370). The dea that rock art mages are passve, external memory records of one sort or another requires crtcal examnaton. In a number of papers Mithen (1988; 1989; 1991), for example, has argued for placing Upper Palaeolithic cave art within an ‘ecological context’. Because modern hunter-gatherers are keen observers of their envronment, and because tracks, hoofprnts, faeces, etc., are depcted, Mthen beleves the art relates to nformaton about the locaton, state and procurement of potental resources. There are at least two methodologcal problems here. The irst relates speciically to Mithen’s approach where he nduces meanng from the mages. Hunter-gatherers are

Functionalist interpretations Numerous writers have argued extensively that rock art records astrologcal and seasonal observatons (for example Marshack 1990; 1991); or that t facltated the exchange of nformaton that allows for the development of socal nteracton, or the creaton and mantenance of socal networks (for example, Conkey 1978; Gamble 1982; 1991; Jochim 1983; 1987); or that t depcts huntng technques and other nformaton assocated wth the locaton and condton of potental resources (for example, Mthen 1988; 1989; 1991). In these studies the production of rock art imagery is assumed, either explicitly or more implicitly, to be an adaptive process facilitating the storage and communication of vital information. But this information always appears to be practical in nature and one s left wth the mpresson that the often

alert to signs of plants or animals which may be of

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overlooked by functionalist approaches is the physical space wthn whch these mages were placed and subsequently consumed. The rock shelter or cave settng does not requre explanaton, because of the die-hard, albeit implicit, primitive perceptions we have about hunter-gatherers. Similarly, the setting does not add to the interpretation of the image. In fact the setting is something we rarely see in publicatons. What we are presented wth are photographs or drawngs of the panels. One such drawng from ‘The Great celng’ n Roufignac is a case in point. Today we are able to reach the panel on a mnature tran, whch takes about forty minutes. The panel is painted on the celng of what was once a low passage. We get a good vew of the panel because the depost has been considerably excavated. We have the assistance of reliable lashlights and electric lights. Not only is it easy for us to stand back and take it all in, but the panel has been painstakingly reproduced, allowing us to carry away a ‘reliable’ copy (reproduced here in Fig. 6.1). These factors necessarily inluence the way we see these images. We are surely seeing them in an entirely different way from the original producers and consumers. Ths celng panel s n a part of the cave whch the orgnal producers and vewers would, n places, have had to crawl on ther hands, knees and stomachs for hours to reach. Once beneath the panted celng, they did not have the beneit of the excavated loor — they were only ever between two and three feet away from the rock face. They had relatively unreliable tallow lamps. They would never have been able physically to experience the panel in its entirety as we can today. The example of ths partcular panel s qute straight forward; about sixty animals painted on the roof of the cave. In other caves images are painted or engraved n small sde chambers, n some cases only a metre in diameter, and room enough for one person. Inside these chambers, reached by chimneylke tunnels, are two or three depctons of anmals. Other Palaeolithic artists made use of natural features on the walls and celngs of these underground cave systems. At Bernifal, for example, an eye and a nostril have been added to a natural protruson of rock to reproduce a human face (Fg. 6.2). Numerous and dverse examples where artsts have made delberate and nterestng use of the rock face are n fact beng notced and reported. Artsts, and obviously viewers, also frequently used a technque of castng shadows to enhance the process of ‘simply’ seeing an image (Freeman et al. 1987, 105).

use to the other sex. At the camp the women wll tell the men about any tracks or game signs they have seen and the men nform the women concernng avalable plant resources (e.g. Draper 1976, 216; Silberbauer 1981, 201, 237–8). Due to the ubiquity of nformaton gatherng there can be lttle doubt that this was used by Upper Palaeolithic hunter gatherers . . . a record of such activity is present in ther art. (Mthen 1988, 297–8)

Because Kalahari Bushman people carefully observe the environment within which they live, it does not follow that any Palaeolithic depictions of animal features or behavoural characterstcs s recordng that as nformaton, a passve record, for others to see. The Bushman people, for instance, use aspects of anmal behavour as metaphors for relgous beliefs and experiences (see Lewis-Williams & Loubser 1986; Dowson 1988). Mthen s projectng an ecologcal nterpretaton of an ethnographc present onto Palaeolithic art. The second methodologcal problem s perhaps more damaging and is shared by most if not all functonalst approaches. Functonalst nterpretations are fundamentally lawed because of their teleologcal nature. The consequence of producng these images, which allowed Palaeolithic communities to ‘adapt’ to ther envronment, cannot account for making the images in the irst place. Some writers attempt to downplay the teleology of their argument by stressing they are not dealing with the origins of the art (Gamble 1991, 3; Mithen 1991, 104). But caveats such as these do not elmnate the logcal problems of the explanatons. An explanaton for the origins of and motivation for image-making needs to be forthcomng. And that explanaton needs to explan how makng the art facltates the knds of consequences functonalsts beleve the art to have had for Palaeolithic communities. Simply, albeit explicitly, ignoring the source of logical problems, n ths case orgns, does not result n the resoluton of such problems. Besides these methodological problems there are a number of emprcal ssues that requre closer attenton. Whle some of the numerous pantngs and engravings obviously do depict observations anyone could make on a daily basis, prominent features of Palaeolithic cave art are simply overlooked when thnkng of the art as an ad to the storage of nformaton. As Halverson (1993, 762) ponts out n his comment on Donald’s book, ‘In the few pages discussing Palaeolithic art (pp. 279–84) there is hardly a sentence that is not dubious or merely wrong.’ The most signiicant feature of the art that is 70

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Figure 6.1. A reproduction of the ceiling panel from Roufignac. (After Barriere 1982.) ‘Images’ like these are often very dificult to ind. And obviously, such techniques draw on an intentional desre that dd not dstngush between the mage and the support; a dstncton that s hghlghted n Western, formalist approaches to art. Indeed, functionalist approaches to Palaeolithic cave art have relied solely on a Western, post-enlightenment apprecaton of art. It is much easier to see these large panels having a didactic function when looking at clean, easy-toread copies in the warmth of one’s armchair. But, havng crawled down some of these passages wth hardly any light, spent a considerable amount of time locating and looking for the images, I ind it dificult to see how they ‘enabled rapid information recall‘ (Mthen 1989, 692). An approach that gnores the physical experience of looking at the images, an experience that played on intense exploration and ambiguity, merely misrepresents the art. Such msrepresentaton results n the knd of monolthc perception of ‘Palaeolithic art’ that Conkey (1987) suggests we avod. Besides this monolithic understanding of an

incredibly diverse artistic tradition(s), these functionalist explanations deny the images their own reality. One of the central tenets of the functionalist approach s to devse at the outset a context wthn whch ‘the art’ s to be examned. The context s taken to be the set of ecologcal parameters wthn whch the art was located, or a seres of archaeologcal features wth whch the art s assocated. Ths context then explains the art. In fact, Mithen (1991, 113–14) inds it mpossble to separate the notons of human adaptation and creativity since they are dependent upon each other. I am left wondering about a possible connecton between the creatve act of producng mages and the creatve thoughts about huntng behaviour such images helped generate. I feel that these must have fed off each other n a spral of creativity leaving us today with the splendours of Palaeolithic art and enabling the Palaeolithic hunters to adapts to ther uncertan world. (Mthen 1991, 113–14)

Gamble’s approach s more subtle, but no less problematc. 71

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art, then, simply facilitated strateges for survval. Approaches lke these predetermine the legitimacy of the imagery. Because Palaeolithic images are assumed at the outset to be early and primitive forms of information exchange, they are nothng more than handmaidens to an evolutionary perspective of prehistory. Prehistory of this sort tends to be what Gellner (1964, 12) calls a ‘world growth story’. Makng art s just another one of those strateges prehistoric hunter-gatherers (usually only the hunters though) adopt to ensure surFigure 6.2. Below the outline of a mammoth, an eye and nostril were added to a vval. natural feature on the wall of the cave (Bernifal) to give the impression of a human face. But there is no need to look at the lives of hunterIn placing the art in different contexts of long-term gatherers or their art in this functionalist way. Huntsurvival — open, refuge and expansion — I have er-gatherer art, past or present, is an integral part of grounded the discussion of its diversity in ecologithe socio-political milieu of the community in which cal varables so that nstead of argung about ntent was produced and experenced (Dowson n press). ton, motve or the meanng of art we can look at ts This view begins by exploring the meaning and social varable role n survval and negotaton. (Gamble role of the imagery; an exploration that must take 1991, 12) place at both local and regonal levels. Attemptng But, as Lewis-Williams points out, contexts are to understand the meanng and motvaton s not as not ‘given’ as the illusion of positivist archaeology futile as Gamble implies. By theorizing the meaning suggests. All contexts are assemblages of selected and social role of hunter-gatherer art, we are able to features; they are value-laden constructs made construct an nformng context, and hence underby archaeologists acting in speciic social circumstand ts role n negotatng socal nteracton. stances. Archaeologsts decde whch features of the past shall be deemed the context of the art. We cannot, however, know what consttutes the nformng context of the art, as dstnct from a vague background, untl we know somethng about ts ‘meaning’ and social role. If we try to formulate the nformng context of the art before we know ts ‘meaning’ and social role, we shall simply be placing constraints on the type of explanation. (LewisWllams 1990, 133)

theorizing Palaeolithic images Over the last decade or so the shamanstc nterpretation of Palaeolithic imagery has developed considerably. Shamanism has often been used to explain Palaeolithic cave art, but in a slight and uncritical manner. In 1988 two papers initiated a more methodologically rigorous attempt at developing this line of enquiry. One attempted to ind a link, based on bird ethology, between the human igure and the ‘brd on the staff’ mage from the shaft of Lascaux (Davenport & Jochim 1988). The other explored a neuropsychological link between visions seen in an altered state of consciousness and Palaeolithic images (Lewis-Williams & Dowson 1988). Having established a neuropsychological bridge between modern experences n altered states of conscous-

Mthen’s ‘ecologcal context’, wth partcular reference to huntng actvtes, results n an ecologcal and adaptational explanation for Palaeolithic imagery that is overtly masculist. By examining the art in the context of archaeologically observed shifts in demography, Gamble also produces an adaptationist understandng as those demographc shfts are thought to be inluenced by ecological constraints. Palaeolithic 72

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ness and Palaeolithic imagery with strong relations of relevance, Lewis-Williams has gone on to develop a shamanistic interpretation that has more explanatory power and potential than any other explanation on offer (Lewis-Williams 1991; 1994; 1997a,b; Clottes & Lewis-Williams 1996). As with any interpretative enterprise in archaeology, the shamanistic approach is not without problems. But for the purposes of this piece, those problems do not include the teleology inherent in the functionalist approaches I have already discussed. In fact the neuropsychological strand of evidence can explain how it is that two-dimensional marks came to represent three-dimensional objects. The answer lies in the way in which visual hallucinations are perceved n altered states of conscousness. Numerous reports suggest that vsual hallucinations and afterimages, which may recur much later, are projected onto plane surfaces. Similarly, the neuropsychological bridge allows us to infer that early Palaeolithic artists experiencing an altered state of conscousness would also have ‘seen’ mental images and after-images projected onto their surroundngs. As a result of experences n altered states, their lives would have already been invested wth mages. There was thus no need to nvent them intellectually. Tracing projected mental imagery with a stck n the sand or on a soft wall n a cave would have ‘ixed’ them, enabling them to be experienced again and again by subsequent viewers. We do not need to resort to complex hypotheses and explanations of how three-dimensional objects came to be represented in two dimensions. Palaeolithic images resulted from a ‘ixing’ of existing mental imagery. The representaton of vsual hallucnatons provded a ‘physical reality’ of personal (spiritual) experiences to be shared and manpulated. As the makng of these mages developed, so too the processes of makng and the experences of seeng these mages added to ndvduals’ perceptions of a supernatural reality. We know that not all paintings were applied with a brush. In certain cases pgment was blown onto the rock surface. Some of these pigments contained manganese oxides. In attemptng to replcate some of the pantngs Lorblanchet was advsed aganst usng pgments contanng manganese oxde (1995, 218), as ths would lead to managanese posonng. He was nformed that this would result in severe psychiatric disorders, ncludng hallucnatons. The medical literature indicates that the side-effects of manganese toxicity are well known. Manganese intoxication was irst described in 1837 (Cook

et al. 1974, 59), and has snce been the subject of many medical reports (see, for example, Abd el Naby & Hassanein 1965; Mena et al. 1967). Those comng nto contact (e.g. through nhalaton) wth manganese develop severe psychiatric and neurological symptoms. Patients become extremely excited, agitated and even deluded. They also report hallucnatons. It is not, then, mere speculation that some artsts at least would have experenced hallucnatons whle blowng pgments onto the rock. Ths would not only have produced ‘new’ loating images, but would also have inluenced perception of the rock surface tself. Numerous accounts of vsual hallucinations experienced under laboratory conditions menton a change n vsual depth relatons and a magniication of detail on surrounding objects (Cohen 1964, 133; Kluver 1966; Keiffer & Moritz 1968). Wth such vsual effects the rock face would not have been perceved as a statc surface. Natural features would have presented vsual opportuntes for graphic manipulation (as in Fig. 6.2). Lewis-Willams (1997b, 333) suggests the rock face should be thought of as a ‘membrane’ between the real world and a sprt world. Such beliefs were, in all probability, widely held, given the widespread yet diverse use and manipulation of natural features on the cave walls. Interpretations that identify images with visual hallucinations are more general in character. But the explanatory power of the shamanistic approach is seen in the way n whch ndvdual mages can be explaned more fully in speciic terms. This avoids the criticism that the construction of Palaeolithic shamanism is nothing more than a grand, monolthc socal nsttuton, and hence has no real meanng or value at all. The potental of the shamanstc approach can be demonstrated from a well-known example from Pech-Merle, the ‘spotted’ horses. Lorblanchet (1995, 210–16) has suggested that the panel was produced n four stages. Briely, the outline of the two horses was followed by six negative hand stencils, then clouds and rows of blown dots, and inally a red ish, red dots and inger stencils were added (Fig. 6.3). Interestingly, the head of one of the horses is suggested by a natural edge of the lat surface on whch the pantngs were executed. Whle blowng the outlne of the horses or the hand stencls wth pgments contanng manganese, t s not outrageous to suggest that the artst(s) began to experence vsual hallucnatons; perhaps the entoptc dots that were subsequently added. But the surface of the rock wth the suggestve horse’s head would also have 73

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world liken to being under water. Rather than simply identifying the spotted horses as a representation of a complex, stage three hallucination, by focusing on the physical processes of making and ‘seeing’ the image, we are able to demonstrate a speciic link between ths panted mage and the sprtual experence from whch t was derved. The uniqueness and apparent simplicity of this panel leads me to thnk t was the revelaton of an ndvdual ‘shaman’. We are, then, able to learn somethng of the apparatus of shamanc representaton that gave this unique image the active part it played in negotatng the socal role of the shaman wth whch it was associated. In painting such a strikingly original panel the shaman was negotiating a speciic, personal relatonshp wth the sprt world. Ths ntmate spritual relationship would certainly have inluenced that person’s identity in the ‘real’ world (cf. Dowson 1998). By extending the study of this image to include the general topography of Pech-Merle and other painted panels, as well as other sites in the Quercy area, a fuller apprecaton of ths person’s role n hs or her community will be possible. In the same region, Lewis-Williams (1997a) considers another distinctive motif, the so-called ‘wounded man’. By examining the details of this rare motif in terms of speciic experiences in altered states of consciousness, and other more abundant imagery, Lewis-Williams argues that these human igures represented a challenge to a hegemony negotiated by a more dominant representational system. These unique examples from Quercy represent distinct social processes. Through the non-material and materal producton of alternatve mages, margnalzed or dsenfranchsed shamans, manpulatng the apparatus of shamanc representaton, negotated speciic personal identities. These images empowered them to advance ther own sprtual and poltcal nterests and hence produce some degree of socal visibility. Mapping the details of speciic spiritual experiences on a microscale, in the ways suggested by the Quercy examples, provides evidence for the speciic socal practces of real prehstorc agents, rather than a record of abstract socal roles and nsttutons where history appears as a by-product. By theorizing the art at ths local level we construct ts relgous and political signiicance. In so doing, we set out to make Palaeolithic history (cf. Barret 1987). By exploring and further developing this religious and political interpretation of Palaeolithic art it becomes increasingly dificult to see how the makng of these mages facltated the exchange of

Figure 6.3. The four episodes of ‘painting’ activity that produced the ‘spotted horses panel’ in Pech-Merle. (Adapted from Lorblanchet 1995, 212–13.) come alive, imparting an incontrovertible reality to the painted image. The ish could easily represent n a graphc manner experences people all over the 74

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information as part of strategies for survival. Palaeolthc cave art does not represent smple forms of information exchange that constitute the early stages of an evolutionary trend ending in complex theories. On the contrary, the images represented material and non-material resources actively negotiated in dayto-day social relations. In releasing cave art from a poston of ntellectual servtude, recent nterpretatve directions in the study of rock art worldwide present a powerful challenge to the persistent evolutionary and androcentrc perspectves on human cognton and art.

Dowson, T.A., 1998. Like people in prehistory. World Archaeology 29(3), 333–43. Dowson, T.A., in press. Painting as politics: exposing historical processes in hunter-gatherer rock art, in Hunters and Gatherers in the Modern World: Conlict, Resistance, and Self -determination, eds. M. Biesele, R. Hitchcock & P. Schweitzer. Providence: Berghahn Books. Freeman, D., J.G. Echegerey, F. Bernaldo de Quiros & J. Ogden, 1987. Altimira Revisited and Other Essays on Early Art. Chicago (IL): Institute for Prehistoric Investigations. Gamble, C., 1982. Interaction and alliance in Palaeolithic society. Man 17, 92–107. Gamble, C., 1991. The social context for European Palaeolithc art. Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 57(1), 3–15. Gellner, E., 1964. Thought and Change. London: Wedenfeld & Nicolson. Halverson, J., 1993. Mythos and logos: comment on Donald, 1993. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16(4), 762. Jochim, M., 1983. Palaeolithic cave art in ecological perspectve, n Hunter-gatherer Economy in Prehistory, ed. G. Bailey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 212–19. Jochim, M., 1987. Late Pleistocene refugia in Europe, in The Pleistocene Old World, ed. O. Soffer. New york (Ny): Plenum Press, 365–75. Jones, S., R. Martin & D. Pilbeam (eds.), 1992. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Human Evolution. cambrdge: Cambridge University Press. Keiffer, S.N. & T.B. Moritz, 1968. Psychedelic drugs. Pennsylvannia Medicine 71, 57–67. Kluver, H., 1966. Mescal and Mechanisms of Hallucinations. Chicago (IL): Chicago University Press. Lewis-Williams, J.D., 1990. Documentation, analysis and nterpretaton: dlemmas n rock art research. South African Archaeological Bulletin 45, 126–36. Lewis-Williams, J.D., 1991. Wrestling with analogy: a problem in Upper Palaeolithic art research. Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 57(1), 149–62. Lewis-Williams, J.D., 1994. Rock art and ritual: southern Africa and beyond. Complutum 5, 277–89. Lewis-Williams, J.D., 1997a. Agency, art and altered states of consciousness: a motif in French (Quercy) Upper Palaeolithic parietal art. Antiquity 71, 810–30. Lewis-Williams, J.D., 1997b. Harnessing the brain: vision and shamanism in Upper Paleolithic western Europe, n Beyond Art: Pleistocene Image and Symbol, eds. M. Conkey, O. Soffer, D. Stratmann & N.G. Jablonski. (Memors 23.) San Francsco (cA): calforna Academy of Sciences, 321–42. Lewis-Williams, J.D. & T.A. Dowson, 1988. The signs of all times: entoptic phenomena in Upper Palaeolithic Art. Current Anthropology 29, 201–45. Lewis-Williams, J.D. & J.H.N. Loubser, 1986. Deceptive appearances: a crtque of southern Afrcan rock art studes. Advances in World Archaeology 5, 253–89. Lorblanchet, M., 1995. Les grottes ornees de la prehistoire: nouveaux regards. Paris: Editions Errance.

Thomas A. Dowson Department of Archaeology University of Southampton Southampton SO17 1BJ References Abd el Naby, S. & M. Hassanein, 1965. Neuropsychiatric manfestatons of chronc manganese posonng. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 28, 282–7. Barrett, J.C., 1987. Fields of discourse: reconstituting a social archaeology. Critique of Anthropology 7(3), 5–16. Barriere, C., 1982. L’Art parietal de Roufignac. Paris: Picard. Barrow, J., 1801. An Account of his Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa in the Years 1797 and 1798, vol. 1. London: Cadell & Davis. Clottes, J., 1996. Thematic changes in Upper Palaeolithic art: a vew from Grotte chauvet. Antiquity 70, 276–88. Clottes, J. & J.D. Lewis-Williams, 1996. Les Chamanes de la Prehistoire: transe et magie dans les grottes ornees. Paris: Seuil. cohen, S., 1964. The Beyond Within: the LSD Story. New york (Ny): Atheneum. Conkey, M.W., 1978. Style and information in cultural evoluton, n Advances in Archaeology, ed. M. Schffer. New York (NY): Academic Press, 61–85. Conkey, M.W., 1987. New approaches in the search for meaning? A review of research in ‘Palaeolithic Art’. Journal of Field Archaeology 14, 413–30. Cook, D., S. Fahn & K. Brait. 1974. Chronic manganese ntoxcaton. Archives of Neurology 30, 59–63. Davenport, D. & M.A. Jochim, 1988. The scene in the shaft at Lascaux. Antiquity 62, 558–62. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard University Press. Donald, M., 1993. Precis of Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16(4), 737–91. Dowson, T.A., 1988. Revelations of religious reality: the ndvdual n San rock art. World Archaeology 20, 116–28.

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Mithen, S.J., 1989. To hunt or to paint: animals and art in the Upper Palaeolithic. Man 23, 671–95. Mithen, S.J., 1991. Ecological interpretations of Palaeolthc art. Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 57(1), 103–14. Potts, R., 1992. The hominid way of life, in Jones et al. (eds.), 325–34. Stringer, C.B., 1992. Evolution of early humans, in Jones et al. (eds.), 241–52. van der Merwe, N.J., 1992. Reconstructing prehistoric diet, in Jones et al. (eds.), 369–71.

Marshack, A., 1990. The Taï Plaque and calendrical notation in the Upper Palaeolithic. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 1(1), 25–61. Marshack, A., 1991. Roots of Civilization: the Cognitive Beginnings of Man’s First Art, Symbol and Notation. 2nd edition. New York (NY): Moyer Bell. Mena, I., O. Marin, S. Fuenzalida & G. Cotzias, 1967. Chronc manganese posonng. Neurology 17, 128–36. Mithen, S.J., 1988. Looking and learning: Upper Palaeolithic art and nformaton gatherng. World Archaeology 19(3), 297–327.

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Chapter 7 Digging for Memes: the Role of Material objects in Cultural evolution Mark Lake The archaeological record exhibits a combination of stability and change that would be familiar to palaeontologists studying the evolution of biological species. As a result it has been suggested by universal Darwinists that culture change is governed by the same basic process as biological evolution, but with genes and organisms replaced by memes and cultural traits. This paper assesses that claim, paying particular attention to the relationship between material culture and memes. Speciically, it asks: what are memes, how are they replicated and what is the role of material objects in their replication? The paper argues that the currently fashionable deinition of the meme obscures its most important property, that it should effect the direct transmission of symbolic structure. Once this is appreciated it can be seen that material objects might represent memes, express memes, or function in a way that conlates representation with expression. These possibilities are illustrated by reference to musical scores, village plans and changes in Late Neolithic beaker morphology. The paper concludes that the role of material objects in cultural evolution cannot be captured in one simple model, but depends on whether they carry or embody a symbolic code.

Many

anthropologsts accept that at a phenomenologcal level human culture exhbts the propertes of an evolutonary system: for example, the archaeologcal record exhbts a combnaton of structural stablty and evolutonary morphogeness akn to that observed by palaeontologsts studyng the orgns and demse of bologcal speces. In other words, t s wdely acknowledged that t looks as if culture change s governed by the same generc process as bologcal evoluton. More controversally, evolutonary bologsts and phlosophers who subscrbe to the noton of a unversal Darwnsm have made the stronger clam that culture-change actually is governed by the same process. They argue that culture evolves as a result of the dfferental replcaton of memes, cultural enttes whch play a role analogous to that of genes. Ths paper nvestgates the role of materal objects n cultural evoluton. It consders three ques-

tons: what are memes, how are they replcated and what s the role of materal objects n ther replcation? Since the subject is fraught with dificulty the answers are undoubtedly partal, f not plan wrong. They also make dificult reading on occasion, for whch no apology s offered save n nstances of muddled thnkng or poor expresson. The prncpal purpose of ths project s to draw archaeologsts and anthropologsts nto the debate about memes, for the smple reason that those who promote them most vgorously tend to be remarkably vague about the detals. The dea that culture evolves by memetc replcaton emerged from the nterface between evolutonary bology and phlosophy, although nether dscplne s partcularly well placed to observe how culture actually changes. consequently there s a clear role for anthropology — and archaeology n partcular — n any serous evaluaton of memetc replcaton. In return, the prncples of unversal 77

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(Dennett 1991), scientiic enquiry (Campbell 1974; Hull 1982), and ndvdual learnng (Blute 1981).

Darwnsm provde a useful framework for thnkng about the relatonshp between deas and materal objects, whether as a heurstc devce or as an explanatory system. The study has three parts. Frst the dea of unversal Darwnsm s ntroduced n order to clarfy what t means to suggest that culture ‘evolves’ sensu stricto. Second, the analytc unts of unversal Darwnsm are employed to explore the noton that culture evolves by memetc replcaton. It s argued that the tendency to model the meme as a drect analogue of the gene has confused attempts to dentfy the mechansm of cultural replcaton: the resultng emphasis on idelity and fecundity has obscured the basc prncple that cultural replcaton requres the drect transmsson of symbolc structure. It s further argued that mtaton does not effect the drect transmsson of symbolc structure and that consequently — and contrary to wdespread supposton — t is insuficient to support cultural evolution. These arguments nform the attempt n the thrd part of ths paper to elucdate the role of materal objects n cultural replcaton. It s suggested that materal objects mght functon n one of three ways n cultural replcaton: as representatons of memes, as expressions of memes, or in a manner that conlates representaton wth expresson. culture can only be sad to evolve sensu stricto when the representaton of memes s dstnct from ther expresson. It s argued that objects that carry or form part of a symbolc code can represent memes wthout smultaneously expressing them. Other objects appear to conlate representaton wth expresson.

Evolution conceived as a generic process Unversal Darwnsm treats neo-Darwnan evoluton by natural selecton (bologcal evoluton) as the paradgmatc example of a generc process whch may be mplemented through any one of a number of mechansms (Lewontn 1970). Neo-Darwnan evoluton by natonal selecton occurs because genetc mutatons that, va ther phenotypc expresson, allow an organsm to reproduce more successfully than other organsms wll ncrease n relatve frequency n the gene pool, whch n turn results n specaton. There s, however, some danger n adherng too closely to ths model when abstractng the generc evolutonary process. As Hull (1988) has argued, the dstncton between genes, organsms and speces may seem natural, but t s not. It happens to work reasonably well for the evolution of fruit lies or humans, in fact for most multcellular sexual organsms, but t s far less helpful for the evoluton of asexual and uncellular organsms. Gven that the majorty of organsms that have lved fall nto the latter group, Hull rghtly cautons aganst dsmssng possble forms of nonbologcal evoluton as ncompatble wth unversal Darwnsm purely on the bass of ‘such pecular phenomena as the transmsson of eye colour n frut lies’ (Hull 1988, 21). It s for ths reason that unversal Darwnsts have attempted to provde a ‘maxmally abstract deinition’ (Dennett 1995) of evolution by natural selecton whch does not refer to genes, organsms, speces, memes or cultures, snce these are found only in speciic implementations of the generic process. Instead, it requires speciication of the algorithm by whch all evolutonary change s effected and the classes of enttes on whch that algorthm acts. The algorthm has been formulated n many roughly equvalent versons (Brandon 1988; campbell 1974; Lewontn 1970). For example, Plotkn’s (1994) ‘g-t-r heurstc’ () blndly generates varants, () tests or selects varants and () regenerates the selected varants. Of more mportance for the purposes of ths paper, however, are the enttes on whch ths algorthm acts, and here Hull’s (1980; 1982; 1988) replicator-interactor-lineage (RIL) scheme s perhaps the most consstent.

Universal Darwinism The term ‘unversal Darwnsm’ has been used to refer to two related ideas. It was irst used by Dawkins (1976) as a label for the noton that the processes responsble for bologcal evoluton on earth are the same wherever adaptaton and/or specaton s occurrng or has occurred n the unverse; t s now more wdely used to refer to the dea that other forms of transformatons of earthly lvng systems are also effected by these same processes (Plotkn 1994, 59). It s the latter usage whch nterests us here because t rases the possblty that culturechange s drven by the same processes as those whch drve bologcal evoluton. Ths has ndeed been suggested (e.g. campbell 1974; Dawkns 1976), as t has also for the functonng of the mmune system (Burnet 1959; Jerne 1967), the functonng of the bran (Edelman 1987), the producton of speech

Replicators, interactors and lineages Logcally, a replicator s ‘an entty that passes on ts structure drectly n replcaton’ (Hull 1980, 318). If one wshes for a teleologcal nterpretaton then t 78

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has been suggested that replcators are what mantan adaptatons for as long as needed (Plotkn 1994, 94), although t s also argued that they are themselves the thngs that evoluton ‘s for’ (Dawkns 1976). The paradgmatc replcator s the gene; memes are also supposed to be replcators. Accordng to Dawkns, replcators must have the three propertes of longevity, idelity and fecundity: they must be long lastng, capable of makng accurate copes of themselves, and fertle n makng as many copes as possble. Ths s a popular concepton, but t s not clear that any of these three propertes are actually necessary; nstead, they are propertes whch a replcator should deally possess n order to be readly observable. Dennett (1995, 356) s partcularly clear on this point when he notes that although low idelity replication may render it dificult to identify species, ths s an epstemologcal, not a metaphyscal ssue. It may be dificult to identify species (and hence the exstence of certan replcators) n the absence of a degree of stass, but t does not follow that the process gvng rse to specaton s not evoluton by natural selecton. An interactor s ‘an entty that drectly nteracts as a cohesve whole wth ts envronment n such a way that replcaton s dfferental’ (Hull 1980, 318). The paradgmatc nteractor s the organsm, but even n the case of bologcal evoluton t s possble for other enttes such as genes and colones to functon as nteractors (Hull 1988, 28). The advantage of makng a dstncton between nteracton and replcaton can be seen n the way t helps to clarfy the debate between gene selectonsts and organsm selectonsts. When gene selectonsts clam that genes are the prmary unts of selecton they mean that they are the prmary unts of replcaton, whereas when organsm selectonsts nsst that organsms are the prmary unts of selecton they mean that organsms are the prmary unts of nteracton (Hull 1988, 28). Replcaton and nteracton result n the producton of lineages: the enttes that actually change, or evolve as a result of the evolutonary process (Hull 1980, 327). In the paradgmatc example of bologcal evoluton there s currently no consensus about what actually evolves. Gradualsts (e.g. Dawkns 1976) would argue that speces are the thngs that evolve, n whch case speces can be construed as lneages. In contrast, punctuatonsts argue that speces are ncapable of evolvng. If ther vew that signiicant change occurs only at speciation is correct, then t s the lneages formed by successons of speces whch are the thngs that evolve (Eldredge & Gould 1972; Gould 1982). However ths debate s

resolved, the most mportant aspect of lneages as conceved n Hull’s RIL scheme s that they are hstorcal enttes, not classes or natural knds (Hull 1982). Natural kinds are deined in terms of a set of characteristics which are necessary and suficient for membershp, and are eternal n the sense that they contnue to exst whether or not they have any members. Snce ths mples that enttes that possess the approprate characterstcs wll always belong to the same class, rrespectve of how they came nto beng, t s clear that classes are not the sort of thngs that can evolve. In contrast, the dentty or contnuty or a hstorcal entty s found n the ancestor-descendant relatonshp of ts consttuent enttes, not n ther smlarty. The fact that evoluton produces hstorcal enttes refutes the common argument (Wspé & Thompson 1976) that socal or cultural change s not evolutonary because bologcal speces are classes, whereas socal groups and cultures are not. The error les ether wth the assumpton that speces are classes, or wth the vew that speces, rather than lneages of speces, are the product of bologcal evoluton. Universal Darwinist approaches to culture-change Replcators and nteractors functon n the evolutonary process to produce lneages. If culture-change conforms to the prncples of unversal Darwnsm then there must exst cultural manfestatons of these enttes. In 1977, Bronowsk concluded that we lack genune theores of sococultural change because ‘we have not been able to pn down the unts wth which it works — which it shufles and regroups, and whose mutaton make the raw materal for new culture’. Nearly twenty years later Plotkn noted that ‘f cultures are ndeed evolvng systems, then n the language of unversal Darwnsm, the replcators, interactors and lineages must be identiied and their propertes understood’ (1994, 216). Thus t appears that the recent enthusasm of phlosophers and evolutonary bologsts for unversal Darwnsm has sharpened our conceptual tools, but that these have yet to be rgorously appled n the context of culturechange; ths paper s an attempt to do just that. Two approaches to cultural evoluton fall under the umbrella of unversal Darwnsm. They may be conceved as overlappng, but each wth a different centre of gravity. The irst errs towards a teleologcal enqury: t asks what cultural evoluton s for n the sense of what knd of knowledge does t allow an organsm (a human) to gan. Ths enqury forms part of the project of evolutonary epstemology (campbell 1974), whch vews evoluton as a 79

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knowledge-gain process such that each speciic evolutonary mechansm provdes a partcular knd of knowledge to a partcular knd of entty (OdlngSmee 1983; Plotkn 1994; Plotkn & Odlng-Smee 1979; 1981; 1982). I have suggested elsewhere (Lake 1995; 1996) that ths approach provdes the approprate theoretcal framework wthn whch to address the queston of why and when the capacty for culture evolved durng the course of homnd evoluton. The second unversal Darwnst approach to culture s of more relevance for later prehstory, and thus also to the ams of ths paper. It s concerned wth understandng how cultural evoluton works, not n order to explan what t s ‘good for’, but to explan how the end product — the content of culture — changes. Ths approach s prmarly manfest n the wrtngs of evolutonary bologsts and phlosophers such as Dawkns (1976; 1982; 1986) and recently Dennett (1990; 1991; 1995).

mes as deas, there s nevertheless somethng very wrong with Dennett’s deinition of the meme if it is also intended as a deinition of the cultural replicator. The properties of idelity and fecundity that Dennett ascribes to memes are those that deine them as members of the subset of successful cultural replcators; they are not propertes necessarly shared by all cultural replcators. In other words, t may well be that the complex deas lsted by Dennett are cultural replcators, but t s far from clear that all cultural replcators are smlarly repeated complex deas. As already noted, Dennett hmself argues that although idelity and fecundity render lines of descent visible, they are not deining properties of a replicator. The deinition of the meme as a successful cultural replcator almost certanly stems from the tendency to conceve of t as drectly analogous to the gene. Although the gene s often cted as the paradigmatic replicator, it too is actually deined as a successful replcator. Accordng to Dawkns a gene s any replcator that lasts long enough through enough replcatons to serve as a unt of selecton (1976, 30). Or as Wllams suggests, ‘In evolutonary theory, a gene could be deined as any hereditary informaton for whch there s favourable or unfavourable selection bas equal to several or many times its rate of endogenous change’ (1966, 25 [my talcs]). It follows that a mutated gene whch causes an organsm not to reproduce s stll a replcator, albet an unsuccessful one: ndeed, t s replcator but not a gene. The current tendency to deine the cultural replcator wth reference to the propertes of thngs that form extended cultural lneages s problematc because t confuses replcaton wth nteracton. consder Dennett’s clam that the dea for the four openng notes of Beethoven’s Ffth Symphony (G-GG-Eb) consttutes a replcator, whereas that for the notes D-F#-A does not. There s nothng ntrnsc n the structure of the irst sequence that renders it more replcable than the second: the work requred to encode each n some medum n order that ts structure can be replcated s not obvously dssmlar. Rather, f the notes G-G-G-Eb are hummed more frequently t s because that sequence has a more favourable effect (s more adaptve) when exposed to the selectve condtons mposed by the muscal tradton of western hgh culture.1 On ths analyss the deas for both G-G-G-Eb and D-F#-A are replcators, but that for G-G-G-Eb s more strongly selected for and therefore more prevalent n culture. (Snce the notes G-G-G-Eb provde a useful example wth whch to evaluate several canddate mechansms of replcaton they are hereafter referred to as the ‘destny’

Cultural replication In 1976, Dawkns argued that cultural evoluton s effected by dfferental replcaton of memes, the cultural analogue of genes, and that ths process obeys the prncples of unversal Darwnsm qute exactly. More recently he retracted ths strong clam, cautonng that the meme-as-gene analogy s useful but may not be exact (1982; 1986). Strctly speakng, however, the analogy need not be exact for cultural evoluton to conform to the prncples of unversal Darwnsm: what matters s that memes are dfferentally replcated to produce lneages. But what are memes? Memes are a subset of cultural replicators Accordng to Dawkns, ‘examples of memes are tunes, deas, catch-phrases, clothes fashons, ways of makng pots or of buldng arches’ (1976, 206). The noton that memes are deas s entrely compatble wth the unversal Darwnan poston that replcators are substrate neutral, n other words, that they are nformatonal not materal enttes. The same s held to be true of genes (Wllams 1966), although ths s often overlooked n popular accounts of bologcal evoluton. Dennett s more explct about what sort of deas memes are. The examples he provdes are all ‘complex deas that form themselves nto dstnct memorable unts’ (1995, 344) and he goes on to suggest that these unts are ‘the smallest elements that replcate themselves wth relablty and fecundty’ (Dennett 1995, 344). Whle t s probably correct to conceve of me80

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meme — after Beethoven’s own suggeston that they represent ‘destny knockng at the door’.) The identiication of memes as ideas that form extended cultural lineages is logically lawed if it is also intended as a deinition of the cultural replicator precsely because t overlooks the crucal Darwnan prncple that replcaton s dfferental. Ths mght not present a serous problem for archaeologcal purposes nsofar as the enttes whch archaeologsts have mplctly or explctly consdered treatng as memes do appear to form extended lneages, for example Acheulean handaxes (Mthen 1994; Steele 1994). Nevertheless, any attempt to elucdate the role of materal objects n cultural evoluton does requre an understandng of how replcaton comes to be dfferental. Ths requrement s unlkely to be realzed so long as the cultural replicator is deined in a manner which confuses replcaton wth nteracton.

transmsson of an dea t has the potental to effect cultural replcaton. It has recently been argued, however, that program-level mtaton does not ensure adequate idelity of transmission to effect cultural replication (Heyes & Plotkn 1989; Heyes 1993). It has already been noted that n Dawkns’ vew replication requires high-idelity transmission, from whch t follows that memes must be subject to a minimum of modiication as they leap from brain to bran. Ths s the vew that has found ts way nto cultural transmsson theory, where t s manfest n the assumpton that ndvdual learnng and cultural replcaton are strctly alternative ways of acqurng a behavoural trat (Boyd & Rcherson 1985, 97). (The followng argument assumes that the acquston of a behavoural trat mples the transmsson of an underlyng dea for the behavour, that s, programlevel mtaton.) Indvdual learnng cannot effect replication because, by deinition, it implies the generaton of a novel behavour through drect nteracton wth the world. Instead, t s supposed that replcaton s effected by an entrely separate type of ‘cultural’ learnng n whch one ndvdual acqures the behavour of another. The mportant feature of cultural learnng s that t s direct, that s to say, the ndvdual who acqures the behavour does not modfy t n the process of copyng. It s frequently assumed that mtaton s a mechansm of cultural learnng (Washburn 1908; Paget 1962; Dawkns 1976; 1982; Boyd & Rcherson 1985; Rogers 1988; Galef 1992), but accordng to Heyes & Plotkn (1989) ths assumpton s problematc because t s far from clear that mtaton s psychologcally dstnct from ndvdual learnng. Heyes & Plotkn (1989) accept that mtaton s drect n the sense that because the naïve ndvdual does not nteract wth ts envronment there s less opportunty for envronmental varables to ntervene and alter the behavour that s acqured. Nevertheless, they suspect that mtaton s not drect at the retenton stage. It seems that, as a psychologcal process, mtaton s not vastly dfferent from some ndvdual learnng processes (Bandura 1977). Ths leads Heyes & Plotkn to doubt whether deas for behavour that are acqured by mtaton are any better nsulated aganst the knds of loss and transformaton that occur durng storage of deas acqured by other means. There s ndeed evdence that culturally acqured deas are often lost or transformed n memory (Bartlett 1932; Bandura & Walters 1963; Loftus 1979). consequently, Heyes argues that mtaton can only effect cultural learnng f t s buttressed by addtonal psychologcal processes whch

Imitation as a mechanism of cultural replication Dawkns suggested that memes ‘propagate themselves n the meme pool by leapng from bran to bran va a process, whch n the broad sense, can be called mtaton’ (1976, 206). Recast n everyday language ths seems reasonable enough: cultural replcaton occurs when deas are transferred from bran to bran by some form of copyng. Nevertheless, any attempt to be more rgorous soon reveals that the noton of mtaton ‘n the broad sense’ s hopelessly vague. consder agan the dea for the sequence of four notes that open Beethoven’s Ffth Symphony, the ‘destny’ meme. Ths meme could presumably be replcated n at least three ways: transmsson from one bran to another could be effected by hummng or playng the notes, by wrtng them down, or by describing them verbally. Only the irst of these bears any resemblance to the phenomenon that psychologsts and cogntve ethologsts would recognze as mtaton, that s, the copyng of ‘novel actons whch are not already present n the behavoural repertore of the learner’ (Byrne 1995). Nevertheless, whether ths counts as cultural replcaton depends on what one thnks s happenng mentally. The mportant dstncton s between impersonation, n whch a novel acton s acqured smply by takng the model’s geometrcal perspectve and copyng the motor-sequence, and program-level imitation, n whch the model’s ntenton s understood and the acton reproduced to that end (Byrne 1995). Impersonaton s not a mechansm of cultural replcaton snce t does not nvolve the transmsson of an dea. In contrast, snce program-level mtaton does not nvolve the 81

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nsulate or renforce the acqured deas (1993). This argument is lawed for two reasons. First, the requirement for high-idelity transmission arises from the prevalng, but unhelpful, assumpton that cultural replcaton can be equated wth the producton of extended cultural lneages. Heyes’ reservaton about the ablty of mtaton to effect the production of extended cultural lineages may be correct: t s at least plausble that spatally and temporally persstent deas need to be mantaned by processes that nsulate socially transmitted information from modiication through ndvdual learnng. Nevertheless, t does not follow (contra Lake 1995) that mtaton s not a mechansm of cultural replcaton. It was argued above that replication should not be deined as a process that produces extended lneages because to do so s to overlook the crucal Darwnan prncple that replcaton s dfferental. Accordngly, mtaton need only be capable of transmttng an dea from one bran to another for t to reman a canddate mechansm of cultural replcaton. Heyes & Plotkn fal to demonstrate that ths s not the case because — and ths s the second problem wth ther argument — ther concepton of the scope of replcaton s too nclusve. Ther reservatons about the status of mtaton as a form of cultural learnng stem from the suspcon that t fals to nsulate acqured nformaton from transformaton n memory. In other words, they suspect that memes acqured from person A are often transformed n the bran of person B before they are passed on to person c. Ths s not an argument aganst mtaton as a form of cultural replcaton because the transmsson of a meme from person A to person c s not one nstance of replcaton, but at least two and possbly more. Transmsson of a meme from A to B s one nstance of cultural replcaton, as s transmsson from B to c. What happens whle a meme s ‘stored’ n the bran of person B s another queston altogether, and not one whch can be pursued here.2 What matters for the moment s that there s nothng n Heyes & Plotkn’s account of mtaton to suggest that transmsson from A to B or B to c cannot be effected by mtaton.

these possbltes dffers from the other two n that t mght count as mtaton n the strct sense. It also dffers n another nterestng respect: t s the only mechansm n whch the notes are actually sounded. The reason why this is signiicant has a direct bearing on the role of materal objects n cultural replcaton. Recall that logcally a replcator s an entty whch passes on ts structure drectly n replcaton (however mperfectly). Recall also that replcators are nformaton, that s to say, they are symbolc structures whch code for, or refer to, non-symbolc structures. If a replcator passes on ts structure directly then replcaton must be a process n whch symbolc structure s transmtted wthout decodng. For sure, the symbolc structure often s decoded, but t s part of the process of nteracton, not replcaton. In the case of bologcal evoluton, for nstance, genes provde nformaton about how to build an organism. The itness of the organism determnes the frequency wth whch the genes that coded for t are replcated, but these genes are never re-encoded, or ‘dstlled’ from the organsm. consequently physcal or behavoural trats acqured by an organsm durng ts lfetme cannot be passed on genetcally to ts offsprng. The nhertance of acqured characterstcs, termed Lamarckan nhertance, has no place n neo-Darwnan evoluton by natural selecton. Any unversal Darwnan account of culture-change must smlarly reject Lamarckan nhertance n favour of the drect replcaton of symbolc structure.3 Does hummng or playng the sequence of four notes that open Beethoven’s Ffth Symphony consttute the drect transmsson of the ‘destny’ meme? Ths seems unlkely precsely because the notes are sounded; nstead, the symbolc structure (the meme) s decoded to produce a non-symbolc structure (the sound) and ths s then re-encoded nto a symbolc structure. The logc of ths argument s clear f one consders what happens when one note s ncorrectly played. If person A has the dea G-G-G-Eb but plays t as, say, G-G-G-E, then person B retreves the dea G-G-G-E: there s no way that person B can retreve the correct sequence solely from this episode of transmission. More mportantly, an error n heterocatalyss (the generaton of non-symbolc structure from symbolc structure) has become ncorporated n the new symbolc structure. Snce ths s clearly an nstance of Lamarckan nhertance t follows that one person playng the notes to another does not consttute a mechansm of cultural replcaton. It s lkely that ths argument can be general-

The real problem with imitation If mtaton cannot effect cultural replcaton the reason has nothing to do with idelity of transmission, but results from a problem whch s altogether more profound: that t does not effect the drect transmsson of symbolc structure. Earler t was suggested that the ‘destny’ meme mght be replcated by hummng or playng the notes G-G-G-Eb, by wrtng them down, or by describing them verbally. The irst of 82

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zed to all cases of program-level mtaton. As already noted, the deining feature of program-level mtaton s the transmsson of the dea behnd an acton. Ths s not replcaton, because the dea s always transmtted through the action to which it refers. common usage of the term mtaton llustrates the point clearly: my actions in imitating you ishing for termtes wll be very dfferent from my actons imitating you writing instructions on how to ish for termtes! The problem wth program-level mtaton is not that it fails to ensure idelity of transmission, but that t s not a mechansm for the drect transmsson of symbolc structure, whether accurately or otherwse. In other words, program-level mtaton conlates the process of replication with the process of nteracton. Note, however, that t does not follow that a sngle entty cannot functon as both a replcator and an nteractor; such a dual role s logcally possble and may actually occur n bologcal evoluton (Hull 1988, 31). Instead, the objecton to mtaton as a mechansm of replcaton s that t does not drectly copy the replcator so much as retrieve t from the nteractor. The noton of retreval s central to the followng dscusson of the role of materal objects n cultural replcaton.

bolc structure rather than a realzaton of the nonsymbolc structure. Turnng agan to the bologcal analogy, t supposes that the score s to the dea as DNA s to a gene. Ths s a reasonable supposton because the score s not the end pont n the chan of signiication. As Hull notes, ‘a country cannot serve as ts own map. Sooner or later, representatons must culmnate n somethng whch s not a representaton’ (1982, 302 [after Lews carroll]). In ths case the idea for the sound s the thng represented and the score one of many possble representatons. A fundamental asymmetry ponts to the logc n ths: whereas wrtten muscal notaton would not exst n the absence of muscal deas, muscal deas can be developed n the absence of wrtten muscal notaton. One mght of course wonder why the sound tself could not functon as the end pont n the chan of signiication, in other words, that the score represents the dea whch n turn represents the sound. Ths poston s ncompatble wth a unversal Darwnan account of culture-change for the same reason that a gene s not a representaton of a phenotype. By deinition, a representation comes after the fact, not before t. consequently, snce the genotype s necessarly pror to the phenotype t cannot be sad to represent t. Instead t s better to conceve of the phenotype as an expresson of the genotype. Smlarly, the dea s pror to the sound; the sound s an expresson of the dea. And just as the form of the phenotype s referable n ts partculars to ontogeny rather than phylogeny, so the exact sound s dependent upon the performance. The above consderaton of the canddate mechansms by whch the ‘destny’ meme mght be replcated suggests that materal objects mght play three dfferent roles n culture-change. Frst, they mght functon as representatons of memes, that s, as the materal manfestatons of memes. In ths case a materal object s not strctly a meme, but an arrangement of matter whch retans the ntatng structure of the meme. Such objects effectvely functon as the ‘DNA’ of culture. Second, materal objects mght functon as nteractors. Such objects are the expressons of memes; they are not representatons of memes but the thngs that memes code for. They functon as the ‘organsms’ of culture, and cultural replcaton comes to be dfferental on account of ther dfferng utlty.4 Thrd, materal objects mght function in a way that conlates the process of replication wth the process of nteracton. In ths case, an object s both the expresson of a meme and at the same tme ts representaton. It was argued above that transmsson of a

the role of material objects in cultural replication can the ‘destny’ meme be sad to have been replcated f the four notes G-G-G-Eb are wrtten down, or the score reprinted? At irst sight it appears that ether transmsson process could be ruled out as a mechansm of replcaton for the same reason that mtaton was rejected: that f, for nstance, person A has the dea G-G-G-Eb but wrtes t as G-G-G-E, then person B can only receve the dea G-G-G-E from ths epsode of transmsson. The vtal dfference, however, s that ths s an error n autocatalyss (the regeneraton of symbolc structure) rather than heterocatalyss (the generaton of non-symbolc structure from symbolc structure). In terms of the bologcal analogy, the new replcator G-G-G-E has been produced by genetc mutaton rather than the nhertance of an acqured characterstc. Even f subject to error, transmsson through a score counts as replcaton because person B receves the symbolc structure drectly: he or she does not retreve t from the non-symbolc structure for whch t coded. Representation versus expression clearly the argument that transmsson through a score counts as replcaton hnges on the noton that the score s a physcal manfestaton of the sym83

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meme through ts expresson cannot count as cultural replcaton sensu stricto because ths s a Lamarckan mode of nhertance. The same argument apples to materal objects that consttute both the expresson and representaton of a meme: the producton of such objects does not result n the drect transmsson of symbolic structure because it conlates replication wth nteracton. It follows that f objects generally play the third role identiied above, then cultural evoluton does not conform to the prncples of unversal Darwinism. Only the irst and second roles are compatble wth a strctly Darwnan model of culturechange as an evolutonary process. consequently, whether the creaton and/or use of materal objects supports cultural evoluton sensu stricto depends upon whether they represent, express or conlate the representaton and expresson of memes.

The objecton that symbolc objects are not representatons of memes because some people may not be able to nterpret them at all s more pertnent. When someone who s unable to read French s presented wth an orgnal text of Jacques Le Goff’s The Medieval Imagination then effectvely there are no rules for heterocatalyss. Nevertheless, ths apparent dsanalogy between genetc and memetc expresson does not necessarly present a serous obstacle to a unversal Darwnan account of culture-change. First, it has no bearing on the eficacy of cultural replcaton snce autocatalyss and heterocatalyss are entrely separate processes. It s possble to copy a French text word for word and thereby replcate the deas t conveys rrespectve of whether one can read French. If the dsanalogy poses any obstacle t s wth respect to selecton. Unversal Darwnsm requres that varaton n nteractors should be correlated wth the varaton n replcators: replcators could not be selected according to the itness of their expressions f ths were not so. The fact that the physcal and chemcal laws that drect bologcal heterocatalyss apply throughout the unverse guarantees ths for bologcal evoluton. In contrast, the rules that drect cultural heterocatalyss are not unform throughout the known cultural unverse. Nevertheless, nonrandom selecton s stll possble, ndeed probably wdespread. The only dfference between cultural and bologcal selecton s that the rules that drect heterocatalyss contrbute to the selectve condtons of the former, but not the latter. Whle ths mght possbly result n novel populaton-level consequences for culture, t does not obvously undermne the logc of unversal Darwnsm.

Symbolic objects represent memes The argument presented above, that wrtten muscal notes can effect the cultural replcaton of a meme, s an argument that a partcular type of materal object, a score, can functon as the representaton of one or more memes. It seems lkely that other objects, such as cuneform number sgns, stone nscrptons and books can lkewse effect cultural replcaton. The property that all these objects share, whch allows them to represent memes, s that they are symbolc: ther form s arbtrary wth respect to the expresson of the memes for whch they code. Ths ensures the drect transmsson of symbolc structure. The objecton that objects such as these are not representatons of memes because dfferent people nterpret them dfferently s not well founded. The objecton, for example, that the openng four notes of Beethoven’s Ffth Symphony do not always sound the same s based on a falure to apprecate the nature of heterocatalyss. consder the bologcal analogy. The relatonshp between genotype and phenotype s one-to-many, not one-to-one: the broad form of the phenotype s determned by the genotype, but much inal detail will be determined in response to the developmental envronment. The genotype sets the parameters wthn whch envronmental responses can vary, but ths s as much as t does lawfully. Exactly the same s true of memetc expresson. certan rules drect the general form of the expresson, but the partculars are referable to ndvdual crcumstances. The rules of the Englsh language ensure that the reader does not mstake cassus for Brutus n Shakespeare’s play Julius Ceasar, but they do not determne the exact ntellectual understandng or emotonal response.

Village plans both represent and express memes vllage plans are seldom, f ever, truly random. For example the vllages of the Eden valley (NW England) fall nto three types: those wth regular rows of tofts5 arranged along a street green, those wth rregular or part regular rows based on axal streets combned wth a central green, and those wthout a green (Roberts 1989). clearly these vllages have been lad out accordng to some sort of template, but although they are descrbed as ‘planned’ (Roberts 1989) ths s not a clam that they were lad out from actual drawn plans. Instead the vllages are ther own template. If there s a meme for regular rows of tofts along a street green then the vllage of Mlburn, for example, s both a materal representaton of the symbolc structure of that meme and smultaneously an nstance of ts non-symbolc expresson. Snce ths meme s both expressed by and transmtted through 84

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the same materal form, the vllage plan s replcated by a process that s Lamarckan and not Darwnan — the plan s retreved from the vllage. Hller & Hanson (1984) have lkewse argued that the common spatal propertes shared by settlements n the vaucluse of southern France are generated by a mechansm whch s not Darwnan. These settlements were not planned as wholes, but grew accretonally. Nevertheless, they all share the same ‘beady rng structure’. Hller & Hanson demonstrate that ths can be generated by locatng each buldng accordng to a set of smple rules. consequently, each settlement can be treated as a dscrete system, that s a system whch depends on the embodment of local rules n a dynamc spato-temporal process. The most mportant pont about ths for our purposes s that accordng to Hller & Hanson the genotype-phenotype dstncton s nverted n dscrete systems. In ther vew, ‘What genetc nstructons are to a bologcal system, spato-temporal realty and actvty are to a dscrete system’ (1984, 44). They suggest that the order n a dscrete system arses not as an expresson of a genotype, but because the components of the system have a mechansm whch permts them to retreve a descrpton of the system from the system tself. Ths mechansm sounds suspcously analogous to that of mtaton, and t too s clearly Lamarckan.

colng. What s partcularly nterestng for our purposes s that ths technque appears to have been learned by tral and error rather than acqured wth the form tself: The lttle trcks that they used to get from the round to the lat bottoms are proof that the adaptation was not easy and that the process took two or three generations at least. To make a lat bottom, the Chalain potters irst built up a round bottom with a horizontal stablzng cordon, sometmes the round bottom was even hdden by addng clay along the nsde of the annular cordon; from the outsde, t looked exactly like lat-bottomed vessel, built up directly from a lump of clay. In ths case, the technque of the true lat bottom became known and adopted only after a long perod of tral and error; the dea had been transmtted wthout a proven technque to go wth t. (Pétrequn 1993, 48)

Pétrequin’s observations that the idea of the lat bottom had been transmtted n solaton from the approprate manufacturng technque strongly suggests ths dea can be treated as a meme. It s the dea for the inished form which has been replicated and not a process of manufacture whch ‘just happens’ to gve rse to that form. What s the role of the beaker as a materal entty n ths nstance of cultural replcaton? If, as Pétrequn tentatvely suggests (1993, 69), the idea of the lat bottom was transmitted in the shape of the vessel tself, then ths s another case where replication is conlated with interaction. The meme was retreved from ts expresson, the form of the beaker, but ths latter also provded the medum of transmsson. Strctly speakng ths s a case of Lamarckan nhertance. consequently, t s strkng that the chalan and clarvaux potters managed to retain the original idea of the inal form over two or three generations of striving to ind the appropriate technque. If potters learned of the new form from each other, then the idea of the true lat bottom should eventually have been lost n the process of retreval from the varous approxmatons. That t was not can be explaned n at least three ways. Frst, it could be that potters only ever learned of the lat bottom from mported Swss beakers, even though they must presumably have learned the technque from ndgenous examples or practces (gven the suggested cross-generatonal strvng). A second possibility is that the idea of a lat bottom was a very generalzed concept. Perhaps a round bottom wth stablzng cordons met the conceptual requrements of a lat bottom, in which case one might suggest that the chalan and clarvaux beakers eventually acquired true lat bottoms simply because that form is

The trouble with beakers It s reasonably clear how the muscal score and vllage plan are mplcated n cultural replcaton. In the case of the beaker t s less clear. The lacustrne zones northwest of the Alps probably provde the most ine-grained prehistoric archaeological data available anywhere n Europe (Pétrequn 1993). Here the runs of permanent vllages establshed on lakes between 3700 and 2400 Bc (the Mddle Neolthc II and Late Neolthc) have been preserved n waterlogged condtons. As a result, many pershable materals have been recovered and, perhaps most mportantly, some tmbers have been dated by dendrochronology to the nearest year of fellng. Ths precse datng has enabled Pétrequn to document changes n beaker morphology wth a resoluton of a few generatons at most. One of the most ntrgung changes reported by Pétrequn concerns the decson by the communtes of Chalain and Clairvaux to copy the lat-bottomed beaker favoured by ther Swss neghbours. Snce these communtes were used to makng round-bottomed pots they had to learn a new technque that nvolved lettng the pot dry as t was bult up by 85

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ultmately more stable. Ths, however, suggests that a mode of use was transmtted along wth the dea of a lat bottom. The third possibility is that idea of the lat-bottomed beaker was not transmitted through the beaker tself, but by some other, perhaps pctoral or lngustc, means. If the idea of the lat-bottomed beaker was transmtted by pctoral or lngustc means ths would count as an nstance of true cultural replcaton conformng to the prncples of unversal Darwnsm. The two other explanatons for how potters managed to retan the orgnal dea over two or three generatons spent learnng the approprate technque both assume that the transmsson process was Lamarckan. They do, however, suggest ways n whch organzatonal, rtual or functonal forces can constran or channel Lamarckan nhertance n such a way that t mmcs the populaton-level consequences of Darwnan nhertance. Ths s smlar to Heyes’ argument that mtaton can produce extended cultural lneages f buttressed by addtonal renforcng mechansms, but t s dfferent n that the need for renforcement stems from the ndrect transmsson of symbolc structure rather than from a lack of idelity in true replication.

Darwnan sense. Nevertheless, as suggested by changes n beaker morphology, t s at least possble that organzatonal, rtual or functonal forces can channel Lamarckan nhertance so as to mmc the populaton-level consequences of Darwnan nhertance. Overall t appears that the role of materal objects n cultural evoluton cannot be captured n one smple model, but depends crucally on whether they carry or embody a symbolc code. Acknowledgements I am grateful to the organzers of the conference for the opportunty to commt my thoughts to paper and for an agreeable and stmulatng three days n cambrdge. Nyree Fnlay, Edward Lowe, Glbert Marshall, Steven Mthen and Stephen Shennan have all helped clarfy my thnkng. I, alas, am the source of any confuson. Mark Lake Institute of Archaeology University College London 31–34 Gordon Square London WC1H 0PY

Conclusion notes Ths paper set out to nvestgate the role of materal objects n cultural evoluton. To that end t addressed three questons: what are memes, how are they replcated, and what s the role of materal objects n ther replcaton? Memes, lke genes, are currently deined as successful replicators. By confusing highidelity replication with successful interaction this deinition obscures the essential property of cultural replcaton: that t effects the drect transmsson of symbolc structure. Imtaton s not a mechansm of cultural replcaton precsely because t cannot effect the drect transmsson of symbolc structure: the dea for an acton s not drectly transmtted, but retreved from the acton tself. Ths dstncton between drect transmsson and retreval provdes the bass for suggestng that materal objects mght represent memes, express memes, or functon n a way that conlates representation with expresson. It appears that objects such as muscal scores and texts have the potental to represent memes, whereas complex materal forms such as vllage plans conlate representation and expression. Since the conlation of representation and expression results n Lamarckan nhertance t follows that not all culture-change s evolutonary n the strct

1.

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It s unclear why Dennett chose the standard major trad D-F#-A to contrast aganst G-G-G-Eb. D-F#-A (the tonc chord of D major) s a key n whch much Western folk musc s played (Sophe Lake pers. comm.) and t s therefore frequently replcated as a chord. Perhaps Dennett means to draw attenton to the fact that G-G-G-Eb s frequently replcated outsde ts orgnal muscal context? If so he needs to be clearer as to whether the meme s the dea for the sound, or the dea — referable to Beethoven hmself — that the sound represents ‘destny knockng at the door’ (Tovey 1935). An addtonal complcaton n that respect s that many of Beethoven’s themes can be recognzed by the bare rhythm wthout quotng any melody at all (Tovey 1935). One possblty s that whenever an dea s recalled an underlyng potental bran state s reconsttuted (Plotkn 1994). Accordng to ths nterpretaton each reconsttuton counts as one nstance of cultural replcaton. Sufice it to say, however, that ‘However such actual [reconsttuted] bran states are re-establshed from potental bran states s . . . a process whose detals are entrely unknown by bran scentsts. We smply do not know how t works’ (Plotkn 1994, 219). There has been much confuson about whether cultural evoluton s Lamarckan (Hull 1982). It looks Lamarckan from the perspectve of bologcal

Dggng for Memes

4. 5.

Heyes, c.M. & H.c. Plotkn, 1989. Replcators and nteractors n cultural evoluton, n What the Philosophy of Biology Is, ed. M. Ruse. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academc Publshers, 139–62. Hller, B. & J. Hanson, 1984. The Social Logic of Space. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Hull, D.L., 1980. Indvdualty and selecton. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 11, 311–32. Hull, D.L., 1982. The naked meme, n Plotkn (ed.), 272–327. Hull, D.L., 1988. Interactors versus vehcles, n Plotkn (ed.), 19–50. Jerne, N.K., 1967. Antbodes and learnng: selecton versus nstructon, n The Neurosciences: a Study Program, eds. G.c. Quarton, T. Melnechuk & F.O. Schmtt. New york (Ny): Rockerfeller Unversty Press, 200–205. Lake, M.W., 1995. computer Smulaton Modellng of Early Homnd Subsstence Actvtes. Unpublshed Ph.D. dssertaton, Unversty of cambrdge, cambrdge. Lake, M.W., 1996. Archaeologcal nference and the explanaton of homnd evoluton, n The Archaeology of Human Ancestry: Power, Sex and Tradition, eds. J. Steele & S. Shennan. London: Routledge, 184–206. Lewontn, R.c., 1970. The unts of selecton. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 1, 1–18. Loftus, E.F., 1979. Eyewitness Testimony. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Mthen, S.J., 1994. Technology and socety durng the Mddle Plestocene. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 4(1), 3–33. Odlng-Smee, F.J., 1983. Multple levels n evoluton: an approach to the nature–nurture ssue va appled epstemology, n Animal Models of Human Behaviour, ed. G.c.L. Davey. London: John Wley & Sons, 135–58. Pétrequn, P., 1993. North wnd, south wnd: Neolthc techncal choces n the Jura Mountans, 3700–2400 Bc, n Technological Choices: Transformations in Material Cultures Since the Neolithic, ed. P. Lemonner. London: Routledge, 36–76. Paget, J., 1962. Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood. New york (Ny): Norton. Plotkn, H.c. (ed.), 1982. Learning, Development and Culture: Essays in Evolution Epistemology. chchester: Wley. Plotkn, H.c. (ed.), 1988. The Role of Behaviour in Evolution. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Plotkn, H.c., 1994. The Nature of Knowledge: Concerning Adaptations, Instinct and the Evolution of Intelligence. London: Allen Lane. Plotkn, H.c. & F.J. Odlng-Smee, 1979. Learnng, change and evoluton: an enqury nto the teleonomy of learnng. Advances in the Study of Behaviour 10, 1–41. Plotkn, H.c. & F.J. Odlng-Smee, 1981. A multple-level model of evoluton and mplcatons for socobology. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 4, 225–68. Plotkn, H.c. & F.J. Odlng-Smee, 1982. Learnng n the context of a herarchy of knowledge ganng processes, n Plotkn (ed.), 443–71.

evoluton because behavours that are not genetcally coded can be passed from generaton to generaton. Here, however, I am only concerned wth whether cultural evoluton s Lamarckan in its own terms. I do not mean to mply utlty solely n a mechancalfunctonal sense. The prvate house plot.

References Bandura, A., 1977. Social Learning Theory. Englewood clffs (NJ): Prentce Hall Inc. Bandura, A. & R. Walters, 1963. Social Learning and Personality Development. New york (Ny): Holt, Rnehart & Wnston. Bartlett, F.c., 1932. Remembering. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Blute, M., 1981. Learnng, socal learnng, and sococultural evoluton: a comment on John Langton’s ‘Darwnsm and the behavoural theory of sococultural evoluton’. American Journal of Sociology 86, 1401–6. Boyd, R. & P.J. Rcherson, 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. chcago (IL): chcago Unversty Press. Brandon, R.N., 1988. The levels of selecton: a herarchy of nteractors, n Plotkn (ed.), 51–71. Bronowsk, J., 1977. A Sense of the Future. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Burnet, F.M., 1959. The Clonal Selection Theory of Acquired Immunity. London: cambrdge Unversty Press. Byrne, R., 1995. The Thinking Ape: Evolutionary Origins of Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press. campbell, D.T., 1974. Evolutonary epstemology, n The Philosophy of Karl Popper, book 1, ed. P.A. Schlpp. Lan Salle (IL): The Open court Publshng company. Dawkns, R., 1976. The Selish Gene. Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press. Dawkns, R., 1982. The Extended Phenotype. Oxford: Freeman. Dawkns, R., 1986. The Blind Watchmaker. London: Pengun. Dennett, D.c., 1990. Memes and the explotaton of magnaton. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48, 127–35. Dennett, D.c., 1991. Consciousness Explained. London: Allen Lane; Pengun Press. Dennett, D.c., 1995. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. London: Allen Lane. Edelman, G.M., 1987. Neural Darwinism: the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection. New york (Ny): Basc Books. Eldredge, N. & S.J. Gould, 1972. Punctuated equlbra: an alternatve to phyletc gradualsm, n Models in Palaeobiology, ed. T.J.M. Schopf. San Francsco (cA): Freeman, cooper & co., 82–115. Galef, B.G., 1992. The queston of anmal culture. Human Nature 3, 157–78. Gould, S.J., 1982. Darwnsm and the expanson of evolutonary theory. Science 216, 380–87. Heyes, c.M., 1993. Imtaton, culture and cognton. Animal Behaviour 46, 999–1010.

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Tovey, D.F., 1935. Essays in Musical Analysis. London: Oxford Unversty Press. Washburn, M.F., 1908. The Animal Mind. New york (Ny): Macmllan. Wllams, G.c., 1966. Adaptation and Natural Selection. Prnceton (NJ): Prnceton Unversty Press. Wspé, L.G. & J.N. Thompson, 1976. The war between the words: bologcal versus socal evoluton and some related ssues. The American Psychologist 31, 341–84.

Roberts, B.K., 1989. Nucleaton and dsperson: dstrbuton maps as a research tool, n The Rural Settlements of Medieval England, eds. M. Aston, D. Austn & c. Dyer. Oxford: Basl Blackwell, 59–75. Rogers, A.R., 1988. Does bology constran culture? American Anthropologist 90, 818–31. Steele, J., 1994. communcaton networks and dspersal patterns n human evoluton: a smple smulaton model. World Archaeology 26, 126–43.

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Chapter 8 Personal experience and Belief: the Signiicance of External Symbolic Storage for the Emergence of Modern Human Cognition E.J. Lowe The signiicance of external symbolic storage for the development of human cognition is not so much that it frees up working memory and facilitates the accumulation of collectively held information, important though these consequences are: rather, it is that it demands conceptually structured thought. Only a concept-user can regard an object as a symbolic representation of another object. Human perceptual experience is conceptually informed: we perceive our world as being populated by objects falling under concepts, and can recombine these concepts in reasoned thought. Lower animals are recognitionally sensitive to perceptual similarities and repeated situations, but do not conceptualize what they perceive and so cannot relect upon past, future and merely possible situations. The emergence of human art, language and symbolism betokened the emergence of truly conceptual thinking (but did not enable it). The human capacity for conceptual thinking cannot be adequately described or explained by information-processing accounts of neural functioning or computational models of the mind/brain, because such approaches are insensitive to issues concerning concept possession and conceptual structure. Our capacity for conceptual thought is a good deal more mysterious than might be supposed, and the gulf between it and animal awareness is enormous.

In hs fascnatng and hghly orgnal book, Origins of

he beleves, was much more recent and non-bologcal n nature, nvolvng ‘the emergence of vsual symbolsm and external memory as major factors n cogntve archtecture’ (Donald 1991, 17). Inevtably, these clams are somewhat speculatve, n vew of the absence of any physcal remans whch could pont conclusively to the separate occurrence of the irst two transtons, each nvolvng changes n forms of behavour alone — the emergence of ‘mmetc’ actvty and the emergence of speech actvty, respectvely.1 In the nature of the case, only the thrd transton has, and can have, left physcal remans as clear evdence of ts occurrence, n the form of human artefacts wth an obvous symbolc or representatve functon. Acceptng that ths thrd transton occurred

the Modern Mind, Merln Donald argues that human culture and cognton have passed through three dstnct evolutonary stages to produce the modern human mind. According to Donald, the irst transiton, from the culture of apes and australopthecnes to that of Homo erectus, nvolved ‘the emergence of the most basc level of human representaton, the ablty to mme, or re-enact, events’ (Donald 1991, 16). The second transton, from the culture of Homo erectus to that of Homo sapiens, n whch the bologcal evoluton of modern humans was completed, nvolved, he thnks, ‘the emergence of the human speech system, ncludng a completely new cogntve capacty for constructng and decodng narratve’ (Donald 1991, 16). The third and inal transition,

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— and leavng asde the altogether more contentous clam that t was ndeed the last of three equally momentous but dstnct transtons, as characterzed by Donald — we may ask: what is the signiicance for modern human cognton of the emergence of systems of ‘external symbolc storage’ (ESS), n the form of vsual symbolsm, pctoral and wrtten? One vew (whch I thnk s broadly Donald’s own) is that the chief cognitive signiicance of this evolutonary development, whch seems to have begun some thrty to forty thousand years ago at most, s that t freed human memory (both workng memory and long-term memory) from the severe lmtatons mposed by the bology of the bran, as an nformaton-processng system. Informaton could now be stored outsde the ndvdual bran, processed there (for nstance, by usng wrtten mathematcal symbolsm for numercal calculaton), and transmtted and accumulated n robust and relable forms. collectve human knowledge, emboded n the world’s lbrares and more recently n computer data bases, now far transcends the memory capacty of any sngle human bran. Wthout wrtten symbolsm, t may be urged, most of modern scientiic knowledge would smply be mpossble: such symbolsm, t may be sad, s essental for the very constructon of scientiic knowledge, as well as for its storage and transmsson. I am not entrely convnced by such clams, even though they do clearly contan a large measure of truth. I beleve that the emergence of ESS was a highly signiicant development for human cognton — but more on account of what t was symptomatic of than purely on account of any eficiency and capacity gains it incurred for human nformaton-processng and data-accumulaton (cf. Olson 1994). It s possble to exaggerate the degree to whch ESS s essental for the emergence of anythng like modern scientiic knowledge. Even as recently as the Renassance, t probably was possble for a sngle human ndvdual to assmlate a szeable fracton of the collectve knowledge emboded n the books then n exstence — not n the sense of beng able to recte all these books by heart, but n the sense of understandng and retanng much of their signiicant content. The sheer preservation of such wrtten knowledge could, moreover, n prnciple be achieved by a suficiently well-organized oral tradton, such as that whch, t seems, may ntally have preserved such works as Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. A nce llustraton of ths possblty s provded by Ray Bradbury’s futurstc novel Fahrenheit 451, whch envsages a state n whch books

have been banned, but n whch dedcated members of a dssdent group take t upon themselves to memorze the last copes of whatever books they can lay ther hands on before these are commtted to the lames. Undoubtedly, ESS makes life much easer and the transmsson and accumulaton of collectve knowledge much more secure — but t s not clear that t s absolutely ndspensable n order for such transmsson and accumulaton to occur n anythng lke the way t has wthn hstorcal tme. An alternative view of the cognitive signiicance of ESS, and one whch I shall expand upon and defend n what follows, sees t as lyng n the fact that the ablty to use one physcal object explctly as a symbol for, or representaton of, another physcal object s ndcatve of — because t demands — a capacty for conceptually structured thought. Here t may be objected that an ablty to use spoken language s tself precsely such an ablty to use symbols or representatons, so that this account of the cognitive signiicance of ESS fails to distinguish the signiicance of ESS from the signiicance of human systems of symbolism or representaton n general. To ths objecton there are varous possble reples. On the one hand t may be urged by psycholngusts, such as Jerry Fodor and Noam chomsky, that human lngustc capacty s nnate, ‘hard-wred’ and modular, nvolvng only a tacit knowledge of phonetc, syntactc and semantc prncples (Fodor 1983) — and accordngly that t does not demand, at root, an explicit recognton of certan physcal objects (spoken words and sentences) as havng a symbolc role. On ths vew, the human capacty for spoken language no more ndcates a capacty explctly to recognze one physcal object as symbolzng or representng another than does the so-called ‘language’ of the bees. On the other hand, f t s held, as Donald Davdson holds, that a capacty for conceptual thought tself demands a capacty for language, and moreover that a language-user must be able to recognze both others and hmself as being a language-user (Davdson 1984), then t wll follow that t s correct, after all, to see a capacty for ESS and a capacty for language as beng all of a pece as regards the cogntve demands whch they mpose upon those possessng them. Moreover, on ths vew of language, t would be proper to see spoken language tself as beng, effectvely, a resource for ESS no dfferent n prncple from the resources provded by vsual symbolsm. Sounds are, ndeed, short-lved n comparson wth pctures and nscrptons, but they do provde a means both for reducng the bur90

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den on workng memory and for storng collectve knowledge. On the irst point, it is a familiar fact that ‘thnkng out loud’ (that s, n spoken words) facltates processes of comprehenson and reasonng; and on the second pont, as already alluded to above, mnemonc technques such as those emboded n rhyme and metre enable complcated bodes of nformaton to be preserved accurately through oral tradton. It s true, of course, that memorzng a poem or recpe does utlze bologcal memory — but t greatly eases the burden on bologcal memory by reducng the requrement on semantic memory. In short, rote learnng enables one to preserve detaled nformaton much more accurately than does learnng whch requres a grasp of semantc content (thnk of how we learnt our multplcaton tables at school). The next thng that I need to explan s why t s that the ablty to use one physcal object explctly as a symbol for, or representaton of, another physcal object demands a capacty for conceptually structured thought. The reason s that only a creature whch perceves objects as falling under concepts can be n a poston to recognze objects as standng n symbolc or representatonal relatonshps to one another. In order to see a vsual mark — such as a pattern of lnes scratched on a stone — as a symbol for or representation of, say, a tiger, I must irst of all possess the concept tiger — that s, I must be able to thnk of certan objects, even n ther absence, as beng thngs of a certain kind (n ths case, a knd of things which are ferocious, lesh-eating, four-legged, furry and so on). In addton, and even more mportantly, I must recognze the vsual mark tself as fallng under the concept symbol (even f I have no word for that concept) and thereby lkewse as beng somethng of a certan knd — namely, somethng ntentonally produced by a thnkng beng wth a vew to representng an object of another knd (n ths case, a tger). The very concept of a symbol s the concept of somethng desgned to represent somethng of a knd, and thus somethng fallng under a concept — so that any creature possessng the concept of a symbol must thereby possess the concept of a concept too, and ndeed must conceve of tself and others wth whom t communcates by means of symbols as beng conceptusers. In short, a symbol-producng creature must have somethng lke a ‘theory of mnd’, by whch t nterprets the behavour of other such creatures as beng expressve of nner thoughts and feelngs (see further Whten 1991). Even prmatologsts who are much more ready than I am to attrbute ‘conceptual’ abltes to monkeys and apes are hestant about crediting them with anything like a fully-ledged

‘theory of mnd’ (see cheney & Seyfarth 1990). At ths pont we need to apprecate how very dfferent s the perceptual world of a concept-user from that of an anmal ncapable of conceptual thought. We are apt to underrate or overlook ths difference, partly because it is very dificult for the mature concept-user to magne what naïve, conceptually unnformed percepton must be lke — and therefore dificult to imagine how different animal percepton must be from our own. As we survey our perceved envronment, we unavodably see t as populated by objects fallng under concepts, that s, by objects of certan recognzable knds (see further Lowe 1989). Here a table, there a tree, yonder a cow standng by a gate — and so on. Sometmes, of course, we notce objects whch we cannot easly classfy n famlar terms, apart from very general and vague ones: I mght ask someone n a house strange to me ‘What s that large, shny cylndrcal object n the corner of the room?’, and perhaps be nformed that t s an old artllery shell-case whch s now being used as an umbrella-stand. Undoubtedly, language facltates such conceptually nformed perceptual recognton, though t seems hghly unlkely that such recognton s impossible wthout the ad of language. On the contrary, t seems lkely that true language — understood as a means for communcatng conceptual thought from one thnkng creature to another — could only have emerged amongst creatures antecedently capable of conceptually nformed perceptual recognton. What, then, of conceptually unnformed percepton — what I have called ‘anmal’ percepton? What does an anmal see, f t doesn’t see ts envronment as populated by objects of recognzable knds? And on what grounds can we deny that anmal percepton s conceptually nformed n the way that human percepton s? Here we need to apprecate that to recognze an object as fallng under a concept, that s, as beng somethng of a certan kind, nvolves a grasp of certan general and condtonal truths (ncludng a crteron of identity for objects of ths knd: see below). Such a grasp nvolves far more than a mere ablty to discriminate perceptually between presented objects of that knd and presented objects of other knds — an ablty whch many lower forms of anmal lfe possess (and one whch ethologsts sometmes extravagantly take to be ndcatve of concept-possesson). Thus, to know that a certan object s a tree, say, s to know, amongst other thngs, that t s a lvng thng, a plant, that t has leaves, that t s not capable of self-moton, that f t s cut down t wll de . . . (the lst s long and open-ended). 91

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Because these general and condtonal truths nvolve the concepts of many other knds of thng, a creature can only recognze an object as fallng under a concept f t possesses a whole system of nterlockng concepts, lnked by general and condtonal truths whch that creature grasps. (By a ‘condtonal’ truth, I mean one whch requres the use of the word ‘f’ for ts natural expresson n Englsh, such as ‘If a tree s cut down, t wll de’.) There s no reason whatever to suppose that any non-human anmal possesses such a system of concepts. Apart from anythng else, there s no reason to suppose that any non-human anmal genunely possesses general or condtonal knowledge or belefs. (For another sceptcal assessment of the suggeston that non-human anmals possess concepts, n anythng lke the human sense, see chater & Heyes 1994.) So, n answer to the queston, ‘What does an anmal see?’, we must be careful not to say that t sees the objects whch we see as we see them (that s, as fallng under concepts). Of course, an anmal may be visually sensitive to the presence of a certan object, and may on that account react approprately (that s, ‘adaptvely’) to t — for nstance, by walkng around it, snifing it, chasing it or running away from it. This requres, amongst other thngs, that an anmal be vsually senstve to (though not that t be conceptually cognsant of) the spatial propertes of an object, such as ts dstance, sze, shape and texture, and lkewse to ts kinematic and dynamic propertes, such as ts velocty and weght. Thus the anmal’s vsual experence must, n some sense, correctly represent to t the general spatal layout of ts envronment as t changes over tme, segmentng that envronment nto dstnct parts wth respect to whch dfferent behavours are mandated — and these dfferent behavours, we may suppose, are some of them nnate, whle others are learned nductvely, beng renforced by nature’s regme of punshment and reward. But none of ths requres us to thnk of the anmal as recognzng objects n ts envronment, n the dstnctvely human sense of seeng ts envronment as composed of thngs fallng under varous concepts, lnked by a system of general and condtonal belefs. Symbols are, of course, a speces of artefact. But the producton of artefacts as such s not a dstnctvely human actvty, nor one whch demands hgh-level, conceptually nformed cognton. Anmal artefacts are commonplace: the beaver’s dam, the honey bee’s comb and the spder’s web are just three of the more famlar examples. As Rchard Dawkns has urged, we should thnk of anmal lfe-forms as exhbtng ‘extended phenotypes’, whch nclude not

just bodly morphology but also effects on the wder envronment whch an anmal partally shapes to ts own ends (Dawkns 1982). When t s alleged, as t sometmes carelessly s, that apart from human bengs only some of the other hgher prmates are ‘tool makers’, t should be acknowledged that ths assertion requires qualiication in the light of the widespread exstence of anmal artefacts even amongst much lower lfe-forms. Probably what s ntended by ths sort of allegaton s that only human bengs and, perhaps, chmpanzees intentionally produce artefacts, designing them deliberately with a speciic purpose n vew. That human bengs do ths s evdently true (though whether chmpanzees ever do s more dificult to assess). But then we see that what is cognitively signiicant about human artefact-producton s, once agan, that t s ndcatve of — because t demands — a capacty for conceptually structured thought. In order for a creature to desgn and produce an artefact intentionally, with a speciic purpose in vew, t must be able to thnk of objects as fallng under concepts. For nstance, delberately to create somethng wth the functon of an axe, desgned to cut certan knds of thngs such as trees, one must conceptualze the objects to be acted upon as objects of a knd suted to the sort of acton for whch an axe s desgned — and ths wll requre the desgner to have a complex body of general and condtonal belefs about the objects to be acted upon, as well as about the materals from whch somethng wth the propertes of an axe can be produced. Lkewse wth symbols, whch are just artefacts wth a specal kind of purpose. What is especially signiicant, cogntvely, about a creature capable of desgnng symbols, s not just that t must be a concept-user — any creature capable of designing an artefact must be that — but that t must possess the very concept of a concept, because t must recognze both tself and others n ts communty as concept-users, nasmuch as the concept of a concept-user s nvolved n a speciication of the very purpose for whch a symbol s desgned. What s begnnng to emerge, I hope, from these relections is that the most signiicant cognitive transton nvolved n the evoluton of the human mnd was the transton to conceptual thinking. Ths transton could not, n my vew, have been a mult-staged process: a creature s ether capable of thnkng n concepts or t s not — there s no half-way house. (Ths s also plausbly true of the transton to syntactcally organzed language — whch may, of course, be n effect the same transton: see Bckerton 1990.) Dfferent creatures may have dfferent conceptual 92

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repertoires — some, for nstance, may have and some may lack the concept of a concept, or that of a conceptuser. But between true conceptual thnkng and an anmal’s mere senstvty to features of ts envronment, coupled wth nnate and acqured behavoural responses to those features, there s a cogntve gulf of enormous magntude — a qualtatve rather than a merely quanttatve dfference. Here I take my lead from Immanuel Kant, whose profound nsghts nto the structure of the human mnd have stll not been adequately absorbed ether by phlosophers or by psychologsts and ethologsts (see Kant 1929). The dstnctve feature of human cognton les n ts synthess of the elements of sensory awareness through the applcaton of concepts, thereby at once provdng the human mnd wth objects of thought and percepton and thought tself wth logical structure, apt for the deployment of processes of theoretcal reasonng. When a human beng thnks, he or she has thoughts of objects wth propertes, or standng n relatons to one another, these thoughts often beng of a general or condtonal form — to use agan a now famlar example, one may have the thought, at once general and condtonal n form, that any tree, f t s cut down, wll de. If one adds to ths the sngular thought that ths object now before me s a tree, one may then nfer, logcally, that ths object wll de f t s cut down. However, there s no evdence, I beleve, that any creature other than a human beng s capable of conceptualzed, logcal thnkng of ths order. On ths queston of anmal nference, chmpanzees are ndeed sometmes held to be capable of elementary practcal reasonng, appeal beng made to examples lke that of Köhler’s famous chmpanzees, whch joned stcks together and used them to rake bananas towards themselves through the bars of ther cage, or stacked boxes on top of one another and clmbed up them to obtan bananas whch were prevously out of ther reach. However, t s by no means evdent that one need ascrbe a capacty for general or condtonal thoughts to a chmpanzee — nor, hence, a capacty for genune reasonng — n order to explan such behavour. We are, regrettably but understandably, apt to anthropomorphze when attemptng to explan the apparently ntellgent behavour of anmals — sayng, for nstance, that our pet dog approaches ts feedng bowl because t sees food there, feels hungry, and knows that by approachng the bowl t can obtan the food and thereby satsfy ts hunger. Ths ratonalstc nterpretaton of such anmal behavour does not, however, easly survve the results of an ngenous experment, n

whch a feedng bowl was attached to a mechansm desgned to move the bowl away from an anmal f the anmal approached and towards t f the anmal retreated: the anmals tested consstently faled to make the approprate adjustment to ther behavour n order to secure the food, puttng n doubt the ntal appearance of ther havng a capacty for practcal reasonng (see Heyes & Dcknson 1990; 1995). Ths inding is reminiscent of one of Köhler’s less wellknown observatons: that when one of hs chmpanzees was presented wth a banana outsde ts cage, but so stuated that the chmpanzee would have to push the banana away from tself before rakng t n, the anmal proved unequal to the task (cheney & Seyfarth 1990, 276). I should explan that when I speak of ‘objects’ fallng under concepts or belongng to knds, I am speakng of thngs whch we thnk of as beng identiiable and, ndeed, re-identiiable as ‘the same thing agan’ — thngs such as tables, trees, mountans, and people (see Lowe 1989). A creature lackng the concept of numercal identity could not thnk of or perceve ts world as beng populated by ‘objects’ n ths sense — nor, of course, could t thnk of itself as a subject of experence wthn that world (see Lowe 1996). (It s mportant to dstngush here between numerical dentty and mere qualitative dentty, or exact smlarty: even pgeons can be traned to dscrmnate perceptually between qualtatvely dfferent shapes, such as trangles and rectangles — though, as mentoned above, ths by no means mples that they possess the concepts of trangularty and rectangularty: see chater & Hughes 1994.) To see somethng as a tree, say, s to see t as a thng wth a past and a (potental) future, that s, as somethng whch can persst dentcally through tme, despte undergong qualtatve changes of varous sorts, approprate to the knd of thng t s. (Phlosophers tradtonally used the term ‘substance’ to denote thngs lke ths.) Thus, we do not see the loss of ts leaves as nmcal to the dentty, or contnung exstence, of a tree, because we conceve of trees as beng thngs of a knd for whch such a change s natural. From the fact that human bengs perceve ther world as beng populated by objects, capable of persstence through changes of shape and poston, t follows too that they see that world as exstng wthn a unied framework of space and time (another Kantan nsght). Thus, humans perceve ther mmedate envronment as formng just a small part of a wder framework of nterrelated objects, spread out n space and tme beyond the ‘horzon’ of present percepton — a feature of human understandng vastly more 93

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sophstcated than the sort of locatonal recognton capactes attrbuted (n the form of ‘cogntve maps’) to pgeons and rats n order to explan ther ablty to ind their way home or to relocate a food source (see campbell 1994). Hence, humans can form expectations with regard to the future and relect on past happenngs: they can make provson today for tomorrow’s needs, and try to make amends today for yesterday’s falures. None of ths s possble for anmals, for whch percepton s merely a regsterng of repeatable features (ncludng, no doubt, geographcal ones), followed by habtuated acton. When there s ran, the anmal may take shelter; when there is danger, it may lee — but it can have no concepton of there beng some one persstng object whch t now sees and may encounter agan, perhaps n a changed condton, after a perod of absence. (Our deep-rooted temptaton to anthropomorphze may nclne us to magne that some anmals — especally our pets! — do have such a concepton, at least where we ourselves are concerned: but when we see what a sophstcated framework of concepts s presupposed by a capacty to recognze objects as objects, ths temptaton may perhaps be more easly ressted.) All of these remarks are ntended to emphasze how truly vast s the gap between anmal and human cognton. Merln Donald, to hs great credt, recognzes the sze of that gap and therefore attempts to show how t can have been brdged, not n one fell swoop — for this would be dificult to reconcile with an evolutonary perspectve on human cognton — but rather through three successve transtons. However, as I have already remarked, I thnk that what s dstnctve of human cognton — our capacty for conceptual thnkng — s an all-or-nothng affar: ether a creature has t n full measure (allowng for dfferences n conceptual repertore), or else t lacks t altogether. The conceptual capacty whch s requred for a mastery of true language — understood as a means of communcatng conceptual thoughts — s one and the same as that requred for the ntentonal producton of vsual symbolsm, whether n the form of pctoral representatons or n the form of wrtng. And to the extent that ‘mmess’ s understood as the ntentonal re-enactment of events for purposes of communcaton (as opposed merely to mtatve behavour, of a sort exhbted by many lower anmals), then t, too, demands precsely the same conceptual capacty for object-recognton and so forth. It s unsurprsng, then, that no human or anmal communty has ever been dscovered to possess one of these behavoural trats — mmess, language and the producton of vsual symbolsm

— wthout the others. One thng whch, I feel, may blnd modern cogntve scentsts to Kant’s nsghts about the structure of the human mnd, and whch may n consequence deceve them nto magnng that the problem of explanng the evoluton of the human mnd s easer than t really s, s the current fashonablty of information-processing or computational models of human cognton. So long as the human mnd/bran s thought of merely as an nformaton-processng devce, analogous to a dgtal electronc computer, Kant’s nsghts about the conceptual structure of human thought threaten to go unheeded. A computer can process vast amounts of nformaton, but clearly doesn’t need to possess concepts n order to do ths. (The computer’s designer and programmer must possess them, of course, f ther work s to be the product of delberate thought and plannng: and the computer’s output s only of use to someone who can nterpret ts computatons by means of conceptually nformed thought.) If one sees the human bran merely as a bologcal computer, then, one wll be apt to see dfferences between t and anmal brans as resdng merely n such factors as speed of processng and memory capacty. The qualtatve dfference between anmal cognton and the sort of conceptual thnkng engaged n by humans wll be lost to vew. For the techncal noton of ‘nformaton’, as deployed n computer scence, s entrely nsenstve to ssues concernng concept possesson and conceptual structure. What s stored on the hard dsk of my computer, n the form of patterns of magnetzed partcles, s ndeed ‘nformaton’ n ths techncal sense. In just the same sense, one may say that the pattern of rngs n a cross-secton of a tree trunk contans ‘nformaton’ — n partcular, nformaton about the age of the tree and about the weather condtons t endured at varous tmes n ts lfe. But, of course, the tree tself does not have to possess the concept of age or of weather conditions — nor, ndeed, any concept whatever — n order to store ths nformaton. By contrast, a human beng who believes — perhaps as a result of countng the tree’s rngs — that the tree has such-and-such an age must ndeed possess the concept of age n order to have such a belef. Belef s a conceptually structured state of mnd, not merely a state of ‘nformaton storage’. These remarks have mplcatons for the very noton of ‘external symbolc storage’ (ESS), for that noton s evdently closely related to the computatonal noton of ‘nformaton storage’. Precsely because a page of a book, lke the hard dsk of a 94

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n the least mean to call nto queston ther truth on this account — on the contrary, a scientiic theory can only be true because t s a logcal structure of concepts, snce truth and falsehood are predcated precsely of such structures.) But now we want to know how the emergence of conceptual thnkng can be explaned, scientiically, that s, n terms whch presuppose the very structure of conceptual thought whose orgns are now n queston. Ths looks suspcously lke tryng to pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps!

computer, ‘stores nformaton’ n a sense whch s radcally dfferent from the sense n whch human bengs possess knowledge, or beliefs, we should not take too lterally the dea of ESS as beng some sort of adjunct to, or extenson of, the human mnd — n short, we should be extremely wary of Donald’s heady talk of ‘the emergence of vsual symbolsm and external memory as major factors n cogntve archtecture’ (Donald 1991, 17). The notons of ‘external memory’ and ‘cogntve archtecture’ that are beng nvoked here are ones drawn from computer scence and the related computatonal concepton of the mnd. If the human mnd/bran could be adequately descrbed merely as an nformaton-processng devce, then ndeed t would make perfect sense to thnk of that devce as capable of havng ts computatonal capactes ‘upgraded’ by ‘connectng t up’ to external devces of varous sorts, such as an abacus or, more ambtously, an electronc computer. But I want to resst, for Kantan reasons, the very metaphor of the mnd/bran as beng a computatonal or nformatonprocessng devce (see also Lowe 1995). A book, an abacus, an electronc computer — all of these human nventons certanly are ads to cognton. But that s all they are — aids — not extensions. The dfference s the dfference between a walkng stck and a motor car: the stck ads us n walking, whereas the car extends our ablty to move by provdng us wth a new means of locomoton. The book, abacus or computer may help us to think more eficiently, but using t doesn’t constitute a mode of thnkng unavalable to us wthout t, n the way that usng a motor car consttutes a htherto unavalable mode of locomoton. And the reason for ths s that true, conceptual thnkng s requred to nterpret the very ‘nput’ and ‘output’ of a book, abacus or computer: nothng that resdes n the structures of these devces themselves bears any relaton to genune thought save through the nterpretatonal efforts of a thnkng human user of them (cf. Searle 1992). A inal question is this: if the gulf between human conceptual thnkng and anmal cognton s as great as I have been suggestng, how can the brdgng of that gap n human prehstory be explaned n evolutonary terms? The answer s that I smply do not know. It may even be that we are consttutonally ncapable of answerng a queston lke ths (a case of what has sometmes been called ‘cogntve closure’: cf. McGnn 1991). Our thought s conceptually structured: we thnk of the world as populated by objects fallng under concepts. Accordngly, our scientiic theories, including the theory of evolution tself, are themselves conceptual structures. (I do not

E.J. Lowe Department of Philosophy University of Durham 50 Old Elvet Durham DH1 3HN note 1.

There s, of course, physcal evdence of changes n the structure of the human vocal tract, preserved n the fossl record (Leberman 1984; 1991), but the mere capacty to vocalze n a modern human way by no means ponts conclusvely to a modern human capacty for spoken language.

References Bckerton, D., 1990. Language and Species. chcago (IL): University of Chicago Press. campbell, J., 1994. Past, Space and Self. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. chater, N. & c. Heyes, 1994. Anmal concepts: content and dscontent. Mind and Language 9, 209–46. cheney, D.L. & R.M. Seyfarth, 1990. How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. chcago (IL): University of Chicago Press. Davdson, D., 1984. Thought and talk, n Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, by D. Davdson. Oxford: clarendon Press, 155–70. Dawkns, R., 1982. The Extended Phenotype. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard University Press. Fodor, J.A., 1983. The Modularity of Mind. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Heyes, c. & A. Dcknson, 1990. The ntentonalty of anmal acton. Mind and Language 5, 87–104. Heyes, c. & A. Dcknson, 1995. Folk psychology won’t go away: response to Allen and Bekoff. Mind and Language 10, 329–32. Kant, I., 1929. Critique of Pure Reason [1787], trans. N. Kemp Smth. London: Macmllan.

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bridge University Press. McGnn, c., 1991. The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution. Oxford: Blackwell. Olson, D.R., 1994. The World on Paper: the Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading. cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Searle, J.R., 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Whten, A. (ed.), 1991. Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading. Oxford: Blackwell.

Leberman, P., 1984. The Biology and Evolution of Language. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Leberman, P., 1991. Uniquely Human: the Evolution of Speech, Thought and Selless Behavior. cambrdge (MA): Harvard University Press. Lowe, E.J., 1989. Kinds of Being: a Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms. Oxford: Blackwell. Lowe, E.J., 1995. There are no easy problems of conscousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2, 266–71. Lowe, E.J., 1996. Subjects of Experience. cambrdge: cam-

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Chapter 9 the supernatural Beings of Prehistory and the external storage of Religious Ideas Steven Mthen Depictions of what are most probably supernatural beings provide some of the most intriguing images that we ind in prehistoric art. While they conirm our suspicions gained from other sources of data that past people possessed religious ideologies as complex as those in the world today, such images rarely provide any substantial information about the nature of those prehistoric ideologies. Is it possible to make any generalizations about supernatural beings that can be applied to those of prehistory? The nature of prehistoric art appears to conirm Durkheim’s view that the principle forms of art seem to have been born out of religion. Why should this have been so? People possess all sorts of complex ideas which they do not feel compelled to represent in material form, the very nature of which seems to contradict the immaterial notion of a supernatural being. It is argued that once we view the human mind from an evolutionary perspective, and recognize religion as a product of recent cognitive luidity, we can indeed make generalizations about likely features of past supernatural beings. Moreover we can understand more fully why religious ideas so frequently need to have material manifestations this is to help anchor them into a mind which has no natural home for ideas that cross-cut evolved domains of knowledge.

T

sculptures of the archaeologcal record. Why should materal symbols be so fundamental to relgous deas and rtual? To argue that we convert relgous deas nto materal objects to gve them relatve permanence so that they can be subjected to operatons whch are beyond the capacty of the mnd (Leach 1976, 37) smply begs the queston. Each of us possesses a vast array of deas on whch we perform complex mental operatons wthout needng to convert those deas nto materal form to do so. We have, for nstance, deas about socal relatonshps, about what other people are thnkng, and about future events n our mnds. But rarely do we create materal symbols to help us form and manpulate such deas. So why do relgous deas requre such dfferent treatment? Why do they requre ‘external symbolc storage’?

he archaeologcal record has many works of art that are lkely to be representatons of supernatural bengs from long forgotten relgons. What can we know of such bengs? ‘very lttle’ s both the common sense and probably correct answer. But the archaeologcal record also prompts another, rather more nterestng, queston: why are materal symbols so fundamental to relgous deas and rtual? For as Durkhem (1915, 381) once suggested, and as Palaeolthc archaeology can now demonstrate, ‘the prncple forms of art seem to have been born out of relgous deas’. Ths paper wll address the queston of why materal symbols are so prevalent n relgous deas. In dong so, t wll also suggest that t may be possble to make some educated guesses about aspects of the supernatural bengs of prehstory beyond those evdent n the pantngs and 97

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external symbolic storage as a solution to the quantity of information

appearance and then loss of such artefacts n the archaeologcal record drectly related to changng socal and economc crcumstances. Artefacts whch relate drectly to relgous deas lack any utltaran explanaton. They appear so prevalent n human socetes that ther presence cannot be explaned by nformaton overload on the human mnd — unless that overload s unversal. Belef n relgous deas appears ubqutous, as does the need to express such deas n materal symbols. Why should relgous deas requre external symbolc storage? To address these questons we must consder the orgn of relgous deas, and ndeed the evoluton of the human mnd n general.

External symbolc storage as a soluton to nformaton overload on our mnds s an approprate nterpretaton for wrtten documents or cD-Roms. As Donald (1991) dscussed, the exstence of such ‘artefacts’ creates real problems as to the locus of human memory. Ther emergence s lkely to have changed — and perhaps contnues to change — the manner n whch the mnd works. Some features of early prehstorc art may can also be nterpreted as relatng to the quantty of nformaton requrng storage and transmsson. Images of anmals wthn Palaeolthc cave pantngs, for nstance, may have functoned to cue the recall of ecologcal knowledge and have prompted the creatve use of that knowledge n decson makng (Mthen 1988; 1990). The speces that were panted, and a range of stylstc attrbutes of the pantngs, seem to relate drectly to the knowledge of these anmals that the Ice Age hunters requred, and the means by whch t was attaned. Informaton was not beng encoded nto these mages; they were actng as recall cues for the nformaton stored wthn the human mnd, and as stmul for the creatve processng of that knowledge when makng huntng decsons. Ths art appears to have been created prncpally at a tme of economc stress when the quantty of nformaton and the qualty of decsons were at a premum (Mthen 1989). Indeed, the recently establshed thematc changes n Palaeolthc art through tme (clottes 1996) suggest that such retreval cues n the art were becomng more prevalent as clmatc condtons deterorated towards the late glacal maxmum and economc stress ncreased; they were culturally selected. Engraved objects from the Upper Palaeolthc whch have the repeated use of smlar motfs are also lkely to have functoned as retreval cues, and possbly for storng nformaton n a smlar fashon as occurred within the irst writing. Such artefacts have been characterized as ‘artiicial memory systems’ (d’Errco 1995) and are approprately descrbed as examples of prehstorc scence, rather than art. classc examples of these are the La Marche antler and the Taï plaque (Marshack 1990; d’Errco 1995; d’Errco & cacho 1994). It remans unclear what nformaton was beng encoded on such objects, but agan t s lkely to have been of a utltaran nature relatng to the socal and natural world. As wth the cave pantngs of anmals, one can readly apprecate (f perhaps not always understand) how the

the origin of religious ideas: archaeological evidence Religion is a notoriously dificult domain of activity to deine. Seeking its archaeological traces poses enormous problems. Whle the dversty of relgous beliefs deies attempts to identify universals, certain recurrent features of relgons exst and ndcate the type of evdence we as archaeologsts must seek. Five features appear to be of greatest signiicance: (1) belef n non-physcal bengs; (2) that nonphyscal component of a person may survve after death; (3) that certan people wthn a socety are lkely to receve drect nspraton or messages from supernatural agences, such as gods or sprts; (4) that performng certan rtuals n an exact way can brng about change n the natural world; (5) the use of materal symbols (see Boyer 1994; Guthre 1993; Park 1994, 32–9 for discussion of attempts to deine relgon and dentfy unversals). coln Renfrew (1985) has dscussed the formdable problems that archaeologsts face when attemptng to dentfy past relgous actvty and when tryng to draw nferences regardng relgous deas. He qute rghtly warns aganst beng ether unduly pessmstc or mmodestly optmstc about our abltes at these tasks. Wth regard to early prehstory (.e. before farmng) the last decade has seen a rgorous re-examnaton of the evdence for rtual, whch has resulted n the rejecton of much of the clamed evdence. The development of our understandng of taphonomy has led to the dsmssal of Neanderthal bear cults, cannbalsm , and grave rtual nvolvng the placement of lowers at Shanidar (Gargett 1989; Gamble 1989; Whte & Toth 1991). In contrast to the vew that ‘prmtve thought’ was orgnally relgous n nature, the archaeologcal evdence clearly ndcates that relgous deas and 98

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prising. Only in South Africa at this time are signiicant traces of artstc actvty. These take the form of an ncrease n peces of red ochre n archaeologcal contexts after 100,000 years ago (Knght et al. 1995). The mplcatons of ths ncrease remans unclear, though body pantng s a lkely explanaton. But there are no representatonal mages and the evdence for any symbolc actvty pror to 40,000 years ago s sparse and hghly ambguous (but see Bednark 1995; Mthen 1996b). Only after ths date does the archaeologcal record contan mages of anthropomorphc bengs and body ornaments whch are lkely to both represent and create the symbolc relatonshps wth the natural world — relatonshps that had perhaps existed since the time of the irst modern humans. The very irst art we possess appears to be ntmately assocated wth relgous deas by contanng mages of what are lkely to be supernatural bengs. The earlest pece s a 28.1 cm hgh carvng in mammoth ivory of a igure half man and half lon from Höhensten Stadel and datng to c. 33,000 years ago (Marshack 1990). contemporary wth ths are the pantngs n chauvet cave whch nclude a half human/half bison igure (Chauvet et al. 1996). Such anthropomorphic igures persist in Palaeolithic art even as the major anmal themes change from carnvorous/dangerous anmals to herbvores. In Les Tros Frères, for nstance, there s the famous sorcerer igure, probably dating to 15,000–12,000 years old. It appears to have the posture, legs and hands of a human, the antlers of a rendeer, the tal of a horse and the phallus n the poston customary n of a felne. As we move beyond the Palaeolthc, anthropomorphic igures continue to be a critical part of the archaeological record, such as the human/ish mages from Lepensk vr (Srejovc´ 1972). And durng later prehistory igurative images pervade prehistoric art whch are most readly nterpreted as mages of supernatural bengs (Gmbutas 1974). It is also likely that many of the non-igurative mages from prehstory relate to supernatural bengs and relgous deas, snce geometrc forms are used to represent relgous deas by ethnographcally documented groups. In yolunga art, for nstance, Ancestral Beings may be iguratively depicted, but their transformatonal aspects (the manner n whch they can exst n dfferent states such as human, anmal or landscape feature) are prncpally depcted n a geometrc fashon. The multvalency of these desgns enable the pantngs to encode the transformatonal aspect of Ancestral Bengs and events (Morphy 1989).

rtual actvtes appeared relatvely recently n human prehistory. They are irst found associated with anatomcally modern humans not more than 100,000 years ago. Ths evdence comes from the archaeologcal record of the earlest modern humans n the Near East. In the caves of Qafzeh and Skhu-l n the Near East burals of anatomcally modern humans have been found. They date to between 100,000–80,000 years ago and n some of these graves parts of anmals were placed wth the human bodes. In Qafzeh, a chld was found bured wth the skull and antlers of a deer (vandermeersch 1970), whle n Skhul one of the burals had been lad on ts back and the jaw bone of a wld boar placed wthn ts hands (Mccown 1937). Three thngs should be noted about these burals. Frst, the assocatons between anmal parts and human bodes have been crtcally examned n recent years followng clams that they are fortutous — the mere result of post depostonal processes (Lndly & clark 1990). Such clams have been rejected and there seems lttle doubt that parts of anmals were ntentonally placed wthn these graves. Secondly, artiicially made symbols appear to be absent from these socetes, nether placed wthn the graves nor worn on the bodes themselves. As much as 60,000 years appears to have elapsed after irst fossil evidence of anatomically modern humans before any symbols were manufactured. Thrdly, Neanderthals also seem to have been creatng graves durng ths tme perod, or very soon after (Gargett 1989; Bar-yosef et al. 1992). But — wth one possble excepton — these lack any grave goods at all, and ndeed any sgns of bural rtual. The one excepton s the recently excavated Neanderthal nfant from Amud (Rak et al. 1994; Hovers et al. 1995). Known as Amud 7, the degree of preservaton of ths nfant mples that t was a bural, and a red deer maxlla was found lyng on the pelvs. currently undated, the locaton of ths bural n the cave suggests a relatvely recent date, .e. younger than 60,000 bp. Ths admttedly scanty evdence mples that anmals were playng a symbolc role n the socety of modern humans (and perhaps the late Neanderthals), n addton to ther utltaran role of supplyng food and raw materals. I suspect that we are seeng here the orgns of totemc and anthropomorphc thnkng n the human mnd, somethng that remaned absent from the majorty of early humans (Mthen 1996a). If parts of anmal bodes were beng used as symbols by the irst modern humans, then the lack of any artstc representaton s perhaps sur99

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A more famlar example of a multvalent abstract mage encodng deas about supernatural bengs s the chrstan cross used as a symbol of the cruciixion and consequently the resurrection of Jesus. It s a dstnct possblty, or even probablty, that the abstract mages from prehstory, such as those cut nto lmestone blocks 30,000 years ago n France (Delluc & Delluc 1978), or much later n prehstory on the stones at New Grange (O’Kelley 1982), also encode nformaton about supernatural bengs, a mythologcal world and relgous deas. In summary, there can be lttle doubt that after 30,000 years ago relgous deas, rtual actvty and materal symbols pervade all human socetes. Even though the meanings associated with igurative or abstract mages cannot be nferred, there can be lttle doubt that the majorty of ths art related to relgous deas. Why should there be such a compulson to represent relgous deas n materal form? After all, to do so s n essence a contradcton of the deas themselves: turnng somethng that s eternal and supernatural nto somethng that s transent and materal. To answer ths we must consder the cogntve orgns of relgous thought.

ways about numerous domans of actvty, such as socal nteracton, tool-makng and the natural world, but were unable to ntegrate ways of thnkng and knowledge from these separate domans (Mthen 1996c). Elsewhere I have traced the evoluton of these cogntve domans and explaned how ther solaton from each other s both compatble wth our understandng of cogntve evoluton, and serves to explan varous features of the Lower and Mddle Palaeolthc records (Mthen 1996a). For nstance, early human technology remaned lmted n scope and complexty as the knowledge of anmal behavour could not be brought nto contact wth techncal knowledge for the desgn of huntng weapons. Socal complexty remaned lmted as ths could not be medated through materal culture as s the case among modern humans. Wth the emergence of anatomcally modern humans, a cogntve transton began n whch new deas could arse by combnng knowledge whch had previously been domain-speciic. As Edmund Leach (1976) descrbed, the ablty to assocate together enttes ether materal or abstract, whch ordnarly belong to qute dfferent contexts, s the essence of symbolsm. He uses the example of the ‘lon as kng of the beasts’ whch requres mxng two contexts n the mnd : the lon as a beast and the kng as the most powerful man n a socety, deas whch ordnarly reman n the contexts of ‘socety’ and ‘nature’ (a rather pertnent example, by chance, n lght of the lon/man from Höhlensten Stadel). Smlarly, conceptons of supernatural bengs brng together deas that ordnarly resde n contexts of ‘physcal objects’, ‘humans’, ‘socety’, ‘nature’ n an almost bewlderng dversty of ways The archaeologcal record mples that ths transition from a domain-speciic to a ‘cognitively luid’ mentality occurred in two major steps (Mithen 1996a). The irst was the bringing together of knowledge and thought about the socal and natural worlds, exempliied in the evidence for totemism and anthropomorphc thnkng among the earlest modern humans by 100,000 years ago (Mthen 1996d). At ths tme, knowledge and thought about materal culture (‘techncal ntellgence’) appears to have remaned as an solated cogntve doman, demonstrated by the absence of artefacts wthn the burals, and the contnuaton of a Mddle Palaeolthc technology by the early modern humans. By beng able to ntegrate deas and knowledge from the two evolved domans of natural hstory and social intelligence people could, for the irst time, attrbute human-lke thoughts to anmals, and beleve that they shared ancestors with speciic animal spe-

Cognitive origins of religious ideas In this section I will briely summarize my own arguments for the orgn of relgous deas, recently dscussed at length elsewhere (Mthen 1996a), and which have signiicant similarities with the ideas of Boyer (1993; 1994; 1996) and Guthre (1993). In our work the crtcal feature of supernatural bengs s that they possess features whch cross-cut the ‘natural’ categores of enttes n the world. For nstance, a supernatural beng may be able to transform tself nto many dfferent speces, although speces n the natural world are mmutable. In ths sense t s lke an artefact, whch can be easly transformed nto dfferent types of tool. Supernatural bengs may have a body lke a human, but be nvsble, just as an dea s nvsble. Supernatural bengs may need to eat n the manner that humans need to eat, but do not undergo the normal processes of brth and death. In that respect they are more lke nert physcal and seemngly tmeless objects, such as a pece of stone. In ths regard, I have argued that the orgn of relgous deas and conceptons of supernatural bengs s just one manfestaton of a transformaton n human cognton that occurred between 100,000 and 30,000 years ago. Before that tme the human mnd appears to have had a domain speciic character: early humans could thnk n essentally modern 100

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culturally speciic, and by the age of three, children appear very able to ntegrate ther knowledge from dfferent domans, or create ‘mappngs across domans’ (Karmloff-Smth 1992; carey & Spelke 1994; Harrs 1994). Older chldren and adults can come up wth deas that volate ther ntutve understandng of the world, for example by attrbutng thoughts and desres to nert peces of moulded plastc (.e. dolls). Pascal Boyer (1993; 1994; 1996) has stressed ths n hs recent work, argung that relgous deas about supernatural bengs characterstcally nvolve such volatons. Supernatural bengs are frequently thought of as beng able to defy the laws of physcs by effortlessly movng through physcal objects or walkng on water; they may not need to feed or undergo the ‘normal cycle of brth, reproducton and death’. They may be able to transform themselves nto other anmal speces, or nto humans or nto physcal features of the landscape. Boyer provdes a host of no less bzarre examples from other relgons: trees that can talk, mountans that can breathe. Such features of supernatural bengs arse from cogntve luidity — bringing together knowledge and ideas from dfferent cogntve domans. Boyer argues that such volatons to our ntutve understandng of the world are essental to the cultural transmsson of relgous deas so as to make them attenton-grabbng: they are somethng dfferent, somethng specal, somethng to be treated wth reverence. The same argument can apply n an evolutonary context. Early humans such as Neanderthals are lkely to have had a profound understandng of the natural world, and of physcal objects — as apparent from ther foragng behavour and tool-makng. They were as adept at mnd-readng and complex socal behaviour as ourselves. But their domain-speciic mental archtecture, whch unlke modern humans, contnued nto adulthood, prevented the ‘mappngs across domans’ and the development of deas whch volated ther understandng of physcs, bology and psychology. Belevng that nanmate objects may have belefs and desres, or that humans could once transform themselves nto anmals — belefs that are recurrent n many relgous deologes — was beyond them. Ths only arose wth the emergence of cognitive luidity, in the two stages at 100,000 and 60,000–30,000 I descrbed above. And just as Boyer has descrbed for the modern world, t s lkely that these volatons to ntutve understandng of the world gave the religious ideas of the irst modern humans a specal salence.

ces. A mappng could be created of the socal world onto the natural world, and vice versa. But as the doman of techncal ntellgence remaned solated, such deas lacked materal expresson. And t would appear unlkely that such early relgous thnkng could have nvolved anmsm, attrbutng thoughts to nert physcal objects. These could only have arsen through the ntegraton of techncal knowledge nto the incipient cognitively luid mind. This appears to be the fundamental cause of the cultural exploson between 60,000–30,000 years ago as ths enabled relgous deas to have materal expresson. We see the consequence n the archaeologcal record wth the appearance of mages such the lon/man from Höhensten-Stadel. Smlarly t s lkely that many of the materal objects, ncludng those used for personal decoraton, now carred symbolc meanng. So we see that the irst inklings of religious ideas arose 100,000 years ago as the domain-speciic mentalty that had been characterstc of the early human mnd began to collapse. Whle consderable functional utility was gained from a cognitively luid mnd, such as the ncreased use of food n medatng socal relatonshps, the emergence of relgous deas s most lkely no more than an ep-phenomenal consequence of ths cogntve transton. Religious ideas as violations of intuitive knowledge The crtcal feature of the relgous deas that arse from the cognitively luid mind, as possessed by all modern humans, s that they nvolve deas whch contradct our ntutve understandng of the world. To explain this we need to briely consider some recent work in child development. Just as cognitve evoluton appears to have nvolved a perod n which thought was domain-speciic in character, so too does cogntve development n young chldren (Hrschfeld & Gelman 1994). Ths s a controversal area of research, but there appears to be substantal evdence that among young chldren an ntutve understandng of psychology, physcs and bology emerges wthn ther mnds (e.g. Whten 1991; Lesle 1994; Atran 1990; Spelke 1991). These domans of ntutve knowledge appear to be unversal, underdetermned by experence and, for a short perod of development, related to domain-speciic ways of thought. I believe they relate to the domain-speciic cogntve domans that arose durng human evoluton (Mthen 1996a). Ths ntutve knowledge appears to act as the buldng blocks for cogntve development: t ‘kck-starts’ other cogntve domans whch are 101

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Religious ideas as susceptible to corruption and dissipation during cultural transmission

domans of ntutve knowledge wthn the mnd. So whle they need to volate some aspects of our ntutve knowledge of the world to have salence, they also need to conform to some aspects of ths to have survval value. And conformty to our doman of ntuitive psychology appears of particular signiicance, as ths s the rchest of our domans of nference. As a consequence, although supernatural bengs are often able to move through physcal objects, and are nvsble or eternal, they nevertheless frequently have belefs and desres just lke any mortal human. As such, people readly may draw nferences about supernatural bengs from the partal evdence about them whch they receve durng the cultural transmsson of relgous deas. As Boyer notes, anthropologsts have been less prepared to descrbe these conformtes to ntutve psychology than the volatons to ntutve knowledge. The Ancestral Bengs of the Aborgnal dreamtme (Morphy 1989) provde us wth an excellent example of supernatural bengs whch both volate and conform to ntutve knowledge of the world. They grab one’s attenton because they can transform ther physcal form from anmals to humans and topographc features, and because they are not born, and do not lve and de lke mortal bengs. yet ther behavour often nvolves practcaltes — they ish and hunt and, more signiicantly, they have belefs, desres and engage n mental manpulaton of others by playng trcks. In ths regard they are very human-lke. consequently, when people are hearng about the Dreamtme, there s a substantal element of the mythology that s easy to grasp, allowng them to generalze about the nature of Ancestral Beings from speciic examples of their behavour. Another readly apprecated example s the gods of ancent Greek mythology, whch have both supernatural powers and very humanlke mnds, dsplayng a belef-desre psychology. Stewart Guthre (1993) has also emphaszed the very human lke-features of supernatural bengs n many, f not all, relgons: ‘For most people, gods and humans are very smlar . . . In varous cultures gods eat, drnk, make war and love, have offsprng, fall sck, grow old and de, very much as humans do’ (1993, 178). Guthre llustrates ths wth many of the major relgons of the world. He llustrates, for nstance, how n the Bble the chrstan god s shown as human-lke, both mentally and physcally. He has human-lke emotons such as anger, love and vengefulness, whle n the New Testament he adopts human form in Jesus. Similarly, in the Jewish tradition, God ‘wants, cares, demands, regrets, says and does — just

Such volatons to our evolved understandng may draw our attenton to relgous deas, but they also make such ideas transient, dificult to comprehend and to transmt. Ths s because they do not relate to an evolved feature of mental archtecture. In an evolutionary context they do ‘it’ into the domain-speciic cogntve domans, and n a developmental context they do not ‘it’ into a domain of intuitive knowledge. As such, they contrast wth other types of deas. For nstance, transmttng knowledge about human socal relatonshps s relatvely easy, as all human mnds appear to have an ntutve grasp of how socal relatonshps work and what knds exst, whch can be readly understood owng to the long evolutonary hstory of a dstnct socal ntellgence (Humphrey 1976; Byrne & Whten 1988; 1992; Mthen 1996a). In other words, we can readly assume that other ndvduals wll share a substantal amount of our own knowledge and assumptons about socal behavour rrespectve of ther cultural context of development. Ths makes communcaton about ths doman relatvely easy. If, for example, you were told that two people were ‘n love’, then you could readly nfer numerous aspects of ther feelngs and lkely behavour patterns, rrespectve of ther cultural context. Relgous deas are n total contrast to ths: there is no domain-speciic basis to religious ideas, they are subject to mmense dversty, there can be no assumptons that other ndvduals wll be able to grasp the deas that one possesses. As a consequence the cultural transmsson of relgous knowledge s fundamentally dfferent to — fundamentally more dificult than — that of social knowledge. Rather than beng nformal, t s often undertaken n the context of rtual: ordered sequences of acton, rgdly adhered to, which serve to maintain the idelity of the ideas durng cultural transmsson. Wthout ths, relgous deas would too readly become corrupted and dsspated. But even wth the bulwark of rtual, relgous deas are ‘wnnowed’ by the process of cultural transmsson; those whch survve are those whch can most easly ind an ‘anchor’ in the human mind. the ‘anchoring’ of religious ideas into the mind Pascal Boyer has drawn on ths nevtable wnnowng of relgous deas to explan certan recurrent features of supernatural bengs. He argues that the relgous deas whch are most lkely to survve cultural transmsson are those anchored onto one of the 102

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human-lke belef-desre psychology. Smlarly, when we consder later prehstorc Europe, there appear to be many ponts of contact between mages we assume to be supernatural bengs from the Palaeolthc, and those found n the Neolthc (Gmbutas 1974), and then from the Aegean Bronze Age nto classcal Greece (Renfrew 1985). If these do relect the longterm survval of relgous deas, then those deas may also have possessed Boyer’s ‘cogntve optmum’ to have survved. So f we return to the queston I asked at the start of ths paper — what can we know of the supernatural beings of prehistory — we may feel conident that they shared many features of normal humans, whatever the form n whch they are manfest to us n the tems of prehstorc art.

lke human bengs’ (1993, 180), and n Hndusm gods and humans are both smlar and contnuous. Gods n other relgons smply lve n a smlar fashon to humans. Quotng Erland Ehnmark, Guthre descrbes how the copper Eskmo great sprt, Kannakapfaluk, lves n a snow hut just lke the Eskmos, wth a lamp and sleepng platform and all the household paraphernala. Smlarly, the Httte gods ‘eat and drnk [and] feel hunger. They work as craftsmen. They are liable to aflictions and employ magic to ward off sckness. They have horses and charots. They keep harems. they assemble n a councl to delberate. They have human passons. They wage wars aganst the gods of other peoples. (Guthre 1993; 1991).

In summary, whle Guthre emphaszes the possesson of general human-lke qualtes, and Boyer of a belef-desre psychology, both of these anthropologsts recognze that many features of supernatural bengs conform to our ntutve knowledge of the world. They are lke normal human bengs. By havng these features they become anchored n the human mnd. Boyer argues that t s the combnaton of both volaton and conformty to dfferent features of ntutve knowledge that provdes relgous concepts wth ther greatest survval value durng the process of cultural transmsson. There s, he argues, a ‘cogntve optmum’ — deas whch have the rght balance of volatons and conformtes to ntutve knowledge are the ones most lkely to survve the rgours of cultural transmsson. Too many volatons and the deas are too dificult to grasp, remember, understand and explan; too many conformtes and they lack adequate salence, they do not grab one’s attenton.

Artefacts, cognition and religious ideas By endowng relgous deas wth features that conform to our ntutve knowledge they are anchored n the human mnd. But there s a second, and perhaps far more signiicant, way in which religious ideas are anchored: they are represented n materal form. Since the time of the very irst members of Homo, people have manpulated and thought about physcal objects. Humans may not be the only speces that makes tools, but there s a vast gulf between the role of materal objects n the lfe of even the earlest Homo and the other major tool usng speces, the chmpanzee. Indeed, I suspect that the manufacture and use of tools by Homo and chmpanzees derves from very dfferent cogntve processes (Mthen 1996a). Early humans are lkely to have possessed a doman of techncal ntellgence, whch was solated from the rest of the mnd for a large part of human evoluton. young chldren appear to exhbt an ntutve understandng of physcs and the behavour of physcal objects, under-determned by ther experence. So relgous deas that are represented n materal form gan survval value for the process of cultural transmsson: they become easer to communcate and comprehend as ther materal form provdes a second anchor n the human mnd. Representaton n physcal form provdes a means whereby those features of supernatural bengs that volate ntutve knowledge may themselves be anchored n the mnd, rather than havng to rde upon the back of the human-lke features of supernatural bengs. In other words, we should expect representatons of supernatural bengs to stress the ntutve knowledge volatons (rather than conformtes) of those bengs. A few examples wll llustrate

Implications for the supernatural beings of prehistory Ths argument s of consderable nterest for archaeologsts. We are frequently faced wth evdence that some features of relgous deas dd ndeed survve for very long perods durng prehstory, through a host of socal and economc developments. I remarked above on the man/animal igures in Palaeolthc art that are present throughout the 20,000 year perod of cave pantng, even though other themes n the art are changng. If these are ndeed representatons of supernatural bengs, the means by whch they volate ntutve knowledge are apparent: they are composed of different species, perhaps relecting abltes at transformng themselves between these. But f Boyer s correct, to have had such survval value, these bengs must have balanced such volatons wth conformtes. Perhaps they possessed a 103

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that ths appears to be the case. If we consder chrstan conography the two most prominent images are the cruciixion, often represented just by the cross, and the vrgn Mary. Both of these are cung the recall of the ntutve knowledge violations of Jesus, the supernatural being. In other words they stress the manner in which Jesus volates normal processes of death and brth (.e. by beng resurrected, and comng from a vrgn brth). In hs study of Anglo-Saxon llumnated manuscrpts, Gameson (1995) has provded an evocatve mage of how such representatons functoned n prvate devotion. He describes how the image of the cruciixion n the New Minster Prayer Book served as a focus for devoton, as the devotees drected ther attenton at dfferent parts of chrst’s body as they conducted ther sequence of prayers. The mage stressed the manner in which Jesus violates one’s intuitive knowledge of the world. The manner in which Jesus conforms to ths knowledge was not necessary as such knowledge s readly acqured, remembered and understood — or as Boyer (1996) descrbes, t s ‘actvated by default’. For a second example we can consder the representaton of detes n the Hndu relgon. Although, as Guthre (1993) descrbes, these often have human-lke attrbutes, they are always represented n anthropomorphc form, except Sva who was represented by the linga (a round-topped pllar representng hs phallus). In other words, the mages depct the features of the detes whch volate our ntutve understandng of the world; they often have multple arms or legs and are composed of several anmals. Strct rules exst as to how each dety can be represented. Fuller (1992) descrbes one role of these mages. When Hndus vst a temple one of the most mportant thngs they can do s smply gaze on the mage for a ‘sght’ a darshana, of the dety. The darshana s n fact an exchange of vsons, as the dety s thought to be also gazng back as the devotee. So, just as n the prevous example, t s the manner n whch the supernatural beng volates ntutve knowledge that s evoked n the mnd. The other, human-lke features, requre no such cues. Many more examples can be readly found. The general pont s that the mages of supernatural beings, represented in a fashion that speciically relates to the manner n whch they volate ntutve knowledge, provde anchors for these relgous deas n the human mnd. Ths allows the deas to be acqured, recalled, understood and transmtted, supplementng the manner n whch ths s acheved by such other features as the deas possess whch conform to ntu-

tve knowledge. Faulstch summarzng the role of art among the Walpr of the central Australan desert, expresses ths most clearly: Among the Walpr, the natural world s vsualsed n terms of totemc features and mythologcal hstores. The art makes those unseen realtes tangble and remnd the people of ther trbal orgns and relgous oblgatons. . . . When a people’s relatonshp wth the sprtual s made tangble, pertnent concepts can be transmtted easly and easly apprecated. The Walpr excel n employng symbols to communcate and comprehend an ntrcate belef system. (Faulstch 1992, 22)

summary Religious ideas ind external storage in material form. Ths s not because of the quantity of nformaton nvolved, but the kind of nformaton. The evolutonary hstory of the human mnd makes relgous deas inherently dificult to comprehend and transmit. Rtual s used to avod corrupton and dsspaton of the deas. But, over the long term, relgous deas are wnnowed, some havng greater survval value than others. Those whch survve are those whch can be anchored n the human mnd. Boyer explans that one type of anchorng s where deas have a component that conforms to our ntutve knowledge of the world. consequently, as he and Guthre explan, a recurrent feature of supernatural bengs s that they have very human-lke characterstcs, partcularly possessng a belef-desre psychology. If ths s so, we may be enttled to attrbute such characterstcs to the supernatural bengs of prehstory about whom we have no knowledge, other than from the mages survvng n the corpus of prehstorc art. Such materal mages are crtcal, snce they provde a second means by whch relgous deas are anchored n the human mnd. And t s characterstc of such mages that they depct the manner n whch supernatural bengs volate our ntutve knowledge of the world. These features need external storage: although the cognitively luid mind is very well suited to nventng supernatural bengs wth such features, t s not well suted to understandng, rememberng, and transmttng these relgous deas. Steven Mithen Department of Archaeology University of Reading Whiteknights P.O. Box 218 Reading RG6 6AA 104

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Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Durkhem, E., 1915. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. London: Allen & Unwn. Faulstch, P., 1992. Of earth and dreamng: abstracton and naturalsm n Warlpr art, n Rock Art and Ethnography, eds. M.J. Morwood & D.R. Hobbs. (Occasonal AURA Publcaton 5.) Melbourne: AURA, 19–23. Fuller, C.J., 1992. The Camphor Flame: Popular Hinduism and Society in India. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press. Gamble, c., 1989. comment on ‘Grave shortcomngs: the evdence for Neanderthal bural’, by R. Gargett. Current Anthropology 30, 181–2. Gameson, R., 1995. The Role of Art in the Late Anglo-Saxon Church. Oxford: clarendon Press. Gargett, R., 1989. Grave shortcomngs: the evdence for Neanderthal bural. Current Anthropology 30, 157–90. Gmbutas, M., 1974. The Goddesses and Gods of Old Europe. London: Thames & Hudson. Guthre, S., 1993. Faces in the Clouds: a New Theory of Religion. Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press. Harrs, P., 1994. Thnkng by chldren and scentsts: false analoges and neglected smlartes, n Hrschfeld & Gelman (eds.), 294–315. Hrschfeld, L.A. & S.A. Gelman (eds.), 1994. Mapping the Mind: Domain Speciicity in Cognition and Culture. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Hovers, E., y. Rak, R. Lav & W.H. Kmbel, 1995. Homnd remans from Amud cave n the context of the Levantne Mddle Palaeolothc. Paléorient 21, 47– 61. Humphrey, N., 1976. The socal functon of ntellect, n Growing Points in Ethology, eds. P.P.G. Bateson & R.A. Hnde. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 303–17. Karmloff-Smth, A., 1992. Beyond Modularity: a Development Perspective on Cognitive Science. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. Knght, c., c. Powers & I. Watts, 1995. The human symbolc revoluton: a Darwnan account. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 5(1), 75–114. Leach, E., 1976. Culture and Communication. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Lesle, A., 1994. ToMM, ToBy, and agency: core archtecture and domain speciicity, in Hirschfeld & Gellman (eds.), 119–48. Lieberman, D.E. & J.J. Shea, 1994. Behavioural differences between Archac and Modern Humans n the Levantne Mousteran. American Anthropologist 96, 330–32. Lindly, J. & G. Clark, 1990. Symbolism and modern human orgns. Current Anthropology 31, 233–61. Mccown, T., 1937. Mugharet es-Skhul: descrpton and excavaton, n The Stone Age of Mount Carmel, eds. D. Garrod & D. Bate. Oxford: clarendon Press, 91–107.

References Atran, S., 1990. Cognitive Foundations of Natural History: Towards an Anthropology of Science. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Atran, S., 1994. Core domains versus scientiic: evidence from systematcs and Itza-Maya folk bology, n Mapping the Mind: Domain Speciicity in Cognition and Culture, eds. L.A. Hrschfeld & S.A. Gelman. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 316–40. Bar-yosef, O., B. vandermeersch, B. Arensburg, A. Belfercohen, P. Goldberg, H. Lavlle, L. Megnen, y. Rak, J.D. Speth, E. Tchernov, A-M. Tillier & S. Weiner, 1992. The excavatons n Kebara cave, Mt carmel. Current Anthropology 33, 497–551. Bednark, R.G., 1995. concept-medated markng n the Lower Palaeolthc. Current Anthropology 36, 605– 34. Blurton-Jones, H. & M.J. Konner, 1976. !Kung knowledge of anmal behavour. In Kalahari Hunter-Gatherers, eds. R. Lee & I. Devore, cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press, 326–48. Boyer, P., 1993. The Naturalness of Religious Ideas, a Cognitive Theory of Religion. Berkeley (cA): Unversty of calforna Press. Boyer, P., 1994. cogntve constrants on cultural representatons: natural ontologes and relgous deas, n Hrschfeld & Gelman (eds.), 391–411. Boyer, P., 1996. What makes anthropomorphsm natural: ntutve ontology and cultural representaton. Journal of the Anthropological Institute 2, 83–97. Byrne, R.W. & A. Whten (eds.), 1988. Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans. Oxford: clarendon Press. Byrne, R.W. & A. Whten, 1992. cogntve evoluton n prmates: evdence from tactcal decepton. Man 27, 609–27. Carey, S. & E. Spelke, 1994. Domain-speciic knowledge and conceptual change, n Hrschfeld & Gelman (eds.), 169–200. Chauvet, J-M., E.B. Deschamps & C. Hillaire, 1995. La Grotte Chauvet. Pars: Édtons du Seul. Chauvet, J-M., E.B. Deschamps & C. Hillaire, 1996. Grotte Chauvet: the Discovery of the World’s Oldest Paintings. London: Thames & Hudson. Clottes. J., 1996. Thematic changes in Upper Palaeolithic art: a vew from the Grotte chauvet. Antiquity 70, 276–88. d’Errco, F., 1995. A new model and ts mplcatons for the orgn of wrtng: the La Marche antler revsted. Cambridge Archaeological Journal 5(2), 163–206. d’Errco, F. & c. cacho, 1994. Notaton versus decoraton n the Upper Palaeolthc: a case study from Tossal de la Roca, Alcante, Span. Journal of Archaeological Science 21, 185–200. Delluc, B. & G. Delluc, 1978. Les manfestatons graphques aurgnacennes sur support rocheux des envrons des Eyzes (Dordogne). Gallia Préhistoire 21, 213–438.

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of the Royal Anthropological Institute 2, 717–19. Morphy, H., 1989. On representng Ancestral Bengs, n Animals into Art, ed. H. Morphy. London: Unwn Hyman, 144–60. O’Kelley, M.J., 1982. Newgrange: Archaeology, Art and Legend. London: Thames & Hudson. Park, c.c., 1994. Sacred Worlds: an Introduction to Geography and Religion. London: Routledge. Rak, y., W.H. Kmbel & E. Hovers, 1994. A Neanderthal nfant from Amud cave, Israel. Journal of Human Evolution 26, 313–24. Renfrew, c., 1985. The Archaeology of Cult; the Sanctury at Phylakopi. London: The Brtsh School of Archaeology at Athens. Spelke, E.S., 1991. Physical knowledge in infancy: relectons on Paget’s theory, n Epigenesis of Mind: Studies in Biology and Culture, eds. S. carey & R. Gelman. Hillsdale (NJ): Erlbaum. Srejovc´, D., 1972. Lepenski Vir. London: Thames & Hudson. vandermeersch, B., 1970. Une sépulture moustérenne avec offrandes découverte dans la grotte de Qafzeh. Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances de l’Académie des Sciences 270, 298–301. Whte, T.D. & N. Toth, 1991. The queston of rtual cannbalsm at Grotta Guattar. Current Anthropology 32, 118–38. Whten, A. (ed.), 1991. Natural Theories of Mind: Evolution, Development and Simulation of Everyday Mindreading. Oxford: Basl Blackwell.

Marshack, A., 1990. Early homnd symbol and the evoluton of human capacty, n The Emergence of Modern Humans, ed. P. Mellars. Ednburgh: Ednburgh Unversty Press, 457–98. Mthen, S., 1988. Lookng and learnng: Upper Palaeolthc art and nformaton gatherng. World Archaeology 19, 297–327. Mthen, S., 1989. To hunt or to pant? Anmals and art n the Upper Palaeolthc. Man 23, 671–95. Mthen, S., 1990. Thoughtful Foragers: a Study of Prehistoric Decision Making. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Mithen, S., 1994. From domain-speciic to generalised intellgence: a cogntve nterpretaton of the Mddle/Upper Palaeolthc transton, n The Ancient Mind, eds. c. Renfrew & E. zubrow. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 29–39. Mthen, S., 1996a. The Prehistory of the Mind: a Search for the Origins of Art, Science & Religion. London: Thames & Hudson. Mthen, S., 1996b. Early Palaeolthc ‘concept medated marks’, mental modularty and the orgns of art. Current Anthropology 37, 666–70. Mithen, S., 1996c. Domain-speciic intelligence and the Neanderthal mnd, n Modelling the Early Human Mind, eds. P. Mellars & K. Gbson. (McDonald Insttute Monograph.) cambrdge: McDonald Insttute for Archaeologcal Research, 217–29. Mthen, S., 1996d. Puttng anthropomorphsm nto evolutonary context (a comment on Boyer 1996). Journal

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Chapter 10 Chinese Burial Patterns: sources of Information on thought and Belief Jessca Rawson Ancient Chinese artefacts deined social and personal relationships. In this way, complex technologies, such as bronze casting and jade working were harnessed to the social structure, and hence, inevitably, to patterns of political and religious ideology. The chapter argues that these ideologies were, in part, formed by the objects themselves. Relationships with the ancestors were, for example, modelled by the ways in which sets of bronze ritual vessels for offerings of food and wine supported and sustained a view that relationships with the dead were constituted like those in the family of the living. When in later centuries the ancient Chinese developed fears about the spirit world, there were contained by creating defences, such as pictures on cofins of spirit warriors holding weapons, the famous terracotta warriors and jade suits. All these artefacts were integral to the ways in which concerns with spirits were formulated and resolved.

I

and wrtng; t now ncludes n addton man-made artefacts. This paper will give speciic examples of the ways n whch artefacts reveal the assumptons and ntentons of ther makers and users. The words ‘symbolc storage’ suggest, however, that assumptons (namely deas and belefs), and ntentons, exist prior to the artefacts and are simply stored in them. But the artefacts do not smply store; they are ntegral to the process of formng the belefs and of brngng them nto beng. Recent work on cogntve processes descrbed by Andy clark supports ths approach (clark 1997).1 Much of the dscusson n ths volume has been shaped by Merln Donald’s dstncton between three modes of actvty and thought whch he terms ‘mmetc’, ‘mythc’ and ‘theoretc’, and the ways n whch such categores of actvty can be dscerned by us today n the artefacts left behnd by ancent peoples. In place of these speciic terms, which mght be regarded as over-condtoned by Western phlosophcal notons (Hall & Ames 1995), we may term the three categores of actvty as ‘performatve’, ‘narratve’ and ‘theoretc’. Into the irst category will fall the rituals in

n several ways, the physcal and the materal not only reveal but also contrbute to what we can call ‘thought’. Ths thess may be llustrated by the appearances and functons of certan ancent chnese objects that show several dfferent ways n whch ther owners provded themselves wth the essentals for lfe and death. From the early Neolthc perod, c. 6000 Bc, the nhabtants of the landmass we today call chna bured large numbers of jars, basns and goblets for food and wne, weapons, tools, and even guards and servants: all, it seems, for the beneit of the dead. The shapes of the tombs and the nature of ther contents changed over tme, and from these changng patterns n the physcal remans, we can today deduce the ways n whch the makers of the objects and the bulders of the tombs assessed the most essental features of lfe and the afterlfe. These assessments presented n a materal form mply an ntellectual structure: a structure n whch the materal was ndeed an essental part. Such an approach s ntended to support and extend the concept of external symbolic storage considered in this volume. The term ‘external symbolc storage’ was formed wth reference to language 107

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Figure 10.1. Archaeological sites in China.

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whch the ancent chnese offered ceremonal banquets to ther ancestors. Fne bronze vessels (Fg. 10.2) made for these ceremones allow us to consder the contrbuton of artefacts combned wth coordnated actions to the expression of social and ritual relationshps and to the ntellectual structures that supported these notons. Here the vew that thoughts and emotons are emboded s relevant (Damaso 1994; clark 1997). complete tombs equpped wth objects for rtual, warfare and daly lfe dsplay artefacts that present a speciic individual and his or her narrative n an dealzed form. To such dscusson of both performance and narratve, the work of Goffman makes a signiicant contribution. Goffman has employed the analogy of a theatre wth actors, each wth a role, to descrbe the ways n whch ndvduals ntegrate ther self-mage n ther nteractons wth each other (Goffman 1969). Fnally, changes both n rtual objects and n tomb contents allow us to dscern n these changes ways n whch theores about lfe, the afterlfe and the structure of the unverse were assocated wth human nteracton wth sngle objects — an ndvdual bronze, wth sets of such objects — a rtual assemblage, and wth a group of sets — the necesstes for a tomb, all of whch, severally or n groups, contrbuted the apparatus upon whch human mnds could work both to thnk and to act. The theores so developed are the paradgms selected by Mchael carrthers (1992) as one part of the apparatus of a belef system. carrthers, n descrbng Buddhsm, n partcular, has suggested that narratves, that s, stores about events and lves, combne wth paradgms, that s theoretcal statements about a fath, to provde two complementary vews wthn a belef system. Narratves and paradgms are nonetheless nterdependent, as a partcular narratve mples a speciic theoretical framework. So too the narratives exempliied by a burial of a particular individual and the theoretcal perspectve of the socety of that tme are nterlnked. Indeed the objects n such ancent chnese tombs served both projects. In ths relaton between narratve and theory, we see also a relaton between ntenton and nterpretaton. For the objects to be descrbed wll reveal some of ther authors’ ntentons and wll also llustrate the range of nterpretatons that peoples of the perod derved from them. One of the trusms of human socety, and one that will be extensively illustrated here, is that it is to a very large extent constructed by the members of the society, who continue to exist in a dialectal relatonshp wth t, modfyng and changng some

or all of ts possessons, practces and belefs, generaton to generaton (Renfrew ths volume; Hnde ths volume). The sense of ease or success enjoyed by members of any socety s lkely to be correlated wth the sense of control and coherence that these nteractons gve members of the socety n queston (Hnde 1997, ch. 29). Members of a socety acheve such coherence by sharng n and developng practces and belefs, ganng for themselves a sense of belongng to an establshed, secure and comprehensble tradton. Sustaned growth of a tradton depends upon some fundamental shared prncples that are susceptble to varety, change and development to ensure coherence n a changng world. As I shall suggest below, such sharng s often focused by shared categores of object and shared physcal representatons. Another persstent aspect of human actvty s the urge to nterpret the envronment. Natural and man-made objects are subjects of and ads to that nterpretaton. very often, such nterpretaton goes far beyond the human and the here and now.

Figure 10.2. Bronze ritual wine lask. Shang dynasty, c. 1200 BC. Height 29.8 cm. British Museum. 109

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Peoples of all regons of the world and of all perods show a persstent tendency to dentfy sources of, or attrbute causes to, phenomena, and to consder among those causes demons, sprts and gods. As Stewart Guthre has shown, anmsm and anthropomorphsm — attrbutng natural events as well as dsasters to human-lke forces — whch n chna ncluded the ancestors and other sprts, as well as detes and demons, arse from a human propensty to seek the best possble, n the sense of the most useful, nterpretaton of the phenomena they observe, be those phenomena natural — such as thunderstorms; or medcal — such as body sores, or sudden death (Guthre 1993). What we wll also observe are ways of nterpreting the unknown in terms of the known, using extensve analoges. Thus the lfe after death was vewed as analogous to ths one. Metaphor, n the sense of the use of a root metaphor, as descrbed by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), plays ts part n such development and explanation (Rawson 1993b). In addition, symbolc systems were characterstc of ancent chna, as they are stll of all sorts human actvty — symbolsm here beng employed to suggest that one thng or sgn s taken to stand for somethng or for a collecton of qute dfferent thngs. But nstead of thnkng of symbols that have the arbtrary character of wrtng systems, we shall be lookng at symbolsm n a wde range of other guses — where rchness of utensls presents rank, where physcal qualtes of materals, such as jade, ndcate sprtual worth, and where representatons made of earthly materals pcture the lfe of the sprts. Wrtng s often treated as the paradgm of such symbolsm. In our present world, domnated by wrtng, knowledge s an accumulaton of nformaton and theory through the wrtten word. However, creaton of wrtng followed a long way behnd human understandng of the natural world and behnd spoken languages and cultures based upon a meshng of materal objects wth socal nteractons. Lteracy s not a skll essental to successful cultural lfe, as the mllenna of early cultures and many present-day ones demonstrate. Indeed, n the past and stll n the present-day, all chldren assume large portons of the cultures nto whch they are born long before the wrtten word s accessble to them. We must nfer that many, f not most, aspects of a culture are managed by a socety and can be handed on n ways that do not nvolve wrtng. In ts place, other physcal sgns, especally artefacts, buldngs and representatons — permanent and transtory — may focus attenton and serve as sources of nstructon,

as gudes or as restrants. Even today, we nterpret both the natural world and our own culturally constructed one through what we see and experience n landscapes, ctes or houses. These physcal elements provde a whole apparatus for lvng, but one that we have to nterpret f we are to lve successfully. Such nterpretatons are developed n each of us, prncpally through socalzaton and through educaton. Symbolc storage, especally n forms of wrtng, measurement and other delberately created sgn systems, are only the tp of a much larger range of materal that manknd nterprets and ndeed creates so that t can be nterpreted. The paper wll concentrate on the ways n whch materal objects and complex depictions composed of artefacts, susceptble to nterpretaton, were deployed to renforce and develop such nterpretatons. We shall ind in the material culture of China props and scenery for the roles descrbed by Goffman and the performances and narratives expected by Donald’s modes. These modes can, t wll emerge, be read from artefacts; for all humans ntentonally desgn ther own settngs and the artefacts that they use, irst of all so that they are intelligible to themselves and secondly so that any bystanders or audence, ncludng a sprt audence, can smlarly nterpret them. Rather than treatng sngle artefacts, groups wll be taken as the man subject, snce the groups provde the props and settngs employed n performance, whereas a sngle artefact s but a fragment n most cases. As already mentoned, nstead of describing such groups as ‘texts’ in the postmodernist vein (even though the notion of text is generally understood metaphorcally), such artefact groups will be recognized as separate and distinct from texts. Indeed, here we might note that our reading of texts may even be determned by processes of nterpretaton honed n decpherng objects and representatons.2 vsual clues therefore wll help us understand how artefacts enabled socal and relgous meanng to be presented through chnese burals for nterpretaton by audences of humans and sprts. An essental aspect of the dscusson s the role of physcal features, most partcularly vsble dfferences, n allowng the vsual to be harnessed to the socal, poltcal and relgous nteractons n a culture. Several authors have stressed the role of visible, rather than verbal, intelligibility for complex practcal tasks. Rangng from work on the processes of driving, lying or riding a bicycle (Miller et al. 1960, 87) to yet more culturally speciic tasks, such as weavng (Bloch 1991, 186) and recognton of objects (Mller 1987), the ways n whch the materal 110

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world provdes detaled vsual nformaton and cues, rather than verbal nstructon, have been stressed. Indeed, as both Mller and Bloch have ndcated, our visual discrimination far exceeds our ability to express these distinctions in words. vsual dfferences n the props for performance and n the stage settngs for narratves wll be explored, although sound and smell were no doubt also contrbutors. Whle many commentators have recognzed the wdespread use of artefacts and mages as ndcators of socal or relgous status, most have commented on the exploitative side of such vsually renforced socal structures. Few seem to have descrbed the ways n whch artefacts — clothes, buldngs or mages — are ndspensable, not only to publc or prvate announcement of socal or rtual poston, but also to create these postons (Renfrew 1986). Nor have many students of artefacts accepted that socetes wll nevtably have some sort of structure and that that structure wll also nevtably be both marked and renforced by materal and hence by vsual means. There may, ndeed, be good perceptual reasons why systems of status or rank, be they steeply graded or relatvely egaltaran, are renforced, or even created, vsually. For the vsual provdes a readly dscernable and relably recognzable focus of attenton; our perceptual system s ndeed partcularly well attuned to minute visual differences. Complex deas can then be lnked to such dfferences, whch become codes or cues, enablng members of a gven socety to remember and to react to a socal, poltcal or relgous stuaton that mght otherwse be vrtually unntellgble (carruthers 1990, 20). Not only wll the vsual be the topc of ths paper, but at the end, when we reach a perod n which written texts expounding belief and practice are contemporary wth burals (whose contents we can compare wth them), we shall note that the nterpretatons suggested by canoncal phlosophcal texts are not co-extensive with or even remotely equvalent to the nterpretatons that can be derved from the artefacts, whch tell us, as they told ther owners, about ther vews on the sprtual world and on the afterlfe. Throughout the dscusson we shall see lteral use of objects to ndcate functon and symbolic use to suggest rank; we shall also ind extensive use of reference, analogy and metaphor suggested by functon, materal, form and decoraton of artefacts, which enabled a complex world of ideas to be created and renforced by artefacts rather than exclusively by languages, spoken and written. At all stages, however, the process was dalectcal, wth a

dalogue between the artefacts and the peoples who sought to exploit them in intellectual as well as physical settngs (Hnde ths volume). Western and Chinese views of the afterlife: metaphor and analogy If we are to make sense of the very large body of data, essentally vsual data, avalable on ancent chnese bural practces, we have to start wth some sort of general proposton, a heurstc devce — perhaps we should call t a workng hypothess — of what the underlyng assumpton, analogy or metaphor was — the structurng prncple from whch all others were developed. The one that I adopt here s that materal remans suggest that chnese tombs were constructed to provde all the necesstes that ther occupants might need to continue their existences after death — existences that would replicate or extend worldly lfe. Ths smple hypothess allows me to ntroduce what I see as the overall structurng concept, that s a transfer, by means of analogy, of a set of practces, materal and cogntve, from one stuaton to another. It s possble to descrbe the chnese deas of the lfe after death as beng analogous to ther vews of real lfe. The tomb was smultaneously a presentaton of this life and of the next. In this way, the unknown was interpreted and explained by means of the known. Such a procedure was not ininitely extendable, but held by certan constrants. These constrants ncluded, most probably, the taught assumptons of the socety, some of whch may have functoned somewhat lke root metaphors dscussed by Lakoff & Johnson (1980). Other constrants were the objects themselves, and the craft tradtons and socal practces that determned and were determned by ther forms and uses. I wll now justfy ths process by my own analogy, nvolvng a comparson between chnese and Western vews of the afterlfe. The chrstan deas of the Kngdom of Heaven reveal both the lteral and the metaphorcal qualtes of ths practce. In both text and illustration, the peoples of the European West descrbed lfe as journey that ended when the Kngdom of Heaven was reached, a place pctured, agan n words and vsual representaton, ncludng artefacts, as a court smlar to those of the great European monarchs. God was descrbed and shown as sttng upon a throne. The unknown was thus pctured and nterpreted n terms of the known. Much use was made of ine materials, gold and jewels, in representatons, so renforcng by further vsual analogy or metaphor the nterpretatons to be gven to 111

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the Heavenly Court. Gold, for example, embraced ts own range of meanngs — standng for purty and ncorruptblty. These subsdary metaphorcal meanngs (derved from ts physcal attrbutes), probably contrbuted at all tmes to the magery of Heaven. In addton, stores, such as the narratves n the Bble, descrbng the ascent of chrst nto Heaven, or the descrpton of St Peter at a Gate, whose keys he held, and tales of ordnary mortals, as n the Pilgrim’s Progress, were all elaboratons based on both the lteral, representatonal and metaphorcal elements of ths cogntve pattern (Goodman 1976, 45–95). Such metaphors not only engender ntellectual comprehenson of the unknown, but also exploit our bodily and emotional reactions to the images of power expressed in regal terms and of eternal joy shown n the form of brllant colours aganst a brght ground. Metaphors or analoges of journeys and of courts were thus essental means of creatng before the eye the unknown and the nvsble, enablng artsts, patrons and nterpreters — or vewers — of all perods to add to or subtract from these wder representatonal and metaphorcal meanngs other elements, as their own experience allowed. For it seems that the more satsfyng systems of formng and elaboratng meanng are those that, whle held wthn clear parameters, allow ndvduals to make ther own versons of the standard repertore. Indeed, the cogntve and materal norms of a socety are always n a dalectcal relatonshp wth ndvdual members of that socety, who approprate them, modfy them and make them ther own. yet t also remans useful to the ndvdual, both as an ndvdual and as a member of a group, to adhere to a prncpal meanng or metaphor, so makng certan of consstency — both nternally wthn a sngle pont of vew and externally with those of other individuals. Such consstency by means of shared cogntve patterns deines a culture (Romney et al. 1996). If we turn now to chna, we can see the same transfer of features of the known to the unknown, of the exploitation of incident, of the use of narrative, and of lteral magery and analogy to construct and reinforce and indeed, over time, to extend ancient chnese vews of the afterlfe (Rawson 1993b). For nstance, the chnese do not seem to have started wth ether the noton of a journey or the noton of a dstant goal, the Kngdom of Heaven. They wanted to stay just where they already were. From the Neolthc untl nearly the modern day, the majorty of chnese tombs were equpped as resdences for the dead, contanng ether real objects or replcas.

As these tombs reproduced the lves of ther occupants, they tell us not just how ther owners thought about death and the afterlfe, but also how they envsaged many aspects of the socety of the lvng. A consequence of ths outlook was that the dead remaned ever present members of socety, near at hand. In the Shang perod (c. 1200–1050 Bc), n partcular, divination texts reveal that the ancestors were mportant famly members, consulted on all serous famly matters, and that they were offered food and wne, that s nourshment, n the form of ceremonial banquets. We have no texts about the burial of the dead, nor about ther aspratons for a lfe after death. From the bural of the bronze offerng vessels n the tombs of the élte, however, t would appear that the dead were expected to continue, as in life, to offer banquets to ther forebears. They were also to pursue other arstocratc and royal actvtes, ncludng warfare (wth weapons and charots), huntng and ceremony — the latter ndcated by ine ornaments and ceremonial weapons of a nonfunctonal materal, jade. In part the tombs were dealzed, lteral presentatons; at the same tme they exploited metaphor in simple ways, in which jade (lke gold n the West) provded alluson to purty and permanence; and in more complex ways, by whch notons about the socety of the lvng and of the dead were developed by analogy wth the structure of the deal famly. These notons were not shared by all contemporary peoples nhabtng the landmass of chna, as we shall see. Dfferences ndcated by artefacts n several geographcally separated socetes, ndeed, reveal speciic ways by which these groups constructed and perpetuated partcular practces (and, presumably, the assumptons, ntentons and nterpretatons that were supported by them) through ther own dstnctve materal cultures. We shall see that the nhabtants of the yellow Rver area shared an abdng nterest n hghly decorated objects wth whch to perform ceremones, whle the nhabtants of the many communtes along the yangz Rver had dverse materal cultures, n whch representatons of anmals and strange magnary bengs played a large part. The artefacts of these peoples were not only qute dstnct from one another, but were also qute dfferent from those of the prncpal yellow Rver cultures (Bagley 1992). If the materal cultures were so dfferent, t s lkely that both practce and belef were dfferent also. Further, the dscusson wll show that, as the sze of the chnese-speakng polty grew, some peoples wth very dfferent outlooks and 112

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practces were drawn nto close contact wth tradtonal chnese socety, whch brought about amalgamatons n artefact types, n practces, n ntenton and n nterpretatons or belefs.

of the ways n whch all artefacts offer nformaton on the reactons, the thnkng and the atttudes of peoples of ther day. Rtual vessel sets are especally nstructve because they are composte rather

Ritual vessel sets The overwhelmng mportance of offerngs to the ancestors n Early Bronze Age socety along the yellow Rver s demonstrated by the wealth of metal and of craftsmanshp ted up n the rtual vessels, used n lfe and expected, it would seem, to be further employed n the afterlfe, as the dead contnued n the other world to offer banquets to ther ancestors. That s to say, the quantty and qualty of bronze and craftsmanshp n themselves are mportant traces of a vew of the ancestors and of how they should be approached (Fg. 10.2). As the rtual vessels are so signiicant, they will be considered irst, before their relative place n tombs s further dscussed. In addton, an account of ths artefact type allows us to consder two other prncpal categores of actvty: the use of vsual dfferences to provde socal and rtual references and the role of performance to formulate and convey deas. Possbly the sngle most sgniicant idea embodied in the ritual set of bronzes was that the ancestors remaned an essental part of socety. Socety was ordered herarchcally by generaton, a herarchy renforced symbolcally each tme the rtuals were performed. In ths vew, socety had a genealogcal source and structure (Hall & Ames 1995). Ths was a far cry from the Western chrstan vew that all are equal before God. If we are to seek for a sngle process that establshed ths concept of the socety, lvng and dead, t would seem that the rtual ceremones were n themselves creators of these vews as well as products of them. A further reason for concentratng on a sngle artefact category s that through t we can get some mpresson

Figure 10.3. Drawing of a typical set of Shang dynasty ritual vessels from tomb 18 at Anyang, Henan province. Such a set would have belonged to a noble of high standing, but was much smaller than the set belonging to the royal consort Fu Hao. (After Kaogu xuebao 1981.4, 491–518.) 113

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Figure 10.4. Drawings of the food tripods, ding, from the tomb of the royal consort Fu Hao, Shang dynasty, c. 1200 BC. From Anyang in Henan province. The different sizes, shapes and decoration indicate that these bronzes had different functions within diverse rituals. (After Beijing 1980a.) than singular objects and are highly complex, both techncally and artstcally.3 This complexity was ntegral to the rtual performance and could be

marshalled to serve both a socal and a relgous programme. Many thousands of Shang and Western zhou 114

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rtual bronze vessels survve, and a large proporton of them come from excavated tombs. These are often close together and belong to members of one famly or to a related class of ndvduals. Tomb contents may, therefore, be relably compared. At any one perod, ndvdual vessel types and groups of such types appear to have been standard, that s, unversally employed and hence recognzed, n what were the metropoltan areas — the ctes of zhengzhou, Panlongcheng and Anyang n the Shang perod (c. 1500–1050 Bc) and much of Shaanxi province, and the cty states of Jn, We and yan n the zhou perod (c. 1050–771 Bc) (Rawson 1996). The majorty of vessel groups known survve from tombs of nobles, but where a bural of a hgher-rankng ndvdual has come to lght, a yet larger groupng s avalable. Thus we can say that vessels were made and employed accordng to known rules, even though many of these may have been implicit rather than explicit. Let us consder four vessel sets or part sets. One, from tomb 18 at Anyang, belongng to a hgh-rankng member of the Shang perod élte, c. 1200 Bc (Bejng 1981) (Fg. 10.3), wll be measured aganst vessels of a sngle category, the ding, from a hgher rankng tomb, that of the royal consort Fu Hao (Bejng 1980a) (Fg. 10.4). A set from tomb M7 at the ste of Rujazhuang near the present-day cty of Baoj, the tomb of a zhou noble of c. 950 Bc (Lu Lancheng & Hu zhsheng 1988) (Fg. 10.5a) wll be compared wth a set belongng to a noble of a slghtly later date, one We Bo Xng of c. 875 Bc, found n a hoard n Fufeng county, west of the present-day cty of X’an (Fg. 10.6) (Rawson 1993a). The set from tomb 18 at Anyang (Fg. 10.3) contans a full complement of vessel types. More-over, t llustrates the relatve mportance of offerngs of wne and the lesser role of food. From the large number of vessels n the tomb of Fu Hao only food trpods are llustrated here (Fg. 10.4). These many trpods probably comprsed vessels wth several dfferent functons; the small ones at the bottom of the igure may have been for travelling or for subordinate ceremones. Ths very large number of trpods shows how the expenditure of effort and resources for a royal set outweghed the bronze craftsmanshp and food used for the set belongng to a noble (Fg. 10.3). The vessel set from tomb 7 at Baoj Rujazhuang (Fg. 10.5a) dates from the tme of the succeedng dynasty, the zhou. The vessel types are smlar, but not dentcal to those of the Shang, as represented by Fgure 10.3. zhou rtual clearly emphaszed food. However, lke the set from tomb 18 at Anyang, ths

later one contans vessels of several categores, many with ine zoomorphic ornament. The inal set, belongng to the noble, We Bo Xng (Fg. 10.6), s qute dfferent. Repetton rather than varety s mmedately apparent. Moreover, the shapes and ther ornament seem less lvely than those of the earler bronzes. Both rtual practce and vessel castng seem to have been changed. Pece by pece, the range of vessel shapes and the decoraton of a set of bronzes can be seen to vary mnutely and, over tme, to show sharp changes. The varatons are, and probably were n the past, perceved both as aesthetc changes and as ndcators of when they were made, who owned them and, f the functons of the sets changed (as llustrated by Fg. 10.6), of new fashons n rtual. The partcular nterest of the rtual vessels s that they were made and used n large sets, and that these sets conveyed visual information more complex that a single item could do. In deining the nature of a set of any type and ts functons, t s useful to consder the analogy of a tool set, such as a set of blades for turnng employed n nneteenth- and early twenteth-century Western workshops (Fig. 10.7). The set is to some extent arbitrary. It can be deined either as the complete set made by an ndvdual or group at one tme, or as the partcular range of blades owned by a craftsman at any speciic time. Breakage or purchase might randomly subtract from or add to the set and enable the owner to make fewer or more categores of turned object. A set s thus a functonal group, determned n part by ownershp and by all the varables whch that implies. Each blade has a speciic and deined crosssecton, one that was known to a specalst wth the approprate skll or competence. Small ncrements of change n the detal of the cuttng edges would have been immediately visible and intelligible to expert craftsmen through these vsual propertes. The vessel set, smlarly, very lkely conveyed comparable nformaton n ts day to the sklled practtoner, perhaps a prest, but possbly also the patron and members of hs or her famly. changes n numbers or types of vessel n a set, or n form and desgn, would lkewse have been vsble and ntellgble through ths vsblty. In the case of the tools, changes n shape would have made possble dfferent types of product; and new vessel types would equally have allowed new varatons wthn the scheme of offerng speciic foods and wines. This example introduces a feature of all objects, but one that is especially true of complex objects consstng of a ‘set’ of parts, namely that people 115

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They may have been even more tellng when the set was employed n a rtual. Although we are not ritual experts of the Shang, we can nonetheless attempt an account of the features that would have helped an expert of the time to dscrmnate between vessels wth dfferent roles n the rtual sequence and wth dfferent socal or relgous connotatons. Thus n the set from tomb 18 at Anyang, the relatve mportance of dfferent types of wne holder appears to be ndcated by the presence of ine relef decoraton on wne vessels, especally on the vessel category known as a zun and ts absence from the vessel type known as a lei (Fg. 10.3). It s lkely that the wde boded lei was ntended for storng lquds, whle the angular and hghly decorated, and hence conspcuous, zun was for servng them. Such a dfference between zun and lei occurs qute regularly. The nearer the stage n Figure 10.5a. Drawings of the sets of bronze ritual vessels and bells from tomb 7 at Baoji the rtual to consumpZhuyuangou in Shaanxi province. Early Western Zhou, c. 950 BC. (After Lu Liancheng ton, the more elaborate & Hu Zhisheng 1988.) the vessels. Dfferences n soassess the uses of partcular tems through comcal status are also marked by the vessels. Thus the parsons of vsble features of shape and decoraton ndvdual who owned the twenty or so vessels (Mller 1987). A sngle object s compared wth objects from tomb 18 was obvously less powerful than the prevously encountered. A set, on the other hand, consort of the kng of the day, lady Fu Hao, who was presents wthn tself smlartes or dfferences bebured wth more than 200. Her crcular trpods for tween the ndvdual parts. We can surmse also that food alone numbered 27, as shown n Fgure 10.4. the people of the day compared ther own sets wth Status seems to have been shown by numbers, sze those they could expect others might own. and range of forms and decoraton. In other words, The many smlartes and dfferences between both the functonal characterstcs of the sets and the tems n an ndvdual set would have been apparther aesthetc qualtes, emboded n bronze and ent when the set of vessels was not n use, but stored. craftsmanshp, meshed wth the socal order (as 116

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Hodder 1986; Mller 1987, 118–21 have argued). In addton, a few vessels, especally those n Fu Hao’s tomb, but also those n tomb 7 at zhuyuangou (Fg. 10.5a) have shapes or decoraton that refer ether to tradtonal designs or to exotic motfs from other areas (Poman 1990), or are even antqutes that were handed down through several generatons, or carry nscrptons that ndcate that at an earler date they had belonged to someone else (Rawson 1993a). Here then a range of vsual features also speciied references to relatonshps between the owner and a place, or wth other ndvduals and or wth the past, although only an expert, a member of the famly or a rtual specalst, would have recognzed all the references. In ths way, we can see the shapes and desgns of the bronzes provdng what wll here be descrbed as a range of references to functon, relatonshps, place, the past and rtual process. Bronze rtual vessels thus contrbuted to and renforced the socal orderng, both at Figure 10.5b. Drawing of the tomb 7 from Baoji Zhuyuangou showing the main burial one tme, and over a long with a female interred to one side. The female has a bronze ritual set smaller than that of span of tme. the male. As well as consderng the set as a sngle object wth many parts, we can encoded bodly movements. The suggeston that also consder t as provdng props for a performance. there were desgnated partcpants wth known roles For the expert, be they ritual practitioner, patron n relaton to the vessels s made because the range or audence, each vessel category seems lkely to of vessels used at any one perod seems to have been have speciied, by means of its shape and design, its standardzed, ndcatng a standard rtual for whch place n a sequence wth other vessels and a range sets of objects could be ordered and employed. of movements wth whch t was carred n the rtual In some cases, no doubt, the vessel shape and ceremony. That s, the vsual features of the vessels decoraton, as n the case of the ding belongng to Fu 117

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ths s not a category of thought or practce that preceded other developments, such as ‘mythc’ or ‘narratve’ thought. Rather some expression of belefs and ntentons through physcally enacted performance nvolvng objects seems lkely to have been an essental element of all rtual and socal practce from the Neolthc perod and so, ndeed, survves to ths day. We can compare the range of actons encoded by the vessels to the those famlar to us n the West when a sword or crown are employed n ceremones at whch the Queen s present. The vessel types provded some of the cues, no doubt, to the sequence of actons. Moreover, changes n the performance over tme are stll vsble to us today, f we compare the two Western zhou sets llustrated n Fgures 10.5a and 10.6. The gestures and foods requred for the later set could not have duplcated those of the earler one. Whle the early set comprses many dfferent vessel types, wth numerous wne vessels, the later set comprses many dentcal peces, few among them for wne. The vessels n Figure 10.6. Drawings of ritual vessels and bells cast by one Wei Bo Xing, found in a the later set (Fg. 10.6) hoard at Fufeng county in Shaanxi province. Late Western Zhou period, 9th century BC. are also cumbersome (After Rawson 1993a.) and heavy, dificult to carry, but easy to dsplay Hao, speciied for which particular ritual they were to an audence at some dstance. Moreover, the very used. Here, ndeed, we have somethng equvalent to large expenditure on bronze bells (used only sparthe category of thought and practce labelled as ‘mngly at earler tmes) probably transformed the rtual metc’ by Donald. But, as I have already suggested, ceremones. Addtonal elements thus added to the 118

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effects on the audence. More vessels of a partcular type, say the twenty-seven ding of Fu Hao (Fg. 10.4), as opposed to the three ding n tomb 18 (Fg. 10.3), would have requred more actons to move and serve wth them at a rtual and would also have requred more food. Whle statc, the vessels already ndcate a socal rankng; when n moton n a rtual, they would have proclamed, n what one mght descrbe as a dramatc form, the socal order. In addton, decoraton and nscrptons ndcated dfferent relatonshps, such as wth earler generatons of owners or wth contemporary relatives or associates and with exotic, outlandsh contacts. References to these relatonshps would all have had ther places and would have been woven nto sequences of gestures and movements. To practtoners of the day, the poston of these references at the dfferent stages of the rtual would have been lkely, I assume, to have gven them dfferent emphases. These emphases and the reactons they produced were no doubt as much bodly and emotonal as ntellectual (Damaso 1994). Some sectons of the performance may have stmulated respect and others awe. So far I have mentoned the practtoners, by whch I mean the rtual specalsts and ther servants or attendants. All rtual acts also had an audence, be that smply the patron and hs or her relatves and servants, or a larger court audence. The sprts, especally the sprts of the ancestors, are lkely to have been ncluded n ths audence. These comments relate speciically to the living, but complex burals, such as those of tomb 18 or of Fu Hao, whch ncluded servants as well as the tomb occupant, seem to have duplcated lfe — provdng rtual specalsts and attendants for the ceremones, among other functons, n the afterlfe. It can be presumed that the audence would have recognzed through gestures, and rhythmc movement, as well as partcular vessel types, the status and relatonshps of the ndvdual who made the offerngs and the persons or ancestors to whom they were made. Later poems of c. 600 Bc menton aromas of food as attractng the attenton of the sprts, and t s lkely that the smell of food and drnk also played a part n the assessment of the messages of the rtuals. The performance probably cemented the relatonshps of generatons n ceremonal meals that ncorporated menton through such references of a wde sphere of nteractons, relevant not only to ths lfe but also to the afterlfe. In these ways, the realm of the ancestors would have been nterpreted wthn a partcular vew of the present. Indeed, under the zhou, who conquered the

Shang n about 1050 Bc, ths modellng was self-conscously renterpreted n a yet more poltcal mode. For the nscrptons on the rtual vessels ncorporated reports of poltcal honours, of relatonshps between ther owners and the kng and even such contentous local matters as battles and court cases. From the language of these nscrptons and from ther postons nsde basns (under the food), t seems that ther contents — ther announcements of the new honours and status of ther owners — were drected at the ancestors as well as at the lvng socety and ts descendants. Thus the performance and ts messages were extended from a presentation of relationships between a seres of generatons of a famly to a sempoltcal account, n whch the poltcal actons of the world were, t seems, deemed nterestng to and hence, perhaps, inluential on the ancestors as well as on the lvng. The unverse of sprts was lterally modelled on the present, through the ancestral sacriices forming a shared activity. tomb structures: narrative thought in the shang and early Western Zhou (c. 1200–c. 800) A complete tomb brngs a wder range of actvty nto the dscusson. Whle the vessel set was for use n a partcular category of performance, a tomb and ts adjacent pts holdng wves and concubnes, hghrankng nobles, and charots, encompassed multple actvtes that were basc elements of courtly and noble ceremonal lfe. Elaborate tombs presented a lfe as but one scene n a longer narratve. By the tme of the hgh Shang, about 1200 Bc, the two categores of performance and narratve cannot be separated. Instead they nteract and thus become ntegrated. What s more, some of the same basc assumptons about, and nterpretatons of, the unverse must have nformed them both and thus created and sustaned coherence between these dfferent actvtes. The story of the ndvdual began n ths lfe and was (t seems lkely) assumed to contnue nto the afterlfe n the same manner. Selecton of the sets of tems for bural, however, suggests an dealzed lfe, wth only the essentals gven emphass. In ths sense the tomb presents not real lfe but only selected aspects of real lfe, as Barry Kemp has suggested wth reference to the dealzed plan of ancent Egyptan town plans. They are: . . . testmony of one partcular facet of the creatve element n socety: ts capacty to structure ts own envronment and beyond ths to create vsons of how human socety should look. . . If . . . we admt

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that the evdence n a partcular case ponts to a clear and consstent underlyng human deal, we are tactly admttng to an deology. Not necessarily a formally conceived and expressed ideology such as that whch portrayed Egyptan kngshp, but an mplct deology of socal orderng. (Kemp 1989, 137–8)

Lnkng all the processes descrbed was the generalzed noton that the afterlfe of the Shang and the Western zhou resembled lfe, structured by relatonshps wthn arstocratc famles occupyng metropolitan Henan and Shaanxi. A hierarchically arranged famly, ordered by generatonal sequence, provded the model for the earthly state and for the sprtual realm. Ths ordered herarchy was equvalent to the Western concept of a Kngdom of Heaven, wth ts supreme monarch and attendant angels and sants. Dfferent ndvduals could no doubt elaborate ther own vews of the afterlfe, accordng to ther sense of ther own roles or narratves wthn ths generalzed outlook. Indeed, whle tomb types were n general terms standardzed, small dfferences of personal detal occurred. Fu Hao owned an mmense crcular trpod (top of Fg. 10.4), whch from ts form, decoraton and nscrpton, appears to have belonged to someone else before her. A vessel handed on n ths way implies some sort of speciic personal relationshp. The owner of tomb 7 at Baoj zhuyuangou (Fg. 10.5b) was bured wth hs concubne, who had her own personal and ndvdual vessels. These tombs thus took on the characters and lfe hstores of ther occupants. The tombs and pts for charots and horses map the relatonshps of famles and of ndvduals wthn famles onto the afterlfe, n the sense that they preserve an outlne of the stage settngs n whch the narratves of the afterlfe were now to be played out. The physcal spacng of the burals, no doubt, conveyed nformaton on herarchcal and famly powers, nformaton that was as present to the body as to the eye or to the mnd. The Shang and Western zhou have not left much n the way of magery to supplement these spatal arrangements. A few traces of inlay of animal-like igures on wooden beams and cofins found in tombs indicate some sort of decorated settng. By contrast wth actvtes n other parts of chna, however, and n lght of subsequent developments now to be dscussed, the scenery was lmted. Ths absence of the stage settngs n whch the kngs and nobles were to enact ther roles s made much more evdent by the magery produced n southern chna. The recent exhibition at the British Museum, Mysteries of Ancient China (Rawson 1996), hghlghted the contrast between Shang socety, dedcatng ts resources to bronze rtual vessels for a performance — that s, a mmetc dsplay — and peoples of the southern areas along the yangz, where bronze was employed for massve mages, that s for the stage settngs for a narratve. The prncpal Shang and

In a comparable way, the tomb presented the essental and the best features of lfe: how t should be, not necessarly how t actually was n all respects. Idealzed though the lfe mght be, however, t would be msleadng to treat the presentaton of the ndvdual achieved in the tomb as ictional in any way. Rather, we should vew the objects n tombs and the actvtes that they enabled as the best possble range of materal to provde the best possble apparatus for future lfe. As the stores n the Bble were and are treated as true, and the mages of the Sants and of the vrgn were treated as panted from lfe and hence also true (Beltng 1994), so the burals of the Shang, zhou, Qn and Han perods were all regarded as provdng for an afterlife that existed in parallel with the lives of the kngs and arstocracy.4 Indeed, all actvty n ancent chna, and hence all artefacts and buldngs, seem to have been desgned wth the vew that the worlds of ancestors and sprts and of humanknd nterpenetrated one another. Presumably, both had an effect on one another at all tmes and both were relevant wth respect to each other. Ancent tombs of the Shang and Western zhou contaned valuable objects, often n very large quanttes: bronze rtual vessels, charots and weapons, precous jade carvngs and bone ornaments, muscal nstruments, and human servants and warrors to defend ther owners. Such goods dctated and determined a quite speciic afterlife: one modelled entirely on real lfe. Emphass on bronze rtual vessels, and on the weapons and vehcles of war, dsplayed the major actvtes of the Shang and early zhou kngs and nobles. Lke the vessels, the charots and weapons were props for dramas already performed and to be performed agan n the afterlfe. Whle ths weaponry and the charots have been gven less consderaton than the rtual vessels, ther constant presence ndcates ther role both n practcal warfare and n the markng of rank. Gfts of bows and arrows, and charot parts and ornaments, are ndeed the subjects of nscrptons nsde rtual vessels. Thus rtual banquets joned together respect for the ancestors and concerns wth the ceremony of a mltary socety. Both enhanced the status of ther owners, and ths status was pertnent not just n the court of the day but also to the ancestors. 120

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Figure 10.7. Drawings of a set of steel turning tools, by Melhuish Ltd, c. 1913. early zhou bronze vessels have to be contrasted with this extraordinary igurative imagery. In the large southern regon, the rtuals of the Shang were not practsed, for complete vessel sets n the manner of those employed by the Shang and early zhou were not made or used (Fgs. 10.3 & 10.4). Instead, the precous materals of bronze and jade were employed qute dfferently. As several authortes have ponted out, bell musc was a salent feature

(Kane 1974; Bagley 1992). Large mages of man-lke igures (Fig. 10.8) (Rawson 1996, no. 22), monstrous masks (Fg. 10.9) and trees on whch perched brds, ndcate a yet dfferent approach, ths tme stagng a narrative, whose context had to be presented if it was to be understood by an audence. These bronze igures and trees offer settings for ceremonies, among whose performers were represented not just known ndvduals but sprts of some knd, whom we may 121

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tares of the yangz and from other areas along the length of ths mmense rver, show us that dverse cultures developed ther own narratves, descrbng n objects the creatures and strange bengs of ther own worlds. Such revelatons call nto queston a monolthc vew of ancent chna. The herarchcal socetes of the Shang and zhou, wth ther nterest n banquets, charots and archery, were not matched n ths southern regon. Here were sources of qute different views of the universe expressed in artefacts qute dstnct from those of the centres along the yellow Rver. Although study of the yangz area s as yet in its infancy, exploration of this region will surely demonstrate that chna n the hstorcal perod brought together peoples from these qute dstnct regons, whose artefacts created and enabled wdely dfferent practces and belefs. Ths s evdent n the amalgamaton of some features from the two areas during the early days of the irst empires of the third to irst centuries Bc. narratives in later tombs of the eastern Zhou, Qin and Han periods The two alternatve methods of presentng accounts and nterpretatons of the sprt world, the performatve and the narratve, contnued n tandem durng the later centures Bc. Whle some changes n tomb pattern durng the Eastern zhou (771–221 Bc), the Qn (221–207 Bc) and the Han (206 Bc–AD 220), ndcate substantal revsons n the ways n whch the afterlfe was represented and hence (we must presume) understood (Rawson 1996, 11–30), some of the fundamental tenets of ancent chnese belef probably remaned the same. There s no suggeston that the dead dd not contnue to lve ther lves n the afterlfe, as they had done n ths lfe. What seems to have changed was the sense of the approprate range of ‘sets’ to nclude n the tomb. Such change ndcates new actvtes and objects for those actvtes, and hence new ways of thought. These new atttudes and nterpretatons seem to have been a consequence of a gradual assmlaton of southern practces of depctng the nvsble, the sprtual world. In addton, the relatonshps of the lvng to the dead seem to have changed. Fnally, untl the advent of the Han dynasty at the very end of the thrd century Bc, a wde dversty of practce and belef was found n the many dstnct areas of the chnese landmass. Three tombs have been chosen to show that from the ifth century Bc, and possbly earler, the nhabtants of several dfferent states (nto whch chna was at this date divided) felt the need to extend the

Figure 10.8. Drawing of a cast bronze igure of a standing man from Guanghan county in Sichuan province, c. 1200 -1000 BC. Height 262 cm. (After Wenwu 1989.5, 1–20, ig. 6.) presume were otherwse nvsble. But these objects too are not ictions, but real presentations of feared and awesome bengs of ther makers’ unverse. I have already used the words stage set and apparatus; we could also descrbe the temple or tomb as a map or dagram of actvtes, relatonshps and belefs for the afterlfe (Tufte 1983; contrast Beltng 1994 wth Walton 1990 and curre 1990). 5 These new dscoveres, from the western trbu122

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scope of the tomb. Thus the tomb of the Marqus y of zeng near the yangz (d. 433 Bc) was set up as a house wth separate rooms, one for each function: a cofin chamber with prvate utensls was for the Marqus to nhabt; a ceremonal, and thus publc room, holdng a magniicent bell set and sets of rtual vessels, as well as many other muscal nstruments, was at the centre of the tomb; an armoury held charot parts and weapons; and a sde Figure 10.9. Drawing of a large bronze mask on an imaginary being from Guanghan room contaned thrteen county in Sichuan province, c. 1200-1000 BC. Width 134 cm. (After Wenwu 1989.5, of the twenty-one women 1–20, ig. 13.) bured wth the Marqus to accompany hm n the afterlfe and to play hs and support the owners of the tomb; they functoned, muscal nstruments (Bejng 1989). The majorty of just as dd utensls and bells. Most mportantly, they tems n the tomb were real, as n earler burals. In were sprts qute dstnct from the ancestors of the addition to ine ritual vessels and the extraordinary yellow Rver tradton. In Hube, belefs most generset of bells, the tomb ncluded such tems of daly ally assocated wth the large state of chu were nlfe as chests of clothes and sets of lacquer cups and luential, and it is from this region that such interests travelling vessels, for everyday meals, in boxes. The and belefs came to be ntegrated wth the later, Han standard approaches to bural had generated new perod, belefs and practces. varatons on the deal lfe, to embrace new practces In the late twenteth century, we may vew such and habts. But despte such changes, tombs contnmages as representatons of somethng not present. ued ther narratve or stage-set functons. But n ther day, t s lkely that, as wth mages n the Now presentaton went beyond a statc tableau Mediterranean world of the sixth and seventh centuof the objects of lfe or the props for a performance. res AD (Beltng 1994), these sculptures and pantngs Pctures were ncluded. Most strkng among these were taken as representatons, beng endowed wth was a large bronze igure of an imaginary bird, the powers of the sprts. In an mportant sense such crowned wth antlers (Fg. 10.10) (Rawson 1996, no. mages seem to have been vewed as havng nstru63). Although of metal, with ine hard-stone inlay, mental powers. We have no texts that would help t resembles wooden carvngs, such as a crouchng us to sort out these possbltes precsely. The very deer, also n the tomb. Here the southern nterest presence of mages, however, and ther contnung in presenting igures of the spirit world has been development, suggest that, from ths date at least, engaged. Images were not conined to sculptures. and perhaps earler (especally n southern chna), Panted pctures were also ncluded, among them a the ancient Chinese had complex notions of repredepcton of the creatures assocated wth the drecsentaton and presentaton. In ths area also wooden tons, the Dragon of the East and the Tger of the igures were widely used as servants and attendants, West, shown wth the names of the Lunar Lodges on a whose presence was no doubt as functonal as the clothes box. Strange creatures holding weapons stand dishes of food that they were expected to serve. alongsde the door and wndows of the Marqus’ The nhabtants of the western Qn state took inner cofin, probably guardians against evil spirits another route, but n the same drecton: they too and demons (Fg. 10.11). Thus sculptures and pctures made mages of thngs that could not otherwse be appear to present bengs who could not otherwse included in tombs. Here in Shaanxi, the inhabitants be ncluded n the tomb. It s lkely that such mages favoured ceramc models of granares and stoves eswere consdered useful, havng the capacty to guard sental for physcal survval (Ledderose & Schlombs 123

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charots, contnued the zhou tradton of mltary mght, by contrast wth the sprtual guardans of the south. One wrter, followng the phlosophcal arguments of Kendall Walton n the realm of representatonal pantng (as understood n a post-Renassance world, one has to add), has termed such igures ‘ictions’ (Kesner 1995).5 But such dstnctons between copy and real, or iction and real, belong to the phlosophcal world of the West and do not necessarly apply n chna (Hall & Ames 1995). In ther partcular context of the soldiers were recognzed as real by ther makers and users. Indeed, as the day-to-day world was and s constructed by ts occupants, so too could be the afterlfe. Moreover, the Emperor would need a strong force to defend hm n the afterlfe, as he had n the battles that destroyed the lesser states. The terracotta solders were defences aganst the sprt armes of the afterlfe, equvalent to the armed igures on the cofin of the Marquis Yi of zeng. From the perspectve of the Emperor, we see the army as functonng n battle. From the perspecFigure 10.10. Drawing of an imaginary bird crowned with antlers. From the tomb of the tve of the offcals and Marquis Yi of Zeng, d. c. 433 BC. Height 143.5 cm. (After Beijing 1989, vol. 1, ig. 147.) workers, who toled n ts producton, the army 1990, no. 25). The nterests and tradtons of the lowas testmony to another aspect of lfe, mltary cal peoples thus determned the representaton or and organzatonal power. The unverse had been presentaton chosen. subdued by weapons and was now controlled by The grand army of terracotta warrors of the the herarches of a bureaucracy. To moblze both Frst Emperor (d. 210 Bc) seems to combne features armes of men and armes of clay requred mof both northern and southern tradtons. These mense and hghly controlled work forces. The very clay igures, equipped with real weapons and real physical presence of rows upon rows of clay igures 124

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Figure 10.11. Drawing of the painting on one side of the inner cofin of the Marquis Yi of Zeng. (After Beijing 1989, vol. 1, ig. 21.) would have mpressed by ther overwhelmng ordered physcal mass. Anyone seeng ths mpressve sght would have been n no doubt of the weght of the Emperor’s mght. Such an mpact would have been as much emotonal, emboded n a person’s sense of personal fear, as n any ntellectual understandng as to how the army was made and what t was to do. The careful dsplay of armour and weapons, by both the human and the sprt army, ndcated the degree of the Emperor’s control, a control that extended far beyond the realms of war in everyday lfe and would subdue also the sprt realms. The later, Han period, clay igures of soldiers, dancers and farm houses that we see as replcas were, therefore, n some essental sense also functonal wthn the narratves of the afterlfe. It s mpossble for us today to be completely certan how the peoples of the tme envsaged ths transfer across the boundary of death. Later stores descrbe events in which tomb igures appear both as tomb igures and as actors n the drama of everyday lfe. They could change from one state to the other. For ths reason, ndeed, the chnese have always been very wary of the igures and have not collected them as works of art. Tomb igures never appear in the early catalogues of collected antqutes, datng from the

eleventh century AD onwards. Here we brng n the irst mention of texts, but texts that fail to describe the feelngs and functons we would lke to know about. In artefacts and scene settngs, however, we have objects that engaged ther vewers n dstnctve modes of nterpretaton, and hence of thnkng, that are perhaps largely ndependent of thoughts expressed in texts. Indeed, such thoughts may not have been accessble to words and may never have been wrtten down (Bloch 1991; Mller 1987). Another reason for the lack of a coherent wrtten account of chnese belefs s dversty, often probably an ncompatble dversty. As already mentioned, the Qin uniied the landmass of China and thereby brought many dfferent relgous practces and belefs, bural customs and ndeed narratves for lfe and afterlfe together. The jade sut, belongng to the thrd tomb now to be dscussed, brngs objects and belefs from yet dfferent regons nto the medley. The prnce, Lu Sheng, son of the Han dynasty Emperor Jngd, was bured n 113 Bc n a jade sut wthn a rock cut tomb n the clff face near Mancheng n Hebe provnce (Bejng 1980b). The sut was carefully crafted, wth more than two thousand carefully cut and polshed bevelled plaques that were joned together wth gold wre threaded through holes n 125

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Figure 10.12a. Drawing of the tomb of Liu Sheng, d. 113 BC, at Mancheng in Hebei province. (After New York 1980, ig. 112.) the corners of each plaque. Ths sut belonged to a long tradton, n whch jades were threaded wth beads and laid over the body. Such jades irst began to be used n the late Western zhou perod, followng the rtual changes mentoned above. Among the profusion of jades were plaques cut to it over the features of the face. yet the chronologcal development of such jade coverngs from the nnth century Bc down to the tme of Lu Sheng dd not lead logcally to ths rather formdable, armour-lke, casng of systematcally carved plaques. Indeed, between 850 and 150 Bc, the numbers of jades bured appears, f anythng, to have declned slowly and unevenly. yet from before the tme of the Emperor Han Wud (141–87 Bc), jade suts seem to have been made on a suficiently large scale to distribute them to a number of members of the Imperal Famly. So carefully made were these suts and so smlar to one another that some sort of prototype or model appears to have existed. Indeed, it is likely that the suts were made n an Imperal workshop, commssoned by the Emperor’s household. As wth the terracotta warriors, jade suits are dificult to comprehend wthout postulatng large-scale, hghly organzed workshops, drected by overseers who could plan because they had a notion of exactly what they wanted to acheve. It s possble that precedents for these jade workshops existed in eastern chna, where large-scale burals of jades, before or at the begnnng of the Han dynasty, have been dscovered. The Emperor’s workshops may have exploited such skills and brought suits into being by multplyng jade plaques untl they covered a body, perhaps by analogy wth armour of ron. For along wth a large labour force drected to a partcular practcal end, an addtonal motve or

objectve s mpled by the nvestment of huge quanttes of labour n jade carvng for a sut. It seems lkely that such a suit was thought to confer special beneit on ts owner. Perhaps the tghtly lnked plaques were beleved to consttute protecton, that s armour, aganst demons and sprts. Here we can suggest that analoges were at work. The form of protecton chosen was comparable to that of a sut of armour; the materal chosen, however, was not that for defence aganst human forces. Jade was thought more sutable, agan perhaps because of an analogy — the permanence of the jade mght protect permanently and confer deathlessness on the wearer. In ths lght we can see the jade sut as a defence aganst unseen forces, as was the terracotta army. The powers of the jade sut were renforced by the stone of the prnce’s tomb tself. Hs bural chamber was dug deep nto a hllsde. The jade sut lay within a cofin in an inner chamber, itself constructed of stone slabs at the heart of the mountan, down a long passageway and beyond a large central chamber. Ths nner chamber had ts own separate stone door and the tomb was sealed wth rubble and molten ron. In the prnce’s nner chamber were small igures of servants, also carved in stone. In the central ceremonial chamber, such servant igures were ceramc, as were those n the tomb of hs consort, Dou Wan. Thus only those igures nearest the body of the prnce were of the most durable materal, stone. The jade sut s probably the key to the physcal and ntellectual ntenton. The jade sut, the stone attendants, the stone slab-lned nner chamber and the tomb at the heart of the mountan may have all had the same purpose, to lend the qualtes of the materals lterally and by analogy to the future lfe of the prnce. Moreover, these precautons were 126

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Figure 10.12b. Drawing of the reconstructed jade suit of Liu Sheng from Mancheng. (After Beijing 1980b, vol. 1, ig. 227.) nether lterally not metaphorcally redundant. If we thnk so, we forget the power of vsual nformaton. Just as n speech and wrtng, a multplcty of versons of the same dea can be used to elaborate and explain, so also a variety of visual forms can develop and thus expound a concept. The separate elements of the tomb elaborated the ways n whch the prnce mght be protected. The strength of the mountan fortress was to gve eternal lfe to the prnce. It was also to separate clearly the worlds of the lvng and the dead. From the Han perod, or possbly earler, the lvng wshed to keep a good dstance from the dead — who mght appear as ghosts to plague them (Sedel 1987; Wu Hung 1994). Thus the three tombs we have revewed llustrate two major categores of actvty and thought. They all present several dverse facets or functons of lfe wth emphases on the most auspcous aspects; and they also all provde for elaborate defences, especally aganst the mpled trals and dangers of the sprt world. Moreover, we can see the deas about sutable forms of protecton beng worked out by manpulaton of physcal objects that thus became ntegral to those deas. Detes, as well as demons and sprts, were recognzed as assstng the tomb occupants. Ths s llustrated by a number of hgh-qualty objects n Lu Sheng’s tomb and other contemporary burals. Among them were representatons of auspcous, mraculous creatures of the unverse (developng the practces n the tomb of the Marqus y: Fg. 10.10). Such images were of the inest materials, especally nlad bronze and jade, and they appear as supports for lamps or roamng over peaked ncense burners n the shapes of hlls. Other mages of detes, such as the Queen Mother of the West, occurred on mrrors or on strange bronze concoc-

tons, known as ‘money trees’ from the cons that illed the branches on which the small images of the dety were placed (Rawson 1996, nos. 87 & 88). During the Qin and Han periods, we know from texts, as much as from materal culture, that detes who nhabted dstant slands n the eastern sea or the western mountans cultvated drugs of mmortalty. If the powerful rulers of the day could send mssons to these mmortal lands, they too mght obtan such drugs and acheve deathlessness. Mssons faled, as we know from the wrtngs of the great hstoran Sma Qan. But hs account also shows that there was a general belef that sprts would be attracted by objects that resembled them. Shaoweng then sad to the emperor, ‘I perceve that your Majesty wshes to commune wth the sprts. But unless your palaces and robes are patterned after the shapes of the sprts, they wll not consent to come to you’ (Watson 1961, vol. 2, 42). Here n the lamps and ncense burners, mrrors and money trees, we have representatons acknowledged as representatons, that were, by ther representatonal qualtes, to draw the real thng to them. But when bured n tombs, these objects were to reman themselves n the sense that they were to continue to exist in bronze — they would presumably not turn nto mountanous rocky peaks, wth mraculous beasts perched upon them. Instead, as wth the utensls of earler tmes, they would, perhaps, contnue to have ther earthly functon, that s, to attract the sprts and mmortals to the ad of ther owners. Thus as well as preparng for a lfe n the tomb, the peoples of the late zhou, Qn and Han perods depcted a varety of detes and sprts n ther tombs, for n the afterlfe, as n the lvng world, these detes would functon and assst the tomb 127

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occupant. The three different examples also show that, as wth the earler tomb types, the contents were the props for a narratve of the tomb occupant that contnued hs earthly lfe nto the afterlfe. From the equpment n a tomb t s possble to see what ther owners deemed essental, and from such prortes we can derve an understandng of what they thought. Indeed, examination of widely differing, even contrastng, tombs proves a useful approach. Whle the granary and army were merely a smple extension of daily life, the igures of strange beings mply a more elaborate concepton of both lfe and the afterlfe, one peopled by good and bad sprts, more threatenng than the ancestors had been. None of the three later tombs can be understood, unless t s recognzed, as the chnese themselves must have done, that the world was nhabted by a wde range of strange and often dangerous sprts. In all three tombs defences were mounted — n the form of guardan sprts, of terracotta solders and of jade suits — which explained to their owners the nature of the dangers and the routes to safety and success that they mght be granted. Alongsde the fearsome creatures of the sprt world were also to be found bengn detes. yet despte the elaborate bural preparations, few texts, if any, enable us to glimpse how the chnese formulated ther nterpretatons of the unverse.6 At ths pont the dsjunctons between the narratves set out n the tombs and the wrtten theores of the late zhou, Qn and Han perods, expounded in a few of the surviving texts, become very notceable.

that llumne such notons. For theories of some sort were expressed by even the very smplest of rtuals and burals. Indeed, I have suggested that both the survvng objects and the very few texts indicate that the Shang and Zhou saw ther unverse as domnated by herarchcally arranged generatons of ancestors. It s lkely that these views were those of the Shang in the irst place and that the zhou, enterng the yellow Rver area from the relatve obscurty of the northwest, took over many Shang practces and hence also belefs, reworkng them n ther own way. Indeed, early zhou poetry assembled n the Shi jing (compled n about 600 Bc, but datng to a much earler tme) descrbes ther orgns n genealogcal terms, gvng ther own twst to the Shang generatonal pattern. Both Shang and zhou ancestors seem to have been concerned wth the actvtes of court lfe, especally banquets to honour them, court ceremony and mltary power. Nowhere are these views systematically expounded, and perhaps they dd not have to be. We have nferred them from the artefacts, and such artefacts may indeed have expressed the particular forms of these notons for ther makers and users. We can see both from objects and texts that much of ths outlook survved n the yellow Rver regon after the fall of the zhou captal n the west n 771. When the zhou captal was overrun, the zhou kngs and noblty moved eastwards, along the yellow Rver, but they also spread southwards towards the yangz. concurrently the state of chu, whch may orgnally have been located n western chna — that is southern Shaanxi or Sichuan — began to reform n Hube. chu was to become the domnant power n central southern chna. These two developments brought a chnese speakng and wrtng élte to power n the mddle yangz area, the regon where the tomb of the Marqus y of zeng was found. Ths chnese speakng élte became the prncpal ntermedary through whch relgous notons of the south were adopted and adapted n a chnese envronment. Indeed, n the Han perod, t was through chu that southern deas were transmtted to and ntegrated nto what became the metropoltan chnese culture of the Han. In ths way, Han thought, and consequently that of later dynastes also, came to combne the herarchcal and genealogcal systems typcal of the yellow Rver wth the much more vared belefs of the south. We can illustrate these two components in textual form n early anthologes of poetry: the Shi jing, already mentoned, and the Chu ci, the poetry of the chu state, assembled n the early Han perod, but

Ideas and theories Throughout the dscusson we have assumed a theoretcal as well as a performatve or narratve vew. The tme has come to address some aspects of ths major ssue. It s not possble here to descrbe the dense hstory of ntellectual culture recorded in ancient canonical Chinese texts. Few of these are as early as the rtual performances of the Shang or Western zhou. Indeed, the majorty were compled n ther present forms only n the Eastern zhou and Han periods. These later texts, which include both hstorcal records and anecdotes and the major phlosophcal works, le, n the man, outsde the prncpal ssues consdered here. The syntheses compled n the Han perod are relevant to the matters descrbed, but let us summarze some of the theoretcal ntentons and nterpretatons mplct n the bural practices discussed, mentioning texts found in tombs 128

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oficial capacity (Rawson 1996, nos. 69 & 95). Many other texts have been found. These embrace treatises on such matters as law, medcne and demonology, useful n lfe to ther owners, and presumably also useful n the after lfe (Harper 1985; 1987). In addton, later Han tombs hold documents, such as land contracts for the pece of land on whch the tomb was constructed, that were addressed, t would seem, to the oficials of the underworld (Seidel 1987). The later Han documents also include texts written on jars that were pleas on behalf of the dead, presumably before the oficials of the underworld (Dien et al. 1985, 1360). Such texts do not elaborate theory; they functioned, as dd all the objects n the tombs, as part of the essental apparatus of ther owner, enablng hm or her to act and to thnk. Only n the last ten years has the underworld bureaucracy and ts celestal counterpart been dentied from tomb documents (Seidel 1987). Han period documents, dating from the irst century AD, nclude references to a prncpal dety, the celestal Thearch. The celestal realm, lke that of the underworld, was organzed n a herarchcal manner, wth detes associated with different stars and celestial ofices manned by sprts. Elements of ths structure were already present n the poems of the Chu ci, and t s lkely that the notons of both the underworld and the heavenly oficials were developed in response to the belefs of the south, as nterpreted n chu. Indeed, whle the documents n Han tombs present a farly ordered account of these realms, there were probably many earler centures when such notons were only partally evolved. Thus one of the forces that led to the concept of such ordered realms was probably the fear of the many demons and sprts current in the south. Texts on dreams, medicine and demonology gve every evdence of these fears (Harper 1985; 1987). The herarchcal organzaton, on the other hand, may have come from the tradtonal orderng by rank and functon current n the yellow Rver regon. Indeed, parallel wth the ntegraton of northern yellow Rver materal culture wth southern mages descrbed above, there seems to have been an ntegraton of dfferent categores of belef system from several regons of chna. A recent discussion of a strange deity igure supports such an account. This igure, known by the name of Tay, decorates a weapon from the chu state (Fig. 10.13). Divination texts also found in Chu tombs reveal the powers of ths sprt, who could avert danger from weapons. In the Han perod, the Emperor Wud (141–87 Bc) ntegrated the worshp of Taiyi into the formal metropolitan sacriices for the

datng n part from the pre-Han perod. In the earler zhou poetry, the ancestors, the genealogcal legends of the zhou, and the mltary adventures of ordnary bengs, as well as heroes, play a large part. The Chu ci brngs out a completely dfferent unverse of sprts and demons, of detes located n the heavens especally amongst the stars, and of heavenly journeys n carrages drawn by dragons. But even as early as the tme of the tme of the Marqus y of zeng, t s clear from the actual tomb contents that compromses and syntheses between traditional ancient Zhou expectations and southern sprtual realms were beng made. Bured n the rear chamber of the Marqus’ tomb (whch held weapons and charot parts) was an nventory that lsted these tems as gfts from powerful assocates of the Marqus (Bejng 1989). Whle the gfts were themselves n keepng wth much earler zhou mltary values, the nventory bured n the tomb was not. Such nventories may have existed at earlier dates, but they do not, on present evdence, seem to have been bured. It s lkely that the bural of the nventory was not chance, but was ntended to demonstrate for all tme that the Marqus not only had wonderful possessons but also that he had powerful frends. The inventory is the irst in a long series found n southern tombs, preserved because the condtons underground kept the bamboo strps on whch they were wrtten ntact. Many of the chu state nventores were evdently ntended for the bureaucrats of lfe to check aganst the objects to be bured, and they were often corrected n the lght of the bural. When placed n the tomb t seems lkely that they were to contnue to have a use. We can speculate that that use was to be n the future lfe of the tomb owner. In Han tmes, some of the nventores were addressed explicitly to an underworld bureaucracy that, in the mnds of the peoples of many parts of central chna, regulated the sprt world, and especally the ranks of the dead. We know that notons of such bureaucraces existed well before the Han dynasty from narratives, also wrtten on bamboo slps, found n a northwestern tomb of the thrd century Bc (Harper 1994). Ths document descrbes how one, Dan, returned to lfe, havng been summoned to the underworld n error. In hs report he mentoned, ncdently, that n ths underworld realm were famous oficial igures of the past. Wrtng tools — nk, brushes, nk stones for grndng the nk pellets and tools for preparng bamboo slips carefully included in the cofins of the southern tombs are, perhaps, also evdence that the tomb occupants themselves hoped to serve n some 129

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avalable complatons of mportant practces. These efforts at synthess and complaton were drven by searches for coherence amd the plethora of belefs and philosophies available at the time. But such textual accounts dd not necessarly match the belefs and practces of the peoples n dfferent regons of chna. Some of the dsjunctons between bural practces and theoretcal wrtng were not smply dfferences n categores of thought, but also a consequence of the separate enterprses. As we have seen n the descrpton of the three tombs, dfferent peoples and cultures were gradually ncorporated nto the chnese-speakng world, and inally into a single state, bringing new views to the generally accepted ancent tradtons, domnated by the ancestors and manpulated by famly loyaltes. Such accounts of demons and spirits, expounded in mages and bured documents, llustrate the power of accounts set out n the physcal terms of utensls and mages. Moreover, t s perfectly clear from detailed attention to burial that beliefs expressed in such practical and physical contexts were widely shared from the hghest socal level to the lowest. The dvergences between reported vews of confucus and much later phlosophers, ncludng the famous sceptc Wang chong, and dependency on the sprt guardans of the Marqus y of zeng, on the army of the Frst Emperor and on the jade sut of Lu Sheng, ndcate a wde gulf between the most theoretcal expositions and the performative and narrative structures of understandng. It s, perhaps, a common sensaton of all peoples that ther vews are not necessarly consstent from one secton of ther lves to another. At the tme of preparaton for bural (often carred out many years before the actual death), an overwhelmng need was to ensure a comfortable afterlfe. The desre for one that conformed, and hence was coherent wth the hghest norms of earthly lfe, led to repeated emphass on condtons for contnuty across the boundary. In chnese tombs, therefore, we see not just one but many patterns of thought. Gven that n many cultures personal belefs often dffer from those of the metropolitan orthodox religious and philosophical canon, physcal remans that reveal elements of rtual performance and narratve are hghly mportant sources of nformaton. They are not only nformaton for us today; ther essental role was to nform ther owners. Such nformaton ndcates a dverse materal culture that presumably mrrored a dverse ntellectual one. The marked regonal dfferences here noted were not smply an aspect of an early stage n the perod of the Shang, c. 1200 Bc, but perssted

Figure 10.13. Rubbing of the two sides of a halberd found at Baoshan in Jingmen county, Hubei province. 4th–3rd century BC. Height 22 cm. (After Li Ling 1995, ig. 4.) major detes of the heavens and the earth (L Lng 1995). Untl recently, the southern orgns of ths major igure in Han ritual and religion had been ignored. Now t s evdent that ths powerful Han emperor was ntent on seekng help and support from detes throughout hs large empre to assst hs rule and to preserve hm from ll fortune. As the Imperal famly had strong contacts wth the south and wth chu, n partcular, belefs from that regon were gathered nto the deas popular at the court. The late zhou, Qn and Han perods were ndeed key moments when dverse belefs and theores, hnted at by the contents of the later tombs, were drawn nto systematc phlosophy. Often known as correlatve phlosophy, such deas joned well-established social and political philosophy expounded n the wrtngs of confucus and Mencus or those of the Mohsts (Hall & Ames 1995; Graham 1989). At the same perod, wrtngs on rtual, often contanng ancent materal, were edted to make 130

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much later nto the Eastern zhou and Han perods. Whole complexes of objects that differed region by regon ndcate wdely separate rtes, rtuals and belefs. The rtual vessels would have mpressed by ther movement n ordered rtuals n whch sequences of offerngs were ted to the ndvdual vessels wthn a set. The towerng bronze sculptures, on the other hand, would have domnated ther audences by ther mpassve unmovng countenances. The bodily experiences, the emotions and the ideas would have been strongly inluenced by such material differences. In this context, artefacts are most usefully consdered not as symbolc storage so much as ntegral components of the belefs, hopes and fears of ther makers and users.

5. 6.

Acknowledgements I would lke to thank Ann Searght for preparng the llustratons. Jessica Rawson Merton College Oxford OX1 4JD

be assmlated to Western phlosophcal or relgous thnkng (Hall & Ames 1995). Gven ths perspectve, t s unlkely that the chnese vewed the tomb contents as merely ‘representatons’. Wide-ranging discussion of iction may be suitable in a Western context, but is not reliably applied to the ancent chnese one. Among the many theories loated whenever Chinese bural practces are descrbed are the propostons about ancent chnese notons of the soul. A number of wrters have attempted to derve systematc notons of the soul and its destination from texts of the Han and earler perods (yü yng-shh 1964). Here, as n the other aspects descrbed, however, t s evdent that the textual accounts, and modern interpretations of those accounts, are not consstent wth the bural patterns of the day. A dvson of the soul nto a heavenly hun soul and an earthly po soul s mentoned haphazardly in historical and philosophical texts. But it is by no means obvous that the bural practtoners and ther patrons subscrbed to these vews (see especally Brasher 1996). In such accounts, the hun porton of the soul s sad to ascend to heaven, whle the po soul remans n the tomb. yet evdence of a search for bodly preservaton s seen n jade suts (Fg. 11.12b). How dd that search relate to ether the fate of the hun or of the po soul? The other tombs descrbed are also hard to explain in the context of a divided soul.

notes

References

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Bagley, R.W., 1992. changjang bronzes and Shang archaeology, n International Colloquium on Chinese Art History, 1991, Proceedings, Antiquities, part I. Tape: Natonal Palace Museum, 209–55. Baxter, L.A., 1992. Root metaphors in accounts of developing romantc relatonshps. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 9, 253–75. Bejng, 1980a. Yinxu Fu Hao mu. Bejng: Wenwu chubanshe. Bejng, 1980b. Mancheng Han mu fajue baogao. Bejng: Wenwu chubanshe. Bejng, 1981. Anyang Xaotun cunbede langzuo ynda mu. Kaogu xuebao 1981(4), 491–518. Bejng, 1989. Zeng Hou Yi mu. Bejng: Wenwu chubanshe. Beltng, H., 1994. Likeness and Presence: a History of the Image Before the Era of Art, trans. E. Jephcott. chcago (IL) & London: Unversty of chcago Press. Black, M., 1962. Models and Metaphors. Ithaca (Ny): cornell Unversty Press. Bloch, M., 1991. Language, anthropology and cogntve scence. Man 26, 183–98. Brasher, K.E., 1996. Han thanatology and the dvson of ‘souls’. Early China 21, 125–58. carrthers, M., 1992. Why Humans have Cultures: Explaining Anthropology and Social Diversity. Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press. carruthers, M., 1990. The Book of Memory: a Study of Memory in Medieval Culture. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press.

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Although the paper addresses speciic issues in Chinese materal culture, the man argument that objects of all categores are ntegral to the creaton and development of what we thnk of as abstract concepts or belef can be appled to all cultures (Sten 1990). Such an approach s supported by recent work on cognton expounded in Clark 1997. The notion of objects as texts has had a wide currency n the last two decades. Such an approach, however, gves unwarranted prorty to the wrtten word and ndeed also to language. Fundamental to ths present paper s the vew that the manfold features of artefacts are not capable of expression in words written or spoken. Indeed, our assessment and exploitation of sgns and wrtng, n partcular, can be seen to be based upon the ways n whch we nterpret objects and envronments. This paper will not explore the wide-ranging technical knowledge dsplayed by the ancent chnese artefacts discussed in this paper. Among such examples, the bell sets in the ifth century tomb of the Marquis Yi of Zeng (Beijing 1989), reveal extraordinary command both of castng technque and muscal vbraton patterns. Nether have I consdered the cogntve processes that such techncal command requred. Throughout the paper t s accepted that the theores that contrbuted to the bural patterns here dscussed were part of a typcally chnese perspectve and cannot

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clark, A., 1997. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. cambrdge (MA): MIT Press. connerton, P., 1989. How Societies Remember. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. curre, G., 1990. The Nature of Fiction. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Damaso, A.R., 1994. Descartes’ Error, Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. New york (Ny): G.P. Putnam’s Sons. Den, A.E., J.K. Regel & N.T. Prce, 1985. Chinese Archaeological Abstracts, vol. 3: Eastern Zhou to Han. (Monumenta Archaeologca 10.) Los Angeles (cA): the Insttute of Archaeology, Unversty of calforna. Dpert, R.R., 1993. Artefacts, Art Works, and Agency. Phladelpha (PA): Temple Unversty Press. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Fong, W. (ed.), 1980. The Great Bronze Age of China: an Exhibition from the People’s Republic of China. New york (Ny): The Metropoltan Museum of Art. Goffman, E., 1969. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Harmondsworth: Pengun. Goodman, N., 1976. Languages of Art: an Approach to a Theory of Symbols. Indanapols (IN): Hackett Publshng co. Inc. Goodman, N., 1984. Of Mind and Other Matters. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Goodman, N. & c. Elgn, 1988. Reconceptions. Indanapols (IN): Hackett Publshng co. Inc. Graham, A.c., 1989. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle: Open court. Guthre, S., 1993. Faces in the Clouds: a New Theory of Religion. New York (NY) & Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hall, D.L. & R.T. Ames, 1995. Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture. Albany (Ny): State Unversty of New york Press. Harper, D., 1985. A chnese demonography of the thrd century Bc. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 45, 459–98. Harper, D., 1987. Wang yen-shou’s nghtmare poem. Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 47, 239–85. Harper, D., 1994. Resurrecton n Warrng States popular relgon. Taoist Resources 5, 13–28. Hausman, c., 1989. Metaphor and Art: Interactionism and Reference in the Verbal and Non-verbal Arts. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Hawkes, D., 1985. The Songs of the South: an Anthology of Ancient Chinese Poems by Qu Yuan and Other Poets. Harmondsworth: Pengun. Hnde, R., 1997. Relationships: a Dialectical Perspective. Hove: Psychology Press. Hodder, I., 1986. Reading the Past: Current Approaches in Interpretation in Archaeology. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Kane, v., 1974. The ndependent bronze ndustres n the south of chna contemporary wth the Shang and Western chou Dynastes. Archives of Asian Art 28, 77–107. Kemp, B.J., 1989. Ancient Egypt: Anatomy of a Civilization. London & New york (Ny): Routledge.

Kesner, L., 1995. Lkeness of no one: (re)presentng the Frst Emperor’s army. The Art Bulletin 77(1), 115–32. Lakoff, G. & M. Johnson, 1980. Metaphors We Live By. chcago (IL): chcago Unversty Press. Lamarque, P. & S.H. Olsen, 1994. Truth, Fiction and Literature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ledderose, L. & A. Schlombs (eds.), 1990. Jenseits der Grossen Mauer: Der Erste Kaiser von China und Seine TerracottaArmee. Munch: Bertelsmann Lexikon verlag GmbH. L Lng, 1995. An archaeologcal study of Tay (Grand One) worshp. Early Medieval China 2(1995–96), 1–39. Lu Lancheng & Hu zhsheng, 1988. Baoji Yuguo mudi. Bejng: Wenwu chubanshe. Mller, D., 1987. Material Culture and Mass Consumption. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Mller, G.A., E. Galanter & K.H. Prbram, 1960. Plans and the Structure of Behaviour. New york (Ny): Henry Holt & co. Ortony, A. (ed.), 1979. Metaphor and Thought. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Pearce, S.M. (ed.), 1994. Interpreting Objects and Collections. London & New york (Ny): Routledge. Poman, K., 1990. Collectors and Curiosities, Paris and Venice, 1500 –1800, trans. E. Wles-Porter. cambrdge: Polty Press. Rawson, J., 1993a. Ancent chnese rtual bronzes: the evdence from tombs and hoards of the Shang (c. 1500–1050 Bc) and Western zhou (c. 1050–771 Bc) perods. Antiquity 67, 805–23. Rawson, J., 1993b. Ancent chnese rtual as seen n the materal record, n State and Court Ritual in China, eds. J. McDermott & J. Ladlaw (forthcomng). Paper presented at a symposum at cambrdge n 1993. Rawson, J., 1996. Mysteries of Ancient China. Archaeological Finds from the Early Dynasties. London: Brtsh Museum Press. Renfrew, c., 1986. varna and the emergence of wealth n prehstorc Europe, n The Social Life of Things, ed. A Appadura. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 141–68. Renfrew, c. & E. zubrow (eds.), 1994. The Ancient Mind: Elements of Cognitive Archaeology. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Romney A.K., J.P. Boyd, c.c. Moore, W.H. Batchelder & T. Brazll, 1996. culture as shared cogntve representatons. Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences, USA 93, 4699–705. Scher, F., 1986. Deeper into Pictures: an Essay on Pictorial Representation. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Seidel, A., 1987. Traces of Han religion in funeral texts found n tombs, n Do-kyo- to sho-kyo- bunka, ed. Akzuk Kan’e. Tokyo: Hrakawa, 21–57. Sten, R.A., 1990. The World in Miniature: Container Gardens and Dwellings in Far Eastern Religious Thought, trans. Brooks. Stanford (cA): Stanford Unversty Press. Tufte, E.R., 1983. The Visual Display of Quantitative Information. cheshre (cT): Graphcs Press. Waley, A., 1954. The Book of Songs. London: George Allen and Unwn.

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Socal Relatons and the Idea of Externalty

Chapter 11 social Relations and the Idea of externality Marlyn Strathern The concept of external storage system raises the question of what is or is not ‘external’ to the person. This chapter offers an ethnographic commentary. Materials from Papua New Guinea lead one to consider the signiicance of social relations in this respect. The chapter is not so much concerned with relations as storers of information but with speciic practices in which people lodge (store) material items in (with) other people. It is argued that these practices create one of the conditions by which people compute what is interior and what is exterior (to themselves), namely through the very fact of their enrolling other persons in their projects. It is further argued that any single difference, as between internal and external, depends on other differences also being held in place. The chapter thus explores some of the supporting conceptual structures which enable these people to imagine that they are able to give out and take in resources of different kinds, thereby created as alternately ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to themselves.

M

through others, is the capacity to relect on interdependence tself. We mght say that the entre loop s gven a dmenson of tme (endurng oblgatons, over the generatons) and space (between persons separated by bography or resdence from one another) when socal relatonshps themselves become objects of relection and manipulation. We may add that the possblty of long-term relatonshps n whch people antcpate the (ds)postons of others n relaton to themselves also allows the same plannng strateges to be moblzed at hgh speed n transent nteractons. Long-term relatonshps are n turn sustaned through the generc condtons or constrants (rules of behavour) expected of persons n partcular locatons (roles) n relaton to one another. Ths seems self-evdent enough. Here I brng to mnd certan ethnographc data, some of t well known, n order to make one further pont. If socal relatons are not external symbolc storage systems n the sense ntended by Donald, the parallel I mean to draw s nonetheless precse n one respect. Relatonshps work through persons conscously acknowledgng the presence, and/or the ntentons, of others as persons capable of acton lke themselves.

ore than one contrbutor to ths volume has commented on the part that socal relatons have to play n any account of human experence. We mght also consder them a rather specal resource n the development of external symbolc storage systems. Socal relatons make artefacts out of persons; that s, persons carry the knd of symbolc load that Renfrew (this volume) inds in material culture. What makes them specal s ther recursve and elctory character. Qute apart from the collectve sense n whch separate mnds mght be sad to be embedded n any evolvng culture (cf. Donald 1993, 12), ongong relatonshps afford certan loopng possbltes. That s, people’s ‘workng memory’ (Donald 1991, 329) loops through other people. Socal relatons do not just contan a record of past nteractons or store nformaton about future behavoural possbltes. They act also as a stimulus to relection. This social relexivity is crucial, for instance, to what Esther Goody (1995) has called the role of antcpatory nteractve plannng n human cognton. In addton to the fact that actons are lnked to response, and that persons become aware of others thereby and of themselves 135

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take n other persons n dong so. My examples come from cultures whch pay an exaggerated attenton to the recursve (e.g. Munn 1986) and elctory (e.g. Wagner 1986) potental of socal relatons. *

*

*

The eght vllages belongng to the Mekeo, who lve along the reaches of the Baru Rver n the central provnce of Papua New Guinea, follow a regular pattern (Fg. 11.1).1 clubhouses of the resdent clan chefs are promnent at each end, whle domestc dwellngs and other Figure 11.1. Plan of Mekeo village, Papua New Guinea. (From Mosko 1985, 26, structures are erected n paralig. 2.1. with kind permission.) lel rows facng each other. In the centre s an area cleared Ths means that all knds of boundary possbltes of permanent features. coconut and areca palms, arse n whch people may put one another at varyplanted behnd the façade of the houses, do not nng degrees of ‘otherness’ or externalty from themtrude on ths central space. selves. Socal relatonshps thus provde an analogue The vllage s the focus of human actvty model for the very exterorzng process that Donald — people eat, reproduce and are bured there. Howdescrbes, n whch memory s externally looped va ever, as the ethnographer (Mosko 1985, 22) adds, devces whch also stmulate t. the vllage s not lmted to human bengs. DomesDonald (1991, 309) argues that external memory tcated anmals, varous plants and a whole range s not smply coextensve wth culture; he wshes to of humanly-fashoned artefacts belong there. These use the term for those mechansms (artefacts such vllage-thngs are radcally separated from those as literacy) that act as speciic analogues to internal of the bush beyond. Indeed ‘vllage’ and ‘bush’ are memory. He hmself deploys an analogue model conceptualzed as dstnct domans of actvtes and n hs appeal to the dfference between bologcal powers, and a well-deined croton hedge bounds the memory and other memory mechansms: he repreperphery of the vllage. The bush s nhabted by sents dverse propertes as the dfference between many bush-thngs, anmal, plant and sprt; t s also what s nternal and what s external to the organthe source of what Mosko refers to an as astonshng sm. Now that concept of dfference depends on other array of natural resources, ncludng garden food dfferences beng held n place, such as that of body and huntng products. What s beyond the vllage s and envronment. The percepton of body boundary thus brought nto the vllage for consumpton, and n turn requres ts own conceptual support — as n wastes are thrown back nto the bush. Mekeo draw the dea of houses havng nterors and exterors, on a conceptual opposton between ‘outsde’ and or n mages of contanment and extenson, or n ‘nsde’2 to encompass both a spatal parttonng of the altered state of whatever s held to cross a lne. the vllage and bush and a temporal regulaton of the None of these conceptual supports can be taken for daly cycle of lfe whch takes people between the granted. Together they make up the knd of analogtwo (1985, 23). The terms are not organzed qute as cal systems by whch socal anthropologsts dentfy Euro-Amercans3 mght magne, however: t s the speciic cultures. It might be of some interest in the bush that s categorcally ‘nsde’ and the vllage that present context, therefore, to explore ways n whch s categorcally ‘outsde’. the very concept of externalty has been (analogFgure 11.1 s not of course the plan of any cally) modelled. I am nterested n models that make speciic village; Mosko has abstracted sets of relaloops out of an externalzng movement, and that tons that sgnfy dfferences of varous orders, here 136

Socal Relatons and the Idea of Externalty

ofice-holder. The artefact thus both absorbed the person, and outlved any one ncumbent n ts own durablty. What was beng dsplayed to the rest of the world was the transformed status of the ncumbent, a vsble remnder n materal form of the mmateral counterpart in the rules that the ofice-holder also observed n hs person. In such crcumstances, the artefact was created as ‘external’ to the person precsely nsofar as t emboded extra-personal power. That social separation of the incumbent from the ofice provded the conceptual bass for magnng a source of authorty beyond the ndvdual person. The same prncple may hold elsewhere, as n the more dffuse system of the Tallensi of Northern Ghana (to keep wth Fortes’ materal), where the power of senor men was seen to emanate from ther status wthn a doman of socal lfe held separate from domestc affars. From the perspectve of the domestc doman, n turn, actvtes were understood as both belongng to t and lyng beyond. Whle n many contexts Melanesan people conceptualse a removed realm of power (a sprt or ancestral world), a preoccupaton wth what s nternal and what s external seems to govern the percepton of all knds of relatons. Dstnctons between two features may be held n place by other dstnctons between other features; they may also be held n place by movement ‘across’ the boundary between features, or by shfts n perspectve whch substtute the vew from one sde by the vew from the other. Such movement and shfts may well be antcpated n both termnology and magery. Let me start wth the example of a clan group. Thnk of the rule of exogamy, the stpulaton that one should marry outsde a partcular group, such as a clan. Exogamy simultaneously deines sets of people as nsders (those who cannot marry one another) and as outsders (those from whom spouses come). Takng up the vantage pont of one’s clan group makes ths clear. But note the consequence of ths partcular example, and t s not fortutous; the postons fold back on themselves. If members of other clans are outsders from the point of view of marrying spouses from them, then these spouses are also brought wthn the clan through those marrages. That movement of persons ‘between’ clans and thus ‘across’ clan boundares helps sustan (make durable) the ntal dstncton. I take a cue from the recent hstory of the area of I know best, Mt Hagen in the Papua New Guinea Highlands.7 A woman would be separated from her own clan through the exchange of brdewealth gfts between the ntermarryng patrlneal clans, components of whch were

rendered n terms of poston and space. Now we may ask of the village, irst, what kind of informaton s beng stored n the placng of ts houses and fences, and, second, what knd of spato-temporal functons does t allow people to operate upon t. The demarcaton between nsde and outsde, made vsble through the croton fence that runs round the vllage, allows what we mght call (after Harrs ths volume) dsplaced communcaton: the ablty to magne oneself ether sde of t. Ths can be rendered n terms of seeng dfferent sets of socal relatons. If the bush beyond the fence s ‘nsde’, ths s also the vew that people have from the perspectve of ther overall terrtory; they are contaned wthn the larger crcumference of the land ther trbe4 occupes, and the bush les wthn ths. A person gong from vllage to bush ‘goes nsde’. The trbe and ts terrtory does not, however, form an undfferentated unt. It s composed of vllages, each of whch contans members of one or more clans, and people nteract regularly wth other vllages of ther trbe wth whom they are ntermarred. From any one person’s pont of vew, then, a trbe contans not only blood kn, but also the afines from whom spouses come, and mother’s kn from whom no spouse can be taken. These latter are so to speak ‘outsde people’ (my term)5 and t s n vllages, the places of human habtaton, that one encounters such people. To go ‘outsde’ n gong nto one’s own vllage s thus to nclude n one’s vew those wth whom one’s clan s ntermarred, and across more than one generaton. In mmetc mode, dstnctons are thus sustaned, held n place, by other dstnctons. These Mekeo formulatons prompt me to consder other materal from Melanesan socetes showng smlar ntellectual preoccupatons wth the relatonshp between ‘nsde’ and ‘outsde’. As Thomas (ths volume) notes, the very conceptualzaton of the person s at ssue. One has to understand the person n an expanded sense: there are necessarly many people nvolved. Inside and outside The dea that t s socal relatons whch separate out aspects of persons and present them wth worlds beyond themselves has many antecedents n anthropologcal accounts. Ths was Fortes’ nterest n the West Afrcan Ashant stool, and the concept of ofice it created.6 Regala that emboded the vrtues and powers of a particular ofice, in this case poltco-relgous postons of authorty, came n turn to bestow vrtue and powers on the person of the 137

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equated wth mortuary payments. Thus a woman was referred to as beng ‘severed’ from her clan of orgn n order to ‘go nsde’ (as they sad) the husband’s clan. Meanwhle her brother would be takng a wfe from an outsde clan and through her outsde powers be producng further members for hs own. If pressed to the pont, Hagen people would probably have sad that t was only by brngng n external sources of fertlty that a clan could reproduce at all. That external source was kept external. Although a woman went nsde her husband’s clan, she dd not lose her connectons wth her own kn; far from t, she became a ‘road’ between them, her outsde orgns beng conserved n her natal clan name whch she kept. Rather than beng fully absorbed by the new clan body, t enclosed or encased her, lke a foregn body. Hagen men sometmes referred to ther wves as beng nsde a fence, as though one could magne a small enclosure wthn the clan terrtory contaned wthn the wder crcumference of the clan land, an mage also summoned by gardens whch were ndvdually fenced wthn a clan terrtory. There are other mages for ths enclosng movement. Across Melanesa, one can generalze, the almentary and procreatve functons of the human body chart the process of substances seen now as nsde and now as outsde. These comprse a reproductve model of lfe, one whch draws readly on metaphors of feedng and evacuaton, of sexual unon and chldbrth. There s thus an nterplay between notons of externalty and nternalty magned as body processes wthn a sngle organsm, as one mght have an dea of a fetus wthn the mother’s enclosng body, and the conjuncton of dstnct bodes n cross-sex ntercourse. Unon, however, would be a bad translaton, at least n the Hagen case, for (by contrast wth Euro-Amercan dom) conjugal partners are not joned together as one person — rather each conserves ther dstnct socal dentty. Indeed, each party elcts from the other behavour approprate both to ther sex and to ther socal orgn. Thus t s because the husband s socally dstnct from hs wfe that the chld she carres s socally dstnct from her (n ths patrlneal system, women carry chldren for the husband’s clan). If ths were Mekeo one mght say that the husband plants an ‘nsde’ seed wthn her ‘outsde’ body. The low of body substance between persons is also a process of extracton or elctaton. What the woman takes wthn her she later brngs forth as the newborn chld. Now whle one mght rase one’s eyebrows at ths plattude, one mght lower them agan on thnkng about the way n whch Hagen

people ncorporate ths nto ther thnkng. We should understand these dfferent body states as havng ther counterpart n socal dvsons marked by marrage rules and food taboos. Transfers of body substance through such rules and conventons n turn have a counterpart n varous artefacts (such as brdewealth valuables)8 that also low between people (cf. Wagner 1977). Bodily lows are both made visible in the transfer of materal tems ‘between’ people and ‘across’ boundares, and make the transmsson of energy and lfe an analogy for those transfers themselves. Ths counterpart movement of artefacts s locked nto body process n a second mode. The tems to whch I refer have value because they are regarded as beng extracted from persons, just as persons (lke the brde) are regarded as extracted from other persons. In fact the two modes nterpenetrate precsely at the pont of marrage. In arrangements of the Hagen knd,9 t was these materal artefacts that elicited persons. One clan yelds ts daughters (n marrage) to another because that other clan had offered artefacts (brdewealth) n the form of valuables for her. Each elctaton was n fact an nstance of the elctory potental of relatonshps. The same elctory potental was played out n the long-term recprocal exchanges of wealth between poltcal unts (such as clans) for whch men in the central Highland of Papua New Guinea were once renowned n the ethnographc lterature. And what was ths ceremonal exchange but the extracton of tems of value from one group — pgs, formerly shell valuables, more recently money — by another who n turn took them ‘n’ order to gve them ‘out’ agan? People’s constant recourse to body magery supposed wealth as always wthn someone’s body: t was only taken from one to be lodged n another. In Hagen, the recpent clan lterally took the valuables nsde ts men’s house and pgs nsde ts terrtory. Ths passage from ‘outsde’ to ‘nsde’ was further sustaned by the dstncton between the vsble and nvsble. What momentarly appeared also dsappeared agan. Items thus oscllated between the condton of beng nternal and beng external to the body of one’s own clan. Concealment and revelation Ths oscllaton s nterestng f only because of the explctness of the accompanyng socal practces. Persons could be orented outwards or nwards, even as partes to the exchanges alternated n ther postons vs-à-vs one another. The men of two clans engaged n exchange alternated from beng the 138

Socal Relatons and the Idea of Externalty

recpents to the beng the donors of wealth; ndeed transactons were locked nto a socal alternaton so we may say that they were exchangng perspectves that those who were producers at one pont became on each other (Strathern 1988, 230). And the posconsumers of equvalent tems at another. sblty was antcpated n the relatonshp between The socal alternaton was explct: the categorthem. A donor was a future recpent, and vice versa. cal dvson nto donors and recpents created the An exchange relationship thereby objectiied that possblty of future creatvty. It was magned n conceptual move, that recursve ablty to see oneself terms of dfferent bodly orentatons. Frst, I noted from the vew of another, through movng tems that a clan recevng wealth took the wealth nto (artefacts) between persons. These artefacts thereby tself when t took the wealth nto ts men’s houses. moved the places persons occuped. (The analogy between houses and persons, medThs was not a logc that the anthropologst had ated through the concept of a body,10 s elaborated to excavate. People acted openly by t. On an occathroughout Papua New Guinea.11) Lke ther ornason of a publc gft, the ceremonal ground would ments that Hageners wrapped up n dark packages be thronged wth those who had come to see what — dark because of the soot that caked the nteror the recpent was gettng, among them those who of houses — shells were secreted away by the rewould be n turn potental recpents of such wealth cpents of an exchange gft, and money even more as he passed on. At the same tme the present donors, easly. Pgs were dspersed to dfferent households. magnng themselves as future recpents, and chalMen removed ther dancng attre, redstrbutng t lengng the present recpent to gve back at least an among those from whom t was borrowed. Walk nto equvalent amount, dd not just draw attenton to the a place a few days after a dsplay and you would see sze of ther present gft — t antcpated ther own nothng — a shabby man n ragged clothes whch future ablty to rase as much agan later. The whole only tell you, f you dd not know by other means, matter mght be about the poltcs of clan composthat you have no dea of the wealth he receved. All ton and the economcs of wealth creaton; t was vsble evdence would have vanshed, the artefacts also about reproducton, ensurng the capacty to be gven away to others or wrapped up and stored nproductve and revealng that capacty through ts sde the house, a process whch n the case of shells effects. was thought to make them grow, untl the next ocNow such clams could not be made n solacason on whch people brought them outsde. Eveton; one could not so to speak reproduce by oneself. rythng was then turned nsde out. So, second, n Donors depended crucally on recpents recevng ther gfts, and for takng them nsde, for how else was the donors’ creatvty to be revealed? Ths was a prestge system where those who clam prestge depended on others to recognze t. Smlarly, the producers of wealth would only be able to produce again, n the future, f those to whom they were gvng the wealth were prepared to accept the mmedate gft. In other words, donors requred wllng contaners n whch to pour the results of ther prowess. We may thnk of these as an audence, or a body of consumers for products, Figure 11.2. Shells laid out down a ceremonial stand, streaming away from a house wth the provso that the [where the viewer is standing]. Mt Hagen, 1964. (Photograph by author.) 139

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standard Hagen conography, wealth would stream from the now open men’s house (Fg. 11.2). Dancers turned themselves nsde out too — on the exteror of ther bodes they wore all the ornaments that sgnied their inner state of well-being — and took omens to reassure themselves that the nteror would yeld ts fruts. Men anxously poured glstenng ol from dull, smoky lasks, waiting for the liquid to low as evdence of ther ablty to brng nternal capactes forth. Wves whom the male donors kept ‘enclosed’, the fertle centres of ther clans, they turned nsde out too. When women danced, they were decorated by ther knsmen, and covered n the red pant that ndcated among other thngs the nterorty of wealth, now everted, turned outsde for all to see. The mportant pont to retan here s what these people retaned. That nner state was not brought outsde, revealed once and for all, so that people could forever see nsde, as one mght magne EuroAmercan knowledge systems where what s brought outsde remans (more or less) permanently n vew. Rather, what you saw on the outsde was an everted inside:12 an nteror state turned momentarly outsde, subsequently to be folded back and concealed from vew. So t remaned an ‘nsde’ beng brought out, the externalzng effect a momentary one. All ths was apparent n the form of the pearlshell, a valuable whch became for a tme the

most potent symbol of economc exchange, poltcal power and generatve reproducton Hagen men possessed. The shell, enclosed n ts resn surround, panted wth ochre, was occasonally lkened to a fetus wthn a womb. connolly & Anderson (1987, 251) reproduce a photograph from the 1930s, n the days when pearlshells irst entered the Highlands n number, n whch men shoulder dozens of shells n specal netbags, not unlke the carryng bags of women (the same term s used of womb). These were bags n whch women put the products of ther creatvty — food for pgs and food for ther famles — contanng thereby what would shortly come outsde for others to consume (Fg. 11.3). Incorporation and inscription

Whether we address the person or the body, we mght want to ask just what s nsde and what s outsde. Or perhaps one should be askng what the personiication of artefacts (the house as a body, the shell as a fetus) does to the dea of thngs beng external at all. In what sense are tems external f they are also caught up n the network of relatons whch bnd people to one another? If the shell you have s mne because you owe t to me, n whose body does t resde, and n what sense s t external to ether of us? Such ‘Hagen’ questons, and the analoges they presuppose, recall Thomas’ (ths volume) reference to connerton’s ( 1 9 8 9 ) a rg u m e n t s o n memory. On the face of t, connerton’s contrast between ‘nscrbng’ and ‘ncorporatng’ practces resonates wth that between the external storage of nformaton as opposed to an nternal one. Inscrbng practce he sees as exemplfed n devces for storng and retrevng communcatons — he mentons encyclopaedas, tapes, computers — that all have the characterstc of lteracy tself; t ‘traps Figure 11.3. Carrying bags. A girl returns from the gardens with sweet potatoes in one and holds nformaton, netbag and vines and leaves in the other. Mt Hagen, 1964. (Photograph by author.) long after the human organsm has stopped 140

Socal Relatons and the Idea of Externalty

performng’ (1989, 73).13 Incorporatng practces, on the other hand, are gestures that requre the presence of bodes to perform them. Protocols of posture or habts of eatng may convey nformaton, but cannot be done outsde the context of the performance. Ths does not mean to say that they have no lastng effect. On the contrary, hs thess s that even n socetes whose practces are domnated by nscrbng techniques we ind a continuity of bodily habit, informaton transmtted from one person to another over tme. The socal dynamc wth whch he s concerned, then, s transmsson and the duraton of memory, so that ancent practces are projected nto the future not just through the records that people leave behnd but through ther bodly routnes. Thus memory may be passed on n non-textual and (he adds) non-cogntve ways (1989, 102–3). Now ths s the pont at whch connerton both prases anthropology for attendng to performance and castgates anthropology for beng nterested n the momentary communcatons of the present rather than seeng the performatve potental for the storage of memory of past practces, and thus of nformaton about them. In attendng to the present, the anthropologst s of course attendng to the pasts and futures that people encapsulate (n the present) for themselves. We mght say that the performance of ceremonal exchange, or brdewealth, s at once an ncorporatng practce, replete wth gestures carred out by human bodes/persons, ncludng communcaton through the artefacts they transfer from one to another, and an nscrbng practce, nsofar as persons/bodes hold nformaton about prevous states of affars that they can ndcate wthout re-enactng. Prevous roles that people occuped, as we mght say a recpent was once a donor, or the antcpaton of an outcome, as one mght say that a clan n handng over a young grl s also handng over a mother wth the potental to have a chld, comprse nformaton held over from other tmes and places. It comes from prevous performances when the actors occuped dfferent postons, or from the projecton of absent people’s performances onto those present. So what the present body enacts s less an ncorporatng repetton of a former state of affars than a transformaton of them, a mmess that works through nvertng or evertng a prevous poston. Instead of magnng persons/bodes (‘mnds’) as embedded n a ‘culture’, Melanesans (not just Hageners) magne them as embedded n other persons/bodes. As artefacts for one another, they are processng enttes of a sort. The socal dynamc s not that of personal memory holdng everythng

one needs to know, to be used when the occason arses n order to repeat past experences or summon former knowledge. Rather, the socal dynamc s that of persons n relatonshps where one body elcts thngs from another, and where one body can only brng forth n the presence of the other. A mutual hstory s contaned ‘between’ them. It allows, at least n the exaggerated form presupposed by exchange relatonshps, that each person can antcpate beng n the poston of the other. As we have seen, ths s an nterdependence whch requres that persons do not merge but reman (socally) external to one another. Here the dea of externalty sustans the possblty of relatonshp as such. Let me produce my own mmess. What do we substtute for ‘culture’? Rather than sayng that already exstng thngs are ncsed wth cultural value (nscrpton), or that the body takes culture wthn tself n ts habts and postures (ncorporaton), we may say that persons create effects as at once external and nternal to themselves. That becomes evdent when t s ther relatonshps whch they wsh to reproduce. People do not have to re-enact speciic events when past events are subsumed under (objectiied in) relationships. But they do, so to speak, have to re-enact the relatonshps themselves. Reiteration In hs exploraton of Technologies of Choice, Lemonner (1993a,b, 22) remarks on the puzzle of techncal nventon. The ssue he has n mnd s how s t that people perceive a suficient gap in what they have to hand to want to plug t. If a system works, how can that conceptual gap arse? How can one conceve of somethng one does not have? Hs nterest then becomes why some techncal practces get chosen over others. One answer s already contaned n Latour’s contrbuton to Lemonner’s volume: ths s a false model of the relatonshp of language to other cogntve processes, even as questons about cultural elaboraton are a false model of the relatonshp of (useful) artefact to (ornamental) object (1993, 378). If Euro-Americans tend to see the pig irst as an animal (one of hs examples) and then as an tem of cultural value, they arrve at nscrpton as the archetypal ‘cultural’ actvty. Latour develops hs counter-model of quas-objects as technque and socalty enfolded nseparably together.14 The anthropologst should be no less adept than hs or her nformants at takng on other perspectves. If we were to start wth the Hagen vew, we mght well wsh to ask about quaspersons: persons have relatonshps enfolded wthn ther bodes,15 smultaneously external and nternal 141

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to themselves. Now f Lemonner’s queston were also about nformaton (f people are already n communcaton, why should they wsh to add anythng?), would ths also contrbute to an answer? It s no new observaton to say that nformaton may be produced as a by-product of other activities (see the discussion on language in Goody 1995). Ths may be true even when nducng states of knowledge seems part of the actors’ ntentons. Observers of ntaton rtuals from Rchards (1956) onwards have noted that boys and grls are ‘taught’ what they already appear to know; there seems no fresh nformaton as such to be ganed Take the Wahpeton Dakota vllage (Spector 1993) and the archaeologist’s reconstruction of a girls’ irst menses: a grl who already knew how to qull was submtted to four ntensve days of nothng but qullng n order to make her ‘good wth the awl’ (1993, 38). Spector nterprets ths celebraton of the grl’s future doman

of accomplshment (the future woman would have her achevements at robe or tent makng nscrbed on the laps of the Council tipi (1993, 37)) in terms of the signiicance accorded the artefact, the awl. We may add that t s also the nstllng of a bodly routne. Far from nformaton beng mparted nto her, t seems that the four days nstead demonstrated the capactes that could be drawn from her. But why dd t have to be reterated? D’Errico (this volume) refers to the signiicance of the accumulaton of notches on bone and other artefacts. He argues that carvng a new notch on a tally stck wthout alterng the prevous record deploys a temporal but not necessarly a spatal or morphologcal code, though these are found n combnaton n other contexts. If we attend to the socal activity of Dakota notchng, we may learn somethng further agan. Someone who has spent hours borng holes n hde then makes a sngle, though unperced, hollow n the bone handle of the tool wth whch she s makng those holes. Perhaps the one notch stands for the completed artefact; but perhaps the acton of makng the notch also stands for the countless hand movements and uses of the tool wth whch she brought other artefacts to completon. (Note that the tool has so to speak changed poston: t has become the recpent of the borng process rather the nstrument of t.) Of course the Dakota used qute dfferent talles as well (e.g. stcks), just as Hagen men n the past used talles for the number of ‘hands’ of shells they had gven to others.16 Indeed, as Spector surmses, we mght wonder f the tool was not also an ornament, an extenson of the body also recevng an mpresson upon t. (She uses the term ‘nscrbe’ to descrbe the impression that inding the awl made on her own mnd (1993, 34) and she no doubt wshes to brng to mnd the nscrbed mpressons on the awl handle tself.) The Hagen tally, demonstratng the prowess n dssemnatng the wealth the (male) wearer had attracted, was made to be worn on the chest (Fg. 11.4). When t came to a ceremonal occason, a man mght ether wear hs own tally or else gve t to a brother or son to wear, or even dvde t up: there was no confuson over nformaton created by such actons, for no-one would reckon the status of a man by hs tally alone. People were openly agnostc n Hagen, as elsewhere n Melanesa, about what could be nferred from external markers; one never knew what revelatons also concealed. But apart from that, reputaton depended on the conigurations of the present, and past explots were only a partal ponter to t; n

Figure 11.4. Tally made of bamboo slats, recording exchange transactions, worn here by someone decorated for an accompanying dance. Mt Hagen, 1967. (Photograph by author.) 142

Socal Relatons and the Idea of Externalty

of openness and closure (to tself and to others).18 But f dfferent tmes (such as tmes of the day or ponts n an exchange cycle) and space (such as the centre or perphery of a vllage or ceremonal ground) provde measures for dfferent socal states, then t means that persons are also perceved as constantly lable to dfferentaton — when they act and where they move takes on a signiication to which they have to respond. As f to emphasze that there s no escape from havng to respond, the Melanesans I have been describing here ind a further analogue in the body’s mode of processng materals, the un-avodable relatonshp between ngestng and egestng. Ths teraton s not mere repetton.19 The body s held n a state of anmaton through what t takes n and gves out. The ablty to repeat actons n other regsters, to conceptualze concepts n ths sense, n turn enacts the replenshment of energy.20 I repeat the pont that renewal of energy or capacity is not conined to the repetton of the same tasks (replcaton) but can be equally well effected n the ablty to transform one task, or relatonshp, nto another (reproducton). Mekeo underlne that pont for us. Let us look at the plan agan (Fg. 11.1). The conceptual algnments and separatons mpose a bodly regmen on the occupants; ndeed the vllage s tself a knd of body. I sad that there were constant transfers of produce from the bush nto the vllage, and return of refuse to the bush. Ths s not an undirected coming and going but a low of substance conceptualzed as though t were coursng through the human frame. Observe the empty space n the centre, used for feastng and occasons when guests are taken nto the vllage. Mekeo do not conceve of ths as the centre of a centre or as the nmost part of the nsde. On the contrary, they cannot do so because we know that the vllage as such s already an ‘outsde’ place n relaton to the surroundng bush. But the same relatonshp between bush and vllage s repeated n the relatonshp of the perphery of the vllage where the houses are and the empty plaza n the centre: the centre s an inside of a kind. Given that the village as a whole s an ‘outsde’ place, t s the outsde’s nsde, and Mosko uses the phrase ‘nverted outsde’. Smlarly n relaton to the nsde bush: the bush mmedately adjacent to the vllage s dstngushed from the more remote bush as a knd of everted regon, an ‘everted nsde’. The Englsh language phrasng s awkward; the conceptual space as t s lved by the Mekeo can be smply re-rendered as movement. Every day follows a smlar course. Food s brought from the remote bush to the vllage, not

any case, to dstrbute hs sgns of achevement among close kn was apt for a man who depended on support for success. Explots could not, then, smply be ‘added’ to explots. Rather, each gvng away of shells ndcated the tremendous effort acqured afresh on each occason to assemble and dstrbute, as each pushng of the awl through the hde requred new effort. The exchange tally was a sgn of the repeatedly summoned energy by whch the wearer brought off yet agan a grand gft. In other words, the number of occasons made a long tally awesome precsely as evdence of someone able agan and agan to draw out of hmself the capacty to dspense wealth, a knd of nsstent rehearsal of actvty or energy, as though teratve endeavour had a vrtue of ts own. In ths mmetc re-presentaton of past actons, people represent the very ablty to act, and that n turn may have ‘nformatonal’ content of a knd. What has to be learnt afresh s that t s only by (fresh) socal acton that the conceptual unverse s kept n place. In the oral and poltcally uncentralzed regmes of the knd I have been descrbng n ths chapter, where persons deploy others as sgns for ther own states of beng, orentng themselves to artefacts lke themselves, constant repostonng becomes both condton and outcome.17 It takes effort to keep socal dstnctons n moton. In communcatng nformaton about the results of those efforts, people stmulate themselves to further effort. As a consequence, postons are made anew. We mght say that socal mmess thus creates the possblty of ‘nformaton’ as new knowledge. certanly, t s overt cultural dogma n a place such as Hagen that relatonshps wll wther away unless they are kept n a state of actvaton. Movement I have been drawng on the exaggerated attenton that certan modern peoples pay to the recursve and elctory character of socal relatonshps. Ther models are suggestve about what both mmess and analogy can ental n human nteractons. Whereas a fence can keep the dstncton between nsde and outsde precsely because t s bult n one place, for that s all t does, when persons becomes sgns for what s nternal and external to themselves, movement may be requred to keep the very dstncton n place. Persons present themselves to others n terms of what they have closed off or, on the contrary, what they can draw out of themselves. Ths s communcated by movement through tme and space, so that the body appears n varyng states 143

Marlyn Strathern

to the centre but to the perpheral dwellng houses where n the evenng t s cooked and eaten. Ths brngng of food nto the vllage s complemented by a scrupulously observed regmen of waste dsposal. A rule speciies the place of excretion. Early morning each vllager makes hs or her way to the bush, not the remote bush but the perpheral bush just over the fence, to empty ther abdomens. When they return they clean up the vllage, sweepng all the refuse and leavngs nto the central plaza. The rubbsh s pled up n the centre, before beng carred to the edge of the vllage and dumped where human bengs have also evacuated. The abdomen of the vllage s thus cleaned out too. Indeed the central plaza s called just ths: ‘vllage abdomen’. Now the vllage centre or body cavty s not n any smple sense an nternal place. If, n the Englsh senses of nsde and outsde, you thnk of the almentary tract through the body as takng n food from the outsde and returnng t to the outsde, one could thnk of those nner chambers as exposed to the outsde world, as though t were the person’s outsde wthn. In Mekeo terms, the waste that collects n the abdomnal cavty s already outsde the person, as though t had been already swept there, and must be taken from ths ‘outsde’ to ‘nsde’ the bush: ‘the abdomen of a human beng s homologously conceved as nsde the body only nsofar as t s an nverson of space outsde the body’ (Mosko 1985, 27). The abdomen s thus smultaneously an nsde and an outsde place, as the vllage abdomen makes evdent. As we have seen, Mekeo always sweep refuse here before removng the stuff to dump over the fence. So rubbsh s swept ‘nto’ an area thereby demarcated off from the rest of the vllage, whle as part of the vllage t otherwse remans an ‘outsde’ place. Waste s separated from produce wthn the vllage, even as the source of produce n the (remote) bush s separated from the place (adjacent bush) where waste s deposted. ‘By vrtue of the daly transfers of objects between vllage and bush,’ wrtes Mosko (1985, 25), ‘outsde and nsde domans are bsected by a reversal or nverson of each, such that the outsde vllage has ts own nsde place (.e. an nverted outsde) and the nsde bush has ts own outsde (.e. an everted nsde).’ In sum, the vllage abdomen s an nverson of an ‘outsde’ (vllage) space, whle the area over the fence s correspondngly an everson of an ‘nsde’ (bush) space. Food and materals collected from the bush and gardens and processed wthn the vllage thus travel n human eyes from nsde to outside and then, in inally being evacuated, from an nverted outsde to an everted nsde.

Needless to say, ths daly routne s only the begnnng of the conceptual operatons Mekeo perform on ther own thoughts. For nstance, the whole system s bsected by what appears above ground and what appears below ground, and there are varous rules about what holes can be dug n the ground where, ncludng rules about the bural of bodes. The plan s also n effect a multdmensonal grd that drects not just the daly actvty of food and waste producton but the conduct of ceremony (n feasts and mortuary rtes and so forth), the manpulaton of supernatural powers, and the relatonshp of persons to one another. Indeed, one may argue t s a presentaton of a basc conceptual schema that reles crucally on the recursve operaton of relatons on relatons. The terated behavoural routne of persons movng between bush and vllage, n the collecton of resources and dsposal of waste, recalls whole sets of analoges. A regular recaptulaton, then, of the movement of tems between vllage and bush s gven longterm spatal presence n the permanent layout of Mekeo houses and plaza. Hagen people enact smlar movement n a qute dfferent temporal trajectory. In dwellng on a partcularly publc set of practces (ceremonal exchange), I have suggested that behnd the change of perspectves entaled by the smple alternaton of donors and recpents n relaton to each other les a socal dynamc of elctaton: a world n whch capacty s predcated on the ablty of persons to draw that very capacty out of one another. What les wthn s potentally external precsely because t can be taken nsde by someone socally external to oneself. In men’s recprocal exchange, the external other actually takes one’s externalzed nsde nto hs own inside. The artefacts that low between them carry this movement: whether they low towards one or away from one wll ndcate the current socal axs of the relatonshp. In Hagen the movement tself takes place over a span of years.21 However, the long-term temporal sequencng between the occasons on whch donors and recpents swtch places s re-enacted spatally n the bref dsplay on the ceremonal ground. The re-enactment s to great vsual effect, for the handng over s ordnarly staged n front of the house that has both taken n and gves forth valuables. *

*

*

There is a inal observation to extract from the way in whch certan Melanesan peoples combne varous analogies to communicate the actors’ effects or inlu144

Socal Relatons and the Idea of Externalty

ence on one another. And that s that they furnsh themselves wth a calculus for those effects; ths s how one could descrbe the tally of shell gfts worn n the past by Hagen men. There s a corollary to ths observaton. An analogc calculus wll requre constant socal work to keep ts measurng capacty n place. Each dstncton requres more dstnctons to sustan t. Men from the Trobrand Islands at present lvng n the captal, Port Moresby, make dsplays of ther urban harvest n mtaton of the harvest compettons people hold at home; Battagla (1995) descrbes one such event that took place n 1985. They bult, as people do at home, mounds of yams n the shape of a cone. The cone has to be composed n one go, a manoeuvre which requires a ine judgement of dmensons and n partcular of the sze of the base to start wth.22 The bulder must project the correct dmensons for the base from the number, szes and shapes of yams, to make a stable and well-shaped stack from them. The whole dsplay would be a test of the gardener’s capacty to turn hs effort to effect n ts mpact on others.23 Ths effect requres a temporal dvson nto past and present, the past beng brought nto the present as somethng formerly hdden and now revealed. By vrtue of havng happened already, the completed actvty beng celebrated s thus categorzed as off-stage (hdden), and what happens off-stage s growth (cf. Bersack 1982). But once the growng s complete and the yams ready for collectng, the transformed labour and sol become a vsble aesthetc object of people’s relatons wth one another. The two states (concealment and revelaton) are thus kept dstnct from one another through accompanyng dstnctons of past/present, growth/cessaton of growth, and so forth. On ths occason, however, Battagla was made aware of a problem for the cty dwellers. Unable to make these cones of yams next to ther gardens, and havng to transport the yams n pckup trucks across the cty — nstead of beng mmedately amassed as they emerged from the ground they were ndvdually wrapped to prevent damage n transt — gardeners fell under suspcon for surrepttously addng tubers from other sources. They were thought to be secretly combnng ther own wth other people’s. As a result, ‘dsplays were growng at a tme when growth ought to have ceased’ (Battagla 1995, 85). The dstncton between growth and dsplay could not be held stable by all the other temporal and spatal markers — and, accordngly, rased questons about how to measure the accomplshments beng clamed.

notes 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

13.

14.

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The so-called ‘Bush Mekeo’; I draw prncpally on Mark Mosko’s (1985) orgnal ethnography referrng to the 1970s. Double quotaton marks ndcate vernacular phrases. A term for a dscourse derved largely from twenteth-century North Amercan and Northern European cultures to whch the language of analyss (such as the one n whch ths chapter s wrtten) belongs. Mekeo were composed of two mutually hostle poltcal unts (‘trbes’), at war wth one another; each of the tribes was endogamous. Population igures were tiny (583 and 1258 respectvely n 1970) (Mosko 1985, 15). Whle I follow Mosko’s account closely n many places, the observatons on perspectve are mne. I smplfy an nterlockng set of analoges. The relatonshp of one’s own clan to one’s spouse’s clan, or of blood kn to non-blood kn, s analogous to that of nsde to outsde, whle the relatonshp between the clans of one’s mother and spouse’s mother s analogous to that between nverted outsde and everted nsde (see below) (e.g. 1985, 144). The range over whch these analogues are repeated forms the subject of Mosko’s book. Kinship and the Social Order (1969) brngs ths and the next example together. The materal wll be famlar to many readers. Relevant to the present account are A. Strathern 1971; A. & M. Strathern 1971; M. Strathern 1979; 1987; 1988. I refer to events as they were irst recorded in the 1960s and 1970s, when the combned populaton of two related dalect areas was some 80,000. One may thnk of ‘artefacts’ as materal tems such as valuables lowing against the low of persons, as n compensaton payments for bodly njury or loss. But we may compress the analogy (between lows of persons/artefacts) and also thnk of the one n terms of the other, e.g. persons as artefacts. Not universal in Papua New Guinea by any means. Some of the controversy is adumbrated in Godelier & Strathern 1991. Readers wll have nferred that I am descrbng arrangements n whch men have more stake than women. For a recent general statement, see carsten & HughJones 1995. Most notably the Sepk rver regon where much play s made (for nstance) of boy ntates enterng houses that are smultaneously male and female n structure, and emerging forth in altered state. Gender distinctons comprse another set of conceptual supports. I antcpate/borrow Mosko’s termnology here, although the Hagen coniguration is by no means drectly mappable onto that of Mekeo. E.g. ‘By substtutng a vsual record for an acoustc one, the alphabet frees a socety from the constrants of a rhythmc mnemoncs’ (1989, 76). He has a wonderful passage (1993, 380) about the nsoucance wth whch we dentfy ‘more [a hgher

Marlyn Strathern

15. 16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

carsten, J. & S. Hugh-Jones (eds.), 1995. About the House: Lévi-Strauss and Beyond. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. connerton, P., 1989. How Societies Remember. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. connolly, B. & R. Anderson, 1987. First Contact: New Guinea’s Highlanders Encounter the Outside World. Harmondsworth: vkng Pengun. Deleuze, G., 1994 [1968]. Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton. London: The Athlone Press. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Donald, M., 1993. Homnd enculturaton and cogntve evoluton. Archaeological Review from Cambridge 12, 5–24. Fortes, M., 1969. Kinship and the Social Order: the Legacy of Lewis Henry Morgan. chcago (IL): chcago Unversty Press. Gillison, G., 1993. Between Culture and Fantasy: a New Guinea Highlands Mythology. chcago (IL): chcago Unversty Press. Godelier, M. & M. Strathern (eds.), 1991. Big Men and Great Men: Personiications of Power in Melanesia. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Goody, E.N. (ed.), 1995. Social Intelligence and Interaction: Expressions and Implications of the Social Bias in Human Intelligence. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Kelly, R., 1993. Constructing Inequality: the Fabrication of a Hierarchy of Virtue Among the Etoro. Ann Arbor (MI): Unversty of Mchgan Press. Latour, B., 1993. The ethnography of a ‘hgh-tech’ case, n Lemonner (ed.), 372–98. Lemonner, P., 1993a. Pgs as ordnary wealth: techncal logic, exchange and leadership in New Guinea, in Lemonner (ed.), 126–56. Lemonner, P. (ed.), 1993b. Technological Choices: Transformation in Material Cultures Since the Neolithic. London: Routledge. Mosko, M., 1983. concepton, de-concepton and socal structure n Bush Mekeo culture, n Concepts of Conception, ed. D. Jorgensen. Mankind specal ssue 14, 24–32. Mosko, M., 1985. Quadripartite Structures: Categories, Relations and Homologies in Bush Mekeo Culture. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Mosko, M., 1991. Great men and total systems: North Mekeo heredtary authorty and socal reproducton, n Godelier & Strathern (eds.), 97–114. Munn, N., 1986. The Fame of Gawa: a Symbolic Study of Value Transformation in a Massim Society. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Rchards, A., 1956. Chisungu: a Girl’s Puberty Ceremony. London: Faber. Spector, J., 1993. What This Awl Means: Feminist Archeology at a Wahpeton Dakota Village. St Paul: Mnnesota Hstorcal Socety Press. Strathern, A., 1971. The Rope of Moka: Big Men and Ceremonial Exchange in Mt Hagen, New Guinea. cambrdge:

level of] socety’ wth ‘more technology’. (Euro-American deinition of human society becomes the more certan the more we can dentty the enlstment of non-humans — tools, artefacts, plants — n people’s nteractons.) On quas-persons see Wagner 1991. As n the case of a Dakota notch for each set of 10 hdes, or tent, whch a woman worked, so each small Hagen slat of bamboo recorded a set of 8 (or 10, a superor 8) shells gven. Melanesansts wll recognze an alluson here to analogic kinship (Wagner 1977; Gillison 1993). The most salent dstnctons have to be the most actvely sustaned. Mekeo have developed this to a ine art (see Mosko 1983; 1991). But then nor s repetton (Deleuze 1994). cf. Donald’s (1993, 13) comment that human bengs n effect start from a new base lne wth each generaton. The Melanesan materal descrbes a world where people do not just relect on their activities but are relexive about them, able to swtch perspectve, to antcpate outcomes and see the past as versons or transpostons of the present. The recall cues (cf. Mthen ths volume) nclude the changng socal postons that people take on one another. Though the Hagen movement s n turn foreshortened, speeded up one mght say, by contrast wth cycles that unfold over generatons, as s true for nstance of Etoro (cf. Kelly 1993). It s the sze of the base whch s measured (by a pece of strng) n the competton between gardeners. Beng able to complete the buldng n one go s a mark of aesthetc power also demonstrated n the carvng of canoe prows. Size and quantity are signiicant dimensions. ‘Yams . . . as much grow ther subjects [the gardener] as the other way round. Gardeners trade on their ability to embody supplementaton, ncorporatng others n exchanges that expand ther own poltcal parameters’ (Battagla 1995, 80).

Marilyn Strathern Department of Social Anthropology University of Cambridge Cambridge CB2 3RF References Battagla, D., 1995. On practcal nostalga: self-prospectng among urban Trobranders, n Rhetorics of Self-Making, ed. D. Battagla. Berkeley (cA): Unversty of calforna Press, 77–96. Biersack, A., 1982. Ginger gardens for the ginger woman: rtes and passages n a Melanesan socety. Man 17, 239–58.

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ley (cA): calforna Unversty Press. Strathern, A. & M. Strathern, 1971. Self-decoration in Mount Hagen. London: Duckworth. Wagner, R., 1977. Analogc knshp: a Darb example. American Ethnologies 4, 623–42. Wagner, R., 1986. Asiwinarong: Ethos, Image, and Social Power Among the Usen Barok of New Ireland. Prnceton (NJ): Prnceton Unversty Press. Wagner, R., 1991. The fractal person, in Godelier & Strathern (eds.), 159–73.

cambrdge Unversty Press. Strathern, M., 1979. The self n self-decoraton. Oceania 49, 241–57. Strathern, M., 1987. Producng dfference: connectons and disconnections in two New Guinea Highland kinshp systems, n Gender and Kinship: Essays Towards a Uniied Analysis, eds. J.F. Collier & S. Yanagisako. Stanford (cA): Stanford Unversty Press, 271–300. Strathern, M., 1988. The Gender of the Gift: Problems with Women and Problems with Society in Melanesia. Berke-

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Problems wth the Noton of External Symbolc Storage

Chapter 12 some Problems with the notion of external symbolic storage, and the Case of neolithic Material Culture in Britain Julan Thomas This chapter offers a critical review of the notion of external symbolic storage from the point of view of contemporary philosophy. It is argued that the concept of external memory representation relies upon the Cartesian division between the mental and the material, and present human knowledge as being composed of atomized bits of information which are gathered from the environment before being ‘downloaded’. In contrast, I present a view of thinking and signiication as engaged, worldly, and relational. In these terms the epochal changes in material culture which characterized the beginning of the Neolithic period in Britain can be understood as a ‘technology of meaning’ which enabled meaningful worlds to be created through social performance.

In

the source of cultural dynamcs wthn a sphere of nternalzed cogntve norms. Both of these approaches see the man thrust of human development takng place wthn the mnd, and consequently render material things in the external world as pallid relections of processes whch happen elsewhere. In Bnford’s terms, the dsadvantage of such a perspectve s that (short of ndulgng n some form of ‘palaeopsychology’, gettng nsde the mnds of long-dead people) t places cultural dynamcs beyond the range of archaeologcal analyss, and reduces the study of materal culture to a descrptve exercse. Ths demoton of archaeology to the nvestgaton of the outcomes of psychologcal events s worryng enough n tself. But t s perhaps a more signiicant charge that much of cognitive psychology s mplcated n a modernst humansm whch contnues to obscure the character of materalty. I wll argue that forms of modernst thought whch irst became a coherent system in the work of René Descartes tend to be mplct n cogntvst accounts of human hstory. For ths reason, I wll suggest that the noton of symbolc storage actually does damage to our apprecaton of materal thngs. Ths paper

addressng the noton of external symbolc storage, the present volume encourages us to consider the role of material culture in signiication and memory. From an archaeologcal pont of vew, ths can only be a postve drecton to follow. However, the ssue also opens up a large area of dsagreement between cogntve psychology and some forms of contemporary phlosophy. In ths contrbuton, I should lke to draw attenton to ths dsagreement, because t arguably has fundamental consequences for the way n whch archaeologsts conceve of materal culture. Put smply, my concern s that the concept of external symbolc storage derves from a framework whch constructs ‘the cogntve’ as a sphere of development whch s separate from, and n some senses anteror to, the materal world and the socal. In assertng that what makes us human emerges n the nteror space of the mnd, and s only later turned outward to encompass materal thngs, t relegates materal culture to the status of a product or repostory of mental actvty. In an nterestng way, ths echoes the culture-hstorcal archaeology of the md-twenteth century, whch was roundly crtczed by Lews Bnford (1965; 1972) for locatng 149

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wll propose an alternatve understandng of the material world, and briely outline its archaeological mplcatons n the context of the materal culture of Neolthc Brtan.

and stored n that external world. Ths concepton of the mnd as an nformaton-processng devce has a long and honourable hstory n western thought, but I should lke to ndcate some ways n whch t mght be seen as unsatsfactory. Frstly, computatonal models of conscousness generally nvolve objects whch exst n the outsde world beng re-presented nsde the mnd as mages. Ths seems to be the case, for nstance, n Donald’s evocaton of Baddeley’s trpartte model of human memory structure, composed of a ‘sketchpad’, an ‘artculatory loop’ and an ‘executve’ (Donald 1993, 747). Each of these dfferent aspects of the memory functon must physcally exst somewhere, and t s dificult to evade the implication that the ‘sketchpad’ at least exsts lodged nsde the head. Such a concepton tends nevtably to establsh a dvson between a realm of thngs and a realm of absolute conscousness. Worldly objects and the mnd that thnks about them are then utterly separate. Ths dstncton was followed n dfferent ways by both Descartes and Edmund Husserl, but n ether case t formed the bass for what was presumed to be an exact scence of conscousness, whch bracketed out the materal world (Maron 1996, 74). Wth both the cartesan cogito and Husserl’s ego we have a pure beng operatng n a realm of essences, where experences take place whch are more fundamental or pure than those avalable n the materal world. Worldly experence s predcated upon more prmordal mental actvtes, and for ths reason Husserl’s phenomenology sought to reduce human experence to a seres of archetypal mental events. For Descartes, the mnd s a knd of matter (res cogitans) whose deining attribute (thinkng) dvdes t categorcally from all materal thngs. By begnnng wth the queston of how a thnkng mnd can come to know the thngs of the world, tradtons of nqury whch have followed Descartes have developed a concepton of materalty whch s essentally negatve. computatonal models rely upon what we mght call an ‘ontology of the occurrent’. That s, they tend to vew materal thngs as unproblematc, because they are smply ‘there’, n the envronment. The way that a thng outwardly appears to us gves us drect access to ts fundamental character, so that to experence a thng s to gan objectve knowledge of t: ths s the foundaton of emprcsm. In the speciic case of Descartes, it is this objective character of worldly thngs whch s consdered to be of primary signiicance: the way in which they can be grasped by conscousness, and descrbed by mathematcs. The dstngushng attrbute of materal

Minds and things As a number of contrbutors to ths volume ndcate, Merln Donald’s book Origins of the Modern Mind (1991) ntroduces the theme of external memory wthn a broader theory of human cogntve evolution. This identiies three successive transformations of the human mnd. Each of these transformatons s concerned wth new systems of memory representaton, but only the thrd nvolves forms of memory storage and retreval whch are external to the person. Donald prncpally assocates ths development wth the forms of notaton found n several early state socetes, but as contrbutors to ths volume demonstrate, the concept of external symbolc storage can readly be appled to other knds of materal culture n non-lterate socetes. Whle earler humans had depended upon the nformaton-storage capabltes of ther own mnds, we ourselves now exst n an ‘nformaton space’ n whch the objects whch surround us take on the secondary characterstc of consttutng memory representatons. These ‘can externally program the user’s bran, that s, create speciic states of knowledge that were intended by the creator of the partcular external devce on dsplay’ (Donald 1993, 747). In other words, thngs are irst of all things, and then latterly have the capacty to encode nformaton added to them, n much the way that an external hard dsk attached to a computer s prmarly an object, whch has the attrbute of beng able to encode nformaton as a strng of ones and noughts. Indeed, Donald’s account makes much use of the language of artiicial ntellgence and nformaton-processng, and he descrbes the emergence of exographc storage as ‘a hardware change just as real as the bologcal hardware changes that mediated the irst two transitions’ (Donald 1993, 745; my emphass). Ths pont of vew seems to me to rely upon what charles Taylor descrbes as an ‘atomst-computatonal’ vew of mental functonng, whch, he says, ‘offers us the pcture of an agent who n percevng the world takes n “bts” of nformaton from hs or her surroundngs and then “processes” them n some fashon, n order to emerge wth the “pcture” of the world he or she has’ (Taylor 1993, 319). The varaton whch Donald offers s that, after beng processed, bts of nformaton are externalzed 150

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things for Descartes is their extension to ill up space (cottngham 1992, 239). Thus conceved, objects are constantly presented to conscousness (the matter that thnks) n an unvaryng manner. They contnuously make available a inite range of information, whch the mnd can ngest n an atomstc manner, and then express verbally or represent vsually. As Taylor argues (1992, 322), ths objectve character of thngs s taken as the ground for an mperatve towards objectvty of observaton, where any dstorton or bas s to be avoded. The deal perspectve thus comes to be one whch s dstant and dsengaged, and any degree of nvolvement wth the observed object s consdered to compromse the perfect transfer of nformaton. By the same token, the ratonal and dsengaged processng of nformaton s presented as the paradgm of what the mnd does under deal crcumstances. For Descartes, reason s the proper and unencumbered use of the mnd (Taylor 1992, 320). So deally the dstncton between object and subject s absolute.

ind themselves enmeshed in a complex web of relatonshps (Ingold 1995). It s the character of human nvolvement n these relatonshps whch s at ssue, and ths s at most ndrectly connected wth the bologcal consttuton of human bengs. What s unque about humans s the way n whch other creatures are ‘there for’ them, or are dsclosed to them (Olafson 1993, 100). Ths s not an attrbute of the mnd, but an aspect of the fundamental relatonalty of humans as lngustc or sgnfyng bengs. We have seen that a computatonal vew of the mnd requres that the ndvdual takes n bts of nformaton from the objects n ts envronment, and processes them. Ths mples a cartesan world composed of dscrete geometrcal enttes. When we conceptualze, categorze and talk about the thngs that surround us, however, we are dong somethng rather dfferent from what other anmals are dong when they negotate ther world. We atomze and objectfy enttes, effectvely severng them from ther context. Thngs do not contnually exst n a mode where they represent raw unts of thematc nformaton: they have to be made to become objects. That s, they have to disclose themselves, to be ‘made present’, by standng out from the background and beng released from ther relatonal context. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of this objectiication of worldly thngs s that t enables them to be rendered as lngustc objects: they can be named. Ths qualty of allowng thngs to show up s what Martn Hedegger referred to as ‘the clearng’: not somethng whch s contaned n any one beng, but a space of disclosure constituted by signiication and by care (Hedegger 1971a, 53). Thngs reveal themselves in a ield which is not the creation of any one person, but whch exsts n the way that language exsts, over and above the human subject (Taylor 1992, 259). Human bengs are sngled out by the way n whch they care; by the way n whch ther own Beng s an ssue for them (Hedegger 1962). Ths, n turn, s a consequence of the fundamentally temporal character of human exstence: humans have a past whch they draw on n order to understand themselves, they exst alongsde others n the present, and they project themselves forward nto an antcpated future. carng, human bengs cannot be ambvalent to thngs, or regard thngs equally, once they are recognized as deinable entites. Some thngs affect them, or are mportant to ther projects, or are useful to them, and wth these thngs they may establsh a closeness, whch s not merely geometrcal (Hedegger 1971b, 166). So some

Mind and world As an alternatve to the vews whch I have just sought to characterze, t could be proposed that materal objects and thnkng subjects are not gvens. Instead, they have to be brought nto beng (e.g. Strathern 1991). Mnd, body and world are not ontologcally dstnct spheres: they are categores whch people have created, and whch often serve to lead us to msunderstand ourselves. Thnkng s not somethng whch takes place n a separate space called the mnd: t s a means of engagement n the world, and t would not be possble f we dd not already exst n a materal world, alongsde other bengs. yet very often human bengs presume themselves to be free-standng and self-contaned ‘ndvduals’, possessng a rch nternal world whch confronts physcal realty from a dstance, and renders t meanngful. Fundamental to ths argument s the queston of exactly what t s that dstngushes us as humans. cogntve evolutonsm seems to mply that our present socal and cultural condton s the outcome of the developng processng power of the mnd, presumably under partcular selectve condtons. I suggest the opposite: that the deining characteristic of humanty s not the hardware wthn, but the relatonshps between persons. Ths s not so straghtforward as to clam that human bengs have socal relatonshps and other anmals do not — there are strong arguments to be made that all anmate bengs 151

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thngs stand out from the background of undfferentated worldhood because we care about them. Importantly, people can comport themselves towards thngs n a number of dfferent ways: regardng enttes as free-standng objects s only one of the possbltes. Sometmes, thngs are merely present n our surroundngs, submerged n the background, whle at other tmes they are taken up and used as thngs-for a partcular task (Dreyfus 1991, 60). Our conceptual distance from them ebbs and lows, and the character of our understandng of them changes. When we use a thng successfully for carryng out some actvty, t can slp away from our notce, as we concentrate on the task tself. In these activities, it is dificult to separate out some component of what we are dong as a mental representaton of a physcal actvty. The more we succeed n our efforts, the less the thngs nvolved are thematzed as alenated objects. They recede once more nto the background, and our relatonshp to them ceases to have much to do wth the representaton of an object (Hedegger 1971b, 167). Thought and practce are here one and the same thng, smply a sklled copng wth the world. Now, all ths suggests that the condton n whch a materal thng becomes lterally an ‘object of thought’, dstngushed from ts context or background, s not merely dscontnuous, t s actually out of the ordnary. So sometmes we ‘thnk about’ thngs, but more often we just ‘get on wth them’. In ths latter state, thngs may not be alenated objects, but they do stll form an ntegral part of our world. Here the word ‘world’ s used nether to mean a partcular planet, nor a gatherng of materal thngs, but a structure of intelligibility. The world n whch we as human bengs effectvely operate s not a collecton of objectvely exstng geometrcal forms, t s characterzed by the totalty of our nvolvements, and the way n whch thngs are relevant to us (Dreyfus 1991, 91). Our world s the totalty of those thngs of whch we could make sense, and t provdes the context for the ntellgblty of any one thng.

wth thngs’ n the world thus means havng an understandng of the network of nvolvements n which we continually ind ourselves, and negotiatng our way amongst thngs n ther normal state of nconspcuous famlarty. One of the condtons of our embeddng n our world s our embodment, the way in which we constantly ind ourselves ‘thrown’ amongst other thngs and people as corporeal bengs. The cartesan deal of dsengagement, far from beng a descrpton of the proper workng of the isolated mind, is an artiicial state which requres a dsembeddng, wrestng us free of our bodly nvolvement n the world. So only under unusual crcumstances do people look down on ther world, or ther own bodes, as f lookng at an solated thng, from a great dstance. Graspng thngs ‘neutrally’ nvolves modfyng our orgnal comportment towards them. Moreover, havng created such a dstanced perspectve on materal thngs for ourselves, there is no guarantee that we will acquire a deinitive understandng of them. For nstance, when the human body s studed as a bologcal organsm by medcal scence the results are no less ‘cultural’ than are those when we nvestgate gender, age gradng and ethncty. These forms of human dentty are often perceved as secondary: nterpretatons of an organsm whch pre-exists them and whose character is already ixed and known (Butler 1993). But any knowledge of the thngs of the world s tself created n the world and artculated n language. One of our central problems n understandng materalty s that we magne that our experences of thngs generate an unmedated truth, and that language s then employed n the attempt to convey what we have learned. But language provdes both the context and the referents of any worldly experence (Butler 1993, 68). A belef n the absolute prmacy of emprcal data rests on the supposton that language s somethng unworldly whch the mnd uses n the attempt to descrbe and communcate the experence of physcal thngs. Once more, ths mples a categorcal separaton of the mental and the materal. When we say that any one object ‘comes nto the clearng’, and s dsclosed thematcally, t s our world that forms the background aganst whch t stands out. Agan, ths characterstc of ‘havng a world’, beng able to place any thng n a context of ntellgblty, s dstnctvely human, and yet t s not somethng whch can be located wthn any one ndvdual, snce t reles so heavly upon a set of cultural practces and understandngs. So human bengs create ther worlds collectvely, they nhert

Language, materiality and experience Any human act or thought takes place n the context of the world we nhabt. Ths nhabtaton does not smply nvolve beng spatally contaned: t has the character of engagement and immersion (Relph 1985, 17). Human bengs and ther world are the two nseparable sdes of a sngle con: one cannot be human n the absence of a world, and a world s consttuted by the presence of humans. ‘Gettng on 152

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and transform ther structures of ntellgblty. The dificulty which arises from this is that just as we isolate individual entities and deine them as objects whch can be dstngushed by partcular attrbutes whch attach to them, so we often beleve that we can solate ndvdual human bengs and dstngush what is deinitively human within them as bounded enttes. Our relatonal exstental propertes are mstaken for monadc trats. In everyday, common-sense terms we tend to dentfy ourselves as objects alongsde other objects. Our bodes are so much meat and grstle to whch some other knd of substance (soul or mnd) has been added (Hedegger 1977, 226). Once we conceve of human beings in this objectiied way, we inevitably begn to search for the roots of human unqueness encapsulated wthn the ndvdual organsm, n the form of a bgger bran, more nformaton-processng capacty, or whatever. But as long as we concentrate on humans as bologcal enttes, we wll overlook their most signiicant qualities: the way in which they brng a world nto beng, and the way n whch they allow the thngs of the world to show up. These are not attrbutes of the ndvdual organsm, but aspects of the fundamentally relatonal character of human beng. It s not helpful to consder these dagnostc aspects of humanty n evolutonary terms, snce they wll not correlate drectly wth any physcal attrbute of the body. Beng human s not somethng whch s gradually added to a bologcal substrate: t s a condton of artculaton whch ether does or does not exst. We have seen already that cogntvsm tends to present the human ndvdual as an rreducble socal atom, and that ths n turn s often connected wth a realst theory of representaton. Ths latter s concerned wth the transfer of nformaton across the boundary between the outsde world and the mental nteror. Images of the world are re-presented inside the mind, while signiication involves the externalzaton of thoughts n a form n whch they can be introduced into the mind of another. As Richard Rorty (1989) argues, this perspective presents language as a ‘thrd thng’ whch exsts between ourselves and the world, leavng both selfhood and worldhood as unexamned gvens. More recent theores of representaton, dervng ultmately from Saussure, place both the ntegrty of the subject and the transparency of language n queston (e.g. Derrda 1976). Far from the subject producng prmordal, prelngustc thoughts and then expressng them n language, it is only within the already existing ield of language that a subject can emerge wth a sense of

dentty (Lacan 1977). Language creates human bengs, rather than vce versa. Smlarly, for thoughts to be transferred from one mnd to another, n wrtng or any other symbolc medum, requres an effective identity of signiier and signiied. The word or symbol must represent the signiied concept n such a way as to exhaust ts meanng, but wthout addng any supplement. Meanng must be absolute, contained within the signiier, and entirely context-free. Materiality and memory Ths brngs us to some possble reservatons concernng the noton of external symbolc storage. What ths concept seems to requre s that deas whch emerge nsde a person’s mnd can be ‘downloaded’, lke a strng of bnary nformaton, nto tems of materal culture whch up to ths pont were meanng-free, lke blank pages or unformatted disks. A irst objection to ths argument s that t mples that the materal world only begns to have ths partcular knd of signiicance at the point when people begin to use t as a means of external storage: that s, at a pont when culture begns to be overlad upon nature. Ths seems to nvolve the entrely modernst assumpton that materal thngs become ontologcally dfferent by vrtue of ther transformaton by human acton. But the burden of the argument whch has been presented here s that thngs are always potentally meanngful as a consequence of ther beng n the world. If something shows up to us at all, it is already signiicant to us. To argue otherwse s to suggest that somethng whch s abject or culturally unntellgble can be ‘stamped’ wth a message and rendered meanngful. Inscrpton changes the potental range of meanngs whch can be read out of a thng or a text, but t does not transform somethng meanngless nto somethng meanngful. conversely, t s never the case that the meaning of a thing is ixed, unitary, or unambiguous. Inscrpton does not nvolve the encapsulaton of a thought nto an object or a symbol, so much as a reconiguration. No matter how much effort the ‘author’ puts nto ths act, symbols always demand nterpretaton. We never read a meanng out of a sgniier, we read meaning into it (Olsen 1990). Reading, whether of a text or of a materal thng, s positioned, n that the reader reads wthn a partcular spatal, temporal and cultural context, and on the bass of a particular life history of their own. Signiiers are nherently ambguous, and can potentally yeld limitless numbers of readings. And as Roland Barthes 153

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(1981) ponts out, readng s a creatve act, whch s not a passve scrutny of a thng but should be seen as an actve producton of meanng. None of ths s to deny the connecton between materal thngs and memory, but t does complcate the ssue. Materal culture clearly has a mnemonc role, but ths s not so straghtforward as to consttute a ‘bank’ of stored deas. Drawng on the past s always a re-presentaton whch s medated n varous ways, and whle worldly experences and sensatons may ‘call the past to mnd’, ths haulngback s always subject to nterpretaton. As numerous authors have ponted out, memory tself can be compared to a text whch s contnually re-worked and renterpreted n the lght of subsequent events (e.g. Fentress & Wckham 1992, 47). It s certanly not a means of transparent access to the past. Nor should rememberng be seen as a computatonal actvty carred out by the mnd n reacton to worldly stmul. In hs book How Societies Remember, Paul connerton (1989) draws attenton to the place of embodment n memory. Accordng to connerton, bodly actons (lke gesture, standng, dancng, walkng, marchng, processng) are nvolved n the drawng back, or recreaton, of meanngs sedmented by what he calls ‘ncorporatng’ and ‘nscrbng’ practces, although agan these experences are subject to nterpretaton.

In Brtan, ths horzon saw the ntroducton of pottery, megalthc tombs, earthen long mounds, polished stone axes, lint mines, piercing arrowheads, earthwork enclosures, and collectve bural (Pggott 1954). Not all of these trats exsted amongst contnental Neolthc groups before ths tme, and they certanly dd not all exst together n any one regon as a uniied assemblage. So we might suggest that ths repertore, whch formed a materal means of signiication, was put together in a process of hybridizaton or brcolage carred out by formerly Mesolthc communtes. Ths would cast the foragng socetes of the Atlantc zone as the actve creators of a new knd of Neolthc, dstnct from that of the Near East or central Europe, rather than passve recpents of an already formulated package. Now, to place ths materal n the context of the debate contaned wthn ths volume, t would seem that at around 4000 cal. Bc, Brtan underwent a revoluton n the provson of external symbolc storage. Ths dd not nvolve the ntroducton of lteracy, but t was concerned wth the emergence of a range of materal forms whch were clearly symbolc, and which had a signiicance which extended beyond the mmedately utltaran. A new repertore, or a new materal language, had been made avalable, even f not all of ts elements were present n all regons. We mght wsh to argue that Brtsh landscapes now became ‘nformaton spaces’ n ways that they had not been before. One of the characterstcs of the materal culture concerned was that t ntervened n and transformed a varety of socal contexts. Pottery vessels were now used n the producton, servng and storage of food, whch mght be expected to result n changes n nterpersonal relatonshps (Braithwaite 1982; Jones 1996). Polished lint and stone axes had begun to crculate from hand to hand over large dstances, allowng the creaton of allances and ndebtedness both wthn and between communtes (Edmonds 1995). Dtched enclosed stes, often only temporary structures, allowed large gatherngs of people wthn a space whch had been set asde from everyday actvtes (Edmonds 1993). Other monuments, generally assocated wth the processng of the remans of the dead, left an enduring mark on the landscape, inluencing the patterns of movement of people and lvestock and contnually brngng the past to mnd (Bradley 1993; Tlley 1994). These artefacts certanly represented a new ‘technology of meanng’, and they were clearly connected wth memory, n that they brought clusters of assocatons and connotatons to bear on socal stuatons. But, crucally, there s no ndcaton

neolithic Britain All of these ponts have consderable bearng on the way n whch we consder the changes n materal culture whch took place at the start of the Neolthc perod n Brtan, around sx thousand years ago. Whle n the precedng Mesolthc perod the nhabtants of Brtan had been sklled n producng tools of stone, bone, antler and other materals, the begnnng of the Neolthc saw a sudden marked ncrease n artefactual elaboraton (Armt & Fnlayson 1992; Knnes 1988). Because ths concded wth the ntroducton of domestcated plants and anmals whch had ultmately orgnated n the Near East, the tendency has been to nterpret ths process n terms of the arrval of a mgrant populaton, or at least the adopton of Neolthc materal culture, ether as a package or as ndvdual trats, by ndgenous people (case 1969; clark 1966; Thomas 1996a). Arguably, both of these perspectves underestmate the extent to whch the natve communtes of Atlantc Europe were actvely nvolved n appropratng and transformng Neolthc cultural forms n order to create somethng new (for a fuller dscusson, see Thomas 1996b, chapter 5). 154

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that a single ixed or uniied code of meaning underlay ths repertore, or that any one artefact had a single cultural signiication stamped upon it. One of the characterstcs of materal symbols s that they are ambguous and polyvalent, and hence that they only sgnfy n a partcular context (Hodder 1986; Tlley 1989). So although the Neolthc artefacts whch were used n Brtan consttute a dstnctve assemblage, they were used together, n context, n order to produce meanngs n rather localzed and contngent ways. Two ponts follow from ths. Although these objects were manpulated n ways that drew the past to mnd, and played on themes of ancestry, dstance and contrast, the lack of a ixed and unitary meaning attached to materal thngs would have meant that conlicting interpretations would have been created. consequently, ths was not a case of meanng beng ‘put nto the bank’ and then wthdrawn, but the creation of an arena of contestation and conlict between competng vews of the world. Secondly, these were not smply dead objects observed by dsemboded ntellgences. Neolthc materal culture was above all performatve. It was used by people n day-to-day actvtes and rtual observances, whch nvolved eatng, gesturng, chantng, labourng, movng though constructed spaces. The evocaton and creaton of meanng was not carred out n an ethereal mental sphere, t was a physcal, bodly engagement. The concept of external symbolc storage s potentally a seductve one for archaeology, snce it inds a place for aspects of material culture in a broader evolutonary sequence. It does so, however, at the expense of separatng a realm of mnd and deas from the world of materal thngs. Inevtably, archaeologcal nvestgaton s lmted to the latter of these. contemporary western socety has developed a fascination for the concept of ‘artiicial ntellgence’, creatng a machne whch can ‘thnk’ lke a human. We can argue that one unfortunate effect of ths mperatve has been to encourage us to conceve of the human mnd as beng rather lke a machne: an nformaton-processng devce whch operates n abstracton from the surroundng world. Ths paper has argued that we cannot separate mnd from body, the mental from the materal, or thought from acton. The materal world s ntegral to all human projects: t s not smply fashoned by thoughts whch emerge n a separate sphere of mental actvty. The creaton of systems of notaton was doubtless a sgnfcant step n socal development, but we should recognze that all human exstence nvolves a meanng-producng engagement wth materalty.

cultural change takes place n the relatonshps between people and thngs, rather than n the head. Julian Thomas Department of Archaeology University of Southampton Southampton SO17 1BJ References Armt, I. & B. Fnlayson, 1992. Hunter-gatherers transformed: the transton to agrculture n northern and western Europe. Antiquity 66, 664–76. Barthes, R., 1981. Theory of the text, in Untying the Text, ed. R. Young. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 31–47. Binford, L.R., 1965. Archaeological systematics and the study of culture process. American Antiquity 31, 203–10. Binford, L.R., 1972. Some comments on historical versus processual archaeology, n An Archaeological Perspective, ed. L.R. Binford. New York (NY): Seminar Press, 114–21. Bradley, R.J., 1993. Altering the Earth. Ednburgh: Socety of Antquares of Scotland. Brathwate, M., 1982 Decoraton as rtual symbol: a theoretcal proposal and an ethnographc study n southern Sudan, n Symbolic and Structural Archaeology, ed. I. Hodder. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 80–88. Butler, J., 1993. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’. London: Routledge. case, H.J., 1969. Neolthc explanatons. Antiquity 43, 176–86. clark, J.G., 1966. The nvason hypothess n Brtsh archaeology. Antiquity 40, 172–89. connerton, P., 1989. How Societies Remember. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. cottngham, J., 1992. cartesan dualsm: theory, metaphyscs and scence, n The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. J. cottngham. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 236–56. Derrda, J., 1976. Of Grammatology. Baltmore (MD): Johns Hopkns Unversty Press. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Donald, M., 1993. Précis of Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 16, 737–91. Dreyfus, H., 1991. Being-in-the-World: a Commentary on Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’, Division 1. cambrdge (MA): Massachusetts Insttute of Technology Press. Edmonds, M.R., 1993. Interpreting causewayed enclosures n the past and the present, n Interpretative Archaeology, ed. c. Tlley. London: Berg, 99–142.

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Edmonds, M.R., 1995. Stone Tools and Society: Working Stone in Neolithic and Bronze Age Britain. London: Batsford. Fentress, J. & c. Wckham, 1992. Social Memory. Oxford: Blackwell. Gugnon, c. (ed.), 1993. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Hedegger, M., 1962. Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarre & E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell. Hedegger, M., 1971a. The orgn of the work of art, n Poetry, Language, Thought, by M. Hedegger. New york (NY): Harper & Row, 15–88. Hedegger, M., 1971b. The thng, n Poetry, Language, Thought, by M. Hedegger. New york (Ny): Harper & Row, 163–86. Hedegger, M., 1977. Letter on humansm, n Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. D.F. Krell. London: Routledge, 213–65. Hodder, I.R., 1986. Reading the Past: Current Approaches to Interpretation in Archaeology. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Ingold, T., 1995. Buldng, dwellng, lvng: how anmals and people make themselves at home n the world, n Shifting Contexts: Transformations in Anthropological Knowledge, ed. M. Strathern. London: Routledge, 57–80. Jones, A., 1996. Food for thought: materal culture and the transformaton n food use from the Mesolthc to the Neolthc, n The Early Prehistory of Scotland, eds. T. Pollard & A. Morrson. Ednburgh: Ednburgh Unversty Press, 291–300. Kinnes, I.A., 1988. The cattleship Potempkin: the irst Neolthc n Brtan, n The Archaeology of Context in the Neolithic and Bronze Age, eds. J. Barrett & I. Knnes. Shefield: J. Collis, 2–8.

Lacan, J., 1977. Écrits: a Selection. London: Tavstock. Maron, J.L., 1996. Hedegger and Descartes, n Critical Heidegger, ed. C. Macann. London: Routledge, 67–96. Olafson, F.A., 1993. The unty of Hedegger’s thought, n Gugnon (ed.), 97–121. Olsen, B., 1990. Roland Barthes: from sign to text, in Reading Material Culture, ed. c. Tlley. Oxford: Blackwell, 163–205. Pggott, S., 1954. The Neolithic Cultures of the British Isles. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Relph, E., 1985. Geographical experiences and being-in-theworld: the phenomenologcal orgns of geography, n Dwelling, Place and Environment, eds. D. Seamon & R. Mugerauer. New York (NY): Columbia University Press, 15–32. Rorty, R., 1989. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press. Strathern, M., 1991. Partners and consumers: makng relatons vsble. New Literary History 22, 581–601. Taylor, c., 1992. Hedegger, language, and ecology, n Heidegger: a Critical Reader, eds. H. Dreyfus & H. Hall. Oxford: Blackwell, 247–69. Taylor, c., 1993. Engaged agency and background n Hedegger, n Gugnon (ed.), 317–36. Thomas, J.S., 1996a. The cultural context of the irst use of domestcates n north-west Europe, n The Origins of Agriculture and Pastoralism in Eurasia, ed. D. Harrs. London: Unversty college London Press, 310–22. Thomas, J.S., 1996b. Time, Culture and Identity: an Interpretive Archaeology. London: Routledge. Tlley, c.y., 1989. Interpretng materal culture, n The Meanings of Things, ed. I. Hodder. London: Unwn Hyman, 185–94. Tlley, c.y., 1994. A Phenomenology of Landscape. London: Berg.

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Chapter 13 symbolic Behaviour: the origin of a spatial Perspective Ezra B.W. zubrow & Patrck T. Daly This paper examines the rise of external symbolic behaviour from a spatial perspective after the human revolution. It reviews the nature, evolution, and processes of spatial representation and provides examples. The material record provides a substantive account of the origins of spatial symbolic behaviour. Early tools and sites, as well as prehistoric maps embed this evidence relecting the importance of territory, the selective advantage of conscious symbolic spatial behaviour for predator/prey relationships, increased behavioural diversity, and their impact on the forms of human dispersal. Two data bases were created — one of prehistoric maps and the other of maps from ethnographic societies whose subsistence is based upon hunting, ishing, or gathering. Twenty-four conclusions drawn from the two data bases show the importance of locality, way inders, minimal topography, and diversity of symbolic forms. The ability to process spatial knowledge at complex levels has existed at least as far back as the Palaeolithic and appears to be universal to almost all individuals and all societies. the nature of spatial symbolic behaviour

‘Go straght ahead’ means nothng to the blnd. All’s straght ahead that does not le behnd. vrgna Hamlton Adar

Most anmals are able to locate themselves n and move through a complex spatal matrx. Frequently, they have terrtores that they wll guard wth ferocty. Humans are conscous of the locaton of many types of phenomena and ther spatal relatonshp to each other. They can abstractly consder these relatonshps, symbolze them, and communcate them to other people. Although the knowledge of locaton s both conscous and unconscous, here we’ll prmarly consder the conscous aspects of human spatal knowledge. The focus s the characterstcs of spatal symbolc behavour and the evdence for external representatons of spatal knowledge.

It s clear that somethng occurred along our ances-

tral lne whch dstngushed us from other anmals.1 We do not know exactly when, why, or how, but lfe developed nto a more purposeful pursut. Homnds became capable of more than just anmal-lke reactons to crcumstances. The facultes of ntuton, creatvty, conscousness, symbolsm, abstracton, and knowledge representaton that sets our genus and speces n a class apart from all others n the anmal world emerged. Ths paper suggests that conscous concerns wth locaton and the symbolc representaton and communcaton of spatal knowledge are fundamental to the dspersal and development of the human lne. The paper s dvded nto four sectons, dscussng the nature, evoluton, and processes of spatal symbolc behavour and presents examples of these phenomena from the prehstorc and ethnographc record.

Sensory data and spatial knowledge Is spatal knowledge the result of sensory data alone? Whle ths may be the case wth other speces, t appears that human spatal knowledge s more than the product of sensory data. Rather, t nvolves a complex set of sensory data, conscousness, and analyss of spatal nformaton. Let us consder the 157

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smplest case. A person knows that he or she s at a gven locaton. Ths requres more nformaton than smply a set of x, y, and z co-ordnates. Mnmally, both a sense of ‘locatonal awareness’ and of ‘self-postonal awareness’ s necessary. It makes lttle dfference whether t s a scholar at a college n cambrdge or a prehstorc hunter at the Lndenmeer ste. Both the scholar and the hunter recognze certan landmarks or features whch ndcate to them a gven locaton (locatonal awareness) and they are aware of where they are relatve to that locaton (selfpostonal awareness). The level of complexty ncreases when people are cognzant not only of ther locaton but of other locatons. Not only are they aware of the landmarks or co-ordnates of ther locaton, but they are conscous of other landmarks, aware of other co-ordnates, and have knowledge of other places. Intally, ths nformaton s stored nternally n ther memory but later, f crcumstances so warrant, t can be stored n external symbolc systems. One form s a map. The negatve of ths s also mportant. Humans can dstngush the locatons and landmarks of where they are from where they are not. They retan ths awareness even when one s no longer n drect contact. For example, one can remember where one was last Frday even when they are no longer there. Far more than smple sensory nformaton s beng processed, stored, and analyzed. For the purposes of brevty, the terms ‘other locatonal awareness’ and ‘other postonal awareness’ descrbe these concepts. One of the most common human actvtes s the communcaton of spatal knowledge to another person. The scholar lost among the Harvard alleys askng drectons, the hunter descrbng to hs frend where to ind game, or a Roman asking a slave to brng an amphora of wne share ths trat. ‘Turn left over there by the Rver charles’, ‘the dk-dk s by the willows’ or ‘bring me that red wine near the ire’ are examples of the recurrent, cross-culturally unversal uses of spatal symbolc knowledge. They are so prevalent n everyday socety that one frequently s not aware that one s usng spatal nformaton. Indeed, the large amounts of symbolc spatal nformaton and operatons that are necessary to make, let alone complete, such a request frequently go unnotced. ‘Other-person locatonal awareness’ and ‘other-person postonal awareness’ are necessary addtons to the prevous concepts of ‘other locatonal awareness’, ‘other awareness’, ‘self-locatonal awareness’, and ‘self-awareness’. For one to be able to convey drecton, one must be able to perceve

not only where one s but where the other s and ther destnaton. When one states ‘walk over the hll by the blue house’, one s aware of the space beng passed through and the locatons the lstener knows or wll be able to recognze.2 The speaker provdes new symbolc spatal nformaton about landmarks and co-ordnates that hopefully helps the lstener along the way. The spatal nformaton exchange also ncludes packets of nformaton whch nform each ndvdual about the recept of the nformaton and the level of comprehenson. In Hntkka’s terms, exchangng locatonal nformaton creates common spatal knowledge (Hntkka 1962). Ths requres exchangng sensory nformaton and producng messages whch state that the sender s ready to send, the recever s ready to receve, the message s sent, the message s receved, and the message s understood. Penrose, the Oxford mathematcan, has been a major proponent of the insuficiency of sensory data alone (Penrose 1989; 1994). Strong locatonal thnkng would suggest mental qualtes of a sort that can be attrbuted to the logcal functonng. Such mental actvty s smlar to the carryng-out of a complex set of algorthms. A person s conscous of and uses locaton, proxmty and separateness n tme and space. When one s lost, one knows that one has a locaton n tme and space even f one does not know exactly where t s. Even n a sensory-deprved envronment, one knows that one s somewhere. Causality, location and evidence of symbolic spatial behaviour It is dificult to conceive of something that is not located n tme or space. Mathematcans, physcsts, and varous scentsts are able to post such systems. For most people, however, even conceptions of ininty when appled to space and tme rase problems n locaton. causalty does seem to work and laymen understand t n a general and mprecse manner. A wne glass on a table s accdentally pushed, the glass falls, and breaks on the loor. The importance of the spatial relationship ‘on the table’ to ‘on the loor’ is as easly understood as the temporal sequence of ‘push’, ‘fallng’, ‘landng’. When one goes to the wne cellar, gets a bottle of wne, places a new glass on the table, ills the glass, and removes the bottle, one recognizes a more complex causal chan of events. It has a more elaborate set of spatal relatonshps. If one asks a frend to go to the wne cellar n the basement next door, get a bottle, and reill the glass, the amounts of symbolc spatal nformaton that are necessary and are communcated ncrease mmensely. 158

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Homnds recognzed ths type of causalty at a very early perod. By the early Palaeolthc, the record shows that they were able to use such complex spatal knowledge and ts symbolc representatons relatvely easly. The evdence s embedded n early tools and early sites. The process of getting a lint cobble from a rverbed, placng t n a poston where t may be ht wth a hammerstone, httng t wth a hammerstone, keepng and usng the tool and dscardng the debtage s analogous to the ndvdual getting the wine bottle, illing the glass, drinking the wne, keepng the glass and removng the bottle. The causal sequences have spatal dmensons. When people use these causal systems, they make abstract and conscous use of spatal concepts. Early homnd tool-makng requred an understandng of locaton and tme. When a homnd tells another homnd to make a stone tool, t s analogous to askng the frend to go to the wne cellar. The fact that, prehstorcally, there are stylstc smlartes spannng extended tme and dstance s a clear ndcaton that homnds followed exactly ths process and that the nformaton was successfully communcated.

usng ndces of the densty of ntruders versus the densty of expellees. Fnally, MacArthur (1972) generalzed these concepts formally demonstratng that terrtoralty s a specal form of contest competton. One needs to wn only once or twce to demonstrate domnance and thus release competton tme for the advantageous collecton of resources. Terrtoralty and spatal abltes are evolutonary advantages and there s evdence that evoluton favours those species whose territories are not ixed but are lexible n tme and space. Modern humans are terrtoral n a broad sense of the word. For Homo sapiens sapiens, spatal knowledge and locatonal analyss are mportant aspects of terrtory. What selectve advantage does conscous locatonal knowledge confer on those who actually possess t? There s a dfference between behavour based upon our conscous knowledge of locaton and our unconscous spatal behavour. All creatures are able to locate themselves unconscously. At the smplest level, the addton of conscousness n spatal behavour ncreases the possblty for dversty of behavour. Addtonally, t makes possble the external storage of spatal nformaton and the opportunty for analyss. For early homnds, the conscous knowledge of locaton and the ablty to represent and communcate spatal nformaton was advantageous for the predators n predator/prey relatonshps. By puttng oneself n the place of the prey one can predct and gve oneself advantages over t. Therefore, a conscous ablty to manpulate locaton may very well be a predator/prey advantage for human predators, even when the prey was ourselves (same genus-same speces) or varatons of ourselves. For our remote ancestors the speciic ability to analyze sophstcated spatal data was a selectve advantage. Ths ablty to understand locatonal phenomena might originally have been site speciic. The more spatally and geographcally generalzed t became, the more evolutonary and culturally advantageous. There s consderable advantage to move from the step of takng shelter n a partcular area to knowng that one may take shelter n any locaton that has smlar characterstcs. Buldng shelters, makng tools, followng game, movng on paths, or gatherngs n an annual round are each mproved by the process of generalzng locaton. Even exogamy s mproved by generalzed knowledge of locaton. Homnds have dstrbuted themselves n the broadest spatal adaptve radaton of all speces. They have walked from the tropcs to both Arctc and Antarctc crcles. Sometmes there have been

evolution of symbolic spatial knowledge and knowledge representation Studyng the spatal relatonshps of anmals has a long hstory. From the tme of Arstotle and Plny, one focus has been the concept of terrtory. Early terrtoral studes on brds n the seventeenth century were augmented n the eghteenth century by concepts of populaton densty and lmtaton. The nneteenth century related ndvdual adaptve values, courtshp and lfe hstores to terrtoralty. By the irst half of the twentieth century, the abstractons of ‘group terrtores’ were dstngushed from ‘ndvdual terrtores’, and ‘ranges’ separated from ‘terrtores’. In the next half century, homnd and prmate ecologes were reconstructed. Terrtory served as a demographc regulatng devce for early speces of Homo and Australopithecus. It was shown that qualtes of the behavours that consttute terrtoralty were very heterogeneous, protectng not only space but access to females, space for sexual dsplay, spawnng stes, and restng stes to name a few. Territories were classiied in various ways. Two types of territories, temporally dependent and spatially loatng, where shown to complcate the spatal mosac. Studes showed that terrtoral resdent anmals are more eficient in inding food and evading predators. Boundary studes became emprcally more accurate by measurng the permeablty of borders 159

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long-dstance movements but, more frequently, the movements have conssted of short-dstance adjustments. Before modern transportaton, most longdstance movements occurred once or twce durng a person’s lfetme. Such mgratons occurred when the ndvdual left ther brth area. Eventually, they establshed themselves elsewhere or pershed n the attempt. Such dspersal s frequently a determnant or a consequence of populaton densty. certan cultures, groups, or ndvduals ndulge n long-dstance and permanent dspersal. They do so when t s lkely to enhance ther economc or reproductive itness. Alternatively, it may enhance the potental of the kn left behnd. For humans, the non-altrustc former and altrustc latter cases are often combned. Hope for a better locaton wth the knowledge that one’s removal may mprove the local stuaton has been a frequent cause for mgraton. Indeed t s a central theme n our mythology and lterature. Stores abound about youngest sons who leave home to ind their fortune. Short-term repettve movements are more frequent. In the course of prehstory there has been only a lmted set of patterns. They are: • hunting, ishing, and gathering with moveable household camps, • hunting, ishing, and gathering with a non-moveable domestc central camp, • pastoralsm n whch the pastoralst takes the household from summer to wnter pasture, • pastoralsm where the shepherd leaves the household to follow the anmals and then returns, • slash and burn agrculture where the entre household moves every few years, • slash and burn agrculture that moves n a crcular route around the household and does not requre the cultvator to move the household. One must remember that for both long-term dspersals and short-term spatal adjustments the conscous knowledge of locaton and the ablty to represent t provded consderable adaptve advantages. Not the least of them was the ablty to communcate to one’s frends and chldren the dsadvantages or advantages of where one has been. From the perspectve of the mgratng partes there are essentally two forms of mgraton. There s pre-determnate mgraton n whch there s foreknowledge of the place to whch they are gong. People are movng ‘to’ these places. Such peces may be where kn are already located or where they know that they have mproved subsstence potental. The other type of mgraton s non-determnate mgraton n whch the mgrants do not know where they

are gong but do know that they must leave where they are. In ths case, people are movng ‘from’ a locaton. For pre-determnate mgraton the spatal pattern of the mgraton s usually n the form of a network. The temporal pattern at any gven locaton usually takes the form of a seres of pulses. Non-determnate mgraton such as takes place by refugees leeing a battle frequently takes any direction and wll have the spatal form of a crcular or dstorted polygon buffer. The rate of low will follow a wave pattern. In ether case, the mgrants know from whence they came and ths knowledge s mportant n ther behavour. The results of ths adaptve radaton have been a clear set of world-wde, regonal and local settlement patterns that demonstrate conscous3 knowledge of spatal patterns. The general prehstorc characterstcs of ths movement are as follows: • out of Afrca wth early occupatons n Asa, • then spreadng throughout the Mddle East, Europe, and the rest of the Old World, • wth late dspersals nto solated areas such as the New World, Australa, and varous major sland groups.4 The spread of populaton across the rver valleys of Europe noted by Ammerman & cavall-Sforza (1984), Greenberg (1991), and Renfrew (1991) are examples. Smlarly, the movements eastward towards the Berng Strats and nto the New World ponted out by Okladnkov (1983), Hopkns (1967), and Martn & Klen (1984) are smlar. Each movement s the aggregate of a set of spatal decsons. At a more local level, one may examne the spatal characterstcs of the contents of a ste. consder the houses n a ste. We know that people may dstrbute themselves or arrange themselves n a varety of ways that range from ordered or regular patterns to clustered patterns, or to random patterns. They may also be ntermedary. Durng the late 1960s numerous studes measured such patternng wth varous statstcs ncludng the popular ‘nearest neghbour’. Random scatters of settlement were by far the rarest and the vast majorty of cases showed that most settlements fell somewhere between clustered and highly ordered. This is also relected in the classiicaton schemes of settlement patterns. For example, one may consder the evolutonary system developed by Moholy-Nagy pontng out that settlement patterns developed followng natural contours, crcular and walled desgns, rectangular schemes, cross-cuttng boulevard patterns, and regonal patterns (MoholyNagy 1968). Lke other speces, humans mantan charac160

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terstc ndvdual dstances that vary culturally and are relected in the material record. Frequently they vary accordng to class and socal status. Hgher status is relected in larger spaces for housing, for domestc actvtes, and for admnstratve functons. They also may be located more centrally. Obvously, there are cultural dfferences but spatal relatonshps are conscously used as symbols. The same types of spatal semotcs have regonal and cultural patterns. Scholars snce De Toquevlle have noted that North Amercan cultures have tended to be spatally expansve whle European and Medterranean have tended to be spatally ntensve.5

drectons may be nterchanged. Indeed, as charles Frake showed, n medeval tmes there was frequently a mxture of tme and drecton. The compass rose mght be dvded nto hour unts or the sundal nto drectonal unts (Frake 1994). We contnue that nterchange when we say ‘Take that road at 11:00 o’clock’. Let us examne some of the spatal processes that have been used by cultures. Afine geometry s a geometry whch nvolves a deinition of parallelism but no other process. If deinitions of length and angular measurement are excluded from Euclidean geometry, afine geometry s what remans. Grouping geometries are geometres whch nclude processes whch satsfy the law of a commutatve group. These nclude the operatons of composton, nverson, dentty, and assocaton. Haptic geometries are geometres whch are lmted to a sense of touch and by extenson to only places where one has been. Dstance s mnmzed n such geometres. Homeomorphic geometries are geometres n whch two spaces are the same f they are equvalent from the standpont of topology. For example, n a homeomorphc geometry, two pont sets are homeomorphc f they are n a one-to-one correspondence no matter what the dstance between the ponts, .e. all closed curves are consdered the same. Thus, crcles, trangles, squares, etc., are the same. In homeomorphc geometres, dstance often seems to be gnored. Syncretic geometries are those n whch the elements have geometrc propertes but are not related to each other n an operatonal fashon. Explorers meetng socetes wth syncretc geometres often could not understand why they would be gven good drectons wth regard to rvers but the fact that a rver ran nto one of the Great Lakes would seemngly be gnored. Non-permanent geometries are geometres n whch there s no concept of the permanence of an object and thus relatonshps among objects are ether non-exstent or, more frequently, change over tme. Proximity geometries are geometres n whch the most elementary spatal relatonshp whch may be grasped would seem to be that of proxmty, .e. ‘nearbyness’. Frequently, they are combned wth separaton. Neghbourng elements that mght be partally blended or confused are clearly demarcated. Principled geometries are geometres n whch all the elements of proxmty geometres are ncluded and organzed accordng to a set of prncples. One prncple s that of successon whch s establshed

Processes of spatial symbolic behaviour The problem wth studyng the evoluton of spatal relatons s that t s a process takng place partally at the perceptual level, partally at the level of thought or magnaton, and partally at the emprcal level. One tests the emprcal aspects of spatal knowledge by actng upon t and f t s n error there are sgniicant disincentives. Everyone is familiar with one dsncentve. It s beng lost. Thus, spatal concepts develop on the forge of tral and error and under the inluence of motor and sensory mechanisms. Whle the achevement of sensory nformaton-gatherng and motor actvty may provde experence of straght lnes, angles, crcles and other spatal concepts, representational thought irst appears to gnore phenomena such as metrc and perspectve relatonshps, proportons and consequently, the development of spatal analyss began wth more prmtve notons such as topologcal relatonshps of proxmty, separaton, order, and enclosure. We are all famlar wth Eucldean geometry. Most of us are famlar wth the advances that have been made snce Eucldean geometry ncludng sphercal trgonometry and the non-Eucldean geometres developed by Boole and Lobachevsky (Newman 1956). Partcular assumptons are relaxed, such as that parallel lnes wll never meet. Although generally dificult to conceive, the logic and potental realty of such geometres may be accepted under partcular crcumstances. Smlarly, t has been known ethnographcally for a long tme that spatal percepton and knowledge representaton may take dfferent forms n other socetes. Some socetes perform spatal analyss usng only part of Eucldean geometry or other forms of spatal processng. Many sland socetes, for example, do not use the cardnal drectons. Instead, they use ‘nland’ and ‘outward’ as the drectonal system. Spatal and temporal 161

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when two neghbourng elements are ranged one before another on a thematc axs. Others are the prncple of enclosure and the prncple of contnuty. examples Maps are one of the best forms of materal evdence whch show that symbolc knowledge representaton was used by our ancestors. They demarcate what locatonal knowledge exsted, what symbolc representatons were used, and what geographc areas were mportant. They provde examples of what aspects of the envronment were emphaszed as well as what technques for spatal surveyng were known. Furthermore, maps have an emprcal realty. Although one may nterpret maps, there s a realty to the spatal representaton whch usually has some geographcal bass. The prehstory and hstory of maps represents a method of modellng realty and communcatng crtcal spatal nformaton to the ‘other’. In short, from ths perspectve they are external symbolic storage systems of quantiiable nformaton. Early studes of prehstorc and early hstorc maps were undertaken by Bruno Adler (1910) (‘Kart prevobytnykh narodov’) as well as by Bagrow (1923). It s generally recognzed that two areas of research are necessary. One must begn by examnng the prehstorc and archaeologcal corpus, and thus compare t to the ethnographc corpus of smlar groups. Ths s what we do below.

Figure 13.1. The famous Tepe Gawra landscape jar. (From Tobler 1950, pl. LXXVIIIa.)

Prehistoric and archaeological maps Surprsngly, we have been able to collect a consderable corpus of prehstorc and archaeologcal maps. Frst, we wll llustrate several well known prehstorc maps. Second, we present n tabular form (Table 13.1) a corpus of prehstorc maps based upon the lterature wth descrptons and references. Thrd, we draw some general conclusons about the nature of prehstorc and archaeologcal maps from the corpus. Figure 13.2. Detail of the map elements from the Tepe Gawra landscape jar. (From Tobler 1950, pl. LXXVIIIb.) The panel has been analyzed as a schematic landscape representation by Tobler (1950). He claims the parallel lines of triangles on both sides of a sinuous line (the river) represent the hills of the river terraces. The herringbone characteristic of the sinuous line represents the river’s terraces. The location of animals and towns are also shown. This controversial interpretation may assume too much symbolic representation. 162

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Figure 13.3. (Above) Petroglyphic map from Bedolina, Valcomonica (2.3 m × 4.2 m); a complex cultural map tracing boundaries, paths or roads, as well as seeming to locate buildings. Archaeologists such as Anati have suggested that it represents the Bronze age landscape from Castelliere del Dos dell’Archa. There have been arguments about whether the stippled areas in this map represent homesteads or ields. (As published in Imago Mundi 18(1964), 7, ig. 1.)

Figure 13.4. The famous Babylonian world map c. 600 BC; an early attempt to depict relationships between places at great distances to each other. The text notes legendary beasts reputed to live beyond the ocean which circles the Babylonian world as well as heroes who have travelled to far places. In one place the ‘sun is not seen’. The map represents a Babylon-centred world-view. Shown at 73 per cent of original size. (© Copyright The British Museum.) 163

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table 13.1. A corpus of prehistoric, archaeological, and very early historic maps. type of maps

name of maps

Brief description of maps

Known references

Prehstorc

The Bedolna petroglyph

Oldest known plan of an nhabted place from northern Italy. Dated to c. 2000–1500 Bc. Beleved to be engraved n dfferent stages, .e. the pctoral mages were added later n the constructon.

Thrower 1996; D.-Smth 1982; Ksh 1972; Blumer 1964

Prehstorc

The Rajum Han stone

Plan of a lvestock enclosure made n Jordan n the early post AD perod. The people depcted n the pcture seem to have been placed nsde of the enclosure ntentonally.

D.-Smth 1987; Hardng 1953

Prehstorc

Magoura cave pantng

Pantng found n Bulgara. Interpreted as a cosmologcal map.

D.-Smth 1987; Georgev 1978; Anat 1969

Prehstorc

Wad Iddo rock pantng

Found n Algera. Suspected to be a cosmologcal map.

D.-Smth 1987; Lajoux 1963; Frobenus 1937

Prehstorc

Hagar Qm

Neolthc terracotta found n a temple n Malta. Perhaps a relef model.

D.-Smth 1987; Trump 1979

Prehstorc

Kesslerloch bone plaques

Drawngs made by Rödger of bone peces wth carvngs. He argued that they all had cartographic signiicance.

D.-Smth 1987; Rödger 1891

Prehstorc

Kesslerlock lgnte ornament

An engraved stone nterpreted by Rödger as a topographc map.

D.-Smth 1987; Rödger 1891; 1890; Merk 1876

Prehstorc

Several mages whch were consdered ‘topographcal’ by Bcknell

These have been nterpreted by Bcknell as mages of huts and related enclosures as seen from an above vantage pont.

D.-Smth 1987; Bcknell 1913; 1903

Prehstorc

Possble map element

A possble mage of two people n a hut, from Penalsordo, Badajoz, Span.

D.-Smth 1987; Acanfora 1960; Breul 1933

Prehstorc

Possble ‘game’ enclosures

Two rock pantngs whch may be cartographc, perhaps represents a sort of enclosure or a topographc feature; from La Pleta, Malaga, Span.

D.-Smth 1987; Dams 1978; Marnger 1960; Breul 1915

Prehstorc

Possble map elements from Algera

Ths mage contans certan features whch mght be cartographc by vrtue of both ther actual contents and the spatal relatonshp whch exsts between the objects; from I-N-Eten, Tassl Mountans, Algera.

D.-Smth 1987; Breul 1954

Prehstorc

Possble map element from Algera.

Possble mage of a camel wthn an enclosure; from the Tassl Mountans n Algera.

D.-Smth 1987; Frobenus 1937

Prehstorc

Bronze Age petroglyph

Petroglyph whch may show some anmals runnng towards a rver; from the Borno Stone from valcamonca.

D.-Smth 1987; Anat 1960; 1966; Battagla & Acanfora 1954

Prehstorc

Palaeolthc engravng on mammoth bone

The mages n the centre have been nterpreted as dwellngs whch were constructed out of mammoth bones but there has not been a strong correlaton between the layout as depcted on the bone carvng and the actual layout of the ste whch t was taken from.

D.-Smth 1987; Pdoplchko 1969

Prehstorc

The Tepe Gawra landscape jar

The pantng on the jar has been nterpreted as representatve of landscape. Tobler has come to the concluson that t s a huntng scene whch s takng place in a valley lanked by high mountains which has a river lowing through t. Ths has been dsputed.

D.-Smth 1987; Goff 1963; Stahl 1960; Tobler 1950

Prehstorc

The Tepe Gawra landscape jar II

Ths s a close-up of a secton of the Tepe Gawre jar from Iraq whch may depct a huntng scene n a valley.

D.-Smth 1987; Goff 1963; Stahl 1960; Tobler 1950

Prehstorc

Pcture map

Pcture map on ‘the great dsk’ from Talat N’sk, Morocco. Interpreted as contanng a rver surrounded by mountans on all sdes. It s signiicant because it displays attributes of a schematic nature.

D.-Smth 1987; Malhomme 1959–61

Prehstorc

Pcture map from a vase

Pcture map on a slver vase found n Malkop, Russa. Dated to c. 3000 Bc, it shows two rivers lowing from a chain of mountains. Ths mage has been seen as ‘a tmd attempt to subordnate landscape with igures’.

D.-Smth 1987; Rostovtzeff 1922

Prehstorc

Wall pantng

Wall pantng of a map found n Çatalhöyük, Turkey. Dated rather accurately to c. 6200 Bc. Possible spiritual signiicance. It is suggested that it s a plan for a town or another type of settlement; perhaps Çatalhöyük tself.

D.-Smth 1982; 1987; Mellaart 1964; 1967; Viragh 1965

Prehstorc

Petroglyph maps (33 maps)

These are typcal Bronze Age mages, found n the val Fontanalba valley, Mont Bego. They possess several qualtes of topographc maps.

D.-Smth 1982; 1987; Bernardn 1979; Blan & Paquer 1976; Lumley et al. 1976; Lous & Isett 1964; Bcknell 1897; 1902; 1903; 1913

Prehstorc

Smple topographc map

Ths map from Seradna, Italy seems to show an orderly layout of dwellngs wth nterconnectng paths and perhaps an orchard.

D.-Smth 1982; 1987; Prul 1985; Harvey 1980; Anat 1960; 1964; 1976; Blumer 1967; 1968

Prehstorc

Smple topographc map II

Ths map from Ponte, San Rocco, Italy seems to show a scatterng of features (perhaps buldngs) connected by paths.

D.-Smth 1987; Prul 1985; Leonard 1970; Anat 1959

164

Symbolc Behavour

type of maps

name of maps

Brief description of maps

Known references

Prehstorc

‘The Skn Hll vllage’ map

Topographc plan from val Fontanalba, Mont Bego, Italy.

D.-Smth 1982; 1987; Lumley et al. 1976; Bcknell 1913

Prehstorc

Map(s) of the ‘Monte Bego vllage’

Possbly a sngle map or a collecton of smaller maps made on the same template.

D.-Smth 1987; Lumley et al. 1976; Bcknell 1913

Prehstorc

composte petroglyph map from Bedolna

Topographc map from Bedolna, valcamonca. Possbly a plan of a settlement or a plan of agrculture land usage. 1967; 1968; Anat 1952; 1959; 1964;

D.-Smth 1982; 1987; Prul 1985; Harvey 1980; Beltran Llors 1972; Blumer 1964

Prehstorc

Petroglyph map from valcamonca

Topographc map from Gadghe, valcamona whch seems to show some sgn of settlement along wth natural features such as a rver. Some features near the bottom may be anthropomorphc.

D.-Smth 1982; 1987; Prul 1985; Blumer 1967; Anat 1959; Battagla 1934

Prehstorc

Pece of a lmestone sculpture

Found n Tarxen, Malta ths pece of sculpture may be part of a plan of a buldng.

D.-Smth 1987; Trump 1979; zammt 1930

Prehstorc

cup marks on stone

Found at venslev, Denmark, these cup marks are possbly representatve of constellatons.

D.-Smth 1987; Schönfeld 1921; Schütte 1920

Prehstorc

cup marks on stone

Found at Dalby, Denmark, these cup marks are possbly a map of several constellatons.

D.-Smth 1982; 1987; Schönfeld 1921; Schütte 1920

Prehstorc

cosmologcal map on a bowl

Pantng on a bowl from predynastc Egypt. The sun can be seen on ts course, there are the mountans of the east and the west, and a prmeval ocean encrclng the whole scene.

D.-Smth 1987; Gedon 1962

Prehstorc

The Trora stela

Possble cosmologcal map on a decorated stone. Several levels on t have been nterpreted to represent levels of exstence; .e. what we would refer to as the heavens, earth, and the underworld.

D.-Smth 1987; 1982; Anat 1973; Bausan 1973

Prehstorc

Topographc mage

Photo of a rock carvng found n the valleys of Monte Bego. It seems to show property demarcatons along wth structural placement.

D.-Smth 1985; Beltran Llors 1972

Prehstorc

Photo of the Bedolna plan

Rock carvng at capo d Ponte, val camonca, Italy made c. 1500 Bc. Sectons of t were added later n the Iron Age.

Blumer 1964

Prehstorc

Resttuton of the elements of the Bedolna plan

Drawng of the Bedolna plan as t would look f t was on a map template.

Blumer 1964

Prehstorc

German gold dsk

Gold dsk found n the Moordorf dstrct of Aurch, datng from the mddle of the second mllennum Bc. It s an mage of the cosmos but t contans some geographcal depcton.

Unger 1937; D.-Smth 1982; Ksh 1980; Jakob-Fresen 1931

Prehstorc1

Fgure n a plan

Upper Palaeolthc cave pantng n Almaden, Span.

Acanfora 1960

Prehstorc1

cave pantng

From Penalsordo, Badajoz, Span, ths pantng shows what could be two igures in an enclosure (possibly some sort of dwelling structure).

D.-Smth 1987; Acanfora 1960; Breul 1933; Frankowski 1918

Prehstorc1

Rock pantng

Several Neolthc rock pantngs from Tamrt, Algera whch appear to have possble map elements.

D.-Smth 1987; Breul 1954

Prehstorc1

Rock pantng from Oua Moln

Neolthc rock pantng showng several outlnes whch may be huts.

Tschud 1955

Prehstorc1

Petroglyph from Sefar

Neolthc petroglyph showng an outlne of what could be a dwellng and several anthropomorphic igures.

Lajoux 1963

Prehstorc1

Rock pantngs from Sefar (6 maps)

Neolthc pantngs of possble dwellngs.

Lajoux 1963

Prehstorc1

Petroglyph from Taghit

Neolithic petroglyph showing a igure in a plan.

Frobenius & Obermaier 1925

Prehstorc1

Rock painting from Libya

Neolithic painting of a igure in a plan from Jebel Uweinat.

Rhotert 1952; Graziosi 1942; caporacco & Grazos 1934

Ethnographc

Marshall Islands stck chart

A ‘rebbelb’, whch s a chart depctng a large porton of the Marshall Islands group. Ths covers an area of around 600 sea mles NW–SE and 300 sea mles NE–SW. The spatal relatonshps between the slands are estmates.

Thrower 1996; Davenport 1960; Lyons 1928

Archaeologcal

Manuscrpt map of Mexco cty as drawn by the Aztecs

Ths map depcts the foundng of Tenochtlan. It contans both geographcal nformaton such as an abstract dea of the layout of the cty (wth plan of settlement and waterways) and nformaton pertanng to the social geography of the rulers and founding igures of the city.

Thrower 1996; Berdan & Anawalt 1992; clark 1938

Archaeologcal?/ Amerndan manuscrpt map Ethnohstorc/ of Msssspp Mssour Ethnographc dranage system

Ths map was presented by the Iowa chef Non ch nng ga at a councl held n Washngton Dc n 1837. Drawn n nk, ts purpose was to show part of ther trbal terrtory. Although drawn by an aborgne, t was made for the purpose of demarcatng land n a ‘modern’ fashon.

Thrower 1996; Lews 1979

Archaeologcal?/ Wood-carved coastal maps Ethnohstorc/ from Greenland Ethnographc

These maps clearly show coastal features. They depct alttude as well as area.

Bagrow 1965

Battagla 1934a

165

Ezra B.W. zubrow & Patrck T. Daly

type of maps

name of maps

Brief description of maps

Known references

Archaeologcal?/ Eskmo map on skn Ethnographc

Ths s a map of the crown Prnce Islands whch was prnted upon skn.

Bagrow 1965

Archaeologcal?/ Bark pantng from the Ethnographc yolngu of NE Arnhem Land Australa

Ths s a map whch was created so that t could only be nterpreted n conjuncton wth other factors. In order for one to be able to make geographc connectons one must know the natve songs and dances whch tell of the creaton of the ‘Ancestral Beng’ and ts relatves. Each of the parts of the crocodle are named and have cogntve assocatons whch geographcal locatons and attrbutes and these are used to teach the chldren the shape of the land.

Thrower 1996; Turnbull 1989

Archaeologcal?/ Abstract maps from the Ethnographc chppewa (6 maps)

Sketches made by aborgnal chppewas to descrbe certan abstract concepts (dreams, cosmos, and sprtualty).

Kohl 1860

Archaeologcal?/ Natve map from the Ethnographc chppewa

Sketch showng a secton of land whch was crossed by the drawer. Snce the trp was done mostly by canoe there s an emphass on the rver’s detals.

Densmore 1929

Archaeologcal?/ A topographcal sketch Ethnographc of the Araguaa

Sketch made by an aborgnal caraja showng several bends n the rver along wth two slands.

Ehrenrech 1891

Archaeologcal?/ Brch bark map from the Ethnographc Naskap

Sketch showng a secton of the rver Atkwabe’o. One method used by hunters to chart the rvers of ther huntng grounds.

Speck & Esley 1942

Archaeologcal?/ Bark maps from the Ethnographc Naskap (5 maps)

Sketches depctng rvers, camps, and huntng grounds. They all show a great deal of geographc knowledge and ablty to transfer ths knowledge through the use of hard copy maps.

Speck & Esley 1942

Archaeologcal?/ Map of southeastern Ethnographc Labrador

Made by Matheu Medkabo of the Montagnas. The accompanyng lterature tells that the ntal attempt to construct ths map was dstorted because t was orented to nternal watersheds.

Leacock 1969

Archaeologcal?/ Sketch of ‘Sprtual’ Ethnographic geography

Sketch mappng out a stuaton n whch a person s beng treated for llness. It shows where the accompanying sacriice (part of the ritual treatment?) goes and where it is intercepted before reaching its inal destination (which s also shown) causng the patent to de.

Jochelson 1905–8

Archaeologcal?/ Pantng of the Garab Islands Ethnographc (5 maps)

Fve pantngs showng dfferent sectons and vews of the slands as well as some of the creatures whch nhabt them.

Mountford 1956

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Early Egyptan map from a wooden sarcophagus

Map showng geographcal content (the depcton of the Nle, Ocean, and desert) as t s related to the abstract concept of passage to the afterlfe.

Thrower 1996; Kamal 1926–51

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Plan of a Mesopotaman cty on a clay tablet

Map datng from c. 1500 Bc whch depcts a small area n the Nppur dstrct wth ts canals, the cty wall, gates, and varous buldngs. The early Mesopotaman maps are mportant because they are the best examples of the early usage of both text and symbol n mappng.

Thrower 1996; Unger 1935; 1937; Merk 1936

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Map of Mesopotama on a clay tablet

Akkadan map found at Nuz datng to 2300 Bc. It shows a large-scale vew of Mesopotama complete wth mountans, water courses, and settlements.

Thrower 1996; Unger 1935; 1937; Merk 1936

Archaeological/ Literate

World map from Mesopotamia on a clay tablet

Assyrocentric ‘world’ map depicting a (lat) view of the earth with Babylon at the centre and the Euphrates lowing into the Persian Gulf. There are references to other centres of geographc nterest such as near by ctes and landmarks.

Thrower 1996; Unger 1935; 1937; Merk 1936

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Map of Metlatoyuea

Ths s an example of ndgenous Mexcan maps as they were made by the Aztecs at the tme of the Spansh colonal Rule. The symbols used on t dsplay smlartes to those of European style mplyng that ths map was produced after the conquest. It was panted on cloth and shows settlement and landscape features.

Guzman 1964

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Maps of Tepetlaoztoc

Two maps from the codex Tepetlaoztoc prnted on European paper.

Guzman 1964

Archaeologcal/ Literate

Map on bottom of Egyptan cofin

Map to ad the deceased n navgatng the mythcal landscapes of their spiritual world.

Bonacher 1965; Schackenburg 1903

Archaeologcal/ Literate

Ground plan on the bottom of an Egyptian cofin

Map to ad the deceased n navgatng the mythcal landscapes of their spiritual world.

Bonacher 1965; Schackenburg 1903

Archaeologcal/ Literate

Map on the bottom of an Egyptian cofin II

Map to ad the deceased n navgatng the mythcal landscapes of their spiritual world.

Bonacher 1965; Schackenburg 1903; Curtius 1923; Rosellini 1834

Archaeologcal/ Literate

Map on the bottom of an Egyptian cofin III

Map to ad the deceased n navgatng the mythcal landscapes of their spiritual world.

Bonacher 1965; Schackenburg 1903; Curtius 1923; Rosellini 1834

Archaeologcal/ Literate

Map on the bottom of an Egyptian cofin IV

Map to ad the deceased n navgatng the mythcal landscapes of their spiritual world.

Bonacher 1965; Schackenburg 1903; Curtius 1923; Rosellini 1834

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Map from the Book of the Dead

Map prnted on papyr depctng a segment of the text’s contents nvolvng passage through a mythcal landscape.

Bonacher 1965; Kees 1926; 1933; 1942; Buck 1935; Budge 1924; Eckert 1921; Grapow 1909–1910; Lacau 1904, 1906; Schackenburg 1903; Esenlohr 1896; Navlle 1886; Krüntz 1793

166

Symbolc Behavour

type of maps

name of maps

Brief description of maps

Known references

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Relef map of southern changsha

Pcture of an orgnal map prnted on slk c. 168 Bc; dscovered durng excavaton of Han tombs n 1973.

chang 1970; 1979; L-Po 1976; Shh-yung 1976; Buck 1975; ch’-Hsang 1975

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Garrson map of southern changsha

Ths s a pcture of a garrson map whch was prnted on slk around 168 Bc. It was dscovered n recently excavated tombs from the Han dynasty.

chang 1970; 1979; L-Po 1976; Shh-yung 1976; Buck 1975; ch’-hsang 1975

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Babylonan world map

Map made on a cuneform tablet c. 500 Bc. It contans both a drawng and a textual descrpton of the Babylonan cosmos.

Unger 1935; 1937

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

cosmos from fresco

Fresco datng to c. 2000 Bc from Telelat Ghassul on the Dead Sea. It s of a relgous nature wth no geographcal bass.

Unger 1937; Mallon et al. 1934

Archaeologcal/ Lterate

Sumeran tablet

Terracotta tablet datng to c. 2100 Bc depctng plots of cultvated land whch belong to the cty of Umma.

Harley 1991

We have drawn the followng conclusons from ths corpus: 1. Most prehstorc and archaeologcal maps are drawn at lmted scales and portray a very restrcted vew, .e. a very localzed world vew. 2. Most prehstorc maps are exceptonally practcal n what s portrayed, emphaszng buldngs, ields and routes. 3. It takes a long tme for non-local maps to develop. Many millennia passed between the irst maps and the earlest maps whch present a broader world vew. 4. Prehstorc maps tend to emphasze and exaggerate local features at the expense of dstant features. Thus there wll be dfferent levels of detal wthn a sngle map. 5. Prehstorc maps tend to have a focal pont n that emphass and resoluton decrease wth dstance from famlar ponts. Frequently there s both an ncrease n scale and a decrease n emphass as one moves from the centre of the map to the perphery. 6. Many prehstorc maps are pctoral but have map status owng to ther dsplay of spatal relatonshps. 7. Prehstorc maps may show usage, ownershp, and horzon markng. 8. Snce most prehstorc maps are so local n character one mght expect most of the local populaton to be famlar wth the terrtory depcted. Thus the functon of such maps would probably not be as way-inders (Blakemore 1981). Rather, they may be memory devces (templates of famlar geographc space whch are used to explan spatal aspects of actvty wthn that area) or mechansms to communcate nformaton to nonlocal populatons. 9. The mages on prehstorc maps tend not to cross cultural boundares. ‘Foregn’ does not seem to be a map concept used frequently n prehstory. 10. There does seem to be a degree of smlarty

across socetes and across tme for the symbolc or semotc representaton of certan features; for example, wavy lnes for rvers. 11. The use of somewhat standardzed feature symbols on prehstorc maps means that succeedng ndvduals or even cultures wll be able to recognze some features of the known topography rrespectve of the semotc or symbolc system whch may be used n other parts of the socal fabrc. 12. Fnally, there s a long tradton of humanods externally representng spatal nformaton n symbolc systems. When dealng wth prehstorc mages whch may depct locaton, space, or other geographc aspects, the interpretation and veriication of these symbols can be problematc. There have been some attempts to nsttute a standardzed crtera (as n the work of Delano Smth) for determnng f an mage s n fact topographc. Many of the cartographc symbols, however, embody only part of these crtera. In many cases, the symbols show the dstncton of locaton and space. In some cases sequences or parallelsm are all that s noted. In others, there are complete plans wth proportonal prncpled geometry. One must keep n mnd when dealng wth prehstorc cases that the materal record s not n any way complete and many symbols may not have survved. To determne other methods for externally storng spatal knowledge we must refer to other sources. ethnographic maps Whle most modern socetes make maps, there are many whch do not. The more smlar ethnographc socetes are to early prehstorc socetes the easer t s to draw approprate analoges and nferences. There are many crtera of smlarty one mght use ncludng economy, socal structure, deology, and demography. Tradtonally, ethno-archaeologsts have used the easest crteron of smlarty, namely economy. Of those modern socetes or hstorcally 167

Ezra B.W. zubrow & Patrck T. Daly

Figure 13.5. Eskimo wood map from the coast of Greenland. This carved map is an excellent example of topographic mapping which considers three dimensions. (Published in Imago Mundi 5 (1965), 93.) socetes n the Human Relatons Area Fles whch had been labelled as relyng on huntng, gatherng or ishing as their primary form of subsistence. The ethnographes were searched under the followng subjects: • • • • • • •

recordng devces recorded hstores proper maps routngs and nautcal charts representatve art cosmologcal maps ethnogeography

We debated whch measures should be used to determne the exstence of materal spatal knowledge representatons or maps. Ultmately, a very conservatve set of crtera was used. We deemed t nadequate f an ethnographer stated that ‘there were natve pctures of the area’, ‘natves drew routes’, or ‘charts were made’. The reasonng was that one could not be sure of the exact character of the ‘potental map’ from the text. Thus, the inal criterion was an actual llustraton of the map n the ethnography or ethnographic iles. Table 13.1 presents the results. Several caveats are approprate. Frst, there may be other categores under whch maps and llustratons may appear. Second, the results are partly determned by the ethnographers’ nterests. Some anthropologsts record spatal data and are nterested n natve maps, whle others show a sublme dsnterest. Thus there may be ‘mappng’ socetes that we have mslabelled. Thrd, the ethnographc record s ncomplete n many ways. Some socetes have never been studed. Some ethnographes were not ncluded n the HRAF corpus. Thus, ths table should be taken wth an approprate ‘gran of salt’ and should be consdered a irst pass and indicative of trends rather than a inal statement.

Figure 13.6. Marshall Island stick chart of the rebbelib type showing wave directions, currents, and islands. (From Lyons 1928, 327; reproduced with permission from the Royal Geographical Society.) recent societies which date to that slightly lexible perod known as the ‘ethnographc present’, the most relevant to a dscusson of the early evoluton of spatal knowledge representaton wll be socetes that relied upon hunting, ishing and gathering. As n the foregong dscusson of prehstorc maps, we present here a few llustratons, then a table derved from a large number of hunting/gathering/ishing societies, and inally an account of the conclusions to be drawn from the corpus. Table 13.2 summarzes the results from approxmately 65 socetes dstngushed by subsstence. It was created by a systematc examnaton of all the 168

Symbolc Behavour

Figure 13.7. Australian bark painting from Arnhem Land. To be of any value in communicating spatial knowledge this map must be viewed in conjunction with certain oral traditions. (From Thrower 1996, 11; reproduced with the kind permission of Galarrwuy Yunupingu, Northern Land Council, Casuarina N.T., Australia.) Several conclusons may nonetheless be drawn from an examnaton of these ethnographc maps. 1. They are relatvely rare. Map makng s not ntegral to many huntng, gatherng and collectng socetes. 2. Topography s relevant. People who lve n areas where topography s mnmal tend to use more maps and the maps are more detaled and accurate. This is exempliied by maps of the Copper Eskmo. 3. Maps tend to be dependent upon the expanse of terrtory covered n daly nteracton. The larger the terrtory and the greater the nteracton, the hgher the probablty of maps. 4. In most of these socetes ndvduals do not need maps for ther local ranges. Rather, they need maps when leavng ther local range or helpng others to ind their way into the local range. 5. Map-makng tends to be dependent upon mode of transport. As one would expect, those socetes whch use boats or anmals for transport wll more frequently requre maps. 6. The greater the uncertanty n the subsstence pattern and the more numerous the varables contrbutng to ths uncertanty, the greater the tendency to make maps. 7. Wthn a socety there s lttle standardzaton of maps regardng scale or features. Thus, two maps wll be very dfferent; examnng dfferent areas, emphaszng dfferent attrbutes, and orented from dfferent drectons. Such cartographc symbols as the wavy lne for a rver or an nverted trangle for hlls, however, are frequently standardzed wthn the socety. Sometmes they are standardzed across socetes.

8. In many of these socetes map-makng s not a secular but a relgous or deologcal actvty. Many maps demonstrate ths by showng the geographcal relatonshps between heaven or other cosmologcal locatons and the area of local nterest. 9. Map-makng may be ntegral to subsstence. yet there are very few thematc maps at all, let alone those emphaszng subsstence. 10. For some socetes the purpose lay n makng the map not the map tself. Geography s taught or communcated through the process of creatng the map thus the map s just a by-product. 11. In many of the socetes there s consderable spatal conscousness that does not correlate wth map-makng. 12. cultures contendng wth dynamc envronments frequently represent the dynamc characterstcs whch are relevant to subsstence and travel n maps. A good example of ths are the Marshall Islands navgatonal charts whch show current drecton. Conclusions We have examned the rse of external symbolc behavour after the human revoluton from a spatal perspectve, revewng the nature, evoluton, and processes of spatal representaton and provdng examples. Sensory data and communcaton of spatal nformaton among ndvduals are crtcal for the development of external spatal symbolc systems. The materal record provdes a substantve account of the orgns of spatal symbolc behavour. Early tools and stes, as well as prehstorc maps, embed ths evdence. The evoluton of spatal symbolc 169

Ezra B.W. zubrow & Patrck T. Daly

table 13.2. A corpus of ethnographic maps from hunting, gathering, and ishing societies. tribe

Semang vedda Kung Mbut Bergdama Hukundka Mwok Nomlak Atsugew Degueno Tubatulabal yokuts yuk Marcopa Washo Murngn Tw Aranda Mskto chamacoco chorot Guato Nambcuara Warrau chrchua-Apache Anu Bozo copper Eskmo Kwakutl Kutena cree Sanpol Tolowa yurok Ser Manus Truk Tkopa Ket Glyak Koryak Alacaluf yahgan Mataco caraja Tucuna callnago Dorobo Sars Naskap Penobscot comanche crow Omaha Gros ventre Kowa Apache cheyenne Ute yukaghr Guahbo Srono Ona Tehuelche Abpon caduveo Awekoma Bororo

Recording devices

Recorded histories

Proper maps

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Routings and Representative nautical charts art – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – yes – yes – – – – – yes – – – – – – – – –

yes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – yes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – yes – – – yes – – – – yes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

behaviour relects the importance of territory in human conduct. Furthermore, from an evolutonary perspectve, we suggest that conscous symbolc spatal behavour has selectve advantages. It provdes ncreased behavoural dversty and advantages n predator/prey relatonshps. Furthermore, t mpacts on the forms of human dspersal. Both

Cosmological maps

ethnogeography

Hunting

Fishing

Collecting

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – yes – – – – – – – – – – – yes – – – – – – – – yes – – – – – – – yes – – – – yes – – – yes – – – – – – – – – – – – yes

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

pre-determnate and non-determnate mgraton requre spatal knowledge n a varety of symbolc forms. The processes by whch varous socetes have organzed and symbolzed spatal phenomena have not been the same cross-culturally, nor across tme. The twenty-four conclusons drawn from the two data bases presented here support several key themes 170

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Battagla, R., 1934a. Incson rupestr d valcamona, n Proceedings of the First International Congress of Prehistoric and Protohistoric Sciences, London August 1–6 1932. London: Oxford Unversty Press, 234–7. Battaglia, R., 1934b. Ricerche etnograiche sui petroglii della cercha Alpna. Studi Etruschi vIII, 11–48. Battagla, R. & M.O. Acanfora, 1954. Il masso ncso d Borno n valcamonca. Bollettino di Paletnologia Italiana 64, 225–55. Bausan, A., 1973. Interpretazone paleo-astronomca della stele d Trora. Bollettino del Centro Camuno di Studi Preistorici 10, 127–34. Beltran Llors, M., 1972. Los grabados rupestres de Bedolna (valcamonca). Bollettino del Centro Camuno di Studi Preistorici 8, 121–58. Berdan, F.F. & P.R. Anawalt (eds.), 1992. The Codex Mendoza, 4 vols. Berkeley & Los Angeles (cA): Unversty of calforna Press. Bernardn, E., 1979. Le Alpi Marittime e le meraviglie del Monte Bego. Genoa: SAGEP Edtrce. Bicknell, C.M., 1897. Le igure incise sulle rocce di Val Fontanalba. Atti della Societa Ligustica di Scienze Naturali e Geograiche 8, 391–411. Bcknell, c.M., 1902. The Prehistoric Rock Engravings in the Italian Maritime Alps. Bordghera: P. Gbell. Bcknell, c.M., 1903. Further Explorations in the Regions of the Prehistoric Rock Engravings in the Italian Maritime Alps. Bordghera: P. Gbell. Bcknell, c.M., 1913. A Guide to the Prehistoric Rock Engravings in the Italian Maritime Alps. Bordghera: G. Bessone. Blan, A. & y. Paquer, 1976. Les gravures rupestres de la vallee des Mervelles. Bollettino del Centro Camuno di studi Preistorici 13–14, 109–19. Blakemore, M.J., 1981. From way-inding to map-making: the spatial information ields of Aboriginal peoples. Progress in Human Geography vI, 1–24. Blumer, W., 1964. The oldest known plan of an nhabted ste datng from the Bronze Age. Imago Mundi 18, 9–11. Blumer, W., 1967. Felsgravuren aus prähstorscher zet n enem obertalenschen Alpental ältester bekannter Ortsplan, Mtte des zweten Jahrtausends v. chr. Die Alpen. Blumer, W., 1968. Ortsplan von Bedolna: Felsgravur um de Mtte des zweten Jahrtausends v. chr. Kartographische Nachrichten 18, 10–13. Bonacher, W., 1965. The Egyptan Book of the Two Ways. Imago Mundi 7, 5–17. Breul, H., 1933. Les peintures rupestres schematiques de la Peninsule Iberique, 4 vols. Pars: Fondaton SngerPolgnac, Imprmere de Lagny. Breul, H., 1954. Les roches peintes du Tassili-n-Ajjer. Pars: Arts et Meters Graphques. Breul, H., H. Obermaer, & W. verner, 1915. La Pileta a Benaojan. (Impr. Artsque v.) Monaco: A. chene. Buck, A. de, 1935. The Egyptian Cofin Texts. (Publcaton 34.) chcago (IL): Unversty of chcago, Orental Insttute.

ncludng ther ‘localty and provncalty’, ther function as more than ‘way inders’, their importance in relaton to mnmal topography, and ther dversty regardng symbolc forms and usage. Perhaps the most fascnatng concluson whch was drawn from ths research s the mmense versatlty n human spatal cognton. Most of the cultures encountered from both the ethnographc study and prehstorc corpus of maps had a culturally unque perspectve to the way that they conceved space and n turn represented t symbolcally. The ablty to process spatal knowledge at complex levels has exsted at least as far back as the early Palaeolthc, and has been n all human socetes snce that tme. Ezra B.W. Zubrow National Center for Geographic Information Analysis SUNY at Buffalo Buffalo, NY 14261-0023 USA & Patrick T. Daly Department of Anthropology SUNY at Buffalo Buffalo, NY 14261-0005 USA References Acanfora, M.O., 1960. Pittura dell’eta preistorica. Mlan: Soceta Edtrce Lbrara. Adler, B., 1910. Karty Pervobytnykh Narodov. Izvestiya Imperatorskogo Obshchestva Lyubiteley Yestestvoznaniya, Antropologii I Ethnograii: Trudi Geograicheskogo Otdeleniya 119(2). Ammerman, A.J. & L. cavall-Sforza, 1984. Neolithic Transition and the Genetics of Populations in Europe. Prnceton (NJ): Prnceton Unversty Press. Anat, E., 1959. Les travaux et les jours aux Ages des Metaux du val camonca. L’Anthropologie 63, 248–68. Anat, E., 1960. La civilisation du Val Camonica. Pars: B. Arthaud. Anat, E., 1964. Camonica Valley, trans. L. Asher. London: Jonathan cape. Anat, E., 1966. Il masso di borno. Bresca: camuna. Anat, E., 1969. Magourata cave. Archaeology 22, 92–100. Anat, E., 1973. La stele d Trora (Lgura). Bollettino del Centro Camuno di Studi Preistorici 10, 101–26. Anat, E., 1976. Evolution and Style in Camunian Rock Art, trans. L. Damond. capo d Ponte: del centro. Bagrow, L., 1928. Ortelii Catalogus cartographorum in Petermannís Geographisschen Mitteilungen v43, v45. Bagrow, L., 1964. History of Cartography, revsed by R.A. Skelton, trans. D.L. Pasey. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Bagrow, L., 1965. Eskmo maps. Imago Mundi 5, 93–5.

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Frobenus, L., 1937. Ekade Ektab: Die Felsbilder Fezzans. Lepzg: Harrassowtz. Frobenus, L. & H. Obermaer, 1925. Hadschra Maktuba: Urzeitliche Felsbilder Kleinafrikas. Munch: K. Wolff. Georgev, G.I., 1978. Forschungsstand der alten Felskunst n Bulgaren, n Acts of the International Symposium on Rock Art: Lectures at Hanko 6–12 August 1972, ed. Sverre Marstrander. Oslo: Unverstetsforlaget, 68–84. Gedon, S., 1962. The Eternal Present: the Beginnings of Architecture, vol. 6. (Bollngen Seres 35.) New york (Ny): Bollngen Foundaton. Goff, B.L., 1963. Symbols of Prehistoric Mesopotamia. New Haven (cT): yale Unversty Press. Grapow, H., 1909–10. zwewegebuch und Totenbuch. Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde 46. Grazos, P., 1942. L’Arte rupestre della Libia. Naples: Edzon della Mostra d’Oltremare. Greenberg, J.H., 1991. Some problems of Indo-European n hstorcal perspectve, n Sprung From Some Common Source: Investigations into the Prehistory of Languages, eds. S.M. Lamb & E.D. Mtchell. Stanford (cA): Stanford Unversty Press, 125–41. Hardng, G.L., 1953. The carn of Han. Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan 73, 8–56. Harley, J.B., 1991. The new hstory of cartography. UNESCO Courier (June 1991), 10–16. Harley, J.B. & D. Woodward, 1987. The History of Cartography. chcago (IL): Unversty of chcago Press. Harvey, P.D.A., 1980. The History of Topographic Maps: Symbol, Pictures, and Surveys. London: Thames & Hudson. Hntkka, J., 1962. Knowledge and Belief. Ithaca (Ny): cornell Unversty Press. Hopkns, D.M. (ed.), 1967. The Bering Land Bridge. Stanford (cA): Stanford Unversty Press. Hutorowcz, H. de, 1911. Maps of prmtve people. Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 43, 669–79. Jakob-Fresen, K.H., 1931. Hmmelskult m alten Norden. Forschungen und Fortschritte 7. Jochelson, v.I., 1905–8. The Koryak. Leden: E.J. Brll. Kamal, Prnce y., 1926–51. Monumenta cartographica Africae et Aegypte, 5 vols. Cairo. Microilm (negative). New york (Ny): New york Publc Lbrary AcG-4476. Kees, H., 1926. Totenglauben und Jenseitsvorstellungen der alten Ägypter. Lepzg: J.c. Hnrchs. Kees, H., 1933. Kulturgeschichte des alten Orients: Ägypten. (Handbuch der Altertumswssensch.) Munch: Beck. Kees, H., 1942. De Feuernsel n den Sargtexten und m Totenbuch. Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde 78, 41–53. Ksh, G., 1972. History of Cartography. New york (Ny): Harper & Row. Ksh, G., 1980. La carte: Image des Civilizations. Pars: Seul. Kohl, J.G., 1860. Kitchi-Gami. London: chapman & Hall. Krüntz, J.G., 1793. Land-Karte. (Ökonom-technol. Enzykl.

Buck, D.D., 1975. Three Han Dynasty Tombs at Ma-wangtu. World Archaeology 7, 30–45. Budge, E.A.W, 1924. A Guide to the First, Second, and Third Egyptian Rooms. 3rd edton. London: Trustees of the Brtsh Museum. caporacco, L. d & P. Grazos, 1934. Le pitture rupestri di Ain Doua (el-Auenat). Florence: Istituto Geograico Mltare. chang, K.-S., 1970. Afrca and Indan Ocean n chnese maps of the fourteenth and ifteenth centuries. Imago Mund 24, 21–30. chang, K.-S., 1979. The Han maps: new lght on cartography n classcal chna. Imago Mundi 31, 9–17. ch’-hsang, T., 1975a. A map more than 2100 years old. People’s Pictorial 9, 34–7. ch’-hsang, T., 1975b. A map more than 2100 years old. Wen-wu 2. clark, J.c. (ed.), 1938. Codex Mendoza. London: Waterlow & Sons. curtus, L., 1923. De antke Kunst. Ägypten und vorderasen, n Handbuch der Kunstwissenschaft, ed. A.E. Brnckmann. Berln: Neubabelsberg. Dams, L., 1978. L’art paleolithique de la caverne de la Pileta. Graz: Akademsche Druck. Davenport, W., 1960. Marshall Island navgaton charts. Imago Mundi 15, 19–26. Delano Smth, c., 1982. The emergence of maps n European rock art: a prehstorc preoccupaton wth space. Imago Mundi 34, 9–25. Delano Smth, c., 1985. The orgns of cartography, an archaeologcal problem: maps n prehstorc rock art, n Papers in Italian Archaeology Iv, pt 2: Prehistory, ed. c. Stoddart & S. Stoddart. (Brtsh Archaeologcal Reports Internatonal Seres 244.) Oxford: BAR, 205–19. Delano Smth, c., 1987. Prehstorc maps and the hstory of cartography: an ntroducton, n Harley & Woodward, vol. 1, 45–50. Delano Smth, c., 1988. Archaeology and maps n prehstorc art: the way forward. Bollettino del Centro Camuno di Studi Preistorici 24, 99–112. Densmore, F., 1929. Chippewa Customs. Washngton (Dc): Government Printing Ofice. Eckert, M., 1921. Die Kartenwissenschaft. Berln & Lepzg: W. de Gruyter. Ehrenrech, P., 1891. Beiträge zur Völkerkunde Brasiliens. Berln: Könglch Museum für völkerkunde, veröffentlchungen. Esenlohr, W., 1842. Ein Altbabylonischer Felderplan. Lepzg: J.c. Hnrchs. Frake, c.O., 1994. Dals: a study n the physcal representaton of cogntve systems, n The Ancient Mind: Elements of Cognitive Archaeology, eds. c. Renfrew & E.B.W. zubrow. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 119–32. Frankowsk, E., 1918. Horreos y palaitos de la Peninsula Iberica. (comson de Investgacones Paleontologcas y Prehstorca 18.) Madrd: Museo Natonal de cencas Naturales.

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60.) Berln. Lacau, P., 1904, 1906. Catalogue general des Antiquites egyptiennes du Musee du Cairo. Sarcophages anterieurs au Nouvel Empire. caro: Insttut Franças d’Archéologe Orentale. Lajoux, J.D., 1963. The Rock Paintings of the Tassilii, trans. G.D. Lversage. London: Thames & Hudson. Le Gear, c.E., 1944. Map-makng by prmtve people. Special Libraries 35(3) (March), 79–83. Leacock, E.B., 1969. The Montagnas-Naskap band, n Contributions to Anthropology: Band Societies, ed. D. Damas. Ottawa: Queens Prnter. Leonardi, P., 1970. Su alcuni petroglii della Valcamonica e della veneza Trdentna, n Symposium International d’Art Prehistorique, Valcamonica, 23–8 Septembre 1968 Union Internationale des Sciences Prehistoriques et Protohistoriques, ed. E. Anat. capo d Ponte: Edzon del centro, 235–9. Lews, G.M., 1979. The ndgenous maps and mappng of North Amercan Indans. The Maps Collection 9 (December), 25–32 L-po, c., 1976. A study of the excavated garrson map from Ma-wang-tu. Wen-wu 21, 24–7. Lous, M. & G. Isett, 1964. Les gravures prehistoriques du Mont-Bego. Bordghera: Insttut Internatonal d’Etudes Lgures. Lumley, H. de, M.-E. Fonvelle & J. Abelanet, 1976. vallee des Mervelles. Union International des Sciences Prehistoriques et Protohistoriques, IX congres, Nice 1976 Lvert- Gude de l’Excurson c1. Lyons, H. (Sr), 1928. The salng charts of the Marshall slanders. Geographical Journal 72(4) (October), 325–9. MacArthur, R.H., 1972, 1984. Geographical Ecology: Patterns in the Distribution of Species. Prnceton (NJ): Prnceton Unversty Press. Malhomme, J., 1959–61. Corpus des gravures rupestres du Grand Atlas. Rabat: Servce des Antqutes du Maroc. Mallon, A., R. Koppel & R. Neuvlle, 1934. Teleilat Ghassul. (Scripta Pontiicii Instituti Biblici.) Rome: L’Institut. Marnger, J., 1960. The Gods of Prehistoric Man. 2nd edton. London: Wedenfeld & Ncolson. Marshack, A., 1972. The Roots of Civilization: the Cognitive Beginnings of Man’s First Art, Symbol, and Notation. London: Wedenfeld & Ncolson. Martn, P. & R.G. Klen (eds.), 1984. Quaternary Extinctions: a Prehistoric Revolution. Tucson (Az): Unversty of Arzona Press. Meek, T.J., 1936. The orentaton of Babylonan maps. Antiquity 10, 223–6. Mellaart, J., 1964. Excavatons at Çatal Hüyük, 1963, 3rd prelmnary report. Anatolian Studies XIv, 39–119. Mellaart, J., 1967. Çatal Hüyük: a Neolithic Town in Anatolia. London: Thames & Hudson. Merk, c., 1876. Excavations at the Kesslerloch Near Thayngen, Switzerland, a Cave of the Reindeer Period. London: Longmans, Green. Moholy-Nagy, S., 1968. Matrix of Man: an Illustrated History of Urban Environment. New york (Ny): Praeger.

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trala: Deakn Unversty Press, 1–66. Unger, E., 1935. Ancent Babylonan maps and plans. Antiquity 9, 311–22. Unger, E., 1937. From cosmos pctures to world maps. Imago Mundi 2, 1–7. vragh, D., 1965. A legregbb terkep. Geodezia es Kartograia 18(2), 143–5. zammt, T., 1930. Prehistoric Malta: the Tarxien Temples. London: Oxford Unversty Press.

of the Baghdad School and the University Museum to Mesopotamia, 2 vols. Phladelpha (PA): Unversty of Pennsylvana Press. Trump, D.H., 1979. I primi architetti: I costruttori dei templi Maltesi. Rome: Gorgo Bretschneder. Tschud, J., 1955. Pitture rupestri del Tasili degli Azger. Florence: Sanson. Turnbull, D., 1989. Maps are terrtores: scence s an atlas, n Nature and Human Nature. Geelong, vctora, Aus-

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Chapter 14 Mind and Artefact: a Dialectical Perspective Robert A. Hnde All humans operate in a world limited by their sensory capacities, which is therefore not the same as the world ‘out there’. Within sensory constraints, each individual elaborates a ‘psychological world’ as a consequence of interaction with others. The psychological worlds of individuals are likely to overlap extensively, in part because they depend on pancultural psychological characteristics and on experiences which have much in common between individuals. More importantly, we strive actively to maintain congruence with the psychological worlds of others. The principles underlying the dialectical relations between individuals and current cultures are likely to be helpful in understanding past cultures; and the principles underlying our interactions with each other can throw into relief some aspects of how we interact with artefacts.

Archaeology

whch they do so ensures a large overlap n ther subjectve worlds, and t s even reasonable to suppose that modern mnds can gan consderable nsght nto the relatons between ndvdual and artefact n past cultures. To that end, some comparsons between the ways n whch ndvduals relate to each other and the ways n whch ndvduals relate to artefacts may be helpful. consderaton of these ssues may make t easer to steer a course between over-smplstc and obscurantst dscusson.

nvolves exploraton of terrtores that can never be fully mapped, and dscusson as to whether even a sketch-plan s possble has been contnuous (Wyle 1993). Much of the current debate reduces to the allocaton of prmacy — to the artefact, as part of the external world, or to the mnds of ts creator and of the archaeologst who tres to dscern its signiicance. Often it is a debate between supposed scientiic objectivity on the one hand and an emphass on the subjectve aspects of our understandng of the world on the other. To one who s outsde the debate, nether extreme vew seems ether acceptable or productve. An mplcaton that we have drect access to a ‘real world’ seems to neglect basc ssues n psychology and physology, whle acceptance of dosyncratc subjectvsm runs counter to the facts of evoluton and of developmental and socal psychology. The suggeston that archaeologcal nterpretatons are largely subjectve rases two ssues. Frst, do ndvduals agree n ther nterpretatons of artefacts? Second, f so, do the nterpretatons of modern observers accord with the signiicance that the artefact had for ts makers and users? It s suggested here that, whle there s a sense n whch all ndvduals construct the worlds n whch they lve, the way n

sensory and perceptual constraints and predispositions The irst point is certainly not new, but perhaps deserves to be underlned n the present context. In the absence of artiicial aids, all humans operate n a world that s not dentcal wth any world that there may be ‘out there’. We can only respond to and descrbe those aspects of the world to whch we are senstve. We have words for colours wthn the vsble spectrum, where we can dscrmnate them, but not for dvsons of the nfra-red or ultra-volet spectrum smply because we are not senstve to them. Ths ssue s not a trval one: the ‘world out there’ affects us only so far as we are senstve to t. 175

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Renfrew (ths volume) ponts out that ‘the possblty of weghng has to arse from experence wth the artefacts of the real world’, but one must add that our ‘real world’ depends on our senstvtes. We would not have devsed balances f we were not senstve to dfferences n weght. An Octopus socety would never do so because, although well able to learn to dscrmnate textures, Octopus seem unable to learn to dscrmnate objects by weght (Wells 1961). The sensory and perceptual characterstcs of our speces are mportant determnants of our artefacts, whch are made to be useful, conspcuous, or dstnctve (Rawson 1992). And a smlar prncple apples also to our motor abltes: a scraper must be nether too small nor too large to hold. Wthn the physcal dmensons to whch we are senstve, we operate wthn a subjectve world that s a consequence of both our nature and our experience. In the irst place, there are some sensory conigurations to which we are especially sensitive: regular igures, for instance, are more conspicuous than irregular igures. And some stimulus coniguratons elct partcular responses: for nstance a touch on the sde of the cheek of a neonate elcts head-turnng towards the pont of stmulaton — part of the sequence that leads to npple contact and suckng. A rapdly enlargng vsual stmulus elcts wthdrawal from older individuals, and certain stimulus coniguratons elct parental or sexual motvaton. Furthermore, by vrtue of our nature we are attracted to some aspects of the external world more than to others. A toddler endeavours to stay near hs or her parent, and eght-year-olds shown pctures of envronments of dfferent knds show a clear preference for savannah (Kaplan 1992), an envronment beleved to have been especally favourable for early humans. Ths selectvty n responsveness, ths way n whch ‘thngs stand out from the background of undfferentated worldhood’, as Thomas (ths volume) puts t, s not a unquely human characterstc, but a feature of all organsms. All ths s because we have evolved to be senstve to, and to respond to, the thngs that matter to us. Natural selecton has also operated so that we are predsposed to learn some thngs more than others (Selgman & Hager 1972; Hnde & Stevenson-Hnde 1973), language beng an obvous example. Human nfants are equpped wth, or rapdly acqure, knowledge of aspects of the physcal world — that sold objects cannot pass through each other (at 4 months) or that unsupported objects fall downwards (at 6 months). They are also equpped wth, or rapdly acqure, knowledge about categores n the external

world — the dfference between anmate and nanmate objects, for nstance (Karmloff-Smth 1992; Spelke 1990; Sperber et al. 1995). the elaboration of the ‘psychological world’ As a consequence of dfferences n nature or crcumstances, however, the experences of every ndvdual dffer from those of others. chldren come to drect ther behavour to some ndvduals rather than others, and to prefer the envronment n whch they lve to savannah. Whle our sensory and perceptual abltes are effectvely pan-cultural, through dfferences n nature and experence each of us constructs a psychologcal world that s n some degree dosyncratc. To say that we ‘construct a psychologcal world’ s, of course, a metaphor. It mples that for all of us the world to whch we respond s not exactly the same as any world whch may exst out there, and furthermore each of us has perceptons and assocatons that dffer n some degree from those of others. The detal of our psychologcal worlds depends for each of us on our own experence. But ths does not mean that we all lve n separate subjectve worlds whch cannot be reconcled wth each other: n practce they are very smlar. Ths s not only because our sensory and perceptual capactes are very smlar, nor just because we all have many aspects of experence n common. There s another more postve reason why we all tend to see the world n a smlar way. It s n our nature (for obvous adaptve reasons) to try to acheve a feelng of securty and coherence, of beng n control, and we can acheve that the more readly f our psychologcal world s compatble wth those of others. We attempt to valdate our vew of the world by comparng t wth those of others, and f there s a dscrepancy, we are lkely to change our own vew or to attempt to change thers (Backman 1985). We construct our worlds ndvdually, not collectvely (contrast Thomas ths volume), but n dong so we are strongly inluenced by how others construct theirs. The more our perceptons of the world concde wth those of others, the more wllng we are to accept them as true. Ths s especally the case wth vews that are unveriable (Byrne et al. 1968), such as those that concern an after-lfe. Searle (1995), wrtng as a phlosopher, reaches a bascally smlar vew — namely that External Realsm s a pervasve and essental ‘Background presupposton’ on the normal understandng of a very large class of utterances. A large degree of commonalty n the psychologcal worlds of the members of any gven 176

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socety, and agreement on many ssues, s thus to be expected. Our unveriiable beliefs, and many of our values and nsttutons, do however depend on a degree of consensus amongst the members of the socety n whch we lve. Each of us s socalzed nto a particular culture and inds other cultures dificult to understand. Does that make t mpossble for archaeologsts, even though agreeng among themselves, to be anywhere near the mark n reconstructing the signiicance of artefacts for their makers and users? Here t s mportant to remember that nether socetal structures nor cultural envronments are gvens: just as ndvduals construct ther psychologcal worlds, so do groups of ndvduals construct and mantan ther socetes and cultures. Each human socety s not a statc entty: t s contnuously beng created, mantaned, changed and dscarded by the actvtes of ndvduals strvng to satsfy ther needs to eat and drnk and procreate, to perceve coherence n the world, to have some sense of control. And n all ther dversty, socetes depend on dalectcal relatons wth the same basc human propenstes or ‘Relatvely Stable characterstcs’ (Hnde 1991), and these are at least n contnuty wth those of the members of earler socetes. Ths s not to deny cultural complexty, for any one cultural feature may have many determnants: ncest taboos may have a dversty of both socal and bologcal nputs. But the dfferent aspects of a culture tend to have some (though ncomplete) coherence: for example, atttudes to women seem to have some relaton to the gender of the detes (Wllams & Best 1982). And all socetes depend and have depended on very smlar propenstes n dachronc nteracton wth ther socal and physcal envronments. The archaeologst s enttled to the same assumpton as the anthropologst engagng n partcpant observaton — that the culture under study has been shaped by propenstes dentcal wth or at least very smlar to those that shaped hs or her own. For understandng the natures of the cultures he or she studes, the principles underlyng the dalectcal relatons between ndvduals and current cultures are more lkely to be helpful to the archaeologst than comparson of partcular past cultures wth partcular current ones. Abstractng such prncples from the wde spectrum of current socetes provdes a powerful tool for understandng other socetes. They brng the archaeologst nearer to the poston of the partcpantly observng anthropologst. Such an approach s facltated by those studyng the role of artefacts n modern socetes (e.g. Halle ths volume)

and, though not explctly stated, s n fact the course adopted by some workng wth moderately complex past societies (Rawson this volume). Of course, this approach may become somewhat less relable the earler the socety under study, but modern mnds can get at least some nsghts nto ‘ancent mnds’ on the bass of ther artefacts, even f that nsght s lmted. Ths s especally the case f the am s prmarly to ind out how artefacts were used, rather than every shade of meanng attached to them (Renfrew 1994). And, as Wyle (1982; 1993) emphaszes, nterpretatve optons can be systematcally evaluated on substantve, evdental grounds, wth the possblty that they can be rejected. As a small contrbuton to ths procedure, comparson wth the manner n whch we nteract wth each other may throw nto relef some aspects of how we nteract wth artefacts, and thus on the signiicance of artefacts in past cultures. the social world and the sense of self We live in an essentially social world. Our personalty s shaped by the socal experences we have had: we are changed as a consequence of nteracton, and we change those wth whom we nteract. Interactons are shaped by the past history of interactions. One’s sense of self depends on the socal envronment one has experenced: the sort of person one sees oneself to be s determned n large measure by the relatonshps one has had wth others. And each relatonshp s specal, wth ts own meanngs, assocatons, memores and expectatons. Thus ndvduals descrbe themselves n large measure n terms of the relatonshps and nteractons that they have wth others — as ‘gettng on well’, ‘havng few frends’, ‘generous’, ‘shy’ and so on (Fletcher & Ftness 1996). The self also comprses the norms and values that we have acqured from socal contacts n the culture n whch we lve. Psychologsts descrbe ths metaphorcally by sayng that the self-system s made up n part of one’s relatonshps wth others. Those others, and the relatonshps wth them, are ncorporated nto the self. Some psychologsts and psychatrsts wrte of the formaton of ‘Internal Workng Models’ of the self, others and relatonshps (Bowlby 1969); others of ‘Self-expanson through relatonshps’ (Aron & Aron 1996). Strathern (ths volume) uses a smlar metaphor when she wrtes of ‘persons havng relatonshps enfolded wthn ther bodes’. The use of metaphors s probably essental n ths context, but they must be seen for what they are — a way to 177

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come to terms wth the complex dalectc between ndvdual and socal experence, a devce to descrbe the ways in which we are inluenced by and inluence our experence (Hnde 1997). We also see ourselves as part of a narratve whch stretches back nto the past and forwards nto the future. Ths narratve can be seen as a dachronc extenson of the Internal Workng Model of the self referred to above. The narrative has some lexibility — we accommodate our story to assmlate new experences and to acheve coherence wth our vew of ourselves and of the world (Holmberg & veroff 1996). It s not unreasonable to suppose that the extenson of our narratve nto an magned future asssts plannng and has therefore been adaptve, and that t may n turn lead to the preoccupaton of humans wth an after-lfe.

some artefacts become part of the self: a mser may become a dfferent person f he loses hs gold. And n usng artefacts, or seeng them used by others, we change them, or at least we change ther meanng for us n such a way that we, and perhaps others, respond dfferently to them n the future. Just as our values are inluenced by social contacts in our culture, so also are they inluenced by artefacts — our possessons, or the cross n the church, to gve two rather dfferent examples. And just as our values affect our personal relatonshps, so do they affect our relatons to artefacts: humans would never have nvented balances f weght (or a correlate of weght) were not mportant to them. Just as the narratves we elaborate embrace our own lves n relaton to those of others, so also they embrace our lves n relaton to the envronment, ncludng the artefacts that we have made and used. The mpulse to go and see the house where one grew up, the treasurng of a chldhood keepsake, have emotonal concomtants, but they also provde physcal conirmation of the narrative one has created, and whose coherence s essental to one’s stablty. Just as we renterpret the narratve of our lfe accordng to how we perceve ourselves at the tme, so the notches on the countng stck, the beads on the rosary or the igures on the VDU are interpreted according to the code n the head of the user. Just as the myths whch ndvduals ncorporate are passed with minor modiication from generation to generaton, so may artefacts outlve the ndvdual who made them (Strathern ths volume), and serve to reelct behavour or re-awaken mages n descendants. The assocatons and meanngs of the god n the temple dffer to some extent between ndvduals (Humphrey & Ladlaw 1993), and ndvduals may choose smlar artefacts for ther houses for dfferent reasons (Halle ths volume). Each one of us may ‘construct’ the assocatons of an object n somewhat dfferent ways — a gven artefact may have a dfferent place n your psychologcal world from what t has n mne. But that does not render hopeless the task of the archaeologst n dscernng the prncpal meanng of an artefact to those who made or used t. Although a ceremonal axe s a ceremonal axe n part because t s labelled as a ceremonal axe by those who used t (J. Heal pers. comm.), and may mean somethng dfferent to emperor, prest and solder, t can stll be recognzed as a ceremonal axe by ts materal propertes and context, and ths has mplcatons about the culture n whch t was used. In most cases the archaeologst may not be n a poston to dscover the meanngs of artefacts to nd-

Individuals and artefacts The role of objects n our lves s n some ways comparable to the role of people, and t s possble to see much of the work dscussed n ths volume n terms of a smlar dalectc between person and artefact. In general, the nature of an artefact depends on aspects of the physcal world (e.g. the materal from whch t s made), on the characterstcs of the ndvdual who made t or for whom t was ntended, and on aspects of hstory and fashon — a concluson reached ndependently by Hnde & Barden (1985) n a study of the physognomy of Teddy Bears and by Rawson (1992) wrtng about the decoraton of chnese bronzes. An artefact s made for a purpose, but n use acqures further assocatons and meanngs n addton to that ntal purpose, and the processes assocated wth ths are very smlar to those nvolved n nterpersonal relatonshps. Just as how we see ourselves s changed by our nteractons and relatonshps wth others, so also s t changed by the artefacts we make and use. Just as havng a frend can change our whole orentaton to the world, so do the objects that surround us. Indeed, we may choose our clothes and possessons so that we are able to present ourselves to the world as we would wsh. Just as people’s self-descrptons are much inluenced by their relationships, individuals have been shown to descrbe themselves dfferently accordng to the envronment that they are n (McGure & McGure 1988), and common experence suggests that they descrbe themselves dfferently accordng to the artefacts that are present. An ndvdual ‘feels dfferent’ n church or temple, or on receiving a gift from a loved one. One could say that 178

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viduals, but can deduce their agreed signiicance in the socety. And f tme brngs changes n the meanng of an artefact to ts users, ths may be revealed to the archaeologst by the context n whch t s found (Rawson ths volume). One way of describing the reciprocal inluences between ndvdual and artefact s to say ‘Mnd, body and world are not ontologcally dfferent spheres’ (Thomas ths volume), and that must be taken as a challenge to unravel the dalectcs nvolved. Socal psychologsts are makng progress n understandng the dalectcs between ndvduals and ther relatonshps, and t s not unreasonable to suggest that a smlar approach mght be relevant to the dalectc between ndvdual and artefact. In studyng relatonshps, psychologsts make use of metaphor, but they endeavour to do so n a way that opens new avenues for exploraton, not one that obscures them. And the fact that dosyncrases of meanng may be beyond the reach of both socal psychologst and archaeologst need be no deterrent to seekng more culturally-general answers: as Wyle (1982, 46) argues, archaeologsts can meet the challenge of comng to terms ‘wth the cogntve, semologcal and symbolic signiicance of their data’.

sual valdaton and nvaldaton on attracton as a functon of avalablty. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 2, 98–107. Fletcher, G.J.O. & J. Fitness (eds.), 1996. Knowledge Structures in Close Relationships. Mahwah (NJ): Erlbaum. Hnde, R.A., 1991. A bologst looks at anthropology. Man 26, 583–608. Hnde, R.A., 1997. Relationships: a Dialectical Perspective. Hove: Psychology Press. Hnde, R.A. & L. Barden, 1985. The evoluton of the Teddy Bear. Animal Behaviour 23, 1371–3. Hnde, R.A. & J. Stevenson-Hnde (eds.), 1973. Constraints on Learning. London: Academc Press. Holmberg, D. & J. veroff, 1996. Rewrtng relatonshp memores: the effects of courtshp and weddng scrpts, n Fletcher & Ftness, 345–68. Humphrey, c. & J. Ladlaw, 1993. The Archetypal Actions of Ritual. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaplan, S., 1992. Envronmental preference n a knowledgeseekng, knowledge-usng organsm, n The Adapted Mind, eds. J. Barkow, L. cosmdes & J. Tooby. New York (NY): Oxford University Press, 581–98. Karmloff-Smth, A., 1992. Beyond Modularity. cambrdge (MA): M.I.T. Press. McGure, W.J. & W. McGure, 1988. content and process n the experence of self. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 21, 97–144. Rawson, J., 1992. Late Shang Bronze desgn: meanng and purpose, n The Problem of Meaning in Early Chinese Ritual Bronzes, ed. R. Whitield. (Colloquies on Art and Archaeology n Asa 15.) London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 67–95. Renfrew, c., 1994. Towards a cogntve archaeology, n The Ancient Mind, eds. c. Renfrew & E.B.W. zubrow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3–12. Searle, J.R., 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. London: Pengun. Selgman, M.E.P. & J.L. Hager (eds.), 1972. Biological Boundaries of Learning. New york (Ny): Appleton century crofts. Spelke, E.S., 1990. Prncples of object percepton. Cognitive Science 14, 29–56. Sperber, D., D. Premack & A.J. Premack (eds.), 1995. Causal Cognition. Oxford: Clarendon. Wells, M.J., 1961. Weght dscrmnaton by Octopus. Journal of Experimental Biology 28, 127–33. Wllams, J.E. & D.L. Best, 1982. Measuring Sex Stereotypes. Beverley Hlls (cA): Sage. Wyle, M.A., 1982. Epstemologcal ssues rased by a structuralst archaeology, n Symbolic and Structural Archaeology, ed. I. Hodder. cambrdge: cambrdge University Press, 39–46. Wyle, M.A., 1993. A prolferaton of new archaeologes: ‘beyond objectvsm and relatvsm’, n Archaeological Theory: Who Sets the Agenda?, eds. N. yoffee & A. Sherratt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20–26.

Acknowledgements I am ndebted to coln Renfrew and chrs Scarre for allowng me to attend the conference on whch ths volume was based, and nvtng me to make ths contrbuton to the volume tself. The precedng dscusson owes much to dscussons wth Dr Jessca Rawson, and I am ndebted to her and to Dr Jane Heal for comments on earler drafts. Robert A. Hinde St John’s College University of Cambridge Cambridge CB2 1TP References Aron, A. & E.N. Aron, 1996. Self and self-expanson n close relatonshps, n Fletcher & Ftness, 325–44. Backman, c.W., 1985. Interpersonal congruency theory revsted: a revson and extenson. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 2, 489–505. Bowlby, J., 1969. Attachment and Loss, vol. 1: Attachment. (2nd edton, 1982.) London: Hogarth. Byrne, D., D. Nelson & K. Reeves, 1968. Effects of consen-

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Chapter 15 Material Culture and Cognition: Concluding thoughts Merln Donald Material culture probably played a seminal role in the initial formation of the human mind. Large-scale efforts at structuring the material environment, such as dwelling arrangements, graves, earthworks and monuments, as well as smaller artefacts, some symbolic, others primarily utilitarian, all played a part. They acquired meaning through their immersion in a rich matrix of custom, ritual, storytelling, and myth. This matrix, in turn, was framed, preserved and sometimes extended by material culture. Material culture externalizes memory and greatly ampliies the permanence, and power, of distributed cognition. In advanced societies, external symbolic storage entails highly complex storage media that require extensive training of the young. Such training can actually change the operational architecture of cognition in the individual by inluencing the developing brain. The continuing interplay between material culture and cognition creates new cognitive opportunities, changing how members of a society represent reality, both individually and collectively.

Materal

serve as shared cogntve maps. These constructs are ‘stored’ n the permanent organzaton of the vllage tself. For the most part, the symbolsm mplct n a vllage plan shapes day-to-day socal nteractons, and serves as one of the foundaton stones of local culture. Perhaps most mportantly, t s also the bass for the acquston of these same cogntve maps by subsequent generatons. The vllage plan s thus transformed nto a transmtter of cultural knowledge, servng as what some neo-Darwnans call a ‘replcatve’ devce, as well as a stablzng force on the culture. Another example of crafted physcal settngs was shown n Dowson’s work on cave art. Although we can never acqure the same detaled documentaton n such cases as Strathern was able to do from a lvng culture, t s nevertheless clear that smlar forces were at work. These cultures shaped and embellshed ther lvng spaces wth materal structures and symbols. Those spaces n turn acted upon ther creators, and shaped the ndvduals lvng n the culture n much the same way that the vllages of New Gunea shaped ther nhabtants. The rchness

culture and the human mnd have coevolved, and ths co-evolutonary process extends far back n tme, perhaps two mllon years or more. Modern humans depend so heavly on materal culture that the word ‘symboss’ does not seem out of place, yet cogntvsts often seem unaware of the importance of this symbiosis, as ish are unaware of the sea. As Renfrew ponted out n hs ntroductory paper n ths volume, we are especally blnd to those aspects of materal culture that are not explctly symbolc, such as the physcal settngs that surround us. yet surely the most nclusve framework of materal culture s ts physcal settng. It s the skeleton, as t were, on whch the body of materal culture s hung. Settlements, roads, ste plans, structures, landscapes, earthworks, and other large-scale arrangements of the envronment form the workng framework, as well as the stablzng anchor, for most of human socal cognton. Strathern’s paper showed very clearly how the physical setting of a village relects and transmits cultural knowledge n New Gunea. The plans of such vllages are really shared analogue constructs that 181

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of cave art conveys the same strong mage of the recprocty of cognton and the physcal settng of culture. Just as t does n lvng cultures, these two factors, the physcal settng tself, and the cogntve map collectvely held by the socety, were constantly accommodatng themselves to one another. Larger physical settings are typically illed wth a constant movement of smaller materal tems between famles and ndvduals, equvalent n function, if not in detail, to the low Strathern observed in New Guinea. She showed how the low of smaller materal artefacts follows an ntrcate pattern that mrrors relatonshps wthn the culture. How early did this pattern emerge? It is dificult to say with any certainty, but the inely-detailed artefacts of the Upper Palaeolthc that were descrbed n detal by d’Errco mght possbly fall nto ths category. Hs paper suggested that small crafted objects appeared early n sapent prehstory. Some of these objects seem to have been non-utltaran, and may have had a prmarly symbolc functon. It wll be mportant to try to determine whether these objects relect a typcally human herarchcal arrangement of material culture; that is, a low-pattern of material objects wthn a larger crafted settng. Alternatvely, ther use mght have been restrcted to ndvduals, but that seems unlkely. Strathern wrote that socal relatons make ‘artefacts’ out of persons, and drew a comparson between the symbolc functons of persons, vewed n ths way, and external symbolc artefacts. Ths s an mportant pont. All of human culture, ncludng ts mmetc and oral aspects, exsts outsde of the ndvdual, or more properly ncorporates and entangles the ndvdual. Wthn that dstrbuted cultural matrx, almost anythng or anyone can be made to serve a symbolc functon. Buldngs can form a symbolc boundary, and so can personal acts, natural objects, or abstract maps. In that case, what s so specal about external symbolc artefacts? Taken n that way, they may not appear to be specal. They can serve functons that are smlar to those served by personal acts, or objects such as buldngs, and n fact they are often substtutes for such acts and objects. But n another sense, external symbols are very specal, and that s why I have placed such emphass on the physcal meda from whch symbolc artefacts are made. As I tred to make clear n Table 2.2, the varous physcal meda of external symbols were crucal varables n the cumulatve ncrease of ther power over tme, because the ntroducton of new meda gradually freed the symbolzaton process from the lmtatons of bologcal memory, eventually

leadng to the possblty of radcally novel symbolc formats such as deographs, logographs, wrtng systems, monographs, geometrc drawngs, schematc dagrams, and mathematcal notatons. Persons can never store knowledge the way a novel or encyclopaeda can, n ether a qualtatve or a quanttatve sense, and the man reason for ths s the lmted medum of bologcal memory storage. crafted cues whose prmary functons are non-symbolc, such as costumes, vllages and houses, can certanly functon symbolcally, and undoubtedly served as mportant way statons durng the thrd transton, but, by ther very nature, they are not comparable n sheer representatonal power to later nventons, such as books and scientiic diagrams. Nevertheless, they were the startng pont of a revoluton, and the only way to reconstruct that revoluton s to trace ther prehstory. The habt of craftng the envronment tself, as well as the smaller, more explctly symbolc forms of materal culture, to meet the socal, practcal and communcatve needs of the group, s possbly the most salent marker of our dstnctvely human style of cognton. Ths remans true n modern human socety, where our materal culture sometmes threatens to overwhelm us wth ts rchness. Indvduals are surrounded by a sea of symbols and artefacts. The conventons regulatng ther uses are complex and subtle, and ndvduals often employ materal culture n dosyncratc ways. Halle’s paper explored how certan cultural objects are actually used by people n modern socety, and he demonstrated somethng that s often overlooked n studes of symbols, that the rules of use are far from rgd and formal, and at tmes appear rratonal n the extreme. Archaeologsts and psychologsts mght both gan an mportant clue from hs study of the mundane uses to whch humans put ther materal culture. There s clearly a wde contnuum of formalty, rangng from the state-enforced rtual uses of formal relgous art and archtecture, to many personal use-patterns that are rather more casual. The latter have probably not changed very much over tme, despte the much greater sze and complexty of materal culture n technologcally sophstcated socetes. Even n modern socety, some of the apparently ‘symbolc’ uses of materal culture are governed by rratonal, largely mmetc prncples. Conformity and mimesis There may be a tendency among hghly lterate academcs to place nordnate stress on the role of 182

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formal languages and symbols n human culture. This relects an aspect of modern social reality, but not necessarly the more basc prncples that rule human cultures. I do not deny the domnant role that language-based symbols have played, but the roots of human culture run far deeper than our language-based cultural nsttutons. In my vew, human culture s prmarly mmetc n ts orgns. It s more deeply rooted n non-verbal cognton and communcaton than t s n language. Ths prncple extends, I beleve, to many of the uses of materal culture, ncludng some of ts earlest forms. Among other thngs, our powerful mmetc sklls make us conformng creatures. The pressure to act and think like others, and to become identiied wth groups, s overwhelmng. It s thus perhaps not surprsng that we commonly use aspects of materal culture to enforce conformty and group dentty. Knshp emblems, vllage plans, dress and body decoraton conspre to mpose a socal order. Ths s a cultural unversal. Even modern scentsts, who (wthout excepton n my experence) beleve themselves to be ‘ndvdualsts’ are n fact strongly condtoned to behave one way n the semnar hall, another n the street, and another n varous prvate settngs. Facal expresson, body language, and actons are closely controlled by these settngs. So, to an alarmng extent, are thought and gesture. The slghtest devaton from an unwrtten, and hghly complex, code of dress, voce, acton and gestculaton wll be pcked up anywhere, whether on the street or n academe tself. Even cambrdge, famous for ts eccentrcs, wll accept only those who conform to ts unwrtten codes. The codes that regulate thought and association are also narrowly cued by speciic settngs — pubs, Hgh Tables, lbrares, laboratores, classrooms, hotels, houses. These settngs call up what computatonalsts call ‘scrpts’, or sequences of behavour approprate to them. Thus there are scrpts for ‘partcpatng n a semnar’, ‘workng n the library’, and ‘eating at High Table’. These deine what s possble n each settng. To be truly a part of cambrdge, we must acqure the approprate scrpts, just as chldren must acqure languages. The most unversal of these scrpts are acqured early n lfe, medated by the mmetc processes so beautfully descrbed by Harrs. certanly, such processes as full-body re-enactment, shared pretendng, and magnatve dsplacement allow modern chldren to acqure an ntal understandng of ther culture, ncludng some of ts materal aspects. Ths understandng s later greatly enlarged through the medaton of language, but the mmetc dmenson

remans fundamental, and to some degree, ndependent. Although, as Harrs has observed, mmess and language may normally develop n synchrony wth each other, mmetc sklls have been observed n nonsgnng deaf people, where there s no possblty of language medaton. Moreover, mmess and language operate by dfferent prncples, the former by concty and analogy, the latter by explct descrpton and explct denotaton of relatons. Even today, the uses of materal culture more often than not relect these ‘irrational’ mimetic forms. The unversal presence of fashon, musc, custom, and rtual n popular culture, so apparently subversve of more formalstc and ratonal cultural nsttutions, testiies to this. Although apparently easy to acqure when young, such conventons are often dificult for adults — more dificult than languages, a lesson that many Western executves and dplomats have learned the hard way. In summary, materal culture acqures ts meanng through mmerson n a rch cogntve-cultural system, and the fundamental cogntve ‘glue’ that holds ths system together s mmess. external memory External memory, as a general rule, s a drect extenson of the larger cogntve-cultural system that generated it. But material culture, broadly deined, has marked homnd socety for a very long tme, whereas I have placed the ‘thrd transton’ n human evoluton squarely wthn the era of sapent humans. Is there perhaps a contradcton here? If not, when dd homnd materal culture suddenly and mraculously start to qualfy as ‘external memory’? Does ths term apply only when the symbolsm of materal culture s explct? Or does t apply to the crafted envronment, ncludng the physcal settng, whch, as we have seen, can be mplctly symbolc? What, for nstance, about the subtle, quas-symbolc inluences of the site plan? Do such things qualify as bona ide ‘external memory’? I now realze that I have not addressed ths queston as thoroughly as I should have, and I am grateful to archaeologsts for pontng that out to me. I thnk I have already hnted at a possble answer: there s nothng magcal about external symbols, and no clear-cut break between non-symbolc, non-ntentonal aspects of materal culture, such as the earlest stone tools, and obvously symbolc aspects, such as systems of notaton whose utlty as memory devces s explct. Apes can learn to use external symbols, and they do not thereby change 183

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ther basc cogntve abltes, even though symbols may release a number of latent sklls. Ther uses of symbols relect the kinds of ‘mental models’ that apes are able to produce. When they master a set of symbols, they do not suddenly start to thnk lke humans. The pont s that external symbols can only be used to enhance and extend basc capactes that are already n place. The same prncple apples to humans. In the course of evoluton, homnds acqured two knds of mental capacty that apes cannot match: mmess and language. Predctably, the external symbols nvented by humans explot those two unquely powerful human capactes. Other aspects of materal culture also explot these specal capactes, but they cannot change human nature, or the basc capactes of humans. The signiicant change came with the transition from casual or implicit material inluences, such as may be found n those aspects of materal culture that are not explicitly symbolic, to full-ledged external symbols. External symbols have become a very powerful transformng force n human lfe, and have altered the cogntve landscape, precsely as they became more potent storage devces, capable of storng much more explct and hghly detaled knowledge. When dd ths transformaton begn? As d’Errco ponted out, when t comes to decodng the earler stages of human prehstory, we are left wth only a few artefacts that mght qualfy as ‘true’ symbols. Moreover, whatever artefacts mght survve hs rgorous ntal screenng lack the codes and conventons that must have nformed ther use. Unfortunately, the external symbols themselves never contan enough nformaton to allow us to redscover the detaled thought-habts of an ancent culture a posteriori. Symbolc artefacts, even of the more elaborate knd, rarely encode the conventons governng ther use, wth the possble excepton of some mathematcal systems. This makes it very dificult to reconstruct the earlest perod of symbolc prehstory, whch ncludes most of the Upper Palaeolthc. D’Errco gves us a hnt of one possble means of resolvng ths ssue. By analyzng carefully the constructon of these very early artefacts, one mght be able to nfer ther usepatterns, and possbly the type of constructon plan n the mnd of the person who made them. Ths mght permit a generic re-classiication of these artefacts, and mght well yeld a new conceptual framework wthn whch not only very ancent, but even more recent artefacts can be placed n a conceptual herarchy. Some delegates, for nstance, Lowe and Thomas, came to ths conference wth the ntent of focusng exclusvely on the ‘storage’ functons of external

symbols. But, n my vew, adherng too closely to such a lteral nterpretaton restrcts dscusson unnecessarly and tends to dstort my theory. (Thomas n partcular msread me as a computatonalst, whch I most emphatcally am not.) I have never placed a lteral nterpretaton on the ttle of ths conference, but some have taken my termnology lterally, as f the term ‘external symbolc storage’ were meant to exhaust all the functons of external symbols. In fact, ths goes completely aganst the gran of my thnkng. The ‘storage’ functon of symbols cannot be solated from ther other functons, nor from the mnds that use them. Above all, they are a testmony to the publc creatve processes that nvented them in the irst place. When I coned the term ‘external symbolc storage’, I was smply snglng out the most salent and ndsputable property of materal culture: t exsts only n relaton to nterpretatve codes stored nsde the heads of the people who nvented t, that s, nsde ther ‘bologcal’ memory systems. Wrtten symbols, and even other less explctly symbolc aspects of materal culture, are external to bologcal memory, and serve as storage devces for the nformaton needed to replcate entre cultures. Ths smple fact changes the nature of shared cognton. But t also makes the archaeologist’s job very dificult, because the speciic content of symbols can never exhaust ther functons when n use. When n use, symbols engage bologcal memory, whch s a creatve, constructve, dynamc, force. Symbols and cogntve artefacts are thus drawn nto a maelstrom of shared cogntve actvty n any culture. Artefacts are statc thngs, and undoubtedly serve as statc storage devces, but ther functons n the larger cultural matrx go well beyond mere storage, because they are n dynamc nteracton wth the entre cogntve-cultural system n any lvng culture. Regardng Lowe’s noton that symbolzng capacty depends upon a unquely human form of conceptualization and classiication, I cannot agree. In the last few years our vew of the mnds of what he calls the ‘lower anmals’ has been somewhat revolutonzed. Ths s especally true of chmpanzees and bonobos, but t also apples to other speces that are genetcally qute far from the prmate lne, such as dolphns and parrots. Many speces have the ablty to use symbols, and use them ntellgently. Pepperberg’s parrot comes to mnd. When confronted wth a choce of varous coloured objects, and asked: ‘Whch s the yellow one?’; he answers correctly, ‘banana’. It seems that even a parrot can conceptually solate the colour from the form of an object, and realze (only mplctly, of course) that objects can smultaneously 184

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come under varous conceptual herarches (Pepperberg & Breznsky 1991; Pepperberg 1992). The same s true of prmates. Premack (1976) showed that chmpanzees can master vsual symbols that represent abstract concepts such as ‘same as’ and ‘dfferent from’, and are able to answer a varety of questons, some farly abstract, usng ths skll. As I ponted out at some length n my (1991) dscusson of symbolc nventon, we should not read too much nto ths; but we should not underestmate ths achevement ether. Savage-Rumbaugh and her colleagues (1993) have demonstrated convncngly that Kanz, ther star bonobo pupl, can do far more than conceptualze objects and ther relatons. He can segment the speech stream nto words, parse smple reversble Englsh sentences, and use hundreds of vsual symbols to communcate, not only wth humans, but also wth other bonobos (although the latter occurs only under hghly structured condtons). Kanz s also able to manufacture (and correctly use) smple stone tools and play smple computer games. Hs symbolc talents far exceed anythng we mght have predcted a decade ago. Humans are undoubtedly unque n ther spontaneous nventon of language and symbols; but, as I have argued elsewhere (Donald 1997; 1998a,b) our specal advantage s more on the producton sde than on the conceptual sde of the ledger. Anmals know much more than they can express. We can come closer to expressng what we know, because of a revoluton n our ablty to apply our knowledge n the control of acton, whether n speech, gesture, or re-enactve pantomme.

object may have several functons, and several layers of symbolsm n dfferent tmes, places, and socal classes, n the same socety. It s only a node n a dynamc socal-cogntve system. The system tself deines the role of such objects. It creates, changes, and enforces ther precse functons. True, the objects themselves serve a storage functon. But to know what symbols and artefacts store, and what knds of speciic cognition they might support, we must know a lot about the culture, and the mnd, that uses them. In ths I am n full agreement wth Renfrew. In the absence of that knd of detaled knowledge, the only avalable strateges for reconstructng homnd prehstory are nterpolaton, based on prmate–human comparsons, and extrapolaton, based on what s known about the uses of materal culture n exstng socetes. Used cautously and n a prncpled manner, these strateges can yeld rch nsghts. I thnk that Mthen’s attempt to recreate human prehstory n cogntve terms s laudable, even though I disagree with many elements of the speciic theory that he has proposed, partcularly hs readng of the domain-speciicity literature. But he has at least acknowledged the complexty of the problem, and gven more tme, we should be able to buld better reconstructons. Many prevous accounts of human prehstory have tended, n the nterest of doctrnare reductonsm, to oversmplfy the magntude of the cogntve steps that early homnds had to take to arrve at our current cogntve and cultural state n two mllon years. There are stll many theorsts who resst the dea that homnds really travelled so far so fast, and who nsst on oversmplfyng the problem, usually, n my opnon, by greatly underestmatng the capabltes of early humans. A few more efforts lke those of Mithen, and perhaps these oversimpliications will be seen for what they are. Renfrew has suggested, n ths ven, that perhaps we should nterpose an addtonal transton n my scenaro, one that effectvely dstngushes between certan Neolthc materal cultures that have many of the forms of modern symbolc culture, wth the notable excepton of wrtng, and those cultures that also have wrtng. Ths dstncton could prove qute useful. Although wrtng was undoubtedly the most powerful symbolc nventon, and the one that started us on the road to modernty, there s a great deal more to external symbolc representaton than wrtng, and wrtng eventually changed the rules by whch symbols were used. Many cultures that completed the transton to food producton, and had large permanent settlements, monuments, hghly

the cultural context All ths s thrown nto sharp relef when archaeologsts and anthropologsts confront us wth cultures that fall outsde our drect experence. I was very struck by Rawson’s paper, whch showed how symbols, sacred objects, and rtual were employed n the mmensely complex matrx of custom that encompassed the whole fabrc of chnese classcal cvlzaton. To understand the functon of a ceremonal knfe n that socety, t s clearly not enough to descrbe the object tself, although t s perhaps the only way to start. A knfe may ndeed serve a storage functon, perhaps to cue a rtual behavour, convey ether acceptance or some other form of socal recognition, or to facilitate a certain kind of relection, but ts cogntve utlty s rarely, f ever, restrcted to ts storage functon. Above all, the symbolc value of any artefact s not always evdent n ts appearance. The same 185

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crafted possessons, emblems, and many markers of dentty and possesson, could be sad to form a symbol-usng category of ther own. Others mentoned that t mght prove useful to ntroduce other addtonal transtons, mcrotransitions as it were, to recognize some of the iner dstnctons between dfferent types of symbolc cultures. Rawson proposed that theoretc culture should perhaps be dssected nto subphases and subcategores, and elsewhere, Egan (1997) has made a smlar suggeston regardng mythc culture. Of course, Renfrew, Rawson and Egan have ther own agendas, and as soon as we abandon my neurocogntve poston, there may well be good reason to make these iner distinctions. However, n defence of my three-transton scenaro, I should say that t was a farly revolutonary act to ntroduce even a sngle nonbologcal evolutonary transton nto what was, after all, a prmarly bologcal scenaro. I chose to ntroduce a thrd transition not so much to develop a reined tool for cogntve archaeology and anthropology (although that s an admrable objectve n tself) but to pont out to neuroscentsts and psychologsts that culture s a major player n shapng the mnd, not n a trval way, but n the psychologcally fundamental sense that t actually alters our cogntve archtecture. It gves the human mnd much of ts adult shape and power. My crteron for categorzng the modern symbolic era as a full-ledged ‘transition’, equal in mportance to the two cogntve adaptatons that shaped the early homnd mnd was that t also trggered an archtectural change n the human cogntve apparatus. Ths change shows up n two ways. Frst, nternally: symbolc lteracy, once t reaches a certan level of complexty, alters our nternal modular bran organzaton. Ths alteraton s mposed by cultural reprogrammng of axonal and synaptc growth durng some of the key perods of neural epgeness. Second, externally; symbolc cultures alter the externally dstrbuted, or shared, archtecture of cognton, ntroducng some very powerful propertes nto the external memory system. Ths change took consderable tme — at least several thousand years — before t had an mpact on how we thnk, but the end-result has been a perod of unprecedented cultural nnovaton, wth some completely new forms of representaton. Whle t s true that most of ths change occurred after the ntal nventon of wrtng, the process actually started long before wrtng, and long before the arrval of the Hgh Neolthc socetes that Renfrew sngles out for dfferent treatment. The external symbolc juggernaut

has not yet settled nto equlbrum, and contnues to spn off new cogntve and cultural forms. For ths reason, I still ind it useful to classify the historical unfoldng of external symbols as a sngle event, at least for the purpose of descrbng changes n psychologcal structure. I wllngly conceded, that, for the advancement of cogntve archaeology, a dfferent, and iner-grained, classiication of material cultures might be justiied. We should not, however, aspre to more precson than the data justfy. Materal culture s multdmensonal n ts functon, and unlkely to blend easly nto a neat, communcaton-engneerng model of cognton, n whch every functonal subsystem s clearly delneated, and every symbol gven an unambguous deinition. Accordingly, I have tried to avoid such models. Unlike the narrowly-deined symbols and algorthms that drve dgtal computers, human physcal culture exsts n a communty of ‘fuzzy’ mnds that tolerate, ndeed thrve on the ambguty, subtlety, and perversty of human lfe. Many of the external symbols invented by human culture relect this fuzzy or analogue thnkng strategy. The fascnatng ancent maps revewed by zubrow are typcal of such symbols, snce they follow a prncple of perceptual and acton-metaphor, relecting ‘pictorial’ and ‘ideographic’ modes of vsual representaton that are essentally analogue n style, and hghly dverse n ther vernacular. These knds of sophstcated symbols seem to have come much later, long after humans evolved language, but they stll operate prmarly accordng to a mmetc organzatonal prncple, whch s the most fundamental level of human representaton. Lake’s paper rased Dawkns’ concept of ‘memes’, and the queston of Darwnan cultural transmsson theory. Ths s an nterestng theoretcal approach, certanly worth explorng, albet wth great cauton. Dawkns’ dea s a dangerously attractve meme n ts own rght, n my vew. It s an oversmplfyng noton thought up by a genetcst as a way of ‘explanng’ cultural evoluton wthout engagng n any psychology. Ths s why socobologsts love memes — they can contnue to avod the complextes of psychology and physology, as they always have. Dawkins’ idea is simple enough: ind the elementary cogntve unts n any culture that self-replcate, and hang the detals; all you need s the theory of natural selecton. Ideas and customs, lke genes, are n constant competton for survval. Some memes self-destruct quckly, whle others prosper for thousands of years. All that remans to be explaned s ther adaptve value; that s, the reasons why certan memes survve, whle others de out. Ths s acheved 186

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by a post hoc process of reasonng. Unfortunately, ths approach leaves out all the detals, and, as the sayng goes, the scence s n the detals. Memes, whatever ther form, are ntentonal representatons. To understand them, we must dscover what they are, n terms of basc cogntve processes. The prmary motve behnd my own theoretcal work has been to answer that queston. Untl we know the answer, we cannot know what memes are, how they emerged, how they are transmtted across generatons, or how they tap nto pre-exstng cogntve domans. Some neo-Darwnans don’t even ask these questons, but hopefully archaeologcal explorers such as Lake wll. It s a chastenng thought for a psychologst to realze that materal culture provdes the context for vrtually all modern hgher cognton. In our socety, materal culture appears as an overbearng force, so much so that one mght be tempted to regard the ndvdual mnd as dmnshed by t. But we cannot have a scence of mnd that dsregards materal culture. Smlarly, we cannot have an adequate scence of culture, whether ancent or modern, that leaves out cognton. Despte the exploson of materal culture n our tmes, the ndvdual mnd remans ts source, interpreter, and inal arbiter.

References Dawkns, R., 1986. The Blind Watchmaker. London: Pengun. Donald, M., 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition. cambrdge (MA): Harvard Unversty Press. Donald, M.W., 1997. The mnd consdered from a hstorcal perspectve: human cogntve phylogeness and the possblty of contnung cogntve evoluton, n The Future of the Cognitive Revolution, eds. D. Johnson & c. Ermelng. Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press, 355–65. Donald, M.W., 1998a. Precondtons for the evoluton of protolanguages, n The Descent of Man, eds. M.c. corballs & I. Lea. Oxford: Oxford Unversty Press, 120–36. Donald, M.W., 1998b. Mmess and the Executve Sute: mssng lnks n language evoluton, n Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases, eds. J.R. Hurford, M. Studdert-Kennedy & c. Knght. cambrdge: cambrdge Unversty Press, 44–67. Egan, K., 1997. The Educated Mind. chcago (IL): Unversty of chcago Press. Pepperberg, I., 1992. Proicient performance of a conjunctve, recursve task by an Afrcan Gray Parrot (Psittacus erithacus). Journal of Comparative Psychology 106, 195–305. Pepperberg, I. & M.v. Breznsky, 1991. Acquston of a relatve class concept by an Afrcan Gray parrot (Psittacus erithacus). Journal of Comparative Psychology 105, 286–94. Premack, D., 1976. Intelligence in Ape and Man. Hllsdale (NJ): Erlbaum. Savage-Rumbaugh, E.S., J. Murphy, R.A. Sevck, K.E. Braake, S.L. Wllams & D. Rumbaugh, 1993. Language Comprehension in Ape and Child. (Monograph 58.) chcago (IL): Socety for Research n chld Development.

Merlin Donald Department of Psychology Queen’s University Kingston, Ontario Canada K7L 3N6

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