Civil Servants and Globalization: Integrating MENA Countries in a Globalized Economy 9781529215762

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Civil Servants and Globalization  Tony Verheijen, Katarina Staronova, Ibrahim Elghandour and Anne-Lucie Lefebvre

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Integrating MENA Countries in a Globalized Economy Tony Verheijen, Katarina Staronova, Ibrahim Elghandour and Anne-Lucie Lefebvre

ISBN: 978-1-5292-0034-8 B R I S TO L

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Civil Servants and Globalization

Transnational Administration and Global Policy Series Editors: Kim Moloney, College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar, Michael W. Bauer, School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute, Italy and Meng-Hsuan Chou, NTU Singapore This series contributes to the theorization of the expansion and institutionalization of global-governance structures by examining the actors and ideas permeating, shaping and engaging in these developments. Forthcoming Whistleblowing and Retaliation in the United Nations Edited by Caroline Hunt-Matthes and Alexis Bushnell Knowledge Alchemy Models and Agency in Global Knowledge Governance By Tero Erkkilä, Meng-Hsuan Chou and Niilo Kauppi Radical Individualism Decentralization from Federalism to Bitcoin By Karl T. Muth and Jodi Beggs Administering Global Health How the Pragmatic and Strategic Business of Doing Global Health Shapes Priorities and Policies By Carmen Huckel Schneider

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CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION Integrating MENA Countries in a Globalized Economy Tony Verheijen, Katarína Staroňová, Ibrahim Elghandour and Anne-​Lucie Lefebvre

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 374 6645 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2022 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-5292-1574-8 hardcover ISBN 978-1-5292-1575-5 ePub ISBN 978-1-5292-1576-2 ePdf The right of Tony Verheijen, Katarína Staroňová, Ibrahim Elghandour and Anne-​Lucie Lefebvre to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the authors and not of their employers, the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc Front cover image: Evie S./Unsplash Bristol University Press use environmentally responsible print partners. Printed in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures, Tables, Boxes and Graphs List of Abbreviations Preface PART I Analytical Framework and Regional Context 1 Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants: Towards an Analytical Framework 2 The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Globalization PART II Civil Servants’ Response to Globalization 3 Drilling Down on Globalization: Performance Indicators and Rankings as Features of Multi-​Level Governance 4 Deepening Engagement with International Development Institutions: Impact on Civil Servants 5 Trickling Down: Impact of the Global Movement on Open Government

vi viii x

3 40

75 107 143

PART III Conclusion: Growing Impact despite Resilient Filters 6 Globalization and Civil Servants: A Response Typology 177 Final Thoughts References Index

208 209 226

v

List of Figures, Tables, Boxes and Graphs Figures 3.1 4.1 4.2 5.1

Vignette 2: Civil servants’ response strategies to performance on indicators Vignette 1: Coordination and collaboration Vignette 4: Consultation and pressures from internal and external stakeholders Vignette 3: Accountability and mobilization of stakeholders

90 126 133 157

Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3

Typology of civil servants based on civil servants’ responses to globalization Overview of organizations for which interviewees work Validation of vignette scenarios in piloting Qualitative vignettes and globalization concepts IMF programme disbursement per capita Summary of interview responses on international partner engagement Eligibility scores of focus countries on the Open Government Partnership Country scores on access to information Perceived importance of stakeholders Four types of civil servants Potential and risks of vignettes Response types by transmission channel and by country

13 31 34 35 115 119 150 152 168 182 188 197

Boxes 3.1 3.2 4.1

Global performance indicators: methodologies and data quality 79 Vignette 2: Affiliation and allegiance 87 Challenges on quality of resource flow data 110 vi

List of Figures, Tables, Boxes and Graphs

4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2

Vignette 1: Coordination and collaboration Vignette 4: Stakeholder consultation and transparency Vignette 3: Application of access to information policies Vignette 4: Participatory processes in practice

125 132 156 166

Graphs 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.2

GCI ranking GCI: basic requirements ranking (2010–​18) GCI: efficiency enhancers ranking (2010–​18) GCI: innovation and sophistication ranking (2010–​18) EFI: evolution of ranking EFI: evolution of ratings EDB ratings Country rankings: EDB 2020 Total new receipts per capita, 2007–​17 Total grant receipts per capita, 2007–​17

vii

80 81 82 82 83 83 85 86 113 114

List of Abbreviations ATI CEDRE CNEA COVAX CSO DAC DPL EBPM EC EDB EFI EIA EU FOIA G20 GAVI GCC GCI GDP GIZ HCI HDI IATI IBP ICT IFI IGPP IMF IOs

Access to Information Conférence Economique pour le Développement, par les Réformes et avec les Entreprises Comité Nationale de l’Environnement des Affaires (Morocco) COVID Vaccines Global Access Civil Society Organization Development Assistance Committee (OECD) Development Policy Loan Evidence-​Based Policy Making European Commission Enabling Doing Business Economic Freedom Index Environmental Impact Assessment European Union Freedom of Information Act Group of Twenty (Premier forum for international economic cooperation) Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, recently renamed Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance Gulf Cooperation Council Global Competitiveness Index Gross Domestic Product German Agency for International Co-​operation Human Capital Index (World Bank) Human Development Index (UNDP) International Aid Transparency Initiative International Budget Partnership Information and Communication Technology International Financial Institution Instance Générale pour les PPP (Tunisia) International Monetary Fund International Organizations viii

List of Abbreviations

IRM IT LIC MENA MFA MIC NGO NPM ODRA OECD OFID OG OGP OPEC PEFA PFM PISA POGAR PPP RFI RTI SDGs SOEs TA TI UAE UK UN UNCAC UNCTAD UNDP UNICEF US UTICA WEF WGI WHO WTO

Independent Reporting Mechanism Information Technology lower-income countries Middle East and North Africa Macro-​Financial Assistance middle-​income countries non-​governmental organization New Public Management Open Data Readiness Assessment Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development OPEC Fund for International Development Open Government Open Government Partnership Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Public Financial Management Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD) Programme on Governance in the Arab Region Public Private Partnership Rapid Financing Initiative Right to Information Sustainable Development Goals state-​owned enterprises technical assistance Transparency International United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Convention against Corruption United Nations Commission for Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund United States of America Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie de la Commerce et de l‘Artisanat World Economic Forum Worldwide Governance Indicators World Health Organization World Trade Organization

ix

Preface In today’s context of global crisis and uncertainty, a study on the impact of globalization on civil servants may seem far removed from reality. Yet, while the COVID-​19 pandemic has shown the limits of globalization in the form of vaccine nationalism and border closures, it has also, once again, shown its potential in terms of helping to save lives and improve livelihoods, through the global COVAX initiative and its roll out. Reviews of responses to the crisis have highlighted the need for more rather than less global action, and a greater role for transnational actors in addressing global issues. Additionally, the pandemic has reinvigorated the global debate on other issues, such as climate change, where there is also a renewed urgency for action. Hence, while the current global crisis may lead to a focus on different aspects of globalization (health and climate) to what we primarily discuss here (economic and governance), to us it is likely that the influence of globalization on the day-​to-​day work of civil servants will increase as a result. This of course will evolve more clearly in the years to come. The origins of this work predate the current global crisis, and arose from a literature and source review done in the context of developing the Oxford Handbook of Global Policy and Transnational Administration (Stone and Moloney, 2019). One of the conclusions of this review (Raadschelders and Verheijen, 2019) was that the literature on the impact of globalization on civil servants is very sparse, and that there is a significant research agenda to be covered, especially in empirical research. This volume is our initial effort to begin building an empirical research base to understand the scope of the nature of ‘influencing and being influenced’ between national civil servants and transnational actors. To us, this is an important topic that needs far more attention, as an aspect of global governance that will determine the success of our ability to cope with the key global challenges of tomorrow and today, starting with meeting the objectives set out in the UN (United Nations) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Transnational actors today are increasingly diverse (classical international organizations, national organizations operating globally, non-​governmental international actors, and so on) and engage with national civil servants in a growing variety of ways: through direct engagement (including formal x

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Preface

cooperation), indirect engagement (global norms and standards, performance indicators), and by empowering national non-​governmental actors to hold governments accountable. The steady growth of interactions is documented in survey-​based research by the Aiddata Laboratory at William and Mary university in Williamsburg, VA, which evidences the depth and breadth of interactions (Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021). This research, as well as other work reviewed in this book, does not give us a picture of what impact this growing engagement, in all its forms, has on civil servants and their role in national governance systems. This is the research gap this book aims to start filling. The conclusions of our work, a blend of literature review and in-​depth empirical analysis, highlight the importance of the topic, and document a growing level of influence, of various forms, of globalization (performance indicators, direct engagement and socialization, and the open government movement) on civil servants and on their role in national governance systems. While the in-​depth analysis covers a small number of middle-​ income countries, we would argue that these are relevant to future research on similar countries and contexts. We hope it serves as encouragement to others to take this important research agenda forward. We would like to acknowledge the support of several colleagues without whom we could not have completed this work. First among them are the researchers that conducted the interviews for us: Amina Nadia Mnasri, Suha Shouqar, Youssef Khanfir, and Rabah Ounissi. All worked tirelessly to make interviewees comfortable with the innovative methods we applied, using vignettes to approximate real-​life situations, and were instrumental in obtaining the evidence-​based material that was needed to conduct the study. Martin Mlynar worked on collecting and mapping the data on performance indicators and financial engagements by international development partners, and transforming these into comparative graphs and material. Michael Frontczak thoroughly edited the manuscript. The Aiddata team shared with us some of the ‘raw material’ of the 2020 ‘Listening to Leaders’ survey. Most of all, of course, we are grateful to the 67 senior civil servants from the four countries for agreeing openly to share critical insights into their engagement with transnational actors and the impact of such engagements on their day-​to-​day work. Tony Verheijen Katarina Staroňová Ibrahim Elghandour Anne-​Lucie Lefebvre Antananarivo, Bratislava, Rabat, and Tunis, May 2021

xi

PART I

Analytical Framework and Regional Context

1

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants: Towards an Analytical Framework Introduction and context Globalization remains a much-​debated and controversial phenomenon. If there is one important lesson from the COVID-​19 crisis it is probably of the limits nation states face when addressing global events. What was already clear from the disruptive force of climate change has been amplified further by a rapidly spreading pandemic that has shown both the risks and potential of globalization. It has demonstrated the risk of our dependence on global production chains and the way global travel can make a dangerous disease spread in no time. It has also revealed the potential of truly transnational initiatives, like the COVID Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) coalition, in accelerating the research (and deployment) of new vaccines as well as managing how they are deployed internationally. While the post-​COVID reality will likely see a return to shorter production chains, and global travel will take significant time to return to pre-​crisis levels, it is certain the power of transboundary action will be remembered as a positive aspect of a phenomenon that has been much criticized over the last decade. This book, and the underlying study, focuses on the impact of globalization on civil servants and civil service systems. Civil servants are influenced by globalization: the international and transnational component of their work is growing over time, and global norms and standards, and the performance indicators affecting them, are increasing in importance, as we will discuss in detail later in this book. National civil servants are also actors in globalization, contributing to the development of international legislation and programmes and interacting with supranational and international institutions as well as transnational organizations. Yet their role and the impact of an ever-​changing context on their work has seen little discussion.

3

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Regardless of the growing importance of transnational organizations and actors,1 and the norms, standards, and indicators set by them, civil service systems have remained a largely nation-​state driven and defined part of institutional setups. While there has been some academic interest in the impact of globalization on civil service systems, this has generally been limited to documenting the volume and relevance of interaction. Such work ranges from the early research by Hopkins (1976) on the impact of globalization on civil servants in the United States (US), through the initial efforts by Welch and Wong to theorize this (Welch and Wong, 1998), to a larger body of research looking at the impact of transnational actors on the substance of policy. This includes discussions on multi-​level governance and the impact on national policy and institutional setups in the context of the European Union (EU) (for example, Mény et al, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Knill, 2001; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), and the work by the Aiddata consortium on the level of interaction between national and international institutions (Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021). Additionally, in a broader sense, there is growing literature on the influence of transnational organizations and actors on institutional reform trajectories (Andrews, 2013; Andrews et al, 2017; Buntaine et al, 2017), which, in some instances, also covers civil service reform. The emphasis in this line of work has been on how to create less ‘institutional mimicry’ (formally adopted, but otherwise largely ignored, reform ideas ‘pushed’ by international development partners) and more problem-​based reform solutions anchored in national politico-​administrative systems and traditions. The work done by these researchers is about creating greater ownership for reform solutions and better adapting these to national contexts. While all this work is relevant and important for understanding the impact of globalization on national policies and related reform trajectories, and linked to the question discussed in this book, it does not necessarily give us a deeper understanding of how increasing globalization influences local civil servants and the civil service. The objective of this study, then, is to look deeper into the specific issue of globalization and its impact on civil servants: how do global norms, standards, and performance indicators, and growing direct interaction with transnational organizations, get transmitted to national civil servants, and how do country level institutional systems filter this transmission. This includes our proposal for an expanded and adjusted analytical framework, building on the earlier efforts by Welch and Wong (1998). Their article reviewed three then-​relevant dimensions of globalization (digitalization, growing direct engagement by global institutions, and peer pressure for performance), identified the concept of transmission channels for global influence and introduced the concept of filters. 4

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

In this regard, our work is part of a broader effort to analyse and understand the impact of a ‘step up’ in international engagement on institutional dynamics in the civil service, in particular on patterns of accountability and the dynamics of politico-​administrative relations, as well as on professionalization and career opportunities. This should, eventually, also impact on system performance and the quality of service delivery, though this is beyond the scope of this study. Our study also builds on the earlier analysis by Raadschelders and Verheijen (2019) that aimed to map ongoing analytical work and define a research agenda around the same thematic. To do this, we will first recapitulate the evolution of thinking on how globalization influences civil servants and civil service systems through the literature on global–​national state interaction (including the work on socialization in multi-​level governance systems), starting from the work by Welch and Wong (1998), before presenting a new analytical model that would help understand today’s complex dynamic of global–​state–​civil service relations. To test this model, we will formulate the main research question, as well as a set of theses that will help test the effect of globalization on civil servants, using an in-​depth assessment of the effect of globalization on local civil servants in four selected case countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region: Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. Coming back to the changing reality of globalization in a world redefined by the COVID-​19 pandemic, we will consider the impact the pandemic is having on the work and position of civil servants, though at this point in time there is not much analysis available on this important issue. In Chapter 2, we will address the impact of the pandemic on the positioning of open economies (like the four countries of focus). Our assumption remains that while the COVID-​19 crisis will change important aspects of the form and process of globalization, it has in many ways also served to underline the inevitability of the trend towards globalization, making this study all the more timely and relevant.

Why a focus on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)? In the remainder of this book, we apply our conceptual and theoretical considerations by utilizing multiple-​case study design (Yin, 2003), that is of four MENA countries in which our unit of analysis is the behaviour, values, and perceptions of civil servants vis-​à-​vis three main globalization dimensions. There are several reasons for choosing countries from the MENA region to assess the impact of globalization on civil servants. First, the rapid increase of exposure to globalization trends in the region after 2011 provides an excellent opportunity to test our hypotheses. Second, apart from the fact that the focus countries for this study have all been moving towards greater political pluralism and democracy (albeit with important variations in speed 5

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

and depth), they are also all relatively natural resource poor, which changes the nature of relations with international and transnational actors. Third, the combined economic and political transition also makes these countries more comparable with other transition states and makes the insights from earlier studies on Central and East European states, for instance, or even Latin America, relevant comparators. The fundamental changes in the MENA region are being driven by numerous factors, including demographic changes (the region’s ‘youth bulge’), the disruptive effect of digitization (embraced by the same growing youth community but not necessarily by the older generation), greater integration in the global economy (especially for non-​resource rich countries), and the resulting change in the social contract that for decades exchanged relative economic security for loyalty and a lack of political contestation. Historically, the MENA region was significantly ‘globalized’, from being the centre of global engagement and influences in the antique world, to the spread of Islam, the Ottoman empire’s development as a major global actor, and finally the engagement with European powers in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The blending of traditions (Islamic and Ottoman traditions that stress the hierarchical, centralized state, with transferred models of mostly European colonial bureaucracies) and practices created unique governance models. The period after World War II saw a significant closing of economies and societies in the region, driven by governance systems that favoured self-​reliance and limited interaction with global actors and institutions, a phenomenon also seen in other regions of the world (such as Latin America): a blend of returning to pre-​colonial traditions and asserting independence in all its forms. Exceptions, like Lebanon, a country that remained relatively open and internationally integrated until the civil war in the mid-​1970s, merely serve to confirm this ‘rule’. While countries like Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia partially integrated into global production chains in the 1970s and 1980s (see Ali and Msadfa, 2016), internationally integrated and protected national economic systems remained separated, with even the tourism sector operating mostly in a parallel universe (see the discussion in Poirier and Wright, 1993, on Tunisia as an interesting example). The last decade has seen a change. Following the Arab Spring in 2011, several countries chose a path of greater global engagement, including opening civil service systems to greater global interaction. We believe this had significant implications for civil servants as actors in the national and international policy environment, as well as on the organization and management of the civil service. The research underlying this book tested this broader assumption, and its outcome thus aims to contribute to a better understanding on how greater global engagement/​globalization impacts on civil servants. 6

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

This changing pattern of engagement of MENA countries with transnational actors is driven by several underlying factors. The first is the collapse of the old social contract. Built on the notion of an exchange of economic security for political loyalty, the MENA social contract of the post-​independence period kept societies and economies (relatively) closed from interaction with global trends (except through natural resource exports for oil producing countries and, from the 1990s onwards, service-​oriented development models in the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Qatar). The demise of this social contract exposed countries and their economic systems to global trends. In parallel, the MENA region has seen an increased engagement on global issues that strongly affect all of its countries, in particular in relation to climate change. With this has also come a significant change in the way the region’s countries engage with international actors; efforts to attract more external investment make performance on global indicators (developed by international and transnational organizations) critical. Collaboration with international development partners has evolved to include collaboration through paid advisory services (between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries2 and various international development partners, including the World Bank and others), and enhanced policy dialogue and lending support (Maghreb and some of the Mashreq countries). In addition, the political opening up of countries like Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan has created greater engagement between civil servants from these countries and transnational organizations, especially on the open government agenda. This naturally has an impact on the way civil servants operate and the way the civil service functions. The question of how the civil servants of these states have responded to this changing form of engagement with transnational actors is important from a research perspective. Documenting the changed engagement of transition countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan with transnational actors, in particular where engagement on economic policy is concerned, will help with analysis of the nature and scope of impact of this change on civil servants and civil service systems. While we recognize there are other cases of engagement on globalization in MENA that would be interesting to study, the move to politically pluralist models (though diverse), combined with economic and social transition, make the cases of Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia both comparable with other transition cases and additionally relevant to answering our research question. At the same time, the countries of focus display variation in terms of administrative history and tradition (see Chapter 2 for more detail), speed and nature of transition (Jordan and Morocco –​incremental, Tunisia –​rupture, Lebanon –​hybrid), and degree of commitment to the Open Government Partnership (OGP), which implies transparency (Morocco was a forerunner, later joined by Jordan and Tunisia, while Lebanon has yet to join). 7

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

The unit of analysis is the senior civil servant in a ministry or agency dealing with economic governance, and his or her behaviour, perceptions, and values.

The study of public administration and globalization The nation state focus remains dominant in the discipline of public administration, with comparative work often focused on countries within the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD) as the main ‘models’ for the organization of public administration and civil service systems. Where internationalization is concerned, the main interest has been in analysing the EU’s unique multi-​level governance system and its impact on national administrations (Raadschelders and Verheijen, 2019). Much less research focuses on administrative systems in a developmental context (Dwivedi and Henderson, 1990; Farazmand and Pinkowski, 2006), and even less on more ‘exotic’ cases like MENA countries or sub-​Saharan Africa. More recent thinking related to the latter approach is summarized in Carothers’ Aiding Democracy Abroad (2000) and Andrews’ Limits of Institutional Reform in Development (2013), as well as Andrews et al’s Building State Capability (2017) and includes the notion that ‘transplanting’ models of institutions (or decision making) is ineffective given the inability of those pushing transplantation to understand the underlying value systems that drive the status quo. Examples from Malawi, Sri Lanka, and other development contexts are put forward to illustrate this. Buntaine et al (2017) add further examples and analyses of the same argument. What matters for this study is not so much this discussion per se (or the alternative approaches that are proposed) but the emphasis these authors put on the notion of underlying value systems, and how these can limit the impact of externally designed or driven reform solutions. This extends to the notion that what is often described as the ‘mimicry’ of institutional setups (borrowed from OECD country models; see, for instance, Pal and Tok, 2019, pp 51–​64 for an interesting discussion on the mechanisms through which this works) is only a partial reflection of how systems operate, and this, in turn, also influences how global pressures play out in national systems. In their review of the discipline of public administration in a global context, Welch and Wong (1998, p 42) emphasize the importance of global pressures on civil servants and civil service systems, be they direct or indirect. At the time when Welch and Wong wrote their article, discussion on the impact of globalization on civil servants was a novel notion, and their article therefore broke new ground. As an illustration of this point, when Central and East European countries opened up after 1989, the question of whether administrative capacity and the quality of civil service systems could be considered conditions for EU membership, or whether these should be 8

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

considered areas of sovereignty that a supranational system should take as a given, was still considered fundamental (Verheijen, 2010). EU membership criteria for civil service systems and administrative capacity were only fully defined around the year 2000, a few years before ten Central and East European transition countries joined the EU. Welch and Wong (1998) proposed a model using structural and behavioural dimensions to explain the influence of key elements of globalization on civil service, such as digitalization, peer pressure for performance, and enhanced direct interaction. They consider the analysis of how civil servants and public administration systems respond and adjust to global pressures (filtered by the broader response of national political systems and social norms) to be a useful and potentially important additional angle for the study of public management systems (Welch and Wong, 1998, p 47). They also propose this as an additional angle through which one could assess system performance. We agree that this remains a valuable and valid point overall, and even more so today given the significant increase in areas of global engagement, with such engagement having been far less pronounced in many of these areas in 1998 when compared to now (climate change, energy, education, investment climate, competitiveness, and so on). New global norms and standards have also emerged, as well as new transmission channels. This is a point we will be discussing further in the next section. Since the late 1990s, the literature has evolved under the influence of a growing number of studies on multi-​level governance and the related emphasis on socialization to deepen the behavioural dimension. Therefore, we propose a new analytical framework to study the impact of globalization on civil service based on two dimensions: institutional literature of bureaucratic accountability (degree and type of control over civil servants’ decision-​making practice) and behavioural responses in the form of socialization (depth and penetration of values in civil servants’ belief systems). Cross-​tabulating these distinctions yielded Table 1.1. The framework is used to identify a typology of civil servants’ responses to globalization in the different MENA countries’ context. Subsequently, we test how these characteristics shape the relative influence of globalization filters (discussed later in this chapter and, more specifically, in Chapters 3, 4, and 5). Let us turn now to individual dimensions of the civil servants’ typology analytical framework.

Bureaucratic accountability dimension There is substantial agreement among scholars in political science, public administration, and international regimes that the concept of bureaucratic accountability has a long history and is essential in understanding the organizational relations between politicians (ministers) and civil servants, 9

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with it being a function of professionalism and performance (O’Loughlin, 1990; Balla and Gormley, 2017). Thus, the role of the bureaucracy and its accountability are directly linked to political control and professional discretion factors in line with a strong Weberian tradition. The ‘control’ version of bureaucratic accountability (rule of law and hierarchy) requires independent and capable internal institutions of enforcement for its success. In addition, a restraint-​oriented strategy becomes feasible in proportion to the degree to which professional codes of conduct become institutionalized, and internalized, by bureaucrats (Peters, 2001). The ‘bureaucratic discretion to act’ version is emphasized particularly in public management literature, where questions about autonomy lie at the heart of what it means to be a professional (Carboni, 2010; Klaas et al, 2018). Bureaucratic autonomy involves asserting a professional view in policy formation and adhering to professional standards in implementation (Svara, 2001). Professional autonomy may be analysed in several dimensions, ranging from the macro level of autonomous agencies and their top managers to the micro level of street-​level bureaucracy and its decision making. The dimension that is central to this analysis concerns the ability of senior civil servants in central ministries to determine their course of action thanks to highly developed specialized knowledge. The promotion of civil service professionalism does not negate the need for civil servants to be accountable for their practice. A central part of formal institutional structures is the accountability system, and the related aspect of politico-​administrative relations. Accountability refers to ‘reviews of the expediency and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’ (Schedler, 1999, p 28). Within a bureaucracy, accountability takes place on two dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Reddick et al, 2020). Vertical accountability is the relationship between non-​equals (subordinate with superior), while horizontal accountability is between more or less equal institutions, often between different branches of government (for example, parliament; Lührmann et al, 2020). It should be noted at the outset that none of these conditions specifies that these relationships have to necessarily be formally codified, or that the actors and institutions involved are formal institutions or hold an official office. Even if the individuals involved are indeed office holders, such as bureaucrats in a state body, their accountability relationship may still be in part or wholly informal (see more on informal institutions in Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Grzymala-​Busse, 2010; Gajduschek and Staronova, 2021).

Socialization dimension As discussed previously in Raadschelders and Verheijen (2019), the growing body of analysis on the EU as a multi-​governance system (see vast literature 10

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on Europeanization, for example, Börzel et al, 2017; Schimmelfennig et al, 2006) has taught us about the importance and depth of socialization processes, and how these can have spill-​over effects on the values held as well as the behaviour of civil servants of national administrations. Other important work around the same theme includes that on institutional mimicry and the related debate on administrative culture by Andrews, Pritchett, Peters and others. Work by Meyer-​Sahling (2009; Meyer-​Sahling and Van Stolk, 2015; Meyer-​Sahling et al, 2016), for instance, examines drivers of socialization as well as why these have different impacts depending on political and cultural contexts. His work includes an in-​depth review of how civil service management tools and institutions that are required by the EU (as part of the ‘soft acquis’ that is the ‘European Administrative Space’) did not ‘stick’ in the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe, even though there was both a presumed ‘cultural fit’ and ‘buy-​in’. De-​politicization, independent civil service commissions, and cornerstones of shared European civil service values, including principles like merit-​based management and tenure guarantees instead of higher monetary rewards, were abandoned by most Central and East European states in the years following their entry into the EU, raising significant questions on the ‘shared values’ assumption that lay behind the so-​called administrative capacity criteria for membership. In their recent work, Schuster, Meyer-​Sahling and Mikkelsen (2020) suggest that solutions that fit one context should not be implemented in other countries without first understanding how these interact with informal rules and procedures within the new context. One area of research that has evolved significantly over the last decades is the cultural and contextual fit of institutional models. The growing prominence of this discussion is, in part, thanks to the challenges to system or model transfer approaches from analysts like Andrews, Pritchett, and Carothers, to name a few, and also to further work on administrative traditions (Painter and Peters, 2010) and informal rules (for example, Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; Grzymala-​Busse, 2010; Gaiduschek and Staronova, 2021). This includes, more recently, retrospective work regarding why presumed adjustment of new EU member states to the (constructed) values inherent in the ‘European Administrative Space’ has failed to occur, or at least has not occurred in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe (see Meyer-​Sahling and Van Stolk, 2015). Similarly, recent works acknowledge the primacy of informal institutions and rules, particularly in emerging economies (Bertelli et al, 2020). The work on administrative traditions, as in Painter and Peters (2010), adds a further dimension to the previously discussed argument, especially as the book addresses non-​OECD traditions as well as OECD ones. It calls for a deeper review of traditions and culture that can be codified or non-​codified, organic or constructed. This adds further credence to the argument that, to 11

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hypothesize and analyse the impact of global pressures on civil service, an underlying understanding of the system under review is needed, at the peril of drawing false conclusions. This is particularly important when one looks at ‘lesser known’ and less analysed systems and cases, like those in African and MENA countries, where formal institutions can be little more than a veneer over underlying traditions (see, for instance, Schomaker and Bauer, 2020, p 2). Against this backdrop, scholars have studied the role of transnational actors and international bureaucracies’ influence on national governments by inquiring whether, how, and to what degree they exert influence (see, for example, Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Bauer et al, 2017; Moloney and Stone, 2019; Busch et al, 2020). However, existing research on globalization has focused on characteristics of the transnational actors rather than on the perspective of the ‘targets’, that is those actors –​national civil servants –​with whom international organizations work on a daily basis. Recently a minor shift has become visible, where information is gathered from the receiver of the advice on the perceived reputation in terms of the transnational actor’s authority and expertise (Herold et al, 2021). Busch and his colleagues (2020) reveal the existence of so-​called authority gaps, that is situations where the de jure and de facto expert authority of transnational actors on national bureaucracies do not always conform. They show that some international actors in some policy areas are characterized by positive authority gaps –​they enjoy more authority de facto than de jure. Other international public actors are characterized by negative authority gaps –​they enjoy less authority de facto than de jure. This research, however, does not explain why and how such authority gaps occur. To make better sense of these findings, a social constructivist approach was invoked in debates on globalization (Checkel, 2014), where the process of interaction between the actors and the institutions, through a number of causal mechanisms, is studied, such as socialization (Checkel, 2005, 2007; Schimmelfennig et al, 2006) and enhanced interaction (Custer et al, 2015, 2018; Pal, 2019). The concept of socialization particularly resonates, as it focuses on neglected actors: national civil servants. Checkel (2005) distinguishes between Type I and Type II socialization, where Type I socialization refers to role-​playing (acceptance that international actors and norms play a role in national processes, but only at the level of ‘checking boxes’), and Type II refers to deeper socialization, where actors are in fact persuaded by a norm’s ‘rightness’ (Checkel, 2005). This implies acceptance of the fact that global actors are legitimate participants in national processes, and that constructive engagement with these actors can have a beneficial impact on the country’s development trajectory. The latter, however, implies a potential dilution of accountability (in addition to the dilution brought about by a greater opening up to national non-​government actors, itself a consequence of the introduction of open government principles). 12

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Table 1.1: Typology of civil servants based on civil servants’ responses to globalization Type of socialization Type I (Accepting) Bureaucratic Control Traditionalist (Passive) accountability Discretion Professional

Type II (Deeper socialization) Rebel Engaged

In many ways, the previously discussed strands of work, around the underlying value systems that determine civil service system evolution and performance, add another layer to the method of analysing global pressures, their transmission channels, and the filters that determine their impact. Quadrant 1: Traditionalist/​passive civil servant The first is the ‘traditionalist’ civil servant, to whom transmission channels of international influence are filtered by legal and formal institutional structures of the nation state, and these pressures are blocked. The subordinates follow the orders from above and there is close supervision of civil servants (O’Loughlin, 1990) by internal control mechanisms. There is an attempt by politicians to directly control and suppress unwanted bureaucratic behaviour. Informally, for instance, leaders might seek to create a climate of fear among bureaucrats, with threats of punishment for transgressions against their wishes. Formally, prohibitive regulations on bureaucratic conduct may be policed internally. Bureaucrats themselves do not identify with values promoted by transnational actors. Quadrant 2: Professional civil servant A range of reforms (also under the New Public Management [NPM] influence) aim to improve organizational culture and increase professionalism, with a classic element of ‘embedded autonomy’ for decision making of bureaucrats based on their skills and knowledge. Bureaucratic accountability hence is associated with the act of discretionary autonomy, which the OECD (Klaas et al, 2018) refers to as ‘managerial accountability’. It asks for a clear focus on performance and compliance with rules. It requires holding managers accountable for results by assigning them responsibility, delegating authority for decision making, and giving them the autonomy and resources necessary to achieve expected results regardless of their persuasion about globalization values. In contrast to the emphasis on the accepting type of socialization of the first two quadrants, with possible tangible rewards as a necessary condition of 13

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effective leverage (Schimmelfennig et al, 2006), Quadrants 3 and 4 represent reconfigured relationships between the civil service and globalization issues. Here, other actors (transnational organizations, non-​state actors, and media) may play roles in ways that can more fundamentally change the incentives for bureaucratic action. Quadrant 3: Rebel civil servant The ‘rebel’ typology speaks to a situation where politicians try exercising control but civil servants choose actively to oppose politicians’ preferences as they are in conflict with their own interests and/​or beliefs. This, arguably, is an infrequent situation but not unheard of in politico-​administrative relations. This scenario is assumed by the literature on agency theory (Brehm and Gates, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2017) by discussing a bureaucrat’s ‘shirking’ tendency as a result of divergent interests between the politician and civil servant. As a result, he/​she engages in activities other than those related to the work position, or works against policies and programmes that the individual and organization is expected to deliver. Quadrant 4: Engaged civil servant The ‘engaged’ civil servant type assumes a greater degree of discretion for civil servants combined with a high degree of Type II socialization. Civil servants go beyond the typical bureaucratic hierarchy and actively search for cooperation opportunities that span traditional institutional boundaries (networks). Thus, the civil servant in this quadrant can mobilize other actors to support respect for global norms and standards within the discretion they are granted, and therefore would be expected to act within accountability schemes. Mobilization of external actors is an option but would be done within the rules of accountability. This typology would provide the best chance for international norms and (performance) standards to permeate national systems and enhance performance and transparency.

Transmission channels and filters of global influence on national civil servants Global influence on national administrative systems has significantly grown over the last two decades. Even if the current global political context leads one to the impression that the impact of globalization might be waning, we argue that direct and indirect global pressure has continued growing, developing, in particular, in areas like performance indicators (for example, Buntaine et al, 2017; Kelley, 2017; Kelley and Simmons, 2019), with new transmission 14

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channels emerging and previously established ones having developed further. Transmission channels are understood as interaction processes between national and global actors, and include specific instruments designed and used for the transmission of global norms and standards, including performance expectations. Filters are the way in which the influence exercised through these transmission channels is reinforced or disrupted. New important transmission channels include global performance indicator systems, and access to information regimes and public participation methods, all of which have developed rapidly over the last two decades. Engagement of civil servants with international partner institutions has also evolved and deepened. Two decades later, new global norms, standards, and performance indicators have evolved, as well as new transmission channels for global trends, while some of the traditional ones, identified earlier by Welch and Wong (1998), have changed and developed further. The first new transmission channel is international indicators on the performance/​results achieved by civil service systems. Traditionally, the performance of civil servants and civil service systems were the domain of intergovernmental exchange and peer review by organizations such as the OECD, which embodied and drove ‘reform diffusion’, as defined in Welch and Wong (1998) –​a process limited mainly to high-​income countries in the OECD (which did contribute to the diffusion of NPM-​ based reforms among this group of countries and, later, beyond them). Other organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, until the early 2000s focused mainly on expenditure measures and privatization processes, and much less on structure, management, and accountability systems in civil and public service (Nunberg, 1999; World Bank, 2008, 2012). However, the last two decades have seen the rapid growth of global performance indicators, developed by international and transnational organizations, which all measure (directly and indirectly) the performance of civil servants. Second, there has been a significant expansion of engagement by international actors, both increasing the exposure of national civil servants to global norms and standards and influencing the design and management of civil service systems (through advice and support of policy reforms). Finally, a new and still-​emerging transmission channel is the evolution and acceptance of international standards on open government, which have fundamentally challenged traditional hierarchical and vertical concepts of civil service accountability. While the first and third transmission channels for globalization are universal, impacting all countries, the second one is of particular importance in states that have a deep engagement with international development partners, in particular, low-​income states (with a high degree of aid dependency) and countries in transition (which depend on support from 15

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international partners for a more limited period of time to offset the cost of reforms associated with economic, political, and social transition). We see all three of these elements of globalization and their transmission channels as an integral part of broader economic globalization trends, in which enterprises consider, as part of their investment and location decision-​making processes, the regulatory environment and the quality of the public sector. This then creates a momentum that reinforces the importance of performance indicators, such as the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), as well as whether macroeconomic stability is underwritten by IMF programmes and reviews or other International Financial Institutions’ (IFI) policy reform support programmes. As they decide on investment and partnerships, global economic actors also consider how countries fare on open government and corruption risks, additionally looking at the evolution of other important indicators, such as the Human Capital Index (HCI), which helps assess the labour force’s potential quality. The presence and ease of access to all this various information makes it easier for enterprises to make investment decisions once they decide to go global. Next, we will review in depth the transmission channels for globalization. This will allow us to reframe the hypotheses as defined by Welch and Wong (1998) and set an agenda that will further test the direction and depth of impact of globalization on civil servants and civil service systems.

New and reinforced transmission channels for globalization Transmission channel 1: Performance indicators, accountability, and civil servants As noted, international performance indicators have become a critical transmission channel for performance norms generated by globalization. While global performance indicators are by no means new (think of the rating agencies that have been determining lending cost of enterprises and states for over a century), the pervasiveness and comprehensive nature of rating and ranking systems, many of which were created in the last two decades, is game changing. Indicator systems for global policy issues, such as the business climate, quality of education, public financial management (PFM) systems, transparency, money laundering and counter-​terrorism financing (including black and grey listing), and global governance indicators (for example Open Government Index, 2018; World Bank, 2020b; World Bank Groups, 2020d), to name a few, have a major influence on countries’ ability to attract investment, obtain loans at attractive rates, and so on. Performance indicators have been established by a variety of transnational actors, 16

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including classical intergovernmental organizations, transnational non-​ governmental organizations (for example Transparency International [TI]), and think tanks (for example Bertelsmann Foundation). Others are a blend, established by a coalition of states but tracked by transnational organizations or other bodies (Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) program assessments). The centrality of some of these performance indicators is well known, and while their credibility varies (especially where perception-​based indicators are concerned), governments do, at least, pay attention to those that are most referenced. They inform citizens on how well their government is performing in terms of providing critical social services (which is one of the reasons why many countries ‘opt out’ of ratings like the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment [PISA]) and in this way enhance accountability in national governance systems (see also the discussion in Kelley, 2017, pp 7–​8). Most analytical work related to global performance indicators has focused on league tables and indicators, with an emphasis on impact on policy substance, an example being the granular analysis of micro-​evidence by Parks and Masaki (2017; Masaki and Parks, 2020). The literature on indicators and standards is also increasingly concerned with ‘gaming’, which includes deliberate efforts by government to ‘tick the boxes’ and take minimal measures to improve their performance on global performance indicators (for example Kelley and Simmons, 2019, pp 499–​502). In the context of this study, however, our question differs from those addressed by previous works, to explore how rankings and league tables act as transmission channels for globalized norms and standards and how, by these means, they affect the behaviour, values, and perceptions of civil servants and the civil service. In this regard, Judith Kelley’s analytical approach presented in Scorecard Diplomacy (2017) provides a helpful framework for analysis. Kelley defines five steps around which to analyse the impact of performance ratings: public monitoring and grading, ongoing diplomacy and practical assistance, indirect pressure, concern about reputation and future ratings, and efforts to improve bad ratings and maintain good ones. Kelley’s model captures both the role of international actors, national civil society organizations (CSOs) (in step 3), and the role of political actors and the civil service (in steps 4 and 5). The framework captures all the elements of how global actors affect national policy and decision making and how national actors play their own role (Kelley, 2017, pp 17–​21). It also highlights the cyclical nature of the process. For our analysis, the interplay between local political leaders (concerned with reputation and improvement) and local civil servants (who need to 17

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deliver on efforts to improve bad ratings and maintain good ones), and the engagement with national and international stakeholders around this interplay, is of particular interest. In Scorecard Diplomacy, Kelley reviews an in-​depth case on ratings (in this case by a bilateral actor, the US) and how they influence national responses in other states. The conclusions of this work reaffirm our hypothesis regarding the impact of internationally defined performance standards on national systems. Based on this work, as well as discussions with officials, observation of administrative practice in various countries, and other literature on the subject (Kelley and Simmons, 2015, 2019; Kelley, 2017; Parks and Masaki, 2017), the response of governments and administrations to ratings and rankings can influence the civil service in various ways, as we will now discuss. First, global scorecards have become important accountability tools, especially in countries where reliable access to information on government performance is limited. Rankings and ratings on such indicators tend to be highly public affairs, extensively discussed in the media and on social networks, which raises the (political) game on the performance measured (see Kelley and Simmons, 2015, p 61, for a concrete example on ratings related to human trafficking and their media impact). This is particularly the case for high profile scorecards such as Enabling Doing Business (EDB) and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (both World Bank), PISA (OECD), the Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP), and HCI (World Bank), all of which are subject to extensive reporting.3 It can also, however, extend to ‘niche’ indicators on politically sensitive issues. Given the growing public debates around performance and results, these indicators with their ratings and scorecards have become visible and credible tools for external actors (such as business and investor associations and CSOs) to review government performance and to question, based on available evidence, institutions’ performance. While in the end it is up to politicians to answer challenges regarding performance, senior civil servants are held responsible for results as well. While politicians, at times, question the fairness and correctness of scores and rankings, they come from transnational organizations and are based on publicly available and proven methodologies, making it harder to deflect criticism. For senior civil servants, the more direct accountability that is associated with the discussion of ratings requires adaptation and the ability to respond to demands for action and follow-​up. Many ranking and indicator systems lead to direct questioning of the performance of institutions, including agencies that function at arm’s length from political leaders, which makes civil servants into the kind of public figures that they are not necessarily used to being, with both positive and negative consequences. Therefore, in our study we are interested to see if civil servants conceptualize accountability for their actions; and furthermore, if they do, whether this 18

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accountability relationship is perceived as a traditional principal–​agent relation or whether they conceptualize this themselves as actors with an obligation to explain and justify their conduct where they may face consequences (Bovens, 2007). Second, as a by-​product of accountability, scorecards and comparison can impact the nature of politico-​administrative relations. Politicians and civil servants will have a common interest in showing improved performance, although for different reasons. Short-​term gains in ranking can often be achieved by targeting specific measures and sectors, and can work even when bypassing the administration and working through political appointees and cabinets. However, sustaining performance on complex and multi-​sectoral composite ratings requires both technical knowledge and capacity in the administration and strong inter-​sectoral coordination, and therefore a collaborative effort between politicians and civil servants. While the former (gaming the system) can increase tensions, the latter could stimulate greater synergy and cooperation between politicians and officials. Third, working on specific ‘projects’ to improve country performance on international scorecards can create opportunities for officials to fast-​ track careers (but equally poses risks). This can work much like the well-​ documented efforts of the ‘islands of excellence’ in Central and East European administrations in their EU accession processes. Civil servants working in EU accession preparation and negotiation units reaped rewards after the completion of the ‘project’ by obtaining senior positions in their own governments or in the European Commission and other EU institutions (see, for instance, Meyer-​Sahling and Van Stolk, 2015; Meyer-​Sahling et al, 2016; Börzel et al, 2017). In the same way, working on specific ‘projects’ and ‘task forces’ to troubleshoot and address performance issues identified as part of the ranking presents an opportunity for younger officials to advance their careers, especially by taking up often coveted cabinet positions. This is especially important in closed civil service systems where such opportunities tend to be rare. International indicator systems can have various impacts on national institutions, including on civil servants and the civil service. Peer pressure and comparison, and the public debate around these, add an additional dimension to accountability for performance, can give rise to new dynamics in politico-​administrative relations, and can create new career advancement opportunities for civil servants as improvements on rankings become ‘projects’ for politicians. While these conclusions are based on a review of the (limited) academic literature on global performance indicators and their impact, the specific ways in which these types of influence work need to be further detailed and validated through more in-​depth empirical research. This will be one aspect of a broader research agenda on the impact of globalization on national civil servants and civil service systems. 19

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Transmission channel 2: The deepening engagement and growing impact of internationally generated policy advice and reform support Welch and Wong already identified the growing engagement by transnational organizations as a feature of globalization, with socialization and direct interaction as the main transmission channel. Two decades on from their research, enhanced engagement with international development partners remains a pattern, and in a growing number of countries. While previously mostly relevant to middle-​and lower-​income countries (MIC and LIC) and Fragile and Conflict States, during the last decade, EU member states and other Group of Twenty (G20) members have seen a growing engagement with international development partners, primarily as a result of the financial crisis and the enhanced role of the IMF and the World Bank in that context (Pal, 2019). In addition, the number of international development partners involved in the provision of assistance and advice has grown significantly over the last few decades, with emerging economies like China playing a growing role. Unlike for the previous topic, where research has mainly focused on the emergence, relevance, and policy impact of global performance indicators, with little attention for their impact on national institutions, on this issue there is a body of theoretical and empirical research on the evolution of relations between international development partners and ‘recipient countries’. Barnett and Finnemore (1999) argue that international development partners may exercise power since it is derived from ‘the legitimacy of the rational-​ legal authority’ and ‘technical expertise and information’ (p 707). In other words, the relation between International Organizations (IOs) and local civil servants is determined, in part, by perceived knowledge, competence, and advice that can be forced or proactively sought by local civil servants, if they perceive the worth of it. Although literature on IOs frequently highlights expert knowledge, competence, and advice as a source of influence, the role of this expertise among local civil servants is not addressed. While scholars have started to examine questions of knowledge production and utilization (Littoz-​Monet, 2017), this has focused more on production (the IOs’ side) and/​or its policy and institutions’ effects than on the local civil servant side (knowledge utilization). One body of research concerns the impact of international development partners on institutional reform, as discussed earlier in this chapter. While important in its own right, in this school of thought national institutions are studied as an object of influence by international partners. In our case we are interested in establishing the impacts that interaction with international partners have on civil servants and the civil service. The work of the Aiddata laboratory (Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021) at Williamsburg University has provided a wealth of relevant empirical research over the last decade, 20

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focusing on documenting patterns of interaction and what drives its impact and effectiveness. Three large-​scale surveys conducted in 2014, 2017 and 2020 (and published in 2015, 2018 and 2021 respectively, see Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021) have provided us with important insights on how civil servants and politicians view international partners, which partners are influential in providing policy advice, and what factors determine the evolution of the relationship between the provider and recipient of support. The surveys covered more than 3,500 respondents in 122 countries, thus providing a broad perspective on what drives these relations. The studies employed systematic data collection as to how national officials perceive their growing engagement with transnational actors; in other words, ‘how the buyers in this market, public sector leaders from low-​income and middle-​income countries, chose their suppliers. Which development partners do leaders prefer and why do they choose these advisory products and services to guide their reform priorities and evidence’ (Custer et al, 2015, p 9). Officials participating in the study provided feedback on frequency of communications, usefulness of advice, influence on setting agendas, and helpfulness in reform implementation. They also assessed the extent to which the ability of partners to provide financial (budget) support had an impact on their access to policy makers and agenda-​setting influence. Finally, the impact of international benchmarking tools on national policy makers was reviewed. The 2017 version of the same survey added the SDGs as an additional filter, looking at what both providers and recipients of advice consider as priorities among high-​level UN development objectives. The ‘Listening to Leaders’ research is primarily concerned with the issue of aid effectiveness –​do the priorities of aid providers match those of recipients, and how effective are providers in organizing the delivery of advice and support to recipients. The 2017 survey adds to this an analysis of how well this is then realigned to citizen preferences (these were obtained through the UN ‘My World Survey’ [Custer et al, 2018, pp 12–​13]). For the purpose of this study, however, the value of the Aiddata research lies in what it tells us about the way civil servants perceive the relationship with providers of advice and assistance, and what, for them, drives the effectiveness of the relationship. On this, the publication of all three surveys (see Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021) provided some important insights. First, the ‘Listening to Leaders’ studies emphasize the value that civil servants place on the permanency of relations, in particular with those partners with whom they have developed a positive relation. Network building between global and national officials and conscious alignment from both sides are seen as critical features (Custer et al, 2018, pp 42–​4). Familiarity with organizations and their staff is an additional important factor, as is the extent of permanent field presence. Finally, a country-​level 21

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track record in resolving difficult policy issues is a further critical driver of perceived partner performance (Custer et al, 2015, p 26, and 2018, p 43). While the ability of partners to put money on the table enhances influence, the level of influence depends almost as much on the level of alignment and the perceived usefulness of policy advice (Custer et al, 2018, pp 43–​5). Another element of the study that is important when gaining an understanding of how growing interaction affects civil servants is analysis of frequency of interaction. In this respect, the 2015 ‘Listening to Leaders’ study (Custer et al, 2015) examines two dimensions: the extent to which development partners communicate with counterparts (frequency of communication), and receptivity, that is the extent to which national governments are open to communication. On frequency of communication, for donor and recipient countries the levels are lower than one might have expected, averaging less than once a month globally. However, organizations that are specialized (such as the Global Fund and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization [GAVI, recently renamed Gavi], which are active in the health sector, and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund [UNICEF], which is related to child development) and generalist multilateral organizations (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] and World Bank in particular) have significantly higher levels of interaction –​up to three monthly interactions with counterparts. Unfortunately, the 2018 publication does not examine the frequency of interaction question in the same granular detail as the one from 2015. However, in both studies, quality of advice, working closely with government counterparts, and access to international expertise are among the top three reasons why partners are considered more helpful and/​or influential (Custer et al, 2018, pp 43–​5). Based on the Aiddata research, the following are some key assumptions as to the impact this form of globalization has on civil servants. First, while there is a significant difference in the level and scope of engagement with international partners, an increasing number of countries have a growing level of engagement, as shown by the Aiddata assessment by SDG (Custer et al, 2018, pp 7–​9). This engagement has also grown qualitatively and is improving based on direct dialogue and cooperation around policy issues. Officials from recipient countries put a premium on direct contact and discussions, and direct advice and sharing of expertise comes just after financing as the most important factor for influence and helpfulness. Hence, direct engagement and dialogue has grown significantly and is assessed positively by civil servants. This has always been an important issue for LICs, but increasingly extends to MICs. Additionally, partnerships between global and regional organizations (intergovernmental, non-​governmental, or transnational) now go well beyond the financial and project support that used to be the main feature of development partnerships. This change has been particularly significant in MIC transition states, where good advice 22

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on the reforms needed to navigate the transition comes at a premium. All these are important conclusions that argue for deeper research on the nature of this dialogue. Second, and like the conclusions on the first element, enhanced globalization for civil servants adds another dimension to accountability and arguably blurs politico-​administrative relations. It impacts on accountability as civil servants and decision makers are responsible/​responsive to partners for agreed development results, on which there tends to be significant media scrutiny, adding a further complication to an already blurred accountability landscape. We assume, and have observed in practice, that enhanced engagement with external partners can also have an impact (positively and negatively) on politico-​administrative relations. This depends on the level of political stability/​turnover between governments, the relative role (compared to political cabinets or advisers) given to civil servants in managing relations with external partners, and the extent to which groups of civil servants manage to own/​capture relations with partners and use them to their own benefit (bargaining position and expertise). On this second issue, based on available research and observation in practice, our hypothesis would be that growing global engagement does have an impact on civil servants and their relations with both politicians and their external environment. Here, too, deeper empirical work is needed to shed further light on the nature and extent of the change.

Transmission channel 3: Global open government-​based norms and how they matter The global push for open, transparent, and accountable governments has intensified over the last decade. There is a growing global community of practice, including the OGP, and a growing academic literature (Wirtz and Birkmeyer, 2015; Kuang-​Ting, 2021) on the topic. An increasing number of governments worldwide are signing up for open government reforms and making available data (for example the OGP platform, OECD Open Government Data, European Commission [EC] Joint Research Centre Data Catalogue, Global Transparency Initiative, One World Trust, and so on) that bring governments (and thus civil servants) closer to their people via a recommended set of administrative reforms and measures (Piotrowski, 2016) that are scrutinized by independent bodies. In addition, a number of transnational actors prepare rankings and reports on transparency, openness in data provision, and/​or evaluating accountability (for example TI –​Corruption Index, OECD –​Open Government Data Index, One World Trust). Data, traditionally produced and owned by governments, used to be concentrated in the hands of the public administration. The ‘Right to 23

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Information’ and ‘Open Data’ movements seek greater transparency, and openness of information, documents, and datasets held by public bodies, to make them openly available and accessible for all to use. A cornerstone of the former movement is the Freedom of Information Act, which had been accepted by more than 70 jurisdictions (Roberts, 2010, p 925) by 2010 (a number that has grown further since, now including, for example, Tunisia), which emphasizes access to information stored predominantly in documents. Transparency and accountability were the initial values associated with the movement. The Open Data movement focuses on data held in government databases, and the access, use, and re-​use of these datasets, including for commercial purposes.4 Importantly, both movements emphasize access as an essential condition for a democratic state pursuing the values of accountability, transparency, openness, and responsiveness in the affairs of government institutions. The openness, transparency, and accessibility of data are believed to boost economic development, improve trust in government, and fight corruption. A further part of the open government movement promotes citizen participation and engagement that is not based on data by creating a deliberate architecture for such empowerment activities. However, both supranational organizations and academic literature assume that access to information and data empowers citizens and thus increases their participation in public affairs. This means that enhanced globalization for civil servants adds another dimension to accountability, notably from the perspective of civil service engagement with citizens and the public. It has impact on accountability as civil servants and decision makers are responsible/​responsive to partners for transparency in decision making and citizen engagement. The tradition of public administration to own and control information is challenged by new views on how information empowers citizens, where civil servants become a medium for collaborative measures with citizens and open forms of data sharing. This has a profound impact on how civil servants (i) create and keep records and thus manage information; (ii) proactively disclose certain types of official information; and (iii) respond and institutionalize internal mechanisms for provision, participation, consultation, and engagement of the public. It also has an impact on civil servants as it equips them with the necessary skills, tools, and mechanisms to meet new obligations (Millard, 2018), and more importantly, to understand the public value of the new governance paradigm, namely attitudes towards open government. At the same time, since data openness, transparency, and participation lack tangible benefits for civil servants while costing a lot in terms of time and effort, many organizations might experience resistance (Wirtz et al, 2016) if new values of the paradigm shift are not transmitted.

24

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

Consequently, civil servants can experience tension between traditionally proprietary and new open systems, both directly (with civil servants who are traditionally inclined to protect information from external scrutiny being demanded to share information that they would not normally have shared, either voluntarily or on request), and indirectly (when politicians may request officials either to release information that is confidential or to withhold information that should legally be shared). Although empirical research on open government, access to information, and participation is growing (Wirtz and Bickmeyer, 2015; Kuang-​Ting, 2021), the overwhelming majority focuses on Western European and North American countries. At the same time, current research discusses various measures, mechanisms, and technical solutions for achieving effective open government concepts and organizational structures, and maps different initiatives, thus providing typologies of open government (Dunleavy et al, 2006; Lee and Kwak, 2012). The impact of such a change in governance norms and standards on the role, values, and perceptions of civil servants and their expectations is profound. However, there is little, if any, literature discussing the impact of these endeavours on the civil service, and how the tension between traditional norms and expectations of more open governance practices (often subscribed to by political leaders) affects them in terms of behavioural response (risk aversion and ‘do nothing’ vs. behavioural change), accountability (expected responsiveness to requests for information and data vs. notions of ‘information is power’), and opportunities. The review by Roberts (2010) highlights the impact of the access to information (ATI) system in India and the impact this has on the civil service in terms of workload (‘not as Herculean as it was expected to be’, p 927) and, though not directly assessed, behaviour. A deeper and more detailed assessment by Bari et al (2015) looks at the impact of ATI regimes across South Asia on citizen–​government relations, including case studies that shed more light on mechanics and real-​life applications.

Main research question and theoretical assumptions: globalization affects civil servants in various ways –​where and how does impact matter most? Based on the review of the academic literature, we have formulated the following main research question that guides this volume: What is the impact that engagement with global actors and networks has had on civil servants in terms of accountability and professionalization (what transmission channels matter and in what way)? 25

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The review of three key transmission channels through which globalization influences the work of civil servants has revealed four dimensions that need further evidence-​based research and analysis. We will formulate these in the form of theses. Thesis 1: Globalization is one of the disruptors of traditional accountability systems, as globalization has an impact on both direct and indirect accountability mechanisms. Accountability has generally become a far more complex issue overall in national governance systems. From classical hierarchy-​based accountability systems, in which civil servants report to managers and office holders only, we have seen an evolution that has added direct accountability and horizontal accountability tools. Direct accountability takes the form of performance feedback from clients, especially through technology (see, for instance, Bhatti et al, 2015), and a growing role of civil society in democratizing societies seeking to hold civil servants accountable. In terms of horizontal channels, we have seen the emergence of independent accountability institutions (anti-​corruption agencies, ombudsman, and so on). The creation of these new mechanisms is strongly influenced by international and transnational organizations and transmitted through the open government movement and through direct engagement. From the discussion in this study, and based on observations and interactions, engagement on international performance standards as well as policy dialogue related to engagement with international partner institutions have, in part, increased scrutiny of civil servants and, in part, changed their role in providing policy advice (from direct providers to brokers and mediators). However, a much more pronounced and direct engagement with international partners also has the potential to empower officials, giving them access to networks that can help influence decision making nationally. Thesis 2: Globalization affects politico-​administrative relations by increasing access to information and enhancing transparency (namely, it reduces the credibility of finger pointing). While globalization has diluted civil servants’ roles in the provision of policy advice, it has also given them access to new networks and relations that they can use to strengthen their positions. As with accountability, politico-​administrative relations have undergone fundamental changes over recent decades. From largely two-​or three-​ dimensional patterns of relations (between politicians, politically appointed officials, and career officials) governed by laws and conventions, traditional patterns of relations have been undergoing change as a result of new actors’ involvement and changes in value systems. In many countries, ‘buffer 26

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

zones’ between politics and administration (traditionally staffed by ‘political’ civil servants recruited from the career civil service or the broader public sector), cabinet, and other ‘political zones’ in the administration have seen a diversification of staffing; this issue was illustrated, for instance, in the 2020 Trans European Dialogue on politico-​administrative relations (Bach et al, 2020). Hence, with political zones between political leaders and the broader career civil service becoming more diverse, policy advisory systems changing as a result of growing competition (given the multiple and diverse sources of advice and information available to political leaders), and the evolution of accountability systems, the traditional ‘balance of power’ between politicians and civil servants is being disrupted. Globalization plays its role in this process due to (i) greater availability of internationally generated performance information; (ii) the possibility for civil servants to use direct relations with international actors to strengthen their positions vis-​à-​vis political appointees and political leaders; and (iii) open government and freedom of information making it more difficult to ‘hide’ or attribute blame. Thesis 3: Globalization triggers bureaucratic responses that lead to change in values. The impacts of globalization on civil servant career prospects are more difficult to capture. One parallel phenomenon to discuss in this respect is that of ‘projectized’ policy objectives, such as in past EU accession management processes. The impact of the latter on career opportunities has been relatively well documented, with many of the officials working in EU accession units in previous candidate states finding opportunities from which to benefit after accession, from career options within European institutions, in political roles, or even in the private sector. Proximity to international actors, both when dealing with improving performance on ratings and when directly managing important partner dialogue, can create these same kind of opportunities and incentives for enhanced professionalization, even if this is not as easy or obvious as it was for those working in EU accession structures in pre-​ accession Central and Eastern Europe. Apart from pushing professionalization, enhanced cooperation and engagement with global actors can also act as a transmission channel for values that can become aspirational for civil servants (transparency, openness, collaboration). In order to confirm (or reject) this assumption, we would need to go beyond the survey-​type engagement that the Aiddata team conducted and into more targeted interviews of those with the roles, both to establish whether this is indeed the motivating factor we assume it to be and if it can lead to enhanced efforts at professionalization and the adoption of aspirational values. 27

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Thesis 4: The global open government movement (including the push for freedom of information, participatory practices, and Open Data) impacts on the role and behaviour of civil servants vis-​à-​vis stakeholders. On this specific element of globalization, evidence is probably the scarcest. While there is abundant literature on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) regimes (though less on the way Open Data works in practice), this literature tends to focus on caseloads, types of cases brought, and resolution. There are references, in many instances, to the workload generated by right-​to-​ information requests (the jury is out), the track record of civil servants in responding to these, and whether more access to information ultimately helps create better services. Little or no work is available on the impact open government reforms have on civil servants (unlike the impact on politicians, who are often assumed to stop creating records altogether, which is not a real option for civil servants). This is therefore another area where it is important to do more evidence-​based work. There is even less available information on the impact of Open Data, even though this particular strand of the open government agenda gets to the heart of the old adage ‘information is power’.

Conclusions and a forward-​looking agenda At the outset of this chapter we looked at the approach developed by Welch and Wong over two decades ago to capture and analyse the impacts of globalization on the civil service. Even if there have been many new strands of theoretical work around the impact of globalization (and in particular on transnational organizations) on policy and reforms, there has been little new work on the impact of globalization on organizations and individuals. While there is research that looks at individual aspects of globalization, like Kelley’s work (2017) on scorecards and rating systems and the Aiddata team’s work (Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021) on the market for policy advice and patterns of interaction between national civil servants and international actors, there is not yet any follow-​up to this that considers the impact of globalization in the larger sense on civil servants, or the ability of the discipline of public administration to develop a more comprehensive analytical framework to help understand the issue. The new theses presented here will need to be tested through more evidence-​ based research, but based on our initial reading, globalization does, quite fundamentally, affect the evolution of civil service systems and civil servants. It does so in conjunction with other trends, to be sure, but the initial evidence based on our review of the existing literature and thinking confirms what was set out in more general terms by Raadschelders and Verheijen (2019): that this is an agenda that needs deeper and substantive 28

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

research. This we intend to advance further in the remainder of this book, through a study of select MENA countries.

Methodological aspects The introductory theoretical portion of this text has addressed the ‘why’ and ‘what’ questions central to the research enquiry of investigating the dynamics of the interaction between civil servants and international organizations. The following portion addresses ‘how’ we will answer these questions in detail. We describe both the construction of the vignettes used and the way we conducted in-​depth interviews.

Country selection As noted earlier, this work will focus on select MENA countries in transition, where a rapid step up in international engagement is part of national political and economic transition processes. We focus in depth on four MENA countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. We do not see this group as a sample, but rather as a selection of countries representing heterogeneity in the region. The region has come late to the recent wave of globalization, and arguably remained significantly closed to external interactions (apart from exceptions like the UAE and Qatar) until 2011. We do consider the ‘Arab Spring’ as a turning point in this respect, given that it pushed a move towards a more open system of governance and a change in economic model (even if this remains incomplete to date). In order to analyse in depth the extent and impact of globalization, it is imperative to focus on countries that have opened up and remained (relatively) open since 2011, as this allows perspective over a long enough period. The Arab Spring, and its implications, is therefore considered a factor in the creation of conditions for a greater impact of globalization on the countries concerned. In this respect, the choice of Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia for deeper case analysis is driven, to a large extent, by the previously discussed reasoning, as well as by the fact that these are all countries that are not resource rich and are therefore more sensitive to the impact of globalization. The policy areas and institutional types (see discussion later for more detail) for every country are represented by a defined list of institutions. Each country research team put together the respective list following the general protocol and determined the institutions (and interviewees) to be included.

Interview partners selection In our book we are interested in the impact of globalization on civil servants’ roles in policy making as well as on their perceptions and beliefs. To address 29

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this, we developed our own approach –​a sequential mixed-​method design (Ebinger et al, 2019) combining in-​depth interviews with high-​level officials with the explorative vignette technique. In-​depth interviews were conducted with current senior civil servants in the two highest hierarchical positions in the ministries, as well as with a small number of political appointees in each of the countries. Altogether, 67 personal interviews, lasting 100–​180 minutes each, were conducted between July and December 2020. As the first step in our research strategy we delineated policy areas where globalization pressures not only exist but are also observable from a comparative perspective. There exist several approaches in public administration on how to conduct comparative work across countries (see, for example, Peters, 1988), one being according to policy area. For comparative and analytical purposes, we chose one policy area, notably competitiveness and business development, from which we selected interview partners. The economic governance area (with an emphasis on competitiveness and business environment) is present in each country, is of interest to international organizations, and thus is exposed to globalization pressures and covered by different types of central government organizations (OECD, 2002). Thus, we are targeting nodal agencies that interface with both global actors and other actors in administration, as well as with civil service management structures, including: • ministerial departments (that is core civil service functions under government control), such as the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Investment, and so on; • non-​departmental agencies and commissions, that is investment agencies, agencies handling business indicators and export promotion, and regulatory and policy advising agencies. Thus, in our interviews we focused on organizations involved in policy making, where the core functions of the state are located, as are, consequently, also critical civil service skills. We also included agencies that engaged in regulatory or core economic management functions (see Table 1.2). In selecting interview partners, we aimed at diversity with respect to different factors such as permanent senior civil servants/​political appointees, senior civil servants whose function is design and implementation of regulations, policy advice (substantive expertise) vs. managerial senior civil servants (heads of independent agencies, commissions), and senior civil servants who deal with global actors as part of their core tasks vs. those who do not. This is because we are interested in the level of internalization of new or additional roles –​not only in Type I socialization for role-​playing (acceptance that international actors and norms play a role in national 30

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

Table 1.2: Overview of organizations for which interviewees work Ministerial departments

Non-​departmental agencies and commissions

Jordan

11

5

Lebanon

 9

5

Morocco

14

6

Tunisia

 9

8

processes, but at the level of ‘checking boxes’), but also in Type II for deeper socialization when actors are persuaded by a norm’s ‘rightness’ (Checkel, 2005). Our interviews were conducted by country research teams in the language of the country (Arabic, French, or English, to decrease the language barrier), face to face (in Tunisia and partially in Jordan and Lebanon) or by videoconferencing (Morocco and partially in Jordan and Lebanon). We targeted senior civil servants, preferably those who had already been in the civil service for a number of years and thus were in a position to observe any changes in the past decade. The interviews followed a set protocol and consisted of four parts, but also allowed for discussion of experience and practice. The first part was a short biographical background, in which we asked for information on education and last employment prior to this position as well as the respondent’s personal motivation for working in the civil service. The latter, regarding personal motivation, serves as the first social mechanism, oriented towards private goals like advancement of career or, alternatively, towards more public values. In the second part the interviewees were confronted with tough hypothetical, but typical, real-​life work dilemmas, framed in four explorative vignettes (more detail on construction and analysis of these to be discussed later). The third and fourth parts focused on senior civil servants’ role perceptions and experience. The interviews were not recorded, but diligent notes were taken. To ensure consistency and cross-​country comparability of data from in-​depth interviews and vignettes, a training meeting was organized early on for each country research team to guarantee that interview protocol, including vignettes, were discussed and applied consistently.

Qualitative vignettes The basis of our data collection in each country consisted of in-​depth interviews and discussions around qualitative vignettes with senior civil 31

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

servants that had been working in the selected policy area for a number of years. As suggested by Jenkins et al (2010), developmental vignettes are hypothetical scenarios that unfold through a series of stages. The respondent is invited to draw on his or her experience and relate to the behaviour of the central character –​his/​her civil service colleague. Vignettes collect situated data on group values, group beliefs, and group norms of behaviour (Bloor and Wood, 2006). Thus, vignettes activate the respondents’ ability to frame situations, dilemmas, and events, leading them to express attitudes and reactions as a result of their personal experience, knowledge, and beliefs. Therefore, vignettes uncover how civil servants perceive and conceptualize professionalism and interaction with international partners. This methodology is ideal for studying the dilemmas civil servants face when balancing different norms in their decision making, for example when they face requests for political assistance from a political appointee, in which case they can either opt for a professional response or a standard bureaucratic response. The methodology is also suitable because we are interested in the level of internalization of new or additional roles –​not only in Type I socialization for role-​playing, but also in Type II for deeper socialization when actors are persuaded by a norm’s ‘rightness’ (Checkel, 2005). Thus, vignettes produce more valid and reliable measures of respondents’ decisions than surveys based on generic questionnaires. This is important because changing global interaction and impact of engagement with international organizations in a civil service work environment, and professionalization, is sensitive. This implies there is a risk that respondents succumb to social desirability. In public administration the technique is still used relatively infrequently, previously having been mostly used in the public service area (for example, Liechti et al, 2017; Rice et al, 2017) and also to study the interaction between political executives and civil servants in Denmark (Christensen and Opstrup, 2018) and Germany (Ebinger et al, 2019). Vignettes are more commonly used in studies related to psychology and sociology. We used four qualitative developmental explorative vignettes, which were constructed as part of this project. The goal was not to develop a set of material with fully crossed variables, as might be typical for factorial experimental vignettes, but rather to represent a situation that might be commonly experienced by civil servants in central executive institutions. We constructed composite vignettes (Bradbury-​Jones et al, 2014) informed by a combination of existing literature, previous research, and professional experience of the research team members to secure internal validity. We followed many academic considerations for constructing vignettes (Hughes and Huby, 2004, and Bradbury-​Jones et al, 2014 to name a few). We began by writing a larger set of short, staged, written vignettes, which varied in the type of situations they presented. The initial 32

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inspiration for the framing of the final four hypothetical situations came from the previously mentioned public administration studies on politico-​ administrative relations (Christensen and Opstrup, 2018) and training material that included cases on conflict of interest from the OECD (2005), while also reflecting real situations and cases in the professional careers of research team members. The hypothetical situations were constructed to be applicable not only in the policy area of our focus (economic governance and competitiveness) but across countries, ministries, and agencies within this policy area. This was a precondition for the collection of data to allow for generalizable conclusions. They are sufficiently realistic to encourage participants to engage in their own processing of the situation and elicit a personal rather than a hypothetical response. Hence, the vignettes are simplifications of the dilemmas civil servants encounter by taking into account the specific context (for example title of document, main stakeholder, or ministry in a specific country) in which the dilemmas might occur. We also took several steps to ensure that our vignettes were suitable for use by senior civil servants. First, we limited the length of scenarios to five to six sentences. Second, to encourage respondents to visualize themselves as third party witnesses, all of our scenarios begin with a ‘your colleague’ formulation. This structure ensures that respondents imagine a situation and dilemma encountered by their colleague (sensitivity). Research team members across the countries first used piloted vignettes internally to make the vignettes as realistic as possible. The final wording and sequencing of questions in the four vignettes were then completed on this basis. The vignettes were pilot-​tested with one or more key informants with direct experience in civil service (former or current senior civil servants) in each country before their wider use, to validate them and provide them credibility and trustworthiness by nuancing the wording, key dilemma, and questions. Next, key informants were asked to rate the realism (‘The situation in the vignette seems to reflect reality to me’), representativeness of the situation (‘How often do you see or hear about situations like the one described in this scenario in the media or your daily life?’), comprehensibility (‘How easy is it for you to understand what is described in the scenario?’), and imageability (‘How easy is it for you to clearly imagine what is happening in the scenario?’), all on 5-​and 7-​point Likert-​type scales (Vagias, 2006). Also, they were asked to identify potential shortcomings of the current design and encouraged to comment on the vignettes’ authenticity. We also gave attention to practical considerations, such as timing and effectiveness of the vignette to generate insightful data. Based on these considerations and on testing, the four final vignettes were assessed as follows (see Table 1.3). Each vignette is a short description of a civil servant’s behaviour in a ministerial setting that brings up the dilemma of the civil servant’s particular 33

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Table 1.3: Validation of vignette scenarios in piloting Realism Representative-​ Comprehensibility Imageability ness of situation Vignette 5.5 scenario 1: Engagement with international actors –​collaboration and coordination

6

3.5

3

Vignette 6 scenario 2: Global performance indicators –​ affiliation/​allegiance

5.5

3

3

Vignette 5 scenario 3: Open government –​ transparency and access to information

4

3.5

2.5

Vignette 6 scenario 4: Open government –​public participation in decision making

6

3

2.5

Note: Aggregated mean on Likert-​type scale of 1–​7 for realism and representativeness and of 1–​5 for comprehensibility and imageability in four countries, where 1 represents strongly disagree/​never/​difficult and 5 represents strongly agree/​always/​very easy, respectively.

professional standard where the impact of international organizations might be visible. In order to reduce the effects of social desirability influencing responses, we asked the respondents to discuss their colleagues’ reactions rather than asking them to talk from the perspective as if they were the characters in the vignette situation. Thus, the vignette’s dilemmas and decisions were posed from the perspective of a colleague rather than that of participants themselves. Focusing on a third party through vignettes helps to desensitize sensitive research topics (Finch, 1987) such as ours. We used a combination of fixed-​choice and open-​ended questioning, allowing participants to reflect on the situation and draw on personal experience. The fixed choice had a variant of 1–​7 Likert scale (strongly agree–​strongly disagree) perception of colleagues’ reaction to a situation, and a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision, giving room for more open justification in response. Open-​ended questions approximate complex choices that civil servants have to make in real life, often a choice between responsiveness to the political minister and professional judgement requiring additional tasks and roles and interaction 34

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

Table 1.4: Qualitative vignettes and globalization concepts Vignette scenario

Globalization concept Discussed by (filters)

Vignette scenario 1: Network building Engagement with Patterns of interaction international actors –​ collaboration and coordination

Custer et al (2015)

Vignette scenario 2: Global performance indicators –​ affiliation/​allegiance

Performance indicators, scorecards

Kelley (2017)

Accountability for performance

Kelley and Simmons (2015)

Vignette scenario 3: Open government –​transparency and access to information

Good governance

Roberts (2010)

Open government

Bari et al (2015) Dunleavy et al (2006) Lee and Kwak (2012)

Vignette scenario 4: Open government –​public participation in decision making

Participatory governance Arnstein (1969) Patterns of participation

Roberts (2004)

with stakeholders. In this way, employing a combination of open-​ended and closed-​ended questioning captures some of the advantages of both questioning techniques. The vignettes represent dilemma situations that a civil servant in a ministry may face when preparing or amending draft policy/​regulations in the areas of competitiveness and business development (see Table 1.4). In each situation the civil servant (colleague) is either asked explicitly by the political appointee (minister) to behave in a certain way, or the minister’s values are known and implicitly direct certain expected behaviour. The civil servant is also explicitly aware of the position of international organizations and of international standards and indicators. As a first step, the respondent is asked how the situation will unfold and how they would expect the civil servant to act in this complex situation, and why and what happens to him/​her as a result of their decision, and in this way to interpret the situation. The more detailed the interpretation, the better. Then the respondents were given a certain development in the scenario and asked to rate the ‘acceptability’ of the colleague’s decision and behaviour on a 7-​point scale labelled ‘totally unacceptable’, ‘unacceptable’, ‘slightly unacceptable’, ‘neutral’, ‘slightly acceptable’, ‘acceptable’, ‘perfectly acceptable’. Next, they were asked for the reasoning behind their response 35

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

to determine the interpretation of each change in the situation, including why they believe each behaviour is (not) acceptable. Then the vignette continues to explore additional positions based on new information as to how the story unfolds (usually two steps). It was this rationale behind the participant’s decision that the vignette depicted that was later analysed and presented in results. The ensuing open answers were coded in-​vivo in order to systematize the identified responses (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). The method of analysis chosen for this study was a hybrid approach of qualitative methods of thematic analysis, and it incorporated both the data-​driven inductive approach and the deductive a priori template of four civil servants’ response types as outlined earlier in Table 1.1. This approach complemented the research question by allowing the tenets of civil servant response type to be integral to the process of deductive analysis while also allowing for themes to emerge direct from the data, by using inductive coding.

In-​depth interviews Vignettes are then immediately followed by in-​depth interviews, which refocus on interviewees’ own views of their interaction with political leaders and representatives of other national governmental and non-​ governmental institutions as well as transnational actors. This part of the interview also explored the civil servants’ self-​perceptions as senior bureaucrats (as opposed to vignette-​projected perceptions of a colleague). The questions explore how civil servants see their own role and what they see as political leaders’ expectations of their role –​in terms of involvement in policy making and providing policy advice; internal and external management (relations with national external stakeholders and transnational actors); and managing relations with political leaders. The interviews focused on the civil servants’ experience in their current role, but also explored how the role of civil servants has evolved over the past ten years. First, the interviewees were asked to describe and discuss their roles and tasks in their current position. To be able to better compare across organizations and countries, interviewees were also given a card (Card I) offering a range of roles to which relative importance is attached. Given that the roles played by these senior civil servants/​political appointees may vary as a function of the ministry in which they serve, their own experience, or their exposure to international organizations, their relative assessment becomes the basis for further questions, such as which roles are considered most important by these senior public servants, what discretion they exercise vis-​á-​vis international organizations and other actors, and what changes they encountered in the past ten years. 36

Globalization and the Changing Role of Civil Servants

A similar discussion was then triggered by Card II on the relative importance of stakeholders, including international, and whether relationships with these stakeholders have been changing over the past ten years. Further, relationships with stakeholders and interest groups also brought in broader interests and connections to international organizations. Part of the activity of the senior public bureaucrat was used to defend and advance his/​her professional position in the organization in the political process within the public sector itself. There may be times when this activity produces conflict with the political role of serving a minister, obviously when the minister is sceptical about the programmes, policies, and standards brought about or visibly supported by an international organization, such as open government and access to information policies, and international rankings and scorecards. In our interviews we directly asked what impact the interviewee perceived from these reforms on their everyday work environment and work roles and tasks, requesting concrete examples of such effects.

Structure of the book To end this chapter, we would like to come back to the objectives we set out to achieve with this study, which are: •​ to contribute to the development of a theoretical and methodological framework for the analysis of the impact of globalization on civil servants and civil service systems; •​ to review patterns of interaction with global actors and frameworks, both in terms of level and substance, through an in-​depth assessment of four country cases; and •​ to define an agenda for further research on this important but under-​ researched topic. This first chapter, which is part of the analytical framework and regional context section of our study, has documented existing thinking and literature on three dimensions of globalization that have a strong potential impact on civil servants and civil service systems, and on this basis, we defined our main research question and four theses. We assess this impact through the use of a combination of vignettes and traditional interview methods, focusing on high-​level officials in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia –​four countries that have seen a significant increase in engagement with international actors over the last decade. The vignettes represent three-​dimensional situations of the research question, studying the impact of international organizations and their norms: (i) international performance indicators, scores and rankings; (ii) 37

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value of engagement with internationally provided policy advice and reform support; and (iii) transparency, access to information, and participation in policy making. The next chapter will position the four case study countries in a broader context, focusing on two key aspects. First, we will review the patterns of engagement of both the MENA region and the four countries with international standards and indicators, international partners, and norms of open government and transparency. Through this assessment, we will show how the fundamental changes that have affected the countries since 2011 have generated a change in patterns of interaction, and the impact these changes could have on civil servants and civil service systems. Second, we will analyse the evolution of civil service and public administration systems in the region, with an emphasis on the four focus countries. This will be built around a discussion of the administrative traditions and models in the region, and how these have been affected by political and economic changes over the last decade. We will give specific attention to the evolution of politico-​administrative relations, accountability systems (internal and external), and professionalization and capacity development. In the second part, three chapters will each focus on one of the three dimensions of globalization considered in this study, and explore how and to what extent civil servants have been influenced and affected by these. This review will be primarily based on evidence from the interviews described in the methodological section, supplemented with other survey data and material. The first chapter of the second part (Chapter 3) will focus on the impact of global performance indicators on civil servants, and review how the growing attention to comparative indicators influences politico-​administrative relations, horizontal coordination across ministries and agencies, and accountability of civil servants, both internally and externally. Two of the four vignettes used in the interview process specifically address situations and behaviour around indicators and ranks –​one being related to the two global performance indicators, and the other to horizontal coordination methods and approaches in the administration –​while a block of questions in the traditional interview also addresses these specific elements. The next chapter (Chapter 4) will address the impact of direct interaction with global and bilateral actors, with a focus on the policy dialogue around reforms. One of the vignettes addresses this specific issue along with a block of questions in the interview. This will be supplemented by evidence from the ‘Listening to Leaders’ surveys conducted by the Aiddata laboratory (Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021), which focus, among other things, on the frequency and quality of interaction between international actors, which provides useful contextual information for the in-​depth interview material that focuses on the four case countries. 38

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The third chapter in this part (Chapter 5) will address the impact of the global movement on open government and freedom of information. While MENA countries are latecomers to this process, all four countries have put in place broader access to information legislation, and Tunisia is a global front runner on both freedom of information and open government engagement. This has constituted a major shift in the context and external accountability of civil servants. Two vignettes focus on this aspect –​one on how freedom of information legislation is being used and one on public participation in policy making –​and as with the other issues, a set of questions in the classical interview part also addresses this issue. In the final part, in the concluding chapter, we will come back to the research question and hypotheses presented earlier, draw conclusions on these based on the case studies and general context of chapters, and outline an agenda for future research on this important topic. Notes 1

2 3 4

International organizations (‘IO’) are traditionally studied by international relations scholars, while literature on public administration is much more diverse, discussing the administrative aspects of international organizations under the headings of ‘international bureaucracies’, ‘compound bureaucracies’, ‘international public administrations’, and ‘international administrative bodies’. For further discussion, see also Trondal et al (2010), Bauer et al (2017), and Christensen and Yesilkagit (2019). Although acknowledging IOs as important actors in global governance, our ambition is not to understand these bodies and/​or explain their sources and power of influence; rather we focus on their channels of influence on local bureaucracies. In addition, we also cover the engagement by non-​governmental international actors, especially in view of their role in developing and monitoring performance indicators. Therefore, throughout this study, we will utilize ‘transnational organizations/​actors’ in line with the definition used by Stone and Moloney (2019). However, when dealing with the specific issue of development partnerships, we will use the term ‘international (development) partners’, which includes bilateral and multilateral development partners. Saudi-​Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait. Enabling Doing Business was discontinued in September 2021. The use of datasets by technology-​based start-​ups is an often-​quoted example.

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2

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Globalization Introduction The impact of globalization on the countries of the MENA region is a subject of much debate, even more so in the aftermath of the transformational events of the last decade’s early years. Transformational events have also made the region into a live laboratory of how enhanced globalized engagement affects national institutional systems, especially for the resource poorer open economies in the Maghreb and the Mashreq. This chapter analyses the context in which the remainder of this book is set and focuses on the dynamics of the enhanced engagement between transnational and national actors, with an emphasis on the civil service. In this context, we will first review the historical patterns of integration of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa in the global economy. While we will look at trends in the region more broadly, we will focus specifically on countries that do not depend significantly on natural resource extraction while at the same time have more open economies and political systems, namely Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. Second, to help us assess the impact of global engagement on civil servants in Parts II and III of the book (Chapters 3–​6), we will lay out contextual information on the origins and evolution of civil service systems in the region and the focus countries, then look at the specific role the public sector and civil service played in the critical post-​independence years, and afterwards focus on the development of the civil service in the transition context. Historically, the Middle East and North Africa has been a deeply internationalized region –​a connection point between continents and cradle of civilizations. Yet the trajectory changed in the 19th and 20th century and saw the region increasingly marginalized. The years since the Second World War, and the advent of the emancipation and independence movements, then saw the region turning inward, driven economically by 40

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natural resource extraction and import substitution policies, and politically by regimes that were, with few exceptions, authoritarian, autocratic, and closed, with elements of cronyism and corruption (Schomaker and Bauer, 2020). A state-​driven development model meant that public sector employment was dominant in the post-​independence decades, and a public sector job was what many graduating youths aspired to. The social contract that formed in this period was one where the state provided subsidized products and services, as well as employment, without citizens expecting a voice or accountability. Trends shifted when a number of countries in the region initiated a process of economic opening up in the late 1970s and 1980s, seeking integration in global value chains and investment in tourism (see Ali and Msadfa [2016] for a discussion on Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt). This gradual move to a more private-​sector-​driven economic structure, starting in the 1980s, has accelerated over the last decade, but has not been sufficient to provide a growing number of labour market entrants with jobs and opportunities, creating a situation of structural unemployment or underemployment among youth. The process of economic liberalization and value chain integration starting in the 1980s was primarily pursued through ‘offshore’ modalities,1 keeping the ‘onshore’ companies, which were engaged in production for domestic markets, protected from competition (and excluded from international value chains). It also included the maintenance of a significant role for the public sector in economic activity, including in onshore production sectors. The creation of dual onshore–​offshore economies had two important consequences. First, it reduced the extent to which national economies could benefit from the know-​how and investment brought by integration in the global economy. Benefits to society accrued mostly in the form of additional employment for a growing youth population. Second, it increased the hold of autocratic leaders on societies through cronyism in the distribution of permits and licenses. Still, overall, the creation of offshore investment is seen as the starting point of a broader process of opening up the economies in the region, and related processes of economic reform (including rethinking the state’s role in the economy) and structural transformation. This process was supported (and some argue pushed) by international development partners, for example through the provision of structural adjustment support that was provided in the 1980s (Radwan, 2020). The events of 2011 are perceived as having accelerated this trend, at least when it comes to the economic aspects of globalization; a key demand of protestors was more and better jobs, a demand that was impossible to meet through the by then outdated dual economic model. Rethinking the structure of the economy and taking the step towards a new economic model became a core element of policy debate, with the focus especially on how to develop the former ‘onshore’ sectors (agriculture and agribusiness in particular) so as to help them become internationally competitive and engage 41

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in job-​generating higher-​quality production. Unfortunately, making the switch from a dual to a more integrated economy, and to a more diversified production base, has proven to be highly challenging, due to resistance from vested interests (as analysed in a landmark ‘unfinished revolution’ report on Tunisia [World Bank, 2014]), a weak enabling environment (including for financial services), and a misalignment between the skills and competencies needed to build a private-​sector-​based economy and the offerings of higher education programmes. As an illustration, the four countries considered in depth in this study all rank in the 70s and 80s in the GCI (Jordan, 70; Morocco, 72; Tunisia, 87; Lebanon 88: Global Competitiveness Index, 2020) and lower in the Trade and Logistics Index, with the exception of Lebanon (Jordan, 84; Morocco, 109; Tunisia, 105; Lebanon, 79: Logistics Performance Index, 2020). The MENA region has an average score on the HCI, though this includes significant outliers on the high end (UAE) and the low end (Yemen). Importantly, regional scores decline when the proportion of people who are employed (the actual use of Human Capital for productive purposes) is considered (Miwa and Amoroso, 2020). The public sector reform literature covering the MENA region and our four focus countries highlights the high degree of intertwinement between the prevalent economic model and the organization and role of the public sector. However, the transition processes in MENA countries have fundamentally altered the context in which civil service systems operate. Globalization became one of the external factors affecting environmental changes and creating new requirements on civil service and public administration systems. Following the global NPM movement, which emphasizes efficiency and competitiveness (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), the public sector, originally built for a state-​led development model, has now been facing growing internal and external pressures to change. Citizens are demanding better services from governments and have higher expectations of civil service and public sector performance. As a result of economic and political opening up, and a greater engagement with transnational actors (driven by support needs as well as increased interest in the region after 2011), we have also started to see greater questioning of economic and social policies that for several decades used the public sector, including the broader public service, as a buffer to absorb demands for employment. As a result, public sector employment in the MENA region now makes up, on average, 24 per cent of total employment –​much higher than the global average, which stands at about 16 per cent (World Bank, 2020a). From a political perspective, the balance of the revolutions of 2011 is sobering, as the same (legitimate) calls for voice and transformation sparked violent conflict and destabilization, reversing decades of development in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. However, this is juxtaposed with the processes of political liberalization in other countries, cautiously in Morocco and Jordan, 42

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and more radically in Tunisia and, potentially, Lebanon, points we will be discussing in more detail later in this chapter. These political transitions, and the high turnover of political elites in the last decade, have led to growing politicization, with a more prominent role given to political appointees in decision-​making processes, hence destabilizing that same civil service. These patterns were reflected in interview responses from the four focus countries in this study, particularly in Lebanon and Tunisia. In Lebanon, “attempts from politicians to instrumentalize donor roles/​interventions” were referred to (Interview 2), highlighting “a noticeable trend [authors’ note: within the Lebanese communities, among politicians, and even some senior civil servants] of looking inward and alienating global actors” (Interview 6), which results in demotivated civil servants that either (i) exit the country or (ii) resign from the civil service. Points made in Tunisia (Interview 14) show that “tensions exist between ministers who want to be the ultimate authority and directors general who have the public interest in mind”. Also, Tunisia (Interview 16) notes “an imbalance in the system where politicians and political appointees no longer trust the administration and continuously get into the technical issues”. This is then confirmed in Tunisia (Interview 17): “political leadership … takes decisions without considering the inputs of their own civil servants”. Finally, the social and economic impact of these transitions has been deepened by the ongoing COVID-​19 crisis, which has highlighted both the risks and benefits of open economies. Whether from integration in value chains (when these chains get interrupted or redirected), dependency on international tourism, or continued dependency on natural resource extraction, it has been shown that no economic system is immune to a global pandemic. In this context, the role of the civil service in ensuring the continuity of the state has also grown in importance. This global crisis should, in our view, make leaders even more conscious of the importance of the quality and performance of their national governance systems as a factor in attracting and retaining investment and ensuring greater continuity of the state.

Regional context: a history of global interconnections Historically, the MENA region has played an instrumental role in international trade both originating within the region and on the transit route between Europe, East Asia, and Southeast Africa. Located at the centre of the east–​west trading axis, the region’s trade importance flourished during the 11th and 13th centuries when the Silk Road ran from Aleppo to Baghdad, through Iran and Uzbekistan and all the way to China. The Indian Ocean connected Indian and East African traders to the Gulf through the Red Sea, carrying not only merchandise but also cultural and religious influences that are seen to this day across Malaysia, Indonesia, and India. 43

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Northern African countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt were at the heart of trans-​Saharan trade’s north–​south, south–​west, and north–​east trade routes, according to Abu-​Lughod (1989), whose documentation of the world system pre-​colonialism emphasizes the long history of an outward-​looking region connected with the world through trade, culture, and tradition. The Mediterranean, a thriving centre of trade connecting Europe’s major ports to other continents via Middle Eastern and North African cities, saw the exchanges of silk, porcelain, spices, dates, textiles, horses, ivory, gold, and slaves, to name a few. As the geopolitical landscape was changing across the Mediterranean towards the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century, Europe’s industrialization instituted a new pattern of trade. According to Dahi and Demir (2008), Europe was exporting manufactured goods in return for primary products and raw materials from the south, which contributed to the decline of manufacture and crafts production within the MENA region. This shift was further aggravated by Europe’s colonial expansionism across the MENA region by the 20th century, resulting not only in a shift in the pattern of production and trade, but also disrupting intra-​regional trade in agriculture and manufactured goods (Dahi and Demir, 2008, pp 5–​7). Colonialism had not only exploited resources of the region’s countries, but subsequently led to the adoption of inward-​looking economic policies by MENA region countries as a means of reinstating political and economic sovereignty. During the colonial period, analysts argue, power remained essentially concentrated among political and economic elites that allied with colonial powers, which helped pave the way to the 1960s populist social contract (Galal and Selim, 2014). By the end of the Second World War, as countries of the MENA region started gaining their independence, political rivalries, the rise of nationalism, and recurrent conflicts, including the Arab–​Israeli conflict, marked a turbulent post-​colonial period and the beginning of a sustained period of entrenchment of autocracy in the region, as illustrated in Makdisi (2017) and Ali and Msadfa (2016). This was facilitated by the region’s hydrocarbon resource wealth, allowing resource rich countries to establish so-​called welfare states, where the social contract was based on the state providing subsidized products and services, without voice or accountability for its citizens. Moreover, the establishment of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1960s and the boom in oil prices in the following decade had ‘spillover effects’ on non-​resource rich countries, in the form of aid from resource rich economies and through intra-​regional trade in labour, with remittances reaching as high as 20 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in labour-​abundant countries such as Jordan, and around 5–​10 per cent of GDP in Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and Tunisia (Shafik, 1998). In fact, natural resources had by then started shaping new 44

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inter-​and intra-​regional trade patterns in the region, breaking with historical patterns. Inter-​regional export of fuels and other primary products (for example natural gas and iron phosphates) reached as high as 50 per cent of GDP in resource rich countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar (Shafik, 1998). This also made non-​resource rich countries progressively dependent on aid and capital inflows from oil producing countries, helping create political alliances, shore up existing political regimes, and maintain a rentier system that is characterized by a weak economic environment with a lack of competition in domestic markets, and capture by elites benefitting from the privileges these regimes provided. As noted earlier, the emerging political and economic systems in most of the region’s countries in the post-​colonial period of the 20th century were largely characterized by a state-​led development model, with the state participating heavily in productive sectors through state-​owned enterprises (SOEs), limited trade integration, and poor private sector access to more advanced market economies. Many analysts have also highlighted that economic liberalization efforts of the late 20th century were undertaken without accompanying political reforms to advance democratic norms and improve voice and accountability. This led to the further entrenchment of existing regimes that were capable of co-​opting business elites through rent-​ seeking activities (Dahi, 2011; Ansani and Daniele, 2012; Hinnebusch, 2020).

Haves and have nots: natural resource rich vs. more diversified economies The political and economic diversity of countries in the MENA regions is marked by a legacy of over-​dependence on oil wealth in some countries, and strong centralized and state-​centred planning systems that were put in place by newly emerging nation states to accelerate economic development and consolidate national identity (Sorensen, 2014). The post-​independence period saw the emergence of a dominant public sector in the national economies of the region: Its principal features included: agrarian reforms combined with the nationalization of industry, banking, insurance, and trade; the adoption of import substitution and the protection of local industry; a central role for the state in the provision of welfare and social services; and a vision of the political arena as fundamentally non-​competitive and ‘organic’. (Amin et al, 2012) Most countries in the region initially exhibited a degree of inertia on economic liberalization and market freedoms. However, this position changed in the wake of falling oil prices and oil price shocks, particularly from the 45

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1980s onwards. Indeed, many countries of the region had by then embarked on macroeconomic and microeconomic structural adjustment programmes supported by international donors and multilateral institutions. This was particularly the case for countries that could not depend significantly on natural resource extraction, and that had traditionally more open economies, including the four focus countries in this book (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia). It is also arguably on the civil servants and civil service systems of these countries that transmission channels of globalization would have the most influence. The economic model of the GCC countries, and more broadly resource rich countries in the region such as Iraq, Libya, and Algeria, has been dominated by the oil and gas sectors since their independence. This model has been largely state led and driven (Hvidt, 2013; Ali and Msadfa, 2016; Chekouri et al, 2017), with the large amount of export and fiscal revenues from oil and gas allowing the government to allocate significant resources to citizens in the form of transfers and public sector employment opportunities, and also invest heavily in infrastructure and social sectors, leading to significant economic development and improvement in social outcomes (Callen et al, 2014). However, the frailty of the model, acknowledged by some of these countries, has led to several attempts at economic diversification, which varied in terms of success and durability. For example, the UAE has successfully implemented policies to reduce its dependence on oil production, including establishing free zones to attract foreign investments (Mansur, 2018). These attempts can be seen as ‘the means to overcome fundamental problems in the allocation state model, by reducing volatility, solving the employment problems and securing high and sustainable income levels for citizens in the future’ (Hvidt, 2013, p 38). Efforts at economic diversification have not always yielded results: among the resource rich countries discussed here, Algeria, for instance, has not made major advances in reducing its dependency on hydrocarbon revenues despite efforts to diversify its economy away from oil and gas dating back to the 1960s. Its economy has remained based primarily on oil production and export (Chekouri et al, 2017). Similarly, the Libyan economy has remained heavily dependent on oil since the 1960s (Ali and Harvie, 2013). While most GCC countries have been largely able to cope with pressure from the multiple international and regional crises of the last decade (the global financial crisis, oil price collapse, COVID-​19) due to accumulated wealth and foreign reserves, non-​GCC member states, including Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Syria, have generally been more vulnerable to revenue windfalls, which can negatively impact levels of public spending and undermine social and political stability (for example in Algeria during the oil price shocks of the 1980s, 2008–​09, 2014–​15, and March 2020). More recently, after the oil price reduction in 2014, resource rich countries 46

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undertook substantial efforts to reduce oil dependency and accelerate economic diversification. Countries like the UAE, Bahrain, and Oman (whose oil reserves are scarcer) have been leading over the past few years in non-​oil exports due to a transformed economic structure, increasingly skewed towards (financial) services and logistics. More recently, efforts at economic diversification in Saudi Arabia have also advanced. In contrast, the transition process of non-​natural resource rich countries of the region, particularly the four focus countries, towards economic liberalization and a market-​oriented economic model was engaged more rapidly but with mixed results. In the initial post-​independence period, most non-​resource rich countries in the MENA region, including Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan, were characterized by inward-​looking economic policies and a state-​led development model. The exception to this was Lebanon, which remained significantly more integrated in the global economy. Many of these countries had also relied on and benefitted from resource rich neighbours, especially during the 1970s and 1980, and particularly in the form of remittances from labour migration within the region and aid to secure sources of foreign exchange (Posusney, 2003). Lebanon, whose economic structure was based on a modern financial and service sector and sufficiently developed infrastructure (port, airports, and logistics), managed to benefit greatly from the wealth of oil rich countries in the region in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is estimated that at the peak of the oil boom in the early 1980s, some 3.5 million Arab migrant workers –​mainly from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Morocco –​were employed in the oil states of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states (Amin et al, 2012). However, starting in the 1970s, direct engagement with global institutions in the region began to grow in importance in the context of macroeconomic and microeconomic structural adjustment programmes, which were supported by international partners and donors to promote a gradual shift towards a market-​oriented economic model, as illustrated in countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and others. These countries started opening up to global markets and attempting to diversify their economies by shifting from import substitution to export promotion policies. For example, post-​ independence, Tunisia shifted from a public-​led import substitution strategy to one that emphasized both import substitution and export promotion along with private sector development. By the early 1990s Tunisia had started to abandon its import substitution policies, first by reducing tariffs and easing quantitative restrictions on imports, and later (in 1995), by becoming a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Morocco similarly started liberalizing its trade regime in the 1980s by entering into several free trade agreements, most notably the Association Agreement with the EU (Ali and Msadfa, 2016). Jordan adopted an export promotion scheme in 1989, with the aim of reducing the anti-​export bias, increasing manufacturing exports, 47

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diversifying economic activity, and attracting more foreign investment. As for Lebanon, the peace process, launched in 1990 after 15 years of civil war, was predicated on launching a comprehensive political reform and economic recovery programme that was based on institutionalizing a parliamentary democracy, the reconstruction of key infrastructure, and the promotion of private ownership and a free market economy. The post-​war economy witnessed structural improvements through the 1990s; the private sector participated directly in reconstruction efforts, the financial sector deepened and widened, and the government and the private sector were able to tap international capital markets (Eken and Helbling, 1999). However, the reconstruction efforts also led to sizeable fiscal imbalances and an increasing public debt, which continued to pose significant risks to its financial outlook in the following decades and precipitated the current economic and financial crisis. The economic liberalization efforts undertaken by countries like Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan failed to bring in major expected benefits in terms of improved economic welfare through better employment opportunities based on stronger private sector activity (Radwan, 2020). First, these policies failed to fundamentally challenge the central role of the public sector in the economy, and second, their impact was often constrained by weak institutional performance by politico-​administrative systems, which were characterized by cronyism and corruption (Ansani and Daniele, 2012). As for Lebanon, analysts have also pointed out that the post-​war monetary and economic policy only benefitted a few, and that the country is characterized by a very narrow market structure where a small number of uncompetitive companies dominate their respective sectors (Picard and Ramsbotham, 2012). The partial nature of economic liberalization reforms, whether in terms of quality of economic policies or weak enforcement and implementation arrangements, did not resolve underlying economic and political governance issues (Amin et al, 2012). Although export promotion schemes accelerated integration into global markets, governments’ failure in promoting inclusive growth resulted in surfacing or long-​suppressed socioeconomic grievances, translating into mass protests in 2011. Indeed, reform efforts failed to achieve inclusive growth and create enough job opportunities for a continually growing youth population. A trend analysis of the scores of the MENA region’s countries on the Economic Freedom Index (EFI) from 1996 to 2016 shows that resource rich countries2 achieved a higher level of market freedom than the other countries (Mansour, 2018). On the eve of the 2011 events, political (and economic) institutions of natural resource poor Arab countries were not conducive to achieving sustainable development. The form of extractive institutions changed over time, but their essence remained the same (Galal and Hoda, 2014). The socioeconomic realities of the MENA region, mostly resource poor economies, in the lead-​up to the 2011 uprisings were, in retrospect, telling 48

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of the region’s need for meaningful structural reforms –​politically, socially, and economically. The inequitable access to power and resources among different segments of the population in the MENA region, and the lack of inclusive development, have called into question the parameters of the social contract in several MENA countries, particularly regarding citizens’ expectations from the state. This is seen in the several reform initiatives and measures attempted by various governments in the region. The decade that has now passed since 2011 also witnessed far-​reaching politico-​administrative transformation processes, including an acceleration of turnover among political elites, in countries like Tunisia, Lebanon, and Morocco, as well as efforts to increase civil service effectiveness and public employment management systems, whose size and importance in terms of presence and dominance in key economic and human capital sectors has not been commensurate with improvements in service delivery performance. As analysts have noted, the unhappy growth paradox is that while macroeconomic indicators of welfare, such as GDP per capita, were rising in the period up to 2010 at reasonably rapid rates, people living in the countries did not feel better off (Amin et al, 2012).

The 2011 events and after: reluctant economic globalization and political transitions of varying speed A decade after the 2011 uprisings, the transition trajectories of Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Lebanon vary significantly, but all face an urgent need to pursue and consolidate further economic and political reform. Political liberalization processes post-​2011 have been significant and radical in Tunisia, and efforts in others, like Jordan and Morocco, have gone further than in the 1980s and 1990s (when these two countries engaged in earlier political liberalization reforms to complement partial economic reforms) by giving opposition political parties more political space and expanding civil liberties (see discussion on authoritarian bargain model in Galal and Hoda, 2014). While no major political transformation process took place in Lebanon, the relatively contained 2011 protests and campaigns, and then the 2015 and 2019 protest movements, did see the emergence of new independent groups and movements gaining momentum and popularity, signalling a desire among civil society to break from the dominant confessional-​based political mobilization and challenge the sectarian regime. Overall, the political liberalization process can also be seen as part of a broader strategy to help improve countries’ international image and attract needed aid inflows and foreign direct investments, at a time when countries, particularly those exposed to EU markets, were still recovering from the impact of the global financial crisis. This is illustrated by the important attention given by international donors to governance reforms and issues, 49

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and subsequently, the increasing volume of financial and budget support commitments from international partners. On the other hand, the implementation of structural economic and financial reforms to enable private sector-​led growth in non-​resource rich countries remains weak and partial, and challenged by socioeconomic tensions, regional and domestic instability, and considerable political economy constraints. Some analysts have argued that post-​2011 outcomes have not fundamentally challenged the status quo and have ‘merely reproduced the existing autocracies and cronyism through a revolving door of power and wealth’ (Ali, 2020). Often considered as the Arab Spring’s only political reform success story, Tunisia has made important strides in transitioning from an autocratic regime towards establishing fundamental democratic norms and principles. The country has held successive free, fair, and peaceful elections at the municipal, parliamentary, and presidential levels since 2011. In May 2018 the first free and fair municipal elections were held, followed by presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019, that formalized a peaceful and constitutional transition in power administered thoroughly by state institutions –​a leap forward in the democratic progress of the region. The country’s new constitution, adopted in 2014, enshrines principles of democratic scrutiny and accountability, concretized by the adoption of several legal and regulatory texts on access to information, Open Data, fiscal transparency, and public participation.3 In contrast, Tunisia’s economic performance has continued to decline, with growth rates falling to an average of below 1.5 per cent annually after 2011. Total unemployment stood at 15.4 per cent in 2017 and is much higher among young graduates (30.2 per cent) and women (23.1 per cent). The growth of most sectors of the economy was negatively impacted by the uprisings, except the telecommunication, oil refining, and public administration sectors (see discussion in Nabi [2019] on growth of sectors between 2005 and 2010 and 2011 and 2014). The deteriorating business environment is also evidenced in the country’s declining performance across several global rankings and indices: Tunisia was ranked as ‘mostly unfree’ in the 2017 EFI. In addition, most governance indicators were in decline between 2011 and 2019, with the clear exception of Voice and Accountability (World Bank Group, 2020d). Jordan and Morocco have also managed to introduce important political reforms during the past decade as part of a largely controlled process, accelerated in response to the 2011 protests. Morocco introduced important political reforms through a constitutional reform process started in 2011, to appease and diffuse protest movements in the context of the Arab Spring (Naguib, 2020). The changes were presented as a more inclusive and pluralistic power sharing scheme, including provisions to guarantee public freedoms and the right to protest, and strengthen Parliament and civil society. 50

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The Monarchy and the government have also announced key initiatives to promote socioeconomic development in the country, attracting financial and technical support from the international community, including the World Bank, German Agency for International Co-​operation (GIZ), and the EU. Despite relatively good economic performance, a decade after 2011 the country still faces important development challenges: income inequality and regional disparities are high, youth unemployment rates remain high, and there are critical shortcomings in public service delivery, particularly in social sectors (Masbah, 2020; Naguib, 2020). In comparison to other countries such as Tunisia and Jordan, Morocco appears to perform better on governance indicators, but is ranked lower on Voice and Accountability (World Bank, 2021). Jordan’s political and economic reform trajectories since 2011 continue to be arduous. In the decade after 2011, the government supported progressive liberalization of political life by adopting a new law to enhance citizen representation in municipal councils. It also renewed its commitment to curb corruption by adopting a new law on integrity and anti-​corruption. For most of the previous decade (2000–​09) the international community applauded the country’s slow-​paced political openings as well as its macroeconomic performance, with an average annual growth rate of 6.5 per cent. However, this situation was destabilized with the invasion and war in Iraq, regional domestic upheavals, and the war in Syria. Foreign direct investment today stands at only two thirds of its 2009 levels. Annual GDP growth averaged just 2.4 per cent from 2010 to 2019. Although the country has been one of the world’s largest recipients of grants relative to the size of its economy (predominantly from the US and GCC), as debt started climbing to unsustainable levels the government turned to domestic taxation as an essential source of revenue, a move with significant political ramifications. In early 2018 the government raised the prices of food staples such as bread and proposed reducing subsidies on electricity and fuel, as well as changes to the tax code. The resulting protests –​representing a cross-​ section of Jordanian society –​constituted the largest demonstrations since those calling for political reform in 2011. In Lebanon, the ongoing economic and financial crises exposed deep-​ rooted structural failures in the governance system. Following previous reform efforts in 2001 and 2007, which were supported by the international community, processes stalled again, creating another period of stagnation. In 2017, Lebanon’s government again sought international support to help address the country’s ailing economy, which was granted during the international donor conference (Conférence Economique pour le Développement, par les Réformes et avec les Entreprises [CEDRE]) in 2018, and included an important capital investment programme. In response to disbursement conditions set forth by international partners in exchange for 51

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further financial support, the Lebanese government adopted an economic reform programme based on greater fiscal rigour, to reduce levels of public debt and to improve the investment climate (UNCTAD, 2019). In October 2019, deteriorating economic conditions, continued institutional paralysis, and political system failures triggered a wave of nationwide strikes, roadblocks, and protests. Mass mobilization persisted for months, with people demanding political reforms, accountability, and better livelihood conditions. As the country’s foreign reserves were being depleted, the government defaulted on its international debt in March 2020, and banks enforced informal capital controls and restricted citizens’ ability to withdraw their foreign currency deposits, all while the Lebanese lira lost, in effect, almost 80 per cent of its value. Now, importers and traders are struggling to keep up with the rising price of the dollar. The country’s import-​dependent supply chain has been almost completely halted. The economic decline was exacerbated further by the catastrophic Beirut port disaster in July 2020, which reinforced an already deeply negative economic spiral. Political liberalization reforms launched in the aftermath of the 2011 events took place in a context of increasing macroeconomic vulnerabilities, worsening the international, regional, and domestic environment in terms of private sector confidence and growth. The general impression following the 2011 events is that early economic reforms to dynamize private sector participation in productive sectors of the economy did not manage to bring in the promised benefits in terms of stronger economic performance and better youth employment opportunities, compared to the traditional role of the public sector as employer of first resort in some countries. Several studies (Altomonte and Ferrara, 2014; Finger and Fressani, 2014; Nabi, 2019; Ali, 2020) have pointed to constraints that were inadequately addressed, in particular regarding the business climate. This includes persistent, cumbersome bureaucratic processes and complex administrative processes, limited access to finance for private investment, state capture by business and political elites, the presence of large and inefficient SOEs and public banks in key sectors of the economy that crowd out the private sector, and still limited trade integration. Overall, those MENA countries that are in a political transition continue to struggle to meet the socioeconomic needs of their populations. The ongoing COVID-​19 crisis has also challenged the economic (and political) transitions of the four focus countries and highlighted the importance of reform and recovery plans to also address deep-​rooted structural economic governance failures. While COVID-​19 disruptions to the global value chains, international travel, and trade and remittance flows might have exacerbated the economic shock of labour-​abundant and resource-​poor states in the region, it is hard to imagine a reversal in the process of participation, albeit reluctant, in economic globalization. However, 52

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as the role of the civil service in ensuring the continuity of the state has grown in importance, this has put further onus on the importance of the quality and performance of national governance systems. A decade after the events of 2011, Tunisia is setting its post-​COVID recovery and rebuilding reform, with a focus on ways to improve private sector participation in the economy, leveraging important legislative reforms (Investment Code, Public Private Partnership [PPP], and available development partner financing [IGPP, 2020]). With accelerated job losses, a weakened economy, and a slowdown in international trade, Tunisia’s tourism industry saw the most severe impact; it makes up 8 per cent of Tunisia’s GDP, and is expected to lose US$1.4 billion in revenue by 2021. GDP declined by 8.8 per cent in 2020, with a fiscal deficit growing to over 10 per cent. Growing unemployment is pushing a greater number of Tunisians into poverty, which stood at an unprecedented level of almost 21 per cent in the spring of 2021 (World Bank, 2021). It is estimated that it could take up to three years for the country to regain the losses of this crisis (World Bank Group, 2021a). For Morocco, the government’s recovery strategy post COVID-​19 focuses on shoring up private sector activity and supporting infrastructure-​related PPPs, digitalizing large numbers of public services, and education, health, and social protection reforms. Similarly, its economy has also been pushed into an abrupt recession –​the first since 1995 –​felt through a decline in economic output and exports, a disruption in the global value chain, and a soaring unemployment rate, which rose from 8.1 per cent to 12.3 per cent (World Bank Group, 2020e). Similar to the other countries, Jordan’s economic recovery post-​COVID-​ 19 will largely depend on the extent to which it can address structural issues by implementing key reforms to improve the business climate, boost private sector investment, improve trade integration, and increase exports. Lebanon’s failing economy, meanwhile, had to deal with additional setbacks resulting from the COVID-​19 pandemic and the Beirut port explosion of August 2020, which exacerbated the country’s financing needs. The government officially asked for IMF assistance in May 2020 based on a government approved financial recovery plan; however, the talks effectively halted after the government resigned in the wake of the port explosion, leaving the country reeling from multiple crises from which it is yet to find a way forward.

Engagement with international partners: complex partnerships As discussed in the previous chapter, until recently there was no systematic and broad academic research on the impact of international partners’ 53

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engagement with national institutions and civil servants. The 2014, 2017 and 2020 surveys of the Aiddata Laboratory constitute the first large-​ scale analysis of this kind and brought out evidence of uneven patterns of engagement, both in terms of scope and impact (Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021). The conclusions drawn from the large global surveys, covering middle-​ and lower-​income ‘clients’ of IFIs, UN organizations, and other multilateral and bilateral development partners, are one of a wide variety of impact on leaders and senior officials, which is to be expected given that not all countries choose or need to have large technical and financial support. However, where there is deep engagement, officials and decision makers consider frequency of contact, consistency of engagement, and the quality of technical advice to be paramount in judging the relevance and influence of partners (Custer et al, 2018, pp 28–​9). This is a message that comes through consistently in the 2015 and 2018 ‘Listening to Leaders’ reports, as well as in the separate ‘Marketplace for Policy Advice’ study (Parks et al, 2015). Historically, the relations between MENA countries and international actors have seen periods of close collaboration, and also times of disagreement and adversarial relations, including popular pushback against reforms that were perceived as externally imposed and harmful to social stability. Yet over the last decade, countries throughout the region have become increasingly engaged with, and in some cases dependent on, international engagement and support. In the following section we will briefly analyse the history and causes of the multi-​faceted relations between MENA countries and their international partners.

The pre-​2011 context: controversy over paradigms and interference As previously said, partnerships between MENA countries and international development partners are complex. As with many other aspects of economic development discussed earlier, there is a stark difference between countries and economies rich in natural resources and ‘others’. The former group has had far more limited engagement with development partner institutions, and little or no engagement with policy-​based programmes and support. Financially, such engagements were not needed as investment could be financed independently and know-​how could be purchased. There has been a change in relations more recently, with many GCC countries, as well as Saudi Arabia, engaging with IFIs through paid advisory programmes. However, the breadth and depth of their relations with IFIs and other development partners is not comparable to those of non-​natural resource rich states. The latter group, including Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, and Jordan, and in some ways also Egypt, has historically had significant partnerships with 54

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IFIs, as well as with bilateral partners, such as through lending and grant programmes and policy-​based support. For these countries, it should be noted that while relations are multi-​ faceted and deeper, there is also significant controversy, with the role of IFIs viewed by many with some suspicion and concern over interference in sovereign issues. This was driven, at least in part, by the dominant post-​ independence development paradigm of state-​driven development based on import substitution policies. Except for Lebanon, all other countries in the non-​extractive economy group followed a variant of this economic development model, with some important nuances. Tunisia’s emphasis on social modernization and investment in education under Bourguiba stands out, with the oft-​quoted example of the first World Bank loan to Tunisia having been for investment in the education sector. The paradigm shift in economic policy that followed in the late 1970s and 1980s also changed the engagement model with international development partners. A recent study by Radwan (2020) analyses this shift in detail, including a detailed case analysis on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, highlighting the presumed significant influence of IFIs over economic reform trajectories. Coming at the height of the ‘Washington Consensus’, the emphasis in engagements by the World Bank, the IMF, and the EU, on reducing the role of the state, opening up economies to trade, and developing export-​driven growth models, should not come as a surprise. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which the programmes analysed by Radwan were driven by IFIs. The argument made in the study ‘Until Debt Tear us Apart’ is one of reforms imposed by international partners (Radwan, 2020). The counterargument to the ‘imposition hypothesis’ is that, as per other analyses quoted earlier (Ali and Msadfa, 2016), countries had started to move towards greater integration with the world economy well before, and the reforms initiated were a logical consequence of a move towards a different economic model. The alternative hypothesis, that leaders leveraged international partners as an ‘excuse’ to push through certain already planned reforms, in that regard is as credible as the hypothesis of imposition. Hence, the ‘chicken and egg’ question on this issue is a legitimate one. What is clear, and also comes out in other analysis (Pal, 2019), is that the deepening of partnerships in the 1980s was controversial (including the oft-​ quoted ‘bread riots’ in Tunisia and other forms of protest) and still today drives many of the perceptions in the region of IFIs as instruments of imposing ‘foreign’ notions of economic development. Discussions on governance were notably absent from this debate as these were not acceptable to the leadership in the region, with the exception of technical and technocratic engagement around PFM and administrative capacity building (Jreisat, 2012). 55

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While much analysis on the relations between MENA countries and IFIs focuses on tensions between indigenous economic development approaches and ‘imposed’ external ones, it is important to note that the programmatic engagement by international development institutions goes far beyond policy-​based lending and reform dialogue. The MENA region and some of the Maghreb countr ies have traditionally been major clients of the European Investment Bank, the African Development Bank, and the World Bank Group when it comes to infrastructure, financial sector development, and other investment programmes. In recent years, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has also expanded its engagement to the Maghreb, Jordan, and Lebanon. Other institutions, such as the Islamic Development Bank and OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) (the international development arm of OPEC) also have significant investment programmes in the region. While these are less pertinent for our discussion (as in most cases this is mainly a financial relationship and has less direct impact on the work of officials and political leaders), they are important for maintaining a continuous relationship between countries and their institutional systems and international partners. In summary, the pre-​2011 context saw significant engagement by international partners, both on reform dialogue (though not in a continuous manner) and on infrastructure and economic development programmes. Given the nature of the region’s governance systems, which are based on extreme centralization, autocratic leadership, cronyism, and internal mistrust (Jreisat, 2009), this engagement would have touched a very limited number of decision makers and officials, with decisions taken in ‘small committees’. This included discussions on reforms that were to have a deep impact on societies, and it is this lack of deeper engagement that is one of the elements of criticism levied at international partners in more recent analyses. Hence, the relationships with IFIs can be defined as transactional in nature and driven by the priorities set by regional leaders that ruled through a process of reform imposition. This did involve testing the limits of what populations were willing to support (Radwan, 2020, pp 27–​8, on the Tunisia bread riots of 1983–​84), including backtracking when popular opposition became too strong. The main point to be made here is that for the purposes of our study there is little or no evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, of the influence of global partners reaching anywhere beyond the top layer of the political system; while relations were important in the non-​resource rich countries of the region, they did not permeate the governance and institutional system, or have significant impact on civil servants and public administrations. When compared to the three factors that, based on Custer et al (2015), determine the potential impact of interaction with international partners 56

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on national civil servants and institutional systems (consistency and linearity over time, frequency and regularity of contact, and quality of technical advice), the limited studies available highlight that relations were mostly of a ‘stop-​and-​go’ nature (apart from financing specific projects) and did not involve deep contacts with a broad set of country interlocuters. Not much can be said, based on the limited available evidence, about the quality and use of partner advice.

Post-​2011 engagement with partners: a different ballgame? While the jury will likely remain out on the ‘chicken and egg’ question on the support of IFIs and the EU to 1980s and 1990s structural reforms, and the impact of such support on national economies and social systems, there is little divergence of view over the radical change in the nature of relations after 2011. While the nature and pace of governance reforms in the four countries covered in this study differ, the nature of relations with IFIs and other development partners changed significantly in each case. This is both part of a broader global shift in relations after 1990 (Pal, 2019, pp. 48–​9) and a consequence of the rapid evolution of relations between MENA region countries and international (multilateral and bilateral) institutions. There are a few fundamental parameters in the shift of relations that apply particularly to the countries discussed here: (i) a deep engagement in governance and democratization, or at least pluralism in the political system; (ii) a change in the nature of relations, from the pre-​2011 limited interaction to a broad engagement across political and administrative counterparts, as well as with CSOs; (iii) the multiplication of partner engagements, again common to all four countries discussed here, but also applying to countries like Iraq and Egypt; and (iv) continuity in engagement around policy dialogue, instead of a stop-​and-​go engagement depending on the interests of political leadership. We will now look at each of these in turn. Before 2011, engagement between development partners and MENA countries on issues of governance and institutional reform was limited to technical aspects of public sector management, excluding broader governance issues around, for instance, accountability and anti-​corruption. The changes in governance systems discussed earlier in this chapter have opened up an array of new engagements in this area, in particular in the four focus countries of this study. In this context, Pal (2019) reviews the engagement by the OECD, EU, and World Bank, which use different but complementary methods of engagement. The OECD works through the more ‘non-​threatening’ peer review system (Pal, 2019, p 11), and stepped up to develop a broad engagement programme for MENA countries over the last decade –​the Initiative on Governance and Investment for Development (OECD, 2020). The programme includes sensitive engagement areas like 57

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money laundering, access to information, gender and equity, and anti-​ corruption alongside traditional technical peer review engagements on PFM and human resource management, and also works on socialization through participation in the OECD’s network and working groups. The EU has an even larger engagement programme under its Southern Neighbourhood engagement, which also includes a strong emphasis on governance and democracy, while the World Bank has supported work on accountability and anti-​corruption alongside its traditional engagement areas (Pal, 2019). There is a myriad of other engagements and programmes by bilateral and multilateral partners that emphasize governance and democracy, which operate most extensively in Tunisia but also in the other focus countries in this study. The significance of these engagements is that they have expanded dialogue between development partner representatives and national civil servants, both in breadth of areas covered and in depth of engagement, with the OECD peer review and committee processes often seen by national officials as particularly enriching. Such engagement would have been virtually unthinkable ten years ago. This brings us to the second element, which is the breadth of engagement. We already discussed the added area of governance and democratization (which gets directly into the internal workings of administrations and civil servants), but this is equally valid for economic policies and development. While structural adjustment engagement in the 1980s and 1990s focused on broad macroeconomic and fiscal reforms, over the last decade policy-​ based lending and grant support engagements4 have substantially broadened, which means engagement between international partners and national administrations involves significantly larger numbers of officials across a broader range of agencies. Interviews with officials in the four countries covered here, which in all countries represented a broad range of institutions engaged in economic governance issues, confirmed this trend regarding both the broadening and deepening of engagement involving multiple development partners in each country. Reform programmes have increasingly become multi-​faceted programmatic engagements involving national governments and partners, including a five-​year reform programme for Jordan (concluded in 2019) and a three-​year joint partner engagement with Tunisia (concluded in 2020). There is increasingly also an interconnection with the dialogue on indicators and rankings, which tend to inform and drive priority-​setting. The multiplication of partner engagements is a third feature common to all four countries discussed here, though this is also the case for other MENA countries, like Egypt and Iraq. Multiple multilateral and bilateral partners are engaged in policy reform dialogue and support as well as other programmatic support. Sector-​wide dialogue, long a feature of development cooperation in sub-​Saharan Africa, is now a feature of programmes in Tunisia, Morocco, and, to a lesser degree, Jordan. Managing this dialogue 58

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is a challenge to stretched administrations that are not accustomed to the intensity of development partner engagement, a point that also comes out in the interviews with officials, especially in the case of Tunisia, but much less so (at least for now) in Lebanon. A fourth feature that differentiates pre-​and post-​2011 engagement is continuity, especially of reform dialogue. While the continuity of engagement with international development partners is in part driven by macro-​financial conditions, Morocco, which has faced relatively fewer challenges in this regard, has still opted for a continuous dialogue on policy reforms, including financing, involving multiple development partners. In our view, this reflects, at least in part (as per the conclusions of the Aiddata surveys and confirmed in interviews done during this study), an appreciation of continuous and substantive dialogue with international partners and this dialogue’s contribution to policy design. Finally, and this speaks to the issue of proximity, development partners have significantly scaled up their presence in MENA countries, including the reopening of diplomatic missions and establishing a presence to enable effective development cooperation (for bilateral partners in particular) and the scaling up of multilateral partners’ presence. This is, again, most visible in Tunisia, but applies also to Morocco and Jordan.5 Lebanon always had a significant partner presence, except during the conflict period in the 1970s and 1980s. If the assumption that the impact and appreciation of partnerships by national officials, and through this their influence on them, is driven by continuity, proximity, and quality of advice and support –​and the Aiddata survey results provide some strong evidence to this effect –​the four trends discussed earlier, plus the scale-​up in partners’ presence on the ground, provide conditions for an increased impact of globalization (on the aspects discussed in this study) on civil servants in the region. This is particularly the case for high-​engagement countries, though may also apply to some of the resource rich countries in the region. The shift from a relatively shallow, stop-​and-​go partnership model based on high-​level contacts, even if, at times, around contentious and sensitive issues, to a broad and deep engagement based on frequent exchanges across administrations and institutions provides the conditions for a ‘two-​way-​street’ relationship that has the potential to have significant impact on civil servants. Regarding the evolution of partnerships and the mutual influence they bring, the factors that define the impact of partnerships (as presented in the ‘Listening to Leaders’ assessments by the Aiddata lab [Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021]) are significantly in place in the four countries studied here (as well as in some other countries in the MENA region): a growing frequency of interaction, a deepened and broadened policy dialogue, and a stepped-​up presence from partner institutions in countries all speak to growing impact 59

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and influence. If partnership management was, in the past, the work of a small number of ‘trusted’ officials, today it is a day-​to-​day reality for a large number of officials. This pattern of engagement adds to the importance of our hypotheses around the potential impact of growing interaction.

Civil service systems: an under-​analysed factor in responses to globalization In contrast to the growing interest in the political and economic transition and in the complex relationship between the MENA region and international partners, civil service systems in MENA countries remain largely under-​ analysed. While some new material has been published in recent years (Pal, 2019; Beschel and Yousef, 2020), published material on MENA civil service systems remains few and far between. The recent work by Pal and Beschel focuses primarily on public management reform efforts and their assessment, with some sparse attention paid to the engagement of civil service systems with international partners. Given the importance of civil service systems and the broader public sector in the economies of MENA countries, especially in the last decade of reforms, this limited degree of attention is somewhat puzzling. In part, this may be the consequence of the limited interest pre-​2011 in what were considered largely frozen systems in the context of authoritarian regimes. This belies the fact that MENA country civil service systems are complex and influenced by various administrative traditions, given the blend of Ottoman and continental European influences overlaid with Islamic notions on the role of the state and deeper underlying fault lines (tribal and traditional, though not in all countries) (Schomaker and Bauer, 2020, pp 379–​81). In their most recent incarnation, MENA country civil service systems were established as systems that ‘mimic’ European models, based on British and French traditions. However, even if they are, in theory, built on imported structures and principles, Schomaker and Bauer (2020) stress that these systems have numerous other undercurrents and influences (Ottoman-​era traditions, tribal influences, and so on) and are also shaped by Islamic thinking on the duties and role of the state. From this perspective, where formal institutions exist over underlying traditions and informal structures, it will be particularly important to look deeper at how administrative traditions have evolved in the context of the four focus countries. This will provide important contextual and cultural elements and nuances to our understanding of how national systems react to the issue of globalization and how they filter the impact of transmission channels, for example the impact of international performance rankings on the behaviour, values, and norms of civil servants and the civil service. This also extends 60

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to also the impact of others, like increased international engagement on institutional dynamics in the civil service, in particular on patterns of accountability and the related issue of politico-​administrative relations. Administrative tradition has been defined as a ‘historically based set of values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate public administration within society’ (Peters, 2008, p 118). More specifically, Painter and Peters (2010) define an administrative tradition as ‘a more or less enduring pattern in the style and substance of public administration in a particular country or group of countries’ (p 118). In further defining the concept, Yesilkagit (2010, p 145) highlights the importance of an inherited set of ideas and beliefs, in addition to the formal institutional and governance structures discussed by Painter and Peters (2010). Administrative traditions influence the way civil servants think, conceptualize, and work within institutional structures. They also determine the nature of the relationship between the legislative, executive, and legal branches of government, and between government and its citizens and private sector operators (Painter and Peters, 2010). There are four key classification criteria to define administrative traditions: (i) whether there is a legal basis for the State (the law as an instrument of the state to intervene in society); (ii) the nature of the relationship between the state and society (interventionist, laissez-​faire, and so on.); (iii) the organization of government (centralized vs. decentralized); and (iv) the status of civil service within society (high or low) (Painter and Peters, 2010). In this regard, it is useful to use these dichotomies to help us understand how administrative traditions in our focus countries continue to influence how civil service systems and civil servants react and function, in particular when it comes to the issue of globalization and its transmission channels. The following section provides a summary of how administrative traditions in the focus countries compare to these dichotomies. In terms of the first dimension, the legal basis for the action of the state is in all four countries based on written constitutional norms and derived legislation. However, Islam (enshrined in the constitutions) also plays an important part in defining the role and functioning of the state, influencing civil servants’ behaviour, and guiding the legislative branch of governments. Islam has been the dominant religion in the Middle East since 632 BC, and religious rules translated into the establishment of centralized, hierarchical, and rule-​based types of administrative systems. In terms of the role of the state, all four countries have gone through a process of change in economic model, as previously discussed in this chapter. However, as we have seen, at this time they all remain significantly interventionist, with the public sector being perceived as an important provider of jobs, and with dominant SOEs, heavy sector regulation and 61

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controls, and high barriers to entry resulting in monopolies and connected firms dominating several economic sectors. As regards the organization of government, the countries share a strong centralized and hierarchical governance tradition, though Jordan (Ebel et al, 1995) and Tunisia (in recent years) have introduced and empowered local self-​governing structures. The type of western administrative practices (French and UK) introduced in the MENA region in the 20th century reinforced existing (and traditional) hierarchical approaches to public sector management; and today culture and religion still play an important role in how countries are governed. For example, the King of Morocco is both the Head of the State and ‘Commander of the Faithful’. He presides over the Council of Ministers and appoints the Head of Government. The monarchy also has a critical unifying role in Jordan, emphasizing a traditionally strong sense of vertical hierarchy. While vertical hierarchy is less pronounced in Lebanon and Tunisia, as they are republics with a greater level of political (and in Lebanon religious) pluralism, in comparative terms, all four countries retain centralized public administration systems with a basis much like that of other MENA countries (Schomaker and Bauer, 2020, pp 379–​81). Interviews conducted to inform this study reflect these same principles of hierarchy and centralization in decision making. Respondents from Morocco characterized the governance system as hierarchical and rooted in a low-​trust environment (Morocco, Interviews 10, 16, and 17). Similarly, the Tunisian administration was perceived as dominated by the French hierarchical culture, where formal structures drive decision making: “there is a high degree of rigidity, we work with an archaic French model” (Tunisia, Interviews 10 and 11). Lebanese respondents described the public administration as dominated by the importance given to formal hierarchical powers and decision making (Lebanon, Interviews 3 and 5). Finally, in the case of Jordan, respondents emphasized formal decision making based on principles of hierarchy (Jordan, Interviews 1, 8, 14, 15, and 16). Evidence-​ based policy making (EBPM) focused on results and performance (supported by strong accountability systems) remains a limited practice, as illustrated by responses to interview questions. In the case of Tunisia, Interviews 1, 6, 9, and 13 all highlighted hindrances to progress in this area, as in Jordan, Interviews 1 and 12; Lebanon, Interview 14; and Morocco, Interview 20. These and other interviewees discussed various challenges to making progress on result-​based and performance management, including a lack of political interest and support, tendencies to centralize decision making within small teams of political appointees (ignoring the administration), preference for using consulting firms rather than building internal capacity, and pushback from stakeholders, like trade unions, that oppose performance management. In terms of status, civil servants continue to enjoy a high status in both Jordan and Morocco, where civil servants are highly trained, both locally 62

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and abroad. Furthermore, there has been a significant investment in administrative modernization, including the introduction of meritocratic civil service recruitment in Morocco. ‘Corps de métiers’, or professional bodies introduced by the French during the protectorate, still dominate the public administration in Morocco and Tunisia, where groups of professionals are united and motivated by common responsibilities and interests, and support each other’s career development. On the other hand, the status of civil servants has been eroded in Tunisia and Lebanon due to increased politicization, despite a politico-​administrative interface based on the French system that uses political cabinets (staffed with either temporary assigned career civil servants or temporary political appointees from outside the administration) as a structured buffer between political office holders and permanent civil servants.

Post-​independence establishment of civil service systems: intertwined with emerging economic models The post-​independence choice for a state-​led and isolationist development model (with the exception of Lebanon) required the creation of large public organizational structures to implement these central development plans (Jreisat, 2008): civil service system development and the creation of a state-​ led economic model thus became closely intertwined. The construction of nation-​states in the MENA countries and the emerging and varied forms of governance systems in the post-​independence period were rooted in a ‘survival strategy’ that served to protect and cement positions of post-​independence elites (Sorensen, 2014; Bhuiyan and Farazmand, 2020). This is seen in the adoption of inward-​looking economic policies by countries of the MENA region to cope with pressures from the industrialized world and help maintain economic and political sovereignty. This is confirmed by Djeflat (2002), who emphasized the point that the economic legacy of the post-​independence period, defined by import-​ substitution and protectionism, continues to mark the fabric of society and the economy. The legacy of economic protectionism has reinforced already existing belief systems (derived from Islamic notions of hierarchy and centralism) that favour central decision making and the control exercised by unaccountable bureaucrats. This in turn drove a rapid expansion of the public sector. The exception to this model is Lebanon, where the financial and service sectors were well established and where public sector dominance was much more constrained. There are various factors that explain the reason for the emergence of this model, including: (i) the weakness of the private sector and need to accelerate economic development post-​independence; (ii) the need to safeguard national interests and provide protection from international pressures; and (iii) the establishment of a populist social 63

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contract. Jawad (2018) argues that the legacy of colonialism combined with geopolitical instability in the region to help establish and consolidate authoritarian and autocratic regimes, and contribute to the prevalence of particularistic distribution networks. As far as the four countries discussed in this study are concerned, the post-​ independence leadership of Tunisia created dual elites: a French educated class versus the traditional tribal and religious leadership. This duality of elite orientation was costly to the society in terms of durable democratic norms and traditions, and led to the rise of rentier elites. In the same vein, the leadership of Morocco and Jordan found ways to accommodate both the traditional and the progressive elites. In Lebanon, the sectarian power-​sharing system strengthened the hold and capture of state resources and saw the creation of a generation of combined economic and political elites in the post-​independence period (Ali, 2020). This is confirmed by Bhuiyan and Farazmand (2020), who conclude that these same elites continue to be the dominant players in policy processes, seeking benefits for themselves at the cost of building a just society. This then reduces transparency, opening the way for rent-​seeking and capture, and a public perception that government and administration serve the interests of the elites rather than society at large. A review of responses from the interview-​based research provides a similar outlook for the focus countries. For example, the Jordan responses highlighted a strong sense of hierarchy in the civil service, with the political level having strong authority and civil servants being in a subordinate position (Jordan, Interviews 3, 4, 8, 14, and 15). The Lebanon responses highlighted differing perspectives on relations between officials and politicians, with some arguing a relation of adversaries (Lebanon, Interviews 1 and 14), and others a relation of trusted advisers (Lebanon, Interviews 8 and 9). Several respondents pointed to inherent tensions between the political and administrative levels in Lebanon (Lebanon, Interviews 2, 6, and 14). The Tunisia responses described a post-​2011 transition context, where previous rules, procedures, and practices are disconnected from the administration’s evolving reality. Several respondents claimed that the work environment has worsened in the last decade due to political instability, lack of reform continuity, and growing tension and mistrust and lack of collaboration between the political and administrative tiers. More particularly, several respondents mentioned the need for politicians to show greater respect and trust for the technical expertise and experience of officials (Tunisia, Interviews 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, and 13). The Moroccan responses described an evolving administration that is consequently working at two speeds: a heavy bureaucratic administration that is fragmented and works in silos versus a more innovative and dynamic one (Morocco, Interviews 1, 8, and 13). Regarding the latter, several respondents described an evolving work environment and work methods 64

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based on information technology (IT) tools and collaborative methods (Morocco, Interview 13).

The social contract and its impact on civil service development The economic and social policies in the post-​independence period were underpinned by a patrimonial political and institutional framework, where the state was the main contributor to social and economic activity and held responsibility for citizen welfare (Jawad, 2018; Mansour 2018). Karshenas et al (2014) also explain that emerging social welfare regimes had more to do with objectives of nation-​building and consolidation of public support for emerging autocratic rulers than strictly to promote citizen rights and development outcomes. Leaders maintained pressure on institutions through a rhetoric of continuous reform (Hibou and Hulsey, 2006), and in this way created a rentier system wherein political leadership shored up the regime through reliance on aid and capital inflows and subsidized service provision. This social contract was also conducive to increasing public employment. As a result, countries have created oversized bureaucracies; public sector employment makes up more than 20 per cent of total employment in Jordan and Tunisia, and about 10 per cent in Lebanon and Morocco. Morocco and Tunisia have the largest public sectors as a share of formal employment within the region, both at over 40 per cent (World Bank, 2020a). The attraction to public sector jobs is driven by public sector wage premiums compared to private sector wages, and non-​wage benefits, such as subsidized housing and utilities, free education and healthcare, and social security, as well as government willingness to absorb graduates in periods of economic and social downturn and raise salaries to appease social tensions (Karshenas et al, 2014; World Bank, 2020a). As an example of this, successive Tunisian governments leveraged public employment and wage policies to appease social tension after the 2011 popular uprising, and oversaw a dramatic increase of its wage bill to GDP ratio, which grew by 4 percentage points to reach 14.7 per cent in six years, and has further expanded over the last 15 months due to the COVID-​19 crisis. All focus countries in this study allocate a significant share of their total expenditure to wage bill spending (ranging from 31 per cent in Jordan to 50 per cent in Lebanon). Efforts at introducing reforms included the adoption and roll out of administrative and human resource management reforms and models (based on NPM principles) in the public sector. A pre-​transition OECD report points out that civil service reform objectives in the region are underpinned by a shift in the role of the state from being the main employer, economic actor, and service provider to one of guarantor of the rule of law, provider of effective social services, and regulator and promoter of the private sector (OECD, 2010, p 60). However, most of the economic and administrative 65

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reforms in which governments of the focus study countries engaged, often with support from global partners and in reflection of global norms and trends, were rather limited in scope and nature and/​or faced opposition from bureaucrats, in part due to the nature of the social contract (Dixon et al, 2018; Jreisat, 2018; Mansour, 2018). Some of the focus countries have attempted voluntary retirement and departure schemes (Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan) to reduce the wage bill, which has had mixed results. As an illustration, Interviewee 18 from Morocco explains that these schemes, which were incentivized by the IMF and World Bank in the mid-​2000s, resulted in significant loss of experience and expertise from the administration. All this leads Jreisat (2018, pp 786–​7) to the conclusion that, for all the rhetoric around administrative reform in Jordan, processes and practices have not significantly changed, and Naguib (2020) to argue that public administration reforms in Morocco, while more advanced than in the other countries, have not resulted in sufficient positive impact on the ground. In conclusion, public sector reform literature covering the MENA region highlights the high degree of intertwinement between the prevalent economic model and the organization and role of the public sector. The dominance of state-​led development models cemented a prominent place for civil servants and the civil service, and while repeated efforts have been made to open up economies, public sector employment remains outsized, imposing a high fiscal burden. While the position of the civil service has been affected by growing political competition and politicization, this has mainly impacted senior levels. As per the analyses quoted earlier, civil service reform efforts have thus far generated limited impact on the size and role of the public sector. This coincides, in the case of Tunisia and Lebanon, with an erosion of status due to growing politicization and associated side-​lining of career officials (as came out frequently in the interview responses).

Post-​2011 transitions and civil service systems: typologies and their implications for trajectories Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia are transition states, going through a simultaneous process of political, economic, and social transformation. In relation to our main theme, the influence of globalization on civil servants and civil service systems, this is an important ‘variable’; it is during transitions that the role and influence of global institutions expands: IFIs come in to provide financial ‘buffers’ (as they did in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and in Latin America in the 1980s), and there is stepped up support to prevent the destabilization of neighbourhood states from regional actors, like the EU in this case, as well as bilateral development partners. Hence, transitions tend to generate enhanced exposure to transnational actors, and this affects both political elites and civil servants. 66

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Taking a perspective from the region on the nature of transitions, we first look at the life cycle for the states approach proposed by Ali (2018). Ali’s assumption is that states move along a transition continuum, resulting in governance capacity variations over time. It begins as a fragile state, consolidating to become a vibrant state, only to embark, eventually, on a downward trajectory through phases of rigidity and decay. If negative trends are not countered, states risk slipping back and becoming failed states (Ali, 2018). Many authors (Jreisat, 2012; Ali, 2018; Dixon et al, 2018; Bhuiyan and Farazmand, 2020) argue that the countries of the MENA region have failed to properly leverage technological progress and knowledge accumulation and diffusion to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state governance capacity, hence posing a significant risk for states to fall into the stages of rigidity and decay. In Ali’s classification model, Morocco is characterized as a state in the rigidity phase, where public policy and administration are resistant to reform. As we discussed in this chapter and elsewhere in this study, this resistance is challenged by international and domestic reform pressure, which has allowed reforms to progress regardless of resistance. Based on the interview responses, aspirations to meet international norms and standards are an important motivation and driving force for civil servants, especially in Morocco (for example, Morocco, Interviews 6 and 7), which provides an important counterbalance to resistance against reforms. In fact, of the four countries, Morocco has gone furthest in modernizing and liberalizing its economic structures and regulatory system, including putting the operation of its SOEs on a more commercial footing. Naguib (2020) also highlights the tension between change and conservatism in institutions, and attributes this to tensions in the political system, which is caught between the driving forces of modern and democratic changes and the power of traditional hierarchical notions. Jordan is classified as a ‘decaying state’, with a stagnating bureaucracy and lack of policy innovation (Ali, 2018, p 769), even if there are international and domestic reform pressures. He sees this as reflecting the failure of the politico-​administrative system to undertake meaningful reform, where political liberalization reforms have not achieved any concrete results. Jreisat (2018) similarly argues that resistance to change and reform, bureaucratic inertia and apathy, and lack of a sufficiently strong political will have created strong obstacles to reform pathways. Interview responses confirmed a strong level of alignment between civil servants and politicians, with a deeply engrained sense of hierarchy among officials (Jordan, Interviews 8, 12, and 14, where the need to follow decisions of hierarchical superiors was confirmed explicitly) and where gaining traction on policy reforms is difficult. 67

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According to the same model, Tunisia and Lebanon are classified as ‘fragile states’ (Ali, 2018, p 768), pushed into this position by events that have weakened their governance capacities, such as sectarian tensions and political divisions along ideological lines. Lebanon’s institutional and political stalemates have pushed the country into an ever deeper economic and social crisis over the last decade, with falling into further fragility a likely option. However, for Tunisia, Ali (2018) foresees a promising path based on the willingness of political elites to seek compromise and consensus solutions, as well as to commit, at least formally, to economic reform trajectories. In contrast to his optimistic scenario, however, since 2018 we have witnessed continuous political conflicts, which have dominated the last three years, pitting two consecutive presidents against three consecutive prime ministers and, in the last incarnation, also against the President of the Parliament; all this has created a renewed sense of fragility for which the political elites of the country have yet to find a solution. In both Lebanon and Tunisia the situation has been aggravated by the COVID-​19 crisis, which has had a disproportionate impact, at least in part, because of the inability of elites to reach compromises on much-​needed reform measures. In addition to this high-​level perspective on transition scenarios, focusing on development trajectories, there is also a growing body of literature on the role of civil servants and civil service systems in transition processes. Work by Linz (1990) and Józsa (1988, 1989) explored transition typologies based on what institution was the instrument of suppression during authoritarian rule, and in this way distinguished between the Southern European and Latin American transitions of the 1970s and 1980s (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Chile, and so on) and the Central and Eastern European transitions of the 1990s: the argument here is that the institutions critical to suppression will be the ones most attacked by new regimes and thus the most prone to politicization. Hence the focus on reforming the military in Southern European and Latin American transition cases, and the focus on the civil service and the intelligence services in Central and Eastern Europe (Verheijen, 1995). The realities in the MENA region are more diverse and less easy to categorize, as we see examples of both transition typologies, as well as, in some cases, a successful pushback and transition reversal by the institutions most targeted. However, narrowing down our perspective to the four focus countries, we would argue that the typology of civil service/​intelligence services sustaining previous authoritarian regimes would be the more relevant one. For one thing, in none of the four countries did the armed forces play a critical role as an instrument of suppression under the former regime. For another, politicization efforts in the civil service are well documented in the interview material for Tunisia and Lebanon, and show a pattern that is somewhat comparable to the Central and Eastern European transitions of the 68

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1990s.6 There as well, civil service systems were the only source of institutional stability in a turbulent political environment, but also experienced erosion of the capacity and status of such systems through a steady effort at politicization (Verheijen, 2001; Meyer-​Sahling, 2009, 2011; Staronova and Gajduschek, 2013). A similar trend came out strongly in interviews in Lebanon, for example Lebanon, Interview 4: “I am trying to protect what is left. The attractive part is the ability to continue going and not surrendering”; and Lebanon, Interview 1: “Vis a vis the political level, I never surrendered and wanted to plan by the book and ensure enforcement of laws and regulations in line with granted authorities/​powers. The clash is inevitable if you do not compromise on these principles. … Politicians often want a yes man”. Similarly, Tunisia, Interview 6, highlighted that “there is an absence of solidarity and cooperation in the broader ministry, increasingly negative since the revolution and appointment of directors general (DGs) not based on merit (politically driven). Ministerial cabinet staff get inappropriate benefits over civil servants, and this creates resentment”. This was also confirmed in Interview 13: “there is an imbalance in the system where politicians and political appointees no longer trust the administration and continuously get into the technical issues, which should not be the case”. These concerns come out mostly in these two countries. However, they illustrate a pattern of change whereby new elites aim to assert control over the perceived key instruments of power, which includes the civil service. This, then, further complicates the relation between civil servants and transnational actors, as proof of loyalty to politicians in these situations comes at a premium. In conclusion, national civil service systems are still significantly influenced by various administrative traditions that are based on notions of hierarchy and centralization and remain significantly interventionist (especially when compared to competitor MIC in Asia), with varied levels of progress in terms of creating more open and globally integrated economies. The notion that the state is a last resort provider of employment remains strong, and this, together with the interventionist state model, creates a highly constraining context for efforts at administrative modernization. This coincides, in the case of Tunisia and Lebanon, with an erosion of status due to growing politicization and associated side-​lining of career officials (as came out frequently in the interview responses). However, the transition processes in the post-​2011 context, which have seen broader and deeper engagement by international donors and partners, have begun to challenge some of these patterns. For example, in several MENA countries constitutions now reflect democratic norms, and values such as accountability, transparency, and openness. Reform processes initiated as part of political transitions have also strengthened accountability institutions through the creation of new independent authorities on anti-​corruption, and on access to information, and given a more prominent role to parliaments, hence bringing both new 69

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forms of oversight over civil servants and new forms of recourse for them. However, an important question remains on the extent to which influences from global engagement can counterbalance an environment that is not very conducive to change in a significant way, in order to create more performance oriented and open civil service systems.

The potential impact of globalization in the context of traditions and transition The discussion in this chapter on political-​administrative transformation and economic trajectories reemphasizes the deep shift and changes in MENA, and the four countries in particular, after 2011. It is true that many of the economic challenges countries are facing represent continuity more than change; capture remains a significant issue, economies have still not fully opened up and are characterized by regulatory and ‘invisible’ barriers to entry, and the distinction between ‘offshore’ and ‘onshore’ sectors remains significant in Tunisia and is still visible in Morocco and Jordan. Lebanon’s economy also is a case of deep capture, though different in nature and extent to the other three countries. If the ‘opening up’ of political space (to differing degrees) represents a major shift, economic opening up still has a long way to go. In this sense, the engagement with international partners (in breadth and depth), the impact of the global drive for performance (given investment needs), and the participation in open government processes could have an important impact on reform trajectories. Civil servants and civil service systems have been critical actors in state and nation building processes in the MENA region. Post-​independence, the public sector-​driven development model, combined with the administrative traditions that characterize the four focus countries, puts civil servants in the driving seat of building a new economic system based on closed economies and investment in basic public services. Exceptions were few and far between, though they included one of our focus countries, Lebanon, which retained an open economy and a significantly more open political system for a long period after independence. Blending in Islamic notions of centralization and hierarchy, civil servants in MENA countries had significant (administrative) authority, and as a result, civil service positions became coveted and respected, and a career that most graduates would aspire to (Jreisat, 2008; Schomaker and Bauer, 2020). The civil service was also a central support function of authoritarian rulers, and central to their ability to wield power. Hence, the transition processes of the 2010s brought considerable turmoil to previously stable and predictable civil service systems, as new political actors sought to ‘place’ their adherents in a system that was seen as central to controlling state resources and, by extension, the state itself. 70

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Growing engagement by transnational actors, in the same period, should therefore be seen in this context. As discussed here, pre-​2011 the engagement with transnational institutions and actors was managed by a small number of trusted civil servants and limited to select and targeted support programmes offered by IFIs and bilateral partners. The rapid expansion of engagement by transnational institutions in MENA countries, to help cushion the impact of economic and social transition processes, therefore happened at a time when civil servants and civil service institutions were already under pressure –​from new elites that were seeking greater power and influence (and jobs for their supporters), and from changes in the economic model that challenged the power of the public sector and the civil service (see discussion in Chapter 2). The COVID-​19 crisis then added an additional challenge, as systems that had been under sustained pressure for a decade were expected to step up and respond to an existential challenge. As noted previously, of our four focus countries only Morocco has weathered this last storm reasonably well, highlighting once more the capacity challenges faced by the transition countries in the MENA region. Modernization efforts have been few and far between, with the exception of Morocco, where progress has been made in creating a more performance-​ oriented civil service system. Enhanced engagement with transnational actors is therefore both an opportunity and a challenge for civil servants. The challenge lies in the fact that it is creating an additional variable in an environment of rapidly growing complexity, and a form of engagement that relatively few civil servants are used to and prepared for. The opportunity is that it can help generate both new opportunities (for career development and for learning) and, more importantly, new partnerships that could help counterbalance the uncertainty and turmoil brought about by the transition. What does this tell us about our theses? The political transition, even if its nature and depth varies between countries, has brought into play new accountability mechanisms; the creation of new independent authorities (on anti-​corruption and on access to information) and the growing diversity of parliamentary systems (in all four countries) bring both new forms of oversight over civil servants and new forms of recourse for them. The question of how the enhanced engagement with transnational actors plays into this is an intriguing one, which we will explore in much more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The changing setting and context of civil service systems, as described here, makes this a relevant and important question to answer. This is even more the case regarding the thesis on politico-​administrative relations, where there is the question of whether engagement by transnational actors (providing additional advisory support) dilutes the role of civil servants in the provision of policy advice, on top of the competition from outside 71

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advisers noted in the interviews (see Chapter 4), or conversely represents an opportunity for civil servants to regain some lost ground. Similarly, the issues explored by the third and fourth theses, on the transfer of values and the introduction of open government principles, are highly relevant given the broader context sketched in this chapter. The challenge we face in this study is isolating the influence of enhanced exposure to globalization from the many other changes facing civil servants in the MENA region, and in our four focus countries in particular. Our methodology, as laid out in Chapter 1, aims to shed light on this question by using vignettes that place civil servants in specific situations where they are/​would be exposed to influence from transnational actors, aiming to isolate this influence from other change factors related to domestic transition processes. We will proceed by analysing the findings of the interview processes in the next three chapters, and then return to our main research question. Notes 1

2

3

4 5

6

Even though not physically offshore, production facilities produced goods for export only, and were not subject to taxation. They were also mostly isolated from local production chains. Originally Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait. We use the designation to indicate this group of countries. This book was written before the events of July 2021 that led to a suspension of parliament, which remains in place to date. The EU tends to use at least partially grant-​based financing for policy-​based support. A few examples: World Bank Group offices in Tunisia and Jordan increased from single digit numbers to 30–​40 staff today; EU delegation offices in Tunisia and Morocco exceed this number, approaching offices of 100 staff. GIZ currently has more than 350 resident advisers active in Tunisia alone, and the African Development Bank re-​opened a hub in Tunis after having previously relocated its staff back to Abidjan. In this work we do not discuss the intelligence services, which, based on anecdotal evidence, are equally considered to have been a powerful instrument for the previous regimes.

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PART II

Civil Servants’ Response to Globalization

3

Drilling Down on Globalization: Performance Indicators and Rankings as Features of Multi-​Level Governance Introduction In the previous chapters we laid out the theoretical framework and the regional context for this second part of the book, where we will present an evidence-​based discussion on how transmission channels of globalization affect civil servants in our four focus countries. In this chapter we review the influence on civil servants of the first dimension of globalization identified in Chapter 1, the global push for performance, with international performance indicators as the transmission channel. The next two chapters will focus on the other two dimensions identified: deepened direct engagement with international actors and the global open government agenda. To assess the impact of the global push for performance on civil servants, we have analysed the extent to which performance on international performance indicators has been internalized in national governance systems and how this impacts civil servants’ values and belief systems. Our review is based on insights gained from in-​depth interviews with senior civil servants in the focus countries, using a mix of vignettes and classical interview techniques.

Performance indicators as a transmission channel for globalization The impact of international performance indicators on national institutions and public policy is a controversial issue, as it is closely connected with the (perceived) exercise of power within and between the states and transnational institutions. That said, and regardless of the differences of view in academic perspectives on the nature of this power (positive or negative), there is broad 75

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agreement that the impact of global indicators is significant and growing. In this context, recent literature talks about Scorecard Diplomacy (Kelley, 2017), The Quiet Power of Indicators (Merry et al, 2015), and the politics of numbers (Hansen, 2012; Fioramonti, 2014; Malito et al, 2018; Honig and Weaver, 2019). We define indicators as: a named collection of rank-​ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different units. The data are generated through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon. The data, in this simplified and processed form, are capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis (such as countries or institutions), synchronically or over time, and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more standards. (Davis et al, 2012, pp 73–​4) In this respect, performance is expressed in both ratings (the evolution of the country score on a given indicator, an absolute measure) and rankings (the position of the country vis-​á-​vis other countries, a relative measure). Ratings and rankings tend to have different ‘audiences’ and interests: while it is the latter that tends to attract media and civil society attention, it is the former that will be observed by potential investors as a factor in investment decisions. In this context, we will focus on the impact of global economic governance performance indicators on civil servants, reviewing their relevance for their day-​to-​day work (how civil servants perceive their role in responding to evolving rankings and rating on the indicators) and the impact of the country performance on the interaction between civil servants and politicians. Given the fact that the four countries discussed here are (relatively) natural resource poor, have diversified economies, and depend on integration in global value chains for their economic development (see the discussion in Chapter 2), we expect their performance on global economic governance indicators to matter –​to politicians, to civil servants, to civil society, and to the media. Much like the assessment of rating agencies that defines the cost at which countries can borrow on international markets, economic governance indicators are one element in investment decisions (national and international), and are therefore significant for economic growth and prosperity. Interviews sought to identify how civil servants perceive and manage these indicators, and what processes (if any exist) are in place to coordinate and manage government responses, with the inclusion of one vignette that specifically focused on performance on international indicators. 76

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Visibility of indicators Doshi et al (2019) review the importance of indicators as instruments through which international organizations influence national regulatory policy, based on an analysis of media coverage and quotes. In doing this, they focus on all main performance indicators, trying to establish the relative visibility of each, and apply the same, slightly adapted, analytical framework that Kelley first laid out in Scorecard Diplomacy in 2017 (Doshi et al, 2019, p 612). The review of global media coverage by Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons brings out a predominance of the EDB1 and GCI indicators. At 65.26 per cent and 16.46 per cent of media hits globally, these two indicators dominate the global public debate on performance on economic governance indicators (Doshi et al, 2019, p 618). While the two indicators are fundamentally different, with one taking a broad and comprehensive view of the enabling environment for country economic performance and the other focusing on actionable and specific aspects of the investment climate, in 2019 they together covered most of the indicator landscape in terms of global media and political attention.

Evidence on indicators and their impact: analytical framework and context In Scorecard Diplomacy, Judith Kelley (2017) sets out an analytical approach to assess the impact of international performance indicators on the behaviour of politicians and civil servants, as well as on the dynamics in their interaction. Kelley created her model to analyse a set of policies related to state actions associated with human trafficking, a very different policy area from the one covered here. Yet, Kelley’s work is relevant to our analysis with regard to: i) the engagement model she lays out in Scorecard Diplomacy (2017), which we will use here to structure and frame the evidence obtained from the interviews with senior officials; and ii) the use of ‘reputation’ as a way of understanding the motives of political and administrative actors for responding to incentives provided by ratings and rankings. While reputational aspects of human trafficking and economic development are not easily comparable, reputation also matters on economic governance. Policies and practices on investment climate, logistics, and development of human capital, to name a few, are central elements of the reputation of countries as investment destinations. Kelley presents a five-​step approach to review the influence of global performance indicators: i) the presence of public monitoring and grading; ii) influencing (diplomacy) and (technical) assistance; iii) indirect pressure by third parties (media, interest groups, and CSOs); iv) concern about 77

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current reputation and future ratings; and v) efforts to improve bad ratings or maintain good ratings. The five steps form a repeating (virtuous) cycle that, if well managed and handled, will improve the reputation and position of the state on the issue being assessed. In terms of the current global context, the COVID-​19 (health, social, and economic) crisis has further upped the importance of performance indicators and reputation. The dislocation of production due to the movement restrictions put in place, combined with economic lockdown processes, has driven a process in which enterprises are reassessing production chains and location. This combines with a reduction of available resources for investment due to the sharp global economic contraction. In Lebanon, the Beirut port explosion added a further element of instability to an economy already in deep crisis. Hence, competition for scarce investment resources is increasing, and with this, so is the potential importance of reputation and rankings for countries in dire need of investment, which is the case for all four of our focus countries. With this in mind, and based on the interview results, we will now review the evidence as structured along the steps proposed in Kelley’s analytical model, and at the end of the chapter will return to the two theses for which the analysis of impact of this element of globalization is expected to be most relevant.

Influence of rankings on economic performance and investment climate As open economies, our four focus countries devote significant attention to their performance on the main international performance indicators. Evidence from the interviews with senior officials from all countries brings out the significance of rankings and ratings on global performance indicators. Global performance indicators have emerged and evolved over the last three decades.2 The oldest performance indicator, the EFI, was first published by the Heritage Foundation in 1995. The International Corruption Perception Index was first published by TI in the same year. Among the other main indices related to economic governance issues, the EDB index was first published by the Word Bank in 2002, the GCI by the World Economic Forum in 2004, the Logistic Performance Index by the World Bank in 2007, and the WGI by the World Bank in 2002. The HCI, covering an important but specific element of country competitiveness, is the most recent addition, having been first launched in 2018, although it has a baseline set back to 2010. Hence, global performance indicator systems are relatively recent phenomena, and little is known about their impact on civil servants. There is no specific research available on this topic. 78

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Box 3.1: Global performance indicators: methodologies and data quality We had to overcome several challenges in our efforts to aggregate indicator-​related data and understand the methodology and approach behind our selected set of indicators, including inconsistencies in methodologies, data accessibility and others. Based on the experience gained conducting the research presented here, the most significant challenges affecting the quality and relevance of global performance indicator systems include the following: • Methodological changes that lead to inconsistency in ranking and rating over time, especially where methodological changes are introduced without providing guidance on transposition –​for instance, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Transparency International, 2003)​changed its scaling from 0–​10 to 0–​100 in 2012. Regardless, the CPI still belongs among better examples as country rankings still had a high level of consistency between years after the scoring model changed. • Data gaps, including the occurrence of blank years with missing data, rankings, scores, ratings and reports that impact on the ability to track progress over time. As an example, the Center for Law and Democracy did not preserve data from the 2015 Global Right to Information Rating on its website (Center for Law and Democracy, 2018). • Changes in the scope of indicators, where the number and selection of countries included in reports vary, which complicates comparison over time, such as, for instance, in the Global Open Data Index (Open Knowledge Foundation, 2017). • Modifications in the definitions of sub-​indexes and categories and the form in which they are published, causing a lack of comparability of sub-​index trends and increasing the difficulty of verifying and viewing the data – for instance, in the Global Innovation Index (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2021). • Changes in methodology, scoring mechanisms, sub-​index naming, and reporting period. In the case of Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum, 2020b), this caused disruptions in trends and made reviewing trends from 2018 onwards more difficult. • Inconsistencies in the calculation equations for subindexes complicates the comparison of sub-​indexes – for example, in Enabling the Business of Agriculture (World Bank, 2019c). Recommendations for publishers and authors of scoring models and rankings: • Adopt common, universal, and data processing-​friendly methods/​platforms for publishing data, rankings, and scores. These could include structured excel sheets with pre-​defined fields and structures, or a platform providing viewers with comprehensive and comparable outputs and clear visualization. • A common platform for publishing data and reports would solve problems associated with potential data loss or data damage.    

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In this chapter, we will focus on some of the main global performance indicators on economic governance, including the GCI, the EFI, and EDB, which are ranked as the three most influencing indicators based on the analysis by Doshi et al (2019).

Trends in country performance In terms of performance on four key indices, the following are the trends for our four focus countries. Starting with the most comprehensive index, the Global Competitiveness Index (2020) trendlines show a sharp decline in ranking (and associated scores) for Tunisia between 2010 and 2019; a relatively stable ranking for Morocco and Jordan; and a trend that declines, recovers, and then starts declining again in 2019 for Lebanon. With rankings between the mid-​60s and mid-​80s, these are hardly rankings that would reflect countries that strive to attract investment, with overall performance across all countries, except for Morocco, declining over the last decade. For the GCI, we reviewed country performance based on the structure of the index as it was up to 2018 (it was subsequently reorganized). Graph 3.1 does include the ‘new’ 2018 and 2019 methodology, but the more detailed analysis that follows draws on the structure of the index as it existed until 2018. In its structure, the GCI is made up of three composite elements: basic requirements (including measures on macroeconomic stability, quality of institutions, infrastructure, IT adoption, and basic education and health),

2019

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2015-2016

2014-2015

2013-2014

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2011-2012

120 100 80 60 40 20 0

2010-2011

Graph 3.1: GCI ranking

GCI - overall ranking Jordan

GCI - overall ranking Lebanon

GCI - overall ranking Morocco

GCI - overall ranking Tunisia

Note: Highest rank =​1. Tunisia did not have a score for 2012–​2013 due to a lack in available data. Here we have maintained an equal score compared to the previous ranking. Source: Based on data from World Economic Forum (2020a)

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Performance Indicators and Rankings

Graph 3.2: GCI: basic requirements ranking (2010–​18) 140

0

2010-2011

20

2011-2012

31

Jordan

125

119

76 74 69

85 73 57

78 75 55

79 70

84 73 57

42

Lebanon

Morocco

51

2017-2018

40

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60

61 54 42

121

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64 57

68 66

127

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80

126

2014-2015

100

116

109

106

2013-2014

120

Tunisia

Note: Highest rank =​1. Source: Based on data from World Economic Forum (2020a)

efficiency enablers (including the quality and size of markets, including goods, financial markets/​sector and labour market, quality of higher education, and technological readiness), and innovation and sophistication (made up of innovative capacity and business sophistication).3 Working through the three components that make up the GCI (see Graphs 3.2–​3.4), the following stand out. First, the sharp drop in rankings for Tunisia on all three composite indicators: on basic requirements, on efficiency enhancers, and on innovation and sophistication. The drop is particularly significant on the first composite indicator, driven by rapidly declining scores on macroeconomic stability and a gradual drop on quality of institutions. Lebanon, to the contrary, has weak rankings on basic requirements but ranks far more positively than its average on the other two composite indicators. Morocco shows the opposite pattern, with relatively high rankings on basic requirements and lower rankings on efficiency enhancers and innovation and sophistication. Finally, Jordan, the best performer among the four countries, has consistent rankings across the three composites, with a slight negative outlier for basic requirements. Hence, Tunisia turned, based on this indicator, from being far ahead of its regional competitors in 2010 to well behind all but Lebanon in 2018, a trend that continues under the new composite ranking structure that is now in place. The EFI shows a broadly similar pattern (Graphs 3.5 and 3.6), though with a significantly larger decline for Lebanon, and a somewhat larger drop for Jordan. The EFI indicator shows differences in performance depending on whether one considers rankings or ratings. Graph 3.6 shows that three out 81

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Graph 3.3: GCI: efficiency enhancers ranking (2010–​18) 120 100 88

80

73 70

60

50

40

79 70 66 58

83 78 64 58

98

94 85 78 70

88 84 75 70

82 71 67

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72 66

20

Jordan

Lebanon

Morocco

2017-2018

2016-2017

2015-2016

2014-2015

2013-2014

2012-2013

2010-2011

2011-2012

0

Tunisia

Note: Highest rank =​1. Source: Based on data from World Economic Forum (2020a)

Graph 3.4: GCI: innovation and sophistication ranking (2010–​18) 120 100 79 78 70

79 74 65

80 60 40

43

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84 81

100 90 79

52 43

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101 93 82

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Note: Highest rank =​1. Source: Based on data from World Economic Forum (2020a)

82

Tunisia

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0

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Performance Indicators and Rankings

Graph 3.5: EFI: evolution of ranking 200 150 100 50 0 2011

2012

2013

2014

Jordan

2015

Lebanon

2016

2017

2018

Morocco

2019

2020

Tunisia

Note: Highest rank =​1. Source: Based on data from Economic Freedom Index (2021)

Graph 3.6: EFI: evolution of ratings

80.00 70.00 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00 2010

2011 2012 Jordan

2013 Lebanon

2014

2015 2016 Morocco

2017

2018

Tunisia

2019 2020 MENA

Note: Between 1–​100. Source: Based on data from Economic Freedom Index (2021)

of four countries (the exception being Morocco) have declined in ratings, even if not excessively, and show a much steeper decline in rankings. This implies that competitor countries have done better in instituting reforms in areas critical to this indicator, such as judicial effectiveness, enforcement of property rights, fiscal spending/​fiscal health, and government integrity.

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Hence, Jordan and Lebanon have dropped much more significantly in ranking compared to the rating: they have essentially ‘stood still’ while others have advanced. A more targeted indicator focused on the business environment is the World Bank’s EDB index, which, as per the earlier analysis by Doshi et al (2019), has historically been among the most visible of the economic governance global performance indicators. This was, in part, because of its actionable nature, and also because it addressed regulations and policies with direct impact on businesses. Before reviewing the country ratings and ranking for this performance indicator (Graphs 3.7 and 3.8), it should be noted that methodological changes, at times, created shifts for individual countries. As an illustration, in Graph 3.7 we have included the score of countries for 2014 twice –​ once according to EDB 2010–​14 methodology, and once according to the 2014–​15 methodology. A further change in methodology followed in 2017. There is a noticeable difference in trends between the EDB scores and those presented earlier for GCI. Jordan and Tunisia show a comparable pattern, starting with a decline from a relatively high score (measured as distance to the best scores in the overall ranking) in 2010, dropping to a lower score in 2016, and then slightly recovering in the years since. Morocco shows a gradual and consistently improving trend in its score, while Lebanon shows a declining trend, falling well behind the other three countries in the 2020 ranking. For both Tunisia and Jordan, trends are different from what we observed on the GCI ranking. This can be explained, in part, by the broader nature of the GCI index, with its emphasis on broader macroeconomic and institutional variables, where Tunisia has suffered an especially heavy decline over the last decade, and also by the inclusion of indicators on human capital and labour market regulation. For countries that depend significantly on external investment and trade for economic development, the patterns in ratings and ranking on the indicators presented here are a matter of concern, most of all for Lebanon (as the lagging country on all indices), although it has not so far shown a strong public interest in its ranking and ratings. The other three countries have made efforts to improve their performance, but with mixed success; improved performance in the case of Morocco contrasts with limited progress or decline for Tunisia and Jordan.

Channels of influence and assistance For the research of mechanisms linked to performance indicators and behaviour of domestic policy actors, notably civil servants, we employed both vignettes and traditional questions and answers.

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Graph 3.7: EDB ratings 80.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0

85

10.0 0.0 2011

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2013 Jordan Linear (Jordan)

2014(a)

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Tunisia

Linear (Lebanon)

Linear (Morocco)

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2019

Note: Distance to 100. 2014(a) refers to the scores according to the EDB 2010–14 methodology, and 2014(b) according to the 2014–15 methodology. Source: Based on data from EDB index (World Bank Group, 2020c)

2020

Performance Indicators and Rankings

70.0

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Graph 3.8: Country rankings: EDB 2020

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Resolving insolvency

Enforcing contracts

Trading across borders

Paying taxes

Source: Based on data from EDB index (World Bank Group, 2020c)

Protecting minority investors

Note: Highest rank =​1.

Tunisia Morocco Lebanon Jordan

Getting credit

Registering property

Getting electricity

Dealing with construction permits

Starting a business

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Ease of doing business 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

Performance Indicators and Rankings

Based on their research, Kelley and Simmons (2015) suggest three main mechanisms through which performance on indicators can affect decisions at the level of policy makers: mobilization of domestic actors to strengthen voice of domestic political coalitions, elite shaming that can influence public sector operations and capacities, and transnational pressures. However, we do not know much about whether and how such pressures transmit to the level of the civil servants, and what beliefs and perceptions civil servants have of indicators. As explained in Chapter 1, vignettes are the most appropriate tool for engaging civil servants in a discussion on their beliefs regarding the importance of country performance on global indicators, in particular, by confronting them with a situation in which decisions by politicians could jeopardize the country’s position in international indicators. Civil servants may respond to the potential drop in performance on global indicators by proactively engaging to create policy space for measures that could positively influence country performance. Alternatively, civil servants could follow the policy maker’s approach without acting. Mapping the range of response types allows us to better understand the effects of indicators on civil servants. With this in mind, the full exploratory vignette reads as follows:

Box 3.2:  Vignette 2: Affiliation and allegiance The Minister of Investment and Cooperation, for whom your colleague works, wishes to revise a regulation, which in your colleagues’ view will make the registration of new businesses more difficult. The minister intends to present a bill to this effect. Your colleague is of the opinion that there is a strong risk that this will negatively affect your country’s ranking in ‘Doing Business/​Global Competitiveness Index’. International organizations active in this area have heard of this and have raised concerns in public. The minister has been informed accordingly by your colleague but nevertheless the minister insists on presenting the bill to Parliament. In the Justification Section to the bill, the minister intends to provide information to support the government’s argument that the bill complies with international good practice. What will your colleague do in this situation?    

As a first step, all respondents were asked to read the text carefully and then opine on ‘what their colleague would do in such a situation’. The ensuing open answers were coded in-​vivo in order to systematize the identified responses (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Figure 3.1 summarizes the responses obtained for Vignette 2. The categories in the left column denote themes 87

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

that emerged directly from the data using inductive coding. In the table headers, identified responses are sorted by country. Based on the typology discussed in Chapter 1 and the responses obtained, we have identified four main clusters (right column of Figure 3.1), corresponding in the following way to the four response profiles to globalization discussed in the typology: hierarchical/​traditional orientation –​the traditionalist type and the professional type; mobilizing –​the engaged type and the rebel type. First, the ‘traditionalist’ (passive official response) civil servants follow the order of the minister to draft the bill justification despite their conviction that it would harm the country ranking. The ‘professional’ response builds on written arguments where more information and evidence are brought forward to persuade the policy maker, but without mobilizing support (internally or externally). The ‘engaged’ civil servant has a mobilization strategy that involves bringing in various actors, including local stakeholders such as businesses and civil society and other public sector institutions, as well as potentially international organizations. This is done with the objective of generating a broader debate on the proposed decision, since the engaged civil servant believes in the values of global issues through deeper socialization. In the ‘rebel’ typology, the civil servant goes beyond institutional boundaries and seeks to mobilize external support, including through informal networks and behaviours such as leaking information, to try and change the position taken by the political leader, and thus becomes part of the political process around the issue. As a second step in Vignette 2, we asked the respondents to consider the behaviour of the colleague ‘following the wish of the minister and preparing the formal justification for the Parliament as suggested by him’. The respondents were asked to express their acceptance of such a situation on a 1–​7-​point Likert scale, where 1 is totally unacceptable and 7 totally acceptable. Afterwards, we also asked what would happen ‘if your colleague decides not to write formal justification of the bill’, thus openly refusing to participate in the minister’s response that could negatively influence the relevant country ranking. The final step in Vignette 2 brought international organizations into the dynamics of national bureaucratic processes. Here, the question asked was how the colleague would react when ‘international partners request a meeting with your colleague to discuss this matter’. In the following section, the Vignette 2 results are analysed in more detail regarding the perceptions, beliefs, and practice of civil servants vis-​á-​vis global performance indicators.

Passive/​hierarchical response: the traditionalist In the traditionalist typology hierarchy remains the strongest determinant of civil servants’ responses to the performance indicators in terms of their 88

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will to do anything about it. As Figure 3.1 shows, even under this typology, respondents expect the civil servant to provide the minister with information and evidence. However, in case there is no change of position, they expect civil servants to follow the order of the minister (“in the end he needs to write the note but before he needs to develop solid arguments”: Morocco, Interview 5). Tunisia constitutes the exception: almost all respondents thought that civil servants would engage in persuading the minister by bringing evidence and more information, and even if that did not succeed, they were less likely than in the other countries to follow the instructions of the minister. The main arguments brought forward by respondents as to why some civil servants (particularly in Jordan and Lebanon) follow the order of the minister were respect for hierarchical principles and political decisions: for example, “in the end, he is the boss and he is the one who is influential” (Jordan, Interview 14). Interestingly, this comes out even when respondents feel the minister is wrong in his or her decision. The main reason why civil servants ultimately followed the order of the minister was a fear of losing benefits and of jeopardizing his or her position in civil service (“to protect her back”, Lebanon, Interview 2). In this case, respondents believe the minister to be wrong not only because he or she might have a negative impact on the country ranking on the indicator, but also because he/​she did not listen to the professional advice from the civil servants. Moreover, the minister’s act of pushing legislation without providing a full account of evidence amassed to the contrary, and thus misleading the cabinet and parliament, was perceived by many respondents as going beyond the limits (“he is doing the wrong thing from an accountability point of view”, Lebanon, Interview 1). Vignette 2 then goes on to ask the question of what the civil servant would do in the case of the minister proceeding with the draft law regardless of the advice received, and here the issue becomes one of how far a civil servant should and could go in pushing for a change to the draft law. At this point, hierarchy and loyalty, the hallmarks to the traditionalist type, become predominant: most respondents (Jordan, Interview 5; Tunisia, Interviews 1 and 7) believe that once the civil servant has exhausted the avenues open to him/​her for contestation, the civil servant will have to fall in line and work with the minister to move forward the decision-​making process, even when representing the ministry externally with international partners. In all four countries, the risk of negative repercussions if the civil servant does not follow the instructions and request of the minister is significant. However, given the fragile economic situation in each of the countries (and the associated importance of hanging on to one’s job), standing up for a point of principle is often seen as impossible and ineffective (as the minister is just likely to assign the task to someone else). 89

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Figure 3.1: Vignette 2: Civil servants’ response strategies to performance on indicators Countries

Jordan

Morocco

Tunisia

Respondents N/​%

16

Following minister

10

Documenting own position (civil servant)

%

14

%

20

%

17

%

63%

10

71%

12

60%

7

41%

2

13%

4

29%

8

40%

4

24%

National/​public interest

5

31%

2

14%

7

35%

6

35%

Convincing minister with evidence

9

56%

6

43%

15

75%

16

94%

Writing alternatives with consequences

3

19%

0

0%

3

15%

3

18%

Reporting from consultation with stakeholders

2

13%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

Conducting regulatory impact assessments

3

19%

1

7%

1

5%

1

6%

Best practice/​benchmarking

3

19%

0

0%

1

5%

1

6%

Mobilizing international organizations

2

13%

1

7%

3

15%

0

0%

Mobilizing stakeholders

1

6%

1

7%

0

0%

2

12%

Mobilizing political actors (parliament, parties, PM)

1

6%

7

50%

1

5%

2

12%

Mobilizing formal internal bureaucracy (oversight)

1

6%

1

7%

5

25%

1

6%

Creating inter-​ministerial taskforce

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1

6%

Holding meeting with stakeholders

1

6%

0

0%

2

10%

1

6%

Mobilizing (informally) network

0

0%

4

29%

2

10%

3

18%

Resigning/​reassigning

0

0%

0

0%

1

5%

0

0%

Source: Authors, based on interview responses (Vignette 2)

Civil servant type Traditionalist

Professional

Engaged

Rebel

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90

Lebanon

Performance Indicators and Rankings

Providing analysis and evidence: the professional who remains within institutional boundaries This cluster of responses directly addresses country reputation and status, including (self-​) perceived competence and effectiveness. This concerns the question of why civil servants should care about their country having lower rankings on international indicators. What triggers their behaviour? The answer is that the EDB indicator and GCI indicator triggered in Vignette 2 target policies on which respondents (and their colleagues in the vignette) have direct design responsibility, hence the reputation of the professional competence of the individual and his/​her respective organization is at stake. When it comes to ways in which civil servants may proactively influence the minister (which most respondents, especially in Tunisia and Lebanon, see as a significant challenge given the growing distance between politicians and civil servants), different approaches were proposed. Moroccan respondents felt that internal dialogue is the best way forward, and that it is the obligation of the civil servant to formally challenge the proposed law through the submission of internal memos and argumentation. In addition to this, proposing or triggering the conduct of a regulatory impact assessment and/​or financial impact assessment of the draft law was also proposed (Tunisia, Interview 1; Lebanon, Interviews 1 and 4; Jordan, Interview 10). Respondents believed civil servants would initiate a process of gathering additional information and evidence, as well as conduct analyses to persuade the minister using their expertise. This was the immediate response in Tunisia (Figure 3.1), where written reports and analyses are the preferred mechanism of persuasion efforts. Several respondents referred to the advisory and expert role of civil servants vis-​á-​vis their minister and referred to their professional duty (Tunisia, Interviews 4 and 12). In Morocco, however, there was also a strong belief that internal processes and bureaucratic and political oversight would ensure that professionalism prevails: “having exhausted all remedies … in any case there will be controls in the process after that” (Morocco, Interviews 10 and 18). This indicates that performance on global indicators is seen as having an effect on perceptions of professionalism and leads to the deployment of evidence-​based analytical techniques that are becoming institutionalized and routinized in Tunisia’s and Morocco’s organizations, though to a lesser extent in Jordan and Lebanon. As per our typology, this brings those civil servants into the professional type: generating and providing evidence and analysis to try and persuade decision makers (that a certain course of action is in the national interest), but staying within the formal boundaries and hierarchy of the institution the official works for. 91

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Mobilizing actors: the engaged type Top-​down studies on the impact of performance indicators (Kelley, 2017) highlight the option of mobilizing actors in support of one’s position as a critical mechanism to exercise influence. However, based on our interview results, this approach is not widespread among civil servants (Figure 3.1): indications of civil servants adopting a ‘mobilizing’ response are few. Some respondents from Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia believe that the civil servant would need to go beyond an internal challenge, mainly because they would not expect this to resolve the issue. This includes directly approaching international organizations (Jordan, Interviews 1 and 7; Tunisia, Interviews 4 and 17; Morocco, Interview 14); approaching CSOs, lobby groups, or external accountability institutions (Lebanon, Interviews 1, 3, 4, and 5); or approaching the Council of Ministers or parliament directly (Tunisia, Interviews 2, 13, and 15; Jordan, Interview 5). However, while using mobilization as a strategy is recognized as an option, the number of officials that expect this strategy to be used remains small.

Proactive behaviour to achieve a change in position:​the rebel Out of all the responses, active formal mechanisms were considered sporadically but not suggested as a response of ‘the colleague’ in Vignette 2. Instead, the wording utilized was more normative, with civil servants realizing the importance of public and/​or national interest (Lebanon, Interviews 10 and 16) but not willing to behave correspondingly, instead normatively using the word ‘should’ (“it is a public issue, stakeholders should be involved”, Jordan, Interview 16; “discussions should be conducted with other stakeholders”, Jordan, Interview 10). Thus, civil servants are willing to reach out, often informally, and mobilize stakeholders, but are not willing to take the initiative, such as organizing a meeting of stakeholders (Tunisia, Interview 11: “He should also advise the minister to create an inter-​ministerial task force to review the draft”). The lack of proactivity on the side of civil servants is surprising when we look at the way the minister’s behaviour is assessed, which across countries is considered wrong. In many instances it was articulated how the minister’s position presents a risk to the country (“with their political mandate they take decisions that are not sensible or even in the interest of the country”, Tunisia, Interview 4; and “it will negatively affect the country ranking”, Jordan, Interview 4). In cases where the minister was perceived to be right in asking the civil servant to draft the justification of the bill, it was because of his/​her superior position in the hierarchy (“needs to respect hierarchy”, Tunisia, Interview 5), reflecting the traditionalist type. 92

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Approaches to mobilization and the potential role of international actors The responses highlighted several actors within their professional networks to whom civil servants could potentially reach out to influence the minister (using professional/​peer pressure). Civil servants in Lebanon show an acute awareness of the political power dynamics that influence decision makers; they propose reaching out to political actors such as parliament, parliamentary committees, other ministers, and other political parties (“I can also leverage external influence through other ministers”, Lebanon, Interview 11), which, if applied in reality, would fit the rebel type. This action is seen as a last resort, where policy negatively affecting the reputation (and ranking) of the country can still be altered: “There are other channels to lobby for changes, such as through parliamentary committees who can amend laws” (Lebanon, Interview 12). It is only in Lebanon that the rebel type comes out in a significant way. Respondents in Morocco emphasize the importance of using professional networks of civil servants as a mobilization strategy. This mainly includes the involvement of fellow civil servants from other departments of the same organization, though not those of different public sector organizations (see Figure 3.1). In fact, fellow civil servants from other public sector organizations were not mentioned at all, which would seem to indicate low levels of formal contacts and cooperation opportunities across ministries and organizations. Preference was given to using informal rather than formal channels. Few civil servants felt that international organizations would be their natural allies, and they rarely mobilized international actors to call attention to a country’s potential backsliding in performance on indicators. In fact, most of the civil servants across the countries saw the conflict of values between the minister and bureaucracy as an internal one: “international organizations should definitely not be involved” (Tunisia, Interview 3). In cases where international organizations were mentioned as an actor to go to, they were seen more as a support to strengthen the argumentation and to be “consulted to get evidence” (Jordan, Interview 1) rather than as an ally in efforts to persuade politicians. As a last step in Vignette 2, the respondents were asked to reflect on how their fellow senior civil servants would react if the roles were reversed and the civil servant was approached by an international partner that raised concerns over the draft bill. Respondents across the countries agree that this step would give them leverage in the discussion with the minister. It would also raise their confidence to mobilize other stakeholders or even the media (Lebanon, Interview 12), and would strengthen their position vis-​á-​vis the minister (Tunisia, Interviews 1, 3, and 4). On the other hand, civil servants across the countries widely share the view that internal conflict between the minister 93

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and bureaucracy should not be revealed to international partners. Hence, civil servants across the countries, if approached by international partners, would take the position of neutral observers or would align with the viewpoint of their minister (Jordan, Interview 14; Lebanon, Interviews 6, 8, and 9; Morocco, Interviews 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 20; Tunisia, Interviews 5, 6, 7, and 8). In Jordan, civil servants were reluctant even to meet with international partners and would rather redirect the partner organizations to the minister, themselves staying impartial. In the rest of the countries, respondents were willing to meet with international partners at the level of civil servants (upon prior briefing of the minister and their approval). This is already perceived as a change (“these days things are more flexible, because we are partners and an official can meet with partners to exchange information”, Tunisia, Interview 4). Nevertheless, respondents frequently mentioned the delicacy of the situation and pointed out how this could backfire, with the potential for the civil servant to be accused of leaking confidential information (Lebanon, Interview 3). Most civil servants emphasized that such a meeting could be organized to exchange experience and gain perspectives, but that no internal positions would be revealed (Tunisia, Interviews 4 and 5). This behaviour and thinking are quite striking when we consider that these are exactly the same respondents who during the first part of the vignette were utilizing various channels to persuade the minister in the name of national interest or preventing the country from backsliding on international indicators. In the second part of the vignette, the same national interest was used as an argument for protecting ‘internal matters’ against international organizations and what was seen as ‘interference’, and siding with the view of the minister in order not to show any internal conflict: “They are a foreign entity and my loyalty is to the state” (Morocco, Interview 13).

Relevance: indicators and reputational concerns Reputational concern is a critical concept in the response model we are applying: if performance indicators are perceived as unimportant or having marginal relevance, the likelihood of impact on the actions by policy makers and civil servants is low. In a review of global experiences responding to global performance indicators, a World Bank study (World Bank, 2020a) identifies five potential drivers that make countries more likely to develop an organized response to performance issues related to global indicators.

Drivers of responses: a review of evidence First, an organized response is more likely if there is already an overall strategy of economic diversification and productivity enhancement. This is, for instance, the case for Jordan, which in its Economic Growth Plan 2018–​2022 (Economic 94

Performance Indicators and Rankings

Policy Council, 2018) sets out a broad strategic framework for diversification that is built on enhancing the business environment and building Human Capital (including responding to performance on the HCI). The Business Environment chapter of the Economic Growth Plan sets out specific targets for regulatory reform to respond to EDB ranking (World Bank, 2020a). A second driver is post-​conflict or post-​crisis restoration of economic activity. The best-​known case, discussed in detail in the comparative study on drivers of responses, is Rwanda, which used the post-​conflict opportunity to reform and revisit its regulatory management system and promote business development through a drastic modernization of its regulatory environment. Among the four country cases studied here, Tunisia had the best opportunity to ‘reset’ economic regulations after 2011, but largely failed to do so, for reasons well documented in international studies (for example, ‘The Unfinished Revolution’, World Bank, 2014). Lebanon may have that same opportunity following the combined impact of its deep economic crisis and the Beirut port disaster, though on present evidence the country does not show signs of taking it. A third possibility is as a response to economic shock or collapse. The case discussed in the World Bank study is Portugal after 2008 (World Bank, 2020a), and there are many other examples, including countries such as Georgia, the Republic of North Macedonia, and Serbia, which all instituted major business environment reforms in response to an economic shock. Fourth, efforts may come as part of processes to join either regional or international organizations, or free trade zones.4 The evidence presented here includes reform efforts by EU candidate states to align with the EU’s regulatory standards, or country efforts to join the OECD (for example, Costa Rica and Peru, World Bank, 2020a, p 5). Finally, the driver may be related to access to financial resources. Access to programmes like the US Millennium Challenge Corporation are often contingent on business environment reforms. Given the significant resources that can be obtained, this can also create an incentive for reform. The discussion on a Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact in Tunisia included the consideration of commitments related to regulatory reform, as well as commitments to improve performance on the Logistics Performance Index (2018) (through port reforms). Morocco’s Country Compact also includes targets on business environment reforms (Morocco, Interview 17). While the response patterns discussed here are based mostly on experience with the EDB indicator, similar analyses are being conducted in relation to other indicators, like the HCI (World Bank Group, 2020b) and the Logistics Performance Index (2018), with the former documented as part of the progress report on the Human Capital Initiative presented in October 2020 (World Bank Group, 2020b). 95

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Looking at the five identified potential drivers that can entice countries to act on performance indicators, several are relevant to the four countries discussed here. Tunisia and Lebanon have gone through major political and economic shocks over the last decade and need external financing for reforms and a change in their economic models. Jordan made improvements to the business environment and enhanced human capital a major part of its 2018–​2022 economic strategy. Morocco is one of the countries having created an institutionalized mechanism to track reforms, with an emphasis on (among others) the business environment, something we will discuss in more detail in the next section. The next question then is how civil servants perceive this, and what the relevance of the indicators and ranking is for them in their day-​to-​day work. The interview material provides a broad perspective on this question. We will divide this into two parts: first, reviewing the answers on the question of relevance and importance of international indicators, as perceived by senior officials, and second, by assessing the relative importance of international performance indicators when confronting a situation where a minister is planning to introduce a reform measure that would have a negative impact on performance indicator rankings.

Evidence on the perceived importance of indicators On the first point, a significant number of civil servants referred to a direct or indirect impact of global performance indicators on their work. This ranged from the impact of performance on the image of the country in terms of transparency, competitiveness, and corruption (Tunisia, Interview 13), through the potential of good performance on indicators to improve the country’s image (Tunisia, Interview 8), to the opportunity international indicators provide for civil servants in advocating for reforms and legislation (Tunisia, Interview 6). This is seen as especially important in a context of low political stability. Finally, Interviewee 3 in Tunisia confirmed the point about indicator-​based performance being a condition for access to loans and grants, in addition to being important for the image of the country. Based on the responses received, Tunisia also has a tracking process for performance on the logistics performance index, the e-​governance index, and in relation to its participation in the OGP (Tunisia, Interviews 1 and 7), with senior officials responsible for managing the process. In a similar way, officials in Morocco also highlighted the importance of indicators for the image of the country and for accessing finance, here through the Millennium Challenge Corporation programme (Morocco, Interview 17). In Jordan, respondents highlighted the link between performance on indicators and the implementation of national development strategies, seeing 96

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rankings as a ‘sanity check’ on country performance based on internationally accepted benchmarks (Jordan, Interviews 12 and 15), with the role of senior officials being to assess the reasons underlying ranking and performance (with a distinction between the absolute performance and performance relative to other countries) and advise policy makers on the way forward. As in Tunisia, indicators are considered a potential instrument to help advocate with political leaders for reform (Jordan, Interview 1). The outlier on the question of relevance and importance was Lebanon, where contrasting views were expressed. One interviewee pointed out that this is really an issue for the political leadership and does not involve civil servants (Lebanon, Interview 10). Others argued that these indicators have little relevance for Lebanon, or at least not for political leaders (Lebanon, Interview 5), and that the process of follow-​up by civil servants is mostly “window dressing” (Lebanon, Interview 4). Other points that came out were that the system is not set up to track performance systematically (Lebanon, Interview 1), and that there is a tendency of political leadership to turn inward and ignore assessments by international organizations or structures (Lebanon, Interview 6). In contrast, other officials did see indicators and rankings as an opportunity to influence decision making (Lebanon, Interviews 8 and 13), making reference to EDB as an opportunity to push regulatory reforms and the Open Budget Index to enhance transparency of the budget process. Hence, where officials in Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan almost unanimously highlighted the relevance of performance on indicators, and many of those interviewed are directly involved in tracking processes, opinions were more divided in Lebanon, where only a minority of the officials interviewed saw this as either important for the image of the country or as an opportunity to influence the direction of policies.

Civil servants’ responses to disagreement with political leaders The dilemma posed to civil servants in the vignette is one of loyalty to country interests versus loyalty to the political leadership of the ministry. Hence, we put the question of relevance of indicators in relative terms: how does a civil servant react if a political leader intends to pass legislation that will negatively affect country scores, or as put more precisely by one of the interviewees (Tunisia, Interview 6): “The issue here is that the national interest and the position and interest of the minister diverge and while the national interest has to take primacy, the hierarchical relations make it extremely difficult for the civil servant to make this happen”. The review of all responses to Vignette 2 shows quite a consistent picture across the board when it comes to relevance (Figure 3.1). Almost all respondents expressed strong concern about the impact, in terms of country 97

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image and interest, of a decision that would set the country back in the next round of EDB and GCI assessments. Another important observation from Vignette 2 reveals that respondents tended to differentiate between what they call ‘technical evidence and advice’ provided by civil servants and ‘political information’ that might be brought forward by a minister. In fact, they used this factor to justify the minister’s behaviour when the latter pushed for a draft bill that might, in the civil servants’ view, harm the country’s performance on the indicator but which, in many instances, nevertheless leads the civil servant to follow the minister (Jordan, Interview 6; Morocco, Interviews 5 and 15). Some suggested the possibility that the minister may not have full information (Tunisia, Interview 7; Morocco, Interviews 5 and 12; Jordan, Interview 6), and cautioned against drawing an overly hasty conclusion that the minister is wrong. Others, however, pointed out that the minister might have “other hidden” business interests and reasons, indicating risks of corruption (Lebanon, Interview 4). One interviewee took the position that laws need to serve the public interest and not serve just to improve the country’s position on global performance indicators (Morocco, Interview 4), but this is a rare case where an official explicitly raised doubts about the need to address the concern over country performance. The overall trend in responses suggests that the civil servant needs to stand up for the public (national) interest and should challenge a decision that would be perceived as going against this. Hence, while respondents saw this as a difficult dilemma, the notion that a decision that negatively affects a country’s ranking on a major performance indicator should be challenged is almost universally shared. On the question of whether the civil servant would really take this step, opinions vary, with many respondents, especially in Jordan, voicing concerns over the implications of expressing dissent too openly. This is less of a concern for the respondents from the other three countries, where this behaviour is seen as an obligation derived from the mandate of the civil servant (the civil servant would be wrong not to challenge such a decision).

Efforts to improve bad ratings or maintain good ones The fifth and final element of the analytical model asks whether countries have put in place efforts to improve bad ratings or maintain good ones. We will address this issue from two perspectives. One is the more straightforward question of whether institutional mechanisms exist to track and address ratings. The second is whether the underlying institutional system is adequate for such mechanisms to generate results. We will address the first through a review of the mechanisms in place in the focus countries, and the second through a combination of a review of trends in indicators on the quality of 98

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institutions and evidence obtained from the interviews with senior officials on the evolution of country institutional systems overall. Our first point of focus then is the presence of institutional mechanisms to track and respond to international indicators. From the interview responses, countries track a variety of indicators and assign responsibility to civil servants to follow up on indicators. In Tunisia, follow-​up on the EDB, HCI, Logistics Performance Index, OGP, and e-​government indices are assigned to various teams and departments. The same goes for the EDB, GCI, and HCI in Morocco, and in Jordan on the EDB and the HCI. Lebanon does not currently appear to have institutional mechanisms in place for tracking progress on indicators; at least none were identified by any of the interviewees (except for the remark that this is a matter for the Prime Minister’s team directly). The best-​documented mechanisms are those related to the GCI and EDB indices. Morocco is the most advanced among the four countries discussed here. The management structure responsible for overseeing and animating reforms on economic governance and the business climate in Morocco is based on a government decree issued in 2010 (Decree 2–​10–​259 of 29 October 2010), which establishes a layered structure headed by the National Committee for the Business Environment (CNEA) –​a formal steering committee that is chaired by the Prime Minister, with mandatory membership of 14 ministers, four agencies, two constitutional entities (independent anti-​ corruption and competition instances), and three professional associations (for employers, trade unions, and the banking sector). The CNEA tends to meet twice a year to track progress. The second layer is a technical committee at the level of the civil service, which acts as a secretariat. This committee is chaired by the government’s Secretary General and has members at the discretion of Secretaries General or Directors General, as well as high-​level representatives of professional associations. The technical committee meets to prepare CNEA meetings. Finally, there is a dedicated secretariat staffed with seconded civil servants that benefit from a special employment regime (higher remuneration and greater autonomy). The secretariat brings together all expertise around international competitiveness indicators (GCI, EDB, EFI, Logistics Performance, and so on), coordinates the work of working groups, and supports the Technical Committee and CNEA. The secretariat has an unusually flat structure that promotes collaboration. The Head of the Secretariat represents the CNEA in external meetings and events. The secretariat may also establish public–​private working groups and teams to initiate and track specific reforms or measures. Based on the interview responses, the CNEA is a well-​established and respected structure that carries weight and can advocate and push for reforms, and can also counterbalance any initiatives that may not be in line with Morocco’s ambitions (Morocco, Interviews 4 and 17). The fact that 99

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the structure handles all key economic governance indicators also ensures coherence in government actions related to them. Tunisia also put in place a formal structure for tracking performance on economic governance indicators, with an emphasis on reform related to business climate. A government decree issued in 2008 created the Tunisian Institute for Competitiveness and Qualitative Studies, which is placed under the administrative supervision of the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Promotion of Investment.5 The Institute was charged with the monitoring of international indicators and with serving as the secretariat of the different inter-​ministerial EDB Task Forces that reported on various elements of the indicator. Finally, a special project management structure was created to manage the process of simplifying business procedures and authorizations. In parallel, the Directorate for Administrative Reform (established under the Ministry of Public Administration) created the National Business Agenda as a public–​private platform for discussions on deregulation (for more details see World Bank, 2021b). The country also has a plethora of other institutions involved in investment climate policy and implementation, including the Tunisia Investment Authority and the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency, both of which also report to the same ministry. Finally, the Agency for Innovation and Investment Promotion under the Ministry of Industry and Small and Medium Size Enterprises focuses on promoting small and medium-​sized (SME) investment. Reflecting concerns over Tunisia’s performance on international economic governance indicators, the government overhauled its institutional mechanisms in 2017, though without abolishing the 2008 decree. Based on a Decision of the Council of Ministers, the responsibility for tracking and managing reforms related to international indicators (including EDB, GCI, and Enabling the Business of Agriculture) was assigned to the Head of Cabinet of the Minister of Development, Cooperation and Investment Promotion, and then reassigned to the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Investment Promotion following the 2020 government formation process.6 The revamped structure had some notable successes in moving forward on specific reform initiatives, notably the comprehensive law on the improvement of the business climate (Law 2019–​47, see also Republique Tunisienne, 2019), which pushed forward a series of business climate-​ related initiatives.7 However, the fact that the current setup does not have a strong legal basis makes it heavily dependent on the weight of the minister and his/​her Head of Cabinet, and their ability to convene and convince other institutions. Finally, the tracking of indicators on logistics (Logistics Performance Index) and on open government and e-​government has been assigned to other 100

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government structures –​to the Ministry of Transport for the former and to the ‘Observatoire Nationale des Marchés Publiques’ for the two governance indicators (Tunisia, Interviews 1 and 7). Given the overall problems in coordinating government action and the growing tensions between politicians, political appointees, and civil servants (Tunisia, Interviews 5, 6, 10, 13, and 17), the lack of clear definition of the structure and the many institutions involved in preparing and implementing government initiatives of economic governance and the business environment pose significant risks. A further rationalization effort therefore appears to be needed. In Jordan, the tracking of economic governance indicators is being led by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, which reports to the Prime Minister’s Office and the Royal Court on progress, and also proposes priorities for follow-​up reforms and actions. Unlike in Morocco and Tunisia, Jordan’s arrangements are not formalized in legal instruments. Given the central position of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, the institution is able to get inputs from other relevant institutions by using its informal leverage (Jordan, Interviews 1 and 12). Finally, Lebanon does not have a formally assigned tracking mechanism; the tracking of EDB is done directly out of the Prime Minister’s Office (Lebanon, Interview 10), and reporting and follow-​up on other indicators is, as in Tunisia, assigned to different line ministries and departments (Lebanon, Interview 13). There is no established coordination system that keeps a broader overview of performance on indicators. In conclusion, the level of institutionalization of the response to indicators varies significantly between the four countries. Morocco and Tunisia have an institutionalized and systemic mechanism in place (even if the Tunisian one is in flux), Jordan has assigned responsibility for tracking without it being formalized in the legal sense, and Lebanon has no clearly defined mechanism. This reflects the overall sentiment in the interview feedback, with many Lebanese interviewees considering performance on global indicators a relatively marginal issue, while interviewees in Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco all highlighted the importance of improved performance for the country’s image.

Conclusions: global performance indicators and their impact on civil servants Global performance indicators have become a prominent feature of contemporary global governance. The responses to the vignettes and interview questions in the four countries provide a unique insight into the bureaucratic responses and influencing efforts of senior civil servants, and how they see the strategic options for influencing policy makers and engaging 101

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with other actors and institutions. Looping back to the conclusions and findings and what they imply for our theses, indicators appear to operate at the national level in more diffuse ways than on the global level. Most of the indicators we discussed in this chapter are relatively new and have been in place for less than two decades, yet they have created a new dynamic in global–​national interaction processes. The reason as to why these new indicator systems have become game changers (unlike previously existing systems such as country credit ratings) lies in their visibility, relevance to public policy makers and private sector leaders, and relative ease of access and clarity. The latter has generated criticism of over-​simplification (in relation to composite indicators like the Worldwide Governance Indicators) as well as of over-​reliance on perceptions (a reproach often made in relation to TI’s perception of corruption index). Apart from this, and as discussed previously, there are challenges, like those that emerged around the risk of capture of indicators. While all these are, to some extent, logical features of new indicator systems that are still evolving and being shaped, the response of political leaders as well as the private sector shows that these systems matter, and increasingly so, with strong media attention further driving their visibility (see Doshi et al, 2019). Our question in this study is how and in what way these indicators, as a feature of globalization, matter to civil servants. The four country studies in this volume all concern relatively open and diversified economies in transition, allowing us to dig deeper into this issue, and look at how civil servants are engaged in developing country responses to rankings and ratings on indicators. The combined use of vignettes, questions and answers, and stakeholder mapping through in-​depth interviews documents the way civil servants are engaged (or not) in developing responses, and how they position themselves towards both political leaders and external actors (national and international). The evidence derived from the interview process is that: i) international indicators are perceived as important and relevant by senior civil servants, even by those that are not always directly involved in tracking or follow-​ up work; ii) the notion that performance on international indicators is a matter of ‘national interest’ comes through in the overwhelming majority of responses, perhaps with the exception of Lebanon; iii) civil servants have a duty to act if decisions are proposed that go against this form of ‘national interest’, and for many respondents this should go beyond internal contestation; and iv) national responses to performance on global economic governance indicators are increasingly systematic and institutionalized, with civil servants playing a key role in tracking processes, in supporting the development of policies to address country performance, and more generally, in ensuring coordinated follow-​up. On the question of whether officials would, in reality, follow through in such situations, the position 102

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varies between countries, as does the discussion on what mechanisms officials could use. Concerning the latter, respondents note the challenges inherent in getting to an effective coordinated response given the growing politicization and fragmentation of civil service systems and the growing ‘distance’ between civil servants and political leaders. This is the case in Tunisia and Lebanon in particular, and while less so, is also present in Morocco. Coming back to the five elements of expected response patterns to global indicators on which we structured the analysis on this dimension of globalization –​(i) presence of public monitoring and grading; (ii) external influencing including technical assistance, (iii) perceived pressure to perform from external parties; (iv) concern about current reputation and future gradings; and (v) institutionalized efforts to maintain/​improve scores –​we have seen in our discussion that four of these impact the day-​to-​day work of civil servants. The picture is less clear on one element: perceived pressure to perform by external parties. This one, however, is critical to our study, and in particular to determining whether and to what extent we see evidence of socialization as a determining element of our typology, and therefore needs some further discussion. A first important distinction on the issue of civil servants’ responses to perceived third party pressures is the difference between responses to specific types of third parties –​international and national. On international third parties, civil servants do see international organizations as a main source of pressure and influence when it comes to global performance indicators. However, direct engagement of civil servants with these international actors is still driven by considerations of hierarchical subordination and loyalty to the nation state (traditionalist type), even in more open systems like Tunisia and Lebanon. Thus, we did not observe deeper values and socialization associated with this global issue, and we do not see responses that would indicate the emergence of the engaged civil servant type. Civil servants will engage with international partners to discuss policy initiatives related to issues that arise from indicators, but only with official permission from the minister. They will represent the official government position and are unlikely to leverage contacts with international partners to influence political leaders, even if they fear national interests are at stake. Hence, while civil servants consider these relations either important or very important in their responses to stakeholder mapping, which was done through a card-​based ranking, they do not seek to leverage these. This response is close to unanimous across the four countries and interviewees. The only difference is the level of evidence brought forward, where Jordan and Lebanon show the pattern of predominately traditionalist civil servants clearly subordinated to ministerial wishes, whereas civil servants in Morrocco and Tunisia tend to work with 103

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various types and measures of evidence in trying to persuade the minister. Nevertheless, if not successful, he/​she will subordinate to the will of the minister, too. Hence, notions of sovereignty and loyalty to the political hierarchy still prevail when it comes to engaging with international partners, and engagement with international partners is seen as subject to different ‘rules’ than engagement with other institutions and entities. Where national-​level third parties are concerned, in particular the media and CSOs, the responses to the vignettes do not indicate perceived pressure on civil servants. This is also confirmed in the stakeholder mapping exercise, which shows that civil servants see the media and CSOs as less important stakeholders. However, one should approach this with nuance: a telling caveat from the interviews is that “CSOs and Media have gained importance. CSOs have become more relevant and active through projects such as Community Driven Development. Donors are now giving more importance to CSOs. CSOs are not more important than public institutions. They have been given an oversized role” (Lebanon, Interview 12). Hence, while CSOs and the media may not yet be seen as having direct impact on the work of civil servants, they are seen as having a strong influence on international organizations, and in some contexts, select CSOs are seen as having “an outsized influence on politicians” (Tunisia, Interview 10). Therefore, while the interview results confirm the pattern of influence of global performance indicators on civil servants (whose role in defining the response is critical, though not final) as well as perceived pressure from international actors, the responses are less definitive on how strong an impact direct engagement by outside actors has on the same civil servants. This then brings us to the relevance of these conclusions for our theses, two of which can be tested for this element of impact of globalization. Thesis 1: Globalization is one of the disruptors of traditional accountability systems, as globalization has an impact on both direct and indirect accountability mechanisms. On this thesis the interview responses raise several issues. First, some respondents bring up the separate roles and responsibilities of politicians and civil servants, in terms of looking after national or public interest (civil servants) and narrower constituency interests (politicians). Civil servants consider themselves guardians of national interests, going beyond narrower political interests, about which many believe they may not have full insight. In this sense, they see their role as challenging and influencing political leaders from within, especially where national interests are concerned, and put a strong emphasis on internal accountability. A quote from an interviewee in relation to the dilemma set out in Vignette 2 illustrates this: “honestly in this situation I would not have known what to do, if the minister had asked me 104

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to write the justification note I would have not hesitated to remind him how a decision-​making process should be structured. The minister should base his decision on the draft law on the position set out in the notes prepared by his administration” (Morocco, Interview 3). In terms of engagement with external actors of accountability, the evidence of impact of this dimension of globalization is less strong. The role of parliament and the option of direct engagement of civil servants with parliament (to raise concerns over political decisions related to indicator ratings and ranking that are not seen as in the national interest) are raised as legitimate options open to civil servants. However, leveraging international partners or CSOs/​media is not seen as either legitimate or useful, with very few exceptions. On this aspect of accountability, loyalty and hierarchy considerations continue to dominate. Hence, on this dimension of globalization there is evidence of impact on a broader ongoing change in internal accountability (perceived roles and responsibility, where performance on indicators creates a clear contrast between general/​national interest and narrow constituency interests) and a growing notion of separate responsibilities for civil servants and politicians. However, we do not see evidence of a change in external accountability patterns as a result of engagement around indicators. Thesis 2: Globalization affects politico-​administrative relations by increasing access to information and enhancing transparency (namely, it reduces the credibility of finger pointing). While globalization has diluted civil servants’ role in the provision of policy advice, it has also given them access to new networks and relations that they can use to strengthen their positions. As per the earlier discussion in Chapter 2, politico-​administrative relations have been changing in the context of the broader political transition, from a single command and control model to a more heterogeneous model. The countries are in different places on this trajectory. The question on this dimension of globalization is then whether the impact of indicators, and their emphasis on measuring system performance, accelerates or decelerates this broader transformation. The interview responses bring ample evidence that indicators accelerate a push for performance in systems that are still in early stages of creating more result-​ based management approaches (with the exception of Morocco). Performance on key indicators matters and has led to the creation of result-​ based institutional tracking and follow-​up mechanisms, even though these are generally not yet a mainstay of country institutional systems. The vignette brought to light the real and practical, day to day manifestations of reforms influenced by indicators and rankings that cause convergence toward global standards –​in mindsets and in actions. In other words, public governance 105

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is changing in the MENA region, and global pressures to perform coming from indicators play a role in driving this change. The reforms initiated in the four countries also sharpen the growing separation of the political and administrative spheres, a trend commented on by many interviewees. The interviews illustrate the challenges faced by civil servants in responding to the motives and actions of politicians, as well as the sentiment among civil servants that they are being scapegoated by politicians who are unwilling to put the national interest over narrower constituency interest. Lebanon and Tunisia are the countries where this sentiment comes out the strongest, and Jordan is on the other end of the spectrum (less evidence of a growing distance between politicians and civil servants). Given the emphasis on performance and accountability, international indicator systems are therefore a disrupter and accelerator for broader changes and a move towards performance management, with the associated potential tensions between politicians and civil servants that we have seen in OECD countries (Coombes and Verheijen, 1997). Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6 7

As noted in the introduction, ‘Ease of Doing Business’ was discontinued in September 2021. The analysis presented in this book is based on interviews and literature analysis conducted in 2020, and reflects reality at that time. We treat global performance indicators as different from the traditional financial rating agency assessments, which have a more limited and narrow focus, even if the former are often see as precursors of the latter. The post-​2018 assessment system has an additional pillar, separating out human capital as a category on its own, though the 12 sub-​indicators remain largely unchanged. While they are discussed separately in the study, we decided to link these two factors into one, given their close interrelation. Until September 2020 it reported to the Ministry of Development, Cooperation, and Investment Promotion, which was merged with the Ministry of Finance and became the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Investment Promotion. A further re-​allocation of this responsibility followed the change of government in 2021. The law covers broad aspects of business environment reforms, including the implementation of PPP engagements (especially on renewable energy).

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Deepening Engagement with International Development Institutions: Impact on Civil Servants Introduction The impact of engagement between nation states and transnational organizations (in particular, international development partners) on development trajectories has been the subject of an ever more intense academic debate. In Chapters 1 and 2 we discussed the various approaches, and the shift over recent years from a primarily ideological debate around the pros and cons of reforms advocated for by international development partners (see discussion in Radwan, 2020) to a more evidence-​based approach (for example, Custer et al, 2015, 2018; Andrews et al, 2017). On the back of an often heated discussion on the appropriateness and desirability of ‘Washington Consensus’ driven reforms in the 1990s, the problem-​driven assessments around government–​development partner engagements proposed by Andrews (2013) and Andrews et al (2017) aimed to improve the impact of policy solutions proposed or supported by international actors by working on better tailoring these to national contexts (technically and politically). Subsequently, the large survey-​based analyses by Custer et al (2015, 2018, 2021) and Parks et al (2015) worked on framing and documenting the impacts of engagement with international development partners on national policy, and what determined the impact of such influence. Both strands of work are concerned primarily with how engagement between nation states and international partners can be made more impactful, by looking into how support programmes can be designed in a more context-​appropriate way and by examining what the drivers of successful dialogue are. The latter includes the frequency and quality of interaction between officials and office holders in partner countries and those 107

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in international development partner institutions (multilateral and bilateral). Driven by such analyses, international development partners have also done their own soul searching on the impact of their financing and dialogue. By and large, these more recent and evidence-​based analytical efforts focus primarily on outcome (what is the impact on the substance of policy or institutional reform) and process (what kind of interaction in what context and why) rather than ideology, and in this way have generated a more substance-​oriented debate on globalization and the influence of global actors on national policies. What has so far been mostly absent in this debate is a discussion on the impact of the engagement with international actors on civil servants. How do civil servants perceive and manage this interaction and what is the impact of deepening engagement and international socialization on the modus operandi of political and administrative systems? This question will be the focus of this chapter. In Chapter 1, we laid out how the institutional and legal setup of national systems can filter global influences. We also classified the possible behavioural responses of civil servants. Based on this approach, we proposed a typology of civil servants’ responses to globalization, based on the level of socialization to global norms (behavioural) and type of accountability system (systemic). This will help us to assess the de facto operation of national systems (and extent to which this filters the influence of global actors), and whether and how behaviours of actors in the system are changing as a result of a deepening engagement with international actors. In terms of the theses formulated at the end of Chapter 1, the globalization dimension of interaction between transnational organizations and national actors (and its impact on socialization) speaks to the first three of our theses: i) the disruptive potential of globalization on accountability systems; ii) the impact of globalization on systems of politico-​administrative relations; and iii) influence on professionalization and values. We will come back to each of these at the end of this chapter.

The evolution of patterns of interaction The importance of interactions between national civil servants and politicians and international partners has continued to grow over the last decades. With new resourceful actors like China engaging significantly worldwide, including through their creation of new IFIs (like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), and international development partners in general taking on an expanded role in the post-​financial crisis period, it goes without saying that the level of engagement between national and global actors has generally been increasing. The ongoing COVID-​19 pandemic has further illustrated the need for global engagement. Efforts to ensure that vaccination endeavours are pursued 108

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worldwide will require both technical and financial support by international actors, both governmental and non-​governmental. The creation of COVAX as a joint Gavi and World Health Organization (WHO) initiative to ensure that LIC and MIC have access to critical vaccines illustrated the importance of a coordinated global response. The coordination of policies and measures to address the economic and social consequences of the crisis give a heightened role to IFIs and other international development actors in terms of both framing and supporting the delivery of support and assistance. Like climate change, the COVID-​19 pandemic has shown the limitations nation states face in addressing issues of a cross-​continental nature. In the MENA region specifically, engagement by international partners expanded significantly in the period following the Arab Spring and the subsequent rise of instability in the region. Among the four countries discussed here, Tunisia, due to its complex political transition, and Lebanon and Jordan, as neighbours of conflict-​affected Syria, have seen a significant step up in international support and engagement, while Morocco has historically had strong engagement with international partners that has further expanded. The multiplication of the number of international development partners (multilateral and bilateral) active in each of the countries, as well as the change in the nature of this interaction, came through loud and clear in the interviews held with senior officials, which indicated that such interactions have both widened and deepened, and now involve a larger number of civil servants across multiple institutions.

Documenting a growing engagement The different patterns of economic opening up of countries in the MENA region were discussed in Chapter 2. While there are different paths and processes, and there remain exceptions of ‘closed’ countries, the overall trend over the last decades has been one of greater integration in the global economy. This has come at a price, especially in non-​resource rich countries, where the shift to a private sector-​led economy and the related reform of subsidy systems have been slow and controversial, resulting in a dramatic narrowing of fiscal space. International development partner support for these transition processes has helped cushion the impact of the economic transition. In this section we will review the trends in resource flow from donor to recipient countries, as well as the type of engagement and support that is provided. Both elements matter. More resources from more partners means more of civil servants’ time is spent working with partner representatives. The type of financial support and engagement matters as well; support through investment projects focuses on ‘getting things built’. They usually involve a limited number of officials and, while they can and do (increasingly) address sector management issues, this has traditionally not been their main objective. 109

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Policy-​based and result-​based projects tend to involve civil servants from a broad range of ministries and agencies in discussions that go to the heart of the policy challenges countries are facing. In the more open systems post-​2011 there is also more space and opportunity for civil servants and representatives of development partners to engage in genuine dialogue.

Resource flow patterns Analysing the patterns in resource flows remains a challenging undertaking. Reliable data on actual flows remains difficult to obtain, regardless of efforts under the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) and global initiatives in the context of the G20. Box 4.1 documents some of the data challenges in more detail.

Box 4.1:  Challenges on quality of resource flow data Absence of data clarity on bilateral and multilateral aid When working with data aggregated in databases covering international partner commitments, disbursements, and so on, we encountered many inconsistencies, weak reporting, and, most importantly, lack of clarity and low data quality. Getting a clear picture on how much aid specific bilateral or multilateral donors provide for Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia was a much bigger challenge than we had expected. Our first approach was working with data provided by the IATI. The IATI supports a broad range of stakeholders (donor governments, IFIs, CSOs, private sector organizations, foundations, and so on) to publish development and humanitarian data in standardized formats, using the ‘IATI standard’ (International Aid Transparency Initiative, 2020). For the purposes of our research, use of the IATI promised access not only to a one-​stop shop for relevant data but also an ability to compare data across different stakeholders and across recipient countries. To explore the IATI data we used the d-p​ ortal (2020), a user-​friendly portal in which all IATI data can be viewed by recipient country (for example, Tunisia) or publisher (for example, the World Bank). The exercise ultimately highlighted several data quality problems, which the IATI cautions users about (International Aid Transparency Initiative, 2020), highlighting the pitfalls of large data collection efforts reliant on an organization’s and a country’s own data quality assurance processes. Some of the quality issues encountered made it difficult to compare data across publishers due to mixed understanding of variables by data reporters (for example, Germany), errors they made in the process (for example, France), incorrect reporting standards used (for example, Switzerland), and inconsistent reporting. Some donors did not report the volume of commitments (for example, OPEC)

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while others reported it multiple times, which showed tremendously high commitment numbers (for example, Belgium). As a result, we relied on OECD reports on Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries published in 2013, 2018, and 2019, covering the 2007–​17 period, which allowed us to view comprehensive tables, including receipts by country and subdivided between bilateral and multilateral and by grant and loan funding. The tables show the transactions of each recipient country with Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and non-​DAC member countries, multilateral agencies, and private donors. DAC (an OECD structure) bilateral flow figures are drawn from member countries’ replies to questionnaires issued by the OECD Secretariat. Multilateral agencies also provide their data on a questionnaire issued by the OECD Secretariat. The coverage of flows from other providing countries varies over the years. In 2017, these data include flows from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, Turkey, and the UAE. The data for these countries and territories have been classified and processed as far as possible according to DAC norms and definitions. Twenty-​six philanthropic foundations reported their development cooperation activities in 2017.1    

As explained earlier, the best proxy for analysing flows of funds towards recipient countries remains the OECD’s DAC database, which documents flows of funds from OECD DAC partner countries,2 the European Union, and the main IFIs (including the World Bank and regional development banks active in the region)3 to LIC and MIC. While incomplete, as it does not include China or most of the Gulf States,4 which are an important provider of financial support to the four focus countries, it does allow us to examine trends in flow of funds by type of funds (divided by concessional or non-​concessional loans and grants). A further important data source comes from the IMF and relates to its programme support, which, while not covered for all recipient countries under the OECD database, gives a further indication of both country engagement with transnational actors (as IMF programmes are based on continuous policy dialogue around reforms) and trends in flow of funds. Hence, to document financial engagement, we analysed trends based on OECD DAC data and IMF data, covering the period between 2007 and 2017 for the OECD DAC (the latest available comprehensive dataset), and data from 2007 up to and including 2020 for the IMF. Graphs 4.1 and 4.2 and Table 4.1 present the results of this analysis. It should be noted here that Graph 4.1 has been calculated based on net disbursements, which means loan repayments to international development 111

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

partners are also reflected. This accounts for some of the sudden variations between years. In this regard, what is most important to observe is the trendline drawn for this graph. For Graph 4.2, an important caveat to note is that since all the four countries discussed here are MIC, grant elements in development assistance are generally limited. Finally, Table 4.1, on IMF disbursements, reflects real disbursements, which in many instances constitute only a portion of original commitments, ranging from 43 per cent on Jordan’s 2016 programme to 59 per cent on Tunisia’s programme, which was agreed in the same year. Tunisia’s 2015 stand-​by engagement disbursed at 87 per cent. In contrast, in the case of Morocco, disbursements are at zero on three of its programme engagements. There are two possible reasons behind these IMF disbursement ratios: a reduced need for financing (implying the country uses the IMF programme for other than financial purposes) or underperformance against agreed criteria. The 2020 disbursements (100 per cent of commitments made) are all special disbursements to cushion the impact of the COVID-​19 crisis, awarded under the IMF’s crisis mechanism, the Rapid Financing Initiative (RFI). Even with all the caveats on comparability, the data still tell an important story. First, the outlier status of Jordan, which shows the most significant upward trend in both total disbursements and grant financing by international development partners involved in the OECD DAC. Part of the explanation in Jordan’s case lies in the additional resources provided to the country to cope with the influx of refugees from Syria, but this is not the only factor. Lebanon has equally benefitted from such support and, while resource flows to Lebanon have increased since 2014, the country does not show a trend line like Jordan’s. Second, there is the immediate response of international partners following the 2011 Arab Spring, with a significant bump in increased disbursement of funds in 2012, except for in Morocco, where volumes remained flat.5 In Tunisia we then see a further uptick of resources after the 2015 terrorist attacks, with support volumes increasing in 2016 and 2017 (and going up further in 2018 in response to the country’s budget crisis, which was triggered by increased oil and gas prices). Third, disbursements of grant resources remain limited, and in all cases come primarily from the EU, France,6 Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US, with outlier contributions by Japan for Morocco and Jordan and by Norway for Lebanon. In terms of the profile of contributions, the most remarkable is the major increase in financing from Germany for all four countries. This covers both loan and grant resources. A second important point is the broadening of international development partner engagement, with the number of development partners that have engagements with the four countries expanding exponentially since 2011. 112

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Graph 4.1: Total new receipts per capita, 2007–​17 Total receipts net in millions of USD per 1 million inhabitants Deepening Engagement

300.000 250.000 200.000

113

150.000 100.000 50.000 0.000 2007

2008

2009

2010

Jordan Linear (Jordan)

Note: Loans and grants minus repayments. Sources: Based on data from OECD (2012, 2013, 2018, 2019)

2011 Lebanon Linear (Lebanon)

2012

2013 Morocco Linear (Morocco)

2014

2015

Tunisia Linear (Tunisia)

2016

2017

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Graph 4.2: Total grant receipts per capita, 2007–​17 Total ODA net in millions of USD per 1 million inhabitants

250.000

150.000 114

100.000 50.000 0.000 2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Jordan

Lebanon

Morocco

Linear (Jordan)

Linear (Lebanon)

Linear (Morocco)

Sources: Based on data from OECD (2012, 2013, 2018, 2019)

2015

2016

Tunisia Linear (Tunisia)

2017

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

200.000

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In USD

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Jordan

2012

2013

2014

242.8

2015

2016

2017

2018

33.6

2019

2020 70.2

115

Lebanon Morocco Tunisia Source: Based on data from International Monetary Fund (2020)

0.0 131.8

0.0 148.0

0.0

83.9 66.4

Deepening Engagement

Table 4.1: IMF programme disbursement per capita

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Hence, based on OECD DAC data we see an increase in the number of active international development partners; an increase in the disbursement of grant resources, with the exception of Morocco; and a continued upward trend in total net disbursements of financing, with the exception of Lebanon. Given that the numbers on total financial flows represent net disbursements (which are significantly affected by large repayments of past loans), the underlying trend on new commitments (for which there are no equivalent data) would be expected to be significantly higher. Finally, where IMF financial flows and programme engagements are concerned the trend is more significant, with no pre-​2011 engagements and significant commitments after 2012, as well as major disbursements of funds to Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Adding up the OECD DAC data and IMF disbursements, and knowing that some significant financiers (mostly GCC countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia) are not covered by our data sources, the overall conclusion derived from the data analysis is one of broadened and deepened engagement between international development partners and policy makers and civil servants in the recipient countries.

Engagement type The engagement type is a second factor that matters when determining the extent to which deepened engagement with international actors can impact on civil servants. In this respect, policy or result-​based operations providing budget support are more likely to involve more officials across a range of institutions and also more likely to lead to deeper partnerships that can have an impact (mutually) on the responsible officials on both sides. This is because reform dialogue has a different intensity and dynamic to the engagement related to the implementation of an investment project. As discussed in Chapter 2, budget support engagements are not new for the countries covered, and were linked to some controversial reforms in several of the countries in the 1980s. However, these engagements were usually limited to IMF and World Bank involvement and were discussed and developed with a small set of associates close to the country’s leadership. The post-​2011 engagement is different both in its scope and implication –​on the side of the international development partner and the government. While we have reliable data on resource flows, it is difficult to document in an exact manner what part of these financial resources go towards policy and result-​based lending support. OECD DAC reports do not draw this distinction, and the data provided by the IATI also do not seem to single out budget support due to data quality issues (see Box 4.1). However, we have several other data points that help provide an indication of the 116

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relative importance of this form of partner engagement and of how this has been evolving. As a first point, the IMF programme engagements are an important part of this, and here we have evidence of a significant step up in engagement and dialogue for all four countries, though Morocco did not draw on most of the committed resources (see Table 4.1). From there being no engagement on the programme side between 2007 and 2011, three countries (the exception being Lebanon, which at no point during this period had an IMF programme) have gone through programme engagements since. Second, we also know that other development partners have been engaged in more and larger budget support programmes since 2011, with the World Bank, for example, financing close to US$2.5 billion in Tunisia between 2011 and 2020, and close to US$2 billion in Jordan in 2018 and 2019 alone. Budget support programme engagements in Morocco have also been significant. Similarly, the EU has used its budget support instrument extensively in Tunisia and Jordan, providing both grant resources and loan-​based macro-​ financial assistance (MFA). In Tunisia, an allocation of €600 million was made for MFA support in 2020 alone. Similarly, the African Development Bank, the French Development Agency (AFD), and the German Development Bank (KFW) have all engaged in more and larger development policy lending programmes across all four countries. Reviews of programme implementation also show the deep challenges inherent in the management of budget support programmes. As an example, the evaluation report on three development policy loans granted to Tunisia between 2012 and 2016, for a total amount of US$1.25 billion, draws a sobering picture of political economy and reform implementation challenges (World Bank, 2018) and sub-​optimal results. In response, and to enhance coordination and bring greater focus, joint government–​ development partner medium-​term reform matrices were agreed between a coalition of four international development partner institutions in Jordan7 in 2019 (World Bank, 2019a), and five international development partner institutions8 in Tunisia in 2020 (World Bank, 2020a). These joint support programmes have the objective of deepening reform dialogue and providing more predictable levels of medium-​term financial support. They also build long-​term working relations and partnerships between international and national officials that create the conditions for influencing and being influenced. Finally, then, while it is difficult to put exact numbers on the total budget support financing volumes for each of the countries, it is clear from documents and anecdotal evidence that these engagements both are large and involve a growing number of financing partners. Between an almost continuous engagement with the IMF and an equally continuous dialogue with a large set of partners, this engagement has growing importance for 117

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

officials in all countries, and most of all in Jordan and Tunisia, which work with structured multi-​annual and multi-​partner support programmes.

Impact and influence: what do survey data and interviews tell us? Based on their global surveys (Custer et al, 2015, 2018, 2021; Parks et al, 2015), covering both politicians and civil servants, Custer and Parks identify several factors that define whether local civil servants and politicians are receptive to or influenced by policy advice from international partners. Frequency of interaction and communications, usefulness of advice, agenda setting influence (including the ability to provide budget support), and helpfulness in reform implementation are the four factors mentioned most often (Raadschelders and Verheijen, 2019). International benchmarking is also identified as a factor of influence, an issue discussed already in Chapter 3.

Evidence on perceptions The interviews with senior civil servants in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia drilled down on these issues through targeted interview questions, with the objective of shedding more light on how engagement with international development partners is perceived by civil servants. In addition, initial results, based on raw data, from the 2020 Aiddata ‘Listening to Leaders’ surveys for Morocco and Jordan (Custer et al, 2021),9 shared with us by the Aiddata team, provide a further insight of the way senior officials and politicians perceive the importance of international partners to their work. The Aiddata team provided aggregate access to responses from Morocco and Jordan concerning three questions: i) whether the official/​ politician has received advice or assistance from a specific partner; ii) whether a specific development partner is considered influential (on policy matters); and iii) whether the specific partner is considered helpful. While the number of responses for Jordan and Morocco is limited, it is sufficient to get a broad idea of patterns of engagement and helpfulness, and adds an additional element of information to our interview material, which targeted senior officials only. For the purpose of comparison, only those international development partner institutions for which at least eight country-​level respondents indicated that they engaged with them were considered.

Insights derived from the question-​and-​answer section of the interviews Table 4.2 summarizes the main issues brought up by respondents during the classical question-​and-​answer-​based part of the civil servants’ interviews. They reflect questions on the level of the official’s engagement with 118

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Table 4.2: Summary of interview responses on international partner engagement Trends in engagement

Dominant discussion themes in order of importance (country specific)

Main benefits

Main constraints

Financing

Fragmentation/​multiplication of partners, difficulty in managing coordination

Advisory support

Growing time investment required given the increased number of partners

All countries

119

Knowledge sharing and advisory support Jordan Majority of respondents are engaged Benchmark and national with international partners positioning Importance of contextualization

Networking opportunities

Many new partners (learning curve) Need for better contextualization

(continued)

Deepening Engagement

Significant increase in number of partners and amount of support

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Table 4.2: Summary of interview responses on international partner engagement (continued) Trends in engagement

Dominant discussion themes in order of importance (country specific)

Main benefits

Main constraints

Coordination challenges and need for agility (by partners)

Possibility of two-​way cooperation Political interests of some partner institutions get in the way of reforms

Lebanon

Some respondents note a decline of Bias and political complacency interest among partners (mutual)

Perception of decreasing interest by partners

120

Challenge to ensure follow through on agreements

Weak implication of beneficiaries in upstream preparation

Morocco Growing interest in two-​way engagement and using Moroccan experience/​expertise

Leveraging partner conditionality and advisory support to help drive reforms and innovation (including change management)

Reform leverage

Advice still frequently ‘off the shelf ’ and not fit to context (especially bilateral focus on ‘marketing the national model’)

Need for more proactivity on Opportunities to present Moroccan the Moroccan side to get the experience best out of opportunities (continued)

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Continued engagement, some new partner institutions (EBRD, Germany)

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Table 4.2: Summary of interview responses on interview partner engagement (continued) Trends in engagement

Dominant discussion themes in order of importance (country specific)

Main benefits

Main constraints

Technical assistance (TA) and advisory support

Fragmentation of donor effort and national coordination challenges

Importance of benchmarking and national reputation

Tunisia 121

From a strictly controlled engagement pre-​2011 to an open dialogue

Helps in building support for reforms that are needed but not always politically feasible

Change in dialogue, an Transfer of know-​how and exchange of views rather than expertise reform imposition Change in substantive Reform pressure and ensuring engagement, focus on follow through (also goes for governance that was not there investment projects) before 2011 Source: Authors, based on interview responses

Sense of decline of quality of support as Tunisia is no longer the main priority

Deepening Engagement

Building a two-​way engagement and ensuring better contextualization

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

international development partners, the advantages and disadvantages of this engagement, and the responses of the officials to Cards I and II, which document the percentage amount of time spent (including the category ‘engagement with international partners’) and the ranking of stakeholder importance (also including international partners). The responses confirm the findings in the earlier discussion on increased engagement based on analysis of financial support trends: three of the four countries note a steep increase in the level of engagement, the number of international development partners involved, and the variety of support. The time investment this takes is seen as compensated for by obtaining new expertise, having the opportunity to share expertise, financing support, and in Tunisia and Morocco, reform leverage. Regarding the latter, it is interesting to note that civil servants come out as proponents of reforms, contrary to their often-​perceived role as a ‘brake’ on reforms. This might be explained by the fact that the interview processes focused on senior officials rather than the street-​level bureaucrats that might stand to lose from deregulation and reforms. While respondents from each of the countries have their own perspective on engagement with international development partners, a few interesting elements are worth noting. The points made in Tunisia on how engagement has changed since 2011 (Tunisia, Interviews 3, 10, and 13) and how more open relations facilitate mutual understanding and joint work are a direct reflection of the changed nature of relations. One interviewee even makes the point that civil servants risk being ‘replaced’ by advisers from international partners, as politicians use the expertise available from international development partners more than their own staff (Tunisia, Interview 17) –​ something that would have been inconceivable before 2011. Moroccan civil servants highlight the two-​way communications as well as the opportunity for Moroccan experience and expertise to be used by international development partners (Morocco, Interviews 7, 9, 12, 17, and 18), with one interviewee noting his role in advising neighbouring countries on reform management structures, which was facilitated by an international development partner (Morocco, Interview 17). This is of direct value for civil servants, as a recognition of their own expertise and the advancement of their country. For instance, one respondent in Morocco, Interview 11, speaks specifically about image building for the country.

‘Listening to Leaders’ 2020 data Turning to the aggregate survey response data obtained from the 2020 ‘Listening to Leaders’ survey,10 the top three mentioned international development partners in Morocco were the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the EU, with 87 per cent, 85 per cent, and 122

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79 per cent of respondents respectively having had engagements with representatives of these organizations. In terms of influence, for Morocco, the World Bank was influential for all respondents that had engagements with the organization (100 per cent). The same went for the IMF and the EU (both 100 per cent), while France (86 per cent) and the UN/​UNDP (86 per cent) also scored high for influence. The African Development Bank was further behind at 69 per cent. On helpfulness, for Morocco, the World Bank and the EU rated highest, at 89 per cent and 88 per cent respectively, before the IMF and the African Development Bank at 76 per cent and 75 per cent, respectively. The interviews in Lebanon brought out more critical notes, with several civil servants arguing that international development partners should have been less complacent with Lebanese politicians (Lebanon, Interviews 1, 6, and 10), and one respondent referring specifically to bias in one partner organization that the respondent felt was due to the nationality of its (then) leader. Also in Lebanon, there was less of a sense of a ‘two-​way street’ and there were concerns over contextualization (Lebanon, Interviews 5 and 13). For Jordan, responses were more general, highlighting the welcome nature of increased contact and cooperation, with one respondent specifically mentioning the importance of Jordan becoming a model for other countries and being used as such by partner organizations (Jordan, Interview 10). Based on the Aiddata ‘Listening to Leaders 2020’ aggregate Jordan survey data, the most important perceived international development partner in Jordan was the US, followed by the IMF and the UN/​UNDP, with 83 per cent, 69 per cent, and 66 per cent respectively. The UN/​UNDP was considered the most influential, with 94 per cent of respondents having had engagements with the organization, followed by the US and the EU, at 88 and 80 per cent of respondents respectively. In terms of helpfulness, Japan was the highest rated at 94 per cent, before the EU at 93 per cent and the US at 89 per cent. Finally, concerns were expressed on the fragmentation of effort from international development partners and the challenges of coordination following the engagement by a large number of new partners. Overall, while many new international development partner organizations have become active in the MENA region, and in these four countries specifically, the focus in most interviews remained on the larger, traditional organizations like the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU. The significant step up in Germany’s engagement came through repeatedly, with direct advisory support provided by GIZ (on a grant basis) considered as being of significant value by respondents across the four countries. This conclusion is broadly consistent with findings of the Aiddata studies, though some of the more technical international partners highlighted by respondents in the 2015 and 2018 studies (GAVI, Global Fund, and UNICEF in particular) did not feature in the same way among the responses obtained here. 123

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

The Aiddata survey responses broadly align with the trend reflected in the interviews (see Table 4.2), where larger traditional international development partners remain the most important day-​to-​day counterparts to government officials. What is noteworthy in the Aiddata responses is the greater role for the UN in Jordan, and the outlier of Japan’s rating as most helpful in the same country. The World Bank is relatively absent from the Jordan responses despite the significant financial support provided by the organization, as discussed in the previous section. However, with response numbers relatively small, it is logical for some such differences to emerge. Reviews of interview material and the 2020 Aiddata aggregate survey responses for Morocco and Jordan confirm a pattern of significantly broadened and deepened engagement with international development partners over the last decade, as well as the development of more substantive dialogue (two-​way street or experience sharing). Coordination challenges are an important downside of this pattern. While there was a difference between the countries as to how relations with international partners are assessed, driven by country context, the impact and influence on civil servants in their work and relations came through clearly. We will examine the nature of the impact in more depth through the study of the responses to two vignettes in the next two sections.

Filters, positioning, politico-​administrative relations, and accountability: evidence from Vignette 1 As regards our typology set out in Chapter 1, Vignette 1 positions civil servants in their relations to politicians on an issue where international development partners have indicated specific preferences. The vignette assesses whether the position of international development partners plays a role in shaping the outcome of the decision-​making process, and also how decisions on important cross-​cutting policy issues (which often involve international partners) are made. By reviewing the responses, we can determine both how civil servants handle outside pressures and the impact these have on their relations with policy makers. The vignette then goes on to examine what the civil servant (colleague) would do when faced with various decision points in establishing the process that should lead to the finalization of a policy solution to address Non-​Performing Loans in Public Banks. The vignette includes several decision points: first on the initial response of the colleague to the minister’s decision, then on next steps once the minister has declared his/​her position and on which of the pressures from international development partners to respond to. Finally, the vignette includes a question on what the best kind of evidence is to present to the minister when it comes to creating a formal inter-​ministerial structure that would help arrive at a shared decision. 124

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Box 4.2:  Vignette 1: Coordination and collaboration A colleague came to you with a cross-​cutting policy initiative on resolving non-​ performing loans held by public banks, which requires specific skills and experience, not all of which are present in your organization. However, other public agencies have the information and the skills required. To get access to them, your colleague would have to establish a formal inter-​ministerial working group. However, the minister gives little value and priority to such a formal coordination mechanism, since in the past the few formal working groups were ineffective and barely met. Therefore, he refers your colleague to the Collaborative Leadership initiative funded by a development partner, which provides a more informal platform for consultations, and the minister believes this will be more effective in generating the required inputs. However, at the same time, a different international organization your colleague works with is requesting that a specific inter-ministerial Task Force is set up as part of budget support prior actions. What will your colleague do in this situation?    

Figure 4.1 maps out the responses obtained on this vignette, categorizing them in four aspects. First, the final position taken by the civil servant that reflects the traditionalist type, based on traditional hierarchical control by the political actor –​the minister –​is shown in very light grey. We included here also ‘answer avoided’, given that several respondents chose to discuss institutional mechanisms and their relative merit rather than going into the interaction and engagement with the minister and discussing the role of international partners. The light grey rows document the form of interaction and type of argumentation used by the professionalist type, ranging from written and oral communication to using the internal accountability procedures. The mid-​grey rows document the engaged type of civil servant, who may try and draw support to make his/​her point and argument, including technical assistance. Finally, the dark grey rows indicate the use of informal mobilization of stakeholders and/​or structures by the rebel type of civil servant. This vignette is challenging as it juxtaposes several pressure points. First, it deals with an issue that is essentially internal to the workings of the institutional system. Hence this is something generally seen as outside the remit of engagement with international development partners (for example, Tunisia, Interview 1: “on this issue we should avoid using the opinion of international organizations as a pressure point”). However, many respondents recognize this as a real-​life situation that in fact happens (Lebanon, Interviews 4 and 5; Tunisia, Interviews 2 and 6; Morocco, Interviews 7, 12, 17, and 19): “this is the kind of situation that I live in my daily work” (Morocco, 125

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Figure 4.1: Vignette 1: Coordination and collaboration Countries

Jordan

Lebanon

Morocco

Tunisia

Respondents N/​%

16

%

14

%

20

%

17

%

Following minister

12

75%

3

21%

0

0%

6

35%

0

0%

1

7%

8

40%

1

6%

Documenting position of civil servant for protection

2

13%

7

50%

11

55%

4

24%

Following general/​national interest

1

6%

2

14%

2

10%

7

41%

Convincing minister (written evidence)

7

44%

11

79%

11

55%

16

94%

Trust and confidence

1

6%

0

0%

0

0%

3

18%

Trade-​offs (benefits/​constraints)

4

25%

5

36%

0

0%

5

29%

Discussing with minister

3

19%

0

0%

2

10%

4

24%

Existing experience elsewhere

1

6%

2

14%

0

0%

1

6%

Internal accountability procedures

1

6%

1

7%

0

0%

0

0%

Donor budget support requirement =​conditionality

1

6%

5

36%

9

45%

3

18%

Supporting international partners

2

13%

6

43%

1

5%

4

24%

Involving external partners (discussion)

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

2

12%

Informal consultations

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

2

12%

Informal structure

0

0%

3

21%

14

70%

9

53%

Source: Authors, based on interview responses (Vignette 1)

Traditionalist

Professional

Engaged

Rebel

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

126

Avoiding answer

Civil servant type

Deepening Engagement

Interview 17). Second, it gets to the essence of national administrative culture and tradition, with Morocco, for instance, having a culture where informal agreements are considered a precondition for formal structures to succeed (which is why many respondents are sceptical about standalone formal structures: “if one works on a formal structure only, one is sure that one will not advance” (Morocco, Interview 13). This is echoed also in Jordan (Interview 12): “formal task forces tend to be ineffective given the nature of the administration”. Across all four countries there is a strong sense that institutional rigidity can be overcome only through the informal ‘pre-​cooking’ of issues, including the creation of structures. Finally, it creates a situation where a political leader brings a preference that insiders from the civil service feel cannot work by itself, and on top of this there is an international development partner backing this solution, reinforcing the position of the minister. Hence, the situation contains multiple dilemmas that the civil servant needs to reconcile. The civil servants’ answers brought out overlapping country-​specific patterns. In the case of Jordan all civil servants except two would ultimately fall into the traditionalist type and follow the minister’s position (“in this country, we follow ministers”, Jordan, Interview 14). Very few respondents saw the conditionality set by an international development partner (and the contradiction with the technical assistance provided by another one) as a major factor. This is not to say that civil servants would not engage with the minister; most had a different preference for the institutional solution, and many respondents would try and convince the minister to take a different position (create a formal inter-​ministerial structure), using either written arguments or discussions (including on trade-​offs). This is consistent with the professional type. Two respondents would formally document this in case challenges were raised later. Only a single respondent saw the condition of international partners as a defining argument. However, external or internal mobilization was barely used or mentioned, with a small number of respondents mentioning technical external partner support as a form of leverage. In contrast, in Lebanon the pressure from the international development partner (conditionality) was picked up as a critical argument by almost half of the respondents. The number of civil servants ultimately following the minister’s position was the smallest in Lebanon, with few respondents taking this line. Other civil servants emphasized the importance of documenting evidence and the need to make a case for their solution to the minister. The following quote from Interview 1 was one illustration of this: “Ministers are in sabotage mode, it is systematic. They couldn’t care less about the public good. One has to beg them to do what is good for the country. The asymmetric relationship between the DG and minister is terrible. The latter always wants to show their control”. Civil servants would argue for 127

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their preferred solution either by presenting written arguments, engaging in discussions with the minister, or using international best practice. However, mobilization was used as a strategy as well, with a significant number of respondents drawing on international advisory support or informal networks to influence the decision. Hence, Lebanese officials come significantly closer to the rebel type, mobilizing internal and external support to challenge the minister’s approach. In Tunisia, a majority of respondents claimed that the civil servant would work in the national interest, which in this case means finding the right blend of informal and formal approaches. All respondents said they would work on bringing the minister on board, with most using written or oral communication, including the presentation of trade-​offs. A minority said they would ultimately follow the minister. The Tunisian pattern is best summarized by a quote taken from Interview 7: “convince the minister based on the merit of the case, explain to the international partner that the way for this process to be managed is a national matter”. The number of officials who believed that conditionality or technical assistance would influence the minister on what is seen as essentially an internal issue (see the previous quote) is small. In terms of mobilization, technical support from international partners and informal networks are the two main methods civil servants indicated, with the use of informal networks the primary instrument quoted. In this way, the Tunisian response pattern comes closer to the professional typology: globalized influence should not become a significant factor in matters that are essentially internal to the country system (hence acceptance but not socialization), hence the extent to which mobilization is used to try and influence the minister’s position is limited. The Moroccan answers were the most intriguing as a handful of respondents did not answer the questions on taking a position vis-​á-​vis the minister, avoiding it by focusing instead on the mechanics of the mechanism to be put in place and discussing these in significant detail. For example, from Interview 17: “One needs a hybrid solution, a formal committee is needed to initiate the process and bring on engagement, but in reality the work is done through informal processes and engagement. One has to start with the formal and then one advances with informal methods (like collaborative leadership)”. This avoidance could either indicate a reluctance to comment on divergences in views with politicians/​leaders or an emphasis on getting the approach right within Morocco’s cultural setting, with its strong emphasis on preparing the ground informally before formalizing (and thus reducing risk of failure). At the same time there was a strong emphasis on trying to convince the minister of the merits of the formal structure solution. A significant number of respondents saw either conditionality or advisory support from international development partners as a decisive factor in the decision on the mechanism to be put in place. 128

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Another issue where Morocco stood out was on informal mobilization (as an instrument), where a majority of respondents indicated using this as an instrument, against only one respondent that would rely on external partner technical assistance. It is difficult to classify the response type of Moroccan civil servants on this particular vignette. The predominant response type comes close to the engaged type, as conditionality and advisory support are considered important factors driving decisions, even on an issue that is broadly perceived as internal in nature. However, there is also a strong presence of filters in the form of administrative practice and tradition that tilt the balance back towards the professional type, where engrained notions on how administrative processes should work come out strongly. Coming back to the three dilemmas posed by the vignette, response patterns varied significantly. First, on the question of the internal nature of the issue: in Morocco and Lebanon, international conditions and/​ or technical assistance were considered an important potential factor in defining the outcome of the discussion, with an ability to tilt the balance one way or the other. This was not the case in Tunisia and Jordan, where civil servants considered the problem posed by the vignette to be an internal issue (see the earlier quote from Tunisia). Hence, even if pressures from international development partners were acknowledged, they were not seen as a deciding factor. In terms of other drivers of the responses, the very strong emphasis on hierarchy across the board in the final response of civil servants in Jordan (follow the minister’s decision) is also echoed in a few interviews in Tunisia (for example Tunisia, Interviews 2 and 12). In terms of the tension between the inherited hierarchical culture and the importance of working in the public interest, Moroccan responses showed a strong emphasis on informal engagement driving the chances of success of a formal structure, and because of this there was a strong focus on ‘how to make things work’ rather than on highlighting the dilemma in terms of relations with the minister. An interesting sub-​element of the discussion, related to the accountability dimension of our typology, was that of administrative coherence. In Lebanon and Tunisia several respondents brought this up, with the most telling one from Tunisia (Interview 5). In order to understand why inter-​ministerial cooperation is difficult, the respondent explained the typology of today’s civil servants: “i) Those who will try and convince the minister based on a methodical comparison of facts, who will seek a compromise and will work transparently; ii) those who limit themselves to carrying out the orders of the minister given the risk of otherwise being cast aside; iii) the opportunist, who will try and please everybody (donors as well as superiors) and will even start both processes in parallel in a way as to meet personal objectives.” The same respondent later goes on to argue that “In Tunisia today, the egocentric approach reigns in the administration and there are 129

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abject instances of coordination failure. Horizontal coordination no longer functions, and officials/​ministries independently pursue objectives without coordination, so a situation as proposed in the vignette might not even occur as coordination may not be sought. This is the very essence of the ongoing ‘dismantlement’ of the public administration”. Juxtaposing this characterization of failing vertical and horizontal coordination systems (which one finds in similar forms in other interviews across the Tunisia and Lebanon interview reports, though not in Morocco and Jordan) with the questions posed in the vignette, the emphasis on keeping the discussion on mechanisms an internal affair becomes easier to understand. Finally, the point of convincing the minister of the best way to get results came out everywhere, as a large majority of respondents would make efforts to convince the minister, either in person or in writing, so as to find the right way forward (which in all cases necessarily includes an element of formalization) and ensure the political leader is not blindsided by what are seen as sub-​optimal solutions when it comes to the final decision. If one looks at the answers through the lens of institutional and behavioural filters, and in terms of how national systems handle pressure arising from engagement with transnational actors, a few points stand out. First, Jordan and Tunisia are the two countries with the strongest filters: even greater international pressure through conditionalities were not seen as decisive when it comes to issues that are perceived as inherently internal. The reasons for this, however, were different in the two cases. In Jordan, hierarchy was the prevailing element, and the focus is on the minister and his/​her decision. While an official would try to influence the decision, the minister is the decision maker. Hence, pressure from international development partners was, in the end, not a critical factor for civil servants, but it could well be an important consideration for the minister. In Tunisia, the challenge of effective horizontal cooperation was a driving factor. Given the growing divide between politicians and civil servants, which came out in all aspects of the interview reports, and a weakening coherence inside the administration, opening up discussions on internal mechanisms to international actors would be a high-​r isk undertaking, further undermining already fragile equilibria in the system. Hence, the reluctance to let international development partners ‘in’ on these debates is understandable, even if these pressures do exist and are acknowledged. So, while the ‘filter’ in Jordan was hierarchy and clarity in politico-​administrative relations, which drives decisions at the political level, in Tunisia it was a combination of concerns over autonomy and the presence of other country-​specific challenges (failing internal coordination systems) that override international pressures. In contrast, in Lebanon and Morocco a significant number of respondents acknowledged that commitments made to international development partners could drive decisions, even on arrangements regarding internal 130

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administrative structures. In addition, civil servants argued that they would use these to push the minister in a direction they see as effective and workable. As noted in our analysis of the responses, national institutional and behavioural norms still create a different typology in each case (rebel in Lebanon and engaged in Morocco). In Lebanon, the deep division between political elites and civil servants made the latter more ready to look for instruments and allies in making sure the right decisions were taken, including international conditions and pressures; interestingly this is the opposite reaction from the one we just saw in Tunisia. In Morocco, the explanation came back to many respondents associating good performance on international standards, as well as reliability in partnerships, with a positive image of the country, hence the inclination to see delivering on agreed actions as in the public interest. This discussion effectively brings out the relevance of institutional and behavioural filters in explaining the extent to which civil servants are influenced by globalization. Administrative culture and cohesion, notions of sovereignty and autonomy, and structure of politico-​administrative relations all emerged as elements of institutional and behavioural filters. Filters then also drive the predominant type of response, bringing out all four of the typologies presented in Chapter 1, from the traditionalist civil servant in Jordan to responses that come close to those associated with the rebel type in Lebanon.

Typologies and engagement with external domestic and international actors: lessons from Vignette 4 Vignette 4 focuses on the relations between civil servants, politicians, and internal and external stakeholders through the lens of consultations. The vignette presents a situation where the civil servant and the minister are aligned in their positions, but where the civil servant has to advise the minister on the best way to ensure that: i) objectives of transparency and value for money are pursued through an ‘open contracting’ approach; and ii) buy in of stakeholders, and especially those directly affected, is obtained to the best possible extent. The role of the international development partners is in this case one of stimulating debate around ‘open contracting’ with the aim to have it applied as a principle. As in previous vignettes, the civil servant is presented with an evolving situation and asked to define what his/​her colleague would do in each of these. Decision points within the vignette include whether or not to include the report on the consultation in the argumentation for the open contracting policy (the international development partner and one critical stakeholder [opposing the reform] would like the report to be included) and whether or not to hold additional consultations (which is not what the international partners would like to see). 131

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Box 4.3:  Vignette 4: Stakeholder consultation and transparency A colleague of yours is asked to prepare a policy proposal on public procurement reform, which includes reflecting principles related to open contracting. One of the motives for the policy change is that this measure is expected to reduce the risk of favouritism in contract awards. The policy proposal is part of the implementation effort related to the National Strategy on Private Sector Development, a strategy that is strongly supported by international organizations. As part of their support for the implementation of the National Strategy, a year ago, international organizations organized a consultation on open contracting to which all stakeholders as well as citizens were invited. The activity produced more reactions than expected. However, these reactions mainly came from a particular interest group, namely the National Business Association, which opposes the open contracting proposal. The minister of your colleague is not comfortable with the whole activity and its results, as the minister would like to see more open contracting. Your colleague must decide whether or how to reflect the result of the public consultation in the final version of the policy proposal.    

As with the previous vignettes, responses were collected and coded, uncovering the themes in positions taken by the civil servant, the approach the civil servant would be willing to take to convince the minister and other stakeholders to find the preferred way forward, and the preferred consultation strategy to use. The themes obtained are summarized in Figure 4.2. Vignette 4 is framed differently from the other vignettes, as here the positions of the civil servant and the minister on the principal question are largely aligned: both are in favour of more transparency through the use of open contracting, which is part of the national private sector development strategy and reflects obligations to international partners (and is potentially beneficial to performance on international indicators) that have been taken on. However, they are not necessarily aligned in terms of how to use the results of the consultation process. The civil servant’s dilemma then relates to how to handle contradictory pressures from different external stakeholders: from the national business association that would like to see the consultation results used to alter the minister’s position on introducing open contracting, and from international partners that would like to see progress on open contracting regardless of the position of the national business association (but as organizers of the consultation would like to see the results of the consultations used). In the end, the civil servant has the options to use or ignore the consultation report (aligning or not aligning 132

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Figure 4.2: Vignette 4: Consultation and pressures from internal and external stakeholders Jordan

Lebanon

Morocco

Tunisia

Respondents N/​%

16

%

14

%

20

17

Following minister

6

38%

2

14%

0

0%

1

6%

Following national/​general interest

2

13%

7

50%

8

40%

7

41%

Professional analysis

0

0%

6

43%

0

0%

5

29%

Trade-​offs

3

19%

5

36%

4

20%

5

29%

Credibility and transparency argument

4

25%

2

14%

4

20%

0

0%

Improving implementation

0

0%

1

7%

0

0%

0

0%

Best practice/​benchmarking

1

6%

1

7%

1

5%

0

0%

Technical assistance from IO

1

6%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

Issuing advice based on internal consultations

0

0%

1

7%

0

0%

1

6%

Using IO opinion

1

6%

2

14%

1

5%

3

18%

%

Civil servant type

%

Organizing additional consultation (with all stakeholders)

6

38%

5

36%

3

15%

6

35%

Presenting full results of consultation

5

31%

6

43%

7

35%

8

47%

Presenting full results of consultation (accompanied by commentary)

0

0%

5

36%

1

5%

5

29%

Presenting selective consultation report

1

6%

3

21%

1

5%

0

0%

Consulting directly with private sector organization

0

0%

0

0%

4

20%

2

12%

Source: Authors, based on interview responses (Vignette 4)

Traditionalist Professional

Engaged

Rebel

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Countries

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

with the minister), and to opt, or not, for conducting additional consultations with the objective of getting a more representative view across stakeholders. Response patterns varied between the four countries. Respondents from Jordan largely followed the minister’s final position, leading the civil servant to call for additional consultations to get to a more balanced result before the final proposal is presented. This requires a difficult balancing act with external stakeholders, but some of the respondents felt that support could be obtained from international partners (Jordan, Interview 13) even if the outcome of the earlier consultation they organized would be diluted. There was less concern over the national business association’s position, given that the civil servant’s primary concern was ensuring that the minister’s proposal comes through. Responses from Lebanon emphasized the primacy of national interest rather than following the position of the minister. Seeking a broader consensus on the proposed open contracting reform was seen as important, leading most respondents to the option of organizing additional consultations and/​ or introducing a commented version of the report outlining the concerns over representativity of the initial consultation (a majority of respondents). Respondents felt the national interest would be best served with a way forward that results in a higher degree of adhesion, as in the example of a quote from Interview 14: “without stakeholder support and consultation, no text will be implemented”. Some respondents suggested getting a better understanding of the arguments of the national business association (Lebanon, Interviews 4 and 13), while a different respondent suggested evidence gathering to strengthen the arguments for open contracting (and contradicting the arguments of the national business association) (Lebanon, Interview 5). Finally, one respondent (Lebanon, Interview 4) also suggested the motives of the international development partner that organized the consultation should be examined. Overall, there was a strong dominance of views that the civil servant needs to do everything possible to move transparency-​based reforms forward, including where this implies generating more adhesion from opposing stakeholders. For Morocco, the position taken was broadly similar to that in Lebanon: an emphasis on national interest and ensuring there was consensus around the reform proposal. However, if this could not be achieved, the civil servant should work on pushing forward the reform process, as per Morocco, Interview 5: “the employers’ association is defending private interests and not the national interest and this should then not prevent the minister from proceeding with his intended reform”. The objective should be getting to a solution that brings more transparency on value for money grounds and for the country’s international reputation, this being in Morocco’s interest, as per Morocco, Interview 7: “In this particular case, transparency has to be the rule. It is the gold standard of economic development”. There was not 134

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much appetite for organizing additional consultations. Instead, respondents believed the civil servant should examine in more detail the objections of the national business association, as well as bring in international expertise to bring international benchmarks into the discussion. However, in the end the emphasis was on the need for the reform to move forward. Tunisian respondents also emphasized the importance of the national interest over following the minister. Conducting analysis and presenting trade-​offs were critical tools, including preparing a note for the minister that sets out different options regarding the use of the consultation results (Tunisia, Interview 5). The option of bringing in international development partners to develop another round of consultation “out of respect for the international partner” (Tunisia, Interview 14) was also raised. Several respondents highlighted the specific circumstances in Tunisia, where the national business association (Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie de la Commerce et de l‘Artisanat [UTICA]) has an outsized role, given its role in the 2014 conciliation process to settle a deepening (and violent) political crisis. The then UTICA leader, Ms Ouided Bouchamaoui, was one of the members of the so-​called Quartet that was awarded the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize for this effort. Hence, the position of the national business association in Tunisia is different from those in other countries, giving its opinion and position more weight. The other specific element highlighted (Tunisia, Interview 10) was the importance attached to consultation in the democratic process, which means that consultations are often elaborate, and reaching consensus is seen as an end in itself. This perspective was expressed very well by the respondent in Interview 15: “the consultative process is particular and fragile, and needs careful reflection as to its methodology, especially as it relates to legislation, public finance and procurement. It is also seen as important to have the right mix of actors, civil society, experts, private sector, construction companies present, as well as to explain the objective. If the objective is to arrive at a shared decision, this is one thing (and one has to respect promises), if it is for information sharing and getting perspectives, this is another. One can reflect on the results as part of the decision-​making process”. Hence, the inclination of many respondents to opt for another round of consultation (but in coordination with development partners), and engage in direct discussions with the business association, should be seen in this specific light. Coming back to typology and filters, our conclusion is as follows. As with Vignette 1, the traditionalist type prevails in Jordan: while civil servants will analyse and present their perspective, in the end the minister’s decision takes precedence, and civil servants will therefore have no or limited engagement with external stakeholders as they ultimately will fall in line behind the minister’s position. For the other three countries the conclusion is different. National interest and ‘doing the right thing’ is the dominant driver of civil servants’ 135

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

behaviour. In all three countries, and most explicitly in Morocco, ‘doing the right thing’ implies working on solutions that enhance transparency and value for money, inspired by international standards and making sure that, through the civil servant’s actions, progress is made in this direction. This also means providing substantive advice to the minister on how to move forward (a point highlighted by a majority of respondents in Tunisia and Lebanon), and directly engaging with external stakeholders, national and international, to understand positions (and find counterarguments), as well as putting high value on consultative processes. The latter is most explicit in Tunisia, and this is explained by the specific national context. In all three countries, the predominant type here is the engaged type: the alignment of views between politicians and civil servants and the sense that globalized norms (as expressed in open contracting) are aligned with national interest give civil servants space to engage partners and mobilize. Filters, either in the form of administrative culture or politico-​administrative relations, which in other vignettes prevent civil servants from proactively seeking solutions, are here overridden by the perceived alignment between national interest and international standards and good practices. Hence the emphasis is on moving forward the process, and doing this in such a way that minimizes the risks of derailing the reform.

Impact of direct engagement on professional development and administrative transformation The final aspect of the direct engagement dimension of globalization concerns its impact on professionalization and modernization efforts. This is different from a discussion on conditionality-​driven administrative reform, which was discussed earlier in Chapter 2, and remains a controversial subject in the MENA region. The question-​and-​answer-​based part of the interview process included questions on the evolution of the work environment, on autonomy, on professional development opportunities, and on modernization efforts. On each of these issues the link with the engagement with international partners was also made. On this issue we see a significant difference in responses, which appear to be a reflection of differing national contexts. Civil servants in Jordan showed a strong appreciation of direct work with international development partners, claiming it benefits professional and career development. Almost all respondents claimed that working with international development partners has a positive impact on professional and career development, as in the example of a quote from Jordan, Interview 6: “It [working with international partners] helps because I stayed in the Economic and Social Council in the government and it helped me to access the different government agencies because international actors seek my recommendations”. Similarly, work 136

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with international development partners was seen as having a positive impact on institutional development, as in the following perspective on progress on managerialism and management system reforms from Jordan, Interview 10: “It has evolved to be better even on the level of employees’ roles inside the ministry. Quality of work has incredibly improved while working with stakeholders”. In contrast, responses from Lebanon and Tunisia showed a more sceptical approach, driven by a (perceived) growing divide between civil servants and politicians. In the face of this, civil servants expressed a sense of isolation, and often a lack of appreciation. Frequent political changes also hinder career development given that ministers tend to rely on a core team of political advisers that moves with them, as in an example from Tunisia, Interview 10: “the problem is that many ministers bring newcomers from outside, academics and theoreticians who have no experience with the administration, and this can make work frustrating”. Overall, there is a sense of erosion of the prestige and position of public servants, and the need for change. There also appears to be a lack of team spirit and a lack of close cooperation between civil servants. Comparisons with greater strategic coherence of government action (whether at political or civil service level) in the pre-​2011 period were also made (Tunisia, Interview 15). Still, even in this context, there were acknowledgements of exposure to new work methods and professional opportunities that working with international development partners can bring (Tunisia, Interviews 8, 11, and 12). For Lebanon, while some respondents mentioned increased engagement with partners that could bring opportunities (Lebanon, Interviews 5, 6, and 12), others argued that international engagement is declining and that, whatever one does, it will not help in career evolution (Lebanon, Interviews 4 and 7). Overall, the notion of a growing disconnect between politicians and civil servants came out most strongly in Lebanon, which then reflects negatively on perceived career opportunities and professional development. A statement from Lebanon, Interview 4, expresses this broader sense of disconnect: “I lost interest in the job and country. Efforts wither away like water leaking from bucket with a hole in it”. While we saw strong statements on the evolving work environment and the link with working with international partners from three countries, feedback from Morocco was more even-​handed. Answers appeared to reflect a more settled and stable system, even if some respondents referred to more frequent political turnover and a sense of a less stable work environment (Morocco, Interview 16). The responses for Morocco focused much more on the internal dynamics in the administration (including the rejuvenation of the civil service, the development of a more open institutional culture, and a more result-​based approach to public management). As with the earlier discussions, relations with international development partners were viewed 137

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

mostly positively, but Moroccan respondents did not explicitly make the link between working with international partners and professionalization and career development. One of the best illustrations of this is that several respondents that have served in international organizations returned to the national system. Looking at the conclusions drawn on the link between engagement with international partners and professionalization/​career opportunities and administrative modernization, the nature of politico-​administrative relations appears to be a defining factor. Civil servants in a system with a stable politico-​administrative interface seemed either to see more benefits in learning from interactions with international partners (Jordan), as these could help career prospects, or see this as a marginal factor (Morocco) as the administrative modernization process has advanced to a degree where the system internally provides opportunities for career and professional development, and so the added value of international engagement becomes less relevant. In systems with politico-​administrative relations in flux, as in Tunisia and, especially, Lebanon, we see fundamental concerns over the perceived disconnect between both sides. Here, engagement with international partners can help in providing motivation and learning opportunities, but there is little expectation of these being reflected in career advancement, which is perceived as defined on political grounds. Most civil servants will not engage in seeking a political position given the short-​lived nature of governments. It is not surprising that many of the references to seeking career opportunities with international partners came from civil servants from these two systems. The stability of the politico-​administrative interface and levels of maturity of national professional development and career management systems, therefore, appear to be the defining parameters in determining whether interaction with international partners and systems influences professional development and career opportunities.

Conclusions on direct engagement The discussions in this chapter document a pattern of rapidly growing engagement with international partners for the four focus countries in this study. The data presented in the first part of this chapter highlight an expansion of engagement in financial terms, in areas of engagement, and in the number of development partners that work with the countries. Civil servants carry the bulk of this increased engagement as they manage the day-​to-​day interaction with international development partners. This does not come as a surprise given the discussion in Chapter 2 on the process of economic opening up and the integration of each of the countries in a globalized economy. While this increased engagement weighs on civil 138

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servants, as it adds an additional (and for some new) dimension to their duties, civil servants saw this, on balance, as positive. It provides opportunities to engage, to learn, and for some to eventually pursue positions at international level (Tunisia, Interview 10). The discussion on Vignettes 1 and 4 brings us back to our analytical model through an examination of how country institutional systems and civil servants ‘filter’ the influences coming from globalization, to what extent international commitments permeate national (and in some cases internal institutional) processes, and how this translates into the response typologies proposed in Chapter 1. The findings from the interviews show that country systems, and civil servants, respond differently to international influence, with Jordan having strong institutional and behavioural filters at the level of civil servants (considerations of hierarchy, subordination, and loyalty) that reduce direct influence of international engagement on their position and the way they work in the national system. In contrast, civil servants in Morocco and Tunisia saw international standards as aspirational and equated them (especially in Morocco) with national interest, especially when it comes to transparency, value for money, and openness/​consultation. Even if both countries present very different realities when it comes to politico-​ administrative relations, the international standards equals national interest link comes out time and again. This is also visible in Lebanon. However, the political complexity of the latter country means civil servants keep more distance from political leaders, and the link between international standards and national interest was not always as straightforward. In discussing Vignette 1, one other factor was notable for the case of Tunisia: the sense of boundary when it comes to what are considered ‘internal matters’ in the administration. On such matters, civil servants were clearly less comfortable to engage with international partners. When presented with a similar dilemma in Vignette 4, but in that case regarding consultations with external stakeholders, the same concern did not emerge. Using our framework to assess how and under what conditions globalization and international engagement can influence the actions (and behaviour) of national officials, and what filters can reduce/​enhance this impact, remains both useful and relevant, and helps in explaining civil servants’ responses to globalization. It is also clear that the transition processes in place in all the focus countries can affect the impact of globalization and can push responses further in one direction. This is visible mostly in Lebanon and Tunisia, where transitions have created a growing distance between civil servants, which influences the way in which civil servants engage with international partners. In both cases, globalization and transition appear to be mutually reinforcing in setting the evolving trajectory of accountability systems and patterns of politico-​administrative relations. In the other two countries the impact of the political and social transition on civil service systems still 139

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appears to be relatively limited. If anything, the political transition has, in Morocco, reinforced an already existing trend towards professionalization and modernization. Further work on the interplay between globalization and transitions would constitute an interesting potential research agenda, though in our four cases we conclude that the transition processes have either reinforced/​accelerated the influence of globalization or have not yet had a significant impact (Jordan). This brings us back to the theses presented in Chapter 1. The conclusion of this chapter allows us to gain further insights on three of the four theses. Thesis 1: Globalization is one of the disruptors of traditional accountability systems, as globalization has an impact on both direct and indirect accountability mechanisms. Regarding this thesis, the discussion in the vignettes provides some powerful insights. In three out of four countries civil servants identified the national interest as their main factor of loyalty, and in addition equated national interest with meeting international standards and (though less conclusive) honouring agreements with international development partners. Loyalty to ministers dominated only in Jordan. While it is also true that civil servants were protective of perceived international interference in issues and decisions that are seen as ‘internal’, even here, civil servants would do what they perceive is ‘right’. It is important to note that civil servants consider it their duty to try and engage with political leaders when they intend to take a decision civil servants see as wrong (Vignettes 1, 2, and 3), or help them if their inclination is right but they face opposing pressures (Vignette 4), but in the end, professional standards and national interest (in each case aligned with global norms) were their drivers, at least in Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. Thesis 2: Globalization affects politico-​administrative relations by increasing access to information and enhancing transparency on performance issues (namely, it reduces the credibility of finger pointing). While globalization has diluted civil servants’ role in the provision of policy advice, it has also given them access to new networks and relations that they can use to strengthen their positions. On Thesis 2 our conclusion follows logically from the previous discussion. The distance between politicians and civil servants appears to be increasing in three out of four countries, and responses for Tunisia and Lebanon are explicit in highlighting this. However, a telling typology of civil servants in one of the Tunisian interview responses (Tunisia, Interview 5) shows that it is important to take a nuanced view of what this implies in terms of civil servants’ responses and, by association, whether it changes their approach to international development partners. Global engagement creates alternative opportunities for building networks and support systems where direct loyalty 140

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to politicians is no longer the rule, whether directly with representatives of international partners or within the administration with likeminded colleagues. While not a straightforward route (especially given the still evolving relations with international partners, which creates a degree of reserve in civil servants), it is one that is at least openly discussed, something that would have been unfathomable in 2010. Thesis 3: Globalization triggers bureaucratic responses that lead to change in values. On this thesis the insights gained from the interview process are different from what might have been expected. Based on the responses, the extent to which global engagement drives professionalization and career development opportunities depends on various factors, including the nature of politico-​ administrative relations (fluid, disconnected/​confrontational, and so on) and the extent to which career and professionalization opportunities exist within the national system. It is not so much a matter of ‘where one sits’ but more of context and level of development of career management systems in the national administrations. That said, the responses to the vignettes and question-​and-​answer portion did bring out strongly the notion of aspiration: in working within a globalized context and in internalizing some of the values transmitted as a result of this, aspirations to embody and ‘live’ these values motivate civil servants to invest in professional development, hence potentially creating a virtuous cycle. While professional opportunities tend to be scarce in the systems we have studied, global engagement can motivate civil servants to proactively look for new opportunities. Context matters on this issue too. Where the level of system development is high, and politico-​administrative relations are relatively fluid, as in Morocco, aspirations generated by international engagement are most likely to translate into efforts at enhanced professionalization and in seeking new career opportunities (also illustrated by the forth and back move that civil servants have made between international and national careers, which is a feature that comes out mostly in Morocco). Jordan is then a case where system development and modernization is at an earlier stage, and where politico-​ administrative relations are stable. However, this also means that additional opportunities (for career development) matter more, and this is seen in the large number of responses that saw international engagement as a significant opportunity. Where politico-​administrative relations are not stable and system development is weak or eroding, the engagement with international partners can bring benefits in terms of professional development; but with career opportunities limited due to politicization and high political turnover, the impact of progress in professional development would be limited to the personal development of individuals rather than being of benefit to the system. Hence, engagement with global norms and values (through either of 141

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the three transmission channels) does translate into heightened aspirations and ambitions, though the extent to which these can subsequently be valorized is strongly dependent on the stability of the institutional context and the fluidity of politico-​administrative relations. Notes 1

2

3

4 5 6 7

8

9 10

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (which has reported since 2009), the United Postcode Lotteries (the Dutch Postcode Lottery, the Swedish Postcode Lottery, and the People’s Postcode Lottery), MasterCard Foundation, Grameen Crédit Agricole Foundation, Bernard van Leer Foundation, MAVA Foundation, Oak Foundation, H&M Foundation, C&A Foundation, Charity Projects Ltd (Comic Relief), Children’s Investment Fund Foundation, Gatsby Charitable Foundation, Conrad N. Hilton Foundation, David & Lucile Packard Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Michael & Susan Dell Foundation, Omidyar Network Fund, Inc., William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Arcus Foundation, Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, Ford Foundation, and Wellcome Trust. This goes beyond OECD member states, including, for instance, the UAE, as well as several other smaller donor countries. Including the African Development Bank for Morocco and Tunisia, and the Asian Development Bank for Lebanon and Jordan, as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank for all countries. With the exception of the UAE, which does provide data. With an increase in net disbursements a year later, in 2013. With the exception of Lebanon, where French grant resources have been limited. The UK (DFID), US (USAID), and Japan (JICA), in association with the EU, Canada, France, and Germany. The World Bank, the African Development Bank, Japan (JICA), France (AFD), and Germany (KFW), in association with the EU. There were insufficient responses to draw conclusions on Tunisia and Lebanon. Access to survey data was provided by the Aiddata Lab team for Morocco and Jordan, for which a sufficient number of individual responses were received.

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5

Trickling Down: Impact of the Global Movement on Open Government Introduction This chapter addresses the third main element of globalization that is seen as influencing civil servants, transparency and participation, and its channel of transmission: the global open government movement. This movement is driven by transnational non-​governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and bilateral development assistance agencies, and revolves around the related themes of freedom of information, participation, anti-​corruption, new forms of accountability, and Open Data. As per the discussion in Chapter 1, our thesis is that this global movement has an impact on national civil servants and the potential to bring significant change to country-​level governance systems. We will hence focus on the impact of global pressure to shift from a traditional understanding of public administration and civil service towards open governance and transparency (Jreisat, 2009; Clarke and Francoli, 2014). In order to better understand this change, to establish if this is truly embodied in the behaviour of civil servants, and to acknowledge the intricacies and complexities that accompany the change, we will apply the analytical framework set out in Chapter 1, looking at both structural and behavioural dimensions, and determine what exactly the global pressures inherent in the open government movement are, which include the context to which they are transmitted (what are the formal rules, the operating environment), and if and how they are internalized (what determines whether civil servants internalize the values of open government). The combination of an analysis of content, context, and process generates a new picture of the effects of global pressures on civil service systems and civil servants. The framework that results provides a clearer understanding of what changes in behaviour, beliefs, and values occur among civil servants, 143

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and also provides insights into how transnational organizations can drive or initiate governance innovations. Specifically, we will establish, first, the extent to which values for access to information are internalized in civil servants (whether socialization is happening), and, second, if participation of stakeholders in decision making occurs and is reflected in the behaviour of civil servants. This will then help us to categorize and classify the response patterns of civil servants in terms of the typology presented in Chapter 1. Based on their systematic review of open government literature, Wirtz and Birkmeyer (2015) and Tai (2021) concluded that the conceptualization of open government is not that complex. Their framework, consisting of three pillars –​transparency, participation, and collaboration –​continues to dominate discussions on open government conceptualization. These three basic elements illustrated in the Open Government Directive all advance public values. Transparency is the ‘traditional’ way of thinking about open government and relates to disclosure of information to the public. We focus on the extent to which civil servants disclose information to external stakeholders through free access to information laws (such as the FOIA). Participation relates to active solicitation of stakeholder feedback, whereas collaboration focuses on the active engagement of citizens in government (Wirtz and Birkmeyer, 2015). Going back to the discussion on performance on global (economic) governance indicators, open government is an area where many MENA countries are not ranked or do not engage with indicator systems. This in itself tells a story: of the three elements of globalization discussed in this study, this is the area where impact could be assumed to be the least obvious and visible, or perhaps formalistic in nature. In this context, Vignette 3 specifically addresses freedom of information as a cornerstone of the open government approach, while Vignette 4 provides insights into the open government thematic linked to public participation in policy design. This chapter is thus interested in how a traditional hierarchical bureaucratic administration incorporates ‘openness’.

Positioning global open government engagement in MENA The contemporary conceptualization of open government remains rooted in transparency and accountability, but it is embedded within the political economy of policy, where international and transnational actors influence the creation and dispersion of global norms and principles across the globe. Years prior to the Arab Spring, analysts had begun highlighting the limited effectiveness of governance systems in the MENA region in terms of functioning in an increasingly globalized world (Jreisat, 2009). Governments had themselves acknowledged the importance of engaging 144

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in open government and democratic governance reforms through various declarations (UNDP, 2010). For example, the 2009 Marrakesh Declaration, resulting from the MENA-​OECD Ministerial Conference, underlined the formal commitment of MENA countries towards involving citizens and civil society in policy making and using consultation mechanisms in policy design (UNDP, 2010). As early as the start of the 2000s, countries in the MENA region had begun to send signals to the international community of their readiness to at least formally engage on the open government agenda by endorsing various international conventions that embody open government and democratic norms and principles. For example, all our focus countries adopted the Rio Declaration in 1992 at the UN General Assembly (United Nations, 1992), which, under Principle 10, calls upon states to ensure citizens’ right to access information, public participation in decision making, and justice in environmental matters (Handl, 2021). This principle was deemed a ‘trail blazer, laying down for the first time, at a global level, a concept [public participation] that is critical both to effective environmental management and democratic governance’ (Handl, 2021). All our focus countries also became parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2003. UNCAC, the only global, legally binding anti-​corruption instrument, covers a list of mandatory actions, such as ensuring the existence of a body or bodies to prevent corruption (Article 6); enhancing transparency in public administration (Article 10); and public participation and access to information (Article 13) (Hechler, 2017). In considering the impact of globalization processes on the public administration of Arab states, Jreisat (2009) commented on the urgency of adopting reforms, and specifically called for the development of competence and ethics that support ‘transition from traditional, centralized, and often corrupt behaviour to professional, accountable, transparent, and ethical performance’ in order for Arab countries to benefit from the ‘new global realities’ (p 49). Reports and studies from that period indicate a growing concern with a so-​called ‘governance gap’ in the region. The 2003 World Bank MENA Development Report described the wedge driving the governance gap between MENA and the rest of the world as ‘weaknesses in external accountabilities and in the access to basic political and civic rights’ (World Bank, 2003, p 62). The 2004 UNDP Arab States Human Development Report (UNDP, 2004b) equally highlighted significant gaps in good governance, which it recommended should be rapidly bridged by democratic reforms, specifically through strengthening accountability and oversight institutions, and citizen voice and civic liberties. The report contended that unless reforms were rapidly enacted, social upheaval could follow. In 2004, the UN and the UNDP conducted a study on the state of public sector 145

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

transparency and accountability in selected countries, including Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco. The aim of the study was to help institutions in the region ‘better align themselves with the new demands of a globally integrating and competitive economy’ (UNDP, 2004a, p 2). The study found that the area of information management remained less developed than other areas of public management, and that the flow of information to the public could be greatly improved, public consultation structures strengthened, and the media and CSOs further empowered. Successive evaluations of the UNDP’s Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (POGAR), in 2004 and 2008, also suggested a need to further strengthen engagement on public sector institutional performance, including on issues of transparency and accountability (UNDP, 2010). A review of the engagement and interventions of our focus countries, as well as their international partners, on governance issues prior to the Arab Spring shows that public sector reform projects remained limited in scope. The UN-​UNDP study (UNDP, 2004a) on public sector transparency and accountability characterized engagement on these issues as mostly involving studies, conferences, public campaigns, and administrative reform or modernization projects. POGAR included activities related to rule of law, participation, and transparency and accountability. Jreisat (2009) argues that the launch of POGAR was a result of a recognition by Arab states of the need to address governance deficiencies, which may include activities such as providing policy advice, engaging in institutional capacity building, and testing policy options through pilot projects (UNDP, 2006). Moreover, the UNCAC also provided a framework for various interventions by the UNDP on matters related to transparency and accountability in the region. In Lebanon and Jordan, the UNDP supported advisory and capacity building programmes on anti-​corruption, transparency, and accountability. Programmes focused on institutional and legal mechanisms in relation to UNCAC. Other partners, such as the OECD through the MENA-​OECD initiative, were also active in providing technical and advisory support on public sector management and modernization (UNDP, 2010). In Tunisia, Lebanon, and Jordan, UNDP supported a national public administration reform and modernization programme, with a focus on leveraging information and communication technology (ICT) and e-​government to make government processes and procedures more transparent and responsive to citizens and businesses. Multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank supported reforms on financial transparency through policy advice and technical assistance programmes. While it appeared that an international consensus on the need to enhance public sector transparency and accountability was emerging (as evidenced by the adoption and ratification of regional and international treaties, declarations and conventions, and public sector reform projects), 146

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these pressures did not translate into change on the ground. In Lebanon, Interviewee 14 pointed to bureaucratic challenges and explained that “It took 20 years for Lebanon to pass the environmental impact assessment (EIA) legislation after signing on the Rio Declaration on Environment. The process was only accelerated around 2012 because of the then upcoming Rio +​20 summit”. As early as 2003, TI noted in its Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International, 2003) that the absence of institutional reforms to accompany economic liberalization programmes and the prevalence of authoritarian rule constituted important obstacles to transparency and accountability in both the state and private sectors. On the eve of the Arab Spring, reform efforts on public sector accountability and transparency were showing, at best, limited impact on improving government effectiveness, reducing corruption, or creating more inclusive and participatory public institutions and spaces. The performance of institutions in our four focus countries on key indicators (World Bank Group, 2021c) continued to lag, partly due to the relatively recent creation of these new mechanisms, or inappropriate or lacking implementation of arrangements, and also due to excessive centralization of authority and weak oversight institutions, which undermined mechanisms of accountability, evaluation, and feedback (for a more in-​depth discussion, see Jreisat, 2009). In the last decade, the open government agenda, through its principal pillars of transparency, participation, and collaboration, has become a far more present feature of public administration reforms in the MENA region, particularly in our focus countries. The Arab Spring opened up space for reforms on open government, first, and directly, in Tunisia, but also creating an opportunity for countries like Jordan and Morocco to showcase their commitment to the political liberalization process. This shift also coincided with an acceleration in the spread of global open government norms and standards. Engagement in the open government agenda manifests itself most visibly in the adoption of new or revised political, institutional, and legal mechanisms across the focus countries. In Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan, democratic and open governance reforms were codified in constitutions, under internal and external pressure (Salameh et al, 2015; Jreisat, 2018; Naguib, 2020). All four focus countries introduced, with the support of transnational organizations, institutional, regulatory, and legal reforms aimed at improving transparency and access to information, strengthening oversight and accountability institutions (including parliament, anti-​corruption authorities, and Court of Auditors), and opening up to public participation in the decision-​making process. In Tunisia and Morocco, IFIs also supported development policy lending operations centred on governance issues. As examples, the World Bank’s programme of support to strengthen governance in Morocco (2013–​ 16) included a series of policy lending operations, Hakama I and II (Governance 147

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I and II). Both operations, initiated at the government’s request, supported the development of a legal framework for transparency and accountability in the management of public resources and open government, including specific provisions on access to information and the right to petition. Similarly, in Tunisia, a series of three budget support operations between 2012 and 2016 focused on strengthening governance, transparency, and accountability, with support for enacting legal frameworks on access to information and budget transparency. In both countries, support for governance reforms was well coordinated among the donor community. In Jordan, a series of two budget support programmes between 2012 and 2015 also included a key pillar on improving transparency and accountability in the public sector, through measures to strengthen implementation effectiveness for the legal and institutional framework on anti-​corruption, citizen consultation, and access to information. At the global level, international institutions such as the OECD and IMF, as well as transnational NGOs such as the International Budget Partnership (IBP), had, by the late 2000s, developed and rolled out well established codes and standards on budget transparency to assess country practices in this area (Philips and Stewart, 2009). Philips and Stewart trace the roots of the global discourse on fiscal transparency back to the mid-​1990s and ‘suggest it is linked to two broader trends that have affected both developed and developing countries: (i) the neoliberal turn in economic policy, which emphasizes fiscal discipline, and (ii) the movement to reform institutions to promote good governance’ (Philips and Stewart, 2009, p 801). In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, governments in the region sought also to establish credibility with IFIs. One pathway to this was to showcase reform commitments on global norms and standards related to the open government agenda. The IMF pointed out in 2014 that it will ‘be critical for [Arab countries in transition] to identify those [reform] measures that can be taken quickly to produce strong effects, such as streamlining business regulation and improving the transparency of the budget process. Enacting this type of reform quickly would help strengthen confidence in the authorities’ commitment to the reform process’ (Finger and Gressani, 2014, p 6). Perhaps the most visible initiative that acted as a conduit to transfer norms on open government in recent times is the OGP (Schnell and Jo, 2019). The OGP was established as a transnational NGO and officially launched at the UN General Assembly in 2011. It is a multi-​stakeholder and international initiative promoting open and responsive government through securing concrete commitments from governments throughout the world (Schnell and Jo, 2019). Specifically, the OGP is designed to help national governments become more transparent, accountable, and responsive to their own citizens, by requiring voluntary commitments and collaboration with civil society in 148

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the development of national action plans. National authorities determine which issues and activities are most relevant and ought to be included in open government action plans, but are encouraged to align their activities with four ‘core values’, including access to information, public participation, public accountability, and technology and innovation for openness and accountability (OGP, 2019). The goal of the OGP is ‘to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance’ (OGP, 2019). To participate in the OGP, country candidates are evaluated against two main sets of eligibility criteria: (i) earning a minimum score across four core eligibility criteria; and (ii) passing the OGP Values Check assessment. The core eligibility criteria consist of four indicators, each based on additional subdimensions: fiscal transparency; access to information; public officials’ asset disclosure; and citizen engagement. To pass the core eligibility criteria, countries must earn at least 75 per cent of the total possible points available. The Values Check was implemented as an additional requirement for OGP membership in September 2017 to ensure that new countries joining the OGP adhere to the democratic governance norms and values set forth in the Open Government Declaration; it does not currently affect countries that were already members. The Values Check considers the extent to which a government (i) controls the entry and exit of CSOs and/​or (ii) represses or inhibits CSOs (World Bank, 2020b). In the MENA region, the Jordanian, Tunisian, and Moroccan authorities joined the OGP, in 2011, 2014, and 2018 respectively, to deepen reforms aimed at promoting transparency and participation in public affairs. In all three countries, government decisions to join the OGP seem to have been motivated, in varying degrees, by the prospect of meeting public demand for greater openness, improving their respective country’s international image, and finally, accessing financial assistance from international partners. International partners played an important role in supporting accession requirements. Both Tunisia and Morocco mention valuable OECD support in their letters of intent to join the OGP (OGP Morocco, 2018). All countries have benefitted from the support of international partners in the implementation of their commitments, with all countries coordinating and prioritizing support through institutional structures such as steering committees, which comprise of government and non-​government members. Jordan was one of the earliest national members to join the OGP worldwide. It joined in late 2011 as one of a cohort of 38 countries that had already attained the minimum score on the eligibility criteria. In MENA, Tunisia was the second country to join the OGP in 2014, and benefitted from OECD support in reaching the OGP eligibility criteria. Morocco officially joined the OGP in mid-​2018. It satisfied the core eligibility criteria (see Table 5.1) upon adoption of the access to 149

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Table 5.1: Eligibility scores of focus countries on the Open Government Partnership Eligibility score (cut-​off rate =​75%) Country

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Jordan

75%

75%

75%

75%

75%

75%

75%

75%

75%

Lebanon

44%

44%

50%

50%

38%

56%

50%

50%

50%

Morocco

38%

38%

69%

69%

69%

69%

75%

75%

75%

Tunisia

69%

69%

75%

75%

69%

69%

81%

81%

69%

Source: Authors, based on OGP (2021)

information law in 2018, which meant that the process to gain eligibility took nearly six years from its initial intent to join for Morocco to complete the required legislative and institutional reforms. This can be linked to the government’s decision to limit the scope of reforms to budget transparency and access to information, and not to make improvements on other eligibility areas concerning asset disclosure and civil liberties. In addition, it can be explained by resistance to change to transparency reforms by some segments of the state and society, which translated into a lengthy drafting and adoption process of the access to information legislation in the legislature that left many provisions cast in broad terms and open to different qualifications and interpretations.

Rule adoption in MENA: free access to information (FOIA) and beyond Engagement on open government reforms in the MENA region across the three pillars of transparency, participation, and collaboration is most visible in terms of legal and institutional arrangements. Over the years, the OGP initiative has helped codify norms and standards of open government through its core eligibility criteria, which are predicated, in part, on legal and institutional measures such as access to information and asset disclosure legislative regimes. The previously mentioned Values Check assessment, introduced in 2017, measures country adherence to democratic governance norms and values through the V-​dem indicators on CSO Entry/​Exit and levels of CSO control and repression. OGP membership is a critical signal of a country’s commitment to open government reforms, but it is also clear that the OGP can be instrumentalized by politicians to increase international status without providing effective support to agents of change for pushing implementation of Open Government (OG) reforms. ‘Open-​washing’ reforms is a risk implicitly acknowledged by the OGP according to Schnell and Jo (2019), as the initiative has ‘built in a series of “safeguards” both in terms of who can join and how member countries 150

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behave once they have joined’. OGP safeguards (eligibility criteria, Values Check, action plans, Independent Reporting Mechanism [IRM], reporting mechanism procedural reviews, and response policy) are meant to provide a check on how members behave and their level of genuine commitment to open government reforms. According to the OGP (OGP, 2020), ‘when it comes to implementing commitments, both Jordan and Tunisia have fallen behind other OGP members’. The results from Morocco’s first OGP action plan are yet to be assessed by the IRM, but early results indicate slow progress (Dutta and Ninua, 2020). That said, whether and how these risks have materialized, and to what extent they affected rule adoption by civil servants, is difficult to assess without understanding the context and operating environment in which open government reforms take place in the member countries. ATI legislation has come to represent the hallmarks of the political transition and liberalization process. Indeed, all focus countries have adopted ATI legislation in recent years (Lebanon –​2017, Morocco –​2018, Tunisia –​ 2016), with the exception of Jordan, which had already adopted legislation in 2007. However, the political and democratic reforms across the countries translated first and foremost into newly enshrined rights in the new or revised constitutions. In Morocco, the new constitution broadened the spectrum of rights, such as the right of access to information (Article 27) and the right to petition (Article 15). A new constitution was adopted in Tunisia in 2014, guaranteeing rights of access to information (Article 32) and ability to seek public integrity and accountability (Article 15). Another aspect is that in all these countries the adoption and implementation of these legislative frameworks was linked to varying forms of financing or technical support from development partners and the international donor community. The OGP platform served as a mechanism to channel support across the MENA OGP countries. In fact, the countries made a total of 129 commitments over the years in a number of areas, including commitments on access to information and Open Data. Costello et al (2013) point out that Jordan was the first country in the MENA region to adopt ATI legislation (and it exhibited substantial flaws and weaknesses). It was passed as part of a series of laws between 2006 and 2008 (the Anti-​Corruption Commission Law 2006; Financial Disclosure Law 2006; Anti-​Money Laundering Law 2007; and Code of Conduct for Government Officials 2008) to support the anti-​corruption theme of the country’s National Agenda 2006–​15 and after ratification of the UNCAC. In Tunisia, the adoption and evolution of the ATI legislative framework was supported by the World Bank in a sequential approach through various budget support and technical assistance operations. Tunisia’s OGP commitments on access to information focused also on administrative and institutional measures, including the creation of an ATI commission. In Morocco, the adoption of ATI legislation also figured under a World 151

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Bank Development Policy Loan (DPL) operation, which was also endorsed and supported by the international donor community. Morocco’s OGP commitments on access to information have focused on elements related to capacity building, awareness raising, and establishing an online ATI request portal. In Lebanon, the government adopted draft ATI legislation in 2017 (the initial technical work on drafting ATI legislation was supported by a 2009 UNDP project) against the backdrop of an international aid support conference (CEDRE). In late 2020, the OECD and UNDP supported the government in developing a national action plan to implement the Right to Access to Information Law. The Global Right to Information (RTI) rating is another important mechanism through which norms and standards on ATI regimes are codified. In fact, the OGP core eligibility criterion on access to information, which reviews the existence of an ATI regime, draws upon the RTI rating (the eligibility criterion does not evaluate quality of legal and institutional regimes). Tunisia ranks among the top global performers on quality of legislation, and constitutes a real exception in the MENA region. Jordan currently ranks in the bottom ten on the Global RTI rating while Morocco and Lebanon hold similar scores well down the ranking list (see Table 5.2). Analysts point to key political economy dynamics that can intervene in the adoption and implementation of reforms, including those on open government, in the countries under review. Regarding Jordan, Jreisat (2018, p 790) finds that: many influences work through diverse channels to impede fundamental reforms that seem threatening to perceived interests of the elite. These Table 5.2: Country scores on access to information Country

Tunisia

Morocco

Lebanon

Jordan

Date

2016

2018

2017

2007

5

4

2

0

Scope

28

20

26

26

Requesting procedure

22

11

12

6

Exceptions and refusals

25

15

7

10

Appeals

23

12

12

9

2

3

0

0

15

8

11

5

120

73

70

56

13

88

98

119

Right of access

Sanctions and protections Promotional measures Total Ranking

Source: Authors, based on Global Right to Information Rating Map (2018)

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influences are more effective under conditions of weak political and administrative leadership and the absence of collaborative and problem-​ solving managerial skills. In hierarchical structures, inhospitable toward, or not used to, collective negotiations and managerial processes of team building, surreptitious influences seem to succeed. On Morocco, Naguib (2020) describes the regime as ‘caught between the driving forces of modern and democratic changes and the pervasive power of traditional and authoritarian rules’ and explains how this institutional dualism has created a situation where ‘change and persistence in institutions’ coexist. Regarding Lebanon, many analysts have pointed to several political and administrative characteristics that plague governance reforms (Haase, 2018): a sectarian power sharing scheme that advances sectarian leaders and political party interests over citizen demands (Safa, 2010; Makdisi et al, 2011), highly centralized bureaucracy (Abou Assi et al, 2013), and widespread corruption (Leenders, 2012).

The next frontier: Open Data and collaborative governance The Open Data movement started in the mid-​2000s, with origins in the US and the UK before then proliferating across the world through many international initiatives that championed transformational potential (see discussion in Jelenic, 2019). In short, the term Open (government) Data refers to making publicly held data more accessible according to technical (format, machine readability, comprehensiveness, disaggregation, and so on) and legal (reuse licenses, free of charge, and so on) standards and principles. The Sunlight Foundation, a non-​profit organization that advocates for open government (which ceased operations in September 2020), identified widely acknowledged principles (Sunlight Foundation, 2013) that provide a lens through which to evaluate the extent to which government data is open and accessible to the public: completeness, primacy, timeliness, ease of physical and electronic access, machine readability, non-​discrimination, use of commonly owned standards, licensing, permanence, and usage costs. In recent years, Open Data has been used by many governments as a lever to further improve government openness (Davies et al, 2019; World Bank, 2020b). However, the impact of the approach thus far remains partial at best. In many instances, governments have made progress in data provision focused on those specific aspects that enhance the economic impact from use and reuse of data, but without taking the necessary concrete steps towards a further opening up of government (Davies et al, 2019; World Bank, 2020b). In the region, much like in other developing countries (as discussed 153

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in Jelenic [2019]), the motivation for promulgating and engaging in Open Data is linked to an interest in improving international image, attracting donor financial assistance, and improving perceptions of transparency and accountability. There are several measurement tools that assess efforts on open government data at both the country and national level, including the Open Data Index and the Open Data Barometer (Davies et al, 2019). The World Bank has also introduced, with support from several partners, a methodology called Open Data Readiness Assessment (ODRA) to assess country-​level readiness to opening up government data and maximizing the impact from said data (World Bank, 2019b). This methodology has been rolled out by different global partners in several countries, including Tunisia (2017), Morocco (2020), and Jordan (2018). With the exception of Lebanon, all focus countries have included commitments on Open Data in their national OGP action plans. The focus countries also have a common motivation underlying these commitments: realization of the social and economic potential and value of releasing government data in open formats. Publicly available reports on the results of the ODRA in Tunisia (World Bank, 2017, 2021b) and Jordan (Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, 2018) indicate limited returns so far in terms of impact on value creation or even government openness due to rather common challenges: limited data provision, weak political ownership, institutional governance fragmentation, inadequate legal framework, and limited demand side activity. In the last three years, Tunisia has significantly stepped up engagement on Open Data, with strong support from global partners (Chaouachi et al, 2020). It has significantly improved release and publication of open government data and has initiated legislation on Open Data, mandating all public institutions to publish their data in open formats. Through subsequent commitments as part of its OGP action plans, Jordan’s government adopted an Open Data policy in 2017 and seeks to further support its development and enforcement, as explained in the country’s latest OGP action plan (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018). For the region, the Open Data agenda, driven in part through its economic value creation lens, offers a new approach to promoting collaborative governance, including a platform to encourage collaboration between government and non-​government stakeholders.

Vignette 3: Evidence on open government regimes in practice (transparency –​freedom of information) As a principle, open government, as an element of good governance, is a normative ideal that guides governments’ actions (Mulgan, 2014). As 154

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discussed in the previous sections, progress is measured by assessing the incorporation of these norms and principles into national legislation or action plans. The Global Open Data Index, the Open Data Barometer, the Open Government Index, and the Open Budget Index thus provide comparative tools to track progress, again mostly focusing on legal frameworks and policy, and hence on the dimension of ‘content’. However, measuring the practical adherence to open government principles by civil servants is far more complicated. Yet it is the internalization of legal and policy principles in the day-​to-​day behaviour of civil servants that will determine the real impact of laws and policies. We have assessed the level of adherence by civil servants in two ways: first through a dedicated vignette, which places the civil servant in a hypothetical situation (but close to reality) related to the application of one of the open government principles (access to information); and second through direct questions on the respondents’ assessment of the relevance, impact, and appropriateness of open government policies and principles. The freedom of information principle was chosen as it is the most concrete and actionable element of the open government agenda and relates most directly to the day-​to-​day duties of civil servants.

Responding to situations Vignette 3 engaged civil servants to discuss their reactions in terms of the behaviour vis-​á-​vis values of granting access to information to a requestor. This section presents insights as to how the encounter between the civil servant and one key open government principle juxtaposes the principles of transparency and openness with traditional principles of hierarchy and self-​protection. This allows us to better understand the effects of open government values on the actions and perceptions of civil servants and their interaction with their environment. The full exploratory vignette is presented in Box 5.1. As a first step, all respondents were asked to read the text carefully and put themselves in their colleague’s situation. Figure 5.1 presents Vignette 3 responses. On the basis of these vignette responses, we differentiated the values associated with defending the right to information against the political actor and any action suggested. We categorized the answers into four civil servant response types. First, the traditionalist (passive) civil servant type that suggests following the political decision and not granting information. Second, bringing values-​based arguments to convince the minister otherwise in order to respect rule of law and policy principles related to access to information (professional civil servant type). Third, mobilization behaviour, where civil servants were willing to take proactive steps in order to pursue their values and beliefs, depending on the inner or outer institutional scope 155

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Box 5.1:  Vignette 3: Application of access to information policies The institution at which your colleague works has received a major information request under the access to information law. The request asks for documents related to contracts with businesses on the provision of public services. Such documents fall under the category of documents that normally would be released upon request. Your colleague is informed that her minister would prefer to see a decision that would not provide the access, though it is not fully clear under what provision of the law access could be refused. Media attention to the case is strong, and rejection would pose a strong risk of negative publicity for the minister. Your colleague is asked to assist in writing a response that would not grant access. What do you think your colleague will do (and why) in this situation?    

of mobilization and accountability, associated with either the engaged or rebel type. As a second step in the vignette, we asked the respondents to consider and comment on the behaviour of the colleague who ‘decides not to respond to the FOIA request (non-​decision)’, and thus neither grants access nor provides information. The respondents were asked to express their opinion on this situation on a 1–​7 Likert scale, where 1 is totally unacceptable and 7 totally acceptable. The final step in the vignette brought international organizations into the dynamics of bureaucratic processes. We wanted to know how the colleague would react when international partners verbalized their negative opinion on the rejection of the FOIA request. In the following section, Vignette 3 responses are analysed in more detail regarding the perceptions, beliefs, and practice of civil servants vis-​á-​vis open government and ATI.

The values of free access to information (and open governance) The responses to the first part of the vignette provided a contrasting set of views. On the one hand, respondents pointed out that, for them, the values generated through good governance are far more difficult to grasp, and articulate “no tangible or material impact on day-​to-​day tasks” (Lebanon, Interview 1; Jordan, Interviews 9 and 12) than those brought, for instance, by NPM (efficiency, effectiveness, results). This comment was symptomatic for our interviewees across the countries, who, while supporting transparency and openness as a principle, struggled to grasp what tangible changes should result from adherence to open government norms (and transparency laws). This shows that there is a limited degree of internalization of such values at this point. 156

newgenrtpdf

Figure 5.1: Vignette 3: Accountability and mobilization of stakeholders Countries

Jordan

Morocco

Tunisia

Respondents N/​%

16

%

14

%

20

%

17

%

9

56%

5

36%

0

0%

9

53%

Document position of civil servant vis-​à-​vis minister 3

19%

0

0%

3

15%

5

29%

Public interest/​public right

8

50%

0

0%

1

5%

1

6%

Provide info despite minister

0

0%

0

0%

2

10%

0

0%

Convince/​warn minister

8

50%

5

36%

7

35%

6

35%

Rule of law (breaking law otherwise)

4

25%

7

50%

11

55%

7

41%

(Non)transparency issue

0

0%

1

7%

0

0%

3

18%

Accountability issues

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1

6%

Trust towards government

3

19%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

Reputational risk (negative publicity) for ministry

3

19%

1

7%

2

10%

1

6%

Mobilizing any stakeholders

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

Mobilizing formally bureaucracy (accountability)

1

6%

4

29%

1

5%

1

6%

Mobilizing media

0

0%

1

7%

0

0%

0

0%

Mobilizing (informally) FOIA requestor

1

6%

1

7%

0

0%

0

0%

Following minister

Civil servant type Traditionalist Professional (arguments used)

157

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Lebanon

Engaged Rebel

(continued)

newgenrtpdf

Figure 5.1: Vignette 3: Accountability and mobilization of stakeholders (continued) Countries

Jordan

Lebanon

Morocco

Tunisia

Respondents N/​%

16

Following minister Protecting her/​himself

Civil servant type

%

14

%

20

%

17

%

14

88%

8

57%

0

0%

11

65%

10

63%

6

43%

1

5%

1

6%

Administrative accountability

0

0%

8

57%

6

30%

1

6%

Professional

Complaining/​appealing by FOIA requestor to relevant institution

1

6%

0

0%

3

15%

0

0%

Engaged

Leaking info

1

6%

2

14%

0

0%

0

0%

Rebel

2nd step after non-​decision

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

158

Source: Authors, based on interview responses (Vignette 3)

Traditionalist

Trickling Down

An illustration of this is that in all countries, respondents expressed a shared view of how wrong the minister is when not granting the access to information, and that such a refusal would have serious consequences for the ‘rule of law’. It was also universally suggested across the countries that transparency laws have brought into existence a whole range of new values that could be invoked to help convince the minister to act otherwise and grant access to information, which civil servants brought forward during discussion of the vignette (see Figure 5.1 for more detail). For instance, transparency was seen as a key value (Lebanon, Interview 7; Tunisia, Interviews 1, 8, and 10). Another civil servant pointed out that not granting access to information “will decrease the trust between the government and the public” (Jordan, Interview 16). Several civil servants, particularly in Jordan, suggested that the essence of transparency laws’ value is that “information is the right of people” (Jordan, Interviews 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 14, 15, and 16) and it is not meant to be followed only in exceptional cases. However, in the case when convincing the minister with the previously mentioned values proved unsuccessful, civil servants would follow the traditional hierarchical chain of command, mostly in Tunisia and Jordan, and to some extent in Lebanon. This is consistent with the professional response type in our typology (presenting professional arguments to the minister, but not mobilizing either other public institutions or external stakeholders), which implies acceptance of global norms but an absence of proactive engagement to support these beyond the professional advisory role of the civil servant. In contrast, however, in Morocco not a single civil servant was willing to follow (and in their eyes break the rule of law and the values it represents) the minister. Instead, civil servants believed in administrative accountability processes that would protect not only them but the values of the FOIA: “the law trumps the will of the minister” (Morocco, Interview 8). The extent to which open government values are anchored in civil servants became even more visible when the hypothetical situation in this vignette evolved and the civil servant –​that is his/​her colleague –​opted for non-​decision in the FOIA case. In this situation, for Moroccan civil servants the non-​decision clashed with the principles of transparency and rule of law. In their view, non-​decision was not only “counter-​productive and unprofessional” (Morocco, Interview 18) but simply seen as not even an option (Morocco, Interviews 9, 10, 14, and 19) because of the various accountability mechanisms available, ranging from appeal procedures to units where civil servants may seek advice. This is where civil servants’ behaviour falls into the engaged category of our typology, given the willingness to mobilize and engage beyond the strict line hierarchy, and in some instances edges closer to the rebel type, implying a willingness to challenge politicians beyond regular appeal mechanisms. 159

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Morocco contrasts sharply with the responses in Jordan and Tunisia, where a non-​decision appears to be rooted in a deeply felt need for self-​protection and a way of “avoiding escalation of the situation with the minister” (Jordan, Interview 13); hierarchy trumps an application of global norms and values. The risk-​averse nature of the answers for Jordan perhaps reflects the fact that the law and administration did not provide clear-​cut guidance for action, but rather opened up a grey area in which the civil servant had to act creatively, albeit under the claim of “satisfying all” (Jordan, Interview 6), rather than following open government values. The responses in Jordan are also in contradiction with the originally claimed public value of transparency laws, which were not translated into action. Interviewees in Tunisia also defined non-​decision as a “strategy” to gain time (Tunisia, Interviews 3, 7, and 16) and avoid and delay a decision on the part of the civil servant. Some thought that this only prolonged the agony and that inevitably the civil servant would have to follow the orders of the minister; some thought other events would divert attention and protect the civil servant in this way. Lebanon is positioned in between these two extremes, with responses from civil servants varying between the urge to protect themselves (and thus follow the minister and not grant information) and upholding the values the FOIA represents (through granting information and mobilizing internal bureaucratic structures). “There are indeed techniques to escape, such as this one where one shifts decision onto other colleagues that might be more vulnerable. This is ethically wrong though” (Lebanon, Interview 5). Another illustration on mobilizing international accountability structures comes from Lebanon, Interview 13: “Civil service statute can provide protection in cases where the law has been disregarded upon the insistence of the minister but a physical [written] record is needed”. All these narratives illustrate two important aspects of open government in practice: first, values associated with open government are still germinating among civil servants. According to Interviewee 11 in Lebanon, it is “still premature” to evaluate the impact of open government and access to information: “There’s still a tradition of secrecy and general fear of any repercussions from being proactive in disclosing information. In the current climate/​rhetoric on fighting corruption, civil servants are more scared”. The exception here is Morocco, where beliefs about open government and transparency for external stakeholders appear to have translated into behaviour and action. It is, among the four vignettes, the only area where Moroccan civil servants would act in a way that comes close to the rebel type, which is a significant departure from the responses to other vignettes. This signals that civil servants perceive the real value of these efforts, which is consistent with earlier discussions in Chapters 3 and 4 where Moroccan 160

Trickling Down

civil servants perceived the movement towards greater transparency as a matter of national interest and reputation (though here show a greater willingness to take action). It may also reflect a greater degree of trust in internal administrative accountability systems, which were highlighted in the discussions on Vignette 2 in Chapter 4, where civil servants from Morocco were more likely to refer cases upwards and expressed trust in the ability of the system to ‘correct’ the position of a minister when this position is not in the national interest or, as in this case, is seen as illegal. Second, the case of Jordan shows that civil servants might follow the rhetoric of open government and verbalize this, but that these principles are not yet reflected in their behaviour. How can we explain this apparent mismatch between verbal signalling and actual behaviour? First, the implementation of the principles of open government and the FOIA demands intensive resource investment and redesign of internal processes (Nam, 2015), which requires changes to the daily routines of civil servants. Without a deep investment of resources, FOIA implementation carries a high risk of being ‘symbolic’. The interview process did not provide evidence that resource investments (through training, additional dedicated staff, and so on) have taken place. To the contrary, civil servants mentioned cases of significant additional workload being imposed without compensation, with no mention of training or capacity building support, which heightens the risk of symbolic interpretation. Interviewee 16 from Tunisia provides an illustration of this: “When I was at the Ministry of Local Government, the requests for information were unmanageable. One should at least ask why information is requested. For example we were asked for all studies undertaken by the Ministry of Environment for the last ten years, can you imagine. And we should share these for free?”. In Lebanon, some interviewees mentioned the need for a solid IT infrastructure to support data management and information access (Interviewees 3 and 6). Second, a new set of values was created through the country engagement on open government, and these are then seen by civil servants as an element of the public interest. However, they often contrast with other legislation, like data protection acts that protect private interests, with the balance between the two not always clear to civil servants (for example, see Tunisia, Interview 8). Even where these values have been more internalized, as in Morocco, they are seen more as abstract principles or aspirations and not as directly affecting civil servants’ roles and tasks. In fact, the perceived impact on internal processes is limited across all the countries, with some interviewees acknowledging that “policies should change” (Jordan, Interview 1 [emphasis added]). In addition, civil servants emphasized the importance of securing a written request from the minister to absolve the civil servant from direct responsibility. 161

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Ball (2009) suggests that good transparency policies must contain instruments to ensure accountability for government actions (including for situations like the one in this vignette, where civil servants are put in a delicate position). The responses to Vignette 3 revealed that even though all four countries have established systems of administrative and political accountability (see Chapter 3), including grievance and redress instruments, in at least two of the countries’ civil servants do not feel protected by such mechanisms when it comes to contesting the decision of a minister. Respondents in Jordan and Tunisia do not refer to these, and instead use non-​decision as a strategy. Clearly, their behaviour suggests that the internal accountability mechanism lacks credibility. Though in the case of Tunisia this may be a consequence of an ongoing shift in the nature of politico-​administrative relations and decreased levels of trust, as discussed in the previous chapters, it is more surprising for Jordan, which has a more stable politico-​administrative interface and higher levels of trust between politicians and civil servants. Additionally, in the case of Jordan, the fact that the ATI legislation existed for an extended period of time without robust implementation arrangements, and with limited public communication and training and legal uncertainty vis-​à-​vis the state secrets law (Almadhoun, 2012; World Bank, 2017; Shuquair, 2019), has further weakened the credibility of the policy commitment. As for the other two countries, Lebanese interviewees perceived these mechanisms as important for the protection of the civil servants: “If checks and balances are strong, he should not be in a position to make a civil servant write a refusal” (Lebanon, Interview 5) and/​or suggested mobilizing them: “To protect himself/​herself, the colleague should report the violation to the Central Inspection Board” (Lebanon, Interview 3). Only a few respondents picked up on the media as a source of accountability, and on the risk of negative publicity. In Lebanon, we also found an extreme option after failure to persuade the minister and/​or internal accountability mechanisms –​that of leaking information on the situation: ‘Typically civil servants will protect themselves. Very few will fight back. Public servants can be powerful agents of change. They should ask themselves: “Am I serving the rules or using the rules to serve the public good”. … In this situation, the colleague could use other means such as passing on the information ‘informally’. These means can be acceptable if they serve the public good. Alternatively, media attention being strong makes this also into a tool for lobbying.’ (Lebanon, Interview 5) This is an example of where civil servants would demonstrate behaviour associated with the rebel typology, and will actively engage to uphold global norms even if this poses a risk to their career and position. 162

Trickling Down

International organizations and open government In the first part of this chapter, we discussed the role of international and transnational organizations in advocating with governments to adopt formal policies and legislation as part of the broader global open government movement. In the final step of the sequence in Vignette 3, we attempted to establish whether international partners can also be effective in influencing the behaviour of civil servants. On this specific issue, we concluded that, unlike with the other vignettes, civil servants did not consider mobilizing international partners at all, neither as a source of additional information nor in efforts to raise their credibility in convincing the minister to grant access to information. All argumentation brought forward by respondents was based on perceived values. The limited involvement and visibility of international partners continued even after the vignette situation evolved and included a proactive move by these partners to push for transparency. Most of the respondents across the countries suggested that knowing they had partner support was useful. However, the presence of such support does not have a real impact on the decisions taken by a civil servant and/​ or a minister: “International Organizations can play a supportive role but at the end of the day it is the minister’s decision” (Lebanon, Interview 8). The interviewees in Tunisia would expect the role of civil servants to be passive and traditionalist, not picking up on another potential round of persuasion but rather only ‘communicating’ the position of international partners, as symbolically stated in this response: “The role of the civil servant is to communicate all impressions to the minister but he cannot go beyond this even if it is a major partner organization that puts pressure” (Tunisia, Interview 9). In fact, some answers were even more extreme: “the opinion of the media and international organizations does not really matter” (Tunisia, Interview 13). Finally, and more surprisingly, it was the interviewees in Jordan, where responses on the first parts of the vignette did not match the expressed adherence to values of open government, who felt that international partners were seen not only to play a symbolic support role but could also incite civil servants to go back to the minister again and use this evidence for a new round of persuasion. One response went even further: “She should ask them [international organizations] for a written view, go to the legislative department and ask them for documents in support of the minister’s decision and based on that she will decide” (Interview 2, Jordan).

Insights from direct assessment In the direct question-​and-​answer-​based part about the importance of open government, interviewees did not see much direct effect on their work tasks 163

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

and roles, and this was attributed to “premature” efforts in a weak institutional environment. Some also highlighted limited capacity on the demand side among external stakeholders, with references to underdeveloped NGOs and think tanks in Tunisia (Tunisia, Interviews 2 and 3). Doubts were expressed as to whether “ordinary citizens need detailed reports and draft laws” (Tunisia, Interview 6), or whether civil society is ready to use information productively. Some respondents in Tunisia doubted, and even distrusted, the motives of external stakeholders when asking for information, ascribing them to “commercial” ones with fear of “intellectual property theft” (Tunisia, Interview 13), and raised doubts as to whether the state should share reports for free when it paid for their production (Tunisia, Interview 9). Other interviewees suggested that the public administration environment is not yet ready, due to a “limited culture of information sharing” (Morocco, Interview 11), a “tradition of secrecy and general fear of any repercussions from being proactive in disclosing information” (Jordan, Interview 7), and/​ or absence of “stronger implementing arrangements” (Jordan, Interviews 13 and 14) and little autonomy and responsibility to act independently (Tunisia, Interview 14). Several respondents in Lebanon acknowledged the importance of having a legal framework for access to information, but its impact was perceived to be limited or even non-​existent (Lebanon, Interviews 1 and 8). Finally, some respondents do not appear to fully understand the purpose and implications of freedom of information principles, as illustrated in Jordan, Interview 10: “Access to information is granted by law, specially to the media, to clarify certain impediments or misguided information”; and Jordan, Interview 1, and Tunisia, Interview 1, where access to information was equated with government communication policies. The responses to the direct questions bring out two points. First, for a significant number of civil servants, open government and, in particular, freedom of information are aspirations and have positive associations. However, even in this group, this is juxtaposed with concerns over inadequate preparation of the legal framework (including the point on limited consultation brought out in Lebanon, Interview 14), a lack of societal readiness to use these instruments, and the lack of resources provided to ensure proper implementation. Second, and more concerning, is the large number of respondents who either do not fully understand the essence of freedom of information systems or do not see them as useful or having an impact on their work. The group of officials interviewed mostly consists of senior level civil servants involved in (economic) governance issues. While this is not the segment of the civil service that would be the most affected or involved in open government engagements (compared to, for instance, social sector ministry officials), they would still have a significant role, given their engagement with private sector partners, and involvement in policy 164

Trickling Down

related to private sector development, and the application of private sector support instruments. Seeing such a large part of this group being lukewarm, or even dismissive, with regards to freedom of information instruments, and not making the connection to their day-​to-​day activity, is unexpected given that we are looking at four of the most advanced countries on open government-​related reforms in the MENA region. In contrast, respondents in Morocco, and some respondents in Lebanon, feel so strongly about the importance of open government norms that they are willing to mobilize and challenge behaviour of the minister, including, in some cases, through the use of media and civil society. The fact that these responses are strongest in Morocco is noteworthy given the relatively high degree of trust between civil servants and politicians.

Beyond access to information: open government and participation (Vignette 4) Next, we will look into a further element of the open government agenda, namely participation, and related perceptions and beliefs. Vignette 4 tackles whether or not to take into consideration results of the participatory consultation process organized by an international organization, particularly if narrow (business) interests of a concrete stakeholder are over-​represented and may create bias. In this way, the vignette reacts to and reflects empirical research about the dominance of certain actors and how consistently active actors are not representative of the broader population (Michels and de Graaf, 2010). The risk might be particularly high among business interests, at the expense of actors representing societal interests, such as NGOs (Flöthe and Rasmussen, 2018). Thus, both practitioners and academics have often voiced concerns about these biases, as business groups are typically seen as representing narrow interests, creating a risk that policies informed by these will favour specific economic constituencies rather that the electorate as a whole. In addition, this time the hypothetical situation of Vignette 4 presented the minister in the light of adhering to the values of open government (see Box 5.2). The fact of having the political decision maker, a minister, on board for consultation and participatory activities made interviewees across the countries more comfortable in engaging in these processes themselves. Almost all interviewees voiced professional approaches to consultation itself, as well as to broader participation by stakeholders in the development of policy proposals. Again, values of transparency and public interest were brought up as the key guiding principle in the exercise. Nevertheless, the understanding of the concept of ‘transparency’ differs among the countries. Perhaps the most conservative approach (traditionalist type) came from interviewees in Jordan, for whom transparency referred 165

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Box 5.2:  Vignette 4: Participatory processes in practice A colleague of yours is asked to prepare a policy proposal on public procurement reform, which includes reflecting principles related to open contracting. One of the motives for the policy change is that this measure is expected to reduce the risk of favouritism in contract awards. The policy proposal is part of the implementation effort related to the National Strategy on Private Sector Development, a strategy that is strongly supported by international organizations. As part of their support to the implementation of the National Strategy, a year ago, international organizations organized a consultation on open contracting to which all stakeholders as well as citizens were invited. The activity produced more reactions than expected. However, these reactions mainly came from a particular interest group, namely the National Business Association, which opposes the current open contracting proposal. The minister of your colleague is not comfortable with the whole activity and its results, as the minister would like to see more open contracting. Your colleague has to decide whether or how to reflect the result of the public consultation from a year ago (organized by IOs) in the final version of the policy proposal.    

to ‘documenting all outputs’ generated from the consultation process and providing it to the minister for a decision without including their own advice. Only a handful of civil servants thought that their role is to advise as well: “She has to provide her feedback. Naturally on pros and cons of the issue to give the minister a very clear idea to result in a better decision on that matter” (Jordan, Interview 11). For interviewees in Lebanon, transparency referred to ‘credibility of the process’, in which the provision of evidence arising from consultations is just the starting point. Documentation must also include the interests of the global actors that need to be examined (Lebanon, Interview 4). However, the interviewees shared a common understanding of the role of the civil servant, whose responsibility is to “reflect upon everything that came out of the public consultation … highlight pros and cons” (Lebanon, Interview 5), and provide support documents and evidence to present counterarguments (Lebanon, Interviews 5 and 6). Some went beyond this and suggested that civil servants should be ready for potential lobbying from the side of the interest group and anticipate the next steps (Lebanon, Interview 13). To other civil servants this meant also taking on a mediating role among the stakeholders: “one should try to understand pressure points of reform actors and stakeholders and find ways to negotiate on issues and reflect some inputs” (Lebanon, Interview 14). However, there were also some who interpreted the minister’s position as ignoring the outputs of the consultation altogether (Lebanon, Interview 10). 166

Trickling Down

A similar view and understanding to that in Lebanon was voiced in Tunisia, where transparency also referred to the duty of a civil servant to reflect upon the input received from the consultation process. Here, a further suggestion was for civil servants to take on the role of negotiators with the dominant stakeholders, even if this would prolong the policy design process. The main aim is to “unblock the process, bring in further consultation to increase trust among stakeholders” (Tunisia, Interview 10). Many civil servants warned against the newness and fragility of these processes and saw risks associated with weak consultation methods and the subsequent use of their outputs. Tunisia addressed legal and regulatory aspects of public consultations through a government decree adopted in March 2018, which aimed to strengthen communication and feedback loops with citizens and civil society on public policies. It also published the public participation online portal ‘e-​ participation.tn’, dedicated to public consultation, including on the draft OGP national action plans. The backdrop to this was the adoption of a series of circulars published in 2011 and 2014 that promoted citizen involvement in the monitoring and evaluation of public services, and their participation in the development of public policies and legislations. Interviewees in Morocco had a very similar view to civil servants in Lebanon and Tunisia, urging bringing the dominant stakeholder on board because otherwise the implementation would not be successful. To that end, they suggested bringing “the views of impartial national and international expert bodies, such as OECD, the Conseil Economique et Sociale and the Court of Auditors” (Morocco, Interview 16). The vignette continued with two additional scenarios: one where the civil servant refused to take into consideration the results of the previous consultation, and one where the civil servant went ahead and organized a new round of consultations. In both these scenarios the interviewees were quite clear: one should not hide or dismiss input from a consultation process even if organized by a different body than the administration; all comments arising from such processes are potentially relevant and need to be considered. To organize an additional round of consultations was seen as a good idea as it constitutes an opportunity to discuss not only different standpoints but also concrete options developed on the civil service side. Only occasionally (with no clear pattern across the countries) was there a voice suggesting that the civil servants can take into consideration what they think is right. In contrast to the freedom of information topic discussed previously, respondents were clearly more comfortable and familiar with public consultation processes, showing familiarity with the concept as well as its practical application. Given the still ongoing transition process and a tradition of closed government, the level of internalization on this element of the open government agenda is more advanced, and the role of the civil servant better defined and understood. There is no clear-​cut explanation as to why 167

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

there was greater comfort with this aspect than with information provision, except the possibility that participation and consultation pushes civil servants less out of their comfort zone than proactively providing public information.

Process: collaboration and cooperation across levels of government vis-​à-​vis external stakeholders Open government challenges bureaucratic and hierarchic administration by demanding ‘new ways of interactive public value creation and citizen co-​creation by systematically integrating external actors … into governmental and administrative processes’ (Hilgers and Ihl, 2010, p 72). Hence, all three pillars of open government –​transparency, participation, and collaboration –​presuppose including a broader range of stakeholders, who would access information and decision making in policy debates and support for implementation. The stakeholders are not just citizens but also include various groups from both inside and outside the organization of respective civil servants. In the interview process, respondents were asked to rank internal and external stakeholders in order of importance, as well as to comment on whether it was appropriate to involve these stakeholders into policy discussion. They were also asked to indicate the trend in the evolution of these relations over the last decade (increased or decreased relations). From the responses obtained, open government-​related values are not yet fully apparent in the relative importance attributed to relations with external stakeholders, such as academia, CSOs, think tanks, and private sector interest groups (see Table 5.3). In level of importance, these actors still rank well below internal stakeholder relations in the administration. In this respect, it has to be stressed that civil servants and organizations are in the middle of a change process, where communication with external Table 5.3: Perceived importance of stakeholders Civil Civil Global Academia CSOs Think Interest Media servant servant actors tanks groups internal external Jordan

1.4

1.7

1.5

2.5

2.2

2.4

2.1

1.8

Lebanon 1.5

1.5

1.2

2.7

2.3

2.7

2.5

2.2

Morocco 1

1.4

1.5

2.4

2.8

2.3

2.9

2

Tunisia

1.7

1.6

2.6

2.8

2.6

2

2.4

1.4

Note: Mean of responses to stakeholder cards with 1–​4 scale: 1=​very important, 2=​important, 3=​somewhat important, 4 =​not important. Source: Authors, based on interview responses

168

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stakeholders is becoming more important, and that is one of the main areas of visible change over the past decade. In this sense, examples of partnerships with CSOs and academia were particularly quoted in Lebanon, with appreciation of the overall collaborative efforts: “the involvement of these stakeholders greatly facilitated our work” (Lebanon, Interview 6). “Before it [interaction with other stakeholders] was not important, we only relied on the instructions of the minister and [… we] didn’t have a clear role on how and why to engage with them [stakeholders]. However, the role is increasingly becoming important” (Jordan, Interview 8). While relations with national external stakeholders remain at a level well below internal stakeholders, it is notable that interaction with global actors is placed almost at the same level of importance as for interaction with internal stakeholders, and in Lebanon, even beyond that level. This is an indication of the importance of evolution of relations, as it would have been inconceivable to get such answers before 2011 when, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, relations with international partners were tightly controlled and managed by a few civil servants. The fact that the interviewees were senior officials that were largely from departments engaged in issues of (economic) governance is likely a contributing factor, but this trend is nevertheless important as it is visible across all four countries and broadly shared. Finally, when comparing the importance of internal and external stakeholders, fellow civil servants within and/​or across the public organizations are still considered as the dominant and most important stakeholders (with the one exception of Lebanon on global actors). However, interviewees across the countries universally felt that transparency laws and policies have helped improve collaboration and cooperation across the public sector, a sentiment especially strong in Morocco (Tunisia, Interview 3; Morocco, Interview 14; Jordan, Interview 16). At the same time, direct interaction and importance of relations with politicians has declined.

The longer road to travel: commitments on open government and factor of trust We now return to our overall analytical framework and to the structural and behavioural filters that drive the impact of transmission channels of globalization on civil servants. In previous chapters, administrative culture, the dynamics in the politico-​administrative interface, and identity and self-​ image were highlighted as critical filters that helped or hindered the impact of globalization. All these fall into the behavioural (revisionist) category of explanatory approaches (Welch and Wong, 1998, p 44). Traditionalist analytical approaches, with the focus on formal systems, provided more limited insights, given the relatively static nature of public administration systems in a context of much broader political change. 169

CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

On the issue of open government, we have identified contrasting patterns of influence. In terms of formal legal change, there has been a significant evolution of legal frameworks, changing both political and administrative external accountability and introducing greater direct accountability to external actors that can demand access to information (and increasingly also data, through Open Data decrees and legislation) and have recourse mechanisms to obtain this. While not legislated, practices in external consultation have equally changed. Civil servants largely adhere to these changes, and in the case of Morocco these have taken on aspirational value across the board. However, when looking at the actual behaviour and the real internalization of the different dimensions of open government, the picture is mixed: relatively positive on consultation and participatory approaches to policy making (Vignette 4), but cautious and contrary to the spirit of legislation on access to information (Vignette 3). We would like to offer three factors that could help explain this contradiction: preparedness, time, and trust, with the latter constituting additional potential filters to be considered when applying our analytical framework. The first factor is institutional preparedness. As brought out in many instances, formal legal frameworks on access to information were adopted fast (some civil servants argue without adequate consultation and under influence from international partners), as a key signalling reform related to a more open and inclusive governance system. However, the preparation of those that were expected to apply these frameworks has been wanting, and the significant number of responses where senior civil servants did not correctly understand the nature and operational aspects of access to information reforms is an illustration of this. If this applies to senior leadership staff in key ministries and agencies, implications would be far greater further down the line, where access to information requests are treated. This is also illustrated in the vignette responses, where in the absence of political leadership many respondents in three of the four countries would not step in even if laws were broken. The second factor is trust, and relates to the ongoing shifts in the nature of politico-​administrative relations that we already discussed in Chapter 2. This is an important explanatory factor: even if all countries have established mechanisms of administrative and political accountability, including recourse mechanisms for civil servants in case politicians try to coerce them into supporting or implementing a decision that contravenes the law, civil servants respond very differently depending on the country context. In Tunisia and Jordan, the use of accountability mechanisms was barely mentioned, even if they exist and civil servants could have availed them if put in a situation in which they would be party to breaking the 170

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law. We have previously discussed the growing rift between civil servants and politicians in Tunisia, which were openly expressed in most interviews, and the sense that civil servants do not trust that they would be supported by internal accountability processes if they were to stand up to a minister. Equally, civil servants in Jordan did not consider contravening the minister, though in this case this is a consistent pattern on all vignettes and better explained by administrative culture and convictions. In contrast, in Morocco, no civil servant would follow the minister in case they were asked to support, defend, or apply an illegal decision. Here civil servants did trust the internal and external accountability systems, and that these would protect them. This was also the case in Lebanon where, in a very different context as to politico-​administrative relations, internal accountability systems are still relied upon to protect civil servants. In both cases, indications were also given that media and civil society could be mobilized in support. Trust in internal systems and, by association, in politicians is therefore an important filter when it comes to the application of access to information policies and broader open government principles. Finally, there is the issue of time and adjustment. Some scholars treat the open government movement as a ‘paradigm shift’. Paradigm shifts do not occur overnight, and taking formal initiatives (regulations, action plans) to drive the opening of governments does not mean that civil servants will automatically perceive the internal value connected with these initiatives for the public sector, nor that a change of behaviour will automatically occur. Other factors come into play and need to be taken into account, including procedural, capacity, and internal communication measures, and the extent to which internal accountability mechanisms are seen as credible and politicians as trustworthy. We believe that in a context of systemic political change there is an adjustment period, and that this adjustment is longer and more difficult when it concerns reforms that go against long-​established elements of administrative culture, such as secrecy and access restrictions. Hence, while some scholars argue that time is not a defining factor when it comes to the introduction of open government reforms (Wilson, 2020), except for countries with long standing traditions, we would take a different position: when linking time with context, and in particular the context of transition, one sees tensions emerge between legal and policy reforms (that are part of the transition) and the ability of civil servants to internalize and adjust –​even more so if insufficient resources are made available for training and for the additional work that comes with access to information or consultation tasks. In conclusion, on this third, and arguably more innovative, dimension of globalization, formal structural filters (preparedness, capacity) combine with strong behavioural filters (trust/​credibility of accountability systems, reality of 171

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politico-​administrative relations) and pending adjustment needs (training, IT infrastructure etc) to weaken transmission channels and limit impact. Filters on this dimension of globalization appear stronger and partially different from those identified in the two previous chapters. Identity and self-​image fade to the background when trust in systems and political leaders comes into play, and are no longer sufficient to drive support for global principles and paradigms.

Conclusions: conflicting narratives and practices The opening up and transitions discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 have brought a paradigm change in the four countries discussed in our study. Hence, in addition to responding to the global trends and pressures to apply open government principles, the democratization/​opening up factor here provides an additional driver for governments to engage in open government reforms. Formal frameworks and commitments towards open government and transparency have been designed and approved as a result of this. This study, however, went beyond appearances and undertook a contextual analysis of civil servants’ behaviour. We provided empirical findings, gained through vignettes and traditional interviews, on how civil servants themselves understood and perceived the concept of open government and transparency initiatives and related values. We also established whether they were leading to changes that would have a deeper impact on civil servants’ roles and tasks, and the level of internalization of the earlier-​mentioned values into practice and behaviour. Our analysis reflects conflicting narratives: 1. Significant progress on the adoption of formal frameworks/​rhetoric, including endorsement by civil servants, but limited internalization in the same civil servants’ actual behaviour. 2. An increased perceived importance of external stakeholders, especially global partners, which has not yet translated into formal changes in procedures and legal frameworks related to policy development and implementation. Hence, on the first dimension we observed significant formal change but limited behavioural change, while on the second aspect we observed a change in posture and approach, but with no known changes in rules or regulations, except in Tunisia. As noted previously, three factors are driving these trends: trust, preparedness, and time. While the latter is not seen as the most critical factor in the literature, we believe that the depth of the paradigm shift in the four countries is such that time does

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play a role, at least in the short term. The vignettes also brought out the direction set by political leadership as one critical element of the equation, as civil servants (due to the trust factor) find it far easier to ‘follow’ than to ‘oppose’. The discussions in this chapter, then, provide the following insights in relation to two of our theses: Thesis 1: Globalization is one of the disruptors of traditional accountability systems, as globalization has an impact on both direct and indirect accountability mechanisms. In the first part of the chapter, we noted that rather than being driven by considerations around responsiveness to citizens or citizen demand, governments may respond to international pressure to demonstrate modernity and legitimacy through formal frameworks, commitments, and OGPs. However, we have also seen that internal bureaucratic processes have not been sufficiently adjusted to internalize this interaction. This became apparent when hypothetical situations in vignettes demonstrated political decision makers’ disinterest in information provision, and civil servants in Tunisia did not invoke internal accountability mechanisms and chose to protect their civil servant status rather than support publicly held values. A similar response was observed in Jordan, but this is consistent with earlier conclusions there on the way the politico-​administrative interface operates, with strong alignment by civil servants to political decisions. While in Lebanon and Morocco there was greater trust in accountability systems (and civil servants claimed they would use them), it was only in Morocco that civil servants suggested they would oppose political decisions that would break country legislation. The response pattern changed on the issue of consultations, where the political decision maker actively promoted interest in public input via consultations. Thus, putting open government values into practical context makes it evident that the intentions behind the political approach matter to civil servants. On this element of globalization we therefore only see a partial impact of international norms, with limited impact from access to information norms (in part due to concerns over the robustness of internal accountability systems), and greater impact from norms on participation and consultation. We noted the same when it comes to the ranking of stakeholders: the trend related to the importance of external stakeholders is changing, but civil servants remain internally oriented in their interactions. Engagement with global partners is an exception to this, as it is ranked close to internal stakeholders. As noted, this is at least partially driven by the position and seniority of the officials interviewed.

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Thesis 4: The global open government movement (including the push for freedom of information, participatory practices, and Open Data) impacts on the role and behaviour of civil servants vis-​á-​vis stakeholders. On this issue we saw a conflicting narrative, with formal recognition of open government principles in policies and legislation, but limited internalization by civil servants. On the one hand, the first part of the chapter provided contextual information on formal commitments to open government principles and how these have evolved in MENA countries. There are rules, regulations, and accountability mechanisms in place that call upon civil servants to justify their actions, act upon criticism or requirements made, and accept responsibility for failure to perform with respect to the values of the commitments. The corresponding narrative discussed was one of a break from traditional hierarchical values: bringing transparency, public value, and other related values to the centre when convincing the political actor to provide information. Still, the empirical section reported how civil servants have only partially internalized these norms in their behaviour. Good governance rhetoric and pressures from international partners do constitute attempts to change the administration by making it economically more efficient and democratically more transparent and collaborative. However, the true application of open government requires a substantial change in the role and behaviour of civil servants, which at this point is only partially present.

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PART III

Conclusion: Growing Impact despite Resilient Filters

6

Globalization and Civil Servants: A Response Typology Introduction Globalization has generated new challenges for nation states, not only in terms of responding to the substantive policy challenges that have emerged (environmental, economic, and, most recently, the COVID-​19 pandemic), but also with respect to modalities of governance and decision making within executive institutions (ministries and agencies), and in broader institutional systems. Challenges include the need to respond to ever more sophisticated global performance indicators, building systems to ensure smarter use of information in EBPM, greater inclusion of stakeholders in policy making, and managing growing engagement with global partners. In this study we have reviewed how globalization affects civil servants, covering select key features of globalization (performance expectations, enhanced interaction and socialization, transparency and participation) and transmission channels (global performance indicators, direct interaction, and norms and principles derived from the open government movement), as well as filters that can mitigate or enhance global influence. Taking countries that have gone through a rapid acceleration of global engagement because of economic, social, and political changes as case studies, we have moved beyond what previous analyses have covered,1 by looking specifically into how civil servants experience and respond to global pressures, and how these affect their working environment, including (perceptions of) their change in work roles, relations, accountability mechanisms, and values. As discussed previously by Raadschelders and Verheijen (2019), the impact of globalization on civil servants can be studied either as a process of interaction or in terms of the impact that global events and developments have on civil servants (the financial crisis of 2008, the COVID-​19 pandemic, and so on). Our interest in this study is primarily on the former, and on the ways in which globalization is influencing and shaping the functioning of institutional systems and the development of administrative capacity. 177

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For the latter, we used the following definition: ‘the ability to manage efficiently the human and physical resources required for delivering the outputs of government’ (Painter and Pierre, 2005, p 2). In this sense, effective global engagement requires more investment in civil servants’ professional development to allow them to become familiar with and able to respond to new challenges. This includes using new tools for policy design and implementation that enhance information flows, building evidence and knowledge in policy design, incorporating new stakeholders, and streamlining decision making via coordination mechanisms at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. This study also addresses the question of whether and how civil servants adopt positive attitudes towards global ideas, and internalize values associated with them. Testing responses to situations in which a civil servant is confronted with a contradiction between a push for the application of global principles and norms on the one hand, but the absence of political support for these on the other, will help establish whether globalization creates a change in civil servants’ roles and identities. This study therefore adds to the literature on the role of transnational actors in global policy (Ege et al, 2020; Moloney and Stone, 2019) and globalization and national institutional systems (Carothers, 1999; Andrews et al, 2017), which so far has largely focused on the impact of globalization on policy substance and institutional reforms. In this final chapter we draw our conclusions on globalization and its impact on civil servants on three levels. First, methodologically, what we have learned from the use of blended interview tools, and especially the innovative use of explorative vignettes, and how and to what extent the latter has helped us to dig deeper into the day-​to-​day realities that civil servants face. Second, theoretically, how the analytical model and typology we developed in Chapter 1 hold up when tested in hypothetical but close to real-​life situations. Based on this, we also examine what dimensions of the approach may need further sharpening and deepening. Third, and most importantly, we consider our findings regarding the main research question, through the lens of the discussion of the four theses we formulated in the first chapter of this book, with a focus on the socialization literature on values, identities, and roles. The country cases we reviewed are specific but have many features that are representative of challenges faced by MIC in transition. It is specific as the discussion on the MENA region in Chapter 2 highlights a rarely analysed context. While there has been increased attention to the region since the events of 2011, this has focused mostly on political governance issues (the largely failed attempts at democratization), on the conflicts that have tainted the region, and on radicalization. In terms of public administration reform, analysis has mostly focused on national case studies rather than 178

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the global context in which these systems operate (see, for instance, Beschel and Yousef, 2020). When it comes to economic governance, the emphasis has been on diversification (and the success stories of some of the Gulf states) and continued dependency on natural resources in ‘stuck’ economic systems. Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia are outliers in the region –​all relatively natural resource poor, all relatively open economically, and with varying degrees of progress on political reforms. They are an interesting group of countries, as it is these countries and systems that, like other countries in the middle-​income group, are most in need of greater integration in the global economy: investment brings both the financial resources and know-​how required to compete and create jobs for the rapidly growing youth segment of the population. At the same time, greater integration in the global economy is often controversial, especially for countries such as these that have a middle class that often resists opening up because of perceived risks of losing out, a feature also discussed in Chapter 2. The discussion in Chapter 2 highlights the relatively unorthodox way this integration in the global economy has evolved: all four countries continue to incentivize export activities, to various extents, through incentives to export-​only firms, including location-​based incentives (economic zones and free zones, for example). Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan applied a strict separation of onshore and offshore economic activity when they reconnected with the global economy in the 1970s after a period of relative economic isolation, but for a long time they did not take the next, necessary, steps of integrating the two systems (a process that is still in various stages of completion). This left them with mostly unreformed and left-​behind ‘onshore’ systems that need continued protection from competition, especially in the important agricultural and forestry sectors, but also in other productive areas that remain(ed) under government control and ownership. This separation has proven hard to eliminate given resistance from vested interests, and is a challenge quite typical for MIC, also seen in Latin America and South Asia. Institutional development, and notably civil service professionalization, is part of the same kind of internal debate as that on modernization vs. the status quo. An essentially Napoleonic (French) model-​inspired system (a little less so in Jordan), overlaying a blend of traditional and Ottoman influences, public administration systems were a central part of an administered and protected economy post-​independence. As documented in Chapter 2, modernization strategies have been slow to take hold. Political reforms and democratization efforts have changed the political environment in which the administration operates, but have not been followed by significant internal changes, except in Morocco. Hence, civil servants find themselves in a position where their environment has undergone change and where there are global pressures for 179

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more change, especially regarding the role of the state, but administrative systems largely continue to operate as before. This situation creates complex challenges and dilemmas for civil servants, which again are not unlike those faced by many other MIC (on South Asia see, for example, Bhatti et al, 2015). Our premise, based on the literature review presented in Chapter 1, is that the response to these challenges and dilemmas results in the emergence of four types of civil servants. Our research, and the evidence it generated, has allowed us to deepen the characteristics of the different categories as follows. The traditionalist: he/​she is passive and will limit him/​herself to respecting the established traditional hierarchy, carrying out the orders of the minister given the risk of otherwise being cast aside, even in situations where he/​ she perceives the potential benefits of key features of globalization, such as enhanced performance expectation, interaction/​socialization, transparency, and participation of external stakeholders. This civil servant does so because he/​she believes in hierarchical order and perceives her/​his role to be to respect this. However, this approach can also be triggered by concerns over potential negative repercussions of not showing loyalty towards the political leaders, or by a sense that the minister might know (thanks to his/​her political connections) more than civil servants and thus ‘knows better’. A significant feature of this civil servant type is that, in case of disagreement with the minister, the official will follow orders but will also aim to protect her or himself by documenting the steps the civil servant has taken. The professional: he/​she will execute his/​her tasks professionally, trying to conduct EBPM in which he/​she serves as a bureaucratic adviser and tries to convince the minister based on a methodical comparison of facts. In these bureaucracies, EBPM is more firmly institutionalized and taken as an obvious step when trying to convince the minister. He/​she often will seek a compromise and will work transparently within the organization, but will not mobilize or engage stakeholders beyond her/​his organization. The sense of national (rather than public) interest is often a trigger for civil servants to look for more information, evidence, and facts to provide substantive advice. The professional civil servant type exhibits trust in existing internal mechanisms of accountability at the level of the ministry or agency, including by engaging colleagues to help reinforce arguments to decision makers. Still, when facing non-​responsiveness or disagreement from the political actor or decision maker, many professionals turn into traditionalists, as we have seen with the open government global filter, due to concerns over job security and their careers. The engaged official: he/​she will try and mobilize internal and external stakeholders to ensure that global norms and principles that are seen as serving the national interest are respected, but will not go beyond the realm of the institutional system, and refrains from political mobilization.

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This type of civil servant will proactively engage with parliament or other accountability institutions within the political system but outside the executive. Where such formal accountability mechanisms are not in place or are not trusted, and the civil servant is convinced she/​he is acting in the national interest, this civil service type can evolve to the next level, the rebel. The rebel: he/​she is a civil servant who will utilize ‘informalities’, such as leaking information, mobilizing political networks and the media, and so on, to defend the public or national interest against the perceived private interest of politicians that is seen as harmful to country reputation or performance, or to ensure the respect for global norms and values that the civil servant believes to be in the national interest. Driven by notions of national interest or perception of corrupt behaviour by politicians, he/​she makes deliberate efforts to mobilize actors through informal (even non-​legal) means (leaking information and so on) to try and ‘correct’ decisions by politicians. This presumes the existence of an active civil society and media that monitors the behaviour of the bureaucracy, with varying degrees of legal recourse. In the context of our study, ‘rebel’ behaviour assumes a high degree of socialization with international norms, standards, and principles. The typology reflects a continuum of the interplay between institutional and behavioural filters that determine the extent to which globalized engagement impacts on civil servants. Regarding the former, we consider accountability systems, in the broad sense, as determining the extent to which civil servants have ‘space’ to act. On the latter, the degree of socialization of global norms determines whether civil servants are willing to engage beyond the boundaries of their prescribed role to advocate for policies and decisions that promote alignment with global norms and principles. Table 6.1 presents the more detailed features of each type. As noted, the typology also reflects the identity crisis facing today’s civil servants. This comes out particularly strongly in these four countries, where political and economic changes go together with ‘frozen’ civil service systems, but also reflects reality in many other countries: change in civil service systems usually lags behind (and even undermines) social and economic changes.2 In Chapter 4, we also examined whether exposure to and engagement with transnational actors can have a positive impact on civil service professionalization and career opportunities for civil servants, and create a positive institutional development dynamic. In the following sections, we will come back to how and to what extent key characteristics of the four civil servant types already discussed were observed in the dilemma-​solving narratives in the four vignettes and the question-​and-​answer sessions discussed in Chapters 3 through 5.

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Table 6.1: Four types of civil servants Traditional Perception of global issue Global issue indifferent

Professional

Engaged

Rebel

Global issue recognition

Global issue motivated

Global issue motivated

Own protection prevails Respects both (personal and Protection of public/​national over public/​national public/​national interest) interest interest

Risks reputation (leaking information, informal contacts) for public/​national interest

Bureaucratic action within hierarchy

Mirrors supervisor (political actor) preferences

Breaks out of institutional boundaries for outside stakeholder mobilization

Professional response to global issue (in conflict situation with political patron –​minister)

Not taking on new roles Role-​playing –​expert advice Internalization of values and but not proactive (Type I proactive behaviour related to socialization) elements of globalization (Type II socialization)

Bureaucratic discretion over global policy issue outcome

No authority (perceived Adjusts to policy outcome or real) to influence outcome

Expertise acquisition Proactively seeks stakeholder (EBPM) for informed advice involvement (institutionalized) to political actor

Internalization of values and proactive behaviour related to global issue (Type II socialization)

Committed to influence policy for Breaks with formal global issue benefit mechanisms and processes

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Value ascribed to global issue

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Table 6.1: Four types of civil servants (continued) Professional

Engaged

Rebel

Traditional vertical, not engaging in other mechanisms

New systems exist, but civil servants do not significantly engage with these (de jure accountability)

Active engagement with new internal mechanisms (de facto horizontal and vertical accountability)

New external mechanisms are seen as important and are triggered (diagonal accountability –​media)

Role of transnational actors

Doesn’t engage

Contacts them to seek advice Systemic engagement and coordination effort

Ad hoc alliance

Role of local external stakeholders

Doesn’t engage

Contacts them but no coordination efforts

Ad hoc alliance

Systemic engagement and coordination effort

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Note: Type I socialization –​consciously accepting the global norms for role-​playing (checking boxes); Type II socialization –​deeper socialization when actors are persuaded by a norm’s ‘rightness’ (see more in Checkel, 2005).

Globalization and Civil Servants

Traditional Accountability system

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Prior to that, however, we will look at the use of vignettes and discuss how effective a tool these were in discovering the civil servants’ perspectives and behaviour on such sensitive issues as globalization effects.

Methodological tools: potential and problems of vignettes in studying civil servants’ values, perceptions, and behaviour Our study used a blend of vignettes, traditional question-​and-​answer sessions, and cards to get a better understanding of how civil servants perceive and respond to situations where interests and positions of civil servants, politicians, and international partners may diverge or conflict. This, we believe, is the best way of obtaining a real understanding of how civil servants perceive and experience globalization and its impact, and their beliefs and behaviour related to values brought out by this ‘paradigm shift’. Vignettes can be presented in a myriad of ways; we opted for explorative open-​ended questions regarding hypothetical situations, to provoke opinions and discussion. Using vignettes posed several risks. First, this is an unconventional interview method that civil servants were unlikely to have previous experience with –​ a point that came out several times. We tried to mitigate this risk by using an indirect approach, asking civil servants not what they would do but what they believe ‘a colleague’ would do in the given situation, so vignettes would not be perceived as personal threats. Also, projecting the respondent into the character of their ‘colleague’ proved to reduce social convenience bias, as the respondents often differentiated between ‘their’ reaction and the ‘other civil servant’ reaction. Second, civil servants, especially in a context as sensitive as the one characterized, could be reluctant to put themselves in a hypothetical situation given the risk of leakage and adverse consequences. Cultural factors also play a role in this context: the cultures of the Maghreb and the Mashreq tend to avoid open disagreement and conflict, while the vignettes in each instance put the respondents in a position where they had to opine on how a colleague would handle such a situation. Having the interviews conducted mostly by a ‘non-​threatening’ third party rather than directly by the authors was the only way of mitigating this risk.3 As for the cultural aspect, while we are conscious of this, there was no way of avoiding creating a situation of disagreement if we were to get to the heart of the issues. Third, working through a sequence of steps in the situation presented, and facing increasingly complex dilemmas, required that the vignettes be framed in a way that presented a realistic situation, without becoming a case that might be too close to reality. Given the insights we sought to obtain, this put high demands on the design process. Finally, the COVID-​19 pandemic meant that, in many cases, interviews had to be conducted using online meeting tools, which added an additional challenge. 184

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The four vignettes discussed in Chapters 3 through 5 were designed to help analyse complex contextual issues that helped us to get insights on the three elements of globalization that we assume have the most impact on civil servants: performance measurement through comparison (Vignette 2), direct engagement with international partners (Vignette 1), and the influence of the global push for transparency and open government (Vignettes 3 and 4). At the same time, we explored value systems, perceptions, and beliefs that arise in difficult and often conflicting situations through obtaining information from senior civil servants who are familiar with these situations, and thus were reflective: they have experienced the presented dilemma in a real context. We were also interested in judgements or the construction of stories that illustrated scenarios and situations evolving from a vignette, as the respondents were asked to report their level of approval or disapproval of twists and steps added to the scenario. Each vignette took the respondents through a sequence of events (behaviours) that put the civil servant in a position of disagreement with either his/​her political superior or international norms or good practices. Building up a sequence of events in the vignette (continuous narrative vignette) proved to be effective for tackling complex issues: it was economical in terms of time, as the contextual material of the added event was the same as in the original scenario, and the extended coverage of issues contained in the vignette led to more detailed insights into the differentiation of civil servants’ values, perceptions, and actual behaviour. In constructing vignettes, one particularly important aspect is securing internal validity, which refers to the extent to which vignette content captures the research topics (Gould, 1996; Hughes and Huby, 2004). As discussed in Chapter 1, the design of the vignettes was informed by a combination of existing literature, the authors’ professional experience, and actual case studies on the topic. Prior to their application, vignettes were piloted with former civil servants in each country or, where this was not possible, civil servants in office, and then adjusted and used in the interviews with senior officials. Thus, respondents were presented with four vignettes, constructed from literature review and authors’ experience, and validated by experts (former civil servants), with the purpose of capturing respondents’ expectations of the main protagonist’s (colleague’s) actions in scenarios about key globalization aspects of economic policy. Responses may be elicited through closed or open-​ended questioning. We employed a combination of both, to capture the advantages of each and to allow respondents to vary their responses in the hope that this would hold their interest in the vignettes for longer. Thus, we asked for ‘yes’/​’no’, ‘right’/​ ’wrong’, and Likert scale of ‘acceptance level’ responses, as well as leaving room for open justification, judgement, and behaviour responses. Open-​ ended questioning elicited rich material on experiences and perceptions 185

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of their own, and of other civil servants known to them. Closed questions aided the quantification of responses. Overall, interviewees’ responses to the use of the tool were positive. Some civil servants commented that the vignettes represent a reality that they live and/​or dilemmas that they face. In a couple of cases (two instances in Tunisia) civil servants did not want to respond to an individual vignette, as it was too close for comfort. In one of these cases, the interviewer then used an alternative way of framing the vignette to obtain at least some insights. In another case, a respondent asked not to have to respond to all four vignettes, as the respondent was more comfortable with a traditional question-​and-​ answer method. However, by and large the response of civil servants was significantly more engaged than expected and of higher quality than with traditional question-​and-​answer methods, and in many instances respondents voluntarily shared additional insights and experience and provided valuable information for the study. Given the combination of the sensitive context and unfamiliarity of the interview tool, the use of vignettes exceeded expectations, and we can conclude that when respondents feel the vignette situations to be relevant and real then the quality of data is likely to increase. The use of an appropriate number of vignettes is critical, but there is no consensus on what the adequate number to be used might be. On the one hand, we wanted to cover the three critical global issues; on the other hand, using too many vignettes could have led to information overload and loss of interest (Hughes and Huby, 2004). One issue that arose frequently during the interview process was the time investment needed to go through a vignette with three to four distinct steps. While the step-​by-​step approach was essential to bringing out the civil servant’s perspective on the dilemma posed in the vignette, it significantly taxed both the interviewer and the respondent, and at certain points led to respondent fatigue. While respondents were asked to set aside up to two hours for the interview, in many instances, the vignettes alone took the full amount of time, which forced interviewers to choose between dropping one vignette or dropping the also-​important question-​and-​answer section and/​or the cards. Hence, combining complex vignettes with other interview methods or tools proved to be difficult, given the time investment this required of busy senior civil servants. Finally, the use of online meeting tools also required an adjustment, as the comfort generated by a face-​to-​face discussion cannot be replaced in an online session. For a discussion on difficult issues, which were often close to reality for the respondents, the face-​to-​face interviews gave better results in terms of depth and detail. Since we anticipated a change in the dynamics, we also adjusted the priority topics in the interview and vignette protocols. Also, we sent vignette texts half an hour prior to the interview to let respondents familiarize themselves with the situation; we did not give any preparation time on the subsequent questions and the evolution of the 186

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events. Respondents did engage in discussion on the vignettes, but at times it was difficult for the interviewer to work through the sequence of steps. This was seen especially in the interviews in Morocco. We believe that this was mainly due to the change in dynamic that arises from using online rather than in-​person discussions. The use of vignettes in a context where respondents are not familiar with the tool, and yet had to respond to hypothetical situations that are sensitive and dealing with disagreement, posed a risk, but one that in hindsight was more than worth taking (see Table 6.2). We believe that the insights generated, discussed in detail in Chapters 3 through 5, could not have been obtained had only traditional interview methods been used. While it is important to identify upfront the potential risks of using this method –​to put in place risk mitigation measures, to be aware of culture and context, and to test the approach –​vignettes work far better than traditional question-​and-​ answer methods when one needs to get insights into behavioural responses to dilemmas, which is what was required for this study. Regarding the question-​and-​answer portion and cards (which covered documenting civil servants’ time allocation and the relative importance civil servants attribute to stakeholders), these provided important additional contextual and general information on the engagement of civil servants with international partners, on the evolution of their work environment and the broader institutional system, and on aspects of administration reform. The answers supplemented insights from the vignettes and hence helped complete our understanding of both the internal dynamics in the administration and its relations with outside actors.

Theoretical insights: explanatory value of old and new theoretical approaches Public administration theory has devoted scant attention to the impact of globalization on civil servants and civil service systems. While there is an active academic debate on the impact of globalization and global institutions on policies and reforms, the impact on actors in the policy process remains under-​analysed. For this study we used the principles of the approach set out by Welch and Wong (1998) as a starting point, but then adjusted and deepened the approach. In so doing, we considered the new realities of a significantly more globalized world and evolving global norms and principles that increasingly influence civil servants and civil service systems, as well as new literature on socialization. The response typology proposed in Chapter 1 and summarized earlier in this chapter reflects both these features by taking into account the bureaucratic accountability (institutional dimension) and depth of socialization of civil servants (behavioural dimension). 187

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Table 6.2: Potential and risks of vignettes Construction of vignettes

Research topic Four short textual (continuous narrative) vignettes, building upon previous events, were based on three global pressure factors. Economic governance (and institutions) is a domain where global performance pressures are both prominent and widespread. The vignettes are a ‘dramatization’ of the way in which global performance pressures impact on specific features of economic governance (for example, regulation on registration of new businesses, contracts with businesses on the provision of public services, National Strategy on Private Sector Development, National Business Association, and so on). Real situation The vignettes resemble real case stories, but are short and informative, reflecting the level of civil servants’ decision making. Constructs are derived from relevant literature review +​consulting experts on vignettes +​own experience in the field. Piloting Key informants (former civil servants in each country) assessed and evaluated vignettes (and questions asked in relation to vignettes) for their realism, representativeness, comprehensibility, and imageability. Subsequently, the sequencing, wording, and selection of the final set of four vignettes were adjusted. Validity We established internal validity by drawing upon existing literature, professional experience, and case study material on the subject to develop the scenarios presented. They were vetted by experts in the field (and former civil servants themselves) for their suitability (see also piloting). Respondents referred to other relevant situations that involved the study constructs and dilemmas. Reliability All respondents analysed the same vignette. Stimulus was standardized for all respondents (same scenario and same evolving of the scenario in steps), directing the respondent’s attention to specific aspects of the problem/​dilemma question.

Execution of vignettes

Interest in vignettes Short and continuous vignettes with dramatic narrative raised respondents’ interest, and in general were considered realistic and relevant.

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Table 6.2: Potential and risks of vignettes (continued) Four vignettes in one interview led to information overload and sometimes to respondent fatigue. Appropriate respondents These were senior civil servants, who could give meaningful answers to all vignettes because of their experience (number of years in service), position (decision-​making position), and topic (relevant institution). Responses Responses were elicited through both open-​ended questioning, to promote individual perceptions and reactions to real-​life situations (and thus contextually situated elements), and closed questioning (Likert scale). Risks and limitations

Sensitive context (perspective of vignette) These were actual situations involving advance decisions that needed to be made by a third person –​a colleague. Still, some respondents avoided and refused to answer questions related to one of the vignette situations (Vignette 3). Indirect data via interviewers Training was provided on key constructs in the vignettes. COVID-​19 pandemic This was a major validity concern, as a number of interviews had to be conducted online rather than face to face, which influenced the dynamics. Interviewers had red/​g reen/​black prioritization of questions and vignettes, and observed signs of interview fatigue. Vignettes were sent half an hour prior to the interview to help interviewees familiarize themselves with them, but not prepare.

Using qualitative analytical tools and focusing on the four case studies, we focused on identifying whether and how filters in national systems work to dilute or reduce the impact of global influence on individual civil servants (which, as noted in Chapter 4, can be very different from the impact these pressures have on political leaders), and how structural dimensions of systems (the accountability system, including the evolution of politico-​ administrative relations) and behavioural aspects (level of socialization) exacerbate or mitigate impact. The application of this approach allowed us to frame and explain proposed responses to hypothetical situations reflecting real-​life dilemmas, which were framed around four transmission channels: performance indicators, a specific dilemma around direct engagement, access to information, and participatory approaches to policy making. Based on values, perceptions, and behavioural analysis, 189

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we were able to identify the filters that determine the extent to which global norms, standards, and ideas were internalized by civil servants. We identified and examined six factors that ‘fit’ the definition of both contextual (formal institutional arrangements) and behavioural aspects (norms, culture, identity) of the approach: i) formal legal/​constitutional setup; ii) accountability and structures of politico-​administrative relations and accountability; iii) norms in administrative culture; iv) identity and self-​image of civil servants (what they stand for); v) position and type of agency; and vi) (national) aspirations. As regards the first factor, formal legal structures do not appear to be a critical factor in mitigating or stimulating the impact of globalization. The formal legal setup of public administration systems in the four countries has mostly remained intact over the last decade, as confirmed in both the literature review in Chapter 2 and in the responses to the question-​and-​ answer section of the interviews. Yet, as discussed in Chapters 3 through 5, the impact of globalization in terms of transmitted norms, standards, and ideas (performance, socialization, participation/​a ccountability, transparency) has increased. What does come out clearly from our analysis is that while there has been limited change in the legal framework that governs the operation of administrative structures, the nature of relations between civil servants and internal and external stakeholders has evolved significantly. For instance, political turnover and the emergence of new political leaders have increased the distance between civil servants and politicians in Tunisia even though the legal definition of politico-​ administrative relations has not changed. The same applies to Lebanon, and has been further aggravated by the current political crisis. This is seen in the articulation of interests by civil servants, who in the responses to the vignettes positioned themselves as guardians of the general/​national interest as opposed to the interests of politicians. A central part of the formal institutional structures we discussed is the accountability system, and the related aspect of politico-​administrative relations. Accountability refers to ‘reviews of the expediency and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’ (Schedler, 1999, p 28). Within a bureaucracy, accountability takes place on two dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Reddick et al, 2020). Vertical accountability is the relationship between non-​equals (subordinate with superior), while horizontal accountability is between more or less equal institutions, often between different branches of government (for example, parliament; Lührmann et al, 2020). Formal accountability systems have evolved, with new internal and external accountability institutions established in all countries, the role of parliaments significantly enhanced, and CSO and the media playing a new role that requires adjustments (see Chapters 4 and 5 for more details). 190

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The latter has added a dimension of direct accountability towards external actors through access to information systems, and has left civil servants more exposed to scrutiny. Nevertheless, despite the new internal accountability structures and mechanism systems in place, civil servants do not seem to utilize them proactively (they are subject to them, but don’t instrumentalize them). When asked about direct relations with external actors, such as international organizations, media, and CSOs, the predominant response of civil servants across the four countries was that they would follow traditional channels of communication (authorization from the hierarchy, communication of the official position taken by the political leader), even if they disagreed with the position taken by the political leader. Exceptions to this pattern are found in Lebanon (where the rebel typology is present), and in Tunisia and Morocco, where mobilization (defining aspect of the engaged typology) is seen as an acceptable course of action. Mobilization was almost fully absent from the responses in Jordan. Changes in the accountability system have been introduced (new oversight institutions, greater external scrutiny of the public administration, and so on), and civil servants do communicate with these new structures. However, this has not significantly changed the way civil servants engage with external partners (outside the institutional system), at least not when it comes to policy dialogue and communicating positions.4 Loyalty of civil servants continues to be directed towards the organization (though less to their political leadership), even in situations where international organizations could support and assist in pushing forward global rules and norms that civil servants state they believe in, with values shifting increasingly to reflect global ideas. Civil servants might be willing to contact international organizations informally on an ad hoc basis for additional information and evidence, but formally, the civil servant would turn to a government representative. In other words, the notion of the role of civil servants as representing their institution is preserved. Based on interview results, the evolution of accountability structures, while creating more options and space for contestation by civil servants (and being used as such), has not had a significant impact on the way civil servants work and engage with transnational actors: while civil servants express adherence to global values (and see this adherence as an element of protection of the national interest), they predominantly try to defend them within institutional or national boundaries. Administrative and political culture, the third factor, is a significant filter of influence of globalization. Based on our case comparison, there is a clear continuum between Jordan, where loyalty to the hierarchy, regardless of its actions, is predominant; through Lebanon, where there is little loyalty to the political hierarchy but no clear alternative reality (and where rebellious behaviour arises, such as informal leaks to the media, transnational actors, and informal contacts); to Tunisia and Morocco, where loyalty to the 191

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national and public interest in many instances appears to override loyalty to the hierarchy. Even though the substantive outcome is not always the same in the latter two countries,5 due to differences in the political context, the positions expressed in responses are similar. This matters a great deal to the potential impact of globalization, as seen in the responses to those vignettes that put politicians and civil servants in a situation of disagreement. When faced with politicians whose actions would be seen as potentially harming national interest (as perceived by civil servants in Vignette 2), or even going against the law (in Vignette 3), civil servants in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Morocco would do everything possible to correct this, while in Jordan, civil servants would mostly follow the hierarchy and conduct activities to protect themselves rather than act in the public/​ stakeholder interest. This comes out clearly on three of the four situational vignettes, covering: i) indicators and rankings; ii) relations with external stakeholders/​participation; and iii) transparency –​access to information. The one exception to this pattern is the vignette on efficient coordination (Vignette 1 in Chapter 4, details in Figure 4.1), where the position of international organizations on a matter of internal structure and process was discussed. In this case, civil servants in the three countries that otherwise have an administrative culture focused on general/​national interest were significantly more reluctant to ‘allow’ influence from international partners in what was considered an internal matter. This, then, relates closely to the fourth factor, and a further element of the organizational/​behavioural dimension, which is self-​image and sense of identity. This, too, is a critical factor in determining the strength of national filters. On this issue there was a marked difference in civil servants’ positions; in the case of Jordan the predominant self-​identity of civil servants was defined by loyalty to hierarchy and leader, and the ‘we follow ministers’ response dominated across the board and across the three globalization dimensions. While present in some responses in the other countries as well, it was always a minority view, with the predominant self-​identity being guardians of national and general interest, with a strong emphasis also on values such as professionalism, due process, and so on. Hence, here too, when positions taken by international partners are aligned with perceived national interest (improved rankings, image of transparency, correct reflection of stakeholder consultation processes, effective internal decision-​making processes), the impact and influence of globalization on civil servants was strong. As on the previous issues, filters were stronger in Jordan than in the other three countries, where the alignment of international values and national interest was a determining factor in civil servants’ responses. A fifth factor is where the civil servant sits, both hierarchically and by agency type. Interviews were selected to come from a cross section of institutions. The emphasis was on economic governance institutions and civil servants 192

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working in cross-​c utting functions (coordination, human resource management). Typically, civil servants that work directly with international organizations in their day-​to-​day duties focused more on the international partner roles than those who have limited direct contact. However, most respondents, even in departments that fulfil cross-​cutting functions, reported some exposure to international partners. Many respondents, especially in Tunisia, highlighted the difference between today’s broad engagement and the past practice of minimizing contacts and discussions to a limited set of ‘trusted’ officials at senior level, especially when discussing budget support and associated reform measures. Contacts were generally less widespread in Jordan, which is consistent with the conclusions on the previous factors. There was also a difference between the most senior level civil servants and the less senior staff, with the latter indicating less exposure and direct engagement, especially in Morocco. Hence, while the position and place of the civil servant matters, the trend is one of broadening exposure across a larger number of civil servants. Finally, there is the important issue of national aspirations. This is an important factor in all countries, and most explicitly in Morocco. Specific aspirations that were frequently mentioned included striving for transparency and open government, improved national reputation and position (on indicators), and professionalism. This is important given that it makes it more likely that civil servants will adopt and internalize international trends (which go in the same direction) and align with international partners. This, together with self-​image and identity, is among the factors most conducive to a greater impact of globalization. Coming back to our typology, examining structural factors (and more specifically accountability systems) and behavioural/​organizational factors together is critical to gaining an understanding of not only the level of impact of globalization on civil servants, but also on what the main filters determining this level of impact are. Whether and how filters apply and work remains a core element of analyses on globalization and its impact on civil servants. Four potential filters identified in the earlier work by Welch and Wong (1998) still prove to be relevant today, with one of these (formal-​level structure) not having a significant impact in our cases, while the three others (accountability systems, administrative and political culture, and position and place of the civil servant) are important and have a mitigating impact on the influence of global principles and norms. Based on our analysis, self-​ image/​identity and aspirations are important additional factors that enhance the impact of globalization, and these were not covered in previous studies. These are therefore critical elements to be considered when analysing the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of patterns of global influence on national civil servants. To conclude, as regards the development of theoretical frameworks on globalization and its impact on civil servants, we tested a new typology 193

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of civil servants based on two elements, bureaucratic accountability and depth of socialization. Focusing on three critical dimensions of globalization –​performance, interaction/​socialization, and transparency/​ participation –​our analysis provided evidence of the relevance of the typology when trying to understand the dynamic and rapidly changing evolution of interrelationships between global norms, standards, and engagement matters, and the positioning and behaviour of civil servants, adding a new evidence-​based approach to earlier work (Hopkins, 1976; Welch and Wong, 1998) on this important topic. In our typology of four possible responses (traditionalist, professional, engaged, and rebel), we found that the three dimensions of globalization influence the day-​to-​day work of civil servants, and have an impact on their relations with political leaders. There is also a broadly held view that many of the principles and norms transmitted through globalization are aligned with the public and national interest, which civil servants believe they should uphold. This pushes civil servants to engage more in evidence and information gathering, and present this to political leaders, so as to ensure global principles and norms are followed and upheld, and to behave as the professional type. However, while global principles and norms are seen as important, at this point in time the number of civil servants that would engage or even rebel in order to uphold these norms and principles remains limited. We found that strong filters are one of the critical explanatory factors for this apparent contraction between growing socialization of global norms and principles and the still restrained behaviour when it comes to proactively advocating for these (either internally or by involving external stakeholders). Starting from the identification and analysis of filters (formal/​ legal and cultural/​behavioural), and using vignette techniques, we were able to gain a deeper understanding of the ‘what’ and ‘how’ regarding the way transmission channels for globalization (indicators, direct interaction, and open government norms and principles) affect civil servants. Starting from filters, and expanding on those identified in earlier studies, we built a deeper and evidence-​based understanding on how and why influence from global norms and principles comes about, on what dimensions it works, and where it will likely not (for example, where internal decision-​ making processes are concerned). As a next step, one could expand the application of this approach to other contexts –​for example, less open or natural resource-​based economies, lower capacity and income contexts, or high-​income economies –​and identify whether and how filters operate there. While we believe that the three elements of globalization discussed here are the most important ones when it comes to impact on civil servants and civil service systems, other elements could also potentially be explored. This would then help to further test and elaborate on the analytical model. 194

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Civil servants and globalization: conclusions on the theses and research question The methodological and theoretical insight, then, bring us back to the answers to the main research question: What is the impact that engagement with global actors and networks has had on civil servants in terms of accountability and professionalization (what transmission channels matter and in what way)? We formulated four theses to arrive at an answer to this question: Thesis 1: Globalization is one of the disruptors of traditional accountability systems, as globalization has an impact on both direct and indirect accountability mechanisms. (This creates space for the emergence of ‘engaged’ and ‘rebel’ types.) Thesis 2: Globalization affects politico-​administrative relations by increasing access to information and enhancing transparency (namely, it reduces the credibility of finger pointing). While globalization has diluted civil servants’ roles in the provision of policy advice, it has also given them access to new networks and relations that they can use to strengthen their positions. (This leads to behaviour associated with ‘engaged’ and ‘rebel’ types.) Thesis 3: Globalization triggers bureaucratic responses that lead to change in values. (This pushes civil servants to behave in ways associated with the ‘professional’ type, away from the ‘traditional’ type.) Thesis 4: The global open government movement (including the push for freedom of information, participatory practices, and Open Data) impacts on the role and behaviour of civil servants vis-​á-​vis stakeholders. (This leads to behaviour associated with ‘engaged’ and ‘rebel’ types.) Overall, interview results and trend analysis in the development of relations between civil servants and transnational actors all show a significant step up in engagement between the two. This was expected given the relatively open nature of the economies and, in addition, the state of transition in which each of the countries finds itself, and the associated step up in international support. Except for Morocco, all countries are also directly and deeply affected by crises in neighbouring countries, further adding to the deepening and broadening international engagement in each of the countries. As per the discussion in Chapter 4, the changing nature of relations between civil servants and transnational partners is seen mostly positively by civil servants, given country financial support needs and also the opportunities to broaden 195

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horizons, get exposure to new working methods, and form new alliances. In this overall context we reviewed each of the theses, which led to the following main findings, as summarized in Table 6.3 and, subsequently, in the individual initial theses we stipulated in Chapter 1. Thesis 1: Globalization is one of the disruptors of traditional vertical accountability systems, as globalization has an impact on both direct and indirect accountability mechanisms. We followed the definition of accountability given by Lührmann et al (2020), as ‘de facto constraints on the government’s use of political power through requirements for justification of its actions and potential sanctions by both citizens and oversight institutions’ (p 812). By government we mean the political heads of the ministries and senior civil servants in the executive. These conclusions are drawn from Vignettes 1, 2, and 3, since in all these hypothetical situations the civil servants were asked by the political actor (traditional agent of accountability) to act on the periphery or against the governance principles and ideas for which globalization advocates. We were interested to understand how, why, and through which processes civil servants responded (what behavioural responses were natural, and if these included proactive engagement with any type of accountability mechanisms: vertical, horizontal, or diagonal6). Thus, instead of directly asking about accountability, our intention was to avoid social desirability bias and rather engage associations with experience gained in situations that were familiar to interviewees, namely, the effective exercise of de facto accountability rather than having introduced de jure institutions of accountability. The responses obtained generated several important observations. First, results show that civil servants across the countries consider themselves guardians of national/​public interest,7 going beyond what they perceive as the narrower political interests of politicians. Civil servants considered it their duty to try and convince political leaders when the latter intended to take a decision that civil servants saw as wrong or, in the oppositive case, help them if their inclination was right but they faced opposing pressures. Second, civil servants in all countries tried to utilize professional means of additional data gathering, analysis, and evidence for persuasion –​we clearly saw the rise of the professional civil servant (see Table 6.3). Professional standards and national interest were their drivers, especially in Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. Civil servants saw their role as challenging and as influencing political leaders from within, especially when national interests were concerned, and put a strong emphasis on internal accountability. In the case of Jordan, we did not observe efforts to constrain a minister’s actions by initiating horizontal and/​or diagonal accountability mechanisms. Civil servants do not go beyond initial direct advice and the provision of evidence, 196

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Table 6.3: Response types by transmission channel and by country Transmission channel

Jordan

Lebanon

Morocco

Tunisia

1.  P  erformance indicators, rankings, and ratings (Ch. 3, Vignette 2)

Traditionalist/​ Traditionalist/​ Professional/​ Professional/​ professional engaged/​rebel traditionalist engaged

2.  E  ngagement with Traditionalist IOs (collaboration and coordination) (Ch. 4, Vignette 1)

Traditionalist

Professional/​ Professional/​rebel engaged

3.  C  onsultations Traditionalist with stakeholders (public participation in decision making) (Ch. 4, Vignette 4)

Professional

Professional/​ Professional engaged

4a. Open government Traditionalist (transparency and access) (Ch. 5, Vignette 3)

Professional/​ engaged

Professional Professional

4b. Open government –​ 2nd step

Traditionalist/​ Engaged/​ professional rebel

Traditionalist

Traditionalist

as they wish to avoid facing the consequences for not following the political agent. The justification of the decisions to follow the minister in relation to ministerial decision is generally ‘to protect myself ’. Thus, we can see that if initial persuasion is not successful, the professional civil servant turns into a traditionalist type. In terms of engagement with horizontal actors of accountability, including parliament and other oversight agencies, the option for civil servants to directly engage with them (to raise concerns over political decisions related to globalization dimensions and not seen as in the national interest) was raised on an ad hoc basis, but not frequently (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5, and Figures 3.1, 4.1, and 5.1). Nevertheless, there were considerable differences across the countries and globalization dimensions. Jordanian and Tunisian civil servants were the least inclined to turn to horizontal institutions of accountability. Lebanese and Moroccan civil servants, on the other hand, would more systematically turn to these, moving in our typology to engaged or, in some instances, the rebel type. In Lebanon, civil servants would turn to political 197

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accountability institutions, such as the parliament, political party members, or even the political opposition, showing characteristics of the rebel type, while in Morocco, they would turn to independent oversight institutions within public administration, as engaged civil servants. Nevertheless, the pattern also depends on what dimensions of globalization and transmission channels we consider. For instance, in the case of the supposed breach of access to information legislation (Vignette 3) it was only Lebanese and Moroccan civil servants who turned to horizontal accountability mechanisms, even though all civil servants perceived the action presented in the vignette (non-​decision in granting information to FOIA request) as not only unethical but as breaking the law (see Chapter 5). With few exceptions, leveraging international partners or CSOs/​media was not seen as either legitimate or useful. Thus, ‘diagonal accountability’ (Lindberg, 2013; Lührmann et al, 2020), which reflects the contribution of non-​state actors to accountability, was not considered (except on an ad hoc basis by rebel civil servants in Lebanon, who considered leaking information to them as a possible response). Overall, on the aspect of accountability, loyalty and hierarchy considerations continued to dominate and civil servants remained largely professional. The notable exception to the pattern is Jordan, where loyalty to ministers and the leadership prevailed over other factors. Even where in Jordan the civil servants would make efforts to ‘correct’ any position of a minister that they saw as having a potentially negative implication for the country’s reputation, they would, in the end, align with the political leadership and remain passive/​traditionalist bureaucrats with every global issue. The responses obtained from civil servants in the interview process, along with the conclusions of the literature review in Chapter 2, provide evidence of impact on a broader ongoing change in internal accountability (perceived roles and responsibility, where performance on indicators creates a clear contrast between general/​national interest and narrow constituency interests), and a growing notion of separate responsibilities for civil servants and politicians, in three of the four countries. In this respect, when global indicators or global standards (for example on open government and freedom of information) align with what is seen as national interest (national image and performance), globalization has the potential to have a strong impact on civil servants, especially in situations where politicians (because of differing interests) may pursue different solutions. While traditional notions of hierarchy remain strong, and the socioeconomic conditions prevalent in the countries put a priority on not putting one’s job at risk, there is a notable trend towards greater alignment between civil servants’ values and priorities and global principles and aspirations, though there is a limited willingness to step out of their traditional role and advocate for these values. 198

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Thesis 2: Globalization affects politico-​administrative relations by increasing access to information and enhancing transparency (namely, it reduces the credibility of finger pointing). While globalization has diluted civil servants’ roles in the provision of policy advice, it has also given them access to new networks and relations that they can use to strengthen their positions. Turning to Thesis 2, politico-​administrative relations in the Middle East and North Africa are evolving from a single command and control model to a more heterogeneous model. Countries in the region are in different places on this trajectory, as reflected in the differing situations in the four countries studied here. When it comes to performance and its transmission through global indicators, there is ample evidence that indicators accelerate a push for performance in systems that are still in the early stages of creating more result-​based management approaches. Given the importance of reputation to each of the countries (and, indeed, more broadly in the region), indicator systems have led to the creation of result-​based institutional tracking and follow-​up mechanisms that are not yet a mainstay of the country institutional systems. Public sector governance is changing in the MENA region, and global pressures to perform arising from global performance indicators play a role in helping drive this change. The reforms initiated in the four countries also sharpen the growing separation of the political and administrative spheres, or in other words, the departure from being a traditionalist bureaucrat towards a professional one who voices his or her opinions and actively seeks the knowledge and analytical tools to support it –​a trend commented on by many interviewees. The distance between politicians and civil servants is increasing in three out of the four countries. Challenges by civil servants of the motives and actions of politicians emerge as a feature of this from the interviews, as does the sentiment among civil servants that they are being scapegoated by politicians unwilling to put the national interest over narrower constituency interest. Given the emphasis on performance and accountability, international indicator systems are therefore a disrupter and accelerator for broader changes and a move towards performance management, EBPM, and the emergence of an engaged type of civil servant. Global engagement also creates alternative opportunities for building networks and support systems where direct loyalty to politicians is no longer the rule, both directly with representatives of international partners and within the administration with likeminded colleagues. Though it is still rare to observe a rebel official type, who is ready to mobilize other stakeholders and policy networks and advocate for change, there is a definite move towards the engaged civil servant type, as civil servants become increasingly aware of the benefits that engagement with stakeholders bring. Thus, while 199

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not a straightforward route (especially given the still evolving relations with international partners and external stakeholders, which creates a degree of reserve in civil servants), it is at least openly discussed, and this in itself is an important conclusion. Thesis 3: Globalization triggers bureaucratic responses that lead to change in values. Concerning Thesis 3, one notable trend is that many civil servants are looking for opportunities to work for transnational organizations, given the perceived deterioration of the national context, especially in Tunisia and Lebanon. Some respondents have a previous track record working in transnational organizations but have returned to the national civil service; this was mostly seen in Morocco. Work on indicators and engagement with international partners makes civil servants more visible to politicians, and this can facilitate civil servants’ moving to more political positions (ministerial cabinets). However, for most interviewees this was not an ambition, given the short-​lived nature of governments and, at least in Lebanon and Tunisia, a growing reluctance to engage with the political class. Hence, a more political engagement is more of a risk factor than a benefit. Our interviews showed that overall senior civil servants have become more exposed to global issues (substantively) as well as to international actors in their day-​to-​day work. What officials emphasize is that engagement with international bureaucrats, especially with larger multilateral ones, provides learning opportunities and exposure to new working methods, especially on result-​based management. This perspective was shared more broadly than expected, including by civil servants not in frequent contact with international partners. Therefore, it is not surprising that civil servants are actively utilizing the concepts and argumentation of performance (aspirations/​national interest), socialization (direct engagement with international partners), and transparency/​ participation (open government movement). More importantly, exposure to international civil servants and work, combined with the inflow of information and international cooperation, professionalizes the bureaucratic responses at the domestic level. We observed in the responses a move from the traditionalist official, following the coercive capacity of the classical principal–​agent relation, to more of a professional official, who voices his/​her concerns but is not yet ready to take the next steps and become engaged (proactive). Nevertheless, we do observe an increase in bureaucratic discretion, with civil servants willing to take additional actions and bring evidence to the principal to change his or her mind for the sake of protecting national or even public value of ideas. The engaged type, who uses space and discretion to mobilize stakeholders, comes through in a minority of cases in Tunisia and Morocco, while we see the appearance of the rebel type mostly in Lebanon. 200

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Our data from the vignettes shift the focus of attention from the level of argumentation to persuade a political actor (professional bureaucrat) to the level of acting in a conflict situation (engaged or rebel bureaucrat). It therefore opens the debate around the internalization of values. In the words of March and Olsen (2004), the essence of socialization (and bureaucratic engagement) is a change in the logic of action, from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness. Checkel (2005) distinguishes Type I socialization as role-​ playing, when actors consciously accept the norms of behaviour, whereas Type II assumes that actors are persuaded by the ‘rightness’ of a norm. More recently, this distinction was also applied to the international and global levels (Freyburg, 2015; Meyer-​Sahling et al, 2016). In our analysis, we find that the daily application and exposure to globalized ideas, standards, and rules, transmitted through indicators, socialization, and the open government initiative, has had a positive effect on civil servants’ attitudes towards an EBPM style (becoming professional or engaged types). Civil servants, as shown in Chapters 3 through 5, actively evoke values related to global dimensions, such as rule of law, transparency, accountability, and evidence (see Figures 3.1, 4.1, and 5.1). There is an overall agreement on values associated with indices across the countries, though still less so with transparency and participation. The global value of participation assumes that civil servants not only seek to guarantee the process of intake of knowledge to governmental decision making in order to enable meaningful deliberation, but in addition that civil servants are willing to admit that non-​state actors representing all relevant interests are of value to decision making. This shift has not yet occurred, and we were surprised to see quite a number of civil servants struggling to see the benefits of participatory processes when the hypothetical situation was framed positively but, at the same time, presented potential problems that required further action to ensure dominant interests were not over represented. Thus, on this particular global issue we do not yet see a transformation towards an engaged bureaucrat, who is willing to coordinate various stakeholders and interests, but rather a swing between passive traditionalist and professional responses. Civil servants in Jordan, in particular, are inclined to formalistic ‘note taking’ rather than active engagement and additional steps, including analysis. Good government rhetoric and pressure from international partners do constitute attempts to change the administration by making it economically more efficient and democratically more transparent and collaborative. However, the true application of open government requires a substantial change in the role and behaviour of civil servants that, at this point, is only partially present, at best. A number of senior civil servants maintain global ideas and norms when national experience motivates them to do so –​when national political pressures predispose them to embrace globalism or when global ideas (indicators, open government agenda) appear to benefit their country. However, public administration culture seems to prevent deeper 201

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changes, influenced as it is by Islamic values of ‘shura’ or consultation, characterized by consultative decision-​making styles in rhetoric, but not in practice (Iles et al, 2012). Accordingly, decisions are not made jointly, and are not delegated down the hierarchy. Subordinates still see joint decision making as an indication of weakness, and do not have expectations for participation in decision making. For some, consultation is used ‘to manage conflicts, persuade potential allies, and save face, as well as gather information’ (Iles et al, 2012, p 7). Our findings confirm that civil servants still dislike committees or group meetings, preferring one-​to-​one consultation in a personalized and informal way, as noted earlier, and thus behaviour reflecting a willingness to please international organizations as well as to ensure that the traditional demands of public administration culture are observed. Thesis 4: The global open government movement (including the push for freedom of information, participatory practices, and Open Data) impacts on the role and behaviour of civil servants vis-​á-​vis stakeholders. Finally, on Thesis 4, open government and freedom of information principles have become key dimensions of the globalization in the past decade but are still new to the broader MENA region. Nevertheless, the four countries discussed here include those that are most advanced in implementing policies that tend in this direction (see our discussion in Chapters 1, 2, and 5 on this issue). The overarching sentiment that transparency is an objective that countries should strive for came out in interviews in all four countries, most strongly in Morocco and Tunisia. These are, at the same time, the countries most advanced in terms of both participation in the OGP (with Tunisia already on its third national programme) and the implementation of ATI legislation (Open Government Partnership Tunisia, 2020). On the latter, Tunisia is the positive outlier among the four countries. It is in this area that international engagement has the greatest change generation potential, especially given the previously closed nature of country governance systems (with the exception of Lebanon). Indicator systems and direct engagement move the needle, as documented earlier, but if adherence to open government principles is permeating national civil service systems and is internalized by civil servants, this is a more significant game changer. The evidence from the hypothetical situations in Vignettes 3 and 4, and the interview process, is that this internalization process is only at an early stage, and the response of civil servants did not match with values expressed towards open government principles (and thus we see them more as professional bureaucrats, who know the rhetoric from being exposed intensely to transnational actors but are not yet fully living up to the words and engaging to ensure these values are upheld). 202

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First, in all the countries, civil servants expressed some concerns and sometimes unease with new open government approaches. In the concrete situation they faced in Vignette 3, they expressed concerns over the potential of sensitive data relating to economic competitiveness getting out in public, of workload increase from access to information requests, over stakeholders’ motivations, and so on. Thus, this was the only global dimension where civil servants were not even in the stage of Type I socialization, consciously accepting the global norms. Second, the actual behaviour ranged from that of a civil servant wanting to satisfy all to those looking for strategies and actions to win time rather than decisively act according to the values linked with data provision. To sum up, the chapters put forward evidence on various civil service responses to dilemma situations that mirrored their true perceptions and values vis-​á-​vis globalization issues. The overall finding on the four vignettes confirmed that four types of civil servants emerge as a response to globalization, as discussed earlier (see Table 6.1 earlier in this chapter). Differences in terms of professional response and accountability have always existed between civil servants; nevertheless, these have increased as some civil servants seem to adapt to some global issues more, and thereby gain additional ‘insight’ regarding global norms and global governance. For transnational actors that have devoted much time and effort to helping national states to engage with governance principles, an important issue is whether indicators and principles, or some combination thereof, best promote value change (or paradigm shift, as often claimed). The responses to the questions also highlight an insufficient investment in training, communication, and resources, making it difficult for civil servants to fully apply open government principles, even when these are legislated for and anchored in formal rules. There is a sharp contrast between the sentiment that transparent and open government is an essential change for the better and the low level of comfort with, or even distrust of, the benefits of applying these principles in day-​to-​day engagements. It is, therefore, here that we see the greatest potential for direct impact of globalization on civil servants and civil service systems, and also the longest road to travel: it will take more than the ten years that have elapsed since the Arab Spring for this impact to be fully felt by citizens and for these principles to be fully internalized by civil servants, namely its outcome of sustained compliance of these new norms and rules of the global community (Checkel, 2005).

Research question Turning then to the main research question we posed, while studying systems in transition means working on an evolving reality, a number of factors emerge clearly. 203

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First, globalization, in each of the three dimensions discussed here, has a rapidly growing impact on civil servants in each of the four countries. Nevertheless, the experience of civil servants, and their perceptions, values, and narratives related to global ideas and how are they translated to day-​ to-​day rules, norms, and subsequent behaviour, differ across the countries and between dimensions of globalization. Globalization is highly significant when it comes to interaction and socialization, transmitted through direct engagement, with rapidly broadening and deepening exposure of civil servants to transnational actors in each of the countries. This has created new opportunities for civil servants, but also driven changes in the organizational (and political) environment to which they are still adjusting. Some of the forms of this impact include more time spent on engagement with international partner representatives, more direct exposure to reform pressures emanating from these engagements, and a greater need for a coordinated and joined up approach when coordination capacity has declined. Consequently, this global dimension is most significantly reflected in value internalization, perceptions, and a shift in the behaviour of civil servants into engaged civil servants, and even into rebel bureaucrats. In terms of the global dimension of performance, as transmitted through global indicator systems, the impact is less obvious, as responding to these directly involves a smaller number of civil servants. However, indicator systems have a significant indirect impact as reference points for civil servants looking for an ‘anchor’ in the evolving reality of their country context. Indicator systems help in giving content and reference points to broader notions of ‘national interest’ that civil servants perceive as their main anchor. Here too, an emergence of the professional and, in some instances, engaged civil servants can be observed. Global norms and standards on transparency/​participation, transmitted through the open government movement, serve as an aspiration for civil servants. While civil servants are still adjusting to new freedom of information practices and open government-​related requirements, there is a broad recognition of this being a good practice that reflects positively on the country (and hence aligns with the broader perceived role of working for the national or public interest), though it has not yet translated in an adjustment in behaviour, which remains more on the professional side or even on the passive traditionalist typology (Jordan). Second, as regards accountability and professionalization, important shifts are occurring in all countries. Here too, influences that come through globalization are part of a new ‘anchor’ for civil servants. The influence is indirect (as civil servants’ loyalty is not being transferred to external actors and remains firmly with the national interest and system) but important. Nevertheless, the actual proactive use of both horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms is limited to some types of globalization 204

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dimension and countries (civil servants in Lebanon and Morocco are more inclined to utilize these). Contributing to country performance in the international system has become a core element of accountability, especially for senior civil servants. This has permeated the national system more broadly than before, and has been noted and experienced even by those civil servants not directly engaged with international actors. While we do not find broad direct impact on professionalization (except perhaps for an intuitive need to bring data and evidence for the persuasion of political actors), civil servants working with international partner institutions consistently view this as an opportunity to learn new skills and working methods. In addition, coordination systems to track and respond to indicator systems, where these are in place, and cross-​governmental coordination systems to engage in dialogue with budget financing partners, enhance system coherence and are important as a countervailing tendency, especially in countries like Lebanon and Tunisia that are suffering from increased system fragmentation. Finally, we come back to the importance of understanding filters and how these mitigate globalization impact. As noted in the previous section, administrative culture and tradition is a significant filter, shown especially in the case of Jordan. We identified self-​image and identity as a further filter that has a strong impact, and which it would be important to explore further in the development of the analytical model. Overall, and reflecting many nuances that are country-​and context-​ specific, our findings reflect the broad impact of globalization, in the three dimensions examined here, experienced by senior civil servants and the civil service, both on aspects of accountability and professionalization, and also in creating new reference points and aspirations for civil servants –​something that is particularly important for systems in transition. The transition process in the countries has contributed to an acceleration of globalized engagement on all three dimensions, but especially regarding direct engagement with international development partners.

Towards a forward-looking research agenda While not a new subject, the impact of globalization on civil servants and civil service systems is an underexplored topic. Whereas the impact of transnational bureaucracies (international organizations) and globalization on national policies and elite responses have received broad attention (Kelley, 2017; Pal and Tok, 2019; Ege et al, 2020, and so on), the way growing global engagement and the rapidly developing set of global norms and indicators affect those in the front line of designing and implementing policy has been underexplored. By the term impact and/​or affect we refer to changes in 205

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our unit of analysis (the civil servant) –​change in behaviour and change in value perceptions, which are often intertwined. In preparing for this study, we found little or no evidence of empirical research on the topic, even if a start had been made as early as 1998 with the development of an analytical model. On the latter, we found the Welch and Wong (1998) model is still a good departure point for analysis today, even though, with the rapid evolution of globalization over the last two decades, new dimensions (and filters) have emerged that have created new and more nuanced response typologies in civil servants, which we defined and tested in our study. We realize that a four-​country study is a starting point for filling an important research gap in the public administration field, but based on the conclusions covering methodology, theory, and findings, we believe there is significant scope for broadening and deepening this work. Transition states, like those covered here, are different from ‘settled’ economies and political systems, and MIC are of course only one category of country experiencing impacts of globalization. Impact on civil servants from low-​ income countries, with higher dependence on international partners’ support but weaker capacity, would be expected to differ from the countries studied here, as would the impact on high-​income countries, and even more so in those countries that help shape the trends in globalization. The middle-​income group of countries, however, is important as a point of focus, given their pivotal role in the global economy and their overall relatively advanced institutional setup, and their choice as a starting point therefore remains justified. Further work on other groups would be of great interest, including following up on earlier research from the 1970s on the USA as a country that traditionally helped shape globalization (Raadschelders and Verheijen, 2019). Research that focuses on deepening our understanding of how influencing and being influenced work is equally important. While there is important work out there on civil servants’ role perception in various contexts, the importance of self-​image and identity (an aspect closely related to but different from administrative culture as a filter/​driver of globalization impact on civil servants) also needs further work. Further analysis on the impact of globalization on patterns of accountability would also be important given the contrasting conclusions we came to within our study. This subject, therefore, is of importance to the field of public administration and public management, and we hope and believe that the findings of our study will inspire others to take this important agenda forward in further research. Notes 1

As discussed in Chapter 1, there is significant academic literature on the impact of globalization on national policies (for example literature on conditionality [for example 206

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2

3

4

5

6

7

Radwan, 2020], on problem-​based engagement [Andrews, 2013 and Andrews et al, 2017], on multi-​level governance systems [Meyer-​Sahling and Van Stolk, 2015, and so on], and on what defines the level of impact of international partners on national policies [work by the Aiddata lab, see Custer et al, 2015 and 2018, 2021]). The latter strand of work comes closest to the topic of this study. In addition, recent work specifically focusing on MENA includes work by Pal and Tok on international organizations and Muslim organizations (Pal and Tok, 2019). The exception to this trend is Morocco, where many years of cautious reforms have created a civil service system that is more resilient and adjusted to today’s realities. In the case of Lebanon one of the authors conducted the interviews, but this author has not worked in Lebanon or with Lebanese officials in the past five years, hence reducing the risk. From the interview records, there is much more and much closer cooperation on joint projects, which have multiplied over the last ten years, which does increase exposure and engagement. There is greater reported alignment in positions between politicians and civil servants in Morocco than in Tunisia. We followed the organization of accountability into subtypes based on spatial direction between actors (see Lindberg, 2013; Lührman et al, 2020). Vertical accountability is a relationship between non-​equals (top-​down), while horizontal is a relationship between more or less equal institutions (different branches, oversight institutions) and diagonal accountability represents outside actors (media and civil society). A distinction was made between national interest (mostly brought up in relation to Vignettes 1, 2, and 4) and public interest (mostly referred to in relation to Vignette 3, when the minister was taking a decision that contravened national legal norms).

207

Final Thoughts The writing of this book was completed in late May 2021. Subsequent events, some significant, are therefore not reflected in the writing, except when acknowledged in endnotes if we thought they were essential. The political events in Tunisia in July 2021 are well known and documented. While it is not clear at this point where these will lead, some may argue that it negates the existence of a ‘Tunisian exception’ when it comes to democratization and pluralism in the MENA region. Yet Tunisia is a country known for its resilience, and historically has been known to weather major storms in unexpected ways. Therefore, we kept the narrative as it was during the two years we worked on this research project, which we believe is fair to our respondents. The discontinuation of the EDB indicator is another such event. Part of this book’s narrative is about the power of global performance indicators and their influence, and we believe that the notion that global performance indicators have, increasingly, an impact on decision makers and civil servants remains intact. The growing number and diversity of performance indicators, and the way these are discussed and used globally, is evidence that this is a trend and tendency that goes beyond individual performance indicators. Coming back to the introduction, stories on the demise of globalization have been written many times over. However, the trends of our times, whether they are about global solutions to the COVID-​19 pandemic or climate change, show that even if many are deeply concerned about the impact of globalization, most of the fundamental issues facing us today transcend boundaries. Therefore, one of the most important takeaways from our study may be that building civil service systems that are based on that awareness and are fit to face global issues is a ‘must’ for our future.

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Index References to figures and graphs appear in italic type; those in bold type refer to tables and boxes. References to endnotes show both the page number and the note number (231n3). A access to information  15, 18, 24–​6, 28, 34, 35, 37–​9, 50, 58, 69, 71, 105, 144–​5, 147–​52, 152, 155–​6, 156, 159–​60, 163–​5, 170–​1, 173, 189, 191–​2, 195, 198–​9, 203 accountability  direct  18, 26, 170, 191 bureaucratic  9–​10, 13, 13, 15, 23 horizontal  10, 26, 190, 198 indirect  26, 195 mechanisms  26, 71, 104, 140, 159, 162, 170–​1, 173–​4, 177, 181, 195–​6, 198, 204 pattern of  5 public  149 systems  10, 15, 26–​7, 38, 62, 104, 108, 139–​40, 161, 171, 173, 181, 183, 189–​91, 193, 195–​6 tools  18, 26 traditional  26, 195 vertical  10, 183, 190, 196, 204, 207n6 administrative traditions  11, 38, 60–​1, 69, 70 African Development Bank (AfDB)  56, 117, 122–​3 aid  15, 21, 44, 45, 47, 49, 65, 110, 110, 152 bilateral  110–​11 International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)  110, 116 multilateral  110 Aiddata  4, 20–​2, 27, 28, 38, 54, 59, 118, 123–​4 Ali, H.E.  50, 52, 64, 67–​8 Andrews, M.  4, 8, 11, 107, 178 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank  108 Arab spring  6, 29, 50, 109, 112, 144, 146–​8, 203 B Bauer, M.  12, 39n1, 41, 60, 62, 70 budget support  21, 50, 116–​17, 118, 125, 126, 148, 151, 193

bureaucracy  10, 67, 90, 93–​4, 153, 157, 181, 190 C Checkel, J.T.  12, 31, 32, 183, 201, 203 civil service  career  27, 63, 70, 136–​8, 141, 162, 180–​1 concepts of accountability  15 independent commissions  11 management  6, 11, 15, 30 performance  15, 200 professionalism  10, 32, 91, 192 reform  4, 65–​6 relations  5 systems  3–​9, 13, 15–​16, 19, 28, 37–​8, 40, 42, 46, 60–​1, 63, 66, 68–​71, 103, 139, 143, 181, 187, 194, 202–​3, 205, 207n2, 208 values  11 civil society organization (CSO)  17–​18, 57, 77, 92, 104, 105, 110, 146, 149, 150, 168–​9, 190–​1, 198 collaboration  7, 27, 34, 35, 54, 64, 99, 125, 126, 144, 147–​8, 150, 154, 168, 169 collaborative leadership  125, 128 conditionalities  130 consultation  24, 90, 125, 126, 131–​5, 133, 139, 145–​6, 148, 164–​8, 166, 168, 170–​1, 173, 192, 197, 202 coordination  34, 35, 109, 117, 125, 126, 135, 183, 192, 193, 197 capacity  204 challenges  119–​21, 123, 124 failure  130 horizontal  38, 130 inter-​sectoral  19 mechanism  125, 178 system  101, 130, 205 vertical  130 COVAX  3, 109

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COVID-​19  3, 5, 43, 46, 52–​3, 65, 68, 71, 78, 108–​9, 112, 177, 184, 189, 208 Custer, S.  4, 12, 20–​2, 28, 35, 38, 54, 56, 59, 107, 118, 207n1 D democratization  57–​8, 172, 178–​9 E Economic Freedom Index (EFI)  48, 50, 78, 80–​1, 83 Enabling Doing Business (also Doing Business) (EDB)​  18, 39n3, 77–​8, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 95, 97–​101, 208 engagement  citizen  24, 144, 149 of civil servants  15, 103, 105, 187 direct  4–​5, 22, 26, 47, 75, 103–​5, 136, 138, 185, 189, 193, 200, 202, 204–​5 global  6, 9, 23, 40, 70, 108, 140–​1, 177–​8, 199, 205 informal  128–​9 international  5, 15, 18, 20, 22, 29, 54, 61, 119–​21, 137–​9, 141, 195, 202 national  18, 54 European Commission (EC)  19, 23 European Union (EU)  8–​11, 19–​20, 27, 47, 49, 51, 55, 57–​58, 66, 72n4, 95, 112, 117, 122–​3, 142n7–​8 F Fragile and Conflict States  20, 67–​8 Free Access to Information Law/​Act (FOIA)  24, 28, 39, 144, 150, 156, 157–​8, 159–​61, 198 freedom of information  27–​8, 39, 143–​4, 154–​5, 164–​5, 167, 174, 195, 198, 202, 204 French Development Agency (AFD)  117, 142 G Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance  22, 109, 123 German Development Bank (KFW)  117, 142n8 global  indicators  7, 76, 87, 91, 94, 101, 103, 198, 199 influence  4, 14, 108, 177, 189, 193 issues  7, 88, 186, 200, 203, 208 pressure  8–​9, 12–​14, 106, 143, 179, 188, 199 value  41, 52, 53, 76, 191, 201 Global Competitiveness Indicator (GCI)  16, 42, 77, 78, 80–​2, 84, 91, 98–​100 Global Open Data Index (ODI)  79, 155 Global Right to Information (GRI)  152 rating  79, 152 globalization  changing reality of  5 effect of  184

engagement on  7 impact of  3–​4, 8–​9, 14, 16, 19, 28–​9, 37, 40, 59, 70, 104, 108, 139, 145, 169, 177–​8, 187, 190, 192–​3, 203, 205–​6, 208 impact on civil servants  4, 16, 23, 37, 78, 101, 107, 178, 185, 193–​4, 198, 204, 206 influence of  4–​5, 9, 26, 66, 140, 191–​2, 194 process of  5, 145 relationship with the civil service  14, 194 trend towards  5 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries  7, 46, 51 H hierarchy  10, 14, 26, 62–​4, 67, 69–​70, 88–​9, 91–​2, 104–​5, 129–​30, 139, 155, 159, 160, 178, 180, 182, 191–​2, 198, 202 Hopkins, R.F.  4, 194 human capital  42, 49, 77, 84, 95, 96, 106n3 Human Capital Index (HCI)  16, 18, 42, 78, 95, 99 I identity  45, 169, 172, 181, 190, 192–​3, 205, 206 Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM)  151 institutional boundary  14, 88, 91, 182 institutional dynamics  5, 61 institutionalization  10, 24, 48, 91, 96, 101–​3, 180, 182 interest groups  37, 77, 168 International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)  110, 110, 116 International Budget Partnership (IBP)  148 International Corruption Perception Index (CPI)  78 International Monetary Fund (IMF)  15–​16, 20, 53, 55, 66, 111–​12, 115, 116–​17, 123, 146, 148 International Organizations (IOs)  12, 20, 29–​30, 32, 34–​7, 39n1, 77, 87, 88, 90, 92–​5, 97, 103–​4, 125, 125, 132, 133, 138, 143, 156, 163, 165, 166, 191–​3, 197, 205, 207n1 investment climate  9, 77, 78, 100 J Jreisat, J.E.  55–​6, 63, 66–​7, 70, 143–​7, 152 K Kelley, J.  14, 17–​18, 28, 35, 76–​8, 87, 92, 205 L leaking information  88, 162, 181, 182, 198 liberalization  41–​2, 45, 47–​9, 51–​2, 67, 147, 151 Likert scale  33–​4, 88, 156, 185, 189 Listening to Leaders (survey)  21–​2, 38, 54, 59, 118, 122–​3

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CIVIL SERVANTS AND GLOBALIZATION

Logistics Performance Index (LPI)  42, 78, 95, 96, 99–​100 Low Income Countries (LIC)  206 M Maghreb  7, 40, 56, 184 Mashreq  7, 40, 184 media  14, 18, 23, 33, 76–​7, 93, 102, 104–​5, 112, 146, 156, 157, 162–​5, 168, 171, 181, 183, 190–​1, 198, 207n6 Middle Income Countries (MIC)  21, 69, 109, 111–​12, 178–​80, 206 Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)  95–​6 mobilizing  88, 90, 92, 128, 157, 159–​60, 162–​3, 181 Moloney, K.  12, 39n1, 178 multi-​level governance  4–​5, 8–​9, 75, 207n1 N National Committee for the Business Environment (CNEA)  99 national interest (also public interest)  43, 63, 84, 90, 91–​2, 94, 97–​8, 102–​6, 126, 128, 129, 131, 134–​6, 139–​40, 157, 161, 165, 180–​1, 182, 190–​2, 194, 196–​200, 204, 207n7 network  14, 18, 21, 25–​6, 35, 58, 64, 88, 90, 93, 105, 119, 128, 140, 181, 195, 199 New Public Management (NPM)  13, 15, 42, 65, 156 non-​governmental organizations (NGO)  22, 39n1, 143, 148, 164, 165 O OECD  8, 11, 13, 15, 33, 57–​8, 65, 95, 106, 111, 142n2, 146, 148–​9, 152, 167 MENA–​OECD Ministerial Conference  145 OECD Development Assistance Centre (DAC)  111–​12, 116 Open Government Data Index  23 PISA  17–​18 offshore  41, 70, 72n1, 179 onshore  41, 70, 179 Open Budget Index  97, 155 Open Data  24, 28, 50, 143, 151, 153–​5, 170, 195, 202 Open Data Barometer  154–​5 Open Data Index  79, 154–​5, 174 Open Data Readiness Assessment (ODRA)  154 Open Government  data  154 movement  24, 26, 28, 143, 163, 171, 173–​4, 177, 195, 200, 202, 204 Open Government Index  16, 155 Open Government Partnership (OGP)  7, 23, 96, 99, 148–​152, 150, 154, 167, 202 Ottoman (empire)  6, 60, 179

P Painter, M.  11, 61, 178 Pal, L.  8, 12, 20, 55, 57–​8, 60, 205, 207n1 Parks, B.  17–​18, 54, 107, 118 participation  34–5, 38, 39, 50, 52–​3, 58, 70, 96, 143–​7, 149, 150, 165, 167–​8, 173, 177, 180, 190, 192, 194, 197, 200–​2, 204 perceived importance  96, 168, 172 performance indicators  form of globalization  3–​4, 15–​17, 177 impact of  19–​20, 37–​8, 75–​7, 92, 94, 101 influence of  75, 77, 104, 199, 208 internalization of  34–​5, 75, 78, 208 methodology  38, 79, 84, 106n2 perceived importance of  94, 96–​7 transmission channel  14–​16, 75, 177, 189, 197 Peters, B.G.  10, 11, 14, 30, 61 policy advice  20–​2, 26, 28, 30, 36, 38, 71, 105, 118, 140, 146, 195, 199 politicization  43, 63, 66, 68–​9, 103, 141 de-​politicization  11 politico–​administrative relations  5, 10, 14, 19, 23, 26–​7, 38, 61, 71, 105, 108, 124, 130–​1, 136, 138–​42, 170–​1, 190, 195, 199 Pritchett, L.  11 professionalization  5, 25, 27, 32, 38, 108, 136, 138, 140–​1, 179, 181, 195, 204–​5 public  public consultation  146, 166, 167 public interest  43, 84, 90, 98, 104, 129, 131, 157, 161, 165, 180, 192, 196, 204, 207n7 public participation  15, 34, 35, 39, 50, 144, 147, 149, 167, 197 public value  24, 31, 144, 160, 168, 174, 200 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) programme assessments  17 Public Financial Management (PFM)  16, 55, 58 R Raadschelders, J.  5, 8, 10, 28, 118, 177, 206 ranking  16–​19, 23, 37, 50, 58, 60, 75–​8, 79, 80–​4, 81–​3, 86, 87, 88–​9, 91–​3, 95–​8, 102–​3, 105, 122, 152, 173, 192 rating  16–​19, 27–​8, 76–​8, 79, 81, 83–​4, 98, 102, 105, 124, 152, 197 response strategy  90 Rule of Law  10, 65, 146, 155, 157, 159, 201 S Schomaker, R.  12, 41, 60, 62, 70 scorecard diplomacy  17–​18, 76–​7

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self-​image  172, 190, 192–​3, 205–​6 senior civil servants  8, 10, 18, 30–​1, 33, 36, 43, 75, 93, 101–​2, 118, 170, 185–​6, 189, 196, 200, 201, 205 Simmons, B.  14, 17–​18, 35, 77, 87 social contract  6–​7, 41, 44, 49, 65–​6 socialization  deep  12, 13, 32 type I  12, 13, 30, 32, 182–​3, 201, 203 type II  12, 13, 32, 182–​3, 201 sovereignty  9, 44, 63, 104, 131 State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)  45, 52, 61, 67 Stone, D.  12, 39n1, 178 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)  21, 22 T technical assistance  77, 103, 121, 125, 127, 128, 129, 133, 146, 151 transmission channels  4, 9, 13, 14–​17, 20, 23, 25–7, 46, 60, 61, 75, 142, 169, 172, 177, 189, 194, 195, 197, 198 transnational actors  4, 6–​7, 12–​13, 16, 21, 23, 36, 42, 66, 69, 71–​2, 111, 130, 144, 178, 181, 183, 191, 195, 202–​4 transnational organizations  3–​4, 7, 14–​15, 17–​18, 20, 26, 28, 39, 107–​8, 144, 147, 163, 200 transnational pressure  87 transparency  in decision making  24 enhancing  26, 105, 145–​6, 148, 195, 199 principle of  148, 155–​6, 159 push for  23, 97, 131, 134, 146, 163, 185 reducing  64 shift towards  143, 147, 160–​1 Transparency International (TI)  17, 23, 78, 79, 147 transparency and openness  23–​4, 69, 144, 155–​6, 203 as a value  27, 69, 139, 159, 165, 201 typology (also response typology)  9, 13, 14, 25, 66, 68, 88–​9, 91, 103, 108, 124, 128–​9, 131, 135, 139–40, 144, 159, 162, 177–8, 181, 187, 191, 193–​4, 197, 204, 206 typology of civil servants  engaged  13, 14, 88, 90, 92, 102–​3, 125, 126, 129, 131, 133, 136, 155–​6, 157–​8, 159, 180, 182–​3, 186, 191, 194, 195, 197, 197–​201, 204–​5

professional  13, 88, 90, 91, 125, 126, 127–​9, 133, 155, 157–​8, 159, 180, 182–​3, 194–​7, 197, 201, 204 rebel  13, 14, 88, 90, 92–​3, 125, 126, 128, 131, 133, 156, 157–​8, 159–​160, 162, 181, 182–​3, 191, 194–​5, 197, 198–​201, 204 traditionalist  13, 88–9, 90, 92, 103, 125, 126, 127, 131, 133, 135, 155, 157–​8, 163, 165, 169, 180, 194, 197, 197–​201, 204 U United Nations (UN)  21, 54, 123, 124, 145–​6, 148 United Nations Child Emergency Fund (UNICEF)  22, 123 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)  145–​6, 151 United Nations Development Program (UNDP)  18, 21–​2, 123, 145–​6, 152 V vignette  construction  31–​3, 35–​6, 188 insights  187–​9 validation  33–​4, 188 Vignette 1  34, 35, 124, 125, 126, 135, 139, 185, 192, 197 Vignette 2  34, 35, 87, 87–​9, 90, 91–​3, 97–​8, 104, 161, 185, 192 Vignette 3  34, 35, 144, 154–​6, 156, 157–​8, 162–​3, 170, 189, 192, 197, 203, 207n7 Vignette 4  34, 35, 131, 132, 133, 139–​40, 144, 165, 166, 197 W Washington Consensus  55, 107 Welch, E.  4–​5, 8–​9, 15–​16, 20, 28, 169, 187, 193–​4, 206 Wong, W.  4–​5, 8–​9, 15–​16, 20, 28, 169, 187, 193–​4, 206 World Bank  engagement by  57–​8, 116 influence of  123 level of interaction  22, 147 loans  55, 110 loss of expertise  66 as a partner  7, 117, 122 role of  20, 56, 123, 146 study  94 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)  18 World Health Organization (WHO)  109 World Trade Organization (WTO)  47

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“There has been far too little attention paid to the civil service in the MENA countries, and this volume provides an interesting and important perspective on the changing nature of public administration in this region. It is necessary reading for anyone seeking to understand governance there.” B. Guy Peters, University of Pittsburgh Tony Verheijen is Operations Manager for Afghanistan, South Asia Region at The World Bank. Katarina Staronova is Associate Professor at the Institute of Public Policy at Comenius University Bratislava. Ibrahim Elghandour is Public Sector Specialist at The World Bank. Anne-Lucie Lefebvre is Resident Representative of The World Bank in Guinea-Bissau.

This volume analyses the impact of globalization on civil service systems across the Middle East and North Africa. A collaboration between practitioners and academic public policy experts, it presents an analytical model to assess how globalization influences civil servants, illustrated by case studies of countries where there has been increased engagement with international actors. It demonstrates how this increased interaction has altered the position of civil servants and traces the shifting patterns of power and accountability between civil servants, politicians and other actors. It is an original and important addition to the debate about globalization’s role in transnational public administration and governance.

Series Editors Kim Moloney Michael W. Bauer and Meng-Hsuan Chou

ISBN 978-1-5292-1574-8

@BrisUniPress BristolUniversityPress bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

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